n . It '/ THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW TREATISE OiN DAMAGES COVERING THE ENTIRE LAW OE DAMAGES BOTH GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY BY JOSEPH A. JOYCE __ AUTHOR OF " JOYCE ON IN8URANC] " 4.ND JOINT \ r I HOR (>F " JOYCE ON ELECT KI< LAW " AM) HOWARD C JOYCE JOINT AUTHOR OF '.puyii i.s ELECTRIC LAW" IN THREE VOLUMES Vol. I. THE BANKS LAW PUBLISHING CO. 21 MURRAY STREET, NEW YORK 1903 :\ T \9( Copyright, 1903, By JOSEPH A. JOYCE AND HOWARD C. JOYCE. DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF Joseph Defendokf Joyce. PREFACE. In writing this treatise the authors have endeavored to pre- sent to the legal profession a work which exhaustively discusses the fundamental principles of the law of damages, not only as to their application in general, hut also particularly in relation to the various subjects. With this purpose in view, definitions are first given, followed by a concise statement of the general principles of liability and damages, after which each and every specific subject, wherein the question of the recovery of dam- ages or the measure thereof has arisen in the courts, is fully and conscienftously discussed and presented and is made thor- ough and complete within itself, thus enabling the court or lawyer to ascertain generally and specifically the entire law of damages. In order, however, to obtain this result, logical ar- rangement has not been sacrificed, but on the contrary has been followed as closely and as exactly as the judgment of the au- thors and the peculiar nature of some of the subjects would permit. It is believed that every subject properly within the law of damages has been examined and treated in these three volumes. Matters which have seemed to the writers to be of peculiar or especial value, have been considered without regard to the fact whether or not the decisions covering them are few or numerous. Inasmuch as actions to recover damages for personal injuries and for the death of a human being have occupied so largely in excess of others the attention of the courts, the authors have given to them the space and prominence which their proper consideration necessitates. The latter subject has also 1 n treated by grouping together as nearly as possible all similar v • vi PREPACK statutory provisions so as to harmonize what otherwise might seem to be inconsistent decisions. The adjudications upon the law of damages in relation to matters of insurance, the law of electricity, marine torts, ship- ping and admiralty, are of so much importance that it has been deemed advisable to exhaustively consider them in addition to other subjects, with a view of meeting the needs of special practitioners. With the intention of affording every possible aid, to those who may find occasion or necessity for using these volumes, official and unofficial reports and series of selected cases have been cited, and the notes and illustrations have been made as full and complete as the space would permit. The authors have in this treatise as in their preceding efforts endeavored to make the work valuable alike to the lawyer who looks for principles and to the one who depends upon cases. The courtesy of the president and faculty of Columbia University in extending to the authors the use of its law library and likewise that of the president and officers of the American Law Library of this city for a like kindness is ac- knowledged with pleasure. Trusting sincerely that this treatise will accomplish the pur- poses intended, it is respectfully submitted to the legal pro- fession. New York City, June, 1903. JOSEPH A. JOYCE. HOWARD C. JOYCE. CONTENTS OF VOLUME I. TITLE I. GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. CHAPTER I. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. 1. Damage defined. § 20. 2. Damages defined. 21. 3. Damages defined — Codes and 22. constitution. 4. Damnum absque injuria de- 23. fined. 24. 5. Measure of damages defined. 25. G. Measure of damages defined —Codes. 20. 7. Civil damages defined. 8. Nominal damages defined. 27. 9. Nominal damages defined — 28. Codes. 10. Constructive damages defined. 29. 11. General damages defined. 12. General damages defined — Code. 30. 13. Special damages defined. 14. Special damages defined — 31. Code. 15. Direct damages defined. 32. 10. Direct damages defined — 33. Codes. 34. 17. Prospective damages defined. 18. Consequential damages de- 35. fined. 36. 19. Consequential damages de- lined — Code. 37, Resulting damages defined. Remote damages defined. Contingent or too remote dam- ages defined — Code. Contingent damages defined. Speculative damages defined. Actual or single damages de- fined. Compensatory damages de- fined. Substantial damages defined. Punitive, vindictive or exem- plary damages defined. Punitive, vindictive or exem- plary damages defined — Codes. Double, treble, triple or in- creased damages defined. Double and single or joint and several damages defined. Additional damages defined. Liquidated damages defined. Liquidated damages defined Codes. Unliquidated damages defined. Temporary or permanent dam- ages defined. Continuing damages defined. vii Vlll TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOL. I. Entire damages defined. I § 40. Reasonable 39. Excessive, inadequate or in- provisions. sufficient damages defined. ' damages — Code CHAPTER II. PARTICULAR TERMS, .MAXIMS AND PHRASES. § 41. Actio non datur non damnifi- CatO. 42. Ad damnum. 43. Ad quod damnum; writ of. 44. •• Damage by the elements." 4.">. Damage feasant. 40. " Damages, costs and ex- penses." 47. Damni injuria? actio. 48. Damnify. 49. Damnum fatale. 50. Damnum infectum. § 51. Damnum rei amissse. 52. Damnum sine injuria esse potest. 53. De minimis non curat lex. 54. Indemnity. 55. Indeterminate and determinate damages. 56. Injuria sine damno. 57. Inquiry of damages; writ of. 58. Proximate damages. 59. " Sound in damages." TITLE II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY AND DAMAGES. CHAPTER III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. § 60. General statement — Distinc- tion between damage and damages, liability and meas- ure of damages. Damages generally. Fundamental law — Ubi jus ibi remedium. 63. Same subject — Violation of statutory duty. There must be a breach of some legal duty. Same subject — Governmental, judicial, discretionary and police duties and powers — Liability. 61. 62. 64. 65. § 06. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 73. 74. Moral obligations, duties and wrongs. Lawful acts. Volenti non fit injuria. Accident or casualty. Act of God — Inevitable acci- dent. Damnum absque injuria — Gen- erally. Same subject — Application of the doctrine continued. De minimis non curat lex. Injuria sine damno. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOL. I. CHAPTER IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. 75. Certainly as ;i requisite. 7ti. Nominal damages — Generally. 77. Nominal damages — Breach of contract. 78. Nominal damages only, unless substantial damage proved. 79. Nominal damages — New trial and reversal. 80. General damages. 81. Special damages. 82. Direct damages. 83. Consequential damages. 84. Proximate cause. 85. Proximate cause continued. 86. Proximate cause for jury. 87. Natural and proximate result of act complained of. 88. Proximate consequences illus- trated. 89. Natural and probable conse- quences — Those in contem- plation of parties — Con- tracts. 90. Natural and probable conse- quences — Torts. 91. Remote, contingent and spec- ulative damages. 92. Application of rule as to remote or speculative dam- ages. § 98. Same subject continued. '.»4. Actual, compensatory and substantial damages. 95. Double, triple <>r treble, "i other increased damages. 96. Same subject — How fixed. i'T. Liquidated damages — Pen- alty. 98. Unliquidated damages. 99. Continuing damage and dam- ages — Entirety of damages. 100. Excessive or unreasonable damages. 101. Same subject continued. 102. Voluntarily remitting excess — Remittitur by court. 103. Where excess is small. 104. Evidence as a factor. 105. Two or more excessive ver- dicts. 10t>. In excess of amount claimed or of ad damnum clause. 107. Inadequate damages. 108. Excessive and inadequate damages — Power of court:. 109. Excessive and inadequate damages — Trial court. 110. Jury and instructions — Gen- erally. CHAPTER V. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. § 111. Exemplary damages gener- § 115. Not as punishment but as ally. 112. Are in nature of punishment. 113. Are in nature of punishment — Continued. 114. Where act punishable or pun- ished criminally. compensation. 116. Doctrine of exemplary dam- ages denied. 1 17. Same Bubject conl inued. 118. Plaintiff UOt entitled to as matter of right. PARLE OF CONTENTS OF VOL. I. 119. Elements necessary to justify. L20, Wanton or malicious act. 121. Malice sufficient to justify. l-_'2. Gross negligence. VS.). Actual damage should be shown. 124. Actions allowed in. 125. Instances when allowed. 126. Interference with exercise of personal rights. L27. Instances when not allowed. 128. In action on bond. 1J'.». State may fix amount. 130. Where two or more defend- ants. 131. Against persons under legal disability. 132. Effect of death of wrongdoer. 133. Mitigation of damages. 134. Act done in exercise of a sup- posed right. 135. Against corporations — Ac- cepted rule. § 136. Decisions holding ratification or authorization of act nec- essary. 137. Same subject — Particular de- cisions. 138. Same subject — Illustrations. 139. Decisions holding ratification or authorization of act un- necessary. 140. Same subject — Particular de- cisions. 141. Same subject — Illustrations. 142. Against municipal corpora- tions. 143. Evidence as to motives. 144. Evidence as to financial con- dition of defendant. 145. Amount, matter of discretion with jury. 146. Instructions as to exemplary damages. CHAPTER VI. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. § 147. Generally. § 159. 1 18. Negligence defined. 160. 149. Ordinary care. 150. Presumption of negligence. 161. 151. Burden of proof — Negli- gence. 162. 152. Negligence — For jury. 1.',:;. " Inevitable accident" — " Act of God." 154. " Inevitable accident " — " Un- avoidable accident." 163. 155. Inevitable or unavoidable ac- cident—Illustrations. 164 156. Avoidable accident. 157. Avoidable accident — Illustra- tions. 165 158. Duty to use ordinary care to avoid consequence of an- other's negligence. 166 Gross negligence. Wilful injury— Wanton negli- gence. Contributory negligence— De- fense to action. Contributory negligence as defense not affected by stat- ute, giving right of action for death. Negligence — Open and visible defects — Contributory neg- ligence. Wilful injury — Contributory negligence no defense. Contributory negligence — Burden of proof. Contributory negligence — Burden of proof — Con- tinued. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF Vol.. I. XI § 167. Contributory negligence — Burden of proof— Conclu- sion. 168. Doctrine of comparative negli- gence. 169. Error <>f judgment — Sudden emergency — Contributory negligence. 170. Error of judgment— Sudden emergency— Neglige nee. 171. Contributory negligence Stop, look and listen. 172. Imputed negligence. 173. Imputed negligence — Cases generally. § 174. [raputed negligence- Sua band and wife. 17"). Contributory negligence of parent us affecting recovery for injury to child — Recov- ery by parent. 170. Contributory negligence of parent as affecting n very for injury to child Recov- ery by child. 177. Contributory negligence — Degree of care required of children. TITLE III. WRONGS AFFECTING BIGHTS OF PERSONS. CHAPTER VII. physical i n.i n: iks. § 178. Physical injuries— Substan- tial and nominal damages — Generally. 179. Damages flowing from negli- gent act though not con- templated. 180. Disfigurement of person. 181. Inconvenience. 182. Prospects of marriage im- paired. 183. Miscarriage — Loss of pro- spective offspring— Wheth- er damages recoverable for. Miscarriage — Loss of pro- spective offspring — Wheth- er damages recoverable for — Conl inued. Miscarriage — Loss of pro- spective offspring— Wheth- er damages recoverable for — Conclusion. 186. Exemplary damages. 184. 185. IsT. Exemplary damages contin- ued. 188. Exemplary damages— Physi- cal injuries occasioned by animals. 189. Exemplary damages - Mal- practice. 190. Exemplary damages— Placing cantharides in wine. 191. Direct results of injury -De- fect in highway Statute —What included— Massa- chusetts. 192. Interest not recoverable. 193. Mitigation of damages. 194. Duty of injured person to minimize damages Medi- cal assistance lft."). Same subject continued. 196. Duty of injured person to submit to surgical opera- tion. Xll TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOL. T. 197. Effect of plaintiff's death. 198. Release of claims for personal injuries — Generally. 199. Release when induced by fraud no bar. 200. Same subject continued. 201. Setting aside' of release— Re- turn of consideration not necessary. 202. Release limited to injuries specifically mentioned. 20:*.. Release by railroad employee — Acceptance of benefits of relief association. 204. Recovery of special damages — Pleadings. 205. Amendment of complaint- Increased damages. 206. Instructions— Generally. § 207. Amount of recovery — Instruc- tions as to. 208. "Such sum as will compen- sate " — " Fair and just com- pensation " — "Fair and reasonable compensation" — Instructions. 209. Instructions — Measure of damages — Miscellaneous. 210. New trial based on change of experts' opinions. 211. Inadequate damages— Gener- ally. 212. Excessive damages. 213. Excessive damages — Remit- titur of part of judgment. 214. Excessive damages — Review of question as to amount. CHAPTER VIII. PAIN AND SUFFERING — MENTAL SUFFERING. § 215. Pain and suffering — Physical injury. 216. Pain and suffering— Evidence as to. 217. Pain and suffering— Effect of prior injury or disease. 218. Mental suffering— Physical in- jury. 219. Same subject continued. 220. Fright — not result of physical injury. 221. Fright— Physical injury re- sulting from. § 222. Same subject continued. 223. Mental suffering — Fear of con- sequences of injury — Rite of dog. 224. Mental suffering of injured person — Disfigurement. 225. Mental suffering — Action by husband for injury to wife — parent and child. 226. Mental suffering— Pleading- Evidence. CHAPTER IX. LOSS OF TIME, EARNINGS AND IMPAIRED EARNING CAPACITY. 227. Loss of time— Earnings — Di- minished capacity to labor. 228. Loss of time — Earnings — Evi- dence of must be given. § 229. Evidence — Loss of time — Earnings and diminished ability. 230. Same subject continued. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOL. I. xni § 231. Loss of time — Earnings — Not recoverable where wages are paid — Evidence. 232. Prospect of increased earn- ings. 233. Loss of time — Business. 2:)4. Loss of time— Partners — Evi- dence. •_':'»•"). Loss of profits. 236. Loss of time — Earnings — Pro- fessional men. 237. Loss of time — Earnings — Can- vasser or travelling sales- man on percentage basis. 238. Loss of time — Earnings — Ped- dler. § 239. Total or partial incapacity English workmen's act — Construct ion of. 240. Loss of time, earnings, etc., — Pleading of as special damages. 241. Loss of time, earnings, eb Recovery for and evidence admissible under general allegations. 242. Loss of time, earnings, etc., Recovery for and evidence admissible under general allegations — Continued. CHAPTER X. PERMANENT INJURIES — PROSPECTIVE LOSS. § 243. Permanent injuries — Prospec- tive loss — Generally. 244. Prospective loss — Must be reasonably certain. 245. Same subject continued. 246. Prospective loss — Permanent injuries — Must be evidence as to. 247. Permanent injury or disabil- ity may be inferred. § 248. Prospective loss — Permanent injury — Mode of assessing damages for. 249. Prospective loss — Permanent injury — Mode of assessing damages for — Continued. 250. Past and prospective loss — Recovery for in one action. CHAPTER XI. EXPENSES — PHYSICIAL INJURIES. § 251. Expenses of treating injury — Generally. 252. Expenses of treating injury — Evidence as to, necessary. 253. Evidence as to expenses in ac- tion by married woman. 254. Surgical and medical treat- ment — Medicines and drugs. 255. Medical expenses — Payment for, not prerequisite to re- covery. 256. Expenses for nursing. § 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 202. Services of physician— Evi- dence of payment or value of — Whether necessary. Same subject continued. Same subject — Conclusion. Expenses in the future — Re- covery of. Expense for work of substi- tute in place of injured per- son. Expense of repairing wagon. XIV TABLE 01 CONTENTS OF VOL. I. CHAPTER XII. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. § 263. Evidence as to plaintiff's con- dition in life. 264. Same subject continued. 265. Evidence as to defendant's condition in life. 266. Evidence as to character of plaintiff — Chastity of fe- male. 267. Evidence as to expectancy of life — Mortality tables. 268. Same subject continued. 269. Same subject continued — Cases. 270. Presumption against serious- ness of injury — Evidence to rebut. 271. Admission in evidence of dep- osition charging attempt to make injuries appear worse, erroneou s — Case . 272. Action against city — Judg- ment roll conclusive in ac- tion on bond. 273. Exemplary damages — Evi- dence in mitigation of. 274. Expert and opinion evidence — Future consequences of physical injuries. 275. Same subject continued. 276. Expert evidence not admissi- ble as to speculative or pos- sible future consequences. 277. Same subject continued. 278. Evidence of physician based on examination of injured person as to his condition. § 279. Expert evidence based on statements of injured per- son. 280. Expert and opinion evidence — Appearance and condi- tion before and after injury. 281. Expert evidence as to cause of condition. 282. Same subject continued. 283. Expert evidence — Ordinary results from injury of like character. 284. Expert and opinion evidence — Malpractice — Cases. 285. Opinions as to amount of dam- ages — Elements of damages. 286. Evidence as to feigning — Per- sonal injuries. 287. Hypothetical questions. 288. Expert and opinion evidence — Cases generally. 289. Same subject continued. 290. Statements and complaints of injured person. 291. Same subject continued. 292. Same subject concluded. 293. Physical examination of in- jured person. 294. Same subject continued. 295. Physical examination of plain- tiff— New York. 296. Same subject continued. 297. Exhibiting injuries to jury. 298. Evidence admissible under pleadings — Cases. 299. Same subject continued. CHAPTER XIII. PARENT AND CHILD — PHYSICAL INJURY. § 300. Recovery by parent — Loss of services of minor child. § 301. Judgment for parent in be- half of child not bar to ac- tion for loss of services. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOL. I. § 302. Action by widow for loss <>t services of minor child. 30:5. Recovery by parent— Loss of services — Minor in employ of another. 304. Statute as to employee not applicable to parent. 305. Injury to child — Parent's re- covery for expenses, nurs- ing, etc. 306. Injury to child— Parents re- covery for future expenses. 307. Evidence as to parent's con- dition in life. § 308. 1 'hild en venti e Ba m< re I damages for injury to. 309. Pain and Buffering Minors. 310. Expenses Keens cry ol by minor. 311. Loss of time -Diminished earning capacity Aiinoi . 312. Prospective loss -Permanent injury Minor. 313. No recovery by minor for in- juries to mother. 3] 1. Recovery by minor for loss of wages in past. 315. Negligence of parent. CHAPTER XIV. HUSBAND AND WIPE— PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 31f>. Husband's recovery for loss of services and society of wife — Loss of earnings. 317. Husband cannot recover for wife's suffering. 318. Loss of time— Married woman. 319. Same subject continued. 320. Wife's right to recover not precluded by husband's right. 321. Sale of laudanum to mar- ried woman — Recovery by husband for loss of services — Case. § 322. Injury to wife -Expenses for medical treatment recover- able by husband. 323. Recovery for services of husband in nursing injured wife. 324. Recovery for services of daughter as nurse. 325. Expenses — Recovery <>f by married woman. 326. Pain and suffering— Married woman. CHAPTER XV. ACTIONS r.V PASSENGERS. § 327. Actions by passengers may be in contract or tort. 328. Physical injuries — Passengers — Generally. 329. Permanent physical injuries — Passengers — Cases. 330. Passenger injured alighting from car. § 331. Passenger injured— Lex loci contractus— Statutory limi- tation as to recovery. 332. Exemplary damages. 333. Exemplary damages— As- sault son passengers. XVI DABLB OF CONTENTS OF VOL. I. g 534. Exemplary damages— Failure or refusal to transport pas- senger. 335. Same Bubject continued. 336. Penalty statute Failure to transport and discharge pas- sengers at destination — ■• Legal or just excuse." 337. Wrongful ejection from train. Wrongful ejection from train — Continued. 339. Wrongful ejection from train — Concluded. 340. Exemplary damages— Ejec- tion of passenger. 341. Exemplary damages— Ejec- tion of passenger — Unnec- essary force or violence. 342. Exemplary damages — Ejec- tion of passenger — When not recoverable. 343. Exemplary damages— Ejec- tion of passenger — Cases. 344. Passenger left at wrong sta- tion. 345. Duty to minimize damages — Ejection of passenger. 346. Passenger carried beyond des- tination. 347. Passenger carried beyond des- tination — Continued. § 348. Exemplary damages — Passen- ger carried beyond destina- tion. 349. Passenger — Illness due to ex- posure — Walking to desti- nation. 350. Same subject — Conclusion. 351. Passenger — Injury to health by exposure. 352. Fright in connection with phy- sical injury — Expulsion of passenger. 353. Mental suffering, etc. — Pas- senger carried beyond des- tination. 354. Mental suffering — Injury to feelings, etc. — Ejection of passenger. 355. Mental suffering — Passengers — Cases generally. 356. Failure to give passenger proper accommodations. 357. Injury or insult by third per- sons to passenger. 358. Wrongful charge of fare — Taking up tickets, etc. 359. Stipulations exempting car- rier from liability. 360. Statutory exemption from lia- bility — Passengers riding on platforms of cars. CHAPTER XVI. ASSAULT AND BATTERY. § 361. Assault and battery — Gener- ally. 362. Elements of damages recover- able. 363. Loss of time — Evidence. 364. Mental suffering. 365. Assault on pregnant woman. 366. Action by married woman. 367. Assault unintentionally com- mitted. 368. Matters in aggravation. § 369. Exemplary damages — When recoverable. Same subject continued. Exemplary damages — When not recoverable. Exemplary damages — Effect of criminal prosecution on allowance of. Same subject continued. Evidence as to defendant's wealth. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF Vol-. I. XVII § 375. Mitigation of damages— Gen- erally. 376. Same subject continued. 377. Words in mitigation. § 378. Pleading. 379. Evidence generally. 380. Whether verdicts excessive tor various injuries. CHAPTER XVII. LI P. EL AM) SLANDER. § 381. Words actionable per se. 382. Evidence showing malice. 383. Privileged communications — Whole communication aot privileged because parts are, if one part alone action- able per se. 384. Nominal damages. 385. Measure of damages — Com- 401. pensatory. 402. 386. Measure of damages generally — In discretion of jury — Ex- cessive verdicts. 387. Injury to feelings — Mental suffering. 04, 388. Expenses — Counsel fees. 389. Libelous article concerning 405. member of legislature — 406. Official investigation of charges — Expenses — Loss 407. of time and labor — Case. 390. Injury to reputation. 391. Injury to business — Loss of employment — Special dam- ages. 409. 392. Charge of incapacity in pro- fession — Allegation of spe- cial damage not necessary. 393. Special damages — Pleading. 394. Special damages— Pleading — 411 Continued. 412. 395. Special damages — Action by husband for slander of wife. 396. Facts tending to enlarge the scope of a libel should be 414. pleaded. 397. Exemplary damages— Malice. y 2 Exemplary damages may be awarded though actual damages nominal. Exemplary damages — Two defendants. Plea of truth as justification — When damages aggra- vated thereby. Same subject continued. Exemplary damages — Malice — Reckless or wanton con- duct. Same subject — Newspaper publications. Evidence of prior statements of like import — Reiteration. Repetition after recovery. Evidence — Social standing and wealth of defendant. Exemplary damages — Several defendants — Malice of one not imputed to others. Exemplary damages — Slander by wife. Exemplary damages — Tele- graph company — Libelous message. Exemplary damages as af- fected by statute. Justification. Mitigation of damages — Gen- erally. Evidence of good faith in mitigation — Absence of malice. Same Bubject continued. Evidence that defamatory matter was common rumor. XV111 TABLE OF CONTENTS OE VOL. I. 416. Source of imformation— Au- thority of others — News agency — Copied from news- papers. 417. Same subject continued. 418. Provocation in mitigation. 419. Same subject— When insuffi- cient. 420. Retraction in mitigation. 421. Exemplary damages — How affected by rules of absent proprietor of newspaper as to investigation. 422. Evidence as to bad character and reputation of plain- tiff. § 123. Evidence as to bad character and reputation of plaintiff — Continued. 424. Allegation of two libelous charges — Only one sub- mitted to jury — Proof of the other in mitigation. 425. Evidence in behalf of plain- tiff as to his social position — Reputation — Financial condition. 426. Evidence to show sense in which words were .spoken — To whom applicable. 427. Actions against mercantile agencies. 428. Slander of title. CHAPTER XVIII. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. 429. -Gen- Malicious prosecution erally. Malice and want of probable cause must both exist. 431. Malice — What amounts to— May be inferred. Probable cause— What is. Conviction in criminal prose- cution — Evidence of proba- ble cause. Probable cause — Burden of proof — Evidence. Acquittal in criminal prose- cution — Evidence of want of probable cause. 436. Measure of damages — Gener- ally. 437. Measure of damages — Gener- ally — Continued. 430. 432. 433. 434. 435. § 438. Mental suffering. 439. Evidence in mitigation of damages. 440. Advice of attorney. 441. Advice of prosecuting attor- ney, magistrate, etc. 442. Exemplary damages. 443. Wealth of defendant— Evi- dence — Genei-ally. 444. Malicious prosecution of civil suit — Attachment. 445. Malicious attachment — Where business unlawful no re- covery for injury to. 446. Maliciously causing person to lose employment. 447. Pleading. CHAPTER XIX. FALSE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT. § 448. False arrest and imprison- 1 § 450. Measure of damages— Gener- ment — Measure of damages, . ally — Excessive damages. 449. Same subject continued. 451. Mental suffering. TABLE OP CONTENT8 OF VOL. I. XIX 162. Punitive damages. 453. Same subject continued. 454. Mitigation of— Continued. § 455. Evidence — Generally. 45ii. Pleading. CHAPTER XX. ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS — CRIMINAL CONVERSATION. § 457. Alienation of affections — Criminal conversation — Measure of damages for. 458. Etfghl of wife to recover for alienation of affections of husband. § 459. Exemplary damages. 460. Evidence in mitigation. 461. Advice by parent to son to leave wife. 462. Evidence — Generally. 463. Pleading. CHAPTER XXI. SEDUCTION. § 464. Seduction — Action by woman to recover for. 465. Seduction — Abortion by phy- sician — Liable for entire damages — Case. 466. Action by woman — Mitigation of damages. 467. Action by parent. 468. Action by parent — Mitigation of damages. 469. Action by parent — Barred by marriage subsequent to so- duction and before confine- ment. TITLE IV. CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. CHAPTER XXII. CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. § 470. Civil damage acts — Who may sue. 471. Measure and elements of dam- ages — Generally. 472. Death. 473. Loss of support. 474. Injury to feelings — Mental suffering. § 175. Exemplary damages — Gener- ally. 476. Exemplary damages General rule. 477. Sale by employee without de- fendant's knowledge no de- fense Exemplary damages — Mitigation of. XX I'AI'.l.i: OF ((> NTH NTS OF VOL. I. § 178. Evidence affecting damages — Generally. 17'.'. Evidence showing unlawful Bale. 480. Sales by two or more persons — Recovery in case of. 481. Plaintiff's knowledge and con- sent to sale may be de- fense. § 482. Release of damages by wife no defense to action by children. 483. Pleading. 484. Civil rights acts — Damages and penalties. TITLE V. DAMAGES FOR CAUSING DEATH. CHAPTER XXIII. DAMAGES FOR CAUSING DEATH — GENERALLY. § 485. Death by wrongful act, etc. — Preliminary remarks. 486. Actio personalis moritur cum persona. 487. Actio personalis — Continued — Tort or contract — Election of remedies. 488. Actio personalis — Tort or contract — Election of rem- edies — Continued. 489. Same subject continued. 490. Death — Abatement or survi- val — Rights of action — Statutes — Generally. 491. Death — Effect of subsequent statute — Survival. 492. Death before or after judg- ment, verdict, etc. 493. Death of wrongdoer — Com- mon law and statutes. 494. Death of wrongdoer — Con- tinued — Abatement and survival of actions. 49o. Death — Civil action — Remedy purely statutory. 496. Nature of statutory remedy for losses by death or where death ensues— Generally. 497. Nature of statutory remedy — Continued — Decisions, etc. 498. Nature of statutory remedy — Continued — Whether rem- edy new and independent. 499. Nature of statutory remedy — Whether same is new and independent — Continued. 500. Same subject — Conclusion. 501. Construction of statutes — General principles. 502. Construction of statutes, etc. — Survival and death loss. 503. Construction of survival and death loss statutes, etc.— Continued. 504. Death— Conflict of laws— Ex- traterritorial jurisdiction — Foreign administrator — Federal jurisdiction. 505. Same subject continued. 506. Death — Conflict of laws — Lex loci — Lex fori. 507. Death — Conflict of laws — Foreign administrator — Party in interest — Federal jurisdiction — Opinions in recent decisions. TABLE OF CONTENT8 OF \<>L. I. XXI §508. Death— Conflict of laws- § 509. Death— Conflict of laws— Ex- Foreign administrator — Ex traterritorial jurisdiction Where action does not lie — Federal jurisdiction. tratei ritorial jorisdii I Federal jurisdiction Mexi- can laws. CHAPTER XXIV. DEATH — RECOVERY AND DAMAGES— GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RULES. § 510. Death— Measure of damages— Generally. 511. Same subject continued. 512. Deiith— Measure of damages — Age as a factor — Gener- ally. 513. Death— Measure of damages — Mental and physical abil- ity, health, strength, etc., as factors — Generally. 514. Death of children— Damages — Age, sex, mental and physical ability, health, strength, etc. — Generally. 515. Beneficiaries —Widow — Loss of support. 516. Beneficiaries — Widow — Fi- nancial condition of de- ceased husband — Increase § 517. 518. 519. 521 1. 521, of his property — Dower — Settlement on widow. Beneficiaries Widow and children — Number, ages, sex, dependency and sup- port — Financial and phys- ical condition — Expendi- tures and financial condi- tion of deceased — Gener- ally. Death — Pecuniary loss or in- jury — The statutes — Gener- ally. Death — pecuniary loss as measure of damages. Death— Pecuniary loss or damage — Construed. Same subject continued. CHAPTER XXV. DEATH — DAMAGES PROPORTIONED TO THE INJUR? § 522. Damages injury- 523. Damages injury tinned. 524. Damages injury- 525. Damages injury- Eviden 526. Damages injury- ages. proportioned to the -Statutes. proportioned to the — Statutes — Con- proportioned to the -Pecuniary loss, proportioned to the -Pecuniary loss — ce. proportioned to the -Exemplary dam- 527. Damages proportioned to the injury — .Jury aud instruc- tions to jury. 528. Damages proportioned to the injury — Factors generally to be considered. 529. Damages proportioned to the injury — Sufferings of in- jured person. 530. Damages proportioned to the injury — Mental aud phy- sical suffering — Loss of society, etc. XX11 TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOL. I. $ 531. Damages proportioned to the] injury — Relationship legal and actual of deceased to beneficiaries— Support and dependency. 532. Same subject continued. 533. Same subject concluded. 534. Damages proportioned to the injury — Contract relation. 535. Damages proportioned to the injury — Reasonable expec- tation of pecuniary benefit. 536. Same subject continued. 537. Damages proportioned to the injury — Physical and finan- cial condition, age, number of family, etc., of benefici- aries. 538. Damages proportioned to the injury — Expenses of sick- ness, funeral, etc. 539. Damages proportioned to the injury — Annuity. 540. Damages proportioned to the injury — Life expectancy — Annuity, etc., tables. 541. Damages proportioned to the injury — Nominal dam- ages. 542. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of husband — Husband and father. 543. Damages proportioned to the injury— Death of wife. 544. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of parent. 545. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of parent — Care, training, etc., of chil- dren. § 546. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of parent — Children's majority. 547. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of children — Generally. 548. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of minor children. 549. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of children — Minority and majority. 550. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of children — Adults. 551. Damages proportioned to the injury — Evidence — Gener- ally. 552. Damages proportioned to the injury — Excessive and in- adequate damages — Gener- ally. 553. Damages proportioned to the injury — Evidence of de- ceased's habits— Mitiga- tion. 554. Damages proportioned to the injury — Insurance. 555. Damages proportioned to the injury — Legacy, devise or inheritance. 550. Damages proportioned to the injury — Marriage and re- marriage. 557. Damages proportioned to the injury — Defenses — Pre- scribing medicine for own family. 558. Damages proportioned to the injury — Self-defense — justi- fication. CHAPTER XXVI. DEATH — "FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE PECUN- IARY INJURY." § 559. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Statutes and constitu- tion — Generally. TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOL. • • XX1U § 560. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Pecuniary loss only. 561. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Nature of action and proof of damages- Nomi- nal damages. 562. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Damages for jury— Ex- cessive or inadequate dam- ages. 563. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Factors generally to be considered. 564. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Sufferings of person in- jured not a factor. 565. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Exemplary or vindictive damages. 566. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Solatium — Mental suf- fering not a factor. 567. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury 11 — Loss of society of de- ceased. 568. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" . — Relationship legal and actual of deceased to bene- liciaries. 569. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Legal duty or obligation of deceased — Legal right of beneficiaries — Support and assistance, depend- ency. 570. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit — Prospective damages. § 571. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Prospect of inheriting. 572. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniar]! injury M —Physical and financial condition, age, number uf family, etc. — When admis- sible. .".7:;. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Physical and financial condition, age, number of family, etc. — When inad- missible. ,Y74. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Financial advantages accruing from death inad- missible to reduce dam- ages. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury 11 — Probable accumula- tions. 11 Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Funeral expenses and expenses for sickness, etc. 577. " Fail and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Funeral and medical ex- penses, support, etc., paid by defendant— Mitigation of damages. 578. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " —Life expectancy— Mor- tality tahles. 579. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Death of husband. 580. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of wife — Death of wife and mother. 581. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of parent. 575, 57i XXIV TABLK OF CONTENTS OF VOL. I. 582. •• Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Support, care, etc., of children. 583. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of parent — Dam- ages not limited to chil- dren's minority. 584. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of children — Gen- erally. 585. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of children — Evi- dential factors relating to children. 586. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of children — Evi- dential factors relating to parents, or next of kin. 587. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of children — De- cisions and opinions. § 588. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Services of minor, cost of support, etc. — Damages not limited to minority. 589. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Nominal damages — Death of infants. 590. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of unborn child. 5.91. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of child — Ex- pense occasioned by mother's sickness. 592. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Collateral kindred — Next of kin. 593. Death — Mitigation of dam- ages — Defenses — Insur- ance. 594. Death — Defense — Provoking difficulty — Liability of sheriff or officer. 595. Death — Allowance of interest. CHAPTER XXVII. DEATH — "FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION WITH REFERENCE TO THE PECUNIARY INJURIES" — "DIRECT DAMAGES" SUSTAINED — FORFEITURE OR FINE — " SUCH SUM AS THE JURY MAY DEEM REASONABLE. 596. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Stat- ute. 597. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Stat- utes — Continued — Gener- ally. 598. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Stat- utes — Continued — Bene- ficiaries, etc. § 599. "Direct damages sustained" — Miners' statute. 600. Forfeiture or fine — Indict- ment — Railroads — Com- mon carriers — Statute. 601. "Such sum as the jury may deem reasonable " — Stat- ute. 602. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- TAI'.I.F OF CONTENTS OF Vol.. I. XXV or cuniary injuries" Pecu- § 610. Diary loss. 603. Same subject continued. 004. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Ex- emplary damages. 605. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Jury and instructions. 600. Same subject — Proper and erroneous instructions — Illustrations. 607. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Fac- tors generally to be consid- ered. 608. Same subject continued — Evidence of wages. 609 "Fair anil just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries 11 — Suffer- ings of person injured. 610. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Sola- tium — Mental suffering, loss of society, etc. 611. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Phy- sical injury to benefici- ary. 612. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Rela- tionship, legal and actual, of deceased to beneficia- ries. 613. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Legal or moral obligation — Le- gal right — Support or de- pendency . 614. Same subject continued. 615. Same subject concluded. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. •• Fair and just compensation with refei i ace to the pe- cuniary injuries " 1;,- i sonable expectation of pe- cuniary benefit. " Fair and jus) compensation with refei ence to the pe- cuniary injuries'' —Phy- sical and financial condi- tion — Age and number of beneficiaries. Same subject continued. Same subject continued. Same subject— Conclusion. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " Wealth of defendant. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Prob- able accumulations. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Ex- penses of sickness, fu- neral, etc. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Life expectancy — Mortality tables. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries "—Nomi- nal damages. Same subject continued. •■ Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Death Of husband Husband and father. Same subject- Annuity — Dower, etc. — Instruction and opinion of court. '• Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" Death of wife. XXVI TABLE OF CONTENTS OF VOL. I. § 630. Same Bubject continued — Married woman's act. 631. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Death of parent. 632. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Train ing, etc., of children — Death of parent. 033. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Death of children. 634. Same subject continued. 635. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Death of children — Minority and majority. § 636. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- • cuniary injuries " — Death of children — Adults. 637. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Collat- eral kindred. 638. Defenses — Mitigation of dam- ages — Insurance. 639. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — De- fenses — Remarriage and marriage. 040. Death — Defenses — Pension to widow and children in mitigation. 641. Damages assessed on affirm- ance of judgment. CHAPTER XXVIII. DEATH — " FAIR AND JUST " DAMAGES " WITH REFERENCE TO THE PECUNIARY INJURY." §642. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Stat- utes — Generally. 643. Same subject continued. 044. Same subject concluded. 645. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniar j' injury " — Pe- cuniary loss. 04*;. Same subject continued. 647. " Fair and just " damages ' ' with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Dam- ages for the jury. 648. " Fair and just " damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Fac- tors generally to be con- sidered. § 649. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Sev- erance of contract rela- tions — Partnership. 650. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Suf- ferings of the person in- jured. 651. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury" — So- latium — Mental suffering. 652. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Re- lationship, legal and ac- tual, of deceased to bene- ficiaries. J A.BLE OF CONTENTS l >F V OL. r. xxvn 654. 655. 656. 657. $663. "Fair and just" damages I •• with reference t" the pecuniary injury"— Le- $ 663. . i .".0 La. Ann. 648), 347. Akersloot v. Second Ave. K. Co. 10 X. Y. St. R. 231), 214. Alabama G. S. R Co. v. Arnold (80 Ala. 600), 84, 122. Alabama (.. S. R. Co. v. Bailey (112 Ala. 167), 215. Alabama, G. & S. H. Co. v. Bu (116 Ala. 509), 175, 514. xxix XXX TABLE OF CASKS CITED TN VOL. I [References are to Sections.] R. Co Alabama <;. S. R. Co. v. Burgess (119 Ala. 555), 209. Alabama <.. S. R. Co. v. Carroll (52 T. s. App. 442), 263. Alabama G.S. R. Co. v. Carroll (84 Fed. 772), 263. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Davis (119 Ala. 572), 252. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Frazier (93 Ala. 45), 139, 145. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Heddleston (82 Ala. 218), 351. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill (90 Ala. 71 ), 293. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill (93 Ala. 514), 135, 180, 186, 187, 215, 248. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Moorer (116 Ala. 642), 64. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Yarbrough (83 Ala. 238), 251. Alabama M. R. Co. v. Griffith (63 Ark. 491), 229. Alabama Mineral R. R. Co. v. Marcus ([Ala.] 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 490), 228. Alabama M. R. Co. v. Marcus (115 Ala. 389), 229. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Carter (77 Miss. 511; 27 So. 993), 64. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Davis (69 Miss. 444), 172. Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Purnell (69 Miss. 652), 335. Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Sellers (93 Ala. 9), 112, 122, 123, 344. Albany v. Sikes (94 Ga. 30), 71. Albert v. Bleecker St. & R. R. Co. (2 Daly [N. Y.], 389), 83. Alberti v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co. (43 Hun[N. Y.], 421), 214. Albertie v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. (118 N. Y. 77), 263, 264,275. Albrecbt v. Walker (73 111. 69), 114. Alcorn v. Mitcbell (63 111. 553), 369, 370. Aldrich v. Concord & M. R. Co. (67 N. II. 380), 84. Aldii.b v. Sager (9 Hun [N. Y.], 537), 471. Alexander v. Blodgett (44 Vt. 476), 364. Alexander v. Humber (86 Ky. 565), 251. Alexander v. Harrison (38 Mo. 258), 440. Alfaro v. Davidson (40 N. Y. Super. [8 J. &S.] 87), 11. Alijandro (56 Fed. 621), 214. All v. Barnwell County (29 S. C. 161), 523. All v. Burnwell Co. ( [S. C] 7 S. E. 58), 503, 523. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital (76 111.441), 308. Allegheny Co. v. Grier (179 Pa. 639), 68. Allegheny, City of, v. Zimmerman (95 Pa. St. 287), 90. Allen v. Ames & C. R. Co. (106 Iowa, 602), 267. Allen v. Atlantic St. R. R. Co. (54 Ga. 503), 514. Allen Co. Commrs. v. Crevistou (133 Ind. 39), 65. Allen v. Conrad (51 Pa. St. 487), 75,76. Allen v. Dillingham (8 C. C. A. 544), 522. Allen v. Manhattan R. Co. (42 N. Y. St. R. 227), 214. Allen v. Manhattan R. Co. (42 N. Y. St. R. 277), 214. Allen v. News Pub. Co. (81 Wis. 120), 397. Allen v. Quann, (80 111. App. 547), 70. Allen v. Queens Co. (84 Hun [N. Y.], 399), 65. Allen v. State Steamship Co. (132 N. Y. 91), 151. Allen v. Steers (30 La. Ann. 586), 94. Allen v. Texas & P. R. Co. ([Tex. Civ. App.] 27 S. W. 943), 176. Allender v. Chic. R. I. & P. R. R. Co., (37 Iowa, 264), 194. Alliance v. Campbell ([C. C] 3 Ohio, Dec. 630), 229. Alliger v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle (2 Silv. S. C. [N. Y.] 5), 420. TABLE 01 ' ASES CITED IN VOL. I. XXXI [References are to Sections.] Alliger v. Mail Printing Ajbbo. (20 \. V. Supp. 763), 402 Ailing v. Ailing (52 N. J. Eq. 92; 27 Atl. 655), 667. Allis v. McLean (48 Mich. 428), 91. Allison v. Chandler (71 Mich. 542), 80, 122, 134, 186. Allison v. Gulf, C. A- S. I'. H. Co. ([Tex. Civ. App.] 29 S. W. 425), 107, 211. Allyn v. Boston R. R. Co. (105 Mass. 77), 165. Alstin v. Huggins (3 Brev. [S. C] 185), 81. Alt v. Grosclose (61 Mo. App. 409 i. 95. Althorf v. Wolf (22 N. V. 355), 193. Althorf v. Wolfe (2 Hilt. [N. Y.J 344), 5(13, 569, 570, 579, 581, 593. Althouse v. Sharpe (13 Wkly. Dig. [X. Y.] 478), 214. Alton Paving B. & F. Brick Co. v. Hudson (74 111. App. 612), 214. Amer. Bldg. & L. Assn. v. Hart (2 Wash. 594), 78. American Express Co. v. Patterson (73Ind. 430), 455. American Exp. Co. v. Risley (77 111. App. 476), 206. American Strawhoard Co. v. Foust ([Ind. App.] 39 N. E. 891), 227. American Sug. Ref. Co. v. Johnson (60 Fed. 503), 503. American .Surety Co. <>f X. Y. v. Woods (106 Fed. 263), 78. American Waterworks Co. v. Dougherty ([Neb.] 55 X. W. 1051), 218. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Goodale (46 Anderson v. Cullen (29 V V. St R. 494 i, 515. Anderson v. Des .Moines St. R, Co. (97 Iowa, 739), L98. Anderson v. Manhattan R. Co. il Misc. [N. V., 504), 214. Anderson v. Miller (96 Tenn. 35), 84. Anderson v. St. Cloud ([Minu.] 81 X. W.746), 65. Anderson v. Taylor (56 Cal. 131), 87. Anderson Foundry & M. Works v. Meyer (15 Ind. App. Andrews v. Hay (reek l:. Co. (60 \. J. L. 610), 71. Andrews v. Chicago, M. & St. P, K. Co. (HG Iowa, 677), 520. Andrews v. Hartford, etc., K. Co. (34 Conn. 57), 199. Andrews v. Stone (10 Minn. 72), 361. Angell v. St. Louis (20 R. I. 391 i. 63. Annas v. Milwaukee A- X. R, R, I o. (67 Wis. 48), 615, 516, 648, 602. 654, 855, 657, 659, 663, 667. Anonymous (21 Misc. [X. Y.] 656), 515. Anthony v. Gilbert (4 Blackf. [Ind.] 348), 111. Antonio, City of. v. Smith ([Tex.] 59 S. W. 1109), 82. Appleby v. Ilorseley Co. No. 1 ( [C. A.] 68 L. J. Q. B. X. S. 2 4 B. 521), 528, 544. Appleton v. Fullerton (1 Gray [Mass.], 186), 62, 74, 7c. Arare v. Idaho Canal Co. ([Id.] 46 Pac. 1024), 67. Archeson v. Western In. Teleg Co. (96 Cal. 641), 78. N. H. 53), 76. Amrhein v. Quaker City Dye Works Aid more Coal Co. v. Bevil (61 Fed. (192 Pa. 253), 99. 757 |, 503, 596. Anderson v. Byrnes (122 Cal. 272), Arkansas M. K. Co. v. Griffith (68 501. Ark. 491 i. 267. 268. Anderson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R, Co. Arlinev. Laurens Co. (77Ga. 24 (35 Xeb. 95), 602, 607,610, 615, 626. Armour v. Czischki (59 111. App. 17). Anderson v. Columbia Finance & I. | 514, 607, 61 1. 635, 686. Co. (20 Ky. L. Rep. 1790), 430,431, j Armstrong v. Percy (6 Wend. [N. Y.] 440. I 535), 46. X X X 1 1 TABLE OF CASKS CITED LN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Armstrong v. Pierson (8 Iowa, 29), 422. Armsworth v. South Eastern Ry. (11 Jur. 758), 522, 524, 540. Arndt v. Bourke ([Mich.] 79 N. W. 190), 264. Arnesen v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co- (9 Misc. [X. Y.] 270,214. Arnold v. Henry Co. (81 Ga. 730), 65. Arnold v. Sayings Co. (70 Mo. A pp. 159), 385, 386, 412. Arnott v. Standard Assoc. (57 Conn. 86), 412. Arrovvood v. South Carolina & G. E. R. Co. (126 N. C. 629), 64. Artusy v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. ([Tex.] 11 S. W. 177), 522. Asbury v. Charlotte Electric Ry. L. & P. Co. ([N. C] 34 S. E. 654), 149. Ash v. Bait. & O. R. Co. (72 Md. 144), 508. Ash v. Marlovv (20 Ohio St. 119), 432. Ash v. Prunier (105 Fed. 722), 462. Ashby v. White (2 Ld. Raym. 953), 62, 76. Ashby v. White (1 Salk. 21), 62. Ashcroft v. Chapman (38 Conn. 230), 261. Asher v. Cabell (2 U. S. App. 158), 522. Asher Lumber Co. v. Lunsford (17 Ky. L. Rep. 559), 104. Ashley Wire Co. v. McFaddiu (66 111. App. 26), 603, 607. Aslew v. Charlotte (35 App. Div. [N. Y.J 62), 214. Assessment & C. of Taxes, In re ([S. D.] 54 N. W. 818), 501. Atchison v. Acheson (9 Kan. App.), 287. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Billings (7 Kan. App. 399), 63. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown (57 Kan. 785), 440. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown (31 Pac. 79), 342. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cham- berlain (4 Okla. 542), 119. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Chance (57 Kan. 40), 285. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Click ([Tex. Civ. App.] 32 S. W. 226), 214, 279. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Con- Ion (7 Kan. App. 549), 226. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cross (58 Kan. 424), 514, 635. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cun- ningham (59 Kan. 722), 199. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dicker- son (4 Kan. App. 345), 338, 354. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Elder (50 111. App. 276), 214. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Henry (55 Kan. 715), 139. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. La- moreux (5 Kan. App. 813), 342. Atchison, T. & S. F. Co. v. Long (5 Kan. App. 644), 340, 343. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Mc- Ginnis (46 Kan. 109), 219, 316, 325. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Midgett ([Kan. App.] 40 Pac. 995), 218. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Xapole ([Kan.] 40 Pac. 669), 499. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Rice (36 Kan. 593), 448. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Rich- ards (58 Kan. 344), 102, 109. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Rowe (56 Kan. 411), 215. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Smith (44 Kan. 4), 434. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Snedeger (5 Kan. App. 700), 285. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Stewart (55 Kan. 667), 135, 214. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Willey (57 Kan. 764), 80, 81, 82. Athens v. Carmer (169 Pa. St. 426), 73. Atkins v. Gamble (42 Cal. 86), 72. Atkins v. Gladwish (25 Neb. 390), 369. Atkins v.Man. R. Co. (57 Hun [N. Y.], 102), 277, 288. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. wxni [References are to Sections.] Atkinson v. Vancleave ([Ind. App.] Auerv. Mauser (6 Pa. Super. CI 57 N. K. 7:11). 443. 430, 131, 132,435. Atl. . B. B. Co. v. (State) Baltimore, etc., Trans. Co. v. Boone Malrowe(63Md. 135), 524, 527, 528, I 15 Bid. 344), 122. 530, 581, .".:;_', :>:;:>. 537, -Ml. Balton v. V. lines cm Va. 398), 152. Baltimore . (95 Tenn. L8), 162, 17.".. Bamford t. Pittsburgh B. Traction Co. ([Pa.] 11 Atl. iocs!, 215. Baltimore * O. R. R. Co. v. (State) Bamka v. Chicago, St. 1'. M. A < >. B Woodward (41 Md. 268), 524, 535, Co. ([Minn.] 63 N. W. 1116), 300, 540, 542. 301. Baltimore & O. S. R. R. Co. v. Slan- | Bank of Commerce v. Coos (39 Neb. ker (180 111. 357), 299. 437), 11, 13, 81, 111, 117. Baltimore & O. S. R. R. Co. v. Slan- , Bank of llopkinville v. Western By. ker (77 111. App. 567), 110. Asylum 1 1 Ky.] 56 S. W. 925 1. 65. Baltimore & O. S. W. Ry. Co. v. Keck j Bangs v. Loveridge (60 Fed. (89 111. App. 72), 309. 507- Baltimore & O. S. W. R. R. Co. v. Bannon v. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. Pletz (61 111. App. 161), 176. (24 Md. 108), 112, 218. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. B. Co. v. Bail.ee v. Reese (60 Miss. 906), 161. Then (159 111. 535), 514, 603, 605, i Barber v. Barber (23 Conn. 335), 406. 607, 616, 635. Baltimore & P. R. R. Co. v. Cumber- land (176 U. S. 232), 64. Baltimore & P. R. R. Co. v. Cumber- land (12 App. [D. C] 598), 514. Baltimore & Rnstertown Twp. v. (State) Crimes (71 Md. 573), 515, 528, 532, 536, 537, 540, 542, 5 1 1, 5 16. Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Baei (90 Md. 97), 193. Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Kemp (61 Md. 619), 329. Baltimore City P. R. Co. v. Cooney (87 Md. 261), 177. Baltimore City P. Ry. Co. v. Kemp (61 Md. 74), 179, 318,351. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Boteler (38 Md. 668), 266. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Breissig (25 Md. 378), 111, 122, 186. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mulli- gan (45 Md. 486), 156. Baltimore, etc., R. B. Co. v. Whit- acre (35 Ohio St. 627), 166. Barbour v. Stephenson ( [Ky.] 32 Fed. 66), 467. Bail. our County v. Horn (48 Ala. 567 I, 142. 263. Barfield v. Southern B. Co. (108 Ga. 744), 63. Barg v. Bonsfield (65 Minn. 355), 21 1. Barker v. Cunard s. S. Co. (91 Hun [N. Y.], 495), 356. Barkerv. Kilbourn (16 Wis. is:, 1. 128. Barker v. l'rizcr ( 150 1ml. I 1. 397, 104. Barkley v. X. V. C. & II. R. R. Co. (35 App. [N. Y.] 22s 1, 274 Barkly v. Copeland (74 Cal. I |, 106. Barksdale v. City of Laurens 1 58 S. C. H3), 65. Barlow v. Louder (85 Ark. 492), 28, 62, 76, 120. Barnard v. Gall (43 La. Ann. 501. Barnard v. Poor (21 Pick. [Mass.] 878), 111, 116. Barnard v. Shirley (151 lad. 160), 71. X \ X V 1 TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IN VOL. [References are to Sections.] Barnes v. Jones (51 Cal. 303), 95. Barnes v. Keene I 132 N. Y. L3), ^64, 300, 305. Barnes v. Martin (15 Wis. 240), 318, 362, 366, 371. Barnes v. Rembarz (150 111. 192), 214. Barnes v. Shreveporl < it y Ry. Co. (47 La. Ann. L218), 176. Barnes v. Ward (2 Car. & K. 661)/523. Barnetl v. Chic. & A. R. Co. (75 Mo. App. 446), 335. Barnett v. Lneas (Ir. R. 6 C. L. 247), 523. Barnett v. Reed (51 Pa. St. 190), 111, 120, 124. Barnowski v. Helson (S9 Mich. 52), 150. Barr v. I'.arr (8 Neb. 68), 369. Barr v. Hack (46 Iowa. 308), 415. Bair v. Kansas City ([Mo.] 25 S. W. 562), 274. Barr v. Moore (87 Pa. St. 385), 114, 372. Barr v. Post (56 Neb. 698), 362, 376, 380. Banc v. Beading B. Co. (155 Pa. St. 170), 164. Barrelle v. Penn. B. R. Co. (4 N. Y. Supp. 127), 292. Barrett v. Delano ([Me.] 14 Atl. 288), 471. Barrett v. Dolan (130 Mass. 366), 472. Barrett v. Lake Ontario Twp. (68 A pp. Div. 601), 163. Barrett v. N. Y. Cent. & II. R. R. R. Co. (61 N. Y. St. R. 9), 214. Barrett v. Railroad Co. (3 Allen [Mass.], 101), 95. Barrie v. Seidel (30 Mo. A pp. 559), 75. Barron v. Illinois C. R. Co. (1 Biss. [U. S.] 412), 602, 603,604, 607, 609, 610, 612, 613, 614, 616, 619, 022, 637, 639. Barron v. Mason (31 Vt. 197), 432. Barrons v. Sycamore (100 111. 588), 81. Barry v. Edmunds (116 U. S. .550), 94, 111. Barth v. Kansas City El. Ry. Co. (142 Mo. 535), 521. Bartlett v. Cicero Light, H. & P. Co. (177 111. 68), 597. Bartlett v. Roach (68 111. 174), 63. Bartley v. Trorlicht (49 Mo. App. 214), 228, 240. Barton v. Brown (145 U. S. 335), 488. Barton v. Springfield (110 Mass. 131), L69. Barton v. Syracuse (37 Barb. [N. Y.] 292, aft'd30 N. Y. 54), 65. Bartram v. Stone (31 Conn. 159), 375, 377. Bass v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. (42 Wis. (154), 136, 340. Bassell v. Elmore (48 N. Y. 561), 393, 404. Bassett v. Bassett (20 111. App. 543), 161. Bates v. British Amer. Assnr. Co. (100 Ga. 249), 104. Batlike v. Krassin ([Minn.] 80 N. W. 950), 458. Battell v. Wallace (30 Fed. 229), 419. Bauer v. Richter (103 AVis. 412), 515. 516, 645, 655, 659, 663. Banman v. Bean (57 Mich. 1), 375. Bay Shore R. Co. v. Harris (67 Ala. 6), 243. Beach v. Bay State Steamboat Co. (6 Abb. [X. Y.] 415), 503. Beach v. Brown (20 Wash. 266), 458. Beach v. Banney (2 Hill [N. Y.], 309), 393. Beal v. South Devon Ry. Co. (3 H. & C. 337), 159. Beale v. Ry. Co. (1 Dill. [U. S.] 569), 135. Beallev. School (1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.] 475), 102. Bearce v. Bass (88 Me. 521), 411. Beard v. Burts (95 U. S. 634), 65. Beard v. Skeldon (113 111. 584), 597, 599. Beard v. Skeldon (13 111. App. 54), 617, 618. TABLE 01 CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] XXXV11 Beardmore v. Carrington (2 Wils. 244), ill. Beardsley v. Mayuard [4 Wend. [N. Y.] 336), 426. Beardsley v. Swann (4 McLean [U. S. C. C], 333), 215, 227. Beardstown v. Smith (150 111. 169), 204. Beasley v. Meigs (1G 111. 139), 4ou. Beatti v. Rapid K. Co. (119 Mich. 512), 208, 355. Beaumont v. Greathead (2C. B. 404), 7. Beavers v. Missouri P. R. Co. (47 Neb. 701), 107. Bebee v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (71 Tex. 424), 404. Beck v. Railway T. P. U. (118 Mich. 497; 77 N. W. L3; 5 Det. L. N. 599), 71. Beck v. Small (35 Minn. 405), 111, 144. Beck v. Thompson (31 W. Va. 459; 7 S. E. 447), 24. 55, 112. Beck v. Thompson (31 W. Va. 220), 362, 369. Becker v. Albany R. Co. (35 App. Div. [X. Y.] 4(1), 214. Becker v. Dnpree (75 111. 107), 119 ? 130. Becker v. Janinski (27 Abb. X. Cas. 45), 318. Becker v. Public Ledger (6 l'a. Hist. R. 89), 402, 403. Beckett v. Grand Trunk R. W. Co. (13 A. R. 174), 554. Beckwith v. Bean (98 U. S. 266), 454. Beckwith v. Boyce (12 Mo. 440), 100. Beckwith v. Griswold (29 Barb. [X. Y.| 291), 99. Beckwith v. New York Central 11. R. Co. (01 Barb. [N. Y.] 200), 227, 233, 243. Bedford v. Moody (find. App. 1899] 55 X. E. 499), 257. Bedford v. Moody ([Ind. 1899] 58 X E. 499), 258. Beech v. Kuder (15 Pa. Super. Ct. 89), 70. Beechei v. Long Island R, Co. (53 App. Div. [X. V.l 324), 562, 563, 572, 578, 579. Beecker v. Derbj Bi idge & Fei i (24 Coin,. 491), 112. Bee Pub. Co. v. World Pub. Co. ([Neb.] 82 X W. ^ 101. Beers v. Shannon (7:; N. V. 292), '.'7. BeerB v. Walhizer (4:; Hun (N. V.J, 254 i, 47:1. 477. Begg v. Whittier (48 Me. 314), 57. Behler v. Daniels ([R. l.J 31 Atl. 582), 63. Beisiegel v. New York Cent. R. R. Co. (40 X Y. 9), 229. Belding v. Black Hills & Ft. P. R. Co. (3 S. I). 369; 53 X W. 750), 499, OIL'. Belding v. Johnson ([(la.] 12 S. E. 304), 472. Belfourv. Raney (3 Eng. [Ark.] 479), 78. Belknap v. Boston & Me. R R. (49 X. II. 358), 115, 119, 135, 265. Belknap v. Scheld i 161 r. S. 17), 65. Belknap v. Stewart ([Neb.] 56 X. W. 881), 515. Bell v. Atlantic City R. R. Co. ([N. J.] 33 Atl. 211 i. 434. Bell v. Campbell (17 Kan. 212), 119, 127. Bell v. Cunningham (3 Pet [U. S.] 69), 94. Bell v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (26 L. R. Ire. 42S), 221, 222. Bell v. Gulf & C. K. Co. (76 Miss. 71), 219. Bell v. Litt (12 App. Div. |X. Y.] C26), 295. Bell v. Midland Ry. Co. (10 C. B. X. s. 306), 111. Bell v. Morrison (27 Miss. 68), 111. Bell v. Morse ([Kan.] 29 Pa. 1086), 100. Bell v. Sun Printing & Pub. Co. (10 .1. & s. [N. Y.| 267), 393. Bell v. Wo. .ten (53 <.a. 684), 405. X X X V 1 1 1 TABLE OF CASES CITED IX VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Belief ontaine, etc., R. Co. v. Snyder (18 Ohio Si. 399), 11'). Belle of Nelson Distilling Co. v. Riggs (20 Ky. L. Rep. 499), 293. Bellinger v. New York C. R. Co. (23 N. V. 12), 67. Belt v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. ([Tex.] 22 S. W. 1062), 508, 509. Belt v. Washington Water-Power Co. (24 Wash. 387), 80. Belt A: R. R. Co. v. Blocker (27 Md. 277), 139. Belt Elec. Line Co. v. Allen (19 Ky. L. Rep. 1656), 293. Beltz v. Yonkers (74 Hun [N. Y.], 73), 214. Belyeav. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S.M. R. Co. (61 Minn. 224), 325. Benagam v. Plassan (15 La. Ann. 703), 214. Benedict v. Michigan, B. & P. Co. (115 Mich. 527), 107. Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co. (134 N. Y. 156; 45 N. Y. St. II. 774; 31 X. E. 328), 72. Bennett v. Backus Lumber Co. (09 Minn. 530), 214. Bennett v. Bennett (110 N. Y". 584), 458. Bennett v. Brooklyn II. R. Co. (1 App. Div. [N. Y.] 205), 214. Bennett v. City of Marion (102 Iowa, 425), 142. Bennett v. Drew (3 Bos. [X. Y.] 355), 83. Bennett v. Hyde (6 Conn. 24), 425. Bennett v. Levi (46 X. Y. St. R. 754), 471. Bennett v. Reed (51 Pa. St. 186. Bennett v. Salisbury (78 Fed 102, 412, 421. Bennett v. Smith (23 Hun [N. 50), 133. Bennett v. Smith (21 Barb. [X. 439), 460. Benoit v. Troy & Lansingburgh R. R Co. (154 N. Y. 223), 169. 190 : 769 1 Y.], Y.] Benson v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (78 Mo. 504), 38. Benson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. ■ (41 111. App. 227), 207. Benson v. Maiden & M. G. Co. (6 Allen [Mass.], 149), 83. Benson v. Village of Waukesha (74 Wis. 31), 94. Bent v. Emery (173 Mass. 495; 53 N. E. 910), 65. Benton v. Benton (122Cal. 395), 515, Benton v. Central R. R. Co. (42 [Iowa], 192), 165. Benton v. Chic, etc., R. R. Co. (55 [low.,.], 496), 300. Benton v. North Carolina R. Co. (122 N. C. 1007), 562, 563, 572, 575. Benz v. South Bethlehem ( [C. P.] 5 Northampton Rep. 381), 80. Bergen v. New Orleans (35 La. Ann. 523), 91. Bergeson v. United States Projectile Co. (2 App. Div. [N. Y.] 57), 214. Bergmann v. Jones (94 N. Y. 51), 80, 124, 391, 397. Bergold v. Nassau Elec. R. Co. (30 App. Div. [N. Y.] 438), 172. Berkson v. Kansas City Cable Co. (144 Mo. 211), 104. Berly v. Taylor (5 Hill [N. Y.], 577), 488. Bernard v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (Rap- ports Judic. De Quebec (11 Cour. Super. 9), 539. Bernard v. Merrill (91 Me. 358), 300, 301. Bernier v. Bernier (147 U. S. 242), 501. Bernstein v. Meech (130 N. Y. 354), 91. Bernstein v. Singer (1 App. Div. [N. Y.] 63), 422. Berry v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. ([C. C. I). Ind.] 70 Fed. 679), 176. Berry v. Sugar Notch (191 Pa. St. 345), S4. Berry man v. Cox (73 Mo. App. 67), 369, 379. TABLE OF CASE8 CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] XX XIX Berryman v. Cox (1 Mo. A. Rep. 29), 374. Bertholf v. O'Reilly (8 Hun [N. V.J, 1G), 471. Betliam v. Philadelphia 1 196 Pa, St 802; 46 At 1. 448), 65. Betser v. Betsei (81 III. A.pp. 399), 458, 460. Betting v. Hoblet ( [111.] 30 N. E. 1048), I7s. Bibb Co. v. Ham i 110 Ga. 340), 80. Bierback v. Goodyear Rubber Co. (54 Wis. 208), 235. Bierbaurv. New Fork C. & II. R. R. Co. (15 Hun [N. V.], 559), 560, 5G2, 586. Biering v. First Nat. Hank (09 Tex. 599), 111, 124. Bigelow v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. (48 Mo. App. 367), 244, 245. Bigelow v. Reed (51 Me. 325), 161. Biggs v. Barb Wire Co. (GO Kan. 217), 64. Bilgrien v. Dowe (91 Wis. 303), 79. Billingsleyv. Maas (93 Wis. 176), 432, 4:: I, 450. Billman v. Ind. C. & L. R. Co. (76 Ind. 166), 58, 00. Billmeyer v. Wagner (01 Fa. St. 92), 89. Hinfoid v. Johnston (82 Ind. 426), 90. Binford v. Young ( 115 lud. 170), 111, 124. Birch v. Railroad Co. (165 Pa. St. 339), 602. Birchard v. Booth (4 Wis. 67), 361, 369, 370, 37.".. Birge v. Gardiner (19 Conn. 500), 177. Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (110 X. V. 504), 561, 562, 569, 570, 584, 586, 588, 589. Birmingham v. Lewis (92 Ala. 352), 175, ISO. Birmingham v. Rochester City & B. R. Co. (45 V Y. St. R. 72 t). 214. Birmingham Tract. Co. v. Southern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co. (119 Ala. 144), 71, 71. Birney v. Wash. Print. Teleg. Co. (18 Md. 341 1. 1 19. Bieaillon v. Blood (64 N. H.565), 176. Bishop v. Belle ' ity R. Co. (92 Wis. L39), 170. Bishop v. Journal Newspaper Co. (168 Mass. 327), 384, 412. Bishop v. St. Paul < ity R, Co. ([Minn.] 50 X. W. 927), 214. Bishop v. St. Paul City By. Co. (48 Minn. 26), 329. Bissell v.N. V . c. nt. B. B. Co. (25 X. Y. 442), 359. Bittner v. CrosstownSt. By. Co. (153 N. Y. 76), 170. Bixby v. Uunlay (56 X. 11. 456), 90, 111, 115. Bizell v. Booker (16 Ark. 308), 69, 148, i:.5. Black v. Buckingham (174 Mass. 102), 434 Black v. Carrolton R. Co. (10 La. Ann. 3:1), 214, 225, 328. Blackmail v. Cardiner Bridge (75 Me. 514), 261. Blackvvell v. Johnston ( [Ky.] 56 S. W. 12), 413. Blackwell v. Kansas City (76 Mo. App. 46), 207. Blackwell v. Landreth (90 Va. 748), 415. Blackwell v. Lynchburg, etc., R. Co. (Ill N. C. 151), 169. Blackwell v. Moorman, ill X. C. 151), 575. 563. Blackwell v. O' Gorman Co. ([R. I. 1901] 40 Atl. 28), 100. Blaecbinska v. Howard Mission (130 X. V. 497), 299, 318. Blagge v. llslcy (127 Mass. 191 1. 467. Blair v. Chic., etc., B. B. Co. (89 Mo. 334), 322. Blake v. Midland B. Co. (18 Q. B. 1101. 218. Blake v. Midland By. (o. (18 Q. B. '.1:: 1. 498, 499, 524, •'•:'•". 660. Blake v. Railway Co. (10 Bug. Law & Eq. 14;',). 499. xl TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IX VOL. [References are to Sections.] Blakesleev. Hughes (50 Ohio St. 490), 425. Blanchard v. Baker (S Greenlf. [Me.] 253), 78. 74. Blauchard v. Burbank (16 111. App. 375), 50, 94, 123, 448, 449. Blanchard v. Ely (21 Wend. [X. Y.] 342), 94. Blauchard v. United States (32 Ct. CI. 444), 65. Blankenship v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (15 Tex. Civ. App. 82), 156. Blate v. Third Ave. R. Co. (29 App. Div. [N. Y.] 388), 235. Blate v. Third Ave. R. Co. (60 N. Y. St. R. 732), 196. Blaymire v. Healey (6 Mees. & W. 55), 71. Blewett v. Coleman (1 Pears. [Pa.] 516), 134. Bligh v. Biddeford & S. R. Co. (94 Me. 499), 623. Blin v. Campbell (14 Johns. [N. Y.] 432 ), 489. Bliss v. Franklin (13 Allen [Mass.], 244), 439. Bliss v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. (160 Mass. 447), 201. Block v. Milwaukee St. R. Co. (89 Wis. 371), 244, 245, 282, 290. Blodgett v. Stone (60 N. H. 167), 76. Bloedel v. Bimmerman (41 Neb. 695), 615. Blood v. Herring (22 Ky. Law Rep. 1725), 83,89. Bloom v. Manhattan Elec. R. Co. (43 N. Y. St. R. 378), 246. Bloominjjdale v. Brinckerhoff 2 (Misc. [X. Y.] 49). 515. Blount v. Simmons, (119 N. C. 50; 25 S. E. 789, aff'd 26 S. E. 649), 65. Blowers v. Sturtevant (4 Den. [X\ Y.] 46), 515. Bloxham v. Florida, C. & P. R. Co. ( [Fla.] 17 So. 902), 65. Bluedornv. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (108 Mo. 439). 63. Blumhardt v. Rohr(70 Md. 328), 111, 124, 387, 390. Blumhardt v. Rohr (70 Md. 342), 400. Blyth v. Brimiugham Water Co. (11 Exch. 781), 148, 154. Board. See Commissioners. Board v. Head (3 Dana [Ky.] 491), 94. Boardman v. Goldsmith (48 Vt. 403), 118. Boardman v. Marshalltown G. Co. (105 Iowa, 445), 79, 123. Board of Admrs. v. McKowen (48 La. Ann. 251), 68. Board of Education v. United States (30 Ct. CI. 160), 65. Board of Shelby Co. v. Scearce (2 Dav. [Ky.] 576), 503. Boden v. Demwolf (56 Fed. 846), 517 828, 833, 836. Bodkin v. Western Un. Tel. Co. (31 Fed. 134), 78. Boehm v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. (91 Wis. 592), 339. Boelter v. Ross Lumber Co. (103 Wis. 324), 293. Boetcher v. Staples (27 Minn. 308), 114, 372. Bogartv. Burkhalter (2 Barb. [N. Y.] 525), 80. Boggess v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. (118 Mo. 328), 160, 194. Boggs v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (156 Mo. 389; 57 S. W. 550), 63. Bohm v. Dumphy (IMont. 333), 119, 120. Bohn v. Cleaver (25 La. Ann. 419), 91. Bohrer v. Dienhart Harness Co. (19 Ind. App. 489), 90. Boikens v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. (48 La. Ann. 831), 199. Boise v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (6 Okla. 243), 271. Boldt v. Budwig (19 Neb. 739), 111, 117. Bolin v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. (108 Wis. 333), 168. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. Xll [References are to Sections. ] Bolineer v. St. Paul & I). R. Co. (36 Boatwick v. Bait. & Ohio EL R. Co. Minu. 41S, -121 i. 503, 517. Bolte v. Third A.ve. R, Co. (38 App. Div. [N. Y.] 234), 298. Bolton v. Vellines (94 Va. 393), 448 450, 45:;. Boltz v. Sullivan (101 Wis. 008), 215, 2 IS. Bond v. Hilton (2 Jones L. [N. C] 149), 77. Bonebrake v. Huntington Co. (141 Ind. 02), 05. Bonesteel v. Bonesteel(30 Wis. 511), 448. Bonuafee v. Williams (3 How. 574), 507. Bonnett v. Galveston, II. it S. A. I;. Co. (89 Tex. 72), 528, 548, 550, 551. Book v. Chic. B. & Q. R. Co. (75 Mo. App. 004), 827. Booth v. Rome, W. & O. T. R. Co. (140 N. Y. 207; 55 X. Y. St. R. 656; 35 N. E. 592, which rev'd 44 \. Y. St. R. 9; 17 X. V. Supp. 336), 07. Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil R. M. Co. (00 N. Y. 487), 75, 89, 91. Borden City In? & Coal Co. v. Adams (09 Ark. 2 P.M. 83. Borland v. Barrett (76 Va. 128), 114 120, 121, 145, 369. Borough. See Name of. Bosch v. Burlington A- Mo. R. Co. (44 Iowa. 402), 87. Boater v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (36 W. \'a. 318), 488. Bostick v. Blower (49 X. Y. Supp. 1040), 515. Boston & A. K. Co. v. O'Reilly 1 158 U. S. 334), 234, 2:!5. Boston A- M. R. R. Co. v. Hurd (108 Fed. 110). 510. Boston A M. It. Co. v. McDuffey (51 U. S. A])].. Ill), 500. Boston & M. R. Co. v. McDuffey (79 Fed. 934, 942 i. 101. 505. Boston Mfg. Co. v. Flake (2 Mason [U. S.], 120), ill. (45 N. V. 712). 153. Boatwick v. Rutherford i I Hawks L. [X. C.J Ml), 439. Boswortll v. Standard Oil Co. (92 Hun [N. Y.J. 485), 21 1. Botsford v. ( base 1 108 Mich. 4:12), 400. Bottoms v. Seaboard a- i;. k. Co. (114 X. C. tin 1 .',. 170. Boult.r v. Webster ( 11 L. T. 598 |, 541. Bourke v. Cork & Macroom Ky. i I L. R. lr. 282), 528, 5:12, 5:;:;, 535, 537, 5 11, 548. V. Danville (53 Yt. 190), 183. Bowden v. Bailes(101 ff. C. 612), 111, 124, 402. Howe v. Bruunbauer (13 Misc. (X. Y.] 631), 290. Bowen v. Gainesville, J. & S. R, ( •. (95 Ga. G88; 22 S. EL 695), 63. Bowen v. Hall (20 Yt. 232), 415. Bowen v. Huntington (35 W. Va. 682 i. 2S1. Bowen v. Southern R. Co. ([S. C. 1900] 30 S. E. 590), 63. Bowers v. City of Boston ([Mass. J 29 X. E. 633), 503. Bowes v. City of Boston (15.") Ma^. 344), 070. Bowei sox v. Bowersox (115 Mich. 24), 402. Howes v. City of Boston ([Mass.] 4 N. E. 03:; ). 503. Bowler v. Lane (3 Mete. [Ky.] 311), 135, 498. Bowles v. Kansas City (51 Mo. App. 410). 292. Bowles v. Rome, W. A O. R. Co. (40 Hun [X. r.], 324), 514, 562,568 572. ;>7::. 586. Bowman \. city of Omaha (59 Neb. 84; 80 N. W. 259), 65. Bowman v. Western Fur. MtV r . Co. (96 Iowa. L88), 449. Bowsher v. Chic. 15. A Q. R, Co. ([Iowa, 1901] ,N4 X. W. 958), 257, 258. xlii TABLE OF ('ASKS CITED IN VOL. I. Boyce v. Manhattan R. Co. (118 N. Y. 314), 161. Boyce v. Shawangunk (40 App. Div. V V.) 593), 214. Boyd v. Brown (17 Pick. [Mass.] 453), 94. Boyd v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (6 Civ. Proc. [N. Y.] 222), 595. Boyd v. Watt (27 Ohio St. 259), 480. Boyden v. Burke (14 How. [U. S.] 575), 81. Boyden v. Fitchburg R. Co. (70 Vt. 125), 521. Boyden v. Moore (5 Mass. 365), 79: Boye v. City of Albert Lea (74 Minn. 230), 65. Boyer v. Barr (8 Neb. 70), 111, 117. Boyle v. Case (18 Fed. 880), 206. Boyle v. Degnon-McLean Const. Co. (61 N. Y. St. R. 1043), 165. Boyle v. Reeder (1 Ired. [N. C] 607), 91. Boyle v. Staten Island & S. B. L. Co. (17 App. Div. [N. Y.] 024), 488. Boyles v. Prisoek (97 Ga. 643), 291. Bradburn v. G. W. Ry. (44 L. J. Ex. 9), 554. Bradburn v. G. W. Ry. Co. (L. R. Exch. 1), 193. Bradford v. Boley (107 Pa. St. 506), 473, 477. Bradford v. Downs (125 Pa. St. 022), 194. Bradley v. Flewitt (0 Rich. L. [S. C] 09), 70. Bradley v. Ohio R. & C. R. Co. (126 N. C. 735; 36 S. E. 181), 03. Bradley v. Sattler (156 111. 603 625, 633, 634. Bradner v. Faulkner (93 N. Y 133, 454. Bradshaw v. Lancashire & T. R. Co. (44 L. J.C.P. 148), 488, 530, 538, 542. Bradshaw v. Standard Oil Co. (114 111. 172), 59. Bradstreet v. Gill (72 Tex. 115), 427. Bradstreet Co. v. Oswald (96 Ga. 396), 388, 391, 394, 427. [References are to Sections.] Bradwell v. Pittsburg & W. End Co. (1 :','.' Pa. 404), 107. Brady v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (6N. Y. Supp., 533), 214. Brady v. Prettyman (193 Pa. St. 628; 44 Atl. 919), 64. Brady v. Whitney (24 Mich. 154), 78. Bragg v. Laraway (65 Vt. 073; 27 Atl. 492), 73. Prague v. Ry. Co. (192 Pa. St. 242), 64. Braithwaite v. Hale (108 Mass. 38), 227, 229. Braithwaite v. Hall [Mass. S. J. C. 1897] 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 623), 229. Branford City, The (29 Fed. 373), 508. Brannan v. Kokomo, etc., R. Co. (115 Ind. 115), 172. Brannon v. Silvernail (81 111. 434), 114. Brantley v. Gunn (29 Ala. 387), 87, 88. Brantigam v. White (73 111. 561), 123. Brasell v. La Campagnie du Grand ([Tc. Rap. Jud. Quebec] 11 C. S. 159), 198. Brash v. Steele (7 D. B. M. [Scotch] 539), 515. Brasington v. South Bound R. Co. ([S. C] 40 S. E. 665), 122. Brauer v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. (34 Misc. [N. Y.] 127), 82, 92. Braun v. Craven (175 111. 401), 219, 220, 221. Bray v. Ford (05 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 213), 386. Brazil v. Pierson (44 Minn. 212), 274. Breckenfeldeu v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. (79 Mich. 560), 657. Breen v. Fairbank (35 Mo. App. 554), 78. Brenstein v. Singer (1 App. Div. [N. Y] 63), 422. Brent v. Kimball (60 111. 211), 75. Brentner v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (68 Iowa, 530), 150. , 300, 515), TABLE OF ('ASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections. ] XlllI Bretton v. Grand Rapids street R. I Co. ([Mich.] 51 N. W. 270), 246. Brewer v. Chase i 121 Mich. 526), 415, 418. Brewer v. Dew (11 M. & W. 825), 111. Brewer v. Jacobs (22 Fed. 217), 444. Brewer v. Watson (65 Ala. 88), 119. Brewster v. Link (28 Mo. l 17), 95,96. Brickell v. New York Central <& II. K. R. R. Co. ( 120 X. V. 290), L72. Brickerv. Elliott (58 Ohio St. 726), 102. Bridge v. Oshkosh (71 Wis. 363), 280. Bridges v. Asheville, etc., R. Co. (27 S. C. 456), 177. 301. Bridges v. North London R. Co. (L. R. (i Q. B. 377), 151. Bridges v. Stickuey (38 Me. 361 ), 91. Bridges v. Tennessee Coal, T. ife R. Co. (10!) Ala. 287; L9 So. 495), 68. Bridgman v. Hopkins (34 Vt. 532), 422. Brig, see Name of. Briggs v. Oliver (4 Hurlst.4 C. 403), 150. Briggs v. Taylor (28 Vt. 180), 159. Brighamv. Carlisle (78 Ala. 243), 91. Bright v. Barnett & R. Co. (88 Wis. 299), 648, 654 Brighton v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. ([Mich. 18'.).")] HI N. W. 550), 198. Brignoli v. Chicago & G. E. Ry. Co. (4 Daly [N. Y.], 182), 227, 220. Brinkmeyer v. Kvansville (29 Ind. 187), 05. Brisco v. Mimah Consol. Min. Co. (82 Fed. 952), 84. Briscoe v. Alfrey (01 Ark. L96; 31 S. W. 505), 67. Briscoe v. Little (19 Miss. [X. Y.] 5), 101. Briscoe v. Southern Ry. Co. (103 Ga. 224 >, 158. Bristol Mfg. Co. v.Gridley(28 Conn. 201), 11, 13, 15, 18, 82, 76, 81, 83, 87, 88. Britton v. (hand Rapids R. Co. (9 Mich. 159), 228. Britton v. Granger, IS Ohio C. C. 2-1 .. 132, 135, 139. Brizsee v, Torrence (21 Wend. [X. Y.] 144), 124. Broadway v. Patterson (72 Mich, 122), 665. Brock v. Gale (14 Fla. 523 Brockway v. Patterson (72 Mich. 122), 472, 478, 654. Broks v. Harlan (65 Cal. 421 i, 568. Broiriley v. Wallace (1 Esp. 2:17), 400. Bronson v. Bruce (59 Mich. 107), 413. Bronson v. Forty-Second St. M. & Si. N\ A. K. R. Co. (07 Hun [N. V.], 017). 21 1. Bronson v. Green (2 Duv. [Ky.] 234), 111. Brook v. Harrison (91 X. Y. 83), 111. Brook v. Luden (0 X. Y. Supp. 510), 211. Brooke v. Turner (95 Va, 696), 501. Brookmire v. Monaghau (15 Hun [X. Y], 10), 472. Brooks v. Carter (Ga. 34 Fed. 505), 377. Brooks v. Clark (57 Tex. 105), 122. Brooks v. Harrison (id X. V. v :'. i. 387, 397. Brooks v. Kings Co. El. 11. Co. (4 Misc. 288), 150. Brooks v. Ludin (1 X. Y. Supp. 338), 107. Brooks v. Sehwenin (54 N. Y. 343), 318. Broom v. Jennings (Kirhy [Conn.), 392), 107. Broscharl v. Tuttle (59 Conn. I |, , . 1 "-. '.to. Brosnan v. Sweetser(127 Ind. 1 1, 255, 256. Broughton v. McGrew (89 Fed. 672), 406, 115, 122. Brown v. Allen (35 Iowa, 306), 121, 133. Brown v. Bait At O. R. Co. (23 Wash. L. Rep. 337), 20:'.. xliv TABLE OF casks CITED IN VOL. 1. [References ar Brown v. Barnes (39 Mich. 211), 406. Brown v. Barry (3 Dall. [U. S.] 365), 501. Brown v. Brown (124 N. C. 19), 461. Brown v. Brown (121 N. C. 8), 458. Brown v. Butler (66 111. App. 86), 471, 472. Brown v. Cape Girardeau, A. Mac. & P. U. Co. (89 Mo. 152), 119. Brown v. Chadsey (39 Barb. [N. Y.] 253), 454. Biown v. Chicago & N. W. E. Co. (Wis. 1901; 85 N. W. 271), 63. Brown v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (102 Wis. 137), 495, 499, 501, 503, 642, 643, 674. Brown v. Chicago, etc., K. Co. (80 Mo. 457), 81. Bi'own v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (54 Wis. 342), 184, 349. Brown v. Congress St. R. Co. (49 Mich. 153), 151. Brown v. Cummings ( 7 Allen [Mass.], 507), 362. Brown v. Doyle (69 Minn. 543), 102. Brown v. Durham ([Tex. Civ. App.] 22 S. W. 868), 427. Brown v. European & W. A. R. Co. (58 Me. 384), 176. Brown v. Evans (8 Sawy. [U. S. C. C] 478), 374. Brown v. Evans (17 Fed. 912), 114. Brown v. Green (1 Penn. Del. 535), 215, 243, 256. Brown v. Kendall (6 Cush. [Mass.] 292), 69, 154. Brown v. Laurens Co. (38 S. C. 282), <)5. Brown v. Master (111 Ala. 397), 442. Brown v. McBride (24 Misc. [N. Y.] 235), 440,442. Brown v. Mt. Holly (69 Vt. 364), 292. Brown v. Perkins (1 Allen [Mass.], 89), 76. Brown v. Record ([Tex.] 23 S. W. 704), 522. e to Sections.] Brown v. Eohins (4 H. & N. 186), Brown v. Smith (83 111. 291), 432. Brown v. Southern P. Co. (7 Utah, 288), 102. Brown v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. (36 Minn. 236), 94. Brown v. Swineford (44 Wis. 282), 112, il4, 372. Brown v. S. W. R. Co. (36 Ga. 377), 83. Brown v. Syracuse (77 Hun [N. V.], 411), 177, 514. Brown v. Third Ave. R. Co. ( 11* Misc. [K Y.] 504), 286, 319. Brown v. Turner (174 Mass. 150), 501. Brown v. White ([Penn. S. C. J 902] 51 Atl. 962), 257. Brownback v. Frailey (78 111. App. 262), 220, 221. Browner v. Davis (15 Cal. 9), 77. Browning v. Jones (52 111. App. 597), 460. Broyles v. Prisock (97 Ga. 643), 229, 230. Brozek v. Steinway Ry. Co. (10X. Y. App. Div. 360), 171. Bruce v. Beall (99 Tenn. 303), 299. Bruce v. Priest(5 Allen [Mass.], 100), 266. Bruce v. Uley (79 Mo. 322), 134. Bruch v. Carter (3 Vr. [32 N. J. L.] 544), 76. Bruhm v. Ford (33 U.S. 323), 92. Brundy v. Maginness (76 Cal. 532), 124. Brunswick & Western R. R. Co. v. Gibson (97 Ga. 489, 497), 158. Brunswick & W. 1!. Co. v. Wiggins ([Ga. 1901] 39 S. E. 551), 16(i. Brunswig v. White (70 Tex. 504), 514, 524, 527, 528, 529, 537, 538, 541, 548, 549, 551, 557. Brusch v. St. Paul City R. Co. ([Minn.] 55 X. W. 57), 290. Brush v. Blot (16 App. Div. [N. Y.] 80), 411. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. xlv [References are to Sections.] Brush Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Lefevre ([Tex. Civ. A pp. 1900] 55 S. \V. 896), 632. Brush Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Simon- sohn (107 Ga. TO), 214, 218, 224. Bryan v. Congdod ([C. C. App. 8th C] 86 Fed. 221), 448. Bryan v. McGuire (3 Head [Tenn.], 530), 120. Bryant v. Omaha & C. B. R. & B. I O. (98 Iowa, 483), 214, 232. Bryant v. Sidgewell (133 Mass. 86), 480. Bryer v. Foerster (9 App. Div. [X. Y.] 542), 214. Buchanan v. Foster (23 App. Div. [X. Y.] 542), 458. Buchanan v. Goethmann ([C. P. Pa.] 29 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 302), 448, 452. Buchanau v. New Jersey R. R. Co. (23 Vr. [X. J.] 265), 220. Buchard v. Booth (4 Wis. 67), 120, 124. Buck v. Maddock (167 111. 219), 478. Buck v. Maddock (67 111. App. 466), 475. Buck v. Mfg. Co. (69 X. H. 257), 64. Buck v. Peoples, etc., R. Co. (40 Mo, App. 555), 256, 300, 305, 306. Buck v. Peoples St. R. & E. L. & P. Co. ([Mo.] 18 S. W. 1090), 214. Buck v. Peoples St. R. E. L. & P. Co. ( 16 Mo. App. 555), 300, 305, 306. Buckalew v. Tennessee Coal T. & R. Co. (112 Ala. 146), 768. Buckel v. Suss (28 Abb. N. C. 21), 460. Buckley v. Knapp (48 Mo. 152, 162), 112, 113, 144. Buckley v. Manufacturing Co. (113 N. Y. 540), 163. Bucknam v. Greal Northern K. Co. ([Minn.] 79 X. W. 98), 220. Bucknam v. Nash (3 Fairf. [Me.] 474), 94. Bucksport v. Rockland (56 Me. 22), 633. Budd v. Mcriden Elec. Rd. Co. (69 Conn. 272), 499, 502, 569. Buddv. Salt Lake City R. Co. ([Utah, L901] 65 Pac. 486), 275. Buffalo L. Oil v. Everest (3 How. [N. S.] 79), 212. Buford v. Mel, iiny i l Mott & M. [8. C] 268), 122. Bullmanv. [nd. C. & L. R. Co. (76 Ind. 166), 87. Bullock v. Bergman (46 Ind. 270), 91. Bullock v. Del. L. & W. R. Co. (61 X. J. L. 550), 145. Bullock v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (105 X. C. 180), 161. Bulwer v. Bulwer (53 L. .). Ch. 402), 901. Bundy v. Magiuness (76 Cal. 532), 111, 369, 3,72. Bunn v. Delaware, L & W. R. R. Co. (6 Hun [X. Y.], 303), 161. Bunyan v. Loftus (90 Iowa, 122), 471. Buuyea v. Metropolitan R. Co. (19 S. C. 76), 881. Burckhalter v. Coward (16 S. C. 436), 401. Burkett v. Lanata (15 La. Ann. 337), 75, 76. 145. Burk v. Dunn (55 111. App. 25), 33. Burk v. Howley (179 Pa St. 539)i 449. Burk v. Serrill (80 Pa. St. 413), 119. Burke v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R. R. (o. (19 Barb. [X. Y.] 529) j 176, 177. Burke v. Dillingham (60 Fed. 729). 522. Burke v. Melvin (45 Conn. 243), :'". Burke v. Wetherbee (98 N. Y. 562), 163, 586. Burke v. Wetherbee (18 Wkly. Dig. [X. V.] 369), 562. Burkett v. Griffith C><) Cal. 532), 128. Burleson v. Reading i no Misc. 512), 270. Burlington & M. R. Co. v. Crockett (17 Neb. 570), 598. xlvi TABLE OV (ASKS CITED IN VOL. I. Burlington & Q. K. Co. v. Emmert (53 Neb. 237), 81. Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wendt (12 Neb. 76), 159. Burnett v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. (55 Iowa, 49(3), 300. Burnham v. Strother (66 Mich. 519), »6. Burnham v. Webster (3 N. Y. St. R. 50), 366. Burnham v. Webster (54 N. Y. Super. 30), 325. Burns v. Ashboro & M. R. Co. (125 N. C. 304; 34 S. E. 495), 563, 575, 579. Burns v. Grand Rap. &. I. R. Co. (113 Ind. 169; 15 N. E. 230), 495, 503, 504. Burns v. Hiues (94 Va. 413), 119. Burns v. Houston, W. S. & P. F. R. Co. (15 Misc. [N. Y.] 19), 205, 559. Burns v. Merchants & P. O. Co. ([Tex. Civ. App. 1901] 63 S. W. 1061), 552. Burnside v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (47 N. H.554), 81. Burr v. Burr (7 Hill [N. Y.], 207), 113. Burr v. Penn. R. R. Co. ([N. J. 1899] 44 Atl. 845), 214. Burridge v. City of Detroit (117 Mich. 557), 65. Burrillv. New York, etc., R. Co. (14 Mich. 34), 81. Burrows v. Syracuse (150 111. 588; 37 N. E. 1096, rev'g 49 111. App. 590), 71. Burton v. Pinkerton (36 L. J. 137), 91. Burton v. Wilmington & W. R (82 N. C. 504), 563, 573, 575. Bush v. McMann (12 Colo. App. 504), 393. Bush v. Prosser (11 N. Y. 347), 413. Bussy v. Donaldson (4 Dall. [U. S.] 206), 94. Butler v. Cushing (46 Hun [N. Y.], 521), 150. Butler v. Kent (19 Johns. [N. Y.] 223), 87. [References are to Sections.] Butler v. Manhattan R. Co. (3 Misc. [N. Y.] 453), 211. Butler v. Man. R. Co. (3 Misc. [N. Y.] 353), 276. Butler v. Manhattan R. Co. (143 N. V. 417), 183, 568, 570, 584, 587, 590. Butler v. Mercer (14 Ind. 479), 114, ;}72. Butman v. Hussey (3 Fairf. [12 Me.] 407), 62, 76. Butez v. Fonda J. & G. R. Co. (45 N. Y. Supp. 808), 212. Butz v. Cavanagh (137 Mo. 503), 514. Byam v. Bullard (1 Curt. [U. S.] 101), 68. Byrket v. Monohon (7 Blackf. [Ind.] 83), 401. Cabell v. Arnold (86 Tex. 102), 448. Cable v. Dakin (20 Wend. [N. Y.] 172), 120. Cable v. Southern R. Co. (122 N. C. 892), 346. Cabot v. McKane (1 N. Y. St. R. 495), 242. Caddy v. Barlow (1 Man. & Ryl. 275), 111. Cady v. Case (45 Kan. 733), 120. Cahalin v. Cochran (1 N. Y. St. R. 583), 150. Cahill v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co. (92 Ky. 345), 172. Cahill v. Eastman (18 Minn. 324), 67. Cahill v. Murphy (94 Cal. 29), 387. Cahuzae v. Samini (29 Ala. 288), 79. Cain v. Railway Co. (97 Ga. 298), 158. Cairncross v. Pewaukee (78 Wis. 66; 47 N. W. 13), 72. Calcroft v. Harborough (4 C. & A. 499), 460. Caldwell v. Central Park N. & E. R. R. Co. (7 Misc. [N. Y.] 67), 380. Caldwell v. N. J. Steamboat Co. (47 N. Y. 282, affg 56 Barb. 425), 63, 122, 135, 151, 186. Caldwell v. Parker ([Tex.] 17 S. W. 87), 104. Ex. Co. TABLE OF casks CITED IN VOL. I xlvn [References ai-e to Sections. 1 Caldwell v. Prunelle (51 Kan. 511; W Campbell v. Campbell (54 Wis. 90), I'm. 949), 65. 422. Calkins v. Barger ill Barb. [N. V.] Campbell v. Cornelius ([Tex. Civ 424), 67. App. 1894] 23 S. W. 117,. 214. Call v. Easton Transit Co. (180 Pa. Campbell v. Finney (8 Watte [Pa.], 618), 152. Call v. Hays ( 169 .Mass. 586), 132. Callaghan v. (all. rata (39 Mo. 137), 113. Callahan v. Caranto (39 Mo. 156), 111. Callahan v. Ingram (122 Mo. 355), 397. Callahan v. Sharp (27 Hun |N. V.], 85), 176. Callahan v. Warne (40 Mo. 131 ), 152. Callaryv. Easton Transit Co. (185 Pa. 176), 155. Callaway v. Laydon (47 Iowa, 450), 474. Callaway v. Mellett ( 15 Ind. App. 866), 340, 343. Callaway v. Spurgoon (63 111. App. 571), 514, 605, 634. Callaway Min. & Mfg. Co. V. Clark (32 Mo. 305), 91. Calumet Elec. St. R. Co. v. Van Pett (173 111. 70), 602, 606. Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin (115 111. 368), 602, 603, 606. 95. Campbell v. Harris N Tow Civ. App. 636), 225. Campbell v. Josepb 11. Bauland Co. (41 App. Div. 174 . Campbell v. McCoy (3 rex. Civ. App. 298), 214. Campbell v. North Amer. Brew. Co. i22 App. Div. [N. V.] 114), 214. Campbell v. Pullman Pal. C. Co. (42 Fed. 484), 2 1:;. Campbell v. Rio Grande W. R. Co. (16 Utah, 346), 504. Campbell v. Rogers (2 Bandy [Ohio}, 110), 508. Campbell v. Syracuse (20Wkly. Dig. [N. V.] 449), 220. Campbell V. York (172 Pa. 222), 268. Cam;. bell v. York (172 Pa. 205), 267. Canada A. R. Co. V. Ilurdman (25 Can. S. C. 205), 68. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robin- son ([Ont] 14 S. C. R. 105). 195, 530. Calumet K. R. Co. v. Moore ([111.] Canavan v. Stuyvesant ( 12 Misc. [N 15 X. E. 764), 104. Calvin v. Peek (62 Conn. 155), 136. Camden* A. R. Co. v. Williams (61 N. .1. L. 646), 267, 268, 661. Cameron v. Bryan ([Iowa] 56 N. W. 4:34), 214. Cameron v. Bryan (89 Iowa, 214), 188. Cameron v. Croat Northern lly. Co. ([\. D.] 80 N. W. 885), 162. Cameron v. Great Northern R. Co. (8N. D. 124), 166. Cameron v. Union Tr. Line (10 Wash. 507), 244. 245. Cameron Sun v. McAnaw (72 Mo. App. 196), 103. Camp v. Camp (59 Vt. 667), 111. Y.j 74). 176. Candrian v. Miller (98 Wis. 164), 381, 122. Canfield v. chic R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (59 Mo. App. 354), 139, 1 15. Canning v. Williamstown (1 Cush. [Mass.] 151), 215, 218, 219, 227. Canning C<>. v. Innes (24 111. App. 33), 150. < lannon v. Brooklyn < !ity R. R. ' !o. (14 Mise. [N. Y.| 400), 214. Cannon v. Brooklyn City R. R .Co. (9 Mise. [N. Y.] 282), 214. 215,216, 274. 280, 282. Canter v. American Ins. Co. (3 Pet. [U. 8.] 307), 72. Cantini v. Tillman (54 Fed. 009), 501. xlviii TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. [References are to Sections.] 1. Capital Traction Co. v. Lusby (26 Was!.. L. Rep. 163), 171. Capithorne v. Hardy (173 Mass. 400), 256. Card v. Columbia (191 Pa. St. 254), 84. Cardon v. McConnell (120 N. C. 461), 428. Carey v. Berkshire R. R. Co. (1 Cusb. [Mass.] 475), 4S8, 495, 510. Carey v. Shults (60 Ind. IT), 454. Carl v. Ayers (53 N. Y. 17), 432. Carl Corper Brew. & M. Co. v. Min- wegen & W. Mfg. Co. (77 111. App. 213), 432. Carlaud v. West. Un. Tel. Co. (118 Mich. 369), 488. Carlisle v. Sheldon (38 Vt. 440), 174. Carlisle, Borough of, v. Brisbane (113 Pa. St. 554), 172. Carolan v. Southern P. R. Co. (84 Fed. 84), 68. Carpenter v. Barber (44 Vt. 442), 133. Carpenter v. Buffalo, N. Y. & P. R. Co. (38 Hun [N. Y.], 116), 563, 569, 572, 578, 586. Carpenter v. Buffalo, N. Y. & P. R. Co. (50 Hun [N. Y.], 116), 570. Carpenter v. Franklin (89 Tenn. 143; 14 S. W. 484), 73. Carpenter v. Matt (66 Hun [N. Y.], 632), 422. Carpenter v. McDavitt (66 Mo. App. 1), 227, 263. Carpenter v. Mexico Nat. R. R. Co. (39 Fed. 315), 227. Carpenter v. Mexico Nat. R. Co. (17 Wash. L. R. 630), 215, 218, 227. Carpenter v. Parker (23 Iowa, 450), 454. Carpenter v. Penn. R. Co. (13 App. Div. [N. Y.] 328), 449. Carpenter v. Rolling (107 Wis. 559), 648. Carpenter v. Wall (11 Ad. & E. 803), 468. Carples v. New York & H. R. Co. I 16 App. Div. [X. V.] 158), 229, 242. Carney v. State (84 Ala. 7), 515. Carnis v. Erwin (59 111. App. 555), 172. Carr v. Easton City (142 Pa. St. 139), 172. Carr v. Risher (28 N. Y. St. R. 260), 492. Carraherv. Allen ([Iowa, 1900] 83 N. W. 902), 82. Carrico v. West Virginia, C. & P. R. Co. (39 W. Va. 86), 297. Carrier v. Bernstein (104 Iowa, 572), 479, 483. Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co. (58 N. Y. 126), 63. Carson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (96 Iowa, 583), 514. Carson v. Edgeworth (43 Mich. 241), 431. Carson v. Texas Installment Co. ([Tex. Civ. App.] 34 S. W. 762), 123. Carston v. Northern P. R. Co. (44 Minn. 454), 330. Carter v. Beckwith (128 N. Y. 312), 102. Carter v. Columbia, etc., R. Co. (19 S. C. 22), 166. Carter v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. (69 Mo. App. 295), 104. Carter v. Rigby (2 Q. B. 113), 522, 523. Carter v. State (49 La. Ann. 1487; 22 So. 400), 65. Carter v. Wells Fargo Co. (64 Fed. 1005), 178. Carterville Coal Co. v. Abbott (81 111. App. 279), 503. Caruth v. Allen (2 McCord [S. C], 226), 76. Case v. Marks (20 Conn. 248), 425. Casey v. Hulgan (18 Ind. 590), 397. Casey v. New York Central R. R. Co. (25 Wkly. Dig. 568), 152. Casey v. Oakes (17 Wash. 409), 104. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN Vol.. 1. [References are to Sections.] xlix Caspar v. Prosdame (46 La. Aim. 36), 362, 377. Cass v. Third Ave R. Co. (20 App. Div. [N. ST.] 91), 227. Cass v. Third Ave. R. Co. (20 App. Div. [N. V.j 591), 277, 287. Cassidy v. Angcll (12 R. 1. 147), 166. Cassidy v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle (138 N. V. 239), 396. Casson v. Bromley (184 Pa. 540), 151. Casswt'll v. Wilmington (2 Mar v. [Del.] 360; 43 Atl. 160), 65. Caswell v. Worth (6 E. & B. 849; 8.j E. C. L. R.), 68. Castanos v. Ritter (3 Dner [N. V], 310), 81. Castello v. Landwehr (28 Wis. 522), 515, 651, 650, 603, 666. Castille v. CafTery Cent. R. & R Co. (48 La. Ann. 322), 504. Castner v. Sliker (33 X. J. L. 95), 375, 377. Catholic Church v. Martin (4 Roh. [La.] 62), 66. Catlin v. Martin (69 N. Y. 393), 515. Catlin v. Pond (101 N. Y. 649), 562. Causee v. Anders (4 Dev. & B. L. [N. C] 246), 369. Cavanagh v. Ocean Steam Xav. < o. (19 Civ. Proc. [N. Y.] 391), 505. Cavanaugh v. Austin (42 Yt. 576), 401. Cave v. Tyler ([Cal. 1901] 65 Pa. 1089), 76. Cayuga Co. Superv. v. State (153 N. V. 279; 17 N. E. 288), 65. Central, etc., K. Co. v. Mason (51 Miss. 234), 165. Central R., etc., Co. v. Roberts (91 Ga. 513), 488. Central Ga. R. Co. v. Bond (111 Ga. 13), 63. Central Gas & Elee. Fix. Co. v. Sher- idan (49 N. Y. St. It. 639), 488. Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Brown ([Ga 1901] 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 30), 135. 4 Central <»f Georgia K. Co. v. Edwards (14 i. a 528 . B2. Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Johnston | lo.; t.a. L30 .-'i:-. Central of Ga. R.Co. v. Price (106 Ga. L76), 84. Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Windham i 120 Ala. 231), L46. Central Pass. Ry. I o. v. chatterson I K.v.| 2'.» S. W. 18), 122. Cent. Pass. R. Co. v. Kuhn (86 Ky. 578), 215, 2ls, 243, 251. Central R Co. v. Moore (51 Ga.151), 263. Centra] K. Co. v. Newman (94 Ga. 560), 164. Central R. Co. v. Serfass (153 111. 379), 215, 218,243. Central R. A- Bkg. Co. v. Lanier (83 (la. 587), 224. Central R. & B. Co. v. Loach (70 Ga. |::l . 511. Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Strickland (90 Ga. 5G2), 212. :•.:','.>. 342. Central R., etc., Co. v. Kent (87 Ga. 402), 153. Central Tex. A- N. W. R. Co. v. Bush i 12 'Dx. Civ. App. 291: 34 S. W. 133), 63. Central Trust Co. v. Citizens St. R. Co. ([U. S. C. C. D. Ind.] 80 Fed. ■J is; •_".) Chi.'. L. News, 297). 65. Central l'n. Teleph. Co. v. Fehring (146 Ind. 189). 107. Cernahaw v. Chrisler (107 Wis. 645), 76. Chacey v. Fargo (5 N. D. 173), Chacey v. Fargo (64 N. W. 932), :;■_'.-,. Chaiborne v. Chesapeake & O. It. Co. | iii W. Va. 363), 112. Chalk v. McAlily (11 Rich. L. [S. C] 153), 74. Chamberlain v. Porter (0 Minn. 260), 87. Chambers v. Frazier (29 . v. Randolph (65 III. App. 208), ::7.'.. Chicago A A. P. Co. v. Shannon i 13 111. 338), 598, 60 ;. 607, 613, 61 l, 617, 626, 636, 637, ■ Chicago & A. P. Co. v. Swan (70 111. App. 331 I, 211. Chicago A A. P. R. Co. v. Wilson (63 111. 107), 243. Chicago & C. R. R. Co. v. Starmei (26 Nel». 630), 227. Chicago & EdiBon Co. v. Moreo (86 111. App. 152), 014, 61!», 627. Chicago A E. I. R. Co. v. Adams (69 111. App. 571 ), 354. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Bivaus ( 142 111. lOli. 285. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Chancellor (105 111. 438), 151, 165, on:;. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Cleminger (77 111. App. 186), 102, 243. 251. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Holland (122 111. 461), 254, 256. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Kneinin (48 IU. App. 243), 517, 607,614, 619. Chic ago & E. I. R. Co. v. Loeb (118 111. 20;5), 99. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. O'Connor (119 111.580), 50:;. 597, 598, 009. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Rousi 111. App. 286), 504. Chicago & E. P. (<>. v. Branyon ([Iud.l :;7 N. E. 190), 514. Chicago A E. R. Co. v. BrinkkopBki (72 111. App. 22), 100. Chicago A E. P. Co v. Cleminger (178 111. 536), 215, 255. Chicago A- E. R. Co. v. Meech i 163 111. 305), 194. 229, 241. Chicago A G. I. P. Co. v. Spurney (69 111. App. 549), 224. Chicago A- G. T. P. Co. \. Gaeinowski I 1.-,:, 111. L89), 108, 598. Chicago A G. \Y. P. Co. v. Travis i n 111. App. 166), 607, 612, 014. op;. Chicago & I. C. P. Co. v. Hunter ([Ind.] 27 N. E. 477), 82. lii TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Chicago & X. W. R. Co. v. Bayfield (37 Mich. 205), 205, 214, .".14, 617, 645, 653, 655, 657, 658, 668, 674. Chicago <& N. W. R. Co. v. Chicago (29 N. E. 1109), 7. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Cicero (157 111. 48), 7-".. Chicago & N. W. R. Go. v. Gillison (72 111. App. ^07), 214. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Howard (6 111. App. 569), 617. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Kane (70 111. App. 676), 214. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Moranda (93111. 302), 614, 617. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Shannon (45 111. 197), 006. Chicago & X. W. R. Co. v. Sweet (45 111. 197), 607, 614, 616, 626, 635, 636. Chicago & X. W. R. Co. v. Whitton (13 Wall. [U. S.] 270), 645. Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Ptacck (62 111. App. 375), 607, 631. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bond (58 Neb. 385), 598, 603, 615. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Bryan (90 111. 126), 141. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gunder- sou (174 111. 495), 614, 625. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gunder- son (05 111. App. 638), 607,619, 631. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Hague (48 Neb. 97), 03. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Harwood (80 111. 88), 606. Chicago, B. cfe Q. R. Co. v. Hines (45 111. App. 229), 224. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. c, ( . v. Honey ([C. C. App. 8th C] 0)3 Fed. 39), 174. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Miller ([C. C. App. 8th C] 76 Fed. 439), 203. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska (170 U. S. 57), 71. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Oyster (58 Neb. 1), 598, 615, 019. Chicago, I!. * Q. R. Co. v. Reith (65 111. App. 101), 29:;. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Spirk (51 Neb. KIT i. 337, 338, 351, 488. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Sykes (96 111. 162), 139. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Van Bus- kirk (58 Neb. 218, 570 ), 598, 603, 615. Chicago, B., etc. R. Co. v. Oleson (40 Neb. 889), 152. Chicago City R. Co. v. Allen (169 111. 287), 206. Chicago City R. Co. v. Anderson (93 111. App. 419), 100. Chicago City R. Co. v. Anderson (80 111. App. 71), 214, 219, 224, 241. Chicago City R. Co. v. Anderson ( 182 111. 298), 215, 241. Chicago City R. Co. v. Fenniniore (78 111. App. 478), 100, 102. Chicago City R. Co. v. Leach (80 111. App. 354), 214. Chicago City R. Co. v. Meneely (78 111. App. 679), 258. Chicago City R. Co. v. Taylor (68 111. App. 613), 214. Chicago City R. Co. v. Taylor (170 111. 49), 218,219,220. Chicago City R. Co. v. Van Bleck (143 111. 480), 280. Chic. City Ry. Co. v. Wall (93 111. App. 411), 238. Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Wilcox (13S 111. 370), 175, 177. Chicago Consol. B. Co. v. Tietz (37 111. App. 509, 599), 602, 610, 635. Chicago, E. & L. S. R. Co. v. Ada- mick (33 111. App. 412), 514, 005. Chic, etc., R. Co. v. Brisbane (24 111. App. 463), 344. Chic, etc, R. Co. v. Bryan (90 111. 126,) 139. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Caulfield (63 Fed. 396), 224. Chic, etc, R. R. Co. v. Flagg (43 111. 364), 338, 354. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gillam (27 111. App. 386), 598, 602, 610, 626. TABLE OF casF.s CI CBD IN 70L. I. liii [References are to Sections. Griffin (68 111. ( Ihic, etc., R. Co 499), 341. Chicago, etc., By. III. 142), IT. Chicago, etc., R. 111. 385), L65. Chic, etc., R. R. Co. v. McKean (40 111. 218), L33. Chicago, etc., K. Co Mich. 532), 169. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 111. 400), 597, 598. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. O'Connor (119 111. 586), 21 l Chic, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Herring (.-.7 111. 59), L39. Henry (62 Chicago, R. I. A 1'. R. Co. \. Ken- ned) (2 Kan. App. 698), 244. Chic, R. i. A- P. R. Co. v. Posteu (59 Kan. 449), 1-1, 228, 233. Chic, K. I. a- 1'. K. Co. v. Sheldon (f, Kan. App. :;4T), 261, 279, 281. Chicago, K. I. & 1'. R. Co. v. Young (58 Neb. 678), 597, 598, 603. Chicago, R. 1. A T. R. Co. v. Zer- necke ([Neb.] 82 N. W. 26), 597, 600. Chicago, R. I. A T. R. Co. v Langs- ton (92 Tex. Tint), 289. (Jo. Co. v. Levy (160 .Miller (40 Morris (26 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. .Sanderson Chi. 'ago. R. 1. A T. R. Co. v. Porter (1T4 111. 405), 160. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Warner (108 111. 538), 215,216. Chic Forge & B. Co. v. Rose (till 111. App. 123), 432, 440. Chicago, G. W. R. Co. v. Kowalski ([C. C. App. 8th C] 84 Fed. 586), 176. Chic, K. A W. R. Co. v. O'Connell (46 Kan. 581), 122. Chicago, M. A St. P. R. Co. v. Dowd (115 111. 650), 508, 602, 603, 606. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Durke (148 111. 226), 71. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. O'Sullivan (14:! 111. 48), 206. Chicago, M. A St. P. R. Co. v. Wilson (35 111. App. 346), 605, 634. Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lewis (48 111. App. 274), 110, 214. Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wool ridge (174 111. 330), 602, 606, 612, 614, 61T, 619, 626,626, 631. Chicago, R. I. A L. Co. v. Boylea (11 Tex. civ. App. 522), :;iT. Chicago, R. I. A 1'. It. Co. v. Archer (46 Neb. 007), 246, -T4. Chicago, R. I. A 1". li. Co. v. Austin (69 111. 426), 632. Chicago, R. I. A 1'. K. Co. v. Downey (85 111. App. 1T5), 60T. Chicago, R. I. A 1'. R. Co. v. Henry (T 111. A]. p. 322), 61T. field (10 Tex. Civ. App. 225), 520, 524, 52S. 532, :.:;t. 542, 54T. Chicago R. R. Co. v. Scurr (50 Miss. B6), 110, :146. Chicago, St. L. A N. O. R. R. Co. v. Scuit (59 Miss. 456). 119. Chicago, St. L. A P. R. Co. v. Spilker ( [Iud.j 33 V E. 280), 279, 2S0. 291. Chicago," St. L. A* P. R. R. Co. v. Spilker ([Ind.] 32 Am. L. Reg. 763), 278. Chicago St. R. Co. v. Foster (175 111. 396), 22T. Chicago W. D. R. Co. v. Klauber (9 111. App. 613), 81. Chicago \V. A V. Coal Co. v. Streator i IT'.' 111. 435), 73. Chick v. Southwestern R. Co. (57 Ga. 357), 495. Chickering v. Lord ([N. 1L] 32 Atl. TT:: i. 95. Chidester v. Consol. Peoples Ditch Co. (53 Cal. 56), 87. Child v. Horner (13 Pick. [Mass. J 503), 419. Childers V. San Jose Mercury Print A P. Co. i L05 Cal. 284), 397. Childress v. Emory (8 Wheat. [U. S.] 642), 507. Chiles v. Drake (2 Mete. [Kyi 146), 111. 112, 11 I. 115, 12ii. L86. Chilton v. st. Joseph (143 Mo. 192), 244. liv TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Chipnian v. Union P. K. Co. (12 lull, 68), 214. Chilly v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. (148 Mo. 64), 100, 102. Choctaw. (>. & G. E. Co. v. Alexander (7 Okla. 591 I, 501. Che >uquet tu v. Southern Elec. R. Co. (152 Mo. 257), 71), 211: Chouteau v. Suydani (21 N. Y. 179), 102. Christian v. Erwin ([111.] 17 N. E. 707), 104. Christian v. Hanna (58 Mo. App. 37), 4:;:,. Christianson v. Chic. St. P. M. & O. R. Co. (G7 Minn. 94), 90. Christie v. Galveston City R. Co. (39 S. W. 038), 242. Christman v. Russell (73 Miss. 452), 95. Chuhb v. Grell (34 Pa. St. 115). 425. Church v. Ante-Kalsomine Co. (118 Mich. 219), 487. Churchill v. Bauraann (95 Cal. 541; 10 Pac. 770), G8. Churchill v. Siggers (3 El. & Bl. 929), 444. Cicero & P. St. Ry. Co. v. Brown (89 111. App. 318), 91. Cincinnati v. Conner (55 Ohio St. 82), 501. Cincinnati v. Gregory (3 Ohio N. P. 142), 175. Cincinnati v. Guckenberger (00 Ohio St. 353), 501. Cincinnati & C. Air Line Co. v. Rogers (24 Iud. 103), 89. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cole (29 Ohio St. 126), 340, 342. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Indianapolis R. R. Co. v. Eaton (94 Ind. 474), 347, 349. Cincinnati, II. & D. R. Co. v. Thie- baud (114 Fed. 918), 504. Cincinnati St. R. Co. v. Murray (53 Ohio St. 570; 35 Ohio L. J. 22), 63. Citizens' Rapid Trans. Co. v. Seigrist (96Tenn. 119), 171. Citizens R. R. Co. v. Hobs (15 Ind. App. 610), 194. Citizens R. R. Co. v. Washington (58 S. W. 1042), 537. Citizens Ry. Co. v. Steen (42 Ark. 321), 139. Citizens St. R. Co. v. Burke (98 Tenn. 650), 204. Citizens St. R. Co. v. Steen (42 Ark. 321), 112. Citizens St. R. Co. v. Tiviname (121 Ind. 375), 319. Citizens St. R. Co. v. Willoeby (134 Ind. 563), 139, 141, 297. Citizens St. R. Co. v. Willoeby (15 Ind. App. 312), 300. City. See Name of. City Bk. v. Mershow (33 Fed. 240), 101. City Nat. Bank v. Jeffries (73 Ala. 1*83), 133, 135. City Pass. R. Co. v. Schuster (113 Pa. St. 412), 176. City R. Co. v. Wiggins ([Tex. Civ. App.] 52 S. W. 577), 291. City Transfer Co. v. Robinson (12 Ky. L. Rep. 555), 139. Claiborne v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co. (46 W. Va. 363, 453. Clapp v. Hudson River R. R. Co. (19 Barb. [N. Y.] 461), 213. Clare v. National City Bank (1 Sw. [N. Y.] 539), 150. Clare v. Sacramento Elec. Power & L. Co. (122 Cal. 504), 75, 94, 214. Clark v. American Dock & Imp. Co. (35 Fed. 478), 436, 448, 450, 451. Clark v. Bales (15 Ark. 452), 111. Clark v. Bennett (123 Cal. 275), 171. Clark v. Bohms ([Tex. Civ. App.] 37 S. W. 347), 385. Clark v. Brown (116 Mass. 504), 422. Clark v. Chicago & A. R. Co. ([Mo.] 29 S. W. 1013), 214. Clark v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. ([Wis.] 36 X. \V. 326), 81. Clark v. Dillon (6 Daly [N. Y.], 526), 318. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. lv [References Clark v. Elizabeth (61 N. Y. L. 565), 65. Clark v. Fairley (30 Mo. App. 335), 119, 186. Clark v. Foot (8 Johns. [X. Y.J 422), L66. Clark v. Fox (10 App. Div. [N. ST.] 514), 390, 423. Clark v. Gay (112 Ga. 777), 92*. Clark v. Hill (69 Mo. App. oil), 458. Clark v. Louisville A- \. R, Co. (101 Ky. 34), 164 (lark v. Newsam (1 Excb. 131), ISO, 136. Clark v. Nevada Land, etc., Co. (6 Nev. 203), 91, 244. Clark v. Nordholt ( 121 Cal. 26), 444. Clark v. Pope ([Fla.] 10 So. 586), 104. ( 'lark v. Westcott (2 App. Div. [ \ . Y.\ 603), 24:!, 258. Clark v. Wilson (103 Mass. 219), 193. (lark Mile-End Spool Co. v. Shaffery (58 N. J. L. 229), 314. Clarke v. Carfin Coal Co. (L. R. [1891] App. Cas. 412), 523. Clarke v. Chicago, K. & X. R. Co. ([Neb.] 37 X. W. 484), 107. Clarke v. Fitch (2 Wend. [X. Y.) 459), 467. Clarke v. Mathewson (12 Pet. [U. S.] 164), 507. Claxton v. Lexington & B. S. R. Co. (13 Bush [Ky.], 636), 122. Claypool v. Claypool (65 111. App. 446), 42:;. Clayton v. Keeler (18 Misc. [X. V. ] 188), 869. Clegg v. Met. St. Ky. Co. (1 App. Div. [N. Y.] 207), 214, 274, 275, 281. Clegg v. Met. St. R. Co. (54 N/. E. 1089), 214. Cleghorn v. New York Cent. «fe H. R. R. Co. (56 N. Y. 44). 135, 136, 137. Clemens v. Sped (93 Ky. 284; 19 S. W. 660), 71. Clement v. Major (8 Colo. App. 86), 431, 432, 434, 440. are to Sections.] Clements \. Malone; (66 Mo. 352), 425. Clements v. Odorless Excavating Co. (67 Md. 461), 430. Clemmous v. Doneforth (67 Vt. 417), 381. Cleveland, C. C. & St L. K. R. Co. v. Baddeley | L50 111. 328), 598, 629. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Balleutine (84 Fed. 935), 64, 68, 84. Cleveland, C. C. ife St. L. R. Co. v. Beckett ([Iml. App.j 39 N. E. 429), 213. Cleveland. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Gray | 148 Ind. 266), 63, 236. Cleveland. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 1 1 albert (75 111. App. 592), 212. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Keeuan (190 111. 217), 602, 616, 627. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Quillen (22 Ind. App. 496), 344. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Tartt (64 Fed. 830), 514 Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Tartt (99 Fed. 369). 64. Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cnrran (19 Ohio St. 1), 359. Clevenger v. Dunaway (84 111. 367), 122. Clifton v. Lange (108 Iowa, 472), 416. Clinton v. Laning (61 Mich. 355), 471. Clinton v. Mercer (3 Murph. [X. C] 119), 77. Clissold v. Machell (26 Up. Can. Q. 427), 112, 137, 138. Closson v. Staples (42 Yt. 209), 437, 444. Coal Co. v. Blatchford (11 Wall. 172), 507. Cobb v. Clongh ([U. S. C. C. D. Minn.], 83 Fed. 604), 65. Cobb v. Columbia & G. X. R. Co. (37 S. C. 194), 94. Cobb v. G. W. K\. Co. (62 L. J. Q. B. 335), 91. Cobb v. People (84 111. 511), 128. lvi TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Cobb v. St. Louis & H. R. Co. (149 Mo. (509), 214, 251. Cochran v. Amnion (16 111. 31(5 ), 2G4. Cochran v. Baker (34 Ore. 555), 102. Cochran v. Millet (13 Iowa, 128), 111 122, 1S9. Cochran v. Phila. & R. I. R. Co. (184 Pa. St. 565), 84. Cochrane v. Tuttle (75 111. 361), 133. Cockburn v. Ashland Lumber Co. (54 Wis. 619), 89, 92. Coddington v. Lloyd (8 A. & El. 449), 452. Coffin v. Brown ([Md. 1901] 50 Atl. 570), 400. Coffin v. Coffin (4 Mass. 41), 361. Coffin v. Vanilla (8 Tex. Civ. App. 417), 107, 448. Coffins v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. (48 Hun [N. Y.], 392), 214. Coghlan v. Third Ave. R. R. Co. (7 App. Div. [X. Y.] 124), 514, 580, 588, 589. Cogswell v. West Street & N. E. Electric R. Co. (5 Wash. 46), 102. Cohea v. Coffers ville (69 Miss. 561), 65. Cohen v. Eureka & P. R. R. Co. (14 Neb. 376), 227, 243. Cohn v. Mayor, etc. of N. Y. (113 N. Y. 532), 85. Cohn v. Western Un. Teleg. Co. (46 Fed. 40), 91. Colburn v. State (47 Ind. 310), 145. Colby v. McGee (48 111. App. 294), 397. Cole v. Drew (44 Vt. 49), 74. Cole v. Fall Brook Coal Co. (159 N. Y. 59), 283, 295. Cole v. Fall Brook Coal Co. (87 Hun [N. Y.], 584), 295. Cole v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. (95 Mich. 77), 274, 275, 286. Cole v. Tucker (6 Tex. 266), 114, 120. Coleman v. Allen ([Ga.] 5 S. E. 204), 81. Coleman v. Allen (79 Ga. 637), 442. Coleman v. Coleman (1 Marsh. [Ky.] 296), 106. Coleman v. Hagerman (5 City Hall Rec. N. Y. 63), 373. Coleman v. Ryan (58 Ga. 132), 111, 120. Coleman v. White (43 Ind. 429), 460. Cole Mfg. Co. v. Falls (90 Tenn. 466), 501. Coley v. Statesville (121 N. C. 301), 65, 90, 151, 563, 575, 578. Colley v. Davidson (10 Minn. 392), 77. Collins v. Council Bluffs (35 Iowa, 432), 145. Collins v. Council Bluffs (32 Iowa, 324), 195, 243. Collins v. Dodge (37 Minn. 503), 236. Collins v. East Penn. V. & G. R. Co. (56 Tenn. 841), 87. Collins v. East Tenn. G. R. Co. (9 Heisk. [Tenn.] 841), 2. Collins v. Janesville ([Wis. 1901] 87 N. W. 241 ), 105. Collins v. Janesville (99 Wis. 464), 214, 246. Collins v. New Hampshire (171 U. S. 30), 501. Collins v. South Boston, etc., R. Co. (142 Mass. 301), 117. Collins v. Stephens (58 Ala. 543), 89. Collins v. Wilson (18 Ky. L. Rep. 1049), 379. Collin's Park & B. R. Co. v. Ware (112 Ga. 663), 267. Collis v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (71 Hun [N. Y.], 504), 514. Coloney v. Farrow (91 Hun [N. Y.], 82), 72. Colorado Coal & I. Co. v. Lamb ([Colo.] 40 Pac. 251), 514. Colorado Midland R. Co. v. O'Brien (16 Colo. 219), 214. Colorado Milling & El. Co. v. Mitch- ell (26 Colo. 284), 501. Colorado M. R. Co. v. Irevarthew (IColo. App. 152), 81. Columbia & P. S. R. Co. v. Hawthorn (19 Pac. [Wash. T.] 25), 214. TABLE OF CASE CITED IN VOL. I. VII [References are to Sections.] Columbia City v. Langohi (20 Ind. Commissioners v. Scearce (2 Duv. App. 895), L94, 195. [Ky.| 576), 503. Columbia Water Power Co. v. Co- < ommissioners oi Worcester < o. \. lumbiaElec. St. R. L. A ['. Co. Kyekman i/.il Md. 36; 16 AtL 317), ([S. E.J 20 S. E. 1002), 65. 60. Columbus v. Ogletree (102 Ga. 293), Commons v. Walters (1 Port. [Ala.] 267, 269. 323), 422. Columbus v. Sims 1 94 Ga. 483), 267. Commonwealth. See state. See Columbus v. Straasuer (138 [nd. 301), People. See Com. 32.-.. Columbus & II. C. & I. Co. v. Tuckm- (48 Ohio St. 41), 71. Columbus & W. R. Co. v. Bridges (86 Ala. 148), L35. Colvin v. Peck (62 Conn. 155), L38. Colwell v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (57 Huu IX. V.i. 452), 258. Com. Sec State. See People. See Commonwealth. Com. (Armstrong) v. E. II. Taylor, Jr., Co. (101 Ky. 325), 501. Com. v. Nagle (4 Pa. Super. Ct. 159), 515. Com. v. Place (153 Pa. St. 314), 415. Comben v. Belleville Stone Co. (50 X. J. L. [30 Vroom] 22b), 152. Combes v. Milwaukee & M. R. Co. (89 Wis. 297), 042. Comer v. Barfield (102 Ga. 489), L58. Comer v. Foley (98 Ga. (ITS), 338. Conicr v. Snowies (IT Kau. 441). 454. Comer v. Sbaw (98 Ga. 545), 58. Cmer v. Taylor (32 Mo. 341), 468. Commerford v. Atlantic Ave. R, R. Co. (8 .Misc. |\. Y.] 599), 214. Cominskey v. Couuellsville \. & 1.. St. R. Co. I 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 431 ), 107. Commissioners v. Duckett (20 Md. 468), 05. Commissioners v. Coffman (60 Ohio St. 527; is OhioCir. Ct. R. 254), 65. Commissioners v. Hamilton (60 Md. 340), 305. Commissioners v. Legg (110 [nd. 479), 517. Commonwealth v. Boston <& A. EC Co. (121 Ma>s. 36), 503. Commonwealth v. Graham ([Mass.] :;i \. E. 706), :.i 1. Commonwealth v. McDufEy (liiu Mass. 469), 66. Commonwealth v. Norfolk (5 Mass. 435), 361. Compton v. Long Island K. R. Co. (12 N. Y. St. R. 554), 153. Compton v. The Chelsea (139 X. V. 538), 95. Conant v. Griffin (48 111. 410), 598, 621, 626, 627, 639. Condliff v. Condliff (29 L. T. 83), 5 1 1. Condliff v. Condliff (29 L. T. 831), 523. Condon v. Great-Southern & W. Ry. (10 Tr. C. L. K. 415), 532, 533, 535, 548. Cone v. Central R. Co. (62 X. J. L. 99), 448, 453. Cone v. Smyth (3 Kan. App. 607), 104. Conger v. Hudson River R. R. Co. (6 Duer ]X. V.]. 375), 154. Conger V. Weaver (20 \. Y. 1 10), 78. Conley v. Maine Cent. R. Co. (95 Me. 149), 605, tin:. Conlin v. < lonlin (15 Rich. Law [s. C. |, 201 i. 523. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. V Y. iS V II. R. R. Co. (25 Conn. 265), 495. Connell v. Stalker (20 Misc. , N. Y. ] 423), 1 16. Connell] v. Nashville (100 Tenn. 262; 16 s. W. 566), 65. Connelly v. Western Oh. Teleg. Co. (| 7a. L902] 7 Ya. Law Reg. 704), 75, 91. lviii TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. Connery v. Slavin (23 Wkly. Dig. [N. Y.] 545), 176. Connoble v. Clark (38 Mo. App. 476), 91. Connolly v. Knickerbocker* Ice Co. (114 N. Y. 104),' 63, 177. Connors v. Railway Co. (71 Iowa, 490), 499. Connors v. Walsh (131 N. Y. 590), 369. Conrad v. Dobmeier (57 Minn. 147), 107. Conrad v. Dobmeier ([Minn.] 58 N. W. 870), 94. Conroe v. Conroe (47 Pa. St. 198), 422. Consol. City & Chelsea Park Ry. Co. v. Carlson (58 Kan. 02), 177. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Haeuni [References are to Sections.] Consolidated Traction Co. v. South Orange & M. Traction Co. (36 N. J. Eq. 569), 71. Constitution Pub. Co. v. Way (94 Ga. 120), 420. ■ Consumers Pure Ice Co. v. Jenkins (58 111. App. 519), 91. Conway v. New Orleans & C. R. Co. (46 La. Ann. 1429), 263. Conway v. New Orleans City & L. R. Co. (51 La. Ann. 146), 214. Conway v. Nichol (34 Iowa, 533), 460. Coogler v. Rhodes (38 Fla. 240), 414, 422. Cook v. Ansonia (66 Conn. 413), 81. Cook v. Barkley (2 N. J. L. 169), 415. Cook v. Cook (100 Mass. 194), 393. Cook v. De Kalb Co. (95 Ga. 218), 65. Cook v. Ellis (6 Hill [N. Y.], 466), (146 111. 614), 215, 227. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Maehl (130 111. 551), 597, 599, 618. Consol. Coal Co. v. Scheiber ( 65 111. App. 304), 255. Consolidated. See Consol. Consolidated Kan. City S. & B. Co. v. Tinchert (5 Kan. App. 130), 256. Consolidated Tract. Co. v. Behr (59 N. J. L. 477), 171, 172. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Graham ([N. J.] 40 Atl. 773), 514. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Graham (62 N. J. L. 90), 101, 105, 212, 501, 645, 646, 648, 668. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Haight (59 N. J. L. 577), 171. Consolidated Traction Co. v mark (60 N. J. L. 456), 172. Consolidated Traction Co. v. (60 N. J. L. 244), 645, 660. Consolidated Traction Co. v. (30 Vr. [N. J. L.] 275, )175. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Lam- bertson (59 N. J. L. 297), 220, 279. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Lam- bertson (60 N. J. L. 457), 219. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Scott (5S N. J. L. 682), 171, 177. 113, 114, 372, 373. Cook v. Fogerty (103 Iowa, 500; 57 N. W. 677), 63. Cook v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co. (19 Mo. 329), 247. Cook v. New York Cent. R. R. Co. (17 N. Y. St. R. 353), 91. Cook v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (10 Hun [N. Y.], 426), 595. Cook v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. (1 N. Y. Snpp. 711), 274. Cook v. Redman (45 Mo. App. 397), 99. Cook v. Ry. Co. (60 Cal. 604), 517. Cooley v. Trustees of N. Y. & B. Bridge (45 App. Div. [N. Y.] 243; CI N. Y. Supp. 1), 65. Hoi- I Coon v. Moffitt (3 N. J. L. 436), 467. Cooney v. Southern Elec. R. Co. (80 Mo. App. 226), 299. Cooper v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (22 Wis. 613), 647. Cooper v. Hopkins ( [N. II.] 48 Atl. 100), 362, 364. Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. (66 Mich. 261), 94, 514,045,646, 647, 648, 653, 654, 655, 657, 600, 661, 662, 669, 672. Cooper v. Mills Co. (69 Iowa, 350), 65. Hone Howe TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. lix ([N. J. Co. (54 It. <'u Cooper v. Mulling (30 <.a. 146), 214, 227, 354. Cooper v. \. V. < >. A W. R. Co. (25 App. Div. [X. V.] 383), -".IT, 562, 50:3, 572. Cooper v. Shore Elec. Co. 1899] 44 Atl. 023), 042. Cooper v. St. Paul Citj P Minn. 379), 214. Cooper v. St. Paul City ([Minn.] 56 X. W. 588), 492. Cooper v. Sun Print, & 1'. ASSOC. ([X. V.| :.T Fed. 566), 390, 102. Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson (113 U. S. 727), 501. Cope v. Hampton ( '<>. ( (2 S. < '. 17). 65. Cop.- v. Hastings (183 Pa. 300; 41 W. X. C. it::: 28 Pitts. L. .!. X. S. 17:.: 38 All. 717 1. 05. Copson v. N. V. X. II. & II. K. Co. (171 Mass. 233), 249. Corbetl v. Twenty-third St. It. Co. (114 X. V. 579), 492, 495. Corbley v. Wilson (71 111. 209), 401. Corcorain v. Ulster & I). R. Co. (40 X. V. Supp. 1117), 214. Corliss v. Worcester, X. & II. P. Co. (68 X. II. 404), 251, 511. Cormier v. Bouroue (32 X. P. 283), 93. Cornelius v. Hambay (150- Pa. St. 359), 459. Cornell v. Putnam (5S X. II. 535), :305. Corning v. Corning (6 X'. V. 97), 266, 376. Cornwall v. Mills (44 X. Y. Supr. 45), 500, 562, 580. Correster v. Kansas City. St. J. & I '. P. K. Co. (25 Mo. App. CIO). 82. Corridan v. Wilkinson (20 Out. App. 184), 400. Conigan v. Dry Dock R. K. Co. (0 N. Y. St. P. 213), 204. Corsicana Cotton oil Co. v. Valley (14 Tex. Civ. App. 250). 302. Cortulla v. Kerr (74 Tex. 89), 385. Corwin v. Walton (18 Mo. '71), 118, 114, 372. [References are to Sections.] Costigan v. Pennsylvania P. Co. (54 X. .1. I.. 283; 2:; Atl. 810), 67. Cosulich \. Standard <>n < o. (122 N. V. lis). 154. Cotulla v. Ken 171 'lex. 89), 397. Coughlan v. Baltimore A: O. P. Co. (24 Mil. ,s4), 510. 55o. Coulter v. Pine Township (164 Pa. St. 5-13), 103. Countryman v. Fonda, .1. & G. K. Co. (166 X. V. 20] 1, 570. County. Sir Name of. See Com- missioners. Courier-Journal Co. v. Sallee (20 Ky. P. Rep. r,34), 4(12. Courtney v. Clinton (18 Iud. App. 0201, ion. 362, 380. Courts v. Louisville & N. K. Co. (99 K\. 571). 35s. Courvoisier v. Raymond (23 Colo. 114), 265. Cousins v. Swords (11 App. Div. [X. Y.j 338), 447, 456. Covell v. Wabash I;. Co. (82 Mo. App. 180), 244. (ovell v. Wabash P. Co. (82Mo. App. 1011). 215. Covington, etc., Street P. Co. v. Herrikoltz (47 S. W. 265), 177. Covington S. R. T. R. Co. v. Pie] ([Ky.] 8 S. W. 440). 105. Covington St. Ry. Co. v. Paeker (9 Bush [Ky.]. 455), 405. 514. Covington Transfer Co. v. Kelly (36 Ohio St. SO). 172. Cowden v. Wright (24 Wend. [X. Y.] 420), 225, 364. Cowen v. Knickerbocker [ce Co. (0 X. Y. St. 1;. oi-_'). 169. Cowen v. Winters (96 led. 020). 340, 313. Cowen v. Winters (96 Fed. 0.",5). 111. Cowley v. Davidson (10 Minn. 302). 77. Cox v. Burbridge (13. C. B. [X.s.! 430), 64. Cox v. Chic. A X. W. K. Co. (102 Iowa, 711), 84. lx TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Cox v. Crumley (5 Lea [Tenn.],529), 112. Cox v. N. Y. Cent. Rd. Co. (63 X. Y. 414), 492. Cox v. New York C. & II. R. R. Co. (11 Hun [N. Y.], 621), 564. Cox v. Richmond & 1). R. Co. (87 Ga. 747), 80. Cox v. Strickland (101 Ga. 482), 413. Cox v. Vanderkleed (21 Iud. 164), 361, 362. Coxhead v. Johnson (20 App. Div. [N. Y.] 605), 214. Coxwell v. Prince ( [Miss.] 19 So. 237), 68. Coyle v. Great Northern Ry. (20 L. R. Ir. 409), 522. Coyne v. Manhattan R. Co. (42 N. Y. St. R. 617), 274. Crabb v. Nashville Bk. (6 Yerg. [Tenn.] 333), 102, 106. Grafter v. Railway Co. (L. R. 1 C. P. 300), 163. Craftsbury v. Greensboro (66 Vt. 585), 514. Craighead v. Railroad Co. (123 N. Y. 391), 163. Craker v. Chic. & N. W. Ry. Co. (36 Wis. 657), 135, 136. Cram v. Hadley (48 N. H. 191), 115, 119. Crampton v. Ivie (124 N. C. 591), 84. Cranfill v. Hayden (22 Tex. Civ. App. 656), 392. Crank v. Forty-Second St., etc., Ry. Co. (53 Hun [N. Y.], 425), 243, 248. Craven v. Bloomingdale (54 App. Div. [N. Y.] 266), 452. Craven v. Bloomingdale (64 N. Y. St. R. 262), 452, 453. Craven v. Walker (101 Ga. 845), 404. Crawford v. Del. L. & W. R. R. Co. (121 N. Y. 652), 246. Crawford v. Doggett (82 Tex. 139), 120. Crawford v. Mayor, etc., of Griffin ([Ga. 1001] 39 S. E. 988), 65. Crawford v. Parsons (03 N. H.438), 83. Crawford v. Southern R. Co. (106 Ga. 870),' 177, 514, Crawford Co. v. Hathaway (60 Neb. 754), 76. Cregin v. Brooklyn Cross Town Rd. Co. (56 How. Pr. [N. Y.] 32), 488. Cregin v. Brooklyn Ciosstown R. Co. (19 Hun [N. Y.], 341), 570. Cregin v. Brooklyn Ciosstown R. Co. (83 Hun [N. Y.], 595), 567, 576, 580. Cregin v. Brooklyn Crosstown R. Co. (18 Hun [N. Y.], 368), 562, 569, 570. Creighton v. Evans (53 Cal. 55), 76. Cremer v. Town of Portland (36 Wis. 100), 159. Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers Union, etc., Co. (120 U. S. 141), 430, 434. Cribbs v. Yore (119 Mich. 237), 387. Crippen v. Des Moines ( [Iowa] 78 N. W. 688), 291. Crites v. New Richmond (98 Wis. 55), 283. Croasdale v. Bright (6 Houst. 52), 386. Croasdale v. Tantum (6 Hous. [Del.] 60), 385. Crocker v. Crocker (98 Fed. 702), 458. Croco v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (18 Utah, 311), 87. Croft v. Smith ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 51 S. W. 1089), 558. Croker v. Chic. & Northwestern Ry. Co. (36 Wis. 057), 380. Crone v. Chic. & N. W. R. R. Co. (102 Wis. 196), 281. Cronin v. Sharp (16 Pa. Super. Ct. 78), 78. Crooks v. Hibbard (58 111. App. 568), 101. Crosby v. Fitch (12 Conn. 410), 153. Crosby v. Humphreys (59 Minn. 92), 369. Cross v. Carter (100 Ga 632), 370. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. lxi R. [References are to Sections.] Cross v.Elmira (86 Hun [N.Y.], 467), dimming v. Brooklyn City R. Co. 214, (104 V V. 669), 176. Cross v.Grant (32 N. H. 675), 460. jCuinmings v. Hyatt (64 Neb. 635), Cross v. Gutlircy (2 Root [Conn.], 90), j 501. 495, Cummings v. Line (45 N. Y. St. II. 56), 386, 390, 418. Cummings v. National Furnace Co. (60 Wis. 601), 150. Cummings v. Riley (52 N. II. 368), 95. Cunningham v. Alexander (58 III. A pp. 296), 106. Cunningham v. X. Y. C. & II. R. R. Co. (49 Fed. 439), 274. Cunningham v. Seattle Elec. It. iV- 1'. Co. (3 Wash. 471), 338. Cunningham v. Wabash K. G'i>. (79 Mo. App. 624), 70. Curl v. Chic. K. I. & P. Ry. Co. (63" Iowa, 417), 119. Cross v. Kansas City, F. S. . R. Co. (1 Curtis v. Rochester, etc., R. R. Co. Hughes, 536), 484. (20 Barb. [X. Y.] 282), 227. Culloughv. Walton (ii Ala. 492), 111. Cumberland & O. C. Co. v. Hutch- ings (65 Me. 140), 99. Cumberland & P. R. Co. v. State, Hogan (4.-) Md. 234), 540. Cumberland, etc., Iron Co. v. Scally (27 Md. 589), 152. Cumberland Teleph. & Tel. Co. v. United Elec. K. Co. (93 Tenn. 192), 67. Cuming v. Brooklyn City R. Co. (109 X. Y. 95), 514. dimming v. Arrowsmith (5 C. H. Rec. [X. Y.] 62), 401. Cumming v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co. (21 Abb. X. C. 1). 300, 306. dimming v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co. (24 X. Y. St. R. 718), 214, 306. Curtis v. Rochester, ete.. R. Co. (18 X. Y. 534), 150, 215, 24:'., 244. Curtis v. Sioux City & II. P. R. Co. ( [Iowa] 54 N". W. 339), 354. Cushing v. Dill (2 Scam. fill. ] 461), 501. Cushman v. Ryan (1 Story [U. S. C. C], 91), 377. Custard v. Burdett (15 Tex. 456), 78. Cuthbert v. Galloway (35 Fed. 466), 450. Cutler v. Smith (57 111. 252). 1 B. Daggett v. State (I Conn. 61), 501. Dailey v. Houston (.-,.", Mo. 361), 268. Daiu v. WyckolY (18 N. Y. 47). 168. Dain v. Wycoff (7 N". Y. 191), 167. Daine v. Kenney (25 N. II. 318), 415. Daisley v. Dun (107 Fed. 218), 391. lxii TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN Vol,. [References are to Sections.] Dale v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (57 Kan. 601), 508. Daley v. Norwich, etc., It. It. Co. (20 Conn. 591), 175, 176. Dallas v. .Jones [(Tex. Civ. App.] 54 S. W. 606), -254, 310. ■ Dallas v. Webb (22 Tex. Civ. App. 48; 54 S. W. 398),.65. Dallas & W. R. Co. v. Spickei (63 Tex. -127), 515, 527, 528, 531, 532, 535, 548, 550. Dallas City R. R. Co. v. Beeman (74 Tex. 291), 159, 522. Dallas Cotusol. Tract. It. Co. v. Hurley ( [Tex.] 31 S. W. 73), 522. Dallas Rapid Transit R. Co. v. El- liott ( [Tex.] 26 S. W. 544), 523. Dalman v. Koning (54 Mich. 320), 408. Dalton v. Beers (38 Coun. 529), 111, 120, 124, 133, 369. Dalton v. Southeastern Ry. (4 C. B. 296), 514, 521, 521, 531, 535, 537, 538, 576, 660. Daly v. Byrne (77 N. Y. 182), 404. Daly v. Dublin Wicklow & W. Ry. (30 L. R. Ir. 514), 523. Daly v. New Haven (00 Conn. 644; 38 Atl. 397), 65. Daly v. Stoddard (66 Ga. 145), 503, 511. Dalzell v. Long Island R. R. Co. (6 N. Y. Supp. 167), 214. Damni v. Damm (109 Mich. 619; 63 Am. St. Rep. 601), 661. Dannenberg v. Guernsey ( [Ga.] 7 S. E. 105), 103. Danner v. South Carolina R. R. Co. (4 Rich. [S. C] 329), 166. Danville & W. R. Co. v. Brown ( [Va. 1894] 18 S. E. 278), 214. Danziger v. Silbertban (21 Civ. Pro. [X. Y.] 283), 95. Darrigan v. Railroad Co. (52 Conn. 285), 290. Darrow v. Cornell (12 App. Div. [N. Y.] 004), 97. Dave v. Morgans L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. (47 La. Ann. 576), 339. Davidow v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (85 Fed.'943), 504, 505, 506, 509. Davidson v. Denver Tramway Co. (4 Col. App. 283), 171. Davidson v. (ioodall (18 N. H. 423), 115, 467. Davidson v. South Pac. Co. (44 Fed. 476), 251. Davies v. Lathrop (12 Fed. 353), 507. Davies v. Thompson ( [Tex Civ. App.] 50 S. W. 1062), 543, 544. Davis v. Fish (9 G. Greene [Iowa], 406), 91. Davis v. Forbes (171 Mass. 548; 51 N. E. 20), 68. Davis v. Gray (16 Wall. [U. S.] 220), 507. Davis v. Griffith (4 Gill & J. [Md.] 342), 418. Davis v. Guarnieri (45 Ohio St. 470), 174, 566. Davis v. Justice (31 Ohio St. 359), 472. Davis v. Marxhausen ( [Mich.] 61 N. Y. 504), 420. Davis v. Nichols ( [Ark.] 15 S. W. 880), 597. Davis v. Standisb (26 Hun [N. Y.], 608), 268, 472. Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (53 Ark. 117), 495, 503, 511, 597, 598, 600, 007, 634. Davis v. St. Vincent's Inst. (61 Fed. 277), 515. Davis v. Tribune Job Print Co. (70 Minn. 95), 104. Dawson v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. (6 Ky. L. Rep. 668), 139. Dawson v. Troy (49 Hun [N. Y.], 322), 240. Day v. Holland (15 Oreg. 464), 120, 122, 143, 145. Day v. Woodworth (13 How. [U. S.] 371), 94, 112, 113. Dayton v. Parke (142 N. Y. 391), 78. Death v. Rapid R. Co. (119 Mich. 512), 291. Deane v. Clayton (7 Taunt. 490), 67. TABLE '»| casus CITED IN VOL. I. 1 x i i i [References are to Sections. Debevoisc v. N. V. L. E. .v- W. R. R. Co. (98 \. V. 877), 195, 505, 508. Decatur v. (.rami Rapids & T. R. Co. (I 19 Ind. .".77), 80. Decatur v. Hamilton (89 111. A pi'- 561), 224. Decatur v. Stoops (21 1ml. App. 397; l Repr. 516; 52 V E. 623), 63, 212. Decker v. BicSorley (111 Wis. 91), 648, 655, 657, 671. Decoux v. Lieux (33 La. Ann. 392), 431, 432. Deei> Min. & I). Co. v. Fitzgerald (21 Colo. 533), 214. Degnan v. Brooklyn City R. Co. (14 Mis.-. [X. V.] 408), '-'14. De Ham v. Mexican N. H. Co. ( [Tex.] 22 S. W. 2 19), 508, 500. Dehler v. State, Bierck (22 Ind. App. 383), 4(54. Deisen v. Chicago, St. P., M. & (). R. Co. (4:; Mi ii ii. 454), 2G7. De Kalb v. Ashley Oil HI. App. 647), 214. De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. McLeroth (00 111. App. 529), 207. Delaware & A. Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Elvins ( [N. .1.] 43 Atl. 903), 90. Delaware & Hudson C. Co. v. Torrey (33 Pa. St. 14:'.), 74. Delaware, etc., R. K. Co. v. Toffey (38 X. .1. L. 525), L61. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Roaiefs ( [C. C. App. 3(1 C] 70 Fed. 21), 279. Delaware State L. . B. Co. r. Lockharl (79 Ala. 315), 84. East Tennessee, V. A: <;. R, Co. v. McClure (94 6a 658), -'48. East Tennessee, V. & <•. It. Co. v. Miller (95 Ga. 738; 22 S. E. 660), 63. East Tennessee, V. & <-. K. Co. v. Smith (94 Ga. 5S0), 291. Eastwood v. Retsoff Mining Co. (86 Hun [X. Y.] 91), 152, 165, 562. Echmondson v. Kentucky C. B. Co. ( 16 Ky. L. Rep. 459), 502. Ecker.l v. Chicago A: X. R. Co. (70 Iowa, 353), 252. Eckman v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. (169 111. 312), 203. Ecliff v. Wabash R. Co. (64 Mich. 196), 177. Economy Light & P. Co. v. Stephen (187 111. 137), 602, 607, 617, 619. Eddy v. Wallace ([C. C. App. 8th C] 49 Fed. 801), 243. Edelmann v. St. Louis Transp. Co. (3 Mo. App. 503), 122. Eden v. Lexington, etc., R. R. Co. (14 B. Mon. [Ky.] 204), 227, 322, 488, 495. Eders v. Skannal (35 La. Ann. 1000), 83. Edes v. Boardman (58 N. H. 580), 66. Edge v. Third Ave. R. Co. (57 App. Div. [N. Y.] 29), 262. Edgerton v. O'Neil (4 Kan. App. 73), 80. Edgett v. Finn ([Tex. Civ. App.] 36 S. W. S30), 481. Edsall v. Brooks (2 Bobt. [X. Y.]414), 382. Education. See Board ot Edwards v. Beach (3 Day [Conn.], 447), 113. Edwards v. Kansas City Times Co. (32 Fed. 813), 385, 41(1, 417. Edwards v. Leavitt (43 Vt. 126), 120, 124, 369, 372. lxviii TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] 30 La. Ann. 926), I Ellis v. Simonds (168 Mass. 316), 432. Edwards v. Kicks 132. Edwards v. San Jose Printing & P. Co. (99 Cal. 4:11), 384, 412, 417. Edwards v. St. Louis, K. & S. It. Co. (79 M.i. App. 25V), 240. Edwards v. Three Rivers (96 Mich. 025), 297. Egan v. Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. Co. (12 App. Div. [N. Y.] 550), 212. Egan v. Murray (80 Iowa, 180), 464. Eggett v. Allen (106 Wis. 60:)), 443. Ehrgott v. New York (96 N. Y. 264), 87, 179, 21."), 229, 237. Ehrisman v. East Harrishuig City Pass. Ry. Co. (150 Penn. St. 180), 171. Eiringer v. Brooklyn II. R. Co. (13 Misc. [N. Y.] 389), 214, 274, 278. Eilers v. Wood (64 Wis. 422), 503. Eiswald v. Southern Exp. Co. (60 Ca. 496), 79. Elhin v. Dean (33 Md. 135), 111, 125. Eldridge v. Atlas Steamship Co. (58 Hun [N. Y.], 98), 288. Eldredge v. Eldredge (79 Hun [N. Y.], 511), 462. Electric Co. v. Bowers (110 Ala. 331), 148, 160. Electric L. & P. Co. v. Lefevre ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1900] 55 S. W. 396), 551. Elfers v. Woolley (116 N. Y. 294), 379. Elgin v. Anderson (89 111. App. 527), 229. Elgin v. Riordan (21 111. App. 600), 194. Elgin J. & E. R. Co. v. Eselin (68 111. App. 96), 214. Eliason v. Crove (85 Iud. 215), 122. Elkhart & W. R. Co. v. Waldorf (17 Ind. App. 29), 100. Ellerbee v. Carolina C. R. Co. (118 N. C. 1024), 152. Elliott v. Barry (34 Hun [N. Y.], 129), 481. Elliott v. Herz (29 Mich. 202), 116, 119. Elliott v. Van Buren (33 Mich. 47), 372. Ellsler v.. Brooks (22 Jones & S. [N. Y.] 73), 77. Ellsworth v. Chicago, B. & Or. R. ( [Iowa] 63 N. W. 584), 340. Ellsworth v. Fairbury (41 Neb. 881), 211, 294. Ellsworth v. Fletcher (59 Kan. 772), 251. Ellsworth v. Potter (41 Vt. 685), 111. Ellsworth v. Thompson (13 Wend. [N. Y.] 658), 375. Elmer v. Fessenden (154 Mass. 427), 412. El Paso Co. v. Bish (18 Colo. 474), 65. Elsam v. Fawcett (2 Esp. 562), 460. Elsas v. Second Ave. R. R. Co. (56 Hun [N. Y.], 161), 276. Else v. Ferris Auth. (N. P. [N. Y.] 36), 418. Elshire v. Schuyler (15 Neb. 561), 611. Eltringham v. Earhart (67 Miss. 488), 263, 264, 370. Ely v. Davis (111 N. C. 24), 447. Emblem v. Myers (6 H. & N. 54), 111. Emory v. Addis (71 111. 273), 472. Engel v. Fischer (44 111. App. 362), 107. Engelken v. Ililger (43 Iowa, 563), 481. Engle v. Jones (51 Mo. 316), 119, 127. Englert v. Kruse (8 N. Y. St. R. 375), 265. English v. Caldwell (30 Mich. 362), 79. English v. State (31 Fla. 340), 501. Ennis v. Buckeye Pub. Co. (44 Minn. 105), 83. Enos v. Cole (53 Wis. 235), 79. Enos v. Enos, (135 N. Y. 609), 406, 425. Enquirer Co. v. Johnston ( [C.C. App. 7th C] 72 Fed. 443), 385, 426. Ensor v. Bolgiano (67 Md. 190), 415. Ephland v. Missouri P. R. Co. (57 Mo. App. 147), 231. TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IN Vol.. [References are to Sections.] Ixix Epstein v. Berkowski (01 III. App. Evans v. Evana (68 Law J. Prob. fO), 498), 434. Erdman v. Walkerton (20 Ont. App. 444), 542. Erickson v. Barker ([Iowa] 49 X. W. 838), 274. Erickson v. Brooklyn II. R. R. Co. (11 Misc. [N. S".] 662), 214. Erickson v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co. (96 Fed. 80), 5(17. Erickson v. Pomerank (66 Minn. 876), 146. Erickson v. Twenty-third St. It. Co. (71 Eun [N. Y.], 108), 152. Erslew v. New Orleans & \. E. R. Co. (49 La. Ann. 86), 514. Erwin v. Dezell (64 Hun [N. Y.]. 391), 394. Erwin v. Neversink S. S. Co. (23 Hun [N. Y.], 573), 502, 563, 595. Erwin v. Sumrow (1 Hawks [N. C] 172), 413. Esterly's Appeal (54 Pa. St. 192), 501. Estes v. Macon (103 Ga. 780; 30 S. E. 240), 05. Etchas v. Orena (121 Cal. 270), 109. 157, WO. Evans v. Foster (80 Wis. 509), 102. Evans v. 1 1 arris (I II. & X. 254), 391. Evans v. Hoggarl ( [Kan. App. L899] 59 Pac. 381), 69. Evans v. Joplin (7'; Mo. App. 20), 206, 252. Evans v. Missouri 1'. It. Co. (7:; Mo. App. 70). 104. Evans v. O'Connor (171 .Mass. 287), 457. Evansville v. Senbenn (151 [nd. 42), 170. Evansville & V. II. R. Co. v. Wilson (20 [nd. App. 5), 347. Evansville <& T. 11. R. Co. v. Hol- comb (9 fad. App. 198), 252. Evansville St. R. Co. v. Gentry (117 Ind. 408), 165, 171. Evening Journal Assoc, v. McDer- mott (15 Vroom [X. J.], 430), 104. Evening News Assoc, v. Tryon (42 Micb. 549), 385, 413,420. Evening Posl ( !o. v. Hunter (18 Ky. L. Rep. 726; 82 \. W. 928), 117. Etckberry v. Levielle (2 Hilt. [N". Y.] Evening Post Pub. Co. v. Boigbl 40), 112. Etberington v. Prospect Park & C. T. R. Co. (88 X. V. 641), 511, 51 I, 520, 500, 502, 564, 566, 567, 586, 580. Eureka, City of, v. Merrifield (53 Kan. 794), 499, 50:5. Eureka v. Merrifield ([Kan.] 37 Pac. 113), 495. Eureka v. Wilson (15 Utah, 67), 501. Euslinv. Euslin ( [X. J. Ch.] 37 Atl. 442) 515. Eustace v. Johns (38 Cal. 3), 503. Eva v. McMahon (77 Cal. 107). 07. Evans v. Cincinnati, S. & M. R. Co. (78 Ala. 341), 91. Evans v. Del. & II. (anal Co. ([Pa. C. P.] 6 Kulp, 405), 211. Evans v. Delk ( [Tex.] S. W. 550), 214. ([C. C. App. 2d C.]i "2 Fed. 885), 420. Everett v. Akins (8 Okla. 184), 102. Evers v. Will (46 Hun [X. Y], 022), 214. Everts v. Everts (3 Mich. 580), 377. Evey v. Mexican C. R. Co. ([U. S. C. C. \. 5th C] 52 V. s. App. 118; 81 Fed. 294), 32, 500. Ewen v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co. (38 Wis. 014), 645, 646, 17. 648, 654, 655, 057. 667, 669, 072. Ewing v. Pittsburg, ('. C. A St L R. Co. (347 Pa. St. 40), 221. Excelsior Elec. Co. v. Sweet (59 X'. J. L. 441), 100. Excelsior Needle Co. v. Smith (61 Conn. 56), 76. Explorer, The (40 L. J. Adm. H), 522. lxx TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Fagan v. Thomas (6 J. & S. 133), 151. Fahey v. Jephcote (2 Ont. L. R. 44!), rev'g 1 Ont. L. R. 18 j, 63. Fair v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. (21 L. T. Rep. 326), 243. Fairbanks v. Witter (18 Wis. 287), 375. Fairbanks Canning .Co. v. Times (24 111. App. 33), 150. Fairchild v. Cal. Stage Co. (13 Cal. 599), 218. Fair, The, v. Himmel (50 111. App. 215), 450. Fales v. Hemenway (64 Me. 373), 83. Falkeuan v. Rowland (70 111. App. 26), 598, 602, 614, 619, 626, 637. Fall v. McRee (36 Ala. 61), 83. Farley v. Charleston Basket & V. Co. (51 S. C. 222), 254. Farley v. Gate City Gaslight Co. (105 Ga. 323), 107. Farley v. Lavary ( [Ky. 1900] 54 S. W. 840) 70. Far man v. Lauman (73 Ind. 568), 114, 144, 372. Farmers H. L. C. & R. Co. v. West- lake (23 Colo. 26), 84. Farnsworth v. Hoover (66 Ark. 367; 50 S. W. 865), 73. Farrand v. Aldrich (85 Mich. 593), 387, 390. Farrand v. Marshall (21 Barb. [N. Y.] 400), 67. Farwell v. Warren (51 111. 467), 121, 369. Farwell & Co. v. Zenon (100 Iowa, 640), 101. Faucitt v. Booth (31 Up. Can. Q. B. 263), 401. Faulks v. Iowa Co. (103 Iowa, 422), 65. Favorite v. Cottrill (62 Mo. App. 119), 123. Fawsett v. Clark (48 Md. 494), 426. Fay v. Davidson (13 Minn. 523), 273. Fay v. Parker (53 N. H. [5 Shirley] 342; 16 Am. Rep. 270), 1, 2, 111, 115, 369, 372. Fay v. Swan (44 Mich. 544), 116. Fay v. Williams ([Tex. Civ. App.] 41 S. W. 497), 470. Feary v. Hamilton (140 Ind. 45), 494. Feedler v. Schroeder (59 Mo. 364), 95. Feeney v. Long Island R. R. Co. (116 N. Y. 375), 243, 244, 254, 260. Feinstein v. Jacobs (15 Misc. [N. Y.] 474), 227. Fejdouski v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. (12 App. Div. 589), 165. Felice v. New York C. & II. R. R. Co. (14 App. Div. [N. Y.] 345), 517, 562, 566, 567, 569, 570, 572, 581, 582. Felix v. Griffiths (56 Ohio St. 39), 501. Felkner v. Scarlet (29 Ind. 754), 467. Fell v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (44 Fed. 248), 139. Fellows v. Goodman (49 Mo. 62), 452. Felton v. Newport (105 Fed. 322), 76. Fenelon v. Butts (53 Wis. 344), 218, 448, 449, 451. Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co. (13 Utah, 532), 417, 425. Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co. (12 Utah, 439), 413, 416, 432. Fentz v. Meadows (72 111. 540), 123, 477. Ferguson v. Brent (12 Md. 33), 153. Ferguson v. Davis Co. (57 Iowa, 601), 218, 219. Ferguson v. Ehret (14 Misc. [N. Y.] 454), 214. Ferguson v. Evening Chronicle Pub. Co. (72 Mo. App. 462), 398. Ferguson v. Wilson ( [Mich. 1899] 80 N. W. 1006), 642. Fernandez v. Sacramento, etc., R. Co. (52 Cal. 45), 161. Fero v. Roscoe (4 N. Y. 165), 401. Ferrerro v. Western Un. Teleg. Co. (9 App. [D. C] 455), 92. TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. XXI Ferristein v. Jacobs | L5 Misc. [N. ST.] 474), 238. Fetter v. Beale (1 Lcl. Rayra. 339), 381. Fewv. Killer ([S. C. 1902] 41 S. K. 85), 76. Fickett v. Lisbon Falls Fibre Co. (91 Me. litis). 214. Fidelity & C Co. v. Allibone (90 Tex. 660), 102. Fidelity & C. Co: v. Weise (80 111. A]. p. 499), 106. Field v. Clark (143 U. S. 649), 501. Fields v. New York Central R. Co. (32 N. V. 346), 150. Fife v. Oshkosb (89 Wis. 540), 318. Filer v. New York Cent. R. R. Co. (49 N. Y. 42), 243, 244, 250, 318, 322, 328. Filer v. Smith (96 Mich. 347), 455. Filiatrau.lt v. Canadian Pac. R. Co. (Rap. Jud. Quebec, 18 C. S. 491), 530. Finch v. lleermans(5 Luz. Leg. Reg. 125), 1, 2, 89. Fine v. Xavarre ( [Mich.] 62 X. W. 142), 444. Finken v. Elm City Brass Co. (73 Conn. 423), 229. Finley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (71 Minn. 471), 174. Finley v. Magill (57 Mo. App. 481), 95. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. McMillan (29 Ala. 147). 79. First Nat. Ilk. v. Burger (9 Ohio S. A C. P. Dec. 824), 82. First Nat. Bk. v. First Nat. Hk. (116 Ala. 520), 76. First Nat. Bank v. Graham (85 Pa. St. 91 ), 159. First Nat. Bank v. Kansas Grain Co. (60 Kan. 30), 123. First Nat. I lank v Iowa, 693), 91. First Nat. Bk. v. W Ohio St. 555), 78. Fisher v. Hamilton (49 Ind. 341), 438 [References are to Sections.] Fisber v. Jansen | L28 111. 549), 228. Fisher v. Met. E. R. Co. (34 Bun [N. Y.], 133), 136. Fisher \. Meyer | L2 Fed. 842), 79. Fisher v. Patterson (1 1 Ohio, H8), 423. Fisher v. Tice (20 Iowa, 479), 128. Fish Keek Co. v. Kedlow (7 Kan. App. 93), 101. Fiske v. Forsythe, etc., Bleaching Co. (57 Conn. 118), 152. Fitch v. Broadway & S. A. R. Co. (10 N. Y. Supp. 225), 214. Fitch v. Fitch (35 N. V. Sup. [3 J. & S.] 302), 11,81. Fitchburg R. Co. v. Donnelly ( [C. C. App. 7th C] 87 Fed. 135), 240. Fitchburg R. Co. v. Nichols ( [C. C. App. 1st C] 85 Fed. 945), 166. Fittsv. MeGhee (172 U. S. 516; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; 43 L. Ed. 536; 31 Chic. L. News, 207), 65. Fitzgerald v. Chic, Rock Island & P. Ry. Co. (50 Iowa, 79), 133, 342. Fitzgerald. See Gerald. Fitzgerald v. Dobson (7s Me. 359), 95, 214. Fitzgerald v. Donoher (48 Neb. 852), 470. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald ([Neb. 02 N. W. 899), 87. Fitzgerald v. Ceils (84 Bun [N. Y.], 295), 393. Fitzgerald v. New York C. & II. R. R. Co. (88 Bun [N. Y.J, 359 |, 562, .".72. 586. Fitzgerald v. Qiiann i 109 N. V. 441), 501. Fitzgerald v. St. Paul, M..& M. R. Co. (29 Minn. 336), 176. Fitzgerald v. Western In. T. Co. (15 Tex. Civ. App. L43), 191, 495. Fitzgihhon v. Brown | |:; Me. 169), 432, 439. Fitzhenry v. Consolidated Trac. Co. ([N. .I.| 12 Atl. 416), 51 I. 667. Fitzpatrick v. Blocker (23 Tex. 552), 146. Thurman (69 U. Tel. Co. (30 TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IX VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Fitzpatrickv. Boston & M. R. Co. (84 Me. 33), 194. Fitzpatrick v. Daily .States Pub. Co. (48 La. Ann. 1116), 413, 417. Fitzpatrick v. Greal Western R. R. Co. (12 Up. Can. Q. B. 645), 183. Fitzsimotis v. Roue (21 W. D. [N. Y.] 343), 214. Flaherty v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. ([R. I.] 36 Atl. 1132), 514. Flaherty v. Powers (167 Mass. 61), 281. Flanagan v. Bait. & O. R. R. Co. ([Iowa] 50 N. W. 60), 255, 299. Flanagan v. Womack (54 Tex. 45), 373. Flannery v. Bait, & O. R. R. Co. (4 Mackey [S. C],lll), 139. Flatow v. Von Bremsen ( 19 Civ. Proc. 125), 394. Fleet v. Hollenkemp (13 B. Mon. [Ky.] 219), 119, 124, 186. Fleming v. Shenandoah (67 Iowa, 508), 318. Fleming v. Texas Loan Agency (87 Tex. 238), 522. Flemington v. Smithers (2 C. & P. 292), 225. Fletcher v. Burroughs (lOIowa, 557), 422. Fletcher v. Chic. & N. W. R. Co. (109 Mich. 363), 437, 443. Fletcher v. Randall (Anth. N. P. [N. Y.] 267), 468. Floetti v. Jornson Engineering Co. (19 App. Div. [N. Y.] 136), 169. Florida v. Anderson (91 U. S. 676), 507. Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Judge (100 Ga. 600; 28 S. E. 379), 63. Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Mooney (40 Fla. 17), 122, 186. Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Scarlett (91 Fed. 349), 488. Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Foxworth ([Fla.] 25 So. 338), 515, 516. Florida S. R. Co. v. Heist (30 Fla. 1), 119, 122, 186. Flourney v. Childress (Minor [Ala.], 93), 106. P"lournoy v. Shreveport Belt Ry. Co. (50 La. Ann. 491), 213. Flower v. Witkousky ([Mich.] 14 West. 44), 471. Floyd v. Hamilton (33 Ala. 235), 111, 122, 124, 186. Flynn v. Fogarty (106 111. 263), 472. Flyun v. Gallagher (52 N. Y. Super. 524), 150. Flynn v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. (78 Mo. 195), 166. Flynn v. San Francisco, etc., R. Co. (40Cal. 14), 161. Foels v. Tonawanda (65 Hun [N. Y.], 624), 580. Foels v. Tonawanda (39 Hun [N. Y.], 567), 87. Foels v. Tonawanda (48 N. Y. St. R. 150), 567. Foerst v. Kelso (131 Cal. 376), 80. Fogarty v. Bogart (60 N. Y. St. R. 81; 43 App. Div. 430), 64. Fohrmannv. Consol. Tract. Co. ( [N. J.] 43 Atl. 892), 112. Foley v. East Flam borough Twp. ([Can.] 26 Ont. App. 43), 63, 84, 173. Foley v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co. (78 Hun [N. Y.], 248), 176 514. Foley v. New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co. (76 Hun [N. Y.], 455), 176. Folsom v. Onderhill (36 Vt. 580), 251. Folwell v. Providence Journal Co. (19 R. I. 551), 417. Fonge v. Pac. Mail Co. (1 Cal. 353), 91. Fonuall v. Standard Oil Co. ( [Mich. 1901] 86 N. W. 946), 66. Foot v. Brown, (8 Johns. [N. Y.] 63), 392. Foot v. Card (58 Conn. 4), 458. Foot v. Tracy (1 Johns. [N. Y.] 46), 422. Foote v. Merrill (54 N. H. 490), 99. TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IN VOL. I. Ixxiii [References are to Sections.] Foote v. Nichols (28 III. 186), 124. Forbell v. New Fork i IT App. Div. [N. V.J 371; 6 V Y. Supp. L005, alT'd 164 N. V. 522; 58 N. E. 644 |, 67. Forbes v. Loftin (50 Ala. 39G), 310. Ford v. Buckley (68 [11. App. 447), 432. Ford v. Charles Warner Co. ( 1 Marv. [Del.] 88), 122, L61, L86, 244. Ford v. Cheevor ([Mich.] 2 Det. L. N. 21.0), 480. Ford v. Ik's Moines (100 Iowa, 94), 244, 246. Ford v. Hoover ([C. P.] 13 Lane. L. Rev. 81), 515. Ford v. Jones (62 Barb. [N. Y.] 484), 304, 376. Ford v. Monroe (20 Wend. [N. V.) 210), 495, 588, 591. Ford v. Umatilla Co. (15 Oreg. 313), 161, 166. Forde v. Skinner (4 C. & P. 239), 111. Fordyce v. Jackson (56 Ark. Uul), 245. Fordyce v. Manuel (82 Tex. 527 i. 338. Fordyce v. McCants (55 Ark. 384), 607, 614, 616, iil7. 624, 625, 635, 636. Fordyce V. .Moore ([Tex. Civ. App.] 22 S. W. 235), 211. 275. Fordyce v. Nix (58 Ark. 136), 346. Forhman v. Consol. Tract Co. ( [N. J. 1900] 4:5 AH. 892), 136. Forke v. Homann (II Tex. Civ. App. 670), 381, 387. Formal] v. Standard Oil Co. ([Mich. 1901] 86 N. W. 946), 64. Fortier v. Moore (67 V II. 460). 472. Forty-Second St. M. & St. X. R. Co. v. Bannon ([('. C. App. 2d C] 85 Fed. 852), 205. Foster v. Bellaire ([Mich. 1901] 86 \. W. 383), 267. Foster v. Elliott (38 Iowa, 216), 62, 76. Foster v. Pitts it'.:: Ark. 387), 431, 442, 628. Foster v. Smith (10 Wend. [N. V. | 377), 57. Foster v. United States (82 Ct CI. L70), 65. Fotheringham \. Adams Exp. Co. Fed. 252), 120. Fowler v. Baltimore, etc., Et. Co. (18 W. Va. 579), 161. Fowler v. Buffalo Furnace Co. (41 App. Div. [\. Y.J 84), 572, 586. Fowler v. Fowler (113 Mich. 575), 416. Fowler v. Shook ([Tex. Civ. App. 1900] 59 S. W. 282), B2, 89. Fowler v. Western Union Teleg. Co. (80 Me. 381 |, 149. Fowiks v. .Southern R. Co. (96 Vt. 742), 84. Fox v. Oakland Consol. St. K. Co. (118 Cal. 55), 514. Fox v. Stevens (13 Minn. 272), 111, 467. Fox v. St. John (23 X. B. 244). 243. Fox v. Wray (56 Ind. 423), 75. Fox v. Wunderlich (64 Iowa, 187), 111, 124, 475. Francis v. Tilyon (26 App. Div. [N T . Y.] 340), 432, 454. Frank v. Curtis (58 Mo. App. 349), 442. Frankfort v. Coleman (19 Ind. App. 368), 214. Fiankforter v. Bryan (12 111. 549), 145. Franklin v. MeCorkle (16 Lea [Term.], 609), 164, 167. Franklin v. Schultz (23 Mont. L66; 57 Pac. 1037), 7::. Franklin v. Southeastern Ry. (8 II. A V 211), 514. 525, 528, 531, 532, 535, 5:17, 552. Franz v. II iltei brand (45 Mo. 721), 113. Fraser v. Freeman (56 Barb. | N\ Y] 234), 594. Frazerv. Berkeley (7C. & P 789), 377. Frazer v. Schroder (60 111. App. 519), 214. Frazier v. Georgia K. & B. Co. (101 Ga. 70), 514. lxxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. Frazier v. McClosky (60 N. Y. 337), 404. Freeh v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. (39 Md. 574), ICC. Frederickson v. Johnson ([Minn.] 62 N. \V. 388), 386, 390. Freelaiul v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (54 App. Div. [N. Y.] 90), 230. Fnc man v. Clute (3 Barb. [N. Y.] 424), 17,87. Freeman v. Hutchinson (15 Ind. App. 639), 284. Freeman v. Tinsley (59 111. 497), 418. Freese v. Tripp (70 111. 496), 123, 124, 474, 477. Freidenheit v. Edmundson (36 Mo. 227), 113. Fremont E. & M. V. R. Co. v. French (48 Neb. 638), 214, 215, 328. . Fremont E. & M. Y. R. Co. v. Leslie ([Neb.] 59 N. W. 559), 214. French v. Bent (43 N. H. 448), 78. French v. Masenna F. Co. ([N. H.] 20 Atl. 363), 503. Friedman v. McGowan (1 Penn. [Del.] 436), 215, 322, 326. Friel v. Plumer ([N. H.] 43 Atl. 618), 438, 444. Friend v. Burleigh (53 Neb. 671), 598, 003, 607, 615, 624, 627. Friend v. Ingersoll ([Neb.] 58 N. W. 281), 213,624. Friend v. Woods (6 Graft. [Va.] 189), 153. Friess v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. Co. (67 Hun [N.Y.], 205), 282. Frink v. Coe (4 Greene [Iowa], 555), 135. Frink v. Schroyer (18 111. 416), 90. Frisbie v. United States (157 U. S. 160; 39 L. Ed. 657; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586), 73. Frish v. Cutter (73 Md. 87), 397. Frobisher v. Fifth Ave. Transp. Co. (81 II un [N. Y.], 544), 204. Frohs v. Dubuque ([Iowa 1899], 80 N. W. 341 ), 325. [References are to Sections.] Frost v. Beikely Phos. Co. (42 S. C. 402; 20 S. E. 280), 67. Frothingham v. Evertou (12 N. H. 239), 78. Fruchey v. Eagleson (15 Ind. App. 88), 484. Fry v. Bennett (28 N. Y. 324), 382, 386. Fry v. Bennett (4Duer [N. Y.], 247), 114, 406. Fry v. Bennett (5 Sand. [N. Y.] 54), 381. Fry v. Dubuque & S. W. R. R. Co. (45 Iowa, 416), 243. Fry v. Hillan ([Tex. Civ. App.] 37 S. W. 359), 252. Fry v. Kaessner (48 Neb. 133), 432. Fry v. Wolf (8 Pa. Super. Ct. 468), 430, 431. Ft. Scott, W. & W. R. Co. v. Kinney (7 Kan. App. 650), 100, 101. Ft. Scott, W. & W. R. Co. v. Light- burn ([Kan. App. 1899] 58 Pac. 1033), 80, 226, 263. Ft. Wayne & B. I. R. Co. v. Dono- van (110 Mich. 173), 108. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Floyd (21 S. W. 544), 515, 531. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Bell (5 Tex. Civ. App. 28), 214. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Hyatt 34 S. W. 677), 528, 535, 537, 549, 551. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Kennedy (12 Tex. Civ. App. 654), 316, 323, 548. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Measles (81 Tex. 474), 102. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Morrison (93 Tex. 527), 532, 535, 537, 548. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Robert- son ([Tex.] 16 S. W. 1093), 214, 243. Ft. Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. Kime (21 Tex. Civ. App. 271), 517, 528, 532, 536, 537, 540, 542. Fulkerson v. Eads (19 Mo. App. 620), 76. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. 1. Ixxv [References are to Sections.] Fulkerson v. Murdock (53 Mo. App. Gaithers v. Blowers (11 Md. 636), 151), 402. 375, 377, 379. Fuller v. Bow ker (11 Mich. 204), 449. Galbraith v. Fleming (60 Mich. K>3), Puller v. Dean (31 Ala. 654), 415. 376. Fuller v. Jackson (92 Mich. 197), Galbraith v. West End R. Co. (165 282. Muss. 572), 159. Fuller v. N'augatuek R. Co. (21 Conn. Gale v. Dover ( [N. 11. 1896] 14 Atl. 557), 318. 535), 63. Fuller v. Redding (13 App. Div. Oale v. New York C. & EL B., etc., [N. Y.] Gl), 443, 455. B B Co. (76 N. Y. 594), 21 1. Fuller v. Redding (16 Misc. [N. V.J Gale. v. N. V. Cent. R. Co. (13 Hun 034), 442. [X. Y.], 1), 100. Fullerton v. Fordyce (144 Mo. 519), Galesbury v. Hall (45 111. App. 290), 108, 194, •_' 1 I Fillmore v. St. Paul City B Co. (72 Minn. 448), 212,279. Fulsome v. Concord (40 Vt. 185), 215, 243, 249. Fulton Co. v. Rickell (100 Ind. 501), 05. Funk v. Beverly (112 Ind. 190), 411. Furman v. Brooklyn H. R. Co. (25 App. Div. [N. Y.] 133), 214. Furnish v. Mo. P. R. Co. (102 Mo. 439), 310. Furstenburg v. Fawsett (01 Mil. 184), 89. Fush v. Egan (48 La. Ann. 00), 119, 127, 133. Fye v. Chapin ([Mich.] 80 X. W. 797), 95, 90, 214, 298. Gaar v. Snook (1 OhioC. D. 142), 82. Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Snook (1 Ohio Civ. Ct. R 259), 91. Gaertner v. Heyl (179 Pa. St. 391), 435. Gage v. Harvey (66 Ark. 68), 471. Gage v. Rogers (20 Cal. 91), 100. Gaggv. Vetter (41 Ind. 228), 152. Gahagau v. Aermotor Co. (67 Minn. 252), 214. Gaillard \. Cantini ( [c. C. App. 4th ('.] 76 Fed. 669), 447. Gainard v. Rochester, C. & 13. R. Co. (50 Hun [X. V.l. 22), 82, 251, 276, 561, 570. Gainesville, 11. & W. R. Co. v. Lacy (80 Tex. 244), 5:17. 227, 229. Gallon V. Lauer (55 Ohio St. 392). 203. Gallagher v. Kingston Water Co. (164 X. V. C02), 70. Gallin v. London & X. W. By. Co. (L. R. 10 Q. B. 212). 359. Galloway v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (56 Minn. 340; 57 X. W. 1058), 214. Galloway v. Weber (55 111. App. 366 ), 107. Galveston v. Barbour (62 Tex. 172), 225, 522, 524, 526, 527. 530, 532, 535, 538, 547, 548. Galveston, II. & S. A. B Co. v. Arispe (5 Tex. Civ. App. Oil i. 528, 532, 540, 552. Galveston, 11. & S. A. B Co. v. Bon- net (38 S. W. 813). 531, 532, 535, 536, 537, 550. Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Clark (21 Tex. Civ. App. 167), 218, 312. Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Cody (20 Tex. Civ. App. 520), 531,554, 550. Galveston, II. & s. A. R. Co.v. Cooper ([Tex. Civ. App.] 20S. W. 990),328. Galveston, II. >. v. Ford 214. (4ti S. W. 77), 528. Galveston, IT. & S. A. R. Co. v. Stov- Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gibson ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 38 S. W. 480), 108. Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Goodwin ([Tex. Civ. App.] 20 8. W. 1007), 280. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gorm- ley (35 S. W. 488), 528, 537. Galveston, IT. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gorm- ley (27 S. W. 1051), 528, 530, 541. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. (Due- lin) Guelm ([Tex. Civ. App.] 23 S. W. 596), 254. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Hamp- ton ([Tex. Civ. App. 1900) 59 S. W. 928), 218. Galveston, II. S. & A. R. Co. v. Hughes (54 S. W. 264), 535, 547. Galveston, H. & S. &. R. Co. v. Hynes (21 Tex. Civ. App. 34), 102. Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. John- son (58 S. W. 622), 524, 536. Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Kief ([Tex. Civ. App. 1900] 58 S. W. 625), 249. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Kutac (72 Tex. 643), 522, 523, 544. Galveston, H. & 8. A. R. Co. v. Leon- ard ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 29 S. W. 955), 540. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Ma- tula (79 Tex. 577), 529, 530, 543. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Mil- ler ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1900] 57 S. W. 702), 542. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Pat- terson ([Tex. Civ. App.] 46 S. W. 848), 345, 358. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Power (54 S. W. 629), 532, 535, 536, 550. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Scott (21 Tex. Civ. App. 24), 214. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Simon ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1899] 54 S. W. 309), 148. all (3 Willson Civ. Cas. Ct. App. [Tex.] 252), 89. Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Tem- pleton ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1894] 25 ,S. W. 135), 214, 242. Galveston, II. & S. A. I!. Co. v. Turner ( [ Tex. Civ. App.] 23 S. W. 83), 345. Galveston, 11. & S. A. R. Co. v. Waldo ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 32 S. W. 783), 214. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Worthy (87 Tex. 459; 29 S. W. 376), 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 530, 532, 542. Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Zant- zinger (92 Tex. 365), 194. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Zant- zinger ( [Tex. 1898] 48 S. W. 563), 82. Galvin v. Gualala Mill Co. ( [Cal. 1893] 33 Pac. 94), 95. Gambrill. v. Schooley (93 Md. 48), 397. Gannon v. Wilson (60 Cal. 541), 150. Ganssly v. Perkins (30 Mich. 492), 116, 475. Garcia v. Sanders (90 Tex. 103) 558. Gardner v. Detroit St. R. Co. (99 Mich. 182), 280. Gardner v. Heartt (2 Barb. [N. Y.] K 15), 67. Garden v. Neiley ( [Can.] 31 N. S. 39), 80. Garland, The ( [Ont.] S. C. R. 409), 522. Garland Monaghan v. Horn (7 S. C. R. [Ont.] 409), 548. Garland v. Wholeham (26 Iowa, 185), 114. Garoui v. Compagnie Nationale de Navigation (39 N. Y. St. R. 63), 177. TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOl [References are to Sections.] Garraux v. Greenville (58 S. C. 575; 31 S. E. 597 |, 65. Garrett v. Sew. n (108 Ala. 521), 119. Garrick v. Florida, C. . 1900] 60 S. W. Geveke v. Grand Rap. & I. R.Co.(57 478), 213. Mich. 589), 218. Geminill v. Brown ([Ind. A pp.] 56 Giacona v. Bradstreel Co. (48 La. N. E. 691 ), 464, 466. Genay v. Morris (1 Bay [S. C] 6), 111, 190. Ann. 1191). 427. Gibbons v. Phoanix (39 X. Y. St. R. 658 I, 281. Geoghegan v. Atlas Steamship Co. I Oihbons v. United States (8 Wall. (146 N. Y. 369). 165. Geohegan v. Atlas S. S. Co. (3 Misc. [X. Y.] 224), 506. George v. Cypress Hill Cemetery (32 App. Div. 281 ), 136, 138. George Kuapp & Co. v. Campbell (14 Tex. Civ. App. 199), 422. Georgia v. Kepford i r> Iowa, 48), 87. Georgia Cotton-Oil Co. v. Jackson (112 Ga. 620 1. 7.".. Georgia P. Co. v. Props! (83 Ala. 518), 766. \V. S.] 269). 65. Gibbons v. Wilkes-Barre, etc., R. R. Co. (155 Pa. St. 279), 169. Gibbons v. Williams t 135 Mass. 333), 176. Gibbs v. Randlett (58 X. II. 107), 440. Ciblin v. Mclntyre (2 Utah, 384), 215, 218, 243. Gibney v. Lewis (08 Conn. 392), 122, 186, 451. Cihsonv. Jenney (15 Mass. 205), 501, Georgia P. R. Co. v. Hughes (87 Ala. Gibson Co. v. Glizozinski (76 111. 610). 172. App. 400), 214. Ixxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections. 1 Giffen v. Gascoigne ([N. J. 1900] 47 Atl. 25), 667. Gilbert v. Eric R. Co. (97 Fed. 751), 161. Gilbert v. Kennedy (22 Mich. 117), 24, 17."). Gilbert v. Rounds (14 How. Pr. [N. Y.]40), 375. Gilbert v. West End St. R. Co. (100 Mass. 403), 280. Gilbertson v. Forty-Second St. N. Co. (14 App. Uiv. [N. Y.] 294), 207, 215, 226. Gilboy v. Detroit (115 Mich. 121; 73 N. W. 128; 4 Det. L. N. 841), 65. Gildersleeve v. Hammond (109 Mich. 431; 67 N. W. 519; 3 Det. L. N. 117; 43 Cent. L. J. 97), 67, 71. Giles v. Diamond, etc., Co. ( [Del.] 6 Cent. 084), 150. Gill v. Rochester & P. R. Co. (37 Hun [N. Y.], 107), 568, 569, 570, 572, 584. Gillau v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. (91 Wis. 633), 338. Gillette v. Mo. Valley R. R. Co. (55 Mo. 315), 135. Gilley v. Gilley (79 Me. 292), 467, 633. Gilligan v. New York & Harlem R. R. Co. (1 E. D. Sm. 453), 300, 305. Gillman v. Florida C. & P. R. Co. (53 S. C. 210), 108,218, 335. Gillreath v. Allen (10 Ired. [N. C] 67), 112, 113. Gilman v. Lowell (8 Wend. [N. Y.] 579), 415. Gilman v. McClatchy (111 Cal. 606), 390. Gilpin v. Consequa (Pet. [N. S. C. C] 85), 94. Ginchard v. New (84 Hun [N. Y.], 54), 514. Gintz v. Bardley (53 111. App. 597), 478. Girard v. Kalamazoo (92 Mich. 610), 291. Girard Coal Co. v. Wiggins (52 111. App. 69), 289. Girot v. Graham (41 La. Ann. 511), 431. Girst v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. ([Neb. 1901] 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 414), 148. Givens v. Berkly ([Ky.]66 S. W. 158), 302, 374. Givens v. Kentucky Cent. R. Co. (89 Ky. 231), 498. Gleason v. United States (33 Ct. CI. 65), 70. Gleeson v. Virginia Midland R. Co. (140 U. S. 435), 70. Glendale, The (81 Fed. 633), 488. Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler (75 Pa. St. 467), 72. Glenn v. Adams ([Ala. 1901] 29 So. 836), 95. Globe Acct. Ins. Co. v. Gerisch (163 111. 625), 290, 292. Globe Acct. Ins. Co. v. Helwig (13 Ind. App. 530), 104. Glover v. L. & S. W. Ry. (37 L. J. Q. B. 57), 87. Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. (57 Me. 202), 135, 140, 145, 333, 364. Godeau v. Blood (52 Vt. 251), 223. Goetz v. Ambs (27 Mo. 28), 122. Goff v. Akers (49 N. Y. St. R. 615), 177, 514. Goff v. Ockers (49 N. Y. St. R. 615), 514. Goins v. Molerly ([Mo.] 29 S. W. 985), 214. Golder v. Lund (50 Neb. 867), 362. Goldie v. Werner (151 111. 551), 108. Goldman v. Wolf (6 Mo. App. 490), 75. Goldsmith v. Joy (61 Vt. 488), 369, 370, 375, 377. Goldstein v. Foss (2 Younge & J. 146, cited 19 R. I. 481), 440. Gomez v. Joyce (1 N. Y. Supp. 337), 398. Gonzales v. New York & Harlem R. R. Co. (39 How. Pr. 407), 161. Goodall v. Thurman (1 Head [Tenn.] ? 209), 111. Goodell v. Bluff City Lumber Co. (57 Ark. 203), 91. TAI'.l.i: Hi" (ASKS CITED IN Vol.. I. 1 X X i X Goodhart v. Penna. R. R. Co. ( 177 Pa. St. 1), 181, 215, 235, 249, 251, 256, 294, 305. Goodlander .Mill Co. \. Standard Oil Co. (63 Fed. 405), 84. Goodson v. Sunbury Gas ConBumer'B Co. ([20 B.] 7.". Law T. Rep. --'."-I), 63. Gordon v. Brewster (7 Wis. 355), 83. Gordon v. Weaver ([Tenn. Ch. A.pp. 1899] 53 s. W. 740), 65. Gore v. Chadwick(6 Dana [Ky.]477), 369, 374, 380. Gores v. Graff (77 Wis. 17! ), 643, 663, 665. Gorbam v. Kansas City, etc., II. R. Co. (113 Mo. 408), 243, 255. Gorliam v. New York Cent. R. Co. (23 Hun [N. V.],44!t), 561, 589. Gorman v. Soutbern Pac. Co. (97 Cal. 1), 340, 343. Gosling v. Veley (4 H. L. Cas. 079), 02. Gott v. Pulsifer (122 Mass. 235), 428. Goucher v. Jamieson ([Midi. 1900] 82 N. W. 603), 042. Gould v. Christiansen (lilatchf . & II. Adm. 507), 371. Gould v. Oliver (4 B. N. C. 142 [33 E. C. L. R]), 08. Gould v. Weed (12 Wend. [N. Y.] 12), 418, 423, 420. Gower v. Carter (3 Iowa, 244), 106. Grace v. Dempsey (75 Wis. 313), 452, 454. Grace v. McArthur (70 Wis. 641), 386. Graham v. Consolidated Traction Co. (04 X. J. L. 10; 44 Atl. 904). 498, 514, 645, 048, 655, 667, 671, 672. Graham v. Davis (4 Obio St. 363), 150. [References are to Sections. ] Graham v. Smith (1 Edm. Sel. Cas, [N. V.J 267), 168. Grand Ave. R. Co. v. Citizens R. Co. (14.S Mo. 665; BOS. W. 305), 71. Grand Lodge A. < >. & v W.Co. v. Baglej (60 III. App. 589), 106. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. [ves (144 U. s. 408), l 19, 152, 161, 653, 655. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada v. Jennings (13 App. Cas. 800), 516, 524, 554. Graney v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. (140 .Mo. 39), 90. Granl v. Armour ( [C. P.] 25 Ont 7), 70. Grant v. Brooklyn (41 Barb. [N. v i 381), 227, 229. Grant v. Dreyfus ([Cal.] 52 Pac. 1071), 104. Grant v. Grant (109 N. C. 710). 588. Grant v. Herald Co. | 12 App. Div. [N. Y.] 354), 102, 403. Grant v. Mosely (29 Ala. 302), 1 18. Gratiot v. Missouri P. R. Co. ([Mo.] 21 S. W. 1094), 214. Grau v. Bouston (45 Neb. 813), 472, 478, 480, 481, 007. Graves v. Battle Creek (95 Mich. 206), 288, 293. Graves v. Glass (86 Iowa. 261), 89. Graves v. New York & N. E. P. Co. (160 Mass. 402), 205. Graves v. Severens l W Vt. 636), 13. Graves v. Sboll (9Wrigkt [Pa.], 58), 70. Graves v. Tichnor (6 N. II. 5:17). L50. Giavetl v. Mugge (89 111. 218), L34. Cray v. Oosl.y I 18 Johns. [N. Y.] 219), 97. Cray v. Durland (51 \. V. 424), 467. Graham v. fidelity Mut. L. Assn. (98 Gray v. Ellzroth | 10 End. A}>]). 587), Tenn. 48), 430, 431, 432, 434. Graham v. Reno ([Colo. App.] 38 Pac. 835), 71. 428. Graham v. Roder (5 Tex. 141), 120. Graham v. St. Charles St. R. Co. (47 La. Ann. 214 (16 So. 800), 71, 120. 115. Gray v. Griffin (111 Ga. 361; 3<'> s. E. 792), 65. Cray v. James I Pet [U. S. C. C] 394). 95. Gray v. Little (127 N. C. 304). 566. lxxx TABLE OF CASES CITED IN V<)L. I. [References are to Sections.] [Mo.] 16 S. W. Gray v. McDonald 398), 499. (.ray v. Second Ave. R. R. Co. (65 N. Y. 561), 161. Gray v. Times Pub. Co. (74 Minn. 452), 384, 420: Grays v. Bibb Co. (94 Ga. 608), 65. Great Southern R. Co. v. Moorer (116 Ala. 64-'), K)0: Greef v. Brown (7 Kan. App. 394), 148. Greeley, S. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Yeager (11 Colo. 345), 111, 117. Green v. Barney ( [Cal.] 36 Pac. 1026), 101. Green v. Craig (47 Mo. 90), 111, 120, 124. Green v. Hudson R. R. Co. (32 Barb. [N. Y.] 25), 511, 520, 560, 561, 562, 563, 566, 580. Green v. Hudson River R. R. Co. (28 Barb. [N. Y.] 9), 495. Green v. Hudson R. R. Co. (2 Abb. Dec. [N. Y.] 277), 567. Green v. Hudson R. R. Co. (16 How. Tr. [N. Y.] 263), 572, 570. Green v. Middlesex R. Co. (10 Misc. [N. Y.] 473), 295. Green v. Penn. R. Co. (36 Fed. 66), 94, 326. Green v. Weaver (63 Ga. 302), 78. Greene v. Martine (21 Hun [N. Y.], 136), 503. Greensboro v. McGibbony (93 Ga. 672), 75, 228. Greenville Oil & C. Co. v. narkey (20 Tex. Civ. App. 225), 214. Greenwood v. Greenwood (28 Md. 369), 467. Greer v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (14 Ky. L. Rep. 876), 267, 268. Greer v. New York (4 Rob. [N. Y.] 675 ; 1 Alb. Pr. N. S. [N. Y.] 206), 65. Greer, In re (39 App. Div. [N. Y.] 22; 56 N. Y. Supp. 938), 65. Gregory v. Brook (35 Conn. 437), 83, 87, 93. Gregory v. Coleman ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 22 S. W. 181), 123. Gregory v. Cotterel (5 El. & Bl. 571), 361. Gregory v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co. (55 Hun [N. Y.], 303), 244, 249. Griebel v. Rochester Printing Co- (38 N. Y. St. R. 788), 412. Gries v. Zeck (24 Ohio St. 329), 255. Griffen v. Lewiston, ([Ida.] 55 Pac. 545), 63. Griffen v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co. (40 N. Y. 34), 161. Griffin v. Coher (16 N. Y. 489), 17. Griffin Wheel Co. v. Markus (79 111. App. 82), 208. Griffith v. Utica & M. R. R. Co. (43 K Y. St. R. 835), 278. Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley (9 Q. B. D. 57), 498, 499. Griggs v. Fleckenstein (14 Minn. 81), 87. Grimes v. Miller (23 Ont. App. 764), 430. Grimmelman v. Union Pac. R. Co. ( [Iowa, S. C. 1897] 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 237), 229. Grinnell v. Bebb (126 Mich. 157), 77. Grinnell v. Wells (7 M. & G. 1033), 467. Grinsted v. Toronto R. Co. (24 Ont. Rep. 683), 351. Grippen v. New York Central R. R. Co. (40 N. Y. 34), 161. Gripton v. Thompson (32 Kan. 367), 119. Griswold v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. (115 X. Y. 61), 274. Groat v. Gillespie (25 Wend. [N. Y.] 383), 46. Grogan v. Broadway, etc., Co. (87 Mo. 321), 514. Groman v. Kukkuck (59 Iowa, 18), 375. Grossman v. Cosgrove (75 111. App. 385), 214. Grosso v. Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. (50N. J. L. 317), 495, 664. Grosvenor v. Danforth (16 Mass. 74), 106. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. ! x \ \ i [References are to Sections. Grotius \. Rosa i [lml. App.]57N. E. 46), 388. Groundwater v. Washington (92 Wis. 56), 244. Groves v. Rochester (39 I in a [N. Y.j, 5), 214. Grubbsv. ThcJoliuC. Fisher ([Pa.] 23 Tills. L. .1. \.s. 122), '•':;. Gruel v. Mengler (74 111. App. 36), 437, tin. Gubb v. Burford (98 Va. 553), 91. Guberette v. BlcKinley (27 linn [N. Y.|, 320), 37'> Wis. 482), 209. Gulbertsonv. Halliday (50 Neb. 229), 161. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Beall (91 Tex. 310), 548. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hell ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1900] 58 S. W. 614), 220. Gulf, C. & 8. F. R. Co. v. Brown (16 Tex. Civ. App. 93), 87, 27-. Gulf, 0. & S. F. R. Co. v. Campbell (76 Tex. 174), 257. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cleveland ([Tex. Civ. App.] :;:; S. 687), 347. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Comptou (75 Tex. 667), 526, 528, .V.:,. 537, 540, 54S, :, 19. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Corapton ([Tex. Civ. App.] 38 S. W. 220), 70. Gulf, C. & 8. F. R. Co. v. Copeland (17 Tex. Civ. App. 55), 339, 3 !•".. ;s:>4. Gulf, C. & 8. F. R. Co. v. Daniels ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 2'.) S. W. 126), 228, 339. Gulf, C. & 8. F. I!. Co. v. Delaney (22 Tex. Civ. App. 127), 528, 531, 532, 537, •■-■.6. Gulf, C. & 8. F. R. Co. v. Evansich (63 Tex. 64), .".11. Gulf, C. & 8. F. K. Co. v. Caedeeke (39 8. W. 312), 101. 6 (.uli. I . & S. F. R. Co. v. Gi ( [Te.\. | 7 S. W. 695), H>l. Gulf, C. & 8. I'. K. i ... v. Hamilton (17 Tex. < iv. App. 76), 26:;. Gulf, c. a >. I . K. Co. \. Hamilton j- S. W. 906), 51 I. 530, 532, 552. Gulf, C. & S. F. K. Co. v. John (29 8. W. 558), 528. Gulf, C. & S. F. K. Co. v. Johnson (91 Tex. 569), 311. Gulf, C. A- 8. F. R. Cm. v. Johnson ( | rex. I iv. App.] 31 8. W. 255), 540. Gulf, C. A- 8. F. R. Co. v. Mannesw it/. (70 Tex. 73), 194. Gulf, C. A- S. F. R Co. v. McFadden ([Tex. Civ. A]. p.] •_'.", 8. W. 151), 335. Gulf, C. A- 8. F. R. Co. v. Noilleet (78 Tex. 321), 394. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Royall (18 Tex. Civ. App. 86), 51 I. 537, 552. Gulf, C. * S. F. R. Co. \. Ryan ([Tex. Civ. App.] IS 8. W. 866), 346. Gulf, C. A- 8. F. R, Co. v. Smith ( [Tex. C. A.] 30 8. W. 361), 355. Gulf, C. A- s. F. R. (o. v. Smith ([Tex. Civ. App.] 26 8. W. 644), r.io. Gulf, C A s. F. R. Co. v South- wick ( [Tex.] 30 s. W. 592), 524, 532, 537, 538, 543, 545, 547. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Trotl (86 Tex. 112), 220. Gulf, C. A- 8. F. R. Co. v. Warlick ( [Ind. Ter.] 35 8. W. 235), 298. Gulf, C. A- 8. F. R. Co. v Wieno ([Tex. Civ. A]. p.] 26 S. W. 230), :.is. Gulf, C. A 8. F. K. Co. v. Younuer ([Tex. Civ. A pp. J 40 8. W. 423), 538, 541,544. Gulf, C. * s. F. R. Cm. v. Tounger (90 Tex. 387), •">:',(■,. 537, .Ml. 545, ;,:,:,. 556, 619, 631, 032, 647. Gumb v. Twenty-Third St. Ry. Co. (114 N. Y. 411), 257, 258, 261. Ixx ;\n TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Guilder v. Tibbits (153 Ind. 591; 55 N. E. 702), 404, 405, 407. G undersoil v. North Western El. Co. (47 Minn. 101), 514. Gunn v. Felton . ( [Ky. 1900] 57 S. W. 15), 04. Gunterv. Beard (93 Ala. 227), 89, 91. Gunter v. Wicker (85 N. C. 310), 101. Guntber v. Johnson (30 App. Div. [N. Y.] 437), 594. Gurley v. M. Pac. R. Co. ( [Mo.] 26 S. W. 953), 242. Gurney v. Grand Trunk K. Co. (37 N. Y. St. R. 557), 505. Guthrie v. Gorrecht ( [Pa. C. P.] 8 Lauc. L. Rev. 25), 515. Guthrie v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (51 Neb. 746), 101. Guy v. C. C. & St. L. II. Co. ( Ohio, N. P. 3), 339. Gwinnett Co. v. Dunn (74 Ga. 358), 05. Gyles v. Jefferis (5 Pa. Dist. Rep. 129), 434. Haab v. Wise (3 Leg. Int. [Pa.] 322), 91. Haberman v. Gasser ( [Wis.] 89 N. W. 105), 145. Hackett v. Pratt (52 111. App. 340), 107. Hackett v. Smelsley (77 HI. 109), 123 124. Haddon v. Ayres (1E.&E. 184 [102 E. C. L. R.] ), 08. Haden v. Sioux City & P. R. Co. ( [Iowa, 1895] 60 N. W. 537), 215, 227. Hadley v. Baxendale (9 Exch. 341), 89. Hadley v. Haywood (121 Mass. 236), 460. Hagan v. Prov. & W. R. Co. (3 R. I. 88), 112, 136. Hagan v. Riley (13 Gray [Mass.], 515), 77. Hagelund v. Murphy (54 Neb. 545), 432. Hagenaers v. Herbst (30 App. Div. [N. Y.] 546; 5:! X. V. Supp. 360), 68. llaggerty v. Central R. R. Co. (31 N. J. L. 319), 350, 503, 643. Haggerty v. Lewiston ( [Me. 1901] 50 Atl. 55), 69. Haigh v. Eoyal Mail S. P. Co. (52 L. J. Q. B. 640), 522. Haile v. Texas & P. R. Co. (23 U. S. App. 80; 60 Fed. 557), 221. Haines v. Barclay Twp. (181 Pa. 521; 40 W. N. C. 564; 37 Atl. 560), 63. Haines v. Schultz (50 N. J. L. 481), 119, 136, 138. Hair v. Barnes (26 111. App. 580), 75. Haley v. Earle (30 N. Y. 208), 161. Halff v. O'Connor (14 Tex. Civ. App. 191), 97. Hall, In re (38 Kan. 670), 501. Hall v. Bruce (21 111. 161), 464. Hall v. Cadillac (114 Mich. 99), 204, 217. Hall v. Elgin Dairy Co. (15 Wash. 542), 411. Hall v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (39 Fed. 18), 514, 524, 525, 526, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 535, 537, 540, 548. Hall v. Hollander (4 B. & C. 660), 488. Hall v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. (23 Fed. 637), 341. Hall v. Ogden City Ry. Co. (13 Utah, 243), 171. Hall v. South Carolina Ry. Co. (28 S. C. 261), 340. Hall v. State (20 Ohio, 7), 501. Hall v. St. Joseph Water Co. (48 Mo. App. 356), 278. Hall & P. Furniture Co. v. Wilbur (4 Wash. 644), 95. Hallock v. Blecher (42 Barb. [N. Y.] 199), 87. Halshed v. Nelson (24 Hun [N. X".], 395), 388. Hamilton v. Brown (125 Ind. 176), 494. Hamilton v. Davey (28 App. Div. [N. Y.] 457), 432. TABLE OF CASES ciTKD IN VOL. I. lx\ CXlll [References are to Sections.] Hamilton v. Eno (81 N. Y. 116), 111, 387,397. Hamilton v. Great Falls St R. Co. (IT Mont. 334), 214. Hamilton v. Jones (125 End. 176), 499, 503. Hamilton v. McPherson (28 N. Y. 72), 17. 89. Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co. { [Min. 1899] so \. W. 693), 64. Hamilton v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. (42 La. Ann. 82-4), 111*. :.l 1. Hamilton v. Third Ave. K. R. Co. (53 \. Y. 25), 119, 135, 218, 342. Handy v. Johnson (5 Md. 450), 304. Hanenacker v. Ferman (47 111. App. 17i. 17.--. Haney Mfg. Co. v. Perkins (78 Mich. 1), 381. Hanna v. Pegg (1 Blatchf. [Ind.] 181), 81. Hanover R. K. Co. v. Coyle (55 Pa. St. 3!C,), 227, 238. Hanrahan v. Cochran (12 App. Uiv. [\. r.]9i), ,;;: - Hansberger v. Sedalia Elec. R. L. & P. Co. (82 Mo. App. 566), 215, 218. Ilansley v. Janesville & W. R. Co. (117 X. C. 565; 115 X. C. 602), 335. Hanson v. European & Am. Ry. Co. (62 Me. 84), 139, 333, 340, 341. Hanson v. Urbana & C. Elec. St. R. Co. I 7.'. 111. App. 174), 107. Harding v. Townshend (43 Vt. 536), 1 93. Hardy v. Brooklyn (7 Abb. N. C. [X. S.] 103 |, 501. Hardy v. Eagle (23 Misc. [X. V.] 141 ), r,l.-,. I lardy v. Meriden Twp. (114 Mich. 454; 72 X. W. 251), 63. Hardy v. Milwaukee R. Co. (89 Wis. 183), 24.-,. Hardy v. Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co. (36 Fed. 657), 266. Hare v. Marsh (61 Wis. 435), 144. Hargreaves v. Deacon (25 Mich. 1), 66. Darker v. Burlington, C. B, a \. I;. I o. ( [Iowa] 55 N. W. 316), 214. Barley \ . Louisville, etc., R. R. < '<>. I 7 Baxt. [Pen n.] 240), 135. Harlinger v. New York C. & II. B. R. Co. (15 Wkly. Dig. [X. V. 572, --.so. Harman v. Cross (5 Wash. 703), 361, 379. Harman v. Cundifl (82 7a 239), l n, 3! 17. 125. Harman v. Old Colony R. R. Co. ( [Mass. S. .J. C. 1897] 2 Am. Xeg. Rep. 7171,227. 233, 318. Harman v. St. Louis (137 Mo. I'M; 38 S. W. 1102), 63. Harper v. Pinkston (112 X. C. 293), 395. Harper v. Railroad Co. (36 Fed. 102), 507. Harpham v. Whitney (77 111. 32), 431. Harrington v. Eureka Hill Min. Co. (17 Utah, 300), 208, 21 I. Harris v. Central of Ga. R. Co. (103 Da. 495), 109. Harris v. Kentucky Timber & L. Co. (10 Ky. L. Rep. 1731). :.14. Harris v. Moss (112 Ga. '.'•",), 01. Harris v. Rand H X. II. 259), 153. Harris v. State (9 S. D. 453; 60 \ W sic,), 65. Harris v. Zanone (93 Cal. 59), 100. Harrisburg, The (110 1\ S. 199), 495, 498, 503. Harrison v. Berkley (1 Strob. [S. S.] •-.2.-.), 87, 90. Harrison v. Denver A- R. G. W. R. Co. ( [Utah] 27 Pac. 728), 100. Harrison v. Ely (120 111. 83), 111. 124. Harrison v. I.. X. W. Ry. (1 I ah. & E. r>40), 531, 54:',. :,:,:>. Harrison v. Trice (22 Ind. If.:,). 460. Harrison v. Sutter St. R. Co. (116 I al. 156), 101. 377. Harrold v. X. V. Kiev. i;. i;. Co. (24 Hun [N. Y.'. 184), 214. Harrold v. Winona £ St. P. R. Co. (17 Minn. 17), 286. ixxxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. [References are to Sections.] Hart v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. (33 S. C. 427), 139, 251. Hart v. Evans (8 Pa. St. 13), 81. Han v. Grennell (122 X. V. 371), 1G3: Hart v. Sliorey ,(Rep. Jud. Quel). 12 C. L. 84), 457. Hartel v. Holland (19 Wkly. Dig. [N. Y.] 312), 229. • Harter v. Crill (33 Barb. [N. Y.] 2S3), 460. Hartfield v. Roper (21 Wend. [N. Y.] 615), 176. Hartigan v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co. (86 Cal. 142), 503. Hartjen v. Reubsamen (19 Misc. [N. Y.] 149), 515. Hartman v. Morning Journal Assoc. (46 N. Y. St. R. 181), 390. Hartpense v. Rodgers (143 Mo. 623), 457, 459. Hartehorne v. Smith (104 Ga. 235), 433. Harvard v. Stiles (54 Neb. 26), 214. Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Gray ([Ind.] 16 N. E. 787), 108. Harvey v. Dunlop (Lalor [X. Y.], 193), 69. Harwood v. Bennington & R. R. Co. (67 Vt. 664; 32 Atl. 721), 63. Harwood v. Lowell (4 Cush. [Mass.] 370), 316. Haskins v. Lumsden (10 Wis. 359), 415. Hastings v. Stetson (130 Mass. 76), 387, 412. Hastings v. Stetson (126 Mass. 320), 404. Hastings v. Stetson (91 Me. 229), 214. Haszlacher v. Third Ave. R. Co. (26 Misc. [X. Y.] 865), 261. Haszlachern v. Third Ave. R. Co. (60 X T . Y. Supp. 1001), 206. Hatch v. Fuller (131 Mass. 574), 467. Hatfield v. Lasher (17 Hun [X. Y.], 23), 412. Hathaway v. Hatchard (160 Mass. 296), 376. Hatjie v. Hare (68 Vt. 247), 430. Halt v. Evening News Assoc. (94 Mich; 419), 394, 397. Haug v. Great Northern R. Co. (8 N. D. 23), 511. Hausberger v. Sedalia, E. R. L. & P. Co. (82 Mo. App. 566), 75. Hauser v. Griffith (102 Iowa, 215), 372. Haven v. Beidler Mfg. Co. (40 Mich. 286), 7. Havens v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co. (28 Conn. 69), 78. Haver v. Cent. R. R. Co. ( [X. J. 1900] 45 Atl. 593), 136. Havermeyer v. Fuller (60 How. Pr. [X. S.] 316), 393. Haviland v. Manhattan R. Co. (40 N. Y. St. R. 773), 212. Hawes v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. (103 Mo. 10), 209. Hawes v. Knowles (114 Mass. 518), 111, 116, 139. Hawk v. Ridgway (33 111. 475), 119, 134. Hawkins v. Front St. Cable R. Co. (3 Wash. 592), 183, 316,322. Hawkins v. Riley (117 B. Mon. [Ky.] 101), 139. Hawkins v. Snow (28 N. S. 259), 431, 442. Hawks v. Winans ( 10 J. & S. 451 ), 161. Haw ley v. Daley (13 111. App. 391), 599. Hawn v. Banghart (76 Iowa 683), 464. Hay v. The Cohoes Co. (2 N. Y. 159), 150. Haycroft v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. R. R. Co. (2 Hun [N. Y.], 489), 177. Hayden v. Piatt (84 Hun [N. Y.], 487), 214. Hayes v. Lease (51 S. C. 534), 377. Hayes v. Smith (15 Ohio C. C. 300), 214. Hayes v. Third Ave. R. Co. (18 Misc. [N. Y.] 582), 246. Hayes v. Williams (17 Colo. 465), 152. 503, 515. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN \'7. Horgan v. Pacific Mills (158 Mass. 402), 300, 302. Horowitz v. Hamburg-American Packet Co. (18 Misc. [N. Y.] 24), 247. TABLE I >F (ASKS CITED IN VOL. I. 1 X X X 1 X [References are to Sections.] Hosley v. Brooks (20 HI. 115), 425. Hut clikiss v. Lothrop (1 .Julius. [N. V.J 286), lis. Hotchkiss v.Oliphanl (2 Hill [N. , > '.), 510), 420. Hotchkiss v. Porter (30 Conn. 414), 413. lloi springs K. Ci>. v. Deloney (65 Ark. 177), 354. Hough v. Young (1 Ham. [Ohio] 504), 78. Ilouglikirk v. Delaware A 11. Can. Co. (92 N. V. 225), 514,561, 563, 568, 570, 572, 584, 586, 589. Houglitaling v. Kilderhouse (1 N. Y. 530), 423. Houseman v. Grossman (177 Pa. 453; 39 W. N. ('. 276; 35 Atl. 736), 'is. Houston v. Gran (38 NTeb. 687), 478. Houston v. State (98 Wis. 481; 74 X. W. Ill), 65. Houston & T. C. It. Co. v. Berling (14 Tex. C. A. 544), 215, 21S, 294. Houston & T. C. R Co. v. Cowser (57 Tex. 293, 297), 524, 525, 520, 527, 52S, 529, 530, 532, 539, 540, 547, 550. Houston A- T. C. R. Co. v. Kimbell ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 4:; S. \V. 1049), 252. Houston «.v T. C. It. Co. v. Lipscomb ( [Tex.], 62 S. W. 954), 522. Houston & T. ('. It. Co. v. Loeffler ( [Tex.], 51 s. \V. 536 1. 527, 528, 5 12. Houston v. T. ('. It. Co. v. McKenzie ( [Tex. Civ. A pp.1 II S. W. s:;i ,, 347. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Nixon (52 Tex. 19, 24), 527. 547. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Pereira ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 45 S. W. 707), 257, 25s. Houston & T. C. K. Co. v. Red Cross Stock Farm (22 Tex. Civ. App. Ill; 53 s. \V. 834), 03. Houston A- T. C. K. Co. \. Rogers (15 Tex. Civ. App. 0S0), 491, 522, 529, 553. Houston a T. C. I:. < !o. \ Rogers i [Tex. Civ. App.] 39 S. W. 1 112], 502. Houston & T. < '. R. Co. v. B (92 Tex. 117), 251. Houston & T. ( . R. < o. \. Rowell ([Tex. C.A.J 45 S. W. 763), 21 Houston & T. C. It. Co. \. Sgalinski (19 Tex. Civ. App. 107), 1 19. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Shirley C.i Tex. L25), 124. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Weaver ([Tex. Civ. App.j )l s. \V. B46),554. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. White (23 Tex. Civ. App. 280), 524, 527, 528, 532, 537, 550, 551. Houston & T. C. R. R. Co. v. Willie (53 Tex. 318), 249. Houston city st. R. Co. v. Artusey ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1895] 31 S. W. 319), 228. Houston City St. It. Co. v. Medlenka (17 Tex. Civ. App. 621), 214. Houston City St. R. Co. v. Rich art (87 Tex. 539), 173. Houston City St. R. Co. v. Sciacca (80 Tex. 350), 549. Houston E. & W. T. It. Co. v. Per- kins (21 Tex. Civ. App. 50S), 354. Houston E. & W. T. R. Co. v. Rich- ards (20 Tex. Civ. App. 203), 209. Houston Printing Co. v. Dement (18 Tex. Civ. App. 30), 387, 390. Houston PrintingCo. v. Moulden(15 Tex. Civ. App. 571). 381, 385, 387, 390. Howard v. Grover (28 Me. 97), 102. Howard v. Stiles (54 Neb. 26), 240. Howard v. Taylor (99 Ala. 450), 75. Howard v. Wilmington & S. R. Co. (1 (Jill [Md.],311 I. 77. Howard Oil Co. v. I>a\ is 1 76 Tex. 630), 215. 218, 227. Howe v. Co.luan (17 .Minn. 103), 178. Howe v. M inneapolis, St. 1'. & S. S M. R. Co. (62 Minn. 71 I, 214. Howell v. Howell do [red. L. [N. C] 84), 113. xc TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. Howell v. Independence ( 07 Mo. App. 817), 228. Howell v. Rochester R. Co. (24 .\[>\>. Div. [N. Y.] 502), 514, 586, 589. Howells v. North Ainer. Transp. & Trad. Co. (24' Wash. 689), 317, 323. Howes v. Knowles (114 Mass. 518), 219. Howett v. Peon., etc., R. Co. (166 Pa. St. 607), 152. Howland v. Howland (114 Mass. 517), 407. Howland v. Oakland Consol. St. R. Co. (110 Cal. 513), 212. Howland v. Vincent (10 Mete. [Mass.] 371), 07. Howlet v. Tuttle (15 Colo. 454), 114, 372. Howserv. Melcher (40Mich. 185), 95. Hnwson v. Mestayer (3 N. Y. St. R. 571 ), 194. Hoyt v. Cleveland, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co. (112 Mich. 038), 330. Hoyt v. Danbury (69 Conn. 341; 37 Atl. 1051), 63. Hoyt v. Hudson (41 Wis. 105), 100. Hubbard v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co. (104 Wis. 160), 043. Hubbard v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (80 N. W. 454), 005. Hubbard (3 Shep. [Me.] W. U. Tel. Co Wis. Mc Arthur [D. Hubbard \ 198), 95. Hubbard a 55S), 78. Huber v. Tember ( C] 484), 114, 372. Hubgh v. New Orleans & C. R. R. Co. (0 La. Ann. 495), 495. Hnckle v. Money (2 Wils. 205), 111. Hudler v. Golden (36 N. Y. 446), 501- Hudson v. Archer (9 S. D. 240), 75. Hudson R. Teleph. Co. v. Watervliet T. & R. Co. (01 Hun [N. Y.], 140; 21 C. P. 204; 39 N. Y. St. Rep. 952; 15 N. Y. Supp. 752; 10 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 364, case rev'd 135 N. Y. 393; 48 N. Y. St. R. 417; 32 N. E. 148), 71. [References are to Sections.] Hudson Valley Knitting Co. (66 Hun [N. Y.], 628), 214. Hudspeth v. Cray (5 Ark. 175), 106. Huerzelerv. Central Crosstown R. Co. (1 Misc. [N. Y.] 136), 514, 586. Hueston Mississippi & R. R. Boom Co. (76 Minn. 251), 99. Huff v. Aultman (09 Iowa, 71), 478. Huff v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. ( [W. Va. 1900] 95 S. E. 866), 64. Hughes v. Anderson (68 Ala. 280), 38. Hughes v. Fond du Lac (73 Wis. 380; 41 N. W. 407), 72. Hugbes v. McDouough (43 N. J. L. 459), 90. Hughes v. Orange Co. Milk Assoc. (10 N. Y. Supp. 252), 214. Hughes v. Richter (161 111. 409), 631. Hughes v. United States ( [U. S. C. C. D. Wash.] 86 Fed. 1022), 65. Hughey v. Sullivan (36 Ohio L. J. 247), 498. Hughkirk v. Delaware & H. Can Co. (92 N. Y. 219), 562. Hugill v. Reed (49 N. J. L. [20 Vr.] 300), 95. Hulbert v. New Nonpareil Co. ([Iowa] 82 N. W. 928), 417. Hulbert v. Topeka (34 Fed. 510), 499. Hulihan v. Green Bay W. & S. P. R. R. Co. (68 Wis. 520), 243. Hull v. Great Northern Ry. (26 L. R. Ir. 289), 528, 532, 537, 544. Hull v. Summer (12 Mo. App. 583), 134. Humble v. Shoemaker (70 Iowa, 223), 467, 409. Humes v. Proctor (73 Hun [N. Y.], 265), 95. Humphries v. Jobnson (20 Ind. 190), 112, 114, 372. Humpton v. Unterkircher (97 Iowa, 509; 66 N. W. 776), 67. Hunn v. Michigan C. R. Co. (78 Mich. 513), 658, 661. Hunt v. Bennett (19 N. Y. 174), 113. Hunt v. Booneville (65 Mo. 620), 142. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. Xi'l [References are to Sections.] Hunt v. Chicago, etc., K. R. Co. (26 [owa, 368), 263, 264, 265. Hunt v. Chicago, H. & B. It. Co. (121 111. 644), 501. Hunt v. Hayes (64 Vt. 89), 515. Hunt v. Kile (98 Fed. 49), 605, 606. Hunt v. O'Brien (59 111. A.pp. 321), 10(5. Hunt v. Tibbetts (TO Me. 221), 83. Hunt v. Webber (22 App. Div. [N. Y.] 631), 104. Hunt v. Winfield (36 Wis. L54), 316. Hunter v. Kansas City & M. R. & U. Co. (85 Fed. 397), 84, 148. Hunter v. Montana C. I!. Co. (22 Mont. 525; 57 Pac. 140), 63. Hunter v. Stewart (47 Me. 41!)), 81, 182, 204. Hunter v. Third Ave. R. Co. (21 Misc. ( [X. V.J 1), 281, 298. Huntington v. Attrill (14U V. S. 657), 510. Huntington v. Burke (21 Ind. App. 655), 267. Huntington County v. Bonebrake (14(1 Ind. 311), 214. Huntingdon, etc., R. Co. v. Decker (84 Pa. st. 419), 521. Huntley v. Bacon (15 Conn. 2G7), 112. Hurfurth v. Corp. of Washington (G D. C. 2S8), 111. Hnrlburt v. Topeka (34 Fed. 510), 503, 508. Hurley v. New York A B. Brew Co. (13 App. Div. [X. Y.l 167), 152. Hurst v. Detroit City R. Co. (84 X. W. 44), 662. Hurst v. Detroit City R. Co. (84 Mich. 539), 199, 642, 645, 646, 647, 648, 651, 655, 667, 672. Hurst v. Warner (102 Mich. 238), 76. Hurt v. St. Louis, 1. M. & S. Ry. (94 Mo. 255; 7 S. W. 1 (, 285. Huso,, v. Dale ( 19 Mich. 17), Wl, 411. Huston v. Gilbert (40 Hun [X. V.]. Hivtcliiiigs \. Ladd i 16 Mich. 493), Ml. Iliit.hins v. Huteliius(7 Hill [X. V. . 104), 74. Hutchins \. St. Paul, M. a M. R. Co. i II Minn. 5), 102, 514. HutchinBon v. Chic. A- X. W. By, (o. i 41 Wis. 541). 93. Hutchinson v. Hubbard (21 Neb. 83), 180. Iluteliinson v. Snider (137 I'a. St. 1: 20 Atl. 510; 26 W. X. C. 531), 74. Iluteliinson v. Van Cleve (7 Kan. App. 676), 255. Huxley v. Berg (1 Stark. 98), 361. HyatI \. Adams (16 Mich. 180), 119, 186, 225, 495, 511. Hyatt v. Hannibal A- St. J. R. Co. I 19 Mo. App. 287), 89. Hyatl A- S. Mfg. Co. v. Cray (111 N. C. '.'2 1, 81. Hyland v. Burns (10 X. Y. Supp. 386), 177. Hysell \. Swift A- Co. (78 Mo. App. 39; 2 .Mo. App. Kepi-. 124), 69. Ilysore v. Quigley (9 Houst. [Del.] 348), HI. Iburgv. Fitch (57 Cal. 189), 95. Ild v. Forty-Second St R. Co. (47 X. V. 317), 411, 511, 561,570, 57l\ 584, 586, 588, 589. Illinois & St. L. R. R. & C. Co. v. Cobb ('68 111. 53), Il'O. Illinois A St. L. R. Co. v. Whalen (19 111. App. 116), Gin, 626, 637. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Asldiue (56 111. App. I75i. 602, 603, 606, 617. Illinois C. R, Co. v. Baches (55 111. 379), G17. Illinois Cent. K. Co. v. Band] (88 111. App. 629), 617. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Barrow (5 Wall. [U. S.] 90), 215. 5(12. 52D. 602, 604, t;n:,. 607, 609, 610, 612, 613,61 1. 616, G19, G22. 636, 637, 639. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. l'.artle (94 111. App. 57l. Gil. Illinois C. R Co. v. Bayse ( 17 Ky 1.. Rep. Hi5 i. 380. xcn TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Illinois C. R. Co. v. Brookliaven Mach. Co. (71 Miss. 603), 135. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cheek (152 Ind. 663), 212. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Chicago Title & T. Co. (79 111. App. 623), 598, 602, 629. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cole (62111. App. 480), 214. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cozby (174 111. 109), 602, 603, 606. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cozby (69 111. App. 266), 105. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cragin (71 111. 177), 151, 165. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Crudup (63 Miss. 291), 139. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Davenport (75 111. App. 579), 338. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Davidson ( [C. C. App. 7th- C] 70 Fed. 517), 237. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Davis (104 Ttnn. 442; 58 S. W. 296), 63. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Gilbert (51 111. App. 404), 514, 607, 626. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Griffin ( [C. C. App. 7th C] 80 Fed. 278), 287, 288, 294, 299. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Hammer (72 111. 353), 139. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Harris (102 111. 200), 214. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Heisner (45 111. App. 143), 70. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Hunter (70 Misc. 471), 514. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Latimer (128 111. 163), 282, 352. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Le Blanc (74 Miss. 626; 21 So. 748), 68. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Londers (178 111. 585), 207. Illinois C. R. Co. v. McCulip (70 Miss. 300: 25 So. 100), 03. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Minor ( [Miss.] 11 So. 101), 207. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mizell (100 Ky. 235), 214. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Nelson (59 111. 110), :)■:». Illinois C. R. Co. v. Reardon (157 111. 372), 603, 607, 634, 035. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Robinson (58 111. App. 181), 212, 214. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Ross (31 111. App. 170), 139. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Siddons (58 111. App. 607), 81, 353. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Slater (139 111. 190), 597, 633. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Slater (129 111. 91), 514, 635. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Slater (28 111. App. 73), 605, 617, 634. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Weldin (52 111. 290), 517, 627, 632. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Wizell (100 Ky. 235), 84. Illinois Steel Co. v. Ostrowski (93 111. App. 57), 197. Importers' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. Christie (5 Rob. [N. Y.] 169), 78. Independent Tug Line v. Jacobson (84 111. App. 684), 69. Indiana B. & C. R. Co. v. Barnhart (115 Ind. 399; 13 West. 425), 150. Indiana B. & W. R. R. Co. v. Allen (113 Ind. 308), 82. Indianapolis v. Caldwell (9 Ind. 297), 161. Indianapolis v. Gaston (58 Ind. 224), 193, 227, 236, 243, 255. Indianapolis Journal Newspaper Co. v. Pugh (0 Ind. App. 510), 388. Indianapolis P. & C. R. Co. v. Bush (101 Ind. 582), 266. Indianapolis P. & C. R. Co. Keely (23 Ind. 133), 495. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Hoist (93 U. S. 291), 166. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Stables (62 111. 313), 219. Indianapolis Water Co. v. Kingan & Co. (155 Ind. 476), 76. Ingersoll v. Jones (5 Barb. [N. Y.] 661), 468. TABLE OF CASES < 1 PED IN \ OL. 1. \ ( ■ 1 1 1 [References are to Sections.] Ionian v. Ball (65 Iowa, 543), 119, L34 Inman v. Foster (8 Wend. ( [N. Y.J 002). Ml. | lii. Innes v. Milwaukee 1 103 Wis. 582), 514. In re. See name. Insurance Co. See name. Insuranco Co. v. Mosely (8 Wall. [U.S.] 397), 603. [nternational & G. X. R. Co. v. Brooks ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1899] 54 S. W. 1050), 64. [nternational & G. N. R. (Jo. v. Culpepper (19 Tex. Civ. App. 182), 161, 528, 531, 532, 542, 544. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Downing (16 Tex. Civ. App. 643), 84. International & G. X. R. Co. v. Garcia (70 Tex. 207), 136. International & G. X. R. Co. v. Green- wood (2 Tex. C. A. 76), 119. International . X. R. Co. v. Rhodes (21 Tex. Civ. App. 159), 219. International & G. X. K. Co. v. Sein (11 Tex. Civ. App. 386), 156, 169, 544. International & (I. X". H. Co. v. Sen- cock (81 Tex. 503), -".>. International & G. X. K. Co. V. Terry (62 Tex. 380), 344, 349. International & (',. X. R. Co. v. Zapp ([Tex. Civ. App.]49S. W.673 Irlbeck v. Bierl (101 Iowa, 240), 379. Irlbeck v. Bierle ([Iowa.] 50 N. W. 36), 388. Iron v. Davis ( [C. A. 1890] 2 Q. B. 330), 239. Iron Mountain R. Co. v. Dies (98 Tenn. 655), 514. Irvine v. Lowrey (14 Pet. 298), 507. Irving's Exrs. v. Borough of Media (1!»4 Pa. St. i'.js; i.-, All. 182), 65. Irwin v. Askew (71 <>a. 581 i. 72. 77. Irwin v. Dearman (11 Bast. 23), 467. Irwin v. Yeager (74 Iowa. 174), 369. Isaac v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. (12 Daly [X. Y.], 340), 588. Isbell v. New York, X. II. & R Co. (27 Conn. 393), 161. Isham v. Dow's Estate (70 Vt 58fi 84. Maud Coal Co. v. Risher ([Ind. App.] 40 \. E. L58), 291. Isola v.Weber (147 X. V. 329), 502, 559. Ives v. Walden ([Iowa. 1901] 87 ST. W. 408), 63. .lack v. Sinsheimer 1 125 Cal. 563; 58 Pac. 130), 34. XC1V TABLE OF (ASKS CITED EN VOL. L. [References are to Sections.] Jackers v. Borgman \2 ( .) Kan. 121), 114, 120, 473, 475. Jacks v. Bell (3 Carr. & P. 316), 114. .Jackson v. Boone (93 Ga. 662 I, 275. Jackson v. Consolidated Tract. Co. (59 N. J. L. [30 Vr.] 25), 646, 047, 668. Jackson v. Grace (3 Okla. 143), 80. Jackson v. Hall (84 N. C. 489), 87, 88. Jackson v. Kansas City, Ft. S. A M. R. Co. (157 Mo. 621; 58 S. W. 32), 63, 64. Jackson v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. K. Co. (14U Ind. 241; 39 N. E. 663), 495, 504. Jackson v. Schmidt ( 14 La. Ann. 806), 119, 122, 127. Jackson v. Stanfield (137 Ind. 592), 92. Jackson v. Stetson (15 Mass. 48), 401. Jackson v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. (87 Mo. 422), 503. Jackson v. St. Paul City R. Co. (74 Minn. 48), 214. Jackson v. Wells (13 Tex. Civ. App. 275), 363, 373, 378. Jackson Co. Commrs. v. Nichols ([Ind.] 38 N. E. 526), 290. Jacksonville v. Doan (48 111. App. 247), 91. Jacksonville v. Lambert (62 111. 519), 122. Jacksonville Journal Co. v. Beymer (42 111. App. 443), 386. Jacksonville S. R. Co. v. South- worth (32 111. App. 307), 159. Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. v. Adams (33 Fla. 608), 501. Jacobs v. Crum (62 Tex. 401), 431, 442. Jacobs v. Hoover (9 Minn. 204), 376. Jacobs v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. (10 Bush [Ky.], 263), 119. Jacobsen v. Dalles P. & A. Nay. Co. (93 Fed. 975), 84. Jacobson v. Van Boening (48 Neb. 80; 66 N. \Y. 993; ■>■) Am. St. Rep. 684), 07. 71. Jacobus v. Congregation of C. of T. (107 Ga. 518), 111, 125. Jacquelin v. Morning Journal Assoc. (39 App. Div. [N. Y.] 515), 386. Jacques v. Bridgeport Horse R. R. Co. (41 Conn. 61), 236. Jacquin v. Grand Ave. Cable Co. (57 Mo. App. 320), 208. James v. Christy (18 Mo. 162), 495. James v. Hayes ( [Kan. 1901] 65 Pac. 241), 69. Jane Grey, The ([U. S. C. D. Wash.] 95 Fed. 693), 488. Jansen v. Jersey City (61 N. J. L. 243; 39 Atl. 1025), 65. Jarnigan v. Fleming (43 Miss. 710), 426. Jarvis v. Manlove (5 Hair. [Del.] 452), 374. Jasper v. Pumell (67 111. 358), 133. Jauch v. Jauch (50 Ind. 135), 418. Jay v. Almy (1 Woodb. & M. 262), 448. Jefcoat v. Knotts (1 Rich. L. [S. C] 649), 111. Jefferson v. Adams (4 Harr. [Del.] 321), 114, :;72. Jefferson v. Brady (4 Houst. [Del.] 626), 166. Jefferson County Sav. Bank v. Eborn (84 Ala. 529), 135. Jeffersonville v. McHenry (22 Ind. App. 10), 514. Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. Rogers (20 Ind. 1), 139, 339. Jelinski v. Belt R. Co. (86 111. App. 535), 64. Jencks v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (33 App. Div. 635), 165. Jenkins v. McCarthy (43 S. C. 278), 151. Jenkins v. Railroad Co. (89 Ga. 756), 158. Jenks v. Lewis (3 Mas. [U. S.] 503: 13 Fed. Cas. No. 7279), 42. T \l;U. OF CABES « [TED in \ l >L. I. XC\ [References are to Sections. 1 Jenks v. Viscount Clifden (1 Ch. 604), 193. Jensoa v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. K. Co. (80 Wis. 580), L81. Jernee \. .Monmouth Con v. Northern Pac. It. R. Co. (47 Minn. 4:50), 24:), 279. Johnson v. Parker (58 N. Y. St. R. 332), 104. Johnson v. Phila. & V. R. Co. (163 Pa. St. 127), 108, 203. Johnson v. Reading City Pass. K. Co. (160 Pa. St. 647), 175. Johnson v. Schlosser (146 Ind. 500), 501. Johnson v. Schultz ( [Mich.] 41 X. W. 865), 478. Johnson v. Smith (64 Me. 553), 114, lit. 372. Johnson v. Steam Guage & L. Co. (146 X. V. 152), 28S. Johnson v. Stinger (39 111. App. 180), 76. Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. (67 Minn. 260), 214. Johnson v. Superior Rapid Trans. R. Co. (01 Wis. 233), 172. Johnson v. Yuthrick (7 Ind. 137), 114. Johnson v. Wells (6 Nev. 224), 210, 220. 266, 355. Johnson Co. v. Hemphill ([Ind. A.pp.] II X. E. 065, rev'd 11 Ind. App. 210; 42 N. K. 760), 65. John Spry Lumber Co. \. Duggan i L82 111. 218; 54 N. E. 102, aff'g80 111. App. 302), 64. XCVJ X LBLB OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. Johnston v. Great Northern Ry. (26 L. I;. Ir. 691), 525, 528, 532, 537, 544, 547. Johnston v. Meagler (14 Utah, 426), 432. Johnston v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. ( [Mo.] 9 S. W. 790), 214. Jolietv. Conway (119.111. 489), 263. Joliet v. Conway (17 111. App. 577), 214. Joliet v. Johnson (177 111. 178), 298. Jolietv. Johnson (71 111. App. 423), 214, 299. Joliet v. Looney (159 111. 471), 214. Joliet v. McCraney (49 111. App. 381), 214. Joliet v. Weston (22 111. App. 225), 605. Joliet St. R. Co. v. Caul (143 111. 177), 293. Jones v. Bell (8 Houst. [Del.] 562), 215, 218, 227, 256. Jones v. Brooklyn II. R. Co. (23 App. Div. [N. Y.] 141), 184. Jones v. Chic. St. P. M. & O. R. Co. ( [Minn.] 45 N. W. 444), 278, 279. Jones v. Clay (1 Bos. & Pull. 191), 114. Jones v. Cooper (97 Iowa, 735), 146. Jones v. Deering (94 Me. 165), 243. Jones v. Erie & W. V. R. Co. (151 Pa. St. 30; 25 Atl. 134; 31 W. N. C. 1; 31 Am. St. Rep. 722; 46 Alb. L. J. 467), 71. Jones v. Estes (2 Johns. [N. Y.] 379), 501. Jones v. Greeley (25 Fla. 629), 386, 397, 406. Jones v. Hannovan (55 Mo. 462), 76. Jones v. Jenkins (3 Wash. 17), 437. Jones v. Jones (71 Cal. 89), 430. Jones v. Matthews (75 Tex. 1), 123. Jones v. Noe (71 Ind. 368), 78. Jones v. Ocean Coal Co. ( [C. A. 1899] 2 Q. B. 124), 239. Jones v. Rahilly (16 Minn. 320), 134. Jones v. Spartinburg Herald Co. (44 S. C 526), 522. [References are to Sections.] Jones v. Thompson (6 C. & P. 415), 460. • Jones v. Turpiu (6 Ileisk. [Tenn.] 181), 112. Jones v. Utica & B. R. R. Co. (40 Hun [N. Y.], 349), 316. Jones v. Utica & Black Kiver R. R. Co. (36 Hun [N. Y.], 115), 177. Jones v. Williamsburg (97 Va. 722; 34 S. E. 883), 65. Jordan v. Bowen (46 N. Y. Super. 355), 311. Jordon v. Middlesex R. R. Co. (138 Mass. 425), 227,318, 325. Jordan v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co. (30 N. Y. St. R. 670), 214. Jordan v. Wyatt (4Gratt. [Vt,] 151), 84. Joseph v. Ager (108 Cal. 517; 41 Pac. 422), 67. Joseph B. Thomas ( [D. C. N. D. Cal.] 81 Fed. 578), 214. Joslin v. Grand Rapids Ice Co. (53 Mich. 322), 233. Josselyn v. McAllister (22 Mich. 300), 448, 454. Judd v. Ballard (66 Vt. 668), 310, 311. Judd v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. ( [Ky.] 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 254), 495. Judice v. Southern P. Co. (47 La. Ann. 255), 346, 348, 353. Judson v. Great Northern R. Co. (63 Minn. 248; 65 N. W. 447), 63. Junction City v. Blades (1 Kan. App. 85), 263. Juskowitz v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co. (53 N. Y. Supp. 992), 175. Jutte v. Hughes (67 N. Y. 267, rev'g 40 N. Y. Super. 126), 11. Kahl v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. ( [Ala.] 10 So. 661), 504. Kain v. Lai kin (131 N. Y. 300), 514, 588. Kain v. Larkin (56 Hun [N. Y.], 79), 594. Kalen v. Terre Haute & T. R. Co. (18 Ind. App. 202), 219, 220. TAHLK ")!•' (ASKS CITED IN VOL. I \r\ 11 K.ilfur v. Broadway Firry A: M. A. K. Co. (161 \. Y. 860), 213. Kalfur v. Broadway Perry & M. Ave. R. Co. (34 App. Div. [N. V.J 267), 214. Kane v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (3 X. V. si. II. 145), 368. Cane v. Mitchell Transp. Co. (90 Hun [N. r.], 65), 520, 561, 562, 569, 572, 584, 586, 592. Kane v. N. V. \. II. & II. R. R. Co. (132 \. V. 160), 243, 244, 250. Kane v. West End St. R. Co. (169 Mass. 64), 177. Kankakee v. Steinbach (SO 111. App. 513), 229. Kansas & A. V. R. Co. v. Fitzlmgh (61 Ark. 341), 156. Kansas & T. Coal Co. v. Reid ( [Ind. Ty.] 40 X. W. s()s i. 102. Kansas City & < >. II. Co. v. Hicks (30 Kan. 288; 1 Pac. 396), 2. Kansas City Car & F. Co. v. Sechrisl (59 Kan. 778), 84. Kansas City, Ft. S. A: G. R Co. v. Kier (41 Kan. 071), 122. Kansas City, Ft. s. & M. R. Co. v. Campbell (0 Kan. App. 4171, 100. Kansas City, F't. S. & M. R. Co. v Stoner ( [C. C. App. 8th C] 51 Fed. 649), 291. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Sinner ( [C. C. App. 8th C] 40 Fed. 200), 24.",. Kansas City, M. & B. K. Co. v. Lackey (114 Ala. 152), 214. Kansas City, S. & G. R. Co. v. Rob- erts (0 La. Ann. 859; 21 So. 030), 08. Kansas Pac. Ry. <'". v. Kessler (18 Kan. 523), 122. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Miller (2 Colo. 442), 122. Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pointer (14 Kan. 50), 159, 243. Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Whipple (39 Kan. 531 I, 177. Karan v. Pease (4:, 111. App. 282), 172. 7 [References are to Sections.] Karasrk v. Peiei (22 Wash. 419; 61 Pac. 33), 67. Earner \. Stump (12 Tex. Civ. App, 401), 448, 150. Karr v. Parka ill Cal. to), 800. Karwowski v. Fitass (-J0 App. Div. [X. V.] 118), 402. Kaspari v. Marsh (74 Wis. 563), 515, 516, 655, 659, 663. Katz v. Wolf i 7:; N. V. st. R. 242), 77. KaulTman v. Babcock (07 Tex. 241), 44.",. KaiitTman v. Cleveland, C. C. A St. L K. Co. (144 Ind. 456), 165. Kavanaugh v. Jauesvillc (24 Wis. 618), 322. Kay v. New England Dredging Co. (92 Me. 454), 598. Kaysn- v. Lindell (73 Minn. 123), 64. Kcar v. Garrison (13 Ohio C. C. 477), 471, 475, 477. Kearney v. Railroad (9 (nsh. [Mass.] 109), 488, 405. Kearney Electric Co. v. Langhlin (45 Neb. 390), 003, 615, 019. Keating v. Fitts (13 App. Div. [X. Y.] 1), 434. Keedy v. Howe (72 111. 133), 123. Keenan v. Brooklyn City K. Co. (145 N. Y. 348), 503, 500, 570, 571, 572, 584, 587, 588. Keenan v. Getsinger (1 App. Div. [X. V.] 172), 2S5. Keenholts v. Becker (."» Den. 340), 404. Kehler v. Schweuk (144 Pa. St. 348), 207. Keigue v. Janesville (68 Wis. 50), 661. Keini v. Union R. R. Co. (90 Mo. 314; 2 S. \Y. 427), 63. Keirn v. Warfield (00 Miss. 799), 76. Keller v. Oilman (93 Wis. 9), 285, 290, 202. Keller v. Hassker (2 App. Div. [N. Y.] 245), 177. Keller v. New York C. R. Co. (17 How. Pr. [X. Y.] 102), 500, 501. XCV111 TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Keller v. New York C. R. Co. ( Abb. De<\ [NT. Y.] 480), 561, 569. Kellett v. K. R. Co. (22 Mo. App. 356), 139. Kelley v. Altemus (34 Ark. 184), 87. Kelley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (50 Wis. 381), 646. Kelley v. Fahrney (97 Fed. 176), 79, 82. Kelley v. MacDonald (39 Ark. 387), 134. Kelley v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co. (168 Mass. 308), 319. Kelley v. Twenty-Third St. R. Co. (14 Daly [N. Y.], 418), 561, 562, 503, 569, 570, 592. Kellogg v. Chic. & N. W. R. Co. (20 Wis. 223), 85. Kellogg v. New York, C. & H. R. R. Co. (79 N. Y. 72), 593. Kellogg Newspaper Co. v. Paterson (59 111. App. 89), 104. Kellow v. Long Isl. R. Co. (42 N. Y. St. R. 813), 100, 214. Kelly v. Mayberry Twp. (154 Pa. St. 440), 316, 319. Kelly v. Valentine (17 111. App. S7), 123. Kellyville Coal Co. v. Yehuka (94111. App. 74), 83, 219. Kelsey v. Covert (15 How. Pr. [N. Y.] 62; 6 Abb. Pr. 336), 57. Kelsey v. Jewett (34 Hun [N. Y.], 11), 492. Kendall v. Albia (73 Iowa, 241), 234, 255, 256. Kendall v. Stone (5 N. Y. 14), 391, 428. Kendall v. Stone (2 Sandf. [N. Y.] 269), 124. Kennard v. Burton (25 Me. 39), 63. Kennedy v. Busse (60 111. App. 440), 194. Kennedy v. Cecil Co. (69 Md. 65), 161. Kennedy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. ( [Minn. 1894] 58 N. W. 878), 214. Kennedy v. Gramling (33 S. C. 367; 11 S. E. 1081), 73. Kennedy v. Holborn (16 Wis. 457), 401. Kennedy v. Mayor (73 N. Y. 365), 84. Kennedy v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. (35 Hun [N. Y.], 186), 305. Kennedy v. North Mo. R. R. Co. (36 Mo. 351), 112, 113. Kennedy v. Rochester City & B. B. R. Co. (54 Hnn [N. Y.], 183), 562. Kennedy v. Ryall (67 N. Y. 379), 589. Kennedy v. Shea (110 Mass. 147), 467. Kennedy v. Sugar Refinery ( 125 Mass. 90), 499. Kennedy v. Whittaker (81 111. App. 605), 214. Kennedy v. Woodrow (6 Hous. [Del.] 46), 397. Kennedy v. Somerville (68 Mo. App. 222), 212. Kennet & A. N. Co. v. Witherington (18 Q. B. 531), 71. Kenney v. New York C. R. Co. (49 Hnn [N. Y.], 535), 561. Kenney v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (2 N. Y. Supp. 512), 561. Kennon v. Gilmer (131 U. S. 22), 218, 219. Kennon v. Gilmer (9 Mont. 108), 102. Kennon v. Western Un. Teleg. Co. (92 Ala. 399), 77. Kent v. Brinckerhoff (8 N. Y. St. R. 794), 515. Kent v. Kent (1 Mo. App. Repr. 124), 73. Kentucky & Port. R. R. Co. v. Smith (2 Duv. [Ky.] 556), 119. Kentucky C. R. Co. v. Ackley (87 Ky. 278), 227. Kentucky C. R. Co. v. Biddle (17Ky. L. Rep. 1363), 348. Kentucky Cent. R. R. Co. v. Dills (4 Bush [Ky.], 311), 112, 122, 186, 328. Kentucky Central R. R. Co. v. Gaste- neau (83 Ky. 119), 160. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I XC1X [References are to Sections. 1 Kentucky Hotel Co. v. Camb ( [Ky. 1805] 30 S. W. 1010), 21 I. Kentucky Lumber ('<>. v. Miracle I 10] Ky. :W4: 19 Ky. L. Rep. 508; 41 S. W. 25), 72. Kenyon v. Cameron (17 R. I. 122), 111, 118, 145. Kenyon v. Mondovi (98 Wis. 50),244, 245. Kenyon v. Western Un. Telef;. Co. (100 Cal. 454; 35 Pao. 75), 7:5. Kerkon v. Bauer (15 Neb. 150), (510, 019. Kerns v. Hagenbukcle (28 J. & S. [N. Y.] 228), 404, 467. Kerr v. Atticks (20 Pa. Co. Ct. 233), 386, 390. Kerr v. Forgue (54 111. 482), 243. Kerrigan v. Force (68 N. Y. 381), 501. Kerrigan v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (194 Pa. 98), 268. Kerrigan v. Penn R. R. Co. ([Pa. 1899] 44 At!. 10(19), 267. Kerry v. England ([P. C. 1898] A. C. 742). 543, 544. Kerry v. England (67 L. J. P. N. S. 150), 527. Kerry v. Pacific M. S. Co. (121 Cal. 564), 102, 100. Kesler v. Smith (66 N. C. 154), 560, 563, 569, 570. 575. Kessler v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co. (3 App. Div. [N. Y.] 426), 172. Ketcham v. Fox (52 Hun [X. V.|. 284), 475. Ketchum v. Merchants Union Transf. Co. (52 Mo. 390), 150. Keyes v. Cedar Falls (107 Iowa, 509), 195, 227, 283, 267. Koyes v. Devlin (3 E. D. Sm. [N. V. | 518), 371. Keyes v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co. (36 Minn. 290), 219. Kidder v. Aaron (10 S. I). 250), 102. Kidder v. Dunstable (11 Gray [Mass.], 342), 63. Kiefer v. Crank Trunk R. Co. (12 A pp. Div. [X. V.j 28), 504, 506, 595. Kin-nan v. Chicago, 8. I'. & C. B. ('... (123 111. 188), 82. Kierzenkowski v. Philadelphia Trac- tion Co. (184 Pa 459), 155. Kiff v. Voumans (86 N. V. 324), 133, 134, 371. Kilburn v. Coe (4s How. Pr. [X. Y.] 144), 471. Kimball v. Friend (95 Va. 125), 166. Kimmer v. Weber (81 Hun. 599), 563. Kinnaird v. Standard Oil Co. (11 Ky. L. Rep. 692; 12 S. W. 9:17: 41 Alb. L. .!. 229; 30 Cent. L. J. 267), 71. Kinnare v. Chicago (70 111. App. 100), 603. King v. Black Diamond C. Co. (99 (ia. 103), 102. King v. C. C. Bendall Commission Co. (7 Colo. App. 507), 107. King v. Cohoes (77 NT. Y. 83), 85. King v. Colvin (11 R. I. 582), 439. King v. Havens (25 Wend. [N. Y.] 420), 95. King v. Miles City Irrig. D. Co. (16 Mont. 403), 110. King v. Root (4 Wend. [X. Y.] 113), 113. King v. Sassaman ([Tex. Civ. App.] 54 S. W. 304), 397. King v. Shepherd (3 Story, 349), 15:5. Kingman & Co. v. Stoddard ([U. S. C. C. A. 7th C] 57 U. S. App. 379; 29 C. C. A. 413; 85 Fed. 740), 68. Kingsbury & Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (156 Mo. 379; 57 S. W. 547), 63. Kinney v. Crooker (18 Wis. 74), 227, 233, 235. Kinney v. Folkerts (84 Mich. 610), 227. Kinney v. Kinney (104 Iowa, 703; 74 X. W. 08S), 71. Kinney v. Tolkerta (84 Mich. 616), 249. Kinsley v. Pratt (148 N. Y. 372; 42 X. E. 986), 08. TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Kirby v. West. Un. Teleg. Co. ([S. D.] 37 X. W. 202), 501. Kirchner v. New Home S. M. Co. (16 X. V. Supp. 7(51), 95. Kirk v. Garrett (84 Md. 383), 449. Kirk v. Hower (77 Hun [X. Y.],459), 214. Kirkser v. Jones (7 Ala. 022), 111, 124. Kitchellv. Brooklyn H. R. Co. ( 10 Misc. [X. Y.] 277), 214. Kitchen v. Carter (47 Neb. 776), 86. Klatt v. Foster Lumber Co. (92 Wis. 322), 80. Klatt v. Houston Elec. Lt. R. Co. ([Tex.] 57 S. W. 1112), 522. Klauber v. American Express Co. (21 Wis. 21 ), 153. Klein v. Jewett (26 N. J. Eq. 474), 215, 318, 325, 320. Klein v. Second Ave. B. R. Co. (22 J. & S. [X. Y.] 164), 227. Klein v. Thompson (19 Ohio St. 569), 255, 362. Kleiner v. Third Ave. R. Co. (36 App. Div. [N. Y.] 191), 172, 299. Klemm v. New York, C. & H. R. R. Co. (78 Hun [N. Y.], 277), 502, 269, 580, 581. Kleven v. Great Northern R. Co. (70 Minn. 79), 338. Kliment v. Corcoi'an (51 Neb. 142), 470, 473. Klinck v. Colby (46 N. Y. 427), 401. Klingman v. Holmes (54 Mo. 304), 369. Bromme (20 Wis 372), Dunn (66 Pa. St. 141), Klopper v 467. Klumph v 425. Knapp v. Fuller (55 Vt. 311), 426. Knappv. Railroad Co. (20 Wall. 117), 507. Knapp v. Sioux City & P. R. Co. (71 Iowa, 41), 243. Knapp v. Sioux City R. Co. (05 Iowa, 91), 169. Knee v. Lizardi (8 La. 26), 137. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Scott (76 111. App. 645), 432. Knight v. Foster (39 X. H. 576), 115. Knight v. Wilcox (14 N. Y. 413), 87. Knight v. Wilcox (18 Barb. [N. Y.] 212), 467. Knittel v. Schmidt (16 Tex. Civ. App. 7), 362,363, 309. Knoll v. Third Ave. R. Co. ([N. Y. 1901] 60 N. E. 1113), 274. Knopf v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. ( [Del. Super. 1900) 2 Penn. 392; 46 Atl. 747), 63. Knowles v. Norfolk N. So. R. R. Co. (102 N. C. 86), 120, 139. Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. (84 N. A'. 448, rev'g 23 Hun, 159), 63. Koebig v. Southern Pac. Co. (108 Cal. 235), 107. Koehler v. Manufacturing (12 App. Div. 50), 163. Koenigsberger v. Richmond S. M. Co. (158 U. S. 41), 102. Koerner v. Oberly (56 Ind. 284), 114. Koetter v. Man. R. Co. (30 N. Y. St. R. 011), 244. Kohler v. Fairbaven & N. W. R. Co. (8 Wash. 455), 102. Kohn v. Collison ( [Del.] 27 Atl. 834). 501. Kohn v. Melcher ( [C. C. D. Iowa] 43 Fed. 641), 471. Kolb v. Bankhead (18 Tex. 228), 120. Koll v. O'Brien (86 111. 211), 119. Kolka v. Jones (6 N. D. 461), 430, 431, 432. Rolling v. Bennett (18 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 425), 473, 479. Kolme v. White ( [Wash.] 40 Pac. 794), 110. Kolzen v. Broadway & S. Ave. R. Co. (48 N. Y. St. R. 656), 452. Kooserowska v. Glasser (8 N. Y. Supp. 197), 516, 572. Koscinsko v. Slomberg (68 Miss. 469), 76. Kountz v. Brown (16 B. Mon. [Ky.] 577), 122, 187. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. t. CI [References are to Sections.] Kowalski v. Chic. Q. W. J:. Co. (84 Fed. 58G), 84, 214. Kraft v. Kice (01 N. Y. Supp. 368), 81. Cramer v. Market si. Rd. Co. (25 Cal. 284), 495. Kramer v. Waymark (4 H. a- C. 427), 547. Kraut v. Ry. Co. (lf,n Pa. 327), -'08. Kreiter v. Nichols (28 Mich. 496), 475, 477. Kreuger v. Sylvester (100 Iowa. 647), 878. Kroener v. Chicago, M. it St. I'. B. Co. (88 Iowa, 10). -_'14. Krom v. Schoonmaker (3 Barb. [X. Y.] 047), 131. Krueger v. Le Blanc (02 Mich. 70), 87. Krug v. Pitass (102 X. Y. 102), 397, 407. Krug v. Sassaman ([Tex. Civ. App.] 54 S. W. 304), 382. Krulder v. Woolvertou (11 Misc. [N. Y.] 537), 563. Krutz v. Bobbins (12 Wash. 7: 40 Pac. 415), :'.:;, 97. Kubic v. Zeke (105 iowa, 269), 514. Kucera v. Merrill Lumber Co. (91 Wis. 637), 244, 245. Kuclii'iuiu'ister v. O'Connor ( [Ohio] 8 Wkly. L. Bull. 257), 122. Kuhl v. Chicago & X. W. I!. Co. (101 Wis. 42; 77 N. W. 15:.), 71. Kuhn v. Chic. M. & S. B. Ry. Co. (74 Iowa, 137), 128. Kuhn v. Freund (87 Mich. 515). 298. Kuhn v. Neeb (32 \. .1. Eq. 047 I. 87. Kullman v. G-reenebaum (92 Cal. 403; 28 Pac. 074). 73. Kunz v. Troy (104 X. Y. 344), 177. Kupferschmid v. Southern Klec. K. Co. (70 Mo. App. 438), 254. Kutner v. Fargo (-".4 App. Div. [X. Y.] 317), 454. Kutner v. Fargo (20 Misc. [X. Y.] 207), 145. Kyle v. Ohio River Co, ([W. Va. 1901] 38 S. E.489), 83. Labro v. Campbell (50 X. V. Super. 70), '.>:.. Lacas v. Detroit C. R. Co. (92 Mich. 412; 52 \. \V. 745), 255,325. Lacey v. Mitchell 12:; End. 67), 432. Ladd \. Granite State Brich ([X. II.] 37 All. 1041), 07. La Fave \. Cit) of Superior (104 \V,s. 154; 80 V W. 742), 246. Lafflin v. Railroad Co. (106 N. V. L36), L63. LaHer v. Fisher ( [Mich.] 79 N. W. 934), 472, 475. Lagley v. Mason (69 Vt 175). 362. Lago v. Walsh (98 Wis. 348), -_>74. Laible \. Xew fork <'. & n. B. B. Co. (13 App. Div. [X. Y.J 57 1,. 84. Laidlawv. Sage (150 X. Y. 73), 84, 205. Laird v. Chic. & A. B. Co. (78 Mo. App. 27:: I. 119. Laird v. Chicago, R. I. A- B. B. Co. I 100 Iowa, 336), 243. Laird v. Pittsburgh Traction Co. (100 Ba. St. 41. 339. Lake v. Merrill (10 X. .1. L. 288), 106. Lake Erie & W. B. Co. v. Christ ison (39 111. App. 4951, 62, 83, 112. 186. Lake Erie A- W. B. I ... v. < loes (•". End. App. ill i. 349. Lake Erie A- W. B. Co. v. Craig (37 U. S. App. 654 i. 86. Lake Erie A W. B. Co. v. Fremont ([U. S. C. c. A. 6th C] 31 C. C. A. 625; 92 Fed. 721, rev'g 5 Ohio L. R. 140), 07. Lake Erie A W. B. Co. v. Mackey (58 Ohio St. 370), 177. Lake Krie A W. R. Co. v. Wills <:;•.• 111. App. 649), 274. Lake Lighting Co. v. Lewis ( [Ind. App. 1902] 04 X. E. 35), 275. Lake Shore & M. S. R Co. V. An- drews (14 Ohio C. C. 564), 504. Lake Shore & M. s. B. Co. v. Bode- mer (139 HI. 596), 159. Lake Shore A- M. S. B. Co. v. Con- way (169 111. -".05), 75. en TABLE <>F CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. I)y- linski (67 111 A pp. 114), 50:3, 597. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Oo. v. Frantz (127 Pa. St. 297), 227. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Hes- sion (150 111. 546), 598. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Orvis (1 Ohio Dec. 492), .495. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ouska (51 III. App. 334), 607, r,14, 627. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Parker (131 111. 557), 606. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Pren- tice (147 l". S. 107), 112, 135, 136, 137, 18(5. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Rohlfs (51 111. App. 215), 602, 003, 005, 606. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Rosen- zweig (113 Pa. St. 519), 122, 139, 344. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ryan (70 111. App. 45), 214. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Teed (2 Ohio Dec. 662), 338, 354. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Topliff (2 Ohio Dec. 522), 214. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Wins- low (10 Ohio C. C. 193), 214. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Yokes (12 Ohio C. 0. 499), 278, 292. Lake St. El. Ry. Co. v. Brooks (90 111. App. 173), 71. Lake St. El. R. Co. v. Johnson (20 111. App. 413), 214. Lamh v. Baker (34 Neh. 485), 87. Lamb v. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. (46 N. Y. 271), 151. Lamb v. Cedar Rapids (108 Iowa, 029), 209,249,250. Lamb v. Ilarbaugh (105 Cal. 080), 123. Lamb v. Stone (11 Pick. [Mass.] 527)- 62, 06. Lamb v. Stone (95 Wis. 254), 369. Lamb v. Taylor (67 Md. 85), 407. Lambeck v. Grand Rap. & T. R. Co. (106 Mich. 512), 84. Lambert v. Pharis (3 Head. [Tenn.] 62 2 >, 415. Lambert v. Staten Island R. Co. (70 N. Y. 104), 63. Lammiman v. Detroit Citizens St. R. Co. (112 Mich. 602), 255, 325. Lamphear v. Buckingham (33 Conn. 237), 503. Lampher v. Clark (149 N. Y. 472), 422. Lampman v. Gainsborough (17 O. R. 191), 523, 547. Lampman v. Lochran (19 Barb. [N. Y.] 338), 97. Lamport v. Lake Shore & M. S.« R. Co. (142 Ind. 209), 165. Lanark v. Dougherty (45 111. App. 206), 214. Lancaster v. Langston (18 Ky. L. Rep. 299), 432,434. Landrum v. Flannigan (00 Kan. 436), 470. Landrum v. Wells ( [Tex. C. A.] 20 S. W. 101), 451,454. Lane v. Atlantic Works (111 Mass. 136), 03. Lane v. Lewiston (91 Me. 292), 39 Atl. 999), 72. Lane v. Missouri P. R. Co. (132 Mo. 4), 160. Lane v. Ruhl (103 Mich. 38), 95. Lang v. Houston St., etc., R. R. Co. (75 Hun [N. Y.], 151), 503. Lang v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co. (51 Hun [X. Y.], 603), 300. Langdon v. Shearer (43 App. Div. [N. Y.] 007), 393, 394. Langworthy v. Green Twp. (88 Mich. 207), 201, 274,297. Lane v. Wilcox (55 Barb. [N. Y.] 015), 369. Lannahan v. Hearer (79 Md. 413), 91. Lannen v. Albany Gas Light Co. (44 N. Y. 459), 161. Lansing: v. Stone (37 Barb. [N. Y.] 15), 155. Lansing v. Wisnall (5 Den. [N. Y.] 216), 81. TABLE OF CASE8 CITED IN VOL. 1. [References are to Sections, j cm Lantz v. Frey (19 Pa. 366), L02. Lapsley v. Union 1'. I; Co. (50 Fed. 172), 198. Laraway v. Perkins (10 X. Y. :;T1), 11, 80. Larkin v. Burlington, etc., It. C>>. (85 [owa, 492), 172. Larkin v. \. V. 4 X. R. R- Co. (40 N. Y. St. i;. 658), -'14. Larkin v. O'Neil (119 X. Y. 221), 163. Lamed v. Buffington (3 Mass. 546), 426. La Rue v. Smith (153 X. Y. 428), 99. Larzelere v. Kirchgessner (73 Mich. 270). 475, 478. La Salle v. Porteriield (38 111. App. 553), 214. Lathrop v. Adams (133 Mass. 471), 407. Laughlin v. Harvey (24 Ont. App. 438), 297. Lauter v. Duckworth (19 Ind. App. 585), 212. Lauter v. Simpson (2 Ind. App. 293), 106. Lavender v. Hudgens (32 Ark. 763), 448. Lavcry v. Crooke (52 Wis. 612), 407. Law v. Western R. of Ala. (91 Fed. 817), 504. Lawrence v. Church (129 N. Y. 035), 102. Lawrence v. Hagerman (56 111. OS), 437, 442. Lawrence v. Porter (93 Fed. 62), 81, 94. Lawrence v. Samuels (20 Misc. [N.Y.] 15), 293, 296. Lawrence v. Samuels (17 Misc. [N.Y.] 55;i|, 296. Lawrence v. Samuels (10 Misc. [X.Y.] 501), 290. Lawrence & Ottawa K. W. Co. v. Lett (11 S. C. R. [Out.] 122), 5 15. Lawson v. Chicago, St. 1'. M. a- <>. R. Co. (i;4 Wis. 448), 515, 05.-,, 859, 663. Lawson v. Bggleston (28 App. Div. [X. V.j 52), 472, 478. Lawyer v. Fritcher i ISO X. V. 239), 464, 107. Lay v. Bayles 1 1 Cold. [Tenn.] 246), 78. Lazelle v. Xcwfaue (70 Vt. 440 626. Leach v. Detroit Elec. By. Co. ([Mich. 1900] 84 X. W. 310), 267. Leach v. Leach (11 Tex. Civ. App. 699), 302. Leahy v. Davis (121 Mo. 222), 122. Lease v. Penn. Co. (10 Ind. App. 47), 203. Leavenworth, L. & G. R. Co. v. Rice (10 Kan. 426), 122. Leavenworth, X. & S. R. Co. v. Meyer (58 Can. 305), 102. Leber v. Stores (64 N. Y. St. R. 464). 76. Le Boutilier v. Fiske (47 Hun [X. Y.], 323), 518. Leclerc v. Montreal ( Rap. Jud. Quebec 15 C. S. 205), 217,227. Ledgewood v. Elliott ( [Tex.] 51 S. W. 872), 419. Ledlie v. Waller (17 Mont. 150 1. 394. Ledue v. Graham (Montreal L. Rep. 5 B. B. 511), 411. Lee v. Burlington (11:1 Iowa. 356 I, 75, 92. Lee v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (21 .1. & S. [N. Y.] 260), 208. Lee v. Publishers (137 Mo. 385), 514. Lee v. Woolsey (19 Johns. [X. Y.] 319), 375. Lee Co. v. Yarbrough (85 Ala. 590), 65. Leeds v. Metropolitan Gas L. <'<>. (90 N. Y. 20). 215, 227,228. Leeds v. New York Teleph. Co. ( [N. Y. 1901] 01 App. Div. [N. V.; 184), 85. Leen Kir A- Co. V. Smith (35 La Ann. 518). 119. Leep v. st. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. (58 Ark. 107). 501. CIV TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. Leffingwell v. Gilchrist, (40 Iowa, 416), 91. Le Frois v. Monroe Co. (88 Hun, 109), 562. Legare v. Esplin (Rap. Jud. Quebec 12 C. S. 113), i93. Legg v. Britton (64 Vt. 652), 499, 503. Legg v. Mutual L. Ins. Co. (53 N. Y. 394), 97. Leggo v. Welland Mfg. Co. (2 Ont. R. 45), 78. Leggott v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1 Q. B. D. 599), 499, 547. Leggott v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (45 L. J. Q. B. 557), 488, 523, 542. Lehigh & H. R. Co. v. Marchant ( [C. C. App. 2d C] 84 Fed. 870), 220, 277. Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp (100 Pa. St. 95), 514. Lehman v. Brooklyn (30 App. Div. [N. Y.] 305), 84. Lehman v. Brooklyn (29 Barb. [N.Y.] 234), 514, 560, 561, 564, 566, 567, 586, 589. Lehman v. Farwell (95 Wis. 185), 642. Lehman v. McQuown (31 Fed. 138), 91. Lehrer v. Elmore (100 Ky. 56), 387, 390. Leighton v. Sargent (31 N. H. 119), 251. Leiter v. Kinnare (68 111. App. 558), 514, 607, 014, 636. Leith v. Pope (2 Wm. Bl. 1327), 111. Lellis v. Lambert (24 Ont. App. 653), 458. Lemmin v. Lorfeld (107 Wis. 264)-, 667. Lemon v. Pullman Pal. Car Co. (C. C. S. D. [Miss.] 52 Fed. 262), 342. Lemser v. St. Joseph Furniture Co. (70 Mo. App. 209), 214. Lencker v. Steilen (89 111. 545), 467. Lenzen v. Miller (53 Neb. 137), 102. Leonard v. Pope (27 Mich. 145), 404. Letson v. Brown (11 Colo. App. 11), 494. [References are to Sections.] Lett v. St. Lawrence & O. Ry. Co. (11 Ont. App. 1), 521. Leuppie v. Osborn (52 N. J. Eq. 687; 29 Atl. 433), 515. Levitt v. Nassau Elec. R. Co. (14 App. Div. [N. Y.] 83), 214. Lewis v. Atlanta (77 Ga. 756), 325. Lewis v. Chapman (19 Barb. [N. Y.] 252), 406. Lewis v. Clegg (120 N. C. 292), 452. Lewis v. Humphreys (64 Mo. App. 466), 413, 426. Lewis v. Jannoupoulo (70 Mo. App. 325), 119, 186. Lewis v. Long Island R. Co. (162 N. Y. 52; 56 N. E. 548, rev'g 32 App. Div. 627; 53 N. Y. Supp. 1107), 63. Lewis v. Thompson (3 App. Div. [N. Y.] 329), 95. Lewis v. Wilson (151 U. S. 551), 102. Lexington & C. County Min. Co. v. Stephens (20 Ky. L. Rep. 696), 166. Lexington & E. R. Co. v. Lyons (20 Ky. L. Rep. ), 516, 339. Lexington Ry. Co. v. . Cozine ( [Ky. 1901] 64 S. W. 848), 138. L'Herault v. Minneapolis (69 Minn. 261), 244. Libby v. Towle (90 Me. 262), 386. Lieberman v. Third Ave. R. Co. (25 Misc. [N. Y.] 296), 314. Lienkauf v. Morris (66 Ala. 406), 120, 122. Lierman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (52 N. W. 91), 643, 645, 663, 665. Lightfoot v. West (93 Ga. 546), 92. Ligon v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (3 Wil- son Civ. Cas. Ct. App. sec. 2), 81. Lilly v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. (32 S. C. 142), 523, 531, 537. Limblech v. Gerry (15 Misc. [N. Y.] 663), 431, 448, 452, 455. Limekiller v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (33 Kan. 83), 508. Lincoln v. Beekman (23 Neb. 677), 229. Lincoln v. Com. (164 Mass. 368; 41 N. E. 489), 71. TAU.I. "I < ASKS CITED IN \'<>L. I. [References are to Sections.] Lincoln v. O'Brien (56 Nob. . * • 1 i, 65. Lincoln v. Power (151 IT. S. 486), 268. Lincoln v, Saratoga A: S. R. Co. (23 Wend. [N. Y.] 425), 93, 238, 328. Lincoln St. K. Co. v. McClellan (54 Neb. 872; 74 \. \V. 1407), 63. Lindev. Elias (4 Alb. L. J. 76), 375. Lindeman v. Fry (77 111. App. 89), 104. Lindsey v. Danville (40 Yt, 144), 322, 323. Link v. Sheldon | 136 X. V. 1 ), 582. Link v. Sheldon (18 X. Y. Supp. 815), 284. Liuskie v. Kerr ( [Tex. Civ. App.J 34 S. W. 705), 544. 548. Linsley v. Bushnell (15 Conn. 236), 112, 113, 215. Linss v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. ([U. S. C. C. D. Ky.] 91 Fed. 964), 107. Linton Coal & M. Co. v. Persons (15 Ind. App. 69; 43 X. E. 651), 119, 186, 215, 227.* Lipe v. Eisenberd (32 X. Y. 229), 124, 467. Lipp v. Otis Brothers & Co. (161 X. Y. 559), 572. 57::. 587. Lipscomb v. Houston (64 S. \V. '.till). 522. Lisonbee v. Monroe Errig. Co. (18 Utah. 343; 54 Pac. 1009), 70. List v. Miner (74 Conn. 50), 369. Lister v. McKee(79 Ell.App.210), 374. Litchfield Coal Co. v. Taylor (81 111. 590), 599. Litten v. Detroit (119 Mich. 495), 217. Little v. Hacked (lit) (J. S. 371), 161. Little v. Munson (54 111. A.pp. 437), 452. Little v. Stanback (63 X. C. 285), 76. Little v. Young (5 Pa. Super. Ct. 205), 470. Littlebale v. Dix (11 Cnsh. [Mass.] 364), 266. Litthjohn v. Fitchburg R. Co. (148 Mass. 478), 503, 511. Littlejohn v. Greeley (18 Abb. Pr. [\. V.] ID, 381. Little Lock & Ft. s. l;. Co. v. Barker (39 Ark. 191), 805, 607. Little Rock & It. s. Ry. Co. v. Barker (33 Ark. 350), 495, 602, 610, 617, 618, 623, 634, 635. Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Eu- banks (48 Ark. 460), 166. Little Lock & Ft. S. B, Co. v. Town- scud (41 Ark. 382), 598. Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Voss ([Ark.] 18 8. W. 172), 514, 607, 619, 624, 636. Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. Barry (58 Ark. 198), 252. Little Hock, M. R, & T. R. Co. v. Leverett (48 Ark. 333), 614, 617, 631, 632. Littlewood v. Mayor, etc., of X. V. (89 X. Y. 24), 499, 503, 564. Livingston v. Adams (8 Cow. [X. Y.] 175), 67. Llewellyn v. Levy (10: 1 , Pa. 047 I. 515. Lloyd v. Albermarle & K. R. Co. (118 X. C. 1010), 150. Lloyd v. City & Suburban Ry. Co. (110 Ga. 107). 158. Lloyd v. Kelly (48 111. App. 554), 473. Lobdell v. New Bedford (1 Mass. 158), 96. Lochte v. Mitchell ( [Miss. 1900] 28 So. 877), 369. Locke v. International & <•. X. R. Co. ([Tex. Civ. App.] 60S. W. 314), 75, 93. Lockporl v. Richards (81 111. App. 5::::). 214. Lockwood v. Belle City R, Co. (92 Wis. 97), 170. Lockwood v. Lockwood (07 Minn. 470). 458, 402. Lockwood v. X. Y. L. E. & \v. i;. Co. (98 \. V. 523), 511, 520, 561, 562, 563, 568, 569, 570, 572, 581. Lockwood v. Thomas (12 Johns. [N. V.] 248), 515. cvi TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Lockwood v. Twenty-Third St. K. R. Co. (23 N. Y. St. K. 16), 214. Loeb v. Karrak (1 Mont. 152), 91. Loeser v. Humphrey (41 Ohio St. 378), 195. Loftus v. Ferry Co. (84 N. Y. 445), 163. Logan v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R. Co. (77 Mo. 663), 342. Lombard v. Chicago, R. I. &P. R. Co. (47 Iowa, 494), 102, 214. Lombard & S. St. Pass. R. Co. v. Christian (124 Pa. 114), 289. Lombardi v. California Street Cable R. Co. (124 Cal. 311), 235, 261. London v. Cunningham (1 Misc. [N. Y.] 408), 316, 319. Londoun v. Eighth Ave. R. Co. (16 App. Div. [N. Y.] 152), 277. Londsdale Co. v. Moies (2 Cliff. [U. S. C. C. D. R. I.] 538; Fed. Cas. No. 8,497), 62, 76. Long v. Booe ([Ala.] 17 So. 716), 457. Long v. Morrison (14 Ind. 595), 189, 225, 495. Long v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (147 Pa. 343), 70. Long v. Trexler ([Pa.] 8 Atl. 620), 121. Long v. Tribune Printing Co. (107 Mich. 207), 387. Lopez v. Central Arizona Min. Co. (1 Ariz. 464), 166. Lorangerv. Dominion Transport Co. (Rap. Jud. Quebec, 15 C. S. 195), 217. Lord v. Mobile (113 Ala. 360), 266. Lord v. Thompson (9 J. & S. [N. Y.] 115), 515. Lorence v. Ellensburgh (13 Wash. 341 ), 214. Losee v. Buchanan (51 N. Y. 476), 155. Lossman v. Knights (77 HI. App. 670), 470, 473. Louder v. Henson (4 Jones L. [N. C] 369), 111, 124, 186. Louisiana W. E. R. Co. v. Carstens (19 Tex. Civ. App. 190), 525, 528, 542. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Ballard (85 Ky. 307), 120, 139, 140, 141. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ballard (10 Ky. L. Rep. 735), 348. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Berry (96 Ky. 604), 521. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Binion (107 Ala. 645), 215, 263. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Blanks (17 Ky. L. Rep. 1065), 214. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Breckin- ridge (99 Ky. 1), 338. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Constantine (14 Ky. L. Rep. 432), 122. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Creighton (20 Ky. L. Rep. 1691), 514. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Donaldson (19 Ky. L. Rep. 1384), 100. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Gower (85 Tenn. 465), 263. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greer ([Ky. 1895] 29 S. W. 337),-215, 218. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Guy (18 Ky. L. Rep. 750), 346. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hine (121 Ala. 234), 327, 338, 354, 488. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Howard (90 Tenn. 144), 193. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jackson (18 Ky. L. Rep. 296), 340, 346. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kelly (100 Ky. 421; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 70; 40 S. W. 452), 3. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kemper (153 Ind. 618), 100. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kingman (18 Ky. L. Rep. 82), 139, 193. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Keller (20 Ky. L. Rep. 957), 340, 351. Louisville & N". R. Co. v. Long (94 Ky. 410), 139. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mattingly (38 S. W. 686), 214. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maybin (66 Miss. 83), 340. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. CV1J Louisville* X. R. Co. v. McCoy (81 Ky. 303), 139. Louisville & X. R. Co. \. McElroy (100 Ky. 153), 201. Louisville & V I.'. Co. v. McElwain (98 Ky. 7(H)). 495, 503. Louisville ( »7. 619. Louisville, N. A. & C. R Co. v. Rinicker (17 Ind. App. 619), 346. v. Ky. L. Rep. 545), 214. Louisville & N. R Co. v. Snivell (13 Louisville, X. A. & C. R. Co. Ky. L. Rep. 902), 504. Shanks (94 Ind. 598), 119, 122. Louisville & X. R Co. v. Trammell Louisville, X. A. & C. R. Co. v. (93 Ala. 350, 354), 515, 516. Louisville & X. R Co. v.Vittitoe (19 Ky. L. Rep. 612), 156. Louisville & X. R. Co. v. Wallace ([Tenn.] 17 S. W. 882), 192. Louisville & X. R Co. v. Webb (97 Ala. 308), 1G0. Louisville & X. R Co. v. Whitley Co. Ct. (20 Ky. L. Rep. 1367), 101. Louisville & X. R. Co. v. Whitlow 14:; s. W. 711), 161. Louisville & X. R. Co. v. Williams (20 Ind. App. 576), 243, 247. Louisville & X. R Co. v. Williams (113 Ala. 402), 508. Louisville & X. R Co. v. Woods (105 Ala. 561), 152. Louisville & X. K. Co. v. Woods (115 Ala. 527), 229. Louisville & X. R Co. v. Yniestia (21 Fla. 700), 166. Louisville & Portland Canal Co. v. Murphy (9 Bush [Ky.], 522), 119. Louisville & Portland R R Co. v. Smith (2 Duv. [Ky.] 556), 122. Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Orr (91 Ala. ->\s). 511. Louisville. N. & Ct. So. R. R. Co. v. Guinan (11 Lea [Tenn.], 98), 112, 184, 342. Snider (117 Ind. 435), 279. Louisville, X. A. & C. R. Co. V. Wood (113 Ind. 544; 14 X. B. 572), 82, 90, 274, 280, 281, 283. Louisville, X. A. & C. R. Co. v. Wurl (62 111. App. 381 i. 122. Louisville Press Co. v. Sennelly (20 Ky. L. Rep. 1231), 387, 397, 402, 413. Louisville, St. L. & T. R. Co. v. Wafus (13 Ky. L. Rep. 951), 80. Louisville s. W. R. Co. v. Dobbins (60 Ark. 481), 243. Louisville, Tex. & Cin. R. R Co. v. Case (9 Bush [Ky.], 718), 119. Lounsbury v. Bridgeport (Of, Conn. 360), 316. Love v. Atlanta (95 Ga. 129), 65. Love v. Humphrey (9 Wend. [N. Y.] 500), 57. Lovett V. Thomas (81 Va. 245), 7:'.. Low v. Archer (12 X. V. [2 Kern] •_'77). 16. Low v. Herald Co. (6 Utah, 176), 100. Lowe v. .Moss i 12 111. 177). 158. Lowell v. Short(4Cush. [Mass.] 27.".). 112. Lower v. Legal (60 X. J. L. 99), 508. Lowry v. Coster (91 111. 182), 111. CV111 TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Lowry v. Mt. Adams & E. P. I. P. Lyman v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. R. Co. ( [C. C. S. D. Ohio] 68 Fed. ! Co. (4 Houst. [Del.] 583), 161. 827), 214. Lyman Co. v. State (9 S. D. 413; CO Loyacano v. Jurgens (50 La. Ann. 44; 23 So. 717),, 63, 265. Lubrano v. Atlantic Mills ([R. I.] 32 Atl. 205), 499. Lucas v. Michigan .C. R. Co. (98 Mich. 1), 340. Lucas v. New York C. R. Co. (21 Barb. [N. Y.] 245) 569. Luck v. Ripon (53 Wis. 196), 241. Lucker v. Liske (111 Mich. 683), 474. 477. Lucy v. Chic. G. W. R. Co. (64 Minn. 7), 357. Ludden v. Columbus & C. M. R. Co. (7 Ohio N. P. 106; 9 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 793), 64. N. W. 601), 65. Lynch v. Brooklyn City R. Go. (5 X. Y. Supp. 311), 233. Lynch v. Knight (9 II. L. Cas. 577), 91, 220. Lynch v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. (112 Mo. 420), 177. Lynch v. Smith (104 Mass. 52), 170. Lynch v. Southwestern Tel eg. & Teleph. Co. ( [Tex.] 32 S. W. 776), 522. Lynd v. Pickett (7 Minn. 184), 111, 120, 121, 124. Lyon v. Donaldson (34 Fed. 789), 95. Lyon v. Manhattan R. Co. (142 N. Y. 298), 295. Ludlow v. Mackintock ( [Ky. 1899] | Lyons v. Allen (11 App. D. C. 453), 53 S. W. 524), 100. 201. Ludlow Mfg. Co. V.Indian Orchard j Lyons v. Second Ave. R. Co. (89 Co. (177 Mass. 61), 76. Hun, 374), 562, 563, 572, 580. Luessen v. Oshkosk Elec. L. & P. Lyons v. Third Ave. Rd. Co. (7 Rob. Co. (109 Wis. 94), 648, 671. [N. T.J 605), 492. Luft v. Lingane (17 R. I. 420), 386, Lyons v. Woodward (49 Me. 29), 495. 390, 403. ! Lytton v. Baird (95 Ind. 349), 448. Lumley v. Wabash R. Co. ( [C. C. E. | Mac. See Mc. D. Mich.] 71 Fed. 21), 198, 202. j Mace v. Reed (89 Wis. 440), 136, 138. Lund v. New Bedford (121 Mass. 286), ' Macerv. Third Ave. R. K. Co. (15 J. 62, 75. Lung Chung v. Northern P. R. Co. (19 Fed. 254), 505. Lunsford v. Dietrich (86 Ala. 250), 436, 438 & S. [N. Y.] 461), 243. Mack v. South Bound R. Co. (52 S. C. 323), 139, 186, 220, 221, 222. Mackay v. Central R. Co. (4 Fed. 617), 508. Lunt v. Philbrick (59 N. H. 59), 407. j Mackay v. McGuire ( [1891] 1 Q. B Lusk's Admrs. v. Kimball (87 Fed. 250), 73 545), 505. Lustig v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. (65 Hun [N. Y.], 547), 561, 563, 572. Lutcher & M. Lumber Co. v. Dyson ([Tex. Civ. App.] 30 S. W. 61), 305. Lyddon v. Dore (81 Mo. App. 64), 369. Lyddon v. Dose (2 Mo. App. 668), 362. Mackin v. Blythe (35 111. App. 216), 134. Maclennau v. Long Island R. Co. (20 J. & S. [N. Y.] 22), 236. Macomber v. Thompson (Fed. Cas. No. 8919; 1 Sumn. [U. 3.] 384), 91. Macon v. St. Louis, I. M. '& S. R. Co. (75 Mo. App. 1), 236. Macon & Indian Springs Electric St. Ry. Co. v. Holmes (103 Ga. 655), 158. TABLE <»F CASES CITED IN VOL. I. rix [References are to Sections.] Macon & W. R. Co. v. Johnson (38 Ga. 409), L58, 511. Macon, Consol. St. K. Co. v. Barnes i L13 Ga. 212). 2:;::. Macon D. a- s. R. Co. v. Moore (99 Ga. 229), 249, 269. Madden v. Mo. Pac. K. Co. (M Mo, Aj>|>. (itlt'i ), S>'>. Madison v. Missouri P. K. Co. (60 Mo. App. 44), 255. Maffit v. Chic. R. I. & P. R. Co. (57 Kan. 912), 441. Ma^ee v. Holland (27 N. J. L. 86), 111. Magee v. Troy (48 Hun [N. Y.], 383), 276. Magner v. Renk (65 Wis. 164), 444. Mahar v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (20 App. Div. [X. Y.] 161 ), 277. Maher v. Louisville, NO. & T. R. Co. (40 La. Ann. 64), 94. Maher v. Philadelphia Trac. Co. (181 Pa. 391), 502, 511. Mahler v. Norwich & N. Y. Trans. Co. (45 Pari). [N. Y.] 226), 508. Mahon v. New York C. R. Co. (24 N. Y. 658), 99. Malioney v. Dank wart (106 Iowa, 321), 219, 220. 221. Mahoney v. Robbins (49 Ind. 146), 79. Mahood v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co. (8 Utah, 85), 214. Mahood v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co. (8 Utah, 85; 30 Pac. 149 i. 214. Mai mono v. Dry Dock E. P. & B. R. Co. (58 App. Div. [N. Y.] 383), 246. Maine v. Chic. P. & Q. R. Co. ([Iowa] 70 N. W. 630), 203. Mairs v. Manhattan Real Est. Assoc. (80 N. Y. 498; 15 J. & S. [N. Y.] 31 ), 67. Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia Manning v. \\'clls 07, (109, <>10. Maney v. Chicago, Ii. a- q. V,. Co. (49 111. App. id:,), 609. Manford v. McVeigh (92 Va. 416; 23 S. E. 857), 68. Mangam v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co. (36 Barb. [N. Y.] 239), 176. Manger v. Renk (65 Wis. 364), 437. Manget v. O'Neill (51 Mo. App. 35), 386. Manheira v. Carlton College (68 Minn. 531; 71 N. W. 705), 7:5. Manire v. Hubbard (23 Ky. Law Rep. 1753), 393. Manistee A N. K. It. Co. v. Commrs. of Rds. (US Mich. 349). 501. Manley v. N. Y. C. A II. R. R. R. Co. (18 Misc. [N. Y.] 502), 214. Manly v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co. (71 N. C. 655), 177. Mann v. Cowan (S Pa. Super. Ct. 30), 134. Mann Boudoir Car Co. v. Dupre (54 Fed. 646), 184. Manning v. Port Henry Iron Ore Co. (91 X. Y. 664), 595. Manning v. Wells (•">. Mayor. See Xame of place. Mayoi \. Lewis (92 Ala. 352), 142, 22 1. McAfee v. Crawford i 1:; How. [I", s. | 447), 90. McAlister v. Hammond (6 Cow. [X V.] 342), I-'.'. McAllen \. Western In. Teleg. Co. (79 Tex. 243), 82. Bit Arthur v. Sears (21 Went. [X. V.] L90), 153. McAulay v. Birkhead (13 Ired. L. [X. C] 2-i. 113. BicAvoj \. Wright (25 lnd. 22), 120. McBean v. McCullum (89 Hun \. Y.], 95), 107. McBride v. St. Paul City R. Co. (72 Minn. 291), 244. McCabc v. Cuinness ( [Ir. 1!.] 9 C. L. 510), 52:;. McCabe v. Third Ave. Co. (22 Misc. [X. Y.] 707). 275. McCafferty v. Pennsylvania R. Co. ( [Pa.] 44 Ail. 435), 199. 503. McCabill v. Detroit City R. Co. (96 Mich. 156), 668. McCall v. Brock (5 Strobh. [S. I .] 119), 153. . McCall v. McDowell (1 Abb. [X. s.] 212), 452. McCall v. McDowell (Deady, 233), 451. McCallum v. Long Island R. R. Co. (38 Hun [X. Y.], 96), 172. McCann v. Newark & S. O. R. Co. (58 X. J. L. 642). 84. McCarry v. Loomis (63 X. Y. 104), 176. McCarter v. Orphan Asylum of X. Y. (9 Cow. 437), 501. McCarthy v. DeArmit (99 La. 63), 130. McCarthy v. Miller ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 57 s. W. 97:; i. 387. McCarthy v. Niskern (22 Minn. 90), 111. 144. 145. McCarthy v. Railroad Co. (18 Kan. 46). 499, 503. McCarty v. Beach ( 10 Cal. 461 ), 77. 81. C xii TABLE OF CASES CITED IN* VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] McCarty v. Lambley (20 App. Div. | McCreery v. Ohio River R. Co. ( [W [N. Y.] 264), 404. McCarty v. Lockport (13 App. Div. [X. Y.] 494), 87. McCarty v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. (62 Fed. '437), 505. MeCarvel v. Sawyer (173 Mass. 540), 04. McClary v. Warner (69 111. App. 223), 515. McClean v. New York Press Co. (19 N. Y. Supp. 262), 412. McClellan v. Hein (56 Neb. 600), 473. McClendon v. Wells (20 S. C. 514), 128. McCloskey v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. (152 Mo. 339), 411, 413. McClure v. Alexander ( 15 Ky. L. Rep. 732), 502. McClurg v. McKercher (56 Hun [N. Y.], 305), 588. McCluskey v. Cromwell (11 N. Y. 593), 501. McConnell v. Kibbe (33 111. 174), 62 76, 94. McCooey v. Forty-Second St. & G. St. Ferry R. Co. (79 Hun [N. Y.], 255), 214, 274. McCord v. Williams (2 Ala. 71), 35. McCormack v. Nassau Elec. R. Co. (18 App. Div. [N. Y.] 333), 172, 562, 563. McCormick v. Conway (12 La. Ann. 53), 430. McCormick v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. (57 Mo. 533), 67. McCormick H. M. Co. v. Wesson (41 S. W. 725), 102. McCoy v. Elder (2 Blackf. [Ind.] 183), 57. McCoy v. Milwaukee St. R. Co. ( [Wis. 1894] 59 N. W. 453), 214, 226, 230, 311. McCoy v. Phila. W. & B. R. Co. (5 Houst. [Del.] 599), 122, 136. McCoy v. Trucks (121 Ind. 292), 464. McCraw v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. ( [Neb. 1899] 81 N. W. 306), 148. Va.. 1901] 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 500), 156, 161. McCruden v. Rochester R. Co. (5 Misc. [N- Y.] 59), 95. McCullough v. Walton (11 Ala. 492), 124. McCurry v. McCuiry (82 N. C. 296), 415. McCutchen v. McGahan (11 Johns. [X. Y.] 281), 515. McDaniel v. Baca (2 Cal. 329), 428. McDermott v. Chic. & N. W. R. Co. ( [Wis.] 55 N. W. 179), 211. McDevitt v. St. Paul (66 Minn. 14), 316, 322. McDonald v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (26 Iowa, 124), 249, 267. McDonald v. Eagle & P. Mfg. Co. (67 Ga. 761), 111. McDonald v. Illinois C. R. Co. ([Iowa] 155 N. W. 102), 254. McDonald v. Illinois C. R. Co. ( [Iowa] 55 N. W. 102), 281. McDonald v. Long Island R. R. Co. (6 N. Y. St. R. 691), 212. McDonald v. McDonald (16 Ky. L. Rep. 412), 504. McDonald v. Montgomery St. R. Co. (110 Ala. 161), 166. McDonald v. New York C. & St. L. R. R. Co. (13 Misc. [N. Y.] 651), 281. McDonald v. United States (33 Ct. CI. 209), 65. McDonnell v. Cambridge R. Co. (151 Mass. 159), 78. McDonnell v. Henry Elias Brew. Co. (16 App. Div. [N. Y.] 223), 214. McDonnell v. Pescadero & S. M. S. Co. (120 Cal. 476), 98. McDowell v. Ga. R. Co. (60 Ga. 320), 495. McFadden v. Dietz (115 Cal. 697), 102. Mcl"arland v. Missouri P. R. Co. (125 Mo. 253), 198. McFarland v. Muscatine (98 Iowa, 199), 240. TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IN Vol,. I. [References are to Sections.] cxni McFarland v. Roly (4 Ohio Dec. 211), McGuire v. <. olden Catc (McAllister 80. U.S.] 104), 136. McFee v. Vickshnrg. s. a- P. i;. Co. BicGuire \. Kiveland (.".»; \'i 62), <;»'.. (12 La. Ann. 790), 139, 510, 51 I. McGanaban v. New Xork, X. II. & McHenry Coal Co. \. Sneddon Ky. 684), 122, 1ST. II. R. Co. (171 Mass. 211). 90, 196, McHugh v. New York El. B. Co. (47 230, 251, 204. X. V. St. R. 7.;), 108. McGann v. Hamilton (58 Conn. 69), Mcllngli v. Schlosser (159 Pa. St. 480), 22s. Mcintosh v. Johnson (51 Neb. 33), 501. Mclntyre v. New York C. K. Co. (47 Barb.[N. ST.] 515), 563, 566, 572 79. Miliar v. Bristol (71 Coon. 652; 42 Atl. 1000), 65. McGarry v. Mo. Tar. R. Co. (36 Mo. App. 340), 442. McGaw v. Lancaster ( [C. P. Pa. J 14 Mclntyre v. X. V. C. R. B. Co. (37 M. Lane. L. Rev. 276), 214. Y. 280), 221 1. ..tit). McGee v. Baumgartner ( [Mich.] 80 Mclntyre v. New York C. R. Co. (37 X. W. 21), 390. McGee v. Penn. K. Co. ( [Pac. P.] 33 W. X. C. 15), 214. \. Y. -_--7 ( . 521, 561, 562, 563, 567, 582. Mclntyre v. Sholty (121 111. 660), 131. Mel, lone v. New Jersey K. Co. (8 Mclntyre v. Weinert (195 Pa. 52), Vr. [X. J.] 304), 646. 392. McGovern v. Hope (63 X. J. L. 76; McKay v. New England Dredging Co. (92 Me. 454), 198, 602, 612, 613, 614, 616. McKeigue v. Janesville (68 Wis. 50), 643, 657, 662, 665, 666. McKeon v. Chicago, M. & S. P. R. R. Co. (94 Wis. 177i. 21 1. 280. McKeon v. Citizens St. Ry. Co. (42 Mo. 79), 113. McKeuna v. Brooklyn Heights R, Co. (41 App. Div. [N. Y.] 255), 252, 260. McKenzie v. Allen (3 Strob. [S. C] 546), 266, 375. 42 Atl. 830), 294. McGovern v. New York Cent. R. Co. (67 X. Y. 417), 514, 586, 588, 589. McGovern v. Standard Oil Co. (11 App. Div. [X. Y.] 588), 152. McGowan v. Boston (170 Mass. 384; 49 X. E. 633), 65. McGowan v. Giveen Mfg. Co. (54 App. Uiv. [X. Y.] 233), 213. McGowan v. Interstate Cousol. St. R. Co. (20 R. I. 264), 211. McGowan v. McGowan (122 N. C. 145), 430. McGowan v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. McEinley v. C. & X. W. B. Co. (44 (60 N. J. L. 198), 501. Iowa. 314), 227, :;<;4. MoGown v. International * (.. X. B. McEinney v. Juhman (38 Mo. App. Co. (85 Tex. 289; 20 s. W. 80), 524, 525,526,528, 530, 535, 5 11. 543. McGown v. Wheeler (20 Tex. 372), 74. McGrath v. Donnelly (131 Pa. 549), 515. McGregor v. Reed M. & Co. (178 111. 4(14), 84. 344), 515. McEnight v. Ratcliffe (14 Pac. St. L68), ill. McKormick v. West Bay City (110 Mich. 21 ;5 1, 229, 241. McEue v. Klein (60 Tex. 168), 522. McLain v. Van Zandl (48 How. Br. fX. Y.) 80), 176. McGuire v. Brooklyn 11. R. Co (30 McLamb v. Wilmington 4 W. B. Co. App. Div. [X. Y.] 227), 281. (122 N. C. 862), 157. CX1V TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] McLane v. Kelly (72 Minn. 395), 488. McLane v. Perkins ( [Maine, 1898] 42 Atl. 256), 165. McLauchlin v. Charlotte & S. C. R. Co. (5 Rich. [S. ('.] 583), 67. McLaughlin v. Cony (77 Pa. 109), 227, 243. McLaughlin v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co. (48 La. Ann. 23), 177. McLean v. City of Kansas City (81 Mo. App. 72), 325. McLean v. Kansas City (2 Mo. A. Rep. 681), 254. McLean v. McLean (15 Wkly. Dig. [N. Y.] 181), 97. McLean Coal Co. v. McVey (38 111. App. 158), 514, 605, 616, 635. McMahon v. Bennett (31 App. Div. [N. Y.] 16), 421. McMahon v. Eau Claire Waterworks Co. ([Wis. 1897] 95 Wis. 640), 214. McMahon v. Field (7 Q. B. Div. 591), 349. McMahon v. Mayor (33 N. Y. 642), 569, 586. McMahon v. New York News Co. (51 App. Div. [N. Y.] 488), 397, 402. McMahon v. New York Elev. R. R. Co. (18 J. & S. [N. Y.] 507), 151. McMahon v. Northern Central R. Co. (39 Md. 438), 219, 243. McMahon v. Sankey (133 111. 636), 475. McMaster v. Dyer (44 W. Va. 644), 470. McMillan v. Union P. B. W. (6 Mo. App. 434), 309. McNair v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (22 N. Y. St. R. 840), 255. McNamara v. King (7 111. 432), 111, 263, 369. McNeil v. Lyons (20 R. I. 672), 211. McNulta v. Jenkins (91 111. App. 309), 605. McNnlty v. Walker (64 Miss. 198), 430. McPeck v. Central Vt. R. Co. (79 Fed. 596), 161. McPherson v. Ryan (59 Mich. 33), 116. McPheters v. Moore River L. D. Co. (78 Me. 329), 83. McQueen v. Hale (1 Coldw. [Tenn.] 212), 448. McQueen v. Heck (1 Coldw. [Tenn.] 212), 448. McQueen v. Middletown Mfg. Co. (16 Johns. [N. Y.] 7), 501. McQuigan v. Del. L. & W. R. Co. (129 N. Y. 50), 295. McRickard v. Flint (114 N. Y. 222), 63. McWilliams v. Bragg (3 Wis. 424), 111, 112. McWilliams v. Hoban (42 Md. 56), 437, 442. Mead v. Haskius (6 Ohio N. P. 522), 463. Mead v. Strattou (87 N. Y. 493), 472. Meade v. Brooklyn H. R. Co. (3 App. Div. [N. Y.] 432), 214. Meade v. Chicago, R, T. & P. R. Co. (72 Mo. App. 61), 300, 305. Meagher v. Driscoll (99 Mass. 281), 125. Medbury v. N. Y. & E. R. Co. (26 Barb. [N. Y.] 564), 83, 87, 91. Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (6 App. Div. [N. Y.] 42), 559, 560, 562, 563, 572, 580. Meehan v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (67 111. App. 39), 633. Meek v. Carlettsburg & P. P. Co. (22 Ky. L. Rep. 1318), 76. Meeks v. Southern R. Co. (52 Cal. 602), 176. Meeks v. St. Paul (64 Minn. 220), 100. Meers v. McDowell (23 Ky. Law Rep. 461), 300. Meeter v. Manhattan R. Co. (63 Hun [N. Y.], 533), 244, 245. Mehrof Bros. B. M. Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. B. Co. ( [N. J. ]16 Atl. 12), 81. TABLE <>!• CASES CITED IN VOL. [References are to Sections.] i'\\ Mchroff v. Mehroff (26 Fed. 13), 458. Meibus v. Dodge (38 Wis. 300), L22, 188. 265. Meidel v. A.nthis (7! III. 241 |, 123. Meigs v. Buffalo (23 Wkly. Dig. [N. V.| 197), 316. Meiners v. St. Louis (130 Mo. 274), 214. Mellor v. Spateman (1 Wins. Saun- ders, 346), 74. Melhvitz v. Manhattan R. Co. (43 N. V. St. U. 354), 299. Melody v. Real) (1 Mass. 471), 501. Melville v. State (121 Cal. 16), 65. Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Martin (117 Ala. 367), 160. Memphis & C. Packet Co. v. Nagel (97 Ky. «.); 10 Ky. L. Rep. 748), 139", 348. Memphis & C. P. Co. v. Pikey ( [Ind.] 40 N. E. 527), 504, 50G. Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Tennessee (101 U. S. 337; 25 L. Ed. 960), 65. Memphis, & C. R. Co. v. Whitfield (44 Miss. 466), 215, 219, 227, 243, 251, 328. Memphis R. R. Co. v. Green (52 Miss. 783), 119. Mendel v. Wheeling (28 W. Va. 233), 65. Mendenhall v. North Carolina R. Co. (12:5 \. ('. 275), 563, 575. Mentzer v. Western Un. Teleg. Co. (93 Iowa, 572), 90. Merchants Ins. Co. of Newark v. Buckner (98 Fed. 222), 385. Merest v. Harvey (5 Taunt. 442), 111. Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Kansas Stale P. Co. ( [Kan.] 59 Pac. 106G), 75. Merkle v. Bennington Twp. (58 Mich. 156), 503. Menihew v. Chicago City R. Co. (92 111. App. 346), 597. Merrill v. Crossman (68 Me. 412), 501. Merrill v. Dibble (12 Bradw. [111. App. j 85), 76 Merrill v. .St. Louis (12 Mo. App. 166), 215. Merrill v. Western Mo. Tel. Co. (78 Me. 97), 78. Merrills v. Tariff Mfg. Co. (10 Conn. 384), 112. Merritt v. Earle (29 N. Y. 117), 153. Merritt v. Earle (31 Barb. [N. V. 38), 153. Merritt v. Ilepenstal (25 Can. S. ('. 150), 177. Mesker v. McCourt (lfl Ky. L. Rep. 1897), 440. Mesnager v. Englehardt (108 Cal. 68; 41 Pac. 20), 71. Messinger v. Dennie (137 Mass. 197), 514. Messinger v. Dunham (62 Ark. 326), 104. Metcalf v. Baker (57 X. Y. 662), 251. Metcalf v. Roberts (23 0nt. Rep. 130), 457. Metcalf v. Tiffany (106 Mich. 504), 458. Metropolitan Accdt. Ins. Co. v. Froi- land (161 111. 30), 106. Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Johnson (90 Ga. 500), 215, 316, 3 17, 318, 326. Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Kennedy ( [C. C. App. 2d ('.] 82 Vv<\. 158), 266. Met. West Side Kiev. R. Co. V. Ker- sey (80 111. App. 301), 214. Metzer v. Western I'u. Teleg. Co. (93 Iowa, 752), 90. Mexican C. R. Co. v. Gehr (66 111. App. 17:: I, 450, 455. Mexican C. R. Co. v. Goodman (20 Tex. Civ. App. 104, 109), 495, 505. Mexican C, R. Co. v. Lauricella ([Tex. Civ. App.] 26 S. W. 301), 21 1. Mexican*'. R, Co. V. Mitten (13 Tex. Civ. App. 653), 214. CXV1 TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Mexican Nat. Hank v. Misette ([Tex. Civ. App. 1894] --'4 S. \V. 520), 214. Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Finch (27 S. W. 1028), 532, .-340, 552. Mexican Nat. R, Co. v. Slater (115 Fed. 593), 509, 550. Meyer v. Bohlflng (44 [nd. 23S), 114. Meyer v. Butterbrudt (140 111. 131), 472. Meyer v. Hart (23 App. Div. [N. Y.] 131), 562, 563, 571, 576, 580. Meyer v. Haven (37 App. Div. [N. Y.] 194), 84. Meyer v. Richmond (172 U. S. 582; 19 Sup. Rep. 100), 71. Meyers v. Litts ( [C. P. Pa.] 3 Lack. L. News, 303), 4:17, 440. Michael v. Curtis (60 Conn. 363; 22 Atl. 949), 27. Michael v. Matheis (77 Mo. App. 556), 387. Michaels v. New York Central R. R. Co. (30 N. Y. 504), 153, 154. Michan v. Walsh (0 Mo. 346), 95. Miehenor v. Harrison (116 Iud. 300), 501. Michigan v. Detroit Cent. Mills Co. (31 Mich. 274), 166. Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Coleman (28 Mich. 440), 163. Michigan L. & T. Co. v. Deer Lake Co. (60 Mich. 143), 95. Mickie v. McGehee (27 Tex. 134), 123, Middleton v. Jerdee (73 Wis. 39; 40 N. W. 629). 73. Middleton v. Moore (30 Mo. App. 027), 77. Midland R. Co. (10 C. B. N. S. 287), 135. Miendorff v. Manhattan R. Co. (4 App. Div. [N. Y.] 40), 228. Miffin v. Commrs. (5 Serg. & R. [Pa.] 09), 57. Mighell v. Stone (74 111. App. 129), 467. Milburn v. Beach (14 Mo. 104), 113. Milford v. Berkely (1 Burr. 609), 457. Miles v. Chic R. I. & P. R. R. Co. (76 Mo. App. 484), 194. Miles v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. (55 S. C. 403), 90. Miles v. Salisbury (21 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 333), 432. Miley v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R. R. Co. (29 N. Y. St. R. 107), 244, 276. Millard v. Brown (35 N. Y. 297), 112, 113, 133. Miller v. Ashcraft (98 Ky. 314), 448, 450. Miller v. Bait. & O. R. Co. ( Fed. Cas. 9,560), 119. Miller v. Boone Co. (95 Iowa, 5; 63 N. W. 352), 214, 218, 243. Miller v. Del., etc., R. R. Co. (29 Vr. • [N. J.] 428), 211. Miller v. Donovan (16 Misc. [N. Y.] 453), 385, 397. Miller v. Erie R. Co. (34 App. Div. [N. Y.] 217), 214. Miller v. Ft. Lee Park & Steamboat Co. (73 Hun [N. Y.],. 150), 244. Miller v. Gleason (18 Ohio C. C. 374), 471, 475. Miller v. Grice (2 Rich. [S. C] 27), 448. Miller v. Hammer ([Iowa, 1895] 61 N. W. 1087), 475. Miller v. Jones (26 Ala. 247), 78. Miller v. Kirby (74 111. 242), 119. Miller v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. (128 Inch 97), 172. Miller v. Manhattan R. Co. (73 Hun [N. Y.], 512), 214, 229. Miller v. Potter (59 111. App. 725), 442. Miller v. Smyth e (95 Ga. 288), 193. Miller v. Steamship Co. (6 N. Y. St. R. 664), 181. Miller v. St. Paul City R. Co. (66 Minn. 192), 214. Miller v. Terre Haute & T. R. Co. (144 Ind. 323; 43 N. E. 257), 63. Milliganv. Tex. & N. O. R. Co. ([Tex. Civ. App. 1902] 66 S. W. 896), 148. TABLE >>l CASES CITED IN v*01 [References are to Sections.] Milliken v. Long (188 Pa. St. 411), 464, 468. Miller, Matter of (HON. V. 216, 222), 501. Millison v. Hook (17 ind. 227), 120. Mills v. Paul ([Tex. C. A. 1895] 30 CXV11 8. W. 558), 33. Mills v. Wilmington City R. Co. (1 Marv. [Del.] 269), 215, 227. Milton v. State (3 Humph. [Teun.] 389), 422. Milwaukee & Miss. R. R. Co. v. 1'in- nej i 10 Wis. 388), 130. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Anus (19 l'. S. 489), 112. Milwaukee, St. P. R. Co. v. Arms (91 U. S. 489), 94, 113, 119, 122, 135, 136, 159. Mi nek v. Martin (22 J. & S. [N. V.J 136), 515. Minick v. Troy (19 Hun [N. Y.], 253), 212, 318. Minneapolis v. St. L. R. Co. v. Beck- with (129 U. S. 26), 95. Minneapolis II. W. Co. v. Cummings (26 Kan. 307), 91. Minneapolis Threshing Macli. Co. v. Regier (51 Neb. 402), 430. Minster v. Citizens Ry. Co. (53 Mo. App. 270). 173, 255. Minter v. Swain (52 Miss. 174), 74. Mississippi Logging Co. v. Robson (69 Fed. 773), 70. Missoula Elec. L. Co. v. Mogan (13 Mont. 394), 95. Missouri & I. Coal Co. v. Schwalb (74 111. App. 567), 599. Missouri. K. & T. R. Co. v. Ann- strong ([Tex.C. A. | 38 s. W.368), 354. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Canlena ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1899] 54 S. W. 312), 63. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cham- bers (17 Tex. Civ. App. 487), 211. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cook ([Tex. Civ. App.] 37 S. W. 769), 299. Missouri, K. A T. R. Co. v. Cook (12 Tex. Civ. App. 203), 214. Missouri. K. & T. I;. < '•>. v. Dickej ([Tex. Civ. App.] in S. W. 626), 254. Missouri, K. A T. R. Co. v. Bdling (18 Tex. Civ. App. 171), 298. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Elliott (102 Fed. 96), 608, 041. Missouri. K. & T. K. Co. v. Elliott (51 S. W. 1067), 609. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Evans (16 Tex. Civ. App. 68), 538. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of T. v. Ferris (23 Tex. Civ. App. 215), 542. Missouri. K. & T. R. Co. v. Ft. Scott (15 Kan. 491), 91. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Gilmore ( [Tex.] 53 S. W. 61), 51 I. 528, 540, 548, 552, 586, 589. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cordon (11 Tex. Civ. App. 072), 214. Missouri, K. F CASES (TTKI» IN VOL, I. CX.X [References are to Sections.] Mitchell v. Tacoma R. & M. Co. (13 Wash. 5(50), 277, 281. Mitchell v. Torrington Union (Q. B. 76 L. T. Rep. 724), 515. Mize v. Glenn (38 Mo. App. 98), 76. Mizell v. McGowau (120 N. C. 134), 7.;. Mizner v. Frazier (40 Mich. 592), 91. Afobile, etc., R. Co. v. Crenshaw (65 Ala. 5G6), 177. Mobile L. Ins. Co. v. Brarae (95 I". S. 754), 495. Moffatt v. Fisher (47 Iowa, 473), 444. Moffatt v. Kenney (174 Mass. 311; 54 N. E. 850), 64. Moffet v. Ayres (X. J. L. [2 Penn.] 655), 103. Mogle v. Blatch (5 Ohio C. C. .",1 ). 94. Mogowan v. Rickey ( [N. J.] 45 Atl. 804), 430. Mohoney v. Dankwart (108 Iowa, 321), 221. Mollie Gibson Consol. Min. Co. v. Sharp (5 Colo. App. 321; 38 Pac. 850), 514. Moloney v. Dailey (07 111. App. 427), 471. Monaghan v. Horn ( [Ont.] 7 S. C. R. 409), 522. Monaghan v. School Dist. No. 1 (38 Wis. 100), 667. Monje v. City of Grand Rapids I 122 Mich. 045: SI X. W. 571). 65. Monroe v. Connecticut River L. Co. (68 N. H. 89; 39 Atl. L019), 72. Montana Co. v. I i r bring ( [U. S. C. C. A. 9th C] 44 U. S. App. 629; 75 Fed. 384), G7. Montaugh v. N. V. C. & II. R. R. R. Co. (23 N. Y. St. R. 03G), 214. Monterey Co. v. Abbott (77 Cal. 5 11 ), 501. Montgomery v. Knox (23 Fla. 595), 397. Montgomery v. Long Island R. R. Co. (6 X. Y. Supp. 178), 214. Montgomery v. Willis ( [Neb.] G3 N. W. 41)4), 110. Montgomery & E. R. Co. v. Mallette (92 Ala. 209), 231. Montgomery Co. X. A. Soc. v. Har- wood i 126 In. I. 440), 01. Montreal v. Gauthier (Rap. Jud. Quebec B. R. 100). 63. Montreal v. Labelle (14 S. C. R. [Ont.] 741), 524, 530. Montreal v. Mulcair (28 Can. S. C. 458), 65. Montreal Gas Co. v. St. Laurent (20 Can. S. C 176), 104. Montreal Rolling Mills Co. v. Cor- coran (2G Can. S. ('. 595), 151, 522. Moody v. McDonald (4 Cal. 207), 122, 186. Moody v. Osgood (50 Barb. [N. Y.] G28), 263, 2G5, 325, 374. Moody v. Osgood (60 Barb. [N. Y.] 644), 63. Mooney v. St. Marys (15 Ohio C. C. 446), 63. Moore v. Anderson (30 Tex. 224), 78. Moore v. Bowman (47 X". H. 494), 115. Moore v. City of Huntington (31 W. Va. 842), 263. Moore v. Central R. Co. (24 N. J. L. 268), 166. . Moore v. Central R. R. Co. (47 Iowa, 688), 264. Moore v. Crose (43 Ind. 30, 34), 111, 119. Moore v. Drayton (40 N. Y. St. R. 933), 187. Moore v. Francis ( 121 N. Y. 199), 391, 412. Moore v. Hammons ( [Ind.] 21 N. E. 1111), 460. Moore v. Kalamazoo (109 Mich. 176), 105, 227. Moore v. Large (20 Ky. L. Rep. 409), 430, 432. Moore v. Leader Pub. Co. (8 Pa. Super. Ct. 152), 381. Moore v. Schultz (31 Md. 423), 119, 127. Moran v. Racine Wagon Co. (74 Hun [X. Y.], 454), 150. cxx TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. Morehead v. Bittuer (20 Ky. L 1986), 404. Morenus v. Crawford (51 Hun [N. V], 89), 471. Morey v. Metropolitan G. L. Co. (6 J. & S. [N. Y.] 185), 17, 92. Morey v. Morning Journal Assoc. (17 N. Y. St. K. 266), 412. Morgan v. Andrews (107 Mich. 33), 397. Morgan v. Bartels (Rap. Jud. Quebec 12 C. S. 1), 515. Morgan v. Bennett (44 App. Div. [N. Y.] 323), 421. Morgan v. Bones (62 Hun [N. Y.] 623; 17 N. Y. Supp. 22; 42 X. Y. St. R. 791), 67. Morgan v. Curley (142 Mass. 107), 364, 451. Morgan v. Durfee (69 Mo. 469), 374. Morgan v. Pacific Mills (158 Mass. 402), 305. Morgan v. Rice (35 Mo. App. 591), 412, 413. Morgan v. Ross (74 Mo. 318), 467. Morgan v. Southern P. Co. (95 Cal. 510), 209, 300, 498. Morley v. Great Northern Ry. ( 16 Q. B. [Ont.] 504), 528, 544. Morning Journal Assoc, v. Ruther- ford (51 Fed. 513), 111, 124, 386, 402, 403. Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (45 Iowa, 20), 215, 218. Morris v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (26 Fed. 23), 859. Morris v. Curtis (20 Ky. L. 56), 393. Morris v. Eighth Ave. R. Co. (68 Hun [N. Y.], 39), 214. Morris v. Grand Ave. R. Co. (144 Mo. 500), 211, 2."5. Morris v. Lindauer (4 C. C. A. 162), 507. Morris v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. (51 App. Div. [N. Y.] 512), 563, 572, 587, 588. Morris v. N. Y. O. & W. R. Co. (73 Hun [N. Y.], 560), 214. [References are to Sections.] Rep Morris v. Piatt (32 Conn. 75), 69. Morris v. Savannah, etc., R. R. Co. (23 Fla. 182), 153. Morris Canal Co. v. Ryerson (27 N. J. L. 457), 153. Morris, etc., R. Co. v. Newark (10 N. J. Eq. 352 ), 72. Morrison v. Davis (20 Pa. 171), 863. Morrison v. Erie Ry. Co. (56 N. Y. 302), 177. Morrison-Jewell Filtration Co. v. Lingane (19R. I. 316), 413. Morrison v. Long Island R. R. Co. (3 App. Div. [N. Y.] 205), 249. Morrison v. Press Pub. Co. (38 N. Y. St. R. 357; 14 N. Y. Supp. 131), 386, 404. Morrissey v. Westchester Elec. Ry. Co. (30 App. Div. [N. Y.] 424), 211. Morrow v. Wheeler & W. Mfg. Co. (165 Mass. 349), 433. Morse v. Auburn & Syracuse R. R. Co. (10 Barb. [N. Y.] 621), 243. Morse v. Morse (65 Vt. 112), 515. Morsemann v. Manhattan R. Co. (16 Daly [N. Y.], 249; 10 N. Y. Supp. 105), 254, 258, 576. Morton v. Frankfort (55 Me. 46), 72. Morton v. Smith (48 Wis. 265), 63. Mosby v. Cleveland Street R. Co. (15 Ohio C. C. 501), 200. Moses v. Newburgh Elec. R. Co. (91 Hun, 278), 295, 296. Mosher v. Russell (44 Hun [N. Y.], 12), 246. Moskovitz v. Light (68 Hun [N. Y.], 102), 561, 563, 572, 573, 578, 586, 589. Mott v. Comstock (8 Wend. [N. Y.] 544), 515. Mott v. Detroit ( [Mich.] 79 N. W. 3), 267, 290. Mott v. Mott (11 Barb. [N. Y.] 127), 97. Mousler v. Harding (33 Ind. 176), 418. Mount. See Mt. Mowbry v. Mowbry (64 111. 383), 633. TABLE OF < A.SES CITED IN VOL. r. CXXI [References are to Sections.] Mowreyv. Central City Ry. Co. (tit; ' Mum Ho v. Bill Mfg. Co. (86 Me. 400; Barb. [N. Y.] 43), 148 30 Ul. 16), 68. Mt. Adams & E. P. R. Co. v. Isaacs Munger v. Tonawanda R. R I (18 Ohio C. C. 177 i. 234. Mi. Adams A E. P. R R. Co. v. W> song (8 Ohio C. C. -11 |, 325 \. V. 349), 161. Munos v. Southern P. H. Co. (51 Fed. 506. Mt. Pleasanl Overseers v. Wilcox (12 Munro v. Pac. Coast, etc., I Pa. Co. Ct. 447), 514. Mt. Sterling v. Crummj (73 111. App. .'i, 194. Cal. 515), 499. Munroe v. Stickney (48 Me. 462), 62, 76. Muckle v. Rochester R. Co. (78 Hun, Murdoch v. Boston & Albany it. B 32), 136, 342 Co. I 133 Mass. 16), 349. Mud River Coal, C. & I. Co. v. Wil- Murdock v. N. V. & B. Desp liauis (15 Ky. L. Rep. 847), 122 Muetze v. Tuteur (77 Wis. 236), 391. Mulcahey v. Givens (115 Cnd. 286), 47:3. Mulcahey v. Wheel Co. (145 Mass. 281), 499. Mulcairns v. Zanesville (67 Wis. 24), 263, 648, 654, 657, 661, 663. Muldowney v. Illinois, etc., R. Co. (36 Iowa, 402), 169. Mulford v. Clewell (21 Ohio St. 191), ,7:;. 474. Mulford v. Panama II. R. Co. (23 \. Y. 465), 499. Mulhall v. Fallon (176 Mass. 266), 51 is. Mullen v. St. John (57 X. Y. 567), 150. Muller v. Brooklyn II. R Co. (18 App. Div. [X. Y.] 177). 177. Muller v. Ryan (2 X. V. Supp. 736), 104. Muller v. St. John (.".7 X. Y. 567), 150. Mullin v. Spangenberg (112 111. 140), 144. Mullison v. Boch I 17 [nd. 227), 111. ( [Mass. s. J. C. 1897] 1 Am. Heg. Rep. 263), 229. Murphy v. Hoard of Ch. F. (28 Vr. [X. .J. L.J 244, 250), 503. Murphy v. Cent Hark X. & K. H. H. R, Co. (16 J. & S. [N. Y.J 96), L36. Murphy v. City of Daytou (8 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 354), 148. Murphy v. Curran 1 24 111. App. 47."»), 475. Murphy v. Deane (101 Mass. 455), 161. Murphy v. Fond du Lac (23 Wis. 365), 62, 70. Murphy v. Bobbs (7 Colo. 541), 111, 117, 372. Murphy v. McGrath (79 111. 594), 375. Murphy v. Mercer County Free- holders (31 Ail. 229), 644. Murphj v. \. Y. & X. 11. H. Co. (29 Conn. 496), 198. Murphy v. X. V. Cent H. R. Co. B8 N. Y. 145), 498, 576,592. Murpby v. NVw Fork Central, etc., K. Co. (lis \. V. 527), 161. Mulvehall v. Millward(ll X. r. 343), Murphy v. Rementer, Pa. (7 Del. Co. 407. Rep. 203), 104, 107. Mummery v. Grand Trunk R. W. Murphy v. Weidman Cooperage Co. Co. (1 Ont. L. R. 022), 547 . 1 App. Div. [X. Y.J 283), 214. Munal v. Brown t[U. S.J 70 Fed. Murphy v. Western & A. R. Co. (23 967), 494. Fed. 637), 342. Munday v. Laudry (51 La. Ann. 303), Murray v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co 210. 1 7 V Y. Supp. 900), 214. Cxxii TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Murray v. Forty-Second Street M. & St. N. K. Co. (9 App. Div. [N. V.| 610), 152. Murray v. Leonard (11 S. I). 22), 380. Murray v. Mo.' Pac. R. R. Co. (101 Mo. 236), 256. Murray v. Salt Lake City K. Co. (10 Utah, 456), 104. Murray v. Usher (117 N. Y. 542), 576, 577. Murray v. Woodson Co. (58 Kan. 1; 48 Pac. 554), 63. Murtaugh v. New York Cent. R. R. Co. (49 Hun [N. Y.], 456), 91. Musick v. Kausas City S. & M. R. Co. (114 Mo. 309), 487. Musick v. Latrobe (184 Pac. 375), 215. Musser v. Lancaster City St. R. Co. (15 Pa. Co. Ct. 430), 102,214. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hillman (145 U. S. 296), 603. Myerle v. United States (33 Ct. CI. 1 ), 98. Myers v. Holborn (58 N. J. L. [29 Vr.] 193), 495, 514, 645. Myers v. Moore (3 Ind. App. 22G), 380. Myers v. Raynolds (3 Ohio Leg. News, 127), 462. Myers v. San Francisco (42Cal. 215), 142. Myhan v. Louisiana, E. L. & P. Co. 41 La. Ann. 964), 511, 514. Mynning v. Detroit, L. & N. R. Co. (59 Mich. 257, 261), 152, 521, 645, 650, 651. Mynning v. Detroit, L. & N. R. Co. (64 Mich. 93), 165. Nagle v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (75 Mo. 653), 514. Nagle v. Mullison (34 Pa. 48), 111, 120. Nailorv. Ponder (1 Marv. [Del.] 408, 398, 406, 415. Nally v. Burleigh (91 Me. 22), 386, 390. Nanticoke v. Warne (106 Pa. 373), 171. Nappanee v. Kuckinan (7 Ind. App. 361), 2 1:;. Nash v. Sharp (19 Hun [N. Y.], 365), 236. Nashville & Chattanooga R. R. Co. v. Starnes (!) lieisk. [Tenn.] 52), 136, 138. Natchez, J. & C. R. Co. v. Cook (63 Miss. 38), 495. National Syrup Co. v. Carlson (155 111. 210), 200. Nave v. Flack (00 Ind. 205), 154. Neary v. Bostwick (2 Hilt. [N. Y.] 514), 17. Neberv. Putter (81 Hun [N. Y.], 244), 386. Nebraska v. Campbell (2 Black (U. S.], 590), 227, 233, 236. Needliam v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co. (38 Vt. 294), 495, 499. Neel v. Deans (1 Nott. & McC. [S. C] 310), 119. Neese v. Radford (83 Tex. 585), 134. Neet v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. (100 Iowa, 248), 156. Nehr v. Dobbs (47 Neb. 863), 433, 434, 447. Neill v. Newton (24 Tex. 202), 119, 120. Nellis v. Cramer (80 Wis. 337), 423. Nelson v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (88 Va. 971), 504. Nelson v. C. R. T. Co. (38 Iowa, 564), 165. Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (78 Tex. 621), 523, 544. Nelson v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. (104 Mich. 582), 645, 646, 651, 653, 657, 661, 062, 664. Nelson v. Minneapolis St. R. Co. (61 Minn. 107), 202. Nelson v. Wallace (48 Mo. App. 193), 412. Nelson v. Wallace (57 Mo. App. 397), 422. TABLE OF CASES CITHD IN Vol.. I. CXXU1 [References are to Sections. ] Nelson v. West Duluth ([Minn.] 57 \. W. 1 19), 107. Netherland A.mer. Steam. Co. v. Hol- lander (59 Fed. 117), S06. Nettles v. Somerrell (6 Tex. Civ. App. 027), 425. Neville v. Gile ([Mass.] 54 \. E. 841), 463. New v. McKechnie (95 X. V. 632), 114, 472. Newark, etc., R. Co. v. Block (55 N. J. 605), 152. Newbury v. Getchel A- M. Lumber & Mfg. Co. (100 Lowa, 441), L02, 180, 213, 224, 310. Newcomb v. Butterfield (8 .Johns. [N. V.J 342), 95. Newdoll v. Young (80 Bun [X. V.], 364), 165. Newell v. Woolfolk (91 Bun [N. V.|, 211; 71 N. Y. St. R. 129; 36 N. Y. Supp. 327), 07. New Jersey Exp. Co. v. Nichols (32 X. J. L. 100), 166, 236. New Jersey Exp. Co. v. Nichols (33 N. J. L. 434), 233. New Jersey R. R. Co. v. West (3 X. L. 91), 214. Newkirkv. Tracey (61 Mich. 174), 95. Newman v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. (54 Hun [X. Y.], 335), 4:,::. 154. Newman v. Phillipsburg Horse Car R. Co. (52 X. J. L. 446), 170. Newman v. Stein (75 Mich. 402), 111, 4 IS. New < Orleans & C. R. Co. v. Schneider ([C. C App. 5th C] 00 Fed. 210), 214. New Orleans A \. E. R. Co. v. Mc- Eweu (40 La. Ann. 1 184; 2 So. 07-".), 69. New Orleans & X. 1!. Co. v. Thomas ([U. S. C. C. A. 5th C] 80 Fed. 379), 68. New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Allbritton (38 Miss. 242), 139, 362. New Orleans, .1. & G. N. R. Co. v. Bailey (40 Miss. 395), 135. New Orleans, .1. a- G. X. R. Co. v. Hursl (36 Mis-. 660), 141, 340, 348. New Orleans, J. A G. N. R. Co. v. Statham (42 Miss. 607), 112, 119, 122. New Orleans, St. L. & C. R. Co. v. Burke (58 Miss. 200), lis, :;:;:;. Newport News v. o. P. R, a- Elec. ([Va. 1902] 40 S. E. 900), lul. Newsom v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. ([U. s. C. C. W. I). Va.] 81 Fed. L33, affd 2:; s. c. C. A. 669), 42 U. S. App. 282; 78 led. 94; 2 Va. L. Reg. 882), 0:;. New sun v. New York Central R. R. Co. (29 N. V. 383), 101. Newton v. Lochlin (77 111. 103), 4:>4. New Whatcom v. City of Fairhaven Land Co. ([Wash. 1901] 04 Pac. 7:;:.), 70. New World, Steamboat, v. King (10 How. [U. S.] 469, 174), 159, 243; 488. New York v. Brady (151 X. Y. Gil), 272. Xew York v. Lloyd ( 17 Wend. [N. V.] 285; is id. 1201. 72. New York v.Stone (20 Wend. [N.Y.] 139), 72. New Fork Academy of Music v. Hil- ton (2 Hilt. [N. Y.j 217i. B8. New York & L. I. 15. Co. v. Smith (14S N. V. :.40), 501. N.w Fork A- N. .1. Teleph. Co. v. Bennett (02 N. .1. L. 712). L95. New York C. A- Min. Sign Co. v. Frazer (130 U. S, oil 1, 91. New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Doane (115 End. 4:;:.). 846. Now York C. A- St. L. R. Co. v. II un- let Hay Co. (149 I ml. 344), 101. Xew York C. A- St. I.. K. Co. v. Kist- ler (16 Ohio C. C. 316), >•■:'.. New York C. & St. L. \l. R. (',.. \. Luebeck (54 111. App. 551 I, 211. Xew York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Musbrush (11 I ml. App. 192; 37 X. E. 954), 514. cxxiv TABLE OF casks CITED IX VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] New York Health Dept. v. Trinity I Nickerson v. Hairiman (38 Me. 277), Church (145 N. V. 32; 04 N. Y. St R. 507; 39 N. E. 833), 71. New York, L. & W. Ky. Co. v. Ben- nett (50 Fed. 49(5), 111. New York, Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Atlantic Refg. Co. (129 N. Y. 597), 161. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Win- ter (143 U. S. 50), 214. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Bridgeport Tract. Co. (65 Conn. 416 ; 32 Atl. 953), 71. New York, P. & N. R. Co. v. Cooper (85 Va. 939), 172. New York Ruhber Co. v. Rothery (132 N. Y. 293), 62, 76. New York, T. & M. R. Co. v. Lander ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 46 S. W. 843 ), 358. Neys v. Taylor (12 S. D. 488; 81 N. W. 901), 437. Nicholas v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. ( [Minn.] 80 N. W. 776), 504. Nicholds v. Crystal Plate Glass Co. ([Mo.] 27 S. W. 516), 214. Nichols v. Brabazon (94 Wis. 549), 180, 224, 362, 364. Nichols v. Bronson (2 Day [Conn.], 211), 444. Nichols v. Crystal Plate Glass Co. ( [Mo. 1895] 28 S. W. 991 ), 214. Nichols v. Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co. (68 Iowa, 732), 318. Nichols v. Marsland (L. R. 10 Ex. 225), 153. Nichols v. Nichols (134 Mo. 187), 458, 462. Nichols v. Norfolk & C. R. Co. (120 N. C. 495; 26 S. E. 643), 36. Nichols v. Union P. R. Co. ( [Utah] 27Pac. 693), 339. Nichols v. Winfrey (90 Mo. 403), 515. Nichols v. Winfrey (79 Mo. 545), 558. Nicholson v. Rust ( [Ky.] 52 S. W. 933), 415, 416. Nickerson v. Bigelow ([U. S. D. C. E. !>. Wis.] 62 Fed. 900), 645, 648, 663, 665. 495. Nicolans v. Snyder (56 Neb. 531), 633. Nicosia v. Vallone (37 L. L. T. 106), 91. Niendorff v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (4 App. Div. [N. Y.] 46), 75,282, 380. Nightingale v. Scannell (18Cal. 315), 83, 111, 124. Niles v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. (14 App. Div. [N. Y.] 58), 87. Nimick v. Troy (19 Hun [N. Y.], 253), 319. Nipp v. Wiseheart (7 Ind. App. 642), 362. Nixon v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (141 Mo. 425), 252. Nixon v. Ludlam (50111. App. 273), 623, 629. Njus v. Chicago, St. P. & M. R. Co. (47 Minn. 22), 506. Noble v. City of Seattle (19 Wash. 133), 507. Noble v. Portsmouth ( [N. II.] 30 Atl. 419), 205. Noble v. White (103 Iowa, 352), 431, 443. Nohrden v. Northeastern R. Co. (54 S. C 492), 523. Nolan v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. (40 N. Y. St. R. 848), 212. Nolen v. Kaufman (70 Mo. App. 051), 432. Nolle v. Herter (65 111. App. 430), 381, 384, 413, 426. Noonan v. Bradley (9 Wall. 394,403), 507. Noonan v. Olermeyer & Liebman Brew. Co. (50 App. Div. [N. Y.] 377), 83. Nordin v. Kjos (13 S. D. 497), 470. Nordhans v. Peterson (54 Iowa, 68), 120. Norfolk v. Jonakin (94 A r a. 285), 214. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Ampey (93 Pa. 108), 214. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Groseclose (88 Va. 267), 162, 176. TABLE OV CASES CITED IN Vol.. I. CXXV [References are to Sections.] Norfolk & W. R. Co. \. Lipscomb (90 Va. 137), 348. Norfolk & W. R Co. v. Neely(91 Va. 539), 342. v. Shote (92 Co. Norfolk & W. K Va. 34), 100. Norfolk & W. K. Co. v. Wysor (82 Va. 250), 124. Norfolk & W. S. B. Co. v. Davis (12 App. I). C. 306), 385. North & S. Rolling Stock <'•>. v. O'Hara (7:: 111. App. 691 }, 1301. North Amer. Ace Asso. v. W 1- son ([C. C. App. 7th C] 64 Fed. 680, 691 ), 292, :;. North Amer. L. & T. Co. v. Colo- Dial .v U. s. M. Co. (28 C. C. A. ss ; 83 Fed. 796), 102. North Carolina v. Temple (1:54 U. S. 22), <;:>. North Chicago, L. & R. Co. v. Barber (77 111. App. 277), 229. North Chicago R. M. Co. v. Mor- risey i ill 111. 040), tin,;. North Chicago St. K'.Co. v. Aunerson (70 III. App. 336), 102. North ChicagoSt. R. Co. v. BarberC77 111. App. 257), 204. North Chicago St. RCo.v. Brodie(156 111. 317), 607, 612, 626, 627, 629, 637. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Rroms (Di' 111. App. 127), 214. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Brown (76 111. App. 654), 211. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Brown (17s 111. 187), 241. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Cotton (29 N. E. 899), 217. North Chicago St. It. Co. v. Eld- ridge (51 111. App. 430), 21 1. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Fitzgib- bons (180 111. 466), 21:.. 248. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Gillow (166 111. IN). 280. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Bousin- ger (17--. HI. 318), 206. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Lehman (82 111. A pi>. 238), 226. North ChicagoSt. K. < o. v. Schwartz. (82 111. App. 493), 214. North Chicago St R. Co. v. Sbreve (171 111. 448), 243. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Wiswell 111. App. 443), 211. North ChicagoSt. R. Co. v. Wi ixon (51 III. App. 307), 514, 605. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Zeigei (78 111. App. 463), 212, 261. Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. Mills I'll Md. 355), 322. Northern l'ac R Co. v. Babcock (154 (J. S. L90), 506. Northern l'ac. R. R. Co. v. O'Brien (1 Wash. 599), 166. Northern P. R. Co. v. Urlin (158U. S. 271), 288, 291. Northern Trust Co. v. Palmer I 171 111. 383), 503. North Jersey St. R. Co. v. Morhatt (64 N. J. L.236), 647, 648, 652, 654, 657, 668, 672. Northwestern & P. II. Rank v. State (18 Wash. 7:1; 50 l'ac. 586), 65. Norton v. Kumpe (121 Ala. 446), 91. Norton v. North Carolina R. Co. (122 N. C. 910), 07. 166, 214. Norton v. St. Louis & II. R. Co. (40 Mo. App. (142). 293. Norton v. Third Ave R Co. (26 App. Div. [N. Y.] 60), 140. Norton v. Volzeke (158 111. W2), 177. Norton v. Warner (9 Conn. 172). 160. Norwell v. Thompson (2 Hill L. [S. C] 470), 7(5. Norwood v. Galveston, II. & S. A. K. Co. (12 Tex. Civ. App. 561 |, 356. Nossaman v. Rickerl (18 End. 350), 114. Nourse v. Snow (6 Greenl. | Me. 94. Noxonv. Bill (2 Allen [Mass.], 215), 87. Noyes v. Boscawen (64 N. II. 361), 172. Noyes v. Phillips (60 N. V. 408), 97. Noyes v. Ward ( 19 Conn. 250), 362. CXXV1 TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections." Nunnally v. Taliaferro (82 Tex. 286), 386. Nutt v. Southern P. K. Co. ( [Oreg.] 35 Pac. 653), 263. Nye & S. Co. v. Snyder (56 Neb. 754), 110. Nye v. Merriam (35 Vt. 438), 111, 120. Oakes v. Maine Cent. 11. Co. (95 Me. 103), 604, 607, 609, 610, 616. Oakland Ky. Co. v. Fielding (48 Pa. St. 320), 300, 305. O'Boyle v. Shirley (65 111. App. 278), 437. O'Brien v. Chic. M. & St. P. R. Co. (89 Iowa, 644), 201. O'Brien v. La Crosse (75 N. W. 81), 293. O'Brien v. Loomis (43 Mo. App. 29), 131, 228. O'Brien v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co. (36 N. Y. St. R. 801), 27G. O'Brien v. Semple Mont. L. Rep. (6 Super. Ct. 344), 398. O'Brien v. Times Pub. Co. (21 R. I. 256), 381. O' Byrne v. Campbell (15 Ont. R. 339), 87. O'Callaghan v. Bode (84 Cal. 489), 514. Ocean Steamship Co. v. Williams (69 Ga. 251), 45, 448. Och v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (130 Mo. 27), 200, 201, 202, 208. Ockerhausen v. Tyson (71 Conn. 31; 40 Atl. 104), 67. O'Connell v. St. Louis Cable & W. R. Co. (106 Mo. 482), 214. . O'Connor v. Nat, Ice Co. (21 N. Y. St. R. 907), 242. O'Connor v. Nolan (64 111. App. 357), 89. O'Connor v. North Trucker Co. (17 Nev. 245), 161. Oddie v. Mendenhall ([Minn. 1901] 86 X. W. 881), 63. Oden v. Stubblefield (2 Ala. 684), 76. Odin Coal Co. v. Denman (185 111. 413), 599. O'Donnell v. American Sugar Refin- ing Co. (-11 App. Div. [N. V.] 307), -14. O'Donnell v. Maine C. R. Co. (86 Me. 552), 607. O'Donnell v. Mclntyre (2 N. V. St. R. 689), 95. O' Donovan, Ex parte (24 Fla. 281 ), 501. O' Flaherty v. Nassau Elec. R. Co. (165 N. V. ti2l), 83. ()' Flaherty v. Nassau Elec. R. Co. (••54 App. Div. [N. Y.] 74), 219, 220, 221, 274. Ogle v. Cumberland (90 Mo. 59; 44 Atl. 1015), 05. Ogle v. Jones (1(5 Wash. 319), 214. O' Grady v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. ( [Pa. C. P.] 28 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 110), 03. O' Grady v. Julian (34 Ala. 88), 444. O'Harrav. New York Cen. & H. R. R. Co. (92. Hun [N. Y.], 56), 152. Oh Chow v. Hallett ( [U. S.] 72 Sawy. 259), 77, 81. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Cosby (107 Ind. 32), 325, 326. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Selby (47 Ind. 171), 359. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Simms (4:) 111. App. 260), 615, 616, 627. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Tiudall (13 Ind. 366), 495. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wangelin (152 111. 138), 520,603,607, 637. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. AVangelin, (43 111. App. 324), 615, 619, 637. Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dickerson (59 Ind. 317), 493. Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Kasson (37 N. Y. 218; 1 " Cyc " L. & P. 645), 66. Oklahoma City v. Welsh (3 Okla. 288), 214. Ohliger v. Toledo (20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 142), 83, 257, 258. O'Horo v. Kelsey (60 App. Div. [N. Y.] 604), 76. 77. Oldfather v. Zent (21 Ind. App. 307), 436. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL,. I. CXXVU [References are to Sections. 1 Oldfiehl v. New York & Harlem R. O'Reilly v. Utah, Nev. & I i I \. V. 310), 560, 561, 562, 564, 566, 568, 569, 570,586, 589,592. Oldman v. Lost (62 .Minn. 261 I, 515. Olga, The (32 Fed. 229), 508. O'Learj v. Brooks Elevator Co. (TN. D. 554; 75 N. W. 919), 64, 67. O'Leary v. Erie R. Co. (64 N. V. Supp. 511; 51 A.pp. Div. 25), 64. Oliver v. Chapman I 15 Tex. 400), 120, L24. oliv.r v. LaValle(36 Wis. 592), 183. Oliver v. North Pac, etc., R. Co. (8 Oreg. 84), 215, 227, 251 Co. (87 Hun | ST. Y. |, 106, 457), 199, 559. .. McGlasker (74 Cal. 1 18), 111. Orgall v. Chicago, B. & E. R, Co. I W Neb.), 603, 625. i >i iental v. Barclay ( 16 Tex. Civ. A.pp. in;;), 135, 139, 201, 254. Oi man v. Mannix (17 < !olo. 56 I), 514, Ormond v. Hayes (60 Tex. 180), 527. Ormsby v. Douglass (37 N. A. 477), 427. Orrasby v. Johnson (1 B. Hon. [Ky.] 80), 114. Olmstead v. Brown 1 12 Barb. [N. Y.] Orr v. Seiler (1 Penny. [Penu.J 445), 652), 393. Olmstead v. Burke (25 III. 86), 81. Olson v. Great Northern R. Co. (G8 Minn. 155), 214. Olwell v. Milwaukee Street R. Co. (92 Wis. 330), 149. Omaha v. Richards (49 Neb. 244), 514, 605. 441. Orscheln v. Scott (79 Mo. A pp. 534), 255. Orsor v. Metropolitan Crosstown K. Co. (78 Hun [N. V.]. 1159), 328. Osbornv. Bank (9 Wheat. [U. S.] 738), 507. Osborn v. Detroit (32 Fed. 36), 194. Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Cook (42 Osborn v. Gillett (L. R. 8 Exch. 88), Neb. :,77), 514. Omaha & R. V. R Co. v. Crow (54 Neb. 747), 598, 615. Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Ryburn ( [Neb.] 58 N. w. 541), 230. Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Talbot (48 Neb. (527; 67 N. W. 599), 63, 172. Omaha Coal C. & L. Co. v. Fay (30 Neb.-), 206. Omaha II. R. Co. Cable T. Co. ( [U. S. C. C. D. Neb.] 32 Fed. 727 |, 75. Omaha St. R. Co. v. Emminger (57 Neb. 240), 255, 290, 297, 330, 355. Omaha St. R. Co. v. Martin (48 Neb. 65), 166. 195. Osbornv. Gillett (42 L. J. Ex.53), 538. < tsborne v. Jenklnson (100 Iowa. 423), 214. Osman v. Dewey (107 Mich. 07), 411. Ostranderv. Lansing (115 Mich. 224), 227. ( »ties v. Cowles E. s. & A. Co. (7 X. Y. Supp. 251), 214. Otis v. Sweeney (48 La. Ann. 940), 430. Ott v. Kaufman (68 M<1. 50: 11 Atl. 580), 497, 523. Ott v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. Ms Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 395), 508. O'Maley v. South Boston Oas Light | Ottawa v. Sweely (65 111. 434), 142. Co. (158Mass. L35; 32 N. E. 1119), Oursler v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 68. (00 Md. 358), L22. Overpeek v. Rapid City ( [S. D. 1901] 85 N. W. 990), 82. Owen v. Brock Schmidt (54 Mo. 285), 576. Owen v. Dewey (107 Mich. 07). 411, II-;. O'Mara v. Hudson R. P. Co. (38 N. V. 445), 514, 561, 570. 586, 588,589. O'Neal v. McKenna (116 Ala. 606), 440. O'Neil v. Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. Co. (30 N. Y. St. R. 934), 218. CXXV111 TABLE OF CASES CITED IX VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Owens v. Bait. & 0. R. Co. (35 Fed. 715), 203. Owensboro & N. R. Co. v. Barclay (19 Ky. L. Rep. 997), 502. Pacific R. Co. v. Dunden (37 Kan. 1), 514. Pack v. Mayor, etc. (3 X. Y. [3 Comst.] 489), 576. Paddock v. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co. (37 Fed. 841), 344. Paddock v. Somes (51 Mo. App. 320), 121. Paddock v. Watts (116 Ind. 140), 431, 440, 444. Paetzig v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co. (12 Misc. [N. Y.] 573), 214. Page v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. (34 App. Div. par. Y.] 618), 252. Page v. Mitchell (13 Mich. 63), 448. Page v. New York (57 Hun [N. Y.], 123), 281, 283. Paine v. Fair (118 Mass. 74), 376. Painter v. Ives (4 Neb. 122), 454. Painton v. Northern Central R. Co. (83 N. Y. 7), 151, 152. Pakalinsky v. New York Central R. R. Co. (82 Barb. [N. Y.] 424), 148. Pallett v. 401. Palmer v, 338), 63. Palmer v. Chicago, etc., R (112 Ind. 250), 164. Palmer v. Conant 33), 229. Palmer v. Crook 418), 460. Palmer v. Degan 70. Palmer v. llaskins 90), 406. Palmer v. Leader Pub. Co. Ct. 594), 107. Palmer v. Long (7 Daly [N. Y.], 33), 418. Palmer v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co. (5 N. Y. St. R. 436), 497, 569. Sargent (36 N. H. 497), Barker (2 Fairf. [11 Me.] R. Co. 58 Hun [N. Y.], (7 Gray [Mass.], (58 Minn. 505), (28 Barb. [N. Y.J (7 Pa. Sup. Palmer v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (26 Wkly. Dig. 26), 578. Palmer v. New York News Pub. Co. (31 App. Div. [N. Y.] 210), 387, 403, 412. Palmer v. Palmer (8 App. Div. [N. Y.] 331), 447. Palmer v. Railroad Co. (3 S. C. 580), 135, 139, 141, 340. Palmer v. Reynolds (3 Cal. 396), 106. Palmer v. Winona Ry. & L. Co. ( [Minn. 1899] 80 N. W. 869), 220. Panton v. Holland (17 Johns. [N. Y.] 02), 67, 72. Papineau v. Taber (Mont. L. R. 2 Q. B. 107), 364. Paris Mountain W. Co. v. Greenville (53 S. E. 82; 30 S. E. 699), 71. Park v. O'Brien (23 Conn. 339), 165. Park Bros. & Co. v. Bushnell ( [U. S. C. C. A. 2d C] 60 Fed. 583), 73. Parke v. Frank (75 Cal. 364), 110. Parker v. Burgess ( [Vt.] Atl. 743), 298. Parker v. Coture (63 Vt. 155), 468. Parker v. Griswold (17 Conn. 288), 76. Parker v. Jenkins (3 Bush [Ky.], 587), 227, 251. Parker v. Long Island R. R. Co. (13 Hun [N. Y.], 310), 119. Parker v. McGlin (52 La. Ann. 1514), 453. Parker v. Monteith (7 Oreg. 277), 467. Parker v. Parker (102 Iowa, 500), 431, 443. Parker v. So. Car. & Ga. Ry. Co. ( [S. C. 1897] 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 681), 255. Parkhurst v. Masteller (57 Iowa, 474), 112,438,442. Parkhurst v. Staples (91 Wis. 196), 95. Parrot v. Wells (15 Wall. 524), 155. Parshall v. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co. (35 Fed. 649), 229, 236. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. CXX1X Parsons v. Hardy 1 1 ) Wend. [N. V.j 215), 153. Parsons v. Harper i If. Gratt. [Va. | 64 i. 448, 151, 452. Parsons \. Lindsay I 26 Kan. 426), 122. Parson v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (94 Mo. 286), 514. Paschal v. Owen (77 Tex. 583; 1 4 S. W. 203), 515, 523, 528, 540. Pasley v. Freeman (3 T. R. 51), 62. Passaic Prinl Work v. Ely & Walker I). (;. Co. I [U. S. C. C. A. Mo.] 44 ('. ('. A. 420; in.-) Fed. 163), 72. Passamaneck v. Louisville K. (o. (98 Ky. 193), 162. Paster v. Kegan (1) Misc. [X. Y'.]547), 449. l'astorius v. Fisher (1 Rawle [Pa], 27 I, 76. Pater v. Haker (3 C. B. 869 I, 428. Patent Brick Co. v. Moore (75 Gal. 205), '.»7. Paterson v. Wallace (1 Mac. II. L. 748), 524, 530. Patsy v. Chic. St. P. M. * C. R. Co. (77 Wis. 218), 340. Patton v. Southern R. Co. ([U. S. C. C. App. 4th 0.] 42 U. S. App. 567), 148. Patrick v. Colorado Smelting Co. (20 Colo. 268), 75. Patterson v. Chic. & G. T. Ry. Co. (40 Mich. 184), 122. Patterson v. Hayden (17 Oreg. 238), 464. Patterson v. South & X. A. R. Co. (89 Ala. 'MS), 122. Paul v. Leydenberger (17 Bradw. [111. App.] 167). 7'.». Paul v. Omaha & St. L. Ky. Co. (82 Mo. App. 500), 237. Paul v. Slason (22 Vt. 231 : 5 1 Am. Dec. 75 I, I '>2, 7»'>. Pauley v. Steam Gauge & L. Co. (131 X. V. 90; 42 N. V. St. K. 636; 29 N. E. 999; :10 X. E. 865, rev'g 61 Hun. 25 1; 40 X. Y. St. R. 855; 16 N. Y. Supp. 820), 68. 9 [References are to Sections.] Paulmier v. Erie R. Co. (34 X. .1. L. 151. 158), 51 i. 521, 645, 654, 655, 657, 'nil. 074. Pawlowski v. Jenks i 115 Mich. 275), I in. Paxton v. Boyei (67 111. 132), o67. Paxton v. Vincennes BIfg. Co. (20 End. App. 253), 107. Payne v. Chicago & A. EL Co. (136 Mo. 562; 38 S. W. 308), 63. Payne v. Rouss (46 App. Div. [N. Y.J 315), 390, 402. Payne v. Western, etc., R. Co. | 13 Lea [Tenn.j. 507), «"»«"», 67. Peacock v. Oaks (85 Mich. 578), 475. Pearce v. Xeedham (:i7 111. App. 90), 452. Pearl v. Benton Twp. ([Mich. 1900] 82 X. W. 226), 65. Pen son v. Elmer (5 Redf. [X. Y.] 181), 501. Pearson v. Lemaitre (5 M. & G. 700), 111. Pearson v. Zehr (1:38 111. 48), 100. Pearslee v. Chatham (69 Hun (X. Y.], 389), 165. Pease v. Shippen (80 Pa. 513), 415, Peavy v. Ooss i 90 Tex. 89), 470. Peck v. Clark (142 Mass. 4;;»i), 76. Peck v. Corning (2 How. Pr. [X T . Y.] 84), 57. Peck v. New York C. A- II. R. R. Co. (4 Hun [X. Y.], 2:;C), 212, 562. Peck v. Xew York. X. II. & H. R. R. (o. (50 Conn. 379), 174. Peckham Iron Co. v. Harper (11 Ohio St. 100), 111, 120. Peek v. Traylor (17 Ky. L. Pep. 1312), 457. Pegram v. Stortzir;i W. Va.220),2, 28, 55, 112. 471. 475. 483. Peirce v. Jones (22 Inch App. 163), 290. Pellardia v. Journal Printing Co. (99 Wis. 156), 381, 386, 390. Pellet v. Manufacturers & M. Ins. Co. (Kil Fed. 502i. 77. Pendergastv.McCaslin (2 Ind. 87), 38. CXXX TABLE <>F CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Pennington v. Smith (24 C. C. A. 145), 507. Penn. R. K. Co. v. Adams (55 Pa. St. 499), 495, 514. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Bantou (54 Pa. St. 495), 576. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Coon (111 Pa. St. 430), 159. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Dolan (6 Fed. App. 109), 198. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Files ([Ohio, 1901] 62 N. E. 1047), 17. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Goodenougli (55 X. J. L. [26 Vroom] 577), 174. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Henderson (51 Pa. St. 315), 359, 516. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Hont (110 Pa. St. 226), 152. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Keller (67 Pa. St. 300), 521. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Kelly (31 Pa. St. 372), 177, 225, 300, 305, 309, 312. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Kerr (62 Pa. St. 353), 85. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Marion (104 Ind. 239), 255. Penn. R. R. Co. v. McCloskey (23 Pa. 526), 511. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Ogier (35 Pa. 60), 527. Penn. R. Co. v. Vanderveer (36 Pa. St. 303), 527. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Weber (76 Pa. St. 157), 166. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Wilson (132 Pa. St. 27), 215. Penn. & Ohio Canal Co. v. Graham 63 Pa. St. 290), 215, 218, 227, 362. Pennsylvania Co. v. Bray (125 Ind. 229), 354. Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan (101 111. 93, 63. Pennsylvania Co. v. Connell (127 111. 419), 354. Pennsylvania Co. v. Finney (145 Ind, 551), 165. Pennsylvania Co. v. Greso (79 111 App. 127), 100. Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton (132 Ind.- 189), 63. Pennsylvania Co. v. Lilly (73 Ind. 252), 300. Pennsylvania Co. v. Xewrneyer (129 Ind. 401), 294. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy (102 U. S. 451), 263, 617. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson (113 Pa. 126; 6 Atl. 453), 67. Pennsylvania, etc., Co. v. Keaue(143 111. 172), 515, 614, 618,637. Penny, In re (7 E. & B. 660), 72. Penny v. Rochester R. Co. (7 App. Div. [X. Y.] 595), 177, 277. People. See State. People v. Albany (5 Lans. [X. Y.] 524), 87. People v. Asten (6 Daly, 18), 501. People v. Buffalo (76 X. Y. 558), 72. People v. Burtlesen (14 Utah, 258; 47Pac. 87), 67. People v. Butter (147 N. Y. 164), 501. People v. Dover & O. H. Commrs. (158 111. 197; 41 N. E. 1105). 65. People v. Foglesong (116 Mich. 556), 290. People v. Gibbs (9 Wend. [X. Y.] 20), 488, 495. People v. Kipley (171 111. 44), 501. People v. Lacombe (99 X. Y. 4:'. |, 501. People v. Martin (178 111. 611). 501. People v. Palmer (109 X. Y. 110), 501. People v. Pettit (74 X. Y. 320), 515. People v. Raymond (18 Colo. 242), 501. People v. Rosenberg (136 N. Y. 510), 501. People v. Simmons (176 111. 165), 501. People v. Starkweather (3 J. & Sp. [X. Y.] 453), 488. People v. Supervisors of Green Co. (13 Abb. [X. C] 421), 501. People v. Thompson (155 111. 451), 501. Peoria & Pa. R. Co. v. Peoria & F. R. Co. (105 111. 110), 75 TABLE OF «'.\si:s CITED IN VOL. I. CXXX1 [References are to Sections.] Peoria Bridge Assoc, v. Loomis (20 Peteraon v. Western In. Teleg. Co. III. 235), H-. 120, L60, L86, 215, (73 Minn. 368), 409 227, 251. Peoria, J». &. E. R. Co. v. Hardwik ;,;; 111. App. 161), 214. Peoria, l». & E. R. Co. \. Rice I L44 111. 227), L69, 293. Peoria, etc., K. R. Co. v. Johns (43 111. App. 83), 256. Pepin v. M. Main. n (154 111. 141; 39 N. E. 4S4. aff'g53 111 App. L89), 67. Peppercorn v. Black River Falls (80 Wis. 38), 310, 311. Percival v. Hickey (18 Johns. [N. Y.] 432), 489. Peri v. N. Y. C. «S U. R. K. R. Co. (87 Hun [N.Y.], 400), 214. Perkins v. Eastern, etc., R. Co. (20 He. 307), 165. Perkins v. Mo. K. R. Co. (55 Mo. 201), 1 39. Perkins v. Philadelphia (156 Pa. 554), 501. Perkins v. stein (15 Ky. L. Rep. 203), 494. Perkins v. Towle (4:) N. II. 220), 115. Perrine v. Blanchard (15 La. Ann. 133), 134. Perry v. Ga. K. & B. Co. (85 Ga. 193), 495. Perzell v. Shook (21 J. & S. [X. V.] 501), 07. Peshine v. Shepperson (17 Gratt. [Va. 1 485), 119. Pessini v. Wilkins (8 N. Y. St. R. 89), 492, 494. Peters v. Lake (60 111. 206), 462. Peterson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Go. (38 Minn. .".11 |, 274, 275. Peterson v. Dakin ([D. C. S. I>. Ala.] 31 Fed. 682), 123. Peterson v. Morgan (116 Mass. 350), 415, 422. Peterson v. Reisdorph (49 Neb. 529), 441. Peterson v. Seattle Traction Co. ([Wash. 1001] 65 Pac. 543), 229. on \. Western in. Teleg. Co. (72 Minn. 41 ), 122. Peterson \. Western l'n. Tele-. Co. (65 Minn. 18), 100. Pen ie v. Columbia & G. N- R- ( '"- (29 s. c. 303), 524, 531, 544. Petry v. Schillo (61 111. App. 286), 134. Pettingill v. Town of Olean (48 X. Y. St. R. 96), 172. Peyton v. Texas & P. R. Co. i 11 La. Ann. 861 ), 102. Plan v. Alteiia (23 Misc. [N. X".] 693), 289. Pfefferv. Buffalo Ky. Co. (54 N. Y. m. K. 342), 214. Pfeffer v. Buffalo R. Co. (4 Misc. [X. Y.] 465), 214. Phalenv. Rochester R. Co. (31 App. Div. [X. Y.] 448), 569, 570, 581. Pl.a.is v.Gere (31 Hun [X. Y.], 143), 05. Pharr v. Southern R. Co. (110 N. C. 751). 157. Pheliu v. Klinderdine (20 Pa. St. 354), 467. Phelps v. Cogswell (70 Cal. 201), 102. Phelps v. Nbwlen (72 N. V. 30), 67. Phelps v. Owens (11 Cal. 22), 124. Phila. Tract. Co. v. Orbann (110 Pa. St. 37), 189, 140, 342. Phila. W. A- B. R. Co. v. Eoeflich (62 Md. 300), 133. Phila. W. & I'.. R. Co. v. Larkin I 17 Md. 15.M. 112. 135, L39, 340, 341. Phila. VY. A- B. R. Co. v. Quigley (21 Bow. [U. S.] 213). 94, 120. 121, 135, 186. Phila. \V. A- B. R. Co. v. State (58 Md. 372), 522, 540. Philips v. Terry (3 Abh. Dec. [X. Y.] 607), 99. Phillips v. Dickerson (85 111. 11), is:;. 220. Phillips v. Kelly (29 Ala. 628 I, 372,878. cxxxn TABLE OF ('Asks CITED IN VDL. I. [References are to Sections.] Phillips v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co. (5 Q. B. Div. 78), 236. Phillips v. Malone (Minor [Ala.] 110), 57. Phillips v. New York C. & II. R. R. Co. (127 X. V. 657), 85. Phillips v. Peoples Pass. R. Co. (190 Pa. St. 222), 170. Phillips v. Southern U. R. Co. (5 C. P. Div. 280), 229. Phillips v. Southwestern Ry. Co. (4 Q. B. D. 40G), 211, 215, 227, 286, 24:3. Philpot v. Lucas (101 Iowa, 478), 435. Phillpot v. Ry. Co. (34 Atl. 850), 556. Phoenix v. Clark (2 Mich. 328), 78. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Charleston Bridge Co. (65 Fed. 632), 184. Phyfe v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (30 Hun [X. Y.], 377), 227. Pickard v. Collins (23 Barb. [X. Y.] 444), 67. Pickens v. South Carolina & G. R. Co. (54 S. C. 498), 80. Pickett v. Crook (20 Wis. 358), 122, 188. Pickett v. West Monroe (47 App. Div. [X. Y.] 629), 78. Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. Co. (117 X. C. 616), 161, 560, 563, 575. Piedmont, etc., R. Co. v. McKenzie (75 Md. 458), 153. Pierce v. Conners (20 Colo. 182), 511. Pierce v. Hosmer (66 Barb. [N. Y.] 345), 76. Pierce v. Lutesville (25 Mo. App. 317), 285. Pierce v. Millay (44 111. 189), 119, 122, 127, 186, 215, 227. Pierce v. Van Dusen (78 Fed. 693), 101, 502. Pierce v. Walters (164 111. 500), 156, 157. Pike v. Dilling (48 Me. 539), 111, 120, 124, 180, 186, 369. Pike v. Jenkins (12 N. H. 255), 501. Pill v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (6 Misc. [X. Y.] 267), 24:1. Pine v. Xew York (103 Fed. 337), 76. Pine v. St. Paul City R. Co. ([Minn.] 16 L. R. A. 347), 339. Pineo v. New York C. R. Co. (34 Hun [X. Y.], 80), 562, 563, 569, 592. Pinkerton v. Snyder (87 111. App. 76), 450. Pitts. A. & M. R. R. Co. v. Donahue (70 Penn. St. 119), 243. Pitts. & L. F. R. Co. v. Blair (11 Ohio C. C. 579), 214. Pitts. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hine (25 Ohio St. 629), 503. Pitts. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lyon (123 Pa. St. 140), 112,334. Pitts. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Cox (55 Ohio St. 497), 203. Pitts. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Dahlin (67 111. App. 99), 605. Pitts. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. En- sign (10 Ohio C. C. 21), 340, 341. Pitts. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hosea (152 Ind. 412), 495, 499. Pitts. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Ma- honey (148 Ind. 196), 198. Pitts. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Mont- gomery (152 Ind. lj, 215, 218. Pitts. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Reyn- olds (55 Ohio St. 370), 337. Pitts. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Russ, (67 Fed. 662), 339, 354. Pitts. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Russ, (57 Fed. 322), 488. Pitts. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Shaw (15 Ind. App. 173; 43 X. E. 957), 63. Pitts., etc., R. R. Co. v. Slusser (19 Ohio St. 157), 135. Pitts., etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith (26 Ohio St. 124), 164. Pitts., etc., R. R. Co. v. Thomson (56 111. 138), 193, 638. Pitts. F. W. & C. R. Co. v. Powers (74 111. 341), 263. Pitts. S. R. Co. v. Taylor (104 Pa. St. 306), 192. Pixley v. Clark (35 X. Y. 520), 150. Plaisted v. B. & K. Steam Xav. Co. (27 Me. 132), 153. TABLE OF casks CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] CXXXlll Planters 1 Oil Co. v. Mansell ([Tex. Civ. App.] 48 s. W. 913), 93. Planters 1 oil .Mill v. Monroe Water- works A: L. Co. (52 La Ann. 1243; _>7 S... 684), o.">. Plath v. Baunsdurff | W Wis. 1UT). 448. Plato v. Turrill (IS 111. 273), 106. Platl v. Brown (30 Conn. 336), PJ4. Piatt v. Waterbury (72 Conn. 531; 45 Atl. 154), 65. Plata v. Cohoes (24 Hun [V V.j, 101), 174. Pleasants v. North Beach it M. It- Co. (34 Cal. 586), 484. Ploof v. Burlington Traction Co. i To Vt. 509), 175, 176. Plonty v. Murphy ([Minn. 1901] S4 N. W. 1005), :'»6.->. Plume v. Lockwood (10 N. .1. L. J. 119), 642. Plumleigh v. Dawson (1 Gilm. [111.] 544 |, 76. Plummer v. Haskel (5 Iowa, :!08), 133. Popp v. < iminnati. EL. A I >. It. * !o. (96 Fed. 165), 507. Popp v. New Fork Central Railroad (26 N. V. St. K. 639), 242. Portei v. Cobb (22 Hun [N. V.j. 278 . 99. l'oricr v. Hannibal & St. Joseph K. R. < o. ,71 Mo. 66), 218. Porter v. Johnson (99 <.a. 275), 430. Poller v. Seihr I-':'. Pa. St. 424), 114, 370. Posl v. Olmstead i 47 Neb. 893), 514, 605,607, 615, 619. Posi v. < (moon 1 7 lleisk. [Tenn.] 167), 91. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Hulsey I 115 Ala. 193), 263. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Louisiana \V. R. Co. | 19 La. Ann. 1270), 102. Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Zopli (48 P. S. App. 141 i. 86. Postlewaite v. Parkes (3 Burr. 1879), 4(17. Posi Pub. Co. v. Hallam ( [C. C. App. Plummer v. Milan (79 Mo. App. 4:59), 6th C] 59 Fed. 530), 425. 194, 215, 218, 243, 297. Potter v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (21 Plummer v. Milan (70 Mo. App. Wis. 372, 374, 472), 527, 645, 651, 598), 318. 054. 057. 663, 672. Poissenet v. Reuther (51 La. Ann. Potter v. Chicago & N. W. It. Co. (22 965), 4 lit. Wis. 615), 055. Polakv. Met. St. R. Co. (58 X. V. Potter v. Hopkins (25 Wend. [N.T.] Supj,. U33), 212. 417i. 562. Polk v. Paucher (1 Head [Tenn.], Potter V. Metropolitan Hist. Ry. Co. 336), 112. Pollard v. Lyon (91 U. S. 225), 393. Pollard v.Porter (3 Gray [Mass.], 312), 78. Pond v. Merrifield (12 Cush. [Mass.] 181), 70. (30 L. T. X. S. 705). 488. Potter v. Prescotl (2 Hun [Mass.], 686), 106. Potter v. Stamph (2 Kan. App. 788 - 119. Potter v. Swindle (77 Ga. noi. 449. Pope v. Barretl (1 Mason [U. s.]. Potter v. Thompson (22 Barb. [N.T.] 1771, 94. Pope v. Farmers 1 Union & M. Co. ([Cal. looo] 62 Par. 384), 44. Pope v. Lake Co. ([U. S. C. C. I). Ind.] 51 Fed. 768), 68. Pope v. Salsmon (35 Mo. 362), 106. Pope v. Welsh ( IS Ala. 631), 422. 87), 502. Potis v. Chic. City Ry. Co. (33 Fed. 810). 136. Pouilin v. Canadian P. It. Co. (47 Fed. 858). 188. Powell v. Augusta it S. K. Co. (77 Ga. 192), 2>s. CXXX1V TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Powell v. Southern K. Co. (125 N. C. I Trice v. Richmond & D. R. Co (38 S. 370), 563. Powers v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (120 N. Y. 178), 11!), 122. Powers v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co. (GOHuu [N. Y.], 19), 152. Powers v. Presgrove (38 Miss. 227), 418. Powers v. Rich (184 Pa. 325), 109. Powers v. Shepard (48 N. Y. 540), . r ,01. Pratt v. Harape ( [Iowa, 1901] 86 N. W. 292), 444. Pratt v. Pratt (Rapports' Judic. Que- bec, 10 C. S. 134), 514. Pratt Coal, etc., Co. v. Brawley (116 Ala. 509), 175. Pratt Iron Co. v. Brawley (83 Ala. 371), 176. Prelm v. Royal Bk. of Liverpool (L. R. 5 Exch. Cas. 92), 7, 11, 13, 81. Prendergast v. New York Cent. R. Co. (58 N. Y r . 652), 561, 586. Prentiss v. Shaw (56 Me. 427), 218, 377. Prescottv. Toucey (18 J. & S. [N. Y.] 1), 425. Press Co. v. McDonald (63 Fed. 238), 402, 403. Press Co. v. Stewart (119 Pa. St. 584), 411. Pressman v. Mooney (5 App. Div. [N. Y.] 121), 514, 572, 586, 588. Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe (73 Fed. 201), 112, 120, 123, 136. Prettyman v. Williamson (1 Penn. [Del.] 224), 457, 459, 460. Price v. Charles Warner Co. (1 Penn. [Del.] 462), 289. Price v. Dearborn (34 N. H. 481), 57. Price v. Hartshorn (44 Barb. [N. Y.] 655), 153. Price v. Marsden ( [C. A. 1899] 1 Q. B. 493), 239. Price v. Murray (10 Bosw. [N. Y. Super.] 243), 134. Price v. Price (91 Iowa, 693), 458. Price v. Price (11 Hun [N. Y.], 299), 494. C. 199), 528, 537. Price v. Richmond & I). R. Co. (33 S. C. 556), 523. Price v. Roy (29 Can. S. C. 494, rev'g in part Rep. Jud. Queb. 8 B. R. 170), 08. Priestly v. Maclean (2 F. & F. 288), 91. Prime v. Eastwood (45 Iowa, 640), 404. Prince v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle (16 Misc. [N. Y.] 186), 397, 398. Prince v. Socialistic Co-op. Pub. Assoc. (64 N. Y. Supp. 285), 402. Pritchard v. Savannah St. & R. R. Co. (87 Ga. 294), 502. Pritchett v. Poole ( [Q. B.] 76 Law T. Rep. 472), 68. Proctor Coal Co. v. Moses (19 Ky. L. Rep. 419), 431. Propson v. Leathen (80 Wis. 008), 214. Piosser v. Montana Cent. R. Co. ( 17 Mont. 372), 166. Pruitt v. Cox (21 Ind. 15), 467, 468. Pruitt v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (62 Mo. 527), 89, 153. Prussing v. Jackson (85 111. App. 324), 397, 420. Pryor v. Chadwick (86 Hun [N. Y.], 75), 380. Pryor v. Met St. Ry. Co. (85 Mo. App. 367), 227. Puckerton v. Le Beau ( [S. D.] 54 N. W. 97), 501. Pueblo Elec. St. R. Co. v. Sherman (25 Colo. 114), 177. Pugh v. McCarty (40 Ga. 444), 418. Pullen v. Glidden (68 Me. 500), 440. Pulling v. Great Eastern Ry. (9 Q. B. D. 110), 538. Pullman v. Illinois C. R. Co. (75 Miss. 027; 23 So. 359), 63. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Barker (4 Colo. 344), 351. Pullman Palace Car Co. Bluhm (109 111. 20), 194, 195. TABLE OF CA8E8 CITED IN VOL. I. CXXXV [References are to Sections.] Pullman Palace Car <'<>. v. Booth I Quigley v. Cent Pac | [Tex. Civ. App.] 28 S. W. 719), 356. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Fowler (6 Tex. ( iv. A|>p. 755), 856. Pullman Palace Car ( <>. \ . Law rence (74 .Miss. 782), 139, 140, 144, 333, 870, 374. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. McDonald rex. C. A] 21 S. W. 945), 354. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Reed (75 111. KIT). 139. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Smith (79 Tex. 478), 323. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Trimble I [Tex. C. A] 28 S. W. 96), 853. Pulver v. Harris (61 Barb. [N. V.] 78), 379. Pundman v. St. Charles Co. (110 Mo. 594 I, 65. Purcell v. Lauer (14 A]>]>. Div. [X. Y.] 33), 514, 569, 572, 578, 586. Purcellv. Richmond & D. R. Co. (108 N. C. 421), 80, 139, 141, 334. Purcellv. St. Paul C. R. Co. (48 Minn. L34), 94, 183, 219, 220, 221. Purdy v. Manhattan El. R. Co. (36 X. V. St. R. 43), 74. l'utli v. Zimbleman (99 Iowa, 641), 457. Putnam v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co. (21 Or. 230), 503. Pymv. Greal Northern Ry. Co. (1 Q. 15. D. 599), 499. Pym v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (4 B. & S. 400), 521, 522. 52 1. 5:;:,. 537, 542, 544, 545, 555. Pym v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (2 Best & S. 759), 511, 535. Quackenbusta v. Chic & N. \V. Ry. Co. (73 Iowa, 458), 329. Quackenbusta v. United states (33 Ct. CI. 355), 501. Quainv. Russell (8Hun[N. V.|. 319), 472. Queen, The (40 Fed. 004). 219, 220. Queen v. Dayton Coal & I. Co. (95 Tenn. 458), 177. R. R. Co. (11 Nev. 350), 139, 218. Quill v. New York (36 App. Div. 470; 55 N. Y. Supp. 889), 65. Quill v. New York Cent. R. R. Oo. (16 Daly [N. V.J. 813), 169. Quimby v. Carter (20 tie. 218), 96. Quinby v. Minnesota Tribune Co. (38 .Minn. 528), H9. Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood (77 111. OS), 199, 597, 598, 626. Quincy Horse R., etc., Co. v. Schulte ( [C. C. App. 7th ('.] 71 Fed. 487), 209. Quinlen v. Welch (69 Hun [N. V.], 584), 470. Qninn v. Long Island R. R. Co. (34 Hun [N. Y.], 331), 218. Quinn v. Lowell Elec. L. Co. I 144 Mass. 476), '.".•. Quinn v. Moore (15 N. Y. 435), 499, 561, 501. 569. Quinn v. O'Keefe (9 App. Div. [N. Y.J 08), 229, 236, 280, 288. Quinn v. Pietro (38 App. Div. [N. Y.J 484), 514, 586. Quinn v. Power (29 Hun [X. V.], 183), 50s. Quinn v. So. Car. Ry. Co. (29 S. C. 381), 111, 135, 139. Quirk v. Siegel-Cooper Co. (00 \. V. St. R. 228; 13 App. Div. 464, afiPg 56 N. V. Supp. IM; 20 Misc. 244), 64, 214, 2 14. Radio v. Detroit ([Mich.] 51 \. '\Y. 300), 503, 643. RadclilT v. Mayor (4 Const. [4 N. Y.J 195), 07, 72. Radley v. Seider i [Mich.] 58 N. \Y. 366), 474. Radman v. Haberstro (1 N. V. St. R. 561), 194. Rafferty v. Buckman (46 Iowa. 195), 472. Railroad Co. See name. Railroad Co. v. Attaway (90 Ga. 657, 661), 158. Railroad Co. v. Austin (69 111.420), 000. i-XXXVl TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL [References are to Sections.] Kailroad Co. v. Babcock (154 U. S. 190), 507. Railroad Co. v. Barry (58 Ark. 198), Kailroad Co. v. Blocker (27 Md. 277), 135. Kailroad Co. v. Bloomingdale (74 Ga. 604), 158. Railroad Co. v. Bradford ( [Ga.] 38 S. E. 823), 158. Railroad Co. v. Carr (71 Ind. 135), 181. Railroad Co. v. Dorsey (106 Ga. 826), 158. Railroad Co. v. Gladman (15 Wall. [U. S.] 401), 166, 177. Railroad Co. v. Harris (76 Ga. 508), 158. Railroad Co. v. Holmes (103 Ga. 658), 158. Railroad Co. v. Jones (95 U. S. 442), 148. Railroad Co. v. Luckie (87 Ga. 6), 158. Railroad Co. v. Markee (103 Ala. 160), 160. Railroad Co. v. Neily (56 Ga. 544), 158. Railroad Co. v. Prince (2 Heisk. [Tenn.] 580), 498. Railroad Co. v. Putnam (118 U. S. 545), 248. Railroad Co. v. Roy (102 II. S. 451), 263. Railroad Co. v. Smith (78 Ga. 700), 158. Railway v. Fuller (63 Tex. 469), 1. Railway Co. See name. Railway Co. v. Garr (57 Ga. 277), 556. Railway Co. v. Lee (92 Ala. 272), 160. Railway Co. v. Need ham (52 Fed. 371), 248. Railway Co. v. Rogers ( [Tex.] 39 S. W. 1112), 491. Railway Co. v. Whitten {74 Tex. 202), 311. Railway Co. v. Wood (113 Ind. 544), 275. Raines v. New York Press Co. (92 Hun [N. Y.], 515), 387. Rajnowski v. Detroit, B. C. & A. R. Co. (74 Mich. 15), 661, 667, 669. Rambant v. Irving Nat. Bk. (42 App. Div. [N. Y.] 143), 79. Ramsburg v. Kline (96 Va. 465; 31 S. E. 608; 4 Va. L. Reg. 584), 73. Ramsdell v. New York & N. E. R. Co. (151 Mass. 245), 870. Ranch v. Lloyd (31 Pa. St. 358), 177. Rand v. Binder ( [Iowa] 75 N. W. 505), 102. Randall v. Dailey (66 Wis. 288), 73. Randall v. Evening News Assoc. (97 Mich. 136), 406. Randlette v. Judkins (77 Me. 114), 66. Randolph v. O'Riordan (155 Mass. 331), 172. Ransom v. N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. (15 N. Y. 415), 215, 362. Ransome v. Christian (49 Ga. -4 1 ) . 401. Rapson v. Cubitt (1 Car. & Marsh. 64), 249. Ratcliff v. Louisville Courier-Journal Co. (99 Ky. 416), 411. Ratteree v. Chapman (79 Ga. 574), 192. Rausch v. Anderson (75 111. App. 526), 404. Ravenga v. Mackintosh (2 B. & C. 393), 440. Rawlins v. Vidvard (34 Hun [N. Y.], 205), 119. Rawson v. State (19 Conn. 292), 501. Ray v. Cortland & H. Traction Co. (19 App. Div. [N. Y.] 530), 354. Rayburn v. Central Iowa Ry. Co. (74 Iowa, 637), 229. Raycroft v. Tayntor (68 Vt. 219; 35 Atl. 53; 43 Cent. L. J. 222), 71. Raymond v. Cowdrey (42 N. Y. Supp. 557), 515. Raymond v. Haverhill (168 Mass. 382), 191. Raynor v. Kinney (14 Ohio St. 283), 401. TABLE OF casks CITED IN VOL. [References are to Sections.] Raynorv. Kims (37 Mich. 84), 134, 14."). Be. See Dame, Elea v. Harrington (58 Vt. 181), 111, 144, 377. Bea-Patterson Mill Co. v. Siyrick ( [Kan. App. 1901] 03 Par. 162), 213. Read v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (32 App. Div. 503), if.'.'. 563. Head v. Case | i Conn. 166), 121. Read v. Clearfield Co. (12 Pa. Super. Ct. 419), T'.i:.. Read v. Greal Eastern Ry. (!) B. & S. 714). :.•_'•_'. .v_':;. Read v. Creat Eastern Ry. Co. (L. R. 3 Q. B. 555 ), 498, 499. Read v. Railway Co. (L. R. 3 Q. B. 1), 499. Read v. Spaulding {'> Bosw. [N. Y.J 395), 153. Read v. Spaulding (30 X. V. 630), 154. Reading v. Donovan (0 La. Ann. 491), 91. Reading Twp. v. Telfer (57 Kan. 798; 48 Pac. 134), 63, 174. Readdy v. Shamokin (1:57 Pa. St. 98), 316. Reade v. Sweetzer (6 Abb. Pr. X. S. [N. V.J 9), 117. Reagan v. Farmers 1 Loan & T. Co. (154 U. S. 362; 14 Sup. ct. Rep. 1047: 3 L. Ed. 1014; 4 Inters. Com. K. 560), 65. Reardon v. Missouri P. R. Co. ([Mo] 21 S. \V. 731), 280. Reath v. State, Johnson (10 Ind. App. 14(i), 472. Record v. Saratoga Springs (46 Hun [X. V.], 44S), 243, 247. Reddin v. Gates (52 Iowa, 210), 372, 376. Redding v. South Carolina It. Co. (5 s. C. [5 Rich.] 67), 484. Redfield v. Oakland Consol. St. R. Co. (112 Cal. 220). .llti. Redfield v. Red fled (7"> Iowa. 435), 111. 12:., :',7.->. rXXXVll • '. Redwood v. .Met. 11. ('... (6 D. 302), 136. Reed v. Augusta i 25 '.a. 386), 91. Reed v. Chic. B. I. & K. Co. (-".7 Iowa. 23), S,\l, 2:.7. Reed v. Chicago .V Si. P. \ . & < ). By. Co. ( [Iowa] 37 \. W. 149), 214. Reed v. Detroit | Ki-. Mich. 224), L95. Beed \. Keith (99 Wis. 672), 102, 386, 397. Reed v. .Madison (83 Wis. 171). 177. Reed v. Madison (85 Wis. 667), 288. Reed v. Northeastern R. Co. (;;7 S. C. I2).:,22, 523. Reed v. Samuels 122 Tex. 114). 120. Reed v. Williams (5 Sneed [Tenu.], 580), 468. Reed Lumber Co. v. Lewis (94 Ala. 62G), 91. Reeder v. Purdy (4S 111. 261), 120, 12 1. Reedy v. Weakley ( [Tenn. Ch. App.] 39 S. W. 739), 107. Reeve v. Wilkesbarre A- W. V. Trac- tion Co. ( [C. P.] 9 Kulp [Pa.], 182), 178. Reeves v. Andrews (7 Ind. 207), 81. Reeves v. Delaware, etc., R. Co. (30 Pa. si. 454), 161. Reeves v. Winn (97 N. C. 246), 112, 11:1, 120. lor,, 425. Reg v. Hopkin's C. C. P. ( [1899] 1 Q. B. 652), 98. Regan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. P. Co. (:.l Wis. 599), 646, 662. Roger v. Rochester Ry. Co. (2 App. Div. [X. V.] 5), 589. Regel v. Bell (77 111. 593), 481. Reeder v. Moore (95 .Midi. 594), tif,7. Beich v. Peck (83 Hun [\. V.], 214), 17::. Reichmanv. Second Ave. Ry. Co. (15 V Y. si. B. 928), 270. Beid \. Johnson (132 Ind. 410), 81. Beid v. Terwilliger (llti X. Y. 530), 175. CXXXV111 TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Reinhardt v. Fritzscher (69 Hun [N. Y.], 565), 470. Reinach v. Railroad Co. (58 Fed. 33), 507. Reining v. New York, L. & W. R. Co. ( 128 N. Y. 157), 71. Reiss v. X. Y. Steam Co. (128 N. Y. 103), 154. Reiss v. Town of Pelham (65 N. Y. Supp. 1033, aft'g 62 N. Y. Supp. 607), 65. Reisterer v. Lee Sum ( [C. C. App. 2d C] 94 Fed. 343), 434. Reizenstein v. Clark (104 Iowa, 287), 369. Reinsen v. Bryant (47 App. Div. [N. Y.] 503), 422. Remsen v. Bryant (24 Misc. [X. Y.] 238), 381, 384. Renck v. McGregor (32 N. J. L. 70), 454. Reune v. United States Leather Co. (107 Wis. 305), 100. Renner v. Marshall (1 Wheat. [U. S.] 215), 57. Replogle v. Frothiugham (16 Pa. Super. Ct. 374), 440. Republican Pub. Co. v. Conroy (5 Colo. App. 262), 381, 410. Republican Pub. Co. v. Mosman (15 Colo. 399), 415. Requer v. Glens Falls S. H. & F. E. St. R. Co. (74 Hun, 202), 338. Reuhl v. Sperry ( [C. C] Ohio C. D. 688), 104. Reusch v. Roanoke Cold Storage Co. ( [Va.] 22 S. E. 358), 391. Rex v. Sewer Commrs. (S B. & C. 355), 67. Reynolds v. Braithwaite (131 Pa. St. 416), 111. Reynolds v. Niagara Falls (81 Hun [N. Y.], 353), 255,274. Reynolds v. Railway Co. (13 Ohio C. C. 39), 327. Reynolds v. Van Beuren (10 Misc. [N. Y.] 703), 214. Rhine v. Morris (96 Ind. 81), 78. Rhines v. Royalton (40 N. Y. St. R. 662), 277. Rhoades v. Varuey (91 Me. 222), 214. Rhodes v. Baird (16 Ohio St. 573), 91. Rhodes v. Rogers (151 Pa. St. 634), 369, 372, 373. Rice v. Crescent City R. Co. (51 La. Ann. 108), 108,514. Rice v. Des Moines (40 Iowa, 638), 195. Rice v. Houston (13 Wall. [U. S.] 66), 507. Rich v. Mayer (26 N. Y. St. R. 107), 386. Rich v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. Rd. Co. (87 N. Y. 382), 487. Richard v. Jones (1 Nev. 405), 78. Richards v. Richards (2 Wood. & Rob. 557), 415. Richardson v. Barker (7 Ind. 567), 412. Richardson v. Dyledahl ( [S. D. 1900] 84 N. W. 486), 431. Richardson v. Fonts (11 Ind. 466), 468. Richardson v. Huston (10 S. D. 484), 453. Richardson v. Kier (31 Cal. 63), 148. Richardson v. North rop (66 Barb. [N. Y.] 85), 99. Richardson v. Northrop (56 Barb. [N. Y.] 105), 418. Richardson v. Richardson (38 La. Ann. 641), 501. Richardson Fueling Co. v. Peters (82 111. App. 508), 639. Richfield v. Michigan C. R. Co. (110 Mich. 406), 169. Richlands Iron Co. v. Elkins (90 Va. 249; 17 S. E. 890), 214. Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co. (87 Mich. 374), 645, 648, 653, 055, 657, 061, 670, 674. Richmond v. Schickler (57 Iowa, 486), 124. Richmond v. '-econd Ave. R. Co. (76 Hun [N. Y.J. 233), 214. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN \'<>r.. I. CXXX1X [References are to Sections. | Richmond & I). K. Co. v. Elliott (149 Riley v. Eastchester (18 App. Div. 94; T. s. 266), 232. I.". V Y. Supp. 148 . 63. Riohmonrl & I). R. Co. v. Parmer (97 Riley v. Grand Island Receivers (72 Ala. 141), 159, -Ji I. Mo. App. 280), 504. Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Freeman Riley v. Harris | [Mass. 1900 58 V ([Ala.] 11 So. 800), 502. E. 584)-, 95. Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Greene 1 Riley v. Lidtke (49 Neb. 139), 316, l [Ala. J 14 So. 495), 293. 319. Richmond & I>. R. Co. v. FTissong Rimmer v. Blasingame (94 Cal. 139), (97 Ala. 1ST: 13 So. 209), 267. 95. Richmond & I). R. Co. v. Jefferson Ringle v. Penn. K. Co. (164 Pa. St. (80 Ga. 554), 357. 529), 203. Richmond & I). R. Co. v. Norment Ringlehaupt v. Young (55 Ark. 128), (84 Va. HIT). 251. 79. Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Vance (93 Ripley v. Leverenz (83 111. App. 60S), Ala. 14-1), 122. 227. Richmond <& I). R. Co. v. Williams Rippe v. Met. St. R. Co. (35 App. [[Ga.] 14 S. E. 120), 214. Div. [N. Y.] 321), 214. Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker (146 Rippey v. Miller (11 Ired. L. [N. C] lad. GOO), 105, 2i;«>. 247), 132. Richmond R. & E. Co. v. Bowles (92 Ritchie v. Stenins (73 Mich. 503), Va. 738), 318, 325. 4 IS. Richmond R. & E. Co. v. Garthright Ritger v. Milwaukee (99 Wis. 190), (92 Va. 627), 214. 172. Ricker v. Freeman (50 N. H. 420), Rittenhouse v. Wilmington St. R, 84. Co. (120 N. C. 544), 08, 502. Ricketts v. Chesapeake ^ < ). R. Co. Ritter v. Ewing (174 Pa. St. 341), (33 W. Va. 133), 136. 432, 435. Ricketts v. Markdale ([Can. 1900, 1 Ritter v. Sieger (105 Pa. 400), 38. Div. Ct] 31 Ont. 610), 535, 551, 041. Riddle v. Delaware Co. (156 Pa. 643), 65. Riddle v. McGinnis (22 W. Va. 253), 407. Ridenhorn v. Kan. City Cable K. Co. (102 Mo. 270), 215. Ridge Ave Pass. R. Co. v. Philadel- phia (181 Pa. 59-2). 81. Ridley v. Seaboard & R. R. Co. (118 N. C. 996), 36, 38. Ki.ss v. Delles (45 Wis. 662), 79. Riewe v. McCormick (11 Neb. 264), 111, 117. Rigdon v. Temple Waterworks Co. ( II Tex. Civ. App. 512), 522. Rigden v. Walcott (6 Gill. & J. [Md.] 419), 400. Kitz v. Austin (1 Tex. Civ. App. 455), 522. Kitz v. City <»f Wheeling (45 W. Va. 262), 04. Rives v. City of Columbia (80 Mo. App. 17:;: 2 Mo. App. Rep. 537), 65*. Roach v. Caldbeck (64 N't. 593 i, 369, 372, 373. Roach v. Consolidated 1. M. Co. (7 Fed. 09s i. 511. Roach v. Western & A. \i. Co. (93 Ga. 785), 172. Roades v. Larson (50 \. V. St. R, 551). 380. Roanoke v. Shull ( [Va. 1899] 34 S. E. 34), 214. Robards v. Wabash K. Co. (84 111. App. 177 1. 04. cxl TABLE OF CASES CITED TX VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Robbins v. Mount (4 Rob. [N. Y.] 553), 151. Robbins v. Springfield St. Ry. Co. (165 Mass. 30), 171. Roberts v. Hettman (45 W. Va. 143), 102. Roberts v. B reckon (31 App. Div. [N. Y.] 131), 394. Roberts v. Graham" (6 Wall. [U. S.] 578), 80. Roberts v. Hackney ( [Ky.] 59 S. W. 328), 454. Roberts v. Heim (27 Ala. 678), 121. Roberts v. Hopper (55 Neb. 599), 471. Roberts v. Mason (10 Ohio St. 277), 114, 370, 372. Roberts v. Ogdensburgh & Lake Champlain R. R. Co. (29 Hun [N. Y.], 154), 295. Roberts v. Rigdon ( [Ga.] 7 S. E. 742), 107. Roberts v. Taylor ( [1899] 21 Ont. R. 10), 63. Robertson v. Cornelson (34 Fed. 716), 215, 218, 243, 263. Robertson v. Mayor of N. Y. (7 Misc. [N. Y.] 645), 514. Robertson v. New York Press Co. (2 App. Div. 49), 389. Robertson v. Wabash R. R. Co. ([Mo. 1899] 53 S. W. 1082), 251, 255. Robertson v. Youghiogheny Riv. C. Co (172 Pa. 566; 27 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 67; 33 Atl. 706), 67. Robinson v. Burton (5 Harr. [Del.] 335), 111, 124. Robinson v. Canadian Pac. R. Co. ([1892] App. Cas. 481), 922. Robinson v. Cone (22 Vt. 224), 176. Robinson v. Detroit & C. S. Nav. Co. (73 Fed. 883), 506. Robinson v. Drummond (24 Ala. 174), 401. Robinson v. Dun (24 Ont. Rep. 287), 427. Robinson v. Evening Post Pub. Co. (39 App. Div. [N. Y.] 525), 417. Robinson v. Gary (28 Ohio, 241), 166. Robinson v. Goings (63 Miss. 500), 124. Robinson v. Masino (3 Wash. 434), 214, 215, 218, 223. Robinson v. Met. St. Ry. Co. (34 Misc. R. [N. Y.] 795), 322. Robinson v. Met. St. Ry. Co. (63 N. Y. Supp. 969), 100. Robinson v. New York Cent. R. R. Co. (66 N. Y. 11), 172. Robinson v. Simpson (8 Houst. [Del.] 398), 63, 251. Robinson v. Superior Rapid Trans. R. Co. (94 Wis. 345), 136, 138. Robinson v. Western Pac. R. R. Co. (48 Cal. 409), 166. Robison v. Rupert (23 Pa. St. 523), 371, 377. Roche v. Redington (125 Cal. 174), 214, 229. Rock v. Denis (4 Mont. L. R. 356), 220. Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. De- laney (82 111. 198), 602, 607, 625, 634, 635. Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wells (66 111. 321), 139. Rockland Water Co. v. Tillsun (69 Me. 255 ), 83. Rockwell v. Eldred (7 Pa. Super. Ct. 95), 224. Rockwood v. Allen (7 Mass. 252), 62. Rodenbaugh, Young, v. Rodenbaugh, ( [C. P.] 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 477), 515. Rodgers v. Fergusou (36 Tex. 544), 124. Rodney v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. ( [Mo.] 30 S. W. 150), 213. Roeder v. Ormsby (22 How. Pr. 270), 576. Roeder v. Ormsby (13 Abb. [X. Y.] 334), 576. Rogan v. Montana C. R. Co. (20 Mont. 503), 227, 233. Roger v. Rochester R. Co. (2 App. Div. [N. Y.], 5; 73 N. Y. St. R. 209), 586. TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. cxli [References are to Sections.] Rogers v. Dutt (13 Moore P. C. C. | Kosedale ( [D. O.S. I). N. Y.] 88 Fed. 200), 71. 324), 320. Rogers v. Ferguson (36 Tex. 544), j Rosekrautz v. Ba'rker (115 111. 333), 112. i.; 1 -'. Rogers v. Henry (32 Wis. 328), 145. Rosen v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. ( [C. Rogers v. Mullen ([Tex. Civ. App. | C. App. 8th C] 49 l. S. A.pp. 847; 1900] 63 S. W. 897), 441. 83 Fed. 300), 1 18. Rogers v. Orion (116 Mich. 324), 325. 1 Rosenbaum v. McThomas (34 Ind. 331), 77. Rosenbaum v. Shoffner (98 Tenn. 624), 859. Rosenfeld v. Stix (67 Bio. App. 582), 443. Rolin v. Steward | 14 ('. 15. p. 005; 23 ' Rosenfield v. Express Co. (1 Wood. L. J. C. P. p. 151), 11. [U. S.] 131. Roll v. Davison (165 Pa. 392), 515. Rosenkranz v. Lindell Ry. Co. ( [Mo.] Rolling v. Chambers (51 Vt. 592), 467. 18 S. \V. 890), 312. Romaine v. Decker (11 App. Div. Rosevelt v. Man. R. Co. (37 N. Y. St. [X. Y.] 20), 458. R. 894), 240. Rombough v. Balch (27 Ont. App. Rosenwald v. llammerstein (12 Daly Rohling v. Rich (23 App. Div. 179; 48 N. Y. Supp. 892), 63. Rohrbough v. Bailer Co. (39 W. Va. 472), 65. Roland v. McGuire (64 Ark. 412), 033. 32), 535, 541, 551. Rompillon v. Abbott (1 N. Y. Supp. 662), 100. Rooney v. X. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co. (173 Mass. 222), 249. Roose v. Perkins (9 Neb. 304, 315), 111, 117, 607, 622. Root v. Butte, A. & P. R. Co. (20 Mont. 354), 80. Knot v. Des Moines City Ry. Co. (113 Iowa, 675; 83 X. W. 904), 181. Root v. King (7 Cow. [X. Y.] 613), 381, 401, 422. Root v. Loundes (6 Hill, 518), 404. Root v. Monroeville ( [Ohio C. C] 1 Toledo Leg. Xews, 208), 244. Root v. Rose (0 X. D. 575), 432, 433. Root v. Sturdivant (70 Iowa. 55), 112, 124. 145,218. Rose v. Gallup (33 Conn. 338), 78. Rose v. McCook (70 Mo. App. 183), 208. Rose v. Mitchell (21 R. I. 270), 4G2. Rose v. Wilmington & W. R. Co. (106 N. C. 168), 139, 141, 340. Rosecrans v. Osay i 19 Neb. 512), si. [X. Y.], 377), 404. Rosewater v. Hoffman (24 Xeb. 222), 406, 410. Ross v. Fickling (11 App. D. C. 442), 102. Ross v. Kansas City (48 Mo. App. 440), 240, 203. Ross v. Leggett (01 Mich. 445), 111, 116, 448, 451, 452. Ross v. Xew Home Sew. Mach. Co. (24 Mo. App. 353), 94. Ross v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (44 Fed. 1 1 .. 51 I. 527, 528, "'37. 548, 551. Ross v. Western Un. Teleg. Co. (81 Fed. 676), 84. Rost v. Brooklyn II. R. Co. (10 App. Div. [X. V.] 477). 207. Kmli v. Kppy (80 111. 283), 111, 12:',, 124. Roth v. Union Depot Co. (13 Wash. 525), 176, 214. Rothschild v. Mark (115 N. Y. 1),488. Rothschild v. Williamson (83 Ind. 387), 81. Rouse v. Detroit Elec. 1!. t\>. i [Mich. 1901] 87 X. W. <*\, 657, . 569), 215, 218. 227, 254. San Antonio & A. P. K. Co. v. Long (87 Tex. L48), 524, 527. 