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 ///^^
 
 3'S 
 
 OFFICIAL COPY. 
 
 THE 
 
 SIEGE OPERATIONS 
 
 IN THE 
 
 CAMPAIGN AGAINST FRANCE, 
 
 1870-71. 
 
 BY 
 
 B. VON TIEDEMANN, 
 
 COLONEL IN THE HOYAL PHUStilAN ENGINEERS. 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 MAJOE TYLER, R.E. 
 
 TFJrS" NINETEEN LITHOGBAPHED PLANS. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed under the Sitpenntcndence of Her Majesti/'s Stationery Office, 
 
 AND SOLD BY 
 
 W. Clowes & Sons, 13 Charing Cross : Hahrison & Sons, 59 Pall Mall 
 
 W. H. Allen & Co., 13 Waterloo Place ; "W. Mitchell, 39 Charing Cross 
 
 Longmans & Co., Paternoster Row ; Thubnee 6c Co., 67 & 59 Ludgate Hill 
 
 Stanford, Charing Cross ; and C. Kegan Palx & Co., 1 Paternoster Square, 
 
 Also by Griffin & Co., The Hard, Portsea ; 
 
 A. & C. Black, Edinburgh; 
 
 Alex, Thom, Abbey Street, and E. Ponsonby, Grafton Street, Dublin. 
 
 1877. 
 
 Price Four Shilling. -s and Sixpence,
 
 PEEFACE 
 
 The campaign of 1870-71, taken in conjunction with that of 1866, 
 will mark a new epoch in military history and the art of war, and 
 will long afford thoughtful soldiers inexhaustible materials for 
 study of every description. 
 
 The war of 1866 was followed by re-organisation and re-arm- 
 ing iu most of the countries of Europe, and similarly that of 1870- 
 7 1 will lead to reforms, among which those in the art of fortification 
 will undoubtedly take a prominent place. 
 
 The first regular siege of a fortress of the highest order since 
 the introduction of rifled ordnance, the blockade of the strongest 
 place in the world with an army for its garrison, and the successful 
 operations before the enemy's capital, containing 2,000,000 inhabi- 
 tants, as well as those against the other strongholds of France, 
 which occupied the German armies for four months after the 
 Battle of Sedan, are all events of the highest interest, not only for 
 the artilleryman and engineer, but for every officer, and even for 
 the general public. 
 
 These pages are supplementary to the many general accounts 
 of the campaign, as they deal exclusively with the siege opera- 
 tions of 1870-71. The author does not at present attempt to put 
 forth a thorough critical examination of those important events, but 
 he wishes to supply a clear account of the particulars of the various 
 sieges, and of the larger sorties, and thus to contribute a chapter 
 to the history of the great war. With this object all available 
 authorities have been carefully collected, sifted, and, where neces- 
 sary, supplemented, so that it is hoped a complete sketch, in out- 
 line, of the siege operations may be offered to the reader. Although 
 this work contains the more important particulars, further details 
 must be looked for in subsequent publications, at a time when it 
 will be more easily supplied. 
 
 36996. WT. 7702, h
 
 IV 
 
 It is impossible to write a complete and perfectly accurate 
 history of the sieges so soon after the war ; this can alone he done 
 by the authorities some time hence, when all the official reports from 
 the various arms of the service are available. The Siege of Sebas- 
 topol was only described for some time by ordinary books and maps, 
 and the same will be the case with that of Paris, which affords, 
 beyond all comparison, more copious matter. The Author is per- 
 fectly aware of the deficiencies of his work in many respects, both 
 in the letterpress and in the plans ; but he hopes for indulgence 
 from the reader, and also from the critic, to both of whom the 
 difficulty of a work of this kind must be known. 
 
 The accompanying Plates will, it is hoped, prove sufficient to 
 explain and supplement the description of the sieges. 
 
 THE AUTHOE. 
 
 Dresden, October 1871.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 . 
 
 
 . 1 
 
 LiCHTENBEEG. 
 
 (Plate I.) . 
 
 
 5 
 
 LUTZELSTEIX. 
 
 (Plate II.) . 
 
 
 . 7 
 
 ;Marsal. 
 
 (Plate II.) . 
 
 
 . 8 
 
 VlTRY. 
 
 (Plate II.) . 
 
 
 . 10 
 
 Pfalzburg. 
 
 (Plate III.) 
 
 
 . 11 
 
 BiTSCH. 
 
 (Plate IV.) . 
 
 
 . 15 
 
 TOUL. 
 
 (PlatkV.) . 
 
 
 . 20 
 
 Laon. 
 
 (Plate VI.) 
 
 . 
 
 . 26 
 
 Strasburg. 
 
 (Plate VII.) 
 
 
 . 29 
 
 Investment and Bombardment 
 
 . 31 
 
 Regular Siege 
 
 
 . 41 
 
 Surrender , 
 
 
 . 53 
 
 Schlettstadt. 
 
 (Plate VIII.) 
 
 
 . 55 
 
 Neu-Breisach 
 
 (Plate IX.) 
 
 
 . 59 
 
 Sedan. 
 
 (Plate X.) . 
 
 
 . 65 
 
 Metz. 
 
 (Plate XI.) 
 
 
 . 70 
 
 The Condition of the Fortress, and of the French 
 
 Army 
 
 within 
 
 it. 
 
 
 . 72 
 
 The Investing Army and 
 
 Field Fortifications . 
 
 . 76 
 
 Sorties 
 
 . 
 
 
 . 79 
 
 Sureende 
 
 R . 
 
 
 . 83 
 
 Verdun. 
 
 (Plate XII.) 
 
 
 . 86 
 
 SOISSONS. 
 
 (Plate XIII.) 
 
 
 . 94 
 
 La Fere. 
 
 (Plate VI.) . 
 
 
 . 99 
 
 Thion^ille. 
 
 (Plate XIV) 
 
 
 . 102 
 
 Montmedy. 
 
 (Plate XV.) 
 
 
 . 108 
 
 LONGWY. 
 
 (Plate XVI.) 
 
 
 . 113 
 
 Mezier£s, 
 
 (Plate XVII.) 
 
 
 . 120 
 
 Paris. 
 
 (Plate XVIII.] 
 
 . 
 
 . 125 
 
 State of Affairs in the Foetf.ess, Preparations foe a Siege, 
 The Army of Paris. ........ 
 
 127
 
 VI 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Arrival of the German Armies before Paris . . . 139 
 
 Arrangements for Attack 142 
 
 Sorties 146 
 
 Preparations for the Artillery Attack .... 157 
 
 Artillery Attack of the East, South, and North Fronts. . 160 
 
 Surrender 171 
 
 Belfort. (Plate XIX.) 174 
 
 Preliminary Engagements before the Siege. . . . 177 
 
 Bombardment 178 
 
 Opening of the Regular Attack 184 
 
 Surrender. . 185 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Advance of the First Army. 
 
 Amiens 
 
 Peronne 
 
 ROCROY 
 
 187 
 188 
 191 
 193 
 
 SUMMARY OF SIEGES.
 
 THE 
 
 SIEGE OPERATIONS 
 
 CiiiPAIGN AGAINST FRANCE, 1870-1871. 
 
 INTEODUCTION. 
 
 In few great wars has the influence of fortifications on military 
 operations been displayed in so striking a manner as in the recent 
 campaign. It is, therefore, of special interest to take a pre- 
 liminary glance at the systems of defence which had been organised 
 in the countries concerned. 
 
 This remark has reference particularly to the advance of the 
 opposing armies on Berlin and Paris respectively ; for Berlin was 
 the objective point of the French, in case the fortune of war had 
 been favourable to them on the Rhine. 
 
 In Prussia we find that from the western frontier to the 
 capital of the country the lines of the rivers and the most im- 
 portant passages over them, as well as the junctions of the high- 
 roads and railways, are protected by fortresses of suitable strength, 
 which not only cover the communications at these points, but 
 also secure the provincial capitals and the military depots against 
 the attack of an enemy. They are generally of such strategic 
 importance and so strong in themselves, that they could not be 
 neglected in any operations of a systematic and deliberate 
 nature. Besides fortresses on the lines of the Rhine and the 
 Elbe, the country is protected by an appropriate and suflScient 
 number in advanced and intermediate positions, which would 
 serve as bases and points of support to an army acting on the 
 defensive in this quarter. We believe it may be assumed that 
 a project for fortifying Berlin — though, perhaps, only in a tem- 
 porary manner — exists, and is so far completed, that its execution 
 
 36996. B
 
 could be effected in a very short time. As far as the means at the 
 disposal of the government permit, the fortresses of Prussia are 
 maintained in excellent condition, and ready for war. 
 
 In France we find a very different state of affairs. On the 
 northern and eastern frontiers lies a threefold girdle of fortresses 
 of all classes, erected for the most part by Louis XIV., ostensibly 
 as a bar to Grerman invasions. We must bear in mind, however, 
 in criticising with our present views this system of land defences, 
 that the regular siege played a far greater part in war formerly 
 than at the present day. Most of the fortresses, both large and 
 small, in that part of the coimtry were originally built, or con- 
 verted from older works to their present form, by Vauban, 
 Chamilly, and Cormontaigne. 
 
 It was on account of tlie slowness of the movements of the 
 armies of that period, and the wretched state of the country topo- 
 graphically, that the fortresses were erected in places that are now 
 of no military value ; for this war has taught us that the advance 
 of the German armies, by the roads and railways now existing, was 
 not delayed by them. As railways form now the chief lines of 
 operations of armies, a sweeping reduction in the number of the 
 small frontier fortresses should long since have been undertaken 
 in France, and there would then have been no occasion for the 
 parsimony that has been shown in the cost of their maintenance, 
 in their garrisons, and even in their armaments and supplies of 
 ammunition. Moreover the French, so long ago as 1814-15, had 
 the best of lessons, especially with regard to the numerous small 
 fortresses of the northern frontier, but to this day they have not 
 profited by it Consequently, of the fortresses in Alsace and 
 Lorraine, only the possession of Strasburg and Metz has for us a 
 decided, and that of Bitsch and Pfalzburg a subordinate interest. 
 Finally, we may observe that, in spite of these circumstances, it is 
 not unlikely that the small fortresses, being there, will be main- 
 tained for some years, because they may be useful as points of 
 support in the conquered country of Lorraine. Independent Of 
 this expense, Lorraine and Alsace will at first cost us more than 
 they will bring in. 
 
 With the fortresses of Lorraine once in our hands, the whole 
 country as far as Paris lies open. We see that, as regards places 
 to bar the communications by road, railway, or canal, Toul and, 
 perhaps, also Vitry were the only important points, since they 
 secure the line of railway leading from Metz and Strasburg, by 
 Nancy, to Paris. The advance to Paris would have been a very 
 different matter for the Grerman armies if Chalons and Soissons, 
 Rheims and Troyes, had been fortresses of suitable strength and 
 size, and had prevented us from marching straight on the capital. 
 Paris was a fortress from an early date down to the reign of 
 Louis XIV. In course of time it was repeatedly enlarged. Louis 
 XIV. caused the fortifications to be demolished, in order to improve 
 and enlarge the town, not without the opposition of Marshal 
 Vauban, who wrote a memorandum on the fortification of Paris, 
 but without result. Again, under Napoleon, suggestions were made
 
 for the fortification of Paris, put forward apparently by Marshal 
 Soult; hut the idea was not carried into execution. Thus the 
 Allies, in 1814-15, found it an open town, with nothing round it but 
 barricades and some slight works at tlie barriers and on Montmartre, 
 so that it was easily taken, after some sanguinary engagements, 
 which took place chiefly round the well-known plateau of liomain- 
 ville, and round Montmartre, then lying without the town. 
 
 Five-and -twenty years later the then premier (Thiers)succeeded 
 in fortifying the capital of the country, at a cost of 140 millions 
 of francs, according to a project proposed — so far as we are aware 
 — by General Dode de la Brunerie. The veteran diplomatist 
 Thiers, a Frenchman to the backbone, has now, after having met 
 with great opposition to his scheme of fortifying Paris, the satis- 
 faction of having seen an army of 250,000 men arrested before 
 the capital in their triumphal march, as he, with full knowledge 
 of the internal condition of France, had prophesied before the 
 outbreak of the war. 
 
 Had Paris not been a fortress, France would have been, in all 
 probability, compelled to make peace after the events of Sedan, 
 because, quite independently of the moral impression which the 
 news of the march of the Grermans on the capital of the country 
 could not fail to produce, the government, sprung from the revo- 
 lution of September, would not have had the time requisite for 
 the creation of new armies in Paris, in the South and in the North 
 of the country, for the acquisition of new materiel, and for the 
 organisation of a popular war in some of the provinces. Without 
 fortifications, Paris could not have defended itself on the 18th 
 March, 1871, and it was a strange stroke of destiny that the builder 
 of the works should stay so long before them without becoming 
 their master. 
 
 The French declaration of war, made on the most frivolous 
 grounds in Jidy, 1870, found the Grerman fortresses of thePlnne — 
 Saarlouis, Cfermersheim, Eastatt, Mainz, Coblentz, Cologne, and 
 Wesel — on a peace footing. Thanks to the admirable system 
 of readiness for war in the German army, and to the regu- 
 lations made for this purpose, these fortresses were put into a 
 complete state of defence to resist a sudden attack, with regard 
 both to their works and their armaments, before the end of 
 the first fortnight. Had the French army pressed on before this 
 time, it would, at the worst, have interfered no more with the pre- 
 paration of the fortresses than with the mobilisation of the army. 
 There must have been some important reasons why the French, 
 after completing their concentration in all essentials so early as 
 the IGth July, did not seize the opportunity to attack Saarlouis 
 and Eastatt, which lay so close to them. 
 
 On the side of the French, at the outbreak of the war, the 
 fortresses of Strasburg, Breisach, Schlettstadt, Belfort, Liitzelstein 
 (La Petite Pierre), Lichtenberg, Pfalzburg, Bitsch, Marsal, jMetz, 
 Toul, Thionville, Longwy, Montmedy, Mezieres, and Sedan were 
 declared in a state of siege, and put into a condition for defence, 
 which last, with the French, corresponds to our ' Armirung ' (pre- 
 
 B 2
 
 paration of works and armaments). But in France, dm*ing- 
 peace, with few exceptions, little or nothing is done to prepare the 
 fortresses for the transition from a condition of peace to one of 
 war, so that the armaments and works of the places there were 
 not ready beforehand ; thus it came to pass that, wherever our 
 advanced guards appeared, they found the preparations for a state 
 of siege incomplete, and interrupted them. 
 
 Never yet has so rich a field for practical and professional 
 training presented itself to the German siege artillery and to 
 the German engineers as in the late war. They had to contend 
 against adversaries, who, firm and unshaken in the traditions 
 of tlieir famous engineers and artillerymen, imagined that 
 they far excelled all other nations in fortification and in 
 gunnery, and had often declared their superiority, both verbally 
 and in writing. Our success against the French fortresses has 
 now proved, clearly and unanswerably, the superiority of the 
 German scientific arms. The armaments of the French fortresses 
 may be said to have been everywhere ample ; but they had 
 omitted to strengthen and extend the fortifications by the addi- 
 tion of detached forts, which would have kept at a distance the 
 enemy's long-range artillery, and the defence was thus at a dis- 
 advantage. Only Metz, Paris, and Belfort were provided with 
 such forts, and these fully answered the purpose for which they 
 were intended.
 
 FAPyROTYPES.M.E.
 
 LICHTENBERG. 
 
 (plate I.) 
 
 The strong mountain castle of Lichtenberg is situated at the 
 entrance to the Vosges, on an isolated conical hill overtopping the 
 table-land around it by about 100 feet. It consists of an enceinte, 
 revetted to a height of 30 to 35 feet, mth a ditch and masonry 
 counterscarp. 
 
 The escarp is broken, so as to flank the ditch, and is in some 
 places provided with machicoulis, by which fire can be directed 
 on the foot of the wall. Inside the fort is a bombproof keep, 
 which, with a few casemates, is the only accommodation for the 
 garrison. The gateway on the west side is blasted out of the 
 rock, and is protected by a ravelin in front. 
 
 The fort bars the road, which leads from Buchsweiler by 
 Ingweiler to Lemberg. It lies at one side of, and about three- 
 quarters of a mile (three-and-a-half miles English) north of the 
 road between the valleys of the Moder and the Rothbach : its in- 
 fluence on the road is dependent on the strength of the troops 
 available for offensive action from the fort. 
 
 The order for the caj^ture of the stronghold of Lichtenberg 
 reached Major- General Yon Obernitz, of the Prussian army, 
 attached to and commanding the Wiirtemberg division, on the 
 evening of the 8th Augiist. With this object a detachment, con- 
 sisting of the 1st and 3rd jiiger battalions, two batteries, half a squa- 
 dron of the 4th cavalry regiment, and a detachment of pioneers 
 (engineers), under the command of General Von Hiigel, started 
 from their bivouac near Rothbach and Ingweiler early on the 9th 
 August, and reached the fortress about half-past 7 o'clock in 
 the morning. 
 
 The village of Lichtenberg, which was weakly occupied, was 
 surrendered by the French on the approach of the detacliment. 
 Captain Schill was sent, with a flag of truce, to the fortress to 
 demand its surrender ; he returned, howe\^r, without any result, 
 after having been fired at. Upon this the 1st jager battalion 
 took up a position in the town of Lichtenberg west of the fort, 
 the 3rd in the wood to the east of it ; the cavalry main- 
 tained the communication between the two on the north side. 
 The artillery came into action at first at 2,000 paces, and 
 afterwards at 1,700 paces, to the eastward of the road leading 
 from the Moder valley Lo Lichtenberg ; later on they advanced 
 about 500 paces. 
 
 The fire of these two batteries, assisted by the musketry of the 
 two jager battalions, was answered by shells and musketry from 
 the fort, without any important result being attained on either
 
 side. About 1 1 a.m. a reinforcement of a third battery arrived, 
 and took np a position on the left of tlie batteries already in 
 action. Some of the guns in the fort were dismounted ; here 
 and there flames were seen in the work. 
 
 The fort was summoned to surrender, Imt without success ; 
 contrary to the custom of war, the flag of truce was fired 
 upon. The engagement began afresh after the arrival of two 
 more infantry companies, who took their share in the musketry 
 fight of the jager battalions ; single skirmishers advanced right up 
 to the glacis ; the pioneers burst through the barrier of the 
 palisades there. As the principal gateway was covered, and 
 could not be shelled by the artillery, and the destruction of 
 tbe buildings did not seem sufficiently extensive to justify an 
 assault, the fire upon the work was stopped late in the afternoon, 
 and the detachment began to march back, leaving before the fort 
 the half-squadron of cavalry and the 1st jager battalion. These 
 troops were to take up a position for the observation of the fortress. 
 Suddenly the roof of one of the principal buildings in the work 
 took fire, and this induced General Von Hiigel to order the 6th 
 battery, which had already inarched off", to recommence fire ; it 
 returned, and cannonaded the fort most effectively, at 1,700 paces, 
 until 7 o'clock in the evening. The damage effected in the work 
 increased visibly, and the Commandant (Second-Lieutenant Arcuer) 
 was, therefore, induced to capitulate, about 10 o'clock in the 
 evening. 
 
 The fort was taken over on the following morning, about 8 
 o'clock, by the 1st jager battalion, left behind under the command 
 of Lieutenant-Colonel Steiger ; while the rest of the detachment got 
 back, on the 1 2th August, to the division, which had in the mean- 
 time advanced to Eauweiler. The artillery had fired about 1,300 
 rounds against the fort. The garrison (consisting of three officers 
 and 280 men, including 27 wounded and 10 killed) comprised 24 
 men of the 96th line regiment, 6 gunners of the oth regiment 
 of artillery, and 240 fugitives from the battle of Worth. It seems, 
 therefore, as if the fort had not from the first been supplied with 
 its war garrison. The war-materiel captured consisted of 4 guns, 
 3 howitzers, 204 chassepot rifles, quantities of gun and musket 
 ammunition, and other artillery and engineer stores, as well as 
 provisions of every kind. 
 
 The officers were allowed to retain their swords for a time, and 
 received their private property. The rest of the garrison were at 
 once sent away as prisoners of war. The capitulation was con- 
 cluded by Major Seestorf, commanding the 1st Wiirtemberg jager 
 battalion, and approved on the 11th August by His Eoyal High- 
 ness the CrowTi Prince of Prussia, as Commander-in-Chief of the 
 Illrd army.
 
 Plate If 
 
 I -L L 
 
 J— —4 
 
 
 ^o , It vY i^'^^^'"' 
 
 J'p !\aar jlj^^^^ Seo Aoo 3oe Zoo ^m clace^r .ji^f*? ^^"^-.^ * 
 
 
 ' "^ \\::^^^P<'^'t« Pierre 
 
 I 
 
 ?(*-. 
 
 
 PApmovrpE SM.£.
 
 LUTZELSTEIN. 
 
 (plate II.) 
 
 The little fort of Liitzelstein (La Petite Pierre) bars the higli- 
 road which leads diagonally over the mountains from Hagenaii 
 to the Saar, as well as the road on the ridge from Bitsch to Pfalz- 
 burg. The roads of the Vosges here, and we may add generally, 
 are kej)t in very good order, and fit for the passage of troops of all 
 arms. 
 
 The fort of Liitzelstein has an escarp 26 feet high, which b}^ 
 its broken trace provides for the flanking of the ditch. The 
 counterscarp is of earth. The outworks on the west and south 
 sides are almost in ruins. Tlie castle in the interior of the fort, 
 constructed in the style of the middle ages, serves as a defensible 
 barrack, and may, with some alterations to the buildings, be made 
 use of as a keep. 
 
 Liitzelstein was abandoned by the enemy and fell into our 
 hands on the 9th August, and with it some guns, magazines, and 
 warlike stores. The capture of the fort was a result of the victories 
 of Weissenburg, Worth, and Saarbriicken, in consequence of which 
 the French entirely evacuated the country from the frontier to 
 the Vosges. The defence of the passes of the Vosges to the death, 
 which they had previously spoken of, was therefore but an empty 
 boast. 
 
 The fort was surrendered, with its garrison of half a company 
 of the 96th regiment of infantry, to a AViirtemberg company. 
 
 Apparently the garrison was taken by surprise at the rapid 
 advance of the German columns. On its occupation there were 
 found half-finished palisades, and great masses of squared stones, 
 which must have been prepared for building, but had not been 
 used. General De Failly, who inspected the jDlace on Sunday the 
 7th August, after the Battle of Worth, left behind him the most 
 distinct orders for its vigorous defence. A great jsart of the arms 
 and ammunition were found buried, as well as some ofiScers' baggage. 
 
 His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief of thellird 
 army, the Crown Prince Frederick William of Prussia, inspected 
 the fort, in the course of his march with the headquarters, on the 
 10th August.
 
 MAESAL. 
 
 (plate II.) 
 
 The fort of Marsal commands tlie valley of tlie Seylle, near the im- 
 portant road -junctions at Chateau-Salins and Moyenvic, where the 
 main roads — JNIetz to Strasburg, Saargemiind to Nancy, and Saar- 
 louis to Luneville — cross one another after being joined by nume- 
 rous branches. The ground in the direction of Metz forms an ex- 
 cellent defensive position if the defence of the North-east of 
 France is in question, but in the hasty retreat of the French to 
 the line of the Moselle this advantage was not made use of. 
 
 The fortress has about 1 ,200 inhabitants, and consists of seven 
 bastioned fronts, of which those commanding the chief roads, and 
 through which the latter enter the fortress, are provided with 
 ravelins. The ditches are supplied from the Seylle, and have 
 masonry escarps but no flanking defences in them ; nevertheless 
 the place must be considered as secure from assault, and much 
 must in recent times have been done to strengthen it. The ground 
 in front of the fort — which lies very low, and is intersected by 
 several channels of the Seylle — is marshy, and thus very ill-adapted 
 for the advance of troops. 
 
 The 4th Bavarian division, under the command of Lieutenant- 
 Greneral Von Bothmer, commenced their march by Tiiitzelstein on 
 the evening of the 14th August. While on the road on the 
 heights of Mecleuves, the order arrived to advance by a forced 
 march immediately through IMarsal to Luneville, in order to cover 
 the left flank. 
 
 The 4th Prussian cavalry division had already arrived before 
 Marsal on the 13th of August. They bombarded the town and 
 demanded its surrender without success ; in the evening the division 
 was relieved by three battalions and a regiment of light cavalry 
 belonging to the advanced guard of the Ilnd Bavarian corps. 
 
 On the 14th of August the ulan brigade, a detachment of 
 reserve artillery, and two companies of engineers, marched for 
 Marsal. The heights surrounding the fortress on the north and 
 south offer good commanding positions; they were each occupied 
 by a regiment of ulans and three or four batteries. All the pre- 
 parations for a vigorous bombardment were completed ; a signal 
 gun was to give the time for opening fire. The officer commanding 
 the corps, Lieut.-Gfeneral von Hartmann, sent a written demand 
 for the sm'render of the place ; during the negotiations, which 
 lasted an hour, a shot was fired from the fortress, and a Bavarian 
 battery also fired 21 rounds prematurely ; the firing was not, how-
 
 ever, without its influence on the commandant, who capitulated. 
 Sixteen officers and several hundred men forming the garrison 
 became prisoners of war, whilst 61 guns and considerable supplies 
 of all kinds fell into the hands of the Bavarian troops. 
 
 With the fall of Marsal the road through Dieuze to Nancy 
 became open, and the communications with the Khenish Palati- 
 nate were established. The war indemnity for the fortress of 
 Marsal amounted to 35,957 francs.
 
 10 
 
 VITEY. 
 
 (plate II.) 
 
 ViTRY, on the Maine, lies between the canal of La Marne and the 
 railroad from St. Dizier to Chalons, and is astride of the main road 
 from 8trasburg to Paris. The town is 300 years old, and was 
 founded by Francis I., on which account it is called ' Vitry le 
 Franpais ' ; its military importance results from the situation, which 
 gives it the command of a main road. 
 
 The fortifications of Vitry consist of nine irregular bastions. 
 There are no casemates, outworks, or detached forts : the profile 
 of the works and the flank defences are such that the place must, 
 nevertheless, be considered proof against assault. 
 
 The preparations for a siege were very scanty, as regarded both 
 works and armaments. The entrance-gates were merely barricaded 
 in such a manner as the hourly expected approach of the enemy 
 rendered absolutely requisite. A railway-bridge 100 feet long, 
 lying within range of the guns of the fort, had, however, been 
 blown up. 
 
 The head of the cavalry division, which had to clear the ground 
 for the march of the Ilird army, had, on the 24th August, ad- 
 vanced into the neighbourhood of the fortress. On the 25th 
 August the head of the advanced guard of the division arrived 
 before the fortress, and summoned the commandant to surrender 
 the place ; in case of refusal a bombardment was threatened. 
 
 About 1 1 o'clock the town capitulated, and was at once occupied 
 by a squadron of the 5th regiment of dragoons, under the com- 
 mand of Captain Von Grorschen. Three hundred men were found 
 there, all gardes mobiles, who had not yet received their clothing, 
 and who without delay laid down their arms. 
 
 The stores of arms and ammunition which the enemy left 
 behind him were also on this occasion considerable : 5,000 stand 
 of muskets, 3,000 side-arms, 17 guns complete (consisting of three 
 rifled 24-pounders, two rifled 12-pounders, three smooth-bore 24- 
 pounders, seven smooth-bore 12-pounders, and two smooth-bore 
 6-pounders) became spoil of war. 
 
 The railway-bridge that had been destroyed was at once re- 
 stored by the Royal Prussian field railway detachment. No. 2.
 
 Plate. Ilf 
 
 x/ .' ' ' 
 
 
 

 
 11 
 
 PFALZBUEG. 
 
 (plate III.) 
 
 The fortress of Pfalzburg commands the mountain road, the rail- 
 road, and the Ehiue-Marne canal, which all lead from Strasburg 
 by Zabern to Nanc}'^ and Paris. The road and the canal lie 
 lialf a mile (2^ Englisli miles) to the south of the fortress. 
 The place is iDidlt on the bastioned trace, and has six bastions. 
 The various lines of the fortress see well into the ravines, and ove]* 
 the vmdulations of the ground in front. The ditches are 24 feet 
 deep and revetted, the escarps being in part cut out of the rock, and 
 the fortress may thus be considered as perfectly secure from assault, 
 Pfalzburg- has two gateways, with bombjDroof barracks in connec- 
 tion with them, and also two large powder-magazines, amply pro- 
 tected against direct and vertical fire. Some of the bastions are 
 provided with hollow traverses, of which the foundations go down 
 to the casemates under the ramparts. Such traverses materially 
 increase the defensive strength of a place, for they afford secure 
 shelter, to the gunners and the guard of the ramparts, against the 
 destructive effect of the artillery of the attack — now a very 
 serious matter — witliout its being necessary for them to leave the 
 ramparts. 
 
 This place, like the fortresses near it, did not delay the Ilird 
 army in its advance. It was desirable, however, to obtain pos- 
 session of it, so as to open the communications in rear of the army 
 with Lorraine and Alsace. The Vlth Prussian army corps, there- 
 fore, received orders to make an attempt to take the place by means 
 of a bombardment. 
 
 The 12th division was ordered on this duty. The infantry 
 marched by the valley of the Ziesel, the artillery by the pass of 
 Liitzelstein ; and by 4 o'clock on the afternoon of the 13th August, 
 the little fortress was completely invested by the 22nd infantry 
 brigade (38th and 51st regiments and 6th jagers). In the evening 
 a reconnaissance was made towards the place, which established the 
 fact that it was amply provided with artillery. During the night 
 an engineer officer crept up to the outer slope of the ditch, and 
 ascertained that the depth of the ditch was seven metres (23 feet). 
 The general commanding, Lieutenant-Greneral Von Tiimpling, was 
 satisfied, from these observations, that a sudden assault upon this 
 very small but defensively strong fortress was not practicable, 
 at all events without special preparations. He, therefore, ordered 
 a bombardment with 60 field-guns, of which 24 were heavy. 
 These were to be jDlaced, on the night of the 13th-14th
 
 12 
 
 August, in covered emplacements on the heights of Weschheim, 
 north-Avest of Pfalzburg. The position taken up for the guns 
 was, upon the whole, the best that could be selected, considering 
 that the formation of tlie ground was unfavourable for the fire of 
 artillery, and having regard to the position and form of the object 
 aimed at. A certain amount of protection was obtained, and 
 the guns were very nearly opposite to the greatest depth of the fort. 
 1160 men were told off for the construction of the emplacements. 
 The works were carried on at night, quietly, and, considering the 
 circumstances, quickly ; and no attempt was made to desti'oy them 
 by the garrison of the fort. 
 
 At daybreak, at 4 a.m. on the 14th August, Major Eeese, of tlie 
 general staff, conveyed to the commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Taillon-Taillaut, a summons to surrender the fortress, which was 
 refused ; whereupon the fire of the batteries commenced, without 
 delay, about half-past 7 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 The artillery soon got the range. Swarms of skirmishers, as 
 opportunities offered during the cannonade, ran up towards the 
 fort, on the sides that were not directly opposed to the fire of the 
 guns, in order to operate against the infantry and gun detachments 
 in the work. The artillery of the fort answered tlie fire with about 
 10 guns, but produced little or no effect. 
 
 As the fort was provided with casemates and other bombproof 
 buildings, it did not suffer much ; but the houses in the town, and 
 especially those near the church, were much injured, although 
 they were mostly of massive construction. The artillery must 
 have fired about 1,800 rounds against the fort. Once more, at 
 half-past 7 in the evening, favourable terms were offered for the 
 surrender of the place, tln'ough Major Eeese, but again without 
 result. The commandant came out in front of the Saverne gate 
 and rejected the offered terms, which were for the free departure 
 of the garrison with their arms, in these words : '• Shoot on ; you 
 will find soon but a heap of ashes, and myself on the last gun." 
 At the same time, to prevent any misunderstanding, he gave 
 notice of a salute of 15 guns in honour of the following day, the 
 fete-day of the Emperor. As nothing more was to be gained, and 
 the advance of the corps could not be delayed, orders were given 
 for departure. The army corps reached Saarburg at 2 o'clock on 
 the morning of the 15th August, and going on through Blomont 
 got to Luneville on the 17th. 
 
 Two battalions of the 51st Lower Silesian regiment remained 
 before the fortress in observation. It should be added, that 
 during this investment the main pipe for the supply of a portion 
 of the drinking-water was discovered and destroyed. 
 
 On the 18th and 19th August the 31st landwehr regiment, 
 three battalions of the 71st landwehr regiment, a squadron of the 
 Silesian reserve regiment of dragoons, and a 4-pounder battery, 
 arrived to relieve the above-mentioned detachment of the Vlth 
 army corps, which had been left before tlie fort, and the newly- 
 arrived troops formally invested the place. 
 
 Before the departure of the battalions of the 51st regiment,
 
 13 
 
 ColoneV Kipping, who commanded it, sent an unavailing sum- 
 mons to the commandant to surrender. The fresh troops em- 
 ployed in the investment were under the command of .Major Von 
 Giese, whose headquarters were in Liitzelburg. The garrison were 
 not idle, but made several small sorties, to harass and drive back 
 their enemy. One of these was directed, on the 24th August, upon 
 the village of Unter-Eichen-Baracken — "les Baraques de chenes 
 d'en bas." The Prussian outposts there were driven out of the 
 village, which was only recaptured from the enemy on the arrival 
 of reinforcements in the course of the day. 
 
 Similar results attended the sorties of the 25t]i and 27t]i 
 August, of which the former was directed upon Mittelbronn and the 
 " red houses " — the latter again against Unter-Eichen-Baracken. 
 
 In consequence of the peculiar tactical position of the investing 
 force, and the character of the ground round Pfalzburg, a light 
 battery was attached to the force, at first from the Ilnd army 
 corps, but it was subsequently relieved by a battery from the 
 Vllltli corps. 
 
 The enemy, in spite of this reinforcement, at 4 o'clock in 
 the morning of the 24th September, made a sortie with 500 men 
 against Blichelberg, and also succeeded in maintaining his position 
 there for a short time. In this action the enemy lost 20 men 
 wounded, and our side 8. 
 
 The energies of the investing force were strained to the utmost. 
 All round them bands of franc-tireurs sprang up, against whom fre- 
 quent reconnaissances had to be made, whilst the watching of the 
 garrison at the same time demanded the closest attention. For- 
 tunately, during October it became possible to add to the weak 
 force several companies, who had been detached for the better 
 protection of the line of commimications — such, for example, as 
 those to Saarburg and Saverne. An attempt was also made t3 
 secure the cantonments against surprise, as far as possible, by 
 constructing barricades. 
 
 All the important events of the war — such as tlie capture of 
 Strasburg, the battle of Sedan, tlie capitulation of jNIetz — were 
 communicated to the commandant ; tliey had, however, no effect 
 upon his conduct. 
 
 Meanwhile, a regular siege or serious bombardment of the place 
 was contemplated : the idea, however, was abandoned when the 
 difficulty was considered of making a breach in works founded 
 partly on rock, and of approaching the jjlace by sap. It was be- 
 lieved that the enemy's morale was already shaken, and that, 
 altogether, the importance of Pfalzburg was not such as to justify 
 the sacrifice of time, of stores, and of troops which a siege would 
 require. 
 
 A long time elapsed w^ithout any events of importance taking 
 place before the fortress, of whose internal condition, especially 
 with regard to the serious diminution of provisions and consequent 
 disease, tolerably accurate information seems to have been obtained. 
 A bombardment of the fort was, therefore, evidently necessary, in 
 order to see what effect it would produce on the enemy, who" was 
 now so hardly pressed.
 
 14 
 
 This was eventually ordered for the night of the 24th-25th 
 November, and three emplacements for the field-battery already 
 mentioned were constructed at Weschheim, Quatre Vents, and 
 Les Trois Maisons ; a subdivision at each. The fort was heavily 
 bombarded, from 10 o'clock in the evening till 4 in the morning. 
 The artillery of the work did not remain silent. They answered 
 the fire vigorously and with energy, but, owing to the darkness, 
 without inflicting any serious injury upon the investing force, who 
 lost only one ofiicer and one man wounded. The result of this 
 bombardment was the entire suspension of the fire of the artillery 
 of the garrison upon the Prussian pickets. 
 
 The negotiations for a surrender were not immediately brought 
 about by this last bombardment, but the end was near. 
 
 On the 12th December the place surrendered at discretion, and 
 the investing force made its way in, after almost 18 weeks of ex- 
 traordinarily severe and exacting toil. 52 officers and 1,839 men, 
 including a considerable number of fugitives from the battles of 
 Worth and ^Yeissenburg, were made prisoners : 65 guns, of which 
 about 30 were rifled, and other warlike stores were captured. No 
 particular written agreement was made for the surrender of the 
 fortress : to this the commandant, who announced his intention of 
 giving himself up in a letter conveyed to Major Von Griese by a 
 deputation, would not consent. The provisions were consumed, 
 and the capitulation was the result, so that the brave garrison and 
 their determined commandant deserved that the endurance they 
 had displayed should be recognised. It was ascertained that the 
 fort had never from the first been completely provisioned, and its 
 fall must have infallibly taken place earlier, but for certain 
 accidental circumstances, favourable to the garrison, which happened 
 at the right moment. Among these was the arrival of some 
 French provision columns after the battle of Worth, and also a 
 similar train, which, originally intended for Bitsch, was unable to 
 reach its destination, on account of the advance of the Germans 
 having rendered the country insecure, and was therefore welcomed 
 at Pfalzburg. 
 
 The town had sustained very serious damage from the 
 shells. Nearly 80 buildings were destroyed by fire, and of the 
 3,000 inhabitants present before the war, nearly 1,000 had taken 
 to flight. The German government, therefore, allowed the town 
 to receive a considerable sum, out of the proceeds of the money 
 raised by contribution from the French, as compensation for losses 
 sustained in the war, and to aid in rebuilding the houses.
 
 Plate IV. 
 
 fA Prno TIPS S .1*. £
 
 15 
 
 BITSCH. 
 
 (rLATE IV.) 
 
 Three main roads from the Ehine valley unite at the fortress 
 of Bitsch, only three-quarters of a mile (tliree-and-a-half English 
 miles) from the frontier of the Bavarian Palatinate, and two of 
 them continue to Saar-union and Saargemlind. The place is 
 on the projected line of railroad from Hagenau to Saargemiind. 
 The town, with 3,000 inhabitants, extends along the western base 
 of a precipitous oblong hill 90 to 100 feet high, and is cut in two 
 by the Hornbach, which can be made available for inundation by 
 means of sluices. The meadow-land above and below the town is 
 impracticable, and equally unfavourable for forming saps or build- 
 ing batteries. The country round is a barren hilly tableland, 
 deficient in water, partially wooded, and only broken here and there 
 by solitary scattered rocky knolls. Some of these knolls — as, for 
 instance, the heights between the Weissenbourg and Strasburg 
 roads — overtop the mountain-fort, and afford sites in some respects 
 well adapted for batteries, to which, however, it is difficult to take 
 the guns, on account of the want of roads. 
 
 The sandstone rock, upon which the fortress is situated, was 
 from the earliest times crowned with fortifications, which had to 
 be razed at the peace of Ryswick. France, however, caused this 
 mountain-fort to be rebuilt, by the Marquis of Bambelle, in the 
 style of the period, in 1741. The most important part of the 
 fortress consists of a long quadrangle, from whose four angles 
 bastions project. The north front is further strengthened by a 
 horn-work with a ravelin, and also by an advanced tenailled work 
 farther down the slope. The escarp on the long sides is broken 
 into short lengths, to obtain flank defence, and is in part hewn out 
 of the rock. Some 40 or 45 feet below the upper work lies the 
 lower fort. It is connected with the first by communications of 
 every kind, such as ramps and staircases, and follows with its 
 tenailled trace the edge of the almost perpendicular cliff. Two 
 practicable roads — the one on the west, the other on the south-west 
 side of the hill — lead out of the town into the upper fort, which 
 they enter through gates secured by proper works, and provided 
 with drawbridges. Besides these, there is, between the hill-fort 
 and the town, an imdergTound passage entirely hewn or mined out 
 of the rock, and said by military historians to have been used 
 during the attack by the Prussians, on the 15th October 1793. 
 This attack, as is well known, failed. 
 
 The defences of the town on the south-west side consist of
 
 16 
 
 bastioned fronts with liigh revetments and deep dry ditches ; the 
 entrances are so closed as to be defensible, and portions of the bridges 
 are moveable. In more recent times defences on a larger scale 
 have been constructed on the west side, consisting of three bas- 
 tioned fronts with connecting lines on the flanks. At the north- 
 west angle is situated the new citadel. It is designed with deep 
 ditches with three caponiers in them, and its interior consists of a 
 two-storied, massive, bombproof redoubt. A wall 25 feet high, 
 with a glacis in front, joins it, and serves as a covered communica- 
 tion to the fort on the hill, and this wall is flanked by the tenailled 
 work of which mention has been made above. Behind the gorge 
 of the citadel is the powder-magazine, completely buried in the 
 ground, and thus perfectly secure from shell-fire. The remaining 
 bastions are connected with one another by long curtains, and 
 provided with large traverses on the capitals, which contain 
 casemates of all descriptions. Bitsch has the great advantage 
 over many of the small French fortresses of the possession of 
 numerous well constructed casemates, which are appropriated to 
 different purposes. Excepting the governor's house, the chapel, 
 and a barrack on the jplace cVarines, all the buildings are bomb- 
 proof; there are the most admirable casemates and underground 
 chambers, which can be made use of as secure cover for the troops 
 and their provisions. The well, 240 feet deep, deserves notice, 
 being also arched over and bombproof. 
 
 The relative levels of the defences are such, that not only the 
 ground in front, but also the more recent advanced defences in the 
 plain, are perfectly seen into by the fort on the hill ; the construc- 
 tion of approaches against the fortress, or of a lodgment in the 
 works lying under the chief fort, is therefore impracticable. 
 
 At the time when the French army set out for Grermany the 
 corps of Greneral Failly was stationed at Bitsch. 
 
 On the 7th August, after the battle of Worth, a part of the right 
 wing of the French army — apparently the army of MacMahon, 
 Avhich subsequently appeared again at Chalons — fell back on the 
 road to Bitsch, in order thence to recommence their retreat 
 through the Vosges. It is not to their credit that they neglected 
 to blow up the railway-tunnels behind them, a measure that would 
 have done infinite injury to the Grerman army, as regarded the 
 bringing-up of troops and provisions. The Grermans, after their 
 victory, did not delay in following up the enemy. On the 8th 
 August the Ilnd Bavarian army corps was before Bitsch. An 
 attempt was made to obtain the surrender of the rock-fort, which 
 was provided with a numerous garrison and armament. With 
 tbis object a battery of Bavarian horse artillery formed up and 
 fired a few rounds at it. The fort answered at once, and it 
 very soon became apparent that the end was not to be gained in 
 this fashion, without siege-batteries or heavy guns. The advance 
 of the army corps could not, however, be delayed on this account, 
 so that there was no choice but to march round the fortress. This 
 was done in three forced marches, of which the first was to Lemberg, 
 the second to Montbronn, and the third to St. Lorenzen. The
 
 17 
 
 roads traversed were, however, so bad, that, although the pioneers- 
 worked at them overnight, they could only be passed by the 
 infantry in file, and by the artillery with the utmost difficulty. 
 We mention these marches to show how great was the influence 
 of even this small fortress which lay in the line of march of the 
 Grerman armies. 
 
 Meanwhile, on the German side, the fortress was watched, siege- 
 guns were brought into position from Germersheim, and the 2nd 
 Bavarian regiment of field artillery was charged with the 
 duty of commencing the bombardment. The field-batteries were 
 in conveniently arranged emplacements covered by the ground. 
 Batteries had been built for the heavy siege artillery, and the 
 direction of the bombardment was given to Colonel Kohlermann. 
 It was commenced on the 23rd August, and was continued during 
 the following days, according to circumstances, without ever 
 becoming a pitched battle of artillery. 
 
 On the Ith September the French made a sortie with a large 
 force, and a tolerably severe engagement ensued. The defenders- 
 were beaten back, witli a loss of 50 killed and wounded and 17 
 prisoners, while the Bavarians lost 6 killed and 10 wounded. 
 
 It was soon seen that an energetic defence was to be en- 
 countered, for which piu-pose the German force at hand was 
 insufficient. Accordingly the 3rd and 8th Bavarian regiments, 
 a company of Bavarian garrison artillery, and a Bavarian company 
 of pioneers, arrived before the fortress as a reinforcement. The 
 siege artillery comprised 16 heavy guns and 4 mortars. 
 
 On the 10th September Colonel Kohlermann intimated that a 
 bombardment of the fortress and town was imminent, and gave 
 permission to the inhabitants to depart. Many of these would 
 have availed themselves of the humane intention of the com- 
 manding-officer of the investing force, but the commandant of 
 the fortress, Lieutenant-Colonel Theyssier, interfered to some extent 
 with their departure, as he -^^dshed the citizens to take part in the 
 defence. 
 
 After these preliminaries the serious bombardment began, at 
 half-past 5 in the morning of the 11th September. As the 
 weather was clear, the fire of the siege batteries was attended with 
 the best results. Firing was soon begun in the fortress, and the 
 artillery of the besiegers at first kept up the fight very briskly, 
 but afterwards with long intervals of silence. About 2 o'clock in 
 the afternoon the fire ceased on both sides. 
 
 On the 12 th Sejatember the bombardment of the fortress was 
 continued. Towards 6 in the evening the churcli in tlie town was 
 in flames, which soon spread in the small closely-built-up town, 
 and between 60 and 70 houses were destroyed. During the day a 
 messenger from the town appeared at the outposts, and begged of 
 the commanding-officer of the investing force that the citizens 
 might depart free. However, after what had taken place, as 
 above stated, this could not be agreed to. 
 
 During the night the fire on both sides slackened somewhat, 
 
 S6996. C
 
 18 
 
 and did not become heavy again until towards the morning of the 
 13th. 
 
 The results were inconsiderable, and it was not till the 14th 
 September that the siege artillery succeeded in setting fire to some 
 of the few destructible buildings on the place cVarmes of the 
 fortress — a result, however, that did not have the smallest in- 
 fluence in inducing the commandant to surrender. 
 
 It was owing to various reasons that the final effect of this 
 bombardment of four days' duration was much inferior to the results 
 which we had learnt to expect from similar undertakings before 
 other fortresses. I^he fort was defended by an energetic comman- 
 dant, was amply provided with ammunition and provisions, and 
 possessed most excellent bombproof cover for the garrison and 
 stores. On the Grerman side they were now convinced that 
 a bombardment alone, even on a larger scale, would not suffice for 
 the attainment of the object in view. A regular siege was not 
 contemplated by the Grerman military authorities, because it would 
 have required a greater expenditure in materiel, troops, and stores, 
 than the value of the fortress would have justified. 
 
 Under these circumstances, it was considered advisable merely 
 to observe the place from a greater distance, to prevent attacks 
 of the garrison on Grerman provision and ammunition trains. 
 
 A part of the investing force was, therefore, detailed for other 
 duty, and the observation of the fortress was handed over to four 
 Bavarian landwehr battalions and a light field-battery. The 
 heavy siege artillery were sent back to Grermersheim. The force 
 remaining before the fortress made every preparation for the 
 winter. The main body went into conveniently situated canton- 
 ments — some troops being held in constant readiness— and the 
 supports of the outposts were put into huts erected for the 
 purpose wherever required. Terrible damage was inevitably done 
 to property in the afflicted town, but every alleviation that was 
 practicable was now afforded to the people, both as regarded their 
 maintenance and their trade ; it was, however, a question whether 
 these concessions granted to the town were not made use of for the 
 benefit of the French garrison, and especially for the completion of 
 their stocks of provisions. 
 
 The observation of the fortress from a greater distance was 
 continued quietly, except when an occasional encounter with the 
 garrison took place. 
 
 Such an event was the sortie undertaken by the French at 
 midnight on the 30th September, which was directed against the 
 Rosshall farm. This place, consisting of two homesteads, was 
 set on fire by the troops engaged in the sortie, who were not till 
 after four hours' fighting driven back into the fortress, from which 
 they sallied forth a second time at 8 o'clock on the following 
 morning. It was generally believed that these two sorties were 
 merely undertaken to facilitate foraging operations in the neigh- 
 bourhood and the supply of provisions to the fortress, for which 
 purpose there was no want of co-operation from the people of the 
 country. For similar reasons, apparently, the French made a
 
 19 
 
 reconnaissance on the 19th November to Hottweiler, where a 
 slight engagement took place. 
 
 Then the winter came on, which made the duty of keeping 
 guard over the fortress very severe for the investing force ; but 
 their condition was so far improved, that the garrison remained 
 peaceably in their works, and gave no occasion for further hos- 
 tilities. 
 
 In the convention agreed to between Grermany and France on 
 the 11th March, 1871, which related to the restoration of the 
 French prisoners of war, the necessary [stipulations were made 
 with regard to the garrison of the fortress of Bitsch, which was 
 given over to Germany at the conclusion of peace. It was 
 allowed that the garrison of Bitsch should march out with 
 all the honours of war. They were to take with them 
 arms, baggage, warlike stores, and all records not belonging to the 
 fortress. The surrender of the fortress was, however, delayed until 
 the end of the month of March. The French garrison, about 
 3,000 strong, was moved in several detachments to Versailles, 
 where they arrived on the 6th April. On the 26th March detach- 
 ments of the Bavarian investing force occupied the town and the 
 fort, and remained until they were relieved, on the 2nd April, by 
 the 1st battalion of the 60th regiment, thenceforward to be the 
 Prussian garrison. 
 
 The town had suffered much from the bombardment. Of 390 
 dwelling-houses, 150 were entirely destroyed, and the rest more or 
 less injured. The damage was estimated at 1,340,000 francs, 
 exclusive of the loss of moveable property. 
 
 The little fortress could boast that it was blockaded during the 
 whole of the time the war lasted, and remained unconquered. It 
 is, however, the fact, as we have seen, that the Germans never 
 besieged it in earnest. 
 
 C 2
 
 20 
 
 TOUL. 
 
 (plate v.) 
 
 The fortress of Toul has 7,000 inhabitants, and is situated thirty- 
 five (164 English) miles from Paris, on the left bank of the Moselle, 
 in a valley also intersected by many smaller streams. On the 
 north the fortress is commanded by the Mont St. Michel, defen- 
 sively a most important position, which in the plans for the recon- 
 struction of the fortress, about thirty years ago, was disregarded in 
 a manner that now appears unaccountable, because the effects of 
 long-range rifled guns upon siege operations were not then known. 
 The road from Nancy crosses the Moselle. The work rests upon 
 the river, which can be dammed up, so as to form an inundation. 
 For this purpose assistance can also be obtained from the Ehine- 
 Marne canal. 
 
 The fortifications consist of a bastioned nonagon, with several 
 ravelins, no flank defences in the ditch, earthen counterscarps, and 
 revetted scarps. They completely encircle the town, but outside 
 the works are situated the suburbs of St. Mansuy on the north- 
 east, and St. Evre on the south-west. The place is rated as a 
 fortress of the second class, and is built without casemates. In 
 default of them some blindages for guns had been made on the 
 ramparts. The garrison were lodged in private houses and huts^ 
 There are no main bombproof magazines for powder. Outworks 
 there are none, but some bastions are provided with cavaliers. The 
 railway lies on the north-west of the town, some 500 paces from 
 the fortress. The cathedral has some architectural merit. It is 
 bviilt in the gothic style of the thirteenth and fourteenth cen- 
 turies, and has four magnificent towers and very fine stained-glass 
 windows. 
 
 Although the fortress placed no important obstacle in the way 
 of the advance of the Ilird army, still the transport of supplies 
 and stores of every description was much delayed, in spite of the 
 use made of the numerous bye-roads, and ran some risk from the 
 attacks of marauding gardes-mobiles and franc-tireurs. The con- 
 veyance of the sick and wounded to the rear became continually 
 more difficult as the army advanced, and the time was indefinitely 
 postponed when it would be possible for the transport department 
 to bring to the front, as rapidly as. was desired, the artillery stores 
 of all descriptions required for the contemplated siege of Paris. 
 Our complete and excellent railway organisation became paralysed 
 at Toul, so that even at this time it had been considered whether a 
 line branching off from Frouard should not be constructed. Thus,
 
 Plate. V. 
 
 - Fapyrotype S.M.E.
 
 21 
 
 from the undeniable present strategical importance of the fortress, 
 the occupation of Toul had become for us a necessity. 
 
 On the 14th August the head of the advance guard of the 
 4th cavalry division appeared before the place, and, after a slight 
 engagement with the cavalry of the garrison (cuirassiers and geus- 
 d'armes), summoned the place to surrender, but in vain. For this 
 purpose Lieutenant the Prince of Hohenlohe was sent with a flag 
 of truce ; he was fired upon. 
 
 The advanced guard of the IVth army corps, coming up at this 
 jimcture, received orders to make a reconnaissance in force towards 
 Toul. The bearer of a flag of truce sent on before returned without 
 having achieved any results, and the trumpeter who accompanied 
 him was shot. On the 17th August two Prussian batteries were placed 
 in position — one under the hill of St. Michel, the other on the road 
 by Grondreville to Nancy — on the east of the fortress. They shelled 
 the place, and fire soon broke out at the Moselle gate. The formation 
 of the ground in the immediate neighbourhood, and the inundation 
 that had been made, apart from the strength of the fortifications, 
 made it impracticable to carry the place by storm. This demon- 
 stration caused considerable losses, especially to the 27th and 93rd 
 regiments. 
 
 Upon this the army corps resumed its advance, and orders 
 were issued from the headquarters of the Ilird army for a close 
 investment of the place by the 7th Bavarian brigade under General 
 Thiereck, two squadrons of light cavalry, and two field batteries. 
 Of the Prussians, the corps artillery of the Vlth corps and the 38th 
 regiment of Silesian fusiliers, under the command of Lieutenant- 
 General von Gfordon, stayed behind to assist the Bavarians. 
 
 The Prussian batteries were placed in well-covered positions on 
 the slopes of the hills, near the village of Dommartin ; the Bavarian 
 batteries on Mont St. Michel and at the village of La Justice, which 
 joins on to and is a suburb of the town. The French allowed the 
 batteries to be prepared unmolested, although a sortie of the 
 garrison might have been advantageously directed against them. 
 The distance of all the batteries from the place was nearly the 
 same — about 2,500 paces. Orders were issued by H.R.H. the 
 Commander-in-Chief to spare the town, and especially the cathe- 
 dral. P^or this reason, and also because it was desired to obtain 
 the surrender of the fortress without bombardment, Colonel 
 Arnold, of the 6th Prussian regiment of field artillery, 
 was sent into the place with a flag of truce. He was referred to 
 the council of war, and brought back the reply that they would 
 not listen to proposals for a capitulation. It was then observed 
 that the preparation of the defences for a siege was not completed, 
 as was indeed generally the case. Neither the railway-works nor 
 the houses in the neighbourhood, shutting in the fortifications, 
 "were destroyed or removed. The plantations left standing on 
 the glacis did certainly prevent the besiegers from seeing into 
 the work, but the view from INIont St. Michel was entirely unin- 
 terrupted. 
 
 On the 23rd August, at 8.45 a.m., the bombardment began,
 
 22 
 
 and was directed at first solely against the works, but afterwards 
 upon the town. A barrack and a forage-store were set on fire, 
 and unfortunately also a military hospital near the barrack was 
 burnt down. Five of these hospitals had been marked con- 
 spicuously by the French with white flags with the red cross upon 
 them. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Hartmann was sent with a second flag 
 of truce to the fortress, accompanied by two civilians, but without 
 results, and the firing, therefore, was resumed. Meanwhile the 
 Prussian artillery received orders to follow the Ilird army in their 
 advance to Chalons, whilst the Bavarian batteries continued their 
 operations before the fortress. Unfortunately, it was not possible 
 to spare the towers of the cathedral, for one of them was used as 
 an observatory by the French garrison. The shot, however, struck 
 only the flat roof of the tower, and destroyed some architectural 
 decorations, but without in any way injuring the beautiful fabric 
 of the building. The French responded at first with moderate 
 vigour, and fired against the German batteries, from their heavy 
 guns, every description of projectile applicable — round-shot, shell, 
 and shrapnel. 
 
 The French chassepot bullets fell in the Grerman batteries, 
 showing the great range of these weapons. Altogether there must 
 have been fired against tlie fortress some 600 rounds from the 
 Bavarian guns, and about 2,500 from the Prussian. 
 
 On the capitulation of Sedan the intelligence of that event 
 was communicated to the commandant. Meanwhile direc- 
 tions had been given to use against the fortress heavy smooth- 
 bore garrison guns, to be brought up to Toul from Marsal. 
 The transport of the guns over the slippery country roads, made 
 soft by rain, and up to the elevated sites of the batteries, was a 
 matter of much difficulty. 
 
 The place was only invested by the landwehr garrison regi- 
 ment of Torgau, under the command of Colonel von Hippel. It 
 was the supposition that a larger body of troops was present 
 for this purpose that prevented the enemy from making sorties. 
 He confined himself entirely to observation, ai^d to sending out 
 the usual patrols. 
 
 Special mention should be made of the bombardment which 
 took place on the 9th and 10th September, after one more useless 
 summons to surrender. On the last day nearly 1,000 rounds were 
 fired during nine hours. The batteries were placed on both sides 
 of the road to Ecrouves, not far from the porcelain-factorj'-. 
 
 But this attempt to make use of the garrison artillery, that 
 had arrived, seemed not to produce the effect desired, owing to the 
 invariably long range, the want of made-up ammunition, and the 
 small striking force of the projectiles. The garrison expected relief 
 from a force said to be 5,000 strong, and to be coming up 
 from Langres. 
 
 On the 1 3th September tlie 1 7th division, under the command 
 of Lieutenant-Gfeneral von Schimmelmann, being considerably 
 strengthened in field artillery, relieved the landwehr troops, and
 
 23 
 
 advanced their outposts much nearer the fortress, in order by degrees 
 to shut the garrison in more closely, and, as far as possible, to pre- 
 vent them from communicating with the suburbs. This operation 
 was not, however, to be accomplished without loss, for the enemy, 
 bringing a well-directed fire from wall-pieces to bear, resisted the 
 assailants to the uttermost. A reconnaissance of the ground round 
 the fortress, in which his Royal Highness the Grand Duke of 
 Mecklenbm'g himself took part, made it evident that the place 
 could be seen into from Mont Michel in a manner scarcely 
 credible. 
 
 On the Prussian side they went at once to work to place three 
 heavy field-batteries on Mont Michel, a task which, laborious as it 
 was, was accomplished by the artillery in one night, so that the 
 guns were able to open fire by the following morning. The fire was 
 directed on the covered emplacements for guns on the defences, 
 and against the observatory on the cathedral. It was interesting 
 here to observe with what precision the artillery fired, although 
 the distance was 1,900 paces. The second shell fell right on the 
 roof of the magnificent church, and knocked the objectionable 
 observatory from its place. 
 
 On September 16th Captain von Rochow, of the cavalry, was 
 sent with a flag of truce into the fortress, but without result. As 
 on former occasions, he was fired upon. 
 
 On the next day, as well as on September 18th, the whole of 
 the field-batteries were employed — namely, four Mecklenburg and 
 three Prussian batteries, which had meanwhile been placed in 
 separate positions around the fortress : on the one hand to harass 
 the garrison, for which purpose they fired alternately at the bar- 
 racks and at the observatory, which was again and again replaced ; 
 and, on the other hand, to reply shot for shot to the fortress, in 
 order to silence its batteries, which was also done in a short time. 
 
 On September 16th, orders were received for the removal of a 
 brigade of infantry, the 75th and 76th Hanseatic regiments, the 
 cavalry, except one regiment of dragoons, and the whole of the 
 light field-batteries. The remainder were, however, considered 
 sufficient for the capture of the fortress. 
 
 There were left before the place only seven battalions of in- 
 fantry, of the 89th and 90tli Mecklenburg regiments, and the 14th 
 jager battalion, besides a company of pioneers, three heavy and 
 one horse artillery battery, and a regiment of cavalry, the 18th 
 Mecklenburg dragoons. As the force was so reduced, the invest- 
 ment of the place had to be kept up with redoubled vigilance. 
 The outpost duties of the troops, therefore, obviously necessitated 
 great exertions. These duties were, nevertheless, materially 
 increased, when the siege artillery arrived before Toul on September 
 20, with a complete siege-train, consisting of ten rifled 24-pounders 
 and sixteen rifled 12-pounders, under the command of Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Bartsch, and when, on the 21st and 22nd September, suffi- 
 cient means being at hand, they were able to proceed to the estab- 
 lishment of the depot and the construction of the batteries. 
 Moreover, the preparations above mentioned for the engineer
 
 24 
 
 attack, imder the direction of Major Schumann, of the engineers, 
 required a veiy considerable number of men. The field-officer 
 named had been present before Toul for some time, and had taken 
 in hand the most necessary reconnaissances. He had perceived 
 that bastion No. 2 was unmistakably the point for attack, and in 
 consequence of the simple character of the profile, and the inva- 
 riable Aveakness of the artillery of the defence (which had become 
 more obvious during the progress of the siege), had proposed an 
 abridged formal attack. The idea was to open a parallel some 
 500 paces from the work, making a covered communication only, 
 •where necessary, and then advance direct on the breach, which 
 was to be made by curved fire. It was hoped that the water in 
 the ditch of the work might be drawn off by blowing up certain 
 sluices, or by breaching a batardeau that had been discovered with 
 much pains. By his direction Lieutenant Strobel, of the com- 
 pany of Bavarian pioneers, stationed in Ecrouves as an ' Etappen ' 
 garrison, had very cleverly blown up a sluice. This demolition, 
 however, did not produce the desired effect. 
 
 In order that tlie projected works might be executed in safety, 
 the outposts were pushed up as close as possible to the ramparts, 
 and all the suburbs — viz. St. Just, St. Evre, and Mansuy — were 
 occupied. The operation of forming a lodgment was, however, 
 interfered with by the shells of tlie enemy, which set the villages 
 on fire in some places, and inflicted considerable loss on the troops 
 engaged. Two battalions of infantry, besides the whole of the 
 artillery and the pioneers, were required for the formation of the 
 battery depots and the construction of ten siege-batteries, and 
 by an extraordinary effort the latter were got ready to open 
 fire early on the 23rd. From the first no great results were 
 anticipated from the fire of the siege artillery. The enemy had, 
 indeed, answered the fire of our guns, though not with much 
 vigour. The fire was especially feeble from the mortars, which 
 could not be got at by the Prussians. This scanty mortar-fire 
 must, however, be considered as a measure of prudence on the part 
 of the defenders, in order to preserve their guns until the last mo- 
 ment. Now, however, they showed with what force they could 
 reply, so that it became our object to reduce them to silence as 
 soon as possible. 
 
 H.E.H. the Grrand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, com- 
 manding the 13th army corps, had arrived at Choloy from 
 Rheims on the night of the 23rd, in order to be present at the 
 close of the siege. Mont Barine, near Mont St. jMichel, was 
 used as a point of observation, H.R.H. the Grrand Duke and 
 Greneral von Schimmelmann remained there to watch the events 
 expected to take place ; the batteries proceeded with their 
 allotted tasks during the morning ; the breaching battery acted 
 chiefly as a counter-battery, as a clump of trees and houses 
 prevented it from performing its legitimate duty. The enemy 
 answered the fire principally with mortars, for the other pieces 
 on the ramparts were soon silenced. Several military buildings 
 and magazines took fire ; it was also observed what good results 
 attended the artillery practice on the porte de la France. On the
 
 25 
 
 other hand, the enemy's shells, about 11 o'clock in the forenoon, 
 set the suburbs of Mansuy and St. Evre in flames, both of which 
 were occupied by the Germans. 
 
 All arrangements had been made, in order, with tlie help of 
 the men available, to throw up, on the night of the 24th, the 
 parallel, of which the position had already iDeen determined by 
 the engineer officers, when, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, it 
 was reported that the white flag waved on the cathedral. The 
 flag was but small, and it could not therefore be made out, with 
 certainty, whether there was not a red cross on it. Recently the 
 enemy had often resorted to the jilan of hoisting a flag of this 
 kind near the ramparts, for the purpose of repairing any injuries 
 clone to the guns. 
 
 The waving of a white flag on the cathedral had, however, 
 been agreed upon as a signal that the Commandant was willing 
 to enter into negotiations. H.R.H. the Grrand Duke had, 
 before the arrival of this intelligence, gone from ]Mont Barine for 
 a short time to Choloy. On receipt of the news, His Royal High- 
 ness and his staff at once mounted their horses, and rode to the 
 scene of action. On the way to Toul he met Major (Command- 
 ing) von Zeuner, who was bringing with liim a French staff- 
 officer, on horseback, with his eyes bandaged. This officer brought 
 a letter from the commandant, announcing his willingness to 
 treat with the Greneral of the North German Confederation. 
 Colonel von Krensky, Chief of the general staff of the Xlllth 
 army corps, was accordingly sent for this purpose to the com- 
 mandant of the fortress of Toul, and on the glacis of the work 
 the negotiations for a capitulation were brought to a successful 
 conclusion, on the basis of tlie terms granted at Sedan. The 
 French garrison — some 2,300 men, including a few line soldiers, 
 but most of them gardes mobiles, with 130 cuirassiers — filed out 
 of the fortress on to the glacis in front of the Porte de la 
 France ; whilst the troops of the division, or as many of them as 
 could be got together, marched with great demonstrations of joy 
 into the fortress and the town. The prisoners were moved into 
 bivouac near the fortress. Of the 109 officers, as many as gave 
 their parole not to serve any more against Prussia were allowed to 
 depart, and the remainder were kept in the fortress under the 
 guarantee of the commandant. The quantity of military stores 
 captured was considerable, and included 30,000 stand of arms, 
 120 guns, 150,000 cartridges, and other things, besides a flag and 
 some standards. On the 25th, at 11 a.m., the formal entry 
 into the town took place, under the command of H.R.H. the 
 Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and his Highness the Duke of 
 Altenburg. The troops paraded in the Place Dauphine, where 
 the Grand Duke caused a cheer to be given for the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, His Majesty the King. The inhabitants had 
 been shut up in the fortress for six weeks, and the North German 
 troops were welcomed by them as deliverers. The garrison had 
 conducted themselves with extreme bravery. They only yielded 
 when they had fired their last shell.
 
 26 
 
 LAON. 
 
 (plate VI.) 
 
 Laon, a town of 10,500 inhabitants, is situated on an isolated hill 
 about 80 metres (262 feet) high, which commands the Ardon, an 
 affluent of the Ailette. It is at the junction of four railways, of 
 which two come from the north-east and the south-east, from 
 Belgimn and from Eheims ; while the other two lead on to the 
 westward, to Terg-nier (for Namur, Amiens, and Paris), and to 
 Soissons (for Paris). Besides this, the roads from Montcornet, 
 Vervins, Crecy sur Serre, Crepy, Chauny, Coucy, Vailly, Fismes, 
 and Kethel all meet in Laon, so that it is one of the most important 
 points for an army operating against Paris. Laon might have been 
 a rendezvous for the gardes nationales and gardes mobiles, and 
 from it they could have continually disturbed our communications 
 with the rear. It is situated at a distance of 140 kilometres (87 
 English miles) from Paris by the Soissons road, and 158 kilometres 
 (98 English miles) by Tergnier. 
 
 The isolated hill on which Laon is situated is shaped like a 
 half-moon, with the horns to the east. 
 
 The citadel, which was strengthened under Louis Philippe, is 
 on the eastern point of the hill, and commands in part the railway 
 station (the only one) on the north of the town, near the suburb 
 of St. Marcel, and to a less extent the suburbs of La Neuville 
 and Semilly, lying to the westward and southward ; but more 
 especially the ground lying opposite to the east front, with the 
 suburbs of Vaux and d' Ardon. 
 
 A section of the 15th (ulan) regiment had summoned the com- 
 mandant of the garrison of Laon to surrender on the 8th September, 
 and he had asked for time for consideration till 4 o'clock in the 
 afternoon. When the news of this reached the 6th cavalry dirision, 
 Colonel von Alvensleben'was sent to Laon with the 15th cavalry 
 brigade and a mounted battery, and took with him a treaty of 
 capitulation, ready drawn out. To Colonel von Alvensleben the 
 commandant again made objections, and begged for further time 
 for consideration, till 9 o'clock on the morning of the 9th 
 September. The 4th jager battalion had been brought up the 
 day before as far as Eppes, and a battery of the 4th corps had 
 marched into St. Quentin. On the 9th September, at 6 a.m., the 
 14th cavalry brigade and a horse artillery battery also started for 
 Laon. ' On his arrival at Eppes Colonel von Alvensleben reported 
 that the capitulation was concluded, and that the citadel, with all 
 the troops and military stores, would be given over to the division 
 about half-past 1 1 o'clock.
 
 Plate Vf. 
 
 papyrotype, s. m e
 
 27 
 
 Probably the cause of this hasty and unexpected surrender was 
 the open dissension between the commandant, the prefect, the 
 mayor and the gardes mobiles, which was such that none of the 
 authorities mentioned would trust one anotlier ; and this, con- 
 sidering the state of affairs, was undoubtedly a great evil. 
 
 The division marched into Laon, both batteries took up a 
 position before the town, and the 14th cavalry brigade formed 
 up next to them. The 15th cavalry brigade had previously 
 occupied all the roads round Laon, and remained in their position. 
 The jager battalion detached a company to occupy the suburbs ; 
 two companies marched up to the marketplace of Laon, and 
 occupied all the outlets ; the 4th company marched with the 
 divisional staff and the staffs of the two brigades to the citadel. 
 The heads of the ' Intendant ' department and Captain Mann, of 
 the horse artillery battery, also accompanied them — the former to 
 take over the general stores, the latter the garrison guns and ma- 
 teriel of war. 
 
 At the entrance of the citadel there was a guard of the gardes 
 mobiles, which was at once relieved by a section of the jagers. In 
 the courtyard of the citadel was stationed the garrison — consisting 
 of about 2,000 men of the gardes mobiles, and one subdivision of 
 infantry of the line of the 55th regiment — ready to march off. 
 
 The capitulation then took place, on the basis of that of Sedan. 
 All the officers who gave their word of honour not to take further 
 part against Grermany were allowed to leave. The arms were laid 
 down, and the gardes mobiles, after they had bound themselves by 
 oath not to fight any more against Grermany, were let go. Finally 
 the party of infantry of the line were conducted to the town under 
 escort. A great part of the officers, as well as the commandant 
 himself, remained behind in the courtyard of the citadel, when, 
 as soon as the last man of the gardes mobiles had passed 
 the gate of the citadel, about two o'clock in the afternoon, 
 two terrible explosions took place, one immediately after the 
 other. 
 
 The powder-magazine, into which probably all the shells and 
 grenades had been brought, Avith 26,000 kilogrammes'^ of powder 
 in bulk, besides all the cartridges, blew up, and apparently also a 
 mine. The magazine stood at the edge of the courtyard of the 
 citadel. All the persons present in the courtyard, as well as 
 the company of jagers posted there, were almost buried under 
 the earth and rubbish. The shells, loose stones, and fragments of 
 masonry iBew right into and beyond the suburbs lying beneath 
 Laon, and injured men, houses, and roofs. The destruction was 
 frightful. Almost every person in the courtyard of the citadel at 
 the time was either killed or wounded — some severely, and some 
 slightly. The half-company of jagers lay on the parade-ground 
 horribly mutilated, and 40 of them were killed on the spot. Duke 
 William of Mecklenburg, commanding the division. Colonel Count 
 Grroben, Major von Schonfels, of the general staff, and Lieutenant 
 Count Koss, of the King's hussars, were more or less wounded. 
 
 * 26 tons, or 585 barrels.
 
 28 
 
 Captain Mann, the only officer on horseback at the moment, was 
 killed. 
 
 The commandant, General Theremin d'Hame, was arraigned 
 before a Prussian court-martial, but, however, no blame for the 
 unhappy event could be brought home to him. Probably it had 
 been caused by a subaltern of garrison artillery named Henriot, 
 actuated by revenge, who had found means to obtain the key of 
 the powder-magazine. At the same time he himself perished. 
 General Theremin d'Hame died on the 14th October, of the wound 
 he had received from the explosion. 
 
 The booty consisted of 35 guns (of which 8 were rifled 
 1 6-pounders) 2,000 stand of arms, and a quantity of other warlike 
 stores. 
 
 The town had to pay a contribution of 100,000 francs (4,000^.).
 
 J 
 
 Plate Vn 
 
 r) 

 
 29 
 
 STRASBUKa 
 
 (plate VII.) 
 
 Strasburg, the capital of Alsace, with 85,000 inhabitants, lies 
 about half a league from the Rhine on the river 111, which has 
 abundance of water, is navigable, and divides itself into five streams. 
 It is a fortress of the highest military importance. It commands 
 the passage over tlie Rhine into Grermany, and has on that account 
 been connected with Metz and Paris on the one side, and with 
 Lyons on the other side, by railways, roads, and canals. It is> 
 moreover, an important cavalry depot, and contains a gun-factory, 
 and an arsenal for the manufacture of carriages and artillery 
 stores. 
 
 The nucleus of the defences is the citadel, with its five bastioned 
 fronts, built by Marshal Vauban in 1685 ; and this is further 
 strengthened by two advanced hornworks, and a number of smaller 
 works down to the Rhine, which is here 500 yards in width. These 
 command the enceinte. On the north and south the town 
 is enclosed by an enceinte with long curtains and spacious bastions, 
 on the system of Specie, which terminate on the parade-ground 
 outside the citadel. At the places where the National gate and 
 the Stone gate are situated, the defences project further out 
 into the country, so as to cover the roads from Wasselonne and 
 Molsheim, and particularly that from Weissenburg, by means 
 of advanced earthworks, among which are the lunettes 52 and 53, 
 often mentioned in the siege. The main enceinte of the west 
 front is of the same character as the lines already described, 
 except that bastions Nos. 10, 11, and 12, at the north-west angle, 
 have counterguards for additional security. Two spacious horn- 
 works are placed outside the west front, so as to give it greater 
 defensive strength. These and the two lunettes 52 and 53 are 
 connected by a glacis common to both, which encloses the north 
 and south fronts in a suitable manner. The profiles are designed 
 with regard to the objects of the works. The escarps are 18 to 30 
 feet in height, according to the importance of the work. On this 
 account, and as the ditches are provided with cunettes, and can be 
 filled with sufficient water, the fortress is to be accounted every- 
 where proof against assault. The greater number of the traverses 
 required are in existence, but the quantity of bombproof cover 
 for troops, warlike stores, and provisions is insufiicient. There are 
 no detached forts.
 
 30 
 
 Strasburg" possesses an additional means of defence in the 
 power of making use of the 111 for partial but effective inunda- 
 tion. For this purpose, at the spot where the 111 enters the town, 
 a large sluice is fixed. This, and the numerous other works for 
 the proper management and control of the water, are in good con- 
 dition, and in situations so well covered, that they cannot easily 
 be destroyed by distant fire. The ground in front of the south 
 side of the fortress consists for the most part of low-lying meadows 
 intersected by numerous watercourses. It can be placed under 
 water for a considerable distance beyond the road, and the artillery 
 practice ground. This is also practicable with the low ground 
 along the foot of the glacis of the north front, and with the glacis 
 of the enceinte of the north-west front. 
 
 The ground in front of the fortress is flat, and here and there 
 the view is interrupted by numerous buildings, and by plantations. 
 
 On the west front, however, the ground rises, at a slope 
 scarcely perceptible, to the spurs of the Vosges mountains, about 
 a league and a half from the town. 
 
 The railway Avhich encircles the town on the south and west 
 has two stations — a terminus inside the town, and a stopping-place 
 outside, at the Austerlitz gate. There is a third station outside 
 the town to the westward. Frequent mention will be made of it 
 during the siege. The railway crosses several streams running 
 into the Ehine, and passes over the river itself by a lattice- 
 bridge, 309 metres (338 yards) long, built in 1858-61. The two 
 banks are also connected by a bridge of boats. 
 
 The interior of the town shows plainly its German origin and 
 past history. Both are as evident in its architecture as in the 
 manners and customs, both public and private, of its inhabitants. 
 The magnificent cathedral is especially interesting, and is famous 
 as one of the most remarkable monmnents of Grerman archi- 
 tecture. It was founded in 510 by Clovis, destroyed by lightning 
 in 1007, restored upon the plans of Erwin von Steinbach, and 
 completed in 1439 by Hans Hiiltz, of Cologne. 
 
 Commerce is flourishing, owing to the advantages of the 
 situation of the place. The junction of four lines of railway, 
 and of the roads from Paris, Lyons, and Basle, the water-carriage 
 by the Ehone, Rhine and Marne canal, and the proximity of the 
 Rhine, are of great value for commercial intercourse. 
 
 Immediately after the sudden and groundless declaration of 
 war with Prussia by France, it seemed as if Strasburg was to be 
 left untouched by the war, for it was evident that the French 
 invasion of Germany and attack on Cologne must be begun with 
 the right flank turned towards Rhenish Bavaria. But when 
 Southern Germany ranged itself on the Prussian side, the situa- 
 tion of affairs was changed. It became necessary for the French 
 armies to march off hastily in a new direction, and it became 
 more probable that Strasburg might be seriously threatened. All 
 the accounts state that before the battle of Worth, the 6th corps, 
 under the command of Marshal Canrobert, was in and round 
 Strasburg. After the battle was lost the corps marched off in
 
 31 
 
 the direction of Metz, and the garrison of Strasbmg was thus so 
 reduced that the place was left in a bad plight. Not even one 
 company of engineers was left in the now-threatened fortress, and 
 its garrison consisted chiefly of national guards. A great 
 number of stragglers from the battle of Worth found ac- 
 cordingly a welcome reception at Strasburg, and its gates also 
 opened for the reception of many thousands of fugitive country- 
 people. The bridge of boats was broken up, and on the 22nd of 
 July the railway lattice-bridge was blown up on the Baden side 
 of the river. On the French side they only brought the swing- 
 bridge on to the landward piers, and, in addition, destroyed 
 several railway-bridges over the Little Ehine, at Neuhof and 
 elsewhere. The preparations for putting the works and arma- 
 ments in a state of siege were, just commenced, when the enemy 
 appeared in the vicinity of the fortress. 
 
 After the battle fought by the Ilird army on the 6th August, 
 at Worth, the pursuit of the retreating French was the first 
 object. The division of the Gfrand Duchy of Baden, which stood 
 on the extreme left of the army, and had not been actually 
 engaged in the fight, received orders to advance into Alsace, and 
 in the first instance in the direction of Strasburg. 
 
 On the 8th August the head of the division arrived before 
 Strasburg. It was believed that the fortress was occupied almost 
 exclusively by national guards, and it was well known that the 
 preparation of the works for a siege was incomplete. Lieutenant- 
 General von Beyer, commanding the division, remained with the 
 main body of the advanced guard a league and a half from 
 Strasburg, and sent Major von Amerongen into the fortress, in 
 order to represent to the commandant the serious disasters of the 
 French army in the field, and to demand the surrender of the 
 place. Tlie commandant, however, rouglily refused the demand, 
 and after this the advanced guard employed upon this recon- 
 naissance withdrew to Brumath. The garrison permitted the 
 enemy to advance undisturbed up to the glacis, and made no 
 attempt to destroy the railways or telegraphs to Miihlhaus and 
 Lyons, and this was now effected by us. A cavalry detachment of 
 the Grrand Duchy of Baden, under the command of Lieutenant 
 Winsloe, on the 10th August destroyed the railway at Greispold- 
 sheim, three-quarters of a mile (three-and-a-half English miles) 
 south of Strasburg. Meanwhile the main body of the division 
 approached, so that on the 12th August the troops had taken up 
 their positions for the investment. These extended round the 
 whole of the ground outside the fortress, except on the south side, 
 where the work was done by some bodies of troops from Eastatt, 
 who had crossed the Ehine to the south of Strasburg. Kehl was 
 occupied, and the communication with Colmar broken. The 
 French did not allow themselves to be disturbed in their prepara- 
 tions for a siege, on the glacis and the ground beyond. They 
 worked on at the construction of traverses, the preparation of the 
 ramparts for defence, and the removal of the plantations on the 
 glacis, as well as at palisades and barricades for the approaches.
 
 32 
 
 For the purpose of interrupting these works three slight engage- 
 ments took place on the 13th August. 
 
 In the course of the afternoon some selected marksmen were 
 sent up to the glacis, and materially interrupted the works there, 
 without being disturbed by the heavy fire of artillery from the 
 ramparts. About 1 a.m. a company of the 2nd Baden grenadiers 
 (the King of Prussia's) advanced in the same direction, in order 
 to drive back some parties of infantry, who had meanwhile come 
 out from the fortress to the foot of the glacis. A musketry fight 
 commenced, and by tliis means the object was successfully ac- 
 complished. The company, after the performance of their duty, 
 were, in returning, followed by a lieavy fire of case and musketry, 
 and had three killed and eleven wounded — among the latter one 
 officer. 
 
 In another direction two small detachments of the body 
 guard grenadiers of the Crrand Duchy of Baden, each led by 
 a lieutenant, and provided with combustibles, advanced at 9 
 o'clock in the evening against the railway-station outside the 
 western gate, and set fire to a loaded railway-train that was stand- 
 ing there. Two sections of infantry followed quickly up to the 
 counterscarp of the ditch, delivered their fire at the troops who 
 appeared on the ramparts and at the guns standing there, and 
 quickly retired again. A field-battery meanwhile was brought up 
 to 2,500 paces from the fortress, and fired upon the works which 
 were lighted up by the flaming railway-trucks. The enemy upon 
 this commenced a persistent but perfectly useless fire. At a 
 third place, as early as 11 o'clock in the forenoon, a company of 
 the 5th (Baden) regiment had been for an hour under fire em- 
 ployed in the demolition of the enemy's works without experiencing 
 any loss. 
 
 On the 14th August intelligence was received of the issue, on 
 the 10th of that month, of the following proclamation by the 
 Commandant-in~Chief, Divisional-General Uhrich : — 
 
 " To the Inhabitants of Strasburg! 
 
 " Disquieting rumours, and fearful reports, have been, inten- 
 tionally or unintentionally, spread through our brave city. Some 
 people have even ventured to assert that it will surrender without 
 resistance. 
 
 " We therefore protest, in the name of the courageous French 
 population, against such cowardly and criminal weakness. The 
 ramparts are furnished with 400 guns; the garrison counts 11,000 
 men, besides national guards. If Strasburg be attacked, Stras- 
 burg will be defended so long as it contains a soldier, a loaf, and 
 a cartridge. Let the well-disposed be calm ; let the others go 
 where they will. 
 
 "Strasburg, August 10th, 1870. 
 
 " The Divisional-General and Commander-in-Chief, 
 
 " Uhrich. 
 
 " The Prefect of the Lower Ehine, 
 
 " Baron Pron."
 
 33 
 
 On the 14th August, at 5 o'clock in the morning, a com- 
 pany of tlie 5th (Baden) regiment attacked the railway-station, 
 and opened tire from the railway embankment upon the workmen 
 on the glacis. The fire was answered by some of the guns of the 
 place, and the company suffered a loss of three severely and two 
 slightly wounded. 
 
 In the course of the day General von Beyer gave over the 
 command of the (Baden) division to Greneral the Baron von 
 La Roche, commanding the cavalry brigade. The division was 
 placed under the orders of Lieutenant-Gfeneral von Werder, of the 
 Prussian Army, Commander-in-Chief of the army corps about to 
 be formed for the siege. 
 
 In the evening the garrison attempted a sortie in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the English country-house near Hohnheim. 
 
 On the 15th August, at 4 a.m., the Baden pioneers blew up 
 the iron bridge wliich leads over the Rhine-Marne canal to 
 Robertsaue, below the orangery. Field artillery fired from covered 
 positions at the works of defence that had been thrown up, in 
 order to destroy them, while under cover of tlie darkness riflemen 
 swarmed close up to the ramparts, causing frequent alarms to the 
 garrison. Lingolfsheim, Wolfsheim, Schiltiglieim, and Robertsaue 
 were already occupied by tlie besiegers, so that the place was 
 closely invested on the west and north, and on the south as far as to 
 Ostwald. In their possession were the railway-stations of Brumath 
 (to Nancy and Metz), Mutzig, and Colmar, and the highroads to 
 Sels, Hagenau, Zabern, Barre, Colmar, and Basle. The commu- 
 nications of Strasburg with the country were as good as cut off. 
 It was suspected that an underground telegraph line existed to 
 Schlettstadt, 7^ miles (35 English miles) distant. 
 
 August 16. — Head-quarters transferred to Mundolsheim. 
 
 About 2 o'clock in the afternoon the French attempted a sortie 
 in greater force, with about 1,500 men, in order to drive back the 
 enemy near Illkirch, a league south-east of Strasburg. The 8th 
 •company of the 3rd (Baden) regiment, under Captain Kappler, had 
 pushed forward a picket from Illkirch over the bridge of the Rhone 
 canal at that place. About 2 p.m. a French squadron attacked 
 them, but were repulsed. Immediately the enemy's infantry showed 
 themselves, while a heavy fire was opened against the bridge over 
 the canal ; and a detachment of the enemy's artillery shelled 
 Illkirch from a position in rear, and set fire to some of the build- 
 ings there. At the commencement of this attack Captain Kappler 
 had posted his whole company on the bridge of the canal, and 
 sent forward two strong non-commissioned officers' patrols by 
 Orafensteden, and by the locks to the northward at Ostwald 
 respectively, to take the enemy in flank. Major Steinwacbs, 
 commanding the battalion, sent immediately out of Ostwald the 
 5th and 6th companies, under Captains Nagel and Selteneck, as 
 well as Gobel's battery. Kappler's company had for half-an-hour 
 answered the enemy's fire with great coolness and steadiness, when 
 the enemy's artillery advanced to within 250 paces of the bridge 
 over the canal, and came into action. The commander of the 
 
 36996. D
 
 34 
 
 company then caused a short and rapid, but effective, fire to 
 be delivered, and, as the supports had by this time come up, 
 attacked with the bayonet. The enemy did not stand to receive 
 this attack, but took to flight, leaving behind 3 guns, 8 wounded 
 and 3 unwounded prisoners, and 20 killed, as well as several 
 articles of their equipment. This brilliant success cost the brave 
 company but 2 wounded. A subdivision of (robel's battery now 
 crossed the bridge over the canal and shelled Weghaiisel, in 
 which place the enemy had rallied on his retreat. The 5th 
 and 6th companies, who then undertook the pursuit, could not 
 again come up with the enemy, who were estimated to amount to 
 about 1,500 men — zouaves, turcos, chasseurs, and artillery. 
 
 Augicst 17. — The French attempted a second sortie against the 
 Eobertsaue, but were beaten back. On the Grerman side tlie most 
 exposed parts of the besiegers' positions were prepared for defence 
 in a proper and suitable manner, and the approaches were 
 barricaded. Field-hospitals were established in Brumath, Ven- 
 denheim, Oberhausbergen, and Hohnheim. Prussian railway and 
 Baden telegraph officials took over the duties of their respective 
 branches. The neighbourhood was requisitioned for labourers and 
 intrenching tools, and in some places resistance was made and ill- 
 will was shown. This was the case in the rich towns of Ernstein and 
 Morstein, whicli had in consequence to pay a contribution, 
 first of 150,000 francs (^^6,000), and in the end of 300,000 francs 
 (£12,000). 
 
 In the forenoon fire was opened from the Baden field^batteries, 
 which had taken up a position in a line with Kehl. The fire 
 ■continiied all day, and was briskly answered by the garrison. 
 During the previous night a sharp action of artillery and in- 
 fantry took place between Konigshofen and Strasburg, and out- 
 side the west front. Several houses were set on fire there by the 
 shells. 
 
 August 18. — Konigshofen was consequently brought within 
 the line of investment, after a short action of artillery. The 
 fire from Kehl was continued. On the night of the 18th- 19th 
 August tlie Baden artillery took up a position close to the road 
 from Lingolfsheim to Strasburg, and set on fire some of the houses 
 at Strasburg at the first shot, and the flames spread rapidly. 
 The enemy answered with 24-poimder solid shot. 
 
 August 19.^The fire was kept up from 16 field-guns, chiefly 
 against the citadel and the adjoining fronts. It was opened at 
 7 A.M., stopped from 12 till 2 o'clock, and continued again till 
 evening. 
 
 The fire was of com-se answered by the artillery of the garrison, 
 who, however, shelled not only the batteries, but also the town of 
 Kehl, which lay exposed, beyond the line of fire. Lieutenant-Oene- 
 ral von Werder, commanding the siege corps, remonstrated against 
 this conduct in a letter, in which he said : " Such a mode of war- 
 fare, which is imheard of among civilised nations, compels me to 
 make yoii personally responsible for the consequences of this action. 
 I shall, moreover, cause the damage to be estimated, and obtain com- 
 pensation by a contribution levied in Alsace."
 
 35 
 
 These valuations were, in fact, made in Kehl,and General Uhrich 
 is said to have replied that he regarded the bombardment of the 
 city of Kehl as reprisals, on account of the city of Strasbm-g having 
 been shelled by the besiegers' artillery without the usual notice 
 being sent beforehand. According to other accounts, however (and 
 this should be noted), Lieutenant-General von Werder, on the con- 
 trary, threatened to bombard the place foiu'teen days beforehand, 
 and caused the proper notice to be sent 24 hours before the firing 
 began. It was clearly, therefore, the business of the French authori- 
 ties to pass this notice on to the citizens, and it was their fault that 
 the inhabitants had not sufficient time to prepare for the bombard- 
 ment, and were therefore taken by surprise. 
 
 It should, moreover, be observed, that in the absence of any de- 
 tached forts round Strasburg, the besieger was able to place his 
 batteries comparatively close to the fortress, and that, if he wanted 
 to fire upon the works at all, it was quite inevitable that the town 
 should also be struck, and should suffer terribly. 
 
 On the 19th of August fom'teen houses were biu-nt down in 
 the city of Kehl (Stadt Kehl), and the fire did still greater damage, 
 comparatively, in the adjoining village of Kehl (Dorf Kelil). In 
 the former place the church was turned into a hospital. Several 
 shells fell close to the Baden temporary hospital constructed in 
 Dorf Kehl. 
 
 In the part of Kehl near the Khine, especially in the neighbour- 
 hood of the Fingach brewery, the brewery itself, the Palmen 
 brewery, and several houses of the inhabitants of the upper classes, 
 were destroyed. The Manner-Hilfsverein (? Humane Society) of 
 Kehl worked with great self-sacrifice at extinguishing the flames, 
 and those of the inhabitants who could sought refuge in the neigh- 
 bouring villages. 
 
 The bombardment of Strasbm-g from the left bank of the Ehine 
 continued, and the result was that a more serious fire broke out in 
 the Weisse Thurmgasse (White Tower street). The desire, on this 
 account, of the inhabitants for a surrender was brought to the 
 notice of the commandant, but without effect. As it had become 
 necessary to obtain French surgeons for the French wounded, a 
 flag of truce with a trumpeter was sent into the fortress ; but as 
 they were both fired at, and the latter was wounded, the design 
 had to be abandoned. 
 
 A company of the 2nd Baden grenadiers, under the command 
 of Captain Hilpert, had prepared for defence the outskirts of the 
 village of Schiltigheim, on the side next the fortress. 
 
 Towards evening the French made a sortie with two companies 
 against the outskirts of the village, but were repulsed. The 
 enemy lost three men killed and eight wounded, and Euth's 
 company of the -ith Baden regiment, posted in reserve on the 
 Kirch-platz, pursued them as far as the glacis. The bm-sting of 
 one of the sluices in the place caused temporary damage to the 
 inundation-works of the fortress, but it was soon repaired. 
 
 August 20. — Tlie investing force began to make more 
 extended arrangements for defence at Schiltigheim, as being a 
 
 D 2
 
 36 
 
 ■poiiit d'appui lying close to the fortress, and of great importance 
 to the investment, having regard to the later ojaerations of the 
 siege. The approaches to the village in the direction of the 
 fortress were barricaded. Shelter-trenches and covered positions 
 for ontposts were laid out. On the side of the enemy the works 
 were masked by the plantations, which had been unaccountably 
 left standing, in consequence of the hasty manner in which pre- 
 parations for the siege had been made. Tlie brewery in Schiltig- 
 lieim and the glue-manufactory in front of the Spital gate had 
 already been set on fire from the fortress, in order not to afford 
 cover to the besiegers. 
 
 Fire was kept up against the fortress from both banks of the 
 Rhine. 
 
 August 21. — The head of the siege-train reached Veudenheim. 
 The train consisted of 200 guns rifled on the Prussian system, and 
 100 smoothbore mortars ; 40 of these guns were at once brought 
 into action against the fortress. Lieutenant-Greneral von Werder 
 asked the commandant, in vain, to remove the observatory erected 
 on the tower of the cathedral, in order that it might be possible to 
 save this magnificent work of architecture from destruction. With 
 similar results he endeavoured to have the military hospital 
 moved out of the line of fire. 
 
 The commandant sent out of the fortress, in detachments of 
 ten men each, 100 Grermans, who belonged to the foreign legion. 
 Upon this, great dissatisfaction against the Grermans showed itself 
 among the population, who broke out into many acts of violence 
 against them. 
 
 August 22. — The commandant asked to send the women 
 and children out of the besieged place. As this proposal would 
 have led to a great demand for transj^ort and other inconvenient 
 results, it had to be refused. 
 
 August 23. — The Kehl batteries, which had been armed 
 since the 18th August with garrison guns from Rastatt, kept up 
 an effective fire day and night against the citadel, and produced 
 a conflagration there. 
 
 On the left bank of the Rhine the town and fortress of Stras- 
 bvu'g was fired into from all sides. The cannonade became heavier 
 towards evening. The infantry kept continually drawing nearer to 
 the fortress. The pickets and outposts were obliged to entrench 
 themselves in shelter-trenches and rifle-pits, to get cover from the 
 fire of the enemy. 
 
 August 24.— On the night of the 23rd-24th August the 
 Baden infantry advanced against the railway- station on the 
 west front, and thus approached within 1000 paces of the fortress. 
 The station was taken without any loss. 
 
 In the evening the bombardment of the west front with siege 
 artillery was begun. For this purpose the Prussian siege artillery 
 had built 13 siege batteries (Nosi 1-13) duringthe preceding night, 
 and had armed them partly with rifled 24-pounders, and partly with 
 heavy mortars. The result was that two large fires broke out in 
 the town, and a third in the citadel ; and the arsenal, containing
 
 37 
 
 the workshops for the manufacture of artillery stores, carriages. &c. 
 was destroyed. The explosion of a small powder-magazine was 
 also observed. One of the two mortar-batteries erected by the 
 French on the island of Sporen was silenced by the Baden 
 artillery. 
 
 The same day there were twenty houses burnt in Kehl, and 
 others were very much damaged. 
 
 August 25. — On the night of the 24th — 25th an exceedingly 
 heavy fire was directed on the town and fortress from the whole 
 of the batteries ; ten rounds were fired per minute. 
 
 It was determined to destroy a mortar-battery which was- 
 placed above the Rhine baths on the other side of the railway 
 embankment, and had seriously injured the Kehl batteries. For 
 this purpose, on the night above mentioned, one officer and forty- 
 five men of the 6th Baden regiment and three gunners crossed 
 the Ehine in perfect silence, but were unable to effect their object, 
 because the French had already withdrawn the pieces of ordnance 
 to the fortress. The detachment accordingly set the bath-house- 
 in flames, and they were, in retreating, exposed to a hea^^ fire. 
 
 The greater part of the inhabitants fled from Kehl. In order 
 to diminish the danger from the falling shells the streets of the 
 town were strewn with litter. Workmen were brought in from 
 the neighbourhood, for three or four leagues round, to work at the 
 batteries. 
 
 The bishop of Strasburg appeared at the headquarters of the 
 besiegers to beg for a cessation of the fire. There was the less 
 chance of his wish being granted, since it appeared to be uttered 
 more as a matter of form than as a serious request. 
 
 About 1 1 A.M. the garrison made a sortie from the White 
 Tower gate, with a small detachment and two guns, against the 7th 
 and 8th companies of the 3rd Baden regiment. 
 
 August 26.— Eight additional 24:-pounder garrison guns 
 arrived at Kehl from Rastatt, and were immediately placed in 
 battery, and fired during the day and the night until 4 o'clock 
 in the morning. 
 
 The bombardment against Strasburg was continued, chiefly 
 from the battery of the Robertsaue, after a pause from 4 a.m. 
 till 12 noon, for the purpose of awaiting the result of the 
 efforts of the bishop to influence the inhabitants. Four several 
 great conflagrations were observed, including the magazines and 
 other buildings in the citadel, which were in flames. The fire 
 from the fortress became comparatively weak. It had, however, 
 destroyed utterly the greater part of the town of Kehl between 
 the railway-station and the Rathhaus (town-hall), while the village 
 of Kehl, south of the town of that name, had suffered but little. 
 
 August 27.— On the night of the 26th-27th the number 
 of batteries on the Kehl side was increased by a mortar-battery,, 
 which was armed with eight 50-pounder mortars. 
 
 During the past night five Baden pioneers succeeded in destroy- 
 ing some dams which were intended to raise the level of the water 
 in the ditches of the fortress. On account of the importance of
 
 38 
 
 the object and the danger of the operation the}'^ were awarded a 
 gratuity of 1000 thalers (about £150). 
 
 To-day, again, the fire was but slack from the fortress, while 
 that of the besiegers was maintained with unabated vigour. A 
 flag of truce was sent to the besiegers to ask for some surgical 
 appliances for the citizens. This showed the great effect of the 
 batteries of the attack, but also the little foresight that had been 
 displayed in the town in preparing for the event of a siege. The 
 surgical appliances were given most willingly, and in return some 
 ice was obtained, which was required in the hospitals. The mayor 
 of Strasburg in vain represented to the governor the desirability 
 of surrendering the fortress. In consequence many persons began 
 to abandon the city ; the greater part betaking themselves to 
 Switzerland. 
 
 On the previous night the advanced posts had been pushed 
 forward to within 400 paces of the fortress, and had there en- 
 trenched themselves. The object of this was to cover and conceal 
 the construction of the first parallel. The artillery at the same 
 time built ten batteries, which were numbered 14, 15, 16, 17, 
 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25. 
 
 August 28. — The bishop of Strasburg made proposals for 
 mediation. He came out to Schiltigheim, where Lieutenant-Colonel 
 von Lescinsky the chief of the staff of the Baden army, conferred 
 with him on behalf of Lieutenant-General von Werder. The 
 bishop considered the bombardment was contrary to interna- 
 tional law. His views were refuted. He begged then per- 
 mission for the inhabitants to depart, and this request was 
 refused. The request of the bishop for an armistice of twenty- 
 four hours was granted, on condition that an assurance should be 
 received within an hour that the governor would commence nego- 
 tiations. He was also invited to come out and make himself 
 acquainted with the preparations for the attack, or to do this by 
 deputy. On his return a regular platoon-fire was commenced 
 upon Lieutenant-Colonel von Lescinsky, although he bore the flag 
 of truce in his own hand. The flag was riddled with bullets. The 
 attempt at mediation was thus quite useless. 
 
 -Meanwhile the bombardment on both sides was continued. 
 Captain von Faber, of the Baden garrison artillery, sank under his 
 severe wounds at Korck. 
 
 Both towards evening and during the night a brisk fire was 
 kejjt up between the outposts on our side and the riflemen of the 
 garrison, who were posted in the covered way. 
 
 August 29. — In the night of the 28th-29th, the shelter- 
 trenches of the advanced posts of the besiegers between Konigs- 
 hofen and the fortress were pushed on to within 500 or 600 paces 
 of the town ; a small sortie in that quarter was repulsed, and the 
 fire of the gims continued as before. At noon a sortie took place, 
 which was repulsed by detachments of the 34th Prussian regiment. 
 
 It may be well to mention here that the bombardment proper 
 began on the 24th August, and lasted, with some intervals, three 
 days. On the Strasburg side the bombarding batteries, thir-
 
 39 
 
 teen iu niimher, were all situated on the front that was sub- 
 sequently attacked, and fire was opened from 26 rifled 24-pounders 
 and 28 heavy mortars. On the side of Kehl there were six batteries 
 in action, armed with 32 heavy rifled guns and 12 heavy mor- 
 tars. The other side of the town and fortress was cannonaded 
 with field-guns. 
 
 The effect of the artillery of the defence was not inconsiderable : 
 the villages of Konigshofen and Schiltigheim, which were within 
 the range of the guns, were completely destroyed ; the Galgens- 
 chanzl had suffered severely, and the railway-station at Kehl was 
 set on fire by shells and completely burnt down, after the inhabi- 
 tants of that part had succeeded with difficulty in saving it from 
 a fire that broke out only a few days before. Of the destruction 
 caused in Strasburg by the bombardment only the most important 
 instances will be noticed here. The Ki'othenaue, the street leading 
 to the gate of Austerlitz, the quarters De Pierre and of the national 
 gate, the railway-station, the corn-exchange, the artillery school, 
 the cannon- foundry, the large building of the garrison staff on 
 the Kleberplatz, the neighbourhood of the cathedral, all suffered 
 severely, and many treasures of art and science were destroyed : for 
 example, the ancient and famous library, with its 400,000 volumes, 
 and valuable documents and manuscripts, the museum of art, the 
 collection of pictm'es, and the Neukirche, with its famous fresco 
 paintings. The damage done to the cathedral, that memorial 
 of early Grerman architecture, was happily not very great. 
 Although the upper part of the roof above the arch was burnt, 
 the interior was uninjured, with the excej)tion of one glass 
 window. The celebrated astronomical clock remained unharmed. 
 
 The siege artillery were directed to spare the cathedi-al, and 
 previous notice was given of the few shots that were fired, chiefly 
 against the tower, in consequence of the enemy having erected 
 an observatory there, with telegraphic communication, whence the 
 besiegers' works were completely seen into. 
 
 Serious injury had been done to the private property of the 
 citizens by the inundation around the fortress, which was, however, 
 a most efficient measure of defence. The inundation placed the 
 smTounding low ground and many of the cellars in the town 
 under water. In the greater number of the latter no provision 
 liad been made for such an event, and the entry of the water, there-. 
 fore, caused great inconvenience, and prevented the buildings from 
 being used, either as shelter for the peo]3le, or as stores for pro- 
 visions. An attempt had, indeed, been made at Erstein, about 
 2^ miles (llf English miles) south of Strasburg, between the 
 road leading to Schlettstadt and the Khine canal, to divert the 
 waters of the 111, which there flows through low ground intersected 
 by many watercourses, and is connected by channels with the Ehine. 
 An attempt had been also made to lead off the water at the dis- 
 charging sluices o/ the inundation close to the fortress on the south 
 front, at the point where the Aar, a branch of the 111, the 111 itself, 
 and the Ehine-Marne canal, are united ; and the destruction of 
 the sluices Nos. 87 and 88 in the Ehine-Ill canal had been under-
 
 40 
 
 taken, and bad resulted in a perceptible reduction of tbe level of 
 tbe water in tbe inundation and in tbe ditcbes. 
 
 Tbe opinion of tbe inbabitants, beaded by tbe clergy, was 
 decidedly against a vigorous defence of tbe fortress ; several 
 unavailing memorials were sent by tbem to the commandant, to 
 induce bim to surrender tbe place. Tbe prices of most kinds of pro- 
 visions for tbe inbabitants were raised to exorbitant amounts, and 
 as tbe supply of beef was long since exhausted, people ate borse- 
 flesb. A bundredweigbt of potatoes cost 12 francs; and in tbis 
 populous town tbere was neither butter nor fresh vegetables. 
 
 Tbe strength and composition of the garrison were ascertained. 
 It consisted chiefly of fugitives from tbe battle of Worth of tbe 
 21st, 23rd, 28th, 33rd, and 74tli regiments, besides turcos, 
 zouaves, spahis, and cavalry of every description, and this pecu- 
 liarity of composition rendered the maintenance of discipline 
 difficult. Tbere was among tbem none of that steadiness which 
 belongs to well-disciplined troops, as might be seen from tbe way 
 in which attacks were executed. By the burning of the military 
 establishments great quantities of warlike stores bad been destroyed^ 
 and by the vigorous bombardment tbe defensibility of tbe place 
 had been very materially reduced. 
 
 Although it was well known that General Barral, of the 
 artillery, who succeeded in entering the fortress in disguise 
 during the investment, must have, in fact, bad the actual direc- 
 tion of the defence, still tbe Governor (General of Division 
 Uhrich) was acknowledged to be a man of honour ; and it was not 
 probable that this meritorious officer would be brought to capi- 
 tulate easily, after having repeatedly refused tbe summons to 
 surrender. 
 
 In tbis state of affairs it became certain, by the 26tb of August, 
 that the object in view was only to be attained by a regular siege, 
 and that thus also the sufferings of the unhappy city would be 
 abbreviated as much as possible. The preparatory measures, to 
 which attention bad prudently been paid at tbe very commence- 
 mient of the campaign, were now rapidly carried into effect. 
 
 Accordingly, in order to be prepared for all events, tbe siege- 
 train was despatched from Magdeburg, Coblentz, and Wesel. Its 
 composition and the numbers of guns of eacli description were in 
 every respect carefully considered. Experiments bad been made 
 by the Prussian Artillery Experimental Committee with rifled siege 
 artillery, especially with 15-centimetre (6-inch) guns, and 21- 
 centimetre (8*27-inch) mortars, both of which fire an elongated 
 shell. The results of these trials, and the use of demolition 
 batteries {Demolitions batterien\ by which, with suitable guns 
 fired at appropriate elevations, bidden escarps can be breached at 
 great distances, were to be tested in actual warfare for the first 
 time at Strasburg. 
 
 In deciding ujaon the place for the artillery attack, it was con- 
 templated that the batteries already existing on tbe front attacked 
 would be maintained for the purposes of the bombardment, and 
 especially that, from the Kehl batteries, which came into play
 
 41 
 
 about this time, fire would be kept up, because tbey were best 
 adapted for operating against the citadel, and for rendering it 
 impossible to defend the fortress in that quarter. 
 
 For the engineer attack an engineer siege-park, wliich had 
 recently been formed for the first time, was brought up before the 
 place. 
 
 Lieutenant-Greneral von Werder, of the Prussian Army, was 
 appointed to the command of the siege corps, with Lieutenant- 
 Colonel von Lescinsky, of the general staff of the Grand Duchy 
 of Baden, as chief of the staff, Lieutenant-General von Decker 
 was appointed to command the siege artillery, and Major-General 
 von Mertens was appointed Engineer-in-Chief. 
 
 The siege corps was composed as follows : — 
 
 1. Infantry.- — 
 
 (a) The landwehr division of the guard. 
 
 (b) P^irst reserve division, to which were attached the 
 30th regiment from Mainz, and the 34th (Pomeranian) 
 fusiliers, which latter regiment, immediately after the 
 declaration of war, had been brought up from Frank- 
 fort to Rastatt, and had already been employed during 
 the investment before Strasburg. 
 
 (c) The Baden division. 
 
 2. Cavalnj. — The 2nd reserve reginient of Prussian dragoons; 
 the 2nd reserve regiment of Prussian ulans ; and the Baden 
 cavalry, consisting of three regiments of dragoons. 
 
 3. Tlce Siege Artillery, altogether 6.000 or 7,000 strong, was 
 composed of 29 companies of garrison artillery belonging to the 
 guard, and to the 4th, 5th, 6th, Ttli, and 10th regiments, 4 
 Bavarian garrison batteries, 4 Wurtemberg garrison batteries, and 
 2 Baden garrison com^Danies. 
 
 4. Pioneers, (Engineers), altogether 2,200 strong, two ' com- 
 bined ' battalions of garrison jDioneers, which were composed of 
 12 companies of garrison pioneers from the districts of the 1st, 
 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, and 11th army corps, in addition to 
 two comjDanies of Baden field pioneers, and a company of Bavarian 
 garrison pioneers, which, however, only arrived towards the end of 
 the siege. Colonel Klotz, of the royal Prussian engineers, was in 
 command of the whole of the pioneers. 
 
 When the formation of the corps was completed, the staffs for 
 the siege artillery and engineers were appointed. Lieutenant- 
 Colonel von Scheliha, of the general staff, formerly of the artiller^^, 
 acted as chief of the staff for the former; and Lieutenant-Colonel 
 von Waugenheim, from the War Office, for the latter. Six field 
 officers of the artillery were appointed commanders of sections, 
 and 20 engineer officers were told off for duty in their own depart- 
 ment before Strasburg. 
 
 The siege army was, altogether, nearly 60,000 strong. The 
 headquarters (Lieutenant-General von Werder) were fixed in 
 Mundolsheim for the siege artillery, and for the business of the 
 engineers. The division of the Grand Duchy of Baden had its 
 headquarters in Oberschaffelsheim and in Lampertsheim, where
 
 42 
 
 was the residence of H.K.H. the Grand Duke of Baden, who 
 followed the progress of the siege with great interest. 
 
 From the accurate knowledge the besiegers possessed of the 
 whole of the fortress, the selection of the front of attack was not 
 difficult. The north-west angle of the enceinte was decided upon 
 for the puriDOse. Its position was so salient that a comparatively- 
 narrow front of attack was admissible, and this front could be de- 
 veloped on ground almost entirely clear of inundations. The parks 
 were placed near excellent roads and other means of communica- 
 tion with the depots in rear. Thus all movements of the siege 
 stores to a flank, which would have caused waste of time, were 
 avoided. The citadel had already been terribly injured, during, 
 the investment and bombardment, by the batteries at Kehl, and, 
 moreover, was of little use on the front selected for attack, so 
 that enfilade-fire on the attack from thence, or from the adjoining- 
 works, was little to be dreaded. The difficulties to be met with in 
 gaining possession of the ramparts, or in entering tlie fortress, 
 on the front in question, would also have been experienced in a 
 greater or less degree on all the other fronts. 
 
 The siege park was situated on the right, the powder magazine 
 on the left, of the highroad, north of Mundolsheim ; the engineer 
 park was in Suffelsweierheim. 
 
 On the night of the 29th-30th August, the first parallel was 
 opened, and at the same time the approaches to it from the rear 
 were made. 
 
 The working party was furnished by the 1st and 2nd landwehr 
 regiments of the guard and the pioneer battalions, so far as the 
 latter were not required for supervision and other technical duties. 
 
 The parallel rested with its left flank on the 111, crossed the 
 road leading from Strasburg to Schiltigheim and Weissenburg, . 
 and the railways to Paris and Basle — the latter line, as it 
 happened, by the over-bridge to Wasselonne — and was thence 
 continued to the south-western outlet of Konigshofen. It ex- 
 tended, therefore, beyond the groimd covered by the attack, by 
 almost half its total length, which amounted to 5,700 paces.* 
 
 The distance of the parallel from the fortress was, on the average, 
 800 paces ; and this was a very favourable circumstance, in com- 
 parison with the siege of Sebastopol, where the besiegers were 
 obliged to execute the same work at a distance of over 1,600 
 paces from the works. 
 
 The communications in rear, from the principal depot, were 
 constructed in a zigzag form, with five returns, and occupied the 
 ground between the highroad to Weissenburg and the railway to 
 Paris. They were nearly in the centre of the attack. 
 
 Some short trenches of communication were also made on the 
 left flank, to connect with the village of Schiltigheim, which was 
 very conveniently situated for the approach on this side. 
 
 The covering troops were posted, and the working parties 
 marched to and fro, in accordance with instructions given for these 
 
 * About 4,700 yards.
 
 43 
 
 purposes, so far as local circumstances did not require a departure 
 from the instructions. 
 
 During- the first night the parallel and the communications 
 from the rear were excavated to a depth of 4 feet and a breadth 
 of 3 feet at the bottom, and this section was widened, in the course 
 of the 30th August, to 8 or 9 feet at the bottom. Thus the breadth 
 required for the trenches, as communications, was obtained, and 
 sufficient thickness was also given to the parapet. The parallel 
 was in many places cut into steps for offensive movements. 
 
 Three engineer depots were also formed, one for the centre 
 and one for each flank, as shown in the plan. 
 
 The enemy permitted all the works to be executed without 
 interruption. It was not till 6 a.m. on the morning of the 30th 
 August, that some unusual movements were observed on the 
 ramparts, but at this time there were already ten new batteries, 
 with 46 additional siege-guns in action. These were batteries 
 Nos. 14 to 17, Nos. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 25. The bombarding 
 batteries Nos. 1 to 13 also continued in action, so that there were 
 firing at this time 
 
 30 long rifled 24-pounders, 
 42 rifled 12-pounders, 
 28 heavy mortars. 
 
 altogether 100 pieces of siege ordnance. 
 
 The enemy was evidently taken by surprise at the execution of 
 the siege-works mentioned, and was unprepared for them. This 
 was apparent from the batteries of the attack being slackly 
 answered. These were, however, in a position to enfilade and 
 counter-batter the principal lines of the front attacked and of the 
 adjoining fronts, and to do serious damage to the enemy in the 
 temporary works thrown up before the siege. 
 
 By their united efforts the batteries of the besiegers succeeded 
 in silencing the artillery of the garrison in a very short time. On 
 account of their great distance from the works, however, some of 
 the bombarding batteries constructed early in the siege (Nos. 1, 2, 
 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12) ceased fire in the course of the day. 
 
 During the fore and afternoon of the 30th August, the artillery 
 of the garrison, after completing the armament of the front of 
 attack, were able to renew the fight for a couple of hours. Both 
 times, however, they were quickly silenced. 
 
 On this day and on the 31st August, the parallels and approaches 
 were first brought to the section necessary for efficiency, and were 
 completed. It became necessary, on this and on the following days, 
 to drive out the French posted in some rifle-pits on Wacken, an 
 island covered with bushes formed by the Aar, a branch of the 111, 
 and by the 111. 
 
 September 1. — During the night between the 31st August 
 and the 1st September the approaches to the second parallel were 
 commenced. They consisted of only a simple trench on the left 
 wing, and three zigzags directed on the capitals of the bastions 
 attacked. In consequence of this the outposts were proportionately
 
 44 
 
 advanced. At the same time batteries Nos. 27 and 28 were built 
 and armed. The enemy displayed great activity during the night, 
 and towards morning commenced a vigorous fire of artillery. The 
 fire was particularly heavy on the north front. 
 
 The engineer lieadquarters were transferred from Mundolsheim 
 to Schiltigheim. The batteries of attack, we may liere mention, 
 were placed partly inside and partly outside the parallels and com- 
 munications. In both cases, however, they were so covered that 
 they were either not at all, or only slightly, visible from the fortress 
 itself. Those for guns were provided for the most part with flat 
 or trough-shaped embrasures. 
 
 September 2. — During the night of September lst-2nd, the 
 zigzag approaches to tlie second parallel were executed, and were 
 made in two separate parts, because it was desired to spare the 
 churchyard of St. Helene, with its monuments. Lieutenant- 
 Colonel von Gayl and Captain Hertzberg, both of the engineers, 
 were killed as they were in the act of endeavouring to improve 
 the defective position of a part of the second parallel, which was 
 too close to the enemy's works. The former was on duty as major 
 of the trenches. The work was not quite completed when, on 
 the night of September 2nd-3rd, about 12 o'olock, a brisk fire of 
 artillery and infantry commenced from the fortress, and was fol- 
 lowed immediately by two sorties against both flanks of the parallel. 
 The French advanced with three columns against the right wing 
 in the direction of Vendenheim, and attacked the company of the 
 2nd Baden grenadiers (King of Prussia's), who were holding the 
 outer buildings of the railway-station. A severe engagement en- 
 sued, so that the commandant of the trenches, Colonel von Renz, 
 had to bring up the 1st battalion of the regiment above named, who 
 were on trench-duty, and drive back the enemy, who was superior in 
 numbers, into the fortress, Captain Grraeff was killed, and the troops 
 lost 50 killed and wounded, chiefly in retreating into the trenches. 
 The 2nd company distinguished itself very much in this engage- 
 ment. 
 
 In the sortie delivered against the left flank of the parallel at 
 half-past 3 in the morning, the French sent three columns over 
 the islands of Jars and Wacken, where outhouses and plantations 
 afforded much cover, and then fell upon the 2nd battalion of the 
 30th Prussian regiment, by whom they were repulsed. The loss 
 of the Prussians amounted to one officer (Lieutenant von Versen) 
 wounded and taken prisoner, and thirty men. A French officer 
 and four chassem-s were taken prisoners. In these sorties the want 
 of a greater number of steps over the parapet for counter-attacks 
 was experienced. Eain coming on made the work in the trenches 
 exceedingly heavy. The besiegers had now got so near the fortress 
 that wall-pieces could be used with advantage, for which purpose 
 wall-piece detachments were formed of both Prussian and Baden 
 troops, and were employed to keep up a fire on the enemy's 
 gunners. The French fired for a similar purpose with wall-pieces, 
 chassepots, and minie-rifles. 
 
 September 3. — Extension of parallels, and construction and
 
 45 
 
 completion of batteries 16a, 17a, 19a, 21a, 29, and 30. In the 
 early morning there was a slight engagement at the outposts, in 
 which the besiegers lost eight wounded. In the forenoon there 
 was a cessation of hostilities for an hour, for burying the dead 
 in the fortress. 
 
 At Schiltigheim the castle-like monastery was converted into 
 a hospital. Two new kinds of siege ordnance arrived at the park — 
 namely, twelve short-rifled 24-pounders, and two rifled 2o-pounder 
 mortars. They threw projectiles of enormous jDower with great 
 accuracy. 
 
 September 4. — The engineer headquarters were transferred 
 back again to Mundolsheim for official reasons. Intelligence 
 arrived of the capitulation of Sedan, which was communicated to 
 the governor of the fortress, in order to make him aware of the 
 military and political condition of France resulting from that 
 event. A thanksgiving service was held by the siege corps, and 
 three saluting rounds per gun were fired by the artillery, in honour 
 of the occasion. 
 
 September 5. — The siege continued its course without any 
 events worthy of remark. During the previous night, as well as 
 in the course of the day, the enemy attacked with small detach- 
 ments, to interrupt the progress of battery No. 33, the mortar 
 batteries 31 and 32, and the other trench works. 
 
 September 6. — At Schiltigheim a line of telegraph, serving 
 apparently for commimication with Metz, was discovered and 
 destroyed. Subsequently, however, it was believed that it had served 
 for private and local uses. The batteries of the attack kept up a 
 very heavy fire, and the fine ' Finkmatt ' barracks, behind the 
 bastion of the same name, where Napoleon III. had made an 
 attempt at insurrection in 1839, were set on fire by shells. In 
 Bischheim, also, a conflagration was caused by the fire of the 
 artillery of the garrison. The Kehl batteries kept up a heavy fire 
 on the citadel and destroyed the city gate there, and by this means 
 the communication with the town and w^itli its defences was 
 rendered exceedingly difficult. 
 
 September 7. — In the morning there was an engagement of 
 the patrols on the Ehine, in which a detachment of the 3rd 
 (Baden) regiment took part. Another detachment captured at 
 Machern, one-and-a-half leagues above Kehl, two vessels comino- 
 from Neu-Breisach with stores for the supply of the artillery', 
 including 30,000 fuzes. The boatmen in charge of the vessels 
 were compelled to discharge their cargoes, on account of the low 
 level of the water in the Ehine, and had set to work to do this 
 without precaution. 
 
 September 8. — During the past night, battery No. 35 had been 
 armed with two 21-centimetre (8'27-inch) mortars, which was a 
 work of much difficulty, as they weighed nearly 150 cwt. — namely, 
 the piece itself about 66 cwt., and the platform about 84 cwt. 
 These experimental mortars throw a shell weighing 160 pounds, 
 shaped like a sugarloaf, and 20 inches in length, with a 15-pound 
 bursting charge, which forms by its explosion a crater 6 feet deep
 
 46 
 
 and 20 feet across. They are, therefore, very effective against 
 bombproof casemates. They were used in combination with 
 battery No. 5 against the redoubt in kmette No. 4-4, which work 
 was in consequence soon abandoned by the enemy. At the same 
 time batteries 39 and 38, and two emplacements for field-guns 
 to fire over the ground in front, were built ; and a battery (No. 40), 
 for firing at high angles near the churchyard of St. Helene, was 
 constructed, and armed with six 25-pounder mortars. 
 
 September 9. — The birthday of H.R.H. the Grand Duke of 
 Baden, kept in time of peace with a grand reveille, thanksgiving, 
 and tattoo, was celebrated by an unusually heavy cannonade, on 
 the part of the besiegers, from both sides of the Ehine. Besides 
 the 32 rifled guns and 8 mortars in the Kehl batteries, there 
 were in the principal attack 98 rifled guns and 40 mortars in 
 action. By the admirable arrangement of the artillery attack, for 
 the mutual support and concentration of fire from the various 
 batteries, that of the enemy was almost silenced. It slackened 
 perceptibly, and on the fronts and lines directly attacked, a rapid 
 mortar-fire only was maintained. 
 
 In Paris a despatch was published, ostensibly from the 
 governor of the fortress, according to which the condition of the 
 place had in the last few days become very seriously worse, owing 
 to the incessant bombardment ; it has not transpired how the 
 despatch in question found its way to Paris under the circum- 
 stances then existing. 
 
 September 10.— During the night of the 9th-10th, work 
 was begun in three places at the communications to the third 
 parallel, and a sortie of the French from the porte Nationale was 
 repulsed by the 2nd (Baden) regiment. The use of the Stein 
 Thor (porte de la Pierre), which lay so close to the attack, was 
 rendered altogether unavailable for making sorties, because it, as 
 well as the bridges at that place, had been entirely destroyed by 
 the fire of the artillery. In the town several, large conflagrations 
 were observed. 
 
 September 11. — During the preceding night the approaches 
 to the third parallel, on the three openings that had been made, 
 were pushed forward about 300 paces. The artillery fire on both 
 sides was heavy. There was a fire at the artillery school, and also 
 in Konigshofen. Breaching battery No. 8 was constructed against 
 lunette No. 53, and was armed with four short 24-pounders. 
 
 Septeinber 12. — During the previous night the third parallel 
 was added, 700 paces in length, which was executed by means of 
 the common sap,* without using gabions, as had been all the 
 earlier works of this description. It deserves to be prominently 
 noticed that the establishment of the third parallel and the com- 
 munications between the second and third parallels by the 
 common sap, instead of the full sap prescribed for their execution 
 in the regulations, shortened the attack by many days ; and this 
 
 * The ' common sap ' is not what is so called in the English Service, but 
 the mode of execution adopted by us for the first parallel.
 
 47 
 
 arrangement, previously unrecorded in military history, was due 
 entirely to the Engineer-in-Chief, Greneral von Martens. The 
 garrison attempted a sortie, which produced no effect, and was of 
 no importance. At the same time battery 8a was constructed, and 
 armed with four oO-pounder mortars, against bastion No. 11, on the 
 front of attack, which was also shelled by battery 35. At break 
 of day the fire of the artillery was resumed, and kept up most 
 vigorously. The position of the third parallel was such that it 
 skirted the foot of the glacis of lunette 53, while it was some 
 60 paces distant from the foot of lunette 52. A kind of demi- 
 parallel was required to connect the two glacis, at their feet, for 
 which purpose a sap had to be driven forward from the third 
 parallel towards lunette 52. Further approaches could no longer 
 be made by zigzags. The double sap {Traversensappe) was 
 necessary to give the additional cover required on both sides. 
 
 Breaching battery No. 42 was erected, for six short 24- 
 pounders, against the right face of bastion No. 11. 
 
 The Swiss, with the consent of the governor of the fortress, 
 and of the commander of the siege corps, made arrange- 
 ments for the departm'e of distressed families. Nearly 800 per- 
 sons left the fortress, with the greatest goodwill on the part of the 
 besiegers. 
 
 September 13. — During the previous bright moonlight night, 
 the work at the double sap was continued with sap-rollers {Erdioalze). 
 The fire of the fortress reached as far as Mittelhausbergen, more 
 than a league (about 4,600 yards) from the place, and set that 
 village on fire. In the com'se of the day an exchange was effected 
 of an unwounded French officer, who was a prisoner, for a wounded 
 Prussian officer, who was also a prisoner — Lieutenant von Yersen, 
 of the 30th regiment. Detachments of Baden infantry occupied 
 the island of Sporen, at the south-east of the fortress ; they made 
 rifle-pits there, and endeavoured to establish communication with 
 the Prussian troops . posted at their right on the Roberstaue, for 
 which purpose a bridge was thrown over the branch of the Rliine. 
 
 September 14. — On the night of September 13th-14th the 
 demi-parallel was completed, and was broken through for a return 
 to the front ; this could only be made by a double sap, executed 
 by means of sap-rollers. At the same time batteries 41 and 43 
 were built, and manned by the "SViirtemberg artillery. The 
 former was armed with four 12-poLmders, and the latter with eight 
 24-pounders, for firing against the adjoining fronts. Then fol- 
 lowed the establishment of mortar-emplacements Nos. 45 and 46, 
 against the outworks lying near them, as well as the construction 
 of 'dismounting battery' No. 44. An indirect breaching battery. 
 No. 42, was built to operate against the right face of bastion 11, 
 and armed with four short 24-pounders. A detachment of Baden 
 troops, consisting of 4 battalions, 8 squadrons, and 3 batteries, 
 under the command of Greneral Keller, was sent from the siege 
 corps to Upper Alsace. It marched by Colmar to Miihlhauseu, 
 was attacked by the garrison of Neu-Breisach and some gardes 
 mobiles, and, in compliance with orders, effected the disarmament 
 of the district, in which signs of a popular rising had appeared.
 
 48 
 
 Septemhev 15. — During- the previous night the glacis was 
 crowned by the flying sap for 50 jDaces along each face of lunette 
 No. 53. A second time the Frencli made an attempt to occupy 
 the island of Sporen in force. This day they endeavoured to effect 
 this object by a sortie in force, apparently with 1,600 men, accom- 
 panied by artillery, who, after a combat of some duration, were 
 driven back. 
 
 At first there were only two Baden companies opposed to the 
 French, but these, during the fight, were reinforced by Prussian 
 detachments, and drove back the enemy, who left behind them 
 killed, wounded, and prisoners. 
 
 In Strasburg the want of provisions, especially among the 
 poorer classes of the population, began to be felt seriously, and 
 arrangements were made for sheltering those whose houses had 
 been burnt in sheds built for horses. At the pressing instance of 
 the clergy of both persuasions there was an armistice from 9 till 
 12 in the forenoon, to allow 500 or 600 women and children to 
 depart from the besieged city. 
 
 September 16. — On the night of the 15th-16th the crowning 
 of the glacis, by flying sap, in front of lunette 52, was begun. 
 At Appenweier, a railway-station, 2 miles (9^ English miles) from 
 Kehl, preparations were made for the repair of the lattice-bridge 
 over the Ehine, which had been destroyed, restoring it, in the 
 first instance, for one line only. The flying-bridge at Ichenheim, 
 about 2^ leagues above Kehl, was also kept ready to be brought 
 down to that place. 
 
 September \1 . — On this night the crownings in front of lunettes 
 52 and 53 were prepai-ed for action, and the artillery displayed, on 
 this occasion, extraordinary activity. Batteries 17a, 19a, 21a were 
 made in front of the second parallel, and Nos. 17b, 19b, 21b were 
 made in connection with them. Batteries Nos. 46, 47, 48, 5a 
 (all batteries for firing at high angles) were built, and armed with 
 light and heavy mortars. Captain Ledebur, of the Engineers, 
 with two resolute pioneers (sappers), had on the night of 
 the 8th-9th September reconnoitred lunette 53. Letting them- 
 selves down by ropes into the ditch, they discovered three mining- 
 galleries of the enemy, of which the entrances were just above the 
 surface of the water in the ditch. One principal gallery was 
 found on the centre line of the work, and one gallery on each 
 side of it. All three were connected by parallel galleries, and 
 formed in the customary manner. This system of mines being- 
 discovered, was given up by the enemy. Only one mine had been 
 loaded, and that was now unloaded. The gallery, on the right of 
 the capital, was converted by working from the third parallel 
 into an underground communication with the ditch of the work, 
 and by the 14th September was made use of as a secure place of 
 observation for watching the effect of the indirect breaching 
 batteries on the right face. Inforrnation was thus obtained that 
 the breach was quite practicable on the 16th September. This 
 was not the only application of indirect fire to the formation of a 
 breach, for it had, as we have seen, been attended by the best re-
 
 49 
 
 suits from battery 33, against the redoubt of lunette 44, and 
 against a covered dam at the Fischerthor, between bastion 15 and 
 ravelin 63. 
 
 In the evening detachments of the 3rd and 6th regiments of 
 Baden infantry repulsed an attack attempted by the French on the 
 island of Sporen. 
 
 September 18. — On the previous night the fortress was bom- 
 barded with increased vigour. An advance was made into the 
 covered way of lunette 52, and the redoubt in the place (Varmes 
 was found to be abandoned by the enemy. The descent into the 
 ditch in front of lunette 53 was excavated during the night, and 
 at intervals by day, and the timber-work was then commenced. 
 The field telegraph was brought up to the third parallel, and the 
 whole of the siege-works put in connection with it. This was its 
 first application in siege operations. 
 
 Septeraber 19. — In the night progress was made with the 
 construction of the descent into the ditch in front of lunette 52. 
 
 Lieutenant Kirchgessner, of the engineers of the Grand Duchy 
 of Baden, was killed. The theatre in Strasburg became a prey 
 to the flames. The bombardment reached all parts of the city, 
 and destroyed a timber-yard in the citadel, and two of the largest 
 and finest houses on the Steinstrasse, by fire. Immediately on 
 completion of the crownings in front of the two lunettes, the 
 artillery went on with the construction of counter-batteries, Nos. 
 51, 53, 54, and armed them each with two 6-pounder guns. 
 
 September 20. — In front of lunette 53 the descent of the 
 ditch was finished, and the foot of the counterscarp was blown in 
 by . a mine. The breach thus caused was widened to 1 2 feet, and 
 made practicable. The debris of the wall, however, only filled 
 up part of the ditch, and about 3 rods (36 feet) of its breadth re- 
 mained to be filled up to complete the passage of the ditch. This 
 was done by throwing in filled sandbags and earth, and fascines 
 and gabions loaded with stones. Towards 5 p.m. this task was 
 completed, and a passage to the work was made practicable, about 
 60 feet long, 18 feet wide, and 4 feet to 8 feet deep in water. 
 Accordingly, the guard of the trenches that happened to be at 
 hand, consisting of some men of the Cottbus landwehr battalion 
 of the guard, under Lieutenant von Miiller, of the fusiliers 
 of the guard, advanced, ascended the breach that had been 
 made in the 18-foot escarp, and effected a lodgment on it. The 
 work was abandoned by the enemy, but the interior was seen from 
 the works lying beliiud it. Lieutenant Frobenius, of the engi- 
 neers, reconnoitred the interior of the lunette. He found the gorge 
 open, a great traverse, with two vaulted passages, erected on the centre 
 line or capital of the work, and some guns. The abandoned guns 
 were spiked by the artillery; and the jjioneers (engineers) having 
 found nowhere any mines for its demolition, the interior of the 
 lunette was occupied. The enemy hereupon opened a brisk mus- 
 ketry fire, from which the new garrison endeavoured to cover 
 themselves as best they could. At night the 3rd company of the 
 34th fusiliers formed the garrison. A pioneer company, under 
 36996. E
 
 50 
 
 the command of Captain Ledebur, effectually closed in the 
 work by the construction of covered communications to the lodg- 
 ment in the gorge, with a parapet facing the enceinte. Mortar- 
 batteries 49 and 50, against the adjoining works, as well as gun- 
 battery 55, were built. In the captured lunette. No. 53, a 7-poun- 
 der mortar-battery. No. 56, was erected. 
 
 September 21. — Greneral Keller's detachment, that had been 
 sent to Upper Alsace, rejoined the siege corps before Strasburg. 
 Night and day work was carried on at the descent of the ditch in 
 front of lunette 52, from the entrance down to the bottom, and 
 many reliefs were employed, so as to finish the work as quickly as 
 possible. The slopes were revetted with gabions, and iron rails, 
 properly supported at the ends, were used in its construction. The 
 breach through the earthen counterscarp to the wet ditch was 
 filled up during the day with gabions, sandbags, &c. At 8 o'clock 
 in the evening preparations were commenced for the passage of 
 the ditch. This was to be effected by means of a bridge of casks, 
 120 feet long, constructed under the charge of Captain Andriae, 
 of the engineers. To prevent noise the bridge was covered with 
 straw, and its construction was completed about half-past 10 
 o'clock. A working party of 100 men, under the command of 
 First-Lieutenant von Keiser I., of the engineers, followed by two 
 companies of the 34th fusiliers, crossed over, and found 
 the lunette armed with some guns, but unoccupied. Fire was 
 opened upon them, however, from the line of works in rear, namely, 
 the counterguard, and the hornwork 47-49; but, though they suf- 
 fered mncli loss, the work was pushed on with great energy, and 
 the contemplated lodgment in the works was effected. Major 
 von Quitzow, of the staff of the engineers (major of the trenches 
 on duty), was killed. Captain Eoese, of the engineers, had charge 
 of the works for closing the lunette, which consisted of a lodg- 
 ment behind the palisades at the gorge, and a communication 
 leading into it. Inside the lunette four 7-pounder mortars were 
 subsequently placed, and it was called battery 57. The loss 
 amounted on this night to 10 killed and 38 wounded. During 
 the day the bombardment was extended to all parts of the town. 
 The prefecture was bm-nt down, and the fire in the Steinstrasse 
 continued its ravages. 
 
 September 22. — During the past night the cannonade 
 never stopped, and the bursting of shells in the city was incessant, 
 causing much loss of life, and making everywhere sad havoc. 
 
 Lunette 52 was captured; with it six 12-pounders, with their 
 proportion of ammunition, fell into the hands of the besiegers. On 
 the crowning a 6-pounder was placed opposite the left face of the 
 work. The losses of the last few days had made it necessary to 
 advance the field hospitals ( Verband pUitze). They were made 
 bombproof by the use of railway metals, and for some of them 
 Abyssinian wells were sunk. 
 
 September 23. — During the past night the besiegers, making 
 use of a dam that happened to be there, debouched from the 
 gorge of lunette 52, by means of the double sap, towards the
 
 51 
 
 siimmit of the glacis of coimterguard al. At this point Captain 
 Ledebur, of the Prussian Engineers, was wounded ; he died of this 
 wound some weeks later. All honour and respect is due to this 
 officer for his gallant conduct. He it was who, by a bold advance, 
 discovered the mines in front of lunette 53, and who swam 
 through the ditch in front of lunette 52 to reconnoitre the 
 gorge of that work. 
 
 On the same night a powder-magazine, which had been 
 struck simultaneously by two French shells, blew up in battery 
 No. 35. In another battery (No. 32,) the roof of the magazine 
 was broken through. In the former case 5 cwt. of powder went off, 
 and blew to pieces the gunner who was employed in the magazine. 
 It was evident from this, that the bridge of casks leading to 
 lunette 52, built on the night of the 21st and 22nd, would not 
 last long. In the course of the day it was disabled by the shells 
 of the enemy. It was accordingly sunk on the following night 
 to the bottom of the ditch, filled up with fascines, sandbags, 
 and gabions, and remained thus a secure means of crossing the 
 ditch. As it was exposed to an uninterrupted flanking fire from 
 lunettes 54 and 55, a parapet was made on the left side, of gabions 
 in two rows, one above the other, filled with sandbags. Breaching 
 battery No. 42 commenced firing against the right face of 
 bastion 11. 
 
 September 24. -During the previous night, breaching battery 
 No. 5S^ for four short 24-pounders, was built opposite the left 
 face of bastion 12, and opened fire in the morning. The double 
 sap, which had been commenced inside the dam leading to 
 lunette 52 from the rear, was pushed forward as far as the crest of 
 the glacis of bastion 11, where it terminated in a traverse that 
 was met with, and which was prepared for defence by infantrv', by 
 cutting a banquette in it. Destruction by fire and ruin of every 
 description continually increased in the city ; the citizens were 
 wounded and killed, by shrapnel and shells, in the streets, in 
 their houses, at any business they undertook. One of the 21- 
 centimetre (8'27-inch) shells passed through three storeys into 
 the cellar of a house, destroying everything in its way. 
 
 September 25. — In lunette 53, battery No. 60 was erected, 
 for three rifled 6-pounders. A complete breach was formed in 
 bastion 11. 
 
 September 26. — A complete breach was formed in bastion 
 No. 12. Bastions 11 and 12 were reduced to shapeless ruins by 
 the fire directed on them, and at the salient of the latter 
 bastion an arched gam-casemate was entirely destroyed. The arch 
 of the Steinthor was shot to pieces. The construction of the 
 crowning in front of the counterguard of bastion 1 1 was continued 
 by the engineers. 
 
 So remarkable were the exertions of the artillery, that it is only 
 right to make special mention of the energy and endurance which 
 these troops this day displayed before Strasburg, and to which 
 alone it is due, not only that the artillery of the defenders was so 
 held in check, that at last they only ventured to come out at nighty 
 
 E 2
 
 52- 
 
 but also that the engineer attack, conducted with measures as well 
 considered as they were excellent and vigorous, attained its object 
 in so short a time. 
 
 The various descriptions of guns which the artillery had 
 in use before Strasburg were long 24-pounder, short 24-pounder5 
 12-pounder and 6-pounder guns ; 21 -centimetre, 50-pounder, 
 25-pounder, and 7-pounder mortars. Altogether 193,722 
 shot and shell were fired, of which 162,600 were fired from 
 197 Prussian pieces of artillery, and 31,112 from Baden 
 artillery. Every day a train of thirty-two wagons was required to 
 bring up ammunition. During the bombardment and the siege, 
 on the average 1,200 cwt. of metal (iron and lead) was thrown 
 into the fortress daily. At the time that most of the artillery 
 were in action — that is to say, approximately, during the last three 
 weeks of the siege — the fortress received,at the ordinary rate of fire, 
 some 6,000 projectiles during the 24 hours, and of these each one 
 exploded separately. Wall-pieces, served by some particularly 
 good marksmen of the Baden division, were made use of from the 
 beginning of the siege. Wall-piece detachments were formed, 
 and posted in the most advanced trenches, in order that they 
 might 023erate against particular guns of the enemy. 
 
 Septeinher 27. — On this day the defence was almost entirely 
 silent, and only now and then gave signs of life. But, though 
 this was the case, all were surprised and astonished when, at 5 
 o'clock in the afternoon, white flags were seen to wave on the 
 cathedral, and on bastions 11 and 12. At the same time, a flag of 
 truce announced that the governor wished to treat for the surrender 
 of the fortress. 
 
 September 28. — At 2 a.m. the terms of capitulation were 
 agreed upon at Kouigshofen, and the principal points were as 
 follows : — 
 
 "Article 1. — At 8 a.m. on the 28th September, 1870, Lieu- 
 tenant-Greneral Uhrich evacuates the citadel, the Austerlitz, Fischer, 
 and National gates. At the same time the German troops occupy 
 these places. 
 
 " Article 2. — At 11 o'clock on the same day the P'rench gar- 
 rison, including mobiles and national guards, evacuate the fortress 
 and lay down their arms. 
 
 " Article 3. — The troops of the line and gardes mobiles become 
 prisoners of war, and march off with their baggage. The national 
 guards and the franc-tireurs are free on specified conditions, and 
 give up their arms at the mayoralty. 
 
 " Article 4. — The officers and officials ranking as non-com- 
 missioned officers depart to such residences as they may select, on 
 a written engagement ' upon honour.' Those who do not do so, 
 go with the garrison as prisoners of war to Germany. 
 
 " Article 5. — Lieutenant-General Uhrich undertakes, imme- 
 diately after the arms are laid do\yn, to hand over all military 
 property, and the public chest." 
 
 This capitulation was signed, on the part of the Germans, by 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Lescinsky, chief of the general staff,
 
 53 
 
 and Captain and Adjutant Count Henckel von Donnersmarck ; and 
 on the part of the French by the commandant of Strasburg-, 
 Colonel Ducasse, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Mangin, sub-director 
 of artillery. It was ratified by Lieutenant-Creneral von Werder. 
 
 The Germans received into their hands, in consequence of this 
 capitulation, 451 officers, 17,111 men (including 7,000 national 
 guards), and some 2,000 sick, 1,843 horses, more than 1,200 pieces 
 of bronze ordnance, 3,000 cwt. of powder, 12,000 chassepot rifles, 
 50 locomotives, and great quantities of other warlike stores. The 
 prisoners of war were sent to Rastatt. 
 
 In accordance with Article 2 of the capitulation, detachments 
 of the siege corps of all arms were posted during the morning 
 between the roads leading to Zabern and to Konigshofen, while the 
 French marched out between lunette 44 and redoubt 37. The 
 march-past of the latter was commenced by Lieutenant-General 
 Uhrich, followed by General Barral, of tlie artillery, and Admiral 
 Exelmann, who was to have commanded the Rliine flotilla. The 
 troops marched at first in their ranks, but afterwards in disorder. 
 They defiled past Lieutenant-General von Werder, in the presence 
 of H.R.H. the Grand Duke of Baden. 
 
 In Strasburg both Lieutenant-General L^hrich and the pre- 
 fect had issued proclamations to the citizens, in which they ex- 
 pressed their sympathy with the hard lot of the inhabitants 
 during the siege, and their confidence that they would accept the 
 new state of affairs worthily and peaceably. 
 
 September 29. — The taking over of the property, barracks, 
 &c. continued. The commimications destroyed were repaired 
 and opened, especially the bridges and gateways of the fortress. 
 
 September 30 — being the birthday of Her Majesty the Queen, 
 and a day to be remembered after the occupation of Strasburg for 
 200 years by the French troops — the entry of the siege army 
 corps took place, with Lieutenant-General von Werder at its head. 
 This event was celebrated by a thanksgiving service in the church 
 of St. Thomas. The siege cost the garrison some 2,000 men 
 killed and wounded, the civil population some 400 or 500 persons, 
 and the besieging army 43 officers, and 863 men killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 Without making any imputation on the military honour of the 
 brave and worthy governor, but looking at the matter in a purely 
 military aspect, it is a fact that the time for capitulation had 
 not arrived. More light will probably be thrown on this point 
 hereafter. The want of discipline was no doubt one cause of 
 disaster for the defence, but it is nevertheless certain that even a 
 better garrison could not have held out mucli longer. For to 
 remain on the ramparts under the incessant cannonade was almost 
 impossible ; a breach had been effected, the citadel was almost 
 destroyed, the entrance gateway of the city was shot to pieces. 
 Under these circumstances, and as there was no flanking fire 
 along the bottom of the ditches, an attempt to storm the fortress 
 was almost sure of success. The capitulation, at all events, had 
 the effect of preventing one or more assaults, which would have
 
 54 
 
 entailed more bloodshed and serious loss of life. The capture of 
 Strasburg was of decided military importance for the prosecution 
 of the war, but it was of far greater moment politically. The 
 German city of Strashurg had surrendered to us, had again 
 become German, and ivoidd, it ivas hoped, long remain so. In 
 a few years the city, heavily though it suffered by the war — for 
 its losses have been publicly estimated to amount to 50,800,000 
 francs (£2,032,000) — will flourish again, and its wounds, which 
 we inflicted with heavy hearts, will be healed.
 
 PAPYflCT/P£ S.M.C
 
 55 
 
 «CHLETTSTADT. 
 
 (plate VIII.) 
 
 ScHLETTSTADT, a fortress of the second class — which indicates, 
 however, only its present relative position — is situated on the 111, 
 not far from the small affluent the Griesen, and consists of eight 
 tolerably regular bastions, constrvicted on Vauban's principles in 
 ] 673. Most of the bastions are provided with ravelins of the form 
 of small lunettes. Nine similar works are placed in the re-enter- 
 ing angles at the foot of the glacis, and of these one on the north 
 and one on the south front respectively, are advanced farther into 
 the country. These works are obviously intended to bring the 
 ground in front under a cross-fire, and to keep the works of a 
 besieger at a distance from the enceinte, for which piu'pose they 
 have been constructed with a low profile, so that their fire may be 
 as grazing as possible. There are no other outworks, except a 
 redoubt raised in the inundated ground to the south of the fortress. 
 Most of the bastions have orillons to protect the retired flanks, 
 and some of them have cavaliers seeing far over the country. The 
 curtains are broken. The fortress contains three powder-magazines, 
 an arsenal, and several barracks. The last-named buildings are 
 not bombproof. Three gates, each covered by one of the ravelins, 
 lead respectively to Colmar, Strasburg, and Neu-Breisach. The 
 important highroad from Strasburg to Colmar passes by the 
 fortress, 300 paces to the westward ; 400 paces farther to the west 
 is the railroad between Belfort, Basle, and Strasburg. The 111, 
 always full of water, can be made use of, by means of a well-pro- 
 tected sluice near the Gate of Breisach, for inundating the ground 
 to the south of the fortress, which is partly meadow-land and 
 partly marsh. Several branches of the stream are also avail- 
 able for this purpose. At the same time part of the ditches of 
 the fortress can be supplied with water. 
 
 The strategic object of Schlettstadt is to command the railway 
 leading to Belfort and Besanpon, the highroad already mentioned, 
 at the mouth of the populous and industrious Vosges valley of St. 
 Marie-aux-Mines, through which pass the railway and road to 
 Luneville. During the war it served for the numerous bands of 
 franc-tireurs, who hung about Upper Alsace, as a place of as- 
 sembly, of which it was necessary to deprive them. The passage 
 of the Vosges here had the advantage that it was never closed by 
 snowdrifts, as happens frequently with most of the mountain- 
 passes thereabouts. 
 
 It will be remembered, that on the 14th September a detach-
 
 56 
 
 ment, composed of troops of the Grand Duchy of Baden — consist- 
 ing of four battalions, eight squadrons, three batteries, and a 
 pioneer detachment — under the command of Greneral Keller, was 
 ordered from the Strasburg siege corps to disarm Upper Alsace, 
 disperse the franc-tireurs, and prevent the organisation of a popu- 
 lar war in that quarter. A detachment of Baden troops, with the 
 same objects, had in the beginning of September already won a 
 victory at Markirch. This mission led also to a reconnaissance 
 being undertaken against Schlettstadt, and in this way trustworthy 
 information was obtained with regard to the garrison and the 
 state of preparation of the fortress. Tlie preparations were fully 
 completed ; the rayon was clear of cover, and the glacis of timber, 
 while the country round was placed under water. The conviction 
 was arrived at, that the fortress was not to be taken by a sudden 
 attack, and it was thought sufficient at the time to break the 
 telegraphic communication with Colmar, and to destroy the railway 
 by blowing up some bridges. The fortress was also observed more 
 completely than before, and was occasionally shelled with iield- 
 guns, after an unavailing demand to surrender had been made to the 
 commandant (Count von Reinach), on the strength of the events 
 that had taken place at Sedan. 
 
 Meanwhile in the neighbourhood of Freiburg, in Breisgau, on 
 the right (the German) bank of the Rhine, the formation of 
 the 4th Prussian reserve division, under the command of 
 Major-General von Schmeling, had been completed. It received 
 orders, accordingly, to commence its military career with the cap- 
 ture of the fortresses of Schlettstadt and Neu-Breisach. For 
 this end the division crossed the Rhine, on the 1st and 2nd 
 October, at Neuenburg, five leagues above Neu-Breisach, by means 
 of ferry-boats, which had been in preparation for some time pre- 
 viously, in consequence of the resistance of the French population 
 in that quarter. 
 
 In this state of affairs orders were given to invest Neu-Breisach 
 at the same time. Action was chiefly, however, taken against 
 Schlettstadt, as it was convenient to have the rear free, and to have 
 direct communication with Strasburg, which was necessary in 
 order to draw from thence siege-materiel of all descriptions, and 
 especially heavy siege-guns. 
 
 That part of the 4th reserve division which was told off for 
 the closer investment of the fortress of Schlettstadt, consisted of 
 battalions of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 43rd, and 45th landwehr regi- 
 ments, the 25th (1st Rhenish) regiment (which had just arrived 
 from Schleswig, and was attached to the division), of two reserve 
 field-batteries, and of one squadron each of the 1st East Prussian and 
 the 3rd reserve ulan regiments. These troops, on the 9th October, 
 went into cantonments close round the fortress. After the Com- 
 mandant of the fortress had rejected, offliand, the demand to 
 surrender, with the words " mes conditions seront les canons," steps 
 were at once taken for bringing from Strasburg the necessary 
 materials for the siege — guns, brushwood, &c. — and the siege detach- 
 ment was reinforced by the 11th garrison company of artillery.
 
 57 
 
 and four garrison pioneer companies — viz., two Prussian and 
 one Bavarian company, and one company of the Grand Duchy 
 of Baden. The siege artillery was placed under the command of 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Scheliha, and Lieutenant-Colonel .Sander, 
 of the engineer staff, directed the works of the siege. 
 
 On the night of the 19th-20th October a battery was con- 
 structed against the east front of the fortress, on the other side of 
 the inundated ground, and was armed with four rifled 1 2-pounders. 
 This battery opened fire on the morning of the 20th October, and 
 had to maintain a fight alone, for three days, against nine guns of 
 the fortress. 
 
 The south-west front was selected for the attack, because the 
 groimd there was beyond the limits of the inundation, and was 
 such that the trenches might be expected to be dry. The latter 
 was an advantage not to be despised. Headquarters during the 
 bombardment were in Kiihnheim. 
 
 On the night of the 22nd-23rd October, the first parallel, with 
 communications to tlie rear, was thrown up by the common saj^*' 
 opposite the south-west front. It was at a distance of only 700 
 paces from the fortress, and though it was so close, and the night 
 was clear and quiet, it was not observed by the enemy. This shows 
 how poorly they did their duty, for they seem to have altogether 
 omitted to send out night-patrols over the ground in front of the 
 works. The trench-work was commenced as night fell, and was 
 very difficult, on account of the rocky nature of the soil ; the few 
 shells and case, which towards morning were fired from the 
 fortress, went much too far, and occasioned the loss of only three men. 
 At the same time that these trenches were put in hand, the con- 
 struction of six separate siege-batteries was commenced ; and on the 
 morning of the 23rd they were armed with -1:4 guns in all — namely, 
 12 rifled 24-pounders, 20 rifled 1 2-pounders, and 12 heavy mortars — 
 and forthwith opened fire. The fire was directed chiefly against 
 the gates within reach, the works, and the military buildings. 
 Unavoidably, however, some of tlie townspeople's houses were also 
 set in flames. The artillery of the garrison brought into action 
 some 30 guns. The activity which they displayed in replacing the 
 numerous guns that were dismounted, and in adding to and altering 
 the emplacements for guns, deserves recognition. However, the 
 injuries done by the siege-batteries to the guns of the garrison 
 were considerable, and it was barely possible for them to remain on 
 the ramparts. The Colmar gate, with its drawbridges, was shot 
 to pieces. Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the 
 fire of the garrison should gradually slacken, wliile the besiegers, 
 on the night of the 23rd-24th October, kept up theirs successfully, 
 and with ever-increasing effect. 
 
 On the 24th October, about 9 a.m., the French hung out the 
 white flag on the cathedral and on some of the works, and in con- 
 sequence Major von Kretschman, of the general staff, was sent into 
 the fortress, to commence negotiations for a surrender. The 
 governor desired an armistice for 24 hours, which was, however, 
 
 * See note p. 4G.
 
 58 
 
 only granted to him until 2.30 in the afternoon. There is no 
 doubt that tlie state of affairs in the fortress materially hastened 
 the conclusion of a capitulation. In consequence of the damage 
 by fire caused by the siege-batteries, as mentioned above, to the 
 buildings of the town, the townspeople were urgent for a surrender ; 
 but of still more importance was the demoralised condition of the 
 garrison, among whom there was no longer any discipline. The 
 want of trained artillerymen, who were scarcely sufficient for two 
 reliefs, and (as at Strasburg) the entire absence of any detachment 
 of engineers, were undoubtedly most disadvantageous to the defence. 
 Soldierlike spirit and military discipline had been alike irrecover- 
 ably lost ever since the place had been first invested. It could not 
 otherwise have happened that a detachment of 300 gardes mobiles, 
 who had been sent on a reconnaissance to some distance from the 
 fortress, never came back again, but preferred to go home, and 
 there willingly allowed themselves to be disarmed by some Baden 
 troops, without offering any resistance. In fact, on the day of the 
 capitulation, the garrison were for the most part drunk, and em- 
 ployed in pillaging, and had thrown off all discipline. Some of 
 them actually set fire to private houses, and went about with the 
 intention of blowing up the powder-magazines. 
 
 While the French officers were endeavoviring to prevent this, 
 the governor tliought proper, contrary to his instructions and to 
 the custom of war, to leave the fortress, and continue the negotia- 
 tions outside the gates within range of the besiegers' forces, and 
 under these circumstances brought them, at any rate, to a rapid 
 conclusion. The capitulation was not even ratified by the general 
 in command, but, as a precaution against greater mishaps, three 
 Prussian battalions marched into the fortress, to prevent further 
 excesses of the French garrison, and chiefly to protect the 
 threatened powder-magazines, which were pointed out in detail 
 by Colonel Pinot, commanding the artillery. About 3 o'clock in 
 the afternoon the capitulation was concluded, and an hour later the 
 fortress was evacuated by the garrison of 100 officers and 2,000 
 men of the different arms, including gardes • mobiles, who were 
 made prisoners of war. In consequence of an order proceeding 
 from headquarters, the officers did not, as in previous capitula- 
 tions, have the option granted to them of going away free on 
 parole. The booty consisted chiefly of 122 garrison guns, 50 of 
 them rifled — of which 116 were mounted on the ramparts, but 24 
 had been dismounted — besides considerable stocks of tobacco, pro- 
 visions, and stores of other descriptions. 
 
 The damages done to private property by the bombardment 
 were estimated at 2,500,000 francs (£100,000). 
 
