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SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES 
 
 ADM1NISTKATION OF A FEEE GOVERNMENT: 
 
 DISCOUKSE, 
 
 PRONOUNCED BEFORE THE 
 
 RHODE ISLAND ALPHA 
 
 PHI BETA KAPPA SOCIETY, 
 
 JULY 8, 1851. 
 
 BY WILLIAM GREENE 
 
 PUBLISHED BY REQUEST. 
 
 P ROVIJ) EN C E.- 
 JO UN F. MOCTRE, PRINTER. 
 1851. 
 
 , 
 
FRED LOCKLEY 
 
 RARE WESTERN BOOKS 
 
 4227 S. E. Stark St. 
 PORTLAND, ORE 
 
 cjs? 
 
DISCOURSE. 
 
 THE problem of a wise constitution, is of much 
 easier solution, than that of a wise administration of 
 government. A constitution of government, is but a 
 generalization of principles, deduced by philosophy from 
 an experience actually realized. An administration 
 of government, on the other hand, is an application of 
 principles to a new experience constantly arising. 
 The one may be said to have an ascertained certainty 
 inHhe test of the past. The other must remain un- 
 certain until determined by the test of the future m 
 The difference is, between that which is suggested by 
 events, and is a deduction from them, and that which 
 anticipates events, and is to be judged % them. Hence 
 the one is comparatively permanent standing on 
 great principles, which rarely change ; while the other 
 is fluctuating perpetually subject to outward influen- 
 ces, which are never settled. The grand inference and 
 lesson from all this, is, that the difficulties in govern- 
 ment are not, or at least, not so much, in its organic 
 structure, as in the practical carrying out of the prin- 
 ciples prescribed by that structure, in the administra- 
 tion of affairs. 
 
 M35386 
 
Whatever may be the form of a government, its ad- 
 ministration nms-t be reflected mainly from the char- 
 acter 'A the- people who are the subjects of it. Hence 
 it is quite as important that the public mind should 
 be rightly informed upon great general principles, as that 
 there should be the right sort of rulers to apply them. 
 In popular systems, especially such as our own, for in- 
 stance there are problems of a disturbing influence 
 constantly arising from the very freedom upon which 
 such systems are founded ; and the free discussion of 
 which in a popular form, is indispensable to their prop- 
 er appreciation by the masses. Such discussion is par- 
 ticularly well for a people, who, in high success, are so 
 engaged in the concrete, as to overlook, ordinarily the 
 abstract of things ; and who by not habitually consulting 
 principles must be liable to all the evils of a want of 
 them. Such discussion is farther recommended by the 
 fact, that a sound administration of a government, can 
 never be assured by mere events. The right and the 
 wrong of politics strike deeper than the surface of 
 affairs; and though great prosperity may stand up, from 
 day to day, in commendation of a system of adminis- 
 trative policy, there may be hostile influences working 
 underneath, which may upheave all that is worth hav- 
 ing, in the foundation on which all rests. 
 
 On the present occasion, I propose to discuss some 
 of the problems referred to, as suggested by the expe- 
 rience of our own political history, and as particularly 
 tipplicable to our own political and social condition. 
 The topics, to which, under this general announcement. 
 I would invite particular attention, I shall class under 
 
three heads : First, inequalities of individual power, 
 which exist among a people, notwithstanding their 
 equality of political rights : Second, the fundamen- 
 tal relations of sovereignty, on the one hand, and of 
 representative responsibility on the other, which exist, 
 reciprocally, between the people and their appointed 
 ministers of power ; and, Third, some particulars con- 
 nected with the action of political parties. These 
 topics present difficulties which would seem inherent, 
 and therefore unavoidable, in every free system of 
 government ; and hence I shall discuss them, not for 
 the purpose of suggesting or discovering radical correc- 
 tives of them, but for the more practical purpose 
 of modifying their tendencies by an attempt at least 
 to understand them : for by comprehending an evil, 
 though we may not entirely remove or overcome it, 
 we may diminish its power for mischief, by enabling 
 ourselves, to some extent, to be on our guard against 
 its influences. 
 
 1. First then of inequalities of individual power ; and 
 these appear, mainly, in three forms ; talent, education, 
 and wealth. All these forms of inequality of individual 
 power, are, in greater or less degrees, and in certain 
 bearings, the occasions of jealousy affecting the well- 
 being of the state. But between the first two and 
 the last, there is this radical distinction : The jealous- 
 ies awakened by superior talent and education, are 
 mainly between individuals of similar ambition and 
 having similar pursuits and aims. The jealousies ex- 
 cited by superior wealth, on the other hand, go beyond 
 individuals and extend to classes. The effects of the 
 
6 
 
 first upon the State, are comparatively remote and in- 
 cidental, as they merely affect the character or career 
 of rivals for political power or place. The effects of 
 the last are direct and instant upon the State, as they 
 are connected with discriminations directly predicated 
 of the pursuits and interests of the whole people of 
 it. The jealousies, again, between rival individuals, 
 are comparatively temporary ; for they must cease with 
 the lives of the parties to them. Those between clas- 
 ses may have any length of permanency; for indivi- 
 dual life gives no necessary measure of their duration. 
 Of talent and education it maybe further said, that 
 they are regarded with respect rather than jealousy by 
 the masses, as giving distinction to the national charac- 
 ter, in which every man, however humble, feels instinct- 
 ively that he is a sharer; and however deficient of eith- 
 er he may be himself, he claims a portion of the power 
 and glory, associated with the possession of them by 
 others. Besides; talent and education are intangible, 
 metaphysical possessions, if you please and beyond 
 any man's conscious power of grasping at his pleasure ; 
 and no man ever dreams of conflict for a thing which 
 he knows to be beyond his reach. Not so of wealth ; 
 for that is a physical affair a thing which admits of 
 divisibility and distribution; and when large estates 
 are accumulated in few hands, the fact that, by physical 
 possibility, such an advantage is within every ones 
 reach, awakens a feeling that there is something 
 wrong in the system of things which admits of such 
 superiority in some over others ; and a fancied unfair- 
 ness, suggests, at once, the correction of such inequality 
 
as an evil. It is to the last of these forms of inequal- 
 ity of individual power, because of its more prominent 
 connection with the well being of the state, that I 
 would invite particular attention. 
 