528, 532, 51 15 . San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Long I in Tex. Civ. App. 649), 528, 544, 5")."). San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. \. Long, (87Tex. 148; 27 S. W. 113), 536, 544, 551, 555. 379), 376. Samuels v. California St. Cable R. Co. (124 Cal. 274). 299. Samuels v. Evening Mail Assoc. (75 N. Y. 004), 124, 397. Samuels v. Richmond & T. R. Co. (35 S. C. 493), 112, 348. San Antonio v. Kreusel (17 Tex. Civ. App. 594), 220. San Antonio v. Mackey (14 Tex. Civ. App. 210; 36 S. W. 700), 31. San Antonio v. Mullally (11 Tex. Civ. App. 596), 03. San Antonio v. Porter ([Tex. Civ. App. 1900] 59 S. W. 922), 253. San Antonio & A. P. I!. Co. v. Beam ([Tex. Civ. App.] 50 S. W. 411), 242. San Antonio . Schmidt v. Menosha Wooden Ware Co. (99 Wis. 300), 642, 663. R. si). ;;iti. Schulerv. Third Ave. R.Co. (44 X. V. Si. R. 744), 214. Schum v. Penn. R. R. Co. (107 Pa. si. 8), L66. Schumaker v. Mather (38 X. Y. St. R. 542), L64. Schumaker v. St. Paul & I). K. Co. I 46 Minn. 39). 344. Schwamler v. Birge I 3:', Hun [X. Y.], 186), 63. Schwanzen v. Brooklyn H. K. Co. (18 App. Div. [X. Y.l 20.", |, 263. Schmit v. Dry Dock E. B. R. Co. (3 Schwartz v. Davis (90 Iowa, 324; 57 N. Y. St. R. 257), SI, 204, 257. X. W. 849), 79. 107. 258. Sell wart z v. North Jersey St. Ry. Co. Schmitt v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. ' ([X. V. Supp. 1901] 49 Atl. 676), (13 App. Div. [X. Y.] 120), 562. 233. Schmitt v. Milwaukee K. Co. (89 Schwartz v. Shull (45 W. Va. 405), Wis. 195), 354, 364. 86, 292. Schmitz v.St. Louis, I. M. A S. R. Schwartzschild & S. Co. v. Savannah, Co. (46 Mo. App. 381), 300, 305. F. & W. R. Co. (76 Mo. App. 623; Schmitz v. St. Louis, I. M. A- S. II. 1 Mo. A. Repr. 588), 68. Co. (119 Mo. 256; 24 S. W. 472; 23 J Schweinfurth v. Cleveland. C. C. & L. R. A. 250), 218, 224, 240, 312. Schoepflin v. Coffey (49 X. Y. Supp 627), 402. Schofield v. Territory Anier. Valley Co. (9 N. M. 526), 108. Scholes v. North London Ry. (21 L. I. 835), 91. Schollield O. & I'. Co. v. Scholfield (71 Conn. 1), 102. Schondorf v. Griffith (13 Pa. Super. Ct. 580), 430. Sclioneman v. Fiegley (7 Pa. Si. 433), 31. Schooner. See name. Schorn v. Berry (63 Hun [X. Y.], 110), 460. Schriener v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (12 App. Div. [X. Y.J5.M i. 360. 10 St. L. R. Co. (60 Ohio St. 215), 161. Schwingschlegl v. Monroe (113 Mich. 683), 217. Scott v. Hanks (60 X. Y. Supp. 397), 257. Scotl v. Hay (3 Md. 431 i. 67. Scotl v. Bryson i7l 111. 420), 11'.'. 131. Scotl v. (arothers ( 17 Ind. App. 673), 515. Seoii v. Central It. Co. (77 . It. Co. (43 W. Va. is I |, 334. Scotl v. Donald (165 D". S. 58), 111, 126. Scott \. Flowers (60 Neb. 675), 449, 155 cxlvi TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. [References are to Sections.] Scott v. London Dry Docks Co. (3 Hurlst. & C. 396), 150. Scott v. Montgomery (95.Penn. St. 444), 218, 227, 245. Scott v. Penn. R. Co. (30 N. Y. St. R. 843), 94. Scott v. Shepherd (2 W. Bl. 892), 84. Scougale v. Sweet (124 Mich. 311; 82 N. W. 1061), 384.' Scripps v. Reilly (38 Mich. 23), 116. Scullane v. Kellogg (169 Mass. 544), 252. Scullin v. Harper ([C. C. App. 7th C] 78 Fed. 460), 416, 426. Seaboard Mfg. Co. v. Woodson (98 Ala. 378), 228, 248. Seabridge v. McAdam (119 Cal. 460), 440. Seabrook v. Hicker (4 Rob. [N. Y.] 344), 149. Seaman v. Farmers L. & T. Co. (15 Wis. 578), 672. Seamans v. Hoge (105 Ga. 159), 430. Searight v. Austin ( [Tex.] 42 S. W. 857), 522. Searles v. Cronk (38 How. Pr. [N. Y.] 320), 74. Sears v. Hathaway (12 Cal. 277), 436. Sears v. Lyons (2 Stark. X. P. 317), 111. Seat v. Morelaud (7 Humph. [Teun.] 575), 77. Seaver v. Adams (66 N. H. 142), 458. Second Ward Sav. Bk. v. Schranck (97 Wis. 250), 102. Secor v. Taylor (41 Hun [N. Y.], 123), 478. Secord v. Great Western Ry. (15 Q. B. [Ont.] 631), 527, 542, 544. Security Title & T. Co. v. West Chi- cago St. R. Co. (91 111. App. 332), 633. Seeley v. Alden (61 Pa. St. 302), 119, 120. Seeley v. Citizens Tract. Co. (179 Pa. St. 334), 198. Seeley v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Co. (8 App. Div. 402), 514, 563, 572, 586. Seeman v. Feeney (19 Minn. 79), 111. Seger v. Barkhamsted (22 Conn. 290), 218. Seifter v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co. (66 N. Y. Supp. 1107), 563, 569. Seip v. Deshler (170 Pa. St. 334), 382. Seitz v. Dry Dock E. B. & C. H. Co. (32 N. Y. St. R. 56), 228. Selden v. Cushman (20 Cal. 56), 119, 134. Selden v. Jacksonville (28 Fla. 558; 10 So. 457), 71. Sellars v. Foster (27 Neb. 118), 478 624. Selleck v. Janesville (100 Wis. 157), 195, 316. Selleck v. Janesville (104 Wis. 570), 323. Sellers v. Arie (99 Iowa, 515), 471. Selma R. Co. v. Lacey (49 Ga. 106), 495. Selsby v. Michigan Car Co. (95 Mich. 204), 233. Seltzer v. Saxton (71 111. App. 229), 214. Senior v. Ward (1 El. & El. 385), 68, 522. Serensen v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (45 Fed. 407), 561, 598, 602, 603, 607, 626, 637. Serwe v. Northern P. R. Co. (48 Minn. 78), 351, 354. Sesler v. Rolfe Coal & Coke Co. ( [W. Va. 1902) 41 S. E. 216), 263. Sess v. Richey (58 N. Y. Supp. 1148), 79. Seward v. The Vera Cruz (10 App. Cas. 59), 498, 499. Seward v. Wilmington (2 Marv. [Del.] 189), 208. Sewell v. Butler (16 App. Div. [N. Y.] 77), 295. Seybold v. Morgan (43 111. App. 39), 515. Seybold v. New York, Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. (95 N. Y. 562), 150. Shaber v. St. Paul, etc., R. R. Co. (28 Minn. 104), 264. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL [References are to Sections.] cxlvii Shafer v. Lacock | 168 Pa. 197 \, L50. Shaffer v. Dry Dock R, <'<>. (5 X. Y. Supp. 700), 240. Bhaler v. Bdwy. Imp. Co. (162 V V. 641), 243, 250. Shallow v. Vernon (Ir. R. it C. L. L50), 523, 544. Shanfelter v. Baltimore (80 Md. 183; :;i Ail. 139), 71. Shanks v. Stunipf (23 Misc. [N. Y.j 264 i, :;:»T. Sharp v. Bowlar (1!) Ky. L. Rep. 2018), 404. Sharp v. Hull (81 111. App. 400), 73. Sharp v. Powell (41 L. J. C. P. 95), 91. Sharpe v. Johnston (76 Mo. 060), 433. Sharpe v. Larson (74 Minn. 323), 413. Sharpley v. Brown (43 IIuu [X. Y.], 374), 478. Shartle v. Hutchinson (3 Oreg. 337), 401. Shatto v. Crocken (87 Cal. 629), 438. Shattuck v. Hammond (40 Vt, 466), 460. Shattuck v. McArthur (20 Fed. 136), 387. Shaw v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co. (8 Gray [Mass.J,4:>), 263. Shaw v. Brown (41 Tex. 446, 499), 111, 120, 124. Shaw v. Hoffman (25 Mich. 102), 05. Shaw v. R. R. Co. (101 U. S. 557), 501. Shaw v. Webler (79 Hun [X. Y.], 307), 201. Shay v. Camden & S. Ry. Co. ( [X. Y. 1001] 40 Atl. 517), S3, 218. Shay v. Thompson (59 Wis. 540), 133. Shea v. Potrero, etc., Railroad Co. (44 Cal. 414), 263. Shea v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. (50 Minn. 305), 171. Shear v. Hiles (07 Wis. 350), 142. She Atv. Hallett (12 sawy. [U. S.] 250), 77, 81. Sheedy v. Union Press Brick Works (25 Mo. App. 527), 75. Sheehan v. ( litizens R. Co. 1 72 Mo. App. 524). 156. Sheehan \. Edgar (58 N. Y. 631), 227. 251. Sheehan v, Pierce (70 Hun [X. Y.], 22), II'.'. Sheehan v. St. Paul & D. R, Co. i [U. S.C. C. A. Ttli C] 22 Q.S.C. C. A. 121; 40 U. S. App. 408; 70 Fed. 201), 03. Sheehy v. Cokleyi 13 Iowa. L83), 425. Sheets v. Ohio River R. R. Co. (39 W. Va. 175 |, . Sheik v. Hohson (04 Iowa. 1 16), L32. Shelby v. Castetter (7 1ml. A pp. 325. Shelby v. Clagett (40 Ohio St. 549), 289. Shelby Co., Board of, v. Scearce (2 Duv. [Ky.] 570), 503. Sheldon v. Carpenter (4 N. Y. [4 Comst.] 578), 436, 137. Shelton v. Simmons i 12 Ala. 466), 401. She pan 1 v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (77 Iowa, 54 i, 354. Shepard v. Creamer (160 Mass. 496), 150. Shepard v. Gates (50 Mich. 495), 95. Shepherd v. Hampton (3 Wheat. [U. S.] 200), 94. Sheridan v. Brooklyn City & X. R. Co. (36 X. Y. 39), 84, 85. Sheridan v. Hibbard (119 111. 307), 227, 24:',. Sherman v. Dutch (16 111. 283), 111. Sherman v. Johnson (58 N't. 40), 405. Sherman v. Kortrighl (52 Barb. [X. T.] 2(17), 375. Sherman v. Stage Co. (24 Iowa. 515), 199. Sherwood v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (82 Midi. 374), 2ls. 224, 251. Sherwood v. Chic. & W. M. K. R. Co. (88 Mich. L08), 278. Sherwood v. Grand Ave. R. Co. (132 Mo. 339), 206. cxlviii TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN \'<>L. I. [References are to Sections.] Sherwood v. Kyle (125 Cal. 662), 386. | Simmons v. White ( [C. A.] Sherwood v. Tetman (55 Pa. St. 77), 468. Sherill v. Connor (107 N. C. 543), 95. She waiter v. Bergman (123 ind. 155), 464, 466. Shidet v. Jules Dreyfuss Co. (50 La. Ann. 280), 214. Shields v. Youge (15 Ga. 349), 495. Shilling v. Carson (27 Ind. 175), 422. Ship. See name of. Shipman v. Learn (92 Hun [N. Y.], 568), 434. Shirk v. City of La Fayette (52 Fed. 857), 507. Shoaff v. Funk (182 111. 224), 390. Shonwiler v. Stewart (104 Iowa, 67). 501. Shores v. Brooks (81 Ga. 468), 133. Short v. Skipworth (1 Brock. [U. S.] 103, 114), 94. Shortsleeves v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. (40 N. Y. Supp. 1105), 214. Shultz v. Griffith (103 Iowa, 150), 240. Shumway v. Walworth & M. Mfg. Co. (98 Mich. 411), 217. Shurtleff v. Porker (130 Mass. 293), 404. Shutev. Hamilton (3 Daly [N. Y.]» 462), 33. Sibley v. Smith (2 Mich. 486), 501. Sickra v. Small (87 Me. 493), 414, 422. Siddallv. Jansen (160 111. 43: 48 X. E. 191, rev'g 67 111. App. 102), 63. Sieber v. Great Northern R. Co. (76 Minn. 209), 514. Siefke v. Siefke (6 App. Div. [X. Y.] 472), 432. Siegel C. & Co. v. Connor (70 111. App. 116), 450. Siegle v. Rush (173 111. 559), 146, 479. Sikes v. Tippins (85 (4a. 231), 460. Silberstein v. H. W. S.. etc., R. Co. (22 X. Y. St. R. 452), 213. Silberstein v. Wicke Co. (29 Abb. N. C. [N. Y.] 291), 514, 586, 589. Silsby v. Mich. Car Co. (95 Mich. 204 233, 235. s. L. J. 07 [1899] ), 532, 533, Q. B. N. 548. Simonin v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. (36 Hun [N. Y.], 214), 229. Simons v. Burnham (102 Mich. 189), 412. Simons v. Busby (119 Ind. 13), 464. Simons v. Lewis (51 La. Ann. 327), 418. Simons v. Monier (29 Barb. [N. Y.] 419), 155. Simpkins v. Ward (45 Mich. 559), 501. Simpson v. Grayson (54 Ark. 404), 467, 468. Sinford v. Lake (3 H. & N. 275), 377. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Holdfodt (86 111. 455), 135, 139, 141. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co. (163 U. S. 169; 41 L. Ed. 118; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1002; 75 Off. Gas. 1703), 67. Singleton v. Kennedy (9 B. Mon. [Ky.] 222), 124. Sinne v. Mayor, etc. (8 Civ. Proc. [N. Y.] 252), 595. Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Finlajson (16 Neb. 578), 102, 214. Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Smith (22 Neb. 775; 36 N. W. 285), 215, 243, 24*. Sipev. People, Milliken (26 Colo. 127; 56 Pac. 571), 501. Sissing v. Beach (99 Mich. 439; 58 N. W. 364), 474. , Skala v. Rus (60 111. App. 479), 434. Skinner v. Tinker (34 Barb. [N. Y.] 333), 83. Skirm v. Hilliker ( [N. J. Supp. 1901] 45 Atl. 679), 89. Skottone v. Oregon, S. L. & N. N. R. Co. ( [Oregon] 30 Pac. 222), 214. Skull v. Gleinster (33 L. J. C. P. 185), 111. Slater v. Rink (18 111. 527), 361. Slater v. Sherman (5 Bush [Ky.],206), 120, 369. Slater v. South Carolina R. Co. (29 S. C. 96), 153. TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IN VX>L. [References are to Sections.] cxlix [Slaughter v. First Nat. Ilk. i 109 Ala. L57; 19 So. 130), 7:'.. Slaughter v. Met. St. It. Co. (110 Mo. 269), 241. Slaven v. Germain (04 Hun [X. Y.], 506), 178. Slavin v. State (152 X. Y. 45), 108. Slayton v. Hemken (91 Hun [X. Y.], 582), 393. Slette v. Great Northern K. Co. (53 Minn. 341; 55 N. W. 137), 214. Sloan v. Edwards (01 Bid. 89,90), DO, 120, 144. 218, 374. Shan v. Petrie (15 III. 425), 401. Sloan v. Speaker (63 Mo. App. 321 ). 369. Sloane v. Southern Cal. R. Co. (Ill Cal. 00S), 221, 222, 299, 338, 352. Sloggy v. Crescent Creamery Co. (72 .Minn. 316; 75 N. W. 225), 73, 79. Sloggy v. Dilworth (38 Minn. 179), 99. Sloman v. Mercantile ( '. G. Co. (112 Mich. 258, 204), 102. Sloniker v. Great Northern R. Co. (70 Minn. 300), 214. Smalling v. Kreech ( [ Tenn. Ch. App.] 40 S. W. 1019), 910. Smawley v. Rutheford Co. I 122 N. C. 007; 29 S. E. 904), 71. Smedley v. Hestonville, M. & P. Pass. R. Co. (1S4 Pa. St. 620), 215, 243, 251. Smeizel v. Odanah Iron Co. (110 Mich. 149), 84. Smelting & K. Co. v. Lieh (48 X. Y. Super. Ct. 508), 91. Smid v. Bernard (31 Misc. [X. Y.] 35), 391, 393, 394. Smiley v. St. Louis & II. Ry. Co. (100 Mo. 029; 01 S. W. 007). 17. 244. Smith v. Allen (5 Daly [Conn.], 857), 100. Smith v. Bagwell (19 Fla. 117), 114, 372. Smith v. Baker ([II. of L. 1891] L. R. 1 App. Cas. 325), 68. Smith \. Bolles ( 132 U. S. 125), 82, 89. Smith v. Brooklyn (18 App. Div. [X. Y.] 340: 40 N. V. Supp. L41), 07. Smith v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (119 Mo. 240), 318. Smith v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (108 Mo. 243), 252. Smith v. Chicago Herald ( [111. C.C.] 50 Alb. L. J. 23), 386. Smith v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R, Co. ([S. I).] 02 X. \V. 907), 884. Smith v. City of Antonio ([Tex. 1900] 57 S. W. 881), 82. Smith v. City of Sedalia(152 Mo. 283; 53 S. W. 907), 65. Smith v. City of St. Joseph (55 Mo. 450), 316,323. Smith v. Clarke Hardware Co. (100 Ga. 163; 28 s. K. 73). 67. Smith v. Dawley (92 Iowa, 312: 00 X. W. 025), 290. Smith v. Des Moines (84 Iowa, 685; 51 X. W. 77), 214. Smith v. Dye (21 Tex. Civ. App. 002), 123. Smith v. East Mauch ( 'hunk i 3 Super. Ct. [Pa.] 495), 181, 251. Smith v. Flannery (69 Hun [X. Y.], 615), 380. Smith v. Ft. W. & C. R. R. Co. (23 Ohio St. 10), 111. Smith v. Hestonville, etc. R. Co. (92 Pa. St. I50i. 175. Smith v. Holcomb (99 Mass. 552), 111, 116, 218, 219, 362. Smith v. [ngersoll Sergeanl Rock Drill Co. I 12 Misc. [X. Y.] 5 X. Y. St. R. 727 1. 178. Smith v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. (75 Ala. 449), 499, 503. Smith v. Lynch (12Civ. Proc. [X. Y.J 348), 492. Smith v. Masten (15 Wend. [X. V.] 270), 457, 460. Smith v. Matthews (152 X. Y. 152), 402, 403. cl TABLE OF CASES CITED TN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Smith v. Matthews (2 Misc. [N. Y.] 150), 390, 423. Smith v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. (T App. Div. [N. Y.] 253), 152. Smith v. Metropolitan St. Ky. Co. (15 Misc. [N. Y.] 158), 497, 502, 559, 561, 564. Smith v. Meyers (51 Neb. 857), 460. Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co. (66 111. App. 516), 430. Smith v. Milburn (17 Iowa, 30), 468. Smith v. Munch (65 Minn. 256), 432. Smith v. Myers (52 Neb. 70), 457. Smith v. Newark Ice & C. S. Co. (8 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 283), 64. Smith v. New York Central R. R. Co. (24 N. Y. 222), 159. Smith v. New York Central, etc., R. R. Co. (38 Hun [N. Y.], 33), 172. Smith v. New Y T ork Central & H. R. R. Co. (4 App. Div. [N. Y.] 493), 169. Smith v. North American Tr. Co. (20 Wash. 580; 56 Pac. 372), 70. Smith v. Nova Scotia Teleph. Co. (26 U. S. 275), 207. Smith v. Overby (30 Ga. 241), 362. Smith v. Parker (148 Ind. 127), 79. Smith v. Phila. W. & B. R. Co. (87 Ind. 48), 342. Smith v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. (23 Ohio St. 10), 218. Smith v. Pittsburg & W. R. Co. (90 Fed. 783), 100, 180, 182, 214. Smith v. Rackliffe ( [U. S. Sup. Cal.] 87 Fed. 964; 31 C. C. A. 328), 65. Smith v. Railroad Co. (82 Ga. 801), 158. Smith v. Reeves (178 U. S. 436; 20 S. Ch. 919; 44 L. Ed. 1140), 65. Smith v. Reynolds (8 Hun [N. Y.], 128), 477. Smith v. Sherman (4 Cush. [Mass.] 408), 13. Smith v. Sherwood (2 Tex. 460), 120. Smith v. Smith (98 Tenn. 101), 458. Smith v. Spokane (10 Wash. 403), 214, 293, 294. Smith v. Sun Pub. Co. ( [N. Y.] 50 Fed. 399), 390, 423. Smith v. Sun Printing Co. (55 Fed. 240), 385, 386, 403. Smith v. Third Ave. R. Co. (10 App. Div. [N. Y.] 409), 214. Smith v. Weed Sew. Mach. Co. (26 Ohio St. 562), 79. Smith v. Western R. Co. of Ala. (91 Ala. 455), 70, 153. Smith v. Whittier ([Cal.] 30 Pac. 529), 214. Smith v. (People) Williamson (31 N. E. 425), 478. Smith v. Wilson (21 R. I. 327), 376. Smith v. Wright (27 Barb. [N. Y.] 621), 65. Smith v. Wrightsville, etc., R. R. Co. (83 Ga. 671), 169. Smith v. Young (26 Mo. App. 575), 467. Smithson v. Chic. G. W. R. Co. (71 Minn. 216), 84. Smithson v. United States Teleg. Co. (29 Md. 162), 98. . Smithwick v. Ward (7 Jones [N. C], 64), 113. Smock v. Carter (6 Okla. 300), 98. Smoot v. Schooler ( [Ky.] 8 S. W. 202), 57. Smyth v. Ames (169 U. S. 466; 42 L. Ed. 819; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; 30 Chic L. News, 243, mod'd 171 U. S. 361; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 888), 65. Sncdeker, Matter of, v. Snedeker, (164 N. Y. 58), 561, 564, 568, 569, 572, 580, 587, 592. Snelling v. Garfield (114 Mass. 443), 95. Snow v. Carpenter (49 Vt. 426), 118. Snow v. Grace (25 Ark. 570), 119, 127, 128. Snyder v. Fulton (34 Md. 128), 385, 397. Snyder v. Lexington (20 Ky. L. Rep. 1562; 49 S. W. 765), 68. Snyder v. Wheeling Electrical Co. (43 W. Va. 661), 150, 155. TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. L Cli [References are to Sections.] Soderman v. Troy Steel & I. Co. (TO Hun [N. Y.], 449), 214. Sohns v. Lias (16 Abb. [N. V.j 311), 80, 81. Solarz v. Manhattan R. Co. (8 Misc. [X. Y.] 656), 214. Sonneborn v. Stewart (2 Woods, 599), 444. Sorensen v. Balaban (11 App. Div. [N. Y.] 164), 588. Sornberger v. Canadian Pac. R. Co. (24 Ont. App. 263), 297. Soule v. X. Y. & N. H. R. Co. (24 Conn. 575), 488, 503. Souter v. Sea Witch (1 Cal. 162), 501. Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Isaacs (20 Tex. (iv. App. L97; \S S. \V. 690), 63. Southern K. R. Co. v. Michaels (57 Kan. 474), 293. Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Rice (38 Kan. 398), 340, 343, 354. Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson ( [U. S. C. C. A. 9th C] 44 U. S. 1; C. C. A. 317; 69 Fed. 559), 68. Southern P. R. Co. v. Rauh ( [C. C. App. 9th C] 49 Fed. 696), 263. Southern P. R. Co. v. Tomlinson (163 U. S. 369), 523, 527, 537, 541. Southern R. Co. v. Barlow (104 Ga. 213), 342. South v. Thompson (1 Penu. [Del.] | Southern R. Co. v. Bryant (105 (4a. Ed. 149), 322. South & North Ala. R bama (101 U. S. 832; 25 L 973), 65. South & North A. R. Co. v. McLen- don (63 Ala. 266), 122, 218, 227, 243. South Boston Iron Works v. United States (34 Ct. CI. 174), 65. South Chicago City R. Co. v. Wal- ters (70 111. App. 271), 246. Southcombe v. Armstrong (28 N. Y. St. R. 753), 390. South Covington & C. St. R. Co. v. Bolt (22 Ky. Law Rep. 906), 248. South Covington & C. St. R. Co. v. Herrklotz (47 S. W. 2(i.->), 176. Southerland v. Troy ct Boston R. R. Co. (74 Hun [N. Y.], 162), 165. Southern Bell Teleph. Co. v. Jordan (87 Ga. (59), 180. Southern Cotton Press, etc., Co. v. Bradley (52 Tex. 587), 159. Southern Cotton P. & Mfg. Co. v. Brandley (52 Tex. 001), 529. Southern Exp. Co. v. Brown (67 Miss. 2(i0), 139. Southern Exp. Co. v. Platten (93 Fed. 936), 364. Southern Kan. K. Co. v. Hinsdale (38 Kan. 507). 354. 316), 346,348. Co. v. Ala- Southern R. Co. v. Bryant (95 Va. 212), 166. Southern R. Co. v. Hardin (101 Ga. 263), 348. Southern R. Co. v. Kendiick (40 Miss. 374), 122, 145, 335. Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina R. Co. ( [U. S. C. C. W. D. N. C] 81 Fed. 595), 65. Southern R. Co. v. Smith (95 Va. 187), 22. Southern R. Co. v. Smith (86 Fed. 292), 133. South Omaha Waterworks Co. v. Vocasek ([Neb.] 87 N. W. 536), 618. South Royalton Bk. v. Suffolk Bk. (27 Vt. 50:0, 67. Southwestern H. Co. v. Paulk (24 Ga. 356), L69. Southwestern Tel. & T. Co. v. Rob- inson (50 Fed. 813), 70. Southwest Va. M. L. Co. v. Chase (95 Va. 50; 27 S. E. 826), 7:'.. Sowardv. Chicago & X. W. R. Co. (33 Iowa, 386), . R. lr. 96), 542. cliv TABLE OF CASKS CITED IX VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] (53 S. C Stehmeyer v. Charleston 259; 31 S. E. 322), 65. Stein v. Belanger (Rap. Jud. Qneb. 9 C. S. 535), 111. Stein v. Burden (24 Ala. 130), 76. Steinbrunner v. Pittsburg, etc., R.R. Co. (146 Pa. St. 504), 267, 268. Stell v. Pascball (40 Tex. 640), 111. Stemmerman v. Nassau Elec. R. Co. (36 App. Div. [N. Y.] 218), 109. Stephen v. Hannibal & S. J. K. R. Co. (96 Mo. 207), 227. Stephens v. Nashville, etc., R. Co. (10 Lea [Tenn.], 448), 916. Stephens v. Wallace ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 30 S. W. 1099), 558. Sterling Iron & Z. Co. v. Sparks Mfg. Co. ( [N. J.] 38 Atl. 426), 67. Sternenberg v. Mailhos (99 Fed. 43), 526, 548. Stetlar v. Nellis (60 Barb. [N. Y.] 524), 375, 377. Stevens v. Cheney (36 Hun [N. Y.], 1), 473. Stevens v. Dudley (56 Vt. 158), 90. Stevens v. Kelley (66 Conn. 570), 95. Stevens v. Missouri P. R. Co. (67 Mo. App. 356), 166. Stevens v. Nichols (155 Mass. 472; 29 N. E. 1150), 64. Stevens v. O'Neill (51 App. Div. [N. Y.] 364), 453. Stevens v. Sonto (18 N. Y. St. R. 929), 81. Stevens v. Yale (113 Mich. 680), 79. Stevenson v. Lord (15 Colo. 131; 25 Pac. 313), 73. Stevenson v. Belknap (6 Iowa, 97), 124, 464. Stever v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. (7 App. Div. [N. Y.] 392), 274, 277. Stewart v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (23 Wash. L. Rep. 247), 507, 508. Stewart v. Butts (61 111. App. 483), 101. Stewart v. Cole (46 Ala. 646), 442. Stewart v. Lanier (75 (ia. 582), 89. Stewart v. Lapsley (7 La. Ann. 456), 79. • Stewart v. Madox (63 Ind. 51), 114, 180, 448, 451. Stewart v. Pa tton (65 Mo. App. 21), 83. Stewart v. Railroad Co. (168 U. S. 445-450), 507, 508. Stewart v. Ripon (38 Wis. 584), 311. Stewart v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. (103 Ind. 44), 503. Stickler v. Yager (29 Fed. 244), 121. Stille v. Jenkins (15 N . J. L. 302) 83. Stilphen v. Ulmer (88 Me. 211), 448. Stilson v. Gibbs (53 Mich. 280), 116. Stilwell v. Barnett (60 111. 219), 119. Stimpson v. Railroad (1 Wall. Jr. [U. S.] 164), 95, 164. Stimpson v. Wood (57 L. J. Q. B. 484), 515, 531. Stitzell v. Reynolds (67 Pa. St. 54), 385, 404. St. John v. New York (6 Duer [N. Y.], 315), 83. St. John Young Men's C. Assn. v. Hutchison (18 N. B. 523), 67. St. Lawrence & Ottawa R. W. Co. v. Lett (11 S. C. R. [Ont.] 422, affd C. A. 11 A. R. 1), 528, 530, 543. St. Louis & P. R. Co. v. Barnes (2 Ind. App. 213), 192. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown (62 Ark. 254), 504, 508. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Farr ( [C. C. App. 8th C] 56 Fed. 594), 249. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hicks (79 Fed. 262), 609, 610, 626. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Neal (66 Ark. 543), 339. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Townsend ([Ark.] 63 S. W. 994), 632. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Weaver (35 Kan. 412), 166. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Whittle (20 C. C. A. 196; 74 Fed. 296), 161. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Woolum ([Tex.] 19 S. W. 782), 214. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. | References are to Sections. ] civ St. Louis & S. \V. R. Co. v. Dingman (62 Ark. 245; 35 S. W. 219), 63. St. Louis & S. W. R. Co. v. Thomas ( [Tex. Civ. App.] ^7 S. W. 419), 349. St. Louis & W. K. Co. v. Germany ([Tex. Civ. App. 1900] 56 S. W. 586), 100. St. Louis & \V. R. Co. v. Benson (58 Fed. 531), G02, 604, tilO, 630. St. Louis, A. & C. R. K. Co. v. Dalby (lit ill. 353), 139. St. Louis, A. &T. H. II. Co. v. Bauer (53 111. App. 525), 014, 617, 619. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Odum (52 111. App. 519), 200. St. Louis, A. & T. II. R. Co. v. Rea- gan (52 111. App. 488), 340, 341. St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Johnston (78 Tex. 536), 517, 524, 525, 527, 528, 531, 532, 535, 537, 542, 5 1 1. 551. St. Louis. A. & T. R. Co. v. Taylor (5 Tex. Civ. App. 668), 523, 550. St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Todd (36 111. 409), 159. St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Miller (138 111. 405), 293. St. Louis C. R. R. Co. v. Hall (53 Ark. 7), 186. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Bragg ([Ark. 1901] (54 S. W. 226), 220. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Davis (56 Ark. 51 ; 19 S. W. 107), 343, 005, 614, 616, 635. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Davis (55 Ark. 462), 343, 005, 014, 010, 635. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Daw- son (68 Ark. 1). 597, 009. St. Louis, I. M. & S. K. Co. v. Free- man( 30 Ark. 41 I, 300. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Free- man (30 Ark. 41). 616, 634, 635. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Leathers (62 Ark. 235; 35 S. W. 216), 63. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Li nam ( [Ark. 1901] 60 S. W. 951), 76. St. Louis. 1. M. & S. R. Co. v. Mad- dry (57 Ark. 506), 607, 011, 010, 027, 632, 640. St. Louis, I. M. iS s. R. Co. v. Mc Cain 1 07 Ark. 377). 007, 009. 612, 627, 029. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Mc- Cormick ( [Tex.] 9 S. W. 540). 508. St. Louis, I. M. & S. K. Co. v. Need- ham (32 L. S. App. 635), B6. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Need- ham (52 Fed. 373), 598, 005, 609, 610, 624,627, 628. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Need- ham (3 (J. S. C. C. A. 129), 511. St. Louis. I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Rob- bins (57 Ark. 377), 517, 607, 609, 014, 027. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Sweet (63 Ark. 503), 597,598, 607, 623. St. Louis. I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Sweet (60 Ark. 550), 517. 612, 014, 622, 024, (127, 632. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v.Waren (65 Ark. 619), 214. St. Louis, I. M. & s. R. Co. v. Yoeum (34 Ark. 493), 598, 639. St. Louis, P. & X. R. Co. v. Dorsey (189 111. 251). 014. St. Louis, P. & X. R. Co. v. Rawley, (90 111. App. 653), 002. 017. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Berger (64 Ark. 613), 379. St. LouisS. W. R. Co. v. Bishop (14 Tex. Civ. App. 504), 532, 530, 544. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Dobbins (60 Ark. 4S1), ISO, 215, 218, 293. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Freedman (18 Tex. Civ. App. 553), 281. St. Louis s. \V. R. Co. v. Mahoney (67 Ark. 617), 597, 609, 633. St. LouisS. W. K. Co. v. McCullough ([Tex. Civ. A]> p.] 33 S. W. 285), 347. St. Luke's Hospital v. Foster (86 111. App. 2S2). 598, 603. Stock v. Boston (149 Mass. 410), 489. clvi TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IX VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Stock Quotation Tel. Co. v. Board of Trade (44 App. :;:>S), 77. Stockton v. Frey (4 Gill [Ind.], 406), 215, 227, 263, 642. Stodghill v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (53 Iowa, 341), 38, 99. Stoher v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. (91 Mo. 509), 122,. 511. .Stouter v. Manhattan R. Co. (38 N. Y. St. R. 162), 281. Stouter v. Manh. R. Co. (25 N. Y. St. R. 083), 214. Stovall v. Smith (4 B. Mon. [Ky.] 378), 95. Stovei- v. Inhabitants of Bluehill (51 Me. 439), 195. Stokes v. Salstontall (13 Peters Stowe v. Hey wood (7 Allen [Mass.], [U.S.], 181), 150. 119), 111. Stoltz v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (7 St. Peter's Church v. Beach (26 Ohio, 514), 924. Conn. 355), 122, 186. Stomne v. Hanford Produce Co. (108 Strader v. Snyder (67 111. 404), 415. Iowa, 437), 267. Strange v. Mo. P. R. Co. (1 Mo. App. Stone v. Billings (167 111. 179), 102. Rep. 209), 353. Stone v. Boston & A. R. Co. (171 I Straus v. Young (30 Md. 246), 431. Mass. 536), 84. Stone v. Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. Co. (115 N. Y. 104), 177. Stone v. Grotore Bridge & Mfg. Co. (77 Hun [N.Y.], 99), 508. Stone v. Hey wood (7 Allen [Mass.], 119), 116. Stone v. Moore ( [Iowa] 49 N. W. 76), 278. Stone v. Poland (81 Hun [X. Y.], 132), 229. Stone v. Swift (4 Pick. [Mass.] 389), 440. Stone v. Varney (7 Mete. [Mass.] 86), 422. Stoneseifer v. Sheble (31 Mo. 243), 111,135. St. Ores v. McGlashen (74 Cal. 148), 145. Storey v. Early (86 111. 461), 386, 406, 416. Storey v. New York (29 App. Div. [3 N. Y.] 316), 84. Storey v. Wallace (60 111. 51), 420. Storm v. Green (51 Miss. 103), 120. Storrie v. Marshall (27 S. W. 224), 530. Storrs v. Grand Rapids (110 Mich. 483), 249. Stnudtv. Shepherd (73 Mich. 588; 41 N. W. (!96), 466, 467, 468. Stout v. Prall (1 N. J. L. 79), 464. Strauss v. Newburgh Elec. R. Co. (6 App. Div. [X. Y.] 264), 172. Streeter v. Marshall Silver Min. Co. (4 Colo. 535), 87. Strehlow v. Pettit (96 Wis. 22), 432. Streng v. Frank Ibert Brewing Co. (04 X. Y. St. R. 34), 24, 75,91. Strieker v. Penn. R. Co. (60 N. J. L. 230), 430, 432, 454.. Strickland v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co. (99 Ga. 124), 375. Strickler v. Yager (29 Fed. 244), 121. Stroll m v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. (90 X. Y. 305), 17, 91, 244. Strong v. Iowa C. R. Co. ( [Iowa] 62 N. W. 799), 214. Strong v. Stevens Point (62 Wis. 255), 514, 054, 057. Strong v. United States ( [U. S. C. C. D. Conn.] 93 Fed. 257), 65. Strother v. South Carolina & G. R. Co. (47 S. C. 375), 63, 542. Struble v. Xodwift (11 Ind. 64), 114. Struby-Estabrook Mercantile Co. v. Keyes (9 Colo. App. 190), 440, 441. Strndgeon v. Sand Beach (107 Mich. 496), 194,292, 294. Strutzel v. St. Paul City R. Co. (47 Minn. 543), 514. Struve v. Droge (62 How. Pr. [N. Y.] 233; 10 Abb. X. C. [X. Y.] 142), 72. TABLE OF (ASKS CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] lvii Stuart v. Haw ley (22 Barb. [N. V.| 619), 67. Stuart v. Lovell (2 Stark. 84), 404. Stuart v. Trotter ([Iowa] 39 X. W. 212), 7!». Stuber v. McEntee (142 X. Y. 200), 561, 5(54, 577. Studgeon v. Studgeon ([Ind. App.] 30 N. E. 805), 361. Stuebing v. Marshall (2 Civ. Proc. [N. Y.] 77), 576, 588. Stumn v. Hummell (39 Iowa, 478), 460. Stumps v. Kelly (22 111. 140), 67. Stuppy v. Hof (82 Mo. App. 272), 362, 364, 377. 8tutz v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co. (73 Wis. 147), 243, 352. Stuyvesant v. Wilcox ( [Mich.] 'rl X. W. 465), 194. Submarine Teleg. Co. v. Dickson (15 C. B. [N. S.] 759), 148. Suburban Elec. Co. v. Nugent (58 X T . J. L. 658), 150. Suffolk v. Woodward (5 X.J. Law J. 287), 362. SuffolkG. M. &M. Co. v. San Miguel Con. M. & M. Co. (!» Colo. App. 407; 48 Pac. 828), 67. Sullings v. Shakespeare (46 Mich. 408), 412. Sullivan v. Horner (41 X. J. Eq.299), 660. Sullivan v. Lowell & I). St. R. Co. (162 Mass. 536), 316. Sullivan v. Oreg. Ry. & Nav. Co. (12 Oreg. 392), 112, 136, 137, 139. Sullivan v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 36 S. W. 1020), 157. Sullivan v. Tioga R. R. Co. (112 N. V. 643), 195. Sullivan v. Union P. 1!. Co. (1 Mc- Crary [U. S. C. ('.] 301). 495. Sullivan v. Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co. (39 La. Ann. 800), 94. Sullivan Co. v. Ruth (106 Tenn. 85), 82. Summit Co. v. (iustaveson (18 I rtah, 351 |, 501. Sumner v. Buel (12 Johns. [X. V.| 475), 393. Sun Print. & Pub. Assn. v. Scheuck (98 Fed. 925), 400, 414. Sutton v. Chicago, si. P. M. & O. R. Co. (98 Wis. 157; 73 X. W. 99! Suydam v. Grand St & Newton R. R. Co. (41 Barb. [N. Y.J 375), 161. Swan v. Long Island R. Co. (86 Hun [X. Y.], 265), 212. Swan v. Long Island R, R. Co. (79 Hun [X. Y.], 612), 214. Swan v. Thompson (124 Cal. 193), 415, 423. Swan v. Worvell (107 Wis. 025 I. 643. Swarthout v. New Jersey, etc., Co. (46 Barb. [X. Y.| 222), 328. Sweet v. Excelsior Elec Co. ( [X. Y.] 31 Atl. 721), 98. Sweet v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (18 Misc. [X. Y.] 355), 488, 580. Sweetland v. Chicago & G. T. R, Co. (117 Mieh. 329;*43 L. R. A. 568), 503, 642, 650, 655. Swenson v. Brooklyn H. R. Co. (15 Misc. [X. Y.] 69), 288. Swift v. Applebone (23 Mich. 252), 95. Swift v. Eastern Warehouse (86 Ala. 294). 89. Swift v. Foster (55 111. App. 286), 607, 615. Swift v. Raleigh (54 111. App. 44), 244. Swift v. Hutkouski (82 111. App. L08), 297. Swift & Co. v. Foster (163 111.50), 614, 618, 627. Swift & Co. v. Ilolonheek (55 Neb. 288), 267, 269, 312. Swigett v. United states (78 Fed. 156), 65. Swinfin v. Lowry (37 Minn. 345), 171. Swolm v. Wal bourn ( [Pa.] 15 Lane. L. R. 118), 404. clviii TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. 1. [References are to Sections.] Sykes v. Northeastern By. (23 W. R. Taylor v. Church (8 N. Y. 452, 460), 473), 528. Sykes v. Northeastern Ky. (44 L. J. C. P. 191), 525, 531, 532, 534,537, 547. Sykora v. Case Mach. Co. (59 Minn. 130), 912. Sylvester v. Maag (155 Pa. St. 225), 214. Symonds v. Carter (32 N. H. 458), 115. Symons v. Met. St. R. Co. (58 X. Y Supp. 327), 229. Syracuse Water Co. v. City of Syra- cuse (116 X. Y. 167), 501. Taber v. Ilutson (5 Ind. 322), 111, 114. Tainter v. Worcester (123 Mass. 311), 65. Talbot v. West Va. R. Co. (42 W. Ya. 560), 24, 119, 122. Talbott v. Great Western Plaster Co. (86 Mo. App. 558), 430. Tallinau v. Syracuse & X. Y. R. Co. (Keyes, 128; 4 Abb. Dec. 351), 501. Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline (37 Fla. 586; 20 So. 780), 67. Tanner v. Louisville, etc., R. Co. (60 Ala. 621), 164. Tappan v. Harwood (2 Speer [S. C], 536), 91. Tarbutton v. Town of Tenville (110 Ga. 90; 35 S. E. 282), 65. Tate v. Booe (9 Ind. 13), 78. Tatnall v. Courtney (6 Houst. [Del.] 434), 369, 374. Tavenner v. Morehead (41 W. Ya. 116), 430, 447. Taylor v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (33 W. Ya. 39), 263. Taylor v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. (18 Ind. App. 692), 430. Taylor v. Bradley* (39 N. Y. 129). 75. Taylor v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (41 W. Va. 704). 300, 303. Taylor v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co. (103 Wis. 27), 214. 113, 413. 414. Taylor v. City of Ballard (24 Wash. 191), 275. Taylor v. Grand Trunk By. (48 N. H. 303, 304), 111, 115, 122, 187. Taylor v. Granger (19 R. I. 410; 37 Atl. 13), 67. Taylor v. Hearst (107 Cal. 262; 40 Pac. 394), 410. Taylor v. Hearst (118 Cal. 366), 414. Taylor v. Long Island R. Co. (16 App. Div. [X. Y.] 1), 562, 563, 570, 57S. Taylor v. Monroe (43 Conn. 36), 240. Taylor v. Xew York & H. R. Co. (27 App. Div. [X. Y.] 190; 50 N. Y. Supp. 697), 71. Taylor v. Pullen (152 Mo. 434), 406. Taylor v. Read (4 Paige [X. Y.], 561), 89. Taylor v. Scherpe & K. Architectural Iron Co. (133 Mo. 349), 243, 245. Taylor v. Welch (92 Hun [X.Y.], 272), 588. Taylor. B. £ II. B. Co. v. Taylor (79 Tex. 104), 522, 524, 526, 527. Taylor, B. & H. R. Co. v. Warner ([Tex.] 31 S. W. 66), 514, 528, 530, 552. Teagarden v. Hetfield (11 Ind. 522), 81. Telfer v. Northern R. Co. (30 X. J. L. 188), 514, 642, 645, 646, 648, 650, 651, 660, 664, 668, 672. Telton v. Aubrey (20 C. C. R. 436; 43 U. S. App. 278; 78 Fed. 350), 63. Templeton v. Linn Co. (22 Or. 313), 65. Tenant v. Gray (5 Munf. [Va.] 494), 102, 106. Ten Eyck v. Del. & R. Canal Co. (18 X. J. L. 200), 87. Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co. v. Hern- don (100 Ala. 451), 520. Tenney v. Tuttle (1 Allen [Mass.], 185), 149. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN Vol.. I. rlix [References are to Sections.] Terliuno v. Koellisch ( [X. J.] 43 Atl. 655), 214. Terre Haute v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. ([U. S. C. C. A. Ind.] 40 C. C. A. 117; 99 Fed. 838), 65. Terre Haute & T. K. Co. v. Williams (69 111. App. 292), 63. Terry v. Beatrice Starch Co. (43 Neb. 866), 83. Terry v. Jewett (17 Bun [X. V.], 395), 571, 574. Terry v. Munger (121 X. Y. 161), 488. Terry v. Xew York Central R. R. Co. (22 Barb. [X. Y.] 574), 101. Terwilliger v. Wands (IT X. Y. .".4), 303, 404. Tesch v. Milwaukee Elec. K. & L. Co. (108 Wis. 593), 168. Tetherow v. St. Joseph & D. M. II. Co. (98 Mo. 74), 478. Texarkana & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. An- derson ( [Ark.] 53 S. W. 673), 219. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brown (39 S. W. 140), 535. Texas & X. O. R. Co. v. Brown (14 Tex. Civ. App. 607), 525, 532, 536, 544. Texas & X. O. R. Co. v. Carr (01 Tex. 332), 192. Texas & X. O. R. Co. v. Crouder (70 Tex. 222), 548, 540, 551. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Echols (17 Tex. Civ. App. 077), 214. Texas & X. O. R. Co. v. Syfan ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 43 S. W. 551), 214. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Syfan (91 Tex. 562), 102. Texas & X. O. R. Co. v. Wood ([Tex. Civ. App. 1894] 24 S. W. 560), 214. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Beckworth (11 Tex. Civ. App. 153), 313. Texas & P. B. Co. v. Bledsoe | [Tex.] 20 S. W. 1135), 522. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Bowlin ( [Tex. Civ. App. | 32 S. W. 918), 21 I. Texas A- P. R. Co. v. Brick (83 Tex. 598), 214. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Brick ([Tex.] 18 S. W. 047), 214. Texas & P. II. Co. v. Buckalew ([Tex. Civ. App.] 34 S. W. 165), 240. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Burton ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 30 S. W. 491), 214. Texas & P. K. Co. v. Cody ( [U. S. S. C. 1897] 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 763), 148. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cody ( [U. S. C. C. A. 5th C.J 07 Fed. 71), 110. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Collins (84 Tex. 121), 522. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cornelius ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 30 S. W. 720), 305. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cox ( [Tex.] 145 U.S. 503). 504. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Geiger (79 Tex. 13), 522, 528. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gott (20 Tex. C. A. 335). 353. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Hall ( [Tex.] 10 S. W. 121), 547. Texas* P. R. Co. v. Heimble (181 U. S. 57 ), 310. 320. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Hill (71 Tex. 451). 522. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Hoffman (83 Tex. 286), 207. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Horn (151 U. S. 110). 102. Texas & P. I!. Co. v. James (82 Tex. 306), 339, 354. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Armstrong (93 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Johnson ( [Tex. Tex.), 355. Civ. App.] 34 S. W. 186), 214. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Barrett ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1000] 57 S. W. 002), 64. Texas & P. B. Co. v. Beckworth ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 32 S. \V. 809), 194. Texas & P. B. Co. v. Jones ( [Tex. Civ. App. I 29 s. W. 499), L36. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Lester (75 Tex. 50). 51 1,524,527,528, 529, 532, 5.;:, 540, 550. clx TABLF OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Texas & P. R. Co. v. Malone (15 Tex. C. A. 56), 215,309. Texas & P. K. Co. v. Mansell ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 23 8. W. 549), 346. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Martin ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1900] 60 S. W. 803), 533, 544. Texas & P. R. Co.. v. Moody (23 S. W. 41), 532. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Moore ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1900) 56 S. W. 248), 63. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Morin (60 Tex. 133, 225), 300, 301, 311. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Murphy (46 Tex. 356), 166. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Neal ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 33 S. W. 693), 194. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Orr (40 Ark. 182), 166. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Phillips (91 Tex. 278), 514. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Putnam ( [Tex. Civ. App. 1901] 63 S. W. 910), 300, 303. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Robertson (82 Tex. 657), 528, 544. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Sherbert ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 42 S. W. 639), 356. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Spence ( [Tex.] 52 S. W. 562), 514, 528, 532, 537, 552. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Turner (37 S. W. 643), 104. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Volk (151 U. S. 73), 229. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Wilder (92 Fed. 953), 514, 528, 531, 535, 537. 549. Texas Brew. Co. v. Dickey (20 Tex. Civ. App. 606), 208,215. Texas Coal & Fuel Co. v. Arnstein (22 Tex. Civ. App. 441), 366. Texas Loau Agency v. Fleming (18 Tex. Civ. App. 668), 523. Texas Midland R. Co. v. Crowder (64 S.W. 90), 537. Texas Trunk R. Co. v. Johnson (86 Tex. 421), 102. Tlieroux v. Northern P. R. Co. (64 Fed. 84), 506. Thibaultv. Sessions (101 Mich. 279), 422. Thickstun v. Howard (8 Blackf. [Ind.] 535), 49. Thill v. Polman, (76 Iowa, 638), 111, 124, 515. Thillman v. Neal (88 Md. 525), 369, 370. Third Nat. Bk. v. Nat. Bk. (30 C. C. A. 436; 86 Fed. 852), 101. Third St. R. Co. v. Boudron (92 Pa. St. 475), 161. Thisler v. Hopkins (85 111. App. 207), 79. Thomas v. Brooklyn (58 Iowa, 438), 318. Thomas v. Consolidated Traction Co. (62 N. J. L. 36), 214. Thomas v. Crosswell (7 Johns. 264), 404. Thomas v. Dansby (74 Mich. 389), 471. Thomas v. Dingley (70 Me. 100), 87. Thomas v. Gates ( [Cal. 1899] 58 Pac. 315), 208, 218. Thomas v. Harris (3 H. & N. 961), 111. Thomas v. Merry ( [Ind.] 15 N. E. 244), 108. Thomas v. Rouse (2 Brev. [S. C] 75, 444. Thomas v. Southern R. Co. (122 N. C. 1005), 335. Thomas v. Snyder (20 111. App. 146), 104. Thomas v. Union Ry. Co. (18 App. Div. [N. Y.] 185), 214, 234. Thomas v. Utica & Black River R. Co. (6 Civ. Proc. [N. Y.] 353), 561, 570, 571. Thompson v. Bell (11 Tex. Civ. App. 1), 431. Thompson v. Boyd Mills (Const. [S. C] 80), 418. Thompson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (104 Fed. 845), 634. TABLE OF CASKS CITED IN VOL. I. I ■ 1 X I [References are to Sections.] Thompson v. Crocker (9 Pick. [Miss ' 59), 73. Thompson v. Ellsworth (39 Mich. 719), 449. Thompson v. Johnston Bros. Co. (86 Wis. r.Td), 514, 854, 657, 672. Thompson v. National Exp. Co. ( [Vt.] 29 Atl. 311), 215, 216. Thompson v. North. Mo. R. K. Co. (31 Mo. 100), 166. Thompson v. Powning (15 Nev. 195), 388. Thompson v. Salt Lake Rap. Trans. Co. (16 Utah, 281), 84, 161. Thomson-Houston Klec. Co. v. Du- rant L. Imp. Co. (144 N. Y. 34), 70. Thoresen v. La Crosse City R. Co. (04 Wis. 129), 657. Thorn v. Knapp (42 N. Y. 474), 404. Thorp v. Carvalho (14 Misc. [N. Y.] 554), 450, 456. Thorpe v. Wray (68 Ga. 350), 452. Thrall v. Knapp (17 Iowa, 468), 377. Thrikfield v. Mountain View Ceme- tery Assn. (12 Utah, 76), 100, 125. Throckmorton v. Evening Post Pub. Co. (35 A pp. Div. [N. Y.] 306), 79. Throckmorton v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (14 Tex. Civ. App. 222), 194. Thrussell v. Handyside ( [Q. B. D. 1888] L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 359), 68. Thurber v. Eastern Bldg. & L. Assoc. (118 N. C. 120), 434. Thurber v. Railroad Co. (60 N. Y. 326), 177. Thuiinger v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (71 Hun [N. Y.], 526), 318. Thurn v. Alta Tcleg. Co. (15 Cal. 472), 501. Thurston v. St. Joseph (51 Mo. 510; 11 Am. Rep. 463), 65. Tiblerv. Alford (12 Fed. 262), 112. Tierney v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R. Co. (85 Hun [N. Y.], 146), 214. Tietz v. Philadelphia Tract. Co. (169 Pa. 516), 101. Tiffin v. Ward (5 Oreg. 450), 83. 11 TilTt v. Culver (:; Hill [N. Y.], 180), 112, 113. Tilley v. Hudson 1;. I;. Co. (24 N. V. 471, 474), :,21. 537, "''m. 566, 567, 569, 570, 571, 575, 581, 582, 592. Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co. ( [20 N. V. 252, 285] ), 520, 560, 561, 563, 575, 583. Tillotson v. Cheetham (3 Johns. [N. Y.] 56), 124, 412. Times v. Milwaukee (103 Wis. 582), 652, 654, 657, (S70. Times Pub. Co. v. Carlisle ( [C. C. App. 8th C] 94 Fed. 762), 385, 397, 402, 403, 410, 413, 417, 420. Tindal v. Wesley (167 U. S. 264; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; 29 Chic. L. News, 337), 65. Tindall v. Wesley (65 Fed. 731), 65. Tipton v. Schuler (87 111. App. 517), 473. Tisdale v. Delaware & H. Can. Co. (4 N. Y. St. R. 812), 212, 562. Tisdale v. Major (100 Iowa, 1), 438. Titus v. Corkins (21 Kan. 722), 112, 145. Titus v. Sumner (44 N. Y. 266), 404. Tobin v. Fairport (12 N. Y. Supp. 224), 299. Tobin v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. ( [Mo.] 18 S. W. 996), 514. Tobin v. Sykes (71 Hun [N. Y.], 469), :l8C h 300, 400. Tobler v. Austin (22 Tex. Civ. App. 99), 75. Toledo v. Clopeck (9 Ohio C. D. 432), 209, 214. Toledo v. Higgins (12 Ohio C. C. 64(1), 214. Toledo Consol. St. R. Co. v. Rohner (9 Ohio C. C. 702), 214. Toledo Elec. St. R. Co. v. Tucker (13 Ohio C. C. 441), 101, 194. Toledo P. & W. R. Co. v. Arnold (4; 1 , 111. 418, 419), 122, 142. Toledo P. & \Y. R. <,,. v. Chisholm ([C. C. App. 8th C] 83 Fed. 652), 166. clxii TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. Toledo P. & W. Ry. Co. v. Johnston (74 111. 83), 122. Toledo Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. Putney (44 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 486; 10 O. C. D. 698), 64. Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Brooks (81 111. 245), 627, 639. Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Eddy (72 111. 138), 194. Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Grable (88 111. 441), 162. Toledo, Wabash & W. R. Co. v. Har- mon (75 111. 298), 139. Toledo, Wabash & W. Ry. Co. v. Smith (57 111. 517), 265. Tomlinson v. Derby (43 Conn. 562), 13, 240, 241. Tompkins v. Clay St. R. Co. (66 Cal. 163), 172. Tompkins v. West (56 Conn. 478), 322, 325, 326. Toorney v. Del. L. & W. R. Co. (40 Misc. [N. Y.] 392), 448. Toomey v. Del. L. & W. R. Co. (53 N. Y. St. R. 567), 450. Topeka v. Bradshaw (5 Kan. App. 879), 214. Topeka v. Tuttle (5 Kan. 311), 87, 88. Topping v. St. Lawrence (86 Wis. 526), 499, 642, 643, 645, 646, 660, 663, 665. Toronto R. Co. v. Grinsted (24 Can. S. C. 570), 351. Tottleben v. Blankenship (58 111. App. 47), 381, 413. Tourgee v. Rose (19 R. I. 432), 468. Towle v. Blake (48 N. H. 92), 115, 120. Town. See name of. Townsend v. Briggs (88 Cal. 230), 107. Townsend v. Briggs ( [Cal.] 32 Pac. 307), 267. Townsend v. Fisher (2 Hilt. [N. Y.] 47), 33, 97. Townsend v. Fontenot (42 La. Ann. 890), 119. [References are to Sections.] Townsend v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (56 N. Y. 295), 135, 136, 138. Townsend v. Paola (41 Kan. 591), 243. Tozer v. New York Cent. R. R. Co. (105 N. Y. 617), 244. Trabing v. California Nav. & T. Co. (121 Cal. 137), 136, 218. Tracy v. Hacket (19 Ind. App. 133), 381, 410, 422. Trainer v. Wolff (58 N. J. L. 381), 120. Transfer, The, No. 4, & The Car Float No. 16 ([U. S. C. C. 2d Cir.] 61 Fed. 364), 488. Trapnell v. Red Oak Junction ( [Iowa], 39 N. W. 884), 256. Trauermann v. Lippincott (39 Mo. App. 478), 122. Travelers Protect. Assoc, of Ameri- ca v. West (102 Fed. 226), 603. Traver v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co. (6 Abb. N. S. 46), 300. Travers v. Kan. Pac. Ry. Co. (63 Mo. 421), 139. Travis v. Barger (24 Barb. [N. Y.] 614), 468. Travis v. Carolton (26 N. Y. St. R. 821), 161. Travis v. Skinner (72 Mich. 152), 65. Treadwell v. Tillis (108 Ala. 262), 77. Treat v. Browning (4 Conn. 408), 422. Trelawney v. Coleman (2 Stark. 191), 460. Trenwith v. Gilvery (50 N. J. L. 18), 94. Trigg v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry. Co. (74 Mo. 147), 353. Trimble v. Com. (96 Va. 818), 501. Trimble v. Spiller (7Mon. [Ky.] 394), 225. Trimble v. Tantlinger (104 Iowa, 665), 393. Trinity & S. R. Co. v. O'Brien (18 Tex. Civ. App. 690), 188 223, 263. TAMA-: OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. clxiii [References are to Sections.] Tripp v. Grouner (60 111. 470), 119. Trompen v. Verhage (54 Mich. o04), 95. Troth v. Wills (8 Pa. Super. Ct. 1; 42 W. N. C. 504), 07. Trow v. Thomas (70 Vt. 580), 155, 305. Troy v. Cheshire K. Co. (23 X. H. 83), 38. Trudel v. La Campagnio DTmprime- rie et de Publication ( [Montreal L. Rep.] 5 Sup. Ct. 297), 411. Trudel v. La Campagnie D'lmprime- rie et de Publication du Canada ( [Montreal L. Rep.] 5 Q. B. 510), 419. Trudel v. Vian ( [Montreal L. Rep.] 5 Q. B. 502), 419. Truth Pub. Co. v. Reed (13 Ky. L. Rep. 323), 412. Tucker v. Chaplin (2 Car. & K. 730), 522. Tucker v. Draper ( [Neb. 1901] 86 N. W. 917), 64. Tucker v. Ferguson (22 Wall. [U. S.] 527), 66. Tucker v. Green (27 Kan. 357), 120. Tucker v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. (92 Va. 549), 156. Tucker v. Parks (7 Colo. 62), 81. Tucker v. State ( [Johnson] 89 Md. 471), 523, 558. Tucker v. Tucker (74 Miss. 93), 461. Tucker v. Tucker (24 Mich. 426), 8:;. Tufts v. Bennett (163 Mass. 398), 78. Tullis v. Rankin (6 X. D. 44), 281. Tully v. N. Y. & T. S. S. Co. (10 App. Div. [N. Y.] 463), 214. Tully v. Phila. W. & B. R. R. Co. ( [Del. 1901] 50 Atl. 95), 149. Tunnicliffe v. Bay Cities Consol. R. Co. (107 Mich. 261), 183, 215. Tunstall v. Robinson ( [U. S. C. C. Ark.] 229), 103. Turner v. Boston & M. R. R. Co. (158 Mass. 261), 256. Turner v. Eddy (83 Tex. 218), 522. Turner v. Footman (71 Me. 218), 375. Turner v. Great Northern R, Co. (15 Wash. 213), 354. Turner v. Hearst (115 CaL 394), 417, 420. Turner v. Newburgh (109 N. Y. 301), 281. Turner v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. ( [W. Va.] 22 S. E. 83), 514. Turner v. North Beach, etc., K. It. Co. (34 CaL 594), 342. Turpie v. Lowe (114 Ind. 37), 78. Turton v. New York Recorder (3 Misc. [N. Y.] 314), 386, 403. 404. Turton v. New York Recorder Co. (114 N. Y. 144), 420. Tuteur v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (77 Wis. 505), 648, 654, 655, 657, 659, 661, 665. Tuthill v. Long Island R. R. Co. (81 Hun [N. Y.], 616), 214. Tuttle v. Chic, etc., R. R. Co. (42 Iowa, 518), 316, 322. Tuttle v. Farmington (58 N. H. 13), 195. Tuttle v. Hannegan (4 Daly [N. Y.], 92), 83. Twist v. Rochester (37 App. Div. [N. Y.] 307), 65, 514, 563, 569, 586. Twomley v. Railroad Co. (69 N. Y. 158), 169. Tyler v. Third Ave. R. Co. (18 Misc. [N. Y.] 165), 108, 240. Tyler S. E. R. Co. v. McMahon (34 S. W. 796), 517, 528, 532. Tyler S. E. R. Co. v. Rasberry (13 Tex. Civ. App. 185), 528, 540, 546, 554. Tynberg v. Cohen ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 24 S. W. 314), 444. Tyson v Booth (100 Mass. 258), 375, 377. Tyson v. Ewing (3.1. J. Marsh. [Ky.] 185), 111. Uertz v. Singer Mfg. Co. (35 Hun [X. Y.], 116), 212. Uhlig v. Barnum (43 Neb. 584), 77. Ullrich v. New York Press Pub. Co. (28 Misc. [N. Y.] 168), 385, 402. clxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] R. Co. v. Evans (52 Neb. v. Hause (1 Wyo. Co. Ulshowski v. Hill (61 N. J. L. 375), 149. Union Bank v. Rideau Lumber Co. (3 Ont. L. Rep. 269), 124. Union Mill. & M. Co. v. Uaughberg (81 Fed. 73), 67. Union News Co. v. Morrow (20 Ky. L. Rep. 302), 300, 303. Union P. R. Co. v. Artist (19 U. S. App. 612), 202. Union P. R. Co. v. Botsford (141 U. S. 250). 294. Union P. R. Co. v. Dunden (37 Kan. 1), 514. Union P. 50), 84. Union P. I 27), 111. Union P. R. Co. v. Jones (49 Fed. 343), 243. Union P. R. Co. v. Jones (21 Colo. 340; 40 Pac. 891), 305, 316, 322, 323. Union P. R. Co. v. Lapsley (51 Fed. 174), 172. Union P. R. Co. v. Mitchell (56 Kan. 324), 213. Union P. R. Co. v. McDonald (152 U. S. 262), 110, 514. Union P. R. Co. v. O'Brien (161 U. S. 451), 166. Union P. R. Co. v. Shook (3 Kan. App. 710), 87, 337. Union P. R. Co. v. Young (57 Kan. 168), 263. Union R. & T. Co. v. Shacklett (19111. App. 145; 8 West. 63), 598. Union Ry. Co. v. Callahan (56 Fed. 992). 84. Union Show Case Co. v. Blindauer (75 111. App. 358), 214. Union Street R. Co. v. Stone (54 Kan. 83), 218, 318. Upton v. Hume (24 Oreg. 420), 417. Upton v. Upton (51 Hun [N. Y.], 184), 133, 408. United Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Brenne- man (21 Misc. [N. Y.] 41), 97. United Press v. New York Press Co. (164 N. Y. 406), 78. United States v. Athens (35 Ga. 344), 501. United States v. Berdan Fire Arms (156 U. S. 566), 65. United States v. Dumplin Island (1 Barb. [N. Y.] 24), 43. United States v. Ellis ([Ark.] 51 Fed. 808), 501. United States v. Hartwell (6 Wall. [U. S.] 385), 501. United States v. Madrozo ( [L T . S. C. C. A. 2d Cir.] 38 U. S. A. 515; 73 Fed. 505), 65. United States v. Reed (86 Fed. 308), 28. United States v. Taylor (35 Fed. 484), 111, 125. United States v. Wiltberger (5 Wheat. [U. S.] 76), 501. United States v. Winchester & P. R. Co. (163 U. S. 244; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993; 41 L. Ed. 145), 65. United States Trust Co. v. O'Brien (46 N. Y. St. Rep. 238), 74, 90. Unterberger v. Scharf (51 Mo. App. 102), 104. Updegrove v. Zimmerman (13 Pa. St. 619), 401. Uransky v. Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. R. Co. (118 N. Y. 304), 318. Vail v. Broadway R. Co. (6 Misc. [X. Y.] 20), 214. Valentine v. Broadway, etc., R. Co. (14 Daly [N. Y.], 540), 214. Vallo v. United States Exp. Co. (147 Pa. St. 404), 169, 194. Van Alstine v. Kaniecki (109 Mich. 318), 479. Van Auken v. Clute ( 13 App. Div. [N. Y.] 622), 101. Van Brunt v. Cincinnati, J. & M. R. Co. (78 Mich. 530), 644, 645, 646, 652, 653, 657, 662, 670, 674. Vance v. Towne (13 La. 225), 83. Van Cleef v. Lawrence (2 C. H. Rec. [N. Y.] 41), 404. TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. clxv [References are to Sections.] Van Clief v. Van Vechten (130 N. Y. 571; 42 N. Y. St. K. 736; 29 N. E. 1017), 73. Vanderberg v. Connoly (18 Utah, 112), 448. Vanderburg v. Truax (4 Den. [N. Y.] 04U), 82. Vanderslice v. Newton (4 N. Y. 130), 80. Van Derveer v. Sutphin (5 Ohio St. 293), 382. Van Deventer v. New York & N. II. R. Co. (27 Barb. [N. Y.] 244), 508. Van Doren v. Pennsylvania K. Co. (93 Fed. 260), 504, 505. Van Dusan v. Grand Trunk K. Co. (97 Mich. 439), 338. Vangundy v. Berkenmeyer (19 111. App. 229), 119. Vanhoru v. Des Moines (63 Iowa, 447; 19 N. W. 293), 65. Van Ingen v. Mail & E. Pub. Co. (14 Misc. [N. Y.] 32G), 397, 417. Van Ingen v. Star Co. (1 App. Div. [N. Y.] 429), 402,403. 412. Van Olienda v. Hall (88 Hun [N. Y]. 452, 458. Van Pelt v. McOraw (4 N. Y. 110), 67. Van Keeden v. Evans (52 111. App. 209), 380. Van Velsor v. Seeberger (35 111. App. 598), 7. Vanwart v. New Brunswick Ry. (27 Sup. Ct. Jud. [N. B.] 59), 532, 547. Van Winkle v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co. ([Iowa], 61 N. W. 929), 279. Varillat v. New Orleans & Carrollton K. R. Co. (10 La. Ann. 88), 135. Varnham v. Council Bluffs, 52 Iowa, 098), 255, 256. Vaughn v. Clarksnn (19 R. I. 497), 462. Von v. Creaton ( 138 Pa. St. 48), 471. Vergiii v. City <>f Saginaw ( [Mich. 1901] 84 \. W. 1075), 253. Vcrry v. Watkins (7 C. & P. 308), 408. Vesberg v. Putney (7s Wis. 84), 281. Vessel. See name of. Vessel Owners Towing Co. v. Wilson (11 C. C. A. 366; 63 Fed. 626), 17:;. Vetaloro v. Perkins (101 Fed. 393), 508. Vicksburg v. McLain (61 Miss. 4), 514. 521. Vicksburg & J. R. Co. v. Patton (31 Miss. [N. Y.] 156), L20, 139. Vicksburg & M. R. R. Co. v. Putnam ( lis f. S. 545), 215, 227, 243, 251. Vicksburg & M. R. R. Co. v. Rags- dale (46 Miss. 45S), 91. Vicksburg & Meridian R K. Co. v. Scaulou (63 Miss. 413), 111, 119, 135. Victorian Ry. Commrs. v. Coultas (L. R. 13 App. Cas. 222). 82, 87, 183, 220, 221. Victory v. Baker (07 N. Y. 366), 07. Village. See name of. Vinal v. Core (18 W. Va. 1), 431, 438. Vincent v. Cook (4 Hun [N. Y.], 318), 150. Vincent v. Steinhauer (7 Vt. 62; 29 Am. Dec. 45), 09. Vinson v. Flynn (04 Ark. 453), 434. Vittum v. Oilman (48 N. H. 410), 487. Vogel v. McAuliffe ([R. I.] 31 Atl. 1), 100. Volans v. Owen (74 N. Y. 520 I. 47:'.. Volkman v. Manhattan Ry. Co. (134 X. Y. 418), 150, 156. Voltz v. Blackmar (04 N. Y. 440, 444). Ill, 112. 113. Von Fragstein v. Windier (2 Mo. App. 588), 113. Vorass v. Rosenberry (85 111. App. 623), 623. Vosblirg v. Putney (78 Wis. 84). 204. Vosburg v. Putney (80 Wis. 523 ), 361. Wabash v. Carver (129 Iiul. 453), 65. Wabash Pr. & Pub. Co. v. Crumrine ( 123 I ml. 89; 21 N. E. 904), 114,410. Wabash R. Co. v. Fox (04 Ohio St 133), 504. clxvi TABLE OF CASES CITED IX VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Wabash R. Co. v. Miller (18 Ind. App. 549), 148. Wabash R. Co. v. Smith (162 111. 583), 606, 610. Wabash R. Co. v. Zerwick (74 111. App. 670), 164. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Rector (104 111. 296), 118. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Shack- lett (10 111. App. 404), 503. Wabash W. R. Co. v. Morgan ( [Ind.] 31 N. E. 661), 215, 218, 243. Wade v. Columbia Elec. St. R. L. & P. Co. (51 S. E. 296), 111, 118, 209. Wade v. Leroy (20 How. [U. S.] 34), 215, 227, 229, 233, 236, 241, 251, 328. Wadhams v. Swan (109 111. 46), 79. Wadsworth v. Treat (43 Me. 103), 361, 362. Wager v. Troy M. R. Co. (25 N. Y. 526), 99. Wagner v. National L. Ins. Co. ( [U. S. C. C. A. 6th C), 61 U. S. App. 691; 33 C. C. A. 121; 90 Fed. 395), 68. Wahl v. Shoulder (14 Ind. App. 665), 285. Waine v. Stanton (12 App. Div. [X. Y.] 623), 107. Wainright v. Satterfield (52 Neb. 403), 100, 102. Wakely v. Johnson (115 Mich. 285), 435, 441. Wakeman v. Robinson (8 Moore, 63), 154. Wald v. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. (162 111. 545), 70. Waldele v. Xew York C. & H. R. R. Co. (29 Hun [X. Y.], 35), 569, 572, 586. Waldhier v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. (87 Mo. 37), 214. Walden v. Skinner (101 U. S. 589), 507. Waldo v. Goodsell (33 Conn. 432). 857. Waldron v. Marcier (82 111. 550), 134. Waldron v. Waldron ([111.] 45 Fed. 314, 315), 459, 462. Walker v. Borland (21 Mo. 289), 113. Walker v. Erie Ry. Co. (63 Barb. [N. Y.] 260), 218, 227, 229, 233, 236, 243, 328. Walker v. Fuller (29 Ark. 448), 133, 134. Walker v. Great Northern R. Co. ( [L. R. It.] 28 C. L. 69), 308. Walker v. Herrow (22 Tex. 55), 165. Walker v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. ( [Mich.] 62 N. W. 1032), 643. Walker v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. (Ill Mich. 518), 632, 645, 666. Walker v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. (104 Mich. 606), 646, 647. Walker v. Pittman ( 108 Ind. 341 ), 437. Walker v. Second Ave. R. Co. 6 N. Y. Supp. 536), 309. Walker v. United States (34 Ct. CI. 345), 65. Walker v. Westfield (39 Vt. 246), 166. Walker v. Wickeus ( [Kan.] 30 Pac. 181), 400. Walker v. Wilson (8 Bosw. [N. Y.] 586), 111, 119, 186. Wall v. Cameron (6 Colo. 275), 122. Wall v. Livezay (6 Colo. 465), 215. Wall v. Posey (105 Ga. 484), 102. Wallace v. Ali Sam (71 Cal. 197), 91. Wallace v. Bennett (1 Abb. N. C. 478), 393. Wallace v. City of New York (18 How. Pr. [N. Y.] 169), 119. Wallace v. Jameson (179 Pa. St. 98), 382. Wallace v. Mayor (2 Hilt. [N. Y.] 440), 65, 112, 120, 186. Wallace v. New York (2 Hilt. [N. Y.] 169), 65, 112, 120, 186. Wallace v. Rodgers (156 Pa. St. 395), 391. Wallace v. Third Ave. R. Co. (36 App. Div. [N. Y.] 57), 132, 152, 562, 572, 581. Wallace v. Third Ave. R. R. Co. ( [S. 0. N. Y. App. Div. 1899] 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 215), 132, 152, 562, 572, 581. TABLK OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. clx vn Wallace v. Western, etc., R. Co. (104 X. C. 442), 215, 218, 227, 229, 243. Wallace v. Williams (59 Hun [N. Y.J, 028), 119. Waller v. Hebron (5 App. Div. 577; 39 N. Y. Supp. 381), 03. Waller v. Stale I 144 N. V. 579; 39 X. E. 080; 04 X. Y. St. R. 220), 65. Waller v. Waller (TO Iowa, 513), 134. Waller Bros. v. Waller (70 Iowa, 513), 119. Wallis v. City of Westport (82 Mo. App. 522), 318. Wallis Iron Works v. Monmouth Park Assoc. (55 X. J. L. [26 Vr.] 132: 20 Atl. 140), :;.;. Walls v. Rochester R. Co. (92 Hun [X. Y.], 581), 562, 581. Walrath v. Radfield (11 X. Y. 212), 87. Walrath v. Whittekind (20 Kan. 482), 91. Walrod v. Webster Co. ( [Iowa, 1900] SI X. W. 598), 65. Walsh v. Boston & M. R. Co. (171 Mass. 52), 105, 166. Walsh v. Chic, etc., Ry. Co. (42 Wis. 23), 327. Walsh v. Great Western Ry. ( [Ir. R.] 6 C. L. 532), 508. Walter v. Post (6 Duer [N. Y.], 363), 17, 83. Wambold v. Vick (50 Wis. 450), 667. Wanamaker v. Bowers (30 Md. 42), 119, 127. Wanck v. City of Winona ( [Minn.] 80 N. W. S51), 293. Wanzer v. Bright (52 111. 35), 120, 442. Ward v. Blackwood (41 Ark. 295), 133, 375. Ward v. Congress Court Co. ( [U. S. C. C. A. 111.] 33 C. C. A. 009; 99 Fed. 598), 05. Ward v. Deaue (32 X. Y. St. R. 270), 387. Ward v. Dick (47 Conn. 300), 401 404. [References are to Sections.] Ward v. St. Vincent's Hospital (39 App. Div. [X. Y.] 024), 487. Ward v. Ward (41 Iowa, 080), 112, 114. Ward v. West Jersey & S. R. Co. ( [X. J. Sup. 1900] 47 Atl. 501), 220. Warden v. M cConnell ( [Neb.] 36 N. W. 278), 470. Wardle v. New Orleans City R. R. Co. (35 La. Ann. 202), 243. Wardrobe v. Cal. Stage Co. (7 Cal. 118), 136. Warder v. Henry (117 Mo. 530), 102. Ware v. Cartledge (24 Ala. 622), 406. Warner v. Chamberlain (7 Houst. [Del.] 18), 215, 227, 254, 250. Warner v. Lockerby (31 Minn. 421), 418, 422. Warner v. Press Pub. Co. (132 X. Y. 181), 111, 124, 397, 402. Warner v. So. Pac. R. Co. (113 Cal. 105), 136. Warner v. Western N. C. R. Co. (94 N. C. 250), 569. Warren v. Boston & M. R. Co. ( [Mass.] 40 N. E. 896), 220. Warren v. Dennett (17 Misc. [X. Y.] 86), 430, 455, 456. Warren v. Doolittle (5 Cow. [X. Y.] 678), 90. Warren v. Englehart (13 Xeb. 283), Warren v. Sheer ( [Pa.] 12 Atl. 204), 57. Warren v. Warren (89 Mich. 123), 458. Warrior Coal & C. Co. v. Mabel fit Co. (112 Ala. 024), 107. Warsaw v. Fisher ( [Lad. App. 1899] 55 X. E. 42), 230. Wartelsky v. McGee ([Tex. Civ. App.] 30 S. W. 09). 470. Wartmau v. Sundell 1 54 X'. J. L. [25 Vt.] 589; 25 Atl. 356), 73. Warwick v. Frouke (12 M. & W. 507), 452. Warwick v. Hutcbiusou (45 N. J. L. 01), 87. elxviii TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Washington v. Missouri, K. & T. K. Co. (90 Tex. 314), 152. Washington & G. R. Co. v. Amer. Car Co. (5 App. U. C. 524), 91. Washington & G. R. Co. v. Gladmon (15 Wall. [U. S.] 401), 514. Washington & G. R. Co. v. Hickey (12 App. D. C. 269), 192, 316, 322. Washington & G. R. Co. v. Patterson (9 App. D. C. 423), 254. Washington & G. R. Co. v. Patterson (25 Wash. L. Rep. 36), 215, 227. Washington, etc., R. Co. v. Harmon (147 U. S. 571), 166, 244. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lans- den(172 U. S. 534), 406. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lans- den ( [D. C. App.] 24 Wash. L. Rep. 807), 385. Washington Twp. v. Coler ( [U. S. C. C. A. 8th C] 51 Fed. 362), 501. Waterman v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. (82 Wis. 613; 52 N. W. 247), 243, 267. Waters v. Brown (3 A. K. Marsh. [Ky.], 557), 375. Waters v. Dumas (75 Cal. 564), 111, 124. Waters v. Greenleaf, Johnson L. Co. (115 N. C. 648), 119. Waters v. Stevenson (3 Nev. 157), 119. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State (19 Tex. Civ. App. 1: 44 S. W. 936), 67. Watkins v. Gaston (17 Ala. 664), 375. Watson v. Hastings (1 Penn. [Del.] 47), 369. Watson v. Loop (12 Tex. 11), 523. Watson v. Rheinderknecht ( [Minn. 1901] 84 N. W. 798), 82, 90, 368. Watt v. Nevada Cent. R. Co. (23 Nev. 154), 91. Watt v. Potter (2 Mason [U. S.], 77), 94. Wattenberg v. Bernhard (26 Misc. [N. Y.] 659), 402. Watter v. Kensinger (2 Pa. Dist. R. 728), 366. Watts v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. (39 W. Va. 196), 78. W T ax v. State (43 Neb. 18; 61 N. W. 117), 103. Weaver v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. ( [D. C] 21 Wash. L. Rep. 179), 504. Weaver v. Page (6 Cal. 681), 444. Webb v. Oilman (80»Me. 177), 111, 118, 119, 124, 145, 369. Webb v. Gross (79 Me. 224), 78. Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co. (3 Sumn. [U. S.] 189, 196), 55, 62, 74, 76, 94. Webb v. Rothchild(49 La. Ann. 244, 369. Webb v. Union Ry. Co. (44 App. Div. [N. Y.] 413), 244. Webber v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. (97 Fed. 140), 487. Webber v. Vincent (29 N. Y. St. R. 603), 408. Weber v. Butler (81 Hun [N. Y.], 244), 390, 402. Weber v. Creston (75 Iowa, 16), 280. Weber v. Squier (51 Mo. App. 601), 75. Weber v. Third Ave. R. R. Co. (12 App. Div. [N. Y.j 512; 42 N. Y. Supp. 789; 76 N. Y. St. R. 789), 502, 559. Webster v. Symes (109 Mich. 1), 148. Webster Mfg. Co. v. Mulvaney (68 111. App. 607), 514, 607, 636. Webster Mfg. Co. v. Nisbett (87 111. App. 551), 69. Weed v. Lee (50 Barb. [N. Y.] 354), 106. Weeks v. State (63 N. Y. Supp. 203; 48 App. Div. 357), 65. Weems v. Mathieson (4 Macq. H. L. 215), 531, 535, 547. Weightman v. Washington (1 Black [U. S.], 39) 65. Weil v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. (64 Ark. 535; 43 S. W. 967), 67. Weinberg v. Met. St. Ry. Co. (139 Mo. 286), 178, 211, 330. Weirs v. Jones Co. (80 Iowa, 351), 65. TABLK <»K CASKS CITED IN V«»I.. I. clxix Weisenberg v. Appleton (26 Wis. 56), 24a Weiser v. Broadway & N. St. R. Co. (10 Ohio C. C. 14), 290. Weiser v. Welch (112 Mich. 134), 473, 476. Weiss v. Hunsicker (14 Pa. Co. Ct. 398), 494. Weiss v. Whittemore (28 Mich. 373), 391. Weitz v. Ewen (50 Iowa, 570), 473. Welch v. Cheek (115 X. C. 310), 434. Wellman v. Sun Print. & Pub. Assu. (66 Hun [X. Y.], 331), 495. Wells v. National L. Assn. (99 Fed. 222), 75. Wells v. New York Central R. R. Co. (24 N. Y. 181), 159. Welsh v. Anthony (4 Harris [Pa.], 254). 95. Welch v. Durand (36 Conn. 182), 120. Wendell v. Pratt (12 Allen [Mass.], 464), 153. Wendt v. Craig (17 N. Y. Supp. 748), 390. Wentworth v. Black man (71 Iowa, 255), 119, 134. Wentz v. Bernhardt (37 La. Ann. 636), 448. Werner v. Chic. & N. W. Ry. Co. ([Wis.] 81 N. Y. 416), 264. West v. Forrest (22 Mo. 344), 215, 218, 867. West v. Southern R. Co. ( [U. S. C. C. A. 8th C], 56 U. S. App. 323; 29 U. S. C. A. 219; 85 Fed. 392), 68. West v. Steamboat Berlin (3 Iowa, 332), 153. WVstbrook v. Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. (66 Mass. 560), 175, 170. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Bode (51 111. App. 440), 214. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Boeker (70 111. App. 67), 165. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Carr (67 111. App. 530), 318. 325. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Carr (170 111. 478), 215, 227, 233, 251, 280. [References are to Sections.] West Chicago St. R. Co. Dooley (70 111. App. 424), 607, 616, 636. West Chicago St. K. Co. v. Foster (175 111. 396), 215, 218. West Chicago St. R, Co. v. James (69 111. App. 609), 224. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Johnson (77 111. App. 142), 214. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Kennedy (165 111. 496), 280. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Levy (182 111. 525), 80, 298. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Lyons (157 111. 593), 206. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Mabie (77 111. App. 176), 514, 598, 602, 603, 605. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Maday (188 111. 308), 229. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Morrison A. & A. Co. (160 111. 288), 104. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Musa (180 111. 130), 213. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Reddy (69 111. App. 53), 282. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Scanlon (Chic. L. J. W T kly. 113), 514. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Scanlon (08 111. App. 628), 607, 625, 634. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Wauiata 68 111. App. 481), 514, 605. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Wheeler 73 111. App. 368), 109. Wist Cumberland Iron, etc., Co. v. Kenyon (11 Ch. I). 782, rev'g 6 Ch. D. 733), 67. Westerberg v. Kinzua Creek & K. R. Co. (142 Pa. 471), 102. Westerfield v. Levis ( [La.] 9 So. 52), 514. Westerfield v. Scripps (119 Cal. 007). 400. Western & A. R. Co. v. Ferguson ( [Ga.] 39 S. E. 300), 150, 171. Western & A. R. Co. v. Ledbetter (99 Ga. 318), 340. Western ct A. R. Co. v. Young (81 Ga. 397; 7 S. E. 912), 63, 177, 180, 192, 215, 312. clxx TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Western Brewery Co. v. Meredith I Weston v. Barnicoat ( [Mass.] 56 N. (166 111. 306, 309), 218, 226. Western Gas Coust. Co. v. Danner ( [U. S. C. C. A. Cal.], 77 Fed. 882), 258. Western Ry. V. Sistrunk (85 Ala. 352; 5 So. 79), 63. Western Ry. of Alabama v. William- son (114 Ala. 131), 166. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Birchfield (14 Tex. Civ. App. 664), 77. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Breshaus (8 Ind. App. 563), 114, 139. Western Un. Tel. Co. v. Brown (58 Tex. 170), 136. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Cooper (71 Tex. 507), 183. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Cunning- ham (99 Ala. 344), 111. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Engler [ (C. C. App. 9th C. ] 75 Fed. 102), 214. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Hall (124 U. S. 444), 75. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Harding, (103 Ind. 505), 501. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Hoffman (80 Tex. 424), 176. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. McGill (57 Fed. 699), 630. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Morrison (83 Fed. 992), 246. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Poe (61 Fed. 449), 501. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Putchett (108 (la. 411), 391. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Seed (115 Ala. 670), 139, 141, 145. Western Union Teleg. Co. v. State (82 Md. 293), 150. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Waxel- baum ([Ga. 1901] 39 S. E. 443), 94. Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Woods (88 111. App. 375), 311. Westlake v. Westlake (34 Ohio St. 621), 458. West Memphis Packet Co. v. White (99 Teun. 256), 214. E. 619), 385, 391. Westphal v. Austin (39 111. App. 230), 472, 615. Wetmore v. Pattison (45 Mich. 439), 89. Whalen v. Citizens Gas Light Co. (151 N. Y. 70), 165. Whalen v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. (60 Mo. 323), 215, 227. Whalls v. Same (1 Ont. L. R. 622), 547. Wharton v. Winch (140 N. Y. 287; 55 N. Y. St. R. 652 ; 35 N. E. 589, rev'g 46 N. Y. St. R. 187; 19 N. Y. Supp. 477), 17. Whatley v. Catlett ( [Tenn.] 53 S. W. 131), 499. Wheatley v. Thorn (23 Miss. 62), 114, 373. Wheeler v. Boone (108 Iowa, 235), 246. Wheeler v. Hanson (161 Mass. 370), 436, 437. Wheeler v. Nesbitt (24 How. [U. S.] 544), 432. Wheeler v. Tyler S. E. R. Co. (91 Tex. 356), 257, 258. Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Boyce (36 Kan. 350), 135, 448. Wheelockv. Noonan (108 N. Y. 179), 99. Whelan v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co. (38 Fed. 15), 251, 254, 267. Whilty v. City of Oshkosh ( [Wis. 1900], 81 N. W. 992), 65. Whimark v. Lorton (8 N. Y. Supp. 480), 78. Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co. (2 Story, 661), 39, 62, 76, 100. Whipple v. Walpole (ION. H. 130), 115, 122. White v. Blanchard (164 Pa. 345), 110. White v. Gaedinger (Rap. Ju. Que- bec, B. R. 156), 63. White v. Griffin (4 Jones L. [N. C] 139), 76. TABLE OF , 498, 499, 508, 511, 500, 501, 504. Whitman v. Egbert (27 App. Div. [N. Y.] 374), 458. Whitmore v. Bischoff (5 Hun [N. Y.], 170), 99. Whitney v. Bartholomew (21 Conn. 213). 07. Whitney v. Clarendon (18 Vt. 252), 243. Whitney v. Hitchcock (4 Den. [N r . Y.] 461), 361,371. Whitney v. New York Casualty Ins. Assoc. (27 App. Div. [X. V.J 320), 440. Whitney & S. Co. v. O'Kouike (172 111. 177). 199. Whiton v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co. (2 Bliss [U. S. C. C. Wis.) 282), 511, 047. 648, 651, 004. Wholey v. Coldwell (los Cal. 95), 70. Wichita v. Stallings (5fl Kan. 770), 214. Wier v. Allen (51 X. II. 177), 417. Wier v. Bradford (1 Colo. 14), 95. Wiese v. Kennne (140 Mo. 289), 175. Wiggin v Coffin (3 Story [U. s .j, 1), no. Wigton v. Met St R. Co. 38 App. Div. [N. Y.j 207), 340. Wilber v. Dwyer (69 Hun [X. Y.], 507), 475. Wilbur v. Crane (13 Pick. [Mass. J 290), 501. Wilcox v. Wilmington City R. Co. ( [Del.] 44 Atl. 080), 203. 489. Wilde v. Xew Orleans (12 La. Ann. 15), 75. Wiley v. Long Island K. R. Co. (70 Hun [N. Y.], 29), 169. Wilhelm v. Brooklyn Q. C. & S. li. Co. (32 App. Div. LX. Y.] 037), 212. Wilker v. Follansbee (97 Wis. 577), 90. Wilkie v. Releigh & C. F. K. Co. (127 X. C. 203), 230. Wilkins v. Gilmore (21 Tenn. 140), 120. Wilkins v. Omaha & C. B. K. & B. Co. (90 Iowa, 668), 214. Wilkins v. Wainright (173 Mass. 212), 132. Wilkinson v. Drew (75 Me. 300), 111, 120. Willard v. Holmes (2 Misc. [X. Y.]. 303), 436, 437. Willard v. Press Pub. Co. (52 App. Div. [X. Y.] 44S), 401. Willett v. St. .Albans (69 Vt. 330; 38 Atl. 72), 07. William Bianfoot. The (48 Fed. 914), 249. Williamette, The ( [U. S. C. C. App. 9th Cir.] 70 Fed. 874), 488. Williams v. Brimingham, B. & M. Co. (OS L. J. Q. B. X. S. 018 [C. C. 1899] 2Q. B. :V.)S), 68. Williams v. Brooklyn (33 App. Div. |N. V.| 539), 196, 214. Williams v. Brown (70 Iowa, 643), 75. Williams v. Camden & A. R. Co. ( [X. J.] 37 Atl. 1107), 517. 648, f>.">7. 050. clxxii TABLE OP CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Willis v. Second Ave. Traction Co. Williams v. Casebeer (120 Cal. 77), 450. Williams v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. (102 Mich. 537), 299. Williams v. Edmouds (75 Mich. 92), 161. Williams v. Frnzier (41 How. Pr. [N. Y.] 428), 81. Williams v. Grant (1 Conn. 487), 153. Williams v. Harrison (3 Mo. 411), 404. Williams v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (18 Utah, 210), 298, 359. Williams v. Reil (20 111. 147), 119, 122, 180. Williams v. Ry. Co. (68 Minn. 55), 290. Williams v. Sargeant (46 N. Y. 481), 562. Williams v. Southern R. Co. (121 N. B. 512), 303. Williams v. Underbill (63 App. Div. [N. Y.] 223), 83, 219. Williams v. Vanderbilt (28 N. Y. 217), 351. Williams v. Vanderbilt (145 111. 238), 501. Williams v. West Bay City (119 Mich. 395), 285. Williams v. Williams (20 Colo. 51), 459. Williamson v. Brandenburg (133 Ind. 594), 91. Williamson v. Stage Co. (24 Iowa, 171), 112, 119. Willing v. Consequa ( [Pet. U. S. C. C] 172), 94. Willing v. La Ban (35 Fed. 302), 95. Willingliam v. Macon & B. R. Co. (113 Ga. 374; 38 S. E. 843), 168. Willis v. Forrest (2 Duer [N. Y.], 310), 376. Willis v. McNeill (57 Tex. 465), 136, 138. Willis v. Miller (29 Fed. 238), 121. Willis v. Prov. Teleg. Pub. Co. (20 R. I. 285), 84. (189 Pa. St. 430), 208. Wilmertou v. Sample (39 111. App. 60), 437. Wilson v. Alabama G. S. H. Co. (77 Miss. 714), 76. Wilson v. Barnes (13 B. Mon. [Ky.] 330), 78, 81. Wilson v. Bowen (64 Mich. 133, 141), 111, 116, 432. Wilson v. Brett (11 M. & W. 113), 159. Wilson v. Broadway & S. A. R. Co. (8 Misc. [N. Y.] 450), 214. Wilson v. Coulter (29 App. Div. [N. Y.] 85), 458, 462. Wilson v. Darwin (I Hill [N. Y.], 670), 57. Wilson v. Dean (10 Iowa, 432), 81. Wilson v. Goit (17 N. Y. 442), 393. Wilson v. Granby (47 Conn. 47), 209. Wilson v. McEvory (25 Cal. 169), 94. Wilson v. Middleton (2 Cal. 54), 114, 369, 472. Wilson v. Morgan (58 N. J. L. [29 Vt.] 426), 107. Wilson v. Northern R. R. Co. (5 Wash. 021), 354. Wilson v. Panne (1 Kan. App. 721), 106. Wilson v. Penn. R. R. Co. (132 Pa. St. 27), 251. Wilson v. Shepler (86 Ind. 275), 406, 425. Wilson v. Smith ( 18 Ky. L. Rep. 927), 104. Wilson v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (13 Utah, 352, 354), 255. Wilson v. The John Ritson (35 Fed. 663), 508. Wilson v. Tootle (55 Fed. 211), 504, 508. Wilson v. Town of Granby (47 Conn. 59), 290. Wilson v. Vaughn (23 Fed. 229), 123. Wilson v. Vick ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 51 S. W. 45, rev'd 53 S. W. 576), 73. Wilson v. Wagar (26 Mich. 452), 78. TABLE OF 0ASE8 CITED IN 70L. I. [References are to Sections.] clxxiii Jfoung (31 Wis. 574), 377. Webster (7 C. & T. 198), Tilden (77 Wis. 152), 843, 7, 648, 652, 654, 057, 667, Wilson v. Wheeling i 19 W. Va. 350), 1 12. Wilson v, Wilton v 157. Wiltsc v. 640, 04 670. Wimbish v. Hamilton (47 La. Ann. 246), 416. Windham v. Rbame (11 Rich. L. [S. C] 28:}), 120. Windisch-Muhlhausei' Brew. Co. v. Bacon ([Ky.] 53S. W. 520), 387. Wing v. Hibbert (9 Ohio C. P. Dec. 65 I, 633. Wing v. Now York & Erie K. R. Co. (1 Hilt. [X. Y.] 235), 154. Wingert v. Carpenter ( [Mich.] 59 S. W. 662), 50(5. Winn v. Peckham (42 Wis. 493). 442. Wmne v. Kelly (34 Iowa, 330), 91. Winnegar v. Cent. Passgr. Ry. Co. (85 Ky. 547), 488. Winner v. Lathrop (07 Hun [X. Y.], 511), 295. Winnt v. International & G. X. R. Co. (74 Tex. 32; 11 S. W. 907), 526, 531, 532, 535, 550, 551. Winons Point S. Club v. Bodi (10 Ohio C. D. 544; 20 Obio C. C. D. U. 637), 76. Winship v. Enfield (42 N. II. 197), 161. Winstead v. Hulnie (32 Kan. 568), 119, 127. Winswore v. Greenback ( Willes, 577), 62. Winter v. Ilenn (4 C. & P. 494), 460. Winter v. Peterson (24 X. J. L. 524), 111, 125. Winters v. Cowen (90 Fed. 99), 338. Winters v. Kansas City Cable R. Co. (99 Mo. 509), 170. Winters v. State ( [Id.] 47 Pac. 855) 70. Wintuska v. Louisville & X. R. Co. (14 Ky. L. R. 579), 504. Wisconsin, M. A X. R. Co. v. Wese- lins (119 Micb. 505), 642. Wise v. Covington, etc., R. Co. (91 Ky. 537), 152. Wise v. McNichols (63 Mo. App. 141), 432. Wise v. Teerpenning (2 Edw. S. ' [N. Y.] 112), 560, 565. Wisner v. Barber (10 Ore. 342), 11, 13. 13. Wiser v. Cbesley (53 Mo. 547), 150. Wiswell v. Doyle (160 Mass. 42). IT... Witcber v. Jones (17 X. Y. Supp. 491), 416. Withers v. North Kent. R. Co. (3 Ilurlst. & N. 909), 153. Wiwirowski v. Lake Shore & Mich. South. Ry. Co. (124 N. Y. 420), 165. Woeckner v. Erie Elec. Motor Co. (187 Pa. St. 206), 305. Wolcott v. Mount (36 X. J. L. 262), 75. Wolf v. Cohen (8 Rich. L. [S. C] 144], 114. W T olf v. Krunk (92 Md. 138), 462. Wolf v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. (55 Ohio St. 517), 161, 162. Wolf v. Trimble (103 Ind. 355), 218. Wolfe v. Great Xortbern Ry. (26 L. R. Ir. 548), 548. Wolfe v. Johnson (45 111. App. 122), 475. Wolfe v. Johnson (152 111. 280), 475. Wolff v. Smith (112 Mich. 359). 415. Womack v. Central R. R. Co. (80 Ga. 132), 495. Womack v. Fudiaker (47 La. Ann. 33), 440. Wood v. Amer. Xat. Bank ( [Va. 1902] 40 S. E. 931), 119. Wood v. Barker (37 Ala. 00), 128. Wood v. Bartholomew (122 X. C. 177), 166. Wood v. City of Hurton ([W. Va. 1990] 85 S. E. 824), 65. Wood v. Lentz (116 Micb. 275), 483. Wood v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (88 Fed. 44), 214. clxxiv TABLE OF CASES CITED IN VOL. I. [References are to Sections.] Wood v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co. (58 Mo. 109), 95. Wood v. Watertown (34 N. Y. St. R. 808), 228. Woodall v. McMillan (23 Iowa, 450), 454. Wooden v. Western N. Y. & P. R. Co. (126 N. Y. 10), 506. Woodgei*& G. W. Ry. Co. (36 L. J. C. P. 177), 91. Woodman v. Nottingham (49 N. II. 387), 1, 62, 115. Woodring v. Forks Twp. (28 Pa. St. 355), 67. Woods v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. (108 Mich. 396), 214. Woods v. Pangburn (75 N. Y. 495), 405. Woodward v. Boscobel (84 Wis. 226), 227. Woodward v. Paine (15 Johns. [N. Y.] 493), 562. Woodward Iron Co. v. Cook (124 Ala. 349), 303, 304. Woolheatherv. Risley (38 Iowa, 486), 480. Woolley v. Grand Street & Newton R. R. Co. (83 Barb. [N. Y.] 121), 148. Woolsey v. Ellenville (39 N. Y. St. R. 744), 318. Wooster v. Western N. Y. & P. R. Co. (40 N. Y. St. R. 844), 214. Wootters v. Crockett (11 Tex. Civ. App. 474; 33 S. W. 391), 71. Worley v. Cin. R. R. Co. (1 Handy, 481), 495. Wormald v. Hill (4 Ky. Law Rep. 723), 134. Wort v. Jerkins (14 Johns. [N. Y.] 351), 111, 125. Worth v. Edmonds (52 Barb. [N. Y.] 40), 153. Worth & N. O. Ry. Co. v. Smith ( [Tex. Civ. App.] 25 S. W. 1032), 83. Wortham v. Basket (99 N. C. 70), 501. Wragge v. South Carolina & G. R. Co. (74 S. C. 105; 24 S. E. 76; 235 L. R. A. 191), 63. Wright v. Boiler (20 N. Y. St. R. 874), 161. Wright v. Clark (50 Vt. 130), 159. Wright v. Compton (53 Ind. 337), 218. Wright v. Detroit, etc., R. Co. (77 Mich. 123), 177. Wright v. Donnell (34 Tex. 291), 132, 146. Wright v. Gregory (9 App. Div. [N. Y.] 85), 382, 386, 390, 404. Wright v. Hayter (5 Kan. App. 638), 430, 431. Wright v. Midland Ry. (51 L. J. 539), 522. Wright v. Southern Exp. Co. ( [C. C. W. D. Tenn.] 80 Fed. 85), 380. Wright v. State Board of Liquidation (49 La. Ann. 1213; 22 So. 361), 65. Wright v. Williams (2 Wend. [N. Y.] 632), 57. Wright v. Wiight ( [N. J.] 43 Atl. 447), 68. Wrightman v. Devere (33 Wis. 570), 473. Wuest v. American Tobacco Co. (10 S. D. 394), 432. Wunsch v. Weber (31 Abb. N. Cas. 365), 295. Wyatt v. Rome (105 Ga. 312; 31 S. E. 188), 65. Wyatt v. Williams (43 N. H. 102), 02, 495. Wyman v. Leavitt (71 Me. 227, 229), 218, 219, 220. Wymond v. Amsbury (2 Colo. 213), 95. Wymore v. Mahaska Co. (78 Iowa, 396, 398), 162, 176. Wynn v. Central Park, North & East River R. R. Co. (133 N. Y. 575), 120, 169. Wynne v. Atlantic Ave. R. R. Co. (14 Misc. [N. Y.] 394), 214, 228. Wynne v. Parsons (57 Conn. 73), 111. TAIJLK OF OASES CITED IN Vol,. [References are to Sections.] clxxv Yaeger v. Southern Cal. R. R. Co. ( [Cal.] 51 Pac. 190), 276. i v. Exchange Nat. Bk. (57 Neb. 310), Hit. Fahn v. Ottumwa (GO Iowa, 429), 174. Vi I.' College v. Sanger (62 Fed. 177), 66. Yarmouth v. France (19 Q. B. D. 647, i.. i;.), 68. Yates v. Joyce (11 Johns. [N. Y.] 140), 62. Yates v. New York C. & II. R. R. Co. (67 N. Y. 100), 133. Yates v. White (4 Bing. [N. C] 272), 554. Yeager v. Berry (82 Mo. A pp. 534), 375. Yeates v. Reed (4 Blackf. [Ind.] 463) 414. Yerian v. Linkletter (80 Cal. 135), 119, 122, 187. Yerkes v. Northern Pac. R. Co. ( [Wis. 1901] 88 N. W. 33), 149. Yertore v. Wiswall (16 How. Pr. [V. Y.] 8), 488, 494, 569. York v. Canada Atlantic S. S. Co. (22 S. C. 167), 100. lost v. Tracy (13 Utah, 431 ), 450, 455. Young v. Citizens St. R. Co. (148 In.]. :>4), 165. STouiig v. Condon (08 Tenn. 577; 40 S. W. 1088), 63. Young v. Fox (26 App. Div. [N Y 1 261), 402. Young v. Webb (ity i 150 Ko 65, -l 14. Youngblood v. So. Car. & <,. r, Co. (60 S. 0. 9), 268. Yount v. Carney (91 Iowa, 559) 448 451. Youqua v. Nixon (Pet. [U. S < c ] 221), 94. Yuhoola R. & C. C. Hydraulic 11. M. Co. v. Irby (40 Ga. 479), 134. Yule v. City of New Orleans (25 La. Ann. 304), 65. Yundt v. Ilartrunft (41 111. 9), 457. Zabriskie v. Smith (13 N. Y. 322), 495. Zanesville v. Fanman (53 Ohio St. 005; 35 Ohio L. J. 51 ; 42 N. E. 703) 63. Zantzinger v. Weight man (2 Cranch, C. Ct. 478), 436. Zebley v. Storey (117 Pa. St. 478). 437. Zerfing v. Mourer (2 Greene [la.] 520), 468. Ziech v. Hebard (67111. App. 97), 151. Zieglerv. Powell (54 Ind. 173), 4:)7. Zimmerman v. Bonzar ( [Pa.] 16 Atl. 71), 104. Zimmerman v. Helser (32 Md 274) 120. Zimmerman v. Union Ry. Co. ( [App. Div. N. Y. 1898] 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 665), 172. Zingrebe v. Union Ry. Co. (56 App. Div. [N. Y.] 555). 278. Zinn v. Rice i 154 Mass. 1). 444. Young v Johnson (46 Hnn [N. Y.], Zion v. Southern >>. C„ ,,7 Fed. 5 164), 376. Young v. Kulm (71 Tex. 645), lot;. Young v.Spencer (10 B.& C. 145), 71 :;:;s. 00), Zipperlein v. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. is Ohio S. & C. p r) ec 587), 192. TITLE I. GENERAL AND PARTICULAR TERMS AM) DEFINITIONS. CHAPTER I. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 1G. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. Damage defined. Damages defined. Damages defined — Codes and constitution. Damnum absque injuria de- fined. Measure of damages defined. Measure of damages defined — Codes. Civil damages defined. Nominal damages defined. Nominal damages defined — Codes. Constructive damages defined. General damages defined. General damages defined — Code. Special damages defined. Special damages defined — Code. Direct damages defined. Direct damages defined — (Odes. Prospective damages defined. Consequential damages de- fined. Consequential damages de- fined — Code. Resulting damages defined. Remote damages defined. 22. Contingent or too remote dam- ages defined — Code. 2-'!. Contingent damages defined. 24. Speculative damages defined. 2."). Actual or single damages de- lined. 2(3. Compensatory damages de- fined. 27. Substantial damages defined. 28. Punitive, vindictive or exem- plary damages defined. 29. Punitive, vindictive or exem- plary damages defined — < 'odes. 30. Double, treble, triple or in- creased damages defined. 31. Double and single or joint and several damages defined. 32. Additional damages defined. :',:;. Liquidated damages defined. 34. Liquidated damages defined — Codes. 35. Unliquidated damages defined. 36. Temporary or permanent dam- ages de lined. 37. Continuing damages defined. 38. Entire damages defined. 39. Excessive, inadequate or in- sufficient damages defined. 40. Reasonable damages — Code provisions. § 1 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. § 1. Damage defined Damage means every loss or diminu- tion of what is a man's own occasioned by another's carelessness, fraud, design, default or fault. It includes acts of omission as well as of commission. It is not confined to the loss of a man's goods but includes all which is a man's own in a strict and proper sense.' Nor was the word originally synonymous with, nor collateral to, the terms fine, penalty, revenge, chastisement, or punishment, even though its meaning in this respect has been extended somewhat as will appear hereinafter in connection with the consideration of exemplary damages generally. 1 1 Damage means every loss or dimi- nution of what is a man's own occa- sioned by the fault of another. Aggs v. Shackelford Co., 85 Tex. 145, 149; 19 S. W. 1085, per Tarlton, J., citing Railway v. Fuller, 63 Tex. 469. "Damage. The loss caused by one person to another, or to his property either with the design of injuring him, or with negligence and care- lessness, or by inevitable accident." 1 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 491. "A synonym of damage, when ap- plied to a person sustaining an in- jury, is loss. Loss is a generic term. Damage is a species of loss. Loss signifies the act of losing, or the thing lost. Damage — in French, dommage ; Latin, damnum from demo, to take away — signifies the thing taken away, — the lost thing which a party is entitled to have re- stored to him so that he may be made whole again . . . When used to signify the money which a plain- tiff ought to receive, damage is never, nor in any sense, synonymous with nor collateral to the terms ex- ample, fine, penalty, punishment, revenge, discipline, or chastisement . . . 'By damage, we understand every loss or diminution of what is a man's own, occasioned by the fault of another.' Ruth. Inst. B. I., ch. xxii, sec. 1; Grotius, Lib. II, cap. xxii, 2. ' The definition of damage 2 extends the notion of it beyond a man's goods. His life, his limbs, his liberty, and exemption from pain, his character or reputation are all of them his own, in a strict and proper sense; so that the loss or dim- inution of any of them gives him a right to demand reparation from those by whose fault they have been lost or diminished.' ibid." Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. (5 Shirley) 342, 354, 356, 362, 16 Am. Rep. 270, per Fos- ter, J. " Damage is the loss caused by one person to another, either to his person, property or relative rights, through design, carelessness or default." Finch v. Heermans, 5 Luz. Leg. Reg. 125. In a statute pro- viding for damages for defects, etc., in bridges the words damage which shall happen to any person, etc., nec- essarily imply "all injury to prop- erty as well as person, the pecuniary loss to the pocket, as well as the bodily loss of bone or flesh and blood." Woodman v. Nothingham, 49 N. H. 387, 392, 6 Am. Rep. 526, per Nesmith, J. "Damnum, Lat. : In the Civil Law. Damage ; the loss or diminution of what is a man's own, either by fraud, careless- ness or accident. In pleading and old English law; damage, loss." Black's L. Diet. See also Anderson's Diet, of Law. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. §2 § 2. Damages defined. — Damages is the compensation or in- demnity recoverable by or awarded to the one who has sustained damage ; the compensation or indemnity due from or awarded against the wrongdoer or the person who has occasioned the damage. The word is also used as defining the amount averred in the ad damnum clause as that which the plaintiff is entitled to recover. And it is not infrequently used as synonymous with the term injuries as the ground of damages. 2 -"'Damages' ' Damna in the com- mon law hath a special signification for the recom pence that is given by the jury to the plaintiff or defend- ant' (demandant) 'for the wrong the defendant hath done unto him.' 2 Coke Litt. 257a." Coke Litt. ( But- ler & Hargraves, notes, 1853) 257a; Macon & Western R. Co. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250, 271, per Benning, J. " Dam- ages are the indemnity recoverable by the injured party from the party who has caused the injury." Finch v. Heermans, 5 Luz. Leg. Reg. 125. " Damages sometimes signifies the clause or passage in a declaration in which the plaintiff alleges or Mays' the sum or amount which he claims to recover; and the word is some- times used, loosely, in the sense of injuries; causes for a recovery of damages." 1 Abb. L. Diet. (ed. 1879)336. "Damages 1. A pecuni- ary recompense awarded by judicial tribunals to indemnify one who has sustained an injury through some wrongful act or neglect; a sum re- coverable as amends for a tort." 1 Abbott's L. Diet. (ed. 1879) 335. " Damages. The indemnity recover- able by a person who has sustained an injury either in his person, prop- erty or relative rights through the act or default of another. The sum claimed as such indemnity by a plaintiff in his declaration; the in- jury or loss for which compensation is sought." 1 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 491; see also Black's L. Diet. " Damages are a sum of money ad- judged to be paid by one person to another as compensation for a loss sustained by the latter in conse- quence of an injury committed by the former. Co. Litt. 257a; Mayne on Dam. 1 ; " Sweet's Diet, of Eng. L. (ed. 1882) 239. " Damages in the ordinary legal sense means the com- pensation which the law will award for an injury done. If the law will give no compensation there is cer- tainly no legal claim for damages." Kansas City & (). R. Co. v. Hicks, 30 Kan. 288, 292, 1 Pac. 396, per Brewer, J. Damages "in legal par- lance means the indemnity recover- able by a person who has sustained an injury either in his person, prop- erty or relative rights through the act or default of another. To con- stitute a right to recover damages, the party claiming damages must have sustained a loss; the party against whom they are claimed must be chargeable with the loss." Col- lins v. East Tenn. & G. R. Co., 9 Ileisk (Tenn. ) 841, 850, per Sneed, J., citing 1 Bouv. L. Diet. " Damages. The compensation which the law will award for an injury done. A species of property given to a man by a jury as a compensation or satis- faction for some injury sustained." Anderson's Diet, of Law. "'Dam- ages,' says Prof. Greenleaf, ' are given as a compensation, recom- §§ 3, 4 TERMS ANT) DEFINITIONS. § 3, Damages defined —Codes and constitution — In four states damages are denned as follows : Every person who suffers detriment from the unlawful act or omission of- another may- recover from the person in fault a compensation therefor in money, which is called damages ; 3 and in Georgia damages are given as a compensation for the injury done. 4 Under the Ken- tucky constitution providing that " damages may be recovered " for death resulting from injury inflicted by negligence or wrong- ful act, the word is used in its broadest sense, and includes all damages known to the law, and covers all compensatory and exemplary damages. 5 § 4. Damnum absque injuria defined. — Damnum absque in- juria is injury without damage ; that is, a damage may be sus- tained by the plaintiff, but it is a damage not occasioned by any- thing which constitutes such an injury in the law as that an action can be maintained therefor.' 1 pense, or satisfaction to the plaintiff, for an injury actually received by him from the defendant. They should be precisely commensurate with the injury; neither more nor less; and this whether it be to his person or estate. All damages must be the result of the injury complained of. 1 2 Greenl. Ev. sees. 253-4, 266- 7, 272. . . . Mr. Tidd defines dam- ages as ' a pecuniary compensation for an injury.' Tidd's Pr. 870." Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. (5 Shirley) 342, 354, 356, 362, 16 Am. Rep. 270, per Foster, J. " Damna (Lat. dam- num). Damages both inclusive and exclusive of costs." 1 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 494. See also Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220, 229, for defi- nition of damages. 3 Cal. Civ. Code (1899), sec. 3281; 1 Mont. Codes (1895), sec. 4270; Rev. Codes, N. D. (1899) sec. 4971; 2 Grantham's Annot. Stat. S. D. (1901) sec. 5777. 4 2 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3905 (3065). 4 5 " Worcester defines the word as ' the indemnity or pecuniary satisfac- tion awarded for an injury.' Defini- tions of this class would clearly in- clude all kinds of damages which might be awarded for an iujury, and we think, as used in section 241 of the constitution, the word is used in its broadest sense and includes all varie- ties of damages known to the law. No limitation is put upon it so far as we have been able to find in any other part of the constitution," and it covers compensatory and exemplary damages. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kelly, 100 Ky. 421 ; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 78; 40 S. W. 452 ; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 249, 251, per Du Relle, J. Denying rehearing, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 69 ; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 165. 6 Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed. 1874) *195, 196. " Damnum absque injuria is a loss which does not give rise to an action of damages against the person causing it." Sweet's Diet, of Eng. L. (ed. 1882) 240. See also 1 Abb. L. Diet. (ed. 1879) 337; TERMS ANH DEFINITIONS. §* 5-7 § 5. Measure of damages defined. — .Measure of damag< the compensation based upon Law, <>r upon law and fact for the injury, wrong or damage sustained : or the test, rule or method for ascertaining the amount of damages. 7 § 0. Measure of damages defined ('odes. — The Codes of four states provide as follows : •• For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proxi- mately caused thereby, or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result therefrom." s " For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of dam- ages, except where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate for all the detriment prox- imately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not," !> while the Code of Georgia reads : " Damages are given as compensation for the injury done, and generally this is the measure where the injury is of a character capable of being es- timated in money. If the injury be small, or the mitigating circumstances be strong, nominal damages only are given." 10 ^ 7. Civil damages defined.— Civil damages are such as ac- crue to a person for violation of his rights as a citizen, or for an injury to his person or property, or to his relative rights by virtue uf the domestic relations, being snch rights as exist under cer- tain constitutional ami statutory provisions, guaranteeing what are known as civil rights to persons of African descent, and also the rights to damages under the civil damage laws of some states, covering the injury caused by the sale of intoxicating Anderaon'8 Diet. Law (1893), 310; Black's L. Diet.; 1 Houv. L. Diet. (eel. 1879) 494. 7 .Measure of damages is "the tesl by which the amount of damages is ascertained.' 1 Sweet's Diet, of Eng. L. (ed. L882) 2:19. See also Ander- son's Diet. I.. (18931 668; _' Bonv. I.. Diet. (ed. L897) 385. 8 Civ. Code Cal. (1899) sec. 3300; 1 Mont. Codes (1895), sec. 4300; lav. Codes, N". D. (1899) sec. 4978 (with additional clause); 2 Grantham's Annot. Stats. S. D. (1901) sec. 57S4. '■' Civ. Code Cal. (1899) BBC. 3333: 1 Mont. Codes (189.",), sec. 4330; Rev. Codes, N. D. (1899) sec. 4997; 2 Crant ham's Annot. Stats. S. D. (1901) sec. 5803. " -2 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3905 (3065). §§8,9 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. liquors, etc. Civil damages may arise for discrimination as to jury service ; as to public accommodations ; as to public school privileges, etc. 11 § 8. Nominal damages defined.— Nominal damages are a small and trivial sum awarded for a technical injury due to a violation or invasion of some legal right, and as a consequence of which, some damages must be awarded to determine the right. 12 § 9. Nominal damages defined— Codes.— When a breach of duty has cuused an appreciable detriment to the party affected, he may yet recover nominal damages. 13 Another provision is : 11 See Anderson's Diet, of Law (1893), 305, 306. 12 Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sec. 943. Nominal damages are "when a trivial sum of six and a quarter cents is allowed in recogni- tion that a mere right of plaintiffs has been infringed, but without import- ant loss sustained." 1 Abb. L. Diet, (ed. 1879) 336. See Anderson's Diet, of Law, "Damages' ' ; Black's L. Diet. "Damages." "Nominal damages are damages to such a small amount (e. g. a farthing) as to show that they are not intended as any equivalent or satisfaction to the party recovering them. They are given when the plaintiff, in an action for the invasion of a right, establishes his right, but does not show that he has sustained any damage." Sweet's Diet, of Eng. L. (ed. 1882) 240, citing Beaumont v. Greathead, 2 C. B. 494 ; Leake on Contracts, 567. Where a cause of ac- tion exists, at least nominal damages will be presumed and must be al- lowed, nor does the fact that the plaintiff insists upon substantial damages, and neither tried his case upon a claim of, asked for, or would have been satisfied with nominal damages, alter the rule. Van Velsor v. Seeberger, 35 111. App. 598, 602. 6 Nominal damages are those recover- able where a legal right is to be vin- dicated from an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind. Duggan v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 159 Pa. 248; 33 W. N. C. 381; 28 Atl. 182, 186; 25 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 13. Nominal damages are those which occur in cases where the judge is bound to tell the jury only to give such. Prehn v. Royal Bk. of Liverpool, L. R. 5 Exch. Cas. 92, 99, per Martin, B. Where there exists only a technical right of action, nominal damages can be collected. Haven v. Beidler Mfg. Co., 40 Mich. 286; Curtis v. Ritzman (City Ct. N. Y.), 7 Misc. 254; 27 N. Y. Supp. 259. Nominal damages may be given where the evidence shows damages, but furnishes no basis for ascertain- ing the amount. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Chicago (111.), 29 N. E. 1109; 4 Am. R. & Corp. Rep. 697; 50 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 150. Every violation of a right imports some damage, and if none other be proved nominal damages are recoverable. Fullam v. Stearns, 30 Vt. 443, 455- 457, per Bennet, J. There must be both an injury and a damage. Id. 13 Cal. Civ. Code (1899), sec. 336; 1 Mont. Codes (1895), sec. 4367; TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. §§ 10, 11 "If the injury be small or the mitigating circumstanci strong, nominal damages only are given." 14 §10. Constructive damages defined. Constructive dam- ages are such "as are imputed in law from an act of wron another person.'" 15 § 11. General damages defined. — General damages are those which the law implies or presumes to have been occasioned by the act of which the injured party complains. They do not depend upon evidence of any particular amount or loss, but rest upon the opinion and judgment of reasonable men, or the sound discretion of the jury, and not upon any measure of assessment which the judge may point out. 16 Rev. Codes, N. D. (1899) sec. 5016; 2 Grantham's Annot. Stats. S. D. (1901) sec. 5822. 14 2 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3905 (3065). 15 Anderson's Diet. of Law, "Damages." 16 " The second kind is general damages and their nature is clearly stated by Crosswell, J., in Rolin v. Steward, 14 C. B. p. 605; 23 L. J. C. P. p. 151. They are such as the jury give when the judge cannot point out any measure by which they are to be assessed except the opinion and judgment of a reasonable man." Prehn v. Royal Bk. of Liverpool, L. R. 5 Exch. Cas. 92, 99, per Martin, B. ; Bank of Commerce v. Goos, 39 Neb. 437; 23 L. R. A. 190, 193; 10 Bkg. L. J. 352; 58 X. \Y. 84, per Ryan, C. Where a valid contract has been broken, plaintiff must be entitled to recover such damages as necessarily ensue from the breach. These are general damages, and need not spe- cially be alleged. Fitch v. Fitch, .'!."> N. Y. Super. (3 J. & S.) 302, 303. See also Jutte v. Hughes, 67 N. Y. 267, rev'g 40 N. Y. Super. 126; Lara- way v. Perkins, 10 N. Y. 371; Alfaro v. Davidson, 40 N. Y. Super. (8 J. & S.) 87,89, per Friedman, J., citing Chitty on Contracts (ed. 1860), 985. " Damages are termed general, mean- ing those which, by implication of law, result from a tort, ami are awarded in the sound discretion of the jury, and without calling for evi- dence of any particular loss.'' 1 Ab- bott's L. Diet. (ed. 1879) 335. See also Anderson's Diet, of Law, " Dam- ages." "General damages: Those which necessarily and by implication of law result from the act or default complained of." 1 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 491. "General damages are such as necessarily result from the injury complained of. and may be re- covered without W'ing specially al- leged." 2 Wait's Act. & Def. 434. General damages "are Buch as the law implies or presumes to have ac- crued from the wrong complained of." Wisner \. Barber, 10 < >re. 342, 344, per Lord, .1. See also 1 Mfg. Co. v. Gridley, 28 Conn. 201, 211, 212, per Ellsworth. J. RC -|0^ ^3 TERMS AM> DEFINITIONS. § 12. General damages defined— Code.— General damages are defined by the Georgia Code as " such as the law presumes to flow from any tortious act, and may be recovered without proof of any amount." " § 13. Special damages defined.— It is often very difficult to distinguish special from general damages ; the former may, how- ever, be defined as those which are not implied or presumed in Law, but are such as actually and directly flow from the injury as the consequence thereof, and must be alleged and proven in order to be recovered. Special damages may constitute of them- selves a ground of action, or may be shown in addition to or in aggravation of other damages. 18 "2 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3910 (3070). 18 Special damage is that which the law does not necessarily imply that the plaintiff has sustained from the act complained of. It is often very difficult to distinguish general from special damage. The necessary re- sult of an injury is often and neces- sarily confounded with the natural and proximate result, and all legal damage, whether general or special, must naturally and proximately re- sult from the act or default com- plained of. It is difficult to lay down any general rule hy which to deter- mine when the law implies the dam- age, and when it does not. It would seem, however, that when the conse- quences of an injury are peculiar to the circumstances and conditions of the injured party, the law could not imply damage simply from the act causing the injury. Tomlinson v. Derby, 43 Conn. 562, 567, per Loomis, J. See also Bristol Mfg. Co. v. Gridley, 28 Conn. 201, 211, 212, per Ellsworth, J. Special damage is some damage of such a character that it may be given in evidence to aggravate the damages in an action, or be itself the substantive cause of action. Smith v. Sherman, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 408, 413, per Shaw, C. J. " Special damages we believe are such as by competent evidence are directly traceable to a defendant's failure to perform his contract obli- gation, or such duties as are imposed upon him by law." Bank of Com- merce v. Goos, 39 Neb. 437; 23 L. R. A. 190, 193, 10 Bkg. L. J. 352.; 58 N. W. 84, per Ryan, C. "Special damages are given in respect of any conse- quences reasonably or probably aris- ing from the breach complained of." Prehn v. Royal B'k of Liverpool, L. R. 5 Exch. Cas. 92, 99, per Martin, B. "Special when they are such as really took place and are not implied by law, and are superadded to gen- eral damages arising from an act in- jurious in itself." Wisnerv. Barber, 10 Ore. 342, 344, per Lord, J. Spe- cial damages are " the indemnity allowable for the specific losses which plaintiff alleges and proves that he sustained." 1 Abbott's L. Diet. (ed. 1879) 335. See also An- derson's Diet. Law, " Damages." " Special damages, such as arise di- rectly but not necessarily, or by im- plication of law from the act com- plained of." 1 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. §§14-17 § 14. Special damages defined — Code. —Special damages are such as actually flow from the act and must be proved in order to be recovered. 19 § 15. Direct damages defined. — Direct damages are those which are the direct, immediate or proximate result of some act or fault without the intervention of some other act or cause.'- 1 ' § 16. Direct damages defined — Codes. — Direct damages are such as follow immediately upon the act done. 21 § 17. Prospective damages defined. — Prospective damages are such as arise from the loss of those benefits which it can be shown would have been reasonably probable or certain to have accrued except for the complained of injury, fault or tort, and which are a direct, natural or necessary consequence thereof or actually or proximately caused thereby, and not such as are merely conjectural, speculative or remote. 22 1897) 491. "Special damages: The damages recoverable for the actual injury incurred through the peculiar circumstances of the individual case, above and beyond those presumed by law from the general nature of the wrong. 1 ' 2 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 392. " Special damage may be itself a distinct ground of action, or it may be given in evidence to aggravate the damages sued forinan action already pending. . . . But if the declaration be framed in reference to some spe- cial ground only, evidence cannot be introduced of any loss or damage beyond what is expressly alleged. Graves v. Severeus, 40 Vt. 636." 2 Wait's Act. and Def. (1877)43.-). l »2 (ia. Civ. Code (1895),sec. 3910 (3070). -° Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sec. 94.-). Direct or immediate damages are " such as result from the operation of the tort without the in- tervention of intermediate causes." 1 Abb. L. Diet. (ed. 1S79) 335. " Such damages as result from an act without the intervention of any inter- mediate, controlling or self-efficient cause." Anderson's Diet. Law, " Damages." See also Black's L. Diet.; Bristol Mfg. Co. v. Gridley, 28 Conn. 201, 211, 212, per Ellsworth, .1. - 1 1 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3911 (3071). Damages are confined in Civ. Code, sec. 3333, to compensation for detriment proximately caused by breach of obligation not arising from contract. Durgin v. Xeal. 82 Cal. 595; 23 Pac. 133; Durgin v. McNally, 82 Cal. 375. -'- Strohra v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 305. 300, per Rapallo, I.. ease reverses 32 Hun (X. Y. ), 20. See the numerous citations of the principal case cited in 'l Silver nail's X. V. Citations. Griffin v. Colver, 10 N. Y. 489, 491: Chicago, etc., Ry. (o. v. Henry, 62 111. 142. The jury in assessing prospective damages should he confined to such as were reasonably certain to follow from the §§ 18-21 TERMS AM) DEFINITIONS. § 18. Consequential damages defined.— Consequential dam- ages are those in which some other circumstance, act or cause intervenes to produce them, even though they result from or are traceable to the complained of act, fault or tort as the primary and ellicient, though not the immediate, cause. 23 § 19. Consequential damages defined— Code.— Consequen- tial damages are such as are the necessary and connected effect of the tortious act, though to some extent depending upon other circumstances.'- 4 § 20. Resulting damages defined. — Resulting damages is a term used generally to indicate consequential damages. 18 § 21. Remote damages defined. — Remote damages are those which do not directly flow from an act, but are the result of the intervention of some intermediate cause without which no injury or loss would occur, although such cause may be at- tributable to the original act. 26 Remote and consequential dam- i ii jury complained of. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Files (Ohio, 1901), 62 N. E. 1047, an action for personal injury. Again "when it appears that the in- jury is permanent and further pain to body or mind is reasonably certain, a sufficient basis is laid for compen- sation for these elements." Smiley v. St. Louis & H. R. Co. (Mo. 1901) 61 S. W. 667; 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 514, 518, per Brace, P. J. See Anderson's Diet, of Law (1893), 307; Wharton v. Winch, 140 N. Y. 287; 55 N. Y. St. R. 052; 35 N. E. 589, rev'g 46 N. Y. St. R. 187; 19 N. Y. Supp. 477; Hamilton v. McPlierson, 28 N. Y. 72; Neary v. Bostwick, 2 Hilt. (X. Y. ) 514; Freeman v. Clute, 3 Barb. (N. V.) 424; Walter v. Post, 6 Duer (X. Y. ), 3G3; Morey v. Metropolitan G. L. Co., 6 J. & S. (N. Y.) 185. ^"Consequential damages, those which though directly are not im- mediately consequential upon the act or default complained of."' 1 10 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 491. See also Black's L. Diet. See Bristol Mfg. Co. v. Gridley, 28 Conn. 201, 211, 212, per Ellsworth, J. See defini- tion of remote damages herein. 24 2 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3911 (3071). 25 "Resulting damages; used to denote consequential damages." 1 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 491. De- fendants are liable for resulting dam- ages from blasting on their own premises when the work is negli- gently done. Denken v. Canavan, 17 Misc. (N. Y.) 392 ; 39 N. Y. Supp. 1078. 26 Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sec. 946. Consequential or remote damages are " such as the tort might not produce without the concurrence of other events and these last are generally disallowed." 1 Abb. L. Diet. ( ed. 1879) 336. "Conse- quential or resulting, indirect or re- mote damages not produced without TEEMS AND DEFINITIONS. 22,23 ages have been used as synonymous terms, but then- is this distinction: "All remote damages are consequential, but all consequential damages are not remote." " § 22. Contingent or too remote damages defined — (ode. — Under the Georgia Code, "if the damages are only the imag- inary or possible result of the tortious act, or other and contin- gent circumstances preponderate largely in causing the in- jurious effect, such damages are too remote to be the basis of recovery against the wrongdoer,"-*" and a " rule to ascertain " is given as follows : " Damages which are the legal and natural result of the act done, though contingent to some extent, arc not too remote to be recovered. But damages traceable to the act, but not its legal or natural consequence, are too remote and con- tingent," 29 while the "exception to tbe rule" reads: "If, how- ever, the tort is committed, or the contract broken, or the duty omitted, with a knowledge and for the purpose of depriving the party injured of such benefits as are specified in the last para- graph, then the remote damages arc made by such knowledge and intent a proper subject for consideration by the jury." 80 § 23. Contingent damages defined. — Contingent damages are those which may follow from the wrongful act, but are not certain to do so and may possibly not happen, for the said act may or may not operate to produce such damages, since the connecting event may or may not occur. 31 the concurrence of some other event I ages, and after an exhaustive exami- attributable to the same origin or ' nation of the authorities, we find an cause." Anderson' Diet, of Law. " Damages." 27 1 Sedgwick on Dam. (8th ed.) sec. 110. See sees. 22, 24, 58, post, herein. 28 2 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3912 (3072). 29 2 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3913 (3073). 30 2 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3914 (3074). 31 The doctrine of proximate cause is at the basis of contingent dam- excellent illustration of the above in 1 Sutherland on Dam. (2d ed.Jsee. 28, as where one wrongfully opens ;t fence, such act may or may not lead to injurious results and damages by reason of injury to animals, crops, etc. " Contingent damages; such damages as may or may not occur, or be Buffered; such as depend upon an event which may or may not happen." 1 Anderson's Diet. Law (1893), p. 300. 11 $§ 24-27 TERMS ANli DEFINITIONS. §24. Speculative damages defined.— Speculative damages are those which resl upon conjectural circumstances or conse- quences, which arc contingent or merely problematical, possible or apprehended, and concerning which the degree of probability of their occurring, as a result of the original injury, does not amount to a reasonable certainty. 82 § 25. Actual or single damages defined.— Actual damages are such as the plaintiff can actually prove he has sustained, and are a conpensation conmensurate with the actual loss or injury. 33 § 26. Compensatory damages defined.— Compensatory dam- ages are those by which the actual loss sustained is measured and the injured party recompensed therefor. 34 § 27. Substantial damages defined.— Substantial damages are generally where a considerable sum is awarded as a com- pensation ; although where a sum is given in excess of nominal damages such sum is denominated substantial damages. 35 82 See Streng v. Frank Ibert Brew. Co. (App. Div. N. Y. 1900), 64 N. Y. Supp. 34; 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 650, per Woodward, .1; Anderson's Diet. Law (1893], p. 308. :ii .Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sec. 942. " Actual damages are such as the plaintiff can actually prove he has sustained as contra-distin- guished from vindictive damages." Bacon's Abr. (Bouv. 1854) "Dam- ages" (I), p. 82. "Actual or single damages: compensation for the real loss or injury." Anderson's Diet. Law (1893), 305. Damages "are actual or single. Avhen the jury find the amount to be awarded and judg- ment is immediately rendered there- for." 1 Abb. L. Diet. (ed. 1879) 336. The term " single damages " has also been used in connection with joint and several damages, as in case of suit against several or a number. Viner's Abr. "Damages" (X),(Y). See also definitions of double and 12 treble damages, post, herein, and sec. 55, post, herein. 34 " Damages should be such as adequately to compensate the actual loss or injury sustained." Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117, 129, 130, per Christiancy, J. Compensatory dam- ages are such as measure the actual loss, and are given as amends there- for. Talbott v. West Virginia C. & P. R. Co., 42 W. Va. 560; 26 S. E. 311. Compensatory damages are "such as are measured by the loss sustained by the plaintiff and are allowed him as a just amends therefor." 1 Abb. L. Diet. (ed. 1879) 336. " Com- pensatory damages, those allowed as a recompense for the injury actually received." 1 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 491. See also Anderson's Diet. Law (1893), 306. Black's L. Diet.; Beck v. Thompson, 31 W. Va. 159; 7 S. E. 447; 13 Am. St. Rep. 870. Examine sec. 55, post, herein. 35 Substantial damages are "when TERMS ANI> I > hi I Ml § 28. Pnnitive, vindictive or exemplary damages defined. — Punitive, vindictive or exemplary damages are those in ex of the actual loss, nol intended as a compensation, 86 but rather designed as a punishment for the grossly negligent, wanton or malicious conduct, or act, or evil motive of one person towards another, as a result of which the latter has sustained some in- jury, loss or damaged a considerable sum is found." 1 Abb. L. Diet. led. L879) 336. See j also Anderson's Diet. Law (1893), 307; Block's L. Diet. Damages, though very small, are substantial, and not nominal, wbere a real legal right is involved. Michael v. Curtis, 60 Conn. 363; 22 Atl. 049. m But see sees, under chap. V herein entitled, " not as punishment but as compensation." "Doctrine of exemplary damages denied," and see sec. 55, post, herein. 37 Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sec. 944. See Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Ya. 220, 2150-237, 6 S E. 485, per Green, J. Exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages are those "al- lowed in excess of a simple, compen- sation for the loss, and upon atheory of punishing the wrongdoer for the wrong inflicted upon plaintiff." 1 Abb. L. Diet. (ed. 1879) 336. See Anderson's Diet. Law, "Damages." " Exemplary damages. Those al- lowed for torts committed with fraud, actual malice or deliberate violence or oppression, as a punish- ment to the defendant and as a warn- ing to other wrongdoers." 1 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. L897) 491. "Exem- plary damages. Those allowed as a punishment for torts committed with fraud, actual malice or deliberate malice or oppression. . . . This allowance is termed • smart money' or 'exemplary,' -vindictive' or -pu- nitive' damages." 2 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 391. " Exemplary or vin- dictive damages are damages given not merely asa pecuniary compensa- tion tor the loss actually sustained by the plaintiff, bu1 likewise as a kind of punishment to the defendant, wiili the view of preventing similar wrongs in the future, as in actions of malicious injuries, fraud, .seduc- tion, oppression, continuing nuisan- ces," etc. Sweet's Diet, of Eng. L. (ed. 1882) 240, citing Broom's C. C. L. 855 : 2 Smith's L. Cas. 540. In actions of tort the damages are left very much to the discretion and judgment of the jury, and in all cases of malicious injuries and trespasses, accompanied by personal insult or oppressive ami cruel conduct, juries are told to give what are called ex- emplary damages, although the ac- tual persona] injury recovered by a pecuniary standard may be but small. Harlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492, 404, per English, C. J. Where a trespass is committed deliberately in wilful violation of the plaintiffs rights, in a manner and under cir- cumstances of aggravation, showing a violent, reckless and lawless spirit, the law allows damages beyond the strict measure of compensation by way of punishment. Champion \. Vincent, 20 Tex. 811, 815, defendant shot plaintiff's hogs. Malice is the wilful purpose, the wilful doing of an act which one knows is liable to injure another, regardless of the COnBequenceS, alt hough there may he no specilic intention to hurt a par- 13 §§ 29, 30 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. § >9. Punitive, vindictive or exemplary damages defined— Codes.— In four states the Codes provide that " In any action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, the jury, in addition to the actual damages, may give damages for the sake of example, or by way of pun- ishing the defendant." ffl So in Georgia, it is enacted that, " In .very tort there may .be aggravating circumstances, either in the act or the intention, and in that event the jury may give ad- ditional damages, either to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass, or as compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff," 38 while another section of the Code reads as follows : " Vindictive damages. In some torts the entire injury is to the peace, happiness of feelings of the plaintiff; in such cases no measure of damages can be prescribed except the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors. The worldly circumstances of the parties, the amount of bad faith in the transaction, and all the attendant facts should be weighed. The verdict of a jury in such a case should not be disturbed, unless the court should suspect bias or prejudice from its excess or its inade- quacy. *° § 30. Double, treble, triple or increased damages defined. — Double, treble, triple or other increased damages are those given by statute in certain specified cases, being a double, treble or other increased sum given for the better prevention of in- juries, the actual damages from which might otherwise be very small." ticular individual or class of indi- viduals. United States v. Reed (C. C. S. D. N. Y.). 86 Fed. 308. See also Anderson's Diet. Law (1893), 648. 38 Civ. Code. Cal. (1899) sec. 3294; 1 Mont. Codes (1895), sec. 4290; Rev. Codes, X. D. (1899) sec. 4977; 2 Grantham's Annot. Stats. S. D. (1901) sec. 5783. 39 2 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3906 (3066). 40 2 Ga. Civ. Code (1895), sec. 3907 (3067). Under the Georgia Code, 14 sec. 2943, exemplary damages can never be allowed in cases arising on contract. Chase v. Western Un. Teleg. Co., 44 Fed. 554; 3 Am. Elec. Cas. 817. Although the West Virginia Code allows damages for mental anguish and grief to be re- covered against telegraph companies. Supp. Code W. Va. (1900) p. 78, act approved March 2, 1900. 41 " By double or treble damages is understood twice or three times as much as single damages. Statutes TEBMS ANI» I-KITNITIONS. §§ 31-38 § 31. Double and single or joint and several damages de- fined. — Double and single or joint and several damages are those formerly awarded in case of a joint suit against a number, as in actions of joint tenancy, <>r in trespass for assault and cut- ting timber, or in trespass against two or three, or in several re- plevins against several. 1 -' § 32. Additional damages defined. — Additional damages are those which may be recovered in a new suit when they accrue after the first judgment for injuries caused by negligence. 43 § 33. Liquidated damages defined — Liquidated damages are those which are definitely fixed by an act of the parties ; or those specified by agreement as the amount of damages, under such circumstances and in such terms as do not constitute a penalty; or such damages as are fixed by a judgment of the court." giving such damages have been lib- erally construed. The construction has been different from that given to double or treble costs. When double or treble damages are given by a statute, tbe demand of such damages must be expressly inserted in the declaration, which must either re- cite the statute, or conclude to the damage of the plaintiff against tbe form of the statute. 1 ' Bacon's Abr. (Bouv. 1854) "Damages" (G), p. 81. Increased double or treble dam- ages are where " upon some wrongs the statute authorizes the court to pass judgment for an increased amount as for twice tbe sum or tbree times the sum found by tbe jury." 1 Abb. L. Diet. (ed. 1879) 336. "Single damages as found by the jury enhanced by the court." An- derson's Diet. Law (1893), 305. "Double or treble damages. In some actions statutes give double or treble damages, and tbey have been liberally construed to mean actually treble damages. . . . Single dam- ages may be recovered if tbe claim under the statute is not made out." 2 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 393^ See 1 Stovers X. Y. Anno. Civ. Code, sec. 1020, p. 1047; 2 id. sec. 1901, p. 1746; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 523, per Field, J. 4 - Viner's Abr. "Damages" (X), (Y). See San Antonio v. Mackey, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 210; 36 S. W. 760; Schoueman v. Fiegley, 7 Pa. St. 433; note 46 Cent. L. J. 387. 4:1 So under the law of Mexico (Evey v. Mexican C. K. Co. [U. S. C. C. A. 5th C], 52 C. S. App. 118; 81 Fed. 294; 38 L. K. A. 387), such right to recover is a matter of remedy only. ■• I damages ultra: additional damages claimed by a plaintiff not satisfied with those paid into court by the de- fendant." Black's L. Diet. See also definitions herein of punitive, etc., damages. •"Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sec. 947; 1 Abb. L. Diet. (ed. 1879) 336; And. Diet. Law (1893), 307; Black's L. Diet. See also Mills v. Paul 15 §§ 34-37 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS. § 84. Liquidated damages- (odes.— " Every contract by whicli the amount of damage to be paid, or other compensation to be made, for the breach of an obligation, is determined in anticipation thereof, is to that extent void, except as expressly provided in the next section." 45 The "next section" reads as follows : " The parties to a contract may agree thereon upon the amount which shall be presumed to be the amount of dam- age sustained by a breach thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be unpracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage." 46 § 35. Unliquidated damages defined. — Unliquidated dam- ages are those where the amount is neither fixed by act of the parties nor by judgment of the court, nor made definite by agreement. 17 § 36. Temporary or permanent damages defined. — Tempo- rary or permanent damages are terms not infrequently used to denote the character of the damages to be assessed with relation to the nature of an injury to land, as whether it is temporary or permanent. 48 §37. Continuing damages defined. — "Damages incurred or suffered between two dates as the beginning and end of the act, and more or less separated in time," are continuing damages.* (Tex. C. A. 1895), 30 S. W. 558; Burk v. Dunn, 55 111. App. 25 ; Kiutz v. Rob- bins, 12 Wash. 7; 40 Pac. 415, 28 L. R. A. 676; Townsend v. Fisher, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 47; Shute v. Hamilton, 3 Daly (N. Y.), 462; Wallis Iron Works v. Monmouth Park Assoc, 55 N. J. L. (26 Vr.) 132; 26 Atl. 140; 19 L. R. A. 456. Liquidated dam- ages, in so far as they depend upon agreement or are fixed, are also called stated or stipulated damages. 45 Civ. Code Cal. (1899) sec. 1670; 1 Mont. Codes (1895), sec. 2243; Rev. Codes, N. D. (1899) sec. 3923; 2 Grantham's Annot. Stats. S. D. (1901) sec. 4769. 46 Civ. Code. Cal. (1899) sec. 1671; 16 1 Mont. Codes (1895), sec. 2244; Rev. Codes, N. D. (1899) sec. 3924; 2 Grantham's Annot. .Stats. S. D. (1901) sec. 4770. See Jack v. Sin- shimer, 125 Cal. 563; 58 Pac. 130, holding that a clause is void in a lease which fixes a certain sum as liquidated damages in case the prem- ises are vacated, under the above Code provision. 47 See definition ante, herein, of liquidated damages and note thereto. See also McCord v. Williams, 2 Ala. 71. 48 See Ridley v. Seaboard & R. R. Co., US N. C. 996; 24 S. E. 730; 32 L. R. A. 708; Nichols v. Norfolk & C. R. Co., 120 N. ('. 495; 26 S. E. 643. 49 Anderson's Diet. Law ( 1893), 307. TEEMS AND DEFINITIONS. §S 38-40 § 38. Entire damages defined.- Entire damages are tl recoverable in one action, even though a part thereof are oc- casioned or result after action brought ; or where the injury is of a permanent or continuing character and successive actions will not lie for the past or future damages ; or where the dam- ages are prospective as well as present. 30 § 39. Excessive, inadequate or Insufficient damages de- fined. — Excessive damages are those which are so largely in excess of what the circumstances or facts of the case and the law justify as to demonstrate that the jury have acted against the rules of law or have suffered their partiality, passions, pre- judices or perverse disregard of justice to mislead them, or which are based upon ignorance or corruption. 51 Inadequate or insuf- ficient damages are those where, by a like test, the sum awarded is manifestly and grossly less than is justified.® §40. Reasonable damages— Code provisions. — "Damages must in all cases be reasonable, and where an obligation of any kind appears to create a right to unconscionable and grossly oppressive damages, contrary to substantial justice, no more than reasonable damages can be recovered." 53 60 Hughes v. Anderson, 68 Ala. 280; Savannah & O. C. Co. v. Bourquin, 51 Ga. 378; Peuder^ast v. McCaslin, 2 Ind. 87; Stodghill v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 53 Iowa, 34; Benson v. Chicago & A. K. Co., 78 Mo. 504; Troy v. Cheshire K. Co., 23 N. H. 83; Ridley v. Seaboard & R. R. Co., 118 N. C. 996; 24 S. E. 730,32 L. R. A. 708; Ritter y. Sieger, 105 Pa. 400. 51 Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg., 2 2 Story (U. S. C. C. D. Me.). 661; Fed. Cas. No. 17,516; Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), §949. 52 Civ. Code Cal. (1899) sec. 3369; 1 Mont. Codes (1895), Bee. 4366; Rev. Codes, X. I). ( 1899) see. 5015; 2 Gran- tham's Aunot. Stats. S. I). (li»01)sec. 5821. ss ,l,, V rc ..ii Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sec. 950; 1 Abb. L. Diet. (ed. L879) 336. 17 §§ 41-43 PARTICULAR TERMS, MAXIMS AND PHRASES. CHAPTER II. PARTICULAR TERMS, MAXIMS AND PHRASES. § 41. Actio non datur non damnifi- cato. 42. Ad damnum. 43. Ad quod damnum; writ of. 44. " Damage by the elements." 45. Damage feasant. 46. "Damages, costs and ex- penses." 47. Damni injuriae actio. 48. Damnify. 49. Damnum fatale. 50. Damnum infectum. 51. Damnum rei amissae. 52. Damnum sine injuria esse potest. 53. De minimis non curat lex. 54. Indemnity. 55. Indeterminate and determinate damages. 5(3. Injuria sine damno. 57. Inquiry of damages; writ of. 58. Proximate damages. 59. " Sound in damages." § 41. Actio non datur non damniflcato.— These words mean an action is not given to one who is not injured. 1 § 42. Ad damnum.— These words mean "to the damage," and are used to indicate the clause at the conclusion of the plaintiff's declaration, wherein he states the extent or amount of damages claimed. In libels in admiralty the same term is used. 2 § 43. Ad quod damnum ; writ of. — These words mean " to what damage." Under the New York Code the writ ad quod damnum is now styled the '* writ of assessment of damages," and is a mode of ascertaining, by an inquisition of damages by the jury, the sum to be paid by the people of the state for tak- ing real property therein, whenever the governor thereof is authorized by law to take possession of the same and he cannot agree with the owners thereof for its purchase. The Code also provides as to the disposition of such damages and the claim- 1 1 "Cyc." of L. & P. 633. i Lewis, 3 Mas. (U. S. ) 503; 13 Fed. 2 See 1 " Cyc." of L. & P. 703, cit- Cas. No. 7,279. See also Anderson's ing Abbott's L. Diet.; Jenks v. | Diet. Law (1893), 309. 18 PABTICULAB TERMS, MAXIMS AND PHBASES. §§44 18 ant's procedure for obtaining them. The writ further applies where the Legislature consents to the taking of any real property within the state for the use of the people of the United Sta § 44. " Damage by the elements." — These words are de- clared to be equivalent to act of (Jod. 1 §4."). Damage feasant. — " (French faisant, damage, doing damage) a term usually applied to the injury which animals be- longing to one person do upon the land of another by feeding there, treading down his grass, corn or other production of the earth." 5 § 46. " Damages, costs and expenses." — " When given as a penalty against a party for the nonperformance of a contract. means the necessary, natural and proximate damages resulting from such nonperformance, and not some remote, accidental or special injury to the party to whom the right of action accrues. Wherever special damages are recovered, it must be on a dis- tinct and definite statement in the complaint." 1 §47. Dainni injnriae actio. — ••(Latin) In civil law: An action for the damage done by one who intentionally injured the beast of another." ' § 48. Damnify. — "To cause damage or injurious loss to a person." 8 Stover's Annot. Code Civ. Proc. N. Y. sees. 2103-2119. See United States v. Dumplin Island, 1 Bail). (N. Y. ) 24. "A writ which ought to be issued before the owner grants further liberties ;is a fair market, etc., which may be prejudicial to others. It is addressed to the sheriff to inquire what damage" (a loss) " it may do to make such grant. It is also used to inquire of lands given in mortmain to any house of religion," etc. 1 " Cyc." L. & P. 938. Anderson's Diet. Law (1893), 309; 2 Black. Com. (1 Cooley) »271. 4 Pope v. Farmers' Union & M. Co. (Cal. 1900), 62 Pac. 384 ; 8 Am. \. _ Rep. 364, used in this case in con- tract to deliver wheat, etc. ; ware- housernaa. • 1 IJouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 191. See also Mack's L. Diet. Low v. Archer, 12 X. V. (2 Kern) _'7T. 282, per Dean. .1., citing Groat v. Gillespie, 25 Wend. ( X. V. | 383; Arm- strong v. Percy, 5 Wend. ( N. Y. ) 535. ' 1 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897 1 494. '' Damni injnriae actio: an action given by the civil law for the dam- age done by one who intentionally injured the slave or beast of another. Calvin." Black's L. Diet. 8 Sweet's Diet, of Eng. L. (ed. 1882 240. lit §8 49-54 PARTICULAR TERMS, MAXIMS AND PHRASES. § 49. Damnum fatale.— " Injury from a cause beyond human control. In the civil law injury caused by a fortuitous event or inevitable accident. The phrase was used to distinguish a class of losses for which bailees were not held liable. Among these were included losses by shipwreck, lightning or similar cas- ualty; even losses by fire, by pirates, by robbery, but theft was not included. The term is sometimes used by common-law writers in the same sense. " 9 § 50. Damnum infectum. — " In Roman law damage not yet committed but threatened or impending. A preventive inter- dict might be obtained to prevent such damage from happening, and it was treated as a quasi delict because of the imminence of the danger." 10 §51. Damnum rei amissae. — "In the civil law a loss arising from a payment made by a party in consequence of an error of law. " u §52. Damnum sine injuria esse potest. — "There may be damage or injury inflicted without any act of injustice. " 12 § 53. De minimis non curat lex. — This maxim means that the law does not concern itself about trifles. 13 * § 54. Indemnity. — Indemnity is where a compensation is agreed upon or awarded as a satisfaction commensurate with the damage sustained or liable to accrue. 14 9 1 Abb. L. Diet. (ed. 1879)337, citing Thickstun v. Howard, 8 Blackf. (Intl.) 535. "Damnum fa- tale. In civil law damages caused by a fortuitous event or inevitable ac- cident; damages arising from tbe act of God. Among tbese were included losses by sliipwreck, lightning or other casualty ; also losses by pirates, or by vis major, by lire, robbery and burglary ; but theft was not num- bered among these casualties. In general bailees are not liable for such 20 damages ; Story, Bailees, 471.'" 1 Bouv. L. Diet. (ed. 1897) 494. See also Black's Law Diet. ; Anderson's Diet. Law. 10 Black's Law Diet. 11 Black's Law Diet. 12 Black's Law Diet. (Lofft. 112.) 13 Broom's Leg. Max. (7 Am. ed. 1874)142, 143, 145, 146, 165 n. See sees. 71, 72, post, herein. 14 Examine Anderson's Diet. Law (1893), 534. PARTICULAR TERMS, MAXIMS A M > PHRASES. §§ 55-67 § 55. Indeterminate and determinate damages.— These terms have been applied to a certain class of damages t<> dis- tinguish them from those known as exemplary, punitive or vin- dictive, the basis for those designated as " indeterminate " being the fact that they can be admeasured by the pecuniary loss, while those which are specified as "determinate " rest upon no definite and exact pecuniary compensation. 13 § 56. Injuria sine damno. — If an injury is done and no legal damage results therefrom, it is injuria sine damno, a wrong for which no action lies in law." ; But it is declared that " it is impossible to imagine any such thing as injuria sine damno. Every injury imparts damage in the nature of it." n § 57. Inquiry of damages ; writ of. — A writ of inquiry of damages was a process issued after interlocutory judgment in cases where the defendant did not confess the whole damages laid in the declaration, commanding the sheriff to inquire into the damages by a jury of twelve men and return such inquisi- tion into court. The sheriff sat as a judge and tried by jury, 16 The court specifies three classes: the first being designated as " de- terminate, pecuniary loss, such as pe- cuniary loss directly sustained, as by the destruction of property; or con- sequently sustained, as for instance the pecuniary value of time Inst by the plaintiff from injuries inflicted on him, the expenses incurred by him " for medicine, physicians' bills, etc.; "determinate pecuniary loss is often but inappropriately . . . des- ignated actual loss or remunerative or compensatory damages, 11 and the court then mentions " indeterminate damages" as distinguished from "determinate damages, 1 ' and con- tinuing it says as to the latter that it can be recovered for a tort of any description, and " must always he the natural and proximate c.>iis<- quenees of the act complained of by the plaintiff. 11 " Indeterminate dam- ages 11 are "such as from their na- ture cannot be ascertained exactly with any sort of approximation to exactness. . . . Damages of this sort have, I think, been generally hut very inappropriately called vindic- tive damages, exemplary damages or I Hi nil ive damages," holding also that compensation only is meant. Pegram v. Stort/.. :M W. Va 220, 230, J:i7: 6 S. E. S. 485, per 4. GO. Moral obligations, duties and wrongs. (17. Lawful acts. 08. Volenti non fit injuria. 69. Accident or casualty. 70. Act of God — Inevitable acci- dent. 71. Damnum absque injuria — Gen- erally. 72. Same subject— Application of the doctrine continued. 73. De minimis non curat lex. 74. Injuria sine damno. §60. General statement— Distinctions between damage and damages, liability and measure of damages. There are certain underlying principles upon which the right to recover damages in any given case must rest, for damages are the result of or occasioned by certain factors which must exist, else the law does not recognize any legal liability even though there may be an injury. As will be apparent from the preceding definitions, there is a distinction between the terms damage and damages and between liability and measure of damages. The question of liability embraces, if it is not strictly limited to, that of rights and remedies, negligence and contributory negli- gence and the like. To legally know that a person lias caused damage to another is but one step towards determining whether or not he is liable for any damages and if so to what extent. We shall therefore not enter into any extended discussion of 23 § 61 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. the doctrine of liability alone, considering it only in so far as it is necessary to elucidate the law of damages or measure of dam- ages. § 61. Damages generally — Whenever by virtue of a lawful contract, some right, duty or obligation is created or assumed, or where by common law or by statute some legal duty exists or is imposed with reference to the rights of others, then a legal rio-ht of action for damages will accrue from the breach of such contractual obligation, or from the violation by negligence, wil- fulness, etc., of such legally imposed duty, having regard to those rules of law which constitute exceptions to the general rule, and which we have fully considered elsewhere in this treatise. 1 1 See also as to general rule, Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sec. 941. " By the common law in all actions, personal and mixt damages were re- coverable, 2 Inst. 286, and though the plaintiff recovers the thing itself demanded, yet he also recovers dam- ages ; as in detinue. ... So in all actions upon statutes winch give damages to the party grieved, or a certain penalty, the plaintiff recovers damages over and above the penalty, so in an action upon a statute winch prohibits anything. But by the common law no damages were re- coverable in a real action, 2 Inst. 286; 10 Co. 116a, nor in an assise except against the disseisor himself, 2 Inst. 284, nor in quare impedit, 2 Inst. 362, or partition, 1 Rol. 575, 1. 14 . . . nor in disceit upon a recovery by de- fault, 1 Rol. 575, 1. 23, nor in account, 1 Rol. 575, 1. 8, 11, nor in warrantia chartae . . . nor in scire facias or other writ of execution ... In per- sonal actions, damages are allowed only to the time of the action com- menced . . . and it is now settled as a general rule that when a new ac- tion may be brought and a new sat- isfaction obtained on that for duties 24 or demands arisen since the com- mencement of the depending suit; these shall not be included in the judgment on the former actions. . . . But on real actions the demandant shall not count of damages: For he shall recover till the time of the verdict." Comyn's Dig. " Dam- ages." " Sir Edward Coke in his Com- mentary on the Stat, of Gloucester, 2 Inst. 286, observes that regularly in personal and mixed actions, damages were to be recovered at the common law, but that in real actions no damages were to be recovered at the common law, because the court could not give the demandant that which he demanded not; and the demandant in real actions demanded no damages either by writ or count." Coke Litt. (Butler & Hargraves' Notes, 1853 ) 355 ( 1 ). In personal ac- tions plaintiff recovers no more damages than he counts for but in real actions he recovers damages pending the suit, and therefore never counts to his damage. Bacon's Abr. (Bouv. 1854) "Damages" (D) 2. pp. 66-68. " By the common law a man could not recover damages in a j real action. But in mixed and per- GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. § 62 § 62. Fundamental law— Ubi jus ibi remedinm. — It is a well known and constantly asserted maxim of the law that " There is no wrong without a remedy." This is a funda- mental legal principle, 2 which runs through all the decisions wherein damages are sought. 5 But this maxim is limited sonal actions lie might. " Viner's Abr. "Damages 1 ' (P) 44, 45. " At the common law no damages were recoverable in any real action; for the detention of the possession, etc., being the cause of damages, till the right to the land was determined, the party could not be Baid to suffer any wrong; also the burden of the feudal duties lay upon the tenant in possession, and consequently, he was to receive the mesne profits until some other made out a better right, who after recovery might have maintained the action of tres- pass." 3 Bacon's Abr. " Damages" (A). a Broom's Leg. Maxims (7th Am. ed. 1874), 191. " Jus in the sense in which it is here used signifies ' the legal authority to do or to demand something.' Remedinm may be de- fined to be the right of action or the means given by law for the recovery of a right, and according to the above elementary maxim, whenever the law gives anything, it gives a remedy for the same: lex semper dabit remedinm. If a man has a right, he must, it has been observed in a celebrated case, have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a rem- edy if he is injured in the exercise and enjoyment of it ; and indeed, it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy, for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal (per Holt, C. J., Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 953; per Willes, C. J.; Winswore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577; Vaugh. R. 47, 253). It appears then that remedium, although sometimes used as synonymous with actio, has . . . a more extended significa- tion than the word ' action ' in its modern sense." Id. 191. See sec. 76 herein. a " Every wrong imports a dam- age." Adams v. Robinson, t;."> Ala. 586, 591, per Somerville, J. Some damages are always presumed to flow from the violation of any right. Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492, 493, per English, C. J. A violation of a right is attended with some legal damage of course. Bristol Mfg. Co. v. Gridley, 28 Conn. 201, 210, per Ellsworth, J. The law infers dam- age from every infringement of a right. The right infringed is prop- erty. McConnell v. Kibbe, 33 111. 174, 179; 85 Am. Dec. 265. The in- dignity suffered by reason of the un- lawful act of another is a proper sub- ject of compensation, whether the act was wanton, malicious or wilful. or whether it was merely negligent or mistaken. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Christison, 39 111. App. 495. Damages may be recovered where a right is invaded or a wrong done, even though no actual damage be proved. Foster v. Elliott, 33 Iowa, 216, 223. Wherever a right is in- vaded the law presumes damage. Munroe v. Stickney, 48 Me. 462. " The plaintiff first proving the de- fendant to be in fault, or a wrong- doer, then it legitimately follows that it should be held liable for the natural, proximate and direct conse- quences of its default." Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 X. H. 387, 392; 6 Am. Rep. 526, per Nesmith, J. " In 25 8 63 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. to legal rights and wrongs, ' although it applies to common law and statutory rights, 3 and as in cases relating to the use of electricity, there may be many instances where the wrong is new in character, nevertheless, the remedy is by the adaptation of old or analogous principles in enforcing the right or in obtaining redress for the wrong. 6 Again the fact that there was no injury, hut a benefit conferred, does not operate against the maxim's application. 7 It is also a general and sound rule of Law that where the law gives a remedy for an injury, such remedy shall be commensurate to the damage sustained;* § 63. Same subject— Violation of statutory duty — The above rule has also been extended to a violation of a statutory duty to the extent at least of a prima facie liability/' There is, however, a doubt as to this rule in so far as it relates to prima facie liability, for upon this point the question of burden of law for every wrong there is a rem- edy. 3 Black. Com. 123: Ashby v. White, 1 Salk. 21. Whenever the law creates or recognizes a private right, it also gives a remedy for the violation of it. 1 Chit. PI. 83; Yates v. Joyce, 11 Johns. (N. Y.)140;" Lamb v. Stone, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 527, 532, per Morton, J. " Every infrac- tion of legal right causes injury. ... If the infraction is estab- lished, the conclusion of damage in- evitably follows." N. Y. Rubber Co. v. Rothery, 132 N. V. 293; 44 N. Y. St. R. 557; 30 N. E. 841; rev'g 62 N. Y. St. R. 905; 10 N. Y. Supp. 609. For every infraction of a man's legal rights, the law gives a remedy. Champion v. Vincent, 20 Tex. 811, 815. See also Dudley v. Tilton, 14 La. Ann. 283, 285; Holmes v. Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 64; Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 3 Snmn. (U. S. C. C. D. Me.) 189; 3 Law Rep. 374; Fed. Cas. No. 17,322, per Story, J.; Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co., 2 Story (U.S. C.C.I). Me.),Wl: Fed. Cas. No. 17,516, per Story, J.; But- 26 man v. Hussey, 3 Fairf. (12 Me.) 407; Hooten v. Barnard, 137 Mass. 36; Lnnd v. New Bedford, 121 Mass. 2S6; Appleton v. Fullerton, 1 Gray (Mass.), 186, 194; Londsdale Co. v. Moies, 2 Cliff. (U. S. C. C. D. R. I.) 538; Fed. Cas. No. 8,497, per Clifford, Cir. J.; Paul v. Slason, 22 Yt. 231, 238; 54 Am. Dec. 75, per Poland. J.; Murphy v. Fond du Lac, 23 Wis. 365, and see sees. 8, 9, herein as to nominal damages. N * See Wyatt v. Williams, 43 N. H. 102; Donovan v. New Orleans, 11 La. Ann. 711. 5 Stearns v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 46 Me. 95. G See Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), ''Preface"; examine sec. 14, note 14, et seq. See also Gosling v. Veley, 4 11. L. Cas. 679, 768, per Coleridge, J.; Pasley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 51, per Ashhurst, J. 7 Murphy v. Fond du Lac, 23 Wis. 305. 8 Rockwood v. Allen, 7 Mass. 254, 256, per Sedgwick, J. 9 Fahey v. Jephcote, 2 Ont. L. R. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY proof rests. To say that for every violation of a statutory duty there is a remedy is in general as true in relation to statute atconimon law ; nevertheless there may be a violation of a statu- tory obligation for which oo right of arti.ni can be maintained, as where contributory negligence is of a character to preclude any recovery even to the extent that there is no ground of ac- tion. Again, the violation of duty imposed by statute may be perse negligence or merely evidence thereof; it may constitute prima facie evidence and not be conclusive, or it may operate to merely shift the burden of proof; it may be a legal wrong and the proximate cause of injury, and yet not of necessity constitute an actionable ground for damages to the extent that some dam- ages must be given by reason alone of the noncompliance with the statute and the consequent injury. In other words a person cannot rely entirely upon another's violation of a statutory duty as a ground of damages for an injury and ignore the legal duties imposed upon himself with reference to avoiding the injury. If, however, a person is injured without any act of omission or commission of his contributing in any degree to the injury and such injury is a legal result of the wrong, then a different ques- tion is presented and the rule of liability would probably apply. The above distinctions will be apparent from the appended cita- tions. What we have said is, however, to be qualified to the extent that the statute imposing the duty may also provide ex- pressly for liability. 10 449: violation of sec. 14 of Out. Fac- tories Act, R. S. ( ). L897, +. There must be a breach of some legal duty. — To re- cover damages there must be a breacli of some legal duty owing pliance with Ga. Code, sec. 708, re- quiring signals at highway cross- ing. Bowen v. Gainesville J. & S. R. Co., 9.") Ga. (5,88; 22 S. E. 695. A.s to cure and diligence required of railroad company under Ga. Code, sees. 2067, 3033, see East Tennessee V. & G. R. Co. v. Miller, 95 Ga. 738; 22 S. E. 660; 2 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. N. S. 216. Violation of stat- utory duty is negligence per se. Western, etc., R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397; 7 S. E. 912. Municipal cor- poration is not deprived of defense of contributory negligence for in- jury from defective sidewalk because of charter provision making it liable. Griffen v. Lewiston (Ida.), 55 Pac. 545. Owner is liable for failure to comply with ordinance respecting elevator doors. Siddall v. Jansen, 160 111. 43; 48 N. E. 191: 39 L. R. A. 112; rev'g (37 111. App. 102. See further as to principle, Pennsylva- nia Co. v. Conlan, 101 111. 93; Bart- lett v. Roach, 68 111. 174. Railroad company is liable for death of engi- neer through failure to maintain cattle guards as required by statute. Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Williams, 09 111. App. 392. As to violation by railroad company for violation, Ind. Rev. Stat. 189, sec. 2293, and sec. 5156; as to crossings, etc., see Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Gray. 148 Ind. 260; 46 X. E. 75; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 48. Railroad company not liable for failure to signal where one driving on tracks is negligent. Miller v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 144 Ind. 323; 43 N. E. 257. As to requirement of Horner's Ind. Rev. Stat. 1897, sec. 5087, requiring pas- sage to the right by vehicles on streets, see Decatur v. Stoops. 21 Ind. App. 397; 1 Repr.'516; 52 X. E. 28 623. Violation of statute requiring signals, etc., at railway crossing is negligence per se. Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, sees. 5307, 5308; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Shaw, 15 Ind. App. 173; 43 N. E. 957. See further Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton, 132 Ind. 189. Violation of statutory duty is negligence per se. Ives v. Walden (Iowa, 1901), 87 N. W. 408; 10 Am. Xeg. Rep. 590. Railroad company is liable under Iowa Code, 1873, sec. 1289, for live stock killed on unin- closed right of way. Sarver v. Chi- cago, B. & Q. R. Co., 104 Iowa, 59; 73 N. W. 498, dist'g Soward v. Chi- cago & N. W. R. Co., 33 Iowa, 386. Failure of driver to turn to right on public highway as required by Code, 1873, sec. 1000, is prima facie evidence of negligence. Cook v. Fogerty, 103 Iowa, 500; 72 N. W. 677; 39 L. R. A. 488; County is only bound to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and dili- gence under Laws, 1887, ch. 237, as to defects, etc., in bridges. Murray v. Woodson Co., 58 Kan. 1; 48 Pac. 554. As to defective highways under Gen. Stat. 1889, par. 7134, and liability for injuries, see Reading Twp. v. Telfer, 57 Kan. 798; 48 Pac. 134; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 138. Statutory duty does not change the burden of proof. Id. As to measure of damages to owner of inclosed lands for neglect of railroad company to build cattle guards under Kan. Gen. Stat. 1889, par. 1259, see Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Billings, 7 Kan. App. 399; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 740; 52 Pac. 61. Driver not chargeable with contributory negligence for driving to left on highway. Loya- cano v. Jurgens, 50 La. Ann. 441; 23 So. 717. Not obligated to strictly GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY § '11 from defendant to the plaintiff," although "while it is true in general that where do duty is owed no Liability arises, this rule comply with statute requiring to igan, etc., K. Co., 83 Mich. 564. drive to right on highway. (Rev. Under Code, 1892, sec 3548, the right Stat. ch. 26); Kennaid v. Burton, to damages for personal injuries 25 Me. 39. See Palmer v. Barker, 2 Fairf. (11 Me.) 338. As to lia- bility for violation of statute, see Baltimore K. Co. v. McDonnell, 43 Md. 552. That street railway com- pany is not liable for neglect to re- pair between tracks as required by Pub. Stat. ch. 52, sec 19, and that notice is a prerequisite to an ac- tion (Pub. Stat. ch. 52, sees. 19, 18), sec Dobbins v. West, End St. R. Co., 168 Mass. 55(5; 47 X. E. 428. This case qualifies the general proposition as to a violation of a statutory duty in that if there is a statutory wrong, the right to an action may be quali- fied by a statutory condition prec- edent. A violation of a statute. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, sees. 2, 3, requiring sleighs to have bells, does not render one liable unless his negligence con- tributed to the injury. Kidder v. Dunstable, 11 Gray (Mass. ), 342. See further as to liability for violation of statute, Lane v. Atlantic Works, ill Mass. 136: Saulsbury v. Hirschen- rader, 106 Mass. 458. Thattownship is liable under the statute for failure to repair highway, sec Handy v. Meriden Twp., 114 Mich. 454; 7^ X. W. 251; 4 Det. L. X. 628. Under a statute, Annot. Stat. sees. 9110, 9113, to prevent the careless use of firearms, one is per se guilty of negligence, and is liable when he points a loaded gun towards an- other and wounds him. Bahel v. Manning. 112 Mich. 24; 3 Det. L. X. 819; 70 X. W. 327; 36 I.. R A. 523. That one who violates statutory duty is liable, see Grand v. Mich- caused by railroad company's mak- ing flying switch is not precluded by contributory negligence but only by wilful and wanton or reckless con- duct. Pulliman v. Illinois C. R. Co., 75 Miss. 627; 1 Miss. Dec. (Xo. 19) 165; 2:; So. 359; As to liability for noncompliance with statute, see also Illinois C. R. Co. v. McCulip, 70 Miss. 360; 25 So, 166. Xegligence per se not to observe ordinance. Jackson v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co., 157 Mo. 621; 58 S. W. 32. Liability attaches where statute provides for liability for nonobserv- ance. Kingsbury v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 156 Mo. 379; 57 S. W. 547; Boggs v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 156 Mo. 389; 57 S. W. 550. City is not liable to a citizen for permitting building of a character prohibited by ordinance to be erected. Harman v. St. Louis, 137 Mo. 494; 38 S. W. 1102. Bailroad company is not liable for running at prohibited rate of speed through city where injured person guilty of contributory negli- gence. Payne v. Chicago & A. R, Co., 136 Mo. 562: 38 S. W. 308. See fur- ther as to liability for nonobservance of statute, Bluedorn v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 108 Mo. 439; 18 S. W. 1103; Keim v. Union R. Co., 90 Mo. 314; 2S. W. 427: Schaferv. St. Louis & II. R. Co., (35 Mo. App. 201. Viola- tion of statute is evidence of negli- gence but not conclusive, oddie v. Mendenhall (Minn. 1901), S6 X. W. 881; in Am. N"eg. Rep. 297. Failure to give statutory signals at county crossing is negligence per se, but 11 For note 11 see page 32. 29 8 64 GENERAL PRINCIPLES <>F LIABILITY. varies with circumstances," unci the question of duty may be- come one for the jury " to be determined upon all its facts of company not liable where there is contributory negligence. .Imlson v. Great Northern R. Co.,63 Minn. 248; ii."> N. W. 447. Noncompliance with statute is negligence. Hunter v. MontanaC. R. Co., 22 Mont. 525; 57 Pac. 140; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. s. 615. Nebraska statute providing for liability of railroad companiesfor injuries inflicted on passengers does not apply to street railroads or to one whose injury was in part due to his own negligence. (Neb. Comp. Stat. 18 ( .»7. ch. 72. sec. 3 I ; Lincoln St. R. Co. v. McClellan, 5 I Neb. 672; 74 N. W. 1074. Neb. Comp. Stat. ch. 16, sec. 104, makes railroad company liable for failure to give statutory signals for penalty or for damages. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Geist, 49 Neb. 489; 68N. W. 6 10; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 421. Hut the failure must be the proxi- mate cause of the injury. Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627; 67 N. W. 599. Presumption of negli- gence arises under Comp. Stat. ch. 72. art. 1, sec. 3, making railroad companies liable. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Hague, 48 Neb. 97; 66 N. W. 1000, 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 476. Town liable for defective high- ways under Laws, 1893, ch. 59, sec. 1 ; Gale v. Town of Dover (N. H. 1896), 44 Atl. 535. Noncompliance with statute may constitute actionable negligence and is negligence per se. Lewis v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N. Y. 52; 56 N. E. 548, rev'g 32 App. Div. 627; 53 N. Y. Supp. 1107. See further as to liability for noncom- pliance with statutory requirement, Pauley v. Steam Gauge & L. Co., 131 N. Y. 90; 42 N. Y. St. R. 636; 29 N. E. 999; 30 X. E. 805; rev'g til Hun, 254; 40 N. Y. St. R. 855: 16 N. Y. Supp. 820; McReckard v. Flint, 114 so N. V. 222; 23 X. Y. St. R. 100; 21 N. E. 153; aff'g 13 Daly, 541; Con- nolly v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 114 X. Y. 104; 22. X. Y. St. R.675; 21 X. E. 101 ; aff'g 8 X. Y. St. R. 901 ; Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84 N. Y. 488, rev'g 23 Hun, 159; Lambert v. Staten Island R. Co., 70 N. Y. 104; Carroll v. Staten Island R. Co., 58 X. Y. 126. Imputes negli- gence, but not conclusive. Caldwell v. N. J. Steamboat Co., 47 X. Y. 282, aff'g 56 Barb. 425; Hoffman v. Union Terry Co., 47 X. Y. 176. Vio- lation of ordinance does not prove negligence, but is a circumstance to be considered. Schaffer v. Baker Transfer Co., 29 App. Div. (N. Y.) 459; 51 X.Y. Supp. 1092. See further, Rohling v. Eich, 23 App. Div. 179;48 X. Y. Supp. 892; Riley v. Eastches- ter, 18 App. Div. 94; 45 X. Y. Supp. 448; under N. Y. Laws, 1890, ch. 568, sees. 16, 17; Hanrahan v. Cochran, 12 App. Div. (X. Y.) 91; Waller v. Heb- ron, 5 Af>P- Div. 577; 39 X. Y. Supp. 381, under X. Y. Laws, 1890, ch. 508, sec. 16; Schwander v. Birge, 33 Hun (X. Y.), 186; Moody v. Osgood, 60 Barb. (X.Y.) 644. Violation of stat- ute is negligence: Bradley v. Ohio, R. cv C. R. Co., 126 X. C. 735; 36 S. E. 181. City liable for omission to keep streets free from nuisance after notice as required by Rev. Stat. sees. 1878, 2640. Zanesville v. Fannan, 53 ( >hioSt. 605;35 Ohio L. J. 51; 42 X. E. 703. Violation by street car com- pany of statute (Ohio Act, May 4, 1891; 88 Ohio Laws, 582), as to care, caution and signals at railroad cross- ing is negligence at least in the absence of extraordinary circum- stances, and company is liable. Cincinnati St. R. Co. v. Murray, 53 Ohio St. 570, 35 Ohio L. J. 22; 42 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. s <;i the probability of danger or the grossness df the ads complained of," '- and in a Georgia case it is held that the owner of hind N. E. 596; 30 I,. R. A. 50S. Failure to maintain statutory sign does not render company liable where injured person knew thai crossing existed. New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Kist- l.i. if, Ohio C. C. :'>16. City liable for neglect to comply with statute (Rev. Stat. sec. 2640), as to bridges. Mooney v. St. Marys, 15 Ohio C. C. 4-46. The duty to keep highways free from impediments under Pa. Act, June 13, 1836, does not extend to those upon lands of abutting owners. Haines v. Barclay Tup., 181 Pa. 521; 40 W. X. C. 564; 37 Ail. 560. See further as to liability for non- compliance with statute, Johnson v. Brown, 61 Pa. St. 58; O'Grady v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (Pa. C. P.), 28 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 110. Liable for violation of statute, Oen. Laws, ch. 74, sec. 1; providing for driving to the right over highway, Angell v. St. Louis, 20 K. I. 391; 39 Atl. 521; 46 Cent. L. J. 287. Cause of action is not given to one injured by violation of Pub. Laws, 1878, ch. 688, sec. 25, providing for protection of elevators. Behler v. Daniels (R. I.), 31 Atl. 582. Violation of statute is negligence per se. Bo wen v. Southern R. Co. (S. C. 1000), 36 S. E. 590. Failure to give statutory signals contributes to injury, even though not the efficienl cause thereof (Rev. Stat. 1893, sec. 1692), Wragge v. South Carolina & o. R. Co., 74 S. ('. lo:,; 25 S. E. 76; 33 L. R. A. 191; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 639; and company is liable for collisions to which such neglect contributed even though not the proximate cause (id.) un- less the person injured was guilty of "gross or wilful negligence. 11 Strother v. South Carolina A- Gr. R. Co., 47 S. C. 375 ■ 25 S. E. 272 ; 5 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. N. S. 430. Right of action is absolute for statute is im- perative. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Davis, 104 Tenn. 442 ; 58 S. W. 296. When no liability for violation of. shan- non's Code, sees. 1601, 1603, 1605. Providing for driving to the right ou highway. Young v. Conden, 98 Tenn. 577 ; 40 S. W. loss. Violation of statute is negligence. Texas & P. R Co. v. Moore (Tex. Civ. A pp. 1900), 56 S. W. 248. Violation oi statute is actionable when it. occa- sioned the injury. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. nf Tex. v. Cardena (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 54 S. W. 312. Is liable. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Red Cross Stock Farm, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 114 ; 53 s. \V. 834. Railroad company liable for failure to construct cattle guard (Rev. Stat, is 1 ,):,, an. 4527). Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Isaacs. 20 Tex. Civ. App. 107; 40 S. \V. 690. See further, Central Tex. & X. \V. R. Co. v. Bush, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 291 ; .34 S. \V. 133 ; 3 Am. A- Eng. K. Cas. X. S. 264. Company liable for fail- ure to construct fences and cattle guards even though contributory negligence ( R. L. sec. 3412). Har- wood v. Bennington A- P. R. Co., 67 Vt. 664; 32 Atl. 721. Xegligeuce per se but not necessarily actionable negligence. Brown v. Chicago A- X. W. R. Co. (Wis. 1001). S:, X. W. 271 ; Am. Xeg. Rep. 403. Xot liable when failure to construct fence in DO way contributed to injury. Sut- ton v. Chicago, st. P. m. a- O. I:. Co., 98 Wis. 157 : 7:'- X. W. 993 ; LO Am. A Eng. R Cas. \. s. 100. Liable. Morton v. Smith, 48 Wis. 265. City 12 For note 12 see pae;e 32. 31 8 (54 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY owes no legal duty to trespassing children to so guard an exca- vation on said land as to prevent injury to them when they come thereupon without his invitation, express or implied, and the court, per Fish, J., in the course of an exhaustive opinion says: " Under the facts stated was the defendant company liable in damages to the plaintiff for the death of his child ? This ques- tion turns upon another ; that is, whether or not the company owed the child any legal duty which it neglected to perform, for there can be no actionable negligence without breach of a legal duty." 1;i So a person incurs no duties towards others by not warning or driving them from his premises, and they go there, if mere volunteers, at their own risk ; and tacit permis- sion to go upon premises is not sufficient as a ground for dam- liable in Florida for neglect to re- pair streets as required by statute (U. S. C. C. A. 5th C. ), 24 C. C. A. 97; 41 U. S. App. 657 ; 78 Fed. 292, citing several Florida cases. Com- pany not liable to trespasser for its noncompliance with ordinance regu- lating rate of speed. Sheehan v. St. Faul & D. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 7th C), 22 C. C. A. 121; 46 U. S. App. 498; 76 Fed. 201; Felton v. Aubrey (U. S. C. C. A. 6th C), 20 C. C. A. 436; 43 U. S. App. 278; 74 Fed. 350. Violation of Va. Code, sec. 1258, as to erection of fences, does not make company liable for death of employee resulting there- from. Nevvsom v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Va.), 81 Fed. 133, aff'd 23 C. C. A. 669 ; 42 TJ. S. App. 282 ; 78 Fed. 94 ; 2 Va. L. Reg. 882. See The Pennsylvania, 19 Wall. (U. S.) 136. Although a statute provides for daily forfeiture against gas companies for failure to restore street, yet a gas company is liable for injury resulting from neg- ligently filling up a trench where the statute also provides that noth- ing shall prevent said company's liability to legal proceedings in con- sequence of making or supplying gas 32 (English Gas Works Clauses, Acts 1847, sees. 11, 29); Goodson v. Sun- bury Gas Consumers' Co. (Q. B. ), 75 Law T. Rep. 251. When much traveled highway is not in state of repair within the fatal accidents act. R. S. O. ch. 166 ; Foley v. East Flam- borough Twp. (Can.), 26 Ont. App. 43. City is liable for loss of revenues from failure to perform statutory duty of widening and prolonging a street. Montreal v. Gauthier, Rap. Jud. Quebec, 7 B. R., 100. See gen- erally Chaplin v. Hawes, 3 Car & P. 554 ; Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685 ; White v. Gnaedinger, Rap. Jud. Quebec, 7 B. R. 156. See further as to acts done in violation of law or or- dinance, note, 53 Am. Rep. 52-55. n Healeyv. Ballantine & Sons (N. J. 1901), 49 Atl. 511; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 155, 159, per Depue, Ch. J., quoting Erie, Ch. J., in Cox v. Bur- bridge, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 430. As to duty as essential element of negli- gence, see note 12, L. R. A. 322. 12 Tucker v. Draper (Neb. 1901), 86 N. W. 917; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 307, 313, per Sedgwick, C. 13 Savannah, Fla. & W. R. Co. v. Beavers (Ga. 1901), 39 S. E. 82; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 8, 12, 13. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. 6 64 ages for injuries to children occasioned by the negligent condition of such premises." But if one expressly or impliedly invites another upon his land and such person is injured by failure of the owner's duty to keep the premises in ;i reasonably safe condi- tion, the owner is liable in damages. 13 "Formal! v. Standard Oil Co. (Mich. 1901), 86 N. W.946; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 402. See also Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. K. Co. v. Ballantine (U. S. C. C. \ 7th C), 56 U. S. App. 260; 28 C. C. A. 572; 84 Fed. 935; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 735. 16 Tucker v. Draper I Neb. L901), 86 N. W. 917; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 307, case of death of child from falling into well. See O'Leary v. Brooks Elevator Co., 7 N. I). 554; 75 \. W. 919; 41 L. R. A. 077; 4 Am. Neg. Kep. 451. As to liability of railroad companies for accidents to children on turntables, see note 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 611,616; note 14 L. R. A. 781. As to duty to trespassers and liabil- ity to children trespassing on rail- road tracks, see Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Moorer, 110 Ala. 042; 22 So. 900; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. V s. 742; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 317, and note. See further as to duty as to trespass- ers, licensees and invited persons. Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Cumberland (U. S. Sup. D. C), 176 C. S. 232; 20 S. Ct. 380, affg 12 App. D. C. 598; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kelly, 182 111. 267; 54 N. E. 979, aff'g 80 111. App. 675; John Spry Lumber Co. v. Duggan, 182 111. 218; 34 X. E. 102, aff'g 80 111. App. 392; Jelinski v. Belt R. Co., 86 111. App. 535; Ro- bards v. Wabash R. Co., 84 111. App. 477; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. 11. Co v. Tartt (U. S. C. C. A. III.). 39 C. C. A. 568; 99 Fed. 309; Biggs v. Barb Wire Co., 60 Kan. 217; 44 L. R. A. 655; Gunn v. Felton ( Ky. 1900), 57 S. W. 15; Moffatt v. Kenuey, 174 Mass. 311; 54 N. E. 850; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 564; McCarvel v. Sawyer, 173 3 Mass. ">4o; Stevens v. Nichols, 155 Mass. 472; 29 N. E. 1150; 15 L. R. A 459; 1 1 ii ink v. Wixoin, 121 Mich. 384, 389; Alabama & V. R. Co. v Carter, 77 Miss. 611; 27 So. 993; Jackson v. Kansas City, Ft. s. & M. K. Co., 157 Mo. 021: 58S. W. 32; Ham- ilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg Co, (Minn. 1899), 80 N.W. 093; Kayserv. Lindell, 7:: Mum. 123; Buck v. Mfg. Co.. 09 N. 11. 257; O'Leary v. Erie R. Co.. 04 N. V. Supp. 511; :>1 App. Div. 25; Quirk v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 00 N. Y. St. R. 228; 4:; App. Div. 404. aff'g 56 N. V. Supp. 49; 26 ' Misc. 244; Fogarty v. Bogart, on X. St. R. 81; 43 App. Div. 430; Arro- j wood v. South Carolina A- G. E. R. Co., 120 N. C. 029; 36 S. E. 151? To- ledo Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. Put- ney, 44 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 480; 10 O. C. D. 698; Ludden v. Columbus & C. M. R. Co., 7 Ohio, N. P. 10C); 9Ohi0 S. & C. P. Dec. 793; Smith v. New ark Ice & C. S. Co., 8 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 283; Brady v. Prettyman, 193 Pa. St. 628; 44 Atl. 919: Brague v. Ry. Co., 192 Pa. St. 242: Texas & P. R. Co. v. Barrett (Tex. Civ. App 1900), 57S. W. 602; International & <;. N. R. Co. v. Brooks (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 54 S. W. 1056; Huff v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. ( W. Va. 1900), 35 S. E. 86(5; Ritz v. City of Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262; Schug \ Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 515. See also as to liability of owner of premises for defective condition, notes, 5 L. R. A. 580; 7 id. 620; as to trespasser or li- censee, note, 9 L. K. A. 640; as to dangerous condition of private grounds, etc., note, 26 I.. R. \. 686. 3a §65 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. § 65. Same subject— Governmental, judicial, discretionary and police duties and powers— Liability.— It may be generally stated that there must be some breach of a duty imposed upon a municipal corporation by law to render it liable for a mere non- feasance, 16 and where a city is under no duty to keep up a bridge, its failure to do. so is not negligence entitling one injured by its being defective to damages. 17 In considering, however, what duties are imposed upon a municipality with reference to a right of action, both statutory obligations and implied liability are important factors ; the next division is that of liability upon contracts and of liability in actions of tort ; while next in order 16 Montreal v. Mulcair, 28 Can. S. C. 45a 17 Crawford v. Mayor, etc., of Griffin (Ga. 1901), 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 26, 2S; 38 S. E. 988. As to liability of cities, counties, etc., for defective bridges, see, Lee Co. v. Yarbrongh, 85 Ala. 590; El Paso Co. v. Bisk, 18 Colo. 474; Daly v. New Haven, 60 Conn. 644; 38 Atl. 397; City of San- deraville v. Hurst, 111 Ga. 453; 36 S. E. 757; Cook v. De Kalb Co., 95 Ga. 218; Grays v. Bibb Co., 94 Ga. 698; Arnold v. Henry Co., 81 Ga. 730; Arline v. Laurens Co., 77 Ga. 249; Gwinnett Co. v. Dunn, 74 Ga. 358; People, Corey v. Dover & O. H. Commrs., 158 111. 197; 41 N. E. 1105; Johnson Co. v. Hemphill (Ind. App.), 41 N. E. 965, rev'd 14 Ind. App. 210; 42 N. E. 760; Bone- brake v. Huntington Co., 141 Ind. 62; Allen Co. Commrs. v. Creviston, 133 Ind. 39 ; Wabash v. Carver, 129 Ind. 453 ; 13 L. R. A. 851 ; Fulton Co. v. Rickell, 106 Ind. 501 ; Walrod v. Webster Co. (Iowa, 1900), 81 N. W. 598; 47 L. R. A. 480; Faulk v. Iowa Co., 103 Iowa, 442; Weirs v. Jones Co., 80 Iowa, 351 ; Cooper v. Mills Co., 09 Iowa, 350; Commrs. of Worcester Co. v. Ryckman, 91 Md. 36; 46 Atl. 317; Pearl v. Benton Twp. (Mich. 1900), 82 N. W. 226; White v. Riley I 34 Twp. (Mich. 1899), 80 N. W. 124; Tra- vis v. Skinner, 72 Mich. 152; Ander- son v. City of St. Cloud (Minn. 1900), 81 N. W. 746; State v. Vaughn, 77 Miss. 681; 27 So. 999; Cohea v. Cof- feesville, 69 Miss. 561; Pundman v. St. Charles Co.. 110 Mo. 594; Dun- can v. State, 42 Neb. 804; Hollings- worth v. Saunders Co., 36 Neb. 141; Jernee v. Monmouth Co., 52 N. S. L. 553; 11 L. R. A. 416; Markey v. Que'ens Co., 154 N. Y. 675; 49 N. E. 71; 39 L. R. A. 46, aff'g 9 App. Div. 627; Reiss v. Town of Pelham, 65 N. Y. Supp. 1033, aff'g 62 N. Y. Supp. 607; Cooley v. Trustees of N. Y. & B. Bridge, 45 App. Div. (N. Y.) 243; 61 N. Y. Supp. 1; Allen v. Queens Co., 84Hun(N.Y.),399; Smith v. Wright, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 621; Board of Commrs. of Hardin Co. v. Coffman 00 Ohio St. 527; 54 N. E. 1054; 48 L R. A. 455; 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 254 10 O. C. D. 91; Templeton v. Linn Co., 22 Or. 313; 15 L. R. A. 730 Riddle v. Delaware Co., 156 Pa. 643 Cope v. Hampton Co., 42 S. C. 17 Brown v. Laurens Co., 38 S. C. 282 Bailey v. Lawrence Co., 5 S. D. 393 Heigel v. Wichita Co., 84 Tex. 392 City of Marshall v. McAllister, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 214; 54 S. W. 1068 Rohrbougk v. Barber Co., 39 W. Va 472. (JKNEKAL PRINCIPLF.S o| I.I A 1:1 L1TV. § 65 is the distinction between municipal corporations strictly exist- ing as such and whirl) are organized under special charter or the general law and those which exist under the general designation of counties, towns, school districts, etc., and which are desig- nated as quasi corporations. These questions, however, are only briefly noticed here as they are not within the scope of this trea- tise except in a general way. 15 Again municipal corporations may become liable for the acts or omissions of others, which it may be helpless to prevent, and their responsibility is not to be measured by that rule which applied to individuals in regard to their own acts, 19 and while they are not liable for the manner in which they exercise their discretionary powers of a public, legislative or quasi judicial nature, nevertheless where their powers become ministerial duties, and there is a negligent per- formance thereof, there is a remedy in an action for damages.* 18 See as to civil actions and liabil- ities and as to the general divisions above, note, 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed.) sees. 935 et seq., 948etseq., 961 et seq, 980 et seq. ; Tiedeman on Munic. Corp. (ed. 1900) sees. 324, 325 et seq. 19 Greerv. New York. 4 Rob. (N.Y.J 675; 1 Abb. Pr. N. S. ( N. Y. ) 206,' and see Wallace v. New York, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 440; IS How. Pr. (N. Y.) 169. 20 Chicago v. Seben, 165 111. 371; 46 N. E. 244, aff'g 62 111. App. 248. ."A municipal corporation is not im- pliedly liable to an action for dam- ages, either for the nonexercise of, or for tbe manner in which in good faith it exercises discretionary pow- ers of a public or legislative charac- ter . . . There may be however . . . an implied liability for the negligent or unskilful manner in which strictly corporate powers, as distinguished from public powers, are carried into execution, although there was no perfect duty resting on the corpora- tion to enter upon tbe works, or un- dertakings involving the exercise of such powers. But the liability in such cases attaches only when the duties cease to be judicial in their nature and become ministerial. This is tbe principle; its application, as will be hereafter seen, is oftentimes extremely difficult." 2 Dillon on Munic. Corp. (4th ed. ) sec. 949. See also Tiedeman on Munic. Corp (ed. 1900) sees. 327 et seq. The powers with which municipal corpo- rations are generally invested, within the scope of their charter, are "gen- eially regarded as discretionary, because in their nature they are legis- lative, and although it is the duty of such corporations to carry out the powers so granted, and to make them beneficial, it has never been held that an action would lie against the corporation at the suit of an in- dividual for a failure on their part to perform such duty. Hut when' a duty of general interest is enjoined, and it appears that the burden was imposed in consideration of the priv- ileges granted and enjoined, and the means to perform the duty are placed at the disposition of tbe corporation, 36 §65 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. So the construction of a sewer has been decided to be a min- isterial work for which a liability arises, if in the construction there is carelessness or negligence and an injury is caused thereby, 21 and if injury results to plaintiff through defective construction of a sewer, and consequent flooding of his land, it constitutes a taking of his property without compensation within the meaning of the constitution. 23 So one is not es- topped from a recovery for the reduction of a grade, the necessity of which she should have foreseen, as where she places her house on the top of a ridge, 23 and although a municipal corporation acts judicially when it selects and adopts a plan for public im- provement, yet it acts ministerially in executing the work, and must carry it on in a reasonably safe and skillful manner. 24 Again where an injury results to a person by reason of negli- gence of contractors in executing a work under contract with a city which has solely to do with the business functions of the municipality, but which is in no sense in furtherance of a pub- lic duty, the city is liable ; £ although in so far as a city dis- charges a governmental function in causing arrests to be made by its police officers, it is not liable therefor, 26 nor is a munici- pality liable for the negligence of officers of the board of health in performing their duty, inasmuch as it is a function of the municipality, by reason of being a political division of the state. 27 they are clearly liable to the public if they unreasonably neglect to com- ply with the requirements of the charter, and where all the foregoing conditions concur, like individuals, they are also liable for injuries to person or property arising from neg- lect to perform the duty enjoined, or from negligence or unskilfulness in its performance.'' 4 Wait's Act. and Def. 631, 632 et seq. 21 Donahewv. Kansas City, 136 Mo. 657 ; 38 S. W. 571. 22 Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510; 11 Am. Rep. 463. 28 McGar v. Bristol, 71 Conn. 652; 42 Atl. 1.000 ( Conn. Gen Stat. sec. 2703). 24 Chicago v. Seben, 165 111. 371; 46 N. E. 244. afTg 62 111. App. 248. 36 26 Twist v. Rochester, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 307; 55 N. Y. Supp. 850. 26 Colely v. Statesville, 121 N. C. 301 ; 28 S. E. 482, and see note, 15 L. R. A. 283. 2? Gilboy v. Detroit, 115 Mich. 121; 73 N. W. 128; 4 Diet. L. N. 841, cit- ing numerous cases. See further as to general principles involved in the above text as to liability of munici- pal, etc., corporations, and as to governmental, judicial, discretionary and police duties and powers, Mel vin v. State, 121 Cal. 16; 53 Pac. 416 Piatt v. City of Waterbury, 72 Conn 531; 45 Atl. 154; Carswell v. Wil mington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 360; 43 Atl 169; Gray v. City of Griffin, 111 Ga 361; 36 S. E. 792; Tarbutton v. Town OKNEIJAI. PRINCIPLES <»F LIABILITY. 6 65 Again matters which come within the police powers or police regulations of a municipality may operate to relieve such cor- of Tennille, 110 Ca. 90; 85 S. E. 282; Wyatt v. Koine, 105 Ga. 312; 31 S. E. 188, 42 L. R. A. 180; Estes v. Macon, L03 (ia. 780; 30 S. E. 24(5; Love v. Atlanta, 95 Ga. 12'.); Biinkmeyer v. Kvansville, 29 Ind. 187; Vanlnnn v. Des Moines, 63 Iowa, 447; 19 N. W. 29:!; Planters' Oil Mill v. .Monroe Waterworks & L. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1243; 27 So. 684; Yule v. City of New Orleans, 25 La. Ann. 394; Com- missioners v. Dnckett, 20 Md. 468; Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495; 53 N. E. 910; McGowan v. Boston, 170 Mass. 384; 49 N. E. 033; Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 311; Monge v. City of Grand Rapids (Mich. 1900), 81 N. W. 574; Burridge v. City of Detroit, 117 Mich. 557; Sehuett v. Stillwater (Minn. 1900), 83 X. \V. 180; Boye v. City of Albert Lea, 74 Minn. 230; Itives v. City of Colum- bia, 80 Mo. App. 173; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 537; Downend v. City of Kan- sas City, 150 Mo. 60; 56 S. W. 902; Smith v. City of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283; 53 s. W. 907; Young v. Webb City, 150 M<>. 333; Ogle v. City of Cumberland, 90 Mo. 59; 44 Atl. 1015; Bowman v. City of Omaha, 59 Neb. 84; 80 N. W. 259; City of Lincoln v. O'Brien, 50 Neb. 761; Clark v. Eliza- beth, 61 N. J. L. 565; 49 Atl. 616, 737; Jansen v. Jersey City, 61 N. J. L. 243; 39 Atl. 1025; Re Oreer, 39 App. Div. (N. Y.) 22; 56 N. Y. Supp. 938; Quill v. New York, 36 App. Div. .476; 55 N. Y. Supp. 889; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 423: Springfield E. & M. Ins. Co. v. Yillage of Keeseville, 148 N. Y. 56; 42 N. E. 405, rev'g 80 Hun, 162; 61 N. Y. St. R. 711; 29 N. Y. Supp. 1130; Barton v. Syracuse, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 292, aff'd 36 N. Y. 54; Hickok v. Plattsburgh, 16 N. Y. 161, note; Betham v. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. St. 302; 4«i Atl. 448; Irving's Exrs. v. Borough of Media, 194 Pa. St. 648; 45 Atl. 482; Kaiksdale v. City of Laurens, 5>s s. C. 413; 3t> s. E. 661; Garrauz v. Greenville, 53 S. C. 575; 31 S. E. 597; Connelly v. Nashville, 100 Tenn. 262; 46 S. W. 566; City of Dallas v. Webb, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 48; 54 S. W. 398; Jones v. City <>f Williamsburg, 97 Va. 722; 34 S. E. 883; Wood v. City of Ilin- ton (\V. Va. 1900), 35 S. E. 824; Men- del v. Wheeling, 28 W. Va. 233; Whilty v. City of Oshkosh (Wis. 1900), 81 N. W. 992; Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black (U.S.), 39; Dent v. Bournemouth Corp., 66 L. J. Q. B. \. S. 395. As to judicial and min- isterial powers of such corporations, see note, 79 Am. Dec. 475-477. As to their liability for neglect of con- tractor, see note to 22 Am. Rep. 510, 511. As to liability where damages are occasioned in execution of sover- eign powers, see note, 66 Am. Dec. 434-442. As to their liability for neg- ligence or unskillfulness of agents, sec note. 5:! Am. Dec. 320-322. As to their liability for grading and re- grading streets, see note, 43 Am. Dec. 723-725. As to their liability for in- juries through want of repair or de- fects in public buildings, see note, 5 Am. Dee. 43-45; for insufficient sys- tem of drainage, see note, 54 Am. Rep. 671, 672; for neglect to repair streets, see note, 63 Am. Dec. 350- 357; for injuries caused by horses becoming frightened in streets, see note. 98 Am. Dec. 608-612; for prop- erty destroyed by mobs, see note, 56 Am. Dec. 580-590; as affected by em- ployment of contractors, 74 Am. Dec. 761, 762 ; for unauthorized acts of offi- 37 § 65 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. poration from liability. 88 In addition, notwithstanding the gen- eral principle which applies under the maxim that for every wrong there is a remedy, the acts of congress * extended pro- tection to all persons for acts they committed in subordination to the military authorities engaged in conducting the war, and conferred upon them the same exemption from liability to suit which belonged to the president, the secretary of war and the department commanders ; x and it is also determined that the government is not liable on implied assumpsit for the torts of its officer committed while in its service and apparently for its benefit. To admit such a liability would involve the govern- ment, in all its operations, in embarrassments, losses and diffi- culties subversive of the public interests. 31 In conclusion : "It is an established principle of jurisprudence in all civilized na- tions, that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts or in any other without its consent and permission, but it may, if it thinks proper, waive this privilege and permit itself to be made a defendant in a suit by individuals or by another state." 3 "-' cers, see note, 100 Am. Dec. 358-360; for negligence notes, 2 L. R. A. 500; 4 id. 325; 5 id. 143, 253; for false im- prisonment and unlawful arrest, note, 44 L. R. A. 795; 47 id. 593; 36 id. 293; for torts of agents, officers, etc., notes, 1 L. R. A. 608, 844; 2 id. 366, 500, 712; 3 id. 257; 4 id. 325; 6 id. 270; 9 id. 205; 11 id. 416; for acts of mob, note 24 L. R. A. 592. 28 Caldwell v. Prunelle, 57 Kan. 511; 46 Pac. 949. As to the general subject of police powers, see Prentice on Police Powers (ed. 1894). As to police powers of state, see note, 1 L. R. A. 51; 13 id. 131; that rights of corporations subject to same, see note, 9 L. R. A. 33; that private in- terests subservient to same, see note, 8 L. R. A. 854; see as to general subject of police powers, notes 1 L. R. A. 51; 6 id. 621; 10 id. 135; 13 id. 131; 16 id. 400; 32 id. 853; 30 id. 609; 38 id. 330. For definition of police power, see 38 Stehmeyer v. Charleston, 53 S. C. 259; 31 S. E. 322. 29 March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 756), and May 11, 1866 (14 Stat. 46). 30 Beard v. Burts, 95 U. S. 434. 31 Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 269, cited in Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 17 ; United States v. Berdan Fire Arms, 156 U. S. 566 ; Schillinger v. LTnited States, 155 U. S. 167. For further citations see 1 Russell & Winslow's Syllabus Digest, p. 1517. 32 Ball v. Halsell, 161 U. S. 83. See Ayres, ex parte, 123 U. S. 443 ; North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22. See also Russell & Winslow's Syllabus Digest for citations of tbese cases. That state cannot be sued, except with its own consent, see Melvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16; 53 Pac. 416; Car- ter v. State, 49 La. Ann. 1487: 22 So. 400; Wright v. State Board of Liqui- dation, 49 La. Ann. 1213; 22 So. 361; Columbia Water Power Co. v. Co- GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. S 65 But while tlie United States cannot be sued on its property rights, affected by a judgment, without the express authority of Congress, nevertheless it has been decided that its rightof prop- erty may, under certain circumstances, be made subject to the results of litigation, 83 and a state institution may be sued.* 1 lumbia Elec. St. R. L. & P. Co. (S. C), 20 S. E. 10(12; Sun tli & North Ala. R. Co. v. Alabama, 101 U. S. 832; 25 L. Ed. 973; Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337; 25 L. Ed. 960. * J Ward v. Congress Const. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 111.), 39 C. C. A. 669; 99 Fed. 598; and see Tindall v. Wesley (U. S. C. C. A. 4th ('.), 13 C. C. A. 160; 25 U. S. A. 124; 65 Fed. 731. 34 Bank of Hopkinsville v. Western Ky. Asylum i Ky. 1900), 56 S. W. 925. As to claims and suits against the United States, see generally United States v. Winchester & P. R. Co., 163 U. S. 244; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 993; 41 L. Ed. 145; Ward v. Con- gress Const. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 111.), 33 C. C. A. 669; 99 Fed. 598; Strong v. United States (U. S. C. C. D. Conn.), 93 Fed. 257; Hughes v. United States (U. S. C. C. D. Wash.), 86 Fed. 1022; Swigett v. United States ( U. S. D. C. D. Mont. ), 78 I '• id. 456; United States v. Madrazo (U. S. C. C. A. 2d Cir.), 38 U. S. A. 515; 73 Fed. 505; South Boston Iron Works v. United States, 34 Ct. CI. 174; Act, March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. 505); McDonald v. United States, 33 Ct. CI. 209; Foster v. United States, 32 Ct. CI. 170; Hay ward v. United States, 30 Ct. CI. 219. As to the right to recover under the Bowman Act for property taken by the army, etc., see Walker v. United States, 34 Ct. CI. 345; Blanchard v. United States, 32 Ct. CI. 444; Board of Edu- cation v. United States, 30 Ct. CI. 160. As to suits and claims against the state, see Holmes v. State (Ala.), I I So. 51; Melville v. State, 121 Cal. 16; 53 Pac. 416; Bloxham v. Florida C. & P. R. Co. (Fla.), 17 So. 902; Cayuga Co. Superv. v. State, 153 \. Y. 279; 47 N. E. 288; Waller v. State, 144 N. V. 579; 39 N. E. 680; 64 X. Y. St. R. 22<); Weeks v. State, 63 N. Y. Supp. 203; 48 App. Div. 357; State Blount v. Simmons, 119 N. C. 50; 25 S. E. 789, aff'd 26 S. E. 649: Cope v. Hastings, 183 Pa. 300; 4 1 W. \. C. 173; 28 Pitts, L. J. N. S. 175; 38 Atl. 717; Re Moore's Case (Atty. Genl.), 6 Pa. Hist. R. 396; Harris v. State, 9 S. U. 453; 69 X. W. 825; Lyman Co. v. State, 9 S. D. 413; 69 N. W. 601 ; Gordon v. Weaver (Teun. Ch. App. 1899), 53 S. W. 740; North- western & P. H. Bank v. State, 18 Wash. 73; 50 Pac. 586; 42 L. R. A. 33, and note; Houston v. State, 98 Wis. 481; 74 N. W. Ill; 42 L. R. A. 39; un- der Rev. Stat. sec. 3200; Smith v. Reeves, 17S U. S. 436; 20 S. Ch. 919; II L. Ed. 1140, affg Smith v. Rackliffe (U. S. Sup. Cal.), 87 Fed. 964; 31 C. C. A. 328. When suit is not a suit against the state, see Donald v. Scott (U. S. C. C. D. C), 67 Fed. 854; City of Terre Haute v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (U. S. C. C. A. Ind.), 40 C. C. A. 117; 99 Fed. 838; Central Trust Co. v. Citizens - St. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. I). End. i. 80 Fed. 218; 29 Chic. L. News, 297; Cobb v. Clough (U. S. C. C. D. Minn.), 83 Fed. 604; Smyth v. Aims. 169 V. S. 466; 42 L. Ed. 819; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418; 30 Chic. L. News, 243; mod'd 171 U. S. 361; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 888. When action against state officer is suit 39 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. § 66. Moral obligations, duties and wrongs.— Legal obliga- tions should not be confounded with those sentiments which are independent of the law and rest merely on grounds of feeling or moral considerations. 5 For, as has been declared in a Massa- chusetts case, " It is very clear that there may be many moral wrongs for which there can be no legal remedy, and there may be legal torts in which the damage to individuals may be very great, and yet so remote, contingent or indefinite as to furnish no good ground of action." * Again, rights have been classified into natural, moral and legal, but a practical definition which may be applied with certainty is most difficult, if not impossible, to formulate. It is certain, however, that there exist many moral rights, claims or duties, for the nonperformance of which there can be no legal redress. " Many duties are by nature or by circumstances imposed upon human beings, which the state never attempts to enforce," while " by legal rights are intended those to which the state gives its sanction," which "is the sanction of remedies. So that a legal right may be said to be a claim which can be enforced by legal means against the persons or the com- munity whose duty it is to respect it. . . . There is no neces- sary identity or even relation of legal right and moral right . . . many moral claims, as we have seen, cannot be converted into legal demands." 37 It is also a maxim that ex nudo pacto non against the state, see Fitts v. Mc- Ghee, 172 IT. S. 516; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 269; 43 L. Ed. 535; 31 Chic. L. News, 207. When action against state offi- cer is not suit against the state, see Tindal v. Wesley, 107 U. S. 264; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770; 29 Chic. L. News, 337; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 420; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1047, 1062; 38 L. Ed. 1014, 1031; 4 Inters. Com. R. 560, 578; Yale Col- lege v. Sanger (U. S. C. C. D. Conn.), 62 Fed. 177. For illustration of suit where state strips herself of sover- eignty and acts in capacity of a pri- vate person, see Southern R. Co. v. North Carolina R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. N. C), 81 Fed. 595. MFormall v. Standard Oil Co. (Mich. 1901), 86 N. W. 946; 10 Am. 40 Neg. Rep. 402, 413, per Grant, J., quoting from Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25 Mich. 1. 36 Lamb v. Stone, 11 Pick, (Mass.) 527, 532, per Morton, J. See Roman Catholic Church v. Martin, 4 Rob. (La.) 62; Raudlette v. Judkins, 77 Me. 114; 52 Am. Rep. 747; Common- wealth v. McDuffy, 126 Mass. 469; Payne v. Western, etc., R. Co., 13 Lea (Tenn. ), 507; 49 Am. Rep. 666; McGuire v. Kiveland, 56 Vt. 62; Ohio, etc., R. Co. v. Kasson, 37 N. Y. 218, 224; 1 "Cyc." L. & P. 645. 37 1 Blackstone's Comm. (1 Cooley's Black. 4th ed.) * 122-* 124, note 2. See also 1 Wait's Act. & Def. (1877) p. 12 et seq. ; Edes v. Boardman, 58 N. H. 580, per Doe, C. J. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. §67 oritur actio, that is, that no cause of action arises from a bare promise, and oven though such gratuitous promise may consti- tute a mural obligation, no Legal responsibility is created, for a contract must, as a rule, be based upon some consideration in law other than a merely moral one in the ethical sense. 1 * § 67. Lawful acts. — It is a maxim of the law that one should enjoy his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another person — Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas*' — and the cases to which this maxim is applicable are very num- erous, and it is said that the exceptions are few. 40 In its appli- cation this maxim is not, however, intended to take away from an)- person the right to improve his own property in a lawful manner, but the law requires that when he shall attempt to do so he must use it with a due regard for the rights of other people and in every way, legally possible, he must avoid injury to those rights. If he goes beyond, he makes himself liable to respond to his neighbor in damages. 41 Again it is a general principle of law that a person is entitled to the reasonable exercise of a legal 38 Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed. 1874) 745-751, * 752 et seq. See as to moral obligations and exceptions to rule, Anson's Law of Contracts (8th ed. 1805), 89.* 75; 2 Blackstone's Comm. (1 Cooley's Black. 4th ed. ) * 445; 1 Wait's Act. & Def. (1877) 104; Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 527. " Nor is a mere moral obliga- tion in the ethical sense of the term, without any pecuniary benefit to the party or previous request, a sufficient consideration to support even an ex- press promise; unless where a legal obligation once existed, which is barred by positive statute or rule of law, such as the statute of limita- tions, or of bankruptcy, or the law of infancy, coverture or the like. 2 Greenl. on Ev. (10th ed.) sec. 107. As to distinction between "moral obligation" in the "broad, ethical sense," and when " used merely to denote those duties which would be enforced at law through the medium of an implied promise," see note, id. 89 Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed. 1874) 364. " The maxim that a man must so make use of his own property as not to injure his neigh bor is undoubtedly to be so limited in its application as not to restrain the owner of property from a pru- dent and reasonable exercise of his right of dominion. If in such an exercise of bis right, another sus- tains damage, it is damnum absque injuria." Gardner v. Heartt. 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 165, 168, per Harris. .1. 40 Hill v. Schneider. 13 App. Div. IN. Y.) 29!); 42 N. Y. Supp. 1; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 141, per Ramsey, .1. 41 Hill v. Schneider. 13 App. Div. (N. Y.) 299; 42 X. Y. Supp. 1: 1 Am. Nog. Rep. 141, per Rumsey, J., citing Morgan v. Bowes, 62 Hun (N. Y. ), 623; 17 N. V. Sup].. 22; 42 X. Y. St. R. 791; Booth v. Rome, W. & O. T. 41 §o7 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. right and is not answerable in damages therefor in the absence of negligence or malice. 4 '' So a man is entitled to do any lawful act upon his own land, and to lawfully use the same in the manner most advantageous to himself, provided he violates no duty owing to others or to the state, and that he is not guilty of negligence, recklessness or wantonness ; this includes the paramount right of others to the use and undisturbed possession of their own property, and by rights of others is understood generally their rights under the law. So the use of one's own, means a reason- able and ordinary use. This principle further extends to per- sons legally designated as such, and it includes municipal corporations, the state, etc. 43 R. Co., 140 N. Y. 267; 55 N. Y. St. R. 656; 35 N. E. 592, which rev'd 44 N. Y. St. R. 9; 17 N. Y. Supp. 336. ** Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. (N. Y.)92; Calkins v. Barger, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 424; Stuart v. Hawley, 22 Barb. (N. Y. ) 619; Livingston v. Adams, 8 Cow. (N. Y. ) 175. 43 "It may be stated, as a general proposition, that every man has the right to the natural use and enjoy- ment of his own property, and if whilst lawfully in such use and enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss occurs to his neighbor, it is damnum absque injuria, for the rightful use of one's own land may cause damage to another, without any legal wrong." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. St. 126, 146; 6 Atl. 453; 57 Am. Rep. 445, per Clark, J. " The maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas is not of universal application; for as a gen- eral rule, a man who exercises proper care and skill may do what he will with his own property. He may not, however, under color of enjoying his own, set up a nuisance which de- prives another of the enjoyment of his property . . . There is another class of cases . . . where a man 42 must answer for the consequences of an act lawful in itself, because it was done in so negligent or unskillful a manner as to cause an injury to an- other ... But a man may do many things under a lawful authority, or in his own land, which may result in an injury to the property of others without being answerable for the consequences. Indeed, an act done under lawful authority, if done in a proper manner, can never subject the party to an action, whatever conse- quences may follow: nor will a man be answerable for the consequences of enjoying his own property in the way such property is usually en- joyed, unless an injury has resulted to another from the want of proper care or skill on his part." Radcliff v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. (Comstock) 195, 198-200; 53 Am. Dec. 357n, per Brouson, Ch. J. See also O'Leary v. Brooks Elevator Co., 7 N. D. 554; 75 N. W. 919; 41 L. R. A. 677; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 451, 457. " The defendant did a lawful act on his own premises and we cannot hold him responsible for injurious conse- quences that may have arisen by reason of it, unless it was so done as to constitute actionable negligence," but an act may be lawful but so neg- GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF UAUILITY. §08 § 68. Volenti non fit injuria. — It is a legal maxim that that to which a person as.sen.ts is not esteemed in law an injury, for ligently done that an injury immedi- ately follows to the property or person of another and so render him liable. How hind v. Vincent, lOMetC. ( Mass. j .",71, 373, 374 ; 4;! Am. Dee. 442, per Hubbard, .1. In this case the in- jury was to a person by falling into an excavation made by one on his own land near to a public street. Where the vibrations from the work- ing of the engines of an electric light company rendered the plaintiffs house almost uninhabitable and cre- ated a nuisance, even though no actual, structural injury was done, the right to an injunction and to have damages assessed exists, al- though no statutory compensation was provided for injuries of such character, and the company had no compulsory power to take lands. Hopkin v. Hamilton Elec. L. & C. Co., 2 Ont. L. R. 240. The plaintiff had bad no opportunity of objecting to the location of defendant's works. The company was incorporated under Ont. Cos. Act, K. S. Ont. 1897, ch. 200. See generally as to the maxim and as to the principles stated in the text and the modifica- tions thereof, Weil v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co., 04 Ark. 535; 43 S. W. 907: 9 Am. & Eug. R Cas. N. S. 721. Briscoe v. Alfrey, 01 Ark. 190; 32 S. W. 505; 30 L. R. A. 007; The Mal- iug; The S. A. McCaulley (U. S. D. C. D. CaL), 110 Fed. 227: 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 357, 307, per Bradford, Dist. J.; Joseph v. Ager, 108 Cal, 517; 41 Pac. 422; Suffolk <;. M. A: M. Co. v. San Miguel Con. M. A M. Co., 9 Colo. App. 407; 48 Pac. 828; Ocker- hausen v. Tyson, 71 Conn. 31; 40 Atl. 104; Whitney v. Bartholomew, 21 Conn. 213; Bailey v. Philadelphia, etc., K. Co., 4 Hair. (Del.) 389; 44 Am. Dec. 593; Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cliue, 37 Fla. 586; 20 So. 780; 33 L. R. A. 376; smith v. Clarke Hardware Co., 100 Ga. 10:;: 28 S. E. 73; 39 L. R. A. 007; Arave v. Idaho Canal Co. (Id.), 40 Pac. L024; Pepin v. McMahon, 154 111. 141; :;;• X. K. 184; 27 L. U. A. 286, aff'g 53 111. App. 1S9; Stumps v. Kelly, 22 111. 140; Durham v. Musselman, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 90; IS Am. Dee. 133; Humpton v. Unterkircher, 97 Iowa, 509; 00 X. W. 770; Herr v. Central Ky. L. Asy., 17 Ky. L. Rep. 320; 30 S. W. '.»71 ; 41 Cent. L. J. 37; 28 L. R. A. 394; Scott v. Bay, 3 Md. 431; Gil- dersleeve v. Hammond, 100 Mich. 431 ; ii7 N. W. 519; 3 Det. L. N. 117; 43 Cent. L. J. 97; 33 L. R. A. 46; Cabill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324; 10 Am. Rep. 1S4; McCormick v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co.. 57 Mo. 533; .Jacob- son v. Van Boening, 48 Neb. 80; 66 X. W. 993; 58 Am. St. Rep. 084: 32 L. R. A. 229; Union Mill A M. Co. v. Daughberg (U. S. C. C. D. Nev. ), 81 Fed. 73; State v. Griffin, 09 X. H. 1 ; 39 Atl. 200: 41 L. R. A. 177: Ladd v. Granite State Brick Co. (N. H.), 37 Atl. 1041; Sterling Iron & Z. Co. v. Sparks Mfg. Co. i X. J.), 38 Atl. 426; Costigan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 54 X J. L. 2:53; 2:1 At!. 810; Forbell v. New York, 47 App. Div. i X. V. | 371; X. V. Supp. 1005: aff'd 104 X. Y. 522; 58 X. E. 644: Smith v. Brooklyn. IS App. Div. (X. Y.)340; Jo X. Y. Supp. 141; Xewell v. Wool- folk. 91 Hun iX. Y.l. 211: 71 X. Y. Si. i;. 129; 30 N. Y.Supp. 327; Mairs v. Manhattan Real Est. Assoc, 80 V Y. 498; 15 J. & S. t X. Y.) 31; Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 \. Y. 39; Victory v. Baker, 07 N. Y. 300; Bellinger v. New York C. R. Co., 23 X. Y. 42; Van Pelt v. McGraw, 4 N. Y. 110; Pick- 43 §68 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. if a man consents to the act which occasions his loss, he can maintain no action for the wrong committed, and this maxim has been applied to the doctrine of contributory negligence. 44 So in a case which has been the subject of much discussion, it is said that " the maxim, volenti non fit injuria, is applicable in actions for negligence, as in other cases. The doctrine of the assumption of risk is merely a formal statement of this maxim in its application to concrete cases." m And where a person went upon the premises of a railroad company to witness a conflagra- tion upon its grounds, in the face of an obvious danger of ex- ard v. Collins, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 444; Farrand v. Marshall, 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 400 ; Gardner v. Heartt, 2 Barb. (N. Y.)l(55; Mark v. Hudson R. B. Co., 50 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 108, aff'd 103 N. Y. 29; Norton v. North Caro- lina R. Co., 122 N. C. 910; 29 S. E. 880; Staton v. Norfolk & C. C. R. Co., Ill N. C. 278; 16 S. E. 181; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 686; Robertson v. Youghiogheny Riv. C. Co., 172 Pa. 566; 27 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 67; 33 Atl. 706; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. San- derson, 113 Pa. St. 126; 6 Atl. 453; Woodring v. Forks Twp., 28 Pa. St. 355; 70 Am. Dec. 134; Troth v. Wills, 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 1; 42 W. N. C. 504 ; Taylor v. Granger, 19 R. I. 410; 37 Atl. 13; Frost v. Berkely Phos. Co., 42 S. C. 402; 20 S. E. 280; 26 L. R. A. 693; McLauchlin v. Charlotte, etc., R. Co., 5 Rich. (S. C.) 583; Cumber- land Teleph. & Tel. Co. v. United Elec. R. Co., 93 Tenn. 492; 29 S. W. 104; 27 L. R. A. 236; 10 Am. R. & Corp. Rep. 549; Payne v. Western, etc., R. Co., 13 Lea (Tenn.), 507; 49 Am. Rep. 666; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 1; 44 S. W. 936; People v. Burtlesen, 14 Utah, 258; 47 Pac. 87; Willett v. St. Albans, 69 Vt. 330; 38 Atl. 72; State v. Harrington, 68 Vt. 622; 35 Atl. 515; 34 L. R. A. 100; Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; South Royal ton Bk. v. Suffolk Bk., 27 Vt. 505; Ka- 44 rasek v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419; 61 Pac. 33; Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. 169; 41 L. Ed. 118; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1002; 75 Off. Gaz. 1703; Montana Co. v. Gehring ( U. S. C. C. A. 9th C), 44 U. S. App. 629; 75 Fed. 384; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Fre- mont (U. S. C. C. A. 6th C.)i 34 C. C. A. 625; 92 Fed. 721, rev'g 5 Ohio L. R. 140; West Cumberland Iron, etc., Co. v. Kenyon, 11 Ch. D. 782, rev'g 6 Ch. D. 773; Rex v. Sewer Commrs.,8 B. & C. 355; Deane v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 490, 529; St. John Young Men's C. A. v. Hutchison, 18 N. B. 523. See also note, 9 L. R. A. 910; 1 "Cyc." L. & P. 647 et seq. and note, id., " Strictures upon common law maxim." See also sees, post, herein, " Damnun absque injuria." 44 Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed. 1874) 267, citing Gould v. Oliver, 4 B. N. C. 142 (33 E. C. L. R.), per Tindal, J. ; Haddon v. Ayres, 1 E. & E. 148 ( 102 E. C. L. R. ) ; Byam v. Bul- lard, 1 Curt. (U. S.) 101, per Curtis, J.; Caswell v. Worth, 6 E. & B. 849 (85 E. C. L. R.); Senior v. Ward, 1 E. & E. 385, 393 (102 E. C. L. R.). 45 Davis v. Forbes, 171 Mass. 548; 51 N. E. 20; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 289, 298, per Knowles, J., in dissenting opinion. See 32 Am. L. Rev. 57. See as to assumption of risk, 1 Bailey's Pers. Inj., Master & Ser- vant (ed. 1897), sec. 455 et seq. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. plosion, it was decided that he assumed the risks of the situa- tion. " He went without inducement or invitation, and without legal right, and assumed the perils of the situation. He vol- untarily and negligently exposed his person to danger, — 'Vo- lenti non fit injuria/ The railway company owed him no active duty —only the duty to abstain, during his presence on the premises, from positive, wrongful act which might result in an injury to him." Mi The cases, however, are numerous wherein this maxim is involved, and as it is not the purpose of this treatise to consider other than general principles of liability underlying the law of damages, we shall only cite certain decisions wherein the rule volenti non fit injuria has been applied. 17 « Cleveland, C. C. * St. L. R. Co. v. Ballentine (U. S. C. C. A. 7th c. i, 56 U. S. App. 266; 28 C. C. A. 572; 84 Fed. 935; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 735, 739, per Jenkins, Cir. J. 47 Bridges v. Tennessee Coal I. & R. Co., 109 Ala. 287; 19 So. 495; Churchill v. Baumann, 95 Cal. 541; 10 Pac. 770; Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 111. 301; 40 N. E. 362; Pope v. Lake Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Ind. I, 51 Fed. 769; 40 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 646; Anderson Foundry it M. Works v. Meyer, 15 Ind. App. 385; 44 N. E. 193; Snyder v. Lexington, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1562; 49 S. W. 765; Board of Ad mis. v. McKowen, 48 La. Ann. 251; 19 So. 328, 553; Kan- sas City, S. it G. R. Co. v. Roberts, 9 La. Ann. 859; 21 So. 630; Mundle v. Hill Mfg. Co., m Me. 400; 30 Atl. 16; O'Maley v. South Boston (las- light Co., 158 Mass. 135; 32 N. E. 1119; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Le Blane, 74 Miss. 626; 21 So. 748; Coxwell v. Prince (Miss.), 19 So. 237; Baker v. Barber Asphalt P. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Mo.), 92 Fed. 117; Aufdenberg v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 132 Mo. 565; 34 S. W. 485; :'. Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 323; Schwartz- schild * S. Co. v. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., 76 Mo. App. 623; 1 Mo. A. Repr. 588; Wright v. Wright I X. J.), 43 Atl. 447; Knisley v. Pratt, 148 N. Y. 372; 42 N. E. 986; 32 L. K. A. 367; rev'g 75 Hun (N. Y.), 32:'.; ::i Abb. N. C. (N. V.I 289; 58 N. V. St. R. 213; 26 N. Y. Supp. 1010; Hagen- aers v. Herbsi, 30 App. Div. (N. Y.) 546; 52 X. Y. Supp. 360; Rittenhouse v. Wilmington St. R. Co., 120 X. C. 544; 26 X. E. 922; Scarlett v. Xor- wood, 115 X. C. 284; 20 S. E. 459; Allegheny Co. v. Grier, 179 Pa. 639; 27 Pitts. L. J. X. S. 427; 36 Atl. 353; Houseman v. Grossman, 177 Pa. 453: 39 W. X. C. 276; 35 Atl. 736; Man- ford v. McVeigh, 92 Va. 446; 23 S. E. 857; 1 Va. Law Reg. 734; Wagner v. Xational L. Ins. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 6th C), 61 U. S. App. 691; 33 C. C. A. 121; 90 Fed. 395; King- man & Co. v. Stoddard (I'. S. C. C. A. 7th C), 57 U. S. Apr. :',7'.': 20 C. C. A. 413; 85 Fed. 740: West v. Southern P. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C.),56 U. S. App. 32:'.: 29 C. C. A. 219; 85 Fed. 392; Cleveland. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Ballentine (U. S. C. C. A. 7th C. ), 56 U. S. App. 266; 28 C. C. A. 572: M Fed. '.<:'>•">: Carolan v. Southern P. R. Co. (U.S. C. C.X. D. Cal.), 84 Fed. 84; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson (U. S. C. C. A. 9th C), 44 U. S. A. 1; 16 C. C. 45 §69 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. § 69. Accident or casualty. — An accident or casualty which results from the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner and which could not by the exercise of ordinary human care or fore- sight have been foreseen or prevented, constitutes as a rule no ground of liability, although it has also been determined that there must be an extraordinary degree of care to have pre- vented the accident. These distinctions, however, as to the de- gree of care imposed, ought to depend upon the circumstances, having in view the use of the thing or property and its danger- ous or harmless character. 18 Thus one may become responsible for the results of an accidental explosion where he has knowl- edge of the dangerous character of the explosives, and by reason thereof his acts are held to be reckless and careless.' 9 But where servants of the defendant opened a box of nitroglycerine and A. 317; 69 Fed. 559; New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Thomas ( U. S. C. C. A. 5th C), 60 Fed. 379; Williams v. Birmingham. B. & M. Co., 68 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 918 (C. A. 1899), 2 Q. B. 338; Smith v. Baker (H. of L. 1891), L. K. 1 App. Cas. 325; Thrussell v. Handyside (Q. B. D. 1888), L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 359; Yarmouth v. France, 19 Q. B. D. 647 L. R; Pritchett v. Poole (Q. B.), 76 Law T. Rep. 472; Canada A. R. Co. v. Hurdman, 25 Can. S. C. 205; Price v. Roy, 29 Can. S. C. 494, rev'g > n P art Rep. Jud. Queb. 8 B. R. 170. 48 Where plaintiff and his helper, a fellow-servant, were working to- gether and the plaintiff sustained a personal injury. which was the result of a mere accident, it was held error to refuse to charge that for such an accident there could be no recovery. Webster Mfg. Co. v. Nisbett, 87 111. App. 551. Where an accident to an employee could not have been fore- seen by the master, the latter is not liable. Independent Tug Line v. Ja- cobson, 84 111. App. 684. An injury occasioned by a slight inequality in a sidewalk, which is not defective, and which is the result of a simple 46 accident, may not be the ground of an action. Haggerty v. City of Lew- iston (Me. 1901), 50 Atl. 55; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 394. Where bacteria, ger- minated from animal matter in a beef packing house, lodged in an em- ployee's eye and destroyed his sight, the master was held not liable. -Hysell v. Swift & Co., 78 Mo. App. 39; 2 Mo. App. Repr. 124. But the injury cannot be attributed to inevitable accident, as in case of a collision between vessels where there was nothing in the action of the elements which contributed to pro- duce the same. The Chicago (U. S. C. C. A. N. Y.), 40 C. C. A. 680; 100 Fed. 999, aff ' d 71 Fed. 537. If ac- cident could not have been foreseen by the exercise of ordinary human care and foresight, no action lies. Harvey v. Dunlop, Lalor (N. Y. ), 193. That an extraordinary degree of care is required, see Vincent v. Stein- hauer, 7 Vt. 62 ; 29 Am. Dec. 45. For definition of "accident," "acci- dental" see 3 Joyce on Ins. (ed. 1897) sec. 2863, note. See further sec. 70 post, herein. 49 Evans v. Hoggart (Kan. App. 1899), 59 Pac. 381. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. § 70 it exploded, injuring certain person, including the plaintiffs, and defendant had no knowledge of or reason to suspect the dangerous character of the contents of said box, it was decided that they were not liable for the accident; " and it was deter- mined in the same case that the measure of care against acci- dents which one must take to avoid responsibility is that which a person of ordinary prudence and caution would use if his own interests were to be affected and the whole risk were his own. Again, while a person is not generally liable for damages for an injury, which is the result of an accident, yet if one has threat- ened another with a loaded gun in a controversy about a dis- puted boundary and injury results by the discharge of the gun, either by reason of the careless handling and without intention or on purpose, the injured one would be entitled to recover at least compensatory damages. 51 § 70. Act of God — Inevitable accident. — It is a constantly asserted maxim that the act of God is so treated in law as to affect no one injuriously, — actus Dei nemini facit injuriam. The act of God signifies any inevitable accident occurring without the intervention of man.® Again, accidents are divided into those which occur without any human agency and those which are the result thereof. 53 This term has been variously defined, but the principal elements of the definitions are that the thing which happens is inevitable, and that which man's foresight, industry or care could not have prevented, something independent of and 60 The Nitro Glycerine Case, 15 Wall. (U. S.)524. 51 James v. Hayes (Kan. 1901), 65 Pac. 241; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 5G, 58. " Where one is engaged in a lawful act, an act not mischievous, rash, reckless or foolish, or naturally liable to result in injury to others, he is not responsible for damages due to unavoidable accident or casualty. 1 " Cyc." L. & P. 652, citing Iiizell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Morris v. Piatt, 32 Conn. 75; Durham v. Musselman, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 96; 18 Am. Dec 183; Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 292, and other decisions. English Fa,tal Accidents Acts 1846, 1864. do not apply for benefit of aliens abroad. Adam v. British * F. S. Co. (1898), 2 Q. B. 430: 67 L. J. Q, B. N. S. 844. Party not liable for accident, etc., if without fault under La. Rev. Civ. Code, art. 2754 : New Orleans A- N. E. R. Co. v. McEwen, 49 La. Ann. 1184; 2 So. 675; 38 L. R. A. 134; 7 Am A- Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 742. M Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed. 1874) 229. 68 3 Joyce on Ins. (ed. 1897) sec. 2863, note, p. 2811, where defini- tions of " accident " are considered. 47 8 70 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. opposed to the act of man. A distinction has also been made be- tween " act of God " and inevitable accident,"' 1 and there must be no negligence or want of skill, diligence or judgment, for in an act of God no amount of skill, judgment or wisdom can pre- vent the damage or injury. 55 So it is declared that the injury must not be such as could have been prevented by human fore- sight, care or skill, but must have been exclusively occasioned by natural causes. Nor in case of carriers must the property have been unnecessarily exposed to the destructive force, nor have been brought in contact therewith through any previous negligence or act of the carrier, which his foresight or industry and skill could have prevented, as in case of unnecessary and negligent delay. 30 Thus a landslide in a railway cut, caused bw an ordi- nary fall of rain, is not an " act of God " which exempts a rail- way company from liability for injuries to passengers caused thereby, 57 and the sickness of a tenant is not an " act of God " excusing his legal obligations under a lease. 53 Nor is a heavy dew which delays a railway train an " act of God." 59 But fire may be, 60 or a sudden snowstorm," 1 or storms of such unusual violence as to surprise cautious and reasonable men, 02 or a sudden 54 Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed. 1874)230; 1 "Cyc." of L. & P. 758 4 where numerous cases are cited with their application to the various sub- jects. Anderson's Diet, of L. (1893) 23. See also Anson ou Contracts (8th ed.), top. pp. 339, 340; Desty's Shi pp. & Admr. (ed. 1879) sees. 250. 259; Elliott on Rds. (ed. 1897) sees. 941, 1455-1457, 1481, 1534, 1651, 1695 ; Hutchinson on Carriers (2d ed. ), sees. 174-178 et seq. ; 1 Shearman & Redf. on Neg. (5th ed. ) sees. 16. 31); Thomas on Neg. (ed. 1895) 129- 134; notes, 11 L. R. A. 615; 30 id. 820; notes, 97 Am. Dec. 408-411; 46 id. 592. As to act of God or accident being an excuse for nonpayment of premium of insurance, see 2 Joyce on Ins. (ed. 1897) sec. 135. 55 Smith v. North American Tr. Co., 20 Wash. 580 ; 56 Pac. 372 ; 44 L. R. A. 557; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 738, 740. 48 au Wald v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. It. Co., 162 111. 545; 44 N. E. 888; 43 Cent. L. J. 423; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 70; 35 L. R. A. 356. 57 Gleeson v. Virginia Midland R. Co., 140 U. S. 435. See Southwestern Tel. & T. Co. v. Robinson, 50 Fed. 813. 58 Mason v. Wierengo, 113 Mich. 151; 71 N. W. 489; 4 Det. L. N. 250. 59 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Truskett (Ind. T. 1899), 53 S. W. 444. 60 Farley v. Lavary (Ky. 1900), 54 S. W. 840. But see Spencer v. Mur- phy, 6 111. App. 453; 41 Pac. 841. 61 Cunningham v. Wabash R. Co., 79 Mo. App. 524; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 465. 62 Lisoubee v. Monroe Irrig. Co., 18 Utah, 343; 54 Pac. 1009. But see Grant v. Armour (C. P.), 25 Ont. 7. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. 5 71 and severe whirlwind, the like of which had never before oc- curred in that locality. 63 Again it is not necessary, in order to escape liability for nonperformance occasioned by an act of God, to provide against such a contingency," and if a contract pro- vides for its fulfillment, "wind, tide and other acts of God per- mitting," nevertheless, if such act of God does not prevent the execution of such contract by other reasonable and available means, performance is not excused thereby. 1 '"' § 71. Damnum absque injuria— Generally. — This doctrine is extensive in its application. It lies in reality at the basis of liability to the extent that damage without an injury precludes liability ; no right has been invaded in law and there is no rem- edy, and thus, even though a loss or damage has actually been sustained for the act occasioning the same, is neither unjust nor illegal. 88 Thus the maxim applies to the use of streets by two electric companies, since the one necessarily inflicts some inci- dental damage upon the other, 67 and where there is a diversion of business by the laying of tracks of a rival company in the street, the maxim is applicable. 68 It has also been applied to the case « 3 Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Comp- ton (Tex. Civ. App.), 38 S. W. 220. See as to Hood, Smith v. Western R. Co. of Ala., 91 Ala. 455; 11 L. R. A. 619; Winters v. State (Id.), 47 Pac. 855; Wald v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 162 111. 545; 44 N. E. 888; 43 Cent. L. J. 423; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 70; 35 L. R. A. 356; Il- linois C. R. Co. v. Heisner, 45 111. App. 143; Long v. Pennsylvania R. Co.. 147 Pa. 343; 14 L. R. A. 341; Satterlee v. United States, 30 Ct. CI. 31. As to rights of riparian pro- prietor where water course diverted by act of God, sec Wholey v. Cald- well, 108 Cal. 95; 41 Pac.31; 49 Am. St. Rep. 64; 30 L. R. A. 820. 64 So held in Gleason v. United States, 33 Ct. CI. 65. See Allen v. Quann, SO 111. App. 547. But ex- amine Mississippi Logging Co. v. Robson (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C), 16 C. C. A. 400; 32 U. S. A. 520; 69 Fed. 773. 65 Adams v. Ames, 19 Wash. 125; 53 Pac. 54(5. See Mississippi Logging Co. v. Robson (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C), 16 C. C. A. 400; 32 U. S. App. 520; 69 Fed. 773. 66 See Kennet & A. X. Co. v. With- erington, 18 Q. B. 531; Backhouse v. Bononie, 9 II. L. Cas. 503; Rogers v. Dutt, 13 Moore P. C. C. 209. 237, 241 ; Blaymire v. Ilealey, 6 Mees. & W. 55. See sec. 76, herein. f ' 7 Birmingham Tract. Co. v. South- ern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co.. 119 Ala. 114; 24 So. 731. See Consolidated Tract. Co. v. South Orange & M. Tract. Co., 36 N". J. Eq. 569; 40 Atl. 15, cited in Joyce on Electric Law (ed. 1900), sec. 405, and see id. sees. 295-321. 68 Grand Ave. K. Co. v. Citizens R. Co., 148 Mo. 665; 50 S. W. 305. 49 8 71 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. of a grade crossing of a railroad and electric road ; m to conse- quential damages caused to one tract of land by taking another for public purposes ; TO to the building of railroad bridges over streets and liability to the fee-owner; 71 to electric street rail- roads and telephone companies and injury to business of the one by electric currents ; 7i to riparian owners' rights ; ra to the ob- struction of a public street by an elevated railway structure ; T4 to lateral support ; * and in numerous other cases. 76 69 New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Bridgeport Tract. Co., 65 Conn. 416; 32 Atl. 953; 29 L. R. A. 367, cited in Joyce on Electric Law (ed. 1900), sees. 348, 409, 414, as to the rights of the different parties in such case. ™Kuhl v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 101 Wis. 42; 77 N. W. 15:,. "i Jones v. Erie & W. V. R. Co., 151 Pa. St. 30; 25 Atl. 134; 31 W. N. C. 1; 17 L. R. A. 758: 31 Am. St. Rep. 722; 46 Alb. L. J. 467; 6 Am. R. & Corp. Rep. 563. 72 Hudson R. Teleph. Co. v. Water- vliet T. & R. Co., 61 Hun (N. Y.), 140; 21 C. P. 204; 39 N. Y. St. Rep. 952; 15 N. Y. Supp. 752; 10 Ry.*& Corp. L. J. 364, case rev'd 135 N. Y. 393; 48 N. Y. St. R. 417; 32 N. E. 148. See citations of this case in Joyce on Elect. Law (ed. 1900), where it is considered fully. 73 Mesnager v. Englehardt, 108 Cal. 68; 41 Pac. 20. 7 * Lake St. El. Ry. Co. v. Brooks, 90 111. App. 173. 75 Gildersleeve v. Hammond, 109 Mich. 431; 67 N. W. 519; 3 Del. L.N. 117; 43 Cent. L. J. 97; 33 L. R. A. 46. 76 Graham v. Reno (Colo. App.), 38 Pac. 835, a case of invalid levy of attachment. Selden v. Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558; 10 So. 457; 14 L. R. A. 370, eminent domain; change of grade of street and right of ingress, egress of abutting owner. Albany v. Sikes, 94 Ga. 30; 26 L. R. A. 653, maxim ap- 50 plicable to property damaged by pros- ecution of public work before adop- tion of present constitution of state. Burrows v. Sycamore, 150 111. 588; 37 N. E. 1096; 25 L. R. A. 535, rev'g 49 111. App. 590, erection of stand- pipe in city street. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Durke, 148 111. 226; 35 N. E. 750; 57 Am. &.Eng. R. Cas. 577; Barnard v. Shirley, 151 Ind. 160; 47 N. E. 671; 41 L. R. A. 737, a case of sinking an artisian well on one's own land and flowing into another stream on other land. Hirth v. Indianapolis, 18 Ind. App. 673; 48 N. E. 876, change of street grade, Kinney v. Kinney,* 104 Iowa, 703; 74 N. W. 688; 40 L. R. A. 626, not liable for natural growth of partition hedge. Clemens v. Speed, 93 Ky. 284; 19 S. W. 660; 19 L. R. A. 240, a case of party walls and injury to building; no recovery. Kinnard v. Standard Oil Co., 11 Ky. L. Rep. 692; 12 S. W. 937; 7 L. R. A. 451; 41 Alb. L. J. 227; 30 Cent. L. J. 267, springs of water were injured by percolating oil and recovery had. Graham v. St. Charles St. R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 214; 16 So. 806; 27 L. B. A. 416, injury to plaintiff's business by influencing others to cease relations. Shaufelter v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 483; 31 Atl. 439; 27 L. R. A. 648, delay or failivre to purchase or condemn land for courthouse site gives no right of action. Lincoln v. Com., 164 Mass. 368; 41 N. E. 489, land GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. §72 § 72. Same subject — Application of doctrine continued.— Damage done to a neighbor's house by the jarring of the ground or concussion of the air, due to blasting carefully done upon adjoining premises, is a case of damnum absque injuria, 71 and if, in the legitimate and proper use of a machine or appliance which is a necessary means to a lawful end, or the performance of a duty imposed by law, such as a steam roller to keep streets in repair, an injury is occasioned to one of the public, and there is reasonable notice to the public of such use, such injury is damnum absque injuria." So a technical breach of trust may taken for sewer. Beck v. Railway T. P. U., 118 Mich. -107; 77 X. W. 13; 5 Det. L. X. 599; 42 L. R. A. 407, may interfere with employer's busi- ness by peaceable means without coercion but may not boycott. Davis v. Shaefer (TJ. S. C. C. W. U. Mo. ), 50 Fed. 764; Jacobson v. Van Boen- ing, 48 Neb. 80; (It; X. W. 993; 32 L. I;. A. 229, a case of surface waters. Andrews v. Bay Creek R. Co., 00 X. J. L. 010; 36 Atl. 826, expenses of litigation incident to condemnation proceedings not recoverable. New York Health Dept. v. Trinity Church, 14.", X. Y. 32; 64 X. V. St. R. 507, 512; 39 X. E. 833; 27 L. K. A. 710, police regulations regulating improvement or use of property for public health and benelit. Taylor v. Xew York 6 H. R. Co., 27 App. Div. (X. ST.) 190; 50 X. Y. Supp. 697, a case of eminent domain, railroads and use of street. Reining v. New York, L. & W. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 157; 40 X. V. St. R. 392. 401; 28 N. E. 640; 14 L. R. A. 133; 10 Hy. & Corp. L. .1. 462 (40 N. Y. St. R. 401. affirms 27 X. Y. St. R. 69; 7 X. Y. Supp. 516); a case of railroads and change of grade and appropriation of street. Smawley v. Rutherford Co., 122 X. C. 607; 29 S. E. 904, constitutional law; minorities must submit to a majority, and there is no wrong done. Columbus & H. C. & 1. Co. v. Tucker, 48 Ohio St. 41; 26 N. E. 630; 25 Ohio L. J. 105; 12 I.. R. A. :.77; 43 Alb. L. J. 289, a case of pol- lution of water and riparian i Henderson v. Phila. & R. R. Co., 1 14 Pa. St. 461; 28W. X. C. 479; 22 Ail. 851; 44 Alb. L. J. 47!); 4S Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 16, setting tires by sparks from locomotive engine, Paris Mountain \V. Co. v. Green ville, 53 S. C. 82; 30 S. E. 699, alter- ation of streets: statutory remedy is nol within maxim. Chattanooga v. Xeely, 97 Tenn. 527; 37 S. W. 281, alteration of streets. Wootters v. Crockett, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 474; 33 S. W. 391, alteration of highways. Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219; 35 AH. 53; 33 1>. R. A. 225; 4:1 Cent. I.. .(. 222, no liability for causing ser- vant's discharge. Hume Bldg. & C. Co. v. Roanoke. 91 Ya. 52; 20 S. E. 895; 27 L. R. A. 551. change .>f street grade; no damage to abutters. See further Meyer v. Richmond. 172 I". S. 582; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106; Chi- cago, B. & Q. R. <',,. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513; 42 L. Ed. 948. 77 Hennerv. Atlantic Dredging Co.. 134 V V. 156; 45 X. V. St. R. 774: 31 X. E. 328; and see note. 10 Am. Neg. Kep. 94 et seq. as to blasting, etc. See sec. 67. ante, herein. 7 * District of Columbia v. Monlton (U. S. Supr. Ct. 1901 i. 21 Sup. Ct. 51 §72 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. come within the doctrine, 79 and it includes injuries resulting from the frightening of horses by the sight of moving cars, trains or locomotives, or the usual noises and incidents of their ordinary operation.* So acts lawful in themselves, even though done with malicious motives, are covered, 81 and what the law authorizes to be done cannot be considered either illegal or wrongful. So damage or loss resulting from the making with proper care and prudence of a public improvement pur- suant to law is damnum absque injuria. But contractors for such an improvement to avoid liability for resultant damage must, as far as practicable, employ reasonably safe means and methods. The doctrine of damnum absque injuria is wholly inapplicable where loss results to third persons from the negligent employ- ment of unsafe methods unnecessary to the conduct of the work.^ Again one may, where he uses the legal care required, lawfully sink the foundation of his house helow that of adjacent owners,** and he may in certain cases obstruct his neighbor's lights or prospect, 84 or exercise his lawful rights under legislative au- thority. 85 So the value of property in a building lost through its destruction to prevent the spreading of a conflagration could not be recovered at the common law in an action against the city, since the only remedy was by an assessment under the statute.'* 840; 10 Am. Neg. Kep. 220. 222. rev'g 15 App. D. C. 363, per Mr. Jus- tice White, citing Lane v. Lewiston. 91 Me. 292, 294; 39 Atl. 999; Morton v. Frankfort. 55 Me. 46; Cairncross v. Pewaukee, 78 Wis. 66; 47 N. W. 13, commenting upon and explaining Hughes v. Fond du Lac. 73 Wis. 380; 41 N. W. 407. w Atkins v. Gamble, 42 Cal. 86; 10 Am. Rep. 282. so Dewey v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 99 Wis. 455; 75 N. W. 74; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 275; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 92. 81 Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler, 75 Pa. St. 467. 82 The Maling; The S. A. Mc- Caulley (U. S. D. C. Del.), 110 Fed. 227; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 357, 367, per Bradford, Dist. J., collision of steamer with dredge employed by United States government. 83 Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 92. See also Stansell v. Jollard, Selw. N. P. 435; Brown v. Robins, 4 H. & N. 186. 84 Re Penny, 7 E. & B. 660, 671. 8a Morris, etc., R. Co. v. Newark, 10 N. J. Eq. 352. See sec. 67, ante, herein. 86 Russell v. New York, 2 Denio (N. Y. ), 461. See also Struve v. Droge, 62 How. Pr. (N. Y. ) 233; 10 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 142; People v. Buffalo, 76 N. Y. 558. But see New York v. Stone, 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 139; New York v. Lloyd, 17 Wend. (N. Y.)285; 18 id. 126. As to tires set by a railway locomotive without negligence, being no ground of ac- tion, see Gaudy v. Railroad. 30 Iowa, 52 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. ';; Again in admiralty, where parties Litigate and there is probable ground for the suit or defense, and the proceedings are in the ordinary course to vindicate a supposed legal title, and there is no pretense to say that the suit was conducted in a malicious or oppressive manner, the court considers the only compensation to which the party is entitled is costs and expenses, and if he has suffered any loss beyond that it is damnum absque injuria. s ~ Another instance is that of opening a street by reason of which the landowner may sustain a heavy loss for which no compen- sation in the law may be had within the doctrine here being dis- cussed. 88 But damnum absque injuria does not apply to the contract of sale/' Nor in connection with the use by the owner of his land is it applicable to the damming of the waters of a stream so as to set them back upon the lands of another and so overflowing them. 30 But one has the right to offer property for sale and to fix the price therefor, since it is an incident to ownership, and it cannot be construed into an actionable wrong by an averment that such offer was made with the intention of depreciating the market value of another's property, and if a loss is suffered by a third person by such Lawful exercise of said right, it constitutes damnum absque injuria."' § 73. I)e minimis non curat lex. — This maxim relates to matters of such trifling importance that no action Lies therefor.® It applies where no permanent right is involved and the action would only entitle plaintiff to recover nominal damages with- out costs; 113 to slight imperfections in the performance of a con- tract; 91 to a reservation of a small excess of interest above the 420, and cases considered under this section, post, herein. 87 Canter v. American Ins. Co.. :'. Pet. (U. S.) 307. 88 Radcliff v. Mayor. 4 Comst. (4 N. Y.) 195, 20:), 206, and numerous citations of this case in Silvernail's New York citations. 89 Irwin v. Askew, 74 Ga. 581. 90 Poloney v. Farrow, 91 Bun (N. Y.), 82; 71 N. Y. St. R. 100; 36 N. Y. Supp. 164. See 4 Thompson on Corp. sec. 5432; Kentucky Lum- ber Co. v. Miracle. 101 Ky. 364; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 508; 41 S. W. 25; Mon- roe v. Connecticut River L. Co. (N. II. |. 39 Atl. 1019. See sec. 76, herein. 91 Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker D. G. Co. (U. S. C. C. \. Mo.), 44 C. C. A. 426; 10:, Fed. 163. M Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed.)* 143. See sec. 76. herein. '" Kcnvoii v. Western l"n. Teleg. Co.. 100 Cal. 4.j4 ; 35 Pac. 7.'.. 94 Franklin v. Sohultz, 23 Mont. 53 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. regular rate; 95 to an unimportant irregularity in posting notice of a foreclosure sale; 96 to an appeal where the damages are slight; and a common illustration is the right of riparian owners to the use of waters of a stream, for a right of action does not necessarily arise to the proprietor, below or above, where there has been a reasonable use thereof by the other owners, and the water has not thereby been rendered useless, or materially affected in its flow, or otherwise. 95 But even though the damage is small to the right of a mill-owner by the acts of another on the same stream, it is decided that an action will lie ; * and although damage done to personal property is slight, yet, if it is capable of estimation, there can be a recovery.™ Nor does the maxim apply to the positive and wrongful invasion of another's property, even though the actual injury is not great. 1 165 ; 57 Pac. 1037 ; Van Clief v. Van Vechten, 130 N. Y. 571 ; 42 N. Y. St. R. 736 ; 29 N. E. 1017. 95 Slaughter v. First Nat. Bk., 109 Ala. 157 ; 19 So. 430. 96 Farnsworth v. Hoover, 66 Ark. 367 ; 50 S. W. 865. y7 Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co. v. Streator, 172 111. 435 ; 50 N. E. 167 ; Sloggy v. Crescent Creamery Co., 72 Minn. 516 ; 75 N. W. 225. See 2 "Cyc. " L. & P. p. 542. 98 Sparks Mfg. Co. v. Newton, 57 N. J. Eq. 367 ; 41 Atl. 385 ; Blanch- ard v. Baker, 8 Greenlf. (Me.) 253, 266. Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed.)* 144, 145; Weeks' Damnum Abs- que Injuria (ed. 1879), sec. 11. See sec. 76, herein. 99 Thompson v. Crocker, 9 Pick. | Mass.) 59. See sec. 76, herein. ioo Fullam v. Stearns, 30 Vt. 443. 1 Waitman v. Swindell. 54 N. J. L. (25 Vr.) 589; 25 Atl. 356; 18 L. R. A. 44. See further as to the ap- plication of the maxim, Kullman v. Greenebaum, 92 Cal. 40:) ; 28 Pac. 674, a case of conversion of stock, and that small item of in- terest was not paid or tendered, held of no importance. Stevenson v. 5-4 Lord, 15 Colo. 131 ; 25 Pac. 313, replevin, slight difference in value of property as found by jury and amount of note of no importance. Manheim v. Carlton College, 68 Minn. 531 ; 71 N. W. 705, amount of mortgage tendered in full except small sum and new trial refused. Re Oneida Street, 37 App: Div. 266; 55 N. T. Supp. 959, rev'g 22 Misc. 235; 49 N. Y. Supp. 828, proceedings to open streets; notices which are not legally defective as to substan- tial matters are sufficient. Athens v. Carmer, 169 Pa. St. 426; 32 Atl. 422, a case of public improvements and sidewalk. Carpenter v. Frank- lin, 89 Tenn. 142; 14 S. W. 484, con- veyance by husband to wife, entire purchase money paid by wife ex- cept trifling amount. Examine also as to the maxim, Sharp v. Hull, 81 111. App. 400; Hilgendorf v. Os- trom, 46 111. App. 465; Kent v. Kent, 1 Mo. App. Repr. 124; Hilson v. Foster (U. S. C. C. S. D. N. Y.), 80 Fed. 896; The France (U. S. D. C. D. N. Y.), 50 Fed. 125; York v. Stiles, 21 R. I. 225; Adler v. Cloud, 42 S. C. 272: 22 S. E. 393; Kennedy v. Gramling, 33 S. C. 367; US. E. 1081; (JKNKIIAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. §74 § 74. Injuria sine damno. — An injury to a right is action- able even though the damage is inappreciable, for an invasion of a right may import damage although pecuniary loss results therefrom. This is well settled, especially where the doing of the wrongful act may by time become an enforceable claim ; or where the act is a continuing tortious one, which may by its doing ripen into a right, 2 as where grass is cut and appropriated under a claim of right. 3 But the rule docs not extend to a merely theoretical injury, 1 although it is sufficient if only prac- tical inconvenience is suffered ; 5 for it is only necessary to show a violation of a right to sustain an action, since actual, percep- tible damage is not necessary therefor, the presumption being that some damage has accrued. These principles apply to the unauthorized use of another's land over which he has aright of way. 7 So if a water course is unlawfully diverted, there is a right to recover without proof of actual damage." But the mere backing up of water in a channel does not constitute a legal in- jury where there is no appreciable damage. 9 The rule applies, however, to acts which might in the future be favorable evi- Wilson v. Vick (Tex. Civ. App.), 51 S. W. 45, rev'd 53 S. W. 570; Bragg v. Laraway, 65 Vt. 073; 27 Atl. 492; Ramsburg v. Kline, 96 Va. 465; 31 S. E. 608; 4 Va. L. Reg. 584; South- west Va. M. L. Co. v. Chase, 95 Va. 50: 27 S. E. 826; Lovett v. Thomas, 81 Va. 24.-) ; Randal] v. Dailey, 60 Wis. 288; Middleton v. Jerdee, 73 Wis. 39; 40 N. W. 629; .Maish v. Arizona, 10 1 O. S.599; 11 L. Ed. 567; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. L93; Frisbie v. Uni- fcedStates, 157 U.S. L60; 39 L. Ed. 657; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586; Park Bros. & Co. v. Bushnell (U. S. C. C. A.2dC), 00 Fed. 583; .Mark ay v. McGuire (1891), 1 Q. B. 250. 2 Cole v. Drew, 44 Vt. 49, 53; Dela- ware & Hudson C. Co. v. Torrey, 33 Pa. St. 14:;, 14!), citing and consid- ering Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Wms. Saunders, 346, note by Mr. Sergeant Williams; Young v. Spencer, 10 B. & C. 145, per Lord Tenderden ; Blanch- aid v. Baker, 8 Greenlf. (Me.) 253; Angell on Water Courses, sec. 135, note 4, sec. 428 et seq. See sec. 76, herein. 8 Cole v. Drew, 44 Vt. 49, 53. 1 Dormanv. Ames, Gil. (Minn.) 347. See Ilutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill I V. ST.), 104; Minter v. Swain, 52 Miss. 174; Hutchinson v. Snider, 137 Pa. st. l; 20 Atl. 510; 26 W. N. C. 531. ■"'Delaware & Hudson C. Co. v. Torrey, 33 Pa. St. 1 13, 1 19, 150. » Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 3 Sumn. (U. S. ) 1S9; Fed. Cas. No. 17,322. 7 Appleton v. Fullerton, 1 Gray ( Mass.), 18G. * Blanchard v. Maker, 8 Greenlf. (Me.) 256. See sec. 70, herein. • Chalk v. M.-Alily, 11 Rich. L. (S. C.) 153. See sec. 76. herein. 55 § 74 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY. dence for the wrongdoer, 10 or to the violation of right in using wrongfully another's property." So the unlawful detention of a deed may give a right of action. 12 And where there is a wrong, it is said that it is no answer to say that it will inflict no injury upon the plaintiff, or that it will even be beneficial to him, and equity will give the remedy to prevent its being referred to in- juria absque damno or some other maxim which may defeat a recovery at law. 13 But it is decided that it is of the very es- sence of an action of fraud or deceit that the same should be accompanied by damage and that neither damnum absque in- juria nor injuria absque damnum by themselves establish a good cause of action. 14 It is also declared that the principle that for every wrong there is a remedy is not of universal prevalence, but is qualified by those other maxims, De minimis non curat lex and Injuria sine damno. 15 10 Seniles v. Cronk, 38 How. Pr. ( N. Y. ) 320. 11 Dudley v. Tilton, 14 La. Ann. 283. 12 McCown v. Wheeler, 20 Tex. 372. 13 So held in United States Trust Co. v. O'Brien, 46 N. Y. SiS Rep. 238; 18 N. Y. Supp. 708, a case of injunction to prevent interference with eovenant rights. That the text statement is somewhat too broad except in its application to the par- ticular case, see Purdy v. Manhat- 56 tan El. R. Co., 36 N. Y. St. R. 43; 13 N. Y. Supp. 265; Birmingham Tract. Co. v. Southern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 119 Ala. 144; 24 So. 731, 734, per Haralson, J. 14 Deobold v. Oppermann, 111 N. Y. 531; 20 N. Y. St. Rep. 81, 89; 19 N. E. 94; 2 L. R. A. 644; 7 Am. St. Rep. 760, affg 4 N. Y. St. R. 512; 26 Wkly. D. 157. 15 Purdy v. Manhattan El. R. Co., 36 N. Y. St. R. 43; 13 N. Y. Supp. 265. GENERAL PRINCIPLES UF DAMAGES. § 75 CHAPTER IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. 75. Certainty as a requisite. 76. Nominal damages — Generally. 77. Nominal damages — Breach of contract. 78. Nominal damages only, unless substantial damage proved. 79. Nominal damages — New trial and reversal. 80. General damages. 81. Special damages. 82. Direct damages. 83. Consequential damages. 84. Proximate cause. 85. Proximate cause continued. 86. Proximate cause for jury. 87. Natural and proximate result of act complained of. 88. Proximate consequences illus- trated. 89. Natural and probable conse- quences — Those in contem- plation of parties — Con- tracts. 90. Natural and probable conse- quences — Torts. 91. Remote, contingent and spec- ulative damages. 92. Application of rule as to remote or speculative dam- ages. 93. Same subject continued. 94. Actual, compensatory and subtantial damages. 95. Double, triple or treble, tir other increased damages. 96. Same subject — How fixed. 97. Liquidated damages— Pen- alty. '.is. Unliquidated damages. 99. Continuing damage and dam ages — Entirety of damages. 100. Excessive or unreasonable damages. 101. Same subject continued. 102. Voluntarily remitting excess — Remittitur by court. 103. Where excess is small. 104. Kvidence as a factor. 105. Two or more exeessive ver- dicts. 100. In excess of amount claimed or of ad damnum clause. 107. Inadequate damages. 108. Excessive and inadequate damages — Power of court. 109. Excessive and inadequate damages— Trial court. 110. Jury and instructions — Gen- erally. §75. Certainty as a requisite.— This principle is so fully considered in this treatise under the particular subjects to which it belongs that it will only be briefly noticed here. It may be generally stated, however, that even though the elements are un- certain and problematic from which the jury are to admeasure the damages, nevertheless, they may be sufficient to constitute the 57 $75 i;kni:ual principles of damages. basis of a verdict. 1 Therefore, the want of certainty is of itself not sufficient to warrant a refusal of damages.' But the jury should consider only such elements thereof as they believe are established by the evidence, and it is also true that the damages should ordinarily be such as are' reasonably or necessarily cer- tain to result from the alleged injury; 3 and evidence which is too vague to furnish any basis for assessment thereof should not be considered. 4 . So an instruction should not be given as to elements of compensation where there is no evidence to warrant it. 3 Again, certainty as to the amount may be a determining factor, upon the question whether the damages are liquidated or a penalty,'' and in case of a claim for profits they ought to be proved with reasonable certainty to warrant a recovery therefor. 7 It is apparent, therefore, from the preceding state- ments that proof must be given, not only of the injury or loss sustained, but that the extent thereof must also be proven with reasonable certainty, and this is the general rule. 8 It is de- clared, however, that damages must be capable of definite as- certainment, and must be certain and definite in character.^ This last assertion is, however, open to criticism. 10 Some cases, 1 Dickinson v. Hart, 142 N. Y. 183; 58 N. Y. St. R. 645; 36 N. E. 801, aff'g50N. Y. St. R. 504; 21 S. E. 307. 2 Omaha H. R. Co. v. Cable T. Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Neb.), 32 Fed. 727, 733,734. 3 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Conway, 169 111. 505; 48 N. E. 483, aff'g 67 111. App. 155. See also Lee v. City of Burlington, 113 Iowa, 356; 85 N. W. 618; Hausberger v. Sedalia, E. R. L. & P. Co., 82 Mo. App. 566; Streng v. Frank Ibert Brewing Co., 64 N. Y. St. R. 34; 50 App. Div. 542. 4 Locke v. International & G. N. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 60S. W. 314. See Satchwell v. Williams, 40 Conn. 371. 6 Georgia Cotton-Oil Co. v. Jack- son, 112 Ga. 620; 37 S. E. 873. 6 Tobler v. Austin, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 99; 53 S. W. 706. This question is, however, more fully considered under the discussion herein as to liquidated damages and penalty. 7 Wells v. National L. Assn. ( U. S. C. C. A. Tex. 1900), 39 C. C. A. 476; 99 Fed. 222. Tins point is, however, more fully considered elsewhere herein. 8 Mergentbaler Linotype Co. v. Kansas State P. Co. (Kan. 1900), 59 Pac. 1066. See Wolcott v. Mount, 36 N. J. L. 2(52, 271 ; Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil R. M. Co., 60 N. Y. 487. 9 Connelly v. Western Un. Tel. Co. (Va. 1902), 2 No. Car. L. Jour. 294; 7 Va. L. Reg. 704, per Cardwell, J. 10 It is open to criticism in that it states the rule too broadly. Cen- erally and substantially it is correct to a certain degree, but it is mis- leading, especially so if it should be applied to causes of action for dam- ages for personal injuries, and to those to recover for loss from death GENERAL PRINCIPLES <>]■' DAMAGES. § to it is true, furnish in themselves, by reason of their nature and circumstances, an obvious rule for ascertaining what constitutes an adequate compensation for the actual loss or injury sustained, whether the action be in contract or tort. But to deny the in- jured party the right to recover any actual damages in cases of torts because they arc of such a nature as cannot be thus cer- tainly measured, would be to enable parties to profit by and speculate upon their own wrongs ; such is not the law.'- 1 Such criticism as we have made does not, however, exclude the rule that necessitates proof of actual damages, in cases other than of nominal recovery, by some data upon which to base the same, being shown with some reasonable certainty where the damage is susceptible of proof, 1 '- for where it is clear that damages have resulted to the property of plaintiffs the}'' are entitled to be reimbursed ; but in ascertaining the extent thereof they should through the negligent or wrongful act of another, for in a large major- ity of these latter causes it is impos- sible to approximate in proof to a " definite ascertainment," or to pro- duce evidence of damage or injury which is '• certain" or "definite" in character. This is clearly evident from the numerous decisions consid- ered by us under the chapter herein covering those subjects. This criti- cism also applies to other actions for damages than those above stated as appears fnun the following citations: Drum v. Harrison, 8:5 Ala. 384; 3 So. 715; Bagby v. Harris, 9 Ala. IT:'.; City of Greensboro v. McGibbony, 93 Ga. 072; 20 S. E. 37; Brent v. Kimball, GO 111. 211; 14 Am. Rep. 35; Fox v. Wray, 56 End. 423; Weber v. Squier, 51 Mo. App. 601; Goldman v. Wolff, Mo. App. 400; Niendorff v. Manhattan R. Co., 4 App. Div. ( \. Y. ) 46; 38 N. Y. Supp. 090. See also Burkitt v. Lanata, 15 La. Ann. 337; Allen v. Conrad, 51 Pa. St. (1 P. F. Smith) 487. 11 Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich. 117, 129, 130, per Christiaucy, J. Again, it is said concerning an ac- tion for personal injuries: " Incases of this cbaracter there can be no di- rect evidence of the amount of dam- ages sustained or the amount of money which will be a compensa- tion for the injury, but it is sutli- cient to show to the jury the extent of the injury." Clare v. Sacramento Elec. PowerA L. Co., 122 Cal. 504; 55 Pac. 320. 12 Howard v. Taylor, 99 Ala. 450; 13 So. 121; Patrick v. Colorado Smelting Co., 20 Colo. 268; 38 Pac. 236; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Cicero, 157 111. 48: 41 X. E. 640; Peoria & Pa. R. Co. v. Peoria & F. R. Co., 105 111. 110; Hair v. Barnes, 20 111. App. 58U: Williams v. Brown, 70 Iowa. 043; 41 X. W. 377; Wilde v. Xew Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 15; Barrie v. Seidel, 30 Mo. App. 559; Sheedy v. Union Press Brick Works, 25 Mo. App. 527: Taylor v. Bradley. 39 N. V. L29; 100 Am. Dec. 415; Gill v. X. Y. Cab Co., 4s IIuiuN. Y.), 524; 1 X. Y. Supp. 202; Hudson v. Archer, 9S. D. 240; 68 X. W. 541. 59 § 76 GENERAL PRINCIPLES <>F DAMAGES. produce the best evidence in their power as to the amount of the loss sustained by them. 18 Nor does the above criticism apply to the general rule that damages must, in breaches of contract, be capable of certain ascertainment as distinguished from remote, speculative or contingent damages. 14 But this reasonable cer- tainty above stated does not mean a mathematical exactness or accuracy, for this distinction is clearly made in numerous deci- sions as will be apparent throughout this treatise, especially so in those cases which cover personal injuries and death by accident, neglect or default. Thus the impossibility of definitely measur- ing damages for personal injuries by a money standard, consti- tutes no reason for denying relief. 1 ' Another point of value in connection with this element of certainty is illustrated by a comparatively recent decision which determines that, in an action for breach of contract to sell and deliver certain timber on land, no such difficulty in ascertaining the damages for said breach exists as to preclude maintenance of said suit. 1!i § 76. Nominal damages — Generally. — The consideration of the general principles covering this subject necessarily involves others heretofore discussed under other headings. 17 Thus it is well settled that whenever a legal right is clearly shown to have been invaded, nominal damages will be allowed, and the failure to perform a duty or contract constitutes a legal wrong inde- pendent of actual damage done to the party injured, and the rule applies even though no actual or special damages be proven. 18 u Holmes v. Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 64. 14 Western Un. Tel. Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444; 31 L. Ed. 479. 16 Mayor, etc., of Birmingham v. Lewis. 92 Ala. 352, 357: 9 So. 243, and see the chapters herein covering personal injuries and death by acci- 65 Ala. 586, 591, per Somerville, J. Some damages are always presumed to follow from the violation of any right, and therefore the law will, in such cases, award nominal damages if none greater be proved. Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492, 493, per dent. English, C. J. Whenever there is a 16 Dorris v. King (Tenn. Ch. App. ! clear violation of a right, it is not 1899), 54 S. W. 683. ; necessary to show actual damages, 17 See sees. 62, 71-74, herein. and if none other be proved, the 18 Every wrong imputes a damage, plaintiff is entitled to nominal dam- and when none other is proved and ages. Bristol Mfg. Co. v. Gridley, the evidence shows a clear breach of 28 Conn. 201, 211, per Ellsworth, J., duty, nominal damages are always j quoting Story, J., in Webb v. Port- recoverable. Adams v. Robinson, land Mfg. Co., 3 Sumner (IT. S.), 196. 60 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMA< So the fact that plaintiff lias been benefited does not of itself preclude nominal damages, 1 '-* and if the evidence shows that any When a right is invaded or a wrong done and no particular damage is proved, the law implies or infers wrongdoer. This last applies more particularly to unlawful entries upon real property and to disturbances of nominal damage. Foster v. Elliott, ] incorporeal rights when the unlaw- 33 Iowa, 216, 223. Whenever a right l'ul act might have an effect upon is invaded the law presumes dam- age, and though no actual injury be sustained, an action may he main- the rightof tin' party and In- evidence in favor of the wrongdoer if his right ever came in question. In tained for the wrongful diversion of \ these cases an action may be sup- water from the plaintiffs mill, and ported though there he no actual nominal damages may he recovered, damage done, because otherwise the Munroe v. Stickney, 48 Me. 462. party might lose his right. So, too, "It is a principle that for the viola- whenever anyone wantonly invades tion of every legal right, nominal another's rights for the purpose of damages at least will he allowed, and injury, an action will lie though no the failure to perform a duty or con- tract is a legal wrong, independent of actual damage done to the party actual damage be done. The law pre- sumes damage on account of the un- lawful intent. But it is believed for whose benefit the performance of that no case can be found where such duty or contract is due." Ful- damages have been given for a tres- kerson v. Eads, 19 Mo. A pp. 620, pass to personal property, when no 023, per Ellison, J., citing 2 Suther- unlawful iuteut or disturbance of a laud on Dam. 11, 13. Proof of in- . right or possession is shown, and vasion of rights entitles to recover ! when not only all probable hut all at least nominal damages. Ilooten ' possible damage is expressly dis- v. Barnard, 137 Mass. 36, citing proved. Paul v. Slason, 22 Vt. 231, Lund v. New Bedford, 121 Mass. 238; 54 Am. Dec. 75, per Poland. .1. 286. Where a wrongful act is charged "Actual perceptible damage is not and confessed in the pleadings, com- indispensable as the foundation of an plainants are entitled to at least action. The law tolerates no further nominal damages. Lonsdale Co. v. inquiry than whether there has been Moies, 2 Cliff. (U. S. C. C. D. R. 1.) the violation of a right. If so the 538; Fed. <'as. No. 8,497, per Clif- party injured is entitled to maintain ford, Cir. J. Whenever an invasion his action for nominal damages in of a legal right is established though vindication of his right if no other no actual damage be shown, the law damages are fit and proper to re- infers a damage to the owner of numerate him. . . Lord Holt says: property and gives nominal damages. ' It is impossible to imagine any such This goes upon the ground either thing as injuria sine damnn. Every that some damage is the probable injury imports damage in the nature result of the defendant's act or that of it. 1 S. P. 2 Ld. Raym. 955, and he his act would have the effect to in- cites many cases in support of his jure the other's right and would be position. ... In the same case of evidence in future in favor of the Ashby v. White (2 Ld. Raym. 938; 6 For note 1!> see page 62. 61 §76 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. property was damaged to any extent while in defendant's possession, it should not be dismissed on motion. 20 So where in any view of the case the plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages, it is error to limit, by instructions to the jury, the right to recover at all.-' 1 And contributory negligence does not of ne- cessity limit the amount of recovery to a nominal sum. 22 It is also decided that the jury are not limited to such damages of ne- cessity, because there is no evidence of particular damage. 23 The same rule has also been applied to an action for not entering satisfaction of a judgment. 24 But damages will be nominal as to a passenger on a train stopped by quarantine officers before entering a city. 25 So the taking of a private way for a public Mod. 45; Holt, 524), as reported by Lord Raymond, 2 Ld. Raym. 953, Lord Holt said: ' If the plaintiff has a right he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and in- deed it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy, for want of right and want of remedy are recip- rocal.' S. P. 6 Mod. 53. * The princi- ples laid down by Lord Holt . . . seem absolutely in a judicial view in- controvertible, and they have been fully recognized in many other cases ... I am aware that some of the old cases inculcate a different doctrine and perhaps are not reconcilable with that of Lord Holt. There are also some modern cases which at first view seem to the contrary . . . upon the whole . . . my judgment is that wherever there is a clear vio- lation of a right, it is not necessary in an action of this sort (diversion of a water course) to show actual damage; that every violation im- ports damage and if no claim be proved, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict for nominal damages, and a fortiori this doctrine applies when- ever the act done is of such a nature as that, by its repetition or continu- 62 ance, it may become the foundation or evidence of an adverse right. See also Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn. & Ad. 304; 5 Barn. & Ad. 1." Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 3 Sumn. (U. S. C. C. D. Me.) 189; 3 Law. Rep. 374; Fed. Cas. No. 17,322, per Story, Cir. J. See also Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co., 2 Story (U. S. C. C. D. Me), 661; Fed. Cas. No. 17,516, per Story, Cir. J., citing Butman v. Hussey, 3 Fairf. ( 12 Me. ) 407. 19 Excelsior Needle Co. v. Smith. 61 Conn. 56; 23 Atl. 693; Mize v. Glenn, 38 Mo. App. 98; Johnson v. Conant, 64 N. H. 109; 7 Atl. 716; Murphy v. Fond du Lac, 23 Wis. 365; 99 Am. Dec. 181. See also Jewett v. Whitney, 43 Me. 242; Pond v. Merri- field, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 181. 2 ° Leber v. Stores, 64 N. Y. St. R. 464; 31 Misc. Rep. 474, affg 62 N. Y. St. R. 1124. Examine as the motion, First Nat. Bk. v. First Nat. Bk., 116 Ala. 520; 22 So. 976. 21 O'Horo v. Kelsey, 60 App. Div. (N. Y.) 604; 70 N. Y. Supp. 14. 22 Felton v. Newport (U. S. C. C. A. Term. ), 44 C. C. A. 530; 105 Fed. 332. 23 Burgett v. Lanata, 15 La. Ann. 337. 24 Allen v. Conrad, 51 Pa. St. (1 P. F. Smith) 487. 25 So held in St. Louis, I. M. & S. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. street will, where such way has the characteristics of the latter, only justify the recovery of such damages by the landowner,* and the return of property during trial of a Buit for conversion is id defense to the whole cause of action, so as bo preclude re- covery of a nominal sum, even though no Bpecial damage is proven. 27 Again, any unauthorized interference with an ease- ment, so as to diminish the full enjoyment of it, is a wrong which may be redressed by action. Thus the law implies dam- age from flowing water back upon the land of another, not only for the present injury, but also to preserve the rights of prop- er tv.* The same rule applies to the diversion of water from a mill, 29 and also to injuries to riparian rights. Nor in any of these cases need actual damage be proved in order to recover nominal damages." Again, a violation of an owner's right by a R. Co. v. Linam (Ark. 1901), 60 S. W. 951. But examine Wilson v. Alabama, G. S. H. Co., 77 Miss. 714; 28 So. 5(>7; 52 L. R. A. 357, citing, Hurst v. Warner. L02 Mich. 238; 26 L. R. A. 484; Town of Kosciusko v. Slomberg, 08 Miss. 469; 9 So. -JOT; 12 L. R. A. 528; Matter of Smith, 146 N. Y. 68, 74; 40 N. E. 497, 498; 28 L. R. A. 820, 823; State v. Burdge, 95 Wis. 390; 70 X. W. 347; 37 L. R. A. 157. 162. 26 In re Opening of North Fifth St., 71 N. Y. Supp. 644. 27 Cernalian v. Chrisler, 107 Wis. 645; 83 N. W. 778. 28 Graver v. Sholl, 6 Wright (Pa.), 58, 67. See generally as to the rights of riparian owners and the nature of such rights aud extent thereof, Cave v. Tyler (Cal. 1901), 65 Pa. 1089; Indianapolis Water Co. v. Kin- gan & Co., 155 Ind. 476; 58 N. E. 715; Meek v. Carlettsburg & P. P. Co., 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1318; CO S. W. 484; Sowers v. Shift, 15 La. Ann. 30 ; Ludlow Mfg. Co. v. Indian Orchard Co., 177 Mass. CI; 58 N. E. 181; Crawford Co. v. Hathaway. 60 Neb. 7".4; 84 X. W. 271. rehearing de- nied, 85 N. W. 303; Spink v. Corn- ing, CI App. Div. (N. Y.) 84; 7u N. Y. Supp. 143; (iallagher v. Kingston Water Co., 164 N. Y. 602; 58 V I 1087, aff'g 49 N. Y. Supp. 250; 25 App. Div. 82; Pine v. New York (U. S. C. C. N. Y.), 103 Fed. 337; 4; 51 Pac. 153; Atcbison, Topeka & S. F. R. Co. v. Willey, 57 Kan. 764; 48 Pac. 25; 2 Am. Xeg. Rep. 144. <* Benzv. South Betblehem (C. P.), 5 Northampton Rep. 381. cu Garden v. Neiley (Can.), 31 N. S. 89. to purcell v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 108 X. C. 421; 12 S. E. 956. 71 West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Levy, 182 111. 525; 55 N. E. 554, atT'g 82 111. App. 202, and cases cited. See also Ft. Scott, W. & W. R. Co. v. Lightburn (Kan. App. 1899), 58 Pac. 1033; San Antonio & A. P. K. Co. v. Weigers. 22 Tex. Civ. App. 344 ; 54 S. W. 910. "'- Cox v. Richmond & D. K. Co., 87 <:a. 747; 13 S. E. 827. 73 Belt v. Washington Water-Power Co., 24 Wash. 387; 64 Pac. 525. 71 Decatur v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co., 146 End. 577; 45 X. E. 793. 1 '' McFarland v. Roly, 4 Ohio Dec. 211 ; 1 Cleve. L. Rep. 118. See Foerst v. Kelso, 131 Cal. 376; 63 Pac. 6S1. 7 " Bibb Co. v. Ham, 110 Ga. 340; 35 S. E. 656. 69 §81 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. it is being graded and paved does not constitute such special damage to a street car company as to enable it to recover there- for, 77 although if special injury has resulted to a person from closing a highway, as where he has been to expense in removing obstructions in order to travel, an action lies. 78 But the fact that an unlawful obstruction of a street cuts off the only prac- ticable route by which an individual may reach his land is not special damage. 79 Again, if special damages are relied on because of failure to stop a train at a flag station, they must be averred,* and one who has suffered such damage from a nuisance may maintain an action against an individual or corporation, 81 but the special damage must sufficiently appear from the allegations in such case. 82 There are also other applications of the doctrine which come within the general principles hereinafter stated. Thus, if special damages are claimed, they must be averred to prevent surprise, and to show that the plaintiff is entitled to them, 53 and such damages must be pleaded in replevin. 84 So, in an action of trespass in case of a wrongful entry and re- moval of a fence and the deprivation of the use of pasture. 85 So, unless they are specifically claimed, they cannot be allowed under a general allegation and demand therefor, although there are specific statements in the same pleading of the precise amount and character of the claimed damage. 85 And the mere conclusion in a pleading that a standpipe or water tower is lia- ble to burst, is not a sufficient allegation of special damages. 87 ]f, however, special items, such as counsel fees, loss of time, etc., general public. Advance Elevator & W. Co. v. Eddy, 23 111. App. 352. 82 Clark v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (Wis.), 36 N. W. 326. 83 See Fitch v. Fitch, 35 N. Y. Super. (3 J. & S.) 302. 303; Alfaro v. David- son, 40 N. Y. Super. (8 J. & S.) 87, 89, per Freedman, J. 84 Rosecrans v. Osay, 49 Neb. 512; 68 N. W. 627. 85 May v. Carter, 67 Mo. App. 323. 86 Dennison v. Lewis (D. C. App.), 23 Wash. L. Rep. 138. 87 Barrows v. Sycamore, 150 111. 588; 49 111. App. 590; 37 N. E. 1096; 25 L. R. A. 535. 77 Ridge Ave. Pass. R. Co. v. Phila- delphia, 181 Pa. 592; 37 Atl. 910; 40 W. N. C. 453; 28 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 55. 78 Lansing v. Wiswall, 5 Den. (N. Y.) 213. 79 Baier v. Schermerhorn, 96 Wis. 372; 71 N. W. 600. 50 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Siddons, 58 111. App. 607. 8' Mehrof Bros. B. M. Co. v. Dela- ware, L. & W. B. Co. (N. J.), 16 Atl. 12. But the special damages which one sustains from the obstruction of an alley must be only such as are dif- ferent from those sustained by the 70 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. §81 have been proven, the jury should not be instructed that " No measure of damages can be prescribed except the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors." 88 Again, if such damages do not necessarily result from the injury, they must be particularly averred to be recovered,' 1 although it is decided that an aver- ment thereof is only necessary where the righl of action itself depends upon the special injury received. 1 * 1 In case of contracts the plaintiff is not always limited to the recovery of general damages. There may be such special circumstances as will en- able him to recover special damages, BUch as are the natural and proximate cause of the breach, although not in general, follow- ing as its immediate effects. Hut the pleading must particu- larize or set out the special damage or loss.'-' 1 It is also deter- mined that in an ad ion to recover such damages for breach of contract, the party in fault must have had knowledge, at the time of entering into the agreement, of the fact, making prob- able the special damages/* It has, however, been said : "The test has been put in another form, namely, that they must be such as a court or jury may reasonably consider to be those which the parties would reasonably contemplate. I do not believe that t6 be the true test for those who make con- tracts mean to fulfill them." 113 But loss of profits must be par- ticularly pleaded in an action for the price of goods where the defense is that they were not according to contract, 91 although it need not be specifically alleged that plaintiff has sustained special damages in order to recover them in an action by an abutting property owner for injury occasioned in the grade of 88 Coleman v. Allen, 79 Ga. 637, 5 S. E. 204. 89 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Willey, 57 Kan. 764; 48 Pac. 25; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 344; SolmB v. Lias, 16 Abb. Pr. (X. Y.) 311; Squires v. Gould, 14 Wend. (N. Y. ) 159; Casta- nos v. Ritter, 3 Duer ( N. Y.), 310; Baldwin v. N. V. & II. S. N. Co., 4 Daly (N. Y.), 314; Williams v. Fra- zier, 41 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 428; and see last preceding section herein, and sees. 88, 89, herein. 00 McCarty v. Beach, 10 Cal. 462, 464. Q i Lawrence v. Porter (U. S. C. C. A. 6th C. ), 93 Fed. 62, 64, per Lurton, Cir. J.; 11 U. S. C. C. A. 27; 22 U. S. A. 483; 26 L. R A. 167. 92 Ligon v. Missouri Pac. R Co., 3 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct. App. sec. 2. 9a Prehn v. Royal Ilk. of Liverpool L. R., 5 Exeh. Cas. 92, 99, per Mar- bin, B. ; Bank of Commerce ▼. Goos, 39 N>b. 437; 23 L. R. A. 190, L93, per Ryan, C. « Stevens v. Sonto, 18 X. Y. St. R. 929; 2N. Y. Supp. 484. 71 S 82 fiEXERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. a street. 95 If, however, legal damages are recoverable under a complaint setting forth a cause of action, an error in alleging special damages does not invalidate the complaint. 96 So an alle- gation of general damages does not preclude an averment of special damages. 97 § 82. Direct damages.— It is a general principle that there should, in cases of injury from a tort, be an indemnity to com- pensate the party injured for the loss which is the immediate result of the wrongful act. 18 So one who does a malicious or illegal act, calculated to prove injurious to others, is responsi- ble for the direct consequences resulting- therefrom, even though the particular damage which followed was not intended or anticipated, " Or was not known, or could not have been fore- 95 Cook v. Ansonia, 66 Conu. 413; 34 Atl. 183. 96 Hoosier Stone Co. v. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. (Ind.)31 N. E. 365. 97 Hillv. Anderson (Ohio Supr. Ct. Cin. 1899), 9 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 480. When averment of special dam- ages is sufficient as to loss of busi- ness, etc., of wife in action by hus- band and wife for injuries to her, see Healey v. Ballantine & Sons (N. J. 1901), 49 Atl. 511; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 155. See further tliat special damages must be averred, Donnell v. Jones, 17 Ala. 689; Tucker v. Parks, 7 Colo. 62; Colorado M. K. Co. v. Trevarthen, IColo. App. 152; 27 Pac. 1012; Bris- tol, etc., Co. v. Gridley, 28 Conn. 201; Olmstead v. Burke, 25 111. 86; Chi- cago, W. D. K. Co. v. Klauber, 9 111. App. 613; Reid v. Johnson, 132 Ind. 416; 31 X. E. 1107; Rothschild v. Williamson, 83 Ind. 387; Teagarden v. Hetfield, 11 Ind. 522; Reeves v. Andrews, 7 Ind. 207; Hanna v. Pegg, 1 Blatchf. (Ind.) 181; Wilson v. Dean, 10 Iowa, 432; Wilson v. Barnes, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.)330; Hunter v. Stewart, 72 47 Me. 419; Hemineway v. Woods, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 524; Burnll v. New York, etc., R. Co., 14 Mich. 34; Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 80 Mo. 457; Burlington & Q. R. Co. v. Emmert, 53 Neb. 237; 73 N. W. 540; Burnside v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 47 N. H. 554; Kraft v. Rice, 61 N. Y. Supp. 368; 45 App. Div. (N. Y.) 569; Hoffman v. Rudiman, 5 Misc. (N. Y.) 326 ; 55 N. Y. Supp. 214; Schmit v. Dry Dock E. B. R. Co., 3 N. Y. St. Rep. 257 ; Uertz v. Singer Mfg. Co., 35 Hun (N. Y.), 116; Hyatt & S. Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 111 N. C. 92; 15 S. E. 940; Hart v. Evans, 8 Pa. St. 13; Alstin v. Huggins, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 185; Oh Chow v. Hallett; She At v. Same (U. S. C. C. D. Ore.), 12 Sawy. (U. S.) 259 ; 5 Chic. Leg. News, 109; Fed. Cas. No. 10,469; Boyden v. Burke, 14 How. (U. S.) 575. 98 Overpeek v. Rapid City (S. D. 1901), 85 N. W. 990; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 489, 492, per Corson, J.; Chi- cago & I. C. R. Co. v. Hunter (Ind.), 27 X. E. 477. 99 Vanderburg v. Truax, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 464. "A person is entitled to recover for all consequences which are the natural and probable result GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. seen; 100 for, as it has been declared, " the direct and immediate consequences of the injurious act are to be regarded," and they must naturally and reasonably result from defendant's acta or omission.' They also, in cases of personal injuries, include all consequences thereof, future, as well as past, even though serious results have ensued. 3 Again, in cases of breach of tract, if the losses resulting therefrom are not the direct and natural consequences thereof, by reason of special circum- stances known to both parties when the contract was made, they must, in order to justify a recovery, be such as could, in view of the circumstances, have been foreseen and estimated with reasonable certainty; ' and if the damages arise from cir- cumstances peculiar to the particular case, and are not the natural result thereof, such circumstances must be known to the party who broke the contract. 5 This question, however, of direct damages and of natural and probable consequences, is so closely involved with that of proximate, remote, uncertain, speculative, contingent and consequential damages/' that the reader is referred to the subsequent sections of this chapter, wherein these questions are fully considered. of injuries negligently intlicted upon him by another, that is, for those consequences which the common ex- perience of men justify us in believ- ing will result from an injury." Atchison, T. & S. P. K. Co. v. Willey, 57 Kan. 764 ; 48 Par. 25, per Duster, Ch. .1.: Watson v. Rhein- derknecht (Minn. L901), 84 N'. W. 798; Me Allen v. Western Un. Teleg. Co., 79 Tex. 243; 7 S. W. 715. See sec. 89, herein. i°° Louisville, X. A. & C. R. Co. v. Wood i End.), I I X. E, 572. i Galveston, li. & S. A. II. Co. v. Zantzinger (Tex. lS'JS), 4S S. W. 503 ; 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. 177, 483, per Gaines, Ch. J. - Victorian Ry. Cornmrs, v. ( 'oultas, L. R. 13 App. Cas. 222 ; The Xotting Hill, L. R. '•' Prob. Div. 105 (Eng. C. A.); .lex v. Strauss, L22 X. V. 293 ; 33 N. Y. St. R. 448 ; 29 X. E. 478, aff'g 22 J. & S. 52. See sees. 88, 89, herein. Gainard v. Rochester, C. & B. R. Co., 50 Hun (N. Y.), 22 ; S. C, 121 N. Y. (5(30 ; 2 N. Y. Supp. 470 ; 18 St. R. 692. 4 Kelley v. Fahrney (U. S. C. C. A. Ark. 1899), 97 Fed. 176. ■■ Brauer v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., (it) X. Y. St. R. 465 ; 34 Misc. 127, mod'd 7:: X. Y. Supp. 291. G See generally as to these dam- ages, Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Edwards, 111 Ga. 528; 36 S. E. 810 j 8 Am. Neg. Rep. 595, 599, 600 ; Civ. Code, Ga. sees. 8912, 3913 ; Kiernan v. Chicago, S. F. & ('. R.Co., 123111. 188; 14 N. E. 18 ; 11 W. 632 ; Indiana, 1). & W. R. Co. v. Allen, 113 I ml. 308; 15 X. E. 451 ; 12 W. 910; Carraher v. Allen (Iowa. 1000), 83 X W. 902 ; Corrister v. Kansas City, St. J. A: C. B. R. Co., 25 Mo. 73 §83 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. § 83. Consequential damages — The question as to the re- coveiy of consequential damages is controlled not only by the form of the action and the pleadings, but also depends upon whether the particular damages claimed to have been sustained can be said to be a proximate and natural result of the original wrongful act. 7 . In this class of damages, for which recovery may be had in some cases, are included those for mental suffering, App. 619 ; Brink v. Wabash R. Co., 160 Mo. 87 ; 60 S. W. 1058 ; Brauer v. Oceanic S. N. Co., 69 N. Y. Supp. 465 ; 35 Misc. 127, mod'd 73 N. Y. Supp. 291 ; First Nat. Bk. v. Burger, 9 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 824 ; Gaar v. Snook, 1 Ohio C. D. 142 ; Sullivan Co. v. Ruth, 106 Teun. 85 ; 59 S. W. 138 ; City of Antonio v. Smith (Tex. 1900), 59 S. W. 1109 ; Fowler v. Shook (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 59 S. W. 282 ; Smith v. City of Antonio (Tex. 1900), 57 S. W. 881 ; Atlantic & D. R. Co. v. Delaware Const. Co., 98 Va. 503 ; 37 S. E. 13 ; 2 Ya. Sup. Co. Rep. 430 ; Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125 ; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39 ; 33 L. Ed. 279 ; 23 Ohio L. J. 57. 7 "We may as well consider here as anywhere what we are to under- stand by consequential damages; when are they so related to the cause to which they are ascribed as to be in legal view clearly ascribable to it, flowing from it and proximate to it. Every judge will agree that all dam- ages must be the result of the injury complained of, whether it consist in the withholding of a legal right or the breach of a duty legally owed to the plaintiff. If they necessarily re- sult, such as the loss of the value of an article of property which is car- ried away or destroyed, or of a sum of money which is not paid to the plaintiff according to the contract, or the loss of time and the endurance of pain consequent upon having one's limb fractured, they are called gen- 74 eral damages and may be shown un- der the ad damnum, or general alle- gation of damages, for the defendant does not need notice of such conse- quences for his defense; he knows that they must exist of course and that they are proximate and will be in evidence on the trial. But if cer- tain injuries and losses do not neces- sarily result from the defendant's wrongful act, but in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence, they are called special and must be specially alleged that the defendant may have notice and be prepared to go into the inquiry. ... In all cases the litigant parties must be confined to the principal transaction com- plained of and to its attendant cir- cumstances and natural results. These results include all the damages to the plaintiff of which the injurious act of the defendant was the efficient cause, though in point of time such damage did not occur until sometime after the act done. Damages are often recovered down to the time of trial and even after, if the jury are satisfied from the nature of the wrong proved upon the defendant that the consequences are likely to follow in the natural course of things. . . . Speculative and possible losses, such as specific profits in business, do not fall within the rule, for they are too contingent and remote." Bristol Mfg. Co. v. Gridley, 28 Conn. 201, 211, 212, per Ellsworth, J. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAl §84 indignity, insult or fright," loss of profits, 9 expenses and future or prospective losses," all of which are more fully treated in this work under the particular actions where their recovery has heen sought. § 84. Proximate cause. — If the loss proceeds inevitably and of absolute necessity from a speciiied cause, that will be the proximate cause; and where a certain result usually and natu- rally follows from a certain cause, the one may be deemed to sustain an immediate relation to the other, but neither of these propositions constitutes the sole test whereby the proximate cause of the loss may be ascertained. If there are different agencies, each of which conduces to the loss, the moving effi- 8 Kellyville Coal Co. v. Yehuka, 94 111. App. 74; Lake Erie & W. K. Co. v. Christison, 39 111. App. 495; Eders v. Skannal, 35 La. Ann. 1000; State v. Weinel, 13 Mo. App. 583; Shay v. Camden & S. Ry. Co. (X. J. 1901), 49 Atl. 547; Williams v. Underbill, 63 App. Div. (N. V. I 228; 71 X. Y. Supp. 291; O'Flaherty v. Xassau Elec. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 624; 59 X. E. 1128; Ft. Worth & X. O. Ry. Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. 1032. 9 Borden City lee & Coal Co. v. Adams, 69 Ark. 219; 62 S. \V. 591; Nightingale v. Scannell, 18 Cal. 315; Gregory v. Brook, 35 Conn. 437; 95 Am. Dec. 278; Blood v. Herring, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1725; 01 S. W. 273; Stewart v. Patton, 65 Mo. App. 21; 2 Mo. App. Rej). 1143; Cranford v. Parsons, 63 X. H. 438; Schile v. Brokhahns, 80 N. V. 614; Kyle v. Ohio River Co. ( W. Va. 1901 1, 38 S. K. 489. The extent of the loss must, however, he shown with reasonable certainty, Stewart v. Patton, 65 Mo. App. 21; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1143, and must be the natural and proximate result of the act complained of. Med- bury v. X. V. & E. K. Co., 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 564; Walter v. Post, 6 Duer (X. Y.), 315; St. John v. Xew York, 6 Duer (X. Y.), 315; 13 How. Pr. 527; Bennett v. Drew, 3 Bos. (X. V.) 355; Albert v. Bleecker St. & R. R. Co., 2 Daly (X. Y. ). 389; Tuttle v. Hannegan, 4 Daly (N. Y.), 92. io Brown v. S. W. R. Co., 36 Ga. 377; McPheters v. Moose River L. D. Co., 78 Me. 329; 5 Atl. 270; Benson v. Maiden & M. G. Co., 6 Allen (Mass), 149; Ohiliger v. Toledo, l'O Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 142; 10 O. C. I). 7<.2. 11 Rockland Water Co. v. Tillson, 69 Me. 255; Still v. Jenkins. 15 X. J. L. 302. Damages for prospective loss in action for personal injury are not recoverable in absence of evidence as to permanency of injury. Noonan v. Obermeyer & Liebman Brew. c>., 50 App. Div. (X. Y.)377; 63 X. Y. Supp. 10(16; 7 Am. Xeg. Rep. 556. When recoverable for breach of contract. Fall v. McRee, 36 Ala. 61; Ennis v. Buckeye Pub. Co., 44 Minn. 105; 46 N. W. 314; Pales v. Beraenway, 64 Me. 373; Tiffin v. War.]. 5 Oreg, 450. When not recoverable, see Vance v. Towne, 13 La. 225; Hunt v. Tibbette, 7d Me. 221; Tucker v. Tucker, 24 Mich. 426; Terry v. Beatrice Starch Co., 13 Neb. 866; 62 N. W. 255; Skinner v. Tinker. .'14 Bail), i V Y. | 333; Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355. 75 § 84 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. cient cause nearest iu the point of time may be considered ; but if one cause be merely the nearest and another the adequate efficient cause, the efficient cause is the proximate one, for close- ness in the order of time in which certain things occur is not necessarily the test. If an efficient adequate cause be found, it is to be considered, unless some other cause, not incidental to it, but independent of it, is shown to have intervened between it and the result. The act may be the primary cause operating through an unbroken successive chain of events, which form a continuous whole, in which case said act is considered the proxi- mate cause, but if the loss may be attributed to a new and con- trolling influence, an independent event intervening, whereby the chain of successive events is broken, then the act which set in motion the successive causes may become too remote to be considered. 12 So the question whether an original wrongful 12 3 Joyce on Insurance, sec. 2834. " The proximate cause is the efficient cause, the one that necessarily sets the other causes in motion. The causes that are merely incidental or instruments of a superior or con- trolling agency are not the proxi- mate causes and the responsible ones, though they may be nearer in time to the result. It is only when the causes are independent of each other that the nearest is of course to be charged with the disaster." ^Etna Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S. 117, 130. See also the G. R. Booth, 171 U. S. 455, 461 ; Phoenix Ins. Co. y. Charles- ton Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 632; Good- lander Mill Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Fed. 405; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mosely, 57 Fed. 925; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Callahan, 56 Fed. 992; Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892. As sus- taining the general principles stated in the text, see the following cases: Jacobsen v. Dalles P. & A. Nav. Co., 93 Fed. 975; The Joseph B. Thomas, 86 Fed. 658; 56 U. S. App. 619; 30 C. C. A. 333; Hunter v. Kan- sas City & M. R. & B. Co., 85 Fed. 76 379; 54 U. S. App. 653; 29 C. C. A. 206; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Ballentine, 84 Fed. 935; 56 U. S. App. 266; 28 C. C. A. 572; Kowalski v. Chic. G. W. R. Co., 84 Fed. 586; Brisco v. Mimah Consol. Min. Co., 82 Fed. 952; Ross v. Western Un. Teleg. Co., 81 Fed. 676; 30 Chic. L. N. 29; 52 U. S. App. 290; 26 C. C. A. 564; Mayer v. Thompson-Hutchin- son Bldg. Co., 116 Ala. 634; 22 So. 859, 22 So. 593; Farmers H. L. C. & R. Co. v. Westlake, 23 Colo. 26; 46 Pac. 134; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Bedell, 11 Colo. App. 139; 54 Pac. 280; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. U. S. 141; District of Cal. v. Derap- sey, 13 App. D. C. 533; 27 Wash. L. Rep. 87; 31 Chic. L. N. 217; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Price, 106 Ga. 176; 43 L. R. A. 402; 32 S. E. 77; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 283; McGregor v. Reid, M. & Co., 178 111. 464; 53 N. E. 323; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 28, rev'g 76 111. App. 610; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Heck, 151 Ind. 292; 50 N. E. 988; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 382; Cox v. Chic. & N. W. R. Co., 102 Iowa, 711; 72 N. W. 301 ; GENBEAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. act was the proximate cause of an accident or injury where other agencies intervened, depends upon whether such original act was the antecedent, efficient and dominant cause which put the other causes in operation. 13 §85. Proximate cause continued. — The maxim, .ansa proxima non remota spectator," is not controlled by time or distance, nor by the succession of events." But where an effi- 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 804; I AfL 121; 43 W. N. C. 389; 29 Pitts. Kansas City Car & F. Co. v. Sechrist, L. J. X. S. 310; Cochran v. Phila 5!) Kan. 778; 54 Pac. G88; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Wizell, 100 Ky. 235; 38 S. \V. 5; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 337; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 738; Stone v. Boston & A. R. Co., 171 Mass. 536; 41 L. R. A. 794; 51 N. E. 1; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 490; Smeizel v. Oda- nah Iron Co., 116 Mich. 149; 74 N. W. 488; 4 Det. L. N. 1111; Lam- beck v. Grand Rap. & I. R. Co., 106 Mich. 512; 64 N. W. 479; 2 Det. L. N. 536; Smithson v. Chic. Gr. W. R. Co., 71 Minn. 216; 73 N. W. 853; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 726; Aldrich v. Concord & M. R. Co., 67 X. H. 380; 36 Atl. 252; McCann v. & R. T. R. Co., 184 Pa. St. 565; 39 Atl. 296; Willis v. Prov. Teleg. Pub. Co., 20 R. 1. 285; 38 Atl. 947; State v. Ruth, 9 S. D. 84; 68 X. W. 189; Anderson v. Miller, 96 Tenn. :;:,; 33 s. W. 615; 31 L. R. A. 604; International ct G. X. R. Co. v. Downing, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 643; 41 8. W. 190; Thompson v. .Salt Lake Rap. Trans. Co., 16 Utah, 281; 40 L. R. A. 172; 52 Pac. 92; 10 Am. ifc Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 563; Isham v. Dow's Estate, 70 Vt. 588; 45 L. R. A. 87. 67 Am. St. Rep. 691; 5 Am. Neg. Rep; 106; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 13; Fowlka v. Southern R. Co., 96 Va. 742; 32 S. Xewark A- S. O. R. Co., 58 X. J. L. E. 464; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 642; 33 L. R. A. 127; 34 Atl. 1052; 4 250: 1 Va. S. C. Rep. 146; Crouse v. Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 382; Laid- Chic. & X. W. R. Co., 102 Wis. 196: law v. Sage, 158 X. Y. 73; 52 X. E. I 78 X. W. 446; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 679; 44 L. R. A. 216, rev'g 2 App. X. S. 780; Eoley v. East Flamborough Div. 374; 73 X. Y. St. R. 469; 37 X. V. Supp. 770; Kennedy v. Mayor, 73 X. Y. 365; 29 Am. Rep. 169; Meyer v. Haven, 37 App. Div. (X. Y.) 194; 55 X. Y. Supp. 864; Lehman v. Brook- lyn, 30 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 305; 51 X. Y. Supp. 524; Storey v. Xew York, 29 App. Div. (3 X. Y.) 316; 51 X. Y. Supp. 580; Laible v. Xew York C. & II. K. R. Co., 13 App. Div. (X. Y.) 574; 43 N. Y. Supp. 1003; Crampton v. Ivie, 124 X. C. 591; 32 S. E. 968; Berry v. Sugar Notch, 191 Pa. St. 345; 43 Atl. 240; Card v. Columbia, 191 Pa. St. 254; 43 Atl. 217: Heister v. Fawn Twp., 189 Pa. St. 253; 42 Twp., 26 Ont. App. 43. W Union P. R. Co. v. Evans. 52 Xeb. 50; 71 X. W. 1062. See also Alabama, G. S. R. Co. v. Arnold, so Ala. 600; East Tenn. V. * G. R. Co. v. Lockhart, 79 Ala. 315; Rickei v. Freeman, 50 X. II. 420; 9 Am. Rep, 267; Sheridan v. Brooklyn City A- N. R. Co., 36 X. Y. 39; 39 Am. Dec. 490; Jordan v. Wyatt, 4 Crat. | Va.) 151; 47 Am. Dec. 720. 14 Penn. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353; 4 Western Jurist, 254; Kel- logg v. Chic. & X. W. Ry. Co., 26 Wis. 223; 7 Am. Rep. 69. 77 §§ 86, 87 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. cient adequate cause has been discovered, that is to be deemed the true cause, unless some new cause not incidental to but in- dependent of the first shall be found to intervene between it and the first. 15 And where one of two causes combine to pro- duce an injury, both of which are in their nature proximate, one being culpable negligence of the defendant without which the accident would not have happened, and the other some ac- cident for which neither party is responsible, the defendant is liable in damages. 16 § 86. Proximate cause for jury. — The question as to the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily one of fact for the jury, 17 except where the evidence is not contradictory and the case is clear, when it may be for the court. 18 The determination, however, of the jury upon this question may be set aside, where it is clearly against the weight of evidence. 19 § 87. Natural aud proximate result of act complained of. — The object of an action for damages being to recover compen- sation for the loss or damage sustained, it is a general rule that in the absence of circumstances which would justify an award of punitive damages, only such damages are recoverable as are the natural and proximate result of the act complained of,* 15 Marble v. City of Worcester, 4 Gray (Mass.), 412, per Thomas, J.; Kellogg v. Chic. & N. W. Ry. Co., 26 Wis. 223; 7 Am. Rep. 69. 16 Leeds v. New York Teleph. Co. (N. Y. 1901), 64 App. Div. (1ST. Y.) 484; 10 Am. Neg. Cas. 435, 438, per Sewell, J., citing Sawyer v. City of Amsterdam, 20 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 227; Sheridan v. Brooklyn City & N. R. Co., 36 X. Y. 39; 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 619; King v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y. 83; Cohen v. Mayor, etc., of N. Y., 113 N. Y. 532; 23 N. Y. St. R. 509; 21 N. E. 700; Phillips v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 127 N.Y. 657; 3 Silv. C. A. 467; 38 N. Y. St. R. 675; 27 N. E. 978. 17 Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Zopfi, 43 U. S. App. 141; 19 C. C. A. 605; 78 73 Fed. 609; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Craig, 37 U. S. App. 654; 19 C. C. A. 631; 73 Fed. 642; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Needham, 32 U. S. App. 635; 16 C. C. A. 457; 69 Fed. 823; Colorado Mortg. & I. Co. (Colo.), 42 Pac. 42; Kitchen v. Carter, 47 Neb. 776; 66 N. W. 855; Pickens v. South Carolina & G. R. Co., 54 So. C. 498; 32 S. E. 567; Klatt v. Foster Lumber Co., 92 Wis. 622, 628; 66 N. W. 791, 793. 18 Schwartz v. Shull, 45 W. Va. 405; 31 S. E. R. 914; 5 Am. Neg. R. 496; Klatt v. Foster Lumber Co., 92 Wis. 622, 628; 66 N. W. 791, 793. 1 9 Kitchen v. Carter, 47 Neb. 776; 66 N. W. 855. 20 The Normannia, 62 Fed. 469, 481; Brantley v. Gunn, 29 Ala. 387; GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF KAMA' §87 and this is true whether the damages arise from the withhold- ing of a Legal right or the breach of a Legal duty," or whether the action be in conl ract or tort, 28 or whether the damages claimed are general or special.- 3 Again, if the damages are the natural and proximate consequences of the wrongful act, the degree of the probability of their occurrence is not to be considered. 31 The burden of proof, however, in an action for personal injuries, to show that the injury was the proximate result of the act com- plained of, rests upon the plaintiff." lint those damages which Kelly v. Altemus, 34 Ark. 184; 36 Am. Rep. 36; Anderson v. Taylor, 66 Cal. 131; 38 Am. Rep. 52; Chides ter v. Consul. Peoples Ditch I Cal. 56; Streeter v. Marshall Silver Min. Co., 4 Colo. 535; Gregory v. Brooks, 35 Conn. 437; '•»:) Am. Dec. 278; Bristol Mfg. Co. v. Giidley, 28 Conn. 201; Johnson v. Drummond, 16 111. App. 641; Bullman v. Ind. C. & L. R. Co., 76 Ind. 166; 40 Am. Rep. 230; Georgia v. Kepford, 45 Iowa. 48; Bosch v. Burlington & Mo. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 402; 24 Am. Rep. 754; City of Topeka v. Tattle, 5 Kan. 311; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Shook, 3 Kan. App. 710; 47 Pac. 685; Thorns v. Dingley, 70 Me. 100; 35 Am. Rep. 310; Noxon v. Hill, 2 Allen (Mass.), 215; Krueger v. Le Blanc, 62 Mich. 70; 28 X. W. 757; Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81; 100 Am. Dec. 100; Chamberlain v. Porter, Minn. 260; Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald & M. C. Co. (Neb. 1805), 62 N. W. 899; Lamb v. Baker, 34 Neb. 485; 52 N. W. 285; Warwick v. Hutchinson, 45 X. .1. L. 61; Kuhn v. Neeb, 32 N. J. Eq. 647; Ton Eyck v. Del. & R. Canal Co., 18 X. J. L. 200; 37 Am. Dec. 233; Cuff v. Newark & N. Y. R. R. Co., 35 X. J. L. 17; 10 Am. Rep. 205; Ehrgotl v. Ww York, 96 N. Y. 264, rev'g 06 How. Pr. 161; Baker v. Drake. 53 V V. 211; 13 Am. Rep. 507; Medbury v. X. V. & E. R. R. Co., 26 X. A'. 564; Knight v. Wilcox, 14 X. Y. 413, rev'g 18 Barb. 212; Walrath v. Redtield, 11 X. Y. 212; Lawrence v. Wardwell, 6 X. Y r . 423; Freeman v. Clute, 3 X. Y. 42 1; Nil.-s v. X. Y. C. & B. R. R. Co., 14 App. Div. (X. Y.) 58; 43 N. Y. Supp. 751; Foels v. Tona- wauda, 59 Hun (X. Y.), ^>1; 38 \. V. St. R. 126; 14 X. Y. Supp. 46; Hallock v. Belcher, 42 Barb. I N. Y.) 199; People v. Albany, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 524; Butler v. Kent. 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 223; Jackson v. Hall, 84 N. C. 489; Adams Exp. Co. v. Egbert, 36 Pa. St. 360; 78 Am. Dec. 382; Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strob. (S. C.) 525; 47 Am. Dec. 578; Collins v. East Penn. Y. & G. R. Co., 56 Tenn. 841; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, 16 Tex. Civ. A. 93; 40 S. W. 608; Dem. Pub. Co. v. Jones, 83 Tex. 302; 18 S. W. 652; Victorian Ry. Commrs. v. Coultas, 57 L. J. P. C. 69; 13 App. Cas. 22; 58 L. T. 390; 37 W. R, L29; 52 J. P. 500; Glover v. I.. A S. W. Ry., 37 L. J. Q. B. 57; L. R. 3 Q. B. 25; 17 L. T. 139; OByrne v. Campbell, 15 Ont. R. 339. - 1 Warwick v. Hutchinson, 45 N. J. L. 61. ■-'- Baker v. Drake, 5:*, X. Y. 211; 13 Am. Rep. 507. 28 Chamberlain v. Porter, 9 Minn. 260. -■» Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strob. (S. C.) 52:.; 17 Am. Dec. 578. 26 McCarty v. Lockport, 13 App. 79 §§ 88, 89 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. are the natural and proximate result of the injury need not be specially pleaded by him. 86 § 88. Proximate consequences illustrated. — The pay- ment of a tax charged against a person by an illegal alteration of an assessment list is a consequential injury resulting from the alteration and for which recovery may be had. 27 And there may be a recovery for damages caused by horses running away, in consequence of stepping into a hole in the street. 28 But damages caused by the ignition of oil negligently allowed to escape where such ignition is caused by the act of a third person are too remote, the negligence in permitting the oil to escape not being the proximate cause of the damage sustained r 9 nor is an injury to a crop resulting from the taking of an animal needed in its cultivation, a proximate consequence of such tak- ing ; :5 ° nor is deterioration from cultivation of the soil, where damages are claimed for clearing land of timber; 31 nor is sick- ness of an opera singer and loss of anticipated receipts in consequence thereof, where the action is for negligence in fail- ing to complete an opera house in time. 33 § 89. Natural and probable consequences — Those in con- templation of parties — Contracts. — In the application of the rule that the damages to be recovered must be the natural and proximate consequence of the act complained of, those results which the wrongdoer must have contemplated as the probable consequence of his fraud or breach of contract will be consid- ered as proximate. 33 Damages which are the natural and prob- able consequences of the breach of a contract, that is, such as may be said to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time of entering into the contract as a natural and prob- Div. (N. Y.) 494; 43 N. Y. Supp. 693. 26 Croco v. Oregon Short-Line R. Co., 18 Utah, 311; 44 L. R. A. 285; 54 Pac. 985. 27 Bristol Mfg. Co. v. Gridley, 28 Conn. 201. 28 City of Topeka v. Tuttle, 5 Kan. 311. 80 29 Neal v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 16 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 241; 4 Pa. Dist. R. 49. so Jackson v. Hall, 84 N. C. 489. 3i Brantley v. Gunn, 29 Ala. 387. 32 New York Academy of Music v. Hilton, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 217. 83 Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OP DAMAGES. §90 able result of a breach thereof, may be recovered. ' But it lias been held that an instruction is erroneous which fixes the 'lam- ages as such as both parties reasonably contemplated at the time of making the contract, since the facts being ascertained, the law and not the contemplation of the parties fixes the measure of damage §00. Natural and probable consequences — Torts. — In ac- tions in tort there may be a recovery of damages for those injuries which may be said to be the natural and probable consequences of the wrongful act complained of and proximately resulting therefrom.* But in this class of actions the rule is much a* Smith v. Holies, 132 U.S. 125: Gunter v. Heard. 93 Ala. 227: 9 So. 389; Swift v. Eastern Warehouse, 86 Ala. 294; 5 So. 505; Mitchell v. Clarke, 71 Cal. 163; 60 Am. Kep. 529; Brock v. Gale, 14 Fla. 523; 14 Am. Rep. 356; Stewart v. Lainer, 75 Ga. 582; O'Connor v. Nolan, 64 111. App. 357; Cincinnati & C. Air Line Co. v. Rogers. 24 Ind. 103; Graves v. Glass, 86 Iowa, 261; 53 X. W. 231; Blood v. Herring, 22 Ky. Law Kep. 1725; til S. W. 273; Dwyer v. Tulane Ed. F. Adm., 47 La. Ann. 1232; 17 So. 796; La. Rev. Civ. Code, sec 1934; Williams v. Barton, 13 La. 404; Furstenburg v. Fawsett, 61 Md. 184; Abbott v. Galch, L3 Bid. 314; 71 Am. Dec. 635; Wetmore v. Pattison, 45 Mich. 439; 8 X. W. 67; Hopkins v. Sanford, 38 Mich. 611; Hatchings v. Ladd, 10 Mich. 493; Pruitt v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 62 Mo. 527; Hyatt v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co.. 19 Mo. App. 287; Skirm v. Hilliker i N. J. Sup. 1901 |, 4:, Atl. 679; Booth v. Spuyten Duy- vil R. M. Co., til) N. V. 1ST; Hamil- ton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 72: 84 Am. Dec. 330; Taylor v. Read, I PaigefN. Y".),561; Billmeyer v. Wag- ner, 91 Pa. St. 92; Finch v. Heer- mans, 5 Luz. Leg. Reg. (Pa.) 125; State v. Ward. 9 Heisk. (Tenu.) 100; Fowler v. Shook (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 59 s. W. 282; Galveston H. &S. A. Ry. Co. v. Stovall, 3 Willson Civ. ''as. Ct. App. (Tex.) sec. 252; Cockburn v. Ashland Lumber Co., 54 Wis. 019; 12 N. W. 49; Hadley v. Haxendale, 9 Kxeh. 341; 26 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 398; Joyce on Elec. Law, sees. 823, 951, '■>■>-. 35 Collins v. Stephens. 58 Ala. 543. se McAfee v. Crawford, 13 How. (U. S.) 447: 14 L. Ed. 217; Frink v. Schroyer, 18 111. 416: Rillinan v. ind. C. & L. R. Co.. 76 Ind. 166; 40 Am. Rep. 230; Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426; 42 Am. Rep. 508; John- son v. Courts, 3 Har. & M. i Md.) 570; Derry v. Flitner, 118 Mass. 131; Watson v. Rheinderknecht (Minn. 1901), 84 X. W. 798; Hughes v. Mc- Donough, 43 X. .1. I>. 459; 39 Am. Rep. 60:',: City of Allegheny v. Zim- merman, '.'.". Pa. St. 287. " ordi- narily in actions of torts, the rule of damages is compensation in money for the damage sustained by reason of the natural and obvious eon- Bequences of the wrongful art. I believe the doctrine of remote anil proximate causes has finally re- duced itself to this. The wrongful aet is the proximate cause of all the -1 §90 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. broader than in the case of contracts. 07 Thus it is said that " the universal and cardinal principle in such cases is that the person injured shall receive compensation commensurate with his loss or injury and no more. This includes damages not only for such injurious consequences as proceed immediately from the cause which is the basis of the action, but consequential damages as well. These damages are not limited or affected so far as they are compensatory by what was in fact contemplated by the party in fault. He who is responsible for a negligent act must answer 'for all the injurious results which flow therefrom by ordinary, natural consequences, without the interposition of any other negligent act or overpowering force.' Whether the injuri- ous consequences may have been ' reasonably expected ' to follow from the commission of the act is not at all determinative of the liability of the person who committed the act to respond to the person suffering therefrom. As said in Stevens v. Dudley. ;i7a ' It is the unexpected rather than the expected that happens in the great majority of cases of negligence.' "^ Damages are re- damage, which ought reasonably and naturally to be expected from it. Always, however, the damage must be something which has a money value, and which can be estimated in money. . . . When, however, the element of malice enters into the wrong, the rule of damages is differ- ent and more liberal. I think it is equally well settled that in such cases there enters into the question of damages, considerations which cannot be made the subject of exact pecuniary compensation such . . . as mental distress and vexation . . . offenses to the feelings, insult, deg- radation, offenses against honest pride, and all matters which cannot arise except in those wrongs which are attended with malice." Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456; 22 Am. Rep. 475; 480, 481, per Cushing, C. J. 37 Mentzer v. Western Un. Teleg. Co., 93 Iowa, 572; 62 N. W. 1; 5 Am. Elec. Cas. 709. So it has been said that " Liability for breach of 82 covenant is less extensive than that for a tort, and involves only such consequences as are the direct and proximate result of the act com- plained of. There are certain arbi- trary rules in regard to such breaches, the principal one of which is to give compensation for what is actually lost, to make the damages correspond with the real injury sus- tained, but not to permit a recovery where the loss cannot be directly traced to the act done or omitted. It will be sufficient if the injury is the natural or necessary conse- quence of the act, but remote or merely possible consequences are excluded from consideration." United States Trust Co. v. O'Brien, 46 N Y. St. R. 238; 18 N. Y. Supp. 798, per McAdam, J. 37 a 56 Vt. 158. 38 Mentzer v. Western Un. Teleg. Co., 93 Iowa, 752; 62 N". W. 1; 5 Am. Elec. Cas. 716, per Deemer, J. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. § M coverable for the natural and proximate results of an injury, though the precise form in which they resulted could nol have been foreseen, 39 or though the full extent of the injury could not have been in the contemplation of, or anticipated by, the wrongdoer; 10 So where a wound is negligently inflicted upon a person, it is not necessary that blood poisoning be the ordi- nary effect of such a wound to permit a recovery therefor." And this rule has also been applied in the case of the sale of liquor to a person, 1 ' of dangerous explosives to a child," and where a landlord has broken into his tenant's store and removed the roof." §91. Remote, contingent and speculative damages. — The rule that recovery can only be had for such damages as arc tin- natural and proximate result of the act complained of, exeludes recovery for such damages as are too remote and are contingenl or speculative in character. 15 So in actions for breach of a eon- 39 Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251. 40 Louisville, X. A. & C. R. Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544; 14 N. E. 572; Bohrer v. Dienhart Harness Co., 19 Ind. A pp. 489; 49 \. E. 296; Sloan v.Edwards, Gl Md. 90; McGanahan v. New York, N. B. & H. R. Co., 171 Mass. 211; 50 N. E. 010; Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542; Christian- son v. Chic. St. P. M. & O. R. Co., 67 Minn. 94; 69 N. W. 640; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 86 ; Hoepper v. Southern Hotel Co., 142 Mo. 378; 44 S. W. 257; Graney v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 140 Mo. 39; 41 S. W. 246; 38 L. R. A. 633; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 187; Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strob. (S. C.) 525; 47 Am. Dec. 578. But see Coley v. Statesville, 121 X. C. 301; 28 S. E. 482; Miles v. Postal Teleg. Cable Co., 55 S. C. 403; 33 S. E. 493; Wilber v. Follansbee, 97 Wis. 577; 72 X. W. 741; The Nor- mannia, 62 Fed. 409, 481. 41 McGanahan v. New York, X. II. & H. R. Co., 171 Mass. 211; 50 N. E. 610. 42 Harrison v. Berkley, 1 Strob. (S. C.) 525; 47 Am. Dec. 578. «Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426; 42 Am. Rep. 508. 44 Allison v. Chandler. 1 1 Mich. 542. 45 N. Y. & C. Miu. Sign Co. v. Fraser, 130 l\ s. 611; 32 L. Ed. 1031; 9 Sup. Co. 665; Colin v. Western Un. Teleg. Co., 40 Fed. 40; Lehman v. Mc- Quown, 31 Fed. 138; Macomber v. Thompson, Fed. Cas. No. s.919; 1 Sumn. i I T . S. I 384; Evans v. Cincin- nati S. & M. R. Co., 78 Ala. 341 : Brig- ham v. Carlisle, 78 Ala. 24:',; 56 Am. Rep. 28; Goodell v. Bluff City Lum- ber Co., 57 Ark. 203; 21 S. W. 104; Wallace v. Ali Sam. 71 Cal. 197; 12 Pac. 46; 60 Am. Rep. 534; Mysore v. Quigley, 9 Houst. (Del. i 348; 32 Atl. 960; Washington A- G. R. Co. v. Amer. Car Co.. 5 App. D. C. 524; Reed v. Augusta, 25 Ga. 3S6; Con- sumers Pure Ice Co. v. Jenkins, ">s 111. App. 51'.'; Chapman v. Kirby, 49 111. 211: Williamson v. Branden- burg, 133 hid. 594; 32 V 1 834; Montgomery Co. V. A. Soc. n. Har- a §91 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. tract, remote or speculative damages should not be considered. 46 And in actions for personal injuries consequences which are con- tingent, speculative or merely possible are not proper to be con- sidered in estimating the damages. It is not enough that the injuries received may develop into more serious conditions than those which are visible at the time of the injury, nor even that they are likely to so develop. To entitle a plaintiff to recover present damages for apprehended future consequences, there must be such a degree of probability of their occurring, as wood, 126 Ind. 440; 10 L. R. A. 532; 26 N. E. 182; Winne v. Kelly, 34 Iowa, 330; Leffingwell v. Gilchrist, 40 Iowa, 416; Walrath v. Whittekind, 26 Kan. 482; Minneapolis H. W. Co. v. Cummings, 26 Kan. 367; Bergen v. New Orleans, 35 La. Ann. 523; Bohm v. Cleaver, 25 La. Ann. 419; Bridges v. Stickney, 38 Me. 361; Lannahan v. Heaver, 79 Md. 413; 29 Atl. 1036; Allis v. McLean, 48 Mich. 428; 12 N. W. 640; Mizner v. Frazier, 40 Mich. 59#; 20 Am. Rep. 562; Connoble v. Clark, 38 Mo. App. 476; Callaway Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Clark, 32 Mo. 305; Loeb v. Kamak, 1 Mont. 152; Denver, T. & G. R. Co. v. Hutchins. 31 Neb. 572; 48 N. W. 398; Watt v. Nevada Cent. R. Co., 23 Nev. 154; 44 Pac. 423; Clark v. Nev. L. & M. Co., 6 Nev. 203; Bern- stein v. Meech. 130 N. Y. 354; 29 N. E. 255, affg 54 Hun 634; 8 N. Y. Supp. 914; Medbury v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 26 Barb. (N. Y. ) 564; N. Y. Smelting & R. Co. v. Lieb, 48 N. Y. Super. Ct. 508; Boyle v. Reeder, 1 Ired. (N. C. ) 607; Rhodes v. Baird, 16 Ohio St. 573; Gaar Scott & Co. v. Snook, 1 Ohio Civ. Ct. R. 259; In re Yohe's Estate, 6 Phila. (Pa.) 293; Haak v. Wise, 33 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 322; Tappan v. Harwood, 2 Speer (S. C. ), 536; Post v. Orndoff, 7 Heisk. ( Tenn. ) 167; San Antonio Gas Co. v. Ilarber, 1 White & W. Cir. Cas. Ct. App. (Tex.) sec. 1125; Connelly v. Western 84 Un. Teleg. Co. (Va. 1902), 7 Va. Law Reg. 704; Burton v. Pinkerton, 36 L. J. Ex. 137; L. R. 2 Ex. 340; 17 L T. 15; 15 W. 1139; Woodger & G W. Ry. Co., 36 L. J. C. P. 177; L. R 2 C. P. 318; 15 L. T. 795; Scholes v North London Ry., 21 L. T. 835 Hobbs v. L. & S. Ry., 44 L. J. Q. B 49; L. R. 10 Q. B. Ill; 32 L. T. 352 23 W. 520; Cobb v. G. W. Ry Co., 62 L. J. Q. B. 335; 1 Q. B. 459; 4 R. 283; 68 L. T. 483; 41 W. 275 57 J. P. 437; C. A; Lynch v. Knight 9 II. L. Cas. 577; 8 Jur. (N. S. ) 724 5 L. T. 291; Sharp v. Powell, 41 L. J C. P. 95 ; L. R. 7 C. P. 253 ; 26 L. T. 436 20 W. 584; Nicosia v. Vallone, 37 L L. T. 106; P. C; Priestly v. Maclean 2 F. & F. 288; Hoey v. Felton, 11 C B. (U. S.) 142; 31 L. J. C. P. 105; I Jur. (U. S.) 764; 5 L. T. 354; 10 W 78; The Notting Hill, L. R. 9 Pi oh Div. 105 (Eng. C. A.); Dallea v. Tay- lor, 35 Q. B. (Ont.) 395. 4 « Gunter v. Beard, 93 Ala. 227; 9 So. 389; Reed Lumber Co. v. Lewis, 94 Ala. 626; 10 So. 333; Fonge v. Pac. Mail Co., 1 Cal. 353; Davis v. Fish, 9 G. Greene (Iowa), 406: 48 Am. Dec. 387; Harris v. Moss, 112 Ga. 95; 37 S. E. 123; First Nat. Bank v. Thurman, 69 Iowa, 693; 25 N. W. 909; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Ft. Scott, 15 Kan. 435; Read- ing v. Donovan, 6 La. Ann. 491; Code, art. 1928; Bullock v. Bergman, 46 Ind. 270; Vicksburg & M. R, R. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMA § 92 amounts to a reasonable certainty that they will result from the original injury. 17 But it is declared thai the mere fact that speculation or conjecture is resorted to will not prevent a re- covery of damages unless it is necessary to resort thereto." Nor are damages necessarily remote and speculative because to some extent uncertain and difficult of exact measurement. 41 Again, where the damages alleged in a complaint are too remote, it is held that the remedy is by motion to strike out instead of by demurrer. 10 § 92. Application of rule as to remote or speculative dam- ages, — Damages arising from the peculiar circumstances of the particular case, and not naturally resulting from a breach of contract, are not recoverable unless known to the person break- ing the contract. 51 And likewise there can be no recovery for the increased price of having logs sawed elsewhere, this being rendered necessary, owing to the defective construction of a sawmill, where it does not appear that this could have entered into the contemplation of the parties,'- or for a loss resulting from a sale of logs without being cut into lumber." So dam- ages for loss of profits on a shipment of goods, which a rail mud company was obliged to decline, because of noncompletion of work which contractors had agreed to have done by a certain time, are too remote and speculative in an action for a breach of the contract. 54 And prospective profits which might have been Co. v. Ragsdale, 46 Miss. 458; Booth v. Spuyten Duyvil It. M. Co., 60 N. Y. 487; Grubb v. Burford, 98 Va. 55:5; 37 S. E. 4; 2 Va. Sup. Co. Rep. 467. 47 Streng v. Frank Ihert Brew. Co. (App. Div. N. Y. 1900), 64 N. Y. Supp. 34; 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 650, per Woodward, J. See also Cicero & P. St. Ry. Co. v. Brown, 89 111. App. 318; Bailey v. Westcott. 16 N. Y. St R. 671; 4 N. Y. Supp. 67; 14 Daly, 506; Stroll m v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 96 N. Y. 805, rev'g 32 Hun, 20; Murtaugh v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 49 Hun (N. Y.), 456; 23 N. Y. St. R. 636; 3 N. V. Supp. 483; Cook v. New York Cent R. R. Co., 17 N. Y. St. R. 853. « Jacksonville v. Doau. 4S 111. App. 247. 49 Chew v. Lucas, 15 I ml. App. 595; 43 N. E. 235. 50 Norton v. Kumpe, 121 Ala. 446; 25 So. 841. 51 Brauer v. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co., 34 Misc. (N. Y. ) 127; 69 V Y. Supp. 465, order modified, ','■> N. Y. Supp. 291. See also Cockburn v. Ashland Lumber Co., 54 Wis. 619; 12 N. W. 49. w Bruhni v. Ford, 38 U.S. 328. &) Biuhm v. Ford, 33 V. S. 323. 54 Atlantic A- I). Ry. Co. v. Del. 85 § 93 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. made by the lessees of property, but for the failure of the lessor to rebuild as it was his duty to do are too remote and specula- tive ; B as are also profits not the immediate consequence of de- fendant's wrongful act.™ Again, where owing to the negligent alteration of a message in the course of transmission, a merchant is unable to fulfill a contract obligation, and as a result of such inability loss of business and customers ensued, damages for the latter result are too remote and speculative to be recovered. 57 So also, where, owing to the negligent delay of a telephone company in delivering a message to a witness to be present at a trial and testify, he failed to appear, and as a result of such failure it was claimed that the suit was lost, damages therefor were held to be too remote."'' And again, in an action to recover damages for unlawfully preventing a person from procuring lumber from accustomed sources, the expenses of travel to another place, in order to purchase lumber are not recoverable. 59 Nor is a wrongdoer, who has broken into a person's house and murdered a servant of the owner, liable for damages, because the owner's family has abandoned such house as a result of the crime, and that in consequence it has become worthless. 60 And where as a result of the negligent operation of a street roller a horse becomes frightened and a blood vessel in the heart is ruptured, which results in death, the city is not liable therefor." 1 § 93. Same subject continued. — Evidence is inadmissible in an action for personal injuries as to loss of capacity for the enjoyment of the pleasures of life, as it is too vague to furnish any basis for damages.'- So also in an action to recover dam- ages for the breaking of a leg, evidence of a hypothetical sec- ond fracture is inadmissible.'" And where damages are claimed Const. Co., 98 Ya. 503; 37 S. E. 13; 2 Va. Sup. Ct. Rep. 230. 55 Lightfoot v. West, 98 Ga. 546; 25 S. E. 587. 56 Morey v. Met. Gas L. Co., 6 J. & S. (N. Y.) 185. 57 Fererro v. Western Un. Teleg. Co., 9 App. (D. C.) 455; 24 Wash. L. Rep. 790; 35 L. R. A. 548. 58 Martin v. Sunset Teleph. & Teleg. Co., 18 Wash. 260; ,51 Pac. 376. 86 59 Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592; 23 L. R. A. 588; 36 N. E. 345. e° Clark v. Gay, 112 Ga. 777; 38 S. E. 81. 