 On the 25th October, Major-General von Schmeling made his 
 entry into the fortress. The occasion was celebrated by ringing 
 the bells, and by holding an evangelical and catholic thanksgiving 
 service.
 
 Plate. IX. 
 
 
 Fapyroty-pe S.MK.
 
 59 
 
 NEU-BREISACH. 
 
 (plate IX.) 
 
 Neu-Breisacii was at one time a model fortress of Marshal 
 Vauban, and is built according to liis third system. It consists of 
 a regular bastioned octagon, at the salients of which bastion-shaped 
 towers have been erected. The ditches are dry, and swept 
 by the fire of sunken works in front of the curtains, called 
 ' tenailles', while the masonry of the bastions is protected from di- 
 rect fire by large outworks or count erguards. In front of the eight 
 tenailles are situated the same number of very spacious ravelins, 
 which are thus placed, both to fire, generally, over the ground in 
 front, and also to give a cross-fire over the space in front of the 
 bastions. The roads to Colmar, Strasburg, Basle, and Belfort pass 
 through the ravelins, so that the entrances, and the lines of the 
 roads, are thoroughly swept by the fire of the guns. There are 
 no outworks anywhere, except a small lunette built close to the foot 
 of the glacis in front of the east face, and intended to flank the 
 Rhone-Ehine canal. Fort Mortier, which played an important 
 part in the bombardment of the place, lies about 2,000 paces 
 from the fortress, towards which it faces. It serves apparently 
 as a bridge-head, and is supported on the defences of Alt- 
 Breisach, which have long since fallen into ruins. As it was situ- 
 ated on the French bank of the river, and could be advantageously 
 made use of for the defence of the ground between Neu-Breisach 
 and the Rhine, and also to command the island there, which, with 
 a flying-bridge, formed a means of communication with Alt-Brei- 
 sach, it had, in spite of its advanced position, been maintained as 
 a means of strengthening the fortress, and had been made securely 
 defensible, by the addition of a suitable gorge, in the form of a 
 bastioned front, on the side towards Grermany. The fortress had 
 ample oasemated buildings and well-protected powder-magazines. 
 More recently, its defensive strength had been increased by the 
 construction of earthen traverses, and of shelter-casemates on the 
 rampart, to afford cover for the guard of the ramparts and the men 
 serving the guns. 
 
 The Rlione-Rhine canal flows through the ground in front of 
 the fortress, circles round the east front, and is of some use for the 
 defence. A second canal, the canal de Vauban, flows round the 
 west of the fortress, and connects the 111 with the Rhine-Rhone canal. 
 The ground in front lies low everywhere, and is protected on the east 
 by the banks of the Rhine, which are clothed with willow plan- 
 tations, and by the numerous islands, and on the west by the Kasten 
 Wald. The surrounding country is divided, for defensive purposes,
 
 60 
 
 into several sections by the features of the ground. The town, 
 being purely a military fortress, is very regularly built, and ex- 
 clusively of one-storied houses. It has only 3,500 inhabitants, most 
 of them employed in the timber trade. Neu-Breisach had never 
 before been besieged. 
 
 The occupation of Neu-Breisach was necessary for the German 
 forces, because the fortress bars the roads leading by Colmar, which 
 is only a few miles distant, to Luneville, and also the Ehine-Ehone 
 canal, and because, by its capture, the last stronghold in Upper 
 Alsace — from which, moreover, operations could have been under- 
 taken against the Baden Oberland — would be wrested from the 
 French. 
 
 The constant good fortune which had attended the Grerman 
 arms since the beginning of the campaign had produced an ex- 
 treme feeling of exasperation among the population of Upper 
 Alsace, who, already prejudiced against everything German, had 
 hitherto been spared the horrors of war. This feeling had 
 especially taken root in the great manufacturing towns, Colmar 
 and Mlihlhausen, and had been cherished by every means avail- 
 able. Circumstances necessitated the closing of a great many 
 of the manufactories. Terrorism was the result, and many thou- 
 sand workmen, thus deprived of their daily bread, were placed in a 
 most precarious position. It suited the purpose of the authori- 
 ties to give to the public feeling a purely political colouring, in 
 order to organise thoroughly a popular war, and for ttiis purpose 
 to make use of Neu-Breisach as a central rallying- point for 
 the movement. Partly on these accounts, and also to obtain more 
 detailed information concerning the fortresses of Schlettstadt, 
 and especially Neu-Breisach, which were then coming into notice, 
 small reconnoitring parties were sent out at the beginning ot 
 September, both from the force investing Strasburg, and from 
 the German troops stationed in the Baden Oberland, who 
 crossed the Rhine for the purpose. Finally, on the 14th Sep- 
 tember, Baden patrols pushed their way close up to Breisach, 
 and showed themselves in Arzenheim and Biesheim, to the north 
 of the fortress, after crossing the Rhine between Diebolsheim and 
 Kappel. In consequence of this, the bridge which crosses the 
 Rhine at the custom-house, was blown up with gunpowder b}^ the 
 garrison of Breisach. 
 
 As has been already mentioned, in speaking of Strasburg and 
 Schlettstadt, a detachment of the troops of the Grand Duchy of 
 Baden, under the command of General Keller, marclied on the 
 same day from the circle of investment of Strasburg for Upper 
 Alsace, and with this object in view arrived on the 15th September 
 at Colmar, on the 1 6th at Miihlhausen. On arriving at Colmar, 
 they received exact intelligence that the commandant of Neu- 
 Breisach was aware of this expedition, and would oppose General 
 Keller's advance. To prevent this being done, an attempt was 
 made on the part of the Germans to find the enemy, and in 
 consequence a squadron of the 2nd regiment of Baden dragoons 
 and the fusilier battalion of the 5th Baden regiment almost
 
 61 
 
 immediately came into contact with them. On the loth this 
 flanking column, which was intended to cover the further advance 
 to Colmar, was involved in an engagement with the enemy, south 
 of Kiinheim. The latter consisted of a party of gardes mobiles 
 and a detachment of cavalry from the fortress, into which they 
 were at once driven back. The Baden troops suffered only the 
 small loss of two men and five horses, but that of the French was 
 far more considerable. In this encounter Second-Lieutenant 
 Maier was taken prisoner, but immediately rescued again by his 
 dragoons. 
 
 While Breisach was observed by a small party of Baden troops, 
 the main body of Greneral Keller's detachment was performing 
 the duty with which it had been charged. It occupied Colmar, 
 Miihlhausen, and Cernay, hunted down the French bands of franc- 
 tireurs, disarmed the communes, and started upon its return to 
 Strasburg, after drawing in the detachment which had been left 
 before Breisach. The commandant of the fortress took advantage 
 of the opportunity to seize at Munzenheim, on the 19th 
 September, a convoy of arms, w^hich was on its way, under an 
 escort of thirty men, from Miihlhausen for the Baden troops. 
 General Keller's detachment arrived before Strasburg again on the 
 20th September, and soon after its return the gardes mobiles in 
 Colmar and Miihlhausen once more took up arms. A party of 
 French troops of the line, coming from Belfort, occupied 
 Miihlhausen ; the garrison of Breisach was reinforced by some 
 gardes mobiles, and scoured the country round, especially the 
 banks of the Ehine, with numerous patrols. The French gardes 
 mobiles and franc-tireurs appeared again in many jjlaces on the 
 Upper Rhine, and now, as before, spread disorder around. It 
 seemed as if the expedition of General Keller had been premature, 
 as at that time they were not ordered to occupy permanently the 
 district in question ; for this purpose the detachment was too weak. 
 
 In order to put an end to these French republican movements 
 in Upper Alsace, and especially to cut them off from Neu-Breisach, 
 which served as a rallying point for these operations, in the begin- 
 ning of October detachments of the 4th Prussian reserve divi- 
 sion, then in course of formation, were sent across the Ehine from 
 Breisgau to invest the fortress. 
 
 On the 5th October, towards evening, the French, about 
 2,000 strong, made a sortie, whicli was vigorously repulsed by three 
 companies of the 43rd landwehr regiment. These were em- 
 ployed foraging in the villages of Heitern, Balgau, and Nams- 
 heim. The troops engaged in the sortie suffered severely from a 
 heavy Prussian battery, which hurried up at a trot from the canton- 
 ments in rear. From the 7th October the place was preliminarily 
 bombarded with field-guns only, which nevertheless set the town 
 on fire in several places. This cannonade was particidarly heavy 
 in the later hours of the day, and especially from the south-west 
 and north sides. It was interrupted for a short time at night, and 
 continued with the same vigour on the following day. The artil- 
 lery of the garrison answered the fire as well as they could.
 
 62 
 
 Meanwhile the investing force before the place was reinforced 
 with troops, and with siege materiel adapted for a more effective 
 bombardment. Siege artillery, &c. were eventually sent from 
 Strasburg, so that by the 9th October the blockade of the fortress 
 may be said to have been close and complete. In order to facili- 
 tate the communication of the troops, and the forwarding of 
 materiel on the right bank of the Ehine, arrangements were made 
 for crossing the Ehine, chiefly with French bridging materials, 
 between Arzenheim on the one side, and Jechtlingen on the 
 other side, about If miles (8j English miles) north of Neu- 
 Breisach. 
 
 On the 12th and loth October small sorties and engagements 
 at the outposts took place without leading to any result of im- 
 portance. 
 
 On the 26th October the investing and siege corps consisted 
 
 of:— 
 
 11 battalions "1 r. , , a^-v. -n 
 
 „ , I 01 the 4th Prussian reserve 
 
 2 squadrons |- y ' ' 
 
 4 field-batteries J 
 
 11 garrison companies of artillery, including one company of 
 the 3rd Bavarian regiment of garrison artillery, and two 
 of the Baden garrison artillery. 
 4 companies of Prussian pioneers. 
 
 Major- General von Schmeling was in command of this corps. 
 The commanders of the siege artillery and of the engineers were, 
 respectively, Lieutenant-Colonel von Scheliha and Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Sander. Headquarters were in Klinheim, one mile (4f 
 English miles) from Neu-Breisach, on the road to Strasburg. 
 
 As it was intended to oj^erate on Fort Mortier from the right 
 bank of the Rhine, the artillery attack was undertaken on that 
 side — in the same manner as before Strasburg — by two com- 
 panies of garrison artillery and one siege battery, both of the 
 Grand Duchy of Baden, with the aid of 12 siege-pieces, con- 
 sisting of heavy ^;uns and mortars. 
 
 The construction of the batteries took place simultaneously 
 on both banks of the Rhine, on the night of the 1st and 2nd 
 November, and was not interfered with by the enemy. The 
 Prussians built their batteries near the villages Biesheim and 
 Wolfgantzen, the Baden troops about a quarter of a league below 
 Alt-Breisach, on a conveniently situated hill, and all opened 
 together against the fortress on the 2nd November. The fire was 
 directed more particularly upon the fronts of the fortifications 
 opposite, and upon the gates and bridges visible, or that could be 
 struck, their positions on the north-west and north-east fronts 
 being accurately known, as w^ell as against Fort Mortier and the 
 splinter-proofs there, and the masonry that could be hit. A great 
 effect was produced, especially in the latter work. Both the posi- 
 tion and the armament of the batteries were very happily chosen. 
 On the left bank of the Rhine only guns were employed, — namely, 
 long and short 24-pounders, and siege 12-pounders, and on the 
 right bank there were also four 50-pounder mortars. The infantry
 
 63 
 
 detachment told off to guard these batteries was obliged, in order 
 to maintain a careful watch over the fortress, to push its 
 outposts by day up to 1,000 paces, and by night, of course 
 nearer, up to 400 paces, right on to the glacis. They were 
 provided with tools for making rifle-pits to obtain cover, and 
 thence patrols were sent forward stealthily to the glacis. The 
 duty was as arduous for our landwehr as it was dangerous. A bold 
 deed that was done on one such occasion deserves mention. Deputy 
 Sergeant-Major Blass, of the Gumbinnen landwehr battalion,, 
 with a patrol, fell upon a French picket in a house close in front 
 of the glacis, and made them prisoners. 
 
 The capitulation of Metz was officially communicated to the 
 commandant of the fortress ; this event had, however, no influ- 
 ence on his resolution. 
 
 The artillery fight between the German batteries that have 
 been mentioned, and the guns of the fortress, lasted from the morn- 
 ing of the 2ud November, day and night, with unabated vigour, 
 till the 7th, on which day the cannonade was but slackly answered 
 from Fort Mortier. Several of the Prussian batteries had, during 
 the night, received new armaments suited to tlie change in their 
 objects ; and by a singular coincidence, the long 24-pounders 
 taken in Strasburg, and the 27-centimetre mortars from Schlett- 
 stadt, did excellent service against their countrymen in the 
 bombarded town, where the defence was unmistakably conducted 
 with energy and skill. 
 
 Although Fort Mortier had its buildings terribly knocked 
 about in every direction by the 3rd November, and had several of 
 its guns dismounted, still its garrison fought well, and kept up the 
 struggle with all their strength with the guns still remaining unin- 
 jured, which it was impossible to replace from Neu-Breisach. 
 
 On the 4th November a great fire was observed on the north- 
 west side of Neu-Breisach, near the Colmar gate. The fortress 
 seconded the fire from Fort Mortier, and owing to its situation 
 set some houses in Old-Breisach on fire, and by this some damage 
 was done on the next day to the cathedral of St. Stephen, which 
 is remarkable for its architecture. 
 
 On the 5th November the garrison attempted a sortie. 
 
 On the night of the 6th-7th November two mortar batteries 
 were built by the besiegers on the left side of the Ehine, to shell 
 the attacked fronts of the bastions, and were each armed with four 
 mortars of heavy calibre, in order to bring a fire to bear on the 
 very active gun detachments on the ramparts, and the covered 
 chambers there. An attempt made from Neu-Breisach to with- 
 draw the garrison of Fort jNIortier failed the same night. 
 
 Complete preparations had already been made by the siege 
 corps for tlie assault of Fort Mortier, when that work unex- 
 pectedly, on the night of the 7th-8th November, offered to 
 surrender, and the terms were arranged by jNIajor von Kretsch- 
 man, of the general staff, with Captain Casteli, commanding the 
 fort. At the hour when the assault would have taken place, the 
 5 officers and 250 men marched as prisoners of war out of
 
 64 
 
 the fort, which in every part presented a scene of shocking devas- 
 tation. Of the seven guns that had served for its defence, six 
 were dismounted — an lionourable and brilliant testimony to the 
 efficiency of the Baden batteries that were opposed to the work. 
 
 Soon after this event, the defence of Neu-Breisach also visibly 
 became weaker, and the rapidity of fire hitherto maintained fell 
 off materially, while the attacking batteries against the fortress on 
 the left side of the Khine were as active as ever. They were com- 
 pelled to capitulate on the 10th November, and about 2 o'clock 
 on that day white flags were hung out on the church-tower of Neu- 
 Breisach, and on the ramparts. In accordance with the terms of 
 a capitulation, concluded by Major von Kretschman with the 
 French commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel de Kehor, at Biesheim, 
 which was ratified at 7 o'clock in the evening by Major- 
 G-eneral von Schmeling, the Prussian troops occupied the four 
 gates of the fortress at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 11th 
 November. About 10 o'clock the French garrison marched out 
 of the fortress through the Basle gate, in the best order, under 
 their commandant. In front of them was the siege corps drawn 
 up in open square. 
 
 The Prussians paid well-earned honours to the brave garrison 
 by presenting to them, and they then began at once to lay down 
 their arms, and were marched off as prisoners of war. 
 
 Some of the prisoners were quartered at Sponeck, others at Neu- 
 Breisach, on the right bank of the Rhine. In round numbers 100 
 officers and 5,000 men, including three battalions of the 74th 
 regiment, were taken. The spoils of war consisted of 108 guns, 
 60 horses of the cavalry {chasseurs a cheval), 6,000 cwt. of 
 ammunition, 1,300 cwt. of powder, and no inconsiderable stores 
 of provisions, which last were all distributed, by command of 
 Major-Greneral von Schmeling, for the support of the needy in- 
 habitants. 
 
 The town had suffered extraordinarily by the bombardment, 
 especially by that of the 7th October. The northern and south- 
 western parts had suffered more than the rest. The losses on this 
 account that came into liquidation mounted up to 1,300,000 
 francs (52,000^) 
 
 During the latter days the greater part of the inhabitants were 
 accommodated in the casemates, in order to afford them cover from 
 the destructive fire of the attacking batteries. Humour gave 
 them the credit of putting pressure on the commandant, to induce 
 him to surrender the place, which surrender was, at any rate, some- 
 what hastened by the death, on the ramparts, of the French com- 
 mander of the artillery. 
 
 The loss of the besiegers was very small, considering the results 
 obtained. It amounted altogether to 8 killed and 18 wounded, most 
 of them belonging to the artillery.
 
 J 
 
 Plate X 
 
 Scale. 
 
 7^^ Totes 
 
 lEM.VM Freruhy Army Corps 
 ^ onthe/ntahtofJlAuaust 
 
 APHOTYPE S.M E
 
 05 
 
 SEDAN. 
 (plate X.) 
 
 Sedan is situated on the railway from Tbionville to Mezieres, at the 
 place where it crosses the road leading outof Belgium by Bouillon. 
 It has 1 6,000 inhabitants and is an important manufacturing town. 
 In the low-lying meadow-land to the westward there are many 
 water-courses running into the JNIeuse, which flows through the 
 fortress. A mile (4-68 English miles) above Sedan, at Eemilly, 
 the river receives the waters of tlie Chiers. On the east the ground 
 rises to some steep wooded heights which make the approach from 
 that quarter difficult. The fortress of Sedan lies on the right bank 
 of the Meuse, opposite the suburb of Torcy, which is enclosed by 
 fortifications consisting of fom- bastioned fronts. This bridge-head 
 is united with the main work by connecting lines of a similar char- 
 acter. The citadel with its high profile, and the castle, in which 
 Marshal Turenne was born in 1622, form the kernel of the whole. 
 Several hornworks with ravelins cover the citadel on the east, and in 
 front of them a spacious entrenchment has been thrown out, in 
 order to bring under fire the ground, which is much cut u]), and also 
 the road to Liittich. The ditches are wet only on the south-front, 
 which lies low, and here, as in other parts of the fortifications, they 
 have retaining walls in good repair. The fortress may, therefore, 
 be considered as perfectly secure from assaidt, and an attack is not 
 practicable without regular engineering preliminaries. However, 
 the masonry is not everywhere sufficiently covered, considering the 
 present ranges of artillery, for a long resistance. Nor does the 
 place possess sufficient bombproof casemates for the garrison and 
 the provisions. Moreover the spacious and extended works on the 
 right bank of the Meuse are not such as to receive the numbers 
 of troops necessary for counter-attacks on a large scale. This is a 
 most essential point if a fortress is to be of use in modern warfare. 
 The stock of provisions on hand was in no case sufficient to maintain, 
 even for a few days, the great masses of French troops who were com- 
 pelled to fall back upon the fortress ; so that, immediately after the 
 battle, it became necessary to have recourse, by agreement, to the 
 resources of the neighbouring fortress of Mezieres. 
 
 The fortress cannot be looked upon as having in itself any 
 gi'eat strategical importance. Nevertheless, in its immediate 
 neighbourhood, owing to the unexpected course of the events of 
 the war, was fought one of the most important battles of the 
 
 36996. - F
 
 66 
 
 campaign of 1870, having results of the widest influenT;e on its 
 further progress. 
 
 It will be remembered that immediately after the battles round 
 Metz, the movements and strength of MacMahon's army remained 
 for some time unknown. Meanwhile that army had reached 
 Chalons, and the Marshal had to march thence to the northward by 
 the positive command of Count Palikao, the War Minister, with 
 the object of dividing the Grerman forces and relieving Marshal 
 Bazaine, who was shut up in Metz. But the Grerman Army, on 
 the contrary, which was advancing on Paris, closed up to the north- 
 ward, covered its right flank with the Thionville-Montmedy- 
 Sedan railroad, and thus drove the enemy's forces from the line 
 Stenay-Varennes, into the narrow space between the Mezieres and 
 Sedan railway and the boundary of the neutral country of Belgium. 
 
 In consequence of the victory won at Beaumont on the 30th of 
 August by the 1st Bavarian, the IVth Prussian, and the Xllth corps, 
 the situation of the French Army in that position became precarious, 
 and they were compelled to concentrate immediately around 
 Sedan. The march to Metz must be considered as completely 
 abandoned at this time. 
 
 On the 31st of August the Grerman army undertook such move- 
 ments as were necessary for sm-rounding the enemy. They kept 
 in contact with him, and the artillery of the 1st Bavarian army 
 corps had an opportunity of shelling the French columns as they 
 were retreating, at first in some order, but at last in complete rout, 
 upon Sedan. 
 
 It was not impossible that the French corps in and round Sedan, 
 threatened as they were by the Grerman army, but still concentrated, 
 might nevertheless endeavour, by a rapid march to the west or 
 east, to set themselves free from their position. For this reason 
 the G-erman army had to draw more closely round them an unbroken 
 girdle of investment. 
 
 Accordingly, on the evening of the 31st of August and during 
 the following night, the Grerman armies were posted as follows : — 
 
 IVth Akmt. — Right Wing. 
 
 The Gruard Corps at Carignan on the right bank of the Chiers. 
 
 The Xllth Saxon Corps at Mairy. 
 
 The IVth Corps on the left bank of the Meuse at Sedan. 
 
 IIIrd Aemy. — Left Wing. 
 
 The 1st Bavarian Corps at Eemilly. 
 The Ilnd Bavarian Corps at Raucourt. 
 The Vth Prussian Corps at Chehery. 
 The Xlth Prussian Corps at Donchery. 
 The Royal Wiirtemberg Division at Boutauc6m-t. 
 The Vlth Army Corps in reserve at Attigny and Semuy, ready 
 to stop the enemy if he should break out to the westward. 
 
 Opposite to the positions of the Germans the French on the 
 same night stood thus : —
 
 67 
 
 1. Right Wing. — 12th corps, Gfeneral Lebrun, at La Moncelle, 
 
 Platiniere, and Petite Moncelle. 
 
 2. In the Centre^ on the heights of Daigny and between La 
 Moncelle and Givonne, the 1st corps, General Ducrot. 
 The 5th corps, General Wimpffen, on the heights which 
 command the Givonne valley, rested its right on the 1st 
 and its left on the 3rd corps. 
 
 3. Left Wing. — The 3rd corps, General Douay, from Floing as 
 
 far as the hill of Illy. 
 
 The position described an arc of a circle round Sedan from 
 south-west to north-west, and extended over a line of 5 
 kilometres {"^-^-^ miles) in length, about 4 kilometres {2\ 
 miles) from the fortress. 
 
 There was thus a gap on the east through which the French 
 army, even if in disorder, might reach the Belgian frontier. They 
 accepted battle, however, and that opening was practically closed 
 for the first time in the com'se of the afternoon of the 1st Sep- 
 tember, at Illy, by the guard and the Vth corps. 
 
 On the morning of the 1st September the fight began with a 
 general advance of the German corps towards the French position. 
 His Majesty the Emperor and King halted on the hill at Frenois. 
 In what follows we will only mention the critical events of this 
 day of hard fighting in the order in which they occm-red. 
 
 The fight began at 4 o'clock in the morning, at Bazeilles. 
 This place was taken after several sanguinary attacks, and the 
 enemy was driven back beyond Balan by the 1st Bavarian corps 
 and Walther's division of the Ilnd Bavarian corps. The Emperor 
 Napoleon was present, close to the fight round Bazeilles. 
 
 From half-past 6 till half-past 9 o'clock the fight was 
 pivoted on the position of La Moncelle-Daigny. The Xllth corps 
 with its 23rd division took Moncelle ; about 12 o'clock Daig-ny 
 fell into the hands of the same corps aided by the 2nd ouard 
 division. The 23rd division pm-sued the advantage they had 
 gained and the guards got round the flank of the enemy at Illy. 
 All the batteries went up the captured heights, and nearly 100 
 guns were in action on the right wing. As already mentioned, the 
 connection of the guard corps with the Vth corps at Illy was 
 completed about 3 o'clock. 
 
 On the left wing of the combined German armies the Xlth 
 corps took Monges and thrust back the enemy on to his strong- 
 position between Floing and Illy. Here they came under a 
 reverse fire from the Bavarian batteries which were posted on the 
 left bank of the Meuse, north and north-east of Frenois. 
 
 The corps-artillery of the Xlth and Vth corps came into action 
 most effectively at Fleigneux. The Xlth corps and the 19th in- 
 fantry brigade took Floing about 1 o'clock in the afternoon. The 
 enemy made some vigorous, but unavailing, attacks with his 
 cavahy. 
 
 About 3 o'clock the enemy was in full retreat from different 
 sides on Sedan, after Illy had been captured and he had lost the 
 Bois de la Garenne. 
 
 F 2
 
 68 
 
 During the fight nearly 25,000 prisoners were made, partly by the 
 IVth army, partly by the Bavarian troops, the Xlth, and the Vth 
 corps ; and 25 guns, 7 mitrailleiurs, 2 flags, and 1 eagle were 
 captured. 
 
 On the French side Marshal MacMahon was wounded at the 
 beginning of the battle, and, in the course of the action, on the 
 German side, Greneral von GTersdorf, commanding temporarily the 
 Xlth army corps, was also wounded. At first Greneral Ducrot 
 became Commander-in-Chief of the French Army ; but subse- 
 quently, in conseouence of an order from the Ministry, Greneral 
 Wimpffen, being senior in the service, took the command. The 
 former, acting on instructions received from the Marshal, made 
 arrangements for a retreat on Mezieres, but the latter cancelled 
 the orders. It was, in fact, plain from the movements of the 
 French during the fight that they first intended to break through 
 to the west and then to the eastward. Round Sedan there were at 
 the last 400 to 500 German guns in action. The fortress itself was 
 only shelled by some Bavarian batteries during the later hours of 
 the afternoon, and a forage store was set on fire. The Emperor 
 Napoleon was taken prisoner ; and the French army, completely 
 shut in by a force of twice their strength, unable to break through 
 or to jDrolong their resistance, after a council of war had been held 
 under the presidency of General Wimpffen, were compelled to 
 surrender. The negotiations were carried on in the chateau of 
 Bellevue at Frenois and concluded at midday on the 2nd September. 
 
 Besides the prisoners made on the previous day, there fell thus 
 into the hands of the victors 83,000 men, 14,000 French wounded, 
 400 field guns, including 70 mitrailleurs, many horses, and military 
 stores, besides the fortress of Sedan with 184 garrison guns. 
 
 As a proof of the communication that existed between the 
 generals of the French armies at Sedan and at Metz, we may here 
 add, for the sake of completeness, that on the 31st August and the 
 1 st September a severe action took place at the latter fortress also, 
 Bazaine's army attempting to force its way out. 
 
 As the Convention of Sedan was taken as a model on several 
 other similar occasions in the course of the campaign, its text is 
 here given : — 
 
 " Between the undersigned, the Chief of the General Staff of 
 King William of Prussia, Commander-in-Chief of the German 
 armies, and the General-in-Chief of the French armies, both pro- 
 vided with full powers from their Majesties King William and the 
 Emperor Napoleon, the following convention has been concluded : 
 
 "Art. 1. The French army, under the command of General 
 Wimpffen, being now surrounded by superior forces at Sedan, give 
 themselves up as prisoners of war. • 
 
 " Art. 2. In consideration of the courageous defence made by 
 this French army, all the generals, officers, and officials ranking 
 with officers are to receive their freedom as soon as they shall have 
 given their words of honour in writing not to take up arms again 
 during the present war, nor to act in any way contrary to the in- 
 terests of Germany. The officers and officials who accept these
 
 69 
 
 conditions are to retain tlieir arms and the personal property belong- 
 ing to them. 
 
 " Art. 3. All arms and warlike stores, consisting of flags, eagles, 
 guns, ammunition, &c. will be given over in Sedan to a military 
 commission appointed by the French General, who will hand them 
 over forthwith to a German commission. 
 
 " Art. 4. The fortress of Sedan will be placed at the disposal of 
 his Majesty the King of Prussia, in its present condition, by the 
 2nd September at the latest. 
 
 " Art. 5. The officers who do not enter into the engagement 
 mentioned in the 2nd article, as well as the troops, will be surren- 
 dered, without their arms, and drawn up by regiments and corps 
 in military order. This proceeding will commence on the 2nd 
 September and be ended on the 3rd. These bodies of troops will 
 be marched on to the ground wliich is bounded by the Meuse at 
 Iges, in order to be given over to the German commissioners by 
 the officers, who will then hand over their command to the non- 
 commissioned officers. The staff-surgeons shall, without exception, 
 remain behind to attend the wounded. Given at Fresnois on the 
 2nd September 1870. 
 
 "Von Moltke. 
 
 " Geaf Wimpffen."
 
 70 
 
 METZ. 
 
 (plate XI.) 
 
 Metz has 50,000 inhabitants, and is one of the strongest fort- 
 resses of Europe, and, as a fortification, much more considerable 
 than Paris. It has, during centuries past, been often besieged, but 
 never taken. 
 
 The fortress is situated on both sides of the Moselle, which 
 forms on the south the islands of St. Symphorien and Saidey, and on 
 the north the island of Chambiere. The river is navigable at 
 Metz, is 200 to 250 paces wide above the fortress, but only 100 to 
 180 paces below it, and is 4 feet deep; but often, after heavy 
 storms of rain, or when the snow is thawing, becomes as much as 
 8 or 10 feet. The principal part of the town lies on the right bank 
 of the Moselle, and is enclosed by a girdle of fortifications. The lines 
 commence at the island of Sauley, cross from the left to the right 
 bank of the river, and continue on that side until they reach the 
 island of Chambiere. Here there are two advanced works, the 
 lunettes Chambiere and Miollis, whose fire is directed upon the two 
 arms of the river. Between the Sauley defences and the Chambiere 
 lunette, on the left bank of the Moselle, lies the large fort La 
 Moselle, consisting of two whole and two half bastions. This 
 work commands the roads to Thionville and Verdun (Paris) as 
 well as the railway from Thionville to Metz, for which the tem- 
 porary railway station (Devaut les ponts) is situated close to the 
 foot of the glacis. 
 
 The connected lines of the place turn to the east on the island 
 of Chambiere,*and form the eastern and southern defences of the 
 town, consisting of eleven irregular bastioned fronts, with ravelins 
 outside. The ditches are partly dry and partly wet, but in time 
 of war can all be placed under water. Tliis is effected by sluices 
 connected with the small right arm of the Moselle. The 
 enceinte of the city is covered by several advanced works close 
 in front. Among these are, on the south, the citadel, consist- 
 ing of a crown-work with a ravelin, and the advanced lunettes 
 d'Arpon and Eogniat. These command the island of St. Sym- 
 phorien and the ground to the south, with the railway works, as 
 well as the road to Nancy. The redoubt du Pate lies to the 
 east of the citadel to command the low ground of the Seylle, 
 which can be made use of for an extensive inundation. The
 
 
 _^ *Juru 
 
 I 
 
 iboc Seo 
 
 \ illllliil 
 
 S'dde 
 
 O /gpo 2cpo 3<^oo ^OQ Sopt^ Sooolui, 
 
 • • • • • mPriL'fsiaji Unt'of mve.sfffurif 
 
 I f L tJte c7i d of All (^f/sf
 
 71 
 
 stream flows between this redoubt and the advanced work, Fort 
 Gisors, into the town. The latter fort. commands the road to Stras- 
 burg and the valley of the Chenau rivulet, which also can be 
 tm'ned to account to flood the hollow ground. 
 
 On the north-east of the town, between the roads leading to 
 Saarlouis and Bouzonville, and guarding those roads, lies the great 
 Fort Bellecroix, consisting of three bastioned fronts, with ravelins. 
 The left demi-bastion and the adjoining bastion flank also the 
 island of Chambiere, and the left bank of the Moselle in the direc- 
 tion of St. Eloy. 
 
 In front of these inner works, which serve for the immediate 
 defence of the town, at a distance of 3,000 to 5,000 paces 
 from the enceinte, are a number of detached forts, pushed 
 forward on the surrounding heights and points of defensive im- 
 portance. These guard most effectively, and at greater distances 
 from the place, the roads leading to Metz. The traces of these 
 works are exceedingly well laid out, and they have strong profiles, 
 and the forts possess, therefore, almost without exception, great 
 capabilities of defence. Their development of front is considerable. 
 Some of their garrisons amount to 3,000 men, and the armaments 
 in some of them to upwards of 100 guns. These detached forts 
 are as follows : Fort St. Julien, on the north-east of the town, on 
 a height about 770 feet above the Moselle, to command the valley 
 of the lower Moselle and the road leading to Bouzonville ; Fort 
 Queleu, at an elevation of 693 feet, between the road to Stras- 
 bm-g and the Seylle ; Fort St. Quentin and Fort Plappeville, the 
 latter named also Des Carrieres, covering Fort Moselle, and firing 
 over an elevated plateau 1,000 feet high, across which passes the 
 road to Verdun and Paris. 
 
 Between these four older forts a number of additional detached 
 works have been inserted more recentl}^, jsarticularly since the 
 Luxemburg affair in 1867, namely. Forts Embarcadere and St. 
 Privat on the -south, Les Bottes on the east of the fortress, on the 
 road to Saarlouis, St. Eloy, between the Moselle and the road to 
 Thionville, and two smaller works north of Fort St. Julien, on the 
 road to Bouzonville. 
 
 All the forts, though their construction was not quite com- 
 pleted, were connected by lines of telegraph with the main work, 
 and to some extent with one another. 
 
 In the protection afforded by these detached forts lies the 
 real strength of Metz, for they render it difficult completely to 
 surround the fortress, and, owing to the great circumference of the 
 works, make it necessary to employ a very large investing force. 
 They secure the main work from bombardment, and the attack 
 upon the enceinte cannot even be commenced until one or more 
 of them have fallen. Finally, they give the main work the 
 character of an entrenched camp, and allow of the concentration 
 under their shelter of vast masses of troops and of rapid offensive 
 operations. 
 
 Metz possesses enormous military stores of every description, and 
 was most amply provided with powder and with guns. As regards
 
 72 
 
 military establishments, it contains a military clothing factory, a 
 depot for the equipment of cavalry, a laboratory-school, a school 
 of fortification, and a powder factory. The manufactm'e of powder 
 is a monopoly in France. The arsenal for the engineers, almost 
 the only one in France, and two arsenals for the artillery, are 
 situated in the Gruisen entrenchment, which adjoins the citadel. 
 These depots contained arms and equipment complete for an army 
 of 150,000 men. 
 
 The barracks of the engineers, the only ones in the fortress 
 that are bombproof, are on the Konigsplatz, those of the artillery 
 at the Chambiere gate, and those of the infantry in Fort Moselle, 
 where also is situated the hospital prepared for the reception of 
 1,900 men. 
 
 The drinking-water in Metz is bad, and tends to produce fevers; 
 during the last few years, therefore, an underground conduit has 
 been made, which draws its supply from Gorze, two miles (9*4 
 English mile?) to the west of the fortress, and brings daily to the 
 place 10,000 cubic metres of wholesome water. Another, but a 
 secondary conduit, brings water to the place from a collecting 
 reservoir near Gravelotte. 
 
 Metz was orignally a German city. Under the secret influence 
 of the priests, as at Strasburg, it was transferred by treachery into 
 the hands of France, whose King, Henry II., in the year 1552, caused 
 the city and fortress to be occupied by the Constable Montmorency. 
 A fruitless siege was undertaken by the Emperor Charles V., and con- 
 ducted by the Duke of Alva for a period of sixty-five days, against 
 the fortress, which was even then of great strength. The place 
 was first formally handed over to France by the Treaty of West- 
 phalia in 1648. 
 
 Notwithstanding tlie great strategical importance of Metz in a 
 war with Germany, and in spite of its important position on the 
 actual theatre of war, the fortress was at the outbreak of the cam- 
 paign in an unprepared condition. Serious preparations for a siege, 
 as regards both the fortifications and the artillery were first under- 
 taken after the battle of Forbach, and for this purpose nearly 
 15,000 peasants were summoned from the country to the fortress, 
 who later on were unable to get out again, and consequently had 
 to be subsisted. 
 
 Under these circumstances it would not have been absolutely 
 impossible for the Prussians, at the expense, perhaps, of heavy 
 losses, to have established themselves in Fort Bellecroix, after the 
 battle of the 14th August. It is another question whether it 
 would have been possible to hold this position, situated immediately 
 in front of the main work, when the French, after three days disorder 
 of their closely massed forces, had fallen back upon the fortress, 
 some 160,000 strong, on the night of the 18th-19th August. 
 The consequences of the battles of the 14th, 16th, and 18th of 
 August w^ere not known until after the capitulation of Metz, on 
 the 27th October. In the French army, which had been beaten 
 four times in succession, discipline was relaxed, the power of 
 taking the offensive, always considered a special attribute of the
 
 French, was wanting, and the army required, before everything, a 
 thorough re-organisation. This was a circumstance that stood us 
 in good stead, and prevented tlie French from making use of the 
 advantages offered to them by the strength of the fortress. 
 
 After the investment of the fortress by the 1st and Ilnd armies 
 the preparation of the fortifications and the armaments for the de- 
 fence were continued. The works in progress were in great measure 
 masked from the investing force, owing to the extent of tlie circle 
 round which the French tield-army was posted. The gan-ison and 
 the national guards, together amounting to 30,000 men, were in the 
 fortress during the investment. 
 
 Fort Plappeville, as well as all the other detached forts, was 
 strengthened by the construction of traverses, expense magazines, 
 and stockades, and brought into communication with tlie adjoining 
 Fort St. Quentin by a covered road. This road was flanked by a 
 lunette placed in the centre. The chief object was to complete as 
 speedily as possible the works in course of construction, and to put 
 the place in a defensible condition by completing the parapets and 
 the gorges of the works, by constructing temporary bombproofs, 
 and by clearing the zone of fire. In the main work only were the 
 preparations complete for resisting a sudden attack, the gates and 
 bridges properly guarded, the flank defences put in a condition to 
 sweep the ditches effectively, the ramparts prepared for defence by 
 infantry and artillery, and the glacis cleared. The field army 
 outside the fortress had in their possession about 25 or 30 farms 
 and villages. They secured themselves in these by barricading the 
 entrances and provided for eventually placing the outposts in 
 security by shelter-trenches and rifle pits. The outlying pickets 
 lay for the most part in shelter-trenches covered from the view of 
 the enemy outside. Ground that afforded natural or artificial 
 cover was arranged for defence, as, for example, the railway em- 
 bankment at Montigny on the south of the fortress, and the park 
 and chateau of Ladonchamp on the north. Communications were 
 stopped up, where necessary, by abattis ; new routes for troops 
 were made throvigh the copses, and pontoon bridges as, for 
 instance, at Moulins, were thrown across the Moselle to connect 
 the two sides of the river. As sorties might have to be made on 
 a large scale, the number of communications over the river was 
 increased, and for this purpose some bridge-trains, that had oppor- 
 tunely come within the limits of the fortress in the general retreat 
 of the Army, afforded the means. 
 
 As the hills around the fortress were occupied by the forts, and 
 afforded excellent sites from which to observe the Prussian position, 
 special observatories were not erected. The highest traverses in 
 the works were used for this purpose. 
 
 Lodging of the troops. — While the field army was accommodated 
 in camps and in the strongly occupied farms and villages that lay 
 around, the barracks were occupied by the war garrison in Metz 
 and in the forts in the manner customary in time of war. But 
 even with great crowding the total accommodation available in 
 them was insufficient, and it was necessary to convert to this use
 
 74 
 
 the magnificent cathedral of St. Stephan, celebrated for its fine 
 stained glass and its tower 350 feet high, and the churches of St. 
 Eucaire and St. Segolene. The most important camps were on 
 the north-east slope of Mount St. Quentin, south of the fortress 
 near Fort Embarcadere and St. Queleu, and north-east of Metz, 
 between Forts St. Julieu and Les Bottes. The ground used for 
 these camps was, however, hilly, and as it was the wet season, this 
 caused the water to accumulate and made swamps of the camping- 
 grounds, thus rendering the sleeping-places unhealthy. 
 
 All authorities agree that the fortress was amply provisioned 
 for its own war garrison of 30,000 men for three months, and 
 received further supplies from a number of provision trains, that 
 were originally destined for the French army that marched out 
 to the west of Metz, but, after the first battles on the German 
 frontier, were stopped on their road and retained in the fortress. 
 From Paris, particularly at this time, immense convoys arrived, 
 for the fortress was intended to form the base of operations for the 
 army on the Ehiue. The position of affairs was changed after the 
 battles round Metz, when the fortress was blockaded and all 
 communication with the outside was cut off. Tlie great masses of 
 cavalry enclosed in the blockade, having a strength of some 24,000 
 horses, must have suffered most. Their evil plight first became 
 apparent in the early part of September. Subsequently, lean 
 horses were driven beyond the outposts, and the slaughter of the 
 better ones began about this time. The rations for the men became 
 scarcer by degrees^ and by the end of August engagements of the 
 outposts took place with the object of obtaining all the provisions 
 out of the villages and digging up potatoes in the country round. 
 In Nouilly, three-quarters of a mile (3^ miles English) eastward 
 from Metz, large stores of provisions intended for the French were 
 discovered by the Prussians. The French, it is true, kept up for a 
 long time their communication Avith the country, which ended, 
 when discovered by the Prussians, in the destruction of the villages 
 concerned. Thus the Prussians burnt the village of Peltre, and 
 blew up with dynamite a farm there called Le Grrange aux Bois 
 because it was evidently useful to the French in their foraging 
 expeditions. The beef was generally reserved for the hospitals. 
 The water for drinking in Metz had to be filtered after the des- 
 truction of the conduit near Gorze, in order to render it at all 
 drinkable ; but, on the other hand, the wine was not all gone, and 
 there was some left up to the time of the sm'render. 
 
 In the second half of September the soldiers received half 
 rations of horseflesh. The want of salt, however, prevented the 
 meat from being pickled in the regular manner, and preserved in 
 this way it did not answer their expectations because they had 
 neglected to slaughter the horses ' at the right time for this pur- 
 pose. There was great scarcity of straw for bedding, the supply 
 being barely sufficient for the sick and wounded. 
 
 In the beginning of October, for want of forage, the field bat- 
 teries were reduced from 6 to 4 guns, and a kind of influenza 
 carried off many horses, who fell victims to disease, partly owing
 
 75 
 
 to the length of time they were in bivouac in very bad weather 
 and to want of care, and partly owing to change of diet, as they 
 had barley and corn in their food. The rinderpest coming on 
 carried off all that were left of the cattle. 
 
 The distress became worse as the investment was prolonged. 
 At first 400, then 300 grammes (about three-fifths of a pound) of 
 horseflesh and bread were served out to each man as his daily 
 ration.* The field army was, in this respect, much worse off than 
 tlie garrison of the fortress, of whom none during the investment 
 suffered actual hunger. At the end of October, the commandant 
 established a system of rations for the inhabitants, and fixed the 
 price of provisions for them, and they shared the sufferings of the 
 garrison with a praiseworthy spirit and endurance. At this time 
 in Metz butter was 14 francs the pound, meat and bacon 8 francs 
 the pound, potatoes 20 sous, horseflesh 20 sous, an egg 15 sous, a 
 schoppen (pint) of milk 14 sous, and lastly a pound of salt 20 
 francs. The fourteen corn mills in Metz remained at work to 
 within two days of the capitulation. It may be assumed that 
 during the investment nearly 20,000 horses were slaughtered. 
 
 Hospitals. — Owing to the great numbers of sick and wounded, 
 which daily increased during the investment, and at the capitula- 
 tion amounted to 20,000 men, the energies of the medical branch 
 were taxed to the uttermost ; and, particularly, a great want of 
 hospital attendants was experienced. The military hospital for 
 1,900 sick soon proved insufficient, and, as early as the beginning 
 of September, it became necessary also to quarter the sick and 
 wounded in the barracks of the engineers, the artillery barracks 
 at the Chambieres gate, the civil hospitals, the churches of St. 
 Martin, St. Maximin, and St. Vincent, and in many private 
 houses. In front of the Palais de Justice, close to the Porte 
 Serpenoise, 336 tents were pitched for the sick ; and, on the 
 parade near the artillery barracks, there were collected 288 railway 
 goods wagons, in which 3,500 sick were lodged. In particular, diar- 
 rhoea, dysentery, typhus, and scurvy made their appearance, the last 
 in consequence of not having salt, and owing to the want of variety 
 in the diet ; but, it should be observed that the dreaded and dan- 
 gerous miasma from the neighbouring battle-fields and the num- 
 bers of unburied carcases of horses turned out to have less effect 
 on health than was naturally anticiiDated ; a blessing for which 
 apparently thanks were due to the cold weather in September and 
 October. The result in this respect was different witli regard to 
 the stagnant inundations of the Seylle on the south of the town. 
 As early as the first half of September, Marshal Bazaiue requested 
 Prince Frederick Charles to allow the sick and wounded in Metz 
 to be sent away to the interior of France, which request was 
 naturally refused. A similar reply was given to his request at the 
 beginning of September that surgeons with medical appliances 
 might be sent into ]Metz. The inhabitants of Metz eudeavom-ed 
 to alleviate the sufferings of the French sick and womided soldiers 
 
 *■ 400 grammes = about 14 oz. or f lb. avoirdupois ; 300 grammes = about 
 10^ oz, or I lb. avoirdupois,
 
 7»> 
 
 with all their power, and the troops had to thank the wives and 
 daughters of the inhabitants that it was found possible to distri- 
 bute large stores of winter clothing to the army. 
 
 Ititelllf/ence department. — Owing to the large military traffic 
 by rail to and from the theatre of war, the postal service during 
 the first half of August got into the greatest confusion, and with 
 the commencement of the investment all communication of the 
 French army with Paris, the neighbouring P'rench fortresses and 
 the adjoining country, was cut off. Nevertheless various expe- 
 dients were adopted to keep up the communication with the 
 government in Paris and with the military headquarters of 
 France. Carrier-pigeons and spies were made use of. One of the 
 latter, disguised as a Franciscan monk, fell into the hands of the 
 1st Prussian army on the 4th August, and with him a correspon- 
 dence between jNIarshals Bazaine, Palikao, Trochu, and MacMahon. 
 The French tried to send news on wood-floats, and concealed in 
 pigs' bladders, down the Moselle toThionville. Many gas-balloons 
 were sent up, of which one came into the hands of the Prussians 
 in the neighbourhood of Paoully, 2 miles (9^ English miles) 
 north-east of Metz. By this means, however, no serviceable 
 intelligence of a trustworthy character was obtained of the French 
 army. Generally, this post was sent up at night, so as the better 
 and more securely to cross the investing lines of the Prussians. 
 
 The works of fortification of the blockading army had for their 
 object to prevent surprise by an advance of the enemy in force, 
 and to detain them long enough to permit of the troops being- 
 concentrated in sufficient numbers. The French had the advan- 
 tage that they could choose what point they liked in the circle of 
 investment, and there make a sortie. The Prussians, on the other 
 hand, besides being fewer in number, were at a disadvantage in 
 having to be ready to receive an attack from the French through- 
 out the whole circle of the investment. It became necessary, 
 therefore, that the Prussians should be able to concentrate on any 
 point in the shortest possible time. For this purpose bridges 
 were thrown over the Moselle above and below the fortress, for 
 instance, at Argency, Hauconcourt, and several other places ; roads 
 for troops were traced or cut, and all the special arrangements 
 suitable for the attainment of this object were made. After the 
 battles of the 16th and 18th August, notwithstanding that move- 
 ments to the rear had again become necessary in some cases, the 
 complete investment of the positions held by the enemy was ac- 
 complished ]-apidly and with the accustomed precision. The head- 
 quarters of the army corps were placed in communication with one 
 another, and with the headquarters of the army by means of lines 
 of field telegraph, and the technical troops charged with this duty 
 had thus a very wide field of activity, and one that was intimately 
 associated with the military operations. The existing French 
 telegraph lines and railways leading to Thionville and Paris and 
 to Strasburg were destroyed, and their materials were used for the 
 purposes of the investment. The intercourse with the fortress by 
 means of a flag of truce was reduced to a minimum after the
 
 77 
 
 French, contrary to every custom of war, had fired upon some of 
 the bearers. This happened on the 19th August to Lieutenant- 
 Colonel von Verdy and Captain von Winterfeld, on the 24th 
 August to First Lieutenant von Kurowsky, and on the 1 st October 
 to Lieutenants von Roder and Manegold. 
 
 Observatories were set up on the highest points of the ground, 
 and two artillery officers provided with good telescopes did duty in 
 each. Each army corps had its own ; such was, for instance, that 
 on the hill of Le Horimont, south of the village of Feves, If 
 miles (8*2 miles English) north-west of Metz, whence a complete 
 view was obtained over the broad plain of the valley to the north 
 of the fortress and the French bivouacs there, and which was of 
 eminent service. 
 
 As it was expected that the blockaded army of the French in- 
 tended to break out in a northerly direction towards Thionville, 
 the main point was to watch the fortress, and therefore its invest- 
 ment was completed before any idea was entertained of following^ 
 up this operation immediately with a bombardment. 
 
 As long as the French held Metz, the railway communication 
 by the lines Saarbruck to Metz and Nancy on the one hand, and Metz 
 to Thionville on the other, was interrupted. The construction was, 
 therefore, commenced of a railway from Eemilly to Pont-a- 
 Mousson, so as to work round the railway junction at Metz. 
 Accordingly on the 9th August Captain Oolz of the general staff 
 received orders, in conjunction with field railway detachments No. 
 1, under Commissioner Dircksen, and No. 4, under Superintending 
 Engineer Menne, to restore the communication with Saarbruck 
 out of the partly destroyed line from Saarbruck to Eemilly, and 
 next to construct a new railroad passing to the south of Metz from 
 Eemilly to Pont-a-Mousson. The first portion of this order 
 being executed by the 13th August, the preparations for, and the 
 setting out of the new junction line, about 5 miles (23^ miles 
 English) in length, were commenced on the 14th. The actual 
 completion of the united lines took place on the 23rd Sep- 
 tember, or in round numbers after 5 weeks' work. The road was 
 a single line with a formation-width of 12 feet. Among the larger 
 works were two viaducts near Eemilly, of which the largest was 
 about 350 feet long and 22 feet high, besides two bridges over the 
 Moselle and its affluent the Seylle. All these works were made 
 of timber. 
 
 Immediately after the battle of Gravelotte, on the 18th August, 
 the positions of the outposts on either side were not finally 
 determined. Backward and forward movements of the opposing 
 forces took place. On the night of the 19th-20th August the 
 French for the first time took up in force the positions which they 
 held, with few exceptions apparently unaltered, during the whole 
 of the investment. The length of the circumference occupied by 
 the Prussian outposts was nearly 6 miles (28 English miles), and 
 that occupied by the main body, consequently, 8 miles (37^ 
 English miles). Without telegraphic communication the success 
 of a sudden attempt of the French in force to break through would
 
 78 
 
 not have been improbable under the circumstances above men- 
 tioned. 
 
 The troops were at first quartered in open bivouacs and in huts 
 of brushwood ; but, by the middle of September, they were, as far as 
 practicable, lodged in conveniently situated close cantonments. 
 For the outposts and pickets weather-screens and huts of brush- 
 wood and other materials were erected, and houses and stables 
 conveniently situated were also made use of; but, in spite of all, the 
 troops suffered terribly from the inclemency of the weather. As 
 Grorze lay within the lines of investment, the waterworks there 
 could not remain unnoticed or concealed. By the end of August 
 they were destroyed. 
 
 The arrangements for defence which were undertaken on the 
 part of the besiegers consisted in the formation of the gTound in 
 various ways so as to adapt it to the tactical conditions mentioned 
 in the beginning of this section. The limits of this book would 
 be far exceeded if we were to enter upon the details. Some 
 general observations will suffice. 
 
 Outposts and pickets lay in shelter-trenches, or in hollows in 
 the ground provided with banquettes for this purpose, according 
 as hollow roads, gravel-pits, loam-pits, or the ditches of high 
 roads presented themselves. By a singular accident, the shelter- 
 trenches which were constructed by the enemy, on their retreat 
 during the battle of Grravelotte towards evening on the 18th 
 August, were used for a long time by the Prussian outposts. The 
 French are very ready at making such trenches in a short time. 
 A similar thing happened with regard to a battery between St. 
 Privat and Amanvillers, which on the same day had been of great 
 service to the French, but was now turned towards the fortress. 
 In front of all was formed a sort of line of obstructions. 
 
 The Prussian outposts were partly armed with chassepot rifles, 
 on account of their great range. Eoutes for columns of troops 
 were made where necessary, roads were improved, and the edges of 
 woods were obstructed by abattis and rendered impassable. Farms 
 situated in important places, especially those from which fire could 
 be directed on the roads by which the enemy would advance, as at 
 Orly, Tournebide, Frescati — both the latter on the south of the 
 fortress — were prepared for defence ; that is to say, loopholes were 
 cut in the masonry, the entrances were barricaded, and they were 
 made secure with palisades. Favourable situations for artillery 
 were made use of for the erection of the larger batteries, or were 
 prepared by excavation for the reception of the guns, as it was 
 confidently anticipated that their practice would be fatal to the 
 enemy's operations, especially by checking the advance of his 
 attacking columns. Such batteries were situated, among other 
 places, on the heights at Chieulles, Vany, Failly, and Servigny, to 
 the north-east of the fortress, where, in spite of the ground being 
 much broken, a good and wide view of the scene of action was 
 obtained, and also at Saulny, Nocroy, Bellevue, Feves, Semecourt, 
 and elsewhere. All the defiles which could be possibly used by 
 the French for breaking out were, in the course of time, fortified
 
 79 
 
 as formidably as circumstances permitted ; and, in places where the 
 enemy was actually expected to appear, the besiegers had, more- 
 over, taken the trouble to construct independent field redoubts in 
 the line of defence. 
 
 The continuance of bad weather and the extremely arduous 
 duty of the investing force had undoubtedly at times a bad effect 
 on their state of health. Diarrhoea and typhus carried off some 
 victims, but these diseases would have had very far more serious 
 results and a wider range had it not been that every possible care 
 was bestowed upon the hospital-establishments and upon the 
 nursing and subsistence. In the latter respect there was no 
 failure, and the continual supplies and issues of pease-sausage,* of 
 fresh and of preserved meat, produced the best effects. A difficulty 
 seemed likely to occur in the supply of meat when the rinderpest 
 broke out in Lorraine and Alsace, but mutton was issued instead 
 of beef, and steps were taken to bring up herds of cattle from 
 Belgium and Holland for the supply of the troops. 
 
 Sorties. — Having described the position of the opposing 
 armies in and before the fortress in their chief features, we turn 
 now to the most important sorties on a large scale which took 
 place from the 19th August to the 28tli October. 
 
 The idea of a regular siege of the great fortress was, with ac- 
 curate knowledge of the circumstances, renounced from the very 
 first. The large forces shut in, both in and round the fortress, 
 would have rendered it unusually difficult to establish parks, and 
 conduct the attacks against the detached forts, which were well 
 situated and amply supplied with guns and stores, and these forces 
 might, in the end, have produced a very critical state of affairs. 
 It was determined, therefore, only to invest Metz, and for this 
 duty there were allotted the 1st, Ilnd, Ilird, Vllth, Vlllth, and 
 Xth army corps, the 18th division, the division of the Grand- 
 Duchy of Hesse, and the landwehr reserve division von Kummer. 
 The 1st army was thus amalgamated with the Ilnd army, and 
 placed under the sole command of Prince Frederick Charles. This 
 army, amounting to about 230,000 men, being thus detained, 
 however, it became impossible to employ them even partially in 
 operations in the open field elsewhere. 
 
 Under these circumstances, after their terrible exertions in the 
 battles of Mars-la-Tour and Grravelotte, both friend and foe re- 
 quired some days of rest, in order that they might both settle 
 themselves down to the new condition of affairs. Towards the end 
 of the month, however, on the 26th August, movements of troops 
 were observed in the French camps, from the left to the right 
 bank of the Moselle, which might be preparatory to an attempt to 
 break through the Prussian lines. The enemy confined himself, 
 however, to skirmishing with the outposts, as he found the Prus- 
 sians ready to fight. Meanwhile, news was received of the advance 
 of MacMahon's army from Chalons and its encounter with the 
 IVth army at Beaumont. In the investing lines, therefore, pre- 
 
 • Erbswurst.
 
 80 
 
 parations were made for the expected junction of Marshals JMac- 
 Mahon and Bazaine. 
 
 Then came, on the 31st August and the 1st September, the 
 hattle of Noisseville. The Prussian troops engaged were posted on 
 the 30th August as follows : — 
 
 1. The 1st landwehr division von Kummer, with a brigade of 
 the line, behind the line Malroy-Charly, the landwehr in reserve. 
 
 2. The 1st infantry division — the 1st brigade of infantry in 
 and behind the line Failly-Servigny, the 2nd brigade of infantry 
 in reserve. 
 
 3. The 2nd infantry division — the 4tli brigade of infantry 
 at Ars-Laquenexy with their front on the line Mercy-le-Haut- 
 Aubigny-Colombey, the 3rd brigade of infantry in reserve. 
 
 4. The divisional cavalry — the 1st and 10th regiments of 
 dragoons between Noisseville and Colombey. 
 
 5. The 3rd cavalry division and the 28th brigade of in- 
 fantry guarding the ground between the 2nd infantry division 
 and the Moselle. 
 
 On the 31st August, at half-past 7 in the morning, the French 
 had taken up a position south of Fort St. Julien on the line Metz- 
 Bellecroix. The following movements consequently took place. 
 
 1. The 3rd brigade of infantry of the 2nd division, with two 
 batteries, marched to the high road to Saarbruck on the heights of 
 Puche. 
 
 2. The 1st brigade of cavalry of the 3rd cavalry division 
 marched to Eetonfay to cover the ground between the high roads 
 to Saarbruck and Saarlouis. By command of General Steinmetz 
 the whole of the cavalry division was moved to that place. 
 
 3. A cavalry regiment and a battery of the Kummer division 
 marched to St. Barbe. The division of the Grrand-Duchy of Hesse 
 crossed the Moselle to the support of the Kummer division. The 
 centre stood fast, while the wings alone were at first engaged. 
 
 About 9 o'clock the French attacked the Prussian left wing ; 
 Colombey was lost to us, but Aubigny and Mercy-le-Haut were held. 
 The 28th brigade of infantry was brought on the battle-field, as a 
 reinforcement, and took up a .position at Laquenexy without com- 
 ing into the action, which was fought by the 2nd division alone. 
 The former marched to the bivouac at Courcelles. 
 
 The Prussian right wing was attacked by a French cavalry 
 regiment, with artillery, who were, however, beaten back by the 
 artillery of General von Kummer. Fort St. Julien opened fire 
 and covered the retreat of the enemy. At 3 o'clock in the after- 
 noon the enemy commenced a heavy fire from Fort St. Julien, and 
 from several batteries that were drawn up there to the southward, 
 and were answered from seven Prussian field-batteries, in whose 
 favour the engagement was decided about 5 o'clock. 
 
 Meantime Leboeuf's whole corps advanced by Nouilly to Noisse- 
 ville ; the 3rd brigade of infantry retired from the field after a 
 severe engagement round the village and the brewery there, and 
 fell back in good order on Servigny. Batteries of the enemy 
 debouched towards evening from Nouilly and fired on the Prussian
 
 81 
 
 artillery at Servigny. Noisseville was finally taken by Memerty's 
 brigade, the whole position was held, and the fight terminated 
 apparently about 9 o'clock. Unexpectedly, however, the enemy 
 recommenced the action, took possession of Flanville, Coincy, and 
 Noisseville, and captured a portion of Retonfay, which nevertheless 
 they had to give up again. At the same time attacks were made 
 upon Servigny, Poixe, and Failly. The battle did not cease till 
 11 o'clock in the evening. In expectation of its renewal on the 
 following day, the infantry and cavalry brigade of the Grrand- 
 Duchy of Hesse and the corps artillery of the 9th army corps 
 were directed during the night to cross the Moselle to the scene 
 of action at St. Barbe. Accordingly, on the following morning, 
 the positions were as follows : Rummer's landwehr division and 
 the 1st army corps on the field of battle during the whole night ; 
 the 25th and 28th divisions at Antilly and advancing on Charly ; 
 the Ilird and Vlllth army corps, as on the previous day ; the 
 Ilnd, Ilird, and Xth army corps on the left bank of the Moselle, 
 near Montmedy, only li mile (7 English miles) from Metz. 
 
 On the 1st September, at 4 in the morning, the battle was 
 renewed, and turned first upon the possession of the thrice-captured 
 Noisseville. It was not possible, however, in spite of the great 
 bravery of the troops, to keep our hold of it, so that we contented 
 ourselves for the time with preventing the enemy from debouching 
 from it. As soon as it was ascertained that strong reinforcements 
 were about to arrive, a heavy fire of artillery was commenced from 
 50 guns against the place and Noisseville was taken. 
 
 On the left wing the village of Flanville was captured about 
 9 o'clock in the morning by the 28th brigade of infantry, parti- 
 cularly by detachments of the 53rd regiment. The 28th infantry 
 brigade thereupon took Coincy, and were subsequently emi^loyed 
 to cover the Saarbruck road. 
 
 At the same time unsuccessful attempts were made by the 
 French on the right wing to take Failly and Rupigny. They 
 were beaten back and pursued as far as the Bois de Grimont by 
 the brigades of Below and Blankensee. 
 
 In the centre the French advanced about half-past 10 to the 
 attack of Poixe and Servigny, but their movements appeared hesi- 
 tating and wanting in vigour. The Prussian artillery beat them 
 back at both places. This failure was the signal for the French 
 to retire into their original positions, while oiu-s were held, though 
 with great losses. These amounted altogether to 151 officers and 
 2,848 men. The French lost 141 officers and 2,664 men. 
 
 On the 2nd September the Xlllth army corps arrived before 
 Metz, and in consequence the German army was distributed for 
 the investment as follows : Kummer's landwehr division on the 
 line Malroy-Charly ; to its left, the 1st army corps as far as the 
 Saarbruck road ; and then came the Xlllth corps as far as Poully. 
 The Vllth corps was placed on the south of Metz on both sides of 
 the Moselle, covering also the passages over the Seylle. On the 
 left bank were the Vlllth corps from Jussy to Chatel, the Ilird 
 corps from Chatel to Saulny, the Xth corps from Saulny to Marange. 
 
 36906. G
 
 82 
 
 In reserve, on the natural line of communication of the enemy 
 with the interior of France, was the IXth corps extended on the 
 line from Eoncourt to Pierrevilliers. 
 
 The battle of Noisseville was the last great attempt made by 
 Marshal Bazaine to break through the investing army, and was 
 followed by three weeks of apparent rest. The next engagements 
 brought on by the French were for the purpose of covering their 
 foraging expeditions in search of hay, straw, and provisions, espe- 
 cially potatoes, a sure preventive of scurvy, which appeared in the 
 fortress owing to the want of salt. Eventually the French used 
 generally to advance with strong columns against our outposts, 
 who thereupon fell back upon the positions previously fortified. 
 If such an attack succeeded, they retired with their booty under 
 cover of the forts, and the Prussian outposts in the evening were 
 back again in their old positions. In this way villages and farms 
 were burnt and much damage of other kinds was done. Such was 
 the character of the engagements at Peltre on the 22ud and 23rd 
 September, and at Mercy-le-Haut on the 27 th September. Per- 
 haps also in these engagements the French had some idea of 
 making an attempt to break through in the direction of Strasburg. 
 The Vllth and 1st army corps were engaged in both the first- 
 mentioned fights, which did not assume large proportions. Of a 
 more serious character, however, was the fight on the 27th Sep- 
 tember, which was at first directed against these same troops, but 
 subsequently also against detachments of the Xth corps at La 
 Maxe on the left bank of the Moselle. On this occasion the 
 French troops were brought immediately on to the battle-field by 
 the railway, which had been reconstructed within the line of their 
 outposts. These battles had no particular consequences, although 
 the loss was considerable on both sides. 
 
 After the fall of Strasburg Marshal Bazaine seemed to have 
 an idea of breaking through to the northward, in the first instance 
 to Thionville, in order to occupy that place or to pass over with 
 his army to neutral territory. Consequently, the distribution of 
 the investing force had to be altered. For the execution of his 
 plan Marshal Bazaine chose the moment when Rummer's land- 
 wehr division came on to the line of outposts in the place of the 
 Xth army corps. The most advanced outposts consisted of two 
 landwehr battalions in patches of wood north of the Bois de 
 Woippy, and pushed forward to Bellevue, St. Eemy, Les Petites 
 and Les Grrandes Tapes, with pickets at St. Agathe and Ladon- 
 champs. 
 
 On the night of the 2nd October the enemy attacked, threw 
 the outposts above mentioned back upon the pickets at St. Eemy, 
 which they assailed in vain, and of which the garrison, consisting of 
 two companies of the Neutomischl landwehr battalion, was at once 
 reinforced by two companies of the Kosten landwehr battalion. 
 
 About 5 o'clock the enemy made a fruitless attack on St. 
 Hemy, whose garrison had been meanwhile strengthened by four 
 more companies, and also on Bellevue, which was defended by 
 the Freistadt landwehr battalion. The six companies of the last-
 
 83 
 
 named battalion retook St. Agatbe, two Prussian batteries fired 
 on Ladonchamps from Semecourt, and from 9 o'clock A.M. a 
 tbird Prussian battery wbicli bad taken up a jDosition at Les 
 Tapes, joined in tbe cannonade. Upon tbese was directed tbe 
 concentrated fire of several Frencb batteries placed at St. Eloy, 
 and tbey bad in consequence to retire. \Miilst tbe landwehr 
 division beld tbeir ground against a vastly superior enemy, tbe 
 artillery fire on botb sides was kept up until tbe evening, and by it 
 St. Eemy and Franclocbamps were set in flames. 
 
 On tbe 7tb October tbe Frencb made a second attack on tbe 
 field of battle, on wbicb tbey bad already learnt by experience 
 tbe bravery of Rummer's landwebr division, and an engage- 
 ment lasting nine bours took place at Woippy. At 1 o'clock in 
 tbe afternoon our outposts of Kummer's landwebr division were 
 attacked at Bellevue and St. Eemy, as well as at Les Petites and 
 Les Grande Tapes, by Frencb columns greatly superior in numbers, 
 about 30,000 or 40,000 men, and after a brave resistance beat 
 tbem back. Tbe Prussian landwebr fougbt bere witb tbe greatest 
 obstinacy, tbe most stubborn endurance, and tbe most brilliant 
 courage, so tbat tbe enemy was unable to gain ground. Simul- 
 taneously witb tbe commencement of tbis attack on tbe left bank 
 of tbe Moselle, tbe Frencb made a demonstration on tbe rigbt 
 bank, against tbe position of tbe 1st army corps at Servigny and 
 Noisseville, and against tbe Xtb army corps at Malroy and Cbar- 
 loy. Tbe figbt bere was only witb artillery and musketry, wbicb 
 tbe Frencb tbougbt sufficient to prevent tbese troops from crossing 
 tbe Moselle. In spite of tbis, Wedell's brigade of tbe Xtb corps, 
 tbe 16tb and 57tb regiments, crossed tbe Moselle at Argency. 
 Here tbey formed to attack on tbe flank of tbe left wing of Kum- 
 mer's division, wbile at tbe same time, on tbe rigbt wing, Conta's 
 brigade of tbe 48tb and 4tb regiments of infantry advanced and 
 occupied tbe Bois de Woippy and a farm close by. Tbe Frencb 
 being vigorously attacked botb in front and on tbeir left wing, 
 bad to give up again tbe positions tbey bad taken earlier in tbe 
 day, and to fall back upon tbe fortress, wbilst tbe Prussians re- 
 mained masters of tbe same ground as at tbe beginning of tbe 
 figbt. Tbey took Bellevue, St. Remy, and tbe two Tapes by 
 storm. On tbe otber band tbey failed in an attempt made late in 
 tbe evening to take tbe Cbateau Ladoncbamps, wbicb was strongly 
 occupied by tbe Frencb and fortified. Tbe loss on tbe Prussian 
 side amounted to 65 officers and 1,665 men. 
 
 Capitulation. — Marsbal Bazaine, after tbe failure of all bis 
 sorties, could not but be aware tbat furtber enterprises of tbe same 
 description would only be attended by similar results. His bonour 
 as a soldier was saved, and bis duty to bis country was done, in 
 detaining 230,000 men before Metz. But if be bad succeeded in 
 breaking out — if tbe Marsbal bad marcbed towards Paris, be 
 would but liave come between two fires ; and as regarded any otber 
 objects of bis marcb, witbout cavalry or borses for transport, witb 
 bis guns wretcbedly borsed, witb no safe communication to tbe 
 rear, witbout tbe means of supporting bis army, be would bave 
 
 G 2
 
 84 
 
 "been exposed to the most harassing pursuit. The consideration of 
 these circumstances clears the Marshal of blame, considering the 
 question from a military point of view, and the more so, as 
 although cut off from all communication hy either land, water, or 
 telegraph, he had held out in a place, which, having been origi- 
 nally provisioned for 15,000 or 20,000 men for three months, had 
 already maintained eight times that number of troops for nine weeks. 
 Whether the Marshal had any ulterior political reason for his con- 
 duct, we know just as little as we know the motive of the myste- 
 rious journey of Greneral Bourbaki from Metz to the Empress 
 Eugenie. In no way liad the capitulation been of use to M. Gam- 
 betta, whose plan was to raise the siege of Paris by armies newly 
 formed in the North and South. This plan was frustrated now 
 that the 1st and Ilnd Prussian armies before Metz had become 
 available. 
 
 The time for negotiations for a surrender had come, and to 
 delay was to starve. Marshal Bazaine wished to surrender him- 
 self and the army, but to keep the fortress for France. On the 
 side of the Prussians, however, this could not be agreed to, be- 
 cause the place, if excluded from the capitulation, was in a condi- 
 tion to hold out for many months. Nothing came, therefore, of 
 the negotiations to this effect, which General Boyer was engaged 
 in from the 13th to the 15th October, at the German head- 
 quarters at Versailles. 
 
 On the 21st October General CoflSnieres, the commandant of 
 the fortress, informed General Bazaine that he had no more pro- 
 visions for the troops quartered outside the fortress. In conse- 
 quence of this, desertions were tacitly allowed, but the deserters 
 were turned back by the Prussian outposts in great numbers. It 
 was also thought that the Prussians might be compelled to take 
 the army prisoners, by bringing on a battle with this intention. 
 At last they thought to sally out by Gravelotte, on the night of 
 the 24th-25th October, but this plan was not executed. 
 
 On the 25th October, General Changarnier entered upon fresh 
 negotiations with Prince Frederick Cliarles. The terms of the 
 capitulation of Sedan were taken as a basis, and the officers who 
 chose imprisonment were permitted to carry their arms away 
 ^^dth them. 
 
 On the morning of the 27th October the fortress fell into our 
 hands, perfectly uninjured, together with its military establish- 
 ments, with its 3 marshals, 50 generals, 6,000 officers, 173,000 
 men, 53 eagles, 300,000 stand of arms, 66 mitrailleurs, 541 field 
 guns, 800 garrison guns, the stores of 85 field batteries, and 2,000 
 military vehicles. On the same day the Crown Prince and Prince 
 Frederick Charles were made Field Marshals. Thanks are due 
 also, however, to the brave investing army, who for ten weeks bore 
 all the hardships with a stedfast endurance peculiarly their own ; 
 who, by steady vigilance and unequalled courage, brought about 
 a result without example in military history, and had compelled 
 the army of the enemy to lay down their arms in Metz, which had 
 been called by them with proud confidence an impregnable fortress.
 
 85 
 
 Already, eight days before the capitulation, railway wagons, 
 with provisions for the garrison and inhabitants of Metz, were 
 standing in the railway station of Courcelles. 
 
 On the day of the capitulation an artillery and an engineer 
 officer from each Prussian army corps, with non-commissioned 
 officers, were told off, in the first instance, to take over the 
 powder magazines and destroy any mines that might exist. Next 
 the forts were occupied, each by two battalions of infantry, a 
 company of garrison artillery, and a detachment of pioneers 
 (engineers) ; then the gates of the town, and finally the town 
 itself, were taken possession of. Steps were immediately taken 
 for restoring the 10 kilometres (6 English miles) of railway from 
 Metz to Courcelles, and the very first train that ran into Metz 
 brought, to the great delight of the inhabitants, 1,000 sheep into 
 the fortress. At the same time German forethought was brought 
 into action for the benefit of the tow^n and fortress, by the imme- 
 diate appointment of an extraordinary sanitary commission to pre- 
 vent the seeds of epidemic disease from being sown. It is to be 
 hoped that they may also succeed, by suitable measm-es and ar- 
 rangements with regard to the inhabitants, both as citizens and 
 as Christians, in bringing universal contentment to the hearts 
 of this originally German population.
 
 86 
 
 VERDUN. 
 
 (plate XII.) 
 
 Verdun, a fortress of the first class, with 12,000 inhabitants, lies 
 deep in the Meuse valley, on both sides of the river. On the 
 north and east the town is enclosed by heights, within gunshot, 
 which fall with steep slopes towards the right bank of the river. 
 The low ground lies chiefly on the left bank, and is severed in two 
 parts by a ridge which extends as far as the town, affording 
 an extensive view over it to the north and south. The 
 latter was in part placed under water. This range in a westerly 
 direction, as well as the bare unprotected hills on the right bank 
 of the Meuse, afford favourable positions for artillery. The stream, 
 which during a great part of the year is very shallow, flows 
 through the town in two branches, and is on this account crossed 
 by many bridges. 
 
 The fortifications are perfectly simple : on the north and south 
 are bastioned fronts ; the enceinte on the east is of a similar 
 trace, and on the west is the citadel, commanding all around it, 
 and connected with the fortifications of the town by lines con- 
 structed for the purpose. Between the town and citadel is the 
 esplanade, which stands high and affords a view over the town. 
 Excepting several ravelins, there are no outworks. The ditches are 
 partly wet, but revetted with masonry, and all the profiles are sach 
 that the place must be considered secure from assault. The kernel 
 of the defence is the formidable citadel. It was entirely rebuilt by 
 Marshal Vauban, and has now four bastioned fronts, each of which 
 is strengthened by having a ravelin in front of it ; the fifth front, 
 turned towards the valley of the Meuse, is of considerable lengtb. 
 The long curtain has, therefore, been broken in the middle in 
 order to obtain better flanking defence of the ditches in front of the 
 bastions. The fire from this curtain sweeps the southern front of 
 the town and some of the bridges over the Meuse. This front 
 has no ravelin to cover the curtain. It is in fact built on the 
 steep slope down to the Meuse. The citadel has a gate leading 
 to the country, and one to the town. The fortifications of the 
 town have three entrances, giving passage to the high roads from 
 Metz, Etain, and Bar-le-duc. They are under the fire of the 
 guns of the fortress. The ground round the fortress is generally 
 clear for a distance of 2,000 paces, with the exception of some 
 villages, the suburb of Pave between the roads leading to Etain 
 and to Metz, and some farms which played a part in the siege 
 and, as we may as well state here, were used to very good effect
 
 Plate XIL
 
 87 
 
 by the garrison to command the ground in front, and to facilitate 
 their sorties. The country lying to the westward of the citadel, 
 in our opinion the only side on which Verdun is open to attack, 
 is covered with many vineyards. There are no detached works 
 round the fortress, nor is there sufficient bombproof cover for a 
 garrison of the war strength. 
 
 The occupation of Verdun was important for the armies before 
 Paris, and for the forces operating in the West of France, because 
 the fortress bars the direct line of railway from the "Middle 
 Rhine " or Metz by Chalons to Paris. This railway was still in 
 course of construction when war was declared in July 1870, and 
 only passable for a short distance. 
 
 Thus Verdun was at that time merely a terminus. The com- 
 pletion of the line of railway from Verdun to Metz, even if but 
 temporary, would have afforded great facilities to the German 
 army before Paris for the transport of ammunition, provisions, 
 and reserve troops, as well as for sending the sick and wounded to 
 the rear. Verdun is also, however, regarded as a " barrier " on 
 the road from the Middle Ehine through the Argonnes, the pass of 
 Les Grandes Islettes, to Chalons and Paris. 
 
 The franc-tireurs, who were very active in that neighbourhood, 
 found the fortress a point d'appui, which they gladly used ; and 
 the very obstinate resistance they made to those of our troops op- 
 posed to them is explained by the fact, that they hoped up to the 
 last moment that Marshal Bazaine would break out and relieve 
 the garrison. 
 
 Immediately after the battles round Metz, which were so fruit- 
 ful in residts for the German arms, the Xllth Saxon army 
 corps was moved from the battle-fields there, by the roads Etain- 
 Verdun or Fresnes-Verdun towards Paris, and accordingly arrived 
 in front of the place on the 24th August. An attempt was made 
 to gain the place by a sudden attack. The field batteries with 
 the army corps took up a position for this purpose on the heights 
 between Verdun and Belrupt, east of the fortress, and shelled 
 the place from 11 o'clock in the morning. Under cover of this 
 fire, the 108th Saxon sharpshooters, with great bravery and 
 under a heavy fire of the enemy, stormed the suburb of Pave, 
 which lies immediately in front of the glacis, on both sides of 
 the road leading to Etain. First-Lieutenant von Schimpf was 
 sent into the fortress with a flag of truce, but returned without 
 having produced any effect. His trumpeter was shot on this oc- 
 casion. General Marmier, commandant for the time being, replied 
 that he would rather be buried under the ruins of the fortress 
 than surrender it. As further proceedings against the fortress 
 were impracticable, and the advance on Paris could not be de- 
 layed, the army corps at once continued its march, and crossed the 
 Meuse, both above and below the fortress, the same day, leaving 
 the 47th infantry brigade behind to observe the place. 
 
 The action had sho-svu that the fortress was secure from assault, 
 defensible, sufficiently garrisoned, and fully armed with heavy 
 garrison guns.
 
 88 
 
 A provision or ammunition train, under the impression that 
 the place was ah-eady in our hands, went straight into the fortress 
 and fell into the possession of the garrison. The same thing 
 happened to a field post coming from Sedan. 
 
 On the 7th September the above-mentioned detachment was 
 relieved by a stronger one under the command of Ijieutenant- 
 Greneral Bothmer. Tlie latter consisted of the 65th regiment 
 (otli Ehenish), the 4th (Schleswig) reserve hussars, the 9t]i ulan 
 regiment (2nd Pomeranian), and two horse artillery guns, with a 
 heavy reserve battery of the Vllth army corps. Of these the 
 ulan regiment and the subdivision of horse artillery were told off 
 for the left bank of the Meuse, but soon recalled, while the rest of 
 the detachment undertook the investment of the fortress on the 
 right bank of tlie Meuse. Of this force, moreover, the 1st battalion 
 of the 65th regiment was ordered off to guard the communications 
 between Sedan and IMontmedy ; so that under these circumstances 
 the investment of the fortress was but very incomplete. Mean- 
 while, artillery materiel was brought up from Toul and Sedan. 
 JVs the place was not completely invested, it was impossible to 
 prevent the garrison from receiving considerable additions from 
 stragglers and escaped prisoners, and from being well informed as 
 to what took place outside the fortress. 
 
 On the 15th September a slight engagement took place at 
 Maxeville. A foraging expedition, consisting of the 7th company 
 of the 65th regiment and a subdivision of hussars, were attacked 
 by four French companies and a squadron of Chasseurs d'Afrique. 
 The things that had been requisitioned were brought off in safety, 
 but the infantry lost 8 killed and 15 wounded. 
 
 September 18. — The same company had another collision with 
 three French companies that had advanced at daybreak against 
 Belleville. They were repulsed by the Prussians, Avho lost 8 men 
 killed and wounded. The artillery of the garrison took part in the 
 action toAvards its close with some effect. 
 
 On the 23rd September four Ehenish landwehr battalions 
 (Aix-la-Chapelle, Jiilich, Simmern, and Andernach), a reserve ulan 
 regiment, and a heavy battery of the 8th brigade of artillery 
 joined the investing force. In consequence of this reinforcement 
 the fortress was more closely invested, especially on the left bank of 
 the Meuse. On the promotion of Lieutenant-General von Bothmer 
 to the command of the 13th division, Major-Gfeneral von Oayl, 
 commanding the 2nd infantry brigade, took over the command 
 of the besieging force. His headquarters were situated in the 
 village of Charny on the Meuse. 
 
 On the 24th September the 10th company of the 65th 
 regiment was attacked at Charny by French infantry in superior 
 numbers and a squadron of chassem's, who were, however, 
 driven back into the fortress with the help of a reinforcement 
 brought up in haste from Bras. The loss on our side amounted 
 to four men. 
 
 On the 25th September the two batteries present with the 
 investing force shelled the south side of tlie fortifications of the
 
 89 
 
 town and the citadel with about 200 shells, and this fire was 
 answered briskly from the fortress. A sortie was repulsed. 
 
 In the night of the 25th-26th September some emplacements 
 were made, near Belrupt and elsewhere ; but the work was very 
 difficult, on account of the rocky nature of the soil. 
 
 On the 2nd October several f'rench companies and a squadron 
 of chasseurs attacked the 6th company of the 65th regiment, but 
 were once more beaten back into the fortress after a hard fight. 
 
 Owing to the comparatively small numbers of the investing 
 force it was not possible to drive the very energetic and active 
 enemy altogether into the fortress from his positions outside. 
 He remained in possession among other places of the villages of 
 Thierville and Regret on the west of the fortress, both of them 
 commanded from the citadel. 
 
 On the 2nd and 3rd October, therefore, a heavy cannonade 
 was opened upon these places by the reserve battery of the 8th 
 brigade of artillery, as unceasing alarms were given, and small 
 skirmishes took place along the whole line of the investment. By 
 their possession of several positions within these, but still outside 
 the fortress, the French were able to bring on these engagements 
 and carry them through successfully ; so that it became absolutely 
 necessary to take possession of the outer lines of the French 
 position. Accordingly the attack on Thierville was forthwith 
 ordered, and on the 11th October the duty was assigned to the 
 1st battalion of the 65th (Rhenish) regiment, which had re- 
 turned to Verdun the previous day from its detached duty of 
 guarding the communications to Sedan. The village was occupied 
 by three companies of gardes mobiles. The battalion named 
 advanced in three columns, threw themselves with a shout on 
 the pickets, and upon the approach to the village, and after a 
 few short struggles in one or two places, drove the garrison out of 
 the village. After the battalion had secured themselves there 
 with field-works, barricades, and shelter-trenches, and the 4th 
 company had taken up a position on the Weinberg, south-west of 
 the village, the enemy came out of Verdun by Jardin Fontaine 
 and endeavoured to recapture the village. This attempt was re- 
 pulsed after a short struggle. The 1st battalion of the 65th regi- 
 ment lost two killed and one wounded in the taking of Thierville. 
 
 During the 12th October a great number of French stragglers 
 were captured in and round Thierville. These men were unable 
 to reach the fortress, where they hoped to be well received. On 
 the evening of this day the 3rd and 4th companies of the 65th 
 regiment, under the command of Captain ]Michaelis, received 
 orders to take possession of the suburb of Jardin Fontaine, 
 which lies close in front of the glacis of the fortress. Whilst the 
 2nd and fusilier battalions at the same time occupied some other 
 places within short range of the fortress, such as Regret, Belle- 
 ville, Grlorieux, the farmhouses of St. Barthelemy and Constantino 
 on the right bank of the Mouse, a heavy and continuous mus- 
 ketry and artillery engagement took place at Jardin Fontaine, in 
 which the defenders were powerfidly supported by the fire of the
 
 90 
 
 artillery, musketry, and mitrailleurs of the citadel. After a 
 nocturnal engagement of 1^ hour's duration they succeeded, how- 
 ever, in establishing themselves in the village and barricading it. 
 Thanks to the darkness and the bad shooting of the French, the 
 loss of the two companies of the 65th regiment employed in 
 the attack amounted only to 1 killed and about 20 wounded. It 
 was not till after these engagements that the fortress could properly 
 be said to be bombarded. The cannonade was now to commence 
 from two sides, and the following batteries had to be built : 
 
 1. To the north of Verdun, en the heights of Belleville, six 
 batteries, which, beginning on the left, were armed with 
 
 6 Prussian rifled 6-poimders 
 6 French rifled 12-pounders. 
 4 22-centimetre howitzers. 
 4 French rifled 24-pounders. 
 4 French rifled 24-pounders. 
 6 French rifled 12-pounders. 
 
 2. On the west of Verdun, on the left bank of the Meuse, on 
 the heights of Thierville, five batteries armed with 
 
 6 French rifled 12-pounders. 
 6 French rifled 12-pounders. 
 6 French rifled 24-pounders. 
 6 Prusssian rifled 6-pounders. 
 4 French heavy mortars. 
 
 The construction of the batteries took place on the night of 
 12th- 13th October under unusually difiicult circumstances. The 
 weather was wet and stormy, so that the enemy did not discover 
 the works. The time had been too short for the preparation of 
 all the battery materials that were required. For the heavy guns 
 there were only improvised platforms, for the lighter ones there 
 were no platforms at all. There was a want of entrenching tools, 
 and the stiff, and in part rocky ground, had generally first 
 to be loosened with the pickaxe. Moreover, the rifled 24- 
 pounders did not arrive from Sedan till 1 o'clock in the morning, 
 and then they were in the travelling trunnion holes. There were 
 no gyns, and thus the work of bringing them into the firing 
 trunnion holes, and placing them in battery, seemed endless. 
 But in spite of all, the whole of the guns were ready to open 
 about 6 o'clock in the morning, and about this time the fire 
 began with a " hurrah " for his Majesty the King. 
 
 The high buildings in the citadel were indicated as the object 
 for the 24-pounders in the first instance, and secondly the guns 
 on the ramparts. An attempt was then to be made to breach a part 
 of the high escarp wall. The rifle 12 and 6-pounders had orders 
 to draw upon themselves the fire of the enemy's guns, and if 
 possible to silence them, and also to oppose any sorties that might 
 be attempted. The heavy howitzers and mortars, lastly, were 
 told off to bombard the town itself, in order to bring pressure to 
 bear on the commandant through the inhabitants.
 
 91 
 
 The construction of the batteries was carried on without 
 interruption from the enemy's fire, and even the first few rounds 
 were unanswered. But it was not long before an enemy not to 
 be despised appeared on the whole of the fronts attacked, and he 
 did not remain in our debt, but paid us back shot for shot. We 
 succeeded, however, during the first afternoon, in setting- fire to 
 several magazines ; guns were silenced here and there, and in 
 many places the town burst into flames, but no white flag was 
 shown to announce a surrender, though the bombardment had 
 lasted day and night for fifty-four hours. Owing to the great 
 distance, on an average 2,400 paces, and to the inaccuracy 
 in shooting of the heavy French guns, the breach could not be 
 reported practicable, so that there was no opportunity for the 
 action of the infantry. The garrison artillery were very active, 
 shot well, and repeatedly brought fresh guns into action. The 
 bombardment above described, which cost the siege corps 6 
 officers, 5 of them belonging to the artillery, and between 60 and 
 70 men killed and wounded, had at length to be stopped, partly 
 owing to the want of ammunition, partly omng to the want of 
 suitable artillery, for the pieces found in Sedan and sent to Verdun 
 proved themselves in practice to be inefficient. Preparations 
 were made, therefore, as quickly as possible, for obtaining rein- 
 forcements of guns and gunners. 
 
 Nevertheless an attempt was made, by sending a flag of truce, 
 to induce the commandant, Greneral Gruerin de Waldersbach, to 
 surrender the fortress, but without result. The commandant, on 
 the contrary, begged the commander of the besieging force, Major- 
 General von Grayl, to desist from the siege, as both the garrison 
 and the citizens were ready to do their duty to the last moment. 
 A fitting reply was made to the French commandant. 
 
 On the 18th October a military execution took place on the 
 person of a French notary named Violard, who was convicted of 
 treachery to the Prussian troops, and was shot at the village of 
 Bras. At the same time the outposts at Maxeville discovered a 
 balloon-post, which conveyed letters addressed to the Grovernment 
 at Tours ; but it could not be caught. 
 
 Meanwhile the technical preparations for a regular siege, spe- 
 cially adapted for hurried operations, were taken in hand. Con- 
 siderable supplies of ammunition and of Prussian siege guns were 
 brought in to the artillery siege park. The garrison continued 
 their energetic defence, and made, on the 28th October, at break 
 of day, two simultaneous sorties against the Prussian batteries on 
 the north and on the west of the fortress. In the first the enemy 
 attacked the village of Belleville on both sides. The companies 
 of the 65th regiment posted there, after being reinforced, drove 
 him back, but unfortunately with a loss to themselves of an officer 
 and 52 men killed, wounded, and missing. The destruction of the 
 batteries contemplated by the enemy on this occasion ended in their 
 rendering unserviceable only one gun that was already on a dis- 
 mounted carriage. In the other sortie, which was directed against 
 the batteries near Thierville, the French were more fortunate, for
 
 92 
 
 tbey succeeded in spiking the guns there. The loss at this place 
 on both sides was not inconsiderable. The disabled guns were, 
 however, made serviceable again on the same day. 
 
 The fall of Metz rendered it practicable to send important 
 additions in troops and guns to the siege corps at Verdun. The 
 60th regiment (7th Brandenburg), the 8th jager battalion, 
 and the 8th Rhenish pioneer battalion came up. The corps 
 was altogether 15,000 strong, including 2,000 artillerymen. 
 Colonels Meissner and Eiedel were nominated to the com- 
 mands of the siege artillery and engineers respectively. All the 
 technical preparations for a regular siege were put in hand at 
 once. Additional materials for trenches and batteries were made 
 ready, timber was cut for blindages, railway metals were sent up, 
 and so on. 140 guns with their equipment of 1,000 rounds were 
 on the spot. 
 
 During these preliminary arrangements the commandant 
 intimated his willingness to enter into negotiations for surrrender, 
 which seemed to be justified since the fall of Metz, in order to 
 avoid bloodshed and the destruction of the town. For this pnv- 
 pose an armistice was granted for eight days, and on the 8th 
 November the capitulation of the fortress and town of Verdun 
 followed. 
 
 Two generals, 11 staff-officers, 150 officers of lower rank, and 
 about 4,000 men were made prisoners; 136 guns, 23,000 stand of 
 arms, a number of excellent Arabian horses, and very considerable 
 amounts of military stores were found. 
 
 The terms of capitulation were made very favourable for the 
 enemy, in proof of which we here subjoin them. 
 
 " Article T. The fortress and town of Verdun, with all warlike 
 stores, stores of every description, official records, and all public 
 property are to be given over on the 9th November to General 
 von Gayl in the condition in which everything is at the moment 
 the convention is signed, on the express understanding that 
 they are to be restored to France after the conclusion of peace. 
 On Wednesday, the 9th November 1870, at 10 o'clock in the 
 morning, the town and citadel of Verdun are to be given over to 
 the Prussian troops. At the same hour artillery and engineer 
 officers, with some non-commissioned officers, will be admitted to 
 the place to take charge of the powder magazines and unload the 
 mines. 
 
 " Article II. The garrison are prisoners of war ; but the gardes 
 mobiles, natives of Verdun, and the domiciled gardes nationales 
 shall be free after laying down their arms, and none of the 
 defenders of Verdun shall be molested. The gensdarmerie shall 
 be free after laying down their arms, and shall keep their horses. 
 The master-tradesmen of corps shall not be considered as soldiers, 
 and are likewise free. 
 
 " Article III. — The arms, and all warlike stores, consisting of 
 guns, stores, military chests, waggons, ammunition, &c. shall be 
 left in Verdun, in charge of a military commission, which will 
 be appointed by the Greneral-Officer Commanding, and they shall
 
 93 
 
 at once hand these things over to Prussian commissioners, to 
 revert to France on the conclusion of peace. The troops disarmed 
 will be marched by corps in order to the places appointed for each. 
 They retain their knapsacks and property. 
 
 " Article IV. — The officers and persons of that rank who select 
 imprisonment, and give their word of honour to present them- 
 selves on a fixed day at a place previously appointed, are free, but 
 only to betake themselves to such places. All retain their arms,, 
 their horses, and property. 
 
 " Article V. — The military surgeons remain behind to treat the 
 wounded. They are to be treated according to the convention of 
 Geneva, as are also the attendants of the hospitals. 
 
 '^^ Article VI. — The town of Verdun remains free from all war 
 tax and contribution in money. Persons, property, civil and reli- 
 gious institutions will be regarded. As far as possible the troops 
 will be quartered in the military buildings, except in case of an 
 extraordinary number passing through. 
 
 " Article VII. — All public establishments, the civil and com- 
 mercial courts, the notariat, trade, and industry remain freely in_ 
 operation. 
 
 " Article VIII. — Separate points that hereafter present them- 
 selves shall be regulated by an appendix, wliicli shall have the 
 same force as the present convention." 
 
 There is no doubt that perfectly clear reasons have been given, 
 for this surrender, extraordinarily favourable as it was to the 
 enemy, but they have not yet been published. Before Verdun the 
 combatants on both sides had learnt to know one another, and were 
 convinced that a siege would have cost much time, materiel, and 
 troops. Under the circumstances then existing both materiel and 
 troops could be turned to better account. 
 
 In the citadel much damage had been done, a straw store was 
 burnt, and, generally :>peaking, all the buildings that it was 
 possible to destroy had been destroyed. The parts of the town 
 near the fortifications had also suffered much ; but the principal 
 streets, and even the lofty cathedral with its observatory, remained 
 uninjured by Prussian shells. The temper of the citizens was 
 in accordance with the circumstances of the case. They had not 
 this time any reason to fear such things as happened after the 
 taking by the Prussians in 1792, when several officers gave a ball, 
 and the revolutionary tribunal caused fifteen young girls to be 
 guillotined — the youngest only seventeen years of age — because 
 they had danced with Prussian officers.
 
 94 
 
 SOISSOXS. 
 
 (plate XIII.) 
 
 For the advance of the Grerman Army on Paris, as well as for 
 their further operations in the north-west of France, it was of the 
 highest strategical importance to have possession of the railway 
 which goes northward from Paris to Soissons, by Nanteuil, Crepy, 
 and Villers-Cotterets, and the road-junctions at Soissons, Chauny, 
 Compiegne, Villers-Cotterets, and Chateau Thierry. 
 
 Soissons is a pleasant manufacturing town with 11,000 inhabi- 
 tants, and has three gates, through which pass the roads to Com- 
 piegne, Laon, and Mezieres. The railway is to the south-east, 
 and within range of the guns of the fortress at a distance of 1,500 
 paces. The Aisne, rising in the forest of Argonne, and washing the 
 town on the east, is here never more than 100 paces broad, and on 
 the south of the fortress receives the rather deeply sunk stream of 
 the Grrise. The Aisne is connected with the Ourcq canal, which, 
 as is well known, discharges itself into the St. Denis canal, near 
 Paris, about fifteen miles (70"2 English miles) from Soissons. 
 
 On the left bank of the Aisne the fortress consists, on its east 
 side, of a defensible wall, some twenty feet high, on which the 
 north and south fronts terminate. These, as well as the west 
 front, are formed of a number of irregidar bastions, with long 
 connecting lines or curtains, strengthened only on the north-west 
 by ravelins in front. Well-protected sluices afford the means of 
 filling the ditches with water when the place is prepared for a 
 siege, thus rendering them impassable. In time of peace the 
 ditches are dry. 
 
 Kecently the south-west front, which is defensively the weakest, 
 has been appropriately strengthened by the addition of a large 
 hornwork placed on some high ground which falls steeply towards 
 the country. Nearly in the centre of the east front a massive 
 bridge, of great beauty architecturally, crosses the Aisne to the 
 subm'b of St. Vaast, which is enclosed independently by fortifica- 
 tions, and serves as a bridge-head. The remaining suburbs — St. 
 Christophe on the west, De Grrise and De Eheims on the south-west 
 — are much built over, and hence of some disadvantage defensively, 
 since they interfere with the fire of the guns of the works behind 
 them. There are some bombproof powder magazines in the 
 fortress, but bombproof barracks are entirely wanting, which is a 
 serious disadvantage to the garrison. The profiles and the details 
 of the works are such that the place is secure from a coup« 
 de-main. The ground close round Soissons is a good deal cut up
 
 Plate XIII 
 
 f/iPrFioTi PC S //.£
 
 95 
 
 by valleys on the south-west and south-east, hut elsewhere flat and 
 partially clothed with plantations ; further off, however, to the 
 north on the plateau of Pasly, to the east at Crouy and Ville- 
 neuve, it is covered with groups of houses, parks, and vineyards. 
 On the south, at Belleu and Vauxbuin, it is favourable for the 
 operations of an investment, for the roads here leading to Sois- 
 sons can easily be converted into defensible defiles and trenches. 
 Some of the heights, especially near Vauxbuin, are within such 
 distances of the fortress that they afford advantageous artillery 
 positions for our long-range rifled guns, and are, therefore, exceed- 
 ingly well situated for the bombardment of the fortress. There 
 are also some places from which the escarps are visible down to the 
 foot of the wall at the bottom of the ditch. 
 
 After the battle of Sedan the army of the Meuse resumed its 
 march towards Paris, and consequently the head of the IVth Prus- 
 sian army corps belonging to that army arrived before the fortress 
 on the 11th September. Major von Wittich, of the general staff, 
 was sent into the fortress with a flag of truce, to ask the Com- 
 mandant to evacuate the place. The latter received him politely, 
 but decisively rejected the proposal. The fortress was put into as 
 good a condition for defence as time and circumstances permitted^ 
 by cutting down the trees on the glacis, barricading the entrances, 
 clearing the lines of fire, and demolishing the suburbs and railway. 
 The commandant had destroyed the passage over the Aisne valley 
 by the fine suspension-bridge at Vailly. The overflow of the 
 Aisne into the lower basin of the ground liable to inundation put 
 the country as far as Bucy-le-Loug under water. The place could 
 not, therefore, be taken without special preparation. As the ad- 
 vance on Paris was ordered to be hastened, the columns of the IVth 
 army corps on the march were directed for the time to i3ass round 
 the place, and it was thought sufficient to observe it vmtil the ar- 
 rival of the 2nd landwehr division, under the command of Major- 
 Greneral von Selchow, who were told off for the investment. They 
 eventually came in the latter part of September. The divisional 
 headquarters were fixed in La Carriere de I'Eveque. Owing to the 
 paucity of troops, the investment of the fortress was incomplete in 
 its earlier stages ; the right bank of the Aisne was almost entirely 
 open to the French, so that they frequently sent out foraging 
 parties there. Small engagements of the patrols were ineffectual 
 to prevent this evil. The investment of the fortress, however, 
 was accomplished, in the face of continual and repeated sorties and 
 alarms of the outposts by the garrison. An affair of this kind on 
 a large scale took place on the 28th September, and tlie enemy 
 was repulsed by the landwehr battalions of Landsberg, Frankfurt, 
 and Woldenberg. The garrison were consequently compelled to 
 beg for a truce to carry off their killed and wounded, whilst our 
 loss was but very small. Meanwhile the siege corps was formed 
 of nine landwehr battalions, comprising those of Frankfurt, Kiis- 
 trin, Landsberg, Woldenberg, Brandenburg, Euppin, Prenzlau, and 
 Jiiterbogk, with the addition of the Halberstadt heavy reserve 
 cavalry regiment, a squadron of the 1st Mecklenburg dragoons
 
 96 
 
 a heavy and a light reserve field battery, three companies of the 
 2nd, 4th, and 11th regiments of garrison artillery, and a com- 
 pany of Schleswig garrison pioneers (engineers), as well as the 
 pontoon company of the 9th battalion of pioneers (engineers). 
 Major-General von Selchow commanded the siege corps, Colonel 
 Bartsch the siege artillery ; Colonel Braun, of the staff of His 
 Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg Schwerin, was 
 the Chief Engineer. 
 
 In spite of repeated engagements with the energetic garrison, 
 who, by a skilful use of the ground, impeded the advance of the 
 siege corps, and, particularly on the 3rd and 9th October, brought 
 on sanguinary actions for the possession of the villages of Crouy and 
 Cuffies, the investment became by the 10th October close and 
 complete. The enemy was forced into the interior of the fortress, 
 and, owing to the energy he had shown, it was necessary to barri- 
 cade, and put into a condition for defence, the nearest villages and 
 farms, especially the Ferme la Periere. This was no difficult 
 matter, as it was solidly built and suitable for defence. In order 
 to connect the sections of the besieging force on both sides of the 
 Aisne, the river was bridged at Pommiers and Venizel. On the 
 following days the heavy guns from the batteries before Toul 
 arrived. The park of artillery consisted of 
 
 10 24-pounders 1 n-a j t> • j 
 
 ■1 r> 1 r. 1 c Kined Prussian ordnance. 
 
 1 o 1 2-pounders J 
 
 2 27-centimetre "j 
 
 4 22-centimetre > French mortars. 
 
 4 15-centimetre I 
 
 Total 36 pieces of siege artillery. 
 
 Materials for the construction of the batteries were also brought 
 from Toul. The southern side of the fortress was found, on being 
 reconnoitred, to be particularly well-adapted for bombardment. 
 The following batteries were constructed : — 
 
 Battery No. 1. Emplacement for field guns. 
 
 Battery No. 2. Enfilading battery, 4 24-pounders. 
 
 Battery No. 3. Mortar battery, 2 27-centimetre and 4 22- 
 centimetre mortars. 
 
 Battery No. 4. Breaching battery, 6 24-pounders. 
 
 Batteries Nos. 5 & 6. Two dismounting batteries ; together, 
 12 1 2-pounders. 
 
 Battery No. 7. Dismounting battery against the hornwork 
 and the flanking casemates at the gate to Compiegne. 
 
 Battery No. 8. Emplacement for field guns. 
 
 The two emplacements were' occupied by the two reserve 
 batteries present with the siege corps. 
 
 On the morning of the 12th October the bombardment began 
 in the presence of H.R.H. the Grrand Duke of Mecklenburg, 
 who had supreme command over the siege corps, and of His 
 Highness the Duke of Saxe-Altenburg. The construction of the 
 batteries had been proceeded with during the previous night
 
 97 
 
 without interruption from the enemy, but with much difficulty 
 from the rocky nature of the soiL Before long the garrison 
 artillery replied briskly from 16 or 18 guns to the fire of the 
 besiegers, so that some of the batteries had to abandon their 
 original objects, and join in the fight against the artillery of the 
 garrison. 
 
 October 13. — It had been observed that the French artillery 
 had been very busy on the ramparts during the night, and had 
 put new guns in position. The garrison opened fire with the 
 same energy as on the day before. Out of regard for the great 
 sufferings of the town a flag of truce was sent into the fortress at 
 2 o'clock in the afternoon, but all proposals for a surrender were 
 rejected ; consequently the fire was continued. 
 
 October 14. — The artillery continued the engagement. The 
 breaching batteries iDroduced the best results. On the previous 
 night gun-emplacements Nos. 9 and 10 were constructed, and on 
 the other hand batteries jSTos. 1 and 8 were removed, because the 
 fire of the neighbouring fronts of the fortress had been concentrated 
 on them. These gun-emplacements were so situated that the direct 
 fire of the works opposite to them could do them no serious 
 injury. 
 
 October 15. — During the night the enemy had been at work 
 at the breach that had been effected, though an incessant fire 
 upon it was kept up, and had repaired the damage, in full expec- 
 tation of an assault. The breach was in fact pi'acticable, the 
 wall had been demolished for a length of 45 or 50 paces, 
 and the earth of the parapet had fallen down, and formed a ramp 
 into the dry ditch. There was no masonry counterscarp there, 
 a circumstance that was so far of importance, that it would have 
 facilitated an assault of the breach, if necessary. In order to be 
 able, in case of need, to proceed with an abbreviated regular attack, 
 it was intended to construct close to La Buerie a portion of a 
 parallel, which might eventually have been used in connection 
 with the so-called " second batteries," and to afford cover to the 
 assaulting columns. This parallel was conveniently situated, as 
 regarded the breach that had been made opposite to it, some 800 
 paces off, the projected gun-emplacements Nos. 9 and 10 being 
 about 100 paces in rear. 
 
 Arrangements had been already made for the assault, when, on 
 the 15th October, a French flag of truce arrived, with a request 
 that an officer might be sent to negotiate for a surrender with 
 the Commandant, Greneral Denue. By order of H.R.H. the Grrand 
 Duke, Colonel von Krensky, Chief of the general staff of the 
 Xlllth army corps, and the Count von Schlieffen, Captain on 
 the general staff, were appointed to conduct these negotiations ; 
 and these officers returned at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 
 16th October, to the headquarters at Venizel, with the capitida- 
 tion concluded. The distress and want in the town, whose 
 citizens were not prepared for a siege, had apparently hastened 
 this capitulation. The fire from our guns had caused great havoc 
 
 36996. H
 
 ^8 
 
 in the place, and made it almost impracticable to continue the 
 duty on the ramparts. It may be observed, in reference to 
 the first, that the arsenal and other military buildings, as well as 
 the large hospital, had been destroyed by fire, and with regard to 
 the latter, that a very large proportion of the guns on the ram- 
 parts were found to be dismounted. This state of things and the 
 existence of a practicable breach must have been the immediate 
 causes of the request of the commandant for a capitulation. 
 
 On the 16th October, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the 
 German forces occupied the gates, and the garrison, about 4,000 
 strong, gave themselves up on the glacis: 128 guns, including 
 many pieces damaged, without side-arms, or destroyed, 70,000 
 shells, 3,000 cwt. of powder, a military chest with 92,000 francs 
 (about £3,680), and a quantity of clothing and equipment stores, 
 were the spoil of the victors. The troops marched past in front 
 of the cathedral before H.E.H. the Grand Duke, who placed him- 
 self in the square formed by the soldiers, caused them to present 
 arms, and took possession of the fortress, with three cheers for 
 His Majesty the King. H.R.H. the Grand Duke of IMecklenburg 
 thereupon proceeded by Rheims to Paris. In sjDite of the heav}?^ 
 fire on both sides, the siege artillery had to lament the loss of only 
 3 killed and 27 wounded.
 
 99 
 
 LA FERE. 
 
 (plate ti.) 
 
 After the capitulation of Metz the 1st army received orders to 
 invest the fortresses of Thionville, Longwy, Montmedj, and 
 Mezieres, and to overthrow the newly raised armies of the enemy 
 in the North-west of France. 
 
 At La Fere the roads from Cambray and Amiens meet. The place 
 itself lies on the highroad, which leads from Laon by Compiegne 
 to Paris, and also on the Crozat canal, which can be used as a 
 communication by water from Paris by Valenciennes to Antwerp. 
 The railway from Laon to Paris joasses by the place on the south, 
 and goes thence westward to Tergnier. From here the lines 
 northwards to Amiens, Cambray, and Valenciennes branch off. 
 
 In considering the important and influential jDosition of the 
 little fortress of La Fere, 4 miles(l8| English miles) north of 
 Soissons, with regard to the operations of the 1st army. Baron 
 Manteuffel, general of cavalry, its commander, could have no 
 doubt that the place ought to be taken as soon as possible, since it 
 barred the communications above mentioned. 
 
 La Fere has 5,000 inhabitants, and was formerly the seat of 
 an artillery school of established reputation, whence have pro- 
 ceeded the most famous generals in this branch of the French army. 
 The place is of no importance otherwise. The fortifications of 
 La Fere, a fortress of the second class, consisted of a high town- 
 wall, arranged for defence, in the manner of the middle ages. The 
 deep ditches in front of this wall are flanked by towers — some 
 half-round, some half-angular — or by flanks in the escarp. On the 
 west, north, and east, this town-wall is covered from direct fire by 
 an earthen parapet of weak profile and irregular trace. Before 
 the introduction of rifled guns of long range, and of indirect 
 breaching-fire, this may have sufficed, but now the to^vn-wa^, in 
 spite of the earthen parapet, can be got at from great distances. 
 The passages over the Oise and the Crozat canal are covered 
 by a little redoubt made like a bridge-head. 
 
 The fortress was as well and completely prepared for a siege 
 as one could expect. It should particularly be observed that the 
 Oise was dammed up, and thus an extensive and effective inunda- 
 tion was caused over the meadow-ground, which was favourably 
 situated for that purpose. This low ground is only about a quarter 
 of a mile (2,060 yards) wide close to the fortress, but becomes 
 broader on the north and south, and extends to the east and west 
 as far as some gently sloping heights ; and these, more particularly 
 
 H 2
 
 100 
 
 on the eastward, pei'mit a complete view into the fortress, and 
 afford very well-placed sites for l)atteries, wlience the place can be 
 effectually shelled. 
 
 In order to hurry on as much as possible the investment of 
 La Fere, the 4th infiiutry brigade, under the command of Major- 
 Greneral von Zglinitzky, was sent on at once from Metz by rail to 
 Soissons, to march thence by road, on the 14th November, to take 
 up the ground before La Fere. The brigade comprised the 4th 
 and 8th East Prussian regiments, a squadron of the 10th 
 dragoons, and a heavy battery of the 1st regiment of artillery. 
 In addition there were attached to the force a company of pioneers 
 (engineers), six companies of garrison artillery, with 16 siege-guns 
 (four 24-pounders and twelve 12-pounders) and six 22-centimetre 
 mortars. The companies of artillery belonged to the 2nd, 4th, 
 1 1th, and guard regiments of garrison artillery. 
 
 On the 1 otli November La Fere was closely invested, and, after 
 repeated reconnaissances of the fortress, the south-east front was 
 selected for attack. Far in advance of the head of the army to 
 which he belonged, surrounded by an irritated and excited popula- 
 tion, in the midst of hostile forces in j)rocess of formation, the task 
 of Major-Greneral von Zglinitzky v;as no easy one. Grreat prudence 
 was required, for the detachment had to be so placed round the 
 fortress that it could at any moment front either way. In fact, 
 on the 20th November it was attacked, on the right bank of the 
 Oise, by six companies of the enemy, with four guns, at Menessis, in 
 the country near Tergnier. The battalion of the 5th regiment, 
 stationed there, succeeded, however, in repulsing the attack, with 
 considerable loss to the enemy. Apparently in connection with 
 this fight, the garrison at the same time attempted a sortie, without 
 deriving therefrom any advantage whatever. 
 
 Meanwhile the siege-guns, mentioned above, had arrived 
 before the place, chiefly from Soissons, and preparations for a 
 bombardment were begun by getting ready some materials for 
 the construction of batteries. The siege-park was formed at 
 Eogecourt, a place situated on the railway, in a valley nearly 
 three-quarters of a mile (6,178 yards) east of the fortress. 
 
 On the evening of the 24th November progress was made witli 
 the construction of the batteries, and they were at once armed. 
 The enemy did not interfere with this work, so that on the 
 morning of the 25th November, at half-past eight o'clock, the 
 fortress was bombarded from seven batteries, which were 
 built on the heights of Danizy, west of the place of the 
 same name, on both sides of the road to Pont-a-Boussy. The 
 fire was directed not only against the positions of the enemy's 
 artillery on the works, but also against the railway station lying 
 on the south side of the Faubourg Neuf, which had been barricaded, 
 fortified, and rendered impassable by blowing up two bridges. The 
 north front was also enfiladed, so that with these dispositions it 
 was impossible to avoid at the same time bombarding the further 
 portion of the town. The garrison replied with vigour to the fire 
 of the siege-batteries, which did terrible havoc in all directions.
 
 101 
 
 They had placed 24 guns on the front attacked, and had changed 
 the positions of their artillery. Soon the town was on fire in 
 several places, and the distress there was the greater, because 
 there were no cellars in which the inhabitants could take refuge. 
 The garrison was entirely without bombproof cover of any sort, 
 the only barracks in the place were soon in flames, several 
 magazines caught fire, the gate of the fort towards Laon was shot 
 to pieces, and the fronts attacked were seriously damaged. Under 
 these circumstances the commandant. Captain Planche, who be- 
 longed to the navy, after a 30-hours' bombardment, could hold 
 out no longer. He gave up the fortress on the 26th November, 
 and thus 2,000 prisoners, chiefly garde-mobiles, 113 garrison 
 guns of different calibres, with their ammunition, 5,000 stand 
 of arms, and other military stores, fell into our hands. As La 
 Fere contained an artillery arsenal, large stores of projectiles, 
 lead, iron, and timber also became ours as spoil of war. The 
 entry into the fortress was made on the 27th November. 
 
 Under the circumstances it was necessary at once to provide 
 La Fere with a sufficient garrison, and to put it again in a condi- 
 tion of defence, so far as was practicable with the means available. 
 For this purpose it was of the first imj)ortance to repair the very 
 serious damage that had been done by the bombardment to the 
 ramparts and gateways. The proximity of the enemy made this 
 especially necessary. In fact, on the 16th December, French 
 columns appeared before the fortress, whence, to the number of 
 3,000 or 4,000 men they pushed on, crossing to the left bank of 
 the Oise with the apparent intention of attacking Laon. The 
 enemy, however, soon went back again without attempting to 
 invest La Fere, to recapture it, or even to threaten this important 
 railway junction.
 
 102 
 
 THIONVILLE. 
 
 (plate XIV.) 
 
 Thionville, or Diedenhofen, a place with 7,800 inhabitants, is the 
 most northern of the French strongholds on the Moselle, and with 
 it commences the line of fortresses — including Long-wy, Mont- 
 medy, Sedan, Mezieres, and Eocroy — constructed as a protection 
 against attacks through Luxembourg and Belgium. 
 
 The fortress was constructed at various epochs. It has been 
 built from designs, partly by Vauban, and partly by Cormontaigne, 
 It consists of three chains of defences, being the main work and a 
 bridge-head on either side of the Moselle, and a work called 
 ' Le Fort,' on the right bank of the arm of the Moselle, which 
 branches off to the south of the place, and is used as a canal. On 
 the left bank of the river lies the main work within the town, 
 which has two gates, one on the north and one on the south, 
 leading respectively to Luxembourg and Metz, and contains the 
 great arsenal and a considerable store of provisions. Four regular 
 bastioned fronts are joined to the Moselle by connecting lines, 
 which on the lower side are strengthened by a complete and inde- 
 pendent hornwork. 
 
 Eavelins, counterguards, and a system of lunettes at the foot 
 of the glacis give the place considerable defensive strength. The 
 gorge of the fortress along the Moselle is closed by an indented 
 defensible wall. A massive bridge of five arches spans the Moselle, 
 here loO paces (123^ yards) wide, and leads into the fortifications 
 of the bridge-head, which consist of a flat elongated crown-work. 
 This work has three bastioned fronts, with counterguards and 
 lunettes at the foot of the glacis in front of the flank bastions. 
 The ditches are wet. Three bridges, or locks, lead over the 
 arm of the Moselle used as a canal, already mentioned, 
 to the right bank and into the strong crown-work of Le 
 Fort, there situated. This consists of two bastioned fronts, 
 provided with ravelins, and with cunettes in the ditches. The 
 roads from Metz, Bouzonville, Saarlouis, and Sierk-Treves, debouch 
 into this work. Outside the fortifications the French held the 
 villages La Orange, Malgrange, and others, situated in the rayon 
 of the fortress. 
 
 Thionville commands the Moselle, and the important high- 
 roads to Metz, Longwy, Luxembourg, and Saarlouis. Moreover, 
 the place is an important railway junction, for the line leading
 
 a^aaaaaa au,ua a. hussuuv sijMeBattenes on22.NovemJ)er 
 hb.ParaUeLs
 
 103 
 
 from Luxembourg to Metz is joined on the south of Thionville by 
 the railway from Longuion to Benning. Under these circum- 
 stances ThionYille was drawn into the sphere of the military 
 operations, as soon as the Grerman armies crossed the frontier. It 
 lay in the district in which tlie 1st army operated, and as early as 
 the 8 th of August an advanced party was sent against the place 
 from the Vlllth army corps. As we were in contact with the enemy 
 after the battles of Forbach and Spicheren, and knew that he had 
 gone to Metz, Thionville was only observed at first, and it was 
 not till after affairs had become more settled at Metz that the for- 
 tress was so far invested, that all communication with the place 
 was cut off. At first the troops in observation consisted only of 
 three squadrons of the 2nd reserve cavalry regiment formed at 
 Deutz, who wore the uniform of cidrassiers, and were armed with 
 lances. Then came, in passing, the landwehr battalions of 
 Kummer's reserve division, the 2nd (Thuriugian) regiment, the 
 94th (Oldenburg) regiment (to which two guns were attached), 
 the 10th (Lauenburg) jager battalion, the 3rd reserve hussars, 
 and lastly, the 10th ulan regiment (1st Posen). On the south of 
 the fortress the communication between the troops posted there was 
 maintained by a bridge between Ucange and Bertrange. 
 
 For some time Lieutenant-Greneral von Bothmer had the com- 
 mand of the troops before Thionville, but he rather observed than 
 invested it. The operations were confined to watching the roads and 
 destroying the bridges and telegraphs. The duty was monotonous 
 enough for some weeks, though there were some bold and prudently 
 conducted reconnaissances made by the garrison, which brought the 
 Grerman force into contact with their equally active opponents. A 
 fight of this kind took place on the 13th September at Veymerange, 
 west of Thionville, where the French had gone ftom the fortress to 
 forage. Numbers of franc-tireurs scoured the country, kept up 
 communication with the unfriendly inhabitants, as well as with 
 those of ' neutrcd ' Luxembourg, and were able in many ways to 
 help the garrison in Thionville, and also to give them news of 
 their enemy's movements. Thus, the French, on the 1 7th Septem- 
 ber, with two companies of infantry and a picket of dragoons, at- 
 tacked suddenly a train of 165 wagons at Konigsmachern, between 
 Sierk and Thionville. The train was laden with oats for the 
 Prussian army. The weak escort of six men were killed or made 
 prisoners, and the train taken into the fortress. After fifty-eight 
 wagons had come within the rayon of Thionville, a patrol of the 
 3rd reserve hussars succeeded in recapturing 107 wagons from 
 the enemy, quite close to the fortress. 
 
 Almost at the same time as this attack, a railway-train was smug- 
 gled in with provisions, which had been collected in Luxembourg 
 and Bettenburg ostensibly for the German army. For this purpose, 
 on the night of the 24th-2oth Sejjtember, the rails that had 
 been torn up were relaid on the Thionville and Luxembourg line ; 
 and the provision-train of sixty wagons, containing meal, rice, coffee, 
 and sugar, was brought into the fortress, where the garrison were
 
 104 
 
 to receive this consignment. The Prussian detachments on the 
 south and west of Thionville heard of the affair, and endeavoured 
 to prevent the unloading, but did not succeed in doing so. The 
 whole business was arranged by tlie French company of the Chemin 
 de Fer de I'Est in Luxembourg, who own the section of railway in 
 question. 
 
 Such a lesson increased the watchfulness of the Prussian troopSy 
 and issuing from Sierk, where a Prussian garrison was stationed, 
 they succeeded in seizing twenty provision-wagons destined 
 for Thionville, and coming from Mondorf and Bettenburg in 
 Luxembourg. 
 
 On the loth and 18th October it was necessary to send a flag 
 of truce into the fortress, and Major von Prittwitz and Captain 
 von Eickstadt, of the cavalry, went in for this purpose. Shots were 
 fired from the fortress at both of them. 
 
 On the 17th October the French made a sortie, but were 
 quickly driven back again into the fortress by our men. We had 
 fifteen wounded ; the enemy carried off their killed and vrounded 
 with them into the place. 
 
 After the capitulation of Metz, the 14th infantry division, 
 under the command of Lieutenant-General von Kamecke, took up a 
 position before Thionville for the complete investment of the place, 
 and thus commenced, in fact, the series of sieges of the north- 
 eastern fortresses of France. 
 
 On the 9th and 10th of November the siege corps began its 
 march from JNIetz, in two echelons. Besides the infantry division 
 already mentioned, it consisted of 13 companies of garrison 
 artillery, under the command of Major Schmelzer, 3 heavy and 2 
 light batteries of the 7th regiment of field artillery, 7 com- 
 panies of pioneers (engineers), including 5 companies of garrison 
 pioneers of different army corps, pontoon column No. 7, and a 
 bridge-train captured in Metz. The pioneers were under the 
 command of Major Treumann, commanding the 7th battalion of 
 pioneers. 
 
 Lieutenant-Geueral von Kamecke placed his headquarters in 
 Hayange. He caused an observatory to be established at Chateau - 
 Serre, whence the fortress was completely seen into. At Ukange 
 a pontoon-bridge was substituted for the ferry previously existing, 
 and the maintenance of this bridge later on gave much trouble, 
 owing to the lising of the waters of the Moselle. 
 
 On the 20th November, the materials required for the con- 
 struction of the batteries having been previously brought up 
 between the I4th and 18th of November, and having been pre- 
 pared under the direction of the technical troops, a matter of no 
 great difficulty in this well-timbered country, the actual construc- 
 tion began. The work at the batteries was partly masked by 
 plantations, which were only removed immediately before the fire 
 began. 
 
 On the 19th November the siege-guns, 158 in number, were 
 all assembled.
 
 105 
 
 The siege-park consisted of: — 
 
 36 24-pounders, 10 of them short, 
 50 1 2-pounders, 
 
 It tpoundei's } °^ ^^' ^"^^ ^'^^^^'y^ 
 
 8 13-inch mortars, 
 
 4 1 1-inch ditto, 
 18 8-inch ditto. 
 
 158 total number of pieces. 
 
 The main artillery park was in Suzauge, the smaller one in 
 Hettange-grande, and Immeldange. 
 
 On the 21st November General von Zastrow, of the infantry, 
 commanding the Yllth army corps, arrived from Metz with his 
 staff, in order to be present at the then imminent bombardment 
 of the fortress. For the bombardment the following batteries liad 
 been erected : — 
 
 1 . On the right bank of the INloselle, at the village of Haute- 
 Yutz, four field batteries, three 6-pounder batteries, and one 4- 
 pounder battery ; at the wood of Illange, four 24-pounders and 
 four 1 2-pounders, four 13-inch French mortars, which had 
 been brought from Metz. These batteries fired upon the bridge- 
 head and north-east front of the town, at a distance of about 
 2.500 paces. 
 
 2. On the left bank of the Moselle, at the farm of Gfassion, four 
 short rifled 24-pounders. Here also four rifled mortars should have 
 been placed, but were not put in position for certain reasons. 
 This 24-pounder battery was established by a detachment from the 
 artillery school of gunnery at Spandau. At Chateau-Serre, a 
 24-pounder 4-gun batter}^ ; on the left of the castle, a similar 24- 
 pounder battery. These batteries fired upon the north-west front 
 of the town, at a distance of about 5,500 paces. In the wood of 
 Veymerange, a battery of short 24-pounders ; in front of Vey- 
 merange, two batteries of 12-pouuders for four guns each. These 
 three batteries were for the bomljardmeut of the town, at about 
 4,000 paces' distance. At Maison-rouge, in front of Hettange- 
 grande, were three 12-pounder batteries, each for four guns. 
 These batteries fired upon the town at 3,900 paces distance, and 
 enfiladed some of the fronts of the fortress. 
 
 There were thus 16 batteries, with 85 guns, in action. 
 
 Major von Eynatten commanded the artillery, Colonel Eiedel 
 the engineers. The latter had originally been ordered to Verdun, 
 but that fortress capitulated on the very day of his arrival. 
 
 Up to the day last mentioned, only the ridges had been occu- 
 pied round the fortress, which lies with its small towers deep in 
 the valley of the Moselle. On the night of the 21st-22nd 
 November, however, the villages and farms lying in front were 
 taken — namely, the farm of Grassion, Terville with the adjoining 
 mill of St. Marie, Haute and Basse Gruentrange, La Grange, and 
 Malgrange, St. Francois and St. Anna. At the same time, in very
 
 106 
 
 bad weather, a j^ioneer company connected the churchyard at 
 Terville with the village, by a trench with a salient angle, in order 
 that those in the fortress might, by seeing the earthworks, be con- 
 vinced of the gravity of the situation. 
 
 The guarding of the low ground by the Moselle was undertaken, 
 on the left bank, by two squadrons of the 2nd reserve cavalry 
 regiment; on the right by some squadrons of the 15th regiment 
 of hussars. 
 
 On the 22nd November, at 7 o'clock in the morning, the bom- 
 bardment began in thick miny weather, rendering it difficult to take 
 aim. After a short time the artillery of the fortress also opened 
 fire. The prefecture, the arsenal, three wings of a large barrack, 
 the large riding-school, and the town-hall became, one after 
 another, a prey to the flames. The conflagrations lasted through- 
 out the night. As the Moselle happened to be very high, some of 
 the streets and the cellars were under water, and it was impossible 
 for the citizens to take refuge in the latter. Eegardless of the 
 destructive fire of the siege-guns, the defence of 'the place was 
 maintained with energy, for the first 24 hours, by the artillery of 
 the garrison ; and for this the commandant of the place, Colonel 
 Turnier, is deserving of credit. Longer than this the defenders 
 could not contend against the increasing severity of the bombard- 
 ment, as the garrison had to be employed almost solely in ex- 
 tinguishing the fires in the town. The rate of fire of the siege- 
 batteries was ordered to be reduced to one round every half-hour 
 by day, and one round every hour by night. 
 
 On the night of the 22nd-23rd November, the artillery of the 
 garrison set fire to the village of Beauregard, the great establish- 
 ment of Jesuits, and the rendezvous of the franc-tireurs at the 
 time of the investment, and thus prevented its occupation by the 
 Prussian troops, which was to have taken place that very night. 
 
 On the 23rd November, at 2 p.m., the tricolour was replaced by 
 the white fiag on the church-tower. The besiegers looked upon 
 this as a sign that a capitulation was desired. On the side of the 
 attack, therefore, fire ceased. As no flag of truce came from the 
 fortress, Lieutenant-Greneral von Kamecke sent one of his adjutants 
 into the place. He returned, however, with a request from the 
 place that the women and children might be allowed to leave the 
 fortress. Under the circumstances this request could not be en- 
 tertained, and the bombardment was therefore resumed at half- 
 past 7 in the evening, and lasted till 10 o'clock in the morning of 
 the 24th November. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, after 
 bombardment for 52 hours, the fortress capitulated, on the terms 
 agreed upon at Sedan. On the Prussian side the capitulation was 
 concluded by Major the Baron von Hilgers, of the general staff. 
 
 On the 25th November, at 11 o'clock in the forenoon, the place 
 was given up. First the gates, powder-magazines, and mines were 
 taken possession of, and then the French garrison marched out, and 
 laid down their arms in front of the gate of Saarlouis. Thence the 
 garrison were sent off, in three detachments, to the South-G-erman 
 fortresses, as prisoners of war.
 
 107 
 
 The loss iu men on both sides was small. The Prussians lost 
 only two killed and eight wounded, the French apparently only a 
 few killed and 40 wounded, whilst of the civil population no one 
 was seriously hurt. The losses entailed on the latter by the bom- 
 bardment were, however, very heavy, and were estimated at 
 3,000,000 francs (^120,000). 
 
 Besides the 4,000 prisoners, including some national guards, 
 200 guns, with great quantities of other warlike stores, were 
 taken. It should be mentioned that the occupation of Thionville 
 led to the discovery of unquestionable evidence of the violation 
 of neutrality by the Grrand Duchy of Luxembourg. 
 
 In conclusion, we may add, as a historical note, that Thion- 
 ville was captm-ed by surprise by France in 1558, just as were 
 Metz and Strasburg. Subsequently it was given up to the 
 Spaniards, and came first definitely under French rule in 1659. 
 
 With this siege, however, Thionville has once more become 
 Diedenhofen.
 
 108 
 
 MONTMEDY. 
 
 (plate XV.) 
 
 The fortress is situated on a conical hill, sloping away from it on 
 three sides. To the north the hill is joined on to a ridge of very- 
 great importance defensively, which, at the village of Thonelle, 
 attains its greatest breadth and height above the bottom of the 
 valley of the Chiers. That river here receives several mountain 
 streams. Eound the fortress the ground is of more or less mili- 
 tary importance, generally covered with wood, and there are also 
 hills difficult of access, which slope down steeply to small water- 
 courses. Between this ridge and the hill on which the fortress is 
 situated the ground falls rapidly, and at the point of greatest de- 
 pression the roads from Paris to Luxembourg and from Sedan to 
 Metz cross. The railway, Sedan-Thionville-Metz, passes under 
 this depression of the ground, through a tunnel about 1,200 paces 
 987^ yards) long. Although the fortress was constructed as far 
 back as the middle of the sixteenth century, it was developed into 
 its present form, and very much strengthened, in the time of Louis 
 XIV., under the direction of Marshal Vauban. The defences then 
 existing consisted principally of a high scarp-wall with many pro- 
 jections, and provided with machicoulis and other defensiv^e ar- 
 rangements of that description ; and partly around this wall was 
 added the existing enceinte, with eight i]*regular bastions and six 
 ravelins, in precise conformity with the edge of the plateiui, and 
 not in accordance with any definite system of fortification. Tlie 
 great height of the profile and the situation of the fortress, on a 
 rocky hill, 200 feet high, impracticable for troops, give the place 
 its strength, and render it secure from any sudden attack in force. 
 There are no detached works. 
 
 The town of JNIontmedy, witli 2,500 inhabitants, is divided 
 into the lower town, which lies in the valley; and the upper town, 
 which is enclosed by the mountain fortress. In the latter there are 
 five barracks for 800 men, two powder-magazines, and the arsenal. 
 The lower town, also called Medybas, is surrounded by a crenel- 
 lated wall, which, being uncovered on almost all sides, can be easily 
 breached. The hospital, and a cavalry barrack for 100 men, witli 
 stabling for 100 horses, are here situated. 
 
 By the 3rd September, after the battle of Sedan, the head of 
 a column of the Eoyal Prussian guard corps, under the command 
 of Captain Zimmerman, of the 3rd ulan regiment of the guard, 
 had arrived in the immediate neighbourhood of the fortress. That
 
 ?lateXV. 
 
 b.h b b,b.i,b,b,6.1'rwsslu.ii Sieae Hictlefif.^- t>n^ i2JJec^n\LeT- 
 c, oj'riisjian Field JinW^nf^ otv I2'9«t>«rwbeir 
 
 '"APf^tirrfes./ite.
 
 109 
 
 officer caused the commandant to be summoned to surrender, by 
 Lieutenant von Jagow, but the demand was refused. In riding 
 thither the trumpeter with the flag of truce was shot. This was 
 immediately reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the army of 
 the Meuse, under whose orders the guard corps was. The com- 
 mander-in-Chief, in consequence, ordered the guard corps, with a 
 brigade of infantry and the necessary cavalry and artillery, to 
 make an attempt to capture the fortress. The two heights, on the 
 north and north-east of the place, afforded suitable positions for 
 the artillery, as they lay nearly as high as the fortress ; but for 
 field-guns, which were almost the only ones available, the distances 
 were too great for obtaining thoroughly satisfactory results. The 
 bombardment was to take place chiefly from the north, from seven 
 batteries of the brigade of artillery of the guard. These were 
 placed as far as possible behind natural cover, and swept both the 
 town and the fortress in the direction of their greatest length. 
 
 On the 5th September, at 10 a.m., the batteries opened fire on 
 the fortress. Soon the sub-prefecture and the adjoining part of 
 the town were in flames. About 11 o'clock the mayor of Thonelle 
 was sent by the officer commanding the artillery brigade of the 
 guard. Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, to the commandant. 
 Colonel Eeboul, to demand a surrender of the fortress within an 
 horn- and a half. The reply given to the mayor was the same as 
 that made to the bearer of the flag of truce on the j^revious day. 
 Upon this the artillery fight began afresh on both sides. After 
 some hours it was broken ofi" on the side of the Prussians. The 
 Prussians lost four men and one horse. As by these proceedings 
 satisfaction had been obtained for the breach of international law 
 in shooting the trumpeter with the flag of truce, and as, more- 
 over, it was manifest that the fortress could not be taken without 
 more preparation of a special character, the Prussians resumed 
 their march on Paris. The French had three killed and 15 
 wounded. 
 
 At this period it was not intended to take the trouble to watch 
 and invest the fortress, which lay off the line of marcli and of the 
 operations of the Grerman armies. Under these circumstances, 
 the commandant was able to send away part of the garrison to the 
 French army of the North, and to carry on the duties of the fortress 
 with almost national guards alone. Supported by, and in com- 
 munication with, tlie people of the country, the commandant did 
 not fail to prove troublesome to the Prussian lines of communica- 
 tion that lay nearest to him. In consequence, many encounters 
 took place with the 2nd and 4th companies of the 65th regiment, 
 which were detached from the investing corps before Verdun to 
 protect the post at Stenay, between the former place and Sedan. 
 After their departure, on the 7th October, the commandant of 
 the fortress made a sudden attack on Stenay. For this purpose 
 about 600 men of the garrison of Montmedy were sent out on the 
 night of the 15th-16th of October, and about 6 o'clock in 
 the morning they arrived at Stenay, only 1| miles (8:^^ English
 
 no 
 
 miles) distant from the fortress. Here a street-fight commenced. 
 Although the garrison in Stenay was turned out very quickly, yet 
 the French succeeded, with the assistance of some confederates in 
 the place, in carrying off to Montmedy the staff-officer of the 
 post, with his adjutant, two artillery officers who happened to 
 be in Stenay, an officer of the intendant with 100 men of the 
 Briihl landwehr battalion, 40 of the Borken landwehr battalion, 
 and 40 sick, and in addition a Prussian military chest, containing 
 10,000 francs (ig400). 
 
 It was not till after the capitulation of Metz, and almost at 
 the same time with the close blockade of Thionville, that Mont- 
 medy was invested by the 27th brigade, under the command of 
 Colonel von Pannewitz, and further by the 74th (1st Hanoverian) 
 regiment, the 39th (Lower Ehenish) fusiliers, the 7th West- 
 phalian jager battalion, and some cavalry and artillery. 
 
 In occupying the positions round Montmedy on the 16th 
 November, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 74th regiment 
 became engaged at Chauvency and Thonelle with the French 
 infantry, who were driven back into the fortress, lea\dng behind 
 86 unwounded prisoners. 
 
 The siege-park told off for the bombardment of Montmedy 
 was almost the same in the calibre of guns, and also as regards 
 the troops employed and the commanding officers, as was engaged 
 at Thionville. From that place they were sent as far as Longuyon 
 by rail, and thence by march along the road to Montmedy. The 
 parks were in several places. The chief park was at Juvigny sur 
 Loison, with supplementary parks at Bazailles and Chauvency, to 
 the south and west of Montmedy respectively. 
 
 On the 28th November Lieutenant-Greneral von Kamecke 
 arrived, with the rest of the 14th division, exclusive of a portion 
 detached from before Montmedy, to observe the fortress of Longwy. 
 Headquarters were in Louppi. Meanwhile the technical prepara- 
 tions for the bombardment were commenced. 
 
 On the nth December the parks were complete. In the 
 meantime the pioneers (engineers) constructed roads and huts 
 for the pickets, and were employed on railway and telegraph 
 works. 
 
 On the 9th, 10th, and 11th December the batteries were con- 
 structed under very difficult circumstances, the enemy endeavour- 
 ing to interrupt the work by the fire of artillery and of chassepots. 
 At 1 1 o'clock in the evening the infantry took possession of the 
 "\dllages of Thonne-les-Pres, Frenoy, Ville Claye, and Ire-le-Pres. 
 In the night of the llth-12th December the arming of the batte- 
 ries was taken in hand, a task that was very difficult, owing to the 
 badness of the roads and the hard-frozen snow. The batteries, 
 except the rifled mortar-battery, were situated at distances of 2,000 
 to 3,800 paces from the fortress, on the heights at Yille Claye 
 and Gerauvaux. The mortar-battery, however, was in the valley 
 close behind the village of Vigneul and the Bois de Moncey. The 
 siege-pieces employed were : —
 
 Ill 
 
 8 long rifled 24-poimders, 
 10 short rifled 24-poimders, 
 
 4 rifled mortars, 
 20 rifled 12-pounders. 
 
 Total ... 42 siege-pieces. 
 
 In addition there were twenty 6-poimder field-guns, and with 
 these pieces a heavy field-battery of the 7th regiment of artillery, 
 and another of the 4th regiment of artillery, were posted on the 
 heights to the north of the fortress. 
 
 On the 12th December, at half-past 7 in the morning, the 
 weather being clear, fire was commenced from all the batteries, 
 which had been armed altogether with 60 pieces. The west front 
 of the fortress was the chief object of the fire. Orders were 
 given that by day each gun should expend five rounds, and each 
 mortar three rounds in an hour, and by night each gun and each 
 mortar one round. The special object ordered to be aimed at 
 by the batteries of the attack were the west front above mentioned, 
 certain flanking casemates, the powder-magazine, the hollow tra- 
 verses, the gate of the fortress leading to the town, and the fortress 
 itself. After a short time the garrison replied very briskly, and 
 although several guns were silenced on the front of attack, the 
 enemy kept up a well-directed fire till the evening, but then the 
 fire entirely ceased. The battery armed with five short rified 24- 
 pounders, on the height and in front of the wood of Grerauvaux, 
 was the most heavily cannonaded. Good results were not to be ex- 
 pected from the siege artillery, for towards noon heavy rain came 
 on, which lasted throughout the day and night. 
 
 On the 13th December fire was continued, at a slow rate, only 
 one round each hour being fired, because a thick fog prevailed, 
 and made it impossible to see the object aimed at. The effect 
 could not be ascertained, except that towards evening the town 
 was on fire. The practice of the artillery had produced a fright- 
 ful effect on the buildings of the place and on the fortifications. 
 Among the latter, some iron splinter-proofs, apjDarently con- 
 structed of railway metals, and built up with masonry, were 
 entirely destroyed. Hardly a house remained uninjm-ed, and the 
 public buildings were for the most part destroyed. About 8 
 o'clock in the evening the order was given to cease fire, as negoti- 
 ations were entered into for a surrender. The commandant, 
 having previously refused to capitulate, now, after 36 hours' bom- 
 bardment, said that he wished to surrender. He sent for this 
 purpose the second in command to Ire-le-Sec, whither also went 
 Major the Baron von Hilgers, of the Prussian general staff. At 
 2 o'clock in the morning the terms of capitulation were concluded, 
 and their ratification took place by 8 o'clock. 
 
 On the 14th December, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the 
 fortress was given up, and the Prussian troops marched in. From 
 the 60 pieces in action, about 3,000 rounds had been fired alto- 
 gether. The effect produced by the rifled guns, and chiefly by 
 the rifled mortars, had hastened the capitulation, and had caused
 
 112 
 
 such devastation, that a longer resistance of the enemy's artillery 
 by the fortress was impossible. The loss of the besiegers amounted 
 to 12 wounded ; that of the French to some 30 or 40 killed, and 
 50 wounded. 
 
 With the taking of Montmedy, there fell into the hands of the 
 victors 3,000 prisoners, 65 guns, of which 21 were rifled, and several 
 well-filled magazines; besides which 4 Prussian officers with 237 men 
 were liberated from captivity. General Aon Kamecke had made 
 the commandant answerable with his head for the lives and health 
 of the prisoners, after he had previously refused curtly to exchange 
 them. The French had blown up the railway tunnel. By the 
 fall of Montmedy the railway line from Thionville to Sedan was 
 opened for the Grerman armies before Paris, and operating in the 
 North-west of France, and, moreover, a sto]) was put to the move- 
 ments of the franc-tireurs, who had their headquarters in the 
 fortress.
 
 Plate XVI 
 
 
 Frwssicmi Sie^e Soytteries 
 JV" 1-8 IiTtfCladb.CcnMitefi ii^B^cachet-Satrtern ,f 
 " 1-irjiEtmiUeuse.f Batteries 
 
 .uit,,ijj,^iv(ixrifji and/ rniichcs g I'eoe nt yot 
 
 
 rrcr S IV! E
 
 113 
 
 LONGWY. 
 
 (plate xyi.) 
 
 This fortress is the point of junction of the roads from Thionville 
 and Metz, from the Belgian fortress of Arlon and from Luxembm^g, 
 and from Verdun and Paris. It also bars the junction line con- 
 necting the railway from Thionville to Mezieres with that from 
 Luxembourg to Arlon. 
 
 The occupation of the place only became desirable after 
 Thionville, Sedan, Montmedy, and Mezieres had been taken, as it 
 appeared necessary then to establish communication between 
 Northern Lorraine and the neighbouring country, and to put an 
 end to the movements of the franc-tireurs in that region, which 
 were much facilitated by the fortress. The siege of Longwy was 
 to be regarded as the final operation against the north-east line of 
 French fortresses, excepting Givet and Charlemont. 
 
 Longwy contains about 3,500 inhabitants, and is situated on 
 the right bank of the Chiers. It is divided into an upper and a 
 lower town, the latter being in the valley, the former on the 
 plateavi in the fortress. The work was built by Marshal Vauban 
 in 1680, as a fortified place opjDosite Luxemburg. 
 
 The Chiers receives close to the fortress several mountain 
 streams, which enclose on the east and south of the place a tract 
 of wooded broken ground wdth deep valleys. Through the plateau 
 of Mexy on the south-east passes the road to Thionville, which, 
 with several windings, descends the slope of the hill and goes 
 through the lower town into the fortress. The slopes of the hill 
 there are very steep, and off the road are scarcely practicable, and 
 thus form a serious obstacle to the approach of the fortress, added 
 to which the defiles on the roads are generally effectively com- 
 manded by the guns of the fortress. The road to Verdun passes 
 over a plateau broken by numerous undulations, and the village 
 of Cosnes may be considered its central point. Here, as well as on 
 the plateau of Mexy, are many favourable positions for artillery, 
 while the ground is such as to permit of approaches b}' sap only 
 in the immediate neighbourhood of the fortress, within a distance 
 from the foot of the glacis of about GOO to 800 paces. 
 
 The fortress of Longwy is a bastioned hexagon, with a circum- 
 ference of 2,340 metres (2,563 yards), and is provided with well- 
 revetted dry ditches. The enceinte is in its essentials laid out 
 according to Vauban's first system, and provided with the outsvorks, 
 ravelins, and caponiers belonging to that system. On the fronts 
 
 86996. I
 
 114 
 
 towards the plateau of Cosnes, the front of attack, three lunettes 
 on a lower level are thrown out at the foot of the glacis. A large 
 hornwork covers the north-east front of the fortress, and covers the 
 defile of the road there, and the extensive trough-shaped valley of 
 the Chiers. 
 
 Longwy, being close to the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers, 
 and remote from the scene of the greater operations of the war, 
 had but a secondary influence on the course of those operations ; 
 and hence only small detachments passing by came into its 
 neighbourhood before the investment and bombardment. Never- 
 theless, their appearance, and the expectation of a bombard- 
 ment, induced the commandant. Colonel Massaroly, to issue pro- 
 clamations to the inliabitants, who were required to assist in the 
 •defence of the place or to leave it. In consequence of this, many 
 of them crossed over to the neutral country of Belgium. 
 
 While the Prussians were employed in the sieges of Montmedy 
 and Mezieres, they confined themselves to observing the place 
 with small detachments, and occasionally operating against the 
 franc-tireurs. These were in constant communication with the 
 fortress, and kept the commandant informed of all the military 
 movements that took place in the country round. Acting on 
 news thus received, he endeavoured, with two battalions, on the 
 night of the 26th to 27th December to carry off the Prussian 
 detachment at Tellancourt, on the road to Verdun, and at Frenois 
 la Montague to the south of it. The enterprise was much facili- 
 tated by the favourable formation of the ground, and moreover 
 the Prussians were actually surprised ; but, nevertheless, the 
 attempt failed entirely, and the French were quickly obliged to 
 fall back on the fortress, taking with them a Prussian officer and 
 two men. 
 
 The investment of the fortress was rendered very difficult by 
 the immediate neighbom'hood of the frontier, especially on the 
 north-west, where it is only half a mile (2^ English miles) 
 distant. The government of Belgium arranged that the frontier 
 there should be^ closely occupied. The investing detachment, 
 consisting of infantry and cavalry of the landwehr, and barely 
 sufficient as regarded its strength and composition for the purj)ose, 
 was at first under the command of Major the Count von Schmettau; 
 but, by degrees, the whole of the troops told off for the siege 
 arrived, under the command of Colonel von Cosel, for the observa- 
 tion of the fortress, and then Colonel von Krensky, chief of the 
 general staff of the Xlllth army corps, took the chief command. 
 He fixed his head-quarters at first in Longuyon, and subsequently 
 in Cons la Grandeville. 
 
 The siege corps had a total strength of — 
 
 11 battalions of infantry, namely, the landwehr battalions 
 of Koslin, Glatz, Miinster, Oftpeln, Neutomysl, Schrimm, 
 Ostrowo, Eawicz, Anclam, and Schievelbein; 
 2 squadrons of cavalry ; 
 
 2 reserve field-batteries of the 11th Hessian regiment of 
 artillery ;
 
 115 
 
 7^ companies of the garrison artillery of the guard and of 
 the 4th, 7th, and 8th regiments of garrison artillery; 
 4^ companies of garrison pioneers (engineers) of the 1st, 
 Ilnd, Ilird, and IXth army corps. 
 
 Major "Wolf acted as commander of the siege artillery, and the 
 direction of the engineering works was entrusted to Colonel Schott, 
 of the engineer staff. 
 
 The energetic commandant of the fortress, Colonel Massaroly, 
 a Gorsican by birth, impeded the advance of the siege corps to its 
 position before the fortress as much as he could. Many engage- 
 ments of reconnoitring parties and of the outposts accordingly 
 took place, and the positions taken up had generally to be 
 secured by field fortifications, barricades, and similar means 
 against further attacks of the French. Thus encounters took 
 place at Herserange, only half a mile (2^ English miles) from 
 Longwy, in a wooded, deep, broken country on the side of the 
 valley of the Chiers, and at the railway station on the south of the 
 fortress, as well as at other places, generally with the object of 
 impediug the works and dispositions of the Prussians. a 
 
 By this activity the vigilant garrison obviously put many 
 difficulties in the way of the execution of the necessary technical 
 reconnaissances by the artillery and engineers, and delayed those 
 operations, which were, moreover, not particularly easy to perform 
 on account of the broken character of the ground. Nevertheless, 
 they had to be undertaken in order to decide upon the front of 
 attack. The decision, on this point, was to attack the fronts Y. 
 and VI., and eventually to force a way into bastion VI., which was 
 conveniently situated for the final operations of the attack. This 
 choice was made having regard not merely to the fortifications, 
 but also to the advantages above mentioned of the ground in that 
 quarter, and especially to the fact that the right wing of the 
 works of attack would thus rest in security on the steep slopes of 
 the valley of the Chiers. 
 
 The transport of the siege park for the artillery, and of the 
 materials and intrenching tools for the construction of the bat- 
 teries and trenches, and of the special equipment necessary for 
 the attack, was troublesome and tedious, owing to the situation 
 of Longwy off the main road. It was necessary first of all to re- 
 construct the railway from Longuyon to Cons la Grandeville, a 
 mile (4f English miles) to the south of the fortress, where it was 
 intended to establish the principal siege park. This was done 
 satisfactorily and quickly by the pioneers (engineers). The arrange- 
 ment mentioned was the most advantageous for the park, on account 
 of the broken ground there in front of the fortress, but the arming 
 of the batteries with the guns and the conveyance of the ammuni- 
 tion to them were matters of extraordinary difficulty. Bad, steep 
 roads, the ground made slippery by frost, and a fall of snow, all 
 contributed to this difficulty. For the execution of the works of 
 the engineers there were two depots of tools established, one at 
 Villers la Montague, and one behind Villers la Chevre. 
 
 I 2
 
 116 
 
 The siege park was comprised of 
 
 \l 24-PO^^nders 1 p^.^^^^.^^ ^^.^^^^^ 
 33 12-poundersJ 
 
 4 2 7 -centimetre mortars "| 
 14 22-centimetre mortars j- French ordnance 
 12 15-centimetre mortars J 
 
 6 mitrailleurs ; 
 
 Total 86 pieces of ordnance besides field guns. 
 
 The artillery was brought from the stores of several fortresses, 
 among others from Thionville, Metz, and Montmedy. At the same 
 time, a part of the materials for the batteries was supplied from 
 those places, whilst the remainder had to be prepared in the 
 well-wooded country round, and brought up thence with great 
 difficulty. 
 
 The batteries were commenced without waiting for the arrival 
 of the last guns, which were delaj^ed on account of the small use 
 that could be made of the railway. Besides which there could be 
 no doubt that under the existing circumstances the batteries would 
 be but slowly built, both on account of the difficult character of 
 the soil, and of the activity displayed by the enemy. In no case 
 would it be possible to build the batteries in a single night, as was 
 done elsewhere. Before the batteries could be commenced, other 
 technical works had to be executed. Among these the most im- 
 portant were, the making of a road over the jNIont des Chats, and 
 the laying of lines of telegraph from Longuyon to the head-quarters 
 and to Villers la Montague. It was considered necessar}'- also to 
 destroy the railway to Luxembourg, by tearing up the rails and 
 blowing up a bridge. 
 
 By the 16th January, it became practicable to proceed with the 
 batteries, and their construction was completed in three nights, 
 except some that were finislied subsequently. A peculiar mode of 
 construction was adopted to obtain more cover and to reduce the 
 chance of discovery, and this consisted in making the parapets at 
 the flanks with gentle slopes which could scarcely be noticed 
 at a distance. The batteries were constructed, in the following 
 order : — 
 
 Battery No. 1. Enfilading and dismounting battery, 3 24- 
 pounders, against fronts VI., V., IV. 
 
 Battery No. 2. Enfilading and dismounting battery, 3 24- 
 pounders, against fronts V., IV., III. 
 
 Battery No. 3. Dismounting and ricochet battery, 4 24- 
 pounders, against bastion V. 
 
 Battery No. 4. Dismounting and ricochet battery, 4 12- 
 pounders, against ravelins, VI., V. 
 
 Battery No. 5. Dismounting and ricochet battery, 4 12- 
 pounders, against bastion VI. 
 
 Battery No. 6. Dismounting battery, 4 12-pounders, against 
 bastion IV. 
 
 Battery No. 7. Dismounting and ricochet battery, 4 12- 
 pounders, against bastions V. and VI.
 
 117 
 
 Battery Xo. 8. Dismounting and ricochet battery, 4 24- 
 
 pounders, against ravelins V. and VI. 
 
 -r, 1 i TVT -I o -i -n r against any sorties that 
 
 Emplacement JSo. 1. 2 mitrailleurs ^ • i x i i.i. i. n 
 
 -T^ ^1 J. TS.T o r. -1 -11 ■{ might be attempted by 
 
 Emplacement No. 2. 2 mitrailleurs ,, * . '■ •' 
 
 '- l^ the garrison. 
 
 The batteries were situated at a distance of about 2,000 to 
 2,400 paces, and from their general arrangement it appears that 
 the design of the attack was to exhaust thoroughly the fronts 
 selected before the final operations of the siege, and also in the 
 first instance to disable as far as possible the artillery defence of 
 the collateral works. 
 
 In order to keep the garrison in ignorance as long as possible 
 of what was done by the attack, and also to push on as far as 
 possible the construction of the batteries undisturbed by the enemy, 
 which was very difficvilt, the fortress was slielled from several 
 points on the ground around it. For this purpose the field 
 batteries present with the siege corps on the IGth to 1 9th January 
 took up 230sitions well covered by the ground opposite the fortress 
 and threw rapidly several rounds of shell into it, with a view of re- 
 tiring again as quickly as they had come up. This bombardment with 
 field guns was not witliout effect. The shells burst here and there 
 in the town, spread alarm and dismay among the inhabitants, and 
 kept the garrison under arms till they were weary. No important 
 fires were caused, but the roof of the prison and the church towers 
 were pierced by shell. To obtain a secure footing as near as 
 possible to the fortress, on the following night the farm PulventeuXj 
 about 1,000 paces to the south of the place, was prepared 
 for defence ; rifle-trenches were pushed up to the slope there, 
 and were also constructed on some heights of the same kind on 
 both sides of the road leading to Verdun. On the evening of the 
 18th January the china factory on the west of the lower town and 
 the railway station were occupied by the besiegers. 
 
 On the 19th January, about 8 o'clock in the morning, battery 
 No. 1 opened fire with siege guns ; the artillery of the garrison, 
 as soon as they became aware of the state of affairs, set to work to 
 increase the armaments of their works, and answered the fire with 
 composure. They directed their attention chiefly to battery No. 1, 
 dismounted several guns, and wounded and killed some men. 
 
 On the 20th January, with the assistance of battery No. 2, 
 the artillery of the defenders was towards evening reduced to 
 silence, and the works demolished to such an extent that the enemy 
 could not renew his fire during the night. A heavy fog prevented 
 the contest of the artillery from being fully developed, and caused 
 a long pause on both sides in the delivery of the fire. On the 
 night of the 19th to 20th of January, the bridge over the river 
 situated in the lower town was blown up to prevent its being used 
 by the enemy for sorties. Also on the left wing of the attack, 
 which contained by far the greater number of batteries, a contest 
 of artillery had taken place with like vigour on both sides. 
 The besiegers had carried out the plan of attack with precision, 
 and had quickly produced a great effect on the front assailed. They
 
 118 
 
 did not delay to improve the advantage gained by the construction 
 of a parallel by the "common sap.''-^^- This was accordingly 
 done on the night of the 21st to 22nd January, at a distance 
 of 1,000 paces from the fortress, and nearly as far in front of 
 the batteries. The heavy frost, however, impeded this work, so 
 that it was not possible on the first night to complete it to the 
 prescribed profile of 4^ feet wide at the top and 3 feet at the 
 bottom, with a depth of 4 feet. It was necessary to make renewed 
 and continued exertions on the following day, and on the night of 
 the 22nd to 23rd January, in order to execute and complete 
 the parallel so as to be at all fit for its purpose, and to obtain a 
 sufficiently strong parapet. 
 