 On this point, then, I would say, that the feeling of 
 hostility, too often indulged by the poorer against the 
 richer classes, as such, is at once, unphilosophical and 
 unjust. It is unphilosophical, because it attacks a con- 
 dition which is inevitable. It is unjust, because that 
 condition being inevitable, the class attacked, exists in 
 conformity with a state of things, ordained by a power 
 higher than their own, and which for that reason, if 
 there be a wrong, can involve no fault of theirs. This 
 would seem to be one of those propositions which are 
 so evident as to preclude all reasoning ; and yet, there 
 are those, and of a high class too, who maintain the 
 opposite opinion, seemingly as demonstrable truth ; 
 and who insist, that inequality of wealth is a wrong, 
 full of oppression and injustice, and calling for correc- 
 tion as an affair of state. Such persons, it appears to 
 me, commit the too common error of making a par- 
 ticular fact the expression of a general truth. That 
 misery is often associated with poverty, no body will 
 deny. This is a particular fact. But that happiness 
 or misery may depend upon conditions, altogether in- 
 dependent of wealth or poverty, every body must ad- 
 mit; and this is a general truth. Now the error re- 
 ferred to, arises from wrongly ascribing the miseries 
 often attending poverty, as necessary to the condition 
 of poverty itself, rather than to a wrong state of mind 
 too often found -in association with it. The first, pov- 
 
erty, may be unavoidable. But the last, the state of 
 mind, must be considered as within every individual's 
 own proper control. The first, because unavoidable 
 in a given case, may be without fault. The last, be- 
 cause within a control which is not exercised, is at- 
 tended by a misery which is the appointed punishment 
 of a moral wrong. The true proposition then, would 
 seem to be, not that misery is a necessary concomitant 
 of poverty, but that some poor men are miserable ; 
 and being poor, are apt to ascribe only to their pover- 
 ty, the misery which may mainly be traced to some- 
 thing foreign to and independent of it. 
 
 The whole philosophy of this matter I apprehend 
 to lie in this: The principle of inequality pervades all 
 nature, inanimate as well as animate. We have it in 
 the varieties of hill and plain which characterize the 
 surface of the earth; in the differences of soil, whether 
 barren or fertile ; in the trees of the forest ; in the plants 
 of the garden ; in the fruits of the fields, and in the cat- 
 tie that range upon the hills. Inequalities in all these 
 meet us at every turn ; and are evidently as necessary 
 in the constitution of things, as the distinctive charac- 
 ter which belongs to every individual existence of them. 
 So with inequalities of human condition, and the 
 power that is incident to it. They are as certain and 
 as necessary as that humanity is not a unit. As far as 
 creative power has given a distinctive conciousness to 
 every individual life, it has given a capacity of distinct 
 individual action and of distinct individual result. And 
 the varieties of this result must be coextensive with 
 the number of the human family, who are the subjects 
 

 
 of them. These varieties, in their character and extent, 
 must depend upon each individual's degree of power, 
 and the manner of using it; and this, whether this 
 degree of power be originally given, or acquired by cul- 
 ture : whether it be the endowment of birth, or the ac- 
 quisition of individual merit. 
 
 From all this, it would seem but mere justice, that 
 what is mine cannot be anothers without my volition, 
 because my capacity, and not anothers, has produced 
 it. But it is not merely just. It is in the order of 
 Providence that it shall be so. This order of Provi- 
 dence involves a higher notion than mere justice. It 
 refers the principle of right to the power that ordain- 
 ed it, and not to the individual who is the accidental 
 instrument of giving it effect. The want of certain 
 things, which, in a particular application, is called pov- 
 erty, is, so far as we know, as clearly ordained in the 
 relations of human affairs, as is the possession of certain 
 things, which, in a particular application, is called 
 wealth. This is evident from the simple fact, that pov- 
 erty, as well as wealth, exists ; and nothing can be as- 
 sumed touching the Providential design of either, 
 which would not apply equally to both; for our know- 
 ledge, in kind and degree, is exactly the same in the one 
 as in the other. Now the man of wealth is the minis- 
 ter of God for the particular end which is his destiny. 
 So is the poorer man equally a minister in another 
 form of action. The question which is the more bless- 
 ed in his particular allotment, whether to wealth or 
 poverty, is altogether independent of the mode of 
 ministry; and depends upon the faithfulness with which 
 
10 
 
 the duties belonging to the one or the other may be 
 fulfilled. Hence the happiness which a rational being 
 should be desirous of, refers, not to the external condi- 
 tion, but to the inward sentiment which should deter- 
 mine and control it; and this is as independent of wealth 
 as it is of station, or any other relation which is purely 
 external to the man. 
 
 But again: the inequalities or diversities of hu- 
 man power, in whatever form, in themselves and their 
 results, are obviously, as wise for human good, as we 
 have seen them to be necessary in the essential con- 
 stitution of things. The great aggregate of human 
 life, as expressed in community associations, is made up 
 of an infinite variety of adaptations and pursuits ; every 
 one of which is necessary to a perfect whole, and no one 
 of which could be omitted without injury to each indi- 
 vidual of which a community may be composed. We 
 must have our farmers and our merchants; our men 
 to till the soil as well as our men to distribute the pro- 
 ducts of it ; our landsmen and our seamen ; our cap- 
 tains to command our ships as well as our men before 
 the mast to work them ; and so through all the grada- 
 tions of human life from the highest to the lowest forms 
 of human power. All these diversities in the applica- 
 tion of this power to things necessary to be done, in or- 
 der to a general prosperity of the whole human family, 
 are equally illustrations of the divine wisdom in the 
 ordering of human life ; and equally the occasions of 
 honorable distinction, as the individual duties involved 
 in them may be rightly and honorably performed. The 
 result of this reasoning is, that if it were practicable to 
 
11 
 
 overcome the inequalities or diversities of human pow- 
 er, it would not be desirable. 
 
 There are two practical views of this matter which I 
 would present before I dismiss it. The first is, that the 
 principle of dependence, as between the rich and the 
 poor, is just as predicable of the one class as of the 
 other. If the wealth of the rich, by its rewards to 
 labor, be necessary to the support of the poor, the la- 
 bor of the poor is just as necessary to the existence 
 and well being of the rich. The idea of compensation 
 is mutual ; and the rendering of it by the one and the 
 other, differs not in the principle but only in the form. 
 Any distinction touching the abstract respectability of 
 the form, is purely factitious. Or, if there be any real 
 moral difference between the two classes in this res- 
 pect, the advantage would seem to be on the side of the 
 poor for it is certain that labor is always entitled to 
 its reward ; whereas it is not certain that wealth is al- 
 ways entitled to the benefits, bestowed by the labor 
 which sustains it. This is a point altogether independ- 
 ent of individual happiness, and must depend upon the 
 manner in which wealth is used ; and this presents an 
 issue with which no one but the individual immediately 
 interested, has any thing to do ; an issue to be de- 
 cided by a tribunal, to which all alike must render an 
 account, altogether independent of human conventions 
 and opinions. 
 
 The second practical view I would present, addresses 
 itself to a selfish feeling, but is, still, cognizable by en- 
 lightened judgment ; and is this : that the hostility 
 which the poor man may feel or manifest towards the 
 
12 
 
 rich one, might, in time, react upon himself- for the 
 poor man of to-day may be the rich man of to-morrow ; 
 and it may be well for him to take heed, lest in the 
 complaints he makes of a present disparity between his 
 condition and that of his richer neighbor, he be forg- 
 ing a weapon for future use against himself. There 
 are those who started with him, but whom he has out- 
 stripped in the race of fortune ; and these will not be 
 likely to forget his former companionship with them- 
 selves. And the argumentum ad hominem attack upon his 
 new position, would not be quite agreeable, when the 
 effect of it would be, to show him, on his own principles, 
 to stand in that new position, in a false and unjustifiable 
 relation to those around him. To be sure, the in- 
 stances may be comparatively few, in which such a 
 state of things would occur. But the right to enjoy 
 it the only true right of equality by the way pre- 
 sumes that every man may reach it ; and this is all 
 that is necessary to the argument. H e who does not, 
 in point of fact, reach it, wants either the worth or the 
 power to reach it ; and, has no right to complain ; for, 
 as already seen, every man is individual ; and, ab- 
 stractly speaking, must trust his success in life to his 
 own powers and not to anothers, except so far as such 
 other may choose to give him aid. The conclusion of 
 the whole matter would seem to be, that the rich man 
 is rich, because, in an unavoidable course of things, 
 circumstances have made him so ; and the poor man is* 
 poor, for the same reason ; and that as neither the one 
 nor the other can control the principle, by which these 
 circumstances have produced certain results rather 
 
13 
 
 than others, in disparities of individual fortune, each i 
 should fulfil the duties of his particular allotment, with- ) 
 out jealousy, opposition, or interference as respects the 
 other. 
 