61 Lee v. City of Burlington, 113 Iowa, 356; 85 N. W. 618. 62 Locke v. International & G. N. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 60 S. W. 314. 63 Lincoln v. Saratoga & S. R. Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 425. GENERAL PKINTIPLES OF DAMAl § 94 for building a railroad nearer to a certain point than specified, the jury cannot consider such elements as danger from lire or the frightening of horses/' 1 And again, the fact that because of excavations in a street, the owner of property on such street has been unable to find a purchaser therefor, is too remote and speculative, 65 as are also injuries consequentially resulting to third persons who stand in no natural or Legal relation to the person injured.™ So also in an action to recover damages as a result of a collision of boats, there can be no recovery for in- jury to the health of a boatman due to exposure in voluntarily remaining aboard after the collision.* 17 And mental suffering because of inability to pay rent due is too remote in an action for personal injuries. 69 Again, it has been held that there can be no recovery of damages on account of the freezing of goods owing to the inability of the owner of land to construct a cel- lar for the purpose of holding such goods because of the pen- dency of a false claim to such land. 69 So also damages for the sinking of a vessel eight months after a collision are too remote to be chargeable to the collision. 70 § 94. Actual, compensatory and substantial damages. — There is said to be no distinction between actual and compensatory damages, 71 and as we have stated elsewhere, actual, perceptible damage is not indispensable as the foundation of an action. rJ But the measure of compensation, as based upon the testimony, limits the amount of recovery, 713 subject, however, to such right as the court may have in the premises and in the exercise of its discretion under the law to increase the amount of the verdict. 74 64 Hutchinson v. Chic. & \. W. Ry. Co., 41 Wis. 541. 65 City of San Antonio v. Mullally, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 596; 3:5 S. \\\ 256. 66 Gregory v. Brooks, 35 Conn. 4:17; .95 Am. Dec. 278. « The Brinton, 50 Fed. 581. 68 Planters' Oil Co. v. Mansell (Tex. Civ. App.), 43 S. W. 913. 69 Cormier v. Bouroue, 32 N. B. 283. 70 Grubbs v. The John C. Fisher (Pa.), 22 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 122. 7 ' Mogle v. Blatch. 5 Ohio C. C. 51. ■- Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 3 Story (U.S.), 189, per Story, J., quot- ed in Blanchard v. Burbank, 16 Bradw. (111. App. i 375, 383, per Bailey, J. 73 Cooper v. Lake Shore* M. S. R. Co., 66 Midi. 261; 33 N. W. 806; 10 W. 184. 74 Sullivan v. Vicksburg, S. A P. R. Co., 39 La. Ann. 800; 2 So. 586. 87 §94 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. Again, it is decided that a recovery of nominal damages is no bar to a suit for actual damages, where they did not take place before the commencement of the former suit. Successive suits for actual damages may be brought from time to time as they are sustained, and in each suit the party may recover such dam- ages as he has sustained prior to its commencement, not barred by a previous recovery. 7 "' liut a judgment for actual damages can- not, it is held, be rendered in an action for exemplary damages '° Again, the simple and direct mode of ascertaining the actual loss should be chosen where there are different modes of estima- tion or determination of the damages, in preference to a method which is complicated by many uncertain and hypothetical ele- ments. 77 Another general rule has been stated, viz ; that where damages have been sustained for a breach of contract, the plain- tiff is not entitled to recover all he could have made had the con- tract been fulfilled. ;s And for a breach of contract of sale the law imposes no damages by way of punishment. The innocent party is only entitled to recover his real loss. If the market value is less than the contract price, the buyer has sustained no loss. 79 So in an action for breach of a contract which contains no qualifica- tion or limitation* to the contraiy, the right to damages is unre- stricted and extends to the inclusion of all injuries, whether fore- -•■> McConnell v. Kibbe, 33 111. 175, 179; 85 Am. Dec. 265. w Cobb v. Columbia & G. N. R. Co., 37 S. C. 194; 15 S. E. 878; 12 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 251. If only actual dam- ages are asked on the trial in a suit for both actual and exemplary dam- ages, a charge that the jury shall "only consider the question of ac- tual damages " will be presumed to have been understood. East Line & R. R. Co. v. Lee (Tex.), 9 S. W. 604. "The Rossend Castle (U. S. D. C. D. N. Y.), 30 Fed. 462. 78 Bacon's Abr. (Bouv. 1854) "Damages" D. I. p. 64, citing Gil- pin v. Consequa, Pet. (U. S. C. C. ) 85; Shepherd v. Hampton, 3 Wheat, (U. S.) 200; Douglass v. M'Callister, 3 Cranch (U. S.), 298; Willing v. Con- sequa, Pet. (U. S. C. C.) 172; Yonqua v. Nixou, Pet. (U. S. C. C.) 221; Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 109; Hell v. Cunningham, 3 Pet. (U. S.) 69; Watt v. Potter, 2 Mason (U. S.), 77; Pope v. Barrett, 1 Mason (U.S.), 177; Blanchard v. Ely, ,21 Wend. (N. Y. ) 342; Boyd v. Brown, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 453. But see Bucknam v. Nash, 3 Fairf. (Me.) 474; Board v. Head, 3 Dana (Ky. ), 491 ; Nourse v. Snow, 6 Greenl. (Me.) 208. See also Short v. Skipworth, 1 Brock. (U. S.) 103, 114, per Chief Justice Marshall. Examine, however, chapters post, herein, on contracts. 79 Lawrence v. Porter (U. S. C. C. A. 6th C), 93 Fed. 62, 65, 66, per Lur- ton, Cir. J.; 11 U. S. C. C. A. 27; 22 U. S. A. 483; 26 L. R. A. 167. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OP DAMAi § '■'» seen or otherwise/ 1 So full compensatory damages may be given for breach of a covenant to perform certain ads, whereby a loss results to the plaintiff." 1 A special mode of compensation may, however, be fixed and so operate as to limit or qualify the recov- ery,® and compensation for the actual Loss governs in contracts of indemnity. 88 If the injury sustained is not the result of wilful or wanton wrong, compensatory damages only will be allowed. But a recovery lies to the full extent of an injury sustained by a passenger through a carrier's negligence/' So in tort gen- erally the damages should be a full indemnity commensurate with the injury or loss suffered,* although the amount of dam- ages awarded for an injury or wrong should not as a rule ex- ceed a fair or actual compensation, 81 unless there is malice, etc. 83 Again, if a jury determines the doubtful facts in the plaintiff's favor, and they should have allowed actual damages, a failure so to do will constitute a ground for reversal.® Sub- stantial damages may be awarded in an action for personal in- juries, even though no direct evidence of the amount of the pecuniary loss be given. 90 So in actions for such injuries it has been declared that the granting of compensation by an award of substantial damages should be encouraged to compel higher vigilance, 91 and such damages may be recovered for a continu- ous tort, even though nominal damages have been awarded in a prior suit therefor/- But they should be shown in trespass to 80 Allen v. Steers, 39 La. Ann. 586; 2 So. 199. But see Short v. Skip- worth, 1 Brock. (U. S. ) 111. bl Trenwith v. Gilvery, 50 X. J. L. 18; 11 Atl. 325; 10 Cent. 182. 8 2 Brown v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 36 Minn. 236; 31 X. V) 83 Wilson v. McEvory, 169. M Green v. Penn. R. Co. (U. S C. E. I). Pa.), 36 Fed. GG Maher v. Louisville, N. <>. & Co., 40 La. Ann. 64; 3 So. 462 941. 25 Cal. C. See also T. K. Phil- adelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 213; Day v. Wood worth, 13 How. (U. S.) 371. See sec. 89, herein. »6Purcell v. St. Paul C. R. Co., 48 Minn. 134; 50 X. W. 1034; 11 Ry. & Cup. L. .!. 111. M I'.ussy v. Donaldson, 4 Dall. (U. S. ) 20G. ^ T Milwaukee, St. P. R. Co. v. Anns, 91 U. S. 489; Stuyvesant v. Wilcox (Mich.), 52 X. W. 465. 88 Barry v. Edmunds, 116 V. S. 550. 89 Aiello v. Aaron, 68 X. Y. Supp. 186; 33 Misc. G80. 90 Clare v. Sacramento Elec. P. & L. Co., 122 Cal. 504; 55 Pac. 326; 5 Am. Neg. Bop. 115. 91 Scott v. l'enn. R. Co., 30 V V. St. R. 843; 9 X. V. Supp. 189; ease was rev'd; 41 X. V. St. K. 712. wStafford v. Maddox, 87 Ga. 537; 13 S. E. 559. 89 8 95 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. land, and they must be proven, unless only a nominal sum is sought.'" So they cannot recover against a vessel in an action by one injured by a fall where the evidence shows that no sub- stantial injuries were received, 95 and if the record shows an en- tire failure to prove in what sum, if any, the plaintiffs were damaged, there can be no recovery. 96 Again, if nominal dam- ages only are allowed, yet, if the plaintiff is entitled, if at all, to a substantial sum, the verdict will be reversed and a new trial granted. 97 § 95. Double, triple or treble, or other increased damages. — The legislature of a state has power to fix the amount of damages beyond compensation by way of punishment for negli- gence in performing duties necessary for the protection of per- sons or property, and the mode in which fines and penalties shall be enforced, whether at the instance of private parties or at the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts collected are matters of legislative discretion. Nor is it a valid objection that the sufferer from the negligence, in- stead of the state, receives such additional damages. Again, the exercise of swch power is not a taking of property without due process of law, nor does it den}'- the equal protection of the laws within the fourteenth article of the amendment of the constitution of the United States. 98 Some of the cases in 93 Ross v. New Home Sew. Mach. Co., 24 Mo. App. 353; Rich v. Rich, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 6G3; Benson v. Village of Waukesha, 74 Wis. 31 ; 41 N. W. 1017. 94 See sees. 76 and 77, herein. 95 The Ed. Roberts (U. S. C. C. A. 3d C), 34 C. C. A. 6S5; 93 Fed. 988. 96 Western Un. Tel. Co. v. Waxel- baum (Ga. 1901), 39 S. E. 443; 10 Am. Xeg. Rep. 254. 9 ? Gartner v. Saxon, 19 R. I. 461; Conrad v. Dobmeier (Minn.), 58 N. W. 870. Examine sec. 78, herein. 98 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, a case of fencing rail- roads; Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26. Under 90 Code, Iowa, sec. 1289, allowing double the value of stock killed or damages caused thereto, and by failure of rail- road to fence, etc., see for the under- lying principles stated in the text, the citations to the above cases noted in Russell & Winslow's Syllabus Digest, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. ; and that " it is competent for the legislature to provide for doubling damages." See also Fye v. Chapin (Mich.), 80 N. W. 797; 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 67, cit- ing Trompen v. Verhage, 54 Mich. 304; 20 N. W. 53; Cummings v. Riley, 52 N. H. 368; Chickering v. Lord (N. H.), 32 Alt. 773; Fitzgerald v. Dobson, 78 Me. 359 ; 7 Alt. 704 ; Barrett v. Railroad Co., 3 Allen (Mass.), 101. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. which double damages are given are for injuries from d< . injuries to stock ; '" embezzling money or chattels before admin- istration ; ' unlawful distress ; trespass ; trespass or trover in cutting timber and carrying it away ; * malicious prosecution to an employer by reason of a laborer or renter having being enticed away; 6 for unlawful detainer of Leased land, but the statute is directory merely; 1 for forcible entry and detainer," and for converting logs lying in a river, or on or near the bank there- of." The following are also instances of the allowance of treble or triple damages. Thus they may be given for in- juries to bridges;"' failure to observe the law of the road; 11 forcible entry and detainer; 1 " forcible exclusion from real prop- s' Riley v. Harris (Mass. 1900), 58 N. E. 584; 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 47; Pub. Suit. Mass. Oh. 102, sec. 93; Swift v. Applebone, 23 Mich. 252; Comp. Laws, 645. See as to constitution- ality of statute, Cliapin v. Fye, (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1900), 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 71; note, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 48; 80 N. W. 797; Fye v. Chapin (Mich. 1899), 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 67; Act No. 161 of 1850, sec. 5593; Comp. Laws, 1897. wo Stovall v. Smith, 4 IJ. Mon. ( Ky. ) 378, Act 1798; Wood v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co., 58 Mo. 109; Wag. St. p. 310, sec. 43; llollyman v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 58 Mo. 480. CSpauhling v. Cook, 48 Vt. 1(5; (Jen. Stat. ell. 51, sec. 10. * Hugill v. Reed, 49 N. J. L. (20 Vr.) 300; 8 Atl. 287. 3 Newcomb v. Hutterfiekl, 8 Johns. (N.Y.J342; Act, April 9, 1805, sec. 28, ch. 94. 4 Welsh v. Anthony, 4 Harris (Pa. ), 254. B Campbell v. Finney, 3 Watts (Pa.), 84; Acts, 1705. G Chrestman v. Russell, 73 Miss. 452; 18 So. 656; Miss. Code, 1892, sec. 1068. 7 Hall & P. Furniture Co. v. Wil- bur, 4 Wash. 644; 30 Pac. 665; Wash. Act, March 27, 1890. - Michau v. Walsh, 6 Mo. 346: Acts, 1837, p. 63; Feedler v. Schroeder, 59 Mo. 364; Wag. St. pp. 645, 646, sec. 22; Finley v. Magill, 57 Mo. A pp. 481; Rev. Stat. sec. 5108. 9 Parklmist v. Staples, 91 Wis. 196; 64 N. W. 882. 10 Shepard v. Gates, 50 Mich. 495; 15 N. W. 878; Comp. Laws, 1320. 11 Stevens v. Kelley, 66 Conn. 570; 34 Atl. 502; Conn. Gen. Stat sees. 2689-2691; Broschait v. Tuttle, 59 Conn. 1; 21 Atl. 925; 11 L. R. A. 33. '-Rimmer v. Blasingame, 94 Cal. 139; 39 Pac. 857; Iburg v. Fitch, .7 Cal. 189; Cal. Code, Civ. Pioc. sec. 1774; Wier v. Bradford, 1 Colo. 1 1; Lane v. Ruhl, 103 Mich. 38; 61 N. W. 347; Newkirk v. Traccy, 61 Mich. 171; 27 N. W. 884; How. Ann. Stat. sec. 8306; Bowser v. Melcher, 40 Mich. 185 ; Comp. Laws. sec. 6717; Shaw v. Hoffman, 25 Mich. 162; Missoula Elec. L. Co. v. Morgan 13 Mont. 394; 34 Pac. 188; Stover's V V. Annot. Code, Civ. Proc. sec. 1669; Labro v. Campbell, 56 N. V. Super. 70; Kirchnei \. New Borne S. M. Co., L6 N. V. Supp. 761; 12 N. Y. St. R. 907; O'Donnell \. Mclntyre, 2 NT. Y. St. R. 689; Pilaris v. (iere, 31 Hun 91 §95 GENERAL PRINCIPLES <>F DAMAGES. erty ; 1:! holding over lands or tenements; 11 failure of tenant to quit after giving notice ; B negligent setting out of fires ; 16 vio- lation of a patent right; 17 seizure by an officer of property ex- empt from process ; 1H vexatiously or maliciously suing or causing any action or special proceeding to be instituted in another's name, without the latter's consent ; w for certain trespasses * if wilful or malicious ; 21 trespass or trover in cutting timber and carrying it away," unless there was an honest belief by the tres- passer that the timber was his ; ^ cutting down, girdling or in- juring trees, timber or underwood; 21 waste by tenants in com- mon ; a or by tenant or guardian ; x permissive waste by a tenant (N. Y.), 443; Compton v. The Chel- sea, 139 N. Y. 538; 54 N. Y. St. R. 538; 34 N. E. 1090, rev'g 70 Hun (N. Y.), 361; 54 N. Y. St. R. 112. 13 2 Grantham's Annot. Stats. S. D. (1901) sec. 5813; Rev. Codes, N. D. (1899) sec. 5007. 14 Cal. Civ. Code (1899), sec. 3345; 1 Mont. Codes (1895), sec. 4351; Rev. Codes, N. D. (1899) sec. 5006; 2 Grantham's Annt>t. Stats. S. D. (1901) sec. 5812. 15 Cal. Civ. Code (1899), sec. 3344; 1 Mont. Codes (1895), sec. 4350; Rev. Codes, N. D. (1899) sec. 5005; 1 Grantham's Annot. Codes, S. D. (1901) sec. 5811. i« Calvin v. Gualala Mill Co. (Cal. 1893), 33 Pac. 94; Cal. Pol. Code, sec. 3344. i" Gray v. James, Pet. (U. S. C. C.) 394; Cross v. United States, 1 Gall. (U.S.) 26; Stimpson v. Railroad, 1 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 164; Welling v. La Bau, 35 Fed. 302; Lyon v. Donald- son, 34 Fed. 789. 18 Wymond v. Amsbury, 2 Colo. 213; Rev. Stat. p. 308, sec. 35. 19 2 Stover's N.Y. Annot. Code, Civ. Proc. sec. 1900. 20 Snelling v. Garfield, 114 Mass. 443; Genl. Stat. Mass. ch. 38, sec. 10; Brewster v. Link, 28 Mo. 147; King v. Havens, 25 Wend. (N. ,Y.J 4 ^>- 92 21 Barnes v. Jones, 51 Cal. 303; Michigan, L. & I. Co. v. Deer Lake Co., 60 Mich. 143. 22 w e i s h v. Anthony, 4 Harris (Pa. ), 254; Stover's N. Y. Annot. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 1668. 23 Alt v. Grosclose, 61 Mo. App. 409; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 645. See also Glenn v. Adams (Ala. 1901), 29 So. 836. 24 Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 3346; Annot. Code, Iowa (1897), sec. 4306; 1 Mont. Codes (1895), sec. 4352; Stover's N. Y. Annot. Code, Civ. Proc. sees. 1667, 1668; Rev. Codes, N. D. (1899) sec. 5008; 2 Grantham's Annot. Stats. S. D. (1901) sec. 5814; McCruden v. Rochester R. Co., 5 Misc. (N. Y.) 59; 25 N. Y. Supp. 114, aff'd 77 Hun(N. Y.), 609; 59 N. Y. St. R. 892; 28 N. Y. Supp. 1135, aff'd 151 N. Y. 623; 45 N. E. 1133; Humes v. Proctor, 73 Hun (N. Y. ), 265; 26 N. Y. Supp. 315; 57 N. Y. St. R. 284, aff'd 151 N. Y. 520; 45 N. E. 948; Lewis v. Thompson, 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 329; 73 N. Y. St. R. 776. 25 Hubbard v. Hubbard, 3 Shep. (Me.) 198; Stat. 1821, ch. 35. 26 Annot. Code, Iowa (1897), sec. 4303; Danziger v. Silberthan, 21 Civ. Proc. (N. Y.) 283 ; 18 N. Y. Supp. 350. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OP DAMAGES. >6, 97 in dower, although the allowance of such damages is discretion' ary; 87 using unsealed weights and measures, 9 and treble the value of moneys or valuable thing lost by gaming " at any nine or sitting." a § 96. Same subject — How fixed. — In New York, it double, treble or other increased damages are given by statute, the de- cision of the court or report of the referee must specify the sum awarded as single damages and direct judgment for the increased damages.* So in Connecticut the court increases the amount found by the jury to conform to the statutory allowance. 31 And in a comparatively recent Michigan case it was declared that " the presumption is that those damages are to be ascertained as in ordinary cases — if the trial be before a jury, by the jury ; and by the court when the jury is dispensed with." In this case the provision of the statute was that " upon the trial of any cause mentioned in this section, the plaintiff and defendant may be examined under oath touching the matter at issue, and evi- dence may be given as in other cases ; and if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court, by the evidence, that the defendant is justly liable for the damages complained of, under the pro- visions of this act, the court shall render judgment against such defendant for double the amount of damages proved and for costs of suit." ffi Upon a contention as to the constitutionality of this statute it was held operative in that the word " court " would be construed to mean •' the court acting through all its instrumentalities which includes the jury." 33 §97. Liquidated damages — Penalty. — Where the Code so provides, a contract liquidating damages is void, except where » Sherill v. Connor, 107 N. C. 543; 12 S. E. 588. 28 Shannon's Annot. Code, Tenn. (is; »ti) sec. 3480. 29 Johnson v. McGregor, 157 111. 350; 41 X. E. 558; 111. dim. Code, sec. 132. 80 Stover's N. Y. Annot. Code, Civ. Proc. sec. 1020. :!1 Broschart v. Tuttle. 59 Conn. 1; 21 Atl. 925; 11 L. R. A. S3. See Quimly v. Carter, 20 Me. 218; Lob- dell v. New Bedford, 1 Mass. 153; Burnham v. Strother, 60 Midi. 619; 33 \. W. 410; Warren v. Doolittle, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 678; Brewster v. Link, 28 Mo. 147. :! - Mich. Corap. L. 1887, sec. 5593; Act Xo. 161, of 1850, as to injuries by dogs. : « Fye v. Chapin (Mich.), 80 X W. 707; 7 Am. Neg. Hep. C>7, per Mont- gomery, J. 93 § 97 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. it is impossible or extremely difficult to fix the actual damages, and this applies to an agreement for a certain sum per month on account of deprivation of possession of certain premises, 31 although it is decided that parties may in case of breach of covenant liquidate the damages recoverable, 35 and also that if the damages are uncertain in their nature in respect to the per- formance or omission of a particular act, the parties may, by agreement, settle the amount of damages at any sum. 36 So a contract for purchase of personal property may validly provide for liquidated damages. 3 ' But it is decided that a stipulation of this character, to be enforceable as such, must be uncertain and not ascertainable by any satisfactory or certain rule of law.* In a recent case in New York, it was provided in a contract between an electric light company and the owner of a build- ing that a certain amount should become due and payable to the company as damages, if the company discontinued its cur- rent, either because the consumer was in arrears or failed to comply with the rules and regulations, or was, through the " fault " of the consumer, prevented from supplying a current according to the provisions of the contract. Under this contract it was held that* the company could not discontinue its current, and recover the liquidated damages merely because of a failure to use the electric lamps and motor while waiting for a tenant. •' Again, if it is clearly ascertainable from the terms of the con- tract that damages were to be paid in a sum agreed upon in case of its breach, it is a valid, enforceable agreement. 4 " But it must clearly appear from the contract, in order to have the pay- ment of a liquidated sum operate as a discharge, that such amount was absolutely to be paid and received in lieu of per- formance, 11 and if the contract expressly and unambiguously 34 Eva v. McMahon, 77 Cal. 467; 19Pac. 872; Cal. Civ. Code, sees. 1670, 1671. See Patent Brick Co. v. Moore, 75 Cal. 205; 16 Pac. 890. 35 Taul v. Everet, 4 J. J. Marsh. (Ky. ) 10. 36 Mott v. Mott, 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 127; Lampman v. Lochran, 19 Barb. I X. V. ) 338. i7 Halff v. O'Connor, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 191; 37 S. \V. 238. ' 94 38 Krutz v. Robbins, 12 Wash. 7; 40 Pac. 415; 28 L. R. A. 676. 39 United Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Brenneman (Sup. Ct. App. Term), 21 Misc. (X T . Y.) 41; 46 N. Y. Supp. 916; Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sec. 947. 40 Eakin v. Scott, 70 Tex. 442; 7 S. W. 777. 41 Gray v. Crosby, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 219. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. §98 provides for the payment of such damages, evidence of a con- trary intention is inadmissible.* So a valid stipulation for a liquidated sum limits the liability for a breach of the contra but there cannot be a recover}' of the amount agreed upon and the actual damages as well, 41 nor can it be shown that the actual damages were less, 1, nor will the covenant !»• extended by im- plication, hut will he enforced as far as applicable. 48 But if the damages are not agreed upon as liquidated and a penalty is fixed, the latter does not limit the amount of the recovery. '* The most important question, however, in this connection, is whether damages are liquidated or a penalty, and as this d. sion belongs to another part of this work, it will be treated in its proper place. § 98. Unliquidated damages. — As to unliquidated damages it is said." The rule upon the subject of liquidated and unliqui- dated damages we take to be, that where a precise sum for dam- ages is not agreed upon and is not of the essence of the contract between the parties, the quantum of damages is unliquidated and it is for the jury to assess them ; but where the precise sum has been fixed and agreed upon by the parties, that sum is the ascertained and liquidated damages, and the jury must assess that amount, no more, no less. ... In the case before us there were no damages agreed upon between the parties, there was not even a penalty named, and the only penalty for breach of the contract, or for negligence in the performance, was what the law would raise and the jury assess according to the circum- stances of the case . . . damages which may he gotten rid <>f altogether or mitigated by proof of circumstances cannot be liquidated," and the court held that a suit against a telegraph company for damages sustained by the failure of the company to transmit a despatch, ordering a sale of gold, was a claim for Shook, 21 J. & S. v. Fisher, 2 Hilt. 42 Perzi'll v. (X. V.) 501. 43 Townsend (N. Y.)47. 44 Harrow v. Cornell, 12 App. Div. i\. V.i mi l; 42 N. V. Supp. 1081. 4i McLean v. McLean, 15 Wkly. Dig. (N. V.i 1S1, rev'd on other grounds, '.it; N. Y. 652. 46 Leggett v. Mutual L. Ins. Co., 53 X. Y. 394, rev'g 64 Barb. (X. Y.) 23 47 So held in Noyea v. Phillips, 60 N. Y. 408. Hut see Beers v. Shan- non, 7.5 X. Y. 292, rev'g 12 Hun (N. Y.), 101. 95 s no GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. unliquidated damages* Claims for unliquidated damages may be settled by the court of claims in a case transmitted thereto by a department, and which involves certain controverted ques- tions of law and fact under a claim on contract. 49 Such dam- ages should not, however, be increased beyond the amount claimed in the ad damnum clause after verdict except upon new trial, where such clause contains the only indication of the de- mand, 30 and averaging estimates by the jury in an action for un- liquidated damages is not a ground for reversal, where they did not agree to be bound by the result, and the sum awarded is slightly in excess of such verdict. 51 Again, it has been decided that in an action for such damages where the defendant does not admit the same in his answer, the plaintiff must establish the amount of his claim, since the burden of proof rests upon him. 5 ' In England the debtor's act, 52a making invalid certain transfers with intent to defraud creditors, does not include as a creditor until after judgment is recovered, the plaintiff in an action for unliquidated damages. 53 § 99. Continuing damage and damages— Entirety of dam- ages. — Formerly where a trespass was of a permanent nature and the injury was continually renewed, the allegation was of a continuing injury from one day to another, and this was called laying the action with a continuando, the plaintiff not being obligated to bring a suit for every separate day's offense ; but if each one of several acts was complete in itself, it could not be laid with a continuando, yet if there were repeated acts of tres- pass, as by cutting down trees, they might be laid to be done not continually, but at different days and times within a given period. 54 So damages for trespass by cattle may be laid with a continuando as at common law, and any number of trespasses * 8 Smithson v. United States Teleg. Co., 29 Md. 162; Allen's Teleg. Cas. 885, 387-389, per Nelson, J. 49 Myerle v. United States, 33 Ct. CI. 1. 50 Sweet v. Excelsior Elec. Co. J.), 31Atl. 721. 51 McDonnell v. Pescadero & S S. Co., 120 Cal. 476; 5'J Pac. 725. 96 \. .M. sa Smock v. Carter, 6 Okla. 300; 50 Pac. 262. 52 a Act, 1869, sec. 13, sub. 2. 5 3 So held in Reg. v. Hopkin's C. C. R. (1896), 1 Q. B. 652; 65 L. J. M. C. N. S. 125. 54 8 Blackstone's Comm. (4th ed.) Cooley, *212, citing upon the last point Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. proved within the time specified." But if the injury directly results from a single act, all the damages must be recovered in one action, for successive actions cannot be brought." Again, in case of a nuisance, every continuance thereof constitutes a new ground of action with resulting damages, ' ; and where persons are sued for a nuisance, it is a repetition thereof to permit it to exist, and an action lies therefor." So successive suits may be brought for a continuing trespass as long as it continues." But if the damages are entire and susceptible of immediate recovery, the claim cannot be divided and successive actions be main- tained, for where it is of a permanent character, as in case of a continuing nuisance if the damage is original and may he at once estimated, one action lies for the entire loss. 1 * Again, in trespass quare clausum fregit and for cutting down and carry- ing away trees, the measure of damages is the amount of in- jury which the plaintiff suffered from the whole trespass taken as a continuous act.' 11 So continuing damages flowing from trespass before and after suit brought must, it is decided, be re- covered in one suit. 1 " And a vendee in possession of real prop- erty under executory contract of sale may recover the whole damage to the land by a trespass.'" So a mortgagor may recover compensation for the entire damage caused by a trespasser in an action against him before suit by the mortgagor.'' 1 But in Loeb, 118 111. 203. See also notes, 53 Am. Rep. 123-139; 59 Am. Rep. 351-369. 65 Richardson v. Northrop, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 85. * Porter v. Cobb, 22 Hun (X. Y. I, 278. See La Rue v. Smith, 15:5 X. V. 428, affg63 X. Y. St. R. 592. 57 Sloggy v, Dilworth, 38 .Minn. 179; 36 N. W. 451; 8 Am. Si. Rep. 856; Heckwith v. Griswold, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 291. See also Wager v. Troy Un. R. Co., 25 X. Y. 526; Phillips v. Terry, 3 Abb. Dec. (N. Y. ) 607; (5 Abb. U. S. 327); 3 Keyes (X. V. ), 313; Mahon v. New York C. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 658. See also City of Mans- field v. Hunt, 19 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 488; 10 O. C. D. 567; Quinu v. 7 Lowell Elec. L. Co., 144 Mass. 176; 11 N. E. 732; 4 X. Eng. 349. 58 Hockstrasser v. Martin, 62 Hun (N. Y.K 165; 41 N. Y. St. R. 761. "■" Savannah, F. & \V. R. <"■>. v. Davis. -'.") Fla. 917; 7 So. •_".»: 43 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 542. 60 So held in Stodghill v. Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co., 53 Iowa. 341 : Chicago A- E. I. R. (o. v. Loeb, 118 111. 203. 6i Foote v. Merrill, 54 X. EL 490; 20 Am. Rej>. 151. 62 Cook v. Redman, 45 Mo. App. 397. 68 Hueston v. Mississippi & li. R. Boom Co.. 76 Minn. 251; 79 X. W. 92. m Delaware & A. Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Elvins (X. J.), 43 Atl. 90:!. 9T §100 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. case of a nuisance, a judgment for defendant in trespass for damages to real property does not bar a like action for dam- ages subsequently accruing after commencement of the first suit, the premises having been repaired and there being new in- juries and also aggravation of old ones. 65 If, however, succes- sive actions may be maintained for a continuing trespass, the recovery is limited so as not to include damages under prior re- coveries. 66 Again,, a court of equity may interfere if the trespass is a continuing one, 67 but if the continuance is prospective merely in case of a nuisance, damages cannot be recovered therefor. 68 Other matters relevant to this question of continu- ing damage and damages are presented in the case of physical injuries and future damage's, as well as in entirety of damages under contracts, which are considered elsewhere herein under their proper headings. § 100. Excessive or unreasonable damages. ^-It is well set- tied that a verdict will be set aside or reversed where it is so much in excess of what the facts in the case and the law justi- fies that it is manifestly the result of passion, prejudice, partial- ity, sympathy, ignorance, corruption or misconception on the part of the jury, or where the damages are so large or unreason- able, or outrageous in view of all the circumstances of the case and the law, as to shock the conscience or moral sense, and thus clearly evidence that the verdict proceeded from some of the above-mentioned causes ; but the rule is otherwise if the above principles do not apply. 69 But a new trial need not be granted 66 Amrhein v. Quaker City Dye Works, 192 Pa. 253: 43 Atl. 1008. 66 Cumberland & O. C. Co. v. Hutch- ings, 65 Me. 140. 76 Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N. Y. 179; 13 N. Y. St. R. 110; 15 N. E. 67. 68 Whitmore v. Bischoff, 5 Hun (N. Y.), 176. 69 Harris v. Zanone, 93 Cal. 59 ; 28 Pac. 845, applied to punitive dam- ages in tbis case; Atlanta v. Marti u (Ga.), 13 S. E. 805; Pearson v. Zebr, 138 111. 48; 29 N. E. 854; Chicago City R. Co. v. Andersbn, 93 111. App. 98 419, afTd 61 N. E. 999; Pennsylvania Co. v. Greso, 79 111. App. 127; Chi- cago City R. Co. v. Fennimore, 78 111. App. 478; 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 520; Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Bink- opski, 72 111. App. 22; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 433; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kemper, 153 Ind. 618; 53 N. E. 931; 1 Repr. 1100; Courtuey v. Clinton, 18 Ind. App. 620; 48 X. E. 799; Elk- hart & W. R. Co. v. Waldorf, 17 Ind. App. 29; 46 N. E. 88; Bell v. Morse (Kan.), 29 Pac. 1086; Ft. Scott, W. & W. R. Co. v. Kinney, 7 Kan. App. 650, 53 Pac. 880; City of Ludlow v. GENERAL PRINCI I'LKs (>!• DAMAGES. 6 100 merely because the amount seems to the court to be excessive, nor because the court is dissatisfied with the award i 7 " but they must also appear to have been given under the influence of pas- sion, prejudice, etc., 71 and the court must be satisfied that such is the fact. 7 - Again, " in no case will the court ask itself whether if it had been substituted instead of the jury, it would have given precisely the same damages, but the court will simply consider whether the verdict is fair and reasonable, and in the exercise of sound discretion, under all the circumstances of the case ; and it will be deemed so unless the verdict is so excessive or outrageous with reference to those circumstances, as to demon- strate that the jury have acted against the rules of law. or have suffered their passions, their prejudices, or their perverse disre- gard of justice to mislead them." 73 So, "in all actions which sound in damages, the jury seem to have the discretionary power of giving what damages they think proper ; for though Mackintosh (Ky. 1899), 53 S. W. 524; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Dixon, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 792 (1883); 50 S. \Y. 252; 47 S. W. 615; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 827; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Donaldson, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1384; 43 S. W. 439; Peterson v. Western Un. Teleg. Co., 65 Minn. 18; 67 X. \Y. 646; 33 L. R. A. 302; 1 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 375; Chitty v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 148 Mo. 64; 49 S. W. 868; Wainwright v. Satterheld, 52 Neb. 403; 72 N. W. 359; Neb. Code, Civ. Proc. sec. 314; Consolidated Tract. Co. v. Graham, 62 N. J. L. 90; 40 Atl. 773; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 600; 17 Nat. Corp. Rep. 213; 58 Alb. L. J. 93; 31 Chic. L. N. 35; Robinson v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 63 N. V. Supp. 969; 31 Misc. 171, affVl 65 N. Y. Supp. 1144; Rowq v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 82 Hun (N. Y. ), 153; 63 N. Y. St, R. 753; Gale v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 13 Hun (N. Y.), 1; 53 How. Pr. 385; Kellow v. Long Isl. R. Co., 42 N. Y. St. R. 813: If, V Y. Supp. 676 ; Rlackwell v. O'Gnrman Co. ( R.I. 1901 ), 49 Atl. 28, and cases cited ; Vogel v. McAuliffe (R. I.), 31 Atl. 1; St. Louis & W. R. Co. v. Germany (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 56 S. YV. :>s t ; : International & G. N. R. Co. v. Hall (Tex. Civ. A]. p.), 21 S. \Y. 1024; Thirkfield v. Mountain View Ceme- tery Assu.. 12 Utah, 76; 41 Par. 564; Harrison v. Denver & R. G. W. I;. Co. (Utah), 27 Pac. 728; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Shote, 92 Ya. 34; 22 s. E. 811; Renne v. United States Leather Co., 107 Wis. 305; 83 N. W. IT:'.: York v. Canada Atlantic S. S. Co., 22 S. C. 167. 70 Smith v. Pittsburg & W. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. N. D. Ohio), 90 Fed. 783; 41 Ohio L. J. 113: 13 Am. & Kng. R. ('as. N. S. 716. See also Rompillon v. Abbott, 1 N. Y. Supp. 662; Chatts- worth v. Howe, 60 111. App. 55. 71 Mceks v. St. Paul, tit Minn. 220: 66 V W. 966. '- Russell v. Bradley (U. S. C. C. D. N. Y.), 50 Fed. 5 15. :; Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co., 2 Story (U. s. C. C. I>. Me.), 661; Fed. Cas. No. 17,516. 99 §101 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. in contracts the very sum specified and agreed on is usually given, yet if there are any circumstances of hardship, fraud or deceit, though not sufficient to invalidate the contract, the jury may consider them, and proportion and mitigate the damages accordingly." 7l § 101. Same subject continued — -If the verdict is clearly excessive in view of an agreed measure of damages, a reversal will be granted/' and so where it is in disregard of the charge to the jury as to the measure of damages; 76 so, where it is not sustained by the evidence and is excessive, 77 and the excess is not due to inadvertence, misapprehension of facts, error of law or error in computation by the jury. 78 But if tin allowance in excess of the amount admitted is based on conjecture, the ver- dict will be reversed, 79 although there will be no reversal where effectual or substantial justice is obtained by the verdict, 80 and a verdict for damages for personal injuries will not be disturbed as excessive, there being no legal measure of damages, 81 nor will it be reversed as excessive on a writ of error where the trial court did not disturb it. 83 But where the amount awarded is in excess of that recoverable on the good cause of action, one of the causes averred being bad, the verdict will be reversed. 85 Ao-ain, where the actual damages awarded are within the rule on which verdicts for excessive damages will be set aside, it will be presumed that the entire verdict, including exemplary damages, is influenced by the same motives, and even though the exemplary damages are remitted, there will be a reversal. 84 The fact, however, that a person who has received a personal 74 3 Bacon's Abr. " Damages " (D), 1. 75 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Whit- ley Co. Ct, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1307; 49 S. W. 332. 76 Tietz v. Philadelphia Tract. Co., 169 Pa. 516; 36 W. N. C. 469. "Green v. Barney (Cal.), 36 Pac. 1026; Ft. Scott, W. & W. R. Co. v. Kinney, 7 Kan. App. 650; 53 Pac. 880. 78 Ft. Scott, W. & W. R. Co. v. Kin- ney, 7 Kan. App. 650; 53 Pac. 880. n Van Auken v. Clute, 13 App. 100 Div. (N. Y.) 622; 43 N. Y. Supp. 1166. 80 City Bk. v. Mershon, 33 Fed. 240. 81 Newport News & O. P. R. & Elec. Co. v. Bradford (Va. 1902), 40 S. E. 900. 8 -' Pierce v. Van Dusen (U. S. C. C. A. 6th C), 47 U. S. A. 339; 78 Fed. G93. 83 Fish Keck Co. v. Redlon, 7 Kan. App. 93; 53 Pac. 72. 84 Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gordon (Tex.), 7S. W. 695. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. 6 102 injury, and has from mere ignorance, and not in bad faith, re- turned to work, and thus aggravated such injury, will not cause damages which have been rendered therefor to be reduced, al- though compensation for the injury is impossible of separation from the aggravation. 85 Another important factor is that the point must be properly brought up and presented on appeal or error or no relief is available.""' § 102. Voluntarily remitting excess — Remittitur by court. — The prevailing party may remit the excess where it is small and is due to miscalculation,* 7 or is nntsogreat as to indicate any improper motive,* or where there is an inadvertence of the trial court in directing a verdict for a few dollars more, the error is not available when first raised on appeal and the excess is vol- untarily remitted, 811 nor will there be a reversal where the only ground urged for a new trial is an excess which is remitted. 90 Again, the parties are not deprived of their constitutional right 85 Toledo Elec. St. II. Co. v. Tucker, 13 Ohio C C. 411; 7 Ohio Dec. 167. See 14 L. R. A. 677, as to excessive verdicts for personal injuries, and see extended note at end of chapter, post, herein, on personal injuries. 86 Curran v. Folley, 67 111. App. 54;'> : Stewart v. Butts, 61 111. App. 483; Crooks v. Hibbard, 58 111. App. 568; New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hamlet Hay Co., 149 Ind. 344; 47 X. E. 1060; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 291, rehearing denied, 49 N. E. 269; J. V. Farwell & Co. v. Zeuon, 100 Iowa, 640; 65 N. W. 317, aff'd 69 N. W. 1030; Briscoe v. Little, 19 Misc. (N. Y.) 5; 42 N. Y. Supp. 908; aff'g 41 N. Y. Supp. 1107; Q. W. Loverin- Browne Co. v. Bk. of Buffalo, 7 X. D. 569; 75 X. W. 92:); Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gaedecke (Tex. Civ. App. ), 39 S. \V. 312; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 707; Chosnutt v. Chism, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 23; 48 S. \V. 549; Third Nat. Bk. v. National Bk. (U. S. C. C. A. 5th C), 30 C. C. A. 436; 58 U. S. App. 148; 86 Fed. 852. 87 McCormick II. M. Co. v. Wesson (Tex. Civ. App.), 41 S. W. 725: 42 S. W. 328. See sec. 108, hereiu. 98 Chicago & K. I. K. Co. v. Clem- inger, 77 111. App. 186, affd 178 111. 536; 53 N. E. 320, citing Holmes v. Jones, 121 N. Y. 461; Hennessy v. District of Columbia, 8 Mackey, 220; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Dwyer, 36 Kan. 58; Peyton v. Texas & P. R. Co., 41 ha. Ann. 861; Howard v. Grover, 28 Me. 97; 48 Am. Dec. 478; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Duelin, 86 Tex. 450; Lombard v. Chicago, R. I & P. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 494; Phelps v. Cogs- well. 70 Cal. 201; Cogswell v. West Street & N. E. Electric R. Co., ". Wash. 46; Brown v. Southern 1". Co., 7 Utah, 288; Sioux City & 1'. K. Co. v. Finlayson. \u Neb. 57s ; 4 ( .i Am. Rep. 724; Kennon v. Gilmer, 9 Mont. 108; Ilutchins v. St. Paul. M. & M. R. Co., 44 Minn. 6. 89 Q. W. Loverin-Browne Co. v. Bank of Buffalo. 7 N. I). 569; 75 N. W. 923. *> Wall v. Posey, 105 Ga. 484; 30 1U1 8 102 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. of trial by jury by the affirmance of a judgment upon the re- mittitur of a suggested sum, 91 and the appellate court may af- firm a judgment on condition that a certain sum or certain items be remitted, 92 where the amount can be' ascertained by compu- tation, 93 or where the measure of recovery is not fixed by law. 91 But the verdict must be such as to come within the rule of in- fluence, passion or prejudice in order to be cured by a remit- titur. 95 Again, it is decided that the common-law rule that an excessive verdict may be cured by a remittitur has not been changed except in so far as the verdict is entirely vitiated by the Code provision allowing it to be set aside when given under the influence of passion or prejudice, 96 and in case of such sug- gestion or condition as to remitting a part of the award and a refusal so to do by the party, a new trial may be granted. 97 But it is also decided that if the verdict is the result of passion or prejudice, a new trial should be granted instead of a remit- titur beino- required. 93 " And where the record as brought to this court shows that in the judgment of the court below the sum awarded by the jury was in substantial excess of a just allow- ance and awarded without due and careful consideration, a re- trial of the case will be ordered, notwithstanding the remission of the sum deemed to be unjust." yy S. E. 729; Augusta R. Co. v. Glover (Ga.), 18 S. E. 406; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 269. »i Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Syfan, 91 Tex. 562; 44 S. W. 1064, aff'g 43 S. W. 551. 92 Rand v. Binder (Iowa), 75 N. W. 505. 93 Brown v. Doyle, 69 Minn. 543; 72 N. W. 814; Chouteau v. Suydam, 21 N. Y. 179. 9* Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Hynes, 21 Tex. Civ. A pp. 34; 50 S. W. 624; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 208. 95 Wainwright v. Satterfleld, 52 Neb. 403; 72 N. W. 359; North Chi- cago St. R. Co. v. Anderson, 70 111. App. 336. * Wainwright v. Satterfleld, 52 102 Neb. 403; 72 N. W. 359; Neb. Code, Civ. Proc. sec. 314. 97 Musser v. Lancaster City St. R. Co., 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 430; 12 Lane. L. Rev. 12. 98 Chicago City R. Co. v. Penni- more, 78 111. App. 478; 3 Chic. L. .1. Wkly. 520. "Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. Co. v. Richards, 58 Kan. 344; 49 Pac. 436; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 25, per Doster, Ch. J. See sec. 108, herein. See further as to remitting excess and remittitur generally. Kerry v. Pacific M. & S. Co., 121 Cal. 564; 54 Pac. 262, modi- fying 54 Pac. 89; McFadden v. Dietz, 115 Cal. 697; 47 Pac. 777; Scholfield G. & P. Co. v. Scholfield, 71 Conn. 1; 40 Atl. 1046; Ross v. Fickling, 11 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OK DAMAGES. §103 § 103. Where excess is small. — Where the excess is so small as to come within the maxim de minimis, there will be no re- versal ; 1 " nor where the excess is a few dollars more in a verdict of guilty in a prosecution for obtaining money under false pre- tenses. 1 But if the damages are substantially in excess of the App. I). C. 442; 25 Wash. L. Rep. 80(5; Dowdie v. State (Ga.), 29 S. E. 595; King v. Black Diamond C. Co., 99 Ga. 103 ; 24 S. E. 970; Spring Valley v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 173 111. 497; 50 N. E. 10(5!): 10 Nat. Corp. Rep. 887, rev'g 72 111. App. 629; 30 Chic. Leg. N. 164; Stone v. Billings, 167 111. 179; 47 N. E. 372, aff'g 63 111. App. 371; Kansas & T. Coal Co. v. Reid (Ind. Ty. App.), 40 N. W. 898; Newbury v. Gretchell & M. L. Mfg. Co., 100 Iowa, 441; 69 N. W. 743; Leavenworth, N. & S. R. Co. v. Meyer, 58 Kan. 305; 49 Pac. 89; Bealle v. School, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 475; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Louisiana W. R. Co., 49 La. Ann. 1270; 22 So. 219; Sloman v. Mercan- tile C. G. Co., 112 Mich. 258-264; 4 Det. Leg. N. 28; 70 N. W. 886; 26 Ins. L. J. 665; Chitty v. St. Louis, I. M. &. 8. R. Co., 148 Mo. 64; 49 S. W. 868; Warder v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530; 23 S. W. 776; Lenzen v. Miller, 53 Neb. 137; 73 N. W. 460, modifying 51 Neb. 855; 71 N. W. 715; Lawrence v. Church. 129 N. V. 635; 29 N. E. 106; 41 N. Y. St. R. 513; Carter v. Beckwith, 128 N. Y. 312; 40 N. Y. St. R. 343; 28 N. E. 582; Everett v. Akins, 8 Okla. 184; 56 Pac. 1062; Bricker v. Elliott, 58 Ohio St. 726; 51 N. E. 1096; Cochran v. Baker, 34 Oreg. 555; 52 Pac 520; Lantz v. Frey, 19 Pa. St. 366; Kidder v. Aaron, 10 S. D. 256; 72 \. W. 893; Crabb v. Nashville Bk., 6 Yerg. (Tenn. | 333; Fidelity & C. Co. v. Allibone, 90 Tex. 660; 40 S. W. 399; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Warren, 90 Tex. 566; 40 S. \V. 6, aff'g 39 S. W. 652; Texas Trunk R. Co. v. Johnson, 86 Tex. 421; 25 S. W. 417, aff'g 25 S. W. 740; Ft. Worth & D. O. R. Co. v. Measles, 81 Tex. 474; 17 S. W. 124; Tenant v. Cray, 5 Munf. (Va. ) 494; Kohler v. Fairhaven & N. W. II. Co., 8 Wash. 455; 36 Pac. 681; denying rehearing 8 Wash. 452; 36 Fac. 253; Roberts v. Bettman, 45 W. Va. 143; 30 S. E. 95; Reed v. Keith, 99 Wis. 672; 75 N. W. 392; Second Ward Saw Bk. v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250; 73 N. W. 31; 39 L. R. A. 569; Evaus v. Foster, 80 Wis. 509; 50 N. W. 410; 14 L. R. A. 117; Koenigsberger v. Richmond S. M. Co., 158 U. S. 41; 39 L. Ed. 889; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 751; Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U. S. 551; 38 L. Ed. 267; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Horn, 151 U. S. 110; 38 L. Ed. 91; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; North Ameri- can L. & T. Co. v. Colonial & U. S. M. Co., 28 C. C. A. 88; 55 U. S. App. 157; 83 Fed. 796; Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger, 7 C. C. A. 130-136; 58 Fed. 152-158. lw Tonstall v. Robinson (U. S. C. C. Ark.), 229. Excess of 29 cents no ground for reversal. Matthews v. First Nat. Bk. (Tex. Civ. App.), 36 N. S. W. 331. Nor an excess of 50 cents but the excess will be directed to be written off. Dannenberg v. Guernsey (Ga.), 7 S. E. 105. But an excess of $3 is not within the maxim. Cameron Sun v. McAnaw, 72 Mo. App. 196. See further, Cullanan v. Shaw, 24 Iowa. 441 ; Moffett v. Ayres, 3 N. .1. L. (2 Pen.) 65.'.. 1 Wax v. State (Neb. ), 61 N. W. 117. 103 § 104 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. amount that ought to be recovered, a new trial will be granted ; the word ''.substantially"* being used as opposed to the maxim, "De minimis non curat lex." And this rule obtains even though the setting aside of the verdict was not requested on that ground.' § 104. Evidence as a factor. — Evidence on appeal will sus- tain a verdict even though there are excessive damages where the prevailing party is entitled to anything, and the question of relief is not before the court. 3 Nor will there be a reversal where the judgment is for the right party, and is sustained by the evidence ; i nor where there is any legitimate proof in the record to sustain the evidence ; 5 nor where the amount awarded is authorized by the evidence and the court has charged the jury correctly as to the measure of damages ; 6 nor where the is- sues were fairly submitted to the jury, although the verdict is for as large an amount as the evidence will sustain ; ' nor where the instructions were that the jury were not bound to accept all plaintiff's testimony as true as to the extent of his injury, but should, upon all the evidence, award only such damages as they believed plaintiff fairly and justly entitled to receive and the plaintiff to pay ; s nor where the plaintiff fails to insert a statement that the case contains all the evidence; 9 nor where all the evidence is not returned on the question of 2 Rowland Lumber Co. v. Ross (Va. 1902), 40 S. E. 922. 3 Globe Accdt. Ins. Co. v. Helwig, 13 Ind. App. 530; 41 N. E. 976. 4 Evans v. Missouri P. R. Co., 73 Mo. App. 76; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 19. See also Messinger v. Dunbam, 62 Ark. 326; 35 S. W. 435; Grant v. Dreyfus (Cal.), 52 Pac. 1074; Kel- logg Newspaper Co. v. Paterson, 59 111. App. 89; Cone v. Smyth, 3 Kan. App. 607; 45 Pac. 247; Wilson v. Smith, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 927; 38 S. W. 870; Jobnson v. Parker, 58 N. Y. St. R. 332; 28 N. Y. Supp. 146; 7 Misc. 685; Caldwell v. Parker (Tex.), 17 S. W. 87; Montreal Gas Co. v. St. Laurent, 26 Can. S. C. 176; The 104 Robert Graham Dun (U. S. C. C. A. 1st, C), 17 C. C. A. 90; 33 U. S. App. 297; 70 Fed. 270; Muller v. Ryan, 2 N. Y. Supp. 736. 5 Murray v. Salt Lake City R. Co., 16 Utah, 456; 52 Pac. 596. 6 Berkson v. Kansas City Cable Co., 144 Mo. 211; 45 S. W. 1119. 7 Murphy v. Rementer (Pa.), 7 Del. Co. Rep. 203: 15 Lane. L. Rev. 270. 8 Christian v. Erwin (111.), 17 N. E. 707. 9 Hunt v. Webber, 22 App. Div. N. Y. 631 ; 48 N. Y. Supp. 24. See Reuhl v. Sperry (C. C), Ohio C. D. 688. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. §104 damage, 10 for the objection of excessive damages will not be considered on appeal in the absence of evidence ; :1 nor will there be a reversal where evidence is wanting that the jury acted corruptly or perversely, or that the damages are grossly excessive ; '' nor where there is evidence tending to show that the damages were in the amount of the verdict;" nor where, although the verdict seems too large, it is, nevertheless, within the estimates of competent witnesses ; M nor where, by the testi- mony of several witnesses, the damages aggregate the amount of the verdict; 15 nor where, in an action of trespass and injury to real property, the actual damages proven are less than one half the verdict, which is for a small amount, as an abstract sum; 16 nor where the evidence is conflicting and the amount is fixed by the jury below the highest and above the lowest estimate of the witnesses; 17 nor where some of the witnesses have fixed the damages at a larger sum than that given; 18 nor where, notwithstanding such conflicting evidence, there is sufficient testimony to sustain the verdict ; u nor where in such case the amount after remittitur was approved by the trial court and justified by the evidence, 20 for "whether the verdict is ex- cessive is to be determined solely from a consideration of the evidence in the case, and whether it will fairly sustain the con- clusion of the jury,"'- 1 although it is said that the appellate court will not weigh the evidence.- But a verdict will not stand on appeal which is for the largest amount justified by the evidence, 10 Davis v. Tribune Job Print. Co., 70 Minn. 95 ; 72 N. W. SOS. 11 Casey v. Oakes, 17 Wash. 409 ; 50 Pac. 53, Rev'g 15 Wash. 450 ; 48 Pac. 53. 12 Doyle v. Maine S. L. R. Co. (Me.), 13 Atl. 275. 18 Asher Lumber Co. v. Lunsford, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 559 ; 32 S. W. 166. 14 Home F. Ins. Co. v. Kulihuan. 58 Neb. 488 ; 78 N. W. 936. 16 Texas A P. R. Co. v. Turner (Tex. Civ. A pp.), 37 S. W. 643. 16 Zimmerman v. Bonzar (Pa.), 10 Atl. 71. 17 Calumet R. R. Co. v. Moore (111.), 15 N. E. 764. 18 Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Bourne (Colo.), 16 Pac. 839; Same v. Scbmidt (Colo.), n; Pac. 842. See Board of Street Opening, In re, 1 N. Y. Supp. 145; Clark v. Pope I Fla. ), 10 So. 586. 19 Lindeman v. Fry. 77 111. App. 89, aff'd 178 111. 174; 52 N. F. 851. -' Royal Ins. Co. v. Crowell, 77 III. App. 5 1 !. •-'' Harrison v. Sutter St. II. ('.>.. 11''. Cal. 156; 47 Pac. 1019; 1 Am. Xeg. Rep. 403. -- Thomas v. Snyder, 20 111. App. 140; 50 N. E. 398. 105 §8 105,106 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. unless there is a remittitur for the excess; 23 and it will be re- versed where it is not warranted in any view of the evidence, and there were errors on the trial, 24 although if exemplary dam- ages might have been allowed, the verdict will stand as to any excess of actual damages. 25 Again, even though there is no proof of special damages, the verdict in an action of slander will not be reversed where the excess is not such upon the facts as to show prejudice * § 105. Two or more excessive verdicts.— A verdict does not cease to be excessive because of repeated adjudications, for a wrong does not ripen into a right, and the last verdict will be set aside if grossly excessive in itself, 27 although it will not be disturbed in the absence of evidence that any verdict was ex- cessive, 28 nor unless it appears that the last award was excessive or unreasonable. 29 Again it is declared in a Wisconsin case that a decision as to the amount of damages recoverable on a given state of facts in a particular case when once rendered in this court is res adjudicata and absolutely controlling in such case, the same as a decision upon any other question. And a verdict for more than the amount once held erroneous, because excessive, cannot thereafter be held good upon the same or substantially the same evidence because sanctioned by a second or any number of juries. 30 § 106. In excess of amount claimed or of ad damnum clause. — The verdict and judgment should not be for a greater amount than the complaint, declaration or petition claims, or it 23 Carter v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co., 69 Mo. App. 295. 24 Bates v. British Amer. Assur. Co., 100 Ga. 249; 28 S. E. 155. 25 West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Mor- rison A. & A. Co., 1G0 111. 288; 43 N. E. 393. 26 Unterberger v. Scharf , 51 Mo. App. 102. 27 Consolidated Tract. Co. v. Gra- ham, 62 N. J. L. 90; 40 Atl. 773; 58 106 Alb. L. J. 93; 17 Natl. Corp. Rep. 213; 31 Chic. L. News, 35; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 660; 44 Atl. 964. 28 Covington S. R. T. R. Co. v. Piel (Ky.), 8 S. W. 449. 29 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Pearson, 82 111. App. 605. 3 « Collins v. Janesville (Wis. 1901), 87 N. W. 241 ; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 520, 529, per Marshall, J. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. § 10- will be reversed, 31 although the excess may be remitted,*-' or if the court correct it during the same term it is not error, 33 but the object ii in cannot be first raised on appeal ; 3I nor is it ground for reversal where the excess is merely for accrued interest pending suit; 35 nor will the verdict be disturbed where the amount thereof corresponds with the sum fixed by agreement during trial* Hut a new trial should be granted where there is no amendment during trial and the excess is not required to be written off, and so even though such excess is merely of interest on the damages claimed, 87 although it is held that the general rule does not apply where the judgment does not ex- ceed the ad damnum. 33 § 107. Inadequate damages. — If the damages are so grossly less or disproportionate as to come within the rule as to passion or prejudice of the jury stated in regard to excessive damages, 51 the court will reverse the same. So it has been decided that if the admitted facts are ignored as to the damages sustained and the charge of the court has been plainly disregarded and the award as found is insufficient, less than that claimed, is contrary to law and not supported by the evidence, the court will on ap- 81 See Flourney v. Childress Minor (Ala.), 9:5; Dinsmore v. Anstil Minor (Ala.), 89; Derrick v. Jones, 1 Stew. (Ala.) 18; Hogan v. Taylor, Hempst. (U. S. C. C. Ark.) 20; Hudspeth v. Gray, 5 Ark. 175; Gage v. Rogers, 20 Cal. 91; Palmer v. Reynolds, 3 Cal. 396; Smith v. Allen, 5 Day (Conn.), 357; Brown v. Smith, 24 111. 190; Gower v. Carter, 3 Iowa, 244; Rowan v. Lee, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 97; Gros- venor v. Danforth, 1(5 Mass. 74; I'ot- ter v. Prescott, 2 Hun (Mass.), 686: Pope v. Salsmon, 35 Mo. 3i>2: Beck- with v. Boyce, 12 Mo. 440; Excelsior Elec. Co. v. Sweet, 59 X. J. L. 441; Lake v. Merrill, 10 X. J. L. 288; Weed v. Lee, 50 Barb. (X. Y.) 354; Crabb v. Nashville Bk., (i Terg. (Term.) 333; Tenant v. Gray, 5 Muni. (Va.) 494. 82 Kerry v. Pacific M. S. Co., 121 Cal. 564; 54 Pac. 262; mod'g 54 Pac. 89; Excelsior Elec. Co. v. Sweet, 59 X. J. L. 44. 33 Holeman v. Coleman, 1 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 296. M Fidelity & C. Co. v. Weise, 80 111. App. 499; Grand Lodge A. O. & U. W. Co. v. Bagley, 60 111. App. 589; Hunt v. O'Brien, 59 111. App. 321; Cunningham v. Alexander, 58 III. App. 296. 86 Metropolitan Accdt. Ins. Co. v. Froiland, 101 111. 30; 43 X. E. 766; 25 Ins. L. J. 595, aff'g 59 111. App. 522. See also Lauter v. Simpson, 2 End. App. 293; 28 N. E. 324. 30 Wilson v. Panne, 1 Kan. App. 721 ; 41 Pac. 984. 37 Georgia R. & Bkg. <"o. v. Craw- ley, 87 Ga. 191; 13 S. E. 508. 88 Plato v. Turrill, 18 111. 273. 89 Sec. 99, herein. 107 §107 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. peal reverse the same ; * and where the damages can be definitely ascertained and the award is unreasonably small, the verdict will be reversed." So where the evidence of plaintiff, if believed, would necessitate a larger judgment or the evidence of defend- ant if believed would require a judgment for him. 42 Again, a new trial is proper where the instructions to the jury would au- thorize them to find a larger amount, 43 or where the verdict should necessarily have been for a larger sum than was rendered upon the issues and evidence, ** or where the plaintiff, if entitled to recover at all, is clearly entitled to a larger sum than that awarded, 45 or where the actual damages are proven with such certainty as to a reasonably definite measure of damages that the verdict is manifestly inadequate, 46 or where in general they evi- dence the result of passion, prejudice, etc. 47 But the appeal court must be convinced that the jury was influenced by partiality, passion or prejudice, or by some misconception of the evidence or the law. 48 And courts of appeal are not inclined to increase the damages unless they are manifestly insufficient ; 4!l nor will the judgment be reversed where there is evidence to warrant the finding of the jury ; m nor where the evidence somewhat con- flicts even though the courts 1 views do not coincide with the finding ; 51 nor merely because the verdict was based upon the lowest instead of the highest estimate; 52 nor where some of the 40 Koebig v. Southern Pac. Co., 108 Cal. 235; 41 Pac. 469. "Wilson v. Morgan, 58 N. J. L. (29 Vr.) 426. 42 Kina v. C. C. Bendall Commis- sion, 7 Colo. App. 507; 44 Pac. 377. « Distad v. Shanklin, 11 S. D. 1; 75 N. W. 205. 44 Yager v. Exchange Nat. Bk., 57 Neb. 310; 77 N. W. 768. 45 Hexter v. Cory ( Tex. ),18 S. W. 574. 4 « Hackett v. Pratt, 52 111. App. 346. 47 Dowd v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 132 Mo. 579; 34 S. W. 493. See also Townsend v. Briggs, 88 Cal. 230; Hanson v. Urbana & C. Elec. St. R. Co., 75 111. App. 474; Galloway v. Weber, 55 111. App. 366; Hackett v. 108 Pratt, 52 111. App. 346; Conrad v. Dobmeier, 57 Minn. 147; Warne v. Stanton, 12 App. Div. (N. Y.) 623; 43 N. Y. Supp. 1167; Bradwell v. Pittsburg & W. End Co., 139 Pa. 404. Coffin v. Varilla, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 417; Allison v. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 425. 48 Palmer v. Leader Pub. Co., 7 Pa. Sup. Ct. 594; 42 W. N. C. 556; 29 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 101. 49 Holmes v. Tennessee Coal I. & R. Co., 49 La. Ann. 1465; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 174. 50 Hercules Iron Works v. Elgin J. & E. R. Co. (111.), 30 N. E. 1050. 51 Brooks v. Ludin, 1 N. Y. Supp. 338. 52 Clarke v. Chicago, K. & N. R. Co. (Neb.), 37 N. W. 484. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. § 108 evidence would justify a smaller verdict ; a nor where a nonsuit should have been granted upon the evidence ; w nor where the testimony fails to show that greater damages wen- sustained or unless some rule of law has been violated; " or where tin- sum awarded is all that the only evidence legally admitted reason- ably warranted, even though the court may have been incorrect in his theory as to the measure of compensation:"* nor can a party complain as to the insufficiency of a master's allowance in his report where it was confirmed by the chancellor without ex- ception taken. 57 § 108. Excessive and inadequate damages— Power of court. — It is decided that excessive damages as a ground lor a new trial applies only to actions ex delicto.* In Illinois the 6:1 Beavers v. Missouri P. R. Co., 47 Neb. 761; 66 N. W. 821. 54 Cominskey v. Connellsville X. H. & L. St. R. Co., 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 431. 56 MeBean v. McCullum, 89 Hun (N. Y.), 95; 34 X. Y. Supp. 1003; 68 X. Y. St. R. 838. ■'"'■ Warrior Coal & C. Co. v. Mabel M. Co., 112 Ala. 624; 20 So. 918. « Reedy v. Weakley (Tenn. Cli. App.), 89 S. W. 739. See further as to noureversal for inadequacy of verdict, Broom v. Jennings, Kirby ( Conn. ), 392 ; Farley v. Gate City Gas- light Co., 105 G:i. 323; 31 S. E. L93; Roberts v. Rigdon (Ga.), 7 S. E. 742; Engel v. Fischer. 44 111. App. 362; Central Un. Telepli. Co. v. Fehring, 146 Ind. 189; 45 X. E. 64; I 'ax ton v. Vincennes Mfg. Co., 20 lnd. App. 253; 50 X. E. 583; Schwartz v. Davis. 90 Iowa. 324; Baldwin v. Dewitt, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1248; 43 S. W. 246; Linss v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Ky.), 91 Fed. 964; Benedict v. Michigan B. & P. Co., 115 Mich. 527; 73 X. Vv*. 802; 4 Del. L. V 967; Nel- son v. West Duluth ( Minn. i. 57 \. \V. 149; Murphy v. Rementer ( Pa. C. P. ), 7 Del. Co. Rep. 203; 15 Lane. L. Rev. 270; The George W. Clyde ( U. S. C. C. A. 2d C), 58 U. S. App. 10; 30 C. C. A. 292; 86 Fed. 665. See also note, 47 L. R. A. 33, under the fol- lowing headings : Inadequacy of damages as a ground for setting aside a verdict: (I.) Power and duty of the court as to; (II.) rule in con- tract actions: (III.) rule in actions with relation to property and prop- erty rights; (IV.) rule in actions for personal injuries: (a) generally; (b) actions for libel and slander; (c) ac- tions for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment; (d) actions for assault and battery and other torts; (e) actions for personal injuries caused by negligence: (1) general rules as to; (2) what sufficient to show bias or omission of duty — in- stances; (/) statutory provisions as tosmallness of damages for personal injury; (V.) effect of uncertainty as to cause of injury; i VI. ) who entitled to relief; (VII.) matters of proced- ure; (VIII.) increase of verdict by court. 58 Harvesting Mach. Co. v Gray (Ind.). 16 X. E. 7S7 ; Thomas v. Merry (Ind.), 15 \. E. 244. 109 §108 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. supreme court will not review the question of excessive dam- ages, 59 but it is determined in Louisiana that the supreme court may diminish or increase damages according to its judgment and reasonable discretion, based upon the facts in the particular case. 60 In Michigan the court may act upon its own motion where the award is insufficient and order a new trial. 61 In Missouri no power exists in the supreme court to set aside a judgment where the only reason is that the verdict appears larger than the evidence seems to justify. 62 Nor will the New York court of appeals whose jurisdiction is limited to the re- view of questions of law, 63 interfere with the insufficiency of an award unless, upon the uncontradicted evidence affected by no question of credibility, the award is inadequate, or a wrong principle has been adopted in admeasuring the damages to the prejudice of the prevailing party. 64 And so where the damages are excessive the remedy being in the lower court. 56 So in New Mexico the supreme court does not sit to pass upon the amount of the award of a jury, but only to correct errors on the trial;* nor will the supreme court of South Carolina review the refusal by a circuit judge of a new trial for excessive dam- ages ; 6T and so as to the Texas court of civil appeals, unless a manifest wrong has been done. 68 Again, in the United States circuit court of appeals the power is limited to the inquiry whether the instruction to the jury properly directed the mode of assessing damages. 69 59 Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Gaei- nowski, 155 111. 189; 40 N. E. 601, aff'g 54 111. App. 276; Goldie v. Werner, 151 111. 551; 38 N. E. 95. 60 Rice v. Crescent City, 51 La. Ann. 108; 24 So. 791. 61 Ft. Wayne & B. I. R. Co. v. Donovan, 110 Mich. 173; 68 N. W. 115; 3 Det. L. N. 369. 62 Fullerton v. Fordyce, 144 Mo. 519; 44 S. W. 1053; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 729. 63 Const. N. Y. (1900), art. VI, sec. 9; N. Y. Laws, 1887, ch. 507. 64 Slavin v. State, 152 N. Y. 45; 46 N. E. 321. "^Starbird v. Barrows, 62 N. Y. 110 615. See as to appellate term of New York supreme court, Tyler v. Third Ave. R. Co., 18 Misc. (N. Y.) 165; 41 N. Y. Supp. 523. See as to general term of New York supreme court, McHugh v. New York El. R. Co., 47 N. Y. St. R. 73; 19 N. Y. Supp. 744. 66 Schofield v. Territory, Amer. Valley Co., 9 N. M. 526; 56 Pac. 306. 67 Gillman v. Florida C. & P. R. Co., 53 S. C. 210; 31 S. E. 224; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 125; Dob- son v. Cothran, 34 S. C. 518; 13 S. E. 679. 68 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gibson (Tex. Civ. App. ), 38 S. W. 480. 69 Homestake Min. Co. v. Fullerton GENERAL PEINCIPLBS OF DAMAGES. §§ 109, 110 § 109. Excessive and inadequate damages — Trial court.— " It lias been repeatedly held by this court that if a verdict for damages is, in the judgment of the trial court, excessive and the result of inconsiderate judgment or unfairness of action, it is its duty to set it aside and award a new trial, instead <>f ordering a remittitur of the amount deemed to be excessive."" 1 ' But the trial court may in California direct a new trial unless the prevailing party remit the excess where, in the said court's opinion, the award is not sustained, by the evidence. 71 So in Georgia the appellate court will not interfere with the granting of a new trial by the trial court subject to the remitting of a part, where it does not appear that the verdict was required under the law and the facts, and a new trial had not previously been granted.'- Again, it is decided in Illinois that it is the trial court's duty to grant a new trial, in case of an exces- sive verdict, or to insist upon the excess being remitted, 7 ^ Again, a referee's report is conclusive like the verdict of a jury upon exceptions raised presenting questions of fact for the trial term. 71 And the appellate division of the New York su- preme court will not further reduce a verdict where, upon the trial justice's opinion, there should be no further modification. 7: ' So in Pennsylvania it is decided that the trial court and the ap- pellate court should determine as to a verdict being excessive or not upon the evidence. 7 * §110. Jury and instructions generally.— These questions are considered in this treatise in connection with the various sub- jects in which the points have arisen and will, therefore, be only generally noticed here. Thus a jury may award damages for (TJ. S. C. C. A. 8th C), 16 C. C. A. 545; 36 U.S. App. 32; 09 Fed. 923; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 596. See further note, 47 L. R. A. 33. 70 Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Richards, 58 Kan. 344; 49 Pac. 4:56; Drumm v. Cessnura, 58 Kan. 331; 49 Pac. 78. "Etchas v. Orena, 121 Cal. 270; 53 Pac. 798. 72 Harris v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 103 Ga. 495; 30 S. E. 425. 73 West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 73 111. App. 368; 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 125. 74 Drown v. Hamilton (X. H.), 44 Atl. 79. 75 Stemmerman v. Nassau Eleo. R. Co., 36 AppDiv. (N. Y.) 218; 5G N. Y. Supp. 730. 70 Powers v. Rich, 184 Pa. 325 ; 39 Atl. 62 ; 41 W. X. C. 407. Ill §110 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF DAMAGES. personal injuries even though no opinion has been given as to the amount." And they may be charged that the only question is as to the measure of damages where there is such conclusive proof of defendant's liability as to preclude a verdict for him. 7s And they may be instructed to award damages to the plaintiff if they believe ■ his testimony, there being none other. 79 But the jury must determine the measure of damages as a fact in accordance with the law. 80 If the instruction applies only to the amount of damages and there in no contention that the judgment is excessive, the charge is not open to objection. 81 And portions as to which there is no evidence as to damages may be eliminated and a requested instruction so modified. 82 So if the true general rule of damages is stated correctly and specific application thereof is made by other instructions, the charge is not erroneous even though turgid and redundant, 83 and where the verdict is for defendant no prejudicial error arises because correct instructions as to the measure of damages are refused. 84 But the party should request a proper charge upon the measure of damages, and if he omits so to do he cannot complain on appeal of the court's omission to so instruct. 85 Proper instructions, however, as to the compensation, do not cure errors in admission of evidence. 86 And a charge is erro- neous which permits the jury in estimating damages to con- sider offensive questions by counsel on cross-examination after warning. 87 So an instruction which requires too high a degree of care in preventing injury to property is erroneous. 88 « Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Lewis, 48 111. App. 274. 78 Union P. R. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U. S. 262; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 019; 38 Fed. 434. 79 White v. Blanchard, 164 Pa. 345; 30 Atl. 204; 25 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 103. 80 Parke v. Frank, 75 Cal. 364. g i Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Slanker, 77 111. App. 567, aff'd 180 111. 357; 54 N. E. 309. 82 Boggess v. Metropolitan St. R. 112 Co., 118 Mo. 328; 23 S. W. 159; 24 S. W: 210. 83 Nye & S. Co. v. Snyder, 56 Neb. 754; 77 N. W. 118. 84 Montgomery v. AVillis (Neb.), 63 N. W. 494. » Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cody (U. S. C. C. A. 5th C), 67 Fed. 71. 86 Kohue v. White (Wash. ), 40 Pac. 794. 87 Driscoll v. Collins, 31 N. B. 604. 88 King v. Miles City Irrig. D. Co., 16 Mont. 463; 41 Pac. 431. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. § HI CHAPTER V. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. § 111. Exemplary damages gener- ally. 112. Are in nature of punishment. 113. Are in nature of punishment, continued. 1 14. Where act punishable or pun- ished criminally. 115. Not as punishment but as compensation. 11G. Doctrine of exemplary dam- ages denied. 117. Same subject continued. 118. Plaintiff not entitled to as matter of right. 119. Elements necessary to justify. 120. Wanton or malicious act. 121. Malice sufficient to justify. 122. Gross negligence. 123. Actual damage should be shown. 124. Actions allowed in. 125. Instances when allowed. 126. Interference with exercise of personal rights. 127. Instances when not allowed. 128. In action on bond. 129. State may fix amount. 130. Where two or more defend- ants. 131. Against persons under legal disability. 132. Effect of death of wrongdoer. 133. Mitigation of damages. 134. Act done in exercise of a sup- posed right. 135. Against corporations — Ac- cepted rule. 136. Decisions holding ratification or. authorization of act nec- essary. 137. Same subject — Particular de- cisions. 138. Same subject — Illustrations. 139. Decisions holding ratification or authorization of act un- necessary. 140. Same subject — Particular de- cisions. 141. Same subject — Illustrations. 142. Against municipal corpora- tions. 143. Evidence as to motives. 144. Evidence as to financial con- dition of defendant. 145. Amount, matter of discretion with jury. 146. Instructions as to exemplary damages. § 111. Exemplary damages generally. — Exemplary, puni- tive or vindictive damages, which are practically synonymous, 1 though said to be wrong in theory, 2 are, nevertheless, allowable l Hurfurthy. Corp. of Washington, v. Drake, _> Mete. (Ky.) 140; 74 Am. 6 D. C. 288; Roth v. Eppy, 80 111. 263; j Dec. 406. Lowry v. Coster, 91 111. 182; Chiles I 2 Dougherty v. Shown, 48 Tenn. 302. 8 11;; S HI EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. in certain cases of tort. 3 Of this rule, allowing such damages, it has been said that tk although it has been occasionally resisted 3 Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58; 41 L. Ed. 632; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265, aff'g 74 Fed. 859; 13 Nat Corp. Rep. 6; Bary v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550; 29 L. Ed. 729; Conard v. Pac. Ins. Co., 6 Pet. (U. S.) 262; Boston Mfg. Co. v. Fiske, 2 Mason (U. S.), 120; Cowen v. Winters, 96 Fed. 935; Morning Journal Assn. v. Ruther- ford, 51 Fed. 513; New York, L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 50 Fed. 496; United States v. Taylor, 35 Fed. 484; Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Cunning- ham, 99 Ala. 314; 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 658; Floyd v. Hamilton, 33 Ala. 235 ; Me- Cullough v. Walton, 11 Ala. 492; Kirkser v. Jones, 7 Ala. 622; Clark v. Bales, 15 Ark. 452; Bundy v. Maginness, 76 Cal. 532; 18 Pac. 668; Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 3294; Ores v. McGlasher, 74 Cal. 148; 15 Pac 452; Waters v. Dumas, 75 Cal. 564; 17 Pac. 685; Nightingale v. Scannell, 18 Cal. 315; Wynne v. Parsons, 57 Conn. 73; 17 Atl. 362; Mason v. Hawes, 52 Conn. 12; 52 Am. Rep. 552; Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn. 529; Robinson v. Burton, 5 Harr. (Del.) 335; Jacobus v. Congregation of C. of I., 107 Ga. 518; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 434 ; 49 Cent. L. J. 307; ~4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 408; 33 S. E. 853; Barber v. Lainier, 82 Ga. 216; 8 S. E. 57; Coleman v. Ryan, 58 Ga. 1321; Ga. Civ. Code, sec. 3906; Harrison v. Ely, 120 111. 83; 11 N. E. 334; Roth v. Eppy, 80 111. 283; Donnelly v. Harris, 41 111. 126; Sherman v. Dutch, 16 111. 283; McNamara v. King, 7 111. 432; Binford v. Young, 115 Ind. 179; 16 N. E. 192; Moore v. Crose, 43 Ind. 34; Mullison v. Hoch, 17 Ind. 227; Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322; Anthony v. Gilbert, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 348; Thill v. Pohlmann, 76 Iowa, 638; 41 N. W. 385. See Iowa 114 Code, sec. 1557; Redfieldv. Redfield, 75 Iowa, 435; 39 N. W. 688; Fox v. Wunderlich, 64 Iowa, 187; Cochran v. Miller, 13 Iowa, 128; Annot. Code, Iowa (1897), sec. 4200; Hefley v. Baker, 19 Kan. 9; Malone v. Mur- phy, 2 Kan. 250; Tyson v. Ewing, 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 185; Bron- son v. Green, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 234; Chiles v. Drake, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 146; Webb v. Gilman, 80 Me. 177; 13 Atl. 688; Wilkinson v. Drew, 75 Me. 260; Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539; Blumhardt v. Rohr, 70 Md. 328; 17 Atl. 266; Elbin v. Dean, 33 Md. 135; Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Breinig, 25 Md. 378; Newman v. Stein, 75 Mich. 402; Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich. 445; Beck v. Small, 35 Minn. 465; 29 N. W. 69; Seeman v. Feeney, 19 Minn. 79; Fox v. Stevens, 13 Minn. 272; Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184; Higgins v. Louisville. N. O. & Tex. R. R. Co., 64 Miss. 80; 8 So. 176; Vicksburg& Meridian R. R. Co. v. Scanlon, 63 Miss. 413; Bell v. Morrison, 27 Miss. 68; Green v. Craig, 47 Mo. 90; Callahan v. Cararoto, 39 Mo. 156; Stoneseifer v. Sheble, 31 Mo. 243 ; Taylor v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 N. H. 304; 2 Am. Rep. 229; Magee v. Holland, 27 N. J. L. 86; 72 Am. Dec. 341 ; Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 524; Warner v. Press Pub. Co., 132 N. Y. 181; 43 N. Y. St. R. 633; 30 N. E. 393; Brook v. Harrison, 91 N. Y. 83; Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N. Y. 116; Voltz v. Black- mar, 64 N. Y. 440; Wort v. Jenkins, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 351; Walker v. Wilson, 8 Bosw. (N. Y.) 586; Bowden v. Bailes, 101 N. C. 612; S. E. 342; Louder v. Hinson, 4 Jones L. (N. C.) 369; Peckham Iron Co. v. Harper, 41 Ohio St. 100; Hayner v. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. §112 by text writers and courts, it has become by a great array of decisions so firmly rooted in the common law that it cannot be overturned except by an act of the legislature.'* ' ^ 112. Are in nature of punishment. — The question whether exemplary damages are to be considered as a compensatioo or are in the nature of a punishment has been much discussed. 22 Am. Rep. 303; Smith v. Ft. W. & C. R. R. Co.. 23 Ohio St. 10; Atlantic it Great \Y. Ky. Co. v. Dunn. 190hio St. 162; 2 Am. Rep. 382; Heneky v. Smith, 10 Oreg. 349; 45 Am. Rep. 143; Reynolds v. Braithwaite, LSI Pa. St. 416; 18 Atl. 1110; 25 W. N. C. 269; 47 Phila. Leg. Int. 426; 20 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 361: Baiuett v. Reed, 51 Pa. St. 190; McKnight v. Ratcliffe, 44 Pa. St. 168; Xagle v. Mul- lison. 34 Pa. St. 48; Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant ( Pa. ), 406; Hazard v. Israel, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 228; 2 Am. Dec 438; Kenyon v. Cameron. 17 R. I. 122: 20 Atl. 233; Wade v. Elec. L. & 1'. Co., 51 S. C. 296; 64 Am. St. Rep. 676; 29 S. E. 233; Quinn v. So. Car. Ry. Co., 29 S. C. 381; 1 L. R. A. 682; 7S. E. 614; Jefcoat v. Knotts, 1 Rich. L. (S. C.) 649; Genay v. Mor- ris, 1 Bay. (S. C. ) 6; Dougherty v. Shown, 48 Tenn. 302; Goodall v. Thurman, 1 Head (Tenn.), 209; Shannon's Annot. Code, Tenn. (1896) 5291; Biering v. First Nat. Bank, 69 Tex. 599; 7 S. W. 90; Shaw v. Brown, 41 Tex. 446; Stell v. Paschall. 40 Tex. 640; Camp v. Camp, 59 Vt. 667; 10 Atl. 748; Rea v. Harrington. 58 Vt. 181; 56 Am. Rep. 561; 2 Atl. 475; Ellsworth v. Potter, 41 Vt. 685; Nye v. Merriam, 35 Vt. 538; Spear v. Hiles, 67 Wis. 350; 30 N. W. 506; Pickett v. Crook, 20 Wis. 35S: Mc- Williams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424; Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Hause, 1 Wyo. 27; Mayer v. Frohe, 40 W. Va. 246, 249; 22 S. E. 58; Bell v. Midland Ry. Co., j 10 C. B. N. S. 306; Huckle v. Money. 2 Wils. 205; Beardmore v. Carring- ton, 2 Wils. 244; Sears v. Lyons, 2 Stark. X. P. 317; Merest v. Harvey. 5 Taunt. 442; Thomas v. Harris. 3 H. & N. 961; Emblem v. Myers. <» H. 6 N. 54: Skull v. Gleinster, 33 L. J. C. P. 185; Pearson v. Lemaitre, 5 M. & G. 700; Forde v. Skinner. 4 C. & P. 239; Doe v. Filliter, 13 M. & \V. 47; Brewer v. Dew, 11 M. & W. 625; I.eith v. Pope, 2 Wm. Bl. 1327: Caddy v. Barlow, 1 Man. £ Ryl. 275; Stein v. Belanger, Rap. .hid. Queh. 9 C. S. 535. But see contra, Greeley s. I,. & P. Ry. Co. v. Yeager. 11 Colo. 345; is Pac. 211: Murphy v. Hohbs. 7 Colo. 541; 49 Am. Rep. 366; 5 Pac. 119; llawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass 518; Smith v. Holcomb, 99 Mass. 552; Stowe v. Heywood, 7 Allen (Mass.), 119; Barnard v. Poor, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 378; Spear v. Hubhard. 4 Pick. (Mass.) 143; Wilson v. Bowen, 64 Mich. 133; Detroit Daily Tost v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447: Bank of Commerce v. Goos, 39 Xat. 437; 2:1 L. R. A. 190; 58 N. W. 84; Boldt v. Budwig, 19 Xat. 739; Riewe v. Me- Cormick, 11 Xeb. 263; Roose v. Per- kins, 9 Neb. 315; Boyerv. Barr,8Neb. 70; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 X. 11.456; Fay v. Parker. 53 X. H. 342; Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer. 2 Wash. St. 45; 25 Pac. 1072; 11 L. R. A. 689; 26 Am. St. Rep. 842; 2 Greenleaf on Ev. (16th ed.) sec. 253n. ♦McCarthy v. Miskern. 22 Minn. 90, per Cilfillan, C. J., 115 U12 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. The general rule, however, as sustained by the great weight of authority, is that such damages are allowed as a punishment and for the purpose of restraining others from following a similar line of conduct. 5 In those cases where the injury complained of is due to fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression, the law blends the interests of society and of the aggrieved individual and awards such damages as an example to the wrongdoer or others and for the purpose of deterring them from similar trans- 5 Lake Shore & M. S. Ky. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 107; 37 L. Ed. 101; Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Arms, 19 U. S. 489; 23 L. Ed. 374; Day v. Woodwartli, 13 How. (U. S. ) 371; 14 L. Ed. 185; Stimpson v. Railroads, 1 Wall. Jr. (U. S. ) 104, Fed. Cas. No. 13,450; Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 201; 51 L. A. 353; Tibler v. Alford, 12 Fed. R. 202; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9; 9 So. 375; Citizens St. R. Co. v. Steen, 42 Ark. 321; Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 3294; Dibble v. Morris, 20 Conn. 420; Beecber v. Derby Bridge & Ferry Co., 24 Conn. 491: Huntley v. Bacon, 15 Conn. 207: Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 230; Merrills v. Tariff Mfg. Co., 10 Conn. 384; 27 Am. Dec. 082; Peoria Bridge Assoc, v. Loomis, 20 111. 235; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Cbristison, 39 111. App. 495; Root v. Sturdivant, 70 Iowa, 55; 29 N. W. 802; Parkbnrst v. Mas- teller, 57 Iowa, 474; 10 N. W. S04; Ward v. Ward, 41 Iowa, 080; William- son v. Stage Co., 24 Iowa, 171; Hen- drickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa, 379; Titus v. Corkins, 21 Kan. 722; Ken- tucky Cent. R. R. Co. v. Dills, 4 Bush (Ky.), 311; Phila. Wilm. & Bait. R. R. Co. v. Larkin, 47 Md. 155; 28 Am. Rep. 442; Bannon v. Rail- road, 24 Md. 108: New Orleans & C. R. R. Co. v. Stathan, 42 Miss. 007; Buckley v. Knapp. 48 Mo. 102: Ken- nedy v. Nortb Mo. R. R. Co., 36 Mo. 351; Fobrmann v. Consol. Tract. Co. 116 (N. J. ), 43 Atl. 892; Am. Neg. Rep. 001; Voltz v. Blackmar, 04 N. Y. 444; Millard v. Brown. 35 N. Y. 297; Etcliberry v. Levielle, 2 Hilt. ( N. Y.) 40; Tifft v. Culver, 3 Hill (N. Y.), 180; Wallace v. Mayor, 2 Hilt. (N. Y. ) 440; 9 Abb. Pr. 40; Sullivan v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 12 Oreg. 392; 7 Pac. 508; 53 Am. Rep. 304; Johnson v. Allen, 100 N. C. 131; Reeves v. Winn, 97 N. C. 246; Gillreath v. Allen, 10 lied. (N. C.) 07; Pitts. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Lyon, 123 Pa. St. 140; 10 Atl. 007; 2 L. R. A. 489; 10 Am. St. Rep. 517; Hodgson v. Mill ward, 3 Grant (Pa.), 400; Hagan v. Prov. & W. R. Co., 3 R. I. 88, 91; Samuels v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 35 S. C. 493; 14 S. E. 943; Louisville, N. & Gt. So. R. R. Co. v. Guinan, 11 Lea (Tenn. ), 98; 47 Am. Rep. 279; Dougherty v. Sbown, 1 Heisk. (Tenn.) 302; Cox v. Crumley, 5 Lea (Tenn.), 529; Polk v. Fancber, 1 Head (Tenn.), 336; Rogers v. Ferguson, 36 Tex. 544; Claiborne v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 40 W. Va. 303; 33 S. E. 202; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 217; Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W. Va. 246; 22 S. E. 58 (in West Virginia tbese two cases overrule the former decisions of Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220; 6 S. E. 485; Beck v. Thompson. 31 W. Va. 459: 13 Am. St. Rep. 870; 7 S. E. 447); Mc Williams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424; Clissold v. Machell, 26 Up. Can. q. 427. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. § 113 actions/' In several states, however, the rule has been affirmed that though punitory damages are those allowed beyond a com- pensation, they are not in the nature of a public punishment but are based upon the act as a tort. 1 And it has been held improper to charge the jury that "you may give what is called vindict- ive damages, that is, such damages as will satisfy the highly excited feelings of the party injured." 8 § 113. Are in nature of punishment, continued.— The doc- trine that such damages are allowed as an example or by way of punishment has been repeatedly affirmed in the federal courts. 9 So in the United States supreme court it has been de- clared that, "in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of the offense rather than the measure of compensa- tion to the plaintiff. We are aware that the propriety of this doctrine has been questioned by some writers, but if repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best exposition of what the law is, the question will not admit of argument. ... In actions of trespass where the in- jury has been wanton and malicious, or gross and outrageous, courts permit juries to give in addition to the measured com- pensation of the plaintiff, which he would have been entitled to recover had the injury been inflicted without design or in- tention, something further by way of punishment or example which has sometimes been called smart money. This has al- ways been left to the discretion of the jury as the degree of the punishment to be thus inflicted must depend on the pecu- liar circumstances of each case." 10 And again in another deci- sion in this court it was said that ''jurists have chosen to place this doctrine on the ground, not that the sufferer is to berecom- « Louisville, X. & Ot. So. R. R. Co. v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282; 28 Am. v. Guinan, 11 Lea (Tenn.), 08; 47 Am. Rep. 270. 7 Humphries v. Johnson, 'JO Ind. 190; Ilendricksou v. Kingsbury, _'l [owa, 870; Chiles v. Drake, no Ky. 146; 74 Am. Dec. 400; City of Lowell V. Short, 4Cush. (Mass.) 27.">; Brown Rep. 582, s . I. »nes v. Turpin, ii Eeisk. | Tenn. i 181. 9 See cases cited in preceding uote. 10 Day v. Woodworth, 13 Bow. (U. S.) 371; 14 L. Ed. 185, per Mr. Justice Grier. 117 $113 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. pensed, but that the offender is to be punished, and although the soundness of it has been questioned, it must be accepted as the general rule in England and in most of the states of this country." " The words of the court in a New York decision are also pertinent in this connection^ it being declared that "in vindictive actions, as they are sometimes termed, such as libel, assault and battery, and false imprisonment, the conduct and motive of the defendant is open to inquiry with a view to the assessment of damages ; and if the defendant in committing the wrong complained of, acted recklessly or wilfully and ma- liciously with a design to oppress and injure the plaintiff, the jury in fixing the damages may disregard the rule of compen- sation, and beyond that may, as a punishment to the defendant and as a protection to society against a violation of personal rights and social order, award such additional damages as in their discretion they may deem proper. The same rule has been held to apply in the case of wilful injury to property, and in actions of tort founded upon negligence amounting to misconduct and recklessness." 12 And in an early decision in North Carolina words of similar import are also used. In this case it was said that, " in actions of tort where there are cir- cumstances of aggravation, juries are not restricted in the measure of damages to the mere compensation for the injury sustained, but may, in their discretion, increase the amount according to the degree of malice by which the evidence shows the defendant was actuated, the extent of the injury intended, and not that which was really inflicted. Accordingly, juries are told in many cases they may give exemplary damages, that is, such as will make an example of the defendant, or vindict- ive damages or smart money, terms which explain themselves. . . . Injuries sustained by a personal insult or attempt to de- stroy character, are matters which cannot be regulated by dol- lars and cents. It is fortunate that while juries endeavor to give ample compensation for the injury actually sustained, they 11 Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489; 23 L. Ed. 374, per Mr. Justice Davis. i' 2 Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N. Y. 444, Bennett, 19 N. Y. 174; Taylor v. Church, 8 N. Y. 460; Burr v. Burr, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 207; Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 466; Tifft v. Culver, per Andrews, J. See also Millard 3 Hill (N. Y.), 180; King v. Root, v. Brown, 35 N. Y. 297; Hunt v. I 4 Wend. (N. T.) 113. 118 KXKMI'LAUY DAMAGES. §114 are allowed such full discretion as to make verdicts to deter others from flagrant violations of social duty, otherwise there would be many injuries without adequate remedy." 13 So, also, this doctrine has been affirmed in the Connecticut cases by the statement that "there is no principle better established, and no practice more universal, than that vindictive damages or smart money may be, and is, awarded by the verdicts <>i juries in cases of wanton or malicious injuries, and whether the form of the action be trespass or case." 14 And it has been said in a Missouri decision that " this is now the general and almost universal doctrine and is thoroughly imbedded in the jurispru- dence of this state." v ' § 114. Where act punishable, or punished criminally.— The objection has been raised in some jurisdictions, that if the act of the defendant may also be punished, or has been punished criminally, exemplary damages should not be given, since this would be an infliction upon him of two punishments for the same offense, in violation of his legal rights. Though much has been said in favor of such a rule, yet the courts have generally adhered to the doctrine that the fact that the defendant is pun- ishable, or has been punished criminally, for the act causing the loss or injury, should not defeat an allowance of exemplary dam- ages. The latter though being in the nature of a punishment are, nevertheless, incidentally compensatory for the wrongful act of the defendant, and such damages, though being also penal, yet are for the wrongful injury to the individual, while the punish- ment inflicted criminally is for the injury caused to society at "Gilreath v. Allen, 10 Ired. (N. C.) 67, per Pearson, J. See also Johnson v. Allen, 100 N. C. 131; 5 S. E. 666; Reeves v. Winn, 97 X. C. 246; Smith- wick v. Ward, 7 Jones (N. C), 64; McAnlay v. Birkhead, 13 lred. L. (N. C.) 28; Howell v. Howell, 10 Ired. L. (N. C.) 84. i* Lindsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 23t>; 38 Am. Dee. 79, per Church, J. See also Denison v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 578; Edwards v. Beach, 3 Day (Conn.), 447. is Buckley v. Kuapp, 48 Mo. 162, per Wagner, J. See also Franz v. Hilterbraiul, 4:> Mo. 121; Callaghan v. Cafferata, 39 Mo. 137; Kennedy v. North Mo. R. R. Co.. 36 Mo. 351; Freidenheit v. Edmundson, 36 Bfo. ■jl'7 ; 88 Am. Dec. 141; Walker v. Borland, 21 Mo. --'89; Corwin v. Wal- ter, 18 Mo. 7:1; Millmni v. Beach, 14 Mo. 104; Von Fragstein v. Windier, •l Mo. A.pp. 588; but see opinion ex- pressed in BfcEeOD v. Citizens St. Ry. Co., 42 Mo. 79. 119 §114 EXEMPLAR? DAMAGES. large for the same wrongful act."' In an early case in New York it is said in this connection that, "in vindictive actions jurors are always authorized to give exemplary damages where the injury is attended with circumstances of aggravation; and the rule is laid down without the qualification that we are to regard either the possible or actual punishment of the defendant by indictment and conviction at the suit of the people. That the criminal suit is not a bar to the civil, and that no court will drive the prosecutor to elect between them if the former be by indictment, is entirely settled. . . . He may proceed by both at the same time ; nor will the court even stay proceedings in the civil prosecution to govern themselves, by the event of a pend- ing criminal prosecution. . . . We concede that smart money allowed by a jury and a fine imposed at the suit of the people, depend on the same principle. Both are penal and intended to is Brown v. Evans, 17 Fed. 912; Wilson v. Middleton, 2 Cal. 54; Howlett v. Tuttle, 15 Colo. 454; 24 Pac. 921; Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117; 45 Am. Rep. 12; Jefferson v. Adams, 4 Harr. (Del.) 321; Brannon v. Silvernail, 81 111. 434; Ward v. Ward, 41 Iowa, 686; Garland v. Wholeham, 26 Iowa, 185; Hendrick- sou v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa, 379; Jockers v. Borgmaun, 29 Kan. 109; 44 Am. Rep. 625; Chiles v. Drake, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 146; 74 Am. Dec. 406; Johnson v. Smith, 64 Me. 553; Boetch- er v. Staples, 27 Minn. 306; 38 Am. Rep. 295; 7 N. W. 263; Wheatley v. Thorn, 23 Miss. 62; Baldwin v. Fries, 46. Mo. App. 288; Corwin v. Walton, 18 Mo. 71; 59 Am. Dec. 285; New v. McKechnie, 95 X. Y..632; Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill (X. Y.), 466; Fry v. Bennett, 4 Dner (X. Y), 247; Sowers v. Sowers, 87 N. C. 303; Hayner v. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292; 22 Am. Rep. 303; Atlantic & Great Western Ry. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio St. 162; 2 Am. Rep. 382; Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 278; Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. St. 385; 30 Am. Rep. 367; Porter v. 120 Seiler, 23 Pa. St. 424; 62 Am. Dec. 341 ; Wolf v. Cohen. 8 Rich. L. ( S. C. ) 144; Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266; Hoadley v. Watson, 45 Vt. 289; 12 Am. Rep. 197; Borland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128; Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282; Jones v. Clay, 1 Bos. & Pull. 191; Jacks v. Bell, 3 Carr. & 1'. 316; but see contra Huber v. Teuber, 3 McArthur (D. C. ), 484; Cherry v. McCall, 23 Ga. 193; Albrecht v. Walker, 73 111. 69; Wabash Pr. & Pub. Co. v. Crumrine, 123 Ind. 89, 93; 21 N. E. 904; Farmau v. Lauman, 73 Ind. 568; Stewart v. Madox, 63 Ind. 51; Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284; 26 Am. Rep. 34; Meyer v. Bohlfing, 44 Ind. 238; Humphries v. Johnson, 20 Ind. 190; Nossaman v. Rickert, 18 Ind. 350; Butler v. Mercer, 14 Ind. 479; Struble v. Nod- wift, 11 Ind. 64; Johnson v. Vuthrick, 7 Ind. 137; Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322; 61 Am. Dec. 96; Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Bierhaus, 8 Ind. App. 563; 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 723; Ormsby v. Johnson, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 80; Austin v. Wilson, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 273 ; 50 Am. Dec. 766. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. §115 deter others from the commission of the like crime. The former, however, becomes incidentally compensatory for damages, and at the same time answers the purposes of punishment."" § 115. Not as punishment but as compensation.— In X. w Hampshire the doctrine of damages being awarded as a punish- ment or example is distinctly denied. The courts in this state though speaking of such damages as exemplary, endeavor to reconcile them with the idea of compensation, it being declared that they are allowed by way of remuneration for the wrong done, considering the aggravating circumstances and the wilful or reckless character of the act. The rule that exemplary dam- ages may be given as a punishment in cases of express fraud, malice, indignity, wantonness, oppression, insult and cruelty, is supported by the early decisions in New Hampshire. 18 But in the case of Fay v. Parker, 19 which contains an elaborate and lengthy review of the decisions and authorities as to such dam- ages, it is declared that the plaintiff in an action of tort is en- titled to a full compensation for the injury sustained by him, but that this cannot be increased by the addition of a line for the punishment of the defendant. 20 And in a later case in this i- Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 466; 41 Am. Dec. 757, per curiam. 18 Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 N. H. 387; Belknap v. Boston & Me. K. K., 49 X. II. 358; Ilolyoke v. Grand Trunk Ry., 48 N. II. 541; Taylor v. Grand Trunk Ry., 48 X. H. 303; Cram v. Hadley, 48 X. H. 191; Towle v. Blake, 48 X. II. 92; M »• v. Bowman, 47 X. II. 494; Perkins v. Towle, 43 X. H. 220; Knight v. Fos- ter, 39 N. II. 576; Eopkinsv. Rail- road, 36 X. II. 9; Symonds v. Car- ter, 32 X. 11.458; Davidson v. Good- all, 18 X. H. 42:'.; Whipple v. Wal- pole, ID X. II. 130. i 9 53 X. II. 342; 16 Am. Rep. 270. 20 The court in conclusion said in this case: "The true rule, simple and just, is to keep the civil and the criminal process and practice dis- tinct and separate. Let the criminal law deal with the criminal and ad- minister punishment for the legiti- mate purpose and end of punish- ment — namely the reformation of the offender and the safety of the peo- ple. Let the individual whose rights are infringed and who has suffered in- jury go t<> the civil courts and there obtain full and ample reparation and compensation ; but let him not thus obtain the 'fruits' to which he is not entitled and which belong to others. Why longer tolerate a false doctrine which in its practical exem- plification deprives a defendant of his constitutional righl of indictment or complaint on oath before being called into court ? Deprives him of the right of meeting the witnesses against him face to face ? Deprives him of the right of not being com- pelled to testify against himself? 121 S 115 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. state it is said that damages sometimes termed exemplary, vin- dictive or punitive are awarded, but these terms do not imply that they are awarded as a punishment for violation of the criminal law. They are not open to the objection of exposing the defendant to a double punishment, but are rather to be considered as a. compensation for the wrong, considering the existence of malice on the part of the defendant. 21 It was declared by the court in this case that : " It is incorrect to sepa- rate what is called actual damages from what is called exem- plary damage. The rule is not, as I understand it, to instruct the jury in the first place to determine the actual money dam- age which the plaintiff has sustained, and then further instruct the jury that if they find the defendant has been malicious, they may give another separate sum in damages by way of ex- ample or for the sake of punishment. The true rule, as I understand it, is to instruct the jury that if they find the de- fendant has been malicious, the rule of damages will be more liberal ; that instead of awarding damages only for those mat- ters which are capable of exact pecuniary valuation, they may take into consideration all the circumstances of aggravation — the insults, offended feelings, degradation, and so on— and en- deavor, according to their best judgment, to award such dam- ages by way of compensation or indemnity as the plaintiff on the whole ought to receive and the defendant ought to pay." a And in an early case in Kentucky the view that such damages may be allowed but that they are to be considered as a remu- Deprives him of the right of being acquitted unless the proof of his offense is established beyond all reasonable doubt? Deprives him of the right of not being punished twice for the same offense ? Punitive damages destroy every constitutional safeguard within their reach. And what is to be gained by this annihi- lation and obliteration of the funda- mental law ? The sole object in its practical results seems to be to give a plaintiff something which he does not claim in his declaration. If justice to the plaintiff require the 122 destruction of the constitution, there would be some pretext for wishing the constitution were destroyed. But why demolish the plainest guarantees of that instrument and explode the very foundation upon which constitutional guarantees are based, for no other purpose than to perpetuate false theories and de- velop unwholesome fruit?" Per Foster, J. 21 Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456; 22 Am. Rep. 475n. 22 Per Cushing, C. J. I.XKM I'l.AKV DAMAGES. § 116 ueration for circumstances of aggravation was also affirmed by the court. 21 § 116. Doctrine of exemplary damages denied.— In one of the later cases in Michigan it is declared that the purpose of an action of tort is to recover such damages as have been sustained as a result of an injury at the hands of the defendant, the ob- ject of such action being compensation to the plaintiff, and that when that is accorded, anything beyond, by whatever name called, is unauthorized. 23 * And it is also declared in this same case that "it is not the province of the jury, after full damages have been found for the plaintiff so that he is fully compensated for the wrong committed by the defendant, to mulct the defend- 23 " The right, however, of the plaintiff to recover vindictive dam- ages for personal injuries where the commission of the act complained of is accompanied with circum- stances of aggravation has been re- peatedly recognized by this court as proper, and this must now be re- garded as a settled rule of law in this state. This rule, when properly understood, is in our opinion sup- ported by principle and analogy and has a decided preponderance of au- thority in its favor. The arguments used in opposition to the rule pro- ceed on the erroneous assumption that vindictive damages are inflicted by way of criminal or penal punish- ment, and are not given by way of compensation for the injury nun- plained of. Such damages may oper- ate by way of punishment, but they are allowed by way of remuneration for the wrong suffered. They are proportioned to the aggravating cir- cumstances and wilful and reckless character of the act which occasioned the injury to the plaintiff. They are discretionary with the jury as the damages for personal injuries always are. The actual damages which are sustained in such cases cannot be measured or determined by any de- finite criterion, but have to be fixed by the jury on a proper consideration of all the circumstances of the case. Where the element of wilful negli- gence, malice or oppression inter- venes, the law permits the jury to give what is termed punitory, vin- dictive or exemplary damages and such damages although given to rec- ompense the sufferer, do inflict a punishment upon the offender. But such is the effect of every judgment for damages which is rendered in an action for an injury to the person; and there would he as much pro- priety in the argument that as dam- ages in such cases always operate as a punishment, the offender, if the act In- one for which he is liable to be indicted, will be thereby twice pun- ished for the same offense, as there is that such an effect is produced when the damages are increased and made exemplary on account of the reckless conduct of the offending party." Chiles v. Drake, 2 Mete. (Ky.l 14(i: 74 Am. Dec. 406, per Simpson. < '. .1. ^a Wilson v. How-en. »'>4 Mich. 141; SI N. W. 81, per Champlin, .J. 123 § 117 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. ant in an additional sum to be handed over to the plaintiff as a punishment for the wrong he has done to the plaintiff." a In an earlier case in this state, however, it is declared that the jury, while they should confine themselves to awarding a compensa- tion and should under no circumstances in addition to com- pensating the plaintiff, proceed to punish the defendant, yet they should fairly compensate the plaintiff for the injury he has sus- tained, and in so doing may consider such aggravating circum- stances, as accompanied the defendant's act in estimating the damages, 25 and a similar doctrine seems to be followed in the Massachusetts decisions.-* 1 § 117. Same subject continued. — The doctrine of exem- plary or punitive damages is also denied in the earlier Colorado decisions. As to the award of such damages being a violation 24 Wilson v. Bowen, 64 Mich. 141; 31 N. W. 81, per Champlin, J. 25 In this case it is said that " the purpose of an action for tort is to recover the damages which the plain- tiff has sustained from an injury done him by the defendant. In some cases the damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the court performs its duty by submitting all the facts to the jury and leaving them to estimate the plaintiff's dam- ages as best they may under all the circumstances. In other cases there may be a partial estimate of damages by a money standard, but the inva- sion of the plaintiff's lights has been accompanied by circumstances of peculiar aggravation which are cal- culated to vex and annoy the plain- tiff and cause him to suffer much beyond what he would suffer from the pecuniary loss. Here it is mani- festly proper that the jury should estimate the damages with the ag- gravating circumstances in mind and that they should endeavor fairly to compensate the plaintiff for the wrong he has suffered. But in all 124 cases it is to be distinctly borne in mind that compensation to the plain- tiff is the purpose in view and any instruction which is calculated to lead them to suppose that besides compensating the plaintiff they may punish the defendant is erroneous." Stilson v. Gibbs, 53 Mich. 280; 18 N. W. 815, per Cooley, C. J. See also in this connection, McPherson v. Ryan, 59 Mich. 33; 26 N. W. 321; Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich. 445; 1 Am. St. Rep. 609; 28 N. W. 695; Johnston v. Disbrow, 47 Mich. 59; 10 X. W. 79; Fay v. Swan, 44 Mich. 544; 7 N. W. 215; Scripps v. Reilly, 38 Mich. 23. But see Ganssly v. Perkins, 30 Mich. 492; Elliott v. Herz, 29 Mich. 202; Detroit Daily Post v. Mc Arthur, 16 Mich. 447, in which cases the court did not seem to draw such a fine distinction as in the later cases. 26 Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518; 19 Am. Rep. 383. See also Smith v. Holcomb, 99 Mass. 552; Stone v. Heywood, 7 Allen (Mass), 119; Barnard v. Poor, 21 Pick. ( Mass. ) 378 ; Spear v. Hubbard, 4 Pick. ( Mass. ) 143. EXEMPLABY DAMAGES. § 117 of the constitutional provision as to two punishments, it is said in the case of Murphy v. Mobbs : * " Courts attempt to explain away the apparent conflict with the constitutional inhibition above mentioned ; they say that the language there refers exclusively to criminal procedure, and cannot include civil actions. But this position amounts to a complete surrender of the evident spirit and intent of that instrument. When the con- vention framed and when the people adopted the constitu- tion both understood the purpose of this clause to be the prevention of double prosecutions for the same offense. Yet under the rule allowing exemplary damages, not only may two prosecutions but also two convictions and punishments be had. What difference does it make to the accused so far as this ques- tion is concerned, that one prosecution takes the form of a civil action in which he is called defendant? He is practically harassed with two prosecutions, and subjected to two convic- tions, while no hyhothesis, however ingenious, can cloud in his mind, the palpable fact that for the same tort he suffers two punishments. An effort has been made to mitigate the un- deniable hardship and injustice by declaring that juries in the second prosecution, whether it be civil or criminal in form, may consider the punishment already inflicted. But both reason and authority conclusively show that this proposition is illusory ; that the application of such a rule is impracticable, and that the attempt to apply it, while producing confusion, would not effectively accomplish the purpose intended." * In this case of Murphy v. llobbs,-"' other objections to the allowance of such damages were also raised, it being declared that the rule allow- ing them was an exception to procedure in all other cases, a trial and conviction being had, and punishment by line inflicted without indictment or sworn information, and also that it re- jected the rules of evidence applicable in all criminal cases, the doctrine of reasonable doubt being replaced by the rule eon- trolling in civil actions, allowing a conviction on mere prepon- derance of evidence and defendant being compelled to testify "7 Colo. 541; 49 Am. Hep. 3G6; 5 Pac. 119, per Helm, .1. This case contains an exhaustive discussion of the suhject. -'- s,. e also Greeley, S. L. A- 1'. Co. v. Feager, 11 Colo. 345; is Pac. 211 •-'7 Colo. r,41; 4!» Am. Hep. 3 Pac. 119. L25 § 118 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. against himself. Exemplary damages were, however, allowed in Colorado by a subsequent act of the legislature,™ and under this act the general rule prevails that it must appear that there was malice or wantonness in the act complained of, or that it was done under such circumstances as show a reckless disregard of the injured person's rights in order to justify an allowance thereof. 31 Again, in Nebraska, the decisions are uniformly op- posed to the allowance of any damages in excess of those which operate as a compensation for the actual loss or injury sus- tained.^ So in this connection it is said in an early case in this state that " damages should be equal to the amount of the injury sustained ; but upon what principle should they be given in excess of that amount? In law the injured party upon being paid the damages sustained by the injury has received full compensation therefor. Why then should the property of the party causing the injury be taken from him and given to another without compensation ? Constitutional guarantees of the rights of private property amount to but little, if courts sanction its practical confiscation, under the name of exemplary or punitive damages. And the effect of permitting the jury to give exemplary damages is to allow them to return a verdict for such sum as their prejudice or caprice may prompt them to do without regard to the amount of the injury. If it is said that these damages are imposed as a punishment, it is a full and sufficient answer to say that the state inflicts punishment and not individuals." ,33 A similar doctrine also has been affirmed in Washington. 34 § 118. Plaintiff not entitled to as matter of right.— Ex- emplary damages are given as a punishment upon the defendant for his wrongful conduct towards the plaintiff, and not upon any theory that the latter is entitled to such damages as a mat- ter of right. 35 30 See Colo. Acts, 1889, p. 64. 31 Denver Tramway Co. v. Cloud (Colo. App. 1895), 40 Pac. 779. 32 Bank of Commerce v. Goos, 39 Neb. 437; 23 L. R. A. 190; 58 N. W. 84; Boldt v. Budwig, 19 Neb. 739: Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 315; Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 70. 126 33 Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 264,265; 9 N. W. 88, per Maxwell, C. J. 34 Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. St. 45; 25 Pac. 1072; 11 L. K. A. 689; 26 Am. St. Rep. 842. 35 Wabash, St. L. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rector, 104 111. 296; Hawks v. Ridg- EXEMPLAR? 1>A MAGES. §119 § 119. Elements necessary to justify. — The primary pur- pose of an action for damages is to recover compensation for the actual loss or injury sustained.* The liability for punitive or exemplary damages, however, being for the purpose of pun- ishment or as an example, rests primarily upon the question of motive." And the jury are not at liberty to go beyond the al- lowance of a compensation unless it be shown that the act was done wilfully, maliciously or wantonly, or was the result of that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation of them, and where there is no proof that the injury was so inflicted, exemplary damages should not be allowed. B So it is declared in a recent decision that "ex- way, 33 111. 473; Schippel v. Norton, 38 Kan. 567; 16 Pac. 804; Webb v. Gilman, 80 Me. 177; 13 Atl. 688; New Orleans, etc., K. R. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200; Kenyon v. Came- ron, 17 R. I. 122; 20 Atl. 233; Wade v. Columbia El. St. R. L. & P. Co., 51 S. C. 296; 29 S. E. 233; (i4 Am. St. Rep. 676; Snow v. Carpen- ter, 49 Vt. 426; Boardman v. Gold- smith, 48 Vt. 403. 86 See chapter on damages gener- ally, herein. :!T Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 493; 23 L. Ed. 374; Wentworth v. Blackman, 71 Iowa, 255; 32 N. W. 311; Fleet v. Ilollen kemp, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 219; 56 Am Dec. 563; Webb v. Gilman, 80 Me 177; 13 Atl. 688; 6 N. Eng. 166 Haines v. Schultz, 50 X. J. L. 481 14 Atl. 1488. as Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v Arms, 91 U. S. 489; 23 L. Ed. 374 The Scotland, 42 Fed. 925; Miller v . Bait. & O. R. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 9,560 Wiggin v. Coffin, 3 Story (U. S.), 1; Garrett v. Sewell, 108 Ala. 521; 18 So. 7:'<7; Brewer v. Watson, 65 Ala. 88; Snow v. Grace, 2." Ark. 570; Ye- rian v. I.inkletter, 80 Cal. 135; Sei- dell v. Cushman, 20 Cal. 56; 81 Am. Dec. 93; Spencer v. Murphy, 6 Colo. App. 453; 41 Pac. 841; Florida S. R. Co. v. Ilerst, 30 Fla. 1; 16 L. R. A. 631; 52 Am. & Eug. R. Cas. 400; 11 So. 500: 12 Ry. A Corp. L. .!. 218; Kolb v. O'Brien, 86 111. 211; Becker v. Dupree, 75 111. 167; Scotr v. Bry- son, 74 111. 420; Miller v. Kirby, 71 111. 242: Tripp v. Grouuer, 00 111. 470; Stilwell v. Barnett, 60 111. 219; Pierce v. Millar. 44 111. 189; Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 111. 475; Williams v. Reil, 20 111. 147: Mansur-Tebbetts I. Co. v. Smith, 65 111. App. 319; White v. Xaerop, 57 111. App. 114; Van- gundy v. Berkenmoyer, 19 111. App. 229; Louisville, X. A. A- Chic. Ry. Co. v. Shanks. 94 Ind. 598; Moore v. ('rose, 43 Ind. 30; Linton Coal & M. Co. v. Persons, 15 Ind. App. 09; 43 X. E. 651; Waller Bros. v. Waller, 76 Iowa, 513; 41 X. W. 307; Inman v. Ball, 65 Iowa. 543; 22 N. W. 666; Curl v. Chic. R. I. A V. Ry. Co., 63 Iowa. 117: 19 X W. 308; Williamson v. Western Stage Co., 21 Iowa, 171; Winstead v. Hulme, 32 Kan. 568; 4 Pac 994; Cripton v. Thompson, 32 Kan. 367; 4 Pac. 69S; Bell v. Campbell, 17 Kan. 212; Potter v. Stamfli, 2 Kan. App. 788; 44 Pac. 4t',; Jacobs v. Louisville A- \". R. R. Co., 10 Bush (Ky.), 263; Louisville & Portland Canal Co. v. Mnrphy, 9 1-27 § 119 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. emplary damages are allowable only where there is misconduct or malice, or such recklessness or negligence as evinces a con- scious disregard of the risrhts of others. But where the act or omission complained of is free from fraud, malice, oppression or other special motives of aggravation, damages by way of punish- ment cannot be- awarded, and compensator}' damages onlv are permissible." 39 And an instruction that' 1 if there was some Bush (Ky. ), 522; Louisville, Lex. & Cin. R. R. Co. v Case, 9 Bush (Ky. ), 728; Kentucky & Port. R. R. Co. v. Smith, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 556; Fush v. Egan, 48 La. Anu. 60; 19 So. 108; Hamilton v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co., 42 La. Ann. 824; 8 So. 586; Townseud v. Fontenot, 42 La. Ann. 890; 8 So. 616; Leen v. Smith, 35 La. Ann. 518; Massie v. Bailey, 33 La. Ann. 485; Jackson v. Schmidt, 14 La. Ann. 806; Sapp v. Northern Cent. Ry. Co., 51 Ind. 115; Wanamaker v. Bowers, 36 Md. 42; Moore v. Schultz, 31 Md. 423; Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 208; Elliott v. Herz, 29 Mich. 202; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180; Hoffman v. Northern P. R. Co., 45 Minn. 53; 47 N. W. 312; Vicksburg & Meridian R. R. Co. v. Scanlon, 63 Miss. 413; Chic. St. L. & N. O. R. R. Co. v. Scurr, 59 Miss. 456; 42 Am, I Rep. 373 (In this decision the case of Memphis R. R. Co. v. Green, 52 I Miss. 783, which held that punitive damages might be awarded against a carrier for a mere omission of duty " by way of punishment for the neg- lect of travelers," citing 2 Kedfield on Rys. sec. 182, is criticised as an entire misconception of Judge Red- field's text.); New Orleans J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 007; 97 Am. Dec. 478; Brown v. Cape Girardeau Mac. & P. R. Co., 89 Mo. 152; 1 S. W. 129; Engle v. Jones, HI Mo. 316; Laird v. Chic. & A. R. Co., 78 Mo. App. 273; 2 Mo. A. Rep. 263; Lewis v. Jannoupoulo, 70Mo. App. 325; Clark 128 v. Fairley, 30 Mo. App. 335; Bohm v. Dumphy, 1 Mont, 333; Waters v. Stevenson, 13 Nev. 157; 29 Am. Rep. 293; Belknap v. Boston & M. R. Co., 49 N. H. 358; Cram v. Hadley, 48 N. H. 191; Powers v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 120 N. Y. 178; 24 N. E. 95; Hamilton v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 25, rev'g 3 J. & S. 118; Wallace v. Williams, 59 Hun (N. Y.), 628; 14 N. Y. Supp. 180; Rawlins v. Vidvard, 34 Hun (N.Y.), 205; Parker v. Long Island R. R. Co., 13 Hun (N. Y.), 319; Wallace v. City of New York, 18 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 169; Auchmuty v. Ham, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 495; Walker v. Wilson, 8 Bosw. (N. Y. ) 586; Waters v. Greenleaf, John- son L. Co., 115 N. C. 648; 20 S. E. 718; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 4 Okla. 542; 46 Pac. 499; Burk v. Serrill, 80 Pa. St. 413; Seeley v. Aldeu, 61 Pa. St. 302; 100 Am. Dec. 642; Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. St. 493; Herreshoff v. Tripp, 15 R. I. 92; 23 Atl. 104; Neel v. Deans, 1 Nott & McC. (S. C.) 310; Springer Transp. Co. v. Smith, 16 Lea (Tenn.), 498; 1 S. W. 280; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Greenwood, 2 Tex. C. A. 76; 21 S. W. 559; Neill v. Newton, 24 Tex. 202; Wood v. Amer. Nat. Bank (Va. 1902), 40 S. E. 931; Burns v. Hi nes, 94 Va. 413; 26 S. E. 875; Peshine v. Shepperson, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 485; 94 Am. Dec. 468; Talhott v. West Va. (.'. & P. R. Co., 42 W.Va. 560 26 S. E. 311. 39 Wood v. Araer. Nat. Bank ( Va. EX EM P L A R 1 U A M A GES. § 120 element of fraud, malice, reckless negligence or oppression, in- sult, rudeness, or wilful wrong, or other cause of aggravation in the running of defendant's train by Lawrence station without stopping," the jury might allow exemplary damages, is held in- correct, as allowing such damages, if there was some element, however inlinitesimally small of any of the above things in the act of the company. "' § 120. Wanton or malicious act. — The rule as supported by authority is that in case of wilful, oppressive, wanton or malicious conduct on the part of the defeudent in inflicting the injury complained of, the jury will not be limited to an award of damages which are merely compensatory for such injury, but may allow exemplary or punitive damages against the wrong- doer. 41 So it is declared in a case in the United States supreme 1902), 40 S. E. 931, per Whit- tle, J. 40 Vicksburg & Meridian R. R. Co. v. Scanlan, 63 Miss. 413, was objected to by defendant. Similar instruc- tion was given in Chic. St. L. & N. O. R. R. Co. v. Scurr, 59 Miss. 45(5; 42 Am. Rep. 373, as however an- nouncing the rule that there should be none but actual dam- ages if there were no wilful wrong. 41 Phila. & W. R. R. Co. v. Quigley. 21 How. (U. S.) 213; Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 193; 38 U. S. App. 410; 28 Chic. Leg. News, 248; Fother- inghain v. Adams Exp. Co., 30 Fed. 252; 1 L. R. A. 474; Lieukauf v. Morris, 66 Ala. 406; Barlow v. Lowder, 35 Ark. 492; Dorsey v. Man- love, 14 Cal. 553; Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn. 529; Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182; 4 Am. Rep. 55; Dibble v. Morris, 26 Conn. 416; Coleman v. Ryan, 58 Ga. 132; Illinois & St. L. R. R. & C. Co. v. Cobb, 68 111.5.1; Wanzer v. Bright, 52 111. 35; Reeder v. Purdy, 48 111. 261; Peoria Bridge Assoc, v. Loomis, 20 111. 235; Mc- Avoy v. Wright, 25 Ind. 22; Millison 9 v. Hock, 17 Ind. 227; Nordhaus v. Peterson, 54 Iowa, 68; 6 N. W. 77; Cady v. Case, 45 Kan. 733; 26 Pac. 448; Jockers v. Borginan, 29 Kan. 121: Tucker v. Green, 27 Kan. 357; Hefley v. Baker, 19 Kan. 9; Sawyer v. Saner, 10 Kan. 460 : Malone v. Murphy, 2 Kan. 250; Louisville . R. Co. v. Blocker, 27 Md. 277: Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184; 82 Am. Dec 7'.': Storm v. Green, 51 Miss. 103; Heirn v. McCaughan, :*.2 Miss. 17: (id Am. Dec. 58S; Vicksburg & .1. R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss. 156; 66 Am. Dec 553; Green v. Craig, 46 Mo. 90; Bald- I win v. Fries, 46 Mo. App. 288; Bohm v. Dunphy, 1 Mont. :::;:!; Towle v. Blake, 4s N. H. 92; Hopkins v. Atr 129 § 120 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. court that, " whenever the injury complained of has been in- flicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of con- tumely or indignity, the jury are not limited to ascertainment of a simple compensation for the wrong committed against the aggrieved person." 42 And again. it has been said that "when there is an element either of fraud, malice, such a degree of neg- ligence as indicates a reckless indifference to consequences, oppression, insult, rudeness, caprice, wilfulness or other cause of aggravation in the act or omission causing the injury, punitive damages may be awarded." *» So also in a case in Alabama, the court says : " We deduce from the authorities the doctrine to be that exemplary damages are allowable not only for acts mali- ciously perpetrated, but also in cases where one knowingly, wan- tonly and recklessly does an act, fraught with probable injury to person or property and ultimately producing such injury or damages." u And in a Texas decision it is declared that it is " too well settled by the decision of this court in accordance we think with the well established rule of the common law to be now questioned, that where the injury complained of is tainted with fraud, malice or wilful wrong, exemplary damages may be recovered." fi lantic Ave. R. R. Co., 36 N. H. 9; Trainer v. Wolff, 58 N. J. L. 381; 33 Atl. 1051; Cable v. Dakin, 20 Wend. (N. Y. ) 172; Wallace v. Mayor, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 440; 9 Abb. Pr. 40; 18 How. Pr. 169; Reeves v. Winn, 97 N. C. 246; 2 Am. St. Rep. 287; 1 S. E. 448; Holmes v. Railway Co., 94N. C. 318; Duncan v. Stalcup, 18 N. C.440; Peckham Iron Co. v. Harper, 41 Ohio St. 100; Day v. Holland, 15 Oreg. 464; 15 Pac. 855; Barnett v. Reed, 51 Pa. St. 190; 88 Am. Dec. 574; Seely v. Alden, 61 Pa. St. 302; 100 Am. Dec. 642; Nagle v. Mullison, 34 Pa. St. 48; Windham v. Rhame, 11 Rich. L. (S. C.) 283; 73 Am. Dec. 116; Wil- kins v. Gilmore, 21 Tenn. 140; Bryan v. McGuire, 3 Head (Tenn.), 530: Crawford v. Doggett, 82 Tex. 139; 17 S. W. 929; 27 Am. St. Rep. 859; Shaw v. Brown, 41 Tex. 449; Neil v. New- 130 ton, 24 Tex. 202; Reed v. Samuels. 22 Tex. 114; Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266; Edwards v. Leavitt, 43 Vt. 126; Nye v. Merriam, 35 Vt. 438; Borland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67. « Phila. & W. R. R. Co. v. Quig- ley, 21 How. (U. S.) 213, 214, per Campbell, J. 43 Holmes v. Railway Co., 94 N. C. 318, per Ashe, J., cited with approval in Knowles v. Norfolk So. R. R. Co., 102 N. C. 86; 9 S. E. 7. 44 Lienkauf v. Morris, 66 Ala. 406, per Somerville, J. 45 Shaw v. Brown, 41 Tex. 449; per Moore, J. See also Hedgepeth v. Robertson, 18 Tex. 858; Kolb v. Bankhead, 18 Tex. 228; Oliver v. Chapman, 15 Tex. 400; Graham v. Roder, 5 Tex. 141 ; Smith v. Sher- wood, 2 Tex. 460. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. §§121.122 § 121. Malice sufficient to justify. The mere doing of an unlawful or injurious act does not constitute malice as used in the rule allowing exemplary damages, but it implies that the act was conceived in a spirit of mischief <>r of criminal indifference to civil obligations. 48 So where the condemnation proceedings under which a railroad company took possession of land and proceeded to construct its trucks and use the same were sub- sequently found to be defective, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover exemplary damages on such grounds, as the entry was without fraud, malice or evil intent. 1 ' But where after one verdict and judgment against defendant he con- tinued to discharge sewage upon land of the plaintiff, such con- tinuance was held to show such malice and wilfulness as would justify an award of exemplary damages. 43 And where a wrong- ful seizure of property is committed in a rude, aggravating or insulting manner, malice may be inferred therefrom and ex- emplary damages may be awarded, 49 as express malice need not be proved in all cases to justify such damages. 50 Again exem- plary damages may be recovered for an illegal levy on property, where the officer at the time had knowledge of the fact that such levy was illegal."' 1 § 122. Gross negligence It is a general rule that exem- plary damages may be allowed where the injury or loss appears to have been the result of gross negligence on the part of the defendant."' 2 The term "'gross negligence" as used in this con- 46 Phila. W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 202; 16 L. Ed. 73; Willis v. Miller, 29 Fed. 238; Strickler v. Yager, 29 Fed. 244; Brown v. Allen, 35 Iowa, 306. See Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166; 10 Am. Dec. 110. 47 Bait. & (). R. Co. v. Boyd, 67 Ind. 32; 10 Atl. 315; 1 Am. St. Rep. 362. 48 Paddock v. Somes, 51 Mo. App. 320. See Long v. Trexler (Pa.), 8 Atl. 620. 49 Roberts v. Heim, 27 Ala. 678. 50 Farwell v. Warren, 51 111. 467; Borland in Barrett, 76 Va. 128; 44 Am. Rep. 152. 01 Willis v. Miller, 29 Fed. 238; Strickler v. Yager, 29 Fed. 244; Lynd v. Pickett, 7 Minn. 184; 82 Am. Dec. 79. ■"'-' Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Vance, 93 Ala. 144; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Arnold. SO Ala. 60; 2 So. :;.-,7 : Soutb t <- N. A. K. Co. v. McLudon, •;:'■ Ala. 266; Kan. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442; Gibney v. Lewis, t'.s Conn. 392; 36 Atl. 799; Chattanooga R. A R. Co. v. Liddell,85 Ga. 482; 21 Am. St. Rep. 169; 11 S. E. 853; Cochran v. Miller, 13 Iowa. 128; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kessler, 18 Kan. Leavenwortb L. A G. R. Co. v. Rice, 131 § 122 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. nection is to be construed as meaning a negligence so gross as to show an entire want of care, and sufficient to authorize the inference or presumption that the person guilty of such negligence was conscious of the probable consequences of his act and was indifferent thereto. 153 And such damages should not be awarded in mere cases of negligence or carelessness, where no element of wilfulness or wantonness appears. 51 10 Kan. 426; Kountz v. Brown, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) 577; Central Pass. Ry. Co. v. Chattersou (Ky.), 29 S. W. 18; Jackson v. Schmidt, 14 La. Ann. 818; Eliason v. Grove, 85 Md. 215; 36 Atl. 844; Stoher v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 91 Mo. 509; 4 S. W. 389; Goetz v. Ambs, 27 Mo. 28; Taylor v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 N. H. 304; 2 Am. Rep. 229; Whipple v. Walpole, 10 N. H. 130; Brasington v. South Bound K. Co. (S. C.)f 40 S. E. 665; East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Lee, 90 Tenn. 570; 18 S. W. 268; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson, 72 Tex. 95; 10 S. W. 325; Talbot v. West Va. R. Co., 42 W. Va. 560; 26 S. E. 311. 5 3 Milwaukee & St. P. Ky. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489; 23 L. Ed. 374; Alabama, G. S. R. Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9; Patterson v. South & N. A. R. Co., 89 Ala. 318; 7 So. 437; Ala- bama G. S. R. Co. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600; 2 So. 337; Lienkauf v. Morris, 66 Ala. 406; Yeriau v. Linkletter, 80 Cal. 135; Wall v. Cameron, 6 Colo. 275; Gibney v. Lewis, 68 Conn. 392; 36 Atl. 799; Ford v. Charles Warner Co., 1 Marv. (Del.) 88; 37 Atl. 39; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Mooney, 40 Fla. 17; 24 So. 148; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 721; Florida S. R. Co. v. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1 ; 16 L. R. A. 631 ; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 409; 11 So. 506; 12 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 218; Chat- tanooga, R. & C. R. Co. v. Liddell, 85 Ga. 482; 11 S. E. 853; 21 Am. St. Rep. 169; Clevenger v. Dunaway, 84 111. 367; Louisville, N. A. &C. R. Co. 132 v. Wurl, 62 111. App. 381; Pierce v. Millay, 44 111. 189; Chic. K. & W. R. Co. v. O'Connell, 46 Kan. 581; 26 Pac. 947; Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. Co. v. Kier, 41 Kan. 671; 21 Pac. 770; Hefley v. Baker, 19 Kan. 19; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kessler, 18 Kan. 523; Leavenworth L. & G. R. Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan. 426; McHenry Coal Co. v. Sneddon, 98 Ky. 684; 34 S. W. 228; Claxton v. Lexington & B. S. R. Co., 13 Bush (Ky.), 636; Louis- ville & N. R. Co. v. Coustantine, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 432; Baltimore, etc., Trans. Co. v. Boone, 45 Md. 344; Pat- terson v. Chic. & G. T. Ry. Co., 49 Mich. 184; 13 N. W. 508; Peterson v. Western Un. Teleg. Co., 72 Minn. 41; 74 N. W. 1022; 40 L. R. A. 661; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 517; Hoff- man v. Northern P. R. Co., 45 Minn. 53; Trauermann v. Lippincott, 39 Mo. App. 478; Edelmann v. St. Louis Transf. Co., 3 Mo. App. 503; Powers v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 120 N. Y. 178; Caldwell v. New Jersey S. B. Co., 47 N. Y. 282; Kuchenmeister v. O'Connor (Ohio), 8 Wkly. L. Bull. 257; 11 Wkly. L. Bull. 170; Day v. Holland, 15 Oreg. 464; Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. St. 519; Brooks v. Clark, 57 Tex. 105; Hoadley v. Watson, 45 Vt. 289; Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300; 20 Am. Rep. 6; Pickert v. Crook, 20 Wis. 358; 2 Shearman & Redf. on Neg. (5th ed.) sec. 748. 54 Floyd v. Hamilton, 33 Ala. 235; Moody v. McDonald, 4 Cal. 297; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. § L23 § 123. Actual damage should bo shown. — A right of action cannot be maintained simply for the purpose of inflicting pun- ishment upon some supposed wrongdoer, and therefore exem- plary damages are not recoverable unless there has been some real or actual damage sustained. Exemplary damages are merely incidents of a cause of action to recover damages for some real or substantial loss, and can never constitute the basis of a cause of action independent of such elements, though the act of the defendant may have been wanton or malicious. It therefore follows that if no actual damage has been suffered, or if the damage has been merely nominal, the injury being purely technical, exemplary damages should not be allowed/" And where the actual damages awarded by a ver- Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442; St. Peter's Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 355; McCoy v. Phila. W. & B. R. Co., 5 Houst. (Del.) 599; Toledo, P. & W. Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 74 111. 83; City of Jacksonville v. Lambert, 62 111. 519; Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. v. Arnold, 43 III. 418; Williams v. Real, 20 111. 147; Louis- ville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598; City of Parsons v. Lind- say, 26 Kan. 426; Kentucky Cent. R. R. Co. v. Dills, 4 Bush (Ky.), 593; Louisville & Portland R. R. Co. v. Smith, 2 Duv. ( Ky. ) 556; Mud River Coal C. & I. Co. v. Williams, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 847; Jackson v. Schmidt, 14 La. Ann. 806; Cursler v. Bait. & O. R. Co., 60 Md. 358; Bait & O. R. Co. v. Breinig, 25 Md. 378; 90 Am. Dec. 49; Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542; New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co. v. Stratham, 42 Miss. 607: 97 Am. Dec 478; Southern R. Co. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374; 90 Am. Dec. 332; Leahy v. Davis, 121 Mo. 227; 25 S. W. 941; Goetz v. Ambs, 27 Mo. 28. ^Paterson v. Dakin ( D. C. S. D. Ala.), 31 Fed. 682; Lamb v. lfar- baugh, 105 Cal. 680; 39 Pac. 56; Kelly v. Valentine, 17 HI. App. 87; Roth v. Eppey, 80 111. 283: Hackett v. Smelsley, 77 111. 109; Brautigain v. White, 73 111. 561; Fentz v. Mead- ows, 72 111. 540; Keedy v. Howe, 72 111. 133; Meidel v. Anthis, 71 111. 241: Freese v. Tripp, 70 111. 496; Boardman v. Marshalltown, 105 Iowa, 445: 75 N. W. 343; Kuhn v. Chic, M. & S. P. Ry. Co., 74 Iowa, 137: 37 N. W. 116; First Nat. Bank v. Kan- sas (irain Co., 60 Kan. 30; 55 Pac. 277; Adams v. Salina, 58 Kan. 246; 48 Pac. 918; Schippell v. Norton, 38 Kan. 567; 16 Pac. 804; Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co., 68 Me. 279; Mattice v. Brinkman, 74 Mich. 705; 42 N. W. 172; Carson v. Texas In- stallment Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 762 ; Jones v. Matthews 75 Tex. 1 ; 12 S. W. 823 ; Ni.kic v. McGehee, 27 Tex. 134; Bar- ber v. Kilbourn, 16 Wis. 485. But see Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe. 7:1 Fed. 196; 19 C. C. A. 429: 38 U. S. App. 410; Wilson v. Vaughn, 23 Fed. 229; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Sellers, 93Ala.9;9So.375;89Am.St. Hep. 17; Blanchard v. Burbank, 16 111. App. 375. In a case in Maine the court says: "It is said in vindication of the theory of punitive damages that the interests of the individual in- 133 §124 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. diet are remitted before judgment, the court is deprived of the power to render judgment for the exemplary damages awarded by such verdict ; x but where the failure to recover compensatory damages is owing to defects in the pleadings and not to the ab- sence of substantial damages, the right to recover exemplary damages will not be affected. 57 And if the actual recoverable damage sustained has been settled for under a compromise agree- ment, no claim for vindictive damages being included in such settlement, it is held that a recovery of actual damages is not a prerequisite to a recovery of vindictive damages. 58 § 124. Actions allowed in. 39 — It may be stated generally that the allowance of punitive damages is confined to actions of tort, ,iU and that they are not allowable in actions for breach of con- tract. 61 But to justify an award of punitive damages, it is not necessary that the injury be attended by force. In this connec- tion it has been said : " There is a class of personal injuries such as slander, libel, malicious prosecution and including injuries to a person's health, business and property caused by indirect means unattended with force and for redress of which the remedy is by an action upon the case and not by an action of trespass, for jured and of society are blended. Such damages are to be awarded against a defendant for punishment. But if all the individual injury is merely technical and theoretical, which is the punishment to be in- flicted for? If a plaintiff upon all such elementsof injury as were open to him is entitled to recover but nominal damages shall he be the reci- pient of penalties awarded on account of an injury or supposed injury to others beside himself? . . . Puni- tive damages are the last to be as- sessed in the elements of injury to be considered by a jury and should be first to be rejected by facts in miti- gation." Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co., 68 Me. 288, per Peters, J. 56 Smith v. Dye, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 662; 51 S. W. 858, rev'g denied in 52 S. W. 981. 134 57 Favorite v. Cottrill, 62 Mo. App. 119. 58 Gregory v. Coleman (Tex. Civ. App.), 22 S. W. 181. 59 Under the heading of the partic- ular injuries for which damages may be recovered, the question as to the allowance of exemplary damages is therein considered where such ques- tion has arisen. 60 Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Wysor, 82 Va. 250. 61 Chase v. Western Un. Teleg. Co., 44 Fed. 554; 3 Am. Elec. Cas. 817; Ga. Code, sec. 2943; Duche v. Wilson, 37 Hun (X. Y.), 519; Houston, etc., R. R. Co. v. Shirley, 54 Tex. 125; Guildford v. Anglo-French S. S. Co., 9 Can. 303. An exception to this general rule may be found in chapter on actions for breach of promise of marriage, herein. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. §124 which a jury may give exemplary damages as well where the action is in case as when it is in trespass.® Such damages may be allowed under a proper state of facts in actions for assault and battery ; ,:! maiming and disfiguring plaintiff ;'•' seduction;® libel and slander ; a fraud ; b ' malicious abuse of process ; ,s wrongfully suing out a writ of replevin ;® illegal and wrongful seizure of prop- erty ;' u attachment sued out wrongfully ; T1 in actions against sher- iff for misconduct of deputy ; 7i against officer who has over- stepped his powers; 18 for trespass to real property ; Tl and in actions to recover damages under the liquor act. 73 And under w Kl.Tt v. Hollenkenip, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 219 ; 50 Am. Dec. 563, per Hise, J. 63 Brundy v. Maginness, 7*5 Cal. 582; 18 Pac. 668: Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn. 529; Harrison v. Ely. 120 111. 83; 11 N". E. 334; Reeder v. Prudy, 48 111. 261; Foote v. Nichols, 28 111. 486; Boot v. Sturdivant, 70 Iowa, 55; 29 N. W. 802 : Webb v. Oilman, 80 Me. 177; 13 Atl. 658; Green v. Craig, 47 Mo. 90; Ileneky v. Smith, 10 Dreg. 349; 45 Am. Rep. 143; Edwards v. Leavitt, 43 Vt. 126; Bircliard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67. <* Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539. 65 Robinson v. Burton, 5 llarr. (Del.) 335; Ball v. Bruce, 21 111. 161: Stevenson v. Belknap, 6 Iowa, 97; Life v. Eisenleid, 32 N. V. 220. 60 Morning Journal Assn. v. Ruth- erford, 51 Fed. 513 ; Binfonl v. Young, 115 Ind. 179; 16 V E. 142: Blumhardt v. Rohr, 70 Md. 328; 17 Atl. 266; Warner v. Press Pub. Co., 132 N. Y. 181; 43 X. Y. St. R. 633; 30 N. E. 393; Holmes v. Jones, 121 X. Y. 461; Bergmann v. Jones, 94 X. Y. 51; Samuels v. Evening Mail, 75 X. Y. 604, rev'g9 Hun, 288; Til- lotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. ( X. V. ) 56: Kendall v. -Stone, 2 Sandf. ( X. Y. ) 269 ; Bowden v. Bailes, 101 X. C. 612; 8 S. E. 342; Sowers v. Sowers, 87 N. C. 303. 67 Piatt v. Brown, 30 Conn. 336; ! Oliver v. Chapman, 15 Tex. 400. But Bee singleton v. Kennedy, 9 B. Mom. (Ky.)222. 68 Barnett v. Reed, 51 Pa. St. 190. See also Louder v. Hinson, 4 Jones, L. (X. C.j 190. 69 Brizsee v. Torrence, 21 Wend. ( X. Y. ) 144. 70 Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184; Robinson v. Goings, 63 Miss. 500. 71 Floyd v. Hamilton, 33 Ala. 235; McCulloughv. Walton, 11 Ala. 492; Kirksey v. Jones, 7 Ala. 622; Shan- non's Annot. Code (Tenn. 1896), 5291: Biering v. First Nat. Bank, 69 I Tex. 599; 7S. W. 90. 7 - Hazard v. Israel, 1 Binn. (Pa.) 228; 2 Am. Dec. 438. 73 Shaw v. Brown, 41 Tex. 446; Rodgers v. Ferguson, 36 Tex. 544. See also Nightingale v. Scannell, 18 Cal. 315; Phelps v. Owens, 11 Cal. 22; Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553. 7 * Waters v. Dumas, 75 Cal. 564: 17 Pac. 685 ; Hefley v. Baker, 19 Kan. 9; Union Bank v. Rideau Lum- ber Co., 3 Ont. L. Rep. 269. 76 Roth v. Eppy, 80 111. 283: Back- I ett v. Smelsley, 77 111. 109; Thill v. Pohlmaun, 76 Iowa, 638; 41 X. v, Fox v. Wunderlich, 64 Iowa. 1<7; Goodenough v. McGrew, 4 1 Iowa, 670; Richmond v. Schickler, 57 Iowa, 486; 10 X'. W. 882. See Iowa Code, s.o. 1557. But see Freese v. Tripp, 70 111. 496. 135 §§ 125, 126 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. the Iowa Code, 7 '"' it is provided that in actions to recover real prop-* erty in case of wanton aggression, the jury may award exemplary damages. § 125. Instances when allowed, — Punitive damages have been allowed where, without any reasonable cause, the defend- ant ejected the plaintiff from a house in inclement weather, at night and while she was in a delicate state of health, she being also assaulted and beaten. 77 So, also, they have been allowed for great and wanton cruelty in beating plaintiff's horse to death. 78 And where a dead body was disintered in a wanton and malicious manner, or as the result of gross negligence, or the reckless disregard of the rights of others, equivalent to an in- tentional violation thereof, such damages might, it was declared, be awarded. 79 Again, the recovery of such damages was per- mitted where judges of an election wilfully, corruptly and fraud- ulently refused to receive the vote of a registered voter. 80 So, also, where a person without authority maliciously cut down a tree on the highway, exemplary damages were allowed ; 81 and they were also held allowable in behalf of the government against one who went upon government land and cut trees thereon, when done wilfully or with a reckless disregard of the rights of the government. 82 § 126. Interference with exercise of personal rights. — Certain personal rights and privileges are secured by the con- stitution of the United States to the individual citizen, and in case of an intentional, malicious and repeated interference with the exercise of such rights, exemplary damages may be awarded. 83 76 Annot. Code, Iowa (1897). sec. 4200. 77 Redfield v. Redfield, 75 Iowa, 435; 39 N. W. 688. 78 Wort v. Jenkins, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 351. 79 Jacobus v. Congregation of C. of I., 107 Ga. 518; 33 S. E. 853; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 437; 49 Cent. 307; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 408. See Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281; Thirkfield 136 v. Association, 12 Utah, 76; 41 Pac. 574. 80 Elbin v. Dean, 33 Md. 135. 8 * Winter v. Peterson, 24 N. J. L. 524. 82 United States v. Taylor, 35 Fed. 484. 83 Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58; 41 L. Ed. 632; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265, aff g 74 Fed. 859; 13 Nat. Corp. Rep. 6. i:\KMPLAUV DAMAGES. §§127-130 § 127. Instances when not allowed. -Though a seizure of goods may be illegal, yet this will not be sufficient to justify ail award of punitive damages in the absence of any evidence show- ing fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression on the part of the defendant,* 1 and such damages were held not recoverable against the owner of a house which was being removed, where, through an error of judgment, he failed to give sufficient notice of danger.'* And where the defendant had placed the plaint iff. a little girl, in a buggy, in an action for injuries caused by the horse running away, it was held that exemplary damages should not be allowed, there being no evidence of malice. 86 So, also, for the sale of property under a judgment, subsequently reversed on appeal, it was held that such damages should not he allowed. where malice on the part of the defendant was negatived by the fact that he acted under legal advice, and also by the other cir- cumstances of the case. 87 § 128. In action on bond. -Exemplary damages are not re- coverable in an action on an attachment bond since such action is regarded as one ex contractu, 83 and a similar rule prevails in an action on a bond executed under the dram shop act in Illi- nois. 89 § 129. State may fix amount. — The amount of damages which may be given as a punishment beyond compensation may, in some cases, be fixed by the legislature of a state. Thus it has been so held in the case of a railroad company where such dam- ages were imposed by statute for gross negligence in failing to provide and maintain cattle guards. And that such damages go to the sufferer instead of the state, is no objection. 9 ' § 130. Where two or more defendants. — In case an action is brought against two or more defendants to recover damages " Snow v. Grace, 25 Ark. 570: Win stead v. Hulme, 32 Kan. 568; 4 I'ac 994; Bell v. Campbell, 17 Kan. 212; Wanamaker v. Bowers, 36 M<1. 42; Moore v. Schultz, :',1 Md. 423; Engle v. Jones, 51 Mo. 316. 86 Jackson v. Schmidt, 14 La. Ann. 806. » Pierce v. Millay, 44 111. 189. 87 Fush v. Egan. 48 La. Aim. 80; 19 So. 108. m Wood v. Barker, 37 Ala. 80; s in>\\ v. Grace. 25 Ark. 670; McClendoo v. Wells. 20 S. C. 514. «» Cobb v. People. 84 III. 611. '" Missouri Pac. By. Co. r. Humes, 115 U. S. 512; 29 L. Ed. 403. (See Mo. Laws, 1875, p. 131.) 137 §§ 131, 132 EX KM PLARY DAMAGES. for an injury jointly inflicted by them, and it appears that only one is chargeable with malice, or such other conduct as would authorize an allowance of punitive damages, such damages can- not be recovered against both or all the defendants. 91 But in such a case exemplary damages may be recovered from the one chargeable with such conduct, and only compensatory damages from the other or others. 92 § 131. Against persons under legal disability — The dam- ages recoverable against persons laboring under a legal disabil- ity should be limited to those which are compensatory and ex- emplary damages should not be awarded. 93 Thus it has been so held in actions to recover damages for a tort committed by a lunatic. 94 And such damages were held not recoverable against a child ten years of age for an injury inflicted by him through recklessness or childish indiscretion. 95 § 132. Effect of death of wrongdoer. — Exemplary damages being in the nature of a punishment inflicted upon a wrong- doer for his wanton, malicious or grossly negligent act in caus- ing the injury complained of, it follows that though after the death of the wrongdoer the right of action to recover damages for the tort may survive against his estate, yet the right to re- cover exemplary damages does not survive. 06 If, however, the death of the wrongdoer does not occur until after verdict against him, it will not affect the recovery of exemplary damages al- lowed in such verdict. Thus it has been held that where a statute provides that where an action is commenced against the executor or administrator of one originally liable for a tort, ex- 91 Becker v. Dapree, 75 111. 167. 92 Clark v. Xewsam, 1 Exch. 131 ; Clissold v. Machell, 26 Up. Can. Q. B. 422. But see contra, McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. St. 63, wherein the recovery is limited in such a case to compensatory damages. 93 O'Brien v. Loomis, 43 Mo. App. 29; Krora v. Schoonmaker, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 647. 94 MeIntyre v. Sholty, 121 111. 660; 2 Am. St. Rep. 140; 13 N. E. 239; 138 Jewell v. Colby (N. H.), 24 Atl. 202. 95 O'Brien v. Loomis, 43 Mo. App. 29. 96 Sheik v. Hobson, 64 Iowa, 146; Edwards v. Ricks, 30 La. Ann. 926; Wilkins v. Wainwright, 173 Mass. 212; 53 N. E. 397; Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 166, sec. 2; Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703; 9 So. 885; 13 L. R. A. 682; Rippey v. Miller, 11 Ired. L. (N. C.)247; Wright v. Donnell, 34 Tex. 291. EXEMPLARY I > AM AGES. §§ 133, 134 emplary damages shall not be allowed, such statute does not apply to a case where the defendant after a verdict againsl him has been rendered and nothing remains to be done except to dis- pose of a motion for a new trial and enter up judgment. 91 § 133. Mitigation of damages. — The manner or motive of the act causing the injury, that is, whether it is done in a wanton or malicious spirit or in such a manner as evinces a reckless disregard of the consequences, being the ground on which the allowance of exemplary damages is based, it necessarily follows that facts showing the absence of a wrongful, malicious or wanton motive may be introduced in evidence in mitigation of such damages. That the act was done in good faith, in a mutual mistake as to the rights of the parties, or that the defendant acted under the advice of counsel, or that his conduct was due to provocation on the part of the plaintiff, are facts which may always be shown in mitigation of or to prevent the allowance of such damages. 93 And contributory negligence of the plaintiff may be shown in an action to recover for personal injuries, as a defense to an allowance of punitive damages. 99 § 134. Act done in exercise of a supposed right. — Although it may be stated as a general rule that exemplary damages may be awarded to a plaintiff who has sustained loss or injury owing to the wilful act of the defendant, yet this may be qualified to the extent that in actions of trespass, involving injury to per- sonal property, the defendant's act may have been wilful, yet 97 Wilkins v. Wain wright, 17:*. Mass. 212: 53 N. E. 397. See Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 1GG, sec. 2. 98 City Nat. Bank v. Jeffries, 73 Ala. 183; Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark. 295; 48 Am. Rep. 41; Walker v. Fuller, 29 Ark. 448; Dalton v. Beers, 38 Conn. 529; Shores v. Brooks, 81 Ga. 408; Cockrane v. Tuttle, 75 111. 361; Jasper v. Purnell, 07 111. 358; Fitzgerald v. Chic. Rock Island & V. Ry. Co., 50 Iowa, 79; Brown v. Allen, 35 Iowa, 300; Plummer v. llarbut, 5 Iowa, 308; Fnsh v. Egan, 48 La. Ann. 00; 19 So. 108; Currier v. Swan, 63 Me. 324; Phila. W. & B. R. R. Co. v. Eoeflich, 62 Md. 300: Bradner v. Faulkner, 93 V Y. 515; Kill v. Youruans, 80 N. Y. 324; Yates v. New York C. & H. R. B. Co.. 67 NT. Y. 100; Millard v. Brown, 35 N. Y. 297; Uptonv. Upton, 51 Hun (N. Y. i, L84; 21 N". Y. St. Rep. 559; 4 X. Y. Supp. 936; Bennett v. Smith. 23 Hun (N. Y.), 50; Carpenter v. Barber, 44 Vt. 442; shay v. Thompson, 59 Wis. 540. ••southern R. Co. v. Smith, - 292; 52 V. S. App. 70S; 40 L. R. A. 746; 30 0. C. A. 58; Chic, eto., R. R. Co. v. McKeau, 40 111. 218. 139 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. have been done in good faith with honest intentions and proper prudence and caution in the exercise of a supposed right, in which case the rule has been generally affirmed that exemplary damages are not recoverable. 110 So an officer, who by mistake, seizes property not embraced in a chattel mortgage under which foreclosure proceedings have been instituted, is not liable for ex- emplary damages where, upon being informed of the mistake, he offers to return the property if the owner will identify it. 1 Nor will a landlord be liable for such damages for levying on prop- erty which is in the possession of the lessee but belongs to a stranger, unless he had knowledge as to the ownership of such property. - Nor again, should they be awarded against one who goes upon vacant land and cuts timber therefrom, where he acted in good faith, believing it to be his own land. 3 § 135. Against corporations — Accepted rule. — The question as to the allowance of exemplary or punitive damages in actions against corporations has been presented in various phases and has also been productive of much discussion in the various courts in which it has arisen. It may be stated generally that private corporations may, in a proper case, be subject to an al- lowance of exemplary damages in actions against them. 4 A cor- 100 Kelly v. MacDonald, 39 Ark. 387 ; Walker v. Fuller, 29 Ark. 448; Selden v. Cushman, 20 Cal. 56; Yahoola R. & C. C. Hydraulic H. M. Co. v. Irby, 40 Ga. 479; White v. Naerob, 57 111. App. 114; Mackin v. Blythe, 35 111. App. 216; Gravett v. Mugge, 89 111. 218; Waldron v. Marcier, 82 111. 550; Scott v. Byson, 74 111. 420; Dobbins v. Duquid, 65 111. 464; Hawk v. Ridg- way, 33 111. 473; Waller v. Waller, 76 Iowa, 513; 41 N. W. 307; Went- worth v. Blackman, 71 Iowa, 255; 32 X. W. 311; Inman v. Ball, 65 Iowa, 543; 22 N. W. 666; Wormald v. Hill, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 723; Perrine v. Blancbard, 15 La. Ann. 133; Sapp v. Northern Cent. Ry. Co., 51 Md. 115; Jones v. Rahilly, 16 Minn. 320; Rayor v. Mims, 37 Mich. 34; 26 Am. Rep. 493; Allison v. Chandler, 140 11 Mich. 542; Bruce v. Ulery, 79 Mo. 322; Hull v. Sumner, 12 Mo. App. 583; Kiff v. Youmans, 86 N. Y. 324; Price v. Murray, 10 Bosw. (N. Y. Super.) 243; Blewett v. Coleman, 1 Pears. (Pa.) 516; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Guinan, 11 Lea (Penn.), 98; Hillman v. Baumbach, 21 Tex. 203; Neese v. Radford, 83 Tex. 585; 19 S. W. 141. 1 Inman v. Ball, 65 Iowa 543; 22 N. W. 666. See Hull v. Sumner, 12 Mo. App. 583. 2 Mackin v. Blythe, 35 111. App. 216. 3 Walker v. Fuller, 29 Ark. 448. * Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 54; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 500; 9 So. 722; Columbus & W. R. Co. v. Bridges, 86 Ala. 448; 5 So. 864; Jef- ferson County Sav. Bank v. Eborn, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. §135 poration, however, can only act though its servants or agents for whose conduct it is, as a general rule, responsible in case of in- jury to third persons, though the act be wanton or wilful where it is done by such servant or agent within the scope of his em- ployment. The question, however, upon which the courts have disagreed has been whether exemplary damages should be al- lowed, where the act of the servant or agent was wilful, wanton or with a reckless disregard of the rights of the injured person. In such cases, however, the rule has been recognized, except in those jurisdictions where exemplary damages are not allowed, that they may be awarded against the corporation where they would be allowed against an individual in like circumstances, that is, when the act may be said to be the corporation's own act, as in case it was negligent in hiring the servant, or when there is an authorization or ratification of an act done by a servant or agent within the scope of his employment and such act would justify an award of exemplary damages if the action were against the latter. 5 84 Ala. 529; 4 So. 380; Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Brown (Ga. 1901), 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 30; Chattanooga, R. t& C. R. Co. v. Liddell, 85 Ga. 482; 11 S. E. 853; 8 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 296; Frink v. Coe, 4 Greene (Iowa), 555; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Stewart, 55 Kan. 667; 41 Pac. 961; Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 Me. 202; 2 Am. Rep. 39; Railroad v. Blocker, 27 Md. 277; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Brookhaveu Mack. Co., 71 Miss. 663; 16 So. 252; Higgins v. Louisville, N. O. & Tex. R. R. Co., 04 Miss. 80; 8 So. 170; Vicksburg & Meridian R. R. Co. v. Scanlon, 63 Miss. 413; Stone- seifer v. Sheble, 31 Mo. 243; Cald- well v. Now Jersey S. B. Co., 47 N. Y. 282; The Oriental v. Barclay, 16Tex. Civ. App. 103; 41 S. W. 117; Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Slusser, 10 Ohio St. 157; Palmer v. Railroad Co., 3 S. C. 580; 16 Am. Rep. 750. 6 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. Ill; 37 L. Ed. 97; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; 7 Am. R. & Corp. Rep. 400; 47 Alb. L. J. 186; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 008; 30 L. Ed. 1148; Milwau- kee & St. P. R. Co. v. Anns. 91 U.S. 489; 23 L. Ed. 374; Phila. W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 210; 16 L. Ed. 75; Reale v. Ry. Co., 1 Dill. (U. S.) 569; Fed. Cas. No. 1,159; Al- abama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 54; ' iiy Nat. Hank v. Jeffries, 73 Ala. 183; Gasway v. Atlantic & W. P. R. R. Co., 58 Ga. 216; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Holdfodt. 86 111. 455; l".» Am. Rep. 43; Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 36 Kan. 350; 13 Pac. 609; 59 Am. Rep. 571; Bowler v. Lane, 3 Mete. (Ky. )311; Hill v. New Orleans, O. & G. W. R. Co., 11 La. Ann. 292; Varillat v. New Orleans & Carrollton R. R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 88; Phila. W. &. B. R. R. Co. v. Lar- kin, 47 Bid. 155; 28 Am. Rep. 442; New Orleans, etc., R. R. « !o. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395; Gillette v. Mo. Valley R. R. Co.. 55 Mo. 315; 17 Am. Rep. 653; Rouse v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 41 141 § 186 KXEMPLARY DAMAGES. § 136. Decisions holding authorization or ratification of act necessary. — Whether a corporation should be subject to exemplary damages for the act of a servant or agent within the scope of his employment, where such act is Wilful, wanton, ma- licious, or done with a reckless disregard of the rights of others, if it has not been previously authorized or subsequently ratified by the corporation, has been the subject of much discussion. That in such a case exemplary or punitive damages should not be allowed is a rule asserted in many jurisdictions. The prin- ciples upon which this rule is based by the various decisions is that exemplary damages are in the nature of a punishment and should not be visited upon one who has not participated in the offense, it not being the purpose of the law to punish a person for an offense of which he is not guilty, and that he is not guilty in the absence of proof making him particeps criminis of the ser- vant's act. fi Mo. App. 298; Belknap v. Boston & M. I!. R. Co., 49 N. H. 358; Ackerson v. N. Y. L. E. & W. By. Co., 32 N. J. L. 254; Cleghorn v. New York Cent. & H. B. B. B. Co., 56 N. Y. 44; 15 Am. Rep. 375; Townsend v. New York Cent. & H. B. B. Co., 56 N. Y. 295; Hamilton v. Third Ave. B. B. Co., 53 N. Y'. 25; Caldwell v. New Jersey S. B. Co., 47 N. Y. 282; Atlantic & G. W. By. Co. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio St., 162; 2 Am. Bep. 382; Hogan v. Prov. & W. B. E. Co., 3 B. I. 88; Quinn v. So. Car. By. Co., 29 S. C. 381; Haley v. Louisville, etc., B. B. Co., 7 Baxt. (Perm. ) 240; Craker v. Chic. & N. W. By. Co., 30 Wis. 057; Bell v. Midland B. Co., 10 C. B. N. S. 287; 4 L. T. N. S. 293. «Lake Shore & M. S. B. Co. v. Prentice. 147 U. S. 101 ; 37 L. Ed. 97; 13 Sup. Ct. Bep. 261; 7 Am. B. & Corp. Bep. 406; 47 Alb. L. J. 186; Denver, B. G. R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 608; 30 L. Ed. 1148; Milwaukee & St. R. Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489; 23 L. Ed. 374; Phila. W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. ( U. S.) 210; 142 The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. (U. S. ) 546; 16 L. Ed. 75; Press Pub. Co. v. Monroe, 73 Fed. 202; 51 L. R. A. 353; Henniug v. Western Un. Teleg. Co.. 41 Fed. 864; Potts v. Chic. City Ry. Co., 33 Fed. 810; McGuire v. Golden Gate, McAllister (U. S.), 104; Tra- birjg v. California Nav. & I. Co., 121 Cal. 137; 53 Pac. 744; 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 695 ; Warner v. So. Pac. R. Co., 113 Cal. 105; 45 Pac. 187; Wardrobe v. Cal. Stage Co., 7 Cal. 118; Colvin v. Peck, 62 Conn. 155; 25 Atl. 355; McCoy v. Phila., etc., R. B. Co., 5 Houst. (Del.) 599; Bedwood v. Met. B. Co., 6 D. C. 302; Augusta Factory v. Barnes, 72 Ga. 217; 53 Am. Bep. 838; Detroit Daily Post v. Mc Arthur, 16 Mich. 447; Haver v. Cent. B. B. Co. (N. J. 1900), 45 Atl. 593; 7 Am. Neg. Bep. 296; Forhman v. Consol. Tract. Co. (N. J. 1899), 43 Atl. 892; 6 Am. Neg. Bep. 601 ; Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481; 14 Atl. 488; Cleghorn v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 44; 15 Am. Rep. 375; Townsend v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 56 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. § 137 § 137. Same subject — Particular decisions. — In this con- nection it has been said by the United States supreme court that "exemplary or punitive damages being awarded not by way of compensation to the sufferer, but by way of punish- ment of the offender and as a warning to others can only 1>p awarded against one who has participated in the offense. A principal therefore, though of course liable to make compensa- tion for injuries done by his agent within the scope of his em- ployment, cannot beheld liable for exemplary or punitive dam- ages, merely by reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent on the part of the agent.*'' 7 And in this same decision it was declared that the law upon the question is nowhere better stated than in the following : " In cases where punitive or exemplary damages have been assessed, it has been done upon evidence of such wilfulness or recklessness or wickedness on N. V. 295; 15 Am. Rep. 419; George v. Cypress Hills Cemetery, 32 App. Div. 281; 52 N. Y. Supp. 1097; Muckle v. Rochester Iiy. Co., 79 Bun (N. Y.), 32; Fisher v. Met. E. R. Co., 34 Hun (N. Y.),433; Murphy v. Cent. Park. N. & E. R. II. R. Co., 16 J. & S. (N. Y.) 96; Donovan v. Man. Ry. Co., 49 N. Y. St. R. 722; Baldwin v. New York & Harlem Nav. Co., 4 Daly (N. Y.), 314; Sul- livan v. Oreg. Ry. & Xav. Co., 12 Oreg. 392; 7 Pac. 508; 53 Am. Rep. 364; Staples v. Schmid, is R. I. 224; 19 L. R. A. 824; 26 Atl. 196; Hagan v. Prov. & W. R. R. Co., 3 R. I. 88; Nashville & Chattanooga R. R. Co. v. Staines, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.) 52; 2 1 Am. Rep. 296; International & G. X. R. Co. v. McDonald, 75 Tex. 41: 12 S. W. 860; 42 Am. & Eng. R. (as. 211; International & G. V R. Co. v. Garcia, 70 Tex. 207: 7 S. W. 802; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 58 Tex. 170; 44 Am. Rep. 610: Willis v. McNeill, 57 Tex. 465; Ricketta v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co.. 33 W. Va. 433; 10 S. E. 801; 7 L. R. A. 354: 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 42; 25 Am. St. Rep. 901; Rohinsonv. Superior Rapid Trans. R. Co., 94 Wis. 345: 34 L. R. A. 205; 68 N. W. 961: Mace v. Reed, 89 Wis. 440; 62 N. \V. 186; Bass v. Chic. & N. W. Ry. Co.. 42 Wis. 654: 24 Am. Rep. 437: Craker v. Chic. & N. W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657: 17 Am. Rep. 504; Milwaukee & .Miss. K. K. Co. v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388; Clark v. Mewsam, 1 Exch. 131, 140; Clissoldv. Machell, 26 Up. Can. Q. li. 422; Bacon's Abr. (Bouv. 1854) "Damages" (D.) 1, p. 65. The re- tention of a servant after knowledge of his act has been held to be such a ratification as will render a corpora- tion liable to exemplary damages (Bass v. Chic. & S. \Y Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654; 24 Am. Rep. 437): though in Texas it has been held that it does not amount to a ratification as a matter of law. Dillingham v. An- thony, 73 Tex. 47; 3 L. R. A. 634; 11 S. W. 139. See also Texas & P. R. Co. v. Jones (Tex Civ. App. ), 29 S. W. 491 1. ■ Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 107; 37 L. Ed. 101, per Mr. Justice Gray. 143 8 137 EX KMl'LARY DAMAGES. 8 the part of the party at fault as amounted to criminality which, for the good of society and warning to the individual, ought to be punished. If in such cases or in any case of a civil nature it is the policy of the law to visit upon the offender such ex- emplary damages us will operate as punishment and teach the lesson of caution to prevent a repetition of criminality, yet we do not see how such damages can be allowed where the principal is prosecuted for the tortious act of his servant unless there is proof in the cause to implicate the principal and make him particeps criminis of his agent's act. No man should be punished for that of which he is not guilty. . . . Where the proof does not implicate the principal, and however wicked the servant may have been, the principal neither expressly nor im- pliedly authorizes or ratifies the act and the criminality of it is as much against him as. against any other member of society, we think it is quite enough that he shall be liable in compensatory damages for the injury sustained in consequence of the wrong- ful act of a person acting as his servant." 8 « Hogan v. Prov. & \V. K. Co., 3 K. I. 88, 91, per Mr. Justice Brayton. And in a New York decision it is likewise declared that "for inju- ries by the negligence of a servant, while engaged in the business of the master, within the scope of his em- ployment, the latter is liable for com- pensatory damages. But for such negligence, however gross or cul- pable, he is not liable in punitive damages, unless he is also charge- ahle with gross misconduct. Such misconduct may be established by showing that the act of the servant was authorized or ratified or that the master employed or retained the servant knowing that he was incom- petent, or from bad habits unfit for the position he occupied. Some- thins: more than ordinary negligence is requisite. It must be reckless and of a criminal nature and clearly established corporations incur this liability as well as private persons." Cleghorn v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. 144 Co., 56 N.Y. 44; 15 Am. Rep. 375, per Church, C. J. So again in a case in Louisiana, it is said that " it is true juries sometimes very properly give what is called smart money. They are often warranted in giving vindictive damages as a punishment inflicted for outrageous conduct. But this is only justifiable in an action against the wrongdoer, and not against persons who on ac- count of their relations to the of- fender are only consequentially lia- ble for his acts as the principal is res- ponsible for the acts of his factor or agent." Knee v. Lizardi, 8 La. 26, 33, per Martin, J. And in a case in Oregon, the court after stating that such damages may be justified against a wrongdoer, says: "To at- tempt to extend the doctrine so as to visit the punishment upon inno- cent parties is to my mind unreason- able and unjust. I cannot see any principle upon which an employer, whether a natural or artificial per- EXEMPLARY I> IMAGES. §138 § 138. Same subject — Illustrations. — The rule stated in the preceding section has been applied where the malicious act of the conductor in ejecting a passenger from a train was neither authorized nor ratified by the carrier. 9 And for the mistreat- ment of a passenger on a boat by the captain, it was held that punitive damages should not be awarded against the owner where the act was not ratified by the latter. 1 " Again, where the servant of a railroad company who was in charge of an engine, blew the whistle and made a great noise which frightened plaintiffs horse and caused injury to the plaintiff, it was held that in the absence of proof that the defendant knew of the reckless character of the servant and witli such knowledge still retained him in its service, only compensatory damages were recoverable." And a similar rule was applied where a person was injured by contact with a telegraph wire which, owing to the negligence of employees, was negligently allowed to touch electric light wires. 1 - And likewise where poison ivy was al- lowed, by employees of a corporation maintaining a cemetery, to grow upon a grave, causing injuries to the owner of a burial son can be made liable for the acts of his or its servant beyond compen- satory damages, unless the employer directed the doing of the act or rati- fied it after it was done. . . . The •acts of the conductor in the present case may have been so malicious and reckless as to indicate a depraved mind, and if such were the fact he ought to be punished for his wick- edness, but by what rule of consist- ency can that punishment be inflicted upon the company. ... It is claimed, however, in the decision of the courts which hold that a railroad company is liable to exemplary or punitive damages, that the conductor of a train of cars is pro hac vice to be regarded as the company itself; but this certainly is only a fiction of law. The fact that the company acts through agents in the transaction of its business is no more peculiar than where a natural person trans- 10 acts his business through agents. The conductor ... is not punished by the judgment against the com- pany. ... It js the stockholders . . . who are punished when exem- plary damages are awarded in the action and if there is any justice in a rule which allows it in such a case, I am apprehensive I shall never be able to discover it." Sullivan v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 12 Oreg. 392; 7Pac. 508; 53 Am. Rep. 304. 9 Robinson v. Superior Rapid Trans. R. Co., 94 Wis. 345; 68 N". W. 0G1 ; 34 L. R. A. 205. See also Town- send v. X. Y. Cent. & II. R. R. Co.. 56 X. V. 295; 15 Am. Rep. 419. I Mace v. Reed, 89 Wis. 440; 62 X. \V. 186. II Nashville v. < hattanooga R. R. Co. v. Staines. 9 Ileisk. (Tenn.) 52; 24 Am. Rep. 296. '- Eenning v. Western Dn. Teleg. Co.. 41 Fed. 864. 14.'» §139 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. lot, it was held that exemplary damages were not recoverable against the corporation in the absence of notice to it of the condition complained of, or a reasonable opportunity to learn of and obviate such condition. 13 So, also, where the act of the servant or agent was unauthorized, as where an agent, by fraudulent misrepresentations, induced a person to take pas- sage on a cholera infected steamship, exemplary damages should not be given. 14 And where a salesman who was in charge of a store being suspicious that plaintiff had stolen certain goods therefrom, detained her and caused her to be sent to the police station, it was held that exemplary damages should not be awarded against the master, it not appearing that he had par- ticipated in or approved of such act. 15 And a similar rule has been affirmed in the case of a wrongful attachment by an agent or attorney. 10 But if the servant be acting in the execution of an unlawful purpose, of which the master approves, such dam- ages may be allowed. 17 And in case of gross negligence or mis- conduct of the servant, if the master was aware of such miscon- duct or had means of knowing that the servant was not prudent or careful, or if proper care was not exercised in his selec- tion, the jury may award exemplary damages. 18 And punitive damages may be recovered against a newspaper proprietor for libelous language inserted in the paper by a reporter upon proof of the approval by the former of the latter's conduct. 19 § 139. Decisions holding ratification or authorization of act unnecessary. Though the rule has been asserted in many jurisdictions that to hold a corporation responsible in exem- plary damages for the act of a servant, it must appear that the corporation was either negligent in the employment of such servant or authorized or ratified his act, yet in a greater number of jurisdictions the contrary doctrine which has been more gen- 13 George v. Cypress Hills Ceme- tery, 32 App. Div. 281; 52 N. Y. Supp. 1097. I* The Normannia, 62 Fed. 469. See also Colvin v. Peck, 62 Conn. 155; 25 Atl. 355, as to unauthorized act of agent. is Staples v. Schmid, 18 R. I. 224; 19 L. R. A. 824; 26 Atl. 193. 146 K Willis v. McNeill, 57 Tex. 465. 1 7 Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Har- ris, 122 U. S. 597; 7 Sup. Ct. 1286; 30 L. Ed. 1146. i g Henning v. Western Un. Tel. Co., 41 Fed. 864. si Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481 ; 14 Atl. 488. EXEMPLAR V DAMAGES. § 139 erally followed prevails. The rule as established by this class of cases is that if the servant or agent was engaged in furthei ing the master's business and was acting in the scope of his employment, exemplary damages are allowable against the mas- ter for an injury due to the wilful, wanton or malicious act or gross negligence of the servant or agent. The principle under- lying these decisions, which may be said to be especially appli- cable as between carrier and passenger, is that the corporation can only act through natural persons, to whom the care, manage- ment and transaction of its business is entrusted, and whether such persons occupy the position of officers, agents or servants, they represent the corporation in the particular employment in which engaged, the entire power of the corporation pro hac vice being vested in such persons. Again the doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes a corporation liable in compensatory dam- ages for the malicious torts of its servants, should apply equally to exemplary as well as to compensator}' damages. The cor- poration, if we view the servant or agent as distinct from the corporation and assume the relation to be as in the case of natural persons, master or principal, and servant or agent, may be equally innocent of wrong so far as the injury is concerned and yet liable for compensatory damages for the wilful or wan- ton act of an agent. The doctrine of respondeat superior is founded on public policy and equally so is the doctrine of ex- emplary damages, and both are equally applicable to corpora- tions irrespective of any authorization or ratification on the part of the corporation, of the servant or agent's act. 41 20 Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Seed, 115 Ala. 670; 22 S. W. 474; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 1; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Prazier, 93 Ala. 45; 9 So. 30:5; Citi- zens Ry. Co. v. Steen, 42 Ark. 321; Flanuery v. Rait. & O. R. R. Co., 4 Mackey (D. C), 111; Ga. Ry. Co. v. Dougherty, 86 servants; lard, 85 Ky. 311; 7 Am. St. Rep. 600; it has no voice but the voice of its 3 S. W. 530, per Holt, J. ', servants; and it has no hands with 82 Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Law- which to act but the hands of its ae* rence, 74 Miss. 803; 22 So. 53, per , vants. All its schemes of mischief Woods, C. J. Again in case in as well ;is its schemes of public en- Maine it is declared that " a ecu po- terprise are conceived by human ration is an imaginary being. It has minds and executed by human hands; 149 £141 EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. £141. Same subject -Illustrations.— Such damages may be recovered for a violation of duty by an employee in the conduct and these minds and liands are its servants' minds and hands. All at- tempts, therefore, to distinguish be- tween the guilt of the servant and the guilt of the corporation; or the malice of the servant and the malice of the corporation; or the punish- ment of the servant and'the punish- ment of the corporation is sheer non- sense, and only tends to confuse the mind and confouud the judgment. Neither guilt, malice nor suffering is predicable of this ideal existence called a corporation. . . . And since these ideal existences can neither be hung, imprisoned, whipped or put in the stocks, since in fact no corrective influence can be brought to bear upon them except that of pecuniary loss, it does seem to us that the doctrine of exemplary damages is more bene- ficial to them than in its application to natural persons. If those who are in the habit of thinking that it is a terrible hardship to punish an inno- cent corporation for the wicked- ness of its agents and servants, for a moment reflect upon the absurdity of their own thoughts, their anxiety will be cured. . . . There is but one vulnerable point about these ideal existences called corporations, and that is the pocket of the monied power that is concealed behind them. and if that is reached they will wince." Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 Me. 202; 2 Am. Rep. 39, per Walton, J. A corporation may be subjected to exemplary or puni- tive damages for tortious acts of its agents or servants done within the scope of their employment in all cases where natural persons acting for themselves if guilty of like tor- tious acts would be liable to such damages. Atlantic & Great W. Ry. 150 Co. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio St. 162; 2 Am. Rep. 382. In this case the court, after asserting the doctrine of iden- tity of principal and agent and de- claring that it rests on sound princi- ples of public policy and applies with peculiar propriety to corporations "which are capable of actions only through the medium of agents and which touch, infringe upon and come in contact with individuals, persons and the public only by means of their agents and servants," puts the ques- tion as to whether damages to the extent of exemplary or punitive damages can be given as in cases of natural persons and says " In answer to this query, it is proper to inquire what is the ground of reason and principle on which exemplary dam- ages are allowable in any case ? The answer is ready and clear. Nobody will dispute it. It rests not on the ground of abstract or theoretical jus- tice but on the ground of public pol- icy — a policy which seeks to pro- mote the public safety; to punish through the medium of a civil pro- ceeding a fraudulent, malicious, in- sulting or wilful wrongdoer, and to hold him up as a warning example to others to deter them from offend- ing in like manner. Now why do not, the same considerations of pub- lic policy apply as well to corpora- tions as to natural pei.su us? I am unable to see why they do not. Cor- porations, embodying as they often do the concentrated wealth and in- fluence of many individuals, cer- tainly have the power to do injury, at least equal to that of natural per- sons; and it seems to me that the history of corporations affords no satisfactory guaranty that they may not use that power for purposes KXKMl'LABY DAMAGES. § 141 of the train causing injury to a passenger when accompanied by oppression, fraud, malice, insult or other wilful misconduct, evincing a reckless disregard of consequences.'- So they may be allowed for the ejection of a passenger where the act is un- provoked, wilful and malicious and performed in a rude and aggravating manner with the intention of wounding the feel- ings of the passenger and of bringing him into contempt and disgrace. 21 And where a train is wilfully run past a station, those in charge refusing to stop to let off or take on a passenger, such damages may be allowed, 25 and similarly in case of such conduct towards a passenger on a boat. 26 Again, they have been inimical to individual and public in- terest unless restrained by conscious- ness of amenability to effective legal penalties, . . . unless the public, through the medium of our laws, retain the means to exercise an ef- fective restraint upon any tendency to wrongdoing to which they may be subject, and especially in respect to the care or the want of it with which their servants may be selected. It seems to me there is so much danger of the abuse of power in this direc- tion as to forbid the recognition of a distinction between them, acting through agents and individuals, act- ing in their own proper persons in respect to the liabilities consequent upon tortious action. The actual management of such corporations is apt to fall into the hands of either a single individual or of a small and closely associated number of indi- viduals; and the danger is that such persons will be led by a spirit of nepotism or personal favoritism or by false notions of economy leading them to lix the compensation for the services of their servants at a rate inadequate to secure the services of competent and trustworthy men, to forget the higher and paramount duty due to the public in this par- ticular, unless the stern but just and discriminating hand of the law is kept constantly visible before them." Per Brinkerhoff, C. J. In Pennsyl- vania it is said that " it seems to be settled by the preponderance of authority in this country that in ac- tions against corporations for in- juries received through the negli- gence of their servants, exemplary damages may be recovered when the injuries are wanton and malicious, are indicted in a gross or outrageous manner, whether the act was per- viously authorized or subsequently ratified by the corporation or not." Phila. Tract. Co. v. Orbann, 119 Pa. St. 42. 12 Atl. 816, per Mr. Justice Clark. 23 Louisville & X. R. R. Co. v. Bal- lard, 85 Ky. 307; 3 S. \V. 530: 7 Am. St. Hep. GOO. a* Chic. B. & Q. K. R. Co. v. Byan, 90 111. 126; Citizens' St. R. Co. v.Wil- loeby, 134 Ind. 563; 3:1 N. E. 627: Rose v. Wilmington & W. R. R. Co., 106 X. C. 168; 11 S. E. 526; Palmer v. Railroad, 3S. C 581: 16 Am. Rep. 750. 25 Purcell v. Richmond & Danv. R. R. Co.. 108 N. C. 414; 12 S. E. '.'54; 12 L. R. A. 113; New Orleans J. & Gt. X. B. Co. v. Hurst. 36 Miss. 660. - 6 Heirn v. MeCaughan. 32 Miss. 1. 151 SS 142, 143 EXEMPLARS DAMAGES. allowed in the ease of gross negligence of the servants of a telegraph company as to the delivery of a telegram.* So, also, where a sewing-machine was sold, to be paid for in monthly in- stallments, and a lease was delivered and accepted, which au- thorized the seller upon nonpayment of any installment to enter the premises of the purchaser without process and remove the machine, and payments were made to a certain agent regularly, and other agents of the seller entered the premises of the pur- chaser forcibly and violently in his absence and removed the machine against the remonstrances of his wife claiming that an installment was unpaid, which was not the fact, it was held that though the machine was returned the next day, exemplary damages might be allowed. 28 § 142. Against municipal corporations. — While a muni- cipal corporation may be liable for compensatory damages, yet it is a general rule that there can be no recovery of exemplary damages against such a corporation s in the absence of express statutory authority. 30 So the treble damages allowed by stat- ute in certain cases are not recoverable against a municipal corporation unless the statute so provides. 31 § 143. Evidence as to motives. — Such evidence should be submitted to the jury as may enable them to act intelligently and justly in determining the amount of exemplary damages 27 Western Uu. Tel. Co. v. Seed, 115 Ala. 670; 22 S. W. 474; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 1. As to general liability of telegraph companies for delay, error or negligence in the transmis- sion and delivery of telegrams, see Joyce on Electric Law, sees. 800- A35. « Singer Mfg. Co. v. Holdfodt, 86 111. 455; 29 Am. Rep. 43. » Mayor v. Lewis, 92 Ala. 352; 9 So. 243; Barbour County v. Horn, 48 Ala. 567; Chicago v. Kelly, 69 111. 475; Chicago v. Jones, 66 111. 349; Ottawa v. Sweely, 65 111. 434; Chicago v. Langlass, 52 111. 256; 4 Am. Rep. 603; Chicago v. Martin, 49 152 111. 241; 95 Am. Dec. 590; Toledo, Peoria & W. Ry. Co. v. Arnold, 43 111. 419; Bennett v. City of Marion, 102 Iowa, 425; 71 N. W. 360; 63 Am. St. Rep. 454; Wilson v. Wheeling, 19 W. Va. 350; 42 Am. Rep. 780. In Myers v. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 215, exemplary damages were allowed in such a case, but the decision was based on a statutory provision au- thorizing the allowance of such dam- ages. 30 Bennett v. City of Marion, 102 Iowa, 425; 71 N. W. 360; 63 Am. St. Rep. 454. 31 Hunt v. Booneville, 65 Mo. 620; 27 Am. Rep. 299. EXEMPLAR V DAMAGES. § 144 to be allowed. Such damages rest primarily upon the motive of the defendant, K and, therefore, every fact and circumstance bearing upon his motive or affecting his conduct at the time of the injury, and all the circumstances under which he acted, should be laid before them, and likewise evidence is admissible to explain his motives and conduct. 33 § 144. Evidence as to financial condition of defendant.— In those cases where exemplary damages may be recovered, it is proper to receive evidence as to the financial condition of the defendant. The plaintiff may introduce evidence showing the wealth of the defendant, so as to enable the jury to determine what damages shall be assessed against him as a punishment, for what might be a severe and excessive punishment to a person of little or no wealth, might, on the other hand, be very inade- quate when awarded against one whose financial standing was high. As such evidence is admissible in behalf of the plaintiff, so likewise the defendant may show that he is poor or a man of little wealth, so that an excessive amount may not be awarded. ** So it is proper to instruct the jury that the same amount of merely penal damages should not be allowed against a man who is poor though he may be found guilty, as in the case of a man who is well off. 35 The rule that evidence of the wealth of the defendant is admissible, has been held applicable where the action is against a corporation, and in such a case it was held proper to inquire : 1. What the entire paid up capital stock of the company was 7 2. What its liabilities were? 3. What were its assets ? 4. What was its surplus over and above liabilities ? 5. What dividends had been paid to stock- 82 See sees. 118-120, herein. 83 Day v. Holland, 15 Oreg. 464; 15 Pac. 855. M Mullin v. Spangenbenr, 112 111. 140; Farm an v. Lauman, 7:> [nd. 568; Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89; Beck v. Small, 35 Minn. 465; 29 N. W. 69; McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90; Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782; 22 So. 53; Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152; Johnson v. Al- len, 100 N. C. 132; Heneky v. Smith, 10 Oreg. 349; 45 Am. Rep. 14:}: Mi- theis v. Mazet, 104 Pa. St. 580; 30 Atl. 4:54; 25 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 109; Kea v. Harrington, 58 Vt. 181; 2 Atl. 475; •"«'> Am. Rep. 561; Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vr. 275; Barman v. Cun- diff, 82 Va. 239; Hare v. M;irsh, 61 Wis. 435. «b M itheia v. tfazet, 104 Pa. St. 580; 30 Atl. 434; 25 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 169. 153 8 14i EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. holders for five years past and how they were paid? 36 And the right of the defendant to introduce evidence of his own poverty has been held to exist, though no evidence as to his wealth has been introduced in behalf of the plaintiff. 37 § 145. Amount, matter of discretion with jury.— While it may be stated generally that exemplary damages should be commensurate to the nature of the offense, having due regard to the standing of the parties, 38 yet it is a general rule that the amount of such damages is a matter which rests in the discre- tion of the jury, 39 and to award exemplary damages the jury need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the injury complained of was maliciously committed. 4 " So, also, where exemplary or punitive damages are clearly warranted by the evidence, it has been held that where the court cannot, as a general rule, say that the jury has awarded a larger sum than is reasonable, proper and necessary to have that statutory ef- fect intended by the law in such cases, 41 unless such sum ap- pear to be grossly excessive, when, as in other cases, the court may set aside the verdict. 1 ^ While the question as to the amount of such damages is a matter for the discretion of the jury, "yet a court is not bound to turn the matter over to them arbitrarily and without any suggestions as to matters which they ought to consider in their assessment of such damages. It may and indeed ought to call their attention to any matters 86 Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Law- rence, 74 Miss. 782; 22 So. 53. 37 Johnson v. Smith, 64 Me. 553. 38 Burke tt v. Lanata, 15 La. Ann. 337; Hooker v. Newton, 24 Wis. 292. 3y Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. Seed, 115 Ala. 670; 22 So. 474; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 1; Doremus v. Hennessy, 62 111. Api>. 391; Frankforter v. Bryan, 12 111. 549; Colburu v. State, 47 Ind. 310; Root v. Sturdivant, 70 Iowa, 55; 29 N. W. 802; Titus v. Corkins, 21 Kan. 722; Webb v. Gilman, 80 Me. 177: 13 Atl. 688; Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 Me. 202; Raynor v. Nims, 3 Mich. 34; 26 Am. Rep. 493; Southern R. Co. v. Ken- 154 drick, 40 Miss. 374; Canfield v. Chic. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 59 Mo. App. 354; Day v. Holland, 15 Oreg. 464; 15 Pac. 855; Kenyon v. Cameron, 17 R. I. 122; 20 Atl. 233; Borland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128; Habeiman v. Gasser (Wis.), 80 N. W. 105. 40 St. Ores v. McGlashen, 74 Cal. 148; 15 Pac. 452. 41 Webb v. Gilman, 80 Me. 177; 13 Atl. 688; Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 Me. 202. « Cutler v. Smith, 57 111. 252; Col- lins v. Council Bluffs, 35 Iowa, 432; Burkett v. Lanata, 15 La. Ann. 337; McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90; Rogers v. Henry, 32 Wis. 328. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. §140 which will tend to prevent any mere arbitrary and thoughtless award, and to make the assessmenl fair and reasonable consid- ering all the circumstances of the case." 1! And, generally, the court should in those cases, where the question of exemplary damages is involved, state the rule in reference thereto to the jury, together with such restrictions and limitations as arc ap- plicable. 44 And where, as a matter of fact, there is no evi- dence to justify the assessment of exemplary damages, the trial court may so instruct the jury. 43 Again, while the amount is to be determined by the jury in its discretion, it is, however, sub- ject to this restriction, that its verdict should not exceed the sum claimed as damages by the plaintiff. 46 § 146. Instructions as to exemplary damages. — An erro- neous instruction as to exemplary damages will not be a ground for disturbing a verdict for the plaintiff, where it clearly ap- pears that only compensatory damages were awarded, 47 nor can the refusal of an instruction as to such damages be complained of where the jury find that plaintiff is not entitled to recover at all, and there is consequently no ground for an award of exem- plary damages. 48 And where no claim is made for punitive damages, an instruction is harmless to defendant which merely limits the recovery to compensatory damages, though it omits to expressly state that the jury are not to give anything by way of vindictive damages. 49 But where a charge improperly per- mits the recovery of such damages, and it is impossible to deter- mine whether the jury allowed such damages in its verdict or not, a judgment for plaintiff may be reversed.'^ "Titus v. Corkins, 21 Kan. 722, per Brewer, J. « Kutner v. Fargo, '20 Misc. | N. Y. ) 207; 45 N. Y. Supp. To;}. See also llaberinan v. Gasser (Wis.), 80 N. W. 10.-). *& Bullock v. Del. L. & \V. R. Co., f.l N. J. L. 550; 40 Atl. 050; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 837; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 419. 46 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Frazier, 93 Ala. 45; 9 So. 303; 30 Am. St. Rep. 28. « Siegle v. Rush. 173 111. 559; 50 N. E. 1008. aff'g 72 111. A pp. 485; Wright v. Donnell, 34 Tex. 291; Fitzpatrick v. Blocker, 23 Tex. 552. 48 Jones v. cooper, 97 Iowa. 735; «5 N. W. 1000; EricksoD v. Pome- rank, 66 Minn. 376; 69 N. W. 39. ■" Norton v. Third Ave. I: Co., 26 App. Div. (X. V.) r,« See Hunter v. Kansas City & M. R. & Bridge Co. (C. C. App. 6th C), 54 U. S. App. 653; 29 C. C. A. 206; 85 Fed. 379; Rosen v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. (C. C. App. 8th C), 49 IT. S. App. 647; 83 Fed. 300; 27, C. C. A. 158 534; Grant v. Mosely, 29 Ala. 302; Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Rich- ardson v. Kier, 34 Cal. 63; Wabash R. Co. v. Miller, 18 Ind. App. 549; 48 N. E. 663: Webster v. Symes, 109 Mich. 1; 66 N. W. 580; 2 Oet. L. N. 982; Geist v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Neb. 1901), 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 414, 424, and cases cited; Mowrey v. Cen- tral City Ry. Co., 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 43; S. C, 51 N. Y. 666; Pakalinsky v. New York Central R. R. Co., 82 Barb. (N. Y.) 424; Woolley v. Grand Street & Newton R. R. Co., 83 Barb. (N. Y. ) 121. See also Milligan v. Tex. & N. O. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1902), 66 S. W. 896. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 5 L50 similar terms have a relative signficance and are dependent upon the special circumstances and surroundings of the particular case. 17 It may be defined generally as such care as ordinarily prudent men, under similar circumstances, would exercise. 1S And where such car.- has been exercised, though an injury may result to another, negligence cannot be said to exist. So where a person performs a lawful act in a lawful manner and without any carelessness on his part, he is not responsible to another for an injury resulting therefrom/' since no man is an insurer that acts which are lawful and done by him with care, shall not injuriously affect others. 90 But acts which are lawful in them- selves may be done in such a careless or negligent manner as to render the doer of such acts liable to a third person in damages for an injury caused thereby.' 1 And where absence of ordinary care has been shown, evidence that the person was a careful, prudent and cautious man is not admissible to negative his want of such care." § 150. Presumption of negligence.— As a general rule negligence will not be presumed from the mere happening of 1 7 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 108; 1 Russell & Winslow's Syl- labus Digest, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 1587, and cases there cited. 18 Asbury v. Charlotte Electric Ry. L. & P. Co. (X. C. 1809), 34 S. E. 654; Houston & T. C. It. Co. v. Sgal- inski. 10 Tex. Civ. App. 107: 46 S. W. 113; Olwell v. Milwaukee Street R. Co., 92 Wis. 330; GO N. W. 362; .luyce on Electric Law, sec. 571. " Ordiuary care is the care ordinarily exercised by the great mass of man- kind or its type the ordinarily pru- dent person under the same or similar circumstances." Yerkes v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Wis. 1001). 88 X. W. 33, 36, per Dodge, J. : Tully v. Phila. W. ct P. R. R. Co. (Del. 1901), 50 Atl. 95, 96. " The expressions, •great care, 1 'due and reasonable care,' ' ordinary care and vigilance.' • reasonable and proper care,' ' reason- able degree of care and diligence,' 'care and diligence adequate to the business which they undertake.' ■ with skill, care and with attention," 'a high degree of responsibility, 1 said to be various forms of express- ing what is known as ordinary care." Joyce on Electric Law, sec. 17n, cit- ing Fowler v. Western I'nion Teleg. Co.. so Me. 381 : -2 Am. Elec. Cas. 012: Birney v. Wash. Print. Teleg. t'n., is m,1. 341; si Am. Dee. 607; Allen's Teleg. Cas. 195, 212. «> Llshowski v. Hill, 01 N. J. L. 375; 39 Atl. 904: 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 318. -' Marshall v. Well wood, 38 N. .1. 1.. 339, 343, per Beasley, C. J. 21 Seabrook v. Dicker. 4 bob. (N. Y. 344. -- Tenney v. Tuttle, 1 Allen M 185. 159 8 150 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. an accident, but there are some cases where an accident occurs which, in ordinary course of things does not happen if proper care is exercised, and in such cases the presumption of negli- gence arises, the doctrine res ipsa loquitur being applied. 23 Thus in an early case in New York, 21 it was said as to carriers of passengers that where it was shown that an accident had occurred "through some defect in the vehicle or other apparatus used by the carrier, a strong presumption of negligence arises, founded upon the improbability of the existence of any defect which extreme vigilance, aided by science and skill, could not have de- tected.'' And where a seaman who was employed on a vessel from which ore was being unloaded by means of a crane was injured by ore falling on him caused by the breaking or slip- ping of a bolt which held the bucket, it was said by the court that the accident " was of such a character as to raise a pre- sumption of negligence, either in the character of the machinery used, or in the care with which it was handled." 5 So the pre- sumption of negligence has been held to arise where a person walking along the street was struck by a chisel falling from a building, upon which work was being done ; * where under similar conditions a person was struck by a piece of wood fall- ing ; r ' and where a person was injured by ice and snow falling from a roof. 28 So, also, such presumption has been held to arise 23 Dixon v. Pluns, 98 Cal. 384; Gannon v. Wilson, 69 Cal. 541: Fair- banks Canning Co. v. Innes, 24 111. App. 83, affVl 125 111. 410; Brent- ner v. Chicago, etc., It. Co., 08 Iowa, 530: Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 82 Md. 293; Manning v. West End Ry. Co., 1GG Mass. 230: Barnowski v. Helson, 89 Midi. 52: Wiser v. Chesley, 53 Mo. 547; Graves v. Tich- nor, 6 N. 11.587: Suburban Elec. Co. v. Nugent, 58 N. J. L. 658; Seybold v. New York, Lake Erie, etc., R. Co., 05 N. Y. 562; Volkmar v. Manhattan Ry. Co.. 184 X. Y. 418: Dunn v. Bal- lantyne, 5 App. Div. 483: Butler v. Cusbing, 46 Hun (X. Y.), 521; Earl v. Cmucb, 131 X. Y. 013: Fields v. New York Central R. Co., 32 N. Y. 160 346; Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 520: Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567; Haynes v. Raleigh Gas Co., 114 N. C. 203: Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 363; Shafer v. Lacock, 168 Pa. 497; Snyder v. Wheeling Electrical Co., 43 W. Va. 661: 28 S. E. 733; 39 L. R. A. 499: Scott v. London Dry Docks Co., 3 Hurlst. & C. 596; Briggs v. Oliver, 4 Hurlst. & C. 403. 24 Curtis v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y^. 534. 25 Cummings v. National Furnace Co., 60 Wis. 601. J,; Cahalin v. Cochran, 1 N. Y. St. R. 583: Dixon v. Pluns, 98 Cal. 384. 27 Clare v. National City Bank, 1 Sw. (N. Y. ) 539. 28 Shepard v. Creamer, 160 Mass. 496. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTEIBUTOBY NEGLIGENCE. § L51 in the case of a building falling;" of walls falling;" where switch tracks were in disrepair as a result of which an employee was injured ; :!1 where goods were broken while in the possession of a carrier ; :si where a bolt from an elevated railway fell into the street j 33 where dangerous structures are erected in the streets or in public places, as a result of which injury ensues ; ;| where a person is injured by the fall of an elevator; :r ' or of a scaffold ;* by the upsetting of a stage coach,' 7 and when- injury is caused by rocks falling upon adjoining land as a result of blasting.'' § 151. Burden of proof— Negligence.— We have stated in the preceding section that under certain conditions negligence will be presumed. This, however, is an exception to the gen- eral rule, which is that where a person has received some injury which he claims is the result of negligence upon the part of another, the burden of proof is upon him to establish such negli- gence.* So where it was claimed that death was due to the in- * Giles v. Diamond, etc., Co. I Del.), Cent. 684. *> Mulleu v. St. John, 57 N". Y. 567 : Vincent v. Cook, 4 Hun ( N. Y. ), S18. a Ind. B. & C. R. Co. v. Bonehart (Ind.), 13 West. 425. 32 Ketchum v. Merchants Union Transf. Co., 52 Mo. 390. : « Volkmar v. Manhattan H. Co., 134 X. V. 41S. Sec also Brooks v. Kings Co. El. R. Co., 4 Misc. 288, aff'd 144 N. Y. 647. 34 Dunn v. Ballantyne, 5 App. Div. (N. Y.) 483; Earl v. Crouch, 131 N. Y. 613. 88 Fairbanks Canning Co. v. Innes. 24 III. App. 33, aff'd 125 111. 410; Moran v. Racine Wagon Co., 74 linn (N. Y. ), 454: 26 N. Y. Super. 852. 36 Flynn v. Gallagher, 52 N. Y. Super. 524. 37 Stokes v. Salstontall, 13 Peters (U. S.), 181; 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 297. 33 Hay v. The Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159. 11 39 Dolby v. Hearn, 1 Mai v. (Del.) 153; 37 Atl. 45; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Chancellor, 165 HI. 43S: 40 N. E. 269, rev'g 60 111. App. 525: Illi- nois, etc., R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 111. 177: Ziech v. Hebard. 67 111. App. 97; State, Brady v. Consolidated Gas Co., 85 Md. 637: Brown v. Congress St. R. Co., 49 Mich. 153: Deserant v. Cerillos Coal R. R. Co. i New Mexico, 1898), 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 2U6: Mc- Mahon v. New York Elev. R. R. Co., 18 J. & S. (N. V. ) 507; Deyo v. New York Central R. R. Co., 34 V. V. 9; Lamb v. Camden A- A.mboy R. K. Co., 16 X. V. 271: Painton v. New York Central Ry. Co., 83 X. Y. 7: Allen v. State Steamship Co., 132 X. Y. 91; 3,0 X. E. 482; Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282, aff'g56 Barb. 425; Coley v. Statesville, 1 J 1 N. C. 30; 28 S. E. 182; < 'arson v. Bromley, 184 Pa. 549; 39 Atl. 1115: Jenkins v. McCarthy, 45 S. C, 278: 22 S. E.883; Montreal Rolling Mills Co. v. Corcoran, 26 < an. S. C. 595; Bi idges 161 § 152 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. haling of gas which the gas company negligently allowed to escape from its pipes, it was held that the plaintiff must estab- lish negligence on the part of the defendant.'" And where a widow was suing for the death of her husband, it was held that tlir burden of proof was upon her to establish negligence either by direct evidence or by weight}-, consistent and precise pre- sumptions arising from the facts proved. 41 And again, where a person died while in prison and it was alleged that his death \\as due to the improper condition of the prison, it was held in an action against the town to recover damages, that the burden of proof was on the testatrix to show that the defendant had neglected its duty as to such prison. 42 So, also, in an action to recover damages for injuries to a cellar due to alleged percola- tion from defendant's stable, it was held that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that the defendant was guilty of negligence. 13 And in another case where a person had met his death by falling over the railing of a stairway of an elevated railway station, it was held that the complaint had been properly dismissed, there being no evidence showing negli- gence on the part of the defendant. 44 Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for the purpose of establishing negligence on the part of a defendant, but it must be such evidence as will lead directly to the conclusion that the negligence complained of was attributable to some act of commission or omission on the part of the defendant. 45 § 152. Negligence— For jury — Where from the facts in a case all reasonable men must necessarily draw the same con- clusion, the question of negligence may then be said to be one of law for the court, but where the facts are such that reason- able men may fairly differ upon the question whether there has been negligence or not, the determination of such question is for v. North London R. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 377; 7 H. L. 232. 40 State-Brady v. Consolidated Gas Co., 85 Md. 637; 37 Atl. 263. 41 Montreal Rolling Mills Co. v. Corcoran, 26 S. C. 595. 42 Coley v. Statesville, 121 N. C. 301 ; 28 S. E. 482. 162 43 Carson v. Bromley, 184 Pa. 549; 39 Atl. 1115. 44 McMahon v. New York Elev. R. R. Co., 18 J. & S. (N. Y.) 507. 45 Robbins v. Mount, 4 Rob. (N. Y. ) 553; S. C, 33 How. Pr. 24; Fagan v. Thomas, 6 J. & S. 133. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. £ 152 the jury."'' In order, however, to authorize the court to with- draw from the jury the decision of the question of negligence, it is said that the facts must not only be undisputed, but there must also be only one set of inferences to be drawn from the facts, and that such inferences must lead to only one conclu- sion. 17 Where negligence is alleged, a mere scintilla of evi- dence in support of the allegation is not sufficient for the sub- mission of such question to the jury.* If, however, there is some evidence, though slight and such as may cause reasonable men to differ as to the question of negligence, then it is for the jury to determine whether there was negligence or not. 49 So where from the evidence an inference might be drawn either 4 « Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408; 1 Russell & Wins- low's Syllabus Digest ; U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 1581) ; Mynning v. Detroit, etc., R. Co.. 59 Mich. 257 : 26 X. W. 514 ; Newark, etc., R. Co. v. Block, 55 N. J. 605 ; 27 Atl. 1067 ; Ilowett v. I'enn., etc., It. Co., 166 Pa. St. 607 ; SI Atl. 306. See the following' cases where question of negligence was left to the jury: Louisville, etc., It. Co. v. Woods, 105 Ala. 561 ; 17 So. 41 ; Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465 ; :',(> Pac. 352 ; Fiske v. Forsythe, etc., Bleaching Co., 57 Conn. 118 ; 17 Atl. 356 ; Gagg v. Vetter, 41 Iud. 228 ; Wise v. Covington, etc., R. Co., 91 Ky. 537 : 16 S. W. 351 ; Balhoff v. Michigan C. R. Co., 106 Mich. 606 ; 65 N. W. 592 : 2 Det. L. N. 723 : 28 Chic. L. N. 166 : Callahan v. Warne, 40 Mo. 131 ; Chicago B., etc., R. Co. v. Oleson, 40 Neb. 889 : 59 V W. 354; Coinben v. Belleville Stone Co., 59 N. J. L. (30 Vroom) 226 : 36 Atl. 473 : O'Harrav. New York Cen. & II. R. R. Co., 92 Hun (N. Y.), 56, aff'd 153 N. Y. 690; McGovern v. Standard Oil Co., 11 App. Div. (N. Y.) 588 ; S. C, 42 N. Y. Supp. 595 ; Dwyer v. Buffalo General Elec. Co., 20 App. Div. (N. Y.) 124 ; 46 N. Y. Supp. 874 ; Wallace v. Third Ave. R. R. Co. (S. C. X. V App. Div. 1899), 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 215 ; Hurley v. New York & B. Brew. Co.. 13 App. Div. i X. V.i 167 ; 43 X. V. Supp. 259 ; Smith v. Metropolitan Street R. Co., 7 App. Div. (X. V. | 253 ; 74 X. Y. St. R. 706; 40 X. Y. Supp. 14S : Ellerbee v. Carolina C. R. Co., lis X. C. 1024 : 24 S. E. 808 ; Call v. Eastou Transit Co., 180 Pa. 618; 37 Atl. 89 ; Washington v. Missouri, K.&T. R. Co., 90 Tex. 314 ; 38 S. W. 764, rev'g 36 S. W. 778. 47 Eastwood v. Retsoff Mining Co., 86 Hun (X. Y. ), 91, aff'd 152 X. Y. 651. 48 Powers v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co., 60 Hun (N. Y.), 1'.' : 38 N. Y. St. R. 558 : 11 X. Y. Supp. 408 : 128 X. Y. 659. See also Dwight v. (iermania Life Ins. Co., 103 X. Y. 311: Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hoist, 110 Pa. St. 226: 1 Atl. 217: Casey v. New York Central R. R. Co.. 25 Wkly. Dig. 56S : Murray v. Forty-Second Street M. & St. X. R. Co., 9 App. Div. i X. Y. i 610 : 41 X. Y. Supp. G20. * 9 Cumberland, etc., Iron Co. v. Scally, 27 Md. 589 : Erickson v. Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 71 Hun iN. Y.), 108 : 24 \. Y. Supp. 003 : Painton v. Northern Central R. Co., 83 N. Y. 7. 163 § 153 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. that the muster did not exercise the proper degree of care as to machinery, appliances, and place to work in for his servant, or that the servant's death was due to a failure on his part to ex- ercise ordinary care, or that it was the result of obvious danger or risk, it was held that the question was one for the jury. 50 And again, where from the facts of the case it was doubtful whether the death of a driver was due to contributory negli- gence on his part, or to negligence of the gripman, the question was held to be one for the jury. 51 But where in answer to the defense of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff's in- testate, it was claimed that the defendant could have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, it was held that in the absence of evidence that the injury could have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care after such contributory negligence had intervened, such issue should not be submitted to the jury. 52 § 153. " Inevitable accident "— " Act of God." —Accidents are generally classified as (1) those which are the "act of God," ( 2 > as " inevitable," and (3) as " avoidable." The terms " act of God" and "inevitable accident" are frequently used as equivalent expressions. There is, however, in the majority of the cases, a distinction made, the term " inevitable accident " being considered as of a broader meaning than the term the " act of God." So it has been said that " every ' act of God ' is an ' inevitable accident ' because no human agency can resist it ; but it does not follow that every inevitable accident is an act of God. Damage done by lightning is an inevitable accident and also an act of God, but the collision of two vessels in the dark is an inevitable accident and not an act of God." ■ " Act of God " may be said as a general rule to denote such acci- dents as arise from natural causes and are not due to and cannot be avoided by human agency. In those cases where loss or injury is due to the act of God, damages therefor cannot be 50 Comben v. Belleville Stone Co., 59 N. J. L. (30 Vroom) 226; 36 Atl. 473. 51 Smith v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 7 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 253 : 74 N. Y. St. K. 706 : 40 N. Y. Supp. 148. 164 52 Ellerbee v. Carolina C. R. Co., 118 N. C. 1024 ; 24 S. E. 808. 53 Anderson's Diet, of L., citing Fer- guson v. Brent, 12 Md. 33, La Grand, C. J. See also The Charlotte, 9 Ben. 6-16; cases, 10 id. 310, 312, 320. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. § 1"> :> . recovered. In such cases the act of God must be the sole and immediate cause of the injury. If, however, there be any human intervention which operates to produce the injury, then it cannot be said, in a legal sense, to be an act of God.™ So where a vessel was sunk by running upon the mast of a sloop which had been sunk by a squall but was visible, it was held not to be a loss occasioned by the act of God. 35 Hut damages due to storms of unusual violence ; M to extraordinary Hoods ; " or snowstorms ;* or to sudden freezing VJ are within the clause. "act of God."' 50 That a loss or damage is due to the act of God is frequently set up by carriers in defense to an action against them for damages where goods entrusted to them for transportation have been lost or injured. It is not sufficient, however, as a defense in such cases unless it appear that the goods were not by any act of commission or omission negligently exposed by the carrier to the danger of loss by such act of God," for if it appear that the carrier's negligence contributed to the loss, he may then be liable for the damages to the goods though 54 Michaels v. New York Central R. R. Co., 30 N. Y. 0(54: Merritt v. Earle, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 38, aff'd 29 X. Y. 117; Mc Arthur v. Sears, '21 Wend. (X. Y.) 190; King v. Shep- herd, 3 Story, 349. 65 Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 117. MNichols v. Marslaud, L. R. 10 Ex. 255; Compton v. Long Island R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. St. R. 554. i: Morris v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 23 Fla. 182: Withers v. North Kent. R. Co., 3 Hurlst. & X. 969; Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171. is Pruitt v. Hannibal, etc.. R. <'o.. 62 Mo. 527. «»Lowe v. Moss, 12 111. 477: West v. Steamboat Berlin, 3 Iown, 532; Worth v. Edmonds, 52 Barb, i N. Y.) 40; Missouri Pac. By. Co. v. John- son, 72 Tex. it.'); 10 S. W. 325. 60 See also the following eases for construction of the phrase, " Act of God:" Smith v. Western R. Co. of Ala., 91 Ala. 455; Williams v. Grant, 1 Conn. 487: Central B., etc.. Co. v. Cent, 87 Ga. 402; 13 S. E. 502; Lowe v. Moss, 12 111. 477; Plaisted v. B. & K. Steam Xav. Co., 27 Me. 132; Pied- mont, etc., R. Co. v. McKcn/.ie, * 75 Md. 458: 24 Atl. 157: Wendell v. Pratt, 12 Allen (Mass.), 464: Harris v. Rand, 4 N". H. 259: Morris Canal Co. v. Byerson, 27 N. J. L. 457: Read v. Spaulding, 5 Bosw. (N. Y.) 395, aff'd 30 N. Y. (530: Parsons v. Hardy, 14 Wend. (N. Y. ) 215; Price v. Harts- horn, 44 Barb. (X. Y. ) 055, aff'd 44 X. Y. 94; 4 Am. Rep. 645: Slater v. South Carolina B. Co., 29 S. C. 96; McCall v. Brock, 5 Strobh. (S. C.) 119; Friend v. Woods, 6 Gratt. i Ya. i 189. 61 Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 410: Bead v. Spaulding, 5 Bosw. I N. V. i 395, aff'd 30 X. Y. 630; Bostwick v. Bait. & Ohio B. B. Co., 45 X. Y. 712. rev'g 55 Barb. 137: Klauber v. American Express Co., 21 Wis 21. 165 S§ 154, 155 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTOR* N KGLIGENCE. the act of God was the immediate cause thereof/'- The burden of proof is, however, upon a carrier, claiming that goods in his care have been injured by such accident, to show that no act or neglect of his contributed to the injury. 63 § 154. "Inevitable accident "— " Unavoidable accident." The terms "inevitable accident" and "unavoidable acci- dent " appear to be used by the courts generally as equivalent expressions,' 51 and may be defined as such accidents as arise un- expectedly from some unknown source, or from some known source, and which cannot be avoided by a person exercising the requisite degree of care and skill in the premises, and in such cases, as a general rule, there can be no recovery for any injury sustained. 05 § 155. Inevitable or unavoidable accident— Illustrations. Where a horse becomes unmanageable without any fault on the part of the driver, and as a result thereof a child is run over and injured, the driver is not liable therefor. 66 Nor is a street 02 Heylv. Inman Steamship Co., 14 Hun (N. Y. ), 564. See also cases cited in preceding note and throughout this section. 63 Michaels v. New York Central R. R. Co., 30 N. Y. 564; Read v. Spaulding, 30 N. Y. 630; Wing v. New York & Erie R. R. Co., 1 Hilt. (N. Y.) 235. 1)4 Mr. Anderson, however, in his Dictionary of Law distinguishes be- tween "inevitable accident" and " unavoidable accident.'' He speaks of inevitable accidents as those which are absolutely unavoidable because effected or influenced by the uncon- trollable operations of nat ure, and un- avoidable accidents as such as result from human agency alone, but are unavoidable under the circumstances. The words "inevitable" and "un- avoidable" are similarly defined and given as synonyms in Webster's Dic- tionary. Inevitable is denned "not 166 evitable, incapable of being avoided; admitting of no escape or evasion; unavoidable;" and unavoidable is defined as " not avoidable; nottobe shunned; necessary; inevitable; as unavoidable evils." 65 Ryan v. Armour, 166 111. 568; 47 N. E. 60, aff'g 67 111. App. 102; Nave v. Flack, 90 Ind. 205; Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 292; Reiss v. N. Y. Steam Co., 128 N. Y. 103; 38 N. Y. St. R. 842; 28 N. E. 24; Cosulich v. Standard Oil Co., 122 N. Y. 118; 33 N. Y. St. R. 287; 25 N. E. 259; Conger v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 6 Duer (N. Y.), 375; Crutch- field v. Richmond, etc., R. R. Co., 76 N. C. 320; Wakeman v. Robinson, 8 Moore, 63; 1 Bing. 213; Blythe v. Birmingham Water Co., 11 Exch. 781. w Trow v. Thomas, 70 Vt. 580; 41 Atl. 652. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTOR? NEGLIGENCE. §156 railway company liable for the death of a child caused by his unexpectedly and suddenly appearing on the track bo closely in front of an approaching car, that it was impossible to stop it in time to avoid the accident. 67 So an electric lighl company is not liable for the death of a person caused by the breaking of a live electric light wire, where the breaking was due to an accident which no reasonable human care could prevent. 6 * And a carrier having no knowledge that a package which it receives contains nitroglycerine is not liable for damages caused by an explosion thereof.' 2 ' Nor is an owner of real property, who is making ex- cavations upon his land, liable for injuries to adjoining buildings caused by such excavations, where he has been guilty of no neg- ligence.' Nor is a person who is lawfully operating a steam boiler upon his own premises with all reasonable care liable to an adjoining owner for an injury sustained by him as a result of the boiler exploding. 71 So it has been held that a person law- fully using fire on his own premises is not liable for an injury to adjoining premises caused by the fire communicating thereto, where there has been no negligence or fault on his part. 74 $ 156. Avoidable accident. —An avoidable accident is one which might have been averted by the exercise on the part of a person performing an act, of such care as under the circum- stances of the occasion would have been required. So though a person may be guilty of contributory negligence in being up- on the tracks of a railroad company, yet if the employees of the company in charge of the engine knew of his danger in time to have avoided the injury by the exercise of reasonable care, and negligently failed to use the means at their command to prevent it, the company will be liable in damages, for the injury so sus- 67 Callary v. Easton Transit Co., 185 Pa. lTti; 30 Atl. 813; Kierzen- kowski v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 184 Pa. 459; :$'.» Atl. 220; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 533. 68 Snyder v. Wheeling Electrical Co., 43 W. Va. GG1; 39 L. R. A. 499; 28 S. E. 733. See Joyce on Elec- tric Law, sees. 450-454, GOO, 607, 612. 69 Parrot v. Wells, 15 Wall. 524. 70 Bailey v. Gray, 53 S. C. 503; 31 S. E. 354. 71 Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 47G; 10 Am. Rep. 47G. -Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Clark v. Foot. 8 Johns. (N. V.) 422; Lansing v. Stone. :)7 Barb. (N. Y. ) 15; Simons v. Monier. 29 Barh. (N. Y.) 419; Hinds v. Barton, 25 N. Y. 544. 167 § 157 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. tained. 73 And it is not essential that the employees should ac- tually know of the danger to which a person is exposed upon the track in order to render the company liable, but it is suf- ficient if they have such notice or belief as will put a prudent man on the alert, 74 and the fact that a person is a trespasser does not change the rule ; ~ r ' and an instruction as to the effect of contributory negligence was held to be properly refused where it failed to state the phase of the case tending to show that the defendant could have prevented the accident by the exercise of reasonable care after having discovered the plain- tiff's danger. 76 Contributory negligence to defeat recovery in such cases must, it is held, intervene between the failure of the defendant to exercise the necessary care to avoid the injury and the accident. 77 In the application of the rule that though a person may have contributed to an injury yet if the person in- flicting it could, after discovering the other's danger, have avoided it, recovery may be had, it is held that prior negligence of the defendant cannot be invoked or considered. 78 § 157. Avoidable accident — Illustrations. — Where a tres- passer on a railroad track, while attempting to rescue a child, was struck by the train, it was held that the company was lia- ble where the engineer saw his danger but failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the injury. 79 And a street railway 73 Kansas & A. V. R. Co. v. Fitz- hugh, 61 Ark. 341: 33 S. W. 960; Pierce v. Walters, 164 111. 560; 45 N. E. 1068, affg 63 111. App. 562; Neet v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 100 Iowa, 248; 76 N. W. 677; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 26: Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Mulligan, 45 Md. 486: Mathews v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 63 Mo. App. 569; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 866: Lloyd v. Albermarle & R. R. Co., 118 N. C. 1010; 24 S. E. 805; Blankenship v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 82; 38 S. W. 216. See also McCreery v. Ohio River R. Co. (W. Va. 1901), 10 Am. Xeg. Kep. 500, 506. 74 Tucker v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 92 Va. 549; 24 S. E. 229. But see 168 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Vittitoe, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 612; 41 S. W. 269. 75 Peirce v. Walters, 164 111. 560; 45 N. E. 1068, affg 63 111. App. 562; Mathews v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 63 Mo. App. 569; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 866; Tucker v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 92 Va. 549: 24 S. E. 229. 7,; Sheehan v. Citizens R. Co., 72 Mo. App. 524. 77 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Sain, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 386; 33 S. W. 558. 78 Dull v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Co., 21 Ind. App. 571; 52 N. E. 1013; 1 Repr. 676. 79 Pierce v. Walters, 164 111. 560; 45 N. E. 1068, aff'g63 111. App. 562. Negligence and contributory negligence. § i"- s company is liable for the death of a person killed on its track where the accident is due to the failure of the motorman to keep watch over the track, or to his neglect to use the proper means for stopping the car after he lias discovered the presence of such person upon the track. 90 So, also, where an engineer of a train saw a man upon the track approaching a trestle about three quarters of a mile away, and made no attempt to check the speed of the train or to give any warning of its approach until about two hundred yards from the trestle, it was held that, notwithstanding any negligence on the part of the person in go- ing upon the trestle, the negligence of the engineer in making no effort to avoid the accident was the proximate cause of the death for which the company was liable. 81 And where a person lying at the side of a track was struck and killed by a train, it was held that the company was liable if the engineer, by the exercise of a reasonable and proper lookout, could have discov- ered him in time to have avoided the accident. 88 But the fact that the employees in charge of a train see an object upon the track at a point where they have no reason to suspect the pres- ence of children, and which appears to be no living object, or anything of substantial value to be injured or to cause injury to the train or passengers, does not put them under any obliga- tion or duty to stop until its nature can be ascertained ; and where a train did not stop under such circumstances, but when it was too late the object was discovered to be a child, and with the aid of every appliance and the exercise of the greatest effort and skill on their part it was impossible to avoid injury, the com- pany was not liable. 83 § 158. Duty to use ordinary care to avoid consequences of another's negligence. — The following discussion from a recent ease ^ ably considers the point indicated by the head line. The 80 San Antonio Street R. Co. v. Renken, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229; 38 S. W. 829. BlMcLamb v. Wilmington & \V. R. Co., li-'U X. C. 862; 29 S. E. 894. 82 Pliarrv. Southern R. Co., 1 IK \. C. 751; 26 S. E. 149. See Sullivan v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 36 S. W. 1020. s:1 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Prewitt (S. C. Kan. 189S), 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. '29. -' Western a- Atlantic R. ('••. v. Ferguson (Ga. |, 39 S. E. 306; 10 Am. Neg. Kep. 228 et seq., per Cobb, J. 169 8 L58 NEGLIGENCE ANI> CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. court says : " In the case of Railroad Co. v. Luckie,* 3 Mr. Jus- tice Lumpkin uses the following language : ' It seems to be the clear meaning of our law that the plaintiff can never recover in an action for personal injuries, no matter what the negligence of the defendant may be, short of actual wantonness, when the proof shows he could, by ordinary care, after the negligence of the defendant began or was existing, have avoided the conse- quences to himself of that negligence.' This language can convey no other impression than that, in cases of the charac- ter referred to, the duty on the part of the plaintiff to use ordinary care for his protection against the consequences of the defendant's negligence does not arise .' until after the negli- gence began or was existing.' The ruling in the Luckie case * was approved in terms in the case of Brunswick & W. R. Co. v. Gibson, 87 where Mr. Chief Justice Simmons used the expression above referred to, saying that ' the plaintiff in an action against a railroad company for personal injuries cannot recover even though the company may have been negligent, if after the neg- ligence of the defendant began or was existing, the person in- jured could by ordinary care have avoided the consequences to himself of that negligence.' In the case of Railroad Co. v. Attaway, 88 the present chief justice used the following language : 'The rule which requires one to avoid the consequences of another's negligence does not apply until he sees the danger or has reason to apprehend it.' In the case of Coiner v. Barfield, 89 Mr. Justice Fish says in substance that if one who was injured by the negligence of another used proper diligence as soon as his peril was apparent to avert the catastrophe, it could not be said that by ordinary care he might have avoided the con- sequences of the other's negligence. In Macon & I. S. Elec. St. R. Co. v. Holmes, 9 " Mr. Justice Lewis says : " A party cannot be charged with the duty of using any degree of care or diligence to avoid the negligence of a wrongdoer until he has reason to apprehend the existence of such negligence. No one can be expected to guard against what he does not see, and cannot fore- 85 87Ga. 7; 13 S. E. 105. 86 Railroad Co. v. Luckie, 87 Ga. 7; 13 S. E. 105. 87 97 Ga. 497; 25 S. E. 484; 11 Am. Neg. Cas. 351n. 170 88 90Ga. 661; 16 S. E. 958. 8 n02Ga. 489; 31 S. E. 90. 90 103 Ga. 658; 30 S. E. 565; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 251. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTOB? NEGLIGENCE. § 158 tell. The rule, therefore, which requires one to exercise ordinary care and diligence to avoid the consequences of another's neg- ligence, necessarily applies to a case where there is opportunity of exercising this diligence after the negligence has begun and has become apparent.' From the expressions used and the rul- ings made in the Cases cited, and there are many others where similar expressions are used and similar rulings made, the rule of force with reference to the subject under investigation seems to be well settled, and may be thus stated : The duty Imposed by law upon all persons to exercise ordinary care to avoid the con- sequences of another's negligence does not arise until the neg- ligence of such other is existing, and is either apparent, or the circumstances are such that an ordinarily prudent person would have reason to apprehend its existence. In such eases, and in such cases only, does the failure to exercise ordinary care to escape the consequences of negligence entirely defeat a recov- ery, in other cases (that is, where the person injured by the negligence of another is at fault himself, in that he did not, before the negligence of the other became apparent, or be- fore the time arrived when, as an ordinarily prudent person, it should have appeared to him that there was reason to apprehend its existence, observe that amount of care and diligence which would be exercised under like circumstances by an ordinarily prudent person) such fault or failure to exercise due care and diligence at such a time would not entirely preclude a recovery, but would authorize the jury to diminish the damages in propor- tion to the amount of default attributable to' the person in- jured/" ... At common law if the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the injury, he could not recover. This doctrine, referred to usually as that of 'contributory negligence,' is not the law of this state; but the doctrine referred to often as that of 'comparative negligence,' is the rule of force here.* 2 This rule authorizes a recovery by the plaintiff, although he was at fault, provided he was injured under circumstances where. l>\ 91 Comer v. Barfield, 102 Ga. 489; I Co. v. Johnson, 38 Ga. 409; 11 Am. 31 S. E. 90: Railroad Co. v. Holmes, Neg. Cas. 292. 103 Ga. 60S; 4 Am. Neg. Hep. 251; 9 - See note on Comparative N'eg- 30 S. E. 565; Macon & Western R. R. |ligence, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 248 262 See also sec. 16S, herein. 171 § 158 NBGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. the exercise of ordinary care on his part, he could not have avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence. 93 If the plaintiff knows of the defendant's negligence, and fails to exercise that degree of care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise under similar circumstances to prevent an injury which will result from such negligence, it is well settled that he cannot recover. 91 If the negligence of the defendant was existing at the time that plaintiff was hurt, and he, in the exercise of that degree of care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under simi- lar circumstances, could have discovered the defendant's neg- ligence, and when discovered could, by the exercise of a like degree of care, have avoided the same, then he cannot recover. 95 If at the time of the injury an ordinarily prudent person, in the exercise of that degree of care and caution which such a person generally uses, would have reasonably apprehended that the defendant might be negligent at the time when and place where the injury occurred and so apprehending the proba- bility of the existence of such negligence, could have taken steps to have prevented the injury, then the person injured cannot recover, if he failed to exercise that degree of care and caution usually exercised by an ordinarily prudent person to ascertain whether the negligence which might have been rea- sonably apprehended really existed. 96 If there is anything pres- ent at the time and place of the injury which would cause an ordinarily prudent person to reasonably apprehend the proba- 93 See Civ. Code, sees. 2322, 3830. 94 See Railroad Co. v. Neily, 56 Ga. 544; Railroad Co. v. Harris, 76 Ga. 508; Railroad Co. v. Luckie, 87 Ga. 6; 13 S. E. 105; Briscoe v. Southern Ry. Co.. 103 Ga. 224. 227: 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 360; 28 S. E. 638; Railroad Co. v. Dorsey, 106 Ga. 826, 828; 32 S. E. 873: Hopkins v. Railroad Co., 110 Ga. 85, 88; 35 S. E. 307. 95 See Atl. & W. P. R. R. Co. v. Loftin, 86 Ga. 43. 45; 12 S. E. 186; 11 Am. Neg. Cas. 350n ; Railroad v. Luckie, 87 Ga. 6: 13 S. E. 105; Bruns- wick & Western R. R. Co. v. Gibson, 172 97 Ga. 489; 25 S. E. 485; 11 Am. Neg. Cas. 351n ; Cain v. Railway Co., 97 Ga. 298; 22 S. E. 918; Railroad Co. v. Bradford (Ga. ), 38 S. E. 823. 96 See Railroad Co. v. Blooming- dale, 74 Ga. 604, 611: Smith v. Rail- road Co.. 82 Ga. 801; 10 S. E. Ill; Jenkins v. Railroad Co., 89 Ga. 756: 15 S. E. 655; Railroad Co. v. Attaway, 90 Ga. 657, 661; 16 S. E. 956; Macon & Indian Springs Electric St. Ry. Co. v. Holmes, 103 Ga. 655; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 251 ; 30 S. E. 563; Lloyd v. City & Suburban Ry. Co., 110 Ga. 167; 7 Am. Neg. Rep. 591; 35 S. E. 170. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. § lo8 bility, even if not the possibility of danger to him in doing an act which he is about to perforin, then he must take such steps as an ordinarily prudent person would take to ascertain whether such danger exists, as well as to avoid the consequences of tin- same after its existence is ascertained, and if he fails to * 1 * > this and is injured, he will not be allowed to recover, if by taking proper precautions he could have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the person inflicting the injury. A railroad track is a place of danger, and one who goes thereon is bound to know that he is going into a place where he is subject to the dangers incident to the operation of trains upon that track. 93 This is true without regard to the place where the track is, — whether in the country, where pedestrians are not expected to be, or at a public road crossing, or at a street crossing, or at the stations and depots of railroad companies, where persons are expected and invited to be present. No matter where the track is located, any person who goes upon the same is bound to know that he is going upon a place where his presence would be at- tended with more or less danger. What would or would not amount to negligence in the manner in which a person entered upon a railroad track would depend to a large extent upon the peculiar location of the place at which he went upon the track. An ordinarily prudent person in the possession of all his facul- ties would not attempt to cross a railroad track at any place without using at least his sense of sight, if not that of hearing, to determine whether at the time and place he was about to cross the same, there were present any of those dangers which a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably apprehend. In Railroad Co. v. Smith," it was in effect held that one is not bound to anticipate negligence when the law commands dili- gence for his protection at the hands of another; Mr. Chief Justice Bleckley in the opinion of that case saying : 'If (the plaintiff) had been on the crossing, or at any place he was by right entitled to be, he would have been warranted in assuming that the whole world would be diligent in respect to him and his safety.' We do not understand this rule to mean that it is an 97 See Comer v. Shaw, 98 Ga. 545; 110 Ga. 167; 1 km. Neg. Rep. 601; „ . .. . ... -vt__ n.... on. . ok C T? 17fl 35 S. E. 170. 25 S. E. 7:5:i: 1 1 Am. !Jeg. Cas. 851n ; . Lloyd v. City & Surburban Ry. Co., 98 78 Ga, 700; 3 S. E. 899. IT:'. § 159 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. act of ordinary prudence for a person to go blindly into a place which may or may not be dangerous, simply because the law has commanded those in charge of such place to do certain things, which, if faithfully performed, would render improbable, if not impossible, injury to any one at that place. Ordinary care would itself require the use of the senses to ascertain whether there was at the particular time any danger in going into the place. An ordinarily prudent person would necessarily apprehend the possibility of danger, and would always act on such apprehension, and use his senses to determine whether or not it was safe to go into the place at the time that he was seeking to enter the same." § 159. Gross negligence. — The distinction generally made as to the different degrees of negligence has not in all cases re- ceived favorable consideration from the court. So it was said in an English case that no matter by what epithet we may call negligence, whether we term it plain negligence or gross negligence, it is really only the "failure to bestow the care and skill which the situation demands." 99 And in a case in the United States supreme court it was declared that the term " gross neolio-ence " was a relative term " doubtless to be understood as meaning a greater want of care than is implied by the term ' or- dinary negligence,' but after all it means the absence of the care that was requisite under the circumstances." It was also said in this case that " the law furnishes no definitions which can be applied in practice, but leaves it to the jury to determine in each case what the duty was and what omissions amounted to a breach of it.*' 1C0 So in a case in New York it is said that the distinction as to the different degrees of negligence is neither founded upon any principle, nor is it capable of any certain and satisfactory application to individual cases as they arise. The court further says : " Attempts have been made to fix a liability 99 Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, State v. Manchester, etc., R. Co., 52 per Rolfe. B. N. H. 557; Wells v. New York Cen- ioo Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. tral R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 181; Briggs Arms, 91 U. S. 494, per Davis, J. v. Taylor, 28 Vt. 180; Hinton v. See also Steamboat New World v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. 646; Beal v. South King, 16 How. 474; Denver Consol. Devon Ry. Co., 3 H. & C. 337. Elec. Co. v. Simpson, 21 Colo. 371; 174 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTOR* NEGLIGENCE. § L59 upon the distinction between gross negligence and negligence merely, but courts have been compelled to abandon the attempt, and to say that negligence does not change its character and be- come anything but negligence by the application of any epithet to it." 1 Though the utility in practice of any classification or definition of different degrees of negligence may be doubtful, yet the fact remains that there are different degrees of negli- gence. Under the same state of facts in two cases, we might in one have a person guilty of negligence in only a slight degree, while there might be on the part of the person in the other case, negligence of a much greater degree. So, again, a given course of conduct in one case might be no negligence at all, or possibly only slight negligence, while in an another case under different conditions the same course of conduct would be an aggravated degree of negligence. Thus it was that negligence was origi- nally divided into three classes, known as slight, ordinary and gross, corresponding to the different degrees of care known as slight, ordinary and great. In this connection it has been said that, " strictly speaking, it is not correct to divide negligence into degrees at all, because there can -be no negligence, within the legal meaning of the term, except where the degree of care required by law in the particular case has not been given. . . . But . . . these terms are in familiar use and are per- fectly well understood, and any attempt to dispense with them will cause far more confusion than it clears away. We adhere, therefore, to a classification of negligence, corresponding with the classification of care." 2 Gross negligence has been defined as the " omission of that care which even inattentive and thought- less men never fail to take of their own property or interests." 3 And again we have it defined as a " great and aggravated degree of negligence as distinguished from negligence of a lower de- • Smith v. New York Central R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 2l'2. 2 Shearman & Rerlfield on Negli- gence (5th ert. ), sec. 48. See also Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pointer, 14 Kan. 50; Burlington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Wendt, 12 Neb. 76; Dudley v. Camden, etc., Ferry Co., 13 Vr. (N. J.) 25: Dallas City R. R. Co. v. Beeman, 74 Tex. 291: Cremer v. Town of Portland, 36 Wis. 100; Const. Texas. 1876, art. 16. sec 26, and cases cited in last note of this section. :i Anderson's Dictionary of Law (1893). 175 § 100 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. gree," ' as " that entire want of care which would raise a pre- sumption of a conscious indifference to consequences,'' 5 as "the want of slight care," 6 and as negligence "amounting to wilful injuiy. " 7 The element of wilfulness does hot, however, in our mind, enter into the determination. of the question to this extent. Gross negligence being, as we view it, the absence of a slight degree of care or diligence not amounting to wilful injury. 8 § 160. Wilful injury— Wanton negligence. — The terms " wilful injury " and " wanton negligence " are used in some cases as equivalent or synonymous terms. 9 Thus it is said in one case : " Then there is that reckless indifference or disregard of the natural or probable consequence of doing an act, designated whether accurately or not in our decisions as ' wanton negli- gence ' to which is imputed the same degree of culpability and held to be equivalent to wilful injury." 10 It may be questioned whether a wilful act can also be classed as a negligent act, since it is claimed that in negligence there is no intent to do wrong which will injure another, the injury being due in case of negligence to a mere absence of care. The terms, however, "wilful neglect," "wilful negligence," and "wanton negli- gence," are used in many of the cases so that though such a phrase may appear incorrect, yet the courts have recognized such terms by using them and their use by the courts has been in an equivalent sense. In the sense in which any one of them is used, they being considered synonymous, it may be defined as 4 Doorman v. Jenkins, 2 Ad. & El. 261. 5 Southern Cotton Press, etc., Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587. 6 Shearman & Redfield on Negli- gence (5th ed. ), sec. 49. 7 St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Todd, 36 111. 409. 8 See Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Farmer, 97 Ala. 141; 12 So. 86; Jacksonville, etc., R. Co. v. South- wortli, 32 111. App. 307, afTd 135 111. 250; 25 N. E. 1093; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Bodemer, 139 111. 596; 20 N. E. 692; Galbraith v. West End R. Co., 165 Mass. 572; 43, N. E. 501; 176 Smith v. New York Cent. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 222; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Coon, 111 Pa. St. 430; First Nat. Bank v. Graham, 85 Pa. St. 91; Austin, etc., R. Co. v. Beatty, 73 Tex. 592; 115 S. W. 858; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Shuford, 72 Tex. 165; Wright v. Clark, 50 Vt. 130. See also Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Dodge (Ky. 1902), 66 S. W. 606. 9 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Webb, 97 Ala. 308; 12 So. 374 and other cases in this state cited in this sec- tion. 10 Electric Co. v. Bowers, 110 Ala. 331; 20 So. 346. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. § 161 the intentional act or failure to act of a person who is conscious of his own conduct and who, from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, is also conscious of the fact that such conduct will naturally or probably result in injury. 11 Thus it is said : "A mere error of judgment, as the result of doing an act, or the omission of an act having no evil purpose or intent, a consciousness of probable injury, may constitute simple negligence, but cannot rise to the degree of wanton negligence or wilful wrong. 1 - And again: "To constitute wilful injury there must be design, purpose, intent to do wrong and inflict the injury." w The words " wanton " and " wilful " are of very sim- ilar meaning. Wanton means unrestrained, reckless, regardless of consequences, and in some cases a wanton act may be a wil- ful one or committed with evil intent. Wilful means inten- tional as distinguished from accidental, with a bad purpose, or with evil intent. 11 So it will be seen that if the terms " w;mton negligence," " wilful negligence," and " wilful injury " are to be used as equivalent in meaning, there must be in each the intent to act or omit to act with a consciousness that such conduct will result in probable injury. 15 § 161. Contributory negligence— Defense to action — It may be stated as a general rule that in actions to recover dam- ages for an injury, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is a defense thereto provided, however, that such negligence con- 11 Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Martin, 117 Ala. 307; 23 So. 231; Louis- ville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Webb, 97 Ala. 308; 12 So. 374; Electric Co. v. Bowers, 110 Ala. 328; 20 So. 345; Railroad Co. v. Markee, 103 Ala. 160; 15 So. 511; Peoria Bridge Co. v. Loomis, 20 111. 235; Kentucky Central R. R. Co. v. Gastineau, 83 Ky. 119. The term "wilful neglecl " is used in the Kentucky statutes. See Kentucky Gen. Slats, ch. 57, sec. 3. w Electric Co. v. Bowers. 110 Ala. 331: 20 So. 346; Railway Co. v. Lee. 92 Ala. 272; 9 So. 230: Al- 12 ahama Great Southern R. Co. v. Moorer, 116 Ala. 642; 22 So. 900; 9 Am. & Eug. R. Cas. N. S. 742; 3 Am. Nee. Rep. 320; Peoria Bridge Assn. v. Loomis, 20 111. 235. But see Kan- sas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Campbell, 6 Kan. App. 417. w Electric Co. v. Bowers. llU.Vla. 328; 20 So. 345. 14 Anderson's Dictionary of Law, L099, 1114. '■ Electric Co. v. Bowers. 110 Ala. 331 : 20 So. 346, and other cases in Alabama cited in this note; Peoria Bridge Assn. v. Loomis, 20 111. 235. But see Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. v. Campbell, 6 Kan. App. 417. 177 § 161 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. tributed directly to and was the proximate cause of the injury. 16 So it is declared by the United States supreme court that if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured, an action for the injury cannot be maintained unless it further appear that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. 17 So it has been held that contributory neg- 16 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 40S; Little v. Hackett, 116 TJ. S. 371; Sheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Whittle, 20 C. C. A. 196; 40 U. S. App. 23; 74 Fed. 296; Fernan- dez v. Sacramento, etc., R. Co., 52 Cal. 45; Flynn v. San Francisco, etc., R. Co., 40 Cal. 14; 6 Am. Rep. 595; Isbell v. New York, N. H. & R. Co., 27 Conn. 393; Maxwell v. Wilming- ton City Ry. Co., 1 Marv. (Del.) 199; 40 Atl. 945: Lyman v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Houst. (Del.) 583; Indianapolis v. Caldwell, 9 Ind. 297; Atvvood v. Bangor, O. & O. T. R. Co., 91 Me. 399; 40 Atl. 67; Bigelow v. Reed, 51 Me. 325; Kennedy v. Cecil Co., 69 Md. 65; 14 Atl. 524; Mur- phy v. Deane, 101 Mass. 455; Wil- liams v. Edmonds, 75 Mich. 92; 42 N. W. 534; Barbee v. Reese, 60 Miss. 906; Schaabs v. Woodburn Sarven Wheel Co., 56 Mo. 173; Dickson v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., 124 Mo. 140; 27 S. W. 476; Guthrie v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 51 Neb. 746; 71 N. W. 722; O'Connor v. North Truckee Co., 17 Nev. 245; 30 Pac. 882; Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197; Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. v. Toffey, 38 N. J. L. 525; Dudley v. Camden, etc., Ferry Co., 45 N. J. L. 368; Griff en v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 34; Mun- ger v. Tonawanda R. R. Co., 4 N. Y. 349: 5 Den. 255; Cunan v. Warren Chemical & Mfg. Co., 36 N. Y. 153; Gray v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 2 J. ' 178 & S. 519, affd 65 N. Y. 561: Suy- dam v. Grand St. & Newton R. R. Co., 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 375; 17 Abb. Pr. 304; Terry v. New York Central R. R. Co., 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 574; Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 117 N. C. 616; 30 L. R. A. 257; 23 S. E. 264; Gunter v. Wicker, 85 N. C. 310; Schweinf tilth v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 60 Ohio St. 215; 54 N. E. 89; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 73; 42 Ohio L. J. 2; Wolf v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 55 Ohio St. 517 : 45 N. E. 708; 36 L. R. A. 812; 37 Ohio L. J. 23; Ford v. Umatilla Co., 15 Oreg. 313; Drake v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 51 Pa. St. 240; Thir- teenth St. R. Co. v. Boudron, 92 Pa. St. 475; Martin v. Southern R. Co., 51 S. C. 150; 28 S. E. 303; Interna- tional & G. N. R. Co. v. Culpepper, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 182; 46 S. W. 922; District of Columbia v. Brewer, 23 Wash. L. Rep. 724; 7 App. D. C. 113; Towler v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 18 W. Va. 579. 1 7 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408. See also McPeck v. Central Vt. R. Co., 79 Fed. 596; Boston & M. R. Co. v. McDuffey, 79 Fed. 942 ; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Hellentlial, 88 Fed. 120; Gilbert v. Erie R. Co., 97 Fed. 751, cited in Russell & Wins- lows' Syllabus Digest, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. (ed. 1900), in support of above proposition; Culbertson v. Halliday, 50 Neb. 229; 69 N. W. 853; j Thompson v. Salt Lake Rap. Trans. NEGLICKNOE AND CON'II: 1IU'T< >RY L61 ligence in any degree which immediately conduces to the injury is a defense. 18 but that it must refer to the direct occasion of the injury and not to a remote cause of it ; 1!1 and that though the plaintiff may be guilty of negligence, yet if such negligence in no way contributed to the injury, it is no defense to an action to recover damages therefor.'- 1 " In determining the question of contributory negligence, it is held that the standard, by which the conduct of the person sought to be charged therewith, is to be judged, is that of an ordinarily careful prudent man.- 1 And that when a person is approaching or is in a dangerous place, he should use his faculties to avoid injury, but that he is not re- quired under this rule to exercise the best judgment or to make use of the most available means for his safety." And the mere fact that a person is at a point or place of danger is not of itself sufficient to charge him with contributory negligence in ease of injury to him since he has the right to assume that any other person who may also be, or have the right to be, at such point will conduct himself in accordance with the rights of both.-' Where contributory negligence is set up as a defense to an action for an injury received in another state, the effect to be given Co., 16 Utah, 281; 52 Pac. 92; 40 L. I! A. 172. » Bunn v. Delaware, L. & W. R. H. Co., 6 Hun (N. Y.), 303; Gray v. Second Ave. K. K. Co., 65 X. Y. 561 : 2 .J. & S. 519. 19 Lannen v. Albany (ias Light Co., 44 N. Y. 459; 46 Barb. 264. J Ford v. Charles Warner Co., 1 Mai v. (Del.) 88; 37 Atl. 39; Hawks v. Winans, 10 J. & S. 451; 74 N. Y. 609; Travis v. Carolton, 26 N. Y. St. R. 821 ; 7 X. Y. Supp. 231: Haley v. Earle. 30 N. Y\ 208; Martin v. South- ern K. Co., 51 S. C. 150; 28 S. E. 303; McCreery v. Ohio River R. Co. (W. Va. 1901), 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 500, 506. 21 Salter v. Utica & Black River R. R. Co., 88 X. Y. 42. •■« Wright v. Boiler, 20 N. Y. St. R. 874; 3 N. Y. Supp. 742, aff'd 123 N. Y. 630: 33 N. Y. St. R. 1028; 25 X. E. 052. See .sees. 158, 168, herein. 28 Newson v. Xew York Central R R. Co., 29 X. Y. 383. See also Gon- zales v. New York tfe Harlem R. R. Co., 39 How. Pr. 407. rev'g 1 Sw. 506; Spooner v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 54 N. Y. 230. rev'g31 Barb. 419; 36 Barb. 217: (irippen v. Xew York Central R. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 34; New York. Lake Erie. etc.. R. < o. v. Atlan- tic Refg. Co.. L29 X. V. 597; 42 V V St. R. 346; 29 N. K. 829; Boyce v. Manhattan R. Co.. 118 X. Y. 314: 23 N\ Y. St. R. 692: 23 X. E. 304: Murphy v. Xew York Central, etc., R. Co.. 118 X. Y. 527; 23 V E. 812; Bullock v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 105 X. C 180: 10 S. E. 988: Reeves v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 30 Pa, St 454. 179 §§ 162, 163 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. thereto is to be determined by the law of the place and not by the law of the forum. 31 § 162. Contributory negligence as defense not affected by statute giving right of action for death — Under the Ohio statute ■ providing that when death is caused by such wrongful act, neglect or default as would if death had not ensued, entitle the party injured to maintain an action for damages, the one caus- ing the injury shall be liable to the personal representatives in be- half of specified persons, it has been decided that in an action for damages contributory negligence on the part of a person killed by such wrongful act, neglect or default is a defense to an action to recover for such death. 26 And under the same statute it is held that the contributory negligence of the beneficiaries, but not of the administrator, constitutes a defense to such an action in behalf of themselves, but not as to beneficiaries free from neg- ligence. 27 So, also, under a similar provision in the Kentucky constitution* it was held that the right which previously existed to rely upon contributory negligence as a defense to an action to recover for death resulting from an injury due to the wrong- ful or negligent act of another was not taken away."' § 163. Negligence— Open and visible defects— Contributory negligence. — In a late decision of the supreme court, appellate division, of New York,* the action was brought for death oc- casioned by a claimed defective platform of a toboggan slide 24 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Whit- low, 43 S. W. 711; 41 L. R. A. 614; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1931. 25 Ohio Rev. Stat. sees. 6134. 6135. 26Wolf v. Lake Erie Ar W. K. Co., 55 Ohio St. 517; 36 L. R. A. 812; 45 N. E. 708; 37 Ohio L. J. 23. See also Cameron v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (N. D.), 80 N. W. 885. 27 Wolf v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 55 Ohio St. 517; 36 L. R. A. 812; 45 N. E. 708; 37 Ohio L. J. 23. See also in this connection. Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Grable. 88 111. 441; Wymoie v. Mahaska Co.,, 78 Iowa, 180 396; 6 L. R. A. 545: Donahoe v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R, Co., 83 Mo. 543: Westerberg v. Kinzua Creek & K. R. Co., 142 Pa. 471: Bamberger v. Citizens St. R. Co., 95 Tenn. 18: 23 L. R. A. 486; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Groseclose, 88 Va. 267. 28 Ky. Const, sec. 241. 29 Passamaneck v. Louisville R. Co., 98 Ky. 195: 32 S. W. 620; 17 Ky. L. Rep. 763. 30 Barrett v. Lake Ontario Imp. Co., 68App. Div. 601; 74 N. Y. Supp. 301. NEGLIGENCE AM) CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. § 163 from which the deceased fell ; a verdict for the plaintiff was set aside. 31 The court said: ''It may be admitted that the ques- tion whether there was evidence to sustain the jury's ver- dict of negligence in the construction of the platform and the railing thereon is not entirely free from doubt. It, of course, would have been a simple and inexpensive matter to have put one or even more additional railings around the platform, and to thus have made impossible arr> accident such as happened. It also would be very easy to say, in the light of the unfortu- nate occurrence which did happen, that it would have been well to have done this. This, however, is not the method by which we are to determine this question. We are rather to say whether before this accident happened there was anything which should have led the person responsible for the structure, in the exercise of ordinary care and caution and thoughtfulin>s, to apprehend that there was a probability of its happening. As was said in Crafter v. Railway Co., a and quoted with approval in Larkin v. O'Neill, 33 'a line must be drawn in these cases between suggestions and possible precautions, and evidence of actual negligence such as ought reasonably and properly to be left to a jury. It is difficult in some cases to determine where the line is to be drawn.' ... In Larkin v. O'Neill, ' plaintiff fell upon the stairway in defendant's store. The steps were used by a great number of people and it was claimed that they were negligently constructed, in that there were no footholds, brass plates or rubber pads thereon to keep one from slipping. The court, referring to the fact that these steps had been used daily in safety by a great number of people who passed up and down. say, with reference to plaintiff's accident: * There is nothing in the manner in which the stairs were constructed, used, or kept from which such a result could reasonably be anticipated. It is quite probable that the accident occurred from slipping or from a misstep by the plaintiff.' In Hart v. Grennell,"' where it was held that defendant was not liable because plaintiff had tripped and fallen over a truck handle in the hitter's store, it was said that the rule of liability in such a case 'has reference 81 Williams. J., dissented. 82 L. R. 1 C. P. 300. *» 119 N. Y. 221-225 ; 23 N. E. 563. 564. "119 X. V. 221: 2:', N. E. 568 85 122 N. Y. 371: 25 X. E. 354. 181 $ L63 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. to such dangers as might reasonably be anticipated by a pru- dent and careful man . . . the question is, could the mischief have been reasonably foreseen?' In Burke v. Wetherbee, 36 an accident was caused by the slipping of a hook from the bail of a car which was used in defendant's mine. The plaintiff claimed that there should have been a bolt through the hook, and there was no question that such an appliance could have been easily used and would have prevented the accident. The car had been used, however, for a long time safely, and without any such accident. In speaking of this test by actual expe- rience, the court say : ' What more could any reasonable or prudent man have to justify him in believing that this con- venient appliance was also a safe and proper one? What greater or different tests could it have been subjected to be- fore a mine owner could use it without the imputation of negli- gence?' In Dougan v. Transportation Co., 37 the deceased was attempting to secure his hat, which had blown off, and in so doing he slipped and went through one of the openings in the rail of defendant's boat and was drowned. There was proof that the boat had run in the same condition for a long time, and that the same situation existed upon other boats, and that no acci- dent had occurred before. The court said : ' Had there been proof tending to show that any such danger would be appre- hended by a reasonably prudent person, the evidence should have been submitted to the jury.' But it held that, in the light of the experiences had with the boat, there was no such evi- dence. In Loftus v. Ferry Co.,* the plaintiff's intestate, a child six years old, while passing from the ferryboat to the dock, fell through an opening, 22 inches high, between the bot- tom and second rail of the float or bridge over which passengers passed in going upon or leaving the boat. The proof was that this bridge had been in service five or six years, was similar to bridges of other ferries, and that no similar accident had pre- viously happened. In holding that there was no proof of negligence upon the part of defendant, the court say : * The rule does not impose upon the defendant the duty of so pro- viding for the safety of passengers that they shall encounter 36 98 N Y. 562. « 84 N. Y. 455; 38 Am. Rep. 533. v 56 N. Y. 1. 182 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. § 103 no possible danger, and meet with no casualty in the use of the appliances provided by it. It was possible for the defend- ant so to have constructed the guard that such an accident as this would not have happened, and this, so far as appears, could have been done without unreasonable expense or trouble. If the defendant ought to have foreseen that such an acci- dent might happen, or if such an accident could reasonably have been anticipated, the omission to provide against it would be actionable negligence. But the facts rebut any inference of negligence on this ground. The company had the expe- rience of years, certifying to the sufficiency of the guard. That it was possible for a child, or even a man to get through the opening was apparent enough. But that this was likely to occur was negatived by the fact that multitudes of persons had passed over the bridge without the occurrence of such a casualty.' ** Within the rules laid down by and the reasoning of these and other cases, and in view of the fact that it had safely and securely served all of the purposes for which it was designed for years, we think it was improper to permit a jury to say that this platform and railing was not constructed with reasonable care and that it was not sufficient to guard against any contingencies which could be reasonably apprehended. We think this case can clearly be distinguished from that of Don- nelly v. City of Rochester, 40 especially relied upon by plain- tiff. . . . Some of the cases to which we have already referred, like that of Larkin v. O'Neill and Hart v. Grinnell, in holding the defendant not liable, especially refer to the fact that the per- son injured was not exposed to any unreasonable or concealed danger ; that the conditions complained of were obvious to every one as to risks, and were well known to the plaintiff, and that the defendant did not expose anyone 'to hidden or unforeseen danger.' We think also that, within the rule laid down in Koehler v. Manufacturing Co., 41 Hickey v. Taaffe, 4 ' and Buck- ley v. Manufacturing Co., 43 it is proper to hold that the in- testate, although an infant, was to be charged with knowledge 3J See also Lafflin v. Railroad Co., 106 N. Y. 136; 12 X. E. 599; 60 Am. Rep. 433; Craighead v. Railroad Co., 123 N. Y. 391; 25 N. E. 387. 40 166 N. Y. 315; 59 N. E. 989. « 12 App. Div. 50; 42 X. Y. Supp. 182, 1105. « 105 N. Y. 26; 12 N. E. 280. « 113 N. Y. 540; 21 N. E. 717. 183 §§ I t"»l. It'..") NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. of the construction which was open to his view, and of the risks which were incident thereto, and to the use of the plat- form. As stated before, the conclusion reached upon these questions lead us to the belief that the order appealed from should be reversed without considering the question of defend- ant's liability as a lessor." § 164. Wilful injury— Contributory negligence no defense. — As a general proposition it may be stated that though a per- son may himself have been guilty of contributory negligence, yet this is no defense to an action for damages for wilful in- jury. 41 And it is declared that no matter how gross the con- tributory negligence may be, it does not exempt one from lia- bility for an injury wilfully and intentionally inflicted after knowledge of the peril to which one has exposed himself by such negligence. 45 But in an action to recover for the death of a person under a recent Kentucky statute, which provided for recovery, where the death resulted from " negligence or wrong- ful act," and which provided for punitive damages if the "act is wilful or the negligence gross," but which did not provide as prior statutes did for recovery in case of " wilful neglect," con- tributory negligence was held to be a defense thereto. 46 §165. Contributory negligence — Burden of proof. — In several of the states the rule prevails that, in an action to re- cover damages for an injury due to the negligence of another, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show an absence of ** Sclmmaker v. Mather, 38 N. Y. St. R. 542; 14 N. Y. Supp. 411, aff'd 133 N. Y. 590: 44 N. Y. St. R. 754; 30 X. E. 755; Martin v. Wood, 23 N. Y. St. R. 457; 5 N. Y. Supp. 274: 1 Silv. S. C. 212, aff'g 18 X. Y. St. R. 274; 4 X. Y. Supp. 208; Sanford v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 343. See also Tanner v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 60 Ala. 621; Denver & R G. Co. v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9; 10 Am. & Eng. R. (as. X. S. 536; 52 Pac. 211; Central R. Co. v. Newman, 94 Ga. 560; 21 S. E. 219; Wabash R. 184 Co. v. Zerwick, 74 111. App. 670; Palmer v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 112 Ind. 250; Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Smith, 26 Ohio St. 124; Hol- stine v. Oregon, etc., R. Co., 8 Oregon, 163; Bane v. Reading R. Co., 155 Pa. St. 170; 26 Atl. 99. 45 Denver & R. G. Co. v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 536; 52 Pac. 211. 46 Clark v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 101 Ky. 34; 39 S. W. 840; 36 L. R. A. 123; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 355; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 1082. NEGLIGENCE AND C0NTRIB1 T"k\ NEGLIGENCE. § L65 contributory negligence. 17 In New York, where the rule is fol- lowed, it is declared that no presumption arises one way or the other as to the absence of contributory negligence, but that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish such absence, or he fails in his case. ls So where there was sufficient evidence on the question of negligence of the defendant to have justified the submission of such question to the jury, it was held that the case was not entitled to go to the jury, there being no evidence upon the question of decedent's freedom from contributory neg- «Park v. O'Brien, 23 Conn. 339; i Ryan v. Bristol, 63 Conn. 2G; 27 Atl. 309; AugustaS. R. Co. v. McDade, 105 Ga. 134; 31 S. E. 420; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 548; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Chancellor, 105 111. 438; 40 N. E. 269, rev'g 60 111. App. 525; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Levy, 160 111. 385; 43 X. E.357; Dyer v. Talcott, 16 111. 300; West Chicago St. K. ('<>. v. Boeker, 70 111. App. 67; Young v. Citizens St. K. Co., 148 Ind. 54: 4 4 X. E. 927. reh'g denied in 47 N. E. 142; Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, 146 Ind. 600; 39 N. E. 552; Evansville St. R. Co. v. Gentry, 147 Ind. 408; 44 N. E. 311; 37 L. R. A. 378; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 500; Penn. Co. v. Finney, 145 Ind. 551; 42 X. E. 816; Kauffman v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. I.. R. Co., 144 Ind. 456; 43 X. E. 446; Lamport v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. C»>., 142 Ind. 269; 41 N. E. 586; Whitesell v. Hill, 66 X. W. 894, aff'd on reh'g in 101 Iowa, 629; 70 X. W. 750; 37 L. R. A. 830; Benton v. Cen- tral City R. R. Co., 42 Iowa, 192; Ryan v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 44 La. Ann. 806; Perkins v. Eastern, etc., R. Co., 29 Me. 307; Allyn v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 105 Mass. 77. (See, however, Walsh v. Boston A- M. R. Co., 171 Mass. 52; 50 X. E. 453); Mitchell v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 51 Mich. 236; Mich. Cent. R. Co. v. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440; Cen- tral, etc., R. Co. v. Mason, 51 Miss. 234; Jencksv. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 33 App. Div. 635; 53 X. Y. Supp. 625; Schafer v. New York, 12 App. Div. 384; 42 X. Y. Supp. 744; Fejdouski v. Delaware it II. Canal Co., 12 App. Div. 589; 43 X. V. Supp. 84; Dorr v. McCullough; B App. Div. 327; 40 X. Y. Supp. 806; Durkee v. Del. & H. Canal Co., 88 Hun, 471; 69 N. Y. St. R. 39; East- wood v. RetzofC Min. Co., 86 Bun (X. Y.), 91: 68 X. Y. St. R. 38; 34 X. Y. Supp. 196, aff'd 152 X. Y. 651; 47 X. E. 1106; Newdoll v. Young, 80 Hun (X. Y.i, 364; 61 X. Y. St. R. 824; Sutherland v. Troy & Boston R. R. Co., 74 Hun (X. Y. ). 162; 56 X. Y. St. R.397: Pearslee v. Chatham. 69 Hun i.N. V.). 389; 52 X. Y. St. R. 695; Wlialen v. Citizens Gas Light Co., 151 X. Y. 70: 45 X. K. 363, rev'g 10 Misc. 281; »;:; \. v. st. K. :!17: 30 X. Y. Supp. 1077: <;eo<_die § L65 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. ligence which would have authorized a finding on such issue in favor of the decedent, and accordingly a nonsuit was ordered. 49 As to the character of evidence necessary to authorize the sub- mission of such question to the jury, it is declared by the court in one of the New Vork cases that " the true rule in my opin- ion is this : The jury must eventually be satisfied that the plain- tiff did not, by any negligence of his own, contribute to the in- jury. The evidence to establish this may consist in that offered to show the nature or cause of the accident, or in any other competent proof. To carry a case to the jury, the evidence on the part of the plaintiff must be such, as if believed, would au- thorize them to find that the injury was occasioned solely by the negligence of the defendant. It is not absolutely essential that the plaintiff should give any affirmative proof, touching his own conduct on the occasion of the accident. The character of the defendant's delinquency may be such as to prove prima facie the whole issue ; or the case may be such as to make it necessary for the plaintiff to show, by independent evidence, that he did not bring the misfortune upon himself. No more certain rule can be laid down." M And it may be said to be the rule in most of the other states which hold that the burden of proof as to contributory negligence is on the plaintiff that affirmative proof by the plaintiff of the absence of contributory negligence is not necessary or essential in all cases, since in many cases the facts and circumstances may be such that its absence may be inferred. 51 In a case in Maine it is declared that if it is sought to establish the absence of contributory negligence by inference, "it must be by inference from the facts in the case. It cannot be inferred from general conduct, nor from the habits or in- stincts of mankind, nor from the argument that men are likely 4J Peaslee v. Chatham, 69 Hun (N. Y. ), 389; 52 N. Y. St. R. 695. See also Chicago & E. I. K. Co. v. Chancel- lor. 165 111. 4:!8: 40 X. E. 269, rev'g60 111. App. 525; Kauffnian v. Cleveland, C. C- & St. L. R. Co., 144 Ind. 456; 43 N. E. 446. 50 Johnson v. Hudson River R. Co., 20 X. Y. 65, aff'g 6 Duer, 633, per Denio, J. See also Boyle v. Degnon- McLean Const, Co., 61 X. Y. St. R. 186 1043, and other Xew York cases cited in this section. 51 Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Cragin, 71 111. 177; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cozby, 69 111. App. 266; Nelson v. C. R. I. Co., 38 Iowa, 564; Mayo v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 104 Mass. 137; Mynning v. Detroit, etc., R. R. Co., 64 Mich. 93, and cases cited in first note in this section. NEGLIGENCE AND C0NTRIB1 lol:Y NEGLIGENCE. 166 to he careful in danger." 8 While it is held that do presump- tion arises one way or the other as to the absence of contribu- tory negligence, yet it is also held in New York that the law will always presume that every man is desirous of preserving his life and keeping his body from harm."'' § 166. Contributory negligence— Burden of proof —Con- tinued. —While, as we have stated in the preceding section, in several states, the rule is that the burden of the proof is upon the plaintiff to show the absence of contributory negligence, yet this is not the rule which prevails in the majority of the states and in the federal eourts, where it is held that the ques- tion of contributory negligence is a matter of defense, the bur- den of supporting which is upon the defendant.' 1 So in an 5 - McLane v. Perkins (Maine, 1898), 4l' At!. :.'.M;. ■•■■ Eastwood v. Retzoff Min. Co.. 86 Hun (X. V.i, 91; 68 X. V. St. R. 38; 34 X. Y. Supp. mti, aff'd 152 X. V. 651; 47 X. E. 1106. 64 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Steele (C. C. App. 6th C), 84 Fed. 93; 54 U. S. App. 550; 29 C. C. A. 81 ; Fitch- hurg R. Co. v. Nichols (C. C. App. 1st C), 50 U. S. App. 297; 29 C. C. A. 500; 8.-) Fed. 945;. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. v. Ohisholm (C. C. App. 8th C), 4!t l'. S. App. 700: 21 C. C. A. 663; 83 Fed. 652; Union P. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 161 U. S. 451; m I.. Ed. 760; 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. tilS: Washington, etc., R. Co. v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 571; (.3 sup. i t. R. .V>7; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Ho I'M. 93 IT. s. 291; Rail- road Co. v. Gladman, 15 Wall. (U. S. ) 401: Western Ry. of Alabama v. Williamson, 114 Ala. LSI; '21 So. 827; McDonald v. Montgomery St. R. Co., 110 Ala. 101; 20 So. 317: Lopez v. Central Arizona Min. Co., 1 Ariz. 404; Little Rock, etc, R. Co. v. Eu- banks, 48 Ark. 460; 3 S. W. 808; Texas, etc, Ry. Co. v. Orr, 46 Ark. 182; Robinson v. Western Pac. R. R. Co., 48 Cal. 409; Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Ryan, 17 Colo. 98; 28 Pac. 79; Jef- ferson v. Brady, 4 Honst. (Del.) 626; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700: St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Weaver, :',:> Kan. 112; 11 Pac. 408: Paducah, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hoehl, 12 Bush iKy. ), 41: Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McCally, 41 Kan. 639; Lexington, etc., County Min. Co. v. Stephens, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 696; 47 S. W. 321; Balti- more, etc., R. R. Co. v. State. 00 Md. 449: Freeh v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 39 Md. .V74: Michigan v. De- troit Cent. Mills Co., 31 Mich. 274; Hocum v. Weitherich, 22 Minn. 152; Lane v. Missouri P. R. Co., 132 Mo. 4; 33 S. W. 645; Thompson v. North Mo. R. R. Co.. ol Mo. 190; 11 Am. Rep. 443; Stevens v. Missouri P. R. Co., 07 Mo. App. 356; Prosser v. Montana Cent. R. Co.. 17 Mom. 372: 43 Pac. 81; Omaha St. R. Co. v. Mar- tin, 48 Neh. 0.".: 00 N. \V. 1007; 1 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 1 : New .Jersey Ex. Co. v. Nichols, 3-.' X. .1. L. 166; Moore v. Central R. Co.. 24 X. J. L. 268; Cameron v. Great Northern R. Co., 8 X. I). 124; 77 X. W. 1010; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 520; 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. 4.")4; Wood v. Barthola- mew, 122 X. C. 177; 29 S. E. 959; 1ST S L66 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. action to recover damages for the death of a person upon a railroad track at a point where he had a right to go upon the track, it was held that after having given proof of negli- gence on the part of the railroad company sufficient to account for the accident without any fault on the part of the deceased, the plaintiff was not under the burden of showing lack of con- tributory negligence." But if in such an action contributory negligence is disclosed by the evidence of the plaintiff, or may be fairly inferred from the circumstances of the case, then the burden may be shifted upon the plaintiff to show the lack of such negligence/* If, however, there is no evidence tending to show contributory negligence, it is held that the presumption is that due care was exercised. 57 Thus it was so held where there was no evidence of how an accident occurred. 58 And where there was no eyewitness to a railroad accident by which a person met his death, it was held that it would be presumed that due care was exercised by the deceased at the time of the accident until the contrary was made to appear by the evidence. 39 The Norton v. North Carolina R. Co., 122 N. C. 910; 29 S. E. 886; White v. Suffolk & Carolina R. R. Co. (N. C. 1897), 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 457; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Whitacre, 35 Ohio St. 627; Robinson v. Gary, 28 Ohio, 241; Ford v. Umatilla Co., 15 Oreg. 313; Hays v. Gallagher, 72 Pa. St. 136; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Weber, 76 Pa. St. 157; Cassidy v. Angell, 12 R. I. 447; Carter v. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 19 S. C. 22; Danner v. South Carolina R. R. Co., 4 Rich. (S. C.) 329; Texas, etc., R. R. Co. v. Murphy, 46 Tex. 356; Walker v. Westfielrl, 39 Vt. 246; Southern R. Co. v. Bryant, 95 Va. 212; 28 S. E. 183; Kimball v. Friend, 95 Va. 125; 27 S. E. 901; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 451 ; 3 Va. Law Reg. 650; Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 1 Wash. 599; 21 Pac. 32; Johnson v. Chesapeake, etc., R. R. Co., 36 W. Va. 73; 14 S. E. 432; Hoyt v. Hudson, 41 Wis. 105; 22 Am. Rep. 714. 66 Toledo P. & W. R. Co. v. Chis- 188 holm(C. C. App. 8th C), 49 U.S. App. 700; 83 Fed. 652; 27 C. C. A. 663. 66 Southern R. Co. v. Bryant, 95 Va. 212; 28 S. E. 183; Kimball v. Friend, 95 Va. 125; 27 S. E. 901; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 451; 3 Va. Law Reg. 650; Durrell v. Johnson, 31 Neb. 796; 48 N. W. 890. 67 Norton v. North Carolina R. Co., 122 N. C. 910; 29 S. E. 886. See also Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sanderson, 174 111. 495; Salyers v. Monroe, 104 Iowa, 74; Northern Cen. R. Co. v. State, 29 Md. 420: Mynning v. De- troit, etc., R. It. Co., 64 Mich. 95; Flynn v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 78 Mo. 195; Cameron v. Great North- ern R. R. Co., 8 N. D. 124; 77 N. W. 1016; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 454; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 520; Schum v. Penn. R. R.Co., 107 Pa. St. 8; Cassidy v. Angell, 12 R. I. 447. 58 Schum v. Penn. R. R. Co., 107 Pa. St. 8. 59 Cameron v. Great Northern R. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORS NEGLIGENCE. § 167 rule that the question of contributory negligence is a matter of defense, the burden of supporting which rests upon the de- fendant is not varied, it is declared, by the fact that plaintiff alleges that he was in the exercise of due care or by any other state of the pleadings.** Although the rule adopted and fol- lowed by the Massachusetts courts is that followed by the mi- nority of the states," 1 yet in that state it is held in a late case that, in an action to recover damages for death caused by neg- ligence under a Massachusetts statute, 62 the burden is upon a defendant railroad company to show that the deceased was guilty of gross or wilful negligence, and that such negligence contributed to the injury, and that plaintiff need not negative such negligence.*" § 167. Contributory negligence— Burden of proof— Con- clusion. — In the preceding sections we have stated the two different rules which prevail as to the burden of proof in con- nection with the question of contributory negligence. It will be noticed that in several of those states which hold that the burden to establish its absence is on the plaintiff, it is also de- clared that the law will always presume that every man is desirous of preserving his life or his body from injury until the contrary is proved, and that the absence of contributory negli- gence may in many instances be inferred from the facts and circumstances in each case, and that where it may be inferred, affirmative proof of its absence is not necessary. In those states where the opposite rule prevails, it is generally held that due care will always be presumed until the contrary is proved, but that contributory negligence may be inferred from the fads in a case, without direct proof thereof, thus casting the burden on the plaintiff to show its absence. The prevailing rule to-day as clearly supported by the great weight of authority is that the question of contributory negligence is a matter of defense, and that in the absence of facts and circumstances from which its R. Co., 8 N. D. 124; 77 N. W. 1016; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 454; 12 Am. & EDg. R. Cas. N. S. 520. 60 Fitchburg R. Co. v. Nichols |C. ('. App. 1st C), 50 U. S. App. --".17: 85 Fed. 945: 29 C. C. A. 500. 1,1 See preceding section. «'-' Mass. Pub. Stat. § 213. «» Walsh v. Boston it M. R. Co., 171 Mass. 52; 50 N. E. 4:.:?. 189 § 168 np:gligence and contributory negligence. existence may be inferred, the burden is on the defendant to show its existence by affirmative proof. § 168. Doctrine of comparative negligence.— In a recent Wisconsin case, 64 the court 65 says that the doctrine of comparative neo-lio-ence does not prevail in that state and adds: "The doc- trine of this court like that of all courts that entirely discoun- tenance comparative negligence, is that contributory negligence of the plaintiff, however slight, precludes his recovering in an action grounded on the defendant's negligence, however great such negligence may have been. In this we do not refer to wilful misconduct of a wrongdoer, which has come to be spoken of as gross negligence, meaning however intent, actual or con- structive, to do the injury, and not negligence at all, strictly so-called. The doctrine of contributory negligence applied here has the sanction of the common law from time immemorial, the support of most of the courts and standard text-writers, and half a century of the adjudications of this court. To change it otherwise than by legislative enactment would be judicial usur- pation. Therefore, it is idle to urge upon our attention author- ities that cannot be applied except by such transgression. Cases supporting each of the lines of comparative negligence and the other rules to which we have referred, are presented here as bearing on the plaintiff's right to recover, and many more might be found, especially in the inferior appellate courts of some of the states. Upon the faith of such authorities it is believed much money has been uselessly expended and false, unattainable hopes built up. Other courts have found it neces- sary, by vigorous language, to stay the tendency of such mis- chief. In a very recent case in Missouri the court used these emphatic words : ' There is no comparative negligence in this state. The rule that the negligence of the plaintiff (want of ordinary care was undoubtedly meant) which contributed di- rectly to the cause of the injury will prevent a recovery, is without exception or qualification.' The court was speaking of where recovery is sought on the ground of defendant's want of ordinary care." * 64 Tesch v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & I 65 Per Marshall, J. L. Co., 108 Wis. 593 ; 84 N. W. 823. | <* Hogan v. Citizens Railway Co., 190 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORS NEGLIGENCE, § L69 §169. Error of judgment— Sudden emergency -Contribn- tory negligence. — If a person owing to the negligence of an- other is placed in a position of peril where he is obliged instantly to choose a line of conduct in the hope of escaping the impend- ing danger, and he makes such a choice as a man of ordinary prudence would make under similar circumstances, and is in- jured thereby, the fact that if he had chosen another line of ac- tion the injury might have heen avoided will not render him guilty of contributory negligence.' 17 Thus it was so held where a 150 Mo. M, 51 S. \V. 473. Doctrine of comparative negligence does not exist in Kentucky. Sandy River C. C. Co. v. Candill (Ky. App. 1901), 60 S. W. 180. Not error to charge "If the defendant was less negligent than thr plaintiff, plaintiff could not recover." Willingham v. Macon & B. R. Co. (113 Ga. 374), 38 S. E. 843, approved in Brunswick & W. R. Co. v. Wiggins (Ga. 1901). 39 S. E. 551. where the court per Little, J., says "as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot recover for injuries indicted by the negligence of an agent of a railroad company in the operation of its trains, if both the agent and the person injured are equally negli- gent at the time the injury was sus- tained. Section 2322 of the Civil Code declares that no person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injuries to himself where the same is caused by his own negli- gence, but if the complainant and the agents of the company arc both at fault, the former may recover, but the damages may be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of default attributable to him." See also opinion in sec. 158, herein, and note 22, thereto. If injury is in- dicted wilfully, contributory negli- gence does not preclude recovery. Bolin v. Chicago, St. F. M. & O. K. Co., 108 Wis. 333; 84 N. W. 446. 67 Southwestern R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 350; Smith v. Wiightaville, etc., R. R. Co., 83 Ga. G71; 10 S. E. 361; Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. Rice, 144 111. 227; 33 N. E. 931; Muldowney v. Il- linois, etc., R. Co., 36 Iowa, 462; Knapp v. Sioux City R. Co.. 65 Iowa, 91; 21 N. W. 198; Barton v. Springfield, 110 Mass. 131; Richfield v. Mich. C. R. Co., 110 Mich. 406: OS X. W. 218; 3 Det. L. N. 425; Chi- cago, etc., R. Co. v. Miller, 4ti Mich. 532; 9 N. W. 841; Benoit v. Troy & Lansingbnrgh R. R. Co., 154 N. Y. 223; 48 N\ E. 524, rev'g 9 App. Uiv. 622; 40 X. Y. St. R. 1140; Wynn v. Central Park. North & East River R. R. Co., 133 N. Y. :.75: 44 \. Y. St. K 673; 30 N. E. 721: Twomley v. Rail- road Co., 69 N. Y. 158: Dyer v. Erie R. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 228; Read v. Brooklyn II. R. Co., 32 App. Div. (N. Y.) 503: 53 N. Y. Supp. 209; Floettel v. Johnson Engineering Co.. 19 App. Div. (X. Y.) 136; 45 N. Y. Supp. 980; Heath v. (ileus Falls, Sandy Hill & Fort Edward St. Ry. Co., 90 Hun (\. Y.), 560; 71 N. Y. St. R. 29: Cowen v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 6 X. Y. St. R. 612, aff'd 112 N. Y. 664; 20 N. Y. St. R. 978; 20 N. E. 413: Quill v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 10 Daly (N. Y. ), 313; 11 N. Y'. Supp. 80: 32 N. Y. St. R. 612; Blackwell v. Lynchburg, etc.. K. • ',,.. Ill X. C. 151: If, S E. 1i': Vallo v. United States Exp. Co.. 147 Pa. St. 404: 23 Atl. 594; Gibbons v. Wilkes- 191 § 170 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. woman, who was a passenger in a car, upon seeing the danger of an impending collision, arose from her seat with the intention of escaping from the car, and was thrown out and injured. 68 And again, where a person was, by the negligence of those in charge of a locomotive placed in a position of danger, and in rising from the seat of his wagon was struck by the engine and killed, while if he had remained seated he would have escaped unin- jured. 09 So, also, where horses commenced to run away and the driver in attempting' to direct their course, though exercising his best judgment, erred, it was held to be an error of judgment, and that there was no ground for the imputation of negligence.' u The rule above stated, however, is held not to apply to a per- son who, by his own negligence, has placed himself in a position of peril. 71 § 170. Error of judgment— Sudden emergency— Negli- gence.— In many cases also where it is sought to charge a per- son with negligence, the fact that the person sought to be charged therewith was confronted with imminent peril and made a mistake of judgment will relieve him of such charge. This may frequently happen in the case of those in charge of cars and other public and private conveyances. Thus in the case of motormen in charge of electric cars, the rule is that where a motorman in the presence of imminent danger has two or more lines of action open to him, and he chooses one of them in good faith, the fact that it may subsequently appear that by the adoption of another line of action the danger might have been better avoided will not of itself constitute negligence on Bane, etc., R. R. Co., 155 Pa. St. 279; 26 Atl. 417; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Sein, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 386; 33 S. W. 558. 68 Heath v. Glens Falls, Sandy Hill & Fort Edward St. Ry. Co., 90 Hun (N. Y.), 560; 71 N. Y. St. R. 29. « 9 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Sein, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 386; 33 S. W. 558. See also Smith v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 4 App. Div. (Y. Y.) 493; 38 N. Y. Supp. 666; Wiley v. Long Island R. R. Co., 192 76 Hun (N. Y.), 29, aff'd 144 N. Y. 717, cases of attempting to cross railroad tracks to escape threatened peril. 70 Benoit v. Troy & Lansingburgh R. R. Co., 154 N. Y. 223, rev'g 9 App. Div. 622; 40 N. Y. St. R. 1140. 71 Richfield v. Michigan C. R. Co., 110 Mich. 406; 68 N. W. 218; 3 Det. L. N. 425; Austin, etc., R. Co. v. Beatty, 73 Tex. 592; 11 S. W. 858; Baltzer v. Chicago & R. Co., 83 Wis. 459; 53 N. W. 885. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. § 171 his part, or render the company liable.' 2 So in a case in New York it was declared that where an employee of a railroad is confronted with a sadden emergency, the failure on bia part to exercise the best judgment possible does no! establish lack of care and skill. 73 So where a motorman, after having started his car across a street, saw a runaway horse coming towards the track, and he had hut a brief instant to decide on what course to pursue, it was held that though he may have erred in judg- ment in continuing to cross the street, yet this of itself did not constitute negligence rendering the company liable. 71 $ 171. Contributory negligence— Stop, look and listen. " In some jurisdictions the mere failure to stop, look and listen by one who is about to cross a railroad track is negligence per se, and this is true notwithstanding that at the place where the person was about to cross, there is imposed upon the railroad company, by statute or otherwise, the duty of giving signals as to the approach of trains to such places. In other jurisdictions it is held that the mere failure to stop, look and listen will not amount to negligence per se, but the question whether it is such negligence as will defeat a recovery is one of fact, to be deter- mined by a jury after taking into consideration all of the cir- cumstances of the case," and the court adds that even in certain jurisdictions referred to in the opinion, ''the rule is settled that 72 Joyce on Electric Law (ed. 1!)00), sec. 574, citing Stabenau v. Atlan- tic Ave. R. Co., 15.j N. V. 511; 50 N. E. 277, rev'g 89 Hun, 009: Bittner v. Cross town .St. Ry. Co., 153 X. JT.76; 46 \. E. 104; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 642, rev'g 12 Misc. ( X. Y. ) 514; 67 \. Y. St. R. 367; S3 X. Y. Sup p. 672; Phillips v. Peoples' Pass. R. Co., 190 Pa. St. 222; 42 Atl. 686; 43 Wkly. N. of ('as. Ml; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 719; Lock wood v. Belle City R. Co., 92 Wis. 97; 65 N. W. 866; Bisliof v. Belle City R. Co., 92 Wis. 139; 65 X. W. 733. 78 Wynn v. Central Park, North & East River R. R. Co., 133 X. Y. 575; 44 N. Y. St. R. 673; 30 X. E. 721. In this case it appeared that while 13 descending a down grade the brake chain on a car broke causing the car to descend of its own weight and to collide with another car, and that the driver remained on his car until it was within four feet of the other, when he jumped. The court held that it appearing that the driver hav- ing used his best judgment and hav- ing done all that could have been done, it was error to leave the ques- tion to the jury to determine whether the car bad been managed with the care and skill required by law. "* Phillips v. Peoples" Pass. II. Co., 190 Pa. St. 222; 42 Ail. 686; 4:1 Wkly. X. of Cas. 531 ; 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. 719. 193 § 171 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. one about to cross a railroad track must use his senses in a way that an ordinarily prudent person would under similar circum- stances use them, in order to determine whether it would be safe to cross at that time and place ; and this is true notwithstand- ing the company may be by law required to give signals, slacken speed, or do such other acts as would, if faithfully performed, render improbable, if not impossible, injury to any one crossing the track." 75 " There has been an endeavor in a large number of cases, in behalf of electric street railway companies, to obtain an enforcement with the same degree of strictness of the rule which requires persons about to cross the tracks of a steam rail- road to ' stop, look and listen,' and making failure to do so neg- ligence per se. The courts, however, have not inclined to a strict application of this rule in the case of electric railway tracks, owing to the difference in the character of the roads, their rights in reference to their tracks, and the general conditions affecting and surrounding their operation. An electric street railway is within the purposes for which a street is dedicated or taken, while a steam railroad is not. The right of the company in the street is merely a right in common with that of the public. It possesses no proprietary interest in or to the right of way, and the cars are not run at such a high rate of speed and are more easily and quickly stopped. On account of these distinctions and differences in the character and operation of the roads, the rule that persons must ' stop, look and listen ' before crossing the tracks of a steam railroad does not apply as strictly in the case of crossing the tracks of an electric street railway." 76 76 Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Ferguson (Ga. ), 39 S. E. 306; 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 230, per Cobb, J. See note as to " stop, look, and listen," 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 408-416. See also notes, 11 L. R. A. 385; 9 L. R. A. 157; 7 L. R. A. 316; notes, 90 Am. Dec. 780-787. 76 Clark v. Bennett, 123 Cal. 275; 55 Pac. 908; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 299; Davidson v. Denver Tramway Co., 4 Col. App. 283; 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 534; Capital Traction Co. v. Lusby, 26 Wash. L. Rep. 163; 12 194 App. D. C. 295; Evansville St. R. Co. v. Gentry, 147 Iud. 408; 44 N. E. 311, 37 L. R. A. 378; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 500; Orr v. Cedar Rapids & M. C. Ry. Co. (Iowa, 1895), 5 Am. Elec. Cas. 445; Rob- bins v. Springfield St. Ry. Co., 165 Mass. 30; 6 Am. Elec Cas. 495; Holmgren v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. (Minn. 1895), 5 Am. Elec. Cas. 499; Shea v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 50 Minn. 395; 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 481; Consolidated Traction Co. v. Scott, 58 N. J. L. 682; 6 Am. Elec. Cas. 616; NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTOR? NEGLIGENCE. § 1 7 "J § 172. Imputed negligence.— Id many cases, although an injured party may be guilty of no direct act of negligence on his part contributing to the injury, yet by reason of some rela- tion existing between such injured party and a third person, an act of such third person contributing to the injury may be im- puted to the person injured so as to prevent the recovery of damages. This question of imputable negligence frequently arises where a person riding in a vehicle or conveyance driven bv another is injured owing to some negligence or carelessness on the part of the person driving. In these cases, in order to impute the negligence of the driver to the person injured, it is necessary that the latter must have taken some part in the con- trol or management of the vehicle, such as directing the manage- ment of the horse or instructing the driver in this particular. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Behr, 59 N. J. L. 477; 37 Atl. 142; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 189; Consolidated Traction Co. v. Haight, 59 N. J. L. 577; 37 Atl. 135; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 192; Brozek v. Steinway Ry. Co., 10 N. Y. App. Div. 360; 6 Am. Elec. Cas. 542; Ehrismau v. East Ilarrisburg City Pass. Ry. Co., 150 Penn. St. 180; 4 Am. Elec. Cas. 486; Citizens' Rapid Trans. Co. v. Sei- prist, 96 Tenn. 119; 6 Am. Elec. Cas. 583; Hall v. Ogden City St. Ry. Co., 13 Utah, 243; 44 Par. 1046; »'. Am. Elec. Cas. 598; 4 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. N. S. 77. See Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sees. 625-050 where this subject is exhaustively discussed in connection with electric railroads and where the conclusion is as fol- lows: "We think we are justified in stating the rule that it is the duty of a person about to cross the tracks of an electric street railway to look and listen for approaching cars, and that failure to do so is prima facie contributory negligence, not nec- essarily precluding recovery, but de- pendent as to its effect upon the cir- cumstances of each particular case. Those operating electric railways are held to the exercise of ordinary care to prevent injury to persons crossing their tracks, that is. a de- gree of care such as an ordinarily [un- dent man would exercise, under the same circumstances, commensurate with the necessities arising from the use of the instrument operated, the possibility of danger, and the circum- stances of each particular case. They have no right to recklessly rundown pedestrians, or persons in vehicles, who may be crossing their tracks. The latter have an equal righl with the company to the use of the portion of the street occupied by the tracks, subject only to the limitation that they must not necessarily obstruct the passage of the cars. Though a person may by his own negligence, be in a position of danger nn the tracks of an electric street railway, yet his act will not preclude recovery, if those in charge of the car, after having become aware of his danger, could, by proper care and diligence, have avoided the injury." See Rus- sell v. Minneapolis St. R. Co. (Minn. 1901), SO N. W. 346. 195 § 17-2 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. If lie has not so done, then whether he be in a public vehicle as a passenger or in a private vehicle riding upon the invitation of another, the rule, as clearly supported by the authorities, is that no negligence on the part of the driver will be imputed to him. 17 He must also exercise due care himself to avoid injury and is not relieved from the consequences of his failure to do so, 78 and if he participates in the negligence of the driver he will be chargeable with such negligence so as to prevent recovery of damages for any injury sustained. 79 So, also, will the negligence of the driver be imputed to him if, with a knowledge of the "Union P. R. Co. v. Lapsley (C. C. App. 8th C.)i 51 Fed- 174; 4 U. S. App. 542; 2 C. C. A. 149; 16 L. R. A. 800; 32 Am. L. Reg. 373; Georgia P. R. Co. v. Hughes, 87 Ala. 610; 6 So. 413; Tompkins v. Clay St. R. Co., 66 Cal. 163; 4 Pa. 1165; Roach v. Western & A. R. Co., 93 Ga. 785; 21 S. E. 67; Carnis v. Erwin, 59 111. App. 555; Branuan v. Kokomo, etc., R. Co.. 115 lud. 115; 17 N. E. 202: Larkin v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 85 Iowa, 492; 52 N. W. 480; Cahill v. Cincinnati, etc., Ry. Co., 92 Ky. 345; Randolph v. O'Riordan, 155 Mass. 331; 29 N. E. 583; Alabama & V. R. Co. v. Davis, 69 Miss. 444; 13 So. 693; Dickson v. Missouri P. R. Co., 104 Mo. 491; 16 S. W. 381; Noyes v. Boscawen, 64 N. H. 361; 10 Atl. 690; Consol. Tract. Co. v. Behr, 59 N. J. L. 477; 37 Atl. 142: Consol. Tract. Co. v. Hoimark, 60 N. J. L. 456; 38 Atl. 684; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 370, afTg59 N. J. L. 297; 36 Atl. 100; Kleiner v. Third Ave. R. Co., 36 App. Div. (N. Y.) 191; 55 N. Y. Supp. 394; De Loge v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co., 92 Hun (N. Y.), 149; 71 N. Y. St. R. 720; McCallum v. Long Island R. R. Co., 38 Hun (N. Y.), 96; 103 N. Y. 686; Masterson v. New York Central R. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 247; Pettingill v. Town of Olean, 48 N. Y. St. R. 96 : 20 N. Y. Supp. 367, aff'd 141 N. Y. 573; McCormack v. 196 Nassau Elec. R. Co., 18 App. Div. (N. Y.) 33; 46 N. Y. Supp. 230, denying reh'g 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 24; 44 N. Y. Supp. 684; Robinson v. New York Central R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 11 ; 65 Barb. 146: Kessler v. Brook- lyn Heights R. R. Co., 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 426; 74 N. Y. St. R. 140; 38 N. Y. Supp. 799; Strauss v. New- burgh Elec. Ry. Co., 6 App. Div. (N. Y.) 264; 39 N. Y. Supp. 998; Gaylor v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 647; 23 Wkly. Dig. 396; Dyer v. Erie Ry. Co., 71 N. Y. 228; St. Clair St. R. Co. ; Covington Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 36 Ohio St. 86; Carr v. Easton City, 142 Pa. St. 139; 21 Atl. 822 ; Borough of Carlisle v. Brisbane, 113 Pa. St. 554; 6 Atl. 372; Markham v. Houston, etc., Nav. Co., 73 Tex. 247; 11 S. W. 131; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Cooper, 85 Va. 939. See also Joyce on Electric Law (ed. 1900), sec. 596. But see Omaha, etc., R. Co. v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627; 67 N. W. 569; Ritger v. Milwaukee, 99 Wis. 190; 74 N. W. 15. 78 Bergold v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 30 App. Div. (N. Y.)438; 52 N. Y. Supp. 11; Johnson v. Superior Rapid Trans. R. Co., 91 Wis. 233; 64 N. W. 753. 79 De Loge v. Hudson & New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co., 92 Hun (N. Y.), 149; 71 N. Y. St. R. 720. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRlBUTOBY NEGLIGENCE. § 173 danger about to be incurred, he neither objects nor makes any effort to avoid it. 80 Thus it was so held where a person was riding in another's conveyance at the iatter's request and the owner drove so recklessly that the other should have perceived his carelessness but failed to do so or to make any remonstrance. Under the conditions in this ease it was held that there could be no recovery of damages for an injury sustained by reason of collision with a railroad train. 81 And it is held that a passenger in a public conveyance may be chargeable with the negligence of the driver, where he has exercised control over such driver be- yond the mere giving of directions as to his place of destination if, as a result of such control, the injury results therefrom either in whole or in part. 82 But the negligence of the driver will not be imputed to him merely because of suggestions as to the line of route to be taken, 83 or of a caution to "ride slow" in ap- proaching a crossing. 1 * 1 § 173. Imputed negligence— Cases generally.— Where a person in an unconscious condition without any fault of his own was placed in a wagon, the negligence of the driver was held not imputable to him so as to prevent recovery for injuries caused both by the negligence of the driver and the condition of the highway. 83 So negligence of a gripman on a cable car in crossing the tracks of another road at excessive speed is not imputable to the conductor so as to prevent re- covery by him for injuries sustained; 1 * nor is the negligence of the driver of a hose cart imputable to a fireman riding on the cart : sr nor of one policeman, detailed to drive an ambu- 8u Miller v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co., 128 Iud. 97; 27 N. E. 339; Don- nelly v. Brooklyn City R. R., 109 X. Y. 16: 14 N. Y. St, R. 29; 15 N. E. 733; 28 W. D. 250; Brickell v. New- York Central A II. R. R. R. Co., 120 N. Y. 290, aff'g 12 \. Y. St. R. 450. "Smith v. New York Central, etc., R. R. Co., 38 II mi ( N. Y.), 33. 82 Haiti more and O. R. Co. v. Adams, U. C. App. 25 Wash. L. Rep. 167; 1 App. D. C. '.'7. 88 Zimmerman v. Union Ry. Co. (App. Div. X. Y. 1898). 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 665. ** Bergold v. Xassau Elec. R. Co., 30 App. Div. (N. Y.) 438; 52 X. Y. Supp. 11. 85 Foley v. East Flaniborough Twp.. 26 Ont. App. 43. 80 Minster v. Citizens Ry. Co.. 53 Mo. App. 276. *" Houston City St. R. Co. v. Rich- art, 87 Tex. 539; 29 S. W. 1040, rev'g 27 S. W. 918. 197 §174 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. lance, to another riding on the inside of same; 1 " nor can the negligence of a tugboat, acting as an independent contractor in the towing of a vessel, and having entire control of her movements, be charged to the vessel. 89 So, also, where a person was with others in a rowboat which was run down by a schooner, it was held that the negligence of the others could not be im- puted to deceased, where it did not appear that he was in any way responsible for their conduct. 90 § 174. Imputed negligence— Husband and wife. — In the case of a woman riding with her husband, it has been held that she is not chargeable with his negligence where they are not en- gaged in a joint enter]) rise and he is not her servant or agent, 91 unless she does some act to encourage his carelessness. 92 She is not, however, excused from using reasonable care herself. So in crossing railroad tracks she should use reasonable and pru- dent effort herself to see that the crossing is safe, and if she observes that her husband is about to commit a negligent act in driving across such tracks, her silence may not, as a matter of law, constitute negligence, but the inferences arising from such facts will present a question for the jury to determine. 93 And this may be said to be the general rule as to the right of a wife to recover for injuries sustained under such circumstances, ex- cept in those states where enabling statutes have not materially changed the status of the wife from her position under the com- mon law, or where the common-law form of action is still main- tained. 94 In an action by the husband and wife, however, it is 88 Bailey v. Jourdan, 18 A pp. Div. IN. Y.)387; 40 N. Y. Supp. 399. 89 Vessel Owners Towing Co. v. Wilson, 11 C. C. A.. 3iiG: 63 Fed. 626. 90 Reich v. Peck, 83 Hun (N. Y.), 214; 63 N. Y. St. R. 806; 31 N. Y. Sup].. 391, aff'd 152 N. Y. 640; N. E. 1151. 91 Finley v. Chicago. M. & St. P. R. Co.. 71 Minn. 471: 74 N. W. 174. 92 Platz v. Cohoes, 24 Hun (N. Y.), 101. 93 Hoag v. New York Central R. 198 R. Co., Ill N. Y. 199; 19 N. Y. St. R. 80; 18 N. E. 648, rev'g 21 Wkly. Dig. 506. 94 So this rule prevails in the fol- lowing states: Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Creek, 130 Ind. 139; 29 N. E. 481; Reading v. Telfer, 57 Kan. 798; Finley v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co. 71 Minn. 471; N. W. 474; Hoag v. New York Central R. R. Co., Ill N. Y. 199; 19 N. Y. St. R. 80; 18 N. E. 648, rev'g 21 Wkly. Dig. 506; Hedges v. Kansas City, 18 Mo. A pp. 26. But see following states where NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 5 175 held that the contributory negligence of the husband will be a defense to the action. 95 In a case in the federal courts it lias been declared that although the statutes may have emancipated a woman from many common-law disabilities and relieved the husband from responsibility for civil injuries committed By her, yet contributory negligence on the part of the wife may consti- tute a defense to an action by the husband for the loss of her society and the expense of her cure. 96 § 175. Contributory negligence of parent as affecting recovery for injury to child— Recovery by parent.— In an action by a parent, to recover damages for his own use and bene- fit, where his child has been injured, the contributory negligence of the parent or of an agent entrusted by him with the custody of such child, will be a defense to the action 97 as will also the the wife may not recover: Peck v. New York, X. II. & H. R. R. Co., 50 Conn. 379; Yahn v. Ottumwa, 60 Iowa. 429; Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 470; Nanticoke v. Warne, 10(5 Pa. St. 373; Carlisle v. Sheldon, 38 Vt. 440. 93 Penn. R. Co. v. Goodenough, 55 N. J. L. (26 Vroom) 577; 28 Atl. 3; 22 L. R. A. 460. M Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Honey (C. C. App. 8th C), 12 C. C. A. 190; 63 Fed. 39; 26 L. R. A. 42. See, however, Honey v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 59 Fed. 423. 97 Alabama, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bur- gess, 116 Ala. 509; 22 So. 913; Daley v. Norwich, etc., R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 591; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 138 111. 370; Chicago v. Hesing, 8:) 111. 204; Westbrook v. Mobile, etc., R. R. Co., 66 Miss. 500; Hogan v. Citizens R. Co., 150 Mo. 36; 51 S. W. 47:'.; Wi.-se v. Remme, 140 Mo. 289; 41 S. W. 797: Juskowitz v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co., 53 N. Y. Supp. 992; 2.". Misc. 04; Bellefon- taine, etc., R. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399; Cincinnati v. Gregory, 3 < >hio N. P. 142; 1 Ohio L. D. 223; Johnson v. Reading City Pass. R. Co., 160 Pa. St. 647; 28 Atl. 1001; 34 W. X. C. 203; Smith v. Hestonville, etc., R. Co., 92 Pa. St. 450; Bamberger v. Citi- zens St. R. Co., 95 Tenu. 18; Ploof v. Burlington Traction Co., 70 Vt. 509. In Missouri it has been held that if the parents of a child are guilty of negligence in permitting it to go up- on the streets unattended, they can- not recover for an injury caused by a street car, even though the driver might have prevented the injury by the exercise of ordinary care, since in the case of two directly negligent acts the court will not endeavor to sever, apportion and discriminate between them for the purpose of de- termining which act caused the in- jury. Hogan v. Citizens R. Co.. 150 Mo. 36; 51 S. W. 47:'.. Neither the contributory negligence of the parent nor of the infant is available as a defense to an action brought against a railroad company under Ala. Code, sec. 2589, for negligent homicide of the child. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Burgess, 116 Ala. 509; 22 So. 913. Iu New Jersey it has been held that the fact that the 199 S L76 ne(ii,k;kn('k ani> contributors negligence. negligence of the child where there is no presumption of inca- pacity. 88 But it is held that the contributory negligence of a parent is no defense to an action by him if the child exercised that degree of care which an adult of reasonable prudence would have exercised." * $ 176. Contributory negligence of parent as affecting re- covery for injury to child — Recovery by child.— Upon the question whether in case of an injury to a child the negligence of the parent of such child contributing to the injury majy be imputed to the latter, so as to prevent recovery by him of dam- ages, the decisions are not in harmony. The prevailing rule, however, as sustained by the courts of the majority of the states, is that where a child has been injured, the contributory negligence of the parent will not be imputed to the child, so as to prevent the latter from recovering for such injury. 100 death of a minor son was partly due to the contributory negligence of the father, yet this would be no defense to an action by the father suing as administrator and sole next of kin. Consol. Traction Co. v. Howe. 30 Vr. (N. J. L.J275. 98 Pratt Coal, etc., Co. v. Brawley, 116 Ala. 509; 22 So. 913. 99 Wiswell v. Doyle, 1H0 Mass. 42; 35 X. E. 107. See McGarry v. Loomis, 63 N. Y. 104. ioo Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Kow- alski (C. C. App. 8th C. |, 34 C. C. A. 1: 92 Fed. 310. aff'g 84 Fed. 586: Berry v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. (C. C. D. Ind.), 70 Fed. 679; Pratt Iron Co. v. Brawley, 83 Ala. 371; 3 So. 555; Daley v. Norwich, etc., R. R. Co., 26 Conn. 591; Atlanta, etc., Airline Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369; 20 S. E. 550; 26 L. R. A. 553; 44 Am. St. Rep. 145; Evansville v. Senhenn, 151 Ind. 42: 47 N. E. 634; 41 L. R. A. 728; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 568, reh'g denied in 151 Ind. 61; 52 X. E. 88; 41 L. R. A. 734; Wymore v. Mahasko Co., 78 Iowa, 396; 6 L. R. A. 545, 200 South Covington & C. St. R. Co. v. Herrklotz, 47 S. W. 265; 20 Ky. L. R. 750; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 153; Barnes v. Shreveport City Ry. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1218: 5 Am. Elec. Cas. 452; Schindler v. Milwaukee, etc., It. Co., 87 Mich. 400; 49 N. W. 670: Westbrook v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 66 Miss. 560; Winters v. Kansas City Cable R. Co., 99 Mo. 509; 6 L. R. A. 536; Bisaillon v. Blood, 64 N. H. 565; 15 Atl. 147; Newman v. Phillipsburg Horse Car R. Co., 52 N. J. L. 446: 19 Atl. 1102; 8 L. R. A. 842; Bottoms v. Seaboard & R. R. Co., 114 N.C. 699; 19 S. E. 730; 25 L. R. A. 784; St. Clair St. R. Co. v. Eadie, 43 Ohio St. 91; Erie City Pass. R. Co. v. Schuster, 113 Pa. St. 412; 57 Am. Rep. 471 ; Western Un. Tel. Co. v. Hoffman, 80 Tex. 424; 15 S. W. 1048; Allen v. Texas & P. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 943: Robinson v. Cone, 22 Yt. 224; 54 Am. Dec. 67; Ploof v. Burlington Traction Co., 70 Vt. 509; 43 L. R. A. 108; 41 Atl. 1017; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 702; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Grose- NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENT B. B 176 While tlie weight of authority supports this rule and it is more clearly in consonance with the principles of law and just ice. yet there are several states in which it is dissented from, the ride in the dissenting and minority courts being- based cither on the ground of the identification of the infant with the parent or of the agency of the parent. In these states it is declared that where a child is non sui juris though it may be incapable by its own negligence of forfeiting its legal rights, yet the carelessness of its parents may be imputed to it so as to prevent a recovery of damages by or in behalf of the child for such injury. 1 Where this rule prevails, however, it has been held that the negligence of the parent must concur with the negligence of the child in order to constitute contributory negligence.- So, also, it has been declared that the negligence of the parents is no defense clore, 88 Va. 267; 13 S. E. 254; Roth v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525; 31 L. K. A. 855; 43 Pac. 641; 44 Pur. 253. In a New Jersey case it was said: "An infant of tender years cannot be charged with negligence, nor can he he so charged with the commission of such fault by substit u- tion, for he is incapable of appointing an agent, the consequence being that he can in no case be considered to be the blamable cause, either in whole or in part of his own injury. There is no injustice, nor hardship in requiring all wrongdoers to be an- swerable to a person who is incapa- ble either of self-protection or of being a participator in their mis- feasance." Xewman v. Phillipsburg Horse Car R. Co.. 52 N. J. L. 446; 10 Atl. 1102; 8 L. K. A. 842, per Beasley, C. J. 1 Meeks v. Southern R. Co., 52 Cal. 602; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Logue, 158 111. 621; 42 \. E. 53, affg 58 111. App. 142; Baltimore & < >. S. W. R. Co. v. Pletz, f,i 111. App. mi ; Brown v. European & W. A. R. Co., 58 Me. 384; Gibbons v. Williams, 135 Mass. 333; Fitzgerald v. St. Paul M. & M. R. Co., 29 Minn. 336: 43 Am. Rep. 212; Dudley v. Westcott, 44 N. Y. St. R. 882; 18 N. Y. Supp. 130, rev'g 40 X. Y. St. R. 506; Foley v. New York Central & H. R. R. Co., 78 Hun (N. Y.), 248; 60 N. Y. St. R. 6; Canavan v. Stuyvesaut. 12 Misc. (N. Y.)74; 66 X. Y. St. R. iiS7: 33 X. Y. Supp. 53, mod'd 154 X. Y. 84; 47 X. E. 967; Mangani v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 36 Barb. (X. Y.) 239; 38 X. Y. 455; Burke v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R. R. Co., 40 Barb. (X. Y.) 529: 34 How. Pr. 239: McLain v. Van Zandt, 48 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 80; Callahan v. Sharp, 27 Ilun |\. Y.i. 85; 85 X. Y. 672; Schindler v. X. Y. L. E. K. K. Co., 1 X. Y. St. R. 289; Doran v. Troy. 22 Wkly. Dig. 230; 104 X. Y. 684; Hart- field v. Roper, 21 Wend. (X. Y. ) 615 (This last case in Xew York may be said to be the leading case in that state, at least, if not the leading case in support of the dissenting doctrine in all the states, ami is cited in the majority of the opinions. ) : Parish v. Eden, 62 Wis. 272. - Foley v. N'.w York Central & H. H. R. i;.c<»., 75 Hun (X. Y. ), 455: 57 X. Y. St. R. 67'.'