 On the 22nd January, at 8 a.m., the artillery fight was re- 
 newed, the garrison and their artillery having remained quiet all 
 the night, and having done nothing to interrupt the construction 
 of the parallel. Batteries No. 7 and No. 8 opened fire. The results 
 produced by the Prussian artillery were on the whole satisfactory. 
 It should, however, be mentioned that the enemy fired for the 
 most part only against battery No. 2, and towards the afternoon 
 their defence became slack. In the evening battery No. 9 was 
 completed in the parallel opposite bastion V., and at once armed 
 with four 22-centimetre (8-66-inch) mortars, in order to fire upon 
 the enemy's workmen and other troops there. During the execution 
 of these batteries the garrison made a sortie and brought on a mus- 
 ketry fight with the Prussian outposts, and thus interrupted the 
 progress of the work for several hours. 
 
 Jaiviiary 23. — Continuance of the fire on both sides. There 
 remained no doubt but that batteries Nos. 1 and 2 annoyed 
 the enemy excessively, for to-day again he was much occupied 
 with them, and opened fire upon them with some pieces of artillery 
 newly brought into position, particularly from some heavy mortars. 
 Otherwise he kept pretty quiet ; for the duty on the ramparts, which 
 were terribly injured by shell, began to be difficult. The construc- 
 tion of mortar battery No. 10 for four 22-centimetre (8 '6 6-inch) 
 mortars, and of mortar battery No. 11 for four 27-centimetre 
 (10'64-inch) mortars, was commenced, and it was intended on the 
 ensuing night to make emplacements Nos. I. and II. for mitrailleurs 
 on the flanks of the parallel, so as to have these pieces near at 
 hand in case of sorties against the trenches. At 8 o'clock in the 
 evening fire broke out in the fortress. Although the flames were 
 made the object of the fire of several batteries of the attack, yet 
 the garrison managed to put them out during the night. 
 
 January 24. — In the previous night battery No. 9 was made 
 ready to fire, and about 8 a.m. the bombardment of the fortress 
 was renewed as usual. The enemy replied with far less vigour than 
 before. Fire again broke out in the fortress, and became at last so 
 extensive that it could not be put out. • The two mortar batteries 
 Nos. 9 and 10, begun the day before, were made ready to fire. Their 
 construction was excessively difficult, for they had to be made 
 
 * See Note, p. 46.
 
 119 
 
 in hard, frozen ground covered witli wood and intersected by 
 roots. 
 
 As the attacked bastion, No. VI., was to be surrounded by the 
 parallel, the trench had to be extended on the following night, and 
 so laid out that its right flank should pass round the bastion, and 
 should be only 600 paces from it. 
 
 The preparations for carrying on this work by night were in 
 hand, when a flag of truce from the fortress appeared at the out- 
 posts, to enter into negotiations for its surrender. These were 
 concluded in the early hours of the morning of the 25th January. 
 200 garrison guns, of which many were much damaged, a quantity 
 of other military stores, and nearly 4,000 prisoners fell into the 
 hands of the besiegers. Among the guns captured were several 
 rifled 24-pounders of the newest construction and of great range, 
 which had been supplied to the armament of Longwy in conse- 
 quence of the Luxembvu'g afi'air in 1867, by special orders of 
 Marshal Niel, then War Minister. 
 
 In connection with this siege, it may be mentioned that in 1792 
 Longwy was surrendered to the Prussians, but was soon evacuated 
 again. In 1814 it was not invested, but in 1815 it was blockaded 
 by Prussian troops under the Prince of Hesse-Homburg. They 
 were then forced, by repeated attacks from Thionville, to retreat, 
 but returned with reinforcements, commenced a regular siege, and 
 after completing the second parallel on the 18th September, com-^ 
 pelled the fortress to capitulate.
 
 120 
 
 MEZIERES. 
 (plate xyii). 
 
 Mezieres is one of tlie most important places in the north- 
 east of France, and the point of junction of four railways, those 
 coming from Givet and Charlemont, Hirson and Laon, Rethel and 
 Eheims, and from Sedan and Metz, and also the place where all 
 the communications by water and by land in that district meet. 
 
 The town of Mezieres, containing 5,600 inhabitants, and with 
 spacious barracks, lies on the right bank of the Meuse, which after 
 making a long detour, returns and washes the place on the north 
 side. On the north and south respectively are the suburbs, 
 d' Arches and de Pierre. The fortress proper, which surrounds 
 the town, forms a long quadrangle, about 1,000 paces (823 
 yards) long and 350 paces broad, of which the north and 
 south sides, being protected by the Meuse, consist merely of 
 an escarp wall, flanked by round bastions, towers, and similar 
 large projections. The works of the town on the shorter sides 
 form a very complicated system of fortifications, with a number 
 of greater and lesser lines of defence, which are only of interest 
 for the engineer, and probably cannot be considered of any value 
 for a siege in the present day. 
 
 The west front is defended by two bastions, with orillons and 
 with broken curtains. It is further strengthened by a ravelin and 
 two counter-guards in front of the bastions, with a great hornvvork 
 between them. These counter-guards, as well as the hornwork, 
 have large traverses, and are in part provided ^vith. block-houses. 
 Outside this fortress lies the suburb of St. Julien. The citadel, with 
 its high profiles, proof against assault, at the foot of the heights 
 of Bertaucourt, protects the east front. It has four whole and two 
 half bastions, and is strengtliened towards the country, as well as 
 to the south, by a double line of fortifications. On the ground in 
 front of it, half way up the slope of the hill of Bertaucourt, which 
 completely commands the fortress, a fleche has been thrust out 
 with a communication covered on both sides. The small suburb 
 d'Arches on the side of Charleville is enclosed by a hornwork, 
 the larger one De Pierre by bastioned lines with ravelins. Both 
 are provided with suitable ravelins, and are thus formidable 
 bridgeheads for the massive bridges over the Meuse. The northern 
 one of these has 26 arches. A quarter of an hour's walk from 
 the suburb d'Arches lies Charleville, which is regularly built, and 
 was formerly fortified. It contains barracks and military estab- 
 lishments l^elonging to Mezieres, among which should be men-
 
 PlateXVII.
 
 121 
 
 tioned an important small arms factory. To the eastward, on the 
 plateau on the right bank of the Meuse, a work had been recently 
 constructed. In Mezieres there is an engineer school, established 
 a long time ago, from whence in its time have proceeded improve- 
 ments in the French system of fortification. ^Many years ago it 
 was of great reputation. The place was well provisioned, amply 
 provided with guns and ammunition, and, as the most northern 
 fortress on the Meuse, was by a decree of the Emperor put into a 
 state of siege at the first outbreak of the war. The open town of 
 Charleville was partly barricaded, and on the north was protected 
 by several small field works. 
 
 The coarse of the events of the war brought jMezieres unes- 
 pectedly into immediate contact with the enemy, as it lay in the line 
 of operations of the army of Marshal MacMahon, which, at the end of 
 August, in attempting to relieve jMetz, found itself, by the exten- 
 sion of the German armies, forced into the small space between the 
 line Sedan-Mezieres and the Belgian frontier. In consequence, 
 Mezieres served as the point d'appiu of the right wing of the 
 French position. When the army of MacMahon advanced, a part of 
 that force was sent from Chalons to Sedan by the Eheims-Mezieres 
 railway, while Yinoy's corps followed in reserve, and hardly com- 
 plete in its organisation, being formed of gardes mobiles and 
 depot battalions, only reached Mezieres on the 31st August. Here 
 General Vinoy found his communication with MacMahon already 
 broken, and he consequently, with the consent of the war minister, 
 began to retreat on Paris. During the battle of Sedan, the Royal 
 "VViirtemberg division was charged to take up a position at Bertau- 
 court, opposite Mezieres, and to observe the place. Accordingly, 
 at break of day on the 1st September, a pontoon bridge was 
 thrown over at Xouvion, and was crossed by jjart of the division, 
 in order that they might at the same time take up a position in 
 readiness for the battle in the neighbourhood of Donchery, while 
 the 1st jager battalion remained on the bridge and furnished 
 patrols opposite Mezieres. In the afternoon the French came out 
 of Mezieres towards Nouvion with two battalions, two squadrons, 
 and four or six guns, and were subsequently driven back through 
 Ayvelles into the fortress, after a short engagement of mus- 
 ketry and artillery by the 8th regiment, a squadron of dragoons, 
 and the 7th field battery, who had fallen back from the main 
 body of the division to the position of the bridge. Two com- 
 panies of jiigers, and a squadron, co-operated with these movements 
 on the right bank of the ^leuse. The detachment bivouacked 
 on the night of the 1st to 2nd September, at Ayvelles. 
 
 On the 2nd September two squadrons of the 6th Prussian 
 cuirassiers, under the command of Captain the Count Monts, 
 were sent forward to reconnoitre opposite Mezieres, and that 
 officer on this occasion treated with the commandant. Count 
 Monts, and also on the following day First Lieutenant the Baron 
 von Reitzenstein, were fired at in returning from the fortress. 
 
 After the battle of Sedan there was a kind of armistice for 
 Mezieres, whilst the fortress, at the instance of the Commander-
 
 122 
 
 in-Chief of the French, Greneral Count von Wimpffen, supplied 
 provisions from its stores for the French prisoners, and permission 
 had to be given for these provisions to be forwarded by the rail- 
 way to the neighbourhood of Donchery. Subsequently, railway 
 trains with wounded, who were sent through Belgium, were allowed 
 to pass unimpeded through the rayon of the fortress, and for this 
 reason, apparently in recompense, the Germans abstained for the 
 time from further hostile measures against the place. 
 
 The country round Mezieres is cut up by hills, valleys, and 
 woods, and is much built over, and, being conveniently near the 
 French frontier, was frequently the scene of the operations of 
 bands of francs-tireurs, supported directly, or indirectly, by the 
 fortress. They fired at railway trains carrying the wounded, 
 and at the end of October they surprised a Prussian provision 
 train, and also a patrol of thirty cuirassiers reconnoitring 
 at Olicy, of whom they seem to have killed the greater number. 
 These circumstances made it difficult to operate against the 
 fortress, as was now necessary. On the advance of the 1st army 
 from Metz to the west of France, the 1st infantry division was sent 
 forward, at the beginning of November, towards Mezieres to 
 cover the right flank, and towards the end of that month it was 
 relieved by the force under Greneral Schuler von Senden (the line 
 brigade of the division previously commanded by General von 
 Kummer. A strict blockade of the fortress was not then con- 
 templated, but detachments of the force mentioned had frequent 
 encounters with the franc- tireurs. A band of the latter was sur- 
 rounded in the neighbourhood of Fagnon, a mile (4f English miles) 
 south-west of Mezieres. The commandant of the fortress. Colonel 
 Vernet, caused a sortie to be made against them on the 14th 
 November, but these troops were driven back into the place. 
 Another band of franc-tireurs had been driven back in a north- 
 westerly direction from the fortress towards Rocroy, and had made 
 choice of the village of Harcy for their abode. The Prussians 
 reached them there, and dispersed them. 
 
 Subsequently the force above mentioned marched away to the 
 westward. After the capture of Montmedy, the bombardment 
 of Mezieres followed in due course. Part of the 14th division 
 took up a position against it, and in doing so engaged the franc- 
 tireurs on the 22nd December at Nouzon, a mile (4f English miles) 
 north of Mezieres, and at Eigmogne. After completely investing 
 the fortress, and having incessant small fights with the franc- 
 tireurs roaming about on the north of it, the preparations for 
 bombarding the place were commenced. 
 
 The siege corps was under the command of Lieutenant-General 
 von Kamecke up to the 25th December on which day he was 
 ordered away to take over the supreme direction of the engineer 
 operations in the attack on Paris. He was accordingly replaced 
 before Mezieres by Major-Greneral von Woyna II., commanding 
 the 28th brigade of infantry. This officer completed the artillery 
 arrangements for the attack, so far as to place the field batteries 
 in covered emplacements on the north and west, so as to fire upon
 
 123 
 
 Charleville according to the preconceived design. Head-quarters 
 were in Boulzicourt, a mile (4f English miles) south of Mezi^res, 
 on the right bank of the Meuse. The artillery consisted of 18 
 companies of garrison artillery of the East Prussian, Brandenberg, 
 Lower Silesian, Ehenish, Hanoverian, and Hessian regiments of 
 artillery, with a siege park composed of 26 long 24-pounders, 11 
 short 24-pounders, 32 12-pounders, 4 rifled 21-centimetre 
 mortars, 7 heavy and 3 light French mortars, and 5 field bat- 
 teries, of which three were heavy and two light. Besides these 
 there were before the fortress 4 companies of garrison pioneers 
 (engineers) of the 1st, Ilnd, IVth, and Vllth army corps, the 2nd 
 and 3rd companies of field pioneers (engineers) of the 7th West- 
 phalian pioneer battalion, 2 pontoon columns of the 1st and Vllth 
 army corps, and the column of intrenching tools of the Vllth 
 army corps. 
 
 Colonel Meissner commanded the siege artillery, Colonel 
 Kiedel the engineers. The principal park of artillery and the 
 laboratory were three quarters of a mile (3^ English miles) south 
 of the fortress at the Pouderie Imperiale, between the railway 
 and the high road to Boulzicourt. Two other small parks were 
 established at Lumes, a mile (4|- English miles) south-east of 
 Mezieres, on the right bank of the Meu?e, and at Warnecourt, a 
 mile and a quarter (5 "9 English miles) south-west of the fortress 
 on the road to Paris. 
 
 The peculiar situation of the fortress was unfavourable for the 
 attack. It was surrounded by the Meuse on three sides, and thus 
 gained considerable defensive strength, especially in time of floods, 
 which at this late period of the year were to be expected. 
 Close reconnaissances, however, led to the conclusion that the 
 principal attack should be directed against the front of the 
 fortifications of the bridgehead De Pierre, but that this should 
 be supported simultaneously by batteries on the right bank of the 
 Meuse, making partial use of the range of heights there. The 
 siege batteries on this side, fourteen in number, and the five field 
 batteries, were, in conformity with this plan, to counter-batter or 
 destroy chiefly the fortifications of the bridgehead, and in rear 
 of it the lines on its flank, the citadel, and the interior of the 
 town of Mezieres, and to enfilade the two bridges over the Meuse 
 that were within range. The open town of Charleville lying be- 
 hind would only be shelled in case it took an active part in the 
 defence. It was intended up to this time to do no more than 
 threaten it with artillery. 
 
 The construction of the batteries was carried out in the period 
 from the 24th to the 30th December inclusive. The works were 
 but little interfered with by the enemy, and were pushed on by 
 day, partly by making use of existing cover. The hard frost 
 that had penetrated the ground to a depth of 1^ feet was, how- 
 ever, a cause of delay. Pepeated demands made to the com- 
 mandant to surrender had not the smallest result. 
 
 On the 31st December at 8 a.m. the bombardment began, and 
 the rule was laid down that by day five rounds should be fired
 
 124 
 
 per gun per hour, and three rounds per mortar ; wliile by night 
 each gun was to fire one round, and each mortar one round every 
 two hours. 
 
 On the Prussian side the battle of artillery was waged with 
 great composure and with manifest results. The French artillery 
 of the garrison replied with 18 to 24 guns, and endeavoured 
 during the night to strengthen their ramparts, and to bring fresh 
 guns into action. 
 
 On New Year's day, 1871, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the 
 white flag was hung out, and a capitulation was concluded at 
 11 o'clock the same evening. The fortress was occupied by the 
 Prussian troops at mid-day on the 2nd January. They took 98 
 officers and 2,000 men jirisoners, and captured 106 guns, and 
 many stores and provisions. 
 
 The bombardment, though it had only lasted twenty-se\'en 
 hours, had however produced a terrible effect, as was shown chiefly 
 by the ruins and the heaps of rubbish. To remain on the ramparts 
 had become impossible, and in tlie town fire broke out after five 
 rounds, and could not be comiDletely extinguished. In the bom- 
 bardment which the Prussians had directed against Mezieres in 
 1815, when the fortress fell for the first time, and after some 
 weeks the citadel also, the cathedral had remained uninjured ; but 
 on this occasion the altar was struck by a Prussian shell, and was 
 completely destroyed. 
 
 Subsequently a rumour was spread that the commandant had 
 been induced to surrender by the dread, on accoimt of both the 
 town and the fortress, of the explosion of the powder magazine. 
 For the honour of the French commandant, we can give no 
 credit to this statement. 
 
 With the capture of the fortress a second unbroken line of 
 railway was gained, through Metz and Mezieres to Paris, and the 
 principal head-quarters of the operations of the franc-tireurs in 
 the Ardennes was taken from them.
 
 PlateXVIII 
 
 Plan/ 
 
 of thje^ 
 
 SIECC OF PARIS 
 
 1870-1871. 
 
 Scale/ 
 
 Fa«£S 
 
 '|./.?|;firT • ^ 
 
 Sc^ So^ 7aM Aug Suy 
 
 rr . ' ^.v^ --v^..- : TM ^*~ '^^^T:^ 
 
 /
 
 PlateXVIII
 
 125 
 
 PARIS. 
 
 (plate XVIII.) 
 
 Paris, with its 1,850,000 inhabitants, is the centre of the 
 business, the manufactures, and the finance of France, and even 
 on these grounds is the capital of the country. Eight rail- 
 ways, numerous high roads, water communication of every de- 
 scription, form its means of intercourse with the other chief 
 business towns. The circumference of the city is six or seven 
 leagues, and the total length of its streets a hundred miles (468 
 English miles). 
 
 The Seine, 200 to 300 paces broad, and spanned by 21 bridges, 
 divides the town into two unequal parts. The fortifications 
 consist of the enceinte, which comprises 98 bastions, generally 
 very spacious, with revetted ditches 35 paces wide, but without 
 ravelins. In this rampart tliere are 47 gates, 14 sally-ports, 10 
 openings for railways, 4 for water-communications. The terre- 
 plein, or military road passing along and within the line of the 
 bastions, is paved ; near and in some parts parallel to it runs the cir- 
 cular railway, which connects the railway stations with one another, 
 and Vas of great use for the armament and defence of the fortress. 
 
 Round this inner line of works, at a distance of 2,500 to 3,500 
 paces, runs the outer line, the circumference of which amounts to 
 12 leagues. It consists of a circle of 15 detached forts, whose 
 distance apart is on the average 3,500 paces ; they cover by their 
 fire a space about 1 8 leagues round. The north and north-east 
 fronts are the strongest. 
 
 The north front commences with St. Denis, the key of the outer 
 line, around which are the forts De la Briche, Double Couronne 
 du Nord, and De I'Est ; these three works are connected by a wall 
 and ditch, and are moreover specially strengthened by an inundation, 
 controlled by sluices on the swift-running stream of Rouillon, and 
 which again is covered by the redoubt of Stains. Railway and road 
 embankments, lines of canals, many villages built solidly and easily 
 adapted for defence, wooded heights, and the inundation above 
 mentioned, which may be positively relied upon, give to this tract 
 of ground great capabilities of defence. South of the railway lead- 
 ing to Soissons, and east of the canal of St. Denis, lies Fort d'Auber- 
 villiers. The parts of the canal from St. Denis and Ourcq lying 
 in rear of this fort are provided with parapets and small flanking 
 earthworks. 
 
 South of the canal of Ourcq and the road to Metz, on the 
 heights of Belleville and Pantin, lies the important fort of Remain-
 
 126 
 
 ville, which is connected with the canal by lines en cremaillere 
 along the slope of the hill. The crest of the plateau of Eomain- 
 viUe is crowned by the three forts Noisy, Eosny, and Nogent, in the 
 intervals between which the redoubts Noisy, Montreuil, Boissiere, 
 and Fontenay, are judiciously placed. 
 
 At this point terminates a section of the defences formed by 
 the Marne, a river of the width of 1 00 paces, and this section is 
 in addition protected at the south-east angle by a line of fortifica- 
 tions 2,800 paces long ; the redoubts De la Grravelle and De 
 la Faisanderie, placed on its flanks, impart to it considerable 
 powers of resistance. The well-kno-^ni fortified castle of Vin- 
 cennes serves as a keep to this work, and is sm-rounded by a park 
 of the same name ; there is also here the great arsenal and the 
 artillery practice ground, which extends to the Marne. Fort 
 Charenton, in the angle formed by the Marne and the Seine, forms 
 the southern termination of the defences of the north-east front. 
 
 The southern front of the outer line of defences commences on 
 the left bank of the Seine, opposite Fort Charenton, with Fort 
 Ivry, and thence is continued on a hilly, wooded plateau, inter- 
 sected by ravines, by forts Bicetre, Montrouge, Vanvres, and Issy, 
 the last commanding the Seine ; in front of the last thi-ee lie the 
 heights of Bagneux, Clamart, Meudon, and Chatillon, which be- 
 came of such importance during the siege. The forts command 
 the railways to Sceaux and to Versailles. 
 
 The west front is bounded by the Seine and the Bois de Bou- 
 logne, and is defended by the fortress of Mont Valerien, which 
 stands at a height of 415 feet above the river. This work is at 
 distances of 1^ miles (7 English miles) and 1 mile (4f English 
 miles) respectively from the forts on either side, namely, St. 
 Denis and Fort d'Issy. The course of the Seine from Fort Issy 
 to the fortifications of St. Denis confers upon this portion of the 
 city of Paris great defensive strength. 
 
 As the forts were built almost all at the same time, they 
 have on the whole been treated almost alike as regards their 
 defensive details ; they have a bastioned trace, revetted ditches, 
 similar arrangements of the communications within and with- 
 out, and ramparts of almost the same very substantial profile. 
 They are all rendered quite proof against assaidt, and furnished 
 with the requisite powder magazines. Bomb-proof cover for the 
 garrisons is provided partly in casemates under the ramparts, in 
 the cm-tains and flanks, and partly in keeps and barracks apart ; 
 where necessary, cavaliers are added to obtain a better view 
 of the ground in front. There are no ravelins ; for this reason 
 the more important forts have hornworks in front of them, 
 for the greater security of the front of attack. The interior space 
 and extent of the forts vary according to the importance of the 
 work they are designed to perform, and the size of the garrisons 
 allotted to them ; the largest is the fortress of Mont Valerien, 
 which has a base of some 500 paces, and the least has a base 
 of about 300. Some of the prominent features of the forti- 
 fications of Paris, with reference to their general arrangement and
 
 127 
 
 to the various points of attack, are mentioned further on in their 
 proper places. 
 
 Excitement and agitation spread through Paris on the re- 
 ceipt of the news of the retreat of the French armies, which 
 became necessary after the engagements at Spicheren, Weissem- 
 bom-g, Worth. The order was given to call out the national 
 guard and the garde mobile. In the former were i^laced all 
 citizens between 30 and 40 years of age, and in the latter 
 those under 30. The populace of Paris showed signs of a dis- 
 position to revolt. The issue of bank notes rose to a total 
 of 2,400 million francs. The governor, Greneral Baraguay 
 d'Hilliers, declared the town in a state of siege, in order that 
 he might be aided by the rigour of martial law in putting 
 the fortress in a state of defence. This entailed serious inter- 
 ference with the daily avocations of the citizens, but was recog- 
 nised as necessary, as no preparations had been made during 
 the long peace, either in the place itself or in the detached 
 forts. Attention was first bestowed upon the safety of the town 
 itself. There was indeed a revetted enceinte with a ditch in 
 existence, but the protection of the gates and entrances of the 
 openings for railways and canals had in great part to be provided 
 for. The ditches were, for the sake of the traffic of the city, 
 crossed in some places by bridges, in others by embankments. 
 These communications, as well as in some places the profile 
 of the ditch, required radical reconstruction to put them in a 
 secm-e state of defence. The gateways were reduced to the smallest 
 number the traffic would allow, the drawbridges were hung and 
 made passable, the number of railway openings was reduced as 
 far as practicable, and they were covered by traverses. Barricades 
 were prepared, as far as the traffic permitted, in the avenues De la 
 Grande Armee, Du Roule, and other jolaces, and openings that 
 could be closed were left for the passage of the traffic. The 
 openings of the underground canals and aqueducts at Asnieres and 
 and at the Aqueduct d'Huys were covered with gratings or closed, 
 and dams were prepared at suitable points on the Seine, as well as 
 at the Viaduct d'Auteuil and at the Port Napoleon, in order to 
 supply the ditches of the fortifications with water. Earthworks, 
 constructed for the purjoose, protected these dams from destruc- 
 tion by distant artillery fire. On the west, north, and east fronts 
 ten bomb-proof powder magazines were formed with walls six feet 
 thick, with coverings of strong timbers, and completely covered 
 up with earth. At the same time that this was done the spaces 
 around the fortresses were cleared, a measure which, in spite of the 
 strict law on the subject existing in France, was necessary, and 
 was remorselessly executed. Buildings and hedges were demolished, 
 and ditches, banks, &c., affi^rding cover to the enemy, were so 
 sloped off as to be grazed by the line of fire from the ramparts. 
 Where necessary, the entrances into the fortifications were protected 
 by earthworks thrown up in front against the fire of the enemy, 
 so as to render them more thoroughly defensible. The communi- 
 cations from the fortress were made impassable for a long distance,
 
 128 
 
 by tearing- up the causeways, by destroying bridges, and erect- 
 ing barricades. A part of the iron -plated gunboats, armed 
 each with one heavy gim, originally intended for the Ehine, 
 was allotted to the defence of Paris and for operations on the 
 Seine ; they were commanded by naval officers, and manned by 
 marines, and special districts and stations, well protected, were 
 assigned to them. Thus some were in the upper Seine under the 
 fire of forts Ivry and Charenton ; others, between Meudon, Sevres, 
 and the island of Bellevue, at St. Cloud and Suresnes ; and others 
 on the lower Seine, under the gims of the defences of St. Denis. 
 
 The manoeuvring of the gunboats was much interfered 
 with, in spite of their small draught, by the shallowness of the 
 water, and subsequently by the breaking up of the ice on the Seine. 
 Escepting steamboats of some use in the defence, all the boats 
 available for ferrying purposes were sunk in the Seine or the Marne. 
 
 The inundation of the east front of the defences of St. Denis 
 was forthwith carried out, because it was always believed in Paris 
 that an enemy would only have to choose between the front of St. 
 Denis-Pantin and the front Eomainville-Charenton. French military 
 writers disputed only on this point, whether the one or the other 
 was the key of Paris : no thought was bestowed on any other front 
 of attack but these two. Great importance was attached to 
 strengthening the ground in front, the sole point in dispute 
 among French military writers ; let us accordingly commence 
 our description on the south. In front of the line of defence 
 in tliat part, between Fort d'Issy and Fort Bicetre, there runs 
 a range of woody heights, over which are scattered villages, 
 parks, and coimtry houses. As the defences were designed in 1840, 
 these heiglits were beyond the range of the guns of the period, and 
 this was the reason that they were not considered. Since the in- 
 troduction of long-range rifled ordnance, however, detached ele- 
 vated spots, which look into the forts and hollows, have become 
 dangerous. At the same time, therefore, that the place was put 
 into a state of defence, as above-mentioned, the erection of de- 
 tached works was undertaken, of which we name only the most 
 important : — 
 
 1. A group of field-works on the ground in advance and to the 
 west and south of Mont Valerien, namely, the Miihlen and Wolfs- 
 gruben redoubts, and the lunette of Suresnes. 
 
 2. A work at ]Montretout, immediately above the railway 
 station of St. Cloud. 
 
 3. A work between forts Issy and Vanvres. 
 
 4. A redoubt by the side of the porcelain manufactory at 
 Sevres, afterwards called the Kronprinzen-Schanze. 
 
 5. A work to the southward of Sevres, afterwards called the 
 Jagerschanze. 
 
 6. A redoubt in the park of Meudon. 
 
 7. A work at Notre Dame de Clamart. 
 
 8. A work at Moulin de la Tour, afterwards called the Baiern- 
 schanze. 
 
 The last two entrenchments were situated upon spots com- 
 manding forts Issy, Vanvres, and Montrouge. The ramparts of
 
 129 
 
 these forts were raised about 2 metres to prevent the enemy seeing 
 into them. 
 
 9. A smaller work at the hamlet L'Hay for the defence of the 
 ground in front of Villejuif and the Fontainebleau road. 
 
 10. The works of Chatillon and Clamart, and of Villejuif, with 
 a defensible communication to Fort Bicetre. 
 
 11. A work 1,000 paces to the west of Villejuif, and south- 
 west of F'ort Bicetre ; this was originally open at the gorge 
 and was afterwards converted into a redoubt. The technical 
 execution and arrangement of this work was praised as being 
 a model, and we give, therefore, some details of its construction. 
 The entrenchment was traced as a five-sided redoubt, with a ditch 
 and parapet of a strong profile, and with a bastioned gorge. The 
 casemates for the accommodation of the soldiers were placed 
 imder the ramparts, and constructed of wood, and their roofs were 
 formed of railway iron. All the ramparts were arranged for 
 artillery defence, and they had numerous hollow traverses, 
 which served for cover for various purposes. The ditch was 
 flanked partly by caponiers built of timber, partly by a loopholed 
 wall, which ran along the foot of the counterscarp and likewise 
 served as a palisading. 
 
 12. A terraced work in tiers at Cachan for eight guns to fire 
 upon the valley of Bievre. 
 
 13. The defences of Vitry, with a communication attached 
 leading to Villejuif, and communications to the rear to Fort Ivry, 
 and as far as the Seine. 
 
 14. Works of defence at Bercy, where the Seine passes into 
 the fortress, and at Point du Jour, where it passes out of the for- 
 tifications. 
 
 15. Works to strengthen the position in front of Fort Vin- 
 <;ennes, and the advanced position on the Marne peninsula. 
 
 1 6. Defences of Mont Avron, consisting of batteries, rows of 
 musketry trenches, and arrangements for the defence of the net- 
 work of buildings ; the object was to take in flank the position of 
 the blockading force on the east. 
 
 17. The defences of the position of La Courneuve, Le Bom'get, 
 and Drancy, where the roads had been made defensible : the places 
 named had been fortified, and an independent earthwork had been 
 constructed to serve as a keep to the whole. 
 
 18. A redoubt at Pierrefitte, northward from St. Denis, to fire 
 upon the roads to Calais and Amiens and the railway to Creil. 
 
 19. A redoubt at Colombes, to command the peninsula of 
 the Seine at that place. 
 
 20. An entrenchment between Billancourt and the Seine, for 
 the defence of the passage of the river there in case it should be 
 attempted. 
 
 21. Barricades in Billancourt, and the reconstruction of a 
 covered trench to Fort Issy, in connection M'ith which it was neces- 
 sary to establish a means of communication over the Seine ; a similar 
 means of communication existed from Fort Charenton over the 
 Marne to the Champ des ^Manoeuvres. 
 
 36996. K
 
 130 
 
 A great number of batteries were also constructed and secured by- 
 special means, such as musketry trenches and defensible communi- 
 cations, of which here only the principal ones will be enumerated. 
 
 22. Batteries at St. Quen, westward of Courbevoye, for the 
 defence of the Nanterre peninsula ; these were intended, in conjunc- 
 tion with the work at Colombes, to fill up the great gap in the de- 
 fences between the fortifications of Mont Valerien and St. Denis. 
 
 23. Batteries on the heights of Argenteuil. 
 
 24. Batteries on the flank of Villejuif, and at the mill of 
 Saquet. 
 
 25. Batteries on the Marne peninsula, which in conjunction 
 with forts Charenton and Nogent fired over the ground round 
 Champigny and Champignolles. 
 
 26. Batteries at Drancy and Courneuve ; these were to fire over 
 the flat ground in front on both sides of the road to Lille. 
 
 The greater part of the works mentioned were executed during, 
 or at the end of the defence, according as it became practicable 
 at various periods to complete the circle of the French fortifica- 
 tions ; for there was no other opportunity of producing much real 
 effect on the defence. 
 
 Much astonishment was occasioned by the abandonment of the 
 defence of Fort Vincennes from the very beginning ; as the reason 
 for this remarkable course, the unsatisfactory structural condition 
 of the buildings there for defensive purposes was assigned, and 
 also the necessity for retaining the work in use as a prison. 
 
 The ground in front of Paris is extraordinarily favourable in 
 general for the construction of fortifications, and was taken advan- 
 tage of for defensive works of every description : for musketry 
 trenches — sometimes in a simple form, sometimes in successive 
 tiers — for defensive communications between the several points 
 important for the defence, for the conversion into defensible posts 
 of walls and enclosures, of which a detailed list would here oc- 
 cupy us too long. The French understood thoroughly how to bring 
 such works into connection both with the older and with the more 
 recently constructed systems of defences, and thereby to prepare to 
 the best advantage the defensible positions on the ground in front 
 for a step-by-step defence, and for an astonishing increase in 
 the number of guns in position. The gangs of men employed in 
 the execution of these works could not be engineer-soldiers ; men 
 of the civil population of suitable trades were employed for this 
 purpose, and no arms were given them, since, as is well-known, 
 there were none to spare, especially at the beginning of the siege. 
 
 Abundant and extensive use was made of obstacles for prevent- 
 ing the ajDproach of the enemy, such as abattis, trous-de-loup, 
 wire fences, land and water torpedoes, &c., in every place where 
 they could be applied, in front of all trenches, batteries, and 
 minor defences. A peculiar description of ground torpedoes was 
 discovered in the captured forts ; they were exploded by friction, 
 caused by the pressure of the foot driving in a hammer ; they 
 must have been intended for use against columns of assault, and 
 for the defence of the breach.
 
 131 
 
 It is not to be denied that General Trochii — whose head-quarters 
 were at the hotel of the President of the Council — arranged for the 
 construction of the defences and for the other dispositions for the 
 defence with great ability and energy. His Chief of the Staff was 
 Gfeneral Schmidt, with Greneral Foy as an assistant. General 
 Trochu is the more deserving of credit for this, since he must have 
 been actively and usefully employed on a multitude of internal ar- 
 rangements, which equally demanded prudence and thought. The 
 measure, not recognised by international law, for the ruthless 
 banishment of all Germans settled in Paris or in France emanated 
 from him. He ordered the removal of the boards of railway 
 directors, and other civil authorities unnecessary in a siege, as well 
 as the transfer of the art treasures in the museum of the Louvre 
 to provincial towns. The seat of government had been pre- 
 viously moved to Tours. All who could not show that they had 
 means of existence, or who disturbed the public order, or who in 
 any way endangered the safety of persons and property, were com- 
 pelled to leave Paris. General Trochu instituted a committee of 
 defence, which consisted, with himself as chairman, of Marshal 
 Vaillant, Admiral RignaultdeGenoully, Jerome David, the Minister 
 of Public Works, and the Generals of Divisions, Chabaud la Tour, 
 Guiod, D'Autemarre, D'Erville, and Soumaine. The plan of de- 
 fence, which the governor intended to follow in case of a siege, 
 was in the main as follows : — 
 
 First Circle of Defence. — Marshal Vinoy, with his corps and 
 the survivors of MacMahon's army assembled at Laon, defended 
 the position at Argenteuil : General Mellinet occupied the position 
 at Sceaux-Bourg with some regiments of the line and newly formed 
 troops ; the provincial garde mobile, with some line regiments, 
 were at Noissy-Villiers. A cavalry corps was placed at Bourget, 
 eastward of St. Denis. 
 
 Second Circle of Defence. — This included the defence of tlie 
 forts which were occupied by gardes mobiles and by marine artil- 
 lery. 
 
 Third Circle of Defence. — This comprised the defence of the 
 enceinte, which was strengthened in rear by preparing the streets 
 and buildings lying near for defence. Much assistance was derived 
 from the circular railway, which was very advantageous for mili- 
 tary purposes. It should be observed that this railway rendered 
 most remarkable service in the prej)aration of works and arma- 
 ments, in the conveyance of great quantities of materials, such 
 as timber and earth for increasing the thickness of parts of the 
 ramparts, and the construction of nimierous traverses and bomb- 
 proofs, as well as in transporting troops at a subsequent period. 
 
 Fourth Circle of Defence. — To this belonged the interior 
 defence by means of barricades, dividing the streets into sections, 
 and by the system of street-defence, projected and executed by the 
 Emperor Napoleon for street-fighting. It cannot be denied that 
 the fundamental idea of this system of defence was well considered, 
 and it woidd perhaps have fulfilled the expectations entertained of 
 it, if the course of events had been such as to require a step-by- 
 
 K 2
 
 132 
 
 step defence, and if tliey had had well disciplined troops available 
 in Paris. 
 
 On this point it remains to be stated that the particulars 
 of the strength and composition of the army of Paris have varied, 
 and no approximation to accuracy has been attained. The original 
 garrison of Paris was in part reinforced by the addition of the 
 4th battalions of the field regiments. After the battle of Sedan 
 there came from the north, from the neighbourhood of Mezieres, 
 Vinoy's corps, strengthened by the survivors of MacMahon's army 
 and the garrison of the camp at Chalons, as well as probably about 
 100,000 men of the army of Lyons. Moreover, 20,000 labom-ers 
 were formed into battalions. In the middle of September, some 
 time before the investment, the strength of the army amounted to — 
 
 Kegulars 80,000 men. 
 
 Parisian Garde Mobile and Garde Nationale . 100,000 men. 
 
 Free Corps 10,000 men. 
 
 Garde Mobile from other places . . . 60,000 men. 
 
 Total 250,000 men. 
 
 Further levies from classes whose age did not exempt them from 
 service, however, brought the army up to nearly double this 
 strength, or 500,000 men. A Polish legion, composed of men 
 belonging to that nationality, thovigh not actually under that 
 title, and an Engii&h-North-American legion placed themselves 
 at the disposal of the committee of defence. The Polyteclmic 
 school fiunished skirmishers, and the artillery for regular duty 
 in the garrisons of bastions 86 and 87 of the enceinte. 
 
 The Paris garde mobile and garde nationale were divided into 
 four divisions, whose head-quarters were situated in the Palais 
 Eoyal, the Conservatoire, the Elysee, and the Luxembourg Palace. 
 The hap-hazard formation of this army, the lack of good military 
 training and discipline, their ignorance of the mode of handling their 
 arms, above all, the want of capable officers and non-commissioned 
 officers made the army of Paris unfit for great enterprises, so that 
 their nmnerical superiority over the comparatively weak German 
 army of investment conld not give rise to any difficulty. General 
 Trochu made proposals to recall the army of Bazaine for the 
 defence of the capital, which were at first approved, but could not 
 afterwards be carried out, because the Marshal was shut up in 
 Metz ; General Trochu protested against the marching away of 
 MacjNIahon's army to the north, but without result. 
 
 During the progress of the siege, however, the condition of 
 the garrison improved, since to their numerical strength they 
 added internal cohesion and tactical skill. The garde nationale 
 and garde mobile were obliged to drill thoroughly, and were 
 made acquainted with the duties on the defences, which required 
 daily 70,000 men. In the middle-of October we find the " ordre 
 de bataille" as follows: — Commanding-in-Chief, General Trochu; 
 Chief of the General Staff, General Schmitz ; of the Artillery, 
 General Goyo ; of the Engineers, G eneral Chalaaud la Tour ; In- 
 teudant General, Wolf.
 
 133 
 
 First Army. — General Clement Thomas, CommandiKg ; Chief 
 of the Staff, Colonel Montagut ; 266 battalions of sedentary 
 National Guard. 
 
 Second Army. — General Ducrot, Commanding; Chief of the 
 Staff, General Oppert, 
 
 1st Corps. — Three divisions. General Blanchard ; Chief of the 
 
 Staff, Colonel Filippi. 
 2nd Corps. — Three divisions. General Renault; Chief of the 
 
 Staff, General Forri Pisani. 
 3rd Corps. — Two divisions of infantry, a division of cavalry. 
 General d'Exea ; Chief of the Staff, Colonel de Belgarie. 
 
 Third Army. — General Vinoy, commanding. Six infantry 
 divisions, including the marines, and two cavalry brigades. 
 
 The defence of the enceinte was divided into nine sections, 
 named after the suburbs in front of them ; each was placed under 
 the command of a General of Division, or Vice-Admiral, whose 
 staff was complete in all arms and branches. The garrison of 
 these sections consisted of national guards — generally 25 to 40 
 battalions to each, according to the number of bastions included 
 in it. Strict instructions and regulations were issued for the 
 guards at the gateways and sally-ports, and for the duty on the 
 ramparts of the bastions. 
 
 Neither the casemates in the town of Paris, nor tlie bomb- 
 proofs in the bastions could accommodate the whole of this 
 numerous garrison. A great part of them went under canvas at 
 Meaux, in the Bois de Vincennes, and in the Bois de Boulogne, 
 as well as in other places, or were sheltered in tents and close canton- 
 ments in the villages lying between the enceinte and the forts. 
 These arrangements were constantly changed. Line troops, as far 
 as possible, did duty in the forts. 
 
 When the enormous circumference of the works to be prepared 
 for defence is considered, every credit must be given to the 
 engineer authorities concerned, at whose head was General 
 Chabaud la Tour. This officer was a highly accomplished 
 engineer, and under his direction the east front of the place, 
 which is excellently defiladed, was executed in 1842-44; he 
 called in the aid of civil engineers who were fit for the work, 
 of whom it has, however, been recorded, that owing to their 
 ignorance of military matters, a great number of demolitions 
 were undertaken, which did not obstruct the approach of the enemy. 
 Numerous bridges and roads were demolished, waymarks were 
 removed, many tunnels and railways were destroyed, where no 
 real necessity existed on any reasonable groimds. The principal 
 demolitions undertaken in the immediate neighbourhood of Paris 
 were as follows: — the destruction of about 60 bridges, viz., 
 those at Sevres, St. Cloud, Suresnes, Bougival, Marly, St. Ger- 
 main, Ouen, Le Pecq, Meaux, Esbly, Lagny, lies de Villenoy, 
 Villeneuve, &c., and the blowing up of the railway tunnels at La 
 Ferte sous Jouarre, Nanteuil, and of the viaduct at Chantilly. 
 
 It is well known that Trochu issued an order for the burning 
 of the forests and woods round Paris in order that the investing
 
 13-i 
 
 army might be deprived both of firewood for their bivouacs, and 
 also of timber for the construction of their works. Thus the 
 woods of Bondy, Montmorency, and St. Grratien, and the park 
 of Monceaux were actually burnt down. The appearance of our 
 troops on the south front, wlio there, and all round Paris, took up 
 their positions with the rapidity and precision for which they 
 are remarkable, prevented in great part the execution of this 
 act of vandalism. Thus the large and magnificent parks of 
 St. Cloud, St. Germain, and Meudon were saved. 
 
 The artillery in the works was under the orders of Greneral 
 Groyo. 
 
 The armament of Paris with artillery was pressed on most 
 energetically, simultaneously with the preparation of the fortifi- 
 cations. We give the particulars of the armaments as they have 
 been made known to us in the report of the Cardinal von Wid- 
 deren, and observe that they must be accepted only as a general 
 statement, as continual changes took place during the progress of 
 the siege. 
 
 The armament was made up partly of heavy and partly of 
 light naval guns ; in this way many smooth-bore pieces were 
 brought upon the ramparts. 
 
 1. The 98 bastions of the enceinte, each with 400 metres (438 
 yards) development of front, were each to receive 8 to 10 twelve- 
 pounders. The gateways and sally-ports were defended by guns of 
 a greater calibre. The carriages were of cast iron. Total 1,226 
 pieces. 
 
 2. The armament of the detached forts is given as follows: 
 Charenton, 70; Vincennes, 117; Nogent, 53; Eosny, 56; Noisy- 
 le-Sec, 57; Eomainville, 49; Aubervillers, 66; Fort de I'Est de 
 Saint Denis, 52; La Briche, 61; Mont Valerien, 79 ; Issy, 64; 
 Vanvres, 45 ; Montrouge, 43 ; Bicetre, 40 ; Ivry, 70. 
 
 It is to be understood that the numbers of guns mentioned 
 include not only the armaments of the detached forts, but also of 
 the detached outworks in connection with them, and the auxiliary 
 redoubts and other defensible posts, as well as a suitable artillery 
 reserve. After the occupation of the works by the Germans, it 
 became evident, moreover, that the above estimates were right as 
 regarded the total numbers ; we should not be far wrong in placing 
 the total number of guns in Paris at about 2,000 pieces. An 
 artillery park was formed in the gardens of the Tuileries. 
 
 From these facts it is clear that the proportion of artillery in 
 Paris, as in other French fortresses was everywhere ample, although 
 the nature of the pieces, the variety of their construction, and the 
 description of carriages may not have been altogether suitable to 
 the requirements of the present time. In this respect they were 
 not in France, and least of all in' Paris, so far advanced, nor so well 
 prepared for the attack and defence of fortresses, as in Prussia. 
 Anyone who knows the arrangements of an artillery depot, or the 
 peace preparations for the artillery defence of a Prussian fortress, 
 will be best able to judge what was wanted in such a case at Paris.
 
 135 
 
 Meanwhile an endeavour was made -with creditable activity, and 
 with much judgment, to supply the deficiencies. As early as the 
 middle of August 6,800 men (later on also women, to some extent) 
 were employed in the manufacture of cartridges and case-shot. 
 Considerable supplies of ammunition of all sorts were brought up 
 from Toulon and Montpellier, where there are great cartridge 
 factories. The large foundries and iron works in Paris were exclu- 
 sively employed in preparing shot and shell, and were in some 
 measure converted into arsenals. During the siege 251,572 pro- 
 jectiles for cannon and 1,000,000 bullets for mitrailleurs were made 
 in Paris. In the engine works of Cail locomotives were built, 
 with iron plated sentry boxes for drivers and stokers, and also iron 
 plated trucks, in which guns were placed. Subsequently goods 
 wagons were converted to this use, and they had plating 4^ inches 
 thick. The works to resist assault were armed with guns of every 
 description, and this was hurried on principally at Point du Jom*, 
 Auteuil, and Vaugirard. and at the detached forts. 
 
 To supply in some measure the want of trained, expert 
 gunners, marine artillery were ordered to Paris in great numbers, 
 and to their soldierlike bearing and steadiness under fire all praise 
 is due. 
 
 The fire of the batteries on the works was, however, kept up 
 with an inexcusable waste of ammunition, apparently according to 
 no pre-arranged plan, and without skilful supervision. The cost 
 of this waste of ammunition on the night of the 28th to 29th No- 
 vember alone has been estimated at 120,000 thalers (^18,000). 
 Frequently costly projectiles were fired at solitary patrols, and 
 objects were aimed at in otlier cases without any good reason that 
 could be assigned. We refer to the destruction of the mag-nificent 
 palaces of St. Cloud and Malmaison, to the laying in ashes of the 
 towns and numerous villas there, acts that were done by the French 
 themselves in the most reckless manner. 
 
 The garrison artillery paid not the least attention to watching 
 their fire for the purpose of fixing its elevation and direction; 
 similarly they appeared to profit but little by the great advantage 
 they had on their side of being able to ascertain the distances accu- 
 rately. Under these circumstances the possession of the best 
 material was of no use to them. Nevertherless, the pertinacity 
 and bravery of the garrison artillery in the working their guns 
 was not to be denied, and they understood how to take advantage 
 of the want of cover of their opponents on every occasion. The 
 artillery fire of the forts derived substantial assistance from the 
 guns which were mounted in the field redoubts in front of, 
 between, and in rear of them, and in separate emplacements. 
 Most of the forts were in fact connected with one another by 
 a military road constructed for the purpose ; from these roads 
 trenches branched out to important points, which afforded a 
 favourable opportunity for bringing an unexpected fire to bear on 
 the ground in front. 
 
 During the siege particular attention was attracted to a new 
 ong-ranging gun, which fired from the fortress of Mont Val^-
 
 136 
 
 rien, and strewed the batteries erected against the south front 
 with its ponderous projectiles, as far as 9,000 paces to the 
 westward. The French named it Sainte Valerie. The bore had 
 a calibre of 36 centimetres (14| inches). The projectile weighed 
 80 lbs. (82-^ lbs. English). The breech closing gear was removed 
 when the fort was given up, so that the gun was unservicea])le ; it 
 is now among the captured artillery at Berlin. 
 
 Provisioning. — The chief in this department was the In- 
 tendant-General of the army of Paris, Wolf. With regard to 
 the provisioning of Paris, the defence committee had to solve a 
 very serious problem, and they performed their task so as to elicit 
 general approval. So early as about the middle of August con- 
 voys of provisions ceased to be sent to the French army of the 
 Rhine, since it was very well known, among those who were con- 
 cerned, that their arrival at their destination was doubtful. Resort 
 was then had to England, and shortly after, twenty-eight ships, 
 laden with flour, left Liverpool under sail for Havre. The defence 
 committee originally contemplated the provision of food for two 
 million inhabitants for two months, and arranged that all the 
 stocks of grain should be sent to Paris from the departments of 
 the Seine and Marue, where corn is abundant, and which are also 
 in other respects fertile and wealthy. This measure was proved to 
 be of practical utility, and it was made more stringently operative 
 by a decree to the effect that all stores, which were in the line of 
 of advance of the Prussians into the country, should be, without 
 exception, destroyed. The issue of the provisions took place ac- 
 cording to a plan, of which the prei^aration and execution were 
 undertaken by a special commission. 
 
 The herds of cattle and sheep brought up by the Government 
 were placed in the Bois de Vincennes, in the Jardin des Plantes, 
 in the outer Boulevards, and in the Bois de Boulogne ; for the want 
 of fodder, and from the unfavourable weather, which early became 
 very cold, the cattle suffered extremely, and succumbed in great 
 numbers, and latterly cows were only maintained to supply milk 
 for the hospitals and for children. The Government, moreover, 
 took all the care that circumstances permitted ; for the cattle were 
 bought on their account, and sold, either to the butcher or the 
 public, at a fixed price. Naturally, in the com'se of the siege, a 
 great advance took place in the prices of all provisions, and the 
 want of butter, salt, and of vegetables, eggs, and milk was much 
 felt ; the flour and wine were not exhausted even in the last days of 
 the siege. That people >vere driven to killing dogs, cats, and even 
 rats, need not much astonish us with so large a population, which 
 included a considerable number of the poorer classes; but the 
 inhabitants, as a whole, must have suffered much, and it is not 
 surprising that among the aged and the children a greater mor- 
 tality took place than under ordinary circmnstances ; this was, 
 moreover, increased by hunger and the cold of winter. The sub- 
 sistence of the soldiers was naturally a great soiu-ce of anxiety ; an 
 actual failure of provisions for the troops was not experienced 
 during the whole siege, although at the last they were reduced to
 
 137 
 
 the consumption of horseflesh, salt meat, bread, and wine, and a 
 reduction of the rations took place to 150 grammes (one-tliird of 
 a pound). Prisoners and wounded, who fell into our hands in the 
 sorties of December, had their rations for four or five days with 
 them ; as the prisoners, however, if it was proposed to send them 
 back to the fortress, preferred to remain with us, it may be con- 
 cluded that the subsistence and service in the army of Paris was 
 not much to their taste. 
 
 The want of coals for fuel and for the manufacture of gas was 
 much felt ; and wood also, in the later periods of the siege, was 
 scarcely to be found : severe measures must have been adopted to 
 secure the timber-yards and the timber in the defences from 
 plunder and depredation. 
 
 As was the case at Metz, the means of existence in Paris 
 lasted some weeks longer than one was at first inclined to expect. 
 What amount of provisions were actually in the to'wn on the 
 19th September will never be known witli any accuracy ; at that 
 time the authorities concerned apparently did not believe in the 
 possibility of holding out 131 days, to the 28th January. In this 
 respect the report is at length gaining credit that the stores 
 originally existing in Paris, exclusive of the special provision 
 made for the siege, had been seriously under-estimated ; for the 
 quantity of provisions that could have been conveyed subsequently 
 into the besieged place, in spite of the blockade, is not worth 
 taking into account. 
 
 The imminent failure of provisions — the actual pressure of 
 hunger in the city- — was, at any rate, one of tlie chief causes of 
 the commencement of negotiations for surrender ; at the time of 
 the three weeks' truce, moreover, it was at its height. The stocks 
 of flour and horseflesh were sufficient only for eight and fourteen 
 days respectively ; and wdth regard to this, it must not be over- 
 looked that the getting in of fresh supplies, which was much 
 facilitated by the German army of investment handing over 
 3,000,000 rations, and throwing open the roads for traffic, took 
 fourteen days longer, during which time the want of provisions in 
 Paris continued. It should be added finally, that at the capitula- 
 tion the provisions of the garrison were not exhausted, so that a 
 portion of them were available for the use of the civil population. 
 
 Intelligence. — Very soon after the appearance of the investing 
 army before Paris all further communication with the country 
 outside was cut off; the last post was despatched on the 18th 
 September. Subsequently an underground telegraph to Tours 
 was discovered, and also another line which w^as led along the bed 
 of the river Seine to Havre ; the latter w^as fished up accidentally 
 at Bougival during the pontooning operations of the Prussians for 
 the military bridge at that place, and it, as well as the former, was 
 destroyed. A like fate befell the floating hollow balls and diving- 
 machines;* the Prussians had nets spread across the stream, and 
 
 * Taucher-boten — probably some apparatus arranged to float down with the 
 stream below the surface of the water.
 
 138 
 
 caught them. Letter-carriers, disguised as sellers of vegetables, en- 
 deavoured to slip through the outposts: this also was impracticable ; 
 only five out of eighty-five returned ! The only road not suspected 
 was that through the catacombs of Paris, but the foolhardy people 
 who ventured by it perished there ; even bloodhounds undertook 
 the conveyance of letters, but they also did not come back. 
 
 The chief part in the transmission of news was played by air- 
 balloons, and for their manufacture and filling special factories 
 with hundreds of workmen were established at the Northern and 
 Eastern railway stations ; they were under the management of 
 the well-known aeronaut, Godard. A school of aeronauts was 
 established ; a committee of professional and scientific persons 
 devoted themselves to this business. The first voyage through 
 the air, that was of any use, was made by the aeronaut Duruof 
 on the 23rd September ; on the 8th October M. Grambetta followed 
 him, and probably also officers, with special commissions to 
 arrange for combined action with the generals commanding the 
 masses of the enemy who were operating in the open field. During 
 the period from the 23rd September 1870 to the 23rd January 
 1871, fifty-four balloons were sent off from Paris ; they conveyed 
 some persons who took charge of the balloons, and several hundred- 
 weights of letters. The use of this contrivance by the public was 
 regulated by special orders, and letters conveyed by balloon were 
 not allowed to exceed 4 * grammes in weight. Altogether, 2,500,000 
 letters, weighing about 10,000 f kilogrammes, were forwarded. 
 The ascents were made from the railway stations of the Orleans, 
 Northern, and Eastern railways ; from Montmartre, the Tuileries 
 gardens, &c. Some balloons, moreover, strayed away to Eothen- 
 burg in Hesse, to Holland, and to Norway ; of the fate of many 
 others nothing was ever heard. Besides these larger air-balloons, 
 there were smaller ones six to seven ij: metres in diameter, called 
 ballons libres, by which letters only were sent to the care of " the 
 esteemed finder." Captive balloons, with cords and ropes, hanging 
 over Paris, served for observing the positions of the enemy, and 
 for watching the sorties from the fortress. 
 
 Great numbers of carrier-pigeons had been brought from 
 Belgium, and the prefect of Lille sent 900 of these birds to 
 .Paris just before the investment. They were generally sent 
 out with the air-balloons — of course enclosed in cages — and 
 were intended to bring back the answer to the balloon letters. 
 These carriers, however, during the latter part of the siege, fre- 
 quently failed to come in, and proved untrustworthy. Some were 
 prevented from returning by the foggy weather, and some sought 
 theii- Flemish homes. Of 200 carrier-pigeons let go from Paris 
 only 73 got back. The despatches tied to them contained 70,000 
 words, which were reduced in size by photography. The manage- 
 ment of the air-balloons and carrier-pigeons was entrusted to the 
 ingenious post-master, Eamport de Chin. 
 
 * About ith part of an oz. avoirdupois, 
 t About 9 tons 16 cwt. 
 t 20 to 23 feet.
 
 I3y 
 
 Observatories were established on Montmartre, the Pantheon, 
 and the towers of Notre Dame, which were chiefly employed in 
 watching the flat country on the west and north-east sides. The 
 forts were connected by underground telegraph with the several 
 head-quarters, particularly with the Place Vendome, and also with 
 one another. Besides all this, visual signals — in part also arranged 
 for use at night — were used for enabling the commandants of forts 
 to communicate with one another. 
 
 From the fortress of IMont Valerien, which afforded the most 
 extensive view, pre-arranged flag-signals were made ; on the side 
 of the Germans it was believed that there was always a certain 
 warning if a sortie was contemplated, and the attention of the 
 besiegers was always doubly increased by these signals. 
 
 By electrical light-apparatus, which was directed on the posi- 
 tions of the enemy before the town, they endeavoured to observe the 
 works vmdertaken there at night. An ample supply of the requisite 
 material, and excellent apparatus worked by skilful operators, were 
 abundant in Paris, and rendered easy this mode of illumination. 
 
 On the German side there were told off for the investment of 
 Paris the Ilird army, under the command of the Crown Prince of 
 Prussia, consisting of the Vth, Vlth, and Xlth Prussian corps, the 
 two Bavarian corps, and the Wiirtemberg division, about 140,000 
 strong ; and the IVth army, under the command of the Crown 
 Prince of Saxony, composed of the Prussian guard and IVth corps, 
 and of the Xlltli (Saxon) corps, about 80,000 strong. The 
 German army of investment was thus of the total strength of only 
 220,000 men, for the reinforcements sent from Germany had not 
 at that time arrived. 
 
 As early as the 16th September the advanced guard of the 
 German cavalry division, which had been pushed forward one or 
 two marches in front of the attacking armies, appeared at Creteil, 
 Nouilly, Corbeille, and Clamart. Their task was to destroy the 
 telegraphs, as well as to intercept the supplies for Paris, and they 
 were intended, on the other hand, to save the railways and prevent 
 the demolition of the bridges ; under these circumstances there 
 occurred some minor engagements with the French detachments 
 sent out of the forts to reconnoitre. 
 
 Septemhei' 17. — Nevertheless the advanced guards of the Ilird 
 army found the permanent bridges over the Seine at Corbeille 
 andVilleneuve-St. George destroyed. It became necessary, there- 
 fore, at once to establish a new means of crossing the Seine. For 
 this purpose the 5th pioneer battalion formed a pontoon bridge 
 above Villeneuve-St. George at half-past 3 o'clock in the after- 
 noon, which was immediately crossed by the 2nd division of 
 cavalry. 
 
 To cover the formation of the bridge the 17th brigade of 
 infantry, with two squadrons and two batteries, had taken up a 
 position on the heights at Limeuil, in the direction of Boissy St. 
 Legere. This detachment was attacked at 2 r.M. by six French, 
 battalions and two batteries. After a severe engagement in the
 
 140 
 
 woods of Valenton the enemy fell back on Creteil, and the passage 
 of the Grerman forces over the pontoon-bridge, which had been 
 formed in the meantime, was not further interfered with. 
 
 On the 18th September the Vth army corps commenced their 
 march on Palaiseau and Bievre. At Dame Eose there was a slight 
 engagement between detachments of the 9th division and the 
 French outposts, but this did not at all delay the further advance 
 on Versailles. 
 
 On the 19th September a more serious encounter took place on 
 the plateau of Petit Bicetre, and Plessis-Piquet, which had been 
 carefully prepared for defence. The Eoyal Bavarian army had also 
 in great part crossed the Seine at Corbeille on pontoon-bridges, and 
 was on the 18th brought forward as far as the neighbourhood of 
 Longjumeau and Palaiseau ; their Ilnd corps on the 19tli followed 
 the Prussian Vth corps on the road to Versailles, to which place 
 the head-quarters of the Crown Prince of Prussia were to be trans- 
 ferred on the 20tli September. On the French side General 
 Ducrot, with the 13th corps, had advanced to the road from 
 Fontainebleau and Orleans, in order to prevent the occupation of 
 the plateaus Clamart-Chatillon and Plessis-Piquet, which were of 
 the greatest military importance. As a point d'appui he occupied 
 the intrenchment of Moulin de la Tour, previously mentioned, 
 which was not yet finished. On the left the French had occupied 
 Sceaux ; their right rested on the park of Meudon. 
 
 By 6 A.M. the advanced guard of the Vth Prussian corps (King's 
 grenadiers, and 47th regiment) had attacked the enemy, who was 
 six times stronger than themselves. At Petit-Bicetre a brisk en- 
 gagement began, and was maintained with equal obstinacy on both 
 sides for several hours. It did not cease until a brigade of the 1st 
 Bavarian division, under Colonel Diehl, was sent forward in support. 
 Later on the 10th division was directed on Villa Coublay, 
 and the corps artillery was advanced. About 11 o'clock the 
 enemy beat a retreat on the entrenchments of Moulin de la Tour. 
 While a Bavarian bi'igade was directed on Sceaux, the 8th brigade 
 of the 4th Bavarian division was sent to Croix de Bernis, the 7th 
 towards Bourg ; with these movements the enemy was to be out- 
 flanked. In the meanwhile, about a quarter to 12, the enemy 
 again made a stand, and attacked Fontenay and Plessis vigorously. 
 The fight thickened, and the artillery took a large share in it. 
 The French fired with six batteries from the entrenchment 
 of Moulin de la Tour, and other strongly fortified positions in 
 front of and beside it, the Grermans from well-covered posi- 
 tions opposite. About half-past 1 o'clock the French ventured 
 an attack on the Bavarian position, and then, failing of success, 
 fell back about half-past 2. The 3rd Bavarian division pur- 
 sued them with the 3rd battalion of jagers, detachments of the 
 14th regiment, two batteries, and a regiment of light horse, 
 occupied the abandoned entrenchment of Moulin de la Tour, 
 and captured there seven 12-pounder field-pieces. The French 
 continued their retreat uninterrupted to Paris. The Vth corps 
 had, in the forenoon, when the enemy fell back at Petit-
 
 141 
 
 Bicetre, resumed their advance on Versailles. They arrived there 
 towards evening-, took 2,000 of the garde mobile prisoners, and oc- 
 cupied at once the entrenchments thrown up by the French at Mont- 
 retout and Sevres. The captured works at Sevres, and at Moulin 
 de la Tour were henceforth named by the Germans the Kron- 
 prinz, the Jager, and the Bavarian entrenchments. The YIth 
 Prussian corps crossed the Seine at Villeneuve, the advanced 
 guard by the bridge made by the Vth corps, the rest by one they 
 had made themselves in the meantime, and went on to Orly. Its 
 further advance was prevented by the fire from the lately-con- 
 structed but unfinished French entrenchment at Villejuif. Towards 
 evening this redoubt was occupied by the Prussians, but unfortunately 
 was given up again, because it was no longer tenable in the face of 
 the heavy fire from the retired positions of the French. The army 
 corps placed their outposts on the line Chevilly to Choisy. 
 
 On the evening of the 1 9th September the outposts of the Ilird 
 army stood on the line Bougival, Sevres, Meudon, Bourg, L'Hay, 
 Chevilly, Thiais, Choisy-le-Eoi, Bonneville, Creteil, Champigny, 
 Brie ; in corresponding positions in rear, were the Vth corps, 
 the 1st and Ilnd Bavarian corps, the Vlth and Xlltli corps, and 
 the Wurtemberg division. 
 
 At Les Tanneries, and in the neighbourhood of Bougival and 
 Tournay, communication was established over the Seine and 
 Marne respectively, by means of pontoon-bridges, with the IVth 
 army. This army performed their march on Paris without meet- 
 ing with any resistance; except that, between Pierrefitte and 
 Montmagny, a slight engagement took place, which resulted in the 
 capture, by detachments of the IVth corps, of the fortified positions 
 occupied by the French. Le Bourget and Drancy remained in 
 the occupation of the enemy, who did not fall back here till the 
 20tli September. The outposts of the IVth army stood generally 
 on the line Neuilly, Villemomble, Le Bourget, Dugny, Stains, 
 Pierrefitte, Epinay, Argenteuil, Besons. The head-quarters of the 
 IVth Army were in Grrand Tremblay ; those of the King in Ferrieres, 
 the chateau of the Rothschilds, on the left bank of Uie ]Marne not 
 far from Lagny ; from this point he overlooked the positions of 
 the two investing armies. 
 
 The machinery of government, organised and centralised in 
 Paris for the whole of France, was thus thrown out of gear, and 
 all communication between the army in Paris and the armies in 
 the field, either investing or in process of formation, was cut oflf. 
 
 The leader of the Grerman army had, with unerring glance, se- 
 lected the south as generally the weakest front for the principal 
 attack; and this on a close examination was seen to have, also 
 defensively, a special cause of weakness which we will mention here. 
 
 The fortress of Mont Valerien protects the west side of Paris. 
 This work is intended not only to prevent any approach on the 
 peninsula of Nanterre to the gorge of the works of St. Denis, but 
 also to defend effectively the ground towards St. Cloud and Sevres. 
 The guns of the adjoining work. Fort Issy, cover the bend of the 
 Seine at Billancourt. But in order to strengthen the position
 
 142 
 
 protected by Mont Valerien in the direction of St. Cloud and 
 Sevres, where the effective action of the fort was weakened, 
 not only by the distance of 4,000 to 4,500 metres, but 
 also by the formation of the ground, the work already men- 
 tioned was constructed at Montretout, as soon as Paris was put 
 into a state of defence. The work fell into the hands of the 
 Prussians when half-finished. Under these circumstances the fort 
 of Mont Valerien had to protect the ground as far as St. Cloud, 
 where the duty was- taken up by Fort Issy. Eeckoning the effective 
 range of the guns of the two works at 3,500 metres, there would 
 remain at Sevres and Bellevue a dead space, which was of great 
 advantage to us. These circumstances were favom-able for an 
 approach, as secure as possible, to Fort Issy and also to Point du 
 Jour. The exit of the Seine, moreover, weakens the latter point, 
 which we should probably have selected, in case of need, for an 
 advance on Paris. 
 
 Viewed in this light, as the result shewed, the determination 
 to take up a position on the south of the fortress and direct the 
 principal attack on that side was most fortunate, and the im- 
 mediate capture of the works, which had been just thrown up 
 by the French in preparation for the siege, had the most im- 
 portant results on the progress of the attack. 
 
 The next step was for the investing army to establish itself 
 firmly in the positions which it occupied, that not only should all 
 communications be cut off between the capital and the people of 
 the country, but it should also become impossible for the garrison, 
 in spite of its superiority of numbers, to break through and 
 establish communication with the French armies of the north 
 and south, which were in process of formation or in the field ; 
 that in fact the French, at every point of the girdle around them, 
 might be so long held at bay as to allow the German troops to 
 arrive in sufficient force to drive them back into the fortress. 
 Each army corps had its own well-defined position of the circle 
 of investment, which it had to occupy and strengthen by 
 suitable works of fortification. The redoubts captured at 
 the first onset of the Grerman army afforded a strong point of 
 support, for which purpose they were turned about towards the 
 enemy, the original gorge being converted into the front of the 
 work, and the entrance made upon our side. At a greater dis- 
 tance points of support were also found in the numerous villages, 
 which from their very massive construction were well adapted for 
 the purposes of defence. The approaches to the villages were, 
 therefore, barricaded, the communications of every kind repaired, 
 walls favourably situated were provided with loopholes and ban- 
 quettes, alarm posts were established, and huts built to shelter 
 those troops who were held in constant readiness. 
 
 The principal objects during the whole of the operations of 
 the investment were the construction of works for the security 
 of the troops at a greater or less distance from the forts, 
 and the establishment of a line of obstacles to be defended 
 by musketry. This was intended to compel the enemy to deploy
 
 143 
 
 his forces as slowly as possible, and to give our troops time to 
 occupy the line of works in rear. In the line of obstacles openings 
 were left in case of our being able to take the offensive. The 
 obstacles consisted of abattis, and the existing walls and buildings, 
 which were made capable of defence. The line of defences behind 
 these obstacles, and prepared in a similar manner, was principally 
 occupied by infantry, owing to the ground in front not being 
 generally exposed to view. According to the nature of the 
 groimd, greater or smaller entrenchments were formed in this 
 line of defences, and partly in front, partly in flank or rear, 
 artillery emplacements were made and strongly secured by works 
 to resist the sorties in force, which were to be expected sub- 
 sequently. 
 
 It would take too long to enumerate the several works of this 
 kind in the circle of investment ; we will take, therefore, only one 
 section of the ground, and select that which the Vth and Vlth 
 corps had to occupy and arrange for defence. 
 
 The Vth corps had the ground between Meudon and Bougival 
 to defend. The line of obstacles in that quarter comprised the 
 northern boundary fence of Meudon, was continued by rifle-pits, 
 &c. round Bellevue to the Crown Prince battery, and followed 
 thence the steep slope to St. Cloud, as far as the Montrecout 
 redoubt, where a gap occurred for the attack of the ground in 
 front of jMont Valerien. Abattis and rifle-pits crowned the heights 
 of Grarches, and led on to the eastern boundary of Bougival, 
 ending here on the Seine. The line of obstacles was flanked 
 along its length by being broken back in some places, by block- 
 houses on it and annexed to it, and by the Crown Prince and 
 Montretout redoubts. The line of works in rear began in the 
 east with the parks of Chalais, Meudon, and St. Cloud, which 
 were arranged for defence ; a series of entrenchments led over 
 the plateau of Grarches to the stud enclosure, which, as the 
 centre of the position, was secured by abattis, a number of 
 batteries, and self-defensible earthworks, and so on in the same 
 manner to Bougival. In rear of this line, on the edge of the 
 plateau towards the villages Ville d'Avray, Marnes, and Yau- 
 cresson, emplacements were arranged for batteries and strongly 
 defended with works. 
 
 The Vlth corps had to cover the ground between the Seine and 
 Bievre, beginning at Villeneuve-St. George, the same place where 
 subsequently were the two bridges allotted for the use of the 
 siege-train. Next was the northern boundary of Choisy, par- 
 ticularly the churchyard, which was fortified in the most formidable 
 manner, barricaded, and rendered completely secure against the 
 assault of infantry. Oj)posite, lay the village of Vitry, also fortified 
 by the French, and close at hand were some gunboats on the Seine. 
 Further to the westward, and within our position came the vil- 
 lages of Thiais and Choisy, both fortified ; opposite, but in the 
 possession of the French, were Villejuif, which was also fortified, 
 and a redoubt at the same place, both covered by Fort Bicetre. 
 At the junction of the high roads to Versailles and Fontainebleau
 
 144 
 
 and inside the German position la}' the strongly enti'enched 
 farm of La Belle EjMne, the central point of an artillery position 
 containing 84 field guns, strengthened and covered by shelter 
 trenches for six battalions ; and next to it, pushed forward on. 
 the slope of the right bank of the Bievre, was the village of 
 L'Hay with the wall skirting its edge arranged for a deter- 
 mined resistance, being the point of support for a brigade. 
 
 Opposite lay the enemy's redoubt of Haute Bruyeres (Cachan) 
 covered by Fort Bicetre. The outposts of the Prussian position 
 at this point were also protected by a line of obstacles with 
 shelter trenches and other arrangements for defence, whilst the 
 section of ground to be held was rendered secure by formidable 
 fortified posts and entrenched emplacements for the employment 
 of masses of artillery. 
 
 In the low country eastward of St. Denis, where the French 
 positions were protected by inundations, the Guard Corps had 
 in a similar manner rendered the section from Seoran to Dugny 
 impassable by damming up the Morce stream, so that only two 
 narrow defiles were available, namely, at Port Iblon on the 
 embanked high road of Lille, and at Aulnay. This inundation 
 was defended by the strongly fortified villages of Dugny, Le Blanc- 
 Mesnil, and Aulnay, which were somewhat retired, Le Blanc- 
 Mesnil being the centre of the defence. Shelter trenches and 
 positions for artillery were formed on the undulating ground in 
 rear of the inundation, and gave a gi-eat power of resistance to 
 the section of the ground. Opposed was the French position as 
 described at par. 17, page 129, and, from a consideration of their 
 mutual position, it is easy to understand why the village of 
 Le Bourget became the object of constant attacks from both 
 sides. The intended inundation of the Moree by the Germans 
 would hardly have succeeded on account of the small supply 
 of water, had it not received a considerable contribution by 
 damming up the Ourcq canal at Sevran. This arrangement 
 proved further disadvantageous to the enemy by reducing the 
 supply to the St. Denis inundation and withdrawing a cer- 
 tain quantity of drinking water from the inhabitants of Paris. 
 The execution of this interesting work was entrusted to 
 Captain von Krause of the Engineers. When the inundation 
 froze during the winter it had to be broken up in a number of 
 places. 
 
 The establishment of communications by constructing roads 
 for the supply and transport columns, and providing them all 
 with guide posts for the information of the troops, caused con- 
 siderable labour, as did also the erection of barricades of all 
 sorts, and the building; of bridges and roads for the coiumunica- 
 tions between the corps ; of this kind were the bridges built at 
 Le Pecq, Bougival, Les Tanneries, Triel, Villeneuve, St. Georges, 
 at Gournaz over the Marne, at Chatout, two at Corbeille, 
 without counting many other foot-bridges over brooks and 
 hollow roads. In places where it was necessary, these t*tructures 
 were secured against a coup-de-main by an entrenchment.
 
 145 
 
 Later, when the winter set in, it required great care to presei've 
 them, or some at least, from the floating masses of ice on the 
 Seine ; a few had to be removed and the permanent bridges 
 lying far in rear of the investing army to be utilized. 
 
 With regard to the tactical considerations of the besieging 
 army, it was above all things necessary to adapt the defence in 
 the best manner to the peculiarities of the ground. Each divi- 
 sion had about one-fifth to one-sixth of its strength on outpost 
 duty. These, together with the picquets (sometimes with guns 
 attached), and the supports, had fortified the particular point 
 indicated to them where a stand was to be made, and had in- 
 structions to receive the enemy in that position. The woods 
 and undulations of the ground, which limited the field of view 
 towards the enemy, made the erection of observations a necessity 
 for the investing army ; one was on the Marly aqueduct which 
 carries water for the fountains at Versailles over the Seine on 
 36 arches at a height of 643 metres above the Seine ; this was 
 often used by the Emperor-King on account of the distant view 
 it commanded ; besides this there were others, viz., in the redoubt 
 of IVIoulin de la Tour, at Malmaison, at Bougival, at the Lantern 
 of Diogenes, in the Villa du Barry, at Sevres, at Le Blanc- 
 Mesnil and other places. Semaphores also were erected for 
 signalling by day and night. 
 
 At the principal commands intelligence-bureaux were esta- 
 blished, and a service for the transmission of important orders 
 by mounted orderlies, organised in relays, posted partly at the 
 picquets, and partly at cross roads. Independently of this, all 
 divisional staffs were connected with the corps, and head 
 quarter staff, by means of the field telegraph. 
 
 As occurred before many other French fortresses, so at Paris, 
 the bearers of fiags of truce were fired upon, contrary to all 
 the customs of war ; this happened, for example, on the 1st of 
 October to Lieutenant v. Kissing, and on the 23rd December to 
 Ist Lieutenant v. XJslar. 
 
 The destruction of the tunnel at Nanteuil, to which allusion 
 has already been made, did not particularly increase the diffi- 
 culties of the advance of the Ilird arni}^, but it was a serious 
 obstacle in the formation of the siege parks. During its restora- 
 tion, when the temporary wooden supports were nearly com- 
 pleted, the whole gave way in consequence of the pressure of the 
 superincumbent chalk, so that recourse had to be made to a 
 branch line to turn the obstacle, which was finished in the latter 
 part of November. With the fall of Soissons, a second line of rail 
 became available for the besiegers on the east side, but on the 
 west and north-west front the line of communication to the rear 
 by Laon and Compiegne was only opened after the fall of La 
 Eere, 
 
 At the beginning of the siege, in consequence of the want of 
 
 railway communication with the provision magazines in rear, 
 
 the supply of the armies Avas a very difficult task; it required 
 
 the greatest activity and foresight on the part of the commis- 
 
 36996. L
 
 146 
 
 sariat officials to cany on the duty in a satisfactory manner. In 
 addition to the regular service of supplies of all kinds from 
 Germany, which were accumulated in the magazines in rear of 
 the investing army, necessity soon required the levy of requisi- 
 tions in the districts beyond the immediate neighbourhood, 
 which had been already exliausted by the French. Opinions 
 have been expressed very strongly against this mode of requisi- 
 tioning, without recognising the laws of war by which an army 
 has to support itself in an enemy's country. Requisttions of 
 this sort required convoys, as not only was the populace hostile, 
 but collisions with the francs-tireurs were of constant occurrence. 
 The escorts for them were provided by detachments of cavalry 
 accompanied by infantry on wagons. When, during December 
 and January, the railway by Amiens and Laon, and the lines to 
 Rouen and Orleans became available, the supply of provisions 
 was an easier task ; as an illustration of the requirements, we 
 may add, that the daily provision and forage transport for a 
 single army corps was about 5 trains of 32 wagons each. The 
 daily provision and forage supply for the armies before Paris was 
 about the following : 148,000 three-pound loaves, 1,020 cwt, of 
 rice or grain, 595 bullocks or 1,020 cwt. of bacon, 144 cwt. of salt, 
 9,600 cwt. of oats, 2,400 cwt. of hay, 28,000 quarts of brandy. 
 
 After this description of the circumstances of the investment, 
 we shall notice next the principal sorties, and after them, the 
 artillery attacks which led to the fall of the capital. 
 
 The object of the smaller sorties was to molest and alarm our 
 outposts, as well as to make demonstrations for special purposes ; 
 they never caused any important interruption in the works of 
 the investment or siege, and did not appear to have that pin-pose 
 in view ; it was only in the last days of the siege, about the 
 middle of January, that small sorties were made against 
 the batteries of the attack on the south front. The sorties 
 en masse, however, played an important part, having no less an 
 object than to pierce the investing line, and form a junction with 
 the French armies operating in the north, south, and west. 
 ' Such sorties were preconcerted with the commanders of the 
 armies in the field, who were probably informed of the intended 
 operations by means of the balloon post. We received infor- 
 mation of these undertakings, days and weeks beforehand, partly 
 by means of prisoners or deserters, partly also by the visible stir 
 on the other side, so that we were always found prepared. These 
 lengthened preparations were probably necessitated by political 
 reasons, such as to tranquilize the Parisian populace, who, in 
 ignorance of the true state of things, were pressing for sorties which 
 could have no good result. The march of large bodies of troops 
 towards the locality of the intended sortie, Avhich took place 
 generally by means of the circular railway, conspicuous on its 
 embankment, as well as on those sections of rail leading beyond 
 the works, and the movement of the troops between the enceinte 
 and the outer forts, could not escape the notice of those in the 
 observatories, or in the German outposts.
 
 147 
 
 It was in consequence of the movement of troops out of Paris 
 on the 1 9th of September, that St. Cloud was occupied on the 
 21st of that month. 
 
 September 23. The French undertook small reconnaissances 
 directed from St. Denis against Pierrefitte, from Aubervilliers 
 towards Le Bourget, and from Fort Bicetre against Villejuif. 
 
 September 24. The outposts at Sevres and St. Cloud were 
 engaged with some gunboats stationed at Suresnes. 
 
 On September 30 there was a more considerable sortie, which 
 the enemy had announced on the 27th and 28th by changes in 
 the positions of the troops outside the fortress. General Vinoy 
 attacked the 12th division with six battalions between Choisy 
 le Koi and La Belle Epine, supported by Forts Montrouge and 
 Bicetre, whilst he made demonstrations on his left wing with a 
 brigade against the Xlth corps, and on his right wing with 
 three battalions against the Vth corps at Sevres and Meudon. 
 At Bas Meudon he threw a bridge over the Seine, The fighting 
 began at 6 o'clock in the morning and turned on the possession 
 of L'ELay, which was bravely defended by the 23rd regiment, 
 but had eventually to be evacuated. It was soon perceived 
 that the attacks on the wings were only demonstrations ; the 
 Vlth corps therefore concentrated its reserves, and, supported 
 by some Bavarian detachments, drove the enemy again out of 
 L'Hay behind his entrenchments. General Guilhelm fell here 
 and his body was handed over to the French next day. These 
 estimated their loss at 1,200 men; on the German side there 
 were 80 killed and 300 wounded — but 300 unwounded French 
 prisoners were taken. It is not known whether the French 
 intended to pierce our lines on this occasion, or only to destroy 
 the passages of the Seine ; or perhaps to retaliate for the check 
 they had received on the 19 th September. 
 
 On the 3rd of October the headquarters of the King were 
 removed fiom the Chateau of Ferrieres to Versailles. 
 
 After frequent alarms on both sides, and much useless can- 
 nonading from the forts, the next sortie took place on the 
 7th of October; on this occasion also there were great move- 
 ments of troops on the preceding day .to the entrenchments 
 in rear of d'lvry and Bicetre. Probably this was only a 
 demonstration. But, in the afternoon, a French force of all arms 
 marched out of Fort Mont Valerien towards Hueil, returning 
 towards the evening, having covered the destruction of part of 
 our line of defence at Malmaison. 
 
 On the loth October the palace of St. Cloud was set on fire 
 by the guns of Mont Valerien, without any apparent reason ; the 
 5th jager battalion, and the 58th regiment attempted to save 
 as much as possible fi-om the flames. The same da}^ 10 French 
 battalions of Blanchard's division, with cavalry and field guns, 
 advanced in three columns against the position of the Ilnd Bava- 
 rian corps, and drove their outposts out of Chatillon and 
 Bagneux ; the enemy had his reserves in readiness behind Fort 
 Montrouge, in case the capture of the heights of Chatillon and 
 
 L 2
 
 148 
 
 the Bavarian redoubt should succeed. After a combat of six 
 hours duration, in which first the 8th, and then the 7th Bavarian 
 brigade took part, the enemy was driven back ^vith considerable 
 loss. In this sortie, which in the French reports is described as 
 an " offensive reconnaissance," the guns from the French redoubt, 
 constructed on the height between L'Hay and Villejuif, gave a 
 good support, and annoyed the Bavarian right flank considerably ; 
 their loss was 10 oflicers and 860 men. 
 
 October 14th. A sortie of several French battalions was re- 
 pulsed by the piquets and some guns of the Xllth corps. 
 
 At this period the 22nd division under General von Wittich, 
 and the 1st Bavarian corps under General von der Tann were 
 withdrawn from the investing force, in order to operate against 
 the French army which had been formed in the south. On the 
 other hand the guard landwehr divisions had arrived before 
 Paris, and numerous changes were made in the positions of the 
 troops. 
 
 In the night of the 19th-20th of October a lively fire was 
 kept up by the forts, and repeated night attacks by strong 
 infantry detachments were made against our outposts at Chevilly, 
 that is to say, in the direction of Orleans, but without any result 
 whatever. 
 
 October 21st. The sortie made on this day against the Vth 
 corps was preceded by a ^heavy fire from Fort Mont Valerien, 
 which was continued later from the gunboats stationed on the 
 Seine ; the latter fired principally against St. Cloud and Sevres. 
 The following troops were drawn up under the command of 
 General Ducrot : General Berthaut with 3,400 men, 20 guns, and 
 one squadron, between the railroad to St. Germain and Rueil ; 
 General Noel with 1,350 men and 10 guns, to operate against 
 Bougival and the park of Malmaison ; Colonel Colleton with 
 1,000 men and 18 guns, to keep up the communication between 
 the two first-mentioned columns, and also to join in the attack 
 on Bougival. Besides these there were two main columns of 
 reserve, one under General Martenot with 2,000 men and 18 
 guns, the other under General Paturel, consisting of 2,000 men, 
 28 guns, and two squadrons. The whole, roundly speaking, 
 10,000 men, 94 guns, and three squadrons, under the supreme 
 command of General Ducrot, were in position an hour after 
 mid-day, supported by the fortress of Mont Valerien. The attack 
 was directed against the 10th division on the line Bougival, 
 Malmaison, Garches. The 19th brigade formed the outposts, 
 with the 46th regiment as the left wing, and the 6th regiment 
 as the right ; the 20th brigade in reserve. Towards 3 o'clock 
 in the afternoon four of the enfemy's battalions attacked the park 
 of Malmaison ; after an obstinate fight they were repulsed by 
 the 46th Regiment, two battalions of the 6th regiment, and 
 detachments of the 1st guard landwehr regiment ; whilst this 
 attack was in progress the enemy directed another against La 
 Celle, which was beaten back by portions of the 50th regiment ; 
 the oth and 6tli companies of which, assisted by some men of
 
 149 
 
 the Gth regiment, captured two guns, and brought them safely 
 away, notwithstanding the heavy firing of the enemy. On the 
 right wing the advanced troops oi the 9th division were engaged. 
 The batteries of the IVth corps at Chatou and Besons, on the 
 right bank of the Seine, co-operated with good effect towards 
 the end of the fight, which terminated at 5 o'clock in a general 
 retreat of the enemy towards Neuilly and to Fort Mont Valerien, 
 under cover of the guns of the latter place. The troops which 
 had taken part in the sortie retreated very slowly to the fortress, 
 so that the Prussian detachments had to remain under arms 
 imtil late in the evening. In Versailles the troops had taken 
 up their defensive positions. Our losses in this combat are 
 given as 15 officers and 297 men killed and wounded, whilst those 
 of the enemy were 28 officers and 232 men, exclusive of 800 
 prisoners. 
 
 A small sortie took place at the same time against the Wlir- 
 temberg division : three battalions, supported by the Faisandrie 
 redoubt, crossed the Marne at Joinville and advanced against 
 Champigny, but were repulsed by the 2nd jager battalion 
 and part of the 7th regiment with a loss of 3 killed and 
 30 wounded. 
 
 The fight on the 30th October at La Bourget, which was 
 occupied by only one company of the Guard, was of more im- 
 portance ; the village had been attacked on the 28th by superior 
 French forces from Fort d'Aubervilliers, and the garrison driven 
 out. The place lay under a cross-fire from the forts at St. Denis, 
 d'Aubervilliers, and Bomainville, and the French made every 
 effort to secure this advantageous position and fortify it. An 
 attempt was made on the 29th to drive the enemy out of Le 
 Bourget by the tire fi'om the batteries in rear, but it failed. ' 
 
 The re-capture of this post of such importance to the Prussians 
 was, therefore, ordered for the 30th October; the 2nd division 
 of foot guards, under the command of Lieut.-General v, 
 Budritzky, was told off for this service. It was arranged that a 
 right column consisting of two battalions of the Franz regiment, 
 a centre column composed of the 3rd grenadiers of the guard, 
 and one battalion of the Queen's (Konigin) regiment, and a left 
 column of two battalions of the Alexander regiment, with three 
 companies of the battalion of sharpshooters of the guard, the 
 whole supported by artillery and engineers as well as the 
 necessary reserves, should attack Le Bourget simultaneously, 
 and, if possible, cut off the retreat of the enemy on St. Denis, 
 Preparations had also been made for the attack to be supported 
 on both flanks by other troops of the investmg force. 
 
 Le Bourget was occupied by 6,000 men, besides a reserve of 
 several battalions on the Paris road. 
 
 The combat was opened at 8 o'clock in the morning by a fire 
 from retired artillery positions in the lines Garges-Aulnay ; the 
 left column was immediately set in motion, crossed the Moleret 
 stream without much resistance, and reached the road south of 
 Le Bourget, drove the enemy out of his entrenched position, and
 
 150 
 
 forced the reserve into a hurried retreat. In the meantime the 
 other columns had advanced to storm Le Bourget, where a most 
 obstinate hand-to-hand fight took place in the streets and 
 houses. The brave General von Budritzky led his troops in 
 person, flag in hand, against the barricades at the northern 
 entrance to Le Bourget, followed by Colonels Count Kanitz and 
 Von Zaluskowsky, the latter of whom was killed in the street of 
 the village. 
 
 On the other side the Augusta regiment had pushed into 
 the village ; its colonel, Count Waldersee, who had only just 
 rejoined after recovery from a severe wound at Gravelotte, 
 fell here, with another oflicer, by French treachery, having been 
 shot from a house, the defenders of which had lured him on by 
 the waving of handkerchiefs. 
 
 In consequence of this the fight was continued with the 
 greatest bitterness by the Prussians ; Le Bourget was in their 
 possession by half-past 12 o'clock. The Prussians lost 85 officers 
 and 449 men killed and wounded. The French 30 oflicers, 
 1,250 unwounded prisoners. 
 
 According to the statements of the prisoners, and judging by 
 the large supply of provisions captured at Le Bourget, the enemy 
 seem to have intended to include this place in the line of their 
 fortified outposts and to construct large works round it. How- 
 ever, the result was different from what they had proposed, for 
 the 2nd pioneer company of the guard, under the command of 
 Captain v. Spanckeren of the engineers, which had particularly 
 distinguished itself in the battle field, immediately prepared to 
 construct the defences of the place. 
 
 The failure of the French sorties caused great dissatisfaction in 
 Paris, and led to a rising in the night of the 30th-31st of 
 October, in which, however, the mob was crushed by the troops 
 at the disposal of Government. In the first days of November, 
 there were negotiations which extended over a period of five 
 days for the conclusion of an armistice, but without result. The 
 Ilnd Prussian corps, which arrived before Paris in the latter 
 half of November, was attached to the Ilird army, and went 
 into cantonments in rear of the YIth Prussian and Ilnd Bavarian 
 corps, from Longjumeau to the Seine. At the same time the 
 Xllth (Saxon) corps moved its left wing across the Marne, and 
 the Wlirtemberg Division closed towards the Vlth corps. The 
 latter was transferred to the IVth army after the sortie of Le 
 Bom'get, with instructions to operate against the bands of franc- 
 tireurs that were making their appearance in rear of the position, 
 and especially at Meaux and Lagny on the line of communica- 
 tion. For this purpose a battalion, accompanied by one 
 squadron and two guns, was despatched as a flying column to 
 Nangis, and succeeded in capturing with small loss, 5 officers, 
 597 men, and two guns. 
 
 Although after the fight at Le Bourget the conflicts between the 
 outposts were of less importance, and the extravagant waste of 
 ammunition from the forts was diminished on the whole, yet.
 
 151 
 
 towards Xovember, there were indications of an important sortie, 
 probably in the south or south-east ; in which direction General 
 Trochu hoped to effect a junction with the army which had been 
 organised in feverish haste by Gambetta, and was pushing 
 forward to the rehef by way of Beaune under the command of 
 General de Paladines. 
 
 On the 29th of November a sortie was made against the posi- 
 tion of the Vlth corps at L'Hay, Chevilly, Thiais, and Choisy 
 le Roi. It began with a heavy cannonade during the night 
 of the 2Sth-29th November from some of the southern forts, 
 apparently for the purpose of fatiguing our troops, who had, in 
 consequence, to be under arms during half the night. Some 
 works of fortification, which were in progress at the time, had, 
 therefore, to be given up for the moment ; among them the con- 
 struction of a redoubt at Villa Coublay for the defence of the 
 siege parks, The attacking columns of the enemy were launched 
 from Arcueil and Yitry against L'Hay, whilst the two wings 
 were directed on the villages of Thiais and Chevilly, lying on 
 either side of the Fontainebleau road. The enemy's strength 
 was about 3,000 men, but he foimd the Vlth corps in a strong 
 position to receive him. 
 
 After a hard fight of three hours, without any result, the 
 French were thi'own back, leaving 2 ofiicers and 200 men in the 
 hands of the Germans ; the latter, sheltered behind their strongly 
 entrenched position, never permitted the French to develope 
 their forces, and caused them great losses both in killed and 
 wounded ; on our side the loss was 200, of whom 3 ofiicers and 
 32 men were killed. 
 
 On the 30th of November, the battle was renewed with 
 increased forces, under the personal command of General 
 Trochu ; an attempt was made to penetrate the lines of the 
 Wlirtemberg division, on the ground in front of the peninsula 
 of St. Maur, The eneni}^ commanded the ground where the 
 Marne bends to the south, the villages of La Varenne, Pont 
 Mesnil, and the district behind St. Maur, including the wood of 
 les Fosses, by means of Forts Charenton and Nogent, and the 
 works thrown up in advance. Near Creteil is Mont Mesly, which 
 is high enough to be regarded as the commanding point of the 
 surrounding country. 
 
 The concentration of the enemy's forces took place near Fort 
 Charenton, in the camp of St. Maur (Forest of Vincennes), and 
 between Forts Rosny and Nogent. 
 
 The first oftensive movement was from Fort Charenton against 
 the hill of Mesly ; the second from Joinville, towards Cham- 
 pigny ; and the third from Nogent, directed against Brie and 
 Villiers. The three companies of Wiirtembergers, forming the 
 garrison of Mesly, were miable to resist the overwhelming attack 
 made against their position at daybreak, and fell back on their 
 supports, whilst the enemy took possession of the Mesly heights 
 and brought two batteries into action on them. An artillery 
 fight now developed itself, whilst the division of Wiirtembergers
 
 152 
 
 formed up and advanced against the heights Avith the 2nd and 
 3rd brigades, and re-captured them, after heavy fighting, about 
 mid-day. They were supported by the 7th brigade of the 
 Ilnd corps, which was in position with one battery at Villeneuve 
 St. Georges, and joined in the attack from the side of Valenton, 
 thus taking the enemy in flank, and preventing the action of 
 the reserves, who were forced in consequence to retreat from the 
 wood of Cr^teil, to the viUage of that name and Fort Charenton, 
 How gallantly the Wiirtembergers fought may be gathered from 
 the fact'^that their losses were 40 officers and 700 men, whilst 
 accordino- to General Trochu's report those of the French amounted 
 to nearly 2,000 killed and wounded. 
 
 At Champigny and Brie, the Wiirtembergers had been relieved 
 just before daybreak by the Saxons ; six companies of the latter 
 occupied these places, but they were obliged to give way before 
 the advancing French columns, who immediately took possession 
 of the village of Villiers, lying more to the north. The French 
 did not attempt a further advance against the Germain main 
 position. In the meantime the reserves had come up. The 
 Germans, n^imely, the 48th infantry brigade (Saxons), and the 
 1st Wiirtemberg brigade, drove tlie enemy with great bravery 
 out of Villiers, though Champigny and Brie remained in the hands 
 of the latter. In the afternoon the fight raged with the greatest 
 bitterness between Neuilly and Coeuilly ; the infantry flghting 
 for the possession of the villages, whilst the artillery were posted 
 in the intervals ; between Noisy and Villiers alone, there were 
 42 gims of the Xllth corps in action. The fight which had 
 been carried on with the greatest determination on both sides, 
 was only brought to a close by the approaching darkness. 
 
 This sanguinary day, which cost the Saxons 29 officers and 
 879 men, and the Wiirtembergers 1,500, whilst they captured 
 940 prisoners, gave the impression that the French had made 
 every effort to break through the German lines ; for not only 
 had all the preparations been carefully planned for this purpose, 
 five bridges constructed over the Marne, and a supply of fresh 
 troops always at hand, but offensive movements had been 
 directed against other points of the investing army. A continuous 
 cannonade was kept up from all the forts, and even iron-plated 
 railway wagons and gun boats, the latter on the Seine and 
 Marne, had been set in motion to flank the battle field. Sorties 
 were made on botli flanks of the battle field, namely, against the 
 Xllth corps in the direction of Chelles, and a second time against 
 the A^'Itli corps at Chevilly. At the latter place the entrench- 
 ments were held ; and the enemy advancing from his fortified 
 position, was thrown back as early as 11 o'clock, so that the 
 Vlth corps was able to detach 6 battalions, 2-i- squadrons, and 
 2 batteries of horse artillery through Villeneuve St. Georges, to 
 the assistance of the hard-pressed Wiirtembergers. At 3 
 o'clock the French renewed their attack, which was repulsed 
 with comparative ease.
 
 153 
 
 Simultaneously with these sorties to the south and south-east 
 of the fortress, others were undertaken from St. Denis against 
 the positions of the IVth and guard corps, as well as from St. 
 Cloud against the Vth corps, but without result; the enemy- 
 brought about a brigade into the field at these points. All round 
 the city there were therefore engagements with the enemy. 
 General Trochu had made a great noise in Paris about his 
 victories at Champigny and Brie, nevertheless he found it neces- 
 saiy to maintain himself quietly next day in the positions which 
 he had occupied. 
 
 On the 1st of December, the troops did not come into 
 collision, but the French demanded an armistice until 4 o'clock 
 in the afternoon, for the purpose of burying their dead. 
 
 In consequence of an order, to be prepared under any circum- 
 stances for a renewal of the attack, the whole Ilnd corps was 
 brought over to the right bank of the Seine, and on the night 
 of the lst-2nd Deceniber took up a position between Coeuilly 
 and Chennevieres as reserve in rear of the Wilrtembergers ; 
 a measure which proved to be most useful. The portion of the 
 Xllth corps on the left bank of the Marne, the Ilnd corps, a 
 brigade of the Vlth corps, and the Wilrtemberg division were 
 placed under the command of General von Fransecky, com- 
 mander of the Ilnd corps. At dawn on the 2nd of December 
 at 7 o'clock, the 1st Wilrtemberg brigade, in company with the 
 Saxons, renewed the attack on Champigny. They succeeded 
 after a short time in taking the village, but the Germans could 
 not maintain themselves there, on account of the defences in the 
 place, and the constant arrival of fresh troops on the field, which 
 were brought by the railroad passing close to Fort Nogent. The 
 7th Prussian brigade, under ^the command of General du Trossel, 
 advanced to the attack from Chennevieres at an opportune 
 moment, but, as the lower part of the village of Champigny was 
 under effective fire of the heavy guns, the Germans were only 
 enabled to keep their hold in the upper part of t\\e village. The 
 3rd infantry division, and the whole of tlie corps artillery had 
 been in action in Champigny and on the line Champigny-Yilliers 
 since 9 o'clock in the morning ; whilst the 8th brigade and a 
 brigade of the Vlth corps remained in reserve at Chennevieres. 
 
 After 10 hours hard fighting, the firing ceased here about 
 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The 24th (Saxon) division had been. 
 ordered to re-capture Brie ; about 8 o'clock in the morning, the 
 place was attacked and the enemy driven into the lower part of 
 the village, where he made a stand covered by good artillerj- 
 positions. The fight in and round Brie came to a standstill. As 
 the enemy in his well-entrenched position, was constantly receiving- 
 reinforcements, it was impossible to get possession of the whole of 
 the village, notwithstanding the devoted bravery of the 1st and 
 2nd battalions of the sharpshooters, of the 107th regiment, and a 
 battalion of the 104th regiment. Although the Germans had a 
 numerous artillery at their disposal, the ground was so unfavour- 
 able that it could not come fully into action. Eound Villiers,
 
 154 
 
 and especially in the park, which was bravely defended, first, by 
 the Wlirtembergers, and afterwards by the Saxons, the fighting 
 continued with great courage on both sides. At nightfall the 
 enemy retired. The- losses of the Saxons on this day amounted 
 to 55 officers and 1,096 men, those of the Wlirtembergers were 
 48 officers and 700 men. The troops went into cantonments in 
 the villages on the battlefield, in order to occupy on the 
 morning of the 3rd December the positions previously held by 
 them. The French repeated on this day some offensive move- 
 ments against Champigny, but without any energy ; they main- 
 tained themselves however at Brie. The Ilud corps lost, on the 
 30th November, and the 2nd and 3rd Decembei", 89 officers and 
 1,517 men. 
 
 The concentrated position taken up by the Germans on this 
 day behind Champigny and Brie, induced the French to retire 
 from the places remaining in their possession ; they retreated 
 from all points across the Marne, removing the bridges of boats 
 after crossing the river. The necessity for strengthening this 
 position with additional fortifications was now recognized, and 
 strong detachments of pioneers were ordered to the spot from 
 the south front. 
 
 Thus these great efforts of the French to break out, for which 
 purpose 70,000 of their best troops had been brought into action 
 on the 30th of November and the 2nd of December, were 
 repulsed without their having been of the slightest advantage to 
 them ; they failed as on former occasions from not following up 
 with resolution the advantages which had been gained by a 
 vigorous attack. General Ducrot, who commanded on the 2nd 
 and 3rd December, and had five horses shot under him on the 
 first day, paid a tribute to the bravery of the German troops 
 in his general orders. The occupation and fortifying of Mont 
 Avron by the French, on the 28th of November, was highly 
 disadvantageous to us. 
 
 Nearly three weeks passed without any sorties from Paris ; in 
 the meantime, an attempt was made on the French side to form 
 a junction of the army of Paris with that of General Faidherbe, 
 commander of the northern army, and, at the same time, to 
 threaten our north-easterly line of communication. The enemy 
 had also in view the molestation of our works in progress for 
 the bombardment of Mont Avron. This led to a sortie " en 
 masse" on the 21st of December, of three divisions under the 
 command of General Ducrot, directed against the north-easterly 
 portion of the investing line in two simultaneous attacks, each 
 on two roads. One attack was covered by Forts St. Denis and 
 d'Aubervilliers, the other by Forts Romainville, Rosny, and 
 Nogent. The advance was made against four points : Stains and 
 Le Bourget defended by the guard corps, and Sovran and 
 Chelles which were held by the Xllth corps. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 20th of December, the movement of 
 large bodies of the enemy's troops out of St. Denis was noticed ; 
 the guard corps therefore made the necessary dispositions. It
 
 155 
 
 was not possible on the morning of the 21st December to make 
 out at what point the enemy intended to attack. Suddenly Le 
 Bourget, which was garrisoned by one battalion of the 3rd 
 regiment of guards, and one company of sharpshooters, was 
 unexpectedly assailed from the northern side, the churchyard was 
 captured and 125 men taken, but the southern edge of the village 
 was bravely held. With the assistance of three companies of 
 the 3rd grenadiers of the guard, and two companies of the 
 sharpshooters of the guards, who were sent to the succour of the 
 hardly-pressed garrison, they succeeded after a hard fight in 
 driving the French out of the village at 3 o'clock in the after- 
 noon. Three officers and 356 men were taken prisoners. 
 
 Almost at the same time Stains, which was garrisoned by the 
 2nd battalion of the 1st regiment of guards, one company of 
 the 3rd regiment of guards, and the fusilier battalion of the 
 1st regiment of guards, the latter in reserve, was attacked, 
 under support from the guns of St. Denis ; but the enemy failed 
 to penetrate into the village and had to retire. The forts l)ear- 
 ing on the field of battle kept up a heavy fire during the entire 
 day, supported by a numerous field artillery, against which only, 
 six batteries of the guard corps were in action; towards 
 evening the fii-ing ceased, and the Prussian troops were enabled 
 to take up their old positions. Three officers and 356 un wounded 
 prisoners fell into the hands of the Prussians ; our loss was 14 
 officers and 400 men, that of the French considerable; they had 
 40,000 men under fire. 
 
 On the 19th and 20th of December, demonstrations had been 
 made from Mont A\a'on towards the Maison Blanche and Ville- 
 Evrart, against the Xllth corps. In the afternoon of the 20th De- 
 cember, the enemy concentrated about two divisions and 11 bat- 
 teries at Noisy-le-Sec, under the command of Generals Malroi and 
 Blaise ; this force was further strengthened during the night by 
 means of the railroad. Fresh batteries were unmasked on Mont. 
 Avron. About mid-day the enemy attacked from Neuilly ; Maison 
 Blanche and Ville-Evrart, which were only held by oui- outposts, 
 were lost. A further advance against the very strong position of 
 the 24th division at Chelles was prevented by the flanking fire 
 of the Wiirtemberg Batteries, Nos. 7, 8, and 9 at Noisy-le-Graud, 
 and by the overflowing of the Marne. As soon as the 24th 
 division was completed by the arrival of the five battalions of 
 the 101st and 107th regiments, the 13th jager battalion, all of 
 which had been detached to support the guard corps, and also 
 nine batteries which had taken up a position at Livry, it 
 advanced against Maison Blanche and Ville-Evrart. The foi-mer 
 was immediately taken by storm, but the fighting round YiUe- 
 Evrart was most obstinate and only ceased at miduight, when 
 500 French were made prisoners ; the place had to be evacuated 
 on account of the rising of the river. The Saxons lost on this 
 day 1 officer and 40 men, most of them slightly wounded. 
 
 On the 21st December, the 4th infantry division was placed in 
 reserve behind the Xllth corps, and the Sth brigade, together
 
 156 
 
 with four batteries, was advanced as far as tlie bridge over the 
 Marne at Voires, but there was no collision with the enemy. 
 
 Whilst these sorties were in progress, the French made de- 
 monstrations at several points, for instance, from Fort Mont 
 Valerien towards Montretout and Buzenval ; the outposts of the 
 5th jager battalion sufficed to repel them. Besides this, a heavy 
 and useless shell fire was kept up from the forts against the corps 
 not attacked. 
 
 On the 22nd of December, two French brigades advanced along 
 the Marne against the left wing of the Xllth Corps, but two 
 Wilrtemberg batteries placed at Noisy soon compelled them to 
 retreat. 
 
 On the 15th of January, there were more sorties of the Paris 
 garrison against the position of the guard and Xllth corps in 
 the direction of Le Bourget, Dugny, and Mont Avron, which 
 were repulsed by the German troops. It is not impossible that 
 the larger sorties on this front were in connexion with the opera- 
 tions of General Faidherbe in the north ; though they may only 
 have been intended to disturb our preparations for the attack on 
 Mont Avron. 
 
 In the last days of December and daring January, whilst the 
 artillery attack was being developed, the political and social con- 
 dition of the beleagued city was becoming more serious. All 
 hopes were based on the success of a sortie " en masse." General 
 Trochu yielded eventually to pressure, and on the 19th of January 
 an attempt was made from Mont Valerien with 100,000 men to 
 j)ierce the position occupied by the Vth army corps and the 
 guard landwehr division. In the event of a success, a further 
 advance w^as to be made on Versailles, the seat of the Royal 
 headquarters. 
 
 At 8 o'clock in the morning, three columns were seen debouching 
 from the immediate neiffhbourliood of Mont Vale'rien ; the ri^ht 
 column, under command of General Ducrot, was to operate along 
 the Seine towards Rueil ; the centre column, under General 
 Bellemare, was to reach the plateau of La Bergerie (the heights 
 of Garches), and the left column, commanded by General Vinoy, 
 was to capture the redoubt of Montretout in order to support the 
 attack in the centre. 
 
 The Prussians had occupied the heights of Garches, as well as 
 the chateau and park of La Bergerie, as a point of support to the 
 position. The French attack, carried out with superior forces 
 and great energy, only caused the Prussian outposts to retire on 
 their supports, but they did not succeed in taking either La 
 Bergerie, which was bravely defended by one battalion of the 
 59th regiment and a company of jagers, or the viUage of Garches ; 
 General Ducrot arrived on the battlefield too late to co-operate 
 with good eifect at the right moment. Meanwhile, the Prussian 
 reserves had come up, and a hard fight ensued for the possession 
 of the heights of Garches. They w^ere stormed about 2 o'clock in 
 the afternoon by two battalions of the King's grenadiers, with
 
 157 
 
 detachments of the 59th regiment and the 5th jao-er battalion 
 supported on the flank by a battalion of the 47th reo-iment. 
 
 Although, towards the end of the battle, the head of General 
 Ducrot's column was able to join in the fight, still as the dark- 
 ness came on, the French were repulsed and had to retire under 
 cover of the guns of Fort Mont Valerien. These had been 
 engaged with the Prussian artillery during the day in order to 
 draw ofl* the fire from the infantry. The 5th light battery of 
 the Vth corps in action at Brdzin suflPered most ; it was at this 
 spot that the Crown Prince of Prussia took up a position durino- 
 the battle. Towards evening our outposts occupied the same 
 ground as in the morning. 
 
 In the attack on Montretout the French were more fortunate ; 
 the weak garrison of 60 men had to evacuate it and fight their 
 way out. The enemy soon made a lodgment there, and brouo-ht 
 guns into action on the right, so that it was not retaken till after 
 dark. This was effecced at 11 o'clock in the evening by detach- 
 ments of the -i7th, 58th, and 82nd regiments. It was observed in 
 the afternoon and evening, that a large force of the French were 
 bivouacking outside the fortress, and it was necessary, therefore, 
 for the Prussians to make preparations to meet a renewal of tlie 
 attack ; consequently a Bavarian brigade of the 1st corps, which 
 had arrived before Paris a few da3's previously from the southern 
 army, and some guard landwehr were moved to Versailles. 
 
 Our loss was 39 officers and 616 men, that of the enem}^ was 
 very considerable, it amounted to 7,000 men, of whom 1,000 
 were left dead on the battlefield. There was also a small fio-ht 
 this day on the eastern side of the investing line ; a company of 
 the 100th regiment together with one of the 101st surprised the 
 enemy's outpost in the farm of Groslay and took 5 officers and 
 150 men prisoners. 
 
 On the 20th of January detachments of the 58th regiment 
 and the 5th jager battalion surrounded and cajitured 18 officers 
 and 320 men in St. Cloud, to which place they had retired in 
 the expectation that the battle would be renewed there. 
 
 Although the investing army was constantly engaged in its 
 front by these repeated sorties, the}^ did not remain unmolested 
 in their rear, where franc-tireur bands, more or less oiganised, 
 threatened the railways and telegraphs, and carried off transport, 
 patrols, and oflicials ; it became necessary therefore up to the last 
 days of the siege to despatch large columns against them, and 
 as late as the 27th of January a force consisting of 2 infantry 
 and 2 cavalry regiments with 8 guns, marched from the southern 
 post of the investing circle towards Auxerre. 
 
 From the beginning of the investment the internal condition 
 of Paris had been anxiously watched at headquarters, and the 
 fall of the capital would have been a mere matter of time, as
 
 158 
 
 tlie provisions decreased daily whilst the political difficulties 
 increased. 
 
 The capitulation of Metz and the destruction of the newly- 
 formed armies in the south and north, seemed to have no effect 
 on the character of the defence ; the negotiations for an armis- 
 tice, which had been carried on in the first days of November 
 between the headquarters at Versailles and the French Govern- 
 ment, had been broken off after lasting for five days. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the necessity of a regular siege or 
 bombardment of the capital had become inevitable, as the only 
 means of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion ; but the pre- 
 parations were on such a large scale, that, as regards the prin- 
 cipal attack on the south front, we shall have to treat them 
 separately. 
 
 A large siege train had to be brought up for the attack, com- 
 posed partly of guns from the home fortresses and partly from 
 the trains which had been already employed against other 
 French fortresses, but at the same time the sieges then in pro- 
 gress, which required a great amount of material, could not be 
 interrupted. It was not surprising therefore, that exactly the 
 most appropriate guns should not have been used in the artillery 
 attack on the south front, or that the Germans were unprepared 
 for the extraordinarily rapid wear of the guns, which influenced 
 the progress of the siege. 
 
 The siege train contained about 300 pieces of ordnance, 
 namely, 70 long 24-prs., 15 short 24-prs., 100 12-prs.. 40 6-prs., 
 exclusive of rifled breech-loaders, besides 20 25 -pr. shell guns, 
 20 50-pr. mortars, and 6 rifled 21-cwt. mortars. Each gun was 
 provided with 500 rounds for curved fire with the necessary side 
 arms and stores ; the carriages, platform wagons, gyns, &c. with 
 all their gear had to be brought up. 
 
 The Ballon guns, of which there were twenty, and which 
 were much spoken of at the time, were not guns but wall pieces, 
 on a small four-wheeled wagon with a platform and spindle 
 moved by means of a ball ; they did not, however, succeed. 
 
 The parking of the siege guns for the south front occupied 
 much time, as only one line of rail, that through Nancy, was 
 available at first, and this could not even be used in its entire 
 length most of the time, as several tunnels and bridges over the 
 Marne, between La Ferte and Meaux, had been destroyed by 
 the enemy and had to be repaired. AH the other bridges on 
 the line had to be carefully inspected and strengthened so that 
 they should not break down under the immense loads ; more 
 than 100,000 cwt. of stores and ammunition alone had to be 
 moved, which for the reasons given above had to be unloaded 
 by hand and conveyed by road from ]\Ieaux and Lagny to the 
 siege train park at Villa Coublay before Paris, a distance of 12 
 miles (56 English miles). Special roads had to be made for the 
 transports, and bridges built over the Seine. Several thousand 
 draught horses were required as the requisitioned teams were 
 insufticient and the drivers were constantly deserting, sometimes
 
 159 
 
 with and sometimes without their wagons, so that the necessary 
 horses had to be provided from the troops ; but this arrangement 
 was not found convenient as a permanency. Twenty-four transport 
 columns, each of 40 wagons, were therefore lirought from Ger- 
 many, and equipped partly with the French wagons and harness 
 taken at Metz. The transport for the first establishment of the 
 siege train occupied several weeks, both night and day, and had 
 even to be continued in the same manner during the siege. 
 
 Two of the Strousberg traction engines were brought into use. 
 The hilly nature of the country, the soft roads, and the slipperi- 
 ness in frosty weather and snow caused the greatest difficulties 
 to the numberless wagons. Although the guns, ammunition, 
 and other stores were all safely conveyed to the artillery park, 
 still it was necessary to have special escorts to protect them 
 against the hostile population. These circumstances increased 
 immensely the difficulties of preparing for the attack on the south 
 front, for whilst, on the east and north fronts everything brought 
 from Germany was ^delivered by rail close up to the parks, in the 
 other case all the material had to be transferred to the wagons 
 and carried from for four to five days by road before reaching 
 its destination, No person without a knowledge of the extensive 
 organisation required for a siege park can form any idea of the 
 vast preparations, or the energy and foresight necessary to carry 
 out such an undertaking. The establishment of the engineer 
 park and depots presented similar difficulties. 
 
 To the right rear of the gun park, were the store sheds, the 
 empty shells and other projectiles, the laboratories, a fuze magazine, 
 and six jwwder magazines, with their proper guardhouses, all 
 screened from the enemy's view by a wood. The situation of 
 Villa Coublay was very convenient for the purposes of the siege, 
 but it required some additional security against hostile enterprise, 
 and three field works were constructed on the plateau of Moulin 
 de la Tour, of which the centre one was armed with 1 2, and the 
 other two each with 6 rifled 12-pounders. The rocky chalk 
 soil, frozen later to a depth of 1^ feet, made the construction of 
 the batteries a work of great difficulty ; the laying of tlie plat- 
 forms had to be executed in the rock with crowbars and miners* 
 tools. On the other hand the presence of the woods and the 
 material they afforded were of great service in building the 
 batteries. In consequence of being thus hidden they were not 
 unmasked until the moment of opening fire ; in one case an 
 artificial screen was formed by planting trees and boughs, behind 
 which the construction of the batteries proceeded quite unper- 
 ceived by the enemy. Countless vehicles with the baulks and 
 platforms (both of which had to be brought from Germany), 
 fascines and gabions, which were made by the Vth and Ilnd 
 Bavarian corps, filled the roads and paths leading to the 
 batteries for months, generally at night so as to be unobserved 
 b}' the French. The production and accumulation of the different 
 materials were, under the circumstances, works of uncommon 
 difficulty ; for, although the equipment provided the greater part
 
 160 
 
 of the tools, still a' considerable quantity had to be obtained by 
 requisition or forwarded from Germany. All these preparations 
 required much time, both on account of the variety of difficulties 
 that had to be encountered, and the shortness of the days ; but 
 until everything necessary for carrying out the siege thoroughly 
 was in its place, the opening of the attack could not be 
 thought of 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add that the time and manner of 
 carrying out the siege had already been decided by the autho- 
 rities ; and if there was any delay in opening the attack, it was on 
 account of circumstances which have been already been noticed, 
 a detailed account of which would be beyond our province. 
 
 Paris was to be attacked on three sides simultaneously, so as 
 to force the enemy to use his heavy guns on more than one 
 front. It is worthy of remark, that the most broken ground 
 bad to be selected for the artillery attack, and that in order to 
 reach the body of the place, several of the outer forts would 
 have to be engaged first, and perhaps have to be captm*ed. 
 
 A short account of the different attacks in the east, north, 
 and south, under the direction of Major-General Prince Kraft 
 of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, commander of the guard artillery 
 iDrigade, will follow here, in the order in which they were carried 
 out. 
 
 I. — ARTiLLERr Attack on the East Fkont. 
 
 The object of the French position on Mont Avron was, in 
 conjunction with the forts in rear, to prepare sorties, and 
 to support them with the fire of the guns; it commanded 
 the valley of the Marne and covered the assembly of troops 
 there, as well as the passages over the Marne, and at the same 
 time it flanked the greater part of our eastern line of in- 
 vestment. These favourable circumstances induced the enemy 
 continually to strengthen this position, so that in the end there 
 were six 30-pounders, six short 24-pounders, twenty-three 
 7-pounders, thirty -four 12-pounders, seven miti*ailleuses, altogether 
 76 guns distributed in eight batteries ; the latter, however, were 
 imperfectly constructed, and unprovided with bombproofs and 
 traverses, on account of the difficulty of working in the frozen 
 ground. The commandant on the plateau of Mont Avron was 
 the well-known and able Colonel Stoffel, who before the war 
 had been attache to the French embassy in Berlin. There was 
 no intention on the German side of occupying Mont Avron, 
 especially as it lay under the cross-fire of Forts Rosny, Nogent, 
 and Noisy, and of the redoubts Montreuil, La Boissiere, and 
 Fontenay, situated in the intervals. Our positions were so close 
 that our heavy guns could engage Mont Avron as well as the 
 forts lying behind it. 
 
 The following batteries were constructed : —
 
 161 
 
 A. — On the PlateoM of Raincy. 
 
 Batteries Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, armed respectively with six 
 24-poimders, six 12-pounders, six short 24-pounders, and four 
 short 24-pounders, altogether 22 guns, directed chiefly against 
 Mont A\Ton, Fort Rosny, and other less important places, such 
 as the villages of Avron, Rosny, Yillemomble, and the redoubts 
 of la Boissiere and Montreuil. 
 
 B. — On the Plateau of Mont Fermeil on the side nearest 
 to Gagny. 
 
 Batteries Nos. 5,* 6, 7, and 8, armed respectively with six 
 12-pounders, six long 24-pOunderSj six 12-pounders, and six 
 12-pounders, total 24 guns, to fire over the same ground as the 
 other batteries, and also to sweep the valley of the Marne. To 
 destroy any bridges that might be thrown over the river and 
 prevent a passage. 
 
 C. — In 'position hetiveen Noisy and Gournay. 
 
 Batteries Nos. 9 and 10, armed respectively with six 12- 
 pounders and six long 24-pounders, together 12 guns. To fire 
 on the Marne valley and the valley of Villemomble and prevent 
 the assembly of troops in these localities. 
 
 D. — In position south-ivest of Noisy-le-Grand. 
 
 Batteries Nos. 11, 12, and 13, each armed Avith six long 24- 
 pounders, making a total of 18 guns to sweep the sides of Mont 
 Avron, the villages of Villemomble and Neuilly, the railway 
 junction, the Fontenay redoubt, and Fort Nogent. 
 
 The distances of the different batteries from Mont Avron varied 
 from 3,500 to 6,000 paces. 
 
 The park of artillery was established at Brou, half a league to 
 the east of Chelles, to which were brought 36 rifled 12-pounders, 
 30 rifled 24-pounders, 10 rifled short 24-pounders, altogether 76 
 siege guns. 
 
 A transport column of 700 wagons was cantoned there in 
 improvised barracks and stables. Ten companies of garrison 
 artillery were available. The whole was placed under the com- 
 mand of Colonel Bartsch as chief of the siege artillery, while 
 Colonel Oppermann superintended the works of the engineers. 
 
 On the ] 3th of December the construction of the batteries 
 was begun ; it had to be carried on almost entirely at night, 
 with the exception of the batteries on the plateau of Raincy, 
 which were screened by the woods. 
 
 Trench communications were made, where necessary, between 
 the batteries, covered by traverses ; roads and bridges were 
 constructed, as well as bombproofs of all descriptions. 
 
 Fire was opened on the morning of the 27th of December at 
 half -past 7 o'clock from 76 guns, and it succeeded by the next 
 
 * In the plate No. 5 Battery is ^hown on the plateau of Raincj-. 
 36996. jj;
 
 162 
 
 day in silencing Mont Avron after a good resistance, and con- 
 siderable loss among the gun detacliments ; only the works in 
 rear continued to respond to the fire, and the German artillery 
 succeeded in driving the French garrison out of Bondy and out 
 of the railway station at Noisy le Sec. 
 
 The French evacuated the position on Mont Avron on the 
 night of the 2 8th- 2 9th of December. They had thrown a 
 garrison into it on the previous night, of two divisions under the 
 command of General d'Hugues, with the intention of occupying 
 it defensively. Their withdrawal during the night, together with 
 the removal of the artillery m.atcriel, took place under the eyes 
 of General Trochu, who had hurried to the spot, and was per- 
 formed in wonderfully good order, covered by the marines 
 and three field batteries. On the 30th of December Mont 
 Avron was occupied by Saxon detachments. Supported by 
 a covering party they levelled the enemy's works and des- 
 troyed the ammunition and other materiel found there ; the 
 magazine had been prepared for demolition. The next thing- 
 was to drive the French out of the villages of Drancy and 
 Bobigny, which they held in force, and for this purpose emplace- 
 ments Nos. J 4 and 15 were constructed. Two other batteries, 
 Nos. IG and 17, were built at Chennevieres to command the 
 plateau of Villiers. To oppose the French position of Courneuve, 
 Le Bourget, and Drancy, No. 1 battery at Blanc-Mesnil, and 
 Nos. 2 and 3 batteries * at Pont Iblon were constructed, and 
 armed altogether with 18 guns, so as to render an offensive 
 movement from that direction impossible. Some of these latter 
 batteries were advanced afterwards as far as Le Bourget, and 
 were thus in a position to co-operate against St. Denis in the 
 attack on the north front. 
 
 On the 2nd and 3rd of January a heavy fire from the siege 
 batteries was continued against the whole of the east front, and 
 was only replied to feebly from Fort Nogent. 
 
 As the east front had always been considered the strongest of 
 the Paris defences, our successes against Mont Avron had raised 
 a great alarm in the city, and ignorance of the military circum- 
 stances had caused an unreasonable despondency, as well as 
 distrust in their military chief. Meanwhile the enemy remained 
 in possession of the villages of Bondy, Bobigny, Drancy, and 
 Rosny, and disturbed our outposts from those places by frequent 
 alarms; thus, on the nights of the 10th and 15th of January 
 the Saxon outposts were attacked on the railway in advance of 
 Aulnay and at Nonneville, whilst the same thing happened to 
 the Guards in Le Bouiget three times during the night of 
 the 14th of January. On account of these offensive movements, 
 the siege batteries bombarded those places for 48 hours on the 
 16th of January, the results of which could only be ascertained 
 Dy a reconnaissance of detachments of the 2nd division of foot 
 
 * These three batteries formed at the same time the left wing of the attack on the 
 north front.
 
 163 
 
 guards against Drancy, and of the 23rd infantry division 
 against Groslay farm, on which occasion 5 officers and 130 men 
 were taken prisoners. 
 
 On the night of the 26th-27th of January the batteries of the 
 attack ceased firing. 
 
 II. — Artillery Attack against the South Front. 
 
 The command here was entrusted to Colonel von Rietf, Presi- 
 dent of the committee on artillery experiments. This ofiicer 
 had arrived before Paris towards the end of September ; the 
 special reconnaissances, and all arrangements for the preparation 
 and execution of the attack had been carried out under his 
 orders. There were at his disj^osal 80 companies of garrison 
 artillery, with their staff, and a numerous body belonging to 
 the store department for duty in the various parks and depots. 
 
 The following batteries were constructed : — 
 
 A. — Left Wing. 
 
 Battery No. 1 (St. Cloud) for six 12-pounders. 
 
 Battery No. 2 (Meudon) for eight 12-pounders. 
 
 Both these batteries to act against Billancourt, the Bois de 
 Boulogne, and the islands in the Seine. 
 
 Batteiy No. 3 (Meudon) six 24-pounders. 
 
 Batteiy No. -i (Meudon) six 2-1-pounders. 
 
 These batteries to counter-batter and enfilade the south and 
 west fronts of Fort Issy. 
 
 Dismounting battery No. 16 (Meudon) four 12-pounders, to 
 fire against the gun emplacements at Fort Issy. 
 
 Dismounting and breaching battery No. 19 (Fleury and 
 Clamart) armed with four long and four short 24-pounders, 
 against the south front of Fort Issy, the long 24-pounders ao-ainst 
 the Paris enceinte. 
 
 Dismounting battery No. 20 (Clamart) for six long 24-pounders, 
 to fire against the south front and the north-west bastion of 
 Fort Vanvres. 
 
 B. — Centre. 
 
 Enfilade and dismounting battery No. 5 (Clamart), six 
 2'i-pounders, against the south-west curtain and the south bastion 
 of Fort Issy. 
 
 Enfilade battery No. 6 (Clamart), six 24-pounders, against the 
 south-east front of Fort Vanvres. 
 
 Enfilade and dismounting battery No. 7 (Moulin de la Tour) 
 for six 24-pounders, against the south front and the south-west 
 bastion of Fort Issy. 
 
 Dismounting battery No. 17 (Moulin de la Tour) for six 
 12-pounders, against the emplacements between Forts Issy and 
 Vanvres. 
 
 M 2
 
 164 
 
 Dismounting and breaching battery No. 8 (Moulin de la Tour) 
 for six 24 -pounders, against the south front of Fort Vanvres. 
 
 Enfilade and dismounting battery No. 9 (Moulin de la Tour) 
 for eight 12 -pounders, to fire on the west front of Vanvres and 
 its south-west bastion. 
 
 Enfilade and breaching battery No. 10 (Moulin de la Tour) 
 for six 24-pounders, against the south and west front of Fort 
 Vanvres. 
 
 Dismounting battery No. 21 (Chatillon) six short 24-pounders, 
 directed against the south-west front of Vanvres, and the neigh- 
 bouring gun emplacements. 
 
 C. — Rigid Wing. 
 
 Enfilade and dismounting battery No. 11 (Fontenoy) with 
 eight 12-pounders, to fiie on the west front of Fort Montrouge. 
 
 Enfilade and dismounting battery No. 12 (Fontenoy) eight 
 24-pounders, also to fire against the west front of Fort 
 Montrouge. 
 
 Dismounting battery No. 18 (Chatillon) for six 24-pounders, 
 to fire against Fort Montrouge, the emplacements to the west of 
 it, and the city. 
 
 Dismounting and enfilade battery No. 22 (Chatillon) for six 
 12-pounders, with the same object as No. 18. 
 
 D. — Batteries for vertical Fire. 
 
 Mortar battery No. 13 for two rifled mortars at the Tour des 
 Anglais, to fire against Fort Issy. 
 
 Mortar battery No. 14, armed like No. 13, to fire against Fort 
 Vanvres. 
 
 Mortar battery No. 15, armed like No. 13, against Fort 
 Montrouge. 
 
 Mortar battery No. 23 for four 50-pounder mortars against 
 Fort Issy. 
 
 Mfjrtar battery No. 24, armed like No. 23, against Fort 
 Vanvres. 
 
 In order to secure the right flank of the artillery attack, against 
 which the French made particular exertions, especially from 
 Villejuif, and to occupy the enemy's batteries there continuously, 
 a flank attack was organised on the line La Rue-Chevilly, under 
 command of General von Ramm, to be carried on independently. 
 The park attached to it was at Rungis, and two batteries, each 
 for six 12-pounders, were at first built in the given line, but 
 afterwards advanced somewhat nearer to Villejuif. 
 
 The original armament of, some of the batteries was cnanged 
 in the course of the siege operations to meet the alterations in 
 the range ; the greatest distance was 4,000 paces, and the smallest 
 1,700 paces ; during the last days of the bombardment, the 
 interior of the city was the object" of attack of nearly all the 
 batteries, some of which sent their projectiles to a distance of 
 12,000 paces.
 
 165 
 
 The garrisons of Forts Issy, Vanvres, and Montrouge observed 
 the ground in their front, by means of ou (-posts and piquets, 
 patrols from which had frequent small collisions with ours ; thus 
 on the 16th December 1870, two companies advancing from Fort 
 Tssy attempted to occupy the village of Meudon, but were 
 repulsed by the Prussian outposts, leaving five wounded behind 
 them. 
 
 With the object of gaining some ground on our side, the 
 French outposts were driven out of Bas Meudon, Le Moulineaux, 
 and Fleury shortly after midnight on the 3rd Januaiy ; strong- 
 reserves had been brought up for the occasion. During the same 
 night, the arming of the German batteries was completed ; but 
 the opening of the fire on the 4th January had to be postponed 
 on account of the fog. In order to take ofi* the attention of the 
 enemy from the attack on the south front, the Xllth corps 
 received orders to make demonstrations on the east side. In 
 accordance with these, on the 4th January, the 24th division 
 undertook a reconnaissance from Chelles ao-aiust Fort Nosjent, 
 whilst at the same time, the demolitions on Mont Avron were 
 carried on with great activity, to create the impression on the 
 enemy that German batteries were to be established there. 
 Two battalions of the 101st regiment, and a light battery 
 advanced against Neuilly sur Marne, and occupied a part of the 
 village and evacuated it again during the night ; as a conse- 
 quence of this, the enemy increased his force in the front, and 
 remained under arms till morning. 
 
 On the 5th of January there were more demonstrations, 
 principally against the villages of Nogent and Rosny. The 2nd 
 battalion of the 105th regiment and the 3rd battalion of the 
 106th regiment, accompanied by a light battery, were directed 
 against Nogent, whilst the enemy's outposts were threatened 
 from Mont Avron, and the 3rd battalion of the 101st regiment 
 was sent against the garrison of Bond3^ Other movements of 
 troops also occurred in this district. The Saxon detachments 
 retired from all points to their original position, after accomplish- 
 ing the tasks with which they had been charged, whilst the 
 French maintained an extremely heavy fire from 31 guns against 
 the German artillery position on the plateau of Raincy. From 
 the 31st of December until the 5tli of January the artillery of 
 the defence on the east front remained almost silent. 
 
 During these occurrences on the east front, the arming of the 
 German batteries on the south front had been completed without 
 molestation ; on the 5th of January, towards morning, the French 
 made several small sorties against the outposts on the hill of 
 Clamart. The latter had occupied the summit of the hill, and 
 were attacked during the previous night, three times in succes- 
 sion, on the last occasion with one battalion, which, however, 
 retired v;hen the bombardment opened. The 80th regiment also 
 repulsed a sortie made against Meudon. 
 
 On the 5th of January, as soon as the fog permitted a good 
 view of the enemy's position, the batteries opened their fire.
 
 1G6 
 
 which had been ordered to commence at half-past 8 o'clock 
 The principal attack fired this day on Forts Issy, Vanvres, and 
 Montrouge, from batteries No. 1 to 17 ; the collateral attack 
 directed its fire against the entrenchments at Yillejnif and the 
 gunboats that appeared on the Seine. 
 
 For the sake of brevity, we cannot give all the details of 
 the artillery fight which had now commenced ; it is sufficient to 
 remark that everywhere the French artillery, but particularly 
 from the main enceinte, and from the batteries at the Point 
 du Jour, showed the greatest activity, and proved itself to 
 be an opponent worthy of our respect, forcing us often enough 
 to give up the tasks originally assigned to single batteries, in 
 order to meet him with united strength. 
 
 January 6th. — Clear weather ; the fire from Fort Issy was 
 temporarily silenced. The enemy fired into St. Cloud, Bougival, 
 and Vaucresson from Fort Mont Valerien, and unmasked four 
 new batteries at the Point du Jour ; the guns on both sides of 
 the aqueduct engaged No. 1 battery and fired on to the plateau 
 of Meudon ; Forts Issy and Vanvres only fired slowl}^ ; on the 
 other hand Fort Montrouge directed a heavy fire against the 
 redoubt of Monlin de la Tour, Avhich was occupied by the 
 Bavarians, as well as against the village of Clamart. Our fire was 
 chiefly against Fort Issy and beyond that towards Paris against 
 the Point du Jour, and the adjoining batteries on the railway 
 embankment and the aqueduct. In the neighbourhood of Point 
 du Jour the flames broke out in several places. 
 
 January 7th and 8th. — Thick weather ; the firing was con- 
 tinued and set the barracks in Forts Vanvres and Montrouge in 
 flames ; our projectiles ranged from 9,000 to 9,500 paces up to 
 the gardens of the Luxembourg Palace, The revetments and 
 buildings inside Fort Issy were being demolished ; the fort 
 answering the fire but feebly. From Fort Vanvres there was 
 only a dropping fire. Montrouge was engaged with the Bavarian 
 battaries at Moulin de la Tour ; a barrack in the fort was set on 
 fire. Against the Point du Jour and the adjoining batteries the 
 artillery fight continued. Some of the batteries were silenced, 
 but the well-conducted defence and extended front of the fortress 
 enabled them soon to be replaced. 
 
 The authority of the Governor, General Trochu, over the 
 Parisian populace was beginning to be shaken ; he jdelded to 
 the pressure put on him and allowed himself to be hamj^ered by 
 a council of eight members ; in a proclamation issued he 
 repudiated the idea of a capitulation. 
 
 January 9th. — The object of our fire now was to prevent the 
 enemy from constructing new earthworks for gun emplacements, 
 communications, tfcc. ; the reply to it from his positions was less 
 energetic ; it seemed as if the enemy were engaged in with- 
 drawing the heavy calibres from the advanced positions. As 
 the day was foggy, with continuous driving snow, the batteries 
 of attack were ordered to slacken their fire. The government of 
 Paris made a protest against the bombardment of the city, which,
 
 167 
 
 considering that the siege had now been in progress for three 
 months and a half, and that in the conduct of the defence neither 
 towns, villages, nor palaces on their own soil had been spared, 
 was naturally rejected ; on the 8th-9th of January some of the 
 batteries received orders to bombard the inner portions of the 
 town. At half-past S in the evening, Le Val was attacked by 
 the lOtli company of the 87th regiment, and a subdivision of the 
 11th company of the same regiment was sent against Moulineaux, 
 as the enemy had located himself again in these places ; after a 
 good resistance he was driven out, and the besiegers by the 
 capture of these places were enabled to approach from 1,500 to 
 1,600 paces nearer to Fort Issy. 
 
 January 10th. — At 3 o'clock in the morning, some chasseurs 
 managed to penetrate into a new battery on the hill of Clamart, 
 which only opened fire on this day, but the covering party drove 
 them out again. This spot was of the utmost importance both 
 for the attack and the defence, and for weeks the ground had 
 been disputed by the outposts. Similar small aftairs occurred at 
 other places, evidently with the intention of making our approach 
 more difficult. Our fire, which was continued without inter- 
 mission, was answered by the enemj^ but only to a limited 
 extent. Paris was burning in several places. The battery at 
 St. Cloud fired into Billan court and the Bois de Boulogne. 
 
 On the 11th of January, a heavy fire was maintained against 
 the enemy's works and gun emplacements. The barracks in 
 Fort Issy wei*6 set in flames, as well as several houses in the 
 suburbs of Gentilly and Vaugirard, and in the north-east part of 
 the city; German projectiles ranged as far as the church of St. 
 Sulpice, a distance of 10,000 paces ; in the more exposed streets 
 of Paris, the stone paving was torn up. The enemy made a 
 skilful use of the entrenchments in front of, between, and in rear 
 of the forts connecting the gun emplacements, to construct new 
 batteries and change the position of the guns. The garrison of 
 Fort Mont Yaldrien undertook a reconnaissance against our 
 outposts at St. Germain, but were soon compelled to retreat. 
 
 January 12th. — The fog, which had been continuous, for the 
 last two days, still interfered with our fire. The enemy replied 
 to it vigorously from the main enceinte. Covered by the fog, the 
 garrison of Montrouge managed to mount some fresh guns. The 
 besiegers threw their projectiles far into the town beyond the 
 Luxembourg Palace, but the storming of the south forts, which 
 at one time was considered a necessity by some of the authorities, 
 was abandoned. In view of the original intention, a parallel had 
 been constructed between Clamart and Chatillon at a distance of 
 1,500 paces from Forts Issy and Vanvres ; which would have 
 formed the basis of a regular attack against those forts. 
 
 A decree published by the provisional government secured to 
 citizens wounded by the enemy's shells, the same claim to 
 pension as the military. 
 
 January l-Sth. — On account of the continued fog the fire on 
 both sides was slack. During the previous night a vigorous
 
 1G8 
 
 sortie of the French, by a force of about 4,000 mobiles stationed 
 in and behind the forts, was repulsed by detachments of the 
 Xlth corps at Meudon and by the Ilnd Bavarian corps at 
 Clamart. 
 
 January 14th. — The fire from tlie besiegers' batteries was 
 continued ; the three forts of Issy, Vanvres, and Montrouge had 
 almost ceased to fire, but the latter made an attempt to reply 
 with field guns when there was a favourable opportunity. 
 
 January loth. — After great labour and exertion battery No. 1 
 (St. Cloud) managed to silence the French batteries established 
 at the Point du Jour in the south bastion, and was enabled now 
 to continue its fire against the three butteries in the north 
 bastion and the town. Prussian projectiles were thrown as far 
 as the church of Notre Dame and the Jardin des Plantes. The 
 dissatisfaction and ferment increased to such an extent in the 
 town, that General Troclui had publicly to contradict tjie report 
 that several generals had been committed for treachery. 
 
 January IGth. — Battery No. 21 opened fire to-day to demolish 
 the casemates in Fort Issy. 
 
 January 17th and 18th. — The enemy showed great energy in 
 re-arming along his front and in the unexpected unmaslcing 
 of guns, which had been mounted in emplacements within the 
 entrenchments. 
 
 Then occurred that momentous event in the history of the world 
 when King William, within sound of the thunder of the siege 
 batteries, accepted for himself and his descendants the title of 
 Emperor, off"ered him by the German princes and free towns, with 
 the vow to uphold, in German faith, the rights of the empire and 
 its members, to preserve peace, and by the help of his people 
 to maintain the independence of Germany, as had been done 
 gloriously by Prussia's kings for 170 years. This ceremony took 
 place on the 18th of January 1871 in the Hall of Mirrors at 
 Versailles, in the presence of the German princes and surrounded 
 ])y representatives of the Geiman Army. 
 
 January 19th. — Notwithstanding the sortie from Fort Mont 
 Valerien against the heights of Garches, the guns on both sides 
 kept up an uninterrupted fire. 
 
 January 20th. — There was a slackening of the fire from the 
 artillery of the defence, probably in consequence of the failure of 
 the sortie of the previous day ; thus, the fire from Montrouge, 
 where the guns had been admirably fought, almost ceased 
 towards mid-day ; in the batteries at the Point du Jour the fire 
 ceased altogether for a time ; the eastern barracks in Fort 
 Vanvres were set in flames. General Trochu sent General Count 
 d'Herison to the commander of the 3rd army to demand an 
 armistice of 48 hours, which, however, was only conceded on the 
 line from St. Cloud to Garches for a sufficient time to bury the 
 dead. 
 
 January 21st and 22nd. — Heavy fire from the batteries ad- 
 joining the Point du Jour and the emplacements between the 
 three south forts ; among the latter a French redoubt constructed
 
 1G9 
 
 ill the interval between Forts Vanvres and Montrouge distin- 
 guished itself particularly ; it required nearly a whole day for 
 our batteries to master it. A powder magazine in rear of 
 Claraart Wiis blown up. Insurrectionary movements of the 
 Parisian populace were observed. 
 
 January 23rd. — Lively fire from the enceinte of the city ; 
 fresh batteries were unmasked by the French at the entrance to 
 the Bois de Boulogne. The artillery of the attack did not allow 
 itself be troubled by this, but managed to silence several bat- 
 teries of the main enceinte, and subdue the fire of the field 
 battery which had been so active on the previous day. 
 
 January 24th. — The fire of the besiegers' batteries could only 
 be continued at intervals on account of the fog, the enemy 
 replying but feebly. A serious outbreak occurred in Paris in 
 which the prison of Mazas was stormed, the prisoners liberated, 
 and the granaries with supplies of bread and wine plundered by 
 the mob ; in front of the Hotel de Ville the national guard 
 fired on the insurgents. 
 
 January 25th. — The enemy attempted, under cover of the fog, 
 to construct earthworks in and lound Fort Issy, but were 
 prevented. The bombardment continued as on the pre^^ous 
 days. 
 
 January 26th. — Clear wer.ther ; the bombardment was only 
 weakly answered from the enceinte of the city, from Fort Mont- 
 rouge and from the emplacements between Forts Vanvres and 
 Issy ; notwithstanding the weather being clear the artillery of 
 the defence were unable to accomplish anything. Equally futile 
 was the hea^y fire from the battery at the Point du Jour against 
 No. 1 battery. The batteries in front of Claniart were fired at 
 but slightly from the fortifications of the town and from Fort 
 Montrouge, and the neighbouring mortar batteries scarcely 
 at all. 
 
 January 27th. — After midnight the batteries on both sides 
 ceased firing by common consent. 
 
 The losses of the German artillery in the 22 days' bombardment 
 were 12 officers and 200 men killed and wounded ; the field 
 hospitals were established at Malabry and Sceaux, the chief 
 hospital at Igny, between Versailles and Palaiseau. Lieutenant- 
 General von Kamecke, who had been in command of the 14th 
 Division during the campaign, was ordered from Mezieres to 
 Paris to take over the chief command of the engineering works 
 of the attack. The works which had been carried out by the 
 engineers during the artillery bombardment M'ere, covered com- 
 munications between the batteries, shelter trenches, traverses, 
 assistance in building batteries and powder magazines, shell 
 stores, posts of observation, underground storerooms (all bomb- 
 proof), rendering the barracks which were not bombproof 
 secure as guard houses, preparation of defences, constructing and 
 maintaining roads, &c. Althourdi the trenches were tilled in 
 some places with water which increased the difficulties of usiua- 
 them, It was an evil which could only be partially remedied : it
 
 170 
 
 must always occur at a siege carried on during the winter, as 
 the trenches follow the lie of the ground and become the natural 
 points of accumulation for the surface and subsoil drainage. 
 
 III. — Artillery Attack agaixst the North Front (St. Denis). 
 
 The intricate works of St. Denis are among the strongest of 
 the defences of Paris, but they have one defect, that they have 
 not a sufficient command to be defiladed from the hills in front, 
 consequently they can be seen into, and in some places even 
 the works of the gorge can be fired at. 
 
 On the 21st of December, there was a sortie at Epinay le St. 
 Denis against the troops holding the investing line at that place ; 
 the gun-boats on the Seine co-operated, but eventUcilly it was 
 successfully repulsed by Prussian batteries of position at Orge- 
 mont and Enghien. 
 
 As long as Mont Avron continued in possession of the French, 
 it was impossible for the German batteries on the north-east 
 front to approach, nearer, because the German position on that 
 side of Paris as well as the strong French position La Cour- 
 neuve, Le Bourget, and Drancy, was brought under an effective 
 flanking fire. The capture of Mont Avron, which was of the 
 utmost importance, as well as the unsuccessful sortie of the 
 French against Le Bourget on the 21st December, must have 
 proved to the enemy that any attacks against the position of 
 the Guards there could lead to no result. In consequence 
 of these occurrences the French defence at that point lost 
 its energy, and the fire of the Prussian batteries was there- 
 fore turned against the villages of Drancy, Bobigny, Bondy, and 
 Rosny, with good effect; the forts of Noisy and Rosny were 
 only fired at occasionally. In the meantime, a number of other 
 German batteries were built on the line Livry-Garches, with the 
 intention of making a frontal attack against the French posi- 
 tion of La Courneuve-Drancy. Two batteries at Garches were 
 directed at the same time to enfilade the works of St. Denis. 
 
 For the actual bombardment of St. Denis, on the capture of 
 which great value was very properly set at head-quarters, it wns 
 necessary, exclusive of the 24 6-pounder field-guns, to organise a 
 special siege train, made up from, the guns which had been 
 employed at Mezieres and Peronne ; namely, 
 
 26 long 24-pounders, 10 short 24-pounders, 82 12-pounders, 
 and 3 rifled mortars. 
 
 The necessary preparations for the attack on St. Denis began 
 on the 10th of January ; the siege train park was established at 
 the railway station of Gonesse, a new transport park for 700 
 wagons was prepared at Ecouen, and a sufficient materiel, which 
 was already partially prepared, for the construction of the 
 batteries, was collected in depots at Arnouville and Montmorency. 
 In order not to postpone the building of the batteries until after
 
 171 
 
 the arrival of the siege artillery companies from Mezieres, tlie 
 em^Dlacements were constructed by men from the field artillery 
 and by the pioneers of the guard and 4th corps. The following 
 15 batteries were made : — 
 
 Batteries Nos. 1, 2, and 3, armed each with six long 24-pounders, 
 and six 12-pounders to fire against Drancy, Bobigny, and La 
 Courneuve. 
 
 Battery No. 4, armed with eight long 24-pounders, against 
 Foi-t Aubervilliers and the suburb of La Yilette. 
 
 Batteries Nos. 5, 6, 7. 8, and 9, armed respectively with six 
 long 24-pounders, six short 24-pounders, eight 12-pounders, and 
 three rifled mortars against the fort and village of Aubervilliers, 
 Fort de I'Est, Double Couronne, Fort de la Briche, and St. 
 Denis. '^i : ;. 
 
 Batteries Nos. 10 and 11, each armed with six long 24- 
 pounders and eight 12-pounders, against the fortifications of St. 
 Denis and the Seine. 
 
 Battery No. 12, armed with six long 24-pounders to fire at 
 the same objects. 
 
 Batteries Nos. 18, 14, and 15, armed with eight 12-pounders, 
 four short, and six long 24-pounders, against Forts de la Briche 
 Double Couronne, and the whole fortress of St. Denis. 
 
 All these .batteries opened fire on the 21st of January. 
 
 A glance at the map is sufficient to show that the besiegers' 
 batteries had the advantage of a concentric fire against St. Denis, 
 the collateral forts, and the French positions generally. As early 
 as the 22nd of January, the fire from St. Denis was almost 
 silenced. The town was in flames in several places. The repulse 
 of the sortie on the 19th of January, and the effect of the bom- 
 bardment against the whole circle of the Paris fortifications, with 
 the exception of Mont Valerien, had produced the greatest discord 
 and dissatisfaction among the populace of the capital. Serious 
 risings occurred among the people, which led, on the 23rd of 
 January, to a severance of the functions of President of com- 
 mittee of national defence from those of Commander-in-Chief of 
 the army. General Vinoy was appointed to the chief command 
 of the army of Paris, whilst General Trochu continued to be a 
 member of the Government only. 
 
 In the meantime, on the 25th and 26th of January, the bom- 
 bardment of the north front went on without interruption until 
 the night of the 26th-27th of January, when the fire on both 
 sides ceased here also. 
 
 On the evening of the 28th of January an armistice of three 
 daj^s was declared, for the negotiation of which Jules Favre, the 
 minister of foreign affairs for the Paris Government, had during 
 the last few days visited Versailles, and been backwards and 
 forwards between that place and Paris. The conditions with 
 regard to Paris were settled with a military commission which 
 arrived from the capital. They were as folloAvs : 
 
 All forts to be at once given up ; the main enceinte to be disarmed. 
 The troops of the line, marines and guards mobiles to become
 
 172 
 
 prisoners of war, with the exception of 12,000 men for the pre- 
 servation of order in the city. The prisoners to remain within the 
 gates of the city during the armistice and to hand over their arms ; 
 the garde nationale and the gensdarmerie to retain their arms. 
 All franc-tireur corps to be disbanded. The Germans to assist the 
 French commissaries as far as possible in the reprovisioning of 
 Paris. Persons desirous of quitting Paris to obtain a permit from 
 the French authorities, with a German visa. The municipality of 
 Paris to pay a contribution for the town of 200 million francs 
 within li days. Public property not to be removed during the 
 armistice. 
 
 In accordance with the above stipulations, on the 29th of 
 January, at 11 o'clock in the morning, all the forts, with the 
 exception of Vincennes, were, after a previous reconnaissance 
 for mines, &c., occupied by the besieging army ; Mont Valerien 
 and Fort Issy by the Vth Prussian corps, Forts Vanvres and 
 Montrouge by the Bavarian corps, Fort Charenton by the 1st 
 Bavarian corps, Forts Ivry and Bicetre by the Vlth Prussian 
 corps, the redoubts Gravelle and Faisanderie by the Wiirtem- 
 berg division, Forts Nogent, Posny, Noisy, and Romainville by 
 the XTIth Saxon corps, Fort d'Aubervilliers by the guard corps, 
 and the works of St. Denis ,by the guard and I Vth corps. At 
 the same time the outposts were brought within from 500 to 700 
 paces of the enceinte of the town, and the main positions 
 advanced in a corresponding degree. In all the forts occupied by 
 the Germans the necessary works were commenced that might be 
 required if the bombardment had to be continued at the reduced 
 rano-e. In the intervals between the south forts, and other 
 suitable positions, six new batteries were erected besides em- 
 placements, which were armed with the necessary guns and 
 prepared for opening fire. 
 
 The execution of the convention with Paris, and the disarma- 
 ment, was carried out without interruption ; though the delivery 
 of a large portion of the arms did not take place on account of 
 the angry feeling of the inhabitants, and for other reasons. How- 
 ever, near 200,000 Chassepot rifles, 600 field guns, and l,3o0 
 garrison guns fell into the hands of the victors. The total loss of 
 the Paris army during the siege is given as 17,000 kiUed. 
 
 On the 1st of March 10,000 men from each of the Vlth and 
 Xlth Prussian corps, and the Ilnd Bavarian corps, marched into 
 the Bois de Boulogne, where they were to remain two days for a 
 review which the Emperor King was to hold in the Champs 
 Elysees and the adjoining part of the town. 
 
 Lieutenant- General Kamecke acted as commandant of that part 
 of Paris which was occupied by the German troops. The latter 
 were to be relieved on the 3rd of March by a body of equal strength 
 from the guard corps, the siege artillery, and pioneers, and the 
 King's grenadiers, which had been specially recalled from Orleans 
 for the purpose. 
 
 This, however, never took place, as the ratification of the pre- 
 liminaries of peace by which the town was to be evacuated at
 
 173 
 
 once arrived from Bordeaux on the day before. His Majesty 
 nevertheless, held a review on Longchamps, and on the same day 
 our troops marched out of Paris. 
 
 The German armies now retired behind the line of the Seine ; 
 those troops which were prevented by the circumstances men- 
 tioned above from passing in review before His Majesty in Paris, 
 namely, the Xth Saxon corps, the 1st Bavarians, and the 
 Wiirtemberg division, were inspected by the King at Villiers. 
 
 This brings to a close the description which we have given in 
 broad outline of the glorious siege of Paris, which was carried on 
 during four months and a half with an expenditure of men and 
 material on both sides, quite without parallel in the history of 
 war; no other siege can be compared with it either for military 
 importance or political consequences.
 
 174 
 
 BELFORT. 
 
 (plate XIX.) 
 
 This fortress, in the valley of the Sund, lies at the junction of 
 three railroads, which lead on the east, via Altkirch and Miihl- 
 hausen to Basle, on the west via Vesoul to Paris, and on the 
 south-west into the valley of the Doubs to Besan9on ; it is 
 the point of junction of the roads from Epinal, Miililhausen, 
 Basle, Besan9on, and Vesoul. This important position gives the 
 fortress its military value, which is increased with regard 
 to operations against Germany, by the pass leading between 
 the Jura and the Vosges, called the Troude of Belfort, which 
 is always passable and not liable to snow drifts like most of 
 the defiles in the latter range. The possession of the fortress 
 became of the greatest importance to Germany after the conquest 
 of Alsace and the fortified towns there, and all the more so, as 
 experience showed that the population of this district, everywhere 
 hostile to the invaders, found a point of support in Belfort ; 
 besides which it was to our interest once and for all to capture 
 the gate by which French armies might debouch into South 
 Germany. 
 
 Belfort, with 14,000 inhabitants, lies on the left bank of the 
 Savoureuse, a tributary of the Doubs, an arm of which flows 
 through the town, where the banks are lined with iron 
 foundries. The Savoureuse forms on the north and north-east 
 of the fortress a tolerably broad valley with meadows ; on the 
 west, the slopes of the Haute du Mont and of La Cote, form a 
 belt of undulating ground about 1,500 paces in width ; on the 
 south side, there are more meadow lands, and on the east, several 
 long ridges, of great importance to the fortress, as well as some 
 isolated groups of hills and ranges of heights, among them the 
 Perches, approach within the rayon of the fortress. 
 
 The ground plan of the fortress consists of a fortified pentagon 
 built chiefly on Vauban's .3rd system. The north and west 
 fronts have three bastioned towers with detached bastions in 
 advance ; the latter front is strengthened by a ravelin with 
 retired flanks, and both are thoroughly flanked by the casemates 
 in the towers. In advance of the north front lies the crown- 
 work of I'Esperance, through which flows the Savoureuse, 
 dividing the fort into two halves, the upper and lower ; here is 
 the sluice-gate of the Savoureuse, by means of which an inunda-
 
 Plate XIXJ
 
 175 
 
 tioii can be formed. At the eastern end of this work lies a 
 bombproof barrack, another is situated on the arm of the 
 Savonreuse, to which alhision has ah-eady been made; on the 
 left wing is a casemated Ijatter}^ On the south-east side of the 
 town lies the citadel, commanding the former ; it was originally 
 planned by Marshal Vauban, and is situated on a steep rock 
 rising to a height of 80 feet above the level of the streets. This 
 fortification consists of a triple line ; namely, a. bastioned front 
 with two bombproof barracks lying one behind the other, a 
 counter-guard, and the outer works, which are of the nature 
 of a crownwork. Both the last-named lines of fortification 
 are provided partly with casemated, partly with open flanking 
 defences, so that the works of the citadel taken as a whole 
 may be considered ver}^ formidable and capable of good resist- 
 ance. Whilst the cliffs on the south-west command the ground 
 lying to the south of the fortress, and form a natural termina- 
 tion to the fortifications there, the defences of the chateau on 
 the north-east are connected, by a separate work having an 
 advanced ravelin, with Fort TEsperance ; from which the south- 
 eastern slope of the long ridge is swept, and on the extreme end 
 of it is the Fort La Justice. The latter is an independent fort, the 
 garrison of which can be accommodated in a bombproof redoubt 
 and in casemates. The work is connected by a curtain with 
 Fort la Miotte. We wish to call particular attention to the lines 
 of these two important outworks, which were planned by the late 
 celebrated inspector-general of the French engineers. General 
 Haxo, because they rendered the construction of the besiegers' 
 parallels and batteries against them a labour of great difiiculty, 
 almost of impossibility. An entrenched camp for 10,000 men 
 lies between the horn work I'Esperance, tlie work advanced on 
 the north-east of the chateau, and the forts of La Justice and 
 La Miotte. The steep slopes of the long ridge form the eastern 
 side, whilst the opposite one is enclosed by an earthwork ; in the 
 interior lies the suburb of Brisach. 
 