 II. From the fundamental relations of sovereignty 
 on the one hand, and representative responsibility on 
 the other, existing, reciprocally, between the people and 
 their appointed ministers of power, (which was the second 
 topic I proposed to discuss,) two difficulties arise. The 
 first refers to the tendency of power in rulers to undue 
 enlargement; and suggests the problem of the true limit 
 of power. The second refers to the tendency of con- 
 scious sovereignty in the people to an undue control of 
 their chosen Representatives ; and this suggests the 
 problem of Representative instruction. On both these 
 problems, there has long prevailed a diversity of opi- 
 nion ; and, on several occasions in our own history, 
 with bearings eminently important to the practical 
 operations of our own government. 
 
 1. As to the first of these problems, I shall discuss it 
 with the view, if possible, of discovering some definite 
 ruling principle that shall solve it. And this, I apprehend, 
 may be found in the proper definitions of sovereignty 
 and power, as contradistinguished from each other. 
 These terms are most often used as meaning the same 
 thing as conveying the same idea. Whereas, in the 
 strict political application of them, they are as different 
 from each other as the fountain and the stream which 
 flows from it or as cause and effect. This, I appre- 
 hend, will appear from investigation. 
 
 Sovereignty, then, is an absolute idea, existing in the 
 
14 
 
 nature of things. It is a pure abstraction and cannot 
 be annihilated without annihilating the body in which 
 it exists. It is predicable of a single individual, or 
 of a community of individuals. As, for instance, if 
 there were but one man on the face of the earth, it 
 would be predicable of him. If there be a communi- 
 ty of a thousand individuals it is predicable of such 
 community ; and for the same reason ; for in a com- 
 munity, each individual is, politically, an expression of 
 the whole body ; and the whole body an expression of 
 each individual. This sovereignty is a unit, and there- 
 fore indivisible. This would certainly be true of a 
 single man ; and for the reason just given, must be 
 equally true of a community. It is also inalienable ; 
 for in the case of a single man, it is a portion of his 
 very being; and he could no more part with it, than he 
 could part with his power of breathing, and yet live. 
 So also of a community : it is the essential principle 
 of its compact ; and it could no more part with it than 
 it could part with its power of cohesion, and yet re- 
 main a compact body. 
 
 Now, if sovereignty be indivisible, because a unit, 
 and inalienable, because adhering, intrinsically, to the 
 body in which it exists, can it be delegated ? If it can 
 be delegated, it must be to something without the 
 body in which it exists, which is inconsistent with the 
 idea that it can exist only within that body. But if it 
 cannot be delegated, how shall it be exercised ? clearly 
 by emanations from itself, rather than ly itself. And 
 here arises the idea of power as contradistinguished 
 from sovereignty. The sovereignty must create a 
 
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15 
 
 magistracy with special orders and powers to do the 
 work of government. These powers to a magistracy, 
 may be of a greater or less extent; may comprehend 
 all that could be conceived as applicable to the details 
 of government, or only a part, as experience may 
 suggest the utility of certain limitations in their 
 grants. If only a part of these powers be given, then 
 the capacity of further emanation which the sover- 
 eignty retains, remains, so far, in the body in which it 
 exists, in a state of dormancy or inaction ; to be given 
 out or not, in future emanations, as occasion may re- 
 quire. 
 
 If these principles be true, a distinction clearly exists 
 between the sovereignty from which power emanates, 
 and the power itself which emanates from it. The for- 
 mer exists in the community ; the latter in the magis- 
 tracy created by it. Hence, they are not convertible 
 terms ; and though sovereignty, as the superior, im- 
 plies power, power, as the inferior, does not imply 
 sovereignty. The one gives, and the other is given by 
 it ; and what is not given of the last, is a residuum in 
 the first. Hence the magistracy in which the power is 
 placed, has its measure of that power, in the constitution 
 or commission which certifies the grant ; and in the ex- 
 ercise of power beyond the grant, the magistracy 
 usurps upon the residuum which the sovereignty has 
 thought proper to retain. 
 
 These views are equally applicable to all forms of 
 government, whether despotic or free whether mon- 
 archical, aristocratic or republican. For the only 
 difference in the different forms of government, is 
 
16 
 
 not in the essential character of the magistracy, as 
 created or affected by the grant of power itself; but 
 only in the greater or less amount of power granted- 
 The sovereignty does not the less exist, that it may 
 have granted all power to the magistracy. It is, in 
 such case, the same sovereignty that it would have 
 been, had it granted only a part, or indeed none at all. 
 This is evident from the fact that it may, at any time 
 it pleases, revoke all power as well as it may a party by 
 an entire change in the frame of the government ; 
 which it could not do, if it ceased to exist as a sover- 
 eignty, by the very act of granting all its power. 
 
 From all this reasoning, the distinction results, be- 
 tween the delegation of sovereignty which is impossible, 
 and the delegation of power which is possible. It also 
 results that the term sovereign can never be properly 
 applied to a magistrate, whatever may be the tenure 
 of his office, or however absolute or restricted in his 
 power whether he be a Kussian Autocrat or an Amer- 
 ican President. The first, is absolute in his power, be- 
 cause the sovereignty has made him so ; not because 
 he himself is sovereign. The last, is restricted in his 
 power, for the same reason. And the difference be- 
 tween the absolute power granted in the one case, and 
 the restricted power granted in the other, is simply 
 and only the difference between despotic and free In- 
 stitutions. 
 