. 201 § 177 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. to an action in behalf of the child to recover damages for an in- jury to him where he has neither committed or omitted any act which would constitute negligence on the part of a person sui juris, and that where he has exercised the care required of a person sui juris, any negligence on the part of the parents is immaterial. 3 And, again, that where the person causing the injury is guilty of gross negligence, the negligence of the par- ents is no defense. 4 And that where the child is in the im- mediate custody of one of its parents, the negligence of the other will not be imputed to it. 5 § 177. Contributory negligence — Degree of care required of children. — Although the doctrine of contributory negligence is applicable to children as well as to adults, 6 yet the former are not held to the exercise of the same degree of prudence and caution as would be expected and required of the latter. The degree of care and caution required of children must be gradu- ated according to the age, experience and knowledge of the child in each particular case, and the question whether a child has been guilty of contributory negligence in a particular in- stance can only be determined by a consideration of circumstan- ces of that case in connection with the above rule. 7 Under this 3 McGarry v. Loomis. 63 X. Y. 104; dimming v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 104 N. Y. 669; 21 Abb. N. C. 1 ; 5 N. Y. St. R. 737: 10 X. E. 855; 25 Wkly. Dig. 506, affg 38 Hun (N. Y. ), 362. See also Lyncb v. Smith, 104 Mass. 52. 4 Connery v. Slavin, 23 Wkly. Dig. (N. Y.)545. 5 Hennessy v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 6 App. Div. (X. Y.) 206; 39 N. V. St. R. 805. 6 Honegsberger v. Second Ave. R. R. Co.. 1 Keyes (X. Y.), 570; 2 Abb. Dec. 378, rev'g 1 Daly, 89; Morrison v. Erie Ry. Co., 56 N. Y. 302; Burke v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R. R. Co., 49 Barb. (X. Y.) 529; 34 How. Pr. 239. 7 Railroad Co. v. Gladman, 15 Wall. (U. S.) 401; Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. 202 Crenshaw, 65 Ala. 566; Pueblo Elec. St. R. Co. v. Sherman, 25 Colo. 114; 53 Pac. 322; Birge v. Gardiner, 19 Conn. 509; Western, etc., R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga, 397; 7 S. E. 912: Xorton v. Volzke, 158 111. 402; 41 N. E. 1085; 49 Am. St. Rep. 167; Atlas Engine Works v. Randall, 100 Ind. 293; Consol. City & Chelsea Park Ry. Co. v. Carlson, 58 Kan. 62; 48 Pac. 635; 2 Am. Xeg. Rep. 536; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 274; Kan- sas Pac. R. Co. v. Whipple, 39 Kan. 531; 18 Pac. 730; Paducah v. Memphis, etc., R. Co., 12 Bush (Ky. ), 41; McLaughlin v. Xew Orleans, etc., R. Co., 48 La. Ann. 23; 18 So. 703; Baltimore City P. R. Co. v. Cooney, 87 Md. 261; 39 Atl. 859; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 759; Collins v. South Boston, etc., R. Co., 142 Mass. NEGLIGENCE AND CONTBIBUTOR? NEGLIGENCE. §171 rule, age alone is not the determining factor, but experience, knowledge and ability to discern danger are also elements to be considered. So it follows that while in one case a child of eleven or twelve might be held not guilty of contributory negligence, yet in another case, under similar facts and surroundings and pursuing a similar line of conduct, a child of eight or nine, pos- sessing a higher degree of experience, knowledge and ability to discern danger, might he chargeable with negligence contribut- ing to the injury. After the question of contributory negligence on the part of a child has been determined, the same general rules as to its being a defense control as in the case of adults, and if it appear, though a child has been guilty of contributory negligence, that the accident could have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care on the part of the person causing the injury, it is no defense in an action to recover damages therefore As a general rule the question whether a child is guilty of con- tributory negligence is for the jury, 9 although in some cases very 301; Wright v.Detroit, etc., R. Co., 77 Mich. 123; 43 X. E. 765: Ecliff v. Wabash R. Co., 04 Mich. 196; Lynch v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., 112 Mo. 420; 20 S. W. 642; Duffy v. -Mo. R. Co., 19 Mo. App. 3s0: Consol. Tract. Co. v. Scott, 58 N. J. L. 682; 34 Atl. 1094; Penny v. Rochester K. Co., 7 App. Div. (X. V.i 595; 40 \. V. Supp. 172: 71 X. V. St. R. 732, all'd 154 X. Y. 770; Muller v. Brook- lyn H. R. Co., IS App. Div. (X. V.) 177: 45 X. Y. Supp. 954: Keller v. Haaker, 2 App. Div. (X. S\)245; 73 N. V. St. R. 374: 37 X. 5T.Supp.792; Haycroft v. Lake Shore A- Mich. S. R. Ry. Co., 2 Bun (X. V.), 489: Thurber v. Railroad Co.. 60 X. V. 326; Kunz v. Troy. 104 X. V. 344. rev'g 36 Hun, 615; Mallard v. Ninth Ave. R. R. Co., 15 Daly i X. V.), 376: 27 X. Y. St. R. S01 : 7 X. Y. Supp. 666; Brown v. Syracuse. 77 Hun (X. V.), 411: 60N.T. St. It. 16; Guichard v. New, 84 IIun(X. ST.), 54; 65 X. V. St. R. 20: Goff v. Akers. 49 X. Y. St. R. 615, aff'd 139 X. Y. 653; Manly v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co.. 7 1 X. I 655; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Mac- key, 53 Ohio St. 370: 29 L. R. A. 757; 41 N. E. 980; 34 Ohio L. J. 259; Penn., etc., R. Co. v. Kelley. 31 Pa. St. 372: Kauch v. Lloyd, 31 Pa. St. 358; Bridges v. Asheville, etc., R. Co., 27 S. C. 456; 3 S. E. 860; Queen v. Dayton Coal & I. Co.. 95 Tenn. 458; 30 L. R. A. 82; 32 s. W. 160; 49 Am. St. Rep. 9:)."): San Antonio Waterworks Co. v. White (Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S. W. 181: Reed v. Mad- ison, 83 Wis. 171: Merritt v. Ilepen- stal, 2:» Can. S. C. 150. a Mallard v. Ninth Ave. B. R. Co.. 1.-, Daly, 376; 27 X. Y. St. R. 801; 7 X. Y. Supp. 666. a Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Wilcox, 138 Ml. 370; Kane v. West End St. R. Co., 169 Mass. 64: 47 X. E. -"."1: Consol. City A- Chelsea Park By. I o. v. Carlson. 58 Kan. 62; 48 Pac. 635; 2 Am. N"eg. Rep. 636; 7 Am. A Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 274; Connolly v. Knickerbocker Ice Co.. 114 X. Y 104; 22 N. Y. St. R. 675; Stone v. 203 8 177 NEGLIGENCE AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. young children have been declared to be, as a matter of law, in- capable of contributory negligence. 10 Dry Dock E. B. & B. K. R. Co., 115 N. V. 104, rev'g 40 Hun, 184; tia- roni v. Compagnie Nationale de Navigation, 39 N. Y. St. R. 63; 14 N. Y. Supp. 797; Jones v. Utica & Black River R.R. Co., 36 Hun (N. Y.), 115; Ilyland v. Burns, 10 N. Y.Supp. 386; 41 X. Y. Supp. 873. 10 So held in case of child four and one half years old, Crawford v. 204 Southern R. Co., 106 Ga. 870; 33 S. E. 826; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 459; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 436; and in case of one a little less than four years of age, Covington, etc., Street R. Co. v. Herrklotz, 47 S. W. 265; 20 Ky. L. R. 75; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 153. See in this connection Joyce on Elec- tric Law (ed. 1900), sec. 585. PHYSICAL INJURIES. TITLE III. WRONGS AFFECTING RIGHTS OF PERSONS. CHAPTER VII. PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 178. Physical injuries — Substan- tial and nominal damages — Generally. 179. Damages flowing from negli- gent act though not con- templated. 180. Disfigurement of person. 181. Inconvenience. 182. Prospects of marriage im- paired. 183. Miscarriage — Loss of pro- spective offspring — Wheth- er damages recoverable for. 184. Miscarriage— Loss of pro- spective offspring — Wheth- er damages recoverable for — Continued. 185. Miscarriage— Loss of pro- spective offspring — Wheth- er damages recoverable for — Conclusion. 18t>. Exemplary damages. 187. Exemplary damages contin- ued. 188. Exemplary damages— Physi- cal injuries occasioned by animals. 189. Exemplary damages — Mal- practice. 190. Exemplary damages— Placing cantharides in wine. 191. Direct results of injury— De- fect in highway— Statute, — What included — Massa- chusetts. 192. Interest not recoverable. 193. Mitigation of damages. 194. Duty of injured person to minimize damages — Medi- cal assistance. 195. Same subject continued. 196. Duty of injured person to submit to surgical opera- tion. 197. Effect of plaintiff's death. 198. Release of claims for personal injuries — Generally. 199. Release when induced by fraud no bar. 20U. Same subject continued. 201. Setting aside of release — Re- turn of consideration not necessary. 202. Release limited to injuries specifically mentioned. 203. Release by railroad employee Acceptance of benefits of relief association. 204. Recovery of special damages -Pleadings. 205. Amendment of complaint — Increased damages. 206. Inst ructions— Generally. 207. Amount of recovery— Instruc- tions as to. 208. "Such sum as will compen- sate"- " Fail and just com- pensation " •' Fair and reasonable compensation " — Instructions. 206 213. Excessive damages — Remit- titur of part of judgment. 214. Excessive damages — Review of question as to amount. ^ 178 PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 209. Instructions - Measure of 212. Excessive damages damages — Miscellaneous. 210. New trial based on change of experts' opinions. 211. Inadequate damages— Gener- ally. § 178. Physical injuries— Substantial and nominal dam- ages— Generally.— As a general rule every injury to a person imports a damage sustained by him, and the fact of an injury having been inflicted entitles the person injured to at least nominal damages. If, however, the injury is a substantial one. more than nominal damages should be awarded. 1 So where owing to the negligence of another a person was injured so as to ren- der him unconscious, confine him in a hospital for several weeks, and his neck was injured so as to cause his head to turn to one side, and at the time of the trial he walked similar to a paralytic, it was held that he was entitled to substantial and not merely nominal damages.- And in this case the plaintiff's injuries being such as to entitle him to substantial damages, it was held that a new trial would be granted where only nominal damages were awarded. But in the absence of evidence upon which substantial damages may be based only nominal damages should be allowed. So where there was no evidence as to the amount of plaintiff's salary as a music teacher, it was held that only nominal damages should be awarded for such item. 3 And where the evidence is conflicting as to the injuries sustained by a' person, that of the plaintiff tending to show them to have been serious, while that of the defendant shows them to have been slight, it has been held that a verdict for nominal damages will not be disturbed, since in such case the credibility of the witnesses is a matter for the jury to determine. 4 And a ver- dict for nominal damages only is held not to be a ground for a new trial where it is apparent that the jury meant to find against his right to recover. 5 And a charge which stated that 1 Smith v. Ingersoll-Sergeant Rock Drill Co., 12 Misc. (N. Y.)5; 66 N. Y. St. R. 727; 33 N. Y. Supp. 70. 2 Carter v. Wells Fargo Co. (C. C. S. D. Cal.), 64 Fed. 1005. 206 3 Baker v. Manhattan R. R. Co., 118 N. Y. 533, aff'g 22 J. & S. 394. 4 Weinberg v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 139 Mo. 286; 40 S. W. 882; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 397. 5 Reeve v. Wilkesbarre & W. V. PHYSICAL in.ii i:ies. §§ 179, 180 the plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages at any rate was held not to be ground fur reversal where actual damages were found by the jury and the cause of action was dependent on the fact of the injury .''' § 170. Damages flowing from negligent act though not contemplated.— It is not necessary that every result of a per- son's negligent act which causes an injury to another could have been foreseen or contemplated by such person in order that a recovery therefor may be had. If the damages claimed flowed directly and legitimately from such negligent act, there may be a recovery of the same. 7 So where, owing to the negli- gence of a carrier, a passenger sustained personal injuries whicli resulted in a cancer, it was held that damages might be recovered for such result. 8 And in another case where, owing to a defect in a highway, the axle of plaintiff's wagon was broken and he was dragged over the dashboard, and he procured another carriage and drove to his home several miles distant in a cold rain, and he claimed that he subsequently suffered injury from the strain and shock, while defendant claimed that such injuries were due to the subsequent exposure to the rain and cold, it was held that the direct result of the accident was the exposure, and whether the subsequent injuries were due to this or to the strain and shock, or to both, recovery of damages therefor might be had. 11 § 180. Disfigurement of person. — Disfigurement is an ele- ment in an action for personal injuries which the jury may con- sider in estimating the amount of damages. 1 " And where a per- son has been permanently disfigured or deformed as a result of personal injuries, damages for mental suffering arising from such disfigurement or deformity may, it is generally decided, be re- Traction Co. (C. P.), 9 Kulp (Pa.), 182. 6 Howe v. Cochran, 47 Minn. 403; 10 Smith v. Pittshurg & W. R. Co (C. C. X. D. Ohio), 90 Fed. 7-:'.: 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 716; 11 50 N. W. 368. Ohio L. J. 113; Alabama G. S. R. Co. TCrouse v. Chicago A- \". \V. Ry. v. Hill, 93 Ala, 511; 9 So. 7^-': 47 Co., 104 Wis. 473. 80 N. W. 752. 8 Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Kemp, 01 Md. 619; 48 Am. Rep. 134. Am. & Eng. R. ; 52 Am. & Fug. R. Cas. 40'.t : 12 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 218 ; Chattanooga R. A- C. R. R. Co. v. Liddell. 85 Ga. 482; 11 S. E. 853; S Ry. & Corp. L. J. 296 ; Pierce v. Millay, 44 111. 189 ; Peoria Bridge Assoc, v. Loomis, 20 111. 2:;:. : Williams v. Real, 20 111. 147 ; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. ( hris- tison, 39 111. App. 495 ; Linton Coal & M. Co. v. Persons, 15 Ind. App. 09 ; 43 N. E. (551 ; Fleet v. Hollen- kemp, 13 B. Mom (Ky.) 219; Ken- tucky, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dills, 1 Bush (Ky. ), 593 ; Chile6 v. Drake, 2 Mete. (Ky. ) 146 ; Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539 ; Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Blocker, 27 Md. 277 : Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Breinig, 25 Md. 378; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. L80 ; Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 542; Doss v. Missouri, etc., R. R. Co. 59 Mo. 27 ; Lewis v. Jauuoupoulo, 70 Mo. App. 325 ; Clark v. Fairley, 80 Mo. App. 335 ; Walker v. Wilson, 8 Bosw. I N. V. ) 586 ; Wallace v. Mayor, etc., N. Y., 2 Hilt. ( X. Y. I 440 ; 9 Abb. Pr. 40 ; 18 How. Pr. 109 ; Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282 ; Louder v. Hinson, 4 Jones (N. C), L. 369 : Heil v. (lan- ding, 42 Pa. St. 49:] ; Bennett v. Reed, 51 Pa. St. 190; Mack v. South Bound R. Co., 52 S. C. 323 : 29 S. E. 905 ; 40 L. R. A. 679 ; :i Chic. L. .1. Wkly. 27_'. See chaps, on Negli- gence, herein. 3» Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. I U. S. ) 202 ; Peoria Bridge Assoc, v. Loomis, 20 111. 285 : Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Blocker. 27 Md. 277: Hopkins v. Atlantic Ave., etc., I!. R. Co., :'•<■' V H. 9 ; Wallace v. Mayor, etc., N. V., •_' Hilt. ( N. V. i 440 ; 9 Abb. Pr. 40 ; IS How. Pr. 169. 213 § 188 PHYSICAL INJURIES. cases of gross negligence,* 4 yet this we think is to be construed as being in line with the above rule, and that the gross negli- gence must be of such a character as to authorize the inference or presumption that the person guilty of such negligence was conscious of the probable consequences of his act and indiffer- ent thereto. 35 In an action, however, for injuries due to negli- gence where it is sought to recover punitive damages, the failure of the court to submit the question of the wilfulness of the defendant to the jury is held to be harmless, where the jury found the defendant free from negligence and, therefore, not entitled to damages. 36 But where the jury are charged that if they find gross negligence they may allow punitive damages, not merely for the purpose of increasing the damages but only as a punishment, and that such damages should not be allowed even for that purpose except the negligence be gross, it is held that such a charge is erroneous in not explaining to the jury under what circumstances such damages may be al- lowed. 37 § 188. Exemplary damages— Physical injuries occasioned by animals. — The rules as to the allowance of exemplary dam- ages in other actions control also in the case of actions to re- cover for physical injuries occasioned by animals. So where a person possessing a dog which he knew was ferocious and ac- customed to bite people, left him unsecured in his sleigh in a village street and the dog threw down and bit a child seven years of age, who came up to the sleigh and commenced hand- ling the whip, it was held that the jury might award vindictive damages if they found that the owner of the dog was guilty of gross and criminal negligence. 38 And where a person owning a 34 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 93 98 Ky. 684 ; 34 S. W. 228 ; 17 Ky. Ala. 514 ; 9 So. 722 ; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 500 ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 87 Ky. 327; 8 S. W. 706 ; Kountz v. Brown. 16 B. Mon. (Ky. ) 577; Taylor v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 N. H. 304. See also chaps, on Negligence, herein; contra Ycriam v. Linkletter, 80 Cal. L. Rep. 1261. See chaps, on Negli- gence, herein. 36 Moore v. Drayton, 40 N. Y. St. R. 933 ; 16 N. Y. Supp. 723. 37 East Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. v. Lee, 90 Tenn. 570 ; 18 S. W. 268. 38 Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300; 20 Am. Rep. 6. See also Cameron L35 : 22 Pac. 70. v. Bryan, 89 Iowa, 214; 56 N. W. 35 Mc Henry Coal Co. ,v. Sneddon, ' 434. 214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. §§ 189-191 ram permitted it to run at large and it was alleged that the owner knew that the ram was inclined to be vicious and to injure man- kind, it was held that there could he no recovery of exemplary damages except upon proof of gross and criminal negligence amounting to a wanton disregard of the safety of Others and iii law equivalent to malice. 39 But where a dog belonging to a pas- senger was tied by a porter so that it could reach other passen- gers, it was held that the company was not liable for punitive damages for injuries caused by a bite from such dog. 40 § 189. Exemplary damages Malpractice. — It would seem that the same rules as apply to the allowance of exemplary dam- ages in other cases would also apply in actions to recover for an injury which is the result of malpractice. If the malpractice is wilful, wanton or malicious, or consists of such gross negligence as raises the presumption of a probable knowledge of the conse- quences and an entire disregard thereof, then such damages would appear to be properly allowable. So it has been held that if a patient proves gross negligence in the treatment of his dis- eases, he may recover exemplary damages. 41 In another case, however, it has been held that the damages which a patient or her representative (not her husband) may recover in an action for malpractice are to be measured by the common-law rule and that vindictive damages cannot be recovered. 4 - § 190. Exemplary damages— Placing cantharides in wine. — The giving to a person of any substance which will probably have an injurious effect and of which effect the giver is aware, though done in a spirit of mischief, should render such person liable to exemplary damages where injury results therefrom. Thus it was so held where a physician put a portion of canthar- ides into the plaintiffs glass of wine, from the effects of which the plaintiff did not recover for several months. 43 § 191. Direct results of injury — Defect in highway- Statute— -"What included — Massachusetts. — ruder the Massa- 39 Pickett v. Crook, 20 Wis. 358. 40 Trinity & S. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 18 Tex. Civ. A pp. 090; 46 S. W. 389. « Cochran v. Miller, 13 Iowa. 128. 4 - Long v. Morrison, 14 End. 595. "Genay v. Norm, l Kay. (S. C.) 6. 215 §§ 192, 193 PHYSICAL INJURIES. chusetts statute 41 providing that where a person is injured by any defect negligently allowed to exist in the highway, the city which is responsible for such defect shall be liable for the direct and immediate results of the injury, if an injury is caused by such a defect, damages will be limited to the direct and imme- diate results thereof and will not include a subsequent in- jury due to a weakness resulting from the original injury. So where a person's ankle was injured by such a cause, and owing to a weakness of the ankle resulting therefrom, the person sus- tained a subsequent fracture of the leg, it was held there could be no recovery of damages for the latter injury. 45 § 192. Interest not recoverable. — The general rule in an action for personal injuries is that the damages therefor should not include an allowance for interest, 40 though it has been said that in estimating the damages the jury may consider the length of time that has elapsed since the injury. 47 But it is held in one case that interest may be allowed, in the discretion of the jury, upon such money as has been actually expended by the plaintiff as a result of the injury and in connection therewith. 48 § 193. Mitigation of damages. — Contributory negligence may in some cases be considered in mitigation of damages in actions for personal injuries. 49 And a person's condition caused 44 Mass. Pub. Stat. chap. 52, sec. 18. 45 Raymond v. Haverhill, 168 Mass. 382; 47 X. E. 101. 46 Western & A. R. Co. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397; Ratteree v. Chapman, 79 Ga. 574; Sargent v. Hampden, 38 Me. 581; Zipperlein v. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 8 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 587: Pittsburg S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. St. 306; Louisville & X. R. Co. v. Wallace (Tenn.), 14 L. R. A. 548; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 490; 17 S. W. 882; Texas & X. O. R. Co. v. Carr, 91 Tex. 332; 43 S. W. 18, rev'g 42 S. W. 126. But see Chic. St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Barnes, 2 Ind. App. 213; 28 X. E. 328. « Zipperlein v. Pittsburg C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 8 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 587. 216 48 Washington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hickey, 12 App. (D. C.) 269. 49 Louisville & X. R. Co. v. How- ard, 90 Tenn. 144; 19 S. W. 116. See chaps, herein on effect of con- tributory negligence. But in a case in Georgia, it was held that an un- qualified instruction that if plain- tiff's negligence contributed to the damages, the jury might reduce the amount according to the extent of the contribution, was erroneous though the jury were also instructed by the court that want of ordinary care on the plaintiff's part would defeat recovery. Miller v. Smythe, 95 Ga. 288; 22 S. E. 532. PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 1^ by injuries sustained prior to those for which he seeks to recover may be considered by the jury.™ And where a boy misrepre- sented his age at the time of obtaining employment in a factory, it was held that such fact might be considered in mitigation of damages for injuries sustained while working at a dangerous machine."' 1 lint the jury in making up their verdict are not to consider sick benefits received from any source other than the defendant/'- And gratuitous nursing, or aid, or help from friends are not to be considered in mitigation of damages." Nor is the defendant entitled to have the proceeds of an accident insurance policy deducted from the amount of damages. 54 And the fact that the results of an injury to a married woman may have been prolonged or her recovery delayed by her becoming pregnant after receiving the injury is held not necessarily and as a matter of law sufficient ground to justify a reduction of damages, where she had not been cautioned in respect thereto by her medical adviser." 1 "' § 194. Duty of injured person to minimize the damages — Medical assistance — Where a person has been injured by the negligence of another, it is his duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent any aggravation of the injury and consequent increase of damages. In these cases it is his duty to employ such medi- cal assistance as ordinary prudence in his situation requires, and to use ordinary care and judgment in so doing. 56 And 61 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kins- man, IS Ky. L. Rep. 82; 35 S. YV. 264; :> Am. & Eug. R. Cas. N. S. 401. See sec. 210, herein as to effect of prior injury or disease. 61 Legate v. Esplin, Rap. Jud. Que- bec, 12 C. S. 113. 02 Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Baer, 90 Md. 97; 44 Atl. 992. 53 Ohio, etc., K. R. Co. v. Dickersou, 59 Ind. 317; Indianapolis v. Gaston, 58 Ind. 224. 64 Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 530; 5 Am. Rep. 304, where a person was injured owing to a defect in the highway. See also Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Thomson, 56 111. 138; Clark v. Wilson, 103 Mass. 219; 4 Am. Rep. 532; Althorf v. Wolf. 22 X. Y. 355; Coulter v. Pine Township, 164 Pa. St. 543; Bradburn v. Great Western R. R. Co., I.. R. Exch. 1. 55 Salladay v. Dodgeville, 85 Wis. 318; 20 I.. K. A. 541; 55 N. w 56 Osborne v. Detroit, 32 Fed. 36; Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Meech, 163 111. :;o:,: 45 X. E. 290: Pull- man Pal. Car Co. v. Bluhm, 109 111. 20; Toledo A- W. \V. K. Co. v. Eddy. 72 111. 188; Elgin v. Riordan, 21 111. App. 000; Louisville. X". A. A C. R. Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409; Colum- bia City v. Langohr, 20 Ind. App. 395: 50 N. E. 831: Citizens R. R. Co. 217 £194 PHYSICAL INJURIES. where any of the consequences which a plaintiff has suffered could have been avoided by the exercise of the required care and prudence, there can be no recovery for such results," 7 although it has been declared that in case of a wilful injury, the mere fail- ure of the injured person to use reasonable care to avoid the consequences of the injury will not prevent a recovery by him for so much of the damage as results from that failure. 58 In this case it was said : "Where in cases of an intentional tort, the plaintiff has purposely omitted to take reasonable steps to prevent an aggravation of his damages, or has been so grossly negligent in that regard as to be deemed guilty of a wilful omis- sion on his part, he ought not to recover for the damages which might have been prevented by proper care ; but on the other hand we think that he should recover his full damages where he has been guilty of ordinary negligence only." » And in cases of injury by the negligence of another, the failure to procure medical assistance at once will not prevent a recovery where the person injured considered the injury at first but a slight one, 60 since a person in such case is only obliged to act in the treatment of an injury in the manner which common prudence would dictate under like circumstances. 01 And where one who had been injured imprudently used intoxicating liquors as a result of which his trouble was aggravated, and the diffi- v. Hobbs, 15 Ind. App. 610: Allender v. Chic. R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 37 Iowa. 264; Fitzpatrick v. Boston & M. R. Co., 84 Me. 33; 24 Atl. 432; Strudgeon v. Sand Beach, 107 Mich. 496; 65 N. W. 616; 2 Det. L. N. 749; Chandler v. Allison, 10 Mich. 460; Fullerton v. Fordyce, 144 Mo. 519; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 729; 44 S. W. 1053; Miles v. Chic. R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 76 Mo. App. 484; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 534; Hogle v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 28 Hun (N. Y.), 303; Howson v. Mestayer, 3 N. Y. St. R. 571; Radman v. Haberstro, 1 N. Y. St. R. 561; Toledo Elec. St. R. Co. v. Tucker, 13 Ohio C. C. 411; 7 Ohio Dec. 169; Vallo v. United States Exp. Co., 147 Pa. St. 404; 14 L. R. A. 218 743; Bradford v. Downs, 126 Pa. St. 622; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Man- nerwitz, 70 Tex. 73. 57 Fullerton v. Fordyce, 144 Mo. 519; 44 S. W. 1053; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 729; Throckmorton v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 14 Tex. Civ. App. 222; 39 S. W. 174. ss Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Zantzinger, 92 Tex. 365; 44 L. R. A. 553; 48 S. W. 563; 71 Am. St. Rep. 859; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 840: 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 477. 5 9 Per Gaines, Ch. J. 60 Kennedy v. Busse, 60 111. App. 440; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Neal (Tex. Civ. App.), 33 S. W. 693. 61 Mt. Sterling v. Crummy, 73 111. App. 572. PHYSICAL [NJUEEES. 6 IK culty of being cured increased, it was held that evidence of this fact was admissible. 82 But the fact that the injur}' has been aggravated by plaintiff's negligence will not prevent the ad- mission of evidence as to the nature, extent and duration of the injuries.* 3 Again, in case of an injury to a minor child of tender years, it has been held that the negligence of the parent in pro- curing medical assistance and treatment after the injury cannot be imputed to the child so as to affect the amount of recovery by the latter for such injury." 1 § 195. Same subject continued. — As we have stated in the pre- ceding section, it is the duty of a person injured by the negli- gence of another to employ such medical assistance as ordinary prudence in his situation requires. This does not, however, mean that he must employ the most skillful practitioner obtain- able, but only that he shall exercise reasonable care in the se- lection of the physician or surgeon, and where such care has been exercised, the fact that more skillful medical assistance might have been obtained will not be considered in mitigation of the damages. 66 So if an injured person has exercised ordinary care in the selection of a physician or surgeon, the fact that the latter makes any errors or mistakes in the treatment of the in- juries will not prevent a recovery of all the damages sustained."' 89 Boggess v. Metropolitan St. R. Co.. 118 Mo. 328; 23 S. \V. 159; 24 S. W. 210. 68 Plummer v. Milan. T'.» Mo. App. 439: 1 Mo. A.pp. Rep. 000. 64 Texas A I\ R. Co. v. Beckworth ( Tex. Civ. App. I. 32 S. W. 809. ,i5 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm, 109 111. 20; Columbia City v. Lansohr. 20 [nd. App. :'.'.»:.; 50 N. E. 831; Rice v. Des Moines. 40 Iowa. 638 ; Collins v. Council Bluffs, 32 Iowa, 324; 7 Am. Rep. 200; Stover v. Inhabitants of Blueliill. 51 Me. 439; McGanahan v. New Fork, N. II. & II R. Co., 171 Mass. 211: 50 X. E. 010; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 284; Moore v. Kala- mazoo, 100 Mich. 170; Reed v. De- troit, 108 Mich. 224; 02 X. W. 967; 2 Det. L. N. 822; New York & X. J. Teleph. Co. v. Bennett. 62 X. J. L. 742: 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 657; 42 All. 7.")!': Tuttle v. Farmington, 58 N. H. 13: Sullivan v. Tioga R. R. Co., 112 X. V. 043: Loeser v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 378; Heintz v. Caldwell. 10 Ohio ( '. C. 630; Sel- lcck v. Janesville. 100 Wis. 157; 75 X. W. 075: II L. R. A. 563; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 352. 66 Columbia City v. Langohr, 20 [nd. App. 395; 50 X. E. 831; Mc- Ganahan v. X. Y. X. II. & II. R. R. Co., 171 Mass. 211: 50 X. E. 610; Reed v Detroit, 108 Mich. 224: 65 X. \\". 967; 2 Det. I.. X. 822; New Fork A- X. .1. Teleph. Co. v. Bennett, 62 X. J. L. 742: 42 Atl. 7-V.>; •"- Am. X'eg. Rep. 657; Ileintz v. Cald- well. 10 Ohio C. C. App. 630. 219 § L96 PHYSICAL tNJURIES. So the following charge to the jury was declared to be certainly supported by authority as well as reason: " The plaintiff is not held responsible tor the errors or mistakes of a physician or surgeon in treating an injury received by a defect in the street or sidewalk, providing she exercises ordinary care in procuring the services of such physician. Again, where one is injured by the negligence of another, or by the negligence of a town or city, if her damages have not been increased by her own subsequent want of ordinary care, she will be entitled to recover in conse- quence of the wrong done, and the full extent of damage, al- though the physician that she employed omitted to employ the remedies most approved in similar cases, and by reason thereof the damage to the injured party was not diminished as much as it otherwise should have been." m So in another case it was held that where a reputable and reasonably competent physician was employed by an injured person, the amount of damages recover- able by such person should not be lessened because the injury was aggravated by the use of the injured arm and shoulder, where used in accordance with the directions of the physician. 68 In those cases where an injured person has consulted a physician, but negligently fails to comply with his directions, he is not necessarily precluded from recovering damages accruing subse- quent to such failure, but only those damages which accrue as a result of such failure are not recoverable. 69 § 196. Duty of injured person to submit to surgical op- eration. — It may in some cases of injury be necessary to per- form a surgical operation in order to effect a cure. Where such an operation is required in order to give relief or to bring about a cure and it is attended with slight inconvenience and no danger, it is held that if a person under such circumstances refuses to submit to an operation, there can be no recovery of damages attributable to such failure. 70 So in a late case in New « Selleck v. Janesville, 100 Wis. 157; 75 N. W. 975; 41 L. K. A. 563; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 352. 68 Columbia City v. Langohr, 20 Ind. App. 395; 50 N. E. 831. 09 Keyes v. Cedar Falls. 107 Iowa, 509: 78 N. W. 227. 220 70 Bailey v. Centerville, 108 Iowa, 20; 78 N. W. 831. See Mattis v. Philadelphia Traction Co., 6 Pa. Dist. R. 94; 18 Pa. Co. Ct. 106, where it was held that where a surgical operation was comparatively new and the profession were not abso- PHYSICAL I N.I TRIES. |§ 19T, L98 York, 71 where this question arose, it was held proper to charge the jury that where a person was injured by the negligence of another, lie was bound to use the usual and reasonable remedies appropriate to effect a cure ; that he could not increase the dam- ages by negligently allowing his condition to become worse than it would if properly treated ; that if an operation was attended with danger in the remotest degree, he was not obliged to sub- mit thereto ; that he must determine this matter for himself, and if he decided not to submit to an operation, either by reason of apprehension or other cause, the person responsible for the in- jury could not complain thereof ; but that the evidence of the ex- perts as to the possibility of curing such an injury by operation and the slight incovenience said to result from such operation in most cases was to be considered by the jury in determining the amount and permanency of the injury. So where a per- son who had been injured by a fall upon a defective sidewalk refused to submit to a surgical operation for hernia and his con- duct was that of a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of reasonable judgment, it was held that he was not charge- able with such negligence as would affect his recovery. 7 - § 197. Effect of plaintiff's death.— The plaintiffs death during the pendency of an action to recover for injuries sus- tained by him and the substitution of his personal representa- tive in his stead does not affect the right to recover damages but only limits the recovery to such damages as are shown to have been sustained by the plaintiff prior to his death. 73 § 19N. Release of claims for personal injuries — Generally. — If a person who has received a personal injury executes a re- lease to the person liable therefor, for a specified consideration, the release being given understanding!}- with full knowledge lutely at rest as to the best method of performing it though it was gen- erally considered as accompanied by Blight risk of death, an injured per- son was not obliged to submit to the same, though it might have occa- sioned substantial relief and approxi- mate cure. 71 Blate v. Third Ave. R. Co., 60 N. Y. St. R. 732. T - Williams v. Brooklyn, 33 A.pp. Div. (N. Y.) 539: r.3 N. Y. Supp. 1007. "Illinois Steel Co. \. Ostrowski. 93 111. App. 57. 221 § 198 PHYSICAL INJURIES. of its force and meaning, and there are no fraudulent or deceit- ful representations, which materially induce the person injured to execute the same, such release will be a bar to a subsequent action for the injuries. 74 And it has been held that an em- ployee may, by contract, assume all liability for injuries received owing to the negligence of the employer, and that such con- tract is not against public policy.' 5 So where an employee has been injured while in the company's employ, and as a part com- pensation for such injury the company agrees to employ him at certain specified wages during his life or ability and disposition to work, he may in an action for the breach of such contract re- cover prospective damages therefor. 76 The measure of damages in such an action is the amount of wages due at the time of the trial, together with compensation for such future benefit as he would probably have received under the contract, less the amount which he earned, or with reasonable diligence might have earned elsewhere, allowance being made to him for the expenses of obtaining such employment. 77 A release executed by an employee who has been injured is, it is held, admissible in an action in trespass on the case against his employee. 78 But where a person who was injured by being thrown from a street car executed a release or receipt in full for all damages received from the fall, such receipt being in the name of a certain street car company, and given to the manager of such company, who was also the manager of another street car company operated in connection with such company, it was held that the receipt was not sufficient to establish the fact that the fall was from the car of the former company, where the manager testified that it was from the car of the latter company. 71 ' ™ Lumley v. Wabash K. Co. (C. C. E. D. Mich.), 71 Fed. 21; McFar- land v. Missouri P. R. Co., 125 Mo. 253; 28 S. W. 590; Seeley v. Citi- zens Tract. Co., 179 Pa. St. 334; 36 Atl. 229. 75 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 148 Ind. 196; 40 L. R. A. 101; 46 N. E. 917; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 441. See Brasell v. La Campagnie du Grand Tronc, Rap. Jud. Quebec, 11 C. S. 150. 222 76 Brighton v. Lake Shore & M. S R. Co. (Mich. 1895), 61 N. W. 550. 77 Perm. R. R. Co. v. Dolan, 6 Ind. App. 109; 32 N. E. 802. 78 Johnson v. Phila. & R. R. Co., 163 Pa, St. 127; 29 Atl. 854; 35 W. N. C. 355. 79 Anderson v. Des Moines St. R. Co., 97 Iowa, 739; 66 N. W. 64. PHYSICAL INJURIES. §§ L99, 200 § 199. Release when induced by fraud no bar.— If a per- son who hats been injured by the negligent acl of another is fraudulently induced to sign a release for the damages sus- tained, such release will not operate as a bar to a subsequent action to recover for such injuries. So where a written release was executed by one who was not in a condition to understand what he was doing, it was held that it was no liar to an action by the injured person to recover damages when attacked for fraud. 80 And where an illiterate employee gave a receipt for wages on which was written the words, "in full for services and damages," it was held that the employer was not thereby released from damages, where it appeared that the employee did not understand that such receipt was to be a release of dam- ages. 81 So, also, where money was received by a person under the impression that it was a gratuity, it was held that an instru- ment which referred to such money as a "donation" to be in " full payment of all the matters " which the maker thereof might have against a certain street car company in consequence of an accident which was declared in the instrument to be due to such person's own carelessness, was not a bar to an action to recover for the injuries resulting from such accident.^ And again, where, four days after an accident while the injured per- son was utterly helpless and was mainly concerned with his immediate needs, a release was executed by him for a very small consideration, and at the instigation of the claim agent of the railroad company, it was held that under such circumstances the release would be set aside as a fraud and an imposition. s: § 200. Same subject continued.— A settlement of a pending suit to recover for personal injuries will not be set aside merely because the plaintiff had not fully recovered, could not read or *" Malmstrom v. Northern P. R. Co., 20 Wash. 195; 55 Pac. 38; 12 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. X. S. 329. M Whitney & S. Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 111. 177; 50 N. E. 242. aff'g 68 111. A pp. 487. 82 Boikens v. New Orleans & C. R. Co., 48 La. Ann. 831; l9So. 737. 88 Atchison, T. & S. V. R. Co. v. Cunningham, 59 Kan. 722; 54 Pac. 1055; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 132. In this case it appeared thai the person, while a passenger, had been injured in a collision, and that, among other severe injuries, his skull had been fractured and his leg broken. The consideration for the release was s75 and care t<> be given him at the hospital to which be was taken after the accident. 9.9.2 £ 201 PHYSICAL INJURIES. write, and his attorneys were not present at the time he made such settlement and had no knowledge of the same. 84 And a release to a railroad company by an employee for injuries re- ceived while on one of such company's trains, due to a defect in the track of another company over which such train was passing, will not, in the absence of undue influence, be set aside on the ground of fraud because the company to which he gave such re- lease represented that the company owning the track was alone responsible where, as a matter of fact, both companies were re- sponsible and the effect of the release was to discharge both companies. 85 Again, though the want of sufficient mental capac- ity may be a good ground for setting aside a release, yet there must be some evidence tending to show the want of such capac- ity in order to authorize the consideration of such question by the jury.* And where a person who has executed a release of damages for personal injuries claims that he had no knowledge of the contents of such release and was induced to sign the same by misrepresentations, though it is held that he cannot state his understanding as to the purport or purpose of the paper, yet he may be asked whether he knew at the time he signed the same that he was settling with the company for damages due to the injury. 87 And where a release is pleaded by the defendant in an action to recover for personal injuries, the admissibility of evidence for the purpose of showing that the release was obtained by fraud cannot be questioned for the first time on appeal.^ §201. Settine: aside of release Keturn of consideration not necessary. — The general rule that one who seeks to rescind a contract must restore the other party thereto to the position which he was in at the time he entered into the contract does not apply where one seeks to set aside a release which has been procured by fraud. In such cases a return of the money or 84 Mosby v. Cleveland Street R. Co., 15 Ohio C. C. 501. 85 Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Sulli- van, 21 Colo. ;i02 ; 41 Pac. 501. ; «()eh v. Missouri. K. & T. R. Co., 130 Mo. 27; :'.9 L. K. A. 442; 31 S. W. '.102: 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 343. ■2-24 87 National Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 155 111. 210; 40 N. E. 492. 88 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. How- ard. 27 Wash. L. Rep. 146; 14 App. D. C. 262. PHYSICAL INJURIES. §20- consideration received at the time of and for the execution of the release need not be made."'' So where one who had been injured, owing to the negligence of another, signed a paper re- leasing such person of all claims For damages, and he was in- duced to make such release by fraud and false representations that the money was a gift from the wife of the defendant who had on previous occasions made gills to her, it was held that liefore commencing an action for such injuries the plaintiff was not bound to restore the money received." And where a pas- senger who had been injured was fraudulently induced to sign a release to the company of all claims for damages for personal injuries under the belief that he was merely signing a release of any claim for damages to his clothing, it was held that it was not necessary for him to return the money received under such release before bringing an action for the physical injuries sus- tained by him. 91 § 202. Release limited to injuries specifically mentioned. — Where a release specifically enumerates the injuries which are known and considered as the basis of the settlement and other injuries subsequently develop, the existence of which were un- known to the parties at the time, but which are of such a char- acter and nature as to clearly indicate that if they had been known the release would not have been executed on such a basis, such release will be no bar to an action for such subse- quently developed injuries. r; And where a release was executed 8 9 O'Brien v. Chic. M. & St. P. R. Co.. 89 Iowa, 044; 57 X. W. 425, where it was declared that the release was a mere receipt for a gratuity which the plaintiff might retain though defeated in the action. Bliss v. N. V. C. & II. R. R. Co., 100 Mass. 447; 30 \. E. 65; Dwyer v. Wabash R. Co., titi Mo. App. 335; Shaw v. Web- ber, 70 Him (X. Y), 307: C>1 X. V. St. R. 430; 29 N. Y. Supp. 437; The Oriental v. Barclay, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 193; 41 S. W. 117. Rut see Lyons v. Allen, 11 App. D. C. 543; 26 Wash. L. Rep. 50; Louisville A X. R. Co. v. McElroy, 100 Ky. 153; IS Ry. L. Rep. 15 730; 37 S. W. 844: Och v. Missouri, K. A- T. R. Co., 130 Mo. 27: 36 L. R. A. 442: 31 S. W. 962: 2 Am. A- Eng. R. (as. X. S. 343. 90 Shaw v. Webber, 79 Bun (N. Y.). 307; HI X. Y. St. R. 430; 29 N. V. Supp. 437. aff'd 151 X. V. i;:,;,. no opinion. W Bliss v. X. Y. C. & H. R, K. Co., 160 Mass. 117: 36 X. E. 05. 92 Lumley v. Wabash R. Co. (C. C. App. 6th ('. I. 76 Fed. 66; 13 I'. S. App. 470; Union I'. R. Co. v. Artist, 19 U. S. App. 012: 23 1.. R, A. 581; Xelson v. Minneapolis St. R. Co., 01 Minn. 107: Och \. Missouri, 225 § 203 PHYSICAL INJURIES. under such circumstances, which was broad enough in its terms but the unsuspected injury which developed appeared to have been the principal injury and to have resulted in serious and per- manent disability, it was held that the release would not be con- strued as including such injury. 93 In this class of cases also a tender back of the money received in connection with such release is not necessary in order to enable the party injured to recover for the injury subsequently developed. 94 § 203. Release by railroad employee — Acceptance of benefits of relief association. —Relief associations have been formed in many instances for the benefit of the employees of a railroad who have been injured or disabled. Of these associa- tions the railroad company in many cases contribute to a certain extent to the running expenses and maintenance and often also to the general relief fund. Where associations of this kind are in existence and an employee joining the same stipulates or con- tracts with the railroad company which employs him, that if he is injured and accepts mone}' from the relief fund on ac- count of such injury, the acceptance by him of such money shall operate as a relinquishment or release of any right to damages against the company, such stipulation is a valid contract or stipulation being supported by a sufficient consideration and not contrary to public policy.' 6 Such a contract is not an agreement K. & T. R. Co., 130 Mo. 27; 36 L. R. A. 442; 31 S. W. 962: 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 343. ^Lumley v. Wabash R. Co. (C. C. App. 6th C), 76 Fed. 66; 43 U. S. App. 476. In this case the sur T geon of the company had told the injured person that the pain com- plained of was sympathetic and due to another cause, but it was held that whether the opinion was honestly or dishonestly given it was immaterial as affecting the question whether the release included such injury. 94 Lumley v. Wabash R. Co. ( C. C. App. 6th 0.), 76 Fed. 66; 43 U. S. App. 476. 9 5 Chic. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Miller 226 (C. C. App. 8th C.)i 76 Fed. 439; 22 C. C. A. 264; 40 U. S. App. 448; Owens v. Bait. & O. R. Co., 35 Fed. 715; Eckman v. Chic. B. & Q. R. Co., 169 111. 312; 38 L. R. A. 750; 48 N. E. 496; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 308, aff'g 64 111. App. 444; Lease v. Penn.Co., 10 Ind. App. 47; 37 N. E. 423; Maine v. Chic. B. & Q. R. Co. (Iowa), 70 N. W. 630; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 299; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 15; Chic. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Curtis, 51 Neb. 442; 71 N. W. 42; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 55 Ohio St. 497; 35 L. R. A. 507; 45 N. E. 641; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 152; 37 Ohio L. J. 30; Johnson v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 163 Pa. PHYSICAL INMIKIES. not to sue the emploj-er for injuries due to the latter's negligence, but merely gives to the employee an election either to incept the benefits, in which case he is precluded by the agreement from suing the company, or to sue the company, in which event he cannot accept the benefits of the associal ion. The acceptance of the benefits operates as a release of all claim to damages against the railroad company. 98 Again, where an employee releases the company from liability by accepting the hem tits of a relief fund, such release is not in violation of a constitutional provision giv- ing to employees the same rights and remedies allowed to per- sons who are not employees in certain cases and providing that a waiver of the benefit of such provision shall be null and void. 9 ' So, also, under a statute of Ohio,"' prohibiting any contract by which the right to damages against a railroad in case of per- sonal injury or death should be surrendered or waived, or in case that right is asserted, the surrender, or waiver of any other right, it was held that a contract by an employee that the accept- ance of any benefits from the relief fund should release the em- ployer from liability for damages was not within such prohibi- tion.'* And where a release of the railroad company has been made by the acceptance of benefits, such release cannot be avoided merely on the ground that the employee did not know that he could prove certain facts, or by what witnesses he could prove them. 10 " 127; 29 Atl. 854: Johnson v. Charles- ton & S. R. Co., 55 S. C. 152: 44 L. R. A. 645; 32 S. E. 2; 12 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. N. S. 761: 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 81. 96 Eckman v. Chic. B. & Q. R. Co., 160 111. 312; 88 L. R. A. 750: 48 X. E. 496; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. \. S. 308, aff'g 64 111. App. 444; Lease v. Penn. Co., 10 Ind. App. 47: 37 N. E. 423: Spitze v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 75 Bid. 102: Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Cox, 55 Ohio St. 497: 35 L. R. A. 50*7; 45 N. E. 641 : 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 152; 37 Ohio L. J. 30; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Bryant, 9 Ohio C. C. 332; Ringle v. Penu. R. Co., 164 Pa. St. 529: 30 Atl. 492: Brown v. Bait. & O. R. Co., 23 Wash. L. Rep. 337. See Elliott on R. R., sec. 1384. " 7 Johnson v. Charleston & S. R. Co., 55 S. C. 152: 44 L. R. A. 645; 32 S. E. 2: 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 761; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 81, con- struing such a release in connection with S. C. Const. 1895. art. 9, sec. 15. 98 Ohio Act. April 2, 1890. 90 Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Cox, 55 Ohio St. 597; 35 L. R A. 507: 45 N. E. 641; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. s. 152; 37 Ohio L. J. 30. wo Vickers v. Chic. B. & Q. R. Co. (C. C. N. D. 111.), 71 Fed. 139. 227 §§ 204, 205 PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 204. Recovery of special damages— Pleadings. — The damages which are recoverable in an action for personal injuries are such as necessarily result from the act complained of in the absence of allegation and proof of special damages. If a plain- tiff in such an action seeks to recover special damages, he should allege them in his complaint and give proof thereof. 1 So where plaintiff claims' particular damages by reason of loss of any spe- cial contract or engagement as a result of personal injuries, the grounds for same .should be stated in the declaration .* And where the only allegation as to special damage was that the plaintiff had been hindered in her business and incurred expenses in beine cured, it was held that evidence was not admissible of any special business engagement into which she had entered, and that she could not express her opinion of what she could or would have earned thereunder. 3 And in an action to recover for injuries received while in defendant's car, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover damages for the cutting of his clothing, since they were special and should be alleged in the complaint. 4 So again, under an allegation of a physical injury resulting in soreness and lameness, it was held that there could be no recovery for rheumatism augmented by such injury. 5 But the recovery of special damages from an injury to plaintiff's business may be had under an allegation that the plaintiff has become so disabled as to interfere seriously with his business in the absence of a motion to make the allegation more definite and certain. 6 § 205. Amendment of complaint— Increased damages The general rule seems to be that a complaint may, in the dis- cretion of the court, be amended so as to increase the amount of damages claimed. Thus it is so held in Massachusetts.' 1 Hunter v. Stewart, 47 Me. 419. 2 North Chic. St. R. Co. v. Barber, 77 111. App. 257; Citizens St. R. Co. v. Burke, 98 Tenn. 650; 40 S. W. 1085. 3 Beardstown v. Smith, 150 111. 169; 37 N. E. 211, aff'g 52 111. App. 46. 4 Schmitt v. Dry Dock R. R. Co., 3 N. Y. St. R. 257; 2 City Ct. 359. In this case it was held that damages for loss by such cutting were not Co., 160 Mass. 402; 35 N. E. 851 228 * ■ . recoverable under an allegation that the clothing of the plaintiff was sat- urated with blood. 5 Hall v. Cadillac, 114 Mich. 99; 72 N. W. 33; 4Det. L. N. 499. 6 Frobisher v. Fifth Ave. Transp. Co., 81 Hun (N. Y.), 544; 63 N. Y. St. R. 287; 30 N. Y. Supp. 1099. 7 Graves v. New York & N. E. P. PHYSICAL lN.irinr.s. \ 206 And in the United States courts it is held that the trial judge may, in his discretion, permit a complaint to he amended so as to introduce an additional element of damages for money ex- pended where BUCh element is foreshadowed in the bill of par- ticulars." So in Georgia it is held that the plaintiff is, after the commencement of the trial, entitled as a matter of right to amend his complaint for the purpose of showing an additional injury, and that the defendant, if surprised thereby, may have a con- tinuance of the case for the purpose of meeting such amend- ment upon making a proper showing.'' And in a case in New York in an action for personal injuries, which occurred prior to the removal of the statutory limitation of the amount recovera- ble in such actions, it was held that where a complaint, declar- ing upon such action, was amended to increase the demand in excess of the statutory limit, it was not prejudicial where the ver- dict was not in excess of such limit, 1 " In New Hampshire also it is held that the statement filed in accordance with the laws of that state " within ten days of the date of the injury may be amended to cover damages which appear subsequent to the date of filing. 12 § 206. Instructions— Generally.— Where the law provides a definite measure of damages in an action for personal injuries, the statement in an instruction of a general principle as to the measure of damages which is broader than is applicable to the particular case and which is not qualified by other instructions is erroneous. ,:! Although it has been held that though an in- struction does not limit the jury to any particular elements of damages, it is not prejudicially erroneous if the verdict is clearly not excessive." Where the plaintiff's recovery was limited by the instruction to the issue " if the jury shall find the plaintiff has been injured as charged in the declaration," such instrue- 8 Forty-Second St. M. & St. N. K. Co. v. Haunou (C. C. App. 2d C. ), 57 U. S. App. 255; 85 Fed. 852; 20 ('. <\ A. 1157. » Atlanta Consul. St. R. Co. v. Bag- well, 107 Ga. 157; 33 S. E. 191. 10 Burns v. Houston W. S. & P. F. R. Co.. 15 Misc. (X. Y.) 19; 36 X. Y. Supp. 774; 71 X. V. St. R. 804. 11 X. II. (ren. Laws, chap. 75. sec. 7. ■■- Noble V. Portsmouth (X. II.), 30 Atl. 419. 1:! Omaha Coal C. A- L. Co. v. Fay, :sc Neb. — ; 55 X. W. 211. 14 Sherwood v. Grand Ave. R. Co., 132 Mo. 339; 33 S. W. 774. 229 § 206 PHYSICAL INJURIES. tion was held to limit the recovery by the plaintiff not only to the described injuries but to their causation as described in the declaration. 13 While an instruction should be clear as to the meas- ure of damages in each particular case, it need not state all the elements of recovery."' And if an instruction attempts to state the causes, other than those for which defendant is responsible, which may have produced the injury, but omits those which the evidence tends to establish as producing causes, such omission does not constitute error. 17 Again, an instruction should not as- sume the existence of elements which should be shown by the evi- dence and are not. So where a person fell into an excavation it was held in an action to recover for the injury caused thereby that an instruction which assumed that the plaintiff sustained physical injuries causing bodily pain and mental suffering, was erroneous. 18 But an instruction that the plaintiff may recover as a result of " said injury " for any pain and anguish which he has suffered or will suffer in consequence thereof, all damages to his person, permanent or otherwise, occasioned thereby, and generally all damages alleged in the declaration which they may believe from the evidence he has sustained by reason thereof, was held not erroneous as assuming that the hernia which it had been shown that the plaintiff was suffering from was a result of the injuries in question. 19 And it was held not erroneous as assuming that damages were sustained to instruct the jury that in assessing damages they should take into consid- eration all the facts and circumstances before them, where a technical liability was admitted by the defendant upon the trial. 20 But in another case it was held to be error to permit the jury to consider the dislocation of a shoulder as an element of damages where there was no evidence showing a dislocation, the only evidence bearing thereon being the testimony of the plain- 15 American Exp. Co. v. Risley, 77 111. App. 476, aff'd in 179 111. 295; 53 X. E. 558; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 40. 10 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. O'Sullivan, 14:3 111. 48; 32 N. E. 398. 17 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Sim- mons, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 501; 33 S. W. 1090. 230 18 Evans v. Joplin, 76 Mo. App. 20; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 485. 19 Chicago City R. Co. v. Allen, 169 111. 287; 48 N. E. 414, affg 68 111. App. 472. 20 North Chic. St. R. Co. v. Hous- inger, 175 111. 318; 51 N. E. 613, aff'g 70 111. App. 101. PHYSICAL [NJURIES. 8 207 tiff that he could not use his arm, and that of his physician that he was unable to tell whether there was a dislocation. Again, if the evidence as to the cause of an injury consists of mere spec- ulations, it is held that a verdict should be directed for the de- fendant. 22 But if the evidence with all its inferences fairly tends to sustain a verdict for plaintiff, it is declared that it is proper to refuse a peremptory instruction for the defendant.- § 207. Amount of recovery— Instructions as to — While the amount named in the complaint in an action for personal injuries may be said to be the amount in excess of which damages should not be awarded, or in other words a limitation as to the damages which the jury may assess, yet the amount claimed may be so largely in excess of what the facts of the case would justify or warrant, that it would be improper to instruct the jury that they may award plaintiff fair, reasonable and just compensation to any amount not exceeding the amount demanded, since such instruction would tend to impress the jury that a verdict of such amount would be justified.-' But though such an in- struction, may be erroneous, yet a judgment will not be reversed on that account alone, if it appear from the amount of the verdict and the evidence that the error was harmless.-"' But where in an action for injuries caused by a defective bridge, the plaintiff had offered to accept a certain amount in his claim filed with the supervisors, it was held not prejudicial to defend- ant to instruct the jury that he could not recover in excess of that amount.- 1 " Where the jury is instructed as to the amount recoverable in such actions, it is a better practice to instruct them that they should not find for any item an amount in excess 21 Haszlachern v. Third Ave. R. Co., 60 N. Y. Supp. 1001. 22 Gerue v. Consol. Fireworks Co., 12 Ohio C. C. 420; 1 Ohio C. S. 616. - :! West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Lyons, 157 111. 593; 42 N. E. 55. 24 Gilbertson v. Forty-Second St. M. St. N. Co., 14 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 204; 43 N. Y. Supp. 782; Rost v. Brooklyn II. II. Co., 10 App. Div. (N. Y.) 477; 41 N. Y. Supp. 1069, See also Illinois C. R. Co. v. Louders. 178 111. 585, rev'g 70 111. App. 41; De La Vergne Refrigerating Bfach. Co. v. McLeroth, 60 111. App. 529; Benson v. Chicago A- X. W. R. Co., 41 111. App. 227; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Minor (Miss.), 11 So. 101; 16 L. R. A. 627. 25 Texas A- P. R. R. Co. v. Hoff- man, 83 Tex. 286; 18 S. W. 711. 26 Horaan v. Franklin County, 98 Iowa, 692; 68 N. W. 559. 231 * -JOS PHYSICAL INJURIES. of what the petition or complaint claims, instead of merely limiting the aggregate amount, and instructing them that in assessing the damages they are to consider the various items claimed in the complaint, but imposing no limitation as to the amount they may assess for each item. 27 Again, where the court was charging the jury as to the amount recoverable for expenses in connection with plaintiff's business, it was held error to instruct them that they were not bound to restrict the amount awarded to what was actually proven in dollars and cents, and that the plaintiff's efforts in going to business, contrary to the advice of his doctor, probably saved the defendants a considerable amount of expense for other superintendence for which they would have been liable." 28 If, however, in a certain case of injuries the amount of recovery is fixed by statute, an in- struction limiting plaintiff's recovery to actual damages, not exceeding such amount, cannot be complained of by defendant.-' 9 And it is proper to charge the jury that in assessing the damages in the particular case before them, they are not to con- sider decisious of the supreme court upon the point whether verdicts awarded by juries in other cases were or were not ex- cessive.* But in instructing the jury as to the amount of dam- ages which they may award to the plaintiff, it is not proper to draw their attention to the price for which they would be will- ing to suffer the same injury. 31 § 208. "Such sum as will compensate"—" Fair and just compensation"—" Fair and reasonable compensation"— In- structions.— In an action for personal injuries the jury is fre- quently charged that they may assess damages at such sum as will compensate the plaintiff, and the use of such term has been held proper. So it is proper to charge the jury that they may " assess the damages in such sum as in your judgment will com- pensate the plaintiff for such injury and pain and suffering." " And, again, the instruction that the plaintiff is entitled to re- 27 Blackwell v. Kansas City, 76 Mo. App. 46; 1 Mo. A. Rep. 486. 28 Smith v. Nova Scotia Teleph. Co., 26 N. S. 275. 29 Schlerth v. Missouri, P. R. R. Co. (Mo.), 19 S. W. 1134. , 232 30 East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. King (Ga.), 14 S. E. 708. si Kehler v. Schwenk, 144 Pa. St. 348; 13 L. R. A. 374; 22 Atl. 910; 48 Phila. Leg. Intel. 910. 32 Springfield Consol. R. Co. v. PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 208 cover such sum as will compensate him for the injuries, "and put him in such a position as he would have been in if he had not heen injured," is proper. So, also, where the jury was in- structed to find compensatory damages, " considering all the facts and circumstances of the ease," it was held that such in- struction was not objectionable as failing to confine the juij to what they believed the evidence showed. 84 And an instruction to the jury that they might assess damages in BUCh an amount as would " fully compensate" for the injury proved is proper, the word " fully " not being construed as extending the measure of damages beyond the amount proved. 35 So an instruction to the jury that they might assess the damages at such sum as would reasonably compensate the plaintiff for her injuries, but which failed to state the elements of damages which the jury should consider, was held not objectionable by reason of such omission, it being declared that if the defendant desired a specification in that respect, he should have made a request therefor.'' But where plaintiff admitted that she had been recompensed up to a certain date for all damages resulting from an injur}', it was held error to charge the jury that if she recovered she was entitled to such an amount as would compensate her for all pain and suffer- ing which she had sustained as a result of the injury. 37 In other cases it has been held proper to instruct the jury that they may award reasonable and fair compensation,* or fair and just com- pensation. 3 ' And where such words were used, the use of the additional words, as in the sound judgment of the jury, is a Hoeffner, 175 111. 634; 51 N. E. 884, aff'g 71 111. App. 162. See Jacquin v. (irand Ave. Cable Co., 57 Mo. App. 320. 83 Lee v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 21 .). & S. (N. V. i 260. - 4 Missouri. K. A T. R. Co. v. M<5- Elree, 1G Tex. Civ. App. 182; 41 S. W. 84:!. 36 Harrington v. Eureka Hill Min. Co., 17 Utah, 300; 63 Pac. 7:17. 36 Rose v. McCook, 70 Mo. App. 183. 37 Och v. Missouri, K. & T. 1!. K. Co., 130 Mo. 27; 21 S. W. 962; 36 L. R. A. 442; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 343. 3 * Seward v. Wilmington. _ Marv. (Del.) 180; 42 All. 451; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Warren (Tex. Civ. App.),39 S. W. 652; -2 Am Neg. Rep. 246, aif.l 90 Tex. 566; 40 S. W 6. But see Texas Brew. Co. v. Dickey, 20 Tex. Civ. A.pp. 606; 49 S. V\ . 935. »9 Griffin Wheel Co. v. Markus, 79 111. App. 82; :; Chic. L. .1. Wkiy. 540, aliYi IsO 111. 391; 5) V E. 206. See Thomas v. Gates (CaL 1899), 58 Pac. 315. 233 § 209 PHYSICAL INJURIES. proper and adequate compensation to the injured party, 10 or in the sound discretion of the jury" have been held no error. Again, where the jury were instructed that they might award such reasonable sum as they thought would be a proper recom- pense for pain and suffering, not a compensation, since such injury could not be compensated, it was declared that though this statement rendered the instruction subject to criticism, yet there was not sufficient cause for reversal where immediately following such statement the court charged that it was for the jury to fix some value for pain and suffering. 42 > § 209. Instructions —Measure of damages — Miscellaneous. — An instruction to the jury to allow "such sum as you believe from the evidence he is justly entitled to" is sufficient in the absence of a request for more definite instructions. 43 So, again, where the jury were instructed that if they found for the plaintiff they should award her such damages, not in excess of a certain specified amount, as from the testimony in the case they might think she was entitled to, such instruction was declared not to be erroneous as indicating to the jury that they might allow the plaintiff a sum in excess of the compensatory damages to which she might be entitled under the evidence. 41 And in an action for wilful or wanton injury where the damages may be punitive in addition to compensatory, it is proper to charge the jury that they may award such damages as they see proper, not exceeding the amount claimed in the complaint. 45 But where an instruc- tion was given to the jury that if they found for the plaintiff the verdict should be, " We, the jury, find the defendant guilty and assess the damages at" — whatever you think proper not in excess of the amount claimed in the declaration, it was held that such instruction was erroneous since it gave the jury uncontrolled discretion, where the basis for the assessment of damages was 40 Seward v. Wilmington, 2 Marv. (Del.) 189; 42 Atl. 451. 41 Griffin Wheel Co. v. Markus, 79 111. App. 82; 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 456, aff'd 180 111. 391; 54 N. E. 206. 42 Willis v. Second Ave. Traction Co., 189 Pa. St. 430; 42 Atl. 1; 5 Am. Neg. Kep. 245. 234 43 Lamb v. Cedar Rapids, 108 Iowa, 629; 79 N. W. 366. See St. A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Oden, 52 111. App. 519. 44 Wade v. Columbia Elec. St. R. L. & P. Co., 51 S. C. 296; 29 S. E. 233; 64 Am. St. Rep. 676. 45 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Burgess, 119 Ala. 555; 25 So. 251. PHYSICAL IN.H'RIES. 5 210 not explained." 1 And an instruction lias been held erroneous which directed the jury that if they found for plaintiff they might bring' in such damages as would make him ,4 whole in dol- lars as far as possible." 17 Again, where the jury were charged that injuries could not be fully compensated by money, and in connection with such statement it was also declared that this did not allow the jury to give whatever was claimed by the plaintiff, but that the question must be considered by them fairly and reasonably and that they must decide under all the circumstan- ces what in good conscience, justice and right ought to be given, the instruction was held not erroneous. 4 " And in another ease where the court stated to the jury that " money is an inadequate recompense for pain/' it was held that this was not a reversible error where the jury was expressly instructed that the plaintiffs measure of recovery was "compensatory damages- that is such sum as will compensate the plaintiff for the injury she has sus- tained," and the whole charge was based on the theory that ex- emplary damages could not be given. 49 And where an instruc- tion permitted the jury to determine the extent of a pecuniary loss resulting from total permanent disability, merely from evi- dence that the plaintiff was sixteen years of age. it was held that such instruction was not, by reason of its inadequacy, prejudi- cially erroneous, especially if the verdict was not excessive.* § 210. New trial based on change of experts' opinions.— The fact that expert witnesses have changed their minds since the trial of a case as to the extent of the injury, is not sufficient ground for the setting aside of a verdict on appeal and the granting of a new trial where the affidavits of such witnesses are met by counter affidavits of other experts of great expe- rience.' 1 40 Quincy II<>rse R-, etc., Co. v. Sch.ike(C. C. App. 7th C), 71 Fed. 487; 18 C. C. A. 221; 34 U. S. App. 444. See Wilson v. Granby, 47 Conn. 47; Hawes v. Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co., 103 Mo. 10; Houston K. & W. T. R. Co. v. Richards, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 203; 49 S. \V. 087. 47 Guinard v. Knapp S. & Co., 95 Wis. 482; 70 N. W. 071. 48 Toledo v. Clopeck, 9 Ohio C. D. 432; 17 Ohio C. C. 585, afTd in 52 Ohio St. 042. •»'•• Morgan v. Southern P. Co.. 95 Cal. 501; 30 Pac. 001. M Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. St. 528; 33 Atl. 558; 37 W. \. C. 480; 26 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 61 Munday v. Landry, 51 La. Ann. 303; 25 So. 00. 1^5 § 211 PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 211. Inadequate damages— Generally.— In actions to re- cover for personal injuries, the damages which may be awarded therefor cannot be graduated with certainty, but must be left to the sound discretion of the jury to be determined by them in the exercise of their intelligence and sense of justice after a consideration of . the facts of each case. The rule as to the granting of a new trial in case the damages awarded are inad- equate is similar to that which controls in the case of excessive damages. The fact that another jury might have awarded a larger verdict is not of itself sufficient to authorize the granting of a new trial unless it also clearly appear that they must have been influenced by passion, prejudice, partiality, corruption or ignorance or mistake as to law or facts. Where any of these elements appear and the verdict is such as to shock the con- science, a new trial may be properly granted.® In this connec- tion it is said in a late case : " Where substantial damages are awarded in an action of this sort, courts are very reluctant to grant a new trial on account of the inadequacy thereof. 53 . . . The extent of the plaintiff's injuries and the money damages which would adequately compensate her therefor, were ques- tions upon which different minds might very naturally and very honestly arrive at different conclusions. The jury were in the best possible position to judge intelligently and fairly in rela- tion thereto ; and while the amount awarded may not be so large as another jury or even the court perhaps might award, yet there being nothing to show that it does not represent the honest judgment of competent and fair-minded men, we have no right to disturb it." M But where the jury rendered a verdict 52 Morris v. Grand Ave. R. R. Co., 144 Mo. 500; Weinberg v. Metropol- itan St. R. Co., 139 Mo. 280; 40 S. W. 882; Spirk v. Chic. B. & Q. R. Co., 57 Neb. 5G5: 78 N. W. 272; Ells- worth v. Fairbury, 41 Neb. 881; 60 X. W. 336; Holyoke v. Railway Co., 48 N. H. 541; Miller v. Del., etc., R. R. Co., 29 Vr. (N. J.) 428; 33 Atl. 950; Morrissey v. Westchester Elec. Ry. Co., 30 App. Div. (N. Y.) 424; 51 N. Y. Supp. 945; Saferstone v. Rochester R. Co., 25 App. Div. 236 (N. Y.) 285; 49 N. Y. Supp. 486; 27 Civ. Proc. 133; Evans v. Del. & H. Canal Co. (Pa. C. P.), 6 Kulp, 465; McNeil v. Lyons, 20 R. I. 672; 40 Atl. 831; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 728; McDermott v. Chic. & N. W. R. Co. (Wis.), 55 N. W. 179; Phillips v. Southwestern Ry. Co., 4 Q. B. D. 406. 53 Citing Manufacturing Co. v. Smith, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 12. 64 McGowan v. Interstate Consol. St. R. Co., 20 R. I. 264; 38 Atl. 497 ; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 737, per Tilling- PHYSICAL INJCRIES. for $55 in an action for personal injuries, and the evidence clearly established the fact that the value of the physician's ser- vices was 888, it was held that though there was no evidence as to the value of time lost by the plaintiff, a new trial should be granted.'' And in another case where it appeared that the plaintiff had expended 6485 for medical services; that the value of her lost time was over $400 ; that her sufferings had been protracted and severe, and that her injuries wen rious and perhaps permanent, it was held that a verdict for $1,000 was inadequate/* And again in another ease it was held that a verdict for nominal damages should be setasideand a new trial granted where it appeared that plaintiff's injuries were severe and that she had suffered much therefrom." Hut it is held that though a verdict may Ik- less than the physician's bill, yet in the absence of evidence showing that such bill is reasonable or has been paid, it will not be set aside as inade- quate in the absence of other grounds. 58 § 212. Excessive damages. — As we have elsewhere stated excessive damages are those which are so largely in excess of what the facts of the case and the law justify as to appear to have been the result of passion, prejudice, partiality, ignorance or corruption, and as a general rule unless it is apparent that some of the above elements have influenced the jury in their ver- dict, it will not be disturbed on appeal on the ground of being excessive. 59 And it has been held that where a verdict is grossly hast, J. In this case the injury was a severe and permanent one and the jury awarded •$.">, 000. See Evans v. Delaware & II. Canal Co. (Pa. C. P.). ti Kulp, 465; Allison v. Gulf <'. & s. F. K. Co. (Tex. Civ. A.pp.), '^ S. W. 42.->. 56 Saferstone v. Rochester R. Co., 25 App. Div. (X. Y.) 285; 49 X. Y. Supp. 4SG; 27 Civ. Proc. 133. M McNeil v. Lyons, 20 R. I. 672; 40 Atl. 831; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 728. 57 Chouquette v. Southern Elec. R. Co., 152 Mo. 257 1 53 S. W. 897. 58 Brook v. Luden, G X. Y. Supp. 510. afTg 1 X. Y. Supp. 338. 59 Howland v. Oakland Consul. St. R. ( o., 110 Cal. 513; 42 Pac. 9S3; Denver v. Stein, 25 Colo. 12.") ; .'.:'. Par. 283; 4 Am. Xeg. Rep. 125; Central R. A- Bkg. Co. v. Strickland, f»0 Ga. 562; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 216; 16 S. E. 352; Xorth Chicago Si. R. Co. v. Zeiger, 78 111. App. 463; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Balbert, 7.". 111. App. 592; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cheek, 152 1ml. 663; 53 X. E. 641; 1 Rep. 975; Decatur v. Stoops. 21 Ind. App. 397; 52 X. E. iVS.\: 1 Rep. 516; Lauter v. Duckworth. 19 Ind. App. 535; Fulmore v. St. Paul City l:. Co., 72 Minn. 448; 75 N. W. 589; 11 0Q7 § 213 PHYSICAL INJURIES. excessive and due to any of the above causes, it will be set aside without regard to the number of times the case has been tried and similar verdicts rendered. 60 So, also,- where the verdict is manifestly the result of any of the above causes or where the evi- dence is conflicting, an order granting a new trial on the ground that the damages are excessive will not be disturbed on appeal. 61 But where the testimony, as to plaintiff's physical condition being a result of the injury or of other causes, is conflicting, a verdict of damages will not be set aside as excessive on the ground that such condition was caused otherwise than by the injury. 6 ' And again where, although there was some evidence that the plaintiff's condition was due partially to alcoholism, it was held that a verdict which was not excessive if his condition resulted solely from the injury would not be deemed excessive on appeal where the trial court had in its charge entirely limited the re- covery of the plaintiff to damages for illness or incapacity as a result of the injury. 63 § 213. Excessive damages— Remittitur of part of judg- ment. — If the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries has been Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 63('>; Ken- uerly v. Somerville, 68 Mo. App. 222; Egan v. Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. Co., 12 App. Div. (N. Y.) 556; 42 N. Y. Supp. 188; Swan v. Long Island R. Co., 86 Hun (N. Y.), 265; 33 N. Y. Supp. 190; 66 N. Y. St. R. 864; Hem- penstall v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 82 Hun (N. Y.), 285; 64 N. Y. St. R. 76; Rowe v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 82 Hun (X. Y.), 153; 63 N. Y. St. R. 753; Uertz v. Singer Mfg. Co., 35 Hun (X. Y.), 116; Butezv. Fonda J. & ue of bones in — tear- ing of ligaments — injury to joint — great pain— bed 3 months— age 75_$4,000. Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 67 Minn. 260; 36 L. R. A. 586; 69 V W. 900; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 93. Injury to ankle confining to house 3 or 4 weeks — loss of 7 or 8 months' time — at time of trial able to earn as much as before the accident — .$8,660. Nichols v. Crystal Plate Glass Co. ( Mo. 1895), 28 S. W. 991. Ankle and heel lacerated and bruised— in bed 11 weeks — loses a year's time — ankle probably more or less weak always — in time may be used without pain and only stiff- ness — farmer — SO, 300. Fremont E. & M. V. R. Co. v. French, 48 Neb. 638; 67 N. W. 472; 4 Am. & Eirg. R Cas. N. S. 365. Sprained and bruised — shoulder dislocated — no considerable time lost — no severe suffering — earning capacity not ma- terially diminished— $2,650, re- duced to |1,200. Fremont E. & M V. R. Co. v. Leslie (Neb.), 59 X. W. 559. Sprained— prevented from oc- cupation as dressmaker — nervous from— in bed 5 or 6 weeks — paid between $5 and $10 for medical serv- ices — $1,000, should lie reduced to $500. Corcorain v. Ulster & I). R. Co., 40 N. V. Supp. 1117; 9 App. Div. i \. V. i 621. Injury to ankle— fibula broken above it — in house 2 months 16 and then went about on crutches — earning capacity not affected, but ankle will be weak for a lon<, r time — $11,006 — excessive and should be re- duced to $5,000. Bronsou v. Forty- Second St. M. & St. X. A. K. R. I ... 67 Hun (N. Y.), 647; 50 N. Y. St. R. 740. Arm — loss of. Verdicts held not excessive. One arm — common la- borer— $10,000. Chicago Anderson Pressed-Brick Co. v. Kembarz, 51 111. App. 543, atrd Barnes v. Rembarz, 150 111. 192; 37 N. E. 239. injured so as to require amputation — labor- ing man — age 46 or 47 — receiving from $1.25 to $1.50 per day— $7,500. Gibson Co. v. (ilizoziuski, 76 111. App. 400. Light arm— leg more or less bruised — evidence from which injury might have been found to be permanent — $8,537. Barrett v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. R. Co.. HI N. Y. St. R. 9. Right arm- other serious and permanent injuries — brakeman — $1 0,000. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Slinkard, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 585 j M S. W. 35. Fore- arm — brakeman — age 35 — receiving $55 per month— great physical pain and mental anguish — $9,119. Mis- souri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Kirkland, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 528; 32 S. W. 588. One arm — suffering— young, iudustri ous and able-bodied man — wholly de- pendent on manual labor for living — $3,500. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Ampcy. 93 Pa. L08; 25 S. E. 226; 2 Va. L. Keg. 284. Injury necessitat- ing amputation — left arm — age 19 — healthy, strong and capable of labor $10,000. Baltzer v. Chicago, M. & N. R. Co., 89 Wis. 257; 00 X. \V. 716. Following verdicts held excessive : right arm— great pain — age 20 — earning $1 per day — idle for 2^ years — then receives employment at $35 per month— $20,000 grossly exces- •J41 §214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. sive. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Kane, 70 111. App. 676; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 489. Right arm— age 19— earn- ing $18 per week, 5 months, in year — also earns additional money — $18,000. Musser v. Lancaster City St. R. Co., 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 430; 12 Lane. L. Rev. 12. Arm — Fractures of. Passenger on street car — arm broken— contact with iron post near track — $2,000. New Orleans & C. R. Co. v. Schnei- der (C. C. App. 5th C), 60 Fed. 210; 8 C. C. A. 571. Woman— age 63— compound fracture of lower part of left arm — dislocation left wrist — great pain— unable to shut left hand or use arm — expenses for surgical treatment $35 — $950. Kennedy v. Whittaker, 81 111. App. 605. Married woman — double fracture of arm — fracture two ribs resulting in trau- matic pleurisy — contusion of knee resulting in synovitis — about thirty abrasions on body — in bed 2 months — home 4 months — much pain — $2,500. Terhune v. Koellisch (N. J. ), 43 Atl. 655. Right arm broken — also five ribs — injured in back — muscles torn from attachments to spine — in bed 3 months — year before he could use arm — ultimate recovery placed at from 2 to 5 years — $25,000. Dieff enbach v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 5 App. Div. (N. Y.)91; 74 N. Y. St. R. 80. Arm fractured — bruised hip — $1,750. Murphy v. Weidman Cooperage Co., 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 283; 72 N. Y. St. R. 486. One arm broken — permanently weakened for labor and also rendered smaller — severe suffering caused by sloughing of pus and taking out of the affected bone — $1,200. Toledo v. Higgins, 12 Ohio C. C. 646; 3 Ohio Dec. 532. Verdicts held excessive. Left arm fractured — permanently impaired — 242 joint became stiffened requiring ad- hesions to be broken when plaster cast was removed at end of six weeks — necessary to break adhe- sions — disabled several weeks longer as result thereof — unable for some time to attend to business as a member of a firm of custom house brokers — expended for physicians about $250— $3,000 held excessive by $500. Thomas v. Consolidated Traction Co., 62 N. J. L. 36; 42 Atl. 1061 ; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 122. Arm fractured and disfigured — $6,600, re- duced to $3,000. Ryder v. Mayor, 50 N. Y. Supr. 220. Back, see Spine and Back. Bite of dog. Following verdicts held not excessive. Bite penetrating to bone of wrist — also on side | inch deep and J long — great fright and terror — nervous prostration — woman —$800. Robinson v. Marino, 3 Wash. 434; 28 Pac. 752. Girl— age 9— bite of dog on hip — one half inch deep and two inches long — in bed several weeks — still lame at time of trial— $1,450. Fitzgerald V. Dolson, 78 Me. 659. (In accordance with the stat- ute the amount in this last case was to be doubled.) Bite of vicious dog — $150. Sylvester v. Maag, 155 Pa. St. 225; 26 Atl. 392. In follow- ing cases verdicts held excessive. Child — resulting epilepsy claimed but evidence not clear as to — doubts resolved by jury in favor of plain- tiff — not clear but that an award by way of punishment was included in verdict— $20,000. Judgment not al- lowed to stand unless $10,000 was re- mitted. Fye v. Chapin (Mich. 1899), 80 N. W. 797. Bright, active and well woman — rendered delicate and nervous — frequent fainting spells and becomes partially unconscious — injury permanent — mind impaired PHYSICAL [NJURIES. 6 21 I and nearly gone — $7,500, reduced to $5,000. Hayes v. Smith, 15 Ohio C. C. 300; 8 Ohio C. D. 92. Crippled by injury. Following verdicts held not excessive: Wound 5 to 7 inches long on thigh — neces- sary to graft skin — permanently crippled— $7,500. Lowry v. Bit. Adams & E. P. I. P. K. Co. (C. C. S. D. ohioi. 88 Fed. 827; 3-1 Ohio L. J. 147. Man — age 36 — formerly good health and active — in business — in bed nearly a year— unable to walk for nearly 3 years — joint of one foot destroyed and control of foot lost — after ten years one leg atrophied — other leg only one fourth of original vigor — other severe injuries — use of legs would never be recovered — 930,000. Smith v. Whit tier (Cal.), 30 Pac. 529. Young man— strong — earning $45 per month — $800 for medical treatment and no relief — Si,, not). Lanark v. Dougherty, 4.") 111. A pp. 206. Woman— earning $6 or $7 per week washing — also $2 per day on knitting machine— kept boarders — hip rendered useless — cannot walk with crutches — or stand without something to lean upon — perman- ent — also both arms were broken — $6,565. Miller v. Boone County (Iowa), 63 N. W. 352. Permanently lame aud partially disabled — broken leg — in bed two months — man 67 — $2,000. Topeka v. Bradshaw, 5 Kan. App. 879; 48 Pac. 751. Crip- ple for lite — employee in paper mill — thrown into hot pulp and acid. $2,037.50. Fickett v. Lisbon Falls Fibre Co., 91 Me. 268; 39 Atl. 996. Injury to girl — intense pain— run- ning sore— cripple for life — $4,000. Coins v. Moberly (Mo.), 29 S. W. 985. Face crushed — lower part im- movable— cripple for life — $8,000. Oties v. Cowles E. S. & A. Co., 7 N. Y. Supp. 251; 2fi N. Y. St. R. 869, aff'.l 130 N. Y. 889; 40 N. Y. St. R. 983; 29 N. K. 151. Woman— ag< apparently healthy — able to earn wages — use of Knees Lost — employ- ment lost — repeatedly blistered and cauterized bul unable to regain use of limbs — obliged to use crutches — $2,500. Cross v. Elmira, 86 Hun | \. Y.i, 467; 33 N. V. Supp. 947; 87 V Y. St. R. 617. Injuries to railroad switchman — permanently lamed and crippled— $7,000. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Winslow, 10 Ohio I I 193; 1 Ohio Dec. 147. Injuries to woman — much pain and suffering cripple for life— $10,000. Skottowe v. Oregon S. L. & U. N. R. Co. (Ore- gon), 30 Pac. 222; 12 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 112. In favor of parent for in- juries to child— age 7— foot injured— $200 for medical treatment — to some extent a cri ppl e for 1 if e— $500. Dub- lin Cotton Oil Co. v. Jarrard (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. 531, affd 42 S. W. 959; 91 Tex. 289. Injury to girl — age 7 — foot injured — to some extent a cripple for life — $2,500. Dublin Cotton Oil Co. v. Jarrard (Tex. Civ. App. I, 40 S. W. 531, affd 42 S. W. 959; 91 Tex. 289. Able- bodied man — age 29 — earning $2.10 per day — crippled for life — $4,000. St. Lotus & S. F. R. Co. v. Wool urn (Tex.), 19 S. W. 7S2. Woman- age 24 — period of 15 months from date of injury to time of trial — help- less invalid and cripple during that time — suffered continual pain dur- ing such time ami at times excruciat- ing agony — neuritis or periostitis as result of injury — take possibly 18 mouths or more to restore to health — unable to assist in household mat- ters — nervous system and general health affected — unable to move around without aid could not par- ticipate in social enjoyment — $5,000. Norfolk v. Jonakin. 94 Ya. 285; 26 S. E. 830. Laborer- age over 35 243 §214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. full health and vigor at time of in- jury—severe pain and suffering- earning capacity — decreased — per- manently crippled— $6,500. Ogle v. Jones, 16 Wash. 319; 47 Pac. 747. In following case verdicts held ex- cessive: Injury to ankle— previ- ously feeble— woman — age 75 — in bed 3 mouths— still suffering pain at time of trial— can never walk with- out crutch— $4,000. Johnson v. St. Paul City R. Co., 67 Minn. 260; 69 N. W. 900; 36 L. R. 586. Earning capacity. Impairment of —cases generally. Following cases, verdicts not excessive: Shipwright —earning about $96 per month- age 48— only able to work lightly for few hours — muscular sense im- paired—unable to do work requiring dexterity and fine manipulation- loss of hearing in one ear — $5,000. The Pioneer ( D. C. N. D. Cal.), 78 Fed. 600. Longshoreman— age 42 — wholly disabled from severe work because injuries aggravated previous disease of heart — $2,000. The Persian Monarch (D. C. E. D. N. Y. ), 49 Fed. 669. Cigar packer —business necessitated his stand- ing up— earning $20 per week- could not stand up at time of trial 2 years after injury — earnings re- duced to $6 per week— suffering from hernia at time of trial— $4,200. Den- ver v. Steia (Colo. S. C. 1898), 4 Am. Xeg. Rep. 125. Permanently disabled and incapacitated from securing permanent employment — $1,0000. Brush Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Simonsohn, 107 Ga. 70; 32 S. E. 902. Boarding house keeper — age 42 — painful in- juries — in bed 2 months— incapable of doing housework previously done by her — constantly growing worse — $800. Lockport v. Richards, 81 111. App. 533. Conductor of street ear — earning from $80 to $90 per month— 244 age 45 — prospects of future career good — impairment of capacity for every kind of employment — $16,500. Chicago City R. Co. v. Leach, 80 111. App. 354.. Widow— age 41— support- ing herself and children by washing and scrubbing— unable to continue scrubbing — unable to stand for only a short time without much pain— $1,500. Joliet v. Johnson, 71 111. App. 423. Man— earning average of $90 pei month — age 32 — incapacitated from work and any manual labor — $6,000. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ryan, 70 111. App. 45. Tailor — loss of use of thumb — prevented from earning full wages at trade — also other injuries — in house 4 months — subsequent suf- fering and failure to sleep well — $3,500. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Broms, 62 111. App. 127. Laborer- earning $1.50 per day — age 51— much past and future suffering — laboring ability diminished one half — $3,500. Frazer v. Schroeder, 60 111. App. 519. Boy — age 16 — physical strength and activity permanently diminished — $1,500. Homan v. Fleming, 51 111. App. 572. Man— earning $15 or $16 per week at time of injury— age over 60 — rendered an invalid — unable to perform manual or mental labor — $12,500. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Bode. 51 111. App. 440, aff'd 150 111. 396; 37 N. E. 879. Stenographer — earning $75 to $80 per month — permanent internal injuries — pain — external bruises — unable to work at her occupation— §10,000. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Eldridge, 51 111. App. 430. Farmer — incapaci- tated from work at — also unable to work at any business requiring phy- sical exertion— $3,500. La Salle v. Porterfield, 38 111. App. 553. Woman — formerly in good health — suffered pain continually — injury probably incurable — unable to do her house- work— $1,000. Frankfort v. Cole- PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 214 man, 19 Ind. A.pp. 368; 49 \. E. -174. Stenographer — receiving salary of (50 per month and earning from $un to $25 ]>er month in addition thereto at time of injury — injury prob- ably permanent — lameness — con- stant pain — incapacitated from reg- ular work- $4,000. Bryant v. Omaha & C. B. K. & B. Co., 98 Iowa, 183; 67 X. W. 392. Woman — severe fall — passing of blood — sinking spells causing pain — unable to ob- tain rest and sleep — unable to per- form labor— $2,000. Atcbison, T. & S. F. It. Co. v. Stewart, 55 Kan. 007; 41 Pac. 961. Engineer — at time of injury earning $103.54 per mouth — age 31 — unable to continue in such occupation at time of trial — hardly able to perform any work — disabil- ity probably permanent — $0,500. Woods v. Chicago & G. T. Co., 108 Mich. 396; 00 N. W. 328; 2 Det. L. N. 888. Man— earning $70 per mouth — age 58 — great pain — under continual medical treatment — as result of injury progressive and incurable disease which will ulti- mately end in death — prevented from further work— $8,800. Cooper v. St. Paul City K. Co., 54 Minn. 379; 56 N. W. 42. Man — earning from $1,200 to $1,500 per year— age 56— great pain — injuries permanent — practically deprived of power to earn a living — $9,000. Furman v. Brooklyn II. R. Co., 25 A pp. Div. (N. Y.) 133; lit \. Y. Supp. 194. Man —earning $18 per week— strong and healthy — age 38 — suffers con- tinual pain — seriously disabled — tremor and dizziness— unable to perform ordinary work —$5,000. Mayer v. Liebmann, 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 54: 41 X. V. Supp. 1067; 2 Am. Xeg. Rep. 700. Man — earning $3,000 per year and expense— age 28 — strong and healthy prior t<> injury — great suffering — loss from inability to wmk and medical expenses at time of trial $9,100 may never again be able to engage in bis former occupa- tion— $25,000. Dieffenbach v. N. v. L. K.& W. R. Co.. 5 App. Div. i\. Y.i 91; 38 X. Y. Supp. 788. Man— in bed 10 days — prevented from work for live weeks — earning power re- duced from $25 per week i" $8 pei week— $2,232.60. Miller v. Manhat- tan R. Co., 7:; Hun iX. V.i. 512; 56 X. Y. St. R. 189; 26 X. Y. Supp. 162. Laborer — earning $2 per day — age 50 — permanently disabled — $1,000. Soderman v. Troy Steel & I. L'<>., 70 Hun (X. Y.), 449; 53 N. Y. St. R. 678; 24 X. Y. Supp. 401. Injuries likely to be permanent — age :;.". disabled from all labor— $15,000. Solar/, v. Manhattan R. Co., » Misc. (X. Y.) 050: 11 Misc. 715, aff'd 155 N. Y. 645. Woman — husband a crip- ple — incapacitated from work by her injury — $1,000. Fitzsimons v. Rome, 21 W. D. (N. Y.) 343. Man- earning $1.50 per day— healthy, strong, sober and industrious — age 46 — leg crushed and broken — 31- years after injury dead bone still working from wound — leg devoid of strength, shortened and partially stiffened — earning capacity practi- cally destroyed— $11,000. Texas & X. O. R. Co. v. Echols. 17 Tex. Civ. App. 077; 41 S. W. 488. Man— earn- ing from $00 to $125 per month — age 42 — permanent injuries — totally unable to pursue his trade— $9,000. Houston City Si. R. Co. v. Mcdlenka, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 621; 43 S. W. 1028. Brakcman — earning from $60 I i |7B per month — age 27 — great physical and mental pain — permanent impair- ment of health — ability to earn a living for the remainder of his life probably permanently destroyed — $1,500. Missouri. K. & T. R. Co. v. Chambers, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 487; 43 S. W. 1090; 3 Chic. L. J. Wklv. 245 §214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. 99. Man — earning about $75 per month — age 30 — confined to house about 4 months — paid about $300 to physicians— obliged to use crutches —earns but little— §10,000. Mis- souri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cook, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 203; 33 S. W. 669, reh'g denied in 34 S. W. 178. Traveling salesman— salary $190 per month above expenses — age 43 — wounds in stomach and body— eyesight gradu- ally failing — prevented from attend- ing to business — $5,000. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Huff (Tex. Civ. App. ), 32 S. W. 551. Man— healthy and robust — age 32 — constant pain — mind impaired and wrecked body — deprived of ability to support him- self and family— $6,500. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Click (Tex. Civ. App.), 32 S. W. 226. Man— in vigorous health — age 30 — earning capacity reduced from $60 to $25 per month — $4,750. Mexican C. R. Co. v. Lauricella (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. 301. Conductor on rail- road — age 36 — several hundred dol- lars expended for treatment — still suffering — earning capacity dimin- ished two thirds— $11,200. Mexican Nat. Bank v. Musette (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), 24 S. W. 520, aff'd 86 Tex. 708; 24 L. R. A. 642; 26 S. W. 1075. Ser- vant — skull broken — necessary to re- move part leaving brain unprotected — capacity to labor materially im- paired— $2,500. Richlands Iron Co. v. Elius (Va. 1894), 17 S. E. 890; 17 Va. L. J. 431. Entirely deprived of health and ability to labor for life — $10,000. Columbia & P. S. R. Co. v. Hawthorn (Wash. T.), 19 Pac. 25. Verdicts held excessive. Woman — about half of time worked as nurse at from $12 to $15 per week — remai nder of time took care of her home — age 59 — only partially incapacitated — $7,000 is excessive, should be reduced 246 to $3,500. Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 80 111. App. 71, afTd 182 111. 298; 55 N. E. 366. Man— pre- viously healthy and able to perform any kind of work — age 30 — woubl continue to be subject to annoyance from pain unless he submitted to an operation to which some risk is at- tached — obliged to work for less wages— $8,000 excessive and new trial unless plaintiff stipulate to re- duce to $5,000. Bosworth v. Stand- ard Oil Co., 92 Hun (N. Y.), 485; 72 N. Y. St. R. 195. Man — leg shortened — still suffering pain — ability to work impaired — $7,500 reduced to $3,500. Geiler v. Manhattan R. Co., 11 Misc. (N. Y.) 413; 65 N. Y. St. R. 437. Man — earning $12 per week — in hospital for a year — use of leg impaired by varicose veins — unable to do hard or heavy work — $15,000 excessive, should be reduced to $8,000. Chapman v. Atlantic Ave. R. R. Co., 14 Misc. (N. Y.) 384; 36 N. Y. Supp. 1045. Man — age 74 — much pain — health and working capacity seriously impaired — not wholly dis- abled— $7,800. Campbell v. Cor- nelius (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), 23 S. W. 117. Eye — loss of and injury to. Ver- dicts not excessive. Locomotive en- gineer — unable to work for eight months — considerable expense — lost sight of one eye — disqualified from his occupation — $3,000. East St. Louis v. Doughtery, 74 111. App. 490. To father of boy aged 6— sight of one eye lost entirely and of other partially if not entirely — $2,900. Seltzer v. Saxton, 71 111. App. 229. Man — age 22 — loss of sight of one eye — $2,000. Lemser v. St. Joseph Furniture Co., 70 Mo. App. 209. Man — age 35 — sight of one eye de- stroyed and of other affected — only able to do one half the work since PHYSICAL, INJURIES. §214 the accident that he could before — $5,000. Johnston v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 9 S. W. 790. Loss of eyesight — in bed about six weeks — in opinion of physician would never recover— $3,000. New Jersey R. R. Co. v. West, 8 N. J. L. 91. Loss of an eye— $5,000. Texas & P. K. Co. v. Bowlin (Tex. Civ. A.pp.), 32 S. W. 918. Verdicts held excessive. Loss of eyesight— $37,500. Deep Min. & I). Co. v. Fitzgerald, 21 Colo. 53:1; 43 Pac. 210. Loss of an eye— $0,000. Excessive remittitur of $2,000. Ben- agam v. Plassan, 15 La. Ann. 703. Fingers— loss of. Verdicts not ex- cessive. Brakeman — one finger lost — another broken — another mashed — hand crushed— unable to do heavy work — earning power reduced from $1.25 to 75 cents per day — $2,350. Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Williams (Ga.), 14 S. E. 120. Car inspector- three fingers of right hand lost — idle about seven months — earning $65 per month — in another position he had filled could earn $75 — obtained position afterwards at $2.00 per day — subsequently increased to $16 per week— $2,416.50. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. v. Howard, 91 Ga. 99; 163 S. E. 306. Brakeman — loss of finger — hand crushed — probable permanent impairment — earnings reduced from $60 to $45 per month — $1,500. Strong v. Iowa C. R. Co. (Iowa), 62 N. W. 799. Man — earning $40 per montb — age 23 — unable to work for eight months — finger injured — thumb am- putated — arm weakened — injury per- manent — unable to do former work — earnings reduced to $1.10 per day —$2,300. Whalen v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 75 low;!. 563; 39 X. W. 89 1. Boy— loss of three fingers on one hand — $4,000. Rarg v. Bonsfield, 65 Minn. 355-; 68 N. \V. 45. Man— married- one child — three fingers lo6t — wrist j and arm injured — earning $1.50 per day— $6,000. Montaugb v. X. Y. C. & H. R. R. K. Co., 23 X. Y. Sr. It. 636. Brakeman — age29 — lossof two middle fingers and also top half of index linger of right hand — loss "f use of hand and hand movement of wrist — intense pain and suffering — earnings reduced from $65 t i $25 per month — $8,000. San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Pan (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. 861. Lossof little finger on right hand — finger next to it drawn up and cannot be straightened — loss of use of hand for four months — ability to perform manual labor greatly impaired — $2,500. Campbell v. McCoy, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 298; 28 S. \V. 34. Switchman— loss of all the fingers of right hand — $7,5(XL Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Hauer (Tex. Civ. App.), 33 S. W. 1010. Railroad section hand— loss of two fingers of left hand — others man- gled, lacerated and devoid of Strength — permanently injured — $3,300. Chapman v. Southern P. R. Co., 12 Utah, 30; 41 Pac. 551. Verdicts held excessive. Employee in paper mill — loss of three fingers. portion of fourth linger and part of outside of hand— $4,250 excessive. — $2,500 sufficient. Sawyer v. Rum- ford Falls Paper Co.. '.til Me. 354; 38 Atl. 318. Boy— age between 8 and 9 — injury necessitating ampu- tation of ring and middle fingers of left hand near first joint — $1,800. Gahagan v. Aer motor <<>., 67 Minn. 252: 69 X. W. 914. Man— age 43— loss of middle linger of left hand — first and third fingers of left hand permanently stiffened — severe pain for several weeks — medical attend- ance costing $25 $8,000 excessive. Reduced to $5,000. Borgeson v. United States Projectile Co., 2 App. Div. (N. Y.157; 37 X. Y. Supp 247 §214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. 72 N. Y. St. R. 548. Freight conduc- tor — injury — necessary to amputate three fingers— subsequently neces- sary to amputate hand at wrist — prior to the accident one of the bones of the hand had been broken — and one or two fingers had be- come stiffened and withered — §8,000. Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co. v. Blair, 11 Ohio C. C. 579. Man— age 25— loss of little finger — next finger to it broken and stiffened— $4,000. Ma- hood v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co. (Utah), 30Pac. 149. Fingers— fracture of. Employee — two fingers broken — $4,000 excessive. Remittitur of $1,000. Mahood v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 8 Utah, 85. Foot — loss of . Verdicts not exces- sive. Farmer — making about $500 per year — age 40 — loss of one foot — $9,000. Georgia II. & Bkg. Co. v. Keating, 99 Ga. 308 ; 25 S. E. 669 ; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 331. Brake- man — loss of one foot — $1,000. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 87 Ky. 327 ; 8 S. W. 706. Man- earning $53.50 per month — age 32 — foot amputated above ankle and fur- ther amputation necessary later — in- tense pain — will probably suffer more or less during life — $9,000. Manley v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 18 Misc. (N. Y.) 502 ; 42 N. Y. Supp. 1076, rev'd however in 18 App. Div. 420; 45 N. Y. Supp. 1108; Man- age 23 — lost part of foot — could not leave bed without assistance for ten weeks — unable to work for eight months — permanently disabled — could subsequently work only about three-quarters of the time — physi- cian's bill $200— $8,500. Commer- ford v. Atlantic Ave. R. R. Co., 8 Misc. (N. Y.) 599; 29 N. Y. Supp. 391 ; 61 N. Y. St. R. 51. Man— age 80 — part of foot lost — incapacitated 248 from attending to business — $11,500. .Ionian v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., 30 N. Y. St. R. 670; 9 N. Y. Supp. 506. Young man— good health — age 18 — injury necessitating the amputation of one foot — in his room four weeks — in house four months — pain in leg results from changes in weather — $8,000. San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Green, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 5 ; 49 S. W. 670. Favor of father for loss of services of minor son — age 19 — employed in dangerous business without father's consent — loss of foot — use of arm permanently im- paired — earning $65 per month at time of injury— $1,200. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Brick (Tex.), 18 S. W. 947. Child — age 3 years — loss of foot — due to gross negligence of employees of railroad company — $10,500. Chipman v. Union P. R. Co., 12 Utah, 68; 41 Pac. 562. Verdicts held excessive. Switch- man — loss of one foot and four toes of other foot — $8,000. Wood v. Louisville & X. R. Co., 88 Fed. 44; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 525. Loss of one foot— $1,200— remittitur $4,000. Kroener v. Chi- cago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 88 Iowa, 16. Laborer — earning $1.50 per day — age 24 — loss of one foot — $10,000 exces- sive and should be reduced to $5,000. Peri v. N. Y. C. & H. 11. R. R. Co.. 87 Hun (N. Y.), 499; 68 N. Y. St. R. 844. Injury necessitating amputa- tion of both feet — man — age 36 — earning $8 per week — $11,620 exces- sive and judgment ordered reversed unless plaintiff accepted $5,000. Pfeffer v. Buffalo Ry. Co., 54 N. Y. St. R. 342 ; 24 N. Y. Supp. 490 ; 4 Misc. 465, aff'd 144 N. Y. 636 ; 64 N. Y. St. R. 868 ; 39 N. E. 494. Hand — loss of. Verdicts held not excessive. Man — age 29 — been earn- PHYSICAL IN. II KIKS. § 214 ing $2.30 per day— loss of one hand — after injury obtained employment without difficulty — but received only $1 a day— $6,500. Wooster v. Western N. Y. & P. R. Co., 40 V V. St. R. 844 ; 16 X. Y Supp. 764- Loss of right hand— $3,500. Green- ville Oil & C. Co. v. Harkey, 20 Tex. (iv. App. 225 ; 48 S. W. 1005. Injury to hand — run over by car— $1,250. Ft. Worth & 1). C. R. Co. v. Bell, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 28 ; 23 S. W. 922. Verdicts held excessive. Child — age two and a half years — loss of both hands and one foot — excru- ciating pain — $4,000, excessive in absence of claim for exemplary dam- ages and in view of fact that ex- pectancy of life after majority is only eighteen and a half years. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Waren, 65 Ark. 619 ; 48 S. W. 222 ; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 729. Loss of one hand — $15,000 excessive, where an- nual earnings are less than annual in- terest on such sum. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. v. Hardwick, 53 111. App. 161. Loss of right hand — workman — $25,000 excessive, reduced at the trial to $15,000 ; held still excessive ; re- duced to $10,000. O'Donnell v. Am- erican Sugar Refining Co., 41 App. Div. (N. Y.) 307; 58 X. Y. Supp. 640; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 322. Hip— fracture of. Dressmaker — earning $2 per day — $15,000 exces- sive, should be reduced to $10,000. Coxhead v. Johnson, 20 App. Div. (N. Y.) 605; 21 App. Div. 626; 47 X. Y. Supp. 389; motion to dismiss appeal denied in 156 X. Y. 680. Jaw— fracture of. Verdicts held not excessive. Jaw fractured — also collar bone — severe pain for several weeks — health not restored at time of trial— $3,000. Chicago, P. & St. L, R. Co. v. Lewis, 48 111. App. 274. Badly fractured— exceedingly pain- ful — permanent effects and disfigure- ment— $<;.'>"<>. Miller v. Erie R. Co., ;;i App. Div. I N. Y.) 217; 54 X. V. Supp. 606. /.,./ -loss of. Verdicts held not ex- cessive. Seaman — loss of leg below knee— much pain — 94,000 not i sive, as recovery was considered not more than half the actual damages. The Edenmore, 58 I x . App. 104; 86 Fed. 886; 30 C. C. A. 675. Bealthy man — able to earn about >1U0 per month— age 39— loss of both legs — must drag himself about on his knees as artificial limbs cannot he adjusted —$13,000. Colorado Midland R. Co. v. O'Brien, Hi Colo. 219: 27 Pac. 701; 10 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 351: 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 235. Left leg severed from body — collision with locomotive — permanent injuries to head, spine and back — much suffering— great expense — vocation interfered with — $6,500. East St. Louis Connecting R. Co. v. Reames, 75 111. App. 28, aff'd 173 111. 582 ; 51 X. E. 68. Brakeman— earning $60 per month — injury requiring amputation four and one half inches below hip — $8,000 Chicago & X. W. R. C<>. v. Gillison, 72 111. App. 207. Girl— age 6— loss of right leg— $12,000. Sloniker v. Great Northern R. Co.. 76 Minn. 306; 79 X. W. 168: 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 819 ; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 298. Brakeman— earning $65 per month — age 32 — leg crushed below knee — — amputation necessary and per- formed three times, the last time above the knee— long and severe suf- fering— $10,000. Holleubeck v. Mis- souri P. R. Co., 1 11 Mo. '.'7: 88 s. W. 7'-': > .: B Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 277. Boy— age 18 months— injury re- quiring amputation above the knee —nearly $16,000. Kalfur v. Broad- 249 § 214 PHYSICAL IN.J TRIES. way Perry* M. Ave. R. Co., 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 267; 54 N. Y. Supp. 503; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 850, aff'g 23 Misc. 417; 51 X. Y. Supp. 179. Boy — age 5— loss of one leg— $12,000. Akersloot v. Second Ave. R. Co., 40 N. Y. St. R. 231; 15 N. Y. Supp. «64, aff'd on other grounds in 131 N. Y. 599; 15 L. R. A. 489; 43 \. Y. St. R. 290; 30 N.E. 105. Healthy woman in prime of life — leg ampu- tated below knee— one arm enlarged —hearing impaired— great suffering and pain— §23,000. Erickson v. Brooklyn H. K. R. Co.. 11 Misc. (N. Y.) 662, aff'd 155 N. Y. 643. Man in prime of life— loss of leg- also arm— $18,000. Murray v. Brook- lyn City R. R. Co., 7 N. Y. Supp. 900. Boy — age 16 — loss of one leg just below knee— $9,000, not excessive, though plaintiff's earning power is less than the legal interest on such amount. Richmond v. Second Ave. R. Co., 76 Hun (N. Y.),233; 59 N. Y. St. R. 113; 27 N. Y. Supp. 780. Brake- man— age 19— injury requiring am- putation of leg below the knee- strength and efficiency of right hand impaired— $9,000. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Brick, 83 Tex. 598; 20 S. W. 511. Strong healthy man— earn- ing from $125 to $150 per month— age 32— loss of right leg below knee — scalded on head, face, hands and arms — loses all his flesh on lower part of arms and on his hands — loses nearly all his hair — right arm par- tially and sometimes totally para- lyzed— $12,500. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Johnson ( Tex. Civ. App. ), 34 S. W. 186, reh'g denied in 14 Tex. Civ. App. 566; 37 S. W. 973; which has writ of error denied in 90 Tex. 304; 38 S. W. 520. Boy— age 11— loss of one leg — permanently weakening of other leg— $10,000. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Robertson (Tex.), 14 L. R. A. 781 ; 16 S. W. 1093. Boy— 250 leg crushed so amputation necessary — -$15,000. Roth v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525; 31 L. R. A. 855; 43 Pac. 641; 44 Pac. 253. Verdicts held excessive. Loss of leg below knee — $10,000 excessive. Remittitur— $3,000. Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Dwyer, 36 Kan. 59. Loss of leg— $8,500, should be reduced to $6,000. Conway v. New Orleans City & L. R. Co., 51 La. Ann. 146; 24 So. 780; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 354. Verdicts held excessive. Man — age 23 — earning about $480 a year — injury requiring amputation be- low knee — not entirely incapacitated from earning a living— $17,000 — reduced to $6,000. Brakeman — loss of leg— $25,000 excessive but third trial refused where plain- tiff offered to remit $5,000. Wald- hier v. Hannibal & St. J. 1!. Co., 87 Mo. 37. Man in good health — cap- able of earning $12 per week— age 28 —suffered great pain— $25,000. Tally v. N. Y. & T. S. S. Co., 10 App. Div. ( X. Y. ) 463 ; 42 1ST. Y. Supp. 29. Loss of leg below knee — hip, right arm and leg cut and knee joint stiffened — three weeks before he could get around — leg healed in four months —$16,000 excessive, $9,000 sufficient. Bailly v. Rome, W. & O. R. R. Co., 84 Hun (X. Y. ), 4; 61 N. Y. St. R. 490. Mason's tender— wages $2.00 per day— loss of leg— $9,000 excessive and new trial unless $5,000 accepted. Morris v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 68 Hun (N. Y.), 39; 52 N. Y. St. R. 61. Laborer— capable of earning but $8 per week— age 36— loss of both leers— $11,620.11 excessive and re- duced to $5,000. Pfeffer v. Buffalo R. Co., 4 Misc. (N. Y.) 465; 24 N. Y. Supp. 490. Clergyman— salary $1400 per year— age 30— injury requiring I amputation of leg just below hip PHYSICAL INJURIES. > 21 ) joint — collar bone broken cuts and bruises — $15,000 excessive where exemplary damages an- not war- ranted. Honl.n v. l'eun. R. R. Co. (Pa. C. P.), 7 Kulp, 52. L( g,fracturt h <<''. Verdicts beld not excessive. Of leg — dislocated ankle — medical expense $75- in house over two months — obliged to use crutches for a time ami subsequently a walking stick — doubtful as to ic- oovery from lameness 91,400. Smith v. Des Moines (lowai, 51 X. W. 77. Of leg— man— age (57— • $2,000. To- peka v. Bradshaw (Kan. C. A. 1897), 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 535. Small bone of leg broken — boy — heel also smashed — leg bruised and injured — nervous By stem ami general health materially impaired — $500. Kentucky Hotel Co. v. CambiKy. 1805), 30 S. W. 1010. Leg broken between knee and ankle — in bed for many weeks — awarded for pain and suffering only — $1,500. Shidet v. .Jules Drey- fuss Co., 50 I.a. Ann. 29(5; 23 So. 837. Leg broken in three places — perma- nently shorter — si, 200. Rhoades v. Varney. 91 -Me. 222: .;'.• Atl. 552. Leg broken — in bed six weeks — at time of trial unable to walk without sup- port and great pain — permanent im- pediment in walk because of foot turning out — §5,1(5(5. Meiners v. St. Louis, 130 Mo. 274; 32 S. W. 037. Leg broken, shortened and use of impaired — less able to work — earn- ing $60 per month-- $7,500. Thomas v.Union Ry. Co.. 18 App. Div. (N. Y.) 185; 45 N. Y. Supp. 920. Leg broken — fracture a simple one — in plaster cast for live weeks — still painful after more than year— $1,100. Stapleton v. Newburg, 9 App. Div. ( X. Y.) 39; 41 X. Y. Supp. 96. Both bones of leg broken — 85,000. Beltz v. Yonkers, 74 Hun (X. Y.), 73; 56 X. Y. St. R. 205; 20 X. Y. Supp. 106. Leg broken — permanent internal injui i' 0. Brady v. Man- hattan Rj . Co., 6 N . Y. supp. ."..,:;. _5 V 1 . St. 1:. 585; 15 Daly, 272, rev'd 127 N. Y. 46; :.7 V V si. R. 340; 27 N. E. 368, Cab-driver — earning $12 per week -age 32— comminuted fracture of both legs- compound fracture of jaw — $12,500. McDonnell v. Henry Elias Brew. Co., 1.5 App. Div. i N. Y. i 223: 44 X. Y. Supp. 652; 2 Am. Neg. Sep. 423. cirl — both bones of leg fractured be- tween kuee and ankle — leg shortened . — toes bent downward and sore caused by bein<: compelled to walk thereon — permanent injury and de- formity in leg and foot — $5,000. Missouri. K. &. T. R. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. \V. 771. Both legs broken — ankle dislocated — using crutches at time of trial four months after accident — railroad em- ployee — $7,500. Evans v. Delk (Tex. ), 9 S. W. 550. Both bones of leg broken and shortened— cannot walk without a cane over two years after the accident — $1,800. Propson v. Leathen, 80 Wis. 60S: 50 X. W. 580. Verdicts held exc< ssixn . Leg broken — man — age 67 — weight 240 pounds —$5,000 excessive; $2,500 is suffi- cient. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Wiswell, 68 111. App. 443, affd 168 [11. 613; 48 X. E. 407. Employee — leg broken — $4,000 excessive. Re- mittitur of $1,500. Lombard v. Chi- cago R. I. & V. R. Co.. 17 Iowa. 494. Roth legs broken — $10. 000 i sive. Reduced to $5,000. Black v. Carrolton R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 33. Railway employee- leg broken- shortened \ to $ ofan inch -capacity to labor not seriously impaired — $4,100. Slette v. Cirat Northern R. Co. (Minn.). 55 X. \Y. 137. Leg broken- simple fracture cured in five months — $3,500. Dwyer v. 261 S 214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. Hickler, 43 N. V. St. R. 221; 16 X. Y. Supp. 814. Leg broken — person already deprived of use of lower part of leg for ten years — #7,500 exces- sive. Half of amount sufficient. Texas C. P. K. Co. v. Burton (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 8. W. 491. Malpractice, negligence of surgeon in failing to discover a dislocation of the shoulder resulting in almost complete paralysis of the right arm — $1,741.60 helu not excessive. Has- tings v. Stetson, 91 Me. 229; 39 All. 580. Miscarriage — Injuries causing. Verdicts held not excessive. Iujury causing miscarriage — also other suf- fering — $2,000. Joliet v. Conway, 17 111. App. 577. Injuries causing bearing down pain and ultimate mis- carriage — #5,000. Butler v. Manhat- tan B. Co., 3 Misc. (N. Y.)453; 52 X. Y. St. B. 498: 23 N. Y. Supp. 163; 30 Abb. N. Cas. 78, afFd 143 N. Y. 030. Passenger — forced to make change of sleepers with no time to dress — miscarriage as result thereof — $2,500. McKeon v. Chicago, M. & St. P. B. Co., 94 Wis. 477; 35 L. R. A. 252; 69 N. W. 175; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 175. Nervous system — Injury to. Ver- dicts held not excessive. Nervous shock from which he may never re- cover — hearing in one ear perma- nently destroyed — sight of one eye impaired — $2,000. Clare v. Sacra- mento Electric P. & L. Co., 122 Cal. 504; 55 Pac. 326; 5 Am. Neg. Bep. 115. Active woman — age 35 — nervous system permanently shat- tered — great pain — unable to indulge in active exercise or endure fatigue —§7,000. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Robin- son, 58 111. App. 181. Strong labor- ing man — earning $40 to $45 per 252 month — age 46 — nervous system per- manently diseased — recovery so as to perform labor doubtful— $6,500. Ol- son v. Great Northern R. Co., 68 Minn. 155; 71 N. W. 5; 7 Am. & Eng, R. Cas. N. S. 241. Nervous shock caused by injury to knee and resulting in development of heart disease — helpless invalid — $10,000. Galloway v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. (Minn. 1894), 23 L. R. A. 442; 57 X. W. 1058. Nervous disorder — knee impaired — urine affected — bruises and pains — $7,500. Quirk v. Siegel, Cooper Co., 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 244; 56 N. Y. Supp. 49. Nervous sys- tem injured causing paresis — $5,000. McMahon v. Eau Claire Waterworks Co. (Wis. 1897), 95 Wis. 640; 70 N. W. 829; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 478. Paralysis. Verdicts held not ex- cessive. Longshoreman — unmarried — earning $3 per day — age 29 — pa- ralysis resulting from fractured skull — grave, permanent injuries there- from also — possibility of imbecility or insanity — earning power perma- nently destroyed— $6,000. The Jo- seph B. Thomas (D. C. N. D. Cal.), 81 Fed. 578. Man — age 50 — in- jury resulting in incurable paraly- sis, $15,000. Bishop v. St. Paul City R. Co. (Minn.), 50 N. W. 927. Injury of extreme severity causing progressive paralysis — will be help- less after a time and necessary to have medical attendance and one or more nurses — $18,500. Tuthill v. Long Island R. Co., 81 Hun (N. Y.), 616; 63 N. Y. St. R. 135; 30 N. Y. Supp. 959. Permanent injuries — Miscellaneous. Verdicts held not excessive. Girl — age five — permanently disfigured — $10,000. Smith v. Pittsburg & W. R. Co. (C. C. N. D. Ohio), 90 Fed. 78: 1 ,; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 214 716; 41 Ohio L. J. 113. Man— age 73 — employed as street sweeper — leg permanently shortened — less able to work than formerly — still suf- fering pain at time of trial one year after the accident— $4,000. Roche v. Kedington, 125 Cal. 174; 57 Pac. 890. Leg permanently stiffened — unable to walk securely or perform her duties as a housewift — $3,500. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Schwartz 82 111. App. 493. Leg permanently weakened — accident cutting through the muscle to the bone — unable to walk for four or five months without crutch or cane— $3,000. West Chi- cago St. R. Co. v. Johnson, 77 111. App. 142, aff'd 180 111. 285; 54 N. E. 334. Permanent injury to hip joint— woman strong and healthy — age 35 — great pain — in hospital nearly six months — obliged to use ' crutches for eight months after | leaving there— $5, 000. North Chi- cago St. R. Co. v. Brown, 76 111. App. 654. Permanent injury to one foot which incapacitates from con- ! stant use of same — unable to work for a year and a half — medical expenses $900 — easily tired — nervous and irri- j table — $5000. Grossman v. Cosgrove, 75 111. App. 385, aff'd 174 111. 383; j 51 N. E. 094. Permanent enlarge- ment of the cartilages of the bone and knee — constant pain — was com- pelled to use crutches and cane — $4,500. Chicago v. Fitzgerald. 75 111. App. 174. Man — earning $58 per month — good health — age 34 — un- able to walk — constant pain — prob- ably hasten his death— $14,000. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Swan, 70 111. App. 331; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 419. Driver of horse car — permanently disabled from all bodily exertions — still suffering much pain at end of four years — temporarily earning higher pay in clerkship than he was as car driver— $15,000. Chicago City R. Co. v. Taylor, 68 111. App. 613, aff'd 170 111. 49; 48 N. E. 831. Brakeman — chronic hip disease re- sulting from crushed hips — $5,000. Elgin J. & E. R. Co. v. Eselin, 68 111. App. 96. Mind permanently im- paired—boy—age 16— $10,000. N. Y. C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Luebeck, 54 111. App. 551. Permanent injury — boy — age 4 — Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Elder, 50 111. App. 276, aff'd 149 111. 173; 36 N. E. 565. Young girl — permanent scar caused by lac- erated wound of face and neck — medical services $75 — $1,500. Cam- eron v. Bryan (Iowa), 56 N. \Y. 434. I tail way freight conductor — earning $60 per month — age 30 — unable to perform duties of conductor — only do light work — injuries permanent — $7,660. Harker v. Burlington C. R. & N. R. Co. (Iowa). 55 N. W. 316. Serious and permanent injuries — $7,175. Wichita v. Stallings. 59 Kan. 779; 54 Pac. 689. Stiff arm— $3,500. Detzer v. Stroh Brew. Co., 119 Mich. 282: 77 N. W. 948: 44 L. R. A. 500; 5 Am. Ncg. Rep. 371; 5 Det. L. N. 803. Shoulder one and a half inches lower than other — as result thereof unable to obtain position as a teacher -$2,000. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Mizell, 100 Ky. 235; 38 S. W. 5: 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 337; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 738. Hearing in one ear de- stroyed — sight impaired— memory unreliable — health seriously affected — unable to work as effective as be- fore injury — $4,000. Kennedy v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (Minn. 1894), 58 N. \Y. 878. Permanent limp and incapacity to straighten leg — boy— $3,000. Buck v. Peoples St. R. * E. L. &P. Co. (Mo.), 18 S. W. 1090, aff g 46 Mo. App. 555. I left hand permanently lost — woman —$1,200. Harvard v. Stiles. 54 Neb. 26; 74 N. W. 399. School teacher- woman — earning $450 per year— age 253 §214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. 48 — much suffering physical and men- tal—in bed three months — consider- able medical expense — also expense for nursing — permanently disabled and obliged to use crutches — $7,208. Burr v. I'enn. R. R. Co. (X. J. 1899), 44 Atl. 845. Young man with wife and child — permanently lame as re- sult of injuries to kidneys and hips — $10,000. Boyce v. Shawangunk, 40 App. Div. (X. Y.) 593; 58 N..T. Supp. 26. Woman — healthy before acci- dent — bruises and sprains — in house two or three months — suffering also from prolapsus uteri and congestion — wearing a pessary — in opinion of physicians condition permanent — $3,750. Rippe v. Met. St. R. Co., 35 App. Div. (N. Y.) 321; 54 N. Y. Supp. 958. Roofer — permanent injuries to —$6,000. Bryer v. Foerster, 9 App. Div. (N. Y.) 542; 41 N. Y. Supp. 617. Child — age 8 — permanently disfig- ured — also will be always unable to masticate food on one side of her mouth — collar bone and four ribs broken — injury to pelvis — $6,000. Bennett v. Brooklyn H. R. Co., 1 App. Div. (X. Y. ) 205 ; 37 N. Y. Supp. 447: 72 N. Y. St. R. 719. Woman- age 27 — run over by street car — per- manent injuries — $15,000. Mitchell v. Broadway & S. Ave. R. R. Co., 70 Hun (X. Y.), 387; 54 N. Y. St. R. 116. Permanent injury to well edu- cated and healthy married man — $25,000. Alberti v. X. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 43 Hun (X. Y.), 421. Woman — healthy— married — age 28 — permanent injury — great sufferer. Groves v. Rochester, 39 Hun (X. Y. ), 5. Permanent injuries to genital or- gans — great pain and suffering — un- able to perform ordinary duties and work — $12,500. Cannon v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 9 Misc. (X. Y.) 282, aff'd 149 X. Y. 615. Van driver— in- juries which will always render him a sickly man — $15,000. Arnesen v. 254 Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 9 Misc. (X. Y.) 270 ; 61 X. Y. St. R. 324; 29 X. Y. Supp. 748. Laborer — age 35 — injuries likely to be of a permanent character wholly disabling him from all labor— $15,000. Solarz v. Man- hattan R. Co., 8 Misc. (X. Y.) 656; 59 X. Y. St. R. 537; 31 Abb. X. Cas. 426; 29 X. Y'. Supp. 1123. Man- strong and powerful — age 22 — per- manent injury to muscular power of hand — intense pain — still suffers pain after several years — $175 for medical attendance — $3,250. Wilson v. Broadway & S. A. R. Co., 8 Misc. (X. Y.) 450; 28 X. Y. Supp. 781: 60 X. Y. St. R. 60. Leg permanently shortened — under surgical treatment for 3 months — great pain — $7,500. Vail v. Broadway R. Co., 6 Misc. (X. Y.) 20; 26 X. Y. Supp. 59; 58 X. Y. St. R. 124; 31 Abb. X. Cas. 56. Permanent enlargement of knee joint— depression of skull— $3,000. Montgomery v. Long Island R. R. Co., 6 X. Y. Supp. 178. Strong man — earning $3.50 per day — per- manent injury — life shortened eight years— $4,680. Hughes v. Orange Co., Milk Assoc, 10 X. Y. Supp. 252. Leg permanently shortened — man — age 32 — nervous system af- fected — in bed eight weeks — $4,750. Dougherty v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co.. 45 X. Y. St. R. 154; 18 X. Y. Supp. 841, aff'd 138 X. Y. 641: 53 X. Y. St. R. 929; 34 X. E. 512. Shoul- der permanently disabled — woman pushed from train — $3,000. Allen v. Manhattan R. Co., 42 X. Y. St. R. 227; 17 X. Y. Supp. 187, aff'd 137 X. Y\ 561; 50 X. Y. St. R. 933; 33 X. E. 338. Married woman — age 52 — severe and permanent injuries — $10,000. Althouse v. Sharpe, 13 Wkly. Dig. (X. Y~.) 478. Woman— permanently and seriously injured — torn ligament in region of the womb— $1,000. Toledo v. Clopeck, PHYSICAL ENJURIES. § 214 g Ohio C. D. 432; 17 Ohio C. C. 585, aff'd 52 Ohio St. 642. Man— age 56 — earning $1.75 per day — arm rendered useless — $2,950. Toledo Consol. St. R. Co. v. Rohner, 9 Ohio C. C. 702. Railmad engineer — earn- ing $1,320 per year — age 43— good health -permanent injuries disabling him — intense Buffering for a long time— $19,000. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Topliff, 2 Ohio Dee. 522. Laborer — injury to right leg per- manently affecting his capacity for lifting— $3,500. West Memphis Packet Co. v. White, 99 Tenn. 25*;: 41 S. W. 583; 38 L. R. A. 427. Rail- road employee— injuries permanent, and serious— health and earning capacity greatly impaired — unable to work at all for about ten months — continual suffering — $6,500. Gal- veston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Waldo (Tex. Civ. App.), 32 S. W. 783. Railroademployee — earning $2.25 per day — age 30 — injuries permanent and one leg shortened — $4,600. Galveston II. A- S. A. R. Co. v. Templeton (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), 25 S. W. 135, aff'd 26 S. W. 1066. Man— earning from $1,800 to $2,400 per year- age 37 — injury causing severe suffer- ing and total disability — probably permanent — $15,000. Galveston, 11. & S. A. R. Co. v. Scott, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 24; 50 S. W. 477. Permanent and painful internal injuries — age 38 — earning $75 per month before in- jury — also other injuries which may make amputation of leg necessary —$10,500. Smith v. Spokane, 16 Wash. 403; 47 Pac. 888. Permanent and almost total loss of use of left arm— age 17—84,000. McCoy v. Mil- waukee St. R. Co. (Wis. 1894), 59 N. W. 453. Verdicts held excessive. Right leg seriously shortened and stiffened performance of manual labor seri- ously interfered with if not pre- vented— $5,000. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Goltz, 71 111. App. 414. Rail- road conductor — age 30— distigured for life by burns about the face- loss of use of left arm — right hand and both feel somewhat injured — $2,500. Standard nil Co. v. Tier- ney (Ky.), 14 L. R. A. 677; 13 Ky. L. Rep. 626; 49 Am. A- Eng. l;. Cas. 117; 17 S. YV. 1025: 11 Ry. A- Corp. L. J. 92. Employee — permanent in- juries to — in house three or four weeks — on crutches live or six months — no expense on account of injuries — again able to work and capacity to labor not materially af- fected— $8,(566. Nicholds v. Crystal Plate Glass Co. (Mo. i, 27 S. W. 516. Usefulness of left arm permanently impaired — difficult, surgical opera- tion necessary at cost of about $3,500 — ability to walk and read greatly reduced— no loss of earnings shown — duration of mental and nervous conditions not shown — $25,000, reduced to $15,000, and expenses. De Wardeuer v. Met. St. R. Co.. 1 App. Div. (N. V.) 240; 37 N. Y. Supp. 133; 72 X. Y. St. R. 741. Bartender — leg shortened — other injuries — $13,500 excessive — $7,000 sufficient Coffins v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. Co.. 48 Hun (X. Y.), 292. Man earning $12 per week — only permanent injury is varicose veins which prevent him from doing hard or heavy work — in hospital about a \ ear— suffered pain part of such time— $12,000. Chapman v. Atlantic Ave. R. R. Co.. 14 Misc. (X. Y.) 404; :;:. V Y. Supp. 104:.; 70 X. Y. St. R. 753. Man— age 06— earning capacity diminished but not destroyed— earning capacity before injury only $20 per week — $7,500. Oeiler v. Manh. P. Co., 11 Misc. (X. Y.i 413; 65 X. Y. St. P. 487; 32 X. Y. Sup].. 254. 255 §214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. Physical wreck — totally disabled. Verdicts held not excessive. Able- bodied man — iron worker — capable of earning $12 to $18 per week— totally disabled— 87,500. Alton Pav- ing 15. & F. Brick Co. v. Hudson, 74 111. App. 612, aff'd 17(5 111. 270: 52 X. E. 256. Woman strong and healthy — injury making her a phys- ical wreck. UeKalb v. Ashley, 61 111. App. 647. Engineer — under 40 years of age — helpless- for a very short residue of lite— 116,000. Chi- cago v. Edson, 4:3 111. App. 417. Young man — bodily maimed and de- formed for life— practically a phys- ical wreck — $14,500. Howe v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 62 Minn. 71; 30 L. R. A. 684; 64 N. W. 102; 2 Det. L. N. 537; 28 Chic. Leg. News, 25. Man — strong and healthy— age 27— mental and phy- sical wreck— $11,400. Cobb v. St. Louis & H. R Co., 149 Mo. 609; 50 S. W. 894; 13 Am. & Eng. R Cas. N. S. 632. Injuries making person a physical wreck— $10,000. Dalzellv. Long Island K. R. Co., 6 N. Y. Supp. 167. Woman — able and obliged to earn her living — good health — almost complete wreck as result of injury — 310,000. Mattis v. Phila. Traction Co., 6 Pa. Dist. R. 94; 19 Pa. Co. Ct. 106. Man — strong and healthy — vi- sion impaired — partially paralyzed and general physical wreck — $8,000. San Antonio & A. P. R Co. v. Long (Tex. Civ. App. 1895), 28 S. W. 214. Ribs— fracture of. Verdicts held not excessi ve. Man — age 65— several ribs broken — fracturing a lung — much suffering — in the house sev- eral weeks — injuries apparently permanent— $8,250. Reed v. Chi- cago, St. P. N. & O. Ry. Co. (Iowa), 37 N. W. 149. Physician— three ribs broken — paralyzed on one side — spine and left hip injured— dis- 256 figured and an invalid for life — prac- tice of $2,500 per year rendered much less by accident— $10,175. Gratiot v. Missouri P. R. Co. (Mo.), 21 S. W. 10'.»4. liib fractured — would prob- ably always have more or less trouble with it— $700. Aslen v. Charlotte, 35 App. Div. ( N. Y. ) 625 ; 54 N. Y. Supp. 754. Rib fractured — development of tumor and pleurisy therefrom — also adhesion to wall of chest— $3,200. Wynne v. Atlantic Ave. R. R. Co., 14 Misc. (N. Y. ) 394; 35 N. Y. Supp. 1034, aff'd 156 N. Y. 702. Man— age 64— fifth rib fractured — rendered uncon- scious for a time — in house two months — much pain — permanent pleuritic thickeuing — diminished respiration — insomnia — incapaci- tated from work over half the time — druggist's and doctor's bills over $100 —$3,600. Eifinger v. Brooklyn H. R. Co., 13 Misc. (N. Y.) 389; 34 N. Y. Supp. 239; 68 N. Y. St. R. 118. Fire- man — age 30 — ribs broken — badly scalded and burned on face, hand and arm — been unable to work since —$9,000. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Croskell, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 160; 25 S. W. 486. Rupture. Verdict held not exces- sive. Permanent rupture — injury to leg — constant pain — ability to labor greatly lessened— $4,000. Dilling- ham v. Richards (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 1061 ; writ of error denied in 87 Tex. 247 ; 28 S. W. 272. Verdicts held excessive. Switch- man — strong and healthy — age 30 — permanent rupture — much pain — obliged to work in position where he receives from $20 to $25 per month less — $8,000. Excessive, reduced to $5,000. Bosworth v. Standard Oil Co., 92 Hun (N. Y), 485; 72 N. Y. St. R. 195; 37 N. Y. Supp. 43. Child — age 4 — rupture — had PHYSK AL I N.i l l;li:s. 6 21 \ previous rupture but that had die- her left arm and shoulder disabled— appeared— second rapture curable compelled as a reeull of the injury to by use of truss or operation— $5,000. wear an iron frame to support her Evers v. Will, 46 Bun iN. Y.). 622; shoulder $3,000. Allen v. Manhattan 17 N. V. Supp. 29; 43 N. V. St. R. R Co., 42 N. Y. St. R 227; IT N. Y. 886, aff'd 133 N. Y. 649. Supp. 181 8ervia loss of parent for child'8. Verdicts held not excessive. Loss of services of seven year old daugh- ter—medical expenses $100— injury, loss of thumb— $2,000. Kitchell v. Brooklyn 11. R Co., L0 Misc. (N. Y. | 277; 63 N. Y. St. K. 207; 30 N. Y. Supp. 827. Mother for loss of serv- ice of child aud extra care and ex- penses— $1,000 already secured — ! $5,000. Cumming v. Brooklyn City I K. K. Co., 24 X. Y. St. R. 718. Loss of services son 14 years of age — sev- eral hundred dollars for medical treatment— earning capacity largely diminished — out of work about eleven months— $1,940. Tex. is & X. O. R. Co. v. Wood (Tex. Civ. App. , L894), 24 S. W. 509. Son 18 years of age — earning capacity diminished about $40 per month — expended for medicine and medical at tendance about $300 — $1,500. San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Green (Tex. Civ. App.), 49 S. W. 672. Verdicts held excessive. Sou— age 17 — injury preventing him from work until after majority— $2,050 exces- sive, ordered remitted to $1,500. McGee v. Penn. R. Co. (Pac. P.), 33 W. N. C. 15. Services — lost of — husband for Wife's. Verdicts hold not excessive. Strong healthy woman — age 39 — be- fore injury — since then confirmed invalid — can never be a wife to plaintiff again —$10,000. Cannon v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co.. 14 Misc. (N. Y.) 400: 35 X. Y. Supp. 1039; 70 N. Y. St. R. 75G. Loss of services, society and companionship of wife — 17 Spine and bocJfc— injuries to. Ver- dicts held not excessive. Brake- man — pernanent injury to spine. bead, legs and hip— much mental and physical Buffering— unable to work for a long time -medical at- tendance $300— $2,000. Kansas! ity, M. & B. It. Co. v. Lackey, 114 Ala. 152; 21 So. 444. Strong and healthy man — age 33— injury to spine, back and side — in bed 5 weeks — unable to work or attend to business for over a year and up to time of trial —still suffering pain — evidence that injuries were permanent — $1,500. Spring Valley v. Gavin (111. 1899 1, :,4 X. E. 1035, aff'g 81 111. App. 456. Permanent injury to spine — $2,500. Union Show Case Co. v. Blindauei. 7.-.. 111. App. 358, arid 175 111. 325; 51 X. E. 707. Injury to spinal cord — danger of permanent paralysis $5,000. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Blaul, 70 111. App. 518. Strong and vigorous man — spine and hips in- jured — continuous bodily pain— per- manently disabled- $6,500. Hunt- ington County v. Bonebrake, 140 [nd. 311; 45 N. E. 47*'. Woman- injury affecting spinal column much pain and suffering life over- Bbadowed if not blighted $12,000. Louisville & X. R. Co. v. McEwan ( Ky.i. 21 Ky. L. Rep. 487; 51 S. W. 019. Permanent and progressive in- jury to spine — impairment of mem- ory — insomnia, hernia, loss of vil ility and incontinence of urine $13,500. Fullerton v. Fordyce, 1 14 Mo. 519; 10 Am. A Eng. R. (as. N. s. 729: 44 S. NY. 1053. Financial manager of firm doing business of $750,000 per 257 §214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. year — severe injury to spine and pos- sibly permanent — confined in bed for a month— at time of trial still under care of physician— medical expenses $750— $7,500. Clark v. Chi- cago & A. R. Co. (Mo.), 29 S. W. 1013. Woman — good health — age 33 — injury resulting in hemorrhage of the spinal cord and traumatic neu- rasthenia — injury to spinal cord probably permanent— $8,000. Kaker v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 28 App. Div. (N. Y.)316; 50 N. Y. Supp. 999. Spine and liver probably per- manently affected — several months' medical treatment — headaches, stomach and liver trouble— $1,500. Ferguson v. Ehret, 14 Misc. (N. Y. ) 454; 35 N. Y. Supp. 1020; 70 N. Y. St. R. 725. Permanent curvature of spine — permanent paralysis of one of shoulder muscles— lifting power of arm affected— $4,000. Degnan v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 14 Misc. (N. Y.) 408; 35 N. Y. Supp. 1047; 70 N. Y. St. R. 755. Injury to spine and brain — man — age 57 — also numerous bruises and paralysis of bladder and sphincter muscle — in bed 4 weeks — from work about five months — still suffering pain four years after the accident— $3,600. Paetzig v. Brook- lyn City R. R. Co., 12 Misc. (N. Y.) 573; 67 N. Y. St. R. 607. Brakeman — earning $1.90 per day — back per- manently injured — severe and con- tinuous pain — unconscious for sev- eral days after receiving injuries — also one leg made smaller and weaker than the other — ability to labor materially affected — $10,000. Tierney v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R. Co., 85 Hun (N. Y.), 146; 66 N. Y. St. R. 85; 32 N. Y. Supp. 627. Healthy woman — age 33 — permanent injury to spine — unable to work since accident — growing worse — $3,500. Morris v. N. Y. O. & W. R. Co., 73 Hun (N. Y.), 560; 56 N. Y. St. R. 258 231; 26 N. Y. Supp. 342. Severe spinal trouble — incapacitated from work for months — physician testified that he could never do anything but light work. — $5,500. Stephens v. Hudson Valley Knitting Co., 66 Hun (N. Y.), 628; 48 N. Y. St. R. 814. Spine seriously injured — $8,525.87. Stouter v. Manh. R. Co., 25 N. Y. St. R. 683; 6 N. Y. Supp. 163. Spine in- jured — permanent prolapsus uteri — $4,000. Valentine v. Broadway, etc., R. Co., 14 Daly(N. Y.), 540. Full vigor, health — concussion of spine — faculties largely impaired — paralysis probably ensue— $30,000. Harroldv. N. Y. Elev. R. R. Co., 24 Hun ( N. Y. ), 184. Newsboy — curvature of spine and continual pain — leg broken in two places and shortened — also some ribs broken— $5,000. Mexican C. R. Co. v. Mitten, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 653; 36 S. W. 282. Railroad fireman — inju- ries producing spinal trouble and hernia — much mental and physical pain— $5,000. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Gordon, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 672; 33 S. W. 484. Injury to back causing traumatic fever — resulting in incur- able disease of spine — $4,000. In- ternational & G. N. R. Co. v. Mul- liken, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 663; 32 S. W. 152. Child— injury to spine — par- tial and probably permanent paraly- sis — double fracture of limb— $5,000. Roanoke v. Shull (Va. 1899), 34 S. E. 34. Man — strong and vigorous — earn- ing $2 per day — injury to back, shoulder, arm and abdomen — proba- bly permanently injured — $5,150. Sproul v. Seattle, 17 Wash. 256; 49 Pac. 489. Verdicts held excessive. Engineer — concussion of spinal cord — $9,250 excessive. Remittitur of $3,000 ordered. Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Finlayson, 16 Neb. 578. Un- married man— age 50— earning $2.75 PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 214 per day — back injured — also knees — varicose veins — not entirely pre- vented from work in the future — $8,000. Campbell v. North A met. Brew. Co., 22 App. Div. i N. V.) 414; 47 X. Y. Supp. 992. Railway pas- senger — bruise on nerves of spine and injury may possibly be permanent — severe shock — numbness of leg as re- sult of spinal injury — $10,000. For- dyce v. Moore (Tex. Civ. App. ), 22 S. W. 235. Temporary injuries — miscellaneous cases. Verdicts held not excessive. Passenger — struck on shoulder by falling lantern — severe pain and dis- abled for sometime — no dangerous or permanent injury — $150. The Wasco ( D. C. D. Wash. ), 5:) Fed. 546. Injury to arm — unable to use it owing to severe pain — no external marks — $1,500. Joliet v. Looney, 159 111. 471; 42 X. E. 854. Man— strong and healthy — age 33 — in bed 5 weeks — unable to attend to business or work for a year — still suffering pain — $1,500. Spring Valley v. Gavin, 81 111. App. 456. Sewing woman — in bed 3 weeks — in room 5 weeks — un- able to run sewing machine more than an hour a day— $1,500. Chi- cago v. Sanders, 50 111. App. 136. Well and hearty woman — great pain — disabled from work — development of a necrosis in the shinbone — forma- tion of abscesses. Joliet v. Mc- Crauey, 49 111. App. 381. Woman in good health — age 59 — in bed several weeks — severe pain — several months after injury still Buffering and unable to perform her customary work about house or weave for support of family as formerly — $2,300. Hill v. Sedalia, 64 Mo. App. 494; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1019. Iu hospital two months — much pain — medical expenses large — unable for considerable time to earn his wages of $25 per week —$3,500. Williams v. Brooklyn, 33 App. Div. I N. Y. i 539; 53 N. Y. Supp. 1007. Injuries requiring medical at- tendance for :> weeks — (1,250, liberal but not excessive — $1,250. Clcg^ v. Met. St. By. Co.. 1 App. Div. (N. Y.| 207; 72 N. V. St. R. 7:;7. Brakeman — in room three and a half weeks — unable to work at end of six months — take a long t tme to recover — 92,500. Hayden v. Platt,84 Bun| N. Y .), B7; 05 X. Y. St. R. 875; 32 X. Y. Supp. 1144. Injury to knee — necessary to inject morphine because of pain — on couch 2 weeks — use crutch in about 3 weeks — 91,000. Kirk v. Hower,T7 Hun (X. Y.), 459; 00 N. V. St. R. 594. Sprained wrist — right leg injured — constant pain — unable to attend to outside business — whether injuries permanent testimony contlictiug— $5,000. Kellon v. Long Island R. K. Co., 62 Hun (X. Y. ), 620; 42 X. Y. St. R. SL!. Serious personal injuries — $375. Dise v. Met. St. Ry. Co.. 22 Misc. (X. Y.) 97; 48 X. Y. Supp. 551. aff'd 21 Misc. 790; 47 X. Y. Supp. 11:; l. Healthy girl— age 14 — in bed 2 weeks — rendered subject to dizzi- ness and headache, sleepless at nights — eyesight and ability to study af- fected—probably not permanent — $3,500 large, but not excessive. Birmingham v. Rochester City & B. R. Co., 45 X. Y. St. R. 724; 18 X. Y. Supp. 649. Black eye— $100. Dun- lap v. Ross. 43 X. Y. St. R. 509; L8 X. Y. Supp. 48. Injury to eye caus- ing pain lor a period of three years —9300. Schuler v. Third Ave. R. C... 11 X. Y. St. R. 774: 17 N. Y. Supp. 834 Able-bodied man — un- able to perform much labor since in- jury — $1,350. Oklahoma City v. WeUh. SOkla 288; 11 Pac.598. Boy — age 11 — scalp torn from side of head— 91,200. McGaw v. Lancaster (C. P. Pa.), 14 Lane. L. Kev. 276. Healthy man — age 28 — earning $80 to 259 §214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. $95 per month— skull crushed— por- tion of removed — left eye destroyed —$10,000. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Parker, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 470; 49 S. W. 717, reh'g denied in 50 S. W. 606. Teeth broken — knee injured- lame for a long time — unable to work efficiently at his trade for about eight months— $1,000. Richmond R. & E. Co. v. Garthright, 92 Va. 627; 24 S. E. 267; 32 L. R. A. 220.- Verdicts held excessive. Injuries consisting of bruises — discoloration and jar of fall — not permanent — no medical attendance necessary — $1,500. Dixon v. Scott, 74 111. App. 277. Sprained wrist— limb bruised and discolored — also sides and back — pain — $2,500. Lake Street Elev. R. Co. v. Johnson, 70 111. App. 413; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 433. Conductor — no loss of time from usual labor — no physician— and no complaint made for a year after the acci- dent—injuries only slight — $1,725. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Banks, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1065; 33 S. W. 627. Slight temporary injuries— $6,000. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sawant, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 545; 27 S. W. 999. Married woman — age 32 — injuries resulting in uterine and other painful difficulties— have partially yielded to medical treatment and probably curable— $20,000, reduced to $7,500. Hamilton v. Great Falls St. R. Co., 17 Mont. 334; 42 Pac. 860, reh'g denied in 17 Mont. 351; 43 Pac. 713. Injuries requiring medical attend- ance five weeks— $1,250. Clegg v. Met. St. R. Co., 54 N. E. 1089, aff g 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 207; 37 N. Y. St. R. 130. Recovery for pain and suffering only— evidence as to con- tinuation of suffering indefinite— $10,000. Becker v. Albany R. Co., 35 App. Div. (N. Y.) 46; 54 N. Y. Supp. 395; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 260 N. S. 853; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 231. ! Boy — earning $10 to $12 per week — I age 17 — earning about half usual | wages four mouths after injury — entire recovery probable in three or i four years— $4,300 Levitt v. Nassau 'Elec. R. Co., 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) '83; 43 N. Y. Supp. 426. Teacher— j earning $1,750 per year — age 54 — cut on forehead and bruises on body and limbs — two weeks in bed — brain ! irritation at time of trial — absent ! from work four months but lost : little in salary or money— $10,000 I excessive, should be reduced to $5,000. Smith v. Third Ave. R. Co., ! 10 App. Div. (N. Y.) 409: 41 N. Y. j Supp. 977. Grocer— legs badly bruised — in bed only two weeks and in house only five weeks — $4,500 reduced to $2,000. Meade v. Brook- lyn H. R. Co., 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 432; 39 N. Y. Supp. 320. Man— able before injury to earn about $500 per year and possibly able since injury to earn about the same — $16,000. Bailey v. Rome, W. & O. R. Co., 80 Hun (N. Y.), 4; 61 N. Y. St. R. 490; 29 N. Y. Supp. 816. Bruise on leg requiring use of crutch eight weeks and subsequently use of cane — $200 for medicine — $450 for medical at- tendance — $12,500. Swan v. Long Island R. R. Co., 79 Hun ( N. Y), 612; 61 N. Y. St. R. 28. Washer- woman — confirmed invalid and earn- ing but $6 per week— age 69— injury neither painful, serious, nor in- curable— $5,000 excessive; $2,500 sufficient. Anderson v. Manhat- tan R. Co., 1 Misc. (N. Y.) 504; 49 N. Y. St. R. 233; 21 N. Y. Supp. 1. Temporary injuries and probably permanent. Verdicts held not ex- cessive. Child— age three months- injury displacing parietal bone — atrophy of muscles on side of neck- spasms not previously existing — may PHYSICAL INJURIES. §214 develop seriously— 52,01)0. Kowalski v. Chicago G. W. K. Co. (C. C. N. D. Iowa), 84 Fed. 586. Man— in good health and prime of life — un- able to follow his vocation for four months — evidence tending to show thai some of his injuries may and probably will be permanent — 15,000. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cole, 62 111. App. 480. Injuries serious and liable to be permanent— $1,000. Osborne v. Jenkinson, 100 Iowa, 432; 69 N. W. 548. Earning ability $2.50 per day —injury to head, chest and hip — much suffering — numbness in hip aud leg — sciatic nerve probably in- jured and perhaps permanently — $2,405. Wilkins v. Omaha & C. B. R. & B. Co., 96 Iowa, 668; 65 N. W. 987. Boy injured by falling from platform of street car — complete re- covery matter of uncertainty — $750. Jackson v. St. Paul City K. Co., 74 Minn. 48; 70 N. W. 956; 5 Am. Neg. Kep. 47. Injury which accord- ing to the evidence may have been the cause of septicemia which plaintiff had— $2,500. Miller v. St. Paul City R. Co., 66 Minn. 192; 68 N. \V. 862. Conductor — earning $75 per month — age 37— medical ex- penses result of injury $750 — invalid and unable to follow his occupation — condition promises to be permanent. Geary v. Kansas City, O. & S. K. Co., 137 Minn. 251; 39 S. W. 774; 60 Am. St. Rep. 555. Verdicts held excessive. Injury to leg — continued at work for several months after injury in same occupa- tion without consulting a physician and did not consult one for nearly six years — $3,500. Shortsleeves v. V V. ('. A- II. R. R. Co., 40 \. Y. Sup]). 1105. Woman — age 04 — ex- ceeding painful injuries aud prob- ably permanent — $10,000 excessive. New trial granted unless $3,000 is remitted. Taylor v. Chicago & N. W. K. Co., 103 Wis. 27: 79 N. W. 17: 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. 8. 1 Thigh — Injuries affecting. Ver- dicts held not excessive. Compound fracture of femur, fibula and tibia- man earning $80 per mouth — age 30 in hid ten weeks anil entirely dis- abled it-ii months strength and plasticity of leg permanently impair ed — only able to earn $00 per month at time of trial — $4,400. The Alijau- ilroiC C. App. 9th. C.)i 6C. C. A. 54; 50 Fed. 621. Child— age 5— simple fracture of thigh bone— leg per- manently shortened one fourth of an inch — pain and weakness more thau two years after injury — $2,000. Met. West Side Kiev. 1!. Co. v. Ker- sey, 80 HI. App. 301; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 112. Married woman — im- pacted fracture of thigh bone — in bed six months — great pain — leg shortened— $5,000. Young v. Webb City. 150 Mo. 333: 51 S. W. 709. Fracture of thigh bone — permanent injury— $5,000. O'Connell v. St. Louis Cable & W. R. Co., 100 Mo. 482; 17 S. W. 494. Woman— age 03 — intense pain— $7,000. Fitch v. Broadway & S. A. R. Co., 10 X. Y. Supp. 225. Thigh broken and leg shortened— $7,500. Danville & W. K. Co. v. Brown [Ya. 1894), 18 S. E. 278. Girl — age 8 — injury involving removal of portion of femur — in bed about eighteen months — much pain — more or less pain through life as result of injury— right leg shortened four to six inches— $8,000. Lorence v. Kllensburgh, 13 Wash. 341: 43 Pac. 20. Verdict held excessive. Man— age forty-nine and a half years— earning $20 per week— right thigh broken- arm hurt and face skinned — in bed six weeks and contracted bed soreB §214 PHYSICAL INJURIES. —five months lost time after which he resumed work at previous wages — suffered great pain and still suf- fers when weather changes — leg shortened— bill of Sill. 50 for medi- cal attendance and expenses — $5,561. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Syfan (Tex. Civ. App.), 43 S. W. 551, aff'd 91 Tex. 502: 44 S. W. 1064: Toe— Injury to. Verdicts held not excessive. Loss of three toes — woman— earning $1.25 per day- age 64 — also head injured — much pain — in hospital seven weeks — earned nothing since — $3,500. Lar- 262 kin v. N. Y. & N. R. R. Co., 46 K Y. St. R. 658; 19 N. Y. Supp. 479, aff'd 138 N. Y. 634. Man— age 33— injury necessitating amputation of three toes — in house five months — unable to work more than three fourths of his time — $8,500. Com- merford v. Atlantic Ave. R. R. Co., 8 Misc. (N. Y.J 599; 61 N. Y. St. R. 51. Loss of great toe — side and leg injured — disabled two and a half months — subsequent occasional suffering and at times disabled — $2,000. Reynolds v. Van Beuren, 10 Misc. (N. Y.) 703; 64 N. Y. St. R. 633; 31 N. Y. Supp. 827. PAIN AND BUFFERING MENTAL SUFFERING. § 215 CHAPTER VIII. PAIN AND SUFFERING— MENTAL SUFFERING. 215. Pain and suffering— Physical injury. 210. Pain and suffering— Evidence as to. 217. Pain and suffering— Effect of prior injury or disease. 218. Mental suffering— Physical in- jury. 219. Same subject continued. 220. Fright — not result of physical injury. 221. Fright— Physical injury re- sulting from. 222. Same subject continued. 223. Mental suffering— Fear of con- sequences of injury — Bite of dog. 224. Mental suffering of injured person — Disfigurement. 225. Mental suffering — Action by husband for injury to wife — Parent and child. 226. Mental suffering— Pleading- Evidence. § 215. Pain and suffering— Physical injury.— Pain and Buffering are naturally connected with all physical injuries and may he considered as the direct and proximate results thereof. Whether the physical injury results from the negligent or wilful act of another, recovery may he had for the pain and suffering connected with such injury, both at the time of its occurrence and subsequently, the recovery being in the nature of compen- satory damages, so far as it is possible to compensate therefor. 1 1 Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Put- nam, 118 II. S. 545; 7 S. Ct. 1; Rouse v. Bornsby (C. C. App. 8th C), 67 Fed. 219; Robertson v. Cornelson, 34 Fed. 71G; Beardsley v. Swann, 4 Mc- Lean (U. S. C. C), 333; Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S. | 34; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Bailey, 112 Ala. 167; 20 So. 313; Louisville & X. R. Co. v. Binion, 107 Ala. 645; 18 So. 75; Alabama <;. S. R. Co. v. Bill, 93Ala. 514; 9 So. 722; 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 500; St. Louis. S. W. R. Co. v. Dobbins, GO Ark. 481; 30 S. W. 887, reh'g denied, 60 Ark. 486; 31 S. W. 147: Wall v. Livezay, 6 Colo 4G5; Maisenbacker v. Society Con cordia, 71 Conn. 369; 42 Atl. 67 Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 293 Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 22."> Warner v. Chamberlain, 7 Boust (Del.) 18; Mills v. Wilmington City R. Co., 1 Marv. (Del.) 269; 46 Atl. 1114; Friedman v. McGowan, 1 IVnn. (Del.) 43G; 42 Atl. 72:5; Brown v. Green, 1 Penn. (Del.) 535; 42 Atl. 991; Jones v. Bell, 8 Boust. (Del.) 562; Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. John- Bon, 90 Ga. 500; Atlanta St. R. Co. v. Jacobs, SS Ga. 647; 15 S. E. 825; 2G3 8 21 n" PAIN AM) SUFFERING — MENTAL SUFFERING. Pain and suffering, however, have no pecuniary value and can- not be measured by an equivalent in money. They are not capable of exact proof by any pecuniary standard. There is no Cooper v. Mnllins, 30 Ga. 146; Chi- cago CityR. Co. v. Anderson, 182111. 298; 55 N. E. 366, affg 80 111. App. 71; North Chicago, Street It. Co. v. Fitzgihbons, 180 111. 466; 54 N. E. 483, aff'g 79 111. App. 632; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Cleninger, 178 111. 536; 53 N. E. 320, aff'g 77 111. App. 186; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Fos- ter, 175 111. 396; 51 N. E. 690, aff'g 74 111. App. 414; Springfield Consol. R. Co. v. Hoeffner, 175 111. 634; 51 N. E. 884, aff'g 71 111. App. 162; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Carr, 170 111. 478; 48 N. E. 992, aff'g 67 111. App. 530; Central R. Co. v. Serfass, 153 111. 379; 39 N. E. 119, aff'g 53 111. App. 448; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Haenni, 146 111. 614; Pierce v. Millay, 44 111. 189; Peoria Bridge Assn. v. Loomis, 20 111. 235; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1; 49 N. E. 582; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 792; Linton Coal & M. Co. v. Persons, 15 Ind. App. 69; 43 N. E. 651; Wabash W. R. Co. v. Morgan (Ind.), 31 N. E. 661; Haden v. Sioux City & P. R. Co. (Iowa, 1895), 60 N. W. 537; Morris v. Chi- cago, etc., R. Co., 45 Iowa, 29; Atch- ison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Rowe, 56 Kan. 411; 43 Pac. 683; Abilene v. Wright, 4 Kan. App. 708; 46 Pac. 715; Cent. Pass. R. Co. v. Kuhn, SQ Ky. 578; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greer (Ky. 1895), 29 S.W. 337; 16 Ky. L. Rep. 667; Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill (Ind.), 406; Canning v. Wil- liamstown, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 451; Tunnicliffe v. Bay City Consol. R. Co., 107 Mich. 261; 65 N. W. 226; 2 Det. L. N. 711; Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466; Covell v. Wabash R. Co., 82 Mo. App. 190; 264 Hansberger v. Sedalia Elec. R. L. & P. Co., 82 Mo. App. 566; Gerdes v. Christopher & S. A. Iron & F. Co., 124 Mo. 347; 27 S. W. 615; Riden- horn v. Kan. City Cable R. Co., 102 Mo. 270; Whalen v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 60 Mo. 323; West v. Frost, 22 Mo. 344; Plummer v. Milan, 79 Mo. App. 439; 1 Mo. A. Rep. 600; Fre- mont, E. & M. V. R. Co. v. French, 48 Neb. 638; 67 N. W. 472; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 365; Sioux City& P. R. Co. v. Smith (Neb.), 36 N. W. 285; Klein v. Jewett, 26 N. J. Eq. 474; Ehrgatt v. Mayor, etc., New York, 96 N. Y. 264; Drink water v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390, rev'g 16 Hun, 250; Cur- tis v. Rochester, etc., R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534; Ransom v. N.Y. , etc., R. Co., 15 N. Y. 415; Gilbertson v. Forty- Second St. R. Co., 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 294; 43 N. Y. Supp. 782; Cannon v.Brooklyn CityR. Co., 9 Misc. (N. Y.) 282; 61 N.Y. St. R. 147; 29 N. Y. Supp. 722; Doyle v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 37 N. Y. St. R. 604; Wallace v. Western W. C. R. Co., 104 N. C. 442; Oliver v. North Pac, etc., R. Co., 3 Oreg. 84; Schenkel v. Pittsburg & B. Traction Co. (Pa. 1S99), 44 Atl. 1072; Bamford v. Pittsburg & B. Traction Co. (Pa. 1899), 44 Atl. 1068; Musick v. Latrobe, 184 Pac. 375; 39 Atl. 22Q; 42 W. N. C. 209; Smedley v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. R. Co., 184 Pa. St. 620; 39 Atl. 544; 42 W. N. C. 169; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 649; Goodhart v. Perm. R. R. Co., 117 Pac. 1; 35 Atl. 191; 38 W. N. C. 545; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 364; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 132 Pa. St. 27; 18 Atl. 1087; Penn. & Ohio Ca- nal Co. v. Graham, 63 Pa. St. 290; 3 Am. Rep. 549; Missouri, K. & T. R. PAIN AND SUFFERING MENTAL SUFFERING. vj 8 216 measure of damages, therefore, furnished in law other thao the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors, under the evidence and instructions of the court, and it is for the jury to estimate and recompense for pain and suffering on the ground of human experience, guided by the facts and circumstances of the partic- ular case. 2 § 216. Pain and suffering— Evidence as to.— The existence of pain may be inferred upon proof of a physical injury, the de- gree of pain, of course, differing according to the nature and character of the injury. So pain and suffering is proved by evidence of mangling and crushing. 3 And evidence may be in- troduced as to the existence of pains, the use of opiates, etc., since the injury, as showing that pains resulted from the in- jury. So a person was permitted to testify as to pains suffered by her in her back and the back of her neck, as tending to show pains resulting from the injuries described in the declaration.' And evidence that a person had never used opiates prior to the injury, but that since then he had used morphine all the time and could not live without it, has also been held admissible, as teiid- Co. v. Hannig, 91 Tex. 347; 43 S. W. 508, rev'g 41 S. W. 196; Howard Oil Co. v. Davis, 76 Tex. 630; Texas Brew. Co. v. Dickey, 20 Tex. C. A. 606; 49 S. W. 935; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Malone, 15 Tex. C. A. 56; 38 S. W. 538; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Berling, 14 Tex. C. A. 544; 37 S. W. 1083; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Hansom, 13 Tex. C. A. 552; 36 S. W. 289; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Keller, 11 Tex. C. A. 569; 32 S. W. 847: Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Rowell (Tex. C. A.), 45 S. \V. 763, aff'd 46 S. W. 630; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 597; Giblin v. Mclntyre, 2 Utah, 384; Fulsome v. Concord, 46 Vt. 135; Thompson v. National Exp. Co. (Vt. |, 29 A.tl.311; Robinson v. Marino, 3 Wash. -134; 28 Pac. 752; Washington A G. R. Co. v. Patter- son, 25 Wash. L. Rep. 36; 9 App. I). C. 423; Carpenter v. Mexico Nat. K. Co., 17 Wash. L. R. 630; Bultz v. Sullivan, 101 Wis. 608; 77 X. W.870; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 508; Phillips v. ! Southwestern Ry. Co., 42 B. D. 406. 2 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Barrow. 5 Wall. (U.S.) 90; Western & A. R. 1 Co. v. Young (Ga.), 7 S. E. -J1l': North Chicago Street R. Co. v. Fitz- 1 gibbons, 180 111. 466; 54 N. E. 483, atl'g 79 111. App. 632; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Warner, 108 111. 538; Salina Mill * Elev. Co. v. Hoyne (Kan. App. 1900), 63 Pac. 660; Mer- rill v. St. Louis, 12 Mo. App. 466; Leeds v. Metropolitan (las L. Co., 90 N. Y. 26 ; Goodhart v. Penn. R. Co., 177 Pa. St. 1; Bamford v. Pitts- burg & B. Traction Co. (Pa. 1899), 44 Atl. 106S. See also cases cited in first note in this section. 8 Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. War- ner, 108 111. 538. 4 Thompson v. National Expr. Co. (Vt.), 29 Atl. 311. 2G5 § 217 PAIN AND SUFFERING— MENTAL SUFFERING. ing to show continued physical suffering requiring the use of morphine. 5 Again, where in an action by a woman, for personal injuries it was shown that after the accident her menstruation had stopped for a period of two months, it was held that she might testify that on its return she was subjected to great pain and spasms. 6 § 217. Pain and suffering— Effect of prior injury or dis- ease. Though a person may have a weak constitution, or be subject to a disease which will render him more susceptible to suffering in case of an injury, the fact of the existence of such a disease will not prevent a recovery for the pain and suffering caused solely by such injury. 7 And a person who has shortly before an accident sustained an injury causing pain may recover for the increase of pain and suffering caused by the subsequent injury. 8 So though the amount of damages which a person sus- tains as a result of a personal injury may be increased by rea- son of his weak or unsound constitution, yet the fact that they are increased by such cause will not prevent his recovery of all damages suffered by him, including the increased amount. 9 And it is not competent to ask the plaintiff questions for the purpose of showing that several years previous to the injury he suffered with a disease, which, though dormant until the injury, may be the cause of his present sufferings, since they relate to matters too remote and conjectural. 10 & Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Han- son, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 552; 36 S. W. 289. 6 Cannon v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 9 Misc. (X. Y.) 282; 61 N. Y. St. R. 147; 29 N. Y. Supp. 722. ^ Hall v. Cadillac, 114 Mich. 99; 4 Det. L. N. 499 ; 72 X. W. 33. In this case it was held where a person had fallen and bruised her knee and hip, that the fact that she had pre- viously had rheumatism thus ren- dering her more susceptible to pain, would not prevent recovery for the pain and suffering caused solely by the injury. See also Shumway v. Walworth & M. Mfg. Co., 98 Mich. 266 411; 57 N. W. 251; Leclerc v. Montreal, Rap. Jud. Quebec, 15 C. S. 205; Litten v. Detroit, 119 Mich. 495; 78 N. W. 543; 5 Det. L. X. 857. 8 Schwingschlegl v. Monroe, 113 Mich. 683; 72 N. W. 7; 4 Det. L. N. 447. Where the pain and suffering resulting from an injured ankle was subsequently increased by a fall on a defective sidewalk, it was held that there might be a recovery for such increased pain and suffering. 9 Loranger v. Dominion Transport. Co., Rap. Jud. Quebec, 15 C. S. 195. i° North Chic. Street R. Co. v. Cot- ton, 29 N. E. 899, aff'g 41 111. App. 311. FAIN AND SUFFERING MENTAL SUFFERING. § 218 § 218. Mental suffering— Physical injury.— Mental suffer- ing is an element to be considered and for which damages may be awarded in an action to recover for bodily injuries. 11 In this 11 Robertson v. Cornelson, 34 Fed. TIC: Kennon v. Gilmer, 181 U. S. 22; District of Columbia v. Wood- bury, 130 U. S. 450; 10 S. Ct. 990; South & North A. R. Co. v. McLen- don, 63 Ala. 266; St. Louis & S. W. R. Co. v. Dobbins, 60 Ark. 481; 30 S. W. 887, reh'g denied, 60 Ark. 486; 81 S. W. 147; Trabing v. Cal. Nav. & Imp. Co., 133 Cal. — ; 65 Pac. 478; Thomas v. Gates (Cal. 1899), 58 Pac. 315; Fairchild v. Cal. Stage Co., 13 Cal. 599; Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 293; Seger v. Barkhamsted, 22 Conn. 290; Jones v. Bell, 8 Houst. (Del.) 562; Brush Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Simonsohn, 107 Ga. 70: 32 S. E. 902; West Chicago St. It. Co. v. Foster, 175 111. 396; 51 X. E. 690, aff'g 74 111. App. 414: Chicago City R. Co. v. Taylor, 170 111. 49; 48 N. E. 831; 9 Am. & Eng. Rep. Cas. X. S. 513, aff'g 69 111 App. 613; Western Brewery Co. v. Meredith, 166 111. :509: 46 N. E. 720, aff'g 66 111. App. 4.". I : Central R. Co. v. Serfass, 153 111. :'.7'.i; 39 X. E. 119, affg 5:: 111. App. 448: Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Montgomery, 152 [nd. 1; 49 N. E. 582; 9 Am. & Ens. R. Cas. \. S. 792: Wabash W. K. Co. v. Mor- gan (Ind.), 31 X. E. 661; Wolf v. Trimble, 103 Ind. 355; Wright v. Compton, 53 Ind. :;:'.7: Miller v. Boone County (Iowa, 1895), 63 X. W. 352; Root \. Stui'divant, 70 Iowa. 55; Ferguson v. Davis Co., ;>7 Iowa, 601; Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co, 45 Iowa, 29; Union Street R. Co. v. Stone,:.! Kan. 83; 37 Pac. 1012; 47 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 90; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Midget! (Kan. App.), 40 Pac. 995; Central Pass. R. Co. v. Kuhn, 86 Ky. 578; Louisville ct X. R. Co. v. Greer ( Ky. 1895), 29 s. W. 337; 16 Ky. I.. Rep. 667; Wy- mau v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 229; Prentiss v. Shaw, 56 Me. 427; Mason v. Ells- worth, 32 Mc 271 : Sloan v. Edwards, 01 Md. 89; Bannonv. Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co., 24 Md. 108; Smith v. Hol- comb, 99 Mass. 552; Canning v. Wil- liamstown, 1 Cash. (Mass.) 451; Sherwood v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., B2 Mich. 374; Geveke v. Grand Rap. & I. R. Co., 57 Mich. 589: Hansberger v. Sedalia Elec. R. L. & P. Co., 82 Mo. App. 566; Porter v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co., 71 Mo. 66; 36 Am. Rep. 454; West v. Forrest, 22 Mo. 344; Schmitz v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. (Mo.), 23 L. It A. 250; 24 S. W. 472; Plummer v. Milan, 79 Mo. App. 439; 1 Mo. A. Pep. 600; American Waterworks Co. v. Doug- herty (Xeb.),55 X. W. 1051; Quigley v. Central P. R. Co.. 11 Xev. 350; Shay v. Camden & S. Ry. Co. (X. .1. 1901), 49 Atl. 547; Consolidated Trac- tion Co. v. Lainbertson, 60 X. J. L. 457; 38 Atl. 684; 10 Am. ct Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 753, alrg 59 X. J. L. 297; 36 Atl. 100; Quinn v. Long Island It. It. Co., 34 Hun (X. Y.), 331; 105 X. Y. 643; Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 X. Y. 390, rev'g 16 Hun, 250; O'Neil v. Dry Dock, E. B. ct B. R. Co., 36 X. Y. St. R. 934; 59 X. Y. Supr. 123: 15 X. Y. Supp. 84, aff'd 129 X. Y. 125; 41 X. V. St. R. 107: 29 X. E. 84; Hamilton v. Third Ave. R. Co., 53 X. Y. 28; Ranson v. \ew York & E. R. Co.. 15 X. Y. 415; Matteson v. X'ew York Cent. It. It. Co., 62 Barb. (X. Y. ) 364; Walker v. Erie Ry. Co., 0:", Barb. (N. Y.) 260; Demann v. Eighth Ave. R. Co. (C. P.), 10 Misc. (X. Y.) 191; 267 § 218 PATH AND SUFFERING MENTAL SUFFERING. connection the following words of the court in a recent Federal case are pertinent : " In the briefs of counsel there is a lengthy discussion of the question whether fright or mental distress alone constitutes such an injury that the law will allow a re- covery for it. This question is not involved in this case. . . . Whatever the rule in such cases may be, en passant, we appre- hend that it will depend upon the particular facts in each case. There is no conflict in the authorities upon the question that when by the negligence of the defendant's acts, the plaintiff re- ceives a bodily injury, he is entitled to recover damages not only for such injury but for all the injurious results which are a reasonable and natural consequence thereof and were accurately and proximately occasioned thereby. We all know by common knowledge that serious results may follow from bodily injuries. . . . The body and mind are so intimately connected that the mind is very often directly and necessarily affected by physical injuries. A nervous shock without a blow to the person might, under some circumstances, be so great as to cause bodily injury. In estimating the amount of damages which the defendants in error were entitled to recover, the jury had the right to take into consideration all the testimony as to the surrounding facts and circumstances at the time of and incident to the collision includ- ing the position and situation in which Mrs. Roller was placed thereby; in order to arrive at the truth as to the extent of the bodily injuries she received and the character and extent of the fright or shock, if any, to her system resulting from and di- rectly attributable to the collision and injury. In a case like 62 N. Y. St. R. 476; 30 N. Y. Supp. 926; Wallace v. Western, etc., R. Co., 104 N. C. 442; Smith v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. 23 Ohio St. 10; Scott v. Civ. App. 544; 37 S. W. 1083; Gal- veston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Clark; 21 Tex. Civ. App. 167; 51 S. W. 276; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Keller, Montgomery, 95 Penn. St. 444; Penn. I 11 Tex. Civ. App. 569; 32 S. W. 847; & Ohio Canal Co. v. Graham, 63 Penn. St. 290; 3 Am. Rep. 549; Gill- man v. Florida, C. & P. R. Co., 53 S. C. 210; 31 S. E. 224; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 125; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Hampton (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 59 S. W. 928; Howard Oil Co. v. Davis, 76 Tex. 630; Hous- ton & T. C. R. Co. v. Berling, 14 Tex. 268 (iibbin v. Mclntyre, 2 Utah, 484; Robinson v. Marino, 3 Wash. 434; Carpenter v. Mexico Nat. R. Co., 17 Wash. L. R. 630; Boltz v. Sullivan, 101 Wis. 608; 77 N. W. 870; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 508; Fenelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 344; Blake v. Midland R. Co., 18 Q. B. 110. See Joyce on Electric Law, sees. 825, 825n, 826, 826n. PAIN AND BUFFERING MENTAL BUFFERING. § 219 the present the proximate damages which the person injur.-, 1 is entitled to recover are the ordinary and natural results of the collision and injury, and are sucli as might reasonably be ex- pected would follow therefrom. This general principle, where- ever discussed, is expressly recognized by all the authorities which hold that damages cannot be recovered for mere fright alone, without any bodily injury. If there was any t right or shock which resulted from her bodily injury in connection with the collision, the accompanying explosion. lire and wreckage of the cars, and the surrounding circumstances directly conni therewith and solely attributable thereto, there is no substantial reason why she should not be allowed to recover all damages naturally and reasonably and approximately arising therefrom." '- ^ '219. Same subject continued,— Such suffering must pro- ceed from the injury as the natural and proximate result thereof, for if independent of and unconnected with any injury, it will not of itself in this class of cases be a ground for recovery. 1 '' But it has been held that in case of wilful injuries or of negli- gence which is gross or amounts to recklessness, this limitation u Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. 748, 749, per Ilawley, D. J. I This was an action for damages for injury to a passenger resulting from a collision. 1: Kennon v. Gilmer. 131 U. S. 22: The Queen, 40 Fed. 694 : Tex- arkana & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Anderson (Ark.), 53 S. W. 673; Chicago City R. Co. v. Taylor, 170 111. 40; 48 N. E. 831; Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. s. 513, aff'g 69 111. A pp. 613; Chicago City R. Co. v. Anderson, 80 111. App. 71; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 41, affM 182 111. 298; 55 \. E. 366; Hi aim v. Craven, 17-") 111. 40; Indian- apolis, etc., R. Co. v. Stables, 02 111. 313; Kalen v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 18 Ind. App. 202; 47 X. K. 694; Mahoney v. Dank wait. 108 Iowa, 321; 79 N. W. 134; ti Am. Neg. Rep. 278; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 417: Fer- guson v. Davis Co.. 57 Iowa, 001; Atchison, etc.. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 4t> Kan. 109; Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227; Me Malum v. Northern Cen- tral R. Co., 39 Md. 438; White v. .Sander, 108 Mass. 290; 47 X. E. 90; Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cush. i Mass. i 451 ; Smith v. Hol- comb, 99 Mass. 552; Keyes v. Minne- apolis, etc.. R. Co., 3(3 Minn. 290; Memphis, etc., I!. Co. v. Whitfield, 4 1 Miss. 466; Denning v. Chicago, R. I. & T. R. Co., 80 Mo. App. 152; 2 Mo. App. Hep. 547; Johnson v. Wells, :>: 38 Atl. 084. aff'g 59 X. .1. L. 297; :if, Atl. 100; <>• Flaherty v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., :;4 App. Div. | N. Y.) 74: 54 N. Y. Supp. 90. See Joyce on Electric Law. sec. 9s7. Also sees. 825-830. 269 § 220 PAIN AND SUFFERING — MENTAL SUFFERING. of the rule is not applicable. 11 Though the general rule in the above class of cases requires that the mental suffering must proceed from or be connected with an injury, yet the fact that the injury is a slight one will not prevent the consideration of such suffering as an element of damage. 15 Again, in the case of a physical injury the effect thereof on the mind of the person may be aggravated by the motive or wantonness of the person inflicting such an injury, and in such case the damages may be larger than where there is a similar physical injury caused through mere carelessness. 16 But in order to authorize a re- covery for mental suffering, proof as to the damages sustained in dollars and cents, on account of such suffering is not essential, 17 and direct evidence that the plaintiff has suffered mental an- guish is unnecessary. 18 § 220. Fright — Not result of physical injury. — In an action for negligence no damages are recoverable for fright, terror, alarm, or distress of mind where no physical injuries have been sus- tained in connection therewith. 19 So mental anxiety as to the » Kalen v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 18 Ind. App. 202; 47 N". E. 694; Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285; 47 N. E. 88; 38 L. R. A. 512; 14 Nat. Corp. Rep. 869; Pur- cell v. St. Paul City R. Co., 48 Minn. 134; 16 L. R. A. 203; Williams v. Underbill, 63 App. Div. (N. Y.) 223; 71 X. Y. Supp. 291. 15 Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 293; Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cusli. (Mass.) 452; Memphis, etc., R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466; Sidekuni v. Wabash, etc., Ry. Co., 93 Mo. 400; 4 S. W. 701. 16 Howes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518. See Kellyville Coal Co. v. Yehuka, 94 111. App. 74. " Bell v. Gulf & C. R. Co., 76 Miss. 71; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 459; 51 S. W. 517, reh'g denied in 54 S. W. 979. 18 International & G. N. R. Co. v. 270 Mitchell (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 60 S. W. 996. 19 Lehigh & H. R. Co. v. Marcbant ( C. C. App. 2d C. ), 55 U. S. App. 427 ; 28 C. C. A. 544; 84 Fed. 870; The Queen, 40 Fed. 694; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Bragg (Ark. 1901), 64 S. W. 226; Braun v. Craven, 175 111. 401; 51 N. E. 657; 42 L. R. A. 199; Kalen v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 18 Ind. App. 202; 47 N. E. 694; Ma- honey v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa, 321; 79 N. W. 134; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 278; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 417; Salina v. Trosper, 27 Kan. 544; Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285; 38 L. R. A. 512; 47 N. E. 88; 14 Nat. Corp. Rep. 869; Purcell v. St. Paul City R. Co., 48 Minn. 134; Darrah v. Illinois C. R. Co., 65 Miss. 14; Johnson v. Wells, 6 Nev. 224; Buchanan v. New Jersey R. R. Co., 23 Vr. (N. J.) 265; Ward v. West Jersey & S. R. Co. (N. J. Sup. 1900), 47 Atl. 561; Consoli- PAIN AND BUFFERING — MENTAL BUFFERING. § 220 safety of the plaintiff or of Lis family, unaccompanied by phys- ical injury, and caused .solely by negligent blasting, as a result of which rocks were thrown upon his land and buildings, is not an element for which recovery may be had. 30 And where a stone was thrown into a room it was held that there could be no recovery for injuries sustained by the wife of the owner who was in such room where such injuries were merely the result of fright alone, though the throwing was done with intention to injure the house but with no knowledge of her being in the room and with no intention to injure her. 21 And in another case it was held that the act of a landlord in suddenly appearing at the open door of a woman's bedroom in which she was packing her goods and his forbidding her to move, accompanied by loud and angry words on his part and a waving of his arms together with threats to call the constable, were not such acts as would constitute negligence which would render him liable for her re- sulting excitement and fright in consequence of which chorea or St. Vitus dance resulted. 22 Nor can damages be recovered for fright which produces a miscarriage, such fright being caused by a quarrel between defendant, plaintiff's husband and another. within her hearing but out of her sight, and it not appearing that the defendant knew that she heard it or knew of her con- dition ; - ! nor can there be a recovery for fright in the case of a seaman thrown into the water by a collision, in the absence of evidence showing inability to pursue his employment, some sub- dated Traction Co. v. Lambertson, 59 N. J. L. 297; 36 Atl. 100, aff' d 38 Atl. 683; 60 N. J. L. 457: Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., 151 N. Y. 107; 45 N. E. 354, rev'g 77 Hun, 607; 59 \. Y. St. R. 892; 25 N. Y. Supp. 844; O' Flaherty v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 34App. Div. (N. V.) 74; 54 X. Y. Supp. 96; 58 Alb. L. J. 347; Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412; 25 S. W. 419; Victorian Ry. Com mis. v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. Cas. 598; Hock v. Denis, 4 Mont. L. R. 356. But see Mack v. South Bound R. Co., 52 S. C. 323; 40 L. R. A. 679; 29 S. E. 905: 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 272; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412; 25 S. W. 419; Henderson v. Canada At- lantic R. Co., 4 Ont. App. 437. See in this connection Joyce on Electric Law, sees. 825 831, 987, 988. 20 Wynian v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227. -i White v. Sander, 168 Mass. 296; 47 N. E. 90. See also Bucknam v. Great Northern If. Co. (Minn.), 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 302; 79 N. W. 98. M Braun v. Craven, 175 111. 401; 51 \. E. 057; 42 1.. R. A. 199, aff'g 73 111. App. 189; 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 77. But sec Brownback v. Frailty, 78 111. App. 262. - Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 111. 11; 27 Am. Hep. 607. •271 § 221 PAIN AND SUFFERING — MENTAL SUFFERINGi stantial injury, or expense resulting therefrom.-' But where, owing to the negligence of a railroad company, a carriage was struck by one of its trains and the person riding therein was thrown to the ground, it was held that such person might re- cover damages for fright and nervous shock, although the in- jury sustained was entirely due to the nervous shock. 23 § 221. Fright— Physical injury resulting from. — In some cases it may happen that physical injuries are not the direct result of a negligent act, but that fright alone is, and that as a result of such fright, nervous shock or some physical injury subse- quently ensues. In this class of cases the weight of authority supports the rule that there can be no recovery for such injury or shock, since such injury cannot be considered as a conse- quence which in the ordinary course of things would flow from the negligent act.* Thus it was declared in an English case,'-' 7 where, by the negligence of the gateman of a railroad company, a man and his wife while driving across the track were almost struck by the train and she suffered greatly from fright which resulted in illness, that " her fright was caused by seeing the train approaching and thinking that they were going to .be killed. Damages arising from mere sudden terror, unaccompanied by 24 The Queen, 40 Fed. 694. 25 Warren v. Boston & M. R. Co. (Mass.), 40 N. E. 895. 26 Braun v. Craven, 175 111. 401; 51 N. E. 657; 42 L. R. A. 199, aff'g 73 111. App. 189; 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 77; Malioney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa, 321; 79 N. W. 134; 6 Am. Neg. Kep. 278; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 417; Spade v. Lynn & B. R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285; 38 L. R. A. 512; 47 W. E. 88; 14 Nat. Corp. Kep. 869; Deming v. Chicago, R. I. * P. R. Co., 80 Mo. App. 152; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 152; Mitchell v. Roch- ester R. Co., 151 N". Y. 107; 45 N. E. 354, rev'g77 Hun, 607; 59 N. Y. St. R. 892; 25 N. Y. Supp. 844; O'Flaherty v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 74; 54 N. Y. Supp. 96; 58 Alb. L. J. 347. See also Haile v. Texas & P. R. Co., 23 U. S. App. 80; 272 m Fed. 557; 9 C. C. A. 134; 23 L. R. A. 774; Ewing v. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 147 Pa. St. 40; 14 L. A. 666; Joyce on Electric Law sec. 831. But see Sloan v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., Ill Cal. 698; Purcell v. St. Paul City R. Co., 48 Minn. 134; 16 L. R. A. 203; Mack v. South Bound R. Co., 52 S. C. 323; 40 L. R. A. 679; 29 S. E. 905; 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 272; Bell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 26 L. R. (Ire.) 428; Henderson v. Can- ada Atlantic R. Co., 4 Ont. App. 437. But see Brownback v. Frailey, 78 111. App. 262. The questions of men- tal suffering and fright may be found discussed in Joyce on Electric Law, sees. 825-831, 987, 988. 27 Victorian Ry. Commrs. v. Coul- tas, 13 App. Cas. 222. PAIN AND SUFFERING -MENTAL BUFFERING. § 222 any actual physical injury, but occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot, under such circumstances (their lordships think;, be considered a consequence which in the ordinary course of things, would flow from the negligence of the gatekeeper.' 1 * So where a blast was negligently set off it was held that there could he no recovery for sickness or disease occasioned not as a direct result of the blast, but by apprehension on the part of the plaintiff as to her mother's safety. 3 And in another case it was held where a person was thrown to the ground and injured by an electric shock that there could be no recovery for injuries produced by fright alone, but that they formed a hasis of re- covery when accompanied by the harm occasioned by the fall. 80 § 222. Same sub ject continued. — hi a case before the courts of Ireland, however, the doctrine is asserted that even though no actual physical injury results by impact from the negligent act of another, yet if a person is so frightened by such act that a nervous shock ensues, resulting in subsequent physical injury, re- covery may be had for such injury. 31 The evidence in tins case showed that as a result of the negligence of the railroad company. the plaintiff was greatly frightened ; that a nervous shock resulted therefrom ; that she was unable to perform her work ; and that she might suffer from paralysis. It was claimed by the defense that though there might be a nervous shock, yet, if it arose from mere fright, unaccompanied by actual physical injury, dam- ages therefor were too remote to be recoverable. In the opinion in this case the decision in Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas, 32 is referred to, and criticized, and the court declines to follow it, holding that damages for injury to health, resulting from fright, are recoverable, and saying in conclusion that " I am of the opinion that as the relation between fright and injury to the nerve and brain structures of the body is a matter which depends entirely upon scientific and medical testimony, it is 2 8 Per Sir K. Couch. 29 Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa, 321; 79 X. W. VM: C, Am. Neg. Rep. 278; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 417. 80 O'Flaheity v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 34 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 74; 54 N. Y. Supp. 98; 58 Abb. L. J. 347. 18 278 ;1 Bell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 26 L. K. lit-. 428, cited in Mack v. South Hound R. Co., 52 S. C. 323; 4u L. I:. A. 679; :.".< S. E. 905; 3 Chic. L. .1. Wkly. 417. n 13 App. ('as. 222. §§ 223, 224 PAIN AND SUFFERING — MENTAL SUFFERING. impossible for any court to lay down, as a matter of law, that if negligence cause fright, and such f right,, in its turn so affects such structures as to cause injury to health, such injury cannot be a consequence, which in the ordinary course of things would flow from the negligence, unless such injury ' accompany such negligence in point of time.' ' ,33 In this case in criticising the Coultas decision, 34 it was also said by the court that " although one witness spoke of nervous shock as contradistinguished from physical damage, the question would still have been open for the jury whether the nervous shock was not, as in the general- ity of, if not indeed in all cases, it must necessarily be — phys- ical injury." In California 35 it is also held in the case of the ejection of a passenger from a train that paroxysms of the nerv- ous sj^stem, resulting from the mental suffering of the passenger, constituted a bodily injury, and that damages were recoverable therefor. 36 § 223. Mental suffering — Fear of consequences of injury —Bite of dog. — In some cases of physical injury the character thereof is such that unusual and excessive pain and suffering and possibly death, will naturally and frequently result there- from. In such cases the fear and anxiety of such result may be an element to be considered in determining the amount of damages recoverable. So, where an injury is inflicted by the bite of a dog, the mental suffering of the person injured, his fear and apprehension as to poison and hydrophobia are elements to be considered. 3 ' § 224. Mental suffering of injured person — Disfigure- ment. — Mental suffering arising from disfigurement, deform- ity, or a knowledge by the injured person that his earning capacity is impaired for life, is a proper element of damage.* 33 Per Palles, C. B. 34 13 App. Cas. 222. 35 Sloan v. Southern Cal. R. Co., Ill Cal. 668; 44 Pac. 320; 111 Cal. 668. 86 See sec. 221 herein pn fright in connection with physical injury — expulsion of passenger. 274 37 Warner v. Chamberlain, 7 Houst. (Del.) 18; Godeau v. Blood, 5:3 Vt. 251; 36 Am. Rep. 751; Robinson v. Marino, 3 Wash. 434; 28 Pac. 752. But see Trinity & S. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 690; 46 S. W. 389. 88 Mayor of Birmingham v. Lewis, PAIN AND SUFFERING — MENTAL SUFFERING. §§ 225, 226 So it was held not to he error to instruct the jury in an action where it appeared that the hoy's legs had been amputated, that damages might be awarded for mortification and anguish of mind which he has suffered and will suffer in the future by reason of the mutilation of his body, and the fact that he has become an object of curiosity or ridicule among his fellows. 8 § 225. Mental suffering— Action by husband for injury to wife — Parent and child.— In actions to recover for phys- ical injuries attributable to negligence, recovery for mental suf- fering is confined to the person receiving the physical injury.* So the mental suffering of the wife is not an element to be con- sidered in an action by the husband for injuries to her. 41 And in an action by a wife, the mental suffering of the husband, as a consequence of injuries to her, is not an element to be consid- ered in the estimation of the damages which she may recover. 12 So, also, in an action by a parent to recover for injuries to a child, the mental suffering of the parent is not to be considered. Vl § 226. Mental suffering — Pleading — Evidence — In an ac- tion for personal injuries, damages for mental suffering arising from the injury itself may be recovered although not specially 92 Ala. 352; Atlanta, etc., K. Co. v. Wood, 48 Ga. 565; Newbury v. Getchel, etc., Mfg. Co., 100 Iowa. 441: Brush Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Si- monsohn, 107 Ca. 70: 32 S. E. 902; Sherwood v. Chic. & W. M. R. Co., 82 Mich. 374; Schraitz v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 119 Mo. 256; 24 S. W. 472: 23 L. K. A. 250: Rockwell v. Eldred, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 95: Nich- ols v. Brabazon, 94 Wis. 549; B9 X. W. 342; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. C<>. v. Miller (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 61 S. W. 978; Heddles v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 77 Wis. 228; City of Decatur v. Hamilton, 89 111. App. 561. But see Chicago City R. Co. v. Anderson, 80 111. App. 71: 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 41; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. .lames, 09 111. App. 609; Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Spurney. 69111. App. 549; Chi- cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Hines, 45 111. App. 20'.): Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Caulfield,63Fed.396; 11 C. C. A. 552. » Heddles v. Chicago City R. Co., 77 Wis. 228; 40 N. W. 115. See also Central R. <& Bkg. Co. v. Lanier. 83 i. a. 587; 10 S. K. 27:'. M Hyatt v. Adams. 16 Mich. ISO. 41 Hyatt v. Adams. 16 Mich. 180. Bul Bee Campbell v. Harris, 4 Tex. civ. App. 636; 2:*. S. W. 85. 4 - Longv, Morrison, 14 Ind. 505. *8 Black v. Carrollton R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 33; Cowden v. Wright, 24 Wend, i N. V. i 429; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Kelly. 31 Penn. St. 372; Galveston v. Harbour. 02 Tex. 172: Flemingtou v. Smitheis, 2 C. & P. 292: contra, I Trimble v. Spiller, 7 Mon. (Ky.)394. •27.-. § 226 PAIN AND SUFFERING — MENTAL SUFFERING. alleged. 14 But in order to admit proof of such suffering there must, in the absence of any allegation thereof, be facts from which it may be directly inferred. 45 And again, no direct evi- dence of mental suffering is necessary in order to warrant a recovery where the physical injury appears to be serious and its effect permanent. 46 But it is declared that in the absence of any evidence showing that the plaintiff suffered in the slightest degree from apprehension, it is error in an action for personal injuries to submit apprehension as an element of damages recov- erable. 47 44 Chicago City R. Co. v. Taylor, 170 111. 49; 48 N. E. 831; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 513, aff'g 68 111. App. 613; Western Brewery Co. v. Meredith. 166 111. 306; 46 N. E. 720, afFg66 111. App. 454; Ft. Scott, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Lightburn (Kau. App. 1899), 58 Pac. 1033; McCoy v. Milwaukee Street R. Co. (Wis.), 59 N. W. 453. 276 « North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Leh- man, 82 111. App. 238. 46 San Antonio v. Krensel, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 594; 43 S. W. 615. But see Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 7 Kan. App. 594; 52 Pac. 460. 47 Gilbertson v. Forty-Second St., M. & St. N. Ave. R. Co., 14 App. Div. (N. Y.)294; 43 N. Y. Supp. 782. LOSS oE TIME, EARNINGS, ETC. §2S CHAPTER IX. LOSS OF TIME, EARNINGS AND IMPAIRED EARNING CAPACITY. § 227. Loss of time — Earnings — Di- minished capacity to labor. 228. Loss of time— Earnings — Evi- dence of must be given. 229. Evidence— Loss of time — Earnings and diminished ability. 230. Same subject continued. 231. Loss of time — Earnings — Not recoverable where wageB are paid — Evidence. 232. Prospect of increased earn- ings. 233. Loss of time — Business. 234. Loss of time — Partners — Evi- dence. 235. Loss of profits. 23(3. Loss of time — Earnings— Pro- fessional men. 237. Loss of time— Earnings— Can- vasser or travelling sales- man on percentage basis. 238. Loss of time — Earnings— Ped- dler. 239. Total or partial incapacity — English workmen's act — Construction of. 240. Loss of time, earnings, etc., — Pleading of as special damages. 241. Loss of time, earnings, etc. — Recovery for and evidence admissible under general allegations. 242. Loss of time, earnings, etc. — Recovery for and evidence admissible under general allegations — Continued. § 227. Loss of time— Earnings Diminished capacity to labor. — As a result of physical injuries a person is in most cases incapacitated either partially or entirely from pursuing his pro- fession, business, or occupation. Where such a result follows the law requires that the person responsible for the injury shall make compensation to the person injured for the loss of time which he lias sustained, or in other words give damages to him for the loss which he has suffered in his income, wages, or earnings or diminished capacity to labor as a result of such in- jury, the pecuniary loss, which is the measure of damages, vary- ing in each case according to his business or occupation and the degree and duration of his disability. 1 And the mere possi- i Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S. ) lumbia v. Woodbury, lot. U. S. 450; 34; Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Put- Rouse v. Eornsby i C. C. App. 8th nam, 118 U. S. 54.J; District of Co- C. ), 07 Fed. 219; Carpenter v. Biexi- >97 §227 LOSS OF TIME, EARNINGS AND bility that physical injuries which result in one being disabled from engaging in manual labor may result in his being compelled to enter another and more lucrative field of employment will can Nat. K. R. Co., ,39 Fed. 315; Ne- braska v. Campbell, 2 Black (U. S.), 590; Beardsley v. Swann, 4 McLean (C. C. U. S.), 333; South- & N. A. R. R. Co. v. McLendou, 63 Ala. 266; Masters v. Warren, 27 Conn. 293; Mills v. Wilmington City R. Co., 1 Marv. (Del.) 269; 46 Atl. 1114; Jones v. Bell, 8 Houst. (Del.) 562; Warner v. Chamberlain, 7 Houst. (Del.) 18; Cooper v. Mullins, 30 Ga. 146; West Cbicago St. R. Co. v. Foster, 175 111. 396; 51 N. E. 690, affg 74 111. App. 414; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Carr, 170 111. 478; 48 N. E. 992, aff'g 67 111. App. 530; Consol. Coal Co. v. Haenni, 146 111. 614; Sheridan v. Hibbard, 119 111. 307; Peoria Bridge Assoc, v. Loomis, 20 111. 235; Cbi- cago v. Elzeman, 71 111. 131; Pierce v. Millay, 44 111. 189; Ripley v. Lev- erenz, 83 111. App. 603; Galesbury v. Hall, 45 111. App. 290; Indianapolis v. Gaston, 58 Ind. 224; Linton Coal v. M. Co., 15 Ind. App. 69; 43 N. E. 651; American Strawboard Co. v. Foust (Ind. App. 1895), 39 N. E. 891; Keyes v. Cedar Falls, 107 Iowa, 509; 78 N. W. 227; Stafford v. Oskaloosa, 64 la. 251; Haden v. Sioux City & P. R. R. Co. (Iowa, 1895), 60 N. W. 537; McKinley v. Cbicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 44 la. 314; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Posten, 59 Kan. 449; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 138; 53 Pac. 465; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Weaver, 16 Kan. 456; Kentucky, C. R. Co. v. Ackley, 87 Ky. 278; Eden v. Lexington, etc., R. R. Co., 14 B. Mod. (Ky.) 204; Parker v. Jenkins, 3 Bush (Ky.), 587; Rutherford v. Shreveport & H. R. R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 793; Sanford v. Augusta, 32 Me. 536; Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill 278 (Md.), 406; Jordon v. Middlesex, 138 Mass. 425; Braithvvaite v. Hall, 168 Mass. 38; 46 N. E. 398; 1 Am. Nag. Rep. 623; Harmon v. Old Colony R. R. Co. (Mass. S. J. C. 1897), 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 717; Canning v. Williams- town, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 451; Ballon v. Farman, 11 Allen (Mass.), 73; Os- trander v. Lansing, 115 Mich. 224; 73 N. W. 110; 4 Det. L. N. 833; Moore v. Kalamazoo, 109 Mich. 176; 66 N. W. 1089; 3 Det. L. M. 52; 66 N. W. 1089; Kinney v. Folkerts, 84 Mich. 616; 48 N. W. 283; Memphis, etc., R. R. Co., 44 Miss. 466; Gerdes v. Christopher & S. A. Iron & F. Co., 124 Mo. 347; 27 S. W. 615; Stephen v. Hannibal & S. J. R. R. Co., 96 Mo. 207; Whalen v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 60 Mo. 323; Pryor v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 85 Mo. App. 367; Carpenter v. McDavitt, 66 Mo. App. 1; Chart- rand v. Southern R. R. Co., 57 Mo. App. 425; Rogan v. Montana C. R. Co., 20 Mont. 503; 52 Pac. 206; Chi- cago & C. R. R. Co. v. Starmer, 20 Neb. 630; 42 N. W. 706; Cohen v. Eureka & P. R. R. Co., 14 Neb. 376; Hopkins v. Atlantic R. Co., 36 N. H. 9; Drinkwater v. Dinsrnore, 80 N. Y. 390, rev'g 16 Hun (N. Y.), 250; Shee- han v. Edgar, 58 N. Y. 631; Fein- stein v. Jacobs, 15 Misc.- (N. Y.) 474; 72 N. Y. St. R. 698; 37 N. Y. Supp. 345; Walker v. Erie R. Co., 63 Barb. (N. Y. ) 260; Beckwith v. New York Central R. R. Co., 64 Barb. ( N. Y. ) 299; .Masterton v. Mount Vernon, 58 N. Y. 391, 396; Curtis v. Rochester, etc., R. R. Co., 20 Barb. (N. Y.) 282; Cass v. Third Ave. R. Co., 20 App. Div. (N. Y.) 91; 47 N. Y. Supp. 356; Phyfe v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 30 Hun (N. Y.), 377; Klein v. Second Ave. I.MI'AIKKI) EARNING CAPACITY. S 228 not deprive him of the right to recover damages based on his diminished earning power in the vocation which he has fol- lowed. 2 Damages for lost time are not to be assessed at the arbitrary discretion of a jury, but must be determined on a pecuniary basis, since the loss is purely a pecuniary loss or in- jury for which only a fair and just compensation should be given. :; § 228. Loss of time — Earnings — Evidence of must be given. — If in an action to recover damages for physical injuries a claim is made for loss of time, evidence showing the value of such time and of the damages sustained must be given, or there can be no award therefor, except nominal damages. 4 In deter- R. R. Co., 22 J. & S. (N. Y.) 164; Brignioli v. Chicago & G. E. Ry. Co., 4 Daly (N. Y.), 182; Grant v. Brook- lyn, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 381; Wallace v. Western N. C. R. Co., 104 N. C. 442; Oliver v. Northern P. R. Co., 3 Oreg. 84; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Frantz, 127 Pa. St. 297; Scott v. Montgomery, 95 Pa. St. 444; McLaugh- lin v. Corry, 77 Pa. St. 109; Penn., etc., Canal Co. v. Graham, 63 Pa. St. 290; Hanover R. R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. St. 396; Howard Oil Co. v. Davis, 76 Tex. 630; San Antonio & P. II. R. Co. v. Keller, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 569; 32 S. W. 847; Washington & <;. K. Co. v. Patterson, 25 Wash. L. R. 36; 9 App. D. C. 42:1 ; Carpenter v. Mex- ico Nat. R. R. Co., 17 Wash. L. R. 630; Woodward v. Hoscobel, 84 Wis. 226; 54 N. W. 332; Kinney v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 74; Phillips v. Southwestern Ry. Co., 4 Q. B. D. 406; Leclerc v. Montreal, Rap. Jud. Que- bec, 15 C. S. 205. - Ostrander v. Lansing, 115 Mich. 224; 73 N. W. 110; 4 Det. L. N. 833. 3 Leeds v. Metropolitan Gas L. Co., 90 N. Y. 26. * Alabama Mineral R. R. Co. v. Marcus (Ala. S. C. 1897), 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 490; Seaboard Mfg. Co. v. Woodson, 98 Ala. 378; 11 So. 733; Greensboro v. McGibbony, 93 Ga. 672; 20 S. E. 37; Britton v. Grand Rapids R. Co., 90 Mich. 159; Howell v. Independence, 67 Mo. App. 317 O'Brien v. Loomis, 43 Mo. App. 29 Baker v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 118 N Y. 533; 29 N. Y. St. R. 936; 23 N. E 885, arf'g 7 N. Y. St. R. 68: 54 Supr 394; Staal v. Grand St. & X. R. R Co., 107 N. Y. 625; 1 Silv. C. A. 516 11 N. Y. St. R. 352; 26 Wkly. Dig. 241 ; Leeds v. Metropolitan Gas L. Co., 90 N. Y. 26; Nienclorfl v. Manhattan R. Co., 4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 46; 38 N. Y. Supp. 690; Seitz v. Dry Dock E. B. & C. R. Co., 32 N. Y. St. R. 56; If. Daly, 204; ION. V. Supp. 1; Wood v. Watertown, 34 N. V. St. R. 808; 58 nun(N. Y.). 298; Wynne v. Atlantic Ave. R. Co., 11 Misc. (N. V.) 414; 35 X. Y. Supp. 1034; 70 X. Y. St. R. 737; McHugh v. Schlosser, 159 Pa. St. 4S0; 23 L. R. A. 574; 28 Atl. 291; 34 W. N. C. 33; 24 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 285; International & Or. X. R. Co. v. Sincock, 81 Tex. 503; Houston City St. R. Co. v. Artusey (Tex. Civ. App. 1895), 31 S. W. 819; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Daniels ilex. Civ. App. I, 29 S. W. 426. Dm see Fisher v. Jansen, 128 111. 649; 21 V E. 598. 279 § 229 LOSS OF TIME, EARNINGS AND mining what is sufficient proof of the value of plaintiff's time to permit the consideration of this element by the jury, it is de- cided that evidence of what the plaintiff usually did and of the value per day of such services is sufficient. 5 So in another case it was held sufficient where the plaintiff testified that as a result of the injury she was unable to do the work which she had formerly done or any other work and there was sufficient evidence upon which an estimate could be made by the jury as to the length of her disability though there was no proof as to the exact time thereof. 6 And again where loss of time was shown, but there was no evidence of what the plaintiff actually lost in money, it was held that nominal damages might be given. 7 But proof merely of the fact that the plaintiff had been engaged in business prior to the injury but had not been able to attend to the same since is not sufficient to permit the consideration of loss of time by the jury, there being no evidence as to the value of his time, the business in which he was engaged or any other facts from which the jury might be able to estimate the value of the time lost. 8 Although in the case of an action to recover for personal injuries to a minor it is held that though there may be no evidence specially bearing upon the question of the plaintiff's earning capacity after reaching the age of twenty-one it will not prevent the allowance of loss of future earnings as an element of the damages which he may recover. 9 § 229. Evidence — Loss of time— Earnings and diminished ability. — For the purpose of showing the pecuniary injury sus- tained by reason of loss of time and diminished ability to labor, evidence is admissible of the earnings of the person injured be- fore and at the time of the injury and subsequent thereto. 10 6 Wynne v. Atlantic Ave. R. Co., 14 Misc. (N. Y.) 414; 35 N. Y. Supp. 1034; 70 N. Y. St. R. 737. 6 Howell v. Independence, G7 Mo. App. 317. 7 Niendorff v. Manhattan R. Co., 4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 46; 38 N. Y. Supp. 690. 8 Leeds v. Me. Gas L. Co., 90 N. Y. 26. 9 Bartley v. Trorlicht, 49 Mo. App. 214. 280 10 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Woods, 115 Ala. 527; 22 So. 33; Alabama M. R. Co. v. Marcus, 115 Ala. 389; 22 So. 135; Alabama M. R. Co. v. Griffith, 63 Ark. 491; 39 S. W. 550; Roche v. Redington, 125 Cal. 174; 57 Pac. 890; Atlantic Consol. St. R. Co. v. Bates, 103 Ga. 333; 30 S. E. 41; Broyles v. Prisock, 97 Ga. 643; 25 S. E. 389; City of Kankakee v. Steinbach, 89 111. App. 513; City of IMPA1KKD EARNING CAPACITY. §229 So in showing an impairment of earning capacity in a certain employment, evidence is admissible of the wages usually paid therein for expert help and that plaintiff had been accustomed to do expert work, but can no longer." And though plaintiff may at time of injury have been engaged in other than his regular employment, yet evidence is admissible of his average earnings in his regular employment. 1 - So, also, though the plaintiff may not have been engaged in any employment for several years prior to the injury, yet for the purpose of showing what business he understood and could enter upon, and what wages would be open to him but for his injuries, evidence is admissible as to the occupation he was formerly engaged in. u And it has been held proper for plaintiff to testify as to the rea- Elgin v. Anderson, 89 111. App. 527; Chatsworth v. Rowe, 166 111. 114; 46 N. E. 763, aff'g 66 111. App. 55; Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Meeeh, 16:) 111. 305; 45 N. E. 290; Bailey v. Centreville, 108 Iowa, 20; 78 N. W. 831; Grimmelnian v. Union Pac. R. Co. (Iowa.S. C. 1897), 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 237; Braithwaite v. Hale, 168 Mass. 38; 46 N. E. 398; Murdock v. N. Y. & B. Desp. Co. (Mass. S. J. C. KS97), 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 263; McKor- mick v. West Bay City, 110 Mich. 265; 68 N. W. 148; 3 Det. L. N. 342; Palmer v. Winona Ry. & L. Co. (Minn. 1899), 80 N. W. 869; Lincoln v. Beekmau, 23 Neb. 677; 37 N. W. 693; Ehrgott v. New York, 96 N. Y. 264; Beisiegel v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 40 N. Y. 9; Mclntyre v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 280; Grant v. Brooklyn, 41 Barb. (N. Y.) 381; Walker v. Erie Ry. Co., 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 260; Brignioli v. Chicago & Great E. Ry. Co., 4 Daly (N. Y. ), 182; Palmer v. Conant, 58 Hun (N. Y. ), 33; 34 N. Y. St. R. 816; 128 N. V. 577; Stone v. Poland, 81 Hun (N. Y.), 132; 62 N. Y. St. R. 731; 30 N. V. Supp. 748; Simonin v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 36 Hun (N. Y.), 214; Carples v. New York & H. R. Co., 16 App. Div. (X. Y.) 158; 44 N. Y. Supp. 670; Quinn v. O'Keefe, 9 App. Div. (N. Y.j 68; 41 X. Y. Supp. 116; Miller v. Manhattan R. Co., 73 Hun (X. Y.), 512; 56 X. Y. .St. R. 189; 26 X. Y. Supp. 162; Symous v. Met. St. R. Co., 58 X. Y. Supp. 327; 27 Misc. 502; Campbell v. Syracuse, 20 Wkly. Dig. (X. Y.) 449; Wallace v. Western X. C. R. R. Co., 104 X. C. 442; 10 S. E. 552; Alliance v. Campbell (C. C), 3 Ohio Dec. 630; Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S.) 343; Parshall v. Minneapolis, etc., R. R. Co., 35 Fed. 649; Phillips v. Southw. R. R. Co., 5 C. P. Div. 280; 5 Q. B. Div. 78; 4 Q. B. Div. 406. 11 Fiukin v. Elm City Brass Co., 73 Conn. 423; 47 Atl. 670. BGalesburg v. Hall, 45 HI. App. 290. See also Rayburn v. Central Iowa By. Co., 74 Iowa, 637. 15 Peterson v. Seattle Traction To. (Wash. 1901), 65 Pac. 54:'>. aff'g 6:: Pac. 539. Where, however, plaintiff had been engaged in do employment for a period of live years prior to the injury, evidence as to the wages he had formerly received therein was held inadmissible. West Clue. St. R. Co. v. Maday, 1S8 111. 308; 58 N. E. 933, aff'g S8 III. App. 49. 281 § 230 LOSS OF TIME, EARNINGS AND sonable worth of his time after the date of the injury, if he had been in his usual health. 14 But where a person is working for a certain sum per day, week or month, the wages actually lost is the measure of damages and not the market value of the average wages of a man of the plaintiff's average capacity work- ing in the same employment. 15 And evidence as to the circum- stances of the continuance of the plaintiff in the employ of a company after he was injured, for the purpose of showing the character of the work performed by him, both before and after the injury, is competent upon the question of how much the in- juries have impaired his earning capacity. 16 But evidence of the plaintiff's aggregate earnings which are the result of the use of capital, and do not depend upon his skill or services, is in- admissible. 17 Nor is it proper for a plaintiff to testify as to what his time is worth to him. The evidence should be as to the reasonable value of his time. 18 And again, under general allegations of loss arising from inability to work, evidence is not admissible of the inability to fulfill a special engagement, but the evidence should be confined to the ordinary earnings or wages of plaintiff. 19 § 230. Same subject continued.— Where in an action for personal injuries the plaintiff seeks a recovery for loss of time or diminished capacity for earnings, evidence is admissible as to the occupation of the injured person prior to the injury and that he received a stated monthly salary, and that as a result of the injury he has been deprived of his position and salary for a certain length of time. 3 And he may show that in addition to his salary from his regular employment his earnings were increased by other means. 21 So evidence is admissible of the fact that plaintiff was accustomed to go out nursing, and that since the 14 Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Bell (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 58 S. W. 614. 15 Braithwaite v. Hall (Mass. S. J. C. 1897), 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 623. ^ Texas & P. R. Co. v. Volk, 151 U. S. 73; 38 L. Ed. 78; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. Holland, 19 Wkly. Dig. (N. Y.) 312. 18 Atchison v. Atchison, 9 Kan. App. — ; 57 Pac. 248. 19 North Chicago L. & R. Co. v. Barber, 77 111. App. 277. 239. 20Broyles v. Prisock, 97 Ga. 643; "Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 25 S. E. 389. 52 Hun (N. Y.), Ill; 23 N. Y. St. R. 21 Wilkie v. Raleigh & C. F. R. Co., 388; 4 N. Y. Supp. 848; Hartel v. I 127 N. C. 203; 37 S. E. 204. 282 IMPAIRED EARNING CAPACITY. § 231 injury she had had several calls to go out for this purpc And evidence that a person was, prior to the injury, engaged for a period of two years in studying a profession, and that since the injury he had been unable to labor, was held admissible, such evidence in connection with his appearance and the testi- mony of physicians that he was permanently disabled by dis- ease, being held sufficient to justify a finding of impairment of earning capacity. 23 As evidence of the occupation of an in- jured person is admissible, so on the other hand it is proper to admit evidence that the plaintiff has learned no business or trade, lias no education and can do no office work.' 1 But evi- dence of the wages paid in larger towns to journeymen dur- ing the period of an injured journeyman's disability, where, prior to the injury, he was working for less wages than those sought to be proved, has been held to be inadmissible.'' And in an action by a draughtsman for injuries to his hands, fancy drawings and sketches made by him, but which have no con- nection with his business, are inadmissible on the question of special damages claimed by him for inability to continue his business. 35 § 231. Loss of time— Earnings— Not recoverable where wages are paid —Evidence. — In an action to recover damages for a physical injury, loss of time or earnings is not an element to be considered in the estimation of such damages, if it appear that the injured person has been paid his regular salary and been in receipt of the same earnings during the period of his disability that he was before the injury.-' 7 Therefore, if in such an action, evidence of loss of wages lias been given, evidence is competent to show that the employer paid the plaintiff's wages while he was disabled.' 3 " But where evidence is introduced a Heddle v. City Elec. R. Co., 112 Midi. 547; 70 X. W. 1006; 4 Det. L. X. 104. •■" McGanahan v. New York, XII & II. R. Co., 171 Miss. I'll : .",0 X. E. CIO. « McCoy v. Milwaukee St. R. Co. (Wis. i, 59 X. W. 45:]. as Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Ry- burn (Neb.), 58 X. W. 541. •» Freeland v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 54 A.pp. Div. (X. V.) 90; 66 N. V. Supp. 321. 27 Ephland v. Missouri P. K. Co., 57 Mo. App. 147; Montfiim >rj . etc., K. Co. v. Mallear, 92 Ala. 209; Chelinsky v. Iloopes & T. Co., I Marv. (Del.) -27:5; 40 Atl. 127. 28 Drinkwatcr v. Dinsmore, B0 X. Y. 390; 30 Am. Hop. 624, rev'g 16 Hun 250. 283 §§ 232, 233 LOSS OE TIME, EARNINGS and showing that the plaintiff had received other employment sub- sequent to his injury in the same line in which he was em- ployed at the time he received the injury, it is held that he may give in evidence the fact that he required and received help from others in his work. 29 § 232. Prospect of increased earnings. — As a general rule in order to authorize a recovery for any loss in the future as a result of personal injuries, such loss must be reasonably certain and not a merely possible loss or damage which may ensue. So in such an action evidence is not admissible, as bearing on the question of damages, of an injured person's possible chances of promotion or of his obtaining higher wages. 30 The prospect of increased wages or earnings of an injured person may, however, in some cases be so reasonably certain as to permit of a recovery therefor. So where an injured person was, as a result of an in- jury, obliged to give up her position, it was held that evidence was admissible that she had been promised an increase of salary within a short time by her employer. 31 And in another case it was held proper to instruct the jury as to a prospect of increased earnings as well as to a diminution of capacity to earn money with advanced age, though there was no allegation in reference thereto, where evidence had been given without objection as to such earning capacity. 32 § 233. Loss of time— Business. — In an action to recover for an injury sustained by a person engaged in business, loss of time is an element to be considered in estimating the damages recov- erable therefor, and in order to assist the jury in arriving at a fair estimate of the compensation allowable for this element, it is proper to consider the business the plaintiff is engaged in, the nature and extent of such business, the importance of his per- sonal oversight and superintendence in conducting it, and the 29 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Zapp (Tex. Civ. App.), 49 S. W. 673. 80 Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Elliott, 149 U. S. 266; 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 837; 3 L. Ed. 728. R. Cas. N. S. 1 284 3i Bryant v. Omaha & C. B. R. & B. Co., 98 L.wa, 483; 67 N. W. 392. 32 Atlanta Consol. St. R. Co. v. Owings, 97 Ga. 663; 33 L. R. A. 798; 25 S. E. 377; 5 Am. & Eug. IMPAIRED EARNING CAPACITY. consequent loss arising from his inability to prosecute it. 83 So in a New York case** it was said by the court that " the plain- tiff had the right to prove the business in which he was engaged, its extent, and the particular part transacted by him and, if he could, the compensation usually paid to persons doing such busi- ness for others." 35 So for the purpose of showing the extent of the plaintiff's business in an action by a contractor for personal injuries, evidence is admissible of a particular contract into which he has entered. 36 And an official stenographer may in an action to recover for personal injuries sustained by him, testify as to the employment of typewriters by him before the injury, and the amount he was paying them per month, such evidence being relevant as to the extent of the decrease of his business. 37 So again it has been held proper to permit the plaintiff to testify that he had been compelled to sell out his business by reason of his being unable to attend to same, although it was said that the fact that he had sold out the business was not material to the question of damages, but that the fact that he was unable to carry on the same was. 5. But though evidence is admissible of the nature of the plaintiff's business and the value of his services, yet the opinions of witnesses as to the amount of his loss is held not admissible. 31 ' Again, it may be impracticable in some cases to accurately measure the value of the plaintiffs services in his busi- 88 Nebraska v. Campbell, 2 Black (U. S. ), 590; Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S.) 34; West Chicago Street R. Co. v. Carr, 170 111. 478; 48 N. E. 992, affg' 67 111. App. 530; Keyes v. Cedar Falls, 107 Iowa, 509; 78 X. W. 227; Chicago, R. I. & P. It. Co. v. Posten, 59 Kan. 449; 53 Pac. 465; 11 Am. & Eng. R Cas. X. S. 138; Silsby v. Mich. Car Co., 95 Mich. 204; 54 N. W. 761; Joslin v. Graud Rapids Ice Co., 53 Mich. 322; Rogan v. Montana C. R. Co., 20 Mont. 503; 52 Pac. 206; New Jersey Express Co. v. Nichols, 33 N. J. L. 434; Wal- ker v. Erie Ry. Co.. 03 Barb. ( N. Y.) 260; Beckwith v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 64 Barb. ( N. Y.) 299; Master ton v. Mount Vernon, 58 N. Y. 391; Lincoln v. Saratoga, etc., R. Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.)425; Lynch v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 5 N. Y. Snpp. 311; 1 Sil. 361; 123 N. Y. 657; Kin- ney v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 74. ;t4 Masterton v. Mt. Vernon, 58 \. Y. 391. 85 Per Grover, J. See also Silsby v. Michigan Car Co., 95 Mich. 204; 54 X. W. 761. 36 Schwartz v. North Jersey St. Ry. Co. (N. J. Sup. 1901), 49 Atl. 676. 87 Macon Consol. St. R. Co. v. Barnes, 113 Ga. 212; 38 S. E. 766. 88 Keyes v. Cedar Falls, 107 Iowa, 509; 7S N. W. 227. 89 Lincoln v. Saratoga R. R. Co., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 425. 285 § 234 LOSS OF TIME, EARNINGS AND ness by any general scale of remuneration, owing to the nature of the business. In a ease of this kind it was held not errone- ous to instruct the jury that the amount of compensation to be awarded for time lost was left to the "sound discretion of the jury under the evidence." * In another case where the plain- tiff:' was engaged in the restaurant business on her own account, it was held proper to admit evidence of what was the market value of her services to others in that business, though she had never worked for any other person. 41 § 234. Loss of time — Partners — Evidence.— Where the business in which a person injured was engaged was a partner- ship one, he may give evidence of his earnings from such busi- ness, where the partnership was one which merely employed the services of the parties. 43 And evidence of the value of the serv- ices of a partner to his firm both before and after the accident is admissible. 43 And without regard to a person's interest in a partnership he may, in case of physical injury causing a loss of time to him in such business, recover the value of his services. 44 But where a person was in partnership with another engaged in the business of a steam thresher, which he had sold out but in which he proposed to engage in again, an estimate by such person of the annual value of his labor was held incompetent to show the extent of his damages, especially where it was not shown in what proportions the earnings of the former business were divided between the partners. 45 Again, where one of the members of a partnership is injured, an agreement entered into between the partners, subsequent to the accident, as to the amount which shall be deducted from the injured partner's share in the business, is held to be inadmissible in an action by him to recover damages for such injury. 46 40 Rogan v. Montana C. R. Co., 20 Mont. 503; 52 Pac. 206. 41 Harmon v. Old Colony R. R. Co. (Mass. S. J. C. 1897), 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 717. 42 Thomas v. Union R.Co., 18 App. Div. (N. Y.) 185; 45 N. Y. Supp. 920. 286 43 Mt. Adams & E. P. I. P. R. Co. v. Isaacs, 18 Ohio C. C. 177. 44 Kendall v. Albia, 73 Iowa, 241. « Boston & A. R. Co. v. O'Reilly, 158 U. S. 334; 39 L. Ed. 1006; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 830. 46 Mt. Adams & E. P. I. P. R. Co. v. Isaacs, 18 Ohio C. C. 177. IMPAIRED EARN1M. CAPACITY § 235. Loss of profits.— In many cases where the plaintiff lias been engaged in business there lias been an endeavor to recover for a loss of profits which he claims to have sustained. There may be instances where the profits may be reasonablj estimated by calculation, and where they are so definite and certain that this is possible, then damages for loss thereof may be allowed, but as a general rule they are too uncertain in amount and subject to too many contingencies to constitute a sab- guide in determin- ing the amount of compensation. 17 So the loss of profits in con- ducting a business in which the labor of others is employed is not an element of damages in an action for personal injuries ; ls but the value of the plaintiff's services in conducting such a business is the measure of damages. 49 And where evidence was offered by plaintiff to show the profits of bis business and was admitted under objections, it was held not to be such as to enable the jury to intelligently perform its duty of finding the earnings of the plaintiff after allowing for interest on capital invested and for the energy and skill of his partners. 50 But it has been held proper to instruct the jury that "if a man has an ordinary business, yielding ordinary receipts, he will be entitled to recover the diminution of those receipts resulting from such injury." M § 236. Loss of time— Earnings — Professional men — In actions by professional men to recover for physical injuries sus- tained by them, evidence is admissible of past earnings in order to enable the jury to properly estimate the value of their serv- Rubber Co., 54 Wis. 208; 41 Am. Rep. 19; Kinney v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 74. « Silsby v. Michigan Car Co., 95 Mich. 204; 54 X. W. 761; Blate v. Third Ave. R Co., 29 App. Div. X. Y. 388; 51 X. Y. Supp. 590; Marks v. Long Island K. R, Co., 3 X. Y. St. R 562. 49 Silsby v. Michigan Car Co., 95 Mich. 204; 54 X. \V. 761; Marks v. Long Island R. R. Co., 3 N. V. Si R 562. w Boston & A. K.i:. Co. \. O'Reilly, 158 U. S. 334. 61 Kinnev v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 74. 287 « Boston* A. R. R. Co. v. O'Reilly, 158 U. S. 334; Lombardi v. Califor- nia Street Cable R. Co., 124 Cal. 311; 57 Pac. 66; Silsby v. Michigan Car Co., 95 Mich. 204; 54 N. W. 761; Masterton v. Mt Vernon, 58 X. Y. 391; Blate v. Third Ave. R. Co., 29 App. Div. (X. Y.)388; 51 N. Y. Supp. 590; Johnson v. Manhattan R. Co., 52 Hun (X. Y.), Ill; 4 N. Y. Supp. 848; Mark v. Long Island R. R. Co., 3 N. Y. St. R. 562 : Goodhart v. Penn. R. Co., 177 Pa. St. 1; 35 Atl. L91; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 364; 38 W. X. C. 545; Bierbach v. Goodyear § 236 LOSS OF TIME, EARNINGS AND ices, and therefore the damages recoverable for loss of earnings and diminished capacity for labor. Although the earnings of professional men may in a certain sense be uncertain and for this reason have been said to be similar to profits of a business, yet they differ from the latter in that they are entirely the re- sult of personal labor and skill aside and independent of the use of capital and the labor of others, while the latter are not as a general rule. The earnings of a professional man depend upon his personal ability, skill and learning personally and in- dividually applied to the pursuit of his profession, and receipts in past years therefrom are reasonably certain of continuance subsequent to the injury to the same or to an increased extent, so that the loss of earnings sustained by a professional man as the result of an injury, may be calculated to a reasonably certain degree by proof of his earnings prior to the injury. 52 So a phy- M Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black (U. S.), 590; Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S.) 34; Parshall v. M. & St. L. K. Co., 35 Fed. 649; Cleve- land, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Gray, 148 Ind. 266; 46 N. E. 665; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 48; Indianapo- lis v. Gaston, 58 Ind. 224; City of Warsaw v. Fisber (Ind. App. 1899), 55 N. E. 42 ; Stafford v. Oskaloosa, 64 Iowa, 251; Holmes v. Halde, 74 Me. 28; Collins v. Dodge, 37 Minn. 503; Mason v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 75 Mo. App. 1; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 295; New Jersey Exp. Co. v. Nicbols, 32 N. J. L. 166; Quinn v. O'Keefe, 9 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 68; 41 N. Y. Supp. 116; Nasi) v. Sharp, 19 Hun (N. Y. ), 365; Baker v. Manhat- tan Ry. Co., 54 N. Y. Super. 394; Maclennan v. Long Island R. Co., 20 J. & S. (N. Y.) 22: Phillips v. L. & S. W. Ry. Co., 5 Q. B. Div. 78; 41 L. T. S. 121, aff g 4 Q. B. Div. 406. The admissibility of snch evidence, however, was commented upon in the case of Masterton v. Mount Ver- non, 58 N. Y. 391, in the following terms : " In Walker v. Erie Railway 288 Company, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 260, it was held that proof of the amount of in- come derived by the plaintiff for the year preceding the injury from the practice of his profession as a law- yer was competent. This goes be- yond the rule adopted in any of the other cases, and it certainly ought not to be further extended. Whether proof of the income derived by a lawyer from the practice of his pro- fession is competent for the purpose of authorizing the jury to draw an inference as to the extent of the loss sustained by inability to personally attend to business may, I think, well be doubted. There is no such uni- formity in the amount of different years, as a general rule, to make such inference reliable. " This case, how- ever, was one of the considerations of profits from business as an ele- ment of damages, and did not involve the question of evidence as to past earnings or income of professional men. The principle we have stated in the text is sustained by the weight of authority. IMPAIRED EARNING CAPACITY. sician may introduce evidence of the extent of his practice and of his earnings prior to the injury and subsequent thereto, 58 and of the loss of certain patients as a result of the injury, 5 * and that his profession was his only means of support. 88 And in ;i similar ac- tion hy a lawyer proof of the income derived from his practice for the year preceding his injury is admissible. 38 So also in the case of an architect, evidence of his average yearly earnings is proper. Where, however, a physician seeks to recover for loss of practice sustained as a result of an injury, the defendant may introduce evidence as to his professional reputation and as to the unlaw- fulness of his practice.™ But though a practicing physician may have no such medical degree as would entitle him to main- tain an action for his services as a physician, yet he may recover for loss of husiness resulting from personal injuries due to the negligence of another."" 9 § 237. Loss of* time— Earnings— Canvasser or travelling salesman on percentage basis.— A canvasser or travelling sales- man whose income is not a definite fixed sum but is determined on a percentage basis, the gross amount thereof depending upon the individual's personal ability and skill, may, as in the cases of professional men where a physical injury has been sustained, show the amount of his earnings in previous years. The income of this class of men, like that of a professional man. may van in the years prior to the injury, and be uncertain for any period subsequent thereto, yet the proof of past earnings will furnish the best possible basis to estimate the pecuniary loss. This evi- 63 Nebraska City v. Campbell, 2 Black (U. S.), 590; Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S.) 34; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Gray, 148 Ind. 2(50; 46 N. E. 675; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 48; Mason v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 75 Mo. App. 1: 1 Mo. App. Rep. 295; Quinn v. O'Keefe, 9 App. Div. (N. Y.) 68; 41 N. Y. Supp. 110; Maclennan v. Long Is- land R. K. Co., 20 J. & S. ( N. Y.) 22; Phillips v. L. & S. W. R. Co., 4 Q. B. Div. 406; 5 Q. B. Div. 78. M Maclennan v. Long Island R. R. | 19 289 Co., 20 J. & S. (N. Y.l 22; Phillips v. L. & S. W. R. Co., 4Q. B. Div. 406. 66 Stafford v. Oskaloosa, C>4 Iowa. 251. H Walker v. Erie R. R. Co., 63 Barb. (N. V.) 200. ,T New Jersey Ex. ('<■. v. Nichols, 32 N. J. L. 166. 68 Jacques v. Bridgeport Horse R. R. Co., 41 Conn. 61: 19 Am. Rep. 483. 59 Holmes v. Ilalde, 74 Me. 28; 43 Am. Rep. 567. §§ 238, 239 loss of time, earnings and dence of past earnings shows what the services of the plaintiff were worth to himself, and what he was capable of earning, and show with sufficient certainty what his earnings would have been subsequent to the injury. 60 So it is proper to admit evi- dence of the annual earnings of a book canvasser, who was working on a percentage basis, for a period of six or seven years prior to the accident. 61 And where one had been engaged in selling electrical apparatus, evidence of his previous earnings, consisting of the difference between the price he was required to obtain for the manufacturer, and that at which the apparatus was sold, was held admissible. 62 § 238. Loss of time — Earnings — Peddler. — A peddler suing to recover damages for a negligent physical injury may give evi- dence of his occupation, the amount of his annual sales, and the percentage made thereon in the usual course of business, such evidence being competent for the purpose of enabling the jury to properly estimate the damages for the loss of time which he has sustained. 63 § 239. Total or partial incapacity — English workmen's act — Construction of. — The English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 w provided that in case of a workman being totally or partially incapacited by an injury, he should receive a com- pensation of a weekly payment, during the period of his inca- pacity after the second week, not exceeding fifty per cent of his average weekly earnings, during the previous twelve months, if he had been so long employed, but if not, then for such period as he had been in the employ of the same employer. In deter- mining the average weekly wages under this act, it is held that 6 » Illinois C. R. Co. v. Davidson (C. C. App. 7th C), 76 Fed. 517; 46 U. S. App. 300; 22 C. C. A. 306; 1 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 583; Rio Grande & Western R. Co., 5 Col. App. 121; 38 Pac. 76; Paul v. Omaha & St. L. Ry. Co., 82 Mo. App. 500; Ehrgott v. New York, 96 N. Y. 264, rev'g 66 How. Pr. 161. si Ehrgott v. New York, 96 N. Y. 264, rev'g 66 How. Pr. 161. 290 62 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Davidson (C. C. App. 7th C), 76 Fed. 517; 46 U. S. App. 300; 22 C. C. A. 306; 1 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 583. 63 Hanover R. R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. St. 396. See also Fenistein v. Jacobs, 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 474; 72 N. Y. St. R. 698; 37 N. Y. Supp. 345. <*Sched. 1, cl. 1 (b). IMPAIRED EARNING CAPACITY. § 240 if the employment is under the same employer, the entire twelve months are to be considered, and this is not altered by the fact of a change in the character of the employment or of the amount of wages."'' In order, however, to consider the entire twelve months, the period of employment must have been a continuous one. Thus where, during the previous twelve months there had been a strike, during which the employee had not worked, it was held that in determining his average weekly wages only the period of time he had worked subsequent to the termination of the strike under anew agreement was to be considered, and not the period preceding the strike. 66 The injury, however, must, it would seem, be of such a character as to cause a decrease in the em- ployee's earning capacity or earnings, in order that he may lie entitled to the benefits of the act. So where an employee lost a part of his thumb in the course of his employment, it was held that he was not entitled to compensation or payment under the act, as for a partial incapacity for that period of time, subse- quent to the accident, during which he was employed, though in a different line of work, at the same wages which he received prior to the accident.' 17 § 240. Loss of time, earnings, etc.— Pleading of, as special damages. — As a general rule, if, in an action for personal in- juries, the plaintiff seeks to recover for any special loss which he has sustained as a consequence of such injury, the pleadings must contain an allegation of such special damage. So there are numerous cases which hold that in such an action there can be no evidence admitted as to, and no recovery for, loss of time, earnings, diminished earning capacity, or any permanent injury, unless the loss thereof is averred as special damages in the com- plaint. 68 So it has been held that there must be allegations of <*Price v. Marsden (C. A.) [1899], Taylor v. Monro.', 43 Conn. 36; 1 Q. B. 493; 08 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 307. Tomlinson v. Derby, 4:5 Conn. 562; 66 Jones v. Ocean Coal Co. (C. A. i Denton v. Ordway, 108 Iowa. 487; 79 [1899], 2Q. B. 124; 08 L. J. Q. B. N. \. \V. 271: Shultz v. Griffith, 10:? S. 731. I<»wa. 150; 72 N. W. 445; 40 L. R. A. 67 Irons v. Davis (C. A.) [1899], 2 117; Homan v. Franklin Co. (Iowa), Q. B. 330; 08 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 673. 57 N. W. 70:5 : Baldwin v. Western 68 Fitchburg R. Co. v. Donnelly Railroad, 4 Gray (Mass.), 333; Ed- (C. C. App. 7th C), 87 Fed. 135 wards v. St. Louis K. & S. R. Co., IV 59 U. S. App. 708; 30 C. C. A. 580; Mo. App. 257; 2 Mo. A.pp. Rep. 412; 291 § 241 LOSS OF TIME. EARNINGS AND special damage to permit evidence of former earnings ; ro of damages to the business of a farmer; 70 of occupation and means of earning support; 71 of loss of time and wages; 7 * of disability to carry on business ; " ,:! of future pain and anguish, 74 and of the permanency of personal injuries." § 241. Loss of time— Earnings— Recovery for and evidence admissible under general allegations.— Although as we have stated in the preceding section there are numerous cases hold- ing that to permit a recovery for loss of time, earnings, or dimin- ished earning capacity there must be special averments of such damage, yet there is also a large number of cases in which such damage has not specially been alleged, but the court has per- mitted evidence of and recovery for such loss under general allegations. So a plaintiff may recover in an action for personal injuries for inability to work at his ordinary and usual employ- ment though the declaration contains only a general averment of such inability caused by the injury, and consequent loss and damage, 76 And evidence is admissible as to the amount Safferv. Dry Dock E. B. & B. R. Co., 5 N. Y. Supp. 700; 24 N. Y. St. R. 210; 2 Silv. S. C. 43; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Buckalew (Tex. Civ. App. ), 34 S. W. 165. But see Ava v. Grena- walt, 73 111. App. 633; Heltonville Mfg. Co. v. Fields (Ind.), 36 N. E. 5-29; Bavtley v. Trorlicht, 49 Mo. App. 214; Schmitz v. St. Louis, I. M. 6 S. R. Co. (Mo.), 23 L. R. A. 250; 24 S. W. 472; Howard v. Stiles, 54 Neb. 26; 74 N. W. 399; Rosevelt v. Man. R. Co., 37 N. Y. St. R. 894; 59 N. Y. Supp. 197; 13 N. Y. Supp. 598, affd 133 N. Y. 537; 44 N. Y. St. R. 929; 30 N. E. 1148; Tyler v. Third Ave. R. Co., 18 Mise. (N. Y.) 165; 75 N. Y. St. R. 913; 41 N. Y. Supp. 26. Also see cases in next section where such evidence is held admissible and recovery allowed under general al- legations. 69Fitchburg R. Co. v. Donnelly (C. C. App. 7th C), 87 Fed. 135; 59 V. S. App. 70S; 30 C. C. A. 580. 292 70 Homan v. Franklin Co. (Iowa), 57 N. W. 703. 71 Baldwin v. Western Railroad Co., 4 Gray (Mass.), 333. 72 Edwards v. St. Louis K. & S. R. Co., 79 Mo. App. 257; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 412. 7 3Saffer v. Dry Dock R. Co., 5 N. Y. Supp. 700; 24 N. Y. St. R. 210; 2 Silv. S. C. 43. 7 *Shultz v. Griffith, 103 Iowa, 150; 40 L. R. A. 117; 72 N. W. 445. 75 Denton v. Ordway, 108 Iowa, 487; 79 N. W. 271. In another case in this same state evidence of plaintiff's future disability was held admissible under an allegation that plaintiff "believes her injuries will incapaci- tate her from performing manual labor for the rest of her life." Mc- Farland v. Muscatine, 98 Iowa, 199; 67 N. W. 233. 76 Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Ander- son, 182 111. 298; 55 N. E. 366, aff'g 80 111. App. 71; Chicago & E. R. Co. IMPAIRED EARNING CAPACITY. §241 of wages earned by the plaintiff under an allegation that he is prevented from attending to his duties as a manufactory em- ployee." Again, where the declaration contained no statement as to any business in which plaintiff was engaged or that he was obliged to relinquish the same as the result of the injury, it was held, nevertheless, that evidence was admissible as to the business in which he was engaged and that he was incapacitated from pursuing the same, as exhibiting the extent of the injury, and that it was followed by loss of time which had to him a pecuniary value. 7. And again, an averment that plaintiff was " hindered from transacting her business affairs " was held suffi- cient to authorize the admission of evidence that she was engaged in work for which she received one dollar per day. 7 ' And under a similar averment evidence of the income of the plaintiff before and after the injury, 8 " and of her employment as a nurse and of her earnings in such capacity' 1 has been held admissible. So where the defendant fails to move for a more specific statement, a prayer for judgment because of a permanent injury to plaintiff's limb has been held sufficient to permit the plaintiff to prove damages for loss of earning capacity resulting from such in- jury/ 2 And an allegation that prior to the injury the plaintiff was healthy, active, and able-bodied, but that as a result of such v. Meecb, 163 111. 305: 45 X. E. 290. I But it is held in this last case that if the plaiu tiff seeks to recover for loss of profits or earnings, which are dependent upon the performance of some special contract or engagement, ; such special contract or engagement together with the facts on which it . is based must be set out in the dec- 1 laration. 77 Russell v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 35 Misc. Rep. (N. Y. ) 293: 71 X. Y. Supp. 765. "Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S.) 34. 79 Chatsworth v. Rowe, 1G6 111. 114; 40 N. E. 763, aff g 66 111. App. 55. See also North Chicago Street R. Co. v. Brown, 178 111. 187; 52 N. E. 804, affg 76 111. App. 654, where recovery was allowed for lessened capacity to attend to business, the allegation being that she was prevented "from attending to the transaction of her affairs." See also Luck v. Ripon, 53 Wis. 196. But in a ease in Connec- ticut it was held that evidence of plaintiff's occupation and earnings was inadmissible under an allegation that he was "prevented from at- tending to his ordinary business." Tomlinson v. Derby, 43 Conn. 562. "Chicago A E. R. Co. v. Meech, 163 111. 305; 45 X. E. 290. 81 Chicago City R. Co. v. Anderson, 80 111. App. 71; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 41, aff'd 1S2 111. 298; 55 X. E. 366. w Bailey v. Centerville, 108 Iowa, 20; 78 N. W. 831. 29S §242 LOSS OF TIME, EARNINGS AND injury she has been totally incapacitated from any work or exer- cise, has become permanently disabled and will not be able to do any work or exercise, has been held sufficient to permit evidence of inability to perforin work subsequent to the injury and of what she could, have earned by ordinary labor. 83 And plaintiff may, it is held, show loss of earnings where the complaint al- leges that he is unfitted from carrying on his vocation and has lost and will lose the earnings of his labor.* 1 § 242. Loss of time Earnings, etc.— Recovery for and evi- dence admissible under general allegations— Continued. — Un- der an allegation that as a result of injuries sustained " plaintiff has suffered great bodily and mental anguish and has been unable to follow his business or perform any kind of labor," evidence is admissible of his inability to earn such wages subsequent to the injury as he had received before. 85 So, also, under the allega- tion that plaintiff has been rendered " incapable of labor," evi- dence of his customary earnings is admissible. 86 And again, evidence of loss of earnings was held to be properly admitted under an allegation that plaintiff had been compelled to remain from work for six weeks, 87 and for a period of one month. 83 And similar evidence is admissible under a general averment of dam- ages in an action for personal injuries, though the complaint contains no allegation as to loss from inability to pursue his ordinary vocation. 89 So again, recovery was permitted for loss of customers and consequent profits under a general allegation of damages by an accident in which the plaintiff received per- sonal injuries, and his milk wagon and horse were injured, where 83 McKormick v. West Bay City, 110 Mich. 26.:.; 68 N. W. 148; 3 Det. L. N. 342. But see Slaughter v. Met. St. R. Co., 116 Mo. 269; 23 S. VV. 760, where it is held that evi- dence is not admissible of loss of time and earnings under an allegation that the " injury is permanent and will render the plaintiff a cripple for life. 1 ' 84 Gerdes v. Christopher & S. A. I. & F. Co. ( Mo. ), 25 S. W. 557, aff'd 27 S. W. 616. 294 85 Gurley v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (Mo.), 26 S. W. 953. 86 Popp v. New York Central Rail- road, 26 N. Y. St. R. 639; 7 N. Y. Supp. 249. 87 Carples v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 158; 44 N. Y. Supp. 670. 88 Doherty v. Lord, 8 Misc. (N. Y.) 227. 89 Cabot v. McKane, 1 N. Y. St. R. 495. IMPAIRED BARKING CAPACITY. § 242 there was no .special averment of such damage.' So, also, though the complaint contained no allegation as to the rate of earnings of the plaintiff, it was held that evidence was admissi- ble as to the rate of his earnings under allegations stating that the plaintiff was a skill till carpenter, the nature of the injuries which were necessarily such as to impair his ability to perform the work of his calling, and permanent disability from transact- in^ his business. 91 And evidence of plaintiff's diminished earn- ing capacity has been held admissible under an allegation of in- capacity to make a livelihood. 92 So again, under the allegation that the plaintiff had lost the permanent and efficient; use of her foot and leg and was a cripple for life. 93 And damages for loss of time may be awarded under an averment that plaintiff was confined to his bed for a certain length of time and stating the amount which he was earning at sueh time. 34 And in trespass on the case to recover for injuries caused by gunshot wounds inflicted by defendant's servants, it is held that evidence of the loss of power to have offspring, resulting directly and proxi- mately from the nature of the wound, may be received and con- sidered by the jury, although the declaration does not specify such loss as one of the results of the wound. 95 *> O'Connor v. Nat. Ice Co., 21 N. Y. St. R. 907; 4 N. Y. Supp. 537, aff'd 121 N. Y. 661; 30 N. Y. St. R. 1014; 24 N. E. 1092. 9 i Christie v. Galveston City R. Co., 39 S. W. 638; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 260. »2 San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Beam (Tex. Civ. App.), 50 S. W. 411. 93 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. John- son (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. 771. 94 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Templeton (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. 135, aff'd 2(5 S. W. 1066; 59 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 191. as Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 122 l*. S. 597; 1 Russell & Wins- low's Syllabus Dig. U. S. Rep. 1118. 295 §248 PERMANENT INJURIES — PROSPECT1VK LOSS. CHAPTER X. PERMANENT INJURIES — PROSPECTIVE LOSS. § 243. Permanent injuries — Prospec- tive loss — Generally. 244. Prospective loss — Must be reasonably certain. 245. Same subject continued. 246. Prospective loss — Permanent injuries — Must be evidence as to. 247. Permanent injury or disabil- ity may be inferred. 248. Prospective loss — Permanent injury — Mode of assessing damages for. 249. Prospective loss — Permanent injury — Mode of assessing damages for — Continued. 250. Past and prospective loss — Recovery for in one action. § 243. Permanent injuries— Prospective loss— Generally. — Where a personal injury has been sustained, the loss or dam- age resulting therefrom may exist not only in the past or up to the time of the trial, but may also be a continuing loss extend- ing into the future. There may be an impairment of the mental or physical powers which is a permanent one, causing future suffering and pain as well as a prospective decrease in earnings and earning ability. For this future or prospective damage there can be no positive fixed measure of compensation, yet in all such cases it is the policy of the law that the one responsible for the injury or damage shall make compensation to the person injured for such prospective loss based upon the facts and evi- dence in each case. 1 1 Vicksburg & M. R. R. Co. v. Put- nam, 118 U. S. 545; Campbell v. Pullman Pal. C. Co., 42 Fed. 484; Robertson v. Cornelson, 34 Fed. 716; Steamer New World v. King, 16 How. (U. S.) 472; Soutb & N. A. R. R. Co. v. McLennon, 63 Ala. 266; Eddy v. Wallace (C. C. App. 8th C), 4 U. S. App. 264; 49 Fed. 801; Union P. R. Co. v. Jones ( C. C. App. 8th C. ), 4 U. S. App. 115; 49 Fed. 343; St. 296 Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Dobbins, 60 Ark. 481; 30 S. W. 887; Bay Shore R. Co. v. Harris, 67 Ala. 6; Malone v. Hawley, 46 Cal. 409; Brown v. Green, 1 Penn. (Del.) 535; 42 Atl. 991; At- lanta, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 66 Ga. 259; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Shreve, 171 111. 438; 49 N. E. 534, aff'g 70 111. App. 666; Central R. Co. v. Serf ass, 153 111. 379; 39 N. E. 119, aff'g 53 111. App. 448; Lake Shore, PERMANENT I N.I ( I: I ES PROSPECTIVE LOSS. 244 § 244. Prospective loss- Must be reasonably certain.— In order to authorize the recovery of present damages for a pro- spective loss, it must appear that the occurrence of such loss or etc., R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 III 641; 20 N.E. 510; Sheridan v. Hib- bard, 110 111. 307; Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 03 111. 107; Kerr v. Forgue, 54 111. 482; 5 Am. Rep. 140 ami note 148; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Cleminger, 77 111. App. 180, aff'd 53 N. E. 320; 178 111. 536; Wabash W. R. Co. v. Morgan (Ind.), 31 N. E. 661; Indianapolis v. Gaston, 58 End. 224; Louisville & X. R. Co. v. Wil- liams, 20 Ind. App. 576; 51 N. E. 128; Nappanee v. Ruckman. 7 Ind. App. 361; 34 N. E. 00!); Laird v. Cliicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 100 Iowa, 336; 09 N. W. 414; Knapp v. Sioux City & P. R. Co., 71 Iowa, 41; Fry v. Du- buque&S. W. R. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 416: Collins v. Council Bluffs, 32 Iowa, 324; Miller v. Boone County, 95 Iowa, 5; 63 N. W. 352; Townsend v. Paola, 41 Kan. 591; Kan. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Pointer, 9 Kan. 620; Central P. R. R. Co. v. Kuhn, 86 Ky. 578; Wardle v. New Orleans City K. K. Co., 35 La. Ann. 202; Jones v. City of Deer- ing, 94 Me. 165; 47 Atl. 140; M.M.i hon v. N. C. R. R. Co., 3'.) End. 438; Johnson v. Northern Pac. K. R. Co., 47 Minn. 430; 50 X. W. 473; Mem- phis, etc.. R. R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466; Taylor v. Scherpe & K. Architectural Iron Co., 133 Mo. 349; 34 S. W. 581; Gorham v. Kansas City, etc, K. R. Co., 113 Mo. 408; Plumner v. Milan, 79 Mo. App. 439; 1 Mo. A. Rep. 000; Sioux City & 1'. R. Co. v. Smith, 22 Neb. 775; 36 X. W. 285; Cohen v. Eureka & P. R. R. Co., 14 Nev. 370; Bolyoke v. <;. T. Ry. Co., 4S X. II. 542; Shalor v. Bdwy Imp. Co., 102 X. Y. 041; 57 X. E. 1124, aff'g 22 App. Div. 102; 47 X. Y. Supp. 815; Ayres v. Del., etc., R. R Co., 158 X. Y. 254; Kan.- v. N. V. V II. A II. R. R. Co., 132 X. Y. 100; 4:i N. V. St. R. 41)4; 30 V E. 250: Dol- lanl v. Roberts. 130 X. V 269; 41 N. Y. St. R. 2:.:;: II L. l;. A. 238; 29 N. E. 104; Feeney v. Lou«, r Island R. R. Co., 110 X. Y. 375; 20 N. V. St. R. 729; 22 X. E. 402; Filer v. New York Cent. R, R Co., 49 X. Y. 42; Drew v. Sixth Ave. R R. Co., 20 X. V. 49; Curtis v. Rochester, etc., Ry. Co., 18 N. Y. 534; Crank v. Forty-Second St., etc., Ry. Co.. 53 Hun (X. Y.), 425; 25 N. Y. St. R. 53; 6N. Y. Supp. 229, aff'd 127 X. Y. 048; 37 N. Y. St. R.966; 27 X. 1-;. 850; Record v. Sara- toga Springs, 40 Hun (X.Y.), 44S; 12 X. Y. St. R. 395; 27 W. D. 500, aff'd 120 N. Y. 046; M X. Y. St. R. 998; 24 N. E. 1102; filacer v. Third A\e. R. R. Co., 15 J. & S. ( X. Y. ) 401 ; Pill v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., Misc. (N. Y.) 207; 57 X. Y. St. R. 78:): 27 X. Y. Supp. 230; Beckwith v. N. V. Central R. R. Co., 64 Barb. (X. Y. 1 299; Walker v. Erie R. R. Co., 63 Barb. (X. Y. ) 200; Morse v. Auburn & Syracuse R. I,'. Co., 10 Barb. 1 X. Y.) 021; Clark v. Westcott, 2 App. Div. (X. Y.) 503: 37 X. Y. Supp. 1111; Wallace v. Western R R. Co., 104 X.C. 442:Smedley v. Hestonville. M. &F. Pass. R. Co., is l Pa. St. 020; 39 Atl. 544; Am. & Eng. II. Cas N S. 649; 12 W. X. C. 169; McLaughlin v. Cony. 77 Pa. si. 109; Pittsburg, V. & M. R. R. Co. v. Donahue. 70 I'enn. St. 119; Fort Worth & 1 >. C. R Co. v. Robertson (Tex. 1892), 14 L. R. A. 781; 16 S. \Y. 1093; Giblin v. Mc- Intyre, 2rt.ili.3Sl: Fulsome v. Con- cord, 46 Vt. 135; Whitney v. Claren- don, 18 Vt. 252; Waterman v. Chi- cago, etc.. R R. Co., B2 Wis. 613; 52 297 §244 PERMANENT INJURIES — PROSPECTIVE LOSS. the existence of a disability in the future is something more than a mere possibility or probability. That it is possible or probable that pain and suffering will exist in the future as a result of the injury, or that a person's earning capacity will be less in the future than it was before the injury as a result thereof, or that he lias been permanently injured, is not of itself sufficient to authorize a recovery for prospective loss. Such loss or future consequences for which damages are sought must be such as in the ordinary course of nature are reasonably cer- tain to result from the injury.' In this connection it is said in N. W. 247; Stutz v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 73 Wis. 147; 40 N. W. 653; Hulihan v. Green Bay W. & S. P. R. R. Co., 68 Wis. 520; Weisenberg v. Appleton, 26 Wis. 56; 7 Am. Rep. 39; Phillips v. Southwestern R. Co., 4Q. B. D. 406, aff'd 5 Q. B. Div. 78; Hod- soil v. Stallebrass, 11 Ad. & E. 301; Fair v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., 21 L. T. Rep. 326; Fox v. St. John, 23 N. B. 244. See chapter IX, herein on loss of time, earnings and impaired earning capacity. 2 Washington, etc., R. R. Co. v. Har- mon, 147 U. S. 571; Ford v. Charles Warner Co., 1 Marv. (Del.) 88; 37 Atl. 39; Swift v. Raleigh, 54 111. App. 44; Ford v. Des Moines, 106 Iowa, 94; 75 N. W. 630; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 2 Kan. App. 693; 43 Pac. 802; McBride v. St. Paul City R. Co., 72 Minn. 291; 75 N. W. 231; L'Herault v. Minnenpolis, 69 Minn. 261; 72 N. W. 73; Covell v. Wabash R. Co., 82 Mo. App. 180; Chilton v. St. Joseph, 143 Mo. 192; Bigelow v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 48 Mo. App. 367; Ay res v. Del. L. & W. R. R. Co., 158 N. Y. 254; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 683; Kane v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 132 N. Y. 160; 43 N. Y. St. R. 494; 30 N. E. 256, aff'g 31 N. Y. St. R. 741; 9 N. Y. Supp. 879; Feeney v. Long Is- land R. R. Co., 116 N. Y. 375; Tozer v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 105 N. 298 Y. 617; 6 N. Y. St. R. 447; 11 N. E. 369; 1 Silv. C. A. 371, rev'g 38 Hun, 100; Strohm v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 96 N. Y. 305; Filer v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 42; Curtis v. Rochester R. Co., 18 N. Y. 534; Webb v. Union Ry. Co., 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 413; 60 N. Y. St. R. 1087; Miller v. Ft. Lee Park & Steamboat Co., 73 Hun (N. Y.), 150; 56 N. Y. St. R. 94; 25 N. Y. Supp. 924; Mee- teer v. Manhattan R. Co., 63 Hun (N. Y.), 533; 18 N. Y. Supp. 561; 45 N. Y. St. R. 704; Gregory v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 55 Hun (N. Y.), 303; 28 N. Y. St. R. 726; 8 N. Y. Supp. 525; Miley v. Broadway & Seventh Ave. R. R. Co., 29 N. Y. St. R. 107; 8 jST. Y. Supp. 455; Koetter v. Man. R. Co., 36 N. Y. St. R. 611; 13 N. Y. Supp. 458, aff'd 129 N. Y. 668; 42 N. Y. St. R. 946; 30 N. E. 65; Clark v. Nevada Land, etc., Co., 6 Nev. 203; Root v. Monroeville (Ohio C. C), 1 Toledo Leg. News, 208; Mo. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 75 Tex. 77; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 224; 12 S. W. 810; Cameron v. Union Tr. Line, 10 Wash. 507; 39 Pac. 128; Kenyon v. Mondovi, 98 Wis. 50; 73 N. W. 314; Groundwater v. Washington, 92 Wis. 56; 65 N. W. 871; Kucera v. Merrill Lumber Co., 91 Wis. 637; 65 N. W. 374; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 590; Block v. Milwaukee St. R. Co., PERMANENT INJURIES PROSPECTIVE LOSS. § 245 one case. " Future consequences which are reasonably to lie ex- pected to follow an injury may be given in evidence for the purpose of enhancing the damages to be awarded. Bui to en- title such apprehended consequences to be considered by the jury, they must be such as in the ordinary course of nature are reasonably certain to ensue. Consequences which are contin- gent, speculative or merely possible, are not proper to be con- sidered in ascertaining the damages. It is not enough that the injuries received may develop into more serious conditions than those which are visible at the time of the injury, nor even that they are likely to so develop. To entitle a plaintiff to recover present damages, for apprehended future consequences, there must be such a degree of probability of their occurring as amounts to a reasonable certainty that they will result from the original injury." 8 And where the evidence shows that an in- jury is permanent and that subsequent mental or physical pain is reasonably certain, there is sufficient basis for compensation for future suffering. 4 § 245. Same subject continued.— An instruction in an action for personal injuries that recovery may be had for such pain and suffering as the plaintiff is " likely to endure in the future" as a result of the injury is erroneous. 3 As is also an instruction that the jury may award damages for injuries likely to be permanent.*' And an instruction that to justify a recovery of damages for permanent injuries there must be a "reasonable probability" of the permanency of the injury is also erroneous. 7 But it is not error to instruct the jury that they may award damages for such future pain and suffering as they "may be- 89 Wis. 371; 27 L. K. A. 365; 61 N. W. 1101. Hut see Ball v. Mabry (Ga.), is s. E. 64. BStrohm v. \. Y. L. E. & W. K. R, Co., 9ti N. Y. 30."), and quoted in A\ res v. Del. L. A.- \V. R. R. Co., 158 N. Y. 254; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. G83. 4 Smiley v. St. Louis & H. Ry. Co., 100 Mo. 629; 61 !S. W. 667. kRurera v. Merrill Lumber Co., 91 Wis. 637; 65 N. YV. 374; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. X. S. 590; Hardy v. Milwaukee R. Co., 89 Wis. 183; 61 N. \V. 771. But see Scott v. Montgo- mery, 95 Pa. St. 444; Cameron v. Union Trunk Line, 10 Wash. 507; 39 Pac. 128. 1 Meeteer v. Manhattan R. Co., 63 Hun (N. Y.), 533; 18 N. Y. Supp. 561; 45 N. Y. St. K. 704. 7 Block v. Milwaukee St. R. < Wis. 371; 27 L. R. A. 865; 61 N. W. 1101. But see Bailey v. Centerville, 108 Iowa, 20; 78 X. W. 831. 299 § 246 PERMANENT IN.HRIKS — PROSPECTIVE LOSS. lieve from the evidence " the plaintiff will endure. 8 And an instruction was sustained which stated that if the jury were satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff's injury was per- manent, they might assess damages for such pain, suffering and impairment of ability to earn a livelihood as he must suffer in the future. 9 So, also, a charge that there might be a recovery for " all damages present or future which, from the evidence, can be treated as the necessary result of the injury," was held not to be erroneous where the court also enumerated all the ele- ments of damage and recovery. 10 But it is proper to refuse to instruct the jury that they should not assess damages for merely possible or even probable future effects not then apparent, since such an instruction would tend to convey the impression that the future results for which recovery might be had must be not merely reasonably certain, but absolutely certain. 11 § 246. Prospective loss— Permanent injuries — Must be evi- dence as to. — As a general rule, in order to justify an allowance of damages for permanent injuries or any prospective loss as the result of a personal injury, there must be some evidence before the jury upon which to base it, and the proof must be such as shows that the consequences for which an allowance is sought are reasonably certain to exist in the future. 12 So where 8 Bigelow v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 48 Mo. App. 367; Taylor v. Scherpe & K. Architectual Iron Co., 133 Mo. 349; 34 S. W. 581; Cameron v. Union Trunk Line, 10 Wash. 507; 39 Pac. 128. 9 Kenyon v. Mondovi, 98 Wis. 50; 73 N. W. 314. 10 Fordyce v. Jackson, 56 Ark. 601; 20 S. W. 597, denying reh'g 56 Ark. 594: 20 S. W. 528. 11 Kansas City, F. S. & M. R. Co. v. Stoner (C. C. App. 8th (:.), 4 U. S. App. 109; 49 Fed. 209; 1 C. C. A. 231. 12 Western LTn. Teleg. Co. v. Morri- son (C. C. App. 8th C), 55 U. S. App. 211 ; 83 Fed. 992 ; 28 C. C. A. 56 ; Dud- ley v. Front St. Cable R. Co. (C. C. D. Wash.), 73 Fed. 128; South Chicago City R. Co. v. Walters, 70 111. App. 300 271; Wheeler v. Boone, 108 Iowa, 235; 78 N. W. 909; 44 L. R. A. 821; Ford v. Des Moines, 106 Iowa, 94; 75 N. W. 630; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Archer, 46 Neb. 907; 65 N. W. 1043; Crawford v. Del. L. & W. R. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 652; 24 N. E. 1092; 23 J. & S. 255; Mosher v. Russell, 44 Hun (N. Y.), 12; 6 N. Y. St. R. 407; 26 W. D. 234; Staal v. Grand St. & X. R. R. Co., 107 N. Y. 625; 1 Silv. C. A. 516; 11 X. Y. St. R. 352; 25 W. D. 241, rev'g 36 Hun, 208; Daw- son v. Troy, 49 Hun (N. Y.), 322; 17 N. Y. St. R. 559; 2 N. Y. Supp. 137; Bloom v. Manhattan Elev. R. Co., 43 N. Y. St. R. 378; 17 N. Y. Supp. 812; Hayes v. Third Ave. R. Co., 18 Misc. (N. Y.) 582; 42 N. Y. Supp. 703; La Fave v. City of Superior (Wis. PERM AN EN I IN.f LRIES — I'ROSl'Kf TI \ K LOSS. § 24' there is no evidence as to future pain, or that the earnings of the plaintiff will be affected, or in any other way showing the injury to be permanent, it is error to submit the issue of permanent injury to the jury or to instruct them thai damages may be given for future pain or loss of earnings. 13 Ami a charge which authorizes the assessment of damages for permanent im- pairment of health, where there is no evidence upon which to base them, is declared to be a ground for reversal unless it clearly appears that it has done no harm. 1 ' So an instruction as to recovery of damages for future pain and suffering is also held to be erroneous where there is no evidence to warrant it. ' And where it is merely shown that pain or suffering may exist in the future it is not sufficient to authorize an allowance for any prospective loss or permanent injury. 111 So testimony by a physician that the plaintiff was likely to be bothered with the injury for several years and might be always, at least under cer- tain conditions, such as overuse, was held not sufficient to authorize the allowance of damages for permanent injuries. 1. Again, where the plaintiff seeks to recover for the future impair- ment of earning capacity, it is held that to justify an award of damages therefor, there must be evidence of his skill and capacity for earning, and that the injury will affect such earning capacity. 18 And as a general rule, a plaintiff who seeks to recover prospect- ive damages in an action for personal injuries has the burden of showing that his injury is reasonably certain to be permanent. 11 ' § 247. Permanent injury or disability may be inferred. — Although as a general rule evidence must be given to show that 1809), 80 X. W. 742; Collins v. Janes- ville, 99 Wis. 464: 75 X. W. 88. 13 Maimone v. Dry Dock, E. B. & B. R. Co., 58 App. Div. (N. V. i 388; 68 N. Y. Supp. 107.). 14 Western Union Teleg. Co.. 55 U. S. App. 211; 8:'. Fed. 992; 28 C. C. A. 56; Ross v. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App. 440; Chicago, R. I. & P. K. Co. v. Archer, 46 Neb. 907: 85 X. W. 1043. 15 Wheeler v. Boone, 108 Iowa, 235; 78 X. W. 909: 44 L. R. A. 821. 16 Ford v. Des Moines. 10ti Iowa. 94: 75 X. W. 630. 17 Collins v. Janesville, 99 Wis. 464; 75 X. W. 88. 18 Staal v. Grand St. & X. K. R. Co.. 107 X. Y. 625; 1 Silv. C. A. 516: 11 X. Y. St. K. 352; 25 W. I). 241: Bietton v. Grand Rapids Street R. Co. (Mich.), 51 X. W. 276; La Pave v. City of Superior i Wis. 1899 N. W. 742. 19 Dudley v. Front St. Cable R. Co. (C. C. I). Wash.}, 7:: Fed 128. 301 § 248 PERMANENT INJURIES — PROSPECTIVE LOSS. an injury is permanent in order that recovery may be had there- for, yet it is not strictly necessary that direct evidence to estab- lish this be given in all cases, since there are many instances where an injury is such that it may reasonably be inferred from the nature thereof that it will be permanent.'- 10 So in the absence of direct evidence that an injury will be permanent, if there is testimony from which such fact may be inferred, an instruction authorizing the jury to assess damages therefor is properly given. 21 And in a 2s lew York case it is said that "prospective disablement may be inferred from the nature of the injur}' or proved by the opinion of experts." ' And in another case in this state it was held that though there was no expert testimony showing that an injury would be permanent, yet the court was justified in in- structing the jury that they might consider " the lasting or per- manent character of the injury " where it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff was struck a violent blow upon the back or spine, and that though at the time of the accident she was a strong, healthy woman fifty years of age, yet that at the time of the trial, nearly three years later, she was still suffering from that injury and under treatment therefor, and was reduced in weight, and was physically feeble.^ § 248. Prospective loss — Permanent injury — Mode of as- sessing damages for — If in an action for personal injuries it ap- pears that the plaintiff has suffered an injury or disability which will be permanent, damages therefor may be awarded, the jury taking into consideration the age and reasonable expectancy of life of the plaintiff, the amount he could earn before the injury 20 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wil- liams, 20 Ind. App. 576; 51 N. E. 128; Cook v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 19 Mo. 329: Ayres v. Del. L. & W. R. R. Co., 158 N. Y. 254; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 683; Record v. Saratoga Springs, 46 Hun ( N. Y. ), 448 ; 12 N. Y. St. R. 395 ; 27 W. D. 500, aff'd 120 N. Y. 646; 31 N. Y. St. R. 998; 24 N. E. 1102; Horowitz v. Hamburg - American Packet Co., 18 Misc. (N. Y.) 24; 41 N. Y. Supp. 54; 13 Nat. Corp. Rep. 212. 302 21 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wil- liams, 20 Ind. App. 576; 51 N. E. 128. 22 Ayres v. Saratoga Springs, 46 Hun (X. Y.), 448; 12 N. Y. St. R. 395; 27 W. D. 500, aff'd 120 N. Y. 646; 31 N. Y. St. R. 998; 24 N. E. 1102, per Vann, J. 23 Horowitz v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 18 Misc. (N. Y.) 24; 41 N. Y. Supp. 54; 13 Nat. Corp. Rep. 212. PEBMANENT INJURIES — PEOSPECTIVE LOSS. jj 248 and the amount he was able to earn subsequent thereto, and also any future pain and suffering.'' The amount of compensation, however, for future pain and suite ring is not capable of exact proofs by any pecuniary standard but must be estimated by the jury in connection both with the evidence before them and with their knowledge, observation and experience in the affairs of life.'-' And where injuries are permanent, the jury may, in es- timating the damages, consider the fact that the plaintiff may suffer more from other ailments which she may have than she would have suffered had it not been for the injury. 26 So tes- timony by a surgeon is admissible that plaintiff's injuries are of such a character that childbearing will be perilous to life.-' 7 The compensation, however, for future disability and loss of earnings, while not susceptible of being computed by a strictly mathematical calculation, is capable of more exact calculation than is that for future pain and suffering and is based upon evi- dence showing the age of the person injured, his expectancy of life, business habits, and his earning capacity and the decrease or reduction therein. 28 In this connection it is said in a recent case : " Evidence may be given of the age of the party injured, the probable duration of life, the effect the injury has had upon the ability of the person to earn money, of the probability that the injurious effect on the ability to earn money will continue in the future, either during life or for a lesser period, and of the business or occupation in which the person was engaged, and the compensation, whether by wages, fees, by a fixed salary or profits that resulted therefrom ; and, from the facts thus proven in evidence, it is for the jury to award such fair sum as will, in « Sioux City & P. R. Co. v. Smith, 22 Neb. 775; 36 X. W. 285. 26 North Chicago St. K. Co. v. Fitz- gibbons, 180 111. 460: :>4 X. E. 483, alFg 79 111. App. 632. 25 Crank v. Forty-Second St., etc., R. Co., 53 Hud | X. Y. |, 425; 25 X. V. St. R. 53; 6 N. Y. Supp. 'J-J'.t. aff'd 127 N. Y. 648; 37 X. Y. St. K. 966; 27 N. E. 850. 27 Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala. 514; 9 So. 7^2: 47 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 500. See South Covington & C. St. Ry. Co. v. Bolt, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 906; 59 S. W. 26. 28 Denver v. Sherret, 60 U. S. A.pp. 104: 31 C. ('. A. 449: 88 Fed. 226; •"> Am. Neg. Rep. 520; Seaboard Mfg. Co. v. Woodson, 98 Ala. 378: 11 So. 733. And see East Tennessee. V. A (J. R. Co. v. McClure, 94 Qa. 658; l'O S. E. 93; Savannah, A. A: M. R. Co. v. McLeod, 94 Ga. 530; 20 S. E. 434. See chapter IX on loss of earnings, time and impaired earning capacity. 303 § 249 PERMANENT LN JURIES — PROSPECTIVE LOSS. their judgment, compensate the party for the decreased or de- stroyed ability to earn money in the future, due allowance being made for the contingencies and uncertainties that inhere in such matters." s And in estimating such damages it is held also that due allowance must be made for the decrease in earning capacity naturally resulting from increased age. 30 § 249. Prospective loss — Permanent injury — Mode of as- sessing damages for — Continued. — The amount which would purchase a life annuity equal to the difference between the earning capacity of a person before and after the injury, is held to be the measure of damages for permanent disability or im- pairment of earning capacity. 31 But where payments for future earnings, for the loss of which damages are claimed, are to be anticipated and capitalized in the verdict, only the present worth of such earnings should be allowed. 32 But it is proper to refuse an instruction which limits the recovery to such sum as would represent the present worth of future earnings, calculated on a basis of a certain per cent per annum. 33 Again, it is competent for a witness to testify as to the present worth of the services of the plaintiff, based upon his expectation of life, upon the basis of his ability to earn annually the dif- 29 Denver v. Sherret, 60 U. S. App. 104; 31 C. C. A. 449; 88 Fed. 226; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 520, per Shiras, D. J., citing Railroad Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545; 7 Sup. Ct. R. 1; Railway Co. v. Xeedham, 10 U. S. App. 339, 351; 3 C. C. A. 129, 148; 52 Fed. R. 371, 378. 30 Savannah, A. & M. R. Co. v. Mc- Leod, 94 Ga. 530; 20 S. E. 434. 31 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Hen- thorne (C. C. App. 6th C), 43 U. S. App. 113; 73 Fed. 634; Houston & T. C. R. R. Co., 53 Tex. 318; 37 Am. Rep. 756. See Morrison v. Long Island R. R. Co., 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 205; 73 N. Y. St. R. 732; 38 N. Y. Supp. 393. 32 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Fan- (C. C. App. 8th C), 56 Fed. 994; 304 6C. C. A. 211; Goodhart v. Penn. R. R. Co., 177 Pa. St. 1; 35 Atl. 191; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 364; 38 W. N. C. 545. See also The William Branfoot, 48 Fed. 914; Kinney v. Tolkerts, 84 Mich. 616; Fulsome v. Concord, 46 Vt. 135. But where there was evidence that plaintiff's earning capacity had not been totally destroyed, it was held to be reversi- ble error to instruct the jury that if they find that plaintiff is entitled to recover, they will find what his earn- ings will or would be for the length of time he is expected to live, and then reduce it to its present value. Central of Ga. R. R. Co. v. Johnston, 106 Ga. 130; 32 S. E. 78; 12 Am. 6 Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 286. 33 Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. PERMANENT INJURIES — PROSPECTIVE LOSS. § 249 ferent amounts which the evidence tends to show. 31 But an allowance as damages of such sum as will at legal interest pro- duce the annual amount of plaintiff's earnings in previous years is not proper ; r> nor is it the rule that the jury must de- termine the number of years that the disability will continue to exist and then multiply this number by the yearly compensa- tion the party has earned in the past.'' And in a case in Geor- gia it is held that the present worth of future earnings is not correctly arrived at by ascertaining the entire amount of such earnings and deducting seven per cent from the whole.* 1 In Massachusetts it has been decided that where a judge is acting without a jury, he may assess the damages at a sum equivalent to the worth of an annuity for a certain number of years, computing the interest at a specified rate, and this though there be no evi- dence of what an annuity of such an amount would cost for such a length of time. 8 In another case in the same state where the plan proposed by the plaintiff's counsel for determining the amount to be awarded for a permanent impairment of earning capacity was the capitalization of the annual impairment, a charge which pointed out the injustice of such method and stated the principle upon which annuities were computed, but which did not suggest the adoption of either method by the jury, leaving it for them to adopt such method as the facts might warrant, was held not to be erroneous where the defendant made no request for an instruction on the point. 39 And where a charge did not contain any rule for the estimation of damages for the loss of future earnings, but stated that the jury might consider plain- Kief (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 58 S. W. X. Y. St. R. 732; Rapson v. Cubitt, 625. M Storrs v. Grand Rapids. 110 1 Car. & Marsh. 64. 36 Denver v. Sherret, 60 U. S. App. Mich. 483; 68 X. W. 258; 3 Det 104: 31 C. C. A. 449: 88 Fed. 226; L. X. 474. 5 Am. Neg. Hep. 520. 35 Gregory v. New York, L. E. & '■ 37 Macon. D. &. S. R. Co. v. Moore, W. R. R. Co., 55 Hun (X. Y.), 303: 28 X. Y. St. R. 726; 8 X. Y. Supp. 525; Houston & T. ('. K. R. Co. v. Willie, 53 Tex. 318: 37 Am. Kep. 715. And see McDonald v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 26 Iowa, 124; Morrison v. Long Island R. R. Co.. 3 App. Div. (X. Y.i 205; 38 X. Y. Supp. ;'.f>3: 7:', 99 Ga. •-'_".': •_'-, S. E. 460: 5 Am. & Eng. R Cas. X. S. 355. *>Copson v. X. Y. X. II. & II. R. Co., 171 Mass. 233: 50 X. E. 618. 89Rooney v. X. Y. X. II. cfe H. R. Co., 17:: Mass. 222: 58 V. K. 435: 11 \m. A- Kng. R. Cas. N. S. 4l':>: 6 Am. [leg. Rep. 78. ■20 305 § 250 PERMANENT INJURIES — PROSPECTIVE LOSS. tiff's earning ability before the injury and also subsequent there- to, and " allow him such amount as you believe from the evi- dence he is justly entitled to," it was held not erroneous. 40 § 250. Past and prospective loss— Recovery for in one ac- tion. — Where a physical injury is the result of a single act, not only may past damages be recovered, but also those which will arise in the future as a direct result of the injury. And since in such cases successive actions cannot be brought for damages as they may accrue, if a person seeks to recover for permanent injury or prospective loss, the recovery therefor not only may but must be had in the same action as that brought to recover for past loss or injury, since there can only be one recovery of damages in this class of cases. 41 So it is said that " successive actions cannot be brought by the plaintiff for the recovery of damages, as they may accrue from time to time, resulting from the injury complained of, as would be the case for a continuous wrong or a continued trespass. The action is for a single wrong, the injury resulting from a single act, and the plaintiff was en- titled to recover not only the damages which had been actually sustained up to the time of the trial, but also compensation for future damages." * And again, " As there can be but one re- covery, it may include damages not only for what has actually been suffered from the disabling effect of the injury down to the time of the trial, but also for such pain or inconvenience as is reasonably certain in the future." ** And in another case a charge that the plaintiff was entitled to recover for "the in- juries that he has sustained and that the jury can look to the future as well as to the past, because plaintiff can maintain no other action" was held correct. 44 As was also a charge that the jury might consider past damages, and also "such as appears from the evidence with reasonable certainty, are prospective." te 40 Lamb v. Cedar Rapids, 108 Iowa, 629: 79 N. W. 366. 41 The numerous cases which we have cited in the preceding sections generally sustain the text. 42 Filer v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 42. 43 Ayres v. Del. L. & W. R. R. Co., 158 X. Y. 254; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 683. 306 44 Kane v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 132 N. Y. 160; 43 N. Y. St. R. 494; 30 N. E. 256, aff'g 31 N. Y. St. R. 741 ; 9 N. Y. Supp. 879. 45 Shaler v. Broadway Imp. Co., 162 N. Y. 641; 57 N. E. 1124, aff'g 22 App. Div. 102; 47 N. Y. Supp. 815. expe:n.-i> physical injuries. § 251 CHAPTER XI. EXPENSES — PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 251. Expenses of treating injury Generally. 252. Expenses of treating injury — Evidence as to, necessary. 253. Evidence as to expenses inac- tion by married woman. ■27)4. Surgical and medical treat- ment — Medicines and drugs. 255. Medical expenses — Payment for, not prerequisite to re- covery. 256. Expenses for nursing. 257. Services of physician — Evi- dence of payment or value of — Whether necessary. 258. Same subject continued. 250. Same subject— Conclusion. 260. Expenses in the future — Re- covery of. 261. Expense for work of substi- tute in place of injured per- son. 262. Expense of repairing wagon. § 251. Expenses of treating injury— Generally.— In an ac- tion to recovery for physical injuries such reasonable sums as have been necessarily expended or incurred in treating such injury and in effecting a cure are recoverable, 1 and it is an error to i Vicksburg, etc.. R. R. Co. v. Put- nam, 118 U. S. 545; Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. (U. S.) 34; Whelan v. X. V. L. E. & W. R. R. Co.. 38 Fed. 15; Davidson v. South Pac. Co.. 44 Fed. 476; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Yar- brough, 83 Ala. 238; :'. So. 447: Adams v. Clymer, 1 Marv. (Del.) 80; :\<) Atl. 1104; Robinson v. Simpson, 8 Houst. (Del.) 398; 32 Atl. 287; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Carr. 170 111. 47S; 48 N. E. 992, affg <">7 111. App. ;"):',<); Peoria Bridge Assoc, v. Loomis, 20 111. 23."); Chicago & E. 1. R. Co. v. Cleminger, 77 111. App. 186, aff'd 178 111. 536; 53 N. E. 3_'0: Louisville N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 409; 1 West. 808; Ellsworth v. Flet- cher, 59 Kan. 772; 51 Pac 904; Alexander v. Humber. 86 Ky. 565; 6 S. W. 453; Cent. Pass. R. Co. v. Kuhn, 86 Ky. 578; 6 S. W. 441; Par- ker v. .Jenkins. 3 Bush (Ky.), 587; Sauford v. Augusta, 32 Me. 536; Mc- Ganahan v. V V. N. H. & II. R. Co.. 171 Mass. I'll; SON. E. 610;Schwing- schlegl, 113 Mich. 683; 72 V W. 7: I Det. I- V 447; Sherwood v. Chic. & W. M. R Co.. 82 Mich. 374; 44 Am. A- Eng. R. Cas. 337; 46 N. W. 773; Memphis, etc., R. Ft C O. V. Whitfield. 44 Miss. 466; Cobb v. St. Louis & II. R. ( .... 140 Mo. 609; .".o S. W. 894; 13 Am. A Eng. R. Cas. X. s. 632; Robertson v. Wabash R, R. Co. i Mo. 1899), •'.:; S. W. 1082; Char- trand v. Southern R. Co., 57 M->. App. 4_'7: Hewitt v. Kisenbart. 36 Neb. 794; 55 V W. 252; Corliss v. Worcester. N. & R. R. R. Co.. 63 N. 307 § 252 EXPENSES — PHYSICAL INJURIES. charge the jury that such expenses may be allowed without lim- iting them to such as are reasonable and necessary. 2 In deter- mining what expenses are of this nature, it has been held that where, upon the advice of a physician, a person goes to a distant city to be specially treated for troubles resulting from an injury, the expense incurred pursuant to such advice is a reasonable and necessary outlay in an attempt to effect a cure and is recov- erable. 3 And where, owing to the unskillful treatment of an in- jury by a surgeon, it has been necessary to pay an increased amount to another surgeon to effect a cure, such amount may properly be considered by the jury in estimating the damages, but this is declared to be the proper limit. 4 The expenses rea- sonably and necessarily incurred in effecting a cure may, it is decided, be recovered, though not specially alleged, an al- legation of general damage being sufficient. 5 § 252. Expenses of treating injury — Evidence as to, neces- sary. The general rule seems to be that in order to permit a recovery for the expense reasonably and necessarily incurred in treating the injury and effecting a cure, there must be some evi- dence offered in reference thereto/' So there can be no recovery H. 404; 1 New Eng. 163; Leigh ton v. Sargent, 31 N. H. 119; Diinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N. Y. 390, rev'g 16 Hun, 250; Sheehan v. Edgar, 58 N. Y. 631; Metcalf v. Baker, 57 N. Y. 662; Ganiard v. Rochester City & B. R. Co., 50 Hun (N. Y.), 22; 18 N. Y. St. R. 692, affd 121 N. Y. 661 ; Oliver v. North Pac. Tr. Co., 3 Oreg. 84 ; Smedley v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. R. Co., 184 Pa. St. 620; 39 Atl. 544; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 649; 42 W. N. C. 169; Good hart v. Penu. R. R. Co., 177 Pa. St. 1; 35 Atl. 191; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 364; 38 W. N. C. 545; Wilson v. Penn. R. R. Co., 132 Pa. St. 27; 18 Atl. 1087; Smith v. East Mauch Chunk, 3 Super. Ct. ( Pa. ) 495; Hart v. Charlotte C. & A. R. Co., 33 S. C. 427: 12 S. E. 9; 10 L. R. A. 794; Houston & T. C. K. Co. v. Rowell, 92 Tex. 147; 46 S. \V. 630; :i08 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 597, nff'g 45 S. W. 763; Folsom v. Under- bill, 36 Vt. 580; Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Norment, 84 Va. 167; 4 S. E. 211. 2 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Rowell, 92 Tex. 147; 46 S. W. 630; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 597, afTg 45 S. W. 763. s Sherwood v. Chic. & W. M. R. Co., 82 Mich. 374; 46 N. W. 773; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 337. 4 Leighton v. Sargent, 31 N. H. 119. & Folsom v. Underbill, 36 Vt. 580. e Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Uavis, 119 Ala. 572 ; 24 So. 862 ; Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. Barry, 58 Ark. 198; 25 L. R. A. 386; 23 S. W. 1097; Chatsworth v. Rowe, 53 111. App. 3S7; Eckerd v. Chic, etc., R. R. Co., 70 Iowa, 353; 30 N. W. 615; Reed v. Chic, etc, R. R. Co., 57 Iowa, 23; 10 N. W. 285; Nixon EXPENSES PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 268 for medical attendance or aid unless there is some evidence in- troduced as to the nature of such medical attendance and the amount of liability therefor. 7 And it was held improper to in- struct the jury that the plaintiff might recover for moneys ex- pended and for which she was liable as a result of the accident, where there was no proof that she had expended any money or had incurred any liability for such expense." And in another case where it merely appeared that the plaintiff had been treated in a city hospital and it was not shown that she had expended any money or incurred any liability for such treatment or for any medical services as a result of the injury, and no evidence was given of the value of the services rendered in the hospital, it was held that there could be no recovery for medical services or treatment. 9 In a case in Massachusetts, however, it is held that though there be no distinct proof of the amount expended for sickness and medical attendance as a result of the injury, yet the jury ma}- allow a reasonable sum for such expenses. 10 But where such expenses were not claimed in the plaintiff's petition, it was held that though he was erroneously permitted to testify as to the probable amount of liability incurred by him, therefor, such error might be cured b} r a remittitur of the amount stated in such testimony. 11 § 253. Evidence as to expenses in action by married wo- man.— Evidence is admissible as to the value of medical services v. Hannibal & St. .J. R. Co., 141 Mo. 425; 42 S. YV. 942: Duke v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 99 Mo. 347; 12 S. YV. 636. Smith v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 108 Mo. 243; 18 S. W. 971 : Evans v. Jop- lin, 76 Mo. App. 20; 1 Mo. A. Rep. 485; Hewitt v. Eisenbart, 36 Neb. 794; 55 N. W. 252; McKenna v. Brooklyn Beights R. Co., 41 App. Div. | \. V.) 255; 58 X. Y. Supp. 402; Page v. Delaware & II. Canal Co., 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 618; 54 X. Y. Snpp. 442; Houston & T. C. 11. Co. v. Kim- bell (Tex. Civ. App.), 43 S. W. 1049; Fry v. Hillan (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. YV. 359; But see Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. Holcomb, 9 Ind. App. 198; Scullane v. Kellogg, 169 Mass. 544; 48 X. E. 622. 7 Page v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 34 App. Div. (X. Y.) (518; 54 N. Y. Supp. 442; Nixon v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 141 Mo. 425; 42 S. W. 942; Evans v. Joplin, 70 Mo. App. 20; 1 Mil A. Kep. 486; Houston A: T. C. R. Co. v. Kiml.ell i Tex. Civ. App. ), 13 s. \\\ 1049. y < hatswortb v. Rowe, 53 111. App. 387. •' Duke v. Mo. Par. R. R. Co., 99 Mo. 347; 12 S. W. 636. 10 Scullane v. Kellogg, 169 Mass. 544; 48 X. K. 622. 11 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. 309 § 254 EXPENSES — PHYSICAL INJURIES. rendered in an action by a married woman as tending to show that credit therefor was extended solely to her. 12 § 254. Surgical and medical treatment— Medicines and drugs. — Such, reasonable sums as have been paid or incurred for surgical or medical treatment and for medicines rendered necessary as a result of the injury are included in those expenses which may be recovered. 13 And it has been held that where there is evidence as to the employment of physicians by the plaintiff, the question of medical expenses may properly be sub- mitted to the jury. 14 So evidence showing that the plaintiff was attended by a practicing physician or surgeon will justify a rinding that such professional services were rendered for a pe- cuniary recompense. 13 And evidence of the continued and nec- essary use of morphine since the injury, and that before the injury the plaintiff had never used opiates, is admissible to show a continued expense on the part of the plaintiff which did not exist before the injury. 16 Again although the amount expended for medicine and medical attendance is not alleged Duelin, 86 Tex. 450; 25 S. W. 406, affg 23 S. W. 596; 24 S. W. 334. 12 Vergin v. City of Saginaw (Mich. 1901), 84 N. W. 1075; 7 Det. L. N. 602. See City of San Antonio v. Porter (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 59 S. W. 922. See sees. 325 et seq, herein, as to recovery by married woman. is Whelan v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co. (C. C. M. D. Ohio), 38 Fed. 15; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Siniard (Ala.), 26 So. 698; Warner v. Cham- berlain, 7 Houst. (Del.) 18; Wash- ington & G. R. Co. v. Patterson, 9 App. D. C. 423; 25 Wash. L. Rep. 36; Chic. & E. I. R. Co. v. Holland, 122 111. 461; 13 N. E. 145; 11 West. 51; McDonald v. Illinois C. R. Co. (Iowa), 155 N. W. 102; McGanahan v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co., 171 Mass. 211; 50 N. E. 610; Kupi'erschmid v. Southern Elec. R. Co., 70 Mo. App. 438; Chartrand v. Southern R. Co., 57 Mo. App. 425; McLean v. Kansas City, 2 Mo. A. 310 Rep. 681; Feeney v. Long Island R. R. Co., 116 N. Y. 375; 26 N. Y. St. R. 729; 22 N. E. 402; 35 L. R. A. 544; 39 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 639; Morsemann v. Manhattan R. Co., 16 Daly (N. Y.), 249; 10 N. Y. Supp. 105; Farley v. Charleston Basket & V. Co., 51 S. C. 222; 28 S. E. 193, reh'g denied 28 S. E. 401; Dallas v. Jones (Tex. Civ. App.), 54 S. W. 606; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Dickey (Tex. Civ. App.), 48 S. W. 626; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Han- son, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 552; 36 S. W. 289; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Keller, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 569; 32 S. W. 847. 14 Farley v. Charleston Basket & V. Co., 51 S. C. 222; 28 S. E. 193, reh'g denied 28 S. E. 401. 15 McGanahan v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co., 171 Mass. 211; 50 N. E. 610. 16 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Han- son, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 552; 36 S. W. 289. EXPENSES PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 255 in the petition in au action for personal injuries, yet it is held that evidence of the amount expended by the plaintiff for such purposes is admissible under an averment that the plaintiff has incurred great expense for medicine and medical attendance. 17 In another case, however, under an averment similar to the above, and which also contained the additional statement that the plaintiff would in the future have to incur such expense to her damage in an amount stated, it was held that such averment was too general to furnish proper notice to the defendants of the facts intended to be established there- under. 1 " Where evidence as to the amount of expense incurred for medicines has been improperly admitted, it is held that this is not sufficient ground for reversal of a judgment in plaintiff's favor if the extent of the injuries have been thoroughly shown by the evidence in the case and the amount of such account is remitted by the plaintiff. 19 § 255. Medical expenses— Payment for, not prerequisite to recovery.— The fact that the bills for surgical or medical treatment or for medicines rendered necessary as a result of an injury have not been paid, will not prevent a recovery there- for. 20 In many of the cases it is declared that it is sufficient 17 Kupferschmid v. Southern Elec- tric Co., 70 Mo. App. 438. 18 The Oriental v. Barclay, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 193; 41 S. W. 117. m Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Duelin (Tex. Civ. App.), 23 S. W. 596; 24 S. W. 334. 2° Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Lorent- zen (C. C. App. 8th C), 79 Fed. 291; 24 C. C. A. 592; 49 U. S. App. 81; Donnelly v. Hufschmid, 79 Cal. 74: 21 Pac. 546; Chicago 4:>: Mo K. & T. R. Co. v. Holman, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 16; :)'.» S. W. 130: May v. Ilahu (Tex. Civ. App.), 54 S. W. lit!: Crouse v. Chicago A- X. W. R. Co.. 102 Wis. 196; 14 Am. cV: Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 780: 78 N. W. 446. 33 Mm ray v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 101 Mo. 236; 13 S. W. 817. 313 § 257 EXPENSES — PHYSICAL INJURIES. bers of the injured person's family could have given him the care and attention needed without expense, is no defense to an allowance of the amount paid for the services of a trained nurse. 31 And though the services in nursing are gratuitously rendered by a member of the family, there may be a recovery of the fair value of such services, 35 and the value of the wife's services may be recovered. 36 In some cases, however, it has been held that in absence of an express contract to pay for the ser- vices of a wife or child in nursing a person who has suffered a personal injury, there can be no recovery therefor. 07 But a parent may recover for the services of a daughter who has nursed him, though such services were gratuitous. 38 And the mother of the plaintiff may testify as to what was a fair charge for ser- vices rendered by her to the plaintiffs In the absence, however, of any evidence of any charge being made by the members of the family for care and attention given to an injured person, there should be some evidence of the value of the services rendered. 40 Where a child has been injured it is held that the parent may recover a reasonable compensation for nursing. 41 § 257. Services of physician— Evidence of payment or value of — Whether necessary — The plaintiff in an action for personal injuries is not entitled to recover for the services of a physician in the absence of some evidence either of payment or of the value of such services. While payment is not a prerequisite to recovery therefor, yet in the absence of proof of payment there should be some evidence showing the value of the services rendered. 42 In this connection the following words from a late 3* Kendall v. Albia, 73 Iowa, 241. 35 Brosnan v. Sweetser, 127 Ind. 1; Varnham v. Council Bluffs, 52 Iowa, 698; Capithorne v. Hardy, 173 Mass. 400; 53 N. E. 915; Dormer v. Alcatraz Pav. Co., 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 407. 36 Mo. K. & T. R. Co. v. Holman, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 16; 39 S. W. 130; Crouse v. Chic. & N. W. R. Co., 102 Wis. 196; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 780; 78 N. W. 446, cit- ing some of the cases here given. 37 Goodhart v. Penn. R. R. Co., 177 314 Pa. 1; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 364; 35 Atl. 191; 38 W. N. C. 545. But see Peoria, etc., R. R. Co. v. Johns, 43 111. App. 83. 38 Varnham v. Council Bluffs, 52 Iowa, 698. 39 Capithorne v. Hardy, 173 Mass. 400; 53 N. E. 915. 40 Trapnell v. Red Oak Junction (Iowa), 39 N. W. 884. « Buck v. Peoples, etc., R. Co., 40 Mo. App. 555. 42 Bedford v. Moody (Ind. App. 1899), 55 N. E. 499; Bowsher v. EXPENSES PHYSICAL tXJl l:li § - _'o7 Pennsylvania decision are pertinent: "There was no evidence showing the amount of money expended for these services, nor what the services wen- reasonably worth. '1 "he Learned trial judge, however, held that in estimating the damages the jury should allow for the direct expenses incurred by the plaintiff by reason of the injury, and instructed the jury that 'the mere fact that it docs not appear from the evidence that she has paid her medical aid will not prevent her from recovering in this case for what would reasonably compensate her physicians.' It is quite true, as the learned judge suggests, that the fact that the plaintiff had not paid her physician, would not prevent her recovering the value of his services. I>ut that is not the question. In the absence of any evidence of the value of such services, or what they are reasonably worth, was the plaintiff entitled to recover anything on account thereof ? It seems to us lather singular that when the physicians who rendered these services were on the witness stand, and detailed the character and extent of their services, they were not interrogated as to their value. It is contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that in the light of their testimony 'the average jury, from their own experience, could estimate with considerable accuracy what would be reasonable compensation.' We can- not assent to this proposition. On the contrary, the average juryman is not a professional man and is not presumed to know the value of such services. What would have been reasonable compensation for the medical services rendered the plaintiff might have been shown by the physicians who attended her, or by others who wen 1 acquainted with the value of similar ser- vices in the community in which they were rendered. It was incumbent on the plaintiff before she could recover from the defendant compensation for medical aid, to furnish the jury Chic. B. & Q. R. Co. | L.wa, 1901), 84 N. W. 958; Reed v. Chic. R. 1. ., (N. Y.), 463; 46 N. Y. St. R. 225; 19 10 N. Y. Supp. 105; lti Daly, -'49; 32 N. Y. Supp. 644. N. Y. St. R. 61. But see Wheeler v. 53 Colwell v. Manhattan Ry Co., 57 Tyler S. E. It. Co., 91 Tex. 356; 43S. Hun (N.Y.), 452; 30 N. Y. St. R. 991; W. 876, rev'g 41 S. W. 517, where it is 10 N. Y. Supp. 636. As to recovery held that though the hill has heen for services of nurse, see sec. 305, paid evidence of such fact and of the herein. amount is not sufficient, but the M Western Gas Const. Co. v. Dan- value of the services must be shown. »er (U. S. C. C. A. Cal. ), 97 Fed. And sec Sehiupf v. Sliter, 64 Ilun 882. 317 §§ 260, 201 EXPENSES— PHYSICAL INJURIES. jury to estimate the allowance for this item on a better basis than mere evidence of payment. Proof of payment however, would seem to be some evidence as to the value of the services rendered, or at least, of the amount expended therefor, but would give the jury less foundation upon which to determine whether the amount of the bill was reasonable. Such proof should, however, we believe, be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover for this item of damages, and we cannot view with favor the proposition that he cannot recover therefor on proof of pay- ment alone, but must also show the value of the services rendered. § 260. Expenses in the future — Recovery of. — In actions for personal injuries, where it is sought to recover for prospec- tive or future loss, the rule is that in order to authorize any allowance therefor, the loss must be such as is reasonably certain to ensue. So the rule applies in order that there may be an allow- ance made for the expense of medical attention which will be needed in the future. 55 And the evidence should show what such expenses will be. So an instruction that the plaintiff might recover " his reasonable expenses incident to his condition in the future " was held to be erroneous where there was no evidence showing what the expenses had been or would be, though the necessity of medical care and of the services of an attendant had been shown. 56 § 261. Expense for work of substitute in place of injured person. — Where a person as a result of an injury is incapacitated from his business or occupation, and is under the expense of hiring another person to do the work which he customarily did, he may recover such expense in an action for damages resulting from such injury. 52 But in order to recover this item of dam- ages, it must be alleged in the complaint. 58 56 Feeney v. Long Island R. R. Co., 116 N. Y. 375; 26 N. Y. St. R. 729; 22 X. E. 402, affg 5 N. Y. St. R. 63. 56 McKenna v. Brooklyn H. R. Co., 41 App. Div. (N. Y.) 255; 58 N. Y. Supp. 462. 57 Ashcroft v. Chapman, 38 Conn. 230; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Zeiger, 78 111. App. 463; Langworth v. Green Twp., 88 Mich. 207; 50 N. 318 W. 130; Gumb v. Twenty-Third St. Ry. Co., 114 X. Y. 411; 23 N. Y. St. R. 748. See Lombardi v. California St. Cable Co., 124 Cal. 311; 57 Pac. 66. But see Blackman v. Gardiner Bridge, 75 Me. 514; Chic. R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sheldon, 6 Kan. App. 347; 51 Pac. 808. 58 Gumb v. Twenty-Third St. Ry. Co., 114 N. Y. 411; 23 N. Y. St. R. EXPENSES PHYSICAL INJURIES. § 262 § 262. Expense of repairing wagon. -In an action to recover damages for injuries sustained from being thrown from his wagon as a result of a collision with cars of defendant, evidence that a certain amount was expended in repairing the wagon is declared to be inadmissible, unless it also appear that such repairs were proper and worth the sum paid.™ 748, rev'g 26 J. & S. 7; 30 N. Y. St. R.253;9N. Y.Supp. 316; Haszlacher v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 26 Misc. (X. Y.) 865; 56 N. Y. Supp. 380. See also North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Zeiger, 78 111. App. 463. 69 Edge v. Third Ave. R. Co., 57 App. Div. (N. Y.)29; 67 N. Y. Supp. 1002. 319 § 263 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN J UK Y CASES. CHAPTER XII. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJUKY CASES. 263. Evidence as to plaintiff's con- dition in life. 264. Same subject continued. 265. Evidence as to defendant's condition in life. 266. Evidence as to character of plaintiff — Chastity of fe- male. 267. Evidence as to expectancy of life — Mortality tables. 268. Same subject continued. 269. Same subject continued — Cases. 270. Presumption against serious- ness of injury — Evidence to rebut. 271. Admission in evidence of dep- osition charging attempt to make in j uries appear worse, erroneous — Case. 272. Action against city — Judg- ment roll conclusive in ac- tion on bond. 273. Exemplary damages — Evi- dence in mitigation of. 274. Expert and opinion evidence — Future consequences of physical injuries. 275. Same subject continued. 276. Expert evidence not admissi- ble as to speculative or pos- sible future consequences. 277. Same subject continued. 278. Evidence of physician based on examination of injured person as to his condition. 279. Expert evidence based on statements of injured per- son. 280. Expert and opinion evidence — Appearance and condi- tion before and after injury. 281. Expert evidence as to cause of condition. 282. Same subject continued. 283. Expert evidence — Ordinary results from injury of like character. 284. Expert and opinion evidence — Malpractice — Cases. 285. Opinions as to amount of dam- ages — Elements of damages. 286. Evidence as to feigning — Per- sonal injuries. 287. Hypothetical questions. 288. Expert and opinion evidence — Cases generally. 289. Same subject continued. 290. Statements and complaints of injured person. 291. Same subject continued. 292. Same subject concluded. 293. Physical examination of in- jured person. 294. Same subject continued. 295. Physical examination of plain- tiff — New York. 296. Same subject continued. 297. Exhibiting injuries to jury. 29S. Evidence admissible under pleadings — Cases. 299. Same subject continued. § 263. Evidence as to plaintiff's condition in life.— As a general rule it may be stated that evidence of the financial con- 320 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. dition of the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries or of the fact that he has a wife, children or others dependent upon him for support, is not admissible for the purpose of enhancing the damages. The admission of such evidence would in many cases tend to arouse the sympathy of the jury and cause them to render a verdict in excess of the amount properly justified un- der the facts of the case. 1 So in a late case, 2 it was said : " The court erred in allowing plaintiff to prove that he was a married man with three young children. The United States supreme court in Railroad Company v. Roy 3 held: 'In such a case the injured passenger being entitled only to compensatory damage, evidence of his poverty or the number and ages of his children is irrele- vant."* This court has held such evidence improper and errone- ous. 1 It is very readily perceptible that such evidence appealed 1 Penn. Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Camp (C. C. App. 0th C. ), 54 U. S. App. 110; 81 Fed. 807; 20 C. C. A. 626; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Carroll (C. C. App. 5th C), 52 U. S. App. 44-2; 84 Fed. 772; 28 C. C. A. 207; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 759; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Hulsey, 115 Ala. 193; 22 So. 854; Louisville & X. R. Co. v. Billion, 1<)7 Ala. 645; 18 So. 75; Barbour Co. v. Horn, 48 Ala. 566; Shea v. Potrero, etc., Railroad Co., 44 Cal. 414; Wil- cox v. Wilmington City R. Co. (Del.) 44 Atl. 686; Central R. Co. v. Moore, 51 Ga. 151; Joliet v. Conway, 119111. 489; ION. E. 223; Pittsburgh, F. W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 74 111. 341; Denton v. Ordway, 108 Iowa, 487; 79 \. W. 271; Union P. R. Co. v. Young, 57 Kan. 168; 45 Par. 580: For! Scott! W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Ligbtburn | Kan. App.), 58Pac. 1033; Junction City v. Blades, 1 Kan. App. 85; 41 Pac. 677; Standard Oil Co. v. Tierney, 1:! Ky. L. Rep. 626; 14 L. R. A. 077; 11 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 92; 49 Am. A Eng. R. Cas. 117; 17S. W. 1025; Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill (Md.), 400: Shaw v. Bos- ton, etc., R, R. Co., s Gray (Mass.), 45: Rossv. Kansas City, 48 Mo. App. 21 440; Alberti v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 118 N. Y. 77; 27 N. Y. St. R. 805; 23 N. E. 35, aff'g 43 Hun, 421; Moody v. Osgood, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 628; Galion v. Lauer, 55 Ohio St. 392; 45 N. E. 1044; 37 Ohio L. J. 97; Nutt v. Southern P. R. Co. (Oreg.), 35 Pac. 653; Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Cower, 85 Tenn. 465; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Lyde, 57 Tex. 505; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hamilton, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 76; 42 S. W. 358; Trinity & S. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 600; 46 S. W. 389; Mulcairns v. Zanesville, 67 Wis. 24; 29 N. W. 565. But see Robertson v. Cornelson, 34 Fed. 710; McXamara v. King, 7 111. 432; Hunt v. Chic, etc., II. R. Co., 26 Iowa, 363; Stafford v. Oskaloosa, 64 Iowa, 251; Eltringhamv. Earhart, 07 Miss. 488; Carpenter v. McDavitt, 66 Mo. App. 1; Dailcy v. Houston. 58 Mo. 301; Youne affected by the unchastity of the plaintiff, and that she was entitled to the same amount as a chaste woman, had a tendency to mislead the jury. The court declared that while an unchaste woman might suffer as much mental and physical pain as a chaste woman, yet the jury might not and perhaps ought not to give the same damages to an unchaste woman as they would to a virtuous, intel- ligent and industrious woman who could command good wages or take care of a family, and that the chastity of the plaintiff as well as other personal virtues and business qualifications might properly be considered in determining the amount of damages to be awarded. 33 There are certain actions in which the unchastity of a woman may properly be considered by the jury in deter- mining what, if any. damages she is entitled to recover.' 1 But to hold that in an action for physical injuries the fact of a woman being unchaste may be considered by the jury on the question of damages and that a chaste woman may recover more than an unchaste woman is a proposition of which it is hard to ap- 364; Johnson v. Wells, 6 Nev. 224; Coining v. Corning, (5 X. Y. 97; Mr- Kenzie v. Allen, 3 Strobh. (S. C. I ",4ti. And see Hardy v. Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co., 3(5 Fed. 657. 28 Lord v. Mobile, 113 Ala. 360; 21 So. 866. 29 Corning v. Corning, 6 N. Y. 97. 80 Boyle v. Case, 18 Fed. 880. 31 Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bote- ler, 38 Md. 568. 83 Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Ken- nedy (C. C. App. 2d C.|, 51 T. S. App. 503; 82 Fed. 158. 88 Abbott v. Tolliver, 71 Wis. 74: 36 V W. 622. 84 See chaps. XX, XXI, herein. 325 $§ 207, 268 EVIDENCE IX PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. prove. Unless a woman's chastity is directly involved by the character of the action, it would seem that evidence upon that point would be incompetent on the question of damages and such we believe is the proper rule. § 267. Evidence as to expectancy of life— Mortality tables. — In actions to recover for personal injuries, evidence is admis- sible in certain cases as to the life expectancy of the person injured. 1 * Such evidence is, however, only admissible in those cases where the plaintiff seeks to recover for a permanent injury and where there is some evidence tending to show that such an injury has been sustained, and where proof to this effect has been given, mortality tables such as the Northampton, Carlisle or other standard ones may be admitted for the purpose of showing the life expectancy of the person injured. 36 § 268. Same subject continued. — As to the admissibility of mortality tables in evidence, it has been declared by the United States supreme court that courts may take judicial notice of the Carlisle tables, and may use them for the purpose of esti- mating the probable duration of life without regard to whether 85 Missouri, K. & T. It. Co. v. St. Clair, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 345; 51 S. W. 666; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Simmons, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 501; 33 S. W. 1096; Waterman v. Chic. & A. R. Co. (Wis.), 52 N. \V. 247. 36 Whelan v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 38 Fed. 15; Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Hissong (Ala.), 13 So. 209; Arkansas M. R. Co. v. Griffith, 63 Ark. 491; 39 S. W. 550; Townsend v. Brings (Cal.), 32 Pac. 307: Collins Park & B. R. Co. v. Ware. 112 Ga. 663; 37 S. E. 975; Columbus v. Ogle- tree, 102 Ga. 293; 29 S. E. 749; Co- lumbus v. Sims, 94 Ga. 483; 20 S. E. 332; Savannah, A. & M. R. Co. v. McLeod, 94 Ga. 530; 20 S. E. 434: Huntington v. Burke, 21 Ind. App. 655; 52 X. E. 415; 1 Repr. 435; Stomne v. Hanford Produce Co.', 108 Iowa, 437: 78 X. W. 841; Keyes v. Cedar 326 Falls, 107 Iowa, 509; 78 N. W. 227: Allen v. Ames & C. R. Co., 106 Iowa, 602; 76 N. W. 848; McDonald v. Chic, etc., R. R. Co., 26 Iowa, 124; Greer v. Louisville & X. R. Co., 14 Ky. L. Rep. 876; 21 S. W. 649; Foster v. Village of Bellaire (Mich. 1901), 86 N. W. 383; 8 Det, L. N. 203; Leacli v. Detroit Elec. Ry. Co. (Mich. 1900), 84 N. VV. 316; 7 Det. L. N. 747; Mott v. Detroit (Mich.), 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 113; 79 N. W. 3; 6 Det. L. X. 87; Deisen v. Chic, etc., R. R. Co., 43 Minn. 454; 45 N. W. 864; Swift & Co. v. Holonbeck, 55 Neb. 228; 75 N. W. 584; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 509; Camden & A. R. Co. v. Williams. 01 X. J. L. 646; 40 Atl. 634: 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 600; Campbell v. York, 172 Pa. 205; 33 Atl. 879; Ker- rigan v. Penn. R. R. Co. (Pa. 1899), 44 Atl. 1069; Steinbrunner v. Pitts- EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY ('ASKS. § 2G8 they have l>een introduced in evidence or not. 17 And in New York it is decided that the court may take judicial notice of the Northampton tables, though they arc not put in evidence, since they are referred to and made a part of its nil The admis- sibility of such tables is held not to depend upon the condition of the health of the person whose expectancy of life is a subject of inquiry, bu1 such condition may be considered as a qualifica- tion of the tables in evidence and in determining the probable duration of life. So the existence of a disease, and its ten- dency to shorten the life of the injured person, is to be considered in connection with such tables. 39 But where the jury were in- structed that the plaintiff's expectation of life was " estimated by the Carlisle and oilier life tables at forty to forty-five years, and that they could take that as a means of estimation of what would compensate him for his loss," it Was held that such in- struction was erroneous since it allowed the jury to infer that plaintiff's expectancy was established by the tables, and that they were not to be given such weight in the absence of evi- dence showing that the plaintiff was clearly within the class of lives tabulated therein. 40 It was declared in this case that Car- lisle tables are admissible only as some evidence for the con- sideration of the jury in determining the expectancy of life where that question becomes material, but they are by no means conclusive, and their value depends greatly on similarity of the life in question to the conditions and habits of those tabulated a century ago. While they are some evidence thereof they do not establish plaintiff's expectancy unless by precedent proof ; the person whose life expectancy it is intended to show has brought himself clearly within the class of selected lives tabu- burp, etc., R. R. Co., 146 Pa. St. 504; X. Y. 592, aff'g 46 How. 11; 10 Abb. 23 Atl. 239; .Missouri. K. & T. U. Co. N. S. 19. v. Simmons, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 501; 39 Greer v. Louisville & X. R. Co., 33 S. \Y. 1096; Waterman v. Chic. & 14 Ky. L. Rep. 870; 21 S. W. 649; A. R. Co. (Wis.). 52 N. W. 247. Arkansas, M. R. Co. v. Griffith, 63 -Lincoln v. Power, 151 V. S. 436; Ark. 491; 39 S. W. 550; Camden & 88 I.. Ed. 224; 14 Sup. Ct Rep. 387. A. R. Co. v. Williams, 61 X. J. L 88 Davis v. Standish, 26 Hun (N. Y.), 608. See as to admissibility of such tables in this state, Sauter v. N. Y. C. & II. R. R. Co., 06 N. Y. 50, aff'g 6 Hun. 446; Schell v. Plumb, 55 646; 40 Atl. 634: 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. GOO. "Kerrigan v. Penn. R. R. Co., 194 Pa. St. 98, 105, 106; 44 Atl. 1069. 