 Fort des Barres, which has a front of nearly 1,200 paces, is a 
 new and spacious work lying on the right bank of the Savour- 
 euse ; and covering the railway leading to Vesoul and Paris. 
 The three bastions have casemates en decharge ; in the centre 
 one is a powder magazine ; the gorge is closed by a loopholed 
 wall. 
 
 Notwithstanding the skill with which the works covered the 
 ground in front, still, at the outbreak of the war, there was a gap 
 in the defences, 2,000 paces south-east of the town, where the 
 ridge, called Perches, commanded the citadel, &c. Before the 
 introduction of rifled long-range guns, it may have been of no 
 consequence to the fortress, all the less so, because an attack on 
 that side would have been under an efiective flanking fire from 
 Forts La Justice and La Miotte ; now, however, the commandant 
 recognised the necessity of crowning these heights with two 
 works of a strong profile, though constructed hastily. The two 
 forts of Halite Perche and Basse Perche have each a front of
 
 176 
 
 from 350 to 400 paces, pi'ovided with two large and roomy 
 blockhouses in the gorge, the ditches beiog blasted out of the 
 solid rock with perpendicular sides, 9 feet deep ; the ground 
 plan has the form of a redoubt with a very broken crest line ; on 
 either side of the gorge were shelter trenches. The Fort Basse 
 Perche is situated 021 the same level as the citadel ; Haute Perche 
 on the contrary lies 30 feet higher, so that it commands the 
 citadel, and may be considered the key of the fortress. 
 
 Another work, Fort Bellevue, which had also been constructed 
 hastily, lay near the railway station, and covered the suburb of 
 Montbeliard ; It likewise had the form of a redoubt, with a very 
 indented crest line. Close to the fort is a farm, which had been 
 fortified, and was brought into the general line of defence. 
 
 Belfort was one of those fortresses which immediately on the 
 outbreak of the war was to have been placed in a state of defence, 
 and the experienced commandant Colonel Denfert, who belonged 
 to the engineer corps, endeavoured to accomplish this thoroughly 
 with all the means at his disposal. For a long time the commu- 
 nication with the south, which remained untouched by the war, 
 was open to him ; and from this side he was enabled to complete 
 the provisioning, as well as to provide all other matdriel for the 
 defence, so that the place had been strengthened and armed with 
 the greatest care. By this means all building was much facili- 
 tated, and was executed with praiseworthy thoroughness and 
 foresight. Guns of heavy calibre, with considerable supplies of 
 ammunition were brought from the great arsenals of Lyons and 
 Toulon. 
 
 None of the French fortresses that fell into our hands during 
 the course of the war, except Metz and Paris, had detached 
 forts, in consequence of which, and also because the besieging 
 artillery were enabled to occupy advantageous positions at close 
 range, their capture occupied only a short time. At Belfort the 
 case was quite different, for here there were not only very strong 
 well-placed detached forts, which kept the besiegers at a distance, 
 but there were extremely few places from whence a successful 
 artillery attack could be carried out. The season and the nature 
 of the ground were also peculiarly unfjwourable to the attack. 
 In addition to this was the military capability of the energetic 
 commandant, and to him must be given the credit of having by 
 military training and discipline turned the heterogeneous garrison, 
 confided to his charge, into opponents worthy of our respect. 
 But most prominent of all was the skill with wliich he defended 
 the ground in front of the works. The following description of 
 the siege will show that he only retired into the fortress proper, 
 during the last days of the defence, after the advance of the 
 enemy had been impeded considerably by the use of suitable 
 field works outside the fortress, which had been defended step 
 by step. 
 
 The 1st reserve division, under Major-General von Tresckow II., 
 received the order in the end of October 1870 to invest Belfort. 
 These troops were distributed at the time throughout Alsace and
 
 177 
 
 in the Vosges, and the march was, therefore, commenced with 
 only 11 battalions, 7 squadrons, and 4 batteries, inclusive of the 
 reinforcements from tlie 4th reserve division. The march was 
 accomplished by the 2nd of November, after constant fights 
 with the franc-tireurs and gardes mobiles. On the 3rcl of 
 November, the investment was completed; the line occupied by 
 the outposts being 5| miles (24-6 English miles) in length. With 
 an infantry force of only 8,000 men, against a garrison of double 
 that strength, who were active op]3onents, and on such unfavour- 
 able ground, where the view was intercepted by Avoods and hills, 
 this was no easy task ; numerous bands of franc-tireurs were in 
 the rear, and from Vesoul to Colmar there were no German 
 troops. Various reports about the presence of Garibaldi's par- 
 tisan corps on the other side of the Doubs necessitated great 
 caution. At the same time, the communication between the 
 different detachments was interrupted by high wooded hills, 
 without roads, in the possession of the enemy's outposts, which 
 were pushed far to the front. Without loss of time the strong 
 castle of Montbeliard, lying about three miles (14 English miles) 
 to the south of Belfort, was occupied. It lies on the Rhine-Rhone 
 canal, and is at the junction of the Allaine, Savoureuse, and 
 Lisaine ; it was placed in a good state of defence, and provisioned 
 for three weeks. The roads that had been broken up were 
 repaired, and the neighbourhood cleared of franc-tireurs. The 
 patrols having reported that Dampierre to the south-west of 
 Montbeliard Avas occupied by the enemy, General von Tresc- 
 kow II. advanced on the 11th November by both banks of the 
 Doubs to Clerval, pushing the enemy in front of him, who in 
 retiring blew up the bridges and destroyed the communication. 
 
 In front of Belfort there were daily small collisions with 
 the enemy's advanced outposts, who were gradually driven 
 back on the fortress. In the meantime. Forts Miotte, Justice, 
 and the two Perches, having a high command and extended view 
 over the ground in this direction, kept up a heavy fire on the 
 wretched villages that were used as cantonments, so that these 
 were completely destroyed. 
 
 After the fall of Breisach, the division received the order to 
 open the siege ; General von Mertens to take command of the 
 engineer works, and Lieutenant-Colonel von Scheliha of the siege 
 artillery. The technical preparations for the siege met with 
 many difiiculties ; above all, the bringing up of the guns, ammu- 
 nition, other siege apparatus, and the provisions occupied much 
 time, as the transport by rail, via Miihlhausen, could only be 
 effected as far as Dannemarie, and from the latter place by road 
 through a difficult country. The principal siege train park was 
 north of Chalonvillars on the Paris-Belfort road ; another at 
 Moval on the road to Delle. 
 
 The next thing was to secure the besieging army towards the 
 south, where the French held a line from the Swiss frontier to 
 Isle sur Doubs ; constant fights occurred here, and gradually all 
 the bridges over the Doubs were destroyed by one party or the 
 other. It was above all things necessary for the troops carrying 
 
 36996. X
 
 178 
 
 on the sieoe to gain ground immediately in front of the fortress ; 
 a task which was rendered very difficult by the behaviour of the 
 garrison ; they made a sortie against Bessoncourt on the 15th of 
 November, with three battalions and six guns, which was 
 repulsed by the Neustadt battalion of landwehr ; the enemy 
 lost three officers and 200 men. On the 23rd of November the 
 combined landwehr regiment, under Colonel Geiicke, captured 
 Valdoye and Mont d'Arsot, and that under Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Ostrowsky, seized the strongly-occupied villages of Cravanche 
 and Essert with Mont Salbert, which lies between them. The 
 enemy made repeated attempts to re-capture these, but failed ; 
 similar sorties were made on the 24th of November against the 
 villao-es of Vezelois and Sevenans, which were repulsed by the 
 Zitzewitz landwehr regiment. The enemy could only be driven 
 step by step out of his advanced positions ; each separate village 
 or wood was the object of a struggle ; the night surprises were 
 generally successful, by which means the villages of Botans, 
 Aroid-ians, and Bavilliers fell into our hands, and enabled our 
 outposts to be advanced to the eastern slope of the Hauteur du 
 Mont and to the Tuilerie, that is to say, into the neighbourhood 
 of Forts Bellevue and des Barres. From this moment the close 
 investment began ; the outposts, however, still extending for a 
 distance of from 5 to 6 leagues^ whilst the cantonments of the 
 main body occupied from 9 to 10. It was necessary, as soon as 
 the besiegers captured the successive positions, to secure them 
 with field works, and maintain the utmost vigilance in patrolling. 
 The headquarters were removed from La Ciiapelle to Fontaine, 
 and the corps, notwithstanding the dispersed positions it occupied, 
 had also to cover a line of communication for IG miles (75 English 
 miles) in Alsace. 
 
 In consequence of a reconnaissance which had taken place on 
 the 16th of November, it was decided to try the result of a bom- 
 bardment, as it might, perhaps, influence a capitulation, and also 
 because sufficient materiel for a regular siege had not yet arrived. 
 To the east of Essert lies a flat-topped ridge, where the batteries 
 for this purpose could be constructed undercover of the advanced 
 troops ; the construction of Batteries Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, 
 armed respectively with four 12-pounders, two short 24-pounders, 
 and two 12-pounders, four short 24-pounders, four long 
 24-pounders, four 12-pounders, four 27-centimetre mortars, and 
 four long 12 pounders was commenced, whilst a demonstration 
 was made on the east side of the fortress by Colonel von Bud- 
 denbrock's detachment to engage the attention of the enemy. 
 The construction of the batteries was completed on the night of 
 the 2nd-3rd of December, unperceived by the enemy, notwith- 
 standing the moonlight. When the batteries opened fire at 
 8 o'clock in the morning, the artillery of the defence replied to 
 them with vigour and without intermission. This cost us a loss 
 of one officer and 10 men killed and 30 wounded ; our projectiles 
 ranged up to the suburbs of Belfort and the neighboiu'hood of 
 the castle, without, however, doing much damage to the enemy's 
 artillery in their commanding position. The bombardment
 
 179 
 
 reached its height on the 8th and 9th of December, witli good 
 results, against the Faubourg de France ; the artillery of the 
 garrison had set in flames the villages of Cravanche, Bavilliers, 
 and Essert, In order to draw closer round the fortress, and 
 prepare for the formal attack on the Perches, the besiegers' 
 artillery was extended towards the right flank ; for this purpose 
 the outposts on the south side had to be advanced. In the 
 execution of this, on the night of the 14th of December, the 
 Deutsch-Crone battalion seized the wood of Bosmont, which was 
 diflicult to penetrate, and had been strengthened by abattis, and 
 the Konitz battalion took the Grand Bois, where they captured 
 an enemy's piquet of one officer and 45 men. On the other 
 hand an attack made in the same night against Danjoutin failed, 
 partly because it was occupied in great strength, and partly 
 because the artillery fire which was to prepare the way for the 
 assault had not been sufficiently eftective against the enemy's 
 defences on account of the fog. At the same time the enemy 
 made a sortie against Bavilliers. Our loss was two officers and 
 79 men ; that of the enemy one officer and 80 unwounded 
 prisoners. These circumstances made it possible on the night of 
 the 17th-18tli of December to build No. 8 battery for four long 
 24-pounders to act against And elnans and Danjoutin ; with the 
 same object. Batteries Nos. Ha and 9 were thrown up during the 
 night of the l7th-18th of December, armed respectively with 
 two J2-pounders and four 6-pounders, as well as with two 
 27-centimetre mortars. 
 
 It now became necessary to strengthen the existing artillery 
 positions to the south-west of the fortress, and to place the re- 
 quisite batteries on well selected points at a nearer range. Their 
 execution, however, had to be postponed partly on account of 
 the continuous rain having cut up the i^oads, which had never 
 been good, and thus -delayed the transport of the guns ; and 
 partly on account of the want of troops, who were scarcely 
 sufficient for the works and the duties under arms ; further the 
 seven battalions of the 4th reserve division, who were coming 
 to reinforce the Germans, arrived but slowly, and the total of 
 the investing army, including the detachments in the south on 
 the heights of Montbeliard, was only 22 battalions of 800 men 
 each. In the meantime frost had set in, and the arming of the 
 batteries could be proceeded with. Batteries Nos. 10, 11, and 
 12 were built on the evening of the 24th of December at Bavil- 
 liers, the first being armed with four long 24-pounders, and the 
 two latter with four 12-pounders each. They were to fire against 
 the horn work of I'Esperance, the post of La Ferme and the 
 Perches ; then batteries Nos. 13 and 14 were built under great 
 difficulties on account of the crround, and armed each with 
 four long 24-pounders ; they were to fire against the Forts 
 Haute-Perche, and La Justice. The batteries Nos. 10, 11, and 
 12, however, did not open fire until the 28th of December, after 
 they had been connected by trenches with the batteries on the 
 
 N 2
 
 180 
 
 left at Epert, and ou the right with the village of Bavilliers. 
 In the night of the 28th-29th of December batteries Nos. 15, 16, 
 17, and 18 were begun, the first one armed with four 27-centi- 
 metre mortars and the remaining "three with four 12-pounders 
 each ; they were to 0]3en fire on the 7th of January against 
 the village of Daujoutin, still remaining in the possession of 
 the enemy, and against the two Perches. Battery No. 19 was 
 also built at this date ; it was originally armed with two 21- 
 centimetre mortars, and later with two 25-centimetre mortars, to 
 throw shells into the town and citadel. 
 
 The first news of the approach of a relieving army under the 
 command of General Bourbaki was received on the 25th of 
 December, The situation of tlie besieging array was not a 
 favourable one. The XI Vth corps stood far ofif at Dijon ; the 
 troops of the investment occupied extended positions, whilst the 
 batteries and siege train parks were on the side from which 
 the enemy was approaching. What was going on on the other 
 side of the Doubs behind the enemy's outposts was unknown, as 
 the bridges were blown up and other communications destroyed. 
 As soon, however, as the news was confirmed the siege operations 
 had to be slackened. But the position at Arcey, as well as the 
 section of the Allaine, had to be prepared with field works and 
 occupied in greater strength ; four 24-pounders were mounted 
 in the castle of Montbeliard, the bridges over the Allaine pre- 
 pared for blowing up, and the roads from Isle sur Doubs to 
 Hericourt and Montbeliard blocked. 
 
 Between the 29th and 31st of December, the besieging army 
 was reinforced by a detachment from Alsace under command of 
 General von Debschitz, consisting of 3 battalions, 2 squadrons, 
 and 2 batteries, so that the total of the investing army was 
 raised to 30 battalions, G squadrons, 6 batteries, 2(j companies 
 of artillery (of which 7 were Bavarian, 4 Baden, and 3 Wtirtem- 
 berg) and G companies of pioneers (to which Bavaria, Baden, and 
 Wiirtemberg each contributed 1). The Prussian siege artillery 
 before Belfort consisted of 12 companies from the guard, 4th, 
 6th, and 7th garrison artillery regiments. The detachment of 
 General von Debschitz occupied the line Audincourt-Vaudon- 
 court- Croix, where they were in frequent collision with the 
 enemy's outposts ; thus, for instance, on the 2nd of January at 
 St. Croix with the Liegnitz battalion, when four French officers 
 and 200 men were driven over the Swiss frontier. At Arcey, 
 also, where Colonel von Bredow was posted with 5 battalions, 
 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries, the necessary reconnaissances 
 towards Isles sur Doubs led to skirmishes. Under these circum- 
 stances the opening of the regular attack, which was now fully 
 prepared, had to be postponed. The construction of batteries con- 
 tinued steadily nevertheless, and when it appeared that the enemy 
 had withdrawn in consequence of the movements of the XlVth 
 corps to its left, and that an attack from the relieving army 
 was no longer imminent, the necessary movements of troops for 
 the intended opening of the formal siege was ordered. As a
 
 181 
 
 preliminary to this, Captain von Manstein, commander of the 
 Schneidemiihl landwehr battaUon was directed on the night of 
 the 8th January to sieze the village of Danjoutin, which was 
 entrenched and held in force by the enemy. The 5 th and 7th 
 companies quitted the wood east of Danjoutin half an hour after 
 midnight and, followed by the Gth and 8th companies, advanced 
 to the attack of the eastern edge of the village. The attack 
 succeeded, and while the 7th and 5th companies pushed the 
 enemy out of the houses and from the barricades in the village, 
 a company of pioneers immediately put them in a state of 
 defence; a company from the 1st and 14th landwehr regi- 
 ments endeavoured to cut off the enemy on tlie south-west, 
 whilst the 5th and 8th companies occupied the railway station, 
 so as to be in position to oppose an expected sortie from the 
 Perches, which actually took place soon after, supported by a 
 battery that came into action at Fort Bellevue, and was repulsed. 
 Notwithstandino; the excellent and well-executed arrano-ements, 
 we lost 2 officers and 80 men, and the enemy 3 officers and Q5 
 men, exclusive of 18 officers and 700 men made prisoners. The 
 building of the batteries made but slow progress on account of 
 the frost and the rocky soil. The pioneers assisted in lajdng out 
 and completing the battery communications at Ravilliers, and 
 afterwards entrenched the village of Danjoutin. Still the formal 
 attack could not be begun, as the relieving army was again 
 approaching. 
 
 On the 9tli of January, the march of French columns from Cour- 
 celles on Arcey was reported. Colonel von BredoAV concentrated 
 his detachment there, and exchanged a few shots with the enemy. 
 The French advanced from Seloncourt towards Vaudoncourt and 
 Dasle against the detachment of General von Debschitz, but were 
 repulsed ; on the next day a portion of the detachment made an 
 attack on Abevilliers. On the 10th of January the enemy de- 
 veloped a larger force with guns, opposite to Von Bredow's 
 detachment, but without attacking. General von Werder sent 
 information that he was marching on Belfort ; he arrived on the 
 11th of January, and all the pioneers and a portion of the siege 
 guns were placed at his disposal. 
 
 The positions Abevilliers, Audincourt, Montbeliard, Hericourt, 
 Chagey, Frahier were fortified and provided with emjjlacements 
 for guns of position, which afterwards had an important influence 
 on the successful issue of the battle. The bridges over the 
 Lisaine, at Busurel, and others as far as Dello were blown up, and 
 the passage of the Ballon d'Alsac to the north of Giromagny 
 destroyed by Nagle's Bavarian pioneer company ; the bridges 
 lying in the line of retreat had to be restored. Von Bredow's 
 detachment in its advanced position at Arcey had assisted 
 materially in arresting the progress of the enemy, so that the 
 divisions on the march gained time to form up behind the section 
 of the Lisaine. 
 
 We must pass over the general description of the battle there. 
 General von Tresckow II. took command of the left wing of the
 
 182 
 
 Prussian position, in addition to that of the investing army. 
 General von Debschitz passed under the immediate command of 
 General von Werder, and had to maintain a series of fights 
 between Doubs and the Swiss frontier. Those troops of the 4th 
 reserve division, which had formed a part of the besieging army, 
 rejoined it. The 1st reserve division, to whom the task of the 
 investment was allotted, had only a small share of the fighting ; 
 as, for instance, in the attack on Chenebier, where the fusilier 
 battalion of the G7th regiment, in company with Baden troops, 
 lost 5 officers and 110 men. During the battle the besieging 
 army remained constantly under arms ; the garrison onl}^ made 
 two small sorties against the west flank. The bombardment of 
 the fortress as well as the construction of the batteries continued 
 steadily. 
 
 It was at this time that batteries Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 
 were built to fire on the citadel. Forts la Justice and Miotte, as 
 well as on the hornwork and the main enceinte ; they v/ere 
 armed respectively with two smooth-bore and two rifled 21 centi- 
 metre mortars, four short French 24-pounders, four long 24- 
 pounders, four long 24-pounder?, and five 12-pounders. 
 
 After the departure of Bourbaki's army the siege was again 
 carried on with energy. On the night of the 21st of January the 
 ground necessary for the security of the right wing of the first 
 parallel as well as the village of Perouse were occupied. This 
 attack was conduced by Colonel von Zglinicky, commanding the 
 67th regiment; the 1st and 2nd battalions, the former being in 
 reserve, seized the entrenched woods of Baillis and Taillies at 
 midnight, and a landwehr battalion of the 26tli regiment took 
 the wood of Morveaux as well as the redoubt there, all without 
 firing a shot. At Perouse, on the contrary, there was severe 
 hand-to-hand fio-htine: both in the streets and houses, but their 
 possession was maintained regardless of the heavy fire from 
 the two Perches and from Fort Justice. As a means of re- 
 cognition among the columns tlie forcible German countersign 
 of "Haut ihn " (strike him) was given. Our casualties on 
 this occasion were 8 officers and 17-J men, while the enemy 
 lost 5 officers and 93 men as unwounded prisoners alone. Battery 
 No. 8, armed with four 12-pounders, had been engaged against 
 Perouse ever since the Sth of January. On the evening of the 
 21st of that month, the first parallel on the line Danjoutin- 
 Perouse against the Perches, together with the communications in 
 rear were completed by a working party of 3,000 men, without 
 any important interruption from the enemy ; it was only delaj'^ed 
 by the ground being frozen to a depth of 1^ feet and the rocky 
 nature of the soil. For these reasons the parallels and communi- 
 cations could not be completed to the necessary profile until the 
 26th of January. The following batteries were built gradually in 
 line with the parallels: No. 26 for four 50-pounder mortars 
 against the Basse- Perche, No. 27 for four 12-pounders against the 
 Haute-Perche, No. 28 for four 60-pounder mortars, and No. 34 
 for two 6-pounders and two 25-pounder mortars against the Haute-
 
 183 
 
 Perche, and to secure the parallel against sorties. The ]-)iincipal 
 engineer depot was in rear of batteries Nos. 15 to 18, on the high 
 road where it quits Daujoutin at the south-east ; two other engi- 
 neer depots were behind the railway embankment, at the point 
 where it intersected the approaches. The artillery of the defence 
 were at this period, although not very energetic, still fairly 
 active. The attack on the Perches was rendei-ed difficult both by 
 fire from the castle and Forts la Justice and Miotte as well as by 
 the rocky ground, the parapets on which had in some places to be 
 formed of sand bags. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the 
 second parallel was completed l)y the 1st of February. At this 
 period, the construction of mortar batteries No. 29 for eight 
 7-pounder mortars, against the Haute-Perche, and No. 80 against 
 the Basse-Perche for four 7-pounder mortars. No. 31 for six 
 GO-pounders against La Justice and Miotte, and gun batteries 
 Nos. 32 and 33 against La Justice and the town, was taken in 
 hand. The labour was very severe at first on account of the 
 cold, afterwards on account of the water, which in consequence of 
 the sudden thaw and rain filled the trenches in some places to a 
 depth of four feet ; as the bottom of the trench could not be 
 constructed level, but had to follow the natural inclination of the 
 ground. 
 
 There were many pressing reasons for bringing the siege to a 
 speedy conclusion, and an assault on the two Perches was there- 
 fore ordered for the evening of the 26th of Januar}^ Five 
 infantry companies, and one of pioneers were told off for this 
 duty. According to the arrangement, three infantry companies 
 were to form the attacking party, one on each flank, the third to 
 advance against the gorge of the works, two companies to remain 
 in support; the pioneers were to blow up the half-sunken block- 
 houses in the ditches at the gorge, remove palisades and cut steps 
 in the counterscarp and parapet ; a working party, 2,400 strong, 
 were drawn up in the parallel, ready, in the event of the assault 
 being successful, to continue the trenches up to the Perches as well 
 as to construct the connecting line of entrenchment. Colonel von 
 Zglinicky commanded the whole. The left column against fort 
 Basse Perche pushed forward up to the ditch at a quarter before 
 7 o'clock in the evening. Tlie pioneers with First- Lieutenant von 
 Bichthofen and Lieutenant Kraatz, jumped down and began their 
 work ; the infantry columns pressed forward with them, one 
 entered the ditch in front and the other two into the trench-like 
 ditches on either side of the gorge. The commandant in expecta- 
 tion of such an assault had placed two battalions with a working 
 party in reserve in rear of the forts, who, advancing at the right 
 moment, repulsed the attack. The result of the attack by the 
 right column on Haute-Perche was more satisfactory so far, that 
 an undulation of the o-round screened it from the defender's view 
 durmg the greater portion of its advance, but beyond that point 
 it was checked by the heavy fire of the enemy. The assault 
 therefore completely failed. The loss of the right column was 
 small, the left column had 5 officers and 250 unwounded men.
 
 1S4 
 
 taken prisoners, as they were surrounded by a superior Frencli 
 force in the ditches from which they could not escape ; there were, 
 besides, 9 officers and 168 men killed and wounded. Both columns 
 were much hnpeded by wire entanglements, that were formed 
 between the stumps of the trees, where the wood of Perche had been 
 felled. The reconnaissances previously undertaken by engineer 
 officers, Captain Koch of the Caden pioneers and First-Lieutenant 
 von Eichthofen (who was taken prisoner in the assault) failed on 
 account of the watchfulness of the French sentries and led there- 
 fore to no result. 
 
 After the 26th Januarj^", news of a fresh movement of a con- 
 siderable hostile force from Morteau and Hyppolyte, made it neces- 
 sary to bring the strength of General v. Debschitz's detachment, 
 which had advanced fighting to Blamont and Pont de Roide, 
 up to 7 battalions, 2 squadrons, and 2 batteries. General 
 V. Debschitz encountered masses of unarmed French troops 
 beyond Maiche, who passed over the Swiss frontier. After this 
 detachment, assisted by the 4th reserve division, had cleared the 
 country between the Doubs and the Swiss frontier as far as 
 Pontarlier, it returned. In the meantime the trench work pro- 
 gressed rapidly, partly by flying sap, partly by half double sap, 
 according as the vigilance of the enemy, the energy of his fire, 
 and the weather and time of day permitted. The engineer corps 
 had to lament the loss of First-Lieutenant Miiller, who died, and 
 of Captains Koch and von Oidtmann, of Lieutenants Adam and 
 Longard, who, with many pioneers, were wounded. 
 
 The difficulties of the ground and the disease among the 
 troops increased seriously. There was so much sickness, espe- 
 cially among the technical troops, that it became necessary to 
 order up two additional companies of garrison pioneers from 
 Strasburg for the siege. The gun emplacements Nos. 35 and 
 36 aojaiust the Haute-Perche, having been constructed and 
 armed each with two 6-pounders, opened fire. On the 8th of 
 February the two Perches were successfully captured by sur- 
 prise. Captain Rose of the engineers, who was on duty v/ith 
 his company in the crowning against the Haute-Perche, noticed 
 that there were no French sentries behind the rampart.- He 
 jumped at once into the ditch, climbed the parapet, called on 
 the nearest men at work in the trenches to follow, ordered 
 the covering party, consisting of the Gels and Hirschberg 
 battalions, to advance, and pressed forward into the interior, 
 taking as prisoners 10 of the weak garrison. As soon as First- 
 Lieutenant von Weltzien and Captain Pflaume, both of the 
 engineers, saw what happened, they agreed with Major Brink- 
 mann of the Kirschberg battalion, to make a similar assault on 
 the Basse-Perche, which was captured after a short fight. 
 
 On the 19th February, batteries Nos. 37, 38, and 39 opened 
 their fire, the two first against the castle, and the latter against 
 Fort Justice. They were each armed with four long 2'1-pounders, 
 and their construction, apart from certain interruptions, had 
 occupied a very long time.
 
 185 : 
 
 In the niglit of the 9th-10th of February, the connecting 
 works between the captured forts and the lodgment in the interior 
 were completed. Besides shattered gun-carriages, there were 
 found in each fort three partially disabled guns. The artillery 
 officers immediately brought their guns out of the nearest batteries, 
 by a temporary'' bridge made over the ditch ; and opened fire to 
 meet an expected sortie of the enemy. The latter replied with a 
 very heavy cannonade lasting several hours, during which, however, 
 the works in the gorge had to be continued. We lost in consequence 
 ] officer (Lieutenant v, SteinkeUer), 6 men killed, and 33 wounded. 
 On the same evening the commandant demanded an armistice. 
 This was, however, refused, as the commandant requested to 
 hold the fortress until the return of the officer who had been 
 despatched to the French Government for instructions. In the 
 meantime, the following batteries were constructed in the second 
 parallel ; No. 40 for four 27-centimetre mortars against the 
 castle, Nos. 41 and 42 for six 60-pounders and four 7-pounder 
 mortars repectively, to fire against the castle and the farm ; the 
 former opened fire on the 1 0th, and the latter on the 11th of 
 February. The heights of the two Perches were now turned into 
 a formidable artillery position for 60 guns placed thus : 
 
 a. On the right of the Haute-Perche, batteries Nos. 39, 38, 
 and 37, armed each with four 24-pounders, and No. 53, 
 for four 24-pounders, against the Citadel and Fort la 
 Justice. 
 h. Between the Haute and Basse Perches, batteries Nos. 34(X, 
 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50, armed respectively 
 with four 12-pounders, four 12-pounders, four long 24- 
 pounders, four 50-pounders, and two 27-eentimetre 
 mortars, four short 24-pounders, four 12-pounders, four 
 12-pounders, and four 12-pounders, all to fire against 
 the Citadel. 
 c. To the left of the Basse-Perche, batteries Nos. 51, 52, and 
 36a, armed respectively with four long 24-pounders, four 
 short 24-pounders, and two 6-pounders, to fire on the 
 Citadel, the west front of the town, and Fort des Barres. 
 Finally, battery No. 53, for four long 24-pounders, was con- 
 structed south of Perouse, to fire against Fort Miotte. 
 After calling the attention of the commandant to this impos- 
 ing artillery array, he was summoned, at 3 p.m. on the 13th of 
 February, to surrender. Just at this time the expected instruc- 
 tions from his government arrived; and the negotiations, which 
 were at once begun with Captain von Schultzendorf, of the 
 general staff, led to a preliminary armistice, to^ give the ^ com- 
 mandant an opportunity of learning the situation of affairs in 
 France, as well as to enable him to prepare for the capitulation. 
 
 There was no interruption in the engineers' works, who pushed 
 out a sap from Basse-Perche against the castle during the night 
 of the 14th of February, and only ceased the advance towards 
 morning.
 
 186 
 
 On the afternoon of the loth of February, the commandant 
 announced himself prepared to surrender the fortress. The 
 neo-otiations continued until 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 
 16th of February. A convention was concluded by which the 
 commandant of the fortress. Colonel Denfert-Rochereau, was to 
 hand over the town, the forts, and the war materiel, to General 
 von Tresckow II. on the IStli of February at mid-day ; the 
 garrison (with the exception of the guards) were to quit the 
 fortress before that hour with all the honours of war, in con- 
 sideration of their gallant defence. The garrison were marched 
 by two roads, in echelons of 1,000 men, to the department Saone 
 and Loire. 7,000 were marched off on the 1 7th of February, and 
 7,500 followed on the 1 8th. According to the report that was 
 received, the garrison numbered 17,000, of whom 11,500 left the 
 fortress, leaving 2,000 sick behind ; the remaining 3,500 were 
 accounted for by deaths, desertion, and as prisoners. The total 
 losses of the besiegers, including those in the open field, were 
 2,100 men. 
 
 On the 18th of February, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the 
 powder magazines and mines were occupied by the German 
 troops ; at 12 o'clock they took possession of the gates, and 
 relieved the guards ; about 280 guns were captured in the 
 fortress. At 2 o'clock p.m. there was a triumphal entry by the 
 Porte du Vallon. A short religious service was held in the 
 entrenched camp, after which General von Tresckow II. called 
 for cheers for his Majesty the Emperor, and the allied German 
 princes, whilst the Prussian flag was hoisted on the castle and 
 saluted with 101 rounds fired from the captured guns. The town 
 itself, as well as the suburbs, had suffered severely from the 
 bombardment. 
 
 After the fulfilment of the conditions of the treaty of peace 
 with France, Belfort was restored to the French.
 
 187 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 The foregoing pages contain a short description of the fortress- 
 warfare in front of those places, which, lying on the north and 
 east frontier of France, barred the march of our armies, and show 
 how their reduction was accomplished by operations on a more 
 or less extended scale. According to the title of the book our 
 task would therefore be completed. 
 
 But it seems to us desii-able to narrate in this appendix as a 
 sequel, those occurrences which relate to the conquest of some 
 small fortified places lying within the zone of operations of the 
 1st army (the citadel of Amiens and the small fortress Peronne), 
 although neither a special besieging army with the accompanying 
 technical troops, nor regular siege artillery were employed, nor 
 even the special technical preparations for siege operations 
 undertaken. We consider this due to our brave 1st army, that 
 fought so well under most difficult conditions, and, on whose 
 operations, these fortresses had such an important influence. We 
 also wish to add a description of the gallant and successful coup- 
 de-main for the capture of Rocroy. 
 
 Advance of the 1st Army. 
 
 After the capitulation of Metz, the 1st army, commanded by 
 General of cavalry Freiherr von ManteuflTel, consisted of the corps 
 under Lieut.-General von Bentheim, the Vlltli corps under 
 Lieut. -General von Zastrow, and the Vlllth corps under Lieut.- 
 General von Goeben, the brigade of General von Senden, and the 
 3rd cavalry division under General Count von der Groben. 
 
 The first task, a difficult one, that fell to this army^ was the 
 evacuation of Metz, and the transport to the rear of 150,000 
 prisoners, also to hold Metz ; to besiege Thionville, Longwy, 
 Montmedy, Mezieres, and in part Verdun, for the security 
 of our line of communication with Paris and the west, and 
 afterwards to maintain these, whilst advancing against the 
 north-west of France ; to overthrow the newly-formed French 
 armies at Lille and Amiens ; finally the siege of La Fere had to 
 be undertaken as well. General v. Zastrow, with the Vllth 
 corps and the brigade of General v. Senden (19th and 81st 
 regiments of the Srd reserve division), had the duty allotted to 
 liim of holding Metz, and carrying on the fortress-warfare on the
 
 188- 
 
 northern frontier of France, in the manner that we have already 
 described. 
 
 Further, the troops before Verdun under General von Gayl 
 had to be reinforced, so that after the detachment had left for 
 La Fere, and the 1st division had been despatched for the 
 investment of Mezieres, there remained for operations in the 
 open field only two incomplete army corps and the 3rd cavalry 
 division. On the 7th of November the army began its march 
 to the west of France by two roads. The 1st corps by Briey, 
 Spincourt, Damvillers, Busency, Eethel, Laon, and Noyon ; the 
 Vlllth corps, on the left, took the road by Etain, Verdun, 
 Varennes, Eeims, Soissons, and Compiegne. 'The Srd cavalry 
 division, accompanied by infantry and artillery, was several days' 
 march in advance to clear the Argonne Forest of franc-tireur 
 bands. Afterwards it rejoined the main body and marched in 
 close connexion with it. 
 
 Just as the army reached the Meuse, Verdun capitulated, and 
 a very important road junction thus fell into our hands. In 
 this forward movement, the army gave brilliant proofs of its 
 marching capabilities; having in 14 days accomplished a dis- 
 tance of from 33 to 36 miles (155 to 169 English miles), measured 
 in a straight line, or 2|- (11 f English miles) per deiy. As the 
 route of the 1st corps led within from 2 to 4 (9 to 18 English 
 miles) of the French line of fortresses, it was necessary, in order 
 to cover the flank, that Montmedy and Mezieres should be 
 observed or invested, in the manner already described in the 
 histor}'- of the sieges of those places. 
 
 On the 20th of November, the head of the columns reached the 
 line of the Oise, the right being at Noyon and the left at Com- 
 piegne, and it was at this time that the 3rd cavalry division, 
 with artillery and two jager battalions attached, reported the 
 presence of considerable hostile forces at Amiens under General 
 Faidherbe, and also at Rouen. In order to prevent the junction 
 of these two French armies, the march was continued on the 
 23rd of November by Montdidier and Noyon, whilst at Le 
 Quesnel and Mezieres there were small aflfairswith the advanced 
 guard. 
 
 On the 26th of November, the Vlllth corps ascertained at 
 Thennes, about 2 miles (9^ English miles) to the south-east of 
 Amiens, that the enemy Avas prepared to offer- resistance before 
 the latter town with a strong force, and that the necessary 
 dispositions ought to be made to give him battle next 
 day. It should be observed that whilst the Vlllth corps was 
 up to its full strength, the 1st corps consisted of only one (the 
 3rd) infantry brigade, one cavalry regiment, and the corps 
 artillery; on the following day, however, the 1st division, 
 having been relieved before Mezieres by the detachment of 
 General v. Senden, arrived in sufficient time to take a part 
 with its leading troops in the battle, the details of which we 
 must pass over. In consequence of the successful issue of the
 
 180 ■■ 
 
 engagement the outposts of the Vlllth corps were established 
 within I a mile (2^ English miles) of Amiens. 
 
 Amie7is. 
 
 Amiens is a manufactviring, industrial, and open to^vn of 
 70,000 inhabitants, lying on the river Somme, navigable here for 
 small sea-going ships, and which flows through the city in three 
 branches. The cathedral, built between the years 1220 and 1228, 
 is celebrated as a masterpiece of pure and well-executed French- 
 Gothic architecture. To the north of the town, and on the right 
 bank of the Somme, which is joined half a league to the east by 
 the river Noye, lies the citadel ; it was built in the reign of 
 Henry the Fourth, and consists of five regular bastions, with 
 very high profiles, and the usual arrangements. A strong 
 well flanked drawbridge leads from the citadel over the ditch 
 to a second bridge over the Somme, used for the regular 
 traffic of the town. Between the citadel and the town is a sort 
 of esplanade, so that the nearest houses are about 300 paces 
 from the former. The ground in front of the citadel on the right 
 bank of the Somme is quite open, and swept by the guns from 
 the fort. 
 
 Amiens is the junction of many important roads and railways ; 
 the latter go to Rouen and Boulogne sur Mer, as well as Arras, 
 Tergnier, and Paris. On the approach of the enemy, the bridges 
 over the Somme in the neighbourhood, and also the railroads 
 for a considerable distance, had been destroyed, and the fortifi- 
 cation of the town was commenced to secure it from a coup-de- 
 main. Some old entrenchments were restored for this purpose, 
 and armed with guns, whilst barricades were erected on the 
 roads leading to the gates. The suburbs de la Hauboye, de 
 Beauvais, and de Noyon were favourably placed for the defence 
 of the city on account of their advanced position ; and also the 
 suburbs de la Maurice and St. Pierre lying on either side of the 
 south front of the citadel. Further in advance, on the south and 
 south-east of the town, shelter-trenches had been carefully con- 
 structed in suitable places and gunpits thrown up at skilfully 
 selected points. But the completion of all these well-considered 
 preparations for the defence was prevented by the rapid course of 
 the military operations in the immediate vicinit}^ of the town. 
 
 On the morning of the 28th of November, the city was occu- 
 pied by the 16th division, under Lieutenant-General von 
 Barneckow, having been evacuated during the night by the 
 French garrison, which consisted of three brigades ; the citadel 
 remained in possession of the enemy. Under these circum- 
 stances, the commandant. Captain Yogel, an Alsatian by birth, 
 was summoned to surrender, but he refused flatly. Nothing 
 remained therefore except to capture it by force of arms. For 
 this purpose some Prussian detachments, led by the mayor of the 
 town, occupied the houses opposite and nearest to the citadel, 
 cutting ofl" all communications with the city, from whence thej"" 
 annoyed the defenders on the ramparts, who replied with artil-
 
 190 
 
 lery and musketry fire. As 'this led to no result, the citadel was 
 ordered to be bombarded ou the 29tli of November by the heavy 
 batteries of the 1st and 8th field artillery regiments. The 41st 
 regiment and two squadrons of the Lithuanian dragoons, both 
 under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel von Hiillessen, of the 
 former, were ordered to take part in the expedition. It started 
 at 9 o'clock in the morning from St. Nicolas, three quarters of a 
 mile (3^ Enghsh miles) south-east of Amiens, with orders to 
 gain the right bank of the Somme ; as it was only from that side 
 that the citadel could be bombarded successfully without injury to 
 the town, which was to be spared on account of having sur- 
 rendered unconditionally. At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Gregorovins, of the 1st East Prussian field artillery regiment, 
 discovered a position on the town side, from whence he could 
 fire on one front of the citadel. The ground in front of the 
 citadel towards the country was not favourable for the bom- 
 bardment. There were certainly a few elevated points at a 
 range of from 2,000 to 3,000 paces, but the citadel could not be 
 seen well from them, even on the clearest days, and it would 
 have been impossible to have prevented injury to the town. The 
 difl&culty of finding a suitable passage over the Somme, and the 
 lateness of the hour, induced General von Manteufiel to postpone 
 the bombardment, to the 30th of November. Colonel von 
 Kamecke, commanding the 8th artillery brigade, who was 
 entrusted with the conduct of the intended operations, ordered 
 the batteries of the Vlllth corps to take position on the 
 right bank, and those of the 1st corps to take position on 
 the left bank of the Somme. These imposing masses of 
 artillery were still on the march, when the white flag was seen 
 hoisted on the citadel ; the batteries, nevertheless, took up 
 the positions that had been ordered. They did not open fire, 
 as the terms of capitulation were concluded by 10 o'clock 
 in the morning ; this was no doubt hastened in conse- 
 quence of the energetic commandant having been wounded 
 on the previous day in the infantry attack on the citadel ; his 
 successor soon found himself pi-epared to hand over the fortress. 
 The basis of the capitulation was that of Sedan. 
 
 Before the occupation by detachments of the 44th regiment, the 
 ofiicers of engineers inspected the mines of the place carefully. 
 A considerable quantity of war materiel was captured, 11 officers 
 and 400 men were taken prisoners and 35 guns fell into our 
 hands, all smooth-bores with the exception of two Armstrongs. 
 The defences, that were to have secured the town against assault, 
 and whose construction had been interrupted by the operations 
 in the field, were now taken in hand by the Prussians, and 
 completed, so as to be prepared for all eventualities. On the 
 14th of December, and a few days before, the greater part of 
 the German garrison quitted the town, partly to make recon- 
 naissance at a distance from Amiens, partly to endeavour to 
 obtain the release of a railway detachment and its covering 
 party of 50 men that had been surprised at Ham ; the citadel
 
 191 
 
 only remained occupied by troops. Although the town of 
 Amiens contributed the supplies and services for the Prussian 
 troops and hospitals with the greatest readiness, still in the 
 pecuKar position of affairs, it became necessary to announce by 
 proclamation that any act of hostility on the part of an inhabi- 
 tant, an^^ attack on the citadel by French troops from the town, 
 as well as any occupation of the town by hostile troops, would 
 lead to a bombardment of the city ; however, the necessity for 
 carrying' out these threats did not arise. The artillery of the 
 citadel had occasion later to fire on some detachments of the 
 enemy, M'ho, advancing from their positions on the north of the 
 fortress had ventured within range ; we merely relate this fact 
 as it was the only instance during the campaign in which French 
 troops were fired upon from a French fortress. 
 
 P Yvonne. 
 
 The forti'ess, notwithstanding its small area, belongs to the 
 first class, and is one of those that were kept in a good state of 
 defence. It lies in the Somme in a marshy and unwholesome 
 lowland between Amiens and St. Quentin, 2^ miles (11| Euo-lish 
 miles) east of Albert and the same distance south-east of 
 Bapaume, on the roads leading from the latter place to Ham, 
 and from the south to Cambrai. 
 
 The fortifications date from diff'erent periods, and have there- 
 fore a very irregular trace ; some of the ramparts are connected 
 with a castle which appears to be very ancient ; it is included 
 within the works. The main enceinte is in the form of an lono- 
 rectangle, in front of it and to the north lies the suburb of de 
 Bretagne, to the south the suburb of Paris, both defended by 
 crownworks. The west side of the fortress consists of four 
 irregular bastioned fronts with small ravelins ; the east, on the 
 other hand, consists of an almost straight line of fortification 
 without a single outwork. On the ramparts of the town are 
 four mediseval towers, one of which in 1468 served as a prison 
 for Louis the Eleventh when he fell into the hands of Charles 
 the Bold, whilst at the foot of another Charles the Simple died. 
 Afterwards the town belonged to Burgundy, but was formally 
 ceded to France by Charles the Fifth after the peace of Madrid 
 in 1526. On the 26th of June 1815, the Enghsh in their 
 advance on Paris stormed the place at the first rush. The 
 fortress is surrounded by flat-topped ridges which ai'e useful for 
 artillery positions at long range. 
 
 The fortress in itself has little strategic value, as it is not 
 capable of a good defence ; but its importance in this war was 
 increased as it threatened the movements of the 1st army in 
 rear, and blocked the railway communication of Amiens with 
 the French Northern Railway at Tergnier. From these causes 
 its capture became a matter of necessity, particularly after the 
 battle on the Hallue, when the eneni}^ again attempted to break 
 out of his quadrilateral of fortresses. Lieutenant- General v.
 
 192 
 
 Barneckow received the order to carry out this with 10 bat- 
 talions, some of them very weak, and eight squadrons of his 
 own and of the 3rd reserve division. The guns available for 
 the attack were 36 field guns of the Vlllth corps and 18 guns 
 of the 3rd reserve division, besides a small park of 12 garrison 
 guns brought from the citadel of Amiens. As, in the course of 
 the bombardment, it became evident that the artillery materiel 
 was insufficient, a portion of the siege train that had been 
 engaged before Mezieres was ordered up, but it never came into 
 use, as the railway before P^ronne was blocked with traffic. 
 
 The peculiar situation of the 1st army made special dis- 
 positions necessary, for covering the siege of P^ronne, in accor- 
 dance with which 11 battalions, 4 squadrons, and 24 guns of the 
 15th division, under the command of Lieutenant-General von 
 Kummer, were advanced towards Arras ; on the left at Bucquoy 
 was Lieutenant-General Count von der Groben with 1 bat- 
 talion, 12 squadrons, and 6 guns ; on the right, at Fins, was 
 Lieutenant-General Prince Albert of Prussia with 3 battalions, 
 12 squadrons, a.nd 18 guns. Lieutenant-General von Goebenhad 
 the chief command over the troops of the investment as well 
 as of the covering forces. 
 
 After several unimportant skirmishes with reconnoitring 
 parties from Pcronne, the fortress was blockaded on the 27th of 
 December. It appeared that the place could be bombarded best 
 from the heights on the north, west, and east, from which posi- 
 tion there were good objects for the batteries to aim at, so as to 
 meet the artillery of the place on favourable terms, without danger 
 of sufiering from its fire on account of the nature of the 
 ground. The 'guns opposite the north front were very well 
 placed for successful practice, as they faced the long side of the 
 fortress. There being no intention of constructing regular 
 batteries with approaches, the guns were placed so as to take 
 advantage of natural cover, or they were protected by epaul- 
 ments. 
 
 On the 28th of December, the batteries on Mont St. Quentin 
 and across the roads leading over the ridge to Clery and Athies, 
 opened fire, striking not only the fortifications, but also the 
 town. The artillery of the place was restricted to smooth- 
 bores,^ and therefore unable to cause much da- .^age to the distant 
 Prussian guns. The besiegers only fired a^ a moderate rate, 
 which in the later period of the bombardment was due to special 
 reasons. 
 
 The advance of the French army from the quadrilateral of 
 Arras, Cambrai, Valenciennes, and Douai, supported by Lille, 
 on the 2nd of January 1871, for the relief of the invested and 
 bombarded fortress, was in connexion with the siege operations 
 which were being successfully carried out against Pdronne by the 
 Prussians. On the same day the weak brigade of General v. 
 Strubberg repulsed a division of the enemy at Sapignies on the 
 road from Arras to Bapaume, and took five ofiicers and 250 men 
 prisoners, though another, division forced back the small Prussian
 
 193 
 
 detachments posted on the railroad. General von Kummer 
 therefore concentrated the 16th division at Bapauine, where it 
 came into serious collision on the 3rd of January, the result 
 causing General FaidherLe to retreat behind his fortresses 
 and relinquish all operations for the relief of Peronnc. The 
 enemy took the direction of Arras, followed by the Prussian 
 cavalry ; the infantry and artilleiy returned to Peronne, as it 
 did not seem advisable to renew the fighting on the 4th of 
 January with such reduced forces, and the risk of a scarcity of 
 ammunition. The battle interfered so far with the bombardment 
 of Peronne that the ammunition wagons of the batteries in 
 action before the place were ordered into the field to meet any 
 possible contingencies that might arise from a scarcity during 
 the action ; after the enemy had been repulsed, the bombardment 
 was continued with renewed vigour. 
 
 On the 9th of January negotiations for a capitulation began, 
 and were concluded during the night of the 10th of January. 
 Various circumstances combined to force the able and energetic 
 commandant. Colonel Gamier, to take such a step ; probably the 
 most important one was the repulse of the relieving army after 
 it had advanced Vvdthin five leagues of the place. The injury 
 done to the town by the Prussian batteries was very considerable ; 
 more than 50 houses Avere in ruins, the church and hospital had 
 become a prey to the flames. Forty-seven garrison guns, and a 
 quantity of war materiel of every kind were captured, and the 
 garrison of 3,000 men, consisting of 750 of the 4ord regiment, 
 and 150 marines, besides moblots and mobiles of the Somme 
 and Pas de Calais, became prisoners of war. 
 
 The repairs to the fortifications were immediately taken in 
 hand, and the fortress carefully secured against a coup-de-main, 
 and occupied by a sufticient garrison. 
 
 With the capture of Peronne the whole line of the Somme 
 came into possession of the German army, and became an im- 
 portant point of support in their later operations. It may be 
 taken for granted that in future wars the value of Peronne will 
 be as great as in the present, and that the French Government 
 will probably have the old-fashioned fortifications extended and 
 reconstructed, 
 
 -"a 
 
 i Rocroy. 
 
 The small fortress of Rocroy, situated close to the Belgian 
 frontier, lies at the junction of the roads leading by Givet and 
 Charlemont to Belgium on the north, and to Rethel on the 
 south ; it is situated on a hilly plateau in the forest of the 
 Ardennes 1,000 feet high, about 19 miles north-west of Mezieres. 
 The town was built in the middle of the forest by Francis the 
 First to protect the frontier of Champagne; in 1643 it was 
 besieged by the Spanish troops from the low countries, and in 
 1815 it was captured after a short investment by the Prussians 
 under Prince Augustus. 
 
 3S996. Q
 
 194 
 
 The fortifications, which are simple, consist of a bastioned trace 
 of five sides with dry ditches arranged in their essential points 
 on the principles of Vauban. As the works have a high profile, 
 the masonry could be seen and destroyed from a distance. To 
 prevent this, the ramparts are surrounded by a screen, which in 
 front of the salients of the west bastions, takes the form of a 
 ravelin or lunette, advanced into the glacis, and brings a cross 
 and grazing fire on to the ground in front. The separate works 
 are very well defiladed, both vertically and horizontally. The 
 east and west fronts have each a gate with the usual defences. 
 With the exception of the two principal powder magazines there 
 are no bombproofs for barracks, hospital, or magazines. The 
 armament had been completed during the war to the necessary 
 extent; nearly all the works had been provided with expense 
 magazines, and all other requirements for an artillery defence. 
 There are no large outworks, but two small earthworks in the 
 form of fleches have been constructed in advance of, and con- 
 nected with the fortress in order to command the road coming 
 from Paris by Eethel and Mdzieres, and also that from Givet. 
 The immediate neighbourhood affords favourable and elevated 
 positions for gun emplacements, although the ground is much 
 broken. 
 
 The 14th division had successfully accomplished its task by 
 the capture of the fortresses of Thionville, Montmedy, Mezieres, 
 and Longwy on the northern frontier of France, and there was 
 no intention on the part of the German commanders, of con- 
 tinuing the warfare against the places lying further to the 
 westward ; a prolongation of the fortress-war would have 
 entailed a great sacrifice of time and materiel, so that it was 
 abandoned for this as well as other reasons. The division 
 received orders to rejoin the Vllth corps, and to proceed by rail 
 to the south, where General von Werder required a reinforce- 
 ment for his undertakino's against General Bourbaki. A few 
 days rest were given to the division after the fall of Mdzieres 
 for concentration and the completion of certain arrangements. 
 If anything, therefore, was to be undertaken against their 
 inconvenient neighbour, the fortress of Rocroy, no time could be 
 lost. It should be remarked, that, although there could be no 
 doubt about the result of a blockade or bombardment of the 
 place, still the loss of time and materiel w^ould have been dis- 
 proportionate to the value of the fortress. It was resolved, 
 therefore, at once to try and take the town by a coup-de-main, 
 that is to say, to attack it unexpectedly ; and this method was 
 adopted because the profiles of the work made the risk of an 
 assault too hazardous. After the fall of Mezieres the enemy 
 quite expected that an attack on Rocroy would follow ; a bom- 
 bardment seemed inevitable, but the roads being bad, it was 
 thought that the difficulties of transporting the siege guns \Yould 
 occupy some time. 
 
 Mezieres capitulated on the 2nd of Januar^^ 1871, and on the 
 4th a detachment of 5 battalions, 2 squadrons of hussars and
 
 195 
 
 6 field batteries and a company of pioneers was, by order of 
 General Schuler von Senden, commanding the 14th division, 
 put in motion for Rocroy. The expedition was under the com- 
 mand of Major-General von Woyna II., and arrived before the 
 place on the evening of the same day. The early twihght pre- 
 vented reconnoitring in front of the fortress, and the garrison 
 were completely surprised by the unexpected appearance of the 
 enemy before the gates, which was a proof of the energy and 
 precision with which the operation was carried out. As soon 
 as the cavalry had cut off all communication between the fortress 
 and the country, the troops took up their position on the invest- 
 ing circle, partly to prevent the garrison from breaking out, and 
 partly to cover the ground from whence the bombardment was 
 to follow. When everything was prepared, at 10 o'clock on the 
 morning of;. the 5th of January, the commandant was called 
 upon to surrender, which he refused. At half-past 10 o'clock fire 
 was opened. A thick fog interrupted the view, but flames were 
 seen to break out in the town and the bombardment was con- 
 tiDued until 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The artillery of the 
 gamson was not idle ; it ^replied vigorously, but Avithout much 
 effect, as the Prussian batteries were screened either by natural 
 cover or hasty entrenchments. It was already in contemplation 
 to give an order to cease firing and assemble the troops, when 
 another attempt was made to induce the commandant to sur- 
 render, by pointing out to him the uselessness of protracting 
 the defence, which, as was found out afterwards, the gardes 
 mobiles were anxious to continue. 
 
 On the evening of the 5th of January, tlie place was handed 
 over, the gates being first occupied by two companies. The 
 garrison consisted of about 160 gardes mobiles and 120 men of 
 the artillery of the line and engineers, who had shown them- 
 selves particularly active in the defence ; 800 of the garrison 
 became prisoners of war ; one stand of colours, some arms, pro- 
 visions, and munitions of war, as well as 72 heavy guns, were 
 captured. Among the prisoners were two Prussians who had 
 been detained as spies. The exertions made by the troops 
 engaged against Rocroy should not be passed over without 
 notice ; they were on their legs for 80 hours, notwithstanding 
 the extreme cold, combined with fog and snowstorms.
 
 196 
 
 SUMMARY OF SIEGES. 
 
 The following fortresses fell during the war, thanks to the 
 energy of our highly trained siege artillery in co-operation with 
 the other branches of our army. 
 
 (1.) "Without defence : Liitzelstein and Montbeliard. 
 
 (2.) After immediate capitulation : Vitry, Laon. 
 
 (3.) After the first bombardment : Lichtenberg, Marsal, and 
 
 the citadel of Amiens. 
 (4.) As the immediate consequence of the loss of a battle in 
 
 the field : Sedan, with the army of MacMahon. 
 (5.) After a long investment : Metz, with the army of Marshal 
 
 Bazaine. 
 (6.) After a long investment and bomdardment : Pfalzburg 
 
 and Paris, with its enclosed army. 
 (7.) After repeated bombardments of several days' duration 
 
 with siege and field artillery : Toul, Neu-Breisach, 
 
 Soissons, Verdun, La Fere, Montmedy, Mezieres, and 
 
 Peronne. 
 (8.) After a bombardment of several days with the opening of 
 
 a regular siege : Schlettstadt, Thionville, and Long^Yy. 
 (9.) After a bombardment of several weeks and the completion 
 
 of the regular siege, with the exception of the passage 
 
 of the ditch and the storming of the breach or interior 
 
 retrenchments : Strasburg and Belfort. 
 
 Bitsch was not surrendered until the conclusion of the peace, 
 after it had been invested during the whole of the war, and 
 bombarded at the commencement. 
 
 Rocroy fell by a coup-de-main after a bombardinent -sv^ith field 
 artillery. 
 
 The garrisons of Belfort and Bitsch were allowed to leave with 
 military honours in recognition of their gallant defence. 
 
 Besides the enormous amount of war materiel taken from the 
 beaten and captured armies, and the materiel, arms, and ammu- 
 nition, as well as barrack, magazine, and hospital stores, found in 
 the fortresses, 5,300 garrison guns, most of them smooth-bore 
 and some of which were damaged, fell into our hands, while 
 1,400 officers and 54,700 men, who had formed the garrison of 
 the towns, were led into captivity. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed by George E. Eyre and "William Spottis-woode, 
 
 Printers to the Queen's most Excellent Majesty. 
 
 For Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 
 
 [7702.— 500.— 10/77.]
 
 REFORMS IN THE FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 Part I. 
 
 THE LAW OF RECRUITING. 
 
 TBAN'SLATED AT THK TOPOGRAPHICAL A.VD STATISTICAL DEPARTMENT 
 OF THE WAR OFFICE, 
 
 By captain HOME. 
 
 ROYAL EXGIXEERS. 
 
 LONDON: 
 Printed ttndpr the Supeiiideudence of Her Mojesty^s Slalioneri/ Office, 
 
 AND SOLD BY 
 
 W. CLOWES & SONS, 13, Cliarinp; Cross; HARRISON & SONS, 59, Pall Mall: 
 
 W. H. ALLEN & Co.. L3, Waterloo Place ; W. MITCHELL. Charing Cross ; 
 
 LONGMAN k Co.. and TEUBNER A- Co., Paternoster R,iw; and 
 
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 Also hif 
 
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 ALEX. TIIOM. Abbey Street, and E. PONSONRV, (xnafton Street. DiBr-tx. 
 
 Pricf Rifili Ipp ■ipPiiee.
 
 [H. & S.— P 1952—500—11 1 72.]
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 When a great Military nation pulls down her Military Institu- 
 tions and builds them up again on a new foundation, the changes 
 that she makes, and the causes of those changes, are lioth interest- 
 ing and instructive. 
 
 The reforms that are taking place in the French Army are 
 so great, and the circumstances under which they are made so 
 peculiar, that much interest attaches to them. 
 
 The Committee that has been appointed to prepare Bills for 
 this purpose has divided the subject into two portions : — 
 1st. The Law on Recruiting; 
 .■^nd. The Law on Organization. 
 
 The former alone has been brought before and passed the 
 National Assembly, and a translation of the Law, with the Com- 
 mittee's Report, is herewith given. 
 
 It is proposed to give a similar translation of the Law on 
 Organization, and some account of the new French Military 
 Administration, so soon as the Committee has reported and the 
 Assembly approved of the Report. 
 
 These translations will form Parts IT. and III. of the series of 
 which this is Part I.
 
 KEPOIIT 
 
 IX THE NAME OF THE COmHTTEE* ENTRUSTED 
 WITH THE DUTY OF PREPARING A REPORT UPON 
 THE RECRUITING AND ORGANIZATION OF THE 
 ARMY AND NAVY. 
 
 By the Marquis Ciiasseloup Laubat, Member of the National 
 
 Assembly. 
 
 RECRUITING OF THE ARMY. 
 
 FIRST PART. 
 
 Chapter I. 
 
 Gentlemen, 
 
 Great disasters carry v.-itli them much instruction. It is 
 wise to understand them ; it is courageous to profit by them. 
 Far, then, from allowing itself to be cast down by its misfortunes, 
 a nation which refuses to fall, studies the causes of its defeat, 
 reforms everything that enfeebles it, must finally raise itself, 
 even greater, after those trials which Providence inflicts on nations 
 as on individuals, the better to point out their duties, and elevate 
 to a higher place those who can support trial. 
 
 This, gentlemen, is what you wish — this is what we liope 
 France will do. 
 
 For this reason you daily seek out everything that from its 
 nature may enervate the country. Y^ou seek to excite its energy, 
 and you do not despair to see her at the cost of some efforts, 
 some sacrifices, preserve her place in the world. 
 
 * This Committee is composed of MM. de Lasteyrie, President ; General Baron 
 Obahaud-la-Tour, Admiral Montaiguac, Vice-Presidents ; Bet hmont, diaper, Colonel 
 Carron, and Iho Marquis de ilornay, Secretaries ; Tlie Marquis de la Kochetliulon. 
 d'Aboville, de Combarien, General Billot, Admiral Dompierre d'Hornoy, Cornelis de 
 Witt, General Loysel, General Ticlor Pellissier, General Duerot, the Marquis de 
 Vorgue, Admiral La Ronciere Le Xoury, Daliirol, de Carayon-Latour, tlie Duke de 
 Crussol, General Martin des Pa'lieres, Colonel de Chadois, Admiral Saissct, General 
 Frebault, Fresneau, Aelocque, IMarquis d'Audelarre, Passy, Baron Vast Vimcux,. 
 Audren de Kerdrel, Flye-Sainte Marie, Yarroy, the Marquis do Chaiseloup Laubat, 
 Geneial Chanzy, Sarrette, Baron de Barante,' de Balleroy, General Trochu, Brun 
 (Var), the Duke d'llarcourt, Cjunt Octave do Bastard, Bouisson, General Charel»u 
 de Meice. 
 
 (489w©) B
 
 AVith this vicvr', you resolved that one of your Committees 
 should report on the laws relating to the recruiting and organization 
 of both the army and navy. 
 
 This Committee your officers have selected to represent all 
 shades of opinion in the Assem.bly, justly persuaded that all the 
 men who compose the Assembly, no mutter whence they come, 
 or what may be their antecedents, will bring to such a task, but 
 one feeling, that of devotion to their common country. 
 
 We then, in the name of that Committee, propose to report 
 on a portion of the task entrusted to us. 
 
 According to your instructions this task embraces ])oth the 
 recruiting and organization of the army. 
 
 The law under which the army is recruited l)elongs as much to 
 civil as to mihtary law, it is addressed to the entire population, 
 it details the duties devolving on it, for the defence and security of 
 the country, and has great influence on its chief interests, the 
 development of agriculture, commerce and industry ; the progress 
 of arts and sciences, the good order of its finances. 
 
 The organization is entirely a military law, which, in addition 
 to the composition and administration of the various corps, deter- 
 mines the conditions under wliich officers are promoted, their 
 status, and regulates the strength of the general staff. 
 
 At present we propose to deal only with the recruiting of the 
 army, on it is based the constitution of the array, and it con- 
 sequently must fill the chief place in our miUtary institutions. 
 
 We do not seek now to discuss wb.at portion of our defeats are 
 due to the faults of existing institutions. 
 
 We have first to ask ourselves if the method of recruiting the 
 army w'hich has hitherto prevailed in France, is in consonance witli 
 the situation of the country as regards Europe, and with the ideas 
 of the people ? 
 
 Doubtless, the law of recruiting, as it at present stands, has 
 given us gallant armies, and even latterly in the midst of our 
 ■ reverses, when our soldiers although under unfavourable circum- 
 stances were able to come to close quarters, they have shown no 
 degeneracy, and that tliey are still, as in Algiers, the Crimea, and at 
 Magenta, the worthy descendants of those who fought at Fontenoy, 
 Fleurus and Jena. It would be unjust, ungrateful not to loudly 
 proclaim this fact. 
 
 But, gentlemen, in order that a law for recruiting the army 
 should give what the exigencies of modern war demand, it is not 
 sufficient that the soldiers sent under the colours should show 
 bravery and self-denial, it must also inspire the whole population 
 with an elevated feeling of duty, and when the defence of the 
 country is at stake a fraction of the citizens must not be left in a 
 state of apathy; above all, the requisite number of defenders must 
 be forthcoming. 
 
 Let us examine if this has been the case, but before doing so 
 let us briefly review the past.
 
 3 
 
 I. 
 
 Without going back to that period in our own history when to 
 fight was a privilege, it may be remembered that under the ancient 
 monarcliy, and more especially under Louis XIV, the army was 
 recruited by voluntary enlistment by the captains of companies 
 aiKl the colonels of regiments, who gave for this purpose commis- 
 sions to subordinate officers, termed racoleurs (" bringers^'), paid 
 in proportion to the number of men they brought. 
 
 But in a short time the inadequacy of this method of filling up 
 the gaps in the army was recognized, and a subsiduary means of re- 
 cruiting was adopted by calling out the provincial militia; each village 
 having tofurnish a contingentfullyequipped foraservice of twoyears. 
 
 Selected originally by the inhabitants of the parish — these 
 militiamen were subsequently drawn by lot. 
 
 Ycu are aware that during the wars of the Hevolution our 
 armies were formed as follows : — 
 
 First by the enlistment of men who, moved by patriotic feelings, 
 volunteered for that purpose. 
 
 Next by levies to compose new battalions called to arms by 
 t!ie words the " country is in danger." 
 
 Then by calling on 300,000 National Guards from 18 to 
 40 years of age, men not married, or widowers witliout children. 
 
 Finally, by a levy en masse until the enemy had been expelled 
 from the territory of the Republic. 
 
 If by these means an army of 400,000 men was formed and 
 tlie foreigner by a sublime effort finally driven out, assuredly the 
 victory v/as due not to our military institutions, as once, order and 
 liberty returned the necessity of organizing a regular and permanent 
 recruiting was recognized. Voluntary enlistment did not suffice, 
 and enlistment for money could not fill the voids. 
 
 The Conscription was then established ; the Conscription we 
 should remind you had been proposed to the constituent Assembly in 
 IJSO, but had been rejected as at variance with the liberty of the 
 citizen. 
 
 General Jourdan had the honour, in the year VI, to propose 
 and carry through the law, which is the point of depai'ture of all 
 our legislative enactments on this subject. By this law all young 
 meii from 20 to 25 years of age were divided into five classes. 
 
 The conscripts comprised in ail five classes ircre attached to the 
 various corps compusiny the Ar)ny; they ivere enrolled by name, and 
 no substitution ivas allowed. 
 
 They could not, however, be sent on active service without a 
 special law; the youngest in each class being then summoned first 
 to join the colours. 
 
 Compulsory personal service was at that time the rule for all ; 
 all might be called on during five years, after which they were 
 absolutely free in time of peace, but were, in time of war liable to 
 be called on, according to circumstances. The conditions requisite 
 to fuitil, to become an officer, were also laid down by this law. 
 Grc:;t aiid fertile principles were enunciated bv it, which have, 
 
 B 2
 
 nevertheless, been much abused, but which remain the greatest 
 legislative enactment of that period^ and which gave France 
 power to struggle against all Europe. 
 
 Notwithstanding the formal declaration in the year VT, that sub- 
 stitutes were not allowed, it must l)e acknowledged that from the 
 year VII, the princiijle of substitution re-appeared. It is to be found 
 in the law of the 28 Germinal, and since then has found a place 
 in all laws, notably in those of the years VIII and XIII, which 
 introduced the drawing of lots to determine which young men of 
 each class should be first enrolled with the colours. Some of 
 these laws, however, placed substitution under certain restrictions ; 
 thus it was allowed only in favour of those who ivere deemed unfitted 
 to sustain the fatigues of war, and of those who, by continuing their 
 studies, were deemed more useful to the State. It also entailed cer- 
 tain responsibilities, and necessitated the payment of a sum of 
 money. 
 
 In any case, conscription, that is to say, an obligation to serve 
 imposed on all young men capable of bearing arms, in each class, 
 existed from the year VI vintil 1814. And if substitution ex- 
 isted during that time, it was bv no means fi-ee. It is also known that 
 the anticipation of the various classes gave rise to great exhaustion 
 during the last years of the empire. And it may be recollected 
 with what favour the Act by which the Restoration abolishedthe 
 conscription was received. 
 
 Subsequently to the events of 1815, when the armies were 
 disbanded, an attempt was made to unite their debris, so as to 
 preserve some troops for the country. Departmental legions, 
 which took the name of the department where thev were formed, 
 were created. Discharged soldiers were induced to re-engage, it 
 being considered that they were not entirely free from military 
 service; others voluntarily enlisted. 
 
 Each legion being recruited in the department where it was 
 formed, — the conscription being abolished, — no means of filling 
 gaps but bv voluntary enlistment were provided. 
 
 The inefficiency of such enlistment soon showed itself, and 
 when after some years' trial, it became requisite seriouslv to 
 re- organize tiie military forces of France, it became also requisite 
 to return to some regular and certain means of obtaining recruits. 
 
 An illustrious General and wiiter, Marshal Gouvion Saint Cyr^ 
 as minister, had the courage, unfortunatelv very rare, to resist 
 the party in power, proj^osed.in 1818, the law known by his name. 
 
 This law organized recruiting in the spirit in which it lias 
 subsequently been conducted. It fixed the strength of the contin- 
 gent to be embodied each year at 40,000; it divided that number 
 amongst the various departments ; it fixed the method of counting 
 the young men of each class ; established a system for drawing lots, 
 to determine the individuals to be furnished by each canton, and 
 fixed the length of service at six vears. 
 
 And, with the object vi having a reserve which could feed 
 the army, the law directed that non-commissioned officers and 
 men sent home on completion of their period of service should.
 
 in case of \vai% under the name of veterans, perform home 
 service, the duration of which was also htuited to six years. 
 
 In tirre of peace no miUtary service was asked from these 
 veterans, and in time of war, except under the authority of a 
 ■special enactment, they could not, be called on to quit their 
 military division. 
 
 But while this law sent into the army all the young men that 
 the ballot designated as forming a portion of the contingent, It, 
 with the object of tempering the severity of military service, 
 admitted exemptions and dispensations. 
 
 These exemptions were based on infirmities, want of height, 
 and upon particular circumstances, which showed that the indi- 
 viduals to which they were applied could not leave their families 
 without doing them an irreparable injury. 
 
 The dispensations were particularlv for those men who 
 benefitted the State by continuing their studies before beginning 
 a useful career. 
 
 There was this difference between exemption and dispensation, 
 that the young men who were exempted did not diminsh the 
 number of the contingent, their places being taken by others in 
 the order of the lots. The young men who obtained dispensations 
 were, on the contrary, deducted from the number of the contingent, 
 in certain cases the dispensation was only provisional, being condi- 
 tional on the youth following the career for which he was studying, 
 and for which he obtained a dispensation. 
 
 This law authorized substitutes, and also an exchange of 
 lots amongst young men who had been drawn. 
 
 With the object of forming the cadres of the army, the law of 
 1818 required that candidates for the post of officer should fulfil 
 certain conditions, serve a fixed period in each grade before 
 promotion, and reserved one-third of the vacancies amongst the 
 sub-lieutenants for deserving non-commissioned officers, and fixed 
 that two-thirds of the j>romotions to the ranks of lieutenant, 
 captain, and major should be by seniority. 
 
 This was, as you see, a law both for the organization and 
 recruiting of the army, and also for the promotion of the officers, 
 and that too, at a moment when France invaded, was stiii 
 occupied by foreign armies. 
 
 Face to face with such painful events, gentlemen, the words 
 security, and independence of territory, have more significance than 
 at other periods. Minds do not then run riot on absurd theories, 
 of universal peace, or on the resiscless power of masses of men, and 
 armaments hastily im]')rovised. 
 
 Then the ideas of thoughtful men are no longer regarded as 
 chimeras, but everything that can preserve the greatness of the 
 country is gladly accepted. 
 
 It must be added that the law of 1818 was not a conscription 
 proper ; conscription compelled all young men of ong class to 
 serve, and used the ballot only to determine the order in which they 
 should be enrolled. 
 
 Recruiting as fixed by the law of 1818, applied only to the
 
 6 
 
 contingent, whicli was divided amongst il.c departn:ents, and 
 young men not selected by lot were completely free from military 
 service: no future demands could be made on them. This 
 explains how, from the outset, this law was so easily adopted, and 
 never produced tlie complaints consequent on the conscription. 
 
 However, the departmental legions, with which the law of 1818 
 did not interfere, failed to produce the advantages expected from 
 them. The fact that it was requisite to take for each legion men 
 of the department in which it was raised produced difficulties 
 of many kinds. This method of recruiting also caused great 
 differences in the value of the various portions of the army, and, 
 consequently, interfered greatly with its homogeneity. Conse- 
 quently, in 1820, the 94 departmental legions were converted 
 into 80 regiments of the line and light infantry, recruiting for 
 which was carried out generally throughout France. 
 
 Finally, and we beg to direct attention to this fact, as dealing 
 with the important question of reserves, the veterans on furlovxgh, 
 after six years' service in the regular army, do not appear to have 
 been as useful as was anticipated ; it was therefore considered 
 preferable — 
 
 1st. To raise the contingent from 40,000 to 60,000 men, 
 one portion of which would not be enrolled, but remain 
 at the disposal of the State. 
 
 2nd. To fix the length of service at eight years in place of 
 six, and free all the men sent home from further service. 
 
 This was the law of the 9th June, 1824. The contingent of 
 60,000 men, you will observe, was then estal)lished, as the con- 
 tingent of 40,000 had been in 1818, and the Government had 
 power to deal with it without reference to the Chambers, except 
 inasmuch as it had to seek grants of money. This power remained 
 until 1830; then it was decided, as a principle of parliamentary 
 government, that the strength of the contingent to be enrolled 
 each year, both for the army and navy, must be fixed each session. 
 
 The system of reserve, organized in 1818, was thus abandoned, 
 and the system of having a contingent larger than could be 
 possibly enrolled was adopted, a certain portion of the contingent 
 being sent on furlough, subject to recall when required. 
 
 This was in accordance with the views of Marshal Soult, when, 
 in 1832, he considered it desirable to alter some of the arrange- 
 ments of the law of 1818. 
 
 The law of the 21st March, which, in addition to the measures 
 we have here described, maintained the recruiting as established in 
 1818, laid down the principle of the division of the contingent into 
 two portions, both placed at the disposal of the Government, in 
 the following words : — 
 
 "The army is composed of two portions, the propoi'tions of 
 
 " which are fixed by the annual estimates, viz. : — 
 " 1st. The effective strength with the colours. 
 " 2nd. Men left on leave or sent home on furlousrh.^'
 
 These men remained under military autliority for seven, years, 
 the period fixed by the law, and could at any time be incorporated 
 with the army, it being believed that this system gave a reserve 
 at the disposal of the Government to meet all eventualities. 
 
 At that period, movements of troops were not rapid, and they 
 could not be quickly united into great armies, it was consequently 
 believed tbat there would always be a certain time available to 
 train the men ; and it was hoped that at the moment of war, when 
 the young men who bad not served were called under the colours, 
 they would come forward with more alacrity than those who 
 already knew the monotony of barracks and the drav»' backs of the 
 profession. 
 
 This, then, was the system which has prevailed in later years 
 (it is desirable to bear it in mind), — a reserve of men left at home 
 — a reserve sometimes more considerable, you will see shortly, 
 than the portion of the contingent actually enrolled. 
 
 From this time, the annual estimates regularly fixed the nmnber 
 of the contingent at 80,000 men; lastly, the law of 1832 allowed 
 substitution. 
 
 But, gentlemen, as luxury spread in France, and ne^v pursuits 
 were opened up for young men, they seemed less ambitious of 
 following the profession of arms ; the number of substitutes in- 
 creased, and the means employed to obtain them occupied public 
 attention, and, m(jre than once, motions on this subject were 
 inti'oduced into the Chambers. 
 
 There were in short, both in the army and in the country, 
 symptoms ^A■hich could not be ignored. In 1841 and 1843, 
 various proposals were made to apply a remedy to the acknow- 
 ledged evil. In 1849, proposals were made by General 
 Lamoriciere, with the object of enabling old soldiers to profit by 
 the money paid for substitutes. 
 
 But these proposals fell to the ground; and, in 1855, the law 
 of the dotation of the army put an end to substitution. But in doing 
 so, it most unfortunately introduced a system which almost 
 entirely did away with personal service; for if, since the yearVII, 
 substitution was allowed, the State was no party to it. The 
 young man called to serve under the colours had to serve, or 
 bring a man in his place, so that personal service was performed 
 either by the individual or his substitute, as directed by the laws 
 of the years VII and Vlll, the law of 1855 completely changed 
 the whole state of affairs. Whoever could pay the price fixed 
 by the administration tor exemption was completely exonerated 
 by the State from all military service, and deemed to have 
 discharged his duty to the country. 
 
 This freedom from all obligation to serve was not the only 
 bad point in the law of 1855 ; there was yet another not less 
 objectionable ; it introduced into the army ideas of pecuniary ad- 
 vantage, which immediately benefitted the man who was desirous 
 of joining or remaining under the colours; and, consequently, can- 
 celled that principle of our military law, — "In the French army there 
 " is neither bounty nor any payment whatever for engagement.^'
 
 8 
 
 The following were, after some years, the consequences of this 
 law of exemption : — 
 
 Out of 32,000 non-commissioned officers, 23,000 had re- 
 engaged with bounty.* 
 
 More than 23,000 exemptions had been claimed annually.f 
 
 The number of that portion of tiie army not furnished bv the 
 conscription had risen to 283,000, of which number 164,000J were 
 Government substitutes — men engaged or re-engaged for money. 
 
 Doubtless, the re-engagement of such a large number of non- 
 commissioned oflScers, tlie composition of whose cadres play such 
 an important part, ought to give great solidity to the army ; and 
 it was this idea, and the wish to improve the situation of old soldiers, 
 that produced the law. But it is also certain thut, on account of the 
 large number of engagements and re engagements with bounty, it 
 was impossible to incorporate with the army each year more than 
 between 20,000 and 30,000 men of the contingent voted. Ex- 
 ceptional circumstances were requisite, to call on the second 
 portion of the contingent, and if it was enrolled, the men had no 
 military instruction. 
 
 It was then seen that some instruction for the men belonging to 
 the second portion of the contingent was requisite, and, conse- 
 quently, they were drilled for three months the first year, two 
 jnonths the second year, and one month the third, as fixed by the 
 circular 10th January, 1861. 
 
 Finally, in 1863, it was determined, with the view of diminish- 
 ing the number of re-engagements of non-commissioned officers, 
 whose cadres were entirely blocked, to delay the payment of the 
 bounty until their ultimate discharge, paying meantime 3 per cent. 
 on the amount. 
 
 Such was the state of affairs ; it had already occupied the minds 
 
 * Prior to 1855 the number of non-commissioned officers who had re-engaged did 
 not exceed 3,000 to 4,000. 
 
 t The number 2S,000 is an average ; but when war broke oiit in 1859 it showed 
 the evils of the system ; the price o exemption had been fixed at 92Z., and had never 
 been increased when the contingent was raised from 100,000 to 140,000 men, 42,000 
 exemptions were then asked for and given. Tliese exemptions had to be compensated 
 for in 1860. 
 
 X Permanent strength (1865-1866) — 
 
 1st. Officei-s attached to regiments, intendance, staff employes 
 
 of the artilleiy and engineers . . . . . . . . 24,897 
 
 2nd. Departmental gendarmes (not including officers) . . 20,200 
 
 3rd. Voluntary engagements without bounty (serving 7 years) 55,230 
 4th. Voluntary engagements with boimty . . 16,016 1 
 
 5th. Government substitutes 50,097 > 154,777 
 
 6th. Men re-engaged with bounties . . . . 88,664 J 
 
 (Not including 10,000 gendarmes i^ho had re-engaged.) 
 7th. Re-engaged without boimty ' 
 8th. Foreign corps (not including French) 
 9th. Native corps (not including Fi'ench) 
 10th. Veterans 
 
 lltli. Retained as a punishment. . 
 12th. Not belonging to the service (workmen, musicians, &c.) 
 
 Total . . 
 
 . . 
 
 2,506 
 
 
 4,n24 
 
 
 8,8r,3 
 
 . • . i 
 
 390 
 
 .. 
 
 10,137 
 
 ins, &c.) 
 
 2,068 
 
 .. 
 
 283,082
 
 both of the Government and all those who clung to the greatness 
 of their country, and knew that a powerful mi'itarv org miza^ion 
 could alone preserve it. Such was the state of ati'airs when the 
 events of 1866 forced into prominence facts which many persons 
 had previously refused to see. 
 
 It was then evident that the constitution of our militiry forces 
 did not correspond with the exigencies of iha new state of 
 Europe. 
 
 Doubtless, our army offered an imposing array; it had pre- 
 served its great qualities. But it could not be concealed, on the 
 one side, that the number of men we could bring into the field 
 was far below that which a neighbouring power could rapidly 
 put on foot; and, on the other hand, that we had no real reserve 
 organized to support and take the place of the armv, or even fill 
 up the gaps that war would produce. 
 
 Judging from official returns, it appears, that after deducting 
 the troops requisite to garrison Algiers, the gendarmerie, and all 
 the men included in the number 400,000 of the army, but not 
 properly combatants, that France had not more than 270,000 to 
 280,000 men to garrison her fortresses and place in line of battle. 
 This number (400,000 men) was the actual strength the estimates 
 allowed to be maintained ; but it was not, we hasten to remind 
 you, the number of men that the law of the contingent placed at 
 the disposal of the Government. 
 
 Thus, during the Crimean war the army was raised to 500,000 
 men, by summoning the second portion of the contingent ; but 
 to keep it to this strength, it was requisite to have a contingent of 
 140,000 men for three years. When that war terminated, it was 
 seen that the contingent must be 100,000 men if the normal 
 strength of the army was to be 600,000 men ; and when the 
 Italian war broke out, the ne(;essity of having a contingent of 
 140,000 men was acknowledged, and this must have been con- 
 tinued if that war lasted. 
 
 It must be borne in mind, gentlemen, that the number of the 
 contingent voted each year is very far from putting at the disposal 
 of the military authorities a number of men equal to the number 
 voted. 
 
 The contingent is reduced by the number of men requisite for 
 the navy, and also by those le2;ally exempted, so that a con- 
 tingent of 100,000 men hardly places 80,000 at the disposal of the 
 War Minister.* 
 
 * Analysis of the result produced by tlie incorporation of a contingent, 100,000 
 
 men, under the laws of 1832 and 1868 — Men. Men. 
 
 Contingent . . . . 100,000 
 
 Ist. Number of men tliat certain joarishes could not 
 supply owing to the numbers of the lots being 
 
 exhausted . . . . . . . . , . . . 90 
 
 2nd. Naval conscripts 2,023 
 
 3rd. Pupils at the Polytechnic School . . . . . . 57 
 
 4th. Employed in public education . . . . . . 1,140 
 
 5th. Pupils in ecclesiastical establishments . . . . 1,06
 
 10 
 
 In any case, looking to the leceul cvciils in Gerniany, it was 
 acknowledged " tliat the military force of France should consist of 
 *« 800,000 men, — viz., 400,000 in the regidar army and 400,000 in 
 " the reserve ; in addition to which it was requisite to form an 
 " army for home defence, clothed, drilled, and capable of being 
 " mobilized under the pressure of extraordinary circumstances, 
 *' such as a threatened invasion of the country." 
 
 These ideas were those which produced the project of 1867, 
 brought forward by Marshal Niel. To obtain the proposed object, 
 this project required — 
 
 1st. That the entire contingent, after deducting those who were 
 exempted or whose services were dispensed with by the 
 law of 1832, should be put at the disposal of the Govern- 
 ment (about 150,000 men annually). 
 
 2nd. That the annual finance law should divide each class 
 enrolled by lots into portions, one of which should be 
 incorporated with the regular army, the other with the 
 reserve. 
 
 3rd. That the length of service in the regular army should be 
 five years, at the expiration of which time the soldier 
 should serve four years in the reserve. 
 
 4th. That the young men who were not incorporated with the 
 regular army should serve four years in reserve, and five 
 years in the National Guard " Mobile." 
 
 5th. Lastly, that service in both the regular army and the 
 reserve should count from the 1st July of the year, when 
 the recruits were placed on the rolls of the corps. 
 
 This, it must be acknowledged, was compulsory service to a 
 certain extent for the entire class placed in the regular army or in 
 the reserve, yet the principle of exemption was maintained, 
 and young men incorporated with the regular army, and those 
 composing the reserve might exchange with men belonging to 
 the National Guard " Mobile," or obtain the latter as substitutes, 
 
 Men. 
 
 6th. Having obtained great prizes . . . . . . 2 
 
 7tli. Discharged the day of the final review . . . . 683 
 
 8th. Unfit for the army 774 
 
 9th. Left at home as being ttie supporters of a family, 
 
 2 per cent. .. 2,042 
 
 loth. Dead ; omitted as liaving been included in error 304 
 
 Total 8,176 
 
 Eemalniug for the army and navy . . . . . . . . 91,824 
 
 Naval contingent.. .. .. ., .. .. .. 9,000 
 
 Eemaining for the army. . . . . . . . . . . . 82,824 
 
 Young meii who have voluntarily engaged, or who already 
 
 belong to the service by indenture or commissions . . 3,400 
 
 Leaving as the actual number of men a contingent of 100,000 
 
 men adds to the army . . , . . . , . , . 79,424
 
 11 
 
 loth hen belonged to the latter forc^, Mhich the 1 .w proposed 
 to create. 
 
 This Guard was composed of young men wlio, not h;.ving 
 served in the regular armj'^, had served four years in tlie reserve ; 
 of all those who, under the law of 1855, were exempted from 
 service, as well as of those who had obtained substitutes for service 
 in the reserve. The length of service in the National Guard 
 *^ Mobile ^^ was fixed at five years. 
 
 Under this system it will be observed that all the young men 
 of each class, except those exempted or dispensed with by the law 
 of 1832, were enrolled for military service from 20 until 29 years 
 of age. Being for the portion selected by lot five years in the 
 regular army and four years in the reserve, for the portion not 
 serving in the regular army, four years in the reserve and five years 
 in the National Guard '' Mobile." 
 
 It consequently fcdlowed that the reserve was composed partly 
 of old soldiers who had served five years with the colours, and 
 were from 25 to 29 years of age, and of young men of 20 to 21 
 years of age who had not been incorporated with the army. 
 
 This project appeared, however, to the legislative body to 
 impose too heavy a tax on the population, and after a discussion, 
 to which we need not now do more than refer, the law of the 
 1st February, 186S, was passed, differing from the Government 
 proposition, it maintained the principles of the law of 1832, tiie 
 yearly contingent l^eing divided into two classes : the first, com- 
 posed of young men incorporated with the army ; the second^ of 
 those who were left at home. 
 
 The length of service was fixed at five years, after which the 
 men served four yer.rs in the reserve. Service was to count from 
 the 1st July of tiie year of enrolment, which was important,^- 
 exoneration was suppressed, substitution and exchange of numbers 
 was allowed; and after five years' service with the colours, 
 re-engagement gave a right to a high rate of pay. 
 
 The law also established, as was asked, a National Guard 
 «' Mobile." 
 
 This guard could only be called out by a special law; it was 
 composed of all the young men who, on account of the nurnljers 
 they had drawn, were not included in the contingent, and of all 
 those who had obtained substitutes ; tinally, of all those exenpted 
 by the action of the law of 1832. 
 
 Length of service in the National Guard "Mobile" was five 
 years, the officers being nominated by the Chief of the State. 
 
 Finally, after allowing the revising councils to grant dis])onsa- 
 tion to those who had families to support in the proportion of 
 10 per cent, in peace, and 4 per cent, in case of war; and hnving 
 established certain punishments for breaches of discipline, the law 
 
 * The operation of tlie census, drawing np tlie lists, the cli-awinp; of lots, the 
 action of the council of revision, could only be performed after the 1st January of 
 each year, and necessarily took some months, consequently the full period of service 
 ■was never actually fulfilled.
 
 12 
 
 ■directed that the yoing men composing the National Guard 
 *' Mobile "— 
 
 1st. Should take part in drills in their own parishes ; 
 2nd. At company aid battalion assmblics, which should take 
 place in the company and battalion districts. 
 
 But, the law added, each drill or assembly must not cause the 
 loss of more than one day to the young men drilled, and these 
 drills and assemblies can take place only 15 times in the year. 
 You can thus see the spirit of the law of 1868, its object was first, 
 — by having a length of service of nine years (live in the regular 
 army and four in the reserve), to put at the disposition of the 
 Government nine contingents, thus forming, if each contingent 
 were 100,000 men, a force of about 800,000 men ; preserving the 
 system which existed, of leaving a part of the contingent at home, 
 and organizing a system of reserve which should be like that 
 formed by the law of 1818, since in effect this reserve was com- 
 posed partly of soldiers who had served under the colours for five 
 years, or, who in the second portion of the contingent, had be- 
 longed to the army for five years. 
 
 Lastlv, an attempt was made to form at once, under the name 
 National Guard "Mobile," a general reserve, into which all young 
 men who on any account whatever were not included in the con- 
 tingent had to enter. In this way, this law established universal 
 compulsory service. 
 
 But at the same time it must be observed that in imposing on 
 the young men composing the National Guard " Mobile " drills 
 and assemblies which shouhl produce a loss of onl^'^ one day, and 
 could only be repeated 15 times in the year, the law did not give 
 any cflicient means of instruction for the men composing this 
 portion of the army. 
 
 In addition, it must not be forjjotten that this organization was 
 hardly drafted when the war of 1S70 broke out. You are aware 
 that cadres for only a very small number of companies and batta- 
 lions had been then formed. But we also know% having witnessed it, 
 the generous efforts of the various departments to hasten the 
 formation of those batteries and battalions which marched full of 
 courage and devotion ; and vou have seen on many occasions 
 how these men, taken but the dav before from their peaceful 
 occupations, hardly knowing how to load their firelocks, have 
 given proof of true courage, and shown what they could do, had 
 the institutions of their country but given them habits of discipline, 
 and a better military education. 
 
 Such, gentlemen, is a precis of the various laws on recruiting 
 in our country. We were anxious to pass them all in review 
 before you, to show on what ideas they were conceived, and upon 
 ■what principles they were founded. 
 
 Now that you, in your turn, have to determine how the mili- 
 tary forces of France are to be organized, it appears advantageous to 
 recall the history of this subject. 
 
 Affairs are in a worse state than those our fathers knew. The
 
 13 
 
 sacrifices we must make are greater ; on this point we must not 
 deceive ourselves. 
 
 Doubtle'^s it is to be regretted on the score of civilization that 
 Euroj:»e siiould be compelled to keep up millions of men read}' 
 to take the field, but this must be so ]on^ as the elements of a 
 balance of power have to be sought. Fur in the midst of civilized 
 nations conquests can but be transitory. But whilst we wait we 
 have at our side a power ready made, who, laborious, well tauglit 
 and disciplined, can fling numerous armies on our naked frontier. 
 We cannot hesitate, let us therefore boldly begin the work. 
 
 II. 
 
 Gentlemen, the problem you have to solve is a difficult one. 
 Its solution has been sought for many years, when the state of 
 things was far less comj^licated than at present ; and yet the 
 ablest men, those most conversant with the subject^ could not 
 agree on what was best to be done. 
 
 But now that armies have been brought to such perfection, 
 new and formidable weapons have been discovered, and since those 
 powerful engines, powerful not only for civihzation and commerce, 
 but also for war — Railways — have given a power of moving masses 
 of men suddenly and rapidly, and throwing them quite un- 
 expectedly on the country to be invaded, the problem has indeed 
 become most complicated. Amid the great changes in the science 
 and art of war, in the formation and mobilization of armies, 
 doul)t!ess some general principles remain cmstant, but to apply 
 them, serious obstacles must be overcome ; and it is only by com- 
 promises tiiat can satisfy everyone that they can be overcome. 
 
 Thus, to give large armies, a great number of men must be 
 enrolled under the colours; but if the^e men are withdrawn for a 
 long period from their ordinary pursuits, society suffers. If too 
 short a period of service is fixed, the men do not acquire the 
 qualities of real soldiers, and the cadres do not acquire sufficient 
 solidity. 
 
 To reconcile these conflicting elements the constitution of the 
 army must be studied. 
 
 The time requisite to make a soldier of the different branches 
 of the service must be fixed; what constitutes a solid cadre must 
 be determined ; and then the problem how, in addition to the regular 
 army, a force sufficient to strengthen, replace, and fill its gaps can 
 be found, nmst be solved. 
 
 From another stand point of view, the effect of the proposed 
 system must be considered ; its effect on the development of 
 population, upon civil pursuits, upon agriculture, commerce, in- 
 dustry, the sciences and arts; lastly, the financial effect of the 
 scheme, and whether the finances of the State can support it. 
 
 Tills is nut all, important as these questions are, there are 
 perliaps others of a different c'ass, of still higiier importance. 
 
 We refer to the effect the law of recruiting must have on the
 
 14 
 
 feelings and the manners of the nation. In a country which requires 
 a powerful army, but where a great number of the citizens can, on 
 account of wealth, excuse themselves from military service, it is 
 probable that by degrees the puljlic spirit will' become profoundly 
 altered. Amidst the dangers and reverses of the country hearts 
 will no longer vibrate with patriotic feelings, a sort of egotism will 
 rule men's minds, and men will gauge the common misfortune but 
 bv that portion they themselves, as individuals, have to sustain. 
 
 In France, thank God, we are not yet at that point. The past 
 has left us so much that is grand that we may yet struggle against 
 the enervating doctrines preaclied to us. In the midst of our dis- 
 asters we had one consolation, it was to see men, hitherto strangers 
 to the military profession, hasten to meet the summons to arms. 
 Witliin these walls, v/e need not recall the many noble examples 
 given on the field of battle, where death levels all distinction of 
 rank. But, gentlemen, for a commonwealth, courage is not every- 
 thinii;. To make it powerful and great other virtues are required. 
 
 The more democratic a commonwealth is, the more obedience 
 to a superior, and the law, the more military and civil discipline 
 are needed ; and we dare to say it, the greater severity for all who 
 violate these laws is requisite. At this price only can order and 
 liberty be maintained. Is it impossible to have a law of recruiting 
 such that it will inspire these feelings and produce these habits ? 
 Your Committee thinks it possible, and its labours have been 
 guided by these ideas. 
 
 The morals of a country cannot be reformed by legislative 
 enactments ; modern society in the midst of the luxury diffused 
 throuoh all classes by industry, commerce, and the arts, in the 
 midst of progress in every direction, each day producing new wants, 
 cannot be compared with those ancient socieUes, where a legislator 
 could by his own will, dealing with small numbers of people, issue 
 laws from which sprang great and fruitful reforms. 
 
 But the influence of institutions on men is also known. It is 
 -acknowledged that there are in the history of nations moments when 
 they must draw themselves together, so to speak, and collect their 
 energies, in order that they may not slide clown that slope, down 
 which falling nations too quickly descend. 
 
 Our hopes, our efforts, v.ill doubtless meet with more than one 
 sceptical objector ; for in this France, for SO years so agitated, so 
 torn, where all forms of government appear to have been tried, 
 where all authorities have been destroyed — raised — but to be again 
 destroyed — what has remained constant, what principle is un- 
 altered ? Has not each revolution been one ruin more on the 
 ground; one doubt more in the minds of men? 
 
 Yet we have confidence in our countrv, we believe that its mis- 
 fortunes — perhaps even on account of its misfortunes — it requires 
 enerjiy only to lay the dangers which menace it, and to place it 
 once more in its proper position in the world. We do not hesitate 
 to think that the legislative enactments you have ordered us to 
 prepare, cannot but have some influence on the ideas and habits 
 of the people.
 
 15 
 
 It is from these various points of view, gentlemen, that your 
 Committee has regarded the task entrusted to it. It has devoted 
 many meetings to this purpose, it has studied the greater number 
 of the questions raised in the projects sulimitted by you, and it has 
 examined the vai-ious systems which h;ive been produced during 
 the course of the discussion. 
 
 It has been acknowledged that the regulations of 1&63 cannot 
 give the results that were expected from them. We will explain 
 why, in another part of our report, it has been further acknow- 
 ledged that these regulations are very far from attaining the object 
 that it appears desirable to reach. 
 
 But if its opinion is formed on this subject, it has not yet (we 
 must acknowledge) decided on many points that m.ust be settled, 
 before arranging all the propositions that should be laid before 
 you. 
 
 It has then only decided on certain general principles, from 
 which, to a great extent, the remainder must flow, and which, in 
 any case, must be the frontispiece of the law. It has therefore 
 desired to submit these principles to you l^efore going further. 
 
 It is good that the country should know them, and know the 
 spirit in which the law, on which its armed force must be based, 
 has been conceived. 
 
 This is why we have separated the first section, which contains 
 the general arrangements, and which has been unanimously agreed 
 to by the Committee. 
 
 This section embraces seven articles, which are rather a declara- 
 tion of principles than the development and application of what 
 flows from those jDrinciples. 
 
 1st Section.— General 1)i::;positions. 
 
 Article 1. 
 
 Every Frenchman is liable to personal military service. 
 
 Article 2. 
 
 There is in the French army neither bounty in money, nor 
 payment of any kind for enlistment. 
 
 Article 3. 
 
 Every Frenchman, who is not declared unfit for all military 
 service, may be called on from the age of 20 to that of 40 years, to 
 form a portion of the regular army and its reserves, according as 
 the law directs. 
 
 Article 4. 
 
 Substitution is abolished. 
 
 Dispensations from service, according to the conditions specified 
 in this law, do not give complete exemption. 
 
 Article 5. 
 Men wiih the cjlours are deprived of the elective franchise.
 
 16 
 
 Article 6. 
 
 Every armed and organized body of men is under martial law, 
 and forms a portion of the army under either the Minister for 
 War, or the Minister for the Navy. 
 
 Article 7- 
 
 No one can serve in the French Army who is not a French- 
 man. 
 
 The following are excluded from and have no title to serve in 
 the army : — 
 
 1st. Those who have been guilty of felony. 
 
 2nd. Those who have been guilty of a misdemeanour and 
 imprisoned for t\\ o or more years, or have been placed 
 under the surveillance of the police, and deprived of 
 municipal, civil, or family rights. 
 
 Before submitting this section to you, gentlemen, we asked 
 the President of the Republic, and the Minister of War to 
 examine it. 
 
 What is now being dealt Mith, you will observe are but general 
 principles, and do not affect the organization of the military forces, 
 and need not interfere in any way with the task to which the 
 Governnient devotes itself in such a praiseworthy method; but as 
 the principles we have enunciated must one day have a consider- 
 able influence upon the army and on society, we considered it 
 right that we should first hear the views of the Government on the 
 subject. 
 
 The Chief of the Executive Povrer and the Minister of War 
 attended a meeting of tlic Committee, and it followed from that 
 meeting that the Committee and the Government were agreed on 
 several important points, and only on the question of substitutes 
 was there anv difference of opinion. 
 
 The study of the details at the proper moment will, we believe, 
 greatly reduce this divergence of opinion; nay, we hope it will 
 ent rely disappear. 
 
 However this may be, it is most desirable that you should see 
 the spirit in which the declarations we have made are submitted 
 to you. 
 
 Personal military servic3 for all Frenchmen is not deemed 
 unfi ting. 
 
 It compels every man from 20 to 40 years of age to answer the 
 summons of his country when its defence or internal security is 
 endangered. 
 
 It prevents his throwing his share of this duty on others. 
 
 It compels those who enlist voluntarily to be disinterested. 
 
 It forbids all interference of the army in political matters. 
 
 It suppresses all armed bodies who do not form a portion of 
 the army and are not under military law. 
 
 Iiastly, it declares that njne but Frenchmen can be admitted 
 into the Ficnch Army, and t lose guilty of disgraceful crimes are 
 excluded from a share in that honour.
 
 17 
 
 We propose to give you, as briefly as possible, some remarks on 
 eacb of these Articles. ^Vlule it is requisite that their bearing 
 should be clearly understood, it should not be exagoeratcd. 
 
 The first Article — " All Frenchmen are liable to personal 
 " military service '' — is the basis on wliich the whole edifice that 
 we would raise rests. 
 
 It is requisite that every one should know from his infancy 
 what he owes to the defence of his country ; it is requisite that he 
 should prepare himself for his task, and that he should not for one 
 moment imagine that he has the power to withdraw himself from 
 the burden when it falls on him. 
 
 In all situations society protects him ; it is requisite that he in 
 his turn should be ready in all situations to protect society with 
 all his powerS; both of body and mind. 
 
 This principle is not new, for, not to quote the law of the 
 year VI, which says, "All Frenchmen are soldiers and are bound to 
 '•' defend the country," does not every law on recruiting proclaim 
 this obligation in a general way ? 
 
 If, on account of considerations to which we will have to 
 revert, these laws have in their application tempered this principle, 
 they have yet maintained it. The last law on this subject, that at 
 present in force, savs,v,-ith reference to the home army (the National 
 Guard ''Mobile ^'), " that it must act as an auxiliary to the army 
 "in the defence of fortresses, coasts, frontiers, and the maintenance 
 "of order." Has not the law of 1SG8 disregarded the greater 
 number of the exemptions previously granted ? Have not all 
 young men been ordered to march ? Has not th.e entire country 
 responded to the appeal ? 
 
 We repeat there is nothing new or surprising in this principle; 
 it is that on which all our laws of recruiting have been founded. 
 
 So far as the general principle goes, and so long as nothing 
 more than was implied in previous laws which submitted all young 
 men to tlie recruiting law was intended, this proposal received no 
 opposition from the Government. 
 
 But we must not conceal from you, that in our eyes this 
 principle, as we have laid it down, is of far v»'ider application than 
 ever was contemplated in any former law. 
 
 We have been induced to ask you to base your law on this 
 principle by viewing it from two different stand points, and in 
 order that two distinct interests may be benefitted. 
 
 Undoubtedly, when this obligation is imposed, when we say 
 that every Frenchman owes personal military service, either in the 
 army or its reserves, we seek tlie power of enlarging the army 
 and putting a much greater number of men at the disposal of the 
 State, in order that the masses of men who can invade this 
 country may be met by masses of at least equal strength ; we are, 
 moreover, desirous (and this will be explained hereafter) that every 
 man, to spare himself the ennui of military service, may seek to 
 prepare himself beforehand, and thus reduce the expenses of the 
 State. 
 
 But other motives, perhaps of a higher and more elevated 
 
 c
 
 18 
 
 cliaracter, have, as we have already explained to you, induced 
 us to proclaim the principle of coivijndsory service. 
 
 First, there is the homage due to the feeling of equality — a 
 feeling which amongst the envious and jealous seeks to degrade all 
 to the lowest level : but which we. on tl\e contrary, seek to make 
 a lever to elevate all. 
 
 When in any assemblage of men, especially in an army v.liere 
 discipline exists, all classes are mixed together, we may feel 
 sure that noble ideas will prevail, good examples will be followed, 
 and that the whole tone will be raised. Further^ we may be sure 
 that, when performing the same duties, obeying the same rules, 
 bound by great common interests, sharing the same privations 
 and the same dangers, all classes will be knit more closely together, 
 and will see much that now appears to divide them disappear. 
 Lastly, we may be sure that under such circumstances men will 
 appreciate one another, and have a mutual sympathy for each 
 other; the different gradations of rank which the force of cir- 
 cumstances always produces in all societies, far from then being 
 an object of jealousy and hatred, will, on the contrary, produce 
 true respect. 
 
 If vou doubt this, gentlemen, ask old military men who, having 
 settled down in the country, meet every day old soldiers who 
 belong to the corps in which they have served. Further, ask naval 
 ofHcers who amid trials and dangers of all kinds have livcel in 
 common with the men of their crews. Ask them what they have 
 learned, wdiat they have found at home, when they have met again 
 the brave men whose labours and perils they have shared. 
 
 But this is not all, we must pay homage to and do justice to the 
 army. Look at what now takes place in the array, how industry, 
 education, feeling, persoiial dignity, the duty of men towards their 
 fellows, respect f^n- superiors, good fellowship with equals, is 
 increased and developed amongst the young men who join the 
 army annually. Follow these men after their discharges to then' 
 homes, you widfind them the most sought after, the most respected; 
 they carry there the qualities they have cultivated, the habits they 
 have learned in the army. 
 
 Let us say it boldly, geritlemen ; the army is the great school 
 for the country. Future generations will come and imbibe there 
 feelings of patriotism, discipline, and honour, and the nation will 
 receive a manly education which cannot but influence its destinies; 
 thus raising the tone of the army itself, which will then be 
 entered by men of the well-to-do classes, and the country in return 
 will receive men improved and civilised by the arm)". 
 
 The principle we propose for your adoption is then from both 
 points of view a healthy one. 
 
 In the terms of Article 2, there is no longer bounty in money 
 or payment of any sort, for engagement. This, as you are aware, 
 is the principle which has existed since the revolution of 1789; 
 the law of 1818 used the same words as we now propose, and 
 they were also reproduced in the law of 1832. If they are not now 
 included in the existing law of recruiting they have been unfortu-
 
 19 
 
 natcly erased for the time. It is requisite that it should be known 
 that men who join tlie army voluntarily do so, not for money, but 
 from a desire to serve the country in a noble career. 
 
 But while we repudiate all ideas of bounty for engagement or 
 re-engagement, we are far from saying that the posiiicm of men 
 who after a certain number of years wish to remam in the army 
 should not be improved, nor that the comforts of old soldiers 
 should not be augmented. 
 
 Thus, additional pay, increase of pension, are by no means 
 interfei-ed w-ith by this Article. What we prohibit is the bait 
 (pardon the expression) used to lure men to enlist. But payment 
 for actual service rendered should be respected what form soever 
 it may take. 
 
 Article 3. "Every Frenchman who is not judged unfit for all 
 *' military service mav be summoned from the age of 20 years to that 
 " of 40^ to serve in the regular armv and its reserves, as fixed by 
 " law." 
 
 Thei*e are in this Article two things to which we must direct 
 your attention. 
 
 Fu'st, it declares that every Frenchman who is not unfit for all 
 military service may be called on for service in the army and its 
 reserves. 
 
 Second, it fixes the limit of this service at from 20 to 10 years 
 of age. 
 
 The first of these Articles you will observe limits exemptions 
 to those granted for such infirmities as debar the individual from 
 forming a portion of the army, or one of the numerous auxiliary 
 services which folL^w all armies. 
 
 Thus, the post office, the hospitals, the telegraphs, the commis- 
 sariat stores, &c.. 8cc., can evidently utilize many men who would 
 be unfit for the ranks. When the law says '"unfit for all 
 military service," it means not only the active duty of the soldier, 
 but for all those other services which do not require the physical 
 qualities requisite for a soldier. 
 
 Perhaps at first sight it may appear strange that all those who 
 cannot completely fulfil the duties of a soldier are not freed from 
 the obligation to serve. But it must be remembered that the law 
 is conceived on the basis that each man must serve his country 
 according to hisaljilities, and that tlie greater part of these auxiliary 
 services take out of the ranks many men who should figure there 
 as combatants; taking this into consideration, it is only just and 
 right to declare that these duties may be performed by young 
 men wdio are now entirely exempted, and believe themselves to be 
 perfectly free of all duties towards the country. 
 
 The second ])roposition is equally important, and its meaning 
 should be clearly understood. 
 
 ItfoUows that from the age of ?0 to 40 years all Frenchmen have 
 a serious duty to perform, that for 20 years the country wdl have, for 
 its defence and securitv, a right, to call on their devotion and courage. 
 But this obligation will not i e the same during the whole period, 
 and public opinion must not be deceived on this subject. 
 
 c2
 
 20 
 
 The law, when it says "may be called on to form a portion of 
 " the army or its reserves as may he directed," wishes to show on 
 the one hand that limits would be placed to the action of the law, 
 and also that the periods during which men would be successively 
 called on for the active army and its reserves as well as the condi- 
 tions of service, would be fixed by legislative enactment. 
 
 You must, gentlemen, alwa\s bear in mind that the section 
 that is now submitted to you contains only general arrangements, 
 and does not enter into details, which necessarily are included in 
 other sections. What we are at present concerned with is the 
 question whether or no it is reasonal)le that all Frenchmen can, 
 according to circumstances, from the age of 20 to that of 40, be 
 called on for the defence of the country and the maintenance of 
 the security of the commonwealth. 
 
 We, so far as we are concerned, do not hesitate to answer 
 affirmatively. Without referring to many countries where a 
 similar obligation begins earlier and finishes later, we say to you 
 definitely that in our opinion there must no longer be bodies of 
 armed men in France, other than those composing the army under 
 the orders of the military authorities. 
 
 We must, then, consider not only the necessity of the organiza- 
 tion of a regular army and the reserves requisite to sustain it and 
 fill up the gaps, but also what is I'equisite for internal order. 
 
 This Article does notseem, then, to impose an exorbitant charge 
 on all Frenchmen for 20 years. 
 
 The law we propose will, if approved by the Assembly, be the 
 law for recruiting and organising all the military forces of France. 
 
 It is requisite, therefore, that it should be comprehensive 
 enough to embrace everything that the security or defence of the 
 country may require, and also leave no space, no matter Avhat may 
 happen, for those extraordinary levies, which strike people Avith 
 astonishment because they do not understand and are not prepared 
 for them. When the various arrangements of this law are examined 
 it will be found, on the contrary, that the demands it makes, 
 although serious, for they are appeals lo the patriotism and devo- 
 tion of every one, are, however, far from interfering with the duties 
 or clashing with the careers of anyone. 
 
 Marriage, for example, your Con:imittee, (who do not accept the 
 idea that a married man owes nothing to the defence of his country.) 
 will tell you when we arrive at these details how it is proposed to 
 reconcile the interests of popvilation with the requirements of 
 military service. 
 
 Your Committee will also point out the important part that pre- 
 paratory military instruction will play, and the happy results that 
 emulation produced by wise measures will produce in the ranks. 
 Once more the Committee beg to repeat its recommendation. 
 All Frenchmen may be called on from 20 to 40 years of age to 
 serve in the army or ils reserves, as may be determined by law 
 according to circumstances. 
 
 This principle has been unanimously agreed on by the Govern- 
 ment and the Committee.
 
 21 
 
 The same has not been the case^ as we already have said, with 
 the next Article, which does away with the law of sul)stitution. 
 
 " Substitution is suppressed." 
 
 " Dispensations from military service do not confer a complete 
 " liberation from that duty."' 
 
 You will have observed, gentlemen, in the first portion of this 
 report, that, notwithstanding the clause against substitution con- 
 tained in the law of the year A^I, it did not fail to make its appear- 
 ance in the law of the year VII, but merely exceptionally, and it 
 remained in force until the year 1814, despite the difficulties and 
 restrictions thrown in the way of its application. 
 
 You have also seen that substitution was allowed in the laM's 
 of 1818 and of 1832, and if it disappeared in 1855 to give place to 
 exoneration as we at present have it, it existed but under another 
 form, which rendered its exercise more easy, and which was 
 re-established in 1868. 
 
 We are not ignorant that substitution has been considered as 
 a means of satisfying the exigencies of civil life, and of those situa- 
 tions that it was desirable for the State to pi^eserve; and whenever 
 this question has been agitated, it has been stated that substitution 
 allowed the law of recruiting to weld itself more easily into our social 
 system. 
 
 It is for this reason that the Government makes no objection 
 to the three first Articles of the Chapter which we now lay before 
 you. As we have already pointed out, the words, "Every Frencli- 
 '■ man is liable to military service," does not touch the question of 
 substitution, any more than the terms of the law of 1832, 
 which submitted all young men having completed 20 years of age 
 to the obligation to draw lots. 
 
 But, gentlemen, your Committee believes it to be desirable to 
 go farther than the laws of 1818 and 1832; it believes it is now 
 requisite to proclaim the rule of compulsory personal service; this, 
 in our opinion, is the basis on which the law should rest. 
 
 It has already told you its motives. 
 
 It does not conceal that doubtless the suppression of substitu- 
 tion has a certain importance, that with the people this Article 
 will at first appear the most severe in the whole law ; but we 
 trust and hope, that when better informed, they will understand 
 the object we have in view, and that they will then see only the 
 application of principles which are dear to them. 
 
 It will be well to give an account of the various arrangements 
 which may be adopted to lighten the load imposed on every one, 
 bat conjointly with the principle of compulsory service, substitution 
 cannot exist. If we suppose that in the formation of the army 
 and its reserves, certain substitutions between the young men of 
 the same class are allowed; suppose that with the object of 
 exciting emulation beforehand and giving, so to speak, a bounty 
 in the form of encouragement to superior attainments, this would 
 not be a deviation from the main principles of the law, which 
 allowing substitution undoubtedly would be. 
 
 But is it requisite that every young man should pass with
 
 22 
 
 the colours the entire period fixed for service in the regular 
 army? We do not think this is requisite, only his not doing 
 so must he in virtue of special dispensation, and such arrange- 
 ments as may satisfy the legitimate ends that must he kept in view, 
 regard being had to the pursuit of civil professions, and the 
 necessities of certain situations. 
 
 Thus, while no exemptions but tliose arising from infirmities, 
 rendering young men afilicted with them unfit for military 
 service, will be allowed, it is evident that those who, for example, 
 are the sole support of a widowed mother, may obtain a dispensa- 
 tion, as well as men who w^ish to take Holy Orders, and enter 
 other situations in life too long to enumerate here. This is what 
 this Aiticle refers to when it speaks of dispensations on the condi- 
 tions prescrilied l)y \&w. 
 
 If we examine wdiat has taken place in a country which on the 
 morrow of a bloody defeat was wise enough to adopt this principle, 
 we see with what care the various interests to which we refer have 
 been conciliated. " Overslaugh's," that is to say, temporary dis- 
 pensations from service are granted not only to those who support 
 a familv, but also to entire categories of individuals who the State 
 considers should pursue their own careers. 
 
 And do not tliink, gentlemen, that these overslaughs 
 are given only to the higher ranks of society, for the reverse is the 
 case. 
 
 Independently of those individuals whose state is similar to 
 those provided for by the exemptions of the law of 1832, we see 
 side by side w'ith them the pupds of certain schools, the heads of 
 industrial, agricultural or commercial establishments, whose 
 presence appears indispensable. We see the sons of farmers 
 w'hose labour is necessary on the farm, workmen and apprentices 
 to whom the State wishes to grant time to complete their 
 education. 
 
 Yet we must again repeat these overslaughs are not complete 
 exemptions, they are conditional, for the most part provisional, and 
 allowed only in time of peace. Then, in addition to these dispen- 
 sations, it has always been arranged, while the application of the 
 general rule was satisfied, that the requirements of various pro- 
 fessions should he considered. Thus, young men who have 
 important studies to pursue, and who give proofs of certain military 
 instruction, are allowed to remain under fixed conditions but a short 
 time with the colours. 
 
 We know that in these overslaughs much is left to the discre- 
 tion of the authorities, but was not tjie same done with us by the 
 law of 1868, even for the bread earners of families ? 
 
 There are, then, no insurmountable difficulties in providing 
 fairly for all the exigencies of various careers. But this must be 
 done by the law, by regulations which must be made in broad day- 
 light, so that everyone may know them. 
 
 The Article adds, " Dispensations do not confer a complete 
 discharge." 
 
 This is evidently a result of the system itself. If every French-
 
 23 
 
 man from the age of 20 to 40 years forms a jjortion of the regular 
 iirmy and its reserves, it is evident that the cause for which a 
 dispensation was allowed must cease at some time or other. It 
 would not be just that he should remain freed for ever from all 
 military service; he must follow the lot of others who l^elong to 
 the same contingent: his obligation must only cease when theirs 
 cease too. Tiiis is the reason dispensation from serA-ice does not 
 give complete liberation. 
 
 By its terms the law wished to show that those whose services 
 are dispensed with, are placed in a situation entirely different from 
 those who are exempted by the laws of lSl>i and 1832, viz., 
 that the exempted men were declared absolutely free. 
 
 The question of substitution is truly the question of com- 
 pulsory service, and it is this which, as we have already said, 
 divides the Committee from the Government. 
 
 The Government think, that without substition it will De 
 impossible to properly satisfy the requirements of certaiis profes- 
 «ions, the necessities of certain situations; in short, what the istate 
 of society actually requires. 
 
 The Committee think, on the contrary, while they do not lose 
 sight of these requirements or necessities, that measures may be 
 taken to satisfy them, which will stimulate earnest study both 
 amongst civilians and military men. without allowing any one, by 
 money, to relieve himself from the obligation of military service. 
 
 Thus, after all, it is but a questioii of means between the 
 Government and the Committee ; and we hope, that when you 
 examine in detail what we propose, you will also be of the same 
 opinion. 
 
 But it apDears desirable to us that the National Assembly 
 should be able to "uaoe the extent of the law. 
 
 When so niaiiy detestable doctrines are spread through this 
 country, whose object is to divide the various strata of society (for 
 there are really no lon2;er classes) when these detestable doctrines 
 seek to divide those termed the ''rich" and the "poor"; oh! 
 gentlemen, it is a grand answer to be able to make to such peojde, 
 all of you, whose sons have fought, or who may l)e called on to 
 fight for France, it is a grand answer to make, "' Substitution is 
 "suppressed, every Frenchman owes military service to his country." 
 
 Your Committee has, with one exception, been unanimous in 
 adopting this principle. 
 
 Article 5, "Men under the colours shall have no vote.'' This 
 Article is inserted in the law on account of discipline. 
 
 It seeks to interfere with none of those questions which a law on 
 the suffrage may raise; it seeks only to remove a cause of discord 
 and insubordination from the ranks of the army. 
 
 It is not advisable that military men, who, in the acts they 
 have to p.erfonn as a bodv.are submitted to tbcir supLM-iors, should 
 .•■ometimes find themselves the equals, perhaps tiie adversaries, of 
 those superiors without ceasing to be under '.lieir orders 
 
 The fielings thus produced may influence, and be influenced, 
 by what passes in the armj', which is much to be regretted.
 
 24 
 
 To use the franchise as laid down by existing laws, men placed 
 in a regiment must form distinct isolated groups, according to the 
 departments they belong to. 
 
 The men forming each group must enter into discussions, and 
 must have names inserted on their voting papers, of whirli they 
 are often ignorant. They are asked out of their barracks and 
 camps to be instructed by ofticious election agents, and God knows 
 what politics, what principles are often taught to them. 
 
 They vote far away from their fellow citizens, who might have 
 enlightened them if they had been amongst them, and, never- 
 theless, their votes are counted amongst the others. 
 
 Gentlemen, we could not have a greater example of the 
 discipline, the good sense, and moral power of the army, than the 
 fact that it has been able to resist the dangerous solicitations, the 
 fatal doctrines, with which, for some years, it has been flooded. 
 
 To take part in elections is, for the army itself, a bad thing 
 But for the Government, of whatever form, nay, for society itself, 
 it is worse. 
 
 The votes of the soldiers, as you are aware, are not cast into 
 the urn on the day of election, and mixed with those of the 
 cifizens ; they are collected apart, and, according as they are 
 favourable or the reverse to such and such a party, to such or such a 
 political personage, public opinion, without taking any account of 
 the causes which may have produced the effect, strives to find 
 out the motives, and very often discovers what really has no 
 existence. 
 
 Thus, in addition to the ill effects produced on discipline, the 
 vote of soldiers with the colours is productive of grave evils. 
 Leave the army its great and noble mission to perfect itself in 
 military art and science. Let it have no political part to play. 
 It belongs to the entire country, and this in itself is greatness ; do 
 not seek to drag it at the tail of political parties. 
 
 Article 6, " All armed bodies are submitted to military law, 
 " and form portion of the army under military authority"; hence the 
 National Guard is suppressed. 
 
 During the last war, bodies of men commissioned l)y the State 
 have been denied the title of belligerents. It is requisite to 
 prevent a recurrence of such things. It must be known that 
 all bodies of men organized and armed by the State are a portion 
 of the army, and are submitted to military law, either under the 
 Minister for War or Marine, according to circumstances. 
 
 This principle is, then, the requisite corollary of the new organi- 
 zation, which, it seems to us, should be that of the militarv forces 
 of France, and the obligation which the law imposes on all 
 citizens. 
 
 When, by the effect of the principle of compulsory service, 
 all men can be called on to form a portion of the regular army and 
 its reserves from the age of 20 to that of 40 years, it is evident 
 that the country will then have at its disposal, not only for the 
 defence of its territory, but also for the maintenance of internal 
 security, everything that is requisite.
 
 25 
 
 Hence, tliere need be nothing beyond the army, in the 
 form of armed bodies submitted to military autliority, but 
 having other origin, following other rules, and dependent on other 
 powers. 
 
 'The National Guard disappears, then, by the force of circum- 
 stances. All men of 20 and 40 years of age ought to serve in tlie 
 army and its reserves ; there is, therefore, no longer the means of 
 forming a national guard, without borrowing from an organization 
 that it is requisite the State should preserve intact. 
 
 But this definition of Article 6 does not interfere with, we need 
 hardly say, the custom-house officials, who, in carrying out the duties 
 entrusted to them, must evidently preserve their arms to defend 
 themselves against smugglers. Neither does it affect the institu- 
 tion of firemen, which is a collection of brave men intended for 
 special service in special cases. 
 
 Lastly, t!ie last Article admit Frenchmen only into the national 
 army, and excludes from military service felons, those wlio are 
 guilty of misdemeanours, or are placed under the surveillance of 
 the police. 
 
 The defence of the country is a duty for all citizens, but it is 
 also an honour; the foreigner has no interest in it, and the un- 
 worthy must be excluded from the privilege. 
 
 These, gentlemen, are the considerations which we desired to 
 make known to you, and whicli we should much h.ave lik ed to 
 abridge. But it was of importance that everyone should understand 
 the bearing of the resolutions which we have the honour to suljniit. 
 We now only submit general principles which may serve as tlic 
 basis of the law of recruiting. 
 
 It is by regarding this question, both as it affects the armv and 
 societ\^ that we have arrived at tiie conclusions we have, and from 
 the same points of view we i)eg vou to approve them. 
 
 Do not think that v.-e have disregarded the fact that interference 
 with the customs of the people so far as the law of recruiting is 
 concerned is a delicate matter. But it seems to us that the tims has 
 now come when the country must take up a position from whirli 
 reforms, such as we desire, may flow. Be sure of this, that far 
 from clashing with popular sentiment, the people will, when tliev 
 see this great Assembly proclaiming these principles, understand 
 the elevation and patriotism Avhich animates it. 
 
 Do not think that we have allowed ourselves to be drawn away 
 in pursuit of novelties, or by an unreasoning desire to imitate what 
 has succeeded with other nations. 
 
 No ; for while we know that it is requisite not to adhere blindlv 
 to the mistakes of the past, and believe that our methods and our 
 institutions arc the best, yet we are equally aware that it would be 
 folly to conclude that, because we have met with reverses, therefore 
 our institutions contain nothing but faults. iSuch alterations as are 
 required should be made, then, with a firm but prudent hand. 
 And, if we have sought instructions beyond our frontier, it is the 
 better to understand our misfortunes, and the better to understand 
 the lessons they convey.
 
 26 
 
 Lastljr, gentlemen, we cannot forget tlie words of Montesquieu 
 as to what constituted the greatness of the Romans. 
 
 " Having successively' eombatted with all people, they invariably 
 *\2,ave up their own customs so soon as they found better. Their 
 "first object was to find out in wliat respect their enemy had a 
 " superiority, and that they instantly adopted.^' 
 
 SECOND PART. 
 Chapters II, III, IV, and V. 
 
 After pointing out in the first part of this report the various 
 laws which have governed the recruiting of our armies; after 
 exposing the general piinciplcs which should, we think, serve as 
 the basis for our new military institutions, there remains to sul)mit 
 to you the various rules which the application of these principles 
 entail. 
 
 But, in order that we mav advance more securely on the road 
 that the interests of the country demand, a-id that public opinion 
 appears in some sort already to have marked out, it is requisite to 
 state the problem clearly. 
 
 We think that the army France at present requires is, not only 
 a force permanently and powerfully organized, and a great school, 
 where all the elements of which the nation is composed may 
 imbibe instruction and military discipline bc^fore entering civil life, 
 but also avast fran)ework within which all these elements, educated 
 and told off beforehand, may range themselves when the country 
 is menaced in its independence, or its internal security. 
 
 This is the problem we seek to solve. 
 
 This problem, genf;iemen, is no invention of ours; force of 
 circumstances, our situation in Europe, above all, the state of our 
 society, imperatively demand its solution. 
 
 Doubtless, existing legislation might create considerable, nay, 
 imposing military forces, but it cannot lay all the dangers which 
 threaten us. 
 
 There is no one who has a greater respect for the distinguished 
 authors of the laws of 1818 and 1832 ; none who render more 
 justice to their work than your Committee. We have owed to 
 them, for fifty years, the soldiers of which we have been so justly 
 proud. The recruiting, the organization of the army, answered 
 fully, as we acknowledge, to the requirements of that period. 
 
 You may recall how at those periods, in the midst of various 
 States which had coalesced against and conquered her, France still 
 preserved her preponderance, owing to the size of her territory, 
 her population, and her unitv.
 
 27 
 
 You may also recall of what the permanent armies of the great 
 powers were composed, what heterogeneous masses manv put in 
 line before the homogeneous forces of France. 
 
 Lastly, it is well knoun that with tiie arms then in use, with 
 the means of transport then existing, the personal valour of the 
 soldier was of great importance. 
 
 This quality of personal courage is not now so gi'cat as when 
 troops fought closer ; firmness and courage upon the held of battle 
 often then compensated for inferior numbers. Under these heads 
 our army has been happily gifted. 
 
 Looking to the state of things in the country itself, after the 
 great and often glorious wars of the revolution and the empire, wc 
 see that although the country was in a state of exhaustion, and there 
 was much outcry against the abuse of the conscription, yet the 
 better classes of society, influenced by the noble history of the 
 past, still sougbt the profession of arms ; young men know-ing 
 nothing of commerce, for whom industrial pursuits, then in their 
 infancy, had no charms, and who were little afTected by the enjoy- 
 ments of luxury. Lastly, if there were in the country parties 
 animated by hostile 'political passions, none, at least, sought to 
 upset social order itself, and to hurl one class of individuals against 
 another. 
 
 Under such conditions laws which, while they based re- 
 cruiting on the principle of equality, gave some alleviation to 
 the severity of the regulations; produced an army which, although 
 drawn from all the living force of the nation, yet by allowing 
 sul)stitution, permitted those who were in easv circumstances to 
 escape military service, and by length of service formed and 
 kept old soldiers. 
 
 Such laws and such an army, we repeat, were then in unison 
 with both our situation in Europe and our internal condition. 
 
 Nevertheless, this legislation, which, when it appeared, was a 
 true conquest over ancient prejudices, yielded, perhaps, too much 
 to the objections raised against conscription. It liberated from 
 military service, and freed for ever fiom the most holy of all 
 duties, those who the ballot did not send under the colours. 
 Thus, raising substitution, in one sense, from a privilege to a 
 right. It cannot be denied, that seeds, the growth of which have 
 enervated the public spirit, and altered the constitution of the army 
 were thus sown. 
 
 This did not fail to show itself under the Governii.cnt of the 
 Restoration, and under that wliich succeeded it, and many men, 
 eminent for their military experience, largely discussed the bearing 
 of these laws. 
 
 They studied by what combinations it was possible to instruct 
 a larger number of young soldiers each year. And this became 
 more desirable when, on account of the increase of riches, 
 and the large number of new careers opening for 3'oung 
 men, it became apparent that each year tlie nu;nber of voung men 
 belonging to the well-to-do classes entering tlie army de- 
 creased, and the number of substitutes increased. Men then
 
 28 
 
 began to be much affected by the change, and means to remedy 
 it were anxiously sought. 
 
 Thus, gentlemen, each day the army became gradually more 
 and more an institution distinct from the country, to which the 
 country appeared entirely to give up its defence and its security ; 
 and all those who did not belong to it were entirely relieved from 
 this duty, and became utterly careless about it. 
 
 Happily, the army preserved its noble traditions, and it 
 imbibed, from feelings of honour and discipline, a power and a 
 patriotism which it should have obtained from the aid of all 
 citizens. Happily, also, at the period of which we speak, our 
 organization, compared with that of the greater part of other 
 nations, was far from being deficient. 
 
 But since then, gentlemen, things have changed not only all 
 round us, but even in our midst. 
 
 You know who are now the great powers of Europe, and in 
 what position thev ai^e, the importance of their military forces, and 
 what has led them to profoundly modify the constitution of their 
 armies. 
 
 You are equally aware of the internal state of our own country ; 
 the revolutionary passions it is torn by ; the fatal doctrines men 
 seek to spread amongst the people; the solicitations they address 
 to the soldiers; the divisions that are to spread in all ranks of 
 society. 
 
 Looking to the state of foreign affairs, and in presence of the 
 infernal perils which threaten us, it appears indispensable and 
 requisite to enlarge greatly the basis upon \vhich hencefortii 
 should rest what we may term the armed organization of this 
 country. 
 
 Doubtless the law of 18G8, and this should be acknowledged, 
 has already taken an important stej) in the direction we seek 
 to follow, since in place of completely liberating from military 
 service the young men who are not embraced in the annual 
 contingent, it still retained them to make a part of the National 
 Guard " Mobile," intended to be an auxiliary to the active army. 
 But, it imposed on them no service in the army, and called on 
 them, only in case of war, without giving them any sufficient 
 military instruction. On the one hand, it gave up a considerable 
 portion of the resources, which it might otherwise have disposed, 
 and on the other, it allowed too great a difference to exist 
 between the men composing the various classes, of whom, some 
 placed in the contingent remained nine years in the army, whilst 
 others belonged only to tlie National Guard " Mobile " for five 
 years, and as substitution was maintained, it was evident that the 
 composition of the regular army could not be altered. It was, 
 then, not in the army but in the National Guard *' Mobile" that 
 all the young men of certain classes in society were to be 
 found. 
 
 Now, on the contrary, what we seek we cannot too often repeat 
 is the union, the mingling in the ranl^s of the army of all the 
 elements of society, how diverse soever they may be. This, in our
 
 29 
 
 opinion, is a social necessity imposed on the country, as urgent as 
 the defence of our soil which imperiously demands it. 
 
 Thus, gentlemen, \vc arrive at the ideas which we have already 
 expressed. 
 
 The army ought to be not only a permanent force powerfully 
 organized, and a great school, where all classes of the nation come 
 in succession to imbibe military instruction before entering civil 
 life, but also a vast framework in which the educated elements 
 previously classed according to their aptitude are arranged, the day 
 the country is menaced, either in its independence or its internal 
 security. 
 
 To realise these ideas has been our desire in bringing forward 
 the project we lay before you. 
 
 This project is divided into five sections. The first is devoted 
 to general arrangements in some sort the preamble of the lav/ ; this 
 we have already dealt with, and do not again propose to refer to. 
 
 The second treats of calling out the various classes. 
 
 The third treats of military service. 
 
 The fourth of voluntary enlistment. 
 
 The fifth of penalties. 
 
 2nd Section. 
 
 Founded, as you are aware, upon the principle of compulsory 
 service for all Frenchmen who are not considered unfit for military 
 service, the Bill will summon all young men, aged 20 years, to 
 form a portion of the regular army, then to serve in the reserve, 
 and then in the territorial army until the age when their services 
 will be dispensed with. 
 
 The census of these young men is carried out according to 
 existing rules, lots are drawn exactly as at present (the reason why 
 will be shortly explained) ; then they are examined by councils of 
 revision, which pronounce upon the objections which may then be 
 raised, as well as on the causes of exemptions and dispensations. 
 The law recognizes no other cause for exemption than those re- 
 sulting from infirmity, which renders a man unfit not only for 
 service in the regular army but also from being utilized in its 
 auxiliary services ; and the law further directs that young men 
 who appear, on account of a want in height, not to fulfil the 
 requisite conditions should stand over, and their cases be sub- 
 mitted for two consecutive years to a new examination by the 
 council of revision. 
 
 As for men whose services are dispensed with, the project 
 admits but three classes. 
 
 The first for young men that the laws of 1S32 and 1868 con- 
 sidered would, by their removal, make too great a gap in families, 
 whatever may be their situation or fortune (Art. 13 of the law 
 of 1832). 
 
 The second is conditional, that the young men to whom it is 
 granted remain for a ceitain time in professions that it is the interest 
 of the State that they should follow (Art. 11 of the law of 183.2).
 
 30 
 
 The tliird for tlio^e who are really the bre id-earners of their 
 fuiuilies, and actually fidfii tins duty. 
 
 These dispensations are, hovvever, vnerely conditional ; the 
 young men to whom thev are granted do not cease to belong to 
 their classes, and wheti the cause for dispensation disappears they 
 are then suljmitted to all the obligations that they otherwise would 
 be found to fulfil. 
 
 Then, to satisfy the requirements of men who have to perfect 
 themselves in their apprenticeship to some trade or art, also 
 to the requirements of certain commercial enterprises, and also 
 the l)etter to meet, we do not hesitate to say, the requirements of 
 justice, the law permits in time of ])eace a delay or overslaugh for 
 young men placed in the above conditions. 
 
 This is, if we may use the expression, a counterbalance to what 
 you will see proposed hereafter for young men whose studies cannot 
 be stopped, or too long suspended, without a great prejudice to 
 the careers on which thev are engaged. 
 
 But these '"delays" do not liberate the person who receives 
 them from military service; they adjourn simply in favour of his 
 vocation in life the period wlien it has to be fulfilled, and mav in 
 certain cases diminish its duration. 
 
 Further, the number of these dispensations accorded to the 
 bread-earners of families, as well as of the "delays," is limited 
 in proportion to the miml)er of young men considered fit for 
 service. 
 
 The responsibility of granting them is handed over to a council 
 possessed of the fullest information, and the composition of which 
 is of itself a guarantee for the justice of its decisions. 
 
 Lastly, all young mtn who may be left in situations such 
 as we have described may be subjected to drill, and in case of 
 war are not exemj)ted from taking part in the defence of the 
 country. 
 
 When the councils of revision have terminated their labours, 
 the parochial recruiting list is finally completed. This list is divided 
 into five parts, so that all the young men, except those definitely 
 exempted on account of infirmities rendering them unfit fcu" any 
 service whatever are inscribed each according to the situation in 
 W'hich he is placed. 
 
 Further, the law directs that from these lists, when the class 
 shall have been placed at the disposal of the Minister of War. 
 there shall be kept in each department or in each district a register 
 upon which the names of all the young men who are not declared 
 unfit for military service shall be borne. 
 
 This register will have a remark opposite each man's name, 
 and the position in wliicli he is, and all the changes tliat may be 
 made in his situation, \mtil he'shall have passed into the teritoiial 
 army, shall be thereon entered. 
 
 Each man entered on this register is bound to notify when 
 he changes his residence, so that the War Office shall know always 
 where he may be found if required, under any of the cases referred 
 to bv the law.
 
 31 
 
 Tliis register \s the basis upon \vliich the system we submit 
 must to a great extent, depend. By it alone can the careers 
 of men fuinning a portion of the active army and its reserves 
 be followed. By it alone can they be classed, not oidy accord- 
 ing to their incorporatioi^ but according to to the various situa- 
 tions that their profession renders tliem fitted for, and the day 
 when it is requisite to call on these men, they will be found all 
 ready classed i)eforehand, and they can at once be used to the liest 
 advantage. 
 
 3iiD Sectiox. 
 
 After thus determining the situation of the young men in each 
 class, the law divides into different periods the time during v/incli 
 every Frenchman who is not declared unfit for all military service 
 may be called on to form a portion of the regular army and its 
 reserves. 
 
 These periods are fixed as follows : — 
 
 In the regular army service for five years, after which service, 
 in the reserve of that army for four years. 
 
 After which men can only be called on for service in the terri- 
 torial army for five vears, and in its reserve for six years. All 
 voung men of the class called on, .vho are not exempted on ac-count 
 of infirmity, or whose services are not dispensed Avith, or who have 
 not obtained '"' delays," form a portion of the regular army and 
 are placed at the disposal of the Minister of War. 
 
 These young soldiers are all registered as belonging to the 
 different corps of the army, and are sent to their corps, to battalions 
 or schools of instruction. 
 
 All begin by serving for a year in the different situations in 
 which they are placed according to their fitness and their profes- 
 sions ; after this first year the number of men only which has been 
 fixed by the Minister of War, according to the estiniatc, and the 
 requirements of the service are retained with the colours. 
 
 These men are selected ])y the numljers they have drawn in 
 the lists of each parish, and in the proportions determined bv the 
 y\av Minister. 
 
 Young men included amongst those who are to serve only one 
 year, but who do not know how to read and write and cannot pass 
 the requisite examinations^ are kept in the corps for a second 
 year. On the contrary, those who by having acquired militarv 
 instruction prior to their entry into the army, joined to what 
 they have learned in the army, can in six months fulfil all the 
 required conditions, may at periods fixed by the Minister be 
 sent home on furlough. This furlough is the situation in which 
 all men sent home after a year's service in the army, as well as 
 those who after a longer or shorter period of service in the army 
 may be sent home, remain. They are at the disposal of the 
 Minister for War during the entire j")eriod they belong to the 
 regular army. And must undergo such inspections and drills as 
 the Minister may direct.
 
 32 
 
 It is requisite to observe that the law, when it says that all 
 soldiers belong to the regular army for five years, does not mean 
 that they remain under the colours for that time. Conside- 
 rations to which we will hereafter refer have induced us to fix 
 this period as that during Avhich all young men of a class, what 
 situation soever thev may be in, that is to say, either serving or 
 held in readiness, or on furlouL^h, or even detailed for auxiliary 
 services, owe their service to the regular army„ which is the first 
 regular force of the country. 
 
 After this period the men enter the reserve of the regular 
 army, and remain there four j^ears. During these four years they 
 are only oi)liged to take part in two manoeuvres, the duration of 
 which must not exceed 28 days each. They may, as may those 
 who are in readiness for the army, marry if they wisli. 
 
 But married men are none the less compelled to give the same 
 service as others of the class to which they belong. 
 
 The time passed in the first reserve being completed, that is to 
 say, when they reach the age of 29 years, the young men of the 
 classes fprm a portion of the territorial army, and later of the 
 second reserve. 
 
 While the project leaves it for a special law to determine the 
 basis of the organisation both of the regular army, the territorial 
 army and its reserves, it however lays down (because a law on 
 recruiting should enable people clearly to understand the extent of 
 their obligations) the principle that the territorial army should be 
 formed from detinite districts fixed by legislative enactment, and 
 that each district should embrace only the men who are domiciled 
 therein. 
 
 As regards the navy and the various corps attached to it — 
 
 Recruiting will continue as at present, no alterations are pro- 
 posed in the naval conscription or for the marines, only on account 
 of the nature of the service, which is essentially a voluntary engage- 
 ment or re-engagement on certain fixed conditions that will be 
 established by law, according to the wishes of the young men wdio 
 may be summoned when the lists are being revised. However, it 
 is only when the requisite number of men cannot be procured 
 voluntarily that recourse will be had to this method. 
 
 In such a case I'ecourse will be had as at present to the young 
 men who h.ave drawn the first numbers in each parish list. But 
 to allow freedom to those wlio feel a desire to serve at sea instead 
 of on land, the law authorised exchanges between these young men 
 and those destined for the army. 
 
 Lastly, men so enrolled for the navj^, or in bodies organised for 
 naval service, after serving the time prescribed for the regular 
 army will remain only two years in the first reserve ; they will then 
 enter the territorial army. The nature of the service renders this 
 favour just. 
 
 4th Section. 
 
 The law then deals with the question of engagements and 
 re-engagements.
 
 33 
 
 The young man who wishes to enlist voluntarily must, if he 
 enter the army, be 18 years old, and at least 5 feet and half an inch 
 in height. The age for engagement is thus reduced one year, the 
 height at present required is lowered by one-third of an incli ; the 
 other conditions required for engagement are continued, and to 
 them we advise you to add, that the volunteer must know how to 
 read and write. 
 
 You have seen already that we propose that the soldier who 
 does not know how to read or write, may, in certain definite con- 
 ditions, be retained one year longer with the colours. It is only 
 natural therefore to impose a condition on those who enlist, the im- 
 portance of which will he recognised daily by the mass of the people. 
 
 The duration of this engagement is five years, but in case of 
 war, all Frenchmen who belong neither to the regular army, nor to 
 its reserve may engage to serve during the continuance of the war. 
 
 Lastly, young soldiers who are about to be sent on furlough, or 
 who are on furlough, may be authorised to complete five years' 
 service with the colours. 
 
 So far as re-engagements are concerned the project allows them, 
 but with certain restrictions, re-engagements which, after five 
 years' service under the colours give a right to high pay, are allowed 
 for only two years, but are renewable for corporals and soldiers 
 until 29 years of age, and for sous-officers until 32 years of age. 
 
 This is an alteration which is somewhat important, and not 
 without its object, for it allows a greater number of men to be 
 passed through the ranks, and allows useless men to be got rid of, 
 men who, if retained too long, would have no chance of finding 
 in civil life occupations capable of procuring a livelihood. 
 
 But in consequence of this arrangement, it is evident that the 
 State must ensure to the sous-officers, who leave the army after 
 12 years good service, a certain number of employments in which 
 they may acquire the right of an honourable retirement. 
 
 This is the object of a special clause, in addition to which it is 
 the intention of the Government, as the Minister for War has 
 informed us, to ask that proportionate pensions be assigned to 
 soldiers who have passed 12 years with the colours; that the 
 position of sous-officers be improved, and without allowing disci- 
 pline to suffer thereby their situation should be made more secure : 
 by thus exciting amongst all men capable of aspiring to these 
 grades a healthy emulation, the cadres of the army will, doubtless, 
 be much improved. 
 
 But an innovation which is much greater is that embodied in 
 the regulations relative to those who engage voluntarily for a year 
 When we laid before you the reasons upon which we based this 
 law, Ave said, without allowing the payment of any sum of money 
 to purchase freedom from military service, it was still possible to 
 satisfy the demands of certain civil careers by measures which 
 would serve to stimulate serious study, and the progress of 
 instruction, both civil and military. 
 
 Chief amongst these measures is undoubtedly the institution 
 of volunteers fur one year. 
 
 D
 
 34 
 
 This institution rests upon a twofulcl idea: — 
 
 1st. That the apprenticeship of a young man to military 
 service may be mucli shorter if he possesses a good 
 education tlian if he does not. 
 
 2nd. That in the interests of society and the army itself, it is 
 better that a young man, who is destined for a civil career, 
 should, on the one hand, interrupt his studies as little as 
 possible, and, on the other, be ready the day the defence 
 of the country summons him to be placed according to 
 his fitness in the position in the service for which he is 
 best adapted. 
 
 The law jorovides for young men in two categories who may 
 come forward to contract such engagements. For both the favour 
 will only be granted when the instruction they have acquired 
 justifies it. 
 
 Oidy some, who are provided with a proof of instruction, by 
 being Bachelors of Letters or Bachelors of Sciences, or belonging 
 to certain schools, are allowed to have a 7^ig}it if they fulfil other 
 conditions to form this engagement for one year. 
 
 Others, on the contrary, who arc not in these situations, 
 must be authorised to pass the prescribed examinations, the 
 programme of which must be drawn up with reference to an 
 extended military knowledge ; the numbsr of the latter class to be 
 settled each year by the Minister for Wa ;. 
 
 In both cases the engagement should be formed before the lots 
 of the class to which they belong are draM'n. In all cases a young 
 man who has diplomas, or who is studying in certain schools, and 
 who has not completed his studies in the school to which he l)elongs, 
 and who desires to complete them within a fixed period, can, by 
 producing the requisite certificates and forming an engagement for 
 one year, obtain from the military authorities an overslaugh before 
 joining the corps in which he has engaged ; this overslaugh can 
 only be granted to him up to 23 years of age. 
 
 The volunteer for one year is clothed, mounted, equipped and 
 maintained at his own expense, thus relieving the State of all 
 charge on his account. But he is none the less submitted to 
 all the obligations imposed on men with the colours. He must 
 pass at certain definite periods the prescribed examinations. If 
 after one year he does not satisfy all the prescribed examinations, 
 he is obliged to remain in the service for a second year, according 
 to the conditions laid down by the regulations. 
 
 It being distinctly understood that in case of war 'he is bound 
 to serve. 
 
 The volunteer for one year, wdio has fulfilled all the examina- 
 tions, may, after his year of service, obtain his rank as a "sous- 
 officer,'' or a certificate of capacity for an employment at least 
 equivalent, and he can only be recalled as provided in the law for 
 the regular army, the territorial army and their reserves. 
 
 Such is the institution of volunteers for a year which has been 
 adopted by all the nations who have based their military laws on
 
 35 
 
 universal compulsory service ; in some respects it follows from that 
 principle. 
 
 In our eyes this institution is as favourable to socletv as it is 
 to the army. 
 
 It evidently excites younu; men, whatsoever m:iy ])e the career 
 they are destined for, to give themselves up to serious study, 
 knowing that they must personally pay their debt of mditary 
 service to the country ; they will see that it is much better for 
 them to do so, during peace time by fullilling conditions such as 
 will allow them to continue, or but slightly interfere with studies 
 which qualify them for their chosen career ; further, they may by 
 application abridge their period of service. 
 
 Tiiis, then, will be an encouragement to studious youths, and in 
 this respect society will be a gainer. 
 
 As regards the army, thesrt young men will bring into the ranks 
 acquired knowledge, and habits of application, which cannot but 
 insjjire all, and more especiallv those called on to command them, 
 with an ardent desire for selt-instruction, lest they should appear 
 inferior to their subordinates. 
 
 The presence of the volunteers for a year cannot therefore but 
 exercise a good influence on the intellectual standard. 
 
 When the defence of the country recalls these men to the 
 r^inks, they come detailed beforehand for the various arms, whose 
 duty they know, a body of instructed able men attached to the 
 interests of the country, and animated by those elevated sentiments 
 vvhich a sound education invariably produces. 
 
 In a neighbouring coimtry, where this institution has for many 
 years existed, great results have been obtained. 
 
 The rules there in force, (which deserve to l)e carefully studied,) 
 show what care is bestowed on the military instruction of these 
 young volunteers. 
 
 The work these men do, the examinations to which they are 
 submitted enables them to be of great utility in various posi- 
 tions and in the different arms of the service in \^hich they are 
 placed. 
 
 As for the condition imposed on the volunteer for a year to 
 support the cost ofUiis clothing, equijDment and maintenance. 
 This is not, as should be known, the price of tl.e reduction of 
 his time of service, snice he remains definitely submitted during 
 all the time fixed by the law to the obligations it prescribes. 
 
 The State disposes of him as of all men of the class to which 
 he belongs. 
 
 Only on account of the course of study they have pursued, 
 the examinations to which they have been submitted when they 
 are engaged, and those to which they must submit before quitting 
 the corps in which they are enrolled, the law admits that their 
 military instruction may be more rai)id, but it compels them to 
 produce proofs of this, and in jjeace time it keeps them as short 
 a time under the colours as possible, in order that they may be 
 employed in careers useful to society. 
 
 There is no longer, as there was with exoneration and substitu- 
 
 D 2
 
 3G 
 
 tion, a privilege accorded to riches. No, for riches alone cannot 
 make a volunteer for a year by our law. 
 
 Acquired information, useful study, not wealthy idleness, are 
 addressed by tliis institution. Its object is, in the interests of 
 the country, to offer to young men who apply themselves to 
 science, arts and literature, without interfering with their proposed 
 careers, a means of acquiring sufficient military knowledge and of 
 paying their debt to the army, while perhaps it may inspire some 
 v.'ith a desire of attaching themselves permanently to the army. 
 
 We are, then, justified in saying that this institution is a power- 
 ful stimulant to serious study. 
 
 The price of his equipment and maintenance paid by the 
 volunteer for one year, is thus not more than compensation for 
 the inconvenience and expense he causes the army. 
 
 Pursuing these ideas, it has been asked if it is not desirable 
 that the Minister of War should not have the power of paying 
 these expenses in a certain number of cases, for young men who 
 fulfil all other conditions of the law, and who have given proof of 
 real capacity. 
 
 But it should be observed that this would be in a certain 
 sense to provide bursaries, and that this is the proper function of 
 the parishes and departments, and that they should provide them 
 for especially meritorious subjects who belong to families M'ith 
 narrow means, but that it would be improper to charge the mili- 
 tary estimates with such things, for the young men who would 
 profit by them, far from remaining in the army, would seek civil 
 professions. 
 
 Lastly, it must be remembered that in a neighbouring nation 
 young men, pupils in colleges at the cost of the State, purchase in 
 some sort this l)enefit by serving in the army dovible the number 
 of years which they have spent in the college ; and if we cannot 
 adopt this plan in our country, at least we should do nothing con- 
 trary to the spirit of such legislation. 
 
 Chapter Y. 
 
 Lastly, the project contains the penal regulations requisite to 
 enforce its ordinances. 
 
 These are almost identical with the actual laws, only as we 
 attach much importance to the esla])lishment of the register of 
 which Ave have spoken, and which alone will enable men belong- 
 ing to the regular army and its reserves to be followed throughout 
 their career, we are desirous that these men should be bound to 
 notify their change of residence; a punishment has been introduced 
 for any infraction of this rule. A new punishment has been 
 introduced for insul^ordination. In time of war, the name of an 
 insubordinate man shall be posted during the entire war, in all the 
 parishes of the district where he is domiciled ; it is thus to a feeling 
 of honour that we are desirous of appealing.
 
 37 
 
 At the same time we seek to raise the intellectual standard of 
 the army, by asking that all young men called under the colours 
 should receive in their regiments, and according to their grades, 
 the instruction determined by the Minister of War. 
 
 The 1st January, 1873, is fixed for the law coming into force 
 as regards the regular army. 
 
 Nevertheless, the whole class called in 1872 will be at the dis- 
 posal of the Minister of War, and the young men who do not form 
 the portion selected by the Minister for ^^^ar, and enrolled in the 
 various corps, shall be placed in the reserve of the regular army 
 in place of forming a portion of tlie National Guard " Mobile," in 
 accordance with the law of 1st February, 1868. 
 
 But young men who shall have been placed, or who belong to 
 the National Guard "Mobile '■* in virtue of this transition state, 
 must undergo such drills and mancEuvres as nsay be directed, in 
 order that they may acquire a military instruction of some value. 
 
 Lastly, men who have completed the period of service demanded 
 by the laws of the empire will, M'ith the other men of their classes, 
 be enrolled on the list of the army reserve, until they reach the 
 age of 29 ; after that age, in the territorial army, as directed by the 
 law. 
 
 Such, in short, gentlemen, is the project which your Committee 
 submits to you. 
 
 2nd Division. 
 
 As you have doubtless observed, the project studiously pre- 
 serves every portion of existijig legislation that can be preserved, 
 and which offers no obstacle to the object in view, making only svich 
 alterations as the custom of the people and the defence, and good 
 order of tlie country demands. 
 
 Thus, you will observe, in all that relates to the rules for taking 
 the census, the drawing of lots, dispensations, revision of the 
 rules, penalties, &c., all these regulations are borrowed from 
 previous laws, to the application of which we are accustomed ; the 
 changes that have been introduced explain themselves, and we 
 need hardly trouble you with them. 
 
 But on other subjects, as you have no doubt remarked, great 
 alterations are proposed. 
 
 Thus the contingent fixed by the annual law no longer leaves 
 men at home without military instruction.* 
 
 * Fixing the amount of tlie coutiiigcnt called each year, as was clone by the laws 
 of 1830 and 1832 accordhig to the foreseen -wants of the moment, when the contin- 
 gent is voted, produced the most deplorable inequahties between the demands made 
 on the different classes called out, without perhaps satisfying the requirements of the 
 service. Thus, when the contingents of 80,000 men were succeeded by those 
 of l-iO,000 men for the Crimean war, the classes which furnished them gave almost 
 the whole of the men capable of bearing arms, after deducting those exempted or 
 dispensed with, while the other classes which justly should have helped the war with 
 an equal number, since these contingents were stQl under the colours, were called on 
 for very few men. In 1859 a contingent of 140,000 men was called. It was incorpo- 
 rated only after the peace, but these men nevertheless served in the army for 
 seven years. This is what has made a Minister for War say " Large contingents 
 correspond often to periods of peace ; small contingents to periods of war."
 
 38 
 
 The entire class is put at the disposition of the Minister for 
 War. All the young men composing it are enrolled in the 
 various corps; all must receive an instruction, at least sufficient 
 to enable them, when the country is in danger, to take their places 
 in the ranks of the army, and to bring to it the elements of a con- 
 siderable force. 
 
 These regulations follow as a consequence of the principle of 
 imiversal compulsory service, which is the key note of the whole 
 law, it is true, in their application important difficulties and the 
 most delicate questions must be raised. 
 
 These problems ai-e those which have caused the longest and 
 deepest discussion in your Committee. And we think it our duty 
 to draw your attention to the various solutions that have been 
 brought before us. 
 
 But in order that you may clearly understand this subject, and 
 to prevent confusion, it is requisite to fix certain data. 
 
 In France, after deducting the two provinces which have been 
 taken from us, the average number of voung men who reach the 
 age of 20 each year is 300,000 to 302,000. 
 
 But it would be an error to jump to the conclusion that France 
 has 300,000 young men aged 20 fit each year for active service ; 
 unfortunately this is not the case. 
 
 If the report furnished by the Minister for War be carefully 
 examined, it will be found that out of these 300,000 young men 
 more than 65,000 are exempted on account of physical infirmity, 
 9,000 for want of proper height, and the other exemptions, pro- 
 vided by the existing law exceed 60,000. Lastly, that 6,000 
 individuals are left at home as indispensable to the support of their 
 families. 
 
 That before the class is finally incorporated the loss by deaths, 
 punishment, and desertions, amounts to 3,000 ; so that the class, 
 allowance l:)eing made for these deductions, does not exceed 160,000 
 capable of carrying arms, which must supply the men for the 
 navy.
 