 The practical application of these principles to our 
 American government, as established by the constitu- 
 tion, is all important ; for it would seem to settle the 
 question as to the character of that constitution, in 
 
17 
 
 especial connection with the Executive Department,^ 
 whether it be an enabling or a restraining instrument. 
 Hamilton, in his vindication of Washington's proclama- 
 tion of neutrality, and Jackson, in his paper to his 
 Cabinet, connected with the removal of the Deposits, 
 in effect, maintain, that our constitution, in regard to 
 Executive power, is only a restraining instrument : that 
 is : that all which is not forbidden may be done. For 
 the act, in each case, is distinctly placed upon the 
 ground of inherent power in the Executive, independ- 
 ently of specific constitutional grant, t Now, if this 
 doctrine be true, in its application to the particular 
 cases referred to, it must be equally true of all other 
 cases, which may come within the definition of Ex- 
 ecutive power in the abstract ; whether power in such 
 other cases be given by the constitution or not. The 
 effect of this, in all matters in which he is not expressly 
 restrained, would be, to invest an American President 
 with the absolutism which belongs to a Turkish Sultan.J 
 
 * I say, "in especial connection with the Executive Department ;" for it is ob- 
 servable, that the Constitution, in reference to the Legislative Department, speaks of 
 "all legislative powers herein granted ;" whereas, in reference to the Executive De- 
 partment, no restrictive terms are used. Hence, it is to the latter Department alone, 
 that the remarks in the text are intended to apply. The Constitution prescribes the 
 ' true limit of power," in the one case ; my remarks are designed to suggest the rule, 
 to ascertain that limit in the other. 
 
 t It must be observed, here, in relation to the Proclamation of neutrality, that my 
 objection is, not to the act itself, but only to one of the grounds upon which it was 
 vindicated by Hamilton. The act itself was undoubtedly a very proper, as well as 
 constitutional one. It was not an exercise of power, creating a new state of things ; 
 but, simply, a declaration of the Executive opinion, as to a state of things already ex- 
 isting ; of which opinion it was right that the people should be informed. Every 
 one must see the difference, in this respect, between the proclamation of neutrality, 
 and the removal of the Deposits. 
 
 ?> 
 
 $ The question of express and implied powers, so much mooted, it is clear, has 
 nothing to do with this investigation ; for powers may be granted by implication as 
 well as in express terms ; and the question, whether an implied power be granted or 
 not, in a given case, must depend upon, and be decided by, principles, altogether for- 
 eign to this discussion. 
 
 3 
 
18 
 
 2. The problem of representative instruction, the 
 second topic under my second general head, may be 
 discussed in two aspects : the one, referring to the pro- 
 position of abstract right in a local constituency, to 
 control the action of the representative by express 
 command : the other referring to a supposed predomi- 
 nating public sentiment, which is regarded by many 
 as entitled to all the authority of an express command. 
 In regard to the first of these aspects, I will present 
 but two thoughts : and the first is, that the theory of 
 all sound government, presumes the wisest and fittest 
 men to be selected for the administration of its powers. 
 And hence, the admission of the right of authoritative 
 instruction in the constituency, would seem to involve 
 the further admission that ignorance shall be of higher 
 authority than intelligence in the conduct of political 
 affairs. To be sure the theory suggested of elect- 
 ing the best men is not always carried out in practice. 
 This fact, however, no farther affects the principle, than 
 as it shows how it may sometimes be abused. The theory 
 must remain the same, whatever mistakes may be made 
 in the action under it. If bad and ignorant men are 
 elected to perform the duties, which only the wisest 
 and the best men are qualified and intended to per- 
 form, it only shows how a wrong judgement in a con- 
 stituency may pervert a power to evil which was pro- 
 perly designed for good. It may also show how, in a par- 
 ticular case, extraordinary means may be necessary to 
 correct a casual mistake. But it certainly does not 
 prove the abstract proposition, that representative in- 
 struction is a necessary element of free government ; 
 
19 
 
 and this is alone the point we are discussing. The 
 theory of election properly carried out, would render 
 instruction unnecessary ; for in fair presumption, the 
 government would be rightly administered without it- 
 If it be not carried out, the resulting evils are the ap- 
 propriate punishment of an abuse of the high power 
 of suffrage. The theory itself cannot be changed 
 without reversing the order of things : without indeed 
 assuming that men are to be elected with the express 
 view to their being instructed, and not because their 
 qualifications place them beyond the necessity of it. 
 In such case, the weak should be placed in power in- 
 stead of the strong ; the foolish instead of the wise ; 
 for of none but these could the doctrine be profitably 
 predicated ; and these, it is admitted, could not get 
 along without it. But it is only these that would re- 
 quire it, or to whom it could consistently be applied. 
 
 The second thought referred to is, that government 
 is a unit; and, being so, the true idea of the represen- 
 tative system, is, not so much that each part is repre- 
 sented, as that the whole is represented by the re- 
 presentation from each part. This appears from the 
 fact, that the laws enacted by the whole body of re- 
 presentatives, are for each part as well as for the whole ; 
 and hence, the representation from each part is as 
 much the representation of every other part as it is of 
 its own. Nor can there be any difference in this re- 
 spect between general and local legislation. For a law 
 of our general government, for instance, specifically 
 applicable to a particular local district of Louisiana, 
 involves the action of the representation from each 
 
20 
 
 district in Rhode Island, as much as it does the repre- 
 sentation from the district in Louisiana. And hence, 
 in regard to that particular law, the representation from 
 the district in Rhode Island, is as exactly the represen- 
 tation of the district in Louisiana, as the representa- 
 tion from that district itself would be. And hence 
 again, if the doctrine of representative instruction be 
 true of the immediate constituency of Louisiana, it 
 must be equally true of the constituency of a district 
 in Rhode Island ; and the constituency in Lousiana 
 may instruct the representation from Rhode Island 
 as well as its own. And, further still : the constitu- 
 ency of Rhode Island may instruct the representation 
 from Lousiana, against the very measure, which the 
 constituency of the latter State may especially desire. 
 Now this would be carrying the doctrine further than 
 is claimed ; and thus, by consequentially involving too 
 much, it is entitled to nothing, and must fall to the 
 ground. 
 
 The doctrine of instruction, in the aspect in which 
 I am now discussing it, appears to me to originate in a 
 confusion of ideas. It confounds the idea of a political 
 governmentnstituted for permanency, having certain 
 prescribed powers, which, in the very nature of them, 
 can be revoked only by a change in the organism which 
 creates them, with the idea of a mere business agency 
 between individuals, in its very nature temporary, and 
 the powers of which, may be, at any moment revoked, 
 by the single word of the Principal who grants them. 
 In the first, the powers created, are beyond the reach 
 of instruction; because, to be so, is a necessary condi- 
 
21 
 
 tion to the complete authority of the government 
 which possesses them : whereas, in the last, the powers 
 conferred are constantly within instruction, because, in 
 the very nature of them, it cannot be absolutely neces- 
 sary that they should be beyond it. Government then 
 is not a mere agent. It is, for the time being, the 
 principal ; the embodiment of the people that created 
 it ; the people themselves, in a concentrated form. Not 
 so the relation between tw r o individuals the one giv- 
 ing, and the other receiving, a commission for the per- 
 formance of some particular service. In the last case, 
 there are two parties ; and the one may, by superior 
 relation, instruct and control the other. In the first, 
 there is, in fact, but one party ; which can be instruct- 
 ed only by itself; and be restrained in its exercise of 
 power, only by the specific rules laid down in the or- 
 ganism which created it. 
 
 The second aspect in which I would discuss the doc- 
 trine of instruction, refers to a supposed predominent 
 public sentiment for which is claimed all the authority 
 of express command. Now, public sentiment may 
 express itself as loudly and as strongly as it pleases, 
 through the press, at the hustings, and by the instru- 
 mentality of popular resolutions. But it can act, with- 
 out revolution, only through organic forms of its own 
 previous creation. The wisdom of these forms, indeed, 
 is proved by nothing so much, as that through their 
 instrumentality, useful changes may be made with any 
 frequency and in any number, without violence. 
 These forms ascertain with certainty, that the public 
 sentiment in question, is a reality and not a sham. 
 