327 §269 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. lated. But mere proof of age and occupation without evidence of habits or health gives to such tables but little weight, and this is substantially true of tables made up by actuaries of rep- utable insurance companies. 41 In Wisconsin it is held that the annuity tables given in certain statutes 42 of that state form no mathematical basis for the estimation of damages for personal injuries not resulting in death. 43 And in Pennsylvania in an action for personal injury, annuity tables are not admissible. Such a table is based on the average anticipation of death, with- out taking account of capacity to work, indolence, vicious habits or tendency thereto, or diminution of ability to earn. The health, earning power or industry of the particular individual have no place in the calculation. 44 § 269. Same subject continued — Cases. — AVhereit is alleged that the injuries are permanent, it is held that mortality tables are not properly admissible unless there be some evidence as to the value of plaintiff's services. 45 In another case an instruction to the jury which in substance authorized them to determine the yearly amount of the plaintiff's diminished earning capacity and then after multiplying this by the number of years of his expect- ancy of life to reduce the entire amount to its present value was 41 Kerrigan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 194 Pa. 98, 105, 106, per Dean, J., 44 Atl. 1069. This was a case of suit for damages for personal injury to a brakeman on defendant's rail- road, who had his right arm crushed while coupling cars. The plaintiff offered in evidence 2 Scribner on Dower (ed. 1883), pp. 811, 812, 818, containing the Carlisle and other ta- bles for the purpose of showing the expectancy of life of the plaintiff, and it was declared that the offer was gen- eral in its character and pointed to no particular life table as applicable to the special facts of this case. It was not suggested whose lives, or what class of persons, or what the perils of their daily employment or avocation. " The court without the 328 least aid from either counsel admit- ted the offer, we do not doubt inad- vertently, and thus fell into error." Id. 105, per Dean, J. The cases cited in connection with the above text herein are Steinbrunner v. R. Co., 146 Pa. 504; Kraut v. Ry. Co., 160 Pa. 327, and Campbell v. York, 172 Pa. 222. 42 Wis. Rev. Stat. 1898, p. 2461. 43 Crouse v. Chic. & N. W. R. Co., 102 Wis. 196; 78 N. W. 446; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 780. 44 Kerrigan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 194 Pa. 98, 106, 107; 44 Atl. 1069, per Dean, J. 45 Macon, D. & S. R. Co. v. Moore, 99 Ga. 229; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 355; 25 S. E. 460. EVinr.xrr. tn PHYSICAL iN.irirv CASES. §§ 270,271 held not erroneous/' In an earlier case in the same slab- it was decided that in using annuity tables as a basis of earnings and age in an action to recover for personal injuries by which the earning capacity of the plaintiff was diminished one half, there should be made a proportionate deduction for his continuing ability to labor, an allowance for probable decreased ability as a result of old age and for contributory negligence if the jury found that he had been guilty thereof. 47 But where there has been only a partial impairment of ability to earn money, it has been declared error to admit evidence of life expectancy. B In determining the expectancy of life by the use of mortality tables in the case of a minor, the expectancy must be based upon the actual age of the minor and not from the age of twenty-one. although in the absence of evidence of emancipation he cannot recover for loss of earnings prior to his majority. 1 '* Where a person is suing for a physical injury which lias been inflicted upon him, the shortening of his expectancy of life is held not to be recoverable by the person injured. 50 § 270. Presumption against seriousness of injury— Evi- dence to rebut.— Where it appears in evidence that the plain- tiff resumed work shortly after receiving the injury, whatever, if any, presumption may arise against the seriousness of the in- juries from such fact may be rebutted by evidence that circum- stances compelled him to resume his work. 51 § 271. Admission in evidence of deposition charging at- tempt to make injuries appear worse, erroneous— Case. — Where a deposition which charges that the plaintiff is attempt- ing to make his injuries appear worse than they really are is erroneously admitted, the admission thereof is reversible error."'-' « Columbus v. Ogletree, 102 On. •_".>:; ; 29 S. E. 749. See Sees 242-249, herein. « Savannah, R. & M. R. Co. v. Mc- Leod, 94 Ga. 530; 20 S. E. 4:;4. 48 Honey drove v. Lamaster (Tex. Civ. App.), 50 S. W. in.,;*.. 49 Swift & Co. v. Holonbeck, 55 Neb. 228; 79 N. W. 584; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 509. 50 Richmond Gas Co. v. Baker, 140 Ind. GOO; 3(3 L. R. A. 683; 45 N T . E. 1049. C1 Burleson v. Reading. 110 Misc. 512; 68 \. W. 294; 3 Det. L. N. 476; 29 Chic. Leg. News 27. M Boise v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 6 Okla. 243; 51 Pac. 662. 329 S§ 272-274 EVIDENCE IN physical injury cases. § 272. Action against city— Judgment roll conclusive in action on bond. — Where in an action against a city for per- sonal injuries caused by an obstruction placed in the street by contractors for the construction of a sewer, such contractors to- gether with the sureties on the bond had notice of the pendency of the suit and opportunity to defend the same, the judgment roll in such action is conclusive evidence, in an action by the city on a bond indemnifying it from all actions against it for damages for personal injuries, of the existence of the obstruc- tion, of the freedom of the injured party from contributory negligence, and of the amount of the damages. 33 § 273. Exemplary damages— Evidence in mitigation of — Where a person has been injured by the negligence of another and the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff in an action to re- cover therefor tends to show that the negligence was of such a character as to authorize the award of vindictive damages, evi- dence in behalf of the defendant is admissible for the purpose of showing that the negligence was not of such a character, and to thus keep down exemplary damages. So where the complaint in an action by a person who had been injured by the bursting of a steamboat boiler alleged that the engineer was " unlicensed " and that the explosion was due to his negligence and unskill- fullness, and evidence was given tending to show a flagrant violation of duty in employing him, it was held that it was proper for defendant to prove that he was a competent engineer for the purpose of rebutting such evidence and keeping down vindictive damages. 54 § 274. Expert and opinion evidence— Future consequences of physical injuries. — Where medical men have attended and examined an injured person their opinions as to the future con- sequences and permanency of such injuries are admissible in evidence. 55 So the opinion of a physician who has attended an 53 New York v. Brady, 151 N. Y. 611; 45 N. E. 1122. 64 Fay v. Davidson, 13 Minn. 523. « Cunningham v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y.), 49 Fed. Co., 101 Cal. 585; 36 Pac. 125; Denver Tramway Co. v. Reid (Colo. App.), 35 Pac. 269; Chattanooga R. & C. R. Co. v. Huggins, 89 Ga. 494; 15 S. E. 848; 52 Am. & Eng. 439; Healy v. Visalia & T. R. R. Cas. 473; Springfield Consol. R. 330 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.HRY CASES. S 27 I injured person, whether the fact that BUch person had not re- covered from his injuries at the time of the trial would indi- cate that such injuries were permanent, is admissihkv 6 as is also his opinion as to the permanency of the shortening of an in- jured person's leg as a result of an injury, from its known con- dition at the time of the trial.' 7 And again, the opinion of a witness that the plaintiff could, since the injury, perform no duties requiring the slightest physical exercise, and that during his severe attacks he could do nothing and that at his best he cannot do anything but jobs of a light nature has been held properly admitted/* So, also, it is competent for a physician to Co. v. Welsh, 155 111. 511; 40 N. E. 1084, aff'jr 56 m. App. 196; Lake Erie & W. K. Co. v. Wills, 39 111. App. 649; Louisville, N. A. & C. K. Co. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 544; 14 N. E. 572; 12 West. 30:i ; Erickson v. Barber (Iowa), 49 N. W. 838; Hol- man v. Union St. R. Co., 114 Mich. 208; 72 N. W. 202; 9 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. N. S. 105; 4 Det. L. N. 518; Cole v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 05 Mich. 77; 54 N. W. 638; Lang- worthy v. Green Twp., 88 Mich. 207; 50 N. W. 130; Brazil v. Pierson, 44 Minn. 212; 4U \. W. 331; Peterson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Minn. 511; 39 \. W. 4S5 ; Ban v. Kansas City (Mo.), 25 S. W. 562; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Archer, 4H Neb. 907: G5 N. W. 1013: Knoll v. Third Ave. R. Co. I \. V. 1901), CO N. E. 1113, aff'g 40 App. Div. 527: 82 N. V. Supp. 10; Ayres v. Del. L. 6 W. R. Co., 158 X. V. 254; 53N. E. 22; 5 Am. Xeg. Pep. 683, aff'g I App. Div. 511; 40 N. Y. Supp. 11; Gris- wold v. X. V. ('. & II. R. P. Co , 115 X. V. 61; 23 X. Y. St. R. 729; 21 X. E. 72(i; Clegg v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 207; 72 N. Y. St. R. 737: 37 X. Y. Supp. 130, aff'd 54 X. E 1089; Stever v. \. V. C. & II. R. R. Co., 7 App. Div. ( X. Y. ) 302; 39 X. Y. Supp. 941; appeal dis- missed in 151 N. Y. 50: 45 X. E. 371; 64 Alb. L. J. 377: O'Flaherty v. X T assau Elec. R. Co., 34 App. Div. (X. V.) 74; 54 X. V. Supp. 96; 58 Alb. L. J. 347; Barkley v. X. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 35 App. Div. (X. Y.) 228: 54 X. Y. Supp. 760; 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. 218: Reynolds v. Niagara Falls, 81 Hun (X. Y.), 353: 03 X. Y. St. R. 118; 30 X. Y. Supp. 954: McCooey v. Forty-St-cond St. & C. St. Ferry R. Co., 79 Hun | X. Y. ). 255: 61 X. Y. St. R. 34; 29 X. Y. Supp. 368; Saltz- inan v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 73 Hun IX. Y.), 567; 56 X. Y. St. R. 220: 26 X T . Y. Supp. 311; Cannon v. Brook- lyn City P. Co.. 9 Misc. (N. Y.) 2S2; 61 X. Y. St. P. 147: 29 X. Y. Supp. 722; Coyne v. Manhattan P. Co., 42 X. Y. St. R. 017: 16 X. V. Supp. 686; Cook v. X. Y. C. A- II. P. P. Co., 1 N. V. Supp. 711: Sabine & E. T. R. Co. v. Ewing (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 s \v. 638; Curran v. A. II. Stange Co., 9S Mis. 59S; 74 X. W. 377; La-jo v. Walsh, 98 Wis. 348; 74 X. W. 212. '"' Erickson v. Barber (Iowa), 49 X. \Y. 838. i7 Reynolds v. Niagara Falls, 81 Hun (X. Y.), 353; 63 X. Y. St. R. lis; 30 X. Y. Supp. 954. 68 Chattanooga, R. * C. P. Co. v. Hoggins, 89 Ga. 494; 15 S. E. 848; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 473. 331 S 2Y5 EVIDENCE TN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. testify that he knows to a reasonable certainty that the thicken- ing of pleura which he has found will be permanent; 59 that as a result of an injury to a boy his ability to work when on his feet will be somewhat impaired and that he is a cripple, though the witness cannot state the extent of his disability ; m and that a person's life will probably be shortened as a result of the in- juries sustained. 61 § 275. Same subject continued. — It is proper to ask a phy- sician as to the probability of an injuried person's recovery. 88 So it is declared in a late decision that " it is well settled by our decisions that in establishing the future physical and men- tal impairment of which damages may be recovered in such cases, by the testimony of duly qualified witnesses, they may be permitted to give their opinion as to the probability of such disability as a direct and natural effect of the injury in question. In Railway Company v. Wood, 63 it is said : ' The questions asked the medical witnesses were as to the probable results that would follow from an injury described by the witnesses, who testified on the trial. We understand it to be well settled that such questions are proper. . . . The cases cited by counsel are di- rectly against them for they both concede that it is competent to ask an opinion as to probable results, although it is held that merely speculative opinions are not competent.' " w And expert evidence is admissible to show that a person is permanently in- jured under a complaint alleging incapacity to work for a cer- tain length of time past, permanent injury, and that the plaintiff will continue to suffer pain and anguish for the rest of his life. 65 So, also, a physician, who has attended the injured person and has testified as to her condition and the probable cause thereof, may also testify as to what percentage of persons in her con- 59 Eifiuger v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 13 Misc. (N. Y.) 389; 34 N. Y. Supp. 239; 68 N. Y. St. R. 118. 60 Springfield Consol. R. Co. v. Welsh, 155 111. 511; 40 N. E. 1034, aff'g 5G 111. App. 196. 61 Ban- v. Kansas City (Mo.), 25 S. W. 562. « Clegg v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 207; 37 N. Y. St. R. 130, 332 aff'd 54 N. E. 1089; Peterson v. Chi- cago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 38 Minn. 511; 39 K W. 485. 63 113 Ind. 544, 558; 14 N. E. 572, 580. 64 Lake Lighting Co. v. Lewis (Ind. App. 1902), 64 N. E. 35, per Black, J. 65 Taylor v. City of Ballard, 24 Wash. 191 ; 64 Pac. 143. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IX.JCKY CASES. § 276 dition recover their health, his statement being based upon his experience, practice and observation/* And where a medical expert in reply to a question as to the possible future conse- quences of an injury states that there are cases on record of such injuries producing death in future years, such testimony is not inadmissible as in effect permitting the introduction of medical books to the jury, since the reference to such cases is for the purpose of showing the basis of the opinion and information of the witness." So the opinion of medical experts as to the nature and future consequences of personal injuries is admis- sible, though learning derived from the study of standard medi- cal works is the basis of such opinion and not experience ac- quired from actual practice. 08 Again, the testimony of a phy- sician is admissible as to the length of time that a person will live under certain conditions, although he states that he can only give the probability as to this based, on the history of other cases. 69 But a physician cannot be asked his opinion as to the permanency of injuries from his examination of the plain- tiff made a few days after the injury and the history of the case where no evidence touching such history had been given on the trial.™ §276. Expert evidence not admissible as to speculative or possible future consequences. While expert evidence is ad- missible as to the future consequences of an injury, yet to authorize its admission the consequences must be such as are reasonably certain to ensue, and evidence is not admissible as to consequences which it is merely possible may ensue. 71 So where a medical expert declined to say that the future results concern- 66 Cole v. Lake Shore A- Si. S. R. Co., 95 Mich. 77: .-)4 X. W. 638; Budd v. Salt Lake City K. Co.(Utah, 1901 ), 65 Pac. 486. 67 Healy v. Visalia A- T. II. Co., 101 Cal. 585; 30 Pac. 125. 68 Fordyce v. Moore (Tex. Civ. App.), 22 S. W. 235. See also Jack- son v. Boone, !»:: Ga. 662; 20 S. E. 46; 47 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 54; Mo. K. & T. R. Co. v. Rose, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 470: 49 S. W. 133. e» Alberti v. X. Y. L. E. & \V. R. Co., 118 X. Y. 77: G L. K. A. 765; 2 \. V. St. R. 865; •-' X. E. 35; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 201. 7 ° McCabe v. Third Ave. R. Co., 22 Misc. (X. Y.) 707; 50 X. Y. Supp. 34. "Ganiard v. Rochester, C. A B. R. R. Co., 50 Him (X. Y.i. 22; is N. V. St. R. 692; 2 X. Y. Supp. 470; 121 X. Y. 661; Magee v. Troy. 48 Him (X. Y.i, 383; 119 X. Y. 040; Reich- man v. Second Ave. By. Co.. 15 X. 333 §277 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. ing which he was testifying would ensue with reasonable cer- tainty and confessed that there was a certain amount of uncer- tainty in reference thereto, it was held that the testimony was incompetent. 72 So it is error to allow a physician to testify as to the merely possible outbreak of some new disease or suffering due to the original injury," or that the pain and suffering resulting from the injury "might" be permanent. 74 And where the plaintiff was suffering from neuritis, it was held proper to exclude a question as to the effect if such disease extended up- ward so as to affect the spinal cord, since such consequences were too remote and speculative. 75 Again, it is incompetent for a physician to testify that in many cases of injuries similar to those from which plaintiff is suffering, certain consequences result, since such testimony is declared to be speculative and conjectural. 7 " So also for the same reasons was it held improper to admit testimony of a physician that the injury from which plaintiff was suffering was liable to trouble him for several years, and that he knew of a case where an injury of that kind had troubled a man for about thirty years.' 7 §277. Same subject continued. — A question to a medical expert as to what results are likely to follow from the injuries is improper. 7S But a physician may be asked whether he can state with reasonable certainty whether or not injuries are per- manent in their nature. 79 And a question to a physician as to what in his opinion will in the " natural and ordinary course of events " be the result of plaintiff's injuries is not objectionable* Y. St. R. 928; Butler v. Manh. K. Co., 3 Misc. (N~. Y.) 353; 52 N. Y. St. R. 498; 30 Abb. X. Cas. 78; 23 X. Y. Supp. 163. See also sec. 275 herein. 72 De Soucey v. Manhattan R. .Co., 39 N. Y. St. R. 79; 15 N. Y. Supp. 108. 73 O'Brien v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 36 N. Y. St. R. 801; 13 N. Y. Supp. 305. 74 Elsas v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 56 Hun (N. Y.), 161; 30 N. Y. St. R. 414; 9 N. Y. Supp. 210. 75 Yaeger v. Southern Cal. R. R. Co. (Cal.), 51 Pac. 190. 334 ™ Jewell v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 27 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 500; 50 N. Y. Supp. 848. 77 Miley v. Broadway & S. A. R. Co., 29 N. Y. St. R. 107; 8 N. Y. Supp. 455. 78 Atkins v. Man. R. Co., 57 Hun (N. Y.), 102; 32 N. Y. St. R. 214; 10 N. Y. Supp. 432. 79 Cass v. Third Ave. R. Co., 20 App. Div. (N. Y.) 591; 47 N. Y. Supp. 356. 80 Loudoun v. Eighth Ave. R. Co., 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 152; 44 N. Y. Supp. 742. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.M'i:\ CASES. § J7- So, also, a physician may testily as to what would be the future result judging from the present condition of the plaintiff as in- dicated from her testimony and assuming it to he true. 8 And where a medical expert in stating his opinion that the plaintiff would never recover, qualified it by adding "so far as to be capable of any persistent occupation," it was decided that such qualification was not a second speculative opinion based upon the first opinion and was not objectionable.* 2 Again, where a plaintiff was suffering from spinal irritation, it was held that the testimony of an expert that he was inclined to think that such irritation would prove permanent and that certain conditions and results were produced by permanent spinal irritation was not obnoxious to the objection that it was merely conjectural. s! And it was similarly determined where a physician had testified that from the fact that a wound had once broken out it was liable to do so again and he was asked whether such result was prob- able and likely to occur." 4 So, also, where, the plaintiff was suffering from a fracture of a leg, it was held that a medical witness might testify as to the probability of complete recovery therefrom and that such evidence was not objectionable as being too remote and speculative. 85 Again, it has been decided that a physician may be asked whether a " direct hernia " ever becomes dangerous to life or dangerous or painful in any way, where such question calls for no opinion as to some possible future complication, but rather as to some result which may ensue from existing conditions. 86 § 278. Evidence of physician based on examination of injured person as to his condition. — Where a personal ex- amination has been made by a physician of an injured person, the testimony of such physician as to the details of such examina- 81 Mitchell v. Tacoma R. & M. Co., 13 Wash. 560; 43 Pac. 528. 82Lehi£h & II. II. R. Co. v. Mar- chant (C. C. App. 2d. C), 84 Fed. 870 ; 55 U. S. App. 427 : 28 C. C. A .544- WMahar v. New York C. A- II. 1!. R.Co., 20 App. Div. (V V.) 161; 40 N. V. Supp. 847. M Penny v. Rochester R. Co., 7 App. Div. (N. Y.) 595; 40 N. Y. Supp. 172; 71 N. V. Si. R. 732. w Rhinefl v. Royalton, 40 N. V. St R. 662; i:> X. V. Supp. 944. ^Stever v. Now York C. & II. R. R. Co., 7 A pp. Div. (X. Y.)892; 39 X. Y. Supp. 1)44 ; appeal dismissed in 151 N. Y. 50; 45 N. E. 371: 54 Alb. L. J. 377. 335 § 278 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. tion is admissible in evidenced So the attending physician may testify as to the condition of a person when she reached her home and he first examined her, 88 and as to the plaintiff's subjective symptoms, 89 and as to any flinching or exclamations of the injured person when he pressed upon certain portions of the body. 93 And where a physician testified that he observed certain symp- toms in his examination of the plaintiff from which the existence of a certain disease might be inferred, it was held that the fact that he did not have such disease in mind at the time of such examination or make a special examination in reference thereto, did not make such testimony inadmissible. 91 Again, where an examination of the plaintiff by the physician was made two years after the injury, it was decided that his testimony as to the plaintiff's condition at that time was not rendered inadmissible by reason of the fact that he was unable to state the cause of such condition, where it appeared from other evidence that prior to the accident the .plaintiff was sound and well, but subsequent thereto was unable to do hard work. 92 Where, however, a phy- sician examines an injured person merely for the purpose of be- coming a witness in the plaintiff's behalf or for any purpose other than advice or treatment, it is held that he cannot testify as to statements or complaints made by the plaintiff at the time of such examination in reference to his symptoms, sufferings or condition. 93 But where statements have been made by the plain- tiff to his attending physician in order to enable the latter to prescribe for him, the physician may testify in reference thereto. 94 87 Stone v. Moore (Iowa), 49 N. W. 76; Sherwood v. Chic. & W. M. R. R. Co., 88 Mich. 108; 50 N. W. 101; Jones v. Chic. St. P. M. & O. R. Co. (Minn.), 45 N. W. 444; Eifinger v. Brooklyn H. R. Co., 18 Misc. (N. Y.) 389; 34 N. Y. Supp. 239; 68 N. Y. St. R. 118. 88 Griffith v. Utica & M. R. R. Co., 4:5 X. Y. St. R. 835; 17 N. Y. Supp. 692. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Civ. App. 93; 40 S. «9 Gulf C. Brown, 16 Tex. W. 608. 90 Zingrebe v. 336 Union Ry. Co., 56 App. Div. ( N. Y. ) 555 ; 67 N. Y. Supp. 554. 91 Chicago, St. L. & P. R. R. Co. v. Spilker (Ind.), 32 Am. L. Reg. 763; 33 N. E. 280, reh'g denied 34 N. E. 218. 92 Hall v. St. Joseph Water Co., 48 Mo. App. 356. 93 Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. Co. v. Y T okes, 12 Ohio C. C. 499; 1 Ohio C. D. 599. See Abbot v. Heath, 84 Wis. 314; 54 N. W. 574. 94 Gulf C. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Brown, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 93; 40 S. W. 608. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.IIUV CASES. 6 279 And an attending physician who has testified as to complaints as to pains made by the injured person may express his opinion as to the nature and extent of the in juries/ 6 So in a case in Illinois it is declared that where, from a personal examination of the plaintiff, an expert witness has formed an opinion in refer- ence to sueh injury, such opinion is admissible in evidence for whatever it may be worth. 96 § 279. Expert evidence based on statements of injured person. — The testimony of an expert in an action for personal injuries may be based in part upon the statements of the injured person where such statements are made to the physician for the purpose of medical treatment.'' 7 And a physician may from knowledge gained by an examination and inquiries of the injured person state the conclusions at which he has arrived.'* So the opinion of a physician based in part upon the statements of the person injured may be given as to the nature and extent of the injury," and as to the probable duration of physical suffering and disability. 100 And where a medical expert on cross-examina- tion testified that his opinion as to a person's physical condition was based on the facts stated by the patient, it was decided that the court properly refused to strike out such opinion, it not appearing any of the statements related to past events. 1 Hut the opinion of a physician that his patient's condition might readily have followed as a result of the injury complained of is inadmissible where no evidence is given showing the statements upon which it was based.' And where a deposition of the pa- tient had been made relating to the injury, it was declared that 96 Austin & N. W. K. R. Co. v. Mo- Elmurry ( Tex. Civ. App. ), 38 S. W. 249. 96 Cliatsworth v. Rowe, 161)111. 114; 40 \\ E. 7(5:5, aff'g 66 111. App. •">•".. 97 Cunan v. A. 11. Stange Co.. 98 Wis. 598; 74 \. W. ■'". See also Jones v. Chicago St. P. M. & O. R, Co. (Minn). 45 X. W. 444; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Click (Tex. Civ. App.), 32 S. W. 226. 9S Chicago. St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Spilker iliul.), :*.:'. N. E. 280; 32 Am. Leg. Rep. 763, reh'g denied.34 N. E. •j is. • )•; ''"Louisville, X. A. A- C. R. Co. v. Snider, 117 [nd. 435; 3 L. R. A. 434; 20 \. E. 284; .Johnson v. Northern 1'. R. R. Co., 47 Minn. 430: 50 V W. 47:1. 100 Consol. Tract. Co. v. Lambert- son. .".'•• X. J. L. 297; 36 Atl. 100, aff'd 38 Atl. 683. i Fulmore v. St. Paul City R. Co., 72 Minn. 448; 75 X. W. 589; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 636. -' Van Winkle v. Chicago. M. & St. P. li. R. Co. (Iowa), 61 X. W. 929. 280 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. it would not be assumed in the absence of any evidence as to the statements upon which the opinion of the physician was based, that it was based upon the same statements as those con- tained in the deposition. 3 So the opinion of an expert as to a person's condition and the probable future result of his injuries is not admissible where founded only upon statements made by such person a year after the accident, not for the purpose of securing the physician's medical services and aid, but merely to qualify him as an expert. 4 Nor is the opinion of a physician as to the plaintiff's condition admissible in evidence where founded in part upon the statements of third persons. 5 § 280. Expert and opinion evidence — Appearance and con- dition before and after injury. — A witness, whether he be an expert or not, who knew the person injured both prior and sub- sequent to the injury, may testify to his apparent physical condition at both periods, since this is a matter of ordinary observation. 6 So witnesses who are not experts may testify that prior to the accident they had seen the plaintiff about her household work and that she was apparently healthy and had a rosy complexion, but not afterwards ; 7 or that before the accident plaintiff's complexion was strong and healthy looking, but that 3 Van Winkle v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R. Co. (Iowa), 61 N. VV. 929. 4 Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Roalefs (C. C. App. 3d C), 70 Fed. 21; 28 U. S. App. 569; 16 C. C. A. 601. 5 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R. Co. v. Sheldon, 6 Kan. App. 347; 51 Pac. 808. eHealy v. Visalia & T. R. Co., 101 Cal. 585 ; 36 Pac. 125 ; District of Col. v. Haller (D. C. App.), 22 Wash. L. Rep. 761 ; North Chic. St. R. Co. v. Gillow, 166 111. 444 ; 46 N. E. 1082, aff'g 64 111. App. 516 ; West Chic. St. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 165 111. 496 ; 46 N. E. 368, aff'g 64 111. App. 539 ; 1 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 341 ; Chicago City R. Co. v. Van Vleck, 143 111. 480 ; 32 N. E. 262 ; Chicago St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Spilker (Ind.), 33 X. E. 280 ; 338 32 Am. L. Reg. 763, reh'g denied 34 N. E. 218 ; Weber v. Creston, 75 Iowa, 16 ; 39 N. W. 126 ; Gardner v. Detroit St. R. Co., 99 Mich. 182 ; 58 N. W. 49 ; Reardon v. Missouri P. R. Co. (Mo.), 21 S. W. 731 ; Hewitt v. Eisenbart, 36 Neb. 794 ; 55 N. W. 252; Quinn v. O'Keefe, 9 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 68 ; 41 N. Y. Supp. 116 ; Can- non v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 9 Misc. (N. Y. ) 282 ; 61 N. Y. St. R. 147 ; 29 N. Y. Supp. 722 ; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. 1007 ; Sanson v. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159; 18 L. R. A. 627 ; 16 S. E. 564; Bridge v. Oshkosh, 71 Wis. 363; 37 N. W. 409. 7 Cannon v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 9 Misc. (N. Y.) 282; 29 N. Y. Supp. 722; 61 N. Y. St. R. 147. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURE CASES. since such injury she looked pale, delicate and unhealthy. 8 Si. evidence is admissible as to the difference in plaintiff's weight before and after the accident. 9 And where a witness testified that she had seen the plaintiff several times directly after the injury, and had then seen him again about a month after that, and she described the apparent condition of the plaintiff, it was held that the opinion of the witness that the plaintiff had grown worse in the interval was admissible. 1 " The plaintiff may also testify as to the condition of his health before and after an in- jury. 11 Photographs of a person taken prior to an injury sus- tained by him may be admissible for the purpose of showing his physical appearance at the time taken, provided there is no direct evidence in reference thereto, but where direct evidence may be easily obtained, it is no abuse of discretion to exclude a photograph. 12 § 281. Expert evidence as to cause of condition.— The opinion of a physician is admissible as to the cause of an in- jured person's condition. 1:: So upon an issue whether a fall upon a defective sidewalk or a disease of several years' stand- ing was the cause of paralysis, it was held that a medical ex- pert might, in answer to a hypothetical <|uestion, state his opinion as to the proximate cause of such paralysis. 14 But the opinion of a physician based on the examination of a witness and the facts stated, and the testimony given during the trial, is not admissible as to the cause of such witness's condition, 1 "' although in another case it was decided that where medical ex- 8 Cannon v. Brooklyn City R. Co., it Misc.(N. V.i 282; 29 \. Y. Supp. 722;61 X. V. St. R. 147. "Quinn v. O'Keefe, 9 App. Div. (N. Y.i 68; 41 X. Y. Supp. ut;. 10 Louisville, X. A. & C. R. Co. v. \V.»,xl (Ind.), 14 X. K. 572. uWest Chicago St. R. Co. v. Can-, 170 111. 478; 48 X. E. 992, aff'g67 111. App. 530. !- Gilbert v. West End St. R. Co., 100 Mass. 40:5: .",(1 X. E. 60. 1:1 Flaherty v. Towers. 167 Mass. 61; 44 X. E. 1074: Tullis v. Rankin, C X. D. 44; 35 L. R, A. 449; 68 X. W. 187; St. Louis S. W. K. Co. v. Freed - man. 18 Tex. Civ. App. 533: 46 S. W. 101. " Bowen v. Huntington, 35 W. Va. 682; 14 S. E. 217. See Crone v. Chic. & X. W. R. R. Co., 102 Wis. 196; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 780: 78 X. W. 446. •■ McGuire v. Brooklyn II. R. Co., 30 App. Div. (X. Y.) 227: 51 X. Y. Supp. 1075. See Page v. New York, 57 Hun iX. Y.i, 123; 32 \. Y. St. R. 563; 10 X. Y. Supp. 826: Yusherg v. Putney, 78 Wis. si; 17 X. W. 09. § -82 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. perts had heard the plaintiff give part of her testimony, and had heard the balance read, they might express their opinion as to the cause of a miscarriage, assuming such testimony to be true. 16 Again, where it was claimed that a miscarriage was the result of an injury, it was held that it was competent for the plaintiff's physician to testify that such miscarriage might be traced to the injury. 17 And where a medical witness had tes- tified to the existence of a bruise and fracture, and of a subse- quent abscess and inflammation in the same place, it was de- clared that he might express his opinion whether the former were the cause of the latter. 18 So in other cases it has been com- petent for a physician to testify as to what in his opinion pro- duced the symptoms which he observed in plaintiff's case, 19 and whether plaintiff's condition when he last called was due to the injuries as he discovered them on his first visit, 20 and whether the physical condition in which he found an injured person could have resulted from the injury; 21 and again whether plain- tiff's suffering could have resulted from the accident, 22 or his physical condition and suffering at the time of the trial, 23 or the impairment of his nervous system. 24 § 282. Same subject continued — A physician who has at- tended the plaintiff may testify whether any other cause ex- isted which might have produced his condition as testified to by him. 25 So, also, the opinion of a physician whether fright i 6 McKeon v. Chicago, M. & S. P. R. R. Co., 94 Wis. 477; 35 L. R. A. 252; 69 N. W. 175; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 175. See also Mitchell v. Ta- coma R. & M. Co., 13 Wash. 560: 43 Pac. 528. 17 <;ihbons v. Phoenix, 39 N. Y. St. R. 658: 15 N. Y. Supp. 410. See State v. Ginger, 80 Iowa, 574; 40 N. W. 057. 18 Stouter v. Manhattan R. Co., 38 X. Y. St. R. 162; 27 N. E. 805. 1 9 Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Wood (Inch), 14 N. E. 572. 20 McDonald v. Illinois C. R. Co. (Iowa), 55 N. W. 102. 21 Hunter v. Third Ave. R. Co., 21 Misc. (N. Y.i 1; 40 N. Y. Supp. 340 1010, affg 20 Misc. 432; 45 N. Y. Supp. 1041. But see Chic. R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sheldon, 6 Kan. App. 347; 51 Pac. 808. 22 Tnrner v. Newburgh, 109 N. Y. 301; 16 N. E. 344; 12 Cent. 215. 23 McDonald v. New Y'ork C. & St. L. R. R. Co., 13 Misc. (N. Y.) 651; 34 N. T. Supp. 921. But see Chi- cago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Sheldon, 6 Kan. App. 347; 51 Pac. 808. 24 Clegg v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 207; 37 N. Y. St. R. 130, aff'd 54 N. E. 1089. 25 Friess v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 07 Hun (N. Y.), 205; 51 N. Y. St. R. 391; 22 N. Y. Supp. 104. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.M'UY CARER. 8 283 would produce heart trouble is admissible. 9 And in a where it was claimed that retroversion of the woifab was ca by the injury, it was held proper to permit a medical experl to testify that a blow upon the stomach would produce such effect.' 7 So, again, testimony that a person's condition could have been produced by contact with a heavily charged electric wire has been held admissible.-" And whore it was claimed by the defendant that the serious results complained of by the plaintiff as arising from a fall were, in fact, caused by a per- manent ailment affecting plaintiff's whole system, it was decided that expert evidence that a breast trouble not alleged in the complaint might have been aggravated by the fall, was admis- sible for the purpose of rebutting such claim and to corroborate the testimony of the plaintiff that it broke out anew as a result thereof, though such evidence was not admissible in aggravation of damages.-"' In those cases where evidence has been given tending to show that the condition of the plaintiff is attributable to a cause for which the defendant is responsible, it is held that the witnesses giving such testimony may be cross-examined for the purpose of showing that such condition is in part attribu- table to other causes.* § 283. Expert evidence — Ordinary results from injury of like character. — A medical expert who has properly qualified may be asked what symptoms or results ordinarily and neces- sarily accompany or follow an injury such as that which the plaintiff has sustained, the purpose of such evidence being to show that the plaintiff's condition is a result of the injury." So, 20 Illinois C. K. Co. v. Latimer, L28 111. 103; 21 N. E. 7. 27 Cannon v. Brooklyn City K. Co., 9 Misc. (X. V.) 282; 61 N. Y. St. R. 147; 29 X. Y. Supp. 7-22. " Block v. Milwaukee St. R. Co., 89 Wis. 371; 27 L. R. A. 305; 01 X. W. 1101. 29 Fuller v. Jackson, 92 Mich. 197: 52 N. W. 1075; 21 Wash. L. Rep. 378: 12 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 173. See also Niendorf v. Manhattan R. Co., 4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 4G; 38 N. Y. Supp. 090. w West Chic. St. R. Co. v. Reddy, 09 111. App. 53; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 17:;. :!l Cole v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 159 X. Y. 59: 53 X. E. 670, affg 87 H uu (N. Y.l, 584: 34 N. V. Supp 572. See also Evansville & T. II. R. R, Co., 116 Ind. 440: 19 X. E. 310; L. R. A. 450: Louisville, N. A. & C. K. Co. v. Wood (Ind.). 14 X. E. 572: ( 'rites v. New Richmond, 98 Wis. 55: 73 N. W. 322. 341 §§ 284, 285 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.HRY CASES. where a medical expert testified that the injury which the plain- tiff had sustained was a severe sprain, it was held proper for him to state what results usually accompany or follow such an in- jury. 32 But it has been declared improper to ask a physician whether he can. state with reasonable certainty that the conse- quences which have followed a certain injury are natural and usual. 35 § 284. Expert and opinion evidence — Malpractice — Cases. — In an action for malpractice where it was claimed that a wounded thumb had been negligently treated, it was decided that a physician might examine the thumb in the presence of the jury and exhibit and describe its condition to them. 34 But where in a like action it was claimed by the defendants that they were prevented by the parents of the injured child from re- dressing a broken arm on a certain night, it was held that it would be incompetent as calling upon the witness to pass on the testimony to ask a physician who had no personal knowledge of the case, whether he would trace any of the results he had heard stated in evidence to the failure to redress the arm on that night. 53 And where a witness was called upon to testify whether proper treatment had been given in a certain case, it was de- termined that he could not testify whether his opinion was " sustained amply by the authorities " since this would indi- rectly call for statements from medical books. 36 So also, where a defendant testified that he had treated twenty-five or thirty cases of a Colles fracture, it was held that he could not testify as to the results in such cases since specific acts were held not to be competent on the question of general reputation as to skill. 3 ' § 285. Opinions as to amount of damages — Elements of damages.— The opinion of the plaintiff as to the amount of 32 Crites v. New Richmond, 98 Wis. 55; 73 N. W. 322. 33 Page v. New York, 57 Hun ( N". Y.), 123; 32 N. Y. St. R. 563; 10 .V. V. Supp. 82G. 34 Freeman v. Hutchinson, 15 Ind. App. fi39; 43 N. E. 1G. 342 35 Link v. Sheldon, 18 N. Y. Supp. 815. 36 Link v. Sheldon, 18 N. Y. Supp. 815. 37 Link v. Sheldon, 18 N. Y. Supp. 815. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.MUY CASES. *-'*'• damages which lie has suffered as a result of a personal injury, is not admissible. 86 Thus it was so held in an action for mal- practice, it being declared that instead of the plaintiff's opinion, all the facts bearing on such question should be presented to the jury. 89 And again, in an action by a parent for an injury to his child, a question to the parent as to the amount of damage he thought he had sustained by reason of such injury, taking into consideration the value of the child's services until his twenty-first year, together with the trouble and expense caused, should, it was held, be excluded. 4 " But it is held that the admission of evidence as to the amount of damages, though it may be incompetent, is not reversible error where a larger verdict would be justified from the uncontroverted competent evidence. 41 So also, the opinions of witnesses are not admissible as to what plaintiff would be capable of earning in some em- ployment or vocation in which he had never been engaged as bearing upon the question of loss of time. 42 But the plaintiff may give his opinion as to the fair and reasonable pecuniary value of his services by the day during the period of his dis- ability from work as a result of the injury. 43 So also, in actions of this nature, the plaintiff's attending physician may testify as to the value of the services rendered by him to the plaintiff in connection with the injury. 14 And a person who takes care of and nurses an injured person is competent to express an opinion as to the value of such services. 45 Opinions of experts, however, are not absolutely binding upon the jury as to the value of services rendered, but the jury are to exercise their own judg- ment after a consideration, not only of the expert evidence, but 38 Pierce v. Lutesville, 25 Mo. A.pp. 317. See also Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Snedeger, 5 Kan. App. 700; 49 Pac. 103. 89 Bain v. Cushman, GO Vt. 343; 15 Atl. 171; 6 X. Eng. 805. « Hurt v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. (Mo.), 7 S. W. 1. 41 Keller v. Oilman, 93 Wis. 9; 66 X. W. 800. "Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Chance, 57 Kan. 40; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 328; 45 Pac. 60. 43 Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Bivans, 142 111. 401; 32 X. E. 456, afTg 42111. App. 450. « Williams v. West Hay City, 119 Mich. 395; 71 X. W. 328; 5 Det. L. X. 845. *6Wahl v. Shoulder, 14 Ind. App. CO:,; 43 N. E. 458. See Keenan v. Getsinger, 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 172; 73 X. Y. St. R. 413; 37 X. Y. Supp. 826. 343 §§ 286, 2e disallowed merely because it omitted to make any mention of an improvement in some of the functions of the arm.'' In another ease the question, " Suppose during the first three months of the confinement of the patient, the attending surgeon would re- move the splint for the purpose of permitting the bones to rub against each other and would put the splint hack again, ami you found the condition you now find, would you say the present condition is the result of proper or improper treatment ? " was held not sufficiently comprehensive and therefore not a proper hypothetical question.' § 288. Export and opinion evidence— Cases generally — Where in an action for personal injuries it was claimed that the plaintiff's arm had been injured, testimony of a medical ex pert was declared to be admissible to determine whether an in- jured condition could co-exist with the plaintiffs ability to use the arm in the manner witnessed by the jury ; B and a physician who has examined a plaintiff may testify whether the existence of certain symptoms as shown to exist in plaintiff's case indi- cated a disordered eondition of the spinal cord. a So also, a physician may be asked whether since the trial commenced he has seen sufficient of the plaintiff to be able to state whether or not an abnormal nervous condition exists in his ease."' 7 And a physician may testify that the plaintiff was examined while under the influence of chloroform and as to her condition at the time of such examination where the chloroform was given as part of the treatment and there was no evidence given to M Illinois C. R. Co. v. Criffin (('. C. A pp. 7th C. ), 53 I". S. A pp. 22; 25 C. 0. A. 413; SO Fed. 278. 88 Cass v. Third Ave. R.Co.,20App. Div. (N. Y.) 591; 47 N. Y. Supp. 856. 64 Atchison v. Acheson, Kan. App. 33 ; 57 Pac. 248. 55 Craves v. Battle ('reck. !>."> Mich. 266; 19 L. R. A. 041; 54 X. VV. 757. ^Qninn v. O'Keefe, '.i App. Div. iN. 7.) 68; n v v. Supp. 116. • [llinois C. R. Co. v. Griffin (C. C. App. 7th <'.). 80 Fed. 278; 26 C. C. A. 413; 53 U. S. App. 22. 345 § 288 EVIDENCE TN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. show that it was unnecessary to have administered it or that it was given for the purpose of the trial of the case. 58 So where plaintiff is suing to recover for injuries resulting in an abortion, it is proper to ask a medical expert, " How would these troubles, affect the nervous system ? " K And again, where plaintiff's eye had been injured, it is competent in an action to recover damages therefor for a physician to express the opinion that it was necessary to remove the eye in order to save the sight of the other which was endangered by sympathetic in- flammation. 60 But a question to a physician as to the symptoms he treated the plaintiff for between the time of the injury and the trial, " due entirely to the injuries she received at the time of the accident," was held to be improper, since, if the witness were allowed to answer such question it would be permitting him to usurp the functions of the jury. 61 And a medical ex- pert in reply to a question as to the treatment and course of disease in plaintiff's case as a result of the injury will not be per- mitted to enter into a general discussion of the disease, the causes producing it and also the possible results thereof, in the absence of any opinion as to the course of such disease in the plaintiff's case. 62 So the opinion of an expert whether a seaman who had been injured was competent to perform the duties of a quartermaster was held inadmissible. 63 Again, in an action to recover for an injury by which plaintiff's leg was broken and the character of the injury had been fully and minutely described by a physician, it was decided that he might also testify as to the position of the leg and the point from which the blow came. 64 And a physician may be asked whether an examination of an injured person was conducted in a superficial or in a careful and thorough manner, the answer to such question not 58 Holman v. Union St. R. Co., 114 I 62 Swenson v. Brooklyn H. R. Co., Mich. 208; 72 N. W. 202; 9 Am. & 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 69; 36 N. Y. Supp. Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 105 ; 4 Det. L. N. 518. 59 Powell v. Augusta & S. R. Co., 445; 71 X. Y. St. R. 496. 63 Eldrirlge v. Atlas Steamship Co., 77 Ga. 192; 3 S. E. 757. 58 Hun (N. Y.), 96; 33 N. Y. St. R. 60 Reed v. Madison, 85 Wis. 667; 1016; 10 N. Y. Supp. 468. 56 N. W. 182. 61 Atkins v. Manh. R. Co., 57 Hun (N. Y.), 102; 32 N. Y. St. R. 214; 10 N. Y. Supp. 432. 346 64 Johnson v. Steam Guage & L. Co., 146 N. Y. 152; 66 N. Y. St. R. 276; 40 N. E. 773. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY OASES. §289,290 being considered as a substitution of the opinion of the witness for the judgment of the jury." § 289. Same subject continued. In the case of non-pro- fessional witnesses their opinions as to the physical condition or pain suffered by an injured person are admissible in evidence when based upon personal observations of the person while in attendance upon him,™ although in a case in Pennsylvania it was decided that a daughter of the injured person, not an ex- pert, was incompetent to testify that her mother suffered in her head and stomach." 7 And testimony by the plaintiff that his head would never be the same as it was.' is or that lie would never recover from his injuries or be able to do a good day's work, is not admissible. 61 ' Again, it has been held that the plaintiff is incompetent to express his opinion that his injuries are perma- nent. 10 Where a plaintiff has received a physical injury, and has exhibited such injury to the jury, it is determined that the defendant is not obliged to accept such experts as may he agreed upon by the parties and appointed by the court to examine such injury, but is entitled to select his own experts. 71 § 290. Statements and complaints of injured person.— Statements, exclamations, or complaints made by the injured person to an attending physician as to his pain and suffering and the symptoms, when they relate to the part of tin- body in- jured, are admissible in evidence." In this connection it is said 66 Northern P. K. Co. v. Urlin, L58 U.S. 271; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840; 39 L. Ed. 977. «« Shelby v. Clagett, 46 Ohio St. 549; 5 L. K. A. 606; 22 N. E. 407; 22 Ohio L. J. 294; Saddles v. Chic. & N. W. K. Co. (Wis. ) 40 N. W. 115; Girard Coal Co. v. Wiggins, 52 111. App. 69. « Lombard & S. St. Pass. R. Co. v. Christian, 124 Pa. St. Ill: L6 Ail. 628; 23 W. N. C. 27:'-; 46 Phila. Leg. Intel. 210; 19 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 404. «8Pfan v. Alteria. 23 Misc. |N. Y.) 693; 52 N. Y. Supp. 88. 69 Pride v. Charles Warner Co.. 1 Perm. (Del.) 462: 42 All. 699. "'Atlanta St. K. Co. v. Walker, 93 Ga. 462; 21 S. E. 48. "Chicago, R. I. & T. U. Co. v. Langston, 92 Tex. 709: 51 S. \V. 331, modifying on reh'g, 50 S. W. "'7 4, which affirms 47 S. W. 1027; 48 Cent. L. J. 35; 4SS. \\\ (ilO. 72 Globe Ace. Ins. Co. v. Gerisch, 163 111. 625; 45 N. E. 563; Peirce v. Jones. 22 Ind. App. 163; 53 V E. 431; 1 Repr. 864: Jackson Co. Comrnrs. v. Nichols ( Ind. ), 47 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 198: 38 N. E. 526: 347 S 201 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. in a late case : " Testimony of other witnesses was admissible of such complaints of pain by the plaintiff after the accident as might properly be regarded as expressive and elicited by existing feeling. ' An individual receives a wound and before his recov- ery complains of suffering from it. His complaint is evidence of his suffering and its degree because it is the natural language of the feelings which such a cause produces. . . . ' ffl But un less the complaints are made to a physician with a view to medi- cal treatment, 74 the proof should be limited upon proper objection to such complaints as are the natural and instinctive expres- sions of present suffering. Evidence is not admissible of com- plaints which are but narrations of past sufferings, 75 or which consist simply of answers to questions or are merely descriptive statements or assertions of the existence of present suffering, Tf ' or which though made to a physician are with a view of using him as a witness at the trial." 7; §291. Same subject continued.— Under the rule stated in the preceding section complaints of a child have been held ad- missible where made during an examination of the injured parts by the attending physician.' 8 And complaints made by the in- jured person to his physician of pain in his chest, side and leg, Smith v. Dawley (Iowa), 60 N. W. 625; Mott. v. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. (Jo. (Mich.), 15 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. N. S. 113: 79 X. W. 3; 6 Det. L. N. 87; People v. Foglesong, 116 Mich. 556; 74 N. W. 730; 5 Det. L. N. 51; Brusch v. St. Paul City R. Co. (Minn.), 55 N. W. 57; Omaha St. R. Co. v. Emminger, 57 Neb. 240; 77 N. W. 675; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 188; Martin v. Wood, 23 N. Y. St. R. 457; 5 N. Y. Supp. 274, aff'g 18 N. Y. St. R. 274; 4 N. Y. Supp. 208; Geiler v. Manhattan R. Co., 11 Misc. (N. Y.) 413; 65 N. Y. St. R. 437; 32 N. Y. Supp. 254; Weiser v. Broad- way & N. St. R. Co., 10 Ohio C. C. 14; 2 Ohio Dec. 463; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Saunders, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 5; 33 S. W. 245; Block v. Mil- 348 waukee St. R. Co., 89 Wis. 371; 27 L. R. A. 365; 01 N. W. 1101. 73 State v. Dart, 29 Conn. 153-155; 36 Am. Rep. 51. 74 Wilson v. Town of Granby, 47 Conn. 59-76; 36 Am. Rep. 51. 75 Rowland v. Railroad Co., 63 Conn. 415-419; 28 Atl. 102. 76 Williams v. Ry. Co., 68 Minn. 55- 59; 70 N. W. 860; 37 L. R. A. 199; Keller v. Town of Oilman, 93 Wis. 9; 66 N". W. 800. 77 Martin v. Sherwood ( Conn. 1902 ), 51 Atl. 526, per Hall, J., citing on this last point, Darrigan v. Railroad Co., 52 Conn. 285-309 ; 52 Am. Rep. 590. 78 Martin v. Wood, 23 N. Y. St. R. 457; 5 N. Y. Supp. 274, aff'g 18 N. Y. St. R. 274; 4 N. Y. Supp. 208; 1 Sil. S. C. 212. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.ICRV CASES. § 292 and that his wrist hurt him have been admitted.'' So also, evi- dence by the attending physician of an injured person, that dur- ing his attendance of several weeks the plaintiff complained of pain, and indicated the locality of same, is admissible in connec- tion with a description of the symptoms which he observed. 8 And where a physician made an examination solely for the pur- pose of ascertaining the extent of the person's alleged injuries, exclamations or complaints made by such person apparently in response to the manipulations by the physician of members of plaintiff's body were admitted. 81 And though exclamations or complaints of an injured person may be made some time after an injury, yet if they are indicative of present existing pain or suf- fering at the time made, they are admissible.^ So such state- ments are not inadmissible because made while suit was pending if they were of such a character as to be admissible if made before suit was brought. 83 ^ 292. Same subject concluded. — Persons other than a physician or nurse may testify to exclamations of pain made by an injured party. 81 So a witness to whose house an injured person was taken after an injury was permitted to testify as to complaints of pain and suffering made by such person on the morning after the accident.^' And where a child of tender years was injured by stepping into a hole in a defective sidewalk, exclamations of pain made by such child in his own home under circumstances indicating that they were the natural and ordinary expressions caused by suffering are admissible. 86 But in another 78 Missouri, K. & T. II. Co. v. .v. Rapid R. Co., 119 Mich. 512; 78 Saunders, 12 'lex. Civ. App. 5: S3 N. W. 537; 15 Am. & Hug. R. Cas. S. W. 245. I N. S. 7!):' : 5 Det. L. X. 90") ; Girard v. » East Tennessee, V. £ G. R. Co. Kalamazoo. 92 Mich. 010; 52 \. W. v. Smith, 94 Ca. 580; 20 S. E. 127. 1021; City R. Co. v. Wiggins (Tex. 81 Boyles v. Prisock, 97 (ia. 64:'.; Civ. App. ), 52 S. W. ">77. 25 S. E. 3S9. See Chicago, St. L. & m Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. P. R. Co. v. Spilker(Ind.), 32 Am. L. v. Stonrr (C. C. App. 8th C), 10 U. S. Reg. 763; 33 N. E. 280, reh'g denied App. 209; 2 C. C. A. 437; 51 Fed. 34 E. 218. 649; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 462. «2 Northern P. R. Co. v. I'rlin, 158 M Brown v. Mt. Holly, 09 Vt. 364; U. S. 271; 39 L. Ed. 977; 15 Sup. Ct. 38 Atl. 69. R. 840; Island Coal Co. v. Risher ( Ind. ** De Long v. Delaware, Lack. & W. App.). 10 \. E. 158; Crippen v. Des R. It. Co., 37 Hun | N". Y.>, 282. Moines (Iowa), 78 N. W. OSS; Heath ^Strudgeon v. Sand Beach, 107 349 § 29o EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. case it has been decided that complaints as to suffering heard by a physician, but which were not shown to have been made for his professional guidance, should be excluded. 87 As it is permis- sible to introduce in evidence the exclamations or complaints of the injured person, so also it has been held proper to admit evidence of the fact that he had made no complaints among his neighbors.* Though statements of an injured person may be admissible in evidence, yet where they are not indicative of present pain but are rather in the nature of a narration of her bodily feelings they should not be admitted.^ And a husband may not testify as to complaints made by his wife as to her pains and hurts resulting from an injury. 1 * Declarations or statements, however, which relate to the cause of the injury should, it is held, be excluded. 91 But in a case in the United States courts it is decided that declarations as to the cause of an accident made at the time of the injury are admissible in an action to recover upon an accident insurance policy against death. 92 Although the statement of a plaintiff that defendant was responsible for the accident may be admissible, yet the latter is entitled to an in- struction that he is not thereby rendered liable unless the entire evidence, including such statement, show that his negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the accident.' 13 § 293. Physical examination of injured person.— In an ac- tion for personal injuries the granting of a motion for the physi- cal examination of the injured person is generally declared to be discretionary with the court in those jurisdictions where the power of the court to order such an examination is recognized. 94 Mich. 496; 65 N. W. 616; 2 Det. L. N. 749. « Hillesum v. New York, 24 J. & S. (N. Y.) 596; 22 N. Y. St. R. 420; 4 N. Y. Supp. 806. 88 Barrelle v. Penn. R. R. Co., 4 N. Y. Supp. 127; 21 N. Y. St. R. 109; 121 N. Y. 697. Keller v. Gilman, 93 Wis. 9; 66 91 Globe Ace. Ins. Co. v. Gerisch, 163 111. 625; 45 N. E. 563; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Yokes, 12 Ohio C. C. 499; 1 Ohio C. D. 599. But see Bowles v. Kansas City, 51 Mo. App. 416. 92 North Araer. Ace. Asso. v. Wood- son (C. C. App. 7th C), 64 Fed. 689; 12 C. C. A. 392. N. W. 800. 93 Schwartz v. Shull, 45 W. Va. 90 Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. v. Wainwright, 99 Ga. 255; 25 S. E. 622. 350 405; 31 S. E. 914; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 496. w Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 90 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.MKY CASES. So, where plaintiffs evidence had been closed and there had been no previous request for his medical examination and a proper one could not at the time be procured without too long a delay of the trial, it was decided that the motion therefor was properly refused in the discretion of the court. T> In a case in Illinois it is held that if the court lias power to order such an examination, such power is discretionary, and where the plaintiff does not pretend to suffer from any secret malady, it should not be ex- ercised. 96 In another case in that state it was determined that the court had no power to order a medical examination of the injured person as to the measure and extent of his injuries for the purpose of learning whether he was in the condition he had testified to on the trial. It was also declared that if such power did exist the court should refuse to order an examination where no necessity therefor was shown, and the plaintiff had already submitted to one examination. 07 In a case in Wisconsin it was held that a refusal by the court to order a second ex- amination of the plaintiff by the X-ray process was not an abuse of discretion where he had already submitted to one examination lasting about two hours and had been accidentally burned during Ala. 71; 8 So. 90; 9 L. R. A. 442; 44 Am. & Eng. II. (as. 441; 31 Cent. L. .1. 376; Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. v. Wainwright, 99 Gra. 255; 25 S. E. 622; Chic. 15. & Q. R. Co. v. Reith, 65 111. App. 461; Southern R. R. Co. v. Michaels, 57 Kan. 474; 46 Pac. 938; Belt Elec. Line Co. v. Allen, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1656; 44 S. W. 89; Relle of Nelson Distilling Co. v. Riggs, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 499; 45 S. W. 99; Graves v. Hat tie Creek, 95 Mich. 266; 19 L. R. A. 641; 54 \. W. 757: Wanck v. City of Winona (Minn.), so X. W. 851; Hill v. Sedalia, 64 Mo. App. 494; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1019; Norton v. St. Louis* II. R. ('«>., 40 Mm. App. 642; Lawrence v. Samuels, 20 Misc. (N. Y.) 15; 44 N. Y. Supp. 602; appeal dismissed in 20 Mise. 278; 45 X. Y. Supp. 743; Demenstein v. Richard- son. 2 Penn. Dist. R. 825; 48 Alb. L. J. 452; 34 W. X. C. 295; Smith v. Spokane, 16 Wash. 403; 47 Pac. 888. It is held that the court may in its discretion order an examination of an injured person to be made at the home of the plaintiff, though in an- other state, instead of in court. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Dobbins, 60 Ark. 481: 30 S. W. 887, reh'g denied 60 Ark. 486; 31 S. W. 147. « Savannah. P. & W. R. Co. v. Wainwright, 99 Ga. 255: 25 S. K. 622. See also Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Greenwood (Ala.), 14 So. 495; South- ern K. R. Co. v. Michaels, 57 Kan. 174: 46 Pac. 938; Marler v. Spring- field, 65 Mo. App. 301; Smith v. Spokane, If. Wash. 403; 47 Pac. 888. '" Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Reith, 65 111. App. 161. " Peoria, D. * E. R. Co. v. Rice, 1 It 111. 227: •".:'. X. E. 951. See also JolietSt. R. Co. v. Caul. 143 111. 177; 32 X. E. 389, iffg 42 111. App. 41; 35] § 294 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. the continuance thereof. 93 And in another decision in that state where the plaintiff claimed that his bladder had been injured, it was declared that it would be an abuse of discretion on the part of the court to order an examination by instruments to de- termine the condition of the bladder where the plaintiff's phy- sicians had testified that such examination would not be pru- dent, and the defendant's physician had stated that if the bladder was unhealthy it would be absolutely dangerous, but if healthy it would be safe." § 294. Same subject continued. — Where the plaintiff is willing to be examined by competent and disinterested men without an order by the court, an order should not be made re- quiring him to submit to an examination. 111 " And in a case in Michigan it is declared that the plaintiff should not be required to submit to a physical examination by medical experts in open court where such examination would necessarily involve the use of anaesthetics.' In the United States courts it is held that the plaintiff cannot be required to submit to a compulsory ex- amination upon the trial of an action for personal injuries : '- and that the court has no legal power or right, on applica- tion of the defendant and in advance of the trial to order the plaintiff to submit to a medical or surgical examination for the purpose of determining the extent of the injury sued for, with- out the consent of such plaintiff. 3 So in Indiana it is declared that unless such authority be conferred by statute, the court can- not issue an order requiring the plaintiff to submit to an exami- nation by medical men appointed by the court for the purpose of furnishing evidence to be used on the trial. 1 In New Jersey St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Miller. 188 111. 4(3:>; 2S X. E. 1091, aff'g 39 111. App. 366. 9 8 Boelter v. Ross Lumber Co., 103 Wis. 324; 79 N. W. 243. a 9 O'Brien v. La Crosse. 75 N. W". 81: 40 L. R. A. 831; 30 Chic. Leg. News. 342. i°o Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Nor- fleet, 78 Tex. 321: 14 S. W. 703: 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 207. 1 Strudgeon v. Sand Beach, 107 401 ; 28 N. E. 860. 352 Mich. 496; 65 N. W. 616; 2 Det. L. N. 749. 2 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Griffin (C. C. App. 7th V.). 58 U. S. App. 22; 80 Fed. 278; 25 C. C. A. 413; Union P. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250; 35 L. Ed. 734; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000. 3 Union P. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250; 35 L. Ed. 734; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1000. 4 Penn. Co. v. Newmever, 129 Ind. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.HUY CASES. § 295 where the court is authorized by statute to issue au order requir- ing the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination by medical men who may testify at the trial as to the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries,"' it has been held that such a statute does not violate the express or implied restraints upon the legislative power in the federal or state constitutions. 6 Though an order requiring a plaintiff to submit to such an examination may be erroneously granted by the court, yet if such order is acquiesced in by the plaintiff by his selection of a physician to act as one of the examiners, by his submission to the examination without objection and by his failure to question the judge's want of power, either at the time of the order or when the physicians give their testimony as to the result of the examination, a judg- ment will not be reversed because of the error in granting the order.' Again, where a physical examination of the plaintiff is desired by the defendant, the latter is not entitled to have such examination made by physicians selected entirely by him- self/ Nor should the plaintiff be compelled to submit to an examination by physicians who have testified adversely to him,'' or by those who are unfriendly to him. 10 But where persons are ordered to make a physical examination of the plaintiff, the fact that they were rude and uncivil in their conduct towards him is not to be considered on the question of damages." § 295. Physical examination of plaintiff — New York.— Courts have no authority either under the common law or by virtue of their inherent power to order a physical examination of the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries. 1 - Such author- ity can only exist where expressly conferred by a statutory en- actment. 13 So in this state prior to the passage of the amend- « X. J. P. L. 1896, p. 344. 6 McGovern (X. J.). 42 Atl. 830. 7 Ellsworth v. Fairbury, 41 Neb. ssi; 60 N. W. 336. 8 Smith v. Spokane, 16 Wash. 403; 47 Pac. 888. 9 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Berlin^, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 544; 37 S. W. 1083. 10 Stack v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 177 Mass. 155 j 52 L. R. A. 328; 58 N. E. 686. 11 Goodhart v. Penn. R. Co.. 177 Pa. St. 1: 35 Atl. 1; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 3G4: 38 Wkly. X. C. 545. ^Cole v. Fall Brook Coal C Hun (X. V. i. 584; 34 X. V. Supp. 572. See Roberts v. Ogdensburgh & Lake Chaiuplain R. R. Co.. 29 Hun (X. V. i, 154. 15 McQuigan v. Del. L. A- W. R. Co.. 1_'0 X. Y. 50; 14 L. It. A. 4<>r, : 41 X. Y. St. R. 382; 'J9 X. E. 235; 23 353 § 295 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. ment to the code, 14 there was no authority possessed by the court which authorized the issuance of an order requiring the plaintiff to submit to a physical examination, or, in case of his failure or refusal to comply with such order, the striking out by the court of the testimony of medical experts who had examined him and testified in his behalf. 15 Under the amendment to the Code, 16 providing for an order for a physical examination by surgeons of the injured person, such examination cannot be authorized as an independent proceeding, but must be in connec- tion with or as a part of an order for the examination of the per- son before trial, and in conformity to the general provisions for such examinations. 17 If the plaintiff has voluntarily submitted the injured part to the jury, he may be required to submit to a per- sonal or professional examination of such part by the defendant in the presence of the jury. 18 And where the defendant asks for an examination in good faith and makes a proper showing therefor, the plaintiff should be required under the New York Code 19 to submit to such examination, unless there has been a stipulation by the plaintiff for use on the trial that he has entirely recovered from his injuries and this is true notwithstanding statements by him in his affidavit that he believes the examination is applied for for the purpose of harassing and annoying him. 20 Again, the defendant is entitled to such examination where he has no knowl- edge of the nature and extent of the injuries, and so far as he knows the plaintiff is the only one having any knowledge in reference to them.- 1 And where an order for an examination is 45 Alb. L. J. 68; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 490; 11 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 62. 14 N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 873, amended 1894. is Cole v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 159 N. Y. 59; 53 N. E. 670, affg 87 Hun 584; 34 N. Y. Sup p. 572. 16 N. Y. Laws, 1893, chap. 721, amending X. Y. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 873. 17 Lyon v. Manhattan R. Co., 142 N. Y. 298; 58 N. Y. St. R. 860; 31 Abb. N. Cas. 356; 37 N. E. 113, aff'g 7 Misc. 401; 58 N. Y. St. R. 50; 27 N. Y. Supp. 966. 18 Winner v. Lathrop, 67 Hun (N. 354 Y.), 511; 51 N. Y. St. R. 258; 22 N. Y. Supp. 510. 19 Code Civ. Proc. sec. 873. 20 Sewell v. Butler, 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 77; 44 N. Y. Supp. 1074. 21 Bell v. Litt, 12 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 626; 42 N. Y. Supp. 112; Green v. Middlesex R. Co., 10 Misc. (N. Y.) 473; 65 N. Y. St. R. 257; 24 Civ. Proc. 272 ; 32 K Y. Supp. 177. Where it is held that he is entitled to such examination upon an affidavit show- ing such facts. Moses v. Newburgh Elec. R. Co., 91 Hun 278; 36 N. Y. Supp. 149; 72 N. Y. St. R. 50. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.JtRY CASES. § 296 granted upon an affidavit showing such facts, such oral questions may be asked the plaintiff by the physician as in the opinion of the latter are necessary to enable him to ascertain and report fully as to the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries. 8 § 296. Same subject continued. — Under the New York Code, 25 providing that the physical examination of a female plaintiff shall he "before" physicians or surgeons of her own sex, it is not intended that such examination shall be in the presence of the referee and counsel.- 4 And where an order is issued under said Code a for such examination, plaintiff is en- titled not as a matter of favor or privilege but as a matter of right, to have inserted therein a provision that the examination be made by a female physician.'-* In a former trial of this ease, it was held that though a female plaintiff has the right to have a physical examination made by a female physician, yet if she makes no effort to have such a provision inserted in the order and seeks to have the order vacated merely on the ground that the papers upon which it is granted are insufficient, she thereby waives her right. 27 Where an order for a physical examination is granted, it should direct the time of service of a copy thereof/ -1 and should be returnable within not less than five days unless special circumstances be shown in the affidavit and recited in the order. 29 The affidavit need not state that it is the purpose of the defendant to make use of such examination upon the trial. 30 And if the affidavit on which the order is granted makes out a case within the provisions of the Code it may not be vacated although the witness fees required by the Code 31 have not been paid or tendered, since it is not obligatory to pay such fees be- 22 Wunsch v. Weber, 81 Abb. X. (as. 365; 29 N. Y. Supp. 1100; 49 Alb. L. J. 176. » Code Civ. Proc. sec. 873. 24 Lawrence v. Samuels, 20 Misc. (N, Y.) 278; 45 N. Y. Supp. 743, dismissing appeal 20 Misc. 15; 44 N. Y. Supp. 002. 25 Code Civ. Proc. sec. 872. 26 Lawrence v. Samuels, 17 Misc. (N. Y.)559; 40 N. Y. Supp. 086; 26 Civ. Proc. 10; 28 Chic. L. N. 420. 27 Lawrence v. Samuels, 16 Misc. (N. Y.) 501; 38 N. Y. Supp. 976. 28 Bowe v. Brunnbauer, 13 Misc. (N. Y.) 831; 34 X. Y. Supp. 919. 29 Bowe v. Brunnbauer, 13 Misc. (X. Y.) 631; 34 \. V. Supp. 919. 30 Moses v. Xewburgb Elec. K. Co., 91 Hun (N. Y). 276; 72 X. Y. St. R. 50; 36 N. Y. Supp. 149. 31 N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 874. 355 § 291 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. fore the party submits to the jurisdiction of the court. 32 Under the Code provision that the plaintiff may be required to ap- pear before the judge or referee, it is held that he cannot be re- quired to appear before the court at special term. 33 The fact that in the papers upon which an order is sought, the plaintiff's injuries are averred in the most general form will not render the papers insufficient where the formal part thereof complies with the statute and it is evident therefrom that the defendant is un- able to inform himself as to the plaintiff's injuries except by such examination. 34 § 297. Exhibiting injuries to jury. — In order to enable the jury to more accurately perceive the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries for which he seeks to recover damages, it is proper that he should in some cases exhibit his injuries to the jury. 35 So an exhibition of an injured limb is proper where made for the purpose of showing its condition at the time of the trial, 36 as that it is shriveled and withered. 37 And where part of a limb has been amputated it is not error to permit an exhibi- tion to the jury of the remnant of such limb. 38 So the fact that an injury has not been properly treated is not ground for ex- cluding an exhibition of the injury to the jury. 39 Again, the injury in such cases may be exhibited for the purpose of having the nature and extent thereof explained by a medical wit- 32 Campbell v. Joseph H. Bauland Co.. 41 App. Div. 474; 58 N. Y. Supp. 984. 33 Bowe v. Brunnbauer, 13 Misc. 631 ; 34 N. Y. Supp. 919. 34 Campbell v. Joseph H. Bauland Co., 41 App. Div. 474; 58 N. Y. Supp. 984. 35 Swift v. Rutkouski, 82 111. App. 108; Citizens Street R. Co. v. Wil- loeby, 134 Ind. 563; 33 N. E. 627; Edwards v. Three Rivers, 96 Mich. 625; 55 N. W. 1003; Langworthy v. Green Twp., 95 Mich. 93; 54 X. W. 697; Plummer v. Milan, 79 Mo. App. 439; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 600; Omaha Street R. Co. v. Emminger, 57 Neb. 356 240; 77 N. W. 675; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 188; Carrico v. West Virginia, C. & P. R. Co., 39 W. Va. 86; 24 L. R. A. 50; 19 S. E. 571; Sornberger v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 24 Ont. App. 263. But see Laughlin v. Harvey, 24 Ont. App. 438. 36 Edwards v. Three Rivers, 96 Mich. 625; 55 N. W. 1003. 37 Langwortby v. Green Twp., 95 Mich. 93; 54 N. W. 697. 38 Carrico v. West Virginia, C. & P. R. Co., 39 W. Va. 86; 24 L. R. A. 50; 19 S. E. 571. 33 Plummer v. Milan, 79 Mo. App. 439; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 600. EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL IN.nitv casks. E 298 ness." 1 And for the purpose of enabling the jury to determine the extent of the plaintiff's injury, the plaintiff may be placed in different attitudes by the physician." § 298. Evidence admissible under pleadings— Cases. — In an action to recover for physical injuries it is not necessary to de- scribe all the characteristics and consequences of a wound in order to render proof thereof admissible.'- So, under an allega- tion in a complaint in general terms evidence is admissible of all specific hurts and direct results therefrom. 43 A general averment in such cases is sufficient if the specific hurts or in- juries are such as can be traced to the act complained of or are such as would naturally follow from it." So where a com- plaint contained a general averment of severe personal injuries from which it was declared the plaintiff had not. recovered and would not recover, and that as a result thereof he had been un- able to follow his usual occupation or do any work whatever and had suffered great pain and agony, it was held that such allegations were sufficient to permit the admission of evidence as to all the effects of the injuries. 45 Again, a general allega- tion of damages caused by a personal injury is sufficient to per- mit the plaintiff to recover for loss of time, physical suffering and permanent disability, and in fact, all such damages as are the natural and necessary results of the injury."'' And, under an averment that as a result of the injuries plaintiff was "made sick, sore and disabled," evidence of pleurisy is admissible. 17 And where a person sued to recover for injuries inflicted by a dog, proof of epilepsy as a result of the injury was admitted under allegations in the complaint that she was injured for life, that 40 Sornberger v. Canadian Pac. R. Co., 24 Out. App. 203. 41 Citizens Street R. Co. v. Willoeby* 134 Ind.563; 33 X. E. 627. 42 Joliet v. Johnson, 177 111. 178; 52 N. E. 498, aft'g 71 111. App. 423. Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 61; Parker v. Burgess (Vt.), 24 Atl. 74:;. 45 Bolte v. Third Ave. R. Co., 38 App. Div. (N. Y.) 234; 56 X. Y. Supp. 1038. 46 Abilene v. Wright, 4 Kan. App. 43 Quirk v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 26)708; 40 Pac. 715. Misc. (N. Y.) 244; 50 X. Y. Supp. 4!». 4T Hunter v. Third Ave. R. Co., 21 44 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Ed- Misc. (X. Y.) 1; 40 X. Y. Supp. 1010, ling, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 171; 45 S. \V. aff'g 20 Misc. 432; 45 X. Y. Supp. 406; Williams v. Oregon Short Line 1044. R. Co., 18 Utah, 210; 54 Pac. 991; 12 357 § 299 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. her whole nervous system had been permanently injured and her mental faculties ruined, that she had suffered great bodily and mental pain and would continue so to suffer in the future, and that her blood had been poisoned and contaminated. 48 But where a person sought to recover for injuries due to an assault, it was decided that proof of epilepsy was not admissible unless alleged in the declaration. 49 In the application of the same rule that evidence is admissible of an injury which is an effect resulting from the injury alleged without a special allegation thereof in the complaint, it was held that where the complaint alleged an injury to the back, spine and brain of the plaintiff, and the evidence showed that such injuries were the natural and proximate cause of defective nutrition of the optic nerve which caused the eyesight to be impaired, damages therefor need not be specially pleaded and could be recovered under the allega- tion of the complaint. 50 And, again, under allegations of numer- ous injuries to the head, back and spine, and that " other serious injuries were done him," evidence is admissible of an impair- ment of plaintiff's eyesight and hearing. 51 So, also, under an al- legation of an injury to the left eye, evidence is admissible as to the effect of such injury on the right eye. 52 And. evidence of a disease of the sciatic nerve has been held admissible in an ac- tion for personal injuries though not alleged in the declaration. 53 § 299. Same subject continued. — Evidence of a miscar- riage, as a result of injuries received, is admissible under an averment that the plaintiff was greatly hurt and bruised and « Fye v. Chapin (Mich. 1899), 80 N. W. 797. 49 Kuhn v. Freund, 87 Mich. 545; 49 N. W. 867. 50 West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Levy, 182 111. 525; 55 N. E. 554, aff g 82 111. App. 202. 61 Curran v. Stange Co., 98 Wis. 598; 74 N. W. 377. 52 Maitland v. Gilbert Paper Co., 97 Wis. 476; 72 N. W. 1124. But in a case where the complaint alleged that the plaintiff's head was cut to 358 the skull for about an inch in length over the right eye, it was held that under such allegation evidence was inadmissible of an injury to one or both of the plaintiff's eyes and of pain suffered by reason thereof. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Warlick (Ind. Terr.), 4 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. N. S. 32; 35 S. W. 235. ^ Beath v. Rapid R. Co., 119 Mich. 512; 78 N. W. 537; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 793; 5 Det. L. N. 905. EVIDKNCK IN PHYSICAL IN.IIRV CASKS. § 299 suffered great bodily injury. 51 And under an allegation of severe nervous shock, as a result of the injuries received, evi- dence is admissible to show that in consequence of the plain- tiff's injuries she suffered from heart trouble, curvature of the spine, chronic meningitis and neurasthenia. 58 So, also, where the complaint contained an averment that the plaintiff intended to prove an injury to lier leg as a result of a fall, evidence was admitted to slmw that varicose veins resulted from the injury, though there was no allegation in the complaint of enlargement of the leg or affection of the blood vessels thereof. 56 Again, where the complaint contained an allegation that the "plaintiff was greatly and permanently injured upon her foot, ankle, body and head, the bones of her ankle and foot were broken, the liga- ments, tendons and flesh crushed, her head was lacerated and wounded, and her mind and memory were permanently injured, and the plaintiff otherwise injured upon her body," evidence was admitted that a tumor developed upon plaintiff's breast, as a result of the injuries, and was necessarily removed. 5 ' And where the complaint alleged that plaintiff was badly bruised, wounded, sprained and injured in and about her body, it was held proper to admit evidence of an injury to the back and spine of the plaintiff. 88 So again, under allegations of injuries to plain- tiff's body by straining, laceration and discoloration and injuries of muscles, nerves and otherwise, evidence is admissible of in- jury to the knee and hip, and of inflammation of the sciatic nerve as a result of same. 59 And under a general averment of bodily injuries evidence of resulting uterine trouble is admissi- ble. 60 So evidence as to the condition of the plaintiff's uterus and the nerves of her leg was held admissible where the complaint alleged nervous prostration and numbness and pain in the neck, arm, side and other portions of her body. 61 And where the plain- M Tobiu v. Fairport, 12 N. Y. Supp. 224. 66 Kleiner v. Third Ave. It. Co., 36 App. Div. (N. Y.) 191; 53 N. Y. Supp. :l!)4. 5 ' ; Joliet v. Johnson, 71 111. App. 423. "Baltimore & O. S. It. Co. v. Slauker, ISO 111. 357; 54 N. E. 309, aff'g 77 111. App. 567. 68 Missouri, K. & T. It. Co. v. Wal- den (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 87. ("•"Williams v.Cleveland, C. C. 4 St L. It. Co., 102 Mich. :>M; 01 N~. W. ;>l'. c0 Samuels v. California St. Cable R. Co., 124 Cal. 294; 56 Pac. 111"). « Illinois C. It. Co. v. Griffin (C. C. App. 7th C), 25 C. C. A. 413; 80 Fed. 278; 53 U. S. App. 22. But 359 § 299 EVIDENCE IN PHYSICAL INJURY CASES. tiff seeks to recover for permanent disability, and so alleges in his complaint, the character of his occupation and the particulars of his earnings need not be alleged in order to authorize the ad- mission of evidence in reference thereto. 62 Nor in an action against a street railway company is it necessary to allege the loss of a certain amount of earnings or the expenditure of a specified amount for medicine where such allegations are gen- erally made. 63 And where a married woman sued to recover for personal injuries, alleging in her complaint that she was not only prevented from attending to her household duties but also from engaging in any other employment, it was held that such allegations were sufficient to permit her to recover for loss of salary which she had been accustomed to receive from her hus- band for services rendered by her to him. 64 And for the pur- pose of showing the seriousness of the plaintiff's injuries evi- dence that prior to the injury the plaintiff could read, was study- ing medicine and going to school, but subsequent thereto he was unable to read, admissible, though not specially pleaded. 65 in another case where the complaint alleged that the plaintiff was wounded, bruised and skinned, his nervous system seriously impaired, and that serious injuries, both exter- nal and internal had been sustained, it was held that proof was not ad- missible as to an impairment of his genital and urinary organs. Mis- souri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Cook (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. 7G9. 62 Flanagan v. Baltimore & O. R. R.Co. (Iowa), SON. W. 60. 63 Cooney v. Southern Elec. R. Co., 80 Mo. App. 226; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 646. See also Abilene v. Wright, 4 360 Kan. App. 708; 46 Pac. 715. See Sloane v. Southern Cal. R. Co., Ill Cal. 220; 32 L. R. A, 193; 44 Pac. 320. ^Blacchinska v. Howard Mission & H. for L. W., 56 Hun (N. Y.), 322; 31 N. Y. St. R. 159; 9 N. Y. Supp. 679. See also as to evidence of loss of earnings in action by mar- ried woman, Mellwitz v. Manhattan R. Co., 43 N. Y. St. R. 354; 17 N. Y. Supp. 112. e 5 Bruce v. Beall, 99 Tenn. 303; 41 S. W. 445; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 841; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 464. PARENT AND CHILD - PHYSICAL INJTJBY. § BOO CHAPTER XIII. PARENT AND CHILD— PHYSICAL INJURY. 300. Recovery by parent — Loss of services of minor child, 301. Judgment for parent in be- half of child not bar to ac- tion for loss of services. 302. Action by widow for loss of services of minor child. 303. Recovery by parent — Loss of services — Minor in employ of another. 304. Statute as to employee not applicable to parent. 305. Injury to child — Parent's re- covery for expenses, nurs- ing, etc. 306. Injury to child— Parent's re- covery for future expenses. 307. Evidence as to parent's con- dition in life. 308. Child en ventre sa mere — Dam ages for injury to. 309. Pain and suffering— Minors. 310. Expenses— Recovery of by minor. 311. Loss of time— Diminished earning capacity — Minor. 312. Prospective loss — Permanent injury —Minor. 313. No recovery by minor for in- juries to mother. 314. Recovery by minor for loss of wages in past. 315. Negligence of parent § 300. Recovery by parent — Loss of services of minor child. — In case of an injury to a minor child which deprives a parent of his services, the parent may recover for such loss, 1 and 1 St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Free- man, 36 Ark. 41 ; Morgan v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 95 Cal. 510; Durkee v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 56 Cal. 388; 38 Am. Rep. 59; Karr v. Parks, 44 Cal. 46; East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Hughes (Ga.), 17 S. E. 949; Bradley v. Sattler, 156 111. 603; 41 N. E. 171; aff'g 54 111. App. 504: Adams Hotel Co. v. Cobb (Ind. T. 1899), 53 S W. 478; Penn. Co. v. Lilly, 73 Ind. 252; Burnett v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co.. 55 Iowa, 496; Meersv. McDowell, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 461; 53 L. R. A. 789; 62 S. W. 1013; Union News Co. v. Morrow, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 302; 46 S. W. 6: Ber- nard v. Merrill. 91 Me. 358; 40 Atl. 136; Horgan v. Pacific Mills, 158 Muss. 402: 33 N. E. 5S1; Bamka v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. I Minn. ). 63 N". W. 1116: Meade v. Chicago. R. I. & P. R. Co., 72 Mo. App. 61; Buck v. Peoples St. R. E. L. & P. Co., 46 Mo. App. 555, aff'd 18 S. W. 1090; Barnes v. Keene, 132 N. Y. 13; Drew v. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 26 N. Y. 49: Dollardv. Roberts, 28 N. Y. St. R. 569; 8 V Y. Supp. 432, aff'd 41 X. Y. St. R. 258; Cam- ming v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 21 Abb. N. C. 1; 109 N. Y. 95, rev'g 361 §301 PARENT AND CHILD — PHYSICAL INJURY. the recovery is not limited to the damages sustained up to the time of the trial, but may also include prospective loss during the child's minority. 2 But it is decided that for loss of future services there can he no recovery unless specially declared for. 3 Although the. parent may recover for loss of services of a minor child, past and prospective, yet there are some cases in which it has been held that a deduction must be made, from the probable gross earnings, of the cost of maintenance and support of the child. 4 Again, in an action to recover for injuries to an adopted child, the complaint should allege the fact of the adoption, showing the child's emancipation by his parents in order to re- cover for loss of services. It is not sufficient to merely describe such child as an adopted child. 5 § 301. Judgment for parent in behalf of child not bar to action for loss of services — The fact that a parent may have obtained a judgment in an action prosecuted by him in behalf of a minor child for injuries sustained by such child, will not operate as a bar to the father's maintaining an action for the loss of the services of the child resulting from the same injury 38 Hun (N. Y.), 362; Gilligan v. New York & Harlem R. R. Co., 1 E. D. Sm. 453: Oakland Ry. Co. v. Fielding, 48 Pa. St. 320; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Kelly, 31 Pa. St. 372; Gavi- gan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 3 Super. Ct. (Pa.) 623: Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Rodgers (Tex. Civ. App.), 39 S. W. 383; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 708; Taylor v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 41 W. Va. 704; 24 S. E. 632; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 115. 2 East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Hughes (Ga.), 17 S. E. 949; Traver v. Eighth Ave. R. R. Co., 6 Abb. N. S. 46; 4 Abb. Ct. App. 42: dimming v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 21 Abb. N. C. 1; 109 N. Y. 95, rev'g 38 Hun (N. Y.), 362: Drew v. Sixth Ave. R. Co., 26 N. Y. 49; Dollard v. Roberts, 28 N. Y. St. R. 569; 8 N. Y. Supp. 432, aff'd 41 N. Y. St. R. 362 253; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Putnam (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 63 S. W. 910; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Rodgers (Tex. Civ. App.), 39 S. W. 383; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 708; San Antonio St. R. Co. v. Muth (Tex. C. A. 1895), 27 S. W. 752. 3 Gilligan v. New York & Harlem R. R. Co., 1 E. D. Sm. 453. 4 Morgan v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 95 Cal. 510; Penn. Co. v. Lilly, 73 Ind. 252; Benton v. Chic, etc., R. R. Co., 55 Iowa, 496; Matthews v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 26 Mo. App. 75. But see Schniitz v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Ry. Co., 46 Mo. App. 381; Mauerman v. St. Louis, etc.. Ry. Co., 41 Mo. App. 349; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Morin, 66 Tex. 133. 5 Citizens Street R. Co. v. Wil- loeby, 15 Ind. App. 312; 43 N. E. 1058. PARENT AND CHILD PHYSICAL IN.M BY. §§ 302, 303 for which the former action was brought. 6 But where the judg- ment obtained by the father in behalf of his minor child in- cludes damages for loss of earning capacity from the time of the injury, such judgment is a bar to an action by the father per- sonally to recover for a loss of the services of the child during minority." £ 'M)2. Action by widow for loss of services of minor child. — While a widowed mother may recover for the loss of services of a minor child, 8 yet where the injury was received during the life of the father, and the latter commenced no action to re- cover for such loss, there can be no recovery by the mother, since it is declared that the right of a parent to recover is based on the supposed relation of master and servant, and it was the father who was entitled to the services at the time of the in- jury and not the mother. 9 And where a widow sues for her separate use and benefit to recover for injuries to a minor child, there can be no recovery by her in the absence of any allegation of loss of services of such child or that she has incurred some expense on her own account by reason of such injuries. 10 Hut in an action by her as guardian of an infant son, there may be ;i recovery for impairment of his ability to earn money during his infancy, since it is said her bringing of the action and her testi- mony will be in effect a transfer to him of any cause of action she may have had by reason of the injury." § 303. Recovery by parent — Loss of services— Minor in em- ploy of another. —If a person knowingly employs a minor to work in a dangerous employment against the known wishes of the ■Bernard v. Merrill, 91 Me. 358; 40 Atl. 156; Bamka v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. (Minn.), 63 X. W. 1116. .See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Moiin, 56 Tex. 133. See Bridger v. Asheville & S. R. Co., 27 S. C. 456; 3 S. E. 8G0; 13 Am. St. Rep. 653, where it is held that a judgment for personal injuries iu favor of a minor child is inadmissible in an action by the father against the same defend- ant to recover damages for the same injury. 7 Baker v. Flint & P. M. R. Co., 91 Mich. 298; 16 L. R. A. 154; 51 N\ \V. 897; 11 Ry. & Cor,,. L. J. 273. B Horgan v. Pacific Mills. 158 Mass. 402; 33 X. E. 581. See sees. :)00, 303 herein, action by parent, etc. 9 Geraghty v. New, 7 Misc. (X. V.) 30; 57 X. Y. St. K. 497: 27 X. Y. Supp. 403. 10 Corsicana Cotton Oil Co. v. Val- ley, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 250;36 S. W. 999. "Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Davis, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 748; 58 S. W. 098. 363 §§ 304, 305 PARENT AND CHILD— PHYSICAL INJURY. father, and the minor sustains injuries while engaged in his work, the father may recover from the employer for the loss of the services of the minor, regardless of the question of negligence as to the injury. 12 But where a minor was injured by accident, through no negligence on the part of his emplo} r er, and the parent had not consented that the boy might work for himself, although the latter had stated at the time of his employment that his father had consented, it was decided that there could be no recovery by the parent for loss of services. 13 In those cases, however, where a minor child is injured owing to his em- ployer's negligence, the right of the father to recover is not precluded by the fact that he consented to such employment or agreed not to trouble the employer in case of injury. 14 § 304. Statute as to employee not applicable to parent. — Where a statute permits the recovery of damages for personal injuries by an employee from an employer in certain specified cases, it will not be construed as authorizing the recovery of such damages by a parent of a minor servant. 15 § 305. Injury to child — Parent's recovery for expenses, nursing, etc. — In an action by a parent to recover damages for an injury to a child, he may recover the expenses incurred for medical attendance, medicine, nursing, and in fact all expenses which have been sustained as a result of the injury. 16 And in 12 Taylor v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 41 W. Va. 704; 24 S. E. 632; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 115. See Union News Co. v. Morrow, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 302; 46 S. W. 6. 13 Williams v. Southern R. Co., 121 N. C. 512; 28 S. E. 367. " So held in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Putnam (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 63 S. W. 910. Consent of parent to the em- ployment is presumed in absence of evidence to the contrary. Wood- ward Iron Co. v. Cook, 124 Ala. 349; 27 So. 455. 15 Woodward Iron Qo. v. Cook, 124 Ala. 349; 27 So. 455. 16 Union P. R. Co. v. Jones (Colo. ), 364 40 Pac. 891; East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Hughes (Ga.), 17 S. E. 949; County Commrs. v. Hamilton. 60 Md. 340; Morgan v. Pacific Mills. 158 Mass. 402; 33 N. E. 581; Meade v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 72 Mo. App. 61; Buck v. Peoples St. R. E. L. & P. Co., 46 Mo. App. 555, affd 18 S. W. 1090; Connell v. Putnam. 58 N. H. 535; Barnes v. Keene, 132 N. Y. 13; 42 N. Y. St. R. 853, reh'g 32 N. Y. St. R. 1138; Dollard v. Roberts, 130 N. Y. 269; dimming v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 21 Abb. N. C. 1; 109 N. Y. 95, reh'g 38 Hun, 362; Martin v. Wood, 23 N. Y. St. R. 457; 5 N. Y. Supp. 274, aff'g 18 N. Y. PARENT AND CHILD— PHYSICAL INJUBY. 8 305 this connection the rule seems to be, that a father may recover compensation for his own, or his wife's services in nursing an in- jured child." So evidence of the value of the services of the plaintiff's wife in attending to an injured child is admissible. 1S And a widowed mother, may recover for labor performed in caring for and attending to her child. 1 -' Again, the father may recover the value of his own services in nursing his child, but where he gives up a lucrative business engagement for this pur- pose, he cannot recover in addition to the value of his services as nurse what he might have made if he had not given up such engagement.'* In Pensylvania, however, it is held that a father cannot recover for the services of the members of the family in caring for his child unless such care and attention deprived him of their services in his business. 21 In this case it was said : " In an action by a parent to recover for loss occasioned by injury to his child, the measure of damages is the pecuniary loss to him. His action is for the injury done to him, not for the injury done his child or for the loss or inconvenience to other members of his family, whose cares and burdens have been increased. . . . The jury was allowed to consider as elements of damage the in- St. R. 274; 4 N. Y. Supp. 208; 1 Sil. S. C. 312; Kennedy v. X. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 35 Hun (N. Y.), 186; \ Y. Supp. 1094, aff'g 18 Misc. 584; 42 X. V. Supp. 700. 26 London v. Cunningham. 1 Misc. (N. Y.) 408; 49 N. Y. St. K. 447; 20 N. Y r . Supp. 882. 377 § 320 HUSBAND AND WIFE— PHYSICAL INJURIES. the husband was engaged in the restaurant business, it was de- cided that he could not recover for a loss of his wife's services in such business since a wife can herself recover for loss of earn- ing power. 27 And where the husband has released to his wife all claim to her services as provided by a statute, 28 and such release has been filed, the wife may recover what the husband might have recovered in his own name for the loss of her services in- cluding her domestic services and also loss of earnings outside of her domestic services. 29 Though it may be stated as a gen- eral rule that the services of a married woman belong to her husband and that he alone can recover for the loss thereof, yet for such loss as is personal to herself she may recover. 30 And her right to recover for loss of capacity to labor or earn money will not be denied because there is no evidence showing such capacity at and just before the time of her being injured, where the evidence shows that she had been in business for a long time prior thereto, such business being discontinued at the time of the injury because of temporary illness. 31 But a statute giving to a married woman the control of her time and actions does not take away from her husband the right of action for loss of consortium due to the negligence of another. 3 ' And under an allegation of injury to the wife's spine whereby the husband has lost her services and society, it is held that evidence is admissible showing that as a result of such injury the husband is prevented from having intercourse with his wife where it is shown that this is the natural and proximate result of the in- jury. 33 § 320. Wife's right to recover not precluded by husband's right. — Where the right is conferred by statute upon a married woman to recover damages for a personal injury, and she is also 27 But see Citizens St. R. Co. v. Tiviname, 121 Ind. 375. See sec. herein as to wife's recovery for loss of earnings. 28 Pa. Act, June 11, 1879. 29 Kelley v. Mayberry Twp., 154 Pa. St. 440; 26 Atl. 595; 32 W. N. C. 224. 30 Minick v. Troy, 19 Hun (N. Y.), 253, aff'd 83 N. Y. 514. Civ. App.), 54 S. W. 606. 378 31 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Humble, 181 U. S.57; 45 L. Ed. 747; 21 S. Ct. 526, aff'g 97 Fed. 837; 38 C. C. A. 502. 32 Kelley v. New York, N. H. &■ H. R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 308; 46 N. E. 1063; 38 L. R. A. 631; 2 Cbic. L. J. Wkly. 326. 33 City of Dallas v. Jones (Tex. HUSBAND AM) win-: PHYSICAL [NJURIES. §321,322 entitled to recover under such ;t statute for any impairment of her capacity to labor, the fact that her husband may recover for loss of her services will not preclude her right to recover for loss of capacity to earn for herself." § 321. Sale of laudanum to married woman -Recovery by husband for loss of services — Case. Where a person sells Laudanum as a beverage to a married woman with knowledge of the fact that her mind and body are being destroyed thereby and that its use Ls causing a loss to her husband who has re- peatedly warned such person and protested against the sale thereof, the latter will be responsible to the husband for such damages as he sustains by reason of the loss of her services. 33 § 322. Injury to wife — Expenses for medical treatment recoverable by husband. — Moneys expended by a husband or for the expenditure of which liability has been incurred by him, where rendered necessary as a result of an injury to his wife for medical treatment or nursing, are recoverable by him in an action against the person responsible for the injury. 86 But it is held that such expenses cannot be recovered in an action by the husband and wife for injuries sustained by her since the right of action therefor is in the husband alone. 5 ' And where in an action by a wife she alleged in the complaint that she had been » 4 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Heimble, 181 U. S. 57; 45 L. Ed. 747; 21 S. Ct. 526, aff'g 07 Fed. 8:17: 38 C. C. A. 502 (under Sand & H. Dig. Ark. Bee. 5641). 36 Hoi le man v. Harward, 119 X. C. 1")(); 25 S. E. 072; 34 L. K. A. 803; 2 Cine. L. J. Wkly. 20. 36 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Jones, 21 Colo. 340; 40 Pac 801; Denver Consol. Tramway Co. v. Riley (Colo. App. ), 59 Pac. 476; Tompkins v. West, 56 Conn. 178; Washington & G. R. Co. v. Hickey, li' App. D. C. 260; 26 Wash. L. Rep. 208; Tut tic v. Chic. R. I. & P. R. R. Co., 42 Iowa, 518; Eden v. Lexington, etc.. P. P. Co., 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 204; Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. Mills, 61 Md. 355; McDevitt v. St. Paul, 66 Minn. 14; 68 X. W. 178; 33 L. R. A. 601: Blair v. Chic., etc.. R. R. Co., 89 Mo. .°,34; Hopkins v. Atlantic, etc., R. R. Co., 36 X. II. 0; Robinson v. Met. St. Ry. ('.... 34 Misc. R. (N. Y. ) 70:»: 69 \. Y. Sup].. 891; Filer v. New York Cent. P. R. Co., -10 \. V. 47; Henry v. Klopfer. 147 Pa. St. 178; 23 At 1. 337; 20 W. N. C. 331; 22 Pitts. L. .1. N. 8. 3s.-): Lindsey v. Danville, If. Vt. 144: Hawkins v. Front St. Cable Ry. Co., :'. Wash. 592 ; Kavanangh v. Janesville. 24 Wis. 618. 37 Smith v. Thompson, 1 Penn. (Del.) 140; 30 Atl. 1100; Friedman v. M.Cowan, 1 Penn. (Del.) 436; 42 Atl. 723. 379 §§ 323,324 HUSBAND AND WIFE PHYSICAL INJURIES. permanently injured so as to be unable to labor and had ex- pended large sums of money, not stating the amount, in attempt- ing to effect a cure, it was decided that such statements were in aggravation for the purpose of showing the severity of the in- juries and that the husband was not thereby precluded from re- covering for loss of her services and society and for money expended by him in her care and treatment.^ § 323. Recovery for services of husband in nursing injured wife.^— If a husband devotes his time to nursing and caring for his injured wife or in doing her work, he may recover for his services so rendered from the persons causing such injury.* 1 The amount recoverable by him, however, is not the salary which he may have lost or the wages which he might have earned in working at his business or trade, but is determined by the value of his services in such capacities. 40 In other cases, however, it is held that the amount which a husband may recover for his services in nursing and attending an injured wife is limited to the sum for which he could have hired other reasonably com- petent persons in such capacity. 41 § 324. Recovery for services of daughter as nurse. — A husband suing to recover for injuries to his wife is entitled to an allowance for the services of a daughter as nurse to her, but he is not entitled to recover therefor the specific amount which she was earning in another capacity simply because her mother desired or required her services. 42 88 Denver Consul. Tramway Co. v. Riley (Colo. App. ), 59 Pac. 476. 39 Hazard Powder Co. v. Voider (C. C. App. 8th A.), 7 C. C. A. 130; 58 Fed. 152; Salida v. McKinna, 16 Colo. 523; 27 Pac. 810; Union P. R. Co. v. Jones, 21 Colo. 340; 40 Pac. 891; Smith v. City of St. Joseph, 55 Mo. 456; Fort Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 654; 35 S. W. 335; Lindsey v. Danville. 46 Vt. 144; Selleck v. City of Janes- ville, 104 Wis. 570; 80 N. W. 944; 47 L. R. A. 691. 380 40 Hazard Powder Co. v. Volger (C. C. App. 8th A.), 7 C. C. A. 130; 58 Fed. 152; Salida v. McKinna, 16 Colo. 523; 27 Pac. 810. But see Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Smith, 79 Tex. 478; 14 S. W. 993. 41 Howells v. North Anier. Transp. & Trad. Co., 24 Wash 689; 64 Pac. 786; Selleck v. City of Janesville, 104 Wis. 570; 80 N. W. 944; 47 L. R. A. 691. 42 Dormer v. Alcatraz Pav. Co., 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 407. HUSBANM AND WIFE — PHYSICAL INJURIES. : 325 § 325. Expenses— Recovery of by married woman. —A wife is entitled to support from her husband, and it may be stated as a general rule that where living with her husband she cannot, in an action for personal injuries suffered by her, recover ex- penses for medical treatment or other expenses incurred as a re- sult of the injury, since the husband being liable for her support and therefore for her expenses is entitled to recover therefor. 4 ' If, however, it appears that she has paid such bills out of her separate estate or become liable therefor, then she may recover the same." Thus it is decided that a married woman may re- cover the expenses of her sickness as the result of an injury, though she had not paid the bill therefor, where it appeared that such expenses were incurred by and charged to her. 15 In a case in Virginia, however, it is held that a married woman cannot recover the expenses of her cure unless it is averred and proved that she paid such expenses out of her separate estate. 46 Where a married woman has not lived with her husband for several years, during which time she has supported herself, her medical expenses may be recovered. 17 So in Illinois it is held that a married woman may recover the expense of her cure, since un- 48 Tompkins v. West, 56 Conn. 478; 16 Atl. 237; Lewis v. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 756; Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Cosby. 107 Ind. 32; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. McGinnis, 46 Kan. 109; 26 Pac. 453: Jordan v. Middlesex R. R. Co., 138 Mass. 425; Rogers v. Orion, 116 Mich. 324: 74 N. \V. 463; 4 Det L. N. 1086; State v. Detroit, 113 Mich. 643; 72 X. W. 8; 4 Det. L. N. 431; Belyea v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 61 Minn. 224: 63 NT. W. 627; Klein v. Jowett, 26 N. J. Kq. 474; Moody v. Osgood. 50 Barb. (N. Y. ) 628; Burnham v. Webster, .-)4 X. Y. Super. 30; Met. Adams & B. R. R. Co. v. Wysong, 8 Ohio C. C. 211; Atlantic & I). R. Co. v. Iron- monger, 95 Va. 620; 20 S. E. 319; Richmond R. & E. Co. v. Bowles, 02 Va. 738; 24 S. E. 388; 2 Va. Law Reg. 14. 44 Lewis v. Atlanta, 77 Ga. 756; Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. Cosby, 107 Ind. 32; Shelby v. Castetter, 7 Ind. App. 318; Jordan v. Middlesex R. R. Co., 138 Mass. 425; Lacas v. Detroit City R. Co. ( Mich. ). 52 X. W. 745 ; McLean v. City of Kansas City, 81 Mo. App. 72: Klein v. Jewett, 26 X. J. Eq. 474; Moody v. Osgood. 50 Barb. (N. Y.)628; Burnham v. Wester. 54 N\ Y. Super. 30; Chacey v. Fargo, ."> X. D. 173: 64 X. W. 932; Atlantic & D. R. Co. v. Ironmonger. 95 V a. 625; 20 S. E. 310. 45 Lacas v. Detroit City R. Co. (Mich.), 52 X. W. 745; Chaccy v. Fargo, 5 N. D. 173; 64 X. W. 932. 46 Atlantic & D. R. Co. v. Iron- monger, 95 Va. 625: 29 S. E. 310. 47 Lammiman v. Detroit Citizens St. R. Co.. 112 Mich. 602; 71 X. W. 153; 4 Det. L. X. 134. 381 § 326 HUSBAND AND WIFE — PHYSICAL INJURIES. der the statute of that state she is personally liable therefor. 48 And in Indiana a married woman may recover such expenses though her husband is liable for the same. 49 But expenses for domestic service during the disability of a married woman as a result of an injury cannot, it is held, be recovered by her.'* Ex- penses for such service would, however, probably be controlled by the same principles as control in the case of the allowance of medical expenses. § 326. Pain and suffering— Married woman. — In an action by a married woman to recover damages for physical injuries sustained by her, recovery may be had for such pain and suffer- ing as are the direct result of the injury. 51 And in an action by the husband and wife jointly to recover for injuries sustained by her, the measure of damages is such sum as will compensate them for her injuries, and they may recover for her pain and suffering, past and prospective. 02 *s West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Carr, 67 111. App. 530, aff'd 170 111. 478; 48 N. E. 992. * 9 Columbus v. Strassner, 138 Ind. 301; 34 N. E. 5. «>Frolisv. Dubuque (Iowa, 1899), 80 N. W. 341. si Green v. Penn. R. Co., 36 Fed. 66; Tompkins v. West, 56 Conn. 478; Friedman v. McGowan, 1 Penn. 382 (Del.) 436; 42 Atl. 7^3; Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 Ga. 500; Ohio & C. R. R. Co. v. Cosby, 107 Ind. 32; Klein v. Jewett,26N. J. Eq. 474. 52 Friedman v. McGowan, 1 Penn. (Del.) 436; 42 Atl. 723, which was an action to recover for injuries sus- tained by the wife from a bite of a dog. ACTIONS BY PASSENGEBS. CHAPTER XV. ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. § 327. Actions by passengers may be in contract or tort. 328. Physical injuries — Passengers — Generally. 329. Permanent physical injuries — Passengers — Cases. 330. Passenger injured alighting from car. 331. Passenger injured — Lex loci contractus — Statutory limi- tation as to recovery. 332. Exemplary damages. 333. Exemplary damages — As- saults on passengers. 334. Exemplary damages— Failure or refusal to transport pas- senger. 335. Same subject continued. 336. Penalty statute— Failure to transport and discharge pas- sengers at destination — " Legal or just excuse." 337. Wrongful ejection from train. 338. Wrongful ejection from train — Contiuued. 339. Wrongful ejection from train — Concluded. 340. Exemplary damages — Ejec- tion of passenger. 341. Exemplary damages — Ejec- tion of passenger — Unneces- sary force or violence. 342. Exemplary damages — Ejec- tion of passenger — When not recoverable. 343. Exemplary damages — Ejec- tion of passenger— Cases. 344. Passenger left at wrong sta- tion. ?,}.">. Duty to minimize damages — Ejection of passenger. 346. Passenger carried beyond des- tination. 347. Passenger carried beyond des- tination — Continued. 348. Exemplary damages— Passen- ger carried beyond destina- tion. 349. Passenger — Illness due to ex- posure — Walking to desti- nation. 350. Same subject — Conclusion. 351. Passenger — Injury to health by exposure. 35'-'. Fright in connection with phy- sical injury— Expulsion of passenger. 353. Mental suffering, etc. — Pas- senger carried beyond des- tination. 354. Mental suffering — Injury to feelings, etc. — Ejection of • passenger. 355. Mental suffering — Passengers — Cases generally. 356. Failure to give passenger proper accommodations. 357. Injury or insult by third per- sons to passenger. 358. Wrongful charge of fare- Taking up tickets, etc. 359. Stipulations exempting car- rier from liability. 360. Statutory exemption from lia- bility — Passengers riding on platforms of cars. 383 § 327 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. § 327. Actions by passengers may be in contract or tort — The duties, obligations and responsibilities which a carrier owes to its passengers do not arise merely out of contract but are im- posed also by law. While a carrier may by contract limit to a certain degree the extent of his obligation, yet the law will not permit him by contract to release himself from all obligations or to seriously impair or affect those which are imposed upon him. So while to a certain extent, it may be said that the re- lation between the carrier and passenger is a contract relation, yet the contract is one which the law imposes upon the carrier the duty to make, and it necessarily follows that where a car- rier incurs any liability for a breach of any of its obligations towards its passengers, the action may either be in contract or for a tort. 1 So where a passenger is wrongfully ejected from a train he may recover damages as for a tort though the relation of the parties be in the nature of a contract. 2 Again, where a passenger owing to the fault of tlie station agent was induced to board a train which did not stop at the station where he wished to alight, it was held that his recovery for his ejection before he reached his destination was not merely for breach of the contract but for the tort. 3 And in most of the cases the action is generally in tort in which form of action the damages are not limited as they would be were the action purely upon the contract. So where a passenger was wrongfully and vio- lently expelled from a train, it was held that though the decla- ration allege a contract for carriage, the action was not for a breach of the contract but in the nature of a tort for breach of the duty the carrier owed* to the passenger and that punitive damages were recoverable. 4 But where the complaint alleged an agreement to carry plaintiff and others by a special train to a certain destination and back on a certain day and that the defendant wilfully, fraudulently and negligently failed and re- fused to carry them back from their destination, whereby plain- tiff was injured in health and business and suffered pain and anxiety of mind, it was decided that the action was upon special 3 Reynolds v. Railway Co., 13 Ohio C. C. 39. i Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hine, 121 Ala. 234; 14 Am. & Eug. R. Cas. N. S. 382; 25 So. 857. *Book v. Chic. B. & Q. R. Co., 75 M<>. App. 604; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 423. 384 4 Head v. Georgia Pac. Ry. Co., 79 Ga. 358; 7 S. E. 217. ACTIONS l;v PASSENGERS. 5 328 contract and not in tort and that the plaintiff's recovery was limited to such damages as naturally resulted from the breach of the contract and that he could not recover for pain and anxiety of mind/' §328. Physical injuries — Passengers — Generally. — The various elements which are to be considered in the estimation of the damages recoverable by a passenger in an action for phy- sical injuries are similar to those which enter into the determina- tion of the amount recoverable in other actions for physical injuries due to the negligence of another. So where a passenger is entitled to. recover, the jury in estimating the damages may consider all the damages which he has sustained from the date of the injury up to the time of the trial and those which he will sustain in the future as a result of the injury, the various ele- ments to be considered being physical and mental suffering, 8 ex- penses actually paid or incurred, 7 loss of time and earnings, 8 diminution of ability to labor, 9 and any permanent disability as a result of the injury. 11 ' As a general rule only such damages can be recovered by a passenger in this class of cases as will com- pensate him for the injury which he has sustained. 11 Exemplary 6 Walsh v. Chic, etc., Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 23; 24 Am. Rep. 376. See also Denver Tramway Co. v. Cloud (Colo. A H>.), 40 Pac. 779. 6 See sees. 215 et seq., herein. 7 See sees. 250 et seq., herein. 8 See sees. 226 et seq., herein. 9 See sees. 226 et seq., herein. 10 See sees. 242 et seq., herein. These various elements as affecting the measure of damages have already liiM'ii fully considered in the sections above referred to, but see also the following cases of actions by passen- gers where they have been consid- ered : Wade v. Leroy, 20 How. (N. S. ) 34; Atlanta Consol. St. R. Co. v. Bates, 103 Ga. 333; 30 S. E. 41; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 128; Louisville, X. A. & C. R. Co. v. Falvey, 104 Iud. 400; 1 West. 868; 2 West. 686; Donaldson v. Mis- 25 sissippi, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Iowa, 280; Chic. It. I. & P. R. Co. v. Posten, 59 Kan. 449; 53 Pac. 465; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 138; Black v. Carrol ton R. Co., 10 La. Ann. 33; Memphis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Whitfield, 14 Miss. 466; Holyoke v. Grand Trunk R. R, Co., 48 X. H. 541; Orsor v. Metropolitan Crosstown R. Co., 78 Hun (N. Y.), 169; 60 X. Y. St. II. 193; 28 X. Y. Supp. 966; Sevarthout v. Xew Jersey, etc., Co., 46 Barb. (X. Y.) 222; Filer v. \e\v York, C. R. R. Co., 46 X. Y. 42; Lincoln v. Saratoga & Schenectady R. II. Co., 23 Wend. 425; Walker v. Erie Ry. Co., 83 Barb. (X. Y.) 260; Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v.Cooper (Tex. Civ. App.), 20 S. W. 990. "Fremont E. & M. V. H. Co. v. French, 48 Xeb. 038; 67 X. W. 472; 385 §§ 329, 330 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. damages will not be awarded in the absence of gross negligence or wanton recklesness. 12 § 329. Permanent physical injuries— Passengers— Cases. — Where as a result of an injury to a passenger he was subse- quently, though a considerable time after the injury, troubled with nervousness, his mental faculties became somewhat im- paired, and this was followed by paralysis, though not until about seven months after the injury, the injury being the direct cause of the paralysis, the company was liable in dam- ages therefor. 13 And it was similarly decided where an injury resulted in a cancer. 14 So also, where as a result of a colli- sion of a vessel on which a woman was a passenger, she was thrown against a chair, but exhibited no signs of injury for several days, and did not call a physician for nine days, it was held that damages were recoverable for spinal irritability re- sulting: from the collision. 15 And in another case where in a railroad accident a passenger who had never been troubled with catarrh, was injured on the nose and catarrh subsequently de- veloped, and evidence of medical experts was given showing that catarrh might result from such an injury under certain exceptional circumstances, it was determined that a refusal by the court to charge that there was not sufficient evidence to show that the catarrh resulted from the injury was proper. 16 § 330. Passenger injured alighting from car. — If a pas- senger while alighting from a street car or railroad train is in- jured owing to the negligent starting of such car or train, he may recover damages for such injuries as he has sustained, in- cluding physical pain and suffering, mental suffering, and for all other injuries both past and prospective. 17 The measure of 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. ST. S. 365; Kentucky, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dills, 4 Bush (Ky.), 593. 12 Kentucky* R. R. Co. v. Dills., 4 Bush (Ky.), 593. 13 Bishop v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 26; 50 N. W. 928. 14 Baltimore City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 619; 48 Am. Rep. 134. 386 is The Rosedale (D. C. S. D. N. Y.), 88 Fed. 324. 16 Quackenbush v. Chic. & N. W. Ry. Co., 73 Iowa, 458; 35 N. W. 523. See chaps. III-VI, herein. 1 7 Omaha St. R. Co. v. Emminger, 57 Neb. 240; 77 N. W. 675; 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 188. As to duty of company when passenger Ac l loss r.v PASSENGERS. §§ 331,332 damages in such cases is the same as in all cases of personal in- juries sustained as the result of the negligence of another. So it was held proper to instruct the jury in an action by a pas- senger for injuries received while alighting from a train, that in estimating the damages they might consider evidence show- ing mental and physical pain and suffering, expenses incurred, loss of time while disabled, and permanent diminution of ability to earn money. ls And where a female passenger was severely injured while alighting from a train, a verdict of 83,000 was held not to be so excessive as to justify the appellate court in holding that it was the result of passion or prejudice. 1 ' 1 But where a passenger was injured by attempting to alight from a moving car which did not stop at the place he expected, it was decided that he could not recover in contract for such injuries because of the failure to stop, since such failure could not be considered as the proximate cause of the injuries.' 30 § 331. Passenger injured— Lex loci contractus— Statutory limitation as to recovery. — A passenger who procures a ticket between two stations within a state over a line of railroad which passes through another state, and who while passing over that portion of the road situate within such other state is in- jured by reason of the negligence of the carrier is not limited as to the amount of damages recoverable by the statutes of such state, since the contract of carriage is to be construed with ref- erence to the laws of the state wherein he procured his ticket and from which his journey commenced, and within which it was to terminate. In such cases the lex loci contractus gov- erns." 1 § 332. Exemplary damages. — The question as to the al- lowance of exemplary damages against coporations has been, as alighting from electric car, and de- gree of care imposed on passengers, see Joyce on Elec. Law, sees. 562- 569. 18 Houston A- T. C. R. Co. v. Rowell (Tex. Civ. App.), 45 S. W. 763, aff'd 46 S. W. 630; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. \. S. 597. 19 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Bayse, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 105; 30 S. W. 000. See Weinberg v. Met. St. Ky. Co.. 130 Mo. 286; 40 S. W. 882, where it was held that a verdict for nominal damages would not be disturbed. - White v. West End St. R. Co., 105 Mass. 522 : 43 N'. E. 298. 2i Dyke v. Erie Ry. Co., 45 N. Y. 113. 387 § 333 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. we have hereinbefore stated, the subject of much discussion in the various courts where it has arisen, and the allowance is in many cases made dependent upon the fact whether there has been in any way a ratification by the corporation of the servant's wrongful act. As this question is discussed elsewhere in this work, we refer thereto 22 for the general principles controlling the various decisions, and will only state generally that we be- lieve the weight of authority sustains the allowance of ex- emplary damages against carriers for the wrongful act of a servant or agent towards a passenger, without regard to the question whether such act has been ratified by the carrier or not. 23 § 333. Exemplary damages— -Assaults on passengers.— The majority of the cases uphold the rule that a carrier is liable for an assault and battery committed by one of its servants upon a passenger, and that if the former without provocation wrong- fully assault a passenger, the latter may recover exemplary damages. So where a brake man attempted to eject a dog be- longing to a passenger, and which had entered the car with him, but was prevented by the latter from so doing, and after- ward the brakeman suddenly assaulted the passenger and seriously injured him, it was held, in an action against the com- pany for such assault and injury, that it was proper to charge the jury that if the brakeman was acting in the performance of his duty as brakeman " he would be justified in using a reason- able degree of force, necessary and proper to accomplish the re- moval of the dog from the car, but if he used more violence than was necessary and inflicted on plaintiff blows that were un- necessary to perform his duty, the company would be liable, and the jury may, in that case, award punitive or exemplary dam- ages." 24 And in another case where a conductor rudely as- saulted a passenger, used abusive and insulting language towards him, roughly seized and pulled him to the end of the car, acted 22 See sees. 135-141, herein, where the question of the allowance of ex- emplary damages against corpora- tions is discussed. 23 See sees. 139-141, herein, and also the various sections in this chapter on exemplary damages. 388 24 Hanson v. European & American Ry. Co., 62 Me. 84; 16 Am. Rep. 404. In this case a verdict of $4,000 was given and was held not excessive. See also Hinkley v. Chicago, etc., R. R. Co., 38 Wis. 194. ACTIONS IIY PAfiSJfitfGfi&d. § 333 as if about to draw a pistol, threatened to kill him, and spit tobacco juice in his tare, it was decided that the company was liable in punitive damages. 2 Agaiu such damages were al- lowed to a passenger who upon demand had given his ticket t<> a brakeman authorized to receive it, but was shortly after ap- proached by the same brakeman, who denied that lie had Item given the ticket and grossly insulted and assaulted him." So also a sleeping car company has been held liable in punitive damages for an unprovoked assault by a porter upon one of its passengers. 27 In this case it was also held that, even if ratifica- tion by the company was necessary in order to render it liable in punitive damages for such assault, the company sufliciently ratified the act of the porter by attempting to prove upon the trial that his conduct was not improper or wrongful, and by making a violent and unwarrantable attack upon the conduct and character of the plaintiff with knowledge derived from the conductor's report of the facts of the ease. In an earlier case in the same state, where a passenger was assaulted by fel- low passengers, who were employees of defendant, but off duty, and the conductor made no particular effort to prevent the assault or protect plaintiff, and the company retained such ser- vants in their employ, it was decided that punitive damages could be recovered.'-* 1 While it is declared that exemplary damages may be recovered for an unprovoked and malicious assault!)}' an employee of a railroad upon a passenger, yet provocation even does not necessarily defeat the recovery of exemplary damages, but the conduct of both parties may be considered by the jury. 89 In this class of actions, as also in actions to recover exemplary damages for the wrongful ejection of a passenger, the ques- tion of liability of the company is made to depend, in many 86 East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Fleetwood, '.><> Ga. 2:'.: 1.". S. E. 778. 20 Goddard v. < ; rand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 Me. 202; 2 Am. Rep. 39, Tap- ley, J., dissenting. In this case it also held that as the defendants bad retained the brakeman in their em- ploy after not ire of the assault, a verdict for $4,H50 would not ho set aside as excessive. 27 Pullman I'alace Car Co. v. Law- rence, 74 Miss. 782 ; 22 So. 53; 15 Nat. Corp. Rep. 124; 8 Am. A Bng. R. Cas. N. S. 59; 2 Am. ffeg. Rep. 580; 1 Miss. Dec. (No. 5.), « \ew Orleans, etc.. R. U. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200: 2 1 Am lie].. 689. -"' Baltimore & < >. 1;. R, Co. v. Bar- ker. 80 Md. 2;!; 30 Atl. 220; 26 L. R. A. 220. §§ 334, 335 actions p.y passengers. cases, upon the fact whether the company has by any act rati- fied the conduct of the employees. 30 In many states, however, statutes have been passed in reference to the allowance of exem- plary damages in one or both class of cases, and where such stat- utes exist, their provisions in reference thereto will control. § 334. Exemplary damages — Failure or refusal to transport passenger. — A railroad company owes to the public the duty of stopping its trains at places and times designated by its sched- ule or time table, for the purpose of enabling intending passen- gers to board such trains, and it is the duty of the company to transport such passengers to the destination called for by the passenger in accordance with his ticket, or upon the payment of the proper fare to the conductor, provided the train is scheduled to stop at such point. And where a railroad company has ad- vertised for passengers for a certain train at a certain station and has or could have had by reasonable diligence sufficient room to accommodate them, but in violation of its statutory duty fails to stop at such station for a passenger, punitive damages are recoverable. 31 And where in pursuance of an unreasonable regulation of the company, its agents refuse to sell an intending passenger a ticket or check his baggage to a regular station of a passenger train, such regulation and refusal indicate such a wanton disregard of the rights of passengers as will warrant the recovery of exemplaiy damages.^ Again, where the employees of a carrier, acting within the scope of their authority, wilfully and wantonly refused to accept a round trip ticket which a passenger tendered for the return trip, and he was by such act obliged to borrow money in order to reach home, it was held that the passenger was entitled to recover exemplary damages against the company. 33 § 335. Same subject continued. — It will be observed that in this class of cases as in all others, the recovery of exemplary 30 See sees. 130-141, herein. 81 Purcell v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 108 N. C. 414: 12 L. R. A. 113; 12 S. E. 954; 10 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 35. 32 Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 390 Lyon, 123 Pa. St. 140; 2 L. R. A. 489; 16 Atl. 607; 23 W. N. C. 69; 46 Phila. Leg. Intel. 311; 39 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 280. 33 Scott v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 43 W. Va. 484; 27 S. E. 211. Actions i;v PASSEK6EES. damages is allowed on the ground that the act of the companj in failing or refusing to transport a passenger is a wilful, wanton or malicious one. The failure to transport may be due to mere negligence, and in such cases it is decided that exemplary damages are not recoverable, the damages being compensatory merely. 34 So where the failure to transport a passenger was due to the fact that the engine was broken down, and there was no personal injury, insult, indignity or intentional wrong done to him, punitive damages were refused.-' And where an intending passenger, owing to the absence of the ticket agent from a flag station, was unable to procure a ticket, and the engineer of the train failed to see his signal to stop, it was held that he was en- titled to recover the actual damages sustained and that to au- thorize the recovery of punitive damages for the failure of the engineer to stop at such station so that he might board the train, the engineer must have seen him, it not being sufficient that in the exercise of reasonable care he could have seen him. 30 And, again, it was held that such damages could not be recovered for delay in transporting a passenger, where such delay was due to a wreck, though the company failed to do all that it might have done to insure the continuance of the journey and though there was sufficient negligence to justify a recovery for loss of time. 17 And where, owing solely to the negligence of the company in calling out the name of a station before it was time for passen- gers to leave the car, a passenger was discharged from a train one and a half miles from the station, it was decided that he could not recover exemplary damages, and this though there was a refusal to stop the train after discovering that the passenger had left it. 38 And in another case it is held that the mere wrongful 84 Southern R. R. Co. v. Kendrick, only be given where the circnm- 40 Miss. 374, where it was held to be stances of the case were found to error to instruct, the jury in an action justify or require them, to recover damages for failure to de- K Hansley v. Jamesville A- W. R. liver a passenger at her destination, Co., 117 N. ('. 565; 115 X. ('. 602; :'.•-' that not only damages compensa- L. R. A. 54:5: •_*:; S. E. II:'.. tory for the private injury might he recovered, but also exemplary dam- ages for disregard of public duty without qualifying that part of the instruction as to punitive damages by stating that such damages should Be Thomas v. Southern EL Co., 122 N. C. 1005; SOS. E. S4:5. :)7 Alabama & V. K. {'<>. v. Purnell, iii» Miss. 652; 13 So. 472. Gulf C. A- s. F. K. Co. \. McFad- den (Tex. Civ. App.), 26 S. W. 451. 391 §§ 336, 337 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. refusal of a carrier to permit a passenger to ride on a certain train is not sufficient to authorize the recovery of punitive damages even though the employees were informed by such person that he desired to reach the deathbed of a brother/ 39 In an action by a person to recover exemplary damages against a carrier for the failure on the part of the conductor to hold the train for him, which he promised to do while the former, who was on his way to attend the funeral of his sister, procured his ticket, it was held that testimony by the plaintiff as to what he did after he had finally reached his home, was admissible though it tended to ag- gravate damages. 40 § 336. Penalty statute — Failure to transport and discharge passengers at destination — " Legal or just excuse." — Where there is a statute imposing a penalty upon railroad corporations for failure to transport and discharge passengers who offer them- selves for transportation, and further providing that the penalty shall be recoverable in an action for debt and that the only de- fense thereto shall be a "just or legal excuse," 41 in an action to recover such penalty by a passenger whom the company had failed to discharge at his destination, it is no defense within the wording of the statute that the train was not stopped at the pas- senger's destination, because in the opinion of the conductor it was unsafe to stop at such station on account of the number of persons who were waiting to take passage on the train which was already crowded. 4 - § 337. Wrongful ejection from train. — Where a passenger is wrongfully ejected from a train, he maj r recover either in an action upon the contract of carriage, or in an action of tort. Where his action is for a breach of the contract, he can only re- cover such damages as are the direct and proximate result of the breach. 43 In a case in Ohio, however, where a person, hav- 3 9 Barnett v. Chic. & A. R. Co., 75 Mo. App. 446; 1 Mo. App. Kepr. 391. 40 Gillman v. Florida, C. & P. K. Co., 53 S. C. 210; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 125; 31 E. S. 224. 41 See How. Ann. Stat. Mich, sec. 3324, which imposes a penalty of $100 in such cases. 392 42 IToyt v. Cleveland, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co., 112 Mich. 638; 71 N. W. 172; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 818; 29 Chic. L. N. 330; 4 Det. L. N. 142; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 199. 43 Union P. R. Co. v. Shook, 3 Kan. App. 710; 44 Pac. 785. ACTIONS P,V PASSENGERS. - ing a ticket good only on trains stopping at a specified station, was induced to board ;i certain train by the statement of the station agent, that such train stopped al his Btation, but which in fact did ootand he was ejected by the conductor before reach- ing such station, it was held that the measure of damages was the same whether the injury was considered as resulting from a tort or from a breach of contract." As a general rule the meas- ure of damages in such an action is such as may fairly he con- sidered as arising naturally in the usual course of events from the breach of the contract, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time they executed the contract as the probable results of a breach of the same. 1 *' § 338. Wrongful ejection from train— Continued.— In an action of tort, a passenger may recover damages for all the in- juries which he has sustained, either directly caused by or flow- ing from the wrongful act. 46 And it is declared that though a passenger in such a case may have suffered no pecuniary loss or actual injury to his person, his recovery will not be limited to merely nominal damages. 47 So where a passenger was ejected ** Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 55 Ohio St. 370; 37 Ohio L. J. 41; 45 N. E. 712; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 95. 46 Chic. H. & Q. R. Co. v. Spirit, 51 Neb. 167; 70 N\ W. 926; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. V S. 205; ^ Am. Neg. Rep. 201. *« Chic. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Spirk. 51 Neb. 1(J7; 70 X. W. 926; 7 Am. & Eng. R. ("as. N. S. 205; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 201. See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bine, 121 A In. 234; 25 So. 857; 1 l Am. A- Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 382. 47 Chic, etc., R. R. C«». v. Flagg, 43 111. 3G4. See cast-s following as to whether verdicts in certain crises were excessive in actions for eject ion of passengers: In following cases held not excessive: Outlawing all certain class of tickets of which pas- senger held one, considered as reckless disregard of passenger's rights -$1,000. Winters v. Cowen (C. C. X. T). Ohio), 90 Fed. 9'.': 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 40. though large not excessive. Charleston & S. R. Co. v. Varnadore, 94 <;a. 639; 21 S. E. 581. Wantonly and wilfully thrown from moving train severe injuries external and internal— $2,000. Illinois, C. R. Co. v. Davenport, 75 111. App. 579. atT'd 177 111. 110; 52 X. E. 266. Force and violence resulting in illness — $2,000. Louisville, X. A. & C. R. C... v. Gohen, 15 End. A.pp. 123; 42 N. E. 111(5, reh'g denied 43 N. E. 890. Labor and inconvenience physical ami mental pain and suffer- ing — humiliation $296.34. Atchi- son. T. A- s. F. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 4 Kan. App. 345; 45 Pac. 975. Tas- 393 § 338 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. from a street car on the unfounded charge that he had not paid his fare, it was held that his recovery was not limited to the amount of the fare, where if the conductor had made an investi- gation which he refused to do, the fact as to the payment of the fare would have been disclosed, and the payment of another fare by the passenger would, in the eyes of the other passengers, have amounted to an admission that he had attempted to de- fraud the company; 18 But where it appeared that a passenger senger afflicted with St. Vitus dance — forcible ejection in belief that, he was intoxicated — $400. Requer v. Glens Falls, S. H. & F. E. St. R. Co., 74 Hun (N. Y.), 202; 56 N. Y. St. R. 300; 26 N. Y. Supp. 625. Publicly charging passenger with attempting to pass a fraudulent ticket, but which was good and proper and con- ductor failed to examine same — $450. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Teed (C. C), 2 Ohio Dec. 662. Roughly spoken to by conductor in presence of other passengers — great mortifi- cation — compelled to walk seven miles to his home— $200. Fordyce v. Manuel, 82 Tex. 527; 18 S. W. 657. Compelled to walk three and a half miles home— $50. Durfee v. Union P. R. Co., 9 Utah, 213; 33 Pac. 944. Large man — crippled — put off five miles from his destination — walked home because of anxiety on account of dangerous illness of his daughter. Sheets v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 39 W. Va. 475; 20 S. E. 566. In following cases verdicts held excessive: Detained two days at expense of $37 — punitive damages not proper — $1,700. Zion v. Southern P. Co. (C. C. D. Nev.), 67 Fed. 500. Obliged to walk about a mile caus- ing recurrence of insomnia and nervous paroxysms — $1,400. Sloane v. Southern Cal. R. Co., Ill Cal. 668; 32 L. R. A. 193; 44 Pac. 320. In belief that ticket was ,not good — no insulting language or improper 394 demonstrations — resumed journey on following day — no pecuniary loss outside of amount paid for fare — $1,300. Comer v. Foley, 98 Ga. 678; 25 S. E. 671; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 250. No physical personal injury or pecuniary damages — $500. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Breckin- ridge, 17 Ky. L. R. 1303; 99 Ky. 1; 34 S. W. 702. Suspicious defects in ticket which in fact valid — no ma- licious or wanton disregard of pas- senger's rights — $225. Eleven v. Great Northern R. Co., 70 Minn. 79; 72 N. W. 828. Ejected by collar of person carried into steamboat ferry by a crowd after offer to pay fare or leave — $1,500. Doran v. Brooklyn & N. Y. Ferry Co., 46 N. Y. St. R. 310; 19 N. Y. Supp. 172. Respectable man of mature years — injuries to feeling and reputation — put off for alleged disorderly conduct — account thereof published in newspaper — pointed out as man put off — $1,475 — should be set aside unless $1,000 remitted. Cunningham v. Seattle Elec. R. & P. Co., 8 Wash. 471; 28 Pac. 745. No evidence as to loss of time — expenses — illness or unusual inconvenience — $1,500, excessive though one half has been remitted. Gillan v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 91 Wis. 633; 65 N. W. 373; 2 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 145. 48 Sprenger v. Tacoma Traction Co., 15 Wash. 660; 47 Pac. 17; 43 L. R. A. 706. ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. § 339 who had broughl an action for his ejection from a railroad train had purchased a bickel consisting of four coupons, and thai the second coupon was missing when he offered his ticket after having used his first coupon, and though having the money he refused to pay his fare, in consequence of which he was ejected, though he informed the conductor that such coupon had been taken up by the former conductor and he showed the return coupons, it was held that, his recovery was properly limited to the amount of fare necessary to complete the journey.* § 339. Wrongful ejection from train— Concluded.— For a wrongful ejection, of a passengeT for a refusal to pay an ex- cessive fare, he may recover for all the consequences of the wrong, and is not limited to the difference between the fare de- manded and that tendered/'" If unnecessary or unreasonable force is not used in the ejection of a passenger, or the act is not accompanied by insult, it is held that the expulsion is not tortious and only compensatory damages are recoverable, where though the passenger was entitled by reason of his contract with the ticket agent to passage, yet his ticket upon its face did not so en- title him/' 1 And it has been decided that if a passenger is ejected in good faith, no unnecessary force being used, and the ejection is pursuant to rules and upon due notice to the passenger, he can only recover compensatory damages. 52 So if he is law- fully ejected but with more force than is necessary, his recovery is confined to such damages as were due to the excessive force used. w In another case where a passenger was wrongfully ejected in the erroneous belief that he was not the owner of a nontransferable ticket presented by him. it was held that the amount of his compensatory damages did not depend upon the good faith or intentions of the conductor."' 1 Inconvenience suf- fered by a passenger in consequence of his wrongful ejection from a train is an element to he considered in estimating the dam- 49 Van Duaan v. (hand Trunk R. Co., 97 Mich. 439; 56 X. W. sis. 60 Jeffersonville R. R. Co. v. Rogers, 28 End. 1. 61 Lexington A' E. R. C<>. v. Lynns, 20 Ky. L. R. .".10: 11 Am. A- Eng. R, Cas. N. S. 212: 40 S. W. 209. ra Pine v. si. Paul City R. I >>. i.Minn.i. 10 L R. A. 347; 52 \" W 392. «M;uy v. C. C. A St. L. K. Co. (C. P.). ohi., \. P. 3. 1 Pittsburg, C C. A- Si. L. R. Co. v. Russ (C. C. A.pp. Ttli C.)i 07 Fed. 062. 395 339 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. ages. 55 But where a passenger was ejected for nonpayment of fare it was decided that damages for unnecessary violence could not include compensation for inconvenience which he suffered in making his way back to a station or for his suffering or sick- ness from exposure. 56 Loss of time is also to be considered in determining the measure of damages for the wrongful ejection of a passenger, 57 but in the absence of some evidence as to the value of such time it cannot be included in the damages awarded. 58 Loss of a job of work, however, due to the ex- pulsion of a passenger is not to be considered in the estima- tion of damages for such expulsion. 59 Nor are the remarks and comments of other passengers made at the time of such ejection to be considered. 60 In another case it was held that a charge to the jury that they were not confined to the same "amount of damages or the same rules as if the suit was between individuals, as the public have an interest in such cases which may be consid- ered and looked to in assessing the damages " was erroneous. 61 Where there is a statutory provision that in all actions against railroad companies the plaintiff may, if he recovers, be also al- lowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed as part of the costs," it is decided that a plaintiff who has been successful in an action against a railroad company for his wrongful ejection from a train should be allowed to recover an attorney's fee. 63 But though a passenger has been wrongfully ejected, yet if no actual damages have been sustained, he is not entitled to recover counsel fees.' 11 And in an action for the wrongful ejection of a passenger from 65 Central R. & B'k'g Co. v. Strick- land, 90 Ga. 562; 16 S. E. 352; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 216; Laird v. Pittsburgh Traction Co., 166 Pa. St. 4; 31 Atl. 51; 25 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 291; 2 Det. L. N. 339; 36 W. N. C. 24; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cope- land, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 55; 42 S. W. 239; Boelim v. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co., 91 Wis. 592; 65 N. W. 506. 56 Texas & P. R. Co. v. James, 82 Tex. 306; 15 L. R. A. 347; 18 S. W. 589. 57 Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cope- land, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 55; 42 S. W. 396 239. See sec. ante herein, as recovery for loss of time. 58 Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Daniels (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 426. 59 Carston v. Northern P. R. Co., 44 Minn. 454. eo Hoffman v. Northern P. R. Co., 45 Minn. 53. 6i Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Nelson, 59 111. 110. 62 See Sand. & H. (Ark.) Dig. sec. 6218. 63 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Neal, 66 Ark. 543; 51 S. W. 1000. 64 Dave v. Morgans L. & T. R. & ACTIONS I'.Y PASSENGERS. ; 340 a railroad train, interest upon unliquidated damages should not be allowed. 1 § 340. Exemplary damages — Ejection of passenger.— Where a passenger has been wrongfully ejected from a train, street ear, or other public conveyance, the recovery is not in all cases limited to an amount which may be compensatory for the loss or damage sustained as a result thereof. The ejection in addition to being wrongful may be done in a malicious or wanton spirit, may be accompanied with vilification, insult or indignity, or with unusual and unnecessary force, or there may be other ag- gravating circumstances, which warrant the imposition of some- thing more than compensatory damages, and in such cases the general doctrine seems to be that exemplary damages may be awarded.'"' 1 In order, however, to authorize the allowance of ex- emplary damages, there must be evidence upon which to base the same. Thus it was held to be reversible error to instruct S. S. Co., 47 La. Ann. 576; 17 So. 128. 6i Nichols v. Union P. R. Co. (Utah), 27 Puc. 093. ee Cowen v. Winters, 00 Fed. 929; Gorman v. Southern Pao. Co., 97 Cal. 1; 31 Pac. 1112; Western & A. R. Co. v. Ledbetter, 99 Ga. 318; 25 S. E. 003; Atlanta Consul. St. R. Co. v. Hardage, 93 Ga. 457; 21 S. E. 100; Georgia R. Co. v. olds, 77 Ga. 673; St. Louis, A. & T. II. R. Co. v. Rea- gan, 52 111. App. 48S; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Goben, 15 [nd. App. 123; 42 X. E. 1116, reh'g denied 43 N. E. 890; Callaway v. Mellett, 15 Ind. App. 360; 24 Wash. L. Rep. 014; 44 N. E. 198; 43 Cent. L. J. 77; 29 Chic. Lee;. News, 43; Ellsworth v. Chicago,B. & <>r. R. Co. (Iowa), 63 N. W. 584; Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398; 10 Pac. 817; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Long, 5 Kan. App. 044; 47 I'ac. 993; Louisville* X. R. Co. v. Keller, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 957; 47 S. W. 1072; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 348; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 589; Hanson v. European, etc., Ry. Co., 04 Me. 84; 10 Am. Rep. 404; Philadelphia, Wilmington & Bait. R. Co. v. Larkin, 47 Md. 155; Lucas v. Michigan C. R. Co., 98 Mich. 1; 56 X. W. 1039; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Maybin, 66 Miss. 83; St. Clair v. Missouri P. K. Co., 29 Mo. App. 76; Wigton v. Met. Si. R. Co., 38 App. Div. ( X. Y.) 207; 50 N. Y. Sup]). 047; Rose v. Wilmington & W. K. Co., 106 N. C. 168; 11 S. E. 526; Atlantic & Greal Western Ry. Co. v. Dunn. 19 Ohio St. 162; Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cole, 29 Ohio St. 126; Fitts- burg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Fnsign. in Ohio C. C. 21; Hall v. South Car- olina Ry. Co.. 28 S. C. 201; 5 S. E. 623; Palmer v. Railroad, :'. S. C. 580; Internationa] A- G. X. R. Co. v. Mil- ler. '.I Tex. Civ. App. 104; 28 S. W. ■_':'.:'. : writ of error denied in 87 Tex. 430; 29 S. W. 2:',:,; Patsy v. Chic. St. 1'. M. A- C. R. Co., 77 Wis. 218; 46 N. W. .".»;; Hass v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654. 397 R 34] ACTIONS RV PASSENGERS. the jury that if in ejecting the plaintiff the agents of the defend- ant were rude and insulting in words, tone, or gesture, they might award punitive damages, there being no evidence upon which to base such a verdict. 67 §341. Exemplary damages— Ejection of passenger— Un- necessary force or violence.— If in the ejection of a passenger more force than is necessary is used, or unnecessary injury is inflicted upon him by the employees of the company, he may re- cover exemplary damages. 68 Ajid though a passenger may make unnecessary resistance to the conductor who proposes to eject him, yet this will not excuse the conductor for inflicting wilful or malicious injuries upon him, and exemplary damages may be recovered. 69 So it was held proper to charge the jury that though a passenger, by reason of his disorderly conduct, rendered himself liable to expulsion therefor, yet if in ejecting him he was subjected to unnecessary and reckless violence and indignity, and the em- ployees of the company acted in a wanton, high-handed and out- rageous manner, exemplary damages might be awarded.' And where a conductor requested a passenger to assist him in the expulsion of a negress from a car set apart for whites and they used wilful and unnecessary violence, the company was held lia- ble in exemplary damages therefor. 71 Again, where a conductor, preparatory to ejecting a passenger, dragged him into the aisle of the car in the presence of a car full of ladies and gentlemen, the ejection being based on the unfounded pretense that he was not the owner of a mileage book presented by him, it was decided that the passenger might be awarded punitive damages. 72 So, 67 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jack- son, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 290; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 437; 36 S. W. 173. 68 Hanson v. European, etc., Ry. Co., 64 Me. 84; Philadelphia, Wil- mington & Bait. R. R. Co., 47 Md. 155; 47 Fed. 155. If, however, a con- ductor starts to eject a passenger in a proper manner and the passenger makes unnecessary resistance to him, the use of force by the conductor will, it is held, be excused and the act of 398 the passenger may be considered in mitigation of damages. Hall v. Mem- phis, etc., R. Co., 23 Fed. 637. 69 Chic, etc., R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 111. 499. 70 Philadelphia, Wilmington & Bait. R. R. Co., 47 Md. 155. 71 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Miller, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 104; writ of error denied in 87 Tex. 430; 29 S. W. 235. 72 Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Ensign, 10 Ohio C. C. 21. ACTIONS P.Y PASSENGERS. also, such damages are held to be properly awarded where there is a disregard of the life and Limbs of the passenger in his ejec- tion, r; as where a passenger was ejected while the train was in motion. 71 § 342. Exemplary damages Ejection of passenger— When not. recoverable. Where the ejection of a passenger is in good faith and without indignity, abuse, unnecessary force, vio- lence, injury, or other aggravating circumstances, only compensa- tory damages will be allowed. 15 And where a passenger is ejected from a train by mistake, there can no recovery of punitive dam- ages in the absence of any element of aggravation.''' So where a conductor, owing to a mistake in reading a passenger's ticket, wrongfully ejected him from the train, but indulged in no abuse, rudeness, or violence, and upon being convinced of his mistake, used every effort to rectify it, there was held to be no basis for the recovery of exemplary damages. 77 And such damages cannot be recovered for his ejection, by the holder of a ticket which he believes will not be accepted by the con- ductor, where he enters the train not with the bona tide in- tention of making the trip called for by the ticket, but rather for the purpose of being ejected. 78 Again, where a person took passage for the purpose of testing the question of fares and with the expectation that he would be ejected and would make 73 St. Clair v. Missouri P. R. Co., 29 Mo. App. 70. w St. Louis, A. & T. II. R. R. Co. v. Reagan, 52 111. App. 488. 75 Lemon v. Pullman Pal. Car Co. (C. C. S. D. Miss.), 52 Fed. 262; Turner v. North Beach, etc., R. R. Co., 34 Oal. 594; Fitzgerald v. Chi- cago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 50 Iowa, 79; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown (Kan. 1893), 31 Par. 79; Atchi- son, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Lamoreuz, 5 Kan. App. 813; 49 Pac. 152: Smith v. Phila. W. & B. R. Co.. 87 [ml 48; 38 Atl. 1072; Ki Am. & Eng. R. < 'as. X. S. 264; Logan v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R. Co., 77 Mo. 663; Hamilton v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 25, rev"g 35 X. Y. Supr. 118; Muckle v. Roches- ter R. Co., 78 Hun (N. Y. i. 32; 61 X. Y. St. R. 193; 29 X. Y. Supp. 732; Louisville, Nashville & Great South- ern 1!. R. Co. v. Guinan, 11 Lea (Penn.),98. 70 Phila. Traction Co. v. Orbann, 119 Pa. St. 37; 12 Atl. 816; 21 W. X. ('. 70; 11 Cent. 631. See also Denver Tramway Co. v. Cloud (Colo. App.), 40 Pac. 77'.'. 77 Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Nr.lv. -.i>f of a breach of any obligation not arising from contract, where there has been oppression, fraud or malice on the part of the defendant, exemplary damages may he awarded, it has been held that such damages may he recovered by a pas- senger who, after having paid his fare once, is again asked for it by the conductor, and upon his refusal to pay again is ejected by the conductor, his ejection being accompanied by undue violence or by insult or abuse.* Again, vindictive damages were allowed where a passenger, though he presented the proper ticket, was ejected from the train on the ground that the ticket had expired, where there was on the part of the conductor such reckless disregard of the rights of the passenger as amounted Co wan- toness.* 7 And where a large number of mileage tickets which had been issued and sold by the authority of tln> general pas- senger agent were deliberately repudiated by him and in con- sequence of his orders a passenger who had purchased one of such tickets was ejected from a train of the company, it was held that the act of the passenger agent was of such a character and so far equivalent to an intentional violation of the company's duties and the passenger's rights as would warrant the award- ing of exemplary damages. B § 344. Passenger left at wrong station. —As a general rule a passenger who by the negligent conduct of the conductor is induced to alight, at the wrong station is entitled to recover compensatory damages therefor, as where a conductor errone- ously informed a passenger that his station had been reached, 84 St. Louis, I. M. & s. II. Co. v. Davis, (Ark.) ; 10 S. W. 107. 86 Sec. 3204. 8 6 Gorman v. Southern P. Co., 07 Cal. 1: 31 Pac. 1112. 26 401 87 Southern Kan. 11. Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. 398; 16 Pac. sit. 88Co\ven v. Winters, 96 Fed. 929, aff '£ 00 Fed. 00. § 845 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. thus causing him to alight at a wrong station. 89 Compensa- tion in such cases may include expenses incurred for a con- veyance or lodging, extra fare if the passenger waits for another train, loss of time, and for any other injury directly re- sulting from the negligent act of the carrier. 90 But where the passenger was unable to procure a conveyance or lodging at the point at which he was left and he walked home, it was held that the action was one on the contract of carriage and that damages for exposure and fatigue, incident to such walk, were too remote and not recoverable. 91 This element of damages we have, how- ever, discussed elsewhere, 92 and the weight of authority sup- ports the conclusion that such damages are recoverable, espe- cially in those cases where it appears that no lodging or convey- ance can be obtained at the place at which the passenger is left. § 345. Duty to minimize damages— Ejection of passen- ger.— Where a passenger, in violation of his contract of carriage, is ejected from a train, there is no obligation imposed upon him to minimize his damages by paying an additional fare to avoid his removal though he may be able to do so. 93 But where a passenger who had been ejected from a train sought shelter and protection at a place further distant from the place of his eject- ment than a reasonably prudent person would have done under similar circumstances, it was held that for an excess of injuries caused by such want of prudence damages could not be re- covered. 94 «9 Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Quillen, 22 Ind. App. 496; 53 N. E. 1024; 1 Rep. 120G. In this case $150 was held excessive where the only expense incurred was $5 for a con- veyance and the only evidence of inconvenience or other damage was the fact of an evening ride across country. 90 See in this connection Paddock v. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co., 37 Fed. 841; Alabama, etc., R. R. Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9; Chic, etc., R. Co. v. Brisbane, 24 111. App. 463; Balti- more & O. R. Co. v. Carr, 71 Md. 135; Schumaker v. St. Paul & D. R. 402 Co., 46 Minn. 39; 12 L. R. A. 257; 48 N. W. 559; Dorrah v. Illinois C. R. Co., 65 Miss. 14; Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. St. 519; I. & G. N. R. Co. v. Terry, 62 Tex. 380. si Hobbs v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111. 92 See sec. 349 herein and preced- ing sections under this chapter. 9 3 Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co., 17 Tex. Civ. App. 55; 42 S. W. 239. See Gal- veston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Patter- son (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 848. sa Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Turner (Tex. Civ. App.), 23 S. W. 83. ACTIONS i;v PASSENGERS. S 346 § 340. Passenger carried beyond destination. Where, owing to the negligence of the carrier, .1 passenger is carried beyond his destination, the latter may recover compensatory damages fertile Loss or injury proximately resulting therefrom. 88 In the absence of evidence showing ;i wilfulness or wantonness on the part of the carrier, or acts which show gross negligence, the damages arc Limited in such cases to an amount which is compensatory for the injury sustained. So where a conductor of a train became confused by an altercation with some of the passengers and neglected to stop his train at a station to which a passenger was hound and carried him eighl miles beyond the same, for which neglect the conductor courteously apologized 35 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jack- son, is Ky. L. Rep, 296; 36S. W. IT:'.; 4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 437; Judice v. Southern P. Co., 47 La. Ann. 255; 16 So. 816; Cable v. Southern R. Co., 122 N. C. 892; 29 s. E. 377. See following oases as to | different amounts which have been awarded in such cases: Carrying beyond destination and refusal to back up to station, accompanied by profane language by conductor in presence of ladies — $1,000, held not excessive. Fordyce v. Nix, 58 Ark. 136; 23 S. W. 967. Arm broken in attempting to walk back to station $1,000, not excessive. New York C. & St. L. K. Co. v. Doane, 115 Ind. 435; 1 L. R. A. 157; 17 N. E. 913. Young and inexperienced girl carried past one station to point at which she could not safely alight and thenhalf mile past next station, which conductor promised to stop .at — $400, not excessive. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Rinicker, 17 Ind. App. 619; 47 N. E. 239; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 15:1. Woman in delicate condition compelled to have train four hundred yards beyond station and walk back over a rough and rocky road — §218, not excessive. Louisville * N. R. Co. v. tiny, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 750; 37 S. W. 1043. Verdict for 84,500 considered very large, but as jury bad power to give punitive damages, court refused to set it aside. New < )i leans, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. 660. Young lady carried to next station beyond — courteously treated — only annoyance was being obliged to wait three hours for return train s'_'50, held ex- cessive. Southern It. Co. v. Bryant, lo:, Ga. 316; 31 S. E. 182; 12 Am. & Eng. II. Cas. \. S. l;,!). Young lady carried one and a half miles beyond station — daytime — told in loud tone to get off — necessary to walk back over track — 82,000, excessive. Chat- tanooga. R. A- C. K. Co. v. Lyon. 89 Ga. I''.: 15 L. R. A. 857: 15 S. E. 24. Carried two miles beyond station — obliged to walk hack healthy, able- bodied man — no ill effects except slight fatigue — $50, excessive. Gulf C. & s. F. R (o. v. Ryan (Tex. Civ. App. i. IS S. W. silo. Carried one half mile beyond station — night inn- obliged to walk and to crawl over two trestles on his knees, which were Sure for several days cold and COUgb from exposure — 81,000, excessive. Texas A I'. K. Co. v. Mansell (Tex. civ. App.), 23 S. W. 549. 403 8 347 ACTION'S BY PASSENGERS. and gave him a free return ticket from that station, it was held to be only a ease lor the awarding of compensatory damages. 96 § 347. Passenger carried beyond destination— Continued. — Where a passenger is wrongfully carried past his destination, the jury may, in awarding damages therefor, properly consider the items, incouvenience, delay and expenses resulting from such negligent act.' 1 '' And in such case evidence that the pass- enger was compelled to walk back over dusty roads, that it took her about three hours, that she was frightened by being chased by dogs and by other causes, that she got wet in crossing a creek, and that by reason of the sultry weather she was made sick, is competent.' 18 But where a woman passenger with a sick child was carried past her station, it was held that the jury, in estimating the damages, were not to consider an arrangement which had been made with the father of such passenger to meet her and her child at the station and take them to her sister's home, where the child was to receive medical treatment, there being no evidence showing that the company knew of any such arrangement." And the fact that a tenant failed to pay a debt during the absence of a passenger from home under such circumstances, is held not to be a proper item to consider in the estimation of damages where there is no evidence showing what 96 Chicago R. R. Co. v. Scurr, 59 Miss. 456; 42 Am. Rep. 373. There being no evidence iu this of auy in- convenience or injury except that the passenger suffered from a slight cold, it was held that a verdict of $833.33 was excessive and should be set aside. 97 Airey v. Pullman Pal. Car Co., 50 La. Ann. 648; 23 So. 512; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 836. But see St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. McCulloush (Tex Civ. App.), 33 S. W. 285, where it is held that if the company used ordinary care not to inflict any unnecessary inconvenience in such a case, there can be no recovery for in- convenience in such an action. ^Cincinnati, Hamilton A Indian- 404 npolis R. R. Co. v. Eaton, 94 Ind. 474; 48 Am. Rep. 179. But see Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cleveland (Tex. Civ. App.), 33 S. W. 687, where it was held that a passenger carried past his destination could only re- cover for cost of lodging or of a con- veyance, and not for damages inci- dent to his walking to his destination without inquiry as to lodgings or a conveyance. See also for a consider- ation of damages in such cases, sec. 349 herein. » Chic. R. I. & F. R. Co. v. Boyles, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 522; 33 S. W. 247. See Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. McKenzie (Tex. Civ. App), 41 S. W. 831. ACTIONS l:V PASSENGERS. §348 she might have done to compel its payment if she had been present."" The fact thai a woman who had been carried past her station owing to the failure to call her as requested, did not leave the train at a point some distance beyond her station and accept a return fare and an opportunity to return by the next train, but chose to continue on the train and find shelter among her relatives, is not, it has been held, to be construed as a fail- ure on her part to reduce her damages. 1 Again, an action to recover damages for carrying a passenger beyond his destina- tion is, for the purpose of determining costs under the Indiana statute where the verdict is lor less than #50, to be treated as an action in tort, the contract of carriage in such a case being considered only as an incident in the creatiou of the relation from which the company's duty arose.' § 348. Exemplary damages— Passenger carried beyond des- tination. — It is the duty of a carrier to accept and transport a passenger, and also to permit him to alight at his destina- tion and to allow him a reasonable time so to do. And where, owing to the gross negligence or wanton or intentional acts of the company, a passenger is carried beyond the place his ticket calls for, he may recover not only damages to compen- sate him for the injury, but also exemplary damages may be al- lowed. 8 So such damages were held to be properly allowable where the employees of a railroad refused to put a passenger off at her station and to whom they were " insulting either in words. tone or manner." 4 But exemplary damages cannot be recovered for failure to announce the station or to give a passenger a rea- sonable time to alight from ;i train, unless such failure is accom- panied by wilfulness or other aggravating conduct."' So where 1 "' Airey V. Pullman Pal. Car Co., 50 Ln. Ann. G4S; 23 So. 512; 11 Am. A- Eng. R. < - :«s. N. S. 836. 1 Airey v. Pullman Pal. Car Co., 50 La. Ann. 648; 23 So. 512; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. \. S. 836. "Evansville & F. II. K. Co. v. Wil- son, 20 I ml. A pp. 5; 50 N. E. 90; 4 Am. Neg. Pep. 141. ;i Memphis, etc., Packet Co. v. Nagel, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 748; 29 S. W. 743; New Orleans, etc.. R. P. < o. v. Hurst. 36 Miss. 660. * Louisville & V P. Co. v. Ballard, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 7:'.5: 2 1.. P. A. 694; 10 S. W. 429. See also Memphis, etc., Packet Co. v. Nagel, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 748; 29 S. W. 743. BJudice v. Southern 1". Co., IT La. Ann. 255; 15 So. 816; Dorrah v. Il- linois ( . K. Co., 65 Miss. 14; 3 So. 36; Xorfork & W. P. Co. v. Lips- 405 § 348 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. a conductor negligently omitted to have his train stop at a flag station so that certain lady passengers might alight therefrom, and for such failure he expressed his regrets to them and stopped at the next station and endeavored to procure a con- veyance to take them back to such flag station, it was held that his acts did not evince such a reckless disregard of the circum- stances as to authorize the recovery of punitive damages. 6 But where a carrier passed a station without giving a passenger op- portunity to alight and refused to return him to such station, where the omission was discovered within a reasonable time and there was no controlling agency to prevent the return, aside from mere inconvenience, it was held that exemplary damages might be recovered. 7 In the Georgia Code 8 it is provided that "in every tort there may be aggravating circumstances either in the act or the intention, and in that event the jury may give addi- tional damages, either to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass or as compensation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff." In a case where this provision was read to the jury, it was held that the mere negligent omission of a carrier to stop its train at a given point to which it has undertaken to transport a passenger is not a trespass within the meaning of the Code, and that the reading to the jury of the concluding clauses of that section, namely, as to the giving of additional damages either to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass or as compen- sation for the wounded feelings of the plaintiff was error. 9 In another case in the same state, which was an action to recover damages for carrying plaintiffs beyond their destination, where it appeared that they were carried to the next station beyond, where they had to wait for a few hours, when they were brought to the proper station by a train from the opposite direction, it was held that the provisions of the Code, 10 that in some torts the injury was to the peace, happiness or feelings of the plaintiff and that the worldly circumstances of the parties, the amount of bad comb, 90 Va. 137; 20 L. R. A. 817; 17 S. E. 809. e Kentucky C. R. Co. v. Biddle, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 1363; 34 S. W. 904. 7 Samuels v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 35 S. C. 493; 14 S. E. 943. s Sec. 3906, Civ. Code. 40G 9 Southern Ry. Co. v. Hardin, 101 Ga. 263; 28 S. E. 847; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 250; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 783. i° Ga. Civ. Code, sec. 3907. ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. § 349 faith in the transaction, and all the attendant facts should l>e weighed, should not be read to the jury." §349. Passenger— Illness duo to exposure— Walking to destination. — In the estimation of the damages which maybe allowed therefor, the jury may take into consideration the place of the ejection, the condition of the weather, and tin- sickness and Buffering, if any, resulting from exposure thereto. 18 So where a passenger was put off at a station where there was no station house, except a box car, of which use as a station she was ignorant, and she walked hack four miles to the sta- tion from which she came, it was held that she might recover for damages from exposure resulting from such walk, since it was the natural and reasonable thing to do. 13 And in another case, where a passenger was wrongfully ejected at a place a long distance from his destination where his duties required him to be, to which place he was obliged to walk, damages were al- lowed for annoyances and exhaustion caused by exposure." Again, where passengers were put off a train in the night at a considerable distance from their destination and at a place where no houses could be seen and they were obliged to walk- to their destination, and in consequence of the exposure caused by such walk the woman, plaintiff in this case, who was preg- nant at the time, suffered a miscarriage and consequent illness, it was decided that the acts done by the plaintiff were proper, that the negligence of the company was the proximate, and not the remote, cause of the plaintiff's injury, that the plaintiff acted with ordinary care and prudence to get out of the difficulty in which she had been placed, and that such injury could be traced directly to the defendant's negligence as its cause. 1 "' In an Eng- lish case, however, which was an action upon the contract for carriage, a different conclusion was reached. 1 " In this case, it "Southern R. Co. v. Bryant, 105 Ga. 310; 31 S. E. 182; 12 Am. & 1 □ ■; R. Cas. N. S. 159. 12 Cross v. Kansas City, F. S. & M. R. Co., 50 Mo. App. 664. "Malone v. Pittsburg & L. E. R. Co., 152 Pa. St. 390; 26 Atl. 638; 31 W. N. C. 407; 23 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 467. 14 Lake Erie A- W. K. Co. v. Cloes, 5 Ind. App. 444; 32 N. E. 588. 15 Brown v. Chic. M. A- St. P. Ry. Co.. 54 Wis. 342: 41 Am. Rep. 41. i6Hol>bs v. London A S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. lu Q. 1). 111. 407 § 349 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. appeared that a passenger with his wife and child were, owing to the negligence of the company, permitted to alight at the wrong station in the nighttime where they could neither get accommoda- tions for the night nor a conveyance. They consequently were obliged to walk a distance of about five miles in the rain in order to reach their destination, and as a result of the exposure the wife caught cold and was taken ill. In an action to recover therefor, it was held that the action was based on the contract, and that damages for the illness resulting from the exposure were too remote to be recoverable, since it could not be said to be either the necessary or probable consequence of a person being put down at an improper place and having to walk home, that he should sustain either a personal injury or catch a cold, and such illness could not be considered as having been in the contemplation of the parties when they made the contract. In this case, how- ever, it would seem that the plaintiff should have been permitted to recover. By the defendant's negligence the woman, accom- panied by her husband and child, was left at a very small station, where no conveyances or accommodations for the night could be obtained. If it had occurred at a larger place where vehicles by reasonable effort could have been found or accommodations se- cured, which would have prevented any necessity for the long walk, the illness due to the exposure might then have properly been found to be due to the passenger's neglect or carelessness and not that of the company. But such was not the condition of affairs. Owing to the negligence of the company the passen- ger was obliged to walk home in order to extricate herself from the difficulty in which the company had negligently placed her. If she had remained at the place she was left at for the night, with no accommodations and had perhaps subjected herself to and in fact suffered a more severe illness, would the company not have contended that in the exercise of reasonable prudence she should have undertaken to walk to her home, and would not such a contention have been upheld as a reasonable one and have been considered as a defense to a recovery, or at least in mitiga- tion of damages ? Under the circumstances of this case it seems a very reasonable consequence that a passenger ejected or left at such a station might be compelled to walk home, and we fail to see how the consequent illness, due to the exposure occasioned 408 ACTIONS i:Y PASSENGERS. § 360 by such walking, could be considered as one not in the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the contract was made. It would also seem that such illness was not too remote even though the action be considered as in contract. 1 ' § 350. Same subject— Conclusion.— It might occur in souk cases that a passenger would be ejected or left at a station where conveyances or lodging for the night could be obtained, and where the passenger would be under no necessity of walking to his destination. In such cases, if he elects to walk instead of procuring a conveyance or lodging, it would be only reasonable and proper that for any damages resulting from such walk the passenger should be held responsible and not the carrier. But if the carrier has left a passenger at a point where he can nei- ther procure a conveyance or lodging, and where the only course left open to him to extricate himself from his difficulty is to walk, then a different rule should prevail. The carrier's obli- gation is to transport the passenger to a certain destination, and if he wrongfully ejects him or negligently puts him off at a point beyond or short of his destination where no conveyance or lodging may be had, and where if he would get out of his difficulty he must walk, then the carrier should be held respon- sible for any injuries necessarily resulting from such walk, in- cluding exposure to the weather and illness resulting from such exposure. Though it has in some instances been intimated that the fact of the action being one in tort or on the contract may be a determining factor in the consideration of this question, yet it seems to us that the true rule is, as we have just stated. that irrespective of the nature of the action, whether it be in contract or tort, if the passenger elects to walk on a dark or rainy night, exposing himself to risks of injury or conse- quent sickness when he might procure a conveyance or Lodging and thus avoid such risk, the damages incident to his election must be borne by him. On the other hand, whether the action "See McMahon v. Field, 7 Q. B. Div. 591; Cincinnati, II. & I. K. R, Co. v. Baton, '.'4 Ind. 474; Interna- tional & G. N. R. Co. v. Terry, 62 Tex. 380; Brown v. Chic. M. & St. P. B. C>.. 51 Wis. 342; ii \ in. Rep. 41. But Bee Muiilcick v. Boston & Albany K. R. Co., 133 Mass. 16; St Louis A S. W. R. Co. v. Thorn is I Tex. Civ. A pp. i. 27 S. W. 419. 409 §351 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. be considered as on the contract or in tort, this should not affect the determination of the question of his recovery where the car- rier has left him at a point where no choice is left to him, but his only way to extricate himself from his difficulty is to walk, since this is only the reasonable act of an ordinarily prudent man, an act which it is reasonable to suppose will follow the car- rier's act, and exposure and illness therefrom are only natural re- sults from such act directly traceable to the act of the carrier, and results which in such cases are reasonably to be contemplated. § 351. Passenger — Injury to health by exposure. — Where a passenger is subjected to exposure to the weather, either by wrongful ejection by the carrier or other negligent conduct on its part, damages for injury to health, caused by such exposure, may be recovered where such injury is the natural and proxi- mate result of the wrongful or negligent act. 18 And where a passenger is wrongfully ejected from a streetcar, and as a result of exposure to the cold illness ensues, he may recover damages therefor. 19 But where a passenger was ejected from a train at a point about fifty miles from his destination, and he started to drive thereto, and instead of starting early in the morning he waited until the first part of the afternoon, it was held that damages were not recoverable for exposure and hardships caused by his losing his way upon the prairie during the night.* In another case where a passenger, after alighting from her train, was compelled to remain in a hail and rain storm because the way to the depot was obstructed by a freight train, it was decided that damages for such exposure were recoverable. 21 So, 18 Alabama G. S. R. R. Co. v. Hed- dleston, 82 Ala. 218; Baltimore C. P. Ry. Co. v. Kemp, 61 Md. 74; Lerue v. Northern P. R. Co., 48 Minn. 78; 50 N. W. 1021; Heim v. McCaughan, 32 Miss. 17; Williams v. Vander- bilt, 28 N. Y. 217; Malone v. Pitts- burg R. R. Co., 152 Pa. St. 390; 25 Atl. 638; 31 W. N. C. 407; 23 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 467. 19 Toronto R. Co. v. Grinsted, 24 Can. S. C. 570; Grinsted v. Toronto R. Co., 24 Ont. Rep. 683. 410 20 Chic. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Spirk, 51 Neb. 167; 70 N. W. 926; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 105. 21 Louisville & N. R. Co. v Keller, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 957; 12 Am. & Eng. L. Cas. N. S. 89; 47 S. W. 1072; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 348. In this case it also appeared that the plaintiff was subjected to the jeers of the railroad employees while so exposed. The court held that the defendant was guilty of gross negligence in ob- structing the way to the depot, and ACTIONS i:\ PASSENGERS. § : '""'l also, where owing to the negligence of a railroad company a collision ensues al the crossing of two roads, damages are recov- erable from such company for exposure to the weather, where such exposure is the proximate result of the negligence.'- But in another case, where owing to the negligence of the defendant, its sleeping car caught fire and plaintiff was compelled to leave the car half clad and took cold which resulted in the suppression of her menses and a long illness, it was held that the defendant was not liable in damages therefor, since it appeared from the evidence that the plaint ill' was menstruating at such time, and that such condition was the cause of her illness. 83 The court declared in this case that though the exposure was the direct result of the defendant's negligence, yet the illness was not the result of the exposure, but the result of the exposure in her then condition ; that such condition was unknown to the carrier and the increased risk arising therefrom must rest upon the should- ers of the plaintiff. In its opinion the court cited the case of Hobbs v. London & S. W. lty. Co.' 4 But in the principal case 25 there certainly seems no just reason why recovery should have been denied to the plaintiff. If a carrier has negligently placed a passenger in a position where injury may ensue, it should be responsible for all the immediate and direct conse- quences of its negligence. Though in this particular case the woman's condition was the nearest cause of her illness, yet such condition is not unusual to every normal healthy woman under a certain age, and of this fact all persons have knowl- edge. If it were a rare and exceptional condition, there might be a basis for the conclusion reached in this case, but to hold that especially in such instances the company must have per- sonal knowledge of this particular condition of its female pass- engers in order to he responsible tor any illness or trouble possibly arising from such condition, even though directly traceable to the company's negligence would, it seems, he carry- ing a rule, that the company should have knowledge of its pas that punitive damages might prop- erly be given. A verdict fur $260 ■was held not excessive. -Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Settle, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 357; 47 S. W. 82a. •i- 1 Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 344; 3 t Am. Rep. 89. « L. R to Q. B. 111. * Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Barker 4 Colo. :',44; 34 Am. K.p. sit. 411 §§ 352, 353 actions by passengers. senger's infirmities in order to render it liable for certain results, to an absurdity. § 352. Fright in connection with physical injury— Expul- sion of passenger. — Where a person is wrongfully expelled from a train, the expulsion maybe at a place where the sur- roundings are such as to cause great fright, which of course, be- ing a species of mental suffering, is an element of damages* Thus, where a woman was compelled to leave a train at a point several hundred feet from a depot platform and was injured by falling into a culvert, it was held that recovery was not limited to damages for the physical injury, but that there might also be recovery for fright suffered by her in endeavoring to extricate herself from the culvert, while cars were approaching on the side track. 21 And where a child was in violation of the statute ex- pelled from a train a few hundred feet from a depot and left on the track, it was held that derangement of the mind, resulting from fright at being left in such place, was an element of dam- age.'^ In a case in California where an action was brought to recover damages for the ejection of a passenger from a train, it was decided that paroxysms of the nervous system, resulting from the indignity and humiliation suffered by the passenger, constituted a bodily injury for which damages might be re- covered.'^ § 353. Mental suffering, etc.— Passenger carried beyond destination. — Where a passenger is carried beyond his destina- tion no damages for mental suffering or fright unaccompanied by any physical injury are recoverable. 30 So where, by the neg- ligence of a railway company, a passenger was carried beyond her destination, but suffered no insult or personal injury, it was 20 See preceding section. 27 Stutz v. Chieage & N. W. R. Co., 73 Wis. 147; 40 X. W. 653. 28 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Latimer, 128 111. 163. 29 Sloane v. Southern Cal. R. Co., Ill Cal. 668; 44 Pac. 320; 32 L. R. A. 193. See sees. 219, 220. 352 herein, on Fright — Physicial injury resulting from. 412 30 Judice v. Southern P. Co., 47 La. Ann. 255; 16 So. 816; Trigg v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry. Co., 74 Mo. 147; 41 Am. Rep. 305; Strange v. Mo. P. R. Co., 1 Mo. App. Rep. 209; Pull- man Palace Car Co. v. Trimhle (Tex. C. A. ) 28 S. W. 96. But see Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gott, 20 Tex. C. A. 335; 50S.W. 193. ACTIONS I'.V PASSENGERS. held that there could be no recovery for anxiety, effects on bei health nor danger by reason of the train stopping an insufficient time for her to get off. And where by the negligence of a rail- road company a passenger was afforded no opportunity to alight at her destination, recovery by her for mental anguish which she suffered on account of the fright and distress of a child from whom she was separated was denied.'" In a later decision in this same state it is determined, however, that there may be a recov- ery for fright, worry and mental anguish where a passenger IS carried beyond her destination, though no physical injuries are sustained.' 53 In another case, where a train which was signalled to stop at a flag station failed to do so, it was held that mental suffering, occasioned as a result of the the failure to stop, formed no part of the actual injury if the act was not wilfully done. 51 §354. Mental suffering Injury to feelings, etc — Ejec- tion of passenger. — Where a passenger is wrongfully ejected from a train under such circumstances as to cause mental suffer- ing, humiliation, shame, mortification, wounded pride, disgrace, indignity or insult, these elements, in substance the same, but thus variously designated by the courts, occurring in connection with such ejection may, in an action to recover damages therefor, be considered in determining the amount recoverable." And 81 Trigg v. St. Louis, Kansas City & N. Ry. Co., 74 Mo. 147; 41 Am. Rep. 305. 3 2 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Trim- ble (Tex. C. A.), 28 S. W. 96. 33 Tex. & P. R. Co. v. Grott, 20 Tex. C. A. 335; 50 S. YV. 193. « Illinois C. R. Co. v. Siddons, 53 111. App. 607. 85 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hine, 121 Ala. 234; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 382; 25 So. 857, humiliation and indignity. Hot Springs R. Co. v. Deloncy, 65 Ark. 177; 45 S. W. 361, humiliation. Cooper v. Mullins, 30 (J:i. 146, mental agony. Pennsyl- vania Co. v. Oonnell, 127 111. 419; 20 N. E. 89, indignity. Chicago & C. R. R. Co. v. Flagg, 43 111. 364; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. A. lams, 69 111. App. 571, wounded pride and humiliation. Paleo v. Bray, 125 End. 229; 25 N. E. 439, humiliation and indignity. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Goben, 15 Ind. App. 123; 42 X. E. 1116, shame and humiliation. Shep- ard v. Chicago, R. 1. ft P. R. Co., 77 Iowa, 54; 41 N. W. 564, indignity, humiliation, wounded pride and mental suffering. Curtis v. Sioux City £ II. P. R. Co. i Iowa i. 54 N. \Y. 339; Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Rice, 38Kan. 398; 16 Pac. 817, injury to feelings. Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Hinsdale, 38 Kan. 507; 16 Pac. 937; Serne v. Northern I'. I.'. Co. I Minn.), 50 N. W. 1021, indignity, cherry v. Kansas City, F. I). S. ft M. K. R. Co., 413 §354 ACTIONS P.Y PASSENGERS. though the conductor of a train may not be personally at fault and may act with no ill-will or malice in (lie ejection of a pas- senger, yet if the ejection be wrongful, mental suffering caused by the shame and disgrace felt by such passenger will be an element of damages for which recovery may be had. 36 So where the conductor did not err personally, but the expulsion was due to the mistake of the ticket agent, recovery was allowed for the humiliation suffered. 37 And where a conductor in good faith ejected a passenger, owing to a misconception of her rights un- der a season ticket, and the conductor acted with no indication of ill-will or malice, but did only what was necessary to carry out his instructions and in as gentlemanly a manner as was con- sistent with a proper discharge of his duties, recovery was al- lowed for the mental suffering caused by the shame and dis- grace. 38 So, also, where a young lady whose ticket was wrongfully taken up was ordered to vacate the car or pa} r fare, it was held that she might recover for the humiliation and mental suffering due to having the attention of other passengers attracted thereto and to being put under obligations to a stranger who advanced money to purchase such ticket. 159 Again, if a conductor in ejecting a passenger uses insulting and abusive language, there may be a recovery by the passenger on account of the words for injury to his feelings, but he cannot recover damages because the words tended to bring him into ignominy and disgrace.* 1 1 Mo. App. Rep., injury to feelings including humiliation, insult and indignity. Ray v. Cortlaud & H. Traction Co., 19 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 530; 46 N. Y. Supp. 521, indignity. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Teed, 2 Ohio Dec. 662, injury to feelings. Texas & P. R. Co. v. James, 82 Tex. 306; 18 S. W. 589; 15 L. R. A. 347, shame aud mortification. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Copeland, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 55; 42 S. W. 239, humiliation. Willson v. Northern P. R. Co., 5 Wash. 621; 32 Pac. 468, humiliation and mental suffering. Schmitt v. Milwaukee R. Co., 89 Wis. 195; 61 X. W. 834, humiliation. 36 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Russ, 414 67 Fed. 662; 14 C. C. A. 612; Hot Springs R. Co. v. Deloney, 65 Ark. 177; 45 S. W. 351; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Dickerson, 4 Kan. App. 345; 45 Pac. 975. 37 Hot Springs R. Co. v. Deloney, 65 Ark. 177; 45 S. W. 351. 38 Curtis v. Sioux City & H. P. R. Co. (Iowa), 54 N. W. 339. 39 Willson v. Northern P. R. Co., 5 Wash. 621 ; 32 Pac. 468. But see Mis- souri K. & T. R. Co. v. Armstrong (Tex. C. A.), 38 S. W. 368. 40 Southern Kan. R. Co. v. Hins- dale, 38 Kan. 507; 16 Pac. 937. See Houston E. & W. T. R. Co. v. Per- kins, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 508; 52 S. W. 124. A: I [QN8 BY l' \ i M.I.I: -. For mental distress caused 1>\ apprehension as to discharge from employment, it is held that there can be no recovery by a passenger virrongfully ejected, unless the company at the time of the contract knew thai in case of delay he was Liable to suffer injury or loss." And mental anguish suffered by a passenger by reason of delay in reaching a sick brother is col recoverable though the situation was explained to the conductor who ejected him. 42 Nor can recovery be had for disappointment, of a wrong- fully ejected passenger, in regard to arrangements for bis wed- ding or for ridicule to which lie may have been subjected, \\ here i he conductor, after he had ejected him, stopped the train and invited him to hoard it again, but he refused to unless it was backed down to where he was, though he was only a short dis- tance from the train. 43 § 355. Mental suffering— Passengers— Cases generally — In an action by a husband against a railroad company, damages may be recovered by him for the mental anguish suffered by tin- wife from the delay and vexation consequent upon the negli- gence of an agent of the company in selling her a ticket to a wrong station." But where, owing to the lock being out order, a woman passenger was confined in the water-closet of a car, it was held that the company was not liable for the mental suffer- ing and mortification occasioned thereby to her, where it was not negligent either in furnishing a suitable lock or in keeping it in repair, and all reasonable and proper efforts were used to effect her release. 45 A passenger who, by the negligence of the com- pany's employees, is injured while alighting from a street car may recover damages for mental suffering.* So. also, one in- jured in a railroad collision may recover damages for the shame 41 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Mc- Donald (Tex. C. A.), 21 S. W. 946. 4 - Hot Springs R. Co. v. Deloney, 65 Ark. 177; 45 S. W. 351. See also Turner v. Great Northern R. Co., 15 Wash. 213; 4(1 Pac. 243; ■> Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 23S. « Louisville & X. E. Co. v. Hine, 121 Ala. 234; 25 So. 857; 14 Am. & Enjr. U. Cas. N. S. 382. 44 Texas & V. R. < !o. v. Armstrong, 93 Tex. 31; .">l S. W. 835; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 721; 14 Am. * En56. «Gulf C. A- S. F. R. Co. v. Smith (Tex. C. A.), 30 s. W. 361. M Omaha Street R. < <>. v. Emmin- ger, 57 Neb. 240; 77 V \V. 675; 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. (.'as. N. S. 188. 415 § 356 ACTIONS I'.Y PASSENGERS. and mortification of being compelled to use crutches or a crutch and a cane. 47 In an action, however, against a carrier by a pas- senger to recover damages for injuries sustained by him, it is error to instruct the jury that they may consider, in estimating damages, pain of mind, aside and distinct from bodily suffering. 48 § 356. Failure to give passenger proper accommodations. — A carrier of passengers who fails to give to a passenger the proper and suitable accommodations called for by its contract of carriage, and which could have been furnished by the exer- cise of the degree of care required of such carriers is liable in damages therefor. So where, as the result of a leakage to which the attention of the proper officers was called and which could have been easily repaired, the berth of a pass- enger upon a steamship became wet and the passenger's health was thereby impaired, the company was held liable for such injury. 49 And where a sleeping car company agreed to furnish accommodations in one of its sleeping cars, to a woman in ill health and with a young baby, but failed to fulfill its contract and she was obliged, with her child, to ride in a common car with negroes, it was decided that the company was liable for the dis- comfort and illness caused thereby. 50 Again, where a passen- ger who had a first-class ticket was placed in a filthy car which was unsuitable for first-class passengers, and in which the occu- pants were smoking, drinking, singing indecent songs, and firing off pistols, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages and that a verdict for $500 was not excessive. 51 But the dam- ages recoverable for the breach of a contract of carriage or sleep- ing car accommodations are generally limited to those which directly and naturally flow from the breach and were in the con- templation of the parties, and there can be no recovery for men- tal suffering or anguish in the absence of evidence showing harsh 47 Beatti v. Rapid R. Co., 119 Mich. 512; 78 N. W. 537; 15 Am. & Eug. R. Cas. N. S. 793; 5 Det. L. N. 905. 48 Johnson v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 6 Nev. 224; 3 Am. Rep. 245. 49 Barker v. Cunard S. S. Co., 91 Him (X. Y. ), 495; 70 N. Y. St. R. 858; 36 N. Y. Supp. 256; 25 Civ. Proc. 108. 416 50 Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Booth (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 719. A verdict for $1,000 was held not exces- sive. 51 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Sherbert (Tex. Civ. App.), 42 S. W. 639. ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. §§ 357, or unkind treatment or some insult or injury inflicted by the company. 32 And in an action by a negro for failure to furnish him accommodations on the train equal to those furnished white passengers, in violation of a statute, it was held that he could not even recover nominal damages in the absence of evidence showing that he had sustained some damage by such failure." § 357. Injury or insult by third persons to passenger — It is the duty of the carrier to exercise a high degree of care to protect its passengers from insult or injury at the hands of third persons, and where it negligently fails to exercise the degro- of care required, it will be liable for all damages sustained from such a source." 11 So where a conductor, without any interference, permitted a passenger to insult or abuse a fellow passenger and to continue such conduct, it was held that the carrier was liable in damages therefor. 55 And where drunken passengers made a colored man dance and sing and subjected him to many other indignities while the conductor refused to interfere, it was de- cided that a verdict in favor of the colored man for tfl,000 was not excessive. 56 § 358. Wrongful charge of fare — Taking up tickets, etc. — If a passenger is wrongfully charged an excessive or exorbitant rate of fare or his ticket is wrongfully taken up by one con- ductor, and another conductor compels him to pay his fare a second time under penalty of expulsion, he may recover therefor his damages, not being limited in all cases to the excess of fare paid, but under certain circumstances he may recover exemplary damages. 57 But where a passenger who had been refused a m Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Fowler, Minu. 7; 31 L. EL A. 551; 86 N. W. 6 Tex. Civ. App. 755; 27 S. W. 268. 044. A verdict for $1,500 \v:is held execs- 57 Richmond & D. EL Co. v. Jeffer- sive to amount of $1,150. 63 Norwood v. Galveston, H. & S. A. K. Co., 12 Tex. Civ. App. 561; 34 S. W. 180: 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. son, 8!» Ga. 554; 17 L. EL A. 571: 16 s. EC. 69; 52 Am. & Eng. EL Cas. 138. 67 East Tennessee, V. & G. R. < ... v. King (Ga. ), 14 S. E. 70S. holding S. 305. $500 not excessive, though an ex- 54 4 Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1591; [ trerne verdict for requiring ;i passen- Hutchinson on Carrier, sees. 548- ger whose ticket had been taken up 552a. by a former conductor to pay his 66 Lucy v. Chic. G. W. R. Co., 64 | fare a second time under penalty of 2H 41' § 359 ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. ticket by the ticket agent because the train which he wished to board did not stop at the station to which he wished to be car- ried, boarded such train without a ticket and the conductor charged him fare in excess of the regular rate, it was held that his recovery was limited to the excess of fare which he had paid, where both the conductor and the ticket agent acted in good faith and in pursuance of what they believed to be the orders of their superior officers, though they were mistaken. 58 Damages are also recoverable for refusal of an agent of the company, whose duty it is to sign and stamp return tickets to so sign and stamp a ticket properly presented to him for such purpose. But where a person presented the return part of an excursion ticket to a station agent to be signed and stamped by him for a return passage, which he refused to do, a verdict for $150 was held ex- cessive, where the owner of such ticket suffered nothing in body or mind, and a friend who was with him, without any request from the latter, purchased a return ticket for a nominal sum? 1 § 359. Stipulations exempting carrier from liability. — As a general rule it may be stated that a carrier of passengers cannot stipulate for exemption from liability for injuries sus- tained by a passenger due to the negligence of the carrier. 60 So where a person who was transporting live stock was given a free pass on the back of which was a stipulation that " the per- son accepting this free ticket assumes all risks of accidents and expressly agrees that the company shall not be liable under any expulsion. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Patterson (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 848. In this case an extor- tionate charge of fifty cents had been made for carrying a passenger overa bridge, one mile long, forming part of the right of way. In addition such passenger was awakened while asleep at night and shaken by the shoulder. Five hundred dollars actual and .$1,500 exemplary damages was held excessive. Two hundred and fifty dollars actual and $500 exemplary damages held sufficient. . 58 Courts v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 418 99 Ky. 574; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 415; 36 S. W. 548; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 223. 59 New York, T. & M. R. Co. v. Leander (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 843. 60 Doyle v. Fitchburg R. Co., 166 Mass. 492; 44 N. E. 611; 33 L. R. A. 844; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 257; 24 Wash. L. Rep. 663; 3 Det. L. N. Mo. 26; 29 Chic. Leg. News, 41; Wil- liams v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 18 Utah, 210; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 61; 54 Pac. 991: 4 Elliott on Railroads, sees. 1497, 1498. ACTIONS BY PASSENGERS. circumstances, whether by the negligence of their agents or other- wise for any injury to the person or for any loss or injury to the personal property of the person using this ticket," it was held that such stipulation did nol excuse the carrier for any injury occasioned by its <>\vn uegligence. §360. Statutory exemption from liability — Passengers riding on platforms of cars. — Where by statute railroad com- panies are exempted from liability for injuries received by pas- sengers while riding on the platforms of cars in violation of printed regulations posted in a conspicuous place in the ear, 62 it is held that the question of a railroad company's exemption from liability for personal injuries under such a statute cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, though there may be evidence bringing the case within the statute. 63 61 Penn. R. R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa. St. 315. See also Ohio & Miss. Ry. Co. v. Selby, 47 Incl. 171; Cleve- land, etc., R. R. Co. v. Cnrran, 19 < )hi<> St. 1. But seeBissell v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 442: Gallin v. London, etc., Ry. Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 212. See 4 Elliott on Railroad, sees. 1495 et seq. 62 See X. Y. Laws, 1892, chap. 676, sec. 53. 63 Schreiner v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 12 App. Div. (X V. i 551; 42 X. Y. Supp. 163. 419 §361 ASSAULT AX!> I5ATTERY. CHAPTER XVI. ASSAULT AND BATTERY. 361. Assault and battery — Gener- ally. 362. Elements of damages recover- able. 363. Loss of time — Evidence. 364. Mental suffering. 365. Assault on pregnant woman. 366. Action by married woman. 367. Assault unintentionally com- mitted. 368. Matters in aggravation. 369. Exemplary damages — When recoverable. 370. Same subject continued. 371. Exemplary damages — When not recoverable. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. Exemplary damages — Effect of criminal prosecution on allowance of. Same subject continued. Evidence as to defendant's wealth. Mitigation of damages — Gen- erally. Same subject continued. Words in mitigation. Pleading. Evidence generally. Whether verdicts excessive for various injuries. § 361. Assault and battery — Generally. — In determining the measure of damages in an action for an assault and battery, the jury are not confined to any precise rule, but may allow in their discretion for such loss and damage as has been sustained, considering all the circumstances of the case. Although there is no precise rule for determining the amount of damages to be awarded, yet the recovery should only include damages for such loss or injury as is the natural consequence of the assault.' As a general rule such recovery should be a fair compensation for the actual loss or injury sustained, subject to certain excep- tions which we shall hereafter consider. 2 And the measure of 1 Slater v. Rink, 18 111. 527; Cox v. Vanderkleed, 21 Ind. 164; Studgeon v. Studgeon (Ind. App.), 30 X. E. 805; Wadsworth v. Treat, 43 Me. 163; Commonwealth v. Norfolk, 5 Mass. 435; Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 41; Avery v. Ray, 1 Mass. 12; Wliit- 420 ney v. Hitcbcock, 4 Den. (N. Y. ) 461; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67; Huxley v. Berg, 1 Stark. 98; Gregory v. Cotterel, 5 El. & Bl. 571; Hodson v. Stallebrass, 11 Ad. & E. 301 ; Fetter v. Beale, 1 Ld. Raym. 339. 2 Whitney v. Hitchcock, 4 Den. ASSAIL! AM' BATTERY. damages is to be determined from a consideration of the results which actually ensued inconsequence of the act of violence and not what the defend ant might reasonably suppose to have contem- plated as likely to result. 3 So the plaintiff is not confined to nominal damages because of the fact that he alleges no special damages, but may recover such general damages as may be shown to have resulted from the injury. 1 And a verdicl for nominal damages will be sel aside on a finding by the jury that an un- lawful assault was committed by defendant on the plaintiff and that as a result thereof, the Latter has suffered much pain, and has expended a considerable amount in the treatment of his injury. § 362. Elements of damages recoverable.— The jury, in determining the amount recoverable for an assault and battery, may allow for physical and mental pain and suffering, 6 expenses incurred, 7 loss of time, 8 and for any permanent injury which results from the act of violence. 9 So the actual expenses in- I .V. Y. ) 461 ; Ilarman v. Gross, 5 Wash. 703; 32 Pac. 787; Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 5-23; 14 L. R. A. 226; 50 N. \V. 403. 8 Vosbnrg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523; 14 L. K. A. 226; 50 X. W. 403. 4 Andrews v. Stone, 10 Minn. 72. 6 Dunbar v. Cowger, 68 Ark. 444; 59 S. W. 951. e Smith v. Overly, 30 Ga. 241 ; Cour- tenay v. Clinton, 18 Ind. A.pp. 020; 48 X. E. 799; Nipp v. Wisebeart, 7 lud. App. 226 ; 34 X. E. 1006 ; Caspar v. Prosdame, 40 La. Ann. 36; 14 So. 317; Wadsworth v. Treat, 43 Me. 163; Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill (Ind.), 406; Smith v. Holconib, Oil Mass. 552; Goucher v. Jamison i Mich. 1900), 82 N. W. 6G3; Stuppy v. Hof, 82 Mo. App. 272; Lyddon V. Dose, 2 Mo. App. 608; Cooper v. Hopkins (N. II. 1900), 48 Atl. 100: Holyoke v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 4S X. II. 541; Ran- som v. X. Y. & Erie R. R. Co., 15 X. Y. 415; Klein v. Thompson, 19 Ohio St. 569; Penn. Canal Co. v. Graham, 63 Pa. St. 290: Learh v. Leach, 11 Tex." Civ. App. 099; 33 S. W. 703: Iieek v. Thompson, 31 W. Va. 220; 7 S. E. 447; Haines v. Martin, 15 Wis. 24U. See sees. 3(54, 368 herein. 7 Cox v. Vanderkleed, 21 ind. 164; Golder v. Lund. 50 Neb. 867; 70 X. W. 379; Beck v. Thompson, 31 W. Va 220; 7 S. E. ^47. The expenses of litigation have in such actions been held to be a proper element for the jury to consider in estimating the damages. Xoyes v. Ward, 19 Conn. 250; New Orleans, etc, R. R. Co. v. Alibi it ton, 38 Miss. 242. 8 Cox v. Vanderkleed, 21 Ind. 164; Wadsworth v. Treat, 43 Me. 163; Suffolk v. Woodward, ."» \. .1. Law J. 287; Lagley v. Mason, 69 Vi. 17".; 37 Atl. 287; Beck v. Thompson, 31 \V. Va. 220; 7 S. E. 447. See see>. 363 herein. 9 Barr v. Post, 56 Neb. 698; 77 N. W. 123. 421 § 383 ASSAULT AND I'.ATTERY. curred by the plaintiff may be proven and it is not necessary to show that the physician rendering the services was licensed under the statute to practice in order to render such evidence competent. 1 " And a physician may testify as to the "probabili- ties " of the plaintiff's recovery. 11 So an instruction that the jury ma}' in estimating the damages recoverable consider the plain- tiff's "loss of time " and "diminished capacity for labor " is not objectionable as authorizing a double recovery. 12 In order, how- ever, to justify a recovery for future consequences, they must be reasonably certain, and for those which are purely speculative there can be no recovery. 13 And where the plaintiff sought to recover damages for a fractured skull and evidence as to the damages probably resulting therefrom was admitted, it was held to be error where the physician, who had examined plaintiff's skull, had given no testimony showing that it had been frac- tured. 14 Again the plaintiff should not be allowed to show that as a result of the assault and battery, he has lost a position to which he was about to be appointed. 15 § 363. Loss of time — Evidence. — As a general rule in order to authorize a recovery for loss of time, there must be some evidence showing what the time was worth. 16 So plaintiff may prove his earnings before and after the assault and his loss of time therefrom. 17 And an estimate may be given by the plain- tiff as to the value of his time, together with a statement of the facts and reasons upon which it is based. 18 Again, under an alle- gation that plaintiff has suffered pain and has been prevented from the transaction of his necessary business as the result of an assault and battery, evidence is admissible that he is unable to work as he could before the assault, and that when he worked in 10 Golder v. Lund, 50 Neb. 867 ; 70 X. W. 379. 11 Nichols v. Brabazon, 94 Wis. .-)49; 69 N. W. 342. 12 Knittel v. Schmidt, 16 Tex. Civ. w Givens v. Berkly (Ky.), 56 S. W. 158. 15 Brown v. Cummiugs, 7 Allen (Mass.), 507. 16 Kane v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 3N. App. 7; 40 S. W. 507. Y. St. R. 145. 13 Hooper v. Haskell, 56 Me. 251; 17 Bagley v. Mason, 69 Vt. 175; 37 Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240. See Atl. 287. sees. 369-373, 379 herein. 18 Jackson v. Wells, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 275; 35 S. W. 528. 422 MI/1 AND BATTERY. the sun he could not work as he could before, though the value of his time be not specially alleged. 18 § 364. Mental Buffering.— In assessing the damages which are to be allowed for an assault, the mental Buffering which nec- essarily and inevitably results therefrom is an clement to be taken into consideration. 31 And damages therefor may be al- lowed, though no physical harm is done and there is no phys- ical contact." Where a wrongful assault is accompanied with circumstance of insult or indignity, injury to the feelings, caus- ing humiliation, may be considered in assessing the damages. 8 And there may be a recovery for mental suffering caused by disfigurement resulting from an assault and battery. 28 But in an action by the father in behalf of a son to recover for an as- sault and battery committed upon him, it is held that the jury is not authorized to give damages for the injured feelings of the parents/ 14 § )JG5. Assault on pregnant woman. — For an assault on a pregnant woman which it is alleged has resulted in a miscarriage, in order to recover substantial damages therefor, it is not nec- essary, it has been decided, to show that and she has suffered more pain, or that her illness has been more severe, or her health impaired t<> a greater extent than would have been if the child had been delivered at the proper time and in the natural way."' "•Knittel v. Schmidt, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 7; 40 S. W. 507. 20 Southern Express Co. v. Flatten (C. C. App. 5th C.i, 0:; Fed. 936; 36 C. C. A. 46; 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 521; Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. •"><>'.>; 42 Atl. 67; McKinley v. C. A- X. W. U. .Co., 44 [owa, :;i4; 24 Am. Rep. 748; Morgan v. Curley, 142 Mass. 107; Stuppy v. II..!, 82 Mo. App. 272 ; Coo- per v. Hopkins | V II. L900), 48 Atl. 100; Nichols v. Brahazon, 94 Wis. 549; 69 N. W. 342; Schmitt v. Milwaukee St. R. Co., 89 Wis. 19:.; 61 X. W. 834. 21 Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 57 Me. 202; Handy v. Johnson, 5 Md. 450; Ford v. Jones, 62 Barb. ( X. Y.) 4S4: Alexander v. Blodgett, 44 Vt. 476; Mori in v. Sboppee, 3 C. 6 P. 373. See Papineau v. Taber, Mont. L. R. 2 Q. B. 107. 22 Schmitt v. Milwaukee St. R. Co., 89 Wis. 195; 61 X. W. 834. 23 Nichols v. Brabazon, 94 Wis. 549; 69 \. W. 342. -> < lowden v. Wright. 24 Wend. | X. Y.) 42!'. a&Plonty V. Murphy (Minn. 1901), 84 N. W. 1005. wherein it was held that three hundred dollars as dam- ages was not excessive. 423 §§ 306-368 ASSAULT AND BATTERY. § 366. Action by married woman. — In an action by a mar- ried woman to recover damages for injuries which she has sus- tained as the result of an assault, loss of time is not an element to be considered in estimating the amount recoverable, where she had no business or employment apart from her husband. 20 Nor can she recover moneys which her husband has expended for medical treatment and expenses in endeavoring to cure her.-' 7 And the right given by the Pennsylvania Married Woman's Property Act of 1887, 2 * to recover for an assault and battery does not entitled her to recover for loss of ability to do house- hold work. 29 And in an action by a husband to recover for an assault committed upon his wife by defendant's agent, it is not proper to instruct the jury that an assault becomes aggravated when committed by an adult male upon a female, since though true, the jury might be misled thereby in the belief that they were justified in assessing more than actual damages. 130 Again, there can be no recovery for the public odium incurred by ex- posure at the trial of the domestic quarrels of the husband and wife. 31 § 367. Assault unintentionally committed. — Though an assault may be unintentional, yet if it is recklessly committed, the party guilty will be liable in damages therefor, and the in- jured party may recover such damages as are the natural and direct result of the act of violence, including mental and physical pain and suffering. 32 But one who in the exercise of his rights of self-defense inflicts an unintentional injury upon a third party is not responsible in damages therefor, as where when a person was assaulted by another he struck a third person, mis- taking him for the assailant. 33 § 368. Matters in aggravation. — The plaintiff may show that injuries which he had sustained prior to the assault have 26 Denton v. Ordway, 108 Iowa, 487; 79 N. W. 271. 2 7 Burnham v. Webster, 3 N. Y. St. R. 50; 25 Wkly. Dig. 556. 28 Act of 1887, sec. 2. 29 Walter v. Kensinger, ( Pa. C. P. ), 2 Pa. Dist. R. 728; 10 Lane. L. Rev. 268. 424 30 Texas Coal & Fuel Co. v. Aren- stein, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 441; 55 S. W. 127. si Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240. 82 West v. Forrest, 22 Mo. 344. MPaxton v. Boyer, 67 111. 132; 16 Am. Rep. 615. ASSAULT AND BATTERY. § 369 been aggravated thereby and also the extent to which they have been aggravated. 81 In this case it appeared that the plain- tiff was a man sixty years of age wli<> had been injured by the explosion of a shell in the Civil War, for which injury he was receiving a pension. His counsel attempted to show as a part of his cast' the physical condition he was in just prior to the assault, arising fr this injury and how and to what extent his condition had been affected by the acts of the defendant, but the court refused to admit such evidence and the question arose on appeal as to its admissibility, when it was said by the court: "The burden was upon the plaintiff to prove such of his injuries as were the direct and proximate result of defendant's acts, and in doing this it was proper to show in what respect and to what extent his present condition could be attributed to the assault and battery and what could more properly be established as the result of his army ex- perience. The injury for which the plaintiff was receiving a pension affected his health and enfeebled him unquestion- ably, but that fact would not deprive him of the right to cover the direct consequence of the defendant's tort, to recover such damages as could be shown to be the direct result of that wrong. That the plaintiff was in ill health, no matter the cause, was no excuse for defendant's acts and would not relieve him from resulting consequences. The defendant could not be held to respond for injuries arising out of other causes, but as to those for which he was an efficient cause an action would lie. The rule is that a perpetrator of a tort is responsible for the direct and immediate consequences thereof whether they may be regarded as natural or probable, or whether they might have been contemplated, foreseen, or expected or not. It is not nec- essary to the liability of a wrongdoer that the result which actually follows should have been anticipated by him." § 369. Exemplary damages— When recoverable. — If it ap- pear that the defendant's act in committing the assault and battery was intentional and without provocation, and was committed in a spirit of wantonness or maliciousness with no 84 Watson v. Kheinderknect (Miun. 1901), 84 X. W. 798. 85 Per Collius, J. 425 § 360 ASSAULT AND BATTKKY. legal excuse or justification, the plaintiff is not confined to dam- ages which are merely compensatory, but may also recover exemplary or punitive damages. 83 So though no malice is charged in the complaint, it is proper to instruct the jury that if they find wilful and malicious conduct on defendant's part, they may award exemplary damages, where the complaint alleges that defendant violently assaulted plaintiff and against her will debauched and carnally knew her. 37 And punitive damages may be recovered by one who has been violently assaulted and wounded by another without any provocation. 38 Again, where a newsboy had dropped a paper upon the floor of a saloon and the proprietor of the saloon struck him a severe blow upon the head and forced him to go back into the saloon and place the paper upon the table, exemplary damages were allowed. 39 So also were they allowed against one who without any warning 36 Bundy v. Manginess, 76 Cal. 532; 18 Pac. (308; Wilson v. Middleton, 2 Cal. 54; Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369; 42 Atl. 67; Dal ton v. Beers, 38 Conn. 529; Tat- nall v. Courtney, 6 Houst. (Del.) 434; Watson v. Hastings, 1 Penn. (Del.) 47; 39 Atl. 587; Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 111. 553; Farwell v. Warren, 51 111. 467; McNamara v. King, 7 111. 432; Reizenstein v. Clark, 104 Iowa, 287; 73 N. W. 588; Irwin v. Yeager, 74 Iowa, 174; Mai one v. Murphy, 2 Kan. 94; Slater v. Sherman, 5 Bush (Ky. ), 206; Gore v. Chadwick, 6 Dana (Ky.), 477; Webb v. Gilman, 80 Me. 177; Pike v. Dilling, 48 Me. 539; Thillman v. Neal, 88 Md. 525; 42 Atl. 242; Crosby v. Humphreys, 59 Minn. 92; 60 N. W. 843; Lochte v. Mitchell (Miss. 1900), 28 So. 877; Klingman v. Holmes, 54 Mo. 304; Lyddon v. Dore, 81 Mo. App. 64; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 668 ; Berryman v. Cox, 73 Mo. App. 67; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 29; Sloan v. Speaker, 63 Mo. App. 321 ; 1 Mo. App. Rep. 767; Connors v. Walsh, 131 N. Y. 590; 42 N. Y. -St. R, 868; 30 N. E. 859; Clayton v. Keeler, 18 426 Misc. (N. Y.) 488; 42 N. Y. Supp. 1051; Lane v. Wilcox, 55 Barb. (N. Y. ) 615; Cansee v. Anders, 4 Dev. & B. L. (N. C.) 246; Hendricks v. Fowler, 16 Ohio C. C. 597; 9 Ohio C. D. 209; Rhodes v. Rodgers, 151 Pa. St. 634; Knittle v. Schmidt, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 7; 40 S. W. 507; Sargent v. Carnes, 84 Tex. 156; 19 S. W. 378; Borland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128; 44 Am. Rep. 152; Roach v. Caldbeck, 64 Vt. 593; Goldsmith v. Joy, 61 Vt. 488; 4 L. R. A. 500; Edwards v. La- vitt, 43 Vt. 126; Beck v. Thomson, 31 W. Va. 220; 7 S. E. 447; Lamb v. Stone, 95 Wis. 254; 70 N. W. 72; Spear v. Sweeney, 88 Wis. 545; 60 N. W. 1060; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67. But see Atkins v. Glad wish, 25 Neb. 390; Barr v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68; 30 Am. Rep. 814; Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342. 37 List v. Miner, 74 Conn. 50 ; 49 Atl. 856. 38 Webb v. Rothchild, 49 La. Ann. 244; 21 So. 258; Webb v. Gilman, 80 Me. 177; 13 Atl. 688. 39 Lyddon v. Dore, 2 Mo. App. Rep. 668. A.88AULT ami i:.\ rn:i:\ . S 370 threw a brickat a boy who was running across his yard in com- pany with other hoys who fearing a policeman were endeavoring to reach another yard and the boy was struck in the eye by the brick and severely injured. 40 § 370. Same subject continued. — Where the defendant en- deavored to force an entrance into plaintiff 's lmii.se during the ab- sence of the husband, alter the wile had refused him admission, and he struck at her several times and gave her a violent blow from which she suffered considerably, an instruction directing punitive damages was held proper. 43 And consent to sexual in- tercourse when obtained by violence may constitute part oi the assault and be a ground for the award of exemplary dam;:. Again, such damages were allowed against one wh<>. in the pre- sence of a large number of people in a court room after the ad- journment of court, spit in a man's face.*' So in another case where an action was bought to recover for an assault with a knife, it was held proper to charge the jury that if they thought tie- at- tack was wanton and unprovoked, and with a deadly weapon, ex- emplary damages might be given." In actions to recover dam- ages for an assault and battery, it is proper to consider the character and standing of the parties. 43 And evidence of the wealth of the defendant is held to be admissible as bearing upon the amount of damages recoverable, 46 and also of the pecu- niary condition of both parties. 47 In actions of this kind it is held that exemplary damages may be given where the assault and battery is malicious, even though there has been ;i criminal prosecution and conviction. 48 Though the court should gene- «°Connors v. Walsh, 131 NT. V. 590; 42 N. Y. St. R. 80S: 30 N. E. 59. "Thillman v. Neal, 88 Mel. 525: 42 Atl. _Ml'. « Dickey v. McDonnell, 41 111. 62. « Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 111. 553. In this ease a verdict for 81,000 was held not excessive. « Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. St. 424. «s Goldsmith v. Joy, 61 Vt. 488; 17 Atl. 1010; 4 L. R. A. 500; 40 Alb. L. J. 48. « Pullman Pal. <"ar Co. v. Law- rence, Tt Miss. 782: 22 So. 53 15 Nat. Corp. Rep. 124; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 59; 2 Am. NTeg. Rep. 586; Rowe v. Mores, 9 Rich. I.. S. 0. ) 123; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67. See sec. 374 herein. « 7 Eltringham v. Earhart, 61 Miss. 488; 7 So. 340. «» Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277. See sec. 372 herein as to exem- plary damages where liable to crimi- nal prosecution. 427 § 371 ASSAULT AND BATTERY. rally instruct as to the allowance of punitive damages, yet a refusal to instruct in regard to such damages does not constitute a reversible error where the verdict clearly shows that vindictive damages were not allowed. 19 § 371. Exemplary damages— When not recoverable The defendant may in committing the assault have acted under the honest belief that he was in immediate danger of an assault by the plaintiff, and where such is shown to be the case, exemplary damages should not be allowed. 50 And where highly provoking language has been used by the plaintiff towards the defendant im- mediately prior to the assault, such malice will not be implied in law as will require an award of vindictive damages by way of punishment, unless the act of violence was carried to an excess, and beyond what a reasonable man would do under such circum- stances, the question of the award of such damages being for the jury, and not for the court. 51 Nor is it proper to instruct the jury that if an assault was committed in such a manner as to show that the defendant intended to injure, annoy, or vex plain- tiff, exemplary damages might be awarded, since such inten- tion is not equivalent to malice. 52 So where a person in remov- ing a trespasser from his premises uses excessive force, exemplary damages are not recoverable on the ground of wantonness and malice, 53 unless the trespasser was not previously requested to leave, and the assault was without qualification. 54 And one who has acquired peaceful possession of property is not liable to the owner of the same in exemplary damages, in the absence of excessive force or an} r motive of malice, where he resisted the effort of the owner to take possession of the property, and the latter for this purpose used a knife with which he threatened and intended bodily harm. 55 So a parent or master cannot re- cover punitive damages from one who has committed an assault 49 Cross v. Carter, 100 Ga. 632; 28 S. E. 390. 60 Keyes v. Devlin, 3 E. D. Sun. (N. T.)518. "Donnely v. Harris, 41 111. 126. ^Badostain v. Grazide, 115 Cal. 425; 47 Pac. 118. M Kiff v. Youmans, 86 N. Y. 324; 428 13 W. D. 273, rev'g 20 Hun, 123; 9 W. D. 461. « Huston v. Gilbert, 40 Hun (N. Y. ), 638; 24 W. D. 54, afE'd 113 N. Y. 622; 22 N. Y. St. R. 992; 20 N. E. R. 876. 65 Barnes v. Martin, 15 Wis. 240. ASSAULT AND BATTERY. § 372 upon a child or servant, even though the assault be of an in- decent character upon a female and under very aggravating cir- cumstances, since such damages are recoverable in a suit by the child or servant herself."'' And where plaintiff was shot by de- fendant while making a riotous disturbance anmnd the hitter's house at night, it was held that exemplary damages should not be allowed, but rather that the fact that he was one of a party creating such a disturbance should go to mitigate the damages. 57 Again, where a master whips a seaman, it is declared that exemplary damages are not recoverable by the latter unless it appear that the master acted wantonly, not with a view of pun- ishment but rather for the purpose of disgrace and mortification. 58 § 372. Exemplary damages— Effect of criminal prosecu- tion on allowance of.— The defense has frequently been set up in actions for assault and battery that a criminal prose- cution and fine is a bar to the recovery of exemplary dam- ages in the civil action, on the ground that two punishments cannot be inflicted for the same offense. Such a defense has not, however, as a general rule, been sustained. The punish- ment inflicted by a criminal prosecution is in the nature of a penalty for the wrong which has been done to the public. Punitive damages, which are so called to distinguish them from the pecuniary damage or loss sustained, are inflicted as a pun- ishment for the wrong done to the individual. The fact that the wrongdoer has been punished criminally and perhaps obliged to pay a tine to the public authorities, should not affect the individual's right to exemplary damages, where the fact- of the case justify an award of such damages. The wrongdoer has in reality been guilty of two wrongs, though the act be < He has done a wrong to society or the public at large, for which the law provides a punishment. He has also committed a wrong against the individual, for which the law says that if accompanied by malice or wantonness he shall be responsible to such individual in punitive damages, and the award of such 66 Whitney v. Hitchcock, 4 Dem. (N. Y.)461. The measure of dam- ages in such an action is the actual loss of service sustained. G'Robison v. Rupert, '23 Pa. St. 523. 68 Gould v. ChristianBoo, Blatchl & H. Adm. 507. 429 §373 ASSAULT AND BATTERY. damages cannot in any just sense be considered as in violation of any constitutional provision or common-law inhibition against the infliction of two punishments for the same offense. 59 § 373. Same subject continued. — Although the general rule is that stated under the preceding section, yet there are some cases which, while sustaining such rule, declare that a conviction and fine should be considered in mitigation of puni- tive damages. 60 Again, though a person may be liable to a criminal prosecution for an assault and battery committed by him upon another person, yet such fact of itself will not entitle the latter to recover exemplary damages. 61 Nor will the dam- ages be increased in such an action by the fact that only a nomi- nal fine has been imposed in a criminal action. 62 » Phillips v. Kelly, 29 Ala. 628; Bundy v. Maginess, 76 Cal. 532; 18 Pac. 668; Wilson v. Middleton, 2 Cal. 54; Jefferson v. Adams, 4 Harr. (Del.) 321; Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117; 45 Am. Rep. 12; Butler v. Mercer, 14 Ind. 479; Hauser v. Grif- fith. 102 Iowa, 215; 71 N. W. 223; Reddin v. Gates, 52 Iowa, 210; Hen- drickson v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa, 379; Johnson v. Smith, 64 Me. 553; Elliott v. Van Buren, 33 Mich. 47; Boetcher v. Staples, 27 Minn. 308; 38 Am. Rep. 295; Corwin v. Walton, 18 Mo. 71; Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 466; Sowers v. Sowers, 87 N. C. 303; Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277; Rhodes v. Rodgers, 151 Pa. St. 634; 24 Atl. 1044; 23 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 95 ; Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. St. 385 ; Roach v. Caldbeck, 64 Vt. 593; 24 Atl. 9S!>; Edwards v. Leavitt, 46 Vt. 126; Hoadley v. Watson, 45 Vt. 289; 12 Am. Rep. 197; Brown v. Swinne- ford,44 Wis. 282. But see Howlett v. Tuttle, 15 Colo. 454; 24 Pac. 921; Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541; Hu- ber v. Teuber, 3 MacArthur (D. C), 484; 336 Am. Rep. 110; Cheny v. 430 McCall, 23 Ga. 193; Farman v. Lauman, 73 Ind. 568; Humphreys v. Johnson, 20 Ind. 190; Butler v Mer- cer, 14 Ind. 479; Austin v. Wilson. 4 Cush. (Mass.) 273; Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342; 16 Am. Rep. 270. 60 Coleman v. Hagerman, 5 City Hall Rec. (N. Y.) 63; Rhodes v. Rodgers, 151 Pa. St. 634; 24 Atl. 1044; 23 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 95; Flanagan v. Womack, 54 Tex. 45; Jackson v. Wells, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 275; 35 S. W. 528. But see Roach v. Caldbeck, 64 Vt. 593; 24 Atl. 989; Hoadley v. Watson, 45 Vt. 289; 12 Am. Rep. 197. In both of these last cases it is de- clared that a criminal prosecution and the payment of a fine is not to be considered in mitigation even of exemplary damages. See also Phil- lips v. Kelly, 29 Ala. 628; Wheatley v. Thorn, 23 Miss. 62; Cook v. Ellis, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 466; Brown v. Swine- ford, 44 Wis. 282. 61 Badostain v. Grazide, 115 Cal. 425; 47 Pac. 118. 62 Honaker v. Howe, 19 Gratt. ( Va.) 50. \s 3A1 l l LND B \TI ! l."> . §§ 374,375 § 374. Evidence as to defendant's wealth. Evidence of the wealth of the defendant is, as a general rule, inadmissible in these actions, except it he a case for the award of exemplary damages, when it is generally considered admissible. So in an action to recover for a wrongful assault by an employee of the defendant, the wealth or pecuniary condition of the latter may be shown when' the facts warrant the recovery of exemplary damages, for the purpose of enabling the jury to inflict proper damages by way of punishment. 01 But where no evidence has been given showing that the defendant in an action for an assault and battery is the owner of any property, it is not proper to in- struct the jury that in assessing punitive damages they may consider the wealth of the defendant.'" § 375. Mitigation of damages — Generally.— The defendant may introduce all proper facts which tend to mitigate the dam- ages for the assault and battery."' So where it is alleged by the plaintiff in his complaint that the act of the defendant was wilfully and wrongfully done, the latter may introduce evi- dence for the purpose of disproving any improper intent in mitigation of damages/' And evidence of provocation is ad- missible and it is not necessarily confined to the immediate time of the occurrence, but the provocation may be continuous, commencing some time prior to the date of the assault and continuing day by day. 68 But as a general rule antecedent 68 Brown v. Evans, 8 Sawy. (U. S. C. C.) 488; 17 Fed. 912; Jarvis v. Manlove, 5 Har. (Del.) 452; Tatnal] v. Courtney, 6IIoust. (Del.) 434; Gore v. Chadwick, 6 Dan;i (Ky.), 477; Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89; Pull- man Pal. Car Co. v. Lawrence, 71 Miss. 782; 16 Nat. Corp. Rep. 124; 22 So. 53; 8 Am. & Eng. K. Cis. \. S. 59; Morgan v. Dnrfee, 69 Wo. 469; :'.:'. Am. Rep. 50S; Berryman v. Cox, 1 Mo. A. Rep. 29; 73 Mo. App. 07; Moody v. Osgood, 50 Barb. (N. V. ) 628; Hendricks v. Fowler, 10 Ohio C. C. 597; Spear v. Sweeney, 88 Wis. 545; CO N. W. 10G0; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450: 21 N. W. 527. Rut see Givensv. Berkley (Ky. 1900), 56 S. W. 158. See in this connection sec. 370, herein. 64 Pullman Pal. Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782; 22 So. 58; 15 Nat Corp. Rep. 124; 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. \. S. 59. 65 Lister v. McKee, 79 111. App. 210. '■ Gilbert v. Rounds, 14 How. Pr. i X. V. i 46; Saltus v. Kipp, 5 Duer (N. Y.), 646: 2 Abh. Pr. 382: 12 How. Pr. 342. 67 Sherman v. Kortright, 52 Barb. i N. r.) 267. '- Dolan v. Fagan, 68 Barb. | N. Y. i 73. See Linde v. Elias. 4 Alb. L. J. 76. 431 §375 ASSAULT AND BATTERY. acts which cannot be considered as part of the same trans- action are not admissible in mitigation of damages though they may have been exceedingly irritating and provoking.* 9 And though acts of the plaintiff in provocation of an assault may be admissible in mitigation of damages, yet they must be so connected with the assault as to raise a presumption that the act of the defendant was committed while his passions were aroused as the immediate result of the acts of the plaintiff. 70 So it is declared that though there may be provocation, yet, if it does not amount to a justification, it cannot be considered in mitigation of actual or compensatory damages. 71 Where a person acts in the belief that he has a right to so act, such fact may be considered in mitigation of damages, as where a person ejected an employer from his house under such a belief, and ex- emplary damages were claimed. 72 And the fact that the plain- tiff immediately before the assault charged the defendant with a crime may be shown. 73 So evidence of previous threats made by the plaintiff has been held admissible.' 4 And when a servant clearly neglects his dut} r and the master in a fit of pas- sion assaults him, such facts may be considered. 75 So the action of the defendant in preventing a third party from joining in the assault and the declaration of such third person at the time that he was about to join in the fight, are facts which the jury may consider. 76 Again, evidence that the plaintiff advanced 69 Lee v. Woolsey, 19 Johns. (N. Y.i 319: Stetlar v. Nellis, 60 Barb. < V Y.)524; 42 How. Pr. 163; Ells- worth v. Thompson, 13 Wend. (N. Y.)658. But see Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Randolph, 65 111. App. 208, where it was held that evidence of a prior assault was admissible. 70 East Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. v. Fleetwood, 90 Ga. 23; 15 S. E. 778; Murphy v. McGrath, 79 111. 594; Groman v. Kukkuck, 59 Iowa, 18; Turner v. Footman, 71 Me. 218; Gaitherv. Blowers, 11 Md. 536; Ty- son v. Booth, 100 Mass. 258; Heiser v. Loomis, 47 Mich. 16; Castner v. Sliker, 33 N. J. L. 95; Dolan v. Fagan, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 73; Lee v. Woolsey, 432 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 319; Stetlar v. Xellis, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 524; 42 How. Pr. 163. n Goldsmith v. Joy, 61 Vt. 488; 4 L. R. A. 500; 17 Atl. 1010; 40 Alb. L. J. 148; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 67. 72 Redfield v. Redfield, 75 Iowa, 435; 39 N. W. 688. 73 Bartram v. Stone, 31 Conn. 159. See Bauman v. Bean, 57 Mich. 1. 74 McKenzie v. Allen, 3 Strob. ( S. C.)546; Waters v. Brown, 3 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 557; Yeager v. Berry, 82 Mo. App. 534; Fairbanks v. Wit- ler, 18 Wis. 287. 75 Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark. 295; 48 Am. Rep. 41. 76 Watkins v. Gaston, 17 Ala. 664. ASSAULT AND BATTEKY. § 376 upon the defendant exhibiting a pistol and brass knuckles and in a threatening manner, whereupon the defendant struck him, is sufficient to justify a finding that the assault was justifiable. 7 ' jj 37G. Same subject continued. -Where a woman brings an action to recover lor an indecent assault, the defendant may show in mitigation of damages specific acts of lewdness on her part. 18 But evidence of defendant's general good character is declared to be inadmissible in such a case. 7 " Nor is evidence admissible as to the general character of the plaintiff tor tin- purpose of mitigating the damages. 80 Nor ran the defendant show that the results of the assault and battery were more ag gravated by reason of the intemperate habits of the plaintiff than they would have been if he had l>een a person of temperate habits. sl Nor is the fact that the defendant entered the plain- tiff's house for the purpose of making an attachment admissi- ble in mitigation. 83 And in an action by the husband and wife to recover for injuries inflicted upon the wife by persons who were forcibly preventing her from entering her house, the fact that her husband had sometime since obtained possession of the house in a fraudulent manner from one of the defend- ants, is not admissible to reduce the damages. s: .Again, in an action by a passenger to recover damages for an assault com- mitted upon him by a railroad conductor, the failure of the court to charge that sneers and contemptuous gestures of the former may be considered in mitigation is not sufficient ground lor a new trial where it does not appear that any request for such charge was made.' 1 if the defendant sets up a mere general denial to an action for an assault and battery, he cannot estab- lish a justification under such plea. 85 So evidence in justifi- 77 Strickland v. Atlanta * \V. I". R. Co., no Ga. 124; 24 S. E. 981. 78 Gulerette v. McKinley, -7 Hun (N. V.i. 320; Young v. Johnson, 46 Hun (N. Y. ), 1G4; 123 X. V. 226; Ford v. Jones, 62 Barb. I X. V.) 484. 79 Redd in v. Gates, 52 Iowa. 210; Sayen v. Ryan, '.» Ohio C. C. 631. 80 Willis v. Forrest, 2 Duer | X. V. |, 810; Galbraith v. Fleming, 80 Mich. 403: Corning v. Corning, 6 X. V. 97. « Littleliale v. Dix, 11 Cush. (Mass. | 364. 82 Sampson v. Henry, 11 Tick. ( Mass. i 379. Hut see Paine v. Farr, 118 Mass. 74. 83 Jacobs v. Hoover. '.' Minn. 204. M East Tennessee. V. A <;. R. Co. v. Fleetwood, 90 Ga. 23. ' Hathaway v. Ilatchard. 160 Mass. 296; 35 x K. 857; Ban v. Pi Xel). CDS; 77 X. W. 123. 28 133 § 377 ASSAULT AND BATTERY. cation of an assault and battery, that the defendant was an officer armed with a process, and only used such force as was necessary to attach plaintiff's property under the writ, is not admissible unless such facts have been pleaded. 86 § 377. Words in mitigation. — Although opprobrious, abu- sive or insulting language by the plaintiff, will not defeat an action for an ' assault and battery, yet it may be consid- ered in mitigation. In this, however, as in other cases where provocation on the part of the plaintiff may tend to mit- igate the damages, the words must not be wholly disconnected from the assault. Nor on the other hand must they necessarily be immediately connected with the act and confined to the time of its commission, but may consist of a series of provoking words extending back sometime from the assault, and in such cases prior words or language may be shown, and only in such cases. 87 So in an action against ;i railroad company for an as- sault by a conductor upon a passenger, the fact that the latter had made slanderous and indecent remarks about the sister-in- law of the former is not competent to reduce the damages in the absence of evidence showing that the remarks were so re- cently uttered as to indicate that the conductor acted under provocation immediately resulting therefrom. 88 And though it may appear that the plaintiff may have made remarks or de- clarations of a slanderous or provoking nature relative to the defendant, yet they are not admissible in evidence in mitigation 86 Smith v. Wilson, 21 R. I. 327; 21 R. I. (part 2) 120; 43 Atl. 634. 87 Cuslimanv. Ryau, 1 Story (U. S. C. C), 91; Bartram v. Stone, 31 Conn. 159; Burke v. Melvin, 45 Conn. 243; Matthews v. Teny, 10 Conn. 455; Donnelly v. Harris, 41 111. 126; Schlossen v. Fox, 14 Ind. 365; Thrall v. Knapp, 17 Iowa, 468; Caspar v. Prosdame, 46 La. Ann. 36; 14 So. 317; Prentiss v. Shaw, 56 Me. 427; Tyson v. Booth, 100 Mass. 258; Avery v. Ray, 1 Mass. 12; Stuppy v. Hof, 2 Mo. App. Rep. 583; Dolati v. Fagan, 63 Barb. (N. Y. ) 73;,Stetlar v. Nel- lis, 60 Barb. (N. Y. ) 524; 42 How. 434 (N. Y.) 163; Maynard v. Berkeley, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 560; Robinson v. Rupert, 23 Pa. St. 523; Hayes v. Lease, 51 S. C. 534; 29 S. E. 259: Goldsmith v. Joy, 61 Vt, 488; 4. L. R. A. 500; 17 Atl. 1010; 40 Alb. L. J. 148; Wilson v. Young, 31 Wis. 574; Frazer v. Berkeley, 7 C. & P. 789; Sinford v. Lake, 3 H. &N. 275. 8 8 East Tennessee, V. «fc G. R. Co. v. Fleetwood, 90 Ga. 23; 15 S. E. 778. See Brooks v. Carter (C. C. S. D. Ga. ) 34 Fed. 505, where remarks made by plaintiff concerning the sister of the defendant were held not to justify an assault. ASSAULT ANIi BATTBBY. §§ 378, 379 unless it also appear that thej were communicated to the d< - fendant immediately prior to the assault. 89 Agaiu, in those where the defendant seeks to reduce damages 03 proof of abu- sive or provoking Language on the part of the plaintiff, the ques- tion is whether the defendant has had tunc Bince the words were spoken to him or came to his knowledge to cool his blood, and not the number of hours thev were spoken prior to the as- sault/" J11 an action by a husband and wife to recover for an assault committed upon the latter, the fact that the husband had used provoking words to the defendant is not admissible in mitigation of damages, unless it also appear that the wife was privy to such Language. 91 § 378. Pleading. — In an action to recover for an assault and battery, the complaint need not state separately the grounds for the recovery of actual and punitive damages. 92 And the plain- tiff may amend his complaint so as to ask for exemplary dam- ages on grounds stated in the original. 93 § 379. Evidence generally. -Evidence tending to show mal- ice is admissible though not specially alleged in the complaint." And evidence that the plaintiff is a laboring man has been ad- mitted." So it may be proper to admit evidence as to the finan- cial condition of the plaintiff, the extent and dependency of his family upon him for support and of the family's source of support since the injury, for the purpose of showing the extent and amount of the damages received by him."" Again, statements made by the plaint iff to attending physicians as to pain suffered by him are admissible in evidence though made after he had decided to bring suit and for the purpose of using such physicians as witnesses.* So also, evidence as to exclamations tending to show pain, though made to one not a physician, are admissible. 98 And where an as- 89 Gaitlier v. Blowers, 11 MHantian v. Cross, 5 Wash. 703; i 6 We cite a few eases as showing 32 Pac. 787. the various elements considered in 1 Hogan v. Ryan,5 N. Y.St. R. 110. determining whether verdicts were - Pulver v. Harris, 61 Barb. I N. Y. ) I excessive: Person secretly ap. 78. proached and struck with heavy 3 Berryman v. Cox, 73 Mo. App. 67; ' chain on head and rendered uncon- 1 Mo. App. Rep. 29. i scious — $2,365 not excessive. Van 4 Irlbeck v. Bierl, 101 Iowa, 240; 67 Reeden v. Evans. 52 111. App. 209. N. W. 400, reh'g denied 70 N. W. 200. Kicked in face while down — jaw 5 St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Beiger, broken and teeth knocked out — 43b' ASSAULT AND BATTRR S - large verdict is awarded and the evidence is not sufficient t" show thai the injury resulted from the act of violence of the defendant, a new trial may be granted. 1 And where ther< statutory provision which authorizes the granting of a new trial in those cases where tin- verdict is so excessive that it appears to have been the result of passion or prejudice,- the court instead of ordering a remittitur should, it is held, order a new trial.' §1,000 not excessive. Myers v. Moore, 3 End. App. 226; 28 N. E. 724. Violent beating ami wounding with axe — $85 not excessive ami a much larger, would, it was declared, be justified. Gore v. Chadwick, ti Dana ( Ky. ), 477. Suffered pain for several weeks — confined in bed and bad a miscarriage— Assault appar- ently under influence of passion — $2,000 not excessive. Barr v. Post, 56 Neb. 698: 77 X. W. 123. Serious personal injury — suffering and mis- carriage, $1,500 not excessive. Pryor v. Chadwick, 86 Hun (X. Y.), 75; 33 N. V. Supp. 1133. Ejected from hotel — when outside assaulted by bartender under direction of de- fendant to "Go out and do that man up." Smith v. Klannery. G9 Hun i\. Y.i, 615; 53 N. V. St. R. L59. Kicked in groin by gatem in of elevated road — subsequent swell- ing and in hospital for six weeks. $570 not excessive. Niendorff v. Manhat- tan Ky. Co., 4 App. Div. (N. V.) 46, appeal dismissed in N. Y. 270. Severe pain and suffering — deprived of use of arm for several months $750 not excessive. Caldwell v. Central Park N. cV: E. K. K. Co., 7 Misc. | N. Y.) 07; 57 N. Y. St. R. 489; 27 N. Y. Supp. 397. Black eye only— $100 not excessive. Dunlap v. Koss, 43 V JT. St. R. 509. Malicious assault- delirious — in bed Beveral months intense pain resulting in insanity, $3,250 not excessive. Spear v. Sweeney, 8* Wis. .".45; 60 N. W. 1" (0. Female passenger kissed by con- ductor whom company discharged on learning of it — compensatory damages against company held recoverable — -SI, 000 not excessive. Croker v. Chic & Northwestern Ky. Co., 36 Wis. i'>57: 17 Am. Rep. 504. Assault and battery with intent to produce an abortion — plaintiff con sented — great pain — unable to per- form domestic duties — injuries not permanent — no punitive damages recoverable — $3,500 excessive. Courtney v. Clinton, 18 End. App. «20; 4S N. E. 799. Defendant in- toxicated and provoked by plaintiff by tatter's language — verdict not wari*anted Oil account nf actual dam- ages — $5,000 excessive. Roades v. Larson. 50 N. S. St. R. 551; 21 X. Y. Sup]). 855; 66 Hun ( \. Y. i. 635. T Wright v. Southern Exp. Co. (C. C. W. I). Tenn. |, 80 Fed. 85. ' S. D. < lomp. laws, sec 5088, subd. 5. 9 Murray v. Leonard, 11 S. D. 22; 75 N. \V. 272. 4:'>7 LIBEL AND SLANDER. CHAPTER XVII. LIBEL AND SLANDER. 381. Words actionable per se. 382. Evidence showing malice. 383. Privileged communications — Whole communication not privileged because parts are, if one part alone action- able per se. 384. Nominal damages. 385. Measure of damages — Com- pensatory. 38(3. Measure of damages generally — In discretion of jury — Ex- cessive verdicts. 387. Injury to feelings — Mental suffering. 388. Expenses — Counsel fees. 389. Libelous article concerning member of legislature- Official investigation of charges — Expenses — Loss of time and labor — Case. 390. Injury to reputation. 391. Injury to business — Loss of employment— Special dam- ages. 392. Charge of incapacity in pro- fession — Allegation of spe- cial damage not necessary. 393. Special damages— Pleading. 394. Special damages— Pleading- Continued. 395. Special damages— Action by husband for slander of wife. 396. Facts tending to enlarge the scope of a libel should be pleaded. 397. Exemplary damages — Malice. 438 398. Exemplary damages may be awarded though actual damages nominal. 399. Exemplary damages— Two defendants. 400. Plea of truth as justification — Wheii damages aggra- vated thereby. 401. Same subject continued. 402. Exemplary damages — Malice — Reckless or wanton con- duct. 403. Same subject — Newspaper publications. 404. Evidence of prior statements of like import— Reiteration. 405. Repetition after recovery. 406. Evidence — Social standing and wealth of defendant. 407. Exemplary damages — Several defendants — Malice of one not imputed to others. 408. Exemplary damages— Slander by wife. 409. Exemplary damages — Tele- graph company — Libelous message. 410. Exemplary damages as af- fected by statute. 411. Justification. 412. Mitigation of damages — Gen- erally. 413. Evidence of good faith in mitigation — Absence of malice. 414. Same subject continued. 415. Evidence that defamatory matter was common rumor. LIBKb AND SLANDER. § 381 § 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. Source of information— Au thority of others— News agency — Copied from news- papers. Same subject continued. Provocation in mitigation. Same subject— When insuffi- cient. Retraction in mitigation. Exemplary damages — How affected by rules of absent proprietor of newspaper as to investigation. Evidence as to bad character and reputation of plain- tiff. 423. Evidence as to bad chat and reputation oJ plaintiff I 'ontinued. 421. Allegation of two libelous charges — Only one sub- mitted to jury — Proof of i he other in mil igal ion. 125. Evidence in behalf of plain- tiff as to his social posil ion Reputation Financial condition. 420. Evidence to show sense in which words were spoken — To whom applicable. 427. Actions against mercantile agencies. 428. Slander of title. § 381. Words actionable per se. — Where words are used by one person in reference to another which are actionable per se, the law will presume damage in an action for libel, and no special evidence showing malice or damage need be given in order to entitle a person to recover. 1 So statements are actionable per se which impute to a physician a general ignorance of medical science and want of professional skill, and incompetency to treat diseases, and it is not necessary tor him to give proof of special damage in order to recover damages for such state- 1 Republican Pub. Co. v. Conroy, 5 Colo. App. 202; 38 Pac. 423; Delaware State F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Croasdale, t; Boust. (Del.) 46; Nolte v. Herter, 65 111. App. 430: Tottleben v. Blankenship, 58 111. App. 47; Tracy v. Hackot, 19 [nd. App. 133; 4:t N. E. 185; Ilaney Mfg. Co. v. Perkins, 78 Mich. 1: 43 N. \V. 1073; Berzog v. Campbell, 47 Neb. 370; 00 N. W. 424; Cruikshank v. Cordon, lis N. Y. 178; 28 N. Y. St. P. 784; 23 N. E. 457, aff'g is Bun ( N. V.), 308; 15 N. Y. si. K. 897; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y.398; 6Am. Pep. 105; Charwat v. Vopelak, 19 .Misc. 1 \. V.i 590; 11 N. Y. Supp. 20. aff'g 18 Misc. 601; Root v. King, 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 013; Littlejohn v. Greeley, 13 Abb. Pr. iN. Y.) 41; Fry v. Ben- nett, ") Sand. (N. Y.) 54; Moore v. Leader Pub. Co., 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 152; 42 \\\ N. C. 57<»; O'Brien v. Times Pub. Co., 21 R. I. 250; 21 R. I. I part 2i 15; 1:'- Ail. 101 ; Mattson v. Albert. 97 Tenn. 232; 36S. W. 1090; Bouston Printing Co. v. Bfoulden, L5 Tex. Civ. App. 571; 41 S. W. 881; Forke v. Homann, 14 Tex. Civ. App, 670; 39 s. w. 210; Clemmons \. Danforth, 67 Vt 417; 48 Am. st. Rep. S30; 32 Atl. 020: Pellardis v. Journal Printing Co., 99 Wis. 156; 71 V W. 99; Candrian v. Miller, 98 Wis. 101; 7:; N. \V. HHI4. 439 S 382 LIBFX AND SLANDER. ments. 2 Actual malice is not in all cases necessary to a recovery of damages in an action for libel and slander. So where untrue statements which reflect upon the character of a candidate for office are published, he may recover from the one publishing such statements the actual damages, regardless of malice. 3 The question of malice in such actions only affects the right to re- cover smart money.' § 382. Evidence shewing malice. — Where words are slan- derous or libelous perse, it is not necessary to give evidence of express malice in order to permit the plaintiff to recover his actual damages."' But evidence of express malice is admissible in aggravation of damages whether the matter complained of is within the class of privileged communications or not." So the plaintiff was permitted to introduce in evidence a letter written to her by the defendant in which the latter stated that if the plaintiff kept on in the course he would " proceed to the bitter end,'* and that she need look for no mercy from him after a specified date. 7 And in an action for slander for charging the plaintiff with theft, the latter was permitted to show that the defendant had declared, twice after the occurrence of the alleged theft, that he would follow the thing up and have the plaintiff discharged if it cost him a hundred dollars. 8 And again, in an action for libel against a newspaper, evidence is admissible of separate and independent libels, not declared on by the plaintiff, published by the same paper in reference to the plaintiff, as tending to show the degree of malice. Such independent libels, however, can only affect the damages by establishing the degree of malice and cannot be made the ground for the recovery of any damages the plaintiff may have sustained from their publi- 2 Cruikshank v. Gordon, 118 N. Y. 178; 28 N. Y. St. R. 784; 23 X. E. 457, aff'g 48 Hun (N. Y. ), 308; 15 N. Y. St. R. 897. 3 Austin v. Hyndman, 119 Mich. 615; 78 N. W. 663; 6 Det. L. N. 8. *Remsen v. Bryant, 24 Misc. (N. Y.) 238; 52 N/. Y. Supp. 515. 5 Charwat v. Vopelak, 19 Misc. (N. Y.) 500; 44 N. Y. Supp. 26, aff'g 18 440 Misc. 601; 42 N. Y. Supp. 235. See sec. 381, herein. 6 Fry v. Bennett, 28 N. Y. 324; 3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 200; Krug v. Sassa- man (Tex. Civ. App.), 54 S. W. 304. ?Seip v. Deshler, 170 Pa. St. 334; 32 Atl. 1032. 8 Wright v. Gregory, 9 App. Div. (N. Y.) 85; 41 N. Y. Supp. 139. LIBEL ANI> BLANDER. §§ : '' s:; . : ' ,S J cation.'' So, also, where a Libel is published bj .1 newspaper charging a person with being connected with an illegal or crim- inal transaction, such as bribery, and challenges such person in explain bis connection therewith, in an action to recover therefor the fact that such paper refused to publish, even as a paid ad- vertisement, an explanation submitted In him which was for- tified by an affidavit, is admissible as showing express malice. But it is held thai the refusal of a newspaper to publish a re- traction is not admissible in an action against such paper for libel, as tending to show malice and enhance the dainag § 383. Privileged communications— Whole communication not privileged because parts are, If one part alone actionable perse. — Where a person having an interest in the matter pub- lished, or a duty, whether Legal, social or moral, and there is a propriety in the publication, communicates such matter in goo. I faith to another having a like int. 'rest or duty therein, or to whom a like propriety attaches to hear or read the utterances, such a communication is privileged and the burden is on the plaintiff to show lack of good faith and malice. 1 ' Of such a character is a publication concerning the general condition of municipal affairs. But if an article, the greater part of which is devoted to such a subject, is published which contains a charge against a village officer of incompetency in his professional ca- pacity and criminality in office, the whole of such publication is not privileged by reason of the fact that the balance thereof is privileged, but the publisher of the same must, when brought into court, be prepared to prove the truth of his charge. § 384. Nominal damages. — Where a person publishes words concerning another which are actionahle per Be, the plaintiff, in an action to recover therefor is not obliged to prove actual 9 Van Derveer v. Sutphin, 5 Ohio St. 293. See Doyle v. Levy, Sit Hun (N. Y.), 350; 35 X. Y. Supp. 434. 10 Wallace v. Jameson, 179 Pa. St. 98; 36 Atl. 142; 39 W. N. C. 387; 27 Pitts. L. J. X. S. 251. " Edsall v. Brooks, •_' Robt. (N. Y.i 414. '- Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 X. V. 636; 42 N. E. 270. U Mattice v. Wilcox. 147 X. Y. 636; 42 X. E. 270. 441 $ 385 LIBEL AND SLANDER. damage in order to recover more than nominal damages. 14 So plaintiff was held to be entitled to more than nominal damages, though no special damages were shown, where it appeared that the defendant had written a letter to a creditor of the plaintiff stating that he was dishonest and intended to evade the payment of his debts. 15 ' As a general rule, whether more than nominal damages should be awarded is a question for the jury to de- cide. 1 " But they will not be justified in restricting the plaintiffs damages to a nominal sum because he fails to take the stand and disprove the truth of the statements for the publication of which he seeks to recover, since the burden of proof is upon the defend- ant to prove the truth of the statements published by him. 17 Nor again, will the fact that they find the character of the plain- tiff to be bad, restrict them to an award of nominal damages un- less they believe that the plaintiff will be compensated by an award of such damages, or that there is no ground for an award of exemplary damages. lh So, also, the fact that a libel or slander may not be believed is no ground for restricting the damages to a merely nominal sum. 19 But where there is no evidence of ex- press malice or of any actual loss or injury to the plaintiff, and it appears that at the time the libel was published, there was a common report or rumor in circulation, the jury should then award nominal damages. 50 § 385. Measure of damages— Compensatory.— Damages in an action for libel or slander should, in the absence of any ele- ment which would justify an award of exemplary damage, be a compensation for the actual injury sustained as the natural or probable consequence of the slander or libel. 21 And the plaintiff 14 Nolte v. Herter, 65 111. App. 430. See sec. 381, herein. 15 Sanderson v. Hall, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 282; 55 S. W. 594. 11 Gray v. Times Pub. Co., 74 Minn. 452; 77 N. W. 204. 17 Remsen v. Bryant, 24 Misc. (N. Y.) 238; 52 N. Y. Supp. 515. 18 Edwards v. San Jose Printing & P. Co., 99 Cal. 431; 34 Pac. 128. 19 Bishop v. Journal Newspaper Co., 168 Mass. 327; 47 N. E. 119. 442 20 Delaware State F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Croasdale, 6 Houst. (Del.) 181. See Scougale v. Sweet (Mich.), 82 N. W. 1061. 21 Merchants Ins. Co. of Newark v. Buckner, 98 Fed. 222; 39 C. C. A. 19; Times Pub. Co. v. Carlisle (C. C. App. 8th 0.) f 9 4 Fed. 762 5 36 C. C. A. 475; 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 633; Enquirer Co. v. John- ston (C. C. App. 7th C.),72 Fed. 443; Smith v. Sun Printing & P. Co. (C. LIBEL AND SLANDER. may recover, in the absence of Legal excuse, irrespective oJ the in- tent of the defendant in publishing the statement, or his belief in the truth thereof, or that he was actuated by an honest or even commendable motive. 22 In estimating the damages the jury should consider the character of the language used, and the manner of the publication, and where the action is for a libel published in a newspaper, the extent of such paper's circulation, as showing the publicity given to the alleged Libel. 28 The dam- ages which a jury may award may include not only compensa- tion for the past injury but also for such injury as may subse- quently arise, smee ;in\ subsequent injury accruing therefrom will not afford a new ground of action. 24 But the damages awarded should not include any allowance for remote or specu- lative matters, whether pastor prospective. 5 ' In assessing the damages the jury may consider the defendant's conduct in con- nection with the libel or slander from the time the same was published down to the day of the verdict. 26 So acts and declara linns of his subsequent to the time when the libel or slander was published may he considered as showing the degree of malice which actuated him.'-' 7 But though there may have been no express malice, and the defendant may have acted from a good or laudable motive, yet if the publication is not justified, C. App. 2d C), 55 Fed. 240; Hearne v. De Young, 132 Cal. 357; 64 Pac. 57(1; Edwards v. Kansas City Times Co., 32 Fed.813; Cioasdale v. Tan- tum, 6 Hems. (Del.) 60; Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden (D. C. App. i, 24 Wash. L. Rep. 807; Snyder v. Fulton. 34 Md. 128; 6 Am. Rep. 314; Evening News Assoc, v. Tryon, 42 Mich. 54!); 36 Am. Rep. 150; Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 X. V. 398; .6 Am. Rep. 105; Ullrich v. New York Press Co., 23 Misc. (N. T.) 168; 50 X. Y. Supp. 788; Miller v. Donovan, 16 Misc. (X. Y. | 453; 39 V V. Supp. S20: Houston Printing (V>. v. Moul- den, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 574; 41 S. W. 381; Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co., 13 Utah, 532; 35 L. R, A. 61 P; 45 Pac. 1097. ™ Holmes v. Jones. 147 X. Y. 67; 69 X. Y. St. R. 310; 41 N. E.409, per Andrews. Ch. J. -'Arnold v. Sayings Co., 76 Mo. App. 159. See Edwards v. Kansas City limes Co., 32 Fed. 813; Wash- ington <.as Light Co. v. Lansden (1). C. App. i. 24 Wash. L. Rep. 807. M Norfolk & W. S. B. Co. v. Davis, 12 App. I). C. 306; ii''> Wash. L. Rep. 261; 57 Alh. L. .). 359; Clark v. Bohms (Tex. Civ. App.), 37 S. W. 347. Sec Weston v. Barnicoat (Mass.), 56 N. E. 619. ssCortulla v. Kerr, 74 Tex. SO; 11 S. W. 1058. *Praed v. Graham, L. K. 24 Q. B. 1). 53. •^Stitzell v. Reynolds. 67 Pa. St. 54; "> Am. Hep. 396. 148 8 386 LIBEL, AND SLANDER. such fact will not prevent the recovery by the plaintiff of the actual damage sustained. 28 § 386. Measure of damages generally— In discretion of jury Excessive verdicts.— In determining the amount of dam- ages which may be awarded in an action for slander or libel, the jury may consider the character of the language used, the various circumstances in connection with its use as showing malice, or in provocation, or in mitigation generally, the pub- licity given to it, as in the case of a newspaper, the extent of the paper's circulation, any subsequent facts aggravating the damages as repetition or mitigating them as retraction, that due care and caution was used by the defendant to determine the truth of the charge, and any attempt at justification not made in good faith. Evidence bearing upon all these points is admissible to enable the jury to determine the monetary loss sustained by the plaintiff, and also in arriving at the amount which they may award as exemplary damages, where such dam- ages are claimed and may be justified.'* The amount of dam- ages which may be awarded in an action for slander or libel are peculiarly within the discretion of the jury* " The jury 28 Ullrich v. New York Press Co., 2 Misc. (N. Y.) 168; 50 N. Y. Supp. 788. 29 Smith v. Sim Pub. Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y.), 50 Fed. 399; Rutherford v. Morning .Journal Assoc. (C. C. S. D. N. Y.), 47 Fed. 487, aft'd 51 Fed. 513: 16 L. R. A. 803; 1 U. S. App. 296; 2 C. C. A. 354; Jones v. Greeley, 25 Fla. 629; 6 So. 448; Storey v. Early, m 111. 461; Smith v. Chi- cago Herald (111. C. C), 50 Alb. L. J. 23; Nally v. Burleigh, 91 Me. 22; 39 Atl. 285; John Brenner Brew. Co. v. McGill, 23 Ky. Law R. 212; 62 S. W. 722; Frederickson v. Johnson (Minn.), 62 N. W. 388; Arnold v. Sayings Co., 76 Mo. App. 159; Fry v. Bennett, 28 N. Y. 324; Wright v. Gregory, 9 App. Div. (N. Y.) 85; 41 N. Y. Supp. 139; Neber v. Butler, 81 Hun (N. Y.), 244; 62 N. Y. St. R. 444 669; 30 N. Y. Supp. 713; Tobiu v. Sykes, 71 Hun (N. Y.), 469; 54 N. Y. St. R. 399; 24 N. Y. Supp. 943; Cum- mings v. Line, 45 X. Y. St. R. 56; 18 N. Y. Supp. 469; Rich v. Mayer, 26 N. Y. St. R. 107; 7 N. Y. Supp. 69; Hilbraut v. Simmons, 18 Ohio C. C. 123; 9 Ohio C. D. 566; Kerr v. At- ticks, 20 Pa. Co. Ct. 233; Luft v. Lingane, 17 R. I.—; 22 Atl. 942; Pel- lardis v. Journal Printing Co., 99 Wis. 156; 74 N. W. 99. These vari- ous points are fully considered in the various sections of this chapter, so Croasdale v. Bright, 6 Houst. (Del.) 52; Manget v. O'Neill, 51 Mo. App. 35; Jacquelin v. Morning Jour- nal Assoc, 39 App. Div. (N. Y.) 515; 57 N. Y. Supp. 299; Morrison v. Press Pub. Co., 14 N. Y. Supp. 131; 38 N. Y. St. R. 357; Grace v. McArthur, 76 Wis. 641 ; 45 N. W. 518. LIBEL AND SLANDER. may give nominal damages or damages to a greater ur amount as they shall determine. The jury may accord damages which are merely compensatory, or damages beyond mere com- pensation, called punitive or vindictive damages by way of ex- ample or punishment, when in their judgment defendant was incited by actual malice or acted wantonly or recklessly in mak- ing the defamatory charge." 31 And the verdict which the jury may award in such a case will not ordinarily be interfered with unless it appear that the damages awarded by them are so grossly in excess of, or inadequate to, the actual injury done, or what the facts of the case would justify, as to clearly indicate that they were influenced by bias, prejudice or some other improper motive, in which case it will be set aside. 32 And where, in an action for slander or libel, a misdirection has been given in favor of the plaintiff upon a material part of the libel and a large ver- dict has been awarded by the jury, who may have been influenced in their award by such misdirection, the judgment may be re- 81 Holmes v. .Jones, 147 N. Y. 59, per Andrews, C. J. 32 Croasdale v. Bright, 6 Eioust. (Del.) 52; Jacksonville Journal Co. v. Reyrner, 42 111. App. 443; Sanborn v. Fickett, 91 Mi-. 364; 40 Atl. 66; Libby v. Towle, 90 Me. 262; 38 Atl. 171: Mangett v. O'Neill, .~>1 Mo. App. 35; Ilolmes v. Jones, 147 N. Y. ."J9; Jaequeliu v. Morning Journal Assoc, 39 App. Div. (N. r.)515; :>7 X. V. Supp. 299; Nunnally v. Taliaferro, 82 Tex. 286; 18 S. W. 149; Grace v. McArthur, 7. App. 5; 2 Mo. A. Rep. 446 359; Michael v. Matheis, 77 Mo. App. 556; 2 Mo. A. Rep. 175; Brooks v. Harrison, 91 N. Y. 83; Palmer v. New York News Pub. Co., 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 210; 52 N. Y. Supp. 539; Raines v. New York Press Co., 92 Hun (N. Y.), 515; 72 N. Y. St. R. 197; 37 N. Y. Supp. 45; Ward v. Deane, 32 N. Y. St. R. 270; 10 N. Y. Supp. 421; Hamilton v. Eno, 16 IIuu (N. Y.), 599; 81 N. Y. 116; Houston Printing Co. v. Dement, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 30; 44 S. W. 558; Houston Printing Co. v. Moulden, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 574; 41 S. W. 381; Forke v. Homann, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 670; 39 S. W. 210; Hirshfield v. Ft. Worth Nat. Bank, 83 Tex. 452; 15 L. R. A. 639; 18 S. W. 743; 34 Cent. L. J. 350; 6 Bkg. L. J. 345; McCarthy v. Miller (Tex. Civ. App. ), 57 S. W. 973. Fenster- maker v. Tribune Pub. Co., 13 Utah, 532; 35 L. R. A. 611; 45 Pac. 1097; Rea v. Harrington, 58 Vt. 181. 36 Cribbs v. Yore, 119 Mich. 237; 77 N. W. 927; 5 Det. L. N. 794. LIBEL AM) SLANDER. the jury may consider any recklessness or negligence on the part of the employees of such paper in respecl to the publica- tion of the libel. 8 ' And in an action by a woman for slander, evidence is admissible of the number and ages of her children, as li«'!- mental suffering might be enhanced by the fact thai her family would suffer as a result of the slander. 88 Bui in a case where the plaintiff had, as a result of a report made to a protective association, been refused credit by other members of tlic association, it was held that evidence was not admissible that the plaintiff had a large family dependent on him for sup- port by reason of which his loss of business had caused him trreat mental suffering. 89 And in those cases where a libel is not actionable per se, there must be proof of some other injury or damage in order to allow a recovery for mental si die ring.' In Texas under the act of May 4, 1895, which provides that in case of the death of the original plaintiff while an action for libel is pending, the action survives the death, the substituted plaintiff may recover for the mental anguish suffered by the original plaintiff. 41 § 388. Expenses — Counsel fees. — It is error to instruct the jury in an action for libel or slander that they may allow the plaintiff for the expense to which he has been put by being com- pelled to vindicate his character, since under such an instruction, the jury might consider an allowance proper for counsel fees for which there can be no recovery. 1 -' So again, to instruct the jury that they may allow compensatory damages including compensa- tion for the entire expense of the litigation is erroneous, as the instruction should specify the expenses to which recovery is 37 Long v. Tribune Printing Co., 107 Mich. 207; 65 N. W. L08; 2 Det L. V 635. Miller (Tex. Civ. A.pp.), .".7 S. W. 973. 41 Houston Printing Co. v. Dement, • »Cahill v. Murphy, 94 Cal. 29; 30 Is Tex. Civ. A.pp. 30; H S. W. 558. Pac. 19"). ** Grotins v. Ross (Ind. App.), 57 ^Windisch-Muhlhauser Brew. Co. v. Bacon (Ky.), 53 S. W. 520. See in this connection sec. 4lT> herein N. E. 4G ; Indianapolis Journal Newspaper Co. v. Pugh, 6 End. A.pp. in ; 33 N. E. 991 : [rlbeck »Hiischfield v. Fr. Worth Nat. Hierle (Iowa), 50 \. W. 36; Has- hed v. Nelson. 24 Hun X. V. Rut see Thompson v. Powning, Bank, 83 Tex. 152; 15 L. R. A. 639; 18 S. W. 743; 34 Cent. L. J. 350; 6 Bkg. L. .1. 345. .See McCarthy v. 15 Nev. L95. 44 §§ 389, 390 LIBEL AND SLANDER. limited. 43 And in order to permit of a recovery for expenses it must appear that such expenses were necessarily incurred as the result of the libel or slander. So where in an action for libel, af- fecting the business standing of the plaintiff, it was alleged in the complaint that as a result of the libel and in order to re- move the effect of false impressions as to plaintiff's credit, which had been created thereby with persons with whom he dealt, he had been obliged to expend a certain gross amount in travelling expenses, it was held that he should be required on special de- murrer to give a fairly accurate, though not necessarily minute, itemized statement showing for what such expenses were in- curred, and that he should allege that the sums stated were nec- essarily expended. 41 § 389. Libelous article concerning member of legislature- Official investigation of charges— Expenses— Loss of time and labor — Case. — In a case in New York which was an action to recover for a libelous article published concerning a member of the state senate, the plaintiff sought to recover for expenses, loss of time and labor in connection with an investigation which was made by the senate as to the charges and statements which were contained in such publication, and it was decided that there could be no recovery therefor unless it appeared that the inves- tigation was caused by the publication complained of, even though the publisher thereof intended such result/' § 390. Injury to reputation.— As a result of a libel or slander, a person may be injured in his reputation and where such an in- jury is shown to have been sustained, it is an element which the jury may consider in estimating the damages recoverable by the plaintiff. 46 Injury to the reputation or character of a person is 43 Indianapolis Journal Newspaper Co. v. Pugh, 6 Ind. App. 510; 33 N. E. 991. See Grotins v. Ross. (Ind. App.), 57 N. E. 40. 44 Brad street Co. v. Oswald, 96 Ga. 396; 23 S. E. 423. 45 Robertson v. New York Press Co.. 2 App. Div. 49; 72 N. Y. St. R. 547; :!7 N. Y. Snpp. 187. 448 46 Lehrer v. Elmore, 100 Ky. 56; 37 S. W. 292; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 551; Blumhardt v. Rohr, 70 Md. 328; Far- rand v. Aldricli, 85 Mich. 593; 48 N. W. 628; McGee v. Baumgartner (Mich.), 80 N. W. 21; Baldwin v. Boulware, 79 Mo. App. 5; 2 Mo. App. Rep. :'>59; Houston Printing Co. v. Moulden, 15 Tex. Civ. App. LIMKL AND SLANDER. one of the natural and ordinary results of a slander or libel, and in most of the cases a slander or libel is a direct imputation against the character of a person, though not always. So charg- ing a person with dishonesty; 47 with bribery; 48 with being a thief or robber ; * a "damned thief"; 30 a counterfeiter ; ° with having passed counterfeit money with intent to defraud ; ■"'-' with having been jailed on a criminal charge ; :c with burning his house to get insurance money, :>l with having committed rape;'"' or with bigamy,* are charges directly against the character of a person and for which damages may be awarded. So also re- covery may be had where libelous or slanderous statements are made imputing unchastity or immoral conduct to a woman ; " 574 ; 41 S. W. 381 ; Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co., 13 Utah, 532; 35 L. R. A. 611; 13 Utah, 532. See in this connection Derham v. Derham I Mich.), 82 X. W. 218. 47 Payne v. Rouss, 46 App. Div. (N. Y.) 315; 61 X. Y. Supp. 705, where verdict of $5,000 held not ex- cessive. Hartman v. Morning Jour- nal Assoc, 46 X. Y. St. R. 181; 10 X. Y. Supp. 308, where $5,000 held not excessive for charging connec- tion with insurance swindle and mis- appropriation of money. « Xally v. Burleigh, 01 Me. 22; 39 Atl. 285. Sheriff charged with brib- ery and permitting prisoner to es- cape — $896. ;!7 not excessive. » Clark v. Fox, 10 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 514; 41 X. Y. Sup]). 1091, $2, not excessive. Wright v. Gregory, 9 App. Div. (X. Y.) 85; 41 X. Y. Supp. 139, $600 not excessive. Ken v. Atticks, 20 Pa. Co. Ot. 233, 1200 not excessive. Frederickson v. John- son (Minn.), 62 X. W. 388; $5,000 excessive — $3,000 held sufficient. «>Shoaff v. Funk, 182 111. 224; 51 N. E. 069, all's 73 111. A.pp. 550, $400 not excessive. Southcombe v. Armstrong, 28 X. Y. St. R. 753; 8 N. Y. Supp. 361. 61 Pellardis v. Journal Printing Co., 29 99 Wis. 156; 74 N. W. 99, $450 not excessive. 62 Mequet v. Silverman, 52 La. Ann. 1369; 27 So. 885, $1 held inade- quate and increased to 8300 in case of boy aged eighteen and of good character. 63 Houston Printing Co. v. Dement, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 30; 44 S. W. 588. Person of unimpeachable character — charged with having been jailed on charge of horse stealing— $1,000 not excessive. "Hilbrant v. Simmons, 18 Ohio C. C. 123; 9 Ohio C. D. 566, $800 held excessive where spoken in heal of an argument in which plaintiff charged defendant with cutting his fence and no malice or special dam- age sbown. • ' . ilmaii v. McClatchy, 111 Cal. 606; 44 Pac 211. $500 as compensa- tory damages not excessive. '• Weber v. Butler, 81 Hun(X. V. |, 2 11; 62 X. Y. St. K. 669; 30 N V. Supp. 713. In daily paper having circulation of over fifty thousand, $800 not excessive. B7 Wendt v. Craig. 17 X. V. Supp. 748; 15 X. Y. St. K. 23: charging woman with keeping disorderly house and with being morally had and unchaste- $2,500 not excessive. 44!' § 391 LIBEL AND SLANDER. or charging a married woman with having eloped, 58 or a single woman with eloping with a married man, 59 or a woman with be- ing a drunken brute of a mother. 60 § 391. Injury to business— Loss of employment— Special damages. — Where language used is slanderous or libelous per se, the damage which the law presumes such language will cause to a person's business, profession or calling being general, a recovery therefor may be had under a general allegation of dam- ages. 61 and if in an action for a slander or libel, a person alleges a loss of business generally, it is not necessary for him to give proof of the loss of particular customers, but he may show a general loss of decline of patronage. 62 But if he has in his allega- tions as to loss of business, given the names of particular cus- Luft v. Lingane, 17 R. I.— ; 22 Atl. 942, charging woman of good character with keeping company with negro and being assaulted by hitter's wife — $2,485.50 not excessive. Heizog v. Campbell, 47 Neb. 370; 66 N. W. 424. Girl of sixteen with be- ing pregnant by her father — $1,000 not excessive. Cummings v. Line, 45 N. Y. St. R. 56; 18 N. Y. Supp. 469. Imputing unchastity while in personal altercation with plaintiff or her father— S3, 000 excessive. 58 Rutherford v. Morning Journal Assoc. (C. 0. S. D. N. Y.), 47 Fed. 487, aff'd 51 Fed. 513; 16 L. R. A. 803; 1 U. S. App. 296; 2 C. C. A. 354. Not prompted by personal malice and injury to reputation prob- ably insignificant — $4,000 not exces- sive. Smith v. Sun Pub. Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. ), 50 Fed. 399. Conspicu- ous publication in a paper in sen- sational and somewhat jeering man- ner of elopement with man with whom her previous intimacy was said to have been freely spoken of — $7,500, not excessive. See Smith v. Matthews, 21 Misc. (N.. Y. ) 150; 47 N. Y. Supp. 96, which was an action to 450 recover damages for charging a mar- ried woman with having eloped. In this case a large verdict was awarded and sustained on appeal on the ground that the plaintiff was a chaste and refined woman, and it was held that a new trial should be granted where there was newly discovered evidence that she was not chaste but was living in adulterous intercourse with the person with whom the de- fendant charged she had eloped. 59 Cooper v. Sun Print & P. Assoc. (C. C. S. D. N. Y.), 57 Fed. 566, .$2,500, not excessive. «>Tobin v. Sykes, 71 Hun, 469; 54 N. Y. St. R. 399; 24 N. Y. Supp. 943. Unsuccessfull attempt at justifica- tion — $400 not excessive. 61 Moore v. Francis, 121 N. Y. 199; Smid v. Bernard, 31 Misc. (N. Y.) 35; 63 N. Y. Supp. 278. 62 Bee Pub. Co. v. World Pub. Co. (Neb.), 82 N. W. 28. See Weiss v. Whittemore, 28 Mich. 373; Ryan v. Benger & H. Brew. Co., 37 N. Y. St. R. 287; 13 N. Y. Supp. 660; Berg- mann v. Jones, 94 N. Y. 51; Evans v. Harris, 1 H. & N. 254; 26 L. J. Ex. 31. LIBEL ANJ» SLANDER. §391 tomers, he will be confined in his proof to those named. 8 Again, where the gist of the action is loss of business, the plaintiff may show the extent and character of the business, both before and after the alleged slander or libel.* And the jury may consider in estimating the damages for loss of business, the probable future as well as the past Loss sustained.''"' And the plaintiff may introduce in evidence a letter received by him from a former customer, refusing t<> trade with him be- cause of the alleged libel or slander." So also evidence that a person has been refused credit is admissible. 61 And where the only element is the general injury to the plaintiff's credit as a merchant and contractor, the fact that a merchant in poor credit is ordinarily compelled to pay more for merchandise than one in good credit, maybe considered by the jury, as may also the further fact that parties who have contracts to give are reluctant to give them to persons of doubtful financial reputation.** lint though a person may allege a loss in business or of employment, he can- not recover therefor, where it is shown that such loss was due to other causes. So where plaintiff alleged loss of his position, he was not permitted to recover therefor, where it was shown that the cause of his dismissal embraced three other charges. 1 ' 9 And again a recovery for loss of employment was not permitted where it appeared that the cause of the plaintiff's discharge was that his employers had decided to dispense with anyone in his ca- pacity.™ And where in an action to recover for the publication of a libelous article concerning plaintiff's business standing, he alleges that in order to raise cash to meet an indebtedness he 63 Hallock v. Miller, 2 Barb. (N. V. ) 630; Kendall v. Stone, 5 N. Y. 14; Keusch v. Koanoke Cold Storage Co. | Va. |, 22 S. K. 358. "Bee Pub. Co. v. World Pub. Co. ( NY1>.). 82 N. W. 28. es Bee Pub. Co. v. World Pub. Co. (Neb.), 82 \. W. 28. 66 Weston v. Baruicoat (Mass.), 56 N. E. 619. 07 Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Putchett, 108 Ga. 411; 34 S. K. 216; Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236; 20 Am. St. Rep. 115; 4ti N. W. 123. In this case an agency for the collection of bad debts had published plaintiff's name on a list of delinquent debtors. A.S a result of the publication it was shown that plaintiff had been re- fused credit by one person, and a verdict of S">71 was held not exces- sive. 68 I)aislev v. Dim, 107 Fed. 218. "Wallace v. Rodgers, 156 Pa, St 395; 27 Atl. 163; :;.", \v. v C. 538. 7 Democrat Pub. Co. v. Jones (Tex.), 18 S. W. 652. 451 § 392 U BEL AND SLANDER. has been obliged as a result of the publication to pay a specified discount on notes of his where the time of the indebtedness would otherwise have been extended, he may on a special de- murrer to such allegation be required to give an itemized state- ment of the amount thus expended. 71 § 392. Charge of incapacity in profession— Allegation of special damage not necessary. — As a general rule where a slan- der or libel is directed against one in his general professional capacity and ability, he may recover without allegation or proof of special damage. 72 So it is actionable per se to impute to a physician a general ignorance of medical science. 73 Or to im- pute to a lawyer a general incapacity in his profession.' 1 But a charge against a professional man of negligence or want of skill in a particular instance is declared not actionable per se, and to render it actionable, there should be allegations and proof of special damage. 75 To render the words actionable per se, it is not necessary in all cases, however, that a slander or libel specifically allege a general incapacity in all branches of a profession, but if a physician or lawyer has chosen some particular branch or sphere of professional labor, a charge of general incapacity to properly perforin the professional duties involved in such a class of cases is equivalent to a charge of general incapacity in his profession for which recovery may be had without allegation or proof of special damage. 76 Thus it was so held in an action by a lawyer, who had been employed several times as counsel to a village, to recover for a libelous publication charging him with incapacity to properly perform the duties of defending negligence cases. 77 The court said : " The plaintiff in this case had been frequently chosen counsel for the village of Oneonta. In such an employ- ment, it would almost necessarily (as in fact it did) happen that 71 Bradstreet Co. v. Oswald, 96 Ga. 396; 23 S. E. 423. 72 Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N. Y. 629; 42 N. E. 270; 71 N. Y. St. R. 244; Cruikskankv. Gordon, 118 N. Y. 178; Mclntyre v. Weinert, 195 Pa. St. 52; 45 Atl. 666. 73 Cruikshank v. Gordon, 118 N. Y. 178. 452 74 Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N. Y. 629; 42 N. E. 270; 71 N. Y. St. R. 244. 75 Foot v. Brown, 8 Johns. (N. Y.) 63. "■' Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N. Y. 629; 42 N. E. 270; 71 N. Y. St. R. 244. 77 Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N. Y. 629; 42 N. E. 270; 71 N. Y. St. R. 244. LIBEL AND si.ANDl.l:. § 393 among others, cases of negligence would arise, and it would be the duty of the counsel employed by the village to defend such suits. A general incapacity to properly perform the duties of defending that class of cases seems to be under such circum- stances equivalent to a general incapacity to properly discharge the duties of his profession. Those duties are in these circum- stances to try such eases and he assumes a responsibility in taking such a general elass of employment to discharge such duties with ordinary care and capacity. A charge which accuses him of incapacity to perform the ordinary duties appertaining t.. the practice of his profession in such eases, is of so general a nature as to come within the reason, if not the very letter of the rule as to general incapacity. It is not incapacity as to a single case or a single litigation. It is incapacity as to a general class of actions in regard to which he lias assumed knowledge and capacity to a reasonable extent by taking such cases as a class, and defending them as part of his professional duties. . . . To confine an accusation of incapacity to a particular case. the. courts hold does not tend to prejudice a man in his profession without proof of special damage, hut it surely must tend to so prejudice him in a case where the accusation is a want of capac- ity to defend a class of cases which the attorney is in the habit of attempting to defend, of holding himself out as capable of defending, and where he has accepted employment from a client, many of whose eases are of that description." ' 8 Where false and defamatory charges an- published concerning a minister and editor of a religious paper, which if believed would bring his character as minister and editor into disrepute, and would there- fore imply injury, it is not necessary to specially allege damages to character in an action to recover therefor.™ $ 393. Special damages Pleading. — Where words which arc libelous or slanderous per se are used by one person concern- ing another, it is not necessary in an action to recover therefor to allege special damage.* And it is declared that though 78 Per Peekham, J. 79 Craniill v. Hayden, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 656; 55 S. W. 805. 82 Fed. 160: 5"J U. S. App. 881; 27 C. C. A. 100; Trimble v. Tautlinger, 104 Iowa. 665; 69 N. W. 1045; Mor- » Dun v. Maier(C. C. App. 5th C. i, ris v. Curtis, 20 Ky. L. 56; 45 S. \V. 393 LIBEL AND SLANDER. words are not in themselves libelous or slanderous, yet if the complaint states extrinsic circumstances which make the words defamatory and contains innuendoes appropriately making the applications of such words to the plaintiff, it is not necessary to allege special damages." 1 As a general rule, however, where words complained of in an action for slander or libel are not action- able per se, since the right to recover depends upon some spe- cial loss or damage which the plaintiff has sustained, such spe- cial loss must be particularly set forth, and if not so set forth the declaration is bad in substance. 82 In such a case special damages arising from the use of such words must be averred and proved. 83 And the declaration should state in precisely what way the special damages resulted from the words used.* 4 It is not enough for the plaintiff to generally allege that he has suffered special damage or has been put to great costs and ex- penses, but the declaration should make it appear how such damages were caused by the alleged libelous or slanderous statements.* 3 It must show the relation of cause and effect and the special injury complained of must be the natural and prox- imate result of such statements. 86 A complaint in an action for slander or libel if insufficient may be amended by inserting an allegation of special injury and damage. 87 86; Smid v. Bernard, 63 X. Y. Supp. 278; 31 Misc. (N. Y.) 35. 81 Slayton v. Hemken, 91 Hun (N. Y.), 582: 70 N. Y. St. R.824; 36 N. Y. Supp. 249. 8 * Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U. S. 225; 2 Russell & Winslow's Syllabus Dig., U. S. Sup. Co. Rep. 3196; Maiuire v. Hubbard, 22 Ky. Law Rep. 1753; 61 S. W. 466; Dickens v. Shepherd, 22 Md. 399; Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 54; Wilson v. Goit, 17 N. Y. 442; Sumner v. Buel, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 475; Wallace v. Bennett, 1 Abb. N. C. 478; Bell v. Sun Printing & Rub. Co., 10 J. & S. (N. Y.) 267; Bassell v. Elmore, 48 N. Y. 561; Havermeyer v. Fuller, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y. ) 316. See Folkard's Starkie 454 on Slander and Libel ( Wood's Am. ed. 1877), chaps. 15, 23. 83 Langdon v. Shearer, 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) 607; 60 N. Y. Supp. 193. Smid v. Bernard, 31 Misc. (N. Y.) 35; 63 N. Y. Supp. 278; Hirshfield v. Ft. Worth Nat. Bank, 83 Tex. 452: 15 L. R. A. 639: 18 S. W. 743; 34 Cent. L. J. 350; 6 Banking L. J. 345. 84 Bush v. McMaun, 12 Colo. App. 504; 55 Pac. 956; Cook v. Cook, 100 Mass. 194. 85 Cook v. Cook, 100 Mass. 194. 86 Olmstead v. Brown, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 652; Beach v. Ranney, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 309. "Fitzgerald v. Geils, 84 Hun (N. Y.), 295; 65 N. Y. St. R. 541; 32 N. Y. Supp. 306. LIBEL AND SLANDER. • §394. Special damages— Pleading— Continued.— A com- plaint which alleges that the plaintiff has been injured in his business but does not state wherein and how he has been in- jured is not a sufficient allegation of special damage. 88 And in an action to recover for the publication of a Libelous communi- cation concerning the business standing of a person, it is not sufficient tor a complaint to allege damage in a gross amount but it should also allege wherein the damage consisted. 81 And again in an action to recover for a slanderous statement con- cerning the chastity of the plaintiff, an allegation that the slander was made for the purpose of injuring her business as a school-teacher and that she is damaged in a specified sum, is not sufficient to support an action based upon special damages. 90 So also where a complaint in an action for slander which did not relate the plaintiffs business, alleged that the plaintiff had been injured in credit ami reputation and that he had been sued for debts which he would not have been, except for the slander com- plained of, and that buyers of live stock and produce had refused as a result of the slander to deal with him, it was held not to sufficiently allege such damage. 91 And again, a complaint al- leging that by reason of the speaking of the words charged, ''divers persons have refused to associate or transact business with plaintiff and he was therefore deprived of the benefits " re- sulting to him from -such association and business as aforesaid to his damage in the sum of $1,000," was held not to suffi- ciently allege special damages.*- So again, in an action to recover for the publication of an article reflecting upon the integrity of the plaintiff as manager of a creamery, it was decided that he could not recover damages accruing from inability to complete a purchase of a creamery unless such special damages were pleaded. 93 And in an action for slander, plaintiff was not 88 Langdon v. Shearer, 43 App. Div. (N. Y.) GOT; GO X. Y.Supp. 193; Smid v. Bernard, 31 Misc. (X. Y.) 35; 63 X. Y. Supp. 278. See sec. 391 herein. 89 Bradstreet Co. v. Oswald, 96 Ga. 396; 23 S. E. 423. ,J °Ledlie v. Waller, 17 Mont. 150; 42 Pac. 289. 91 Erwin v. Dezell, 84 Hun i X. Y.\. 391; 4G X. Y. St. K. 595; 19 N. V. Supp. 7S4. 9 - Flatow v. Von Bremsen, 19 Civ. Proc. 125; 11 X. Y. Supp. 680. M Roberts v. Breckon, 31 App. Div. (X. Y.) 431; 52 X. Y. Supp. G38. 455 §§ 395, 396 LIBEL AND SLANDEK. permitted to show that in consequence of the slander he was ridiculed by his associates and left his employment temporarily when not alleged as special damages. 94 § 395. Special damage— Action by husband for slander of wife. — If a husband brings an action to recover damages because of a slander or libel of his wife, he must, in order to maintain such action, aver special damage. 95 § 396. Facts tending to enlarge the scope of a libel should be pleaded. — Though an article may be libelous on its face, }-et if the plaintiff desire to enlarge the scope of such article and ag- gravate its meaning by the proof of facts tending in that direc- tion, such facts should be alleged in the complaint "upon the same principle which compels such averment when the article in and of itself is not libelous. In the one case facts are to be shown which render the publication actionable, while in the other facts are offered in proof for the purpose of enlarging the scope of an article and making it more strong than it appears on its face." ^ In the case cited in the note, the defendant had pub- lished an article referring to the plaintiff as being " as big a rascal " and a " bigger rascal " than one McDermott. On the trial of the case the plaintiff offered in evidence several articles published years before concerning McDermott, for the purpose of showing in what estimation the defendant held him, and such articles were admitted, though their admission was objected to by the defendant. On appeal it was held that such proof tended to enlarge the character of the libel itself, and that the plaintiff should have apprised the defendant of such intention in his pleading, by alleging the facts upon which he relied to show the estimation in which McDermott was held by the defendant. In this connection the court said : " It was not admissible upon the question of malice or damages without being pleaded. . . . The prior publications contained no libel upon the plaintiff and did not refer to him directly or indirectly. To allow proof of them 94 Hatt v. Evening News Assoc, 94 . 95 Harper v. Pinkston, 112 N. C. Mich. 119; 54 N. W. 766, rev'g on 293; 17 S. E. 161. reh'g 94 Mich. 114; 53 N. W. 952. 96 Cassidy v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, I 138 N. Y. 239, 243, per Peckham, J. 456 LIBEL am» 3L \NDKi:. § 397 by way of showing malice would as I have said be no more than enlarging by proof the character of the libel, while making no averment in regard to it, or in other words it is an effort to en- hance damages by showing other publications against a third person in order to show how big a rascal McDermotl w.is in the estimation of defendant. I think that to admit such proof un- der a pleading which simply sets forth the libelous article coin- plained of would be unjust to the defendant because it would naturally be a surprise to him. It would be trying a matter of which defendant had not complained, and in regard to which the defendant ought not to be called upon to defend. It is true the plaintiff by this evidence only seeks to prove the kind of rascal that defendant had itself charged against McDermott. But the charges against McDermott were separate articles which had been published years before the one complained of and at that time had no relation to it. If plaintiff should desire to ag- gravate his damages by proof which in effect goes to enlarge the character of the libel itself, there is no injustice in compel- ling him to apprise defendant of such intention in his pleading. He ought not to be allowed to add to the natural and legal ef- fect of the libel as it appears on its face by this kind of proof without setting up the facts which form a basis for such addi- tion. I do not see that this rule was at all altered by the fact that the article as published was libelous per se." 97 §397. Exemplary damages— )Ialiee. — Where it appears in an action for libel or slander that the defendant was actuated by express malice, the jury may in their discretion award exemplary damages. 98 But express malice need not neces- » 7 Per Peckham, J. 98 Times Pub. Co. v. Carlisle (C. C. App. Sth C.)i 9-t Fed. 762; 36 C. C. A. 47.->; 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 633; Stallings v. Whiita- ker, .-).') Ark. 494; L8 S. W. 829; Cbilders v. Sao .lose Mercury Print. & P. Co., 10.') Cal. 284; 38 Pac. 903; Kennedy v. Woodrow, 6 lions. (Del.) 4(5; Jones v. Greeley, 25 Fla. i)2f); 6 So. 448; Montgomery v. Knox, 23 Fla. 595: Prussing v. Jack- son, 85 111. App. 324; Colby v. Mc- Gee, 48 III. App. 294; Barker v. Prizer, 150 [nd. 4; 4s N. E. 4; Casey v. Hulgan, 118 1ml. 590; '-'1 N. E. 322; Hess v. Sparks. 44 Kan. 4ti:> : 24 Pac. 979, reh'g denied 44 Kan. 470; 25 Pac. 580; Louisville Press Co. v. Sennelly, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1281; 49 S. W. 15: Fresh v. Cutter, 7:1 Md. ^7; l Colo. 571; Jackson v. Stetson, 15 Mass. 48; Doss v. Jones. ."> How. ( Miss, i 158; Shartle v. Hutchinson, 3 Oreg. :;:'.7: LJpdegrove v. Zimmerman, 13 Pa. St. G19; Hurckhalter v. Coward, 16 S. C. 4o(>: Cavanaugh v. Austin, 42 Vt. 576; Faucitt v. Booth, 31 Up. Can. Q. B. 263. 10 See Ward v. Dick, 47 Conn. MOO; ;56 Am. Rep. 7~>; Ransome v. chris- tian, 49 Ga. 491; Corbley v. Wilson. 71 111. 209; Sloan v. Petrie, 15 111. 425; Byrket v. Monohon, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 83; Huson v. Dale, 19 Mich. 17; 1'allett v. Sargent, 36 N. II. 497; Raynorv. Kinney, 14 Ohio St. 283; Kennedy v. Holborn, 16 Wis. 457. 11 Code Civ. Proc. Bees. 508, 535, 536. l - Willard v. Press Pub. < <>.. 52 App. Div. (N. Y.) 448; 65 N. Y. Supp. 73; Klinck v. Colby. 46 N. V. 427: Ainl v. Fireman's Journal Co., 10 Daly (N. Y.)254. Formerly in this state the rule prevailed that if the de- fendant reaffirmed the slander or libel in his pleadings, alleging the truth thereof as a justification, and he failed to establish the truth of his pleas, such facts might be considered 461 §402 LIBEL AND SLANDER. The question of the bad faith of the defendant in pleading such a defense is for the jury to determine in connection with the evidence offered to sustain such plea or other circumstances of- the case. 13 § 402. Exemplary damages— Malice— Reckless or wanton conduct. — As we have stated in the preceding section, express malice is not necessary to authorize a recovery of exemplary damages, but malice sufficient for that purpose may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. So such damages may be allowed in an action for libel or slander where it appears that the defendant acted with such gross negligence, reckless- ness or wantonness as was equivalent to an intentional violation or utter disregard of the rights of the plaintiff. 14 So where a person wilfully and with a reckless indifference of the conse- in aggravation of damages, though the attempt was made in good faith or in an honest helief that the plain- tiff was guilty of the matter laid to his charge. Fero v. Roscoe, 4 N. Y. 165; dimming v. Arrowsmith, 5 C. H. Rec. (N. Y.) 52. See Root v. King, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 613. « Holmes v. Jones, 121 N. Y. 461; 31 N. Y. St. R. 379; 24 N. E. 701. "Times Pub. Co. v. Carlisle (C. C. App. 8th C), 94 Fed. 762; 36 C. C. A. 475: 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 633; Bennett v. Salisbury (C. C. App. 2d C.) 78 Fed. 769; 45 U. S. App. 636; Press Pub. Co. v. McDonald (C. C. App. 2d C), 63 Fed. 238; 26 L. R. A. 531; 11 C. C. A. 155; 27 Chic. Leg. News, 53; Cooper v. Sun Printing & P. Assoc. (C. C. S. D. N. Y.), 57 Fed. 566; Morning Journal Assoc, v. Ruther- ford (C. C. App. 2d C), 51 Fed. 513; 16 L. R. A. 803; 1 U. S. App. 296; 2 C. C. A. 354; 46 Alb. L. J. 305; Courier-Journal Co. v. Sallee, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 634; 47 S. W. 226; Louisville Press Co. v. Sennelly, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1231 ; 49 S. W. 15 ; FulkersOn v. Mur- 462 dock, 53 Mo. App. 151; Smith v. Matthews, 152 N. Y. 152; 46 N. E. 164; 55 Alb. L. J. 202: Holmes v. Jones, 147 N. Y. 59; 69 N. Y. St. R. 310; 41 N. E. 409; Warner v. Press Pub. Co., 132 K Y. 181; 43 N. Y. St. R. 633, aff'g 15 Daly,. 545; McMahon v. New York News Co., 51 App. Div. (N. Y.) 488; 64 N. Y. Supp. 713; Payne v. Rouss, 46 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 315; 61 N. Y. Supp. 705; Grant v. Herald Co., 42 App. Div. (N. Y.) 354; 59 N. Y. Supp. 84; Young v. Fox, 26 App. Div. (N. Y.) 261; 49 N. Y. Supp. 634; Schoepflin v. Coffey, 25 App. Div. (N. Y.) 438; 49 N. Y. Supp. 627; Karwowski v. Pitass, 20 App. Div. (N. Y.) 118; 46 N. Y. Supp. 691; Van Ingen v. Star Co., 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 429; 37 N. Y. Supp. 114; 72 N. Y. St. R. 565; Weber v. Butler, 81 Hun (N. Y.), 244; 30 N. Y. Supp. 713; 62 N. Y. St. R. 669; Waltenberg v. Bernhard, 26 Misc. (N. Y.) 659, 56 N. Y. Supp. 396; Prince v. Social- istic Co-op. Pub. Assoc, 364 N. Y. Supp. 285; Ullrich v. New York Press Pub. Co., 23 Misc. (N. Y.) 168; 60 N. Y. Supp. 788; Alliger v. Mail LIBEL AND SLANDEB. quences to a woman charges her with incontinency, punitive damages may be awarded against him. u § 403. Same subject — Newspaper publications. — The publi- cation of a libel by a newspaper without any effort to verify the statements made therein constitutes such a reckless and wanton indifference to the rights of others as to justify an award of punitive damages. 16 So where an article is published which names a certain person as the one charged by a woman with being the father of her illegitimate child, and no investigation is made to determine bhe truthfulness of such statement, the facts show such a disregard of the rights of the person to whom the article refers as will justify an award of punitive damages. 17 And again, a statement in a newspaper article upon the affidavit of a person living hundreds of miles away, that a person of good character and reputation is the head of a gang of thieves, with- out any inquiries for the purpose of verifying the truth of the statement, and against his denial and protest, will render the newspaper liable in punitive damages. 18 So, also, the publication of stories of elopements and other gossip taken from the col- umns of another paper without any attempt to verify the truth Printing Asso., 20 N. Y. Supp. 763; 49 N. Y. St. R. 495; Bowden v. Bailes, 101 N. 0. 012; 8 S. E. 342; Hayner v. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292; l'2 Am. Rep. 303; Becker v. Public Ledger (C. P. Ta.), 6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 89. is Bowden v. Bailes, 101 X. C. 612; 8S. E. 342. is Press Pub. Co. v. McDonald (C. C. App. 2d C), 63 Fed. 238: 11 C. C A. 155; 26 L. R. A. 531; 27 Chic. Leg. News, 53; Smith v. Sun Printing A- P. Asso. (C. C. App. 2d 0.)i •">•"' Fed. 240; Smith v. Matthews, 152 N. Y. 152; 46 \. E. 164; 55 All.. 1.. J. 202; Van Engen v. Star Co., 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 429; 72 \. Y. St. R. 565; 37 N. Y. Supp. 114; Turtou v. New York Recorder, 3 Misc. I V T.)314; 52 X. Y. St. R. 898; 22 X. Y. Supp. 766. See Rutherford v. Morning Journal Assoc. (C. C. S. D. N. Y.), 47 Fed. 487, aff'd 51 Fed. 513; 16 L. R. A. 803; 1 U. S. App. 296; 2 ('. C. A. 354, where a verdict of 84,000, was held not excessive for publication of a false statement, without previous investigation that plaintiff had eloped. In Luft v. Lingane, 17 R. I.—; 22 Atl. 042, a verdict of $2,485.50 was held not ex- cessive for publication, without any attempt at verification, of the charge the female plaintiff had been Been in the company of a negro and had been assaulted by the hitter's wife. 17 Grant v. Herald Co.. 42 App. Div. |N. V.i, 354, 59 N. Y. Supp. 84. ib Times Pub. Co. v. Carlisle (C. App. 8th c.i. 91 Fed. 762; 36C.C.A. 475; 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 633. •463 § 404 LIBEL AND SLANDER. of such statements will justify an award of such damages. 19 But where a newspaper publishes a libelous article which it has received from a reliable and correct news agency in the ordinary course of business, under such circumstances as will excuse the duty of investigation, inquiry or delay, it should not be liable therefor in exemplary damages. 20 But the fact that an article is based on information received from a news agency will not re- lieve a newspaper- from liability for such damages where it is guilty of gross negligence in not attempting to verify the truth of the article before publication. 21 So a finding that an article received from such a source was wantonly published, and that the defendant is liable in exemplary damages, may be jus ti- lled by facts showing that the publication was false and that the defendant when requested to retract the same refused to do so and merely stated that if the plaintiff would furnish proof that the article was untrue, he would be glad to make a retraction.* If, however, a libel is published by inadvertence or mistake and no malice or gross negligence prompted such publication, and an immediate and full retraction is made, exemplary damages should not be allowed. 33 § 404. Evidence of prior statements of like import — Reit- eration.— Evidence of the use by defendant of like statements in regard to the plaintiff or of the substantial reiteration of libel- ous or slanderous charges is admissible as showing malice and in aggravation of damages. 24 And evidence of repetition of the 19 Morning Journal Asso. v. Ruth- erford (C. C. App. 2dC), 51 Fed. f,13; 2 C. C. A. 354; 16 L. R. A. 803; 1 U. S. App. 296; 46 Alb. L. J. 305. 20 Smith v. Sun Printing & P. Assoc. (C. C. App. 2d C), 55 Fed. 240. - 1 Smith v. Sun Printing & P. Assoc. (C. C. App. 2d C.), 55 Fed. 240. 22 Palmer v. New York News Co., 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 210; 52 N. Y. Supp. 539. 23 Becker v. Public Ledger (C. P. Pa. ), 6 Pa. Dist. R. 89. See sec. 413, herein. 24 Rausch v. Anderson, 75 111. App. 464 526; Barker v. Prizer, 150 Ind. 4; 48 N. E. 4; Sharp v. Bowlar, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 2018; 45 S. W. 90; Leonard v. Pope, 27 Mich. 145; Williams v. Har- rison, 3 Mo. 411; Cruikshank v. Gor- don, 118 N. Y. 178; 28 N. Y. St. R. 784; 23 N. E. 457, afTg 48 Hun (X. Y.) 308; 15 N. Y. St. R. 897; 1 N. Y. Supp. 443; Turton v. New York Re- corder Co., 144 N. Y. 144; 63 N. Y. St. R. 69; 38 N. E. 1009, aff'g 3 Misc. 314; 52 N. Y. St. R. 398; 22 N. Y. Supp. 766; Bassell v. Elmore, 48 N. Y. 561: Titus v. Sumner, 44 N. Y. 266; Wright v. Gregory, 9 App. Div. (N. Y.) 85; 41 N. Y. Supp. 139; LIBEL AM) SI.ANhl.K. § W4 charges made after the commencement of the suit is admissible to show malice but not as an independent ground of dama In this connection it is said in a recent New York case : - It is the prevailing doctrine that the reiteration of a libel or Blander after suit, brought may be proved on the question of malice and damages, probably with this qualification, however, that the cause of action for the reiteration has been haired !,\ the statute of limitations, or that the language subsequently reiterated is for some other reason not actionable. The authorities upon this point are not harmonious. 26 No case holds that a repetition of a libel or slander after suit brought is in its nature not competent evidence on the question of malice and damage, and whenever it has been excluded as evidence, it has always been upon the ground that it was an independent cause of action, and thus if such evidence were received, that there would be danger of a dou- ble recovery." * So where unchastity is imputed to an unmarried woman she ma}*, in an action to recover therefor, show that the defendant substantially reiterated the charges after the com- mencement of the action. 28 And where an action is brought Morrison v. Press Pub. Co., 3S N. Y. St. H. 357; 13 N. Y. Supp. 131; Ro- senwald v. Hammerstein, 12 Daly (N. Y. ), 377; Ionian v. Foster, 8 Wend. (X.Y.)G02; Root v. Loundes, Hill (X. Y.), 518; Distin v. Rose, 7 Hun (X. Y.), 83; Swolm v. Wal- bourn (C. P. Pa.), 15 Lane L. Rev. 118; Bebee v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 71 Tex. 424; 9S. W. 449. See Waul v. Dick, 47 Conn. 300; 36 Am. Rep. 75. In Evening Journal Assoc, v. McDermott, 15 Vroom i X. J.), 430; 43 Am. Rep. 392, it was held that for the purpose of showing malice, evi- dence of previous publications was admissible though an action lor such publications might lie barred by the statute of limitations. In Stitzell v. Reynolds, 07 Pa. St. 54, it has been held that subsequent declarations are admissible to show malice, but that damages for such declarations should uot awarded. 30 » Ward v. Dick, 47 Conn. 300; 36 Am. Rep. 75; Van Cleef v. Lawrence; 2 C H. Hec. (N. Y. ) 41. ^Citing "Townshend on Slander and Libel (4th. ed.), 653 et seq.; St unit v. Lovell, 2 Stark. 84: Thomas v. Cross well, 7. Johns. 264; Inman v. Foster, 8 Wend. 602: Keenholts v. Pecker, 3 Den. 346; Hoot v. Loundes, 6 Hill, 518; Johnson v. Brown, 57 Barb. 118; Thorn v. Knapp. 42 X. Y. 474; Titus v. Sumner, 44 N. Y. 266; Bassell v. Elmore, 48 X. Y. 561; Fra- zier v. McClosky, 60 V Y. 337; Daly v. Byrne, 77 X. Y. L82; Cruikshanh v. Gordon, 118 X. Y. 178." - ; Turton v. New York Recorder Co., 1 H X. Y. 144; 63 N. Y. St. R. 69; 38 X. E. 1009, aff'g 3 Misc. 314; 52 \. V. St. R. 398; 22 X. Y. Supp. 766, per Karl. .!. But see Daly v. Byrne. 77 X. Y. 182. -■ Craven v. Walker, 101 Ga. B45; 29 S. E. 152. 165 §§ 405, 406 LIBEL AND SLANDER. against a newspaper to recover for the publication of a libelous article charging dishonest, fraudulent and criminal conduct on the part of the plaintiff, the latter may show that when a demand for retraction was made, such paper published a second article, which might be construed as containing an evasive and covert reiteration of the original charges, and in such case punitive dam- ages may be recovered. 3 But where the manager of a depart- ment store had made a charge of theft against a former employee of the store, and upon a demand by the latter's attorneys for a retraction of such charge had made to a law clerk of such at- tornej's, in reply to the demand, a repetition of the charge, it was held that his reply was prima facie privileged, and express malice must be shown to maintain an action for slander thereon.'* And the repetition by others of the charges made by defendant concerning the plaintiff are held to be too remote to be re- covered. 31 § 405. Repetition after recovery. — The fact that a person has recovered damages for a slander or libel will not prevent a subsequent recovery from the same defendant for the repetition of the slanderous or libelous statements subsequent to such re- covery, since such repetition constitutes a new injury for which there is another cause of action, and the judgment re- covered in a former case is in no way a satisfaction for the sub- sequent injury. 32 § 406. Evidence— Social standing and wealth of defend- ant. — In an action for libel or slander evidence is admissible as to the character, social standing and influence of the de- fendant in the community. 35 And where punitive damages may be allowed, evidence as to the financial standing of the defend- 29 Hoboken Printing & Pub. Co. v. Kalin, 59 N. J. L. 218; 35 Atl. 1053; 5 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 1. soMcCarty v. Lambley, 20 App. Div. (K Y.) 264; 40 N. Y. Supp. 792. 81 Prime v. Eastwood, 45 Iowa, 040; Shurtleff v. Parker, 130 Mass. 293; 39 Am. Rep. 454; Hastings v. Stet- 466 son, 126 Mass. 329; 30 Am. Rep. 683; Terwilliger v. Wands, 17 N. Y. 57. 32 Woods v. Pangburn, 75 N. Y. 495, rev'g 14 Hun (N. Y.), 540. 33 Broughton v. McGrew (C. C. D. Ind.),39 Fed. 672; 5 L. R. A. 406; Xailor v. Pouder, 1 Marv. (Del.) 408; 41 Atl. 88. LIBEL AN It SLANDER. § K>7 ant is also admissible/ 1 And evidence thereof is also admissible for the purpose of showing the effect defendant's words would have in the community. 85 But though such evidence may be admissible in the case of an individual defendant, yet if the de- fendant is a corporation, it is declared that evidence is not ad- missible to show the actual or reputed wealth of the corpora- tion. 38 And where there are several defendants, evidence is not admissible as to the wealth of one of them as bearing on the al- lowance of punitive damages, since the verdict must be against all the defendants and may be collected from anyone of them. 37 And where such evidence is erroneously admitted and not spe- cifically withdrawn, its admission cannot be cured by merely charging the jury that punitive damages cannot be recovered." ^ 407. Exemplary damages— Several defendants Malice of one not imputed to others.— In an action against several de- fendants for libel or slander, malice of one defendant cannot be imputed to the others for the purpose of aggravating the dam- ages, without connecting proof. Thus, in an action against sev- eral defendants for the publication of an article libelous per se. it was decided that a judgment against all must be reversed where the plaintiff, in order to establish express malice, was permitted M Broughton v. McG-rew, 39 Fed. (572; Barkly v. Copeland, 74 Cal. 1; :> Am. St. Rep. 413; 15 Pac. ::"7; Barber v. Barber, . 33 Conn. 335; Jones v. Greeley, 25 Fla. 629; 6 So. -448; Wilson v. Simpler, 86 1ml. 275; Stan wood v. Whitmore, 63 .Me. 2<>!i; Brown v. Lames. 3!) Mich. 211; :'.:'. Am. Hep. 37">; Taylor v. Pullen, !:>•-' Mo. 4:54: :,:', s. W. 1086; Lewis v. Chapman, L9 Barb. ( N T . V. i 252; Fry v. Bennett, 4 Duer | N. V.i. 247; Reeves v. Winn, '.'7 N. C. 246; 1 S. E. 448; 2 Am. St. Rep. 287; Baynor v. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292; 22 Am. Be p. 303. But see Ware v. Cartledge, 21 Ala. 622; Rosewater v. Hoffman, 24 Neb. 222: 38 V W. 8.77: Hues \. laios. 135 N. V. COD; 48 X. V. St. R. 392; 32 N. E. 123; Palmer v. Ilaskius. 28 Barb. (X. Y. ) 00; Young v. Kuhn. 71 Tex. 645; 9S. W. 8(50. 35 Botsford v. Chase, 108 Mich. 432; 66 X. W. 325; 2 Det L. N. 802. • Story v. Early, 86 111. 161; Ran- dall v. Evening News Assoc. 97 Mich. L36; 56 X. W. 361; 44 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 347; Rosewater v. Hoffman, 24 NY1». 222. ■ 7 Washington (Lis Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 X. s. 534; 43 L. Ed. 543; 19 Sup. d. Rep. 296; 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cms. X. S. 596, rev'g 9 App. I). C. a0s : 24 Wash. L. Rep. 807. " Washington Gas Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 D. S. 534; 43 L. Ed. .