 39 
 
 Table showing an Analysis of a Class composed of the gross 
 number o 302,0 !0 names. 
 
 Average strength of the class 
 
 Deduct. 
 1st. Youug men exempted for physical infirmity 
 2nd. Young men dispensed with — 
 
 1. For want of Jieight (less than 5 ft. 0^ in.). . 
 
 2. As being the eldest children of families "1 
 
 of orphans. . .. . . . . J 
 
 3. Sons or grandsons of widows 
 
 4. Sons or grandsons of persons 70 rears of 1 
 
 age, or blind . . . . . J 
 
 5. Younger brothers of blind or crippled men 
 
 6. Elder of two bi others called on to draw ] 
 
 lots together, and both selected by lot J 
 
 7. Brothers of soldiers under tlic coloui'S . . 
 
 8. Brothers of soldiers who have died on"| 
 
 active se^wice, or when on furlough, or | 
 allowed pension for wounds received )■ 
 on duty, or for infirmities contracted | 
 wlien serving by sea or land . . . . J 
 
 9. Ah-eady in the Army or Navy by virtue "] 
 
 of a voluntary engagement, a warrant, > 
 or commission . . . . . . j 
 
 10. Enrolled naval conscripts . . 
 
 11. Pupils at the Polytechnic . . 
 
 12. Employed as selioolmastcrs or vishers 
 
 13. Pupi s of the great seminai-ies, or young"! 
 
 men who are about to become clergy- J- 
 men of the creeds paid by the State. . J 
 
 11. Young soldiers left at home by the 
 Councils of Eevision as being the sup- 
 port of a family, 4 per cent . . 
 
 15. Losses by death, punishment, or deser-"! 
 
 Xumber of Men 
 if the Class 
 be called out 
 
 in its inte;jrit}-. 
 
 302,000 
 
 65,000 
 
 
 9,000] 
 
 3,209 
 
 
 20,2G3 
 
 
 1,135 
 
 
 9l> 
 147 
 
 • 48,709 
 
 20,528 
 
 i- 
 
 3,318, 
 
 ! 
 
 i 
 
 r0,434 
 
 5,600 ~] 
 
 3,400 I 
 
 94 j. 12,725J 
 1,953 I 
 
 I 
 
 1,678J 
 
 tiou, &c. 
 
 6,300 
 
 2,700 
 
 Total 
 
 144,434 
 
 Eemain really disposable, of which- 
 The Navy requires 
 The Army 
 
 8,000 
 149,566 
 
 157,566 
 
 157,566 
 
 Or, in round numbers, the contingent for the Army will be 150,000 men. 
 
 Note. — No change is proposed as regi ds any of these dispensations from 2 to 13 
 except that those who are to be schoolmasters must serve one year with the colours 
 or in a mihtary school. 
 
 Doubtless, the law which we propose recognises no exemptions, 
 but those which render a man incapable of all military service ; but, 
 as we have already said, it admits as causes for dispensations, so 
 long as those causes exist, the particular sit'iatioiis which the 
 existing legislation had in view when it allowed all young men in 
 those situations a complete release from military service. 
 
 These dispensations will, it is true, give no entire release from 
 military service; those who obtain them must be drilled, and aro 
 liable to be called on in case of war.
 
 40 
 
 But it is not therefore requisite to increase tlie number of 
 young men in each class who join the a.Ymy each year.'-'^ 
 
 And while we believe it requisite to preserve such dispositions 
 as shall allow families to retain the young men who are in a gieat 
 measure their support, we think that the number to be put each 
 year at the disposal of the War Minister cannot be placed higher 
 than 150,000 men. 
 
 This number is derived from official documents, and we have 
 therefore taken it as the basis of all our calculations^f a"d we ask 
 you to accept it. J 
 
 * These men, by the law of 1868, formed a portion of the National Guard 
 "Mobile." 
 
 + Table showing the number of young soldiers enrolled or who might have been 
 enrolled in the contingent of the class of 1870, wliich is composed of llie entire 
 number of healthy young men, no dispensations being granted for those who are the 
 support of families. 
 
 Ain .. .. 1999 
 
 Aisne .. .. 2397 
 
 Allier .. .. 1764 
 
 Alpes (Basses) . . 5G5 
 
 Alpes (Hautes) . . 521 
 
 Alpes Maritimes 932 
 
 Ardeche . . . . 1972 
 
 Ardennes .. ]2:8 
 
 Ariege .. .. 1318 
 
 Aube .. ,. 989 
 
 Aude .. .. 1379 
 
 Aveyroii . . . . 1645 
 
 Bouches du E . . 1821 
 
 Calvados . . . . 1713 
 
 Cautal .. .. 1089 
 
 Charente . . 1543 
 
 Chareute luferieure 2044 
 
 Cher .„ .. 1855 
 
 Correze .. .. 1390 
 
 Corse .. .. 1184 
 
 C6te d'or. . . . 1768 
 
 Cotes du Nord . . 2G00 
 
 Ci-euse .. .. 1364 
 
 Dordoguc . . 2045 
 
 Doubs .. .. 1385 
 
 Dr&me .. .. 1599 
 
 Eure .. ,. 1587 
 
 Eure et Loir . , 1607 
 
 Finistere . . . . 2456 
 
 Gard .. .. 1804 
 
 Garonne (H) .. 2142 
 
 Gers .. .. 1046 
 
 Gironde .. . . 3170 
 
 Herault ,. .. 1727 
 
 Ille et Villaine . . 2673 
 
 ludre . . . . 1141 
 
 Indre et Loire . . 1271 
 
 Isere .. .. 2557 
 
 •Tura . . . . 1255 
 
 Laudes . . . . 1362 
 
 Loir et Cher 
 
 1216 
 
 Yar 
 
 906 
 
 Loire 
 
 2618 
 
 Yancluse . . 
 
 1148 
 
 Loire (Haiitc) . . 
 
 1424 
 
 Vendee . . 
 
 1865 
 
 Loire luferieure . . 
 
 2707 
 
 Vienne . . 
 
 1545 
 
 Loiret 
 
 1970 
 
 Yienue (11.) 
 
 1448 
 
 Lot 
 
 1298 
 
 Yosges , . 
 
 1814 
 
 Lot et Garonne . . 
 
 1278 
 
 Youne 
 
 1783 
 
 Lozere . . 
 Maine et Loire . . 
 
 673 
 2382 
 
 
 
 Total .. 1 
 
 57,138 
 
 Manchc . . 
 
 2083 
 
 
 
 Marne 
 
 1385 
 
 Deduct losses 
 
 
 Marno (Haute) . . 
 
 1089 
 
 when tlie con- 
 
 
 Mayenne . . 
 
 1708 
 
 tingent was 
 
 
 Mem-the et M. . . 
 
 1566 
 
 ordered to join 
 
 2,700 
 
 Meuse 
 Morbihan 
 
 1271 
 2380 
 
 
 
 Remain . . 1 
 
 54,438 
 
 Nievre 
 
 1897 
 
 
 
 Nord 
 
 5821 
 
 On account of 
 
 
 Oise 
 
 1458 
 
 vrar many 
 
 
 Orne 
 
 1628 
 
 young men has- 
 
 
 Pas de Calais 
 
 3458 
 
 tened their 
 
 
 Puy de Dome 
 
 2418 
 
 time of service, 
 
 
 Pyrenees (B.) 
 
 2352 
 
 on this aceomit 
 
 
 Pyrenees (H.) 
 
 1165 
 
 the contingent 
 
 
 Pyrenees (Orient) 
 
 873 
 
 was increased, 
 
 
 Rhone 
 
 3064 
 
 viz. 
 
 8,247 
 
 Saone (H.) et . . 
 
 — 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 
 Belfort . . 
 
 1895 
 
 Total .. 162,685 
 
 Saone et Loii-e . . 
 
 3153 
 
 
 
 Sarthe . . 
 
 1857 
 
 The number of 
 
 
 Savoic 
 
 1095 
 
 men would 
 
 
 Savoie (H.) 
 
 1142 
 
 have been in- 
 
 
 Seine 
 
 7117 
 
 creased if the 
 
 
 Seine luferieure . . 
 
 2654 
 
 standard had 
 
 
 Seine et Marne . . 
 
 1591 
 
 been lowered 
 
 
 Seine et Oise 
 
 2411 
 
 one-third of an 
 
 
 Sevi-es (Deux) . . 
 
 1502 
 
 inch 
 
 2,652 
 
 SsATmnr* 
 
 2394 
 1641 • 
 
 
 
 ► JL'IllllJ.L. • ■ , , 
 
 Tarn 
 
 Men really 1 , , 
 
 ■*r^ oo^ 
 
 Tarn et Gar 
 
 1146 
 
 disposable 1 ^^^'^-^ 
 
 Deduct 8,000 men for the navy and there remains for the army 157,337. This 
 muuber would be reduced however to 150,000 if 6,000 men, the number of young 
 men who received dispensations as being supporters of famihes, being deducted. 
 
 t It is further confirmed by the number of the class of 1870, which was entirely 
 enrolled. Vide the preceding table.
 
 41 
 
 It must also be observed that the army includes a great number 
 of men who are not recruited by such enrolments, and who must 
 be taken into account. This number is composed of the officers 
 and men of the administrative corps, the staff of the artillery and 
 engineers, as well as the gendarmes, those who have engaged or 
 re-engaged voluntarily, the foreign corps, &c., &c. This perma- 
 manent portion of the army, wliich embraces the greater portion 
 of the cadres, was largely increased l)y the action of the law of 
 .1855, which granted bounties for engagements and re engagements, 
 vide page 8 of the first portion of this report, but restrained by 
 the limits, while we propose, this portion of the armj'- will embrace 
 at all times at least 100,000 to 120,000 men. 
 
 If for the future, as aj^pears desiral)le, the gendarmes be not 
 counted as a portion of the effective strength of the army.* 
 
 It is requisite to get rid of the false impression created by the 
 high numbers borne on the war estimates, and which in reality 
 include a great number of non-combatants or men intended for 
 police purpose, the cost of whom should not be charged to army 
 votes. 
 
 However this may be, let us assume the results as they now. 
 stand. 
 
 100,000 to 120,000 men composing the permanent portion of 
 the army, 150,000 young men capable of active service, placed each 
 year at the disposition of the War INIinister : this is the point of 
 departure from which the army must be formed. 
 
 If, therefore, on the one hand, all the men of each class are 
 compelled to enter the army each year, and remain there the 
 same time, and if, on the other, the effective strength of 
 430,000 to 460,000 men with the colours must not be exceeded, 
 it will follow that each class can be kept only two years in the 
 service. 
 
 * Table showing the existuig efFectire strength of that portion of tlio Army not 
 proTidecl for by enrohnents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 =• 
 
 
 
 
 VJ 
 
 M 
 
 
 
 
 
 *-• 
 
 g ^^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 £ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 > 
 
 S 
 
 c 
 '5s 
 
 a 
 
 .1 
 
 
 S 
 
 
 cc 
 
 ^ 
 
 '- 
 
 u 
 
 < 
 
 
 S 
 
 < 
 
 H 
 
 1. Officers 
 
 •2,641 
 
 Gon 
 
 13,008 
 
 3,941 
 
 2,229 
 
 249 
 
 327 
 
 1,909 
 
 25,000 
 
 2. Departmental Gendarmes 
 
 
 18,707 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18,707 
 
 3. Volunteers for five years 
 
 
 
 15,533 
 
 4,040 
 
 2,668 
 
 1,698 
 
 754 
 
 307 
 
 25,000 
 
 4. Ee-engaged men 
 
 
 
 13,697 
 
 5,922 
 
 3,451 
 
 750 
 
 495 
 
 775- 
 
 25,000 
 
 5. Native troops, Tirailleurs, and ) 
 Spatris S 
 
 
 
 7,258 
 
 3,174 
 
 
 
 
 
 10,432 
 
 fi. roreign Coi-ps 
 
 
 
 3,200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3,200 
 
 7. Soldiers retained under the 'jolours~^ 
 beyond their period of services V 
 as a punishment j 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7,063 
 
 1,236 
 
 685 
 
 64 
 
 131 
 
 21 
 
 9,200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 S. Employe's of the Artiiioryand En-'^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 gineers, workmen engaged or >• 
 
 2,493 
 
 
 3S6 
 
 310 
 
 37 
 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 2:0 
 
 3,461 
 
 commissioned ... ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 5,136 
 
 tl9,403 
 
 60,055 
 
 18,603 
 
 9,070 
 
 2,770 
 
 1,711 
 
 2,232 
 
 120,000 
 
 t The Eepubhcan Guard of Paris, numbering 5,840, one-half the cost of which 
 is paid for by the War Offio-, is not inchided in these figures.
 
 42 
 
 Now, gentlemen, granting that by means of well-directed 
 labour it were possible to instruct and give a military education 
 to a soldier in a year or 18 months, which, for special services, is 
 more than doulnful — 
 
 It is evident — 
 
 1st. That the men of each class would return to their homes 
 at the very moment when they would be the best fitted 
 to render iiood service. 
 
 2nd. That sufficient cadres would be almost impossible to 
 form, if not formed by men other than those belonging 
 to the contingents. 
 
 3rd. Tliat under these conditions the army would be only a 
 great school where young men could be trained ; 
 but would not constitute that permanent and power- 
 fully organized force which it is desirable that this 
 country should possess. 
 
 Thus we are connpelled to seek some combination that will 
 satisfy both these demands : — 
 
 * 1st. To have and to keep in the army men completely 
 
 trained to the trade of arms. 
 2nd. To enrol a large number of men to whom a sufficient 
 military instruction may be given. 
 
 Here let us for one moment pause, for this is t^e point 
 where divergency of opinion is produced, and upon which we must 
 explain ourselves as clearly as possible. 
 
 Without going back to the periods when, even in the greatest 
 battles, men fought in some sort hand to hand, and when arms, 
 skill, and the force of each individual was of the greatest import- 
 ance, it is a recognized fact, if modern wars are reviewed, that 
 since the introduction of firearms each improvement in arms, 
 each improvement in the material state of a country, has modified 
 not only the conditions of war, but also the relative importance of 
 the man as a fighting unit. 
 
 According as arms are improved, and their range increased, 
 the means of communication improved, and transport becomes 
 easier, and the transmission of intelligence more easy and rapid, 
 armies become more numerous. On the one hand, the genius, the 
 knowledge of the leaders, and the preparation for war becomes 
 of more importance ; on the other, the importance of each com- 
 batant diminishes. 
 
 It has been, therefore, justly said, the factor that must be 
 given to numbers has increased with civilization, while the factor 
 to be assigned to the value of each individual unit is reduced in 
 the same propt/rtion.* 
 
 Shall we say, then, that number?; will suffice? No ; we cannot 
 too often repeat. No ; for if the progress in all branches of the art 
 
 • By this it is not meant that less courage and energy ai'e needed in the soldier, 
 but only that the importance of each individual s less.
 
 of war requires a greater soience, more profound study on the part 
 of those who command, it demands still more loudly, a sufficient 
 instruction, with the gi'eatest discipline, on the part of those who 
 ought to oliey. 
 
 Let us bainsh, then, these dangerous theories. 
 But let us also get rid of another delusion, and, perhaps, a 
 more dangerous one, which is, that in the actual state of the 
 military forces of the various nations in Europe, we can afford 
 to have an army strongly organized and composed of old soldiers, 
 but the number of which cannot, on a given day, be largely in- 
 creased by men already prepared. 
 
 In our opinion, viewing this vSubject entirely from a military 
 standpoint of view, that although it would be a profound error 
 in the formation of an army not to appreciate at its true value 
 the quality of the troops, it would be an error quite as fatal not 
 to consider their number. 
 
 Gentlemen, this is the problem. 
 
 The first point to settle is, evidently, the time requisite to 
 make a soldier and non-commissioned officer? 
 
 You can understand that no absolute reply can be given to, 
 this question, for the time must be longer or shorter, according to 
 the arm of the service, according to the greater or less intelligence 
 of the man, according to his said position, and the instruction that 
 he has received prior to his joining the corps. 
 
 Lastly, and this is most important to remark, this period is 
 longer or shorter according to the amount of superintendence 
 given b)' the chief, and the zeal that he has thrown into his work. 
 Your Committee has debated this subject seriously. On one side 
 it has been remarked that military instruction was not everything 
 for the soldier ; the importance of military education was quite 
 as great, and that the latter requires a longer period. It has been 
 said, that amongst men, in some sort disciplined beforehand, in 
 a society where distinctions of rank are well marked, this education 
 may be more rapid than with us, and that it is requisite that we 
 should not allow ourselves to be induced to place the limit of 
 our service too low, lest we weaken the army. 
 
 On the other hand, instances have been adduced where the 
 bearing and courage of men has been acknowledged by everyone, 
 and who, after a short period, have been completely moulded (thanks 
 to the continual care that has been bestowed on them) to the duties 
 to which they were called.* 
 
 We have observed in several nations that have recently intro- 
 duced great alterations into their military organization the length 
 of service does not exceed three years in the regular army, and 
 four to seven in the reserve, that four years have been deemed 
 sufficient for the special arms to whom special advantages were 
 granted. 
 
 Lastly, it has been asked why our soldiers, who are as intelli- 
 
 * The Marine Light Infantrv formed the Battalion do Loriert in less than one 
 year.
 
 44 
 
 gent as those of other nations, should require a longer time to 
 train. It has therefore been proposed that the time during which 
 they should belong to the regular army should be fixed at three 
 years. 
 
 As this proposition was not adopted, four years was 
 named; but the majority of your Committee did not concur, 
 nevertheless, having carefully examined the facts of the case, 
 after studying what the ablest men have written on this 
 subject, lastly, having studied what has taken place amongst 
 neighbouring nations, the Conunittee has considered that the 
 period during which, under the regulations of the law of 1868, men 
 should belong to the regular army should be that laid down in 
 the law of 1868 as a maximum, which will allow the army to have 
 the elements of a powerful organization.* 
 
 As we pointed out in the first portion of this report, the 
 length of service has been fixed as follows : — 
 
 By the law of the year VI, which proclaimed the principle 
 of universal service, at 5 years. 
 
 By the law of 1818, for the contingent (the rest of the class 
 being entirely free), at six years in the army and six in 
 the reserve. 
 
 By the law of 1824, at eight years for the contingent, 
 divided into two portions, of which one-half remained 
 at home. 
 
 By the law of 1832, at seven years for the contingent, 
 similarly divided into two portions. 
 
 Lastly, by the law of 1868, for the contingent, at five years 
 in the regular army and four years in the reserve, and 
 for that portion of the class not included in the con- 
 tingent, at five years in the National Guard " Mobile." 
 
 In 1828, the Infantry Committee of the Superior Council of 
 "War proposed — 
 
 1st. To divide France into great military districts, subdivided 
 
 into regimental districts. 
 2nd. To pass each contingent in succession through the 
 
 ranks. 
 .3rd. To send on indefinite leave all young soldiers after 
 
 three years' service. 
 4th. To have depot battalions, whose function should be to 
 
 collect these young soldiers ; at certain periods to train, 
 
 inspect, and confirm the military habits acquired in the 
 
 regular battalions. 
 
 The following is the text of this report, which is to be found in 
 the archives of the War Office, and which at tlic present day is of 
 much interest : — 
 
 * Vide The Army according to Ihe scheme of General Morand.
 
 45 
 
 " Meeting of the Wth At/f/ust, 1828. 
 
 " The Comir.ittee is of oiDiniou tliat instruction cannot be pro- 
 perly given except Avith the colours to the whole of the soldiers. 
 That for this purpose the entire class (that is to saj-, the con- 
 tingents fixed by the law of 1824) should be enrolled in succession, 
 and then sent on indefinite leave, so that the peace strength of the 
 army should be composed of the youngest classes, and the war 
 strength of the classes nearest their time of liberation. This 
 proposal, which is preferable, as giving better instruction, is also 
 that which gives the greatest economy. 
 
 " The Committee is fuither of opinion that the men sent on 
 indefinite leave should be assembled each year for short periods, 
 and that this duty can only be performed by cadres belonging to 
 the regiments of the regular army. 
 
 " Lastly, to decrease the expense caused by the great number of 
 men that must be sent each year under the colours and returned 
 again to their homes, and to restrict the expense produced by 
 short trainings, as also to facilitate such trainings, it appears indis- 
 pensable that the kingdom should be divided into five great divi- 
 sions, in each of which a certain number of regiments proportionate 
 to the population and barracks would recruit and occupy in turn the 
 different garrison towns. These military districts to be divided 
 into regimental districts for the assembly of men on indefinite leave. 
 
 " The conditions requisite for the instruction of the entire force 
 being fulfilled by sending entire classes beneath the colours ; the 
 time during which they should remain there to acquire a solid 
 instruction and good military habits must next be determined. 
 
 " The Committee is of opinion that about three vears is requisite 
 for this purpose, and that after that period the soldiers may pass 
 to the war contingent. 
 
 ^' Approved by Monseigneur the Dauphin, Marshal Mnrmont, 
 Marshal Molitor, Lieut. -Generals Reille, Rogniat, Valee, Bordes- 
 souUe, Ruty, Girardin, Bourmont,Loverdo, Pelleport, d'Ambruseac; 
 the Intendants, Denniee, et Ragnault ; the Major-General Saint 
 Alphonse."— F7'077i the archives of the War Office. 
 
 In the North German Confederation, by the law of the 
 9th November, 1867, the length o!" service is three years in the 
 ranks, four in the reserve, and five in the Landwehr. 
 
 The Landstrum embraces all men from 17 to 42, who belong 
 neither to the army nor navy. 
 
 Three years appearing insufficient for the Cavalrv, special 
 advantages are off'ered to retain under the colours as manv men as 
 possible for another year. 
 
 In the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the law of the 5th 
 December, 1868, fixes the duration of service at three years in the 
 ranks, seven in the reserve, and two in the Landwehr for men who 
 join it after completing their period of service in the regular army 
 and reserves, 12 years for those men who are incorporated directly 
 into the Landwehr. 
 
 If, then, we have accepted a service of five years for the law
 
 46 
 
 \^liicli we propose, it is, we must acknowledge, with the view that 
 the army may have always at its disposal four classes of trained 
 men, as we shall shortly explain, and not with the idea that the men 
 should remain with their corps for five years. It \\ill rest with the 
 War Offi e to arrange, according to the arms of the service, the 
 wants of the army, the instruction that has hcen acquired, and the 
 financial resources, the incorporation and maintenance of tlie 
 effective of each class and the sending of the men on furlough ; 
 so as to keep for the special arms and for the cadres everything 
 that is requisite that they should possess, to give a ]:)owerful 
 or""anization to the army, and at the same time to instruct the 
 greatest numher of young men. 
 
 Lastly, gentlemen, in examining this important question, we 
 have considered carefully the transition state in which every country 
 that alters the law of recruiting and organization of its military forces 
 must for some years be placed. 
 
 Doubtless we have faith, as we have already said, in the principles 
 which pervade our law ; we have faith in our country. It is aware 
 of the enegy, the sacrifices, requisite to save it from decay. Its 
 misfortunes have reanimated its patriotism. 
 
 But this new education given to our young men, and which 
 will prepare them so well we hope for all that the country expects, — 
 this education begins tardily ; time is requisite for it to bear fruit ; 
 time is requisite that the people should understand the interest 
 they have in acquiring military knowledge before entering tiie army. 
 Every day the minds of men will more and more get used to 
 this idea; young men will jon the army more and more prepared 
 beforehand, knowing much that it is requisite to teach them, and 
 thus, being more quickly able to be of use, they will be able to 
 return home more quickly, whilst they may be as useful to the 
 army as if, like soldiers more dithcult to teacli, they had remained 
 with the colours a longer time. 
 
 But while these results are being awaited, it is requisite to 
 give certain powers which will be used less each year, and thus 
 to take account of an actual state of things, which in the future 
 will have no existence, save to fix, as you will see, the number 
 of instructed classes of which the regular army accorchng to our 
 ideas should consist. 
 
 But what progress soever our social customs mav make, from 
 these various points of view, whatever may be the aptitude, the 
 preparation of the young men at the moment they are enrolled, it 
 is perfectly certain that they will not all remain under the colours 
 for the same length of time. The special arms, for example, require 
 longer service ; the necessities of the army itself produce too great 
 differences between the various sicualions in which young men 
 entering the army find themselves. 
 
 Thus, gentlemen, on the one side it is impossible, without 
 enfeebling, without disorganizing the army, to keep the young men 
 of each class only two years with the colours. 
 
 It is equally impossible to keep them longer without having 
 too numerous an arm v.
 
 47 
 
 On the other hand^ it is al)solutely requisite to keep in the 
 army a certain number of men during a period sufficiently h)ng to 
 have solid cadres, and to satisfy the requirements of the special arms. 
 
 There is an equal necessity to instruct the largest possible 
 numlier of young soldiers. 
 
 Hence some meai s must be adopted to determine who wiil 
 have to serve in the various conditions entailed by the force of 
 these circumstances. 
 
 The simplest method to adopt for this purpose is that which 
 the people ah-eady know, that is to say,, the numeral order assigned 
 to each by the ballot. 
 
 This custom comes to us from a very early date, it being that 
 used under the old monarchy for the enrolment of recruits in the 
 provincial militia. 
 
 It is that adopted after the law of the year VI had submitted 
 to compulsory service all the young men of 20 to 25 years of age ; 
 in place of enrolling, as had been proposed, the youngest men of 
 each class, it was determined as more just to select them by lot. 
 
 This is also the way the laws of recruiting of 1818 and 1832 
 have prescribed the composition of the contingents placed at the 
 disposal of the Minister of V\'ar; complaints of its action have 
 never been raised. Nevertheless, under the agency of these laws, 
 the difference between the situations of men drawing different 
 numbers has been far greater than that proposed by oui law, some 
 having to serve seven years, others being freed from all military 
 service. 
 
 With the law now under discussion such inequalities cannot 
 take place; all young men of each class form a portion of the 
 regular army or its reserves for the same period. The only 
 difference that can arise is from men being sent into the various 
 arms of the service, and the necessity of their serving longer in 
 certain regiments in order to satisfy the exigencies of good military 
 organization. 
 
 The Bill, therefore, proposes to do what is simplest, most 
 just, and most conformable to our customs, by directing that the 
 various destinations of the men be settled by lot, a method 
 well understood by the people, and in accordance with their 
 customs. 
 
 But as other solutions of this difficult problem, have been 
 proposed and discussed at great length by your Committee, it is 
 requisite that they should be brought to your notice. 
 
 Amongst others, two systems have been brought before the 
 Committee which have been much discussed. 
 
 Both concur with the Bill under discussion in requiring com- 
 pulsory personal militarv service. 
 
 Both admit that in tlie constitution of our army it is impossible, 
 especially for the special services and the cadres, to require only 
 two years' service with the colours. 
 
 Both provide that all the men of each class, who are not unfit 
 for military service, should form a portion of the regular army, 
 and be placed at the disposal of the Minister for War, and should
 
 48 
 
 all be enrolled on the registers of various corps, and whether or 
 not with the colours should belong to the regular army during the 
 same period. 
 
 These are important points which it is requisite to give in 
 detail, as upon them the Committee is unanimous. 
 
 But after that a divergence of opinion begins. 
 
 One of these systems does not deem it requisite that all the 
 young men of a class should receive military instruction ; it is 
 content with enrolling them in the various corps ; it seeks to 
 incorporate only a certain number of men wlio should serve 
 during the time fixed by the law, unless sent on furlough as now 
 takes place with the actual law. 
 
 Thus it is only the first portion of the class which really 
 undergoes military service ; as for the other, doubtless, it is not 
 freed entirely as by the law of 1832, neither is it sent into the 
 National Guard Moble as the law of 1868 directs, but it remains 
 at home, only each man is always at the disposal of the War 
 Minister, either for reviews or drill, or for service in the auxiliary 
 branches ; in short, if he is required for the army he may be sent 
 either definitely or temporarily into the corps in which he is enrolled. 
 
 The selection of the men forming the first portion of the class 
 incorporated with the army is made by means of the numbers 
 drawn in each parish, and according to a fixed proportion ; it is 
 similarly by the order of tlie numbers that men are called, if the 
 second portion of the class, is required. 
 
 The Honourable General Ducrot, who has made this proposal, 
 has conceived it in the following terms : — 
 
 " Aii. 40. All the young men of the class called who are not 
 " exempted on account of infirmitj'', or whose services are 
 *•' not dispensed with in accordance with the provisions 
 " of this law, who have not obtained overslaughs, or who 
 " are not told oft' for the navy, form a portion of the 
 " regular army, and are placed at the disposal of the War 
 " Minister. 
 
 '• They are all enrolled in various corps. 
 
 " Art. 41. Each year the War Minister fixes the number of 
 '• men to be incorporated with the army according to the 
 " requirements of the service and the money allowed in 
 ^' the estimates. 
 
 " The selection is made by the numbers drawn in each 
 " parish from the first portion of the parish recruiting 
 " list, as determined by the above decision. 
 
 " Art. 42. Young men not immediately incorporated are 
 '' allowed to remain at home, but are always at the 
 " disposal of the Minister of War, either for roll calls, 
 " for assemblies and drill, or for being specially employed 
 " in certain auxiliary branches of the srmy as doctors, 
 " surgeons, veterinary surgeons, survej'orSj telegraphists, 
 *' armourers, or mechanics of any kind. 
 
 '•' All may be embodied temporainly or entirely into the
 
 40 
 
 " corps to whicli they belong, every time the servic^ 
 " requires them, but always in the order of tiie number 
 " of each class." 
 
 This system, the Honourable General who brought it forward, 
 and whose opinion had great weight, informed the Committee 
 was very similar to that in force in a neighbouring nation, who, 
 from the impossibility that exists of compelling every man to 
 pass three years with the colours, leaves at home the men who 
 cannot be included in the contingent. They are called up the 
 following or some ether year, but it does not the less follow that 
 some receive no military education, except when called upon to 
 fill the gaps or in case of war. 
 
 This is, doubtless, true, but there is a fact that has not been 
 given sufficient weight to : it is, that the nation to which he 
 referred was composed of 18,000,000 in i860, and nevertheless 
 called up 63,000 men who remained not less than three years with 
 the colours. 
 
 Consequently the number of men who received no military 
 education must have been very slight, if we grant that the exemp- 
 tion, dispensations and overslaughs are given in anything like the 
 same proportion as with us. 
 
 If, then, it is desired to establish conditions similar to those to 
 which allusion has been made, it will be seen that the number of 
 men actually incorporated must be greater.'^ But in order that 
 this may be the case, the length of service must be much reduced, 
 and that the proposal does not admit ; the number of men incorpo- 
 rated each year with the army must be smaller the. longer the men 
 are kept with the corps, and the result of such a system would be 
 that hardly one-half of each class could be called under the 
 colours. 
 
 Doubtless, thanks to volunteers for one year, which form a 
 portion of all systems, a greater number of young men than what 
 we have pointed out would receive military instruction. Doubtless, 
 also, by clearing the ranks by furloughs and sending the entire class 
 home on the completion of the fourth year, it would be possible 
 to incorporate greater numbers. But the other portion, still 
 very numerous, would remain uninstructed, for, according to the 
 Honourable General, it is only at the moment when these men 
 are called on that they would be drilled or put in a situation to 
 render service to the State. 
 
 Your Committee, gentlemen, whilst acknowledging that the 
 system under discussion is preferable to that existing at present, 
 since it proposes that all the young men of the class should be at 
 the disposal of the Minister for War and should be enrolled in 
 various corps, is yet unable to accept it. 
 
 In our country, which has not yet formed the habits which 
 spring from the application of the principle of universal service, it 
 
 * If with a population of 18 million -i, cacli year there are 63,000 young men to be 
 incorporated and eduimted iinder the cokiirs, with a population of 36 niiilious the 
 number shoiUd be 126,000. 
 
 £
 
 50 
 
 is to be feared that owing to the power of leaving a portion of the 
 class at liome, without any military instruction, it is to be feared 
 that the errors of the past would soon again spring up 
 
 From a natural feeling, perhaps from strong convictions, the 
 commandants of corps and the military administration would seek 
 to keep men as long as possible with the colours, and the number 
 of men incorporated in place of increasing, and length of service 
 in place of decreasing, as the military spirit and instruction of the 
 country increases would, in all probability, remain stationary. 
 
 The second portion of the class would by degrees escape all 
 obligations, aud its situation would be so different from that of the 
 first portion; that it would become disgusting to the people, who 
 as a consequence would demand substitution. 
 
 Lastly, when in the hour of danger it became requisite to call 
 on this second portion of the class it would be by no means 
 prepared. It would be only what the National Guard Mobile was 
 in accordance with the laws of 1868. It was neither equipped nor 
 instructed ; it possessed nothing; much time elapsed before it could 
 be utilized, meantime the country suffered fearfully. 
 
 This would be exactly what the second portion of the con- 
 tingent would be if untrained. 
 
 Your Committee ask, the whole idea of the law is that all 
 young men fit for military service should be clothed, armed and 
 taught. All will pass a time in the ranks, longer or shorter, on 
 account of the requirements of the army; but, first, all will come 
 there to obtain military instruction, in order that in the future 
 they may all also seek and find the means ready prepared to 
 make them useful. 
 
 The second proposal has been made by the Generals Chanzy, 
 Chareton, Loysel, Des Pallieres and Billot; in one sense it differs 
 less from what we ask you to adopt. 
 
 According to this proposal young men who wish to serve in 
 the special services, and who prove that they are suitable for them, 
 are to be admitted at once when the lots are drawn ; it is only if 
 un insufficient number volunteer for these services that young men 
 of the class are to be detailed according to their fitness and in order 
 of number. 
 
 By this proposal the entire class must pass through the ranks; 
 it is acknowledged, precisely as in the Bill, that a portion only can 
 serve for one year, but in place of selecting this port'on before the 
 class enters the army it is detailed at the termination of a year's 
 service. 
 
 Then the men sent home are taken exclusively from amongst 
 those who can read and write, and are the best educated ; these 
 men being selected by lot. 
 
 So far as allowing the young men to select the arms of the 
 service they prefer to join there can be no difficulty about that, 
 it is what is usually done. It appears but natural that when the 
 lists are revised, and the various aptitudes are known, that the 
 young men should do this. 
 
 Wc have mserted a special article (Article 29) for this purpose.
 
 51 
 
 But we aclinnwledge we feel some hesitation to insert in the 
 law an article which, in case a sufiicient number of voung men did 
 not volunteer for the special arms, would detail them for that pur- 
 pose by the numbers they have drawn and their special aptitude, 
 for the following reason. 
 
 When the question of recruiting is dealt with, it is desirable 
 that everything should be clear and precise, that both privileges 
 and duties should be clearly defined, so that no disputes can 
 possibly arise on the application of this rule. 
 
 See when it is requisite to pronounce on the causes of exemp- 
 tion, that is to say, to make that on which the fate of men depends 
 clear ; see how our laws surround the councils of revision with 
 precautions which is necessary, in order that all requisite checks 
 may exist. 
 
 It has been understood that in these matters the people have 
 so great an interest, that this tribunal, which is the soie judge, 
 should be composed of the representatives of the people. 
 
 But this tribunal has only one duty to perform, once it gives 
 its decision it does not again interfere, and the young men declared 
 fit for military service are put at once at the disposal of the mili- 
 tary authorities. Then it must be the latter authoritv that classes 
 them according to their fitness lor service, and which alone has 
 the power of determining this. 
 
 Now, if according to the law it is just that this classification 
 should follow the ballot numbers, nothing can be more natural, 
 and we repeat this is what is, or ought to be done at the present 
 moment, and it is quite right that a ministerial order should 
 point this out as the proper course to follow when it is prac- 
 ticable. But to add an article to the law, making this which is 
 only a matter of favour a matter of right, would cause, we think, 
 more trouble than convenience, therefore we have not added it. 
 As for the proposal to send home young men after one year's 
 service, and to select them exclusively amongst those whose mili- 
 tary instruction shall be most advanced, and who shall be selected 
 by lot, doubtless there is something very attractive in this pro- 
 posal at first sight. 
 
 In short, it appears a stimulus to good conduct, to constant 
 efforts, to acquire as rapidly as possible the instruction deemed 
 sufficient, and from this point of view good results might be 
 expected from it. 
 
 But when we examine it closer, gentlemen, one is struck by 
 the fact that the emulation so produced has but one object, yiz., to 
 get out of the army as quickly as possible. 
 
 Now, this bemg the prize offered, the man will gradually come 
 to regard it, and not promotion, as the object of all his exertions. 
 Promotion is at present his chief object, he then would dread it, 
 because more would undoubtedly be asked from him if promoted, 
 and thus this system, even in the instruction of young recruits, 
 would not have the happy results hoped for. 
 
 It would, we believe, be the same in other respects. 
 
 At present the young man who, before the revision, draws a 
 
 E 2
 
 lot. knows, once lie lias got a number, wh.etlier he makes a portion 
 of the conlingeiit or not; he also knows to what conditions he is 
 submitted, and his family understands his situation. 
 
 Doubtless, under the new lavr, the obligations of the youug 
 man will be more extensive; he will remain at the disposal of the 
 armv during the whole time fixed, and he ought, in every case, to 
 spend with the colours a time, long or short, as may be determined 
 on; but from tlic moment he is enrolled, until he quits his house, 
 his position is unchanged, his individual interest, that is to say, the 
 interest of the entire population, necessitate this. 
 
 It is equally requisite for the interest of the army. 
 
 It is requisite that when the young soldiers join, the com- 
 manding officer should know how long they will form a portion 
 of the corps he commands. On the other hand, if the officers 
 see every year tlie best drilled and most efficient men leave the 
 service, if they only keep the worst men, will they not find their 
 task disagreeable, will they not feel that esprit clc corps, that 
 regimental pride, that all wish to preserve, and which is in fact a 
 portion of their own honour, will not they feel this diminished .'' 
 
 Lastly, will not a selection amongst all men having one year of 
 service, between those whose instruction appears to be the most 
 forward, and who must draw lots in order to be sent home, and 
 those who are not so selected, will not this selection produce 
 discontent perhaps not uttered, but at least feelings that 
 will sour many minds, and which will be most prejudicial to 
 discipline. 
 
 We have serious misgivings on this subject. 
 
 Thus, how favourable soever the majority of your Committee 
 is to all that could inspire earnest emuJation in the army, to 
 all that could excite the man, whatever might be his grade, to 
 develope and improve his instruction, it could not adopt the 
 proposal we are discussing. The Committee desire to express 
 its respect for the ideas that have dictated this proposal ; it 
 sought to adopt it, but after careful examination its application 
 appeared to produce difficulties of more than one kind, which 
 it was not advisable to encounter. 
 
 For the solution of this problem, the Bill we ask you to adopt, 
 provides, as you have already seen, — 
 
 That all the young men of tlie class called on, and acknow- 
 ledged as fit for the service, shall form a portion of the regular army, 
 and shall be placed at the disposal of the Minister of War ; 
 
 That all are to be enrolled in the various corps in the 
 army, and sent either to the said corps, battalions or schools of 
 instruction ; 
 
 Lastly, that each year the Minister for War fixes the number 
 of young soldiers who must reniain more than one year under the 
 colours, and that the selection of these men will be made in the 
 proportion fixed, according to the numbers they have drawn, on the 
 recruiting lists of their parishes. 
 
 We beheve it absolutely requisite, that for the destination of 
 these men the military authorities should know beforehand what it
 
 53 
 
 has to depend on. As for young men who are detailed to pass 
 only one year in the army, they will be well aware that if their 
 instruction is not sufficient during the year, they may be com- 
 pelled to remain a longer time with their corps. Similarly, 
 if after six months they have shown themselves well taught 
 and fit for duty, they may be sent on furlough; there is therefore 
 jin incentive to exertion for those who now serve only a year, but 
 who can nevertheless, if they feel it their vocation, aspire to 
 all grades. 
 
 You see, gentlemen, by what considerations vre have been 
 guided in fixing — 
 
 1st. Five years as the period during which all healthy French- 
 men belong to the regular army, whether under the colours 
 or not. 
 
 2nd. In requiring that all the young men of each class should 
 be enrolled in the various corps, and be bound to serve 
 under conditions which doubtless vary- according to the 
 exigencies of the army and its constitution. 
 
 ord. Lastly, to fix by lot, when the men are enrolled, the 
 various destinations they should according to their 
 aptitude receive. 
 
 These resolutions, we must not conceal from you, have not all 
 o1)tained the assent of the Government. 
 
 Thus the Minister of War has told us that he agrees with us 
 o far as — 
 
 1st. The principle of universal service. 
 
 2nd. The institution of volunteers for a year. 
 
 3rd. The length of time during which all Frenchmen, declared 
 fit for service, ought to make a part of the regular army. 
 
 4th. Lastly, upon the drawing of lots and the enrolment of all 
 young men of each class in the various corps, but he cannot 
 admit that all these young men should be incorporated and 
 pass all under the colours according to the destination to be 
 given them. 
 
 He thinks it is not requisite to incorporate more than the 
 number of young soldiers required for the different arms of the 
 service, and that they should continue to serve only as long as 
 they are required. 
 
 And that these young men should be taken by the numbers 
 they have drawn, the others be sent home, but should remain at 
 the disposal of the Minister for War, to be called either to 
 flil vacancies in the corps in which they are enrolled, or in mass 
 if circumstances require it. 
 
 As for their military instruction, the Minister thinks that it is 
 possible, by arrangements to be made hereafter, to give such an 
 instruction. 
 
 The Minister also wished that the duration of the re-engage- 
 ment should be fixed at two years as a minimum, and four years as 
 •a rir xin-ium ; he thinks that within these limits re-engagements
 
 54 
 
 will offer none of the inconveniences pointed out, and will offer 
 men such inducements as may lead tliem to exert themselves. 
 
 As you will doubtless remark, the great point of divergence 
 between the Government and the Committee is that poition of 
 the Bill which directs that all the young men of each class shall be 
 subjected to such a bona fide instruction as shall enable them to 
 come already taught and prepared when they are called out. 
 
 The reasons for this rule you know ; we have pointed them 
 out in the first portion of this report. We have still further 
 developed them when analysing the system proposed by the 
 Honourable General Ducrot. 
 
 They rest besides on ideas which have reference not alone 
 to the interest of the army, and they have such force in our eyes, 
 that, despite the observations of the War Minister and the great 
 regret we experience at not being able to coincide with him, 
 we feel compelled to abide by our proposal. 
 
 Let us now see what force the new law will place at the 
 disposal of the country. 
 
 Five classes, each composed of 150,000 men, equals 750,000. 
 But losses by death, discharges, &c., must take place each 
 year, and it is admitted in all the calculations upon recruiting that 
 these may be assumed at 4 per cent, for the first, 3 per cent, for 
 the second, and 2 per cent, for the remaining years. 
 
 Thus after live years the force will not be 750,000 but 704,720. 
 Four reserve classes of the regular army will furnish after the 
 same deduction, 510,380. 
 
 This will give a total of 1.215,000; this added to the perma- 
 nent portion of the army ; or that not recruited by enrolment, and 
 which numbers 120,000 men, will give for the regular army as 
 fellows: — 
 
 Regular Army. 
 
 Portion not recruited by enrolment . . . . 120,000 
 
 Five classes, deductions being made for deaths, &c. 704,720 
 
 Total 824,720 
 
 Add reserve, four classes, deductions being made 
 
 for deaths, &c. 500,380 
 
 Grand total 1,325,100 
 
 But of the five classes enrolled for the regular army, the last, 
 or youngest, class is not yet trained, and if because it is enrolled 
 it figures on the muster rolls as effective, it is only after a certain 
 lapse of time that it can be considered as possessing any real 
 military value. 
 
 If, then, it is desirable to get rid of shams, it is necessary to 
 calculate tlie force which the country can make use of in the day 
 of danger, without trusting to this class, for in our opinion it is 
 only the four trained classes of the regular army, united to the per-
 
 manent portion not recruited by enrolment, which forms the army 
 ready to enter into hne of battle. 
 
 Tliis is why, while we allow that except for the formation of 
 cadres and special arms, it is not requisite that the men sliould in 
 ordinary circumstances be more than three or four years with the 
 colours, we have nevertheless asked tliat five years may be fixed 
 as the period during which each cla ^s should belong to the regular 
 army. We ha\e been desirous that the army should ahvavs have 
 four trained classes, and that the young men before they enter the 
 reserve, where the duties are different, should serve this period of 
 five years. 
 
 Thus, Gentlemen, for the regular army : — 
 
 1st. The permanent portion . . . . 120,000 
 
 2nd. Four trained classes . . . . . . 554,720 
 
 Total 674,720 
 
 The reserve of the regular army .. .. 510,380 
 
 Grand Total 1,185,100 
 
 This will be the force disposable, while the youngest class 
 receives the requisite training. 
 
 It must be added that a certain number of young men de- 
 termined by special conditions, are only summoned in case of M'ar. 
 Also that a certain number of young men are classed as being only 
 fitted for duty in the auxiliary branches of the arm}^ and these a 
 careful administration will draw on, for such services, leaving the 
 men fit to carrj'' arms in the ranks. 
 
 Behind these, 1,185,100 men, there is the territorial army, 
 composed of men from 29 to 34 years of age, and organized 
 entirely on a different footing, so that entire freedom may be given 
 to the regular army and its reserve. 
 
 Doubtless these figui*es appear to you very high in comparison 
 with those existing formerh", but we must not confine ourselves to 
 a consideration of these facts by themselves. 
 
 A law on the recruiting of the army, a law constituting the 
 military forces of a nation, must be looked at as regards the forces 
 of other nations. It should place the country on the same footing 
 as other nations; the sacrifices called for may be heavv and grinding, 
 but they are the price we must pay for the independence of the 
 country. 
 
 Gentlemen, if you look across our frontier you will see the 
 great ti'ansformations that the military institutions of the great 
 States have undergone during the last few years ; you will see 
 what forces they can mobilize ; and we think that, with the army 
 we propose, you will acknowledge that France will be by no means 
 in a state inferior to what she was.
 
 56 
 
 RUSSIAN ARMY. 
 
 Russia has, by a ukase dated 4th-16th Novemberj 1870> 
 introduced a new principle into her military institutions, and 
 seeks to alter them; it is not, therefore, very easy to give an exact 
 account of the results of the system she has adopted. 
 
 Her ohject is to borrow from local and reserve troops, hitherto 
 intended for service in the interior of the country, and the instruc- 
 tion of recruits, a sufficient number of cadres to form the reserve 
 of infantry and foot artillery. 
 
 The young men of each contingent selected by lot for incor- 
 poration serve from 21 to 36 years, namely, seven years under 
 the colours, and eight years in the reserve. 
 
 Lastly? with regard to the entire male population capable of 
 bearing arms, and estimated at four millions, it is thought that 
 Russia can put a force of two million of men on foot, several years, 
 however, appear requisite to attain this result, but, meantime, the 
 actual constitution of the Russian army is as follows : — 
 
 1st troops (active or mobile). 
 2nd troops (local or reserve). 
 
 These are again divided into regulars and irregulars (Cossacks). 
 
 The active or mobile troops include the guard and the army of 
 the line ; they are intended to take the field at once, and are 
 provided with a material and equipment requisite for this purpose. 
 These troops have no fixed garrison, and may be concentrated 
 anywhere in the Empire, as the government may direct. 
 
 The local troops are, in peace time, in permanent garrisons ; 
 they are intended to furnish the garrisons of fortresses. They 
 include 80 hattalions of reserve infantry, who are chiefly intended 
 for instructing recruits ; squadrons and batteries exist for the 
 same purpose. 
 
 The irregular troops consist chiefly of cavalry, and a certain 
 number of horse batteries, which are devoted to active or local 
 duties, according to circumstances. 
 
 The active army is composed as follows : — 
 
 Active Aeitt — War FcoTi^a. 
 Iiifaiifrj/. 
 
 
 Officer-. 
 
 :\Ien. 
 
 188 Eegiments of Infantry, at 3.397 pci- regiment 
 30 Battalions of Rifles, 394 per battalion 
 
 11,288 
 780 
 
 621,318 
 27,360 
 
 
 15,068 
 
 651,708 
 
 Total lufantiy 
 
 666 
 
 776
 
 57 
 
 C'acah'i 
 
 56 Cavahy Eegimeuts — 938 men, G33 horses 
 ^Q Cavalry Regiments of the Don 
 
 Total Cavalry. . 
 
 OffK-crs un.l 
 Men. 
 
 52,518 
 Gl,451 
 
 113,98:; 
 
 Horses. 
 
 35,418 
 60,709 
 
 96,157 
 
 A.-tiUcrtj. 
 
 
 
 
 Men. 
 
 Guns. 
 
 47 Brigades of Foot Artillery, 4 battalions, 8 guns eac-:: 
 
 18 Brigades of Horse Artillerv, ditto 
 
 14 Brigades of Horse Ai-tillery (Cossacks), ditto 
 
 50,055 
 6,066 
 
 3,831 
 
 1.504 
 144 
 112 
 
 Total Ai-tiUery 
 
 69,952 
 
 1,760 
 
 l£nci!neers. 
 
 
 of 
 
 Officers. 
 
 :.rcn. 
 
 11 Battalions of Engineers, 6 Domi-Batlalious 
 Pontomiiers . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 } 
 
 374 
 
 15,215 
 
 Total Engineers 
 
 
 15,619 
 
 Pares, Artillery, Engineers, Telegraphs, &c. 
 Ambulances 
 
 Men. 
 
 23,070 
 44070 
 
 Grand Total of Troops in F/mt Line. 
 
 Men 
 
 Horses 
 Guns 
 
 923,419. 
 
 96,157 
 
 1.968 
 
 Si-> <_e Giiis. 
 
 209 
 
 These troops liave. since 1S66, been several times assembled 
 in various camps. 
 
 AUSTRIAN ARMY. 
 
 The law of the 5th November, 1 868, which has proclaimed 
 universal compulsory service in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, 
 h.as fixed the duration of service —
 
 58 
 
 At 3 years in the regular army ; 
 7 years in the reserve ; 
 2 vears in the Landwehr, for men who enter it after 
 
 fulfilling their time in the army and reserve; 
 12 years in the landwehr for men who enter it directly. 
 The men named for the reserve substitutes may, until the age 
 of 30, be placed in the ranks. 
 
 The war strength of the permanent army has been fixed at 
 800,000 men for ten years, not including the frontier trooj^s, who 
 amount to 45,135. 
 
 In case of war the landwehr may be used to aid the regular 
 army; it is composed of 170 battalions and 67 squadrons, forming 
 an effective of 192,674 men. 
 
 So that, leaving out the reserve substitutes kept to fill up any 
 vacancies in the active army, and disregarding the landsturm, the 
 total force that Austro-Hungary can moblise is— ' 
 
 Men. 
 
 Army 800,000 
 
 Frontier troops . . . . . . 45,135 
 
 Landwehr 192,671 
 
 Total 1,037,706 
 
 The countries representing the Reichsrath furnish — 
 
 For the army 470,368 
 
 For the landwehr 101,929 
 
 Hungary furnishes — 
 
 For the army . . .... 329,632 
 
 For the landwehr . . . . . . 90,742 
 
 GERMAN ARMY. 
 
 AVhen the military law receives its fall development in the 
 countries annexed to the North German Confederation and in 
 South Germany, the army of the German Empire will include 
 18 corps and a half, composed each of 41,000 men on the active 
 or mobile list, and 40 to 43,000 depot or garrison troops,, or a 
 total of 1,517jOOO men. These 18 corps already exist. 
 
 ITALIAN ARMY. 
 
 When the new military law comes completely into operation, 
 which it will do in 1874-75, the total force of Italy will be 
 750,000 men. 
 
 First line . . . . . . . , 350,000 
 
 Provincial iiiiliiia . . . . . . 200,000 
 
 Substitute tioops in military districts 200,000 
 
 Total 750,000
 
 59 
 
 Lastlv, if you will take into account the deduction which must 
 always be made from the army, and which cannot be avoided, yon 
 will arrive at the number of what are termed the normal non- 
 combatants. 
 
 Tiiat is to say, the category of military men who do not figure 
 on the field of battle amounts to 90,000 men; then you must add 
 the army of occupation in Algiers, about 40,000 men (66,000 have 
 been asked for 1872). Lastly, actual deductions from tlie numl^er 
 under arms, which are about 36,000 men, or a total of 166,000 
 men, who appear on the estimates, but who cannot be counted, 
 amongst the troops disposable for defence. 
 
 These men are — 
 
 aucl mcu in cliavge of Kemouiit "1 
 
 1st. — XOKMAL NOX-COMBATAXT?. 
 
 1. Staff of Fortresses .. .. 
 
 2. Departmental Police . . 
 
 3. Fusiliers and Pioneers of discipline companies 
 
 4. Cavalry School 
 
 5. Riding School men 
 
 6. Veterinary Surgeon 
 
 Establishments .. .. .. .. 
 
 7. Artillery Workmen . . . . . . . . , . 
 
 8. Workmen of Train of Equi2:>ages 
 
 ■9. Chaplains, Surgeons, Apothecaries, Army and Garrison 
 Chaplains, Interpreters, Officers of Administration, of 
 Inteudance, Clothing, Camp Equipment, Harness, sub- 
 sistence, and Hospitals, and Military Prisons 
 
 10. Military Workmen, Clerks, Butchers, and Bakers, , 
 
 11. Hospital Corps 
 
 12. Supernumeraries, such as Armovtrers, Boot Makers 
 
 Saddlers, Smiths, &c. 
 
 13. Effectives absolutely requisite in time of war (old sol- 
 
 diers) for training recruits. . 
 
 Total 
 
 ■■} 
 
 020 
 19,403 
 739 
 163 
 200 
 
 4,104 
 
 2,116 
 544- 
 
 3,135 
 
 G.124 
 
 7,527 
 
 15,762 
 30,044 
 
 90,480 
 
 2nd. — Mex not atailabl-e foe Home Defence, 
 Army of Occupation in Algiers , . . . . . . . 40,000 
 
 3rd. — Men to be actf^vxiy deducted as a Peejiane-st Loss feom 
 THE Eanks. 
 
 1. Sick 
 
 2. Men on leave . . 
 
 3. On Command, in Workshops, Recrviiting Est ablishmeuts,&c. 
 
 4. Under Punishment . . 
 
 5. Men intended for Baggage Gruard, Muleteers, &c. . . 
 
 16,617 
 8,000 
 3,555 
 5,775 
 2,000 
 
 Grand Total 
 
 166,427 
 
 Under the proposed law the actual number of normal non- 
 combatants may be reduced by using the men classed as fit for 
 duty with the auxiliary services. 
 
 We recall these facts, gentlemen, in order that truth may come 
 clearly to light and nothing be kept in the dark. 
 
 France should know what slie rests on when the number of 
 men borne on the estimates is calculated, and what, without any 
 deception, is at her disposal.
 
 60 
 
 But, gentlemen, it is requisite that we should tell you not only 
 the number of men that the application of our law will put at the 
 disposal of the country, we have also to point out the amount of 
 instruction and military education that these men will acquire, in 
 order that you may estimate what will be the value of the perma- 
 nent organized force that it will offer. 
 
 That, it must be remembered, is the first portion of the problem. 
 Thus, although we are only discussing the law of recruiting, and 
 your Committee proposes hereafter to deal with the organization 
 of the army and the constitution of its cadres, yet we would not 
 completely fulfil our task if we did not show you that while the 
 entire class will be passed through the ranks it is possible, while 
 keeping the effective strength within reasonable limits, to have, on 
 the one hand, a sufficient number of men trained completely as 
 soldiers, and, on the other, to give a certain amount of military 
 instruction to those who, remaining a shorter time in the army, 
 may be sent on furlough, and yet held at the disjoosal of the 
 military authorities. 
 
 Various arrangements may be made for this purpose, for it is 
 possii)le, having incorporated a sufficient number of young soldiers, 
 to send a large or smaller nuinber on furlough, when they shall 
 have 1;een trained for the various arms of tlic service, according to 
 the wants of the army, and by this means to alter the number of 
 men kept with the colours. This was what was done by the law of 
 1832, by which the first portion of the contingent only was incor- 
 porated; when it was considered requisite to instruct a larger number 
 of young soldiers, it was customary to limit the service to four 
 years.-i- 
 
 But whatever system he adopted, it is evident that the first 
 thing to be done is to determine the effeclive strength that the 
 country wishes to preserve under the colours, since that of course 
 must be the basis of all calculations. 
 
 To be able to place before you the results of the project which 
 we submit, and to make you understand in some measure its 
 mechanism, m'C must then fix this amount. 
 
 This we ol^tain from the proposals made to the Assembly by 
 tlie Government which in our opinion fixes the numbers at a figure 
 far from too large, deductions being made as already referred to. 
 
 404,000 men, including the gendarmerie, have been asked by 
 tlie Government for the year 1872. 
 
 Taking this number, then, as a point of departure for the expla- 
 nation we propose to give as to the composition of the regular army, 
 such as will on one of many hypotheses result from the action of our 
 law, we will assume that each year 15,000 "volunteers for a year,^' 
 clothed, equipped, and kept at their own cost, will come forward ; 
 
 * " When," said Marshal Niel, '• we tliink of war, it is requisite to instruct a 
 larger number of soldiers. What have we done ? we have limited the service to four 
 years, and we have embodied the men of the young reserve ahat is to say, the second 
 portion of the contingent,) in the army, so that there is not in the army any man 
 who is not completely instructed."
 
 Gl 
 
 tMs number will dovibtlcss not appear too great, when you re- 
 member that the substitution and exonerations have been every 
 year 23;,000 on a contingent of 100,000, and in 1859, upon a 
 contingent of 140,000 men, the figure rose to 42,000. 
 
 Doubtless the diplomas and examinations required will not 
 allow all the young men, who, under existing regulations, seek sub- 
 stitutes, to be admitted as volunteers for a year ; this, we need not 
 say, is what we wish ; but allowing for the progress of instruction 
 which the excitement to industry the new law will dovdjtless 
 produce, we think the number of 15,000 on a total of 150,000 is 
 not too large to assume, as the numl^er who are likely to fulfil the 
 conditions required by this kind of engagement. 
 
 Lastly, remember that the permanent portion of the army 
 includes now 120,000 men ; and let us see what, under these con- 
 ditions, will result from the possible combinations of our law, and 
 what results it w'ill give. 
 
 With 150,000 young men enrolled, of whom 15,000 will be 
 volunteers for one vear, the number to be borne on the estimate 
 will be 135,000 men." 
 
 If out of these 135,000 yourg soldiers the Minister for War 
 determines on keeping 75,000 on an average four years with the 
 colours, there remains 60,000 who need give only one year to their 
 instruction. We arrive thus at the total number of the army 
 without counting the volunteers for one year, or the men on fur- 
 lough. 
 
 1st year 135,000 
 
 2nd ., 72,000* 
 
 3rd „ 69,840* 
 
 4th „ 68,440' 
 
 345,280 
 Add permanent portion . . . . 120,000 
 
 Total . , . . 465,280 men 
 
 Such will be the portion paid for by the State; all being eflfective 
 and without any deductions except those foreseen, which is not 
 likely. 
 
 If we add to this number 15,000 volunteers of a year, that is ta 
 say, young men capable of acquiring a sufficient military instruction, 
 we arrive at a total of 480,000 men. 
 
 In addition to which the men sent away at the end of the fourth 
 year, forming still a portion of the regular army, amount to 67-080, 
 that is to say, a real total of 547,000 men, 465,000 only being 
 paid for by the estimates. 
 
 But this is not all. The regular army still has other volunteers 
 for a year, viz., those who have completed the year for which they 
 have engaged. 
 
 * That is, 75,000 men, deducting 4, 3, and 2 per cent, per year.
 
 G2 
 
 It has, in addition, the men who after one year of service are 
 placed at tlie disposal of the regular army, and at the orders of the 
 Minister for War. The volunteers for one year, deducting the 15,000 
 already included, number 57,190, and are young men well in- 
 structed, who have at least warrants as non-commissioned officers. 
 The men at the disposal of the regular army number 220.000, so 
 that the total number becomes 824,000 men. 
 
 However, to understand clearly the number that may 1)e put in 
 line by this organisation, we must, as already pointed out, deduct 
 from these 824,000 men, the youngest class, or 150,000 men. The 
 active army will therefore consist of — 
 
 The permanent portion which does not 
 recruit by enrolment, and composing the 
 cadres 120,000 
 
 Soldiers of 2, 3, 4, and 5 j-ears' service . . 277>COO 
 
 Men at the disposal of the War Minister, 
 
 who have served one year . . . . 220 000 
 
 Volunteers for a year >. .. ., 57,000 
 
 Total .. .. 674,000 
 
 So far as the reserve of the army is concerned, it offers condi- 
 tions still more favourable, for out of 510,000 men 255,000 will have 
 served five years with the colours, 202,000 will have served one year 
 and 53,000 will be volunteers for a year. 
 
 Thus, to repel iiivasion, France, without counting the territorial 
 army, will dispose, as we have already said, of 653,000 men trained 
 to the profession of arms, 110,000 having, as volunteers for one 
 year, obtained M^arrants as nun-conmiissioned officers, and 422,000 
 possessing an instruction sufficient to bring to the army when 
 incorporated the elements of a real force.* 
 
 * Table sliowiug the Effective of tlie Army in 
 
 tlie foregoing liypotb 
 
 ;sis : — 
 
 
 Volunteers 
 for a Year. 
 
 At the 
 disi>osal of 
 the ILilitary 
 Authorities. 
 
 General 
 Total. 
 
 'Permanent portion 120,000 
 
 1st year 135,0i:0 
 
 Vlndycar 72,000 
 
 Kegular ^ 3rcl year 6^,000 
 
 Army. 4tli year 68,0i;0 
 
 15,000 
 14,700 
 14,410 
 14,130 
 
 13,Su0 
 
 57,000 
 55,430 
 54,310 
 
 53,230 
 
 1 
 l 824.720 
 
 4C5,280 
 Voth year on furlougli 67,080 
 
 _, 
 
 Toral 532,360 
 
 72,090 
 
 220,270 
 
 
 / 1st year 63.740 
 
 "'''^■'<' i 3rd year ' ... 63,1 
 
 1,4th year 61,8b0 
 
 13,570 
 13,300 
 13.030 
 12,770 
 
 52,170 
 51,170 
 50,110 
 49.110 
 
 i 510,380 
 
 Total 2,o5 U'O 
 
 52,670 
 
 202,520 
 
 1,:J35,100 
 
 Deduct the last class enrolled as nut Icing taught 
 
 1.50,000 
 
 Remain 
 
 i, 185,000
 
 63 
 
 We do not conceal from ourselves that amongst the volunteers 
 for a year, a certain number of young men are intended for civil 
 careers, neither do we conceal the fact that tlie deductions which 
 we have foreseen may be exceeded, that a portion of the army 
 must be employed in instructing the last class enrolled, although it 
 may be possible to reduce this number. But this must occur 
 with every system. But as a set off, there are many young men 
 whose services have been dispensed with, or have been classed 
 for the auxiUary services, and in case of invasion, we repeat, 
 these men would be found very valuable. 
 
 But, gentlemen, the combination which we lay before you in 
 order that you may see the working of the law is by no means the 
 most favourable for its execution. As we have not taken into 
 account that by sending men on leave a much larger number of 
 young men may be prepared. We have not taken into account 
 *' overslaughs," or sending men back in anticipation, or in short all 
 that must be allowed to give elasticity to a law of recruiting, and 
 modify the number of men with the colours ; these things will pro- 
 duce a considerable effect. 
 
 If you refer to a discussion that took place in 1869, when an 
 examination was made to determine what would be the result of 
 the legislation actually in force on the service of men with their 
 corps, you will observe that it was acknowledged and declared that 
 this period would be much shorter than tliat fixed by the law.* 
 
 If this idea of three years' actual service with the colours be 
 applied, and a deduction be made for the last class enrolled, at the 
 end of five years' service in the army and four in the reserve, the 
 state of affairs would be as follows : — 
 
 In the Regular Army. 
 
 100,000 men having 2 years' service. 
 288,160 ., having .S years' service. 
 120,000 „ permanent portion of the army. 
 
 508,160 
 
 In the Reserve. 
 358,050 men who have served 3 years with the colours. 
 
 866,210 
 
 Add at the disposal of the Military Authorities — 
 
 * In 1869, when the law on the contingent was under discussion, a note was sen 
 to the Committee hy Marshil Kiel to tlie following etfec;:— The service counts 
 doubtless from the 1st July, but the contingent is not called until after the 1st 
 October, when the harvest is collected ; in adJiiion to which the men are generally 
 sent home before the expirition of the prescribed time. And when it is added that 
 those who serve with zeal and are not bad shots havoleive of from 6 to 7 months 
 before their periorl of service cxpir.?, it must be acknowledged that a gooJ soldier 
 need be absent from his family in time of peace for a period of barely three years.
 
 • G4 
 
 57,090 Volunteers fur a year having a Vkarra;;t as non- 
 commissioned officers 
 109,470 who have passed one year in the army. 
 
 In Reserve. 
 
 52,670 Volunteers for a year. 
 
 99,G60 men who have served for one year. 
 
 318,890 
 
 1,185,110 Grand Total. 
 
 It is evident that the number of men who receive a complete 
 military education, may perhaps be higher than we have shown, 
 and consequently the number of men who receive only one year's 
 instruction may be much diminished. 
 
 If, in the application of the new law for the length of service 
 with the effective strength of corps, the data given in 1869 be 
 admitted, the number of men entirely trained to the profession of 
 arms will be much increased both for the regular army and its 
 reserve, which the law deems will bring into the ranks a very 
 powerful contingent. 
 
 These, however, are arrangements of detail, which it is the pro- 
 vince of the Government to make; they doubtless will each year 
 become more simple, according as the military education of the 
 country extends, and the standard of education generally is raised. 
 Full latitude must be given to the Government in these parti- 
 culars.* 
 
 So far as the special arms are concerned, it is sufficient to see 
 the proportion in which the decision of the effective strength of the 
 ai'my is made, to be convinced that with all possible combinations 
 their recruitment will always be completely assured; doubtless the 
 proportions l)etween the various arms will be modified, but what- 
 ever it may be there will be no difficulty in adjusting matters. f 
 
 * AVe are well aware of the ir.et that the incorporation of a greater number of men 
 will increase the cost of the first outfit and kit. This, for a foot soldier, cost.4 
 51. lis. 8(7. ; if, then, in place of incorporating 90,000 men j'ou incorporate 135,000, 
 an excess of 251,250^ is caused. But on the other hand, on account of their incor- 
 poration not taking- place so soon as provided for, which is always the case, and also 
 by sending well taught men away before the expiration of the year, this expense 
 may be more than covered. 
 
 f By the estimate of 1872 the following is the strength of the various Corps : — 
 Number of men in excess of the strength of Corps . . 7,000 
 
 Infantry 298,200 
 
 Cavalry .. 60,000 
 
 Artillery 45,000 
 
 Engineers 9,000 
 
 Military Train 8,000 
 
 Troops of the Administration . . . . . . . . 8,000 
 
 Total 
 
 Departmental Gendarmerie. . 
 Eepublican Guard of Paris . . 
 
 Total 
 
 435,200 
 
 23,000 
 
 6,166 
 
 464,366
 
 G5 
 
 The presence of all tlie healthy young men of each class coming 
 either into corps to remain there the time required by the wants of 
 the various arms of the service, or in battalions or schools of in- 
 struction to acquire a certain amount of military knowledge, and 
 form habits of discipline will make the army a great school where 
 each will learn the duties of a soldier before exercising the rio-hts 
 of a citizen. 
 
 Lastly, thanks to the classification, according to profession and 
 aptitude of all the young men forming a portion of the army, or 
 its reserve, it will be a vast cadre, in which, when requisite, all men 
 placed according to their capacity, may render great service to 
 the State. 
 
 From the point of view of the constitution itself of the armv, 
 the project that we submit to you offers to the country guarantees 
 as important and greater than those that flow from existing 
 legislation. 
 
 But you should know that we have been governed by other 
 considerations than those connected with the army. We think 
 a military law is a social institution from which may flow important 
 reforms in our customs, in our habits, and in our legislation. 
 
 Thus, gentlemen, the return to the principle of universal com- 
 pulsory military service, the return we advisedly say for this prin- 
 ciple was what SO years ago we possessed, other nations borrowed 
 it when we abandoned it ; to return to the principle of compulsory 
 service, to mix up in the army all ranks of society, will raise at 
 once not only the military character, but also, what is more im- 
 portant, the character of the citizen. 
 
 It will give our army all the elements of a powerful organi- 
 sation, with solidly formed cadres ; it will cause a large number of 
 young men, who have received a suflScient military instruction to 
 enter the ranks, and when they are required will have ready a 
 reserve already instructed. It Mill ofTer to all those intended 
 for a civil career, or who have furnished the proofs of havino- 
 acquired military instruction by useful labour, the means of pursu- 
 ing important studies without liberating them from their debt 
 to the country. 
 
 These are the results which we hope the law we submit to you 
 will produce. The idea which has continually directed us, you are 
 aware, is the state of the country. 
 
 Doubtless, when you look at the map of Europe; when you think 
 of the dangers to which we are exposed, we must, notwithstandino- 
 our misfortunes, strive to prevent the disturbance of a certain equi- 
 librium too much to our detriment; this we must seek by the con- 
 stitution of our military force, and strive to put the country in a 
 state to resist invasion. It will not be free otherwise ; to attain 
 this object what we have suggested appears sufficient. 
 
 Gentlemen, in any case there is no other means to resist the 
 evil which threatens us, the breaking up of the elements which 
 compose our society. 
 
 F
 
 66 
 
 There is no other means to animate every heart with patriotism 
 to inspire ideas of disciphne and feelings of devotion in every mind ; 
 lastly, to tighten the bonds which unite all the children of this 
 France, now so cruelly tried. 
 
 BILL ON THE RECRUITING OF THE ARMY. 
 
 Chapter I. 
 
 GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS. 
 
 yis projwsed by the Committee. Alterations made by the Assembly. 
 
 Chapter I. 
 General Arrangements. 
 Article 1. 
 
 Every Frencluran owes personal 
 military service to his country. 
 
 Article 2. 
 
 In the French Army there is 
 neither bounty in money nor any 
 payment for engagement. 
 
 Article 3. 
 
 All Frenchmen not declared unfit 
 for all military service, may be called 
 on from 20 to 40 years of age, to 
 form a portion of the regular army 
 or its reserves, as laid down by thi? 
 law. 
 
 Article 4. 
 
 Substitution is suppressed. Dis- 
 pensations from service as laid down 
 in the law do not give a complete 
 1 iberation. 
 
 Article 5. 
 
 Men with the colours are not 
 allowed to vote. 
 
 Article 6. 
 
 All bodies of men organinized and 
 under arms are x;nder military law, 
 form a portion of the army, and 
 report either to the Minister of War 
 or to the Minister of Marine.
 
 67 
 
 As proposed hj the Committee. Alterations made by the Assembly. 
 
 Article 7. 
 
 No one is admitted into the French 
 Army wlio is not a Frenchman. 
 
 The following are excluded from 
 military ser^dce, and have no I'ight 
 to serve in the army. 
 
 1. Those who have been con- 
 demned to corporal or degrading 
 punishment. 
 
 2. Those who have been con- 
 demned to two years' imprison- 
 ment, and have in addition been 
 placed by the court under the 
 surveillance of the chief police, 
 and interdicted in whole or in 
 part from the exercise of civil 
 municipal or family rights. 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 Enrolments. 
 
 First Section. 
 
 Enumeration and Drawing Lot?. 
 
 Article 8. 
 
 Every year a table showing the 
 number of young men having com- 
 pleted 20 years of age during the 
 preceding year, and domiciled in the 
 canton will be drawn up by the 
 Maires : — 
 
 1. Upon the declarations that the 
 young men, their parents, or 
 guardians, are bound to make. 
 
 2. Upon the registers of the civil 
 departments of the State, and 
 other documents and informa- 
 tion. 
 
 These tables will show in a column 
 of remai'ks the profession of each 
 young man whose name appears 
 thereon. 
 
 These tables are published and 
 placarded in each township according 
 to the forms prescribed in Articles 
 63 and 64 of the Civil Code. 
 
 The last publication must be not 
 later than the 1 5th January. 
 
 A public notice on the same form 
 indicates the place and day where 
 the aforesaid table will be examined. 
 
 F .v;
 
 68 
 
 As proposed hy the Coimnittee. Alterations mach hy the Assemhly. 
 
 and by means of the ballot a number 
 will be assigned to each young man 
 whose name is therein entered. 
 
 Article 9, 
 
 Individuals born in France whoso Individuals horn in France whose 
 ] mrcnt3 arc forcigncra and who arc parents are foreigners, arid thosehorn 
 admitted to the benefit of Article 9 abroad, or of foreigners naturalized 
 of the Civil Code, will in the cantona m France, and those icho may not 
 where they arc donaioilcd draw lota le of age ichen their pareiits are 
 a I Ihc ballot next following the dc- naturalized, will draw lots at the 
 elaration they have in accordance lallot fulloioing the declaration made 
 with the aforcgaid article made. hy them in accordance ivith Article 9 
 
 Indi\dduals declared Erenchmen qf the Civil Code, and Article 2 of 
 in virtue of the 1st Ai-ticle of the ike law of the 1th February, 1851. 
 law of the 7th February 1851, will 
 similarly draw lots in the canton 
 where they are domiciled, at the 
 ballot following their coming of age, 
 if meantime they have not under 
 the law just quoted claimed their 
 rights as foreigners. 
 
 Both are only subject to the obli- 
 gations of military service of the 
 class to which from their age they 
 belong. 
 
 Article 10. 
 
 The following are held to be 
 legally domiciled in the canton : — 
 
 1. Young men although emanci- 
 pated, employed, or living else- 
 where, expatriated, absent, or in 
 a state of imprisonment, if their 
 father, mother, or guardian, has 
 their domicile in one of the 
 townships of the canton, or if 
 their father expatriated had his 
 domicile in one of the said 
 townships. 
 
 2. Young men married, whose 
 father, or failing the father, 
 whose mother is domiciled in 
 the canton, unless they show 
 that their true domicile is in 
 some other canton. 
 
 3. Young men married and domi-, 
 ciled in the canton even if their 
 father and mother are not domi- 
 ciled there. 
 
 4. Young men born and living in 
 the canton, who have neither 
 father, mother, nor guardian.
 
 69 
 
 As proposed ly the Committee. Alterations much hy the Assemhhj. 
 
 5. All young men living in the 
 canton not included in the above 
 classes, and who give no proof 
 that they are inscribed in 
 another canton. 
 
 Article 11. 
 
 The following are considered as 
 being of the proper age, by public 
 consent : all young men who cannot 
 and do not produce before the ballot 
 an extract from the registers of the 
 Civil State, proving them to be of a 
 different age, or who failing the 
 registers cannot, or have not proved 
 their ages in accordance with Article 
 46 of the Civil Code. 
 
 Article 12. 
 
 If in the tables <jf enumeration, or 
 in the ballot of previous years, yoi;ng 
 men have been left out, they are to 
 be entered on the table of enumera- 
 tion of the class which is enrolled 
 after the discovery of the omission, 
 provided they have not completed 
 30 years of age, when the table is 
 closed. After that age they are in- 
 cluded with the class to which they 
 properly belong. 
 
 Article 13. 
 
 When there are several townships 
 in the canton the examination of the 
 table of enumeration and the drawing 
 of lots is to take place at the chief 
 town of the canton in public, in pre- 
 sence of the Svib-Prefect, assistecl by 
 the Maires of the canton. 
 
 In those townships which form 
 one or several cantons the Sub-Pre- 
 fect is helped by the Maire and his 
 assistants. 
 
 The table is read aloud. The 
 young men, their parents, or those 
 having cause to speak are heard. 
 The Sub-Prefect decides a Iter having 
 taken the advice of the Maires. 
 The table is then corrected, if requi- 
 site, and finally determined on and 
 signed. 
 
 Where the canton is composed of
 
 70 
 
 As proposed hy the Committee. 
 
 several communes the order in wliicli 
 they are called is determined by lot. 
 
 Article 14. 
 
 The Sub-Prefect will write at the 
 top the names of the young men 
 who come under i\rticle 60 of this 
 law. 
 
 The first numbers will be given to 
 them as a matter of right. 
 
 These numbers are in consequence 
 taken oiit of the urn before the 
 drawing begins. 
 
 Alterations made hy the Assembly. 
 
 Article 15. 
 
 Before drawing lots the Sub-Pre- 
 fect will publicly count the numbers 
 and place them in an urn after having 
 ascertained that the numbers corres- 
 pond with the young men who are 
 to draw lots ; he will then state that 
 he has done so. Each young man 
 will be called as his name stands on 
 the list and will draw a number from 
 the urn, which will be read aloud 
 and entered opposite his name. 
 
 The relations of those that arc 
 not present, or failing them, the 
 Maire of the township will draw for 
 them. 
 
 Once the lots are drawn no altera- 
 tions can be made ; on no pretext 
 
 can it be recommenced, and each man 
 
 will keep the numbei he has drawn 
 
 or that has been drawn for him. 
 
 A. list following the order of num- 
 bers is prepared as the numbers are will he at once entered on the list pro- 
 
 drawn, and opposite the names will vided with supplementary numbers, 
 
 be entered the causes of exemption and draio lots to determine their 
 
 or dispensation that the young men, places on the recruiting list. 
 
 their relations, or the Maire of the 
 
 townships propose to bring before 
 
 the Coimcil of Revision, referred to 
 
 in Article 28. 
 
 The Sub-Prefect adds aoy remai'ks 
 
 aie may think fit. 
 
 The li*t is then read, approved, and 
 
 signed in the same way as the table 
 
 of enumeration, and attached to that 
 
 table ; is publiahed and posted up in 
 
 each township in the canton. 
 
 Insert here — 
 
 Young men tcho may he left out.,
 
 71 
 
 As proposed hy the Committee. Alterations made hy the Assembli/. 
 
 Second Section. 
 
 Exemptions, Dispensations^ and 
 Overslaughs. 
 
 Article 16. 
 
 Young men whose infirmity makes 
 them unfitted for all active or aux- 
 iliary service in the army ai'e ex- 
 empted from military service. 
 
 Article 17. 
 
 The services of the following with 
 the regular army are dispensed 
 with : — 
 
 1. The eldest of a family having 
 lost both father and mothei*. 
 
 2. The only son, or the eldest son, or 
 failing the son or the son-in-law, 
 the only grandson, or the eldest 
 grandson of a woman actually a 
 widow, or of a blind father who 
 is in his 70th year. 
 
 In the cases referred to in the 
 previous paragraphs the younger 
 brother will enjoy the same pri- 
 vileges if his elder brother is 
 blind or afflicted with any in- 
 firmity which is incurable and 
 makes him impotent. 
 
 3. The eldest of two brothers who 
 draw lots at the same time if 
 the younger is fit for service. 
 
 4. He who has a brother in the 
 regular army. 
 
 •5. The brother of any man killed 
 on active service, or who has 
 been discharged or given a pen- 
 sion for injuries received in the 
 execution of his duty, or on 
 account of ill health acquired 
 either in the army or navy. 
 
 The dispensations granted by 
 paragraphs 5 and 6 will be applicable 
 to only one brother for one case, but 
 they may be granted to the same 
 family as often as the same circum- 
 stances recur. 
 
 The young man who neglects to 
 come forward, either by himself or 
 his reprpsontative, at the drawing of 
 
 Insert — 
 
 Or a icoman whose husband has 
 been declared legally absent.
 
 "72 
 
 As projjosed hi/ the Committee. Alterations made hi] the Assemhly, 
 
 the lots of the class to which he 
 belongs cannot claim a dispensation 
 as pointed out by the present article 
 unless the causes of dispensation 
 occur after the closing of the lists. 
 
 The causes of these dispensations 
 ought, in order that the dispensa- 
 tion may be allowed, exist the day 
 the Council of Revision is called on 
 to decide. 
 
 Those which occur between the 
 decision of the Council of Revision 
 and the 1st July, the day from 
 which the service of each class dates, 
 do not alter the legal position of the 
 young men composing the class. 
 
 Nevertheless, the recruit who, 
 after the decision of the Council of 
 Revision, either on the 1st July 
 becomes the eldest of a family with- 
 out father or mother, the only or the 
 eldest son failing, the son, the son- 
 in-law, the only grandson or the Insert 
 
 eldest grandson of a widow, or a o,. ^ ,^omr»?. ivhose husband has 
 blmd father may, if he demands it i^^n legally declared absent. 
 alter one year s service in the ranks, 
 be sent home and kept at the dis- 
 position of the militaiy authorities 
 antil the period of his service be 
 completed. 
 
 Article 18. 
 
 Young men who, when the Coun- 
 cil of Revision meets, have not the 
 requisite height of 5 feet Oi inch 
 or are thought too weak for duty 
 under arms may be sent home for 
 two years, at the end of which time 
 they must be again examined. 
 
 The young men, unless specially 
 authorized, are bound to appear 
 before the Council of Revision of the 
 Canton which has sent them back. 
 
 After the final examination, they 
 ai-e classed, and those of these young 
 men Avho are considered fit for ser- 
 vice, either in the Army or in some 
 auxiliary branch of the Army, must 
 then fulfil the obligations of the' 
 class to which they belong. 
 
 Article 19- 
 
 The fol lowing arc conditionally dis - 
 p e nsed from military service ;
 
 73 
 
 As jJJ'oposed by the Committee. 
 
 1. Tho pupil s o f the Ecole P0I3- - 
 t ooliDiqu o , th o Ecole called des 
 Jovuies d e - Langue ^. , the Ecole des 
 C hart i — - -- 
 
 t4 . 
 
 ^l artly in those s c 
 partly in th o public s e r-yiee. 
 2v^ Tho m e mb e r s — o f the public 
 educational cs tablishm o nt s , th e 
 
 who e nga ge to B p e n 
 i n t e aching, and h a ve be e n ac 
 ? il of the 
 
 fixed for dra^ s dng -let&i- 
 
 il — Jr UGtitution s -4&¥ — the- 
 
 Dcaf and Dumb. 
 
 1. Tho members and th o novi ces 
 
 o f the r e ligious as G ociationB who 
 
 dev o t e — themsolve a — to — t eao h - 
 
 l aw ; also tho o c that aro aoknow - 
 I cdged to bo of public advan 
 
 5^— ¥- oung men who being plac e d 
 i n the cii-cum s tancos foi'c s oon 
 
 o f the 15 t h March, 1850, an d- 
 
 o f the 10th April, - 1867, may 
 c ontract r jimilnr engagement s . 
 6 . EcclcoiaDticnl pupilo - 
 f or thiri pui'poac by - 
 
 A v n-t K 1->T c'It j-^1 . L-i ^-.i* t-? T r» l-t y-v i-vr< Q ft rJ 
 
 XXlO — y" OXiIlcf" ~ I Hdl nil tXlUl i^iJvl brT 
 
 t hemselves te- thc Ministry in 
 a ny of the worships paid by 
 the — State. ^J^n d e r the con - 
 dition — th€tt - they aro — bo und 
 t o p e rform their militar y 
 vice, if the y— eease - 
 t hese profeooion a and have not 
 e nt e red holy — ofdera — of- been- 
 c on s ecrated before they arc 26 
 y ear s of ago. 
 
 Alterations made by the Assembly. 
 
 The pupils of the Ecole Poly tech- 
 nique and the Ecole Forestiere are 
 considered as serving under the 
 colours tchile at those schools. 
 
 The laiv on Army Organization 
 referred to in Article 45 of the Lata 
 will determine hoiv the young men 
 ivho j}ass out of these schools and do 
 not enter the A) my or JSavy, shall 
 be employed, tch ether in " ivaiting," 
 or in the Reserve, or in the Territorial 
 Army, or in the Auxiliary Services. 
 The pupils at both these schools who 
 do not pass tlie fined examination, 
 shall follow the lot of the class they 
 by age belong to, the time spent at 
 these schools being deducted from, 
 the total service required by Article 
 36 0/ this Law. 
 
 Article 20. 
 
 M e mb e r s of the public in s truction 
 a n d th e ■ y ouitg ni c u — who. without
 
 74 
 
 As proposed by the Committee. 
 
 ]) eloDgiQ g ^k>- 4 li e religiou s as soci ar 
 tioas- mentiouod in para g raph 4 of 
 the— j^reoeding articlo, - 
 com e und e r the oaso s-f)¥< 
 
 March, 1850, or by - tJ i e A rti c le 18 of 
 tb€J[iaw-of^t ^ o IQth March, 1867, 
 
 ment to d e vot e t he m s elve s for 10 
 i st i'uction ar c hound to n ass 
 -y^ar-inr- 
 
 milita r y s c hoo l s el e ct e d b y~t 
 st#r- for "War, 
 
 lie4-0. 
 
 Alteratiims made by the Assembly, 
 
 Conditional Dispensations from 
 Military Service are granted to — 
 
 1. Members of the Public Educa- 
 tional Establishments, jxijiils of 
 the Higher Normal School of 
 Paris who have engaged to devote 
 themselves to education for 10 
 years, and who have been accepted 
 by the Pector of the Academy 
 before the ballot, and who fulfil 
 the engagement. 
 
 2. Professors in the National Insti- 
 tutions fur Deaf and Dumb and 
 Blind, under the same conditions 
 as the former class. 
 
 3. Artists tcho have carried ojf the 
 great prizes of the Institutes, on 
 condition that they fulfil all their 
 duties to the State and spend at 
 the School at Rome the p)roper 
 number of years. 
 
 4. Pupils of the School of Oriental 
 Languages, and pupils of the 
 School of Maps, provided they 
 agree to spend 10 years in these 
 schools or in the Public Service. 
 
 5. Members and novices of the reli- 
 gious societies devotfid to education, 
 authorized by the luw,or acknow- 
 ledged to be of public utility , the 
 directors, masters, or assistants 
 of lay schools ivhich fulfil these 
 same conditions, provided, both 
 have, prior to the ballot, made an 
 agreement before the Rector of the 
 Acadetny to teach for 10 years 
 and fulfil that engagement. 
 
 Ck Young men who are not embraced 
 in the above classes, but irho are 
 in the situations provided for by 
 Article 79 of the law of the loth 
 March, 1850, and Ai tide 18 of 
 the law of the lOth Ajml, 1867, 
 and have, prior to the ballot, 
 formed the same engagement be- 
 fore the Rector. 
 
 The engagement to teach for 10 
 years must be fulfilled by the 
 tutors and assistant tutors, both 
 in the Public Schools as well as 
 the Free Schools named by the 
 Minister of Public Education, in 
 accordance n-ith the adi ice r>f the 
 Departmental Council.
 
 75 
 
 As proposed hy the Committee. Alterations made by the Assembly. 
 
 7. Piij)ils selected by the Arch- 
 bishojys or Bishops, and young 
 men authorized to continue their 
 studies., to devote themselves to be 
 Ministers oj any worship paid by 
 the State, provided that they com- 
 plete their Military Service if they 
 drop the studies for u'hich they 
 have received a dispe)isation, or if 
 at 26 years of age, the frst have 
 not entered Holy Orders and the 
 latter been consecrated. 
 
 Article 21. 
 
 ^i.\) I J t^illj* \}\J Uxxt? OCX 
 
 J Army or Navy v by 
 
 )7 and tlio young sailors 
 
 m v al con F jori] >tio n, in 
 conformity with the rule s laid down 
 by Articlc r i 1, 3 ,-gj-4y-# , of th o Law 
 of th e S f d Brama ire- Year — t V, as 
 wel l as the y oung men named by 
 Art ic l e \^. wh o coano to b o in -the 
 po s ition laid -d own by tho af oresaid 
 artielej — bofoi-c aocompli s hing — the 
 eoiiditiefts — impoaed — on — theea — are 
 boun dj — l at. To - makc -a-4ee lar a ti o n - 
 o f t l^e — ciyettfftstftrn oe B boforo th e 
 Mai re of ^:he~ town s hi p-in th o y ear 
 
 ciluCrCu^ — t^y~ ' traG C©S S ft' V lOH 0± Xr&G±i 
 girt"" '*'*•'* ^-^ i4 n-j-T T iw ft'fii fi xT Q Ttri "^Ck i"0 \tc\ 
 
 a \vay -ar-eepy -ef-4beir-declarat-ion . 
 
 2nd. To serve in the Army the 
 time laid down by this law, and to 
 foi'm a portion of the reserve as laid 
 down for the class to which they 
 belong. 
 
 Failing to make such a declaration 
 and submit it to the inspection of the 
 Prefect of the department within 
 one month, they will be liable to be 
 punished in accordance with Article 
 60 of this Law. 
 
 They join the first class, entering 
 the ranks on the 1st July following 
 the date when their duty, service, or 
 study ceased. 
 
 The time that elapses between 
 such cessation and the date of their 
 declaration is not to count in the 
 service required by this law. 
 
 It is to be understood that the 
 
 Young men belonging to the Army 
 or Navy, either by a Warrant or 
 C'ommissioti, and ivho quit the 
 Service ; young sailors xohose names 
 are borne on the register of the naval 
 conscription in conformity icith the 
 rules laid doicn in Articles 1, 2, 3, 
 4, 5 of the law 25th October, 1795 
 {3rd Bruniaire Year IV), and who 
 erase their names from the lists; 
 young men described in Article 
 19, tvho cease to be in the position 
 therein described before completing 
 the conditions imposed on them are 
 bound — 
 
 1*^. To make a declaration to 
 that effect before the Maire of the 
 Commune icithin two months, and 
 take away a copy of that declaration.
 
 76 
 
 As proposed by the Committee. 
 
 number of years that any French- 
 man passes in the service of the 
 State either in the naval consci'iption, 
 by young men attached to the Army 
 or Navy in virtue of a voluntary 
 engag e ment or commission, is to be 
 always deducted from the number of 
 years they should spend in the 
 ranks. 
 
 Article 22. 
 
 Young men selected by the Muni- 
 cipal Councils of the Commune 
 where they are domiciled may 
 receive provisional dispensations, if 
 they are bond fide supporters of 
 families. 
 
 The names of these young men 
 are presented to the Council of Re- 
 vision by the Maire. 
 
 Dispensations may be granted by 
 departments to the extent of 4 per 
 cent, of the number of yoimg men 
 reported as fit for the service, and 
 included in the first portion of the 
 canton lists. 
 
 Every year the Maire of each 
 Commune will repox't to the Council 
 of Revision the situation of the 
 young men who have obtained dis- 
 l^ensations during previous years as 
 supporters of families. 
 
 Alterations made hy the Assem,hh/. 
 
 Omit ' voluntarij enr/agement^ in- 
 sert ' Warrant.' 
 
 Article 23. 
 
 In time of peace overslaughs may 
 be given to young men who, prior 
 to the drawing of the lots, have 
 asked for them from the Munic ipal 
 CouRcil of the Commun e wli e ro - they 
 ai^e-domieiled^ 
 
 In order that these overslaughs 
 may be granted, the young men 
 must prove that either on account of 
 their being apprentices, or on ac- 
 count of their engagement in agri- 
 culture, industry, or commerce, on 
 their own, or their parents, account, 
 such overslaughs are I'eally indis- 
 pensable. 
 
 Omit ''from the'' to ' domiciled.' 
 
 These overslaughs give no right 
 to exemption or dispensation. They 
 are granted for one year, and may 
 he reneioed for a second year. 
 
 A young man who gets an over- 
 slaugh must keep the number he has 
 drawn and must fulfil all the obli- 
 gufions imposed on him hy that 
 numher.
 
 77 
 
 As proposed It/ the Committee. Alterations made hy the Assemhlij. 
 
 Article 24. 
 
 Tliese demands for overslaughs are 
 sent to the Maire of each Commune; icho expresses his opinion. 
 the Municipal Council gives its 
 opinion ; they are forwarded to the 
 Council of Revision, and sent in 
 duplicate to the Sub- Prefect, who, 
 having added his observations, sends 
 them to the Prefect, with all the 
 requisite documents. Overslaughs 
 to the extent of 4 per cent, of each 
 class may be granted to the whole 
 depar-tment, the percentage to be 
 calculated on the number of young 
 men fit for service in the class and 
 included in the first portion of the 
 cantonal recruiting lists. 
 
 Article 2&7 
 
 '^ be renewed 
 t wice afterwards ; after whi c h the - 
 young man must fulfil the obligation s - 
 p ass at least one year in the regular 
 a rmy. 
 
 Article 2 0. Article 25. 
 
 Young men who receive dispen- 
 sations from serving in the regular 
 army according to Article 17 of this 
 Law, young men dispensed with as 
 being supporters of families, as well 
 as the young men to whom over- 
 slaughs are granted, may, by an 
 order of the Minister, undergo 
 certain drills. 
 
 When causes for dispensations or 
 overslaughs cease, they are then 
 treated as the remainder of the 
 class to which they belong. 
 
 A rticle 37. Article 26. 
 
 Young men whose services with 
 the regular army in accordance with 
 Article 17, young men dispensed 
 with as being supporters of families, 
 as well as those who have obtained 
 overslaughs, may in case of war be 
 called on as other men of their class. 
 
 The military authorities dispose
 
 78 
 
 As proposed bij the Committee. Alterations made by the Assembly. 
 
 of them then according to tlie re- 
 quirements of the different ai'ms. 
 
 They may, however, be — e xc e p - 
 tionally left in the atatc - in which 
 priof dcciaiona placed them. 
 
 Third Section. 
 
 Councils of Revisions and Lists oj 
 Cantonal Recruiting. 
 
 Article 27. 
 
 The operations of recruiting is 
 reviewed ; the appeals to which these 
 operations give rise are heard ; the 
 causes of exemption and dispensation 
 provided for by Articles 16, 17, and 
 20 of this Law, are decided in public 
 by a Revising Council composed 
 of:— 
 
 President. 
 
 The Prefect, or failing the Prefect, 
 the General Secretary or Coun- 
 cillor of the Prefectui-e, delegated 
 for that purpose by the Prefect. 
 
 A Councillor of thePrefectare, named 
 by the Prefect ; and a member of 
 the General Council of the depart- 
 ment other than the representa- 
 tive elected in the canton where the 
 revision takes place : both named 
 by the Permanent Council-General 
 in accordance with Article 82 of 
 the Law of the 10th August, 1871. 
 
 A General or Field Officer named by 
 the military authorities. 
 
 A Member of the Intendance. the 
 Commandant of the Recruiting 
 Depot, a Military Surgeon, or 
 failing him, a Civil Surgeon 
 selected by the military authori- 
 ties, will also assist at the opera- 
 tion of the Council of Revision. 
 
 The Member of the Intendance is 
 heard on behalf of the law when he 
 asks, and can enter his observations 
 on the register of the deliberation?. 
 
 The Council of Revision moves 
 from one canton to another, but if 
 locally convenient the Pi'efect may 
 exceptionally unite in the same 
 place several cantons for the opera- 
 tions of the Council.
 
 79 
 
 As proposed htj the Committee. 
 
 The Sub-Pi-efect or the functionary 
 by -whom he would be replaced is 
 present at the meetings of the 
 Council of Revision heid in his 
 arroudissement. He gives his 
 opinion. 
 
 The Maii'es of the Communes to 
 ■which the young men called before 
 the Council are present at the meet- 
 ings and may be heard. 
 
 Article 28. 
 
 The young: men whose names are 
 borne on the censiis table are sum- 
 moned, examined, and heai-d by the 
 Council of Eevision. They may then 
 state the arm in which they wish to 
 serve. 
 
 If they are absent or unrepresented, 
 or have obtained no delay, their case 
 is dealt with as if they were present. 
 
 In case of exemption for infirmity 
 e xporta nro oonoultoJi 
 
 The cases of claims for dispensa- 
 tions are judged on the production 
 of authoritative documents, or fail- 
 ing such, documents on certificates 
 signed by those fathers of families 
 domiciled in the same canton whose 
 sons have been enrolled. 
 
 These certificates must also be 
 signed and approved by the Maire 
 oi the Commune of the complainant. 
 
 Article 29. 
 
 "When the young men whose 
 names are borne on the census tables 
 have made appeals, the admission or 
 rejection o? which depends on the 
 decision of judicial questions relative 
 to their state and thek civil rights, 
 the Council of Eevision adjourns its 
 decision, or only gives a conditional 
 decision. 
 
 The questions are judged in 
 concert with the Prefect, at the 
 request of those who are most anxious ; 
 the tribunals decide without delay 
 and the Minister is informed of it. 
 
 Article 30. 
 
 Except in the cases referred to by 
 the previous Article the decisions 
 of the Council of Revision are defi- 
 
 Alterations made by the Assemhly. 
 
 Add— 
 
 If on account of absence the 
 Council of Revision consists of only 
 four members, it may deliberate, 
 but the President has no casting 
 vote. A decision must be given by 
 their votes, if they are divided the 
 Council must adjourn. 
 
 the Council only decides after 
 hearing the Surgeon who assists 
 them. 
 
 Brothers may exchange numbers.
 
 80 
 
 Asjiroposed hy the Committee. Alterations made hy tie Assembly. 
 
 nite ; they may however be im- 
 pugned before the Council of State 
 for incompetence or exceeding their 
 ])0wers. 
 
 They may also be impugned by 
 the Minister of War and in the 
 interest of the law ; nevertheless the 
 persons affected will profit by their 
 being annulled. 
 
 Article 31. 
 
 After the Council of Revision has 
 decided on the cases for exemption 
 and dispensations, as well as upon 
 all the consequent appeals, the can- 
 tonal recruiting list is definitely 
 signed and completed by the Council 
 of Revision. 
 
 This list is divided into five parts, 
 viz. : — 
 
 1. In the order of the numbers 
 drawn all the young men de- 
 clared fit for military service 
 and who are not classed in the 
 following categories. 
 
 2. All the young men dispensed 
 with under Article 17 of this 
 Law. 
 
 3. All the young men provisionally 
 dispensed with in virtue of 
 Article 20, as well as the young 
 men connected with the army 
 by a voluntary engagement, a 
 warrant or a commission, and 
 the enrolled young sailors. 
 
 4. Young men who on account of 
 their want of height have re- 
 ceived dispensations for service 
 in the regular army, but who 
 are fit for duty with the aux- 
 iliary branches of the army. 
 
 5. Lastly, young men who have 
 been sent back to be a second 
 time brought before the Council 
 of Revision. 
 
 Article 32. 
 When the recruiting lists of a,ll 
 the cantons of the department have 
 been completed in conformity with 
 the regulations of the preceding 
 Article, the Council of Revision, to 
 which is added two members of the 
 General Council, nominated by the
 
 81 
 
 As proposrd by the Committee. Alterations made hy the Asse?nhly. 
 
 Permanent Committee, will assemble 
 at the chief town of the department 
 and pronounce on the applications 
 for dispensations on the grounds 
 that the men are supporters of 
 families, and upon the demands for 
 overslaushs. 
 
 Fourth Section. 
 Registration Lists. 
 
 Article 33. 
 
 A registry is kept in eacli depart- 
 ment, or in the divisions of each de- 
 partment, in virtue of an order of 
 the public administration. 
 
 This registry is drawn up by 
 means of the lists just referred to 
 (Article 31), and on it will be borne 
 the names of all the young men not 
 unfit for any military service, or 
 who have not been sent back for 
 a new examination by the Council 
 of Revision. 
 
 This register will have entered on 
 it the date of the incorporation of 
 each recruit, or the position in which 
 he is left, and also in succession all 
 the changes which take place in his 
 state until he enters the territorial 
 army. 
 
 Article 34. 
 
 Every man entered on the register 
 who changes his domicile is bound 
 to give notice to the Maire of the 
 Commime that he leaves and the 
 Maire of the place he goes to. 
 
 The Maire of each of these Com- 
 munes transmits within eight days 
 a copy of the said declaration to the 
 registry office of the district in which 
 the commune is situated. 
 
 Article 35. 
 
 Every man entered on the register 
 who wrshes to reside in a foreign 
 country is bound in his declaration 
 to the Maire of the Commune where 
 he lives to make known the place he 
 is going to, and so soon as he arrives 
 to inform the consular agent of 
 France.
 
 82 
 
 As proposed by the Committee. 
 
 The Maire of the Commune within 
 8 clays sends a copy of this declara- 
 tion to the registry office of the 
 district in which the commune is 
 situated. 
 
 The consular agent within 8 days 
 sends a copy of this declai'ation to 
 the Minister of War. 
 
 Alterations made hj tlie Assembly. 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 Military Service. 
 
 Article 36. 
 
 Every Frenchman not declared 
 unfit for all military service will 
 serve in the regular army for 5 
 years, in the reserve of the regular 
 army for 4 years ; in the territorial 
 army for 5 years, in the reserve of 
 the terrihorial army for 6 years. 
 
 1. The regular army is composed, 
 in addition to the men who are 
 not recruited by enrolment, of 
 all the young men declared fit 
 for one of the services of the 
 array and included in the five 
 last classes enrolled. 
 
 2. The reserve of the regular army 
 is composed of all the men 
 declared fit for any of the 
 services -of the army, and em- 
 braced in the four classes 
 eni-olled immediately before 
 those serving in the regular 
 army. 
 
 3. The tei-ritorial army is com- 
 posed of all the men who have 
 completed the period of service 
 prescribed for the regular army 
 and the reserve. 
 
 4. The reserve of the territorial 
 army is compoeed of all the men 
 who have completed the period 
 of service for this army. 
 
 The territorial army and the 
 second reserve are formed by districts 
 fixed by a decree of the pviblic 
 administi-ation 
 
 They embrace for each region the 
 men detailed ia paragraphs 3 and 4 
 who are domiciled in the remon, 
 
 Insert last.
 
 83 
 
 As proposed hij the Committee. 
 
 Article 37. 
 
 The navy and tlie corps of marines 
 are composed in addition to the men 
 furnished by the maritime inscrip- 
 tion : — 
 
 1. Of the men engaged vokmtarily 
 or re-engaged on conditions 
 fixed by an order of the public 
 administration. 
 
 2. Of young men who when the 
 Council of Revision sits, shall 
 apply foi- service in the navy or 
 in one of its corps, and shall 1)6 
 accepted as fit for the duty, 
 
 3. Lastly, and failing the number 
 of men included in the previous 
 categories being sufficient, of 
 the portion of the contingent 
 detailed by the Minister of War 
 for the nav y or i t s corps . 
 
 luis conting'eiit is ttrawn tn each 
 
 by the want ?*- of the s ervice -. 
 
 Exchang e -befo re incorpoi frt i on i s 
 Jiuxnorisod Detween tnc v^nnii^ m^^n 
 
 - army anti-mt^. 
 
 For men who -do-net-hekm g to th e 
 
 rc a oi'vc. 
 
 These men then - - pass into — the 
 
 Article 38. 
 
 Length of service counts from the 
 the 1st July of the year when lots 
 are drawn. 
 
 Each year, on the 30th of June, in 
 peace time, soldiers who have com- 
 pleted their period of service in the 
 reserve of the regular army, those 
 who have completed the period of 
 service pi'eseribcd for the territorial 
 army, lastly those who have com- 
 pleted the period of service for the 
 reserve of this army, receive a cer- 
 tificate which states — 
 
 For the first, tluir transfer info the 
 first reserve. 
 
 Alterations made hij the Assemhhj. 
 
 The contingent furnished hij each 
 canton in the j^roportion fixed by 
 that decision is composed of the 
 young men included in the first por- 
 tion of the Canton Recruiting List 
 and who have drawn the first num- 
 bers 
 
 A decision of the Administration 
 will fx the conditions xindcr ichich 
 exchanges between the young men 
 detailed for the Army and Navy 
 may be made. 
 
 For men who do not belong to the 
 Naval conscription tlie period of 
 service in the Navy is five years, in 
 the Reserve 2 years. 
 
 After irhicJi the men pass into 
 the territorial army. 
 
 G 2
 
 84 
 
 yls proposed b]) the Committee Altera tluna made hy the Asstmbly. 
 
 Yov the second, their transfer into 
 the territorial army. 
 
 For the third, their transfer into 
 the second reserve ; at the expiration 
 of their time of service in ihis re- 
 serve the men receive their final 
 discharge. 
 
 In war time they will receive their The last paragraph is applicable 
 discharge so soon as the men of the at all times to men composing the 
 class who rej)lace them shall arrive, crews of ships in commission. 
 
 Article 39. 
 
 All the young men of the class 
 enrolled who are not exempted on 
 accomit of infirmities, or are not 
 dispensed with under the provisions 
 of this law, or who do not obtain 
 overslaughs, or are not detailed for 
 the na^'y, form a portion of the re- 
 gidar army, and are placed at the 
 cii.^-position of the Minister for War. 
 
 These young soldiers are all en- 
 rolled in the various corps of the 
 army, and sent to the various corps 
 or to battalions and schools of in- 
 struction. 
 
 Article 40. 
 
 After one year of service, young 
 soldiers in the conditions previously 
 sjiecified are no longer kept with the 
 colours, the number retained being 
 that fixed each year by the Minister 
 for War. 
 
 They are taken in the order of the 
 numbers drawn upon the first por- 
 tion of the recruiting list of each 
 canton, and in the proportion fixed 
 by the ministerial decision ; this 
 decision is given as soon as possible 
 after the completion of the recruit- 
 ing operations. 
 
 Article 41. 
 
 Notwithstanding the regulations of 
 the previous article, the soldier, 
 although included in the category 
 of those who are only to remain one' 
 year with the colours, but who does 
 not know how to read or write, and 
 docs not pass the examinations re- 
 quired by the Minister for War, may 
 be kept for a second year with his 
 corps. 
 
 The soldier placed in the same
 
 85 
 
 As proposed by the Committee. Alterations made h>j the Assemhlij. 
 
 category, who, by instruction ac- 
 quired pieviously to his entry into 
 the service, fulfils all the required 
 couditions, may after six months at 
 the periods fixed by the War Minif^ter 
 and before the expii"ation of the year, 
 be sent home on fui lough in accor- 
 dance with the following article. 
 
 Article 42. 
 
 Young men who having served tlie 
 period of service prescribed in Arti- 
 cles 40 and 41 are not kept with the 
 colours, remain at the disposal of the 
 regulai' army, and may be sent on 
 furlough until recalled by the War 
 Minister. 
 
 They may, by order of the Minis- 
 ter, take part in reviews and drills. 
 
 Article 43. 
 
 Men sent into the reserve of the 
 regular army remain registered as 
 prescribed by the law on oi'ganiza- 
 tion. 
 
 The recall of the reserve of the 
 regular army may take place in a 
 distinct and independent manner, 
 both for the army and navy ; it may 
 be made by clas>es, beginning with 
 the yoimgest. 
 
 The men of the reserve of the 
 regular army are liable to take part 
 in two manoeuvres during their re- 
 serve service. 
 
 The length of tlnse manccuvres 
 must not exceed four weeks. 
 
 Article 44. 
 
 Men at the disposal of the regular 
 array and reserve men may mnrry 
 without leave. 
 
 But married men are liable to all 
 the duties exacted from the classes 
 to which they belong. 
 
 But men at the disposition of the 
 regular army who are the fathers of 
 four living children ])ass by right 
 into the territorial army. 
 
 Article 4.5. 
 
 Special laws will determine the 
 basis of the organization of the 
 regular army, the territorial army, 
 and their reserves.
 
 8G 
 
 As proposed hy the Committee. Alterations imcde hy the Aasc'inbly. 
 
 Chapxer IV. 
 
 Oa engagements, Re-enga(jem,ents, 
 and Conditional Emjagcm^cnts for 
 one year. 
 
 First Section. 
 
 Engagements. 
 
 Article 46. 
 
 Every Frenchman may voluntarily 
 engage on the following conditions : 
 The Volunteer must — 
 
 1 . If he engages to serve in the 
 navy be 16 years' old, in which 
 case he need not be of the 
 height prescribed by the law. 
 But if he is 18 yt>ars of age, he 
 must be of the required height. 
 
 2. If he engages in the army, he 
 must be 5 feet 0^ inch in 
 height, and be 18 years of age. 
 
 3. He must know how to read and 
 write. 
 
 4. Must be possessed of civil 
 rights. 
 
 5. Neither married nor a widower 
 with children. 
 
 6. Must have a certificate of good 
 conduct from the Maire of the 
 Commune he last lived in, and 
 if he has not resided a year in 
 that commune he must have a 
 certificate from the Maire of tl>e 
 Commune he previously lived 
 in. 
 
 The certificate must contain a des- 
 cription of the young man who 
 wishes to engage, and a statement of 
 the time he has lived in the com- 
 mune, and must state that he is in 
 the enjoyniCDt of civil rights. That 
 he has never been punished for theft, 
 roguer) , deception, or offences 
 against morals. 
 
 If the volunteer is less than 20 
 years of age he must obtain the 
 approval of his father, mother, or 
 guardian. 
 
 This last may be given by the 
 authority of a family counsel. 
 
 The requisite conditions as regards 
 militarv fitness for the different
 
 87 
 
 As proposed hj the Committee. Alterations made by the Assembly. 
 
 branches of the army, are fixed by 
 a decree inserted in the " Bulletin 
 " des Lois." 
 
 Article 47. 
 
 The length of engagement is for 
 five years. 
 
 This period of service counts in 
 the length of military service fixed 
 by Article 36. 
 
 In case of war all Frenchmen 
 who have finished the period of ser- 
 vice prescribed for the regular army 
 and its reserve, ai'e allowed to engage 
 in the regular army for the duration 
 of the war. 
 
 This engagement does not give 
 dispens'vtions as provided in para- 
 graphs 4 and 5 of the Article 17 of 
 the present law. 
 
 Article 48. 
 
 Men who after fulfilHng the con- 
 ditions of Articles 40 and 41 of this 
 Law, are about to be sent on fiu'lough, 
 may be allowed to remain in the 
 army so as to complete five years' 
 service. 
 
 Men sent on furlough may ako be 
 allowed to complete five years' serA-ice 
 in the ranks. 
 
 Article 49. 
 
 Volunteers allowed to remain in 
 the regular army, as well as those in 
 waiting, who have been allowed to 
 complete five years' service in the 
 regular army, cannot be sent on fur- 
 lough without their consent. 
 
 Article 50, 
 
 Voluntary engagements are con- 
 tracted as prescribed by Articles 34 
 to 44 of tlie Civil Coae, before the 
 Maires of the chief places in ihe 
 cantons. 
 
 The conditions as to length of 
 engagement are entered on these 
 forms. 
 
 The other conditions are read to 
 the persons forming these engage- 
 ments, before signature, and the fact
 
 88 
 
 As proposed hy the Committee. Alterailuns made by the Assemhly. 
 
 of this having been done is entered 
 on the face of the document, other- 
 wise it is void. 
 
 Second Section. 
 Re-engagements. 
 
 Article 51. 
 
 Men may be allowed to re-engage Two years at least and not ex- 
 ■s ccodiug tw e^ ceeding five years. 
 
 Re-eugagements can only take 
 place during the last year of service 
 with the colours. 
 
 They are renewable until 29 years 
 of age for corporals and privates, and 
 until S2- years of age for sergeants. 35. 
 
 The other conditions are fixed by 
 a regulation inserted on the " Bulle- 
 tin of Lois." 
 
 Re-engagemeut after 5 years' 
 service with the colours gives a right 
 to high pay. 
 
 Article 52. 
 
 Engagements referred to in 
 Article 48 of this law may be 
 formed before the Intendants and 
 Sous Intendants, on the form directed 
 in Article 51. Upon presenting 
 which the engaged or re-engaged 
 man may enter or remain in the 
 corps for which he engages or re- 
 engages. 
 
 Third Section. 
 
 Conditional Engagements for one 
 Year. 
 
 Article 53. 
 
 Young men who have obtained 
 the degree of Bachelors of Letters or 
 
 U nivPl'sitV St ll d ir iP OTl d h tn^r* fn l rm 
 
 honours . - 
 
 Those who belong to the central 
 school of industry and commerce, to 
 tlie schools of arts and trades, to the 
 schools of the fine arts, the musical 
 institution, or mav have been
 
 89 
 
 As proposed by the Committee. 
 
 declared admissible to these schools ; 
 pupils of the veterinary schools, the 
 schools of agriculture, are allowed 
 before the lots are drawn when they 
 bring certificates issued by authori- 
 ties named in the "Bulletin of Lois," 
 and af ter— att—exa^iHtvatJoi^ fi xed by 
 the War Mi ni s t e r to form engage- 
 ments for one year as provided for in 
 the said regulation. 
 
 Alterations made by the Assembly. 
 
 Out pupils of the School of Mines, 
 the School of Fonts et Chaussees, 
 the School of Naval Engineers, 
 pupils of the School of Mines at 
 Saint Etienne are allowed 
 
 for one year in the Army. 
 
 Article 54. 
 
 the previ ous a rticl e^-^-numb er t o be 
 fix e d ea ^h year by the. Minister ft>r 
 AY ^ ar who pas s t he exa m inationfi 
 ■r equired - m ay ' b e-ad mitted to form 
 snch e n c acren ie n t?^. 
 
 In addition to the young men re- 
 ferred to ifi the previous Article 
 those who pass the examinations re- 
 quired in the various programmes 
 prepared by the Minister for War 
 and approved by decrees of the 
 Public Administration, may con- 
 froct similar engagements 
 
 These decrees must be inserted in 
 the " Btdletin des Lois.'" 
 
 The number of conditional en- 
 gagements for a year is fixed each 
 year by the Minister for each De- 
 partment in proportion to the con- 
 tingent. 
 
 Article of). 
 
 The Volunteer for a year is 
 clothed, mounted, and fed at Ji is own 
 cost. But the War Minister may 
 exempt in part, or altogether from 
 tins charge, young men wJio, in their 
 e.ramination, give proofs of capacity, 
 and who sJiow according to pre- 
 scribed rules that tJiey have not ths 
 means of meeting this cost. 
 
 Article 56. 
 
 own cost. 
 
 He is liable to all duties imposed 
 on men in the ranks. 
 
 He must pass the examinations 
 fixed by the War IMinister. 
 
 If after a year of service he does 
 not pass the examinations he is 
 obliged to remain for a second year 
 Jis determined hv thi? law. 
 
 'J'hc volunteer for a year is en- 
 rolled. 
 
 If after a second year he cannot 
 pass the required examiuation he is 
 deprived of the advantages reserved 
 for a, volunteer for one year, and is 
 submitted to the same obligation as 
 (he nirn hrloiirjing to the same class.
 
 90 
 
 As prvposi^d by the Cuininitlte. Alterations inade by the Asaembly. 
 
 In any case if ^var breaks out he 
 is kept in the service. 
 
 The time the volunteer for a year 
 serves counts in the length of service 
 required by Article 3G of this law. 
 
 In case of mobilization the vo- 
 
 irticle bl Itinteer for one year is dealt ivith 
 
 precisely as the class to which he 
 
 During the year which precedes the belongs. 
 enrohuent of their class, the J oungmen 
 enumerated in Article 53 who bave 
 not completed their studies in the 
 faculties or schools to which they 
 belong, but who wish to complete 
 them in a definite period of time, 
 may, while contracting an engage- 
 ment for one year, obtain by military 
 authority an overslaugh to prevent 
 their joining the corps to which 
 they belong. This overslaugh must 
 not extend beyond 23 years of age. 
 
 -zirtich-ff^. 
 
 -jH-44m<?-<»?— w^ay-- all cugagomcnt g 
 fe«--a-^ar-are-&Hspe«4ed . 
 
 Article 58. 
 
 After the volunteers for a year 
 have passed the examination required 
 by law, they may obtain warrants as 
 non-commissioned officeis or commis- 
 sions equivalent at least thereto. 
 
 Special laws referred to in Aiticie 
 46 will determine the employment of 
 the young men either in waiting, in 
 the reserve of the regular army, or 
 in the territorial army in the various 
 services to which their studies have 
 specially destined tliem. 
 
 Chapter V. 
 
 Icnal Uegulations. 
 
 Article 50. 
 
 Every n\an borne on the register 
 who does not make the declarations 
 relative to change of domicile, pre- 
 scribed by Articles 34 and 35 of this 
 law, is retorrtd to the ordir.ary tri- 
 bunals, and may be fined from 8s. Ad. 
 to 8/. 6s. 8(/. ; he m;iy be also im- 
 prisoned from fifteen days to three 
 months. In time of war these penal- 
 tics are doubled.
 
 91 
 
 As proposed hy the Committee. Alterations made hi/ the Asscmhhj. 
 
 Article 60. 
 
 Any fraud or trick, causing the 
 name of any individual to be omitted 
 from the census tables, or the lists 
 for the ballot, are to be referred to 
 the ordinary tribunals and punished 
 by imprisonment for from one month 
 to one year. 
 
 The following are referred to the 
 same tribunals and liable to the same 
 punishment : — 
 
 1. Young men who being enrolled 
 shall on account of fraudulent 
 collusion fail to appear before 
 the Councils for Revision. 
 
 2. Young men who by means of 
 fraud or trick cause themselves 
 to be exempted by the Councils 
 of Revision, the accomplices in 
 such crimes are liable to similar 
 punishments. 
 
 If young men whose names have 
 been left out have been condemned as 
 authors or accomplices in frauds or 
 tricks the regulations of Article 14 
 will refer to them at the first drawing 
 of lots which takes place on the 
 termination of their punishment. 
 
 Any young man improperly ex- 
 empted will be placed on the )ist 
 with the first number. 
 
 Article 61. 
 
 Every inau brirne on the register 
 to whom an order to march has 
 been duly notified, and who does 
 not anive at his destination within 
 one month of the day fixed by that 
 order, is, after the expiration of a 
 second month, punished as insub- 
 ordinate with imprisonment of from 
 one to twelve months in time of 
 peace, and two to five years in time 
 0^ yar y^^ //,, /^,^^^,,. ^.^^^^ 
 
 At the termination or this punish- 
 ment he is to be sent to a discipline 
 company. 
 
 In time of war the names of in- 
 subordinate men are posted in all 
 the communes of the canton where 
 they live, and remain so posted 
 during the war.
 
 92 
 
 As proposed by the Committee. Alterations made hrj the Assemhly. 
 
 These regulations are also appli- 
 cable to all volunteers who, with- 
 out legitimate cause, do not reach 
 their destination at the period fixed 
 by their routes. 
 
 In case of absence from their 
 domicile, the order to march is sent 
 to the Maire of the Commune where 
 the recruit has drawn lots. 
 
 So far as recruits are concerned 
 the delay of one month is increased 
 to two months if the recruit is 
 domiciled in Algiers, in the islands 
 or counties near France, or in 
 Europe. It is extended to six 
 months in all other parts of the 
 world. 
 
 Insubordinate men are tried by 
 Court Martial in the military divi- 
 sion where they are arrested. 
 
 The time during which the volun- 
 teer or the man borne on the re- 
 gister shall have been absent, is not 
 to be included in his period of 
 service. 
 
 Artivle 62. 
 
 Whosoever is guilty uf having 
 concealed, or taken into his employ, 
 a man guilty of insubordination is 
 punishable with imprisomiient not 
 exceeding six months ; according to 
 circumstance this punishment may 
 be commuted into a fine of IGs. 8c/. 
 to 8/. Gs. 
 
 Whosoever helps the escape of 
 an insubordinate man is liable to an 
 imprisonment of one month to one 
 year. 
 
 Those who by culpable tricks 
 prevent the departure of young 
 soldiers are liable to the same 
 punishment. 
 
 If this ci-ime has been accom- 
 ])anied by riotous conduct the 
 jiunishment will be doubled. 
 
 If the accused is a public func- 
 tionai-y employed by the Govern- 
 ment or the Minister of any creed 
 paid by the State, he may on con- 
 viction be imprisoned for two years, 
 and in addition be fined a sum not 
 exceeding 80/.
 
 93 
 
 As I'roposed hj the Commitfee. Alterations made hj the Assembly. 
 
 Article 63. 
 
 Any man convicted of tampering 
 with his health so as to make him 
 unfit, cither temporarily or per- 
 manently, for military service with 
 the view of evading the provisions 
 of this law is sent before the Civil 
 Court by the Council of Revision, 
 and may be punished with Imprison- 
 ment for from one month to one year. 
 
 Those guilty of the same crime 
 during the period of closing the 
 lists of the canton and joining their 
 cor| )S are liable to the same punish- 
 ment. 
 
 On the completion of their punish- 
 ment, both are placed at the dis- 
 posal of the Minister for War, and 
 may be sent to a discipline company. 
 
 Accomplices are also liable to the 
 same punishment -in — addition — t© 
 fin e s o f 8^. t O' 80/., and-iij-addition 
 to-h eavier puni s hment s w hie-h-- may 
 -l4e4 nflictod by tho ^eim l code. 
 
 If the accomplices are Doctors, 
 Surgeons, Health Officers, or Apo- 
 thecaries, the punishment will be 
 from two months to two years. 
 
 Article 64. 
 
 The periods spent in prison do 
 not count as a portion of the ser- 
 vice. 
 
 In addition to fines of Si. to 80/., 
 and in addition to heavier punish- 
 ments aicarded bi/ the civil code. 
 
 A I tide 65. 
 
 Any military or civil functionary 
 who, under any pretext whatsoever, 
 shall authorise or allow exemptions, 
 dispensations, or exclusions other 
 than those provided for b}^ this law, 
 or who arbitrarily shall extend the 
 length or relax the rules or condi- 
 tions of enrolments, engagements, 
 or re-engageuients, shall be guilty 
 of an abuse of authority and liable 
 to be punished as directed in Arti- 
 cle 185 of the Criminal Code, in 
 addition to any more severe punish- 
 ment directed by the code in other 
 cases.
 
 94 
 
 As proposed by the Committee. 
 Article 66. 
 
 Doctors, Surgeons, Health Offi- 
 cers, who are called on by Councils 
 of Revision to give their opinion 
 conformably with Articles 16, 18, 
 20, and shall receive bribes or give 
 promises to be favourable to young 
 men who they may examine are 
 liable to imprisonment for two 
 months to two years. 
 
 They are liable to this punishment 
 whether the bribes and promises 
 may have been given before they 
 have been asked to assist the coun- 
 cil or whether they have been given 
 after they have been so asked. 
 
 They are equally' forbidden to 
 receive anything, even for an ex- 
 emption or discharge legally pro- 
 nounced. 
 
 Alterations made by the Asicmbli/. 
 
 Article 67. 
 
 Punishments provided in Articles 
 60-62. 63, for certain acts^ are ap- 
 plicable to those ii'ho attempt to com- 
 mit them. 
 
 hi the cases referred to in Article 
 06, those who offer bribes or promises 
 of bribes are punishable in the same 
 way as those ivho receive them. 
 
 Article 'o'^. 
 
 In every case not provided for in 
 the foregoing articles, the civil and 
 military tribunals, within the limit 
 of their jurisdiction, shall a|)ply the 
 criminal law to such crimes as may 
 be committed in carrying out this 
 law. 
 
 In all cases when imprisonment 
 is awarded under this law, the 
 judges may, according to circum- 
 stances, deal with the case as pres- 
 cribed in Article 463 of tlie (.'riminal 
 Code. 
 
 Special Arrangements. 
 
 Article 69. 
 
 Young men enrolled in the army 
 under this law shall, in addition to 
 the instruction requisite for their 
 military duty, receive such other 
 instruction as shall be prescribed bv 
 the Minister of War.
 
 95 
 
 As proposed hi/ the Cummittee. Alterations made hy the Assembl/. 
 
 Article 70. 
 
 The Minister of (1'ar a7id of the 
 Navy shall i?isure. hy recjiilation, to 
 tnen of all arms of the service the 
 freedom requisite to attend Divine 
 Service on Simday, and any religious 
 festivals held sacred hy the creed 
 they hold, these reyidations to be in- 
 serted in the "^Bulletin dis Lois.' 
 
 Article 71 . 
 
 Every man who lias passed 12 
 years under the colours, four at 
 least with the rank of Serjeant, 
 shall receive a certificate from the 
 commanding officer of his corps, 
 which confers on him the right to 
 receive (in proportion to the vacan- 
 cies that occur) some civil or mili- 
 tary employment suitable for his 
 qualifications and education. 
 
 A special law will enumerate the 
 employments in each department of 
 of the State which shall be alto- 
 gether or in part reserved for can- 
 didates with the aforesaid certifi- 
 cates. 
 
 Article 72. 
 
 No one can be admitted before 
 30 years of age to a civil or military 
 employment who has not fulfilled 
 the conditions imposed by this law. 
 
 Temporary Arrangements. 
 
 Article 74. 
 
 The provisions of this law shall 
 be applicable to the regular army, 
 beginning on the 1st January, 
 1873. 
 
 Nevertheless, the whole class 
 enrolled in 1871 shall be put at the 
 disposal of the Minister for War, 
 and young men not belonging to the 
 contingent selected l»v the Minister 
 
 Article 73. 
 
 The War Minister shall, before 
 the Z\st March of each xjear, furnish 
 a statement to the National As- 
 sembly, of the working of the law 
 during the previous year.
 
 90 
 
 As proposed hj the Committee. 
 
 shall be placed iu the reserve of the 
 army in place of the National 
 Guard Mobile, as provided for by 
 the law of the 1st February, 18G8. 
 
 Young men now i-ftelttded-4n-th€ 
 National Guard Mobile will alao be 
 4fteki4e4-in-4li«H:=e8erve- ef-4h c arm y-. 
 
 formed in oonform ity-with -tiie SOth 
 
 Artiol o of the -Law-ef^the ^Ist 
 
 1- 8 3 2, modified b y the law of 
 
 i^efa'ua ry, 1868 . 
 
 Both will r effiaifl-4rH 4hc ic a crve 
 
 They then will bo transferr e d to 
 the territo j -Jal arm y^4n— eeaferBHty 
 with Article §7 of thi 8-4ja,w^. 
 
 ■ M e n b el onging ^;-o — tfee — cl a s ses 
 
 ^tlarrehr-^-B3^% who- ha ve not been 
 includ e d in th e conting ^nts^-t rnished 
 by th e ii ^-elasseg^ -frnd would have 
 ■ jj o on inc l ud e d in 4lie Na tional Gua rd 
 4fobile— undei^ -the-law - of the 1st 
 F o bruary, 1-8^ -are-toHbe borne on 
 4be4i&ts-of ihe-yeserve-af the regu- 
 4aF -arniy tH> til 29 y ears of a ge , and 
 -thenH-^tall^-i^^-conl ormity w ith Arti^ 
 -ele ^^ of -%ln& law, be tra nsf e rred t o 
 
 Alterations macJc hy the Asscmhli/ . 
 
 And will remain there a period 
 equal to the service performed in the 
 regular army and its reserve hy the 
 men of the same class included in 
 the contijujent, after which both tvill 
 he transferred to the territorial army 
 in accordance with the arrangements 
 of Article 36 of this law. 
 
 Length of service for the class of 
 1871 will cvunt from 1st July, 1872, 
 in accordance with the regidalions 
 of the law of \st February, 1868. 
 
 Young men ivho have come in'o 
 the Army beforehand ivill, in ac- 
 cordance icith t/ie decree 5th Janu- 
 ary, 1871, count their service from 
 1st January, 1871. 
 
 Article 75. 
 
 Young men belonging to the 
 classes ^of 1867, 1868, 1869, and 
 1870, enrolled in virtue of the law 
 of the \st February, 1868, and who 
 have beeii included in the contingent 
 of the Army, will, on the termina- 
 tion of their service in the reserve, be 
 placed in the territorial army in 
 conformity with Article 36 of this 
 law. Young men of the same 
 classes who have' nut been included 
 in the contingent and ivho are noir 
 serving in the National Guard 
 " Mobile " shall, on the \st January, 
 1 873, be placed in the Reserve, where 
 they will remain until the discharge 
 from the service of the young men 
 of the same class, icho have been in- 
 cluded in the contingent of the 
 Army. They will then, in con- 
 formity with Article 36 of the law, 
 be placed in the territorial army.
 
 97 
 
 As j^roposed hij tJie Committee. Alterations made hi/ the Assemhli/. 
 
 Article 76. 
 
 Men of previous classes enrolled 
 under the law of the ?)\st March, 
 1832, loheiher theij have or have 
 not served in the Armrj, icill serve 
 in the territorial army and its 
 reserve, in accordance ivith the dis- 
 jjosition of Article 36 of this lair, 
 until they shall have reached tlte aye 
 prescribed for discharge from the 
 territorial army and its reserve. 
 
 The position of the men will be in 
 conformity ivith Article 15 of the 
 law of the \st February, 18G8, they 
 may be enrolled by classes, beyinning 
 with the youngest. 
 
 A Council of Revision in eacJt, 
 district, formed in accordance with 
 Article 16, law 1st February, 1868, 
 will pronounce on claims for exemp- 
 tion on account of infirmity or 
 tvant of height. 
 
 Article 77. 
 
 Young' men who, in place of be- 
 longing to the National Guard 
 Mobile, form a portion of the reserve 
 in conformity with the preceding 
 articles shall be drilled and reviewed 
 as determined by the Minister of 
 War. 
 
 Article 78. 
 
 The obligation to know how to 
 read and write requisite to form 
 a voluntary engagement, or to be 
 sent on furlough after one year's 
 service, shall not be imposed until 
 after the 1st January, 1875. 
 
 Article 79. 
 
 All the provisions of the laws 
 and prior decrees relative to recruit- 
 ing the army are and will remain 
 cancelled.
 
 98 
 
 The subject of volunteers for one year being of great importance, 
 and also one that produced much discussion in the Assembly, the 
 Decrees putting Article 54 in force, and which have been published 
 in the " Moniteur de I'Armee" for the 6th November, 1872, are 
 herewith appended : — 
 
 CONDITIONS FOR CANDIDATES AS VOLUNTEERS FOR 
 ONE YEAR. 
 
 The President of the French Republic, 
 
 Referring to the law of the 27th July, 1872, upon the recruiting of 
 the Army : 
 
 Referring to Article 54 of that law, relative to the examinations which 
 3H:)ung men who seek to become volunteers for one year, and who are 
 not included amongst those named in Article 53 : 
 
 Upon the recommendation of the Minister for War, with the advice 
 of the Council of State, 
 
 Decrees ; 
 
 Art. 1. Young men who desire to form a conditional engagement for 
 one year, iinder Clause 54 of the law of the 29th July, 1872, 
 must undergo two successive trials before examiners selected 
 by the Minister for War, and chosen amongst farmers, arti- 
 zans, and men of business, or citizens who have belonged to 
 these professions. 
 
 Art. 2. The first trial consists in waiting French from dictation. 
 
 Ai"t. 3. Tlie second tiial is a viva voce public examination. Candidates 
 are classed in three sections — agriculturist, artizaus, or busi- 
 ness men ; each of these classes goes before a different 
 examiner. 
 
 This examination is divided into two portions — 
 The first has reference to the subjects on which the candi- 
 dates should have been instructed in elementary schools. 
 
 The second portion deals with the candidate's theoretical 
 and practical knowledge of the profession he belongs to. 
 
 Art. 4. On the completion of these oral examinations, the examiners in 
 the three sections meet under the presidency of the General 
 Commanding the Department or a Field Officer named by him, 
 to whom is joined a member of the Council-General named by 
 the Council or by the Permanent Commission. A committee 
 is thus formed which draws up the general list of the suc- 
 cessful candidates. 
 
 Art. 5. The Minister of War is charged with carrying out this Decree, 
 which will be published in the " Journal Otficiel," and inserted 
 in the '' Bulletin des Lois." 
 
 Given at Versailles, 31st October, 1872. 
 
 A. Thiers. 
 By the President of the Republic. 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 E. DE CiSSEY.
 
 99 
 
 Programme of the professional examinations to which young men who 
 seek to form an eugagemeut for one year, under Clause 54, 27th 
 July, 1872. Each candidate will be examined according to his pro- 
 fession and special acquirements, in accordance with the following 
 syllabus : — 
 
 Agriculture. 
 
 The various kinds of soils, viewed in an agricultural point of view ; 
 manures, and method of reclaiming land ; climate and seasons, their 
 effect on cultivation ; irrigation ; agricultural implements and tools ; 
 systems of cultivation ; preservation of harvests ; cattle and domestic 
 animals ; agricultural accounts; markets for the chief agricultural pro- 
 duce of the district. 
 
 Commerce. 
 
 The iioods forming the special trade of the candidate ; how tfiey are 
 produced ; the employment and the outlay requisite to produce them ; 
 book-keeping ; names of commercial books ; principal operations of trade 
 and banking ; usual forms for a note of hand, a letter of exchange, an 
 order or cheque ; meauhig of terms used in trade and banking. 
 
 Mechanics. 
 
 Nature and properties of the chief materials or metals ; how pro- 
 cured or smelted, and their uses; implements, engines, machines, or 
 tools that the candidate habitually uses; description of the method 
 adopted by the candidate in carrying out his own special trade ; 
 description of his trade. 
 
 [H * S.— r 10.V2— f)CO-II I 72]
 
 REFORMS IN THE FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 GENERAL ORGANIZATION. 
 
 TRANSLATED IN THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT, HOESE GUARDS, 
 WAR OFFICE, 
 
 By major C. B. BRACKENBURY, R.A., 
 
 D.A.A. GENERAL. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 Printed under the Superintendence of Her 3IaJesti/'s Stationer!/ Office, 
 
 AWD SOLD BY 
 
 W. CLOWES & SONS, 13, Charing Cross; HARRISON & SONS, 59, Pall Mall i 
 
 W. H. ALLEN & Co., 13, Waterloo Place ; W. MITCHELL, 39, Charing Cross ; 
 
 LONGMAN & Co., Paternoster Row ; TEUBNER & Co., 57 & 59, Lndgatc Hill ; 
 
 STANFORD, Charing Cross; and H. S. KING & CO., 65, Conihill ; 
 
 Also hy 
 
 GRIFFIN & Co., The Hard, Poetsea ; 
 
 A. & C. BLACK, Edinburgh ; D. ROBERTSON, 90, St. Yincent Street, Glasgow ; 
 
 ALEX. THOM, Abbey Street, and E. PONSONBY, Grafton Street, DuBLrs, 
 
 Price Two Sliilliiigs.
 
 [Wt. p. 681a. 500—6 | 74— H. & S.— 4170.]
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The following pages should be read in connection with. Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Home's translation of " The French Law of 
 Recruiting," of which they are a continuation. 
 
 But there are many persons who may be glad to know 
 something of the changes in the French Army, without having 
 time or inclination to study the subject in detail. To such, the 
 present translator addresses this short introduction, not being 
 without hopes, however, that the casual reader may be induced 
 to dive deeper, and search among the arguments in favour of 
 the great changes now being accomplished in the French 
 military service, for those general truths which, among much 
 that is only French or ephemeral, stand fast as great principles 
 for the guidance of all ci\dlized nations. 
 
 The italics in the translation are those of the original, and 
 seem to mark points which the author of the Report wished to 
 force on the attention of his hearers. 
 
 Among them are to be found these : — 
 
 " NeitliP}' armies nor Generals can be improvised by a decree 
 " and, if education is rapid on tlie field of battle, its cost is far too 
 "' dear.'' Page 4. 
 
 " Time is no longer on the side of the defence.^' " Perma- 
 " nent preparation then, and rapidity of mobilization stand forth as 
 '• the two indispensable conditions of every army organization.^ 
 Page 5. 
 
 " We icere beaten by want of preparation, organization, and 
 •' direction, and by the iceakness of our effective, rather than by the 
 " arms of our enemies" Page 9. 
 
 " Generals are responsible for military operations and for orders 
 " to supjjly and distribute ; Commissaries are responsible for the 
 " means of supply and for payment and distribution.'' 
 
 " The military organization and constitution of the corps, and 
 " various administrative services, shoidd be the same in time of peace 
 " as in time of war." Page 64. 
 
 And, with reference to mobihzation : — 
 
 " The Minister transmits the order for mobilization to the 
 " Generals commandmg army corps, and concerns himself no 
 ''^further as he used to do, ivith the details of its execution. All 
 " ought to be prepared beforehand by the Commander of an army 
 " corps, loho is responsible for the rapid execution of the order.'' 
 Page 69. 
 
 France has adopted, as the foundation of her military 
 system, the principle that it is the duty of every Frenchman to 
 serve his country under arms. 
 
 A 2
 
 IV 
 
 The Law of Recruiting pro^"ides an " annual contingent," 
 — that is, a body of young men ehgible in all respects for 
 military service, — numloering about 158,000. Of these about 
 8,000 are required for the navy. The annual force, therefore, 
 at the disposal of the mihtary authorities for the army, amounts 
 to about 150,000 men, twenty years old. 
 
 Part of this contingent will consist of " volunteers for one 
 year," who are young men of education, prepared to defray a 
 considerable portion of their own expenses. They have only to 
 serve in the ranks for a period of from six months to a year, 
 provided they pass an examination at the end of then- term, 
 when tliey receive, as a ride, certificates of qualification as non- 
 commissioned officers. Like all others they are liable to be 
 called upon at the outbreak of war. 
 
 The young men forming the rest of the contingent, are 
 enrolled m coi-ps, without reference to the part of the country 
 they have come fi'om, and are all kept with the colours at least 
 one year. After one year, some of them are sent home, but 
 remain always at the disposal of the Minister of War, who 
 keeps many or few in the ranks, according to the varying con- 
 ditions of education of the men ; and according to his own 
 needs, on the one hand, to provide for the service of the 
 country, on the other, to keep within the provisions of the 
 budget. 
 
 But, in any case, the 150,000 men of each coiitingent 
 remain five years m the active army, liable to seiwe m the 
 ranks at any time and to be called out for peace manoeuvi'es. 
 
 Out of the various accumulating annual contingents together 
 with a permanent force, explained in Table 6, Appendix A, is to 
 be built up an active army of 780,000 trained men organized in 
 corps and ready to take the field at once on the outbreak of 
 war, having belimd them "troops of re-inforcement " amount- 
 ing to 279,000 men Avho have all served at least one year in 
 the army. These '• troops of re-inforcement " will be distributed 
 in the corps depots together with the 150,000 men of the last 
 class called up and not yet fully instructed. 
 
 Thus the fightmg army of . . . . 780,000 men 
 
 will have behind it . . . . . . 429,000 men 
 
 moi'e or less instructed, learning more day-by-day, and always 
 ready to fill up vacancies in the fighting corps or even, if neces- 
 sary, to furnish a new army. 
 
 The forces already spoken of come from the active army 
 and its reserve which consists of men who have passed five 
 years in the active army, but have not completed then- ninth 
 year of total service. 
 
 After nine years' service m the active army and its reserve, 
 the soldier falls into the " territorial army," and, after five years 
 in it, comes to the "reserve of the territorial army," where 
 he remains till he has completed his twentieth year of service. 
 A table showing the estimated strength of the active and terri-
 
 torial armies witli their reserves is given on page 108. The 
 grand total, at the end of twenty years' working of the law, 
 should amount to 2,423,164 men. 
 
 Twenty years may appear a long time, but it will be ob- 
 served that, nine years after passing the law, France ought to 
 see a field force ^\4th reserves amounting altogether to about 
 1,200,000, and the Government could hardly fail to find old 
 soldiers able to garrison the principal fortresses in case of the 
 occm-rence of war withm the next eight or nine years. 
 
 So far we have spoken of numbers, let us now briefly 
 examine the organization. 
 
 France is di\dded into 18 regions, each ganisoned by an army 
 corps. There is besides a special corps for Algeria. 
 
 Each corps will have two infantry divisions, one brigade of 
 cavalry, one brigade of artillery, one battahon of engineers, and 
 one squadron of field train besides staff" and auxihary ser"\aces. 
 The proportion of guns is to be 3*6 per 1,000 combatants. The 
 extra-divisional artillery is to be called " corps artillery " instead 
 of " reserve artillery " as before, lest, as happened in the late war, 
 the name should lead to its use " as a mere support " instead oi 
 " at the commencement of the battle." 
 
 The various army corps A\dll be recruited indifferently from 
 the whole contingent ; and, during peace, may be moved from 
 region to region; but the reserves will be organized in then own 
 regions. At the outbreak of war the men of the reserve are to 
 be mobilized near then homes, clothed and armed at depots 
 already known to them, within a day's w^alk, and sent to swell 
 the ranks of that corps which happens to be stationed in the 
 region at the time. 
 
 The teiTitorial army will, at all times, belong to its o^\ll 
 region. Its duties in war will be to garrison fortresses, defend 
 strategic points, and work the etappen arrangements (lines of 
 communication). 
 
 Thus the new French system is a combination of the German 
 district system, and that called by General Chareton the 
 " national system." 
 
 There are to be no combinations of army corps to form 
 armies under one Commander during peace. 
 
 Among the decrees of the President to carry out the prin- 
 ciples of the Bill, is one for the re-organization of the staff'. It 
 is short, but indicates clearly enough the intention of the 
 military authorities to carry out in its integrity the principle 
 that the head-quarter staff should, during peace, be constantly 
 occupied in preparation for war, while the Generals command- 
 ing army corps are directly responsible, in peace as in war, for 
 both command and administration of their respective corps. 
 
 Few subjects have created more controversy than the rela- 
 tion of the command to the administration. The French have 
 settled it on the principles thus laid down by General Chareton 
 in the name of the Committee (page 65). 
 
 " 1st. Absolute independence of the control.
 
 VI 
 
 '* 2nd. The separation of the administrative services of the 
 
 " management, direction, and control. 
 " 3rd, The subordination of the administration to the com- 
 
 " mand in time of peace as in time of war. 
 " 4th. The individual working of the medical corps under 
 
 " the direct authority of the command." 
 
 To sum up, it may be said that the experience of one of the 
 most terrible disasters that ever befel a high-spirited nation has 
 caused the army of France to be remodelled on these principles : 
 
 1st. General obligation of military service. 
 
 2nd. A peace organization, approacliing as nearly as possible 
 the organization for war. The corps are always ready, 
 *r^~^ with their staffs and administrative services, and only 
 
 require the addition of their reserves — always close at 
 hand — in order to take the field. Their stores are also 
 on the spot. 
 
 3rd. Decentralization. Each General mobilizes his own 
 corps, is responsible for his own first supplies, and can 
 have no one but himself to blame if he is slow or wants 
 anything. 
 
 4th. On the other hand, the Government has a corps of 
 inspectors who will, dming peace, detect the incompe- 
 tence of a Commander. This corps of inspectors is 
 spoken of, in page Go, as the " General Control," as 
 distinguished from the "Interior Control." 
 
 5th. The control is carefully separated from the administra- 
 tion, and the Generals are expected to be good admini- 
 strators as well as good leaders of troops. 
 
 6th. Recruiting, remounts, hospitals, &c.^r ^ye managed by 
 the territoiial stafi" in each region, but «». xvays under the 
 General commanding the corps there present. When 
 a coi-ps is mobilized and quits its region, the command 
 of the region and its territorial troops is handed over to 
 an ofiicer previously appointed by the Minister. 
 
 In order to distinguish the French system fit'om the German, 
 now and in the future, the French word "regional" has been 
 literally translated wherever it applies to the former, although 
 it is used by the French in speaking of the German system. 
 When the same word refers to the German system it has been 
 translated " district." 
 
 The reader is requested to bear in mind the distinction 
 between an " army corps " and a " coi-ps." The latter may 
 mean any organized body of men, such as a regiment or 
 battahon of infantry, or a brigade of artillery. The word corps 
 is frequently used in this sense, for instance, in Article 11 of the 
 BiU. 
 
 The most important measures taken to carry out the provi- 
 sions of the Bill have been added at the end of this translation. 
 
 C. B. B.
 
 REPORT 
 
 OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMY RE-ORGANIZATION 
 UPON THE BILL FOR THE GENERAL ORGANIZA- 
 TION OF THE FRENCH ARMY. 
 
 By General Chareton, Member of the National Assembly. 
 
 Anneo'ed to the proces-verbal of the Sitting, 9th June. 
 
 Translated in tlie Intelligence Department, by Major C. B. 
 Brackenbury, R.A., D.A.A.G. 
 
 The Committee was thus composed : — 
 
 President.— M. de Lasteyrie. 
 
 Vice-Presidents. — General Baron de Chaband-la-Tonr. Ad- 
 mnal de Montaignac. 
 
 Secretaries. — M. M. Bethmont, Chaper, Emile Carron, the 
 Marquis de Momay. 
 
 Members. — Messieurs de la Rochethulon, d'Aboville, de 
 Combarieu, General Billot, Admiral de Dompierre d'Hornoy, 
 Cornehs de AYitt, General Loysel, General Yictor Pelhssier, 
 General Chareton, General Ducrot, the Marquis de Yorgue, 
 Admu-al de la Ronciere le Noury, Dahirel, de Carayon-Latom-, 
 the Duke de Crussol-d'Uzes, General Martin des Pallieres, 
 Colonel de Cha ", " ",, Admiral Saisset, General Frebault, Fresneau. 
 Aclocque, Marquis d'Andelarre, Passy, Baron Yast-Yimeux, 
 Andren de Kerdrel, Yarroy, General Chanzy, Sarrette, Baron 
 de Barante, Brun (Yar), the Duke d'Harcourt, the Count 
 Octave de Bastard, Bouisson and de Merode. 
 
 ACTIYE ARMY. 
 
 FIRST SECTION— ORGANIZATION. 
 
 § 1. Necessity of fixing by Law the base of our Military 
 
 Organization. 
 Gentlemen, 
 
 The organization of the military forces of a nation is one 
 of the attributes of the sovereign power. 
 
 Placed under the control of a system of Orders in Council 
 in monarchies where the executive power and the sovereignty 
 are blended in the same hands, it must be _ regulated by laAv m 
 countries where the sovereign power is distinct from the 
 
 executive. 
 
 B
 
 You, yourselves, decided this when you voted Article 45 of 
 the law of the 27th July, 1872.* 
 
 The Government holds the same opinion ; and the President 
 of the Repubhc, in introducing the Bill on organization, which 
 was laid upon the table, gave you to understand that there are 
 two essential reasons for this. 
 
 First. Because the foundations of a country's greatness 
 should be profoundly stable. 
 
 Second. Because the formation of cadres is a work of time : 
 they can never be improvised and there ought to be no differ- 
 ence except that of numbers between the peace and war foot- 
 ing of an army. 
 
 To these essential reasons we will add a third which is 
 no less essential. It is that we could not reduce the effective 
 of the ranks beyond a certain lunit without rendering impossible 
 the instruction of the cadres, and reducing hurtfully that 
 rapidity of mobilization which is, in these days, the first con- 
 dition of all good army organization. 
 
 It is the business of the law to fix the minimum, and 
 experience teaclies that when this is not done, there is danger 
 lest the credits opened for the war budget to keep up the 
 effective of bayonets should, by too early dismissal of men to 
 their homes or an exaggerated issue of temporary leave, be 
 rendered capable of being transferred and used towardf? other 
 expenses not anticipated or not authorised by the legislative 
 power. 
 
 It is necessary to guard against this danger if we would 
 not have the army become a fiction. 
 
 The Bill presented to you by the Government seemed to 
 have taken no thought of this matter, for it only foresaw the 
 construction of permanent cadresf without mentioning the 
 number of effectives in the ranks either on a peace or war 
 footing.^ 
 
 Your Committee will propose to you to fix the minimum of 
 the peace establishment in the Bill which it will have the 
 honour to submit to your deliberations. The Bill will also deter- 
 mine the internal constitution of the executive§ bodies of troops. 
 
 An objection has been made to this fixation, and must not 
 be passed over in silence. It is that we cannot foresee the 
 necessities of the future and ought therefore to avoid giving 
 pledges. 
 
 To tliis we reply that by fixing a minimum for the effective 
 of men, the Assembly abdicates no part of its liberty smce it 
 ceases not to be sovereign. 
 
 * The Article is in these terms : — "'Special laws will determine the bases of the 
 " organization of the active and territorial armies, as well as of the reserves." 
 
 1" See the annexed tables on the Grovernment's proposed law. 
 
 X It is necessary to go back to the details of the war budget in order to know 
 the effei-tive on a peace footing. 
 
 § " Corps de troupps." This French expression has no equivalent in English 
 military language. It means organized liodies of soldiers, such as battalions, 
 brigades, &e., as distinct from staff. — C. B. B.
 
 The country must no longer live on illusions. Our duty 
 both to it and to ourselves is to tell the truth. 
 
 Now, we cannot avoid seeing, and we ought to confess that 
 one of the most striking faults in our national character is a 
 e^vift forgetfulness in present prosperity of past lessons and 
 future dangers. 
 
 Assuredly, gentlemen, you who have been ^^dtnes8es of 
 our countiy's misfortunes are not the men to haggle vnth. the 
 Government over the means to prevent their recun-ence. 
 
 But, who can tell whether the Assembhes which will 
 succeed you, may not oncf^ again treat as miproductive and use- 
 less the expenditm-e on the array ? 
 
 Who can tell, whether, on the eve of a war, there may not 
 be found a Financial Committee demanding of the Assembly 
 the reduction of our military forces, and a ministry ready to 
 consent to the measure ? 
 
 Against this oblivion of the past and against these fatal 
 tendencies it is onr desire to forewarn our successors. 
 
 We would tell them, by fixing a minimum for the number 
 of men, that the maintenance of the strength of an army is 
 an annual premium of insurance against foreign invasion and 
 dismemberment of territory. You cannot diminish the pre- 
 mium without diminisliing at the same time the safeguards of 
 the country. 
 
 Forgetfulness of this fact has cost us two of our most 
 patriotic provinces and five milHards. 
 
 The Assemblies that will succeed us, may, it is true, like 
 those before our time, remain deaf to this voice of warning ; 
 but we shall have done our duty, and if they by imprudent 
 reductions of our military forces should compromise the se(;urity 
 of the country, the responsibility Avill be theirs alone. 
 
 Such, gentlemen, are the three essential arguments which 
 should determine you not to lay the foundations of our military 
 organization on the shifting will of Governments or Financial 
 Committees. 
 
 You have already regulated by the law of recruitment the 
 obligations of citizens towards the State. 
 
 You have before you two bills : the first which assures to 
 non-commissioned officers, after 12 years of good service in 
 the army, employment in one of our public departments. 
 
 The second regulates the rehgious service in the army in 
 peace as well as in war. 
 
 A\Tiat your Committee now propose is, to continue the 
 work of reorganization and regeneration, by fixing also legally 
 the principles of the general organization of the army : — prin- 
 ciples which may serve as a foundation for special laws regu- 
 lating the internal constitution of the executive bodies of troops, 
 of the staff, schools, and administrative services, regulating also 
 the advancement and position of officers. 
 
 Some of these special laws have already been studied by 
 your Committee ; they will be laid before you hereafter. 
 
 B 2
 
 But, gentlemen, if yon shonld only have decreed the outHiie 
 to be tilled up in completing onr militaiy legislation you would 
 have done much for the honour and security of the country. 
 
 § 2. — Insufficiency of our Military Organization. 
 
 A^ew conditions of Modern War. 
 
 The events which took place during the war 1870-71 have 
 shown the insufficiency of our military organization. 
 
 A few months sufficed the German army to invade our 
 territory, turn or reduce our fortresses, starve out our capital, 
 and place us in the very situation occupied by Prussia after 
 our victories of 1806 and 1807. 
 
 With the restorative elements, and the vital energy pos- 
 sessed by our country, — forces the extent of which was rmsus- 
 pected by us a few months ago ; wdth a people active, laborious, 
 intelligent and, in spite of our disasters, four times as numerous 
 as tlie population of Prussia in 1807, shall we not know how to 
 repair our reverses by the reform of our military institutions 
 and the wisdom of our administration ? 
 
 The two years whicdi have just elapsed permit us, gentle- 
 men, to indulge a legitimate hope that we shall. 
 
 But if the insufficiency of our military organization has been 
 proved by experience, experience also teaches us that, neither 
 armies nor Generals can he improvised hy a decree, and that if 
 education is rapid on the field of battle, its cost is far too dear. 
 
 The conditions of war are no longer what they were. The 
 machine is coming to take the place of the man on the field of 
 battle ; and if war yet remains an art in its highest conceptions, 
 we cannot deny that it has become a science, subject to fixed 
 rules in its applications. 
 
 In the combat, fire assumes a growing preponderance over 
 the bayonet. 
 
 The necessity of passing over great distances under the 
 fire of artillery of precision and of rapid rifle fire, paralyses 
 the dash of troops, and forces them to fight from afar and 
 under shelter. 
 
 These new conditions of war are unfavourable to us, for 
 they are essentially contrary to om' temperament and national 
 character. 
 
 Differing from former times in their tactical aspect, they 
 are no less so from a strategical point of view. 
 
 At the epoch of out- great mihtary glory, in spite of the pro- 
 gress realised under the first Empire in the system of our means 
 of communication, there existed only roads on wliich troops 
 and convoys could move but slowly, and the difficulties of sub- 
 sisting armies on even short lines of operation necessitated a 
 reduction of their effective strength. 
 
 But it is otherwise now ; the railway and the locomotive 
 have given astonishing rapidity to mihtary operations, and the 
 possibility of transporting rapidly, to great distances, masses of
 
 troops, pro^asions, and material, has had for result the increase 
 of numbers in such proj)ortions as would appear exaggerated 
 and clumerical to the minds of those who have arrested their 
 raihtary studies at a past that is not yet very far from us, and 
 refused to pay sufficient attention to the new conditions. 
 
 For us, gentlemen, these invading masses, as powerful by 
 their number as by their organization, have been sad realities ; 
 and experience lays upon us imperatively the obligation of 
 taking account of them, if we would not expose the country to 
 the most terrible eventuahties. 
 
 We cannot hide from ourselves that if some of our fortresses 
 — too few unhappily — have succeeded, thanks to a noble and 
 glorious resistance, in holding fast a part of the enemy's forces, 
 they could not sensibly retard the march of invasion. 
 
 The time is past when the prolonged resistance of a fortress 
 could permit a beaten national army to reorganize and reinforce 
 itself in order to take the offensive. 
 
 Time is no longer as formerly on tlie side of the defence. 
 
 It is then necessary that at every instant, and with all its 
 means of action, the defence must be ready to face an attack. 
 