22 
 
 ' The rule of addition gives an unerring result in the 
 comparative numerical force of the ayes and noes of 
 the ballot box. And he who maintains the ascertain- 
 ment of an authoritative public sentiment in any other 
 way, in effect maintains the political absurdity, that 
 a minority may, of right, overrrule a majority in gov- 
 ernment ; for it is only through the instrumentality of 
 the ballot box that the side on which the majority ex- 
 ists can be certainly ascertained. ^^^ ^ 4J~* <^ 
 Public sentiment, however overwhelming, cannot 
 enact law. It can, at the most, only express the tone 
 with which the powers of government should be ad- 
 ministered, in the opinion of those by whom that senti- 
 ment is entertained. Whether or not it be entitled 
 to authoritative influence in the administration of 
 the government, the ministers of power for the time 
 being, must, upon their proper responsibility, be the 
 sole judges. If, perchance, the law making power en- 
 act a law in opposition to the public sentiment, there 
 are two ways of meeting the difficulty : first, by direct 
 resistance to the law ; and, second, by patiently await- 
 ing its repeal, by the election to power of a new and 
 more faithful set of men. The first is rebellion; which, 
 in resisting one law, violates all ; and thus breaks up 
 the government. The second, in due time, breaks up 
 the law and maintains the government. The first, in 
 correcting one evil, perpetrates a thousand others. 
 The second, by correcting an evil, does a good and 
 nothing more. The first, is anarchy, with a liability to 
 all the desolating mischiefs that pertain to it. The 
 
 \ second, is the every day experience of the best systems 
 
23 
 
 of government, and nobody is disturbed. The gov- 
 ernment itself, remains sacred as it was. 
 
 III. The third and last general topic I proposed to 
 discuss, is, some particulars in the action of political 
 parties. It is quite too late to discuss the question of 
 the necessity of political parties in a free State. The 
 whole problem on this subject is solved by the simple 
 fact, that opposing parties are the necessary result of 
 perfect freedom of individual opinion; and the right, 
 by association of numbers of similar ways of thinking, 
 to propose and vindicate such measures of policy as 
 that opinion may designate to be wise and just, is as 
 indispensable to freedom as the right of opinion itself 
 is. As individual opinions vary, so opposition must 
 arise in the expression of them, and in the action 
 upon them. And in this opposition, each party must be 
 assumed to be equally honest and patriotic with every 
 other ; and neither can properly be put down, by al- 
 ledged dishonesty in the motives that may be supposed 
 to actuate it. The question of parties then in a free 
 government, should be, not whether they shall exist, 
 or whether their rights shall be respected; but rather 
 how the spirit of them shall be directed and controlled, 
 in its bearing upon the welfare of the State. Whether 
 this spirit shall be upright or the reverse, is, certainly, 
 a matter vital to the character of the community, 
 whose very freedom, as has been seen, originates and 
 justifies it. But, on this point, no rule can be given 
 foi the security of uprightness in the conduct of rival 
 parties, that is not equally applicable to the mainten- 
 ance of virtuous conduct in the affairs of individual 
 
24 
 
 life. In the first, as in the last, there are all the lia- 
 bilities of moral evil ; for in both, there is the necessary 
 exposure to the influence of human passions. The most 
 that can be said, then, of political parties, touching the 
 question of their existence, is, that their incidental 
 evils must be borne for the sake of the good which 
 could not exist without them ; instead of being made 
 the ground of denunciation to the system, which the 
 necessity of human infirmity compels to tolerate 
 them. 
 
 Generally speaking, the leading parties in a state 
 are only two the one supporting, and the other op- 
 posing, the existing system of administrative policy. 
 And however much the members of these two parties, 
 respectively, may differ among themselves, upon sub- 
 ordinate matters not vital to their general aims, the 
 integrity or unity of their organization is rarely brok- 
 en ; for they agree in the one grand rallying point, of 
 support or opposition to the existing government. 
 Such a division, standing as it does upon the mere dis- 
 crimination between those in, and those out of power, 
 would seem natural and convenient. But this conve- 
 nient arrangement is now and then disturbed in the 
 operations of a government, by the creation of a third 
 party with .particular views, in which, in their detach- 
 ed action, they have no sympathy with either, and are 
 equally opposed to both the other two. And here a 
 complexity arises in the course of party action, of so 
 much importance to the general welfare, as to give it 
 a particular prominence, and to entitle it to a special 
 consideration in an investigation of the philosophy of 
 
25 
 
 parties. This complexity I propose to discuss ; and in 
 what I shall suggest concerning it, I shall speak of the 
 origin, the main source of power, and the influences 
 most likely to control the action, of third parties. And 
 first of their origin. 
 
 1. There is a class of men in the world, who, however 
 upright, are never satisfied with any present state of 
 things, however comparatively good ; and who, in a 
 state of unrest in relation to some matter of present 
 absorbing interest, have a feverish desire of instant 
 realization. They are not willing to regard the high- 
 est attainments of humanity as things of progress; 
 but they would have them all at once ; and the judi- 
 cious patience, which awaits the natural growth of 
 things, step by step, is not theirs. Their condition 
 would seem to be, one of complaint at what they 
 have not, rather than of thankfulness for what they 
 have. In their exclusive thought of an ideal, they 
 overlook the actual which is indispensable to enable 
 them to reach it. And thus their world is made one 
 of imagination rather than of fact of desire rather 
 than of acquisition. Such minds are characterised by 
 particular views which terminate in themselves, rather 
 than by general aims, to which these views, to be val- 
 uable and useful, should be subordinate. Hence, they 
 make ends of what should perhaps be only means ; 
 and are apt to lose sight of a general purpose, how- 
 ever important, in their exclusive devotion to what 
 should be regarded only as a particular step in the at- 
 tainment of it. Such minds rarely do much good for 
 the whole of a thing. Rather the reverse ; for their 
 
26 
 
 influence is to impair the force or lessen the estima- 
 tion of a great general purpose, by the dispropor- 
 tionate attention bestowed upon only a part, and 
 perhaps a very small part, of it. Of relations that 
 pertain to ordinary life, the benevolence which should 
 embrace them all, as parts of one great whole, is 
 dwarfed by its devotion to some single part, as though 
 that were the whole. Of matters connected with the 
 movements of a government, the patriotism which 
 should range over them all, in their due proportions, 
 is narrowed down to some single particular, as though 
 the compassing of that, comprehended all that be- 
 longed to the great aggregate of patriotic duty. I do 
 not and cannot impeach the integrity of the class of 
 men of which I speak ; for their error, as I conceive 
 it to be, consists, generally, not in designing too little, 
 but too much, for human good: in attempting to do, 
 not what should not, but what cannot., be done ; and 
 thus in wasting power, with undiscriminating judg- 
 ment, rather than abusing it, with an unworthy purpose. 
 