■.4:',; lit Sup. Ct Rep. 296; 9 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. X. S. 596, revV y App. D. C. 508: 24 Wash. I.. Rep. 807. § 407 LIBEL AND SLANDER. to show as against all the defendants, that several years prior to the publication in question, one of the defendants had made remarks concerning the plaintiff, expressing contempt and ill-will for him. 38 In this case the court said: "There was no connec- tion between these remarks and the other defendants, who neither heard them nor ever heard of them so far as appears. It is un- disputed that Pitass knew nothing about the article until some time after it had been published. He did not directly or indi- rectly cause or consent to its publication. He was liable only because he owned the newspaper and was responsible for the acts of his agents in publishing it. His previous statements did not cause the publication nor have any effect upon it. Between those statements and the fact of publication, there was no con- nection and no relation of cause and effect. They did not enter into, or become part of, or have any bearing upon the wrong of which the plaintiff complains. As the article would have been published if they had not been made, they were immaterial for they did not touch the wrongful act and could not aggravate the damages. Punitive damages which are in excess of the actual loss are allowed where the wrong is aggravated by evil motives in order to punish the wrongdoer for his misconduct and furnish a wholesome example. ... In an action for tort, there can be no recoveiy of punitive damages for general malice, but only for such particular malice as existed when the tortious act was done and which had some influence in causing it to be done. . . . Neither the author nor editor was a party, to the malice of the publisher and his malice did no harm, because it had no effect upon the result. While he was responsible for their acts, they were not responsible for his motives of which they had no knowl- edge. He was not responsible for his motives in connection with their acts because there was no connection. The malice proved in this case did not cause the conduct complained of. The one guilty of the malice did not commit the wrong except through an agent who knew nothing about the malicious feel- ings of his principal. The principal was not liable for general malice, but only for such particular malice as was connected with the publication. The agent was not liable for the general malice of his principal of which he knew nothing and which had : » King v. Pitass, 162 N. Y. 154. 46b LIBEL AM» SLANDER. §§ 408 I LO qo connection with the wrong done. The writer ol the article was not Liable for the malice of another of which he had n< heard and which had no influence upon the wrongful act. Yet the general malice of one of three defendants, although it had no connection with the wrong, has, as it must be presumed, en- tered into the verdict of $6,250 against all, in violation of the rights of each. As the malice proved neither caused QOrprompted the publication of the Libel, the judgment must he reversed and a new trial granted. "' " In a ease in Massachusetts, however, it is held that where a newspaper is conducted by a partnership, the malice of one of the partners in the publication of a libel in such newspaper will he imputed to his copartners although proof of actual malice is required by statute." § 408. Exemplary damages— Slander by wife.— Where a slander has been uttered by a married woman against another, and the husband is made a party defendant because of his marital relation, and not because of any active participation of his in the slander, and he is in fact an innocent party, a narrower limit of exemplary damages exists. 4 -' So where he is absent at the time slanderous words are spoken by his wife, and they are uttered without his consent or knowledge, the exemplary damages against him should be less than if he had participated therein. 1 - 1 $409. Exemplary damages— Telegraph company Libel- ous message.— A telegraph company is liable for the acts ol its agents within the scope of their authority. So where a Libelous message is maliciously transmitted by an agent of the company, within the scope of his employment, punitive damages therefor may be recovered against the company." §410. Exemplary damages as affected by statute.— Under the California Civil Code.'"' if the publication of a Libel was not *> Per Vann, J. « Lathrop v. Adams. 183 Mass. 471 ; 4:1 Am. Rep. 528. *■ Upton v. Upton, 51 Hun ( N. V.). 184; 21 N. Y. St. K. 559. "Webber v. Vincent, 29 N. V. St. R. 603; 9 N. Y. Supp. 101. 44 Peterson v. Western Tin. mi Tel eg. Co., 75 Minu. 368; 43 L. R. \. 581; 77 N. W. its:,: 5Am. Neg. Rep. 370. See Joyce on Electric L;iw (ed. 1900). sec. 9S-J. « Sec. 3294. 469 § -411 LIBEL AND SLANDER. made with ill-will or intention to injure or defame, there can be no recovery of exemplary damages. 46 And under the Colorado laws, 47 which provide that there shall be an allowance of punitive damages only in those cases where wrongs are attended by cir- cumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton disregard of the injured party's rights and feelings, there can be no recovery of such damages in an action for libel, where it was published in the belief of its truth and with no desire or intention to do injury. 48 So again, under the Indiana laws if a person who has published a libel is subject to a criminal prosecution therefor, exemplary damages cannot be awarded in a civil action to re- cover damages for such libelous publication. 49 But a contrary rule seems to prevail in Missouri. 50 In Nebraska there can be no recovery of exemplary damages against a newspaper for the publication of a libelous article therein. 51 In an action in a Federal court to recover damages for a libelous publication, such court is not bound to follow the statute of the state in which it is sitting, which requires that when actual and punitive damages are allowed by a jury in a libel case, they shall return such damages separately. 52 §411. Justification. —The defendant in an action for libel or slander may set up as a defense to the action the truth of his statements, and where the truth of the same is established, it will operate as a justification, and no recovery can be had. 53 But the truth of such a publication cannot be shown either as 46 Taylor v. Hearst (Cal.), 40 Pac. Rep. 394; 41 Cent. L. J. 54. 47 Colo. Sess. Laws, 1889, p. 64. 48 Republican Pub. Co. v. Conroy, 5 Colo. App. 262; 38 Pac. 423. 49 Tracy v. Hacket, 19 Ind. App. 133; 49 N. E. 185; Wabasb Printing 6 Pub. Co. v. Crumrine (Ind.), 21 N. E. 904. 50 Baldwin v. Fries, 46 Mo. App. 288. 51 Rosewater v. Hoffman, 24 Neb. 222; 38 N. W. 857. 52 Times Pub. Co. v.' Carlisle ( C. C. App. 8th C. I, 94 Fed. Rep. 762. 470 63 Ratcliff v. Louisville Courier- Journal Co., 99 Ky. 416; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 291; 36 S. W. 177; Owen v. Dewey, 107 Mich. 67; 65 N. W. 8; 2 Det. L. N. 573; McCloskey v. Pu- litzer Pub. Co., 152 Mo. 339; 53 S. W. 1087; Press Co. v. Stewart, 119 Pa. St. 584; 14 Atl. 51; 21 W. N. C. 204: 12 Cent. 275: Mitchell v. Spradley, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 43: 56 S. W. 134: Tiudel v. La Campagnie D'lmprime- iie et de Publication, Montreal L. Rep. 5 Sup. Ct. 297, aff'do Q. B. 510; Leduc v. Graham, Montreal L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 511. LIBEL AND SLANDER. §411 a justification of the defendant's act or in mitigation of damages, unless pleaded. 51 And an answer alleging Buch a defense must set up therein with some particularity the facts which L, r <» b tablish the truth of the statement made and for which the action is brought.* Bui where the purpose of proving the truth of a charge for which an action is Wrought isnotasa justification, but to rebut malice and in mitigation of damages, evidence tending to prove its truth is admissible under a plea of the general issue only.* 3 If the trmh is set upas a justification it is not necessary that it be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is suf- ficient if it be shown by a preponderance of evidence."' And where an action is brought for the publication of a statement that the plaintiff had been discharged from the employ of the defendants upon a confession by him that he had misappro- priated money belonging to them, the burden of proof is not upon the defendants to show an actual conversion of the money, but they merely have the burden of proving the confession."* So, also, in an action by contractors to recover for defamation of them in their business, where it is alleged in defense that the article complained of was merely a comment or criticism in ref- erence to a public work made by citizens and taxpayers who were interested therein, it must appear to sustain such defense that there was no malice on the part of the defendants towards the contractors, either individually or in a business way in the making of such comment or criticism, and that the statements in the publication were fair and reasonable. 90 64 Atwater v. Morning News Co., 67 Conn. 504; 84 Atl. 865. 55 Brush v. Blot, Hi App. Div. (N. Y.) 80: 44 \. V. Siipp. 1073. In this case which was an action for li- bel, the defendant in his answer al- leged that he had knowledge of the alleged libelous article, and at the time of publication believed it to be true, and that his motive in publish- ing the same was worthy and the ends justifiable, and that it was done in the discharge of a duty to the pub- lic, whom he believed were entitled to be informed as to the conduct of the plaintiff, who had held a public office in the city prior to the publi- cation. See Funk v. Beverly, 112 Ind. 100: 11 West. 220; 13 V E. 573. »Huson v. Dale. 19 Mich. 17: 2 Am. Rep. 66; Stanley v. Webb, 21 Barb, i N. V.i 148. 67 Owen v. Dewey, 107 Mich. 67; 65 \. W. 8; •-' Det. L. V 573. ■ Hall v. Elgin Dairy Co., 15 Wash. 542; 46 Pac. 1049. 69 Bearce v. Bass. 88 lie. 521; 34 Atl. 411. 471 § 412 LIBEL AND SLANDER. § 412. Mitigation of damages— Generally. — Evidence is ad- missible in mitigation of damages, of the facts and circumstances which induced the use of the alleged libelous or slanderous state- ments by the defendant.' 8 And in an action for slander in im- puting unchastity to a female, the defendant may show that the slander was repeated many years after it first started and after the reputation of the plaintiff had become bad. 61 Evidence, how- ever, is not admissible in mitigation of damages of facts and cir- cumstances which did not come to the knowledge of the defend- ant before the libelous or slanderous statements were made by him. 62 So where the defendant had charged the plaintiff with having charge of a fund for the corruption of voters at an elec- tion, he was not permitted to show specific acts of the plaintiff as to the use of money at prior elections, where no evidence was given showing knowledge of such acts on the part of the defendant prior to the publication in question. 63 And in an ac- tion for libel, the defendant cannot show in mitigation of dam- ages, that actions have been commenced for the publication of the same libel against other newspapers. 64 Nor is it material in such a case that a judgment has been recovered ngainst another newspaper, 63 since it is declared that a person who has com- mitted a tortious act cannot offset against the damages resulting therefrom, damages to the same person from the separate tortious act of another. 66 And where a series of articles have been pub- lished by a paper or magazine, the defendant cannot show in mitigation of damages that the same plaintiff has previously re- covered against him in another action for libel based on a former article of the series, though such article contained the libelous words charged in the second action. 67 Again, evidence is not admissible for the purpose of excuse or defense, that the libel 60 Donnelly v. Swain, 3 Phil. (Pa.) 93. 61 Nelson v. Wallace, 48 Mo. App. 193. 62 Simons v. Burnham, 102 Mich. 189; 60 N. W. 476; Morey v. Morning Journal Assoc, 17 N. Y. St. R. 266; Hatfield v. Lasher, 17 Hun (N. Y.), 23. 63 Edwards v. San Jose Printing & P. Co., 99 Cal. 431; 34 Pac. 128. 472 64 Palmer v. New York News Pub. Co., 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 210; 52 N. Y. Supp. 539. ^Bennett v. Salisbury (C. C. App. 2d C), 78 Fed. 769; 45 U. S. App. 636; 24 C. C. A. 329. 6i Arnold v. Sayings Co., 76 Mo. App. 159. 67 Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 Johns. (N. Y. ) 56. LII'.KL ANI» SLANDER § H3 may not be believed/" or that it was published accidentally, in- advertently or by mistake.* Though the fact that the publica- tion was accidental or by mistake cannot affect the question of substantial damages, it may, under certain circumstances, go to the question of exemplary damages.™ Ami as bearing upoD tin- questions of malice ami such damages, evidence is admissible showing that the language was rendered libelous by a mistake in punctuation/ 1 or by reason of a typographical error. ,: In tin- case of the accidental or inadvertent publication of libelous mat- ter, the evidence should, it would seem, tend to show that the publication was purely by accident or inadvertence, for in such case the question of negligence would enter, and if the publica- tion was due to gross negligence or recklessness, exemplary damages should be allowed. It is also no defense to an action for the publication of an article reflecting upon the integrity of a person, that such article was intended as a political joke or pleasant gibe, where the article or paper contains nothing to in- dicate that it was so intended.'" And in those cases where a re- covery may be allowed for loss of time and fur trouble as the result of a slander, the amount of recovery therefor should be reduced by the fact that no deduction for such time was made by plaintiff's employer. 74 § 413. Evidence of good faith in mitigation— Absence of malice. — For the purpose of rebutting any presumption of mal- ice which may arise from the publication of libelous words, the 68 Bishop v. Journal Newspaper Co., 108 Mass. 327; IT X. E. 119; Hastings v. Stetson, 130 Mass. 76; Van Ingeu v. Star Co., 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 429; 72 X. Y. St. R. 565, affd on opinion below, 157 X. Y. 642. See Richardson v. Barker, 7 Ind. 567. «9 Henderson v. Fox, 83 Ga. 233; 9 S. E. 839; Morgan v. Rice, 35 Mo. App. 591; Moore v. Francis, l.'l N. Y. 199; 8L. R. A. 214; 30 X. Y. St. R. 467; 31 Cent. L. J. 10; 23 \. I.. 1127; Griebel v. Rochester Printing Co., 38 X. Y. St. R. 788; 14 X. Y. Supp. 848. 7 McClean v. New York Press Co., 19 X. Y. Supp. 262 ; 40 V Y. St. R. 700. 71 Arnott v. Standard Assoc, 57 Conn. SO: 17 A 1 1 . 301; 3 L. R. A. 69. 7 - Median v. New York Press Co., 19 X. Y. Supp. 262; 46 N. Y. St. R. 700. See Sailings v. Shakespeare, 46 Mich. 408: 41 Am. Rep. 166. « Truth Pub. Co. v. Reed, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 323. 74 Eimee v. Fessenden, 154 Mass. 427; 2S X. E. 299. 473 $ 413 LIBEL AND SLANDER. defendant may show the circumstances of publication, the sources from which the information was received and the reliability of the same, and his honesty of purpose, good faith and belief in the truth of the allegations."' So evidence is admissible in be- half of the defendant to show that the publication was made in good faith and in an honest belief of its truth, and where such facts are established, they are to be considered by the jury in mitigation of damages. 76 But the good faith of the defendant in the publication will not affect the recovery of the actual dam- ages sustained. Such facts, when established, will only affect the allowance of exemplary damages." So in the case of an ac- tion against a newspaper for the publication of a libelous article, though the defendant's motives were good and there was no intention to injure the reputation or character of the plaintiff, and the publication was made in the ordinary course of business and with justifiable ends, the plaintiff may still recover his actual damages, and he will be restricted to such damages where such facts appear.' 8 In some cases it has been declared that if the de- fendant acted in good faith in the publication of such an article and with an honest belief in its truth, and has made reasonable and proper investigation, the jury will be warranted under cer- tain circumstances in reducing the damages to a minimum. 79 In 75 Owen v. Dewey, 107 Mich. 67; 65 BT. W. 8; 2 Det. L. N. 573. See Taylor v. Church, 8 N. Y. 452. 76 Times Pub. Co. v. Carlisle (C. C. App. 8th C), 94 Fed. 762; 36 C. C. A. 475; 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 633 ; Hotchkiss v. Porter, 30 Conn. 414; Cox v. Strickland, 101 Ga. 482; 28 S. E. 655; Nolte v. Her- ter, 65 111. App. 430; Tottleben v. Blankenship, 58 111. App. 47; Louis- ville Press Co. v. Tennelly, 20 Ky. L. Kep. 1231; 49 S. W. 15; Blackwell v. Johnston (Ky.), 56 S. W. 12; Bron- son v. Bruce, 59 Mich. 467; 60 Am. Rep. 307; 26 N. W. 671; Evening News Assoc, v. Tryon, 42 Mich. 549; 36 Am. Rep. 450; Sharpe v. Larson, 74 Minn. 323; 74 N. W. 2:33; McClos- key v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 152 Mo. 474 339; 53 S. W. 1087; Morgan v. Rice, 35 Mo. App. 591; Lewis v. Hum- phreys, 64 Mo. App. 466; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1011; Bush v. Prosser, 11 N. Y. 347; Erwin v. Sumrow, 1 Hawks (N. C), 472; Morrison-Jewell Filtra- tion Co. v. Lingane, 19 R. I. ; 33 Atl. 452. 77 Times Pub. Co. v. Carlisle (C. C. App. 8th C), 94 Fed. 762; 36 C. C. A. 475; 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. N. S. 633; Evening News Assoc, v. Tryon, 42 Mich. 549; 36 Am. Rep. 450; Lewis v. Humphreys, 64 Mo. App. 466; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1011. 7S Fitzpatrick v. Daily States Pub. Co., 48 La. Ann. 1116; 20 So. 173. See Hearne v. De Young, 119 Cal. 670; 52 Pac. 150. 79 Bronson v. Bruce, 59 Mich. 467; LIBEL AM> SLANDER. 5 : n i another case, however, it was held to be erroneo tating an incorrect rule of damages to instruct the jury, in an action against a newspaper for the publication of a Libelous article, that though it was not a defense to the action that the defendant published the article in good faith, as a matter of news and without malice, yet such fart might be considered in mitigation of damages, and with other mitigating circumstances might be sufficient to reduce the damages to a mere minimum. 80 S 414. Same subject continued.— In an action for the al- leged libelous publication by a newspaper of a sectarian or club meeting at which it stated that certain speakers insinuated that funds were being diverted from their intended purposes, and the report further insinuated that such funds had been embezzled by the plaintiff, the defendant may show for t he purpose of estab- lishing good faith on its part and in mitigation of damages that the article complained of was a fair and true report of the meet- ing/ 1 And as tending to disprove malice and to show the good faith of the defendant in an action for libel, evidence is admissi- ble showing what he said when printing the article. 88 But the defendant cannot show that the actions and conduct of the plain- tiff were such as to excite his suspicions, either for the purpose of proving that he acted in good faith or in any way tending to mitigate damages/ and only facts which the defendant had knowledge of at the time of the publication and which might have influenced him in making the statements contained therein are admissible. 81 And evidence showing the insanity of the de- fendant is admissible on the question of malice and in mitigation of damages/' or that he was drunk at the time the slanderous statements were made by him. 86 If the publication of an article 60 Am. Rep. 307; 26 N. W. 071 ; Mor- gan v. Rice, 3"> Mo. App. 591. bo Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co., 12 Utah, 439; 13 Pao. 112: 35 L. R. A. till. 81 Sarasohn v. Workingrnen's Pub. Assn., 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 302; 60 N. Y. Supp. 640. 82 Taylor v. Church, 8 N. Y. 452. sasickra v. Small, 87 Me. 493; 33 Atl. 9; 47 Am. St. Rep. 314. But see Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240; 21 So. 109. 84 Sun Printing & Pub. Assn. v. Schenck, 98 Fed. 925; 40 C. C. A. 163. 85 Yeates v. Reed, 4 Blackf. (lud.) 463. 86 Gates v. Meredith, 7 Ind. 440. 475 8 415 LIBEL AND SLANDER. libelous per se is admitted and the recovery is expressly limited to compensatory damages, evidence is irrelevant either as to the good faith or the negligence of the publisher of such article. 87 § 415. Evidence that defamatory matter was common rumor. — The courts do not seem to be in harmony upon the question whether in an action for slander or libel the defendant may show upon the question of malice and in mitigation of damages that the defamatory matter which he has spoken or published concerning the plaintiff was a general rumor or report. It would seem that such evidence should be admissible for such purpose, for if there was in fact a general rumor or report in substance the same as the alleged libelous or slanderous state- ments, damages in such a case should certainly not be awarded to the same amount as where no rumor or report had previously been in circulation affecting the plaintiff in the manner in which the alleged libel or slander affected him, and such seems to be the rule in the majority of the jurisdictions in which the ques- tion has arisen, though nearly an equal number hold otherwise. 88 So in an action for slander for charging a woman with being an adulteress and prostitute, evidence is admissible of general ru- mors or reports of guilt of adultery on her part, 89 and the defend- ant is entitled to give proof that the defamatory matters which were charged against the plaintiff were current rumor and re- port prior to the publication, and that the publication was made 87 Taylor v. Hearst, 118 Cal. 366; 50 Pac. 541. 88 See Broughton v. McGrew, 39 Fed. 672; Fuller v. Dean, 31 Ala. 654; Swan v. Thompson, 124 Cal. 193; 56 Pac. 878; Republican Pub. Co. v. Mosman, 15 Cob.. 399; 24 Pac. 1051; Nailor v. Pouder, 1 Marv. (Del.) 408; 41 Atl. 88; Gray v. Ellzroth, 10 Ind. App. 587; 37 N. E. 551; Barr v. Hack, 46 Iowa, 308; Nicholson v. Rust (Ky.), 52 S. W. 933; Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526; 46 L. R. A. 397; Hoboken Printing & P. Co. v. Kahn, 58 N. J. L. 359; 33 Atl. 382; Cook v. Barkley, 2 N. J. L. 169; Mc- Curry v. McCurry, 82 N. C. 296; 476 Lambert v. Pilaris, 3 Head (Tenn.), 622; Richards v. Ricbards, 2 Mood. & Rob. 557. But see S trader v. Sny- der, 67 111. 404; Eusor v. Bolgiano, 67 Md. 190; 9 Atl. 529; 8 Cent. 296; Peterson v. Morgan, 116 Mass. 350; Baldwin v. Boulware, 79 Mo. App. 5; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 359; Dame v. Kenney, 25 N. H. 318; Gilman v. Lowell, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 579; Com. v. Place, 153 Pa. St. 314; 32 W. N. C. 107; 26 Atl. 620; Pease v. Sbippen, 80 Pa. St. 513; 21 Am. Rep. 116; Black well v. Land re th, 90 Va. 748; 19 S. E. 791; Bowen v. Hall, 20 Vt. 232. 89 Gray v. Ellzrotb, 10 Ind. App. 587; 37 N. E. 551. LIBEL AND BLANDER. § «6 in good faith in reliance in such rumor though the plea of jus- tification fail and the publication be false.'" Bui though evi- dence of a general rumor «>r report is admissible, yel writnesses should not be permitted to detail conversations which took place in reference to such report or rumor; 91 nor .should evidence of the existence of a general rumor to the same effect as the all< slanderous or libelous statements be admitted unless it also be shown that such rumor or report was communicated tn the de- fendant prior to the statements complained of." And it in an ac- tion for slander or libel it appear that the alleged defamatory matter was positively stated with no reference or suggestion of its resting on rumor merely, it is declared that evidence of the existence of a rumor is not admissible."' § 416. Source of information— Authority of others— News agency— Copied from newspapers. — It is not a justification or excuse in an action for libel or slander that the defendant was told by another the matter which he stated." But the defend- ant may plead in mitigation of damages that the words were uttered on the authority and information of others whose names he gave at the time the words were spoken by him, 95 and that he also stated at that time that he did not believe the statement to be true* So, also, for the same purpose, evidence is admis- sible that he was informed that the statements made by him were true, 97 and the defendant may testify that he made the statement upon information, in the belief of its truth, and with- out malice. 98 But where a libel purports to be based upon the 90 Republican Pub. Co. v. M<>sm;in, 15 Colo. 399; 24 Pac. 1051. Hut see Baldwin v. Bo ul ware, 79 Mo. App. 5; 2 Mo. App. Be p. 3">9. 91 Nicholson v. Bust (Ky.), 52 S. W. 9;',:?. MWolfi v. Smith, 112 Mich. 359; 4Det. L. X. 73; 70 X. \V. 1010. 93 Haskins v. Lumsden. 10 Wis. 359. 94 Edwards v. (C. C. \V. D. Mo bish v. Hamilton 16 So. 856. Kansas City Times , 82 Fed. 813; Wim- 47 La. Ann. 246; 96 Baldwin v. Boulware, 79 Mo. App. 5; 2 Mo. App. Bep. 359. See Hinkle, v. Davenport, 38 Iowa. 355. But see Inman v. Foster, 8 Wend. (X. Y.) 602. 9i Xicholson v. Bust (Ky.), 52 S. W. 933. 97 Fowler v. Fowler, 113 Mich. 575; 71 \. W. 1084; 4 Det. L. X. 412. See Story v. Early. 86 111. 461. 98 Scullin v. Harper (C. C. App. 7th C. ), 78 Fed 460; 46 U. S. App. 673: 24 C. C. A. 169. See Mature v. Wilcox. 147 X. V. 024: 71 N. Y. St. 477 §417 LIBEL AND SLANDER. writer's own knowledge, evidence is not admissible in mitiga- tion of what he was told or heard before publishing the same. 93 § 417. Same subject continued. — If, as in the case of an action against a newspaper for the publication of a libelous article, such article appears on its face to be derived from sources other than the publisher's own knowledge, though the source of information may not be stated, evidence is admissible to show that the publisher acted on apparently reliable information and in good faith. 100 And for the purpose of showing good faith and due care in the publication of an article by a newspaper, and as tending to mitigate damages, the defendant may show that the article was received from a news' agency, which had theretofore been found trustworthy. 1 But evidence that the information upon which an article is based was received from a reliable source, is not of itself admissible in mitigation of damages, in the absence of evidence showing that the publisher had reason to and did believe that the information was true. 2 So in an action to recover damages for the publication of a statement by a newspaper, that the plaintiff was to have charge of a fund for the purpose of corrupting voters at an election, it was held that in order to mitigate the damages, the defendant must not only show the source of its information, but it must also show that the persons who informed it were possessed of such a character and standing as would command a belief in their utterances.' In an action for libel the defendant may also prove that the publication was based on an article published in a news- paper of large circulation, which he had seen, read and be- lieved to be true, 4 or that the article in question was taken R. 244; 42 N. E. 270; Dolevin v. Wilder, 7 Rob. (N. Y.) 319; Witcher v. Jones, 17 N. Y. Supp. 491: 43 N. Y. St. R. 151. ^Clifton v. Lange, 108 Iowa, 472; 79 N. W. 276; Fenstermaker v. Trib- une Pub. Co., 12 Utah, 439; 35 L. R. A. fill; 43 Pac. 112. 100 Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co.. 13 Utah, 532; 35 L. R. A. 611: 45 Pac. 1097. 478 1 Folwell v. Providence Journal Co., 19 R. I. 551: 37 Atl. 6. 2 Robinson v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 39 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 525; 57 N. Y. Supp. 303, rev'g 25 Misc. 243; 28 Civ. Proc. 239; 55 N. Y. Supp. 62. 3 Edwards v. San Jose Print. & P. Co., 99 Cal. 431; 34 Pac. 128. 4 Hoey v. Fletcher, 39 Fla. 325: 22 So. 716. See Turner v. Hearst, 115 Cal. 394: 47 Pac. 129; Hewitt v. LIBEL AM) BLANDER. § 418 therefrom as a mere matter of news. 3 Although where an in- struction h;is been given that no exemplary damages can be allowed, hut that plaintiff is entitled to compensatory dam it is improper to instruct the jury that they may consider in mitigation of damages the fact that oilier similar articles were published in other newspapers immediately prior to the pub- lication of the article in question. 6 Bui in order to render sueh articles admissible in evidence in mitigation of dam; they must be pleaded for that purpose in the answer. 1 The de- fendant in such an action may also allege in mitigation of dam- ages that the article in question was published as a matter of news in accordance with its regular custom upon information furnished by the police authorities for the purpose of restoring the plaintiff —whom the article said had mysteriously disap- peared — to her friends, and was published in a friendly spirit and without malice. 8 But where, in the publication of an article in reference to a seduction case, the name and address of an innocent party was given as the complaining witness, and the reporter, who wrote the article, based it on information received over the telephone and a note left by the justice on the report- er's desk, it was held that the justice's docket was not admissi- ble in evidence in mitigation of damages, where neither the reporter nor the publisher saw the docket prior to the publica- tion. 9 § 418. Provocation in mitigation. — In an action for slander or libel there may have been conduct on the part of the plaintiff which amounted to a provocation and in consequence of which the statements for which action is brought were made by the defendant and evidence of such conduct is admissible in mitiga- Pioneer Press Co., 25 Minn. 178; 23 Am. Rep. 680; Wier v. Allen, 51 \. II. 177. But see Reade v. Sweetzer, 6 Abb. Pr. X. S. (N. Y. ) 9. 6 Edwards v. Kansas City Times (C. C. W. D. Mo.), 32 Fed. 813. 6 Van Ingen v. Mail * Ex. Pub. Co., 14 Misc. (N. r.)326; :'."> X. V. Supp. 838; 70 N. Y. St. R. 355. See Hoey v. Fletcher, 39 Fla. 325; 22 So. 716; Fitzpatrick v. Daily States Pub. ' (Iowa), 82 N. W. 928. IT!' Co., 48 La. Ann. 1116; 20 So. 173; Upton v. Hume, 24 Oreg. 420: 21 L. R. A. 493; 33 Pac. 810. 7 Times Pub. Co. v. Carlisle (C. C. A] M >. 8th C), 94 Fed. 762; 36 C. C. A. -17.".: 10 Am. A- Eng. Corp. (as. \. s. 636. 3 Evening Post Co. v. Hunter, IS Ky. L. Rep. 726; 38 S. W. 487. ' Hulbeit v. New Nonpareil Co. $418 LIBEL AND SLANDER. tion of damages. 10 So in an action for libel, previous articles published by the plaintiff may, in certain cases, be considered in mitigation of damages. 11 Thus, the fact that the article for which an action in libel is brought is professedly an answer to a publication made by the plaintiff, and which is referred to in such article, is admissible in evidence under the general issue, in mitigation of damages. 1 ' So where defendant had in a pub- lication charged the plaintiff with being " a degraded scoundrel, liar and blackguard, " he was, in an action to recover damages for such a statement, permitted to show under the general issue that shortly prior to the publication of said libel he had been charged by the defendant with false swearing in an action in which he was a witness. 13 But to render a previously published libelous article admissible in mitigation of damages, it must be shown that the plaintiff caused or had some part in its prepara- tion or publication." And in an action for slander, the defend- ant may show that in consequence of the plaintiff's violent con- duct or language, he was provoked in a moment of anger to the use of the words charged. 15 10 Freeman v. Tinsley, 59 111. 497; Monsler v. Harding, 33 Ind. 176; Janch v. Janch, 50 Ind. 135; 19 Am. Rep. 699: Simons v. Lewis, 51 La. Ann. 327: 25 So. 406; Davis v. Griffith, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 342; Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526; 46 L. R. A. 397; 80 N. W. 575; Newman v. Stein, 75 Mich. 402; 42 N. W. 956; Ritchie v. Stenins, 73 Mich. 563; 41 N. W. 687: War- ner v. Lockerby, 31 Minn. 421; Powers v. Presgrove, 38 Miss. 227; Richardson v. Northrop, 56 Barb. (N. Y.)105; Else v. Ferris Auth. N. P. (N. Y.), 36; Massnere v. Dickens, 70 Wis. 83. ii Pugh v. McCarty, 40 Ga. 444; Brewer v. Chase, 121 Mich. 526; 46 L. R. A. 397; 80 N. W. 575; May- nard v. Beardsley, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 560. i 2 Hotchkiss v. Lothrop, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 286; Gould v. Weed, 12 480 Wend. (N. Y.) 12; Thompson v. Boyd, Mills. Const. (S. C.) 80. 13 Davis v. Griffith, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 342. 14 Dressel v. Shippman, 57 Minn. 23; 58 N. W. 684. 15 Simons v. Lewis, 51 La. Ann. 327; 25 So. 406; Newman v. Stein, 75 Mich. 402; 42 N. W. 956; Pal- mer v. Long, 7 Daly (N. Y.), 33; Else v. Ferris Auth. N. P. (N. Y. ), 36. Hilbrant v. Simmons, 9 Ohio C. D. 566; 18 Ohio C. C. 123, where a verdict for -S800 was held excessive for charging the plaintiff in the course of a quarrel with him, with burning his house to get insurance money. In Cnmmings v. Line, 45 N. Y. St. R. 56; 18 N. Y. Supp. 469, a verdict for $3,000 was held exces- sive for imputing unchastity to the plaintiff in the course of a quarrel which was heard by but few wit- nesses. LIBEL AND SLANDER. 419 §419. Same subject— When insufficient. In an action against an employer for abusing an employee and culling him a thief in a public place in the presence of others, the fact that the employer was at the moment very angry with the employee because of reports which had come to him as to trouble beta the employee and the manager, does not excuse the employer for uttering such statements. u; And the fact that slanderous words were spoken by the defendant in a moment of anger or Budden resentment will not preclude the plaintiff from the recovery of other than nominal damages. 17 Again, a previous provoking pub- lication by the plaintiff in reference to the defendant can neither be considered in justification or in mitigation of damages in an action for libel or slander, where such previous publication is en- tirely irrelevant to and wholly independent of the publication for which the action is brought, and where the publication of the plaintiff was not so connected in point of time with that of the defendant as to justify the belief that the latter's statement was made in a moment of anger. 13 And in an action for slander or libel, the defendant cannot plead as a set-off, damages suffered by him as a result of a previous slanderous or libelous attack, or charges made concerning him by the plaintiff. 1 ' 1 In New York under the Code provision a which requires that a counter- claim to be available must be "a cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim or connected with the subject of the action," the defendant cannot avail himself, as a counter- claim, in an action for slander, of a slander uttered by the plain- tiff after the slander of which he complains is complete, though uttered in the same conversation.' 1 16 Poissenet v. Heather, 51 La. Ann. '.it - ,:,; -j;, So. 937. 17 Ledgerwood v. Elliott (Tex.), :,1 S. W. ST-.'. iSRattell v. Wallace (C. C. S. D. V. V.). 30 Fed. JJO ; Child v. Tloiner, 13 Pick. (Mass.)503; Quinby v. Min- nesota Tribune Co., 38 Minn. 528; 38 N. W. 623; Baldwin v. Bonlware 1 Mo. App. Rep. -466. 19 Baldwin v. Boulware, 1 Mo. 31 App. Rep. 466; Trudel v. Vian. Montreal L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 502. But see Trudel v. La Campairnie D'lm- primierie et de Publication da Can- ada. Montreal L. Rep. 5 Q. R. 510, affg •". Super. Ct. -JOT. 2 " X. Y. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 520. 21 Sheehan v. Pierce, 70 Ilun I N. Y.), 22: 53 N. Y. St. R. 438; 23 NY. Supp. 1119. 481 § 420 LIBEL AND SLANDER. § 420. Retraction in mitigation. — If subsequent to the publication of a libelous article or slanderous statement, the publisher makes a retraction of the same, such fact may be considered in mitigation of damages." A retraction, however, to be available in mitigation should be full and fair, and not evasive. So where the defendant had published a libelous article charging the plaintiff with fabricating the story of an assault and battery for the purpose of concealing the fact that his wounds were received in a row over a woman, it was held that the retraction was not a full and fair one where the publication of the original article was not referred to or admitted therein and no retraction or desire to retract was expressed, but it was in effect a criticism upon the police department upon whom it attempted to place the responsibility for the rumor. 23 And though a retraction may be made after the commencement of an action for libel, yet if such action is commenced without any request on the part of the plaintiff to retract and the defendant promptly after the commencement of the suit publishes a full and fair retraction, such publication may be proved and sub- mitted to the jury in mitigation of damages. 1 * 4 In this connec- tion it was said by the court in this case: " Under such circum- stances a retraction after suit brought may be as valuable and effective as one published before and there is the same reason for the submission to the jury of the one as the other. . . . No case holds that a repetition of a libel or slander after suit brought is in its nature not competent evidence on the question of malice and damages. ... If the plaintiff can give in evidence the lan- guage published or uttered subsequently to the commencement of the action for the purpose of aggravating damages, it seems quite reasonable that the defendant ought to be permitted to give in evidence a fair and honest retraction of the charges promptly made subsequently to the commencement of the action in mitigation of damages." 23 In California a similar rule pre- 22 Storey v. Wallace, 60 111. 51; Davis v. Marxliauseu (Mich.), 61 N. W. 504; Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill (ST. Y.), 510. 23 Gray v. Times Newspaper Co., 74 Minn. 452; 77 N. W. 204. See Alliger v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 2 482 Silv. S. C. (N. Y.) 5; 6 N. Y. Supp. 110. 24 Turton v. New York Recorder Co.> 144 N. Y. 144; 63 N. Y. St. R. 69; 38 N.E. 1009,affg3Misc. (N.Y.)314;52 N. Y. St. R. 39S; 22 N. Y. Supp. 766. 2 » Per Earl, J. LIBEL AMi SLANDER. § 421 vails,* but in Michigan it has been bel 1 that a retraction of a published after the commencement of an action therefor cannot be considered in mitigation. 2 ' In this rase, however, it appeared that the retraction was not made promptly but that considerable time elapsed after the commencement of the suit. While a re- traction subsequently to the commencement of the action may, under certain circumstances, be considered by the jury in re- duction of damages, yet a mere (titer to retract at such time cannot/* So an offer made under stress of an impending suit to publish an interview with a person libeled, or a letter from him, is not a retraction which will operate to mitigate the damages.-"' Again, it is no justification nor a fact to be considered in mitiga- tion of damages, that the person concerning whom a libel is pub- lished did not go to the publisher and ask him to retract the same.*' The Illinois act of 1895 ::1 which provided that where a libel was published in good faith and retracted, the plaintiff should be limited in his recovery to his actual damages, is con- strued as applying only to the publishers of newspapers. 32 § 421. Exemplary damages — How affected by rules of ab- sent proprietor of newspaper as to investigation. — The fat that the proprietor of a newspaper, who is himself absent from the place of publication and who has placed the general man- agement of such paper in the hands of others, has made a rule that no article reflecting upon any person or corporation shall be published until after strict investigation the truth of the matter shall have been established, does not of itself relieve such absent owner from liability for punitive damages for the publication of a libelous article, for though he may have made such a rule, yet if it appear that the article was carelessly or recklessly published. * Turner v. Hearst, 115 Cat. 304; 47 Pac. 129. 27 Evening News Assoc, v. Tryon, 12 Midi. 549; 30 Am. Rep. 450. 28 Tuvton v. New York Recorder Co., 144 N. Y. 144; 52 N. Y. St. R. 398; 22 N. Y. Supp. 766, aff'g8 Misc. 314; 52 X. V. St. R. 398; 22 X. V. Supp. 766. 29 Evening Post Pub. Co. v. Voight (C. C. App. 2d 0.), 72 Fed. 885; 38 U. S. App. 394; Constitution Pub. Co. v. Way, Dl Ga. 120; 21 S. E. 139. 30 Times Pub. Co. v. Carlisle (C. C. App. 8th C), 94 Fed. 762; 36 C. C. A. 475; 10 Am. & Eug. Corp. Cas. N. S. 033. « Act June 24, 1895; Laws, 1895, p. 315. 82 Prussing v. Jackson, 85 111. App. 324. 483 § 422 LIBEL AND SLANDER. such damages may be recovered." 1 Rules of such a character will not relieve the publisher from liability for exemplary dam- ages unless it be shown that they are enforced. 31 In a case in the Federal courts, where this question arose, it was claimed that exemplary damages could not be recovered from an absent owner where he had made a rule that communications of a personal nature sent by unknown correspondents must be verified by an investigation by an accredited correspondent, and when thus verified might be published. In this case it was held that the existence of such a rule did not, as a matter of law, free the pub- lisher from liability, but that it was a question for the jury whether such a rule showed a reckless indifference to the rights of others, and that if they found it did so show, exemplary dam- ages might be awarded, and a verdict for plaintiff was sustained, the court declaring that the jury probably found the rule inade- quate to meet the imperative demands of prudence and caution which investigation demands. And it was also said that if such a rule could protect an absent publisher from the recovery of exemplary damages in an action for libel, the principle of law which permits of the recovery of such damages in cases of careless or reckless indifference to injury to others, could be easily evaded.* In this case it was also held that the testimony of the city editor of the paper as to his belief in the thoroughness of an investigation made by an accredited correspondent to whom the article in question was referred, was properly stricken out as the o-ood faith or malice of the city editor was not in issue and the question of punitive damages turned entirely on the negligence of the defendant/* § 422. Evidence as to bad character and reputation of plaintiff. — In an action for libel and slander, evidence is not only admissible as to the bad character of the plaintiff in the 33 Morgan v. Bennett, 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 323; 60 N. Y. Supp. 619; Mc- Mahon v. Bennett, 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 16; 52 N. Y. Supp. 390. 84 Morgan v. Bennett, 44 App. Div. (N. Y.) 323; 60 N. Y. Supp. 619; Mc- Mahon v. Bennett, 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 16; 52 N. Y. Supp. 390. 484 ^Bennett v. Salisbury (C.C App. 2dC), 78 Fed. 769; 45 U. S. App. 636. se Bennett v. Salisbury (C. C. App. 2d C. ), 78 Fed. 769; 24 C. C. A. 329- 45 U. S. App. 636. LIBEL ANH SLANDER. 5 122 trait involved in the alleged slanderous or libelous statements,* 1 hut ;ilso as a general rule evidence as to the general bad char- acter of the plaintiff is in most jurisdictions admissible, as in the majority of the cases libelous <>r slanderous statements affect the character of the person against whom they are directed, and where the general character of a person concerning whom such charges are made is had, the damages awarded him should not be the same as if the charges were made concerning a person against whose character no improper charges had ever been made. 88 And under the general issue or general denial evidence is admissible in mitigation of damages as to the general bad character of the plaintiff in tliose cases where the plaintiff claims damages for a libel or slander which contain charges involving his character.* So where a newspaper published an article stat- ing of a certain person that he had ''made his name notorious and hated," defendant was permitted to show in an action for libel, the general reputation of the plaintiff in the community in which he lived. 1 " And in such cases the evidence need not be 87 Treaty. Browning, 4 Cj>. Div. (X. Y.) 503; 62 X. Y. Supp. 434. 485 § 4-J-") LIBEL AND SLANDER. restricted to the particular charges contained in the alleged libel or slander, but evidence of the general reputation of the plaintiff either as a man of moral worth or in the particular relation is admissible. 41 As bearing upon the actual damages recoverable, evidence is admissible of the reputation and character of the plaintiff prior to the time when the alleged libel or slander was published. 42 So the plaintiff in such an action may be cross- examined as to his reputation and character prior to the time when the alleged libel or slander was published, as tending to show his credibility as a witness.* 3 And again in an action to recover for the publication of a charge that plaintiff kept a dis- orderly house, the defendant may show not only the general reputation of inmates and frequenters of such house, but evi- dence is also admissible of specific acts of lewdness and immo- rality on the part of the plaintiff. 44 So also in an action for libel for publishing a statement of the plaintiff that he had " run " the only house of prostitution in the place, the defendant ma} r show in mitigation of damages that the plaintiff became a surety on the bond of the inmates of such house, and also on the bond of the proprietress, whom the evidence tends to prove was his kept mistress.* 5 And in a similar action for the publication of a state- ment that the plaintiff had been indicted several times for main- taining a gambling house, evidence is admissible showing that the plaintiff is a gambler and permits gambling in a house owned and controlled by him. 46 § 423. Evidence as to bad character and reputation of plaintiff — Continued. — In those cases where the action is to recover for an attack made upon the chastity of a female plain- tiff, the jury may properly consider in mitigation of damages the fact that her reputation in this respect was bad prior to the statements made in reference thereto by the defendant, since a «Sickra v. Small, 87 Me. 493; 33 (N. Y.) 63; 72 N. Y. St. R. 41; 36 N. Atl. 9; 47 Am. St. Rep. 344. See also cases cited in first two notes in this section. ^Bernstein v. Singer, 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 63; 72 N. Y.' St. R. 41; 36 X. Y. Supp. 1093. 43 Bernstein v. Singer, 1 App. Div. 486 Y. Supp. 1093. "Lampher v. Clark, 149 N. Y. 472; 44 N. E. 182. 45 Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240; 21 So. 109; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 127. 46 George Kuapp & Co. v. Campbell, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 199; 36 S. W. 765. LIBEL AND SLANDER. i 123 woman whose reputation for chastity is bad cannot suffer the same damages fur statements reflecting upon her chastity as a woman of good reputation would, and a refusal by the court to so instruct the jury is error." So where an action is brought for calling a married woman a whore, the defendant may show thai she has been guilty of acts of adultery, both before and subse- quent to the time of speaking of her in such terms. 1 So. also. in an action to recover damages for the publication of a state- ment which charged the plaintiff with political perjury and which declared that lie would lie to defend himself against such charges, the defendant may prove the general reputation of the plaintiff for truth and veracity, and that his word in political matters was generally regarded by the community as unworthy of belief. 49 And again, in an action for libel, the defendant may show that the plaintiff is by general reputation a common li- beler. 50 While as a general rule the defendant may, in mitigation of damages, prove the general had character of the plaintiff, and may in certain cases give specific instances of immorality on the plaintiff's part, yet the defendant cannot show in mitigation of damages for a specific libel other and disconnected immoralities on the plaintiff's part. 51 So evidence is not admissible that the plaintiff has been guilty of a specific crime which is in no way connected with the defamatory words. 5 - And in an action for slander for charging the plaintiff with drunkenness, where the answer contains a plea of justification, evidence of acts of drunk- enness which did not occur within the period covered by the plea are not admissible in support thereof. 53 So in an action for slander for charging the plaintiff with robbing the defend- "Nellisv. Cramer, 86 Wis. 337; 56 N. W. 911. In this case an error in refusing to so instinct was held cot to be cured by an instruction that ■ the jury should consider the general reputation of the plaintiff tor chas- tity, her social standing among her friends and acquaintances and the public generally, and the mental suffering she experienced as a result of the publication of the article in question. See Smith v. Matthews, 21 Misc. (N. Y.) 150; 47 X. Y. Supp. 96. 48 Claypool v. Claypool, 65 111. A pp. 446. 43 Sanford v. Rowley, 93 Mich. 119; 52 X. W. lllli. Mavnaid v. Beardsley, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 560. But see Gould v. Weed, 12 Wend. (X. Y.) 12. i Holmes v. Jones. 147 X. V. 59; 69 V. V. St. K. 310; -11 N. E, 409. 69 Fisher v. The, ■_'(> Iowa. 47'.'. See Fisher v. Patterson. 14 Ohio, 418. 63 S\van v. Thompson, 124 Cal. 193; 56 Pac. 878. 487 § 424 LIREL AND SLANDER. ant evidence is not admissible under a general denial that the plaintiff had misappropriated certain money. 51 And where the defendant in his answer has pleaded the truth of the charge that the plaintiff was a liar, he cannot testify in support of such plea that he conversed with certain neighbors of the plaintiff, and that he was in formed by them that plaintiff's reputation was bad.. 55 So, also, if the defendant has certain evidence of plaintiff, excluded on the ground that no attack was made by him upon the social standing or the character of the plaintiff, he is thereby estopped from subsequently introducing any evidence as to the social position, standing or character of the plaintiff, for the purpose of mitigating the damages. 56 § 424. Allegation of two libelous charges— Only one sub- mitted to jury— Proof of other charge in mitigation — Where an action is brought to recover for the alleged libelous publica- tion of two charges which relate to the same transaction and subject-matter, and are not disconnected and independent, and the plaintiff, though he alleges both charges in his complaint, only submits one of them to the jury, and the other charge was justified in the answer, the defendant may, under certain cir- cumstances, give evidence in substantiation of such other charge which may go in mitigation of damages on the charge submitted to the jury. 57 64 Clarke v. Fox, 10 App. Div. 514; 41 N. Y. Supp. 1091. « Mitchell v. Spradley, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 43; 56 S. W. 134. 66 Smith v. Sun Pub. Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y.), 50 Fed. 399. 57 Holmes v. Jones, 147 N". Y. 59; 69 N. Y. St. R. 310; 41 N. E. 409. In this case it appeared that the plain- tiff, who had rendered services as an undertaker, in connection with the death of General Grant, had, by a letter to a newspaper, provoked a public discussion as to the non- payment of his bill by General Grant's family, and that the defend- ant newspaper, in the present action, had published an article in reference 488 thereto, stating that the bill was ex- tortionate, and that the defendant was intoxicated at the time the ser- vices were rendered. The charge of extortion w;is justified on the first trial. On the second trial, though alleging both charges in his com- plaint, only submitted the charge as to intoxication to the jury. Evi- dence by the defendant showing that the charge of extortion was offered for the purpose of mitigating dam- ages on the charge of intoxication, but was excluded. On appeal, the exclusion of this evidence was held to be error. The court said: "The two charges were made in respect to the same subject-matter. They re- LIBEL AND SLANDER. § 125 § 425. Evidence in behalf of plaintiff as to his social por- tion— Renntal ion Financial condition. -- In an action for slan- der or libel, evidence is admissible as to the position in Hi the plaintiff and his social standing as bearing on the extent of his injury.* But he should not be permitted to introduce- evi- dence of his character or reputation, where it is not a material issue or has not been attached, since it is unnecessary to prove that which the law assumes, and the character of the plaintiff in such a case is not a basis for the recovery of general damages. ' If, however, the libelous or slanderous charge directly affects the character of the person, as in the case of a charge against his integrity, and evidence has been offered to sustain such charge, he may show his general reputation and character fol- iated to the same transaction, and the plaintiff makes no denial of the main matter in which the calumny originated, namely, the extortionate and unjust bill, but does deny the truth of one of the incidents of his conduct alleged in the article. He comes claiming damages for injury to his character. It is well settled that defendant cannot show in miti- gation of damages for a specific libel, other and disconnected immorali- ties, but can attack only the plain- tiff's general character. But the charges in the article were not dis- connected and independent in any proper sense, and we think it plain in reason that the plaintiff ought not in justice to recover punitive dam- ages for a misstatement in the arti- cle as to his intoxication, if it ap- peared that his conduct in other matters in the transaction to which the charge related had been repre- hensible, and when he himself had provoked public discussion. The conduct of both parties in the whole matter should have been permitted to be shown so as to aid the jury in determining the extent of the dam- ages to be awarded." Per Andrews, Ch. J. 68 Klumph v. Dunn, 8G Pa. St. 141; 5 Am. Rep. 355. See also Hosley v. Brooks, 20 111. 115; Wilson v. Shepler, S6 Ind. 275; Larned v. Buffington, 3 Mass. 54G; Clements v. Maloney, 55 Mo. 352; Fenstermaker v. Tribune Pub. Co., 13 Utah, 532; 35 L. R. A. 611;45Pac. 1097; Harman v. Cundiff, S2 Va. 239. In Bnos v. Enos, 135 N. Y. 609; 48 N. Y St. R. 392; 32 N. E. 123, which was an action to recover damages for a slanderous statement imputing unchastity to a female, evidence that the plaintiff had :i family of young children was de- clared admissible on the question of damages. But see Prescott v. Toncey, 18 J. & S. i X. Y.) 1. i9 Stafford v. Morning Journal Assoc, 142 X. V. 598; 37 N. E. 625; 60 X. Y. St. R. 309; Houghtaling v. Kilderhouse. 1 X. V. 530, aff'd 2 Barb. 149; Blakeslee v. Hughes, 50 Ohio St. 490; 31 X. E. 793; 30 Ohio L. J. 248: Chubb v. Grell, 34 Pa. St. 115. But see Bennett v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 24; Nettles v. Somervell, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 627: 25 S. W. 058. 489 § 426 LIBEL AND SLANDER. integrity." So where a person is charged with stealing, and under a plea of justification defendant has attempted to show that his general reputation as a law-abiding citizen is bad, he may introduce evidence showing that his general reputation for honesty and integrity is good. 61 And where a slanderous state- ment had been made imputing unchastity to a woman, and in an action therefor evidence had been introduced tending to show that she had intercourse with her husband before marriage, that she made an indecent exposure of her person, and that she other- wise conducted herself in a licentious manner, she was permitted to show that her general reputation for chastity was good. 63 And if the plaintiff in such an action alleges that his character and reputation are good, and the defendant puts such allegation in issue by his answer, the plaintiff will thus be permitted to intro- duce evidence to sustain his allegations. 613 While evidence is generally held to be admissible as to the wealth of the defend- ant, yet on the other hand evidence is not admissible as to the pecuniary condition of the plaintiff, for the purpose of enhancing the damages, 64 although it is declared that it may be admis- sible to show actual damage. 65 § 426. Evidence to show sense in which words were spoken — To whom applicable. — -In an action for slander to recover for words not actionable per se and which were per- haps ambiguous, evidence is admissible as to the understanding of hearers or bystanders as to the sense in which they under- stood such words to be used. 66 If, however, the language used is plain and direct such evidence is not admissible. 67 Again, in 60 Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam (C. C. App. 6th C), 59 Fed. 530; 8 C. C. A. 201. 61 Balcom v. Michels, 49 111. App. 379. 62 Sheeny v. Cokley, 43 Iowa, 183; 22 Am. Rep. 239. 63 Stafford v. Morning Journal Assoc., 142 N. Y. 598; 37 N. E. 625; 60 N. Y. St. R. 309. 64 Reeves v. Winn, 97 N. C. 246; 1 S. E. 448; 2 Am. St. Rep. 287. See also Case v. Marks, 20 Conn. 248. 490 65 Reeves v. Winn, 97 N. C. 246; 1 S. E. 448; 2 Am. St. Rep. 287. 66 Nolte v. Herter, 65 111. App. 430; Lewis v. Humphreys, 64 Mo. App. 466; 2 Mo. App. Rep. 1011; Knapp v. Fuller, 55 Yt. 311; 45 Am. Rep. 618. See Fawsett v. Clark, 48 Md. 494; 30 Am. Rep. 481. 67 Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss. 710; 5 Am. Rep. 514. See Beardsley v. Maynard, 4 Wend. (N. Y.)336; Gould v. Weed, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 12. LIBEL AMi SLANDER. § 427 an action for libel, though the name of the plaintiff may not be mentioned in the article complained of, lie may show by wit- nesses who were familiar with the relations existing between the parties, both immediately prior to and at the time of the publication, that when they read the publication they understood the plaintiff to be the person referred to therein. 1 '' But the de- fendant in an action for slander should not be allowed to state what the party to whom the slander is alleged to be uttered, understood by his statements to him, though he may testify that lie told such party the source of his information and what it was.'" In an action to recover for a publication libelous per se, the plaintiff may, by extrinsic evidence, show that the libelous words were published concerning him. So in an action 1>\ a lawyer to recover for such a publication he may, by such evi- dence, connect the libelous words with his professional character, and where such connection is shown, the natural and proximate damages resulting to him in his profession may be recovered.'" And in such an action a witness may be permitted to testify as to whom he understood the alleged libelous publication applied. 71 § 427. Actions against mercantile agencies. — Where in- formation is furnished by a mercantile agency to a subscriber in response to an inquiry by him, and such information is given in good faith, on the authority of one apparently well qualified to give it, and there is no reason to doubt its correctness, the fact that such information is false will not render the agency liable for damages in an action for libel. 72 But if false and unfounded communications are negligently circulated by a commercial agency concerning the business standing of a certain person, as a natural result of which the latter sustains special damage, such agency will be liable therefor though it acted innocently 68 Russell v. Kelly, 44 Cal. 641; 13 Am. Rep. 169. «»Scullin v. Harper (C. C. App. 7th ('.), 78 Fed. 460; 4(5 U. S. App. 673; 24 C. C. A. 169. "" Sanderson v. Caldwell, 45 N. V. 398: 6 Am. Rep. 105. 71 Enquirer Co. v. Johnston (C. C. App. 7th ('.). 72 Fed. 443; 18 C. C. A. 628; 34 U. S. App. 607. 72 Robinson v. Dun, 24 Ont. Rep. 287. See Ormsby v. Douglass, 31 -V Y. 177: Bradatreet Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115; 2 L. R. A. 405. As to privilege of mercantile agencies, see notes 2 L. R. A. 405; 9 L. R. A. 86, 103; 20 L. R. A. 138; 49 L. R. A. 614. •491 § 428 LIBEL AND SLANDER. and no malice existed.''' And where a mercantile agency vol- untarily sends out a false statement to all its customers whether creditors of a certain firm or not, that such firm has assigned and refuses to retract such statement upon request, the state- ment will not be considered a privileged one, and the agency will be liable for the damages sustained as a natural result thereof. 74 Though the person concerning whom an erroneous report has been made by a mercantile agency stating that an action has been commenced against him may be negligent in not taking reasonable steps to have the error corrected, yet such negligence will not prevent the recovery by him of such dam- ages as he sustained as the result of the false publication prior to his own negligence. 75 But the publication by a mercantile agency that an action has been commenced against a certain person though it may be false is not actionable per se, and in order to support an action for libel thereon special damages must be shown 76 § 428. Slander of title. — In an action for slander of title, the plaintiff must show both the falsity of the words and that they were uttered with malicious intent. 77 Malice may, however, in some cases be inferred, as where the language used by the de- fendant was known by him to be false and was uttered with in- tent to injure. 78 In such an action only such damages as are the natural and direct results of the words used can be recovered. 7 * And where special damages are claimed by the plaintiff, they must be alleged in the complaint, and the proof confined to the losses alleged therein. So where the plaintiff alleges special damages from the loss of sale of property, as the result of false and ma- 73 Bradstreet Co. v. Oswald, 96 Ga. 39G ; 23 S. E. 423. See Brown v. Durham (Tex. Civ. App.), 22 S. W. 868. 74 Mitchell v. Bradstreet Co., 116 Mo. 244; 20 L. R. A. 138; 22 S. W. 358. 75 Giacona v. Bradstreet Co., 48 La. Ann. 1191; 20 So. 706. 76 Giacona v. Bradstreet Co., 48 La. Ann. 1191; 20 So. 706. 77 Hill v. Ward, 13 Ala. 310; Mc- \ N. Y. 14 492 Daniel v. Baca, 2 Cal. 329; Graham v.Reno (Colo. App.), 38 Pac. 835; May v. Anderson, 14 Ind. App. 251; 42 N. E. 946; Cardon v. McConnell, 120 N. C. 461; 27 S. E. 109; Pater v. Baker, 3 C. B. 869. 78 Hopkins v. Drowne, 21 R. I. (parti) 82; 41 Atl. 567. ™ Burkett v. Griffith, 90 Cal. 532; 13 L. R. A. 707; 27 Pac. 527; 25 Am. St. Rep. 151. See Kendall v. Stone, 5 LIBEL AND SLANDER. § 42^ licious statements concerning such property published by the defendant, evidence is not admissible of the value of such prop- erty for exhibition or as a scientific curiosity.* sooott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235; 2o Am. Kep. 322. 493 §429 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. CHAPTER XVIII. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. § 429. Malicious prosecution — Gen- erally. 430. Malice and want of probable cause must both exist. 431. Malice — Wbat amounts to — May be inferred. 432. Probable cause — Wbat is. 433. Conviction in criminal prose- cution — Evidence of proba- ble cause. 434. Probable cause — Burden of proof — Evidence. 435. Acquittal in criminal prose- cution — Evidence of want of probable cause. 436. Measure of damages — Gener- ally. 437. Measure of damages — Gener- ally—Continued. 438. Mental suffering. 439. Evidence in mitigation of damages. 440. Advice of attorney. 441. Advice of prosecuting attor- ney, magistrate, etc. 442. Exemplary damages. 443. Wealtb of defendant— Evi- dence — Generally. 444. Malicious prosecution of civil suit — Attachment. 445. Malicious attachment— Where business unlawful no re- covery for injury to. 446. Maliciously causing person to lose employment. 447. Pleading. § 429. Malicious prosecution — Generally. — Malicious pros- ecution is the setting in motion of the machinery of the law against a person, without probable cause and with malice. The nature of the action is closely allied to that for false imprison- ment, since arrest and false imprisonment is frequently a result of malicious prosecution, but malicious prosecution does not always include false imprisonment. The elements of damage in an action for malicious prosecution are declared in an early case l to be as follows : 1 . Damages to a man's fame, as in the case of a scandalous accusation. 2. Injuries to a person such as danger of losing life, limb or liberty. 3. Damages to a man's property as where he is accused of crime and is obliged to expend monev in order to acquit himself. This classification has gen- erally been accepted as the basis for the award of damages in an action for malicious prosecution, and the various items which 1 Saville v. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 374. 494 MALICIOUS PR( 'Si. i i l [ON. § 430 the jury may properly consider in estimating the damages recov- erable are included therein. §430. Malice and want of probable cause must both exist. — In an action to recover for a malicious prosecution, it is nec- essary in order to maintain the action that both malice and want of probable cause exist. J So a mere arrest, though without legal authority, Is not a sufficient ground to support such an a in the absence of want of probable cause or malice. 1 Nor in the absence of such elements is the bringing of a multiplicity of suits sufficient to authorize the recovery of damages. 1 So one who in good faith procures the arrest of another is not liable to damages for malicious prosecution/' But where a person exe- cutes a dispossess warrant against another who has entered as the tenant of a prior owner, and both malice and want of prob- able cause exist, he is responsible for the damages caused by such act.' 1 Since it is essential to the support of an action that 2 Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers Union, etc., Co., 120 I'. S. 141; 1 Russell & Winslow's Syllabus Dig. U. S. Rep. 1001; .Jones v. Jones, 71 Cal. 89; 11 Pac. 817; Spitzer v. Friedlander, 14 App. D. C. 550; Sea- mans v. Hoge, 105 Ga. 159; 31 S. E. 156; Smith v. Michigan Buggy Co., 66 111. App. 516; Wright v. Ilayter. 5 Kan. App. 638; 47 Pac. 540: An- derson v. Columbia Finance & T. Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 790; 50 S. W. 740; Moore v. Large, 20 Ky. Law Rep. 409; 46 S. W. 508; McCorniick v. Con- way, 12 La. Ann. 53; McXulty v. Walker, 64 Miss. 19S; 1 So. 55; Tal- bott v. Great Western Plaster Co., 86 Mo. App. 558; Strieker v. Penn. K. R. Co., 60 X. J. L. 230; 37 Atl. 776: 7 Am. & Eng. R. (as. N. S. 758; McGowan v. McGowan, 122 N. C. 145; 29 S. E. 97: Kolka v. Jones, 6 N. D. 401; 71 \. W. 558; Schon dorf v. Griffith, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. 580; Auer v. Mauser. 6 l'a. Super. Ct. 61S; 42 Wkly. V & C. 40; Fry v. Wolf, 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 468: 43 Wkly. N. & C. 124; 29 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 200; Rutfner v. Hooks, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 278; 38 Wkly. N. C. 516; 27 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 86: Baker v. Hornik, 57 S. C. 213; 35 N. E. 524; Graham v. Fi- delity Mut. L. Asso., 98 Tenn. 48; 37 S. W. 995; Tavenner v. More- head, 41 W. Va. 116; 23 S. E. 673. See Magowan v. Rickey ( N. J.), 45 Atl. 804. In an action to recover for the malicious prosecution of a civil suit, it has been held that such action will lie though such suit, was prosecuted without probable cause, but it is also declared that such suits are not encouraged. Clements \. Odorless Excavating Co., 07 Md. 461; 10 Atl. 412; 8 Cent. 900. 3 Tavenner v. Morehead. 41 W. Ya. 110; 23 S. E. 673. 4 Otis v. Sweeney, 48 La. Ann. 940: 20 So. 229. Crimes v. Miller, 23 Ont. App. 704. ■ Porter v. Johnson, 99 Ga. 275; 25 S. E. 631. 495 §431 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. both malice and want of probable cause must exist, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff in this class of cases to establish the existence of such elements.' So in an action to recover for the malicious suing out of a writ of attachment, the existence of malice and want of probable cause must be affirmatively shown by the plaintiff. 8 But in an action to recover for malicious prosecution, it is not necessary to show that the defendant acted maliciously and without probable cause, both in the commence- ment and continuance of the prosecution, but the existence of such elements either in the commencement or the continuance of the action is sufficient. 9 In the absence, however, of evidence show- ing malice, though want of probable cause may be proved, a verdict may properly be directed for the defendant. 10 §431. Malice — What amounts to — May be inferred. — Where a person seeks to recover for malicious prosecution the malice which is necessary to support the action is declared to mean the evil mind, which is regardless of social duty and the rights of others. 11 Malice of this character may be inferred by the jury from want of probable cause, though such inference does not necessarily arise therefrom. 12 And the inference of malice arising from want of probable cause is one of fact for the jury to 7 Scheldrup v. Farwell Co., 67 111. App. 630; Taylor v. Baltimore & O. S. W. K. Co., 18 Ind. App. 692; 48 N. E. 1044: Wright v. Hayter, 5 Kan. App. 638; 47 Pac. 546; Ander- son v. Columbia Finance & T. Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1790; 50 S. .W. 40; Warren v. Dennett, 17 Misc. (N. Y.) 86; 39 N. Y. Supp. 830; Hilbrant v. Donaldson, 69 Mo. App. 92. 8 Anderson v. Columbia Finance & T. Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1790; 50 S. W. 40. 9 Hilbrant v. Donaldson, 69 Mo. App. 92. 10 Hatjie v. Hare, 68 Vt. 247; 35 Atl. 54. 11 Graham v. Fidelity Mut. L. Assoc, 98 Tenn. 48; 37 S. W. 995. See Noble v. White,, 103 Iowa, 352; 72 N. W. 556. 496 12 Foster v. Pitts, 63 Ark. 387; 38 S. W. 1114; Harpham v. Whitney, 77 111. 32; Paddock v. Watts, 116 Ind. 146; Parker v. Parker, 102 Iowa, 500; 71 N. W. 421; Markly v. Kirby, 6 Kan. App. 494; 50 Pac. 953; Wright v. Hayter, 5 Kan. App. 638; 47 Pac. 546; Anderson v. Columbia Finance & T. Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1790; 50 S. W. 40; Decoux v. Lieux, 33 La. Ann. 392; Straus v. Young, 36 Md. 246; Carson v. Edgworth, 43 Mich. 241; Limbeck v. Gerry, 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 663; 39 N. Y. Supp. 95; Kolka v. Jones, 6 N. D. 461; 71 N. W. 558; Fry v. Wolf, 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 4G8; 29 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 200; 43 W. N. C. 124; Auer v. Mauser, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 618; 42 W. N. C. 40; Richardson v. Dybedahl (S. D. 1900), 84 N. W. 486; Gra- MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. | t32 determine and is not one of law." Malice may, however, in some cases, exist as a matter of law. So where the defendant, after the dismissal of an action by his immediate vendors against the plaintiff, which involved the hitter's right to land and the timber thereon, caused the arrest of the plaintiff on the charge of feloneously cutting and removing timber from such land, it was held that the malice essential to support an action for mali- cious prosecution existed as a matter of law." Again, malice may exist though the defendant believe the charge he makes to be true, and a failure to so instruct the jury, though no request for such instruction is made, is error. 1 ' § 432. Probable cause— What is. — Probable cause, in an action for malicious prosecution which will constitute a defense to such action, is such a state of facts and circumstances as would lead an ordinarily prudent and cautious man. acting reasonably, conscientiously and without prejudice upon the same facts to believe that the person accused is guilty."' While from ham v. Fidelity Mut. L. Asso., 98 Tenn. 48; 37 S. W. 993; Jacobs v. Crura, 62 Tex. 401; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Griffin, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 91 ; 48 S. W. 542; Viual v. Core, 18 W. Va. 1. w Thompson v. Bell, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 1; 32 S. W. 142. See cases in preceding note. m Proctor Coal Co. v. Moses, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 419; 40 S. W. 681. See Clement v. Major, 8 Colo. App. 86; 44 Pac. 776. 15 Hawkins v. Snow, 28 N. S. 259. 16 Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How. (U. S.) 544: Ilitson v. Sims (Ark. 1901), 64 S. W. 219; Clement v. Major, 8 Colo. App. 86; It Pac. 766; Knicker- bocker Ice Co. v. Scott. 7t; 111. App. 645; Chic Forge & B. Co. v. Rose, 69 111. App. 123; 29 Chic. Leg. News, 239; 2 Chic. L. .1. Wkly. 207; Ford v. Buckley, 68 111. App. 447; Lacey v. Mitchell, 23 lud. 67: Moore v. Large, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 409; 46 S. W. 508: Decoux v. Lieux, 33 La. Ann. 392; 32 Fitzgibbon v. Brown, 43 Me. 169; Wilson v. liowen, 64 Mich. 133; Ellis v. Simonds, 168 Mass. 316; 47 X. E. 116; Smith v. .Munch, 65 Minn. 256; 68 X. W. 19; Xoleu v. Kaufman, 70 Mo. App. 651; Wist' v. McNichols, 63 Mo. App. 141; Hagelund v. Murphy, 54 Neb. 545; 74 X. W. 956; Fry v. Kaessuer, 48 Neb. 133; 66 X. W. 1126; Strieker v. Penn. R. Co., 60 X. J. L. 230; 37 Atl. 776; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 758; Hodges v. Richards, 30 App. Div. (X. Y.) 158; 51 X. Y. Supp. 869; Carl v. Ayers, 53 X. Y. 17; Root \. Rose, 6 N. D. 575; 72 X. W. 10-2: 2 chic. L. J. Wkly. 664; Milesv. Salisbury. 21 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 333; 12 C. C. D. 7; Ash v. Mar- low, 20 Ohio St. 119; Hess v. Ore- gon German Bkg. Co., 31 Oreg. 503; 49 Pac. 803; Ritter v. Ewing, 174 Pa. St. 341; 34 Atl. 584; Graham v. Fidelity Mut. L. Assoc. 98 Tenn. 18; 37 S. W. 995; Ban-on v. Mason, 31 Vt. 197: Billingsley v. Maas, 93 Wis. 17C: 67 N. W. 49;Spearv. Riles, 497 §433 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. want of probable cause an inference of malice may in some cases arise, yet want of probable cause cannot be implied from malice. 17 § 433. Conviction in criminal prosecution — Evidence of probable cause. — While an acquittal is prima facie evidence of want of probable cause, a conviction on the other hand is conclu- sive evidence that there was probable cause for commencing and continuing the prosecution and will relieve the defendant in an action for malicious prosecution from liability therefor. 18 And this is declared to be the effect of evidence showing a convic- tion in the criminal action, even though such conviction may be reversed on writ of error. 19 And it is said that where a decision of a court is interposed as conclusive evidence of probable cause, no inquiry can be made into the honesty of such decision. 20 But in another case it is held that a conviction in a criminal action raises a presumption of probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution, which may be rebutted by proof of facts depriving the conviction of any probative effect.^ 1 Again, an indictment 67 Wis. 330; Hicks v. Faulkner, 8 Q. B. Div. 167. In the foregoing case, facts have been considered as showing probable cause. See fol- lowing cases where on various facts the question of whether probable cause existed or not is considered : Carl Corper Brew. & M. Co. v. Min- wegen & W. Mfg. Co., 77 111. App. 213; Lancaster v. Langston, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 299; 36 S. W. 521; Call v. Hays, 169 Mass. 586; 48 X. E. 777; Eagleton v. Kabrich, 66 Mo. App. 231 ; Hamilton v. Davey, 28 App. Div. (N. Y.) 457; 51 N. Y. Supp. 88; Fran- cis v. Tilyon, 26 App. Div. (N. Y.) 340; 49 N. Y. Supp. 799; Siefke v. Siefke, 6 App. Div. (N. Y.) 472; 39 N. Y. Supp. 601; Durham v. Jones, 119 N. C. 262; 25 S. E. 873; Kolka v. Jones, 6 N. D. 461; 71 N. W. 558; Britton v. Granger, 13 Ohio C. C. 281; 7 Ohio Dec. 182; Ruffner v. Hooks, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 278; 27 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 86; 38 W. N. C. 516; Wuestv. 498 American Tobacco Co., 10 S. D. 394; 73 N. W. 903; Johnston v. Meaghr, 14 Utah, 426; 47 Pac. 861; Strehlow v. Pettit, 96 Wis. 22; 71 N. W. 102; Charlebois v. Surveyor, 27 Can. S. C. 556. "Brown v. Smith, 83 111. 291; Auer v. Mauser, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 618; 42 Wkly. N. C. 40; Graham v. Fidelity Mut. L. Assoc, 98 Tenn. 48; 37 S. W. 995. 18 Morrow v. Wheeler & W. Mfg. Co., 165 Mass. 349; 43 N. E. 105. "Hartshorne v. Smith, 104 Ga. 235; 30 S. E. 666. SeeNeherv. Dobbs, 47 Neb. 863; 66 N. W. 864. 20 Root v. Rose, 6 N. D. 575; 72 N. W. 1022; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 664. 2i Neher v. Dobbs, 47 Neb. 863; 66 N. W. 864, where it was held that evidence was admissible showing that the convicting court acted under a misapprehension of the law appli- cable to the facts of the case. MALICIOUS PROSE4 I'TION. § t:;i or the commitment of the accused by an examining magistrate is prima facie evidence of probable cause.- § 434. Probable cause— Burden of proof -Evidence. — As we have stated elsewhere an action for malicious prosecution can- not be maintained in the absence of proof of want of probable cause. And want of probable cause cannot be implied.'-' 1 Il must be expressly and substantially proved and the burden of proof to establish it is upon the plaintiff. 8 The question of probable cause in an action of this character, where the facts are not in dispute, is for the court to decide as one of law. " And a judgment of the court upon this point in favor of the plaintiff is generally considered as conclusive proof of prob- able cause unless it appear that such judgment was obtained by means of fraud, 2 * though it may subsequently be reversed by an appellate court. Again, facts tending to show that the plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution was guilty of the crime charged in the criminal prosecution are declared to be admis- - Sharpe v. Johnston, 76 Mo. 660. •"Vinson v. Flynn, 64 Ark. 453; 39 L. K. A. 415; 43 S. W. 146; 4ti S. W. 186; Petry v. Schillo, 61 111. App. 236. 24 Graham v. Fidelity Mut. L. Assoc. 9S Tom. 48; 37 S. W. 995. ^Spitzer v. Friedlander, 14 App. D. C. 556; 27 Wash. L. Rep. 368: Ep- stein v. Berkowski, 64 111. App. 498; 1 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 309; Skala v. Bus, 60 111. App. 479; Paddock v. Watts, 116 hid. 146; Lancaster v. Langston, IS Ky. L. Rep. 299; 36 S. W. 521 ; Girot v. Graham, 41 La. Ann. 511; Black v. Buckingham, 174 Mass. 102; 54 X. E. 494; Keating v. litis. 13 App. Div. (N. V.) 1; 43 X. V. Supp. 124; Welch v. Cheek. 115 N. C. 310; 20 S. E. 460; Mitchell v. Logan, 172 Pa. St. 349; 3:', At 1. 554; 26 Pitts. L. J. X.S. 392; 37 Wkly. N. C. 398; Graham v. Fidelity Mut. L. Assoc, 98 Tenn. 48; 37 S. W. 995; Hicks v. Faulkner. 8Q. B. Div. 167. But see Mann v. Cowan 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 30. In this case it appeared that the defendant had without process or warrant and without the advice of counsel placed plaintiff in the cus- tody of an officer, and that he was subsequently regularly arrested and discharged, and it was held that the burden of proof was on the defend- ant to show probable cause. 26 Roisterer v. Lee Sum (C. C. App. 2d C. ). 94 Fed. 343; 36 C. C. A. 285; Clement v. Major, s Colo. App. 86; 44 Pac. 776; At.hison, T. & s. V. Ry. Co. v. Smith. 44 Kan. I: 55 Pac. 272; Matlick v. Crump, 62 Mo. App. 21: 1 Mo. App.Rep. 712; Neher v. Dobbs, 47 Neb. 863; 66 X. W. 86 1 : Bell v. At- lantic City R. K. Co. ( N. .1.1, 33 Atl. 211; Sliipiuan v. Learn. 92 Hun (N. Y.i. 568; 72 X.Y. St. K. 73; 36 N. Y. Supp. 969; Mitchell v. Logan. 172 Pa. St. 349; 33 Ail. 554; 26 Pitts. L. J. X. S. 392; 37 Wkly. X. C. - Gyles v. Jefferis, 5 Pa. Dist. Pep. 129. But see Johnson v. HcDaniel, t Ohio Leg. News, .">:>: Billingsley v. Maas, 93 Wis. 176; 67 X. W. 49. 499 §§ 435, 436 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. sible, though unknown by the defendant at the time he insti- tuted such prosecution. 28 §435. Acquittal in criminal prosecution — Evidence of want of probable cause. — Where a criminal prosecution is vol- untarily dismissed or the defendant is acquitted, such dismissal or acquittal is not conclusive, but merely prima facie evidence of a want of probable cause,-" 9 which throws upon the defendant in an action for malicious prosecution the burden of showing that probable cause existed for his making the charge. 3 " So where the grand jury returns an indictment as " not a true bill," such action will cast upon the defendant the burden of proving that he had probable cause for the prosecution. 31 But where the complaint in a criminal prosecution is defective and the action is dismissed on that account, such dismissal is not an acquittal for the purpose of commencing an action for malicious prosecution. 32 The general rule that the acquittal of the de- fendant in a criminal action throws upon the defendant in a civil action for malicious prosecution the burden of showing probable cause, is not applicable where the plaintiff's own testimony shows its existence. 33 § 436. Measure of damages — Generally. — In an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff may recover damages for such injury as is the natural and direct result of the wrongful act, and he is not confined in his recovery to the loss which he has sustained up to the time of the trial, but evidence is also admis- sible as to any loss which it is reasonably certain will ensue in 27 Crescent City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers Union, etc.. Co., 120 U. S. 141; 1 Russell & Winslow's Syllabus Dig. U. S. Rep. 1001. 26 Thurber v. Eastern Bldg. & L. Assoc, 118 N. C. 129; 24 S. E. 730. ,29 Eagletou v. Kabrich, 60 Mo. App. 231; Christian v. Hanna, 58 Mo. App. 37; Britton v. Granger, 13 Ohio C. C. 281; 7 Ohio Dec. 182; Auer v. Mauser. 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 618; 42 Wkly. X. C. 40. But see Philpot v. Lucas. 101 Iowa, 478; 70 N. W. 625, 500 30 Hidy v. Murray, 101 Iowa, 65; 69 N. W. 1138; Ritterv. Ewing, 174 Pa. St. 341; 34 Atl. 584. 31 Gaertner v. Heyl, 179 Pa. St. 391; 36 Atl. 146; 39 Wkly. N. C. 393; 27 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 358. 32 Wakely v. Johnson, 115 Mich. 285; 73 N. W. 238; 4 Det. L. X. 859. 33 Ruffner v. Hooks, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 278; 27 Pitts. L. J. X. S. 86; 38 Wkly. N. C. 516. ma Liciora i'i;< iseci' noK. 5 137 the future.* 1 So the jury in estimating the damages may con- sider such injury to his reputation as the plaintiff may have sus- tained. 88 But a person who though morally guilty has escaped in a criminal action cannot recover damages for injury to his reputation resulting from the unsuccessful prosecution. 21 So, also, the plaintiff may recover for injury to Ins business or loss of employment 8 ' and injury to his credit." So where a person was arrested on the charge of embezzlement, in an action for the malicious prosecution of such charge, evidence was admitted of the nature of the plaintiff's business, of the amount of his earnings, as to the difficulty he had in getting employment, as to the tools necessary for him to use therein, and as to the trouble which the taking away of his property, on which he relied to ob- tain other tools, subjected him to." And where the complaint al- leges that as a result of the malicious prosecution of the plain- tiff he was obliged to surrender a contract with an insurance company, evidence is admissible not only to show the surrender of the contract, hut also of conversations between the plaintiff and the company's agent at the time of the surrender as part of the res gestte of the surrender. 10 But under a general allega tion that plaintiff was "greatly injured in his business," evidence to show the forfeiture of earnings under a special contract is not admissible." § 437. Measure of damages— Generally- Continued.— The jury may also consider the indignity, shame and humiliation 34 Wheeler v. Hanson, 161 Mass. 370; 37 N. E. 382. 35 Clark v. American Dock & Imp. Co., 3.") Fed. 47S; Lunsford v. Dietrich, 80 Ala. 250; Spencer v. Cramblett, 56 Kan. 794; 14 Pac. 985; Wheeler v. Hanson, 161 Mass. 370; 37 X. K. 382; Minneapolis Threshing-Mach. Co. v. Regier, 51 Neb. 402; 70 \. W. 93 1; Sheldon v. Carpenter, 1 NT. V. (4 Comst. ) 57S; Willaid v. Holmes, 2 Misc. (N. Y.)303; 21 N. Y. Snpp. 998; 51 N. Y. St. R. 569; Johnson v. McDaniell, 5 Ohio S. & C. 1'. Dec. 717; Zantzinger v. Weightnian. 2 Cranch C. Ct. 478; Saville v. Rob- erts, 1 Ld. Raym. 374. 36 Sears v. Hathaway, 12 Cal. 277. 87 Spencer v. Cramblett, 56 Kan. 794; 44 Pac. 985; Willaid v. 11. .lines. 2 Misc. (N. V.l 303; 21 N. V. Snpp. 998; 51 \. Y. St. R. 569. 38 . Johnson v. McDaniell, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 717. 89 Wheeler v. Hanson, 161 Mass. 370; 37 N. E. 382. » Oldfather v. Zent, 21 End. App. 307; 52 \. E. 286. « Oldfather v. Zent, 14 Ind. App. 89; 41 X. K. 555. 501 §437 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. directly resulting from the charge made against a person. 42 And where a person was arrested he may show, in a civil action for malicious prosecution, the had condition of the place in which he was confined and any discomfort or deprivation which he may have suffered. 43 But the jury should not, in estimating the damages, consider an aggravation of injuries which existed prior to his arrest, where the evidence tends to show negligence or other conduct on his part which may have caused the aggra- vation. 44 Expenses of the defense of a person in a criminal prosecution is also an element to be considered in an action by him for malicious prosecution. 45 And this includes attorneys' fees which have been paid, unless they are obviously excessive, in which case a reasonable sum should be allowed. 46 The amount of damages to be awarded in such actions is a proper subject for the jury to determine, and whether a verdict is excessive or not is to be determined by the same general principles as in the case of awards in other actions for damages. 47 42 McWilliams v. Hoban, 42 Md. 56; Wheeler v. Hauson, 161 Mass. 370; 37 N. E. 382; Willard v. Holmes, 2 Misc. (N. Y.) 303; 21 N. Y. Supp. 998; 51 N. Y. St. R. 569; Johnson v. MeDaniell, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 717. 43 Drumm v. Cessnum, 61 Kan. 467; 59 Pac. 1078; Zebley v. Storey, 117 Pa. St. 478; 12 Atl. 569; 10 Cent. 823; 21 W. N. C. 68. « Fletcher v. Chic. & N. W. R. Co., 109 Mich. 363; 67 N. W. 330; 3 Det. L. N. 100. 45 Easton v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123; Lawrence v. Hagerman, 56 111. 68; 8 Am. Rep. 674; Ziegler v. Powell, 54 Ind. 173; Walker v. Pitt- man, 108 Ind. 341 ; Sheldon v. Carpen- ter, 4 N. Y. 578; Willard v. Holmes, 2 Misc. (N. Y.)303; 21 N. Y. Supp. 998; 51 N. Y. St. R. 569; Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209; 1 Am. Rep. 316; Magmer v. Renk, 65 Wis. 364. See Wilmertou v. Sample, 39 111. A pp. 60. 46 Drumm v. Cessnum, 61 Kan. 467; :> ( .) Pac. 1078; Wheeler v. Hau- 502 son, 161 Mass. 370; 37 N. E. 382; 42 Am. St. Rep. 408; Johnson v. Me- Daniell, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 717. 47 Chapman v. Dodd, 10 Minn. 350. See following cases as to amounts awarded under various circum- stances: Attempt by landlord to seize property of tenant under dis- tress warrant, though no rent due, and subsequent arrest of latter — $212.50 not excessive. Gruel v. Men- gler, 74 111. App. 36. Charges in- volving integrity of man high in financial circles and holding several important fiduciary positions — $31,700 not excessive. Willard v. Holmes, 2 Misc. (N. Y.) 303; 51 N. Y. St. R. 569; 21 N. Y. Supp. 998. Arrest of person without probable cause — $1,000 not excesssive, though greatly in excess of expense incurred and plaintiff was treated with proper care and consideration. Neys v. Taylor (S. D. ), 81 N. W. 901. Ma- licious prosecution on charge of assault with intent to murder — wil- ful perjury — $3,000 not excessive. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. §§438-440 § 438. Mental Buffering. — In an action to recover dania for malicious prosecution, mental suffering is one of the ele- ments for which damages may he assessed, and it may he con- sidered though there he no physical injury or pain in connec- tion therewith. 1 " 1 § 439. Evidence in mitigation of damages. — Defendant in an action for malicious prosecution may show in mitigation of damages the general had reputation of the plaintiff. ' And evi- dence in such an action that the plaintiff voluntarily surrendered himself for arrest, hut was in fact never really arrested, is ad- missible in mitigation of damages. 50 But evidence is not ad- missible, that the period of the plaintiff's imprisonment might have been shortened if he had availed himself of his right to a preliminary examination, unless it be shown that his object in waiving such examination was to enhance the damages."' 1 And the defendant cannot for such purpose show that the plaintiff had instituted a similar suit against him. 88 § 440. Advice of attorney. — As a general rule it is a defense to an action for malicious prosecution that the defendant acted upon the advice of an attorney. But such advice must have been sought of a reputable attorney and not a co-conspirator and must have been asked for in good faith, and the defendant must have disclosed to such attorney all the facts within his knowl- edge, and must have acted in good faith upon such advice. :ki So Jonec v. Jenkins, 3 Wash. 17; 27 Pao. 10:22. Arrest and confinement in hotel for fifteen hours — no injury to business or reputation — $2,500 excessive. O 1 Boyle v. Shivley, 65 111. App. 278. In jail fifteen hours — money damages nominal — s750 ex- cessive — should remit §250. Myers v. Litts (C. P. Pa. ), 3 Lack. L. News, 363. 48 Lunsford v. Dietrich, 86 Ala. 250; Shatto v. Crocker, 87 Cal. 629; Tisdale v. Major. 100 Iowa, 1; 75 N. W. 663; Parkhurst v. Mastellar, 57 Iowa, 474: Fisher v. Hamilton, 49 Ind. 341; Friel v. Plumer (N. H.), 43 Atl. 618; Johnson v. McDaniell, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 717; Vina] v. Core, 18 W. Va. 1; Rowland v. Sam- uel. 1 1 Q. B. 39. 49 Rosenkrantz v. Barker, 115 111. 333; Fitzgibbon v. Brown, -t:; Me. 169; Bostwick v. Rutherford, 4 Hawks L. (X. C.) 8:?; Britton v. Granger, 13 Ohio C. C. 281; 7 Ohio Dec. 182. 60 Chatfield v. Bunnell, 69 Conn. 511; 37 Atl. 1074. si Kin? v. Colvin. 11 R. I. 582. 52 Bliss v. Franklin, 13 Allen l Mass. I, 214. "O'Neal v. McKinna, 116 Ala. GOO; OUo § "i 40 MALICIOI'S i ROSECUTION. advice of an attorney is no defense to such an action, where it appears that defendant had the plaintiff rearrested on same day after his discharge in habeas corpus proceedings, and did not communicate the fact of such discharge to the attorney. 54 The defendant, however, in such cases is not necessarily relieved from liability by stating to his attorney all the facts which he actually knew, but the rule extends to those facts which he should have known by reasonable diligence. 55 But where the question of probable cause is for the jury, advice of counsel that plaintiff is guilty, is declared not to be a complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution, but it is to be considered by the jury in determining whether or not probable cause existed, and also upon the question of malice, for which smart money may be given. 56 The good or bad faith of the counsel, however, in giving the ad- vice is not an element to be considered in determining the merits of such a defense, 57 unless it appear that such attorney was a 22 So. 905; Holliday v. Holliday, 122 Gal. 26; 55 Pac. 703, aff'g in banc 53 Pac. 42; Seabridge v. McAdam, 119 Cal. 460; 51 Pac. 691; Struby- Estabrook Mercantile Co. v. Keyes, 9 Colo. App. 190; 48 Pac. 663; Clem- ent v. Major, 8 Colo. App. 86; 44 Pac. 776; Gruel v. Mengler, 74 111. App. 36; Chicago Forge & P. Co. v. Rose, 69 111. App. 123; 29 Chic. Leg. News, 239; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 207; Paddock v. Watts, 116 Ind. 146; Bowman v. Western Fur Mfg. Co., 96 Iowa, 188; 64 N. W.775; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, 57 Kan. 785; 48 Pac. 31; Meskerv. McCourt, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1897; 44 S. W. 975; An- derson v. Columbia Finance & T. Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1790; 50 S. W. 40; Womack v. Fudiake-r, 47 La. Ann. 33; 16 So. 645; Pullen v. Glidden, 68 Me. 566; Stone v. Swift, 4 Pick. (Mass.) 389; Pawlowski v. Jenks, 115 Mich. 275; 73 N. W. 238; 4 Det. L. N. 874; Alexander v. Harrison, 38 Mo. 258; Brown v. McBride, 24 Misc. (N. Y.) 235; 52 N. Y. Supp. 620; Johnson v. McDaniell, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 717: 504 Johnson v. McDaniel (C. P.), 4 Ohio Leg. News, 53; Hess v. Oregon Ger- man Bkg. Co., 31 Oreg. 503; 49 Pac. 803; Keplogle v. Frothingham, 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 374; Myers v. Litts (C. P. Pa. ), 3 Lack. L. News, 363; Goldstein v. Foulkes, 19 R. I. — ; Ravenga v. Mackintosh, 2 B. & C. 693. 54 Replogle y. Frothingham, 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 374. 55 Seabridge v. McAdam, 119 Cal. 460; 51 Pac. 691; Chic. Forge & B. Co. v. Rose, 69 111. App. 123; 29 Chic. L. News, 239; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 207; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, 57 Kan. 785 ; 48 Pac. 31; Anderson v. Columbia Finance & T. Co., 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1790; 50 S. W. 40; St. Denis v. Shoultz, 25 Ont. App. 131. But see Holliday v. Hol- liday, 122 Cal. 26; 55 Pac. 703; Hess v. Oregon German Bkg. Co., 31 Oreg. 503; 49 Pac. 803. 66 Brown v. McBride, 24 Misc. (N. Y.) 235; 52 N. Y. Supp. 620. "Seabridge v. McAdam, 119 Cal. 460; 51 Pac. 691; Sandell v. Sherman, 107 Cal. 391. MALICIOUS PBOSECtJTION. §§ 4tl - * l - co-conspirator aiding others to extort money for personal gain." Again, where after a statement of facts made by a client to his attorney, which do not constitute probable cause for an arrest, the latter personally swears to the information upon which a warrant of arrest is issued, he will be personally liable to the per- son arrested, and his professional privilege will not shield him. " § 441. Advice of prosecuting attorney, magistrate, etc.— The fact that a criminal prosecution was instituted upon the advice of the prosecuting attorney is admissible in evidence for the purpose of exoneration in an action for malicious prose- cution/ But in order that the defendant may be exonerated by such advice, he is bound to state the tacts in connection therewith to the same extent as if he were seeking the advice of his personal attorney, and to have acted upon such advice in good faith.' 11 And the facts that the defendant stated all the facts and circumstances of the case to a magistrate, that the latter declared that the accused was guilty if the statement was true, and that the prosecution was instituted upon such assur- ance, are admissible in evidence on the question of malice and in mitigation of damages.^ § 442. Exemplary damages. — The plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution is not limited in the damages which he may recover to those which are compensatory for the injury sus- tained, but may, in those cases where the defendant acted wan- tonly, recklessly or with actual malice, recover exemplary dam- ages. 63 So evidence is admissible in such an action for the 58 Clement v. Major, 8 Colo. App. 86; 44 Pac. 77ti. 59 Whitney v. New York Casualty Ins. Assoc., 27 App. Div. (N. Y.) 320; 50 X. Y. Supp. 227. lojlaffit v. Chic. R. I. & P. K. Co., 57 Kan. 912; 48 Pac. lllii; Wakely v. Johnson, 115 Mich. liS5 ; 73 X. W. 238; 4 Det. L. X. 859; Rogers v. Mullen (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 63 S. W. 897; Peterson v. Reisdorph, 49 Neb. 529; 68 X. W. 943. Estabrook Mercantile Co. v. Keys, Colo. App. 190; 48 Pac. 663; Rogers v. Mullen (Tex. Civ. App. 1000), 03 S. W. S97. '-llhseh v. Feeney. 83 111. 550; White v. Tucker, 16 Ohio St. 168; Sisk v. Hurst, 1 W. V;i. 53. MBrownv. Master, 111 Ala. 3'.»7; 20 So. 344; Stewart v. Cole. 46 Ala. 646; Foster v. Pitts, 63 Ark. 387; 38 S. W. 1114; Coleman v. Allen, 79 Ga. 637; Lawrence v. Ilaperman, «i See sec.440 herein. See Struby- I 50 111. 68; 8 Am. Rep. 874; Wauzer v. 505 § 443 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. purpose of showing the motive of the defendant in causing the arrest of the plaintiff. 64 And evidence of a subsequent arrest is admissible as showing a vindictive spirit on the part of the de- fendant/" In determining the amount of exemplary damages which may be awarded, the jury may consider the respective social positions of the parties to the action. 66 And evidence of the wealth or financial ability of the defendant in such an action is admissible. 6 ' But though the plaintiff may be entitled to exemplary damages, it is improper to instruct the jury that they are to assess such damages in such sum as in their judgment plaintiffs are entitled to. (W § 443. Wealth of defendant — Evidence— Generally— In an action to recover for a malicious prosecution where the facts of the case may justify an award of punitive damages, evidence of the wealth of the defendant is admissible. 69 And where a per- son has been arrested for a wilful wrong, he may in an action for malicious prosecution give evidence for the purpose of negativ- ing wilfulness on his part. 70 But statements of a local attorney of a railroad company, are not admissible in an action against the company for malicious prosecution, as tending to show mal- ice on the part of the company, where such attorney was not au- thorized to speak or act for the company. 71 And where a village Bright, 52 111. 35; Parkhurst v. Mas- teller, 57 Iowa, 474; Schippel v. Nor- ton, 38 Kan. 567; McWiliams v. Ho- ban, 42 Md. 56; Frank v. Curtis, 58 Mo. App. 349; McGarry v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 36 Mo. App. 340; Brown v. McBride, 24 Misc. (N. Y. ) 235; 52 N. Y. Supp. 620; Fuller v. Redding, 16 Misc. (N. Y.) 634; 39 N. Y. Supp. 109; Johnson v. McDauiell, 5 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 717; Orr v. Seiler, 1 Penny. (Penn.)445; Jacobs v. Cram, 62 Tex. 401; Shear v. Hiles, 67 Wis. 3.";0; Winn v. Peckham, 42 Wis. 493. See Hawkins v. Snow, 29 N. S. 444. 6 *Fuller v. Redding, 10 Misc. (N. Y.) 634; 39 N. Y. Supp. 109. 66 Miller v. Potter, 59 111. App. 125. 66 Johnson v. McDariiel (C. P.), 4 Ohio Leg. News, 53. 506 67 Eagleton v. Kabrich, 66 Mo. App. 231. es Foster v. Pitts, 63 Ark. 387; 38 S. W. 1114. 69 Atkinson v. Vancleave (Ind. App. 1900), 57 N. E. 731; Whitfield v. Westbrook, 40 Miss. 311. See Eg- gett v. Allen, 106 Wis. 633; 82 N. W. 556. See sec. 442 herein. 70 Parker v. Parker, 102 Iowa, 500; 71 N. W. 421. In this case plaintiff had been arrested for a wilful tres- pass in cutting down and removing timber, and he was permitted to show in an action for malicious prosecu- tion that his object was to make the land available as pasture land. " Fletcher v. Chic. & N. W. R. Co., 109 Mich. 363; 67 N. W. 330; 3 Det. L. N. 100. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. § 444 trustee procured the arrest of .1 person for the violation of an ordinance forbidding the riding of a bicycle on a sidewalk, it was declared in an action against such trustee {>»■ false imprison- ment and malicious prosecution that evidence showing that the road was obstructed where plaintiff turned on to the sidewalk was inadmissible as showing defendant's motive. 75 Again, in an action based on the arrest of .1 woman for purchasing goods on the credit of her husband, pending her appeal from a decree ot divorce against her, evidence Bhowing that goods were purchased by her from other dealers is not admissible for the purpose of showing probable cause. 151 And where the arrest of a person is procured on the charge of wilful trespass on the land of another, in an action for malicious prosecution based on such arrest, the defendant should not he permitted to show that certain persons had said that plaintiff was damaging his property to a certain specified amount.' 1 § 444. Malicious prosecution of civil suit— Attachment — Damages may also be recovered for the malicious prosecution of a civil suit, and in an action to recover therefor the jury may compensate the plaintiff for such mental, physical and financial loss as has directly and naturally resulted. 75 And as a ground for special damage he may show his peculiar situation and cir- cumstances at the time the suit was brought. 76 And for the purpose of showing malice, evidence is admissible that the de- fendant has brought several suits against the plaintiff upon the same groundless claim. 77 So for the prosecution of a civil suit, maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause, which is terminated in favor of the defendant, the latter may recover from the plaintiff in an action for the damages sustained in the defense of the original suit, in excess of the taxable costs ob- tained by him. 78 And where a person was indebted to another w Fuller v. Bedding, 13 App. Div. ■ 48 Atl. 618; Thomas v. Rouse, 2 (N. Y.i til: 43 \. V. Supp. 90. '3 Rosenfeld v. Stix, 07 Mo. App. 582. » Noble v. White, 103 Iowa, 352; 72 N. W. 556. 7 » Nichols v. Bronson, 2 Day, (Conn.) 211; Friel v. Plumer (N. H.), Biev. (S. C.) 7;"); Churchill v. Sig- ners, 3 El. & BL 929. 76 Nichols v. Bronson, 2 Day. (Conn.) 211. 77 Magner v. Renk, 65 Wis. 104. 78 Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209; 1 Am. Rep. 316. 507 § 444 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. in the sum of fifteen dollars and the latter maliciously and without probable cause brought an attachment suit for $2,030 against him, it was held that he could recover for the injury resulting from the bringing of such suit. 70 And in such an ac- tion evidence .showing injury to the credit of the plaintiff is admissible. 8 " And there may be a recovery for injury to the business of a person against whom an attachment is maliciously procured, and for this purpose a witness may testify as to what, from his own knowledge, was the effect upon the business and credit of the plaintiff.* 1 But evidence is not admissible as to the profits usually made in the same kind of business in the plaintiff's neighborhood.* 2 And where the plaintiff claims that he has been injured in his business as the result of a malicious attachment, in order to authorize a recovery therefor the evi- dence must not only show a loss in his business, but must also show that it was attributable to the attachment, and in the ab- sence of such evidence it is not proper for the plaintiff to show the course of his business from the time of its inception down to the time he disposed of it, covering a period of several years before and several months subsequent to the attachment. 83 And where the delay of a firm to forward goods purchased is not shown to have been the result of an attachment, evidence of such fact is not admissible. 81 But where as the result of an action maliciously instituted by the lessor of property, the lessee is ejected therefrom, the latter in an action to recover therefor is entitled to damages for the value of the use of the premises to him during the time he was out of possession and also for any permanent injury to the leasehold due to the lack of ordi- nary care by the lessor while he was in possession of the same.'" And again, in an action for maliciously issuing a writ of attach- ment on a crop of potatoes which were not dug until after the release of the levy, it was held that damages were recoverable, 79 Clark v. Nordholt, 121 Cal. 26; I 81 O'Grady v. Julian, 34 Ala. 88. 53 Pac. 400. See Weaver v. Page, 82 O' Grady v. Julian, 34 Ala. 88. 6 Cal. 681. 83 Zinn v. Rice, 154 Mass. 1 ; 12 L. 80 Brewer v. Jacobs, 22 Fed. 217; R. A. 288; 37 N. E. 747. Tynberg v. Cohen (Tex. Civ. App.), 84 Tynberg v. Cohen (Tex. Civ. 24 S. W. 314. See Fine v. Navarre App. ), 24 S. W. 314. (Mich.), 62 N. W. 142; Sonneborn v. | 85 Moffatt v. Fisher, 47 Iowa, Stewart, 2 Woods, 599. 473. 508 MALICIOUS PE08ECU1 [ON. §§ \\'< 1 17 the measure of such damages being the difference between the value of the potatoes in the ground at the time of the levy, and its value at the time of release thereof/ § 445. Malicious attachment — Where business unlawful no recovery for injury to. — Though there may be a recovery for any loss which a person has sustained in his credit, business or reputation, owing to the wrongful suing out of an attachment, yet if the business in which a person, against whom such an attachment is issued, is engaged, is carried on in violation of the law, such as the business of keeping a gambling house, there can be no recovery for injury thereto/' § 446. Maliciously causing person to lose employment. — Where a person maliciously procures the discharge of another from his position or employment, he will be liable to such person for the damages sustained as a direct result of such malicious act, and such damages will include the time lost by the person discharged, and it is declared that he need not look for employ- ment in other localities. 88 § 447. Pleading. — A complaint in an action for malicious prosecution should allege that the prosecution was malicious and without probable cause." And it should set forth the alleged malicious conduct of the defendant, it not being sufficient to merely allege that the defendant acted maliciously." And like- wise facts showing want of probable cause should be alleged. And want of probable cause was held to be sufficiently set out in the complaint where it alleged that under a misap- prehension of the law applicable to the facts of the case, which were known to the complainant and which established the innocence of the defendant, the latter was convicted, and . 86 Pratt v. Hampe (Iowa. 1901), 86 N. W. 292. 87 Kauffman v. Babcock, 67 Tex. 241; 2 S. W. 878. »8 Connell v. Stalker, 20 Misc. (N. Y.)423; 45 N. Y. Supp. 104S, afTd 21 Misc. (N. Y. ) 609; 48 X. Y. Supp. 77. " H Hilbrant v. Donaldsou, 69 Mo. App. 92; Ely v. Davis, 111 N. C. -'4; 15 S. E. 878; Cousins v. Swords, 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 338; 48 X. Y. Supp. 907; Palmer v. Palmer, 8 App. Div. (X. Y.) 331; 40 X. Y. Supp. 829. 90 Tavenner v. Morekead, 41 W. Va. 116; 23 S. E. 673. 509 § 447 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. that such conviction was reversed on appeal. 91 Again, in an ac- tion to recover damages based on an alleged conspiracy to in- jure and oppress the plaintiff, he may in his complaint properlv allege injury and suffering of his wife, and injury to his own feelings, resulting from acts done in pursuance of the conspiracy J M 91 Neber v. Dobbs, 47 Neb. 863; 66 I 4tb C), 76 Fed. 699; 42 U. S. App. N. W. 864. 133; 22 C. C. A. 493. 92 Gaillard v. Cantini ( C. C. App. ' 510 FALSE AJSRE8T AND QdTPBISOXMENT. §448 CHAPTER XIX. FALSE ARKKST AND l.M PKISONM KNT. 448. False arrest and imprison- menl — Measure of damages. 449. Same subject continued. 4f)0. Measure of damages — Gener- ally — Excessive damages. 451. Mental suffering. 452. Punitive damages. 453. Same subject continued. 454. Mitigation of damages. 455. Evideuce — Generally. 456. Pleading. § 448. False arrest and imprisonment— Measure of dam- ages. — In an action to recover damages for false arrest and im- prisonment, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for such injury as he has sustained as the result of the wrongful act. The ques- tion of motive does not affect his recovery of compensatory damages, but the plaintiff upon proof of the false arrest and imprisonment is entitled to compensation for the injury ensuing therefrom, and his recovery may include damages for deprivation of liberty, physical pain and suffering, mental suffering, humilia- tion and indignity of the act, loss of time from labor or in busi- ness, expenses of procuring release, for any physical injury due to imprisonment in an unhealthy or unwholesome place, and for any permanent injury. 1 So it is proper to instruct the jury that 1 Bryan v. Congdon (C. C. App. 8th 0.)i 57 U. S. App. 505; 86 Fed. 221; 29 C. C. A. 670; Clarke v. Amer- ican Dock & I. Co., 35 Fed. 478; Lavender v. Iludgens, 32 Ark. 7(3:1; Ocean Steamship Co. v. Williams, 09 Ga. 251; Blanchard v. Burbank, .16 111. App. 375; Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51; Lytton v. Baird, 95 Ind. 349; Yount v. Carney, 91 Iowa, 559; Atchison, T. & S. F. II. Co. v. Rice, 30 Kan. 593 j Wheeler* W. Manufg. Co. v. Boyce, 36 Kan. 350; Miller v. Ashcraft, 98 Ky. 314; 32 S. W. 10S5; 17 Ky. L. Rep. 894; Wentz v. Bern- hardt. 37 La. Ann. 636; Slilphen v. Ulmer, 83 Me. 211; 33 Atl. 980; Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich. 445; Josselyn v. Mc- Allister, 22 Mich. 300; Page v. Mitch- ell, 13 Mich. 63; Bacon v. Bacon, 76 Miss. 458; 24 So. 90S; Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703; 13 L. R. A. 682 ; 9 So. S85 ; Cone v. Central R. Co., 62 NT. J. L. 99; 40 Atl. 780; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 278; 4 Am. Neg. Rep.659;Toomeyv. Del. L.& W. R. R. Co., 4 Misc. (N. Y. ) 392; 53 \. Y. St. R. 907; 24 X. Y. Supp. 1'-: Ball v. Borrigan, 47 N\ Y. St R.384; Limbeck v. deny, 15 Misc. (X. Y. ) 663; 39 N. Y. supp. 995; Duggan v. Baltimore & O. R, R, Co., 159 Pa. St 511 § 449 FALSE AIIREST AND IMPRISONMENT. defendant's motives in making an arrest cannot affect the plain- tiff's right to recover for physical inconvenience, loss of time, physical and mental suffering, humiliation of mind and expenses incurred. 2 And the jury in estimating the damages should con- sider the jeopardy of the person arrested, his age and physical condition when arrested, and the distance he was obliged to walk, together with his physical and mental pain and suffering.' And the taking of a man through a crowded thoroughfare caus- ing him humiliation may be considered. 4 So for humiliation and insult and subjection to great indignity, the jury may prop- erly give compensation- 5 §449. Same subject continued.— In estimating the dam- ages in such an action, the jury may also properly consider the discomforts experienced while confined in jail, due to the un- clean or unhealthy condition of the same, or to other causes, 6 and suffering due to the absence of the proper necessities and comforts of life, such as food, bed, or sufficient heat may be con- sidered. 7 So in an action for false imprisonment by confine- ment in an industrial school, evidence is admissible as to the restraints imposed, the treatment received and the sleeping facil- ities afforded. 8 Again, in the case of the wrongful imprisonment 248; 28 Atl. 182; 33 W. N. C. 381; 25 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 13; Buchanan v. Goettman (C. P.), 29 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 302; Abrahams v. Cooper, 81 Pa. St. 232; Miller v. Grice, 2 Rich. (S. C.) 27 ; McQueeu v. Heck, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 212; Cabell v. Arnold, 86 Tex. 102; 22 L. R. A. 87; Karner v. Stump, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 461 ; 34 S. W. 656; Coffin v. Varilla, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 417; Vanderberg v. Con- noly, 18 Utah, 112; 54 Pac. 1097; Bol- ton v. Vellines, 94 Va. 393; 26 S. E. 847; 3 Va. L. Reg. 120; Parsons v Harper, 16 Gratt. (Va.) 64; Ogg v. Murdock, 25 W. Va. 139; Fenelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 344; Plath v. Branns- dorff, 40 Wis. 107; Bonesteel v. Bone- steel, 30 Wis. 511 ; Jay v. Almy, 1 Woodb. & M. 262. See sec. 451 herein as to mental suffering. 512 2 Karner v. Stump, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 461; 34 S. W. 656; Miller v. Grice, 2 Rich. (S. C.) 27; McQueen v. Hale, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 212; Par- son v. Harper, 16 Gratt. (Va. ) 64. 3 Ahem v. Collins, 39 Mo. 145. 4 Toomey v. Del. L. & VV. R. Co., 4 Misc. (N. Y.) 392; 53 N. Y. St. R. 567; 24 N. Y. Supp. 108. 5 Ball v. Horrigan, 47 N. Y. St. R. 384; 19 N. Y. Supp. 913; Limbeck v. Gerry, 15 Misc. (N. Y. ) 663; 39 N. Y. Supp. 95. 6 San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Griffin, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 91; 48 S. W. 542; Fenelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 344. 7 Abrahams v. Cooper, 81 Pa. St. 232. 8 Scott v. Flowers, 60 Neb. 676; 80 N. W. 81. FALSI: ARBEST AND I M PRISi >N MKNT. 5 450 of a passenger, he may recover from the railroad company re- sponsible therefor, for his physical and mental Buffering, injury to feelings, loss of time, interruption in business and actual ex- penses incurred. 9 So, also, may a similar recovery be had for wrongful confinement in an insane asylum. 1 " But the loss of a job of work or employment because of being detained beyond a certain hour is not an element to be considered by the jury. 11 And where plaintiff alleged that he was hindered from transact- ing his business and from engaging in business which he other- wise could and would have engaged in, it was held that he could not, under such allegations, give evidence that while under bonds not to go out of the county he could twice have done so in his business as claim collector. 1 '- And if at the time of the arrest or during the imprisonment of the plaintiff, the defendant took, injured or destroyed property of the plaintiff, the latter may recover for such loss, where he alleges it in his complaint." Again, where a person has been arrested, it is the duty of who- ever makes the arrest to bring such person within a reasonable time and without unnecessary delay before a magistrate, who shall deal with the case as the facts may require, and though an arrest may be lawful, yet for any undue and unnecessary delay in so acting, the persons responsible therefor may be liable in damages. 14 § 450. Measure of damages— Generally — Excessive dam- ages. — In estimating the damages recoverable in an action for a wrongful arrest and imprisonment, the malice or bad motive of the person responsible therefor is an element to be considered. So, also, the jury may consider circumstances of aggravation in making the arrest, or in the inprisonment, the place and dura* ' Duggan v. Baltimore & <). R. Co., 159 Pa. St. 248; 28 Atl. 182; 33 W. N. C. 381; 25 Pitts. L. J. \. S. 13. w Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703; 9 So. 885. "Carpenter v. Perm. R. Co., 13 App. Div. (N. Y.) 328; 43 X. V. Supp. 203; Hoey v. Felton, 11 C. B. (N. S.) 142. See Thompson v. Ella- worth, 39 Mich. 7 i- Fuller v. Bowker, 11 Mich. 204. 33 18 Blanchard v. Burbauk, 16 111. App. 375. u Kirk v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383: 38 Atl. 1089. See in this connection Potter v. Swindle. 77 Ga. 419; Diers v. Malkm,4G Neb. 121; 04 N. W. 722; Gibbs v. Randlett, 58 X. II. 407; Pastor v. Regan, 9 Misc. tX. Y. | 547; Burk v. Howley, 179 I'm. St 36 Atl. 327 j 39 W. N. C. 473; 27 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 266. 513 § 450 FALSE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT. tion of imprisonment, and the standing, financially or socially, of the person arrested. The length of the imprisonment may be brief, hut the circumstances accompanying the arrest as of insult or false and malicious accusation .of a criminal offense or mali- cious imprisonment, either with criminals or in a foul or loath- some place, may be circumstances which justify an award of more than actual damages. lj ^See the following cases where these various elements have heen considered: Woman — arrested on faise charge of forcible entry into house of one of defendants — con- fined with disorderly women — re- quired to give surety of the peace without trial — arrest without proba- ble cause and to keep plaintiff away from house until defendant could re- move plaintiff's things therefrom and tear house down — $4,000 not exces- sive. Clarke v. American Dock & j Improvement Co., 35 Fed. 478. i Arrest and detention from Friday j until Monday— $3,500 not excessive, j Cuthbert v. Galloway, 35 Fed. 466. Evidence of passion or prejudice — prosecution conducted with much bitterness — some of property recov- ered, but fact withheld from court and jury — $2,000 not excessive. Williams v. Casebeer, 126 Cal. 77; 58 Pac. 380. Woman— illegally ar- rested and detained three days and nights in detective agency — chained to bed one night — $1,271 not exces- sive. Pinkerton v. Snyder, 87 111. App. 76. Arrest by private person on charge of shoplifting — not guilty — allowed to go only after she had paid five times the price of goods she was accused of stealing — $2,500 not excessive. Siegel-C. & Co. v. Connor, 70 111. App. 116; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 271. Young man of high per- sonal character, excellent family and social connections — imprison ment rigorous and loathsome and health 514 seriously and permanently impaired — imprisoned eight weeks — $40,000 not excessive. Mexican C. R. Co., v. Gehr, 66 111. App. 173; 12 Nat. Corp. Rep. 651; 1 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 419. In custody eight days — forty dollars expended to secure release — $100 not excessive. Johnson v. Kou- ton, 35 Neb. 898; 53 N. W. 995. Elderly gentleman charged with at- temping to steal ride on train — $500 not excessive. Toomey v. Del. L. & W. R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. St. R. 507; 24 N. Y. Supp. 108. Unlawful arrest- only lucked up an hour and a half- — $1,000 not excessive. Thorp v. Car- valho, 14 Misc. (N. Y.) 554; 70 N. Y. St. R. 760; 36 N. Y. Supp. 1. Arrest on charge of horse stealing — con- fined in jail twelve hours — $400 not excessive. Karner v. Stump, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 461; 34 S. W. 056. Arrest of police captain for wearing uniform and badge which he did un- der belief that he had right to do so until his successor qualified — carried through streets in van — searched — and confined in prison until released by habeas corpus — $1,000 not exces- sive. Bolton v. Velliues, 94 Va. 393; 26 S. E. 847; 3 Va. L. Reg. 120. Woman accused of shoplifting — re- quired to go to office, where she vol- untarily remained some time— mis- take — innocent — $1,000 excessive. The Fair v. Himmel, 50 111. App. 215. No humiliation, expense or incon- venience — restrained of liberty only a few minutes — $500 excessive. FALSF. ARBEST AM) IMPRISONMENT. §§ 451, \~>- § 451. Mental suffering. — In case of wrongful arrest or false imprisonment, damages for mental suffering, wounded pride, indignity and humiliation are recoverable. 18 So where a wrong- ful arrest is made in a public place and in the presence of a large number of persons, damages for mental suffering may be properly allowed." And the fact that the jail in which the plaintiff was confined was in a filthy condition, is admissible in evidence upon the question of his mental suffering, as is also any fact showing the circumstances of his family, or that he was deprived of certain comforts or necessities. 18 Butinan action for false imprisonment it is decided that evidence is not admissible as to the amount of plaintiff's damages per day as a result of mental suffering; all the facts should be submitted to the jury and it is for them to determine the damages recoverable. 19 § 452. Punitive damages. — The motive of the defendant is properly considered in determining whether punitive dam- ages shall be awarded. If there appears no evidence of bad motive, malice, or wanton, or oppressive conduct, such damages should not be given, and the plaintiff is properly confined to the actual damages sustained, but if it appear that the false arrest Miller v. Ashcraft, 98 Kv. 314; 32 S. W. 1085; 17 Ky. L. Rep. 894. Ar- rested for making threats — ordered to give bonds for $500 — but refused to though he could have easily done so, and went to jail — damage from loss of time merely nominal — ■$288 excessive. Yost v. Tracy, 13 Utah, 431; 45 Pac. 346. Xo actual confinement — after being in custody only an hour released upon making a small deposit and promising to ap- pear in court when no examination was made and there was no objec- tion to discharge — $3,500 grossly ex- cessive and reduced to $1,000. Bill- ingsley v. Maus, 93 Wis. 176; 67 X. W. 49. "Gibney v. Lewis, 68 Conn. 392; 36 Atl. 799; Stewart v. Maddox, 63 End. 51; Yount v. Carney (Iowa), 60 N. W. 114; Morgan v. Cm-lev, 142 Mass. 107; Ross v. Leggett. 61 Midi. 445; Lamlrum v. Wells (Tex. C. A.), 26 S. W. 1001; Hays v. Creary, 60 Tex. 445; Parsons v. Harper, 16 Gratt. (Va. ) 64; Fenelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 344. 17 Yount v. Carney (Iowa), 60 X. W. 114. 18 Feuelou v. Butts. :>;; Wis. 344; Clark v. American Dock, etc., Co.. 35 Fed. 478; McCall v. McDowell, Deady. 233; Abraham v. Cooper, si Pa. St. 232. It is held, however, that if the plaintiff is subjected to annoyances, inconveniences, discomforts or any other wrongful act which the defend- ant did not in any way authorize, evi- dence thereof is not admissible. Ocean Steamship Co. v. Williams, 69 Ga. 251. la Landrum v. Wells (Tex. C. A.), 26 S. W. 1001. 515 § 453 FALSE AKREST AND IMPRISONMENT. and imprisonment was actuated by malice or oppression, or wantonness on the part of the defendant, then such facts may properly be considered by the jury and will justify an award of exemplary or punitive damages. 30 But the allowance of such damages is in the discretion of the jury. 21 So for the purpose of showing malice and as bearing upon the question of exem- plary damages, the jury may properly consider the damage done by defendant to household furniture of the plaintiff shortly after his arrest. 22 And where an arrest is made under circum- stances indicating a wanton disregard of the rights of the person arrested, punitive damages may be awarded, though there be no actual malice. 23 And gross negligence or insult may be suffi- ciently aggravating to justify the award of such damages. 24 § 453. Same subject continued. — It is not necessary to show malice in the ordinary sense to entitle one to recover punitive damages in an action for false imprisonment, but legal malice is sufficient. 25 Though an arrest may not be prompted by anger, bad motive or vindictiveness, yet an improper motive may be in- ferred from a wrongful act, as in the case of an arrest based on no reasonable ground, and such a motive will constitute malice in 20 McCall v. McDowell, 1 Abb. (N. S.) 212; Roza v. Smith (D. C. N. D. Cal.), 65 Fed. 592; Thorpe v. Wray, 68 Ga. 359; Little v. Munson, 54 111. App. 437; Pearce v. Needhara, 37 111. App. 90; Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich. 445; 28 N. W. 695; 1 Am. St. Rep. 608; Fellows v. Goodman, 49 Mo. 62; Craven v. Bloom ingdale, 64 N. Y. St. R. 262; 30 Misc. 650, afTd 54 App. Div. (N. Y.) 266; 66 N. Y. St. R. 525; Kolzen v. Broadway & S. Ave. R. Co., 48 N. Y. St. R. 656; 1 Misc. 148; 20 N. Y. Supp. 700; Lim- beck v. Gerry, 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 663; 39 N. Y. Supp. 95; Lewis v. Clegg, 120 N. C. 292; 26 S. E. 772; Bucha- nan v. Goettmann (C. P. Pa.), 29 Pitts, L. J. N. S. 302; Balton v. Vel- lines, 94 Va. 393; 26 S. E. 847; 3 Va. Law Reg. 120; Parsons v. Harper, 16 516 Gratt. (Va. ) 64; Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 313; Coddington v. Lloyd, 8 A. & El. 449; Warwick v. Frouke, 12 M. & W. 507. 21 Craven v. Bloomingdale, 54 App. Div. (N. Y.) 266; 66 N. Y. Supp. 525, aff'g 64 N. Y. Supp. 262. 22 Hendricks v. Haskins, 114 Mich. 291; 72 N. W. 152; 4 Det. L. N. 511; 30 Chic. Leg. News, 81. 23 Kolzen v. Broadway & S. Ave. R. Co., 48 N. Y. St. R. 656; 1 Misc. 148; 20 N. Y. Supp. 700; Pearce v. Needham, 37 111. App. 90. 2 * Lewis v. Clegg, 120 N. C. 292; 26 S. E. 772. 25 Craven v. Bloomingdale, 64 N. Y. St. R. 262; 30 Misc. 650, afFd 54 App. Div. (X. Y.) 266; 66 N. Y. St. R. 525. KALSK ARREST AND I M i'l:is< >\ M BNT. § 158 law which may be rebutted by evidence.'-* But where an arrest is madron suspicion and is deemed to be warranted by the circum- stances, and is made in good faith, and there is no evidence show- ing any malice, ill-will or wanton disregard of rights, there is do ground for an award of punitive damages.'' So an arrest of a passenger at the instance of a railroad conductor, though with- out probable cause, will not render the company liable for ex- emplary damages where it appears that the conductor acted in good faith, being honestly mistaken, and there is no evidence of any malice on his part or that he acted with an intention to injure or oppress such passenger.* But where the plaintiff who was ex- amining watches in defendant's store was detained and searched in the presence of and surrounded by defendant's employees, on the suspicion of having taken a watch which the salesgirl said was missing, punitive damages were awarded to the plaintiff in an action for false imprisonment. 21 And where a person accused an industrious young man of sober habits of stealing his bicycle, and refused to go with him to prominent citizens, by whom he could establish his movements on the evening in question, but summarily arrested him and then turned him over to a night watchman with instructions to hold him until the wheel was found, and such acts were done in the presence of a number of peo- ple, and the watchman also kept him exposed to the gaze of people passing by and refused to give him the opportunity of establish- ing his innocence by the people whom he wished to see, punitive damages were declared to be properly allowed.* So, also, where a tenant who had been given notice to vacate the premises oc- cupied by him was engaged in removing his furniture when the landlord appeared, and against the tenant's objection entered the house and used abusive and violent language and became so threatening in his actions that the tenant drew a pistol, where- upon the landlord procured his arrest on the charge of as- 2* Bolton v. Vcllines, 94 V:i. 393; 217. See Cone v. Central R. Co., 82 26 S. E. S IT ; 3 Va. Law Keg. 120. 27 Newman v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 54 Hun (N. Y.), 835; 27 N. Y. St. R. 135; 7 N. Y. Supp. 5G0. 28 Claiborne v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. Co., 46 W. Va. 863; 33 S. E. 262; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. N. J. L. 99; 40 Atl. 780; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 278; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 6:>9. '-'■' Stevens v. O'Neill, 51 App. Div. (N. Y.) 304; 64 N'. Y. St. R. 603. 80 Hight v. Naylor, 86 111. App. 508. oil § 454 FALSE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT. sault with a dangerous weapon, compensatory and punitive damages were given.- 1 * 1 But where the plaintiff seeks to recover exemplary damages in an action for false arrest and imprison- ment, alleging in his complaint that the defendant acted mali- ciously and without probable cause, the latter may, under a gen- eral denial, show all the facts and circumstances connected with the arrest, for the purpose of preventing an award of such dam- ages. 32 § ±54. Mitigation of damages. — If the arrest and imprison- ment of a person is in good faith and under such circumstances and facts as would warrant a reasonable man in the belief that there was probable cause for making the arrest, such facts may be considered by the jury in mitigation of exemplary damages but not of actual damages. 33 But though there may exist prob- able cause for the arrest of a person on a specific charge, yet this will not justify the detention of the arrested person on a substituted charge. 34 Where, however, there is information which points to a person's guilt upon which information another acts, but before procuring the arrest of such person he lays the whole matter before a magistrate who advises the issuance of a warrant, and the arrested person simply repudiates the charge but does not attempt to explain the suspicious circumstances, 31 Parker v. McGlifl, 52 La. Ann. 1514; 27 So. 946. 32 Richardson v. Huston, 10 S. D. 484; 74 N. W. 234. 33 Mitchell v. Malone, 77 Ga. 301; Newton v. Locklin, 77 111. 103; Carey v. Sheets, 60 Ind. 17; Painte- v. Ives, 4 Neb. 122; Gamier v. Squires (Kan. 1900), 62 Pac. 1005; Comer v. Knowles, 17 Kan. 441; Roberts v. Hackney (Ky. 1900), 59 S. W. 328, mod'g order 22 Ky. Law R. 975 ; 58 S. W. 810; Strieker v. Penn. R. Co., 60 N. J. L. 230; 37 Atl. 776; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 758; Renck v. Mc- Gregor, 32 N. J. L. 70; Bradner v. Faulkner, 93 N. Y. 515; Kutner v. Fargo, 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 317; 54 N. Y. Supp. 332; Newman v. New 518 York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 54 Hun (N. Y.), 335; 27 N. Y. St. R. 135; 7 N. Y. Supp. 560; Brown v. Chadsey, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 253; Grace v. Demp- sey, 75 Wis. 313: Landrum v. Wells (Tex. C. A.), 26 S. W. 1001; 43 N. W. 1127. The question of the ex- istence of probable cause which would authorize the arrest of a per- son without a warrant is held to be one of law for the court. Diers v. Mallon, 46 Neb. 121; 64 N. W. 722. 34 Francis v. Tilyon, 26 App. Div. (N. Y.) 340; 49 N. Y. Supp. 799. In this case a person was arrested on the charge of grand larceny and sub- sequently detained on the charge of vagrancy. FALSE FREEST AM» [MPEISONMENT. § 155 such facts are sufficient to show probable cause. ' But instruc- tions given to the defendant by his employer to procure the arrest of the plaintiff are not admissible in mitigation of dam- ages. 93 In such actions the defendant may, as bearing upon the question of malice and for the purpose of preventing an award of exemplary damages, introduce in evidence for the considera- tion of the jury, the affidavit, warrant and proof of arrest under the assumed authority of a void warrant.' And. where a per- son is arrested on suspicion of disloyally and an act of assas- sination, the officer responsible for the arrest may show a mili- tary order, in mitigation of damages for false imprisonment, though it may not justify him in his act. :s Again, where an offi- cer arrested a person on the charge of aiding and abetting de- serters from the army and the arrest was without a warrant, but made under the orders of his commanding officer, he was, in an action against him for false imprisonment, allowed to show in support of his belief for making the arrest and in mitiga- tion of damages, that the arrested person had been engaged in procuring men to enlist and then to desert after they had obtained their bounty, though such facts were not known to him at the time of the arrested person's release from imprison- ment. 39 § 455. Evidence — Generally. — In an action to recover for false arrest and imprisonment, the fact that an account of the ar- rest was published in the newspapers is admissible in evidence as bearing on the question of damages. 40 And the plaintiff in such an action may testify to the fact that tie- person making the ar- rest under the direction of the defendant promised him in re- sponse to a request by the plaintiff that he would notify his wife of his arrest, hut that she failed to come and see him. and that none of his friends came until the following morning. 41 But the 35 Kutnor v. Fargo, 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 317; :>4 X. Y. Supp. 332. 88 Josselyn v. McAllister, 22 Mich. 300. 87 Woodall v. McMillan, 3S Ala. 622. 88 Carpenter v. Parker, 23 Iowa, 4:.0. as Beck with v. Bean, 98 U. S. 266; 1 Russell & Winslow's U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Syllabus Uigesl 11 Filer v. Smith. 96 Midi. :',17; 55 X. W. 999; 35 Am. St. Rep. 603; 37 ('cut. L. J. 237; Scott v. Flowers, 60 Neb. 07:.; St X. W. SI. 41 San Antonio & A. F. R. Co. v. Griffin, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 91; 48 S. \Y. 542. 519 8 456 FALSE ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT. fact that a village trustee against whom an action for false im- prisonment and malicious prosecution had been brought for pro- curing the arrest of the plaintiff for riding upon the sidewalk, in violation of an ordinance, had on a previous occasion told an officer to watch the plaintiff and two other women, and in case he found them riding upon the sidewalk to arrest them, is not admissible as showing malice in the absence of evidence that such order was given for any other purpose than to procure the enforcement of the ordinance. 42 Evidence as to the plaintiff's previous good character is not admissible in an action for false imprisonment where no attempt has been made to assail it, 4 * but otherwise where the defendant in mitigation of damages has introduced evidence to show that the public strongly sus- pected him of the crime for which he was arrested. 44 Nor can the defendant, where no justification is pleaded, in such an action introduce in evidence an unsigned commitment under which the plaintiff was imprisoned. 45 Again, the burden of prov- ing that an arrest was procured by the defendant and that there was want of probable cause rests upon the plaintiff. 46 But evidence of facts and circumstances which raise a reasonable presumption that the defendant ordered or directed the false arrest and im- prisonment of the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for him. 47 And where it has been shown that defendant acting through his agent procured the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff and that he was subsequently discharged, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show a justification for his act. 48 § 456. Pleading. — In an action to recover for false imprison- ment, the plaintiff must allege in his complaint that the impris- onment was illegal or was procured without a warrant. 49 Un- 42 Fuller v. Reddingr, 13 App. Div. (N. Y.) 61; 43 N. Y. Supp. 96. 43 Diers v. Mallon, 46 Neb. 121; 64 N. W. 722. 44 American Express Co. v. Patter- son, 73 Ind. 430. 45 Yost v. Tracy, 13 Utah, 431; 45 Pac. 346. See Russell v. Shuster, 8 W. & S. 308. 46 Limbeck v. Gerry, 15 Misc. (N. 520 Y.) 663; 39 N. Y. Supp. 95; Warren v. Dennett, 17 Misc. (N. Y) 86; 39 N. Y. Supp. 830. 47 Limbeck v. Gerry, 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 663; 39 N. Y. Supp. 95. 48 Mexican C. R. Co. v. Gehr, 66 111. App. 173; 12 Nat. Corp. Rep. 651; 1 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 419. 49 Cousius v. Swords, 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 338; 43 N. Y Supp. 907. FALSK A.RREST AM" IMPRISONMENT. § \. ".t; der the New York Code," which provides that in an action tore- cover for persona] injuries two or more causes of action may be joined, there may be a joinder of a cause of action for false im- prisonment with one for malicious prosecution. 51 But though such causes of action may he joined in the same complaint, they cannot be maintained on the same state of facts. 68 60 N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 484, subd. 2. " Thorp v. Carvalho, 14 Misc. (N. Y.) 5o4; 70 N. Y. St. R. 760; 36 N. Y. Supp. 1. 52 Warren v. Dennett, 17 Misc. (N. Y.) 86; 39 N. Y. Supp. 830. 521 § 467 ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS. CHAPTER XX. ALIENATION OP AFFECTIONS — CRIMINAL CONVERSATION. $ 457. Alienation of affections — I 45'.). Exemplary damages. Criminal conversation — ' 460. Evidence in mitigation. Measure of damages for. 461. Advice by parent to son to 158. Right of wife to recover for alienation of affections of husband. leave wife. 4Gi'. Evidence — Generally. 403. Pleading. § 457. Alienation of affections — Criminal conversation — Measure of damages for. — One who by his intentional con- duct prejudices a wife against her husband, and alienates her affections from him, is liable to the husband for the damages which he suffers as the result of such act. 1 And where the wife is seduced in such a case, the husband has a right of action based on his loss of consortium. 2 While loss of consortium is the main ground for the assessment of damages, it is, however, not the only ground. 3 So the alienation of her affections while not the gist of the action, may be considered in aggravation of the damages. 4 So in an action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation, the husband may recover for the loss which he has sustained of the services of his wife, including her conjugal society, aid, assistance, comfort and affection, and the mortification, mental anguish and disgrace resulting from de- fendant's act, the damages being dependent in each case upon the extent of the injury sustained by the husband, to be de- termined in the discretion of the jury, whose verdict will not be disturbed unless the amount awarded appear to have been the result of passion, prejudice or corruption. 5 And though 1 Halfpence v. Rodgers, 143 Mo. 623; 45 S. W. 650; Metcalf v. Rob- erts, 23 Ont. Rep. 130. 2 Evans v. O'Connor, 174 Mass. 287; 54 N. E. 557. See Evans v. Evans, 68 Law J. Prob. 70.(1899); Prob. 195; 81 Law T. (N. S.) 60. 522 3 Evans v. Evans, 68 Law J. Prob. 70 (1899); Prob. 195; 81 Law T. (N. S.)60. 4 Evans v. O'Connor, 174 Mass. 287; 54 N. E. 557. 6 Long v. Booe (Ala.), 17 So. 716; Prettymau v. Williamson, 1 Penn. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION. 8 t51 no damages in a specific amount are proved, the plaintifl in such an action is entitled to recover substantial damages.' 1 So it is proper for the judge in instructing the jury to call their attention to the several ways in which plaintiff may suffer damages as a result of his wife's Seduction, leaving it to them to determine whether from all the evidence he did suffer in any of the ways specified, and if so, to what extent.' But an instruction to the jury in an action by a husband for the seduc- tion of his wile, that the real and substantial damages are for the loss of the society of the wife, and the alienation of her affections, together with "al] other proper considerations," which are applicable to the circumstances of each case, was held to he error where the amount awarded was large." Although the jury in estimating the damages in this class of actions may consider the elements above mentioned, they are also to consider that the husband's right to the services, conjugal society, affection, aid and assistance of his wife, is burdened with the obligation on his part to support, clothe, cherish and care for her.' 1 Again, in an action to recover lor a wife's seduction, evidence is admissi- (Del.) 224; 39 Atl. 731; Yundt v. i Bartrunft, 41 111. 0; Puth v. Zimble- inaii, 9!) Iowa. 641; (iS \. W. 895;! Johnston v. Disbrow, 47 Mich. 59; ■ Hartpence v. Kodgers, 143 Mo. 623; 45 S. W. 650; Smith v. Myers, 52 Neb. 70; 71 N. W. 1006; Smith v. Masten, 15 Wend. ( N. Y. ) 270; Wil- ton v. Webster, 7 C. & P. 198; Duberly v. Gunning, 4 Term R. 657. See following cases as to amounts , awarded for alienation of affections and criminal conversation: $1,500 held not excessive, Path v. Zi noble- man, 99 Iowa, 641; 6S N. W. 895; | $4,375 not excessive, Dorman v. Sebree (Ky.), 52 S. W. 809; $5,250 not excessive where husband and wife had previously lived happily, and her reputation had always been good prior to the time she came un- der defendant's influence, Hart- pence v. Rogers, 143 Mo. 623; 45 S. W. 650; $3,000 not excessive, Smith v. Myers, 52 Neb. 70: 71 Neb. 1006; $15,000 not excessive, rela- tions prior to acquaintance with de- fendant, cordial, friendly and af- fectionate — plaintiff a lawyer and prosecuting attorney, and his wife a school-teacher receiving good wages. Speck v. Gray, 14 Wash. 589; 45 l'ac. 143: $5,000 held ex- cessive where plaintiff consented to sexual intercourse between plaintiff and his wife. Peek v. Traylor, 17 Ky. L. Rep. L312; 34 S. W. 705. ''■ Hart v. Shorey, Rep. Jud. Queb. 12 C. S. 84. 7 Matheis v. Mazet, 164 Pa. St. 580; 30 Atl. 434: 25 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 169. 8 Hoggins v. Coad. 58 111. App. 58. '•' Prettyman v. Williamson. 1 Penn. (Del.) 224: 89 Atl. 731: l'uth v. Zimbleman, 99 Iowa. 641: 6S N. W. 895; Rudd v. Rounds. 64 Vt. 432; 25 Atl. 438. 523 § 458 ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS. ble of facts which aggravate the injury, and consequently go to enhance the damages. So the happiness which existed in the domestic relations of the husband and wife prior to her se- duction, and her previous virtuous behavior and unblemished reputation and character, together with any special advantages accruing to the husband by reason of the relations of husband and wife, are facts which the jury may consider. 10 But where the plaintiff claims damages for a venereal disease, which he has contracted as a result of defendant's intercourse with his wife, he must specially allege damages from such cause. 11 § 458. Right of wife to recover for alienation of affections of husband. — The common-law disability which prevented a wife from maintaining an action in her own name and con- sequently from suing any one for alienating the affections of her husband, has as a general rule been removed by statute, so that to-day under the enabling acts, which permit her in most of the states to sue as a feme sole, she may recover dam- ages against a third person for the alienation of her husband's affections and consequent loss of society, aid, and support. 1 -' 10 See Milford v. Berkely, 1 Burr. 609; Duke of Norfolk v. Germain, 12 How. St. Tr. 927. " Dowdell v. King, 97 Ala. 635; 12 So. 405. 12 Betser v. Betser, 87 111. App. 399; Dietzraan v. Mullin (Ky. 1900), 57. S. W. 247; Lockwood v. Lockwood, 67 Minn. 476; 70 N. W. 784; Nichols v. Nichols, 134 Mo. 187; 35 S. W. 577; Clark v. Hill, 69 Mo. App. 541; Ro- maine v. Decker, 11 App. Div. (N. Y.) 20; 43 N. Y. Supp. 79; Gernerd v. Gernerd, 185 Pa. St. 233; 39 Atl. 884; 40 L. R. A. 549; 42 W. N. C. 49; Brown v. Brown, 121 N. C. 8; 38 L. R. A. 242; 27 S. E. 998; Beach v. Brown, 20 Wash. 266; 43 L. R. A. 114; 55 Pac. 46. But see Crocker v. Crocker, 98 Fed. 702, construing the Massachusetts statute. Smith v. Smith, 98 Tenn. 101; 38 S. W. 439; Lellis v. Lambert, 24 Ont. App. 653. 524 See in this connection also, Mehrott' v. Mehroff, 26 Fed. 13; Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 4; 6 L. R. A. 829; Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581; 14 L. R. A. 787; Price v. Price, 91 Iowa, 693; 29 L. R. A. 150; Warren v. Warren, 89 Mich. 123; 14 L. R. A. 545; Seaver v. Adams, 66 N. H. 142; 19 Atl. 776; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584; 6 L. R. A. 553; Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621; 32 Am. Rep. 397. See following cases as to amount awarded in actions by wife for aliena- tion of husband's affections: Action against parents of husband — conduct wilful and malicious — health of wife impaired by the separation — $15,000 not excessive. Lockwood v. Lock- wood, 67 Minn. 476; 70 N. W. 784, — $5,000 not excessive. Nichols v. Nichols, 147 Mo. 387; 48 S. W. 947. Action agninst brother of wife — no evidence showing he advised or CRIMINAL CONVERSATION. § 158 Id mi action against another woman for alienating the affections of the plaintiff's husband, there must have been on the part of the defendant some wrongful or wilful intent to engage his affections and thereby seduce him from his duty and fidelity to the plaintiff, and there will be no faull imputed to the defendant in law because she may have been attractive, or pleased with his admiration. 1 " And where owing to the wilful and malicious conduct of another, a husband is induced to abandon his wife, she mav recover damages as a compensation for the loss of his society, protection and aid, such damages not being merely Limited to the injury she has sustained up to the time of the suit." And her recovery of such damages should not be affected by the fact that she procured a separation from him after he had deserted her, where the action for the separation was not prose- cuted by her because she desired to live apart from him, but rather because she could not learn of his whereabouts and hoped to induce him to return. 1 "' But where by an agreement of separa- tion in consideration of a certain sum paid by the husband and accepted by the wife, she relinquishes her claim against him for support, she cannot in an action for alienation of affections re- cover for the loss of support and maintenance." 1 The gist of the action is said to be the loss of consortium and not the loss of assist- ance, and it is held that it is not sufficient that the relations of the husband with the defendant were improper and that he remained away from his family, but there must also have been on the part of the defendant some active interference. 17 But in another case where the evidence showed that there had been illicit inter- course between the husband and the defendant, though there was no proof showing that such relations were the result of the seduction of the husband by the defendant, it was held that such Bought to iudnce plaintiffs wife to leave him — $5,000 excessive. Bathke v. Krassin (Minn.), 80 N. YV. 950. Husband 2; 34 N. V. Supp. 777. 13 Whitman v. Egbert, 27 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 374. See Buchanan v. Foster, 23 App. Div. (X. Y.i 542; 48 X. V. Supp. 732. "Nichols v. Nichols, 147 Mo. 387; IS s. W. 017; Wilson v. Coulter, 29 Div. (N. Y.) 85; 51 \. Y. Supp. 804. 'Wilson v. Coulter. 29 App. Div. i\. Y. ) 8;>: ol X. Y. Supp. n.>4. "Metcalf v. Tiffany, 106 Mich. 504: 04 X. W. 470; 2 Det. L. N. •*-:'.•>. 17 Buchanan v. Foster. 2:1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 042; 48 X. V. Supp. 732. 525 § 459, 460 ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS. evidence would sustain a finding that the defendant was re- sponsible for the desertion and nonsupport of the plaintiff by her husband and liable in damages therefor. 18 §459. Exemplary damages — Exemplary damages may be given against one who wilfully and maliciously alienates the affec- tions of another's wife, or who seduces her. 19 Or for the alienation of a husband's affections, where done wantonly and maliciously? 1 But in an action for the alienation of a wife's affections, it was decided that an instruction to the jury was not erroneous because it failed to state, in connection with an instruction as to exem- plary damages, that the jury must find that the act of the de- fendant was wanton, malicious or from an improper motive, in order to authorize the recovery of such. damages, where the only evidence bearing upon this was the statement of the defendant that his motive was to take the plaintiff's wife for himself, and that the sooner he could get rid of the husband the sooner he could get the wife, and the jury found that the act of the de- fendant in persuading plaintiff's wife to abandon him was in- tentional." 1 Alienating the affections of a husband or wife is declared to be a wrong done to the person within the meaning of the Colorado act, which permits of the recovery of exemplary damages in such cases. 22 § 460. Evidence in mitigation. —Evidence of misconduct on the part of the husband in his relations and duties towards his wife is admissible in mitigation of damages. 23 So the jury may consider evidence showing that their relations were unhappy, that his treatment of her was cruel and unkind, or that there was a lack of affection between them. 21 So where statements 18 Romaine v. Decker, llApp. Div. (N. Y.) 20; 43 N. Y. Supp. 79. 19 Prettymanv. Williamson, 1 Penn. (Del. ) 224; 39 Atl. 731; Johnson v. Disbrow, 47 Mich. 59; Hartpence v. Rogers, 143 Mo. 623; 45 S. W. 650; Johnson v. Allen, 100 N. C. 131; Cor- nelius v. Hambay, 150 Pa. St. 359; 24 Atl. 515; 22 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 476. ^Waldron v. Waldron (C. C.-N. D 21 Hartpence v. Rogers, 143 Mo. 623; 45 S. W. 650. 22 Williams v. Williams, 20 Colo. 51; 37 Pac. 614. 23 Cross v. Grant, 32 N. H. 675; 13 Am. St. Rep. 607. See Schorn v. Berry, 63 Hun (N.Y.), 110: 43 N. Y. St. R. 508. M Prettyman v. Williamson, 1 Penn- (Del.) 224; 39 Atl. 731; Coleman v. 111.), 45 Fed. 314. I White, 43 Ind. 429; Hadley v. Hey- ' 526 ( ' R I M I NAL CON V ERSATION. § 460 have been made by the wife, prior to the alleged seduction, afi to cruel treatment of her by her husband, evidence of such statements is admissible fur the purpose of mitigating the dam- ages. 25 But evidence of domestic trouble occurring years before the time of the alleged seduction is not admissible, being too remote.* Again, evidence is admissible that the husband is living apart from his wife, 27 for if they were separated before the wife committed adultery with the defendant, such fact would be a good reason why damages against the defendant should be assessed at a lower rate. 28 But such facts, however, only go in mitigation of damages. So though there may be a written agree- ment between the husband and wife, in which she agrees to re- lease her marital rights with her husband, in consideration of a certain amount, sueh agreement is no defense to an action for the alienation of the husband's affections.-' Again, the defend- ant may show in mitigation of damages that the relations of the plaintiff with other women at times subsequent to the marriage, and before the trial, have been of a criminal character.* So where a husband has brought an action against his wife's father for the alienation of the wife's affections, evidence is admissible that the husband was a frequenter of brothels and boasted of his criminal connection with lewd women, and that he was an ha- bitual drunkard. 31 The jury may also consider in mitigation of damages, the bad character of the wife or any specific acts of unchastity which she has been shown to have committed. 32 But wood, 121 Mass. 236; Palmer v. Cook, 7 Grya (Mass), 418; Ilarter v. Crill,33 Barb. (N. Y.) 283; Jones v. Thomp- son, 6 C. & 1". 41.") ; Calcroft v. Har- borougli, 4 C. & P. 499; Trelawney v. Coleman, 2 Stark. 191; Bromley v. Wallace, 4 Esp. 237. ^ Palmer v. Crook, 7 Gray ( Mass. ), 418; Rudd v. Rounds, 64 Vt. 432; 25 Atl. 438. * Dorman v. Sebree | K v. i. 52 S. W. 809, where evidence of domestic trouble which occurred eighteen years before the time of the injury was held inadmissible. 27 Prettyman v. Williamson, 1 Penn. I Del.) 224: :;;» Atl. 731. 23 Evans v. Evans, 68 Law J. Prob. 70; (1899) Prob. 195; 81 Law T. (U. S.) 60. -^Betser v. Betser, 87 ill. App. 399, aff'd 58 X. E. 249. But see Buckel v. Suss, 28 Abb. N. C. 21; 44 X. V. St. R. 571. ;, Sh;ittuck v. Hammond, 46 Vt. 466; II Am. Rep. 631. See Norton v. Warner, 9 Conn. 172; Smith v. Masten, 15 Wend. (X. V.) 270. 31 Bennett v. Smith, 21 Barb. ( X. Y. ) 139. a Xorton v. Warner, 9 Conn. 172; Harrison v. Price, 22 I ml. 165; Con- way v. Xichol, 34 Iowa. .".:'.:'.; Winter v. Henn, 4 C. & P. 494. § 461 ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS. where such evidence has been given in behalf of the defendant, the plaintiff may show in rebuttal the general reputation for chastity of his wife. 33 And though immoral conduct on the part of the wife of the plaintiff may mitigate the damages recover- able by him for her seduction, yet if it appears that her immoral conduct took place before marriage and was confined exclusively to her intimacy with the defendant, who induced the plaintiff to marry her on his recommendation that she was a good girl, and the plaintiff married her, believing her to be pure and virtuous, such conduct should not be considered in mitigation of dam- ages. 34 And if there has been, in respect to the wrongful act of the wife with the defendant, any loose or negligent conduct on the part of the husband, not amounting to consent, such con- duct may be considered by the jury. 33 But though a husband may, after knowledge of the infidelity of his wife cohabit with her, such fact is not a bar to an action against the one who seduced her. 36 And the fact that the wife consented to an illicit intercourse with the defendant is no defense to an action for her seduction, 31 but otherwise if the intercourse with the de- fendant was the result of her own licentiousness. 38 And the defendant may show by letters from the wife to him, or by other evidence, that the first advances were made by the wife, such evidence tending to mitigate the damages. 39 § 461. Advice by parent to son to leave wife. — In an action against a parent for advising his son to separate from his wife, it is decided that though the advice was wilful, yet it is not thereby necessarily malicious so as to render the parent liable in dam- ages for the abandonment if the parent was moved by proper motives for his son's welfare and happiness, 40 but otherwise if 33 Browning v. Jones, 52 111. App. 597. •^Stumm v. Hummell, 39 Iowa, 478. See Conway v. Nichol, 34 Iowa, 533. ^Prettyman v. Williamson, 1 Penn. (Del.) 224; 30 Atl. 731. 36 Smith v. Meyers, 51 Neb. 857; 71 N. W. 1006. See Sikes v. Tippins, 85 Ga. 231; Stumm v, Hummell, 39 Iowa, 483. 528 37 Moore v. Hammons (Ind. ), 21 N. E. 1111. 38 Hoggins v. Coad, 58 111. App. 58. 39 Elsam v. Fawcett, 2 Esp. 562. *» Tucker v. Tucker, 74 Miss. 93; 32 L. R. A. 623; 19 So. 955; 43 Cent. L. J. 118; Brown v. Brown, 124 N. C. 19; 32 S. E. 320; Gernerd v. Ger- nerd, 185 Pa. St. 233; 40 L. R. A. 549; 39 Atl. 884; 42 W. N. C. 49. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION. § 162 the act of the parent was unjustifiable, 4 ' as where the parent had not properly investigated the farts or acted recklessly or from dishonest purposes, since in such cases the law will presume malice.'- In an action of this character it is proper to show in mitigation of damages that the son was married while he was intoxicated and that no affection everexisted on his part towards her. 15 § 462. Evidence — Generally.— In an action for alienation of affections, evidence is admissible as to the wealth of the defend- ants. 44 And a female plaintiff in an action fur alienating the affections of her husband may give evidence of the cost to her of living. 48 And she may also show that by reason of the con- veyance of his property to the defendant, she has not been able to recover anything on account of alimony and costs due to her by reason of a judgment of separation in her favor."' And as bearing on the question of damages, letters written by the plain- tiff's wife to the husband prior to the time of the alleged aliena- tion of her affections are admissible in evidence. 47 So also in an action by the. wife for alienation of her husband's affections letters written by him to her before and after he became ac- quainted with the defendant are admissible for the purpose of showing his feelings towards her before defendant intervened and subsequent thereto. 48 As are expressions of remorse by him in interviews with her after the intimacy. 1 '' And for the purpose 41 <;ernerd v. Gernenl, 185 Pa. St. 233; 40 L. R. A. 549; 39 Atl. 884; 42 W. X. C. 49. « Brown v. Brown, 124 N. C. 19; 32 S. E. 320. * 3 Bassett v. Bassett, 20 III. App. 54:;. " Peters v. Lake, CO 111. 206; Nich- ols v. Nichols, 1 17 M<». :;s7: is s. \V. <»47: \V;il. Iron v. Waldron, )•"> Fed. 31G. Hut, sec Bailej v. Bailey, '.»l Iowa, 598; 03 N. W. 341; Derham \. Derham (Mich.), 83 N. W. 1005; 7 Det. L. N. 430. In these lav, two cases which were actions by wife for alienation of husband's affections such evidence was held inadmissible. 34 ** Bowersox v. Bowersox. 115 Mich. 21; 72 N. W. 980; 4 Det. L. X. 742. "Wilson v. Coulter, 20 App. Div. (N. Y.) 85; 51 \. V. Supp. Sill. 4,; Homer v. Vance, 93 Wis. 352; 07 N. W. 72H. Such letters were held admissible notwithstanding thai the Wis. Rev. Stat. sec. 4072, provided that confidential communications between r husband and wife during their marriage Bhould not l>o dis- closed. 4 -\sh v. Prunier, in:, Fed. 72l\ 44 ('. C. A. 675. » Ash \. Prunier, 105 Fed. 722; 44 C. C. A. 075. 529 § 463 ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS. of showing loss of affection, a husband who has discovered his wife in the company of the defendant may give proof of state- ments made by her at such time as to the state of her affection for her husband and for the defendant. 50 But evidence of state- ments made by the wife of the plaintiff subsequent to the im- proper relations between her and the defendant, which the latter admits and which tend to show that her mind was the dominat- ing one, are inadmissible for any purpose. 51 Where, however, a wife sues the parents of her husband for the alienation of his affections, evidence that he had stated that he had decided to leave his wife is admissible as part of the res gestae to show an accomplished fact resulting from defendant's influence over him. 52 Again, as bearing upon the question of damages in an action by a woman for alienation of affections, it is proper to show that prior to the husband leaving home she had improper relations with another of which her husband had knowledge, though it does not appear that he left because of such relations. 53 In an action by a husband or wife for alienation of affections, the bur- den of proving the allegations in reference thereto is upon the plaintiff. 54 And where she seeks to recover for the loss of his society, affections and companionship, she must show that the defendants have, by means of their tortious acts, enticed him away from her and thus caused the loss for which she claims a re- cover}-. 55 § 463. Pleading. — The declaration in an action for the alienation of the affections of a husband or wife should allege the loss of consortium ; the alienation of the affections is merely to be considered in aggravation of damages and is not a sub- stantive cause of action, 56 and the declaration should allege the facts which constitute the wrong and not conclusions. 57 60 Rose v. Mitchell, 21 R. I. 270; 21 R. I. (part 2) 60; 43 Atl. 67; As to evidence of affection, see also Ea- gon v. Eagon, 60 Kan. 597; 57 Pac. 942; 49 Cent. L. J. 288. 51 Vaughn v. Clarkson, 19 R. I. 497; 36 Atl. 1135; 34 Atl. 989. 52 Lockwood v. Lockwood, 67 MinD. 476; 70 N. W. 784. 530 53 Wolf v. Frank, 92 Md. 138; 48 Atl. 132; 52 L. R. A. 102. i4 Myers v. Raynolds,, 3 Ohio Leg. News,' 127; 3 Ohio N. P. 186. 55 Eklredge v. Eldredge, 79 Hun (N. Y.), 511; 61 N. Y. St. R. 540. 56 Neville v. Gile (Mass.), 54 N. E. 841. " Mead v. Hoskins, 6 Ohio N. P. 522; 8 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 342. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION. § 1' I But it is decided that it is a sufficient allegation of lact to sustain an action for alienation of affections where the complaint alii that the defendants wrongfully enticed, influenced and induced plaintiff's husband to leave her. 98 Hut in another case a petition which stated that the defendants conspired with the malicious intent of injuring plaintiff and of destroying his peace and happi- ness and to injure and deprive him of the comfort, society and services of his wife, and that they induced her to leave and separate from him, was held to be demurrable as stating conclu- sions. 7 ' 1 And where a complaint alleged that the defendant lived in immoral relations with the plaintiff's husband, having knowl- edge of the marriage between plaintiff and her husband, and that the defendant had assumed the husband's surname, and that such assumption and false impersonation of the plaintiff preju- diced her in the community and scandalized and injured her in name and fame as a lawful wife, by reason of which she was damaged in a specified amount, was held not to set forth a cause of action.* M Nichols V. Nichols, 1:34 Mo. 187; P. 522; 8 Ohio S. & C. P. Dec. 35 S. W. 577. 342. M Mead v. Hoskius. t> Ohio N. . "" Hodecker v. Strieker, 39 N. Y. I Suop. 515. 531 § 464 SEDUCTION. CHAPTER XXL SEDUCTION. § 464. Seduction — Action by woman to recover for. 465. Seduction— Abortion by phy- sician — Liable for entire damages — Case. 466. Action by womau — Mitigation of damages. 467. Action by parent. 468. Action by parent — Mitigation of damages. 469. Action by parent — Barred by marriage subsequent to se- duction and before confine- ment. § 464. Seduction— Action by woman to recover for. — In those jurisdictions where a female is entitled to recover damages for her own seduction, it is not necessary to a recovery that there should have been a promise of marriage, 1 but where such a promise lias been made, it is said that the breach thereof may be proved in aggravation of damages.' Nor is it necessary that the woman should at all times in the past have lead a virtuous life. It might occur that at some time in the past she ma}' have led an unchaste life but that she had reformed and that at the time of the alleged seduction her conduct was that of a virtuous and moral woman, and where such facts appear in evidence her seduction should be visited with damages to such an amount as the jury believe the defendant ought to pay. 3 But to entitle her to recovery in such a case, it must appear that there was a ref- ormation. 1 In estimating the damages in an action for seduc- tion, the jury may consider the consequences naturally resulting from the defendant's wrongful act. So upon the question as to whether a verdict for $5,000 was excessive, it was held that it 1 Milliken v. Long, 188 Pa. St. 411; 238; 3 L. R. A. 529; 21 Pac. 129; 41 Atl. 540; Franklin v. McCorkle, 10 Lea (Tenn.), 609. - Franklin v. McCorkle, 16 Lea (Tenn.), 609. 3 Patterson v. Hayden, IT Oreg. 532 Gemmill v. Brown (Ind. App. ), 56 N. E. 691. 4 Patterson v. Hayden, 17 Oreg. 238; 3 L. R..A. 529; 21 Pac. 129. SEDUCTION. 6 [&4 was not excessive where it appeared that the defendant • married man fifty-two years of age, and the plaintiff an orphan aged seventeen at the time of the seduction, and that the defend- ant hud procured two abortions to be performed upon her, as a result of which her health had hern greatly injured and she was prevented from Labor, and had suffered much pain and anguish and injury to her reputation. 9 So where pregnancy ensues, re- sulting in childbirth and sickness, such elements may be consid- ered," and the suffering and anguish of mind in connection with childbirth are also elements for which recovery may be had. So, also, the jury may consider the effect the seduction has had upon her standing in the community, and that she has lost her social standing, and evidence is admissible of the treatment ac- corded her by her individual acquaintances before and after the seduction.'' Again, the motive of the defendant may be an ele- ment to he considered in estimating the damages in an action for seduction, as an aggravation of the wrongful act, and in this connection and as bearing on his motive, evidence of his arts, persuasions and promises is admissible,' 1 and if the defendant has given publicity to the seduction, such fact may be a ground for additional damages." In an action of this nature exemplary damages may be recovered, 11 and evidence is admissible as to the financial standing of the defendant. 1 - 6 Guilder v. Tibbits, 153 1ml. 59 1 : 55 N. E. 762. ,j McCoy v. Trucks, 121 Ind. 292; 23 X. E. 1)3. See Egan v. Murray, 80 Iowa, 180; 45 X. \V. 563, where it was held thai a verdict in au action for seduction for SI, 500, was not ex- cessive where ii appeared that the plaintiff had given hirth to au ille- gitimate child. 7 Gemmill v. Brown (Ind. App.), 56 N. E. 691; Simons v. Bushy. 119 End. 13. 8 Havvn v. Banghart, 76 Iowa, 688; 3'.) N.W.251. See (, under v. TiU.its. 153 Ind. 591; 55 N. E. 762. 9 Stevenson v. Belknap, Iowa, 97. 10 Simons v. Busby (Ind.), 21 N. E. 451. 11 Ball v. Bruce. 21 111. 161; Steven- son v. Belknap, *'* Iowa. 97; Stout v. I'rall, 1 X. .1. L. 7:<; Lawyer v. Eritcher, 130 X. V. 239; 14 L. R. A. 700; 41 X. Y. sr. K. 268; 29 X. E. 267; 45 Alb. L. J". 72: Kerns v. Bagen- buckle, 28 J. & S. ( X. Y.) 228: 42 N. V. St. It. 669. '- shewalter v. Bergman, 123 Ind. 155: 2:'. \. E. 686; Gemmill v. Brown (Ind. App. (,56 \. E.I 91. See Dehler v. state, Bierck, 22 [nd. App 383; 53 X. E. 850. This case was a bastardy proceeding, and for the purpose of ascertaining the proper amount to assess against the defendant, evi- dence of his financial condition and prospects ia life was admitted. 533 §§ 465-467 seduction. § 4G5. Seduction — Abortion by physician — Liable for en- tire damages — Case. — Where in an action by a woman for se- duction, it appears that a physician, acting in conspiracy with her seducer, performed abortions upon the plaintiff for the purpose of concealing the illicit intercourse, and that the physician repre- sented that in order to save her life the abortions were necessary, the latter will be liable for the entire damages of the plaintiff, since the continued course of conduct of the seducer consti- tuted an entire wrong which will not be apportioned among the wrongdoers, and the fact that the physician did not know that the illicit intercourse was the result of plaintiff's seduction will not relieve him from liability. 13 § 466. Action by woman — Mitigation of damages. — The character of a woman prior to the time of her seduction and specific acts of lewdness on her part may be shown in mitigation of damages in an action by her for seduction. 11 But the defend- ant in such an action cannot show that the plaintiff's reputation was bad after the seduction, 15 nor can his damages be lessened by the fact that subsequent to the seduction the plaintiff con- tinued to meet his advances. 16 § 467. Action by parent.— The parent's right to recover for the seduction of a minor daughter is technically based at com- mon law upon the loss of services, and where no such law exists the action cannot be maintained. 17 In Tennessee, however, it is not necessary for either the pleading or the proof to show that there has been a loss of her services to entitle a father to recover damages. 18 And in Michigan also a similar rule pre- vails, it being only necessary in this state to show the parental » Guilder v. Tibbits (Ind. ), 55 N. E. 762. 14 Gemmill v. Brown (Ind. App. ), 56 N. E. 691. 15 She waiter v. Bergman, 123 Ind Md. 369; Kennedy v. Shea, 110 Mass. 147; Mulvehall v. Mill ward, 11 N. Y. 343; Martin v. Payne, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 387; Grinnell v. Wells, 7 M. & G. 1033, and other cases cited in tliis 155; 23 N. E. 686. See sec. 464, herein. I section. But see Franklin v. McCor- 16 Stoudt v. Shepherd (Mich.), 41 kle, 16 Lea. (Tenn.) 609. N. W. 696. is Franklin v. McCorkle, 16 Lea. 17 Humble v. Shoemaker. 70 Iowa, | (Tenn.) 609. 223; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 i SEDUCTION. § 167 or other relation by nature or wardship to permit a recovery. 19 But in those jurisdictions where the parent's action is based on l,»ss of services,it is necessary to show that the relation of master and servant exists between the parent and daughter to authorize a recovery,* and if it appears that such relation dors not exist, as in the ease <»f a child being bound outas an apprentice, there can be no recovery of damages by the father for the daughter's seduction . a But slight evidence, however, is suffi- cient to establish such relation, 22 and though the action may be founded on loss of services, it is immaterial whether the ser- vices rendered by her for him were paid for or not. 2 So, also, though tie' daughter is temporarily employed elsewhere, a loss of services will be presumed in l'avor of the father, who has not parted with his right to the services of a minor daughter.- 1 And the fact that the daughter was not in the father's actual service, at the time of her illness and death, but was at the defendant's, will not prevent the father from recovering for loss of her ser- vices on account of the seduction. 3 "' But it has been decided that the defendant may show that the plaintiff is not legally entitled to the services of the girl for whose seduction he is suing to recover damages, by proof of the fact that his marriage with the woman who is the mother of the seduced girl was void. 26 To 19 Stoudt v. Shepherd (Mich.), 61 N. W. 696. 20 Barbour v. Stephenson (C. C. D. Ky.), 32 Fed. 06. 2i Dain v. WyculT, 7 X. Y. 191; Pos- tlewaite v. Parkes, 3 Burr. 1879. -Lamb v. Taylor, 07 Bid. 85; 8 Atl. 760; 7 Cent. 377; Davidson v. Goodall, 18 X. II. 427; Gray v. Dur- land, 51 N. Y. 424; Hewitt v. Prime, 21 Wend. (N. Y. ) 79. 2 » Lamb v. Taylor, 67 Md. 85; 8 Atl. 760; 7 Cent. 377. "Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me. 292; 9 Atl. 623; 4 N. Eng. Rep. 495; Greenwood v. Greenwood, 28 Md. 369; Mulvehall v. Millward, 11 N. Y. 343; Clarke v. Fitch, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 459; Lamb v. Taylor, 67 Md. 85; 8 Atl. 760; 7 Cent. 377. Under tlie Minnesota Gen. Stat. 1894, sec. 5163, providing that an action for the seduction of a daughter may be prosecuted by the father, though the daughter is not living with t lie father at the time she is seduced, and there is no loss of services, the plaintiff, in such an ac- tion, is not obliged to slmw that his daughter's ruin was accomplished by seductive nets to enable him to recover other than his actual money loss. Hein v. Holdridge (Minn.), 81 N. W. 522. 25 Lawyer v. Kriteher. 54 Hun (N. Y.), 586; 28 N. Y. St. R. 221; 7 X. V. Supp. WO. ■■»Howland v. Howland, 114 Mass. 517; 19 Am. Rep. 381. 535 § 467 SEDUCTION. entitle a parent to recover damages for the seduction of a minor daughter, there must be some proof of actual damage, but the slightest proof of damage will be sufficient. 27 And the damages which a father may recover incase of the seduction of a minor daughter are not limited to a recovery for the loss of her ser- vices, and for expenses incurred, but may include compensation for what he as a father has felt and suffered for the wrong and injury received for his daughter's ruin.* So the disgrace sus- tained by the plaintiff and his family, as a result of her seduc- tion, is an element to be considered. 2 ' So, also, there may be a recovery for expense necessarily incurred as the natural and direct result of the seduction. 30 So again, the jury may consider in aggravation of the damages that the defendant procured an abortion to be performed upon the seduced girl. 31 And in certain cases exemplary damages may be given in the discretion of the jury. 32 Mere proof of criminal intercourse is not, however, suffi- cient to justify an allowance of such damages. 33 And they should 27 Lawyer v. Fritcher, 54 Hun (N. Y.), 586; 28 N. Y. St. 221; 7 N. Y. Supp. 909. See in this connec- tion as to what is sufficient to show a loss or damage necessary to sus- tain the action, Lencker v. Steilen, 89 111. 545; Blagge v. Ilsley, 127 Mass. 191; Abraham v. Kidney, 104 Mass. 222; Hewitt v. Prime, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 79; White v. Nellis, 31 Barb. (N. Y.). 279. 28 Barbour v. Stevenson (C. C. D. Ky.), 32 Fed. 66; Herring v. Jester, 2 Houst, (Del.) 66; Pruitt v. Cox, 21 Ind. 15; Hatch v. Fuller, 131 Mass. 574; Fox v. Stevens. 13 Minn. 272; Morgan v. Ross, 74 Mo. 318; Coon v. Moffitt, 3 NT. J. L. 436; Lunt v. Phil- brick, 59 N. H. 59; Lipe v. Eiseu- leid, 32 N. Y. 229; Phelin v. Klender- dine, 20 Pa. St. 354; Rolling v. Chambers, 51 Vt. 592: Riddle v. McGinnis, 22 W. Va, 253; Lavery v. Orooke, 52 Wis. 612; 38 Am. Rep. 768; Irwin v. Dearman, 11 East. 23. 29 Herring v. Jester, 2 Houst. (Del.) 66; Mighell v. Stone, 74 111. 536 App. 129, affd 175 111. 261; 51 N. E. 906; Felkner v. Scarlet, 29 Ind. 154, Smith v. Young, 26 Mo. App. 575; Lunt v. Philbrick, 59 N. H. 59; Coon v. Moffitt, 3 N. J. L. 436; Par- ker v. Monteith, 7 Oreg. 277. 30 Simpson v. Grayson, 54 Ark. 404; 16 S. W. 4; Humble v. Shoemaker, 70 Iowa, 223; Hogan v. Cregan, 6 .Robt. (N. Y.) 138. 31 White v. Murtland, 71 111. 250; Klopfer v. Bromme, 26 Wis. 372. See Gunder v. Tibbits, 153 Ind. 591; 55 N. E. 762. 32 Mighell v. Stone, 74 111. App. 129, aff'd 175 111. 261; 51 N. E. 906; Russell v. Chambers, 31 Minn. 54; Kerns v. Hagenbuckle, 28 J. & S. (N. Y.) 228; 42 N. Y. St. R. 669; Lawyer v. Fritcher, 130 N. Y. 239; Knight v. Wilcox, 18 Barb. (N. Y.) 212; Badgely v. Decker, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 577; Lavery v. Crooke, 52 Wis. 612; Irwin v. Dearman, 11 East. 23. 33 Hogan v. Cregan, 6 Robt. (N. Y.) 138. SEDUCTION. § 468 not be awarded in an action for Beduction except the action be brouglit by the parent of the seduced girl or by the girl her- self. 8 * § 408. Action by parent -Mitigation of damages. — In an action to recover for the seduction of a. minor daughter, the facl that she has been guilty of youthful indiscretions in the past will not prevent a recovery of the damages sustained, where il appears that she had reformed, and at the time of the all seduction was living a virtuous life and enjoyed the esteem and regard of her acquaintances/" 3 And a parent's damages will not be limited to a recovery for loss of expenses because of previous acts of unchastity on her part. 86 But the defendant may, for the purpose of mitigating the damages, show that the daughter's unchaste conduct in the past has been a matter of common knowledge, and may introduce evidence showing specific acts of illicit intercourse between her and others. 37 And where her un- chaste conduct has been so notorious that nothing coidd be added to the sufferings of the parent, or to the danger of corrupting the family's morals by the seduction, no recovery can be had for such elements. 38 And the defendant may show, for the pur- pose of mitigating damages, acts and conduct on the part of the plaintiff which amount to negligence or a careless indifference.* 1 In a case in Rhode Island, the defendant endeavored to show by various facts a reckless or careless indifference on the part of a father in respect to his daughters, which could be considered in mitigation of damages in an action for seduction. The evi- dence which the court held was inadmissible, as not tending to show such indifference, was that the father, who was a farm M Lipe v. Eizenlerd, 32 N. Y. 229. Reed V.Williams, 5 Sneed (Tenn.), ^Millikenv. Long, 188 Pa. St. 411; ! 580; Parker v. Coture, 63 Vt. 155; 41 Atl. 540. Carpenter v. Wall, 11 Ad. a I 86 Simpson v. Grayson, 54 Ark. Verry v. Watkins, 7 C. & P. 308. 404; 10 S. W. 4. '-Simpson v. Grayson, 54 Ark. 87 Simpson v. Grayson, 54 Ark. 404; 404; 165 S. W. 4. 10 S. W. 4; White v. Murtland, 71 M Richardson v. Pouts, 11 Ind. 466; 111. 250; 22 Am. Rep. 100; Smith v. Zerflng v. Mourer, 2 Greene l Milburn, 17 Iowa, SO; Dalman v. Ko- 520; Graham v. Smith, 1 Edm. Sel. ning, 54 Mich. 320; Stoudt v. Shep- Cas. (N. Y.) 267; Travis v. Barger, herd (Mich.), 41 N. W. 696; Fletcher 24 Barb. (N. Y.J 614; Sherwood v. v. Randall, Anth. N. P. (N. Y.) 267; Tetman, 55 Pa. St. 77. 53 § 469 SEDUCTION. laborer, was absent from home all day, while his wife was also away, as a result of which his daughters were given an oppor- tunity to receive male visitors, and that under such circumstances an elder daughter had been seduced three years before and had given birth to a child two months after her marriage. 41 So again, where the misconduct of the daughter was as much the cause of the seduction as the acts of her seducer, such fact may be con- sidered in mitigation" of damages and will prevent a recovery on account of the injured feelings of the family and also of exem- plary damages. 41 But the defendant cannot show for the pur- pose of mitigating damages an offer on his part to marry the girl whom he has seduced. 42 Nor should the jury consider the fact in estimating the damages recoverable by a father for a daughter's seduction that she may recover, or has recovered damages, for her seduction. 43 Nor is evidence admissible to show that the plaintiff's character is bad for the purpose of reducing the damages. 44 § 469. Action by parent— Barred by marriage subsequent to seduction and before confinement.— If a father's recovery is limited to loss of services and expenses in an action for seduction, 45 and after the daughter's seduction she is married to another than her seducer, and she is not confined until after her marriage, and there has been no loss of services or expenses in- curred by the father as a result of the daughter's seduction prior to her marriage and confinement, there can be no recovery by the father, since he was neither entitled to her services nor bound to incur expense in her behalf after her marriage. 46 40 Tourgee v. Rose, 19 R. I. 432; 37 Atl. 9. « Comer v. Taylor, 82 Mo. 341. 4 2 White v. Murtland, 71 111. 250; 22 Am. Rep. 100; Ingersoll v. Jones, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 661. 538 43 Pruitt v. Cox, 21 Ind. 15. 44 Dain v. Wyckoff, 18 N. Y. 47. 45 See Iowa Code, sec. 2,556. 46 Humble v. Shoemaker, 70 Iowa, 223. TITLE IV. CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. CHAPTER XXII. CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. § 470 Civil damage acts Who may sue. 471. Measure and elements of dam- ages — Generally. 472. Death. 47:1 Loss of support. 474. Injury to feelings — Mental Buffering. 475. Exemplary damages — Gener- ally. 470. Exemplary damages— General rule. 477. Sale by employee without de- fendant's knowledge no de- fense—Exemplary damages — Mitigation of. 178. Evidence affecting damages — Generally. 47'.'. Evidence showing unlawful sale. 480. Sales by two or more persons — Recovery in case of. 481. Plaintiffs knowledge and con- sent to sale may be de- feuse. 482. Release of damages by wife no defense to action by children. 483. Pleading. 484. Civil rights acts — Damages and penalties. § 470. Civil damage acts — Who may sue. — In most of the states statutes have been passed, generally known as civil dam- age acts, which in substance provide that any person who shall supply liquor to one in the habit of becoming intoxicated, after he has been given notice of such habit, shall be liable in dam- ages for any injury or damage to the person, property or means of support of another as a result of liquor so supplied. L'nder such a statute conferring the right to recover such damages upon every wife, child, parent, guardian or employer, or other person, a husband is included in the general classification ••other per- sons." 1 Such a statute is declared not to be a penal statute but merely one giving a remedy for damages.' And a widow who 1 Landrum v. Flannigan, GO Kan. 436; 56 Pac. 753; Kan. Gen. Stat. 1897, chap. 101, sec. 41. -Keiuhardt v. Fritzsche, 69 Hun (N. V. i. 565; 53 N". Y. St. R. 261; 23 N. V. Supp. 958. § 470 CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. is without other means of support than that furnished by her son, and who by his death is injured in her means of support, may recover under such a statute, giving a right in such cases to a parent; 5 So where a statute provides that in case a liquor dealer violates his bond by selling liquors to a minor, " any per- son or persons aggrieved " may sue on his bond, a mother may maintain an action. 1 And under a statute giving a right of ac- tion to a parent against a liquor dealer and his bondsmen for loss of services of a minor son due to his death as the result of the sale to him of intoxicating liquors, the action may be prose- cuted in the name of the party entitled to damages, the inter- vention of an administrator of the estate of the deceased not being necessary , 5 Again, a married woman injured in any of the ways stated in the statute by the sale of liquors to her son may recover in her own name, though her husband, the father of the son, is living, where the statutes of the state permit her to sue as a feme sole.' 5 And where the liquor dealer's bond is required by statute to be conditioned that he will not sell liquors to any person after having received notice in writing from the wife of such person not to sell to him, and in case subsequent sales are made, the right is conferred upon the person " aggrieved " by the violation of the bond to sue thereon, a married woman who has given the notice required may recover on the bond where a sub- sequent sale is made, though she has not been injured thereby in person or property.' And again, where the statute in such a case gives a married woman the right to maintain an action in her own name, such right is not lost by her subsequently obtain- ing a divorce. 8 And the fact that a widow who sues under such 3 Depuy v. Cook, 90 Hun (N. Y.), 43; N. Y. Lans. 1873, chap. 64G. *Peavy v. Goss, 90 Tex. 89; 37 S. W. 317; Tex. Act. 23d Leg. chap. 121, p. 177. 5 Fitzgerald v. Donoher, 48 Neb. 852; 67 N. W. 880; Neb. Comp. Stat, chap. 50. 6 McMaster v. Dyer, 44 W. Va. 644; 29 S. E. 1016. ' Fay v. Williams (Tex. Civ. App. ), 41 S. W. 497; Tex. Gen. Laws, 1893, pp. 177-181. 540 8 Nordin v. Kjos, 13 S. D. 497; 83 N. W. 573; S. D. Laws, 1897, chap. 72, which requires liquor dealers to give bonds and provides that " it shall be lawful for any mar- ried woman or any other person at her request to institute and maintain a suit on any such bond mentioned in this act for all damages sustained by her or by her children on account of such traffic and the money when collected shall be paid over for the use of herself and her children. 1 ' CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. § 171 an act procured liquor for her husband and drank with him on some occasions does not bar her from the right to maintain the action.'' In Nebraska in such an action on a bond, a married woman may sue in her own name, or she may join her children, and the damages when collected are to be paid over to her for the maintenance of herself and children. 10 So, also, in Illinois a widow and minor children, who were wholly dependent on de- ceased for support, may sue jointly. 1 ' But in an action to recover for the breach of liquor dealer's bond by the sale of intoxicating liquors to a minor son. the wife cannot maintain the action by joining her husband as plaintiff pro forma, as the recovery in such an action is community property. 12 In New York it is declared that a posthumous child is within the provisions of the law giv- ing a right of action to every husband, wife, child or other per- son." And in Nebraska a poor person dependent for support upon a relative whose death was due to the sale of intoxicating liquors to him, may maintain an action against the vendors of such liquors in his own name and for his own benefit." Again, in Pennsylvania the intoxicated person himself may recover under a statute which provides that " any one aggrieved may recover full damages." 1 "' In Illinois though a father may be legally en- titled to his son's wages, yet such fact gives him no right to re- covery under the act of that state for the intoxication of a son if he is not living with his family and his means of support are not affected. 16 § 471. Measure and elements of damages Generally.— The amount of damages recoverable under the civil damage acts for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, is a question to be determined by the jury under the instruction of the 9 Kliment v. Corcoran. 51 Neb. Y. Supp. 968; N. Y. Laws. 1st:?. 142; 70 N. W. 910. chap. 646. 10 Warden v. McConnell (Neb.), 36 M Fitzgerald v. Donoher, 48 Neb. N. W. 278. 852; 67 N. W. 8S0. Sec Neb. Comp. 11 Ilelmuth v. Bell (111.), 37 N. E. Stat. 1895, chap. (17. 230. 15 Littol v. Young, "> Pa. Super. Ct. 12 Wartelsky v. McGee (Tex. Civ. 205; 41 W. N. C. 100; Pa. act. May8, App. ), 30 S. \V. 69. 1S54. 13 Quinlen v. Welch, 69 Hun i.N. 16 Lossman v. Knigbts, 77 111. App. Y.). 584; ■">:; N. Y. St. R. 250 ; 23 N. 670. 541 § 471 CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. court. 1 ' And the verdict of the jury in such an action will not be set aside as excessive, unless so erroneous as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice, ignorance or corruption. 18 Under the statutes in some of the states, money paid for in- toxicating liquors sold in violation of the law may he recovered from the person selling such liquors. 19 And recovery may be had for expenses of medical attendance in an action to recover damages under such a statute. 20 So, also, where a husband abuses his wife so as to cause illness, while he is intoxicated as a result of liquors sold to him in violation of the law, recovery may be had by the wife for the illness so caused.- 1 And, where, owing to the negligence of a minor while intoxicated, a horse 17 Miller v. Gleason, 18 Ohio C. C. 374; 10 OhioC. D. 20. 18 Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220; 6 S. E. 485. See the following cases where amount of verdicts in various cases has been considered: Intoxica- tion of plaintiff's husband resulting in death, whose support during life was worth from $200 to $300 per year — $1,000 not excessive. Brown v. Butler, 66 111. App. 86. As result of drink reduced from prosperous business man to a sot — property ex- hausted and business ruined — wife abused and loss of support because husband's means therefor squan- dered—sales not made by defendant alone but by several — $1,000 not ex- cessive. Bunyan v. Loftus, 90 Iowa, 122; 57 N. W. 685. Husband killed while intoxicated— age thirty-five— good wages as a mechanic which had been devoted to support of wife and four children— wife and children left destitute — $850 not excessive. Schiek v. Sanders, 53 Neb. 664; 74 N. W. 39. Causing intemperance of hus- band — wife deprived of husband's former earning capacity of four dol- lars per day — loss will continue for some time— $1,000, not excessive. Bennett v. Levi, 46 N'. Y. St. R. 754; 19 N. Y. Supp. 226. Loss of good 542 and comfortable support by death of son while intoxicated — mother in poor health, age sixty-three, and having no other means of support— $1,325, not excessive. Du Puy v. Cook, 90 Hun (N. Y.), 43; 70 N. Y. St. R. 397; 35 N. Y. Supp. 632. Death of husband while intoxicated — aged thirty-eight — strong and ro- bust, earning one dollar and a half to three dollars per day — paying for a home — family comfortably sup- ported — verdict to wife for $275, in- adequate. Johnson v. Gram, 72 111. App. 676. 19 Sellers v. Arie, 99 Iowa, 515; 68 N. W. 814; Barrett v. Delano (Me.), 14 Atl. 288; Kilburn v. Coe, 48 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 144. In Kohn v. Melcher (C. C. S. D. Iowa), 43 Fed. 641; 10 L. R. A. 439, however, it is held that money paid by a phar- macist for intoxicating liquors can- not be recovered under the Iowa Code, § 1550, which gives a right of action for the recovery of money paid for liquors sold in violation of the prohibitory liquor law. 20 Thomas v. Dansby, 74 Mich. 389; Aldrich v. Sager, 9 Hun (N. Y.), 537. - 1 Kear v. Garrison, 13 Ohio C. C. 447; 7 Ohio Dec. 515. CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. § 471 was killed and the carriage injured, the owner of such horse and carriage was permitted to recover for such Loss from the person un- lawfully selling the liquor to the minor. 28 Again, where a horse belonging to plaintiff was killed by her husband while intoxi- cated, it was decided that in an action under the civil damage act sin- could recover the value of the horse. 28 So, also, where as the result of the sale of intoxicating liquors to a person, he per- mitted the garden to go to waste, it was held that the person selling such Liquors could nut escape Liability in an action by the wife, because she; might have employed some one else to market such produce.'-' 1 Recovery, however, cannot be had in an action under such a statute for money which was taken from the owner's pockets while intoxicated, since the proximate cause of the loss is not the sale of liquor but the intervening wrong- ful act of a third person.'"' So, also, damages for an assault committed by a person while intoxicated are too remote to be recovered, where the assault is voluntary and incited by the persons assaulted.- 1 ' And the contingent liability of a father for his son's support under the poor laws of a state because "i injuries sustained, due to the unlawful sales of liquor to such minor, is too remote to permit a recovery for the unlawful sale. ■'■ But where the support of an adult son as a poor person under the statute was voluntarily assumed by the father, it was decided that the latter, in an action under the civil damage act, might recover the sum which it would be reasonably necessary for him to expend in the support of such son based on his own and his son's expectation of life.* And in an action against a saloon keeper to recover for damages sustained as a result of the dis posal of property by the plaintiff while intoxicated from liquors furnished by defendant, there can be no recovery in the absence 22 Flower v. Witkousky (Mich.), 14 West. 44; 37 X. YV. 364; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 8 Hun (X. Y.), 10, aff'd B'Swiufm v. Lowry, 37 Minn. 345; :'.t \. W. i'-'. - 7 Veon v. Creaton, 138 Pa. St. 48; 74 N. Y. 516. 9 L. R. A. 814; 27 \V. X. C. 57; 48 - ;i Morenus v. Crawford, 51 Hun (X. Y.), 89. ' 2i Maloney v. Dailey, 07 111. App. 427. 25 Gage v. Harvey, 00 Ark. 68; 43 L. R. A. 143; 48 S. W. 898. Phila. Leg. Int. 35; 21 l'itts. L. J. X. S. i:. I. -* Clinton v. Laning, 01 Mich. 355. 543 8 472 CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. of any evidence as to the value of such property or an admis- sion in reference thereto. 29 § 472. Death. — The general rule is that where a statute gives a person who has been injured in his or her means of support by reason of the intoxication of another, a right to recover damages therefor against the person who by giving or selling the intoxi- cating liquors has caused the intoxication in whole or in part, the person so injured may also recover where the intoxication causes the death of such person. 80 So under such a statute a wife may recover for the death of her husband under such cir- cumstances, 31 and a woman for the death of her son, 32 and a minor for the death of his father. 33 But in order to authorize a recov- ery it must appear that the plaintiff has suffered in his or her means of support, and that the death was caused by the sales of liquor shown. 14 But though necessary to show a loss of support, 2 9 Roberts v. Hopper, 55 Neb. 599; 1813, 04 N. W. 245; Mead v. Stratton. 76 N. W. 21. 30 Cruse v. Aden, 127 111. 231; 3 L. K. A. 327; 20 N. E. 73; Flynn v. Fogarty, 106 111. 263; Emory v. Ad- dis, 71 111. 273; Johnson v. Gram, 72 111. App. 676; Brown v. Butler, 66 111. App. 86; Marschall v. Langhran, 47 111. App. 29; Westphal v. Austin, 39 111. App. 230; Reath v. State, John- son, 16 Ind. App. 146; 44 N. E. 808; Rafferty v. Buckman, 46 Iowa, 195; Doty v. Postal, 87 Mich. 143; 49 N. W. 534; Lafler v. Fisher (Midi.), 79 87 N. Y. 493; Davis v. Standish, 26 Hun (N. Y.), 608. 3-= Du Puy v. Cook, 90 Hun (N. Y. ), 43; 70 N. Y. St. R. 397; 35 N. Y. Supp. 632. 33 Westphal v. Austin, 39 111. App. 230. 34 Meyer v. Butterbrodt,.146 111. 131 ; 34 N. E. 152, affg43 111. App. 312; Westphal v. Austin, 39 111. App. 230 ; Davis v. Standish, 26 Hun (N. Y.), 608. Where the evidence showed that a person became intoxicated by X. W. 934; 6 Det. L. N. 358, Grau v. | reason of liquors sold to him, and Houston, 45 Neb. 813; 64 N. W. 245; | that when in such condition he fell a Mead v. Stratton, 87 N. Y. 493; Quain ; distance of about thirteen feet to the v. Russell, 8 Hun (N. Y.), 319; Lan- son v. Eggleston, 28 App. Div. ( N. Y. ) 52; 52 N. Y. Supp. 181; Du Puy v. Cook, 90 Hun (N. Y.), 43; 70 N. Y. St. R. 397; 35 N. Y. Supp. 632. But frozen ground, while going up an out- side stairway to his home, that he was taken up in an unconscious con- dition and lived for five days after the injury, which was pronounced by the see Brookiuire v. Monaghan, 15 Hun \ medical attendants as concussion of (N. Y.), 16; Barrett v. Dolan, 130 j the brain or a clot of blood on the Mass. 366; Davis v. Justice, 31 Ohio | brain, it was held that such evidence st 359 was sufficient to sustain a finding :J i Johnson v. Gram. 72 111. App. j that the proximate cause of his death 676; Doty v. Postal, 87. Mich. 143; 49 was the fall. Marschall v. Langhran, N. \V. 534; Grau v. Houston, 45 Neb. ! 47 111. App. 29. 544 CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. § 472 it is not necessary to give an accurate detailed statement of the amount contributed by the deceased to the support of the plain- tiff, it being sufficient to show that some contribution was made by the deceased. 85 So, though the plaintiff in such an action may have an income, yet if the deceased contributed to am ex- tent to his support, there may be a recovery, 36 and the fact tint the person for whose death the action is brought, received liquor elsewhere will not relieve one who, by his sales of Liquor to the deceased, contributed to his death. 1 " Again, though a person may in certain cases recover damages for the death of a person as a re- sult of intoxicating liquors furnished to him by another, yet the jury in estimating the damages therefor should only consider the loss which the plaintiff has sustained as a direct and necessary result of the death, and no recovery should be allowed for any loss which is not directly traceable thereto as the proximate result thereof. So in such an action for the death of a hus- band, evidence should not be admitted of the loss of the home- stead as a result of the husband's death, because of the foreclosure of a mortgage upon it which existed during the life of the hus- band, and which the widow had no means to pay, since it is a mere conjecture whether the husband would have redeemed the homestead had he lived, and its loss cannot be traced as the prox- imate result of the death. 38 The recovery of damages for the death of a person, under these acts is not confined to those cases where the intoxicated person himself dies, but extends to those cases where one is injured in his or her means of support by the death of a person due to the act of another while intoxicated from liquors unlawfully furnished him.' 59 85 Latter v. Fisher (Mich.), 79 N. W. 934; 6 Det. L. N. 358. Action to recover under ;'. How. (Mich.) Ann. Stat. sec. 2283e 3. 36 Reath v. State. Johnson, 16 Ind. A.pp. 146; 44 N. K. 808. This rust- was an action brought by a father to recover for his son's death under a statute giving a right of action to one injured in his " means of support *' vented because of the fact that the father bad an income of 855 per month independent of the sun's earn- ings. 37 Lawson v. Eggleston, 28 A pp. Div. (X. Y.i 52; 52 X. Y. Supp. L81. 88 Karan v. Pease, 45 111. App. 3S2. 39 Broekway v. Patterson, 72 Mich. 122; 1 L. R. A. 70S; 40 N. W. 192 j Fortier v. Moore, 67 N. II. 460; 86 by reason of intoxication due to AH. 869; New v. McKechnie, 95 N". T. liquors furnished by another, and it I 632. See Belding v. Johnson (Grft.), was held that recovery was not pre- 1 11 L. K. A. 53; 12 S. E, 304. 35 545 § 473 CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. § 473. Loss of support. — Where as the result of the intoxi- cation of a woman's husband she is injured in her means of sup- port she may recover either jointly or severally against the per- sons, who by the sale of the liquor to the husband, caused the intoxication. 40 . And the damages recoverable are not limited to the mere sum which was paid for the liquors and which would otherwise have been devoted to the support of the wife, but they include such damages as proximately result from the sale of the liquors, such as the loss of the husband's position which thus injures the wife in her means of support. 41 So in this connec- tion evidence is admissible in behalf of the plaintiff that her husband has, as the result of the sale to him by the defendant of intoxicating liquors, been reduced from a prosperous business man to financial insolvency and that his mental condition borders upon a state of imbecility. 42 It is not necessary, however, to en- title a wife to recover, that she has been deprived of the bare necessities of life, but she may be injured in her means of sup- port where the ability of the husband to furnish her with the comforts of life has been lessened or destroyed, and in such a case may recover. 43 And though a husband has become a drunk- ard and as a result has ceased to support his wife, yet this will not prevent a recovery from one, who by subsequent sales of liquor to the husband, causes the loss to continue. 44 And again, though all the damages sustained by a wife are not traceable to the sales made to the husband by the defendant, yet where such sales produced the intoxication which was the beginning of a continuous debauch, lasting several da}^s or weeks, damages may be recovered from the defendant for all the injuries which she has sustained during the entire period. 45 But loss of support due to the imprisonment of the husband because of a crime com- mitted by him while under the influence of liquor and his con- 40 Stanley v. Leahy, 87 111. App. 465. 41 Kolling v. Bennett, 18 Ohio Cir. Ct. K. 425; 10 Ohio C. D. 81. See Loseman v. Knights, 77 111. App. 670, an action by parent for sales of liquor to minor son. 42 Kliment v. Corcoran, 51 Neb. 142; 70 N. W. 910. 546 43 Maloney v. Dailey, 67 111. App. 427. See De Puy v. Cook, 90 Hun (N. Y.), 43; Mulford v. Clewell, 21 Ohio St. 191. 44 Lloyd v. Kelly, 48 111. App. 554; Rouse v. Melsheimer, 82 Mich. 172; 46 N. W. 372. 45 Johnson v. Johnson (Mich.), 58 N. W. 1115. CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. § it:; sequent inability to work are declared Dot to be a proximate result of the sale of liquor to him for which recovery may be had. 46 In New York, however, where a man while intoxicated shot and killed another Eor which crime he was convicted and sent to state prison Eor life, thus depriving the wife of her means of support, it was held that the wife was entitled to maintain an ac- tion for loss of support.* Again, if the husband is injured while intoxicated, the wife may recover for Loss of support due to such injuries, though the intoxication was merely a contributory cause and not the sole or principal cause of the injury. 1. So where the defendant sold liquor to the plaintiffs husband while he was intoxicated and the latter while returning with his wife in a sleigh was so injured as to be paralyzed and unable to work, and the wife was also injured, it was decided that damages therefor were recoverable by the wife from the liquor dealer.* And in such a case it is not necessary that the evidence show that the husband was, at. the time he was injured, so intoxicated that his reasoning, judgment and memory were in such an impaired con- dition that he was not aware of the natural and reasonable con- sequences of his acts. 90 Again, in an action by a mother to recover damages for the sale of intoxicating liquors to her son. as a re- sult of which she has been injured in her means of support, she may show her situation in life, her dependence on him for sup- port, the amount which he earned prior to the time he became addicted to the use of liquor, and any decrease in his earnings subsequent to such time or loss of employment, traceable to such habits. 51 And in an action by a parent to recover for loss of sup- port as the result of the intoxication of an adult son, it is neees- sarv to show that the parent is poor and has no other adequate means of support. 52 « Bradford v. Boley, 167 Pa. St. 506; 31 Atl. 751; 25 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 396; 36 W. N. C. 238. 47 Beers v. Walhizer, 4:; Hun (N. V.), 254; 4 X. Y. St. R. 377; 26 Wkly. Dig. 29. 48 MoClellan v. Hein, 56 Neb. 600; 77 N. W. 120. 49 Mulcahey v. Givens, 115 Ind. 286; 17 N. E. 798; 15 West. 309. ^Tipton v. Schuler. ST 111. A pp. :.17. H VNYis.T v. Welch. 112 .Mich. 134; 70 x. \V. 4:18; 3 Det. L. X. 880. See Weitz v. ESwen, 50 Iowa. 570: Dun- lavey v. Watson. 3S Iowa, :)'.»: .lock- ers v. Borgman, 29 Kan. 109; Wright- man v. Devere, .'!:'. Wis. 570. Stevens v. Cheney, 36 Hun (N. Y.), 1. See Volans v. Owen, 7t N. Y. 526. 547 §§ 474, 475 CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. § 474. Injury to feelings— Mental suffering.— In an act in Michigan, 88 it was provided that where, as a result of liquor fur- nished by one person to another, certain persons were injured in person, property, means of support " or otherwise," a recovery might be had for such injury from the one furnishing the liquor by means of which the injury occurred. Under such an act it is decided in this state, that a wife may recover for the shame and mortification which she suffers as a result of the publication in a newspaper of her husband's connection with and participation in a saloon row. 54 So, also, for the mental suffering which she experiences resulting from the disgrace and discomfort at tendant upon her husband's besotted condition. 55 And where the husband is convicted of drunkenness resulting proximately from the sale, she may recover for the disgrace and mortification resulting from such conviction. 56 But mental anguish suffered by an intoxicated person as a result of any injury sustained by him cannot be recovered. 57 And where a father has been an habitual drunkard for years, before the particular sale com- plained of, a daughter cannot recover for mental suffering result- ing from her father's intoxication. 58 Outside of those states where recovery for mental suffering or anguish is allowed by the wording of the statute, either expressly or by a general term, such as in the Michigan act, and the recovery is expressly al- lowed for injury to person, means of support or property, the general rule seems to be that mental suffering alone is not sufficient to authorize a recovery of damages under the statute. 59 §475. Exemplary damages — Generally.— In one of the earlier cases in Illinois in which the right of a person, suing un- der the civil damage act, to recover exemplary damages was con- sidered, it was decided that the mere sale of intoxicating liquors and resulting damages would justify an award of exemplary 53 Mich. Act, 1887. 5* Lucker v. Liske, 111 Mich. 683; 70 N. W. 421; 3 Det. L. N. 850. 55 Radley v. Seider (Mich.), 58 N. W. 366. 50 Lucker v. Liske, 111 Mich. 083; 70 N. W. 421: 3 Det, L. N. 850. 548 57 Sissing v. Beach (Mich.), 58 N. W. 364. 58 Sissing v. Beach (Mich.), 58 N. W. 364. 59 Freese v. Tripp, 70 111. 497; Callo- way v. Laydon, 47 Iowa, 456; Mul- ford v. Clewell, 21 Ohio St. 191. civil. DAMAGE ACTS. 3 it:. damages. 60 In a Later case in this state, however, it was held that a wife suing a saloon keeper for personal injury and loss of support, as a result of the sale or gift of intoxicating liquors to her husband, eould only recover such damages where the con- duct of the defendant was wanton, and in wilful disregard of her rights. lint it was also declared that the selling of liquor to a person who was an habitual drunkard by one who had knowl- edge of such fact was such a wilful violation of the statute as would justify an award of exemplary damages/' 1 And the sale of liquor to a man after requests and warnings of the wife to the defendant not to do so will render the latter liable for such damages, where the plaintiff has sustained actual injury in con- sequence thereof. 1 '-' So. again, in this state it is declared that the sale of liquors to one who is plainly intoxicated and who is subsequently killed by a railroad train, while in such condition. will justify an award of exemplary damages.*' In Iowa they may be recovered from one who has wilfully violated the stat- ute. 61 In Kansas the sale of liquors to a husband after notice from the wife not to sell her husband any intoxicating liquors will authorize the recovery of such damages.'" And in Michi- gan, where actual damages have been sustained, exemplary damages may be recovered, they being given as a punishment of the wrongdoer." 1 Under the Michigan act of 1883,'" how- ever, such damages can only be recovered in cases of wilful wrong.' 8 And the sale of liquors to a husband by the defendant after notice to him from the wife not to furnish any more liquoi-s to the husband is such a wilful act as will justify an award of punitive damages/" So, also, the sale of liquors to a man by App. Johnson, 45 111. App. 60 Murphy v. Cunan, 24 I 475. "» Wolfe v. 122. w Wolfe v. 38 N. E. 886 133 111. 636: Johnson, 152 111. 280; Mr. Main >n v. Sankey, 24 N. E. 1027; Hane- waeker v. Perman, 47 111. App. 17. 68 Buck v. Maddock, 07 111. App. 466, affd 107 111. 219; 47 X. E. 20S. 64 Fox v. Wunderlick, 04 Iowa, 187. See Miller v. Hammers (Iowa, 1895), 61 N. W. 1087. 65 .lockers v. Rorgman, 29 Kan. 100. 66 Peacock v. Oaks, 85 Mich. 578; 48 N. W. L082. See Weiser v. Welch, 112 Mich. 134; 70 N. W. 438; 3 Del. L. N. 880; Larzelere v. Kirchgessner, 7:1 Mich. 276; 41 X. W. 88. 81 Mich. Stat. 1883, p. 215. '- Kosecrants v. Shoemaker. 60 Mich. 4: 26 X. W. 791: Gaussly v. Perkins, 30 Mich. 492; Kreitei \. Nichols, 28 Mich. 490. 89 Rouse v. Melsheimer, 82 Mich. 549 8 476 CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. one with knowledge that he was intoxicated, and who met his death while intoxicated, will authorize the recovery thereof in an action by the wife. 70 In New York the mere sale of liquor is not of itself sufficient to justify a recovery of exemplary dam- ages by one who has been injured as the result of intoxication caused by such sale, 71 but there must be some proof of aggra- vating circumstances with which the defendant was connected. 72 So they are not recoverable against the lessor in such an action, in the absence of evidence showing participation in, or know- ledge of, the aggravating circumstances. 73 But they may be re- covered of one who sells liquor to another after he has become intoxicated, the sale to him while in such condition, being such an aggravating circumstance as will permit of their recovery. 74 In Ohio a wife may recover punitive damages from a saloon keeper who sells liquor to her husband after his name has been placed on the blacklist. 75 And in such an action, evidence is admissible in aggravation of damages of the continuance of the sale of liquor to the plaintiff's husband by defendant after no- tice of the action against him. 76 In West Virginia, in an action under such a statute, exemplary damages are not recoverable merely because of an illegal sale, unless it appear that the de- fendant acted maliciously or in wanton, deliberate and wilful disregard of the rights and known wishes of the plaintiff. 77 § 476. Exemplary damages— General rule.— From a con- sideration of the cases noted in the preceding section it will be 172; 46 N. W. 372; Larzelere v. Kirch- gessuer, 73 Mich. 276; 41 N. W. 88. 70 Lafler v. Fisher (Mich.), 79 N. W. 934; 6 Det. L. N. 358. "' Wilberv. Dwyer, 69 Hun (N. Y.), 507; 52 N. Y. St. R. 625; 23 N. Y. Supp. 395. 72 Reid v. Terwilliger, 116 N. Y. 530; 27 N. Y. St. R. 563; 22 N. E. 1091, rev'g 42 Hun (N. Y), 310; Ketcham v. Fox, 52 Hun (N. Y.), 284; 5 N. Y. Supp- 272; Wilber v. Dwyer, 69 Hun (N. Y.), 507; 52 N. Y. St. R. 625. 73 Ketcham v. Fox, 52 Hun (N. Y. ), 284; 5 N. Y. Supp. 272. ■* Wilber v. Dwyer, 69 Hun (N. Y. ), 507; 52 N. Y. St. R. 625; 23 N. Y. Supp. 395. 75 Kear v. Garrison, 13 Ohio C. C. 447; 7 Ohio Dec. 515. ™ Miller v. Gleason, 18 Ohio C. C. 374; 10 Ohio C. D. 20. 77 Pegram v. Stoitz, 31 W. Va. 220; 6 S. E. 485. In this case it is declared that exemplary damages are not given as a punishment in an action by a wife, but as a compensation for injury to her means of support and under certain circumstances for men- tal anguish. CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. 177.478 seen that exemplary damages are recoverable under the civil dam- age arts, but that the mere fact of the .sale of intoxicating liquors and resulting damage to another will not of itself author- ize a recovery of such damages. To entitle the plaintiff to such an award, there must have been some circumstances of aggrava- tion in connection with the defendant's conduct in making the sale, such as malice or a wanton, deliberate and wilful disregard of the plaintiff's rights. And a sale to one who is in an intoxi- cated condition, or after notice has been given to make no further sales, or after notice of the commencement of the action are acts showing su.-h a wilful disregard of the rights of others as will justify an award of such damages. 78 § 477. Sale by employee without defendant's knowledge no defense — Exemplary damages— Mitigation of.— In an action to recover damages for the unlawful sale of liquors, the defendant cannot escape liability because the sale was made by his bartender without his knowledge or authority and in viola- tion of his express orders and instructions. 79 And in certain cases, though the sale may be made under such circumstances, exemplary damages may be recovered. 80 But though such dam- ages are recoverable, yet it has been decided in Illinois that the defendant may show in mitigation thereof that the sale was made by a servant in violation of orders given by the defend- ant. 81 § 478. Evidence affecting damages— Generally.— In an action by a wife to recover damages under the civil damage act, evi- dence is admissible of the conviction of the plaintiffs husband for drunkenness, such evidence being admissible to show the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injury but not to establish drunkenness. 82 And evidence is admissible in an action by a " 8 See cases cited in preceding sec- tion. 79 Smith v. Reynolds, 8 Bun (N. Y.), 128. so Kear v. Garrison, 13 Ohio C. C. 447; 7 Ohio Dec. 515. See Krieter v. Nichols, 28 Mich. 496. 81 Fentz v. Meadows, 72 111. 540; Freeze v. Tripp, 70 111. 496. 8 2 Lucker v. Liske, 111 Mich. (583; 70 N. W. 421; 3 Del. L. X. 850. See Beers v. Walhizer, 4:; Qua (N. Y. i. 254; 4 N. Y. St. EL 377: 26 Wkly. Dig. 29, as to evidence of conviction for crime. But Bee Bradford v. Boley, 1G7 Pa. St. 506; 31 At 1. 751; 25 l'itts. L. J. N. S. 3%; 30 W. N. C. 238. 551 § 478 CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. wife that her husband had, on previous occasions, drank at defendant's place, and had been on protracted sprees to de- fendant's knowledge.* 3 And in an action to recover for the sale of intoxicating liquors to a person which resulted in his death, evidence is admissible of his industrious habits when sober, and of acts performed by him for the support of his wife, such evi- dence tending to show his ability and disposition to provide for his family. 81 So, also, as bearing on the question of the damages to be awarded in an action by a widow for loss of support, evi- dence may be given of her subsequent remarriage. 85 So again, in such an action the intemparate habits of deceased may be shown. 86 In Iowa, however, it is declared that the defend- ant cannot show, in mitigation of damages, that the deceased had been an habitual drunkard for years before his death, but rather that such evidence is admissible in behalf of the plain- tiff for the purpose of showing that the sale of liquor by de- fendant to deceased was unlawful. 87 But where in an action by a wife to recover damages for the unlawful sale of liquor to her husband, she seeks to recover for money lost by her husband in gambling while intoxicated, evidence is admissible in behalf of the defendant that the husband was in the habit of gambling.* And in an action by a widow to recover for the damages sus- tained by the death of her husband as the result of his intoxica- tion from sales by defendant, evidence is admissible of injuries sustained by the deceased previous to such sale, which impaired his ability to labor and which would probably shorten his life. 811 But the fact that property accumulated by the deceased during his lifetime, went to to the plaintiffs upon his death, should not be considered by the jury in mitigation of damages, but it is de- clared that the fact of the deceased's ability to accumulate such 88 Lawson v. Eggleston, 28 App. Div. (N. Y.) 52; 52 N. Y. Supp. 181. 8 * Buck v. Maddock, 167 111. 219; 47 N. E. 208, aff'g 67 111. App. 466. 85 Sharpley v. Brown, 43 Hun (N. Y. ), 374. 86 Brockway v. Patterson (Mich.), 40 N. W. 192; Uldrich v. Gilmore, 35 Neb. 288; 53 N. W. 135. See also 552 Smith v. People, Williamson, 31 N. E. 425, afFg 38 111. App. 638; Gran v. Houston, 45 Neb. 813; 64 N. W. 245. 87 Huff v. Aultman, 69 Iowa, 71. 88 Gintz v. Bradley, 53 111. App. 597. 89 Slaven v. Germain, 64 Hun (N. Y.), 506; 46 N. Y. St. R. 514; 19 N. Y. Supp. 492. CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. S IT'.' property should rather go to enhance damages. 90 Again, in an ac- tion by a wife to recover for her husband's death while intoxicated from liquors sold by defendant, evidence is not admissible as to the number and ages of the surviving children, where the law gives them separate rights of action there for." And where no claim is made for exemplary damages in an action by a minor brought by bis mother as guardian, evidence that a judgment has already been recovered by the mother againsl the defendant for the same act is not admissible/ 12 In actions, however, to re- cover under a civil damage act for the death of a person and loss of support, mortality tables are generally admissible to show the expectation of life. 93 § 479. Evidence showing unlawful sale. — In an action to recover damages for injuries sustained as the result of an all unlawful sale of liquors a preponderance of evidence showing the sale to be unlawful is sufficient.'" So in an action by a wife who sues to recover for injury to her means of support as tin- result of her husband's intoxication from sales by defendant, evi- dence that the defendant made numerous sales of intoxicating liquors to her husband is sufficient where the evidence also shows that liquor was sold by the defendant a sufficient number of times to have materially aided in producing a condition of habitual intoxication on the part of the husband.'"' And under a complaint alleging unlawful sales by the defendant, evidence is admissible of sales made by employees of the defendant.'*' But in an action against a saloon keeper under such a statute. evidence is not admissible as part of the res gesta? of statements made by the intoxicated person after an injury as to where he obtained the liquor.' 1 ' 90 Houston v. Gran, 38 Neb. 687; 57 N. W. 403. . 91 Larzelere v. Kiirbgessner, 73 Mich. 270: 41 X. W. 88; Johnson v. Schultz (Midi.). 41 V W. 865. But see Tetherow v. St. Joseph it I). M. R. Co., 98 M<». 74: 11 S. W. 310. 92 Secor v. Taylor, 41 Hun (N. Y. |, 123. 98 Sellars v. Foster, 27 Neb. 118. See Betting v. Hobbet (111. ), 30 N. E. 104- . 94 Kolliiiiz v. Bennett. 18 Ohio C. C. 42:>; 10 Ohio C. I). 81. 95 Siegle v. Bush. 17:: 111. 559; 50 V E. 1008, aff'g 72 111. A.pp. 485. 96 Carrier v. Bernstein, 104 Iowa, 572; 7:; V W. 1076. '-' : Van Alstine v. Kaniecki. 109 Mich. 318; 67 \. W. 502; 3 Det. L. N. 103. 553 §§ 480, 481 CIV1I, DAM ACE ACTS. § 480. Sales by two or more persons- Recovery in case of. — In actions under the civil damage acts it frequently appears that the injury to the plaintiff was the result of the sales by two or more persons. In such cases the rule, so far as it may be possible to deduce one from the few decisions upon this point, is that in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover against one of such persons, it must be shown that the sale by the defendant was a contributing cause of the injury to the plaintiff, one which tended to produce the injury sustained, and where such fact has been shown, the defendant will be liable for all damages sustained as the result of the several sales. 33 And in an action for loss of support, by death, an instruction to the jury that if defendants furnished "any quantity" whatever of liquor, to the deceased, they would be liable, was held not erroneous though it was declared that the idea of contribution was more finely drawn by such instruction than was proper." For any injury which oc- curred prior to the time when defendant began selling liquor to the plaintiff's husband, there cannot, however, be any recovery. 100 § 481. Plaintiff's knowledge and consent to sale may be defense. — It may be shown, in defense to an action under the statute, that the plaintiff consented to or acquiesced in the sale of the intoxicating liquor, as a result of which he has been injured in the manner designated in the statute. 1 So, in an action by a wife, it is error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury that if she consented to, or contributed to the use of the intoxicating liquors by her husband, there can be no re- covery by her.- And where the statute provides for the recov- ery of a penalty as liquidated damages, by any person aggrieved, a father cannot recover such penalty for a sale of liquor to his 98 Woolheather v. Risley, 38 Iowa, 486; Bryant v. Tidgewell, 133 Mass. 86; Ford v. Cheever (Mich.), 2 Det. L. N. 215; 63 N. W. 975; 27 Chic. Leg. News, 408; Ulrich v. Gilmore, 35 Neb. 288; 53 N. W. 135; Hutch- inson v. Hubbard, 21 Neb. 83; Boyd v. Watt, 27 Ohio St. 259. 554 "Gran v. Houston, 45 Neb. 813; 64 N. W. 245. i^Ford v. Cheever (Mich.), 2 Det. L. N. 215; 03 N. W. 975; 27 Chic. Leg. News, 108. i Reget v. Bell, 77 111. 593. 2 Elliott v. Barry, 34 Hun (N. Y.), 129. See Engelken v. Hilger, 43 Iowa, 563. CIVIL DAMAGE A.CT8. §§ 182, 183 minor son, where he consented to the sale. In a case in Ne- braska, however, it is declared that though ;i wife may coi to, or acquiesce in the sale of liquor to her husband, yet this will be no defense to an action under the statute of that state brought by her in behalf of herself and children for Loss of support. 4 § 4N2. Release of damages by wife no defense to action by children. — Where minor children are by statute given a right of action to recover damages for the sale of intoxicating Liquors to their father independent of any similar right con- ferred upon the wife, a release by the latter of all damages from the sale of intoxicating liquors to her husband will be no de- fense to an action by the children. 5 $ 483. Pleading. — To enable the plaintiff to recover dam- ages for injury to her means of support sustained as the neces- sary consequence of the intoxication of her husband, such as would result from his inability to labor while intoxicated, it is sufficient to allege generally that she was injured in her means of support in consequence of the intoxication of her husband, but if she wishes to recover damages for any injury to her means of support which is not the necessary result, hut the natural result of his intoxication, such as the reckless expenditure of his money when drunk, she must allege this in her declaration. 1 ' In Michigan in an action to recover damages under the statute of that state, the plaintiff may properly allege the cause of action as a continuing one. 7 In Iowa a cause of action arising under a statute giving a right of action to a wife, injured in her means of support as the result of the sale of intoxicating liquor to her husband, cannot be joined in a single pleading with a cause of action under a separate statutory provision which pro- vides for the recovery of a penalty by any citizen in the county, 3 Ed£ettv. Finn (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. 8:'.0. Miran v. Houston, 4."» Neb. si;;-. 84 X. W. 24:,. 5 Johnson v. McCauu, 01 111. App. 110. " Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220; t; S. E. 485. 7 Wood v. Leutz, 110 Mich. l'7.~; 74 V W. 462; SO chic. Leg. News, 258; 4 Det L. N. l's.">. action brought under Mich. Pub. Acts. l>*-7. act No 313. 55o § 484 CIVIL DAMAGE ACTS. who shall be entitled to one half the amount collected in those cases, where a person has sold intoxicating liquor to one already intoxicated or in the habit of becoming so. s § 484. Civil rights acts — Damages and penalties. — Where the plaintiff, a colored female, was refused passage on a street car of defendant, the conductor refusing to stop, saying, " We don't take colored people in this car," and it was also proved that there was ample room for the plaintiff, and that she was provided with the usual passage tickets and was ready and will- ing to pay her fare, it was decided the case was not one for ex- emplary damages since there was no proof of special damage or of wanton or violent conduct on the part of defendant, and that if the plaintiff was wrongfully excluded from the car, such a violation of her rights entitled her to nominal damages which the law would presume in the absence of proof of actual dam- ages. 9 But the denial of such privilege when not on the ground of race or color does not subject the defendant to the statutory penalty. 10 8 Carrier v. Bernstein, 104 Iowa, I reason of race, color and condition, 572; 73 N. W. 1076. see 10 Century Dig. columns 2133- 9 Pleasants v. North Beach & M, K. Co., 34 Cal. 586. w Cully v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 1 Hughes, 536; Fed. Cas. No. 3,466. As to allegations for denial of priv- ileges of inn, see Fruchey v. Eagle- son, 15 lnd. App. 88; 43 N. E. 146. As to allegation of wrongful dis- crimination on account of color and race, see Redding v. South Caro- lina R. Co., 5 S. C. (5 Rich.) 67, de- cided 1873. As to discrimination by 556 2143, covering the following subjects: Sec. 714. " In general ; " sec. 715. " Public conveyances; " sec. 716. " Marriage ; " sec. 717. " Occupa- tion and employment ; " sec. 718. Inns and Theatres ; " sec. 719. "Resi- dence;" sec. 720. "Competency as witness; 1 ' sec. 721. "Homestead;" sec. 722. "Punishment of crime;'' sec. 723. " Public schools; " sec. 724. " Constitution of juries." See also 10 Century Dig. cols. 51-52, sec. 12. TITLE V. DAMAGES FOR CAUSING DEATH. CHAPTER XXIII. DAMAGES FOE CAUSING DEATH — GEN EB ALLY. §48o. Deatli l>v wrongful act, etc. — Pi eliiuinary remarks. 48J. Actio personalis moritur cum persona. 487. Actio personalis — Continued — Tort or contract — Election of remedies. 488. Actio personalis — Tort or contract — Election of rem- edies — Continued. 489. Same subject continued. 490. Death — Abatement or survi- val — Rights of action — Statutes — Generally. 491. Death — Effect of subsequent statute — Survival. 492. Death before or after judg- ment, verdict, etc. 493. Death of wrongdoer — Com- mon law and statutes. 494. Death of wrongdoer — Con- tinued — Abatement and survival of actions. 49o. Death — Civil action — Remedy purely statutory. 496. Nature of statutory remedy for losses by death or where death ensues — Generally. 497. Nature of statutory remedy — Continued — Decisions, etc. 498. Nature of statutory remedy — Continued — Whether rem- edy new and independent. §485. Death by wrongful marks. — Prior to the enactmei 499. Nature oi statutory remedy — Whether Bame is new and independent — Continued. 500. Same subject — Conclusion. 501. Construction of statutes — General principles. 502. Construction of statutes, etc. — Survival and death loss. 50o. Construction of survival and death loss statutes, etc. — Continued. 504. Death — Conflict of laws— Ex- traterritorial jurisdiction — Foreign administrator — Federal jurisdiction. 505. Same subject continued. 506. Death — Coullict of laws — Lex loci — Lex fori. 507. Death — Conflict of laws — Foreign administrator — Party in interest — Federal jurisdiction — Opinions in recent decisions. 508. Death — Conflict of laws — Foreign administrator — Ex- traterritorial jurisdicl ion Where action does not lie — Federal jurisdiction. 509. Death— Conflict of laws— Ex- traterritorial jurisdiction — Federal jurisdiction — Mexi- can laws. act, etc. — Preliminary re- lt of what may he generally •357 § 486 DEATH— ACTIO PERSONALIS. designated as the death loss statutes, there were certain rules of law whereby personal rights of actions died with the person injured. We shall therefore briefly notice these legal principles or rules, the distinction between torts and contracts in connec- tion therewith, the election of remedies, the common law, the death loss statutes generally, and the nature and construction thereof. It may also be stated here, that while these legislative enactments are perhaps an attempt to accomplish the same general purpose of affording a remedy against the person respon- sible for the wrongful or negligent killing of another, neverthe- less they differ widely in their terms, many of them having evidently been enacted to meet certain conditions peculiar to the especial jurisdiction, or to remedy what may have been considered defects in pre-existing statutes, either of the same or other jurisdictions. Thus there exist statutes relating to death caused by the use of deadly weapons ; by wilful or grossly negligent acts ; by killing in a duel : death occasioned by rail- road corporations, by defective highways, by negligence in operating mines, by negligence, etc.. of certain common carriers ; a remedy by indictment, an action in the name of the state to the use of specified persons and the general action for damages by designated legal representatives or beneficiaries. Again, certain of the statutes use specific terms as to the measure of re- covery which are similar in a few states, while in the other juris- dictions no measure of damages is specified, and in still others some of the elements of damages are mentioned. A difficulty therefore exists in formulating or applying any general govern- ing rule. We shall, however, classify as far as we deem war- ranted and possible, the statutes having similar provisions and those of a general and special or peculiar character, stating the rules applicable under each subdivision. § 486. Actio personalis moiitnr cum persona.— The rule that a personal right of action dies with the person ' was applied by Blackstone to actions arising ex delicto for wrongs actually done or committed by the defendant as trespass, battery and slander, and he declares that such actions " never shall be re- vived either by or against the executors or other representa- 1 Noy Max. 14; Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. Ed.) *909. 558 DEATH ACTIO I \ LIS. §48' tives." 2 At common law the rule actio personalis was held to be peculiarly applicable to actions in form ex delicto. " It being a general rule that an action founded in tort and in form e\ de- licto was considered as actio personalis and within " the maxim above given. 3 § 487. Actio personalis — Continued— Tort or contract — Election Of remedies. — Actions on tort abate and those on con- tract survive as a general rule, on the death of the injured party unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary. In apply- ing this ride, however, regard should be had rather to the sub- stance than to the form of the action. And it is declared that if the damages are merely incident to the injur}', that being per- sonal and the proximate cause of the damages, the action dies, otherwise where the breach of the contract itself is the primary cause of the damage and the personal injuries are mere inci- dents of the breach.' And even though a contractual relation 2 3 Black. Comra. (Cooley's ed. 1899) 302. 3 Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed.) *909, citing Wlieatley v. Lane, 1 Wins. Saund. 216 n (1). * Webber v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 97 Fed. 140, case of passenger on street railroad holding that a per- sonal representative of one whose death was caused by an injury re- ceived as such passenger could not maintain an action under Gen. Stat. Minn. 1894, sec. 5912, which applied alike to contract and tort, said suit not being in accordance with the provisions of sec. 5913. As to the rule actio personalis " it has been observed that this maxim is not ap- plied in the old authorities to causes of actions on contracts, but to those in tort which are founded on mal- feasance or misfeasance to the per- son or property of another; which latter are annexed to the person and die with the person, except where the remedy is given to the personal representative by the statute law." Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed.) *909. Although there be an ex- press contract to furnish a skillful, trained, competent nurse to a pa- tient, and an action for tort for breach of duty might lie, yet an ac- tion can be maintained for the breach of contract. Ward v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 39App. Div. (N. Y.)624; 57 N. Y. Supp. 784; 6 Am. Neg. Kep. 164, rev'g 50 N. Y. Supp. 466; 23 Misc. (N. Y.)91; 30 Chic. Leg. News, 258; •") Det. L. N. (No. 4). Action for breach of contract for carriage and injury to passenger for damages prior to death survives to personal representatives. Kelley v. Union Pac. K. Co., 16 Colo. 455; 27 Pac, 1058; 11 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 10. False representations as to real estate sold; action survives death of plaintiff under I !al. Civ. Code, sec. 954, provid- ing for such survival to the personal representatives upon the owner's death of a thing in action arising out of the violation of a right to property. Henderson v. Henshall 559 488 DEATH — ACTIO PERSONALIS. exists, yet if the plaintiff's case depends as to a considerable por- tion thereof upon a breach of duty outside of and not a part of the contract, an action lies in tort, although said duty is de- pendent upon and connected with the contract. 5 § 488. Actio personalis — Tort or contract — Election of remedies — Continued. — It has been held in New York that an action against a common carrier may be brought in contract for an injury resulting in death, for the benefit of decedent's per- sonal representatives. 6 And a cause of action is held to survive to personal representatives of a husband, who has brought suit for a personal injury to his wife, per quod servitium amisit, the defendant being a carrier of passengers. It was said, however, that the action would have abated at common law on plaintiff's death, the action being grounded in tort.' So, also, a cause of (U. S. C. C. App. 9th Cir.), 54 Fed. 320. Action for damages for tres- pass on land survives to personal representatives of deceased owner. Musick v. Kansas City S. & M. R. Co., 114 Mo. 309; 21 S. W. 491. That actions ex contractu do not survive, see Vittum v. Oilman, 48 N. H. 416. 6 Church v. Ante-Kalsomine Co., 118 Mich. 219; 76 N. W. 383; 5 Det. L. N. 486. " Ordinarily the es- sence of a tort consists in the viola- tion of some duty to an individual, which duty is a thing different from the mere contract obligation, and omission to perform a contract ob- ligation is never a tort unless that omission is also an omission of a legal duty. That legal duty may arise from circumstances not con- stituting elements of the contract as such, although connected with and dependent upon it, and born of that wider range of legal duty which is due from every man to his fellow to respect his rights of property and person and to refrain from invading them by force or fraud." Ander- son's Law Diet, title " Tort," p. 1040, citing Rich v, N. Y. Cent. 560 & H. R. Rd. Co., 87 N. Y. 382, 390, 398, per Finch, J. 6 Doedt v. Wiswall, 15 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 125, aff'd 15 How. (N. Y.) 145; Yertore v. Wiswall, 16 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 8. But see Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258, rev'g 32 Hun (N. Y.), 141; 5 Civ. Pro. (N. Y.) 228. As to survival and acts of 1847 and 1849, see Baker v. Bailey, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 54; Dickens v. N. Y. Cent. Rd., 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 41; Safford v. Drew, 3 Duer (N. Y.), 627; 12 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 150. 7 Cregin v. Brooklyn Cross Town Rd. Co., 56 How. Pr. ( N. Y. ) 32, aff'd 75 N. Y. 192; 56 How. (N. Y.) 465, aff'g case cited in numerous cases. Action survived, however, under Xew York statutes as to survival of actions in case of wrongs to property rights, or interest of another. Ex- amine Sweet v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 18 Misc. (N. Y.) 355; 41 N. Y. Supp. 549. That executrix might sue in contract for death consequent upon injury to her husband, who was a passenger on a railroad train. See Bradshaw v. Lancashire & T. R. Co., 44 L. J. C. P. 148; L. R. 10 I'l: A I'll \< I In PERSONALIS. § 188 action may be brought upon contract though sounding in tort. the tort being waived, and such action survives against personal representatives. 8 It is further held that the right to waive a tort, and sue on an implied contract is well settled.' Again, C. P. 189. See also Winnegar v. Cent. Passgr. Ry. Co., 85 Ky. 547; Potter v. Metropolitan Dist. Ky. Co., 30 L. T. N. S. 7t3:> ; Leggott v. (ireal North. Ry. Co., 45 L. J. Q. B. 557; 24 Wkly. H. 784; Q. B. I). 599; City of Brussels, Ben. (TJ. S. Dist. X. Y.) 371. An action by a passenger on board a vessel for negligence, death or injury, is either in rem or in per- sonam. Desty's Shipp. & Admlty. (Pony. ed. 1879), sec. 273, citing The Highland Light, Chase Dec. 150; The New World v. King, 16 How. (U. S. ) 469. That the recovery, however, should be under a statute, see The Job T. Wilson (U. S. I). C. D. Md. ), 84 Fed. 204; The Jane Grey (U. S. D. C. D. Wash.), 95 Fed. 693; The Williamette (IT. S. C. C. App. 9th Cir.), 18 C. C. A. 366; 46 U. S. App. 26; 31 L. R. A. 715; 70 Fed. 874, modified 18 C. C. A. 373; 44 U. S. App. 96; 31 L. R. A. 720; The Glendale (U. S. C. C. A. 4th Cir.), 42 U. S. App. 546; 81 Fed. 633, rev'g 77 Fed. 906; The Transfer, No. 4, & The Car Float, No. 16 (IT. S. C. C. 2d Cir.), 61 Fed. 364; Barton v. Brown. 145 U. S. 335; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 949; 36 L. R. A. 727; 46 Alb. L. J. 66; Rundell v. La Compagnie Gen. Trans. (IT. S. D. C. X. I), ill. i. 94 Fed. 366. This point, however, will be more fully considered in an- other part of this work. 8 People v. Starkweather. 3 J. & Sp. ( N. Y. ) 453. 9 Central Gas & Elec. Fix. Co. v. Sheridan, 49 X. Y. St. R. 639; 1 Misc. (X. Y.) 386, ease of contract to furnish house with g:>s fixtures, and failure to complete purchase. 36 Demand for goods and refusal to re- turn or pay for them and allegation for conversion of goods. Rothschild v. Mark. 115 N. V. 1; 42 Hun ( X. Y.), 72; 23 X. V. St K. 992; 21 X. E. 726, ease of money obtained by fraud and tort waived. Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill (N. Y. ), 577, case where goods deposited and wrong- fully sold, tort waived. Boyle v. Stat en Island & S. B. L. Co., 17 App. Div. (X. Y. I 621; 45 V Y. Supp. 496, case where agent received securities to pay for property, lmt used se- curities of his own of less value for payment, tort waived. Terry v. Munger, 121 X. Y. 161 : 30 X. Y. St. R. 746: 24 X. E. 272, aff'g 49 Hun (N. Y.), 560; 18 X. V. St. EL 506; 2 N\ Y. Supp. :;4S, case of wrongful conversion of personal property. Doherty v. Shields. 86 Hun | X. Y. ). 303; 67 X. Y. St. EL 211, case of tortious conversion. Abbott v. Blossom, 66 Barb. 353, use of an- other's materials in repair of build- ing. Starr Cash-Car. Co. v. Kein hart, 4'.i X. Y. St. R. 228; 2 Mise. (N. Y. ) 116, case of conversion of cash; carriers. But tort cannot be waived by a real estate owner, and suit be brought against a trespasser on a contract for the value of the use of the premises. Me Lane v. Kelly, 72 Minn. 395; 75 X. W. 601 Examine also People v. Gibbs, 9 Wend. (X. Y. I 29. So an action againsi a telegraph company for breach of contract n I not he ex delicto. Carland v. West, Uu. Tel. Co., 118 Mich. 369; 76 X. W. 762; 4:; L. EL A. 280; 5 Det. I.. X. 539. As to character or form of ac- 561 § -189 DEATH — ACTIO PERSONALIS. the wrongful ejection of a passenger who is rightfully on a train under a contract for his carriage to a certain point, con- stitutes a ground for an action for breach of the contract, or for an action ex delicto for tort or negligence of the carrier. 10 § 489. Same subject continued. — In a comparatively re- cent California case the plaintiff was employed by the board of state harbor commissioners as a night deck hand upon a tug- tion for failure to transmit a tele- gram, etc., ex delicto or ex con- tractu, see Joyce on Electric Law (ed. 1900), sec. 1013. See Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Scarlett (U. S. C. C. A. 5th Cir.), 33 C. C. A. 554; 63 U. S. App. 377; 91 Fed. 349, case of conversion of ties. Statute gave right where transaction was of the nature of tort and contract to waive the one and rely upon the other. 10 Chicago, B. & Q. K. Co. v. Spirk, 51 Neb. 167; 70 N. W. 926; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 205; Boster v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 36 W. Va. 318; 15 S. E. 158. So also where a passenger has been furnished an im- proper ticket, he may sue in tort for damages for ejection from train on refusal to pay fare demanded, his means being exhausted. Pouiliu v. Canadian P. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. E. D. Mich.), 47 Fed. 858; 11 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 39, and passenger wrongfully expelled may sue in tort or for breach of con- tract. Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Russ (U. S. C. C. App. 7th Cir.), 6 C. C. A. 597; 57 Fed. 322. So also for injury caused by a breach of the carrier's duty owed to a pas- senger, action lies in tort or con- tract. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hine (Ala.), 25 So. 857. "The re- fusal of a common carrier to accept a passenger must be (citing Lake Erie, etc., R. Co. v. Acres, 108 Ind. 548; 9 N. E. 453), and his wrongful 562 ejection of a passenger with or with- out unnecessary force may be (citing Central R., etc., Co. v. Roberts, 91 Ga. 513; 18 S. E. 315, and other cases), the subject of an action in tort rather than in contract, and the right of election exists in any case of positive misfeasance to a pas- senger," (citing several cases) 2 Shearman & Redf. on Neg. (5th ed.). sec. 486. At common law the passen- ger's right of action for injury was confined solely to him, and the maxim actio personalis applied except, it is said, where the plaintiff sustained a direct loss himself as in case of a, loss of service from injury to his servant. Hutchinson on Carriers (ed. 1891), sec. 777, citing Carey v. Railroad, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 475; Kearney v. Railroad, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 109; Whit- ford v. Railroad, 23 N. Y. 465; Eden v. Railroad, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 204; Soule v. Railroad, 24 Conn. 575; Holland v. Railroad, 144 Mass. 425; Matthews v. Railroad, 26 Mo. App. 75; Hall v. Hollander, 4 B. & C. 660, and other cases. Passenger's remedy is in contract or tort at his election. 2 Harris on Dam. by Corp. (ed. 1892) sees. 544, 545; 4 Elliott on Railroads (ed. 1897), sees. 1693, 1694, 1696; Black's Law & Pract. in Accdt. Cas. (ed. 1900) sees. 90; Thomas on Neg. (ed. 1895) p. 129, V; Booth on Street Rys. (ed. 1892) sec. 375. DEATH A.CTIO PERSONALIS. §489 boat belonging to the state and used by said board, and was injured, as ulk-ged, by a fall, while in the performance of bis duties as .said employee. It was urged that the relation of master and servant was a contract relation, and that the action was to recover damages for a breach of duty under the con- tract. The court, however, declared the action to he one in tort and not upon contract. "The contract of employment has nothing whatever to do with the liability, except to create a duly on the part of the employer — a duty not expressed in the contract, and for the violation of which the contract of employ- ment furnishes no rule or standard lor the estimation of dam- ages. Nor is the action grounded upon the contract hut upon the duty springing from the relation created by it, viz : that of employer and employee, and under the old system of pleading was always classed as an action ex delicto." 11 And if a tort exists independently of the contract even though one of the consequences is a breach thereof, action may be brought in tort. 1 ' There are, it is said, three classes of cases in which ac- tions for tort are founded : (1) an invasion of some legal right of person or property; (2) the violation of some duty toward the public which has resulted in some damage to the plaintiff, or, (3) an infraction of some private duty or obligation which has been productive of damage to the complaining party. 11 So the election as to contract or tort applies not only to mis- feasance or nonfeasance but tort also frequently lies where there is simply a nonperformance of contract. 14 11 Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 289, 297. See also 1 Waiis Act. & Def. (ed. 1S7T) i>. L35. 12 Stock v. Boston, NO Mass. 410; 21 N. E. 871. A claim for a conver- sion of securities by a member of a linn of stockbrokers wbo has died, may be sued on as a claim in lort against the estate of tbe deceased partner or as an action on implied contract against the survivor if the linn. Matter of 1'ierson, 19 A.pp. Div. (N. Y.i 478; 46 N. Y. Supp. 557. is 1 Wait's Acts & Def. fed. 18771 p. 132, from which the above is sub- stantially taken. u Broom's Leg. .Max. (7th Am. ed.) *202. See also Black's Law & Pract in Accdt. Cases (ed. 1900), sec. 90; 1 Shear. & Redf. on Neg. (5th ed.i sec. 220, eases cited, 1 Stover's X. Y. Ann. Code (5th cd.), p. 329a et seq. : Blin v. Campbell, 14 Johns. (N. Y.i 432; McAllister v. Hammond, 6 Cow. i \. V. i 342; Per- eival v. Hickey, Is Johns. i\. Y.) 432. But it is held that for the neg- ligent performance of a duty arising out of contract, tort does not lie. 563 §§ -190,491 DEATH— SURVIVAL. § 490. Death — Abatement and survival — Rights of action — Statutes — Generally. — Seven distinct propositions may be deduced from the decisions : (1) The maxim actio personalis ap- plied to torts and not to actions on contract. Actions of tort which were annexed to the person died with the person in the absence of a statute to the contrary. (2) Actions of tort for injury to a man's person, reputation or feelings within the maxim actio personalis are distinct from those causes of action, whereby it is sought to recover for loss by the death itself, occasioned by a statutory wrong or omission as the proximate cause. (3) An action for a tort annexed to the person who is a party to a per- sonal action and which dies with such party, has been distin- guished from a case wherein the party alleged to be injured and the wrongdoer are still in existence and the injury arises to the plaintiff outside of and independent of that to the deceased, as where there is an injury to some relative right, such as a loss of service to a master, husband or parent. (4) Excluding from consideration any reference to death statutes, it may be stated generally that personal representatives stand not so much for the person as for the estate and assets of the deceased. (5) The statutes giving a cause of action in the civil courts for loss by death for and to designated parties, occasioned by specified wrongs are, in so far as the decisions are of any weight, limited in their construction and application to the terms of each par- ticular statute. (6) An exception to the last proposition should exist in those cases where there are like or similarily worded statutes. (7) Within such an exception the weight of any extraterritorial decision would evidently be limited by the rule stare decisis. 15 § 491. Death— Effect of subsequent statute— Survival.- Masters v. Stratton, 7 Hill (N. Y.), 101. See note 41 L. R. A. 807, under the following heads : Death; com- mon-law right of action of parent for loss of services of child killed: damages; (d) effect when death is not instantaneous; (2) the contrary- rule ; (3) the true rule ; (4) rule when injury consists of a breach of contract. (1) Rule that no action will lie; i> The various decisions from which (a) different theories as to: (6) doc- i the above propositions are deduced trine that private injury is merged ! appear throughout the sections here- in public wrong; (c)< doctrine that in, in which the subject of death human life is not a subject of civil ! losses are considered. 564 DEATH 8URVIV W.. S 492 In Texas it is decided thai the Legislature was empowered to make a statute, providing for the aonabatemenl of rights of ac- tion 1>\ death of a person injured in health or reputation, appli- cable to existing causes ofaction and to provide that they should not abate thereafter by such death. 10 So that an action for per- sonal injuries received before the passage of said act survives the injured plaintiff's death, 17 but a right of action which abated by death of the injured plaintiff prior to said enactment is not within its provisions. 18 § 492. Deatb before or after judgment, verdict, etc.— In a case in the United States supreme court the original plaintiff brought suit to recover for personal injuries received while a passenger on a railroad train. Upon petition of the railroad com- pany, the suit was removed from the Ohio court into the United States circuit court. After removal the plaintiff died. At the time of his death the common-law rule as to the abatement of causes of action for personal injuries prevailed in Ohio. The injury resulting in such death was received in Indiana, and it was held that the action did not finally abate by reason of the death of the plaintiff before trial and judgment, but that it ought be revived and prosecuted by his executor or administrator, duly appointed in Ohio by the proper court, and that the point whether the action could be revived in a Federal court was not 16 Missouri, K. & T. K. Co. v. Settle, 19 Tex. Civ. App. :ir>7; 1 Jour, of App. 37; 47 S. YV. 825; Act, Tex. May 4, 1895; Tex. Rev. Stat. 1 395, art. 3353a. See also City of Marshall v. McAllister, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 15!); 43 S. W. 1043; 3 Am. Xeg. Rep. 743. "It appears that after the injuries were alleged to have heen received and before said L. <;. McAllister's death, the legislature <>f Texas passed an act (art, 3353a, Rev. St. 1895), pro- viding that actions pending or there- after brought for personal injuries not resulting in death should survive to and in favor of the heirs and legal representatives <>f the party in- jured upon his death. It is insisted by counsel for the city that the said act is retroactive and uncon- stitutional and that its provisions should not govern in this ease. This precise point was raised in the case of Railway Co. v. Rogers (Tex. Civ. App.), 39 S. W. 1112, and we there held that the action would sur- vive. Thequestion was fully consid- ered when that case was under con- sideration and we now see no reason for changing the views tbere ex- pressed/ 1 Id.. 74."), per Rainey, J. i" Houston it T. ('. R Co. v. R 15 Tex. Civ. App. 680; 39 S. W. 1112. u Fitzgerald v. Western On. T. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 143: 40 S. W. 421. 565 §493 DEATH OF Wi:<>N<;i)OER. affected in this case, by the fact that the deceased received his injuries in Indiana. 19 So in Minnesota an action for personal in- juries caused b} r negligence does not abate by death of one of the parties after verdict rendered, but may be continued by or against personal representatives. 20 Nor does an action for dam- ages through negligence of defendant's servants abate by death of the plaintiff after verdict. 21 But it is also held that the com- mon-law rule that a right of action for damages for personal injuries abates on plaintiff's death is not changed by the Code unless a verdict, report or decision has been rendered. 22 Again, in Ohio, death of the plaintiff after judgment in his favor in an action to recover for personal injuries does not abate the suit where a new trial has been granted, but none is had. 23 § 493. Death of wrongdoer — Common law and statutes. — In its application the maxim actio personalis relates not only to the person injured, but also to the death of the wrongdoer, and with some exceptions the statutes which give a remedy for loss by death to certain representatives or beneficiaries of dece- dent have not changed the common-law rule as to defendants 19 Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co. v. Joy, 173 U. S. 226; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387; 43 L. Ed. 677; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 760. The court considers Rev. Stat. Ohio, sec. 5144 ; 1 Rev. Stat. Ohio, 1890, p. 1491; Rev. Stat. Intl. sees. 282, 283; sec. 955, Rev. Stat. U. S. (Judiciary Act, U. S. Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 90, c. 20, sec. 21 ) ; Rev. Stat. U. S. sec. 721 (Judiciary Act U. S. 1789, 1 Stat. 92, ch. 20, sec. 34). 20 Cooper v. St. Paul City R. Co. (Minn), 56 N. W. 588, under Minn. Genl. Stat. 1878, ch. 66, sec. 41. 21 Lyons v. Third Ave. Rd. Co., 7 Rob. (N. Y.) 605, under Code Proc. sec. 121 (Stov. Ann. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 755). 22 Corbett v. Twenty-third St. R. Co., 114 X. Y. 579; 24 N. Y. St. R. 538; 21 N. E. 1033, under Stov. Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1898) sec. 764. As to meaning of "decision." see 566 same case. Also Adams v. Nellis, 59 How. (N. Y.) 385, rev'd 24 Hun (N. Y. ), 605. Parties may stipu- late for nonabatement by plaintiff's death before final judgment. Cox v. N. Y. Cent. Rd. Co., 63 N. Y. 414, rev'g 4 Hun (N. Y. ), 176; 6 T. & C. 405. Stov. 1ST. Y. Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1888) sec. 763, is not applica- ble where final judgment has been entered. Carr v. Risher, 28 N. Y. St. R. 260. See further as to cases under sees. 763-765, Smith v. Lynch, 12 Civ. Proc. (N. Y.) 348; 8 N. Y. St. R. 341; Kelsey v. Jewett, 34 Hun (N. Y.), 11; Pessini v. Wilkins, 8 N. Y. St. R. 89; 54 N. Y. Snpr. 146. See also cases noted Stover's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (1888) pp. 765-767, sees. 763-765. 23 Ohio & P. Coal Co. v. Smith, 52 Ohio St.—: 34 Ohio L. J. 94; 2 Ohio Leg. N'ows, 718. DEATH OP WRONGDOER. §494 or the wrongdoer. To be more specific, it is clear that prior to " Lord Campbell's act, "' -'' if a person by his wrongful act caused another's death, no action could be maintained against him, nor did that act prescribe any remedy against the personal n sentativcs of the wrongdoer or tort-feasor. A distinction, how- ever, existed and generally exists bel ween a tort to tin' person, and a tort in respect to real or personal property. ' § 494. Death of wrongdoer- Continued — Abatement and survival of actions. — If death alone constitutes a cause of ac- tion, there being no injury to the estate or to the property of the deceased, such right of action abates by the wrongdoer's death.' 4 " So it is held in a Texas case that if no action is commenced during the lifetime of one killing another, the right of action does not survive the death of the one at fault.'-' 7 It is also de- »* ( 1846) 9 and 10 Vict. cb. 93. 25 " By the Statute 3 and 4, Will 4, ch. 42, sec. 2, . . . trespass and case will also lie against personal rep- resentatives for any wrong commit- ted by any person deceased in his lifetime to another in respect of his property, real or personal," subject to a specified time limit, both as to the commission of the act and the bringing of an action. " Prior to this act, the remedy for a tort to the property of another, real or personal, by an action in form ex delicto, such as trespass, trover or case for waste . . . could not have been en- forced against representatives of the tort-feasor . . . For a tort commit- ted to the person it is clear then that at common law no action can be maintained against the personal rep- resentatives of the tort-feasor, nor does the Stat. 9 and 10 Vict, ch. 93, as amended 27 and 28 Vict. ch. 95, supply any remedy against the exec- utors or administrators of the party, who by his ' wrongful act, neglect, or default,' has caused the death of another, for the first section of this act renders that person liable to an action for damages ' who would have been liable if death had not ensued,' in which case, as already stated, the personal representatives of the tort- feasor would not have been liable" Broom's Leg. Max. (7th Am. ed. ) *914, *915. Action for continuance of obstruction to ancient lights may be maintained against executors or administrators under 3 and 4 Win. IV, chap. 42, sec 2, providing for trespass on the case, etc. Jenks v. Viscount Clifden (1897), 1 Ch. 694; 76 Law .lour. Hep. 382; 66 L. J. Ch. X. S. 338. -■< llegericli v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258; 1 X. E. 787, rev'g 32 Bun i . X. F.), 141; 5 Civ. Pro. ( X. Y. ) 228. See 1'ri.c v. Price, 11 linn (N. Y. , 299, afE'd 75 X. V. 244; Pessini v. Wilkins. 8 X. V. St. R. 89; 54 Super. Ct. (N. V.i 146; Fertore v. WlSWall, L6 How. Pr. I \. V.i 8, and Doedl v. Wiswall, 15 How. i X. V.) 128, held that the action could be continued against defendant's repre- sentatives, but the later decisions must be considered as the law. "Johnson v. Farmer, 89 Tex. 610; 35 S. W. 1062, under Tex. Rev. Stats. 5GT § 495 DEATH -STATUTORY REMEDY. cided iii Pennsylvania that an action by a widow for causing her husband's violent death abates upon the death of the defendant before judgment. 25 So in Ohio if the death be caused by another, and he die, the action abates. 3 In Colorado, an action for negligently or wilfully inflicted injury dies with the wrongdoer, and the words "trespass for injuries done to the person " in the statute of 1868, are held not to imply of necessity a trespass vi et armis. 30 Again, an action for personal injuries abates on defendant's death in Indiana, even though the in- jury is alleged to have arisen out of a breach of contract and recovery is also incidentally sought for injury to property. 31 And the act of negligently running over a person by a driver is neither a trespass nor an assault so as to come within a statute excepting assault and battery with other actions from its pro- visions as to survival, but providing that actions for personal injury survive. 32 §495. Death — Civil action — Remedy purely statutory — Although one sustaining a personal injury might sue in tort to recover damages therefor, or might have his election as to an arts. 3024, 3026, providing for sur- vival in such cases only when action is commenced during life of per- son at fault. Action may be con- tinued if defendant die pending suit and does not abate by death of either party to record, if any beneficiary survives. See Sayles 1 Civ. Stat. Tex. sees. 2900—2908; Tex. Rev. Stats. 1885, sec. 3353a. 28 Weiss v. Hunsicker, 14 Pa. Co. Ct. 398; 3 Pa. Dist. K. 445. As to death after judgment or verdict, see section 492 herein. 29 Russell v. Sunbury, 37 Ohio St. 372; 41 Am. Rep. 523. See Bates' Ann. Stat. Ohio, 1897, sec. 4975. As to killing, see Moreliead v. Bitt- ner, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1986; 50 S. W. 857, under Ky. Stat. 1894, p. 176, sec. 10, which provides that on death of person injuring, actions for "as- sault" cease or die. 568 30 Letson v. Brown, 11 Colo. App. 11; 52 Pac. 287, under Colo. Rev. Stats. 1868, p. 632, which provides for survival to and against executors and administrators of all actions at law except actions on the case for slander or libel or trespass for injuries to the person, and actions to recover real estate. See Colo. Civ. Code, sec. 15. See also Munal v. Brown ( U. S. C. C. D. Colo. ), 70 Fed. 967. 3 *Feary v. Hamilton, 140 Ind. 45; 39 N. E. 516, under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1894, sec. 283, which provides for abatement by death of either party in actions arising out of injury to the person. See also Hamilton v. Brown, 125 Ind. 176; Hess v. Lowery, 122 Ind. 225; 7 L. R. A. 900. 32 Perkins v. Stein, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 203; 22 S. W. 049. l>l. \ i ii - I \ I l r< » 1 : N REMEDY. : 195 action for tort or contract in certain ''uses, nevertheless, what- ever remedy exists by way <>f a civil action, for tin- benefit of the relatives, beneficiaries or estate of decedent, for Loss by death of a human being, Is purely statutory, it being well settled that under tin' '-0111111011 law, no civil right of action existed in such case. 33 33 Higgins v. Butcher, Yelvcrton, j 89; 1 Browne & C 206, husband for | wife. Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campb. 493, husband for wife. " In a civil court t lie death of a human being could not be complained of as an in- jury." Id., per Lord Ellenborough. Osborn v. Gillett, L. R. 8 Exch. 88, per Pigott, J., master for servant. See Canadian, etc., R. Co. v. Robin- son, 14 Can. Sup. Ct. 10."). Preamble to Lord Campbell's act (1840), 9 and 10 Vict. ch. 93, reads, " Whereas no ac- tion at law is now maintainable against a person who by his wrong- ful act, neglect or default may have caused the death of any person.'' Little Rock & F. S. Ry. Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350, parent for minor. Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 53 Ark. 117; 13 S. W. 801, parent for minor. Kramer v. Market St. Kd. Co., 25 Cal. 234, parent for minor. Hindry v. Holt, 24 Colo. 464, orphan child for uncle. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. X. Y. & X. H. R. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265, rule applied to indirect loss as insurer for insured's death. Womack v. Central R. R. Co., 80 Ca. L32; 5 S. E. (!3, husband for wife. Bell v. Wooten, 53 Ca. (384, father for death of son from negligence of surgeon. Selma R. Co. v. Lacey, 49 Ca. 106; Ohio & M. R. R. Co. v. Tindall, 1:'. Ind. 366; Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595; Indiana, P. & C. R. Co. v. Keely, 23 Ind. 133; Burns v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. (Ind.), 15 \. E. 230, actio personalis; Jackson v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co., (Ind); :;'.» N. K. 663, parent for child. Pittsburgh, c. c. & St. L. R. Co. v. llosca. 152 Ind. 412: 1 Repr. 896; M Am. A- Eng. R, Cas. N. S. G'J2; Malott v. Shinier, 10:; Ind. 35; 1 Repr. 1234; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 263; IT) Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 774; 54 N. E. 101; Eureka v. Merrilield (Kan.), 37 Pac. 113; Covington St. Ry. Co. v. Packer, '.» Bush (Ky. |, 455, parent for minor. Eden v. Lexing- ton, etc., R. R. Co., 14 B. Man. (Ky.) 204, husband for wife. Judd v. Chesapeake * O. Ry. Co. (Ky. Ct. App. 1897), 1 Am. Xeg. Rep. 254, 2.',.".. statutory action for death of em- ployee. " The case at bar is purely a statutory right not existing under the common law," per the court. Louisville A X. R. Co. v. McElwain, 98 Ky. 700; 18 Ky. L. Rep. 379; 34 S. W. 236; 34 L. R, A. 788; 3 Am. A- Eng. K. cas. X. S. 309, statutory ac- tion for loss of wife's society on ac- count of injuries resulting in death is more advantageous than common- law action for loss of her society. Hermann v. New Orleans & C. R. R. ( !o., 1 1 I. a. Ann. 51, widow for minor. Ilubgh v. Xew Orleans & C. R. 1!. Co., 6 La. Ann. 4'X>, wife for hus- band. Nickerson v. Harriman, 38 Me. 277, parent for minor. Lyons v. Woodward. 49 Me. 29, wife for hus- band. Carey \. Berkshire R. 1.'. * >o. I wife for husband |, and Skinner v. Housatonic R. < •>.. 1 Cush. | M iss | 47-">, parent for child. Kearney v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Cush. 569 § 496 DEATH— STATUTORY REMEDY. § 496. Nature of statutory remedy for losses by death or where death ensues — Generally. — The discussion of the nature of the remedies given by the various statutes for loss b} r death of a human being involves also the construction of such statutes. (Mass.) 10S, by executor or adminis- trator. Mass. Act ( Mass. Colonial Laws [ed. 1660] Boston, 18S9, p. 120), however gave a remedy as early as 1648 for loss of life from defective ways and bridges. Hyatt v. Adams, 10 Mich. 180, husband for wife. Scheffler v. Minneapolis, etc., Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 125, parent for minor. Natchez, J. & C. R. Co. v. Cook, 63 Miss. 38, parent for minor. Wyatt v. Williams, 43 N. H. 102, wife for husband. Myers v. Holborn, 58 N. J. L. (29 Vr.) 193; Grosso v. Dela- ware, etc., R. R. Co., 50 N. J. L. (21 Vr.) 317, husband for wife. Cor- bett v. Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 114 N. Y. 579; 24 N. Y. St. R. 538; 21 N. E. 1033, holding that the rule of com- mon law that action to recover dam- ages for personal injury abates on death of plaintiff is not changed by sec. 764, N. Y. Code Civ. Pro., un- less a verdict, report or decision has been rendered upon the issues, and explaining "decision" in that sec- tion. Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258; 52 Am. Rep. 25, rev'g 32 Hun (N. Y.), 141; 8. C 5 Civ. Pro. (N. Y.) 228, actio personalis. Debevoise v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 377, purely statutory and does not exist at common law. Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co., 23 X. Y. 465; 3 Bos. (N. Y. ) 67, statutes create a new cause of action in favor of represen- tatives of deceased. Dickens v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 158; Za- briskie v. Smith, 13 N. Y. 322; Crow- ley v. Panama R. R. Co., 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 99; Green v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 9, aff'd 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 260, aff'd 2 Keyes, 570 294; 2 Abb. App. 277, husband for wife's immediate death. People v. Gibbs, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 29, cause of action ex delicto does not survive though by statute an action of as- sumpsit be given against the wrong- doer. Wellman v. Sun Print. & Pub. Assn., 66 Hun (N. Y.), 331; 50 1ST. Y. St. R. 254, case of libel of wife, that miscarriage produced her death — held a personal wrong which died with her. Worley v. Cin. R. R. Co., 1 Handy (Cin. Sup. Ct. ), 481, hus- band for wife. Russell v. Sunbury, 37 Ohio St. 372; 41 Am. Rep. 523, actio personalis applies. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Orvis (C. C), 1 Ohio Dec. 492, father for son, no ac- tion at common law. Penn. R. R. Co. v. Adams, 55 Pa. St. 499; Mexi- can C. R. Co. v. Goodman, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 109; 48 S. W. 778, wife for husband, does not survive unless statute in states where death occa- sioned, as well as in state where brought. Fitzgerald v. West. U. T. Co., 15 Tex. Civ. App. 143; 40 S. W. 421, holding that action against tele- graph company for failure to deliver message is personal and abated with death of plaintiff prior to act. Tex. May 4, 1895. Sherman v. Johnson, 58 Vt. 40, parent for son. Needham v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 38 Vt. 294, actio personalis rule. Brown v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137; 77 N. W. 748; 44 L. R. A. 579; 13 Am. & Ehg. R. Cas. N. S. 603; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 255, 257, per Mar- shall, J. See further Mobile L. Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 TJ. S. 754, 756, " no deliberate well-considered decision to the contrary is to be found," per I»K \Tir STATUTORY KEMEDY. S 19' There is certainly a distinction between the following c < 1 i Where a right of action survives the death, such rights hav- ing existed before such death, but no action having 1 □ com- menced prior thereto. (2) Where an action for the injury to the person has been commenced during the Lifetime of the in- jured and it survives his death. (3) Where the action is com- menced after death to recover for Loss thereby, the injury having been instantaneous therewith or at Least instantaneous in tin- sense of there being no appreciable period of time between the two. (4) Where the action is penal or l>v way of indictment for the benefit of designated persons. (5) Where the action is special. (6) Where employer's liability, miners 1 acts, dueling acts and other particular statutes are involved. (7 | Where the construction of enactments relating to recovery for death losses are involved in the same case with that of other statutes, and finally. (8) where the nature of the remedy is dependent upon the express wording of the particular statute, with its amend- ments. $ V.)7. Nature of statutory remedy— Continued— Decisions, Hunt. J.: The Ilarrisburg, 119 U. S. rii; Denuick v. Central K. R. Co., L03 I". S. 11; Webber v. St. Paul City Ky. <'o. (U. S. C. C. A. Minn.), '.'7 Fed. 140, a general proposition that actions on torts abate on death of injured party in the absence of a statute giving a right of action. Matz v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (C. C. W. D. Mo.), 85 Fed. lso. decides that where a statute gives a right of ac- tion in case of instant death, the right is not defeated because there was no suffering or injury for which a per- sonal action could have been brought at common law. Gerling v. Halt. & O. R. C, 151 U. s. i;:.".: 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; 38 L. Ed. 311, holds thai death of the plaintiff abates a cause of action in West Virginia brought for personal injuries and notwithstanding the statute giving after death a right of action to per- sonal representatives. Sullivau v. Union I*. K. Co., 1 Mc< Vary (U. S. C. C). 301, parent for child. Hut ex- amine contra. Cross v. Guthrey, 2 Root (Conn.), 90. .See Augusta Fac- tory v. Davis, 87 Ga. 04S; Perry v. Ga. R. & B. Co., S5 Ga. 193; 11 S. K 605, loss of services of minor. Mc- Dowell v. Ga. K. Co., 07. 571 ^ 498 DEATH STATUTORY REMEDY. etc.— Iii New York it is declared that the light to damages for injuries causing death does not depend upon the right to sup- port from the deceased.'' 1 In Louisiana the statutory right of action is attached to the person, and is not transmissible as a property right. :r> In Massachusetts the act is penal, 36 although a civil action may also be maintained. 37 In Maryland under the survival statute relating to actions for personal injuries, the rio-ht to recover is held to depend upon the nature of the action and not upon the character of the damages claimed. 33 In a Fed- eral court case it is decided that the right of action for recovery for loss of life by negligence of a railroad company, etc., is not property upon which administration can be obtained by a for- eign administrator in Kentucky. 3 ' In New York it is held that in an action for death, the cause of action is the death and not the injury, and that the action is governed by the law in force at the time of death. 40 And under the Ohio statute it is decided that the right to revive an action is a right inhering in the ac- tion which accompanies it into the Federal court in removal. 41 § 498. Nature of statutory remedy— Continued— Whether remedy new and independent.— In England, " Lord Campbell's act " permitting the recovery for the benefit of the family of damages for death of a human being caused by wrongful act, neglect or default of another in cases where, if death had not en- sued, the injured party would have been entitled to maintain an action for damages in respect thereof, and the preamble to which specifies that no claim at law was then maintainable in such cases has evidently been considered as conferring a totally new cause of action resting on a new and different principle and not operating merely as a transfer of an old right of action.^' Un- 3* Palmer v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 39 Marvin v. Maysville St. R. & T. 5 X. Y. St. R. 436; 26 Wkly. Dig. 26. Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Ky.), 49 Fed. 436. 36 Huberwald v. Orleans R. Co., 50 j *° Smith v. Metropolitan St. Ry. La. Ann. 477; 23 So. 474. Co., 15 Misc. (X. Y.) 158; 35 N. Y. 36 Adams v. Fitchburg R. Co. 67 Supp. 1062. Vt. 76; 30Atl. 687. 41 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Joy, 37 See Mass. Pub. St. c. 112 (af- 173 U. S. 226; 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387; fected 1894, 67). 43 L. Ed. 677; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 38 Ott v. Kaufman (Md.), 11 Atl. 760, under Ohio Rev. Stat. sec. 5144. -g 42 Seward v. The Vera Cruz, 10 572 DEATH STATUTORY REMEDY. \ 198 der this statute the executor or administrator of the deceased was entitled to sue for the benefit of hia surviving family, but only us above noted in casus where the injured party could b maintained the action. Now, while the enactment gave a rem- edy which did not exist prior to Its passage, yel the courts might well consider that the right of the executor or administrator to bring suit rested alone upon the injured party's right to recover and did not exist as an independent right Ln the named repre- sentatives. In this sense it was perhaps Dot unduly extending legal argument to hold that the injured party's cause of action was transmitted upon his decease to his representatives for the benefit of his family under the terms of the statute. This reason- ing would assume tone in determining to what extent the acts of the injured partyin releasing his right of action or in obtaining damages through a civil action would affect the right oi his executor or administrator to recover damages for the benefit of the family of the deceased, and so it has been asserted that the right of the representative of the deceased to maintain an ac- tion is not absolute in the former, and independent of the fact whether or not the injured party has received compensation in his lifetime, and therefore that the representative is merely sub- stituted as to the right of action in that place which the injured party would have had, had he survived, and that only a new principle as to the assessment of damages is conferred and no new right of action created. 43 From this standpoint statutes which are worded the same, or substantially the same as the English act, might come within the same reasoning, and if the argument is sound, then it may fairly be extended as involving logically the following points: (1) Can damages be recovered for pain and suffering of the deceased from the injury causing death, and if the statute does not create a new cause of action for the loss by death but operates to continue the action began . by the injured party, ought it not to include in the recovery all that the injured party would have been entitled to recover had App. Cas. 59, per Lord Blackburn ; Blake v. Midland liy. Co., 18Q. B. 98; 16 Jur. 562; 21 L. J. Q. B. 233, per Coleridge, J. "See Read v. Great Eastern Ky. Co., L. R., 3 Q. B. J-s, per Black- burn, J. Sjr<- Griffiths v Karl of Dudley, 9 Q. B. D. 57. 573 § -499 DEATH — STATUTORY REMEDY. he lived? 44 (2) What is the meaning of pecuniary loss? 45 (3) What right have the named representatives to sue for loss by death for the benefit of the designated beneficiaries in addi- tion to the personal representative's right to continue, under survival statutes, the action brought by the injured party dur- ing his lifetime ? (4) What is the effect of instantaneous death so far as the right of action is concerned? (5) From what time does the limitation of the right of action commence? 46 § 499, Nature of statutory remedy — Whether same is new and independent -Continued. — It is held in Indiana that the statute of that state creates a new and independent cause of ac- 44 That damages are confined to loss by the death, and are not allow- able for pain and suffering of the in- jured person prior to his death, see Blake v. Midlaud Ry. Co., 18 Q. B. 93, per Coleridge..!.; Dwyer v. Chicago St. P. M. & O. R. Co. (Iowa), 51 N. W. 244, under Iowa Code, sec. 2525; Cheatham v. Red River Line (U. S. D. C. E. D. La.), 5(5 Fed. 248. under La. Civ. Code. art. 2315; Holland v. Brown, 35 Fed. 23. under Comp. Laws, Oregon, 1887, sec. 371 ; Wilcox v. Wilmington City Ry. Co. (Del. Super. 1899), 44 Atl. 686, under Rev. Code, p. 676; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sander, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1941; 44 S. W. 644; Whitford v. Panama R. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 465, 469, contra, as to survival of suit, Missouri, K. &. T. R. Co. v. Settle, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 357; 47 S. W. 825, contra, as to pain and suffering prior to death, Murphy v. Railroad, 29 Conn. 496. Examine Bowler v. Lane, 3 Met. (Ky.) 311; Railroad v. Prince, 2 Heisk. (Tenn. ) 580. See Ky. Genl. Stat. ch. 57, sec. 1 ; La. Civ. Code. art. 2315 and chap- ters on measure of damages herein. See Murphy v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 445; 14 Wkly. Dig. 150; Givens v. Kentucky Cent. R.. Co., 89 Ky. 231 : 12 S. W. 257. This ques- 574 tion is fully considered elsewhere herein. 45 That the recovery is confined to the pecuniary loss, see Morgan v. Southern P. Co., 95 Cal. 510; 17 L. R. A. 71; 29 Am. St. Rep. 143; 30 Pac. 603; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 101; Lap- sley v. Union P. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. X. D. Iowa), 50 Fed. 172, affd 51 Fed. 174; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9; 52 Pac. 211; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 536, under Colo. Gen. Stat. sec. 1032; Lazelle v. Newfane, 70 Vt. 440; 41 Atl. 511. under Vt. Stat. sec. 2452; Graham v. Consolidated Traction Co. (N. J. Sup. 1899), 44 Atl. 964, under act March 3, 1848; 1 Gen. Stat. p. 1188; McKay v. New England Dredging Co., 92 Me. 454; 43 Atl. 29, under Me. Act, 1891, ch. 124; Hughey v. Sul- livan (U. S. C. C. S. D. Ohio), 36 Ohio L. J. 247. The question, how- ever, of pecuniary loss is more fully considered elsewhere herein. 46 This last point would apply where it is held or declared that the statute presenting the time limit for suing is independent of the statute of limitations and confined to the statutory remedy in cases of loss by death. See The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, per Waite, C. J. DKATII STATl TORY REMEDY. § m tion to the representatives of the deceased for tin' benefit <>( I designated therein. 47 So in New York it is declared thai the Code docs not simply provide a new remedy but creates .1 new right and a new liability, and that the statutory provisions are part of the substantn e law of the state. 48 And substantially the same language is used in a Wisconsin case lf) where tin' court considers at some length the distinction between tin' survival enactment and the death loss statute, declaring that they refer to entirely distinct losses recoverable in different rights and that the former creates no new liability but prevents the lapsing by death of an old one, while the latter creates a new right in the surviving relatives to compensation for their loss arising from the death. * 7 Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hosea, 152 End. 412; 1 Repr. 896; 14 Am. A- Eng. <'as. \. S. 692, un- der Horner's Rev. Stat. 1897, sec. 284. <» O'Reilly v. Utah, Xev. A- I al. Stage Co., 87 Hun, 457; 34 X. Y. Supp. 358; 68 N. Y. St. R. 1:!l'. See Whitford v. Panama R. Co., 23 N. Y. 465; 3 Bos. (X. Y. ) 67, where it is said that the statute creates a new- cause of action in favor of repre- sentatives of the deceased. Quiun v. Moore, 15 X. Y. 435, per Comstock, J., Littlewood v. Mayor, etc., 8!' \. V. 24, per Rappaljo, J.; 8. C, 14 Wkly. Dig. 400, aff'g 47 Super. Ct. 547. 49 "The death loss act of the Eng- lish statute, !> and 10 Vict. ch. 03, commonly called 'Lord Campbell's Act,' and the various law sot' a similar kind that have been modeled after it, gave a new cause of action un- known to the common law for the benefit of a certain designated class of surviving relatives. Such relatives do not take the cause of action Eoi damages to the deceased bj transfer to them by operation of law or other- wise, but ate enabled by statute to recover the pecuniary loss i,, them- selves caused by the wrongful taking off of the decedent the continuation of whose life would have been hen.- ficial to them. . . . The action a. ernes to the surviving beneficiary mentioned in the Btatute by reason <>f tlie deal h of the injured pers u caused by the wrongful act of an- other. It is strictly not proper to say that it is ;i cause of action which survives, hut it is rather a new ac tion by sees. 4255, -1250 (Rev. Stat. Wis. 1898), which can lie brought not for the benefit of the estate hut. solely for the benefit of the benefici aries named in the statute.' - Brown v. Chicago & X. \V. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137; 77 X. W. 748; 44 L. R. A. 579; 13 Am. A Eng. R. < as. \.s. 603; 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. 255, 257. per Mar shall, J., rehearing denied 44 L. R. A. 585; 78 N. \\\ 771. See also Topping v. Town of St. Lawrence, 86 Wis. 526; 57 \. V. ;',h5, per Ort.ou, J. 60 The value of the following justi- fies its insertion at length: "The law of this state conferring upon surviv- ing relatives the right to n their pecuniary loss caused by the wrongful taking off by death of a husband, wile, child, father or mother has existed for forty years, while the law- reviving the right in favor of the personal representa- tives of a deceased person to his claim tor damages t" his person was § 499 DEATH— STATUTORY REMEDY. So it is also held that the remedy is purely statutory under the Illinois act and not a survival of decedent's cause of action. 51 In not enacted till 1887. But independ- ent of that circumstance, as before observed, the language of the two provisions is plain. They refer to en- tirely distinct losses recoverable in different rights; the oiie in the right of the deceased for the loss occa- sioned to him; the other is the right of the surviving relatives for the loss to them. Both are dependent on the injury but only one dependent on the death with surviving relatives to take under the statute. The language of one provision is that 'actions for personal injuries shall survive' and of the other ' in case of the death of a person by the wrong- ful act of another. 1 Under certain circumstances named the wrongdoer • shall be liable to an action for damages notwithstanding the death of the person injured, if the death be caused in this state.' The only condition of the right of action in the former case is the existence of the actionable claim for damages at the time of the death of the injured party. The statute creates no new liability, but prevents the lapsing by death of an old one. The only con- dition of liability under the other provision is the existence of an ac- tionable claim in the right of the in- jured party at the time of his death and the existence of the beneficiaries mentioned in the statute. The lia- bility of the wrongdoer while de- pendent on the condition named is not on the actionable claim called for to satisfy such condition, but on a new right created by the statute, — the right of the surviving relatives to compensation for the loss which falls upon them." And criticising Holton v. Daly, 106111. 131, the court continues: " That learned court rea- sons that there is but one ground of liability, — the wrongful act; and as all claims for damages grow out of the one wrong, it is unreasonable to say the legislature intended there shall be two causes of action based upon it; that the more reasonable view is that the act making causes of action for personal injuries sur- vive should be considered as refer- ring to a special class of actions not included in those named in the general provision giving a right of action to surviving relatives; that without that construction there would be a repugnance between the two provisions. The fallacy of that reasoning is easily apparent. Thus in the circumstances named, there is but one wrongful act, but that is not the sole ground of action in the right of the deceased, or the sur- vivor. It takes the wrongful act and the loss to make the complete cause of action, and as the loss to the person upon whom the injury is inflicted must be recovered by or in his right, and the loss to the sur- viving relatives by or in their right, the causes of action are clearly dis- tinct. . . . The views of the Illinois court accord with the judgment of the supreme court of Kansas. Mc- Carthy v. Railroad Co., 18 Kan. 46; City of Eureka v. Merrifield, 53 Kan. 794; 37 Pac. 113; Martin v. Railway Shimer, 153 Ind. 35; Rep. 263. See Holton v. Daly, 106 111. 131; Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 111. 68; Chicago v. Major, 18 111. 349. 51 Malott v. 1 Repr. 1234 ; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 774; 54 N. E. 101; 6 Am. Neg. 576 IM'.A III STATUTORY REMEDY. 199 Pennsylvania it is declared that one section of the statute of 1851 gives to a common-law action the quality of survivorship, the estate of the decedent and tin- other for tin- benefit of bis surviv- ing relatives are entirely distinct, the former beit)' r b;ise v. Cromwell, 11 X\ Y. 593; Esterly's Appeal. 54 Pa. St. 192; Hearn v. Erwin, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 599; Shaw v. K. R. Co., 101 U. s. 557; Browu v. Barry. 3 Dall. (U. S.)365. 581 § 501 DEATH — STATUTORY REMEDY. a penalty must not be strictly construed.' 14 But it is also de- cided that remedial statutes should receive a liberal rather than a strict construction," with a view to. the intended beneficial purpose.* A statute should, however, be given some effect differing from the status of the law as it existed without it. 6; So the object, spirit and purpose of a statute should be con- sidered, 68 and its purpose is determined by its natural and rea- sonable effect. 1 ' 9 Again, statutes are to be construed together and are in pari materia, when they relate to the same general subject-matter, or to the same thing. 70 And statutes in pari ma- 64 Thurn v. Alta Teleg. Co., 15 Cal. 472; Allen's Teleg. Cas. 146, 148 per Baldwin, J.; Daggett v. State, 4 Conn. 61; Rawson v. State, 19 Conn. 292; United States v. Athens, 35 Ga. 344; Cushing v. Dill, 2 Scam. (111.) 461; State v. Indiana & I. S. R. Co. (Ind.), 18 L. R. A. 502; 32 N. E. 817, hold- ing also that the rule is not violated where a common sense view of the statute as a whole is taken so as to effect the legislative purpose if per- mitted by a reasonable construction, State v. Hogriever, 152 Ind. 652; 53 N. E. 921; 45 L. R. A. 504, holding also that the rule should not be un- reasonably applied so as to defeat the sovereign will when that is ex- pressed with ordinary certainty. Western Un. Teleg. v. Harding, 103 Ind. 505; 1 Am. Elec. Cas. 814, 818, per Mitchell, C. J.; State v. Lowell, 23 Iowa, 304; Melody v. Reab, 4 Mass. 473: Pike v. Jenkins, 12 X. H. 255; Chase v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co.. 26 N. Y. 523; Sprague v. Birdsall, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 419; Jones v. Estes, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 379; Hall v. State, 20 Ohio, 7; Kirby v. West. Uu. Teleg. Co. (S. D.), 37 N. W. 202; United States v. Ellis (U. S. D. C. W. D. Ark. ), 51 Fed. 808, holding also that con- struction must be fair and reason- able and not forced. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 76; United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 582 (U. Si) 385; Joyce on Elec. Law (ed. 1900), sec. 179. 65 Mcintosh v. Johnson, 51 Neb. 33; 70 N. W. 522; Kohnv. Collison (Del.), 27 Atl. 834. 66 Hudler v. Golden, 36 N. Y. 446, and a liberal construction should be given to statutes intended for the public good. Tallman v. Syracuse & N. Y. Rd. Co., Keyes, 128; 4 Abb. Dec. 351. 67 Quackenbush v. United States. 33 Ct. CI. 355. 68 People, Wood v. Lacombe, 99 N. Y. 43; 1 N. E. 599, aff'g 34 Hun ( X. Y. ), 401 ; Pearson v. Elmer, 5 Redf . (N. Y.)181. 69 Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30; 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 768. 70 State v. Gerhart, 145 Ind. 439: 44 N. E. 409; 33 L. R. A. 313. See Micbenor v. Harrison, 116 Ind. 300; State v. Sloss, 83 Ala. 93; People v. Raymond, 18 Colo. 242; 19 L. R. A. 649 ; Ex parte O'Donovan. 24 Fla. 281 ; Hunt v. Chicago, H. & B. R. Co., 121 111. 644; Re Hall, 38 Kan. 670; Rich- ardson v. Richardson, La. Ann. 641; Merrill v. Grossman, 08 Me. 412: Simpkins v. Ward, 45 Mich. 559; State, Brown v. Klein, 116 Mo. 259: Gartner v. Cohen, 51 N. J. L. 125: Syracuse Water Co. v. City of Syra- cuse, 116 N. Y. 167; 26 N. Y. St. R. 364; 22 N. E. 381; 5 L. R. A. 546; Wortham v. Basket, 99 N. C. 70; DEATH -STATUTORY lMlMEDY. §501 i.i i;i are to be construed together as if parts of the same act. 71 The intention governs in the construction of a statute and this in- tention must be gathered from the whole statute and sometimes from statutes in pari materia. 78 So every word of a legislative enactment is presumed to have some force and effect. 78 And the act must also be construed in its entirety so as to give effect to every part without violating the intention of the legislature/' And it is held that the intention governs though contrary to the letter of the statute/"' Again, that one of two constructions will he presumed to have been intended which is within the power of the legislature. 76 And if tin- meaning of a statute is too plain to admit of construction, the maxim noscitur a sociis has no application," for tin- Language of an unambiguous statute should not be departed from in construing it. 78 It may also be Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727: 2s L. Ed. 1137; Ryan v. Carter, 93 U. S. 78; 23 L. Ed. 807. 71 People v. Asten, (5 Daly, 18; 49 Mow. (X. V.) 40:,, aff'd 02 X. Y. 623. See Powers v. Shepard, 48 X. Y. 540, aff'g 49 Barb. (X. Y.) 418; 35 How. I N. Y. J 53; McCarter v. Orphan Asy- lum of X. Y.. 9 Cow. 437. 72 People, Ouondaga Co. Sav. Bk. v. Butler, 147 X. Y. 164; 69 X. Y. St. K. 410; 41 X. E. 416, rev'g 85 Hun (N. Y. ), 616; State, Jones v. Mack. 23 Xev. 359; 47 Pac. 763; Barnard v. Gall, 43 La. Ann. 959; 10 So. 5. 78 Brown v. Turner, 174 Mass. 150: 54 N. E. 510. See Cincinnati v. Guck- enberger, 60 Ohio St. 353; 42 Ohio L. J. 79; 54 X. E. 376; Cincinnati v. Con- ner, 55 Ohio St. 82; 36 < >hio L. J. 25: 14 X. E. 582. 74 Johnson v. Schlosser, 146 Ind. 509; 45 X. E. 702; :;■; L. K. A. 59. Every clause will if possible be given effect. Mcintosh v. Johnson, 51 Xeb. 33; 70 X. W. 552. must be construed so as to give force and effect to legis- lative intent. Shonwiler v. Stewart, 104 Iowa, 67; 73 N. W. 179, must be so construed that one section will not destroy but support and explain the other. Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U. S. 242: 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; 37 L. Ed. 752. See further Washington Twp. v. Coler (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. ), 2 C..C. A. 272; 4 U. S. App. 622; 51 Fed. 362. '■' Hooper v. Creager, 84 Md. 195; 35 Atl. 967, 1103; 35 L. II. A. 202, re- hearing denied 84 Md. 258; 30 Atl. 359; 35 L. R. A. 210. 76 Martin v. North Salem L. Co., 97 Ya. ;!49; 1 Va. S. C. 442; :':., S. E. 600; Martin v. South Salem L. Co., 94 Va. 28; 2 Va. L. Keg. 743; 26 S. E. 591; 6 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. X. S. 312; S. < '., 97 Va. 349; 33 S. E. 600; 1 Va. S. C. Rep. 442. 77 Brown v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co., 102 Wis. 137; 78 X. W. 771: 44 L. R. A. 585, denying rehearing 77 X. W. 74S; 44 L. R. A. 579; 5 Am. Xeg. Pep. 255; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 603. See also McGowan v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 60 X. J. L. 198; 38 Ail. 671; Choctaw, < >. it G. R. Co. v. Alex- ander, 7 Okla. 591: :.i Pac. 121, aff'g 7 Okla. 579: 52 Pac. 944. - Matter Of Miller. 110 X. Y. 216, 222; IS X. Y. St. R. 226; 18 N. E. 139, aff'g 47 Bun (X. Y. |, 394; 14 X. Y. St. R. 529; 2S Wkly. Dig. 47. See 583 501 DEATH STATUTORY REMEDY. stated that a statute is constitutional unless clearly otherwise,™ and every intendment and presumption favors its constitutional- ity even to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt,* so that one of two constructions which will bring a statute in harmony with the constitution should be adopted. 81 Again, a statute may be valid in part and unconstitutional in part if the parts are sepa- rable, and sufficiently operative provisions remain, 82 and the in- People v. Supervisors of Green Co., 13 Abb. N. C. 421; 66 How. Pr. (N. Y.)330; Johusonv. Hudson R. Rd. Co., 49 N. Y. 455, rev'g 2 Sweeny (N. Y.), 298. 79 Cummings v. Hyatt, 54 Neb. 635; 74 N. W. 411; Malloy v. Fay- etteville, 122 N. C. 480; 29 S. E. 880. See Perkius v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554; 33 Wkly. N. Cas. 41; 24 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 85; 44 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 325; 27 Atl. 356. 80 Com. Armstrong v. E. H. Taylor Jr. Co., 101 Ky. 325; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 552; 41 S. W. 11, rev'g 38 S. W. 10; Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554; 33 Wkly. N. Cas. 41; 24 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 85; 44 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 325; 27 Atl. 356; De Walt v. Bartley, 146 Pa. 529; 30 Wkly. N. C 121; 24 Atl. 185; 15 L. R. A. 771, aff'g 1 Pa. Dist. Rep. 199, 202, 220; People, Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 111. 451; 40 N. E. 307; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381, aff'g 9 Hun (N. Y.), 185; Cole Mfg. Co. v. Falls, 90 Tenn. 466; 16 S. W. 1045; Holton v. State, 28 Fla. 303; 9 So. 716. And its uncon- stitutionality must be shown be- yond a reasonable doubt. Denver v. Knowles, 17 Colo. 204; 30 Pac. 1041; 17 L. R. A. 135. In case of reasonable doubt courts will hold a statute con- stitutional. People, Woodyatt v. Thompson, 155 111. 451; 40 N. E. 307. The rule, however, is held to be one of comity only with regard to rea- sonable intendment favoring consti- tutionality, and does not apply where 584 statute is contrary to manifest inten- tion of the constitution. Perkins v. Philadelphia, 156 Pa. 554; 24 Pitts. L. J. N. S. 85; 33 Wkly. N. C. 41; 27 Atl. 356; 44 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 325. 81 New York & L. I. B. Co. v. Smith, 148 N. Y. 540; 42 N. E. 1088, aff'g 90 Hun (N. Y.), 312; People v. Rosenberg, 136 N. Y. 410; 53 N. Y. St. R. 1; 34 N. E. 285, rev'g 67 Hun (N. Y.),52; 51 N. Y. St. R. 189; 22 N. Y. Supp. 56. 82 State v. Street, 117 Ala, 203; 23 So. 807; Leep v. St. Louis, I. & M. S. R. Co., 58 Ark. 407; 23 L. R. A. 264; 57 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 1; 25 S. W. 75; Anderson v. Byrnes, 122 Cal. 272; 54 Pac. 821; Jacksonville, T. & K. W. R. Co. v. Adams, 33 Fla. 608: 15 So. 257; 24 L. R. A. 272; English v. State, 31 Fla. 340, 356; 12 So. 689; State, Lamar v. Dillon, 32 Fla. 545; 14 So. 383; 22 L. R. A. 124; 44 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 134; People, De- neen v. Simmons, 176 111. 165; 31 Chic. L. News, 75; 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 506; State v. Gerhardt 145 Ind. 439; 44 N. E. 469; 33 L. R. A. 313; Manistee & N. E. R. Co. v. Commrs. of Rds., 118 Mich. 349; 5 Det. L. News, 507; 76 N. W. 633; State, Crow v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1; 52 S. W. 395; 45 L. R. A. 363; State v. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 335; 38 S. W. 317; State, Aull v. Field, 119 Mo. 593; 24 S. W. 752; State, Wilmot v. Buckley, 60 Ohio St. 273; 42 Ohio L. J. 35; 54 N. E. DEATH STATUTES GBNKRALUS 502 valid part may be rejected/ 1 But the invalid section may sus- tain such a material relation i" the other sections or be so dependent thereon as bo invalidate all/ 1 and it is held that an unconstitutional provision in an act. while nol constituting the basis of a right, is of effect in ascertaining the meaning ..1' that part which is valid/' §502. Construction of statutes, etc.— Survival and death 1088.— The Texas survival act relating to personal injuries not resulting in death is held not unconstitutional as applied to one who was injured before its passage but died thereafter." Nor is the Georgia act of 1889 unconstitutional as applicable to ac- tions pending at the time of its passage. 87 As to the effect of constitutional provisions, it is held in Kentucky that the right granted by the statute to designated persons to bring an action where a husband or father is killed by the wanton or malicious use of firearms, or by any weapon, is not taken away by the con- stitution, which provides that the personal representatives shall bring suit where death results from an injury inflicted by neg- ligence or wrongful act. 88 And the general statute of that state 272; Re Assessment & C. of Taxes (S. D.), 54 N. W. 818; Trimble v. Com., 96 Va. 818; 1 Va. S. C. Rep. 29; 5 Va. L. Reg. 92; 31 Chic. L. News, 361; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649: 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; 36 L. Eil. 294: Cantini v. Tillman (U. S. C. C. D. S. C. ), 54 Fed. 969; 47 All). L. J. 430. 83 People, Akin v. Kipley, 171 111. 44; 49 N. E. 229; State v. Newell, 140 Mo. 282; 41 S. W. 751; State, Corn- stock v. Stewart. 52 Neb. 243; 71 X. W. 998; State, Wheeler v. Stuht, 52 Neb. 209; 71 X. W. 941; Eureka v. Wilson, 15 Utah, 67; 48 Pac. 150. 84 Cheyenne v. Swan ( Wy. i. 51 Pac. 209; 40 I.. R. A. 195. See Dur- yee v. Mayor, New York, 76 N. V. 477; State, Scott, v. Bowen, 54 Neb. 211: 74 N. W. 615: People. Deneen v. Martin, 178 111.611; 53 X. E. 309; state, Gray v. Dover, 62 X. J. L. 40; 49 Atl. 640, aff'd 42 Atl. 674; West- ern U. T. Co. v. Poe (U. S. C. C. D. Ohio), 61 Fed. 449; State v. Godwin, 123 N. C. 697; 31 S. E. 221. ssSipev. People, Milliken. 20 Colo. 127: 56 Pac. 571. 86 Marshall v. McAllister, 18 Tex. Civ. A pp. 159; 43 S. W. 104:1: 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 743, under Tex. Rev. Stat. 1895, art 3353a, followiug Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Rogers (Tex. Civ. App. ), 39 S. W. 1112. See also Mis- souri, K. & T. P. Co. v. Settle, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 357; 1 Jour. App. ')7: 47 S. W. 825. 87 Pritchard v. Savannah St a R. R. R. Co.. 87 Ga. 294; 13 S. E. 493; I I L. R. A. 721: <;a. Ait <>f Novem- ber 12, 1889, amdg. Ga, Code, sec. 20H7. "Mii'lme v. Alexander. 15 Ky. L. Rep. 732; 2 1 s. W. 619: Ky. Gen. Stat. ch. 1, sec. 6; Kv. Const, sec. 241. 585 § 502 DEATH — STATUTES GENERALLY. permitting the widow to recover for the wrongful death of her husband, where there are no children, is not repealed as incon- sistent therewith, by the constitutional provision giving the personal representative a right of action.® Nor does the con- stitutional provision of that state allowing the recovery of dam- ages for death negligently caused, deprive any person of property without due process of law in violation of the Federal constitution, although the relative entitled to recover has no legal pecuniary claim on the deceased. 90 Again, the New York constitution pro- viding against legislative limitation of the amount recoverable for injuries resulting in death, and that the right of action shall never be abrogated, is not retroactive but is prospective and does not apply to causes of action theretofore accruing, although if the injury occurred before, and the death after, the constitution went into effect, the provision applies. 91 So in North Carolina the act of 1897, providing that the negligence of a fellow ser- vant shall not be a defense in actions against a railroad company for death or injury of an employee, is held not to apply where the employee was injured before its enactment. 92 As to the effect of an amended or repealing statute, it is held that the Alabama Code of 1886 embodies the act of 1872, "to prevent homicides;' and although it drops the title and provides for the recovery of such damages as the jury may assess, it is unchanged in purpose C.)i 24 U. S. C. C. A. 280; 47 U. S. App. 339; 78 Fed. 693. si Weber v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 15 App. Div. (N. Y.) 512; 42 X. Y. Supp. 789; 76 X. Y. St. R. 789; art. 1, sec. 18, Const. X. Y. 1895; s 9 Edmonson v. Kentucky C. R. Co., 16 Ky. L. Rep. 459; 28 S. W. 789; Ky. Gen. Stat. ch. 57, sec. 3; Const. Ky. sec. 241. 90 Owensboro & X. R. Co. v. Bar- clay, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 997; 43 S. W. 177; Ky. Const, sec. 241; U. S. Const. 14th Amdt. See Illinois C. R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. (72 U. S. ) 90; 18 L. Ed. 591. And the Ohio Act, April 2. 1890, governing railroad's liability for injury to employees and which applies to all railroad corpora- tions within the state and to all of a common class of their employees, does not violate a constitutional re- quirement that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform oper- ation throughout the state. Pierce v. Van Dusen (U. S. C. C. A. 6th. 586 Smith v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 15 Misc. (X. Y.) 158; 35 N. Y. Supp. 1062; Isola v. Webber, 147 N. Y. 329; 69 X. Y. St. R. 691; 41 N. E. 704, rev'g 13 Misc. (N. Y.) 97; 68 N. Y. St. R. 32; 34 N. Y. Supp. 77, rearg. denied 148 N. Y. 736: art. 1, sec. 18, Const. X. Y. 1895; O'Reilly v. Utah, Xev. & Cal. Stage Co., 87 Hun (X. Y.), 406; 68 X. Y. St. R. 432; 34 X. Y. Supp. 358; art. 1, sec. 18, Const, as am'd 1874. 92 Rittenhouse v. Wilmington St. R. Co., 120 X. C. 544; 26 S. E. 922. DEATH STATUTES GENERALLY. § 503 although the prior act provided for the assessment of such sum as the jury deem just. 93 Again, it is decided in Pennsylvania that the survival act in case of actions for injuries to the person has not been expressly or impliedly repealed or modified by sub- sequent legislation." Ami in Washington it is held that the statutory right of action in the heirs or personal representatives is not inconsistent with and does not repeal another section of the same Code which gives a parent a remedy for the death or injury of a child. 86 Again, as we have elsewhere stated, the nonabatement or survival statute of Connecticut as to personal injuries and death, and the enactment giving a remedy for loss of life by a railroad company's negligence, etc., are brought to- gether in the statutes of 1888 of that state which includes all injuries resulting in death.*'' § 503. Construction of survival and death loss statutes, etc.— Continued. — Another question which has necessitated the construction of these statutes relates to the effect of enactments where the death loss act provides a remedy and other statutes are of necessity involved. To illustrate : It is held in South Carolina that the death loss act of 1859 does not apply to a case under the act of 1874, which gives a right of action against the county where one is injured by a defective highway or bridge. 97 And in another case it is decided that an administra- trix continuing an action under a survival statute cannot re- 6)1 Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Free- man (Ala.), 11 So. 800; Ala. Act February 5, 1872, embodied in Code, 1886, sec. 2580. 91 Maherv. Philadelphia Trac. Co., 181 Pa. 391; 40 Wkly. X. C. 477; 87Atl. 571; 3 Am. Xeg. Rep. 85; Pa. act, April 15, 1851, sec. 18; art. 3, sec. 21, Const. Pa.; case was decided May, 1897. citing Birch v. Railroad Co., 165 Pa. St. 339; 30 Atl. 82(5. 95 Hedrick v. Ilwaco R. & Nav. Co., 4 Wash. 400; 30 Par. 714: 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 45; Wash. Code, 1881, sees. 8, 9. Sec. 8 was later in pas- sage. »* Budd v. Meridan Elec. Rd. Co., 69 Conn. 272: 37 Atl. 683; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 335. 341, per Andrews, Ch. J.; Acts 1848, ch. 5, sei'S. 1, 2; Acts 1853, ch. 74, sec. 8; Genl. Stats. 1888, sec. 1008. 9 ' All v. Burnwell Co. (S. C.I. 7 S. E. 58; Gen. Stat. S. C. sec. 2183, enacted 1859; Gen. Stat. S. C. sec. 1087, enacted 1S74. See also Radio v. Detroit (Mich.). 51 X. W. 360, under Flow. Mich. Stat. sees. 8313, 8314, and Mich. Pub. acts 1887. No. 264. Examine Bowes v. City of Boston (Mass.). 29 N. E. 633, under Mass. Pub. St. ch. 52, sec. 17, and Pub. St. ch. 165, sec. 1. 587 § 503 DEATH -STATUTES GENERALLY. cover damages under an act creating a new right of action limited to cases of death caused by violence or negligence and also limiting the exercise of the right to. persons other than the one acting as administratrix.* So in an Illinois decision an action under the death loss act is held not within the statute relating to damages for injuries to the person," and it is decided in a Federal case that the state of West Virginia, which gives a right of action after death to the personal representatives, does not impliedly save an action for damages for personal injuries which abates by death of the plaintiff. 100 Again, where a statute provided that a cause of action for negligent injuries should survive, and the death loss act provided for an action for the benefit of the heirs to the extent of the pecuniary injury re- sulting from the death, it was held that an action for the benefit of the estate for death from the injuries and also an action for the pecuniar}- loss to the heirs was not given. 1 This question of the effect upon the remedy or right of action of death loss enactments and survival, and other personal injury statutes, has also been passed upon in other states and is involved as to the construction of such legislative acts with other matters which are elsewhere considered fully herein, in so far as they are germane to the subject of damages, and the rights of action therefor. 3 98 McCaffei ty v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (Pa. 1899). 44 Atl. 435. 99 Lake Shore v. M. S. R. Co. v. Dylinski, 67 111. App. 114: 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 77, under death loss act, 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, and personal injury act, ch. 83, sec. 14. Examine Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 119 111. 586; 9 N. E. 263; 6 West. 673; Hoi ton v. Daly. 106 111. 131; 19 111. App. 591. 110 Ceiling v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 151 U. S. 673; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep- 533; 38 L. Ed. 311. Examine Hurlburt v. City of Topeka, 34 Fed. 510; Martin v. Missouri P. Ry. Co., 58 Kan. 475; 49 Pac. 605; 7 Am. &Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 576; 3 Ana. Xeg. Rep. 165, under Kan. Civ. Code, sees. 420, 425 ; McCarthy v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 18 Kan. 46; City of 588 Eureka v. Merrifield, 53 Kan. 794; 37 Pac. 113. 1 Sweetland v. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 117 Mich. 329; 43 L. R. A. 568. '- See Brown v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 102 Wis. 137; 77 N. W. 748; 44 L. R. A. 579; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 603; rehearing denied 44 L. R. A. 585; 78 N. W. 771; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 603; Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 53 Ark. 117; 13 S. W. 801; Hartigan v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 86 Cal. 142; 24 Pac. 851; Mayhew v. Burns, 103 Ind. 328; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. McElwain, 98 Ky. 700; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sanders, 86 Ky. 259; 55 S. W. 563; Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Phillips, 64 Miss. 693; 2 So. 537; Little wood v. Mayer, 89 N. Y. 24; DEATH — 8TATUTES GENERALLY. Upon the point whether the statutes of the character under consideration should receive a liberal or strict construction, the authorities are not in harmony. As we have slated elsewhere, statutes in derogation of the common law, and likewise penal statutes, should be strictly construed, while it is also held that remedial statutes should be liberally construed. The construction therefore, of any enactment must depend upon the view which the courts of that state take of its character. Thus while the Massachusetts statute has been held penal in form, it has also been declared to be remedial in its nature, 8 and that the act is penal while the action also given the administrator is merely a substitute for the indictment. 1 In the New Hampshire cases, those arising- under the statutes of 1867 "' and of 1878 '' should lie viewed in the light of the remedy given by way of fine under those acts, and the change effected by the subsequent enact- ment. 7 Again the Maine statute of 1857 s likewise provided a for- feiture to be recovered by way of indictment. So also does the statute of 1883, '•' and decisions under the earlier acts should be considered in comparison with those involving the survival enactments of that state as well as those rendered under the acts providing for a civil action. 10 In Louisiana the statute of 1857 was in effect a survival act," which so remained in the ("ode of 1889 with a slight change as to the parties whose death gave a right of action. 1 -' And in this connection it is held in Illinois that the abatement or survival acts of 1874 are re- medial and will be liberally construed to embrace a case not within its terms. 18 So the Colorado statutes providing for the 14 Wkly. Dig. 400, aff'g 47 Sup. Ct. 547; Putman v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 21 Or. 230; Legg v. Britton, 04 Vt. 652: 24 Ail. 1016; The Harris- burg, 119 U. S. 199; 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 140, per Waite, Ch. J. 3 Commonwealth v. Boston & A. R. Co., 121 Mass. 36. 4 Littlejohn v. Fitchburg R. Co., 148 Mass. 478; 20 N. E. 103, per Holmes, J. s Gen. Stat. N. H. 1867, ch. 264, sec. 14, p. 259. 6 Gen. Laws, 1878, ch. 282, sec. 14. 7 N. II. Laws, 1879, ch. 35, sec. 1; N. H. Laws, 1885, ch. 11; N. II. Laws, 1887, ch. 71; N. H. Pub. Stat. 1891, ch. 191, sees. 8-13. See French v. Masenna F. Co. ( X. H. ), 20 Atl. 363. 8 Rev. Stat. Me. 1857, ch. 51, sec. 42 p. 370: ch. 52, p. 376. 9 Rev. Stat. 1883, ch. 51. 10 See Acts Me. 1891, ch. 7l'4; Rev. Stat. Me. 1888, ch. 18. U Rev. Stat. La. 1857, sec. 18, p. 79. J- La. Civ. Code, 1889, art. 2315. 11 Xortheru Trust Co. v. Palmer, 589 § 503 DEATH — STATUTES GENERALLY. recovery of damages for death by wrongful acts, etc., are held to be remedial and not penal statutes. 14 Again in a Wisconsin case it is said of the death loss act of that state : " To be sure the rule of strict construction should apply as the act is in deroga- tion of the common law 15 if the language is open to construc- tion ; but in our judgment it is not." 16 It is decided in an Illinois case that a liberal construction will be given to effectu- ate the purpose of an act for the health and safety of coal miners, 17 while in Kentucky the statute is held to have a double char- acter, remedial in part and penal in part, to be construed accord- ingly. 1 " It is clear, therefore, that the value of any decision depends upon so many factors that except in the case of, at least, substantially similar statutes, the extraterritorial force of any decision or declaration of the courts must necessarily be limited in determining its weight on the question of liberal or strict construction of these various statutes. 19 171 111. 383; 49 N. E. 553, affg 70 111. App. 93; 111. Rev. Stat. 1874, ch. 3, sec. 123, p. 97, sees. 10, 11. See Henderson v. Alexander, 2 Ga. 81; Greene v. Martine, 21 Hun (N. Y. ), 136. 14 Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465; 30 Pac. 352; Mill's Ann. Stat. Colo. sees. 1509, 1510. 15 Citing Eilers v. Wood, 64 Wis. 422; 25 N. W. 440. 16 Eau v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 95 Wis. 69; 69 N. W. 997; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 537, 538, per Marshall, J. The court adds, ''There is nothing either in the terms or spirit of the act from which the court can say the legislative idea was to confine its effect to rights of action in favor of injured persons as the law existed on the subject at the time section 4255 was passed." Wis. Rev. Stat, sec. 4245. The court also considered the effect of this statute as covering the death of a railroad employee not- withstanding Laws, Wis. 1893, ch. 220, relating to liability of railroad companies to employees. 590 17 Carterville Coal Co. v. Abbott, 81 111. App. 279; 3 Starr & C. A'nn. Code of 111. ch. 93, sec. 14. The Miuers' Act provides a remedy in case of loss of life, etc. So also Rev. Stat. Mo. 1889, sec. 7074. 18 Board of Shelby Co. v. Scearce, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 576. 19 Courts favoring a strict construc- tion are, in addition to cases con- sidered in the text, Smith v. Louis- ville, etc., R. Co., 75 Ala. 449, 450; Daly v. Stoddard, 66 Ga. 145; Hamilton v. Jones, 125 Ind. 176; 25 N. E. 192; Stewart v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co., 103 Ind. 44: Jackson v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 87 Mo. 422; Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hine, 25 Ohio St. 629. Cases favor- ing liberal construction in addition to these noted in text are, Lam- phear v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 237; Soule v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 24 Conn. 575; Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Shacklett, 10 111. App. 404; Merkle v. Bennington Twp., 58 Mich. 156; 24 N". W. 776; Bolinger v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 36 Minn. DEATH CONFLICT OF LAWS. §504 § 504. Death— Conflict of laws— Extraterritorial juris- diction-Foreign administrator— Federal jurisdiction.— It is decided in several cases that the test whether an action for the loss occasioned by a negligent killing can be maintained in an- other jurisdiction than that in which the death occurred, depends upon whether the action is contrary to the public policy of the state whose jurisdiction is invoked or inconsistent with its laws; if not, the action lies. But the complaint must aver the ex- istence in such other state of a statute similar to that of the 418, 421; 31 N. W. 856; Haggerty v. Cent. R. R. Co., 31 N. J. L. (2 Vr.) 349, 350; Murphy v. Board of Cb. F. 28 Vr. (N. J. L.) 244, 250; Lang v. Houston St., etc., R. R. Co., 75 Hun (N. Y.), 151; 58 N. Y. St. R. 504; 27 N. Y. Supp. 90, case aff'd 144 N. Y. 717; 70 N. Y. St. R. 8G8; 39 N. E. 858; Beach v. Bay State Steamboat Co., 6 Abb. (X. Y.) 415; 27 Barb. (N. Y.)248; 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 1, case rev'd 10 Abb. (X. Y.) 71; 30 Barb. (N. V. ) 433; 18 How. (N. Y.) 335. Examine further Eustace v. Jahns, 38 Cal. 3; Burns v. Grand Rap. & I. R. Co., 113 Ind. 169; 15 N. E. 230. See further upon the general con- struction of statutes the following cases: Sees. 420 and 422 of the Kan- sas Civ. Code must be construed in pari materia, and sec. 422 is exclusive. Martin v. Missouri, Pac. Ry. Co., 58 Kan. 475; 49 Pac. 005; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 576; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 105, 107, citing McCarthy v. Rd. Co., 18 Kan. 40. The La. Civ. Code, art. 2315, relating to survival of the right of action in case of death in favor of the minor children, etc., for the space of one year from the death, applies to acts of commission as well as omission: American Sug. Ref. Co. v. Johnson (U. S. C C. A. 5th C), 60 Fed. 503. As to the ap- plication of the Ark. statutes to Indian Territory under act of con- gress, May 2, 1890, Anlmore Coal Co. v. Bevil (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C), 61 Fed. 757. 20 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, 62 Ark. 254; 35 S. W. 225; Weaver v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (D. C), 21 Wash. L. Rep. 179; Law v. Western R. of Ala. (U. S. C. C. Ga.), 91 Fed. 817; Burns v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co., (Ind.); 15 X. E. 230; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Snivell, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 902; 18 S. W. 944: Higgins v. Cen- tral N. Eng. & W. R. Co. (Mass.) ; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 212; 29 N. E. 534; Nicholas v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., (Minn.) ; 80 X. W. 776; Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (U. S. C. C. A. 3d C. N. J.), 35 C. C. A. 282; 93 Fed. 200; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 577; Davidow v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (U. S. C. C. I). X. Y.), 85 Fed. 943; Kiefer v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 12 App. Div. (N. Y.) 28, aff'd 153 X. Y. 688; Nel- son v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co.; 88 Va. 971; 14 S. E. 838; 16 Va. L. J. 255; 15 L. R. A. 583; 11 Ry. A- Corp. L. J. 245. See Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Rouse, 78 111. App. 280, aff'd 178 111. 132; 52 X. E. '.'51; 44 L. R. A. 410; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 706; 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. 549, citing numer- ous cases; Stewart v. Baltimore & <>. R. Co. (U. S. Sup. C. D. C.i, L68 U. S. 445; 42 L. Ed 537; L8 Sup. Ct. in:,: 25 Wash. L. Rep. 81 t; 3 Va. L. Reg. 045, rev'g 6 App. I). C. 56. It is held in this decision that while, 591 §504 DEATH — CONFLICT OF LAWS. state where the suit is brought. 21 But the fact that the statutes of the two states differ in some particulars, 22 or that a different law of distribution may prevail in other jurisdictions, does not preclude the right to sue. 23 The Ohio statute 24 authorizes a suit in its courts by an administrator appointed in another state, subject to the same restriction as applies to a nonresident, under the Maryland- statute author- izing the survival of the right of ac- tion, the state is the proper plaintiff and the jury trying the cause is to apportion the damages recovered, and under the act of congress in force in the District of Columbia, the proper plaintiff is the personal representative of the deceased, and the damages recovered are distrib- uted by law, these differences are not sufficient to render the statutes of Maryland inconsistent with the act of congress, or the public policy of the District of Columbia. It is also decided in the same case that the purpose of the several statutes passed in the states in more or less conformity to what is known as Lord Campbell's act, is to provide the means for recovering the damages caused by that which is in its nature a tort, and where such a statute simply takes away a common-law obstacle to a recovery for the tort, an action for that tort can be main- tained in any state in which that common-law obstacle has been re- moved when the statute of the state in which the cause of action arose is not, in substance, inconsistent with the statutes or public policy of the state in which the right of action is Bought to be enforced. The same coui't also holds that the supreme court of the District of Columbia has jurisdiction of an action, sound- ing in tort, brought by the adminis- trator of a deceased person against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, to recover damages for 592 the benefit of the widow of the de- ceased by reason of his being killed by a collision which took place while he was travelling on that railroad in the State of Maryland. In Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cox (Tex.), 145 U.S. 593; 36 L. Ed. 829; 12 Sup. Ct. 905, it is held that a cause of action founded upon a statute of one state, conferring the right to recover dam- ages for an injury resulting in death, may be enforced in a court of the United States sitting in another state if it is not inconsistent with the stat- utes or public policy of the state in which the right of action is sought to be enforced. This cause of action founded upon the statute of Louisi- ana, conferring such right, is en- forceable in Texas, notwithstanding the decisions of the courts of that state, referred to in the opinion of this case, those cases being in con- struction of the statute of Texas on that subject, and not applicable to the Louisiana statute. See also ci- tations of this case in 3 Russell & Winslow's Syl. Dig. U. S. p. 3922. - 1 Kahl v. Memphis, etc., R. Co. (Ala.), 10 So. 661. But see Jackson v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. (Ind.), 39 N. E. 663; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Andrews, 14 Ohio C. C. 564. 