 And if, in the past, it was correct to say, that victory ad- 
 hered to the big battalions, we may now say, and with even 
 better reason, that she cleaves to liim who, with equal forces, 
 is sooner ready and able to get the start of his adversary. 
 
 Permanent preparation, then, and rapidity of mohilization, stand 
 forth as the two indispensable conditions of every army organization. 
 
 The Bill which we have the honour to present to you is 
 specially intended to reahse these conditions. 
 
 In accord with the Government on the main object, your 
 Committee has had the satisfaction to agree with it also on the 
 means for attaining that object. 
 
 The Government recognises equally with your Committee 
 the power of numbers. It admits that to make our luiJitary 
 honom- and national independence safe, it is indispensable for 
 us to be always in a condition to oppose to invasion forces 
 equal to those of the invader in quantity and solidity of 
 organization. 
 
 We shall gain the desired qualifications, uidividual and 
 collective, by the five years service in the active army imposed 
 upon all citizens by the law of recruiting. 
 
 Comparing the resources which the law of recruiting, 27th 
 July, 1872, places at our disposal, Avith the strength of other 
 Em-opean Powers, we find that we are inferior to none of them 
 in point of numbers.* 
 
 We only place omvselves at a pomt of view exclusively de- 
 fensive, for, in agreement with the Government, you have 
 yom-selves proclaimed, gentlemen, that the policy of France is a 
 policy of peace. 
 
 Peace is necessary for us to repair our disasters and rebuild 
 
 * See Table I in Appendix.
 
 6 
 
 our ruins ; but, according to the old adage, we shall be sure of 
 peace just m proportion as we are strong and always ready to 
 repulse unjust aggression. 
 
 Besides, has not France been the last of the great powers 
 of Europe to occupy herself T\dth the reconstruction of her 
 military organization on new foundations? 
 
 Germany^ Russia, Austria, Italy, and even England have 
 preceded us on this road. 
 
 It would be impossible, with any show of reason, to attribute 
 to us aggressive intentions, for they would be in manifest con- 
 tradiction with our situation. 
 
 But numerical strength only, without military instruction and 
 discipline, is disorder and helplessness. 
 
 In this double aspect our adversaries have been incontestably 
 superior to us ; to recognise the fact is to determine for our- 
 selves and the country that these two causes of mferiority shall 
 cease to exist. 
 
 Our Officers have comprehended it, and have, of their own 
 accord, boldly undertaken reform. 
 
 The Government energetically seconds theii- efforts, and we 
 may explain, with a satisfaction which you, gentlemen, will 
 share, the extent of the progress already made in this direction. 
 
 A very marked intellectual movement has taken place in the 
 army within the last two years ; it has manifested itself 
 especially in numerous studies and publications on the ques- 
 tion now occupymg our attention — that of mihtary reorganiza- 
 tion. 
 
 The press itself has taken a greater interest than formerly 
 in military affairs. 
 
 Your Committee have borrowed, from numerous documents 
 and works transmitted to them, very useful information, and can 
 say, with truth, that the bill they now submit to your dehbera- 
 tion is only the result of that great military investigation to 
 which all men who, in spite of her reverses, have not despaired 
 of their country's future and are still jealous for her power and 
 grandeur, have brought the disinterested help of their experience 
 and devotion. 
 
 § 3rd. — Resources placed at the disposal of the Country 
 BY THE Law op Recruiting, 27th July, 1872. 
 
 The Law of Recruiting, 27th July, 1872, places at the dis- 
 posal of the country the following resources, calculated according 
 to an annual contingent of 15.0,000 men,* deducting losses esti- 
 mated at 4 per cent, for the first year, 3 per cent, for the second, 
 and 2 per cent, for the other years : — 
 
 * See Table, Law of Recruiting, Captain Home's translation, page 39.
 
 Active Forces* 
 
 Active army (5 classes) . . . . . . 704,714 
 
 Reserve of the active army (4 classes) . . 510,294 
 
 On fm-loiiglif . . ^ 141,414 
 
 Adding the permanent portion of the army 
 
 not provided for by enrolments^. . . . 120,000 
 
 We arrive at a total of , . . . 1,476,420 
 
 for the active army. 
 
 Territonal Army. 
 
 5 Classes (organized) . . . . . . 582,523 
 
 Reserves, not organized (6 classes) . . 625,000 
 
 Total for the territorial army . . 1,208,156 
 
 We must not, however, suppose that all the active forces 
 can be opposed to aggression in time of war. 
 
 From the total of active army .. .. 1,476,420 
 
 must be deducted, as follows — 
 
 1. The last class enrolled 150,000, whose ^ 
 
 instruction is not yet complete . . . , | 
 
 2. Men on furlough, about 141,420, who have ! ^jq-. .^^ 
 
 not yet any instruction, and could not, ' "' ' 
 therefore, be incorporated with the regi- 
 ments wnthout weakening them 
 These will all be sent to corps depots to be 
 trained when war breaks out. 
 
 Thus the total of the active forces is 
 
 reduced to 1,185,000 
 
 * Table No. 2. Appendix, 
 t Table No. 3. Appendix. 
 
 j See Table, Law of Eecruiting, Captain Home's translation, page 41. 
 It is probable that the number of the engaged and re-engaged men will be con- 
 siderably diminished in consequence of the application of the new law.
 
 Brought forward 1,185,000 
 
 A farther reduction must be madeH 
 
 of men organically worthless, I ^^n qqq 
 and the permanent deficit of the .' ' 
 
 corps . . . . . . . . J 
 
 But against this deduction may be 
 set men obtained — 
 
 1st, by relieving the Algerian corps 
 by territorial troops, we gain 
 40,000 men. 
 
 2nd, by taking the men left at home 
 unfit for armed service, and em- 
 ploying them for auxiliary ser- 
 vices. 
 
 Estimate for the nuie classes about 
 31,000. 
 
 Deduct 31,000 and 40,000, or . . 71,000 
 
 Leaves a total deficiency attribut-1 qr ^/^^ q- ^rv^ 
 
 able to non-effectives . . . . f ' ' 
 
 We can, therefore, dispose of a real ef-'^ 
 
 fective strength for the organization of f -, aqa qaa 
 the army, after providhig for all home T ' ' 
 
 service, amounting to . . . . . . J 
 
 Such an army, composed entirely of soldiers who have served 
 at least a year, ^vith complete cadres, and, above all, well com- 
 manded, havmg behind it about 291,432 men under instruction 
 at the depots, resting further on an organized territorial army 
 of 582,523 men, which itself has a reserve of recruiting of 625,633 
 men, would seem sufficient to make head against every aggres- 
 sion, even if made simultaneously upon several points of the 
 frontier ; sufficient, also, to prolong a struggle to as far a point 
 as oiu: financial resources woidd carry us. 
 
 It is our busmess to make the best of these resomxes ; and 
 the necessity of economizmg in peace, so as to be able to sustain 
 a long war, is a new element introduced mto the problem of our 
 military organization. 
 
 § 4th. — Organization in Groups of the Forces constituting 
 
 THE Army. 
 
 1. — Organization before 1870. 
 
 How are we to distribute and group these constituent forces 
 of our army? 
 
 ^ Before the war of 1870, France was divided into gi-eat 
 military commands.
 
 Tliese commands, excepting Paris and Lyons, which ad- 
 mitted of active organized forces, were in fact only territorial 
 commands, comprising a certain number of territoiial military 
 divisions and subdivisions. 
 
 Usually, the Generals commanding had under their orders 
 only depots or fractions of corj)s which they occasionally united 
 in order to review them ; the most fortunate were able to group 
 in this mamier one or two regiments. 
 
 The constituted brigade and division only appeared as ex- 
 ceptions at Paris and Lyons. In other places nothing was 
 formed but the regiment, and its strength, weakened by the 
 great number of furloughs given each year for economical 
 reasons, was for the most part scattered in a multitude of little 
 garrisons,* to the great detriment of instruction and discipline. 
 
 We need hardly add, that none of these groups were com- 
 pletely provided with the material wliich would be necessary to 
 enter on a campaign. 
 
 The result was dispersion and breaking up of corps ; Generals 
 forgetting their position and teaching nobody; inferior officers 
 without real command, and consequently, without responsibility 
 or means of instruction. 
 
 In one word — no preparation for war. 
 
 This was our condition when the events of 1870 burst 
 upon us. 
 
 We found ourselves v^dthout preparation, without organiza- 
 tion, and, it may be added, without du-ection ; armed with an 
 inferior artillery ; face to face with an enemy long ago pre- 
 pared, strongly organized, and havuig in his favour the ad- 
 vantage of number and superiority in commanders. 
 
 We could not but succumb, and these, gentlemen, were the 
 causes of our reverses. 
 
 We xvere beaten by icant of preparation, organization, and direc- 
 tion, and by the iveakness of our effective, rather than by the arms of 
 our enemies. 
 
 If we recall here the memory of our own reverses, it is not 
 to condemn the men who brought them upon us, for we are all 
 more or less culpable, but to draw from them useful lessons 
 and to guard against theu' recmTence. 
 
 Necessity of a Permanent Formation. 
 
 The first of all these lessons is, that the army ought to be 
 at all times prepared for a tear and permanently constituted in 
 brigades, divisions, and corps d'armee, provided ^.vith. com- 
 manders, staff, all the administrative and auxiliary services and 
 necessary material,! so as to be able to take the field with the 
 
 * Table No. 7, Garrisons. 
 
 t Article 9 of the Bill of the Commission, and Article 6 of the proposal of the 
 Government.
 
 10 
 
 least possible delay, passing from a peace to a war footing by a 
 simple increase of numbers. 
 
 This fandamental principle of all army organization is not 
 new to us, tliougli unliappily so quickly forgotten. 
 
 We read the following in the preamble of the Ordinance of 
 17th March, 1788, which divided the French Array into brigades 
 of two regiments of the same arm grouped in twenty-one 
 divisions : — 
 
 " His Majesty wills that the troops be always ready to take 
 " the field, and, to that end, that they be organized, equipped, 
 " and provided with all their field appointments, as they ought 
 " to be in war, so that peace may be for them a constant school 
 " of discipline and instruction, whilst it will be a school of com- 
 " mand for the Generals." 
 
 To this principle of permanent preparation we must return. 
 
 3. — Permanence of the Cadres. 
 
 From it, then, follows as a result the permanence of the 
 cadres, to wliich must be given such elasticity that, at the 
 moment of mobilization, they may be sufiicient for a number of 
 men at least double that of the peace strength. 
 
 The Government and your Committee are agreed that in 
 time of peace the cadres ought to be kept up to the normal 
 standard fixed by the law of organization. At the moment of 
 mobilization these cadres will be placed on a war footing by 
 means of non-commissioned ofiicers called up to active service. 
 
 The non-commissioned officers retired from the ranks of the 
 active army, and placed " at disposal," sent on furlough, or in 
 the army reserve, find also in the law guarantees assurmg them 
 that, in case of being recalled to serve, they will return with 
 their grade to the ranks of the mobilized army. 
 
 Your Committee have thought it right to give those gua- 
 rantees, in order not to alienate from the cadres, already so 
 difficult to recruit, young persons who, having assured positions 
 in civil life, have no necessity to obtain later, by a continuance 
 of their service in the active army, one of the employments 
 wliich the Bill before you promises them conditionally. Thus 
 also may be preserved even the one year volunteers who may 
 obtain brevets as non-commissioned officers in virtue of Article 
 58, law of recruiting. 
 
 Of what use would the rank be to either of these classes if, 
 having obtained it, they could be recalled to serve as privates ? 
 
 Some fear has been expressed that, by permitting this right to 
 non-commissioned officers " at disposal," or in the reserve, there 
 would result some embarrassment at the moment of mobiliza- 
 tion on account of their number. 
 
 To this your Committee reply that Article 58 of the law 
 of recruiting in relation to one year's volunteers is too plain to 
 leave room for denial, and that there is no motive for treating 
 less favourably non-commissioned officers -who have left the
 
 IL 
 
 ranks. Besides, the greater number of the latter will only quit 
 the active army to enter the civil service at an age when the 
 class to which they belong will be passing to the tenitorial 
 army. Thus they will no longer belong to the active army at 
 the moment of mobilization. 
 
 The formation of troops of remforcement or of depots ^vill 
 employ the whole, or at least t^e greater part of the others ; 
 and far from their number being an embarrassment, it is rather 
 to be feared that it will be insufficient, and we may be obliged 
 to have recourse to new promotions in order to complete the 
 cadres. 
 
 § 5. — Constitution of the Army Corps.* 
 
 The permanent organization of the troops in brigades, 
 divisions, and army corps being admitted, how shall om- army 
 corps be composed? 
 
 The Government and the Committee are agreed in ask- 
 ing you to decide that an army corps is to contain two 
 divisions of infantry, one brigade of cavalry, one brigade of 
 artillery, one battalion of engineers, one squadron of field train, 
 with the staffs and different services necessary for its working. 
 The Algerian corps will receive a special organization, because 
 of the special nature of the services required of it and the 
 division of our African colony into three pro\ances. Tliis corps 
 will be constantly kept up to its war footing. 
 
 Seeing that the question, whether each army corps should 
 be nominally composed of two or three divisions, is much 
 debated, and the cleverest people are not agreed on the point, 
 it would be little in conformity with the logic of facts to wish 
 to resolve it in an absolute manner. We may say, perhaps, 
 more exactly, that the composition of an army corps should 
 vary according to the part assigned to it in the niihtary opera- 
 tions, and even more according to the presumed capacity of its 
 chief. 
 
 Thus we see, in 1870, with the army of the Rhine, three out 
 of seven of our army corps composed of four divisions of 
 infantry, under the command of Marshals of France, while the 
 others, commanded by Generals of Division, only contained 
 three. The Imperial Guard itself only had two divisions. Each 
 of these corps comprised also a division of cavalry. 
 
 In the war of 1870, the Germans, whose army corps were 
 originally four divisions of infantry, set themselves to reduce 
 the number while rendermg them uniform. Their corps are 
 now composed of two divisions of infantry, each having two 
 brigades of two regiments, two regiments of di\dsional cavalryf 
 and seventeen batteries of artillery. 
 
 The Bavarian corps, the Guard corps, the 8th Prussian 
 
 * Article 6 of the Bill. f One for each infantry division.
 
 12 
 
 corps, and the 12th Saxons, are the only exceptions to this 
 rule, and then only as regards the cavalry. 
 
 The Guard corps, besides two divisional regiments of 
 cavalry, has a cavalry division of three brigades. 
 
 The Bavarian corps have, in addition to the two divisional 
 regiments, a cavalry brigade of two regiments. 
 
 The 8th and 12th Prussian corps have a cavalry division of 
 two brigades, besides the ordinary formation.* 
 
 These exceptions affect more particularly the allied corps of 
 South Germany, and do not infringe the rule, for the infantry 
 composition of all the army corps is the same — namely, two 
 divisions. 
 
 If from these latter times we go back to the epochs of our 
 earlier wars, we find that all armies having organized army 
 corps, from 1796 to 1815, have only exceptionally corps of 
 more than three divisions. Not more than ten examples are to 
 be fomid in a period of more than twenty years of war. 
 
 In 1805, we find one corps of more than four divisions ; in 
 1809, one of four and one of five ; in 1812, two of four and two 
 of five; in 1813, one of four; and in 1815, two of four 
 divisions.f 
 
 In the Crimea, out of three army corps, the French army 
 Jaad one corps mth four divisions and one with five ; but this 
 was a necessity engendered by special circumstances m war — 
 a great siege as well as field operations. This example, then, 
 cannot be considered as a type of army organization. 
 
 In Marshal Niel's Bill of 1868, the Army Corps had three 
 divisions of infantry and one brigade of cavahy. 
 
 The combination of threes is at first seductive and is praised 
 by its partisans, because, according to circimistances, it pro\ades 
 a centre and two wings, or one division for a reserve, while, in 
 case of the detachment of a division, there remain two under 
 the General's command. 
 
 " If," they say, " the corps contains only two divisions, and one 
 is detached, the corps commander has under his orders but one 
 division which has already its chief, so that there is the same 
 work to be performed by two authorities of unequal degree." 
 
 The partisans of the two division formation answer that these 
 considerations, if they have any foundation, would require equally 
 the threefold combination in tactical imits smaller than an army 
 corps. 
 
 The Company of Infantry in two sections, the regiment of 
 
 * " The Franco-G-erman "War," edited by the Prussian Staff. 
 t Out of 200 army corps which have ■ taken part in operations of war since 
 1790, we may reckon 
 
 2 of 1 division (Imperial Guard) in 1805-6. 
 
 97 of 2 „ 
 
 73 of 3 „ 
 
 23 of 4 „ 
 
 5 of 5 „ 
 
 The formation in two divisions has, then, been that most employed.
 
 13 
 
 cavalry with four squadrons, the brigade of two regiments, and 
 the division of two brigades are examples to tlie contrary. 
 
 It would then be logically necessary to modify tliis state of 
 thmgs and adopt the threefold formation for these different 
 units — yet no one proposes such a measure. 
 
 As for the argmnent drawn fi*om the chance of the detach- 
 ment of a division we may reply, with Marshal Bugeaud* and the 
 Duke of Ragusa,t that if' the detaclmient of small units is with- 
 out serious dangers, the same cannot be said for large ones. 
 Such detachment should therefore be avoided as a fault or 
 danger. More than one example may be found in our military 
 history. Marshal Marmont has cited several, the most striking 
 being that of the Battle of Marengo which, lost at fh'st, was 
 only won at the end of the day by the return of the division of 
 Desaix M'-ho, detached towards Novi, retraced his steps on hear- 
 ing the cannon. Without gomg back so far we may cite the 
 case of Lapasset's brigade in the last war. Detached from the 
 5th corps at Sarraguemines, it was cut off for the rest of the 
 campaign from the corps to which it belonged. 
 
 The regulations of the 3rd May, 1832 on field service (Head 
 IX), only seems to permit detachments from small units. 
 
 The argument urged by the partisans of formation in three 
 divisions, that one may be wanted for detachment, does not seem 
 to justify such a formation. 
 
 That drawn from the equal duty of two authorities unequal 
 in rank, agamst formation in two divisions, has no greater value, 
 for the army corps is not composed solely of two infantry 
 divisions ; it contains besides a brigade of cavalry, a corps of 
 artillery equal to the divisional artillery, Avithout counting the 
 reserve of engineers and all the admmistrative and anxihary 
 forces not included in the divisions but forming an effective of 
 more than 9,000 men ; there is not then equality of action as 
 these partisans pretend. 
 
 It seems to us that the formation and the effective strength 
 of the army corps should be determmed by more logical con- 
 siderations. 
 
 The army corps ought to be a little army, and tliis is its 
 essential character. 
 
 It is called upon to aid in the execution of a part of the plan 
 of campaign ; it combines its operations with those of other 
 corps ; it acts in joint responsibihty and m relation to them, but 
 separately and at distances more or less great, and the union 
 between several army corps only takes place on the field of 
 battle. 
 
 * " Do not make detachments, except in case of absolute necessity. In most 
 " cases it ^ill be better to move all the army than to risk by detaching it, a part of 
 " its forces, or to be deprived of the help of that part when attacked or obliged to 
 " move away in its absence." — Marshal Bugeaud, '' Maximes, Couseils et Instruc- 
 " sur I'Art de la Guerre," page 87- 
 
 t " Esprit des Institutions Militaires," 3rd part, chapter v, pages 171 and follow- 
 ing. '• Eien n'est plus dangereux que de faire un detachement."
 
 14 
 
 Except as regards combinations, its existence is independent, 
 and it should therefore be individually provided with all means 
 of action. 
 
 In the last war the strength of our army coi-ps was not on 
 an average greater than 25,000 men, too low for their constitu- 
 tion in three divisions, and they were too inferior in number to 
 the corps of the enemy. 
 
 The Germans apparently did not fear to impose on their 
 Generals a heavier task, and their army corps, on a war footing, 
 numbers no less than 88,000 men. 
 
 This fitoess of the chiefs for command arises from the 
 German organization in peace, for the troops are always in 
 brigades, divisions, and army corps ; their Generals and staff 
 officers thus acquire more practice than ours in great commands. 
 It will suffice us, in order to reach the same result, to act hke 
 them and to leave our Generals more authority and initiative ; 
 . by reducing within sensible limits the excessive centralization 
 of the War Mmistiy, and by rendering the Generals responsible 
 for the preparation and instruction of their army corps. 
 
 We shall not hesitate then to raise to 38,000 or 40,000 men 
 the strength of these corps at the moment of mobihzation. 
 
 The strength thus determined will be base of their forma- 
 tion. 
 
 The generally accepted composition of our infantry regiments 
 being three active battalions, each of 1,000 men, our active 
 divisions of infantry will have about 12,000 men. 
 
 If the army corps were to be composed of three divisions, 
 its infantry alone would present an effective of 36,000 men. 
 
 Adding to this strength two or three regiments of cavalry, 
 vnth artillery and its reserves in the proportion of foin- guns per 
 1,000 men, engineers, and all the administrative and auxihary 
 services, we should arrive at about 50,000 men, 12,000 horses, 
 1,000 carriages, and 156 guns, as the total strength of an army 
 corps. 
 
 It is evident that this would not be a simple army corps, but a 
 veritable army wliich would require not less than a day to defile 
 before its chief on one of our largest and best kept national 
 roads. 
 
 The composition in three divisions might very well be ac- 
 cepted if the regiments were to have a strength of only 1,500 
 or 1,800 men, which would give 6,000 to 7,000 men per division, 
 but not with regiments of 3,000 men and divisions of 12,000, as 
 in our new organization. Nor must we reckon on the rapid 
 weakening of the army corps, as m the past, for the organiza- 
 tion of reserves for all arms has, for its especial object, the pre- 
 vention of such weakening. 
 
 Might there not also be some difficulty in finding always a 
 sufficient number of Generals capable of exercising such a com- 
 mand as this, and of managing such a mass m marches and on 
 the field of battle ? 
 
 Another interest besides those of the exercise, command, and
 
 15 
 
 mobility of the army corps should cause us to reduce it to tAvo 
 divisions. 
 
 The strength of an army corps being determined, its consti- 
 tution in three diA^isions would necessitate the creation of three 
 administrative and auxiliary services. Now the importance of 
 these services for a division is not in proportion to its strength, 
 but remains virtually the same whether the streng-th be 8, 10, 
 or even 12,000 men. 
 
 It is then advantageous as regards the reduction of the 
 number of non-combatants, to have for our army corps two 
 strong divisions rather than three weak ones, provided always 
 that their strength be not exaggerated. Divisions of 12 to 
 15,000 men are certainly not above the possibility of being 
 commanded by a divisional General, and they prepare better 
 than would smaller bodies for the command of an army corps. 
 
 It is equally advantageous for the rapid transmission of orders 
 because the chief command has only to do with two mtei-me- 
 diaries instead of three. 
 
 We may add that the formation m two divisions is preferable 
 as regards the strength of regiments. 
 
 For instance, the strength of the army corps being fixed at, say 
 48,000 men, the battalions which, in the formation in two divi- 
 sions would be 1,000 strong, must be dimmished by one-third if 
 there were to be 36 instead of 24 battalions in the corps, and 
 each battahon would only count 667 men. With this strength 
 and a formation of six companies to a battalion, the strength of 
 the company would be no more than 110 men ; certainly in- 
 sufficient to meet the requirements of modern war which tend 
 to make the company the tactical unit in battle. 
 
 Many a page has been A\a-itten lately by mihtary men of all 
 ranks on this question of the composition of army corps. 
 
 The Minister of War has caused to be made an analysis and 
 rhume of the different opinions put forward by a certam num- 
 ber of Generals on the re-organization of the army, and it may 
 be said that general opinion is m favour of the formation in two 
 divisions. 
 
 Every body agrees in asldng that the composition of om- 
 army corps should be uniform, as in the German army. 
 
 Your Committee, gentlemen, had agreed upon a mean solu- 
 tion between the two systems, in accordance with the considera- 
 tions we have had the honour to lay before you. 
 
 It had decided to propose to you the formation of 12 
 regional corps, each havuig 3 divisions or 6 brigades ; each of 
 the corps was to detach, following a fixed tour of service, one 
 of these brigades to unite in forming 3 army corps destined to 
 garrison Lyons and Paris. The 5 brigades remaining to each 
 army corps would then constitute 2 thvisions plus one brigade 
 not included in a division but forming the infantry reserve of 
 the army corps. 
 
 The non-regional corps were constituted in only 2 divisions, 
 but instead of having, like the regional corps, only 3 squadrons
 
 16 
 
 of cavalry, tliey were to have 5, one of which, was to furnish 
 the divisional cavalry ; the four others were formed m divisions. 
 This system had the advantage of confiding the keeping of 
 Paris and Lyons to the whole army, and of calling, successively 
 and in regular order, all the corps to form part of the gar- 
 rison of Paris, this having been always considered as an 
 advantage. 
 
 Thus each army corps would have had a reserve, and the 
 corps of Paris and Lyons being, according to the idea of your 
 Committee, destmed to serve as general reserve to the fighting 
 army, need only be mobilized after the regional corps, thus 
 obviating the inconvenience of mobilizing rapidly these brigades 
 detached from their corps and far from their reserves. The 
 corps of Paris and Lyons need only leave then garrisons after 
 being relieved by the territorial army. This was a necessity 
 for public order imperiously forced upon us by the experience 
 of the past. 
 
 The system might suffer under the reproach of neglecting 
 the prmciple of uniformity of army corps ; but this incon- 
 venience would disappear to some extent by forming the two- 
 division corps into an army of reserve acting independently. 
 
 But, the Government having demanded 3 army corps for 
 Paris and 1 for Lyons, your Committee felt that it was their 
 duty to give effect to this desire, all the more because in doing 
 so it became possible to give to the army corps a imiform com- 
 position, without altering the mode of their formation and the 
 advantages which it seemed to present. 
 
 The Committee therefore agreed with the Government that 
 all the army corps should have the same composition, except 
 that of Algeria, where tlie division of the colony into 
 '6 provinces requned a special formation. The details of both 
 these two formations will be given m the law on the interior 
 constitution of the regiments. 
 
 It is a fixed principle of your Committee and of the Govern- 
 ment,* that the regiments or the fractions constituting these 
 regiments should alw^ays, especially in war, be furnished with 
 all requisites for active service. 
 
 But, beside this principle stands another no less important. 
 It is that the troops should in no case be taken fi-om the com- 
 mand of their dhect and habitual commanders. For this reason 
 the Government and yom- Committee have agreed to reject the 
 past formation of Artillery and Engineers for the army corps 
 from detached batteries and companies taken from all the regi- 
 ments of the arm, and brought together for the first time 
 under the orders of an improvised Chief, whom they often saw 
 for the first time, of whom they had no knowledge, and by 
 whom they were equally unknown. 
 
 Your Committee thought that the same brigade of artillery 
 and the same battahon of engineers, under command of their 
 
 * Article 9 of the Bill.
 
 17 
 
 accustomed chiefs, should for the future, furnish to the same 
 army corps the requisite artillery and engineers. 
 
 This formation m brigade under the command of a general 
 ofBcer is, besides the peace formation, adopted by the Govern- 
 ment for the interior organization of our artillery schools. 
 
 Each army corps ha^ ing about 38,000 men, only 30,000 of 
 Avliom can be counted on as combatants, the attachment of a 
 brigade of artillery to each army corps gives a proportion of 
 3' 6 guns per 1,000 combatants. 
 
 This proportion is accepted by the Government, and could 
 hardly be increased without over-weighting the colunms 
 beyond all measure. 
 
 Here, gentlemen, your Committee beheves it necessary to 
 offer an observation that appears to be important. 
 
 It has been the usage, and we find the same expression 
 in the explanation of the Government Bill which has been 
 distributed,* to call the extra-divisional artilleiy, '■^reserve 
 artillery^ 
 
 In a country like ours, where, unhappily, words are often 
 more miportant than facts, it has seemed necessary to your 
 Committee to fix men's ideas, by giving to this artillery its truo 
 name " corps artillery " (de corps artillerie (Varmee). 
 
 The method of fightmg which consists in putting in line 
 masses of artillery at the commencement of the battle, so as to 
 obtain decisive results and open the way for the effective 
 action of the other arms, has been the habit of our adversaries 
 dming the late war. We had forgotten the examples given to 
 us by Napoleon I ; but their coips artillery always worked with 
 the advanced guard, whilst ours, considered as reserve artillery 
 because it was called so, was rarely employed at the commence- 
 ment of the battle. 
 
 We must return to the tactics of Napoleon I and the 
 Prussians, and because there is reason to fear that the inexact 
 name " reserve artillery," so opposed to the spirit which should 
 guide our extra divisional artillery, would lead to its use as a 
 mere support, thus exposing our batteries to be destroyed in 
 detail, we decided to give it its true name. 
 
 As for the Engineers, the prevalent usage has been to 
 attach to each division of infantry, a company of Sappers and 
 Miners, and to place a reserve company at head-quarters with 
 the corps park. Now, in practice, it generally happens that the 
 reserve company charged with the general service of the army 
 corps was insufficient for its work ; while the divisional com- 
 panies were less usefully employed. Besides, these companies 
 were generally drawn, like the batteries of artillery, from 
 different regiments,! and being notoriously insuflicient for their 
 duties were an embarrassment hi the battle. 
 
 * Page 5. 
 
 t This state of affairs had been modified in 1870. It was rightly decided in that 
 campaign to employ in that campaign companies from the same regiment only, for 
 the same army corps. 
 

 
 18 
 
 Tlie principle that each division should contain all its means 
 of action, does not permit the suppression of this company. 
 
 Your Committee thought that the inconveniences wliich 
 experience has proved to exist in our organization, might be 
 avoided without violating the divisional prmciple, by attaching 
 to each army corps one complete battalion of Engineers. Thus 
 the reserve of Engineers would be reinforced and one company 
 of Sappers and Miners would be attached to each division. 
 This company might be recalled to the battalion in certain 
 special cases, such as a siege or an important and urgent work, 
 as has already been done at Rome and before Sebastopol, 
 where all the divisional companies were united for the siege. 
 
 What we have said of the composition of the artillery 
 and Engineers is equally applicable to the corps of military 
 transport. 
 
 It is just as important that tliis corps should be so consti- 
 tuted that it can be divided mto parts corresponding with the 
 divisions, brigades, regiments, battahons, and companies, in 
 order to make sure that the service of these units shall be pro- 
 perly performed in case of their detachment ; and, in order that 
 there may never be either hesitation or embarrassment, the 
 fractions should be detailed beforehand. Studying these con- 
 ditions, we have decided to attach to each army corps on a 
 war footing, a squadron of military train. 
 
 § 6 — Determination of the Number op Army Corps. 
 
 The organization of our army corps being thus deter- 
 mmed, what should be the number of these corps ? 
 
 In the Bill wliich has been distributed to you, the Govern- 
 ment asked for twelve, in order to constitute four great armies, 
 each of 120,000 to 150,000 men^ one for the centre, two for 
 the wings, and the fom'tli for reserve. 
 
 Your Committee did not agree with this wish, because, as 
 we have said, we considered army corps of 50,000 men too 
 heavy and then* concentration too difficult. Besides, in such 
 matters it was not possible to take no notice, as was the case in 
 the Government Bill, of the organization of that Power which 
 we may yet have to resist. 
 
 Let us not forget that we have taken a strictly defensive 
 view of our military organization, and that the essential advan- 
 tage of the attack, mistress of the hour and place of aggression, 
 is to copimand, to a certain extent, the means and the move- 
 ments of the defence. 
 
 Whatever be the part assigned to us by Providence, we can- 
 not with equal forces resign ourselves beforehand to present to 
 our adversary from the beginning of the defensive operations 
 a front inferior to his, for we should be exposing ourselves again 
 to be outflanked and turned on our wings, as we were almost 
 always in the late war, and from this point of view the number 
 of army corps is not a subject for indifference.
 
 19 
 
 Let us suppose two armies face to face, each 200,000 strong ; 
 the first composed of four corps of three divisions, as the Govern- 
 ment Avould have it ; the second of six corps of two divisions, 
 the number of divisions being the same in both cases. 
 
 ]\Iost fi-equently the Hne of battle of the first army will be 
 formed of two di\nsions from each corps; the tliird division 
 being placed in reserve beliind the centre of the two others. 
 
 The second army with four of its corps, deployed in the same 
 manner but without a reserve di\dsion, will occupy the same 
 front as the fii'st. 
 
 But the Commander of the second army will have two 
 corps at his disposal which he can send in a mass against one 
 vjf the adversary's ^migs, the latter beuig only able to oppose 
 to this turning movement the reserve division of the threatened 
 array corps. 
 
 In case then of an equal total strength there is the ad- 
 vantage in ha^ang a greater number of army corps though 
 each corps will be weaker. We will therefore organize our 
 fighting army in eighteen corps of two chvisions, instead of 
 adopting the twelve corps of three divisions, as proposed by the 
 Government. In either case there would be thh'ty-six divisions. 
 
 § 7. — Formation of Armes. 
 
 The Bill presented to you does not admit the existence, in 
 time of peace, of separate armies permanently constituted, and 
 here youi- Committee are in accord with the Government. 
 
 The formation of an army should, in fact, be made in view 
 of a definite operation of war, and after taldng into accomit the 
 topographical nature of the soil, the chmate, the productions of 
 the country, the nmnber, organization, and strength of the 
 enemy to be met. It is, therefore, essentially variable according 
 to these different elements. Dependent on circumstances in 
 case of war, the permanent formation in peace has no reasonable 
 object, and wordd, j^erhaps, not be without its dangers. You 
 will understand what those dangers are, gentlemen; it is 
 needless for us to explain them. 
 
 From the mihtary stand-point, — the only one where we have 
 to place om-selves, — the inconvenience would not be less. The 
 formation of permanent armies in the country during peace, 
 immobihzmg, so to speak, the great commands under the hands 
 of certain general officers, Avould tmni the Commanders of 
 army corps into subalterns, and thus hinder the development 
 of indi\adual initiative among those officers who may some day 
 be called to undertake the command-in-chief. They would 
 acquu-e neither the sentiment nor the habit of responsibility, 
 and when called upon to act they would hesitate and wait for 
 orders. Moreover, it would be difficult at the moment of war to 
 depose emment chiefs whose age and infirmities might have 
 rendered them hardly capable of performuig active duty, and 
 to place m other hands the commands they had been accustomed 
 
 to consider as their right. 
 
 c2
 
 20 
 
 We Bhould assuredly hesitate so to wrong their long and 
 honourable service, and they Avould themselves complain "with 
 all the energy of their patriotism, in the name of then- military 
 honour, against what they would with reason call an affront 
 done to then- hoary heads. 
 
 These considerations have seemed to your Committee so 
 serious that we have not hesitated to ask you to decide by a 
 formal legislative decree* that there are to be no armies per- 
 manently organized in time of peace, and that the commandants 
 of the army corps shall not be retained in the same command 
 more than four consecutive years, and, fm'thermore, that the 
 exercise of command in time of peace shall create no ulterior 
 privilege to exercise the functions of their rank.f 
 
 These provisions, if you think Avell to adopt them, will 
 guard, to a certain extent, against the inconveniences we have 
 just pointed out to you. They will enable the Government to 
 pass during peace a greater number of Generals through the 
 command of armies and army corps, and, by thus enlarging 
 the limits of choice, to confer the command of armies and army 
 corps on those who may be judged most capable and most 
 deserving. 
 
 § 8.— Non-permanence of Army Corps in their respective 
 
 REGIONS. 
 
 Though the organization of the army corps in permanent 
 armies during peace has found few delenders in your Committee, 
 the contrary principle has not prevailed altogether without 
 opposition. 
 
 Some members have pointed out that the necessities of 
 pubhc order might, in certain cases, demand the union of 
 several army corps under the same command ; that in fact it 
 might become necessary at a given moment either to assemble 
 an important force at given points of the country, or to form 
 an army of observation on one of our frontiers. 
 
 The Committee, while maintaining as' indispensable for the 
 preparation of the Army the principle of the permanence of 
 regiments and corps in the army corps to which they belong,^ 
 has thought that the first of these necessities of service might 
 be sufficiently satisfied by the power given by Article 15 to 
 detach temporarily from a regional corps, regiments or fractions 
 of regiments in order to place them under another command. 
 But it must be well understood that these detachments will 
 only be temporary, and that they must return to the original 
 command to which they belong as soon as the causes of their 
 removal shall have ceased. 
 
 The proposal to leave to the Government the power of in- 
 terchanging army corps, by causing them to pass from one 
 regional circumscription to another, while making no alteration 
 
 * Article 7 of the Bill. f Article U. X Article 15.
 
 21 
 
 in the rapidity of mobilization, has been combated within the 
 Commission by members who have m-ged the following reasons. 
 It was said that the system appeared to be in opposition to the 
 spirit and tendency of the law. 
 
 What was^ in fact, the fault of onr old military organization ? 
 It was the isolation of the army from the nation, making it a 
 separate caste with special laws, separate traditions and a spirit 
 wliich might become distinct from that of the conntry. 
 
 There was, men said, a striking analogy between this mili- 
 tary constitution and that of the rehgious orders. The latter 
 were cloistered in their monastery, as the soldier in his barrack, 
 subject like him to a special discipline and a special law, for- 
 getful of the country and the family and asking nothing but to 
 be forgotten. 
 
 The army, isolated from the rest of the country by its mode 
 of recruitment and the particularism of its institutions, was no 
 longer the real expression of the nation. As the religious mili- 
 tant belonged rather to heaven than earth, the army belonged 
 rather to the chief of the State than to the nation, and this 
 was arrived at by a perpetual change of garrison, which no 
 longer permitted it to Hve the hfe of the country, and inhale its 
 spuit. The more the soldier could be alienated by breakmg 
 the bonds which attached him to his \allage and his family, the 
 greater was thought to be the success. JBut uoav that all our 
 children, without exception, will be called to the standards, the 
 character of the army is altered : it must be the army of the 
 nation and the law, it ought no longer to be rmmindful of the 
 family, and while the ties wliich bind it must not become an 
 obstacle to military duty, neither must we suffer those ties — 
 abeady so unhappily weakened — to become entirely broken. 
 
 The mterchauge of region between different army corps, 
 would present serious mconveniences as regards permanence of 
 preparation. 
 
 The army corps is not composed merely of regiments and 
 a personal or auxiliary administration always easily replaced, 
 but also of elements attached permanently to the territory of 
 the regional circumscription, such as magazhies, arsenals, 
 hospitals, bakeries, butchers, &c. 
 
 The commanders should be specially solicitous as to the 
 condition of these estabhshments, for it was m this part of the 
 service, the preparation for mobilization, that our failm'e in 1870 
 was most marked. 
 
 Now it is in the nature of man to give more importance to 
 things wliich are of personal interest, and from which he may 
 draw definite advantages. The interest of the command \d\l 
 be m harmony T^dth its cares, and its vigilance if, in the prepara- 
 tion of all parts of the serAace, it can feel that it is preparing 
 its own glori/. 
 
 Is it not then to be dreaded that, if in constant expectation 
 of sudden removal, the command will take less interest in a 
 work of preparation, the fruits of which it may never reap ?
 
 22 
 
 Is it not ako to be dreaded that, by means of these changes 
 of corps from one region to another, we may alter the national 
 character which the new organization is endeavouring to give 
 to the army, and that we may reach at last the very dualism 
 we wished to avoid ? 
 
 In first drawmg up Article 2 of the Bill, your Committee 
 had formally consecrated the principle of the permanence of 
 armv corps in their regions, and had been led to adopt, as the 
 natmal consequence of tliis principle, the formation of the 
 corps of Paris and Lyons by successive detachment of brigades 
 from each of the regional corps, but, this organization havmg 
 been abandoned for the much simpler and more rational one 
 of the uniform organization of 18 army corps, the permanence 
 of the army corps in their respective regions, did not appear 
 to present the same interest. And in fact we have no longer 
 any right to consider the army corps of Paris and Lyons 
 as intended to form the army of reserve ; all the corps being 
 regional except that of Algeria, might be mobihzed at the 
 same time and in the same manner, which was certainly an 
 advantage. It is even presumable that the corps of Paris 
 and Lyons, less dispersed in gamsous, and, therefore, more 
 exercised and better prepared than the others, Avill be, by 
 reason of the nmnerous railways convergent on these two 
 points, concentrated first and brought first to the frontier, 
 and that, instead of forming the army of reserve they "wdll, 
 on the contrary, form the advanced guard of the armies. 
 Therefore, in order that each corps may in turn occupy these 
 garrisons, it is necessary to admit that it may change its 
 region. The abandonment of the principle of the permanence 
 ipf Army Corps m their respective regions is also necessary for 
 political reasons on which we need not enter now, and by the 
 necessity of unitmg several corps for the annual manoeuvres. 
 These movements must not be frequent, as they mil cause some 
 expense, and the National Assembly wall always be able to 
 control the necessity of these changes and keep them witliin 
 just limits by its vote on Articles 1st and 2nd of Part VI, 
 Chapter VI, of the war, budget relative to payments for marches 
 and cost of transport of troops. 
 
 Moreover, the Generals commanding army corps not being 
 able to preserve the same command for more than four years, 
 there is no longer any reason, so far as preparation is con- 
 cerned, for keeping the army corps longer than this in the 
 same region. Besides the real danger is not in the movements 
 of the great tactical units, movements wliich do not alter the 
 principle of then- permanent lormation. Preparation is then 
 only an affair of the budget, more or less rapid, more or less 
 complete, according to the importance of the credits you 
 devote each year to the reconstruction of our war material, the 
 expense of which, as your Committee on contracts has mformed 
 you, should be rather more than a milliard and a half. The 
 most important matter is not to permit the great units to be
 
 23 
 
 broken up by permanent and too frequent changes from one 
 region to another of the regiments, or fractions of regiments, 
 composing them. Article 15 of the law has provided for this 
 by specifying that the regiments or fractions of regiments be- 
 longing to an army corps may not be detached otherwise than 
 temporarily. The same two regiments w^ll ahvays be brigaded 
 together. 
 
 Must we, therefore, gentlemen, approve the consecration of 
 the prmciple of the permanence of garrisons, extolled as it is by 
 some men of talents Certainly not, for this immobility of 
 corps would present inconveniences of some gravity in relation 
 to military spirit and disciplme by the bonds of all sorts which 
 would result from it. 
 
 The commandant of the army corps will, then, be able, 
 whenever he judges it necessary, to move the detachments 
 from one garrison to another, throughout the region, and 
 replace them by troops of the same arm. 
 
 This last restriction, accepted by the Government, is in- 
 dispensable on two accounts, the interest of the Treasury and 
 rapidity of mobilization. 
 
 You know^, gentlemen, that quartering in barracks is esta- 
 blished under different conditions for the various arms, and 
 that at each change of occupation from one arm to another, it 
 is indispensable to make modifications which generally cause 
 considerable expense, to say nothing of the troops being badly 
 or incompletely installed, and often wanting the local acces- 
 sories necessary for the service. The fixity of barrack accom- 
 modation is then at once an economy for the Treasury and a 
 guarantee of comfort for the troops. 
 
 It is above all indispensable for rapidity of mobilization. 
 
 The principle of the permanence of army corps in their 
 regions Ijeing abandoned, and the corps magazmes being 
 separated from their depots to become regional establishments 
 no longer attached to a definite corps but to the garrison, the 
 men of the reserve are no longer attached to a corps which 
 may be moved, but to a place of garrison wdiere they must 
 find, instead of the regiment or corps which has gone, a corps 
 of the same arm as that in which they are enrolled. 
 
 Thus the movement of army corps neither changes the 
 rapidity of mobilization nor the permanence of barrack arrange- 
 ments. It permits us to preserve for the corps the gTeatest 
 mobility, and proA^des against the pro\dncial spu-it which might, 
 dm-ing a long sojourn in the same garrison, penetrate, not among 
 the rank and file who never remain more than five years in the 
 same garrison, but among the cadres, and cause the reappearance 
 of some of those inconveniences which we endeavoured to avoid 
 by distributing the contingent through all the army corps 
 without distmction. 
 
 Moreover, we are maldng a new law, which experience has 
 not yet sanctioned. Let us then make the experiment, and 
 give' to the law such elasticity that the Government may not
 
 24 
 
 find itself obliged to come to you every moment with requests 
 for modifications. 
 
 § 9. — Decision on the Strength of the Fighting Army. 
 
 1st. On the War Footing. 
 
 We have limited the normal strength of an army corps to 
 the maximum of 40,000 men. 
 
 But in this effective all are not combatants. There are the 
 auxiliary and administrative services, the number of which 
 amount to about one-fifth the total of mouths. This leaves for 
 the effective strength only about 32,000 combatants. 
 
 The 18 corps of our field army, which would have to bear 
 the first shock, will therefore comprise about 740,000 men,* 
 including the officers. 
 
 If the resources of our budget were indefinite, and there 
 Avere ]io need to take account of the necessities of the national 
 labour, Avhich alone can assure to us the financial resources 
 indispensable to sustain and carry through Avar, we should not 
 have to trouble ourselves about the expenses that the permanent 
 maintenance of such a military condition would occasion. Such 
 expenses are, however, insupportable by any power in Europe. 
 
 It is, then, necessary tliat this strength be kept during 
 peace Avithin the hmits of a normal budget not exceeding our 
 resources. 
 
 2nd. On the Peace Footing. 
 
 It is generally admitted that the cadres of a Avell-constitnted 
 army should present sufficient elasticity to enable them, Avhen 
 necessary, to supply cadres for double the normal strength. 
 Our cadres are so organized as to fulfil this condition, since 
 for a strength of 740,000 men,t we shall have 26,400 officers, 
 and this number will be capable of increase by means of 
 auxiliary resources. 
 
 Since the active army and its reserve contain each four 
 classes after deducting the first class the instruction of which 
 Avould not be sufficient at the moment when war Avas declared, 
 we see that the call of the reserve classes to the colours Avill 
 nearly double our strength.^ Thus, in order to have Avhen Avar 
 breaks out, — coimting about 40,000 men of the Algerian corps, 
 — an army of 780,000 men, the permanent part of which neces- 
 sarily kept up at all times amounts to 120,000 men,§ and the 
 
 * Not including the corps of Algiers. 
 
 t The composition of these effectives will be shown hereafter by tables annexed 
 to the law on the interior constitution of the corps. The total here given is that 
 which figures in tlie budget of 1814, page 557, and comprises neither ofBcers of 
 gensdarmes, nor those of the Republican guard. 
 
 X Sec Table of the effectives of each class, deducting losses (Table No. 2). 
 
 I ^''^ '^^^'^<i of the composition of this permanent effective, page 70, Report of 
 M. de Chasseloup-Laubat.
 
 25 
 
 part called up to tlie colours 600,000 men, it is at once necessary 
 and sufficient to maintain during* peace 330,000 men ready to 
 be called up. This will bring the total peace strength to 
 450,000 men. 
 
 The general recapitulation presented to you in the War 
 Budget for 187-4 shows an army of 420,000 men,* including 
 the effectives outside the regiments as well as the regiments 
 themselves. To this must be added 23,000 gensdarmesf 
 enth-ely maintained by the State, and 6,170 men of the 
 Republican Guard, the half of whose mamtenance is borne 
 by the city of Paris (3,085), or for the total strength maintained 
 451,850. 
 
 The strength shown on the Budget of 1873 amounts to this 
 number,^ and that of 1872 to 461,283 men, or 10,000 more. 
 
 But the difference between these numbers is so small that 
 we may consider 450,000 men in round numbers as the normal 
 strength of the army to be maintained on a peace footing.§ 
 Nor is this exceeded in the new organization proposed by 
 your Committee. 
 
 Compared with the present organization, the projected one 
 realises a sensible economy in the budget, while notably in- 
 creasing our military power. This is done by maldng better 
 use of the cadres, which, be it well understood, are not at 
 present sufficiently occupied. 
 
 If we examine the arrangement of the effectives of an 
 infantry regiment, as shown in the budgets of 1873 and 1874, 
 we see that by the constitution of the regiment the strength 
 provided for the company is not more than 50. Deducting men 
 in hospital or on leave, cooks, orderlies, and other employed 
 men, there scarcely remain 30 to 35 men m the company for 
 service and manoeu\a-es. 
 
 With such a weak effective we may say that neithei- instruc- 
 tion of the cadres is possible nor emulation among the men. 
 Thus the country has, if you permit me to say so, only the 
 skeleton of an army instead of an efficient military force. 
 
 By these facts is justified the proposal which will be made 
 to you to fix a minimum for the men on a peace footing. 
 
 Besides, this permanent definition is in no way peculiar to 
 our country; it exists in Germany and Austria. It is only the 
 pendant and counterweight of the provisions contained m 
 
 * Pages 556 and 557 of the Budget for 187-1'. 
 
 t Pages 558 and 559, idem. 
 
 t See Table No. 5. 
 
 § Tables of these effectives hare been prepared by j'our Committee to serve as 
 foundation for ealciilating the expenses to which the new organization may give rise. 
 They fix at 100 men (120 including cadres) the minimum strenglli of the company 
 of infantry on a peace footing ; at 106 horsemen (140 including cadres) that of the 
 cavalry squadron ; and at 60 men (95 including cadres) that of the field battery of 
 four guns. 
 
 These tables will be annexed to the Bill which will be hereafter laid before you 
 on the internal constitution of the corps. They will be more in place there than 
 attached to a law on general organization.
 
 26 
 
 Article 40 of the Law on Recrmting-, Avliicli transferred from 
 the Assembly to the Government the right of fixing what was 
 called in our old legislation the " annual contingent," in other 
 words, that part of the class Avhich had to serve five years. 
 
 Moreover, it will have the advantage of putting an end to 
 the number of half-yearly furloughs which are granted each 
 year to soldiers for economical reasons and render instruction 
 impossible. 
 
 The reduction of the time with the colours resulting of 
 necessity from the application of the new law on recruiting 
 permits only, except in case of illness or convalescence, the 
 granting of very short furloughs such as twenty to thirty days, 
 and even this is not to be permitted during the first year of 
 service. 
 
 § 10. — Troops for Reinforcement and Depots. 
 
 We have just told you, gentlemen, that the annual grants 
 for the budget permit us to maintain on the peace footing an 
 army of 450,000 men, which we shall be able at the moment of 
 war to increase to 780,000, but that would not be sufficient, for 
 it is necessary not only to sustain a Avar, but to keep up the 
 strength of the army by means of a reserve of men Avho have 
 already acquired an amount of military instruction sufficing to 
 ensure that then* successive incorporation in the ranks will not 
 weaken the constitution of the regiments. 
 
 The formation of the field army, 780,000 men, including the 
 troops of Algeria, A\nll not employ all the resources in men 
 placed at oin- disposal by the law of 27th July, 1872, and 
 amountmg to 1,215,008.* 
 
 The strength of the army on a peace footing, fixed at 
 450.000 men, comprises all the interior services which must 
 remam in time of war, to supply the field army Avith arms and 
 material, and for the service of hospitals and other military 
 establishments. It comprises also the permanent deficit of 
 soldiers composed of men in hospital, in prison, &c. 
 
 The number of these ineffectives for field service amounts 
 to 126,000.1 This will give 126,000 men, the replacing ot 
 Avhom in the field army is to be deducted fi'om the recruiting 
 resources. If to this number we add 150,000 men of the last 
 class, Avho cannot make part of the field army, we liaA^e a total 
 of 276,000 men; this, deducted from the recruiting resources, in 
 romid number 1,215,000, leaA^es only of the levies disposable for 
 the formation of the field army 939,000. 
 
 This army comprises, besides the permanent part numbering 
 120,000 men, 660,000 of the levies. Subtracting this number 
 from the 939,000 furnished by the law of recruiting, there 
 
 * Table No. 2, annexed to this Report. 
 
 t Page 25, Table of the Report upon the Eecruiting Law.
 
 27 
 
 remain 279,000, that is to say, a little more than one-third of 
 the field army to constitute troops of reinforcement.* 
 
 You will remark, gentlemen, that all these men at disposal 
 and of the reserve of the active army, have served at least 
 one year, and a certain number of them three, four, or five 
 years ; they are therefore ready-made soldiers, who will be able, 
 after a few weeks of exercises and manoeuvres, to take the 
 field in a state of military instruction and education nearly 
 equivalent to that of the efiectives with the fighting army. 
 These men will be distributed in the corps depots with the 
 150,000 men of the last class, who have not yet had sufiicient 
 instruction, which will give us a total strength of 429,000 men, 
 that is to say, enough to form at need a second army. 
 
 Article 24 of the Bill mdicates in fact that they may bo 
 formed into companies, battalions, squadrons, or batteries, and 
 even into regiments if the exigencies of war require it. They 
 constitute in the latter case what are called marching regiments. 
 AVe aU know the just criticisms to which the formation of these 
 regiments has given place. If these criticisms have been per- 
 fectly justified, it is because nearly all the men of wliich these 
 regiments were formed in 1870, and at later periods, were with- 
 out military instruction, and above all, because their cadres were 
 notoriously insufiicient. In the new organization it will no 
 longer be the same, for when a regunent is to be formed there 
 will be these means at disposal ; the cadres of the depot corps 
 which can be doubled by the addition of officers who are at 
 disposal or on half pay or holduig auxiliary brevets; non- 
 commissioned officers and corporals from the reserve. 
 
 In these cadres ^^dll be mcorporated men having all served 
 from one to five years. They will be to the men of the 
 last class in the proportion of two to one. 
 
 11. Depots. 
 
 We have spoken of depots in connection with troops of re- 
 inforcement, it is now time to speak of their organization and 
 the important part they are called upon to play in the mobiliza- 
 tion of the army. 
 
 We have the more reason for doing so, because the imperfec- 
 tion of tliis organization was, in the war of 1870, one of the cliief 
 causes of the delay made in the formation of our fighting 
 army, and consequently, of our reverses. Thus, for instance, 
 we see even now, regiments forming part of the army corps 
 of Lyons, whose depots and stores are at Brian^on. As 
 an administrative question, it is astonishing to see stores 
 destined for the clothing and equipment of troops trans- 
 ported at great expense to the summit of the Alps, in order to 
 
 * Page 94, Table of the Keport upon tlic Eecruiting Law (deducting the corps 
 of AJgiers).
 
 28 
 
 be loronglit down again at once to Grenoble and Lyons, wlien 
 there are upon onr cliief railway lines at a sliort distance from 
 Lyons, garrison towns with barracks nnoccupied. As a 
 question of mobilization it is even more astonishing, for a man 
 of the reserve being to-morrow called to rejoin, would be 
 obJiged, as before 1870, to go to Brian9on to be equipped and 
 armed, in order to come back and be incorporated at Lyons. 
 Such a state of things can assuredly not be continued. We 
 know that the Government has made praiseworthy efforts to 
 connect the depots and stores as much as possible with the 
 active battalions of their corps. But that is not sufficient, and 
 your Committee think that the solution of the difficulty will 
 be found by fixing in the territory all magazines, which will bo 
 thus no longer corps magazines but garrison magazines, where 
 the troops will find all that they require without difficulty and 
 Avithout transport expenses. 
 
 The garrison magazines will be filled from the general store 
 magazines established in the districts of the Army Corps. 
 
 The law on general administration will determine the 
 method of manufacturing all articles of clothing, encampment, 
 &c., that form part of general magazines. These are in this 
 case only reserve magazines. The question is consequently 
 completely reserved. 
 
 To each body of troops is permanently attached a dejDot 
 cadre, the composition and importance of which will be 
 determined by the law upon the interior constitution of 
 corps. 
 
 Your Committee, in agreement with the Government, do 
 not permit corps to keep their supernumerary company nor to 
 have workshops and magazines of their own. 
 
 General magazines are established in the district of the 
 regional Army Corps. From these magazines are filled the 
 sub-divisional magazines placed with the bocUes of troops. 
 
 From the subdivisional magazines the troops di'aw every- 
 thing that they need. 
 
 In whatever manner the articles stored in the general 
 magazines are made, whether by industrial enterprise or by 
 meaiis of civil and military Avorkmen m the workshops or 
 magazines of the State, or by both these systems, iii what- 
 ever manner the receiving of them is managed, which will be 
 determined by the law of administration, the important point 
 is, to free the corps from then- impedimenta, and to facilitate 
 their mobility by fixing in each regional sub-division, magazines 
 which cease to belong exclusively to any particular corps. 
 They can then serve both the active and territorial army. 
 
 Therefore companies, squadrons, batteries will no longer have 
 only one worlcman of each profession for keeping everything 
 in repair, nor corps only two or three workmen for great 
 repau'S. 
 
 The possibility of rapidly renewing stores now offered by 
 railways, mil make it unnecessary for the corps to take Avith
 
 29 
 
 tliem on campaigns more than such snpphes as they can 
 always renew rapidly. 
 
 One of the essential characteristics of tlio bill whicli is laid 
 before you, is this separation of magazines from the b(jdies of 
 troops ; stability given to the former and mobility gained by 
 the latter. The sub divisional magazines, according to Article 3 
 of the Bill of the Committee, are, in fact, exclusively regional 
 establishments, without sj)ecial connection with such regiments, 
 although placed near them. If the regiment changes its 
 quarters, the magazines work in the same way for the one 
 Avhich replaces it. 
 
 If the active battalions are mobilized the depot companies 
 which are permanent, existing in time of peace as in time of 
 war, remain with the magazines and can be directed as we have 
 said, in order to enrol men at disposal, and men of the reserve 
 who are not incorporated in the lighting army, also men of the 
 last class called, who have not yet received sufficient instruc- 
 tion. This battalion assumes then a double character of battalion 
 for reinforcement and for instruction. 
 
 This organisation makes it possible to save, in time of peace, 
 the fourth battalion proposed in the first Bill of the Govern- 
 ment, without in any way altering the constitution of the 
 fighting army. Besides the corps depots of which Ave have just 
 spoken. Article 22 of the order of the 3rd May, 1832, upon 
 service in the field, orders the formation for divisions and 
 armies of minor depots, destined to serve as halting and meeting 
 places for the detachments which are rejoining the army. 
 They cUstribute to these detachments men who have become 
 disposable, and in return receive from them men who have 
 ceased to be so. They comprise, as much as possible, hospitals 
 and convalescent establishments. 
 
 The question of whether it would be wise to keep this 
 organization has been given to your Committee to solve. It is 
 to be observed that in the old organization, the j^rincipal corps 
 depots were, in time of mobilization, to be moved to the base 
 of operation of the army to places and gai'visons sufficiently 
 Jar from the jjoiut of the operations of the army to insure that 
 they should not be exposed to frequent changes of place* This 
 is a measure of precaution winch gives the army time to 
 evacuate its magazmes m case of retreat, but it has on the 
 other hand a certain inconvenience. In case of an off"ensive 
 movement, it places between the Army Corps and its depot, a 
 distance greater in proportion as the offensive movement is 
 more decided, and more difficult to traverse in proportion 
 as the means of communication are more imperfect. Armies 
 are then obliged to establish between them and their first 
 bases of operations, an intermediary movable basis, which 
 serves, as says the regulation, for a meeting and halting- 
 point. 
 
 * Article 20 of the Regulationa of 1832 upou service iu the liekl.
 
 30 
 
 It is at tills second basis, wliicli is in constant relations on 
 the one side with the principal depots and, on the other with the 
 corps, that the detachments sent by these depots to the army 
 and received from it are assembled. 
 
 At this second basis there is not generally, (because of its 
 mobility), any permanent establishment, but the difficulty of 
 transporting the sick and wounded to any great distances, 
 makes it necessary to establish there sometimes temporary 
 hospitals and convalescent depots. 
 
 Then, if the army has taken from the enemy some important 
 fortress or military post to keep or to defend, before advancing 
 it establishes itself strongly upon these new lines, draws closer 
 its base of operation, and establishes there its store and 
 victualhng depots ; such is methodical war, in which the day's 
 march of an army is generally ten to twenty kilometres ; but, 
 since the invention of raihvays has made it possible to transport 
 quickly, to great distances, masses of troops and material, the 
 base of operation of the array can, without inconvenience, be 
 established and kept much further back from the line of mihtary 
 action. 
 
 The experience of the last war has shown us that there is 
 great danger in keeping the base too close ; an army exposes 
 itself thus to lose its depots and magazines at- the very begin- 
 ning of the hostiUties. Such a fate befelus at Metz, Strasbourg 
 and Luneville, where we had massed the greater part of our 
 resources. 
 
 To maintain the provisions of the law of 1832 scarcely 
 seems necessary for our new organization; the creation of 
 an etappen service, and the facilities offered for the transport 
 of the sick by the establishment of railways and the appoint- 
 ment of the special stores provided liy the society for the help 
 of the sick and wounded, will make it possible to collect from 
 each etappen establishment on the line of operations, the de- 
 tachments and stores sent from the depots to the army, and vice 
 versa ; also to transport the sick and wounded in a manner 
 which seems to be satisfactory. 
 
 But it is to be observed that the creation of minor depots arose, 
 not only from the necessity to have relays behind the corps, but 
 also from circumstances of war which can only be appreciated 
 by the authorities in command. The authorities might examine 
 if, in certain cases, this service ought to be amalgamated 
 with the etappen service, though, as a principle, it must be 
 maintained, even while detaching it from the hospitals and 
 convalescent depots which might be a special service. 
 
 Thus freed, the minor depots could follow more easily the 
 movements of the army, which they relieve of a part of its 
 impedimenta. If in particular cases they were amalgamated 
 with the etappen service, they might Avork with it to cover, in 
 the rear of the hne of military action, the heads of railway lines 
 in the stations of which are collected, upon wheels, stores for a 
 certain number of days for the Army Coi-ps that are operating
 
 31 
 
 in front. In case of retreat, they Avould protect tlio removal 
 of these stores. Although troops of reinforcement seem specially 
 intended, by their origin, each to fill the vacancies which occur 
 in the regiment that recruits its regional subdivision, your Com- 
 mittee thinks that the ties binding it to this regiment are not 
 such as to prevent it, in case of need, sending men of its 
 companies to any other regiment which has experienced very 
 great losses. 
 
 Foreseeing the natural objections which Commanders of 
 corps might make if their reinforcement were taken from them 
 to be sent to another corps, yom* Committee has thought it 
 necessary to establish, formally in the law,* the principle that 
 reinforcements, to whatever regions they belong, may be sent 
 by detachments mdiflferently to any army corps, accorchng to 
 the needs of these corps. The authorities in command will use 
 this privilege whenever they judge it necessary. 
 
 To this provision of Article 24, an objection has been made, 
 which we must not pass over m silence. 
 
 It is said that men for reinforcement thus distributed in corps 
 where they are not known, and the cadres of which they do not 
 know, will necessarily produce a weakness in the constitution 
 of those corps, all the more dangerous^ because the infusion 
 of a foreign element occurs at the very time when war 
 has already weakened them. To these objections it may be 
 replied : a corps suffers great loss in a battle ; the reinforcements 
 belong to its regional subdivision; are for the moment very 
 distant from it ; a new engagement is immment ; the neighbour- 
 ing corps has not suffered, it has with it its reinforcements, which 
 can, in a few hours, be incorporated with the weakened corps. 
 Would it be wise, then, to neglect this means of help, and leave 
 one part of the line of battle weakened^ rather than remforce 
 it with strange elements, whose military instruction is quite 
 sufficient to enable them to render good service ? AVhen two 
 regiments have suffered, and both are disabled, is there ever any 
 hesitation to join the men of one corps to those of the other, in 
 order to form a new regiment, except such as springs from the 
 doubt of being able later to make such a formation seem regular 
 in the eyes of the Government ? No ; Avithout doubt, gentle- 
 men, these practical considerations justify the dispositions pro- 
 posed by yom* Committee in Article 24 of this Bill. 
 
 § 12.— Special Bodies placed under Arms. 
 
 To the two categories — Fighting army, depot and rein- 
 forcement troops — under which we have mdicated the distri- 
 bution of the forces allotted to the composition of the army of 
 the field, there is to be added a special supplementary force. 
 
 Article G of the law upon recruiting has, in fact, foreseen the 
 creation of organized armed corps making part of the army 
 
 * Ai-ticle 2i.
 
 32 
 
 and submitted either to the Minister of War or tlie ]\Iinister of 
 Marine and it has placed these corps nnder mihtary law. 
 
 The first Bill of the Government* and that of the Com- 
 mittee agree to give the executive power the right to au- 
 thorise by Decree, but only in time of war, the formation of 
 these special corps, imposing upon them all obligations of 
 mihtary service, and subjecting them to the rules of inter- 
 nation nl law. 
 
 These articles ore introduced in order to prevent the return 
 of imhappy misimderstun dings which occurred in the last war, 
 during Avhich it is said tliat National Guards and Francs-tireurs 
 were shot by the enemy, because our military laws had not 
 given them the rights of belligerents. 
 
 The proposals made to you by your Committee are more 
 restricted than those of the first Government Bill, which im- 
 posed no condition on the creation of these special corps. In 
 this manner it Avould have become possible, at a given moment, 
 to reconstitute, legally, the old National Guard now sujDpressed 
 by a special laAv, and to authorise by a Decree the formation of 
 those bands of foreign adventurers who have^ during all the 
 worst epochs of our history, fallen upon France and, under pre- 
 text of defending her, fi'equently subjected her to devastation 
 and pillage. 
 
 Your Committee proposes to you only to authorise the 
 formation of these special corps during war, and when the men of 
 whom they are formed have already belonged to services 
 regularly organized in time of peace. 
 
 Strangers who aspire to the honour of serving France can 
 always do so in the Foreign Legion. 
 
 The plan of your Committee is to comprise, mider the general 
 heading of men belonging to organized services in time of 
 peace, pupils in the Government schools, those in piivate or 
 pubhc educational establishments, gardes champetres, forest- 
 rangers, men in the service of the custom-houses, octrois. 
 
 The fire brigades, in whose favour the law of June 27, 
 1872, made an' exception by reason of the signal servdces they 
 render and their daily proofs of devotion, engmeers, agents 
 and men employed in bridge, road, and mine services, or 
 in the departmental and municipal commission of public ways, 
 light -keepers of our ports or coasts, clerks of the semaphores, 
 engineers, guards, overseers, agents, and clerks in the railways 
 and telegraph services, sailors in the training schools and, gene- 
 rally, all men employed in corps constituted in time of peace. 
 Armed bodies that may be organized by commanders or 
 governors amongst the population in case of attack or siege, to 
 relieve sentries, to help in the works of defence of these towns 
 and places, are also to enjoy the privileges given to the 
 special corps, and to be subjected to the same obligations. 
 
 * Article 4-, Goverumeut Bill.
 
 33 
 
 SECOND SECTION-WORKING OF THE PROJECTED 
 ORGANIZATION. 
 
 After having slio^ai you, gentlemen, the most important 
 organs of that complex machine called the army, there remains 
 only to show you the worldng of it. 
 
 The interior constitution of bodies of troops, exercises no 
 great influence upon the general working of the military 
 organism. The conditions of this working remain the same 
 whether battalions are formed of 4, 6, or 8 companies, whether 
 regmients of cavahy comprise 5, 6, or a greater number of 
 squadrons, and those of artillery, 12, 14, or 16 batteries. That 
 is merely an affair of strength and of cadres, — important with- 
 out doubt, since it constitutes the chief element of the formation 
 of the War Budget, — but not pressing upon our immediate 
 attention in the statement of motives for a law of general 
 organization. We shall return to it later, when we are occupy- 
 ing ourselves with the interior constitution of the bodies of 
 troops, and presenting the old and new organization either from 
 a technical or jjecuniary point of view. 
 
 §1- 
 Distribution and Incorporation of Contingents. 
 
 The first act of the working of all military organization is 
 the distribution and incorporation of the contingent among 
 various corps of the army. Two methods of distribution have 
 been laid before youi* Committee and discussed by it ; they are 
 at the root of the system of organization itself. The first 
 consists of incorporatmg in the same corps all young soldiers 
 domiciled in the recruiting district corresponding to the corps. 
 This is what is called the regional system. It is used for all 
 German army corps except the Royal Guard, wliich recruits 
 over the whole territory. 
 
 The second consists of distributing indifferently among all 
 corps of the active army, young men of the last class without any 
 distinction of origin ; under this second system, which, m oppo- 
 sition to the first, we will call the national system, is avoided 
 even the incorporating of the men coming from the same de- 
 partment two years running in the same corps. 
 
 The defenders of the regional system, impressed perhaps too 
 much by the events of the last war, do not sufficiently consider 
 the nature of our pohtical institutions and our national character. 
 Insphed by the example of Germany, they see nothing better 
 than to copy the system to which they attribute the success of 
 oui- adversaries. 
 
 1st. — Historical. 
 
 The system of regional recruiting is not new ; it existed under 
 the old monarchy. At that time, if voluntary enlistments did 
 
 D
 
 34 
 
 not suffice, the army was completed by calling in the provincial 
 militias, and the regiments they served to form took either the 
 name of their province, their owner, or their chief. The organi- 
 zation was in harmony with our political and administrative 
 system, in which the provinces had a sort of autonomy, and it 
 is not astonishing that the similarity of the political institutions 
 of Prussia to this system should have led her to adopt the same 
 organization. 
 
 Monarchy had accomplished national unity from a territorial 
 point of view. The revolution accomplished it administra- 
 tively and politically, by administrative centralization ; mihtary 
 centralization was the consequence. Provincial raiUtias were 
 suppressed and the laws of 1792-93 decided that army corps 
 should for the future recruit over the whole territory. This 
 organization continued during the period of our great wars. The 
 regulations of 1815 which reorganized the army after foreign 
 powers had demanded its disbanding, returned to the system of 
 the old monarchy. The infantry was formed into 94 depart- 
 mental legions bearing the names of the departments where 
 they were organized. But, conscription having been abolished 
 by Article 12 of the Charta, the departmental legions could not 
 succeed in recruiting sufficiently by means of voluntary enlist- 
 ments. 
 
 The regulations of 1815 did not sufficiently consider the 
 great changes accomplished in our political and administrative 
 organization, and were a military anachronism. 
 
 In 1818 the law of Gouvion Saint-Cyr associated the national 
 system with the regional. The national active anny re- 
 cruited indiffiirently over the whole territory. The reserve only 
 was regional and formed of departmental corps of veterans. 
 However, the law of Gouvion Saint-Cyr was rather a law of 
 recruiting than a law of general organization. 
 
 The regulation of 25th October, 1820, returned to the prin- 
 ciples of the law of year VI, by suppressing the 94 departmental 
 legions to each of which the young sokhers of the department 
 were still in practice exclusively allotted as a transitory measure. 
 Since 1820 the young soldiers supplied by recruiting have been 
 always indifterently distributed among all the corps of the active 
 army ; and for that army the national system has prevailed. 
 
 We find the same system in the organization of 18(58, where, 
 in the spirit of the law of 1818, the regional system is apphed 
 to the Guard Mobile while the active army recruits over the 
 whole territory, but the former, corresponding m a measure to 
 the Prussian Landwehr, was only considered by the projector 
 of the law as an auxiliary or reserve to reinforce the active 
 army. Like the veterans of the law of Gouvion Saint-Cyr it 
 was not permanent, and we must not forget this side of its 
 organization. Unfortunately for France death prevented the 
 much-regretted Marshal Niel from carrying into practice the 
 military organization of which he had laid the foundation, and 
 which would perhaps have saved our country. The defenders
 
 35 
 
 of the two systems bring forward such serious reasons to support 
 their opinions that your Committee have found it very diific-ult to 
 decide without hesitation. Hesitation that has been all the 
 greater because it has it has been shared by the most competent 
 judges of military organization.* 
 
 We are about to lay before you the pruicipal among these 
 reasons. 
 
 2nd. — District Syatem. 
 
 The district system, say its defenders, is sanctioned by 
 experience and by the authority of Prussia after a trial of more 
 than 60 years. It has the advantage of offering greater facihties 
 than any other to rapid mobihzation. When we gi-oup young 
 men of the same pro\Tnce around the same flag, that flag 
 becomes to them the steeple of their callage church transported 
 to the camp, and, in a common danger, they learn to love it 
 more and to defend it with still greater devotion. There is 
 between young men who have been born on the same soil a 
 kind of moral tie and a feeling of joint responsibihty favourable 
 to the accomplishment of duty. When they return to their 
 homes, any one who has offended mihtary honour and aban- 
 doned liis comrades would be pohited out and, for the rest of 
 his hte, laid mider the ban of the public opinion. 
 
 Home thoughts are roused by tallvs at mess or in the 
 bivouac. Absence is more bearable, and there is less home sick- 
 ness. These remembrances increasing the energy of a young- 
 soldier, raise also his moral tone ; for men of one bu-th-place 
 exercise upon each other, even without knoAving it, a contrul 
 which their life in common makes impossible for them to 
 escape. And if the soldiers do not forget, neither are they 
 forgotten. When the troubles and dangei'S of war come, their' 
 families follow them in thought mto foreign lands, the village 
 concerts together to come to then* aid and send some alleviation 
 to the troubles" and suffering which the tenderness of mothers 
 and sisters always exaggerates because the sufferers are far 
 away. Between different corps on the battle-field springs up an 
 
 * Mormont, " On the Spirit of Military Institvitions," page 250. " It remains 
 " to be determined which is jji'eferable of these two systems ; to place in same regi- 
 " ments recruits from the same country, or to distribute them to ditferent corps. 
 " My opinion is in fayour of the first system." 
 
 We read in the note on page 52 of the same work, that the Council of War in 1828 
 considered this question. General Ambrugeac, one of the most distinguished olBicrs 
 of the army, reporter of the infantry council, proposed a mixed system, which, 
 creating an excellent reserve, solved the question in a perfectly satisfactory manner. 
 General Moraud (" L'Armee Scion la Chart e," page 6 and following) proposed io 
 recruit the army with young men from twenty to twenty-eight years old. After 
 three years of service, considered by the General as sufEcient for the instruction of a 
 soldier, to whatever arm he belongs, he is sent home, and may be recalled to active 
 service. France would have, besides, 200,000 men of from twenty-nine to thu-ty-six 
 years old organized by arms and battalions. 
 
 A permanent cadre would be charged with keeping up the instruction of men of 
 the active army who are in reserve in theii- homes ; they would be subjected to 
 exercises, and organized in a legion of reserve for tl e active army by battalions, 
 squadrons, and by districts. 
 
 D 2
 
 36 
 
 emulation fruitful in military success. Finally, dangers shared 
 under the same flag cause all differences of rank to disappear, and 
 give birth between poor and rich to fi-iendships which continue 
 in private life to the great profit of individuals and of society. 
 
 From this last point of view, the regional system completely 
 attains the end proposed by your recruitmg law when it pro- 
 claimed the great and salutary principle of personal obhgation 
 to military service for all citizens not exempted for physical 
 or moral reasons. 
 
 3rd. — Natio7ial System. 
 
 Partisans of the national system reply that the military 
 institutions of a country are only in a measure the corollary of 
 its political institutions. They say that Prussia and Germany 
 have been, and are still, but a collection of provinces working 
 together as a whole, or of confederate States with independent 
 Sovereigns and chstinct administrations. That with a political 
 and admmistrative organization without centraHzation, a 
 national centralized military organization would be out of 
 place. That if the district system has incontestable advan- 
 tages with regard to mobilization, all these advantages can be 
 obtained to the same extent without injuring the unity of the 
 active army, by a rational organization of the reserves destined 
 to fill up the corps of this army. 
 
 Then, is the advantage of receiving young men from the 
 same district into the same corps really as great as it is said to 
 be ? The men of one regiment, of one battalion, of one company, 
 even though recruited in the same country, do not necessarily 
 know each other. The people of one canton only occasionally 
 know those of the neighbouring canton ; they have often no 
 connection with them, either of business or pleasure ; if they meet 
 sometimes, it is on a fair-day or at market. If, between the 
 commune of the same cantons, interests are closer and connec- 
 tions more frequent, interests are sometimes opposed and con- 
 nections not always good. What becomes, then, of the advan- 
 tages of the joint responsibility attributed to district recruit- 
 ing ? For these advantages to be really great, the recruiting 
 must be communal instead of by districts, for it is only in the 
 same commune that there is real community of interests. Only 
 in the same commune do children meet together every day at 
 church to receive religious instruction, i*i the same village street 
 to share the same games, on the benches of the same school to 
 learn to read and write. Beyond the limits of the commune it 
 cannot be said that any real bonds between the men of 
 the contingent exist. Besides, these advantages, if they exist 
 to the extent generally supposed, can still be obtained in a 
 very large degree by incorporating into one corps the reserves 
 from one district when, at the moment of mobilization, they 
 come to double their force. 
 
 Do Ave not attach a somewdiat exaggerated importance to
 
 37 
 
 district recruiting? In the contrary system are to be f(jund 
 very real advantages. 
 
 Independently of dividing the losses in case of misfortune' 
 among the wlioJe national territory, instead of throT\dng all the 
 families of one district into mourning ; we find in the svstem of 
 national recruiting this advantage. It draws closer the bonds 
 of French unity, and gives to our troops a more uniform 
 bravery and solidity. The army ought to be one and national 
 like the nation itself. Otherwise, it no longer expresses the 
 nation. Norman and Breton must march beside Basque and 
 Provencal ; from the fusion of these various elements will 
 be obtained bodies of troops in which the qualities of indi- 
 viduals will counterbalance and complete each other. In 
 face of these opposed but equally serious arguments, your 
 Committee would have hesitated, gentlemen, before it proposed 
 to you to distribute the annual contingent indifferently among 
 all the corps of the active army, if it had not found itself on 
 this point in perfect accord Avith the Government, and if it had 
 not been led to this decision by particular considerations which 
 it was impossible not to take into account. 
 
 Since the revelations of the inquiry into the acts of the 
 Government of the 4th of September, and the separatist ten- 
 dencies then brought to light, it cannot but be doubted whe- 
 ther provincial spirit can be trusted with the maintenance of 
 French unity; and the terrible events of 1871 were not of a 
 nature to lesson this legitimate doubt. It was not possible 
 under such conditions to think of forming each of our army 
 corps out of elements drawn exclusively from the same district. 
 The national system therefore forced itself on your Com- 
 mittee, at lea^ for the recruiting of the active army, as a 
 necessity of our present situation and as the consequence of 
 our political constitution and of our national unity which we 
 must guard at all cost. 
 
 But, while not proposing you to adopt for the recruiting of 
 the active army, a district system which would expose us to 
 dangers not to be disregarded, your Committee think that 
 France must not be deprived of the incontestable advantages 
 which this system presents for the rapid mobilization of the 
 army ; they propose to you, therefore, to adopt a mixed system, 
 which makes it possible to avoid the disadvantages and to 
 realize the advantages of both the others. Under this system, 
 the corps of the active army receive their recruits indifferently 
 from all parts of the national territory, and complete their 
 strength at the moment of mobilization by the incorporation of 
 the men at disposal* and of the reservef of the active army, 
 domiciled in the territorial region where these corps are gar- 
 risoned. To this end, men, who have served in the ranks 
 of the active army the time required by the law, and then 
 returned to their homes, are, on their arrival, enrolled by care of 
 
 * Article 42 of the Recruit iug Law. t Article 43 of the same law.
 
 38 
 
 the cliief of tlie recruiting office in the nearest corps to their 
 place of domicile, and, if possible, in a regiment of the arm with 
 which they have already served. 
 
 For each of the corps of the region a special Hst is kept of 
 these registered men. A copy of this list is given to the 
 corps, so if the corps changes garrison, it has nothing to do but 
 give the list to the corps that replaces it. As barrack accom- 
 modation makes it necessary for garrisons to be invariably 
 allotted to corps of the same arm, every man of the reserve 
 knows thus the place where he is to go in case of recall, and 
 is not obliged to trouble himself about any changes of gamson 
 which may take place between the corps. This arrangement 
 gives great mobihty to bodies of troops without in any way 
 affecting rapichty of mobilization. 
 
 The system indicated in Article 11 of the Bill we have the 
 honour to submit to you is not new. It is found in the pro- 
 positions made by General dAmbrugeac to the chief council of 
 war in 1828,* and m the writings of General Moraud.f 
 
 Your Committee regretted not to see the proposals for it 
 republished in the first Bill laid before you by the Government. 
 They felt great satisfaction m coming to an agreement with 
 the Government on this point, for it may be said that all the 
 force of the BiU is m Article 11, and that the adoption or rejec- 
 tion of this Article implies necessarily the adoption or rejection 
 of the Bill itself, all the remainder being only of secondary im- 
 portance compared with the i-apithty of mobilization wliich is 
 the chief object of our new miHtary organization. 
 
 § II. — Mobilization. 
 
 Everyone was struck by the rapidity T\dth which the Gennan 
 army from the beginnmg of the war invaded our territory, 
 with very superior forces that enabled him to manoeuvre 
 round oiu* scarcely formed armies, to suiTOund them, and anni- 
 hilate them before they had collected thoir forces and stores. 
 
 We have naturally been led to think, says the expose des 
 motifs of the first Bill presented by the Government, that 
 rapidity of mobilization depends upon keeping soldiers, officers 
 and Generals close to each other and to their stores, so as to be 
 ready to march on the first order. 
 
 * "Manuscript Eeports of the Sittings of the Chief Council-of- War," pages 121 
 to 142. Sitting of April 1, 1828, see note to page 75 of the " Eeport upon the Ee- 
 " cruiting Law" of M. le Vicomte de Chasseloup-Lauhat (" Archives de la Gruerre"), 
 
 t " A'Armee d'api'es la Charte," page 7 and following : — 
 
 The active army, composed of soldiers recruited from all parts of the territory, 
 only retains the men with the colours for three years, after which they are sent to 
 their homes, where they are organised in legions according to their departments, 
 and in battalions or squadrons according to their arrovdissejnents, in order to be 
 drilled as battaUons every three months, and to be mauceuvred as legions twice a 
 year. In case oT mobilization, the regiments of the active army will receive no more 
 recruits. The recruits are carried to the war account, with the soldiers drawn from 
 the legions in which the recruits are placed to receive instruction. 
 
 A soldier belonging to a legion need not necessarily, in case of recall, be sent to 
 a regiment where he received his instruction. To spare the expense and time of 
 travelUng, he may be sent to the nearest regiment.
 
 3.9 
 
 The Government considered that tliis view was a mistaken 
 one. It recognised readily that the proximity of all the 
 elements for the formation of army corps and ai-mies, might 
 have had sometliiiig to do with the rapid mobilization of the 
 German army, but it considered that the true reason of this 
 promptitude was to be found in the pre-existence of an 
 organization constantly maintained, incessantly exercised and 
 provided with all its war material? What the Government 
 considers to be hurtfal to rapidity of mobilisation in our army 
 of 1870, was not that a man residing at Marseilles was obliged 
 to come fi'om thence to Verdun or Chalons in order to rejoin 
 his corps, which after all is but a small loss of time since the 
 creation of railways, but that when that man arrived at his 
 destination he did not find there a corps alread}^ formed — 
 brigades and divisions constituted with their staffs, then ad- 
 ministrative, and auxiliary services, and then- stores.*' 
 
 The Government considers the difficulty was not the massing 
 of the men, but the want of previous organization. According 
 to its view, it mattered little whether men of the reserve had to 
 travel ten leagues or 150. 
 
 Your Committee could not share this sentiment to which the 
 experience of facts gives no sanction. If we turn to months 
 July and August of 1870, and examme the official documents 
 we find that the brigades and divisions of the Army of the 
 Rhine had been already estabhshed and concentrated; that 
 the army corps themselves were organized and provided with 
 their various ser\dces, if not completely, at least in part ; that 
 the operations of war were in full activity and that we had 
 been already beaten at Wissenbourg, Froeschviller and 
 Spicheren, before oui- reserves were able to join the corps to 
 which they belonged. 
 
 It cannot then be said that the want of a previous formation 
 in brigades, divisions, and army corps was the cause of the 
 delay of the mobilization of the army in 1870. We must look 
 elsewhere for the causes, and we find then, independently of 
 the confusion existmg between mobilization and concentration, 
 which should be two distinct operations, the former always 
 preceding the latter. 
 
 First. In the excessive centralization of the IMinister of War, 
 from whom all orders necessarily came, and whose offices kept 
 the command m strict tutelage, and allowed it no initiative 
 in the preparations. 
 
 Secondly, In the insufficiency of the recruiting service 
 which had but one centre of mobilization in the capital of the 
 department and took no less than 14 days to send off 163,000 
 men of the reserve, not to their corps but to its depot. 
 
 Thirdly. In the obligation imposed on a man of the reserve, 
 living for instance at Strasbourg, whose corps is already con- 
 stituted in brigades and divisions in that town, to go to the 
 
 * Page 11, Goverument Bill.
 
 40 
 
 depot of his regiment at Bayonne, there to get his clothing, 
 equipment and arms, and then to come back to Strasbourg. 
 
 Fourthly. In the difficulty of dispatcliing orders to 5,000 or 
 0,000 individuals through the complex channels of the hierarchy; 
 of starting these men off separately, without organization, 
 without direction, without chiefs ; above all the difficulty ot 
 keepmg them together and making them arrive at their des- 
 tination. And it must not be thought a matter of indifference 
 whether they travel 10 leagues or 150 leagues. Experience 
 has sufficiently demonstrated the contrary, and the opinion of 
 your Committee upon this point is confirmed by that of the 
 Marquis Latour Maubourg, who in his report to the King, upon 
 the organization of the French army, October 23rd, 1820,* 
 expresses himself as follows : — " The constant call to service 
 " of young soldiers of different classes gives occasion for con- 
 " siderable expense by the necessity of sending them to the 
 " legion of their departmentf which is often stationed at a 
 " great distance, whereas it would be easy to distribute them 
 " among the corps stationed in the military division to which 
 " their department belongs. Experience proves on this point 
 " that by diminishing the distances to be traversed by young 
 " soldiers in order to join their corps, Tve obtain, besides a 
 " reduction in the expenses, the advantage of fewer deserters." 
 
 The first of the causes to which we have attributed the 
 slowness of mobilization in our army may be lessened by modi- 
 fjdng the duties and powers of the Minister of War, and trans- 
 ferring to the Generals commanding the army corps, part of 
 the authority and the duties still centralised in his office. 
 
 Generals commanding army corps invested with more 
 extensive powers may be made res^^onsible for the instruction, 
 discipline and administration of the troops placed under their 
 command, as well as for those measures whose object is to 
 ensui-e rapidity of mobilization. And in whose hands can the 
 care of preparing troops for war be better placed than in those 
 of the general officers who are to command them in war, and 
 whose mihtary honour is staked upon then* thorough preparation. 
 
 By organizing and multiplying centres of mobilization, 
 and by detaching magazines from corps, the slowness of mus- 
 ters will be remedied, and magazines and recruiting offices 
 win be put within reach of the men of the reserve. The 
 third and most grave cause of delay in mobilization will be 
 done away with by fixing in garrison towns tlie magazines of 
 the corps ; the magazines will thus become regional establish- 
 ments and will no longer belong especially to one regiment. 
 
 Fixed in a garrison these magazines will supply indifferently 
 all regiments of the same arm that succeed each other there. 
 The corps fi-eed from their imjyedimejita "will be rendered more 
 
 * Official Military Journal, tlie first half year, 1820, page 168. 
 + Legions were recruited exclusively with men domiciled in the region where 
 they had been formed, aud of which they bore the name.
 
 41 
 
 moHle, and the Treasury will be spared a great expense of 
 transport. 
 
 Thus, men of the reserve when they are recalled will find 
 with their corps everything necessary for equipment wnthout 
 any loss of time, and it Avill no longer be necessary to detach 
 transport cadres to receive them and transport them to their 
 corps, smce the corps will be on the spot. 
 
 It was proposed to the Committee to continue to attach 
 magazines to their corps as they are at present, in order that 
 the corps might be considered responsible for the magazmes, 
 and transfer them to the next corps succeeding them in the 
 garrison ; this transfer was a very great, and Avliat is more, 
 a completely useless complication. Your Committee think 
 that this transfer was not free from inconveniences, and it 
 seems to them, that the authors of the proposition had not suffi- 
 ciently considered the number and variety of objects in store, 
 which, with the increase of the number of soldiers, would 
 render the transfer of these magazines very long and veiy 
 difficult, and might lead to incessant quarrels between the 
 different corps. 
 
 For this reason yoiu- Committee do not propose to you 
 to accept this system, any more than that which consists 
 of fixing the corps themselves in their garrisons with their 
 magazines, according to the system in use in Germany, 
 We have already shown you the inconvenience of such a 
 plan. Whatever organization we may decide to adopt for 
 the depots of troops, it seems to us impossible, remembei-ing 
 the events of the late war, to keep, with effectives three times 
 as great as those we had to mobilize in 1870, a system of 
 mobilization that was our ruin and the chief difficulty of the Bill 
 presented by the Government. 
 
 This system you know, gentlemen, consists in recalhng a 
 man of the reserve, wherever he may he living, to the corps m 
 which he has already served, wherever it may he stationed. 
 That is to say, a man hving at Antibes will join his regiment 
 at Dunkirk, while one of his comrades living at Dunkirk ^^nW. 
 join at Antibes. Himdreds of thousands of cases of this ex- 
 pensive and useless chasse-croise constantly occur, and you 
 might see again trains full of men crossing each other in every 
 direction from one end of France to the other, arriving often 
 at their place of destination when the corps to which they 
 belonged had already left it, then ol)liged to fi)lIow this corps 
 to find it perhaps beaten, in retreat, or invested in a fortress 
 where they could not rejoin it. 
 
 These are not suppositions, gentlemen, they are facts made 
 famihar to us all by the last campaign.* Besides the loss of 
 
 * The 26th regiment of the line, which belonged to the 6th corps of the army of 
 the Rhine, had to draw the greater part of its reserve from tlie department of the 
 Moselle, the latter had been sent to the depot of this regiment at Chorbourg, there 
 to get to tlieir habiliments, equipments, and arms ; they were afterwards dispatched 
 to Metz, where the greater part did not arrive till after the investment of the place.
 
 42 
 
 time it necessitates, tliis system of mobilization, under wWch 
 men set out separately from their homes, presents another 
 great danger. These men, "without surveillance and without a 
 chief, produce disorder and indisciphne everywhere on the 
 journey and m their corps when they reach it. It is difficult 
 to keep them on their road, and as M. Latour Maubourg has 
 so well said, to make them arrive surely at their destination. 
 The rapid collection together of men is not the only thing 
 necessary for mobilization, but this rapidity is one of its most 
 essential elements and that sul)ject to the greatest number 
 of accidents. An accident to the railway Hne, to a bridge, 
 an insufficient number of carriages, may stop the service of the 
 line — men isolated or without chiefs to keep them together 
 disperse, tune is lost in getting them together again, trains 
 succeed each other, the line is encumbered, and no fui'ther 
 progress can be made.* 
 
 Unfortunately all our railway Hues have not double tracks, 
 there are changes of line and stoppages, and the greater the 
 traffic the greater the loss of time. Is it not then more logical, 
 and at the same time more practical and less expensive, to 
 incorporate men beforehand in the corps nearest to their place 
 of residence ? With the system proposed to you by your Com- 
 mittee, men of the reserve are mustered at the centres of 
 mobilization of the sub-division in which they live. To join, 
 they have but a short distance to go. They find there the 
 corps to which they belong, they are immediately incorporated, 
 they receive their clothing, equipment, and arms from the 
 magazine of the garrison. And if when they were dispersed to 
 their homes, they left their arms and knapsacks at that 
 magazine, they find them there again and receive them back. 
 Thus, whether their kits become the property of the men, and 
 are kept for them in the magazine during the time that they 
 spend in theu' homes, or whether the kits, if the men have 
 not served their regulation time, are given to others, the 
 proposed system of mobilization is exactly the same in both 
 cases. In one case as in the other, what is of real importance 
 is that there is no loss of time. 
 
 Besides, men of the reserve have already been recalled for 
 manoeuvres at the epochs fixed by the recruiting law or by minis- 
 terial decisions. Mobilization is thus for them only a repetition 
 of a movement they have already executed several times and 
 in which, therefore, there can be no difficulty. Distances 
 being much reduced, chances of accident and disorder are 
 avoided. 
 
 Finally there is more certainty that the men of the reserve 
 shall join then- corps. 
 
 The corps being mobilized, can be sent in order to the 
 
 * The P. L. M. Company informed the Minister ofWar, after the 9th of August, 
 1870, that the line was so encumbered it could no longer undertake the work of 
 transport further than Besancjon.
 
 43 
 
 points of concentration indicated beforehand. The spirit of 
 order is, unfortunately, not one of the attributes of our national 
 character, and it is all important to us to prevent, at the 
 moment of taking the field, a disorder we can never stop 
 when once it is introduced into our camp. This disorder we 
 saw in 1870, and we should certainly see again. 
 
 One of the most serious arguments adduced in support of 
 the maintenance of the old state of things, is the advantage 
 of sending a man back to the C(^rps in which he has already 
 served, where he wall find his old commanders and comrades 
 whom he knows and by whom he is knoAvn. We recognise at 
 once that this is a great advantage. It would have been 
 attained by adopting completely the district system of Ger- 
 many, and we sho^^ld not have hesitated to propose it to you 
 if the considerations we have had the honour to submit to you 
 had not dissuaded us. We must not, however, exaggerate this 
 advantage. 
 
 Taking into consideration chances of advancement, the 
 method generally adopted of making officers change from one 
 corps to another when they are promoted, and the short 
 duration of service, it is probable that, after having been for 
 some yea,rs away from a corps, a man would no longer turd, 
 when he returned to it, any of his old comrades. 
 
 Such is the opinion of your Committee, and they are 
 strengthened in it, by the opinion of General Morand, who 
 expresses himself as follows on this subject :* — 
 
 " A soldier admitted into a legion need not necessarily, in 
 *' case of recall, be sent to the regiment in which he received 
 " his education. He may be sent to any other designated by 
 " the Minister, and to spare the expense and time of travelling 
 " to the regiment nearest to the region in which he lives." 
 
 It must not be forgotten also that men dismissed to remain 
 at disposal, or to the reserve of the active army, are submitted 
 to reviews and to exercises, prescribed by a ministerial regulation, 
 or subjected during their time of service in the reserve, to take 
 part in two manoeuvi'es, each of which may last four weeks. f 
 
 Men being, on tlieii- return to their homes, enrolled in one 
 of the corps of the region to which they belong, "udll join this 
 corps in case of manoeuvres. They will not therefore be 
 strangers to each other. According to the first plan of the 
 Government, on the contrary, these musters and these ma- 
 noeuvi-es, so important for keeping alive a military spirit 
 among the members of the reserve, while they are at the same 
 time exercises in mobilization, could not take place without 
 costing the Treasury heavy travelling expenses. Hence it is 
 almost certain they would have been given up. 
 
 We have, gentlemen, laid side by side before you two 
 systems of mobilization, one proposed by the fii'st Government 
 
 * " L'Armee Selon la Charte," page 46. 
 
 t Articles 42 and 43 of the Recruiting Law,
 
 44 
 
 Bill, the other by your present Committee and the Minister of 
 War. 
 
 Having shown you the reasons that have made us give 
 preference to the latter, we must now show you its action. 
 After having served his time in the active army, a soldier, 
 whether dismissed to be at disposal, or to the reserve of the 
 active army, ceases to belong to the corps in which he has 
 served,* no matter to what arm he belongs. 
 
 He is sent to the depot of the regional sub-division of the 
 district in which he wishes to establish his home. On his 
 arrival he is enrolled by the recruiting service in one of the 
 corps of the region, and, if possible, in a corps of the arm 
 in which he has served; he receives a paper, mforming him 
 of the garrison and the corps he is to join in case of mobiliza- 
 tion, or for the manoeuvres; if convenient, he leaves his kit 
 and equipment at the magazines, then returns to his home. 
 
 As soon as they receive their recalling order, the men 
 recalled go separately to the corps and place of garrison 
 indicated to them, never very far from their place of resi- 
 dence. They there find the battalion, squadron, or battery, 
 in which they have been enrolled. There they receive their 
 clothing, equipment and arms, — new, if the resources of the 
 magazine allow of it, — otherwise they receive back again the 
 kit and equipment they left there when they returned to their 
 homes. We have already pointed out that the magazines of 
 the regional sub-divisions, or their branch establishments, do 
 not belong especially to any regiment or any battalion, l)ut 
 that they are, on the contrary, regional establisliments, work- 
 ing as centres of mobilization independently of the regiments. 
 Hence, a regiment can change garrison without obliging the 
 men of its reserve to rejom. Thus we escape unnecessary loss 
 of time, and avoid falling into the vice of the old system of 
 mobilization, which obliged a man to go to the depot of his 
 corps for his equipment and arms before he could rejoin. Here 
 the depot, the magazine, and the corps, are united in the same 
 place, the magazine alone being fixed. This system may be 
 reproached with not insuring that a man of the reserve shall 
 be enrolled in the regiment Avith which he has served during 
 one or two manoeuvres, for the corps may have quitted the 
 garrison and been replaced by another corps of the same 
 arm a few months or even a few days before the issue of 
 order for mobilization. True, but changes of garrison will 
 be less frequent than they used to be; they will only take 
 place exceptionally, and for reasons determined by the com- 
 mander of the army corps. . It Avill be most probable that 
 members of the reserve will find the corps with which they 
 
 * Article 43 of Recruiting Law. It is understood that if he has served in one 
 of the corps of the region where he lives, which happens very frequently to men of 
 the second part of the contingent, who liave only six months or a year to serve in 
 the active army, he will continue on the strength of the regiment in which he has 
 served.
 
 45 
 
 have already served still in tlie same garrison, and were it 
 otherwise, we must not attach too great consequence to their 
 not doing so. What is really important is, that in mobilization 
 not a moment shall be lost. 
 
 It may also happen that a region in consequence of its 
 topographical configuration, the nature of its soil and of its 
 pojDulation, may not be able to finnish all the reserve necessary 
 to the mobilization of the brigades of cavalry or of artillery of 
 its army corj^s, and that it may be obliged to borrow part of 
 the reserve of these two arms fi'om the neighbouring regions 
 where perhaps they are in excess. Here we have one of the 
 reasons that have made the Prussian regional system seem to 
 your Committee not entirely applicable to France. In a case ot 
 this kind members of the reserve who exceed the requirements 
 of the army corps of their region "svill be enrolled by tlie recruit- 
 ing office of their district, not in corps of their district but in 
 the nearest regiment of their arm belonging to the neighbouring 
 army corps. The recruiting services of the two army corps 
 will arrange the matter together. 
 
 Foreseeing these accidents, the difference between the 
 strength of the peace and war footmg of the cavalry and 
 artillery is less than that of the other arms. 
 
 We have tried to facilitate the mobilization of these corps 
 by incorporating a smaller number of reserve at the moment of 
 mobilization, hoping thus always to be able to find enough in 
 each region. 
 
 Your Committee would not have hesitated to propose to 
 maintain the cavalry always on a war footing if the expense 
 had not been too great, and if what was spent in this manner 
 Avould not have had the consequence of reducing the peace 
 effective of the infantry, already so weak. Rapidity of mobi- 
 lization is indeed more important for cavalry than for any 
 other arm, for it must be immediately sent to the extreme 
 front, in order to cover the operations of mobilization, recon- 
 noitre the army that is forming, keep close to the enemy to 
 pick up information of his preparations, and, above all, to 
 prevent his scouts from penetrating into our own coiTntry. 
 
 It is only when the mobilization of the active army is com- 
 pleted that the depot cadres of the corps are increased by means 
 of officers at disposal on the rethed list, on half-j)ay, or auxiliary, 
 and of non-commissioned officers or corporals of the reserve, and' 
 divided so as to officer the men who, remaining in excess after 
 mobilization, constitute troops of reinforcement. It is also in 
 these depots that the mstruction of the last class called in is 
 continued, and that of men exempted from service, but liable to 
 be called in vu-tue of Article 26 of recruiting law, is begun. 
 
 It may be objected to the permanent maintenance of a 
 depot cadre in infantry corps, that if, as seems rational, the 
 Minister distributes, druing peace, all soldiers of the last 
 class among the active battalions, in order to leave the care 
 and responsibility of instructing their men to the commanders
 
 46 
 
 of companies, equadi'ons, or batteries, the cadre will have 
 nothing to do. 
 
 This wonld be a mistake, for, independently of the branches 
 of instruction that may be confided to it as well as to active 
 companies, the cadre can be used for can-ying out the provjsions 
 of paragraph 2, Article 42, of the recruiting law, which subjects 
 men at disposal to be reviewed and exercised. Part of these 
 cadres, in the capitals of cantons, in the regional sub-divisions, 
 might even be detached (as some officers beg) without too 
 much expense, for a certain time at that part of the year when 
 agricultural work presses least, in order to give some fii-st 
 instruction close to their own homes, to young men who are 
 dispensed from service, but bound to undergo certain exercises 
 by Article 25 of the law on recruiting. 
 
 The detailed provisions of the Bill of your Committee ofier 
 the means of carrying out all the dispositions of the law on 
 recruiting. 
 
 §111. 
 Requisitions and Damages in case of Mobiijzation and 
 Manceuvres. 
 
 It is readily understood that it would be as impossible to 
 keep up during peace the full number of horses and carts for 
 the service of the Army as it would be to keej) up the full 
 strength of men without ruining our budget. 
 
 It has therefore seemed necessary to the Government and 
 to your Committee to take such measm^es as will ensm-e the 
 recruiting of horses and carts at the moment of the mobilization 
 of the Army.* 
 
 A preliminary census of private horses, mules, and carts 
 seemed the simplest method of providing for it. This plan, in 
 use in Germany,! is just, and the stipulation of an indemnity 
 brings it into harmony with our laws, which obhge every French- 
 man to sacrifice his property when public interest requires it. 
 
 By this means it will be possible to reduce, to a very great 
 extent, the number of horses and mules for the active Army 
 dming peace ; tliis plan seems better than the present one, 
 by which the horses and mules belonging to the State are 
 placed under the charge of farmers in order to free the budget 
 of war from the cost of their keep. These animals are certainly 
 not so w^ell taken care of as if they belonged to the farmers 
 themselves. In case of death the State bears the loss, xmless 
 there is any gross fault on the part of the person with whom 
 
 * The army requires, in order to pass from a peace to a war footing, 175,000 horses 
 for aU arms. No census having been yet made, it is impossible to know if the method 
 proposed by the committee will provide them all. We may, however, hope that it 
 will, for the Prussians have already made this census in the yielded provinces, and 
 they have found that the one-seventh part of the horses would be sufficient for their 
 wants. 
 
 t On the 30th of last May the Reichstag voted a Law in 34 Articles upon eveiy 
 kind of assistance to be furnished by the country in time of war. (See "Revue 
 " MiUtaire de I'Etranger," Fo. 106 of 16th June).
 
 47 
 
 the horse is phiced. The State also suffers by the diminution 
 of value made in this capital by each year's work. It would 
 only seem wise to maintain the present system for a strength 
 reduced to Avhat is strictly necessary for the manoeuvres which 
 are to take place every year. The partial mobilization required 
 for them would not authorise the application of the requisitions 
 made legal by Article 13 of the Government Bill, and Article 25 
 of that of the Committee. Although thus limited, the right of 
 requisition given to the Government by the law of organization 
 has raised objections on the part of some of our colleagues, 
 who are justly pre-occupied with the interests of the agricul- 
 tural population to whom draught or pack horses are the instru- 
 ments of then- w^ork. These gentlemen feared, at first, that in 
 consequence of the pro\asions of Article 34 of the Recruiting 
 Law, proprietors, in case they wished to sell their animals, 
 would be obHged to declare the fict, which would bs a restric- 
 tion to commerce, and perhaps injure the breeding and raising 
 of horses. 
 
 They asked if the animals would be enrolled beforehand in a 
 particular corps, Hke the men, as was suggested by the first 
 Bill of the Government and by the first edition of that of the 
 Committee. They observed, that in this case the apphcation of 
 the law would be made impossible by the difficulty of keeping- 
 registers of enrolment, in consequence of the constant movement 
 of the animals from one place to another. In order to satisfy 
 these well-founded objections, your Committee intend it to be 
 understood that the declaration of change of place, however 
 desirable it may be, shall not be obHgatory upon the proprie- 
 tors, who vnll remain perfectly free, as before, in commercial 
 transactions. They will be bound by no other obligation than 
 that of facilitating a census made by military authority, because 
 the census made for the establishment of the assessment of the 
 tax upon horses and carriages would not be sufficient. It is neces- 
 sary for the military authority to know and note down, not only 
 the number but also the size and form of the horses, and their 
 aptitude for the various services of the Army, as well as the de- 
 scription of carriages, and the services for which they are most fit. 
 
 Article 13 of the Government Bill and Article 30' of that of the 
 Committee agree m giving the Government right of requisition 
 on condition of indemnity. A first edition of the Bill added to 
 the word " indemnity," those of " equal to their value." These 
 words have disappeared in the final edition, for the law only 
 means to give to the owner of a fancy horse requisitioned for 
 the service, an indemnity representing what the State would 
 have paid for the horse, and not the fancy price which its owner 
 may fix upon it. Though the owner may have paid 3,000 
 or 4,000 francs for the horse, the indemnity will be fixed at 
 1,200 francs, if this last figure is the price given by the State 
 for horses of the same arm as that for which this animal is 
 requu-ed. 
 
 The Bill of the Committee, going still fm-ther, proposes that
 
 48 
 
 the fixing of the price and the payment shall be decided by an 
 order of public administration. Some members of the Com- 
 mittee have expressed fears as to the legality of this arrange- 
 ment. Considering the right of requisition as a veritable right 
 of appropriation, they had expressed an opinion that this right 
 can only be given to the Government by a special law. 
 
 Our reply to the objection is, that the right of requisition is 
 nothing new in our country. Always, during war, the armies 
 have had recourse to requisition, and Article 15 of the Order of 
 the 3rd of May, 1832, upon Service in the Field, invests Gene- 
 rals commanding armies or army corps with the right of 
 making requisitions in kind eveii upon French terriitory. 
 
 The law of April 29th, 1792, determmes the method of 
 these requisitions and the payment of the indemnities to 
 be granted to the proprietors of the requisitioned horses and 
 carriages. 
 
 We should, however, remark that the pro^dsions of this law 
 apply more particularly to temporary requisitions, and that 
 they bear more the character of hiring by contract than of pur- 
 chasing. Nothing, however, in the law of 1792 limited the 
 duration of the hiring, and it was in the power of the military 
 authorities to retain the things hii-ed. For the proprietors, 
 thus left in uncertainty, this discretionary power was certainly 
 more severe than an actual deprivation, which would have 
 enabled them to return home, bearing with them an indemnity 
 always calculated on a liberal scale. 
 
 But the law of the 29th of April was not executed without 
 great opposition. Proprietors declared that only military autho- 
 rity was invested with the right of requisition, and they refused 
 to comply with requisitions made upon them, in its name, by 
 the civil powers of a district. 
 
 The resistance was so great that a new law, of the 24th 
 of June, had to be issued in the same year, to smooth the 
 difficulty. _ ■ 
 
 We have told you, gentlemen, that the application of the 
 law of the 29th of August, 1872, gave rise to some difficulties. 
 You will easily understand what might be the consequences of 
 legal resistance, at the moment of mobilization, if as in 1792, 
 a new law were necessary in order to surmount them. Your 
 Committee think that the Government and military authority 
 must now be strongly armed, and must be permitted, without 
 having recourse to assemblies, to explain or change anything 
 that may be obscure or uncertain in the dispositions in force. 
 These dispositions, if you agree with us in this matter, vnW. 
 be imposed by an order of public administration, till a BiU can 
 be submitted to your consideration. 
 
 Your Committee recognize, however, that the same con- 
 siderations of urgency cannot be brought forward in support of 
 the dispositions of Article 28 of the Bill, which give to an 
 order of public administration the care of deciding the 
 method of valuing the damage done to properties by the man-
 
 49 
 
 oeuvres of the troops, as well as the payment of indemnities duo 
 to the OAvners. 
 
 The dispositions seem, indeed, to bear upon the general 
 principles laid down by the law of 3rd May, 1841, upon ap- 
 propriation and npon the special case foreseen by the law of 
 March 30th, 1831, relative to temporary occupation, in case of 
 m'gency, for military Avorks — an outrage which, at first sight, 
 doss not seem sufiiciently justified, either by m-gency or by 
 considerations of public benefit, since Ave are noAV in perfect 
 peace. 
 
 But he who desires the end must not reject the means. 
 With the formalities insisted upon by the present laws, 
 manoeuvres are impossible. Our German neighbours have per- 
 fectly understood this, and the dispositions we propose to you 
 to adopt ha\'e been borrowed from them. They have apphed 
 them in the manoeuvi'es executed by then- troops, near Keims, 
 upon land of great A^alue, and the OAvners have had no cause of 
 complaint. It seems, also, better for these proprietors to be 
 indemnified forthA\'ith, than to proceed before the conseils de 
 prefecture for the regulation and pajmient of the damage 
 suffered by theh land, and go thi'ough formalities affordmg, 
 perhaps, better protection, but more slowly, and, aboA^e all, 
 at a greater cost. 
 
 Experience will shoAV the cost of these new proceedings, 
 and, if it can be decided by legislatiA^e arrangement, an order of 
 public administration Avill make no difficulty. 
 
 According to the statement laid before you, you see, 
 gentlemen, that the plan of miUtary organization Ave have had 
 the honour to submit to you, rests upon tln-ee principal bases : — 
 
 1st. Preparation. 
 
 2nd. Distribution of recruits in gi'oups, and the reunion of 
 these groujis under one initiatory force, Anz. : — The 
 Command, — bound to insure their military efficiency by 
 training and their material existence by administration. 
 
 3rd. Finally, a mobilization Avhicli enables the army, at any 
 giA^en moment, to increase its strength rapidly from the 
 minimum made necessary by economy in the time of 
 peace, to the maximum of power needful for Avar. 
 
 These three great divisions we shall find in the drawing up 
 of the Bilk 
 
 THIRD SECTION.-DISCUSSION OF THE BILL, 
 
 After having, under the first head, provided for preparation 
 by organizing the territory into regions and subdiA^sions of 
 of regions, the Bill, imder Head II, defines the Command and 
 Administration. 
 
 The organization haAmig been roughly sketched. Head III 
 regulates its action by treating of incorporation and mobiliza- 
 
 E
 
 50 
 
 tion. Head IV relates to the organization of the territorial 
 army. Head V comprises detail and transitory arrangements. 
 
 HEAD I. 
 
 § 1st. Division of Territory. — Composition of Army Corps. 
 
 Article 1 of the Bill divides the territory of France into 18 
 regions, and each of these regions into a certain number of sub- 
 divisions. The duty of carrying out these divisions is left to 
 the Government. They will be determined according to the 
 recruiting resources, and the exigencies of mobilization, by an 
 order of public administration. 
 
 The working of our recruiting 8er\acc is based upon depart- 
 mental cu-cumscription. In fixing the limits of military regions, 
 we must then avoid, as much as possible, cutting up one 
 depai-tment or dividing it between several regions, in order that 
 we may not complicate connections, nor place the recruit- 
 ing service under several commanders. The thing seems 
 possible, because as the formation of the fighting army does not 
 absorb all our recruiting resources at the moment of mobili- 
 zation, the surplus may famish means of equalizing the 
 strength of the fighting corps of the same region ; the troops of 
 reinforcement alone being unequally supplied. It is, of com'se, 
 understood that, when particular circumstances make it neces- 
 sary to divide the territory of one department between two or 
 more regions, as, for instance, in Paris and at Lyons, there will 
 be no hesitation in making the division independently of con- 
 siderations of population. 
 
 We must also, in the formation of regions, pay attention to 
 possibilities of defence, which are determined by topographical 
 considerations. Thus, Ave have upon our eastern frontier the 
 natural defence of the Vosges, that of the Alps, and behind them, 
 those of the Morvan and the Loire. We must endeavour to 
 attach each of these natui-al defences to one or more regions, 
 that is to say, one or more army corps. We shall also make 
 mobilization easier by having regard, in the division of the 
 territory, to the existence of all means of communication ; rail- 
 Avays, roads, navigable watercourses, capable of assisting the 
 rapidity of mobilization and the concentration of troops and 
 stores. 
 
 Compared with these grave considerations of mobilization and 
 defence, barrack accommodation, however important it may be, 
 seems to your Committee only secondary, and your Committee 
 thinks that it should not be admitted as a prime mover in 
 determining the boundaries of regional districts. 
 
 Accommodation will be provided for, with the co-operation 
 and the subsidies of towns, to wliich the establishment of 
 garrisons within their walls, will be a sure source of revenue. 
 They Avill not hesitate to make sacrifices to that end, if the 
 permanence of the garrison is assured — an assurance never
 
 51 
 
 yet granted to them. The cstabHshment of campH will bo 
 sufficient provision during the period of transition. Your Com- 
 mittee do not, however, think that the estabhshment of per- 
 manent camps or huts can be looked upon as a satisfactory 
 pro^'ision for the accommodation of troops, for if the expense 
 of their first establishment* be relatively less than that of 
 regular barracks, well built, Mdthout luxury and with all the 
 simplicity suitable to military works, they are expensive to 
 keep up and last but a short time. In sanitary respects, they 
 present all the inconveniences that result from great agglomera- 
 tion of men; they necessitate supplementary grants to the 
 troops that occupy them ; moreover, they are far from advan- 
 tageous to instruction, to the maintenance of discipline, and to 
 the moral tone of the troops. 
 
 The multipHcity of considerations, in fixing the boundaries 
 of the regions and those of the subdivisions, ^\dll necessarily 
 occasion difiiculties and hesitation, and make it impossible to 
 fix these boundaries by law. 
 
 Many changes, only to be suggested by experience, will cer- 
 tainly have to be made, and the Grovernment must not be bound 
 to come to you for legislation upon all these changes. 
 
 However, in order to prevent the needless changes that 
 occur so often in our army, your Committee think it would be 
 wise to give to this point of military organization at least that 
 stability which results from orders of public administration. The 
 opmion of the council of state will be necessary. Some members 
 of the Committee propose to add to Article 1, these words 
 " the chief council of war." It has been justly observed that 
 the ehief council of war has not yet had, like the council of 
 state, a legal existence, and we could not thus in an incidental 
 manner take for granted the creation of this important institu- 
 tion. Also because of the liigh position of the members of 
 the chief council of war, there is some danger lest the opinion 
 of this council might be rendered obligatory by law. It might 
 happen indeed without the will or desire of the Government 
 that this opinion, coming from the most eminent men in the 
 army, would exercise an almost irresistible pressure on the 
 council of state. 
 
 See then, gentlemen, the position in which your Committee 
 were placed, and in which you would yourselves have been 
 placed, if the Government had persisted m its first resolutions, 
 and yoin- Committee had not been able to come to an agree- 
 ment mth it. You would have found yourselves confronted 
 with this statement twice repeated by the Government in 
 its expose-des-motifs,'\ that the measures it proposed to you had 
 been maturely considered and fully approved by the chief council of 
 war. 
 
 The authority of the chief council of war is undoubtedly 
 very great, but we ought to knoAv by what majority its votes 
 
 * See note No. 8 annexed to the Eeport. f Pago 2. 
 
 E 2
 
 52 
 
 are passed, and what are the motives of its decisions. This 
 Avould require that its sittings should be more or less pubHc, and 
 publicity would not perhaps be convenient. 
 
 Such, gentlemen, are the reasons which have made your 
 Committee refuse to insert in the text of Article 1 of the Bill, 
 any obligation for the intervention of the chief comicil of war 
 in the order of public administration, which is to determine the 
 boundaries of the regional district of each of the 18 volunteer 
 army corps. 
 
 After having decided upon the method of fixmg the 
 boundaries of the districts, Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Bill 
 regulate the organization of these regions "svith regard to pro- 
 vision supplies for the troops, and preparations for mobilization. 
 A recruitmg service is established in each region and charged 
 with the enrolment of men at disposal, and of the reserve, with 
 keeping lists of the territorial army, and with the census of 
 horses, mules, and carriages, fit for the service of the army. 
 
 Special magazines always provide supplies, arms, and stores 
 of all kinds to the troops of the army corps stationed there. 
 These magazines are either general or special. The first 
 belong to the Avhole region, the second to subdivisions of the 
 region. It has been asked what will be the character of these 
 general magazines. We reply that they are reserve magazines 
 from which the subdivisional magazines will be supplied. It 
 belongs rather to the law of administration yet to come 
 than to a law of general organization to determine the 
 manner in which these general magazines shall themselves be 
 supplied. In proposing to you to create them, your Committee 
 hope to increase the harmonious working of army corps by 
 administrative decentralization, to let each one contain m itself 
 all means of activity, and to free them from the necessity of 
 having recourse at the critical moment of mobilization to large 
 magazines, in which the Government has had a tendency to 
 over-centralize our army stores. It is against this system, the 
 consequences of which we have had such opportunity of esti- 
 mating, that we propose to you to act. We do not of course 
 intend to prejudge any questions concerning the manufacture 
 and preparation of the stores — these must depend on industrial 
 conditions wliich will not be the same in all regions ; the general 
 magazines of army corps are, therefore, in all regions the great 
 centres and great manufactories and workshops which the 
 Government may establish conformably to the special law of 
 organization. 
 
 It must not be supposed that the regional subdivision 
 proposed by the bill is the same as the present territorial com- 
 mand of a department. 
 
 This territorial command, as it is constituted at present, dis- 
 appears in the new organization before the creation of the 
 regional subdivision. 
 
 The subdiAdsions will not necessarily correspond to the 
 actual departmental districts. Their number and extent will
 
 53 
 
 be regulated iu each army corps according to the necessities of 
 mobihzation. 
 
 The Committee intended first to make them correspond to 
 each of the infantry brigades of the active army corps, but it 
 was decided that it was asking too much from the centres of 
 mobilization ; their workmg would have been rendered very 
 difficult by multiphcity of writings, and, above all, by the ol> 
 struction that would have been caused by the concentration 
 at one place of men at disposal, and of the reserve recalled to 
 the fighting army. 
 
 Your Committee think that in order to avoid obstructions 
 and to facilitate mobilization the work must be divided ; and it 
 is necessary, while keeping at the subdivisional centre the com- 
 mand of the administration of soldiers who are m their homes, 
 to divide the recruitmg service and the store ser\nce, among a 
 certain number of secondary centres, in order that they may be 
 nearer to the men when recalled, and mobilization be rendered 
 quicker. 
 
 The recruiting gives us for the nine 
 classes of the active army and its 
 reserve .. .. ^ .. .. 1,215,008* 
 
 If we deduct from tliis figure the 
 present effective in the service 
 and liable to be recalled, viz.f . . 330,000 
 
 There remabs 885,008 ' 
 
 To collect at the moment of mobili- 
 zation m the 72 regional subdivi- 
 sions, which leaves for each one to 
 
 furnish 12,000 
 
 To tliis we must add for the terri- 
 torial army. . . . . . . . 8,000 
 
 This makes a total of 20,000 
 
 as the number of men to be administered in peace and mobilized 
 at the moment of war by each regional subdivision. 
 
 It would be possible, Ijy multiplying the number of employes, 
 to provide for the exigences of such a service so far asto keep 
 tlie registers of enrolment and muster, and the administration 
 of soldiers in their homes. 
 
 But imagine the obstruction that would be occasioned by 
 the arrival of all the reserve of a subdi\asional region at one 
 
 * See Table 2 at tlie end of the Report. 
 
 t The active army is 450,000 men 
 
 of which the permanent pari is , . . . . . • • • • 120,000 
 
 There remains 330,000 for the 
 
 portion liable to be recalled.
 
 54 
 
 place. Supposing even that tlie mobilization of ttie active army 
 and the territonal came one after the other, there would be 
 nevertheless 12,000 men of the active aiiny to mobilize at the 
 same time. 
 
 How would it be possible to lodge all these men, to feed 
 them, to furnish them with clothing, equipment, and arms in a 
 very limited space of time 1 Even with a regional subdivision 
 to every regiment the number of men to administrate and to 
 mobilize would be — 
 
 For the reserve of active army . . 6,000 
 For the territorial army , , . . 4,000 
 
 Total 10,000 
 
 If we wish for rapid mobilization, no centre of mobiHzation 
 must be responsible for more than two or three thousand 
 men liable to be called to the colours. This leads us to divide 
 the regional subdivision of each regiment* mto two districts of 
 mobilization, or, still better, mto thi*ee, each corresponding with 
 one active battalion.f 
 
 In view of the necessity for sub-divisional branch establish- 
 ment. Articles 4 and 6 of this Bill have been drawn up. They 
 propose that one or several magazines shall be placed in each 
 regional subdivision, and one or several recruiting offices where 
 the reserve of the subdivision are to collect. At these offices 
 the men of the reserve will have returned to them the arms 
 and equipments they deposited on dispersing to their homes, or 
 they will be supplied with new equipments, clothing, and arms. 
 
 And now see, gentlemen, how everythmg is bound up 
 together in an organization such as that with which we are 
 concerned, and how the smallest details can sometimes be of 
 great importance. The nature of the uniform vre adopt for the 
 troops will necessarily have a very great influence upon the 
 rapidity of mobilization. With the tight and close fitting 
 clothing which our soldiers are now obliged to wear, it will cer- 
 tainly happen that after men have passed two or three years in 
 their homes, their clothes, when they are recalled at the 
 moment of mobiHzation, will be found to be too small for them. 
 Three or four days will be taken up with altering them, and 
 during those days we may perhaps be surprised and invaded. 
 We must then throw away traditions of the past, and adopt 
 for our troops an uniform sufficiently ample to be worn in- 
 differently by men twenty or forty years old ; it must be simple 
 and without ornaments, in order not to burden the Treasury 
 
 * lu 1870 tlie eighty-nine departmental recruiting offices took fourteen days to 
 collect 163,000 men, and to start them on their way to the depots of their corps ; 
 this is an average of 130 men every day to each department. 
 
 t The Germans have for each army cor^Ds district seventeen depdts, of which 
 sixteen are for the eight infantry regiments, viz., two for every regunent of three 
 battalions, and one over for the capital of the region.
 
 55 
 
 with useless expenses, and easy to transform, so that it may be 
 worn either by the territorial or active army. 
 
 After treating- of the organization of territorial regions, and 
 of the services which belong to them permanently, the law 
 treats in Articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the formation and composi- 
 tion of regional army corps of the active army, and of the special 
 corps the formation of which is the aim of Article 6 of the 
 recruiting law. These Articles correspond to Articles 4, 5, 6 
 and 9 of the Government Bill. 
 
 Articles 9, 11, 12 and 13 relate to measures to be taken in time 
 of peace, for the preparation for mobilization. Article 9 lays 
 down, for the first time since the order of 1788, the principle of 
 permanent readiness in time of peace as in time of war ; and of 
 the storing within reach of a corps the material it requu'es 
 for taking the field. 
 
 Your Committee, gentlemen, cannot forget all that was 
 brought to light by the inquiry into magazines and arsenals. 
 M. Blondeau's deposition made before this Committee made us 
 feel strongly the danger that lies in accumulating material in 
 great magazines, whence it could not bo brought in less than 
 six or eight months.* 
 
 Division of stores is then one of the essential conditions of 
 mobilization. Thus we must avoid all excessive conceiitration, 
 and, on the contrary, divide the stores ; give to every division, 
 every brigade, and, still better, to every_ regiment in time of 
 peace, the stores that it will require in time of war, and make 
 it responsible for the care of them. It would then be known 
 that stores are always in readiness, and frequent inspections 
 would make its readiness still more sure. These arrangements 
 seem so important to your Committee that it has not hesitated 
 to issue a legal order which enforces the storing of material upon 
 wheels. Thus the principle laid down by Article 9 is to give 
 to every corps all its material in time of peace as well as in time 
 of war, and to store that material within its reach. For example, 
 regiments of artillery charged with the care of ammunition wag- 
 gons should have those waggons and the ammunition stored 
 close to theii- garrison; and cartridges destined to be distri- 
 buted among the men ought also to be stored T\dthin reach of 
 the corps. 
 
 Article 10, agreeing with Article 14 of the Government Bill, 
 decides that, with the exception of the corps mentioned in the 
 law, no new corps can be created, nor can any change be made 
 in the normal constitution of those that exist, save by vu-tue of 
 a law. 
 
 The object of this order is to prevent the recurrence of 
 alterations which have incessantly, at all epochs, affected the 
 organization of the army and the constitution of corps. 
 
 These alterations are a source of expense to the war budget. 
 
 * Page 30 of the dispositions annesecl to the Report of the Committee.
 
 56 
 
 When reductions are made, it becomes necessary to put a 
 certain number of officers on half-pay, or at disposal, because 
 their appointments are suppressed. When, on the contrary, it 
 is considered necessary to increase the army, if the additions 
 are not made gradually and in proportion to the resources of 
 the cadres, they necessitate the creation of new appointments, 
 which can only be filled by promoting men who are sometimes 
 quite unfit for promotion. This in itself is a source of weakness, 
 and a corps thus treated cannot recover for years. We will 
 only add here, that alterations in the interior constitution of 
 corps cause uncertainty and trouble hi the establishment of 
 garrison quarters, — a result injurious both to the interests of 
 the Treasury and to the well-being of the troops, whose 
 accommodation leaves much to be desired at the best of times. 
 
 All of you, gentlemen, must have been struck by the 
 numerous changes made of late yqars in the uniforms of the 
 corps. These changes, besides having been often for the worse, 
 cause no trifling expense to the war budget. They have been 
 also a cause of great inconvenience to all our officers, and have 
 driven many of them into debt. 
 
 Without wishing to go so far as to hinder necessary reforms, 
 your Committee propose to you no longer to authorise any 
 change in equipment and uniform, save by virtue of a law, 
 unless it be partially or as an experiment. 
 
 You will then be able to count beforehand the probable 
 expense of such changes, and to see if it would not be pos- 
 sible Avhen the army wants so much, and everything is to be 
 reformed, to employ the money of your taxpayers in a way 
 more useful to it. Articles 11, 12 and 13 are the most im- 
 portant of the law. They regrdate the manner of distri- 
 Tjuting the contingent of the classes among the various corps 
 and services of the army and the method of mobilization. 
 They decide the general system of our organization : — 1st. 
 Recruiting of corps over the whole territorial national system ; 
 2nd. Regional mobilization, by recalling into the same corps 
 the men at disposal, and of the reserve domiciled in the district 
 of its subdivision. 
 
 We have spoken at sufficient length of these two points ; we 
 shall not, therefore, return to them here. Articles 11, 12 and 13 
 of the Bill may be reproached with ha\Tng rather the character 
 of regulations than of a law ; but they are so important that 
 your Committee thought it right to invest the orders contained 
 in them with the stability of a law. These orders are also so 
 little susceptible of change, that there is but httle danger of 
 it. The Government makes no remark on this subject ; it 
 agrees with your Committee that all shall be prepared and 
 decreed beforehand for mobiHzation^ in order to avoid varia- 
 tions in ministerial cnculars, which might perplex the people 
 responsible for carrying them out, and occasion uncertainty 
 and disorder at a moment when it is most important to 
 act with certainty and order.
 
 57 
 HEAD II. 
 
 COMMAXD. — AdMIXISTRATION. 
 
 Head II organizes tlio command and lays down general 
 principles as the foundation of the law upon administration. 
 Article VIII of the first Government Bill corresponds to Articles 
 14, 15 and 16, which relate to the command. 
 
 We have abeady said, that according to the plan of your 
 Committee, the organization of regional subdivisions must be 
 followed by the suppression of the present territorial com- 
 mands. In time of peace, generals in command of army corps 
 join the command of the territory of the region to that of the 
 active troops. This command is not exercised through the 
 Generals commanding active divisions or brigades, but directly 
 by means of a permanent staff placed with the command. 
 It is called the territorial staff, and forms part of the general 
 staff of the army corps, for which it constitutes, as it were, a 
 special office under the dnection of the chief of the staff. 
 
 The first Government Bill also admitted* that the staffs and 
 personnel of the various services attached to army corps, 
 divisions and brigades, should be organized in movable sections 
 destined to follov.^ the troops in case of mobilization, and in 
 fixed sections attached to the territory, responsible for depot 
 reserve and supply services of all kinds. It did not, however, 
 invest Generals in command of arm}'' corps with the command 
 of the territory, and though it admitted that Generals might 
 exercise both these commands, it did not suppress the appoint- 
 ment of Generals commanding territorial divisions. Still the 
 Government did seem to understand all the difficulties that 
 would sprmg from this close contact of two independent com- 
 mands, for it relegated the decision of their connections with 
 one another to a special law. 
 
 In these arrangements yom* Committee see a complication 
 of work and an increase of expense resulting fi-om the necessity 
 of keeping up two commands, consequently two staffs working 
 one beside the other ; above all, your Committee consider them 
 to be contrary to the principle of unity of command and of 
 ' responsibility, and they propose to you to suppress the terri- 
 torial divisions and subdivisions, and to amalgamate the com- 
 mand of aU the troops and services of the region with the com- 
 mand of the army corps, m order that responsibility may not be 
 divided and that reacUness for war may be more thorouglily 
 insm-ed. 
 
 * Article 7.
 
 58 
 
 This ai-rangement, based upon the principles of one re- 
 sponsible command, is not new ; for at Paris and Lyons, where 
 there are active divisions and brigades, the Generals of the 
 brigades and divisions have no territorial power. 
 
 It must not be forgotten tliat active trooj)S and the Generals 
 who command them are hable to be moved fi-om one part of 
 the region to another, and that this mobility is incompatible 
 with the duties of an essentially fixed territorial service. 
 These Generals furthermore have enough to do, responsible as 
 they are to the General-in-chief for the appearance and dis- 
 cipline of their troops. It is also extremely important not to 
 multiply the hands through which orders must pass at the 
 moment of mobilization, and you will see in Article 2 of the 
 Bill that orders of mobilization are transmitted from the 
 General commanding the army corps directly, without passing 
 through any intermediate official channels to the various 
 recruiting offices which then call in the reserve. 
 
 To send these orders through divisional Generals, to Generals 
 of brigades, who, following out the same plan, would send them 
 to the commander of the subdivisional recruiting office, so that 
 he in his tm-n might send them to the branch establishments of 
 the subdivision, would cause a complication and loss of time 
 dangerous at such a moment. 
 
 Your Committee attach very great importance to the 
 direct centralization of all operations of recruiting and mobili- 
 zation in the hands of the Commander-in-chief of the army 
 corps, and propose to you to make this territorial service inde- 
 pendent and distinct from that of active trooj)s and to give 
 it a special staff attached to the region. 
 
 To this arrangement itis ol)jected that the functions defined 
 in Article 18 of the Bill as belonging to the superior officer 
 charged with the superintending of the recruiting and the ad- 
 ministration of soldiers in their homes, are not the only ones 
 that ought to be comprised in the territorial service. There 
 are revisional councils in which the Generals of the brigades 
 commanding in the department should take part ; there are 
 the hospitals which these general officers visit every month, to 
 decide upon propositions of chsmissal or mvalidmg made by 
 the military doctors ; there are also matters concerning military 
 justice. These the Bill does not mention, but nevertheless 
 their solution must be provided for. 
 
 We reply to these observations. 
 
 With regard to revisional councils, it is not now necessary 
 for the General commanding in the deparment to be present. 
 In the terms of Article 27 of the recruiting law, this duty is 
 assigned to a general or senior officer designated by military 
 authority. Let the General commanduig the army corps 
 appoint this officer. As for the hospitals, men under treat- 
 ment in them belong exclusively to that portion of the active 
 ai-my which is ^\itll the colours. The duty of invahding or 
 granting furloughs to sick or convalescent men belongs naturally
 
 59 
 
 to the Generals commanding brigades and divisions of the active 
 army; the army corps commander will appoint one of the 
 Generals to perform this service in the hospitals estaljlished in 
 the part of the territory occupied by the brigade. 
 
 Touchuig military justice, once men at disposal and of the 
 reserve have returned to then- homes, they are citizens. The 
 law, it is true, has not yet determined their judicial position, but 
 should they, by the law to come, be made amenable to councils 
 of war, which is extremely unlikely, nothhig prevents the 
 judicial business concerning them from being transmitted to the 
 army corps commander, as it is at present to the divisional 
 General he replaces. In fact, instead of having 21 divisions, 
 as at present, we shall have only 18, and tliis makes all the 
 difference. They will, it is true, be a little larger, but with the 
 double staff given to the commander this extension is not of a 
 nature to overload and compromise the service. 
 
 Besides if the General commanding the army corps, desires 
 to relegate some of his duties to the Generals of brigades or 
 divisions placed under Ins orders, the law does not forbid him 
 to do so ; while definmg the duties of a commander of a regional 
 subdivision, the law gives to the cluef command a latitude 
 by which the working of all parts of the service will be far 
 better secm-ed than if it had confirmed the principle of the union 
 of the territorial command with that of divisions and brigades, 
 for then the exact limits of these commands must have been 
 determined by an order of public administration. 
 
 The Government itself feared the confusion likely to result 
 from this multiphcity of departments corresponding to necessi- 
 ties of different services, and pronounced in tavom- of maintain- 
 ing the dispositions of Ai'ticle 18, which it considers in every way 
 satisfactory. 
 
 It is the general opinion, as we have said, that many of om' 
 late military reverses were due to the excessive centralization 
 which hes like a weight upon our army. Without asking how 
 far they are due to this centralization, we cannot hide from our- 
 selves, that it has been fatal to us, and that the subordinate 
 positions assigned to our Generals is not of a natm-e to 
 develop in them a bold spnit, a readiness to accept responsi- 
 bility or a power of command. 
 
 Division of labour is one of the essential conditions of the 
 well being of modern societies. 
 
 Your Committee, gentlemen, propose to apply it to oiu' 
 military organization, and to detach a part of the attributes of 
 the central administration of war in order to give them to 
 Generals commanding army corps. 
 
 But this decentralization must be coniined withm such limits 
 that it ynW compromise neither the principle of authority nor 
 unity of direction. 
 
 General government can be carried on fi-om a distance, but 
 the administration of details must be conducted on the spot. 
 Let us then give each one his place in the working of the aiiny,
 
 60 
 
 — to the Minister belongs command and direction, hut command 
 from on high and general direction ; — to the commanders of army 
 corps belong personal responsibility for the execution of the 
 general orders of the Minister, and to him they must be account- 
 able. Yonr Committee consider these to be the true principles 
 which should actuate the command not only in high places, but 
 in all degrees of military government. It is important that too 
 frequent interference of the chief with the duties of the subordi- 
 nate should not rob him at once of power and responsibility, 
 and thus shake the principle of authority to its foundations. 
 
 Our military regulations, by determining the duties of 
 every one, have confirmed these wise prmciples. 
 
 Unfortunately their provisions are not always scrupulously 
 observed. 
 
 The first and most essential condition of command is unity. 
 Article 15 of the Bill confirms it. The commander of an army 
 corps, responsible to the Minister for the appearance, discipline, 
 instruction and efiicient working of all the special services of 
 the army corps, has under his command all troops stationed in 
 the region, and the personnel of the various services. 
 
 With regard to the services or establishments that supply 
 the general needs of the army, and the material necessary 
 for the general defence of the country, the local command 
 only exercises a general and permanent surveillance over 
 these services, and over the j^^^^onnel they employ, with a 
 view to maintaining interior order and discipline. Thus, the 
 cannon foundries, arsenals, arm manufactories, general work- 
 shops, general hospitals, military schools, establishments of 
 administrative service, Avhich supply the general service and 
 the stores of the army ; the service of forts, which belongs 
 to the general defence of national tenitory, and in general, 
 all establishments not allotted in a special and exclusive 
 manner to the service of an army corps, remain under the 
 immediate authority of the Minister-of-War under the work- 
 ing conditions applicable to them. Their chiefs receive their 
 orders directly from him and correspond with him. It would 
 be difficult, however, to keep these establishments completely 
 free of the command. They employ military workmen 
 organized in armed companies. The directors of the establish- 
 ments are themselves military officers, and this in itself 
 makes it impossible to render them independent of the sur- 
 veillance and discipHne of the army corps' commander. But 
 though this general officer must not interfere in the administra- 
 tion of these establishments, seeing he is in no way responsible 
 for it, neither must he be completely mdifferent to them. He 
 ought to visit them, inquire what is being done in them, 
 acquaint himself with the mmisterial orders, make sure that 
 they are carried out, render an account to the Minister of their 
 execution, and of the observations to which this execution has 
 given rise. You perceive that your Committee proposes to give 
 the Generals commanding army corps great authority, both
 
 61 
 
 over personel and material ; but in giving them this authority 
 we must also give the means of exercising it. 
 
 Article IG of the Bill of the Committee, which corresponds 
 with Article 7 of the Government Bill, gives the General com- 
 manding an army corps a double staff, under the direction of 
 one chief of the staff. 
 
 The first of these staffs is charged with all that concerns 
 the personel and the various military services of the active 
 army corps. It marches wdth the corps in case of mobili- 
 zation. 
 
 The second is attached to the territory of the region. It is 
 charged with all that concerns the personel, and the services 
 of the men at disposal, those of the reserve of the active and 
 territorial armies recruiting, remounts, soldiers in their homes, 
 and generally all services exclusively territorial; it keeps 
 archives and perpetuates traditions. It remains in the region 
 and secures the working of all the services in the interior, while 
 the active army corps takes the field. 
 
 Your Committee, gentlemen, attach such importance to the 
 stability of this territorial 'organization, that they propose to 
 you to have the superior oflicer, Avho in the teri'itorial staff" is 
 charged Avith centralizing the recruiting service, appointed 
 directly by the ]\]inister, in order that he may neither be dis- 
 placed nor hindered in his work, save by a ministerial order. 
 
 The conditions of stabihty seem indispensable, in the 
 interest of the territorial service and rapidity of mobilization. 
 
 Like the general staff, though in a lesser degree, the staffs of 
 artillery and engineers have also to fulfil double duties ; active 
 work in the general working of the army corps ; sedentary 
 work in the different services of the interior ; such as arsenals, 
 arm manufactories, military buildings, fortifications, &c., &c. 
 
 These two staffs vrill, like the general staff", be divided into 
 an active part, which is to follow the troops into the field, and 
 a territorial part, which is to secure the workmg m the interior 
 of the general services that supply the needs of the active 
 army and of the mobihzed territorial army, and provide for the 
 defence of the territoiy. 
 
 Yom- Committee, having admitted the principle that the 
 authority of the command ought to extend over all the ad- 
 ministrative services in a manner to be hereafter determined 
 by a special law of administration, make the army corps com- 
 mander active chief over all administrative services. These 
 services, however, in no way lose their mdividuality, for their 
 chiefs are severally responsible and superintend them almost 
 entirely. 
 
 The General-hi-chief knows the wishes of the Minister, he 
 indicates to the chief of the staff" the direction to be given, but 
 neither one nor the other execute them. They direct, and execu- 
 tion belongs to the chiefs of the various serAdces of the army. 
 A ministerial order will determine the composition and distribu- 
 tion of the staffs and various services of each army corps.
 
 62 
 
 We could not assign a normal constitution to these staffs 
 and services, as we do to the army corps itself. 
 
 Important reforms will no doubt be required in the general 
 staff of the army ; these reforms Lave already been the object 
 of serious study, as much on the part of extra Parliamentary 
 Committees as on that of your Committee. 
 
 The result of these studies will be ultimately laid before 
 you. But your Committee consider it better to submit at 
 once for your approbation the principles which are to serve 
 as the organic bases of the general administration of the 
 army ; also a regulation of its connection vntli the command. 
 These bases are indicated in Article 17 of the Bill. The 
 Government treated of them in Article 8 of the Bill which it 
 presented to you. It admits the authority of the command 
 over the administrative services, but it does not define it. 
 Your military Committee agreeing with the Committee on 
 Contracts, after having consulted with them on the subject, have 
 been much impressed by the facts brought to light in the 
 inquiries conducted by that Committee. They see the necessity 
 of being more explicit, and considering administration as one 
 of the chief attributes of the command — an attribute of which 
 we cannot continue to be deprived — your Committee propose 
 to you to complete, from an administrative point of vieAv, the 
 definition they have given you of the command in Articles 14, 
 15 and 16, by deciding in Article 17, that the administration 
 shall, in time of peace as in time of war, be placed under the 
 orders of the command. 
 
 It must be acknowledged that at present the command is 
 much too distinct from the administration ; the latter has ended 
 by becoming an independent power, which sometimes uses the 
 practical wants of the men as a means of overruling the 
 command. 
 
 This state of things is brought about because our Generals 
 have not sufficient practice in administration during peace, and 
 are unable to exercise it in time of war. 
 
 Contempt of administration means in war contempt of men's 
 lives, and he who wishes to deal with masses of men, must add 
 the genius of the administrator to the genius of the captain.* Do 
 we then pretend to exact fi'om Generals commanding anny 
 corps the capability of becoming superintendents of hospitals 
 and victualhng services, or responsible agents for clothing and 
 encampment ? No ; cei'tainly not. Too much observance of 
 details is injurious to greatness, of conception. It confines the 
 spirit, and prevents it from rising to that general grasp of 
 affairs so indispensable to a Commander-in-chief. 
 
 We have represented the command to you as giving 
 impetus to the services of the army, and superintending them, 
 though each service remains entirely under the authority of its 
 chief so far as regards the execution of its duties. 
 
 * Page 3, " Exposg-des-motifs of the GoTerument.'
 
 63 
 
 Your Committee desires and prays you to grant, that, since 
 the command is to have general superintendence and to be tlie 
 moving power, this command may be one, and the responsibility 
 undivided. 
 
 The administrative anthoritrj with which the Bill invests 
 the commander of an army corps, will be exercised, like all 
 superior authority, in a manner fixed by regulations, and through 
 the medium of harmonious yet individual departments com- 
 posed of medical or administrative military functionaries, under 
 the surveillance of an independent control directly responsible 
 to the Minister of War. Do iiot think, gentlemen, that your 
 Committee ask you to sanction a novelty. They simply propose 
 to you to return to the principles laid down by the King's 
 Ordinance, 17th August, 1788, which subordinate the admini- 
 stration to the command.* Those principles are confirmed in 
 the Ordinance of June 14th, 1844, concernmg the administra- 
 tive service of the marine, with tlie one exception, that the 
 Ordinance of 1844 separates the control and the ordering of 
 the expenses, which the Ordinances of 1788 and 1835 had 
 united.f 
 
 The principle of subordinating the administration to the 
 command has been eloquently combated by two of the mem- 
 bers of youi- Committee, who have remembered that after the 
 Ordinance of 1788, the law of 28 Nivose, year III, caused 
 a diametrically opposite principle to prevail in the administra- 
 tion of the army. Article 9 of the first document of this law 
 sanctions the entire independence of the admmistration from 
 the commanders-in-chief.* The power of the commissaries of 
 war charged with this administration, extended Jiot only over all 
 parts of military administration, over everything which con- 
 cerned economy in the expenses and supplies, but also, over all 
 that concerned police and discipline of the troops. § Section 
 three of the law of the year III, enumerates the duties of 
 these functionaries. A glance at the list suffices to lay bare 
 the feeling that prompted the dispositions of the law. The 
 national convention doubted the military cluefs, and the same 
 feeling of mistrust that caused it to send representatives of the 
 people invested with full powers to the armies, made it sanction 
 by law the independence of military administration. This 
 independence was such that no one could give an order for the 
 removal of stores from the military magazines of the Republic, nor 
 even demand infor^nation about their condition, icithout having first 
 informed the commissary of tear and received his consent. 
 
 The commissaries of war attached to the armies, being 
 
 * Order of iVth August, 1788, Articles 22, 23, and 24. 
 
 t Report to the King, and Ordinance of June 14th, 1844. Maritime and Colo- 
 nial Eecords, vol. 84, page 163 and following. 
 + Article 9. 
 § Document I, Section 3, Article 1.
 
 64 
 
 solely under the command of the chief commissary, whether 
 within or outside the territory of the Republic, counter- 
 balanced the authority of the General-in-chief. They con- 
 stituted really an independent power established side Ijy side 
 with the Generals, in order to be able at any moment to keep 
 the command in check, if the Committee of public welfare 
 distrusted it. It is easy to conceive how such a system must 
 have hampered the Generals, and injured military operation?, 
 though under the Government of the National Convention it 
 may perhaps have been partially necessary. 
 
 The Ordinance of July 25th, 1817, decreeing the creation 
 of a corps of military administration under the title of com- 
 missaries of the stores, maintained the chief dispositions of the 
 law of Nivose, year III, and placed the commissaries and sub- 
 commissaries of the stores under the immediate orders of the 
 minister, Avhose deputies they were in all that concerned the 
 administration of tlie army.* 
 
 Recommendations of promotion came not from the com- 
 mand, but from the chief of the department to which they 
 belonged.! It may be seen that these dispositions retamed the 
 independent character with which the law of Nivose, year III, 
 had endowed the administrative body. This independence was 
 also confirmed, word for word, by the Ordinance of September 
 18th, 1822, which reorganized mihtary administration.^ In 
 matters of administration the commissaries are only obliged to 
 obey the command when orders of urgency are given them by 
 general officers upon their own responsibility, and they are 
 accountable for them to the Muiister. But these dispositions 
 were only apphcable in time of peace, and the connection of 
 the administration ^^^th the general officers of the army on a 
 war footing was determined by the regulations upon service in 
 the field. § 
 
 We must then turn to Ordinance of the 3rd May, 1832,|| to 
 determine the comiection between the administrative services 
 and the command in time of war. This Ordinance is forma]. 
 Article 17. IT 
 
 " Generals are responsible for military operations and/or orders 
 " to supply and to distribute ; Commissaries are responsible for the 
 " means of supply, and for payment and distribution^ 
 
 In presence of this formal law and of the principle that tlie 
 military organization and constitution of the corps and various 
 administrative services should be the same in time of peace as 
 in time of war, your Committee cannot, •wdthout disregarding 
 the fundamental principles which it has itself laid down in 
 accord with the Government, hesitate to return to the disposi- 
 
 • Article 17. t Head III, Article 8. 
 
 J Head III, Article 1. § Head IX, Article 22. 
 
 II Ordinance of September 18, 1822, Head YII, Article 2( 
 If Idem, Article 31.
 
 65 
 
 tions of the Ordinance of August 17tli, 1788, and May 3rd, 
 1832, which seem to sanction the true principles of admini- 
 stration. Without entering into details of the organization of 
 the administration, which will be the object of a special law ; 
 they propose, in Article 18 of the Bill, to lay down the follow- 
 ing general foundations of organization : — 
 
 1st. Absolute independence of the control. 
 
 2nd. The separation of the administrative services of 
 management, direction, and control. 
 
 3rd. The subordination of the administration to the com- 
 mand m time of peace as in time of war. 
 
 4th. The individual working of the medical corps under the 
 fhrect authority of the command. 
 
 The commander of an army corps is thus the deputy of the 
 Minister for the administration, as he is that of the Government 
 for the command of the troops. 
 
 It would seem, then, natui-al to entrust him also, with the 
 assignment of credits and the ordering of expenses. 
 
 Your Committee, acting upon the same principles that in- 
 spired the Orduiances of 1788, 1844, and 1832, upon service in 
 the field, think that the prestige of the command would suffer 
 if it were charged with financial operations. It would be 
 forced to descend to details, better committed to a special 
 functionary in an inferior department. They propose to you 
 to commit to an Intendant Ordonnateur and to a papnaster, 
 the duty of guaranteeing the administrative services of an 
 army corps, by the ordermg and payment of expenses, ac- 
 cording to the mamier which shall ultimately bo decided by 
 the law of administration. The credits necessary to cover the 
 special expenses of territorial or active services, exclusively 
 attached to an army corps, will be assigned to this Intendant 
 Ordonnateur. 
 
 With regard to the general services that remain under the 
 immediate authority of the IMmister in the working conditions 
 that belong to them, the ]\Iinister ^^^ll assign the credits espe- 
 cially allotted to them, in whatever manner seems to_ him best 
 to insure the working of these services. All administrative 
 operations are submitted to a double control; 1st. The mterior 
 control, or control of details; 2nd. The exterior, or general 
 control. The first can only be efiicaciously exercised by a man 
 initiated into all the practical details of the service, that is to 
 say, by the du-ector of that ser%ace liimself, whose functions 
 must be quite distinct from those of the responsible manager. 
 The general control is exercised by delegation from the Minister, 
 independently of the management and the du-ection of the 
 administrative services, which remain under the authority of the 
 command. 
 
 We do not wish to prejudge anything here, gentlemen, of 
 the attributes of the control or of the organization and situa- 
 tion of its j^ersonnel nor of the duties of other administrative 
 authorities. Their relations with the command, and with civil 
 
 F
 
 66 
 
 authorities, will be decided by the law upon general adminis- 
 tration. It is not our duty to prejudge this organization ; we 
 have only to lay down the bases of it, and to tell you, gentle- 
 men, that the institution of a special corps charged with the 
 administrative control satisfies a real want ; namely, that of 
 returning to the normal condition of a well-conceived admi- 
 nistration, in which management, direction and control are 
 separated, responsibility real and clearly defined. 
 
 In tliis your military Committee, your Committee on Contracts 
 and the Government, are perfectly agreed. Some members of 
 the Committee were of the opmion that the control should be 
 independent of the Minister of War, and responsible to the 
 Minister of Finance. Your Committee think that to go so far 
 would be to change the constitutional conditions of the Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The Minister of War could not indeed be dependent upon 
 one of his colleagues, nor be submitted to his control. Each of 
 them is responsible to the country, and in this case you are 
 yourselves the true controller who can at any moment, by an 
 interpellation or a parliamentary inquuy, make knov^m the acts 
 of the minister, and oblige him to explain and to justify them 
 to you. 
 
 Yom* control is the only one that can be sanctioned, for it 
 alone, by the withdrawal of your confidence, can oblige the 
 Minister to resigii. 
 
 It has been feared, that by placing the administration under 
 the authority of the command, a way ^^all be opened to abuses, 
 and the interests of the treasury will be compromised. Your 
 Committee A\ash you to observe, on this point, that a General 
 commanding an army corps does not administer personally, 
 and that he can neither order, nor spend, vrithout ready money, 
 if he attempted to do so he would find it practically impossible. 
 
 The ordainer can only di-aw upon the open credits of each 
 special chapter of the budget. If he actted otherwise, the pay- 
 master, responsible and amenable to the Audit Ofiice, would 
 refuse to cash cheques u'regularly ch-awn. There is therefore 
 nothhig to fear from that direction. 
 
 Such, gentlemen, taking them all together, are the piiiiciples 
 laid down by your Committee. If you give them your sanction, 
 the Committee will lay before you, in a special laAv, their deve- 
 lopnii nt and their application to the spending departments of 
 the aimy. 
 
 Ai tides 15, 16, and 17, of the law, determine the manner in 
 which the command will act upon the troops, and the various 
 admiiistrative services of the active army. But the action of 
 the ccmmand is not confined to them; it is exercised also over 
 all the soldiers of that army who are for any reason m their 
 homes; over all the estabhshments and regional services 
 specially allotted to the army corps; and over the personnel 
 of the territorial ai-my up to the moment of its mobilization. 
 Articles 18 and 19 regulate the method of this action, and
 
 G7 
 
 determiue itB relatious with the personnel oi the men at disposal 
 and of the reserve, and with the recniitwf/ whenever it is desired. 
 An account is given to the command of the changes in tlic 
 situation of this personnel, and every six months, of its distri- 
 bution, and its enrohnent, in order that the commander of an 
 army corps may make any proposals to the Minister which are 
 necessary m order to keep the complementary cadres and eflec- 
 tives in constant readiness for mobilization. 
 
 HEAD III. 
 
 Incorporation. Mobilization. 
 
 Head III regulates the manner in which the organization 
 prepared by the two first documents of the law is to act. 
 Article 20 treats specially of the incorporations of the con- 
 tingent. 
 
 The men given by the recruiting are, as Article 40 of the 
 law prescribes, di^dded into two categories, the first comprising 
 those who have more than one year to serve ; the second, those 
 who may be dismissed to their homes at the expu-ation of that 
 first year. Both are sent to then* corps after having received the 
 necessary clothing, equipment and arms, from the magazines 
 of the regional subdi^nsion to wliich they belong. 
 
 Your Committee think, hoAvever, that there would be great 
 advantage in enrolling young soldiers who have only one 
 year to serve, at once in one of the corps of the same region, 
 and that, without endeavouring to fit them out completely, 
 they should only be given a certain part of the necessary kit, 
 &c., which part shall be determined by the ]\Iinister. Thus the 
 Treasury ^\i\\ be saved the expenses of travelling and equip- 
 ment, and the recruitmg offices spared much useless v^n.-iting. 
 
 Still, objections have been made to this system ; it has l^een 
 said the result of such a measure would be tha.t these men, 
 exercised in their own country, woidd have no real idea of 
 military life, and that they would have no stimulus to 
 encourage them seriously to learn w^hat they ought to know. 
 
 They would be merely a collection of young men without 
 esprit de corps, bearing their misfortune patiently, doing as little 
 as possible, and looking forward to the not far distant time 
 when they will return to their families. 
 
 We reply to tliis olyection. that dismissal after a year of serAice 
 is not a right, and that to obtain tliis favour, the young men must 
 satisfactorily fulfil the conditions of instruction and discipline 
 determined by the Minister (Article 41). They may abridge 
 (heir time of service by six months, if bcl^orc entermg the corps 
 they have acquired some military instruction. Under these con- 
 ditions, there will bo a feclmg of emidation strc)ng enough, at 
 least to lessen, if not entirely remove the drawback alluded to. 
 
 We must, at all events, make the experiment, for the con- 
 
 F 2
 
 68 
 
 siderations of economy imposed upon our military organization 
 ma.ke it our duty to avoid all expenses not strictly indispensable, 
 or not counterbalanced by the result obtained. 
 