 Now, if I do not greatly mistake, third political par- 
 ties are mainly recruited from the class of men of which 
 I have been speaking. Not, because, the various indi- 
 viduals composing the class, have, necessarily, anything 
 in common in their purposes; but because their pur- 
 poses are directed by the same common principles of 
 character, viz; the desire of instant change from a 
 present state of things, to an imagined better, and the 
 devotion to one idea of a great general subject, to the 
 exclusion of all others. 
 
 2. A. third party, thus formed, derives its power in a 
 
27 
 
 community., mainly from a cabalistic word reform 
 Honest credulity is easily attracted by the sound of 
 that word. In itself, and in its ordinary signification, 
 it expresses an idea of inappreciable value ; but fre- 
 quently, in its cabalistic application, it means anything 
 but good. In its practical uses in the history of gov- 
 ernments, it means quite as often to upheave and over- 
 turn as to improve and make better. The first movers 
 in reforms, however innocently, often mistake change 
 for improvement. They think that something must 
 be better than the present, because, as every body 
 knows, the present is not perfect; and that some- 
 thing, they think they have discovered. They over- 
 look the fact, however, that the principle of imperfec- 
 tion which never ceases, must equally attach to this 
 new something which they would reach ; and that thus, 
 the principle of reform, as they apply it, resolves it- 
 self into an infinite series of experiments ; the effect 
 of which must be, to keep up perpetual agitation 
 with perpetual disappointment in the objects of it. 
 
 But there is such a thing as true reform and as I 
 apprehend it, it is gradual improvement ; not sudden 
 change. The first, adapts itself to circumstances ; and 
 by seeming to submit to them, really controls them ; 
 and thus is aided by them, in a natural and certain 
 growth. The last quarrels with circumstances; and thus 
 creates a hostile influence, which must meet it at every 
 turn, and perpetually war against it, and, in most in- 
 stances, defeat it. In political communities, all true 
 and permanent reform must stand, ultimately, upon 
 the convictions of the masses that compose them. 
 
28 
 
 These convictions are necessarily of slow growth : for 
 the public mind reasons by events rather than by prin- 
 ciples. Affairs affect and influence communities by ac- 
 tion and not by contemplation. The wisdom of a giv- 
 en measure, is ascertained at once to the Philosopher by 
 the force of reason. To the masses, that wisdom can be 
 learned only by actual experience. If a dark and over- 
 shadowing evil pervade the land, in the form of some 
 deep and fundamental error in its political condition, no 
 human power, however great, can exterminate it in a 
 day; or would be wise in attempting it. But, by a care- 
 ful and judicious training of the public mind to new 
 forms of thought and new modes of action: by the ap- 
 plicatlon,from day to day, of principles which everybody 
 can understand and nobody deny, long years can hardly 
 fail to establish the right, which gifted minds would de- 
 sire to make prevail at once, but which all history 
 proves, can never be fully and profitably realized by the 
 masses, but in the lapse of time. 
 
 3. The number of a third party, originating as we 
 have supposed it to do, is rarely large compared with 
 the whole population of a State. Its existence at all, 
 is but a form of eccentricity, the very definition of 
 which imports merely a departure from the generally 
 approved course of things, in which but a few are found 
 to sympathize or take a part. The number being thus 
 comparatively small, if their movements were left to 
 the ordinary course of party action, their efforts would 
 signify but little in results. But, there are two im- 
 portant influences liable to bear upon them, which, 
 if unrestrained by some superior control, may make 
 
their position not only significant but dangerous. The 
 first of these influences is from without ; the second, 
 from within, themselves. The first refers to alliances 
 with other party organizations than their own, which, 
 though without a particle of sympathy with their prin- 
 ciples, are yet ready to offer terms for their power. 
 The second refers to an exaggerated rule of personal 
 conscience, which places the individual in opposition 
 to the State. Both these influences are worthy of 
 particular remark. 
 
 As to the first then : In the history of the two great 
 general parties, into which, as we have seen, a State is 
 usually divided, each, in its struggle for predominence, 
 is found to avail itself, without particular scruple, of 
 adventitious aids. Of these, a third party, which, of 
 itself, may be of but little account, may yet, as holding 
 the balance of power, be of the largest importance, as 
 a means of determining the question of power be- 
 tween the other two. Honest and conscientious as 
 this third party may be supposed to be, and generally, 
 in fact, is, the slightest hope of advantage to their 
 peculiar theory, making them forgetful of other in- 
 terests, must naturally predispose them to alliances, 
 which shall be likely, in any form, to give that theory 
 even an incidental prominence. Such alliances are 
 easily brought about by the negociations of leading 
 and generally interested men ; and, under such pre- 
 texts, as to exclude the appearance of any compromise 
 of principle. But whatever may be the particular re- 
 sults of such alliances, they cannot, in their general 
 effects, be otherwise than harmful. If the third party, 
 
30 
 
 by the force of such alliance, carry their point, a very 
 ( small minority, against all fundamental ideas, has been 
 made to exercise a power of state. If the party in al- 
 liance with them, succeed in establishing their predom- 
 
 inance, they have done it upon bargain instead of prin- 
 ciple. And on this point, I hold nothing to be clearer, 
 than that it is better for a wrong measure to succeed 
 upon right principles, than that a right measure should 
 succeed upon wrong ones. Time, in the one case, will 
 correct the error, which the spirit of truth will be sure 
 to detect and expose. Whereas, in the other, the right 
 can hardly hope for permanence, when sustained by 
 means, perpetually at war with the principle of up- 
 rightness, on which, alone, it can be made, consistently, 
 to stand. 
 
 The case of misalliance, here presented, cannot be re- 
 deemed of its offensive character by the apology of 
 compromise. To be sure, compromise is often very 
 proper, and sometimes indispensable, to the carrying 
 on of government ; but it must always be predicated 
 of the two leading parties in the state, and always re- 
 fer to modifications of measures. Whereas, any com- 
 promise between one of these parties, and a third, can 
 refer, generally, only to men. The compromise, in 
 the one case, is simply a yielding up of something, 
 that something may be accomplished, in the proper 
 and necessary business of administrating the govern- 
 ment ; and is regulated by the principle in every day 
 use in this imperfect life, that, when we cannot get 
 the whole of what we aim at, we take a part. In the 
 other case, the compromise can have, ordinarily, no other 
 
31 
 
 reference than to mere party power ; and is practi- 
 cally affected by a concession of higher or lower of- 
 ficial place, to third party men, as the consideration of 
 their support. In the one case, the men in power re- 
 main the same, notwithstanding the compromise ; and 
 without any violation of the principle of suffrage ; 
 whereas, in the other, new men are placed in power, 
 whose principles are obnoxious to a large majority of 
 the community, and of course in entire disregard of 
 the principle of suffrage. 
 