22 Nelson v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 88 Va. 971, 14 S. E. 838; 16 Va. L. J. 255; 15 L. R. A. 583; 11 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 245. 2:5 Weaver v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (D. C), 21 Wash. L. Rep. 174. 2 *Rev. Stat. sees. 6133, 6134a. DEATH CONFLICT <•!•" LAWS. and also gives a right of action in that state even though accru- ing under the laws of another state, upon the general principle of comity, that is, in cases where such other state would permit the enforcement in its courts of a statute of Ohio of like char- acter. Therefore an administrator appointed in Indiana may sue in Ohio for the intestate's death occasioned in Indiana."' But it is not sufficient to merely show that the courts of such other state entertain actions for death. 36 In Georgia a dependent mother's right of action is not confined to resident mothers." And the Illinois courts will not refuse to enforce another state's statute abolishing the fellow-servant rule in a suit for the death of one of its own citizens occurring in such foreign state, where such action is brought by one of its own citizens against a cor- poration in its own state.* So in Indiana a foreign administra- tor may sue for wrongful death occasioned in Indiana even though in the state where the intestate resided there is no stat- ute giving a right of action in similar cases.' 8 Again, the rem- edy under the Kentucky statute ;o is not restricted to personal representatives appointed in said state, nor to deceased persons who were citizens or residents thereof. 11 And an administrator appointed in that state may sue for killing the intestate in Ten- nessee, although the statutes differ in some respects." 2 But the damages recovered in Kentucky will go to the widow in accord- ance with the Illinois statute where the death was occasioned.* 5 In Louisiana' 54 an action for an employee's death may be brought 25 Cincinnati H. & D. K. Co. v. Thie- band (U. S. C. C. App. 6th C), 114 Fed. 918. •^Wabash K. Co. v. Fox, 04 Ohio St. 133; 59 X. E. 888: 9 Am. Nog. Rep. 593. 27 Augusta K. Co. v. Glover (Ga.), 18 S. E. 400. ^Chicago v. E. I. K. v. Rouse, 178 111. V.V2: 52 N. E. 951;44 I,. R. A. HO; 12 Am. & Eng. R. < as. \. s. 706; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 549, aff'g 78 111. A.pp. 286. The court said in this caBe: " Actions not. penal lint lor pecuniary damages for torts in civil injuries to the person or property are transitory and if actionable when committed. 38 in general may he maintained in any jurisdiction in which the defendant can be legally served with process." 29 Memphis & C. Packet Co. v. Pikey, (Ind.) : 40 N. E. 527, under Ind. Rev. Stat. 1881, sec. 284. 31 Ch. 57, p. 550. !l Marvin v. Marysville St. R. . v. Sanb. & B. Wis. An not. Stat. sec. Higgius, 85 Tenn. 620; 4 S. W. 47. 4255. Sec Mexican C. R. Co. v. Goodman, "Northern Pac. K. Co. v. Hah 20Tex. Civ. App. 104: 48 S. W. 778. cock, 154 V . S. 190; 38 I- Ed. 958; " Boston* M. K. Co. v. McDuffey 44 Sup. Ct. Hep. 978. See 2 RusBell (U. S. C C. A. Vt.), 25 C. C. A. -.'IT: & Winslow's Syl. Dig. V. S. p. 2920, Tit Fed. 934. for citations of this case. « Hodges v. Kind. all (U. S. C. C. A. Va.), 34 C. C. A. 10:',; 01 Fed. 845, rev'g Lusk's Ad mis. v. Kimball, 87 48 Munus v. Southern P. R. N ! I.l< "i I IF LAWS. § 507 his injury in Iowa, the laws of that state, as construed therein, are to be followed and construed in the same manner as in the courts of said state, even though suit is brought in .1 Minnesota court." lint it is determined that the laws of Indiana where the action is brought controls where the wrong was committed, on the Ohio river between Indiana and Kentucky,"" although where the cause of action arose in a foreign state, by the laws of which it is barred, it cannot be amended alter such limita- tion under the Michigan statute as to death." Again, the laws of the Island of Trinidad do not govern an action for the death of an employee upon a British ship registered in England and owned and navigated by a Canadian corporation, since such vessel is English territory.' 11 § 507. Death— Conflict of laws— Foreign administrator Party in interest— Federal jurisdiction -Opinions in recent decisions. — It is decided in a Federal case in the circuit court of Ohio*'' that a foreign administrator may in that state main- tain an action under its statute m for death by wrongful act, and that the administrator is not merely a nominal party, but the real party, and may bring an action in the Federal courts not- withstanding the beneficiaries reside in another state, namely that of the death. In this decision, Thompson. Dist. J., said: ''This cause is submitted to the court upon a demurrer to the petition upon the ground that it does not appear therefrom that the court has jurisdiction of the action. 1. It is said that, for aught that appears in the petition, the plaintiff may have been appointed administratrix in a foreign country, or in some state of the Union other than Ohio, and that under section 6133 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, a foreign administrator cannot maintain an 'action for death caused by wrongful act ' under sec- tions 6134, 6134a, and 613") of said statutes. This claim is (U, S. C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1. 85 Fed. 943. 68 Njus v. Chicago, st. P. & M. R. •J Dupont v. Quebec S. s. Co., Rap. .1 ihI. Quebec, 11 S. C. 188. See Wil- son v. The John Ritson, •">■"> Fed. 6(53. Co., 47 Minn. 22; 49 N. VV. 527. G - Popp v. Cincinnati. II. & D. K. 69 Memphis & C. P. C. v. Pikey (lnd.), 40 N. E. 527. w How. Mich. Stat. sees. 8313, 8314; Wingert v. Carpenter (Midi.), 59 S. W. 662. Co. (U. s - C. C. S. D. Ohio), 9(1 Fed 465. «• Kev. Stat. sec. 6133-6134.1, 6135. 597 § 507 DEATH CONFLICT OF LAWS. based upon a construction of section 6133, which would exclude actions for wrongful death as not being brought by the foreign executor or administrator ' in his capacity,' of executor or adminis- trator because any damages recovered in such action would not become assets, of the estate, but would be apportioned among the wife, husband, children or next of kin of the deceased. I do not think this construction sound. I think the manifest intention of the legislature was to allow foreign executors and administrators to prosecute any action which might be prosecuted by an executor or administrator appointed in this state, ' in like manner and under like restrictions as a nonresident may be permitted to sue.' 6 ' 2. It is said that the beneficiaries under the statute are the real parties in interest, and that Federal jurisdiction, based upon diverse citizenship, has relation to the citizenship of the real parties in interest, and not to that of mere nominal parties ; that the plaintiff is a mere nominal party, and for aught that ap- pears in the petition, the other beneficiary may be a citizen of Ohio and, therefore, jurisdiction not appearing upon the faee of the petition, the action must be dismissed. The plaintiff, in the opinion of the court, is not a mere nominal party. She is a real party so far as the prosecution of the suit is concerned. It is not a case where the suit is being prosecuted in the name of somebody else, where the party actively conducting the litiga- tion is doing it in the name of the state, in the name of a next friend or the like, but it is a case where the administratrix is the active party in the prosecution of the suit, who institutes it, carries it on, and, with the sanction of the court, may com- promise or dismiss it. She has absolute control of, and is re- sponsible for, the conduct of the case. 65 In the Stewart case™ the 64 Duchesse D'Auxy v. Porter, 41 Fed. 68; Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall. 394, 403. 65 Harper v. Railroad Co., 36 Fed. 102; Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 164: Bonnafee v. Williams, 3 How. 574; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 738; Irvine v. Lowrey, 14 Pet. 298; Ptice v. Houston, 13 Wall. (U. S.)66; Davis v. Gray, 16 172; Knapp v. Railroad Co., 20 Wall. (U. S. ) 220: Florida v. Ander- Wall. (U. S.) 117; Chappedelaine v. j son, 91 U. S. 67(5; Walden v. Skinner, Dechmaux, 4 Cranch (U. S.), 306: 101 U. S. 589; Davies v. Lathrop, 12 Childress v. Emory, 8 Wheat. (U. S.) Fed. 353; Shirk v. City of La Fay- 642; Clarke v. Mathewson, 12 Pet. ' ette, 52 Fed. 857; Reinach v. Railroad 66 168 U. S. 445; IS Sup. Ct. 105. 598 DEATH CONFLICT OF LAWS. £ 507 question was whether a cause of action arising in Maryland could be sued upon in the District of Columbia, owing to the peculiarities of the Maryland statute requiring suits to be broughl in the name of the state. It was not a question of Federal juris- diction, and the court held that, the state of Maryland not being the beneficiary of the fruits of the litigation, the Buit might be brought in the District of Columbia by the personal representa- tive of the deceased. The case is thus stated in the Digest : • An action for death caused by negligence in Maryland, where the statute provides for an action in the name of the state as nominal plaintiff, but for the benefit of certain prescribed heirs, is not such a special remedy for a purely statutory right of ac- tion as will prevent the maintenance of an action by the ad- ministrator in the District of Columbia, where the statutes pro- vide for actions by personal representatives in such cases for the benefit of certain prescribed heirs, although the beneficiaries may not be exactly the same under the two statutes.' (i7 In suits by the state on relation of A. B. or by a next friend, the state and the next friend are not real parties, in the sense that they con- trol the litigation ; but executors, administrators, trustees, etc., although they have no personal interest in the fruits of the liti- gation, yet are real parties in the sense that they control, and are responsible for the litigation. The demurrer will be over- ruled." In another decision in the United States circuit court in Washington the opinion is as follows : " The demurrer to the complaint in this case raises the question whether the adminis- trator of the estate of a deceased person in the state of Washing- ton can maintain an action to recover damages for a personal injury to his decedent causing death, the injury being committed in Alaska, and there being no widow or children of the deceased to benefit by the recovery. The complaint in this case contains no allegation that the deceased person, of whose estate the plain- tiff is administrator, left surviving him any widow or children, and presumably there are no such relatives. As the laws of this state do not authorize an action by an administrator to re- cover damages for the infliction of an injury causing death, ex- Co., 58 Fed. 33; Morris v. Lindauer, i v. Smith. 24 C. C. A. 145: 78 Fed. 4 C. C. A. 1G2; 54 Fed. 2:5; Bangs v. 399. Loveridge, 60 Fed. 963; Pennington ' 67 4 l. Co-op. U. S. Dig. p. 59. 599 §508 DEATH CONFLICT OF LAWS. cept for the benefit of the immediate family, that is, wife and children of the deceased," 8 it is insisted that the plaintiff has no right to maintain the action. If the injury complained of had been inflicted in this state, the defendant would be certainly right in the position it has taken, but the law of the place where the wrong was committed must determine the rights of the parties. 69 The laws of the state of Oregon, which by an act of congress have been adopted as laws of Alaska, confer upon the personal representatives of a deceased person a right of ac- tion to recover damages for the wrongful act or omission of an- other, causing death, in cases in which the deceased, if he had lived, might have maintained an action for the injury to him- self, by the same act or omission. The serious question in the case is whether this statute creates any right in favor of per- sonal representatives residing and acting beyond the limits within which the laws of Alaska have force, and whose authority to represent the deceased does not spring from the laws- of Alaska. I consider, however, that the question is practically set- tled in favor of the plaintiff by the decisions of the supreme court of the United States in cases of Dennick v. Railroad Co., 7n and Stewart v. Railroad Co.,' 1 and upon the authority of these decisions I will overrule the demurrer. 7 - § 508. Death — Conflict of laws — Foreign administrator — Extraterritorial jurisdiction —Where action does not lie — Federal jurisdiction. — In Alabama the law has no extraterritorial force and although the death occurred and the action is brought in the state having the statute, such law does not apply where the wrongful act causing the death was committed in another state. 73 So where, by the law of Maryland, an action must be brought in the name of the state for the use of the beneficiaries, no re- covery can be had in another jurisdiction, and the United States statutes 74 do not include death in Maryland, so as to permit a 68 Noble v. City of Seattle, 19 Wash. 133; 52 Pac. 1013. 69 Railroad Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190, 203; 14 Sup. Ct. 978. *> 103 U. S. 11-21. ™ 168 U. S. 445-450; 18 Sup. Ct. 105. 600 72 Erickson v. Pacific Coast Steam- ship Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Wash. W. D. ), 96 Fed. 80, per Hanford, Dist. J. 73 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wil- liams, 113 Ala. 402; 21 So. 938. 7 * 23 U. S. Stat, at L. p. 307, ch. 126; Acts Cong. February 17, 1885. DEATH CONFLICT OF LAWS. § 508 recovery by the administrator of a resident <>f the District of Columbia, to which the said statute only applies as bo casualties within its borders. r ' Again, an administrator of Missouri has no standing in the Federal courts of Kansas,"' 1 and the theory of the law in Kansas differs from that in New Mexico in relation to the recovery for death losses, m that ld the former state it is compensatory, while in the latter it is strictly penal, so that the law that penal statutes have no extraterritorial force applied to an attempt to enforce the New Mexico enactment in Kansas. 7 ' So if the statute is a penal one, the Federal courts of another state will not entertain jurisdiction, 78 and it is decided in Mary- land that the courts of a state other than that where the acci- dent occurred, causing the death, cannot entertain jurisdiction. 7,1 Again, where a cause of action accrues in Minnesota, a Missouri appointee cannot sue in the former state, but the administrator of Minnesota can in such case sue in Missouri. 80 And where a declaration under the Pennsylvania statute shows the widow to be entitled, and such enactment requires her to bring the action instead of the personal representative, the complaint is demur- rable, 81 for an administratrix appointed under the New Jersey statute cannot sue for death by negligence in the former state/-' So under a Federal decision an administrator cannot maintain an action under the statute of and in another state,*' and the statute 75 Stewart v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. (D. C. App.), 23 Wash. L. Rep. 247. See Stone v. Grotore Bridge & Mfg. Co., 77 Hun (N. Y.), 99; 59 X. Y. St. R. 53; 28 N. Y. Supp. 445. 76 Hurlburt v. City of Topeka (U. S. C. C. Kan.), 34 Fed. 510; Lime- killer v. Hannibal & St. .1. R. Co., 33 Kan. 83; 5 Pac. 401, under 1 Rev. Stat. Mo. 1S70, sees. 2121, 96, and Comp. L. Kau. 1879, sec. 422. 77 Dale v. Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co., 57 Kan. 601; 47 Pac. 521; 14 Nat. Corp. Cas. 34; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 46, and note, p. 47. See Adams v. Fitchburg R. Co. (Vt.), 30 Atl. 687; Matheson v. Kansas City, Fr. S. & M. R. Co., 61 Kan. 667; 60 Pac. 747, un- der Rev. Stat. Mo. 1889, sec. 4425; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown, 62 Ark. 254; 35 S. W. 225; Russell v. Pacific R. Co., 113 Cal. 258; 45 Pac 323; 34 L. R. A. 747; 12 Nat. Corp. R. 650; Lew.r v. Segal, 59 N. .1. L. (30 Vr.) 66; 34 Atl. 945. - Marshall v. Wabash R. Co. (U. S. C. C. Ohio), 46 Fed. 269. "' Ash v. Bait. & O. K. Co., 72 Md. 144; lit Atl. 64:5; 7 Rd. & Corp. L. J. 50!); 20 Am. St. Rep. 461. » Wilson v. Tootle (TJ. S. C. C. W. I). Mo. ). 55 Fed. I'll: Mo. Act, April 20, 1891. 81 Lower v. Segal, 60 N. Y. I,. 99; 36 Atl. 777. "- Lower v. Segal, 59 X. J. L. (80 Yr.) 66; 34 Atl. 945. m Mackay v. Central R. Co. (U. S. 601 §508 DEATH CONFLICT OF LAWS. has no extraterritorial force as to an injury occurring in another state in the absence of evidence of a similar statute in such for- eign jurisdiction. 81 So although the statute ffi gives a right of action, though the death occurred in another state, neverthe- less, suit cannot be maintained for the death of an employee where he could not, upon the proven facts, have recovered in such foreign jurisdiction. 86 Nor can a nonresident alien sue under the act of 1855 of Pennsylvania, 87 and a recovery can be had in that state for death occurring in a foreign jurisdiction only where some negligent act or omission in the former state was the proximate cause of the injury. 83 Nor will the statute of a foreign jurisdiction be enforced, in Texas, where the provi- sions of the enactment are dissimilar ; ai and so, even though the injury occurred in another state and the death within Texas, and the defendant railroad company's line extends into another coun- try or state. 90 Again, in an action under 9 and 10 Vict. ch. 93, and. 27 and 28 Vict. ch. 95, where the death of a person occurred in the course of his employment on board a steamer belonging to a railway company during the passage from Milford to Water- ford, it was alleged that the boiler explosion, which occasioned the accident, was caused by the corrosion of part of the machin- C. C. N. Y. ), 4 Fed. 617, under the acts of 1847 and 1849. If the injuries occasioning death are inflicted in another state even though done by a New York corporation, an action cannot be there maintained. Whit- ford v. Panama R. R. Co., 23 X. Y. 465, aff'g 3 Bosw. (N. Y.) 67; Mahler v. Norwich & N. Y. Trans. Co., 45 Barb. (N. Y.) 226; 30 How. (N. Y. ) 237, case rev'd 35 N. Y. 352; Van Deventer v. New York & N. H. R. Co. See Van Derwerker v. Same, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 244; 6 Abb. (N. Y.) 239. 8 *Debevoise v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 377. 85 Rev. Stats. Ohio, sec. 6134a. 86 0ttv. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 18 Ohio Civ. Ct. R. 395; 10 O. C. D. 85. See Campbell v. Rogers, 2 Handy (Ohio), 110. "Act April 26, 1855 (F. L. 309); 602 Deni v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 181 Pa. 525 ; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 01 ; contra Veta- loro v. Perkins (U. S. C. C. E. D. Mass.), 101 Fed. 393, per Colt, Cir. J.; Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266; 57 N. E. 386. 88 Derr v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 158 Pa. 365; 33 W. N. C. 295; 27 Atl. 1002. 89 Belt v. Gulf C. &. S. F. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 22 S. W. 1062, under Mansfield's Ark. Dig. sees. 5225, 5226, adopted as the law of Indian territory by act of Congress, May 2, 1890; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McCor- mick (Tex.), 9 S. W. 540. 90 De Ham v. Mexican N. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 22 S. W. 249, under Tex. Rev. Stat. art. 2899; S. C, 86 Tex. 68; 23 S. W. 381; 7 Nat. Corp. Rep. 350; Belt v. Gulf C. <& S. F. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 22 S. W. 1062. DEATH CONFLICT < >!■' LAW'--. § 509 ery, and that the process of corrosion extended overa period dur- inor which the steamer had been several times in Ireland, it was decided that no part of the cause of action was shown to have arisen within the jurisdiction of the Irish court.' § 509. Death Conflict of laws— Extraterritorial juris- diction — Federal jurisdiction— Mexican laws.— The statin. of Mexico giving a civil right of action to recover damages for wrongful death through negligence, although it bases such right of action on the fact that defendant's negligent acts or omissions constitute crimes, does not for that reason hehmg to the class of criminal laws which can he enforced only in the courts of the country where the offense was committed. So that said laws in so giving a light of action to recover damages for a wrongful death occurring in that country are not contrary to the public policy of Texas, nor to natural justice or good morals, nor is their enforcement in that state calculated to in- jure the state or its citizens, and an action to enforce the right so given may be maintained therein in a state or Federal court having jurisdiction of the parties, in which the established tonus of procedure are such that substantial justice can he done between the parties. Again, under the Rev. St. Tex. 1895, art. 3027, in an action for wrongful death, "the jury may give such damages as they may think proportionate to the injury resulting from such death, and the amount so recovered shall be divided among the persons entitled to the benefit of the action ... in such shares as the jury shall find by their verdict." As construed by the courts of the state, while such damages are limited to com- pensation for pecuniary loss, they are not confined to such sum as can be exactly proved, but may include a further element of damages where the person killed stood in the relation of husband, wife, or parent to the beneficiaries ; also to be fixed by the jury in the exercise of "their own knowledge, experience, and sense of justice," and the right to such damages is not affected by the remarriage of the surviving wife or husband. The statute also 91 Walsh v. Great Western Ry. Ir. R. 6 C. L. 532; 10 Mew's Eng. Dig. (1898) p. 114. See Dupontv. Quebec S. S. Co., Rep. Jud. Quebec, 11 S. C. 188; Wilson v. The John Ritson, 3o Fed. 663; The Olga, 32 Fed. 229; The Branford City, 29 Fed. 373. G03 $509 DEATH CONFLICT OF LAWS. requires that the rights of all entitled to damages shall be de- termined and settled in one action. Under the laws of Mexico the liability of the defendant in such case is limited to the fur- nishing of a continuing support to the legal dependents of the deceased during the periods of time that such support would have been due from him, and in the amounts that it would have been due, proportioned to his ability to give it and the necessities of those entitled to receive it, which questions are required to be determined by the judge. The recovery in such case is in the nature of alimony or pension awarded by the court to each beneficiary, payable in monthly installments, which cease in the case of a widow or daughters on their marriage, and in case of sons on their attaining majority. Held, that the right of recov- ery given by such laws, at least in a case where the wife and daughters of the deceased are beneficiaries, is so dissimilar to that given by the laws of Texas, and so incapable of- enforce- ment through any procedure provided for trials at law by the statutes of Texas or by the common law, with due regard to the rights of the defendant, that a circuit court of the United States in that state should decline jurisdiction of an action at law for its enforcement. 92 But in Texas a suit may be brought in its courts where the defendant's railroad extends into that state and said defendant is incorporated in the United States, nor is the suit precluded by the fact that the road is also owned and operated in Mexico nor by the facts that the injuries were there received and the action could have been instituted in that countrv. 93 92 The above text is the syllabus to Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Slater (U. S. C. C. A. 5th 0.), H5 Fed. 593. There was also evidence of a learned professional man as to the law of Mexico in addition to the laws of- fered in evidence. This case also fully sets forth the laws of Mexico. 9 8Evey v. Mexican C. R. Co. (U. 604 S. C. C. A. 5th C), 52 U. S. App. 118; 81 Fed. 294; 38 L. R. A. 387. See De Ham v. Mexican N. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 22 S. W. 249, un- der Tex. Rev. Stat. art. 2899; 8. C, 86 Tex. 68; 23 8. W. 381; 7 Nat. Corp. Rep. 350; Belt v. Gulf, C. App. Div. ( X. Y. ) 121; 39 N. V. Supp. 44; Cogh- lan v. Third Ave. P. R. Co., 7 App. Div. (X. Y.) 124: 39 X. Y. Supp. 11098, aff'g 16 Misc. (X. Y.) C77; 25 Civ. Pro. (X. V) 249. Damages for loss of services is fully considered elsewhere herein. "'■ Alabama, G. A- S. R. Co. v. Bur- gess, llii Ala. 509; 22 So. 913, under Ala. Code, sec. 2589. 611 §514 DEATH —DAMAGES GENERALLY. be brought by the personal representative of the deceased. 17 So in other jurisdictions the right of action is held to lie only for the pecuniary loss resulting from the death. ls While in other states the pecuniary loss is not confined to the minority of the child, but includes a reasonable expectation of pecuniary bene- fits thereafter, to those entitled as beneficiaries. 19 Again, the age of a minor is deemed of importance in determining whether he is capable or incapable of rendering services for which the parent could recover, as in case of children of very tender years.*' So, age, sex and health affect the right to support or the par- ents' liability therefor, and consequently the measure of dam- ages. 21 And the age, sex, intelligence, strength, etc., of minor 17 Harris v. Kentucky Timber & L. Co., 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1731, 1732; 45 S. W. 94, denying rehearing 43 S. W. 462, under Ky. Stat. sec. 6. See also Illi- nois C. R. Co. v. Hunter, TO Miss. 471; 12 So. 482, under Miss. Const. 1890, sec. 193; Fitzhenry v. Consoli- dated Tract. Co. (N. J.), 42 Atl. 416, under 1 N. J. Gen. Stat. p. 1188. The question of the majority of a child as a limit in determining dam- ages is considered elsewhere herein. 18 May v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 67; 42 Atl. 165; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 517; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 417, under 1 Gen. Stat. N. J. p. 1188; ActsN. J. approved March 3, 1848. Myers v. Holborn, 58 N. J. L. (29 Vr.) 193; 33 Atl. 389; 30 L. R. A. 345, under N. J. Rev. Stat. p. 294, This question of pecuniary loss is fully considered elsewhere herein. 19 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Wilder (U. S. C. C. A. 5th C), 35 C. C. A. 105; 92 Fed. 953; 13 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. N. S. 520; McLean Co. Coal Co. v. McVey, 38 111. App. 158; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cross, 58 Kan. 424; 49 Pac. 599; Thompson v. Johns- ton Bros. Co., 86 Wis. 576; 57 N. W. 298. Loss of services is fully con- sidered elsewhere herein. 20 Atlanta Consol. St. R. Co. v. Ar- G12 nold, 100 Ga. 566; 28 S. E. 224; Al- len v. Atlantic St. R. R. Co., 54 Ga. 503; Crawford v. Southern R. Co., 106 Ga. 870; 33 So. 826 ; 4 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 436; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 459. See Con- solidated Traction Co. v. Graham (N. J.), 40 Atl. 773; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 660; Graham v. Consolidated Trac- tion Co. (N. J. 1899), 44 Atl. 964; Ihl v. Forty-second St. Ry. Co., 47 N. Y. 317; Lehman v. City of Brooklyn, 29 Barb. (N. Y.)334. 21 It is held that a father's liability for his daughter's support ceases at her attaining her majority if she is then able to support herself, and that even though she thereafter becomes mentally incompetent, the liability is not revived. Mt. Pleasant Overseers v. Wilcox, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 447; 2 Pa. Dist. R. 628. Before the act of 187o in Arkansas a female was a minor un- til 21 years of age. Rowland v. Mc- Guire, 64 Ark. 412; 42 S. W. 1068. It is held that a parent's obligation to support a daughter is not deter- mined by her marriage and removal from her parent's domicile, where her husband cannot provide for her wants, and she is in actual need. Pratt v. Pratt, Rapports' Judic. Quebec, 10 C. S. 134. A father may emancipate his minor daughter. DEATH DAMAGES GENKRALLY. .14 children also affect the question of contributory negligence by parentsand infants, and necessarily the determination of the point whether a right exists to recover any damages whatsoever.* So the same factors are considered as of weight in determining whether the damages assessed are excessive, inadequate or other- Kain v. Larkin, 131 N. V. 300; 43 X. V. St. R. 1U7: 30 N. E. It)"., rev'g42 N. Y. St. K. 571; IT N. V. Supp. 223. And a sun is also held emancipated by marriage, notwithstanding con- tinued residence with his father's family. Craftsbury v. Greensboro, 66 Vt. 585; 29 Atl. 1024. As to re- covery of damages where deceased son was emancipated, etc., see Franklin v. South Eastern l!y. Co., 3 Hurl, & N. 211. Examine Dalton v. South Eastern Ry. Co., 4 C. B. (U. S.) 290. An infant husband who mar- ried without his father's consent, and needs his wages for the support of himself, his wife and children, is entitled to them. Commonwealth v. Graham (Mass.), 31 X. E. 706; 16 L. li. A. 578. The father's liability for board, care and medicine furnished a minor sou ceases where the cir- cumstances show an emancipation. Kubic v. Zemke, 105 Iowa, 269; 74 X. W. 748. A father may also be liable for necessaries furnished a minor son who is sick and in a desti- tute condition, where he had aban- doned the sou and had been notified of his condition. Manning v. Wells, 61 N. Y. St. R. 59; 29 X. Y. Supp. 1044; 8 Misc. (N. V.) 040, aff'd 83 Hun (X. Y.), 27; 66 X. V. St. It. 109; .32 X. Y. Supp. 601. The question of expenses for medical attendance, care, nursing, etc., of minors as an element of damages, and also the deduction for support and mainte- nance, will be considered elsewhere herein. "Age, intelligence and ability to understand the character of the act and its consequences may be consul ered by the jury in determining the contributory negligence of a boy 14 years old. Texas \. P. Ii. Co. \. Phillips, '.U IVx. 278; 42 s. \V. 852, vev'a 40 S. \V. : J ,44. It is held that an old person is not required to ex- ercise greater care than a young and vigorous one. Culbertson v. Holli- day, 50 Neb. 229; 69 X. W. 853. Precisely the same degree of care and prudence is not required in an infant of about twelve years of age as in case of an adult. Baltimore * P. R. Co. v. Cumberland, 12 A.pp. ill.c.i 598; 26 Wash. L. Rep. 306. Age of infant and all the other cir- cumstances are to be considered and what might be contributory negli- gence in the case of an adult may constitute a question of fait for the jury in case of an infant of tender age. Brown v. Syracuse, 77 Hun lX Y.), 411: CO X. Y. St. R. 16. See also Ginchard v. Xew. 84 Hun (X. Y.I, 54; 65 X. Y. St. R. 20: 31 X. Y. Supp. 1080: Masser v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.. 68 Iowa. 002: Washington & G. R. Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. ill. S.) 401; 21 L. Ed. 114; Goff v. Ockers, 40 X. Y. St. R. 615; 21 X. Y. St. K. 454; 1 Misc. (X. Y. | 408, aff'd 139 X. V. 653; 54 V V. St. R. 934; 355 V E. 207: Messenger v. Dennie, V.)l Mass. 197: 50 Am. Rep. 205: Springfield Consol. R. Co. v. Welsh, 155 111. 511; 40 V K. 10:^4, aff'g 50 111. A pp. 190. That age, sex. health, strength, capacity, experience, intelligence, ability, ex- tent of information, activity, etc., go to the question of contributory 613 §514 DEATH DAMAGES GEM EH ALLY. wise. 3 Again, it is held that damages will not be restricted to a merely nominal sum for the negligent killing of a child five years old, although the only evidence furnishing a basis for the determination of the amount of damages is as to the age, sex and general intelligence of the child.' 4 So the habits and energy of a negligence of minors, see Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. K. Co. .v. Tartt (U. S. C. C. A. 7th C), 12 C. C. A. 625; 64 Fed. 830; Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Cook. 42 Neb. 577; 60 N. W. 899, rehearing denied 42 Neb. 905: 62 N. W. 235; Carson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 96 Iowa, 583; 65 N. W. 831; Union P. R. Co. v. McDonald, 152 U. S. 262; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619; 38 L. Ed. 434; Collis v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 71 Hun (N. Y.), 504; 55 N. Y. St. R. 82; 24 N. Y. Supp. 82; Robertson v. Mayor of N. Y., 7 Misc. (N. Y.) 645: 58 N. Y. St. R. 391; 28 N. Y. Supp. 13, aff'd 144 N. Y. 609; 44 N. E. 1128; East Tennessee, V. n. Hardy v. Eagle (N. Y. City Ct.), 23 Misc. (N. Y.) 441; 51 N. Y. Supp. 501. But examine Morgan v. Bartels, Rap- ports Jud. Quebec, 12 C. S. 125. That husband is liable for mainte- nance or necessaries, etc., of wife when she is separated or living apart from him, see Llewellyn v. Levy, 163 Pa. 647; 30 Atl. 292; Davis v. St. Yin- cents Inst. (U. S. C. C. A. 9th C), 61 Fed. 277; Seybold v. Morgan. 43 111. App. 39; Mclvinney v. Juliman, 38 Mo. App. 344; Le Boutilier \. Fiske, 47 Hun (N. Y.), 323; Anony- mous, 21 Misc. (X. Y. ) 656; Lord v. Thompson, 9 J. & S. (X. Y.) 115; Hartjen v. Keubsamen, 19 Misc. (N. V.I 149; 77 X. Y. St. K. 446; 43 N. V. Supp. 466; Lockwood v. Thomas, 12 Johns. (X. Y.) 248; Kent v. Brinckerhoff, 8 N. Y. St. R. 794; 26 Wkly. Dig. (X. Y. ) 438; Blooming- dale v. Brinckerhoff, 2 Misc. (X. Y. i 49;49X. Y. St. R. 142;20N. V. Supp. 858; Minck v. Martin, 22 J. & S. iN. Y.) 136; 6 X. Y. St. K. 803; Com. v. Tragic, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 159; 40 Wkly. X". C. 350. Contra see Sawyer v. Richards, 65 X. H. 185; 2:', Ail. 150; Raymond v. Cowdrey, 42 X. V. Supp. 557: 19 Misc. (X. Y.) 34; Cat- lin v. Martin, 69 X. Y. 393; Anderson v. Cullen, 29 N. Y. St. R. 494; 16 Daly (X. Y. ), 15: 8 X. Y. Supp. 64:;. Blowers v. Sturtevant, 4 Den. ( X. Y. ) 46; Guthrie v. Gorrecht (Pa. C. P.), 8 Lane. L. Rev. 25; Hentze v Marjenhoff, 42 S. C. 427: 20 S. E. 278. Examine Raymond v. Hay mond, 74 Tex. 414; 12 S. W. 90. See Morse v. Morse. 65 Yt. 112; 26 Atl. 528; Hunt v. Hayes, 64 Vt. 89; 15 L. R. A. 661; 23 All. '.i20; 34 Cent. L. J. 473; 45 Alb. L. J. 414; Mott v. Comstock, 8 Wend, i N. V.) 5 14; Belknap v. Stewart (Neb. ), 56; X. W. 881. a4 Louisville, etc., I!. Co. v. Tram- well, 93 Ala. 350, 354, per McClel- lan, .1. * Dallas A- W. l;. Co. v. Spieker, 61 To;. 427. That $6,250 not exces- sive damages where husband had always supported his wife, was a 617 § 516 DEATH DA. MACKS GENERALLY. negligent killing of a husband are not limited to the simple value of his support and protection to the widow. 36 § 516. Beneficiaries —Widow — Financial condition of de- ceased husband — Increase of his property — Dower — Settle- ment on widow. — In a New York case the administratrix of the deceased was permitted to testify in an action to recover dam- ages for his negligent death that he left no property . ;?7 And the widow may recover for the negligent killing of her husband not only the value of his support, but the damages ma} r include com- pensation for the share which she might reasonably be expected to have received from an increase to his property or accumula- tions to his estate had he not been thus wrongfully killed. 33 So in an action by a widow under the Florida statute for her hus- band's death, the damages may include compensation for her loss of whatever she reasonably could have expected to receive by way of dower or legacies from his estate, where her life ex- pectancy would exceed his. 39 Again, it is held not error to re- fuse to charge the jury that in case the deceased was largely indebted at the time of his death, the plaintiff would have no pecuniary interest in his life until his debts were paid, and the jury in estimating the pecuniary value of the loss of the plaintiff's husband, must, if they can, fix a period in his life if he had lived when he would have acquired property beyond his debts. w And in an English case it is declared that financial pro- visions made by a husband for the maintenance of his widow might be considered in estimating her loss, but that the nature of the provision and the position and means of the deceased ought to govern the extent to which reduction should be made in the damages, as where deceased did not earn his living, and had set- healthy man, earning from .$500 to $1,200 a year and of the age of 55, see Paschall v. Owen (Tex.), 14 S. W. 203. 36 Bauer v. Richter, 103 Wis. 412; 79 N. W. 404. 37 Koosorouska v. Glasser, 8 N. Y. Supp. 197. 88 So held in Bauer v. Richter, 103 Wis. 412 ; 79 N. W. 404. See Kas- pari v. Marsh, 74 Wis. 563 ; Annas v. 618 Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 67 Wis. 48; Lawson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 64 Wis. 448. 39 Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Fox- worth, 41 Fla.— ; 25 So. 338; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 469, under Fla. Acts, 1883, chap. 3439, sec. 2. See chap. 27, herein, as to dower. 40 Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hender- son, 51 Pa. 315. DEATH DAMAGES GENERALLY. 6 51' tied one half of his income on his wife, his death would not oc- casion the loss of that half, although, to the extent of her inter- est in the other half, the jury might estimate her loss." § 517. Beneficiaries— Widow and children— Number, ages, sex, dependency and support— Financial and physical condi- tion Expenditures and financial condition of deceased— Generally.— The courts in determining whether or not the dam- ages awarded are excessive, have in numerous cases considered not only the number, ages and sex of the surviving children, but also the fact of the dependency of the widow and children upon the deceased for support, his contribution in whole or in part thereto, and in some case their physical condition and the financial as well as physical condition of the deceased. 42 41 Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Canada v. Jennings, 13 App. Cas. 800; 58 L. J. P. C. 1; 59 L. T. N. S. 079; 37 Week. R. 403, per Lord Watson who also considers Hicks v. Newport, A. & H. Ry. Co., 4 Best & S. 403. See Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Trammell, 93 Ala. 350, 354, per McClellan, J., noted in next preceding section herein. 42 Deceased whose expectancy of life was 25 years contributed $800 to $900 a year to his wife and children for their support— $10,000 held not ex- cessive. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Sweet, 60 Ark. 550; 31 S. W. 571. Deceased contributed from his earn- ings of $00 per month, from $40 to $55 per month to his family, consist- ing of a widow and children. He had no other means of revenue— $7,500 held excessive. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Robbins, 57 Ark. 377; 21 S. W. 5GG. Deceased had de- pendent upon him a wife and adult unmarried daughter and his expect- ancy of life was about nine and one half years aud his utmost >„M'oss earn- ings would have only amounted to $12,000. Held that $8,000 wa6 exces- sive. Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., 116 Cal. 156; 47 Pac. 1019; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 403. Invalid wife and daughter survived — $8,000 held not excessive. Cook v. Ry. Co., 60 Cal. 604. Widow and minor children sur- vived; deceased was a laborer — $5,000 held excessive. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Welden, 52 111. 2!)0. Husband left a wife and three children aud he owned two teams at his decease — $5,000 held not excessive. Louisville, X. A. & C. R. Co. v. Patchen, 66 111. App. 206. Widow and two minor children were left — $5,000 held not excessive. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Stanley, 54 111. App. 215. Labor of deceased furnished only means of support for his wife and three children — $5,000 held not excessive. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Eneinin, 4s ill. App. 243. Widow aud two sons 19 and 14 years old; deceased was in good health and a postal employee — $5,000 held not excessive. Malott v. Shinier, 153 Iud. 35: 5 1 \. E. 101: 1 Repr. 1234; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 263; 15' Am. & Kim. R. Cas. N. S. 774. Widow and six young children survived. Deceased provided for bis family to 619 § 518 DEATH DAMAGES GENERALLY. § 518. Death— Pecuniary loss or injury — The statutes — Generally. — Some of the statutes expressly provide for compen- sation based upon the pecuniary injury, while in others the word pecuniary does not appear, and in several states there are ex- the best of his ability ; $5,000 held not excessive. Board of Commrs. How- ard Co. v. Legg, 110 Ind. 479; 11 X. E. 612. Employee 50 years old left widow and four children. His wages were 50 cents an hour while he worked, and the amount of his earn- ings were left indefinite by the evi- dence; $1,500 was awarded. Boden v. Demwolf (U. S. D. C. E. D. La.), 56 Fed. 846. Widow two minors and another child left— $5,000 held not excessive. Bolinger v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 36 Minn. 418; 31 N. W. 856. Intestate was a bricklayer, 57 years old. He left a widow and three children, aged respectively 17, 14 and 11. Deceased was prosperous in busi- ness and had accumulated property. He was suffering from a disease which might soon have terminated his life; $3,800 held not excessive. Williams v. Camden & A. R. Co. (N. J.), 37 Atl. 1107; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 569. Deceased, a railroad fire- man, left a wife, son and daughter. He never earned more than two dol- lars a day — $15,000 held excessive. Cooper v. N. Y. O. & W. R. Co., 25 App. Div. (N. Y.) 383; 49 N. Y. Supp. 481. Widow and three chil- dren were left. Deceased was in good health and sole support of his family and earned $1.25 per day — $5,000 held not excessive. Felice v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 345; 43 N. Y. Supp. 922; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 637. Deceased, an expert railroad man, 30 years old, in good health, contributed at least $45 out of his earnings of $75 per month to the support of his wife and two small children. He was thrifty and 620 provided a comfortable home for his family. There was no evidence of what sum would purchase the equiva- lent of the pecuniary benefit which the widow and children had a right to reasonably expect from his life continuance — $15,000 held not exces- sive. Ft. Worth & G. R. Co. v. Kime, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 271; 51 S. W. 558, affd 54 S. W. 240. Deceased devoted most of his earnings of $60 per month to the support of his wife and five children. He was about 40 years old, industrious, frugal and economical, and a railroad brake- man, but was affected with asthma — $10,000 held not excessive. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Ransom, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 689; 41 S. W. 826. De- ceased contributed his entire wages of $60 per month to. the support of his wife and children. He was in good health, 47 years old— $11,000 held not excessive. Tyler v. S. E. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 796. Widow and seven year old daughter survived, average wages of deceased were $125 per month ; $5,000 to eacli survivor held not excessive. St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 536; 15 S. W. 104. Widow and two young children left. De- ceased was stout and healthy, 35 years old and earned $1.25 per day — $10,000 held not excessive, although the court declared that the law did not intend to give compensation for anything but pecuniary loss by esti- mating the money value of the life of the relative, but that the inquiry was not intended to be narrowed down by the law to a result that could be ex- actly accounted for by the facts in DAMAGES M.NERALLY. §§ 519, 520 press provisions for the recovery of exemplary or punitive dam- ages, while in a few states such damages are recoverable even though not expressly so provided, although in some of these latter states there are later decisions which substantially over- rule the earlier ones allowing such damages. These differences in the statutes, in so far as they affect the measure of damages under the decisions, will appear under the several sections within this title. § 519. Death— Pecuniary loss as measure of damages.— In determining whether or not the pecuniary loss sustained, or a loss susceptible of a pecuniary estimate, is the sole standard for the admeasurement of damages in case of the death of a human being, reference must be had (1) to the meaning of the word pecuniary ; (2) to the terms and intent of the statute under which recovery is sought ; (3) to the statutory allowance in certain states, of exemplary or punitive damages and the limita- tions thereto ; (4) to the factor of solatium or the inclusion or exclusion of injuries not susceptible of being estimated on any pecuniary basis ; (5) to the nature of the action, viz : (a) whether the recovery rests upon a survival of the original action, or (16) whether it is an action for compensation to the beneficiaries for the loss to them by the death itself: and (6) to the class of beneficiaries seeking a recovery having in view their relation to deceased.* 5 § 520. Death Pecuniary loss or damage— Construed.— In so far as the statutes authorize a recovery only of pecuniary loss or damage occasioned by the death of a human being, the meaning of •'pecuniary" becomes important. The word ought not to be construed in this connection as covering a loss of ac- tual money alone. Thus what dependents may have received from deceased in "money" may have been the very least of the benefits conferred," and, therefore, not of itself the measure of evidence and that every parent and husband has for his wife and chil- dren a pecuniary value beyond the amount of his earnings. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lehmbeig, 75 Tex. 61 ; 12 8. W. 838. 4:! See citations throughout this title. ** Chicago, Hock 1. & T. R. Co. v. Porterfleld, 19 Tex. Civ. A.pp. 225; 46 s. \V. 919, aff'd 49 S. U\ :;u7: 12 Am. & Eng. It. Cas. N. S. 383. 1321 §521 DEATH DAMAGES GENERALLY. damages or of the pecuniary loss. The word pecuniary may, however, include something of money value, or the means of acquiring either money itself or that which is of money value. 15 Again, pecuniary loss is evidenced in this class of cases in num- erous instances by facts covering not only that which is capable of being definitely estimated in money, but also the capacity to create something tangible, having approximately at least a money equivalent or actual commercial value, or on the? contrary it may include some benefit or advantage absolutely incapable of being estimated on any certain money basis, and as has been clearly stated '• there is no way to ascertain mathematically what that damage would be, it necessarily must be to a great extent specu- lative." « § 521. Same subject continued. — An instruction may prop- erly be refused which fixes the pecuniary loss at the actual amount in money which a widow has lost by reason of being deprived of her husband's support, 4 ' although an instruction may direct the jury to fix the damages at a fair equivalent in money for the earning power of the deceased, lost by the de- struction of his life, taking into consideration his age, etc. 48 It is declared in a New Jersey case that. " our statute con- fines the amount of the recovery in such cases to the pecuniary injury sustained by the next of kin, by reason of the death of the decedent and that injury as was said by Beaslev, Ch. J., 49 45 Green v. Hudson K. R. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 25, 33, per Allen, J. See Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 29 N. Y. 274. 46 Etherington v. Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 641, afTg 24 Hun (N. Y.), 235; Lockwood v. N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 523, case affirms 20 Wkly. Dig. 341; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 152 111. 138; 38 N. E. 760; Andrews v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 86 Iowa, 677; 53 N. W. 399; 12 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 296; 52 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 252; Tennes- see Coal I. & R. Co. v. Herndon, 100 Ala. 451; 14 So. 287. "When the suit is brought by the representative the pecuniary injury resulting to the 622 next of kin is equally uncertain and indefinite. 11 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. (U. S.)90; Kane v. Mitchell Transp. Co., 90 Hun (N. Y. ), 65; 70 N. Y. St. R. 203; 35 N. Y. Supp. 581, case aff'd 153 N. Y. 680. 47 Barth v. Kansas City El. Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 535; 44 S. W. 778; 10 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 281 ; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 682. 48 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Lang, 100 Ky. 221; 19 Ky. L. Rep. 67; 40 S. W. 451, modifying 19 Ky. L. Rep. 65; 38 S. W. 503, modification denied 19 Ky. L. Rep. 68; 41 S. W. 271. 49 In Paulrnier v. Railroad Co., 34 N. J. L. 158. DEATH -DAMAGES GENERALLY. §521 'is nothing more than a deprivation of a reasonable expectation of a pecuniary advantage which would have resulted by a con- tinuance of the life of the deceased.'" 7 ' And to much the same effect is a .Mississippi case which holds that the word. " pecuniary " comprehends such prospective advantage and is not confined in its meaning to present money losses."' 1 But it is held under the Michigan statute that all injuries not susceptible of being compensated for by a money consideration to the beneficiaries should be excluded in admeasuring damages."'-' In conclusion we may add that the recovery is the money estimate of the loss sustained, based on as certain elements of damages, as the particular circumstances of each case may permit of, reference being had to the intent, express or implied, of the statute under which recovery is sought, and also to the class of beneficiaries seeking recovery.* 1 60 Consolidated Traction Co. v. Graham, G2 N. J. L. 00: 58 Alb. L. J. 93; 40 Atl. 773; 17 Natl. Corp. Rep. 213; 31 Chic. L. News, 35; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 060, per Gummere, J. 51 City of Vicksburg v. McLain, 67 Miss. 4. See Dalton v. Southeastern Ry. Co., 4 C. B. N. S. 206; Boyden v. FitchburgR. Co., 70 Vt. 125; Pym v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 4 B. & S. 406. 52 Mynning v. Detroit L. & N. R. Co., 59 Mich. 257; 26 N. W. 514, un- der How. Mich. Stat. sec. 8314. 68 Opinions of text writers. — The principle on which damages are awarded in this class of cases is com- pensation for the pecuniary loss or injury. There must be evidence of pecuniary loss to the survivors or beneficiaries to enable them to re- cover substantial damages. . . . The loss must be such as can be com- puted or estimated by a money con- sideration." Black's Law it l'ract. in Accdt. Cas. (ed. 1000), sec. 254, citing Demarest v. Little. Is \'i. (X. V. i 28; Huntingdon, etc., R. Co. v. Decker, 84 Pa. St. 419; Myn- ning v. Detroit, etc., R. R. Co.-, 59 Mich. 257; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. v. Berry, 96 Ky. 604, and other cases. " The pecuniary damage which alone can be recovered in most of the states for the death of any person must be something of definite and almost of commercial value. It is not necessary, however, to show that the deceased was under any legal obligation to the next of kin. If they had a reasonable expectation from the continuance of his life, they may recover for it." 2 Shearman & Redfield on Neg. (5th ed.) sec. 769. " The rule confining recoveries to pecuniary losses is not applied in a strict sense. ' When we consider' says Fullerton, ' the defect which the statute was designed to remedy, it is taking too narrow a view of the matter to say that the word pecu- niary was used in so limited a sense as to embrace only losses of money. 1 " 3 Sutherland on Dam. (2d ed.) sec. 1263, citing Mclntyre v. New York C. R. Co.. 37 X. Y. 287 I 35 How. [N. Y.] 36; 4 Trans. App. 1. case affirms 47 Barb. [N. Y.] 515 i: Tilley 623 §521 DEATH DAMAGES GENERALLY. v. Hudson R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471 (23 How. [N. Y.] 363); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Keller, 67 Pa. St. 300. "The use of 'pecuniary' to desig- nate the kind of loss for which re- covery can be had is misleading for the damages are by no means con- fined to the loss of money or of what can be estimated in money. . . . The meaning would be better ex- pressed by ' material ' as was sug- gested by Patterson, J., as in an opin- ion in which he carefully reviews all English decisions'' (citing Lett v. Lawrence & O. Ry. Co., 11 Out. App. 1; Patterson's Railway Accident Law); Tiffany's Death by Wrong- ful Act (ed. 1893), sec. 158. Age, etc., of children — Excessive and inadequate damages- -Decisions. Boy 10 months old, healthy, etc., — $1,000 held not excessive. Hoppe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 61 Wis. 359; 21 N. W. 227. Child 18 months old — $2,000 held not exces- sive. Scarier v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. R. Co., 65 Wis. 457; 27 N.W. 167. Son 25 months old, a stout, healthy sensible boy — $6,000 held not exces- sive. Austin Rap. Trans. R. Co. v. Cullen (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 256, rehearing denied 30 S. W. 578. Child 3 years old — $12,500 in favor of the parents held excessive and reduced to $4,000. Rice v. Crescent City R. Co., 51 La. Ann. 108; 24 So. 791. Deceased was under 4 years of age — $10,500 held excessive where com- pensation only is allowed. Louis- ville & N. R. Co. v. Creighton, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 1691, 1698; 50 S. W. 227; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 713. Deceased was not 4 years old and no special pecuniary injury was shown — $4,000 held excessive. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Mabie, 77 111. App. 176. Girl 4 years old, $3,500 held excessive — $2,000 declared suf- ficient. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. 624 Scanlan, 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 113, aff'd 168 111. 34; 44 N. E. 148. Roy 4 years old — $5,000 held excessive. Graham v. Consolidated Traction Co. (N. J. 1899), 44 Atl. 964. Boy between 4 and 5 years old — $5,000 held grossly excessive. This sum was awarded on three different trials and set aside each time and the court declared that it would continue to set aside excessive verdicts just as often as rendered. Consolidated Traction Co. v. Graham, 62 N. J. L. 90; 40 Atl. 773; 58 Alb. L. J. 93; 31 Chic. L. News, 35; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 660; 17 Natl. Corp. Rep. 213. Boy 4 years old, ordinarily bright, healthy, affectionate and obedient — $6,000 held excessive. Fox v. Oakland Consol. St. R. Co., 118 Cal. 55; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 825. Child 5 years old, healthy, well grown, of fine mind, bright, able-bodied, duti- ful, etc., — $2,500 held not excessive. Ross v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (U. S. C C. W. D. Tex.), 44 Fed. 44. Daughter 5 years Old — $2,000 in favor of a father held not excessive. Huerzeler v. Central Cross-Town R. Co. (C. P.), 1 Misc. (N. Y.) 136; 48 N. Y. St. R. 649; 20 N. Y. Supp. 676. Son was 5 years old — $1,000 was re- covered for damages to the child and nominal damages to the father. Westerfield v. Levis (La.), 9 So. 52. A 5 year old boy— $3,000 held not excessive. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Waniata, 6 111. App. 481, aff'd 169 111. 17; 48 N. E. 437. Child 6 years old — $4,500 recovered. Ahern v. Steele, 46 Hun (N Y.), 517; 1 N. Y. Supp. 257; 16 N. Y. St. R. 24; case rev'd 115 N. Y. 203; 26 N. Y. St. R. 295; 22 N. E. 193. Girl 6 years old, healthy, bright and intelligent, only child of gardener and his wife who survived her — $5,000 recovered. Age, sex, general health and intelli- gence considered as factors. Hough- DEATH — DAMAGES GENERALLY §521 kirk v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 92 N. Y. 210, rev'g 38 Hun (N. Y.), 407; 15 Wkly. Dig. 522, which aff'd 11 Ahb. N. C. (X. Y.)72; 63 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 328; 4 Month. L. Bull. 65. Deceased was G years old — $2,300 held not excessive. Strutzel v. St. Paid City R. Co., 47 Minn. 543; 50 X. W. 690; 11 Ky. & Corp. L. J. 132. Son was 6 years old, in good health and of ordinary intelligence and promise — $3,000 held excessive. Gundersou v. North Western El. Co., 47 Minn. 161; 49 N. W. 694. Son 6 or 7 years old — $2,000 held not ex- cessive. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Becker, 84 111. 483. Boy 7 years old, bright, intelligent, healthy and very industrious — $5,000 held not exces- sive. Taylor, B. & II. R. Co. v. Warner (Tex. Civ. App.),31 S. W. 66. Son 7 years old — $2,000 to a parent held not excessive. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Gilmore (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 53 S. W. 61. Boy 7 years old, bright and healthy — $3,500 not excessive. Heinz v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 91 Hun (N. Y.), 640; 71 N. Y. St. R. 023; 36 N. Y. Supp. 675. Son 7 years old — $2,500 held not excessive. Johnson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 64 Wis. 425; 25 N. W. 223. Son was 8 years old— $4,000 was reduced to $2,000. Vicksburg v. McLain, 67 Miss. 4; 6 So. 774. Son 8 years old — $1,200 held not ex- cessive. Strong v. Stevens Point, 62 Wis. 255; 22 N. W. 425. Bright boy 8} years old — $6,000 held excessive. Schaffer v. Baker Trans. Co., 29 App. Div. ( X. V.) 459; 51 N. Y. Supp. 1092. Boy 10 years old — $2,850 held not excessive. Omaha v. Richards, 49 Neb. 244: 68 X. \V. 52S, aff'd 70 X. W. 363. Boy 10 years old— $5,000 to next of kin held excessive. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Wrixon, 51 111. App. 307. Boy 10 years old attend- ing school and at times did errands 40 for his mother — $1,500 in her favor held excessive. Heusner v. Houston W. St. & P. F. Ry. Co., 7 Misc. ( X. Y. > 48; 57 X. Y. St. R. 528; 27 X. V. Supp. 365. Boy 11 years old— $1,500 recovered. O'Mara v. Hudson R. R. Co.. 38 N. Y. 445. Girl 11 years old, healthy and strong — $1,500 held not excessive. Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 00 Mich. 201 : :):) \. W. 300. Son 11 years old— $1,300 held not excessive. Citizens St. Ry. Co. v.Lowe (Ind. App.), 39 N. E. 105. Boy 11 years, 8 mouths old, intel- ligent, healthy and promising — $3,000, held not grossly excessive. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Dunden, 37 Kan. 1; 14 Pac. 501. Boy about 12 years old — $2,500 held not more than compensatory. Case was princi- pally one of negligence and contrib- utory negligence and evidence would have justified punitive damages. Iron Mountain R. Co. v. Dies, 98 Tenn. 655; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 273. Boy, 12 years old, was killed by ele- vator. The death was occasioned by defendant's negligence. Verdict of one cent damages was held inade- equate aud new trial granted. Lee v. Publishers, 137 Mo. 385; 38 S. W. 1107; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 297. Boy, 12 years old, healthy and ordinarily in- telligent, had gone to school and learned to read, write and cipher, was gooil boy to work and helped to do chores — $1,000 not excessive. New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Mush- rush (Ind. App. 1894), 37 N. E. 904. Girl, 12 years old — $2,500 held not excessive. Baltimore & O. S. W. K. Co. v. Then, 159 111. 5:;:.; 42 X. E. 971. affg 59 111. App. 501. Sons, one 13, another 1"> years old— $9:>; and $1,050 both held excessive. Telfer v. Northern II. ('o.. 30 X. .1. L. L88. Son, 1 1 years old, earning capacity and expenses of maintainance eon sidered also — $1,250 held not ezces- §521 DEATH— DAMAGES GENERALLY. sive. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Nee (Pa), 13 Atl. 841, and annotations. Boy, 15 years old, a farm hand — $3,000 held excessive in action by next of kin — $1,500, declared suffi- cient. May v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 67; 42 Atl. 165; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 417; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 517. Boy, 15 years old, strong, robust and attentive to busi- ness, etc. — $1,846.40 held not exces- sive. Franke v. St. Louis (Mo.), 19 S. W. 938. Son, 16 years old— $1,700 in favor of a mother held not exces- sive. Thompson v. Johnston Bros. Co., 86 Wis. 576; 57 N. W. 298. Son, 16 years old, strong, healthy, indus- trious and of average intelligence — $4,500, in favor of widowed mother, held not excessive. Turner v. Nor- folk & W. R. Co. ( W. Va. ), 22 S. E. 83. Daughter, 16 years old— $4,000 re- duced to $2,500. Dinnihan v. Lake Ont. B. Imp. Co., 8 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 509; 40 N. Y. Supp. 764. Boy, 16 years old, was killed by collision with team, while he was riding a bi- cycle — $2,000 held not excessive. Quinn v. Pietro, 38 App. Div. (N. Y.) 484; 56 N. Y. Supp. 419. A 17 year old boy— $2,500 to next of kin, held not excessive. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 51 111. App. 404. Daughter, 17 years old — $5,000 held excessive. Chicago, E. & L. S. R. Co. v. Adam- ick, 33 111. App. 412. Boy, 17 years old, and a competent compositor — $2,400 held not excessive. Post v. Olmstead, 47 Neb. 893; 66 N. W. 828. Son, 18 years old, industrious, etc. — $5,000 held not excessive. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hamilton (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 906. Son, 18 years old— $2,250 held excessive. Hick- man v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 22 Mo. App. 344. Son, 18 years old and brakeman — $5,000 held excessive. Parson v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 94 Mo. 286; 6 S. W. 464. Son, 18 years 626 old — $3,400 held excessive. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205. Son, between 18 and 19 years old, robust, healthy and dutiful, etc. — $2,000 awarded. Myhan v. Louisiana Elect. L. & P. P. Co., 41 La. Ann. 964; 6 So. 799; 7 L. R. A. 172. Girl, 19,> bright and industri- ous, and gave earnings to support family — $6,000 held excessive — $4,000 sufficient. Seeley v. N. Y. C. &. H. R. R Co., 8 App. Div. 402; 40 N. Y. Supp. 866; 75 N. Y. St. R. 261. Son 19 years old, healthy and indus- trious — $5,000 held not excessive. Twist v. Rochester, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 307; 55 N. Y. Supp. 850. Son 19 years old, strong and vigorous — $2,500 in favor of the parents was recovered. Erslew v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., 49 La. Ann. 86; 21 So. 153. Deceased was 19 years old, in good health, strong and intelligent — $3,000 to next of kin not excessive. Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Branyon (Ind. App. ), 37 N. E. 190. Unmarried son 21 years old — $2,500 held not exces- sive. Webster Mfg. v. Mulvaney, 68 111. App. 607, aff'd 168 111. 311; 48 N. E. 168. Deceased was 22 years old and one of eight children — $5,000 reduced to $3,500 in favor of parents. Flaherty v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. Co. (R. I.), 36 Atl. 1132; Index S. S. Re- scripts, 19. Son 22 years old— $3,000 held excessive. Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 151. Son 22 years old— $7,500 was reduced to $6,000 as the object was compensation and not benefit. McFee v. Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co., 42 La. Ann. 790; 7 So. 720. Son 22 years old had given one half his earnings to his mother who was 60 years old — $3,550 held not ex- cessive. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220; 12 S. W. 828. Deceased was 23 years old, of good habits, etc. — $3,000 held not exces- sive. O'Callaghan v. Bode, 84 Cal. DEATH DAMAGES GENERALLY. §521 489; 24 Pac. 2(59. Son 26 years old, only child of widow 51 years old — $4,200 recovered. Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 75 Tex. 56. Uu married son 33 years old and supported pa- rents over 70 years old — §5,000 held excessive, $3,000 declared sufficient. Leiter v. Kiunare, 68 111. App. 558. Son 35 years old — 8870 in favor of father ami mother, respectively 68 and 67 years old, held not excessive. Texas & P. Pc. Co. v. Spence (Tex.), 52 S. W. 562. Daughter 36 years old, in good health, etc. Bowles v. Rome W. & O. R. Co., 46 Hun (X. Y.), 324; 21 -V. Y. St. R 457, aff'd 113 N. Y. 643; 22 N. Y. St. R 997; 21 \\ E. 414. Youn■> §550. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of children — Adults. 551. Damages proportioned to the injury — Evidence — Gen- erally. 552. Damages proportioned to the injury — Excessive and in- adequate damages — Gener- ally. 553. Damages proportioned to the injury — Evidence of de- ceased's habits — Mitiga- tion. 554. Damages proportioned to the injury Insurance. 555. Damages proportioned to the injury — Legacy, devise or inheritance. 550. Damages proportioned to the injury — Marriage and re- marriage. 557. Damages proportioned to the injury — Defenses — Pre- scribing medicine for own family. 558. Damages proportioned to tin- injury — Self-defense — justi- fication. § 522. Damages proportioned to the injury— Statutes. The statutes of England, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Arizona, 1 Maryland, South Carolina and Texas 3 provide that " the jury may give !Rev. Stat. Ariz. 1887, sec. 2155, now changed; but the state is here classified by reason of the decisions under that enactment. 2 Eng. 9 and 10 Vict. ch. 93, am'd 27 and 28 Vict. ch. 95 (Scotland ex- pressly excluded). As to English Employer's Liability act, see 43 and 44 Vict. ch. 42 (personal injuries); English Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, cl. 1 (a)(i); id. sec. 7, subd. 2; Nov. Scot. Kev. Stat. 1884, ch. 116 Ont. Rev. Stat. 1887, ch. 135 (R. S. Ont. 1877, ch. 128, re-enacted in that province, Lord Campbell's Act, 9 and 10 Vict. ch. 93; In re The Gar- land ; Monagban v. Horn, 7 S. C. R. 409, Out., and art. 10."j6, C. C. is re-en- actment and reproduction of the Con. Stat. L. C. C. 78; Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 14 S. C. It. 105, (Ont.) Canada. Code, art. L056. Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1901, pp. 733, 734, sees. 2704, 27G6 changes Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1887, tit. 36, sees. 2145, 2155, and see Rev. Stat. 1901, p. 438, sec. 1349, (140), as to nonabatement by death. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1901, p. 734, sec. 2767, as to liability of corporation to employee. The act sees. 2764. 2767 took effect April 19, 1901. Md. Pub. Gen. Laws, Poes Code, 1888, art. 67, sees. 1, 4: Pub. Gen. Laws, 1888, sec. 25; Pub. Gen. Laws, 1860, ait. 65, sees. 1-4; 1852, ch. 299. sec. 1. S. C. 1 Rev. Stat. 1893, pp. 800, 801, sees. 2315-2318; S. W. 749. See this case as to construction of this act and the effect of change of one subdivision of said section by act of March 25, 1887. When rail- road companj not liable for killing by its agent, Houston £ T. C. K. Co. v. Lipscomb (Tex. Civ. App. ), 62 S. W. 954, judgment modified, Lipscomb v. Houston, 64 S. W. '.'23. Gol § 523 DEATH DAMAGES § 523. Damages proportioned to the injury — Statutes — Continued. — The executor or administrator may sue in Eng- land, Nova Scotia, Ontario and South Carolina." While in Said art. 2899 (3017) Does not in- clude persons other than carriers, servants or agents. Asher v. Cabell (U. S. C. C. A. 5th C), 2 U. S. App. 158; 50 Fed. 818. Corporations. A corporation is a person within art. 2899 of Tex. Rev. Stat. (art. 3017 of Sayle's, 1900, Stat. ). Kigdon v. Temple Waterworks Co., 11 Tex. Civ. App. 512; 32 S. W. 828. A private corporation is liable for in- juries resulting in death from what may be deemed its own wrongful acts or omissions as distinguished from acts or omissions of its servants or agents. Cases of municipal cor- porations should be distinguished from this case under art. 2899, subd. 2, Rev. Stat. Tex. and in view of art. 3140, id. construing the word '•per- son." Fleming v. Texas Loan Agency, S7 Tex. 23S; 27 S. W. 126; 26 L. R. A. 250 (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 388. Private corporations in- clude common carriers and those not common carriers. Lynch v. South- western Teleg. & Teleph. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 32 S. W. 776; 2 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. X. S. 574. A corpor- ation is still liable though it goes out of business. Jones v. Spartenburg Herald Co., 44 S. C. 526; 22 S. E. 731. Under the Texas statute as it stood in 1884, a railroad com- pany was nqt liable in damages for the death of a person killed upon its track, unless it was shown by the evidence that the death was caused by the negligence or carelessness of the proprietor, owner, charterer, or hirer of such road or by the un- fitness, gross negligence or careless- ness of their servants or agents. Dallas City R. Co. v. Beeman, 74 Tex. 291, 293; 11 S. W. 1102, per Acker P. J., citing, R. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 305. The principal case was an action by parents for dam- ages for death of an infant son who was run over by defendant's car. Prior to the Texas act of March 25, 1887, omitting the word "gross" from art. 2899, par. 2, a railroad company was not liable for injuries resulting in death caused by the negligence of servants of the com- pany unless the negligence was gross. Sabine & East Tex. R. Co. v. Hawks, 73 Tex. 323, 324; 11 S. W. 377, citing Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Hill, 71 Tex. 451; 9 S. W. 351. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1901, p. 734, sec. 2767, as to liability of corporations to em- ployees. See as to English Em- ployer's Liability Act, 43 and 44 Vict, ch. 42. " Corporation " is expressly 6 See statutes cited at beginning of next preceeding section. In Eng- land and Ontario, if there is no exec- utor or administrator, or if there is one and no action is brought in his name in 6 months after the death, all or any of the persons for whose benefit the action lies may sue. 27 and 28 Vict. ch. 95; Ont. Rev. Stat. 1887, ch. 135, sec. 7. See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1887, sec. 2151; 632 Sayles Civ. Stat, and Supp. 1900, p. 1119, art. 3023 (2905), as to duty of executor or administrator to sue within limited time. Action lies by the person beneficially entitled with- in 6 months, where there is no ex- ecutor or administrator (Lampman v. Gainsborough, 17 O. R. 191; C. P. D. [Ont.], or by a relative. Holleran v. Bagwell, 4 L. R. Ir. 740. PROPORTIONED TO INHUV. - 523 Arizona the action is brought by the personal representative, except that the father or in certain cases the mother may sue for a child's death or a guardian for the death of his ward,' and in Texas, 8 all the persons entitled or anyone or more of them, may sue for the benefit of all. 9 Bui in Maryland the ac- tion is brought by and in the name of the state for the use of those entitled to damages."' The beneficiaries in all the juris- included as liable under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1901, p. 733, sec. -'764, and so under 1 Rev. Stat. S. C. 1893, p. 800, sec. 2315 (2183). while the Ariz, act of 1887, sec. 214."), and Sayle'a Tex. Civ. Stat, and Supp. 1900, p, 1113, art. 3017 (2899) made and make certain carriers liable, and the same section of the statute in Texas provides f«>r liability of receivers of railroads, and both the Const. (1876, art. 16) and the statute (Sayle's 1900, p. 1117, art. 3020 [2902] ) of that state also ex- cluded regard for criminal proceed- ings while the statute (id.) has the above text provision as to felony. " Person " includes bodies politic and corporate under the Md. Stat. sec. 34. Municipal corporation is not liable under Texas Rev. Stat. art. 2899 (art. 3017, Sayle's Stat. 1900). Ritz v. Austin, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 455; 20 S. W. 1029, 1031; Searight v. Austin (Tex. Civ. App.), 42 S. W. 857. Examine City of Galveston v. Barbour, 62 Tex. 172 ; 50 Am. Rep. 519, where it is said that in the absence of an express statute de- claring the liability of a municipal corporation for an iujury resulting from neglect of a city to keep its sidewalks and streets in repair, the corporation is liable. Receivers. Although the Texas statute of 1900 (see beginning of this note) contains a provision as to a lia- bility of receivers, the decisions in that state are that they are not liable for death through their negligence or that of tin- employees under them upon the railroad. Burke v. Dilliug bam (U. S. C. <'. App. 5th «'. E. I). T.x.i. 60. Fe.I. 729; Allen v. Dilling bam | U. s. < '. C. App. 5th C. E. 1). Tex. |, 8 C. C. A. 544; 60 Fed. 176: Dillingham v. Scales (Tex. Civ. App.), 24 S. \V. '.i7.">; Texas & I'ac. R. Co. v. Collins, 84 Tex. 121; 19 S. W. :}<;:,; Turner v. Eddy, 83 Tex. 218; 18 S. W. 578; 15 1.. R. A. 262; Texas & l'ac. R. Co. v. Geiger, 79 Tex. 13; 15 S. \V. 214; Brown v. Record (Tex. Civ . A]. p. i. 23 S. \V. 7D4; Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Bledsoe (Tex. Civ. App.), 20 S. W. 1135. This case, however, makes the qualification that they were not personally and immediately guilty of negligence, etc., and it is held that such receiver is not a necessary but a proper party to the action. Dallas Consol. Tract. R. Co. v. Hurley (Tex. Civ. App. I, 31 S. \\\ 73. Examine 5 Thompson's Com. on Corp. sec. 7159. Felony. This clause is considered hereinafter under the section as to dofi'tises. 7 Action may be by the father, or in case of his death or desertion <>f his family, then by the mother. Aiix. Rev. Stat. 1901, p. 733, sec. 2765. 8 And in Ariz, under Rev. s te founded on the pecuniary loss, actual or expected, suffered by the persons specified in the statute. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Woodward. 41 Md. 2GS; Baltimore & O. R. Co. V. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 271, 280, per Cochran, J.; State, Coughlan, v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 24 Md. 84, lor,; 87 Am. Dec. 600, per Bovie, C. .1.; Hall v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Tex.), 39 Fed. 18, per charge of Maxey, J., to jury; San Antonio & A. 1'. K. Co. v. Long, 87 Tex. 148; 27 S. W. LIS; 24 L. R. A. 637, rev'g 2G S. W. 114. where it was said that the statute gave dam- ages only for the pecuniary loss. 037 §524 DEATH —DAMAGES to the injury," are construed to mean in proportion to the re- spective losses sustained by those entitled to sue,* 1 and a charge which directs the jury to assess such sum as they might " think McGown v. International & G. N. R. Co., 85 Tex. 289, 293; 20 S. W. 80, holdiDg that recovery is limited to actual damages such as are purely pecuniary and compensatory. St. Louis, Ark. & T. R. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 536, 542; 15 S. W. 104, per Gaines, Assoc. J., holding that dam- ages are for the pecuniary loss of the party benefited by the recovery. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220, 224; 12 S. W. 828, per Acker, P. J. ; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 61, 67, 68 ; 12 S. W. 838, per Henry, Assoc. J., who also said: " It must be ad- mitted that the inquiry is not in- tended to be narrowed down by the law to a result that can be exactly accounted for by the facts in evidence." Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 75 Tex. 56, 58; 12 S. W. 955; International & G. N. R. Co. v. McDonald, 75 Tex. 41, 45; 12 S. W. 860, per Acker, P. J., Brunswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504, 512; 8 S. W. 85, holding that a refusal to give an in- struction limiting the recovery to the pecuniary loss is not erroneous where such instruction has already been given by the court. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496, 502, 503; 7 S. W. 857, such damages as will compensate for the loss. The true measure is a sum equal to the pecuniary benefit reasonably to be expected, except for the death. Damages are essentially indefinite, hence the law furnishes no definite measure therefor. City of Galveston v. Barbour, 62 Tex. 172, 174; 50 Am. Rep. 519, per Stayton, Assoc. J.; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 297, 301, 306, per Bonner, Assoc. J. Measure of damages for the death of a husband and father is a fair com- pensation for the pecuniary loss sus- tained. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 58 S. W. 622; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. White, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 280; 5() S. W. 204. Louisiana West. Ext. R. Co. v. Carstens, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 190; 47 S. W. 36; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 781, holding that the dam- ages should be such a sum as will compensate for the loss of pecuniary benefits, etc. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Hines (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. 152, entitled to the pecuniary damages sustained. San Antonio St. R. Co. v. Renken, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229; 38 S. W. 829, only pecu- niary loss considered. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Southwick (Tex. Civ. App. ), 30 S. W. 590, measure of dam- ages is not pecuniary value of de- ceased wife's services. Hicks v. Newport, A. & H. Ry., 4 B. & S. 403n, damages are restricted to the actual pecuniary loss. Blake v. Midland Ry.. 18 Q. B. 93; 21 L. J. Q. B. 233; 16 Jur. 562, compensation can be given for pecuniary loss only. Dalton v. Southeastern Ry., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 296; 27 L. J. C. P. 227; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 711; 6 W. R. 57, probable pecuniary loss recoverable. Grand Trunk R. W. Co. of Can. v. Jennings, 13 App. Cas. 800 (Ont.), aff'g 15 A. R. 477, damages restricted to actual pecu- niary loss. City of Montreal v. La- belle, 14 S. C. R. (Ont.) 741; Pater- son v. Wallace, 1 Mac. H. L. 748, 20 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 297, 301, per Bonner, Assoc. J. 638 PROPORTION F.T> TO INJURY. §524 proportioned to the injury," although copied from one article, of the statute is erroneous in that it ignores the other article of said enactment which confines the right of recovery to ac- tual damages, as well as the settled construction of the article, to the effect that the sum found must he a compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained. It is also error to refuse to charge that the jury are confined to the consideration of the money value of deceased's life, 21 although it has heen determined that the court should not restrict the jury to such a sum as the plain- tiffs would have received " in money" from deceased, had he lived. 22 The jury should not, however, give an award equal to a perfect compensation for the pecuniary injury, hut only what they consider under all the circumstances a fair compensation j 88 and circumstances may be considered which are capable of pecuniary estimate, 2 ' although actual damages must have ac- crued.-"' So, if the value of services are incapable of estimation there is no pecuniary loss. 2 " Again, in so far as the recovery of punitive or exemplaiy damages is not permitted, the statutory action for death allows only the recovery of actual damages,-' 7 damages must be of a pecuniary character in England, contra in Scot- land. See further sec. 526, herein. 21 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Worthy, 87 Tex. 459, 465-467; 29 S. W. 290, per Brown, Assoc, J., who also said that it was well settled that under arts. 2899, 2909. Rev. Stat, plaintiffs were entitled to recover the pecuniary value of the life lost, and that the verdict should be in a sum which would compensate for the injury caused by the death. 22 Chicago, R. I. & T. R. Co. v. Porterheld, 19 Tex. Civ. 225: 46 S. W. 919, aff'd 49 S. W. 361; 12 Am. & Eng. R.. Cas. N. S. 3S;5; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 461. But see San Antonio Tract. Co. v. White (Tex. Supr. Ct. 1901), 61 S. W. 706; 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 616, rev'g 60 S. W. 323, where the court charged the jury to "consider alone the money value" and in Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 61, 67, 68; 12 S. W. 839, Henry, Assoc. J., uses the words " money value " and " pecuniary loss " in juxtaposition. 23 Rowley v. London & N. W. Ry., 42 L. J. Ex. 153; L. R. 8 Ex. 221; 29 L. T. ISO; 21 W. R. 869, per Brett, J. Should give a fair compen- sation, Armsworth v. Southeastern Ry., 11 Jur. 758. 21 Pym v. Great Northern Ry., 4 B. & S. 396; 32 L. J. Q. B. 377; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 199; 8 L. T. 7.J4; 1 W. R. 922. 25 Duckworth v. Johnson, 4 H. & N. 653; 29 L. J. Ex. 25: 5 Jur. i \ S. | 6o0; 7 W. R. 655. See sees. 525, 526, herein. w Holleran v. Bagnell, 6 L. R. Ir. 333. This rule, however, has been much qualified as we have shown under other sections, as in case of minor children, etc., and see sees. 525, 526, 5 14. herein. - 7 International & (',. X. R. Co. v. McDonald, 75 Tex. 11: 12 S. W. S60. Where the petition is sufficient for 639 § 525 DEATH — DAMAGES and it is said that in determining the amount to be awarded, the jury should confine themselves to such compensation as will supply the surviving members of deceased's family, the same results as would have followed from N his labor during his prob- able duration, of life except for the death, based of course upon other general factors, such as we have elsewhere considered. 28 In South Carolina the injury for which damages are allowed is seemingly not limited to the pecuniary loss or the deprivation of a right susceptible of measurement by a pecuniary standard, but the language of the statute is much broader and authorizes the jury to award such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from the death. 29 § 525. Damages proportioned to the injury— Pecuniary loss — Evidence. — It is declared that it is " necessary for the plaintiff in cases of this kind to show a damage of a pecuniary nature ... It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove such facts and circumstances as will enable the jury to return a ver- dict upon the evidence which would approximate reasonable certainty." * But it is also decided that in an action for the actual damages it cannot be reached by a general demurrer although it is deficient in the claim for exemplary damages. Taylor B. & H. B. Co. v. Taylor, 79 Tex. 104; 14 S. W. 918. See sec. 526, herein. 28 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 271. 29 Mason v. Southern Ry., 58 S. C. 70, 77; 36 S. E. 440; 79 Am. St. Rep. 826, per Gary, J., quoting Petrie v. any other fact. " It is difficult to imagine a case iu which it can be proved directly. It must be proved by circumstances . . . The law does not and cannot compel the party causing the death to give a gratuity in these cases. The recovery is to compensate the loss and not to confer a bounty." St. Louis, Ark. & T. R. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 530, 542; 15 S. W. 104, per Gaines, Assoc. J. Columbia & G. R. Co., 29 S. C. 303; It must be shown that the parties 7 S. E. 515. which is cited with ap ; to whom the right of action is given proval in Strother v. South Carolina j have sustained some pecuniary injury & G. R. Co., 47 S. C. 375; 25 S. E. ; by the death. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 272; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 430. j S. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220, 223,224; 12 so Hall v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. W. 828, per Acker, C. J. And regard Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Tex. ), 39 Fed. must be bad in each instance to such 18, per charge of Maxey, J., to jury, facts and conditions as cast light In the entire absence of proof of upon the subject. Missouri Pac. R. damages there can be no recovery. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 61, 67, 68; McGown v. International & G. N. 12 S. W. 838, per Henry, Assoc. .1. K. Co., 85 Tex. 289, 293: 20 S. W. | As to proof, see also Houston & T. 80. The loss must be proved like j C. R. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 297, 640 PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. § 526 negligent killing of a wife, a mere claim for damages is suffi- cient, it being unnecessary to either allege or prove pecuniary injury." And it is also determined in a South Carolina case that it is not necessary to prove damages. 32 § 526. Damages proportioned to the injury— Exemplary damages. — Punitive or exemplary damages are not recoverable under the Maryland act of 1852. ffl And in South Carolina it is error to charge the jury that "if there was gross carelessness or recklessness or wilfulness then you may give what is known as punitive or smart money damages." Nor will the appellate court uphold the verdict upon the assumption that it does noi embrace such damages, but merely gives compensatory dam- ages. 34 But in Texas exemplary damages are recoverable where the death was due to wilful act or omission, or gross negligence."' 304, per Bonner, Assoc. J. Must show a pecuniary loss, Texas & N. O. K. Co. v. Brown, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 697, 29 S. W. 140. Jury should be limited to a consideration of the evi- dence, Galveston, H. . v. Lett, 11 S. C. R. (Out.) 422. aff'd ('. A. (11 A. R. 1) which rev'd Q. B. D. (1 O. R. 545). 649 §528 DEATH —DAMAGES sation Act, 51 the amount of compensation paid dependents for death is based upon the period of continuous employment im- mediately preceding said death.® 667. Deceased's age, salary aud ex- penses considered — -13,550 not exces- sive. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220; 12 S. W. 828. Damages are not limited by amount of earn- ings. In this case, deceased was a laborer about 35 years old and earned SI. 25 per day. He was "stout, healthy and sober." Missouri P. R. Co. v. Lebmberg, 75 Tex. 61; 12 S. W. 838. Deceased was the only child of a widowed mother. He was 26 years old, a locomotive engineer, was economical, industrious aud temperate and earned $1,000, a year. Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 75 Tex. 56; 12 S. W. 955. Age of child and mental characterestics and its bodily health and strength were shown and also its ability to be use- ful. Brunswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504; 8 S. W. 85. Deceased was old- est son of widow. He was sober, industrious and economical. His life expectancy was also considered and from the evidence of his charac- ter, etc., he gave prospects of being a useful and prosperous citizen. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496, 502, 503; 7 S. W. 857, per Walker, Assoc. J. Deceased was a young and robust man with probabilities of a long life. He was a skilled workman whose loss could not be estimated solely by the remuneration he had received for his labor — -$15,000 not so clearly excessive as to be set aside although larger than ought to have been given. East Line & Red R. R. Co. v. Smith, 65 Tex. 167; S. C, 62 Tex. 274. The age, life ex- pectancy and earnings of deceased might yield a much smaller sum than that awarded— $12,000— "but the additional skill which may have been acquired in some of the years of life he was deprived of, would increase his wages,' 1 and verdict sustained. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Oimond, 64 Tex. 485, 490, per Robertson, Assoc. J. Deceased was 31 years old, sober, industrious and of good physical constitution for some time before he sustained the injury. But there was evidence tending to show that at some former period he may have been intemper- ate. He was a druggist by profes- sion, although at his death he was engaged in other business under contract with persons who bad un- dertaken to grade a railroad and lay the rails and he was to receive $2.50 a day. And there was evidence of ability to furnish pecuniary aid to his wife and mother — $5,000 not excessive. Dallas & W. R. Co. v. S picker, 61 Tex. 427; 48 Am. Rep. 297. See S. C, 60 Tex. 435. Evidence should show the circumstances of deceased, his occupation, health, habits of industry, sobriety and economy, his skill and capacity for business, the amount of his 6* Act 1897, cl. 1, (a) (i). 65 Appleby v. Horseley Co. (No. 1), (C. A.), 68 L. J. Q. B.N. S. 892(1899), 2 Q. B. 521. In this case the em- ployment had not been continuous, for there was an interval of eleven months when deceased was not in 650 said employ, and at the time of his death he had returned and was work- ing under another contract, although the period from the beginning of his original employment was a few months less than three years. PROPORTIONED TO [NJ1 BY. 8 529 § 5'iO. Damages proportioned to the injury -Sufferings of injured person. Under the statutory clause providing that property, liis annual earnings and the probable duration of bis life. Deceased here was over 21 years of age. Houston red. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. White, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 280; SOS. W. 204. Deceased was 31 years old, healthy and industrious and earned $60 a month, but had been divorced and remarried. Son by first wife re- covered $5,000. Not excessive. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Delaney, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 427; 55 S. W. 538. Deceased was 30 years old with a life expectancy of 35 years, was in good health, an expert railroad man earn- ing about $75 a month, of which about $45 a month was expended for his wife and two small children. He provided a comfortable home for them, was industrious and thrifty and bad presumptively the usual chances of promotion by his employ- ers — $15,000 not excessive although a less sum might have covered the loss. Ft. Worth & II. G. R. Co. v. Kime, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 271; 51 S. W. 558, aff d 54 S. W. 240. Deceased's income from her estate and superior business ability in managing the same are factors. San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Long, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 049; 48 S. \V. 599. Deceased was a fireman in the line of promo- tion to locomotive engineer, and the wages of the latter were held compe- tent evidence as showing reasonable expectations as to the future. Gal- veston, A. & S. A. R. Co. v. Ford (Tex. Civ. App.), 46 S. W. 77. De- ceased was about 40 years old, a rail- road brakeman who stood well with his employers and had good busini ss prospects. He had asthma but was temperate, industrious, frugal and ei nical, and earned $60 a month and supported bis wife and 5 child- ren — $10,000 not excessive. Mis- souri, K. In re Mayo's Estate, 60 S. C. 401; 38 S. E. 634; Ex parte North- eastern R. Co., id., under Rev. Stat. 1893; sees. 2315, 231(5, 2318. 60 Agricultural & Mecli. Assoc, v. State, Carty, 71 Md. SG; 18 Atl. 37; 17 Am. St. Rep. 507; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Mahone, 63 Md. 135, 146; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 271,280; State, Coughlan, v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 24 Md. 84, 106; 87 Am. Dec. 600, per Bowie, C. J. ; Hall v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Tex.), 39 Fed. 18; McGown v. Inter- national & G. N. R. Co., 85 Tex. 289, 293; 20 S. W. 80; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220, 224; 12 S. W. 828, per Acker, P. J. ; City of Galveston v. Barbour, 62 Tex. 172, 174; 50 Am. Rep. 519; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 297, per Bonner, Assoc. J. ; San Antonio St. R. Co. v. Renken, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229; 38 S. W. 829; Storrie v. Marshall (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 224; Blake v. Midland Ry., 18 Q. a 93; 21 L. J. Q. B. 233; 16 Jur. 562; Paterson v. Wallace, 1 Mao. H. L. 748; Canadian Pacif. R. W. Co. v. Robinson, 14 S. C. R. 105 ( Ont. ) : St. Lawrence & Ottawa R. W. Co. v. Lett, 11 S. C. 422 (Out.), afTg 11 A. K. 1. which rev'dQ. B. D. ( 1 O. R. 545 j; Filial rault v. Canadian Par. R. Co., Rap. .hid. Quebec, 18 C. S. 491. See City of Montreal v. La- belle, 14S.C. R. 741 (Ont.); Storrie v. Marshall (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 224. See San Antonio Tract. Co. v. White (Supr. Ct. Tex. 1901), 61 S. W. 706; 9 Am. Xeg. Rep. G16, rev'g 60 S. W. 323. Contra in Scotland, Paterson v. Wallace, 1 Macq. H. L. 748. «i Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 271. 62 Hall v. (ialveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. I). Tex.). 39 Fed. 18; Taylor B. * H. R. Co. v. Warner (Tex.), 19 S. W. 449. See Sao Anto- nio Tract Co. v. White (Supr. Ct. Tex. 1901). 61 S. W. 706: 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 616. rev'g 60 S. W. 323. 6 3 Galveston. II. A- S. A. 1!. Co. v. Worthy, 87 Tex. 459, 466, 467; 29 S. W. 376; McGown v. International & G. N. R. Co., 85 Tex. 289, 293; -"> S. W. 80. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Matula. 79 Tex. 577,583, 584; 15 S. W. 57::; San Antonio St. R. Co. v. Renken, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229; 38 S. W. 829; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gormley (Tex. Civ. App.). 27 S. W. 1051. Loss of society not an element in England. 653 §531 DEATH— DAMAGE* absence of proper pleadings can the loss of advice and counsel of a father and husband be considered, 64 although the fact may be admissible that a deceased son had aided his mother with counsel and advice. 65 And loss to deceased's personal es- tate by reason pf his inability to attend to business is a proper element of damages. 68 § 531. Damages proportioned to the injury— Relationship legal and actual of deceased to beneficiaries— Support and dependency. — The legal and actual relations between the de- ceased and those entitled to damages are important factors in arriving at the amount to be awarded for the death. But they are not exclusively determining elements. Thus a widow or a mother, son or daughter, may be entitled to recover for a hus- band or father's death, even though he may have separated and is living apart from them, especially in case of a widow who has not by any act of hers lost her legal right to support. 67 But Blake v. Midland Ry., 18 Q. B. 93; 21 L. J. Q. B. 233; 16 Jur. 562. 64 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Worthy, 87 Tex. 459, 466, 467; 29 S. W. 376. See next following note. 66 Missouri Pao. R. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496; 7 S. W. 857. See Galves- ton, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gormley (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 1051; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hamilton (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 906. 66 Bradshaw v. Lancashire & York- shire Ry., 44 L. J. C. P. 148; L. R. 10 C. P. 189; 31 L. T. 847; 23 W. R. 310. 67 But the appellant's sixth prayer contained a proposition which we think is not sustained either by rea- son or authority. It asks the court for instruction that if they find that the decedent had been separated from his family for a period of about twelve years immediately preceding his death, and that he had contrib- uted nothing to the support of his wife or infant child during that pe- riod, that then the plaintiff was only 654 entitled to nominal damages. In this we do not concur. The marital relation still continued to exist be- tween the parties at the time of the death of the husband aud whilst they had not for the period stated lived together as man and wife, her legal rights had suffered no change or im- pairment. It is very clear from the testimony in the record that the wife had not by her own wrong forfeited her right to a decent support from her husband in accordance with her station in life. The marital relation created this right, and it continued to exist in law to the death of her husband, and this too without refer- ence to the will or wishes of the hus- band.' ' Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Chambers, 81 Md. 371, 389; 32 Atl. 201, per Roberts, J. So in an action by a widow for the benefit of herself and mother, there was evi- dence showing some estrangement between the wife and husband and the court said that while deceased may have left his wife for a year or PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. §531 a wife ma}*, by separating from her husband and entering a house of prostitution, forfeit her right to his support and con- sequent damages for his death, especially so where her immoral conduct is not justified by his misconduct. 68 And a husband who has quarreled with and separated from his wife, living apart from and holding no communication with her for years, can recover nothing for her death even though she would have been absolutely entitled to a large sum of money had she sur- vived her aged mother. 63 So a father who has abandoned his family and has contributed nothing to their support for years and has held no communication with them, and who has never more before his death and after leav- ing her may have had no further communication with her and may have intended never to return to her or contribute to her support, yet so long as the marital relation existed, without reference to the will of the husband, the wife not being shown to have forfeited her right thereto by her own wrong, she was entitled to a decent support in accordance with their station in life, from her husband. The marital relation created this right and it would have continued to exist so long as the re- lationship continued and so without reference to the will of her husband. There is no legal presumption that such relation would ever have been dissolved prior to the time when one of the parties thereto in the ordinary course of events would have died. Dallas & Wichita R. Co. v. Spicker, 61 Tex. 427, 431; 48 Am. Rep. 297, per Stayton, Assoc. J. See . C, 60 Tex. 435. See Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Delanoy, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 427; 55 S. W. 538, where there was a divorce and remarriage by husband, and son by first marriage recovered. International & (J. N. R. Co. v. Cul- pepper, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 182; 46 S. W. 922, holding that a minor daughter could recover for her fa- ther's death even though he had been divorced from her mother with whom she was living. 68 Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Floyd (Tex. Civ. App.), 21 S. W. 544. At the trial of an action brought by the plaintiff as the widow of the deceased under the provisions of Lord Camp- bell's Act (9 and 10 Vict. ch. 93), S. 2, against the defendants for negligence which caused the deceased's death, it appeared that the plaintiff was at the time of her husband's death and had for many years previously, been liv- ing apart from him in adultery with another man. During the time they were so living apart the deceased did not support the plaintiff, though he occasionally gave her small sums of money. Held that the action was not maintainable, inasmuch as the plaintiff had lost her legal right to support by reason of her adultery and had no reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage by the de- ceased remaining alive which could be taken into account by a jury. Stimpson v. Wood. .'.7 L. .1. Q. B. 484; 5!) L. T. 218; 36 W. R. 734; 52 J. I'. 822. See 10 Mew's Eug. Dig. ( is! IS) p . 105. 69 Harrison v. L. N. W. Ry., 1 Cab. & E. 540. 655 531 DEATH —DAMAGES been assisted or aided by bis son, has sustained no such pecu niary injury by tbe hitter's death as entitles him to damages, for while the relationships named in the statute give the right of action, they do not of themselves give the right of recovery.™ While, however, legal relationship and consequent legal obliga- tions are to be considered as a basis of pecuniary benefit and of reasonable expectation of advantage, 71 nevertheless, the dam- ages are not to be given with reference merely to the loss of a legal right, but should be calculated with reference to the rea- sonable expectation of pecuniary benefit as of right, or other- wise, from the life of deceased had he not been killed. 7 ' Again, 70 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220, 222-224; 12 S. W. 828. 71 Duckworth v. Johnson, 4 H. & N. 653; 29 L. J. Ex.25; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 630; 7 W. R. 655; Sykes v. North- eastern Ry., 44 L. J. C. P. 191; 32 L. T. 199; 23 W. R. 473; Dalton v. South- eastern Ry., 4 C. B. (N. S.)296; 27 L. J. C. P. 227; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 711; 6 W. R. 574; Baltimore & (). R. Co. v. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 271, 281; Lilly \. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co., 32 S. C. 142; 10 S. E. 932, holding that an allegation of dependency upon de- ceased by a widow and children is not a sufficient allegation of neces- sary relationship. St. Louis, Ark. & T. R. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 536, 542; 15 S. W. 104, per Gaines, Assoc, J., declaring that a husband's duty is to support his family, etc., and that it was the duty of the hus- band of a surviving daughter to sup- port her. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Cody, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 520; 50 S. W. 135, writ of error denied, 51 S. W. 329, holding that where the relationship is denied evidence that deceased supported plaintiffs is ad- missible to show that he was their husband and father. See also addi- tional cases cited under notes to this section. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Culpepper, 19 Tex. Civ. App. leged relationship, etc., and was held sufficient, holding that a minor daughter has a legal right to sup- port. Winnt v. International & G. N. R. Co., 74 Tex. 32-35; 11 S. W. 907; 5 L. R. A. 172, holding that the right of action is confined to the persons named in the statute where exemplary damages are sought. 72 Franklin v. Southeastern Ry., 3 H. & X. 211; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 565; 6 W. R. 573. Not necessary to prove that persons described in the statute had a claim upon deceased for sup- port or services, which amounted to a legal right but proof of reasonahle expectation, etc., sufficient. Balti- more & O. R. Co. v. State, Mahone, 63 Md. 135, 145, per Robinson, J. Not merely for loss of a legal right. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 271, 281. The dam- ages are such as the jury think are proportioned to the injury and are not confined to the deprivation of some legai claim so that it need not appear that children, as in the case of adults, had any legal claim upon de- ceased for support. Mason v. South- ern Ry., 58 S. C. 70, 77; 36 S. E. 440; 79 Am. St. Rep. 826, per Gary, J. Petrie v. Columbia & G. N. R. Co., 29 S. C. 303; 7 S. E. 515. Damages are not restricted to loss of benefits 182: 46 S. W. 922, where petition al- 1 to which plaintiff had a legal right. 656 PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. § 531 in some jurisdictions the parent has by statute an action against a child for support, but apart from any such enactment there is certainly an indisputable, natural obligation for a child to care for a necessitous parent. 73 And it has been asserted that a mother has such a Legal claim upon her son for support as coupled with actual assistance given, that her claim to damages is valid ; but even if there was no legal obligation on a child to maintain a parent, it is declared that the imperfect moral obligation of a son who was his mother's only support would constitute a suffi- cient basis for the claim. 74 In those jurisdictions, however, where the law does not impose upon a child any legal duty to care for necessitous parents, the reasonable expectation, irrespec- tive of legal right resulting from the condition of the child, coupled with his ability and disposition to aid and bestow upon them pecuniary benefits in obedience to filial duty or otherwise, constitutes a valid basis of damages, especially where there has been such assistance on the part by the child and a promise of continued future aid, even though such promises cannot be le- gally enforced. 75 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Wilder (U. S. C. C. A. 5th C. Tex.), 35 C. C. A. 105; 92 Fed. 953, 955, 95G; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 520, per Parlance, Dist. J. Are not to be given with reference to the loss of a legal right, etc. Hall v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Tex.), 39 Fed. 18, per Maxey, J., charging jury. Ta Texas & P. R. Co. v. Wilder (U. S. C. C. A. 5th C. Tex.), 35 C. C. A. 105; 92 Fed. 953, 955, 95G; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 520, per Parlance, Dist. J. 7 *Weemsv. Mathieson, 4 Siacq. II. L. 215. 75 Hall v. Galveston, II. AS. A. K. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. I). Tex.), 39 Fed. 18, per Maxey, J., charging the jury: Texas & P. R. Co. v. Wilder (TJ. S. C. C. A. 5th C. Tex.), 35 C. 0. A. 105; 92 Fed. 95:5. it:,.-), 956, per Par- lance, Dist. J. See St. Louis. Ark. & Tex. R. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 42 536, 542; 15 S. W. 104, per Gaines, Assoc. J.; Dallas & Wichita R. Co. v. Spicker, 61 Tex. 427; 48 Am. Rep. 297. See 6'. C, 60 Tex. 435. In such a case it would be proper to show the reasonable expectation of benefit which the parent would have re- ceived had the child not been killed, and in the absence of legal right to benefit prior to the death of the child this would depend on the will and ability of the child to confer benefit on the parent. In such a case evidence throwing lisht on these matters would be proper, and should be considered by the jury under a proper instruction. In this case evidence was introduced to enable the jury to ascertain the ability have the jury pass upon the ques- tion of compensation, which was the true one. and with the general charge standing as it did should have been given. This is not as in- tended by the appellee, an applica- tion of the rule of annuities, some- times insisted upon, nor of any mathematical rule for the ascertain- ment of damages. On the contrary, it leaves the determination of amount to the jury acting upon all proper considerations, of which a possible difference in value between an amount paid in prasseuti and the same amount paid in contributions made at intervals through a period of time is one. It has often been said that the measure of damages in this class of cases is 'a sum equal to the pe- cuniary benefit the parent had a rea- sonable expectation of receiving from the child had he not died.' Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 503; City of Galveston v. Barbour. H2 Tex. 174. In those cases the court had no occasion to consider or dis- cuss such a question as that now be- fore u.s. All of the authorities recognize the proposition that, com- pensation is the fundamental meas- ure, and wii li t he idea of compensa- tion in mind the statement of the measure in the cases referred to is collect and means equality in coin pensation. not necessarily in amount hut in value." Per Williams. Assoc. J. And it is also held in Ft. Worth A- D. ('. K. <',,. v. Morrison (Tex. civ. A,. p. L900), 56 S. W. 931. that only the present value of such henetits is recoverable, and not the reasonable amount of pecuniary aid the parents would have received. 659 § 582 DEATH— DAMAGES gent killing of children, 73 or of a parent or husband or both. 79 The petition need not, however, specially aver the nature of the aid extended in the lifetime of a deceased mother to each of the 78 Agricultural & Mechanical Asso- ciation v. State, Carty, 71 Md. 86; 18 Atl. 37; 17 Am. St. Rep. 507; Balti- more & R. T. R. Co. y. State, 71 Md. 573; 18 Atl. 884; Hall v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. ( U. S. C. C. W. D. Tex. ), 39 Fed. 18 per Maxey, J., charging jury, International & G. N. R. Co. v. Knight, 91 Tex. 660; 45 S. W. 556, rev'g 45 S. W. 167; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220; 12 S. W. 828; Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 75 Tex. 56; 12 S. W. 955; Winnt v. International & G. N. R. Co., 74 Tex. 32, 35, 36; 11 S. W. 907; 5 L. R. A. 172, per Hobby J.; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496, 502, 503; 7 S. W. 857, per Walker, Assoc. J.; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 297, 305. In this last case deceased had at one time contributed some property and had at sometime contributed two thirds his wages, but there was no evidence of his pecuniary circumstances or of what his wages had been or then were, al- though such testimony was easily accessible. " Without such evidence the verdict of the jury could have been but little more than a merely speculative one and the court had no standard by which to determine its correctness." Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. White, 23 Tex. Civ. A pp. 280: 56 S. W. 204, holding that the amount of earnings contributed to the parent's support and tlie probable duration of such support are proper elements. Brush Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Lefevre (Tex. Civ. A pp. 1900), 55 S. W. 396, holding that the aid and assistance rendered and reasonably to be expected are evidential facts. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Power 660 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 54 S. W. 629; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Ford (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 54 S. W. 37; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Knight (Tex. Civ. App.), 52 S. W. 640; Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Spence (Tex.), 52 S. W. 562; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Royall, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 86; 43 S. W. 815: Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Bonnett ( Tex. Civ. App. ), 38 S. W. 813; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Southwick (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. 592; International & G. N. R. Co. v. McNeel (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 1133; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hamilton (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 906; Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Finch (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 1028; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Arispe, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 611; 23 S. W. 928, rehearing denied 5 Tex. Civ. App. 617; Simmons v. White (C. A.),68L. J.Q. B.N. S. 507(1899), 1 Q. B. 1005. See this case also as to parents being "in part dependent.' 1 Hetherington v. Northeastern Ry., 51 L. J. Q. B. 495; 9 Q. B. D. 160; 30 W. R. 797; Franklin v. Southeastern Ry.,3 H. &N. 211; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 565; 5 W. R. 573; Condon v. Great South- ern & Western Ry., 16 Iv. C. L. 415; Van Wart v. New Brunswick Ry., 27 Sup. Ct. Jud. (N. B. ) rev'd on App. to Sup. C. C. In Bourke v. Cork & Mac- room, 4 L. R. Ir. 282, the father was independant of his son's earn- ings. 79 An instruction is sufficiently restrictive which directs the jury to exclude all damages to adult chil- dren unless they find they were de- pendent upon their father for sup- port and maintenance by reason of some want of ability to support and PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. i 532 children who were plaintiffs. The fact thai deceased during her life contributed to the support of her children may be con- sidered by the jury in an action for damages occasioned by her wrongful death, and perhaps, where the children are adults and no longer reside under the parental roof, some evideace oi like character or effect may he necessary to justify an award of dam- maintain themselves. Baltimore & entitled to such sum as they might <). R. Co. v. state, Ilauer, 60 Md. have received from the assistance or 449, 468. Support of family should earnings of deceased. San Antonio be considered. Baltimore & O. R. St. R. C<». v. Henken, 15 Tex. Civ. Co. v. State, Kelly, '-'4 Md. 271. Wife App. 229; 38 S. W. 829; 1 Am. Neg. and children were entirely depend- Rep. 354. Where adult son and mai- eut upon deceased's labor for sup- ried daughters had received and ex- port, Galveston, H. & S. A. Et. Co. pected nothing from deceased e.\- v. Worthy, 87 Tex. 4.")0, 465; 29 cept occasional presents and were S. W. 376. Divorced husband never independent of his support, there contributed to support of wife or can be no recovery. Si. Louis, S. & son, so that son recovered damages. W. R. Co. v. Bishop, 14 Tex. Civ. Gulf C. &S. F. K. Co. v. Delaney, 22 App. 504; 37 S. W. 764. Decease! Tex. Civ. App. 427; 55 S. W. 538. gave his entire salary to support his See as to allegation of support, In- ; wife and children. Tyler S. E. R. ternational & (t. N. K. Co. V. Cul- Co. v. McMahon (Tex. Civ. App.j. pepper, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 182; 46 34 S. W. 796. Widow and children S. W. 922. In this last case how- had been entirely dependent upon ever there was no proof of sup- deceased's professional earnings for port, but child was a minor and their maintenance. Sanderson v. San recovered. Deceased supported his derson, 36 L. T. S47. The fact that mother, wife and child. Chicago, R. a deceased husband and father had I. & T. R. Co. v. Porterfield, 19 Tex. sent his wife and child but two small Civ. App. 225; 46 S. W. 919; 4 Am. sums of money may be accounted Neg. Rep. 461, aff'd 49 S. W. 361; 12 for by the fact that he had been out Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 383. De- of employment, and that at bis ceased devoted the greater part of death bis employer owed him about his wages to the support of his wife three months' wages. As to the other and 5 children. Missouri, K. & T. beneficiaries, there was no evidence R. Co. v. Ransom, 15 Tex. Civ. App. that, deceased had contributed any- 689; 41 S. W. 826. Widow entitled to thing to their support and he had probable amount of contributions to nothing with which to support her maintenance, etc. Missouri, K. himself. St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R. & T. R. Co. v. Ilines (Tex. Civ. Co. v. Johnston. 78 Tex. 536, ">42: App.), 40 S. W. 152. Adult sous not 15 S. W. 104, per Gaines, \ssoc. J. entitled to recover where they have It was also said in this case that the received no pecuniary aid or sup- circumstances repelled the idea that port from deceased and expected the latter named beneficiaries had none. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. any just grounds to expect pecuniary Brown, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 697; 39 assistance from deceased. S. W. 140. Widow and children | 661 § 532 DEATH — DAMAGES ages. But such facts are not in themselves substantive facts which justify a judgment, and being mere matters of evidence need not be pleaded either in detail or with any great degree of particularity. Therefore an allegation is not vague and indefi- nite which sets forth that the deceased mother " during her life- time aided, in the support and maintenance of each one of the plaintiffs, cared for them in time of sickness and at other times, and that her house was their home whenever they desired to make it such, and that each had every reasonable expectation that if said mother had lived she would have continued to aid and assist in the support and maintenance of each of them as aforesaid, and they aver that by her death each of them has been deprived of her motherly care and assistance and her said support and maintenance, all in their damage," etc. 80 Again, evidence of a daughter is not irrelevant upon the issue of pe- cuniary loss that the deceased mother had in her lifetime aided in the support of all her adult children, and that her house was their home whenever they desired to make it so ; that three of said children lived with her when not away from home ; that she furnished one of the latter with money for her support and to pay for medicine and medical attention when needed ; that she also remitted money at different times to another daughter and to a son ; that she aided one of the sons, who lived with her, with money and also assisted him in the support of his children by giving them clothes, etc., and that deceased was a woman of simple tastes and habits, and was always ready to aid her children with her means whenever they needed it. And pe- cuniary benefits are not limited to the results of a mother's men- tal and bodily labor, since evidence is admissible that she had an income from the rents of property and interest on loans, and that she devoted it to the support of herself and children. But a question and answer upon the point whether the children had any expectation of continuance of support during the life of deceased, and asking for the facts upon which such expectation is based, are inadmissible in so far as they seek for and elicit the witnesses's opinion, and to this extent should be excluded.* 1 In 80 San Antonio & A. P. K. Co. v. i "San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Long, 87 Tex. 148, 152; 27 S. W. 113; Lout;-, 87 Tex. 148, 152, 153; 27 S. W. 47 Am. St. Rep. 87. | 113; 47 Am. St. Rep. 87; 19 Tex. QQ2 PROPORTIONED TO INJl BY. § 532 addition the actual relations sustained between the parties are material. Thus that deceased was kind, affectionate and indul- gent to his family has been declared to be competent evidence, 82 although it cannot be shown in mitigation of damages that he was a negro, upon the theory that in that race the family ties are not strong." But the fact whether the deceased and the sur- vivors lived apart or under the same roof, whether the survivors were married or unmarried and the character of tin- services or aid rendered, if any, are factors entering into the determination of damages. M Civ. App. 649; 48 S. W. .".99. In this case the mother was a woman whose superior business management of her estates enabled her to provide for her children in an increasing de- gree even to the extent of furnishing them a home. 8 -i Missouri P. R. Co. v. Bond (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. 930. See also Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 271; Ft. Worth & K. G. R. Co. v. Kime, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 271; 51 S. W. 558, aff'd 54 S. W. 240. 83 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Moody (Tex. Civ. App.), 23 S. W. 41. 84 Deceased made her permanent home with her daughter — one of the plaintiffs. She attended to the house- work and looked after the children while the daughter was away at work. These services enabled the daughter to work out constantly and when so at work she earned $6 a week, and since her mother's death she had been unable to go out to work because she had no one to take care of the house and children. It was declared that such services were a pecuniary benefit which the daugh- ter had a right to expect from the continuance of the mother's life and such value was to bo assessed by the jury and was not what the daughter might earn by going out to work, because by hiring sonic one else she might still go out to work. In the same case there were also two sons as plaintiffs; one was 2d years old, married and had one child, the other 28 years old, married and had two children. The mother although she made her home at her daughter's was in the habit of assisting the sick members of her two sons' families. How often she went, how long she remained and what was the value of her services did not appear nor was there any evidence to show that in case of sickness the sons were obliged to employ some one else. Held that there was no evi- dence legally sufficient of pecuniary loss. "To attempt to assess dam- ages under such circumstances would be to indulge in mere conjecture or speculation." Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. .State, Mahoue, 03 Md. 136, 146, 147. Three of the plaintiffs had resided with their mother for whose death recovery was sought. San An- tonio & A. R. Co. v. Lonjr, 87 Tex. 14S, 153, 158, 159; 27 S. W. 11:); 47 Am. St. Rep. 87. Son's knowledge of father's business affairs admissible. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Davis, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 335; 54 s. W, 009. That one of the beneficiaries was a married woman was considered. St. Louis. Ark. & Tex. IX. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 636, 542; 15 S. W. 104, per Gaiues, Assoc. .1. So the business relations of the parties are 663 533 DEATH -DAMAGES § 533. Same subject concluded.— Again, it is decided in a recent case in Texas that the statute does not impose the con- dition precedent to a recovery of damages, that deceased must have contributed to the support of the beneficiaries, and there- fore a married daughter can recover for her father's negligent killino-. 85 And it is determined in the same decision, that even though the aid furnished was gratuitous and given at irregular intervals, nevertheless she was damaged by said death. Under the English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, which pre- scribes a scale of compensation payable to the dependents of a workman, " where death results from the injury," it is held that the defendants are entitled to compensation on that scale if death results in fact from the injury, even though at the time of the injury it could not be reasonably expected as the probable con- sequences thereof. 86 And where an employee, a son of fourteen, had turned over all his wages to his parents, receiving from them such pocket money as they thought right, and he had been employed for five weeks before his death, it was held that such parents were "in part dependent"' on such employee, un- der the English Workmen's Compensation Act.* 7 Again, the pecuniary damage requisite is shown, although the assistance rendered the father by his son extended only over a period of about six months when the former was out of work, and no aid factors as where the son assisted his father iu business although in this case it was held that there was no pecuniary loss. Sykes v. Northeast- ern Ry., 44 L. J. C. P. 191; 32 L. T. 109 ; 23 W. R. 473. In an action for a stepmother's death, her earnings, their application to the support of the family, that plaintiff resided with her father and and stepmother up to the time of the accident were con- sidered, but it was held that there was no evidence of pecuniary loss. Johnston v. Great Northern Ry., 26 L. R. Ir. 691. Deceased mother re- sided with plaintiff and was lodged and maintained by her and assisted her daughter as laundress, in house- keeping, cooking and serving meals. It did not appear that the value of 664 her services exceeded the cost of keeping her and verdict for plaintiff was set aside. Hull v. Great North- ern Ry., 20 L. R. Ir. 289. 85 Texas & P. R. f'o. v. Martin (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 60 S. W. 803; Sayle's Civ. Stat. arts. 3021-3027. See also Petrie v. Columbia & G. R. Co., 29 S. C. 303; 7 S. E. 515. 86 Syllabus to Dunham v. Clare, 71 L. J. K. B. 683; C. A. under 60 and 61 Vict. ch. 37, Schedule I, 1 (A.); English Work. C.-mp. Act, 1897. "Simmons v. White (C. A.), 68 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 507 (1899), 1 Q B. 1005. Under English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897, sec. 7, subd. 2, son received $17 per week on the average. PKOI'OKTIONEJ) TO INJURY. §§ 534, 535 had been given for five or six years. It also appeared, however, that the plaintiff's ability to work had decreased, that he was physically injured, and was also nearly blind, although he was only fifty-nine years old* So the jury may consider the fact of the probable increase of the son's earning capacity and also that lie would have contributed some of his earnings to his widowed mother's support, and this even though said son had never earned any money at the time of his death. 89 But it is also decided that there must be evidence of some pecuniary assistance rendered. 90 § 534. Damages proportioned to the injury— Contract re- lation. — If the only pecuniary benefit to the survivors entitled to sue is derived from a contract which they had entered into with deceased, they are not entitled to recover. 91 § 535. Damages proportioned to the injury— Reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit. — The reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or prospective advantage to the beneficial^ had the deceased remained alive should be considered whether resulting as of right or otherwise, and this expectation may be shown by acts in the past or by evidence of actual or legal rela- tions, although it is not dependent upon the latter. In certain eases no recovery can be had where there is no proof of the loss of a reasonably probable pecuniary expectation or advantage. 1 '' 88 Hetherington v. North Eastern Ry. Co., 9 Q. B. D. 160. 89 Condon v. The Great S. W. R. Co., 16 Irish L. R. X. S. 415, son was 14 years old. 90 Bourke v. Cork & M. R. Co., 4 L. R. Irish, 682. 91 Sykes v. Northeastern Ry., 44 L. J. C. P. 191; 32 L. T. 199; 23 W. R. .473. 92 The reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage by the rela- tion remaining alive may be taken into account by the jury and dam- ages may be given in respect of that expectation being disappointed and the probable pecuniary loss thereby occasioned. Dalton v. South Eastern Ry., 4 C. B. (X. S. ) 296; 27 L. J. C. P. 227: 4 Jur. (X. S.) 711; 6 W. R. 574; 10 Mew's Eng. Dig. (1S98) p. 108. Damages should be calculated with reference to a reasonable expectation of pecu- niary benefit as of right or otherwise from a continuance of the life of tie- ceased. Franklin v. South Eastern Ry., :: H. & X. 211; 4 Jur. X. S. 565; 6 W. R. :,7:'.: in Mew's Eng. Dig i 1898) p. ins. Reasonable expecta- tion, should he considered. Pym v. Great Northern Ry., 4 B. & S. 396; 32 1.. .1. Q. B. ::T7: 10 Jur. N. S. 199; S L. T. 734; 11 W. R, 922; Weems v. Mathieson, l Macq. II. L. 215. Sneli probability may be increased by evi- 665 § 535 DEATH- -DAMAGES Such advantages, however, should be such only as might rea- sonably be expected under all the circumstances and do not dence of past acts. Condon v. Great Southern & W. Ry. 16 Ir. C. L. R. 415, not necessary to show pecu- niary advantage; sufficient if there is reasonable expectation of future pecuniary benefit in case of death of minor child. Ricketts v. Markdale (Can. 1900), (Div. Ct.) 31 Ont. 610; Rombough v. Balch, 27 Ont. App. 32. Proof is sufficient to warrant a recovery where there is evidence of pecuniary benefit, the continuance of which a surviving daughter had a right to expect. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Mahone, 63 Md. 135. 145, 146, per Robinson, J., citing Balti- more & O. R. Co. v. State, Hauer, 60 Md. 449, which applies the rule to adult children in the case of their father's death, and also holds that it includes past and prospective losses suffered as a direct consequence of the death, and this last case follows Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Woodward, 41 Md. 263. See also Agricultural & M. Assoc, v. State, Carty, 71 Md. 86; IS Atl. 37; 29 CeDt. L. J. 250. Reasonable expec- tation of continuance of pecuniary advantage from a son's continued life is a proper element. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Wilder (U. S. C. C. A. 5th C.Tex.), 92 Fed. 953, 955, 956; 35 C. C. A. 105; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 520; Hall v. Galveston, H. & S. A.'R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Tex.), 39 Fed. 18; Fort Worth & Denver City R. Co. v. Morrison, 93 Tex. 527; 56 S. W. 745. This case is cited in San Autonio Tract. Co. v. White (Supr. Ct. Tex. 1901), 61 S. W. 706; 9 Am. Xeg. Rep. 616, rev'g 60 S. W. 323; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Long, 87 Tex. 148; 27 S. W. 113; 24 L. R. A. H37; 47 Am. St. Rep. 666 87; case reverses 26 S. W. 114, hold- ing also that amount of benefits should be shown with some degree of accuracy. Id. 159. Pecuniary ad- vantage reasonably to be expected must be shown. McGown v. Inter- national & G. N. R. Co., 85 Tex. 289; 20 S. W. 80. Loss of prospective pecuniary benefits recoverable in case of son's death. Gulf Colo. & S. F. R. Co. v. Comptou, 75 Tex. 6(57 ; 13 S. W. 67. Must show expected pecuniary benefit from son. Winnt v. International & G. N. R. Co., 74 Tex. 32, 35, 36; 11 S. W. 907, per Hobby, J. Measure of damages is a sum equal to the reasonable expec- tation of pecuniary benefit. Mis- souri Pac. R. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496, 502, 503; 7 S. W. 857, per Walker, Assoc, J.; City of Galveston v. Bar- bour, 62 Tex. 172, 174; 50 Am. Rep. 519, per Stayton, Assoc. J.; Galves- ton, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Hughes (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 54 S. W. 264. Proper to show such reasonable ex- pectation. Dallas & Wichita R. Co. v. Spicker, 61 Tex. 427, 431, 432; 48 Am. Rep. 297, per Stayton, Assoc, J. See S. C, 60 Tex. 435. Charge to jury should not exclude considera- tion of such expectation. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Power (Tex. Civ. App. 1S99), 54 S. W. 629. As to reasonable expectations of contri- butions from son, see San Antonio Tract. Co. v. White (Tex. Civ. App. ), 61 S. W. 706, rev'g (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 60 S. W. 723. The proof of past support, etc., shows such rea- sonable expectation. Galveston, H. & S. & R. Co. v. Ford (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 54 S. W. 37. Evidence inadmissible to enhance damages may be given to show such reason- PROPORTIONED TO INJURY < .">:',.", cover all benefits which might possibly have b<-en received. 98 And in an English case it was held that there was such a rea- sonable expectation of pecuniary benefit as would sustain an action by a widow and children of deceased, where he died in- testate and his income ceased with his death, even though there was a jointure and certain settlements secured u> the survivors, and although it was ;i matter of uncertainty whether deceased would have saved or accumulated anything from his income to provide fur the beneficiaries at his death, and it was also uncer- tain what disposition deceased would have made of his income in connection with his family's social and domestic advantages. able expectation. Galveston, H. & S. A. K. Co. v. Bonnett (Tex. Civ. A pp. I. 88 S. W. 813. What proof required — What con- stitutes reasonable expectation. Though pecuniary loss required to sustain such an action may be evi- ; dence by proof of a reasonable ex- pectation of pecuniary benefit, yet tliere must be some evidence from which a jury shall be able to arrive, otherwise than by guess or specula- tion at the conclusion that there was [ such reasonable expectation, and I this involves (1) a reasonable expec- tation that profit would be made from the continuance of the life; ) (2) a reasonable expectation that some part of the profit so made would become the property of the person on whose behalf damages are claimed, either as of bounty or of right. Hourke v. Cork & Macroom Ry., L. R. Ir. 282, per Pallas, C. B.; 10 Mew's Eng. Dig. (1898) pp. 107, 108. In a case of this description, the plaintiff could not succeed with- out proof of a state of facts in which pecuniary advantage arose or bad formerly arisen, and was likely to again arise to the father, and the continuance or renewal of which pecuniary advantage the father might have reasonably expected if the son's life had continued. Id., per Dowse, B. The action was by a father for the death of a minor son, and it was held that there was no evidence of deprivation of reasonable expecta- tion of pecuniary advantage. ll'A' // proof insufficient, no recovery. If the proof does not show a reason- able prospect or expectation of pecu- niary benefit, then' can be no recov- ery. Harrison, L. & N. W, Ry., 1 Cab. & E. 540. Action for wife's death, parties were living apart. Mason v. Bertram, 18 Ont. R. 1 Chy. D. Ac- tion for death of son, who had just reached majority. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Mahone, 63 Md. 135, It". Action for mother's death. Two of the beneficiaries were adult married sons, who were denied re- covery. St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 536, 542; 15 S. W. 104. Xo reasonable expect- ation shown, sufficient to entitle two of the beneficiaries, a son near majority and a married daughter, to recover. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App.). 39 S. W. 140. Adult sons proved no reasonable expectation of aid from deceased. »«Fort Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Hyatt (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 677. An action for death of a minor child. 607 § 536 IH2AT11 DAMAGES It was, however, declared that the jury should consider all the contingencies and uncertainties and whether there was such a reasonable and well-founded expectation of pecuniary benefit as could be estimated in money. 94 § 536. Same subject continued. — In Maryland it is held that in case of a son's death, the reasonable expectation of pecu- niary benefit from the continuance of his life after majority constitutes no ground of recovery in favor of a parent. 95 But prospective benefits to children may be estimated up to majority, and a widow is entitled to prospective pecuniary damages. 1 * 1 Again, in case of the death of a husband and father, it is no ob- jection to the recovery of a fair compensation that such measure of damages might not be what the plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of receiving, and an instruction may be refused that the recovery should be limited to a sum representing the pres- ent worth of future earnings of deceased, which they had a rea- sonable expectation of receiving had he survived, where such requested charge also contains the clause that said present worth be calculated upon the basis of six per cent per annum. 97 Nor should such reasonable expectation be excluded from the jury's consideration. 98 And the disposition by deceased of his earnings may affect the question of probable aid and of expecta- tion of pecuniary benefit or of continued support. 99 Although « Pym v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 2 Best & S. 759; 8 Jur. N. S. 819; 6 L. T. N. S. 1537; 31 L. J. Q. B. 249; 10 Wkly. R. 737, aff'd4 Best* S. 396; 10 Jur. N. S. 199; 32 L. J. Q. B. 377; 11 Wkly. R. 922. Pecuni- ary advantage derived from a minor child need not be shown. It is suf- ficient that the evidence justifies a reasonable expectation of future pecuniary benefit capable of being estimated. Ricketts v. Markdale (Div. Ct.), 31 Ont. 010; Rombough v. Balch, 27 Ont. App. 32. 95 Agricultural & M. Assoc, v. State, Carty, 71 Md. 86; 18 Atl. 37; 29 Cent. L. J. 250 ; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, 60 Md. 449. 668 96 Baltimore & R. T. R. Co. v. State, 71 Md. 573; IS Atl. 884. 97 Galveston & S. A. R. Co. v. John- son (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 58 S. W. 622. 98 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Power (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 54 S. W. 629, a case of death of son. 99 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Knight (Tex. Civ. App.), 52 S. W. 640. Deceased son gave his earn- ings to his father in this case. Ft. Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. Kime, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 271 ; 51 S. W. 558, aff'd 54 S. W. 240. Deceased pro- vided a comfortable home for and supported his family in this case. PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. § 537 the fact, that no proof was offered of what sum would be suffi- cient to purchase the equivalent of the pecuniary benefit which the widow and children might have reasonably expected from deceased's life, will not be a ground for disturbing a verdict as excessive where the other facts in evidence justify its sustaining such verdict. 100 Hut where the value of all the prospective benefits that would have accrued to the beneficiary, except for the death, is exceeded by the amount received by him from the estate of the decedent, there can be no recovery under a statute providing for a separate recovery by each beneficiaiy of a speci- fied class of relatives and giving damages only for the pecuniary injury. 1 § 537. Damages proportioned to the injury — Physical and financial condition, age, number of family, etc., of benefici- aries. — In considering whether or not evidence of the character indicated by the above headlines is admissible under statutes permitting the recovery of damages proportioned to the injury, it may be stated as an abstract, independent proposition that it is a technical general rule of law that evidence of this nature will be rejected when offered for the single or express purpose of enhancing or mitigating damages, although even this rule has been subject to exceptions and qualifications. On the other 100 Ft. Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. continued life, so declared in Gulf, Kime, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 271; 51 S. Colorado & S. F. R. Co. v. Younger, W. 558, aff'd 54 S. \V. 240. 90 Tex. 387; 38 S. W. 1121; 1 Am. 1 San Antonio & A. P. P. R. Co. Nej;. Rep. 378, per Brown J. As to v. Long (Tex.), 27 S. W. 113; 24 instruction concerning reasonable L. R. A. 637, rev'ji 26 S. W. 114. expectation of pecuniary assistance Widow may recover for husband's from deceased husband and father. death probable amount which he Bee San Antonio St. R. Co. v. Renken, would have contributed to her 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229; 38 S. W. 829. maintenance and support had he As to reasonable expectation of pe- lived. Missouri, K. & T. It. Co. v. cuniary aid from deceased adult son, Ilines (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. 152. In case adult sons had re- ceived and had no expectation of receiving pecuniary aid, no damages see Galveston, II. A- S. A. R. Co. v. Bonnett(Tex. Civ. App.), 38 S. W. 813. Adult son and married daugh- ter cannot recover where the evi- can be recovered. Texas & N. (). R. deuce fails to show a reasonable ex- Co. v. Brown, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 697; peotation of pecuniary assistance. 39 S. W. 140. Evidence is adrnis- St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Bishop, 14 sible to show what aid a child could Tex. Civ. App. ">04: 37 S. W. 7 TO IN.IPRY. § 537 tion of the head of the family at the time of the wife's death is admissible where the action is in behalf of said husband and his minor daughter, to show what aid the child could expect to re- 63 Md. 135. Surviving daughter's earnings on account of being able to go out to work because the deceased had remained at home and cued for the household, and also the age of two surviving sons, and that both were married and had children were considered. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 271. Proof of age and condition of health of de- ceased and members and state of family sufficient for more than nom- inal damage. Lilly v. Charlotte C. & A. R. Co., 32 S. C. 142; 10 S. E. 932. Allegation of dependency con- sidered not sufficient. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Wilder (U. S. C. C. A. 5th 0.)i 35 C. C. A. 105; 92 Fed. 953, 955, 956; 13 Am. & Eng. R. las. N. S. 520. Courts avail themselves of all circumstances which may assist them. Ross v. Texas & P. R. Co. (U. S. ('. C. W. O. Tex.), 44 Fed. 44. Plaintiffs were poor, father was 56 years old and wife 52, and kept hotel at time of son's death. Hall v. Gal- veston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. U. Tex.), 39 Fed. 18. In charge to jury it was said that the testi- mony should include tho circum- stances of the plaintiff (action was for death of son), his atie and health, the amount of bis property and the duration of bis life. The father here was dependent and in feeble health. Fort Worth & Denver City R. Co. v. Morrison, 93 Tex. 527; 56 S. W. 74:.. Jury should consider all the circum- stances and aid to parents. Here the parents were poor, 04 years old and in bad health. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Knight (Tex. Civ. App. ), 52 S. W. 640. Father's pov- erty may be shown. Same case, 91 Tex. 660; 45 S. W. 550; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 79; rev'g 43 S. W. 167; St. Louis, Ark. & T. R. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 536, 542; 15 S. W. 104, per Gaines, Assoc. J. Age of minor child, and that another beneficiary was married and that a widow and child were left, were considered. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Compton, 75 Tex. 667; 13S. W.667. Surviving mother's life expectancy need not be proven by other than age and physical con- dition. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220; 12 S. W. 828. Plaintiff was 60 years old; she was in good health, strong and vigorous, and was aided in her support by de- ceased. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lehm- berg, 75 Tex. 61: 12 S. W. S38. One of the surviving children was 4 years old and the other was born about a month after the father's death. Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 75 Tex. 56; 12 S. W. 955. Action by widow for son's death; the fact that her advancing years might create a greater necessity and dependence, proper matters for consideration. Brunswig v. While. 70 Tex. 504; 8 S. W. 85. The circumstances of the parents who sue often becomes necessary evidence, not as a basis for increasing or diminishing the amount, but to illustrate the acts of the deceased child as useful or Other- wise. In this case all the family worked and were poor people, en- gaged in the dairy business. Mis- souri Pac R. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496; 7 S. W. 857. Plaint ill's age and life expectancy are proper factors. It may be shown that one of the plain- tiffs was a ciipple in an action by the widow and children, under Sayle's 071 § 537 DEATH — D ASIA GES ceive from the continuance of the mother's life in the given state of circumstances surrounding them. This rule does not, how- ever, entitle the child to recover more or less damages because Civ. Stat. art. 3027, Texas Midland R. Co. v. Crowder (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 64 S. W. 90. So evidence that the parents were very poor and had no means, may be admitted in an action for the son's killing, where the jury were told at the time that such evi- dence should not be considered as a basis for increasing or diminishing the damages, but only to show the child's usefulness. Citizens It. Co. v. Washington (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 58 S. VV. 1042; Houston & T. C. K. Co. v. White, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 280; 56 S. W. 204. Pecuniary condition of parents of deceased adult may be shown and also plain- tiffs' ages. Gulf, C. & S. F. K. Co. v. Delaney, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 427; 55 S. W. 538. That there were no children by second marriage of de- ceased was considered. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Davis, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 335; 54 S. W. 909. Sur- viving father's age and pecuniary ability are competent evidence. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Ford (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 54 S. W. 37. Surviving parents and 8 other children and were aided by de- ceased. Texas & P. K. Co. v. Spence (Tex.), 52 S. W. 562. Plaintiff's age in case of son's death considered. Ft. Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. Kime, ■1\ Tex. Civ. App. 271; 51 S. W. 558, aff'd 54 S. W. 240. Deceased left a widow and two small chil- dren; there was no proof of the wife's life expectancy. Chicago, R. I. & T. R. Co. v. Porterfielcl, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 225; 46 S. W. 919; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 461, case aff'd 49 S. W. 361; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 383. Surviving father was decrepit and 672 dependent. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Royall, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 86; 43 S. W. 815. Surviving mother's age and life expectancy and dependency considered. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Bonnett (Tex. Civ. App.), 38 S. W. 813. That father was very poor, admissible to show reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit but not for the purpose of increas- ing damages. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Gormley (Tex. Civ. App.), 35 S. W. 488. Financial condition of deceased admissible. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Hyatt (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 677. Surviving mother's age and number of her children admissible. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. South wick (Tex. Civ. App. j, 30 S. W. 592. In action by child for mother's death the child's surroundings should be considered. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Mc- Neel (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 1133. The surviving mother was a widow and dependent. Austin Rapid- Trans. R. Co. v. Cullen (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 256, rehearing de- nied 30 S. W. 578. Plaintiff's (par- ents) were poor. San Antonio & A. i P. R. Co. v. Vaughn, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 195; 23 S. W. 745. Evidence admissible of the parent's wealth or poverty to show whether plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negli- gence in permit! ing the child to go unattended on a railroad track. Sanderson v. Sanderson, 36 L. T. 847. Deceased left a widow and four infant children dependent. Hetlier- ington v. Northeastern Ry., 51 L. J. Q. B. 495; 9 Q, B. D. 160; 30 W. R. 747. Father's age, that he was nearly blind and injured in his leg and PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. § 537 of the fact that the family was rich or poor. But the circum- stances surrounding a mother and child arc different in wealthy and poor families and, therefore, such facts may be proven for the purpose above specified/' And the husband's financial con- dition during his illness preceding his death has been admitted hands and comparative inability to work, and that he did sometimes work and also that he had been out of work were considered. Sykes v. Northeastern Ry., 44 L. J. C. P. 191; 32 L. T. 199; 23 W. R. 473. The surviving father's occupation to show loss of deceased's assistance was considered. Rowley v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 8 Ex.221; 42 L. J. Ex. 153; 29 L. J. 180; 21 W. R. 809. Mother's age considered in connection with annuity right. Pyni v. Great Northern Ry., 4 P. & S. 396; 32 L. J. Q. B. 377; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 199: 8 1, T. 734; 11 W. R. 922. The loss of the comforts and conveniences of life owing to the father's condition in life were con- sidered. Duckworth v. Johnson. 4 H. & N. 653; 29 L. J. Ex. 25; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 030: 7 W. R. 655. The father's condition in life was that of a workinginan. Franklin v. South Eastern Ry., 3 II. & N. 211; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 565; 5 W. R. 573. Sur- viving father was old and growing infirm; his condition in life was also poor. .Johnston v. Great Northern Ry., 26 L. R. Ir. 691. Plaintiff was in humble life; her earnings, that she worked in a factory, and her inability to work from weakness and poor health were considered. Hull v. Great Northern Ry., 26 L. R. Ir. 2S9. Plaintiff received lodg- ing and maintenance and assisted her deceased mother. Bourke v. Cork & Macroom Ry., 4 L. R. Ir. 282. Plaintiff's (the father's) con- dition in life was that of tradesman and he was independent of deceased 43 sou's earnings. See Dalton v. South Eastern R. Co., 4 C. B. N. S. 296. 3 Gulf, Colo. & S. F. R. Co. v. Younger, 90 Tex. 387, 391, 392; 38 S. W. 1121; 1 Am. Xeg. Re]). 378, per Brown, Assoc. J. The evidence in controversy was that the father was a man of means, president of a bank, worth from $30,000 to *50,000. The testimony was offered for the purpose as stated to the trial court of enabling the jury to intelligently and properly pass upon the question of damages because it is a matter of common knowledge that children of poor and indigent parents are more dependent upon their parents, partic- ularly upon their mother, for train- ing and culture and nurture than are children of parents better circum- stanced; that while children, partic- ularly daughters, of people of very moderate circumstances were al- most entirely dependent upon their mother for training, nurture, educa- tion, educational advantages, etc.: that ordinarily persons of moderate competence, moderate means and well to do, when their daughters reached the age of Delia Younger, 14 years, sent their daughters off to boarding School, procured for them teachers and tutors and gave them better opportunities than people of moderate means were able to furnish their children and thereby to a large extent removed them from imme- diate dependence upon their mother for nurture, training, etc., and there- fore measured by the ordinary eon duet of men, the loss of a mothei to a minor daughter was greater where 673 § 538 DEATH — DAMAGES to show imposition and duress in obtaining a release which has been pleaded in bar. 1 § 538. Damages proportioned to the injury— Expenses of sickness, funeral, etc. — Under the English statute compensation for the funeral expenses or for family mourning, 5 or for medi- cal expenses incurred by the injured person is not recoverable. 6 But where a railway passenger is injured and thereafter dies, medical expenses and loss occasioned during his lifetime may be recovered by his executrix in an action for damages to his per- sonal estate arising from breach of the carrier's contract for safe carriage. 7 In South Carolina funeral expenses paid are a proper parents were in moderate circum- stances tlian where they were in better condition financially; that the defendant was entitled to show the financial condition of the plaintiff, Dr. Younger, that the jury might in- telligently pass upon the extent of damage that the plaintiff's daughter, Delhi Younger, had sustained by the death of his wife. On appeal the court per Brown, Assoc. J., id. 392, quotes from Tilly v. Ry. Co., 24 N. Y. 476, as to the duty of nurture, in- tellectual, etc., training owing from parents, especially the mother, to children, and as to the loss thereof through death, being a pecuniary in- jury as distinguished from injuries to the feelings and sentiments and says in addition : " In the absence of proof a jury might assess damages in such a case based upon a common knowledge of the manner in which mothers usually perform such duties (Gainesville H. & W. K. Co. v. Lacy, 86 Tex. 244, 24 S. W. 269 ). It is true, however, that these duties are dis- charged and rendered to children in various degrees according to the tem- perament, education and other cir- cumstances of the different mothers and it is always proper to inform the jury of every fact and circumstance 674 which will assist them to deter- mine what aid the child would iu all probability have received from the mother in the particular case if she had lived. By this means we ap- proach as near as practicable the ac- tual pecuniary injury sustained by the death of a parent," citing several cases. 4 Price v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 38 S. C. 377; 17 S. E. 732; same case, 33 S. C. 556; 12 S. E. 413; 26 Am. Rep. 700. 5 Daltonv. Southeastern Ry., 4 C. B. (N. S.) 296; 27 L. J. C. P. 227; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 711; 6 W. R. 574. 6 Pulling v. Great Eastern Ry., 9 Q. B. D. 110. In Osboru v. Gillett, 42 L. J. Ex. 53; 8 Ex. 88; 28 L. T. 197; 21 W. R. 409, damages were claimed, including burial expenses paid for by plaintiff, and an auswer was held good as a bar to recovery of any damages, that the death was instantaneous. 7 Bradshaw v. Lancashire & York- shire Ry., 44 L. J. C. P. 148; L. R. 10 0. P. 189; 31 L. T. 847; 23 W. R. 310. See 10 Mew's Eng. Dig. (1898) pp. 107, 111, 115. See cases cited in note headed " When does not bar ac- tion " under sec. 523, herein, as to statutes. PROPOI; TlnNKI) To INJURY. § 539 element of damage, 8 and in Texas medical and other like ex- penses may be included in an action for a minor child's death. So funeral expenses incurred by a husband by reason of his wife's deatli arc part of the damages, 1 " but evidence of the value of a physician's services cannot be given unless specially pleaded." § 539. Damages proportioned to the injury — Annuity.— It has been said that perhaps the nearest measure of damages, approximating reasonable certainty, would be such a sum as would purchase an amount equal to the value of the pecuniary aid which the plaintiff would have derived from the deceased, calculated upon the basis of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case, reasonably accessible in evidence and in- cluding the probable duration of life. 1 - But it is also decided that the jury are restricted too closely in estimating damages by an instruction which directs the finding of a sum which would purchase such an annuity." And in Canada the meas- ure of damages for the benefit of a mother for the death of her son is held to be a sum which would purchase an annuity equaling the fair and moderate value of the maintenance which she had a reasonable expectation of receiving from him for the rest of her life, and since she has a legal recourse against any one of her children alone for her maintenance, the fact that she has surviving children cannot operate to reduce the amount so recoverable." 8 Petrie v. Columbia & G. R. Co., 29 S. C. 303; 7 S. E. 515. 9 Brunswig v. White. 70 Tex. 504; 8 S. W. 85. See also id. 512. When •' necessarily incurred." City of Gal- veston v. Barbour, 02 Tex. 172, 174; 50 Am. Rep. 519, per Stayton, Assoc. J. Incidental expenses accruing from the injury and death of a son may be recovered even though the mother maybe improperly joined as to that item. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Evans, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 68; 41 S. W. 80. io Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. South- wick (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. 502. & T. R. Co. v. Civ. App. 889; 11 11 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Younger (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. \V. 423. '-'Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Cow- ser, 57 Tex. 297. 304, per Bonner. Assoc. J. 1:f Missouri, K. Ransom, 15 Tex. S. W. 826. "Bernard v. Grand Trunk R. Co. Rapports Judic. De Quebec, 11 Cour. Super. 9. The following is the ByllabuB of a frequently cited Eng lish decision: At the trial of an ac- tion under 9 and 10 Vict. cb. 93, brought for the benefit of tbe mother, widow and children of R.. 675 §540 DEATH — DAMAGES § 540. Damages proportioned to the injury— Life expect- ancy — Annuity, etc., tables. — We have considered generally the subject of life expectancy as one of the general elements of claiming damages from the defend- ants for having by their negligence caused the death of R., it was proved that deceased was under a covenant to pay his mother an annuity of £ 200 during their joint lives. A witness was then called by the plaintiff, who stated that he was an "accountant" and that he had personal experience as to the mode in which insurance business was conducted. He gave evidence after referring to certain tables used by insurance offices called the " Carlisle Tables' 1 as to the average duration of life of two persons of the ages of the mother and sou respectively, and as to the price for which an annuity for the mother's life could be bought. The admissibility of this evidence was objected to by defendants and was ruled to be admissible. In summing up the learned judge directed the jury that they might, if they thought proper, calculate the mother's damages by ascertain- ing what was the sum which would purchase an annuity of £ 200 for a person of her age, according to the average duration of human life; and that in calculating the widow's and children's damages, they might, if they thought proper, take as a guide the probable duration of life of a person of the age of the de- ceased. On the argument of the bill of exceptions tendered to the ruling of the learned judge in ad- mitting the evidence and to his di- rection to the jury, held first (by Blackburn, Keating, Grove and Archibald, JJ.), that the witness was competent to give evidence as to the probahle duration of life and 676 the price of the annuity, although not an actuary, and (Brett, J., dis- senting) that the evidence was relevant and properly admitted. Secondly, by the whole court, that the direction to the jury as to the calculation of the mother's damages was wrong. By Blackburn, Keat- ing, Archibald and Honyman, JJ. The direction was erroneous in not noticing the circumstance that the annuity of the mother was on the joint lives of herself and son, and that it was only secured by the per- sonal covenant of her son. By Honyman, J. The direction was also erroneous in authorizing the jury to find the term for which an annuity is to be purchased solely by reference to the average duration of life, without taking into account the state of health of the particular annuitant. By Brett, J. The only legal direction to the jury would have been that they ought not to attempt to give damages to the full amount of a perfect compensation for the pecuniary injury, but must take a reasonable view of the case and give what they considered under all the circumstances a fair compensation: and the direction was, therefore, erroneous, inasmuch as it left it open to the jury to give as damages the utmost amount which they might think was an equivalent for the pecuniary mis- chief done. Thirdly (by Black- burn, Keating, Grove and Archibald, JJ., Brett, dissenting), that the direction as to the mode of calculat- ing the damages recoverable by the widow and children might be con- strued as meaning that the probable PROPORTIONED TO lN.UkV. 6 540 damages, 15 but it may be stated here that in an action for the death of the husband, the reasonable probability of the continu- ance of life of the deceased and of the widow may be factors, or as it has been more exactly expressed, in estimating damages to the widow the probable duration of the joint lives of herself and husband should be considered, and this probability is such as the jury may find reasonable under the circumstances. 16 So the life expectancy of a deceased child and of the parent are important," and it may be given in evidence without being specially pleaded. 18 Nor does plaintiffs failure to prove the same preclude recovery, for although the evidence of experts is ad- missible in proof thereof, it is not necessary. 'Hie statute con- duration of the life of a person of the same age and in the same cir- cumstances as the deceased was an element to be taken into the calcu- lation of the jury with the rest of the evidence and being so construed was correct. The facts of the case were these: The deceased was an attorney and by articles of partner- ship between his father and himself, he covenanted to pay his mother an annuity of £200 during the joint lives of himself and mother. He was 40 years old at the time of his death, and his mother (51 years old at that time. Rowley v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., L. H. 8 Ex. 221; 42 L. J. Ex. 153; 29 L. J. 180; 21 W. R. 869. 15 See sec. 528, herein. 16 Baltimore & Reistertown Twp. v. State, Grimes, 71 Md. 573, 583, 584; 18 All. 884, per Robinson, J., citing Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. State, Bitzer, 58 Md. 372; Cum- berland & P. R. Co. v. State, Ilogan, 45 Md. 234; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Woodward, 41 Md. 268; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Traiuor, 33 Md. 542. See also Pas- chal v. Owen, 77 Tex. 583; 14 S. W. 203, where the life expectancy of deceased was considered. Ft. Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. Kime, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 271; 51 S. W. r>:>s. aft d 54 S. W. 240, where the deceased's life expectancy was 35 years. Tyler, S. E. R. Co. v. Rasberry, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 185; 34 S. W. 7!>4; :l Am. & Eug. R. Cas. X. S. 370, husband's life expectancy was 35 years. Row- ley v. London & X. W. Ry.. 42 L. J. Ex. 153; L. R. 8 Ex. 221: 29 L. T. 180; 21 W. R. 809. See digest of this case in full under sec. 539, herein. 17 Hall v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Tex.), 39 Fed. 18, per Maxey, J., charging the jury. Missouri Pae. R. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496, 502, 503; 7 S. W. 857, per Walker, Assoc. J. Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Cilmore (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), where it was admitted that a minor child had an expectancy of life until majority. International & G. X. R. Co. v. McXeel (Tex. Civ. App.), 29S. W. L138. The surviving mother's ex- pectancy of life was over 28 years. Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Finch (Tex. Civ. App. ), 27 S. W. 1028. Surviving mother's expectancy was 13j years. 18 International & G. N. R. Co. \. Knight, 91 Tex. 060; 45 S. W. 556; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 79, rev'g 45 S. W. 167. §541 DEATH DAMAGES templates that the jury shall judge of this upon evidence of age and physical condition. 19 So mortuary tables included in an in- surance manual are admissible upon being shown to be reliable and standard authority with insurance men; and American ex- perience tables published in the United States, 20 and mortality tables are properly admitted even though they do not consider the vocations of men, 21 and even though plaintiff is in poor health.--' So a life insurance agent, familiar with mortuary tables and hav- ing had experience thereunder, is a competent witness. 4 ' But annuity tables do not govern in estimating the value of de- ceased's life, for the jury must give what they consider fair damages. 24 And however useful such evidence may be, courts cannot hold juries bound by statistics or calculations of life ex- pectancies. 4 "' Again, a book containing tables of expectation of years cannot be shown in evidence in the absence of proof of its correctness where it is not one of those standard works of which courts take judicial notice and recognize as authority. 26 § 541. Damages proportioned to the injury — Nominal dam- ages. — In England the action does not lie merely for nominal damages, 27 and the right thereto is not given by mere proof of is Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Comp- ton, 75 Tex. 667; 13 S. W. 667. See also Armsworth v. Southeastern Ry., 11 Jur. 758. 20 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Ran- som, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 680: 41 S. W. 826. Life tables are admissible to show a deceased husband's life ex- pectancy, even though they have no reference to the widow's age. Mis- souri, K. &T. R. Co. v. Hines (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. 152. Properly authenticated life tables used by in- surance companies are admissible. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App. ), 26 S. W. 644. Deceased's life expectancy as shown by ap- proved tables is to be considered. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 297, 304, per Bonner, Assoc. J. 21 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. John- son (Tex. Civ. App.), 31 S. W. 255. 678 82 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Leonard (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 955. 23 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Kuehn (Tex. Civ. App.), 21 S. W. 58. 2 * Armsworth v. Southeastern Ry., 11 Jur. 758. 25 Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 75 Tex. 56, 61; 12 S. W. 955, per Henry, Assoc. J. 2 <5 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Arispe, 81 Tex. 517; 17 S. W. 47; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 350. In this case plaintiffs introduced in evidence a book entitled " A Million of Facts; Conkling's Handy Manual of Useful Information and Atlas of the World, all for twenty-five cents." 27 Boulter v. Webster, 11 L. T. 598; 13 W. R. 298. PBOPORTION ED TO IN.M'UY. §541 the death and the relationship of the parties, since actual dam- ages must have accrued from the death. 28 In Arizona the de- I'endant may object to a remittitur reducing the verdict to nom- inal damages, where they have been unlawfully fixed by the plain- tiff of record and the defendant is thereby left open to the danger of another suit by some of the persons entitled.'- 3 In Maryland it is decided that the recovery is not limited to a nominal sum merely because of the separation of deceased from his family and noncontribution to their support, 30 and in thatstate proof of age, etc., is not necessary to warrant such a recovery. 31 Again, the fact that the deceased had contributed nothing to the support of his wife or child for about twelve years, during which time he had been separated from them, is held not to prevent the re- covery of more than nominal damages for their benefit." In South Carolina it is not required to prove pecuniary damages in an action for an infant's death/ 3 But in Texas the statute limits the recovery, and where there is no proof of the value of services of a deceased wife, nor of any expectation of pecuniary benefit, the doctrine of nominal damages does not apply. 34 Op- posed, however, to this decision, is an earlier case in which it is declared that if the killing of a child was wrongful, etc., the parents are entitled to recover at least a nominal sum, 35 al- 28 Duckworth v. Johnson, 4 H. & N. 653; 29 L. J. Ex. 25; 5 Jur. N. S. 630; 7 W. K. 656; 10 Mew's Eng. Dig. (1898) p. 111. See also Bourke v. Cork & Macroom Ry., 4 L. R. Ir. 282, where there was no evidence of reasonable expectation of pecuniary beuefit, all hough the death and cer- tain other facts were proven, yet judgment was for defendant. That it is not necessary to show pecuniary advantage in case of death of minor child, see Ricketts v. Markdale (Div. Ct.), 31 Out. 610; Kombough v. Baleh, 27 Out. A pp. 32. 29 Southern P. R. Co. v. Tomlinson, 163 U. S. 3(59; 41 L. Ed. 193; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1171, under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 1887, sees. 214."), 2155. 80 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Chambers, 81 Md. 371, 3S9; 32 Atl. 201. See quotation from this case un- der sec. 531, herein. ai Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 271, 280. 83 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Chambers (Md.), 32 Atl. 201. 1)3 Mason v. Southern Ry., 58 S. C. 70; 36 S. E. 440; 79 Am. St. Rep. 826. 84 McGown v. International & G. N. R. Co., S5 Tex. 289, 293; 20 S. W. 80; Galveston, II. & S. A. R, Co. v. Goimley (Tex. Civ. A pp.), 27 S. W. 1051. ^Brunswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504; 8 S. W. 85, per Walker. Assoc. J.; id. pp. 508, 512. See also Austin Kip. Trans. R. Co. v. Cullen (Tex. Civ. App. ). 29 S. W. 256, rehearing denied 30 S. W. 578. 679 ^ f)42 DEATH DAMAGES though it is also decided that it is not necessary to specially plead the fact in order to show generally the services of a wife and that the mere claim of damages is sufficient/* § 542. Damages proportioned to the injury— Death of hus- band— Husband and father.— Outside of the general elements of damages fully considered elsewhere,' 7 the legal and actual relations sustained by deceased to the other members of the family is important, and this includes the fact whether or not the husband and wife were living together or separately . ss Again, it is the duty of the head of a family to support his wife and children, and the presumption is that he would have continued to discharge that duty. 39 So that the consequent, legal and ac- tual dependency should be considered, extent of aid furnished, 4 " as well, also, as the condition in life of deceased. 41 These mat- ters further embrace the reasonable prospect of pecuniary bene- fit to the survivor or survivors. 42 Again, the loss of deceased's advice and counsel may, in some cases, be a proper element of damages, although no recovery can be had in an action for the death itself for mental and physical suffering of deceased, nor can damages be had for the loss of his society, nor for mental anguish of the survivors. 43 But if the statute specifies the class of beneficiaries entitled to recover, their number, ages and sex become important. 41 The petition, however, by a widow and child to recover for the negligent killing of their husband and father, need not allege, as against a general demurrer, that they were damaged, where the prayer is for a specified sum as dam- ages and the other allegations, are sufficient to show a cause of 86 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Younger I also Louisiana W. E. R. Co, v. Car- (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. 423; stens, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 190; 47 S. W. Chapman v. Roth well, El. & Bl. 168; 27 L. J. Q. B. 315; 4 Jur. (N. S.) 1180. 87 See sec. 528, herein. 88 See sees. 531, 554, herein. 89 St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 530; 15 S. W. 104, per Gaines, Assoc. J. 40 See sec. 531, herein. 41 See sec. 528, herein. 42 See sees. 535, 536, herein. See 680 36; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 781; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Han- som, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 689; 41 S. W. 826; Missouri. K. * T. R. Co. v. Hines (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. 152; San Antonio St. R. Co. v. Renken, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229; 35 S. W. 829; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Bond (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. \V. 930. 43 See sec. 530, herein. 44 See sec. 535, herein. PROPORTIONED TO fNJURY. § 542 action. 45 Again, under an English decision, the representatives may maintain an action for the benefit of the surviving widow and younger children, even though there was a settlement of the bulk of the property of deceased upon the eldest son, and the loss of education and comforts and conveniences of Life to them may be considered with reference to their reasonable ex- pectations of pecuniary benefit from his continued life. 41 ' So the widow may recover for damages occasioned to deceased's per- sonal estate where he dies after an interval, in consequence of an accident through defendant's negligence. 17 And there may be a recovery by the widow and children, even though there is no evidence of the life expectancy, nor of the sum which would purchase the equivalent of the pecuniary benefit reasonably to be expected from the continuance of deceased's life. 48 But where 46 So held in International & G. N. K. Co. v. Culpepper, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 182; 46 S. W. 922. A widow bringing an action as administratrix does not sue in the same right as in an ordinary action, but as trustee for a specific class of persons under the English statute. Leggott v. Great Northern Ky., 45 L. J. Q. 15. 557 ; 1Q. B. D. 599; 35 L. T. 334. As to lib- erty of father and mother to appear at trial in action by widow and ad- ministratrix, see Steele v. Great Northern Ry., 26 L. R. Ir. 96. Evidence. In an action by a widow for damages for her husband's death brought against the same defend- ant's as those in the suit by her hus- band brought during his lifetime, but abating by his death, his exam ination de bene esse is admissible where he was cross-examined by said defendants (Eidruan v. Walkerton, 20 Ont. App. 444), but evidence of the cost of raising a child is inadmissi- ble. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Kuehn (Tex. Civ. App.), 21 S. W. 58. w Pymv. Great Northern Ry., 4 B. & S. 396; 32 L. J. Q. B. 377; 10 Jur. N. S. 199; 8 L. T. 734; 11 W. R, 922. 47 Bradshaw v. Lancashire & York- shire Ry., 44 L. J. C. P. 148; L. R. 10 C. P. 189: 31 L. T. 847; 23 W. R. 310. Excessive or absurd damages. The court will interfere where the dam- ages awarded the widow and chil- dren are excessive (Secord v. Great Western Ry., 15 Q. B. 631) [Ont.]), or where they are so small as to be absurd. Springett v. Balls, 6 B. & S. 477. In Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Miller (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 57 S. W. 702. 810,000 in favor of the widow and (5,000 for each of two children was held excessive. But in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. of T. v. Ferris, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 215. $10,000 in favor of the wife and chil- dren was held not excessive. So in Fr. Worth cv It. G. R. Co. v. Kim.-. 21 Tex. Civ. App. 271; -".1 S. W. 558, aff'd 54 S. W. 210, $15,000 in favor of the widow and two small children was held not excessive. See further as to excessive damages, sec. 528, and note herein. Ft. Worth & R. G. R. Co. v. Kimc. 21 Tex. Civ. App. 271; 51 S. W. 558, aff'd 54 S. W. 240. 681 § 542 DEATH — DAMAGES the husband was accustomed to give his monthly earnings to his wife, an instruction is erroneous which directs the jury to assess her damages in sucli sum as they believe from the evi- dence she would probably have received in a pecuniary way from deceased, since the jury may infer that the sums she would have probably received from said earnings was the measure of damages. 49 Again, it is decided that a deceased husband's earn- ings do not limit' the widow's recovery/* since she is entitled to such a sum as will compensate her for the loss of the pecuni- ary benefits she would have probably received except for her husband's death. 51 But an instruction which directs the jury to assess a widow's damages for killing her husband, in such sum as they believe from the evidence she would probably have received in a pecuniary way from her husband had he lived, is 49 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Loeffler (Tex. Civ. App.), 51 S. W. 536. 50 Louisiana West. Extension R. Co. v. Carstens, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 190; 47 S. W. 36; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 781. See also Missouri ifc P. R. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 61; 12 S. W. 838; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Chambers, 81 Md. 371; 32 Atl. 201; State, Grice, v. County Commrs., 54 Md. 426; Bal- timore & O. R. Co. v. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 276, 280-282; San Autonio St. R. Co. v. Renken, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229; 38 S. W. 829. See also sec. 528, herein. 51 Louisiana West. Exten. R. Co. v. Carstens, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 190: 47 S. W. 36; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 781. See further as to damages recoverable by widow or widow and children. Baltimore & Reistertown Twp. v. State, Grimes, 71 Md. 573; 18 Atl. 884; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Woodward, 41 Md. 268; Bal- timore & O. R. Co. v. State, Kelly, 24 Md. 271 ; Strotber v. South Car. & G. R. Co., 47 S. C. 375; 25 S. E. 272; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 430; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. 682 Worthy, 87 Tex. 459; 29 S. W. 376; St. Louis, Ark. & T. R. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 536; 15 S. W. 104; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 61; 12 S. W. 838; Inter- national & G. N. R. Co. v. Mc- Donald, 75 Tex. 41; 12 S. W. 860; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Loeffler (Tex. Civ. App.), 51 S. W. 536; Louisiana West. Ext. R. Co. v. Carstens, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 190; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 781; Chi- cago, R. I. & T. R. Co. v. Porter- field, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 225; 46 S. W. 919, aff'd 49 S. W. 361; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 383; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 461; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Ransom, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 689; 41 S. W. 826; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Hines (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. 152; Hicks v. Newport, A. & H. Ry., 4 B. & S. 403 n.; Rowley v. London & N. W. Ry., L. R. 8 Ex. 221; 42 L. J. Ex. 153; 29 L. J. 180: 21 W. R. 869. See this case un- der sec. 539 herein as to annuities. Pym v. Great Northern Ry., 4 B. & S. 396; 32 L. J. Q. B. 377; 10 Jur. (N. S.) 199; 8 L. T. 734; 11 W. R. 922. im:<>i><>i:ti<>ni;i> to INJURY. 8 543 erroneous, when his disposition of his earnings was to give them all to her, since the jury might well infer that they should as- certain what sums she would probably have received from such earnings."'- Again, where the parents have in fact no right to recover and it is alleged by a widow in an action for her hus- band's death that such parents are joined merely for a final ad- judication of their rights, and that they resided in a foreign country, and did not receive and would not have received any pecuniary aid from the deceased, such petition does not show a want of good faith in suing for the benefit of all the parties en- titled to recover under the 'Texas stilt ate. 38 § 543. Damages proportioned to the injury Death of wife. — In determining the husband's right to damages for his wife's death, not only their actual and legal relations should be considered,' 1 but also his reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit j 55 and he can recover not only for the actual injury result- ing to him from her death, 53 but he is entitled to the pecuniary value of her services less the cost of suitably and properly main- taining her,' ; and he sustains a substantial loss where he is obligated to replace her household services by hired labor. Again if there are children, the mother's care and moral training should be considered.™ But where a husband and child sur- vive, it does not necessarily follow that he has sustained damage ■'-' Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Loeffler (Tex. Civ. A pp.), 51 S. W. 530. Deceased was a brakeman and widow was held entitled to recover ldr the loss of the pecuniary benefits she would have received. Louis- ville Western Ex. K. Co. v. Caistens, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 190; 47 S. W. 36; 12 Am. A- Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 781. 63 San Antonio St. K. Co. v. Ren- ken, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229; 38 S. W. 829. 61 Harrison v. L. & N. W. Ry., 1 Cab. & E. 540. See also sec. 531 herein. 65 Harrison v. L. & N. W. Ry., 1 Cab. & E. 540; McGown v. Inter- national & G. N. R. Co., 85 Tex. 289; 20 S. W. 80. See also sees. 535, 536, herein. ■•'• Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Matula, 70 Tex. 577, 583, 584; 15 S. W. .~i7:'.: McGown v. International & G. N. R. Co., 85 Tex. 289; 2d S. W. 80; St. Lawrence a- Ottawa R. W. Co. v. Lett, 11 S. C. R. (Out. i 422, affg II A. R. 1, which rev'd Q. B. D. (1 O. R. 54). See sec. 530, herein, ■'■' Gulf, C. A' S. P. R. CO. V. South- wick (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. 592. 08 St. Lawrence & Ottawa R. W. Co. v. Lett, 11 S. C. R. (Ont) 422, aft" g 11 A. R. 1. which rev'd Q. B. I). (1 O. R. 545). As to evidence of services see sec. 539, herein. 683 §544 DEATH DAMAGES because the child is damaged by the killing of the wife and mother. 59 § 544. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of parent. — What we have said elsewhere in regard to the death of the husband and father applies here.' Primarily it is the duty of a father to support his minor children. 1 ' 1 but this legal right of minors does not preclude an action by an adult child for the parent's death. 6 -' And a child unborn or a posthumous child is within the word " children " and is a surviving child under the Texas statute, giving the right to sue for a parent's death." So a minor daughter who is living with her mother, from whom her father is divorced, is entitled to damages for his negligent killing, where the decree of divorce failed to provide for such child, and it does not appear that he had aided in her support.* 1 It may. however, be generally stated that in assess- » Kerry v. England (P. C). (1898) A. C. 742; 67 L. J. P. C. N. S. 150. Examine Davies v. Thompson (Tex. Civ. App.), 50 S. W. 1062. See sec. 526, herein. 60 See sec. 542, herein. 61 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Culpepper, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 182; 46 S. W. 922; Linskie v. Kerr (Tex. Civ. App), 34 S. W. 765, also holding that such support must he given out of the father's property, and not out of the child's, unless absolutely required. St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. R. Co. v. Johnson, 78 Tex. 536; 15 S. W. 104, per Gaines, Assoc. J. « 2 Petrie v. Columbia & G. R. Co., 29 S. C. 303; 7 S. E. 515. A case of a mother's death. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Kutac, 72 Tex. 643, 653; 11 S. W. 127, holding that an adult is included within the word "children," for the statute makes no distinction upon the ground of age. The action here was for the death of a mother. 63 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Robertson, 82 Tex. 657; 17 S. W. 1041; 27 Am. 684 St. Rep. 929; Nelson v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co., 78 Tex. 621; 14 S. W. 1021; 22 Am. St. Rep. 81; 11 L. R. A. 391. And under Lord Campbell's Act a child in ventre sa mere may re- cover after its birth for a father's death prior to such birth. The George & Richard, L. R. 3 Adm. 466; 24 L. T. 717; 20 \V. R. 246. In Mis- souri Pac. R. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 61; 12 S. W. 838, one of the children was born a month after his father's death, but the question was not discussed. See sees. 522, 523, herein as to statutes. 64 International & G. N. R. Co. v. Culpepper, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 182; 46 S. W. 922. But the petition in be- half of a minor child should allege directly or state inferential facts showing that he is a child of the deceased wife (Gulf, C. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. Younger (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 948), although a mother as next friend is entitled to recover damages for the father's death, but if the recovery exceeds §500, she can only collect the same upon qualifying PROPORTION KD To INJURY. § 544 ing the sum to be awarded minor children, they should be given such pecuniary damages as will compensate them for what the}- have suffered, or will suffer as the direct consequence of the parent's death. 85 And every parent has for his children a pecuniary value, beyond the amount of his earnings.'" So in the ease of both minor and adult children, the reasonable expecta- tion of pecuniary benefit should be considered, including past and prospective losses or benefits. 63 And in the ease of adults especially, this expectation must be based largely upon the legal and actual relations sustained between them and deceased, and also upon their dependency and the aid and assistance rendered of necessity or otherwise. These last two questions are. how- ever, fully considered herein under their respective headings."' In Texas where a minor daughter had a legal right to support, as guardian. International & G. N. K. Co. v. Sein, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 386; 33 S. W. 558, under Sayle's Tex. Civ. Stat. art. 121 la, as ain'd by act of Feb- ruary 11. 1893. Where damages were awarded on an improper basis for the death of a parent, and there was no cross appeal to sustain the verdict, the action was dismissed with costs in City of .Montreal v. La- belle, 14 S. C. R. (Ont.) 741. <* Baltimore & R. Twp. v. Stale, Crimes, 71 Md. 57:'.. 583, 584; 18 Atl. 884, per Robinson. J. Action was for use of widow and infant children. 60 Missouri Pac. II. Co. v. Lehm- berg, 75 Tex. 01, 07, OS; 12 S. W. 838, per Henry, Assoc. J. 87 Baltimore & O. K. Co. v. State, Mahone, 03 Md. 135, 145, per Robin- son. J.; Baltimore it (). R. Co. v. State, Hauer, 00 Md. 440; Gulf, C. & S, F. R. Co. v. Younger, 00 Tex. 387; 38 S. YV. 1121: San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Long, 87 Tex. 148, 152, L53; 27 S. W. 113: 47 Am. St. Rep. 87: Texas & X. O. R. Co. v. Brown, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 097: 30 S. W. 140; St. Louis, S. & W. B. Co. v. Bishop, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 504; 37 S. W. 764; Pym v. Great Northern Ry. 4 B. & S. 30(i : 32 L. .1. Q. B. 377; 10 Jur. N. S. 199; S L. T. 734: 11 W. R. 9_'2. 68 See sees. 531,534, herein. See further as to death of parents gener- ally, State, Grice, v. County Commrs., 54 Md. 42*1; International & C X. EL Co. v. McDonald, 75 Tex. 41: 12 S. W. 860; International & G. X. R. Co. v. Ormond, 64 Tex. 485; Da vies v. Thompson (Tex. Civ. App.), 50 S. W. 1062; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Long, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 049: 48 S. W. 599: Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Kansom. 15 Tex. Civ. App. 089; 41 S. YV. 820; International A- C. N. R. Co. v. Kuehn (Tex. Civ. App.), 21 S. W. 58; Kerry v. England (P. C. ) (1898), A. C. 742; 07 L. J. P. C. X. S. 150; Appleby v. Horsely Co. | No. 1) (C. A.), 08 L. J. Q. B. X. s. 892 (1899); 2 Q. B. 521: Condliff v. Cond- liff, 29 L. T. S3; 22 W. Et 325; Springett v. Balls. 6 B. A- S. 477; Pym v. Greal Northern Ry., 4 B. & S. 396; 32 L. J. Q. 15. : , .77; 10 Jur. (X. S.) 199; 8 L. T. 731; 11 W. R. 922; Hull v. Great Northern By.. 26 L. R. Ir. 289; Shallow v. Vernon, [r. B.. 9 C. L. 150; Morh-v \. Great Western Ry.. 16 Q. B. (Ont I 504; Secord v. Great Western Ry., 16 Q. 685 §545 DEATH —DAMAGES of which her father's death had deprived her, it was held that she was entitled to recover for his negligent killing, even though it was not proved that he had contributed to her sup- port, and although her mother with whom she was living had been divorced. No provision, however, had been made for the daughter in the decree. 69 And where the mother, whose income was derived solely from her estate, had been able by reason of her superior management to provide in an increasing degree for not only the present but possible necessities of her children, even to the extent of furnishing them a home, and she was willing to furnish such aid although her estate would go to them upon her death, yet such facts were held to constitute a basis for pecuniary damage to them, consequent upon her negligent killing. 70 Again, a married daughter can recover damages for her father's death.' 1 § 545. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of par- ent—Care, training, etc., of children. — A mother owes to her children the duty of nurture, and of intellectual and moral and physical training, and of such instruction as only can proceed from her, and these are elements which relate to their future welfare and success in life, and in the absence of proof a jury might assess damages in such cases based upon the common knowledge of the manner in which mothers commonly perform such duties, although the temperament and education of the mother and other circumstances may affect the manner of render- ing such aid to children. Again, the wealth or poverty or the surroundings of the child or mother may affect the question of the aid, culture, moral and intellectual training of a child. Therefore these facts may all be considered and this would also include as an element of damages in an action for a mother's death, the financial condition of the husband as head of the family. 72 So under an English decision it is declared that the B. (Ont.) 631. As to death of father and stepmother, see Johnston v. Great Northern Ry., 26 L. R. Ir. 691. 69 International G. W. R. Co. v. Culpepper, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 182; 46 S. W. 922. 70 San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Long, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 649; 48 S. W. 599. 686 71 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Martin (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 60 S. W. 803. 72 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Younger, 90 Tex. 387; 38 S. W. 1121; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 378, per Brown, J.; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Southwick (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. 592; St. Lawrence & Ottawa R. W. Co. v. Lett, 11 S. C. R. (Ont.) 422, aff'g 11 PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. §§ 546, 547 loss of advantages to minor children, as well also as of the greater comforts and conveniences of life, depends on the pos- session of pecuniary means to procure them, and where the father's income ceases with his life, a pecuniary injury is sus- tained. 73 § 546. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of parent— Children's majority. — In .Maryland where the action was for the use of the widow and her infant children, the court instructed the jury that as to the latter, prospective damages could be estimated to their majority, 7 * and this instruction fol- lowed a prior decision in the same state which limited such re- covery to said period.' 5 But in Texas the contrary rule has been asserted. 76 § 547. Damages proportioned to the injury— Death of children— Generally. — In Texas the father and mother may join in an action for the death of their child.'' So where a A. R. 1, which rev'd Q. B. I). (1 O. K. 545), holding that loss to the chil- dren o'f the care and moral training of their mother are grounds of dam- ages. 73 Pym v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 2 Best & S. 759; 31 L. J. Q. B. 249; 10 Wkly. R.737, per Cockburn, C. J., aff'd 4 Best & S. 396; 32 L. J. Q. B. 377; 11 Wkly. R, 922. 74 Baltimore & R. Twp. v. State, Grimes, 71 Md. 573; 18 Atl. 884, and cases cited. 76 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, Trainor, 33 Md. 542. 76 Tyler S. & E. R. Co. v. Rasberry, 13 Tex. Civ. A pp. 185; 34 S. W. 794: 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. \. s. 376. 77 Texas & P. R. Co. v. Hall (Tex. |, 19 S. W. 121. And a stepfather may be joined after suit brought by the mother of deceased. San Antonio St. R. Co. v. Cailloute, 79 Tex. 341; 15 S. W. 390. So a widow suing for her husband's death may sue also for the use and benefit of her hus- band's parents, even though they have no knowledge ^hereof, where such suit is for t lie purpose of final adjudication of their rights notwith- standing such parents could not re- cover. San Antonio St. R. Co. v. Renken, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 229; 38 S. W. 829. As to right of father to have his name added as a party to the rec- ord and liberty granted to appear by counsel, and put in evidence at the trial, see Johnston v. Great North- ern Ry., 20 L. R. 4, and see Van Warl v. New Brunswick Ry., 27 Supr. Ct. Jud. (N. B.) 59, rev'd on App. to Sup. C. C. Vol. 17, p. 35. Where a child sues for his own per- sonal injuries and dies after verdict but before judgment signed, a new trial w;is refused. Kramer v. Way- mark, 4 II. & C.4l'7; 35 L. Ex. 148; L. R. 1 Ex. 241; 12 Jur. (N. S.i 395; 14 L. T. 368; 14 W. R. 659. An unmar- ried man having come to his death by reason of injuries indicted by the defendants, two act ions were brought to recover damages occasioned by his death. The first in point of time 687 §54T DEATH — DAMAGES husband had abandoned his wife and contributed nothing to her support for many years and she brought an action in her own name, without joining her husband, to recover for the loss by the negligent killing of her son who had supported her, nevertheless, if the husband hud received, any pecuniary benefit from the son during his life, the damages should be apportioned between them for the amount both would have received, but otherwise, in absence of a finding of any such benefit received by the father. 78 If the child is legitimate, 79 the measure of damages for its death is based primarily upon the value of the child's services, combined with the reasonably probable pecu- niary benefit which the parent or parents would have received except for the killing. This necessarily involves a considera- tion of the child's age, health, strength, mental and physical capabilities by way of usefulness, ability to earn a livelihood and to render aid, assistance or support to his parents, coupled also with the fact of what the child has done in that connec- tion. Other considerations are also involved and are con- sidered else\vhere herein, such as legal and actual relations be- tween deceased and the survivors, and the general elements of damages so far as applicable to children of deceased's age ; and the dependency of parents is a material element. 80 Again, was brought by the paternal grand- father and grandmother of the de- ceased, and the second by his mother who had obtained letters of adminis- tration to his estate after the bring- ing of the first action upon a motion by the mother to stay one or the other of the actions. Held that while the grandfather and grand- mother could legally proceed with their action under Rev. St. Ont. 1897, ch. 166, although brought within six months of the death, so long as there was no executor or administrator, yet, an administratrix having been appointed and an action brought by her within the six months, she was entitled to proceed with it and the first action was the one to be stayed. Lampman v. Township of Gainsbor- ough (1888), 17 Ont. R. 191. and Hol- 688 leran v. Bagnell (1879), 4 L. R. Ir. 740, explained and followed. Held also that the administrator would have the right iu her action to claim damnges sustained by the personal estate of the deceased. Leggott v. Great Northern R. Co. (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 599, followed; syllabus to Mum- mery v. Grand Trunk R. W. Co.; Whalls v. Same, 1 Ont. L. R. 622. 78 Missouri P. R. Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220; 12 S. W. 828. 79 See as to illegitimate children, sec. 523, herein and notes. 80 In Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496; 7 S. W. 857, deceased was the oldest son of his widowed mother. He was sober, industrious and economical. He worked for his mother and aided her with advice and counsel. His devotion to her PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. § 547 in determining whether or not the parent has sustained dam- ages by her daughter's death, the loss none the less exists, be- cause the deceased's means of aiding her mother were derived from her husband. 81 But there must be some showing of a pecuniary loss actually sustained according to the English de- cisions ; thus, although there was a deprivation of the son's assistance, and an inability of the father to take contracts which was such that the neighbors could testify to repeated declarations that he would support lier as long as she lived. He was a farm hand, working for wages and his mother was a renter. The idea given in the testi- mony of this boy's character, habits, and person, was that of a prospec- tive useful and prosperous citizen from whom the mother, but for his being killed, would have received as- sistance greater probably than that given her by the verdict. Id. 503, per Walker, Assoc, J., who also said ( id. 502, 503) : " The measure of dam- ages given by the court is ' such sum as you may under the circumstances reasonably believe plaintiff might have received from the assistance of Robert E. Lee (the deceased) had he not been killed by the train of de- fendant, and you may in estimating such sum, if any, consider under the evidence before you, the age of said deceased, the time he might have lived, the age of the plaintiff, the time she may probably live and any other evidence tending to show what damages, if any, she may have suf- fered by the killing of said Robert E. Lit. . . . You will find for plaintiff such damages under the instructions hereinbefore given as you may think will compensate her for the loss, if any, she may have sustained by the killing,' etc. We do not believe the word 'might' instead of 'would' could have misled the jury as deBCi Ip- tive of the pecuniary beuefits antici- 44 pated, nor does it appear that the enumeration of subjects of considera- tion necessarily or even probably ex- tended the limits of investigation by the jury beyond what, from the testi- mony, plaintiff reasonably would have received had her son lived, nor is the further clause as to compensa- tion misleading, for express reference is made to the preceding part of the charge. The true measure is 'a sum equal to the pecuniary benefit the parent had a reasonable expectation of receiving from her child had he not died.' City of Galveston v. Barbour, 62 Tex. 172,741; Interna- tional & G. X. R. Co. v. Ormond, 64 Tex. 485, 490: Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 293; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Nixon, 52 Tex. 19; Rev. Stat. 2609." See also as sup- porting the last clause in the above opinion as to "true measure," etc., Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Hughes (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 54 S. W. 264. See further as support- ing the above text, Galveston, II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Ford (Tex Civ. App. ISO!)). 54 S. W. 37; Interna- tional & G. N. R. Co. v. Knight (Tex. Civ. App.), 52 S. W. 640; Chi- cago, Rock Isl. it T. R. Co. v. Por- terfield. 19 Tex. Civ. App. 225; 16 S. W. 919; 4 Am. Neg. Rep, 461, aff'd 49 S. \V. 361; 12 Am. A Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 383. See sees. .".31. 534, herein. Bl Gulf, C. A- S. F. R. Co. v. South- wick i Tex. Civ. App. ). 30 S. W. 592. 689 §548 DEATH — DAMAGES he had taken during his son's lifetime, yet, where such son had received from his father the wages of a skilled laborer, it was determined that there was no pecuniary loss. 83 Again, where the mother of deceased was one of the plaintiffs, the fact that she had been allowed an annuity of £200, during their joint lives under a personal covenant was a factor. 83 Again, the legal or moral obligation of a child to support his parent has been considered.* 4 § 548. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of minor children. — The loss of services of a minor child consti- tutes a ground of action by the parents, 85 or by the mother as sole surviving parent, 86 and the husband and wife may recover jointly, since they are equally entitled in case of their child's death. 87 Again, in determining the value of such minor's ser- vices, the fact that she was bright and intelligent and rendered such aid in the household duties as enabled her mother to use her time to a pecuniary advantage will be evidential facts and the question of such value is for the jury. 38 And although such 82 Sykes v. Northeastern Ry., 44 L. J. C. P. 191; 32 L. T. 199; 2:) W. R. 473. See sec. 525 herein, as to pecuniary interest. 8i Rowley v. London & N. Ry. Co., L. R. 8 Exch. 221. 84 Weems v. Mathieson, 4 Macq. H. L. 215. See sec. 531, herein. 85 Sternenberg v. Maillios (TJ. S. C. C. A. 5th C. E. D. Tex.), 99 Fed. 43. See Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Beall, 91 Tex. 310; 42 S. W. 1054; 41 L. R. A. 807, and note. See Dallas & W. R. Co. v. Spicker, 61 Tex. 427, 431 ; 48 Am. Rep. 297, per Stayton, Assoc, J., quoted from in sec. 550 herein as to adults. It is error to submit the issue to the jury of defendant's lia- bility -where the minor was in de- fendant's employ without the par- ent's consent. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vieno (Tex. Civ. App.), 20 S. W. 230. 86 But the petition should allege the value of the child's services to 690 recover exemplary damages, even if the statute allows such damages. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Compton,' 75 Tex. 667; 13 S. W. 667. See State, Coughlin, v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 24 Md. 84, 107; 87 Am. Dec. 600, per Bowie, C. J.; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Crowder, 70 Tex. 222, 225; 7 S. W. 709, per Stayton, C. J. But a mother has no standing iu the maritime court of Ontario not having sued as personal representative of the child. In re The Garland; Mona- ghan v. Horn, 7 S. C. R. (Ont.) 409. 87 Bruuswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504, 512; 8S. W. 85. 88 Brunswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504, 508-512; 8 S. W. 85, per Walker, Assoc, J. In this case deceased was 6 years old, was in good health, with the exception of a few chills, and was of great assistance in the household, caring for the baby, help- ing to wash dishes and sweep and rendering other important services. PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. §548 minor is of tender years, the facts that be had begun to be of some service, that he was well grown, kind and dutiful, of fine mind and able-bodied, have been considered. So notwithstand- ing an absence of evidence of actual earnings, and although it is not reasonable to suppose that a very young child could find employment by which wages might be earned, still it cannot be said that the parents have suffered no pecuniary injury by its death." 9 So the habits and energy of deceased are proper ele- ments.'" And a value may he placed upon a child's services even though he has never earned wages. So the probability may be considered that he would have devoted a part of such earn- ings to his widowed mother's support, and the deceased's past tilial conduct will increase such probability. 91 Under the English See quotation from opinion in this | case in note to sec. 527 herein. In Wolfe v. Great Northern Ry., 26 L. K. Ir. 548, the deceased daughter was 10 years old and rendered such services to her parents as enabled them to dispense with a servant, they having employed one two years be- fore. Hut after the child's death they were again ohliged to employ hired help. The exact value of the child's services was not proven. It was declared however that, there was sufficient evidence for a finding of some pecuniary value for deceased's services. But in Bourke v. Cork & Miuioom Ry., 4 L. R. Ir. 282 (10 Mew's Eng. Dig. 1898, pp. 107, 108), the action was by a father for the death of a son, aged about 14 years. It did not appear that the plaintiff had ever received from the deceased benefits or services which could in any sense be regarded as of any pe- cuniary value. It was, however, proved that the child was, up to tin- time of his death, a strong, intelli- gent and well-disposed boy, thai be had been receiving a school educa- tion for mercantile pursuits and that in a few years, if he had lived, his services would have been worth a sub- stantial sum in the plaintiff's own shop or a similar establishment. The plaintiff himself was a respectable salesman and his position rendered him independent of any earnings which his son might have been after- wards competent, to gain. Held that there was no evidence to enable the jury to say it was reasonably proba- ble that pecuniary benefit would have resulted to the father from the continance of the child's life and that defendants were entitled to judgment. s9 lloss v. Texas & Pac. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. I). Tex.), 44 Fed. 44. 47. 48, 1'.'. per Maxey, J. so Missouri, K. A- T. K. Co. v. cil- more (Tex. Civ. Api>. 1899), :>'■', S. W. 61. It) this case deceased was 7 years old. lie helped his father farm, worked willingly, was obedi- ent, brought wood and water, was sound in mind and body and learned well at school. In Austin Rapid- Transit R. Co. v. Cullen (Tex. Civ. App. ), i".'s. w. u r. i "» . rehearing denied, 30 S. W. 578, the child was 25 months old. obeyed his mother, uudei what was said to him and was just beginning to talk. 91 Condon v. Great Southern A W. 691 §548 DEATH DAMAGES Workmen's Compensation Act recovery may be had for a minor's death, although he had been employed only a short time before he was killed, where he turned over all his earnings to his par- ents and received from them such pocket money as they deemed right.* 2 But where the evidence was only of trifling household services, rendered incapable of estimation on a pecuniary basis, damages were denied. 93 In addition, much the same elements of damasre enter into the amount recoverable for a minor child's death as we have stated under the last preceding section, the principal factor being the prospective pecuniary benefit which might have accrued to the parents had the child survived. 94 If the minor has reached an age where he can be of service to his parents, that should be considered, together with his ability, con- dition and disposition to aid them, evidenced by actual acts coupled with the parent's right to claim service, or, perhaps, the filial obligations of the child irrespective of legal claim may be of importance, at least as a guide in connection with other testimony, as where the son had promised to aid his par- ents. In such case that fact has been considered even though limited by an instruction that such promise could not be legally enforced. The child's age, etc., 95 and that of the parents' 96 are important, and it has been said that the contingency of the son's marriage should be considered as affecting the fulfillment of his promises and ability in that respect. 97 Another factor also en- Ry., 16 Ir. C. L. R. 415. See Wolfe v. Great Northern Ry., 26 L. R. Ir. 548. 92 Simmons v. White (C. A.), 68 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 507 (1899); 1 Q. B. 1005, under act 189". sec. 7. snbd. 2. 93 Holleran v. Bagnell, f> L. R. Ir. 333; child here was 7 years old. 94 See cases next cited. See sec- tions 531, 535, herein. 95 See cases cited in third follow- ing note. See section 528, herein. 96 See section 537, herein. 97 Hall v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Tex. ), 39 Fed. 18, where the charge of Maxey, J., to the jury, covers in an exhaustive manner the elements of damage in an 692 action for the killing of a son, in- cluding also all the above points in the text. See also Ft. Worth & Den- ver City R. Co. v. Morrison, 93 Tex, 527; 50 S. W. 745 (Tex. Civ. App.), 56 S. W. 931, fully considered under sec. 531 herein. This case is cited in San Antonio Tract. Co. v. White (Tex. Supr. Ct. 1901), 61 S. W. 706; 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 616, rev'g 60 S. W. 323, and the court, per Williams, J., said : " The true measure of damages is compensation for the loss sus- tained by plaintiff from the death of her son." See further as to pecu- niary benefits, Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Compton, 75 Tex. 667; 13 S. W. 667; City of Galveston v. Bar- PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. S 549 ters into the estimation of damages for the death of a minor child, especially where such minor is of very tender years, and that is the expense of rearing or maintaining and educating such- child. 98 But it should likewise he considered that the father is entitled, to all his son's earnings while he remains a minor under his control. 99 § 549. Damages proportioned to the injury— Death of children — Minority and majority. It is deelared that in an ac- tion to recover for the wrongful, etc., death of a minor child, employee of a railroad company, the only respect in which his minority can be considered would he upon an inquiry whether or not the employer had used such care towards him as his years or inexperience would make necessary. But that if the action is for loss of services of such child, the rule would be differ- ent, 100 and the jury may consider the disposition and ability of the son, both before and after majority, to aid the father. 1 But not all the possible benefits which might have been received after majority should be considered, the damages being limited to such pecuniary advantages as might be reasonably expected after such period commenced.- And under a Federal decision bour, 62 Tex. 172, 174; 50 Am. Rep. 519; Hetherington v. Northeastern Ry., 51 L. J. Q. B. 495; 9 Q. B. D. 160; 30 W. R. 797; Bouike v. Cork & Mac- room Ry., 4 L. R. Ir. 282. 98 Ft. Worth & T). C. R. Co. v. Hy- att, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 435; 34 S. W. 677; 3 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 397. See Wolfe v. Great Northern Ry., 26 L. R. Ir. 548; San Antonio Tract. Co. v. White (Supr. Ct. Tex. 1901), 61 S. W. 706; 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 616, rev'g 60 S. W. 323. In Duck- worth v. Johnson, 4 H. & N. 653: 29 L. J. Ex. 25; 5 Jur. (N. S.) 630; 7 W. R. 655. there was no evidence of the cost of boarding and clothing the de- ceased son, and a verdict, for £ 50 was retained. In Brunswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504, 512; 8 S. W. 85, Walker, Assoc. J., said: " It is insisted also that the court should have limited the value to probable net proceeds, excluding expenses of nurture, edu- cation, etc. We do not think thai a jury of ordinary intelligence would need such a caution from the judge." See Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Comp- ton, 75 Tex. 667, 674, 675; 13 S. W. 667. 99 Bonnett v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co., 89 Tex. 72: :!:; s. \Y. ;;;;4. And see as to obligation to support chil- dren, Linskie v. Kerr (Tex. <'iv. App.), 34 S. W. 765. io° Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Crowder, 70 Tex. 222, 225; 7 S. W. To'.', per Stayton, C. J. 1 So held in Galveston. II. & S. A. R. Co. v. Davis. 1 Tex. Civ. App. 468; •_>:; s. W. 301, aff'd -';'. S. W. 1019. -Ft. Worth & I). C. R. Co. v. Hyatt (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 677. See as to what is sufficient evidence of G93 §549 DEATH — DAMAGES the pecuniary benefits are not limited to those which the parents might have received during minority. 3 contributions which the parent had a reasonable expectation of receiving after the son's majority, San An- tonio Tract. Co. v. White (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 60 S. W, 323, rev'd (Sup. 1901), 61 S. W. 706. 3 The damages are not restricted to such benefits as the plaintiffs might have received from the services of the son up to majority. The jury had a right to consider what reason- able expectations the plaintiff had of pecuniary benefits after majority was reached. The statutes provide for full pecuniary compensation for the parents for the loss of a son, and this is not restricted to the loss of benefits to which plaintiffs had a legal right. Much difficulty arises in assessing damages, aud courts must avail themselves of all circumstances which may assist them in reaching a proper conclusion. In this case the son was over 18, was dutiful and evinced willingness to assist his parents by freely giving his earnings to his mother, and it was plainly proper to instruct as to reasonable expectation, that son would con- tinue to assist after majority. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Wilder ( U. S. C. C. A. 5th C. Tex.), 92 Fed. 953, '.'55, 956; 35 U. S. C. C. A. 105; 13 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. N. S. 520, per Parlance, Dist. J., citing Houston City St. R. Co. v. Sciacca, 80 Tex. 350; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Compton, 75 Tex. 667. See principal case also as to allega- tions of complaint. In the last cited case (75 Tex. 667; 13 S. W. 667), the deceased son was 18 years old and was employed with plain- tiff's consent in defendant's shops and was sent out as a fireman, and was killed in a collision. It was 694 decided that a mother, who is a sole surviving parent, is entitled to ser- vices of son during his minority and is therefore entitled to recover, if at all, damages not only for the loss of such services during such period, but also for the loss of any prospec- tive pecuniary benefits after he would have attained majority, for her right to recover is not restricted to minor- ity and it is not error to refuse to charge that the measure of damages is limited to the value of services from death to the age of 21, less the cost of maintenance and support for said time. See this last case also as to allegations in action by mother. But see Brunswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504, 508-512; 8 S. W. 85, where the court seems in one part of its opinion to limit the recovery to the child's minority. There is an extended quotation from this case in an note to sec. 527, herein, and see San Antonio Tract. Co. v. White (Tex. Civ. App.), 60 S. W. 323; rev'd 61 S. W. 706; 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 616. Contra, in Agricultural & M. Assoc, v. State, Carty, 71 Md. 86; 18 Atl. 37; 17 Am. St. Rep. 507, it was decided that there could be no consideration of any expectation of pecuniary advantage beyond child's minorityeven though the son was emancipated 2 years before he was killed, and was work- ing for himself, and had aided his father each year out of his wages, giving him over one half thereof, and it was also held that vague declaration or promise to aid after minority was too slight to base any reasonable expectation of advantage thereon. See also State, Coughlan, v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 24 Md. 84, 107; 87 Am. Dec. 600, per Bowie, C. J. PROPOl; TIONED TO INJURY. § 550 §550. Damages proportioned to the injury — Death of children — Adults. — There is a distinction between a suit by a parent for the negligent killing of a minor and that of an adult child. The law gives to the father tin; right in the former case to the services and the proceeds of his labor, and the pr< (li- ability that the minor would remain in the service of the parent during minority, or would have permitted the parent to have the proceeds of his labor, is said to be unimportant. Hut where the deceased was an adult, the above rule does not apply, for the right to services no longer exists. And in an action by the mother, she must allege something more than the amount of damages. 4 The measure of recovery, therefore, depends in such 4 Winnt v. International & G. N. R. Co., 74 Tex. 32, 35, 36; 11 S. W. 907; 5 L. R. A. 172, per Hobby, J., who also says, " In such a suit should be shown the reasonable ex- pectation of benefit the parent would have received had the adult child not been killed and in the ab- sence of legal right to his services this would depend upon the ability and will of such child to confer the benefit on the parent. Dallas & W. R. Co. v. Spicker, 61 Tex. 429, 431 ; 48 Am. Rep. 297 ( per Staytou, Assoc. J. ). See also International & G. N. R. & M. P. R. Cos. v. Kindred, 57 Tex. 498. There are no allegations in the petition which would authorize any proof upon this point to support the claim for actual damages. The averments were that by his death so occasioned, she, 'as his sole surviv- ing parent, had been damaged $10,000, actual damages.' It did not follow that she had been so damaged by reason of the death of her son, alleged to have been over 21 years of age, as a necessary con- sequence. In the absence of some averment showing that he supported or contributed to her support, or that there was some expectation of benefit of a pecuniary character to be derived by the plaintiff from the services of her son, there could be do presumption of law arising from the mere fact that she had been damaged by the death of her adult son." Only necessary to the al- leged amount of damage. Interna- tional & G. X. R. Co. v. Knight, 91 Tex. 660; 45 S. W. 556; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 79, rev'g 45 S. W. 1<>7. The father is not a necessary party to an action for the death of an adult son. St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Taylor, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 668; 24 S. W. 975. In the Dallas, etc., v. Spicker case above cited the court, per Stayton, Assoc. J., said (id. p. 431), that in so far as the claim to damages might be based upon the services of a minor "child before majority, the will of the child to render its services to the parent or to permit the parent to have the proceeds of its labor would be an unimportant inquiry, for the law gives the parent the right to both. Hence, an inquiry as to the proba- bility that the child during minority would have remained in the service of the parent, or would have per- mitted the parent to have the pro- ceeds of its labor rendered in the service of others, would be likewise 695 § 550 DEATH -DAMAGES cases upon the pecuniary injury sustained and rests solely upon the doctrine of compensation with reference to the deprivation by the death of prospective benefit, and this includes as a prin- cipal factor the loss of contributions, aid or assistance, the rea- sonable probability of the continuance thereof, the disposition and ability of deceased to render such aid, the dependency of the parents and other elements, such as age, etc., of deceased, and of the survivors which are fully considered elsewhere herein, under appropriate headings. 5 unimportant and irrelevant unless it was shown that the child had in some way been emancipated by its parent. The same rule would not apply where no legal right to benefit existed as iu the case of a suit by the parent for injury to a child after majority which resulted in death." After majority, a father is not en- titled to his son's earnings and this should be considered in determining what elements enter into the esti- mation of damages for the death of adult children. Bonnett v. Galves- ton, H. & S. A. R. Co., 89 Tex. 72; 33 S. W. 334 (Tex. Civ. App.);38 S. W. 813. See also as to mother's right to services, State, Conghlin, v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 24 Md. 84, 107; 87 Am. Dec. GGO, per Bowie, C. J. 6 Missouri Pac. K. Co. v. Henry 75 Tex. 220; 12 S. W. 828, holding also that the statute expressly au- thorizes a suit by the mother with- out accounting for the nonjoinder of her husband, provided she bring the action for the benefit of all par- ties concerned, and in good faith prosecutes it for the benefit of all. In case she sues for the benefit of herself and husband, it is proper to instruct the jury that if it was shown that the father of deceased and hus- band of plaintiff would have received any pecuniary benefit from the son during his lifetime, then to return a 696 verdict for the amount the father and mother would both have received from the deceased son had he lived, and apportion that amount between them according to the sum each would have received, and if the father would not have received any pecu- niary benefit from the son, if he had lived, then they would not find any amount for him. See as to adult child's death. Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Lester, 75 Tex. 56; 12 S. W. 955; Wiunt v. International & G. N. R. Co., 74 Tex. 32; 11 S. W. 907; 5 L. R. A. 172; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Cowser, 57 Tex. 297; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. White, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 280; 56 S. W. 204; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Power (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 54 S. W. 629; Gal- veston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Bonnett (Tex. Civ. App.), 38 S. W. 813; 89 Tex. 72; 33 S. W. 334; International & G. N. R. Co. v. McNeel (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. W. 1133; St. Louis, A. & T. R. Co. v. Taylor, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 668; 24 S. W. 975. All the above cases are considered fully herein under their appropriate headings as to reasonable expectations of pecu- niary benefit, aid and assistance ren- dered and dependency, the general elements of damage, etc. In Mason v. Bertram, 18 Out. R. 1 Chy. D. deceased had just attained majority when he was killed. He had been temporarily employed as a ma- PEOPORTIONED TO INJURY. § 551 § 551. Damages proportioned to the injury— Evidence- Generally. — Inasmuch as evidence and its admissibility or re- jection is a question which runs through and affects the measure of damages in all its various phases relating to a recovery for the injury occasioned by death by negligence, we shall only con- sider under this section such general points as affect the recov- ery. Thus it has been asserted that while damages in actions of this nature are necessarily indeterminate, and while much must be left to the sound sense of the jury in every case, it does not follow that plaintiffs need not prove with a reasonable de- gree of certainty the data from which their compensation is to be assessed, when it is practicable to do so. And where it is within the power of a beneficiary to show with some degree of accuracy the amount of benefits received by him, his failure to testify specifically to the facts ought to be a circumstance against him sufficient to justify setting aside an excessive verdict/' It is also true, however, that damages do not admit of exact proof and cannot be made a question of mathematics. 1 If the de- ceased was an adult son, it is not error to exclude testimony as to the receipts of the father from his son's wages, before the lat- ter arrived at age. Such evidence does not tend to prove what the child would have given him after his earnings became his own to be disposed of at his will, and although it had been tes- tified that the deceased, just before his death, was preparing him- self to become a machinist, evidence cannot be given as to the wages ordinarily received by machinists and engineers, the probability being too remote, contingent and speculative, to show the son's probable future earnings, and also being calculated to chinist. Prior thereto he had at- tended school and worked on his father's farm without wages. It was also intended that he should, during vacations, while pursuing a medical course, also work on the farm as usual. The expense to his father of such professional education would he about $1,000, the course being from three to four years. In an ac- tion by his father for his death, a nonsuit was ordered as there could be no reasonable expectation of pe- cuniary henefit. « San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Long, 87 Tex. 148, 159; 27 S. YV. 113; 47 Am. St. Rep. 87; 24 L. R. A. 637, per Gaines, Assoc. J. See Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lehmberg, 75 Tex. 01. 67, 68; 12 S. W. 838, per Henry. Assoc. J. 1 St. Louis. Ark. & Tex. K. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 536, 542; 15 S. W. 104, per Gaines, Assoc. J. See also 697 8 551 DEATH— DAMAGES mislead the jury. 8 Again, pecuniary injury must be proven, 9 although it is also determined that in case of a minor child's death it is sufficient that there is evidence of a reasonable ex- pectation of benefit capable of estimation, and that it is unneces- sary to prove a pecuniary advantage except for the killing." 1 But the evidence in this class of cases cannot furnish the meas- ure of damages with any certainty and accuracy, especially in case of young children, where the age and undeveloped state of the child precludes any accurate approximation of the value of the child's services, although as the age increases and the faculties and ability develop, testimony as to actual services can and should be produced, even though their value is indefinite as to amount. 11 The statements of deceased that he could support his mother are admissible. 12 So the son's knowledge of his father's business and plans and his ability to carry them out may be proven." Again, a mother's conclusions that the cause of the death of her three months' old child was exposure, will be admissible in connection with other evidence as to the infant's previously healthy condition, the mother's age and the large number of offspring she had had, and that immediately after such exposure the child contracted a cold which grew worse until he died. 14 Ross v. Texas & Pac. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Tex. ), 44 Fed. 44, 48, 49, per Maxey, J. 8 Bonnett v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co., 89 Tex. 72, 76, 77; 33 S. W.334. 9 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220, 224; 12 S. W. 828, per Acker, P. J. See Winnt v. Inter- national & G. N. R. Co., 74 Tex. 32, 35, 30; 11 S. W. 907; 5 L. R A. 172, per Hobby, J.; Hetherington v. Northeastern Ry., 51 L. J. Q. B. 495; 9 Q. B. D. 160; 30 W. R. 797. 10 Ricketts v. Markdale (Div. Ct.), Ont. 610; Roinburgh v. Baleb, 27 Out. A pp. 32. i 1 Brunswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504, 508-512; 8 S. W. 85, per Walker, Assoc. J. In Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Crowder, 70 Tex. 222, 225; 7 S. W. 709, it is declared, per Stayton, C. J., that in an action by a mother 698 for the death of her minor son, it is incumbent on her to show such facts as would have entitled her son to have recovered had he lived. But evidence of the value of the services of a farm hand is admissible even though not alleged. International & G. N. R. Co. v. Knight (Tex. Civ. App.). 52 S. W. C40. 12 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496, 503; 7 S. W. 857; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. White, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 280; 56 S. W. 204. See also Electric L. & P. Co. v. Lefevre (Tex. Civ. App. 1900), 55 S. W. 396. But see State, Coughlan, v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 24 Md. 84, 107; 87 Am. Dec. 600, per Bowie, C. J. 1 3 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Davis, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 335; 54 S. W. 909. "Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. PBOPORTIONED TO INJURY. § 552 §552. Damages proportioned to the injury Excessive and inadequate damages -Generally. The verdict will not be reversed merely because the damages awarded are larger than the evidence might probably justify, n although it will be set aside where it is greatly in excess of what is shown to be warranted." 1 So a new trial may be granted where the damages are manifestly too small. 1. Hyatt (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 677. '■• .Missouri Pac. K. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496; 7 S. W. 857. w Plaintiff's son lived with her and give lier all his wages of about $30 a month, reserving only enough to buy clothes. Her expectancy of life was only 1S\ years— $6,000 re- duced to $3,000. Mexican Nat. R. Co. v. Finch (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 1028. Son was a young man who lived with his father aud assisted him in carrying coals around the wards of a hospital, for which the father was paid a small allowance. The son earned also good wages, but as the father was not in need the son did not aid him in any other way, than as above stated; £ 75, was held excessive. Franklin v. Southeastern l;y.. 3 II. & N. 211; 4 Jur. (X. S.) 565; 5 W. It. 573. When damages not excessive. $870 in favor of parents, aged OS and 07 years, even though deceased was dissipated and a spendthrift, but was 35 years old and aided with the other children in supporting the plaintiffs. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Spence (Tex.), 52 S. W. 562. $2,000 for death of 7 years old son. Mis- souri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Gilmore (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 53 S. W. 61. $10,000 in favor of widowed mother for death of son 23 years old, un- married, industrious, sober and healthy aud who contributed from $30 to $50 a month to his mother's support out of earnings of 865 monthly. The son was qualified for a locomotive engineer, at which his wages would have been from 8108 to 8125 monthly. International & G. N. R. Co. v. McNeel (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 S. \V. 1133. $-',000 in favor of mother; son had a life ex- pectancy of over 36 years, earned from $60 to $70 a month, and gave his mother from 820 to 835 monthly; she was 69 years old. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Royall, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 86; 13 S. W. 815. 85,000— son was 7 years old, healthy, industrious bright and intelligent—verdict was in favor of mother. Taylor B. & II. R. Co. v. Warner (Tex. Civ. App. i. 31 S. W. 66. $6,000. deceased son was a month over 2 years old; he was healthy, stout and sensible. Austin Rapid-Transit II. Co. v. Cullen (Tex. Civ. App.), 29 s. \V. 256, rehearing denied 30 S. \V. 578. $5,000 in favor of mother for sou 18 years old, who gave her $20 a month and had good habits and was industrious, and 17 Deceased husband was 28 years old and widow 29 years of age; con- tributed $300 a year to her support; earned from $1.50 to $1.75 per day and was constantly employed. Ho was also in perfect health: held insufficient. Under Rev. Stat, art. 1452, a new trial was granted. Hums v. Merchants & P. O. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 63 S. W. 1061. 699 $§ 553, 554 DEATH — DAMAGES. § 553. Damages proportioned to the injury— Evidence of deceased's habits — Mitigation. — It may be shown that de- ceased's habits were such that he was a worthless person and that therefore his family lost little in the value of his services. ls §554. Damages proportioned to the injury Insurance- Life insurance moneys received under a policy on deceased's life cannot be considered in defense or in mitigation of damages. 19 But under an English decision the contrary rule obtains, 20 and although this ruling has been approved in an Ontario decision, it was determined in that case that insurance money on a de- ceased husband's life is not to be deducted from the amount of damages previously assessed, irrespective of such consideration ; that she is benefited only by the accelerated receipt of the amount of the policy, therefore the benefit represented by the interest of the money during the period of acceleration could be compen- sated by deducting future premiums from the estimated future earnings of deceased. 21 she also relied upon his personal aid and comfort. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hamilton (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 906. $3,500 in favor of mother for strong, healthy boy. San An- tonio St. Ry. Co. v. Watzlavzick (Tex. Civ. App.), 28 S. W. 115. $3,000 for son aged 20 years, who gave his parents $15 to $20 a month. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Arispe, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 671; 23 S. W. 928, rehearing denied 5 Tex. Civ. App. 617; 24 S. W. 33. 18 Standlee v. St. Louis & S. W. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App. 1901), 60 S. W. 781. 1 9 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Cody, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 520; 5 S. W. 135, writ of error denied, 51 S. W. 329. Money was received by the widow and children. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Weaver (Tex. Civ. App.), 41 S. W. 846. Life insurance received by dependents. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Rain (Tex. Civ. App.), 40 S. W. 635; Tyler S. E. R. Co. v. Ras- 700 berry, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 185; 34 S. W. 794; 3 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. N. S. 376. Insurance was on life of em- ployee. 20 Hicks v. Newport A. & H. Ry., 4 B. & S. 403 n. 2 1 Grand Trunk Ry. of Can. v. Jen- nings, 13 App. Cas. 800 (Out.), 58 L. J. P. C. 1; 59 L. T. 679; 37 W. R. 403, aff g 15 A. R. 477; contra Yates v. White, 4 Bing. (N. C.) 272; 5 Scott, 640; 7 L. J. C. P. 116. See 10 Mew's Eng. Dig. (1898) p. 112; Brad- burn v. G. W. Ry., 44 L. J. Ex. 9; L. R. 10 Ex. 1 ; 31 L. T. 464; 23 W. R. 48. The deceased had effected a policy of insurance on his life which was in force at the time of his death. At the trial the jury were directed to deduct the amount of the policy from the verdict wliich amount was after- wards added by the divisional court (8 O. R. 601). On appeal the court being equally divided in opinion on this branch of the case, the appeal was dismissed with costs. Hagarty PROPORTIONED TO INJURY. §555 § 555. Damages proportioned to the injury — Legacy, devise or inheritance. — Evidence is admissible, in mitiga- tion of damages, of a mother's will, whereby there is vested ab- solutely in a part of the surviving children the title to the corpus of all her property which had been the only source of her income, and of the only aid which the children had derived from her, all of said income with the exception of a very small proportion thereof having been used in assisting all of them. In such case the value of the property exceeds the prospective benefits. There is this qualification, however, that in the state where this rule is asserted the statute permits each beneficiary of the class specified to recover separately for his own special injury." But where one seized in fee tail of landed estates pos- C. J. O. and Osier, J., were of opin- ion that the actual loss or injury re- sulting from the death can alone be recovered in such a case, and if a large increase of fortune occurs to the parties as the result of such death or property or money falls to them as a like result, whether under a settlement or in the shape of a life insurance effected for their benefit, that must be taken into considera- tion in estimating the loss sustained. Burton, J. A., was of opinion that under the circumstances the divi- sional court were right in increasing the verdict by the amount of the insurance money. Per Patterson, J. A. The receipt of the insurance money is a proper matter for the consideration of a court or a jury in estimating the damages and might afford ground for making some reduction from v a gross as- sessment, but in the present case there was nothing shown to war- rant any reduction (Hicks v. New- port, etc., R. W. Co., 4 13. & S. 403 n., commented on). Beckett v. Grand Trunk R. W. Co., 13 A. R. 174; 16 S. C. B. 713 (Ont.). See 3 Ont. Dig. (Smith, Joseph & Cartwright) p. 1396. 22 San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Long, 87 Tex. 148, 153, 158, 159; 27 S. W. 113; 47 Am. St. Rep. 87; 24 L. R. A. 637, rev'g 26 S. W. 114. See A'. C, 19 Tex. Civ. A pp. 649; 48 S. W. 599. The deceased left all her property by will to four of her adult daughters who, with two adult sons, were the plaintiffs, three of whom resided with their mother. The testimony in this case by one of the daughters in addition to the above was that de- ceased left surviving neither father nor mother; that plaintiffs were her only children; that the value of her property was $18,500, and the in- come about $l.,s. v. Cailloutte, 79 Tex. 341; 15 S. W. 390. » Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Cody, •_'() Tex. Civ. App. 520; 50 S. W. 135, writ of error denied 51 S. \V. 329. - 9 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Rogers, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 080; 39 S. W. 1112. 703 § 558 DEATH - DA MAGES administered to said daughter, the court said : " How much of nonexpert medical practice ma}' be indulged in is not for the courts to determine. Only in case of alleged injury are such matters brought before the courts. It ma}' be that many men are their own physicians, prescribing for themselves and fami- lies," but this will not excuse negligence which causes death. 30 § 558. Damages proportioned to the injury — Self-defense — Justification. — If self-defense or justification is relied on, it must be established by a preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. 31 30 Brunswig v. White, 70 Tex. 504, 512; 8 S. W. 85, per Walker, Assoc. J. 31 Tucker v. State, Johnson, 89 Md. 471, 475, 485; 43 Atl. 778; 44 Atl. 1004; 46 L. R. A. 181. In this case Boyd, J., said: " This is the first time this court lias been called upon to review a case iti which the death, which is the foundation of the suit, was occasioned by the discharge of a loaded pistol at the person killed. Our statute . . . provides that the action is to be brought in the name of the state for the benefit of the wife, husband or parent and child of the deceased 'whenever 1 ... If the plaintiff's testimony had pre- sented any facts from which justifi- cation or legal excuse for the shoot- ing was shown, or could properly be inferred, then the case would have been different, but it did not and the defendant sought to excuse him- self by trying to convince the jury that he believed Reynolds was in imminent danger: that the only way to protect him was to shoot at or towards Johnson, and that he had good grounds for that belief and acted on it. It was not a question as to whether Johnson was still beat- 704 ing Reynolds when defendant fired which, as we have seen, was the real difference between the witnesses, but the defense depended mainly upon the belief of the defendant, his ob- ject in shooting and the necessity for it. He thus set up distinct affirma- tive matters of defense which under all the rules of evidence applicable to such cases, he was required to establish by preponderating evidence to meet the case proved by the plain- tiffs of the wrongful killing of John- son." This court cited Broks v. Haslan, 65 Cal. 421, and dis'd Nichols v. Winfrey, 79 Mo. 545; March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 377. See also as to liability in damages of one who kills another while the latter is fleeing, Stephens v. Wallace (Tex. Civ. App. ), 30 S. W. 1099. That evi- dence is inadmissible as to a crim- inal action having been instituted or not against the one who did the kill- ing, see Croft v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 51 S. W. 1089. See further Garcia v. Sanders, 90 Tex. 103; 37 S. W. 314, rev'g 35 S. W. 52, as to self- defense and killing while attempting arrest, and see as to burden of proof of self-defense, Croft v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 51 S. W. 1089. DEATH FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION CHAPTER XXVI. DEATH— "FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION FOB THE PECUN 1AUY INJURY." §559. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" —Statutes and constitu- tion— (Generally. 560. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Pecuniary loss only. 561. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Nature of action and proof of damages — Nomi- nal damages. 562. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " —Damages for jury— Ex- cessive or inadequate dam- ages. 563. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Factors generally to he considered. 564. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" —Sufferings of person in- jured not a factor. 565. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Exemplary or vindictive damages. 566. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury "' —Solatium— Mental suf- fering not a factor. 567. " Fair and just compensation for tlve pecuniary injury " — Loss of society of de- ceased. 45 568. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Relationship legal and actual of deceased to heue- ficiaries. 569. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury'" —Legal duty or obligation of deceased— Legal right of beneficiaries — Support and assistance, depen- dency. 570. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury *' — Reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit — Prospective damages. 571. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Prospect of inheriting. 572. '• Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury '* — Physical and financial condition, age, number of family, etc. — When admis- sible. 573. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Physical and financial condition, age. number "f family, etc.— When inad- missible. 574. • Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Financial advantages accruing from death inad- missible to reduce dam ages. 7 On § 559 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION § 575. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Probable accumula- tions. 576. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Funeral expenses and expenses for sickness, etc. 577. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Funeral and medical ex- penses, support, etc., paid by defeudaut — Mitigation of damages. 578. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Life expectancy — Mor- tality tables. 579. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of husband. 580. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of wife — Death of wife and mother. 581. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " —Death of parent. 682. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Support, care, etc., of children. 583. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Death of parent — Dam- ages not limited to chil- dren's minority. 584. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Death of children — Gen- erally. 585. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury 1 ' — Death of children — Evi- dential factors relating to children. 586. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of children — Evi- dential factors relating to parents, or next of kin. 587. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of children — De- cisions and opinions. 588. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Services of minor, cost of support, etc. — Damages not limited to minority. 589. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Nominal damages — Death of infants. 590. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Death of unborn child. 591. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of child — Ex- pense occasioned by mother's sickness. 592. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury" — Collateral kindred — Next of kin. 593. Death — Mitigation of dam- ages — Defenses — Insur- ance. 594. Death — Defense — Provoking difficulty — Liability of sheriff or officer. 595. Death — Allowance of interest. § 559. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury " — Statutes and constitution — Generally. — The New York Code ' provides that in actions for death caused by negli- 1 2 Stover's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. I (ed. 1898) sec. 1904, as am'd, ch. 946 I of 1895, took effect January 1, 1896. 706 rOB THE PECUN1 YKY IN.MKV. § 560 gence,etc, the damages tube awarded shall be a " fair and just com- pensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from decedent's death," 2 and this is the language of the North Carolina Code with a slight difference in the wording. I tie earlier New York statutes l limited the amount of damages, but the New York constitution 3 provides that the amount recoverable in Buch actions shall never be subject to statutory limitations and the right of action shall never be abrogated." This provision, how- ever, does not authorize the recovery of any except actual dam- ages sustained in excess of the limit which theretofore prevailed. Nor does it call for the affirmance of a verdict clearly in excess of the pecuniary loss. 7 § 560. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury "—Pecuniary loss only — The measure of damages un- der this statutory provision as to " fair and just damages for the pecuniary injury " existing in New York and North Carolina is the pecuniary loss sustained by the negligent death, and the recovery is limited thereto, 8 for the interest which the next of *"The damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such a sum as the jury, upon a writ of inquiry, or upon a trial, or, where issues of fact are tried without a jury, the court or referee deems to be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- juries resulting from the decedent's death, to the person or persons for whose benefit the action is brought." Interest on the sum awarded from the decedent's death is included. X. Y. Code Civ. Proa, sec. 1004. S N. C. Code, 1883, sec. 14 Misc. (X. Y.) 158; 70 X. Y. St. R. 687; :'.'> X. Y. Supp. 1002. But ex- amine Burns v. Houston, West St. & P. F. R. Co., 15 Misc. (X. Y.) 19; 36 X. Y. Supp. 774. 7 Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 6 App. Div. (X. Y.) 42; 39 N. Y. Supp. 613. 8 Etheringtou v. Prospect Park & 707 § 561 DEATH FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION kin have in the life is pecuniary." And if any pecuniary injury be shown, the jury are at liberty to give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation, 10 with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death. 11 But the statute does not confine the recovery to the immediate loss of money or property; it contemplates damages or advantages of a pecu- niary nature occasioned by the death as opposed to those for in- juries to the sentiments or affections. 12 § 561. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury " — Nature of action and proof of damages— Nominal damages. — As a preliminary statement it is important to re- member that the statute has been held in New York to create a new cause of action for the benefit of the husband or wife and next of kin of a decedent, and it also deals with remote and uncertain damages not recoverable at common law. 13 The statute is also applicable to the case of any person where death ensues, who could himself if living have maintained the action and is not limited to the cases of a wife, for the loss of a husband or children of parents, 14 and the cause of action is C. I. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 641, affg 24 Hun (N. Y.), 235; Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 29 N. Y. 252; 24 N. Y. 471; 23 How. (N. Y.) 363; Whitford v. Panama R. Co., 23 N. Y. 465, 469; Dickins v. New York C. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 158; 1 Keyes, 23; 1 Abb. Dec. 504. See id. 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 41; Oldfield v. New York & Harlem R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310; Bier- bauer v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 15 Hun (N. Y.), 559, aff'd 77 N. Y. 588; Green v. Hudson R. R. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 25, afTd 30 How. (N. Y. ) 593 n.; Lehman v. Brook- lyn, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 234; Wise v. Teerpenning, 2 Edm. S. C. (N. Y.) 112. See Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 6App. Div. (N. Y.)42; 39 N. Y. Supp. 613; Keller v. New York C. R. Co., 17 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 102; Pick- ett v. Wilmington R. Co., 117 N. C. 616; Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154. See sees. 561, ")6'2, herein. 708 9 Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 234. 10 Cornwall v. Mills, 44 N. Y. Supr. (12 J. & S.) 45; Etherington v. Pros- pect Park & C. I. R. Co., 88 N". Y. 641. See cases in next note. See cases considered in note to sec. 562, herein, as to discretion of jury, etc. 11 Mclutyre v. New York C. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 287; 35 How. (N. Y.) 36; 4 Trans. App. 1; Tilley v. Hud- son R. R. Co., 29 N. Y. 252; Dickens v. New York C. R. Co., 1 Abb. Dec. 504; 1 Keyes (N. Y.), 23. 12 Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471; Bierbauer v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 15 Hun (N. Y.), 559, aff'd 77 N. Y. 588. See sees. 565- 567, herein. 13 Matter of Snedeker v. Snedeker, 164 N. Y. 58, 62, 63, per Bartlett, J. 14 Oldfield v. N. Y. & Harlem R. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310, 316, per the court (under Laws of 1847, ch. 450). FOR THE PEC1 N I \ l:Y INJURY. § 561 the death and not the injury. 1 '' Again the pecuniary loss to be considered and which a party is entitled to recover may consist of special damages, that is of actual and definite loss cap- able of admeasurement and of prospective general damages, in- culpable of being accurately estimated. The former should be shown to have been sustained and their amount proven, while the latter depend as a basis of computation upon the existence and proof of certain general elements of damages such as age, etc., elsewhere noted." 5 But evidence of specific pecuniary Loss to the next of kin is unnecessary to justify an award of sub- stantial damages, proof of the above noted general elements being sufficient. 17 And it is the rule that affirmative proof of actual, definite, pecuniary damage need not be given to justify an award of some or nominal damages. IS So the fact that the This language of the court is quoted in Matter of Suedeker v. Snedeker, 164 N. Y. 58, 62, per Bartlett, J. 15 Smith v. Metropolitan St. K. Co., 15 Misc. (N. Y. ) 158: 35 X. Y. Supp. 1050. Examine Whitford v. Panama K. Co., 23 N. Y. 465, 484; Dibble v. New York & E. R. Co., 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 183. The statutory liability accrues only by reason of the death. Stuber v. McEntee, 142 X. Y. 200, 203, per O'Brien, J. 16 Houghkirk v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 92 N Y. 219, rev'g 28 Hun (N. Y.), 407; 15 Week. Dig. 522. Future as well as past consequences will be considered. Ganiard v. Rochester City & B. R. R. Co., 50 Hun(N. Y.),22; IS X. Y. St. R. 692; 2 Y. N. Supp. 470, case aff'd 121 X. Y. 661; 24 X. E. 1092. See Old- field v. X. Y. & Harlem R. R. Co., .14 X. Y. 310; Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 29 X. Y. 252; Mitchell v. Xew York C. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Hun (X. Y.), 535; 5 T. & C. (X. Y.) 122, aff'd 64 X. Y. 655. See sees. 560, 563, herein. 17 Lustig v. Xew York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 65 Hun(X. Y.),547; 48 X. Y. .St. R. 916; 20 X. Y. Supp. 477. 18 Kelly v. Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 14 X. Y. St. H. 699; 14 Daly, 418; 27 Wkly. Dig. 572, aff'd 113 X. Y. 628; 22 X. V. St. R. 994; 20 X. E. 878; Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 110 X. Y. 504; 18 X. Y. St. R. 130; 18 X. E. 108, aff'g 41 Hun. X. Y. 404; 3 X. Y. St. R. 133; 25 Wkly. Di£. 46; Ihl v. Forty-Second St. R. Co., 47 X. Y. 317; Prender- gast v. Xew York Cent. R. Co., 58 X. Y. 652. See Kane v. Mitchell Transp. Co., 90 Hun (X. Y.), 65; 70 X. Y. St. R. 203; 35 X. Y. Supp. 581. aff'd 153 X. Y. 680: Gorham v. Xew York Cent. R. Co., 23 Hun (X. Y.j, 449; O'Mara v. Hudson R. R. Co., 38 X. Y. 445; Mclntyre v. Xew York Cent. R. Co., 37 X. Y. 287: 35 How. (X. Y.) 36; 4 Trans. App. 1: Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 29 X. Y. 252: Oldlield v. X. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 14 X. Y. 310, aff'g 3 E. D. Smith. 103; Keller v. Xew York C. R. Co., 2 Abb. Dec. (X. Y.) 4S0; 24 How. |N. Y.i 172, aff'g 17 How. (X. Y.) 102; Safford v. Drew, 3 Duer (X. Y. |, 027; Green v. Hudson R. R. Co., 32 Barb. (X. Y.) 25. 8 561 DEATH- FAIR AND JUST < O.M I'KN NATION result in ascertaining the probable pecuniary benefit is some- what subject to chance, does not prevent a recovery nor limit it to nominal damages, 19 since the recovery is not restricted to such pecuniary loss as is susceptible of definite proof. 20 And in this connection it is expressly declared that the theory of the statute is that the next of kin have a pecuniary interest in the life of the person killed and the value of this interest is the amount for which the jury are to give their verdict, and the statute imputes to them a direct pecuniary loss from the negligent killing of one whose life has a greater or less value. 21 Again in the case of collateral relatives it is declared that it is difficult to see how a pecuniary loss results and if so to what extent, but nevertheless damages may be recovered in such case, and the jury's discretion in awarding the same will not be disturbed, where no principle of law has been violated, since the law does not require direct and exact proof upon this sub- ject." But it is also held that under the New York Act of 1847, the complaint must aver that deceased left a widow or next of kin who sustained a pecuniary loss by his death. 23 So in another case it is decided that in actions for negligent death, the plaintiff must show a pecuniary damage or loss. 24 19 Thomas v. Utica & Black River R. Co., 6 Civ. Proc. (N. Y.) 353, aff'd 34 Hun (N. Y. ), 626, aff'd 98 N. Y. 49. 2 ° Oldfield v. New York C. & H. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310, aft'o 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y), 103; Green v. Hudson R. R. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.)25, and cases in last preceding note. See sees. 559, 560, herein. See Lockwood v. New York. L. E. & W. R. Co.. 98 X. Y. 523, 526, affg 20 Wkly. Dig. 341; Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 234. Case of nominal damages, Keller v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co.. 17 How. Pr. ( N. Y. ) 102. 21 Quin v. Moore, 15 N. Y. 432, 435, per Comstock, J. As to allegation of damages and nominal damages, see Kenney v. New York C. R. Co., 49 Hun (N. Y.), 535; 15 Civ. Proc. (N. Y.) 347; 18 N. Y. St. R. 441; 2 N. Y. Supp. 512; 54 Hun (N. Y.), 710 143; 26 N. Y. St. R. 636; 7 N. Y. Supp. 255, aff'd 125 N. Y. 422; 35 N. Y. St. R. 447; 20 N. E. 626. See Safford v. Drew, 3 Duer (N. Y.), 627; 12 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 150, noted post. in this section. — Dickens v. New York C. R. Co., 1 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.)504; 1 Keyes, 232; 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 41, which was rev'd 23 N. Y. 158. Case was decided before amd't Laws, 1870, ch. 78. See Kelly v. Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 14 Daly (N. Y.), 418; 14 N. Y. St. R. 699; 27 Wkly. Dig. 572, aff'd 113 N. Y. 628; 22 N. Y. St. R. 994; 20 N. E. 878. 23 Safford v. Drew, 3 Dner (N. Y.). 627; 12 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 150. 21 Mitchell v. New York C. R. Co., 2 Hun (N. Y.), 535; 5 Supr. Ct. (5 T. & C.) (N. Y.) 122, case aff'd 64 N. Y. 655; Staal v. Grand St. & N. FQH THE PECUNIARY IN.UKV. § ">62 And in an action for the death of a married woman it is deter- mined that some pecuniary injury must be proven, to enable the husband to maintain the action, although very slight evidence is sufficient. 25 Again it is declared that the jury "are required to judge and not merely to guess, and therefore such basis for their judgment as the facts naturally capable of proof can give should always be present and is rarely if ever absent* And where a widowed mother was suing to recover damages for her child's death and was examined as a witness before the jury, so that they might approximately determine her age, the failure to prove her age was held not to preclude a recovery of more than nominal damages, where it was in evidence that she had young children and her circumstances and condition in life were proven.'- 7 So damages are implied from an allegation of the wrongful act. 28 § 562. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury " — Damages for jury — Excessive or inadequate damages. — The amount of damages upon the evidence is for the jury and rests largely upon their sound sense, judgment and discretion. This does not mean an arbitrary, unlimited discretion, nor can they base their verdict upon any mere inference or guess, for they are to judge the amount of recovery within the limits of a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained. But the discretion to be exercised may be liberal, although just, espe- cially where, as in case of prospective general damages, the plain- tiff is unable to show, direct, specific, pecuniary loss, or even though the proof may be unsatisfactory and the damages quite uncertain and contingent. The jury, in brief, must take those elements of damages properly in evidence before them and make the best estimate they justly can within the terms of the statute. 29 R. Co., 107 N. Y. 625; 1 Silv. C. A. 516; 11 X. Y. St. R. 352; 25 Wkly. Dig. 241, rev'g 36 Hun (X. Y.), 208. ^Cornwall v. Mills, 44 X. Y. Supr. Ct. (12 J. & S.) 45. ^Houghkirk v. Delaware & II. Can. Co., 92 X. Y. 225, per the court, quoted in Serensen v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Mont.), 45 Fed. 407, 410. -' Moskovitz v. Lighte, 68 Hun (X. Y.), 102; 52 X. Y. St. R. 216; 22 X. Y. Supp. 732. 28 Kenney v. New York C. & II. R. R. Co., 2 X. Y. Supp. 512. 29 The verdict should not be of such an amount as to clearly more than cover the pecuniary loss to the next of kin. Taylor v. Long Island R Co., 16 App. Div. (X. Y.) 1; 44 X. Y. 711 § 562 DEATH FATE AND JUST ('< >MPENS ATlON And the protection against excessive verdicts is found in the power of courts in some of the modes allowed by law to revise or set aside such verdicts.* This rule would also apply to pro- tection against inadequate verdicts. 31 The above rule, however, Supp. 820; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 608. Jury should not give damages clearly in excess of the pecuniary loss. Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 6App. Div. (N. Y.) 42; 39 N. Y. Supp. 613. Measure of damages in such a case (where deceased was adult and left widowed mother and adult hrothers and sisters) must usually he left to the jury, there be- ing no well-defined rule by which it can be determined. Kane v. Mitch- ell Trans. Co., 90 Hun (N. Y.), 65; 70 N. Y. St. R. 203; 35 N. Y. Supp. 581, aff'd 153 N. Y. 680. Jury can- not base its verdict on any inference or guess. Eastwood v. Retsofs Min- ing Co., 86 Hun ( N. Y. ), 91 ; 68 N. Y. St. R. 38; 34 N. Y. Supp. 196, case aff'd 152 N. Y. 651; 47 X. E. 1106. Amount of damages for death of young child is for determination of jury. Biikettv. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 110 N. Y. 504; 18 N. Y. St. R. 130; 18 N. E. 108, afTg 41 Hun (N. Y.), -104; 3 N. Y. St. R. 133; 10 Civ. Proc. R. (N. Y.) 52. In but few cases can direct, specific pecuniary loss be shown. Jurors must make best estimate they can from proof furnished, although proof unsatis- factory and damages uncertain and contingent. Lockwood v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 523. Jury are not to guess the amount but must judge the same. Hough- kirk v. Delaware & H. Can. Co., 92 N. Y. 219, case reverses 28 Hun (N. Y.), 407; 15 Wkly. Dig. 522. There is no way to ascertain mathematic- ally what the pecuniary loss is. It is to a great extent speculative and amount must be left to good judg- 712 meut of jury, which there is nothing to control or fix except their discre- tion and the statutory limitation of the amount (then limited by statute of 1847). Etherington v. Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 641, aff'g 24 Hun (N. Y.), 235. Jury has a liberal discretion. Dickens v. New York C. R. Co., 1 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 504; 1 Keyes, 232 ; 28 Barb. (N. Y. ) 41, rev'd 23 N Y. 158. Damages must be somewhat indefinite and must de- pend upon good judgment of jury. Green v. Hudson R. R. Co., 32 Barb. 25, 32, case aff'd 30 How. (N. Y.) 593 n. For jury's discretion where enough evidence of pecuniary injury, see Cornwall v. Mills, N. Y. Super. Ct. (12 J. & S.) 45. 3° Lockwood v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 98 X. Y. 525, per Earl, J. See Houghkirk v. Delaware & H. C. Co., 92 N. Y. 219. 31 See as to the general rule applica- ble to excessive or inadequate ver- dicts, Kennedy v. Rochester City & B. B. R. Co., 54 Hun (N. Y.), 183; 26 N. Y. St. R. 871:7 N. Y. Supp. 221, rev'd on different grounds, 130 N. Y. 654; 3 Silv. C. A. 591; 41 N. Y. St. R. 329; 29 X. E. 141; Le Frois v. Monroe Co., 88 Hun, 109; 68 N. Y. St. R. 535; 34 N. Y. Supp. 612; Hempenstall v. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. Co., 82 Hun (N. Y.), 285; 64 N. Y. St. R. 76; Rowe v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 82 Hun (N. Y.), 153; 63 N. Y. St. R. 753; Pineo v. New York C. R. Co., 34 Hun (N. Y.), 80, aff'd 99 N. Y. 644; Tisdale v. Del- aware & H. Can. Co., 4 N. Y. St. R. 812; 25 Wkly. Dig. 308, aff'd 116 N. Y. 416; 20 N. Y. St. R. 887; Fnl: THE PECUNIARY [K.TtJRl 8 562 seems in its application to be largely a matter of discretion as is clearly evidenced by the verdicts that have been sustained, modi- fied or set aside according to what may be designated as the court's sense of justice, based upon the various factors existing in each particular case.* It is held in North Carolina that a motion to 22 N. E. 700: Peck v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 4 Hun (N. Y.), 236; 6 T. & C. 430; 8 Hun (N. Y.), 286, aff'd 70 N. Y. 587; Potter v. Thomp- son, 22 Barb. (N. Y.) 87; Potter v. Hopkins, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 417; Woodward v. Paine, 15 Johns. (N. Y. ) 493. See cases noted in second following note herein. If the court determines, however, that a verdict is excessive it may order the same to be reversed unless the amount is reduced by a specified sum, in which case it will be affirmed as modified. See Taylor v. Long Island R. Co., 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 1; 44 N. Y. Supp. 820; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 608; McCor- mack v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 18 App. Div. (N. Y.) 333; 46 N. Y. Supp. 230; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 631, denying rehearing 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 24; 78 N. Y. St. R. 684; 44 N. Y. Supp. 684. 3 - Deceased was a railroad fire- man 34 years old. He never earned more than $2 a day. He left a wife, son and daughter — $15, 000 excessive. Cooper v. New, Y'ork, O. & W. R. Co., 25 App. Div. (N. Y.) 383; 49 N. Supp. 481. Deceased was a helper on an ice wagon — $12,000 held ex- cessive " The reason why we reach this conclusion is that the pecuniary loss to the next of kin does not in any fair view reach the amount of the verdict. It scarcely adds to the settlement of any fixed rule to set out our reasons in detail upon this question, as each case must stand upon its own particular facts.'" Mo- Cormack v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 18 App. Div. (N. Y.) 333; 46 N. V. Supp. 230; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 631, denying rehearing in 16 App. Div. (N. V.) 24; 78 N. Y. St. R. 084: 44 N. Y. Supp. (>84, per Hatch, J. See Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights K. Co., 6 App. Div. (N. Y.) 42; 30 N. Y. Supp. 613. Deceased was a laborer 52 years old, earning 82.50 a day — $10,000 excessive. Taylor v. Long Island R. Co., 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 1; 44 N. Y. Supp. 820; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 608. Deceased was a steel and iron worker, 29 years old, earned $3.50 a day, and had regular employment — $25,000 reduced to $15,000. Schmitt v. Metropolitan L. Ins Co., 13 App. Div. (N. Y.) 120; 77 N. Y. St. R. 318; 43 N. Y. Supp. 318. Deceased was a woman 63 years old, did housework for the family, consisting of husband and three grown sons— $7,500 reduced to $5,000. Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights It. Co., 6 App. Div. (N. Y. | 42; 39 N. Y. Supp. 613. Death of wife and mother; no pecuniary aid received from her — $5,000 excessive. $2,500 sufficient. Klemm v. New Y'ork C. & H. R. R. Co., 78 Hun (N. Y.), 277; 60 N. Y. St. R. 231; 28 N. Y. Supp. S61. Deceased was about 48 years old, earning capacity was about $1 a day and board. She was a seamstress and widow and lived with a married daughter who was one of three surviving children, all of aye. She had also assisted in making small articles of clothing for her children. She left no property — $3,500 reduced to $1,000. Mclntyre v. New Y'ork C. K. Co., 37 N. Y. 287; 35 How. (N. Y.) 36; 4 Trans. App. 713 § 562 DEATH FAIR AM) JUST COMPENSATION set aside a verdict, because excessive, rests in the discretion of the trial court, and such discretion is not reviewable by the su- preme court. 3 ' 1, aff'g 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 515. De- ceased was 60 years old and was a strong, healthy woman. She did all the housework and drove a milk wagon for her husband — $150 in- sufficient. Meyer v. Hart, 23 App. Div. (N. Y.) 131; 48 X. Y. Supp. 904. Deceased was 61 years old, actively engaged in business and enjoyed good health — $10,000 not excessive. Beecher v. Long Island R. Co., 53 App. Div. (N. Y.) 324; 65 N. Y. St. R. 642. Deceased was a member of the police force of New York city; salary was $1,250 a year; age 43. He left, dependent upon him for support, rive children, the oldest a daughter 21 year's old and the youngest a son 10 years old — $9,000 not excessive. Wallace v. Third Ave. R. Co., 36 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 57; 55 N. Y. Supp. 132; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 215. Deceased was a laborer 33 years old, married, of temperate habits, good health and sole support of family — $5,000 not excessive. Felice v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 14 App. Div. (N. Y.)345; 43 N. Y. Supp. 922. Deceased was a daugh- ter in good health and comfortably supporting her father, who was 82 years old, with a life expectancy of ten years and was penniless and de- pendent — $3,000 not excessive. Purcell v. Lauer, 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 33; 43 N. Y. Supp. 988. Action by father 106 years old, for death of industrious son 27 years old — $S00 not excessive. Burke v. Witherbee, 18 Wkly. Dig. (N. Y.) 369, case rev'd 98 N. Y. 562. Deceased was 72 years old, strong and healthy, and did general housework for her- self and two children — $1,500 not excessive. Walls v. Rochester R. Co., 92 Hun (X. Y.), 581; 72 N. Y. St. R. 250; 36 N. Y. Supp. 1102, aff'd 154 N. Y. 771. Deceased was 26 years old, unmarried, sober and in- dustrious, and earned about $400 during each season of navigation. There was no evidence that he had ever contributed to the support of the survivors, a widowed mother and adult brothers and sisters — $3,000 not excessive. Kane v. Mitchell Transp. Co., 90 Hun (N. Y.), 65; 70 N. Y. St. R. 203; 35 N. Y. Supp. 581, aff'd 153 N. Y. 680. Deceased was a woman 63 years old; she did all the housework for her husband and daughter, and was living with them — $5,000 not excessive. Lyons v. Second Ave. R. Co., 89 Hun, 374; 69 N. Y. St. R. 816; 35 N. Y. Supp. 372, aff'd 152 N. Y. 654; 47 N. E. 1109. Deceased was unmarried, 22 years old, earned $1.85 a day. He lived with his father, his next of kin, who was 58 years old — $3,000 not exces- sive. Fitzgerald v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 88 Hun (N. Y.),359; 68 N. Y. St. R. 762; 34 N. Y. Supp. 762, case rev'd 154 N. Y. 263; 48 N. E. 514. Deceased was 33 years old, un- married, healthy and lived with his father for whom he made pianos, I receiving such amount therefor as 33 Benton v. North Carolina R. Co., 122 N. C. 1007; 30 S. E.333. Seelhlv. Forty-Second St. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317; Catlin v. Pond, 101 N. Y. 649; Williams v. Sargeant, 46 N. Y. 481; j 76 N. Y. 594 714 Link v. Sheldon, 136 N. Y. 1, 5, per Gray, J., citing Oldfield v. New York & Harlem R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310, 321; Gale v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., POT? THE PECUNIARY IN.M l:\ S 563 § 563. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury "Factors generally to be considered. The factors to be considered generally are deceased's age, sex, health, strength, and within this element height and weight have been noticed, activity, mental condition, character, qualities and capacity, general intelligence, business qualifications, skill or ability to work or labor, competency or incompetency to till a better posi- tion, occupation, whether regularly employed or not, present or former employment and character thereof, earnings or income, proceeds of business, probable profits, earnings in immediately prior employment, earning capacity and its probability that it may increase or diminish with advancing age, value and charac- ter of services in case of a deceased wife or child, disposition of earnings, cost of living, habits of industry, sobriety or otherwise, expenditures and care exercised therein, life expectancy, whether the father thought proper; prospect of inheritance considered also — §5,000 not excessive. Johnson v. Long Island R. Co., 80 Hun (X. Y.), 306; 62 X. Y. St. R. 46; 30 X. Y. Supp. 318, aff'd 144 X. Y. 719; 70 X. Y. St. K. 868; 29 X. E. 857. Xo evi- dence was given as to deceased's earnings or of the value of his life to his next of kin, who were a brother and sister in Ireland and three nephews in New York city, nor did it appear that he ever supported or assisted them in any way— I si, 000 not excessive. Kelly v. Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 14 Daly (X. Y.), 418; 14 X. Y. St. R. 699; 27 Wkly. Dig. 572, aff'd 113 X. Y. 628; 22 \. Y. St. R. 994; 20 X. E. 878. Deceased daughter was 3j years old, in good health, earned $8 t<> $9 a week for 5 or years prior to her death. In twenty years she had contributed from $300 to $400 a year towards her parents 1 support. Her father was 66 years old and in infirm health; the wife was 58 years old; both were without prop- erty — $4,000 not excessive. Bowles v. Rome Watertown R. Co., 46 Hun (N. T.)i 324; 12 X. Y. St. R. 457, aff'd 113 X. Y. 043; 22 X. Y. St. R. 997; 21 X. E. 414. Action was for death of sister aged 14: father had not provided for family for years and was not known to be living — $3,500 not excessive. Pineo v. Xew York C. R. Co., 34 Huu (X. Y.), 80, aff'd 99 X. Y. 044. Deceased was an engineer, industrious, etc. His mother was his next of kin— $5,000 not excessive. Erwin v. Xeversink S. S. Co., 23 Hun i N. V. i. 573, aff'd 88 X. Y. 184. Deceased did all the housework for her husband and three children, assisted in taking charge of store and sometimes earned as much as $20 a week sewing. All her earnings were used in family's sup- port. Husband died and his admin- istrator recovered for loss of her earnings and services — $2,500 not excessive. Cregin v. Brooklyn Cross- town R. Co., IS Hun, 368. Deceased was 22 years old. He was unmarried, earned $25 a month. His father, mother, two brothers and a sister resided abroad — $5,000 not excessive. Biei'bauer v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 15 Hun (X. Y.), 55'.'. afFd 77 X. Y. 588. 715 <:»i;:; DEATH-- -KAli: AND JIST < OMI'KNSATION deceased was married or unmarried and the relation of the sur- vivors to deceased, their age, sex, situation and condition. There are also other elements dependent upon whether deceased was a wife, adult, or minor, etc., which are noted elsewhere herein under appropriate headings.* 1 But it is unnecessary to prove 34 In but few of the cases cited be- low is there any discussion as to the above factors being elements of damages. They are as a rule merely mentioned as facts which are in evi- dence or as determining factors in the case, being generally conceded to be such. Life expectancy con- sidered — death of minor. Keenan v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 145 N. Y. 348; 64 N. Y. St. R. 813; 40 N. E. 15. Character, qualities, capacity and condition of deceased, age and condition of next of kin. Lockwood v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 523, aff'g 20 Wkly. Dig. 341. Age, sex, general health and intelli- gence of deceased, situation and con- dition of survivors and their relation to deceased. Houghkhk v. Delaware & H. Can. Co., 92 N. Y. 219, rev'g 28 Hun (N. Y.), 407: 15 Wkly. Dig. 522, which aff'd 11 Abb. X. C. (N. Y.) 72; 63 How. (N. Y.) 328; 4 Month. L. Bull. 65. Life expectancy. Sauter v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 50; 23 Am. Rep. 18 affg, 6 How. (N. Y.) 446. "What did deceased usually earn'?' 1 is a pertinent and material question. Mclntyre v. New York C. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 287; 35 How. (N. Y.) 36; 4 Trans. App. 1, aff'g 47 Barb. ( N. Y. ) 515. Deceased mother's business capacity and her habitual employments, and value of her earn- ings to show capacity are admissible. Til ley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 29 N. Y. 252; 24 N. Y. 471; 23 How. (N. Y.) 463. Earning capacity of deceased may be shown. Seifter v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 66 N. Y, Supp. 1107; 55 App. Div. (N. Y.)10. That de- 716 ceased was an active business man in good health, (>1 years old, and that exceptional activity promised long life were considered and jury were not bound by decedent's actual earnings during his life, but might consider whether his earning capac- ity would have increased or dimin- ished. Beecher v. Long Island R. Co., 53 App. Div. (N. Y.) 324; 65 N. Y. St. R. 642. Evidence of wages not incompetent, although appren- ticeship articles did not require them. Kimmer v. Weber, 81 Hun 599; 63 N. Y. St. R. 291; 30 N. Y. Supp. 1103. Age, height and weight, health and strength, mental ability. Morris v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 51 App. Div. (N. Y.) 512; 64 N. Y. St. R. 878; 30 Civ. Proc. R. ( N. Y.) 371. Health, youth, industry, earn- ings and disposition thereof con- sidered. Twist v. Rochester, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 307; 55 N. Y. Supp. 850. Deceased was a contractor and evi- dence by a partner as to the amount of capital invested by them, the number of employees and the firm's net income from short duration con- tracts was held inadmissible to prove earning capacity. Read v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 32 App. Div. 503; 53 N. Y. Supp. 209. Deceased never earned more than two dollars a day in the course of his employment and this fact was considered in holding the damages excessive. Cooper v. New York, O. & W. R. Co., 25 App. Div. 383; 49 N. Y. Supp. 481. Age and occupation were also factors in this last case. Age, sex, health, strength, amount of work and char- FOR THE PECUNIARY IN.H'RY. § 568 all these elements in order to recover damages. Thus failure to prove a widowed mother's age is not fatal to her recovery, beyond nominal damages for the death of her son, where certain other factors arc proven and she appears as a witness before the :icter of services, earnings and prob- able profits considered. Meyer v. Hart, 23 App. Div. (N. V.) 131; 48 N. Y. Supp. 904. Occupation con- sidered. McCormack v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 18 App. Div. (X. Y.) 333; 46 N. T. Supp. 2:50; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 631. Denying rehearing of case (priucipal question was that of im- putable negligence and negligence), 16 App. Div. ( X. Y.) 24; 77 X. Y\ St. R. 684; 44 \. Y. Supp. 684. Age, earnings, life expectancy, inability to earn continuously, decrease of same, deduction of living expenses, net earnings considered. Taylor v. Long Island R. Co., 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 1: 44 N. Y. Supp. 820; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. COS. Ages of deceased and surviving father considered. Seeley v. New York C. & II. R. R. Co., 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 402: 40 N. Y. Supp. 806. That deceased was a woman, was 63 years old and had no source of income, and that she did the general housework for her fam- ily was considered. Mediuger v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 6 App. Div. (N. Y.) 42; 30 X. Y". Supp. 01:;. Age, health, industry, sobriety and aver- age daily earnings considered. Krul- der v. Woolverton, 11 Misc. (X. Y. ) 537; 32 X. Y. Supp. 742. Age, sex and occupation considered. Ilenn- ing.v. Caldwell, 4:> X. Y. St. R. 373; 18 X. Y. Supp. 339, afFd 137 N. Y. 553; 50 N. Y. St. R. 931; 33 X.E. 337. Age and good health of wife and mother, and character of new services considered. Lyons v. Second Ave. R. Co., 89 Hun (X. Y.),374; 69 X. Y. St. R. 816; 33 X. Y. Supp. 372. afFd 152 X. Y. 654; 47 X. E. 1109. Intemperate habits is an important factor. Devor v. Van Vranken, 29 Hun (X. Y.), 201. Occupation, industry and disposition. Erwin v. Xeversink S. S. Co., 2:; Hun (N. Y.),573, aff'd 88 X. Y. 184. Age and relation to de- ceased appeared, but no evidence of her abilities or condition in life. Mitchell v. Xew York, C. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Hun (X. Y.), 535; 5 T. & C. 122, aff'd 64 X. Y. 6.")."). Value of sup- port by husband, and father of wife and children, loss of earnings con- sidered. Althorf v. Wolfe, 2 Hilt. ( X. Y. ) 344, aff'd 22 X. Y. 355. Age, sex, life expectancy considered. Mc- Intyre v. Xew York C. R. Co., 47 Barb. (X. Y.) 515, case aff'd 37 X. Y. 287; 35 How. 30; 4 Trans. App. 1. Loss of services of wife, and whether or not she was an amiable and edu- cated woman may be considered. Green v. Hudson R. R. Co.. 32 Barb. I X. Y. | 25, affd 80 How. ( X. Y. ) 593 n. Life expectancy and probable gross income are factors. Russell v. Windsor S. S. Co., 120 X. C. 361; 36 S. E. 191. Personal living expenses admissible to show net income and care exercised in the matter, also in- competency of deceased to fill a better position admissible, where it is shown that he had occupied a more remunerative one, and where it was in evidence that he was em- ployed as fireman on defendant's road at the time of his death. Testi- mony is incompetent as to his occu- pation, when not on duty, it not ap- pearing that he was remunerated therefor, but it was competent to prove deceased's earnings as engineer which position he had filled prior to 717 §564 DEATH FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION jury and is examined so that they may approximately determine her age. 35 So proof of the character, quality, capacity and con- dition of deceased and of the age, condition and circumstances of the next of kin is sufficient to warrant recovery of substan- tial damages. 36 § 564. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury "—Sufferings of person injured not a factor — The "fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " given under the statute in cases of loss resulting from death, rep- resents the pecuniary loss sustained by the beneficiaries for whose benefit the legislature created a new cause of action. 37 It is the pecuniary interest which they have in the life of de- ceased which is the ground of recovery and even though the that of fireman, there being evidence as to his habits, industry and ability. Burns v. Asheboro & M. R. Co., 125 N. C. 304; 34 So. 495. And where deceased was addicted to drink, and a question arose as to the cause of his death, he having been fouud dead near defendant's railroad tracks, the case was held properly left to the jury. Powell v. Southern R. Co., 125 N. C. 370; 34 S. E. 530. Cost of living and expenditures, and life expectancy considered. Mendenhall v. North Carolina R. Co., 123 N. C. 275; 31 S. E. 480. Same facts and present value of accumulation of net income considered. Benton v. North Carolina R. Co., 122 N. C. 1007; 30 S. E. 333. Age, habits, industry, means, business qualifications and skill are factors. Benton v. North Carolina R. Co., 122 N. C. 1007; 30 S. E. 333. Cost of living and ex- penditures, net and gross income, habits of sobriety and condition of health are factors. Coley v. States- ville, 121 N. C. 301; 28 S. E. 482. Expectancy of life a factor, also net income. Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 117 N. C. 616; 23 S. E. 264; 30 L. R. A. 257. Net earnings, 718 health and habits are factors. Black- well v. Moorman, 111 N. C. 151; 16 S. E. 12; 17 L. R. A. 729. See Burton v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 82 N. C. 504; 84 N. C. 192; Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154. 35 Moskovitz v. Lighte, 68 Hun (N. Y.), 102; 52 N. Y. St. R. 216; 22 N. Y. Supp. 732. 36 Lustig v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 65 Hun (N. T.), 547; 48 N. Y. St. R. 916; 20 N. Y. Supp. 417. See Pineo v. New York, C. & H. R. R. Co., 34 Hun (N. Y.), 80, aff'd 99 N. Y. 644; Kelly v. Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 14 Daly (N. Y.), 418; 14 N. Y. St. R. 699; 27 Wkly. Dig. 372, aff'd 113 N. Y. 628; 22 N. Y. St. R. 994; 20 N. E. 878. But examine Ahern v. Steele, 48 Hun (N. Y.), 517; 16 N. Y. St. R. 24; 1 N. Y. Supp. 259, rev'd 115 N. Y. 203; 26 N. Y. St. R. 295; 22 N. E. 193; Mitchell v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Hun (N. Y.), 535; 5 T. & C. (N. Y.) 122, aff'd 64 N. Y. 155; Carpenter v, Buffalo, N. Y. & P. R. Co., 38 Hun (N. Y.), 116. See further sees. 561, herein, as to nominal damages. 37 Matter of Snedeker v. Snedeker. 164 N. Y. 58, 62, 63, per Bartlett, J. FOR THE PECUNIARY INJURY. § 565 action can be maintained only in the cases in which it could have been brought by deceased had he survived, nevertheless the damages are given upon different prineiples and for different causes.* Again, as we have elsewere stated, the cause of action is for the death and not for the injury to deceased. 39 The re- covery therefore to which the beneficiaries are entitled by reason of the death is not the recompense which would have belonged to deceased had he lived and necessarily does not include damages for the pain and suffering of mind and body endured by the injured person, nor for the personal wrong to him, even though had he not been fatally injured he might himself have recovered therefor. 40 But if it is stipulated that the action by the injured person for his personal injuries shall not abate by his death, then his personal executors may, it is held, recover what he might have done had he lived." § 565. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury "—Exemplary or vindictive damages. — Under the New York statute B the measure of damages is, as we have elsewhere stated "such a sum " as is deemed to be "a fair and just com- pensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the death" and so reads the North Carolina enactment.* 5 And this provi- sion excludes the recovery of exemplary or vindictive damages. 44 38 Wliitford v. Panama R. Co., 23 N. Y. 465, 469. See Dibble v. New York & E. R. Co., 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 183; Littlewood v. Mayor, 89 N. Y. 24; 14 Wkly. Dig. 400, case affirms 47 Super. (N. Y.) 547. See sees. 559- 560, herein. 3 9 Smith v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 158; 35 X. Y. Supp. 1062 (1050); 7 App. Div. (N. Y.) 253; 74 N. Y. St. R. 706; 40 N. Y. Supp. 148. " The statutory liability has no existence in his life- time and accrues only by reason of his death." Stuber v. McEntee, 142 N. Y. 200: 31 Abb. X. C. (X. Y. ) 246; 58 X. Y. St. R. 455; 36 X. E. 878, per O'Brien, J. 40 Etheringtou v. Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co., 88 X. Y. 641, aff g 24 Hun, 235; Whitford v. Panama R. Co., 23 X. Y. 465, 469; Quin v. Moore, 15 X. Y. 435, per Comstock, J.; Oldrield v. New York & Harlem R. Co., 14 X. Y. 310, case affirms 3 E. D. Smith, 103; Lehman v. Brook- lyn, 29 Barb. (X. Y.)234; Dorman v. Broadway R. Co., 16 X. Y. St. R. 753. « Cox v. X( w York C. & H. R. R. Co., 11 Hun (X. Y.), 621. **2 Stov. Annot. Code (ed. 1898), sec. 1904. "Code, \. C 1883, sec. 1499. 41 Wise v. Teeipennin?, 2 Edw. S. C. iN. Y.) 112. See sees. 564, 569, herein. 719 ^§ 566, 567 faii; and just compensation So punitive damages cannot be recovered against a physician for malpractice resulting in a wife's death. 43 § 566. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury " — Solatium — Mental suffering not a factor. — The words of the statute are exclusive in so far as mental suffering, an- guish or grief of the beneficiaries are concerned, since no recov- ery can be had therefor nor for any injury whatsoever to the feelings alone ; for what has been frequently designated as sentimental damages or injuries to the affections or sentiments cannot be pecuniarily measured. 46 § 567. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury " — Loss of society of deceased. — Nothing can be recov- ered for loss resulting from the deprivation of the companionship of relatives or for the comfort therefrom, as such loss is incapa- ble of compensation by any recognized measure of value. 47 And where a husband brought an action for loss occasioned by his wife's injury, it was held that he might recover for loss of com- fort from his wife's society, but upon his death that such right ceased as to that element of damages and did not survive to his personal representatives. 48 "Gray v. Little, 127 N. C. 304; 37 S. C. 270. 46 Felice v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 345; 43 N. Y. Supp. 922; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 637; Etherington v. Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 641, aff'g 24 Hun (N. Y.), 235; Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471, 474; 29 N. Y. 252; Oldfield v. New York & Harlem R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310, aff'g 'i E. D. Smith (N. Y. ), 103; Mclutyre v. New York C. R. Co., 47 Barb. 515, aff'd 37 N. Y. 287; 35 How. (N. Y.) 36; 4 Trans. App. 1; Green v. Hudson River R. Co., 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 25, aff'd 30 How. (N. Y.) 593 n; Lehman v. Brook- lyn, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 234. 47 Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471; 23 How. 363; Felice v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 345; 43 N. Y. 720 Supp. 922, per the court, case of de- ceased husband and father; Ether- ington v. Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 641, per the court, aff'g 24 Hun (N. Y.), 235; case of de- ceased daughter; Green v. Hudson R. R. Co., 2 Abb. Dec. (N. Y.) 277; 2 Keyes, 294, aff'g 31 Barb. 260, aff'g 16 How. (N. Y.) 230; 28 Barb. 9; 30 How. (N. Y.) 593, aff'g 32 Barb. 25. See Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 234; Mclutyre v. New York Cent. R. Co. 37 N. Y. 287; 35 How. (N. Y.) 36; 4 Trans. App. 1, aff'g 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 515. 48 Cregin v. Brooklyn Crosstown R. Co., 83 Hun (N. Y.), 595, rev' g 19 Hun (N. TO, 349; 38 Am. Rep. 474; 75 N. Y. 192. See Foels v. Tona- wanda, 48 N. Y. St. R. 150; 20 N. Y. Supp. 447. FOB THE PECUN1 \i:Y INJUBY. §568 § 568. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury "—Relationship, legal and actual, of deceased to benefi- ciaries.- While a recovery dues nol in New York depend necessarily upon a legal obligation or duty on the part of de- ceased but upon the existence of beneficiaries, 48 nevertheless the relationship, legal and actual, of deceased to the beneficiaries is an important and relevant factor admissible on the question of damages. Thus the legal relation of husband and wife, parent and minor child, are both material upon the points of who are entitled to recover, 50 and they also affect the measure of dam- ages, since a wife is entitled to her support and the father is obligated to support his children during minority, and the latter are also entitled to a certain degree of personal care, nurture, in- struction and training, and in addition this legal relationship entitles him to their earnings and services until majority, as we have elsewhere stated. Again, under certain circumstances an obligation rests upon children to aid their parents." 1 What we have above stated is illustrated by the following decisions. Thus one element in determining the amount of recovery for prospective damages is the relation of the beneficiaries to de- ceased. 52 So "recent statutes changing the rule of the common law recognize the ties of kindred, the mutual dependence of parents and children, husband and wife, and of persons standing in other degrees of relationship." a So the general character of deceased for affection and kindness towards his relatives may be proven, although evidence cannot be given of specific acts. M 49 See next following section. 50 " Husband, wife or next of kin " are the persons entitled under N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 1902 (Stover's Ann. Code, 1898). As to those en- titled under North Carolina Code, see sees. 559, 560, herein. 61 See next following section. 52 Hoii.. 110 N. Y. :,()4. 508; 18 X. Y. St. R. 130 ; 18 X. E. 108, per Earl, J., case affirms 41 Hun (X. Y. ), 404; 8 X. Y. St. K. 138; 25 Wkly. Dig. 46. ' Sec. 91 I which provides that " the father, mother ami children of Sufficient ability of :i poor person 723 § 569 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION although the jury should not be charged that a "father could compel the son to support him in his old age, and the jury had a right to consider that fact," without reference to the condi- tion or inability of the father to support himself and the son's " sufficient ability " or means wherewith to relieve and maintain him as provided by statute, and within the intent thereof, es- pecially so where in the same charge the question is left in doubt as to the father's right to the son's earnings after he became of age. 6 " Again, in the case of infants of very tender years, this duty to support parents after the child reaches majority, and the possibility that the future situation of the parties might bring them within the above decision or statute, would certainly be a factor dependent upon many contingencies and most remote and uncertain. 67 Although the jury, in estimating the pecuniary value of a child to the next of kin could take into consideration all the probable or even possible benefits which might result to them from such child's life, modified, as in their estimation they should be, by all the chances of failure or misfortune, using their own good sense for their guidance. 68 And it is also true that the fact of contribution to support, or the rendering of aid and assistance, or the legal and perhaps the moral obligation to ren- der it, or the legal right to demand the same, or that deceased was the sole support of the beneficiary, or the extent of depend- ency upon deceased for maintenance, or facts showing a reason- able expectation of the continuance of support, contributions thereto, or of aid and assistance, are all admissible in evidence and affect in a greater or less degree the measure of damages. They are also factors which the courts have frequently con- sidered in determining whether the verdict should stand, be set aside, reversed or modified. 61 ' The question of support or de- who is blind, old, lame, impotent or i of Gill v. Rochester & Pittsburg R. decrepit so as to be unable by work Co., 37 Hun (N. Y. ), 107. to maintain himself must at theirown ! 68 Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice charge relieve and sustain him." Co., 110 N. Y. 504, 508; 18 N. Y. St. 66 Keenan v. Brooklyn City 11. Co., 145 N. Y. 348; 64 N. Y. St. R. 813; 40 N. E. 15, rev'g 8 Misc. (N. Y. ) 601 ; R. 130; 18 N. E. 108, language of Earl, J., case affirms 41 Hun (N. Y. ), 404; 3 N. Y. St. R. 133; 25 Wkly. 60 N. Y. St. R. 831; 29 N. Y. Supp. Dig. 46. 325. 69 Evidence is admissible as to the 67 See the somewhat analogous case extent to which deceased contributed 724 FOR THE PECUNIARY INJURY, S 569 pendency also involves primarily that of the existence of bene- ficiaries which is necessary to be shown in New York, even though recovery may be had by them without proof of depend- ency for support, 10 as it is not required that the degree of kin- to the support of his family. Seifter v. Brooklyn Heights B. Co.,66N. V. Supp. 1107; 55 App. Div. (N. Y.) 10. Deceased son la years old gave wages ■ to his father. Twist v. Rochester, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.)3<)7: 55 N. Y. Supp. 850. Deceased woman 68 years old, dependent to some extent for sup- port upon contributions from her children. Phalen v. Rochester R. Co., 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 448: 52 \. Y. Supp. 836; 28 Civ. Proc. (N. Y. ) 42. Deceased was 33 years old and sole support of family. Felice v. New York C. & H. R.R. Co., 14 App. Div. (N. Y.)345; 43 N. Y. Supp. 922; 1 Am. \eg. Rep. 637. Deceased daughter comfortably supported father, a penniless and dependent old man, and she was only child upon whom he could depend for sup- port in his old age. Purcell v. Lamer, 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 33; 43 N. Y. Supp. 988; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 57. Deceased, a woman 54 years old, had six children more or less dependent upon her for support. Henning v. Caldwell, 45 X. Y. St. R. 373: is N. Y. Supp. 339, affd 137 X. Y. 553; 50 N. Y r . St. R. 931: 33 \. E. 337. De- ceased son contributed to bis moth- er's support. Waldele v. New York C. & H. R, K. Co., 29 Hun (X. Y.), 35, rev'gGl How. (X. Y. ) 350, rev' d 95 N. Y'. 274. Deceased daughter had contributed from $300 to |400 a year to her parents' support. Bowles v. Rome, YVatertown R. Co., 46 Hun (X. Y\), 324; 12 X. Y. St. R. 457, affd 113 X. Y. 643; 22 X. Y. St. R. 997; 21 N. E. 414. Action for death of sister aged 14: father bad not provided for family for years. Pineo v. New York C. R. Co, 34 Hun (X. Y. ), 80, affd 99 N. Y. 644. Deceased was a wife and mother; all her earnings were used in tlie family's support Cregin v. Brook- lyn Cro8stown R. Co., 18 Hun (X. Y'. ), 368. Value of support of wile and children by father may be con- sidered. Altborfv. Wolfe, 2 Hilt. i \. Y. ) 344, affd 22 \. Y. 355. See further as to necessity of showing support or dependency, legal duty, etc., Lockwood v. Xew Y'ork, L. K. & W. R. Co.. 98 X. Y. 523, aff'g 20 Wklv. Dig. 341; Quin v. Moore, 15 X. Y. 432; Keller v. Xew York ( . R. Co., 2 Abb. Dec. (X. Y. ) 4S0; 24 How. (N. Y.) 172, aff'g 17 How. (N. Y.) 102; 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 44 n. 70 Under the present Xew York Code (Stover's Annot. Code, L898), sec. 1902. " the executor or ad- ministrator of a decedent who has left him or her surviving a hus- band, wife or next of kin, may main- tain an action," etc., but the former statute read " widow and next of kin," and the action was maintain- able where there was next of kin only, and no widow, or where tbere was a widow only and no next of kin. McMahon v. Mayor, 33 X. Y. 642; Quin v. Moore, 15 V Y. 432; Oldlield v. New York & Harlem R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310, aff'g 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 103; Keller v. New York ('. R. Co., 2 Abb. Dee. | N. Y.) 480; 2 1 How. (N. Y.) 172, aff'g 17 How (N. Y.) 102; 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 44 u Safford v. Drew. 3 Duer I N. Y. ). 027: "Next of kin" is defined by section 1905 of the Code of Xew Y'ork as having the same meaning as 1-25 § 5 "° DEATH— FAIR AND .JUST COMPENSATION dred should be such as to create the duty of sustenance, support or education. 71 But in North Carolina the existence of next of kin seems unnecessary to maintain the action. 72 § 570. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury "- Reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit — Pro- spective damages. — Future proximate results as well as past consequences should be considered, although prospective dam- ages are incapable of being accurately estimated. The compen- sation for the pecuniary injury includes the deprivation of what reasonably may have been expected, by those for whose benefit the recovery is had, if the deceased had not been killed. The damages may cover those which the jury may believe, and find, will in the future result from the death as the proximate cause thereof. In brief, the money value of the reasonable expecta- tion of pecuniary benefit to the next of kin from the continu- ance of the life of deceased should be considered. 73 And the that given by id., section 1870, and in- cludes those entitled to share under the law of distribution of personal property, " other than a surviving husband or wife." That existence of beneficiaries necessary, see Davidow v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (U. S. C. C. D. N. Y.), 85 Fed. 043; Dickins v. New York C. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 158; Lucas v. New York C. R. Co., 21 Barb. (N. Y.) 245 ; Saf- ford v. Drew, 3 Duer (N. Y.), 627; 12 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 150. Examine Hegerick v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258; 1 N. E. 787, rev'g32 Hun (N. Y.), 141; 5 Civ. Proc. 228; Quin v. Moore, 15 N. Y. 432; Oldfield v. New York & Harlem R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310, aff'g 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.), 103; Keller v. New York C. R. Co., 24 How. (N. Y. ) 172; 2 Abb. Dec. 102, aff'g 28 Barb. 44 n.; 17 How. (N. Y. ) 102; Yertore v. Wiswall, 16 How. (N. Y.) 8, 28. •! Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 474, cited in Matter of Sne- deker v. Snedeker, 164 N. Y. 58, 63. '•- Warner v. Western N. C. R. Co., 726 94 N. C. 250. This case is cited to the point that the law ordinarily will presume that a deceased person has heirs, and that it is not necessary to name the heirs in Budd v. Meriden Elec. R. Co., 69 Conn. 272; 37 Atl. 683; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 335, 342, per Andrews, Ch. J. Examine Kessler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154. It is impor- tant, however, to note that the North Carolina statute differs from the New York statute as to the persons who are or may become entitled to the amount recovered as damages. See sec. 901. herein as to distribution of damages. 78 Thomas v. Utica & B. R. R. Co., 6 Civ. Proc. (N. Y.) 353, aff'd 34 Hun (N. Y.), 626, aff'd 98 N. Y. 49; Carpenter v. Buffalo, N. Y. & P. R. Co., 50 Hun (N. Y. ), 116; Houghkiik v. Delaware & H. C. Co., 92 N. Y. 219, rev'g 28 nun (N. Y.), 407; 15 Wkly. Dig. 522, which aff'd 11 Abb. X. C. (N. Y.)72; 63 Horo. (N. Y.) 328; 4 Month. L. Bull. 65; Keenan v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 145 N. Y. 348, FOB THE PECUNIARY INJURY. 570 statutes recognize the reasonable expectation that pecuniary aid or assistance, even outside of legal obligations, will be ex- tended by relatives to each other in case of necessity, and upon this basis have given a statutory action for the benefit of the widow and next of kin. 71 So the benefit of the counsel of a hus- band and father are of pecuniary value.'"' In New York it is held that it does not follow that damages should be red need although it does not appear that the next of kin would have been benefited by the continuance of decedent's life. 76 So the prol table earnings which deceased's family would receive after the cost of his own living was deducted, were considered in determining whether a verdict was excessive. 77 350, 351, per Haight, J.; 64 N. Y. St. R. 813; 40 N. E. 15; Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 110 X. Y. 504; 18 N. N. St. R. 130; 18 N. E. 108, aff'g 41 Hun (N. Y.), 404; 3 N. Y. St. R. 133; 25 Wkly. Dig. 4G; Stanl v. Grand St. & N. R. Co., 107 N. Y. 625; 1 Silv. C. A. 516; 11 N. Y. St. R. 352; 25 Wkly. Dig. 241; Lockwood v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 523, aff'g 20 Wkly. Dig. 341; Ihl v. Forty-Second St. &. G. St. F. U. Co., 47 N. Y. 317; O'Mara v. Hud- son R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 445; Til- ley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471; 29 N. Y. 252; Oldtield v. New V«»rk & Harlem R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310, aff'g 3 Ed. Smith (N. Y.), 103; John- son v. Long Isl. R. Co., 80 Hun (N. Y.), 306; 62 N. Y. St. R. 46; 30 N. Y. Supp. 318, affd 144 N. Y. 719; 70 N. Y. St. R. 808; 29 N. E. 857; Ganiard v. Rochester City & 13. R. Co., 50 Hun ( N. Y. ), 22 ; 18 N. Y. St. R. 692 ; 2 N. Y. Supp. 470, affd 121 N. Y. 661; 24 N. E. 1092; Cregin v. Brooklyn Cross- town R. Co., 19 Hun (N. Y.), 341, case rev'd 83 N. Y. 595; Cregin v. Brooklyn Crosstown R. Co., IS Hun (N. Y.), 368; Kelly v. Twenty-Third St. R. Co., 14 Daly (N. Y.), 41S; 14 N. Y. St. 609 ; 27 Wkly. Dig. 572, aff d 113 N. Y. 628; 22 N. Y. St. R. 994; 20 N. E. 878; Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154. As to jury not being limited to actual damages specifically proven and their right to consider prospec- tive or indefinite damages, see Coun- tryman v. Fonda, J. & G. R. Co., 166 X. Y. 201; 59 N. E. 822, rev'g 54 N. Y. Supp. 1098. 74 Butler v. Manhattan R. Co., 143 X. Y. 417, 420; per Andrews, Ch. J.; 62 N. Y. St. R. 432; 38 N. E. 454. 75 Felice v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 14 A pp. Div. (N. Y.) 345; 43 X. Y. Supp. 922; 1 Am. Xeg. Rep. 637. See (Jill v. Rochester & P. R. Co., 37 Hun (X. Y.), 107. 70 Phalen v. Rochester R. Co., 31 App. Div. 448; 52 N. Y. Supp. 836; 28 Civ. Proc. (N. Y.) 42. In this case deceased was a woman 68 years old; she was dependent to some ex- tent upon her children and was not in robust health; $800 was held not excessive notwithstanding sec. 1904, N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. 77 Taylor v. Long Island R. R. Co., 16 App. Div. (N. Y.) 1; 44 X. Y. Supp. 820; 2 Am. Xeg. Rep. 608. In this case deceased was a laborer. As to deduction of earning of benefi- ciaries, see Althorf v. Wolfe, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 344, case affd 22 X. Y. 355. The question is what were the prob- 79.7 §§ 571, 572 FAIU AND JtfRT COMPENSATION §571. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Prospect of inheriting. — The jury have the right to consider not only the amount the deceased would have brought to the next of kin while living, but their prospect of inheriting from him after death. 78 But the prospect that children would upon their father's death and intestacy have received an estate increased by the value of the earnings of a deceased wife and mother does not constitute a proper item of damages in an action for her death, brought by him as administrator of his wife. 79 So evidence is admissible in an action by a husband as his wife's administrator, as to the amount of her earnings and probable profits, where she had no descendants, and under the Code her husband was entitled to her personal estate. 80 § 572. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury" — Physical and financial condition, age, number of family, etc. — When admissible. — The age, number, sex, phy- sical and financial condition and the circumstances of the next of kin have been considered in numerous cases, either by the court below or by the appellate court in reviewing the case. In most of the decisions, it is true, there has been no discus- sion as to the admissibility of such evidence, and in some, the relevancy is apparent. Again, even though these factors may able chances of pecuniary benefit from a continuance of the life under all the circumstances, and that the result may be somewhat subject to chance does not prevent a recovery. Thomas v. Utica & B. R. R. Co., 6 Civ. Proc. (N. Y.) 353, case affd 34 Hun (N. Y.), 626, which is affd 93 X. Y. 49. 78 Eeenan v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 145 N. Y. 348, 351, per Haight, J.; 64 X. Y. St. R. 813; 40 X. E. 15. This was a case of a minor son's death. It reverses 8 Misc. (X. Y.), 601; 60 N. Y. St. R. S31; 29 X. Y. Supp. 325. The court cites on the above propo- sition, Johnson v. Long Island R. Co., 80 Hun (X. Y.), 306; 62 X. Y. St. R. 46; 30 X. Y. Supp. 318, affd 144 X. Y. 719; 70 X. Y. St. R. 868; 728 29 X. E. 357; Thomas v. Utica & B. R. R. Co., 6 Civ. Proc. (X. Y.) 626, case affd 34 Hun (X. Y.), 626, affd 98 X. Y. 49. See sees. 570, 575, herein. This proposition differs from that involved in Terry v. Jew- ett, 7 Hun (X. Y.), 395; 78 N. Y. 338, as this relates to the right to receive certain benefits as damages, while the Terry case merely relates to the reduction of benefits by the inheritance. See sec. 574, herein. ' 9 Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 24 X. Y. 471; 23 How. (X. Y.) 363. 80 Meyer v. Hart, 23 App. Div. (X. Y.) 131; 82 X. Y. St. R. 907; 48 X. Y. Supp. 904, under X. Y. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 2732 (relating to order of distribution), sec. 2734 (re- lating to estates of married women). FOR THE PECUNIARY [NJXJBY. §572 not be directly material for the express purpose of enhancing or mitigating damages, yet they may be relevant and material as showing or tending to prove certain other relevant, material and competent, evidential facts or elements. 81 Thus that a father is 81 See Lockwood v. New York, L. E. & YV. K. Co., 20 Wkly. Dig. 341, aff'd 98 N. Y. 523; lloughkirk v. Delaware & H. Cau. Co., 92 X. Y. 219, rev'g 28 Hun (N. Y\), 407; 15 Wkly. Dig. 522, which aff'd 11 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 72; 63 How. 328; 4 Month. Law Bull. 65; Lustig v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 65 Hun (N. Y.), 547; 48 N. Y. St. R. 916; 20 N. Y. Supp. 417. Wife was de- prived of her home and support. Beecher v. Long Island R. Co., 53 App. Div. (N. Y.) 324; 65 N. Y. Supp. 642. Ages, number and de- pendency of children considered in action for father's death. Wallace v. Third Ave. R. Co., 36 App. Div. (N. Y.) 57; 55 N. Y. Supp. 132; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 215. Deceased left a wife, son and daughter. Cooper v. New York, O. & W. R. Co., 25 App. Div. (N. Y.) 383; 49 N. Y. Supp. 481. Deceased left a wife and three children of whom he was the sole support. Felice v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 14 App. Div. (N. Y. ) 345; 43 N. Y. Supp. 922; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 637. Deceased loft six children more or less dependent upon her. Henning v. Caldwell, 45 N. Y. St. R. 373; 18 N. Y. Supp. 339, aff'd 137 N. Y. 553; 50 N. Y. St. R. 931; 33 N. E. 337. Surviving father was a penniless and dependent old man. Purcell v. Laurer, 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 33; 43 N. Y. Supp. 988; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 57. Surviving father was 61 years old. Seeley v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 402; 40 \. Y. Supp. 866. Deceased woman's family con- sisted of a husband 65 years old and live grown up sons, only three of whom lived at home, and deceased had no .source of income. Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 6 App. Div. (X. Y.) 4l'; 39 X. Y. Supp. 01:;. The fact that deceased left a wid- owed mother and adult brothers and sisiers was considered. Kane v. Mitchell Transp. Co., 90 Hun (N. Y.), 65; 70 X. Y. St. R. 203; 35 N. Y. Supp. 581; aff'd 153 X. Y. 680. Deceased woman's family con- sisted of husband and daughter for whom she performed the household work. Lyons v. Second Ave. R. Co.. 89 Hun (X. Y. ). 374; 69 X. Y. St. R. 816; 35 X. Y. Supp. 372, aff'd 152 X. Y. 654; 47 X. E. 1109. Deceased lived with his father, his next of kin, who was 58 years old. Fitzgerald v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 88 Hun (X. Y.), 359; 68 X. Y. St. R. 762; 34 X. Y. Supp. 702, case was rev'd 154 X. Y. 203; 48 N. E. 514, upon insufficient e\idence as to cause of death. That parent was aged and infirm and his health and pecuniary circumstances and that he had an aged wife, both of thorn being without means of support, may be shown where he issuing for an adult daughter's death and is the only next of kin. Bowles v. Rome, Watertown R. Co., 46 Hun (X. Y r ), 324; 12 X. Y. St. R. 457; 113 X. Y. 643; 22 N. Y. St. R. 997; 21 X. E. 414. Age and circumstances of next of kin should be shown to sustain a verdict. Carpenter v. Buffalo, N. Y. & P. R. Co., 38 Hun (X. Y.), 116. So the occupation of the father and circumstances and condition in life of the parents may he considered in 729 8 572 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST C< >M 1'KNSATION aged, poor and unable to support himself, may be proven in connection with evidence that a deceased son, for whose death the action for damages is brought, might have become of suf- ficient abilit\ r or means to support him, except for the death, and so become obligated for such support. 82 And logically this decision should, by virtue of the criminal code, extend to the mother and children of sufficient ability of a poor person who is blind, old, lame-, impotent or decrepit, so as to be unable by work to maintain himself,* 3 provided such poor person is within the statutory class and " next of kin." w And in this connection it may be stated that the sum to be recovered rep- resents the entire pecuniary loss to each and all the relatives, as a class, who are mentioned in the statute. 85 Again, in case of children of deceased, their number, ages, sex and condition of health may be proven, also their situations with reference to deceased, whether they are married or unmarried, whether they lived with deceased or away from home, whether they are de- pendent upon him or self-supporting, and it may also be shown that such children have no property of their own, and the character of services, if any, rendered by them to deceased in an action for a child's death. Ihl v. Forty-Second St. & G. St. F. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317, 321. So the fact that the mother had no means of her own may be shown in an action for her son's death. Waldele v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 29 Hun (N. Y.), 35, rev'g 61 How. (N. Y.) 350, rev'd 95 N. Y. 274. Three children survived, of whom two were mar- ried and lived away from deceased who was a widow about 50 years old, likely to became dependent within ten years. Mclntyre v. New York C. R. Co., 47 Barb. (N. Y.) 515, aff'd 37 N. Y. 287; 35 How. (N. Y.) 36; 4 Trans. App. 1. In an action for death of her son, the plaintiff was permitted to prove that she was disqualified from working, owing to a malady, and that she had no means at the time of the son's death. Harlinger v. New York 730 C. & H. R. R. Co., 15 Wkly. Dig. (N. Y.) 392, aff'd 92 N. Y. 661. 82 Keenan v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 145 N. Y. 348; 64 N. Y. St. R. 813; 40 N. E. 15, rev'g 8 Misc. (N. Y.) C01; 60 N. Y. St. R. 831; 29 N. Y. Supp. 325; Johnson v. Long Island R. Co., 80 Hun (N. Y.), 306; 62 N. Y. St. R. 46; 30 N. Y. Supp. 318, aff'd 144 N. Y. 719; 79 N. Y. St. R. 868; 29 N. E. 857. 63 N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. sec. 914. The complaint showed that deceased left a mother, her next of kin, de- pendent upon her. Green v. Hudson R. R. Co., 16 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 263, aff'd 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 260, which was aff'd on appeal. 84 See sec. 573, herein. 85 Snedeker v. Snedeker, 164 N. Y. 58, 63, per Bartlett, J., aff'g 47 App. Div. (N. Y.)471. FOR THE i'i:crviAl:V IN.liUY. ^o.L' return for support, as in the case where an unmarried daughter did the housework ; it also appearing thai she was afflicted with a disease which incapacitated her from labor. 86 As we have stated elsewhere, the jury may consider those factors of mental and physical health and condition, etc., of deceased, which show what probable and possible pecuniary benefits the next of kin would have derived from the continuance of life of de- ceased.^ And throughout all the decisions it is apparent that since the pecuniary injury only is to be considered, evidence is admissible as to the factors of pecuniary loss, present and pro- spective, 88 and this necessarily involves the consideration of the pecuniary or financial condition of deceased at the time of his death and of his reasonably probable accumulations had he lived. 811 So that proof is relevant and material which shows the situation, means, circumstances and physical or financial con- dition of deceased. Thus the fact that the father of a deceased child was prosperous and paid for said son's education and did not rely upon him for a source of income, may be considered in determining the inadequacy of the damages/' 1 And the receipt of an adult son's earnings and the use thereof in paying house rent and supporting a family, of whom deceased was one, may properly be proven. 91 So proof of the mother's financial cir- cumstances is relevant upon the question of her pecuniary damage from the loss of her son.*' And evidence of the father's pecuniary condition, in that he required his child's services to maintain his household, is competent. 93 Again, the circumstances and condition in life of a widowed mother, suing for the death of her youngest child, and the fact that she had three minor children was considered, not only in deciding that the dam- ages were not excessive, but also as being material in deter- 88 Lockwood v. New York, L. E. j 91 Lipp v. Otis Brothers & Co., & W. R. Co., 08 X. Y. 523; 20 Wkly. 161 N. V. 559, 563, per Parker, Cli. J. ; Dig. ;J4l. 56 N. E. 79, ease reverses 28 A pp. 87 See sees. 5GG, 570, herein. Div. (N. Y. ) 228. 68 See sec. 570, herein. M Fowler v. Buffalo Furnace C<>., 89 See sec. r>7:>, herein. 41 App. Div. (X. Y.) 84; 58 X. Y. 90 Morris v. Metropolitan St. Ky. Supp. 223, appeal dismissed 1G0 N. Co., 51 App. Div. (X. Y.) 512; 04 X. I Y. C65. Y. St. R. 878; 30 Civ. Proc. R. (X. | 93 Pressman v. Mooney, 5 App. Y.) 371. Div. (X. Y.) 121; 39 X. V. Supp. 44. 31 § 573 DEATH—FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION mining that the failure to prove her age was not fatal to a re- covery,'" and evidence is admissible that deceased left no estate and the administratrix may so testify. 96 And in North Carolina the means, skill and business qualifications, etc., may be con- sidered.'" 