 It has been proposed to equip all yoimg soldiers at the 
 magazine of their regional subchvision, before sending them to 
 the various army corps among wliich they are to be distributed. 
 Your Committee have, however, been impressed by the objections 
 made to this arrangement. Such a measure, it has been said, 
 is practicable with a system of regional recruiting, where men of 
 the same district belong to the same corps and would, conse- 
 quently, require the same equipments ; it ceases to be practicable 
 for men who are to be distributed indifferently among all corps. 
 It would be necessary that the subdivisional magazine should 
 be provided with equipments for all arms, if not for all corps. 
 Men are only well ecjuipped by the corps itself, where the chief 
 is responsible for every ser\ace that of equipment included. 
 Besides if, as we hope, individuality of corps, in matters of ad- 
 mmistration, mil be sanctioned by the law yet to come upon 
 aclmmistration, it is probable that all equipment mil, like linen 
 and shoes, belong to the soldier, and will be paid for by the 
 corps, as is now done in the Zouave Regiment, and in a few of 
 our infantry regiments, where tlie trial of this system seems to 
 have produced good results. 
 
 In this case, to make the subdivisional magazines supply the 
 men with equipments at the moment of incorporation, would be 
 both to misplace responsibility and to complicate the accomits 
 of the corps. 
 
 These very serious objections have not been completely 
 removed by the authors of the proposition. They said first that, 
 with the recruiting system based upon the obhgation of personal 
 service, wc could no longer cover France mtli detachments of 
 conscripts going in rags to rejoiii their corps; that, from the 
 moment when the young soldiers were called they belonged to 
 the army, because they owed the duties of soldiers to the 
 country and that, from that moment, they should wear none 
 but soldier's clothes ; that, once started to join their corps, they 
 were soldiers, not citizens, and that the sentiment of equality 
 agreed with discipline in demanding that everyone, without 
 exception should, before their departure, be clothed in mihtary 
 uniform, in order that all might feel they had ncAv duties to 
 fulfil. They added, that as the subdivisional magazines are 
 all supplied with equipments from the same sources, that is to 
 say,^ from the regional magazines, the men would be as well 
 equipped at these magazines as at their coi-ps ; that, in their 
 corps, too much is thought of making their uniform fit tightly, 
 and that more attention is paid to effect on parade than to the 
 necessities of war. 
 
 That war uniform, the only kind that should be used in the 
 army, ought to be simple, without ornament, warm and ample, 
 made so as to fit equally well all men of the same height. 
 
 That these conditions, dictated both by the necessities of the' 
 
 I
 
 G9 
 
 services and the well being of the men, are equally desirable for 
 economical reasons. 
 
 That they are imperionsly demanded by the necessities of 
 prompt mobihzation ; and that, in the new national army, the 
 objections raised agamst the proposed measure have no longer 
 the weight they might have had in the old organization. 
 
 Though your Committee recognize how well founded are 
 these last observations, and how useful it would be to have but 
 one uniform for infantry, and another for cavalry, in order to make 
 exchange possible without expense to the State, they consider 
 it better to leave the care of equipping their contingents to the 
 corps themselves, who are to draw their supphes from the 
 general magazines, and, by that means, avoid the division of 
 responsibility and the chance of hindering administrative in- 
 dividuahty. 
 
 They think, nevertheless, that it would be well, both for 
 the sake of the principle of equality in the service and for the 
 sake of discipline, which must be impressed upon the young 
 sokher from the very beginning of his career, to make the con- 
 tingents travel always in uniform, only giving them, |however, 
 at their departure, such articles of equipment as the Minister 
 shall decide to be strictly necessary. Articles 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
 26, 27, and 28 of the Bill regulate, in a general manner, the 
 method and successive periods of mobilization. 
 
 The Minister transmits the order for mobilization to the 
 generals connnan ding army corps, and concerns himself no further, 
 as he used to do, loith the details of its execution. All ought to he 
 •prepared heforeliand hy the commander of the arnv/ corps, icho is 
 responsible for the rapid execution of the order. 
 
 Articles 22 and 23 imply the prehminary and permanent 
 preparation of all the details of mobilization, the general working 
 of which Ave have already laid before you. Thus, during peace, 
 a general plan of mobilization and concentration should be pre- 
 pared beforehand, and revised each year. All individual orders 
 of convocation, of muster, and transport by rail, also all requisi- 
 tions of carriages and animals necessary for the various services 
 of the army corps, must be prepared beforehand ; and, as there 
 is no change in the situation of members of the reserve who 
 are to rejoin, not a regiment, but a particular garrison, where 
 they will always find a regiment of the same arm, orders of 
 mobilization may be in readiness either at the town hall or, 
 perhaps better, at the police station, where the inspector of 
 police, at each of his visits, sees that they are in good pre- 
 servation. 
 
 The commanders of police stations, helped, if need be, by ,the 
 postmen and the gardes champetres of the comnnuies, send 
 the recalling orders, which are always ready in advance, and 
 which serve as way-bills to the individuals concerned. 
 
 To these orders, a cheque for the payment of traA-elling 
 expenses may be joined, wliicli the man detaches, after having 
 receipted it, and gives to the tax-gatherer or to the mayor
 
 70 
 
 if there is no tax-gatLuerer in the coninimie. If necessary a 
 railway ticket must be enclosed, which will enable him to rejoin 
 the corps in which he has been enrolled, m the garrison chosen 
 for him, which he knows beforehand. 
 
 The railway companies will be reimbm'sed upon presenting 
 these tickets. 
 
 Hence no more interference on the part of the sub-commis- 
 sary of stores, no more requisitions on the station-master, no 
 more perplexities about the liquidation of our debts to the rail- 
 way companies. 
 
 The etappen commander keeps the men on their way, directs 
 them, and provides for their wants. These men, enrolled in the 
 corps of their arm which is nearest their domicile, have not 
 more than from 25 to 30 kilometres to go, and can generally 
 reach their corps in one day's journey. Here lies the chief 
 advantage of regional mobilization. 
 
 We shall, perhaps, be asked how this system of mobilization 
 can be applied to regiments of artillery and to battalions of 
 engineers which, collected in schools of mstruction, may some- 
 times be stationed outside the district of the army corps to 
 which they belong '? These regiments, as well as the cavalry, 
 may have their reserve scattered over the whole region, and 
 this is, indeed, what will most frequently happen. These 
 reserves join their corps if it is stationed in the region and, if it 
 is not, go to the depot which must under all circumstances be 
 kept in the region. There they are equipped and armed. In 
 this there is no difficulty nor does it delay mobilization, although 
 the distance that these reserves will have to travel is somewhat 
 further than the infantry. 
 
 You see, gentlemen, by what Ave have had the honour to 
 say before you, that the Bill of organization proposed to you 
 realizes the advantages of prompt mobilization to the same 
 extent as the exclusively district system, without adopting the 
 inconveniences of that system. 
 
 We have already shown you, gentlemen, the total given by 
 the effectives of the active army of depot and reinforcement 
 troops, and by the recall of men at disposal and of the reserve, 
 and of men exempted from ser\ace but liable to be recalled in 
 virtue of Article 30 of the recruiting law. 
 
 This total is certainly reassuring, but great numbers are 
 not all that we need. 
 
 With a national character so impressionable, so eager to 
 follow a first success, so easily discouraged at the first reverse, 
 our great object must be to obtain this first success, and it 
 is with the purpose of securing it, that we must organize the 
 fighting army which Avill liaA^e to support the first shock of the 
 enemy. 
 
 We must then, for the constitution of this army, choose care- 
 fully from among the elements which the recruiting laAv puts at 
 our disposal. 
 
 We have already said that in the active army wo shall only
 
 71 
 
 keep men who are serving at least their eecond year, and that 
 the last class incorporated will be went to the depots at the 
 moment of mobilization, there to continue its instructii^n* Avith- 
 oiit exceeding the resources of the orchnary budget of war — 
 
 We can maintain during peace ... . . 450,000 men 
 
 If from this figure we subtract for the per- 
 manent effectivef . . . . . . 80,000 „ 
 
 There remains for the effective of the classes 370,000 
 After sending back to the depot the last 
 
 class called 150,000 
 
 There remains 220,000 
 
 for the total of men of the active army vdio had served more 
 than one j^ear. 
 
 According to the composition of the army on 
 a peace footing, the proportion of the dif- 
 ferent arms is 
 For infantry and military train . . . . 0*65 
 
 And for special arms . . . . . , . . 0"o5 
 
 The effective of 220,000 men is distributed 
 
 thus : — 
 Infantry and military train . . . . . . 143,000 men 
 
 Special arms . . ' 77,000 „ 
 
 If we allow the men of the infantry and military train to 
 serve, as in Germany, only three years in the active army, which 
 is considered enough by the Committee of 1828 and by General 
 Morand, no matter for icJiat arm ; the number of 143,000 men 
 assigned to the infantry and military train together, will cor- 
 respond to the classes serving the second and third years. 
 Consequently, 71,500 men| will be dismissed every year fi-om 
 the active army to the men at disposal and reserve. The 
 six classes of the men at disposal and the reserve will present 
 an effective ,of 71,500 x 6 s= 429,000 men at disposal for tne 
 infantry and military train of the fighting army. 
 
 If the special arm keep their men five years in the serA^ce, 
 
 * If it was decided to incorporate men only on the 1st of October, as war rarel_v 
 breaks out till May or June, this class would have served six or seven months at tlie 
 moment of mobilisation, and might bo very usefully incorporated in the active bat- 
 talions. 
 
 t We suppose here that the Algerian troops have been relieved, and arc come ' o 
 reinforce the Continental army. 
 
 X The annual contingents for infantry and military train . . 71,000 
 
 And for other arms in round numbers . . . . . . . . 19,000 
 
 Correspond to the first part of the conthigent of . . . . 00,000 
 Which must serve for five years, and to a second part which need 
 
 only serve one year .. .. .. .. .. •• (^O.OOi' 
 
 Total of the classes .. •• •• loi'.t i c
 
 72 
 
 the strength of 77,000 men assigned to them in the distribu- 
 tion will correspond to four classes of 19,250 men each. 
 
 The four classes of the reserve will give then 77,000 men 
 at disposal for the mobilization of the special arms. 
 
 The recall of these classes into the ranks of the active army- 
 will give the following resources : — 
 
 Infantry and military train : — 
 
 One class with the active army serving 
 
 its second year . . . . . . . . 71,500 
 
 One class with the active army serving 
 
 its third year 71,500 
 
 Two classes (4th and 5th) "^ having served") 
 
 at disposal .. >- at least three V 429,000 
 
 I'our classes of the reserve) years ..) 
 
 Total 572,000 
 
 Special arms : — 
 
 One class with the active army serving its 
 
 second year . . . . . . . . 19,250 
 
 One class with the active army serving its 
 
 third year 19,250 
 
 One class with the active army serving its 
 
 fourth year ^ . . 19,250 
 
 One class with the active army serving its 
 
 fifth year 19,250 
 
 Four classes of the reserve having served 
 
 five years 77,000 
 
 Total 154,000 
 
 The total of the resources for the formation of the active 
 army, adding to the men of the classes the permanent part 
 which is not allotted to the service of the interior, amounts to — 
 
 Infantry and mihtary train . . . . , . 572,000 
 
 Special arms . . . . . . . . . . 154,000 
 
 Permanent part : — 
 
 Officers .. .. 26,400 
 
 Non-commissioned officers (re-enlisted)* . . 3,700 
 
 Algerian sharpshooters. . . . . . . . 9,000 
 
 Spahis .. , .. .., 999 
 
 Foreign regiments . . . . . . . . 3,000 
 
 Eight classes of volunteers for one year, 
 
 counted at 8,000 a-year . . . . . . 64,000 
 
 Total 833,099 
 
 * This figvirc can only be given approximately, we liayc only counted npon a 
 tenth part of non-commissioned officers.
 
 73 
 
 The strength of the coutineiital fighting 
 ^^ army bemg .. .. , .. .. 737^601 
 
 To wliich must be added the Algerian troops 
 that will be relieved by the territorial army, 
 say one army corps of . , . . . . 38 234 
 
 Wliich gives a total of 775,925 
 
 Our resources are, you see, gentlemen, amply sufficient to 
 constitute the fighting army in such a, manner that three- 
 quarters of the infantry and military train shall be composed of 
 men who have served three years, and one-quarter of, men 
 who have served at least one year and are serving their third 
 year with the fighting army ; one-half of the special anns is 
 composed of men who have served five years and the other half 
 of men who have served from two to five years. 
 
 You will, without doubt, think with us, gentlemen, that such 
 a composition offers all the guarantees of solidity that we can 
 desire with respect to numbers. 
 
 With regard to troops of re-inforcement, they are supplied 
 after the constitution of the fighting of the army in the manner 
 we have just shown you, from men belonging to the reserve or 
 at disposal who have served at least one year, but have not 
 been incorporated in the said army. 
 
 We have shown you, gentlemen, in Table No. 2, that, allow- 
 ing for all deduction of losses, the four first classes of the active 
 army and the four of the reserve give — 
 
 A strength of 1,066,008 
 
 And subtracting for the strength of the 
 
 fighting army . . . . . , . . 775,925 
 
 There remains for the strength of the troops 
 of re-inforcement, and the services of the 
 interior 289,083 
 
 To this we must add the depot troops, com- 
 prismg the last class called, whose instruc- 
 tion is not yet complete, say . . , . 150,000 
 
 And the men Avho have been exempted from 
 service, but are liable to be recalled, whose 
 instruction is complete .. .. .. 141,000 
 
 Total 291,000 
 
 As soon as mobilization is ordered, the General commanding 
 an army coi-ps sends for the General appointed beforehand in 
 the mobihzation cadres to succeed him, and transfers the com- 
 mand to liim as soon as the mobilized active army corps quits 
 the region lo march to the front. This General has, under his 
 orders, the various administrative services, the territorial staff, 
 and those parts of tlio staffs of the artillery, and ongineei-s 
 allotted to regional service.
 
 74 
 
 The various corps of the inobiKzed territorial army so long- 
 as they are not in brigades and divisions are, like the troops 
 at present in garrison, under his command. So are the depots 
 of the active army corps. For staff he has the territorial staff, 
 which Article 16 attaches as a second section to the staff of the 
 active corps. It is by this staff that all the traditions of the 
 territorial service of the region are transmitted, and the work- 
 ing of the various services of the interior is insured. It has 
 been said that if this General appointed beforehand has had no 
 duty during peace to fulfil in the active army corps, his work 
 will be quite unknown to him at the moment of mobihzation. 
 But how is it managed at present wlien a General is appointed 
 to take the command of a division or a territorial brigade ? His 
 work is equally new to him, yet nobody attempts to suggest 
 that this General Officer is incompetent. Does not he find when 
 he arrives, the staff that worked under his predecessor, which 
 possesses all the traditions of the service, and very soon acquamts 
 him with everything he shoald know. There is then nothmg 
 new in the dispositions of the law, v\diich merely enacts that the 
 territorial command as it exists at present is re-established at 
 the moment when the General commanding an active army corps 
 quits the mobihzod region with liis army corps. But it is no 
 longer the same if the troops of the mobilized territorial army 
 are divided into brigades and divisions and organized as an 
 army corps to take the field. Things change then; brigades and 
 divisions are provided with their staffs and their administrative 
 services. The text of the law does not say what the General 
 commanding the territory is in this case to become, and it is 
 useless to do so, for then we return to the legislative arrange- 
 ments that ruled the active army corps before its mobilization. 
 The nature and name of the troops are changed. 
 
 We have nothing to add to what we have already told you 
 with respect to the provisions contained in Articles 24 and 25 of 
 the Bill. The Government has caused a special Bill to be pre- 
 pared upon the requisition of horses and carriages. It will be 
 submitted to you and, while waiting for the law to be voted and 
 carried into execution, the law of 29th April, 1792, and an order 
 of public administration will suffice. 
 
 Articles 26 and 27 of the Bill of the Committee are only a 
 reproduction of the first Bill of the Government, It must be 
 observed, however, that the active army has telegraph and rail- 
 way companies which operate within the zone of military 
 action, therefore the proposals, in Articles 26 and 27 apply 
 more particularly to the ser-saces behind this zone, and that 
 these are two distinct services, one a marching, the other an 
 etappen service. The first is created with exclusively military 
 elements and organized m a military manner. The second 
 employs the ordinary elements of the company's services, belongs 
 to the territorial army, but is liable Hke all the troops of that 
 army, to be detached in order to join the active army on the con- 
 ditions mentioned in the last paragraph of Article 34 of the Bill.
 
 75 
 
 Servauts of the railway companies who are less than 2i) years 
 old, belong to the active army, but it has been aslccd is it not 
 dangerous to mobilize them just at the time when the operations 
 of mobilization will throw exceptional work upon these com- 
 panies, and requii-Q the employment of all their j^ersomul 2 Wc 
 may reply to this observation that the law of recruiting has 
 made no exception for these servants, and has granted them no 
 privilege. The lines of all the railway companies will not be 
 employed at the same time in the mobilization and concentra- 
 tion of the army and its material, and the Govermnent by 
 means of requisitions will cause extra supplies of the servants 
 as well as of the stock of these companies to be sent to the most 
 active lines. The ^Minister of War has also the right to modify 
 the execution of the recruitmg law for the public good. In 
 order to place it in harmony with the necessities of the ser\ace, 
 he may arrange with the servants of the railway companies that 
 they are not to join then- corps till after the operations of the 
 mobilization and the concentration of troops and material are 
 entirely accomplished. These servants are generally em'olled 
 in military railway companies or corps of engineers. 
 
 We must call yoiir attention for one moment, gentlemen, 
 to an agreement made by the Minister of War, stipulating for 
 the establishment and syndicate of the companies, because this 
 agreement explains the organization of our engineer and rail- 
 way companies. The representatives of six large companies 
 have engaged to give professional instruction to young soldiers 
 enrolled in the engineer and railway companies, who shall 
 be sent to them, after having served for one year with their 
 corps. 
 
 The companies will utilize their services, and treat them 
 like their own servants. The young men will cost absolutely 
 notlmig to the State. At the moment of mobihzation they will 
 be recalled and sent back to the military railway companies to 
 which they belonged, and in which they never cease to be 
 enrolled till they are old enough to pass into the reserve. 
 
 According to the terms of the agreement, they must not 
 number more than 400. 
 
 As the Minister can always exact his full right, in eight 
 years the four classes belonging to the active army and the 
 four classes of the reserve will be able, if necessary, to fm-nish 
 an effective of 3,200 men, instructed in the real requirements of 
 the ser^^ce by daily practice, of wdiom^ a proportion of fom- 
 sixths are layers for the rail service, one-sixth engine-men, 
 stokers, fitters, &c., for the traction service, and one-sixth for 
 the general working. 
 
 You will recognize, without doubt, gentlemen, the advantage 
 of this arrangement both to the Treasury and the army, secur- 
 ing as it does to the latter at the moment of mobihzation a 
 sufficient number of railway companies to meet the require- 
 ments of the army corps and the army reserve. 
 
 The agreement does not so much concern the technical in-
 
 76 
 
 structioii of the officerB and cacbes of these companies; they 
 must, however, necessarily exist in time of peace, though within 
 very confined limits, as, at the moment of mobilization, they 
 will be filled up with the servants of engmeers and railway 
 companies servants. 
 
 We would draw the attention of the Minister of AYar to this 
 oversight. 
 
 Ai-ticle 43 of the recruiting laAv subjects men of the reserve 
 and the active army to take part in the manoeuvi'es which occur 
 twice every year, and cannot last more than four Aveeks. 
 
 Eeferring to Table No. 2, it may be seen that the total 
 strength of these reserves is not less than 510,000. This ex- 
 plains the necessity of recalling 255,000 men for a certain time 
 every year to the regional coi-ps in which they were enrolled 
 on then* dismissal. The maintenance of these men will be a 
 cost to the Treasury not comprised in the provisions of the 
 budget, the maximum of the cost being equivalent to the 
 continued maintenance for one year of 22,000 men. This ex- 
 pense will necessarily vary with the duration of the manoeuvi'es, 
 and with the distances which the men recalled have to travel. 
 It will then be advantageous, as it were, to localise the enrol- 
 ment of members of the reserve, and place them in the coi*ps 
 nearest to then* domiciles, in order to lessen travelling expenses, 
 instead of having to convey them to all the coi'ps of the region. 
 This is one of the motives which have caused your Committee, 
 in accordance "with the Government, to allot the reserves of a 
 region permanently, to whatever body of ti'oops is in garrison 
 in that regional sub-diAasion, though that body may be changed 
 and replaced by another of the same arm. 
 
 These manoeuvres, which your Committee and the Govern- 
 ment think should terminate the new instruction of the troops, 
 are no longer to be conducted as they used to be, upon 
 manoeuvruig grounds, levelled and prepared lieforehand, but in 
 the open country fields, all the real chcumstances of war, of 
 Avhicli they are to be a faithful repetition. Consequently, they 
 Avill occasion damages for wliich we must justly indemnify the 
 proprietors of the land. Your Committee and the Government 
 propose to you, for the reasons we have already indicated, 
 to leave the method of valuation and payment of the indemni- 
 ties to an order of public administration until a law upon the 
 matter is issued. 
 
 We tlnnk, also, that though the expenses occasioned by these 
 manoeuvres -wnll recur every year, they ought not to be con- 
 founded in the army budget with the maintenance of the 
 ordinary effective. But they ought to be the object of a 
 special Article in Chapter 6, in order that you may reserve 
 to yourselves the power of var;^dng the credits demanded 
 of you by augmenting or diminishing the duration of the 
 manoeuvres. 
 
 Supposing that they average twenty days, the time for 
 going and returning included, the maintainance of 255,000 men
 
 77 
 
 during this time Avill correRpoiul to the inaintenance of 14,000 
 men for a year. 
 
 But the men of the reserve of the active army are not the 
 only ones obliged by the recruiting law to return periodically 
 to their place in the ranks. Article 42 of the law lays the men 
 at disposal in their homes under the same obligation ; it does 
 not define the duration of the musters for these latter, and it 
 leaves to a ]\Iinisterial order the decision of the reviews and 
 exercises they are to undergo, with the right of multipl^-ing 
 them according to the requirements of instruction. It is then 
 impossible to foresee what these reviews and exercises may cost 
 the budget of war. 
 
 Yet it will be wise to make a rough estimate of the cost, 
 in order that it may be set down in the pro\nsions of the annual 
 war budget. 
 
 Admitting the division of the annual contingent into two 
 parts, the first of 90,000 men, the second 60,000 men ; a pro- 
 portion wliich results, as we have said, from having for Avar a 
 fighting army of. . . 737,000 men. 
 
 If we average the maintenance on a peace 
 footing of an effective of . . . . . . 450,000 ,, 
 
 We have of men at disposal the following 
 result : — 1st. Four classes of 60,000, the first 
 being incorporated entnely . . . . . . 240,000 „ 
 
 2nd. Two classes of the first part of tlie 
 contingent dismissed from the infantry or 
 miHtary train after three years' service to the 
 men at disposal of the active army, consisting 
 of 71,500 men each 143,000 „ 
 
 Total of men at disposal . . . . 383,000 „ 
 
 There are three ways of instructing those men : the first 
 consists in recaUing them to the nearest depots ; the second, in 
 having them exerci.^ed in their homes by the corporals and non- 
 commissioned oflicers of the reserve of the active army, domi- 
 ciled in the commune or canton; the third, in detacliing 
 part or whole of the depot cadres in the chief places of the 
 canton, for a certain time, as proposed by Marshal Bugeaud.* 
 The first of these three methods of instruction is witliout doubt 
 the best, for by returning to a numerous and well organised 
 corps, the men at disposal will acquire new military spirit. But 
 it is also incontestably the most costly. The second will only 
 occasion the trifling expense of small indemnities for the cadres 
 of instruction, every one bemg in then- own home. But these 
 reserve cadres vnW themselves very likely have lost part of the 
 vigour and firmness necessary for instruction by having been 
 for a long time in their homes. The third, which takes a middle 
 course between the tAvo others, would only occasion the ex- 
 
 * De I'organisation xmitaire do I'armce (iingc 14).
 
 pcnses of tlio travellijig and the niiautciuinco of flic cadres, 
 Avliicli could not be very great. Whatever conrso the Minister to 
 whom the right of decision belongs may decide to adopt, the 
 maximum expense resulting from the adoption of the first of 
 these three systems, would be the maintenance of 383,000 men 
 for 15 days, say about equal to 15,000 men for a year. To this 
 must be added the maintenance of the reserves during the 
 manoeuvre months, of which the maximum prescribed by the 
 law would correspond to an effective of 37,000 men to be main- 
 tained, besides the normal effective of 450,000. The sketch of 
 the budget presented for 1874,* estimates the annual expense 
 of a soldier to average 430 francs.t That would be an average 
 of 19,350,000 to add to the normal army budget. We have 
 already told you, gentlemen, that the organization proposed by 
 your Committee would save about 3,000,000 of the war esti- 
 mates for 1874. But these estimates made no provision for the 
 expense of recalling the men at disposal and of the reserve. Of 
 the recall there can be no question this year, but we must fore- 
 see the necessity of it ultimately; and you perceive that though 
 the Budget proposed for 1874 requires no addition in order to 
 cover the expenses of the new organization, we must neverthe- 
 less provide in future budgets for the expense that will result 
 from the annual recall of men of the reserve for one month 
 every two years, and of men at disposal for fifteen days every 
 year, conformably to the dispositions of Articles 42 and 43 of 
 the recruiting law you have voted, the full and entire execution 
 of which will thus be assured. The extra expense of 16,350,000 
 which remains when we subtract the 3,000,000 from the 
 19,350,000 unprovided for in the esthnates, will be partly 
 covered by the 8,000 to 10,000 volunteers for one year, who 
 are to pay their own expenses, and who have been included 
 in the efrective of 450,000 men to be maintained. 
 
 We can only give you here, gentlemen, a general summary. 
 The law yet to come upon the constitution of corps can alone 
 furnish us with certain data for th,o future war budget. 
 
 Territoral ArmYc 
 
 The organization of the active army is so closely connected 
 with the organization of the territorial army, that it is impos- 
 sible to submit the former to the deliberations of the Assembly 
 without at the same time submitting the latter. 
 
 The interior constitution of corps does not influence the 
 formation of great unities more in the territorial army than in 
 the active army. The only notable difference there is between 
 
 * Page 674. 
 
 + This docs not include clothing, as all men ought to be pvoTided with kits on 
 the incorporation of the class of 150,000 men.
 
 79 
 
 the two armies consists in tlic diffcvcnce of tlieir stieiigth, for 
 while tho recruiting resources of the active army amount to 
 1,215,000 men, tliose of the territorial army only amount to 
 582,000 men, that is to say, less than half. 
 
 If we allow, and there is no reason why we should not, that 
 the corps of both armies shall be constituted in tho same way, 
 it amounts to saying, that to each brigade of the active army 
 there shall be a corresponding regiment of the same arm in the 
 territorial army. 
 
 If we wish to have a regiment in the territorial army corre- 
 sponding with each regiment of the active army bearing the 
 same number, with the addition of " and a half," as has been 
 proposed, we must construct it ^\dth only half the effective, that 
 is to say, constitute regiments of infantry in two little battalions, 
 and regiments of cavalry in two squadrons. 
 
 Independently of tho weakening effect of this parcelling out, 
 how could vre provide for the formation of the cadres, which 
 are already so difficitlt to recruit, and then would have to be 
 doubled. 
 
 It does not seem possible to organize the territorial army 
 in any Avay as the double of the active army. Their duties 
 are different, and there is no reason for this similitude and cor- 
 respondence between the constituted corps of the two armies. 
 The active army is intended for mobile war in the field ; the 
 territorial army, on tho contrary, is charged with the care and 
 defence of fixed points of territory, fortresses, strategic points, 
 coasts, and etappen stations and Hues. It will, as a i-ule, have 
 to operate only in more or less important detachments, while 
 the active army operates in masses. The territorial army will 
 rarely detach bodies of troops to join the active amiy,* and if 
 the law has pro^dded for this detachment, it is only mentioned 
 as an exception. 
 
 AVe might, however, find ourselves in the position of having 
 to organize the teriitorial army into brigades, divisions, and 
 army corps, in consequence, for instance, of offensive operations 
 upon the enemy's territory, operations which while freeing the 
 toTitorial army from the necessity of guarding fixed positions 
 in the interior, would necessitate its presence upon the enemy's 
 territory behind the active army, to support its movements, to 
 guard its communications, to keep the conquered country, or to 
 besiege and reduce fortresses. 
 
 This constitution of the territorial army in great practical 
 unities is foreseen by the law,* and must be prej^ared in time of 
 peace for this army as well as the active army. 
 
 The territorial army is, then, a special army. It has its own 
 nmneric classification, its special corps, and its independent 
 organization. In case of war it must supply the defence ot 
 of Algeria, just as it does other parts of the national territory, 
 and must refieve troops of the active army stationed there. It 
 
 * Article 34 of the Bill.
 
 80 
 
 must also relieve tlic corps stationed at Paris and Lyons, and 
 reinforce the garrison of those two towns, which, like the garri- 
 son of other fortresses, Avill be composed from the depots and 
 mobilized contingents of the active army not employed in the 
 formation of the army of the field. 
 
 But, the territorial army is not permanent. In time of peace 
 it only maintains the -personel necessary for administration, and 
 for the keeping of accounts and muster rolls.* There is also no 
 danger of its recruiting being exclusively regionalf, for, imme- 
 diately after its mobilization, the Government can dispose of the 
 corps, and change them from one place to ajiother, either to 
 send them to the etappen lines or to form garrisons. No legal 
 order sanctions the permanence of the various corps in their 
 recruiting region. 
 
 The reserve of the territorial army is not organized in corps. 
 It is only a recruiting reserve which is called up by classes in 
 case of need,t to fill vacancies in the territorial army, or to 
 reinforce its corps. 
 
 As regards officers the cadres of the territorial army are 
 organized permanently beforehand, by means of officers on half- 
 pay or retired and the volunteers for one year who have ob- 
 tained the brevet of auxiliary officers.^ 
 
 We should say here that the law allows neither privilege 
 nor dispensation for these volunteers, and they cannot be 
 incorporated in the territorial army till they have served the 
 nine years required by the law in the active army. Ip case 
 these resources are not sufficient, the cadres of officers^ will be 
 filled up by promoting non-commissioned officers, risen from the 
 ranks, and volunteers for one year who have obtained the 
 brevet of non-commissioned officer and, by reason of their age, 
 have passed from the reserve of the active army to the 
 territorial army, Avith the rank of auxiliary sub-lieutenant. 
 All nominations of officers will be made by the chief of the 
 executive power on the recommendation of the Minister of 
 War ; those of non-commissioned officers by the Generals com- 
 manding regional army corps.| 
 
 Finally the Minister may order the soldiers of the territorial 
 officers to be mustered when he thinks vight.f 
 
 Articles 32 and 33, ordering the method of formation of 
 the territorial army, correspond to Articles 3, 4, and 5, and 13, 
 18, and 19, which order the organization of the active army into 
 regional subdivisions, the keeping of enrolment registers, and 
 the manner of filling up vacancies that may occur m the cadres. 
 
 We must draw your attention here to the great difference 
 between the dispositions concerning the active army, and those 
 whicli concern the territorial army, with regard to the distribution 
 of the contingents. For the active army drawing as it does 
 recruits from the whole national territory, this distribution is 
 
 * Article 29 of the Bill. f Avticlo 30, idem, % Article 31, idem.
 
 81 
 
 made by the Minister. As at present, he assigns to each 
 department the nmnber of men of a certain arm which it must 
 furnisli to the different corps, and the various services of the 
 army. 
 
 For the territorial army, on the contrary, where recruiting 
 is exclusively regional, the General commanding the region 
 makes this distribution by subdivision for the infantry, and over 
 the whole region for other arms.* It has been asked whether, 
 as in Article 2, when the district of an army corps cannot 
 fiu'nish, for instance, all the artillerymen requned, it would not be 
 permissible to make the neighbourijig regions give the men that 
 they have in excess '^ There is no doubt that this should be 
 done, and as the recruiting service works over the whole region, 
 the central recruitmg service stationed with the General-in-chief 
 should make all necessary arrangements beforehand with the 
 recruiting services of the neighbouring regions. 
 
 The organization of the regions and of then subdivisions is 
 common to the armies, and works for both in the same way. 
 
 AVhile they remain in the region without bemg detached to 
 join the active army the mobilized troops of the territoiial 
 army are placed under the command of the General com- 
 manding the army corps,t or under that of the officer who 
 replaces him when the active army corps quits the region.| 
 
 These troops are generally organized only into regiments, 
 battahons, batteries and companies. The nature of then* 
 service prevents it being otherwise unless they are organized 
 in brigades and divisions, and formed mto an army corps for 
 active service. 
 
 The duties of the General who replaces the general officer 
 gone with the mobilized corps, in the command of the region, 
 are then the same as those of the Generals who at present 
 command territorial divisions. 
 
 It has been asked, what relations will exist in this case 
 between the mobihzed corps of the active army, and the esta- 
 blishments and magazines they have left in the region where 
 they were stationed ; whether they wiU contmue to receive from 
 them the supplies of arms, equipments and habiliments which 
 they require "? 
 
 bnce the active army is marched to the front, the ties which 
 bind an army corps to its region are broken, and the corps 
 will then be supplied with necessary stores and jjersonel from 
 the nearest sources. 
 
 This principle is sanctioned by Article 24 with regard to 
 reinforcements, and it is easily seen that it could not be other- 
 wise. The events of war may m fact invert the order of battle 
 of the corps, and those that were at the left may be sent to the 
 right, and vice versa. If the corps remained specially attached 
 to the magazines of their respective regions, the result would 
 
 * Article 32. t Article 35. % Article 23.
 
 82 
 
 be a cliasse-croise of men and material upon the railways in 
 the rear of the army, leading inevitably to confusion and delay 
 of transport. 
 
 The general magazines of the army corps, while continuing 
 to supply the subdivisional magazines, will lose their special 
 character. They will supply not the corps attached to their 
 region, but the nearest corps of the fighting army, whichever 
 they may be. They will be elements of a basis of general 
 operations, and no longer special to such or such coi*j38 of the 
 active army. 
 
 This general character puts them in the position of the 
 magazines placed by Article 14 under the hnmediate direction 
 of the Minister, and during the whole war they will keep this 
 character. 
 
 When mobihzed, the temtorial army will be submitted to 
 the same laws and regulations as the active army, which it 
 will resemble in the matter of pay and allowances. A law will 
 regulate the hierarcliical relaticms of the two armies. 
 
 When we add that during peace the clothing, equipments 
 and arms are stored in the subdivisional magazines, we hope 
 you will be convmced, gentlemen, that there is notliing in 
 common between the territorial army, as it is constituted, and 
 the National Guard, such as it was made by the law of March 
 21, 1831, and suppressed by the law of August 25, 1871, 
 because it was no longer needed and because it was impossible 
 for it to exist with the territorial army. 
 
 Such is the general outline of the legislative dispositions 
 wliich regulate the territorial army. 
 
 As in the case of the active army, your Committee think it 
 unnecessary to enter here into the organization and interior 
 constitution of the corps of the territorial army, or to speak of 
 their administration and of the method of promotion in the 
 cadres; these questions will be decided by special laws. We 
 must, however, note here some general considerations wliich we 
 thi]ik should serve as the basis of its organization. 
 
 Its character of territorial army will lead it to conform as 
 much as possible to administrative circumscriptions in the 
 formation of companies, batteries, battahons and regiments. 
 This is also the opinion of the Government. 
 
 In the organization of the artillery, above all, batteries 
 should be first organized dismounted. We should try to 
 enrol in the batteries old artillery drivers who understarrd the 
 manoeuvrmg of gurrs so that, by means of these drivers, they 
 can be trarrsformed into mounted batteries as soon as we can 
 procure horses for them. 
 
 We must give up any thought of having the same propor- 
 tion of cavalry for the territorial army as for the active arrrry, and 
 this for two reasons : 1st, the difiiculty of nrounting it ; 2ndly, 
 because, as the active army is irr the front, the territorial army 
 wherr organized in brigades and (hvisions for the purpose of 
 following and supporting it, has no need of making rccon-
 
 83 
 
 naissances in front, but only up^n its -\\ang-s, and may rely upon 
 the scouts of the active army. 
 
 Old cavalry solchers of the territorial army, when found to 
 exceed the requirements of that army, will be sent into the 
 mihtary train and organized in companies with old soldiers of 
 the artillery and military train, to diive artillery carriages and 
 carnages requisitioned in execution of Articles 5 and 25 of the 
 law. These carriages will most hkely furnish sufficient means 
 of transport, and there will be no need to have recourse to 
 military material, which should be reserved as much as possible 
 for the operations of the active army within the zone of 
 military action. 
 
 The recruiting of the territorial army will give a great 
 number of professional craftsmen, who could be utilised in the 
 engineermg army. The formation of companies or battalions 
 of tliis arm is most important to the defence of strong places. 
 
 The recruiting of the cadres of these companies and 
 battalions will be made easy, because we can employ part of the 
 officers and guards of the territorial engineering service, to 
 whom we can give as auxiliaries, the Government engineers 
 for roads, bridges and mines (in whose instrucdon the study 
 of fortification is comprised), students in the Central School 
 of Arts and Manufactures, and arcliitects. This was done ^\ath 
 success during the defence of Paris, to wliich the auxihary 
 companies of engineers, as is well known, contributed the most 
 devoted and useful service. 
 
 Finally, by the applymg the dispositions of Article 8 to 
 the territorial army, we may attach to this army corps of 
 woodmen, who could be organized, even in time of peace, 
 with custom-house agents and with the agents of the Woods 
 and Forests serAnces. 
 
 This organization could be divided into an active part and 
 a fixed part. The first, composed of men under 40, might form 
 guides for the active army operating in the country, and the 
 second for the territorial army. Firemen should also be 
 organized in such a way as to make it possible for them to be 
 mobilized and sent to fortresses where then- habitual devotion 
 will be a great help in case of conflagration from bombard- 
 ments. We should also consider whether, folloA\ring the 
 example of Italy, we should not, like her, constitute special 
 companies and battalions of hifantry of the Alps, of the Jura, 
 and of the Vosges, chosen from men of the country accustomed 
 to marching, and ^4th a knowledge of all the passes and foot- 
 paths of the momitaius. Such companies or battalions should 
 be specially allotted to the defence of the mountainous regions 
 where the men of which they are composed were born. 
 
 The corps of the territorial army will have the same imifoi-m 
 and the same colours as the corresponding corps of the active 
 amiy, so that the enemy may not know which it is attacking, 
 and,' besides, to simphfy"the supplies by making them alike. 
 
 You will remark, gentlemen, that Article 30 of the Bill pre-
 
 84 
 
 scribes the recall by classes commencing with the newest 
 reserve of the territorial army, while the same condition is not 
 imposed by the law for the reserve of the active army. Article 
 21 expressly states that the Minister may order the mobilization 
 of all or of a part of the various classes of the men at disposal, 
 and of the reserve of the active army. 
 
 The recall of this army caimot then be made by whole 
 classes, but categorically in each class. The Minister may 
 mobilize one or several corps of the active army, and only 
 recall to these corps men who belonged to the first part of 
 the contingent and have passed five years in the service. 
 
 Though this arrangement is qtiite different from that which 
 regulates the method of the mobilization of the territorial army, 
 it is not, as you might think, in opposition to the recruiting law. 
 Article 43 of the recruiting law is formal in this respect. The 
 text of this Article states in fact that the recall of the reserve 
 of the active army may be made distinctly and independently 
 for the land army, or for the sea army, and that it niai/ also be 
 made by classes beginning at the newest. That is a power 
 given to the Minister, it is not an obligation imposed upon him. 
 
 There are several good reasons for this difference in the 
 manner of recalling the reserves ; the first is, that it may some- 
 times be necessary, when a war is localized on a particular part 
 of the frontier, to mobilize one or several of the corps of the 
 active army, without any necessity for mobilizing the other coi-ps. 
 The second is, that we are obliged only to call out one or 
 several army corps by turns for practice of mobilization and for 
 the manoeuvres, the reserves being only subjected to manoeuvi-es 
 every two years. 
 
 Article 43 of the recruiting law does not allow the Govern- 
 ment to obviate this obhgation by calhng out reserves to annual 
 manoeuvres of a shorter duration than the maximum of four 
 weeks fixed by the law ; were this to be done, it would give 
 double inconvenience and double trouble to the reserves, and 
 to then' industrial, agricultural and commercial interests, thus 
 adding to the burden of the obligations laid upon them by 
 the law. 
 
 The third and chief motive spiings from a miHtary necessity, 
 so important that it may almost be called a matter of public 
 welfare. It is to present to the enemy, from the opening of 
 miHtary operations, a fighting army in the plenitude of its power 
 in order to insure, if possible, a first success. None of these 
 motives exist for the territorial army. 
 
 Thus, the law gives the Government the right of first re- 
 calhng to the active army the men of the fii'st class of the reserve 
 who have already served five years in the active army, and of 
 dealing in the same manner with other classes, without mobi- 
 Hzing the men of these classes who have only served one 
 year and who may be called out to form troops of reinforcement. 
 
 It may be added here that in case of war, volunteers for one 
 year march with this first part of the class to which they belong.
 
 85 
 
 It is an obligation imposed upon them, in compensation for 
 wliat may be considered as a privilege accorded, for the sake of 
 theii" civil careers, to the well-to-do classes of society, from which 
 these volunteers generally come. The law considers that, since 
 their- fortune and social position give them more interest in the 
 defence of the tenitory, they owe greater duties to the country, 
 and therefore, before all other citizens to whom they owe an 
 example of abnegation and devotion, they should present theii- 
 breast to the buUets of the enemy. 
 
 HEAD V. 
 Particular Dispositioxs. 
 
 When the law imposes this glorious duty upon the volunteers 
 for one year, it should give them the power to fulfil it in the 
 most profitable manner for the army, by utihzmg for its benefit 
 the superior knowledge they are supposed to possess. This is 
 what it has done under Head V. 
 
 This Head imposes some special dispositions which we 
 shall have the honour to lay before you. 
 
 Article 19 of the recruiting law states, that the law of 
 general organization will decide upon the employments most 
 fit for the pupils of the Ecoh Polytechnique, and the Ecole 
 Forestiere, who have satisfactoiily passed out of the said 
 schools, but have not been placed in the armies of sea or land. 
 Article 36 has been prepared to decide this question. 
 
 The said pupils may be cHvided into two categories ; those 
 who, passing out satisfactorily, are declared fit for pubhc 
 services and school, and those who enter into pubhc civil 
 services. 
 
 Article 36 gives to the first, as to their comrades who enter 
 into the army, a brevet of sub-lieutenant, or a commission 
 equivalent to the auxihary rank. There was no reason to treat 
 them in a different manner, since they both fulfilled the same 
 conditions. An objection has been made to this, because of the 
 recruiting of the cadi'es of artillery and engmeers. The in- 
 sufficiency of these cadres is declared in the Bill which was 
 presented to you, its object being to confer the rank of sub- 
 lieutenant upon the pupils of the Ecole Polytechnique, upon 
 certain conditions, after only one year's study, by dispensuig 
 with the dispositions of the law of promotion. 
 
 Article 36 of the Bill, it is said, allows the pupils of the 
 Ecoles Polytechnique and Forestiere to be cormted among the 
 men at disposal of the active army, when, having passed satis- 
 factorily out of these schools, they obtain the brevet of sub- 
 heutenant, and are not placed in a public service. 
 
 They are thus dispensed from ser\ace with the active anny, 
 a privilege not given to them by the old laws, which obliged 
 them, on leaving the schools, either to rejoin a coi*ps or to
 
 86 
 
 provide a substitute. Is it not then to be feared that a certain 
 number of these young men, after having passed through tlie 
 Ecole d'Apphcation, may cbaw back and use the Ecole Poly- 
 technique as a means of escaping certain obhgations to mihtary 
 service, instead of being utiHzed in the artillery cadi^es, still so 
 incomplete ? 
 
 We reply, that these young men "would attain that end more 
 easily by volunteering for one year, and that we, by insisting 
 that they should serve theii' whole time with the active army, 
 should draw away a great number of them who might make ex- 
 cellent auxihary officers, from the study of high mathematics. 
 It is objected that when they leave the Ecole Polytechnique 
 they have only received a very superficial military training, and, 
 cannot make good officers. Tru3 ; but how many young men 
 have passed straight fi-om school to be sub-lieutenants in 
 the infantry? Have they been the worse officers for that? 
 Generals who have employed them say. No ! 
 
 It all reduces itself to making them undergo in a regiment 
 what then- comrades undergo in the Ecole d'Apphcation. 
 
 These young men, as auxiliaries, will furnish the army 
 with excellent elements, of which we must not deprive it. 
 Influenced by these thoughts^ your Committee propose to you 
 to adopt the conditions of paragraph 1, Article 36. 
 
 It is understood that these young men will share the lot of 
 the class to which they belong, and such among them as 
 entered the schools at an exceptional age w^ill pass into the 
 reserve of the active army, if when they leave the school they 
 have reached the age of 25. 
 
 The second paragraph of Article 36 is applicable to pupils 
 of the Ecoles Polytechnique and Forestiere, who, when they 
 leave the said schools, are classed in the civil public services. 
 These will enjoy the same advantage as the first. The law 
 considers then- first civil employment equal to the rank of 
 auxihary sub-lieutenant, and leaves to an order of public 
 administration to determine according to the position which 
 they occupy in the public services, the rank and employments 
 that may afterwards be given them in the army in case of 
 mobilization. 
 
 The men conditionally engaged for one year, after having 
 fulfilled the obhgation imposed upon them by the law, remain 
 at disposal of the active army, and afterwards pass the time 
 prescribed by law m the reserve of the said army (Article 37). 
 
 Such of these young men as have obtained the brevet of 
 non-commissioned officers, can be promoted to the rank of 
 auxiliary sub-lieutenant if they prove their capacity for it, after 
 having passed a second year either in the active service or in a 
 school chosen by the Minister (Article 38). Here we have a 
 means of utilizing for the benefit of the army the intelligence 
 and instruction acquu-ed by these young men, who form, as it 
 were a nursery of officers, without which it would be difficult 
 to complete the cadres of the tiirritorial army.
 
 87 
 
 Volunteers for one year and pupils leaving the schools, aa. 
 we have said above, are not dispensed from any of their militaiy 
 obligations, and they are enrolled beforehand as noii-com- 
 missioned officers, or as officers in the corps and services for 
 which they are destmed. 
 
 Article 39 of the law goes further ; it allows to remain in 
 the servace with the rank of non-commissioned officers those 
 who, in order to continue then- military career, wish to complete 
 five years of service in the active army, but does not allow 
 them to claim the privilege as a right; this power is sul)ject 
 to the authority of the Minister, who enlarges or restricts it 
 according to the character of the individuals, and the require- 
 ments of the cadi'es. But while opening the doors of the army 
 to all capacities, no matter whence they come, and while utihzing 
 all devotion, the law must take care to guard the interests of 
 the permanent cadi'es by preventing the recurrence of the ab- 
 normal facts and abuses which occurred during the last war. 
 These abuses obliged the National Assembly to appomt a Par- 
 liamentary Commission to revise the ranks which mgency had 
 made it necessary to confer upon men, brave and devoted with- 
 out doubt, but sometimes incapable, or upon others, little to be 
 recommended, whose previous conduct ^vsis unknoA\Ti. 
 
 Article 40 gives all the rights of regular officers to auxiliary 
 officers when they are servmg vnth the active army ; but it 
 specifies formally, that any promotion which they may receive 
 during then- service with the active army can only be given to 
 them as auxiliaiy, and that in no case can they hold this rank 
 as belonging to the active army. The law gives the right of 
 ha\Tng their retning pensions revised to those ^^ho, being on 
 the retired list, have been called to active service either in the 
 active army or in the territorial army. But will this revision be 
 made with regard to the new rank they may haveattamed 
 dm-ing their period of active ser^ace, or wdll it only add to the 
 pension already paid, the increase assigned to the length of 
 service, and to the campaigns of the new period ? The question 
 presented itself after the last war, it may present itsefi" again. 
 The Committee beg you to observe on tliis point, that the 
 reply does not belong to a law of general organization. The 
 law must content itself with legalizmg the right without de- 
 finmg it. The individuals interested must demand a definition 
 from the law upon rething pensions and upon promotion. 
 
 But it is otherwise with regard to rank m the Legion of 
 Honour, which soldiers of the territorial army may have ob- 
 tained durmg their ser\ace m the said army. AVith regard to 
 that, they ^vill enjoy all the rights given to soldiers of the same 
 rank in the active army. This will apply also to tliose avIio, 
 from having been invalided or wounded, vaW have a right to 
 pensions. The pensions will be paid as to soldiers of the same 
 rank in the active army. Here is a new fact, certainly, which 
 affects the remainder of the invalided soldier's life; and, if the 
 right is defined liy law, the detinition was made because it is
 
 88 
 
 natural and just that the law should assure him some means 
 of existence. The principle is incontestable, and the right 
 partially defines itself. 
 
 In the transitory dispositions which end the Bill, Article 41 
 opens the way for officers of the old Guard Mobile, and of the 
 mobilized corps, to re-enter the cadres of the tenitorial army, 
 under conditions to be determined by the Minister. In the last 
 war, we saw improvised officers at the head of mobilized and 
 mobile battahons, paying with their blood for the honour of 
 defending then- country ; and if their instruction and their 
 military science may be doubted, no one will hesitate to render 
 homage to their bravery, their sense of duty, and their devo- 
 tion to their country. 
 
 We could not, then, without ingratitude, shut out the brave 
 officers, who served then- country so usefully dming the war, 
 from the cadi'es of the territorial army at the moment of its 
 formation. To lay it open to them is both to perform an act 
 of justice towards them, and to serve the interests of the 
 territorial army. But this power should not extend beyond the 
 first formation of this army ; for, as we have said, gentlemen, 
 the territorial array is not a national guard, but a serious army, 
 with a regular government and fixed regulations, like the active 
 army. Article 41 only lays down, then, a transitory measure. 
 
 Such, gentlemen, in outhne and in detail, are the disposi- 
 tions of the law, which we have the honour to submit to your 
 deliberations. It is a new law; for it is the first time that 
 legislative dispositions regulating the general organization of 
 the army have been laid before a French Assembly. This law 
 being necessary — nay, we believe, indispensable, — after the 
 events which struck so hard a blow at our power and om- military 
 organization, your patriotism does not recoil before the grievous 
 task of raising the ruins, and reconstituting the edifice upon 
 new, and, let us hope, more solid foundations. The nation and 
 the army who await this law as an instrument of regenera- 
 tion, will be grateful to you for your work, however imperfect 
 it may be. Above all, do not let us forget that profound and 
 serious reforms are the work of time, and that impatience and 
 precipitation are powerless to found anything durable. 
 
 It cost the Germans more than 60 years to found the 
 organization of which we have lately proved the terrible per- 
 fection. Let us then learn to wait without impatience, as with- 
 out discouragement. The army has not been fortunate, gentle- 
 men, but if the fortune of war proved too strong for its courage, 
 its patriotism and its faith in the future of the country are not 
 weakened. If, after many days of honour and glory, its day of 
 humiliation came, it was because Providence would have it un- 
 derstand still better the extent of its duties to the country. 
 
 The army will fulfil them all, gentlemen, for it will be the 
 army of the nation of law and of right ; and, thanks to it, we 
 can still conceive a hope, that France has not ceased to be the 
 soldier of God.
 
 89 
 
 Therefore, gentlemen, your Committee have the honour to 
 propose to you, to be pleased to adopt the Bill here following : — 
 
 BILL ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY. 
 
 As proposed hy the Committee. Alterations made hy the Assembly. 
 
 Article L 
 
 The French territory is divided 
 into eighteen regions, for organi- 
 zation of the regular army and its 
 reserve, and of the territorial army 
 and its reserve, and into subdivisions 
 of these districts. 
 
 These regions and subdivisions 
 of regions established according 
 to their resources for recruiting, 
 and to the exigencies of mobiliza- 
 tion are determined by a Decree in 
 the form of regalations for public 
 administration and inserted in the 
 " Bulletin des Lois." 
 
 Article 2. 
 
 Each region is occupied by an 
 army corps which garrisons it. 
 
 There is in addition a special 
 army corps assigned to Algeria. 
 
 Article 3. 
 
 Each region possesses general 
 supply magazines, in which are kept 
 the arms and ammunition, clothing, 
 armament, harness, equipment and 
 camp equipage necessary for the 
 different arms which compose the 
 army corps. 
 
 Article 4. 
 
 Each subdivision of a region 
 possesses one or more magazines 
 furnished with the necessary arms 
 and ammanition, clothing, arma- 
 ment, harness, eqiiipment and 
 camp equipage, which are supplied 
 from general magazines of the 
 region. 
 
 Article 5. 
 
 In each subdivision of a region 
 there is one office, or more, for re- 
 cruiting. In eacli office is kept 
 the registry of enrolment prescribed 
 by Article 33 of the law of July 
 27th, 1872, for the men belonging
 
 90 
 
 As proposed by the Coimnitlce. Alffrations made hij the Asseiuhhi. 
 
 to the regular army and to the 
 reserve of the said army. 
 
 This office is charged with the • 
 
 arrangement of the enrohnent in 
 the different corps of the region 
 of the men "at disposal" and of 
 those of the reserve, conformably 
 to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of 
 Article 11 (below). 
 
 It is besides charged with the 
 registers of the territorial army, 
 for men resident in the subdivision, 
 and wath their enrolment in the 
 different corps of the territorial 
 army of the region. 
 
 By means of this office a general 
 census is made each year of the 
 horses, raules, and carriages capable 
 of utilization for the wants of the 
 army. 
 
 These horses, mules, and car- 
 riages are distributed in advance to 
 each army corps, and inscribed in 
 a special register. 
 
 Article 6. 
 
 Each of the army corps of the * 
 
 eighteen regions comprises two 
 divisions of infantry, one brigade 
 of cavalry, one brigade of artillery, 
 one battalion of engineers, one 
 squadron of mihtary train, besides 
 the staff and the different necessary 
 services. 
 
 The detailed composition of the 
 army corps, divisions and brigades, 
 that of the cadres of the troops of 
 all arms composing the army, and 
 the effectives of those troops both 
 on a peace and war footing, will 
 be determined by a special law. 
 
 Article 7. 
 
 In time of peace the army corps 
 are not united as armies on a pei'- 
 manent footing. 
 
 Article 8. 
 
 The men belonging to the services 
 regularly organized in time of 
 peace may, during war, be formed 
 into special corps destined to serve 
 either with the regular army, or 
 the territorial army.
 
 91 
 
 As proposed hy tlie Coinviiftre. 
 
 The formation of tlieso special 
 corps is authorized by Decree. 
 
 These corps are stiliject to all 
 the obligations of military service, 
 enjoy all the rights of belligerents, 
 and ai-e subject to the rules of the 
 right of nations. 
 
 Article 9. 
 
 Each army corps is organized in 
 a permanent manner by divisions 
 and brigades. 
 
 The army corps, and also the 
 troops which compose it are always 
 provided with staiF, and all the 
 administrative and auxiliary ser- 
 vices which they require for taking 
 the field ; materiel of every sort 
 with which the troops and various 
 services of the army corps ought to 
 be provided in time of war is 
 always organized and stored within 
 their reach. 
 
 Rolling stock is stored on 
 wheels. 
 
 Article 10. 
 
 ■»-of- 
 
 Alterations made h\j the Asseudlij. 
 
 made in the normal constitution of 
 those that e xist, in th e ir oquipmcnt 
 or uniform unless it be partially 
 and b^ — TTfry — yji t rial, — except by 
 virtue of a law . 
 
 Article 11. 
 
 The regular army is recruited 
 over the whole territory of France. 
 In case of mobilization the effective 
 forces of the various troops, and of 
 the different services which enter 
 into the composition of each army 
 corps 9 re completed from the 
 soldiers "at disposal," and of the 
 reserve resident in the district, and, 
 in case of insuificiency, from the 
 soldiers "at disposal," and of the 
 reserve of the neighbouring dis- 
 tricts. 
 
 To this end the young men who, 
 by reason of their ticket in the 
 lottery, have been comprised, in 
 
 " Witli the exception of those 
 ' mentioned in Article 8, no neic 
 ' corps can he created, nor any 
 ' change made in the normal con- 
 ' dition of those that exist exapt 
 ' by virtue of a law. No change 
 ■' in equipment or uniform can take 
 ^ place without a special vote of 
 ' supply."
 
 92 
 
 As proponed ly the Committee. Alterations made hy the Assemhiy. 
 
 the part kept for more than a year 
 in the service, are as soon as they 
 enter the reserve, enrolled in one of 
 the corps of the region in which 
 they have declared their wish to 
 reside. 
 
 This enrolment is mentioned in 
 a special column on the certificate 
 indicated in Ai'ticle 38 of the law 
 of 27th July, 1872, so that a soldier 
 belonging to the reserve knows 
 always where he is to present 
 himself in case of mobilization. 
 
 Young soldiers who conformably 
 with Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the 
 law of the 27th July, 1872, remain 
 '' at disposal " in their homes are _^ 
 
 also enrolled in the various corps 
 of the region, and receive as soon 
 as they are placed " at disposal " a 
 certificate of their enrolment in 
 that corps which, in case of being 
 called back, they are to join. The 
 same arrangement is applicable to 
 soldiers engaged conditionally for 
 one year after their year of service 
 has expireil. It is also applicable 
 to soldiers, corporals, brigadiers 
 and non-commissioned officers 
 placed " at disposal " before the 
 expiration of the five years of 
 service in the regular army decreed 
 by Article 36 of the law of the 
 27th July, 1872. 
 
 Article 12. 
 
 Young men in the various posi- 
 tions mentioned in Article 20 of the 
 law of 27th July, 1872, and of 
 whom military authority disposes 
 conformably to the said Article are 
 specially mustered (^sont partes sur 
 des etats speciaux). In case of 
 mobilization they are distributed 
 among the various corps of the 
 region, according to the need of 
 the army. 
 
 Article 13. 
 
 The holders of the various posts, 
 the creation of which is rendered 
 necessary by the mobilization of 
 the army, are always decided upon 
 beforehand, and are kept as far as
 
 93 
 
 As proposed hy the Committee. Allcratiuns made Inj Hie Assemhli/. 
 
 possible informed of the positions 
 assigned to them. 
 
 The auxiliary officers mentioned in 
 Articles 36, 38 and 41 of the present 
 law, the non-commissioned officers 
 taken from the soldiers conditionally 
 engaged for one year, and the non- 
 commissioned officers who from the 
 regular army have passed into the 
 reserve, are beforehand allotted to 
 the various corps of the region, 
 and are given a certificate of their 
 enrolment. 
 
 Article 14. 
 
 1. In every region the General 
 commanding the army corps has 
 under his command the territory, 
 the forces of the regular army and 
 of its reserve, of the territorial 
 army and of its reserve, also all 
 the military services and establish- 
 ments which are exclusively allotted 
 to these forces. 
 
 2. Special establishments in- 
 tended to ensure the general de- 
 fence of the country, or to supply 
 the general services of the armies 
 remain under the immediate direc- 
 tion of the Minister of War in the 
 working conditions in which they 
 stand. 
 
 3. At the same time the com- 
 mander of the army corps exercises 
 permanent surveillance over these 
 establishments, and transmits his 
 observations to the Minister of 
 War. 
 
 4. In time of peace no com- In time of peace no comma inUr 
 mandcr of an army oorpo oan retain of an army corps can retain his 
 the command of tho s am e corp s for command for more than three years 
 more than four years consecutively. M«iess at the expiration of that term 
 
 he is maintained in his functions 
 hy a special decree of a ministerial 
 council. 
 
 5. The exercise of this command 
 does not give to general officers 
 who have been invested with it any 
 privileges of rank subsequent to 
 their holding it. 
 
 Article 1-5. 
 
 Execntive bodies of troops or 
 parts of tliese bodies belonging;" to
 
 94 
 
 As proposed by tlie Committee. Altrralinns maile hij the AsHemUij. 
 
 au army corps may be momen- 
 tarily detached and placed in 
 another army corps. They are 
 then under the command of the 
 General commanding the array corps 
 to which they are temporai'ily at- 
 tached. 
 
 Article 16. 
 
 The General commanding an 
 army corps has nnder his orders a 
 staff service placed under the direc- 
 tion of his chief of the staff, and 
 divided into two branches : 
 
 1st. Active branch, marching 
 with the troops in case of 
 mobilization. 
 2nd. Territorial branch, attached 
 permanently to the region, 
 whose duty it is to ensure 
 always the working of the re- 
 cruiting, of hospitals, remounts 
 and all other territorial services. 
 The staff of artillery and en- 
 gineers and the various ad- 
 ministrative and sanitary ser- 
 vices of the ai^my corps are also 
 divided into active and terri- 
 torial branches. 
 A regulation of the Minister of 
 War determines the composition 
 and distribution of the staff, and 
 the various services for each army 
 corps. 
 
 A superior officer belonging to 
 the territorial branch and chosen 
 by the Minister of War is charged 
 with centralizinof the recruitiner. 
 
 Article 17. 
 
 Besides the staff mentioned in 
 the preceding Article, the com- 
 mander of an army corps has about 
 him, and under his orders, the 
 functionaries and agents responsible 
 for the direction and management 
 of the administrative services and 
 the sanitary service. 
 
 A special law on the administra- 
 tion of the army will regulate the 
 attributes of these various function- 
 aries and agents, and provide for 
 the establishment of an independent 
 control.
 
 9o 
 
 As proposed hy tlie Committee. Allerations made bij the Assemhlu. 
 
 Article 18. 
 
 A superior officer is placed at 
 the head of the recruiting service 
 of each subdivision. 
 
 All soldiers of the regular army, 
 the reserve and the territorial army 
 who are for any reasons in their 
 homes, and are resident in the sub- 
 division, are under this superior 
 officer. 
 
 He keeps the general command- 
 ing the army corps and the com- 
 manders of troops and of the dif- 
 ferent services informed of all 
 changes which take place in the 
 situation of the officers, non-commis- 
 sioned officers, and men "at dis- 
 posal" and of the reserve, who are 
 enrolled in the various regional corps. 
 
 Article 19. 
 
 Every six months a statement is 
 drawn up by the central service of the 
 army corps, of the auxiliary officers, 
 non-commissioned officers and men 
 of the cadres " at disposal " and of 
 the reserve enrolled in the various 
 corps and services of the region 
 who would be immediately recalled 
 in case of mobilization, in order to 
 place the cadres on a war footing. 
 
 The general commanding trans- 
 mits this statement to the Minister-of 
 War, and makes any propositions 
 necessary for keeping the comple- 
 mentary cadres always ready for 
 mobilization. 
 
 Article 20. 
 
 Young soldiers who by reason of 
 their tickets in the lottery are in- 
 tended to be kept more than one 
 year on active service, present them- 
 selves on the reception of their 
 order of departure at the recruit- 
 ing office of the subdivision in 
 which they live. 
 
 They there receive under the 
 surveillance of the transport cadres 
 the kit necesary to fit them for 
 starting, and they are sent by de- 
 tachments to the various army 
 corps to which they are allotted.
 
 96 
 
 As proposedly the Committee. Alterations made iy the AssemUi/. 
 
 Young soldiers who by their ticket 
 in the lottery are only called 
 upon for one year of active ser- 
 vice, present themselves also at 
 the recruiting office of their sub- 
 division. 
 
 They accomplish the period of 
 instruction for which they are 
 bound in the regional corps in which 
 they have been enrolled. 
 
 Article 21. 
 
 In case of mobihzation and for 
 the purpose of placing the military 
 forces of the region, on a war 
 footing, the Minister of War sends 
 to the Greneral commanding the 
 army corps an order for the mo- 
 bilization of all or of a part of the 
 men of the various classes "at 
 disposal " and of 'the reserve in 
 order to put the various classes of 
 the territorial army on active ser- 
 vice. 
 
 Article 22. 
 
 Immediately on the receipt of 
 this order the general causes each 
 officer commanding a subdivisional 
 recruiting office to give notice at 
 once to the soldiers " at disposal " 
 and of the reserve intended to fill 
 up the companies, squadrons, bat- 
 teries and services of the army 
 corps of the region, that they are 
 to join their corps within the time 
 fixed by the order of departure. 
 
 The chief of the recruiting office 
 sends to each man wh© is recalled, 
 a special order, which is always 
 ready, telling him to rejoin. 
 
 Article 23. 
 
 Dating from the day on which 
 he receives the order for mobiliza- 
 tion the General commanding the 
 army is assisted in his command 
 by the general officer who is to re- 
 place him, and who has been chosen 
 beforehand by the Minister of War. 
 This general officer assumes com- 
 mand of the region on the day
 
 97 
 
 As proposed ly ilie Committee. Alterations made hy the AsseynUy. 
 
 y\hen the mobilized army corps 
 quits it. 
 
 Article 24. 
 
 Men for reinforcements, no mat- 
 ter to what region they belong, 
 can be sent by detachments to the 
 various army corps according to 
 the needs of these army corps. 
 
 They can also be formed into 
 companies, battalions, squadrons, or 
 batteries, or even into regiments if 
 the exigencies of war make it 
 needful. 
 
 Article 25. 
 
 In case of mobilization, the re- 
 quisition of the horses, mules, and 
 carriages, of which, in execution of 
 Article 5 of the present law, a cen- 
 sus has been taken, may be ordered 
 by decree of the President of the 
 Republic. 
 
 This requisition takes effect on 
 consideration of fixing and pnying paying a just indemnittj — a 
 an iuflpi7inity. Till the promiilga - special law will deferminn the 
 timi of a, sppnini Inw on tlie matter, manner of carrying out this requi- 
 n T-Pgn1ntinn of pnhliV nflmiTiistrfl- sition, and the viode of fixiiuj and 
 tir^n int;pvfpfl in tLp " T-Jnl I.-1 i'n rlos paijing tMs indemnity. 
 
 Imis," flptpvminps thn m nun or of 
 
 cnn- ying out this requisition, and 
 tlint, in wliich the indemnity is fixed 
 and paid 
 
 Article 26. 
 
 In case of mobilization or of waf, 
 the railway companies place at the 
 disposal of the Minister of War, all 
 the means necessary for the trans- 
 port and concentration of troops 
 and army materiel. Marching or 
 etappen services will be organized 
 along the lines of the railways by a 
 Ministerial regulation. 
 
 Article 27. 
 
 The telegraph administration 
 always holds the materiel and per- 
 sonnel necessary for strengthening 
 or completing the militaiy telegraph 
 services, at the disposal of the 
 
 Minister of War. 
 
 H
 
 98 
 As proposed hij the Committee. Alterations made by the Assembly 
 
 Article 28. 
 
 The progressive and regular in- 
 struction of troops of all arms, ter- 
 minates every year with marches, 
 manoeuvres, and combined opera- 
 tions of brigade of division, and 
 when circumstances permit, of army 
 corps. 
 
 Till the promulgation of a special 
 law upon the matter, a regulation 
 of public administration, inserted in 
 the " Bulletin des Lois," will deter- 
 mine the conditions according to 
 which the damages caused to pri- 
 vate properties will be valued, as 
 well as the payment of indemnities '' 
 
 due to the proprietors. 
 
 Article 29. 
 
 The territorial army always keeps 
 its cadres intact. 
 
 The composition will be deter- 
 mined by the special law mentioned 
 in Article 6 of the present law. 
 The permanent and paid effective 
 of the territorial army, only com- 
 prises i\\e personnel necessary for the 
 administration for the keeping up 
 the control, the book keeping and 
 the preparation of measures, which 
 have for their object the recall to 
 active service of the men of the 
 said army. 
 
 Article 30. 
 
 Conformably to the territorial * 
 army is formed Article 36 of the 
 Law of the 27th July, 1872 of men 
 resident in the district. 
 
 Soldiers of all grades composing 
 it remain in their homes, and are 
 only mustered or called to active 
 service by order of the military 
 authority. 
 
 The reserve of the territorial 
 army is only called to active service 
 in case of the resources of the ter- 
 ritorial army being insufficient. In 
 this case it is called up in classes 
 beginning at the newest. 
 
 Article 31. 
 The cadres of the troops and
 
 99 
 
 As proposed hy the Committee. Alterations made bi/ the Assrmhh/. 
 
 various services of tlie territorial 
 army are recruited. 
 
 1st. For officers and functionaries, 
 from officers and functionaries 
 "o'lio have thrown up their com- 
 missions or who are on the 
 retired list, from men condi- 
 tionally engaged for one year, 
 who have obtained commissions 
 or brevet rank of auxiliary 
 officer, conformably to Articles 
 36 and 38 of the present Law. 
 ^Nevertheless, old non-commis- 
 sioned officers of the reserve, 
 and men conditionally engaged 
 for one year, who are provided 
 with the brevet of non-com- 
 missioned officers, can, after an 
 examination determined by the 
 Minister of War, be promoted 
 to the grade of sub-lieutenant 
 in the territorial army when 
 they pass into the said army 
 conformably to the law of 
 27th July, 1872. 
 2ndly. For non-commissioned 
 officers and clerks, from the . 
 old non-commissioned officers 
 and clerks of the reserve, and 
 men conditionally engaged for 
 one year, who have obtained 
 the brevet of non-commissioned 
 officer, also from old corporals 
 and brigadiers who possess the 
 necessary qualifications. 
 
 The nominations of officers and 
 functionaries are proposed by the 
 Minister of War, and made by the 
 President of the Republic. 
 
 Nominations of non-commissioned 
 officers and clerks ai-e made by the 
 General commanding the army corps 
 of the region. 
 
 Advancement in the territorial 
 army will be regulated by a special 
 law. 
 
 A special pnihlic regulation icill 
 determine the hierarchical relations 
 heticeen the regular and territorial 
 armies. 
 
 Article 32. 
 The formation of the various 
 
 H 2
 
 100 
 
 As proposed ly the Committee. Alterations made hj the Assembly. 
 
 corps of the territorial army takes 
 place : — 
 
 By subdivision of tlie I'egion for 
 the infantry. 
 
 Over the whole of the region for 
 other arms. 
 
 To this end each chief of a re- 
 cruiting office 'makes known to the 
 General commanding the region, 
 the number of men of each arm 
 who, having served their time in 
 the reserve, are residents in his sub- 
 division. 
 
 After the distribution made be- 
 tween the various arms by the 
 General commanding, every man 
 passing into the teriitorial army is 
 informed by the chief of the re- 
 cruiting service of the subdivision, 
 of i\\e corps to which he belongs. 
 
 Mention is made of it in a special 
 column of the certificate which 
 ought to be given to him conform- 
 ably to Article 38 of the Law of the 
 27th July, 1872. 
 
 The provisions of A.rticles 34 and 
 35 of the Law^ of the 27th July, 
 1872, are applicable to soldiers id- 
 scribed upon the muster rolls of the 
 territorial army. 
 
 Article 33. 
 
 Every chief of a recruiting office 
 keeps the General commanding the 
 region well informed of the state 
 of the territorial army, according to 
 the manner to be determined by a 
 Ministerial order. 
 
 The General commanding, pro- 
 poses to the Minister of War, such 
 changes as seem to be necessary for 
 keeping the cadres of the said 
 army complete. 
 
 Article 34. 
 
 In case of mobilization, the troops 
 of the territorial army may be de- * 
 
 tailed to garrison fortresses, to the 
 halting posts and lines, to the de- 
 fence of the coasts and of strate- 
 gical points : they may be also 
 formed into brigades, divisions, and 
 army corps intended to take the 
 field.
 
 101 
 
 .4s proposed by the Committee. Alterations made by the Assembly. 
 
 Finally, they may be detached to 
 form part of the regular army. 
 
 Article 35. 
 
 The territorial army when mobi- 
 lized is subject to the laws and 
 regulations which rule the regular 
 army, and resembles it exactly in 
 the matter of pay and allowances 
 of all kinds. 
 
 So long as the troops of the 
 territorial army are in the region 
 of their formation without being 
 detached to form part of the 
 regular army, they remain under 
 the command determined by Ar- 
 ticles 14 and 16 of the present 
 law. 
 
 When they are formed into di- 
 visions and army corps they are 
 provided with staff and special ad- 
 ministrative sanitary and auxiliary 
 services. ' 
 
 Article 36. 
 
 Pupils of the Ecole Polytechnique 
 and of the Ecole Forestiere, who 
 have passed out satisfactorily from 
 the said schools and are not placed 
 in a public service, receive a brevet 
 as auxiliary sub-lieutenants, or a 
 commission equivalent to the 
 auxiliary title and remain " at dis- 
 posal," in the reserve of the regular 
 "Tmy, or in the territorial army 
 during the time for which they are 
 bound, in conformity with Article 
 36 of the Law of the 27th July, 
 1872. 
 
 But conformably to Article 19 of 
 the Law of the 27th July, 1872, the 
 time passed by them in those schools 
 is deducted from the time for which 
 they are bound to serve. ■ 
 
 A public administrative regula- 
 tion is issued for each of the services 
 in which are placed the pupils who 
 pass out of the Ecole Polytech- 
 nique, and do not form part of the 
 armies of land or sea, and the 
 pupils of the Ecole Forestiere who 
 have entered the service of Woods 
 and Forests, and it determines the 
 rank and employments that may,
 
 102 
 
 As proposed hy the Committee. Alterations made hy the Assembly. 
 
 in case of mobilization, be given to 
 them in the army according to the 
 position they occupy in the pubhc 
 services to which they belong. 
 
 Article 37. 
 
 Men conditionally engaged for 
 one year who after having served 
 the year exacted by Article 56 of 
 the Law of 27th July, 1872, pass 
 satisfactorily all the examinations 
 prescribed, and obtain the brevet 
 of non-commissioned officers, or 
 a commission in one of the ser- 
 vices of the army, remain " at 
 disposal " and pass afterwards into 
 the reserve, and into the territorial 
 army for the time prescribed by law. 
 
 With this object they are enrolled 
 beforehand in the corps, or detailed 
 to the service for which they are 
 intended, and on being placed 
 "at disposal" receive a document 
 which informs them of the corps 
 or service they are to join in case 
 of being recalled. 
 
 Article 38. 
 
 Men conditionally engaged for one 
 year who pass satisfactorily the ex- 
 aminations prescribed by Article 56 
 of the Law of 27th July, 1872, 
 by remaining one year more either 
 in the regular army or in a school 
 chosen by the Minister of War, 
 can after having passed the proper 
 examinations obtain a brevet ot 
 auxiliary sub- lieutenant, or an 
 equivalent commission, and be 
 placed with their rank according to 
 the needs of the army either " at 
 disposal," or in the reserve of the 
 regular army, and after the time 
 prescribed by law in the territorial 
 army. 
 
 They are enrolled as officers . in 
 the corps, or services of army corps 
 to which they are attached, mention 
 is made of it in their brevet or 
 commission. 
 
 Article 39. 
 Men conditionally engaged for 
 one year who have passed the ex-
 
 103 
 
 As proposed hi/ the Committee. Alterations made hy the Assembly, 
 
 aminations prescribed by Article 56 
 of the Law of July 27th, 1872, and 
 who wish to complete five years 
 service in the active army, can be 
 authorised to do so. 
 
 In that case, those who conform- 
 ably to Article 58 of the said Law 
 have obtained a brevet of non-com.- 
 missoined officer keep their rank in 
 the regular army, and compete for 
 advancement in the corps to which 
 they belong. 
 
 Article 40. 
 
 Auxiliary officers, and officers of 
 the territorial army are during 
 their presence with the colours con- 
 sidered as belonging to the regular 
 army, but they cannot profit by 
 the rank which they have held or 
 obtained during this time so as to 
 be kept in the regular army. 
 
 Those, however, who enjoyed a 
 retiring pension can have this 
 pension revised. 
 
 In the matter of the military 
 medal of the cross of the Legion of 
 Honour, obtained by them while 
 they were with the colours, as well 
 as in the matter of pensions for 
 wounds and infirmities they enjoy 
 all rights given to soldiers of the 
 same rank in the regular army. 
 
 Article 41. 
 
 Officers of the ^National Garde 
 Mobile, who are bound by their 
 age to serve in the reserve of the 
 regular army in pursuance of Ar- 
 ticle 7Q of the Law of 27th July, 
 1872, can temporarily, and on con- 
 dition of passing an examination 
 which will be determined by an 
 order of the Minister of War, re- 
 ceive a brevet as auxiliary sub- 
 lieutenant in the reserve of the 
 regular army. They will pass into 
 the territorial army at the same 
 time as men of the class to which 
 they belong. 
 
 Officers, non - commissioned 
 officers, and men of the National 
 Garde Mobile, and of the mobilized 
 corps, who by reason of their age
 
 104 
 
 As proposed by the Committee. Alterations made hy the Assembly. 
 
 are not classed in the reserve of the 
 regular army can temporarily, and 
 on condition of passing an exami- 
 nation which will be fixed by an 
 order of the Minister of War, bo 
 adniitted'into the cadres of the terri- 
 torial army. 
 
 Article 42. 
 
 Orders of public administration 
 and Ministerial order will provide 
 for the execution of the pro- 
 visions contained in the present 
 law. 
 
 Article 43. 
 
 All dispositions of anterior laws 
 contrary to the present one are re- 
 pealed. 
 
 Discussed in public sittings, at Versailles, the 7th, 18th, and 24th 
 of July, 1873. 
 
 The President, 
 (Signed) L. Buffet. 
 
 Secretaries : 
 (Signed) L. Grivart. 
 Felix Voisin. 
 Albert Desjardins. 
 E. DE Cazenove de Pradine. 
 
 The President of the Repulic promulgates the present law. 
 
 M*''- de MacMahon, 
 
 I>uc de Magenta. 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 G^BN^ DU BaRAIL.
 
 105
 
 106 
 
 No. 2. 
 
 Table of the Besources furnished hy the Becruiting Law of July 11th, 
 
 1872. 
 
 1st year 
 
 2nd year, deducting a loss of 
 
 3rd „ „ 
 
 4tli „ „ 
 
 5th ,, „ 
 
 Active Army. 
 
 say 6,000 
 say 4,320 
 say 2,794 
 say 2,738 
 
 Strength of the five classes of the Active Army , . 
 
 150,000 men. 
 144,000 „ 
 139,680 „ 
 136,886 „ 
 134,148 „ 
 
 704,714 
 
 Reserve of the Active Army. 
 
 6th year, deducting a loss of say 2,683 
 
 7th „ „ say 2,229 
 
 8th „ „ say 2,577 
 
 9th „ „ say 2,525 
 
 Strength of the four classes of the Reserve of the Active 
 Army . . 
 
 131,465 men. 
 128,836 „ 
 126,259 „ 
 123,734 „ 
 
 510,294 
 
 10th year, deducting a loss of 
 
 11th „ 
 
 12th „ 
 
 13th „ „ 
 
 14th „ 
 
 Territorial Army. 
 
 say 2,475 
 say 2,425 
 say 2,377 
 say 2,329 
 say 2,283 
 
 121,259 men. 
 118,834 „ 
 116,457 „ 
 114,128 „ 
 111,845 „ 
 
 Strength of the Territorial Army 582,523 
 
 Reserve of the Territorial Army 
 
 I5th year, deducting a loss of say 2,237 
 
 16th „ „ say 2,192 
 
 17th „ „ say 2,148 
 
 18th „ „ say 2,105 
 
 19th „ „ say 2,063 
 
 20th „ „ say 2,022 
 
 Strength of the Eeserve of the Territorial Army 
 
 Recapitulation. 
 
 Active Army (5 classes) . . . . . . . . 
 
 Reserve of the Active Army (4 classes) . . 
 
 Territorial Army , . . , . . . . . . . . 
 
 Reserve of the Territorial Army (6 classes) 
 
 Total of the resources furnished by the Recruiting 
 Law 
 
 109,608 men. 
 107,416 „ 
 105,268 „ 
 103,163 „ 
 101,100 „ 
 99,078 „ 
 
 625,633 
 
 704,714 men. 
 510,294 „ 
 582,523 „ 
 625,633 „ 
 
 2,423,164 
 
 The figui'es of this table are only approximate. They cannot be rendered per- 
 fectly exact till the operations just now beginning of the Councils of Revision are 
 finished.
 
 107 
 
 No. 3. 
 
 Table of the Nine Classes of Men dispensed from service, in virtue oj 
 Articles 17 and 22, liable to be recalled in time of tear (^Article 26 
 Hecruiting Laiv). 
 
 Isfc class 
 
 2nd class, deducting a loss of 4 per cent. 
 3 per cent. 
 
 3rd class 
 4th class 
 5th class 
 6th class 
 7th class 
 8th class 
 9th class 
 
 say 698 
 say 503 
 2 per cent. say 325 
 say 319 
 say 312 
 say 306 
 say 300 
 say 294 
 
 Total of men dispensed, but liable to be recalled , 
 
 
 17,458* 
 
 
 16,760 
 
 
 16,257 
 
 
 15,932 
 
 
 15,613 
 
 
 15,301 
 
 
 14,995 
 
 
 14,695 
 
 
 14,401 
 
 141,412 
 
 * The figure, J 7,458, is obtained as follows, taking as a basis the operations of 
 the Council of Revision for the class of 1868 (See account rendered of the recruiting 
 
 during 1869, page 38). 
 
 of the annual contingent of 
 
 1. Suppoi'ters of families 
 150,000 men 
 
 2. Eldest of orphans who have neither father nor mother 
 
 3. Eldest sons or grandsons of widows 
 
 4. Elder brothers of men called to service. . 
 
 5. Brothers of soldiers in the active army. . 
 
 6. Brothers of soldiers who have died in the service 
 
 7. Sons or grandsons of septuagenarians and blind people 
 
 8. Younger brothers of blind or infirm men 
 
 Total 
 
 Of whom one half may be counted fit for service. . 
 
 6,000 
 
 1,587 
 
 11,000 
 
 84 
 
 13,975 
 
 1,384 
 
 834 
 
 53 
 
 34,917 
 17,458 
 
 These figures are only approximate. They cannot be rendered perfectly exact 
 till the operations of the Council of Rerision, just now beginning, are finished. 
 
 No. 4. 
 
 Table of Men exempted from service because tliey are under lieight, but 
 able to join the Auxiliary Service. 
 
 Annually exempted for being imder height 
 
 Of whom one-haK may be exempted for other causes 
 
 Remains for auxiliary services 
 
 1st class 
 
 2nd class, deducting a loss of 4 per cent 
 
 3rd 
 
 4th 
 
 5th 
 
 6th 
 
 7th 
 
 8th 
 
 9th 
 
 Total for the 9 classes . . 
 
 These figures are only approximate. They cannot be rendered perfectly exact 
 till the operations just now beginning of the Council of Revision are finished. 
 
 Only one-half of the men exempted, becaiise they ai-e under height, are included 
 here, in order to allow for other unavoidable causes of exemption. 
 
 4 per cent. 
 
 say 153 
 
 3 per cent. 
 
 say 109 
 
 2 per cent. 
 
 say 71 
 
 
 say 70 
 
 
 say 68 
 
 
 say 67 
 
 
 say 66 
 
 
 say 64 
 
 7,655 
 
 3,827 
 
 3,827 
 
 3,827 
 
 3,674 
 
 3.565 
 
 3,494 
 
 3.424 
 
 3.356 
 
 3.289 
 
 3,223 
 
 3,159 
 
 31,011
 
 108 
 
 No. 5. 
 
 Table of the Effective of the Armi^, estimated for in the Budgets q/'1872, 
 
 1873, 1874. 
 
 Strength, in addition to the bodies of troops . . 
 Strength of the bodies of troops 
 G-endarmerie 
 Republican Q-uard 
 
 The strength, in addition to the bodies of troops, is 
 composed as follows : — 
 
 Staffs 
 
 Chaplains and Sanitary Personnel 
 Administrative Personnel 
 Veterinaries 
 Interpreters . . . . 
 
 (1.) It should be remarked that in the Budget for 1872 administrative troops, 
 amounting to 8,000, were added to the regular bodies of troops, while in the Budgets 
 for 1873, 1874, they form part of the administrative effective, and that added to 
 the administrative personnel of 1872, they make a total precisely the same as given 
 for the admuiistrative effective of 1873, 1874. 
 
 1872. 
 
 7,000 
 
 428,200 
 
 23,000 
 
 3,083 
 
 461,283 
 
 1873. 
 
 14,604 
 
 410,396 
 
 23,000 
 
 3,085 
 
 451,085 
 
 4,409 
 
 818 
 
 9,298 
 
 4 
 
 75 
 
 1874. 
 
 14,758 
 
 410,242 
 
 23,000 
 
 3,085 
 
 451,085 
 
 4,439 
 
 1,259 
 
 1,298 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 4,606 
 
 775 
 
 9,298 
 
 4 
 
 75 
 
 7,000 
 
 14,604 
 
 14,758 
 
 No. 6. 
 Table of the permanent effective not recruited ly means of levies. 
 
 Regular Corps. 
 
 OflScers* . . 
 
 Gendarmerief . . 
 
 Eepublican guardf (half of it supported by the State) 
 
 Skirmishers^; (3 regiments) 
 Spahis j (3 regiments) 
 
 Foreign regiment f . . . . . . , . . . 
 
 Soldiers sentenced to remain in the service . . . . 
 
 Staffs 
 
 Chaplains and sanitary personnel 
 Administrative personnel 
 Yeteriuaries . . . . . . 
 
 Interpreters 
 
 Stafs. 
 
 26,682 ] 
 
 
 23,000 
 
 > 52,765 
 
 3,083 
 
 
 9,000 ] 
 
 
 999 
 3,000 
 
 22,199 
 
 9,200 J 
 
 
 4,6061 
 
 
 775 
 
 
 1,298 
 
 \ 6,758 
 
 4 
 
 
 75J 
 
 
 
 81,722 
 
 * The details will be given idtimately, in the tables annexed, to the law upon 
 the constitution of corps and staffs. 
 
 t Budget for 1874, page 557- X Budget for 1874, page 563.
 
 100 
 
 Note. — The number of voluntary enlistments and re-enlist- 
 ments, mentioned in the table annexed to M. le Marquis de 
 ChasselovTp Laubat's report as 50,000, cannot be exactly known 
 before the working of the new law. It is probable that it 
 will be considerably diminished by the obhgation to personal 
 service. 
 
 Volunteers for one year mamtam themselves at their own 
 expense. 
 
 Volunteers under the conditions of Article 51 of the recruitmg 
 law, will necessarily be counted for three years, T\atli then class ; 
 for if they enhst at eighteen, the lowest hmit of age, the engage- 
 ment that they contract will only, properly speakmg, be 
 advancing then call to service by two years. 
 
 With regard to re-enlistments on the part of non-commis- 
 sioned officers, they will probably not be numerous. Anyhow, 
 it is impossible at present to average their number. 
 
 The Guard began to receive re-enlistments on July 30th, 
 but on the 1st of August, the effectives of its regiments, which, 
 when mobili2;ed, ought to amount to 2,200 men, had only 
 reached an average of 1,750 men. 
 
 The second corps was receiving reserves up to the 10th 
 August, that is to say, tiU four days after the battle of Spicheren, 
 but the effectives of its regiments had still an average of 1,805 
 men, instead of 2,400. 
 
 In this same corps the movement of reserves continued from 
 the 10th to the 18th of August, T\dthout, however, gi^ang the 
 regmients then proper effectives. 
 
 Mobilization was not completed till the 18th of August, that 
 is to say, thirty-five days after the order for mobilization. 
 What happened to the 2nd corps happened to all the others. 
 We will not give the details of their mobilization here ; it 
 suffices to sum up the results. 
 
 The corps began to receive men of the reserve on the 29th 
 July and 1st August. The regiments whose mean effective did 
 not exceed 1,500 at the moment of the declaration of war, had 
 on the 1st August, got them up to 1,800. The 44th and 
 30th regunents of the line alone approached the average of 
 2,400. 
 
 From August 1st to August 14th, the day of the battle of 
 Bomy, and the extreme limit of the arrival of reinforcements, 
 reserves might have been seen constantly setting out from the 
 depots to rejoin the active battalions. 
 
 On the 3rd of August, the Minister gives orders to send 
 men of the reserve of a great nmnber of regiments, as soon 
 as possible to the active battalions. 
 
 The despatches of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Uth of 
 August, order more reserves to be sent to the corps. 
 
 On the 12th of August, 550 men left Caen to join the 93rd 
 regiment of the line at Metz. 
 
 On the 13th and 14tli of August, there still remained 
 reserves to be sent to Metz.
 
 no 
 
 During this time, the moving of artillery, engineers, and 
 mlKtary train continued. These various transports accumulate, 
 and retard each other. 
 
 On the 9th August, the P. L. M. Company gives notice that, 
 by reason of the line being encumbered, it can no longer under- 
 take the transport of troops from the south, further east than 
 Besan9on. 
 
 Note upon the transport of reserves at the time of the tear of 
 
 1870. 
 
 Taken from ojfficial documents existing in the War Offi.ce. 
 
 The order for mobilization was given on July 14th^ 1870. 
 The chief towns of departments sent to the depots : — 
 
 On the 
 
 18th July, 
 
 3 
 
 departmental 
 
 contingents 
 
 7,839 
 
 
 19th „ 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 14,331 
 
 
 20th „ 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 25,077 
 
 
 21st „ 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 22,597 
 
 
 22nd „ 
 
 23 
 
 
 
 43,542 
 
 
 23rd „ 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 22,629 
 
 
 24th „ 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 5,471 
 
 rom 25th to 28th „ 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 21,484 
 
 From 18th to 28th July, 89 contmgents. Total 163,020 
 
 Fourteen days (from July 14th to 28th) were spent in sending 
 off 163,020 men, not to join their corps but to go to the depots, 
 and as in July, 1870, the number of the reserves amounted to 
 173,507, 10,487 still remained to be sent off after the 14th of 
 August. 
 
 July 29th, the Major-general of the army wrote to the 
 Minister of War in Paris : — 
 
 " I approve of the destinations you propose for the re- 
 " serves, viz : — Metz for those belonging to the Guard and 
 " to the 2nd and 3rd corps ; Strasbourg for those of the Ist 
 " corps ; Thionville for those of the 4th corps ; Belfort for 
 " those of the 7th corjDS ; Sarreguemiens for those of the 5th 
 " corps. 
 
 " July the 29th was then the earliest date at which it was 
 " possible for the reserves to be sent from the depots to the 
 " active battalions."
 
 Ill 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 MEASURES FOLLOWING THE ADOPTION OF THE 
 BILL, AS MODIFIED BY THE ASSEMBLY. 
 
 DECREES of the President of the Republic, carrying out the 
 principles of the Bill, after it had been adopted by the Assembly. 
 
 The President op the French Republic duly considering the Law 
 of 24tli July, 1873, upon the Organization of the Army, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. 18 army corps are immediately created to occupy here- 
 after the 18 districts into which France is to be divided conformably 
 to Article 1 of this law. Each of these army corps comprises two 
 divisions, and each division two brigades of infantry. 
 
 The 126 regiments of infantry, and the 30 battei'ies of chasseurs-a- 
 pied shall be at once distributed between these corps, divisions, and 
 brigades conformably to the list attached to the present decree. 
 Deci'ees and subsequent decisions will provide the complement of 
 troops of all arms for each army corps, and when the law upon cadres 
 shall have been issued, will determine the composition of its variou.s 
 services conformably to the tenor of that law. 
 
 The divisions and infantry brigades created by the present decree 
 are numbered in the order of the army corps to which they belono-. 
 The divisions from 1 to 36, and brigades from 1 to 72. These 
 numbers will be henceforth allotted to them, and will serve, together 
 ■with the names of the Generals who command them, to designate them 
 in reports upon the operations of war. 
 
 The 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th, actual army corps are 
 dissolved. The divisions and troops of the line which compose them 
 enter into the formation of the new army corps. 
 
 Art. 2. The Minister of War is charged with the execution of the 
 present decree. 
 
 Griven at Versailles, the 28th of September, 1873. 
 
 M^^. ]\IacMahon, 
 
 Due de Magenta. 
 Par le President de la Republique. 
 The Miaister of War, 
 
 Gen\ du Barail. 
 
 The President of the French Republic, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. Conformably to Article 2 of the Law of July 4th, 1873, 
 on the General Organization of the Army, the special troops in Algeria, 
 constitute a distinct army corps, and will take number 19. 
 
 Ai't. 2, The command of this army corps is exercised in ordinary
 
 112 
 
 times by the General in chief commanding the land and sea forces in 
 Algeria. 
 
 Art. 3. The organization and details of composition of this army 
 corps will be subsequently determined conformably to the provisions 
 of the law which is to be made on the cadres of the army. 
 
 Art. 4. For the 19th army corps a 19th brigade of artillery is 
 created. 
 
 Art. 5. Till further orders besides the special corps in Algeria 
 troops of all arms actually in Algeria will be considei^ed as provisionally 
 detached from the army corps of the interior. Their service relations 
 with these latter shall be decided hereafter. 
 
 Art. 6. The Minister of War is charged with the execution of the 
 present decree. 
 
 Given at Versailles, 28th September, 1873. 
 
 M^^ DE MacMahon, 
 
 Due de Magenta. 
 By the President of the Republic. 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 Gen'', du Baeail. 
 
 The President of the French Republic, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. The folloAviug general officers are appointed to the command 
 of the 18 army corps of the interior, created by a decree under date 
 of the day : — 
 MM. 
 
 Clinchant (Justin), 1st army corps. 
 
 Montandon (Jean Baptiste Alexandre), 2nd army corps. 
 
 Sebrum (Barthelemy Louis Joseph), 3rd army corps. 
 
 Deligny (Edouard Jean Etienne), 4th army corps. 
 
 Bataille (Hem-i Jules), 5th army corps. 
 
 Douav (Felix Charles), 6th army corps. 
 
 Le Due de Aumale (Henri Eugene Philippe Louis d'Orleans), 7th 
 army corps. 
 
 JDucrot (Auguste Alexandre), 8th army corps. 
 
 Courtot de Cissey (Ernest Louis Gustave), 9th avmy corps. 
 
 Forgeot (Jules Etienne Marie), 10th army corps. 
 
 Lallemand (Orphis Leon), 11th army corps. 
 
 De Lartigue (Marie Hippolyte), 12th army corps. 
 
 Picard (Joseph Alexandre), 13th army corps. 
 
 Bourbaki (Charles Denis Saiiterre), 14th army corps. 
 
 Espivent de la Villesboisnet (Henri), 15th army corps. 
 
 Baron Aymard (Edoaard Alphonse Antoine), loth army corps. 
 
 De Saliguac Fenelon (Jules Victor Anatole), 17th army corps. 
 
 d'Aurelle de Paladines (Louis Jean Baptiste), 18th army corps. 
 
 Art. 2. The prerogatives and attributes of the commanders of the 
 18 new army corps will be limited till further orders to those 
 defined by the present regulations and instructions for the command of 
 regular troops. 
 
 The territorial command will continue to belong to the Generals 
 commanding the territorial divisions until the 18 districts for the army 
 corps, shall be fixed upon in the manner prescribed by the law. 
 
 Art. 3. The date when each general officer called to the command of
 
 113 
 
 one of the,se 18 army corps shall enter upon his duties will bo fixed by 
 his letter of command. 
 
 Ai't. 4. The Minister of War is cliarged with the execution of the 
 present decree. 
 
 Given at Versailles, September 28th, 1873. 
 
 M*^ DE MacMahox, 
 
 Due de Magenta. 
 By the President of the Republic, 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 Gen\ du Barail. 
 
 The President op the French Republic on the report of the Minister 
 of War, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. The army of Versailles, as it was reconstituted by decrees 
 under date of the -Slst of May and 5th June, 1873, is dissolved. The 
 troops which compose it will be divided between some of the army 
 corps which are to be formed in execution of the Law of July 24th, 
 1873. 
 
 Art. 2. General of division Ladmirault, military governor of Paris, 
 at present commander-in-chief of the army of Versailles, and chief com- 
 mandant of the 1st military divisions, will take the title of Governor of 
 Paris, chief commandant of the 1st military division, and will continue 
 to exercise his functions. 
 
 Art. 3. Till the division of the territory of France into 18 districts 
 has been definitely concluded by a decree issued in the foi-m of orders 
 of public administration, all troops stationed within the the boundaries 
 of the 1st military division, no matter to what army corps they belong, 
 will be under the orders of General Ladmirault. 
 
 Special instructions will make known the relations which are to 
 exist between these troops and the commander of their army corps. 
 
 Art. 4. The Minister of War is cliarged with the execution of the 
 present decree. 
 
 Given at Versailles, September 29th, 1873. 
 
 M^\ MacMahon, 
 
 Due de Maffenta. 
 
 By the President of the Republic. 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 Gen', du Barail. 
 
 The President of the French Republic on the report of the Minister 
 
 of War, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. Till the division of the territory of France lias been defi- 
 nitely ordained by a decree issued in the form of orders of public 
 administrative, general of division, Bourbaki, commandant of the 6th 
 army corps and chief commandant of the 8th and 22ud military 
 divisions appointed by decree of September 28th, 1873, to the command 
 of the 14th army corps, will continue to exercise the functions of chief 
 commandant of the 8th and 22nd mihtary divisions. He will take the 
 title of Military Governor of Lyons. 
 
 I
 
 114 
 
 Ai't. 2. The JNIinister of War is charged with the execution of the 
 present decree. 
 
 Given at Versailles, 29th September, 1873. 
 
 M". DE MacMahon, 
 
 Due de Magenta. 
 By the President of the Republic. 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 GrEN'-. DU BaRAIL. 
 
 The President of the French Republic, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. In each of the 18 army corps of the interior, created by the 
 decree of the 28th September, 1873, and in order to complete the 
 number of regiments necessary to make up the four brigades of infantry 
 composing the two divisions allotted to each army corps by Article 8 
 of the Law of the 24th July, 1873, an eighth regiment will be imme- 
 diately created, the elements of which will be taken from the seven 
 former ones. 
 
 Art. 2. The 18 regiments of infantry to be created according to 
 the terms of the preceding Article, will rank after the infantry 
 regiments at present existing, and will be numbered from 127 to 144 
 in the order of the army corps in which they have been formed. 
 
 Art. 3. Each of the said regiments will be formed by joining 21 
 companies, taken at the rate of 3 per regiment from the infantry 
 regiments allotted by the decree of September 27th, 1873, to each 
 army corps. These companies will not be replaced in the regiments 
 which furuish them, so that the 8 regiments. of every army corps will 
 each contain 21 companies. 
 
 Art. 4. The number of companies of each infantry regiment being 
 reduced to 21, the 4th battalions will cease to exist, and till the law 
 which is to be issued upon cadres shall have decided upon this point, 
 each of these regiments will comprise 3 battalions of 6 companies, and 
 3 depot companies. 
 
 Art. 5. The cJiefs de hataillons, adjutant majors, and adjutant non- 
 commissioned officers belonging to the reduced fourth battalions, who 
 do not find places in the new organization, are provisionally placed on 
 the succession list. 
 
 Art. 6. The infantry regiments, Nos. 127 to 144, will have pro- 
 visionally neither drum-major, nor band, nor sappers, nor will any 
 (extra) companies be formed till further orders. Special measures will 
 be taken as to the latter point to provide for this service. 
 
 Art. 7. Superior officers and othei'S necessary for forming the 
 regimental and battalion staff will be chosen from the whole of the 
 army, and by preference only in the army corps. They will pro- 
 visionally not be replaced in the general cadre of officers of their rank. 
 Art. 8. The Minister of War is charged with the execution of the 
 present decree. 
 
 Given at Versailles, September 29th, 1878. 
 
 li^'-. de MacMahon, 
 
 Due de Magenta. 
 Par le President de la Republique, 
 The Minster of War, 
 
 Gen\ du Bar ail.
 
 115 
 
 The President of the French Republic, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art 1. In order to prepare tlie execution of the law of July 24th, 
 1873, on the organization of the army by dividing the squadrons of 
 cavalry actually existing into a greater number of cavalry brigades 
 allotted to the 18 army corps, while reserving the regiments necessary 
 to the special divisions of this arm, 14 new regiments of cavalry are 
 created. 
 
 Art. 2. They are formed by taking one established squadron from 
 every six squadrons of the 56 cavalry regiments at present existing, 
 the regiment of Chasseurs d' Afi-ique and Spahis excejDted. 
 
 Art. 3. The 56 squadrons thus obtained are divided into groups of 
 4 squadrons, as much as possible of the same arm, and intended to 
 form one of the new regiments. 
 
 Art. 4. The cavalry of France is thus constituted of 56 regiments 
 of 5 squadrons each, and 14 regiments provisionally consisting of 
 4 squadrons each. In each of the old regiments the third majors, the 
 third adjutant- majors, and one of the ajapointments for adjutant non- 
 commissioned ofl&cers are thus reduced. Those of them who cannot 
 find a place in the organization of the new regiments are provisionally 
 to be placed on the succession list. 
 
 Art. 5. The 14 new regiments will comprise : — 
 
 6 regiments of dragoons Nos. 21 to 26 
 6 ,, „ chasseurs ,, 15 to 20 
 
 2 ,, ,, hussars „ 11 and 12. 
 
 Art. 6. Superior ofl&cers and others called to form the staff of the 
 new regiments -will not till further orders be replaced in the general 
 cadre of officers of their rank. 
 
 Art. 7. The said new regiments will not have, till further orders, 
 either band or supernumerai-y peloton. 
 
 Art. 8. Conformably to Table I, annexed to the present decree, 
 18 divisional cavalry brigades are formed, numbered from 1 to 18, and 
 allotted to the 18 army corps of the same number. 
 
 Art. 9. The 34 regiments of cavalry excluded from these forma- 
 tions are organized in brigades and divisions, conformably to Table 2, 
 annexed to the present decree. 
 
 Given at Versailles, September 29th, 1873. 
 
 M". MacMahon, 
 
 Due de Magenta. 
 Parle President de la Republique, 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 Gen', du Barail. 
 
 The President of the French Republic, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. In execution of the law of 24th July, 1873, upon the 
 general organization of the army, 8 regiments of artillery are created to 
 complete the number of regiments of that arm necessary to form the 
 19 brigades of artillery allotted to the 18 army corps of the interior 
 and the special army corps for Algiers. 
 
 Art. 2. These regiments will be formed of elements taken from all 
 the existing regiments, so that the total number of batteries of ai-tillery 
 
 l2
 
 116 
 
 already existing, and the actual cadre of officers of this arm, will not 
 he augmented. 
 
 Art. 3. The 38 regiments of artillery resulting from this creation, 
 are divided, conformably to the list annexed to the present decree, into 
 19 brigades allotted in numerical order to the 18 army corps of the 
 interior, and the special army corps for Algiers. 
 
 Art. 4. The provisional composition of each brigade and each 
 regiment, till the issuing of the law upon cadres, will be decided by a 
 special ministerial decision. 
 
 Art. 5. The Minister of War is charged with the execution of the 
 present decree. 
 
 Given at Versailles, September 29th, 1873. 
 
 M*\ DE MacMahon, 
 
 Due de Magenta. 
 Par le President de la Republique, 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 Gen'', du Barail. 
 
 The Peesident op the Feench Republic, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. In order to insure unity of command, and while waiting for 
 the promulgation of the order of public administration which is to 
 determine the districts and subdivisions of districts, the following 
 changes have been made in the territorial composition of military 
 divisions. 
 
 Art. 2. The 4th military division is provisionally reconstituted at 
 Chalons-sur-Marne. It comprises the departments of the Marne, the 
 Ardennes, the Aube, the Meuse, the Vosges, the Meurthe, and 
 Moselle. 
 
 Art. 3. The following departments are joined to the named divisions 
 as follows :— 
 
 To the 1st military division the department of the Orne, of the 
 Somme, of the Mayenne, of the Sartbe, and of the Loir-et-Cher, de- 
 tached from the 2nd, 3rd, 16th and 18th military divisions. 
 
 To the 9th military division the departnaents of the Ardeche, and of 
 the Gardo, detached from the 8th and 10th military divisions. To the 
 10th mihtary division the department of the Tarn detached from the 
 12th military division. 
 
 To the 12th military division the departments of the Ariege, the 
 Gers, and the Lot-et-Garonne, detached from the 11th, 13th and 14th 
 military divisions. 
 
 To the 15th military division the departments of Morbihan and 
 Finisterre detached from the 16th military division. 
 
 To the 28th military division the departments of the Deux Sevres, 
 the Maine- et- Loire and of the Indre, detached from the 15th and 19th 
 railitary divisions. 
 
 To the 19th military division the departments of the Cote d'Or, 
 and of the Saone-et- Loire, detached from the 8th military division. 
 
 To the 20th militaiy division the departments of the Loire and 
 the Allier, detached from the 19th military division. 
 
 To the 21st mihtary division the department of the Dordogne de- 
 tached from the 14th military division.
 
 117 
 
 To the 22nd military division the department of the Drome de- 
 tached from the 8th railitary division. 
 
 Art. 4th. The Minister of War is charged with the execution of 
 the present decree. 
 
 Given at Versailles, loth October, 1873. 
 
 M"-. DE MacMahox, 
 
 Due de Magenta. 
 Par le President de la Repnblique, 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 Gen'', du Bakail. 
 
 The President of the French Republic, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. Consequent upon the decree of this day determining the 
 new provisional composition of the military territorial divisions, the 
 following changes are made in the command of those divisions. 
 
 Ai*t. 2. The army corps' commanders mentioned below are required 
 to join to the command of the army corps, conferred iipon them by the 
 decree of the 28th of September, 1873, the command of a territorial 
 military division, viz. : — 
 
 The General Commanding Is appointed Commandant 
 
 The 1st army corps Of the 3rd military division at Lille. 
 
 The 3rd ,, ,, 2nd military division at Rouen. 
 
 The 6th ,, ,, 4th military division at Chalons- 
 
 sur-Marne (division reconsti- 
 tuted by the decree of this day). 
 
 The 7th „ „ 7th military division at Besan9on. 
 
 The 8th ,, ,, 19th military division at Bourges. 
 
 The 9th ,, „ 18th military division at Tours. 
 
 The 10th „ ,, IGth military division at Rennes. 
 
 The 11th ,, ,, 15th military division at ISTantes. 
 
 The 12th ,, ,, 21st military division at Limoges. 
 
 The 13th „ „ 20th military division at Clermont 
 
 Ferrand. 
 
 The 17th „ „ 12th military division at Toulouse. 
 
 Art. 3. The commanders of the three following army corps are 
 required to exercise provisionally the chief command of two neigh- 
 bouring mihtary divisions, viz. : — 
 
 The General Commanding Is appointed Commandant 
 
 The 15th army corps Of the 9th and 17th military di- 
 
 visions at Marseilles. 
 The 16th ,, „ 10th and 11th military divisions 
 
 at Montpellier. 
 The 18th „ „ 13th and 14th military divisions 
 
 at Bordeaux. 
 
 The generals commanding the 11th, 13th, and 17th military divi- 
 sions keep in their hands the administi'ation of military justice in all 
 that concerns their respective divisions. 
 
 Art. 4. Generals invested both with the command of an army 
 corps and the provisional command of one or two di^-isions, take, 
 according to the case, the title of " General commanding the — army
 
 118 
 
 corps and the — military division," or that of " General commanding 
 the — ■ army, and chief commandant of the — and — military 
 divisions." 
 
 Art. 5. 'No change is made in vphat "was ordered by the decree of 
 September 29th, with regard to the command of Paris and Lyons. 
 
 But the pro^dsional attributes of the Generals commanding the 2nd, 
 4th, and 5th corps, of which the troops are all stationed within the 
 territory of the 1st military division, are determined by a special 
 ministerial decision. 
 
 Art. 6. The Minister of War is charged with the execution of the 
 present decree. 
 
 Given at Versailles, 13th October, 1873. 
 
 ■ M''^ DE MacMahon, 
 
 Duo de Magenta. 
 Par le President de la Republique, 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 Gen'-, du Barail. 
 
 The President of the French Republic, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. The dispositions contained in the decrees of the 28th and 
 29th of September last, relative to the new organization of the army, 
 and to the commands which it comprises, and those contained in the 
 decrees of the 13th October, relative to the provisional composition 
 and to the command of the territorial divisions will be in force from 
 the 21st October. 
 
 From that date the army corps, divisions, and brigades will be con- 
 stituted, and the Generals who have, or shall have received the com- 
 mands of them, will enter upon their duties. 
 
 Till further orders, the Generals, the corps of all arms, and the 
 personnel of the various services which are not comprised in the 
 organization of army corps, divisions, and brigades determined by the 
 aforesaid decrees, shall be subject only to the territorial command. 
 
 Special instructions will regulate the relations of detached troops 
 on the one hand with the commander of the army corps to which they 
 belong, on the other hand, with the commander of the military division 
 in the territory of which they are stationed. 
 
 Art. 2. The Minister of War is charged with the execution of the 
 present decree. 
 
 Given at Versailles, the 15th of October, 1873. 
 
 M". de MacMahon, 
 
 Due de Magenta. 
 Par le President de la Republique, 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 Gen^, du Barail.
 
 119 
 
 MINISTERIAL DECISION 
 
 Relative to the Tereitorial Command conferred provisionally on 
 THE Generals commanding the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Army Corps. 
 
 In execiation of Article 5 of tlie Decree of the 13th of October, 
 concerning the changes made in the command of territorial divisions, 
 the position of the Generals commanding the 2nd, 4th, and 5th army- 
 corps, with regard to territorial command is, till further orders, 
 regulated as follows : — 
 
 The General commanding the 2nd army corps, will exercise by 
 delegation from the general Governor of Paris, Chief Commandant of 
 the 1st military division, the chief command of the subdivisions of the 
 Somme, the Oise, and the Aisne, comprised in the 1st military division. 
 He will have his head-quarters at Amiens. 
 
 The General commanding the 4th army corps will exercise in the 
 same manner, and by delegation, the chief command of the Orne, 
 Mayenne, Sarthe, and Eure-et-Loir. 
 
 He will provisionally have his head-quarters at Paris. 
 
 The General commanding the 5th army corps will exercise in the 
 same manner, and by delegation, the chief command of the subdivisions 
 of the Loir-et-Cher, the Loiret, the Yonne, and the Seine-et-Marue. 
 
 He will provisionally have his head- quarters at Paris. 
 
 Consequently the Generals commanding the subdivisions above 
 mentioned, will be subject to the chief command to which they are 
 responsible for all service matters, and will receive from it all orders 
 relative to their command. 
 
 Nevertheless, the administration of miHtary justice will remain 
 directly and exclusively in the hands of the general Governor of Paris, 
 Chief Commandant of the 1st military division, in all that concerns 
 the subdivisions comprised in the said division. 
 
 Nothing is changed in the position nor the attributes of the 
 General commanding the subdivision of the Seine and the fortress of 
 Paris. 
 
 The General commanding the subdivision of the Seine-et-Oise, will 
 add to his present command the command of the fortress of 
 Versailles. These dispositions will be in force from the 21st of 
 October, 1873. 
 
 Versailles, October 14th, 1873. 
 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 Gen'-, du Bakail.
 
 120 
 
 The President of the French Republic, considering the Presidential 
 Decree of June 8, 187], concerning the organization of the central ad- 
 ministration of the Minister of War, which creates a general ministerial 
 staff divided into two bureaux : 
 
 Considering the Law of July 24th, 1873, relative to the General 
 Organization of the Army, which divides it into 19 army corps, pro- 
 vided each with its staflFs and various services : 
 
 Believing that in order to act up to the spirit of the last-mentioned 
 law, it is necessary to constitute the War Office, under conditions more 
 in accordance with the new organization of the army : 
 
 Upon the report of the Minister of War, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1, Article 2 of the Presidential Decree of the 8th of June, 
 1871, is modified as follows: — 
 
 The Department of the Chief of the General Ministerial Staff com- 
 prises the Ministerial Cabinet and 6 bureaux, namely : — 
 
 1st Bureau. — General organization and mobilization of the Ai'my. 
 Positions and strength. 
 
 2nd Bureau. — Military statistics; historical office. 
 
 3rd Bureau. — Military operations ; instruction of the army ; topo- 
 graphical office. 
 
 4th Bureau. — Etappen and railway service ; execution of move- 
 ments of troops ; transport of troops by land or sea. 
 
 5th Bureau. — General correspondence. 
 
 6th Bureau (or war depot) . — Technical services ; collections ; mate- 
 rial and accounts of the general staff. 
 
 Two Deputy Chiefs of the staff are attached to the Chief of the 
 staff. 
 
 Art. 2. The chiefs of all the bureaux, except that of general corres- 
 pondence are superior officers. 
 
 Art 3. These officers only receive the full pay of tbeir rank. 
 The salary of General Officers who hold an appointment in the 
 general staff of the Minister of War, will (including ordinary pay) 
 be fixed at 25,000 francs for a General of Division, and 15,000 for a 
 general of brigade. 
 
 Tbe latter sum is the same as the salary of other Generals of 
 Brigade, who are chiefs of any of the services of the central adminis- 
 tration. 
 
 Art. 5. The Minister of War is charged with the execution of the 
 present decree, which Avill be in force from the 15th of March, 1874. 
 Given at Versailles, March 12th, 1874. 
 
 M*\ DE MacMahon, 
 
 Due de Magenta. 
 By the President of the Republic. 
 The Minister of War, 
 
 Gen'', de Barail.
 
 121 
 
 The President of the French Republic; on the report of the 
 Minister of War ; pursuant to the Law of the 24th July 1873, on 
 the General Organization of the Army ; pursuant to the 1st 
 Article, conceived as folloAvs : — 
 
 "The French territory is divided into eighteen Regions, for 
 organization of the regular army and its reserve, and of the 
 territorial army and its reserve ; and into Subdivisions of these 
 Regions. 
 
 " These Regions and Subdivisions of Regions, established 
 according to their resources for recruiting and to the 
 exigencies of mobilization, are determined by a decree in the 
 form of regulations for public administration, and inserted in 
 the Bulletin des Lois." 
 
 Having conferred with the Council of State, decrees : 
 Art. 1 . Each of the eighteen Regions mentioned in Article 1 
 of the Law of the 24th July 1873 contams eight Subdivisions 
 of Regions. 
 
 These Regions and Subdi^dsions of Regions are limited, as 
 shown in the tables and map hereto appended. 
 
 Art. 2. The Minister of War is charged with the execution 
 of the present decree, which shall be inserted in the Bulletin des 
 Lois. 
 
 Done at Versailles, 6th August 1874. 
 
 Marshal de MacMahon, 
 
 Duke of Magenta, 
 By the President of the Republic, 
 
 The Vice-President of the Council 
 Minister of War, 
 
 General E. de Cissey. 
 
 Table showing the division of France into Eighteen Regions, 
 and into Subdivisions of Regions. 
 
 L REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Lille. 
 Comprises the departments of Nord and of Pas-de-Calais. 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 Department of Nord. 
 Arrondissement : Lille.
 
 122 
 
 2nd Subdivision. 
 Department of Nor d. 
 Arrondissement : Valenciennes. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Nord. 
 
 Arrondissements : Douai ; Cambrai : cantons of East and 
 West Cambrai, Marcoing, Solesmes, and Carnieres. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 Department of Nord. 
 
 Arrondissements : Avesnes ; Cambrai : cantons of Clary and 
 of Le Cateau. 
 
 5th Subdivision. 
 Department of Pas-de- Calais. 
 Arrondissement : Arras. 
 
 6th Subdivision. 
 Department of Pas-de- Calais. 
 Arrondissements : Bethune, Saint-Pol. 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Pas-de-Calais. 
 Arrondissements : Saint-Omer, Boulogne, Montreuil. 
 
 8th Subdivision. 
 Department of Nord. 
 Arrondissements : Dunkerque, Hazebrouck. 
 
 II. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Amiens. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Aisne, Gise, Somme, Seine- 
 et-Gise (arrondissement of Pontoise) and of Seine (cantons of 
 Saint-Denis and of Pantin, lOth, 19tli and 20tli arrondissements 
 of Paris). 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Aisne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Soissons, Chateau-Thierry. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Pontoise. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Saint-Denis and 
 of Pantin, and of the 10th, 19th and 20th arrondissements of 
 Paris.
 
 123 
 
 2xD Subdivision. 
 Department of Aisne. 
 Arrondissements : Saint-Quentin, Vervins. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 Department of Oise. 
 Arrondissements : Beauvais, Clermont. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 Arrondisseraent : Portion of the an'ondissement of Pontoise. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Saint-Denis 
 and of Pantin, and of the 10th, 19th and 20th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 Department of Somme. 
 Ari'ondissement : Amiens. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Pontoise. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissement : Portions of the cantons of Saint-Denis 
 and of Pantin, and of the 10th, 19th and 20th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 5th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Oise. 
 
 Arrondissement : Compiegne, SenKs. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 Arrondissements: Portion of the arrondissement of Pontoise. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantoDS of Saint-Denis 
 and Pantin, and of the 10th, 19th and 20th aiTondissements of 
 Paris. 
 
 Department of Somme. 
 
 Arrondissements : Abbeville, Doullens. 
 
 6th SUBDmSION. 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Pontoise. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Saint-Denis 
 and Pantin. and of the 10th, 19th and 20th arrondissements of 
 Paris.
 
 124 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Aisne, 
 Anordissement : Laon. 
 
 Department of Seine- et-Oise. 
 AiTondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Pontoise. 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Saint-Denis 
 and Pantin, and of the 10th, 19th and 20th arrondissements of 
 Paris. 
 
 Department of Somme. 
 
 Arrondissements : Peronne, Montdidier. 
 
 8th Subdivision. 
 Department of Seine -et-Oise. 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Pontoise. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Saint-Denis 
 and of Pantin, and of the 10th, 19th and 20th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 III. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Rouen. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Calvados, of Eure, of Seine- 
 Inferieure, of Seine-et-Oise (arrondissements of Mantes and of 
 Versailles) and of Seine (cantons of Courbevoie and of Neuillj, 
 1st, 7th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 16th, 171h and 18th arrondissements of 
 Paris). 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Eure. 
 
 Arrondissements : Pont-Audemer, Bernay. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the arrondissements of Mantes 
 and Versailles. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Courbevoie and 
 Neiiillv, and of the 1st, 7th, 8th, 9th, 15tli, 16th, 17th and 18th 
 arrondissements of Paris. 
 
 '?ND SmmivisiON. 
 Department of Eure. 
 Arrondissement : Evreux. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the arrondissements of Mantes 
 and Versailles.
 
 125 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 AiTondissements : Portions of the cantons of Courbevoie and 
 Neuilly, and ol the 1st, 7th, 8th, 9th, loth, 16th, 17th and 18th 
 arrondissements of Paris. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Calvados. 
 Arrondissements : Vire, Falaise. 
 
 Department of Seine- et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the arroncHssements of ]\Iantes 
 and Versailles. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 AiTondissements : Portions of the cantons of Com-bevoie 
 and Neuilly, and of the 1st, 7th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 
 18th arrondissements of Paris. 
 
 5th Subdwision. 
 
 Department of Stine-Inferieure. 
 Arrondissements : Rouen, cantons of Boos, Grande-Couronne, 
 Elboeuf and Rouen (left bank) : Diej^pe, Neuchatel. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 Ari'ondissements : Portions of the arrondissements of Mantes 
 and Versailles. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Courbevoie and 
 Neuilly, and of the 1st, 7th, 8th, 9tli, 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th 
 arrondissements of Paris. 
 
 6th SUBDrV'ISION. 
 
 Department of Seine-lnferieure, 
 Arrondissements : Rouen ; cantons Boos, Grand-Com'onne, 
 Elboeuf and Rouen (left bank) 
 
 Departmenl of Enre. 
 Arrondissements : Les Andelys, Louviers. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the arrondissements of Mantes 
 and Versailles. 
 
 Department of Seme. 
 Arrondissements: Portions of the cantons of Courbevoie and 
 Neuilly, and of the 1st, 7th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th 
 arrondissements of Paris.
 
 126 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Calvados. 
 Arrondissements : Caen, Bayeux. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the arrondissements of Mantes 
 and Versailles. 
 
 Departfnent of Seine. 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Courbevoie and 
 Neuilly, and of the 1st, 7th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th 
 arrondissements of Paris. 
 
 8th Subdivision. 
 Department of Seine-Inferieure. 
 Arrondissements : Le Havre, Yvetot. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 Arrondissements: Portions of the arrondissements of Mantes 
 and Versailles. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Courbevoie and 
 Neuilly, and of the 1st, 7th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 17th and 18th aiTon- 
 dissements of Paris. 
 
 IV. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Le Mans. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Eure-et-Loir, Mayenne, Orne, 
 Sarthe, Seine-et-Oise (arrondissement of Rambouillet) and of 
 Seine (cantons of Villejuif and of Sceaux, 4th, 5tli, 6th, 13th 
 and 14th arrondissements of Paris). 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 Department of Mayenne, 
 
 Arrondissements : Chateau-Gontier; Laval, minus the canton 
 of Chailland. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 Arrondissement: Portion of the arrondissement of Ram- 
 bouillet. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Villejuif and 
 Sceaux, and of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 13th and 14th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 2nd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Mayenne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Mayenne ; Laval, canton of Chailland.
 
 127 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Ram- 
 bouillet. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Villejuif and 
 Sceaux, and of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 13th and 14th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 3rd SUBDmSION. 
 Department of Sarthe. 
 
 An-ondissements : Mamers ; Saint Calais, minus the canton 
 of Chateau-du-Loir ; Le Mans, cantons of Ballon, Montfert and 
 3rd canton of Mans. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise, 
 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Ram- 
 bouillet. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Villejuif and 
 Sceaux, and of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 13th and 14th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 Department of Sarthe. 
 
 Arrondissements : La Fleche ; Le Mans, 1st and 2nd cantons 
 of Le Mans and cantons of Sille, Conlie, Loue, La Suze and 
 Ecommoy ; Saint Calais, canton of Chateau-du-Loir. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Ram- 
 bouillet. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 AiTondissements : Portions of the cantons of Villejuif and 
 Sceaux, and of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 13th and 14th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 5th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Eure-et-Loir. 
 
 Arrondissements : Chartres, cantons of North Chartres, 
 Courville and Maintenon ; Nogent-le-Rotron ; Dreux. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Ram- 
 bouillet. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Villejuif and 
 Sceaux, and of the 4th, 5th, 6th, loth and 14th arrondissements 
 of Paris.
 
 128 
 
 6th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Enre-et-Loh\ 
 
 AiTondissements : Chateaucluii ; Chartres, cantons of South 
 Chartres, Auneau, Illiers, Voves and Janville. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Ram- 
 boiiillet. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Villejuif and 
 Sceaux, and of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 13th and 14th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Orne. 
 Arrondissements : Alencon, Mortagne. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Ram- 
 bouillet. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Villejuif and 
 Sceaux, and of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 13th and 14th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 8th Subdivision. 
 Department of Orne. 
 Arrondissements : Argentan, Domfront. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 Arrondissement : Portion of the arrondissement of Ram- 
 bouillet. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Villejuif and 
 Sceaux, and of the 4th, 5th, 6th, 13th and 14th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 V. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Orleans. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Lohet, Loir-et-Cher, Seine-et- 
 Marne, Yonne, Seine-et-Oise (arrondissements of Etampes and 
 of Corbeil) and of Seine (cantons of Charenton and Vincennes, 
 2nd, 3rd, llth and 12th arrondissements of Paris). 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 Department of Yonne. 
 Arrondissements : Sens ; Joigny, cantons of Cerisiers, Ville- 
 neuve-sur-Yonne, Brienon and Joigny.
 
 129 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the arrondissementsof Etampes 
 and Corbeil. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Charenton and 
 Vincennes, and of the 2nd, 3rd, 11th and 12th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 2nd SUBDRISIOX. 
 
 Department of Sehie-et-Marne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Fontainebleau, Provins. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissements: Portions of the arrondissementsof Etampes 
 and Corbeil. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Charenton and 
 Vincennes, and of the 2nd, 3rd, 11th and 12th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Marne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Melun ; Coulommiers, canton of Rozoy. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissements: Portions of the arrondissementsof Etampes 
 and Corbeil. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Charenton and 
 Vincennes, and of the 2nd, 3rd, 11th and 12th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 4th Subdwision. 
 Department of Seine-et-Marne. 
 Arrondissements : Meaux ; Coulommiers, minus the canton 
 of Rozoy. 
 
 Department of Seine-et-Oise. 
 
 Arrondissements: Portions of the arrondissementsof Etampes 
 and Corbeil. 
 
 Department of Seine. 
 Arrondissements : Portions of the cantons of Charenton and 
 Vincennes, and of the 2nd, 3rd, 11th and 12th arrondissements 
 of Paris. 
 
 5th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Yonne. 
 
 Arrondissements: Auxerre, Avallon, TonneiTe 
 
 K 3
 
 130 
 
 ()TH SUBDIVISIOxV. 
 Department of Loiret. 
 Arrondissements : Montargis, Gien. 
 
 Department of Yonne. 
 Arrondissement : Joigny, cantons of Saint-Julien, Charny, 
 Aillant. Bleneau and Saint-Fargeau. 
 
 7th Subdwision. 
 Department of Loir-et-Cher. 
 
 8th Subdh^ision. 
 Department of Loiret. 
 Arrondissements : Orleans, Pitliiviers. 
 
 VI. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Clialons-sur-Marne. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Ardennes, Aube, Marne, Meur- 
 the-et-Moselle, Meuse and Vosges. 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 Department of Meurthe-et-Moselle. 
 Arrondissements : Nancy, West Nancy, and Saint-Nicholas. 
 
 Department of Vosges. 
 Arrondissement : Samt-Die. 
 
 2xD SuBDrvasiox. 
 
 Department of Meurthe-et-Moselle. 
 
 Arrondissements : Toul ; Nancy, minus the canton of West 
 Nancy and Saint-Nicholas. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 Department of Vosges. 
 
 Arrondissements : Epinal, Mirecourt, Remiremont, Neuf- 
 chateau. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 Department of Meurthe-et-Moselle. 
 Arrondissement : Briey, cantons of Briey, Conflans and 
 Chambley. 
 
 Department of Meuse. 
 Arrondissements : Verdun, Bar-le-Duc, Commercy. 
 
 5th Subdfv^ision. 
 Department of Ardennes. 
 Arrondissements : Rocroi, Mezieres, Sedan.
 
 131 
 
 Department of Meuse. 
 
 Arrondissement : Montmedy. 
 
 Department of Meurthe-et-Moselle. 
 
 Arrondissement : Briey, cantons Longuyon, Longwy and 
 Audun. 
 
 6th Subdivision. 
 Department of Marne. 
 Arrondissement : Reims. 
 
 Department of Ardeiines. 
 Arrondissements : Voiiziers, Rethel. 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Aube. 
 
 8 th Subdivision. 
 Department of the Marne. 
 Arrondissements : Sainte-Meneliould, Chalons, Vitry, Epernay. 
 
 VII. REGION, 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Besangon. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Ain, Doubs, Jura, Haute- 
 Marne, Haut-Rhin, Haute-Saone and of Rhone (canton of Neu- 
 ville, 4:th and 5th arroncUssements of Lyon). 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 Department of Haut-Rhin. 
 
 Arrondissement : BeLfort. 
 
 Department of Haute-SaCne. 
 Arrondissement : Lure, canton of Champagney. 
 
 Department of Doubs. 
 Arrondissements : Baume-les-Dames, Montbeliard. 
 
 2nd Subdivision. 
 Department of Haute-Saone. 
 Arrondissements : Vesoul ; Lure, minus Champagney, 
 
 Department of Haute-Marne. 
 
 Arrondissements: Langres; Chauniont, canton of Arc-en- 
 Barrois. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Haute-Saone. 
 
 Arrondissement : Gray.
 
 132 
 
 Department of Rhone, 
 Arrondissement : Lyon, canton, 4th arrondissement of Lyon. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 Department of Haute-Marne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Cliaumont, minus the canton of Arc-en- 
 Barrois ; Vassy. 
 
 Department of WiSne. 
 
 Arrondissement : Lyon, canton of Neuville and 5th arron- 
 dissement of Lyon. 
 
 5th SUBDmSION. 
 
 Department of Jura. 
 
 Arrondissements: Lons-le-Sanlnier; Poligny; Dole, cantons 
 of Chaumergy, Chaussiii and Montbarrey ; Saint-Claude. 
 
 6th SuBDnasiox. 
 Department of Doubs. 
 Arrondissements : Besan^on, Pontarlier. 
 Department of Jura. 
 
 Arrondissement : Dole, minus Chaumergy, Chaussin and 
 
 Montbarrey. 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Ain. 
 
 Arrondissements: Bourg, minus Pont-d'Ain; Trevoux, 
 minus Montkiel, Chalamont, Meximieux. 
 
 8 th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Ain, 
 
 Arrondissements: Belley; Gex ; Nantua ; Bourg, canton of 
 Pont-d'Am ; Trevoux, cantons of Montluel, Chalamont, Mexi- 
 mieux, 
 
 VIIL REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Bourg es. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Cher, Cote-d'Or, Nievre, Saone- 
 et-Loire and Rhone (arrondissement of Villefranche). 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 Department 6f 8a6ne-et-Loire. 
 Arrondissements: Louhans, canton of Saint-Pierre-en-Bresse; 
 Chtilon, cantons of Chagny, Verdun- sur-Doubs, and Saint- 
 Martin-en-Bresse. 
 
 Department of CSte-cfOr. 
 
 Arrondissements : Beaune ; Dijon, cantons of Auxonne and 
 Pontailler.
 
 133 
 
 2XD SUBDH^ISIOX. 
 
 Department of Cote-d'Or. 
 
 AiTondissements : Chatillon; Semur; Dijon, minus Auxonne 
 and Pontailler. 
 
 3rd Subdivisiox. 
 
 Department of Saone-et-Loire. 
 
 AiTondissements : Macon, cantons of Cluny, Saint Gengoux, 
 
 Lugny, and Tonrnus ; Louhans, minus Saint-Pierre-en-Bresse ; 
 
 Chalon, minus Cbagny, Verdun-sur-Doubs and Saint-Martin- 
 
 en-Bresse. 
 
 4th Subdr^isiox. 
 
 Department of SaSne-et-Loire. 
 
 Arrondissement : Macon, cantons of Nortli and South Macon, 
 Chapelle Tram ayes and Matour, 
 
 Department of Rhone. 
 Arrondissement : Villefranche. 
 
 5th Subdivision. 
 Departinent of Cher. 
 
 A.rrondi8sement : Sancerre. 
 
 Department of Nievre. 
 Arrondissements : Clamecy, Cosne. 
 
 6th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Cher. 
 
 Arrondissements: Bourges ; Saint-Amand, minus the cantons 
 of La Guerche, Sancoins and Nerondes. 
 
 7 th Subdivision. 
 Department of Saone-et-Loire. 
 
 Arrondissements : CharoUes, Autun. 
 
 8 th Subdivision. 
 Department of Nibvre. 
 
 Arrondissements : Chateau-Chuion, Nevers. 
 
 Department of Cher. 
 
 Arrondissement : Saint-Amand, cantons of La Guerche, 
 Sancoins and Neronde. 
 
 IX. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Tours. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Maine-et-Loire, Indre-et- 
 Loire, Indre, Deux-Sevres and Vienne,
 
 134 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 Department of Indre, 
 Arrondissemente: Issoudim; La CMtre ; Chateauroux, minus 
 the cantons of Chatillon and Ecueille. 
 
 2nd Subdwision. 
 
 Department of Indre. 
 
 Arrondissements : Cliateauroux, cantons of Chatillon and 
 Ecueille ; Le Blanc. 
 
 Department of Vienne. 
 Arrondissement : Montmorillon. 
 
 Department of Indre~et- Loire. 
 
 Arrondissement : Loches. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 Department of Deux-Sevres. 
 Arrondissements : Parthenay, Bressuire, Niort. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 Department of Vienne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Poitiers, minns the cantons of Saint- 
 Julien, Saint-Georges, Neuville and Mirebeau ; Civray. 
 
 Department of Deux-Sevres. 
 Arrondissement : Melle. 
 
 5th Subdwision. 
 
 Department of Vienne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Chatelleranlt; Loudim ; Poitiers, cantons 
 of Saint- Julien, Saint-Georges, Xeuville and Mirebeau. 
 
 Department of Indre-et-Loire. 
 
 Arrondissement : Chinon, minus the cantons of Langeais 
 and Bourgueil. 
 
 6th Subdivision. 
 Department of Indre-et-Loire. 
 
 Arrondissements : Tours ; Chinon, cantons of Langeais and 
 Bourgueil. 
 
 Department of Maine-et-Loire. 
 
 Arrondissements : Saumur, cantons of North-East, North- 
 West, and South-East Saumut; Bauge, cantons of Noyant and 
 Longue. 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Maine-et-Loire. 
 
 Arrondissements : Segre ; Bauge, minus the cantons of 
 Noyant and Longue ; Angers, minus the cantons of Chalonne, 
 Pont-de-C^ and Thouarce.
 
 135 
 
 8th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Maine-et- Loire. 
 
 Arronclisseraents : Cholet ; Angers, cantons of Pont-de-Ce, 
 Chalonne and Thouarce ; Saumur, minus the cantons of North- 
 East, North- West and South-East Saumur. 
 
 X. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Rennes. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Cotes -du-Nord, Manche and 
 lUe-et-Vilaine. 
 
 1st SuBDmsiox. 
 Ihpartment of Cotes-du-Nord. 
 Arrondissements : Guingamp, Lannion. 
 
 2nd Subdivision. 
 Department of C6tes-du-Nord. 
 Arrondissements : Saint-Brieuc, Loudeac, 
 
 3rd Subdwision. 
 Department of Ille-et- Vilaine. 
 Arrondissements : Rennes, Redon, Montfort. 
 
 4th SUBDmSION. 
 Department of Ille-et- Vilaine. 
 Arrondissements : Yitre, Fougeres. 
 
 5th SUBDmSION. 
 Department of Manche. 
 Arrondisements : Valognes, Cherbourg. 
 
 6th SUBDmSION. 
 Department of Ille-et- Vilaine. 
 Arrondissement : Saint-Malo. 
 
 Department of Cdtes-du-Nord. 
 Arrondissement : Dinan. 
 
 7th SUBDmSION. 
 Department of Manche. 
 Arrondissements : A^^.'anches, Mortain. 
 
 8th SUBDmSION. 
 Department of Manche. 
 Arrondisements : Saint -Lo, Coutances.
 
 136 
 
 XI. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Nantes. 
 
 Comprises tlie departments of Finistere, Loire-Inferieure, 
 Morbihan and Vendee. 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 Department of Loire-Inferieure. 
 Arrondissements : Nantes, minus the cantons of Carquefou, 
 Vertou, Loroux, Vallet, Clisson and Aigrefeuille; Saint Nazaire; 
 Paimboeuf. 
 
 2nd Subdivision. 
 Department of Loire-Inferieure. 
 Arrondissements: Ancenis; CMteaubriant ; Nantes, cantons 
 of Carquefou, Vertou, Loroux, Vallet, Clisson and Aigrefeuille. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Vendee. 
 
 Arrondissements : La. Roche-sur- Yon, minus the cantons of 
 Mortagne, Herbiers and Chantonnay; Les Sables d'Olonne. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Vendee. 
 
 Arrondissements : La Roche-sur- Yon ; cantons of Mortagne, 
 Herbiers and Cliantonnaj ; Fontenay. 
 
 5th Subdivision. 
 Department of Morbihan, 
 Arrondissements : Vannes, Ploermel. 
 
 6th Subdivision. 
 Department of Finistere. 
 Arrondissements : Quimper, Quimperle, ChateauUn. 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Finistere. 
 Arrondissements : Brest, Morlaix. 
 
 8th Subdivision. 
 Department of Morbihan. 
 
 Arrondissements : L orient, Pontivy. 
 
 Xn. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Limoges. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Charente, Correze, Ci-euse, 
 Dordogne and Haute- Vienne.
 
 137 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 Department of Haute-Vienne. 
 
 AiTondissements : Limoges ; Rocliechouart, minus the 
 canton of Saint-Junien; Saint- Yrieix, cantons of Nexon and 
 Chains. 
 
 Department of Creuse. 
 
 AiTondissement ; Bourganeuf, minus the canton of Bene- 
 vent. 
 
 Department of Dordogne. 
 
 Arrondissement : Nontron, minus the cantons of Mareuil, 
 Champagnac, Thiviers, Lanouaille and Jumilhac. 
 
 2nd SuBDrv^isiON. 
 Department of haute-Vienne. 
 Arrondissements : Rochechouart, canton of Saint-Junien ; 
 Bellac. 
 
 Department of Cltarente. 
 Arrondissement : Confolens. 
 
 Department of Creuse. 
 
 Arrondissements : Gueret, cantons of La Souterraine and 
 Grand- Bourg ; Bourganeuf, canton of Benevent. 
 
 oRD Subdivision. . 
 Department of Creuse. 
 AjTondissements : Aubusson; Boussac; Gueret, minus the 
 cantons of La Souterraine and Grand-Bourg. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 Department of Correze. 
 Arrondissements : Tulle, Ussel. 
 
 5th Subdivision. 
 Department of CJiarente. 
 Arrondissement : Barbezieux. 
 
 Department of Dordogne. 
 Arrondissements : Riberac ; Nontron, cantons of Mareuil 
 and Champagnac ; Perigueux, minus the cantons of Exeideuil, 
 Hautefort and Thenon. 
 
 6th Subdivision. 
 Department of Charente. 
 Arrondissements : Angouleme, Ruffec, Cognac. 
 
 7 th Subdr'ision. 
 Department of Dordogne. 
 Arrondissements: Nontron, cantons of Lanouaille, Jumilhac 
 and Thiviers ; Perigueux, cantons of Exeideuil, Hautefort and 
 Thenon ; Sarlat, canton of Terrasson.
 
 138 
 
 Department of Haute- Vienne. 
 Arrondisseraent : S&iut-Yrieix, cantons of Saint- Yrieix and 
 Saint-Germain. 
 
 Department of Correze. 
 
 Arrondissement : Brives. 
 
 8th Subdiyisiox. 
 
 Department of Dordogne. 
 
 Arrondissement: Bergerac ; Sarlat, minus ^ the canton of 
 Terrasson. 
 
 XIII. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters. — Clermont-Ferrand. 
 
 Comprises the departments of AlHer, Loire, Puy-de-D6me, 
 Haute-Loire, Cantal and Rhone (cantons of I'Arbresle, 
 Condrieu, Liraonest, Mornant, Saint Symphorien, Saint-Laurent 
 and Vaugneraj). 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Pvy-de~D6me. 
 
 Arrondissements : Riom ; Thiers ; Clermont, cantons of 
 North-East, North-AVest, and South- West Clermont, Rochefort, 
 Bourg-Lastic and Herment. 
 
 2XD SuBDmsiox. 
 Department of Allier. 
 Arrondissements : Moulins, Montlugon, Gannat. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Puy-de-D6me. 
 
 Arrondissements : Clermont, minus the cantons of North- 
 East, North-West, South-West Clermont, Rochefort, Bourg- 
 Lastic and Herment ; Issoire ; Ambert. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Haute-Loire. 
 
 Arrondissements : Brioude, cantons of Blesle, Auzon, 
 la Chaise-Dieu and Lavofite. 
 
 Department of Cantal. 
 
 5th SuBDmsiON. 
 Department of Haute-Loire. 
 Arrondissements: LePuj^; Yssingeaux ; Brioude, cantons of 
 Pinols, Langeac and Paulhaguet. 
 
 6th SuBDmsiON. 
 Department of Loire. 
 
 Arrondissement : Saint-Etienne.
 
 139 
 
 7th Subdiyisioj;. 
 Department of Loire. 
 Arrondissement : Montbrison. 
 
 Department of Rhone. 
 Arrondissement: Lyon, cantons of Arbresle, Condrieux, 
 Limonest, Mornant, Saint - Symphorien, Saint - Laurent and 
 Vaugneray. 
 
 8th Subdh^ision. 
 Department of Allier. 
 Arrondissement : La Palisse. 
 
 Department of Loire. 
 Arrondissement : Roanne. 
 
 XIV. REGION. 
 
 Head- Quarters. — Grenoble. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Hautes-Alpes Drome, Isere, 
 Savoie, Haute-Savoie and Rhone (cantons of Givors, Saint- 
 Genis-Laval, Villeurbanne, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 6th arrondisements 
 of Lyon). 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Isere. 
 
 Arrondissement : Grenoble. 
 
 2xD S^JBDI^^SION. 
 Department of Isere. 
 Arrondissements : La Tom--du-Pin, Saint Marcellin. 
 
 3rd SuBDmsiox. 
 Department of Haute-Savoie 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 Department of Savoie. 
 
 5 th Subdivision. 
 Department of Isere. 
 An-ondissement : Vienne. 
 
 Department of Rhone. 
 
 Arrondissement : Lyon, cantons of Givors and 6th arron- 
 dissement of Lyon. 
 
 6th Subdr'ision. 
 Department of Drdme. 
 Arrondissement : Valence.
 
 140 
 
 Department of Rhone. 
 Arroudissement : Lyon, canton of 3rd arrondissement of 
 Lyon. 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Drome. 
 AiTondissements : Montelimart, Die, Nyons. 
 
 Department of RhSne. 
 
 Arrondissement : Lyon, canton of Villeurbanne, and 1st 
 arrondissement of Lyon. 
 
 8th Subdivision. 
 
 Departments Hautes-Alpes and Rhone. 
 
 Arrondissements : Lyon, cantons of Saint-Genis-Laval and 
 2nd arrondissement of Lyon. 
 
 XV. REGION. 
 
 Head- Quarters. — Marseille. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Basses-Alpes, Alpes- 
 Maritimes, Ardeche, Bouches-du-Rhone, Corse, Gard, Var and 
 Vaucluse. 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Var. 
 
 Arrondissements : Brignoles, Toulon. 
 
 Department of Bouches-du-Rhojie. 
 
 Arrondissement : Marseille, cantons of Aubagne, Ciotat, 
 Roquevaire, Centre and South-Extra of Marseille. 
 
 2nd SUBDmSION. 
 Department of Alpes-Maritimes, 
 
 Department of Var. 
 Arrondissement : Draguignan. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Bouches-de-Rhone. 
 
 Arrondissements: Aries; Aix ; Marseille, cantons of Centre, 
 North and South-Intra and North-Extra of Marseille. 
 
 Departrrent of Basses-Alpes. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 Department of Corse. 
 
 5th Subdivision. 
 Department of Gard. 
 
 Arrondissements : Nimes, Alais, le Vigan.
 
 Ul 
 
 6th SUBDR'ISION. 
 Department of Vaucluse. 
 
 7 th SUBDmSION. 
 
 Department of Ard che. 
 
 AiTondissements : Tournon ; Privas, minus the cantons of 
 Viviers, Bourg-Saint-Andeol and Villeneuve-de-Berg. 
 
 8th Subdivision. 
 Department of Gard. 
 AiTondissements : Uzes. 
 
 Department of Ardeche. 
 
 AiTondissements : I'Argentiere ; Privas, cantons of Viviers, 
 Bom-g-Saint-Andeol and Villeneuve-de-Berg. 
 
 XVI. REGION. 
 Head Quarters. — Montpellier. 
 Comprises the departments of Aude, Aveyron, Herault, 
 Lozere, Tarn and Pyrenees-Orientales. 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 Department of Herault. 
 Arrondissements : Beziers, Samt-Pons. 
 
 2nd Subdivision. 
 Department of Herault. 
 Arrondissements : Montpellier, Lod^ve. 
 
 Department of Aveyron. 
 Arrondissement : Saint-Affrique. 
 
 3rd SUBDmSION. 
 Department of Lozere. 
 
 Department of Aveyron, 
 Arrondissement : Milhau. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 Department of Aveyron. 
 Arrondissements : Rodez, Villefranehe, Espalion. 
 
 5th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Aude. 
 
 Arrondissements : Narbonne ; Carcassonne, minus the 
 cantons of Saissac, Montreal, Alzonne and East and West 
 Carcassonne.
 
 142 
 
 6th Subdivision. 
 Department of Pyrenees-Orientales, 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Tarn. 
 Arrondissement : Castres. 
 
 Department of Aude. 
 
 Arrondissements : Casteliiaiidary ; Carcassonne, cantons of 
 Saissac, Montreal, Alzonne and East and West Carcassonne. 
 
 8th Subdivision. 
 Department of Tarn. 
 Arrondissements : Albi, Gaillac, Lavaur. 
 
 XVII. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters — Toulouse. 
 
 Comprises the departments of Ariege, Haute-Garonne, Gers, 
 Lot, Lot-et-Garonne and Tarn-et- Garonne. 
 
 1st Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Tarn-et-Garonne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Castelsarrasin, Cantons of Saint-Nicolas, 
 Lavit, and Beaumont ; Moissac. 
 
 Department of Lot-et-Garonne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Agen ; Nerac, cantons of Nerac and 
 Francescas. 
 
 Department of Gers. 
 
 Arrondissements : Condom, cantons of Condom and 
 Montreal ; Lectoure, cantons of Lectoure and Miradoux. 
 
 2nd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Lot-et-Garonne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Marmande ; Villeneuve, minus the can- 
 tons of Villereal, Montflanquin, Fumel and Tournon ; Nerac, 
 minus the cantons of Nerac and Francescas. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Lot. 
 
 Arrondissements : Figeac, canton of Carjac ; Gourdon, can- 
 tons of Payrac, Gourdon, Salviac, Saint-Germain and 1^, Bastide ; 
 Cahors. 
 
 Department cf Lot-et-Garonne. 
 
 Arrondissement : Villeneuve, cantons of Villereal, Mont- 
 flanquin, Fumel and Tournon.
 
 143 
 
 Department of Tarn-et-Garonne. 
 
 Arrondisseraent : Montauban, cantons of Molieres and 
 Montpezat. 
 
 4th Subdivisiox. 
 
 Department of Lot. 
 
 Arrondissements : Gourdon, minus the cantons of Payrac. 
 Gronrdon, Salviac, Saint-Germain and la Bastide ; Figeac, minus 
 the canton of Carjac. 
 
 Department of Tarn-et-Garonne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Montauban ; minus the cantons of 
 Moheres and Montpezat; Castelsarrasin, cantons of Castel- 
 sarrasin, Montech, Verdun and Grisolles. 
 
 5 th Subdivision. 
 Department of Haute- Garonne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Toulouse ; Villefranche ; Muret, cantons 
 of Saint-Lis, Muret, and Auterive. 
 
 6th Subdivision. 
 Department of Haute-Garonne. 
 Arrondissement : Muret, canton of Cintegabelle. 
 
 Department of Ariege. 
 Arrondissements : Pamiers, Foix ; Saint Girons, canton 
 of Massat. 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Gers. 
 Arrondissements : ]\Iirande ; Auch ; Condom, minus the 
 cantons of Condom and Montreal ; Lectoure, minus the cantons 
 of Lectoure and Miradoux ; Lombez. 
 
 8th SuBDmsiON. 
 
 Department of Haute-Garonne. 
 
 Arrondissements : Muret ; minus the cantons of Cintegabelle, 
 Saint-Lis, Muret and Auterive ; Saint-Gaudens. 
 
 Department of Ariege. 
 A.rrondissement : Saint-Girons, minus the canton of Massat. 
 
 XVIII. REGION. 
 
 Head-Quarters — Bordeaux. 
 
 Comprises the departments of the Charente-Inferieure, 
 Gironde, Landes, Basses-Pyrenees and Hautes-Pyrenees. 
 
 1st SuBDnasioN. 
 Department of the Charente-Infirieure. 
 Arrondissements : Saintes, Marennes, Jonzae.
 
 144 
 
 2nd Subdivision. 
 Department of the Charente-Inferieure. 
 Arrondissements : La Roclielle, Rocliefort, Saint-Jean- 
 d'Angely. 
 
 3rd Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Gironde, 
 
 Arrondissements: Libourne, Blaye, La Reole. 
 
 4th Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Gironde. 
 
 Arrondissements : Bordeaux, Lesparre, Bazas. 
 
 5iH Subdivision. 
 
 Department of Landes. 
 
 Arrondissements : Mont-de-Marsan ; Saint-Sever ; Dax, 
 cantons of Montfort and Castets. 
 
 6th Subdivision. 
 Department of Basses-Pyrenees. 
 Arrondissements : Bayonne, Mauleon. 
 
 Dep)artm€nt of Landes. 
 
 Arrondissemcnt : Dax, minus the cantons of Monfort and 
 Castets. 
 
 7th Subdivision. 
 Department of Basses-Pyrenees. 
 Arrondissements : Pau, Ortliez, Oloron. 
 
 8th SUBDTViSION. 
 Department of Mautes-Pyrenees. 
 
 The President of the French Bepubhc, 
 
 Pursuant to the Decree of 13th October 1873, provisionally 
 modifjnng the territorial composition of the Military Divisions ; 
 
 Pursuant to the Decree of the 6th August 1874, fixing the 
 Regions and the Subdivisions of Regions ; 
 
 On the report of the Vice-President of the Council, Minister 
 of War, 
 
 Decrees : 
 
 Art. 1. The Military Divisions modified by the Decree of the 
 28th October 1873 having been suppressed by the Decree of 
 the 6th August 1874, the territorial command is entrusted, from 
 the 16th August 1874, to each Army-Corps Commander ■v^^thin 
 the bounds of his Region as defined by the said Decree, with 
 the exception of the provisional modifications contained in 
 Art. 3 hereafter respecting Paris and Lyons.
 
 145 
 
 Art. 2. Provisionally and until the promulj^ation of a law on 
 military justice wliich has been placed on the Table of the 
 Assembly, the Commander of Army-Corps will take the title ol 
 ^' Commander of such an Army-Corps and of such a Military 
 Division," the Divisions taking- the same number as the 
 Army-Corps. 
 
 Art. 3. Provisionally likewise and pending the constitution 
 of the commands of Paris and Lyons, which a law requires from 
 the National Assembly, the department of Rhone will be attached 
 to the command of the 14th Army-Corps and of the 14th Military 
 Division, and the departments of Seine and of Seine-et-Oise will 
 make up a 20th Military Division under the command of the 
 Governor of Paris. 
 
 Art. 4. The Vice-President of the Council, Minister of War, 
 is entrusted with the carrjdng out of the present Decree. 
 
 Done at Versailles, 10th August 1874. 
 
 Marshal de MacMahon, 
 
 Duke of Magenta. 
 
 By the President of the Republic, 
 The Vice-President of the Council 
 Minister of War, 
 
 General E. de Cissey.
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Pbinted fob Heb Majestt's St*ttoneby Office, 
 
 BY H>JIRIS0N AND SONS, 
 
 Pbintebs in Ordinary to Her Majestt. 
 
 [P. 68lA~60C— 3 I 75.]
 
 THE 
 
 NEW LAW 
 
 REGULATING 
 
 MILITARY SERVICE 
 
 IN 
 
 RUSSIA. 
 
 TRANSLATED IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH OF THE QUARTER- 
 MASTER-GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT, HORSE GUARDS. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 Printed under the Superintendence of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
 
 AND SOLD BY 
 
 W. CLOWES & SONS, 13, Charing Cross ; HARRISON & SONS, 59, Pall Mall ; 
 
 W. H. ALLEN & Co.. 13, Waterloo Place ; W. MITCHELL, 39, Charing Cross ; 
 
 LONGMAN & Co., Paternoster Row ; TRUBNER & Co., 67 & 59, Ludgate HiU ; 
 
 STANFORD, Charing Cross ; and H. S. KING & Co., 65, Comhill : 
 
 Also by 
 
 GRIFFIN & Co., The Hard, Poetsea ; A. & C. BLACK, Edixbuegh ; 
 
 ALEX. THOM, Abbey Street; and E. PONSONBY, Grafton Street, Dublin. 
 
 Price Two Shillings and Sixpence.
 
 We, Alexander II., by the Grace of God, Emperor and Autocrat 
 of aU the Russias, King of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, &c., 
 &c., &c. 
 
 To all our faithful subjects be it known : 
 
 In our constant solicitude for ensuring the weKare of our 
 Empire, and endowing it with the best institutions, we could not 
 refrain from directing oiu" attention to the present condition of the 
 obligation to military service. According to the legislation now 
 in force, this obligation weighed exclusively upon the trading and 
 agricultural classes, and a considerable majority of Eussian subjects 
 were exempt from a duty which is equally sacred to all. This 
 regime, which had arisen under a different oixler of things, being 
 found wanting in harmony with the present condition of the 
 Empire, is no longer compatible with the military requirements of 
 the age. Contemporary events have proved that the strength of 
 States does not lie solely in the numerical value of the army, but 
 chiefly in its moral and intellectual qualities, which only attain 
 their highest degree of development when the defence of the 
 country becomes the common work of the nation, when all, with- 
 out distinction of rank or class, are banded together in the fulfil- 
 ment of this sacred obligation. 
 
 Having deemed it indispensable to reform the organisation of 
 the military forces of the Empire on tlie basis of the experience of 
 the age, we ordered our Minister of War. in 1870 to elaborate 
 proposals for an improved system of recruitment for our armies, 
 extending the obligation of military service to all classes of the 
 population. 
 
 The proved eagerness of our faithfiil subjects to sacrifice them- 
 selves for the State, was for us a sure guarantee that our appeal 
 would find a sympathetic echo in aU Russian hearts. Our hopes 
 have not been disappointed. Our trusty nobles and the other 
 classes exempt from conscription have expressed to us, by nume- 
 rous manifestations, their anxious desire to share the burthens of 
 obligatory military service with the rest of the nation. 
 
 We have received theu^ manifestations with feehngs of proud 
 satisfaction and humble gratitude to Providence, by whom our 
 sceptre has been placed over a people, with whom love of country 
 and self-sacrifice form the hereditary appanage of aU classes, re- 
 peating itself from generation to generation. 
 