 But the second of the influences I have mentioned, 
 as liable to bear upon third party organizations, is, of 
 far deeper moment than the first ; for it strikes at the 
 very foundation of all government. It is this; that 
 the action of an exaggerated rule of personal con- 
 science, may place the citizen in opposition to the 
 State. Now, if it be right for any man to say, " I will 
 not obey a law because it is unconstitutional ; or if it 
 be constitutional, I will not obey it, because it inter- 
 feres with a higher law of my own mind ;" (and such 
 is the language ascribed to Dr. Palfrey a gentleman 
 for whom I entertain a most sincere respect) ; I say, 
 if it be right for a citizen to advance and to act upon 
 such a proposition, let it be commended to the world, 
 and that, too, by scholars, as a definite and well ascer- 
 tained truth in political philosophy. On the contrary, 
 if the proposition be false, let its pretensions be ex- 
 amined and exposed ; and that, too, with a freedom 
 and decision, proportioned to the high places in which 
 it has been uttered, and to the character of the dis- 
 tinguished names, by which it has been endorsed. 
 
32 
 
 r For one I believe the proposition to be false. Car- 
 ried out, I believe it to be full of uncalculated and 
 I ^incalculable mischief. It would destroy government, 
 by the very means it proposes to sustain it. It sug- 
 gests anarchy as a cure for bad legislation a wisdom 
 i * of the sort of that which would kill off the whole hu- 
 ^ I man race to get rid of sin. 
 
 The proposition, as I apprehend it, suggests an alto- 
 gether erroneous view of true civil liberty, as connected 
 , with the rights of individual conscience. Civil liberty, 
 if I mistake not, in contradistinction to natural liber- 
 ty, is purely a conventional arrangement absolutely 
 necessary, to be sure, to the existence of society but 
 I still conventional. It is that portion of natural liberty 
 i which is left to the individual, beyond the restraints 
 imposed by the social compact, or the constitution, 
 if there be one, and the laws constitutionally ascertain- 
 ed to exist under it.* Now civil liberty, in this view, 
 supposes two parties : the State, or the aggregate of indi- 
 I viduals composing it, on the one hand ; and each indi- 
 vidual, in his separate capacity, on the other. And be- 
 tween these two parties, there is a contract, importing 
 a guaranty of protection on the part of the first, and 
 a promise of loyalty, in consideration of that protec- 
 
 * I say, "the laws constitutionally ascertained to exist under it:" For there is a 
 marked distinction between a law constitutional or unconstitutional, on the one 
 hand, and a law constitutionally ascertained to exist, on the other and this distinc- 
 tion is essential to the very being of a constitutional government. The transactions 
 of every government, are necessarily clothed with certain forms for the expression 
 of them. When a law has been enacted according to these fo/ms, it must necessari- 
 ly be treated as constitutional, [whether it, in fact, be so or not,] until, through other 
 lorms prescribed for the purpose, it shall be ascertained to be otherwise. To say 
 that any individual citizen, however enlightened, and in however palpable a case, 
 may treat a law as unconstitutional, because he thinks it to be so, would be equivalent 
 to saying, that ever^ citizen is at liberty to interpret every law, and to hold himself 
 amenable to it or not, according to his own personal will and pleasure. 
 
33 
 
 tion, on the part of the last. These are mutual cove- 
 nants between the two, each binding upon the party 
 making it ; and conscience, in its largest sense, is the / / 
 security that each shall be faithfully performed. Now, j / 
 this obligation of loyalty in the citizen must, of course, 
 apply to law in general ; and so, doing, forestalls the 
 conscience in every instance of a particular law. For? 
 to allow an individual at his pleasure, on whatever 
 pretext, to discriminate between one law and an- 
 other, in applying the principle of obedience, would be 
 to absolve such individual from the obligation to obe- 
 dience altogether extending, as the power of discrimi- 
 nation would, to every other law, as well as to any par- 
 ticular one. For, it must not be overlooked, in the dis- 
 cussion of this "higher law" doctrine, that no rule defin- 
 ing the limits of its application, can be drawn from the 
 particular character of the subjects of it ; and that hence, 
 if it be admissible as a principle of action upon one 
 subject, its authority must be admitted as of equal force 
 in all others. And thus every law of the State is brought 
 within the operation of the doctrine ; and the ques- 
 tion of the obligation to obey, in the case of any given 
 law, being submitted to the decision of every individual 
 conscience, such law can have no binding force upon 
 any individual whose conscience disapproves it. A 
 most convenient state of things for the felon on the 
 scaffold, who would plead exemption from the impend 
 ing penalty of crime, that he had despoiled his neigh, 
 bor of his goods on the philanthropic principle of an 
 equal division of property, or had perpetrated a deli- 
 berate homicide for conscience sake. Now, if this ex- 
 5 
 
34 
 
 treme application of the doctrine be inadmissable, (and 
 who can believe it otherwise,) it must follow, the doc. 
 trine failing altogether, that the conscience, however 
 opposed to a particular law, is bound to obey it, on the 
 principle of a prior general pledge to obey it. Nor is 
 there any thing in this that forces or constrains the 
 conscience ; for the case presented is a sort of dilemma, 
 involving a comparison of duty, in which a decision 
 must be made one way or the other ; and in which 
 the preference is awarded to what the judgment an- 
 nounces as the superior claim. I say, to what the judg- 
 ment announces as the superior claim ; for, though con- 
 
 ( science be a distinct and separate faculty of the mind, 
 there is nothing occult or mystical about it. It takes 
 
 ) its counsels from the judgment, as do all the other 
 faculties; and must be controlled by them. Con- 
 - V science is a principle of the mind, not an instinct of the 
 passions. It is a thing of culture, and has its govern- 
 ment in the intellect : not a thing prior to intellect, 
 standing out from it, and acting in spite of or independ- 
 ^ gently of it. It is a principle of character, upon which 
 T "* the intellect works, and which the intellect informs 
 and developes as it does other principles of character ; 
 jmd which, in its application to the condition^ of im- 
 
 ; perfect human life, must deliberately submit to the 
 
 modifications and judgments, which the intellect shall 
 determine to be proper, in its general direction of hu- 
 man affairs. If, then, the obedience of which I have 
 been speaking, be a proper suggestion of the reason- 
 ing powers, as connected with the necessary philosophy 
 of government, and indispensable to its existence ; and 
 
35 
 
 if no discrimination between one law and another can 
 be made in the application of the principle, it follows 
 that disloyalty or disobedience to a particular law, is a 
 proper subject of condemnation to the conscience, how- 
 ever strongly the same conscience may condemn the 
 law itself. The " higher law," then, which an indivi- 
 dual may assume as commanding in him resistance to 
 a particular law of the state, is simply the ordinance of 
 an arbitrary personal will, which, in opposition to the 
 wisdom of the government, sets up an individual wis- 
 dom of its own as superior to it. 
 
 Nor should it be overlooked, that there are two par- 
 ties in this matter. There are those whose consciences 
 approve a given law, as well as those whose con- 
 sciences condemn it. And if those, whose consciences 
 condemn the law, are morally absolved from the obli- 
 gation to obey it, so those whose consciences approve 
 the law, are morally bound by its authority ; for the 
 conscience would be equally binding in both cases. 
 And hence, we have two classes in the State, in respect 
 to the authority of law : the one bound, and the other 
 not bound by it which is a political absurdity. The 
 fact is, in the case of a law involving conscience, as in 
 the case of one not involving it, the question must 
 arise, (if the government is to be preserved,) which 
 class shall rule ; and the answer to this question, set- 
 tles the whole matter. For the alternative of anarchy 
 is just as sure to be presented by an issue of conscience, 
 touching the morality of a law, as it would be by an 
 issue of mere judgment, touching its expediency; 
 and the decision of the question in either case, as 
 
36 
 
 claimed by the higher law theory, must necessarily 
 destroy the government ; for in dispensing with the 
 principle of obedience, no matter with what apology, 
 when the power of government has given the rule, it 
 must take away the only means by which the govern- 
 ment can be preserved. 
 