5 Again, the financial and physical condition of the parents may be proven, as where the mother of the deceased, a son thirteen years old, had no means and was unable to work, because of a malady which she had. 97 And the admission of proof of financial circumstances has been sanctioned in the case of a mother for the purpose of determining the amount of her pecuniary damage for the loss by death of her son. 95 But the fact that the parents might by reason of imbecility or feebleness, arising from old age or other causes, possibly become dependent upon others for advice and counsel is too remote to constitute a basis of recovery for the loss by death of a son seventeen years old. 99 § 573. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury"— Physical and financial condition, age, number of family, etc. — When inadmissible. — Evidence is inadmissible as to the poverty, misfortunes or riches, the number of the fam- ily, inability to work or of any other fact relating to the situa- tion, condition or circumstances of the brothers, sisters or other relatives of deceased, who are not the next of kin, where an ac- tion is brought by a father to recover damages for his adult son's killing, and he is the sole next of kin and entitled to the entire damages which may be recovered. 100 Nor can evidence be 9 * Moskovitz v. Lighte,68 Hun (N. Y.), 102; 52 N. Y. St. R. 216; 22 N. Y. Supp. 732, aff'd 140 X. Y. 619; 55 N. Y. St. R. 929; 35 N. E. 890. But see sec. 593, herein. 95 Kooserowska v. Glasser, 8 N. Y. Supp. 197. 96 Benton v. North Carolina R. Co., 122 N. C. 1007; 30 S. E. 323. 97 Harlinger v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 15 Wkly. Dig. (N. Y.) 392, aff'd 92 N. Y. 661. 98 Fowler v. Buffalo Furnace Co., 41 App. Div. (N. Y.) 84; 58 N. Y. 732 Supp. 223, appeal dismissed 160 N. Y. 665. 99 Gill v. Rochester & Pitts. R. R. Co., 37 Hun (N. Y.), 107. 100 Lipp v. Otis Bros. & Co., 161 N. Y. 559; 56 N. E. 79 (under N. Y. Code Civ. Pioc. sees. 1903, 1904, 2732, subd 7, and sec. 1870), iev'g28App. Div. (N. Y.) 228. The court said in that case: "We are unable to agree with the prevailing opinion of the appellate division in so far as it ex- cuses, if it does not fully justify, the course of the plaintiff in calling as FOR THE PECUNIARY INJUKY. § 574 given as to the property of the mother of a deceased wife, and an instruction to disregard such evidence does not render it harmless. 1 Nor can the number of children of deceased be proven in North Carolina. 2 § 574. »' Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- his last witness his own son to tell the jury about the children and grandchildren of the plaintiff and thus calling attention to the great opportunities that the plaintiff had to make a charitable use of any sur- plus moneys he might have after satisfying his own personal necessi- ties. The evidence could serve no other purpose than to arouse the sympathies of the jury, for none of the persons described were next of kin of deceased, nor were their riches or poverty entitled to consideration at the hands of the jury. . . . George Lipp died leaving no wife or children but he left a father, this plaintiff, who was his sole next of kin (Code, see. 1870 and sec. 2732, subd. 7), and as such entitled to the entire amount of recovery in this action. . . . From the first question to the last, cov- ering nearly three printed pages of the record, the plaintiff's counsel asked of the witness not a question which did not relate to the brothers, sisters and nephews and nieces of the deceased, not one of whom was next of kin of the deceased, who alone were entitled to be taken into con- sideration by the jury in determining the amount of damages which they should award. . . . The first ques- tion asked of the witness after he had testilied that he was the son of the plaintiff and a married man was: ' Q. When were you married? ' And after objection had been overruled and the exception noted, the answer <-ame, ' I was married ten years ago. Cj. Have you a wife and family? A. I have, and a big family, too.' Other questions related to sisters, both married and unmarried, the last question eliciting the answer that the unmarried sister was not able to work. Every question was objected to and the learned counsel for the plaintiff was fully apprised of the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff had no legal right to have the jury consider the mis- fortunes or the poverty of the broth- ers and sisters and nephews and nieces of the dead man, in determin- ing the amount of compensation which should be awarded to the father for the injuries sustained by the death of his son. . . . That the answers elicited from the witness were irrelevant and immaterial to the issues presented for trial by the pleadings is not open to question nor should it, we think, be said it was harmless. . . . The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted. 11 Id. 562-565, per Parker, Ch. J. It appeared that the deceased son was 30 years old. But see Moskovitz v. Lighte, 68 Hun (X. Y. ), 102. aff'd 140 X. Y. 619, considered under sec. 572. herein; Bowles v. Rome, Watertown R. Co., 46 Hun (N. Y), 324, aff'd 113 X. Y. 643, considered in first note to sec. 572, herein. 1 Malonee v. New York C. R. Co., 20 Wkly. Dig. (X. Y. ) 252, action by husband. 2 Burton v. Wilmington, etc.. EL Co., 82 X. C. 504; Kessler v. Smith, 66 X. C. 154. 733 575 DEATH— FAIK AMD JUST COMPENSATION jury " — Financial advantages accruing from death inadmissi- ble to reduce damages. — The jury have no right to consider in reduction of damages the financial advantages accruing to de- cedent's next of kin in acquiring property of deceased by reason of his negligent or wrongful killing. 3 § 575. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury "—Probable accumulations. —Inasmuch as the pecuniary loss includes, as we have stated elsewhere, probable and possi- ble prospective benefits, it is evident that probable accumula- tions are necessarily an important, relevant and material factor, although it is equally self-evident that the net sum which would represent a husband's or parent's earnings during his life expect- ancy would, in probably a large majority of cases, amount to little or nothing as probable accumulations, such net sum being depend- ent, of course, principally upon the size of his family or number of dependents, his income and habits of saving and expenditure, although the other factors of age, health, strength, business, qualifications, ability, activity, skill and probable increase or decrease of physical or mental powers are all of weight in de- termining whether there would be any probable accumulations, and if so, their amount.' In this connection it may be stated that a mother's capacity to conduct business and make money may be considered, 5 although her earnings and probable accum- ulations will be affected, in so far as her children's right in and to such probable estate is concerned, by the fact that their father's life intervenes." Again, the measure of damages is the present value of the net income or net pecuniary worth of de- ceased, and this is arrived at by ascertaining his gross income and deducting therefrom the cost of his own living and expen- ditures, and then estimating the present or net value of the ac- cumulations of such net income, based upon his life expectancy.' 3 Terry v. Jewett, 17 Hun (N. Y.), 395, aff'd 78 N". Y. 338. 4 See Mclntyre v. New York C. R. Co., 37 N. Y. 287. See sees. 570, 571, herein. See last two cases under last note to this section. 5 Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 29 N. Y. 252. 734 o Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471; 23 How. (N. Y.) 36. See as to wife's and mother's earnings, sees. 562, 563, hereiu and notes. 7 Mendenhall v. North Carolina R. Co., 123 N. C. 275; 31 S. E. 480; Ben- ton v. North Carolina R. Co.. 122 N. C. 1007; 30 S. E. 333; Burns v. Ashe- FOK THE PECUNIAR* INJ1 l:Y § 570 And it is also held that a refusal to instruct that the measure of damages would be the present value of accumulations aris- ing from deceased's life expectancy is not cured by a charge that such damage is the net money value of the deceased's life to those dependent upon him. 8 § 576. ''Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury "Funeral expenses and expenses for sickness, etc.— Necessary funeral expenses are recoverable where the beneficia- ries are legally liable therefor, and this rule does not necessitate a liability for such expenses on the part of all of said beneficiaries, 9 and a physician's bill and funeral expenses of a child may be recovered. 10 So also may expenses of nursing and medical at- tendance, 11 and the item of expenses so incurred survives the boro & M. R. Co. (N. C), 34 S. E. 495; Burton v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 82 N. C. 504; 84 N. C. 192; Kess- ler v. Smith, 60 N. C. 154. See Coley v. Statesville, 121 X. C. 301; 28 S. E. 482. * Pickett v. Wilmington & W. R. Co., 117 N. C. 616; 23 S. E. 264; 30 L. R. A. 257. Net earnings, health and habits are factors. Blackwell v. Moorman, 111 N. C. 151; 16 S. E. 12; 17 L. R. A. 72! t. 9 Murphy v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 445 ; 14 Wkly. Dig. 150, all- 25 Bun, 311; 13 Wkly. Dig. 213. "Under a similar statute in England it has been held that funeral expenses cannot be recovered. Dalton v. Southeastern R. Co., 4 C. B. N. S. 296; Boulter v. Webster, 13 Weekly Rep. 289. But in this country, so far as I can discover, it has been uniformly held that the plaintiff can recover such expenses if the law imposes upon the relatives for whose benefit the suit is brought tin' obligation to bear them. Penn. R. Co. v. Bantoin,54 Pa. St. 495; Owen v. Brock-Schmidt, ."•4 Mo. 285; Roeder v. Ormsby, 22 How. Pr. 276;" Murphy v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 445, 446, 447, per Earl, J. In this case the ac- tion was brought by the husband for the benefit of himself and children. and it was also decided that " it is immaterial that the children were not bound to defray these funeral expenses, aud that all of them fell exclusively upon the husband. They form au item of the pecuniary loss caused by the death, and were proper for the consideration of the jury in estimating the damages to be awarded.' 1 Id. 447, Andrews, Ch. J., dissented. That the funeral expenses were $120 was considered with other factors in determining that a verdict of $150 was grossly insufficient for a wife's killing. Meyer v. Hart, 23 A]. p. Div. (N. Y.) 131; 48 N. V. Supp. 1104. Funeral expenses are recoverable. Stuebing v. Marshall. 2 Civ. Proc. (N. Y. ) 77, aff'd 2 Civ. Proc. (N. Y.) 81; 10 Daly (N. Y.), tiit;. Death of minor child. Green v. Hudson R. R. Co.. 16 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 263, aff'd 31 Barb. 263. 10 Pack v. Mayor, etc., :? N". Y. (3 Comst.) 489. u Stuebing v. Marshall. 2 Civ. 735 § 577 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION death of a husband pending an action for negligent injury occa- sioning the wife's death. 19 But only such expenses are recov- erable as are necessary and reasonable, although these facts need not be averred, and in an action for an infant's killing, an allegation that the father was compelled to pay a certain speci- fied sum of nione}' for medical attendance, funeral and other expenses caused by the death is sufficient on demurrer. 13 In connection with the allowance of such expenses it is held that the value of a physician's services is not necessary to be proven, since the bill is sufficient evidence. 14 §577. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury "—Funeral and medical expenses, support, etc., paid by defendant— Mitigation of damages. — The fact that defend- ant has paid for the support, maintenance and medical expenses of deceased from the time of his injury to his death, and also for his burial cannot be shown in mitigation of damages. 15 With all due respect to the learned court, it is difficult to reconcile so much of this decision, as relates to medical and funeral expenses, with those cases elsewhere noted herein, which permit the re- covery thereof, for logically if such expenses are a proper element of damages, it should make no difference whether the defendant paid them voluntarily before the death or by way of a judgment and as part of the damages after death. But it is not, how- ever, intended by this criticism to convey the idea that such payment by defendant should operate other than as a reduction of the damages to the amount so paid. We are encouraged somewhat in making this criticism by a case decided in 1894, in the same state, where the claim was that the payment of a cer- Proc. (N. Y. ) 77, aft'd 2 Civ. Proc. (N. Y.) 81; 10 Daly (N. Y.), 406. The action in this case was for a minor child's death. See Green v. Hudson R. K. Co., 10 How. Pi. (N. Y.)263, aff'd 31 Barb. 200. Exam- ine Murray v. Usher, 117 N. Y. 542; 27 N. Y. St. R. 928; 23 N. E. 5(54, aff'g 46 Hun (N. Y. ), 404; 11 N. Y. Hun ( X. Y. ), 341. See S. C, 75 N. Y. 194; 56 How. (N. Y.) 465, which affirms 56 How. (N. Y.) 32. '» Roeder v. Ormsby, 13 Abb. (N. Y.) 334; 11 How. (N. Y.)270. 14 Morseman v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 10 N. Y. Supp. 105; 32 N. Y. St. R. 61; 16 Daly (N. Y.), 249. is Murray v. Usher, 117 N. Y. 242; St. R. 7S9; 27 Wkly. Dig. 411. 27 N. Y. St. R. 928; 23 N. E. 564, 12 Cregin v. Brooklyn Crosstowu R. | aff'g 46 Hun, 404; 11 N. Y. St. R. Co.. 83 N. Y. 595, case reverses 19 789: 27 Wkly. Dig. 411. 736 FOB THE PECUNIARY IN.H'KY. 578 tain sum of money by defendant before suit brought operated as a release, which point was decided adversely to defendant, upon the facts before the court, but it was held that it might, without doubt, be shown, as the facts were, that the payment was made and that it was applied to the expenses of the funeral and burial of deceased, and that the jury should credit the amount to defendant in estimating the damages, if any, which the plain- tiff should recover." 1 This certainly is a most logical and just con- clusion operating to the benefit of parties in needy circumstances and depriving those entitled to recover for the death, of none of their rights to a fair and just compensation. It is true that in this latter case the expenses were all incurred after the death, while in the former, only a part thereof were for expenses so incurred. But the decisions are that expenses of the sickness and of the funeral are both recoverable as an element of dam- ages for the killing, and the 1894 ruling ought to cover all ex- penses concerning which evidence is admissible to increase the damages. § 578. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury " — Lite expectancy — Mortality tables. — Life expectancy is, as we have seen, 17 an important factor, and it involves the con- sideration of other elements. Thus the fact that a mother has only a life expectancy of ten years may bring into consideration the probability that she will become dependent upon her children and so affect the measure of damages. 1 * So earning capacity may be affected in that it would in certain cases prob- ably diminish, as advanced age lessened the life expectancy and ability to earn continuously." Again, the probability that a 16 Stuber v. McEntee, 142 X. Y. •200; 81 Abb. X. C. 246; 58 X. Y. St. II. 455; 36 X. E. 878, case reverses 47 X. Y. St. R. 294: 10 X. Y. Sup]). 900. The amount paid was $400, which was used by the family to pay the funeral expenses and the cosl of a lot in the cemetery and to pur- chase a gravestone to mark the bu- rial place. 17 See sec. 562, herein and note. "Mclntyre v. New York C. R. Co., 47 47 Barb. (X. Y. ) 515, case affd 37 X\ Y. 2ST: :'.". How. 36: 4 Trans. App. 1. See Purcell v. Earner, 14 App. Div. (X. Y. ) 33; 43 X. Y. Supp. 988; 2 Am. Xeg. Rep. 57. "Taylor v. Long Island R. Co.. 16 App. Div. (X. Y. ) 1: 14 X. Y. Supp. 820; _' Am. Neg. Kep. i'»0s. per Hatch, .1., who in considering whether the verdict was excessive says that the deceased was ti: 1 . years "hi and "taking into consideration his 7:37 §579 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION very old man would live a longtime may be important upon the question of his pecuniary loss by the deprivation of his support through defendant's negligence, and the jury having him before them may judge from his appearance something of the years al- lotted to him in the future. 20 So the fact that exceptional activ- ity promised long life to a man even though in advanced years constitutes a factor. 21 And the probable duration of a life may be shown by the Northampton tables, 22 although as above stated the jury may judge of this fact from the party's appearance. But something more than the probable duration of the life of deceased and of one relative whom he was supporting should be considered. 23 So proof of the life expectancy of the surviving parents would seem to be necessary in an action for a child's death. 21 And in North Carolina the life expectancy of a de- ceased child, when not fixed by statute, is a matter of evidence. 25 And mortuary tables embodied in the Code may be considered by the jury without having been put in evidence. 26 § 579. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of husband. — The primary question in the case of a husband's death, as in other cases, is what was the probable chance of pecuniary benefit to the widow as well, also, as the extent of the present, actual pecuniary loss. In deter- probable duration of life, and his ability to earn continuously, which could not increase, but would cer- tainly diminish, the sum which his family would receive as a result of his earnings, after the cost of his own liv- ing was deducted, we can readily see that the pecuniary loss to the next of kin was more than covered by the sum which is rendered. 11 See Beecher v. Long Island R. Co., 53 App. Div. (N. Y.) 324; 65 N. Y. St. R. 642. See sec. 563, herein, and notes. 20 Purcell v. Laurer, 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 33; 43 N. Y. Supp. 988; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 57, per Ward, J. See also upon the last point, Moskovitz v. Lighte, 68 Hun (N. Y.), 182; 52 N. Y. St. R. 216; 22 N. Y. Supp. 732, 738 case aff'd 140 N. Y. 619; 55 N. Y. St. R. 929; 35 N. E. 890. 21 Beecher v. Long Island R. Co., 53 App. Div. (X. Y.) 324; 65 N. Y. St. R. 642. 22 Sauter v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 6 Hun (N. Y.), 446, aff'd G6 X. Y. 50; 23 Am. Rep. 18. 23 Palmer v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 26 Wkly. Dig. 26; 5 N. Y. St. R. 536, aff'd 112 N. Y. 234; 20 N. Y. St. R. 904; 19 N. E. 678. 24 Carpenter v. Buffalo, N. Y. & P. R. Co., 38 Hun (N. Y.), 116. 25 Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N. C. 961; 36 S. E. 191. 26 Coley v. Statesville, 121 N. C. 301; 28 S. E. 482. FOR THE PECUNIARY INJUBY. §580 mining these the general factors of age, etc., 27 are important ele- ments, but the extent of the proof available in any certain case must necessarily differ according to the varying circumstances, and the courts of New York have certainly not been illiberal in awarding damages and sustaining verdicts for want of exact or extended proof. 28 But vindictive or exemplary damages arc ex- cluded as well, also, as mental .suffering, etc., and Bufferings of the injured husband prior to his death. 29 A material element of damages exists by reason of the rule that a wife is entitled to her support, and the deprivation of such maintenance and of her home, and the facts that her husband was in a position to give them to her by reason of his health, business activity and prom- ise of long life, notwithstanding his advanced age, will justify a fair award of damages for his negligent killing, and in this con- nection the amount of his earnings, his earning capacity and the probability of its increasing or diminishing are material and rele- vant. 30 So the husband's chances of promotion, his competency or incompetency to fill a better position, his actual living ex- penses, care exercised therein, his net income, former and present employment and industry are all admissible in evidence. 11 In New York it is decided in an early case that the value of the support of the widow and children, during the time deceased would probably have lived, less their earnings, may be con- sidered. :a § 580. » 4 Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury "—Death of wife— Death of wife and mother. Under the former statute of New York, the husband suing as admin- istrator for his wife's death by negligence could not prove the value to him of her services and could not recover therefor as the damages were for the exclusive benefit of the " widow and next of kin," and went in such case to the next of kin. 33 But 27 Examine sees. 563-572, herein. 28 See as to jury not being restricted to the pecuniary loss proven, sec. 560, herein. 29 See sees. 563-567, herein. 30 Beecher v. Long Island R. Co., 53 App. Div. (X. Y/.)324; 05 N. V. St. R. 642. See Althorf v. Wolfe, 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 344, aff'tl 22 N. V. 355. See sees. 562, 569, 574, herein. ; i Barns v. Asheboro & M. R. Co., 125 N. ('. 304: 31 S. K. 405. *> Althorf v. W.-lfe. 2 Hilt. (N. Y. ) 344, aff'd 22 \. V. 3.".:.. 43 Dickens v. New York C. R. Co., 23 N. Y. 158, rev'g 28 liarb. 41. 739 § 580 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION where the husband is entitled to the wife's entire personal es- tate, she having no descendants, he can show the amount and character of her work, her earnings and probable profits as well as the amount of her funeral expenses, and her age and health, where he sues, as administrator, for her killing. 34 These cases differ from those where the husband's right of action for loss of the wife's services by reason of personal injuries survives her death, 35 and from causes of action for the loss of the wife's ser- vices, loss of her society and comfort and expenses of her in- jury and the death of the husband after suit brought. 36 It should also be remembered that the present Code, 37 provides that the husband, wife or next of kin are entitled to sue and that the damages recoverable are exclusively for their benefit, and the change making the husband a beneficiary was affected in 1870. :B The surviving husband, wife or next of kin, are therefore the class named and are entitled to the proceeds of the recovery to be distributed as if they were unbequeathed assets, etc. 39 If the husband is the sole surviving beneficiary, the pecuniary loss sustained by him as the husband might differ in character, in so far as the loss of his wife's services is con- cerned, from that sustained by other surviving next of kin who are entitled to share in the proceeds of the recovery. But, however this may be, it is held that very slight evidence of pe- cuniary injury to the husband is required, although some evi- dence thereof is necessary to justify a recovery. 40 It would also seem to logically follow that the intent of the statutory amendment above mentioned would entitle the husband when :ii Meyer v. Hart, 23 App Div. (X. Y.) 131; 48 N. Y. Supp. 904. 35 In Sweet v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 18 Misc. (N. Y.) 355; 41 X. Y. Supp. 549, the action was for the loss of services from the wife's injury and it was held to survive her death. 36 See Cregin v. Brooklyn Cross- town R. Co., 83 X. Y. 595; 38 Am. Rep. 474, rev'g 19 Hun, 341; 8. C, 75 N. Y. 192; 56 How. 465; 31 Am. Rep. 459, aff'g56 How 32; S. C, 18 Hun, 368; Foels v. Tonawanda, 65 Hun (X. Y.), 624: 48 N. Y. St. R. 150; 20 X. Y. Supp. 447. 740 37 2 Stov. Annot. Code (1898), sees. 1902, 1903, 1908 and see sec. 1870. 36 See X. Y. Laws, 1847, ch. 440, ch. 450, sees. 1, 2; Laws, 1849, ch. 236, ch. 256; Laws, 1870, ch. 78. See Lynch v. Davis, 12 How. (X. Y.) 323. 39 Snedeker v. Snedeker, 164 X. Y. 58, 62, per Bartlett, J. 40 Cornwall v. Mills, 44 X. Y. Supr. 45. See Mitchell v. Xew York C. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Hun (X. Y. ), 535 ; 5 T. & C. 122, aff 'd 64 X. Y. 655. FOIL THE PECUNIARY INJURY. S 581 suing as one of a surviving class to prove the loss of his wife's services us a part of the damages, eveD though lie would receive- no greater share in the amount recovered for that reason, alone, and in this connection it is held that the jury may take into ac- count the wife's, or wife's and mother's prospective earnings and the loss of her services, and in determining the value of the hitter, the character of the services rendered may he considered, including not only the household labor and care of the family but also the nature of whatever other occupation she was en- gaged in and from which a pecuniary benefit by way of earn- ings or otherwise was derived and which was lost by reason of her premature death. The disposition of her earnings is also a relevant factor, us where the family was wholly or in part sup ported thereby, or whether all or only a part of said earnings were so used. The size of the family and the age and sex of the children may also be relevant and the fact that the deceased had no income may also be material. Xecessarily the age, health, etc.. of deceased may be proven. This last question has. how- ever been fully considered elsewhere herein as have the ques- tions of funeral and medical expenses, loss of society, mental and physical suffering." §581. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury ''—Death of parent. — In determining the measure of damages to surviving children for loss occasioned by the kill- ing of a parent or parents, the liability of the parent for the support of a minor must constitute a factor, in so far as the parent's death deprives such minor thereof. The pecuniary 41 See upon the above points, Cregin v. Brooklyn Crosstown R. Co., 83 N. Y. 595; 38 Am. Rep. 474, rev'g 19 Hun, 341; 6'. C, 75 N. V. 192; 5(1 How. 405; 31 Am. Rep. 459, aff'g 50 Bow. 32; 8. C, 18 Hun, 368; Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 6 App. Div. ( N. Y. i 42; 39 X. Y. Supp. 013; Lyons v. Second Ave. It. Co., 89 Hun (X. Y.), 374; 09 X. Y. St. R. 810; 35 X. Y. Supp. 372, aff'd 152 X. Y. 054; 47 X. E. 1109, Klemin v. New York, C. & H. R. R. Co . 78 Hun (X. Y.), 277; 60 X. Y. St. R. 231; 28 X. Y. Supp. 861: Creen v. Hudson U. R. Co.. 32 Burb. i N. V.i 25, afTd 30 How. 593 n. See also 8. C., 28 Barb. (X. Y. i 9: If, Bow. 230, 203, aff'd 31 Barb. 200. which is aff'd 2 Abb. Dec. 277: 2 Kcycs. 294; :!0 How. 59:l. Examine also Malonee v. X. Y. C A- H. K. R Co., 20 Wklv. Dig. (X. Y. ) 252; Mitchell v. Xew York C. A H. R. II. Co., 2 Hun (X. Y. i. 5:15: 5 Thoinp. & C. (X. Y.i 122. aff'd 64 X. Y. 655. 741 § 581 DEATH FAIR AND .1 1 Si' COMPENSATION benefit, therefore, which would have accrued to surviving chil- dren, had the parent not have been prematurely killed, should be considered, and they ma} r recover such prospective, pecuniary losses as are actually shown by the evidence to be the proximate damages from the negligent or wrongful killing, although the jury is not confined to those actually proven in order to award such damages. The elements which may be proven and which are of weight in determining the amount of the verdict, or whether or not such verdict should be reversed, set aside or modified, are the age and sex of deceased, his or her mental and physical health, character, quality, capacity, condition, occupa- tion, and, if a father, his chances of advancement in his employ- ment, earnings, earning capacity, situation and circumstances in life, financially and otherwise, dependency upon children, pecun- iary aid furnished the latter by them, whether or not deceased was the children's sole support and his life expectancy. The size of deceased's family or number of surviving children may be shown, also their age, sex, mental and physical health, circum- stances or financial condition as involved in the question whether they were solely dependent upon the parent's aid for support, or whether they were self-supporting, wholly or partially, whether the children which are next of kin were married or unmarried, living away from home or at home, whether able to work or not, their capacity therefor, and whether and to what extent they aided or supported the deceased. It is not, however, essential that all these factors should be proven for the reason, as we have stated elsewhere, that prospective damages are of such a character as to be incapable of direct or exact proof, and nominal damages will be given without such proof. 4 - 42 In a majority of the following cases the factoi-s noted are con- sidered, but without discussion. Age of deceased father, his occupation, health, salary, number of children, the entire dependency upon him for support, their age and sex con- sidered. Wallace v. Third Ave. R. Co., 36 App. Div. ( N. Y. ) 57 ; 55 N. Y. Supp. 132; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 215. Deceased was a woman 68 years old, not in robust health and somewhat 742 dependent upon her children for sup- port, but held that it did not follow that her life was of no pecuniary benefit to her next of kiu. Phalen v. Rochester R. Co., 31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 448; 52 N. Y. Supp. 836; 22 Civ. Proc. 42. Day laborer, 33 years old, left wife and three children. He was their sole support, earned $1.25 a day and was of temperate habits. His chances of advancement were also considered. Felice v. New FOB THE I'Kri'Nl \l;\ lN.il i:Y. § *82 § 582. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury" — Support, care, etc., of children The benefit of the counsel of a husband and father is of pecuniary value, 1 and bo is the loss of maternal nurture and education, and the jury may consider the parent's capacity to bestow such physical, moral and intellectual instruction, training and education as may be of service to the children in after life, and which would have been received from deceased. 41 And this rule may include not only minor but adult children.'"' Fork C. & H. R. R. Co., 14 App. Div. (X. Y.) 345; 43 N. Y. Supp. 922; 1 Am. Xeg. Rep. 037. Deceased was widow, age and health and number of children noted, also that she did the housework. Walls v. Rochester R. Co., 92 Hun (N. Y.), 581; 72 X. Y. St. R. 250; 36 X. Y. Supp. 1102. Death of wife and mother, no pe- cuniary aid received from her, $5,000, reduced to $2,500. Klemm v. New York C. & II. R. R. Co., 78 Hun, 277; (50 N. Y. St. R. 231; 28 X. Y. Supp. 361. Deceased was a woman, her oc- cupation, age, strength, activity, number of children and their de- pendency upon her considered. Ilen- ning v. Caldwell, 45 X. V. St. R. 373; 18 N. Y. Supp. 339; aff'd 137 N. Y. 553; 50 X. Y. St. R. 931; 33 X. E. 337. Pecuniary injury should be ascer- tained from proof of the character, qualities, capacity and condition of deceased and number, age, sex, cir- cumstances and condition of health of children or next of kin of de- ceased. Rut it does not follow that there is no pecuniary loss because children are of full age ami living away from home and supporting themselves. There was also a sick daughter at home, one sou and daugh- ter, one married and the other un- married and children had no prop- erty. Lock wood v. Xew York, L. E. & \V. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 523, aff'g 20 Wkly. Dig. 341. Age, earnings, oc- cupation, life expectancy and proba- bility of dependency of mother, a widow, also number of children; that some were married and did not live with deceased, and that all were of age and that she aided her children by making small things which were useful to them, were all considered. Mclntyre v. Xew York C. R. Co., 47 Barb. (X. Y.) 51:). aff'd 37 X. Y. 287: 35 How. 30; 4 Trans. App. 1. See same case, 43 Barb. 532, as to nonsuit not being granted where services are 43 Felice v. Xew York C. & II. R. R. Co., 14 App- Div. (N. Y.) 345; 43 X. V. Supp. 922; 1 Am. Xeg. Rep. 037. "Tilleyv. Hudson R. R. Co., 29 N. Y. 252: 24 \. Y. 471; 23 IIow.(N. V. | 303 (cited 1 Am. Xeg. Rep. 380). In this case besides performing her household duties and other outside work, the mother sent her children to school and instructed them, ami also nursed them when they were sick. Her religious activity in the church, as well as her business ca- pacity and ability to save, were also factors in this connection. See also Mclntyre v. Xew York C. R. Co., 37 X. Y. 287; 35 How. (X. Y. ) 36; 4 Trans. App. 1, aff'g 47 Barb. 515. 45 See Tilley case, cited in last pre- ceding note. In this case there were five children, the eldest being an adult 23 years of age. See next fol- lowing section herein. 743 §§583,584 FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION § 583. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury " — Death of parent — Damages not limited to children's minority. — In estimating the pecuniary injury to children oc- casioned by a parent's negligent or wrongful killing, there is no sufficient legal reason for limiting the damages to the children's minority, if there is evidence to satisfy the jury that the pecu- niary benefits would have been continued afterward, or that the damages will continue after such minority. "' § 584. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury " — Death of children — Generally. — In considering the general elements of damages in connection with the loss occa- sioned to parents by the negligent or wrongful killing of their children, the courts have classified the cases so that they dis- tinctly cover (1) children of tender age, (2) minors generally, and (3) adults, and it is obvious that as a child becomes more advanced in years the character of the proof of pecuniary injury is of necessity more specific, even though it cannot even in cases of adults be exact. Evidence of the facts and circumstances at- tending the injury and death are as a rule available, but beyond such evidence the proof becomes at once of comparatively little value in so far as the actual pecuniary loss is concerned, espe- cially so where the deceased was a young child, for specific loss is difficult of approximation, and whether the case be that of minors or of adults there can be no well-defined, positive rule worthy of more than the most general application, or which of- fers any safe basis for estimating the value of the life. All probable and possible benefits should be considered, and present and prospective losses to the next of kin, including the prospect of inheriting from the child. 17 But the probability of loss of proven which are of some value or where they are of some pecuniary benefit. That jury may include prospective losses actually shown by evidence to result to the next of kin as the proximate damages and as to value of mother's earnings and pros- pect of inheritance, see Tilley v. Hudson K. R. Co., 24 N. Y. 471. See also sees. 570, 571, 574, herein. As to duty to support, dependency, etc. 744 physical and financial condition, see sees. 568, 569, 572, 573, 575, herein. As to value of support of wife and children and deduction of earnings, see Althorf v. Wolfe, 2 Hilt. 344, aff'd 22 N. Y. 355. 46 Tilley v. Hudson R. R. Co., 29 N. Y. 252. 47 See on the three general propo- sitions the following citations and the opinions of the courts therein: Knl: Till'. PECUNIAE? INJURY. § 585 advice and counsel of a child in case the parents become aged and dependent, physically or mentally upon others for advice, is held to be too remote an element of damages. 48 A general rule would be that the net moneyed value of the child's life consti- tutes the measure of damages, or a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury sustained by the next of kin or those entitled to recover. " § 585. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of children Evidential factors relating to children.— In determining what constitutes a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by reason of the killing of children through negligence or wrongful act, it must be remembered that, as we have stated elsewhere, the very ten- der years of a child may of necessity preclude proof of facts which might be available and applicable in case of children of advanced years or of adults, and in stating the following gen- eral factors as elements of damage, we have given those which have been proven and considered in the various cases of very young infants, minors generally and adult children. These fac- tors are deceased's age and sex, mental and physical condition and ability, and this includes height, weight and strength in certain cases, ability to work continuously, when of age to ren- der services or to labor, the child's brightness and general intelli- gence, attendance at school and progress there, general character, adaptability and capacity. If the child is of sufficient age to have developed habits of industry or sobriety or otherwise. Keenan v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 145 N. Y. 348, 350, 351 ; 64 N. Y. St. K. 813; 40N. E.15; Butler v. Manhattan R. Co., 143 N. Y. 417, 421; 62 N. Y. St. R. 432; 38 N". E. 454; Birkctt. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 110 X. Y. 504; 18 N. Y. St. R. 130; Houghkirk v. Delaware & II. Can. Co., 92 N. Y. 219; Ihl v. F..rty-Second St. & G. St. F. R. ('«>., 47 N. Y. :!17; Kane v. Mitchell Trans. Co., 90 Hun (X. Y.), 65; 70 X. Y. St. R. 203; 35 X. Y. Supp. 581; Johnson v. Long Island R. Co., 80 Hun (X. Y.), 306; 62 X. Y. ' St. R. 46; 30 X. Y. Supp. 318, aff'd 144 X. Y. 719; 70 X. Y. St. R. 868; 29 N r . E. 857. « Gill v. Rochester A- P. R. Co., M Hun (X. Y.), 107. See sec. 569, herein. 49 Russell v. Windsor Steamboal Co., 126 X. C. 961: 36 S. E. 191, cit- ing Birkett v. Knickerbocker [ce Co., 110 X. Y. r.iU: 18 N. V. Si. R. 130; Ihl v. Forty-Second St. A G. St. F. R. Co., 47 N. Y. 317, and numerous other cases. 745 § 586 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION these are important and relevant factors. Life expectancy is also material, and whether or not there was a promise of a con- tinued and useful life. If the child was of suitable years the fact whether he or she was married or not may be considered, and also whether deceased, especially if an adult, lived at home with the parents or elsewhere. The occupation, earnings and saving capacity of the child when of age and ability to perform labor are relevant' and material evidence, and whether continu- ously employed, the number of years engaged in labor, whether the employment was by the parent or otherwise, the child's dis- position of his or her earnings, whether they were given all to the parent or only a part thereof or were wholly used by the child, and in case of employment by the father whether the child received fixed wages for his services or a sum dependent upon the father's judgment and good will, the disposition made by the parent of the child's earnings by way of support of the family or otherwise, are all important, material and relevant factors. In addition there are other elements of damages re- lating more particularly to children of tender age and minors generally which are given elsewhere. It is not necessary, how- ever, to prove all the above factors. 50 § 586. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury " — Death of children — Evidential factors relating to parents or next of kin. — The evidential factors to be consid- ered upon the question of damages, resulting from the negli- gent or wrongful killing of children, and which relate to the parents or next of kin, as distinguished from those relating to the deceased child as elements of damages, are the age of the parent or parents or of surviving next of kin, the sex of the latter, and also whether the sole parent surviving was a father or mother ; the parent's physical and mental health and condi- tion, character and capacity ; the circumstances, position and condition in life, as that the father or mother were penniless or without means of support or otherwise, whether or not such parent or parents were dependent wholly or in part upon the deceased for support, and whether the latter was supporting 60 For authorities supporting the I above propositions, see note to next I following section. 746 FOB THE PECUNIARY IN.M"I:Y. § 586 them wholly or partly or furnishing no pecuniary aid, and this would also include the question of legal obligation of children of sufficient means to support indigent parents ; the duration and extent of care of parents by children and of contributions if any, to their support; and the employment of the child's wages or earnings therefor. The fact that the child's care was volun- tary lias also been considered. Other elements are the parent's or parents' life expectancy, occupation and earnings. Evidence is also material and relevant that the deceased left no widow or children, that the father was the sole heir and next of kin and exclusive beneficiary, that a widowed mother survived, whether or not there were any next of kin and the character of the rela- tion of the surviving next of kin and their number and ages. But the number, ages and condition, mental, physical or finan- cial of those who are not next of kin is inadmissible, nor may it be shown whether they are married or unmarried. Evidence has also been considered, showing that the parents or other next of kin resided in a foreign country as bearing upon the pecuni- ary injury to them, and the nature of their actual relations with the deceased. It may also be stated that it is clearly apparent throughout the decisions that the statute contemplates possible and uncertain damages not before recoverable and the range of probabilities is seemingly limited only by those which are based on some reasonable expectation and which are within the intent. by fair construction of the statute, having in view the rem- edy contemplated, and we may here repeat what was said in the last section, that there is no necessity of proving all the above-mentioned elements of damages to warrant a recovery/' 1 51 Some of the following citations j the entire pecuniary loss. Birkett have been considered elsewhere I v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 110 N Y. herein under their appropriate head- ings, but owing to the importance of this subject of the death of chil- dren and for more convenient and 504; 18 N. V. St. R. 130; 18 N. E. 108, aff'g 41 Hun. 404: 3 X. Y. St. R. 133; '25 Wkly. Dig. 46. This case is cited as to the measure of damages ready reference, they are also given j for the killing of an infant of tender in this note. See also cases consid- years in Russell v. Windsor Steam ered under the next following section, boat Co., 126 X. C. 961; 36 S. E. 191. In case of a young child, loss is to be estimated upon all the facts proven, including probable and possible ben- Father was aged 106; deceased son was 27 years old and industrious. Burke v. Wetherbee, 9S X. V. 562, efits, and the measure of damages is I rev'g 18 Wkly. Dig. 3G9. Deceased 747 £ 587 DEATH — FAIK .VXD JtTST COMPENSATION § 587. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury " — Death of children — Decisions and opinions. — In a de- cision which turned upon the right of the father to share in the son was 13 years old. Mother had no means and was unable to work because of a malady; evidence held admissible. Harlinger v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 15 Wkly. Dig. 392, aff'g 92 N. Y. 661. Deceased daughter was 6 years old, intelligent and healthy; parent's occupation was market gardener; circumstances of death proven, no other evidence, special and prospective damages re- coverable, the first proven by char- acter and amount thereof, the second by age, sex, general health and intelli- gence of deceased, and the situation and condition of survivors and their relation to deceased. General indef- initeness and inaccuracy of proof considered at length by the court. Houghkirk v. Delaware & II. Can. Co., 92 X. Y. 219, rev'g 28 Hun, 407; 15 Wkly. Dig. 522, which aff'd 11 Abb. X. C. 72; 63 How. (X. Y. ) 328; 4 Month. Law Bull. 65. Age and sex of deceased, social condition and standing of next of kin and proba- bility of their sustaining any pecuni- ary damage by infant's death should be considered by the jury. Deceased Avas daughter of plaintiff. Ether- ington v. Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co., 88 X. Y. 641, aff'g 24 Hun, 235. Father may recover full damages for loss of infant son, where recovery is for his exclusive benefit, and this includes loss of his son's services during minority. McGovern v. Xew York, C. & H. R. R. Co., 67 X. Y. 417. Where child is of tender years affirmative proof of special damages unnecessary. Prendegast v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 58 X. Y. 652. See also sec. 561, herein. De- ceased was about three years old. 748 Damages may be estimated from age and sex of child and circumstances, condition and position in life of par- ents and occupation of father, pres- ent and prospective damages to be considered. Difficulty of furnishing any specific or direct proof consid- ered by the court. Ihl v. Forty-Sec- ond St. & G. St. F. R. Co., 47 X. Y. 317; 7 Am. Rep. 450, cited as to the measure of damages for killing an infant of very tender years in Rus- sell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 X. C. 961; 36 S. E. 191. Value of services of minor, aged 11, may be determined by jury of their own knowledge. O'Mara v. Hudson R. R. Co., 38 X. Y. 445. Examine also the last cited case. Xot necessary that deceased infant son should leave a widow and next of kin to entitle father to recover. McMahon v. Mayor (X. Y.), 33 X. Y. 642. De- ceased was between 6 and 7 years old; no proof of damages necessary. Oldfield v. New York & Harlem R. Co., 14 N. Y. 310, aff'g 3 E. D. Smith 103. Mother for son's death, her financial circumstances admissi- ble. Fowler v. Buffalo Furnace Co., 41 App. Div. (X. Y.) 84; 58 X. Y. Supp. 223, appeal dismissed 160 X. Y. 665. Boy 16 killed while riding- bicycle, circumstances of accident proven and $2,000 held not exces- sive. Quinn v. Pietro, 38 App. Div. (X. Y.) 484; 56 X. Y. Supp. 419; 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. 692. Deceased son was 19 years old, healthy, industri- ous and earning wages which he gave to his father — $5,000 not exces- sive. Twist v. Rochester, 37 App. Div. (X. Y.) 307; 55 X. Y. Supp. 850. Deceased was a bright boy 8} years FOR THE PECUNIARY IN.H RY. S 587 recovery by the widow, the court, per Bartlett, J., says: "It does not follow that the father has no pecuniary interest in the death of his son. It might have happened had the son survived old — $6,000 held excessive. Sch after v. Baker Transfer Co., 29 App. Div. i X. Y.) 459; 51 X. Y. Supp. 1092. Only evidence was of the age, sex and general intelligence of deceased (child was 5 years old); nominal damages recoverable. Howell v. Rochester R. Co., 24 App. Div. (N. Y.) 502; 49 X. Y. .Supp. IT. De- ceased daughter was a vigorous woman before the injury, about 60 years old. She was large and weighed about 180 pounds. The facts of the accident and injury were proven. The plaintiff was next of kin and was before the jury and they could judge somewhat as to his probable duration of life. He was penniless and dependent, 82 years old and might live 10 years. Deceased was his only child and was comfortably supporting him at the time of the injury — $3,000 uot excessive. Pur- cell v. Lamer, 14 App. Div. (N. Y.) 33; 43 X. Y. Supp. 988; 2 Am. Neg. "Rep. 57. Only evidence was that father was a laborer and deceased daughter was 16 years old and since her mother's death had taken care of his house. There was no evidence as to his or her character or capabil- ities or of the relations existing be- tween them — (4,000 was reduced to $2,500. Dinnihan v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp. Co., 8 App. Div. (X. Y. ) 509; 40 X. Y. Supp. 764. Deceased daughter was 19 years old; she was bright and industrious and earned $7 a week, which she gave to her mother to aid supporting family. Her fa- ther was 61 years old — $6, 000 reduced to $4,000. Seeley v. Xew York C. & H. R. R. Co., 8 App. Div. ( X. Y. ) 402: 75 X. Y. St. R. 261 ; 40 X. Y. Supp. 866. Deceased was an infant daughter and father was exclusive beneficiary. Held that he could recover the entire pecuniary loss and that prospective earnings during infancy were in- cluded and this covered loss of ser- vices during infancy. Also that an instruction winch precluded recov- ery for loss of earnings while an infant and until majority, was not, cured by an instruction that the jury were not confined to minority, but might find for pecuniary damages thereafter. Coghlan v. Third Ave. R. Co., 7 App. Div. (X. Y.) 124; 39 X. Y. Supp. 1098, aff'g 16 Misc. 677; 25 Civ. Proc. 249: 39 X. Y. Supp. 113. Action by father for death of child 7 years old ; evidence admissi- ble that services of child were re- quired in household. Pressman v. Mooney, 5 App. Div. (X. Y". ) 121: 39 N". Y. Supp. 44. Deceased was 3J years old; the number of brothers and sisters surviving and their ages was shown, also the age of the fa- ther, his occupation and amount of his earnings per week — $375 not set aside as inadequate. Roger v. Roch- ester R. Co.. 2 App. Div. (X. Y.) 5: 73 X. Y. St. R. 209. Deceased was a boy 7 years old, bright and healthy — $3,500 held not excessive. Heinz v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 91 Hun (X. Y.), 640; 71 X. Y. St. R. 623; 36 X. Y. Supp. 675. Deceased wa> 26 years old, an unmarried man. so- ber and industrious, adult brothers and sisters and a widowed mother survived. He had never contributed to their support — (3,000 not exces- sive. Kane v. Mitchell Transp. Co.. 90 Hun (X. Y.i. 65: 7<> X. Y. St. l:. 203; 35 X. Y. Supp. 581, aff'd 15:'. 749 § 587 DEATH— FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION thirty years, that his wife would have died childless and he be left as the only support of an aged and penniless father ; or if no father was living but several next of kin of the same degree, N. Y. 680. Deceased was 22 years old; he was unmarried: earned $1.85 per day. His father with whom he lived was his next of kin and was 08 years old. Fitzgerald v. New York, C. & H. K. R. Co., 88 Hun (N. Y.), 359; 68 N. Y. St. R. 762; 34 N. Y. Supp. 762, case rev'd 154 N. Y. 263; 48 N. E. 514, upon ground that cause of death did not suffciently appear as due to negligence of defendant. Deceased, a man, was unmarried, 33 years old, worked for his father but at no fixed wages, such amount be- ing paid him as the father judged proper. Present and prospective loss and prospect of inheritance con- sidered. Johnson v. Long Island R. Co., 80 Hun (N. Y.), 306: 62 N. Y. St. R. 46; 30 N. Y. Supp. 318, aff'd 144 N. Y. 719; 70 N. Y. St. R. 868; 29 N. E. 857. Only proof was that deceased, a boy 7 years old, attended school and did errands for his mother — $1,500 excessive. Heusner v. Houston, W. St. & P. F. Co., 7 Misc. (N. Y.) 48; 57 N. Y. St. R. 528; 27 N. Y. Supp. 365. Deceased was 4 years old. The mother was a widow with three surviving chil- dren of the ages of 13 and under; her circumstances and condition in life were shown and she was exam- ined before the jury to enable them to determine her age, failure to otherwise prove her age held not fatal to a recovery of more than nominal damages — $2,000 not exces- sive. Moskovitz v. Lighte, 68 Hun (N. Y.), 102; 52 N. Y. St. R. 216; 22 N. Y. Supp. 732, aff'd 140 N. Y. 619; 55. N. Y. St. R. 929; 35 N. E. 890. Deceased was a son; mother had no means; son aided her. Waldele v. 750 New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 29 Hun (N. Y.), 35, rev'g 61 How. 350, rev'd 95 N. Y. 274. Deceased boy was aged 2 years and 9 months and was in good health; only nominal dam- ages in absence of further proof and verdict therefor will not be set aside as inadequate. Silberstein v. Williams Wicke Co., 29 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 291; 22 N. Y. Supp. 170. Deceased daughter was 5 years old — $2,000 to father not excessive. Huerzeler v. Central Crosstown R. Co., 1 Misc. (N. Y.) 136; 48 N. Y. St. R. 649; 20 N. Y. Supp. 676, aff'd 739 N. Y. 490; 54 N. Y. St. R. 836; 34 N. E. 1101, upon point of imputed negli- gence of mother, and Earl, J., said, " The question of damages is not be- fore us. There was sufficient evidence in the case upon the question of dam- ages for the jury," citing Houghkirk v. Delaware & H. Can. Co., 92 N. Y. 219, noted at beginning of this note. Deceased was 6 years old — $4,500 not excessive, although the court doubted that the death of so young a child could result in pecuniary damages. Ahern v. Steele, 48 Hun (N. Y.), 517; 16 N. Y. St, R. 24; 1 N. Y. Supp. 257, case rev'd 115 N. Y. 203; 26 N. Y. St. R. 295; 22 N. E. 193, case is cited in Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Gilmore (Tex. Civ. App. 1899), 53 S. W. 61. Deceased daugh- ter was 36 years old and was in good health. The amount of her weekly earnings, for 5 or 6 years prior to her death, was proven and also her yearly contributions to her parents' support for 20 years and her volun- tary care of her father and mother. Her father was the only next of kin. He was 66 years old and infirm in FQB THE PECUNIARY INJURY, ? •>' it is within the range of possibilities that the decedent might have accumulated within his added years of life a considerable sum and then died, leaving it to them. The statute evidently deals with remote and uncertain damages not recoverable at common law." The deceased in this case left no children. 52 In another case the deceased son was thirty years old. He left no wife or children and only his father, who was his sole next of kin and so entitled to the entire amount recovered. The son, at the time of the accident occasioning his death, was in good health, had never been sick since he was a boy and had never been known to stay away from w r ork one day on account of his ill- health. His trade was st one cutting, which he had followed since he was 16 years old. Every two weeks he would turn over to his father the sum of sixty dollars, of which the father would return to him twelve dollars, being six dollars a week with which to buy clothes and pay bis incidental expenses, the remaining sum of forty-eight dollars being used by the plaintiff in paying house rent and supporting his family, which included boarding plain- tiffs intestate and furnishing him with a home, and the court declared that all of this evidence was helpful and proper, but the plaintiff did not rest here, and proved the marriage, size of family, physical condition, misfortunes and poverty of survivors, who were not the next of kin, and for such error the judgment health, and without property, as was also the mother who was 58 years old. There were also personal ser- vices rendered by the daughter. Bowles v. Rome, Watertown R. Co., 46 Hun (N. Y.), 324; 12 N. Y. St. K. 457, aff'd 113 N. Y. 643; 22 X. Y. St. K. 997; 21 N. E. 414. Mother had no means and son contributed to her support. Age, circumstances and condition of next of kin should be shown. Carpenter v. Buffalo, X. Y. & P. R. Co., 38 Hun (N. Y.), 116. Deceased son was 17 years old; pos- sibility of loss of advice and counsel to parents or possible need by rea- son of future feebleness, etc., not considered. Gill v. Rochester & P. R. Co., 37 Hun, 107. Deceased was about 22 years old; he earned $25 a month and was unmarried; survivors were a father, 65 years old, and a mother, two brothers and a sister, who all resided in a foreign country. Bierbauer v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 15 Hun (N. Y.), 559, aff'd 77 N. Y. 588. Court considered the probable burden and expense that a deceased child would have been, and his probable inability to support himself. Child was about 4 years old. Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. (X. Y.) 234. See sees. 561, ."'71. herein. 62 Matter of Snedeker v. Snedeker. 164 X. Y. 58, 63, aff'g 47 App. Div. 471 751 § 587 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION below was reversed. In this case evidence as to the son's earn- ings was held admissible to show what use the father was accus- tomed to make of such wages and this part of the case was not reversed and accords with the ruling of the appeal court. 55 Again, where deceased was a boy five years of age and the plaintiff was his father and next of kin, the trial judge charged that : " In an action for the loss of services of a child by the father, the limit of recovery is twenty-one years of age ; but in deciding this case you may take into account, if you find it to be probable, that this boy might have lived beyond the age of twenty-one years, and you may compensate the father for what- ever age you find the probabilities of the case to be that this boy would have lived." The court also charged as an abstract proposition of law, " that the father has no legal claim upon the earnings of the son beyond the age of twenty-one years," and added, " that the father could compel the son to support him in his old age and the jury had a right to consider that fact," but the court refused to charge upon request, as a proposition of law, " that the father has no claim on the earnings of the son beyond the age of twenty-one years, except in case the father be- comes poor and unable to support himself and the son is shown to have means." For this refusal to so charge the judgment was reversed and a new trial granted. The court of appeals, per Haight, J., affirmed the rule declared in an earlier case as setting forth the various elements of pecuniary loss to be con- sidered by the jury in estimating the damages and which is as follows : " First, the probable earnings of the son during his minority, over and above his support, clothing and education ; next, the probability of his living and becoming of sufficient ability to support his father in case of his becoming aged, poor and unable to support himself; and then they had the right to consider the amount he would have brought to his next of kin while living, and their prospect of inheriting from him after death," 54 and in addition it was declared that, " the father had no right to the earnings of his son as such, after he became 53 Lipp v. Otis Brothers & Co., 161 N. Y. 559, per Parker, Ch. J., 56 N. E. 70, rev'g 28App. Div. (N. Y.) 227; 51 N. Y. Supp. 13. 54 Citing Johnson v. Long Island 752 R. Co., 80 Hun ( N. Y. ), 306 ; 62 N. Y. St. R. 46; 30 N. Y. Supp. 318, aff'd 144 N. Y. 719; 70 N. Y. St. R. 868; 29 N. E. 857. FOR THE PECUNIARY IN.MItV. § 588 twenty-one years of age." 55 Another declaration of the court of appeals, per Andrews, Ch. J., although made in connection with the question of damages for a miscarriage resulting from personal injury is also pertinent here. The court, after stating the difficulty of estimating damages for an infant's killing, as- serts that the ascertainment of the value of an infant's life is in a great degree a matter of speculation and conjecture, dependent upon the probabilities whether the infant would have lived to an age capable of rendering service and whether the continued life would be a pecuniary benefit or a burden, and also upon numerous contingencies. But it was added that the material facts capable of proof were the age and sex of the infant, its mental and physical condition, its bodily strength, and generally whether there was an apparent promise of a continued or use- ful life or the contrary, and in view of the facts of the case be- fore the court there is a strong intimation that proof is neces- sarv as to the sex, mental and physical capacit}^ of the child, although such intimation would, however, only be binding as such, in a like or analogous case.* In another decision in the appeal division a judgment of six cents damages was set aside as insufficient where it appeared that the deceased was a boy sixteen years old, who was attending school and expected to graduate therefrom the following summer. Said son was healthy and strong, six feet in height and weighed one hundred and forty pounds. The father did not depend upon the son for a source of income but on the contrary was prosperous, and paid the expenses of his education. 57 § 588. " Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary in- jury " — Services of minor, cost of support, etc. — Damages not limited to minority. — Outside of those general elements of damages where an action is brought to recover for the death of children, 38 there are certain factors which relate particularly to 66 Keenan v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 145 N. Y. 348; 04 X. Y. St. R. 813; 40 N. E. 15, rev'g 8 Misc. 601; 60 N. Y'. St. It. 831; 29 N. Y. Supp. 325. 56 Butler v. Manhattan R. Co., 143 N. Y. 417, 421; 62 X. Y. St. II. 432; 60 N. Y. St. R. 873; 38 N. E. 454, rev'g 4 Misc. 401: 53 N. Y. St. R. 664: 24 4K 753 X. Y. Supp. 142, aff'g3 Misc. 45:',: 30 Abb. \. ('. 78; 52 N. Y. St. K. 198; 23 X. Y. Supp. 103. 67 Morris v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 51 A pp. Div. (X. Y.i 512; 04 \. Y. St. R. 878: 30 Civ. Proc. II. 371. 68 See sees. 584 et seq., herein. § 588 DEATH— FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION minor children. It is a matter of common knowledge that chil- dren of very tender years can render no services of provable value and in extreme infancy their services can be of no actual pecuniary value, while the burden necessarily rests upon the parents of support, clothing and education during minority, or at least until emancipation. But before majority is reached a child's services may be of actual provable value not only as a wage earner, aiding in the care and support of the family but, as, in many cases, bearing the entire burden of support thereof. Or a child may be of service in performing household duties, even though it ma} r be very young. And in view of the law that present and prospective damages may be awarded, it can- not be said that a child's services are of no pecuniary value, even though such value is not susceptible of definite proof, nor will it be held that the cost of support, clothing and education of a child exceed the value of its services. A father is legally en- titled to the services of his child during its minority and also to such child's earnings except in so far as the child's emancipation may change the rule. When, however, majority is reached, these legal claims of the father cease, except the conditions are such as to bring the child within the rule in New York, enforc- ing a legal obligation under certain circumstances to support indigent, etc., parents. It follows that a father can recover for the loss of services during minority and for the probable earn- ings of the child during that period, over and above its support. Nor is the recovery limited to the child's minority, for all the benefits probable and possible, as modified by the chances of failure and misfortune which might result to the next of kin from the child's life after majority would have been reached, may also be considered. In addition the action is not based upon the loss of the child's services but upon the statute and therefore the recovery is held not to be restricted to such loss of services but is the whole pecuniary loss. 59 In North Carolina 59 Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 110 N. Y. 504; 18 N. Y. St. R. 130; 13 Cent. 130; 18 N. E. 108, aff'g 110 N. Y. 504; 3 N. Y. St. R. 133; 25 Wkly. Dig. 46; Keenan v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 145 N. Y. 348, 350, per Haight, J.; 64 N. Y. St. R. 843; 40 754 N. E. 15, citing Johnson v. Long Is- land R. Co., 80 Hun (N. Y.), 306; 62 N. Y. St. R. 46; 30 N. Y. Supp. 318, aff'd 144 N. Y. 719; 70 N. Y. St. R. 868; 29 N. E. 857; McGovern v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 417; Ihl v. Forty-Second St. & G. St. F. R. FOR THE I'EITMAKY IN. HU\ § 589 under the same wording of the statute as to the amount to be awarded being a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury, the infant's probable gross income, based upon his ex- pectancy of life, less the expenditures for his living, constitutes the measure of damages. 60 §589. "Fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury "—Nominal damages— Death of infants.— We have considered under a prior section the question of nominal dam- ages for the negligent or wrongful killing of other than chil- dren.' 11 In case an infant is negligently or wrongfully killed if Co., 47 N. Y. 317; 7 Am. Rep. 450; O'Mara v. Hudson R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 445; Coghlan v. Third Ave. R. Co., 7 App. Div. (N. Y.) 124; 39 N. Y. Supp. 1098, aff'g 16 Misc. 677; 25 Civ. Proc. 249; 39 N. Y. Supp. 113; Pressman v. Mooney, 5 App. Div. ( N. Y. ) 121; 30 X. Y. Supp. 44; Ford v. Monroe, •_'() Wend. (N. Y. ) 210. See Morris v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 51 App. Div. i \. Y. ) 512; 64 N. Y. St. R. 878; 30 Civ. Proc. 371; Stuebingv. Marshall, 2 Civ. Proc. (X. Y.) 77, aff'd 2 Civ. Proc. 81: 10 Daly, 406. 60 Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co.. 126 \. C. 961; 36 S. E. 191. And in that state Uiere is a legal presump- tion that a father is entitled to his minor son's earnings and if he con- tinues as a member of the family after his minority, services rendered by him are presumed to be gratui- tous. Grant v. Grant, 109 N. C. 710; 14 S. E. 90. As to mother's right to sue for loss of services of her infant unmarried daughter by reason of death caused by malpractice, see Sorensen v. Balaban, 11 App. Div. (X. Y.) 164; 76 X. Y. St. R. 654; 42 N. Y. Supp. 654. As to emancipation of infant and right of such minor to work for herself, sec Taylor v. Welsh. 92 Hun (X. V.i. 272: 72 X. Y. St. R. 316; 36 X. Y. Supp. 952. Father liable for abandoned minor son's necessaries. Manning v. Wells. S Misc. (X. Y.) 646; > sue if the child was a " minor and unmarried." Isaac v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 12 Daly (N. V. >. 340, aff'd 102 X. Y. 718. As to right of action for loss of ser- vice of child killed, see notes 41 L. R. A. S07; 34 id. 788. And see as to value of children, 15 Cent. L. .T.2SG. 6i See sec. 560. herein. 7-").") § 589 DEATH — FAIR AND .JUST COMPENSATION the child is of very tender years, the proof upon the question of damages must of necessity be limited and cannot extend much beyond that of the age and sex of the child, the situation or circumstances and condition in life of the parents and other facts existing at the time of the death and trial, while in some cases the infant's mental and physical condition ma} r be sus- ceptible of proof, and in a general way the last might be true as to all very young. children. The pecuniary value of the life of an infant for several years after its birth is from a strictly legal standpoint a matter concerning which it would be most difficult if not impossible to determine even approximately, for all evidence beyond that above mentioned would be merely specu- lative and hypothetical and of no aid to the jury. But to hold that such a life is of no pecuniary value and that no recovery can be had except upon proof of the pecuniary loss occasioned by its wrongful taking would put a premium on negligence. The jury, therefore, have been given a large discretion in de- termining what constitutes a fair and just compensation in this class of cases. And the rule is that in an action to recover dam- ages for the negligent or wrongful killing of an infant of tender years, proof of special or direct pecuniary damage or injury is not necessary, either to maintain the action or to enable the jury to give nominal damages, nor will they be restricted to nominal damages in such case. This is likewise true where there is an absence of proof of pecuniary injury as such, or other than as above stated. 62 But it is also intimated in a case decided in 62 Rule applied in an action for the killing of an infant ."> years old although the only evidence was of the age, sex and general intelligence of deceased. Howell v. Rochester R. Co., 24 App. Div. (N. Y.) 502; 49 N. Y. Supp. 17. The recovery is not limited to nominal damages but rests upon such proof as can be made, and the amount to be assessed rests in the jury's discretion subject to review upon abuse of such discre- tion. Birkett v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 110 X. Y. 504; 18 N. Y. St. R. 130; 18 N. E. 108, aff'g 41 Hun. 404; 3 X. Y. St. R. 188? 25 Wkly. 750 Dig. 46. This case is cited as to the measure of damages for an infant's death in Russell v. Windsor Steam- boat Co., 126 N. C. 961 ; 36 N. E. 191. Deceased was 6 years old, healthy and bright. The facts attending her death and parents' occupation were shown. There was no other proof of pecuniary injury and the court declared that although the proof was inadequate, no more could be required than it was possible to give, and the matter was. therefore, for the jury to determine the pecuniary loss. Houghkirk v. Delaware & H. C. Co., 92 N. Y. 219, rev'g 28 Hun, 407; 15 FOE THE PECUNIARY INJURY )89 1894 that while there are some material facts capable of proof, such as the age and sex of the infant, its mental and physical condition, its bodily strength, and generally whether there was Wkly. Dig. 522, which affM 11 Abb. N. C. 72; 03 How. 328; 4 Month. Law Bull. 65. In the case of the death of an infant daughter, i he court de- clared that the jury should consider the age and sex of the deceased and the social condition and standing of tbe next of kin, and the probability of their sustaining any pecuniary damage by her death, and that noth- ing could be allowed which was not of definite pecuniary value, while the verdict must be only for the pecu- niary injury, but that there was no way to ascertain mathematically what that damage would be, there- fore it must be to a great extent speculative with nothing to control the jury or fix the amount of the verdict except their good judgment and the statutory limit. This limit does not. however, now exist. Eth- erington v. Prospect Park & C. I. R. Co., 88 N. Y. 641, aff'g 24 Hun, 235. Proof is not necessary as to special pecuniary damage. Kennedy v. Rvall, 67 N. Y. 379, aff'g 40 N. Y. Super. 347. See sec. 561, herein. Where deceased was only 3 years old, it was held that proof of special pecu- niary damages was unnecessary to maintain the action or to warrant the jury in finding more than nominal damages, and that the jury might es- timate the damages with reference to the pecuniary injury, present or pros- pective, upon all the facts proved, which were sustained by those en- titled to recover. The jury in this case had before them the parents, their position in life, the occupation of the father and the age and sex of the child. A nonsuit was refused and the court declared that any other evidence would necessarily be specu- lative and hypothetical and would not aid the jury. There is also a discussion as to the impracticability of furnishing direct evidence of specific loss in these cases and a further declaration that to require such proof would render the statute nugatory in most cases. Ihl v. Forty-Second St. & 95 this respect to matters of procedure, etc. 71 But interest on the damages is to be added in the entry of judgment, and is not within the province of the jury to compute. 7 ' " Kiefer v. (hand Trunk R. Co., 12 App. Div. (N. Y.) 28; 76 N. V. St. R. 171; 42 N. Y. Supp. 171, afPd 153 N. Y. 088. 11 Manning v. Port Henry Iron Ore Co., 91 N. Y. 004: 10 Wkly. Dig. 401, rev'g27Hun, 219. But see Boyd v. New York C. & H. R. K. Co., li Civ. Proc. (X. Y\ ) 222; Sinne v. Mayor, etc., 8 Civ. Proc. (\. Y. ) 252 note. " When final judgment for the plain- tiff is rendered, the clerk must add to the sum awarded interest there- upon from the decedent' 8 death, and include it in the judgment. The in- quisition, verdict, report or decision may specify the day from which in- terest is io lie computed; if it omits to do so, the day may be determined by the clerk upon affidavits." 2 Stover's N. Y. Ann. Code Civ. Proc. sec. 1904. 761 DEATH FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION CHAPTER XXVII. DEATH — "FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION WITH REFERENCE TO THE PECUNIARY INJURIES " — " DIRECT DAMAGES"" SUSTAINED— FORFEITURE OR FINE — " SUCH SUM AS THE JURY MAY DEEM REASONABLE.' 1 § 596. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Stat- utes. 597. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Stat- utes — Continued — Gener- ally. 598. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Stat- utes — Continued — Bene- ficiaries, etc. 599. " Direct damages sustained" — Miners' statute. 600. Forfeiture or fine — Indict- ment — Railroads — Com- mon carriers — Statute. 601. "Such sum as the jury may deem reasonable " — Stat- ute. 602. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Pecu- niary loss. 603. Same subject continued. 604. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Ex- emplary damages. 605. "Fair and just compensation with inference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Jury and instructions. 762 606. Same subject — Proper and erroneous instructions — Illustrations. 607. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Fac- tors generally to be consid- ered. 608. Same subject continued — Evidence of wages. 609. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Suffer- ings of person injured. 610. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Sola- tium — Mental suffering, loss of society, etc. 611. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Phy- sical injury to benefici- ary. 612. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Rela- tionship, legal and actual, of deceased to beneficia- ries. 613. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Legal or moral obligation — Le- gal right — Support or de- pendency. WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIAR'? INJURIES. 6 596 § 614 61".. 616. 61' 618. 610. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625 626 627 628 Same subject continued. Same subject concluded " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Rea- sonable expectation of pe- cuniary benefit. •■ Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Phy- sical and iiuancial condi- tion — Age and number <>f beneficiaries. Same subject continued. Same subject continued. Same subject — Conclusion. '• Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Wealth of defendant. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Prob- able accumulations. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Ex- penses of sickness, fu- neral, etc. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Life expectancy — Mortality tables. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries'* — Nomi- nal damages. Same subject continued. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries" — Death of husband— Husband and father. Same subject — Annuity — Dower, etc. — Instruction and opinion of court. 620. •• Fair and jusl compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries' 1 -Death of wife. 630. Same subject continued — Mai i ied woman's act. 631. -Fair and just compensation with reference t" the pe- cuniary injuries " Death of patent. 632. "Fair and just compensation witli reference to the pe- cuniary injuries*" -Train- ing, etc., of children — Death of parent. 633. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries " — Death of children. 634. Same subject continued. 635. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries *' — Death of children — Minority and majority. 636. " Fair ami just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries *' — Death of children — Adults. 637. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries'" — Collat- eral kindred. 638. Defenses— Mitigation of dam- ages — Insurance. 639. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries'" — De- fenses — Remarriage and marriage. 640. Death— Defenses— Pension to widow and children in mitigation. 641. Damages assessed on affirm- ance of judgment. § 596. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the 8 596 I>KATI1 FAN: AND JUST COMPENSATION pecuniary injuries " — Statutes. — In Arkansas, Illinois, Maine, Montana and Nebraska, the jury may give such damages under the General Statutes as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries. In Arkansas the con- stitution ' prohibits a limitation of the amount to be recovered. In Illinois, Maine and Nebraska, the damages are limited to five thousand dollars, and in Montana they must not exceed twenty thousand dollars. The wife and next of kin are the designated beneficiaries in Arkansas, Illinois, Montana and Nebraska, and the amount recovered is for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin, while in Maine the damages are those result- ing from the death to the persons for whose benefit the action is brought, and the recovery is for the exclusive benefit of the widow, if no children, and of the children if no widow, and if both, then of her and them equally, and if neither, of his heirs. The action in all the above named states must be brought by and in the name of the personal representative. The right to sue exists where the death is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, such as would if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action, and recover damages in respect thereof, and this even though the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a felony.'- i Art. 5. •^ Ark. Sandels & Hill's Dig. Ark. Stats. 1894, p. 1310, sees. 5911, 5912. (See id. p. 1309, 131, sec. 5908, id. pp. 1311-1314, sees. 5920-5939, as to revivor of actions in general. ) Mansfield's Dig. sees. 5225, 5226. Sanborn & Hill's Dig. sees. 5912, 5925, 111. Hurd's 111. Rev. Stat. 1899, p. 964, ch. 70; 1 Starr & C. Ann. St. oh. 70; Rev. Stat. 174, p. 582; 1 111. Rev. Stat. 1858, sees. 1, 2, p. 422; 111. Act, Feb. 12, 1853. Indian Ty. Mansfield's Ark. Dig. sees. 5225, 5226, adopted as law of Indian Territory, by act of congress, May 2, 1890; for construction of act and application, see Arc! more Coal Co. v. Bevil (U. S. C. C. A. 8th Civ.), 61 Fed. 757. Me. Acts, 1891, cb. 124, sees. 1, 2; 764 Freeman's Suppl. 1885-1895, p. 438. Mont. Codes (Civ. Proc), 1895, sees. 578, 579; Comp. Stat. 1888, p. 911, sees. 981, 982; Rev. Stat. 1879, p. 508; Codes (Civ.), 1895, sees. 4353, 4354, provides for payment of debts by one who kills another in a duel, and also for maintenance of widow and minor cbildren of the person slain or disabled. As to survival of actions, see Const. Codes & Stats. 1895, sec. 587, p. 792. See also cbaps. 23, 31, herein. Neb. Comp. stat. 1901, p. 523, sees. 2503, 2504 (that action does not abate, see id. p. 1248, sec. 5632, and as to revival generally, see id. p. 1311, sees. 6035, et seq. ) ; Comp. Stat. 1897, ch. 21; Comp. L. 1881, ch. 21, sees. 1, 2. WITH REFERENCE TO PECl MAKV INJURIES. 19' § 597. *« Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries" Statutes — Continued — Generally.— Damages may be recovered in all cases under the Nebraska statute for the wrongful act, neglect or default of another where the injured party might have maintained the action had he sur- vived the injury, 8 and this applies bo one whose death was oc- casioned by injuries while being transported by a railroad com- pany.' So the Arkansas death act applies to all cases in which a recovery may be had for negligent, etc., killing, regardless of the agency inflicting the injury, and supersedes the act of 1875, relating to injuries by railroad trains."' In Illinois the compen- sation to be awarded is to be considered in view of the fact whether or not the death results from a cause other than the injuries for which the suit is brought.' 1 This involves the question whether there was conscious suffering or an instan- taneous death. 1 And in the same connection the survival statute is important, 8 as is also the determination of the point whether the action is for the death or the injury and the necessary elements of damages in connection with these actions 3 Chicago, R. I. & V. R. Co. v. Young, 58 Neb. 678; 79 X. W. 556; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 343; Neb. Comp. Stat. 1897, chap. 21. * Chicago, K. I. & T. R. Co. v. Zernecke (Neb.). 82 X. \V. 26. 5 Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 53 Ark. 117; 13 S. W. 801; 7 L. R. A. 283; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 690. 6 Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 119 111. 586; 6 West. 773; 9 N. E. 203: 19 111. App. 591; Merri- hew v. Chicago City R. Co., 92 111. App. 386, under Act, Feb. 12, 1853, Laws, 1853, p. 97. See sec. 009, herein. 7 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Dyliuski, 67 111. App. 114; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 77; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Dawson. 68 Ark. 1; 56 S. W. 40, citing numerous cases; St. Louis, S. W. R. Co. v. Mahoney, ''.7 Ark. 617; 55 S. W. S4U; Sawyer v. Perry, 88 Me. 42; 33 Atl. 660; State v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 61 Md. 114, indictment; State v. Maine, C. R. Co., 00 Me. 490, indictment. s Ark. Const, ait. 5; Ark. Dig. Stat. 1884, sec. 5223; 111. Rev. Stat. 1891, ch. 3, sec. 122; 1 Starr* C. Ann. Stat. 1885, p. 247: p. 123, sec. 123; Comp. Stat. Mont. 1887, sec. 22. Examine Hill v. Bryant, 61 Ark. 203; 32 S. W. 500, under Sanb. & R. Ark. Dig. sec. 5925. Does not sur- vive against wrongdoer's personal representative. Davis v. Nichols (Ark.), 15 S. W. 880. That action lies against corporation for re- ceiver's negligence after receiver's discharge and restoration of prop- erty, see Bartlett v. Cicero Light, II. & P. Co., 177 HI. 68; 52 N. E. 389; 48 Cent. L. J. 11C; 42 L. R. A. 715, rev'g 69 111. App. 576. Exa- mine cases cited in laBt preceding note herein. Tt'.o § 597 DEATH — FA IK AND JUST COMPENSATION and which are dependent upon the character thereof, since if the death act is exclusive, the measure of damages would not rest upon the same factors as under a survival action. 9 The above considerations further involve the question whether or not there can be more than one recovery and to what extent the action for the injury or a judgment in the survival action bars an action for damages for the pecuniary loss suffered by the negligent or wrongful killing. 1 " Although a father may sue as administrator and recover for the death of a son, and the judgment is not a bar to an action by him in the same capacity for damages for the death of another son from the same act of negligence. 11 In Arkansas, however, these actions are dif- ferent and neither is a bar to the other and there may be a recovery for the damages resulting from the injuries and also for those occasioned by the death. 1 - And in the case of a minor child's death the father has also a common-law action for loss of services. There is also the survival right in the personal repre- sentatives so that three actions lie in such case which may be prosecuted at the same time and recoveries had in each and all of them. 1J 9 See Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 119 111. 586; 6 West. 773; 9 N. E. 263; 19 111. App. 591; Holton v. Daly, 106 111. App. 591, both cited in Martin v. Missouri P. R. Co., 58 Kan. 475; 49 Pac. 605; 7 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 576; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 165. 10 See Consolidated Coal Co. v. Machl, 130 111. 551; 22 N. E. 715, Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 119 111. 586; 6 West. 773; 9 X. E. 263; 19 111. App. 591; Beard v. Skeldon, 113 111. 584; 13 111. App. 54; Holton v. Daly, 106 111. 131. See Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 111. 68; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Morris, 26 111. 400; Chicago v. Major, 18 111. 349. Ex- amine Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Dylinski, 67111. App. 114; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 77. 11 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Slater, 139 766 111. 190; 28 N. E. 830; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 480, aff'g 39 111. App. 69. 12 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Sweet, 63 Ark. 563; 40 S. W. 463: 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 295, per Bates J., a case of death from injuries caused by the derailment of a train and the pendency of the action for the injury, and verdict thereon was averred. Administrators may maintain two actions, one under act of 1838 and one under act of 1883. Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 53 Ark. 117; 13 S. W. 801; 7 L. R. A. 283; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 690. 13 So held in Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 53 Ark. 117; 13 S. W. 801; 7 L. R. A. 283; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 690. The act of 1883 does not take away the survival right under Mansf. Dig. sec. 5223. This statute (id. sees. 5225, 5226), super- WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY INJURIES. 6 598 § 598. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries" — Statutes— Continued -IScncfieiurics, etc. — In Arkansas, under the death loss act, the suit is brought by the personal representative for the benefit of the widow and next of kin, and the father has also his common-law right of action," and the damages are not for the benefit of the es- tate. 1 "' In Maine the damages recoverable are limited to those which result to the beneficiaries themselves. 16 So in Montana the existence of beneficiaries is necessary, and a complaint is fatally defective which fails to aver whether deceased left a widow or next of kin. 17 In Nebraska the complaint must show some person entitled to recover under the statute, and it must sedes the act of 1875, relating to suits for injuries by railway trains. As to action being new, see State v. Grand Trunk R. Co., Gl Me. 114, indictment; State v. Maine C. R. Co., 60 Me. 400, indictment. M Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 53 Ark. 117; 13 S. W. 801; 7 L. R. A. 283; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 690. As to the existence of benefi- ciaries being necessary under prior act, see Little Rock Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Crow, 54 Neb. 747; 74 N. W. 1066. 21 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Oys- ter, 58 Neb. 1; 78 N. W. 359; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 655. 22 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Hession, 150 111. 546; 37 N. E. 505, aff'g 50 111. App. 685. See St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Yocum, 34 Ark. 493. 23 Falkenan v. Rowland, 70 111. App. 26. 24 Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. O'Con- nor, 119 111. 586; 6 West. 773; 9 N. E. 263; Holton v. Daly, 106 111. 131. 25 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 338, per the court. 26 Union R. & T. Co. v. Schacklett (111.), 8 West. 63. 27 Chicago & G. T. R. Co. v. Gacin- nowski, 150 111. 189; 40 N. E. 601, aff'g 54 111. App. 276. DEATH •' DIREC I' DAM \ <.!.>. § 599 against a railroad company, there must be a widow and next of kin and the existence of such persons must be alleged, 38 although the hushand suing as administrator may recover. 39 And do cause of action is stated in a declaration which does not aver that any one suffered any pecuniary loss because of deceased's killing, nor that she left her surviving a husband and next of kin * And it must also he alleged that a child born after deceased was killed was one of the next of kin. 81 § 599. "Direct damages sustained "Miners' statute.— In Illinois there is a statute known as the miners' act which pro- vides for the recovery of "direct damages sustained*" for a wilful violation thereof or for a wilful failure to comply there- with. Under this enactment the right of action accrues to the widow of deceased, his lineal heirs or adopted children, or any person dependent for support upon deceased before he was killed and the limit ofrecovery is five thousand dollars. 83 Hut the action under this statute is not to recover a penalty but only the damages alleged to have been occasioned by a violation of the law. ;! And an allegation of a ''wilful omission *' to comply 88 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Morris, 26 111. 400. » Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Raddeley, 150 111. 328: 36 X. E. 965, aff'g 52 111. App. 94. 30 St. Luke's Hospital v. Foster, 86 111. App. 282., See further as to ex- istence of beneficiaries being neces- sary, etc. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co, v. Hession, 150 111. 546; Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 111. 68; Conant v. Griffin, 48 111. 410; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Mabie, 77 111. App. 176, holding also that the omission of the essential averment of the existence of next of kin is not cured by ver- dict. As to instruction fixing tlie term next of kin, see Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 338. As to re- covery whore no next of kin or pecu- niary loss proven, see Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gillam, 27 111. App. 386. The loss for the death of a wife is for the surviving husband and next 1 74 111. App. 567 49 of kin. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Chicago Title & T. Co., 79 111. App. 623; Chi- cago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Dowd, 115 111. 659; 2 West. 882. 31 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Logue. 47 111. App. 292. 82 3 Starr & C. Ann. St. (am'd 1887 1 ch. 93, sees. 4, 14, p. 400; Hurd's Rev. Stat. 1889, ch. 93, sees. 6, 8, 14. Sec. 4 of this act requires an inspection of the mine each morning before the miners enter, and for a report thereof, and where deceased was killed in said mine by a fall of dirt, no re- covery can be had where, after the employees had commenced work but three hours prior to the accident an inspection had been made, since a defect which existed earlier could have been discovered when the in- spection was made. Missouri it I. Coal Co. v. Schwalb, 74 111. App. 567. : " Missouri & I. Coal Co. v. Schwalb, 'i;m 600 DEATH FORFEITURE Oil FINE. with the requirement as to providing a sufficient light does not involve a charge of wrongful intent, but that such omission con- stituted conscious acts of the mind and not merely inadvertence, and it is proper therefore to refuse testimony of an intention to comply with the statute in good faith. 34 Another important con- sideration is that this statute gives a right of action for the in- jury and also a right to recover for the loss of life, 33 and although different beneficiaries are named under this act than are desig- nated by the general death loss act, it seems that the action is not brought by the personal representative, but that the widow may sue, although others may be benefited who are shown to exist. 36 § 600. Forfeiture or line — Indictment— Railroads — Com- mon carriers — Statute. — In Maine in addition to the statutes elsewhere herein noted, railroad corporations and other common carriers forfeit for loss of life through their negligence or care- lessness or by that of their servants or agents, not less than five hundred, nor more than five thousand dollars to be recovered by indictment. But due care and diligence is required to have been exercised by the person killed and a fine is precluded where de- ceased was killed while walking in the road or while there con- trary to the company's rules and regulations. The recovery is for the same class of beneficiaries as under the general death stat- ute. 37 The action, however, while in form by indictment is anal- ogous in some respects, at least, to the civil action for death, in so far as the rules of evidence and general legal principles gov- 34 Odin Coal Co. v. Denman, 185 111. 413; 57 N. E. 192, aff'g 84 111. App. 190. See also Hawley v. Daly, 13 111. App. 391. 85 3 Starr & C. Ann. Stat, (am'd 1887) ch. 93, sees. 4, 6, 8, 14; Hurd's Rev. Stat. 1889, ch. 93, sees. 4, 6, 8, 14. 36 See Litchfield Coal Co. v. Taylor, 81 111. 590; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Maehl, 130 111. 551; 22 N. E. 715; Beard v. Skeldon, 113 111. 584; 13 111. App. 54. See sec. 598, herein, as to beneficiaries. 37 Rev. Stat. Me. 1883, ch. 51, sees. 68, 69; id. ch. 52, sec. 7; Rev. Stat. 770 1871, ch. 51, sec. 36; Rev. Stat. Me. 1857, ch. 51, sec. 42, p. 370; ch. 52, sec. 7, p. 376; Act 1855, ch. 161. As to contributory negligence, see State v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 70 Me. 357; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 312. As to Ark. Act, 1875, relating to injuries by railway trains, see Davis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 53 Ark. 117; 13 S. W. 801; 7 L. R. A. 283; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 690. As to Neb. Comp. Stat. ch. 72; Ark. 1, sec. 3, see Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Zernecke (Neb.), 82 N. W. 26. I»l..\ I i! REASONABLE BUM. §601 erning the recovery are concerned. 38 This statement is subject, however, to this qualification that in survival actions a different rule as to the elements of damages generally exists than in cases where the action is for the death itself. 39 Sothatit maybe stated not only as pertinent to the above assertion, but also as a rule under this enactment under consideration that in determining whether the action for killing lies under this statute or another act in that state, the test is the instantaneous death," 1 which in- volves the survival of the injured party's right of action, and the construction of the statutes upon the question of the legislative intent to create two remedies for the same injury, which latter cannot be assumed." Again, it will be observed by comparison of this enactment with the general death loss act that as we stated at the beginning of this section the persons entitled t<> recover are the same, therefore the same rules as to the existence of beneficiaries being a prerequisite to the action should apply in both cases. 4 - In Arkansas there is a statutory remedy in case an adult is killed by the running of a railroad train in that stated § 601. "Suck sum as the jury may deem reasonable"— Statute.— Another statute !4 in Maine provides for the recovery of such sum as the jury may deem reasonable as damages where the life of any person is lost through defect or want of repair or sufficient railing in any highway, causeway or bridge, and the county or town obligated to keep the same in repair is liable, provided it had the required statutory notice. 1 "' 38 State v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 58 Me. 176. 39 See sees. 503, 609, herein. 40 See chap. 37 herein as to in- stantaneous death. 41 State v. Maiue G. R. Co., 60 Me. 490, per the court; Sawyer v. Perry, 88 Me. 42; 33 Atl. 660. See Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Zernecke (Neb.), 82 N. W. 20. See see. 609, herein. 42 See sec. 598, herein. Existence of beneficiaries necessary and should be averred. State v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 60 Me. 145, indictment. 43 Sandel & Hill's Dig. Ark. Stat. 1894, p. 1310, sec. 5910; Act, Febru- ary :'., 1875, sec. 3. See also Sanb. «£ H. Dig. 1894, sees. 6349,6357, as to damages to persons or property by railroads. As to injury, etc., to em- ployees of railroads, see 111. Act. February 28, 1893; Stats, sees. 6248 6250. As to death of employee in Montana, see Codes (Civ. Proc.), 1895, sees. 578. 579. 44 See sees. 599, 600, herein, for other Maine statutes. 45 Rev. Stat. (Me. 1888), ch. 18. 771 § 602 DEATH— FAIR VNI> JUST COMPENSATION § 602. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries " — Pecuniary loss. — The plaintiff in the case of negligent or wrongful death is entitled to recover a fair and just compensation for the benefit of those entitled for the pecuniary loss sustained by them by reason of the death, not exceeding the sum limited by statute 16 where the statute fixes such limit. Only the pecuniary loss can, however, be recov- ered. 47 This rule is well settled, and has been asserted in a large majority of the cases wherein actions have been brought to recover the loss occasioned by negligent and wrongful killing in the states which come under this fair and just compensation statute. But the damages awarded must be within such amount as the statute limits as the extent of the recover}- in states where there is such a limitation, 4 " 1 although the actual pe- 46 Anderson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 35 Neb. 95; 52 N. W. 849. See Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Keenan, 190 111. 217; 60 N. E. 107, aff'g 92 111. App. 430. 47 St. Louis & \V. R. Co. v. Henson (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C), (E. D. Ark.) 58 Fed. 531; Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350; 34 Am. Rep. 44; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 195, 212; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. ( U. S. ) 90 ; 18 L. Ed. 591, aff'g Barron v. Illinois C. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C. N. D. 111.) 412, 453; Bai- ley v. Chicago & A. R. Co.. 4 Biss. (U. S. C. C. N. D. 111.) 430; Economy Light & P. Co. v. Stephen, 187 111. 137; 58 N. E. 359, aff'g 87 111. App. 220; Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Woolridge, 174 111. 330; 51 N. E. 701, rev'g 72 111. App. 55; Calumet Elec. St. R. Co. v. Van Pelt, 173 111. 70; 50 N. E. 678, aff'g 68 111. App. 582; Chi- cago, M. & S. P. R. Co. v. Dowd, 115 111. 659; 2 West. 882; Holton v. Daly, 106 111. 131; Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Uelaney, 82 111. 198; 25 Am. Rep. 198; St. Louis, P. & N. R. Co. v. Rawley, 90 111. App. 653; Chicago City R. Co. v. Gillam, 27 111. App. 386; West Chicago St. R. Co. 772 v. Mabie, 77 111. App. 176; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Chicago Title & T. Co., 79 111. App. 623; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Ashline, 56 111. App. 475; Chicago Cousol. B. Co. v. Tietz, 37 111. App. 599; Malott v. Shimer, 153 Ind. 35; 1 Repr. 1234; 54 M. E. 101; (i Am. Neg. Rep. 263; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 774; McKay v. New Eng- land Dredging Co., 92 Me. 454; 43 Atl. 29; Anderson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 35 Neb. 95; 52 N. W. 840. See sees. 605, 610, herein. Under the general allegation of damages evidence is admissible as to all dam- ages necessarily and naturally re- sulting from the death (Serensenv. Northern Pac. R. Co.[U. S. C. C. D. Mont.], 45 Fed. 407, 411, per Knowles, J.), and the complaint need not allege special damages to the next of kin, and need not show that they have suffered a pecuniary loss by the death. Serensen v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Mont.), 45 Fed. 407, 409, 410, following Illi- nois C. R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90, per Nelson, J. « Calumet Elect. St. R. Co. v. Van Pelt, 173 111. 70: 50 N. E. 678, aff'g 68 111. App. 582; Anderson v. Chicago, WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY INJURIES. cuniary loss is not the limitation of damages for the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit. 40 So the right to nominal damages 80 and the right of action under the survival statutes, and the elements of damages in such cases should be consid- ered. 51 Nor will the total amount of pecuniary damages be in- creased to aid one of the beneficiaries lo get enough, even though that one be entitled to more than the others. 52 § G03. Same subject continued. — The question of the ne- cessity of alleging and proving pecuniary loss becomes impor- tant, but it is also closely involved with that of the recovery of nominal damages, 53 for if the statute was intended to give such damages without proof of actual loss, then it is obvious that the allegations need not go beyond the legal proof required to justify the recovery of some damages. In Illinois the aver- ments of the complaint will be sufficient if they are such as to admit evidence of the pecuniary loss ; but special pecuniary injury need not be pleaded, and an allegation of damages in a stated sum is, it seems, also sufficient, : ' [ although a complaint in which it does not appear that any one suffered any pecuniary loss because of the death is insufficient. 55 Special or pecuniary R. & Q. R. Co., 35 Neb. 95; 52 N. W. 840. See Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cozby, 174 111. 109; 50 N. E. 1011, aff'g 69 111. A pp. 256; Chicago, M. & St. P. K. Co. v. Dowd, 115 111. 659; 2 West. 882. But examine Illinois C. I!. Co. v. Ashline, 56 111. App. 475. See Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Rohlfs, 51 111. App. 215; Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 111. 368; 2 West. 50. See sec. 605, herein. 49 Chicago v. Keefe, 114 111. 222; 1 West. 352. 5 ' See sec. 625, herein. S1 See sees. 503, 596 n, 609 and chap. 23 herein. 62 Falkenan v. Rowland, 70111 App. 20. 63 See sec. 625, herein. 54 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Carey, 115 111. 115: 2 West. 73; 3 N. E. 519; Stafford v. Rubens, 115 111. 196; 1 West. 640; Chicago v. Hesing, 83 111. 204. See cases cited, sec. 625, herein. See further as to pleading and evi- dence, Ilolton v. Daly, 106 111. 131; Barron v. Illinois C. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C. 111.) 412. An allegation that defendants promised and under- took to perform certain acts for the safety of the deceased is mere sur- plusage in an action of trespass on the case for death caused by defend- ants' negligent acts, and that it is no obstacle to the action that abroach of contract arises from the wrong done or duty neglected. Kinnare v. Chi- cago, 70 111. App. 106, aff'd 171 111. 332; 49 X. E. 536; 3 Chic. L. Jour. Wkly. 128. 58 St. Luke's Hospital v. Foster. 86 111. App. 282. But see Falkenan 773 §608 DEATH FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION loss need not be averred under the Montana statute of 1879. 5 * But in Nebraska it must not only appear that the person for whose benefit the suit is brought, had a pecuniary interest in the life of deceased,"' 7 but there must also be an averment of pecuniary injury with reference to the survivor, 58 although it is sufficient, if the facts set forth with respect to the deceased and the relation the survivors sustained to him are such as show a pecuniary loss. 59 . And it seems that it is not necessary that the words, damage, injury or loss be used to ensure the absolute sufficiency of the complaint or petition. 60 The necessity of proof of pecuniary loss, as well as the requirement of an allegation thereof, is involved with that of the right to nominal damages and has been considered in connection therewith/' 1 v. Rowland, 70 111. App. 20; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 530, where there was no proof of pecuniary interest of the brothers and sisters in deceased's life. 56 Page 508; Serensen v. Northern P. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Mont.), 45 Fed. 407. 57 Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Co. v. Young, 58 Neb. 678; 79 N. W. 556; 14 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 343, un- der'Neb. Comp. Stat. 1S97, chap. 21. See cases in next following note. 58 Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co. v. Bond, 58 Neb. 385; 78 N. W. 710; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 759; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 116; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 58 Neb. 218; 78 N. W. 514; Orgall v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 46 Neb. 4; 64 N. W. 450; Orgall v. Burlington, etc. R. Co. is same case. 59 Friend v. Burleigh, 53 Neb. 674; 74 N. W. 50. Deceased's good health, active conduct of business and that he left a widow and chil- dren, held sufficient in this case. Kearney Electric Co. v. Laugldin, 45 Neb. 390; 63 N. W. 941, holds that there is a sufficient showing of pe- cuniary injury, where the petition avers that minor children are left, 774 who were wholly dependent upon deceased for support. 60 Kearney Elect. Co. v. Laugh lin, 45 Neb. 390; 63 N. W. 941, under Neb. Comp. Stat, 1893, ch. 21, sec. 2. 61 See sees. 613, 625, herein. When declarations of one killed that he intended to take passage on a train are part of the res gestse relating to the act of departure. Chicago &E. I. R. Co. v. Chancellor, 165 111. 438; 46 N. E. 269, rev'g 60 111. App. 525. As to no necessity of exact proof of loss, Baltimore & O. S. R. Co. v. Then, 159 111. 535; 42 N. E. 971, aff'g 59 111. App. 561. That ad- ministrator suing for the death is a competent witness on his own be- half, Illinois C. R. Co. v. Reardon, 157 111. 372; 41 N. E. 871. That evi- dence must afford some data to enable the extent of the loss to be ascertained, Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 152 111. 138; 38 N. E. 760. As to necessity of proof of pecuniary loss, Chicago v. Major, 18 111. 349. As to reduction of damages where no special precuniary injury is shown in case of death of a 4-year old child. West Chicago R. Co. v. Mabie, 77 111. App. 176. Decedent's daughter, though not an expert, may WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY INJURIES. § 604 § 604. "Fair and jnst compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries "—Exemplary damages — The intent of this statutory provision, specifying the measure of compensation, does not cover exemplary or vindictive damages, since no dam- ages are allowed by way of punishment." Nor can a husband recover anything except the value of his deceased wife's services estimated in dollars and cents upon the evidence. 68 Nor can punitive damages he awarded under the Maine statute of 1891.*' testify as tn hi-; health and physical ability. Ashley Wire Co. v. Me- Fadden, 66 111. App. 26. As to reduc- tion of damages where no proof existed as to age, etc., see Serensen v. Northern P. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Mont.), 45 Fed. 407. In case of death and an action under accident insurance policy, see as to declar- ations as to the fact, nature and extent of injury made hy the injured party a few minutes after the acci- dent being admissible as res gesta3. Travelers Protect. Assoc, of America v. West (U. S. C. C. A. 111.), 42 C. C. A. 2S4; 102 Fed. 226. The declarations of a party himself to whomsoever made are competent evidence when confined strictly to such complaints, expressions and exclamations as furnish evidence of a present existing pain or malady to prove liis condition, ills, pains and symptoms, whether arising from sick- ness or from an injury or accident or violence. If made to a medical attendant they are of more weight than if made to another person. So is a declaration made by a deceased person contemporaneously or nearly so with a main event, in consequence of which it is alleged he died as to the cause of that event. Though generally the declarations must be contemporaneous with the event, yet where there are connecting circum- stances, they may even when made sometime afterwards, form a part of the whole res gestae. Where the principal fact is the fact of bodily injury the res gestae are the state- ments of the cause made by the party injured almost contemporane- ously with the occurrence of the in- jury, and those relating to the consequences made while the latter subsisted and were in progress. In- surance Co. v. Mosely, 8 Wall. (U. S. ) 397, cited Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 U. S. 296; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Rambo, 59 Fed. 77; North Am. Ace. Assoc, v. Woodson, 64 Fed. 691; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. 752, 756. See 4 Joyce on Ins. sees. 3820, 3821. See further as to evidence, sees. 605, 613, 625, herein as to nominal damages, support and dependency, jury and instructions, and the cases giving facts under sec. 607, herein, as to factors generally. G - Barron v. Illinois Cent. K. Co.. 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C. X. I). 111.1453, 455, 45t>, charge of Davis, J., to jury, the case was affirmed, Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. (72 U. S) 99; 18 L. Ed. 591. See same case gener- ally, 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C. X. I). 111.) 412. <*St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Ilenson (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. E. D. Ark.). 58 Fed. 531; 7 C. C. A. 349. 6 H)akes v. Maine Cent. K. Co., 95 Me. 103; 49 Atl. 418; Stat. 1891, c. 124. See sees. 602, 603, herein. 775 § 60.' DEATH I'Ali: AND JUST COMPENSATION § 605. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries" — Jury and instructions.— The jury should determine what is a fair and just compensation, and this must depend upon all the facts and circumstances in evidence before them in each particular case. There are cases, however, in which much must necessarily be left to the judgment and discre- tion of the jury, especially so where from the very nature of the action there can be no certain definite proof of the pecuniary in- jury, as is evidenced in a suit for the death of young children of too tender years to render services. But however much discre- tion is vested in the jury, the verdict must not be the result of passion or prejudice, and the jury should be properly instructed by the court, while their award of damages is subject to be modified, reversed or set aside for proper cause, as where the verdict is excessive, etc. 65 66 In an action of this kind the con- stant factor is the practical knowl- edge, varied experience and sound judgment of 12 men. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Needham (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. E. D. Ark.), 3 C. C. A. 129; 10 U. S. App. 339; 52 Fed. 371, 377; 5 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. 88, per San- born, Cir. J. The court should limit the jury to the assessment of such damages as the evidence shows. Mc- Nulta v. Jenkins, 91 111. App. 309. It is the duty of the court to in- struct the jury as to the basis upon which the damages are to be com- puted, and the pecuniary value of deceased's life ascertained. Hunt v. Kile (U. S. C. C. A. 111.), 38 C. C. A. 641; 98 Fed. 49. The jury should not consider the comments of the coroner's jury on the situation at the place of accident, nor should they take with them depositions or a plat attached to the coroner's verdict, nor should they consider the defend- ant's conduct in regard to the acci- dent in connection with the same. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Dahlin, 67 111. App. 99. Where de- 776 ceased is a minor, the value of her services may be estimated, without proof thereof, from the child's age, and the juror's knowledge and ex- perience in matters of common obser- vation. Callaway v. Spurgeon, 63 111. App. 571. An instruction should refer to the evidence as the basis of damages. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Rohlfs, 51 111. App. 215. Jury should be instructed as to the ele- ments on which to estimate the dam- ages, and not generally directed to award them according to their be- lief. Chicago E. & L. S. R. Co. v. Adamick, 33 111. App. 412. Damages must depend upon the good sense and sound judgment of the jury upon all the facts and circumstances of each particular case, and the pecun- iary injury is uncertain and indefi- nite. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Barron (111. Stat.), 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90; 18 L. Ed. 591, per Nelson, J.; City of Chicago v. Major, 18 111. 349. As to damages being left to jury's dis- cretion, etc., see St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Davis, 55 Ark. 462; 18 S. W. 628; Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. Willi REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY INJURIES. g 606 § 600. Same subject— Proper and erroneous iust met ions- Illustrations. It is not improper to charge the jury that they may consider whatever they may from the evidence believe tin- widow and next of kin might have reasonably expected in a pecuniary way from the continued life of the intestate,® and an instruction is not objectionable that if the jury believed the plaintiff was entitled by a preponderance of evidence to recover under any count of the declaration they might award such dam- ages as, under the evidence, they thought the parties, for whose use the suit was brought had actually sustained, if any, not exceeding the amount demanded in the declaration.' 17 And the jury may be charged that if they find for the plaintiff they shall assess the damages at such sum as they believe will be a fair and just compensation, based on the pecuniary loss, if any, re- sulting from the death to the next of kin, not exceeding the sum v. Barker, 39 Ark. 491; Chicago v. Scholten, 75 111. 468; McLean Coal Co. v. McVey, 38 111. App. 158; Chi- cago M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Wilson, 35 111. App. 346; Salem v. Harvey, 29 111. App. 483, affd 129 111. 344; 21 N. E. 1076; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Slater, 28 111. App. 73, aff'd 129 111. 91; 21 N. E. 575; 6 L. R. A. 418. While the court should not state what constitutes a reasonable and just compensation, yet" it may ex- press the extreme limit to which a verdict should go. Couley v. Maim' Cent. R. Co., 95 Me. 149; 49 Ail. 668; State v. Maine C. R. Co., 76 Me. 357; Johnson v. Missouri P. R. Co., 18 Neb. 690; 26 N. W. 347. Deceased was twelve years old — $2,500 not excessive. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Then, 159 111. 535; 42 N. E. 971, affg 59 111. App. 561. Judgment for §2,000 will be reversed as attributable to pas- sion, where boy was killed and evi- dence is meager. East St. Louis Elec. St. R. Co. v. Burns, 77 111. App. 529. Deceased was less than 4 years old; no special pecuniary injury was shown —$4,000 excessive. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Mabie, 77 111. App. 176. Deceased was 5 years old — $3,000 not excessive. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Waniata, 68 111. App. 481, affd 169 111. 17; 48 N. E. 437. Deceased was a 10-year old boy — $5,000 excessive. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Wrixon, 51 111. App. 307. Deceased was an in- fant son — $1,000 not excessive. Joliet v. Weston, 22 111. App. 225, affd 123 111. 641; 14 N. E. 665; 12 West. 750. Deceased sou was 10 years old — $2,850 not excessive. Omaha v. Richards, 49 Neb. 244: 68 N. W. 528, aff'd 70 N. W. 36:5. De- ceased boy was 17 years old— 82.400 not excessive in behalf of father who was poor and had dependent children. Post v. Olmstead, 47 Neb. 893; 66 X. W. 828. w Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kelly, 182 111. 267; 54 N. E. '.'7'.'. affg 80 111. App. 675. 67 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Cozby, 174 111. 109; 50 N. E. 1011, affg 69 111. App. 256. 777 § 606 DEATH FAIi: AND JUST COMPENSATION claimed in the declaration. 68 So an instruction is not erroneous that if the plaintiff has proved his case as alleged, the jury should find the defendant guilty and assess plaintiff's damages at such sum as proved by a preponderance of the evidence, where the jury are also explicitly directed that they must be governed solely by the pecuniary loss sustained and the manner of estimating such loss is charged. 69 Again, if the jury find the defendant guilty of the wrongful act, neglect and default under the evidence aud the court's instructions, and as averred in the complaint the widow and next of kin may recover such dam- ages as the jury may deem from the evidence and proofs a fair and just compensation having reference to the pecuniary injuries sustained through the death by such widow and next of kin within the statutory limitation, and an instruction to this effect is proper. 70 But a charge not to assess the damages above the amount demanded in the declaration is censurable although not reversible, although the amount claimed exceeded the statu- tory limit. It appeared, however, that the verdict was not af- fected by such instruction. 71 And a direction to the jury is too general and indefinite and is erroneous, that the jury are not limited to the actual present loss that might be proved, but that they might go further and compensate for the relative injury with reference to the future and compensate for the pecuniary in- juries present and prospective ; nor should they be charged as to deceased's disposition to aid his mother, for they should be con- fined to the facts of actual help or obligation to help. Vi So an instruction is erroneous which merely states that the jury may assess the damages at whatever sum in their opinion to which the plaintiff is entitled, not exceeding five thousand dollars." But a charge is not objectionable as placing no limitation upon the amount recoverable, where the jury are directed that if they believe defendant's negligence caused the death, plaintiff was 68 Calumet Elec. R. Co. v. Van Pelt, 173 111. 70; 50 N. E. 678, aff'g 68 Hi. App. 582. 69 Wabash R. Co. v. Smith, 162 111. 583; 44 N. E. 856. Above instruction does not direct damages to be al- lowed as a solatium. ™ Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. 778 Dowd, 115 111. 659; 3 West. 882; 4 N. E. 368. 71 Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 115 111. 368; 2 West. 50. 72 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Shan- non, 45 111. 197. ™ Hunt v. Kile (U. S. C. C. A. 111.), 38 C. C. A. 641 ; 98 Fed. 49. will! mi- i:i:i:n. s. W. R. Co. v. Then, 159 111. 535; 42 \. F. Mil. aff'g 59 111. App. 561. Loss of wages 781 § 608 DEATH— FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION the rate of wages to all classes of the defendant's employees was, in connection with other evidence, held competent for the purpose of showing the wages paid the fireman in its employ.™ of minor son not the limit of damages. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Beardon, 157 111. 372; 41 N. E. 871. Deceased brother was habitual drunkard, and incapable of self-support. North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Brodie, 156 111. 317; 40 N. E. 942, rev'g 57 111. App. 564. Evidence should afford some data for ascertain- ment of loss. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 152 111. 138; 38 N. E. 760. As to habits, capacity, etc., see Chi- cago v. Scholten, 75 111. 468. As to instruction as to present and pro- spective loss being too general and indefinite, see Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Swett, 45 111. 197. Deceased •was a son, the character and amount of aid rendered parents, father's age and financial condition considered — $2,000 not excessive. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 388. Deceased was son and brother; his age, occupation, income, property, probable increase or decrease of wealth, that he was unmarried and possibility that he might have mar- ried are material. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Barron (Stat. 111.), 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90; 18 L. Ed. 591; Barron v. Illinois C. R. Co., 1 Biss. (IT. S. C. C. N. D. 111.) 412, 453. Deceased man's age, health, strength, earning capacity, daily wages, and that he left a wife and children considered —$5,000 not excessive. Economy Light & P. Co. v. Stephen, 87 111. App. 220, affd (111.); 58 N. E. 359. Evidence of habits of deceased may be competent upon question of contributory negligence. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Downey, 85 111. App. 175. Age, earnings and finan- cial condition admissible. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Pearson, 82 111. App. 605. Earning until 21 years of age, not the limit of damages. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Dooley, 76 111. App. 424; 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 238. Deceased was a girl 4 years old — $3,500 reduced to $2,000. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Scanlon, 68 111. App. 628; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 113, affd 168 111. 34; 48 N. E. 148. De- ceased son was 33 years old; he sup- ported parents 70 years old — $5,000 reduced to $3,000. Leiter v. Kin- nare, 68 111. App. 358. Age of de- ceased adult son, that he was un- married and disposition of his wages considered. Webster Mfg. Co. v. Mulvany, 68 111. App, 607, affd 168 111. 311; 48 N. E. 168. Deceased's age, occupation and property owned by him considered— $5,000 not exces- T9 The witness here was a termi- nal agent and as such had been of- ficially furnished with and had possession of this official schedule of wages paid employees. Moreover there was competent evidence to show about what the earnings of a fireman were on the company's road if it was material to prove the fact, and it is not essential to prove the in- dividual earnings of a fireman killed where it is shown that he was paid 782 on a mileage basis and the rate there- of. And the jury may take notice of the fact that such employees are paid under a general schedule of wages as well also as of other facts in the common knowledge of intelligent men, and they may exercise their good sense and judgment in esti- mating damages. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Elliott (TJ. S. C. C. A. 8th C. C. C. A. Ind. Ty. ), 102 Fed. 96 ; 42 C. C. A. 188. WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY IXJl l:lis. § tin-: It also decided in the same case that the admission of evidence of what deceased told witness he earned per month when he first commenced work in defendant's switch yards and of the amount of his wages when he became fireman is, if incompetent, sive. Louisville, X. A. it C. R. Co. v. Patchen, 66 111. App. 206. Healtb and ability to perform hard labor may be proven. Ashley Wire Co. v. McFadden, 66 111. App. 26. De- ceased's age and occupation and age of surviving child considered — $5,000 excessive. Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co. v. Gunderson, 65 111. App. 638. Death of mother, adult sous lived with her and she kept house for them. Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Ptacek, 62 III. App. 375; 1 Chic L. J. Wkly. 53. That daughter was an adult, and her earnings and aid rendered parents considered — $4,140 exces- sive. Armour v. Czischki, 59 111. App. 17. Deceased employee's earn- ings which he might have given family are not the limit of recovery. Swift v. Foster, 55 111. App. 286. Deceased, laborer, earned $1.50 a day. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Stanley, 54 111 App. 215. Deceased minor sons, age and daily earnings considered — $2,500 not excessive. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Gilbert, 51 111. App. 404. De- ceased was 45 years old: when he was employed, he earned weekly $9 or $10 and supported his fam- ily — $5,000 not excessive. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ouska, 51 111. App. 334, affd 151 111. 232; 27 N. E. 899. Deceased was 31 years old, and in good health and sole sup- port of family. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Knevrim, 48 111 App. 243. Age of deceased husband, his health, education, habits of sobriety and steadiness, the fact that he had learned a trade and that he was un- employed considered — $2, 000 not ex- cessive. Marschall v. Laughran, 47 111. App. 29. Habits and character of deceased as affecting next of kin*s pecuniary relations with him and support received admissible. Chi- cago & G. W. R. Co. v. Travis, 44 111. App. 466. Dependency of surviving sister on deceased brother, her occu- pation and earnings considered. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 43 111. App. 324. Deceased adult daugh- ter was school-teacher, aided in sup- port of family and lived with parents. City of Salem v. Harvey, 29 111. App. 483, affd 129 111. 1076; 21 W. E. 1076. Deceased son's age, occupation, disposition of earnings with relation to parents, etc., considered. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Adler, 28 111. App. 102. Deceased was 73 years old, labored at odd jobs for part of time and earned about 8215 yearly — $1,200 held excessive. Conley v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 95 .Me. 149; 49 Atl. 668. Earning capacity, ability to labor and probabilities of obtaining profit- able employment are elements of damages. Oakes v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 95 Me. 103; 49 Atl. 418, under Stat. 1891, cb. 124. Deceased was laborer, unskilled, aged 23, had not saved anything and had no family — $8,000 excessive and also more than statutory limit. ODouuellv. Maine C. R. Co., 86 Me. 552: 30 Atl. 116: 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Rep. 293; 25 L. R. A. 658. Occupation and daily earnings were in evidence and also the facts that some of the kindred resided abroad but there was no evi- dence as to age, earning or saving capacity — 11,750 excessive. Seven- sen v. Northern P. R. Co. (U. S I C. D. Mont. ), 45 Fed. 407. See John- 783 § 609 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION immaterial error, where it is merely cumulative evidence of a fact abundantly proved by competent testimony, and is in addi- tion a fact which is a matter of common knowledge. Nor will such testimony be a ground of reversal where no objection is interposed to it as hearsay at the time of its introduction. The admission of incompetent evidence of a material fact being an error without prejudice, where the fact is proved by other com- petent evidence or the party complaining of the error was in- strumental in excluding competent evidence to prove the fact, or where the fact is one of common knowledge. 80 § 609. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries " — Sufferings of person injured. — Where the trial court permits the plaintiff to prove the nature of in- testate's injuries and that they had occasioned his death, but it also charged the jury that " nothing can be allowed for the pain and suffering of deceased," such action is not error for which there will be a reversal of the case. 81 But where there was only a moment's interval of conscious suffering, a verdict of four thousand dollars for the pain and suffering of son v. Missouri P. R. Co., 18 Neb. 690; 26 N. W. 347. Deceased's age at the time of death important. Soyer v. Great Falls Water Co., 15 Mont. 1 ; 37 Pac. 837. Life expect- ancy of deceased material, so are his good health and activity in business and manner of his death. Friend v. Burleigh, 53 Neb. 674; 74 N. W. 50. Deceased minor son's age and that of his father, the latter's poverty and condition with relation to dependent children, the son's occupation and competency therein, earning capac- ity and amount of earnings consid- ered — $2,400 not excessive. Post v. Olmstead, 47 Neb. 893; 66 N. W. 828. Life expectancy just before the injury and value of services may be proved. Missouri P. R. Co. v. Baier (Neb.), 55 N. W. 913. Deceased's indulgence in liquors, careless and and nonsaving habits and fail- 784 ure to aid next of kin considered. Anderson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (Neb.), 52 N. W. 840. See further Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304 ; Staf- ford v. Rubens, 115 111. 19t>; 1 West. 640; Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 111. 198; 25 Am. Rep. 198; Malott v. Shimer, 153 Ind. 35; 1 Reptr. 1,234; 54 N. E. 161; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 774; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 263; Gran v. Houston, 45 Neb. 813; 64 N. W. 245. g o Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. El- liott (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. C. C. A. Ind. Ty.), 102 Fed. 96; 42 C. C. A. 188. 81 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hicks (U. S. C. C. A. W. D. Ark.), 79 Fed. 262; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 793, per Thayer, Cir. J. In this case an em- ployee of a lumber company was killed by reason of open switch on railroad track. WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY INJURIES. § 610 deceased will be reversed,"-' although a verdict of "two thousand five hundred dollars will stand where deceased suffered intense pain and anguish for the twenty-four hours during which he survived the injuries, and he suffered a terrible shock to his system and his leg was mangled. 83 In the states however which come under this provision of the statute as to fair and just com- pensation, etc., this question of recovery for the pain and suf- fering of the injured party is also involved in that of the survival of the cause of action, as well as that whether or not the action for the death is separate and distinct from that which survives," and if the death is occasioned by a cause other than the injury, there is precisely the same basis of recovery as the person him- self would have had had he lived, otherwise his bodily pain and suffering cannot be considered, s "' and it may be generally stated that nothing can be allowed for the pain and suffering of the injured person. 86 § 610. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries "—Solatium— Mental suffering, loss of society, etc. — Nothing can be allowed for the grief or distress of 82 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Dawson, 68 Ark. 1; 56 S. W. 46. In this case a child 6 years old was killed on railroad track. Examine also St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Maho- uey, 67 Ark. 617; 55 S. W. 840.- Ser- vant was killed in this case. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McCain, 67 Ark. 377; 55 S. W. 165. A ser- vant was killed in this case. Fore- man of switching crew and switch- man of another crew are not fellow servants under Sanb. & B. Dig. sees. 6248, 6249. 83 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Robbins, 57 Ark. 377: 21 S. W. 886, brakeman killed. 84 An action survives in favor of the widow and children in Indian Territory. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (Ind. Ty.), 51 S. W. 1007: 14 Am. & Eng. R. ( 'as. X. S. 587. See sec. 596 n, herein. 50 85 Chicago* E. I. R. Co. v. O'Con- nor, 119 111. 586; 6 West. 773; 9 X. E. 263; 19 111. App. 591. See also Hol- tou v. Daly, 106 111. 131. 86 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Needham (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. E. D. Ark.), 3 C. C. A. 129; 10 U. S. App. 339; 52 Fed. 371, 378; 5 Am. & En S . R. Cas. 88, per Sanborn. C. J.: Illi- nois Cent. R. Co. v. Barron. 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90; IS L. Ed. 591, per Nel- son, J.; Barron v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 1 Hiss. (U. S. C. • '. X. D. 111.) 412, and charge of Davis, J., in same case; id. 445. 453. 4:.."): .Maney v. Chicago, B. * Q. R. Co.. in 111. App. in:,; Malotl v. Shimer, 15:: Ind. :;.",: 1 Repr. 1234; 5 1 \. K. L01 ; 15 Am. * Eng. R. Cas. V S. 771; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 263; Oakes v. .Maine < cut. Et Co., 95 Me. in.:: 49 Atl. lis. under Stat. 1891, ch. 124. 785 611 DEATH— FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION anyone, 8 * whether husband, wife, parent, child or other lineal or collateral kindred, for mental anguish or suffering is excluded as an element of damages under this statutory provision which allows only a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injury, 88 nor for loss of a wife's companionship, of her love and affection or anything of that kind. 89 Nor can anything be allowed for the wounded feelings of a parent. 90 Nor can there be any recovery for loss of companionship and association of a deceased child. 91 Nor for loss of society of other deceased persons, 92 and although the declaration alleges that the next of kin are deprived of the deceased's comfort, assistance and com- panionship, an instruction to give such damages as are proved by a preponderance of evidence is not open to the objection that it allows damages as a solatium where it also explicitly charged that the jury must be governed solely by the pecuniary loss. 9 ' §611. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries "—Physical injury to beneficiary.— The physical injury sustained by a beneficiary, although re- 87 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hicks (U. S. C. C. A. W. D. Ark.), 49 U. S. App. 112; 79 Fed. 262; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 793. But see sec. 609, herein. 88 St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Henson (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. E. D. Ark.), 58 Fed. 531; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Needham (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. E. D. Ark.), 3 C. C. A. 129; 10 U. S. App. 339; 52 Fed. 371, 378; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 88, per Sanborn, Cir. J.; Little Rock & F. S. R. Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350; 34 Am. Rep. 44; Barron v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C. N. D. 111.) 412; id. 453, 455, 456, charge by Davis, J., aff'd Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. (U. S. ) 90; 18 L. Ed. 591 ; Bailey v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. N. D. 111.), 4 Biss. 430; Wabash R. Co. v. Smith, 162 111. 583; 44 N. E. 856; Chicago Consul. Bottling Co. v. Tietz, 37111. App. 509; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gillam, 27 111. App. 386; Malott v. Shinier, 153 Ind. 35; 1 786 Repr. 1234; 54 N. E. 101; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 263 ; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 774; Oakes v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 95 Me. 103; 49AU.418; Anderson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 35 Neb. 95 ; 52 N. W. 840. 89 St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Henson (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. E. D. Ark.), 58 Fed. 531. 90 Bailey v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. N. D. 111.), 4 Biss. 430. Barron v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C. N. D. 111.) 412; id. 453, 455, 456, per Davis, J., charging the jury; case aff'd Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90; 18 L. Ed. 591. oi Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350; 34 Am. Rep. 44. 92 Kerkow v. Bauer, 15 Neb. 150. See cases cited in preceding notes to this section. 9 3 Wabash R. Co. v. Smith, 162 111. 583; 44 N. E. 856. WITH REFEUENCE DO PECUNIAR* [NJUBIES. §612 suiting from the killing, as in case of ill health occasioned by overwork, consequent upon the death, is nut a ground of re- covery." § 012. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries " — Relationship, legal and actual, of de- ceased to beneficiaries. -The relationship, legal and actual, sustained by deceased to the beneficiaries, is important in de- termining not only the actual loss, hut also in ascertaining the pecuniary advantage which the beneficiaries had a reasonable expectation of deriving except for the death. So that damages may be based upon this reasonable probability of pecuniary ben- efit, whether arising from legal or family relations. 11 '' Thus the fact that deceased was at borne only a small part of the time, coupled with his business energy and habits will be considered in connection with the value of his instruction and training of his children. 96 So the relations between deceased and his next of kin, lineal or collateral, are important, 1 ' 7 and although legal relations may have ceased between a husband and wife, yet his actual relations with her by the way of aid furnished her for their children will be considered. 95 But if legal relations be- tween husband and wife have been terminated, the right of re- covery has ended." Again, the pecuniary relations of deceased with the surviving beneficiaries are material and relevant. 1 " And in fact this question of legal and actual relations, in so far as ii affects the measure of damages, is involved in nearly every ease where recovery is sought for the negligent or wrongful killing of a person, and to add to this section the decisions which come within this classification would be to substantially repeat most of the cases which have been considered elsewhere under other headings. The reader is, therefore, referred to the several sec- 94 Elshire v. Schuyler, 15 Nob. 591; Barron v. Illinois C. R. Co.. 1 561. Biss. (U. S. C. C.) 412, 4.-):;. 1,5 McKay v. New England Dredg- w St. Louis. I. M. & S. R Co. ingCo., 92Me. 454; 43Atl. 29, under v. McCain, 87 Ark. 377; 55 S. W. Me. act, 1891, ch. 124. 105. 90 St. Louis, 1. M. & s. R. Co. v. w North Chicago v. Brodie, 156 Sweet, 60 Ark. 550; 31 S. W. 571. 111. 317; 40 N. E. 942. 97 Illinois C. K. Co. v. Barron (111. 100 Chicago«& G. W. K. Co. v. Travis. Stat.), 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90; 18 L. Ed. 44 111. A.pp. 460. 7-7 § 613 DEATH— FAIB AND JUST COMPENSATION tions relating to damages for death under this fair and just com- pensation statute. 1 § 613. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries " — Legal or moral obligation — Legal right — Support and dependency. — What has been lost by the death depends upon what constitutes the " pecuniary injury " and therefore that is the basis of recovery, 3 but the question at once arises whether the legal or moral obligation to support those in certain relations, such as the wife or the minor children, or the legal or moral right of such persons to claim support can enhance the damages, and it has been decided that it must appear that there was a legal obligation to support the next of kin because of their dependency, or that it must be shown that they were supported in whole or in part by deceased, in order to recover more than nominal damages, although it was subse- quently held in the same case that the inability of the next of kin to support themselves and the question of their depend- ence were not material or admissible evidence to show pecuniary injury. 3 And it has also been declared that it need not be proven that a legal claim to support exists to justify a recov- ery. 4 In case of a child's death in so far as the parent's legal right to services, and also the former's right and the latter's obligation to support are concerned, it is certain that the dam- ages rest largely upon the legal obligation and legal right coupled with the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit. But where the child is too young to render services of any value, then it is apparent that the question is one rather of a deprivation of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage than otherwise. 5 lr rhe point is particularly involved I 4 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Barron (111. in those sections, which relate to Stat.) 5 Wall. (U. S. ) 90, 106; 18 support and to reasonable expecta- < L. Ed. 591; Barron v. Illinois C. tion of pecuniary benefit under ' K. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C. )412. See sees. 613-616, herein. McKay v. New England Dredging 2 See sees. 602, 603, herein. Co., 92 Me. 454; 43 Atl. 29; Chicago B Chicago P. & St. L. K. Co. v. & A. R. Co. v. Shannon. See sec. Woolridge, 72 111. App. 551, rev'd 625, herein. 174 111. 330; 51 X. E. 701. See John ■■ 5 See sees. 616, 635, 636, herein. Morris Co. v. Burgess, 44 111. App. 27. i 788 WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY I \.H' I: I F.s. & 614 § OH. Same subject continued.— The statutes of those stairs which come within this provision as to fair and jusi com- pensation are evidently intended to benefit those who as bene- ficiaries have been deprived by the death of certain rights due from one who sustained at the time of the killing certain legal relations burdened with certain legal obligations such as the duty to support and the right to claim thesame. 6 Therefore in Arkansas and Illinois the amount of contributions of tie- de- ceased towards the support of his wife and children, and all the various factors which show the ability of the intestate in the matter of supporting his family will be considered, as well as the reasonable expectancy from his continued life had he not been killed. 7 And in these states where the deceased was either a minor or adult child, the extent of his contributions to his parents for their support or to other kindred as well as the intent to continue the same will be relevant and material upon the question of damages, although the recovery may also rest upon the reasonable expectation of benefit of pecuniary advan- tage, shown by the evidence. 8 So that it is apparent that in this latter instance the recovery does not rest upon any legal obligation or legal right, but rather upon the loss of a pecuniary 6 See sec. 598, herein. i St. Louis, I. M. & S. K. Co. v. Sweet. 80 Ark. 550; 31 S. W. 571; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Maddry, 57 Ark. 500; 21 S. W. 472; 58 Am. cV Eng. R. Cas.327; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Robbing, 57 Ark. 377; 21 S. W. SSi): Pennsylvania, etc., Co. v. Keane, 143 111. 172, 175; 32 X. E. 260; Chicago & Edison Co. v. Moren, 86 111. App. 152, affd 57 X. E. 773: Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ouska. 51 111. App. 334, affd 151 111. 232; 27 N". E. 897: Chicago A- E. I. R. Co. v. Kni'vrim, 48 111. App. 243; Chicago & C. W. R. Co. v. Travis, 44 111. App. 4(3(3. Widow's testimony that she was supported by her husband is competent. St. Louis P. & N. R. Co. v. Dorsey, 1S9 111. 251: 59 X. E. 593, affg 89 111. App. 555. Hut sec Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Moranda. 93 111. 302; Swift ifc Co. v. Foster, 103 111. 50; 44 X. E. 37: 12 Xar. Corp. Rep. 396. ■ St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Davis. 55 Ark. 402; IS S. W. 02S: For- dyce v. McCants, 55 Ark. 384; 18 S. W. 371: 51 Ark. 509; 11 S. W. 694; l L. R. A. 296; Letter v. Kinnare, 68 111. App. 358; Armour v. Czischki, 59 111. App. 17; St. Louis. A. & T. 11. R. Co. v. Bauer, 5:', 111. App. 526, affd 156 HI. 106; W N. E. 148; City of Salem v. Harvey. 29 111. App. 183, aff'd 12'." [11. 344: 21 X. E. 1076; Cl.i- oago & A. R. Co. v. Adler, 28 111. App. 102. Hut examine Little Rock. M. R. .V T. K. <••>. v. Leveret t, 48 Ark. 333: 3 S. W. 50, and sees. 617- 019, herein. 789 §614 DEATH— FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION benefit." But in another case some stress seems to have been put by the court upon the legal obligation of a deceased son to have aided his mother, for it was decided, that one of the ques- tions to be considered was whether he was bound to aid her. 10 Again, an instruction is held erroneous which allows the jury to award such damages as will be a just compensation for the dam- age to the. means of support of the next of kin. 11 In Illinois, as we have elsewhere, stated, 12 proof of support of lineal kindred does not seem necessary, 13 although upon this question the deci- sions are not in harmony. 14 In that state under the statute limiting the damages to the pecuniary injuries sustained by the wife and next of kin, it is immaterial that the lineal descendants were dependent upon the deceased and were unable to support themselves. 1 " 1 But it is also held that it is not a material factor that minor children had other means of support after the father's negligent death, 16 and evidence of the deceased widow's ability to earn money is admissible under allegations that by her negligent death the children are deprived of their education and means of support. 17 But evidence of pecuniary loss is ad- missible upon an averment that the widow and minor children have by the death of the husband and father been deprived of support, etc., 18 and the amount of the recovery will be affected 9 Examine McKay v. New England Dredging Co., 92 Me. 454; 43Atl. 29. 10 Chicago & N. W. K. Co. v. Swett, 45 111. 197. ii Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bartle, 94 111. App. 57. i' 2 See sec. 625, herein. 13 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gun- derson, 174 111. 495; 51 N. E. 708, aff'g 74 111. App. 356. See Illinois C. R. Co. v. Barron (111. Stat.), 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90, 106; 18 Lawy. Ed. 591. i* See Swift & Co. v. Foster, 163 111. 50; 44 N. E. 837; 12 Nat. Corp. Rep. 396, see sees. 617-619, herein. 1 5 Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Woolrklge, 174 111. 330; 51 N. E. 701, rev'g 72 111. App. 551, under 111. Rev. Stat. eh. 70, sec. 2. This last case (72 111. App. 551) held that in 790 order to recover more than nominal damages, it was necessary in an action by the administrator to prove that the next of kin were wholly or in part supported by the deceased, or that by reason of their dependence he was legally bound to support them. 1 6 Heyer v. Salsbury, 7 111. App. 93. 1 7 Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. Carey, 115 111. 115; 3 N. E. 519. is Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Carey, 115 111. 115; 3 X. E. 519; 2 West. 73. Hut see Mayers v. Smith, 121 111. 442; 13 N. E. 216; 11 West. :>7:>; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Moranda, 93111. 302; .John Morris Co. v. Bur- gess, 44 111. App. 27. See further as to loss of support and recovery there- for, Chicago & A. R. Co. v. May, 108 111. 288. WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIAR? INJURIES. § 615 by the fact that the next of kin have received no aid or contrib- uted towards their support, and this also where they are not dependent therefor upon deceased. 19 § 615. Same subject concluded. — If collateral kindred have been aided and needed support, proof of the amount is de- cided not to be accessary to justify the award of substantial dam- ages. 20 And the recovery is not limited by the contributions to the family's support \>y deceased/ 1 nor is it the entire expense of supporting tbe family, but the damages arc to be measured by a fair and just compensation for the loss of the means of support with which they would probably have been provided bad there been no death. 22 In Nebraska there should be a party survivor who was dependent upon or legally entitled to support by deceased ; ^ as well also that there was some one dependent upon him therefor, 21 or that there are kindred upon whom the law confers a right to be supported. 25 Although if facts are al- leged showing ability to support, such as health and the active conduct of business, together with such averment of the exist- ence of the proper persons, it will be sufficient, although evi- dence which is otherwise competent to show tbe pecuniary loss to the widow and next of kin is not rendered incompetent be- cause of the fact that the next of kin are self-supporting ami independent of the earnings of deceased, none of which are de- voted to their maintenance. 26 And the extent of the loss may * Chicago v. Scholten, 75 111. 468; I 21 Swift v. Foster, 55 111. App. 286. Chicago & X. W. R. Co. v. Swett, 45 w Ohio & M. R. <',,. v. Simras. 43 111. 197; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shan- non, 43 111. 338; Chicago v. Hosing, 83 111. 204; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Barron (111. Stat.), 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90; IS L. Ed. 591; Barron v. Illinois C. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S. ('. C.) 412. De- ceased was an adult and one of the collateral kindred had received some 111. App. 260. -' Chicago, !'.. & <.>. K. Co. v. Bond, 58 Neh. 385; 78 N. W. 710; 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 116; 15 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 759, citing Chi. 'ago. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Van Buskirk, 58 Xeb. 218; 78 N. W. -".li: Friend v. Bur- leigh, 53 Xeb. 074; 74 X. W. 50. • aid. In Falkenan v. Rowland, 70 M Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 111. A|.p. 20, brothers and sisters had Oyster. 58 Neb. 1: 78 N. W. 359; 12 at times received pecuniary aid from Am. it Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 655. deceased but they had no pecuniary -•' Omaha A: R, V. K. Co. v. Crow, interest in his life. 54 Neb. 747: 74 N. W. 106(5. »Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wangelin, -"Friend v. Burleigh. 53 Neb. <'-74; 43 111. App. 324. I 74 X. \V. 50. 791 8 616 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION be shown by evidence of deceased's competency to support his family, coupled with proof of their need. 27 So the fact that minor children are " wholly dependent " upon deceased shows pecuniary injury. 28 But evidence showing noncontribution to the support of brothers and sisters will affect the amount of re- covery. 29 But in these cases, as also in the case of a father where the son has been killed, there may, it seems, be a recovery, al- though there was no legal obligation to support the beneficiary. 80 Another question of dependency upon deceased arises in con- nection with those cases where proof is admissible by a widow of the number of minor children left by the death of a husband and father. 31 § 616. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries " — Reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit. — The reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit of which the parties entitled to recover have been deprived by the negligent killing is to be considered under this statutory provi- sion as to " fair and just compensation." * The reasonable char- 27 See facts in Post v. Olm stead, 47 Neb. 893; 66 N. W. 828. 28 Kearney Electric Co. v. Laugh- lin, 45 Neb. 390; 63 N. W. 941. See as to minor children, right to recover for loss of support, Westphal v. Austin, 39 111. App. 230; Bloedel v. Bimmerman, 41 Neb. 695. 29 Anderson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 35 Neb. 95; 52 N. W. 840. And see as to father who had received no aid from deceased son, Johnson v. Missouri P. K. Co., 18 Neb. 690; 26 N.'W. 347. 30 See cases in last note. See sees. 617-619, 625, herein. si See sec. 617-619, herein. 32 "St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Maddry, 57 Ark. 306; 21 S. W. 472. Action was in favor of decedent's widow and minor children. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 55 Ark. 462; 18 S. W. 628, death of child. Fordyce v. McCants, 51 Ark. 509; 11 S. W. 694; 4 L. R. A. 296; 55 792 Ark. 384, 388; 18 S. W. 371, father for adult son's death. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41, death of child. Cleveland, C. C. & St, L. R. Co. v. Keenan, 190 111. 217; 60 N. E. 107, aff'g 92 111. App. 430; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kelley, 80 111. App. 675, holding that instruc- tion is not objectionable, that jury may consider whatever they may from the evidence believe that widow and next of kin might have reasonably expected in a pecuniary way from the life of the intestate, afTd 182 111. 267; 54 N. E. 979; Illi- nois C. R. Co. v. Barron (Stat. 111.), 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90; 18 L. Ed. 591; Barron v. Illinois C. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C.) 412, 453, action for death of adult man for benefit of father, brothers and sisters. Balti- more & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Then, 159 111. 535; 42 N. E. 971, aff'g 59 111. App. 461, death of girl. Chicago v. Keefe, 114 111. 232; 1 West. 352; West WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY INJURIES. 6 61 acter, however, of such expectation must appear from the facts proven, and these determine the measure of damages. This reasonable expectation includes also the light to recover for prospective losses by way of probable support, expected gifts, aid or assistance and the like, as more fully appears under other appropriate headings herein. Again, it is decided that the dam- ages awarded must be the present worth of the future pecuniary benefits, lost to the beneficiary by the wrongful killing. So the probabilities that deceased would have obtained profitable em- ployment may be considered. 51 So every reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or advantage, from the continuance of the life of deceased, of which there is any legal evidence, should be considered by the jury. 35 § 617. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries "—Physical and financial condition Age and number of beneficiaries.— The poverty and dependency of a father or of parents will be considered* although the Chicago St. R. Co. v. Dooley, 7G 111. App. 424; 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 238, death of child. Chicago & G. W. R. Co. v. Travis, 44 111. App. 460; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Simms, 43 111. App. 2(50, death of man with family. Mc- Lean Coal Co. v. McVey, 38 111. App. 158, death of son. McKay v. New- England Dredging Co., 02 Me. 454; 43 Atl. 29, to next of kin. Missouri, P. R. Co. v. Baier (Neh.), 55 X. W. 913; Johuson v. Missouri, P. R. Co., 18 Neb. 699: 20 X. W. 347, death of son. But see Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Swett, 45 111. 197. See sec. 635 herein, upon the point whether this reasonable expectation of pe- cuniary benefit extends beyond mi- nority of children. 88 Fordyce v. McCants, 51 Ark. 509; US. W. 694; 4L. 11. A. 296. ^Oakes v. Maine Cent. R Co., 95 Me. 103; 49 Atl. 418, under Stat. 1891, oh. 124. 86 West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Dooley, 76 111. App. 424; 3 Chit-. 1.. J. Wkly. 238. See McLean Coal Co. v. McVey, 38 111. App. 158. ; " Fordyce v. McCants, 55 Ark. 384; 18 S. W. 371: 51 Ark. 509: 4 L. R. A. 296; 11 S. W. 694: Little Rock, M. R. & T. R. Co. v. Leverett, 48 Ark. 333; 3 S. W. 50; Little Hock & It. S. R. Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350; 39 Ark. 491. Mother in this case was poor and kept boarders; a case of excessive damages. Chicago* A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 3SS. Pecuniary condition of father and aid rendered by deceased son considered. Chicago v. Powers, 42 111. 169. Parents' condi- tion admissible: this case is ex- plained and distinguished in Chicago A- X. W. R. Co. v. Bayfield. 37 Mich. 205; St. Louis, A. * T. II. R. Co. v. Bauer, 53 111. App. 525, afPd 156 111. 1(16: 40 \. E. 4 IS. Aid was Furnished parents who were advanced in years; a case of not excessive damages. Aurora v. Seedel man, 34 111. App. 285 Pecuniary condition of parents ad- missible for death of small child to 793 £ 618 DEATH FAN; AND JUST COMPENSATION financial condition of a father who sues as administrator for the next of kin cannot be shown, as that plaintiff was wealthy and able to hire others to perform services in place of a deceased son, where there is no proof that the latter was unable to care for himself. 157 Nor can the pecuniary loss be affected by the number of children left by deceased and their ages, nor by the fact that he supported his family, nor is such evidence admissi- ble as it is calculated to awaken the sympathies of and prejudice the jury on other issues. 58 And in line with this decision it is determined that an instruction is not misleading as basing the recovery upon the pecuniary condition of the widow and chil- dren after his death, where such instruction allows a recovery, if by the wrongful death said beneficiaries have been and are deprived of their means of support. 39 And it is also decided that a surviving father's physical condition, as that he had but one arm, is inadmissible evidence as it could not affect the loss.* So it has been decided in another case that the pecuniary cir- cumstances of the widow and her minor daughter could not be considered, nor the fact that the plaintiff was physically crippled, since the question was one of pecuniary loss only as the meas- ure of damages. 41 § 618. Same subject continued. — Evidence is admissible show inability to keep more vigilant ■watch over their children. 37 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Slater, 28 111. App. 73, affd 129 111. 91; 21 N, E. 575; 6 L. R. A. 418. 38 St. Louis, P. & N. R. Co. v. Rawley, 90 111. App. 653; Pennsyl- vania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. (12 Otto) 451; 26 L. E. 141, has been cited as supporting the point that evidence of the size of the family is irrelevant, but that was a personal injury case. Widow cannot show the number of her family. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ashline, 56 111. App. 475. 39 Economy Light & P. Co. v. Stephen, 187 111. 137; 58 N. E. 359, aff'g 87 111. App. 220. 40 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bandy, 88 111. App. 629. See also Chicago, P. 794 & St. L. R. Co. v. Woolridge, 72 111. App. 551, rev'd 174 111. 330; 51 N. E. 701; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Moranda, 93 111. 302, holding that evidence is inadmissible that the earnings of deceased were the sole means of support of plaintiff and her child. John Morris Co. v. Bur- gess, 44 111. App. 27, holding that widow cannot be asked as to source of support of herself and children at the time of her husband's death. See further Beard v. Skeldon, 13 111. App. 54; Chicago v. McCulloch, 10 111. App. 459; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Henry, 7 111. App. 322 ; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Howard, 6 111. App. 569. "Illinois C. R. R. Co. v. Baches, 55 111. 379. WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY INJURIES. § til!* as to the dependency of the widow and children before and at the death of deceased, although their pecuniary circumstances since the death cannot be shown.* 2 So evidence may be given that deceased Left childeren, 4 and the facts that a deci daughter left a father, mother, two brothers and a sister and her pecuniary relations to the family have been of weight in determining the amount of damages. 44 So where it is claimed that deceased at the time of the injury was contributing to the assistance of the next of kin, his father, in the performance of the latter's legal duty of supporting the mother and other chil- dren, the fact of the existence of such mother and other children would seem to be entirely admissible, not us a direct ground for the juty's action, but as showing what deceased was doing and likely to do to make his life pecuniarily valuable to the plaintiff. The evidence is admissible not as establishing di- rectly a greater right to consideration from the jury, but as showing what consideration plaintiff was receiving and likely to receive in the future from this deceased son. 15 So where a child was killed, the family was shown to be poor, living by daily labors of the father and mother, since in case of such poverty the fact that the boy would have commenced early to assist in supporting them is relevant. 1 ' 1 Again, the facts that the mother was poor and kept boarders was considered a factor in determining the measure of damages for the loss of a son who was an only child. 4 ' § 619. Same subject, continued.— In Arkansas the fact that the sister of deceased was an invalid, and that he had con- tributed to her support, was considered as bearing upon the ex- 42 Swift & C». v. Foster, 163 111. 50; 44 X. E. 837; 12 Nat. Corp. Rep. 396; Pennsylvania Co. v. Keane. 143 111. 172: 32 X. E. 260; Mayers v. Smith, 121 111. 442; 13 X. E. 216; 11 West. 575. 48 Consolidated Coal Co. v. Maelil, 130 111. 551; 22 X. E. 715; Heard v. Skeldon, 113 111. 584; 13 111. App. 54. 44 City of Salem v. Harvey, 29 111. App. 48::, affd 129 111. :I44: 21 X. K. 1076. 45 South Omaha Waterworks Co. v. Vocasek (Neb. 1901), 87 X. W. 53t>; 10 Am. Nog. Rep. .V per Hastings, C. 46 Bailey v. Chicago & A. R Co. (U. S. C. C. X. 1). 111. i. 4 Bias. 430. 47 Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350; 38 Ark. 491. $4,500 held excessive and 18,500, re- duced by $1,285. 795 §619 DEATH— FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION tent of aid rendered his mother. 48 But it cannot be shown that surviving minor children have other means of support, 41 ' nor that lineal next of kin are unable to support themselves, and are dependent upon decedent. 30 Again, where the beneficiaries or next of kin of the deceased sustain the relation specified un- der the statute, the appellate courts in determining whether or not the damages awarded are excessive, have considered the number, ages and sex of such beneficiaries or next of kin, their life expectancy, circumstances, dependency and physical con- dition, the contribution by deceased to their support as a family or individually, and as bearing upon their pecuniary loss, and the intestate's ability to aid them, his age, physical condition, expectancy of life, occupation and earnings, have been deemed factors. 51 So evidence may be given showing the financial con- « Little Kock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Voss(Ark.), 18 S. W. 172. 49 Hyer v. Salisbury, 7 111. App. 93. 50 Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Woolridge, 174 111. 330; 51 N. E. 701, rev'g 72 111. App. 55. . 51 Survivors were a mother and in- valid sister. The former was 59 years old with a life expectancy of nearly 15 years, and the latter was 19 years old with a life expectancy of 42 years. Deceased was in good health with a life expectancy of over 32 years, and he had contrib- uted money to the joint and indi- vidual support of his mother and sister, the former being his next of kin, and the aid rendered her daughter was considered a contri- bution to her support— $6,500 held not excessive. Little Rock & Ft. ,S. R. Co. v. Voss (Ark.), 18 S. W. 172. In the following decisions the facts noted have frequently been briefly stated by the court as in evi- dence without any discussion as to their admissibility, and where there is no such discussion, it is apparent that such facts were admitted in the trial court or their admissibility 796 conceded, and the weighing of such facts by the higher court in de- termining whether or not the dam- ages are excessive, while not having the force or effect of a direct adjudi- cation, is nevertheless entitled to some weight, for it cannot beasumed that an appellate court would, in de- ciding a cause, consider evidence if it was clearly inadmissable. Motion may show that deceased was sole sup- port. Kerkow v. Bauer, 15 Neb. 150. There were 7 minor children be- tween 5 months and 13 years old, wholly dependent upon deceased for their maintenance. Kearney Elect. Co. v. Laughlin, 45 Neb. 390; 63 N. W. 941. Names of surviving minor dependent children averred in com- plaint overcomes insufficiency by reason of failure to allege that de- cedent left a widow. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Oyster, 38 Neb. 1 ; 78 N. W. 359; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 655. Father's age, that he was a poor man with four dependent young children considered in action for death of minor son — $2,400 not ex- cessive. Post v. Olmstead, 47 Neb. 893; 66 N. W. 828. Deceased left a widow and 2 children; a case of not WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY INJURIES. § 620 dition and circumstances of the parent or parents in case of the death of a minor, for the purpose of determining the pecuniary loss sustained by the survivor or survivors. 5 -' And the pecuniary circumstances of the parents may also be proven, in the case where a small child is killed, for the purpose of showing their inability to keep a more vigilant watch over their children." § 620. Same subject — Conclusion. — It is apparent from the preceding decisions that the courts of the above specified states, do not intend to adhere strictly to any rule winch will unquali- exeessive damages. Economy Light vaoced in years, and deceased sou & P. Co. v. Stephen, 87 111. App. [had aided in their support; a case '220, aff'd (111.); 558 N. E. 369. of not excessive damages. St. Louis, Deceased left widow and 4 children, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Bauer, 53 111. the eldest heing 14, and the young- App. 525, aff'd 156 111. 100; 40 N. E. est 3 years old. Deceased was the | 448. Deceased was only support of family's supporter. Chicago, Edi- wife and three children — a case of son Co. v. Moren, 80 111. App. 152, not excessive damages. Chicago & aff'd (111.); -V7 N. E. 773. Earn- E. & I. R. Co. v. Knevrim, 48 HI. App. ings. financial condition, age and 24:5. As to proof that deceased con- family of deceased admissible, tributed to sister's support, and that Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Pearson, 82 she needed it. See Ohio & M. R. 111. App. 005. Support or depend- Co. v. Wangeliu, 4:1 111. App. 324. eucy for support must be shown to Deceased left father, brothers and recover more than nominal damages, sisters whom he aided. Illinois & In this case a son was shown to be St. L. R. Co. v. Whalen, 19111. App. crippled and so dependent. Chi- ! 110. Fathers, brothers and sisters, cago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wool- all of whom deceased had aided, ridge, 72 111. App. 551, case rev'd survived ; amount of deceased's prop- 174 111. 330: 51 N. E. 701. Deceased erty and probable increase or de- left a mother 60 years old, and live crease of his wealth held proper brothers and sisters. Falkenan v. factors. Illinois C. R. Co. v. Rowland. 70 111. App. 20; 3 Am. Barron, 5 Wall. (U. S.) (111. Statute), Neg. Rep. 530. Deceased left a wife 90; 18 L. Ed. 591; Barron v. Illinois and two children, and owned two C. R. Co., 1 Biss. (V . S. C. C.) 412. teams— a case of not excessive dam- 453. See also cases cited iu the ages. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. preceeding notes under this section. v. Patchen, 00 111. App. 206. De- I 5 - City of Chicago v. Powers, 42 ceased's youngest child was 10 years 111. 100: 89 Am. Dec. 418, cited to old; a case of excessive damages, substantially the same points in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gunder- Gulf, Colo. & S. F. R. Co. v. Younger, son, 05 111. App. 63S. Deceased left 90 Tex. 387; 38 S. W. 1121; 1 Am. a widow and two minor children: a Neg. Rep. 378, 380, per Brown, J. case of not excessive damages. i:; Aurora v. Seidelman, 34 [11. Baltimore* O. R. Co. v. Stanley, ">4 App. 2S.-J. Examine Chicago v. Mc- 111. App. 21."). Parents were ad- j Culloch, 10 111. App. 159. §§ 021-623 FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION liedly exclude evidence of age, physical and financial condition and the like, of beneficiaries ; but that the tendency is to ex- clude such evidence in the abstract, where it is offered solely for the purpose of enhancing or mitigating the damages. If, however, the nature of the statute and the class of the benefi- ciaries designated is such as to make the testimony relevant under the terms of the statute, then it will be admitted. It may also be admissible in certain cases to show that a pecuniar)' loss has been sustained by the wrongful killing by reason of the especial circumstances of the case or the particular class of beneficiaries, or to show a deprivation of a reasonable expecta- tion of pecuniary advantage from the loss of the particular life ; or it may be admissible in connection with, or as explaining or as tending to show the relevancy or admissibility of other mate- rial evidence. § 621. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries." — Wealth of defendant. 51 — Defendant's wealth cannot be shown to affect the measure of damages. 55 § 622. "Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries " — Probable accumulations. — Deceased's probable accumulations or probable increase or decrease of wealth may constitute important factors.* They would, however, be dependent upon various other elements, such as occupation, earnings or income, earning capacity, ability, experience, habits of industry, saving, age, etc. 57 §623. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries "—Expenses of sickness, funeral, etc. — In Arkansas funeral expenses are not a proper element of damages in an action for the benefit of the widow and next of kin brought for the killing of a passenger by a railway company, and evi- dence is inadmissible that the casket has not been paid for by either the company or the widow. 53 In a subsequent appeal in 64 See sees. 607, 617, herein. 55 Conant v. Griffin. 48 111. 410. 111.) 412, 453; Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304. 56 See Illinois C. R. Co. v. Barron, j 57 See sec. 607, herein. 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90; Barron v. "Illinois j 58 Sfc Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. C. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C, X. D. Sweet, 57 Ark.—; 21 S. W. 58. 798 WITH Kl.i Kl; I. N< IE TO PECUNIAE INJURIES. the same action the question of the allowance fur medical and sur- gical attention and for funeral expenses was considered and the de- cision undoubtedly qualifies the rule above stated. 58 In an earlier decision, however, where the action was brought against a railway company for killing a child, the recovery included expen And the husband may recover expenses consequent upon his wife's injuries from malpractice incurred thereafter, up to the time of her death therefrom. In Maine, however, an action by a father cannot be maintained for loss of a minor's services and for burial expenses which is not under the act of 1891, where the child was instantaneously killed.' 3 § 624. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries'"— Life expectancy — Mortality tables. — We have seen that the natural expectancy of lib: of deceased and of the beneficiaries constitutes an important factor in the es- timation of a fair and just compensation. 65 And to prove such expectancy the Carlisle tables are admissible, 61 even though the next of kin are not dependent upon deceased's earnings/'"' But 53 " The instruction as to damages is erroneous in this: It told the jury that in estimating the damages they might take into consideration, among other tilings, the amount for which the estate of the deceased was liable for medical and surgical attention and for funeral expenses. The es- tate was not liahle for such attention and expenses of a claim for tin; amount due therefor was not pro- bated within two years after the date of letters of administration of appellee, and moreover the amount due for or the value of medical and surgical attention is not shown. The giving of this instruction is a prej- udicial error." St. Louis. I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Sweet, 03 Ark. 5113; 40 S. \V. 463; 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 295, per Bat- tle, .J., citing Railroad Co. v. Barry, 58 Ark. 108; 23 S. W. 1007; Foster v. Pitts (Ark.), 38 S. W. 111. That parent not liable for medical expenses of a son who has reach- ed majority, see Vorass v. Rosen- berry, 85 111. Ap[>. 623. 60 Little Rock &. F. T. S. K. Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350; 34 Am. Rep. 44. 11 Nixon v. Ludlam, 50 111. App. 273. ''•-' Bligh v. Biddeford & S. R. Co., 94 Me. 499; 48 Atl. 112. 63 See sec. 007, herein. Little Rock & Ft. S. 1!. Co. v. Voss (Ark.), 18 S. \V. 172: St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Sweet, 00 Ark. 550: 31 S. W. 571; Fordyce v. McCants. 55 Ark. 384; 18 S. W. 371; Dwyer v. St Louis & S. F. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Ark), 52 Fed. 87; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Baier iXeb.), 55 N. W. 913. « Friend v. [ngersoll (Neb.), 58 N. W. 281; Friend v. Burleigh. 5:'. Neb. 674; 74 X. \\\ 50; Sellars v. Foster. 27 Neb. 118; 42 X. W. 907. «s Friend v. Burleigh, 53 Neb. 074; 74 X. \Y. 50. 799 §§ 1 125, 62G FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION such tables are not conclusive and should be considered with other competent and material evidence. 66 § 625. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries" — Nominal damages. — Where a recovery is sought for the benefit of the father of a person killed by a railroad company's negligence, only nominal damages can be re- covered unless facts are proven showing a reasonable expecta- tion of pecuniary benefit from the continued life of decedent, or that the father was assisted by deceased. 67 In Illinois, however, proof of support is unnecessary to warrant a recovery of at least nominal damages by lineal kindred. 68 And where a mother is en- titled to the earnings of her minor son, proof of pecuniary loss is unnecessary as it will be presumed, while a question of error of law is presented on appeal from the refusal to instruct that only nominal damages can be given to the mother and brothers of a deceased child. 69 So the law presumes pecuniary loss where the relation of parent and child or husband and wife exists, and the death is shown, 70 although in Nebraska there can be no recovery of even nominal damages unless the petition shows that the persons entitled to recover have sustained pecuniary injury by r the death. 71 § 626. Same subject continued. — Although a mother may be the only one entitled to more than nominal damages, yet the fact that under the statute of distributions she will take only a 66 Friend v. Ingersoll (Neb.), 58 N. W. 281. See St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Needham ( U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. E. D. Ark.), 3 C. C. A. 1:39; 10 U. S. App. 339; 52 Fed. 371, 375; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 88. 67 Fordyce v. McCants, 51 Ark. 509; US. W. 694; 4 L. R. A. 296. See Little Rock & F. S. R. Co. v. Barker, 39 Ark. 491. 68 Chicago. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gun- derson, 174 III. 495; 51 N. E. 708, afTg 74 111. App. 356. But see sees. 613-615, 617-619, herein. « 9 Bradley v. Sattler, 156 111. 603; 41 N. E. 171, afTg 54 111. App. 800 504; Stafford v. Rubens, 115 111. 196; 1 West. 640; Holton v. Daly, 106 111. 131; Rockford, R. 1. & St. L. R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 111. 198. See Johnson v. Missouri P. R. Co., 18 Neb. 690. 70 Chicago P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Woolridge, 72 111. App. 55; case was rev\l as to dependency in 174 111. 330; 51 N. E. 701; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Scanlan, 68 111. App. 626; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 113, afTd 16S 111. 34; 48 N. E. 149; Chicago v. Scholten, 75 111. 468. 71 ( )rgall v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.. 46 Neb. 4; 64 N. W. 450. See sees. 602, 603, herein. WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIAR? INJ1 RIES. 6 626 fractional part of the amount recovered, will not justify an award of more than the total loss in order to enable her to recover the full amount of her loss. ,; Again, where a deceased brother was an habitual drunkard and incapable of supporting himself, only nominal damages will be allowed.'" And in case of collateral kindred where then; is no proof of pecuniary loss by way of sup- port, aid or otherwise, only nominal damages will be awarded. 71 Outside, however, of the question of proof of pecuniary lo&Sj would seem that proof is necessary of the statutory prerequisites, such as the death, the wrongful act, neglect or default, the ex- istence of such circumstances as would have entitled the injured party to recover damages had he lived, and the existence of some of the designated beneficiaries, otherwise nominal dam- ages ought not to be awarded, 76 although damages have been awarded where there has been no proof as to next of kin. 73 Dependency, however, for support seems, as above stated, to be the test of the recovery of nominal or substantial damages,' 3 although this is immaterial in case of lineal next of kin. 79 72 Falkenan v. Rowland, TO 111. App. 20. 78 North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Brodie, 150 111. 317; 40 N. K. 942, rev'g 57 111. App. 564, under III. Act, Feb. 12, 1853. See also Anderson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.. 35 Neb. 95: 52 N. W. 840. 74 Falkenan v. Rowland, 70 111. App. 20, citing North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Brodie, 156 111. 317. See Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gillam, 27 111. App. 386; Chicago v. Ilesing, 83 111. 204; Chicago v. Scholten, 75 111. 468; Serensen v. Northern P. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Mont. ), 45 Fed. 407. In this case there was an absence of certain proof and $1,750 was held excessive for cousin. Examine Lazelles v. Newfane, 70 Vt. 440; 41 Atl. 511. 76 See sees. 602, 603, herein. 78 See Quincy Coal Co. v. Hood, 77 111. 68; Conant v. Griffin, 48 111. 410; Chicago v. Scholten, 75 111. 408. The plaintiiT has a right to show that de- ceased received injuries which re- 51 suited in his death, although it is un- necessary to show the exact nature of injuries and to enter into details. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Hicks (U. S. C. C. A. W. D. Ark.). 70 Fed. 262; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 793, per Traver, Cir. J. 77 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Gillam, 27 111. App. 386. But see sec 598, herein, as to degree of relationship and proof. See Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 338, per the court. This case is disapproved in Lazelles v. Newfane, 70 Vt. 440; 44 Atl. 511. ^Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Swett, 45 111. 197; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 338, per the court ; Illinois & St. L. R. Co. v. YVhalcn. 19 111. App. 116. See further as to nomi- nal damages being recoverable and pecuniary loss, Illinois C. R. Co. \. Gilbert, 157 111. 354: 41 N. K. 724; Chicago v. Eeefe, 114 111. 222; Chi- cago v. Major, 18 111. 349; Johnson v. Missouri P. R. Co., 18 Neb. 896. 71 Chicago. P. & St L. R. Co. v, 801 § 627 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION § 627. " Fair aud just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries" — Death of husband — Husband and father.— In an action to recover damages for the negligent or wrongful killing of a husband or of a husband and father, the first point to be considered is the intent of the statute in des- ignating the beneficiaries, 80 and then the question whether the action is based upon the death loss act or rests upon the survival of the action which accrued to the injured party. 81 The widow, however, should receive such a sum as will compensate her for the pecuniary injury. 83 The general elements of damages ap- plicable to this class of cases in common with- others have been considered elsewhere, 83 but there are certain factors which more particularly apply to the damages for a husband's or husband's and father's death. Thus the right of the wife and minor chil- dren to support is important. 81 The extent, however, of such dependency and the evidence showing it has been limited. 85 But the entire expense of supporting the family is not the measure of damages but a fair and just compensation for the deprivation of the means of support which deceased might have provided except for the death, 86 although an averment of the depriva- tion of support of the widow and minor children constitutes a basis of evidence of pecuniary loss, 87 and necessarily the various factors which show upon what his contributions to sujjport of his wife and family are based, such as the actual amount of his earnings, expenditures, ability, industry, etc., are material and relevant, 88 although it is decided that the damages are not Woolridge, 17-4 111. 330; 51 N. E. 701, rev'g 72 111. App. 55. See sees. 613- 615, herein. 80 See sec. 598, herein. 81 See sec. 607, herein. 82 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Needham (U. S. C. C. 8th C. E. D. Ark.), 3 C. C. A. 129; 10 U. S. App. 339; 52 Fed. 371, 375; 5-4 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 88. See Cleveland, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Keenan, 190 111. 217; 60 N. E. 107, aff'g 92 111. App. 430. 83 See sees. 607, 608, herein. 84 See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wel- don, 52 111. 290. 802 85 Swift & Co. v. Foster, 163 111. 50; 44 N. E. 837; 12 Nat. Corp. Rep. 396. See sees. 613-615, 617-619, herein. 86 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Simms, 43 111. App. 260. 87 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Carey, 115 111. 115; 2 West. 73; 3 N. E. 519. 88 Dwyer v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. W. D. Ark.), 52 Fed. 87; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Sweet, 60 Ark. 550; 31 S. W. 571; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Robbins, 57 Ark. 377; 21 S. W. 886; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ouska, 51 WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY IKJUEIES. 6 628 limited to the amount of money of which deceased's earnings might have contributed to the support of his family.'' So the size of the family of deceased has been considered and also his financial condition, 90 and his probable accumulations, 91 cai his family, 92 and the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from his continued life 93 are important factors. In ease of abso- lute divorce there is, as a rule, no pecuniary loss, ;M although where, notwithstanding a divorce, the husband frequently sent the wife money to aid in the support of his children, they may recover their pecuniary loss. 11 "' Again, evidence of marriage may become material in certain cases,' 10 although the general rule is that it is immaterial,' 7 for it is not important until the distribu- tion whether the claimed widow is so in fact or not, nor is it material who the next of kin are, it being sufficient to show that a widow and next of kin exist. 98 In an action for damages for the widow and her minor children, she cannot be questioned on cross-examination whether she was entitled to a pension and its amount, her husband having drawn one, since the amount as fixed by congress is not properly a subject of testimony by her." Other matters, such as expenses of the funeral, sickness, etc., and the question of solatium have been fully considered elsewhere. 110 § 628. Same subject — Annuity — Dower, etc.— Instruction 111. App. 334, aff'd 151 111. 232; 27 N. E. 897; Chicago, Edison Co. v. Moren, 86 111. App. 152, aff'd (111.) 57 N. E. 773; Friend v. Burleigh, 53 Neb. 074; 74 X. W. 50. See sees. 007, 608, herein. 89 Swift v. Foster, 55 111. App. 280. 90 See sees. 607, 608, herein. 91 See sec. 622, herein. « St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Sweet, 60 Ark. 550; 31 S. W. 571. See sec. 032, herein. 93 St. Louis, I. M. & S. K. Co. v. Maddry,57 Ark. 500; 21 S. W. 17-'; 58 Am. & Eug. 11. (as. 327; Chicago «£ A. R. Co. v. Kelley, 182 111. 267; 54 ST. E. 979, aff'g 80 111. App. 075. See sec. 616, herein. M See Ninth Chicago v. Brodie, 156 111. 317; 40 N. E. 042. « St. Louis, I. M. & S. K. Co. v. McCain, 67 Ark. 377; -V> S. W. 165. 96 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Brooks, 81 111. 245. 97 Conaut v. Griffin, 48 111. 410. 98 Conaut v. Griffin, 48 111. 410. See last note to see. 629, herein. See as to nominal damages where it appears that such widow and next of kin exist. Johnson v. Missouri 1'. R. Co., 18 Neb. 090, and sees. 625, 629, herein. 99 St. Louis. I. M. & S. K. < !o. \. Maddry. 57 Ark. 506; 21 S. YV. 472: 58 \in. & Eng. R. Cas. 327. '"' See sees. 010, 023, herein. 803 § 628 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION. and opinion of court.— In a frequently cited case in the Federal court, 1 the question of annuity and the manner of ascertain- ing the amount thereof as well as the factor of dower was in- corporated in the charge to the jury among other instructions not criticised.- The court, per Sanborn, Cir. J., said: "Aside from the palpable errors arising from the unsuccessful attempt to divide the cause of action given by the statute, one vice of this instruction is that it positively directs the jury to measure plaintiff's damages by mathematical calculation based upon the yielding power of money when invested in an annuity. It was undoubtedly proper for the jury to consider under the evidence what amount of money so invested would yield the yearly amount the widow and next of kin would probably have re- ceived from the deceased if he had lived, but they were not bound to allow damages based upon that method nor any partic- ular method of investment of money. It would be proper for a jury upon proper evidence to consider what amount, invested in government bonds, well secured mortgages on real estate or 1 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Needham (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. E. D. Ark. ), 3 C. C. A. 129 ; 10 U. S. App. 339; 52 Fed. 371, 375, 377; 54 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 88. 2 The following is a part of the charge: After stating the rule as to pecuniary loss and the factors to be considered, the court added: " When this is ascertained you will allow plaintiff such sum not to exceed the probable earnings of deceased, nor the amount named in the complaint, as will purchase an annuity for such sum as will yield annually during the term of expectancy of deceased, an amount equal to the annual value of the pecuniary benefits that plain- tiff would have received from her said husband during said time. But if the jury find that the probable duration of plaintiff's life is shorter than that of her said husband, then she should only be allowed such sum as will equal the value of the 80t benefits she would have received during the term of her life, and if the jury believe that plaintiff's ex- pectancy of life is greater than that of her said husband, then they will add such additional sums as will equal the present value of any prop- erty that she would probably re- ceive from her said husband as dower in the event she should so survive him, provided the jury find that the said deceased would have accumulated any such property, in excess of what was required for the support and maintenance of himself and family. In plaintiff's case the amount of such dower interest would be one half of any personal property and a life estate in one half of any realty, which her husband would own at his death if no children survived him, and if he left children her interest would be one third instead of one half." WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIAR? [NJURIES. § 629 any other safe .security, would yield the annual amount the in- jured parties would probably have received from deceased had he lived, hut it would not be the province of the court to direct them to allow an amount based upon any one of these methods of investment. Indeed if after considering all of tin- evidence they found difficulty in arriving at a conclusion by mathemat- ical calculations based on any method of investment, the)' would be authorized to estimate the loss according to their own good sense and sound judgment." It was also declared that •• the same vice runs through that portion of the instruction where the jury was directed in case they believed the plaintiffs expectancy of life was greater than that of her husband to add to the amount that would purchase the annuity referred to, the present value of any property that she would probabl}' have received from her said husband as dower if he had not been killed. At the death of the husband the plaintiff was 20 years old and her expectancy of life, according to the tables, was 41.53, while her husband was 22 years old and his expectancy of life was 40.85 years. He was a fireman earning 875 or $80 a month and the expenses of his household during his lifetime, had con- sumed all his wages. Under this evidence so many chances and contingencies of life and death, of sickness and health, of accident and injury, of marriage and divorce, of the birth and rearing of children, conditioned the lives and relations of this husband and wife, that no court was authorized to instruct the jury that they must allow the widow one third or one half of the present value of the husband's future accumulations if they were of the opinion she would probably have outlived him if he had not been killed." § 629. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries " — Death of wife. In Illinois a hus- band may recover, in an action by him as administrator, the pe- cuniary injuries resulting to him as husband for the negligent killing of his wife, since a liberal construction of the statute 3 It was further decided in this case that a widow suing must join all persons having an interest iu- cluding a half-brother, who is en- titled to share in the damages. 4 See sees. 590 n, 602, GO;}, 609, 810, 013, and chap. 37, herein. 805 § 630 DEATH FAlK AND JUST COMPENSATION does not limit the damages to those resulting to her and her next of kin, 5 although in case of absolute divorce there is no pecuniary loss recoverable. 6 The amount of damages, however, is subject to the statutory limitation. 7 Again, in case of death through malpractice in performing a surgical operation, the hus- band as such cannot maintain an action for the killing of his wife, although he is entitled to damages for the loss of her ser- vices for the time she survives the operation and for his conse- quent expense during that period. s There are other factors which enter into the measure of damages for a wife's death which are not peculiar to the relation of wife, and this is true of actions where the husband and next of kin survive. The limitation of damages to the pecuniary loss, the exclusion of mental suffering as an element, the relevancy of the survival act, the questions of dependency, instantaneous killing and other material factors are considered elsewhere herein, and the reader is therefore referred to the several sections covering these points. § 630. Same subject continued — Married woman's act. — It is decided that a widower is not a beneficiary or a party un- der the Arkansas statute of 1889, 9 and therefore cannot re- cover under that enactment for the killing of his wife. 1 " Hut it is also determined that the married woman's act of that state does not so far preclude a husband's right to his wife's services, or relieve her from the ordinary legal duties arising from the relation, as to prevent his recovering the pecuniary loss sus- tained by her death. Nothing, however, can be recovered by him except the value of her services to him in dollars and cents, as shown by the proof. 11 5 Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Baddeley, 150 111. 328; 36 N. E. 965, aff'g 52 111. App. 94. That the measure of damages is the pecuniary loss to the surviving husband and next of kin, see Illinois C. R. Co. v. Chicago Title & T. Co., 79 111. App. 623. See sees. 598, 602, 603, herein. 6 See North Chicago R. Co. v. Bro- die, 156 111. 317; 40 N. E. 942. But 806 see St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McCain, 67 Ark. 377; 55 S. W. 165. 7 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Chicago Title & T. Co., 79 111. App. 623. 8 Nixon v. Ludlani, 50 111. App. 273. 9 Sees. 4518, 4519. 10 Western Un. Teleg. Co. v. McGill (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. Dist. Kan.), 57 Fed. 699. a St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Henson WITH ];|;fKI:1:N('K TO PECUNIARY LNJDRtBS. §631 § 631. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries" — Death of parent.— Under this fair and just compensation statute, the rights of children as beneficiaries as well as the general construction of the statutes and tin- meaning of the woids "pecuniary injury "" are of some impor- tance. Primarily minor children are, as a rule, entitled to sup- port, so that such right as well as the extent of contribution to such support is a most material factor 18 upon which the rea- sonable expectation of pecuniary benefit 14 must largely depend. The amount of compensation to be awarded also rests somewhat (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. E. D. Ark.), 58 Fed. 531. The charge and opin- ion was as follows: "I will say to you, in regard to the relation of hus- band and wife, that while in this state it is true that so long as the wife chooses, her earnings and her property are her own, and not sub- ject to the control or direction or management of her husband, yet if she chooses to give him her services then he may have them, and in de- termining this question as to the value of her services, if you find from the testimony that she did, from the time of her marriage up to the time of her death, give him her services and her earnings, that is a circumstance to consider in deter- mining whether or not she would continue to do so. If you shall find from the testimony that her services were given to him, the next question is what were they worth in dollars and cents." " The act provides that a married woman may bargain, sell, assign and transfer her separate per- sonal property, and carry on any trade or business and perform any labor or service on her sole and separate ac- count, and that the earnings of any married woman from her trade, busi- ness, labor or services shall be her sole and separate property, and may be used or invested by her in her own name. The contention of the plain- tiff in error is that under this act the husband has no valuable right in the services of his wife, and that he suf- fers no pecuniary loss by her death. This act does not put the wife on a footing of a concubine to her hus- band. It does not relieve her from those marital duties and obligations she takes upon herself at the mar- riage altar, and which are inherent in the relation of husband and wife among all Christian people. The statute does not purport to relieve a wife, and was not intended to relieve her from the legal duty of perform- ing those services which it is the pleasure of every good housewife to render her husband in sickness and in health, independently of any mere technical obligation, and which she would render despite any statute that could be enacted to the con- trary. These rights and duties are imposed by a law having a much higher and better source than the common law, which simply imparts totheni that legal sanction essential to their maintenance and protection in a court of law against invasion from any quarter." Id. 533, per Caldwell, Cir. J.; 7 C. C. A. :;49. u See sees. 59S, 602, 603, herein. 1; See sees. 613-615, herein. 14 See sec. 616, herein. 807 § 632 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION upon the general elements of damages such as age, etc., of de- ceased, 15 and undoubtedly every material and relevant fact and circumstance should be considered to enable the jury to deter- mine what is a fair and just compensation. 16 Again the question of the admissibility in evidence showing the physical condition and dependency. of children has been the subject of considerable discussion 17 in the states which come within this fair and just compensation clause, and inasmuch as the cases are not in ex- act harmony, we must refer the reader to the section wherein this subject is considered. 18 In the case of adult sons who have suffered pecuniary injury by a mother's death, the facts that she lived with them and rendered services in keeping house for their benefit has been considered in determining whether or not the actual damages awarded are excessive. 19 If the court is not requested to limit the damages to the minor children by an in- struction to that effect, and evidence is admitted without objec- tion in regard to adult children, this cannot be availed of on appeal. 20 And it seems that the facts that the children have reached majority and are self-supporting and not living with the deceased, are not of themselves sufficient evidence to con- trovert such children's pecuniary loss. 21 § 632. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries"— Training, etc., of children— Death of parent If the father was a careful, painstaking, temperate, industrious man, spent part of his time at home, was trustworthy and possessed of good business ability, or otherwise fitted to train, care for or educate his minor children, the value of such 15 See sees. 607, 608, herein. ld Little Rock, M. R. & T. R. Co. v. Leverett, 48 Ark. 333, 344; 3 S. W. 50, and Chicago v. Powers, 42 111. 173, are cited upon this point in Gulf, Colorado & S. F. R. Co. v. Younger, 90 Tex. 387; 38 S. W. 1,112; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 380. " Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v. Woolridge, 72 111. App. 551, rev'd 714 111. 330; 51 N. E. 701. i 8 See sees. 617-619, herein. » Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. 808 Ptacek, 62 111. App. 375; 1 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 53. 20 Hughes v. Richter. 161 111. 409; 43 N. E. 1066, aff'g 60 111. App. 616. 21 Salem v. Harvey, 29 111. App. 21, aff'd 129 111. 344; 21 N. E. 1076. Where the youngest child was 19 years old at the time of the trial and deceased was a shoemaker 65 years old — $5,000 was held exces- sive. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Gunderson, 65 111. App. 638. Willi l:i:i'i;i;l.\( K TO PECU N I Ai: V INJURIES. § 633 training, care or education may be considered in awarding the damages for the parent's negligent or wrongful killing. 8 - the loss of instruction, physical, moral and intellectual training by the parent is material and relevant. 23 Bui it seems that there should be some evidence that such parent, whether lather or mother, was able or fitted to render such service § 633. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries"— Death of children.— The first proposi- tion to be considered is the right of parents as beneficiaries or to share in the distribution, or their right of action."' Also the righl to recover if death had not ensued.*' So it is important whether or not one or more actions can be maintained.-' 7 And in Ar- kansas the question of conscious suffering or instantaneous death is material and relevant. 28 Again, the measure of com- 22 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Sweet, 60 Ark. 550; 31 S. W. 571; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Townsend (Ark. 1901), 63 S. W. 994. See cases cited in next following note. 23 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Maddry, 57 A.rk. 506; 21 S. W. 472; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 327. See Little Rock, M. R. & T. R. Co. v. Leverett, 48 Ark. 333, 344; 3 S. W. 50; Chicago v. Powers, 42 111. 173, both cited upon the point of the loss of such training, etc., through a mother's death and the fact that the temperament, education, etc., of different mothers affect their fitness to discharge the duty, in (iulf, Colo. & S. F. R. Co. Younger, 90 Tex. 387; 38 S. W. 1121; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 378; Baltimore, etc., It. Co. v. Stanley, 54 111. App. 215. If it is alleged that minor children have been deprived of means of education, it is a sufflcieul allegation to admit evidence of pe- cuniary loss. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Carey, 115 111. 115; 8 \. E. 519; 2 West. 73. a* Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Austin, 69 111. 426, cited in Walker v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., Ill Mich. 518; 69 X. W. 1114: 3 Det. L. N. 775; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 267 I which was an appeal from a trial after new- trial granted in 104 Mich. 606; 2 Det. L. N. 34; 62 N. W. 1032), which held that such damages as loss of train- ing, etc., could not be considered, especially in the absence of evidence on the matter, and where deceased rendered only such assistance as any parent would 4 111. App. 504; Chicago v. Major. 18 111. 849; .Mcohan v. Chi- cago & X. W. K. Co., 67 ill. App. 89. See sec. 901, herein. -'■ Chicago v. Major, 18 111. 849. 27 See Illinois ( lent. R. Co. v. Slater, 139 111. 190: 28 V E. 880; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 480, affg89 111. 69. See sec. 597, herein. a See St. Louis, s. W. R. Co. v. Mahoney, 67 Ark. 617; 55 S. W. S4U. See sec. 609, herein. 809 634 DEATH -FAIR AND JCST COMPENSATION pensation depends upon whether the deceased child was a minor or an adult, since in the former case the right of the father to the services and earnings of such child and the hitter's right to support, etc., are necessarily involved.'-' 9 §631. Same subject continued. — The general rule, there- fore, is that the parent, whether father or mother, who is so en- titled and upon whom such obligation rests may recover for the loss of services or earnings of a minor child less the cost of main- tenance, education and like expenses. 30 But the loss of wages from the time of death until the child would become of age is not the proper measure of damages for the killing of a minor son, 31 and the question whether or not the damages are confined to minority is important.' 2 Again, it is decided in Arkansas, that for loss of services of a minor the damages are limited to those which accrued during the period between the injury and the death and cannot include those accruing after the death. 33 ^ Until the Ark. act of 1873 a female was a minor in that state until the age of 21. Roland v. Mc- guire, 64 Ark. 412; 42 S. W. 1008. In Illinois a mother upon the father's death is entitled to the services and earnings of her minor children as she is the head of the family. Bradley v. Sattler, 156 111. 603; 41 N. E. 171, aff'g 54 111. App. 504. See as to mother's obligation to provide for her children when she had sufficient means, Mowbry v. Mowbry, 64 111. 383, cited in Wing v. Hibbert, 9 Ohio C. P. Dec. 65. Father entitled to son's earnings. Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me. 92. As to emancipation, see Nicolaus v. Snyder, 56 Neb. 531. That consent to emancipation may be inferred, see Bucksport v. Rock- land, 56 Me. 22, Examine White v. Henry, 24 Me. 531. As to earnings and instruction as to same and dam- ages, see Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Slater, 129 111. 91; 21 N. E. 575; 6 L. R. A. 418, case affirms 28 111. App. 73. Mother can recover for killing of illegitimate child. Security Title 810 & T. Co. v. West Chicago St. R. Co., 91 111. App. 332. 30 Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Delaney, 82 111. 198; 25 Am. Rep. 198; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41; Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350; 34 Am. Rep. 44; 19 Am. & Eng. K. Cas. 195, 212; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Becker, 84 111. 483 (These last two cases are cited in Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N. C. 961; 36 S. E. 191.); Bradley v. Sattler, 156 111. 603; 41 N. E. 171, aff'g 54 111. App. 504; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Slater, 129 111. 91; 21 N. E. 575; 6 L. R. A. 418, aff'g 28 111. App. 73; Staf- ford v. Rubens, 115 111. 196; 1 West. 640; Chicago v. Keefe, 114 111. 222; 2 N. E. 267 ; Chicago v. Hesing, 83 111. 204. 31 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Reardon, 157 111. 372; 41 N. E. 871. 32 See sec. 635, herein. 33 Davis v. St. L. I. M. & S. R. Co., 53 Ark. 117; 13 S. W. 801; 7 L. R. A. 283; 44 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 690. WITH REFERENCE! TO PECUNIAR* tNJURlE8. In case of the death of a very young child incapable of earning anything or of rendering services of value, the difficulty of prov- ing any actual damages is obvious, and necessarily much must be left to the jury's sound discretion for there can be no rule of damages in such eases. 3 ' But it is proper to consider the child's general, mental and physical ability or capacity, and personal characteristics, as that he was bright, intelligent, industrious, obedient and the general character of such services as are ren- dered, etc., 85 although where the parentis entitled to earnings and services of the minor, damages may be allowed, even though there is no proof of the value of the services, such evidence being unnecessary. 36 And the value of a child's services will not be based on the parent's estimate thereof. 1 Other factors are involved, but they are considered elsewhere herein. ' Again, there can be no recovery for a minor child's death where the father has abandoned the mother and has not aided the family for years. 39 But it is held that evidence should go to the jury, that the father was a foreigner and had received no aid from his son after the latter's arrival in this country a short time prior to his decease. 10 § 635. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries "Death of children— Minority and ma- jority. — The recovery for (bath of a minor child may include a* Chicago, >I. & St. P. R. Co. v. Wilson, 35 111. App. 346; Callaway v. Spurgeon, 03 111. App. 571. See sec. 604, herein. 86 Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Barker, 33 Ark. 350; 34 Am. Rep. 44; Chicago v. Scholten, 75 111. 468; Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. ('<>. v. Delaney, 82 111. 198; --'5 Am. Rep. 198. ( allaway v. Spurgoon, (33 111. App. 571; Little Roek A Ft. S. R. Co. v. Barker, 39 Ark. 191; Bradley v. Sattler, 156 111. 00:5; 41 X. E. 171, aff'g 54 111. App. 504; Stafford v. Rubens, 115 ill. L96; 1 West. 040; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Scanlan, 08 111. App. 020; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 113, aff'd 108 111. 34; 48 X. E. L49. But see sec. ti25, herein. • i7 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41. 38 The questions of the physical aud financial condition of parents' de- pendency for support and contribu- tion thereto by the child, the parents' and child's ago, sex, etc., the reason- able expectation of pecuniary bene fit, mental suffering, loss of society or companionship, etc., have been considered under appropriate head- ings, herein. 89 Thompson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. 1). Net).), 104 Fed. 845, per Munger, Dist. J. 40 Johnson v. Missouri, 18 Neb. 090; 26 X. W. 347. 811 635 DEATH FAIi: AND JUST COMPENSATION the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit for a period be- yond minority, where the deceased has manifested an intention to contribute to his parents' support after attaining majority. This has been expressly so decided in a case where a deceased minor son had contributed to his father's support prior to the injury resulting in death. 41 Other cases do not, however, extend the estimate of probable damages beyond minority of the child, but restrict the pecuniary loss to that period. 4 ' 3 Again, the amount of the yearly expenses of a son and the disposition of his earnings above his living expenses are factors. Vl In another decision an adult daughter who earned only small wages, had given her parents about one quarter thereof and they relied upon such contributions, and these facts were considered in determin- ing the amount of damages for such daughter's death. 44 And it is held that the question is not what disposition the deceased may have had to aid his mother, but that the point was, did he aid her, was he bound so to do and what was her loss in this respect arising from her son's death. 45 In Arkansas, the fact that the deceased had contributed to his father's support and maintenance and showed an intention so to do after his majority, may be availed of for such parent's benefit as the next of kin in an action to recover damages for the loss occasioned b}* the child's wrong- ful or negligent killing* So the intention of the deceased to continue his assistance to his parent or parents after his ma- jority is material and relevant evidence for the jury. 4 ' In Illi- nois the loss of a minor son's wages by the father during the period between his death and his attaining majority had he lived. 41 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 55 Ark. 462; 18 S. W. 628. *2 Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Barker. 33 Ark. 350; 34 Am. Rep. 44; 19 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 195, 212; dis'd in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cross, 58 Kan. 424; 49 Pac. 599; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41. 43 Fordyee v. McCants, 55 Ark. 384; 18 S. W. 371. Deceased's ex- pectancy of life was 17 years and he sent his father all his earnings above his living expenses which were only 812 $125 yearly. See also Fordyee v. McCants, 51 Ark. 509; 11 S. W. 694. 44 Armour v. Czichki, 59 111. App. 17. $4,140 held excessive. 45 Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Swett, 45 111. 197. « St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Davis, 55 Ark. 462; 18 S. W. 628. Examine St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Freeman, 36 Ark. 41. 47 McLean, etc., Co. v. McVey, 38 III. App. 158. See Armour v. Czi chki, 50 111. App. 17. WITH REFERENCE T< > PECUNIARY INJURIES. is held not the proper measure of damages* In that Btate, how- ever, the pecuniary benefits which the nexl of kin might have derived had the minor child not met with premature death, include what the next of kin might have received from the child at any age or every reasonable expectation they had of obtaining any pecuniary advantage, as shown by the evidence from the con- tinuance of his or her life, and the recovery is not Limited to tin' value of the deceased's services or earnings before becoming of age. 11 ' § tiM. " Fair and jnst compensation with reference to the pe- cuniary injuries"- -Death of children— Adults. In determin- ing the measure of damages for the death of adult children under this statutory provision as to a fair and just compensation, the principal factors are the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or the extent of the contributions to the support of, or the aid rendered to the parent by deceased, and in this connection the latter's ability and willingness to assist, evidenced by bis acts, will be considered, as will also his occupation, earnings, ex- penditures, the increasing or diminishing value of his services, the disposition of his earnings with relation to the parent or parents, the character and amount of his contributions to them, their physical and financial condition are all important and relevant in Arkansas, and the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit depends upon the proof."" Substantially the same rule "Illinois C. R. Co. v. Reardon, 157 111. 372; 41 N. E. 871. The jury are not limited to the earnings of deceased until he should attain ma- jority. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Dooley, 76111. App. 424; 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 238; McLean Coal Co. v. McVey, 38 111. App. 158. See fur- ther Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Slater. 129 111. 91 ; 21 X. E. 575. ■*» Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Then, 159 111. 535; 42 N. E. 971, aff g 59 111. App. 561, deceased was a girl. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Reardon, 157 111. 372; 41 N. E. 871, deceased was a son. Illinois Cent. K. Co. v. Slater, 129 111. 91; 21 N. E. 575: 6 L. R. A. 418, aff'g 28 111. App. 73; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Dooley, 70 111. App. 424: 3 Chic. L. J. Wkly. McLean Coal Co. v. MoVey, 38 111. App. 158. See Chicago Consol. B. Co. v. Tietz, 37 111. App. 599. Kx- amine Rockford, K. I. & St. L. K. Co. v. Delaney, 82 111. 198; 25 Am. Rep. 198; Chicago v. Scholten, 75 111. 468. »Fordycev. McCants, 55 Ark.384, 388; 18 S. W. 371; 51 Ark. 509; I L K. A. 29G; 11 S. W. 694; Little Rook & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Vosa (Ark.), 18 S. W. 172. See BBC. 616 herein as to reasonable expectation. 813 § 637 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION prevails in Illinois, subject to such exceptions as may exist in relation to proof of the physical or financial condition of the parent or next of kin. 51 There is, however, an early decision in that state which excludes the question of mere disposition to aid the mother as a determining factor, for it expressly holds that the point is, in such cases, did he help her, was he bound to do so, and what did she lose in this respect? 3 ' Other ele- ments which have been eonsidered are whether the deceased was married or not, lived with his parents or elsewhere, 53 age, earn- ing capacity, etc. 54 § 637. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries " — Collateral kindred. — The nearness of the degree of relationship is declared to be immaterial in case of collateral kindred, where there has been no pecuniary assistance and no need thereof, but it is also said that if there exists a de- pendency for support upon deceased, it is then immaterial how remote the relationship, 55 and this question of support and de- pendency * is most material in considering the amount of dam- 51 Adult son contributed to support and for the benefit of his mother paid a life insurance premium on father's life. The latter had some property also. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 388. Adult son gave his wages amounting to $18 a -week to his father. Webster Mfg. Co. v. Mulvaney, 68 111. 607, aff d 168 111. .311; 48 N. E. 168. Adult son supported parents over 70 years old. Leiter v. Kinnare, 68 111. App. 368. Adult daughter earned but 85 cents a day and had given her parents $60 to $75 a year. Armour v. Czichki, 59 111. App. 17. Adult daughter aided in support of family. She was a school-teacher, and left a father, mother, and other kindred. City of Salem v. Harvey, 29 111. App. 483, aff'd 129 111. 344; 21 N. E. 1076. Adult son gave his wages to his mother and otherwise aided her. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Adler, 28 111. App. 102. See further, Chicago & 814 A. R. Co. v. Kelly, 182 111. 267; 54 N. E. 979, aff'd 80 111. App. 675; Illinois Cent. R. Co., v. Barron, 5 Wall. (U. S.) (Stat. 111.) 90. As to physical and financial condition, see sees. 617-619, herein. 52 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Swett, 45 111. 197. 53 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 388. Son lived with father part of time. Webster Mfg. Co. v. Mul- vaney, 68 111. App. 607, aff'd 168 111. 311; 48 N. E. 168. Son was unmar- ried. Leiter v. Kinnare, 68 111. App. 368. Son was unmarried. City of Salem v. Harvey, 29 111. App. 483, aff'd 129 111. 344; 21 N. E. 1076. Daughter lived with her father, mother and sister. ^ See sees. 602, 604, 607, 608, 625, 626, herein. 35 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. 338. 56 See sees. 617-619, herein. REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY [NJUBEBS. §§638, I ages to be awarded to collateral kin.' ,; Although it is not es- sential that the evidence should be such as to enable the loss to be ascertained with a reasonable degree of certainty where the action i.s by a sister for a brother's death," and the evidence shows assistance rendered and her necessities. 89 But the dam- ages recoverable for a brother's death may be limited, where by reason of habitual drunkenness he was unable to support him self.'" Outside of the above decisions, it may be stated that much the same general rules apply to the damages in case of collateral next of kin as govern in other cases. § 638. Defenses— Mitigation of damages -Insurance.— In- surance money on the life of deceased cannot operate as a re- duction of the compensation for the negligent or wrongful killing, 61 although the fact that the father's life was insured for the mother's benefit, and that the deceased son paid and had promised to keep paid the premium thereon will be con- sidered. 62 ^ 639. " Fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries"— Defenses — Remarriage and mar- riage. — Remarriage by a widow and the seeming thereby of a new means of support cannot be considered upon the question of the measure of damages for the former husband's killing.'' 1 : ' 1 See Pennsylvania Co. v. Keaue, 143111. 172; 32 X. E. 2(H); Chicago v. Hesing, 83 111. 204; Chicago v. Schol- ten, 75 111. 4G8; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Barron (111. Stat.), 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90; 18 L. Ed. 591; Barron v. Illinois C. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C.) 412; Falkenan v. Rowland, 70 111. App. 20; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 530 (citing North Chicago R. Co. v. Brodie, 150 III. 317); City of Salem v. Harvey, 29 111. App. •483, aff'd 129 111. 344; 21 X. E. L076; Illinois & St. L. R. Co. v. Whalen, 19 111. App. 116; Serenscn v. Northern P. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. D. Mont. i. 15 Fed. 407. See sees. 625, 626, herein. 68 Ohio A M. R. Co. v. Wan-din, 152 111. 138; 38 N. E. 760. 59 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 43 111. App. 324. 60 North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Bro- die, 156 111. 317; 40 X. E. 942, rev'g 57 111. App. 564, under 111. act Feh. 12, 1853. ,;1 Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Thomp- son. 56 111. 138. 62 Chicago »t A. R. Co. v. Shannon, 43 111. ' o. S. Richardson Fueling Co. \. Peters, 82 111. App. "'tis. Asto plain- tiff's marriage with deceased and evidence thereof, see Toledo R. Co. v. Brooks. Si 111. 2I.">; Conant v. Griffin, 48 111. 410. As to remarriage bt- inj-C consistent with allegation of being widow, see St. Louis, I. M. A S. K. Co. v. Yoeum, 34 Ark. 493. 815 §§ 6-10, 641 FAIR AND JUST COMPENSATION. Nor is the fact material that the living husband stands in loco parentis to deceased's children by reason of said remarriage. 64 But it is at least intimated that the probability that a bachelor might marry, and his property descend through another may be considered.' 5 § 640. Death —Defenses — Pension to widow and children in mitigation.— It cannot be shown in mitigation of damages that the widow and children are under an act of congress en- titled to a pension. 86 § 641. Damages assessed on affirmance of judgment.— Ten per cent damages may be assessed upon affirmance of the judgment under the Arkansas statute, which is in force in In- dian Territory. 1 ' 64 O. S. Richardson Fueling Co. v. Peters, 82 111. App. 508. 65 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Barron (111. Stat.). 5 Wall. (U. S.) 90; 18 L. Ed. 591; Barron v. Illinois C. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S. C. C.) 412, 453. 66 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. 816 Maddry, 57 Ark. 506; 21 S. W. 472; 58 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 327. 67 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. El- liott (U. S. C. C. A. 8th C. Ind. Ty. ), 102 Fed. 96, under Mans. Dig. Ark. sec. 1311. DEATH — FAIR AND JUST DAMAGES. CHAPTER XXVIII. DEATH — "FAIR AND JUST " DAMAGES "WITH REFERENCE TO THE PECUNIARY INJURY." § 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651 652 "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Sta- tutes — Generally. Same subject continued. Same subject concluded. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Pe- cuniary loss. Same subject continued. "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Dam- ages for the jury. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Fac- tors generally to be con- sidered. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Sev- erance of contract rela- tions — Partnership. "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Suf- ferings of the person in- jured. •• Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — So- latium—Mental suffering. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Re- lationship, legal and ac- tual, of deceased to bene- ficiaries. 52 653. " Fair and just " damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Le- <,m1 nr moral obligation- Legal right — Support and dependency. 654. Same subject continued. 655. "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Rea- sonable expectation of pe- cuniary bench t. 656. "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Pros- pect of inheritance. 657. "Fair and just" damages " witli reference to the pecuniary injury "—Phy- sical and financial condi- tion, ajrp. number, of family, etc.— When ad- missible. 658. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Fin- ancial condition — When inadmissible. 659. •• Fair and just " damages •• wit h reference to the pecuniary injury" — Prob- able accumulations. 660. " Fair and just " damages •• with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Ex- pense of funeral, sickness, etc. B17 §642 DEATH— FAIR AND JUST DAMAGES. 661. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Life expectancy and mortuary tables. 662. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Nom- inal damages. 663. "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury 11 — Death of husband — Hus- band and father. 664. "Fair and just 11 damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury 11 — Death of wife. 665. "Fair and just 11 damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury 11 — Death of parent. 666. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury 11 — Training, etc., of chil- dren. 667. "Fair and just" damages " with reference of the pecuniary injury" — Death of children. 668. Same subject continued. 669. Same subject concluded. 670. "Fair and just 11 damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Death of adults. 671. Death of children — Minority and majority. 672. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Death of children — Mi- nority and majority. 673. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Mother's sickness from child's death. 674. "Fair and just 11 damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Col- lateral kindred. § 642. "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury "—Statutes — Generally. — In Michigan, New Jersey and Wisconsin, the jury may give such damages as they shall deem fair and just with reference 1 to the pecuniary injury resulting from the death to the persons designated by the statute ; and the action lies against the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued, and such parties are liable in the two first named states, although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to a felony ; while in all these states the action lies where death is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, and the action must be brought by the personal representative of deceased. In New Jersey the amount recovered is for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin, while in Wisconsin the beneficiaries are 1 In Wis. " in reference." 818 WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIAR! tNJUEY. . 642 the surviving husband or widow, if any, otherwise his or ber lineal descendants and in default thereof to his or her Lineal an- cestors, and in this last state the amount recoverable is limited to five thousand dollars. The Michigan statute also provides for recovery against railroad companies with like provisions as those above noted in that state, bul the beneficiaries under, with these statutory provisions in this state, are the persons who would be entitled to distribution of personal property left by persons dying intestate. Again, a peculiar provision of the New Jersey enactment requires a delivery to and upon request, bv defendant or his attorney, of a particular account in writing of the nature of the claim in respect to which damages shall be sought and recovered. 1 Other factors involved in the deter- mination of damages are the survival acts and these would also include the question as to the effect of these acts and whether or not the death loss statutes give a new and different cause of action from that under such revival enactments, or whether they rest upon the same principles, and also whether the surviving beneficiaries' right of action is exclusive, being only connected with the injured party's right of action by the provision of the death loss statutes as to the beneficiaries' right of recovery being dependent upon the injured person's cause of action had death not resulted. We have given some consideration to these ques- tions elsewhere. But we may state here that in Michigan, New Jeisey and Wisconsin there are survival statutes for the recov- ery of damages to the person. '-' Mich. Com]). Laws. 1897, p. 3151, sees. 10427. 1042S; id. p. 1989, sec. 6308; i'l. p. 1997, sit. 6309; id. p. 2021), sc.s. 6389, 6390; id. p. _".i7.~>; sec. 9728; Bowell's Aim. Stat. 1883, sec. 8313; 2 Howell's Ann. Stat. L882, secs.8313j 8314, 3391, 3392, 3491,3492; Dewey's Comp. Laws. 1872, pp. 188, 771, .sl4; Rev. Stats. 1857, ch. 515, sees. 1, 2, p. 1329. As to survival of art ions, see Mich. Comp. Laws, 1897, p. 3007, sees. 10113 et seq. N. .1. Geu. Stat, 1895, p. 1188, see. 10 tsec. 1), see. 11 (sec. 2), sec. L2 s< •■. 3); Am'd Sess. Laws, 1897, p. 134, eh. 58, sec. 2: Rev. Stat. 1878, p. 294, sees. 1 :'.: Approved Act, March '■'>, isis. p. I.. L848, p. L51; 1 Lev. Laws. 1877, p. 293. Wis. Sanborn & Berry- man's Stat. 1898, sees. 42:.:., 4256, 4219, 1224, subd. 3; A mi. a. Stat 1889, sees. 4255, 4256; Taylor's Rev. Mat. 1858, eli. 135, sees. 12, 1:;. p. 800 I see Rev. Stat. 1878, see. 1816, re- pealed 1880). As t.. 1. ill of particu- lars, see Telfer v. Northern R. Co., 30 \. .1. L. L88. II. .well's Ann. Slat. (Mich. ) see. 7-;'.'7: 2 N. .1. Gen. Stat. ].. 1426, see-, i. :,: l N. .1. Gen. Stat. pp. 919, 925, sees. 65, 92; Wis. Lev. Stat. 1898, see. 4253; Wis. Laws. 1887, 819 643 DEATH — FAIR AND JV ST DAMAGES § 643. Same subject continued. — In Wisconsin the bene- ficiaries designated in the statute must be shown to be in being by the allegations of the complaint, otherwise the action for damages for the death cannot be sustained. Nor will the court uphold the claim that by the statutes the right of action for the wrongful death of a person is conditional only upon the circum- stances being such that if death had not ensued the decedent could have proceeded against the wrongdoer for damages. 1 So oh. 280. Action does not abate on death of beneficiary, although the duration and extent of the personal injury is limited to the beneficiary's lifetime. Cooper v. Shore Elec. Co. (N. J. 1899), 44 Atl. 623. As to ef- fect of Dakota survival statute (Com p. Laws, sec. 5498) in Wiscon- sin, see Belding v. Black Hills & Ft. P. K. Co. (Wis.), 53 X. W. 750; 52 Am. & Eng. E. Cas. 624. That ac- tion survives and is separate and distinct from action for death loss, and that the latter is exclusive, and for an exhaustive discussion of this question, see Brown v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 102 Wis. 137; 77 N. W. 748; 44 L. R. A. 579; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 603; 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. 255, rehearing denied 78 X. W. 771; 44 L. R. A. 585: 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 603. This last case cites Hurst v. Detroit City R. Co., 84 Mich. 539: 4S N. W. 44: Leh- man v. Farwell, 95 Wis. 185: 70 X. W. 170, and numerous other cases. See also Topping v. St. Lawrence, 86 Wis. 526; 57 N. W. 365, cited in Sachs v. City of Sioux City, 109 Iowa, 224; 80 X. W. 336; as to sur- vival of action and suit being barred by failure to give notice, etc., to cor- poration defendant, other Wiscon- sin cases are also cited therein to the same point. That second husband cannot continue suit after the widow's death brought by her for damages for the death of her former 820 husband, see Schmidt v. Menosha Wooden Ware Co., 99 Wis. 300; 74 X. W. 797. The Michigan survival act, sec. 7397, applies only where the death results from other causes than the injuries, and damages are not re- coverable by the heirs for the pecu- niary loss to them, and also by the personal representative for the ben- efit of the estate under the survival act. 3 How. Ann. Stat. sec. 7397; and the death act, 2 How. Ann. Stat. sees. 8313, 8314; Sweetland v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co., 117 Mich. 329; 75 X. W. 1006; 43 L. R. A. 568; 5 Det. L. X. 283. As to abatement by death under General Statutes, see Plume v. Lock wood, 10 N. J. L. J. 119; Ferguson v. Wilson (Mich. 1899), 80 X. W. 1006; Beith v. Por- ter. 119 Mich. 365; 78 X. W. 336; 5 Det. L. X. 837; Wisconsin, M. & X. R. Co. v. Weselins, 119 Mich. 505; 78 X. W. 544; 5 Det. L. X. 873. The power to proceed against a corpora- tion judicially is wholly divested by its dissolution, except by special statutory authority. Combes v. Mil- waukee & M. R. Co., 89 Wis. 297; 62 X. W. 89; 27 L. R. A. 369. 4 Brown v. Chicago & Xorthwest- ern R. Co., 102 Wis. 137; 77 X. W. 748; 44 L. R. A. 579; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 603; 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. 255, rehearing denied 78 X. W. 771; 44 L. R. A. 585; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 603, citing several Wiscon- sin cases. See Wiltse v. Tilden, 77 WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY IN-'l RY. ! 643 in Michigan the complaint should show the existence of a wife and children who would be entitled to damages/ And in this state the children's right of action, no husband or widow sur- viving, constitutes no part of deceased's estate and a final set- tlement thereof is not a bar to a suit by the personal representa- tive for such children's benefit. 6 Another peculiarity of the Wisconsin enactment, noted under the preceding section, is that only the surviving husband or widow is entitled in the first in- stance to the damages, then his or her lineal descendants, and fin- ally his or her lineal ancestors. 1 And infant children are the only proper beneficiaries and the complaint should show that some of the children are minors." While in New Jersey the words for the "exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin" do not prevent bringing an action by the next of kin when no widow- survives, for the statute does not apply solely to the cases where deceased leaves surviving a widow. 1 ' And in Michigan the per- sons entitled to distribution of the personal estate of intestate are the beneficiaries. 1 " Another factor which has a bearing upon the right to recover damages for death by negligence, etc., is that under the Wisconsin statute." Railroad companies are lia- ble to employees for the negligence of co-employees and where a railroad employee is killed by such fellow servant's negligence Wis. 52; 46 X. W. 234; McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; 31 \. W. 298. Walker v. Lake Shore & M. 8. R C<>. (Mich.), 62 X. W. 1032; 5 Det. L. N. 34. See Charlebois v. Gogebie & M. R. Co., 91 Mich. 59; 51 N. W. 812. •Hubbard v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co., 104 Wis. 160; 80 X. W. 454. See Brown v. Chicago & X. W. It. Co., 102 Wis. 132; 78 X. W. 771: 44 L. R. A. 58o, denying rehearing 77 X. W. 748; 44 L. R. A. 579; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 255; 13 Am. & Kn£. R. (.'as. \. S. 603; Gores v. Graff, 77 Wis. 174; 46 X. W. 48. Examine also Abbott v.McCaddan, si wis. 563; 51 X. W. 1079; Schadelwald v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. R. Co., 55 Wis. 560; 13 X. W. 458. 7 <;.>rcsv. Graff. 77 Wis. 174: 16 V W. 48; Schmidt v. Deegan, 60 Wis. 300; 34 X. W. 83. See also Brown v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co., 102 Wis. 137; 78 X. W. 771: 44 L. R. A. 585, denying rehearing 77 X. W. 748; 44 L. R. A. .-,79: 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 255; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 603, and opinion of Marshall, .J.; and see cases in last note herein. I.ierman v. Chicago. M. <& St. P. R. Co. (Wis.), 52 X. W. But a special ad- ministrator may maintain an action. Swan v. Worvell, 107 Wis. 625; 83 X. W. 934. ■ Toppingv. St. Lawrence, 86Wis. 526; 57 X. W. 365. "Haggerty v. Central K. R. Co., 31 X. J. L. 349, under Nixon's Dig. 211. e Michigan statutes oited at beginning of this Bection. '1 Laws, 1893, ch. 220. See Wis. Rev. Siat. 1898, sec. 1816. 821 §£ 044, 645 FAIR AND JUST DAMAGES an action lies therefor under the death loss enactment which permits an action where deceased could have sued if the injury had not been fatal. 13 Again, a right of action against a city for death resulting from defects in a highway, given by the Michi- gan death loss statute, is not taken away by the enactment mak- ing cities liable for defective highways and abrogating the com- mon-law liability although it contains no provisions for damages to any person other than the one injured. 13 § 644. Same subject concluded. — So in New Jersey the board of chosen freeholders in a county is liable under the death loss statutes where the circumstances are such that it would have been liable to the injured person if death had not ensued. 14 Nor is there any presumption that the intent of the death loss statute of Michigan was to create a different rule of damages against private and other corporations in case of death from that in such actions against a railroad company. 13 It is apparent therefore, that although the prescribed statutory measure of damages is in the same language in these states, nevertheless, there are other peculiarities of the statutes which will affect the beneficiaries ' rights either as a class or otherwise, so that any decision in one state which applies to a certaiu class of those entitled should be carefully examined, except perhaps upon cer- tain general questions, before being relied on in another state as an authority. §645. "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Pecuniary loss.— The measure of recovery is the pecuniary loss solely, either present or prospective, sus- tained by those entitled to recover. 10 In Michigan, however, i' 2 Ean v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. | holders (N. J.), 31 Atl. 229, under Co., 95 Wis. 69; 69 N. W. 997; 1 Am. X. J. Act, March 3, 1848. Neg. Rep. 537. See extended note \ 15 Van Brunt v. Cincinnati, J. & at end of chapter 29, herein, as to fel- M. R. Co., 78 Mich. 530; 44 X. W. low servants. j 321. « Radio v. Detroit (Mich.), 51 N. ^ Walker v. Lake Shore & M. S. W. 360, under Pub. Acts, 1887, No. I R. Co., Ill Mich. 518; 69 N. W. 1114; 264, and How. Ann. Mich. Stat. sees. ' 3 Det. L. X. 775; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 8313,8314. 267 (see S. C, 104 Mich. 606; 62 N. » Murphy v. Mercer County Free- W. 1032; 2 Det. L. X. 34), citing WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIAR! QSJXJSY. 645 while the damages recoverable are those sustained by the stat- utory beneficiaries who have suffered pecuniary Loss, neverthe- less persons who have not been subjected to pecuniary loss may be entitled to a share of the amount recovered. 17 In de- termining what constitutes a pecuniary loss within the intent of the statute, the decisions in two of these states are that the injury must be such as is capable of a money compensation and that no other loss can be considered." Thus it must be shown that advice and counsel relates to the pecuniary affairs of Nelson v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 104 Mich. 582; 02 X. W. 993, 2 Det. Leg. X. 33; Van Brunt v. Cincinnati, J. & M. R. Co., 78 Midi. 530; -it N. W. 321; Batch v. Grand Rapids & S. R. Co., 07 Mich. 3D4; 34 X. W. 884; 11 West. 470; Mynniug v. Detroit, L. A- X. R. Co., 59 Mich. 201;. 20 X. W. 514; Chicago & X. W. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 214. See also Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 87 Mich. 374; 49 N. W. 361; 10 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 324; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 307; Hurst v. Detroit City R. Co., 84 Mich. 539; 48 X. W. 44; Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. K. Co., 66 Mich. 201, 271; 33 X. W. 306; 10 West. 104; Chicago & X. W. R. Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 270; 20 L. Ed. 571 (in error to U. S. C. C. S. E. D. Wis.); Graham v. Con- solidated Tract. Co., 64 X. J. L. 10; 44 Atl. 994, per Magie, Ch. J.; Con- solidated Tract Co. v. Hone, 60 X. J. L. 244; 38 Atl. 759; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 249, case reverses 59 X. J. L. 275; 35 Atl. 899; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 679; Consolidated Tract. Co. v. Graham, (52 X. J. L. 90; 40 Atl. 773; 58 Alh. L. J. 93; 31 Chic. L. Xews, 35; 17 Xat. Corp. Rep. 213; 4 Am. Xeg. Rep. 660, per Gummere, J.; May v. West Jersey & S. S. R. Co., 62 X. J. L. 67; 42 Atl. 165; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 517; 5 Am. Xeg. Rep. 417, a case of child's death; May v. West Jer- sey & S. R. Co., 62 X. J. L. 63; 42 Atl. 103, a case of wife and mother's death; Myers v. Holhoru, 58 X. J. L. (29 Vr.) 193; 33 Atl. 3s9; 30 L. R A. 345; Demarestv. Little, 47 X. J. L. (18 Vr.) 28; Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 151; Telfer v. North- ern R. Co., 30 X. J. L. (1 Vr.) 188; Nickerson v. Bigelow (17. S. D. C. E. ]). Wis.), 02 Fed. 900; Bauer v. Richter, 103 Wis. 412; Thompson v. Johnston Bros., 80 Wis. 570; 57 N. W. 298; Topping v. Lawrence, 86 Wis. 526; 57 X. W. 365; Lierman v. Chicago, M. it St. P. R. Co. (Wis. i, 52 X. W. 91; Ewen v. Chicago A N. W. R. Co., 38 Wis. till; letter v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co., 21 Wis. 372. 17 Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., s7 Mich. 374; 49 X. W. 621; lit Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 307; 10 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 344; Howell's Annot. Stat. Bee. 3392, and miller statute of distri- butions. w Mynuing v. Detroit. L. & N. K. Co.,59 Mich. 257;26 X. W. 514: Dema- rest v. Little, 47 X. J. L. (18 Vr.) 28. •• It is simply an action to recover in dollars and cents a compensation for the loss and damages which have ac- tually been sustained." Telfer v. Northern R. R. Co., 30 X. J. L. (1 Vr.) 188, 209, per Van Dyke, J. 823 § 640 DEATH — FAIH AND JUST DAMAGES the next of kin and would probably result in a pecuniary bene- fit, the loss of which would bring the case within the statute. 19 § 646. Same subject continued. — And the pecuniary loss must be alleged and proved, at least to some extent, particularly so where the damages are for the loss of prospective earnings which are special in their character and must be specially pleaded and established by evidence.'** Although in Michigan if the fact appears from the proof that the next of kin have sustained damages from the death of the intestate the declaration may be amended so as to show such fact. 21 In New Jersey, however, it seems that there is no absolute requirement as to averring that there has been a pecuniary loss," but it is evident from another decision in that state there must be sufficient proof to justify the award of damages, otherwise the amount of the ver- dict will be reduced to the compensation which the evidence shows to be a proper sum, since the plaintiff, it was declared, could recover nothing but the pecuniary loss sustained by those 19 May v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 63; 42 Atl. 163. 20 Hurst v. Detroit City R. Co., 84 Mich. 539; 48 N. W. 44, citing Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 66 Mich. 261, 271; 33 N. W. 306; 10 West. 184, per Champlin, J., and nu- merous other cases. Must allege facts showing that some person en- titled thereto has suffered pecuniary loss. Charlebois v. Gogebie & M. R. Co., 91 Mich. 59; 51 N. W. 812. Evidence of pecuniary loss to some person essential in action against railroad com pany. Van Brunt v. Cin- cinnati, J. & M. R. Co., 78 Mich. 530; 44 N. W. 321. See further Topping v. St. Lawrence, 86 Wis. 526; 57 N. W. 365; Regan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 51 Wis. 599; 8 N. W. 292; Kelley v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 50 Wis. 381. Allegations that plain- tiff was intestate's mother and show- ing the extent of her dependency for support, and averring pecuniary loss and damage, sufficiently allege 824 plaintiff's representative character. Wiltse v. Tilden, 77 Wis. 152; 46 N. W. 234. And if there is evidence to support the general verdict for plaintiff and a finding against con- tributory negligence, a nonsuit is properly refused, nor will the ver- dict be set aside on such ground. Averments that plaintiff's intestate was a widow and bad small children dependent upon her for support, nurture and education are sufficient in action for children for her death. McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; 31 N. W. 298. Examine Evven v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 38 Wis. 613, as to there being no necessity of averring special damages to admit proof thereof. A case of proof of pension. 21 Canity v. Detroit Citizens St. R. Co., 112 Mich. 369; 70 N. W. 1018; 2 Chic. L. J. Wkly. 277; 4 Det. L. N. 46; 37 L. R. A. 529. 22 McGlone v. New Jersey R. Co., 8 Vr. (X. J.) 304, per Beasley, J. WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY IN.UKV. S 647 entitled to the damages. The effect of this decision as well as those below cited is that the amount of substantial damages must depend upon the proof of pecuniary injury,-' for the re- covery cannot be in excess of any possible calculation based upon the evidence which must furnish some standard for the estimation of the amount of damages. 21 § 647. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pe- cuniary injury " — Damages for the jury. The amount of dam- ages to be awarded rests largely in the jury's discretion, but it must be founded upon the evidence, otherwise the verdict will not be sustained for the sum fixed thereby 23 May v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 67; 42 Atl. 165; 13 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 517; 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 417. See Telferv. North- ern R. Co., 30 N. J. L. (1 Vr.) 188 and Consolidated Traction Co. v. Graham, 62 N. J. L. 90; 40 Atl. 77:; ; 58 Alb. L. J. 93; 31 Chic. L. N". 35; 17 Natl. Corp. Rep. 213; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 660, upon the point of necessity of some evidence to recover sub- stantial damages. 24 Jackson v. Consolidated Tract. Co., 59 N. J. L. (30 Vr.) 25; 35 Atl. 754. See Walker v. Lake Shoe.' & M. S. R. Co., 104 Mich. 606; 02 X. W. 1032; 2 Det. L. N. 34. See also 8. C, 111 Mich. 518; 69 N. W. 1144; 3 Det. L. N. 775; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 2G7. In this last case there was no evidence as to nurture, etc., of chil- dren and this was considered, al though the court held that damages therefor were not recoverable, but this intimation of no evidence and that it was not claimed that de- ceased was a tutor to his children leaves room for the inference of a possibility of alleging and recover- ing upon proof of special damages in this respect. Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 66 Mich. 261, 271; 33 N. W. 306; 10 West. 184, where the court says, " The jury was not warranted in giving damages not founded upon the testimony or beyond the measure of compensa- tion for the injury inflicted,' 1 and this is quoted by the court in Hurst v. Detroit City R. Co., S4 .Midi. :.:;'.'; 48 N. W. 44. See Nelson v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 104 Mich. 582; 62 N. W. 993; 2 Det. L. N. :'-;;. » Walker v. Lake Shore A- M.S. R. Co., 104 Mich. 606; 62 X. W. 1032; 2 Det. 1.. X. :D: Burst v. Detroit City R. Co., 84 Mich. 539; IS N. W. -II. quoting Cooper v. Lake Shore it M. S. R. Co., 66 Mich. 261, 271 : :):; X. W. 300 ; lOWest. 184; North .Jersey St. R. Co. v. Morhatt, (34 X. J. L. 236; 15 Atl. 812; Jackson v. Consolidated Tract. Co., 59 X. J. L. (30 Vr. i 25; 35 Atl. 754; Whit on v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co.. 2 I'.iss. (U. S. C. C. Wis.)282; L3 Wall. (U. S.) 270; Wiltse v. Town of Tilden, 77 Wis. L66; 46 N W. 2:1 I; Staal v. Grand Rap. & I. R Co.. 57 Mich. 2 15 ; 23 \ . W. 795 Both these cases are cited, upon the point that the jury should lie in- formed of every fact ami circum- stance to assist them, in Gulf, Colo. &S. F. R. Oo.v. lounger, 90 Tex. 887; 38 S. W. 1121: 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 378, ! per Brown, J. That jury not limited 825 § 648 DEATH I'AIK AND JUST DAMAGES § 648. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pe- cuniary injury " — Factors generally to be considered. — The factors generally to be considered are deceased's age, sex, health, occupation, earnings and probability of increase thereof or other- wise, earning capacity, including the qualification, or otherwise for a more remunerative position, and the increase or diminution of such capacity, as well as the education, capacity, social stand- ing, the ability, skillfulness or unskillfulness of deceased in his employment or business, his personal qualities, his life expect- ancy, habits as to industry, sobriety, expenditure or otherwise, whether he was married or not, his care of his family, if there be any family or dependents, and plaintiffs or the beneficiaries' age and life expectancy. There are other elements, such as prob- able accumulations, dependency for support or extent of con- tributions thereto, which enter into the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit, etc., which are specially considered else- where herein. 26 by any definite and exact rule, exam- ine Ewen v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 38 Wis. 613; Cooper v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 22 Wis. 615. Damages rests largely in jury's discretion. Whiton v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. (U. S. C. C. E. D. Wis.), 2 Biss. 282, 289, per Drummond, J. See also sees. 667- 672, herein, as to death of children. 26 Deceased was a woman 56 years old ; only proof was as to boarding husband and minor children, and clothing latter— $7,000 excessive. Nelson v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 104 Mich. 582; 62 N. W. 993; 2 Det. L. N. 33. Life expectancy of deceased and of mother to be con- sidered. Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 87 Mich. 374; 49 N. W. 361; 10 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 344; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 367. Pro- spective earnings in Mich, when pleaded. Hurst v. Detroit City R. Co., 84 Mich. 539; 48 N. W. 44. Age, health and strength of de- ceased girl considered. Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 66 Mich. 826 261; 33 N. W. 306; 10 West. 184. Deceased's age, contributions to support, life expectancy and earn- ings. Balch v. Grand Rapids & S. R. Co., 67 Mich. 394; 11 West. 476; 34 N. W. 884. Deceased son's age, earnings and disposition thereof, and father's age. North Jersey St. R. Co. v. Morhart, 64 N. J. L. 236; 45 Atl. 812. Deceased son's age and probabilities of pecuniary bene- fits from son's earnings. Graham v. Consolidated Tract. Co. (N. J.), 44 Atl. 964; Consolidated Tract. Co. v. Graham, 62 N. J. L. 90; 40 Atl. 773; 58 Alb. L. J. 93; 31 Chic. L. N. 35; 17 Natl. Corp. Rep. 213; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 660. Deceased son's age, occupation, wages, exclusive of board, and as compared with earn- ings of full grown able-bodied men at the same labor, no evidence that any increase of wages could be an- ticipated during minority; no evi- dence that he was qualified or would be qualified during minority for any more remunerative position. Held WITH REFERENCE TO PECl NIARY EN.J1 RY. B 649 §649. "Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " Severance of contract relations Part- nership. — The severance of relations of contract by the death, that pecuniary benefits would nol reach amount of verdict and 13,000 reduced to $1,500. M iy v. West .Jersey & S. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 67; 42 Atl. 10-"): 13 Am. & Eng. R. < is. \. S. 617; •"> Am. Neg. Rep. 117. Next of kin were two sons, one married, and the other 17 years old. Deceased kept bouse for husband, and aided him incidentally iu his occupation — $5,000 excessive. May v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 62 \. J. L. 63; 41 Ail. 10:1. Deceased was f>7 years old at time of t lie accident, a bricklayer by trade, and followed the business of contracting and build- ing. He was sober, industrious aud prosperous in business, and bad ac- cumulated property out of bis earn- ings. At the time of the accident. be was in good health and never known to be sick, although it was claimed that he had Blight's disease. He left surviving him a widow aud three children, aged IT, 14 and 11 — §:>,800 not excessive. Williams v. Camden & Atlantic R. Co. (X. J.), 37 Atl. 1107; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 569. Deceased's probable accumulations, and that he had acquired a com- petence considered. (See this case also as to age and situation of the parties, increasing or decreasing mental aud physical ability as ap- plied to business.) Demarest v. Little, 47 X. J. L. (18 Vr.) 28. See Telfer v. Northern R. Co., SOX. J. L. (Vr. ) 188. Yearly earnings and probable value of an annuity for term of expectancy. Xickerson v. Bigclow (U. S. D. C. E. D. Wis.), 62 Fed. 900. Earning capacity, mental and physical ability, personal qualities, social standing and char- acter. Whiion v. Chicago A N. W. R. Co., 2 Bias. I Q. S. C. C. Wis Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Whiton, 13 Wall, i r. S. i 270. Deceased was r years old, Btrong and healthy. Decker v. McSorley, ill Wis. 91; 86 N. W. ."..".4. Deceased's son was 17 years old, intelligent, in good health, capable of earning com able money and unmarried. Lues- sen v. Oshkosk Elec. L. A: P. ( 109 Wis. 94; 85 N. W. 124. De- ceased was a strong, healthy man, 38 years old. Carpenterv. Roeling, 107 Wis. 559; 83 N. W. 953. Deceased husband's life expectancy and widow's reasonable expectations from bis earnings ami aim. nut sufficient for her support, but not gross earnings for life expectancy. Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. K. Co., 101 Wis. 292; 77 X. W. 109; 12 Am. & Eng. R, Cas. V S. 196. Deceased was a freight handler; railroad company liable to employee for negligence of co-em ployee. Ean v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 9.7 Wis. 69; 69 V W. '.".'7; 1 Am. Xeg. Rep. .7:17. Deceased was a workman 33 years old — -S4.000 not excessive. Bright v. Barnetl & R. Co., 88 Wis. 290; 60 V W. 418; 26 1.. R. A. 524. Deceased's age, occu- pation and financial condition, and reasonable expectation of pecu- niary benefit. Tuteur v. Chicago & X. W. K. Co., 77 Wis. 505; 46 N. W. 897. Deceased's education and capacity for earning money. Wiltse v. Tilden, 77 Wis. 152; 46 N. W. 234. Deceased's age. health, earn- ings and dependency of family con- sidered- 12,500 not excessive. Annas \. Milwaukee & N. R. <'o., 07 S27 8 650 DEATH— FAIR AND JUST DAMAGES such as that of partnership, cannot be considered as an element of damages. 27 § 650. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Sufferings of person injured. — In deter- mining whether' or not the sufferings of the person injured con- stitute an element of damages, it must be remembered that, as we have elsewhere stated, in Michigan there is a survival stat- ute which covers negligent injuries to the person, and such en- actment only includes those cases where death results from other causes than the injuries, while the death loss act applies where death is occasioned by the negligent or wrongful act, and results in pecuniary injury to the heirs. 28 And we have also seen that there are survival statutes in the other states which come under this provision as to fair and just damages with reference to the pecuniary injury, viz : New Jersey and Wisconsin. 29 In so far, therefore, as those actions rest upon different principles, and are separate and distinct, the death loss statute cannot include the mental or physical sufferings of the person injured, for these appertain only to the person and the survival action, and it is clearly apparent that the legislature in enacting both a death loss and survival enactment could not have intended that the heirs or designated beneficiaries should recover for other than the pecuniary injuries resulting solely from the death.* Wis. 46. Deceased was 55 years old, married and unskilled laborer — §2,000 not excessive. Mulcairns v. Janesville, 67 Wis. 24. Deceased son 18 months old— $2,000 not ex- cessive. Schrier v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. R. Co., 05 Wis. 457; 27 \. W. 167. Deceased son was 7 years old; character of his services and condition of parents considered — $2,500 not excessive. Johnson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 64 Wis. 425; 25 N. W. 223. Deceased and parents' ages, and latter's condition and circumstances considered — $1,000 not excessive. Hoppe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 61 Wis. 359; 21 N. W. 227. Age and services 828 of minor, situation and condition of parents — $2,000 not excessive. Ewen v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 38 Wis. 613. 27 Demarest v. Little, 47 N. J. L. (18Vr.) 28. 28 S\veetland v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co., 117 Mich. 329; 75 N. W. 1066; 5 Det. L. X. 283; 43 L. R. A. 568, under death Stat. 2 How. Ann. Stat. sees. 8313, 8314. and survival act, 3 How. Ann. Stat. sec. 7397. 29 See sees. 642-644, herein. 30 See Mynning v. Detroit L. & N. R. Co., 59 Mich. 257; 26 N. W. 514: Telfer v. Northern R Co., 30 ST. J. L. 188, and cases cited; sees. 642-644, herein, as to statutes. EEFBUENCE TO PECUNIARY INJURY. §§ 651, 652 § 651. " Fair and just " damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury "—Solatium— Mental suffering.— In an action to recover under the death loss statute, nothing can be allowed for the mental suffering of those entitled to damag Nor can a declaration in a cause of action for a child's death he amended by inserting an averment for injuries inflicted and suffered up to the time of the death. 32 § 652. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pe- cuniary injury "—Relationship, legal and actual, of deceased to beneliciaries.— The question of relationship, legal and actual, of deceased to the beneficiaries, is certainly important and mate- rial in so far as the existence of statutory beneficiaries is neces- sary to be alleged and proven. This point of relationship is also involved in that of reasonable expectation of pecuniary ad- vantage, since the probability of the continuance of past benefits would, to some extent at least, be evidenced both by the legal and actual relations between deceased and those entitled to re- cover for his death, and the question of dependency of survivors upon deceased ought to be relevant, as is instanced by the ease of a widow's sole support being cut off by her husband's negli- gent or wrongful killing, the family also being dependent. Other illustrations of the above points are where allegations that plaintiff was the mother of intestate and dependent upon him, are facts showing her right to sue, and that she has sus- tained pecuniary loss. 34 So the facts that a deceased son was unmarried and that there were a number of other sons surviving, are relevant, and affect the measure of recovery."' And the right : 'i Teller v. Northern R. Co.. 30 V. J. L. 188. Nothing for injury to a father's feelings for death of a Bon, killed by railroad company, under N. J. Act, March 3, 1848. Demurest v. Little, 47 N. J. L. 28, a case of husband for wife's killing. \\ niton v.Chicago & X. W. R. Co.. 2 Hiss. (U. S. C. C. E. D. Wis.) 282, 289, per Drummoud, J. See Nelson v. Lake Shore & M. S. K. Co., 104 Mich. 582; 62 N. W. 998; 2 Det. L. X. S3; Myn- ning v. Detroit, 1,. A N. R, Co., •"»'.' Mich. 257; 20 N. W. :>14: Castello v. Landwehr. 28 Wis. 522; Totter \. Chicago & N. W. R Co., 21 Wis. 372. Examine also cases cited undei sees. 645, 646, herein. 32 Hurst v. Detroit City K Co., 84 Mich. 539; 48 V W. 44. 83 Annas v. Milwaukee A N. R. Co., C7 Wis. It',; 30 X. W. 282. m Wiltse v. Tilden, 77 Wis. 152; 10 N. W. 234. 35 Innes v. Milwaukee. 1<>3 Wis. 582; 7'.' V W. 783. 829 § 653 DEATH— FAIR AND JUST DAMAGES of a divorced woman to the custody of her children under a de- cree of divorce is material. 36 Again, that the father was next of kin and the actual relations between him and a deceased son with reference to the disposition of such son's earnings and the loss thereof by the premature death, affect the right to and the measure of the damages as well, also, as the possible future re- lation of dependency, in case the father should become neces- sitous. 37 But a father and brother of intestate were not permitted a recovery where they were not dependent on deceased. 58 These general illustrations might be continued indefinitely if it were necessary, but it is not, for the reason that like cases appeal- throughout the chapters covering this subject, especially so in connection with those sections which relate to prospective gifts and contributions to support, as well as to the question of legal and moral obligation to render aid or support. It is not intended however, to assert by reason of what is above stated that proof of the legal and actual relations of deceased to the beneficiaries is absolutely necessary to be alleged and proven as a prerequi- site to a recovery, for that is another question, viz., that of the right to nominal damages, which we have elsewhere considered, but nevertheless, such relationship does affect the extent of the recovery in numerous cases. 39 § 653. "Fair and just " damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Legal or moral obligation— Legal right —Support and dependency. — In Michigan the recovery does not depend upon any moral obligation of deceased to supply the needs or wants of the beneficiaries, although in case of the death of a young child, evidence which should be received with caution, might perhaps be given, when it tends to establish a moral obligation to demand assistance in the future from such child, had it lived. 40 This ruling has been frequently cited as supporting the claim that damages do not depend upon any legal obligation of deceased to support or aid the beneficiary. 36 Wiltse v. Tilden, 77 Wis. 152; 46 N. W. 234. 37 North Jersey St. R. Co. v. Mor- hart, 64 N. J. L. 236; 45 Atl. 812. 830 38 Van Brunt v. Cincinnati, J. & M. R. Co., 78 Mich. 530; 44 N. W. 321. 39 See sees. 652, 662, herein. 40 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Bay- field, 37 Mich. 205, per Cooley, C. J. WITH REFERENCE TO PEC1 MA1:\ IN.M RY. § 653 Tn this connection it is pertinent to state thai although the right to recover rests upon tho terms of the death Loss stat- ute, nevertheless, thai enactment bases the damages upon the pecuniary loss sustained. This point also involves numerous other factors which enter into what proof is obligatory to recover any damages, and what evidence may be given to enhance the damages, and the old questions of nominal damages and what beneficiaries are entitled are again brought up, so that the diffi- culty of deducing any positive rule is obvious. It certainly is true that the right of a wife or minor child to support rests upon a legal liability as dues also the light of a father to a son's earnings during the hitter's minority, and where the loss of such support or earnings is out off by premature death, it is hut reasonable to assert that the consequent, pecuniary loss to the widow, child or parent rests upon a pre-existing legal obliga- tion, and a corresponding legal right. But where damages are recoverable, not for the benefit of specifically designated bene- ficiaries, but in reality for the estate, to be distributed as the law provides, it might be a question how far such statutory provision would bring such indirectly named distributees within the law of legal liability and legal right, as affecting the meas- ure of recovery, and this, again, takes us back to the question elsewhere herein considered, as to the necessity of alleging the existence of persons entitled to recover. Irrespective, however, of any other question, that of contribution to support is material and relevant, and the extent of the loss may be measured by and based upon an estimate of the customary contributions by deceased. a So it has also been declared that deceased must have left some one dependent upon him for support or some one who had a reasonable expectation of receiving some benefit from him during his lifetime. 1 - Again, where deceased was a « Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Bay- field, 37 Mich. 203, per Cooley, C. J. *i Grand Trunk R. Co. of Can. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408; 36 L. Ed. 485, under How. Ann. Mich. sees. 3: > >'.»1, 3392, citing Chicago & X. W. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Midi. 205; Van Brunt v. Cincinnati, J. & M. It. Co., 78 Mich. 530; Cooper v. Lake Shore & ant insisted that DO <>ne was left dependent litre, and therefore there was no right of action. Court stated that above was according to deci- sions of Michigan, but that do ques- tion as to this phase of the caae arcs,-, for the action alleged that it was brought for the benefit of three daughters and one son, whose names M.S. R. Co., 66 Mich. 261. Defend were given, although the ooly evi- 83] §654 DEATH— -FAIR AND JUST DAMAGES woman fifty-six years old, and the amount of recovery was af- fected by the fact that the only evidence was that she boarded her husband and two minor children and clothed the latter, but it did not appear what was spent for clothing, 13 and where deceased contributed to the support of his mother and invalid sister, but he did not aid other members of the family, the recovery was limited to those whom he had assisted. 44 So there can be no recovery by lineal or collateral relatives where there is no de- pendency. 45 § 654. Same subject continued.— Again, the cost of an annuity which will furnish the support to which the person is entitled is the measure of recovery for the loss of support. 46 And the present value of deceased's annual contributions to the support of his family, not to exceed the highest amount con- tributed for one year, and the present value of the same for two years, and so on for his life expectancy, should be considered, and the sums added together will represent the present value of the amount, 47 So the parents' dependency for support may be considered, 48 as well as the possibility of the father's or mother's dependency in the future , 49 although the fact that a deceased adult son was not the only child upon whom the mother could depend for support may be considered. 50 But the aid and as- dence as to this allegation was brought out incidentally and not directly, and the record failed to show that any exception was taken on the trial as to lack of any evi- dence in this particular and it was therefore not before this court, and the legal presumption is there were beneficiaries, and the general charge assumed that such evidence had been introduced and a requested charge of defendant proceeded on that as- sumption. Id. per Mr. Justice La- mar. 43 Nelson v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 104 Mich. 582; 2 Det. L. N. 33; t!2 N. W. 993. 44 Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 87 Mich. 374; 49 N. W. 361; 832 10 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 344; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 367. 45 Van Brunt v. Cincinnati, J. & M. R. Co., 78 Mich. 530; 44 N. W. 321. 46 Brockway v. Patterson, 72 Mich. 122; 40 N. W. 192; 1 L. R. A. 708. 47 Balch v. Grand Kapids & S. R. Co., 67 Mich. 394; 11 West. 476; 34 N. W. 884. 48 Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 66 Mich. 261; 10 West. 184; 33 N. W. 306. See sec. 657, herein. 49 North Jersey St. R. Co. v. Mor- hart, 64 N. J. L. 236; 45 Atl. 812; Thompson v. Johnston Bros. Co., 86 Wis. 576: 57 N. W. 598; W T iltse v. Tilden, 77 Wis. 152; 46 N. W. 234. 50 Innes v. Milwaukee, 103 Wis. 582 ; 79 N. W. 783. Willi REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY INJURY. E 655 sistance rendered by a wife to her husband in his occupation are not a ground of recovery by the nexl of kin, 51 and a verdict of substantial damages will be set aside where il rests only upon evidence of a general character, where the deceased, an adult, left a mother and minor brothers, and the mother was able to support herself, nor is a legal right to support necessary. 82 So where a deceased widow hud supported a daughter and assisted a son from time to time with small sums of money, the reason- able expectation of support or other benefit constitutes a factor. 53 And an obligation of a surviving mother to support minor children is an element of damages."* 1 Again that the widow or family was largely or wholly dependent upon deceased for sup- port is material and important, B and the relations of deceased to his lather and mother, their dependence upon him and his obligation to support them is relevant and admissible testi- mony/'' § 655. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit. — The reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or of the continuance thereof is the important consideration, and in New Jersey the damages are limited thereby, and it may be generally stated that the basis thereof is age and the factors elsewhere noted. 57 Necessarily the nature of this reasonable expectation depends upon the character of the relation sus- tained by those entitled as beneficiaries, since elements show- ing a loss to a parent would probably differ from the factors proving pecuniary damage to a widow, and in this connection what we have stated elsewhere concerning the differences in 51 May v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 6:3; 42 Atl. 163. ra Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 151, 156. 88 Tuteur v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 77 Wis. 505; 46 N. W. 807. 64 Mulcairns v. Janesville, 67 Wis. 24; 29 N. W. 365. 65 Annas v. Milwaukee & N. R. Co., 67 Wis. 46; 30 N. W. 282. See further as to dependency and sup- port, Johnson v. Chicago & X. W. 53 R. Co., 64 Wis. 425; 25 N. W. 223; Strong v. Stevens Point, 62 Wis. 255; 22 X. W. 125; Hoppe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 61 Wis. 350; 21 N. W. 227; Ewen v. Chicago * X. W. R. Co., 38 Wis. 613; Potter v. Chi- cago * N. W. K. Co., 21 Wis. 372; 22 Wis. (115. See sec. ti.">7. herein. ■ Bright v. Barnetl a- K. Co., 88 Wis. 209; 60 N. W. 418; 26 L. R. A. 524. ,T See sec. 648, herein. 833 § 655 DEATH FAIR AND JUST DAMAGES the statutes as to those entitled to recover is material. 58 But the general rule is that what it is reasonably probable deceased would have earned, or accumulated, or contributed towards support, or care of those entitled to recover, or what the latter would have derived from the continuance of life except for the fatality, or any deprivation of a reasonable expectation of pe- cuniary advantage cut off by the premature death is properly an element of damages. The facts evidencing this loss must however vary in each particular case and all the available, ad- missible, material and relevant circumstances in each case should be proven, for the extent of the damages depends largely upon the proof. 59 58 See sees. 642-644, herein. 59 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408; 36 L. Ed. 485, under How- ell's Ann. Mich. Stat, sees. 3391, 3392; Sweetland v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co., 117 Mich. 329; 75 N. W. 1066; 43 L. R. A. 568; 5 Det. L. N. 283; Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 87 Mich. 374; 49 N. W. 621; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 367; 10 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 344; Hurst v. Detroit City R. Co., 84 Mich. 539; 48 N. W. 44; Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 66 Mich. 261; 33 N. W. 306; 10 West. 184; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205, where the court says : " What the family would lose by the death would be what it was accustomed to receive or had reasonable expectation of re- ceiving in his lifetime." Graham v. Consolidated Tract. Co., 64 N. J. L. 10; 44 Atl. 964, holding that dam- ages must be limited to compensa- tion for the loss of such reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit (under act N. J. March 3, 1848; 1 Gen. Stat. p. 1188), and the probabil- ities as to the pecuniary benefits which a father would receive should be considered. May v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 90; 40 Atl. 773; 31 Chicago L. N. 35; 58 Alb. 834 L. J. 93; 17 Nat. Corp. 213; 4 Am. Neg. Rep. 660, where Glimmers, J., says, the pecuniary injury " ' is nothing more than a deprivation of a reasonable expectation of a pecun- iary advantage which would have resulted by a continuance of the life of deceased,' " quoting Beasley, Ch. J., in Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N". J. L. 158; May v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 63; 42 Atl. 163, holding that the claimed injury must be such as would have re- sulted in a pecuniary benefit or the deprivation thereof in the case of a wife's death. Demarest v. Little, 47 N. J. L. ( 18 Vr. ) 28, a case of loss of parent. See Decker v. Mc- Sorley, 111 Wis. 91; 86 N. W. 554; Bauer v. Richter, 103 Wis. 412; 79 N. W. 404, a case where an employee was killed by the fall of a derrick erected by employees of another. Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co., 101 Wis. 292; 77 N. W. 169; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 196. This case considers wife's reasonable expectations from husband's earn- ings, etc. See further as to reason- able expectations, Tuteur v. Chi- cago & N. W. R. Co., 77 Wis. 505; 46 N. W. 897; Kaspari v. Marsh, 74 Wis. 562; Annas v. Milwaukee & REFERENCE TO PEC1 NIAKY INJURY. §§656,657 § 656. "Fair and just" damages 4k \villi reference (<> the pecuniary injnry " — Prospect of inheritance. -The prospect of inheritance in so Ear as it Is involved in the deceased's in- crease of property or probable accumulations, and the reasonable expectation of sharing therein is considered under that heading. 1 § 657. "Fair and just " damages "with reference to the pecuniary Injnry "—Physical and financial condition, age, number of family, etc.— When admissible. In the three states'' 1 which we have placed together, for the reason thai the statutes therein prescribe the rule as to damages in the same terms, the designation of beneficiaries differs, 82 so that it is im- portant to remember this fact in considering the admissibility of evidence as to the physical and financial condition of such beneficiaries, the age, sex and number of family surviving, their dependency, etc. In Michigan, dependency, or the existence of some one dependent upon deceased, seems to be material.''' And this dependency is the turning point in relation to the ail- mission or rejection of evidence of the character under discussion. Thus the ages and number of dependent children of deceased may be proven where plaintiff sues as a personal representative for the benefit of those entitled to damages lor the pecuniary loss/* 1 In another case it was in evidence that the deceased wife had clothed and boarded two minor children. 65 Again, the aid furnished a mother and invalid sister confined the pecuniary loss to them, although there were other members of the family."'' And the minority of the children and the marriage of the daugh- ter should, it seems, be considered in an action by the widow. 63 N. K. Co., 07 Wis. 4G, 48; 30 N. W. 282; Lawson v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co., 64 Misc. 448; 24 V \V. 618; Ewen v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 38 Wis. 613; Totter v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 22 Wis. 615; 21 Wis. 372. 60 Sec sec. 655, herein. « Mich. N. .1. and Wis. 62 See sees. 624-044. 63 See sees. 852 654, herein. 64 Breckenfeldor v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 79 Mich. 500; 44 N. W. 957. ' Nelson v. Lake Shore A- M. S. R.Co., 101 Mich. :><)•..':•_' Dot. !.. X. :'.:'.; 62 V W. !".»:'.. a case where the dam- ages were held excessive. ''''• Richmond v. Chicago A- \V. M. R. Co.. 87 Mich. 374; l'.' V W. 361; in Am. A Eng. R. Cas.867; L0 Ry. & Corp. L. .1. 344. See Van Brunt v. Cincinnati, J. A M. R. Co.. 78 Mich. 530; it V W. 821. •' Rouse v. Detroit Eleo. R. Co. (Mich. 1901), ST N. W. 68; 8 Det L X. 577. 835 § 657 DEATH I AlK AMi JUST DAMAGES So evidence is admissible as to the pecuniary circumstances of the parents of a deceased child. 68 And the jury should be per- mitted the fullest insight as to the family circumstances where the head of the family and its support is killed, in order that they may ascertain the exact extent of the pecuniary loss. 69 In New Jersey the fact that the father, who was next of kin, might become necessitous and dependent, is relevant and material upon the question whether he had suffered pecuniary loss by his son's death. 70 And where deceased left a widow, the number and ages of the surviving children were noticed as factors by the court in determining whether or not the damages awarded were excessive. 71 So the age of a surviving mother, her ability to support herself, and the number and ages of surviving brothers appeared as facts in another case where the damages were held excessive. 7 - Again, in Wisconsin, the age of a sur- viving mother suing for her son's death, and also the number and ages of her other surviving sons were in evidence and considered upon the question of the reduction of the amount of the verdict. 73 And the husband's circumstances and financial condition may be shown in an action for the negligent killing of his wife in order to enable the jury to assess fair and just damages. 74 So proof of a mother's pecuniary circumstances may properly be given in an action for her son's death in order to show her possible dependency upon such child after his minor- ity. 75 And a widow suing for the killing of her husband may show the number and ages of her dependent children, 75 and 68 Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 66 Mich. 261; 10 West, 184; 33 N. W. 306. 69 Staal v. Grand Rap. & I. R. Co., 57 Mich. 239; 23 N. W. 795. See next section herein. 70 North Jersey St. R. Co. v. Mor- hart, 64 N. J. L. 236; 45 Atl. 812. 71 Williams v. Camden & A. R. Co. (N. J.), 37 Atl. 1107; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 569. The question was not dis- cussed, however, it being evidently conceded that the evidence was prop- erly before the court, 72 Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 151. 836 73 Innes v. Milwaukee, 103 Wis. 582; 79 N. W. 783. Examine Decker v. McSorley, 111 Wis. 91; 86 N, W. 554. 74 Thoresen v. La Crosse City R. Co., 94 Wis. 129; 68 N. W. 548; 6 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 101. 75 Thompson v. Johnston Bros., 86 Wis. 576; 57 N. W. 298; Potter v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 21 Wis. 372. 76 Abbott v. McCadden, 81 Wis. 563; 51 N. W. 1979; Mulcairns v. Janesville, 67 Wis. 24; 29 N. W. 565. WITH I.I.I I.Ki:\«'l I" PEC1 NlAfcY lN.M'kY. § 657 that her only means of support has been cut off by such death. 11 So the fact that the children have reached majority does oot preclude their reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit.' Again, a mother who hud been given the custody of the intes- tate child under a decree of divorce may prove such fact and also her pecuniary necessities. 19 And special pecuniary loss to decedent's minor children may be shown by evidence that some of them are in poor health." So the parents' ages and poverty, the father's poor health, the nature of his physical afflictions and the character of his and the mother's occupation, as evi- dencing their necessitous condition, are proper factors for con- sideration as well also as the fact that a large family survived. In addition to the physical and financial condition of the bene- ficiaries, we have seen that the health, industry, habits, earning capacity 88 and probable accumulations of deceased ffl are factors, and these necessarily include a consideration of his or her finan- cial condition, either as affecting dependency upon deceased for support, or the question of reasonable expectation of pecu- niary advantage/ 1 77 Annas v. Milwaukee & N. R. Co., G7 Wis. 46; 30 N. W. 282. 78 Tuteur v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 77 Wis. 505; 40 \. W. 897. '■■•< Wiltse v. Tilden, 77 Wis. 152; 46 N. W. 2:54. 80 McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; 31 X. W. 298, a case where de- ceased was the mother. 81 Johnson v. Chicago A X. W. R. Co., 64 Mis. 42.",; 25 X. W. 223; Strong v. Stevens Point, 02 Wis. 255; 22 N. W. 425; Hoppe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 01 Wis. 359: 21 X. W. 227: Ewen v. Chicago & X. W. R. Co.. 38 Wis. 618, all cases as to excessive damages. Potter v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 21 Wis. 472: 22 Wis. 015. In this last case the indigent condi- tion of the parents was declared nec- essary to he shown, otherwise the damages would he limited. This de- cision, in so far as it is relied upon as an authority upon the point relat- ing to evidence of poverty heiug ad- missible, is criticised as a " dictum" and the Ewen case is explained as within that class of decisions "in which perhaps such evidence must he received, because it tends to estab- lish a moral obligation to demand assistance in the future from one at the time incapable of giving it. as where the person killed was a very young child ami at present contrib- uting nothing in aid of anyone." Per Cooley, .1.. in Chicago & \. W. R. Co. v. Bayfield, :'.7 Mich. 205. 82 See sec. 648, herein. 83 See sec. 659, herein. 84 See also as to financial condit ion of deceased. Williams v. Camden & A. R. Co. (X. J.), 37 Atl. 1107; 3 Am. Neg. Rep. 569. The facts, how- ever, are only noticed as being proven and there is no discussion in this case. Tuteui v. Chicago & X. W. EL Co., 77 Wis. 505; 40 X. W. 837 §§ 658,659 FAIR AND JUST DAMAGES § 658. « Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Financial condition — When inadmis- sible. — Notwithstanding the decisions under the preceding sec- tion, it is evidently the law in Michigan that the damages recov- erable have no regard to the needs of the persons entitled to recover under the statute, and that the poverty of the family can have no tendency to prove the extent of their reason- able expectations of receiving pecuniary benefit ; that is, that the amount of the loss is not and cannot be measured by the wealth or poverty of the beneficiary. 8 ' This decision is followed in a later case which holds that the extent of the family's property, and of the incumbrance thereon, cannot be proven where a recovery is sought for the killing of plaintiff's husband. 86 §659. " Fair and just " damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury "—Probable accumulations. — The fact that the deceased husband and father had been prosperous in busi- ness, and had accumulated property, has been considered in determining whether or not the damages awarded were exces- sive. 8 ' But where deceased had already accumulated a com- petence, his physical and mental health and vigor, as affecting his ability to safely invest and keep the same during his life expectancy and the probability of such property remaining in- tact at his death for his children's benefit should be considered by the jury.** Again, the damages may include compensation to a widow for the share which she might reasonably have expected to receive from her husband's increased property, had he not been killed. 89 So adult children's reasonable expectation of pe- 85 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Bay- field, 37 Mich. 205. 80 Hunn v. Michigan C. K. Co., 78 Mich. 513; 44 N. W. 502; 7 L. R. A. 500; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. X. S. 452. See sec. G73, herein. 5:7 Williams v. Camden & A. R. Co. 88 Demarest v. Little, 47 N. J. L. (18 Vr.) 28. 89 Bauer v. Richter, 103 Wis. 412; 79 N. W. 404. Examine Kaspari v. Marsh, 74 Wis. 5(53; 43 N. W. 368; Annas v. Milwaukee & N. R. Co., <>7 Wis. 40, 50; 30 N. W. 282; Lawson v. (N. J.), 37 Atl. 1107; 3Am.Neg. Rep. Chicago, St. P. M. & <>. R. Co., G4 569. Xo discussion was had, how- upou the point, the facts heiug merely stated. 838 Wis. 448; 24 X. W. 618; Castellov Landwehr, 28 Wis. 522. REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY in.ii l:V. §§ 660, 661 cuniary benefit from deceased's probable increase of property or accumulations constitute a factor." § 660. " Fair and just " damages "with reference to tin' pecuniary injury "—Expenses of funeral, sickness, etc. Fu- neral expenses arc not recoverable as a pari of the damages in New Jersey, 91 and in Wisconsin where the complainl alleged the payment by intestate's children and heirs at law, of expensi the funeral and of sickness, it was held fatally defective beean-e it did not show that any of the children were minors, as under the death loss statute of thai state, the damages are for the ben- efit of the infant children who have sustained pecuniary 1 It may, therefore, be reasonably inferred that if it had been averred that the minor children had been pecuniarily dam by such payment of expenses, the complaint would have been sufficient. 93 § 661. " Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Life expectancy and mortuary tables. — Life expectancy is a question for the jury, and although stand- ard or statutory annuity, mortality or mortuary tables are ad- missible in evidence, they are not conclusive, for they are subject to variation by proof as to age, health, habits, etc., of the par- ties and are to be considered in the Light of such evidence." This 90 Tuteur v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 77 Wis. 505; 40 N. W. 897. al Consolidated Tract. Co. v. Hone, 00 N". .J. L. 244; 38 Ail. 759; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. s. 249, rev'g 59 N. J. L. 275; 35 All. 899; 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 679, which hold that in case of the death of a child. funeral expenses were part "f the pecuniary damages when such ex- penses hail been paid l»y the father and could he recovered by him as administrator. The reversing case cites Dalton v. Southeastern K. Co., 4C. B. N. S. 296; Blake v. Midland R. Co., 18 Q. B. 93. Examine Telfer v. Northern R. Co., 30 X. J. I.. 188, 209, where the court intimates that the expenses growing out of child's injuries are recoverable, al- though the point is nol discussed. See Sullivan v. Horner. 41 V .1. Eq. 299; 7 Atl. ill, cited in Rowe v. Ru- per, 23 lnd. App. 27; 54 V K. 77". as to funeral expenses of minor child not being a charge against hi> esl ate, where he leases a father able to pay them. 9 - Topping v. St. Lawrence. 86 Wis. 526; 57 \". W. 365. '' ; Examine I looper \ . Lake shore & M.S. R. Co.. or. Mich. 261; 33 N W. 306; m West. L84. « Damm v. Damm, 109 Mich. 619; 67 N. W. 984; 3 Dot 1. tf.810. Mor- iu:u\ tables in How. Mich. Statutes, sec. 4245, are admissible, Sunn v. Michigan C. R Co., 7s Mich. 513; 44 §661 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST DAMAGES rule, however, as to conclusiveness of such tables is subject to this qualification, viz, that they are controlling, when in evidence in the absence of proof varying or tending to vary their effect. 95 But they are not admissible to show the life expectancy of a child of an age less than any age computed in such tables. 96 It does not, however, constitute error as to defendant, in an action for a child's death to admit in evidence English tables showing the life expectancy to .be less than that shown by American expe- rience under the statute. 97 In New Jersey the rule is substan- tially the same as that stated at the beginning of this section, since the standard mortality table may be used there to estab- lish probable life expectancy without proof of its repute. The rule of computation furnished thereby is not, however, an abso- lute one, for the conditions of each case must affect the conclu- sion. In determining the admissibility of such table, the court should be satisfied as to its authenticity by proof as where wit- nesses familiar with it and its use testify thereto. 98 In deter- mining the pecuniary loss to a mother and sister who were dependent beneficiaries and to whose support deceased had con- tributed, the computation as to them should be confined to the period between the mother's life expectancy and that of de- ceased. 99 So in case of a husband's death, the annuity given as a compensation for her support should be based upon his probable duration of life. 100 And the probable duration of a parent's life affects the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit to sur- viving children. 1 It is unnecessary, however, to continue these illustrations as the question of life expectancy of deceased or of N. W. 502; 7 L. R. A. 500; 41 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 452. See also Mc- Keigue v. Janes ville, 68 Wis. 50; 31 N. W. 298; Mulcairns v. Jauesville, 67 Wis. 24; 29 N. W. 565. 95 Nelson v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 104 Mich. 582; 62 N. W. 993; 2 Det. L. N. 33. 96 Rajnowski v. Detroit, B. C. & A. R. Co., 74 Mich. 15; 41 N. W. 847. Child in this case was 5 years old; no age under 10 years was given in tables. 97 Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. 840 Co., 66 Mich. 261; 33 N. W. 306; 10 West. 184. 9 » Camden & A. R. Co. v. Williams, 61 N. J. L. (32 Vr.) 646; 40 Atl. 634; 11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 600. 99 Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 87 Mich. 374; 49 N. W. 361; 10 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 344; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 367. 100 Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co., 101 Wis. 292; 77 N. W. 169; 12 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. N. S. 196. 1 Tuteur v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 77 Wis. 505; 46 N. W. 897. REFERENCE TO I'l • r.\l.\l:V tNJTJEY. §§ 662, 663 survivors is involved in nearly every case where damages are sought for a negligent or wrongful killing. § 662. " Fair and just" damages kk with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Nomina] damages. — In Michigan nominal damages cannot be recovered for a death in the absence of evi- dence showing some pecuniary injury or loss,-' and in New Jer- sey the rule has been, as we have shown elsewhere, very posi- tively affirmed and constantly followed, that nothing hut the pecuniary loss can be recovered, although there does not Beem to exist as strict a requirement with regard to pleading such injury as exists in some other states. 1 So in that state a ver- dict for the benefit of the next of kin of a decease! 1 wife and mother will be deemed excessive, where the pecuniary loss to the sons as such next of kin is only nominal. 4 In Wisconsin, however, the facts that deceased was a widow and had small children dependent upon her sufficiently show a pecuniary injury to them. 3 But it is also decided that there must be some evidence showing pecuniary loss to justify an award of nominal damages. 6 § 663, "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Death of husband — Husband and father. — Outside of the general factors which enter into the considera- tion of the pecuniary loss and the measure of damages, those elements which should he placed before the jury as a basis of their award in case of the death of a husband or of a husband and father have been stated herein under the various headings to which they more properly belong. They are involved in the consideration of dependency upon him as the sole support of 2 Hurst v. Detroit City R. Co., 84 Midi. 539; 48 N. \V. 44, citing ami quoting from Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. K. Co., 66 Mich. 261, 271; 83 N. W. =506; 10 West. L84. See also Charlebois v. Gogebie & M. K. Co., 91 Mich. 59: 51 X. W. 812; Van Brunt v. Cincinnati, .1. it M. K. Co., 78 Mich. :>:;<>; 44 N. W. 321. See also as to wife's services, Nelson v. Lake Shore & M. S. K. Co., 104 Mich. 582; 62 X. W. 993; 2 Det. L. \. 33. See sec. 674. herein, as to collateral kin- dred. 3 Sec Bees. 645, 646, 662, herein. 4 May v. West Jersey a s. k. Co., 62 N. J. L. 63; 42 All. L63. McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; ■". \. W. 298. ■ Regan v. Chicago, M. & St P. EL Co., 51 Wis. 599; 8 N. W. 292. 841 § 663 DEATH -FATR AND JUST DAMAGES the family and the family circumstances; 7 the measure of com- pensation to children for a parent's death, their loss of care, education and training ; 8 the reasonable, expectation of pecu- niary benefit, probable accumulations and prospective losses ; 9 the legal and moral obligation to support and the beneficiaries' right thereto ; 10 solatium, and various other factors. 11 Again the terms of the statutes providing for fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injury must be construed in the light of their provisions as to the beneficiaries in those states which come within this specific wording as to the measure of damages. Thus in Wisconsin the surviving widow's right is exclusive, and her damages do not include the money value of his life to the child ren. 1 '-' But it is also decided that the measure of damages may be an allowance based upon the pecuniary loss of the widow and children within the five thousand dollar limi- tation, and although it should not be such a sum as will produce at six per cent interest deceased's yearly earnings, yet there should be awarded the probable value of an annuity charge to produce such income for the term of expectancy, 13 or as the rule has also been stated, the widow is not entitled to an amount covering her husband's gross earnings during his life expectancy, but she may recover within the statutory limitation of five thousand dollars, a sum which will yield an amount which will support her dur^ ing a period covering what would have been deceased's expecta- tion of life, together with such sum as she might reasonably have expected to receive from his earnings. 14 Again, the value 7 Staal v. Graud Rap. & I. R. Co., 57 Mich. 239; 23 N. W. 795; Annas v. Milwaukee & N. R. Co., 67 Wis. 46; 30 N. W. 282; Mulcairns v. Janes- ville, 67 Wis. 24; 29 N. W. 565. See Rouse v. Detroit Elec. R. Co. (Mich. 1901), 87 N. W. 68; 8 Det. L. News, 577. See sees. 653, 654, 657, herein. 8 See sec. 666, herein. 9 See sec. 655, herein. 10 See sec. 653, herein. 11 See sees. 648, 653, herein. 12 Lierman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (Wis.), 52 N. W. 91; Abbott v. McCadden, 81 Wis. 563; 51 X. W. 1079; Gores v. Graff, 77 Wis. 174; 46 842 N. W. 48; Schmidt v. Deegan, 69 Wis. 300; 34 N. W. 83. See Topping v. St. Lawrence, 86 Wis. 526; 57 N. W. 365. As to beneficiaries in Michigan and New Jersey, see sees. 642-644, herein. As to statutes that widow's second husband cannot con- tinue her action as administrator of her estate and that of her former husband, see Schmidt v. Menasha Wooden Ware Co., 99 Wis. 300; 74 N. W. 797. 13 Nickerson v. Bigelow (U. S. D. C. E. D. Wis. ), 62 Fed. 900. 14 Rudiger v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co., 101 Wis. 292; 77 N. W. WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIAR! INJURY. I of the widow's support and protection does not constitute the limitation of her damages, but the share in her husband's in- creased property had he lived, and which she had a reasonable expectation of receiving may be included. 13 § 664. "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Death of wife In Michigan tin value of the wife's services to the husband must be proven in an action for her killing, 16 and where defendant's malpractice results in her death, this does not prevent an action for the loss to tin- hus- band of her services between the injury and death, although the damages are limited to such period of time. 17 In New Jersey the husband's damages are limited to such as can be compen- sated for in money, or by a pecuniary standard. 1 " And the wife's services in and about the ordinary household duties, or rendered him by way of assistance and aid in his occupation, belong ex- clusively to him. The continuance of stub services during bis life does not afford a basis of recovery to her next of kin, for they do not constitute a pecuniary benefit to them within the statute. Nor can the question whether her services after her husband's death constitute such a benefit to said next of kin be considered because it is too remote. 19 Nor does the statutory remedy extend to injuries suffered by the husband for the im- mediate killing of his wife.'* Nor is he entitled to any damages for his mental distress or anguish. 21 Fn considering the husband's damages for the death of bis wife, the statutory provisions of these three states should not be overlooked,-' especially so, since 1G9; 12 Am. A Eng. R. Cas. N". S. 196. « Bauer v. Richter, 103 Wis. 412; 7'.t N. W. -tot. See further as to widow's damages, Caspari v. Marsh, 74 Wis. 568; 43 N. W. 368; Lawson v. Chicago, St. P. & M. O. R. Co., 04 Wis. 44S: 24 N. W. 618; Castello v. Landwehr, 28 Wis. 522; Totter v. Chicago A- X. W. R. Co., lit Wis. 872. '" Nelson v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 104 Mich. 582; 62 X. W. 993; 2 Det. L. N. 33. 1 7 Hyatt v. Adams, 10 Mich. 180. inTelfer v. Northern R. Co., 30 V J. L. 188. See sees. 645, 646, herein. '•'May v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 02 N. .1. L. 0:!; 42 All. L63. -(.rosso v. Delaware, I. & W R, Co., 50 X. .7. L. :il7: l:i Ad. 238; 11 Cent. 674, under Art. V .1. March ■'». L848I Rev. 294). - 1 See si 0. 651 , herein, as to condi- tion of surviving wife, consequent on child's death and husband's loss. See sec. « *« T : » . herein. -'-'See sees. 642-644, herein. 843 8 665 DEATH— FATE AND JUST DAMAGES in Wisconsin, he is expressly named as entitled to recover in the first instance, and in this state the deceased's mental qualities, earning capacity, social standing, ability, services and general superiority as a wife and mother, may be considered. 23 § 665. " F&ir and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Death of parent.— In case of the negligent or wrongful killing of a parent, the fair and just damages under the above statutory provision cannot include elements of which there is no evidence showing special pecuniary loss nor damages based upon mere inference of such loss, nor for injuries based upon duties which a parent is supposed to render his children and which are in their very nature incapable of measurement by any pecuniary standard. 24 Inasmuch, however, as minor chil- dren are entitled to support, the damages should be an annuity which would furnish the same.' 25 In New Jersey in an action for the benefit of two sons who were the next of kin of the de- ceased wife and mother, the facts were considered that one was a minor, seventeen years of age and the other married, that the damages to them were merely nominal, and although she had rendered services of benefit to her husband, yet the question whether such services could benefit said next of kin, after her husband's death, will be too remote to be considered. But it may be shown that her advice and counsel would relate to the pecuniary affairs of the next of kin and would probably result in a pecuniary benefit to them, the deprivation of which would constitute a pecuniary loss. 26 The above case is important in that it involves not only the question of advice and counsel of a parent, but also the factors were in evidence, that deceased was a wife and mother and had assisted her husband in the house- hold and in his occupation, and the children were an adult and a 23 Whiton v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 2 Biss. (U. S. C. C. Wis.) 282; 13 Wall. (U. S.)270. 2* Walker v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., Ill Mich. 518; 69 N. W. 1114; 3Det. L. N. 775; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 267, rev'g new trial granted iu 104 Mich. 606; 62 N. W. 1032; 2 Det. L. N. 34, per Montgomery, J. 844 25 Brockway v. Patterson, 72 Mich. 122. See Nickerson v. Bigelow (U. S. D. C. E. D. Wis. ), 62 Fed. 900. 20 May v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 62 N. J. L. 63; 42 Atl. 163. $5,000 was held excessive in this case. See also Demarest v. Little, 47 N. J. L. (18 Vr.)28. WITH REFERENCE T» > PECUNIARY IN. II KV minor, so that the age and situation of the parties were evidently relevant. The case is also noteworthy by reason of the decisions noted elsewhere herein, as to nurture, training and education being a pecuniary loss.-' I i u t in view of the decisions in thai state which so strictly construe the meaning of pecuniary I it is evident that the mlc of compensation will noi be extended in this class of cases and that the reasonable expectation of pe- cuniary benefit will be limited thereby. 23 In Wisconsin, as we have stated elsewhere, the right of the children to recover must depend upon the existence of a surviving parent, since the par- ties entitled in the first instance are the surviving husband or wife and in the absence of such survivor then the children may recover through the personal representative.'' And the children must be minors since the pecuniary loss must be sustained by them, the infant children being the only proper beneficiaries, 81 although it seems to be also true that children who are all of the age may recover damages upon the basis of a reasonable ex- pectation of pecuniary benefit from a mother's increased property or of such expectation by way of support or otherwise. 38 The effect, therefore, of this last mentioned decision is that the dam ages are not confined to the surviving children's minority. But it may, however, be reasonably argued that the later decision in point of time overrules such a qualification and does limit the recovery to minors, that is, if the decisions are not in har- mony. But, however this may be, the children's right of recov- ery for the parent's death must rest largely upon the surviving parent's right of recovery and the measure of compensation to such parent. 83 In the case of a mother's death, the children's health constitutes an important element of damages.' 1 There are 27 See sec. 600, herein. 28 See sees. 645, 646, 667-672, here- in. 29 Sec I Vina rest v. Little, 47 X. J. L. ( 18 Vr. ) 28. Sec sees. 655, 659, herein. »See Bubbard v. Chicago* X. W. R. Co. (Wis.), 80 X. W. 454. See cases in next note. 81 Topping v. St. Lawrence, 86 Wis. 52G; 57 X. W. 865, a case of death caused by want of repair of a high- way. Lierman v. Chicago, If. & St. P. K. Co. (Wis.). 52 X. W. 01: Ab- bott v. McCadden, 81 Wis. 563; 51 X. W. 1079; Cures v. Graff, 77 Wis. 174; 46 X. W. 48; Schmidt v. Deegan, 69 Wis. 300; 34 N. W. 83. S< 663, herein. 82 Tuteur v. Chicago A S. W. H. c... 77 Wis. 505; W V W -'.'7. 88 See Bees. 663, 68 1. herein. BfcKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; 31 N. W. 298. See also get herein. 845 §§666,667 FATE AND JUST DAMAGES other factors such as age, etc., of deceased, legal and moral obli- gation and dependency, income of property or probable accumu- lations, etc., which have been fully considered under appropriate headings herein, to which the reader is referred. §666. "Fair and just " damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury "—Training, etc., of children.— The jury may not, in Michigan, in an action for a parent's death, con- sider the nurture, instruction, physical, moral and intellectual training which children would have received from their father had he lived during their minority, and an instruction to this effect will be erroneous. But notwithstanding this express rul- ing the court which asserted the rule declared, evidently by way of qualification, that there was no evidence on this matter ; that it was not claimed that deceased was in any sense a tutor to his children. " The most that can be inferred is that he rendered to them occasional assistance such as a parent is supposed to render his children, but which in its very nature is as incapable of measurement by a pecuniary standard as is the loss of love, affection and sympathy." s5 In Wisconsin, however, the fact that young children were dependent upon the deceased widow for support, nurture and education, is an averment showing pecu- niary loss to such children. 36 § 667. " Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury "—Death of children.— In case of the negli- gent or wrongful killing of a minor child under the above statu- tory provision, there are two principal factors : first the right of the" father to the services and earnings of such child, and the right of support to which the latter is entitled. 37 After a child, as Walker v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., Ill Mich. 518; 69 N. W. 1114; 3 Det. L. N. 775; 1 Am. Neg. Rep. 267, per Montgomery, J., rev'g judgment on new trial granted in 104 Mich. 666; 2 Det. L. N. 34; 62 N. W. 1032, and citing on last point Railroad Co. v. Austin, 69 111. 426; State v. Bait. & O. R. Co., 24 Md. 106. 36 McKeigue v. Janesville, 68 Wis. 50; 31 N. W. 298. See Castello v. 846 Landwehr, 28 Wis. 522. And see also sees. 665, 666, herein, as to death of parent, including advice and coun- sel of parent as an element of dam- ages. 3 7 Prima facie a father is entitled to a minor child's earnings. Reeder v. Moore, 95 Mich. 594; 55 N. W. 436. When mother is obligated to support infant, see Ailing v. Ailing (N. J. Ch.), 27 Atl. 685. As to cus- WITH REFEREN< I. TO PECUNIAR? LNJ1 BY. however, lias reached majority, other and different elements af fecting the measure of recovery enter into the question of the rel- ative rights and obligations of parenl and child, as will hereinafter appear. In New Jersey the father cannot maintain the action,* but only the deceased son's personal representative." Irrespec- tive, however, of the question whether or nol the action must be brought by the personal representative, the measure of damages rests upon the right to the infant's earnings and services during minority, and the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit therefrom, having in view the right of the minor to support, edu- cation and maintenance until majority. The father's liability therefor, and the probable value of such support should be esti- mated and deducted."' §668. Same subject continued.— In New Jersey, the father being entitled to his children's services until they become twenty- one years old, he can recover only what those services might rea- sonably have been expected to be worth, subject to the burdens tody and control of child, see Griffin v. Gascoigne (X. J. Ch. 1900), 47 Atl. 25; Lemmin v. Lorfeld, 107 Wis. 264; 83 N. W. 350; Wiltse v. Tilden, 77 Wis. 152 ; 46 N. W. 234. As to eman- cipation, evidence thereof and earn- ings, see Monaghan v. School Dist. No. 1, 38 Wis. 100; Wambold v. Vick, 50 Wis. 456. «8 Under 1 X. J. Gen. Stat. p. 1188. 89 Fitzhenry v. Consolidated Tract. Co. (X. J.), 42 Atl. 416. It was also held in this case that when father as such had brought the action instead of the personal representative, the summons and declaration could not be amended after demurrer filed, by substituting the personal rep- resentative as plaintiff. That amend- ment of cause of action for loss of services of child cannot be made by inserting claim for injuries, etc., before death, see Hurst v. Detroil City R. Co., 84 Mich. 539; 48 V W. 44. That mother may be appointed administratrix where she is jointly interested with father, see Rajnow- ski v. Detroit, B. C. & A. K. Co., 74 Mich. 15; 41 N. W. 847. In case of divorce a mother to whom t lie decree has given custody of her children may show that fact. Wiltse v. Tilden, 77 Wis. 152; 46 N. W. 234 40 Rajnowski v. Detroit, B. C. & A. R. Co., 74 Mich. 15; 41 X. W. 847; Graham v. Consolidated Tract. Co. (N. J.), 44 Atl. 964. See also Schrier v. Milwaukee, L. S. & W. R Co., 65 Wis. 457 j 27 X. W. 157; Soppe v. Chicago, M. & St. r. R. Co., 61 Wis. S59; 21 X W. 227; Ewen v. Chicago & N". W. R Co., 38 Wis. 613. These last three cases are cited to the point that the measure of damages for the death of an in- fant is the difference between snob infant's probable gross income based | a minor is confined to the child's minority, or includes under tin- statute a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefil from the continuance of the child's life beyond that time, has been a sub- ject of considerable discussion. Necessarily, when a child be- comes of age certain relative legal rights and obligations spring- ing from the relation of an infant and the parent cease, and in so far as the damages depend exclusively upon such rights and obligations, the determination thereof would preclude the re- covery of damages dependent solely upon such a source. But to hold that the measure of recovery is restricted to such sources is in effect to assert as the law that a child's minority is the limit of his life expectancy, beyond which period the parent could not reasonably hope to derive any benefit. To thus arbitrarily fix the expectation of life is certainly not permitting a parent to recover the pecuniary loss according to the reasonable expecta- tion of pecuniary benefit from a continuance of the child's life. It is a matter of general knowledge that as a rule in a majority of cases a greater pecuniary benefit may he derived by a parent from a child after it passes its minority than has resulted dur- ing that period. This is also apparent from the large number of decisions where the facts in evidence in an action for the death of adult children show the great dependency of parents upon them for support or contributions thereto or for aid and assistance of some kind. But however favorable the argument R. Cas.307; Van Brunt v. Cincinnati, J. & M. R. Co., 78 Mich. 530; t 1 V W. 321; Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N.J. L. 151; luues v. Milwaukee. 103 Wis. 582; 7'.' V W. 783; Wiltee v. Tilden, 77 Wis. 152; 16 N. W\ 234 * limes v. .Milwaukee, 103 V\ 78 N. \V. 7S3. 85 I § 672 DEATH — FAIR AND JUST DAMAGES may be in support of a rule which will not limit the recovery for the death of a minor to its minority, it will probably not change the decision of any court which has adhered to the op- posite rule, especially in view of the doctrine of stare decisis, and although there may be a modification or extension of a rule of law in some cases, nevertheless the rule remains, and the modification or extension thereof is the exception. We be- lieve, however, that the weight of authority should be that the pecuniary loss is not measured by the child's minority but that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit to the parent by a continuance of a minor's life after majority may constitute a basis of recovery. 55 § 672. "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury" — Death of children — Minority and ma- jority. — In Michigan it seems that the courts have kept in view the relative legal rights and obligations springing from the relations of parent and minor, and have upon this basis, or the loss of services, confined the pecuniary loss of a parent for such child's death to the period of its minority. 56 In New Jer- 55 "The rule for measuring dam- ages in actions like that now under consideration is not open to doubt in this court. The statute which per- mits such action has been uniformly construed to limit the damages to compensation for the deprivation of pecuniary advantage from the con- tinuance of the life of the deceased person. . . . The damages properly to be awarded in the case were such as would compensate the father for the reasonable expectation of pecun- iary benefit from the deceased dur- ing his period of minority when he owed service to his father and thereafter when he would be- come emancipated by being of full age. ... It is not impossible to determine that $5,000 far exceeds any reasonable probability of pecun- iary benefit from the continued life of deceased. Looking at the liability 852 of the father for the support, main- tenance and education of the child during minority, and considering what pecuniary benefit the father would receive from the son's earn- ings during or after minority in its most favorable aspect, it is plain that the award far exceeds any possible amount of such pecuniary benefit." Graham v. Consolidated Tract. Co., 64 N. J. L. 10; 44 Atl. 964, per Magie, Ch. J. But examine Decker v. McSorley, 111 Wis. 91; 86 N. W. 551; Luessen v. Oshkosh Elec. L. & P. Co., 109 Wis. 94; 85 N. W. 124. « Hurst v. Detroit City K. Co., 84 Mich. 539; 48 N. W. 44; Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 66 Mich. 261; 33 N. W. 306. In this case the deceased was a daughter, healthy, 11 years old, born of poor parents, liv- ing with and being cared for by her grandmother. WITH REFERENCE TO PECUNIARY IVHl:Y ■' l 72 sey, however, the jury may consider the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit to the father from such contributions after minority as the son might reasonably be expected bo make, either voluntarily or by compulsion, in case the father should become necessitous. 57 In another case in that state, however, where the action was for the killing of a boy of about fifteen years of age, and in which the damages were reduced one half, the court said that "the cause was tried upon the basis that the father was entitled to the earning capacity of the deceased until he should arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and not beyond that time," and the instructions of the court below were to that effect. The court further declared that there was a misapprehension, per- haps, of the instructions, and in discussing the facts evidencing the pecuniary loss, the court confined itself to those relating to deceased's minority and the loss of earnings or services during that period, and based its ruling that there was an excessive verdict upon the principle that the pecuniary benefit which would accrue to the father by a continuance of life of the son during his minority could' not reach .the sum awarded by the verdict. 58 This decision was based upon an early case"' 1 in the same court, which expressly limited the damages to the pecun- iary loss only, and affirmed said ruling with others of the same tenor. In the early case the court also expressly declared that nothing more than what the services of a deceased child were reasonably expected to be worth until minority, less support, etc., could be recovered. 60 So that it may be reasonably inferred from all of the above that the principle as to minority was af- firmed by the subsequent decision. In Wisconsin the jury may consider evidence showing that a mother might have become dependent upon her son after majority, and also her reasona- ble expectation of pecuniary benefit from the continuance of 67 North Jersey St. R. Co. v. Mor- hart, G4 N. J. L. 236; 46 Atl. 812. Deceased son was over 18 years old in this case Graham v. Consoli- dated Tract. Co. (N. J.), II Atl. 904. Deceased hoy was 4 years old, and the probabilities as to benefit from son's earnings, before or after majority, considered. May v. West Jersej A 8 R. Co., 62 \. .1. I.. 87; 12 Atl. 165; L3 Am. & Eng. K. (as. N. S. 517; 5 Am Rep. 417. »Telfer v. Northern R. I J. L. 188. ' i 1.1., per Van Dyke. .1. §§ 073, 674 FATE AND ,1UST DAMAGES the son's life even after he has reached majority. 61 But this rule as to reasonable expectation was limited in an earlier deci- sion to those cases where the parent's indigent condition was shown, otherwise the damages were restricted to services dur- ing minority.® § 673, "Fair and just" damages "with reference to the pecuniary injury "—Mother's sickness from child's death. — The fact that the shock occasioned by a child's killing caused the mother's sickness and thus deprived her husband of her services and society and increased his expenses, is not such a pecuniary injury within the death loss statute as to give a right of action for the child's negligent or wrongful killing. 63 § 674. " Fair and just" damages " with reference to the pecuniary injury " — Collateral kindred. — Evidently in Michi- gan the right of collateral kindred and the measure of damages to them rests upon dependency for support or the aid and as- sistance given by deceased by way of such support or other- wise, 61 and this would include the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit to those entitled to recover. 63 But the differ- 61 Thompson v. Johnston Bros. Co., 86 Wis. 570; 57 N. W. 298. The court refused to hold excessive a verdict in this case of $1,700, the de- ceased son being 16 years old. See also Johnson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 64 Wis. 425; 25 N. W. 223; Ewen v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 38 Wis. G13. See as to excessive damages, where deceased were children, cases cited under sec. 648 herein, as to factors generally to be considered. °- Potter v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 21 Wis. 372. See Seaman v. Farmers L. & T. Co., 15 Wis. 578. 63 Myers v. Holbern, 58 N. J. L. (29 Vr.) 193; 33 Atl. 389; 30 L. R. A. 345, under N. J. Rev. Stat. p. 294. See May v. West Jersey & S. R, Co., 62 N. J. L. 63; 42 Atl. 163, as to con- dition of surviving son consequent upon death of wife and mother, by 854 reason of loss of her services as wife. G4 Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 87 Mich. 374; 49 N. W. 361; 10 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 344; 49 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 367; Van Brunt v. Cin- cinnati, J. & M. R. Co., 78 Mich. 530; 44 N. W. 321. But in the following case a father and brother were the next of kin and a recovery was had. $3,400 was, however, held excessive, although the court declared that the damages rested upon the actual con- tributions of deceased. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich. 205. See sees. 645, 646, 653, herein, as to pecuniary loss, and as depend- ency. 65 See cases in last preceding note, and sec. 654, herein; Paulmier v. Erie R. Co., 34 N. J. L. (5 Vr.) 151, 156. Willi RKFERENCE TO l'l.< l SIABY IN.II'KV. ence in the statutes of Michigan, New Jersey and Wisconsin, as to the persons entitled to the right of action, or 1 1 1» - damages when recovered, should not be overlooked In determining the rights of collateral kindred, and this is non< the Less true be- cause of the same statutory provision as to the measure of damages. 66 And in Wisconsin the statute excludes brothers and sisters, and they cannoi recover damages for their pecuniary Loss sustained li\ the death, for the action is for the benefit of the hnshand or widow, if surviving, then to the lineal descendants, or in default thereof to tin- lineal ancestoi G0 See sofs.. 642 644 herein. See also remarks of Morse, J., in Rich- mond v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co., 87 Mich. 374; 49 N. W. 361; 10 Ry. & Corp. L. J. 344; 49 Am. & Eng. R. (as. 367. 67 Brown v. Chicago it X. W. R. Co., 102 Wis. 137; 77 V W. 748; U L. R A. 570; 18 Am. & Eng. R Cms. V S. 603; 5 Am. \> •■_ Rep. 21 hearing denied 44 L. R. A. 585; 7^ \. W. 771: 13 Am. a Eng. B N. S. 603. See sees. 642 644, herein, as to statutes. Sou LAW UBRARY 000 742 935 * ~ ~ ;fl#* - 1 - J * T ti