 Two objections may be urged against this reasoning : 
 the one, practical, to break its force ; the other, ab- 
 stract, to overthrow it altogether. The first assumes 
 a distinction between actual resistance to a law, on the 
 one hand, and simply refusing to aid in carrying it 
 into effect, on the other. The second goes to the prin- 
 ciple of revolution. 
 
 In respect to the first of these objections, I would 
 say, that, as a practical affair, it may be well enough, 
 as long as the aid referred to shall not be required. 
 But when the cases arises, in which the law cannot 
 be carried out without the aid of every citizen, the re- 
 fusal of such aid when properly called for, would be 
 equivalent to actual resistance. The same principle, 
 which so far justifies the law, as that it may not be re- 
 sisted by actual force, equally requires that it be posi- 
 tively supported, when the occasion is such, that, with- 
 out such positive support, it would fail of being carried 
 into effect. For the consequence would be the same 
 in both cases viz. : that of nullifying a law. So that 
 the distinction referred to, in any substantial applica- 
 tion of it, is without any admissable difference, in de- 
 termining the course of individual duty to the state. 
 
 Nor can the recusant derive any advantage in this 
 argument, from the suggestion, that he is ready to 
 
37 
 
 suffer the penalty of recusancy ; for that considera- 
 tion presents an entirely different issue from the one 
 we are discussing. The true question here is, not 
 whether the nonperformance of a duty shall be pun- 
 ished, but whether a duty shall be performed. The 
 last question is prior to the first, and entirely inde- 
 pendent of it ; and addresses itself to the ordinary 
 sentiment of patriotic duty, and not to the extraordi- 
 nary one of martyrdom. But further, if it would be 
 right w to disobey a law, because of something wrong 
 in the law itself, it would be wrong to punish a citi- 
 zen for his disobedience to it. And in such case, the 
 punishment should be resisted as well as the law. 
 The argument, then, from readiness to suffer the pen- 
 alty, is purely gratuitous ; and has nothing to do with 
 the discussion. Should the principle of martyrdom 
 however, still be urged, notwithstanding these views, 
 it might be well to bear in mind as a matter of practi- 
 cal importance, that that great principle may be 
 quite liable to be abused ; and that the case might 
 exist, in which, under all the views that might be tak- 
 en of it, martyrdom for one good cause, might be at 
 the expense of another equally good ; and with even 
 this difference in favor of the latter : that the first 
 concerned the martyr alone ; whereas the other would 
 refer to the well being of the whole community be- 
 sides. This would be a selfish martyrdom ; and prove, 
 not how much a man would suffer for the public good, 
 but rather how far he could give license to his egot- 
 ism or his vanity, under the influence of his zeal. A 
 
38 
 
 proper case for martyrdom in politics,* would really 
 be a proper case for revolution in the government. 
 And in that application, the principle is as grand, as 
 is the spirit of freedom, which on occasion, it might 
 be required to vindicate. 
 
 But to the second objection : the right of revolu- 
 tion. This objection is liable to the same answer with 
 the first. It does not belong to the issue we are dis- 
 cussing. For that issue does not propose a case in 
 which a government is to be overturned, but only one 
 in which a law of a government, intended to be contin- 
 ued, may or may not be resisted. Nobody denies the 
 right of revolution from one system of government to 
 another. If, however, a change of this kind occur, 
 and a new system be substituted for the old one, the 
 point we are discussing would be just as certain to 
 arise under the new, as it has arisen under the old ; 
 for the same philosophy of government would belong 
 as exactly to the one case as to the other. 
 
 What then is the result of this discussion, as to the 
 true duty of a citizen in relation to an existing law, 
 however odious to his feelings or wrong to his judg- 
 ment ? It is, unquestionably, to sustain the law while it 
 
 * I say "martyrdom in Politics," in contradistinction to Martyrdom in Religion. 
 For, in the first, as has been seen, the necessities of civil government make the prin- 
 ciple of obedience to law, absolutely sacred ; and thus, in some sense and degree, sub- 
 ordinate the conscience to convention : Whereas, in the last, no such necessities ex- 
 ist , and the conscience may act to the full extent of its own requirements without 
 reference to the principle of obedience. The distinction is, between what is absolute- 
 ly indispensable to the very existence of civil government, on the one hand , and 
 what may or may not form an element of it, but is, in no way, vitally essential to it, 
 on the other. The one is predicated of a human relation between one man and a 
 community of men, with whom for certain considerations, it has been necessary for 
 him to make an unconditional promise of obedience : the other is predicated of an 
 extra human relation, between each individual and his God, into which no other 
 principle of duty can enter, but such as each individual conscience shall direct. 
 Religious martyrdom, therefore, is admissible, whenever the conscience shall re - 
 ouire it: Political martyrdom never, except when political oppression shall nave 
 -determined a case for revolution. 
 
39 
 
 exists ; and if needful to assist in carrying it out. He 
 may condemn it, but not resist it, directly or indirectly. 
 He may speak against it, and write against it, with all 
 the freedom that belongs to the amplest discussion of 
 a nation's policy of administration. But while the 
 law remains upon the Statute Book, it must be sacred 
 as a principle of duty. Until it be repealed as unwise, 
 or set aside as invalid, by competent authority, in a 
 case properly made, no individual judgment can gain- 
 say its authority, without disloyalty no individual 
 conscience can resist it, without violating a superior 
 duty to the State. In certain things the rule of ne- 
 cessity is as indispensable to political government, as 
 it is to the economy of individual life and one form 
 of that rule is illustrated in what I have said. 
 
 My proper hour for this discourse is passed ; and I 
 would not abuse a patience which has borne with me 
 so kindly, and honored me so much. I have taken my 
 topics mainly, from suggestions of our own history : 
 and I trust that no apology is necessary for my hav- 
 ing done so. My purpose, in part, has been, to dis- 
 cuss, in a plain way, some matters of moment that 
 seem in our very midst; and I have studiously labor- 
 ed to present these upon their own merits, without 
 any extraneous aids, to give them an effect beyond the 
 fair claim of argument. The times are quite too grave 
 for a mere entertainment of the taste, on an occasion 
 which admits of something that should be more prof- 
 itable to them, in the discussion of high matters for the 
 judgment. If, in what I have uttered, I shall have 
 done nothing to relieve the doubts, which in certain 
 
40 
 
 matters, now agitate the country, I think the spirit in 
 which I have spoken will bear me witness, that I have 
 not been forgetful of the country's interest and honor; 
 and that in asserting what I believe to be the truth, in 
 connection with these doubts, however delicate the 
 problems in which they have had their birth, while I 
 have not failed to suggest the honest thoughts of one 
 American citizen, I have testified a true appreciation 
 of the deference and respect due to those of every 
 other. 
 
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