 With a view to prepare a new regulation for military ser\ice on 
 the general principles indicated in the foregoing, a special com- 
 mission was appointed, composed of members from different 
 branches of the adndnistration, and other persons possessing 
 special knowledge. The regulation elaborated by the Commission, 
 and amended, after a careful examination, by the Council of the 
 Empire, is in complete accord M-ith our views. Adoptmg as a
 
 fundamental principle that the defence of the throne and of the 
 country forms the sacred duty of every Russian subject, this regu- 
 lation calls upon the entire male population to participate in 
 military service, without exemption by purchase or by providing 
 substitutes. The action of this new law will not be extended to 
 the Cossack population, wliere military service is subject to special 
 regulations, nor to certain foreign races in the Trans-Caucasus and 
 other remote countries mentioned in the ukase to the govei^ning 
 Senate, and for whom special regulations will be promulgated. 
 Witli these exceptions, and certain temporary exemptions stated 
 in the aforesaid ukase, the male population of the Empire and ot 
 the kingdom of Poland, on attaining the age of 20 years, will be 
 required to take part in a drawing by lot, \vhich will determine once 
 and for all those young men who must fulfil their obligations to 
 active service, and tliose who are to remain exempt therefrom. 
 
 Although a term of service of 15 years is fixed for those to be 
 incorporated in the land forces, they will be dismissed to their 
 homes at the end of six years, or sooner if possible, with the 
 reservation that they join the colours at the summons of the 
 Government, in case of urgent necessity. 
 
 Special terms of service will be fixed for the navy, and for 
 those troops quartered in certain distant localities. Those young 
 men who have been students in educational establishments, in- 
 cluding even the primary schools, will have the duration of their 
 service in the army in time of peace notably reduced, according to 
 the nature and degree of their instruction, while other important 
 facilities are reserved to them. 
 
 In sanctioning the law upon obligatory military service, 
 elaborated on the basis above mentioned, and in addressing our- 
 selves to our subjects on behalf of the country so dear to our 
 hearts, with a view to bidding them to a zealous accomplishment of 
 the duties imposed on them, we have no intention of deviating 
 from the principles which have invariably guided us during our 
 reign. As we have never hitherto sought, neither do we seek now, 
 the lustre of military glory, and we consider as the best destiny 
 that given us by Providence to lead Eussia to greatness by the path 
 of peaceful progress and the general development of the country. 
 Tlie organisation of a powerful armed force can neither prevent nor 
 retard this development ; on the contrary, it wiU serve as a 
 guarantee for its continual and regular progress, by ensuring the 
 security of the State, and averting any blow aimed at its tranquility. 
 Witli regard to the important privileges accorded to young men of 
 education, we hope that they will be a fresh incentive for spreading 
 in the bosom of our people those true lights, in which we see the 
 foundation and the security of their future happiness. 
 
 Given at St. Petersburg, the 1st January in the Year of Grace 
 One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventy-four, and in the nine- 
 teenth of our reign. 
 
 ALEXANDER.
 
 UKASE (JF H.M. THE EAIPEEOE. 
 
 TO THE GOVERNING SENATE. 
 
 Having saiictioued this day the new regulation for obligatory 
 military service, we command as follows : — 
 
 I. This regulation will be put in force throughout the Empire 
 and the Kingdom of Poland. The following will be exempt from 
 its application : — 
 
 1. The Cossack popalatiuns, whose military service is subject to 
 special regulations. 
 
 2. The undermentioned localities and certain parts of the 
 population whose military obligations will be determined later by 
 special regulations adapted to local requirements, viz. («), the 
 Trans- Caucasus, Turkestan, the maritime and Amour provinces, 
 the Sredne-Kolymsk, Verkhoiansk and Vilinsk districts of the pro- 
 vince of Yakoutsk, the Touroukhansk and Bogoutchansk sections 
 of the government and district of Yenissei, the Togoursk section 
 of tlie government and district of Tomsk, and the Berezov and 
 Sourgout districts of the government of Tobolsk ; (&), the native 
 populations hitherto exempted from recruiting in money or in 
 kind, and domiciled in the north of the Caucasus and the govern- 
 ment of Astrakhan, the provinces of Tourgai and Oural, and in all 
 the governments and provinces of East and AVest Siberia, as well 
 as the Samoiedes established in the Mezene district of the govern- 
 ment of Archangel. 
 
 II. The application of ol)ligatory military service to the Bashkir 
 Teptiars will liberate them from the payment of a tax of 60 copecks 
 per head, which had been fixed by the regulation of 14th May 
 1863. 
 
 III. Exemptions from military service will continue to hold 
 good for the following classes, including the children born at the 
 time of their settlement : — («) life exemptions to the Eousnaks 
 who arrived in Eussia in 1854; to foreign emigrants settled on 
 the landed property of private persons, and who have become 
 naturalised Eussians by virtue of the decision of the Council of 
 the Empire sanctioned by us on the 18th December 1861 ; to the 
 Czechs who have immigrated to the south-w^est provinces, to Avhom 
 the rights and privileges established by tlie aforesaid decision of 
 the Council of the Empire have been applied ; to foreigners settled 
 in the Kingdom of Poland prior to the 1st January 1872, who 
 have become naturalised Eussians ; and, lastly, to those Eussians 
 belono-ino- to provinces in the interior who have established them- 
 selves in the domain lands near the fortress of Novogeorgievsk ; 
 (h) exemption for twenty years, dating from the time of their 
 immigration, to those Memnonites who have settled in new colonies 
 of the Empire in accordance with the regulation of 19th Xovember 
 1851, and tq such as have settled On the landed property of 
 private persons, and become naturalised Eussians by virtue of
 
 6. 
 
 the decision of the Council of the Empire of tlie 18th December 
 1861 ; (c) for twenty years, counting from the 31st March 1860, 
 to the citizens of Vladikavkaz who were enrolled on the 
 registers of that town prior to the promulgation of the present 
 ukase, and to the inhabitants of the former towns of Anapa and 
 Novorossiisk, who are borne on the registers of the port of Temruk ; 
 {d) for six years, dating from the promulgation of the present ukase, 
 to all Memnonites settled in the Empire who do not benefit 
 by the immunity specified in paragraph (h) of the present article. 
 
 IV. In the case of the families of persons who suffered death for 
 their loyalty to the throne and the law during the later troubles in 
 the Kingdom of Poland and the Western provinces, an exemption 
 will be accorded to three members of each family, preference being 
 given to tlie sons and grandsons of the deceased. 
 
 V. Exemptions will be made in favour of those persons who, 
 on the day of promulgation of the present ukase, being in the ser- 
 vice of the Warsaw- Vienna, Warsaw- Bromberg, Warsaw-Terespol 
 Railways and of the factories at Lodz, are in the enjoyment of 
 freedom from recruitment by virtue of Article 15 of the regulations 
 annexed to our manifesto of the 26th June (8th July) 1868, witli 
 regard to recruiting in the Kingdom of Poland, and concerning 
 the classes and persons exempt from this obligation. 
 
 VI. Postponements of entry into the ranks of the army for a 
 period of four years will be granted, for the first five levies subse- 
 quent to the introduction of the regulation for obligatory military 
 service, to those young men whose numbers demand their personal 
 service, and who belong to families engaged in trade, or who 
 possess a factory or an industrial establishment, by virtue of a 
 patent from some guild or otherwise, save and except establish- 
 ments for strong liquors (see the Eegulation on this head, Article 
 .301, Supplement of 1869 and observations), even though the 
 recruits in the latter case should be with a father or grandfatlier, 
 still capable of work, and should have brothers, but not less than 
 16 years of age. These postponements will not be counted as part 
 of the service, either with the colours or in the reserve. 
 
 yil. The formation of recruiting districts, in conformity with 
 Article 67, et mj. of the regulation for obligatory military service, 
 will be completed within three months of the receipt of the present 
 ukase. 
 
 VIII. A delay of six months, dating from the promulgation of 
 the present ukase, wiU be allowed for the young men summoned to 
 the first recruiting in accordance with the new regulation— that is 
 to say, to those attaining the age of 20 years during tlie course 
 of the year 1873 — to lodge the declaration relating to their enrol- 
 ment in the recruiting district, conformably witli Articles 95 and 
 96 of the aforesaid Regulations. 
 
 IX. Besides the individuals incorporated in the militia by 
 vh-tue of Articles 10 and 154 of the regulations, aU persons under 
 40 years of age not in the military service (with the exception of
 
 those mentioned in Articles IV and V of the present ukase), who 
 on the 1st January 1874 liave attained the age of 21 years, shall be 
 called to form part of the jMilitia. The same shall apply to those 
 who being in the military service shall have been discharged before 
 attaining the age of 40 years. 
 
 X. The recruitment announced by our manifesto of 22nd 
 November 1873, for the period between 15th January and 15th 
 February, will be carried out conformably to the regulations men- 
 tioned in this document. A remission will be made of the arrears 
 which might fall upon the recruiting districts in carrying out this 
 levy and of all other arrears on this head. 
 
 XI. The undermentioned regulations will be observed for such 
 recruiting quittances as may remain in circulation after carrying 
 out the levy mentioned in the preceding Article : — 
 
 («) The quittances must be presented by the 1st October 1874, 
 at the latest, to the District, Circle, and Urban Eecruiting Com- 
 missions, who must either exchange them for quittances of a new 
 form, or make an entry acknowledging their presentation. 
 
 (6) Every quittance presented to a District, Circle, or Urban 
 Commission will be inscribed in the name of an individual 
 nominated by its possessor, and cannot be transferred nor sold to 
 a third party. 
 
 (c) In le^des for the military service, these quittances will 
 only be accepted for the person in whose name they are inscribed, 
 or for his brother, half-brother, half-brother on the father's or 
 mother's side, or cousin. 
 
 (d) Eecruiting quittances which are not presented for exchange 
 within the term above specified will cease to be valid. 
 
 (e) The holder of a quittance can present the same to the 
 Treasury, and receive in lieu a sum of 480 roubles. 
 
 (/) The order and term for the redemption of quittances will 
 be fixed by the Minister of Finance as soon as the total number of 
 such quittances in circulation shall be known. 
 
 The Governing Senate w^iU arrange for the execution of the 
 present ukase, 
 
 ALEXANDEE. 
 
 St. Peteesbukg, 
 
 1st January, 1874,
 
 REGULATIONS RESPECTING MILITARY SERVICE 
 IN THE RUSSIAN ARMY.*. 
 
 (CONFIEMED BY THE EmPEROR. JaX. 1 1874.) 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 General Eegulations, 
 
 Art. 1. The entire male population, without distinction of class, 
 is liable to military service. 
 
 2. Exemption by purchase, or by obtaining a substitute, is 
 prohibited. 
 
 3. No citizen of the male sex, who is upwards of 15 years 
 of age can be relieved of his Eussian nationality until he has 
 completely satisfied all obligations to military service, or has 
 become exempted therefrom after taking part in the drawing. 
 
 4. Persons upwards of 15 years of age, who take up their 
 residence in those parts of the Empire where military service is 
 regulated by special provisions, are to be subject to the general 
 regidations in force in those particular districts. 
 
 5. The armed force of the empire consists of the Eegular forces 
 and the Militia. The latter force is called out only when extra- 
 ordinary events in time of war require its services, 
 
 7. The Eegular Land Army consists of: — 
 
 The Active Army, recruited by means of yearly levies taken 
 
 throughout the Empire. 
 The Eeserve, to fiU up the effective strength of the Eegiments, 
 
 &c., composed of men allowed to remain on furlough until 
 
 their term of ser\dce expires. 
 The Cossacks. 
 Eegiments, &c., composed of foreigners. 
 
 8. The Naval Forces consist of the Fleet and Eeserve. 
 
 9. The number of men required to complete the strength of the 
 Army and the Fleet is fixed by the Legislature every year, on the 
 recommendation of the Minister of War, and promulgated to the 
 Senate by an Imperial Ukase. 
 
 *The Regulations are contained in 224 Articles, divided into 14 Chaptei-s.
 
 10 
 
 10. Admission to the service is determined by lot-drawing, 
 in which every male person takes part once during lifetime. Those 
 who are exempted from active service, by reason of having draw'n 
 a particular number, are enrolled in the Militia. 
 
 11. One class only of the population is annually called upon 
 to take part in the drawing, namely, that which comprises all the 
 men who have reached the age of 20 years on the 1st of January 
 of the year in wdiich the recruiting takes place. 
 
 12. It is lawful for those persons who have fulfilled the 
 requisite stipulations respecting education, to relieve themselves 
 from military service, without having recourse to the drawing, 
 by enlisting as Volunteers in accordance with the provisions con- 
 tained in Chap. XII of tliese regulations. 
 
 13. Any person who is deprived of all his civil rights, or only 
 of such rights and prerogatives as belong to Mm individually, or 
 by virtue of his condition, cannot be admitted eitlier to the drawing 
 or to the service. 
 
 14. The annual levy and the drawing for active service wiU 
 take place from November 1st to December 15th, and in the case of 
 Siberia from October 15th to December 31st. Should there be an 
 application from the competent authorities (Art. 76-78), the 
 Ministers for the Interior and for War may, by common consent, 
 authorise a change in the normal term appointed for European 
 Eussia, but with the proviso that, when any change is sanctioned, 
 the levy shall be completed by the 31st December at the latest. 
 
 15. This article contains the regulations for recruiting the Fleet ; 
 the latter will, in the first instance, be carried out in localities 
 specially set apart for the purpose ; the men thus raised, who may 
 not be admitted into the naval forces, will serve in the land army. 
 After them, the following will be taken generally throughout the 
 Empire for duty in the naval forces, namely : — 
 
 (a) Young men who have served on board an ocean-going ship, 
 or a coasting vessel, for one voyage at least, immediately 
 prior to the drawing. 
 
 (h) Those who have served for one voyage at least preceding this 
 same year, as engineers or stokers on board steamboats, or 
 for a year in workshops w^here steamboats are built. 
 
 (e) Ships' carpenters, caulkers, or coppersmiths, unless the dis- 
 tricts set apart for the recruiting of the fleet can provide the 
 requisite nimiber, 
 
 {d) Seamen by trade, that is, those who express a wish to 
 serve on board ship, provided that the number does not 
 exceed that annually determined by the Minister of Marine. 
 
 16. The list of the localities specially set apart for the recruit- 
 ment of the fleet is arranged l)y the Ministers for War, for the 
 Marine, and for the Interior. This list will be published as soon 
 as it has received the Emperor's sanction.
 
 11 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 DUKATION OF SERVICE IN THE ACTIVE AUMY AND IN THE RESERVE. 
 
 17. In the case of recruits wlio have taken part in tlie (lra\dncr, 
 the ordinary term of ser\dce in tlie land forces is fixed at 15 years, 
 of which 6 years wiU be spent on active service, and 9 years in 
 the Reserve. An exception is made to this rule in the case of 
 men who are called upon to serve in Corps belonging to the oMili- 
 tary District of Turkestan, or in those quartered in the provinces 
 of Semipalatinsk, the Transbaikal, Yakoutsk, Amour, and the 
 Maritime provinces, in wliich the ordinary term of service is fixed 
 at 10 years, of Avliich 7 years are Active, and 3 years Reserve. 
 
 18. In the naval forces, the ordinary term is 10 years, namely, 
 7 years' Active service and 3 years in the Reserve. 
 
 19. The period of service for men who have taken part in the 
 drawing will commence from the 1st of January of the year followincr 
 the levy, in the event of their entering the service at the time of 
 the levy, and from the 1st of the month following their entry into 
 the service when it takes place at any other period of the year. 
 
 20. The duration of service, as laid down in Arts. 17 and 18, 
 applies only to times of peace ; in the event of war, the men who 
 constitute the land and sea forces must remain with the colours 
 so long as tlie State requires their services. 
 
 21. The jMiiiisters of War and jMarine are empowered to send 
 to the Reserve such men of the land and sea forces as are not 
 no]i-commissioned officers, even if they have not completed their 
 period of active service, according to Arts. 17 and 18. The naval 
 and military autliorities also reserve to themseh'es the right to 
 grant during the entire period of service temporary furloughs, not 
 exceeding one year, to men belonging to the laud and sea forces 
 who are not non-commissioned officers. 
 
 22. AVith regard to the naval forces, the men wiU not, as a 
 general rule, be transferred to the Reserve until the termination of 
 the annual cruises, but under no circumstances before the month 
 of October. Those who are on board ships of war in foreign waters 
 may, if they have completed their term of active service, and shoidd 
 so desire it, be sent to the Reserve immediately their ship enters a 
 Russian port. Under special circumstances, the officer cojnmauding 
 is empowered to discharge to the Reserve such of his men as desire 
 it, even if he be in a foreign port, in which ease the men must pay 
 their own travelling expenses. Any period of time wliich men be- 
 longing to the sea forces actively employed may pass in tlie service 
 over and above the specified term counts for twice the time they 
 would have to serve in the Reser^-e. Those men who, during peace, 
 are detained compulsorily lieyond the ordinary period fixed upon for 
 acti\e and reserve service, will enjoy the same privileges as are
 
 12 
 
 granted to those who exceed their term of service, and, if they do 
 not take advantage of them, will draw double pay for the whole of 
 the term exceeding the regulated period. 
 
 23. Men belonging to the Eeserve will be called up for active 
 service should it be found absolutely necessary to complete the 
 strength of Regiments and Corps. This will be done by an 
 Imperial ukase to the Senate. During their service in the Reserve, 
 the men can be called up for drill by the Minister of War or the 
 Minister of Marine, but not oftenei' than twice during the whole of 
 their Reserve service, and for not more than six weeks at one time. 
 
 24. Men who are employed by the State, or by any corporate 
 body, and whose names are on a special list which has received the 
 sanction of the authorities, are exempt from being called upon to 
 serve in the Active Army. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Privileges of Persons in the Active Army and in the Reserve. 
 
 25. Men serving in the Active Army and in the Reserve retain 
 all the personal and proprietary rights of their position, subject only 
 to such restrictions as are laid down by law. Persons belonging 
 to such classes as are liable to rates and taxes continue to belong, 
 to the townships in which they are enrolled at the time they join 
 the service, and enjoy the rights which the civil code confers upon 
 them. 
 
 26. The above persons are exempt, whilst serving with the 
 colours, from all taxes payal)le to the treasury, the zemstvos or cor- 
 porations, and from payments in kind. 
 
 27. Men belonging to the Reserve are subject to the general 
 laws and enjoy the rights belonging to their social condition, 
 as also those acquired by them while in the service ; they must, 
 however, obey the special regulations applicable to men belonging 
 to the Reserve. 
 
 28. Men belonging to the Reserve will be permitted to enter 
 the service of the State or of corporate bodies, or choose any other 
 kind of employment, so long as they obey the law. Should they, 
 however, be called back to active service, the promotion in civil 
 life which they may have gained shall not give them the right to 
 any step of rank or position higher than that which they had 
 obtained at the time they were discharged from active service. 
 
 29. Men belonging to the Reserve, who are called upon to 
 leave civil state employment for active service in the ranks, retain
 
 13 
 
 the employment they have had to give up, and are allowed to 
 return to it~wlien they have received their discharge a second 
 time. 
 
 60. Should men belonging to the Reserv^e be guilty of any 
 crimes or misdemeanours, they are liable to be tried by the civil 
 tribunals, except in the following cases when they must be brought 
 before a military tribunal {a), absence from duty when called out 
 for active service or temporary drills ; {h), crimes or misdemeanours 
 committed during the period when they are out for duty ; (c), 
 breach of discipline or want of respect to superiors when the 
 offenders are dressed in uniform. 
 
 31. Men belonging to the Eeserve, for the first year of their 
 service in that class, are exempt from all taxes, dues and payments 
 in kind. 
 
 CHAPTEK IV. 
 
 SOLDIEKS WHO BECOME INCAPACITATED FOR DUTY. 
 
 32 to 36. Men unfitted absolutely for the service, by reason of 
 sickness or other infirmities, are granted their discharge from active 
 service and also from the Eeserve, and receive an authenticated 
 document stating that they have fulfilled all the necessary require- 
 ments. If they happen to be deficient in means, or not in a fit 
 state to work, and have no relatives who can render them 
 assistance, they receive from the Government a monthly allowance 
 of 3 roubles, or are admitted into hospitals or other charitable 
 institutions ; in default of this they are handed over to the care of 
 persons of good character who receive a monthly allowance not 
 exceeding G roubles. The families of men who have been killed 
 or have disappeared during time of war, or of men who have 
 died of their wounds, are maintained according to special regula- 
 tions. The families of Reserve men who are called up for active 
 service with the colours in time of war, are provided for by 
 the zemstvos and urban or rural corporations Avhere they reside.
 
 14 
 
 CHAPTEK V. 
 
 The Militia. 
 
 36 to 41. The Militia consists of all men, not forming part of 
 the standing army, who are capable of bearing arms, and whose 
 ages are between 20 and 40 years inclusive. The Militia includes 
 also those men who have been released from the Eeserv^e, either 
 of the land or sea forces. All persons of more than 40 years of 
 age are permitted to enrol themselves in the IMilitia should they 
 desire to do so. The men belonging to the Militia are divided 
 into two classes, of which the first consists of those who were 
 enrolled in the Militia at the time the last four levies took place 
 and who would form part either of the mobilised IMilitia, or who 
 would fill vacancies in the Regular Army, if required, or in 
 the event of the number of Eeserves being insufficient. The 
 Militia is mobilised by Imperial manifesto. The first ban may 
 also be mobilised, if absolutely necessary for the reinforcement 
 of the standing Army, by an Imperial Ukase to the Senate. The 
 Militia is dismissed at the termination of a war, or previously 
 should its services not be required. The families of men belong- 
 ing to the Militia, who may be called out, will be provided for 
 by the zemstvos and urban or rural corporations, in accordance 
 with special regulations. Families of men of the Militia who 
 may be killed in action or die of wounds received on a cam- 
 paign, are provided for in a manner similar to that laid down for 
 the families of men belonging to the Regular Armv. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Exemptions, postponements and othee immunities from 
 Military Service. 
 
 42 to 44. All men are exempt absolutely from Military Service 
 who are unfit by reason of bodily defects or disease, except such 
 as have injured themselves wilfully, in which case they are com- 
 pelled to serve in the Army. A detailed statement of the natural 
 defects and maladies which debar young men from being admitted to 
 the service, as well as instructions to the recruiting authorities re- 
 garding the examination of men drawn for the service, wiU shortly 
 be published by the Minister of War, the Minister of the Interior, 
 and the Director of the Ministry of Marine, after consultation 
 with the Medical Council. Young men who are insufficiently 
 developed or are attacked with iUness which is not of so aggra- 
 vated a nature as to incapacitate them, or have not quite re- 
 covered from recent sickness, wiU be allowed one year before 
 entering the service. If at the expiration of that period they are 
 not fit to serve, another year will be allowed them, after whicb,
 
 15 
 
 should they still be unfit for the service, they will be finally 
 discharged. 
 
 45 to 51. These Articles contain a statement of such exemp- 
 tions as are allowed for family reasons. Of these there are three 
 classes. 
 • The first class includes :— 
 
 (a) The only son, fit for work, of a father wiio is incapacitated 
 or of a widow. 
 
 (ft) The only brother fit for work, in a family which consists of 
 one or more orphans of both sexes. 
 
 (c) The only grandson fit for work, in the case where the 
 gTandfather or graudmotlier has no son fit for work. 
 
 {d) The only son of a family, even if the father be able-bodied. 
 
 (e) A natural son who is the support of his mother, she having 
 no other sons capable of work ; or when a natural son is 
 the sole support of a sister or an invalid brother. 
 
 The second class consists of the only son, fit for work, of a 
 father also able-bodied, wdiere one or more brothers are unfit for 
 work. 
 
 Lastly, the third class comprises young men who are the 
 next in age to brothers who have been called up for service, or who 
 have died in the service. Children who have been deserted by their 
 parents, and who have been adopted previous to their arriving at the 
 age of 10, and stepsons, are looked upon as sons in the ordinary 
 sense.* All male children, of the same father, in families which are 
 either Mahometan or in which polygamy is permitted, are regarded 
 as consanguineous, and he alone is considered an only son who is 
 the sole male child belonging to the family. 
 
 46. Those only are considered as able-bodied persons who are 
 from 18 to 55 years of age, with the following exceptions: — 
 
 (a) Persons who by reason of some infirmity or sickness are 
 quite unable to work. 
 
 (6) ExHes. 
 
 * When immunity is claimed for family reasons, the adojitiou of a deserted 
 child by members of the trading and agricultural classes before it attains the 
 age of 10 years, is considered to be proved by the production of a certificate 
 stating that the child has been inscribed as belonging to the family in the usual 
 manner. In families where one or more members have embraced the monastic 
 state before 1st January 1874, immunities foi- family reasons are accorded in 
 proportion to the number of males of which they are composed ; but if the 
 number of the family is diminished by one of its members embracing the state 
 after the 1st January 1874, this circumstance gives it no claim to fresh 
 immunity from military service. Young men who have been allowed to 
 postpone taking part in the lot-dra^dng, cannot make use of the right to obtain 
 a transfer from one recruiting district to some other (see Arts. 119 and 121).
 
 16 
 
 (c) Absentees of whom no tidings have been heard for three 
 
 years. 
 
 {d) Men belonging to the land and sea forces not non-com- 
 missioned officers on active service. 
 
 48. Men who have the right of being exempted, by virtue of 
 Art. 45, from being placed in the first or second of the above 
 classes, lose such right if their parents, or grandfather or grand- 
 mother, state that they do not assist in providing for their family. 
 This article does not apply to those young men who have become 
 converts to Christianity. 
 
 49. Should a family suffer the loss of its only member fit 
 for work, the eldest person in the family has the power of selecting 
 one of his relatives wdio may be serving in the army ; the latter 
 then obtains his discharge at once, except in time of war and 
 during the period of the ordinary drills. 
 
 50. If two or more brothers, half-brothers on the father's or 
 mother's side, or lastly adopted sons, of the same family and born 
 in the same year, draw such numbers as to require their personal 
 service, one only will be admitted thereto ; those who have drawn 
 the higher numbers will be inscribed in the Militia. At the 
 same time the brothers or adopted sms are allowed to exchange 
 numbers. 
 
 51. Every member of a family, drawn for active service or already 
 serving, can be enrolled in the Militia and his place in the regular 
 army taken by his brother, brother by the father's side, brother by 
 the mother's side, or cousin, provided the substitute has not him- 
 self been drawn, nor enrolled in the Reserve, and that his age 
 is not less than 20, nor more than 26, years. The substitute must 
 serve for the regulated number of years in the Army and also in 
 the Reserve. 
 
 52. Individuals who personally manage their estates and direct 
 their own commercial or industrial establishments, with the exception 
 of vendors of strong liquors, may have their entry into the service 
 postponed for a period not exceeding two years. 
 
 53 to 61. These Articles relate to the periods for which re- 
 cruits can postpone entering the service on the ground of educa- 
 tion. Students in certain educational establishments (a list of 
 which is annexed to these regulations)* who have reached the 
 age appointed for entering the service, must attend the drawing 
 like the rest ; should they express the wish, they are allowed to 
 postpone taking part in the drawing in order to complete their 
 education : firstly, until they are 22 years of age, in the case of 
 students of second-class establishments and those who belong to 
 the Imperial Fine Arts Academy, the School of Painting, Sculpture, 
 and Architecture at Moscow^ the St. Petersburg and Moscow Con- 
 servatories of the Russian Imperial Society of Music, and the 
 public institutes, seminaries, and schools ; secondly, until they 
 
 * See page 54.
 
 17 
 
 are 24 years old, in the case of students belonging to Orthodox 
 ecclesiastical seminaries, Armenian-Gregorian or Eoman Catholic, 
 as well as those in naval schools of various kinds ; thirdly, up 
 to the age of 25, for students in the School of Painting, Sculp- 
 ture, and Architecture of Moscow, who have gained the silver 
 medal before they were 22 years of age and who are continuing 
 their education in Art at the school, and for students in the singing 
 classes at the St. Petersburg and Moscow Imperial liussian 
 Society of Music, who have passed their examinati(jn before 
 they were 22 years old, and are still attending the aforesaid 
 classes in Art; fourthly, up to the age of 27 for students 
 from educational establishments of the first class, for young men 
 who have finished their University course and are selected with a 
 view to their becoming teachers, and for students of the St. Peters- 
 burg and Moscow Conservatories of the Imperial Society of Music 
 who have obtained their certificate before they were 22 years old 
 and are still pursuing their studies at these institutions ; fifthly, 
 up to 28 years of age, for students at the Orthodox and Roman 
 Catholic ecclesiastical establishments, for young men who have 
 finished their University career and who have been selected with 
 a view to their filling the professorial chair, and also for students 
 at the Imperial Fine Arts Academy who have gained the silver 
 medal before they were 22 years of age, and are still continuing their 
 studies at the Academy. 
 
 54. Students belonging to the [)laces of education named in the 
 preceding Article are permitted to declare, at least two months 
 before the drawing takes place, that they wish to enter the service 
 as enlisted volunteers, in which case they are relieved from the 
 drawing and are allowed the periods above stated before being 
 caUed upon to join. 
 
 55. Those who have successfully finished theii' course of studies 
 in tlie orthodox ecclesiastical seminaries and academies are granted 
 a year's grace to allow of their entering the priesthood — a profession 
 (according to Art. 62) winch exempts them altogether from military 
 service. 
 
 56. Reduction in the period of obligatory service is made under 
 the following circumstances : — 
 
 1. To 6 months in the Army and 14^ years in the Reserve, in 
 
 the case of men who have completed their course of study 
 at the universities and other educational establishments of 
 the first class, or who have passed ecpiivalent examinations. 
 
 2. To 18 months in the Army and 13^ years in the Reserve for 
 
 men who have finished the course of six classes in the 
 gymnasia or real schools, or of the second class in ecclesias- 
 tical seminaries, or the course in educational establishments 
 of the second class, or who have passed examinations 
 of the same scope. 
 
 3. To 3 years in the Army and 12 years in the Reserve in the 
 
 c
 
 18 
 
 case of persons who have finished their course of study in 
 educational establishments of the third class, or passed an 
 examination equivalent to it. 
 4. To 4 years in the Army and 11 years in the Eeserve, in the 
 case of men who have received a certificate that they 
 possess the knowledge demanded in the course of study 
 of the primary schools, in accordance with the Eegnlations 
 of the 14th of July 1864, or in that of educational establish- 
 ments of the fourth class (except men enrolled in the 
 military district of Turkestan, tlie Semipalatinsk, the Trans- 
 baikal, the Yakoutsk, the Amour and Maritime Provinces, 
 or in the fleet, in which cases the length of service is fixed 
 at 6 years' active service and 4 years in the Eeserve). 
 
 57. Young men not of Eussian extraction, who are studying in 
 educational establishments where a knowledge of the Eussian 
 tongue is not, compulsory, must, in addition to the ordinary subjects 
 of education, be able to read Eussian coiTectly, understand, and 
 write it legibly, before they can lay claim to a reduction of service. 
 
 58. With the exception of surgeons, veterinary surgeons 
 and apothecaries, who discharge their liability to service in their 
 special vocations, persons referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, Art. 56 
 cannot be called upon to serve in the non-combatant branches of 
 the service except with their own consent. Those men who are unfit 
 for the combatant ranks, by reason of bodily ailments or l)ail 
 health, are finally relieved from serving. 
 
 59. The foregoing may: — (1) Enter the Army immediately 
 they have completed their studies, or passed the necessary examina- 
 tions, without waiting for the drawing, in which case their term of 
 service is calculated according to the rules laid down in paragraph 2 
 of Art. 19 ; (2) be embodiecl in the branch of the service which 
 they select, provided always that the number in each branch 
 does not exceed the regulated number fixed by the Minister of 
 War. 
 
 60. Young men included under paragraphs 1, 2, 3 of Article 56, 
 who belong to districts from which recruits for the navy are 
 selected, and who are called upon to serve (with the exception 
 of students who have completed their education in naval schools), 
 are not to join the fleet except they express a wish to do so, but 
 are to be sent to the Army. Should their request to join the 
 naval service be granted, they will remain for 3 years on active 
 service, and afterwards for 7 years in the Eeserve. 
 
 61. The period of service in the naval forces is as follows for 
 recruits who have taken part in the drawing : — 
 
 1. Two years of active service and 8 years in the Eeserve for 
 
 men who have succeeded in obtaining, by examination, a 
 captain's certificate for an ocean-going ship, or in the coast- 
 ing-trade, or as navigating officer in an ocean-going ship. 
 
 2. Three years' active service and 7 years' Eeserve for men
 
 19 
 
 who have received, by examination, a certificate as navi- 
 p-atinp- officer in the coastinrr-trarlft. 
 
 gating officer in the coasting-trade 
 
 62 to 65. These Articles have reference to exemptions originat- 
 ing from the social condition, oi- the occupations of recruits. 
 
 62. The following are exempted from serving : — 
 
 1. The clergy of all Christian denominations. 
 
 2. Singers in orthodox churches, who have completed their 
 
 course of study at an ecclesiastical academy, seminary or 
 school. In all cases where men liave given up tlieir 
 profession as singers before the expiration of 6 years from 
 the date of their exemption from serving, in consideration 
 of their being so employed, they are lialjle to serve in the 
 Armv and in the Reserve for the number of years correspond- 
 ing to the education which they have received. Persons 
 who resign their duties in the church after a period of 6 
 years, are at once enrolled in the Eeserve, up to the age 
 of 36 years. 
 
 63. Of the men who have become liable to military service by 
 reason of the number which they have drawn, the following are 
 exempt, in time of peace, from serving actively, and are at once 
 enrolled in the Eeserve, and remain in it for a period of 15 years. 
 
 1. Doctors of medicine, surgeons, licentiates in the veterinary 
 art or in pharmacy, and veterinary surgeons, unless they are 
 liable to obligatory military service by the statutes of the 
 establishments in which they were educated. 
 
 2. Exhibitioners in the Imperial Fine Arts' Academy who are 
 
 sent abroad to complete their education. 
 
 3. Persons who belong to establishments named in Art. 53 and 
 
 to any other puljlic educational establishments not there 
 enumerated, and whose business it is to impart instruction in 
 subjects the study of which is obligatory according to their 
 statutes, also tutors or their assistants in such estalilisii- 
 ments as are under Government authority, or whose statutes 
 are under its sanction. 
 
 During the first six years, however, from the date of their enrol- 
 ment in the Reserve, they must annually present certificates from 
 their superiors, stating that they are still engaged in their duties ; 
 in default of this, they will have to serve actively for such a period 
 as corresponds with the amount of education they have received. 
 Masters of naval schools, if called out for the navy, are enrolled for 
 10 years in the Reserve of the fleet. 
 
 64. In time of peace, the following young men who have been 
 drawn for service in the naval forces, are exempted from active 
 service and are enrolled in the Reserve of the fleet for a period of 
 10 years. 
 
 1. Captains or navigatino- officers in ocean-ooincj ships or in the 
 
 c 2
 
 20 
 
 coasting trade, or engineers, provided that they are employed 
 on board merchant-ships sailing under the Russian flag. 
 2. Pilots or pilots'-apprentices legally qualified. 
 
 In all cases, those persons referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
 the above Article, who during the period of lU years shall have 
 spent more than one year without performing the duties of their 
 calling, are to be called up for a term of active service, against 
 which they will l)e allowed to reckon the time passed in the 
 performance of tlieir special duties. 
 
 65. The period of active service in the fleet as laid down in 
 Art. 18 and para. 4 of Art. 56 is reduced under the following 
 circumstances : — 
 
 1. By 2 years for men who liave served for at least 2 years as 
 sailors on board ship during a long voyage, or as engineers 
 on board a steamer. 
 
 . By 1 year in the case of men who have served for at least 
 2 years as sailors on board vessels making short trips or 
 employed in the coasting trade, or as stokers on board a 
 steamer. 
 
 The term of service in the Reserve of the fleet is increased, in 
 these cases, by 2 years and 1 year respectively. 
 
 66. Men serving as sailors on board vessels belonging to the 
 Russian mercantile marine, and engineers and stokers on board 
 steamers of all descriptions, also belonging to the merchant service, 
 are allowed during peace to postpone their entry upon active 
 service, after they have taken part in drawing, until they have 
 fulfilled the engagements into which they may have entered, 
 unless such postponement will cause them to have completed their 
 twenty-fifth year. The length of time they serve on board 
 merchant ships subsequent to their having taken part in tlie 
 drawing and previous to their entering the service, will be deducted 
 from the length of time during which they will be enrolled in the 
 Reserve of the fleet, two years of such service counting as one 
 year in the Reserve. . 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Reckuiting Circumscriptions. 
 
 67. The Recruiting Sub-divisions may include a portion of a 
 district or an entire district. 
 
 68. Every town which contains 10,000 male inhabitants, as a 
 minimum, may form one distinct Recruiting Sub-division. Should 
 the inhabitants desire it, towns containing a smaller number than 
 the above may also be made distinct Recruiting Sub-divisions, 
 provided that their male population amounts to at least 5,000 
 souls.
 
 21 
 
 71. Rural sul)-di visions, and sul)-di visions containing a mixed 
 population partly resident in villages and partly in towns, must 
 consist of from 8,000 to 20,000 male inhabitants ; sub-divisions 
 strictly urban, of from 5,000 to 40,000 males. Towns whose male 
 population exceeds the latter figure may be split up into a number 
 of sub-divisions. 
 
 72. The rural su])-di visions in Siberia are formed either of separate 
 bailiwicks, or l)y the union of two or, " at most, three bailiwicks. 
 Bailiwicks nearest to towns which contain less than 5,000 males 
 are united to the towns to form Recruiting Sub-divisions. 
 
 73. A certain place is fixed upon in each sub-division, at which 
 those w^ho take part in the drawing are to present themsehes, 
 and at which the recruits are to be received. 
 
 74. As a general rule, the distance of the rendezvous from the 
 most distant villages in a sub-division should not exceed 50 
 versts (about 33 miles). 
 
 75. If a rural sub-division has no place suitable for a rendezvous, 
 the drawing must take place in the town or village which is nearest 
 to the sub-division, provided that it is not further than 50 versts 
 from the most distant part of the subdivision. 
 
 Articles 76 to 79 explain the method to be adopted in forming 
 the districts into sub-divisions, and in selecting the rendezvous for 
 the drawing. The results arrived at are, according to Art. 80, 
 to be communicated by the local authorities to the Ministers of 
 the Interior and War. The lists of the sub-divisions will be pub- 
 lished by the first-named Minister. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Authorities charged with the Recruiting. 
 
 81. In each Government or Province a Recruiting Commission 
 is formed, presided over by the Governor or Head of the Pro- 
 vince. This Commission consists of the Marshal of the Nobility 
 in the Government, the President of the provincial delegates, and 
 one of its members, the Military Chief of the Government or the 
 officer who is performing the duties as such, and, lastly, the Pro- 
 cureur of the District Court of Judicature or his deputy. 
 
 82 and 83. These Articles set forth the exceptions to the above 
 rule which obtain in certain localities (Governments in which 
 provincial institutions and the new judicial codes have not yet 
 been introduced, the Baltic Provinces, Siberia, the Kingdom of 
 Poland, and the Cossack lands). 
 
 84. In each district or sub-district, a Recruiting Commission is 
 formed, under the presidency of the Marshal of the local Xol)ility ; 
 this Commission consists of an officer appointed by the military 
 authorities, the Commissary of Police of the District or the official 
 who performs similar duties, and one of the pro^dncial delegates of 
 the District chosen by that body. "NVlien this Commission sits
 
 22 
 
 in a sub-division containing an urban population, one of the town 
 delegates is added to it. In places where there are no delegates, 
 the Municipal Corporation selects a person to sit on the Com- 
 mission. 
 
 85. This Article contains certain exceptions to the above, 
 rendered necessary by local circumstances. 
 
 86. The District or Sub-district Commission holds its sittings 
 in succession in the various recruiting sub-divisions within its 
 jurisdiction. 
 
 87. At St. Petersburg, Moscow, Odessa, Eiga, Kazan, Kharkof, 
 Kief, Saratof, Vilna, Kischinef, Cronstadt, Nicolaief, and Sevas- 
 topol, separate Urban Commissions are formed for recruiting pur- 
 poses. These Commissions are presided over by the mayor, and 
 consist of an officer selected by the military authorities, an official 
 appointed by the Chief of Police, and two menibers of the Muni- 
 cipal Administration, selected by the latter. The Commission at 
 Warsavr, presided over by the City President, consists of an officer 
 selected by the military authorities, an official appointed by the 
 police authorities, and two residents chosen by the representative 
 of the Emperor. 
 
 88. The aforesaid Urban Commissions sit only in the sub- 
 divisions belonging to their respective cities. 
 
 89. The following duties devolve upon the Commission of a 
 Government or Province : — 
 
 1. To superintend generally the proceedings connected with 
 
 the drawings, and to make the necessary arrangements for 
 receiving the recruits. 
 
 2. To apportion the number of recruits, which the Government 
 
 or Province has to supply, amongst the sub-divisions within 
 its jurisdiction. 
 
 3. To call up for a second examination, in cases referred to in 
 
 the present regulations, such men as are sent back after 
 their first examination. 
 
 4. To inquire into any complaints which are made against the 
 
 District, Sub-district, and Urban Commissions. 
 
 5. To examine the reports from these Commissions and draw up 
 
 a general report on the recruiting in each Government or 
 Province. 
 
 6. To pass judgment upon or to submit, in case of necessity, 
 
 to the decision of superior authority, any errors that may 
 occur in the proceedings of these Commissions. 
 
 •JO. The District, Sub-district, and Urban Commissions have the 
 following duties to perform : — 
 
 1. To draw up special lists of those persons named in Art. 95 
 
 who are to take part in the drawing. 
 
 2. To correct these lists. 
 
 o. To forward to the proper authorities returns of the number 
 of young men who are liable to take part in the drawing.
 
 23 
 
 4. To sumnion to the rendezv'ous the men who are to take 
 
 part in the drawing. 
 
 5. To settle the rightful claims of eacli man. 
 
 6. To decide upon the men that are to be admitted into the ser- 
 
 vice, and upon the order in which they are to ])e taken. 
 
 7. To cause an examination to be made of the recruits drawn 
 
 for the service, for the purpose of assuring themselves as 
 to their eligibility for military duties. 
 
 8. To make arrangements for the reception of recruits. 
 
 9. To forward to the Commission of the Government or Pro- 
 
 vince, at the conclusion of tlieir duties in the sub-divisions, 
 a detailed account of the drawing and of the proceedings 
 connected with the admission of the men to the service. 
 
 91. To each Eecruiting Commission two medical men are ap- 
 pointed (one by the civil, the other by the military authorities) and 
 one officer, belonging either to the Army or Na\y ; the two former 
 for examining, and the latter for receiving, men about to enter the 
 service. Besides these, two medical men are appointed to the 
 Commissions for the purpose of attending to the recruits when 
 required. 
 
 92, 93. These Articles have reference to the mode of conducting 
 recruiting generally, and to matters for wliich stamped paper is not 
 required to be used. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Enrolment in the Recruiting Sub-divisions and Method of 
 Arranging the Drawing Lists. 
 
 This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
 refers to the enrolment of young men in the Recruiting Sub- 
 divisions, and shows the manner in which the lists are to be 
 prepared. 
 
 94. Men who were inscribed at the time of the general census, 
 and men admitted into the corporations subsequently, are accounted 
 for in the Recruiting Sub-divisions to which the villages and baili- 
 wicks in w^hich they reside belong. 
 
 95. Persons exempt from the enrolment at the tenth general 
 census, and men no longer belonging to a class which is liable to 
 taxation since the census took place, are to be enrolled for military 
 service in the Recruiting Sul>division in which the real pro-
 
 24 
 
 perty belonging to themselves or their parents is situated, or in 
 the place where they are domiciled, or where they were last 
 domiciled. 
 
 96. The enrolment for military service is completed after the 
 declaration of each man has been lodged, together with the registei 
 of birth (or equivalent legal document), with the District, Sub- 
 district or Urban Commission, within whose jurisdiction the Eecruit- 
 ing Sub-division selected by the grantee is situate. 
 
 97. With the exception of rural populations liable to taxation, 
 every male inhabitant at the age of 1 6 and at the latest on the 
 31st December of the year in w^hich he has completed his 20th 
 year, is bound to provide himself with a certificate stating in which 
 sub- division his name is enrolled. 
 
 100. This certificate must Ije produced by the bearer in case 
 he marries, or enters the service of the State or a Corporation. 
 
 102-118. The second section contains a detailed account of tha 
 method in which the lists are to be drawn up and of the formalities 
 which are to be observed ; these lists are arranged by the District, 
 Sub-district and Town Commissions, and by the municipal and 
 bailiwick administrations, and contain the names of those men 
 who have completed their 1 9th year during the year preceding 
 that in which the drawing takes place, save and except the enlisted 
 volunteers. 
 
 119-122. The third section relates to the manner in which 
 transfers from one Sub-division to anotlier are to be arranged. 
 Every man liable to military service may present himself at the 
 drawing either in the circumscription in which he is em-olled, or 
 in that in which his own, or his parents' property is situate, or, 
 lastly, in that in which he has resided for three months at least 
 before he makes his selection. This selection cannot be made 
 after the 15th January of the year in wdiich the drawing takes 
 place. 
 
 The fourth section relates to the declarations which it is 
 necesssary to make in order to claim immunity in matters con- 
 nected with recruiting. 
 
 123. Persons ^^■ho are desirous of being allowed a postpone- 
 ment for the purpose of completing their education must send in 
 their declarations to the District, Sub-district or Urban Eecruiting 
 Commission, together with a certificate from the head of the esta- 
 blishment in which they are studying ; they must also state whether 
 it is their intention to take part in the drawing or to become 
 enlisted volunteers. 
 
 124. INIen who require a postponement by reason of their being 
 employed under contracts as sailors, engineers, or stokers on board 
 vessels belouging to the Eussian Mercantile Marine, must send in 
 their applicaxion to the Commissions, together with either the 
 original contract or a copy of it. 
 
 125. These declarations are to be made to the Commissions at 
 least two months before the time fixed for the drawino;.
 
 25 
 
 126. Persons who claim absolute exemption i'rom military- 
 service, or only from service in time of peace, and persons wlio can 
 claim only a reduction of their term of active ser\dce, must forward 
 to these Commissions — in the former case, certiiicates stating the 
 condition or occupation which gives them a right to claim total 
 exemption, or exemption in time of peace ; and, in the latter, the 
 diploma or certihcate of their academic rank or class, or a certificate 
 from the heads of the educational establishments, as to whetlier 
 they have completed the course of scientific study in \\lnch they 
 were engaged, or passed a corresponding examination. 
 
 CHAPTEE X. 
 
 The Drawing and Admission to the Service. 
 
 This chapter contains nine sections, the first of which treats of 
 the preparatory aiTangements (Art. 127 to 130) ; the second relates 
 to the distribution of the annual contingent. 
 
 131. The distribution amongst Governments and Provinces 
 is made annually by the ]\linister of War ; it is then communicated 
 to the Eecruiting Commissions with a view to its being made 
 public. 
 
 132-3. The contingent is subsequently re-apportioned by the 
 Commissions amongst the recruiting sub-divisions, winch receive 
 from them the definite distribution. This latter distribution is 
 then published in the local gazettes. 
 
 1 34. The third section has reference to the dra^^•ing, for whicli 
 aiTangements are made in the various Sul)-diYisions by the Dis- 
 trict, Sub-district, and Urban Eecruiting Commissions. 
 
 135. The following persons are not to be called upon to take 
 part in the drawing : — young men who have been ordained priests 
 of the orthodox or of any Christian religion subsequent to their 
 names being enrolled on the recruiting lists, or are employed to 
 chant the psalms in the orthodox church ; those who have been 
 granted postponements on account of their heing proprietors (Art. 
 52), for the purpose of finishing their education (Art. 53), or 
 from the fact of their being under contract to serve in some ship 
 of the mercantile marine. The exemption is also extended to those 
 entitled to the immunity of the first class, except their calling 
 up for active service is ordered in virtue of Art. 152, by a decision 
 of the Council of the Empire under Imperial sanction. 
 
 136. A dangerous or serious illness, or other equally valid cause 
 legally proved, will be allowed as an excuse for those who do not 
 come forward at the time appointed for the drawing. 
 
 137-9. The fourth section lays down the formalities to be 
 observed in determining, from their appearance, the age of men 
 who have no authentic documents to prove it.
 
 26 
 
 140. The fifth section, consisting only of one Article, relates to 
 the verification, by the Eecruiting Commissions, of the lists of the 
 names of men who are to take part in the dramng. Every person 
 present is allowed the right of taking objection to the enrolments 
 on this list, which is read in public, and if the Commission deems 
 these objections to be well founded, it has power to make the 
 requisite alterations. This being completed, the drawing takes 
 place in accordance with the regulations contained in the sixth 
 section (Arts. 141 to 143). 
 
 144. The seventh section relates to the examination and recep- 
 tion of the men who are to enter the service. The examination 
 takes place in the presence of the Eecruiting Commissions ; the pre- 
 sident has the power to authorise third persons to take part in it. 
 
 145. Men who are provided with certificates from a doctor in 
 the employment of the State, showing that their physique and 
 general state of health are such as to offer no impediments to 
 their entering the service, are not required to present themselves 
 for examination. 
 
 146. This Article lays down the order in which the young men 
 are to be examined. 
 
 147. Persons who have been the subjects of a judicial inquiry, or 
 are under a judicial prosecution, and who have drawn a number 
 which renders them liable to serve, are not eligible for examination 
 until they have been acquitted, or have undergone their sentence, 
 provided that they have not been thereby deprived of all civil rights, 
 or of all rights and privileges which belong to them personally, or 
 by birth. 
 
 148. Should a recruit declare that he is affected by epilepsy, or 
 any other internal malady sufficient to render him unfit for the ser- 
 vice, and any doubt exists as to his truthfulness, he is to be at once 
 sent to hospital, with a view to being placed under observation. 
 The same course is to be adopted with men who are suspected by 
 the doctors of having induced the complaints from which they 
 are suffering. 
 
 150. The deficiency in the number thus created is filled up 
 from those who have drawn numbers next highest to that which 
 designated the others for active service. 
 
 151. Men who enter the service under these circumstances, as 
 supplementary recruits, have the right to their discharge to the 
 Militia, as soon as those men whom they have replaced are brought 
 back into the service. 
 
 152. Men who are passed as fit for the service and who form 
 part of the contingent of a Eecruiting Sub-division, are regarded as 
 being with the colours, and are at once placed on the Eeception 
 lists. 
 
 154. The remainder are enrolled in the Militia, with the ex- 
 ception of such as are considered unfit for the service. 
 
 155. The business of the Commission is brought to a close by 
 the list being read over of those men M'ho are to join the service.
 
 27 
 
 and by the adiniiiistratiou of the oath. The llecruits may then be 
 dismissed to their homes by the Goveriuneut or Provincial Com- 
 missions. Notification is given them as to the time and place 
 at which they have to join. 
 
 156. Men whose religious creed does not allow their takin^ the 
 oath are exempted from its administration. 
 
 157. Memnonites can only be employed in non-comliatant 
 duties in hospitals, in the army or navy workshops or other similar 
 occupations, and are exempted from bearing arms. Tliis rule is not 
 applicable to persons who may join this sect, or who may make the 
 Empire their place of residence after the promulgation of these 
 Eegulations. 
 
 The eighth Section (Arts. 158 and 159) enacts that men of 
 20 years of age, who have not been enrolled in the Recruiting lists 
 and who have not made the necessary declaration previous to the 
 date at which the drawing takes place, sliall forfeit the right of 
 taking part in it, and shall be straightway compelled to join the 
 service, if eligible, unless they can bring forward satisfactory proof 
 that the neglect has arisen from no fault of their own. In tliis case 
 they will be allowed to take part in a supplementary drawing. 
 
 The ninth Section (Arts. 160 to 163) lays down that men who 
 have taken part in the drawing and are not required to serve 
 actively, shall receive certificates stating that they have fulfilled the 
 requirements of military service. Men who are found to be unfit, 
 receive certificates to the effect that they are liberated altogether from 
 serving ; those who are to join the Militia receive certificates 
 showing their enrolment for life and the number wliich they have 
 drawn. Men who are granted postponements, or who are to be re- 
 examined, or who are to be sent to hospital in order that their state 
 of health may be under observation, or who are under judicial 
 inquiry, or prosecution, receive temporary certificates stating the 
 period at which such certificates expire. 
 
 161. On the bearer of an enrolment certificate (Art. 97) pre- 
 senting himself to join the service in any Eecruiting Sub-division, 
 a record of the fact is to be made on the face of such certificate. 
 
 163, Certificates filled up in this manner, and those delivered in 
 accordance with the provisions of Art. 160, must be produced as 
 laid down in Art. 100.
 
 28 
 
 CHAPTEK XI. 
 
 Expenses attending the Dkawing and Admission of Eecruits 
 INTO THE Service. 
 
 164. The following items of expenditure are charged to the 
 Treasury : — Travelling, lodging, and maintenance allowances for 
 officers, doctors, and the military official who is entrusted with 
 the duty of admitting recruits into the ser\dce ; cost of articles 
 required for measuring recruits and for their medical examination ; 
 expenses connected with the office of the District, Sub-district 
 and Urban Commissions, for articles required at the drawing, and for 
 providing printed Eecruiting lists for the bailiwick officials. 
 
 166. Travelling and maintenance allowances for presidents and 
 members of Commissions appointed by the zemstvos (or what 
 corresponds to them) are charged to the general territorial revenues 
 in each Government. 
 
 167. The Recruiting Commissions hold their meetings in public 
 buildings belonging either to the State or to Corporations, and, 
 where there are none, in houses paid for out of the general terri- 
 torial revenues. 
 
 168. In the case of Poland, all these expenses are defrayed by 
 the State. 
 
 169. Men who are called upon to take part in the drawing must 
 appear properly dressed and shod at the rendezvous of their sub- 
 division, and are required to pay their own expenses whilst the 
 drawing is going on. 
 
 170. The men are provided for at the pubKc expense from the 
 date of their arrival at the place where they actually join the colours, 
 or from the day on which they commence active service, if they 
 enter upon such service as soon as the drawing is completed. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Voluntary Enlistment. 
 
 This chapter contains two sections (Arts. 171 to 197). The 
 first section relates to voluntary enlistment in the land forces. Men 
 who are willing to enter the service as enlisted volunteers can do 
 so on tlie folio win u' conditions : —
 
 29 
 
 1. They must be at least 17 years of age ; if they are minoi-s 
 they are required to prove that they have received the 
 consent of their parents, tutors, or guardians. 
 
 2. Their state of health and physique must be such as to fulfil 
 
 all the necessary conditions required of men admitted to the 
 service. 
 
 3. They must be provided with a document showing that they 
 
 have passed the examination after a complete course of 
 study, either at one of the first-class educational establish- 
 ments named in the Appendix to Art. 53 of these Regula- 
 tions, or of six classes at the Gymnasia or Real schools, or of 
 the second-class in an ecclesiastical seminary, or that they 
 have passed an examination according to a special scheme 
 drawn up ijy the Ministers of War and Public Instruction 
 conjointly. 
 
 172. Men who are under j udicial inquiry, or under remand for 
 trial, or men who have received a sentence which involves their 
 being deprived of their right to enter the service, also men who 
 have been legally proved to be guilty of theft or swindling, cannot 
 be enlisted as volunteers. 
 
 173. Enlisted volunteers are divided into three classes, accord- 
 ing to the education which they have received ; their service in the 
 Active Army is as follows : — 
 
 1. For three months, if they have passed their examination at 
 
 a first-class educational establishment. 
 
 2. Six months, if at one of the second-class establishments 
 mentioned in section 3, Art. 171. 
 
 3. Two years, if they have merely passed the examination in 
 accordance with the joint scheme specially drawn up 
 by the Ministers of War and Public Instruction. 
 
 At the expiration of the above periods an enlisted volunteer is 
 permitted, in peace time, if he is not a non-commissioned or com- 
 missioned officer, either to remain on active service, or to be passed 
 into the Pi.eserve, where he will remain for 9 years. In time of 
 war, the regulations contained in Art. 20 apply equally to enlisted 
 volunteers. 
 
 174. Enlisted volunteers are allowed to enter the service at any 
 time ol the year. The period of service commences on the 1st 
 of the month following that in which they join their regiments or 
 corps. 
 
 175. Enlisted volunteers can enter as private soldiers only such 
 combatant branches of the service as are allowed to receive them. 
 They are permitted to choose the arm with which they prefer to 
 serve, pro\dded that the number does not exceed the regulated 
 number of each arm fixed by the ]\Iinister of War. In time of war 
 enlisted volunteers are sent at first to the local regiments. Nurses 
 can enter the service on all occasions as military nurses.
 
 30 
 
 176. Enlisted volunteers who join the guard or cavalry must 
 maintain themselves at their own expense In other regiments or 
 corps they are maintained by the State, unless they express a wish 
 to defray their own expenses. 
 
 177. Enlisted volunteers who defray their own expenses may 
 lodge where they please, except whilst they are assembled in camps 
 of instruction ; the commanding officer has the power, however, of 
 depriving them of this privilege if he thinks fit. 
 
 178. Enlisted volunteers jointheser\dce asprivate soldiers just as 
 if they had taken part in the drawing, and fulfil the same obligations, 
 with certain mitigations which the Minister of War sliall appoint. 
 
 179. In order to distinguish between enlisted volunteers and 
 men who have taken part in the drawing, the former wear a 
 distinguishing badge on their uniform, which, however, carries no 
 privilege with it. 
 
 180. When enlisted volunteers have passed the prescribed ex- 
 aminations they may, with the approbation of their immediate 
 commanding officers, be promoted : — 
 
 1. To be non-commissioned officers after two months' service, 
 
 should they belong to the first-class named in Art. 173 ; 
 after four months if they belong to the second class ; and 
 after one year's service, if to the third class. 
 
 2. To the rank of officer, if they have served as non-commis- 
 
 sioned officer for 3 months, in the case of those belonging to 
 the first class ; for 6 months, in the case of the second class ; 
 and for 3 years, if they belong to the third class. The rank 
 of officer cainiot, however, be granted to any enlisted volun- 
 teer, even though he belong to the first class, unless he has 
 served in camp during at least one period of exercise. 
 
 181. Officers who (Art. 173) belonged to the third class of en- 
 listed volunteers can only enjoy the personal and civil rights 
 appertaining to their station, after a service of at least three 
 years with the colours. 
 
 182. Enlisted volunteers are eligible for four months' furlough. 
 But such period of absence is deducted from their term of active 
 service, as well as from the period required of them before they can 
 become non-commissioned officers or officers. 
 
 183. Students in the special classes of the Corps of Pages, and 
 those belonging to Military Infantry Schools, the Nicolas Cavalry 
 School, the Nicolas Engineer School, the Michael Artillery School 
 and the Military Topographical Schools, are considered as enlisted 
 volunteers. The time spent at , the above-named schools and in 
 the special classes for Pages, is reckoned as active service in the 
 case of men who leave them either as officers or as soldiers. They 
 are required to remain with the colours one year and a half for each 
 year spent at the above-mentioned establishments. The general term 
 of service in their case is reckoned from the 1st of the month suc- 
 ceeding that in which they left these establishments.
 
 31 
 
 184. Students belonging to the establishments detailed in Art. 
 183 who may have left before completing the entire course of one 
 of the classes, are also required to remain one year and a half for 
 each year tliat they spent at the school. In no case, can they be 
 promoted to the rank of officer until they have comjjleted one 
 year's service in tlie ranks. 
 
 185. Stiidents who are educated at the expense of the State in 
 civil educational establishments can also enter the military ser^dce 
 in the capacity of enlisted volunteers, but in no case can tliey 
 discharge the obligatory civil duties to which they are l)ound until 
 after the expiration of the period during -which they are M'itli the 
 colours, as laid down by these Eegulations. 
 
 186. The second Section relates to enlisted volunteers for the 
 naval service.* Persons desirous of entering this service as enlisted 
 volunteers have, in addition to the terms imposed by Arts. 171 
 and 172, to pass an examination in subjects bearing upon the brancli 
 of the service which they are about to enter. 
 
 187. Enlisted volunteers remain 2 years in Active Ser^^:ce and 
 5 years in the Reserve. 
 
 188. They can enter the service at any period of the year ; their 
 term of service is regulated in the manner laid down in Art. 174. 
 
 189. Enlisted volunteers are enrolled as non-commissioned 
 officers of the noble degree (Junker) both in the fleet and also in 
 special Itranches of the service, at their option, provided that the 
 number of them does not exceed that laid down, for each arm 
 of the service, by the Minister of Marine. 
 
 190. If they wish to become naval cadets or conductors, they 
 must pass a qualifying examination, and must have hnd a six 
 months' cruise at least. When they get their first step of pro- 
 motion as ofticers, their seniority dates from the day on which 
 they fulfilled the required conditions of the service ; the time 
 spent as naval cadets and conductors being reckoned from the ex- 
 piration of their obligatory service, according to Art. 173. If the 
 final examination for promotion to the rank of officer has not been 
 passed at the proper time through the negligence of tlie enlisted 
 volunteer, he does not acquire seniority of rank until tlie date of 
 passing the examination. 
 
 191. Enlisted volunteers who desire to be appointed as naval 
 cadets or conductors on entering the Reserve, must pass the 
 examination prescribed for this purpose. 
 
 192. Enlisted naval volunteers who do not pass the specified 
 examination (Art. 190) before the expiration of 2 years, are enrolled 
 in the Reserve of the Army as non-connuissioned officers, for the 
 period laid down in Art. 173, their time of service in the fleet being 
 allowed them. If they prefer it, they are allowed to remain and 
 serve as non-commissioned officers in the fleet, provided they are con- 
 sidered eligible by their commanding officers. Should they not be 
 suitable they can remain in the service as non-commissioned officers 
 
 * See also p. 47.
 
 32 
 
 ill the Army, according to the rules laid down for enlisted military 
 volunteers. 
 
 193. Enlisted naval volunteers are allowed private quarters. 
 Whilst on a cruise they draw the regulation rations and are 
 provided with a kit at the public expense, until they become naval 
 cadets or conductors. 
 
 194. Besides the foregoing Articles (Art. 186 et seq.), Art. 20, 
 181 and 182 apply equally to enlisted naval volunteers. 
 
 195. Students at the naval school, the N"aval Engineer School, 
 at classes for non-commissioned officers (nobles) at Nicolaiev, also at 
 schools for ship-boys, are regarded as enlisted naval volunteers. 
 
 196. After their appointment as naval cadets or conductors, 
 students named in the preceding Article, and enlisted volunteers 
 who have attended the classes at the before-mentioned schools 
 or those of the non-commissioned officers (nobles) at Nicolaiev, 
 and, generally, all persons who have received a naval education 
 at the cost of the State, must serve for one year and a half 
 actively for each year spent in these establishments. Ship-boys 
 remain 10 years on active service, at the expiration of which 
 they are at once transferred to the Militia. The period of service 
 commences from the age of 17, in the case of boys who have left 
 the schools before they reached that age, and for ship-boys who 
 have left after they were 17 years old, from the date of leaving. 
 
 CHAPTEE XIII. 
 
 Appeals and Complaints with Eeference to Military Service. 
 
 This chapter (Arts. 197 to 211) lays down the course of pro- 
 ceedure to be observed in deciding upon any questions which 
 may arise. 
 
 CHAPTEE XIV. 
 
 Penalties for Offences against the Laws relating to Mili- 
 tary Service. 
 
 212. Persons liable to have their names enrolled in the Eecruit- 
 ing lists (Arts. 95 to 97) who do not comply with the regulations 
 on this head before the end of the year in which they attain the 
 age of 20 years, are fined a sum not exceeding 100 roubles. 
 
 213. Persons who, by their own neglect, have not been em'olled 
 in the Eecruiting list, and who, on this account, would be liable
 
 33 
 
 to serve with the colours without the right of taking part in the 
 drawing, but who are found unfit for military duty, will incur 
 a detention of 2 to 4 months in a civil prison, or imprisonment for 
 a period not exceeding 3 months. 
 
 214. In addition to their being called up for active service, 
 an imprisonment not exceeding a term of 3 months will ]je inflicted 
 on persons who, after drawing numbers which necessitate their 
 entering the Active Army, do not appear for examination at the 
 appointed time, unless they can give some valid reason for such 
 neglect. 
 
 215. The military authorities will award such punishment as 
 they may think proper to those who falsely assert that they 
 are suffering from internal diseases of a nature to render them unfit 
 for the service. 
 
 216. Persons who join the Army, or who have drawn numbers 
 which require them to join, and who do not appear at the appointed 
 time, will incur the punishment laid down in Art. 146 of the 
 military penal code. 
 
 21 7. Every person who shall be guilty of fraud for the purpose 
 of escaping from military service, or of profiting by immunities to 
 which he can claim no right, will be compelled to serve in the 
 Active Army, and ^vill undergo solitary confinement of from 4^ 
 months to 6 months in a military prison. 
 
 218. The same punishment (namely, emljodiment in the Active 
 Army and solitary confinement) will be inflicted on persons who, 
 either by themselves or by the aid of third parties, become muti- 
 lated with a view to escaping active service. 
 
 219. The term of service for persons who do not appear at the 
 time appointed (Art. 216) and who will therefore have to be 
 embodied after their comrades, v;ill date from the 1st July, in the 
 case of men admitted during the first half of the year, and from the 
 1st January following, in the case of men admitted during the 
 second half of the year. 
 
 220. If the persons referred to in Arts. 216 and 217 are 
 embodied in the Active Army, or not discovered until they have 
 completed their 35th year, they will be confined in a civil prison 
 for a period of from 4 to 8 months in the case of those alluded to 
 in Art. 216, and from 8 months to 1 year and 4 months for those 
 referred to in Art. 217. 
 
 221. Every person who, by his own request or with his con- 
 sent, shall be guilty of having mutilated another M'ith the object 
 of rendering him unfit for military service, or have assisted at 
 such mutilation, shall be imprisoned for a period of from 8 
 months to 1 year and 4 months in a civil jail ; persons who per- 
 formed the mutilation with the same object, but without tlie 
 consent of the mutilated person, shall suffer the punishment 
 awarded by the penal code to mutilation, wounding, or other bodily 
 injury wilfully inflicted. 
 
 222. The prosecution against any person for having mutilated 
 
 D
 
 34 
 
 a third party is instituted without reference to the complaint of 
 the person mutilated, or whose health has been injured. 
 
 223. Persons who instigate others to disobey these regulations, 
 or who are aiders and abettors of them, are liable to the punish- 
 ments prescribed by law for complicity, and are liable to all the 
 penalties enumerated above wliich are not accompanied by military 
 service. 
 
 224. Delinquents cannot enjoy any benefits arising from the 
 prescription laid down in the common law,
 
 35 
 
 I1EGULATI0^S RESPECTING THE MILITAEY SERVICE 
 OF THE COSSACKS OF THE URAL 
 
 (Confirmed by the Emperor, March 9, 1874.) 
 
 The Eegulations, which consist of 68 Articles, are divided 
 into 9 chapters. The First Chapter (Aits. 1 — 3) contains the 
 general arrangements. 
 
 According to Art. 1, the sons of all persons belonging to the corps 
 of Cossacks of the' Ural, who have reached the age of 19, are 
 enrolled amongst the Cossacks and take the oath of fidelity. 
 To this, however, there are certain exceptions, to be regulated by- 
 special enactment. 
 
 2. For the first two years of their enrolment in the lists, 
 these young men constitute a class intended for duty in the in- 
 terior ; they then pass for 15 years into the class destined for service 
 in the field, after which they again return to duty in the interior 
 for another period of 5 years. At the expiration of this latter term, 
 they receive their discharge. 
 
 3. All Cossacks belonging to the class for service in the field 
 are to serve at least one year with the troops on active ser\dce, 
 or in the Instructional sotnia. 
 
 The Second Chapter (Aits. 4 — 8) treats of the effective strength 
 of the active force. 
 
 4. The Cossacks of the Ural are to be formed into 9 cavalry 
 regiments of 6 sotnias each; of these 3 regiments are for duty 
 in time of peace. They will moreover maintain for active duty 
 the squadron of Cossacks of the Ural of the Guard, and the 
 Instructional sotnia at Ouralsk. 
 
 5. Cavalry regiments, which receive permission to return to 
 their homes, will be called out for active duty in case of war, 
 or by special orders from the Emperor ; in case of urgent necessity 
 these regiments may also be called up by order of the oflSicer 
 commanding the troops in the Orenburg military district, who 
 must, however, report the circumstance at once to the Emperor. 
 
 6. Should it be found that the number of Cossacks belonging 
 to the class for field service is insufficient, or should there be a 
 marked falling off in their effective in time of war, men belonging 
 to the class for home service may also be called out. If the 
 
 d2
 
 36 
 
 interest of the State demands still greater efforts, the entire Cossack 
 population capable of resisting the enemy, whether on service or 
 not, may be called to arms. 
 
 7. The effective strength of the active force depends upon the 
 number of men available for that duty. 
 
 8. Active service is subject to the Eegulations in force for 
 Cossack regiments, and matters connected with the economical 
 administration are defined in Special Eegulations. 
 
 9. 10. The Third Chapter (Arts. 9 to 21) has reference to the 
 enrolment and admission of Cossacks into the service. The 
 enrolment in the special registers (which takes place in each stanitsa) 
 will comprise all male children, officers of all ranks, non-commis- 
 sioned officers, Cossacks, officials, whether in the service or retired, 
 and generally all persons belonging to the Cossacks of the Ural. 
 
 11. All male children on completion of their 17th year (with 
 the exception of such as belong to the higher and secondary educa- 
 tional establishments and Progymnasia) are to be enrolled for two 
 years, and perform the duties imposed upon Cossacks accord- 
 ing to special regulations sanctioned by the officer commanding 
 the troops in the Orenburg military district. 
 
 12. When the above have reached the age of 19, they are 
 then inscribed on the Cossack muster-rolls ; as soon as they have 
 taken the oath of fidelity they are placed upon the lists for 
 home service. At the end of two years they pass into the class 
 for service in the field. 
 
 13. These various enrolments are conducted annually in each 
 stanitsa between the 15th of August and the 15th of September. 
 
 All the details connected with the enrolment are laid down 
 in Arts. 14 to 20. Those persons who have declared themselves 
 to be unfit for the service are examined before the Commission of 
 the stanitsa, which decides as to their eligibility or otherwise. 
 
 21. The Ataman locum tenens publishes an order of the day con- 
 taining the enrolments that have been made ; he also brings on the 
 roster those for home service, and grants discharges to such as have 
 completed their term of service, or to those who have been pro- 
 nounced unfit for it. The term of service in each class commences 
 from the 1st January of the year following that of their enrolment. 
 
 The Fourth Chapter has reference to the calling up of the active 
 troops for duty. 
 
 22. These troops when called up in time of peace in the ordinary 
 manner, remain on duty until further orders. When assembled by 
 an extraordinary decree, or as a temporary measure, they are 
 dismissed at the termination of the period for which they have been 
 summoned. 
 
 23. The non-commissioned officers and soldiers who are serving 
 in the permanent active force are sent to tlieir homes, at the expira- 
 tion of the period of service laid down in the Eegulations. 
 
 24. Vacancies in the establishment are filled up by volunteering, 
 or, in default of this, by lot-drawing.
 
 37 
 
 25. Such Cossacks us are not promoted, receive an allowance 
 for outfit on joining the active force. 
 
 26. The method to be adopted for calling up volunteers, for 
 conducting the drawings when necessary, and for the distriljution 
 of the allowance for outfit, are laid down in special regulations 
 which are to be submitted every year to the officer commanding 
 the forces in the Orenburg military district for his approval. 
 
 27. Exemption from active service is granted to — 
 
 1. Persons who have sifffered from fire, inundation, murrain, 
 
 continued sickness, and other similar misfortunes. 
 
 2. Persons who are prevented from working at the principal 
 
 occupations of Cossacks, such as fishing, &c. 
 
 Those who become sufferers from the misfortunes detailed above, 
 while on active service, are to be sent back to their homes. 
 
 28. The above exemptions and the length of leave granted to 
 Cossacks in the service are decided upon (in the case of Cossacks 
 who have not been promoted) by the Ataman locus tenens, and 
 in the case of officers of all ranks, and of the stanitsas as a whole, 
 by the officer commanding the forces in the Orenburg military 
 district. 
 
 Articles 29 to 31 contain detailed rules to be observed in 
 calling out the men for active duty, in their instruction &c., at the 
 rendezvous at Ouralsk, Gourief, and lletsk. 
 
 32. When the men are to be sent to their homes, those 
 belonging to the active forces return, in the first place, to their 
 respective rendezvous, where they are ins^Dected and asked in the 
 presence of their officers if they have received everything to 
 which they are legally entitled, and if they have any complaints 
 to make. 
 
 33. The 6 Eegiments which remain at the disposal of the 
 authorities for calling up during time of war, and at that time only, 
 are divided into two turns of duty, three regiments being for duty 
 at one time. 
 
 34. The Fifth chapter (Arts. 34 — 42) has reference to the 
 Instructional sotnia, which is placed under the immediate ordei"S of 
 the Chief of the Staff of the Cossacks at Ouralsk. The object of 
 this sotnia is to serve as a school of instruction for the active force 
 in riding, target practice, sword and lance drill, as also for the 
 training of instructors. 
 
 35. 36. The sotnia consists of a cadre appointed for three 
 years, and of men M'ho are relieved annually. 
 
 37, 38. A school for Cossacks who have not been promoted, 
 and who are intended to be instructors, is attached to the sotnia , 
 Cossacks temporarily on the strength can also be admitted to this 
 school. The instruction is imparted by the officers of the sotnia.
 
 38 
 
 Article 39 contains a statement of the nature and amount of 
 ammunition, &c., which each sotnia receives annually for ball 
 practice. 
 
 40. The nature of the exercises to be gone through by the sotnia, 
 and by the school, together with the order in which they are to 
 take place, is laid down in special detailed schemes and 
 regulations on the subject. These schemes and regulations are 
 somewhat similar to those in force for the Kegular Army, and are 
 issued with the approval of the officer commanding troops in the 
 Orenburg military district. 
 
 41. The sotnia is inspected, and the men under instruction 
 are examined once a year, previous to the anival of the new 
 effective. 
 
 Article 42 contains the regulations respecting distinctions 
 and rewards to which the Cossacks of the sotnia can lay claim on 
 quitting it. 
 
 The Sixth chapter (Arts. 43 — 54) refers to Cossacks who have 
 been permitted to remain at their homes. 
 
 43. Cossacks belonging to the class for field service, who are 
 allowed to remain at their homes, are obliged to be provided with 
 horses and the necessary armament and equipment for active 
 service. 
 
 44. These Cossacks are to assemble once a year at their stanitsas. 
 After their horses, arms, and equipment have been inspected, those 
 of them who returned from service the preceding year, and such as 
 have completed their seven years and upwards in the field service 
 class, are sent home. The remainder are instructed in drill or in 
 target-practice for a period of three weeks. If their number is not 
 suiSicient to form a complete sotnia, they join the Cossacks of the 
 stanitsa nearest to them. 
 
 45. The Ataman locum tenens fixes the time for these summer 
 drills to commence, and is guided in his decision by the period 
 when the Cossacks are most free from their agricultural labours. 
 
 46. An of&cer, of the rank of a sotnik at least, is told off 
 in each sotnia, with a trumpeter as assistant, for the purpose of 
 sounding the signals whilst firing is going on, and of instructing 
 such men as are desirous of receiving instruction in the trumpet. 
 
 47-48. Besides the summer concentrations, instructors are 
 appointed in each stanitsa, whose duty it is to instruct the 
 Cossacks in ball-practice, in the management of their arms, and in 
 equitation. 
 
 49. The number of instructors in each stanitsa, limited to 
 four, is determined by the Ataman locum tenens. These instructors 
 receive an allowance, and, in addition to this, the period during 
 which they are so eaiployed is reckoned as active service. 
 
 50. Both the instructors and those under instruction are required 
 to take part in tlie summer drills. 
 
 51 . This article gives a detailed statement of the nature and
 
 3^ 
 
 amount of ammunition wliicli is to be issued to the Cossacks during 
 the summer drills. 
 
 52. The system of instruction to be adopted at these drills and in 
 each stanitsa is arranged by the officer in command of the troops 
 in each military district. 
 
 53. At the termination of the summer drills the Ataman locum 
 tenens (or officer of rank appointed by him) makes an inspection of 
 the men, and puts them through their target and riding drill. 
 Prizes, consisting of things suitable to their station, are awarded to 
 such of them as have most distinguished themselves ; for this object 
 500 roubles are annually set apart from tlie Cossack Treasury. 
 
 54. Another sum of 500 roubles is placed at the disposal of the 
 Ataman locum tenens, from the same source, for rewarding the most 
 pains-taking of the instructors. 
 
 The seventh chapter (Arts. 55 — 59) treats of the duties of 
 Cossacks for home service. 
 
 55. In the class for home duty are enrolled all the young 
 Cossacks for the first two years of their service, besides such as 
 have completed their term of 15 years' field service ; the latter 
 remain in this class for 5 years. Men who from physical 
 defects are unfit for field duty are also included in this class, in 
 which they remain until they receive their discharge on completion 
 of their term of service. 
 
 56. For the first year after enrolment the men are exempt from 
 all extra duty, and are not allowed to volunteer for active service. 
 The first year should be devoted to arming and equipping the recraits. 
 
 57. After they have been borne for a year on the list for home 
 service, they take part in the summer concentrations, and are 
 enrolled in their stanitsas like men who belong to the field service 
 class (Art. 47). 
 
 58. Cossacks who have not been promoted and who have com- 
 pleted their term of field service if they so desire it, remain in the 
 field service class ; in this case they enjoy the privileges granted 
 in accordance with the military regulations of 1859. Each year of 
 such additional service is reckoned as equivalent to two years of 
 home service. 
 
 59. In time of war, or in the event of the Cossacks being em- 
 bodied as an extraordinary measure, those men who are for home 
 service are placed on a war footing like those who belong to the 
 field service class. In time of peace their duties are defined by 
 special instructions which are submitted annually to the officer 
 commanding the troops in the military district for his approval. 
 
 The eighth chapter (Arts. 60 — 62) relates to Cossacks wlio have 
 been discharged from the service. 
 
 60. All Cossacks who have not been promoted and who have 
 completed 15 years of field service and 7 years of home serAace, 
 and men who are unfit for both by reason of pliysical infirmities, 
 are granted their discharge. 
 
 61. Men who can claim their discharge on account of length
 
 40 
 
 of service may continue to serve in either category should they 
 desire to do so, and enjoy the privileges detailed in the Regulations 
 of 1859. 
 
 62. For the first ten years after their discharge, the men are 
 liable to the contributions of their corps, the nature of which is 
 regulated by a schedule submitted annually to tlie approval of the 
 officer in command of the troops in the Orenburg military district. 
 After the expiration of 10 years, the men can only be employed in 
 the service on the recommendation of the corporations. 
 
 The ninth chapter (Arts. 63 — 68) relates to certain details 
 connected with the administrative affairs of the sub- divisions. 
 
 63. For administrative purposes the corps of Cossacks of the 
 Ural is told off into 3 sub-divisions. 
 
 64. The first of these sub-divisions comprise the Uralsk district 
 and the Uestsk stanitsas : the second embraces the Gourief district ; 
 the third the Kalmuk district. 
 
 The administrative staff of each sub-division is regidated by a 
 table attached to Art. 65. 
 
 Article 66 contains an account of the duties of each of these 
 sub-divisions, namely, to look to the safety of the territorial frontier 
 line, to assist the civil power in maintaining order and public 
 safety, and to observe the details connected with the enrolment 
 of the men and their instruction. 
 
 67. The administrative staffs are under the orders of the Pro- 
 vincial Staff, and, so far as their authority extends, carry out their 
 duties through the heads of the stanitsas and of the officers com- 
 manding the advanced posts. 
 
 Article 68 gives an account of the duties of the Atamans of 
 sub-divisions and their assistants, 
 
 The establishment of a mounted regiment of Cossacks is to con- 
 sist of 42 officers and 873 non-commissioned officers and men 
 (besides 48 non-combatants), and 951 horses (of which 905 are troop 
 horses and 3 draught).
 
 41 
 
 REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE ADMISSION OF 
 ENLISTED VOLUNTEERS. 
 
 (Sanctioned by the Emperor, March 19th, 1874.) 
 
 Art. 1. Those persons who satisfy the requirements contained 
 in Chap. XII of the Regulations of the 1st January, 1874, respect- 
 ing Military Service, are admitted as Enlisted Volunteers for active 
 service in those arms to which the regidations in force allow 
 Volunteers to be admitted ; until the aforesaid regulations are 
 revised, the number of admissions allowed is provisionally in- 
 creased by four per company, battery and squadron. 
 
 2. Enlisted Volunteers are allowed to select the arm of the ser- 
 vice which they wish to join ; those, liowever, who belong to the 
 Third Class (para. 3, Art. 173) can only be admitted into corps in 
 which there are vacancies, whilst Volunteers belonging to the two 
 first classes are allowed to enter as supernumeraries in accordance 
 with special instructions from the Minister of War. 
 
 Hence, when all vacancies for Enlisted Volunteers, as laid down 
 in Article 1, are filled up in corps imder theii' command, the 
 officers commanding Divisions, or general ofiicers exercising similar 
 authority, will apply to tlie General Staff for permission to receive, 
 as supernumeraries, such enlisted Volunteers of the two first classes 
 as may present themselves. 
 
 Note. — Enlisted Volunteers of the two first classes are only 
 admitted into the Guard, Artillery, and Engineers, and with the 
 express stipulation that they obtain the consent of the officer 
 commanding the corps which they are desirous of joining. 
 
 3. Men who are desirous of entering the service as Enlisted 
 Volunteers must present their petition, on paper bearing a stamp of 
 70 copecks, to the ofiicers in command of regiments or other corps. 
 These petitions, together with documents in support of them, are then 
 forwarded to the ofiicers in command of Divisions, local troops, 
 light infantry or sapper brigades, or commandants of artillery 
 brigades, with a view to the necessary permission being granted. 
 
 Note. — In time of war, these petitions must be presented to 
 the military heads of governments. 
 
 4. Petitions should be accompanied by the following docu- 
 ments : — 
 
 a. A certificate of enrohnent in the recruiting sul)-division, in 
 accordance with Articles 95 and 97 of the Eegulations 
 respecting JMilitary Service, and, in the case of young men 
 belonging to the class of villagers liable for taxes, a certificate 
 from the head of the bailiwick showing that they have been 
 enrolled in such and such bailiwick, and in such and such a 
 recruiting sub-division, and stating their ages. 
 
 d3
 
 42 
 
 h. In the case of persons under twenty-one years of age, the 
 written consent of their parents, or, should the latter be 
 dead, of their guardians. 
 
 c. A certificate from a medical officer in State employment, 
 showing that they do not suffer from any bodily defects or 
 ailments such as to render them unfit for military service, 
 according to the instructions laid down for liecruiting Com- 
 missions regarding the admission of Enlisted Volunteers. 
 
 (1. A written declaration by the Enlisted Volunteer that there is 
 nothing against his character which is sufficient to debar him 
 from entering the service (Article 172 of the Eegulations 
 respecting Military Service). 
 
 e. An engagement on the part of the parents or guardians that 
 
 they will provide for the expenses of such Enlisted Volun- 
 teers as enter the guard and cavalry, as also of those entering 
 other branches of the service who are willing to defray their 
 own expenses. 
 
 f. The academical diplomas of Enlisted Volunteers, and certifi- 
 
 cates showing that they have completed the course of study 
 in one of the educational establishments of the two first 
 categories (see Appendix to Article 5.3 of the Eegulations 
 respecting Military Service), or have passed an equivalent 
 examination ; or certificates of examination according to the 
 course of the gymnasia of six classes, of the professional 
 schools, or of the ecclesiastical seminaries of the second 
 class, or lastly, certificates to show that they possess the 
 amount of knowledge required by the special programme 
 fixed upon for the admission of Enlisted Volunteers of the 
 third category. 
 
 g. Authenticated copies, upon unstamped paper, of the confir- 
 
 matory documents referred to in paragraphs a and /. 
 
 ^vj-QTE. — All documents and copies must be in Eussian ; those 
 referred to in paragraphs b, c, d, and / of Article 4 must be on paper 
 bearino- a 40 copeck stamp. In addition to the documents named 
 in this Article, men who are anxious to join the cavalry of the line 
 as Enlisted Volunteers must forward, with their petitions, sufficient 
 money to purchase an Officer's outfit, namely, 200 roubles for men 
 entering Dragoon regiments, 250 roubles for Lancers, and 350 
 roubles for Hussars. 
 
 5. After- the petitions and accompanying documents have been 
 examined, and the petitioners are deemed to have fulfilled the 
 requirements contained in the Eegulations, the officers commanding 
 Divisions and local troops, and the commanders of brigades 
 make known in an order of the day that the petitioners have been 
 admitted into the service as soldiers, classifying them according to 
 their educational certificates. These officers then forward the peti- 
 tions and documents to the corps in which each man is to be enrolled. 
 Should there be no vacancies, the officers will act in confoiniity 
 with Article 2 of these Eegulations.
 
 43 
 
 6. As soon as the aljove order of the day has been published, 
 and the Enlisted Volunteers have joined their respective corps, the 
 officers in command of the latter take them on the establishment 
 by an oider of the day. The Volunteers then take the same oath 
 as that required of men who have participated in the drawing. 
 
 7. When the Enlisted Volunteers have been finally received 
 into the service, and have taken the oath, the officers in command of 
 their regiments or, corps report the circumstance without delay to 
 the recruiting commissions of the town, district, or Government, 
 accordino- to the recruiting subdivisions to wdiich the Enlisted 
 Volunteers belong. Subsequently the certificates of enrolment m 
 the recruiting subdivisions or the attestations of the heads of the 
 bailiwicks alluded to in paragraph a, Article 4, and the educational 
 certificates, are returned to the Enlisted Volunteers ; the latter give 
 autograph receipts for the same, which, together with the other 
 documents mentioned in Article 4, and the copy of the oath, are 
 preserved in the archives of the staff of the regiment or corps. 
 
 8. Enlisted Volunteers maintained at the expense of the State re- 
 ceive the same pay and allowances as are granted to private soldiers 
 generally. Those who have entered into an engagement to defray 
 their own expenses, until they are promoted to the rank of officer, 
 merely receive from the State their arms, such things as are required 
 for their drill, and their equipments ; in the cavahy and horse 
 artillery Enlisted Volunteers who are admitted to fill existing 
 vacancies are not required to find their own horses ; super- 
 numeraries, on the other hand, have to provide themselves with 
 horses, and receive no allowance for forage. 
 
 XoTE. — Each cavalry regiment must provide 16 horses for 
 Enlisted Volunteers ; these horses are foraged at the expense of the 
 State. 
 
 9. Enlisted Volunteers must perform the same duties as private 
 soldiers of the same service as themselves, receive the same 
 instruction, but are exempt from agricultural labour and employ- 
 ment in private industries. 
 
 10. Officers in command of regiments or corps are held per- 
 sonally responsible that proper surveillance is exercised over 
 Enlisted Volunteers as regards their instruction (both in the prac- 
 tice and science of their profession), their conduct, their mode of 
 living, and general arrangement. For this purpose Enlisted Volun- 
 teers will be told off to companies, squadrons, or detachments which 
 are stationed at the same place as the Staff of the regiment or bat- 
 talion ; those who do not reside in private lodgings are to reside in 
 barracks when practicable. In these latter special compartments 
 should, if possible, be assigned to them, and they should form distinct 
 messes, receiving for this purpose a portion of the mess'ing fund. 
 
 11. Enlisted Volunteers are promoted to be acting non-commis- 
 sioned officers, as supernumeraries ; but this promotion can only 
 take place after the Volunteer has passed an examination as to his 
 knowledge of his duties according to a special programme.
 
 44 
 
 XoTE. — In order that Enlisted Volunteers may be passed into 
 tlie Reserve after their term of service has expired (Art. 173), such 
 of them as have iDeen promoted to the rank of non-commissioned 
 officer have to undero-o an examination accordinti; to the same 
 programme. Before they can become artiticers or non-commissioned 
 officers of Sappers, Enlisted Volunteers must pass a special exami- 
 nation. 
 
 12. The rules regarding the admission of Enlisted Volunteers 
 to the course of study pursued in the non-commissioned officers' 
 schools, and their promotion to the rank of officer, continue in force 
 at present. Enlisted Volunteers can, however, be admitted, 
 even as private soldiers, to the non-commissioned officers' schools, 
 without any restriction as to the length of time they have served, 
 but with the proviso that they are first examined as to their 
 knowledge of their duties. Promotion to the rank of officer 
 depends upon the length of service in the case of each category of 
 Enlisted Volunteers (Art. 180, Regulations respecting Military 
 Service). 
 
 Pkovisional Kegulations kespecting the Privileges granted 
 TO Enlisted Volunteers admitted into the Service prior 
 TO March 1, 1874. 
 
 Enlisted Volunteers who joined the service previous to March 1, 
 1874, enjoy the following advantages, either in conformity with the 
 former Kegulations of March 8, 1869, or by virtue of the new 
 Regulations of January 1, 1874 : — 
 
 1. Sucli Volunteers as have completed their course of study at 
 the higlier educational establishments, or have produced certificates 
 to show that they have passed the prescribed examination at 
 these establishments, retain their former right to promotion as 
 officers after an active service of not less than two months, pro- 
 vided they have fulfilled all the conditions required by the law then 
 in force. 
 
 2. Those Volunteers who have completed the course of study 
 at secondary educational establishments, or passed the final exami- 
 nation at such establishments, also those who, by virtue of the 
 degree of education they have received, are classed according to 
 the new Regulations (January 1, 1874) in the first category of 
 Enlisted Volunteers, enjoy the privileges granted to this category 
 in the aforesaid Regulations, i.e., they can be promoted to the rank 
 of officer after at least six months' active service (in lieu of the 
 former term of one year), provided that they fulfil in other respects 
 all the necessary qualifications. • 
 
 3. Enlisted Volunteers who have already entered the service by 
 right of birth (that is, without having passed the examination in 
 the superior or secondary educational establishments), and w^ho 
 have not as yet been admitted into the schools for non-commissioned 
 officers of noble rank, retain, if they belong to the old first 
 category (hereditary nobles), their former right to promotion as
 
 45 
 
 ■officers after tlicy have served at least two years ; all others, who are 
 arranged according to the former classification into the second and 
 third categories, obtain the right to promotion as officers after they 
 have served three years (that is to say, at the expiration of the 
 period laid down in the new Eegulations for Enlisted Volunteers 
 of the third category, instead of four years and six years as 
 was formerly the case). 
 
 4. None of the Enlisted Volunteers referred to in the last 
 article can enjoy their privilege of promotion to the rank of officer 
 unless they pass the examination for admission to the non-commis- 
 sioned officers' (nobles) schools during 187-i or 1875, in conformity 
 with the progTamme then in force. Hence, all Enlisted Volunteers 
 at present admitted into the service, who are not in the enjoyment 
 of the pri\dleges granted to persons of education, and who are 
 unable to produce certificates to show that they have successf idly 
 completed the course of six classes at a gymnasia or professional 
 school, or of the second class of ecclesiastical seminaries, must at 
 at once inform their commanding officers if it is their intention to 
 offer themselves for examination for admission to the non-commis- 
 sioned officers' (nobles) schools at the commencement of this year's 
 com'se of study, or wait until September 1875. 
 
 Enlisted Volunteers who completed their twentieth year 
 in 1873, are compelled to undergo an examination durinc; the 
 current year. Should the number of candidates in 1874 exceed 
 the number of vacancies in the schools, those will be admitted wIkj 
 have obtained the greatest number of marks ; the remainder will 
 return to their respective corps, and will join the schools in 1875. 
 
 5. Those Volunteers who do not pass the requisite exami- 
 nation in 1875, or who have stated previously that they are not in a 
 position to prepare themselves for examination within the pre- 
 scribed period^ will be excluded from the number of Enlisted 
 Volunteers. In this case, those who, on January 1, 1874, have not 
 yet attained their twenty-first year (the age at which tliey have to 
 take j)art in the dra\\ang, according to the new Eegulations), will 
 he required to present themselves at a stated time to take part in 
 the drawing, or may remain in the service under the title of 
 " Amateurs ;" * those who are upwards of twenty-one, may take 
 their discharge if they do not wish to serve as '•' Amatem\s." 
 
 6. Those Enlisted Volunteers, who, on entering the artillery or 
 engineers, have passed the necessary quahfying examination, are 
 not required to undergo any further examination ; they enjoy the 
 privileges granted by the new Eegulations to Enlisted Volunteers 
 ■of the third category. 
 
 Note. — Enlisted Volunteers who have joined the artillery and 
 engineers, and who liave not as yet passed the examination in 
 
 * In the original Eussiau such ]iei-sons are called OMot/u'i-i, which signifies 
 iimatems or volunteers ; the first of these exju'essions is adopted in (U-der to 
 .distinguish this class fruni the volunteers proper {Vobio-opredieh'ai/Ks/ie/iu^'/a).
 
 46 
 
 question, must undergo it during the course of this year, or they 
 will be subjected to the rules laid down in Article 5 of the present 
 Eeguiations. 
 
 7 An exact compliance with the instructions given above is 
 enjoined upon all officers in command of corps. 
 
 Eegulations respecting the Admission of " Amateurs " into 
 
 THE Service. 
 
 {Sanctioned hy the Emperor, March IS^th, 1874.) 
 
 1. Men who are enrolled in the militia, as well as those who 
 are exempted from being drawn as recruits, are allowed to join the 
 jservice as "amateurs." (Articles 10 and 154, Eeguiations respect- 
 ing Military Service.) 
 
 2 The following are not eligible as amateurs : 
 a. Men of upwards of 30 years of age (in time of war, however, 
 those who are from 30 to 40 years of age may be admitted 
 into the service). 
 h. Persons who have forfeited their civil rights, or the rights 
 and privileges which belong to them personally or by virtue 
 of their social condition. 
 
 c. Men who are under remand for trial, or have been subjected 
 
 to judicial inquiry for crimes or misdemeanours. 
 
 d. Persons who have been judicially condemned to a punish- 
 ment carrying with it the forfeiture of the right of admission 
 to the service of the State. 
 
 c. Lastly, persons who have been found guilty of theft or 
 swindling. 
 
 3. Amateurs are admitted in time of peace on condition that 
 they remain on active service and in the reserve for the same length 
 of time as recruits who have taken part in the drawing. (Articles 
 17 and 56 EeguLltions on Military Ser\dce.) In time of war, they 
 must remain with the colours so long as it lasts ; when they leave 
 active service they are not, however, enrolled in the reserve, 
 except of their own free will. 
 
 4. Amateurs are admitted at any period of the year. Their 
 service counts from the first day of the month following that in 
 which they are admitted. 
 
 5. Amateurs are admitted into any branch of the service, 
 or military administrative departments or establishments, as pri- 
 vate soldiers, either as combatants or non-combatants according 
 to' their capabilities. They are included in the list of men Hable 
 to the ordinary term of ser\'ice, and are maintained at the public 
 expense. 
 
 6. Amateurs desirous of entering the service are to make appli- 
 cation to that effect, on luistamped paper, to the officers in command 
 of regiments, batteries or other separate corps, or to the heads of 
 departments in the Ministry of War, or of the administrative
 
 47 
 
 branches in the military districts, or to other oilicers in charge of 
 military departments. 
 
 7. Amateurs must send in the following documents with their 
 applications : — 
 
 a. A certificate of enrolment in a recruiting subdivision, and, in 
 
 the case of villagers liable to taxation, an attestation from 
 the head of the bailiwick, showing that they are enrolled in 
 such and such a bailiwick, and such and such a recruiting 
 subdivision, and giving the age of the person. 
 
 b. The certificate of a medical officer in State employment to 
 
 show that the applicant is fit for the service. 
 
 c. A declaration signed by the applicant stating that he is not 
 
 under sentence of a court of justice, nor under judicial 
 inquiry, and that he has not undergone any of the convictions 
 detailed m Article 2 above. 
 
 d. If the applicant is enrolled in the Militia, an attestation 
 
 from the proper Recnuting Commission, stating the fact 
 (Article 160, Eegulations on Military Service). 
 
 e. If the applicant is desirous of entering the service with the 
 
 privileges attached to his educational acquirements, a certi- 
 ficate showing that he has completed the course of study, or 
 passed satisfactorily the prescribed examinations, in accord- 
 ance with the rules laid down in Articles 56 and 57 of the 
 Eegulations on Military Service. 
 / If the api)licant belongs to a class liable to taxation, a certi- 
 ficate from his corporation showing that there is nothing to 
 prevent his being admitted to the service. 
 
 8. As soon as the order of the day admitting them to active 
 service has been published, the Amateurs are called upon to take 
 the oath in the same way as is laid down for recruits who have 
 taken part in the drawings. 
 
 9. Amateurs perform the same duties as soldiers who have 
 have taken part in the drawing, and are promoted in the same way 
 to be non-commissioned officers and officers. 
 
 I. Eegulations respecting the Admission and Service of 
 
 Enlisted Naval Volunteers. 
 
 {Sanctioned by the Emperor, 2oth August 1875,) 
 
 1. The following are eligible for admission to the Navy as 
 enlisted volunteers : — Young men who satisfy the conditions men- 
 tioned in Pars. 1 and 2 of Art, 171, and in Art. 172 of the Eegu- 
 lations of 1874 respecting Obligatory Military Service, and Avho at 
 the same time furnish a certificate to the effect that they have passed 
 an examination in the complete course of studies of one of the edu- 
 cational establishments of the two first categories named in the 
 Appendix to Art. 53, or of the course in a gymnasium of six classes, 
 or professional school, or, lastly, of the second class of ecclesiastical 
 seminaries.
 
 48 
 
 2. Enlisted volunteers of the third category can in no case be 
 admitted to the navy. 
 
 3. All enlisted volunteers admitted into the fleet or special 
 arms of the navy are enrolled as non-commissioned officers of noble 
 degree {Junker). 
 
 4. The autliorities of the navy receive information, at the com- 
 mencement of each year, of the number of enlisted volunteers which 
 may be admitted to the fleet and the special arms at each of the 
 principal ports of war during the cun-ent year. 
 
 5. The choice of the special service, and that particular por- 
 tion of the fleet which they desire to enter, is left to the volun- 
 teers themselves, provided there are vacancies. Exceptions to 
 this are only allowed with the special authority of the Minister 
 of Marine. 
 
 . 6. Young men who desire to enter as enlisted volunteers pre- 
 sent a petition to that effect to the commanders-in-chief at naval 
 ports. Such petitions are to be written on stamped paper, and on 
 the form hereunto annexed. 
 
 7. Petitions for admission to the service as enlisted volunteers 
 must be accompanied by the following documents : — 
 
 {a) A certificate of being inscribed in a recruiting subdi\dsion, 
 in conformity with Arts. 95 and 97 of the Eegulations for 
 Military Service ; and for such persons as are liable to taxes, 
 a certificate from the competent bailiwick officer that they 
 are enrolled in such and such a bailiwick, in such and such a 
 recruiring sub-division, and are of such and such an age. 
 
 (h) The written consent of their parents or guardians when the 
 volunteers are under age (21 years). 
 
 (c) In the application of Art. 145, a certificate from a surgeon 
 in the service of the State to the effect that tliey are free 
 from any corporeal defects and disease, which would unfit 
 them for service in the fleet, in accordance with the terms 
 of Art. D. of the instructions to Eecruiting Commissions for 
 Military Service. 
 
 {d) The written declaration of the volunteers that nothing of 
 the nature mentioned in Art. 172 of the Eegidatious for 
 Military Service as rendering them unworthy of admission 
 can be laid to their charge. 
 
 (e) An engagement on the part of the parents to maintain at 
 their own expense the volunteers who have declared their 
 wish to defray the cost of their maintenance. 
 
 (J) The academical diplomas of enlisted volunteers or certifi- 
 cates, stating that they have completed the course of studies 
 in one of the educational establishments of the two first 
 categories (Appendix to Art. 53 of the Eegulations on 
 Military Service), or undergone an equivalent examination, 
 or the certificates of examination according to the course of 
 gymnasia of six classes, or of professional schools, or of the 
 course of the second class in ecclesiastical seminaries.
 
 49 
 
 (g) Certified copies of the documents* mentioned in tlie above 
 paragraphs (a) and (/). 
 
 8. After examining the petitions and documents in support, 
 and taking care that they are in accordance with the regulations, 
 the commanders-in-chief at ports notify in the port orders of 
 the day, that tlie applicants are admitted to the service as non- 
 commissioned officers of the noble degree (Junker), that they are 
 registered on the ship's books for which they applied, and are enrolled 
 as enlisted volunteers. The original petitions, with their supportinf 
 documents, are then sent to the ship or administration concerned. 
 
 9. After the receipt of the commander-in-chief's orders of the 
 day, and the arrival of the volunteers at their destination, these 
 latter are admitted to the service in the orders of the day, and the 
 oath is at once administered to tliem in the manner prescribed for 
 recruits taking part in the lot-drawing. 
 
 10. After the volunteers are finally admitted and have taken 
 the oath, the authorities notify the fact to the Urban, District, or 
 Sub-district Administrations, under whose jurisdiction the several 
 volunteers are included. Tlie certificates of enrolment in the re- 
 cruiting sub-divisions, or the attestations of the bailiwicks (alluded 
 to in Par. a Art. 7 above), and the educational certificates are 
 returned to the volunteers against autograph receipts, which, with 
 the other documents alluded to in Art. 7 and the form of oath, are 
 preserved in the archives of the ships or other administrations. 
 
 11. In order to enable volunteers to prepare themselves more 
 easily for tlie grade of naval cadet or conductor, they may be 
 admitted, if they wish it, to the course of study either of the naval 
 and technical schools, or of the classes of non-commissioned 
 officers {Juiikers) at Xikolaiev, accordiug to the places where 
 they are serving, and the commander-ir-fhief at ports must send 
 intimation thereof to the commandants of schools ; in all cases, 
 the volunteers must mention, in their yietitions for admission to 
 the ser\dce, the school and the special classes in which they are 
 dsiro us of studying. 
 
 Volunteers who receive permission to enter these schools, as 
 also those who do not undergo the course, may be admitted to the 
 examination for the grade of naval cadet or conductor, after 
 satisfying the conditions prescribed in Art. 190 of the Eegulations 
 for Military Service, but not later than after two years' service 
 as non-commissioned officers of noble degree. Should they fail 
 in the examination, they are allowed to remain another year in the 
 service as non-commissioned officers, at the expiration of which 
 they must present themselves once more for examination, and if 
 they again fail, they come under the provisions of Art. 192 of the 
 same regulations. 
 
 12. Volunteers who have expressed a wish to maintain them- 
 selves at their own expense until their promotion to naval cadet or 
 
 * All these documents and their copies must be written in Russian, and on 
 stamped papei*.
 
 50 
 
 conductor, merely receive from the State their arms, equipments, 
 and the requisites for their instruction. During cruises they receive 
 the regulation subsistence authorised for the navy generally. 
 
 13. Volunteers who defray the cost of their own maintenance are 
 allowed to occupy separate quarters ; but the commanders of ships 
 have the right to deprive any person of the privilege, should it 
 be deemed necessary to exercise a special surveillance over him. 
 
 14. Volunteers who have not expressed their intention of 
 maintaining themselves at their own expense during their service 
 as non-commissioned ofiicers of noble deo^ree, are bound to live 
 m barracks, and receive from the State the regulation equipment, 
 the shore pay of boatswain, and, while on shore, the ration and 
 share of messing money. When on board ship they receive the 
 authorised subsistence. 
 
 15. Volunteers perform the same duties on board ship and else- 
 where as other seamen with the rank of non-commissioned officers. 
 
 16. Commanders of ships and heads of special branches of the 
 service are charged, on their personal responsibility, with the care 
 of the volunteers, both as regards their instruction, so as to 
 accelerate their naval and scientific education, and their conduct 
 and manner of life. With this object, it is desirable to assign 
 separate rooms in barracks to those not allowed to hire distinct 
 quarters, and to authorise them to form separate messes with their 
 grant from the mess fund. 
 
 17. Volunteers are peremptorily required to undergo the 
 examinations laid down for promotion to the grade of naval cadet 
 or conductor, at the naval schools which correspond to the special 
 service whicli they have chosen. These examinations must take 
 place at the same time as the admission and final examinations of 
 the pupils of these schools, and in the same subjects ; consequently, 
 non-commissioned officers of noble degree, who may be trans- 
 ferred to ports of the second class, must be sent at the time of the 
 examinations to the nearest principal port, receiving from the State 
 the regulation suljsistence money. 
 
 18. Non-commissioned officers of noble degree who have satis- 
 fied the conditions imposed by Art. 190 of the Eegulatious for 
 Military Service, are promoted, according to their speciality, to the 
 grade of naval cadet or conductor in the orders of the day of 
 H.I.H. the Grand Admiral. 
 
 19. If, by virtue of special authority, a non-commissioned 
 officer of noble degree should happen to be on a cruise in foreign 
 waters, his final examination for promotion to the grade of naval 
 cadet or conductor will take place on the return of the vessel to 
 Eussia, in accordance with the terms of Art. 17, but no seniority 
 is allowed him for the time which he may have served as non- 
 commissioned officer in excess of the prescribed period. 
 
 20. All volunteers admitted to follow without payment the 
 courses of study at naval schools, and of classes of non-commissioned 
 officers of nol^le decree, are bound to the conditions adverted to in
 
 51 
 
 Art. 196 of the Kegulations as regards the duration of their obliga- 
 tory service — that is to say, they are iadebted to the State 1^ years 
 of active ser^dce for every jeav during which they have been under 
 instruction. 
 
 21. The promotion of naval cadets and conductors to the rank 
 of officer takes place in accordance with the naval regulations in 
 force for tliese non-commissioned officers. 
 
 II. Temporary Eules as to the Rights of Volunteers ad- 
 mitted TO the Navy prior to 1st March, 1874. 
 
 1. Volunteers admitted to the service prior to the 1st March, 
 1874, in special arms of the navy, i.e., in the Marine Artillery, Pilot 
 Service, or as Engineers, bi/ virtue of the rights appertaining to them 
 hy birth, and belonging, according to the ancient sub-division, to the 
 first category (hereditary nobles), retain their long-standing right 
 to promotion to the grade of conductor after a service of not less 
 than two years. Those who belonged to the second and third 
 categories do not obtain the right to this promotion until after 
 three years' service as non-commissioned officers — that is to say, 
 at the expiration of the period fixed by the new regulations on mili- 
 tary service for volunteers of the third category in the land forces, 
 and provided they satisfy the other conditions appointed for the 
 navy. 
 
 2. Volunteers admitted to the fleet before the 1st March, 1874, 
 by virtue of former regulations, and not in accordance with the 
 regulations of 1st January, 1874, who may not have passed the 
 examination for promotion to the grade of naval cadet at the 
 expiration of the two years fixed for their service as non- 
 commissioned officers of noble degree, are allowed to remain another 
 year in the same position, provided they are recommended by their 
 commanding olficers. Should they be unable to pass the examina- 
 tion at the end of this adjourned period, they come under the 
 provisions of Ai"t. 192 of the Regulations for Military Service. 
 
 3. Every volunteer serving at this moment in the fleet as non- 
 commissioned officer of noble degree, or as non-commissioned officer 
 (noble or not) in special corps of the navy, who has been admitted 
 by virtue of former regulations, and has served the prescribed 
 number of years, must present himself for examination for the 
 grade of naval cadet or conductor, not later than the first admission 
 or final examination which shall take place in the naval schools 
 after the promulgation of the present rules. Those wdio may not pass 
 these examinations, or shall have declared beforehand their inability 
 to prepare themselves for them, will be excluded from the number 
 €)f enlisted volunteers. Those among them who had not attained the 
 age of 21 years on the 1st January 1874, must take part in the lot- 
 drawing, or remain in the service as amateurs ;* those who have 
 
 * See Note p. 45.
 
 52 
 
 passed this age, and do not wish to remain in the service as 
 amateurs, may receive their discharge. 
 
 III. Regulations for the Admission to the Fleet of 
 
 Amateurs. 
 
 In order to complete the effective of the fleet, in addition to 
 the men furnished by recruiting and voluntary enlistments, the 
 following persons may be admitted to the service under the title of 
 amateurs : — 
 
 1. Persons exempt from recruitment, and those belonging to the 
 militia (Arts. 10 and 154 of the Eegulation for Military Service). 
 
 2. The following are not eligible as amateurs : — 
 
 (a). Persons upwards of 30 years of age, excejjt in time of war, 
 when they may be admitted up to the age of 40 inclusively ; 
 (b) those deprived of their civil rights, or of the rights and 
 privileges which belong to them personally, or by virtue of 
 their condition ; (c) men who have been brought to trial, or 
 have been subjected to inquiry for crimes and mis- 
 demeanours ; (d) persons who have been judicially con- 
 demned to a punishment entailing the forfeiture of the 
 right of admission to the sei'vice of the State ; (e) lastly, 
 persons who have been found guilty of theft or swindling. 
 
 3. In time of peace amateurs are admitted on the express condition 
 that they remain on active ser\ice, and in the reserve for the same 
 length of time as recruits M'ho have taken part in the drawing 
 (Art. 18, and par. 4 of Art. 56 of the Regulations on Military Ser- 
 vice). In time of war they must remain with the colours so long 
 as it lasts, but when they leave active service, they are not enrolled 
 in the reserve, except of their own free-will.* 
 
 4. Amateurs are admitted at any period of the year. Their 
 time of service dates from the 1st of the month following their 
 admission. 
 
 5. Amateurs are admitted into any branch of the service, or 
 the naval administrative departments or establishments, in the capa- 
 city of sailors or soldiers, either as combatants or non-combatants, 
 according to their capabilities ; but not otherwise than as forming 
 part of the number of the authorised effective, subject to the ordinary 
 term of service and maintained by the State. Amateurs entering 
 from the ranks of enlisted volunteers are enrolled as non-commis- 
 sioned officers. (Art 3 Section II of the present regulations.) 
 
 6. As regards the duration of their effective obligatory service, 
 and of their maintenance in the reserve of the fleet, as also with 
 reference to their conditions of advancement to the rank of naval 
 cadet or conductor, amateurs who enter the naval service, and 
 satisfy the educational and other conditions demanded of enlisted 
 volunteers, enjoy the same rights as are accorded to the latter by 
 
 * Amateurs enjoy the rights aud privileges quoted in Paias. b 
 Art 22 of the Regulations on Military Service.
 
 o3 
 
 Arts. 187, 189, and 190 of the Eegulations on Military Service, and 
 by the 1st Section of the present regulations, and they wear on their 
 uniform the same distinguishing badge. 
 
 7. Young men who are desirous of entering the service as 
 amateurs must present the request in person, written on un- 
 stamped paper, either to the commanders of ships, detachments, 
 or special companies of the fleet, or to heads of departments, edu- 
 cational establishments, and administrative institutions of the 
 
 8. Their applications must be accompanied by the following 
 documents : — 
 
 (a) A certificate of enrolment in a recruiting sub-division, and 
 in the case of villagers liable to taxation, an attestation from 
 the head of the bailiwick, showing that they are enrolled 
 in such and such a bailiwick, and such and such a recruit- 
 ing sub-division, and giving the age of the person.* 
 
 (b) The certificate of a medical officer in State employment to 
 show that the applicant is fit for the navy. 
 
 (c) A declaration signed by the applicant, stating that he is 
 not under sentence of a court of justice, nor under judicial 
 inquiry, and that he has not undergone any of the convic- 
 tions detailed in Art. 2 above. 
 
 (cl) If the applicant is enrolled in the militia, an attestation 
 from the proper Recruiting Commission stating the fact, 
 (Art. 160, Regulations on Military Service.) 
 
 (c) If the applicant is desirous of entering the navy with the 
 pri\dleges attached to his educational acquirements, a certifi- 
 cate showing that he has oompleted the course of study, or 
 passed satisfactorily the prescribed examinations in accord- 
 ance with the rules laid down in Arts. 56 and 57 of the 
 Regulations on Military Service. 
 
 (f) If the applicant belongs to a class liable to taxation, a 
 certificate from his corporation, showing that there is 
 nothing to prevent his being admitted to the service. 
 
 9. After the publication of the order of the day admitting them 
 to the naval service, amateurs take the oath prescribed for recruits 
 enlisted in the usual manner. 
 
 10. Amateurs who do not enjoy the privileges attached to 
 education perform the same duties, and are promoted to the 
 grades of non-commissioned officer and officer in the same manner 
 as seamen who enter the service in the usual manner. 
 
 * In lieu of the certificate of inscription in a recruiting sub-divi.sion, young 
 men who on their entry into the service as amateurs were not more than 21 
 years of age at the time of the promulgation of the Eegulations on Military 
 Service, as well as those born in localities to which the present regulations do 
 not apply, are required merely to present their certificates of birth and 
 baptism, oi- documents of a similar character recognised by law.
 
 54 
 
 A.PPENDI X. 
 
 Thsi following is a list of the educational establishments, referred to 
 in the Regulations respecting Military Service (p. 16), divided into 
 classes : — 
 
 1. Superior EDgcATiONAL Establishments. 
 
 a. Under the direction of the Ecclesiastical Authorities of the 
 orthodox faith : 
 
 The Ecclesiastical Academies. 
 
 b. Under the direction of the Minister of Public Education : 
 
 The Universities. 
 
 The Imperial Historico-Philological Institute of St. Petersburg, 
 
 The Colleges, namely: the Cesarevritch Nicholas College at 
 
 Moscow (for students at the University), the Demidoff 
 
 College for the study of law at Jaroslav ; and the Prince 
 
 Bezborodko's College at Niejine. 
 The Lazaref Institute for Oriental Languages at Moscow (for 
 
 students who have finished their course in the special classes). 
 The Institute of Agriculture and Sylviculture at New Alexandria. 
 The Veterinary Institutes at Kief, Kharkof, and Dorpat. 
 
 c. Under the direction of the Minister of the Imperial Household : 
 
 The Imperial Academy of Fine Arts (for students who have 
 gained first and second-class certificates as artists in all 
 branches of art). 
 
 d. Under the direction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs : 
 
 The section for Oriental Languages, which is attached to the 
 Asiatic Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 e. Under the du'ection of the Finance Minister : 
 
 The Mines Institute. 
 
 The Technological Institute at St. Petersburg. 
 The Polytechnic School at Riga. 
 /. Under the direction of the Minister of War : 
 
 The Imperial Medico- Chirurgical Academy at St. Petersburg 
 
 (all sections). 
 The Military Law School at St. Petersburg. 
 g. Under the direction of th6 Minister of the Interior : 
 
 The School of Construction at St. Petersburg. 
 The Roman Catholic Ecclesiastical Academy at St. Petersburg. 
 The Imperial Musical Conservatories (for students who have 
 gained their diplomas). 
 
 /(. Under the direction of the Minister of Justice : 
 
 The Imperial School of Law at St. Petersburg.
 
 55 
 
 The Constantine Institute for Land-surveying. 
 
 t. Under the direction of the Minister of Domains : 
 
 The School of Agriculture and Sylviculture at Petrovskoe, near 
 
 Moscow. 
 The Agricultural Institute at St. Petersburg. 
 
 j. Under the direction of the Minister of Roads, &c. : 
 
 The Institute of Engineers. 
 
 /.-. Under the direction of the Empress Marie's Institutfons : 
 
 The Emperor Alexander College at St. Petersburg. 
 The Imperial Technical School at Moscow (for students who 
 have completed the special course). 
 
 2. Secondary Educational Establishments. 
 
 a. Under the Direction of the Ecclesiastical Authorities of the 
 Orthodox faith : 
 
 The Ecclesiastical Seminaries (for students who have com- 
 pleted at least the second-class course). 
 
 b. Under the direction of the Minister of Public Education : 
 
 The Gymnasia, in which is included the Gymnasium of the 
 Philanthropic Society (for students who have completed at 
 least the sixth-class course). 
 
 The Alexander Institute at Nijni-Novgorod. 
 
 The Lazaref Institute of Oriental Languages (for persons who 
 have studied in the general classes). 
 
 The Dome School at Revel. 
 
 The Paul Galagane College at Kief. 
 
 The Schools attached to Churches of religions other than the 
 Orthodox, viz., the Churches of St. Peter, St. Anne, and 
 the Reformed Church at St. Petersburg ; the Lutheran 
 Church of St. Peter and St. Paul at Moscow. 
 
 The Cesarevitch Nicolas College at Moscow (for students at the 
 Gymnasia). 
 
 Private Gymnasia. 
 
 Real Schools, consisting of six and seven classes. 
 
 The Higher Industrial School at Lodzi. 
 
 The Commercial School at Odessa. 
 
 Schools established in conformity with the Regulations of 
 31st May, 1872, to train masters for the municipal schools. 
 
 c. Under the direction of the Minister of the Imperial Household : 
 
 The Imperial Academy of Fine Arts (for students Avho have 
 gained a third-class artist's certificate, or a certificate as an 
 artist not classed, in all branches of art). 
 
 The School of Painting, Sculpture and Architecture, founded 
 by the Society of Ai-ts of Moscow. 
 
 d. Under the direction of the Minister of Finance : 
 
 The Practical Academy of Commercial Science at Moscow. 
 The School of Mines of the Ural at Catharinebursr.
 
 66 
 
 The Naval Classes of the 2nd and 3rd category. 
 e. Under the direction of the Minister of War : 
 
 The Corps of Pages of His Imperial Majesty (students who 
 
 have attended the general classes). 
 The Corps of Cadets of Finland (students who have completed 
 
 the sixth class course at least). 
 The Schoolmasters' Seminary at Moscow. 
 The Special Artillery Schools, namely, the Pyrotechnical and 
 
 Technical Schools. 
 /. Under the direction of the Minister of Marine : 
 
 The Naval School at St. Petersburg (students who have attended 
 
 the general classes). 
 The Technical Naval School at Cronstadt (persons who have 
 
 followed the general course of study). 
 
 g. Under the direction of the Minister of the Interior : 
 
 The Ecclesiastical Seminaries, namely, the Roman Catholic and 
 
 the Armeno- Gregorian. 
 The Imperial Musical Society's Conservatories (students who 
 have received certificates). 
 h. Under the direction of the Minister of Justice : 
 
 The School of Land Surveying. 
 i. Under the direction of the Empress Marie's"" Institutions : 
 
 The Nicholas Institute for Orphans at Gatchina. 
 
 The Commercial Schools at St. Petersburg and Moscow. 
 
 3. Minor Educational Establishments. 
 
 a. Under the direction of the Minister of Public Education : 
 
 The Municipal Schools. 
 
 The District Schools, and Schools in the Don Cossack territory. 
 
 The Schoolmasters' Seminaries formed for the purpose of 
 training masters for the Primary Schools supported by the 
 Government ; in these are included the schools in the 
 Warsaw and Dorpat districts, and the Tartar Schoolmasters' 
 Seminaries at Oufa and Simpheropol. 
 
 The Catharine Schoolmasters' Institute at Tambof. 
 
 The Schoolmaster's Seminaries and Colleges of the Zemstvo, 
 at which the course of study is the same as at the Govern- 
 ment Seminaries, and which enjoy similar privileges. 
 
 The Municipal Schools, divided into two classes in the Govern- 
 ments of Kief, Podolsk and Volynsk. 
 
 The Rural Schools, divided into two classes, founded by the 
 Minister of Public Education in the most populous and the 
 most central villages in the various districts. 
 
 h. Under the direction of the Minister of the Imperial Household : 
 
 The Court Choir. 
 
 The Theatre Schools at St. Petersburg and Moscow. 
 
 c. Under the direction of the Minister of Finance : 
 
 The Stroganof School of Design at Moscow.
 
 hold; 
 
 57 
 
 The School of Mines at St. Petersburg. 
 
 The Alexander Techniea,! School at Tchernovetz. 
 
 The Steiger School at Lissitchansk. 
 
 The District Schools of Mines and Manufactories at Catharine- 
 burg, Zlatooust, and at the manufactories at Kouvschine, 
 Bogoslof, and Votkine. 
 
 The Naval Classes of the First Category. 
 
 The Navigation Class attached to the Progymnasium at Libau. 
 
 The Schools for Ship Captains at Kemi and Archangel. 
 
 Under the direction of the Minister of War : 
 
 The Military Progymnasia. 
 
 The Schools for the Manufacture of Arms at Toula and Ijef. 
 The Schools for Military Nurses. 
 Under the direction of the Minister of the Interior : 
 The Luthero-Evangelical Seminary at Kolpiuo, near Gatch na, 
 
 to train masters for the parish Schools in Finnland. 
 Under the direction of the Minister for Pubhc Domains : 
 The Schools of Agriculture at Gori- Gorki, Kharkof, Kazan, and 
 
 the Marie School. 
 The School of Agi-iculture belonging to the Society for the 
 
 study of the Theory of Agriculture, at Moscow. 
 The Land Surveying and Taxation Classes attached to the 
 
 Gori-Gorki School. 
 Thp School of Horticulture and Agriculture at Oumane. 
 The Schools of Horticulture (Second Category) at Penzino and 
 
 Bessarabia. 
 The Schools of Horticulture at Nikitskoe. 
 The School of Sylviculture at Lissino. 
 The School of Hunting at Lipstok. 
 , Under the direction of the Minister of Roads, &c. : 
 The School lor Conductors. 
 The Delvig School of Railways at Moscow. 
 The Alexander Industrial School of Railways at Eltz. 
 The Railway Technical School. 
 
 Under the direction of the Empress Marie's Institutions : 
 The Kommissarof Technical School at Moscow. 
 The Schoolmasters' Seminary, near the Foundling Hospital at 
 
 St. Petersburg. 
 The School for Nurses at the Foundling Hospital at Moscow, 
 
 the Galitzin Hospital, and the Oboukhof Hospital at St. 
 
 Petersburg. 
 
 4. Primary Schools. 
 . Under the direction of the Minister of Public Education : 
 
 The primary Schools of various kinds, namely, Schools of one 
 class in towns and in the country, parish schools, parish 
 church schools, and schools for Cossacks. 
 Under the direction of the Minister of the Imperial House- 
 
 The School for Hunting.
 
 58 
 
 c. Under the direction of the Minister of Finance: 
 
 The Primary Schools of Manufacture in the mining districts 
 of Catharineburg, Goroblagodat, Bogoslof, Kama-Votkine, 
 Zlatooust, Olonetz, Lougansk, and the gun factories at Perm. 
 
 d. Under the direction of the Minister of War: 
 
 The Military Schools for Cliildren of Men belonging to the 
 
 Guard. 
 The RojdeKtvenskaia School for Children of Soldiers, at Revel. 
 The Free School for Soldiers' Children attached to the Powder 
 
 Mill at Okhta. 
 
 e. Under the direction of the Minister of Marine : 
 
 The establishment for Naval Instruction, and the School for 
 Writers and Storekeepers. 
 
 /. Under the direction of the Minister of the Interior : 
 
 The Schools belonging to the Luthero-Evangelical and the 
 Armeno- Gregorian Churches. 
 
 g. Under the direction of the Empress Marie's Institutions : 
 
 The Rural Schools in the Foundling Hospital districts. 
 
 h. Under the direction of the Minister for State Domains : 
 
 The Industrial School at the School of Agriculture at Gori- 
 Gorki. 
 
 HAkBiaOK AND IONS, PKICiTBBS IS ORDINAKT TO HER MAJESTY, 8T. MABTIN'S LAMB.
 
 STEPPE CAMPAIGNS. 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN 
 
 IN THE 
 
 TOPOGRAPHICAL BRANCH, Q.M G.'S. DEPARTMENT, 
 
 BY 
 
 CAPTAIN F. C. H. CLARKE., R.A., D.A.Q.M.G. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed tinder the Sujpenntendence of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
 
 AND SOLD BY 
 
 W. CLOWES & SONS, 13, Charing Cross ; HAREISON & SONS, 59, Pall Mall; 
 
 W. H. ALLEN & CO., 1.3, Waterloo Place; W. MITCHELL, 39 Clianiig Cross 
 
 LONGMAN & CO., Paternoster Row; TRUBNEE & CO., u7 & 59, Ludjrate Hill ; 
 
 STANFORD, Charing Cross ; and H. S. KING & CO., 6y, CornhiU ; 
 
 Also hy 
 
 GRIFFIN & CO., Tlie Hard, Poutsea ; 
 
 A. & C. BLACK, Edinburgh; D. ROBERTSON, 90, St. Vincent Street, Glasgow 
 
 ALEX. THOM, Abbey Street, and E. PONSONBY, Grafton Street, Dublln. 
 
 1874.
 
 i^OTE BY THE TRAN'SLATOE. 
 
 These Lectures were originally delivered in the Junker School 
 at Orenburg, in 1872, by V. Potto, and were afterwards published 
 in the " Voenny Sbornik/' the semi-official Russian military 
 magazine. 
 
 To a translation of these Lectures some brief remarks have 
 been added on the Expedition to Khiva in 1873, as well as some 
 account of the Turkmen tribes in the Central Asian Steppe 
 bordering on the Affghan and Persian frontiers. 
 
 Topographical Branch, 
 Quartermaster-General's Department, 
 Horse Guards, 
 
 December 1874.
 
 STEPPE CAMPAIGNS. 
 
 I. 
 
 Short Geographical and Ethnographical Sketch of 
 
 THE Country. 
 
 Description of the Kirgiz Steppe.— Frontiers, Administrative Division, 
 General Character of the Locality, Climate, Soil, Sands, Saltmarslies, 
 Mountains, Lakes, Rivers, Vegetation, Lines of Communication, Towns, 
 and Forts. — Short Sketch of Turkestan ; its Administrative Division, 
 Frontiers, Chief Mountain Ranges, Rivers, Sandy and Salt Steppes, Soil, 
 Towns, and Forts. 
 
 The broad tract, lying to the east of the River Ural and of 
 the Caspian, between the southern frontiers of Western Siberia, 
 the north-west of China, the branches of the Tian Shan, Bokhara, 
 and Khiva, is known as the Kirgiz steppe. 
 
 In an administrative respect the Kirgiz steppe forms part of 
 six provinces : of these the Semipalatinsk and Akmolinsk (the 
 province of the Siberian Kirgeze) are subject to the Governor- 
 General of Western Siberia; the provinces of Ural and Turgai 
 (formerly provinces of the Orenburg Kirgeze) are under the 
 Governor-General of Orenburg;* while the Semirechinsk and Syr 
 Darya form part of Turkestan. 
 
 The characteristic features of the Kirgiz steppe are great 
 scarcity of water, total absence of trees, and excessive aridit}-, due 
 to the great heat of summer and the scantiness of the rainfall; a 
 clay soil, partly sandy% partly salt ; and finally, a " terrain " com- 
 pletely" dried up by the winds. 
 
 The climate of the Kirgiz steppe is thoroughly continental, 
 and is remarkable for the strong contrasts it presents — a severely 
 cold winter and an excessively hot summer. The frost reaches 
 30'' and even 39^ (Reaum), and lasts for about three months. But 
 the inhabitants do not suffer to so great an extent from the cold 
 as from the winds and storms, which rage chiefly in the winter 
 season. The snow storms are so violent that villages are buried 
 iu the drift and whole herds and flocks destroyed. The summer 
 
 * This goverumeut also included the Mangjslilak Circle, established on the east 
 bank of the Caspian for the administratiou of the Adaeff Kirgeze. In (he beginning 
 of 1870 this circle came under the Caucasus authorities, and iu the present day 
 the Una dividing it from the Uralsk ProTince passes from Mertry-Kidtuk to the 
 north-west corner of the Aral sea, a little south of the deserts of Asmantai Matai 
 and Sam. 
 
 B 2
 
 heat in its turn becomes insupportable ; in some places the clay 
 soil, the sandy hillocks, baked by the burning rays of the sun, joined 
 to the absence of large rivers and forests, raise the temperature to 
 50° R. Two or three hours before sunrise the thermometer shows 
 30° to 32°. Under these conditions, the grass which shoots forth in 
 spring becomes rapidly burnt up, particularly in some parts of the 
 Kara Kum and in the valley of the Syr Darya, where the heat even 
 at the end of April becomes intolerable. The summer nights are 
 likewise sultry, but the autumnal, on the other hand, are extra- 
 ordinarily cold in comparison with the temperature of the day. 
 
 Rain and dews are very rare in the steppe, particularly in the 
 summer months. 
 
 The winds are very strong, and in many places blow periodically 
 at a certain season of the year. In winter they increase to 
 terrible storms, and in summer to violent tornadoes which twist 
 about in a columnar form with extraordinary force. We must 
 observe that the winds of the summer months are of two kinds : 
 one, called by the Kirgeze *'Angazak," blows in the steppe 
 chiefly after the first spring droughts, and lasts until the severe 
 heats, when the other wind commences, called ^' Shildio,'' which, 
 according to Kirgiz reports, blows for a period of 40 days. Of 
 these the " Shildio," from its dryness and stifling nature, has a 
 pernicious efi'ect upon human beings, particularly those unac- 
 customed to the climate, producing general debility accompanied 
 with constant perspirations and severe derangement of the 
 digestive organs, which often leads to a serious illness. In winter 
 the N.E. wind has great power, causing 5 or 6 degrees of frost 
 to be felt as much as 15 or 16 degrees in a still atmosphere The 
 general causes of the severe cold and excessive heat in the steppes, 
 irrespective of their geographical situation, are the absence of woods, 
 running water, and especially the non-existence of high mountains 
 to screen them from the winds blowing from Central Asia. 
 
 In a hygienic point of view the climate of the steppe is 
 generally favourable ; at least, signs of epidemic disease are never 
 seen among the natives, with the exception of small pox, to which 
 children are the chief victims. 
 
 The best soil is found in the northern and eastern parts of the 
 Kirgiz steppe, where we meet with grass-lands and plains covered 
 M'ith black mould, which cannot be excelled for agricultural 
 purposes. The western part, that is to say, the district between 
 the River Ural and the Aral Sea, is less fertile and sufl'ers from a 
 want of fuel, as with the exception of a few shrubs and trees dis- 
 persed along the banks of the Ilek and its tributaries, there is no 
 M'ood. Towards the south in the direction of the Caspian sea, we 
 find sandy wastes, extensive salt plains, and lakes of water unfit 
 for use. Cattle will only eat the grass when they can get no other. 
 There is a grass called by the Kirgeze " IMamachup," which, 
 while not difi'ering in ajDpearance from ordinary grass, produces 
 serious sickness among the horses, particularly lameness, and is only 
 fit fur food, as a rule, in the autumn when the frosts have diminished 
 its virulence. ^Ihcre are but few drinking places ; ground suited 
 
 I
 
 for cultivation is only met with on the banks of the Sagiz and 
 Emba. 
 
 Beyond the Emba commences the entrance to the isthmus 
 between the Caspian and Aral Seas, called the Ust Urt. This 
 district forms a broad plain intersected in many places by isolated 
 volcanic mountains, which stretch in lofty narrow chains from 
 N.E. to S. and consist of a grey lime stone, furnishing excel- 
 lent building material. Particularly important in this respect 
 are the mountains near Lake Chugikakul, the banks of which are 
 watered by good fresh springs. The best of these springs is the 
 Ak Bulak, where at the time of General Perovsky's campaigns 
 was built the Ak Bulak or Chugikakul Fort. The Ust Urt itself 
 is a sterile plateau, surrounded on all sides by a sinuous and 
 precipitate cliflF called the " Chink.^' At some points it attains a 
 height of 650 feet above the level of the sea, and is only accessible 
 by the regular caravan roads. As regards the plateau itself it is 
 not watered by a single river, and in consequence of this there is 
 no pasturage whatever. The shrul)s and grass growing upon it 
 are suitable onlv as forage for those camels which are not fanciful. 
 To its barren soil are united terrible whirlwinds and storms which 
 render the plateau nearly uninhabitable in winter. 
 
 Equally barren almost is the entire central part of the Kirgiz 
 steppe included between the Ulu-tau mountains, the commence- 
 ment of the Barsuk deserts and Lake Aksakal. Here the soil 
 consists partly of a dry, friable and nearly barren clay, which pro- 
 duces only wormwood, and partly of extensive sandy districts, 
 broken here and there with salt lakes and dried salt marshesr 
 Spots suited for cultivation are found only on the banks of 
 the Turgai. Equally if not more sterile is the whole of the 
 southern part which ends on the side of Turkestan with the 
 so-called Hungry steppe. 
 
 The chief sandy deserts of this country are the Kara Kum 
 and the Bek-pak-dala — or the Hungry steppe — which lie on the 
 northern borders of Turkestan and extend for some hundreds of 
 versts in area. Then come the broad sandy districts reaching to 
 the N-E. from the Aral sea — the Great and Little Barsuks ; west 
 of these, on the banks of the Uil, lies the Barkin desert, on 
 which is built the Uil Fort and Taisugan ; and more to the south, 
 in the northern part of the Ust Urt, are the Sam and the 
 Asmantai-Matai deserts. 
 
 It should be remarked, however, that in these sandy districts 
 absolutely barren places are seldom met with ; the greater part 
 have good water and are interspersed with shrubs or grass, in 
 the form of isolated oases, so that very often the flora of the sands 
 is much richer than that of the adjacent steppe. But these deserts, 
 so terrible in the season of the summer hurricanes, are of great 
 advantage in winter to the inhabitants, as their sandy dunes olFer 
 considerable protection to the herds from the storms which rage 
 in these regions, and allow of the winter dwellings being con- 
 structed in the intermediate hollows. 
 
 The marshes here arc called soloiir/iaks. that is to sav, muddv
 
 6 
 
 swamps containing a large quantity of saline matter. Some of these 
 marshes dry up very rapidly when the hot weather commences, 
 and become covered with a solid white incrustation from the salt 
 which remains. Such salt marshes, remarkable for the complete 
 absence of vegetation, are called dry or salt lands, in contra- 
 distinction to those which do not freeze in winter and dry up 
 slowly in summer ; both present nearly insurmountable obstacles. 
 Salt marshes are chiefly met with in the western part of the 
 steppe, at the mouths of the rivers Emba, Sagiz, Uil, and on the 
 north shore of the Caspian. 
 
 The Kirgiz steppe is by no means flat, on the contrary it is 
 undulating and is intersected in places by considerable mountain 
 chains. Thus, the branches of the Ural range, which project into 
 the Kirgiz steppe on the north-west, take a direction partly 
 towards the sources of the Irgiz and partly towards the village of 
 Ilinsk and the town of Orsk, where they are called the Guberlin 
 mountains. I n its western part the Kirgiz steppe is intersected 
 by the well known Mugojar range, which forms, as it were, a con- 
 tinuation of the same branch of the Ural. This range, at its 
 highest point (Mount Airiuk), attains a height of 1,200 feet, but 
 in other places, as for example, in the mountains Jaksi-tau, 
 Jaman-tau, Baktibai-Karatau, and others, the elevation does not 
 exceed 700 or 800 feet ; as we travel southward it becomes 
 lower and lower, passing by degrees into sandy hills which merge 
 into the table land of the Ust Urt. The Mugojar range consists 
 of granite ridges, with abrupt and nearly perpendicular sides, 
 covered in many places with isolated clumps of trees of stunted 
 growth ; still there is good grass, which, although not abundant, is 
 in sufficient quantity for the small herds of the nomad tribes. 
 These localities serve as hiding places for gangs of robbers, 
 who are further aided by the deep narrow and rocky defiles, 
 abounding in springs, which are found at the base of the Mugojar 
 mountains. 
 
 On the east side there project into the Kirgiz steppe, branches 
 of the Altai mountains ; in the central part lies the isolated 
 mountain range of the Ulu-tau, which separates the Kirgeze of the 
 Orenburg and Siberian administrations ; while on the south, along 
 the right bank of the middle course of the Syr Darya, run the 
 Kara-tau mountains — branches of the Tyan-Shan range. Besides 
 these, there lie to the west of the Ust Urt the famous low chain 
 of the Ak-tau, and to the south of the Ust Urt, the Aksary Baba 
 mountains. 
 
 The Kirgiz steppe abounds in lakes ; some of these are of 
 fresh water but the majority are bjtter or salt. After the Aral, 
 the largest is Lake Balkhash, situated on the frontiers of the 
 Akmolinsk and Semirechinsk provinces. It is about 600 versts in 
 length from N.E. to S.W. and is surrounded by deep sands. In 
 the middle of the steppe are the large lakes of Aksakal-Barbi, 
 which are separated from the Aral by a sandy steppe, and at one 
 time formed a single sheet of water 200 versts in circumference. 
 At the present time the Aksakal-Barbi, sometimes called Aksakal-
 
 Taun, forms a group of small lakes separated by sandy tracts, 
 which are overgrown with reeds and, in places, present eligible 
 sites for nomad dwellings. After these come the small lake, 
 Chalkar, or, as it is called by the Ural (Jossacks, Lake Cherkhal, 
 known to the whole horde for the quantity of its fish ; the great 
 salt lake, Bartyldakhta, and, lastl)", the Inder, situated among the 
 rocky mountains of that name, on the left side of the Ural, about 
 10 versts from the Gorsk advanced post. Besides these, many 
 large, but completely dried-up lakes filled with sand, are found in 
 the Kirgiz steppe, such as Mashe, in which is built the Lower 
 Emban Fort, and others, which are only dry at a certain season of 
 the year, as for example : Lakes Chushkakul,* Asmantai Matai, 
 Sam, and others, which are covered in summer with a hard and 
 thick incrustation of salt. 
 
 Of the rivers watering the Kirgiz steppe, the most important 
 on the west is the Ural, and on the east the Irtish, which receives, 
 among others, the Rivers Tobol and Ishim, on which the town of 
 Akmolinsk is situated. Into the Tobol fall the Ui, serving as a 
 boundary between European Russia and the Kirgiz steppe, and 
 the Ubagan, which separates the Siberian steppe from the 
 Orenburg. 
 
 Of the tributaries of the Ural, on the left side, the Or and 
 Ilek are worthy of note; the latter in its upper course is called 
 the Isenbai. The latter receives near lletz Zashchita th9 great 
 Khobda, the banks of which are bordered with excellent meadow 
 land. 
 
 Into the Caspian falls the River Emba, which takes its rise in 
 the Mugojar Mountains and receives several tributaries of which 
 the more important are the Temir, celebrated for its excellent sweet 
 water, and the Ati-Jaksi, upon which Count Perovsky built a fort 
 called the Eraban. To the north of the Emba flows the little 
 river, Sagiz, which loses itself in salt marshes ; and still more to 
 the north is the Uil, with the fort of the same name on its banks. 
 Lastly, into Lake Aksakal Barbi falls one of the most important 
 Kirgiz rivers, the Irgiz, which receives many affluents, the prin- 
 cipal being the Turgai, from which the district receives its name. 
 From the western slopes of the Mugojar Mountains there like- 
 wise issue a number of rivers, of which the more important are 
 the Karachandak, Kunduz, Ashche-Sai, Ak-Tyken (Aulie-Mola) 
 and Karagand, the banks of which, from their sources in the 
 mountains are covered with meadow grass, birch groves, poplars, 
 rock-cherry and gooseberry bushes, Mood-bine, willow and other 
 small growing timber. Next we must mention the River Chagan, 
 which takes its rise nearly at the foot of the UstL^rt ; arid although 
 possessing sweet water, yet from the overgrowth of reeds and its 
 sluggish course, is so teeming with infusoria as to be quite unlit to 
 drink in summer. 
 
 The chief peculiarity of the rivers here is the low state of the 
 water ; in spring the greater part overflow the vast plains or form 
 
 * So called from flic munber of wild boar iu the yiciuifv.
 
 8 
 
 torrents in the deep ravines. In either case the mass of water 
 increases to large dimensions ; it becomes impossible to ford, 
 and, in order to cross, the Kirgeze are obliged to form rafts 
 (sals), and even bridges of bmidles of straw which they skil- 
 fully connect by means of horse-hair rope. But these high 
 floods do not last long ; the water commences to fall rapidlj', and 
 in summer the rivers become fordable everywhere, and in places 
 entirely dry up or form a few small pools. On this account 
 navigation along these rivers is impossible; even floating down at 
 the time of the floods is scarcely practicable, as at this season the 
 mass of water is very considerable and flows with destructive 
 velocity. Moreover, most of the rivers never reach the sea, but 
 lose themselves in the desert or empty themselves into lakes. 
 Another still more characteristic peculiarity of the rivers is that 
 the water at the end of the flood in the majority, for instance, 
 in the Uil, Sagiz, Emba, Irgiz, and some others, becomes so salt 
 or bitterly saline to the taste as to render it unfit for drinking in 
 summer and autumn. 
 
 The vegetation of the Kirgiz steppe is, as a rule, not abundant. 
 Woods, principally fir, are met with on the slopes of some of the 
 mountains, and in the northern part where there are the two well- 
 known pine forests, Aman Karagai and Ara-Karagai, situated in 
 the NicolaefF uyezd. The principal vegetation which covers the 
 steppes in spring is the feather-grass, Timothy grass, lucerne, 
 clover and wormood. Of other plants some species of poisonous 
 herbs are worthy of mention ; for instance, Mamerchup, about which 
 we have previously spoken, and Eitsygek, used by the robbers to 
 taint and poison the wells in those places frequented by our 
 detachments. Among the useful herbs may be mentioned : 
 Kumartchek, resembling in appearance rolling-flax, and used by 
 the Kirgeze as food in bad harvest years; Drovyanik, in Kirgiz 
 Kukpek, which is the best fuel in the steppe; the reed saksaul and 
 chi or chievnik ; also a kind of reed, from which the Kirgeze plait 
 very prettily-figured mats for their kibitkas. As regards saksafd 
 its outward appearance is somewhat like woodbine, but it has long 
 soft and saline prickles. The tree itself is strong, heavy, and 
 burns in the fire damply, emitting an agreeable odour. Saksaul 
 commences to be found in the steppe between the Mugojar moun- 
 tains and the Aral sea; but in consequence of the sandy soil 
 only grows as a dwarf shrub. As we travel southward it 
 becomes larger, and on the banks of the Syr Darya, where the soil 
 is clayey, attains a considerable height, growing like a tree, and 
 forming woods. On the Ust Urt, according to Levshin,* saksaul 
 also grows in abundance. 
 
 Many of the lakes, the banks of rivers and the sea-shores are 
 overgrown with reeds. Thus, on the north side of the Caspian, from 
 the mouth of the Ural to that of the Emba, a distance of 100 versts, 
 there grows a compact mass of reeds. Larger districts even are 
 covered Avith reeds for hundreds of square versts ; for example 
 
 * " Pcscriplion of the Kirgiz Hordes aud Steppe. 1832."
 
 9 
 
 the vicinitj' of the Aksakal lake, the banks of the Syr Darya, 
 and some parts of the east shore of the Aral. Generally speaking 
 the reed grows to a gigantic size, 20 to 35 feet in height. The 
 uses to -which it is applied are many ; the young reed is used by 
 the Kirgeze as hay; the heads of the old serve in winter as 
 fodder for cattle, while the stalks, where there is no wood, are 
 employed as fuel. Besides this, where the reeds grow high and 
 thick, there the nomad tents in winter find the best protection 
 against frost and storms. 
 
 The steppe is passable nearly everywhere, and consequently 
 the Kirgeze have no ideas of artificial modes of communication. 
 There are no roads, but there are certain directions taken l)y 
 the trade caravans, by the Kirgeze in their migrations, and by 
 our own military transports, leaving in the steppe broad paths or 
 deep cart ruts, which close up with grass so slowly that they re- 
 main visible for many years. In places where there is but little 
 water, the roads depend solely upon the position of the wells, 
 without which it would be impossible to exist in these deserts. 
 As regards postal communication, the principal road passes from 
 Orenburg through Orsk, Karabutak, Irgiz, and Kazala to Tashkent, 
 the so-called Orsk-Kasala road. Along- the whole of this road* 
 there are postal stations, at some of which Cossack picquets are 
 quartered during the summer; these remain at their posts up to 
 the return of the Kirgeze to their winter quarters. Postal com- 
 munication between the steppe forts and the detachments is 
 usually carried on by chabars (messengers) ; but of late years 
 attempts have been made to organize a regular service, a com- 
 mencement being made by opening the post road from Orenburg 
 to Ak-Tiube, from whence the Kirgeze, if required, willingly pro- 
 vide relays of horses either to the Emban post or to Karalnitak. 
 
 Towns of lonsr standins; are found onlv in the eastern part of 
 the Kirgiz steppe, which is under the Siberian jurisdiction ; they 
 serve as centres of administration of the Kirgeze, for instance, 
 Ormsk, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Petropavlovsk, Kokchetav, 
 Pavlodar, Kokpekty. In the western part, which is usually the 
 theatre of military operations, the towns are replaced by forts. Of 
 such are the forts in the Turgai district —Orenburg and Ural (in 
 Kirgiz, Djar Mola), which have recently been transformed into the 
 towns of Turgai and Irgiz ; after these come Forts Karabutak 
 and Ak-Tiube. The Ural district has for depots, the Emban post 
 and the forts of Lower Emba (in Kirgiz, Issen Berdy) and Uil 
 (Kugjar) ; the other towns, which are centres of Kirgiz adminis- 
 tration, are not properly in the steppe, but lie within the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Orenburg Government, as, for instance, Orenburg and 
 the Ilets Zashchita: or in the country of the Ural Cossacks, the 
 towns of Uralsk, Kalmykoff, and GuriefF. 
 
 Turkestan, which includes a considerable tract of the Kirgiz 
 
 * As we are aware, regular postal stations are only established at a few places 
 on the Kazala highroad, within the borders of the Orenburg steppe ; at other points 
 there are earthen huts or nomad tents, which, however, aflbrd no eonvcnienccs for 
 trarellcrs, particularly in the cold season.
 
 10 
 
 steppe, is divided into two districts, the Semirechinsk and Syr 
 Darya. 
 
 The general character of the region is steppe ; but all the 
 eastern, particularly the south-eastern part, may be more correctly 
 described as mountainous, having in some places an Alpine cha- 
 racter. Such is the Semirechinsk (Seven Rivers) district, the 
 eastern half of which is mountainous, being intersected by branches 
 of the Tian-Shan which attain an elevation of 16,000 feet above 
 the sea level. The Syr Darya district in some parts is very similar, 
 the north-east being traversed by part of the lofty snow-range of 
 the Alexander mountains, and their continuation known as the 
 Kara-tau, which strikes, as before-mentioned, the central course of 
 the Syr Darya, terminating at Fort Djulek. 
 
 Of the rivers which water this district, the principal are the 
 Syr, vi'ith its affluents, in the Semirechinsk district the Tchu, 
 which rises in the Tian-Shan beyond Issyk Kul, and the Hi which 
 also takes its rise in the Celestial mountains (Tian-Shan) but in 
 Djungaria. 
 
 Of the lakes, besides the Balkhash, of which we have previously 
 spoken, there is the very picturesque lake Issyk Kul, about 250 
 versts in length, surrounded by gigantic snow mountains. 
 
 All the northern, and also the south-western part of Turkestan, 
 presents one almost unbroken sandy steppe ; it commences on the 
 south-west with the desert of Kizyl Kum, bounded by the Khanates 
 of Bokhara and Khiva, thence passes to the north as the Kara 
 Kum desert, and from thence is continued as far as Lake Balkhash 
 under the name of the Hungry steppe * (Bek-pak-dala and Bispak 
 Kum). In spite, however, of the name, the scantiness of the 
 vegetation and the want of water, a very important caravan road 
 passes through this steppe from the town of Turkestan past 
 Akmolinsk to Petropavlovsk. 
 
 The fertile part of Turkestan commences close to the em- 
 bouchure of the Syr Darya, and extends as a narrow band along 
 its course and affluents, and also along the mountain valleys of 
 the south-eastern part of the Syr Darya, and the south of the 
 Semirechinsk, districts. But in spite of its fertility, the soil, in 
 consequence of the intense heat of the summer, demands a con- 
 siderable amount of artificial irrigation, without which agriculture 
 is impossible. 
 
 The seat of government and place of residence of the Governor- 
 General of Turkestan is Tashkent. In the Syr Darya district the 
 troops are distributed at the following points : — Kazala, Fort 
 No. 2, Perovsky, Djulek, Turkestan, Tchemkent, Tchinaz, 
 Khodjent, Aulie-ata, Merke, Ura-Tiul)e, and KliuchefF (near 
 Djizak). 
 
 The towns in the Semirechinsk district are Vernoe (district), 
 Kapal, Sergiopol, Tokmak, Karakol, and Fort Naryn. Besides 
 these there are in this district many villages of Siberian cossack 
 
 * The more accurate translation of the Kirgiz, " Bck pak dala," is flic Lousy 
 Steppe. •
 
 11 
 
 troops^ and with each year the colonisation of Semirechinsk with 
 emigrants from the interior of Russia is increasing, especially in 
 the southern part of the district. 
 
 II. 
 
 General Idea of the Kirgiz Nation and its subdivisions : AVinter locations of 
 the Kirgeze within the Orenburg jurisdiction ; Different Systems of 
 Administration of the Kirgeze up to the recent reforms ; Regulations of 
 1869 ; Mode of Life of the Kirgeze ; Education, Religion, Customs, 
 Cattle Breeding, and Summer Nomadising of the Kirgeze ; their Skill in 
 War, and Armament. — Tribes populating Turkestan, — Sarts, Uzbegs, and 
 Kara-Kirgeze. — Turkmen. 
 
 The primitive population of the steppe consists of nomad tribes 
 of Kirgeze, which, according to tradition, formed at one time, in a 
 political sense, a single race inhabiting this immense tract of ter- 
 ritory, speaking the same tongue and having one sovereign — a 
 Khan. One of these Khans, by name Alatch, shortly after the 
 fall of the Gengiz Khan dynasty, divided his possessions among 
 his three sons, by whom were founded the Little, Middle, and 
 Great Hordes. 
 
 The Great Horde nomadizes chiefly in Turkestan, and is partly 
 dispersed over the neighbouring Central Asian territory ; it is 
 divided into 5 races or 19 tribes. 
 
 The Central Horde occupies the steppe district of the present 
 Siberian jurisdiction, and consists of 4 races or 37 tribes. 
 
 The Little or Trans-Ural Horde, about which we shall speak 
 more in detail, occupies the Orenburg steppe, and consist of three 
 races which have been broken up into 25 tribes. These races are: 
 Alim, Baulyn, and Semirod (Jity-ruyu). 
 
 To the first of these belong six tribes : Kitin, with the branch 
 Ujiraef, Chumekeyef, Chiklin, Diurtkarin, Karasakal, and Kara- 
 kisyak. 
 
 To the second: AdaefF, Baibaktin, Alatchin, Maskar, Kyzylkurt, 
 Tcherkesh, Isyk^ Bershef, Isentemir, Yapas, Altyn, and Taz 
 (Tazlar*). 
 
 To the Semirod : the Tabyn, with the branch of Tchumyshli- 
 Tabyn, Tamin, Kerderin, Kireit, llomadan, Teleuf, and Jigal- 
 bailin. 
 
 Each of these tribes has a distinguishing badge or stamp [tamga) 
 and. a military Uran, or battle cry, a detailed study of which 
 would be very advantageous in so far that the stamp of a captured 
 herd, or the cry of an advancing foe, would serve to distinguish 
 the tribe of Kirgeze to which they severally belong. 
 
 In addition, each of these tribes is subdivided into divisions, 
 for instance, the Tchiklins have the following divisions : Kabak, 
 
 * Part of the Baiyulin race, as early as the commencement of the present centuiT, 
 passed over vnth. its sultan (Bukeya) to the Astrakhan government, and there formed 
 the separate inner or Bukeyef horde, -which, in the present day, is under the Govern- 
 ment-General of Orenburg.
 
 12 
 
 Nazal', Jikeyef. Jankliclief, Jakaim, Churenef, Tlyav, Kirgiz. The 
 divisions have also numerous subdivisions. 
 
 The highest grade are the sultans, descendants of the governing 
 Khans. As men belonging by their origin to the " ivhite bone,'^ 
 that is to say, to the desecndants of Chingiz Khan, they are not 
 included among any of the tribes, but have a genealogy of their own. 
 
 As the Kirgeze only nomadize in summer, and always return 
 in winter to one and the same localities, the locations of the 
 different tribes are designated in accordance with their more 
 permanent places of residence. 
 
 In the Turgai province : — 
 
 To the north, along the rivers Ubagai, Tobol, and the upper 
 part of the Turgai, live the Argyns and Kipchaks, which belong 
 properly to the Middle Horde, but have long since passed from 
 the Siberian to the Orenburg steppe. 
 
 Between the old and new Orenburg lines, the Kireits, and 
 along the lines themselves are dispersed the Yappas tribe, a great 
 part of which, how^ever, passes the winter in Turkestan on the Syr 
 Darya and in the Kara Kum desert. 
 
 Then, commencing from Upper Uralsk to Orsk and to Fort Hi 
 beyond, and in the steppe along the course of the Or, the Jigalbailins. 
 
 Along the River llek, the Novoiletz line, and the Ural, as far 
 as the Irtetsk advanced post of the Ural troops, the Tabyns and 
 Tamins. 
 
 From Fort Uralsk along the Irgiz southward as far as Terekli, 
 and to the east and north as far as the frontiers of the Turgai and 
 Nikolaef uyezds, the Chumikeyefs. 
 
 Furthei'^ among the Little Barsuk and along the bank of the 
 Aral sea as far as Perovsky bay, and to the north as far as the 
 frontiers of the Ilets and Nikolaef iiyezds^ the Diurtkarins; and 
 lastl y, 
 
 In the Great Barsuk, the Tchiklins. 
 
 In the Ural district the Kirgeze are distributed as follows : — 
 
 Along the Ural, between the Rubej and Kogikhar advanced 
 posts, winter the Kerderin tribe. 
 
 Beyond this, to Fort Topolin, come the Baibaktin tribe. 
 
 To the east of the latter, among the reeds of Lake Kara Kul, 
 live the Maskars; and opposite Fort Kulagin and the Grebensh- 
 chikof advanced post, the Kyzylkurts. 
 
 Down the Ural, from Fort Baksai to Saraicliik, the Bershefs. 
 
 Along the Caspian, opposite Gurief-Gorodok, are the Tcher- 
 kesh and Taz tribes. 
 
 To the east of the Ural, among the sources of the Uil, winters 
 part of the division of the Tchiklin tribe — the Tchurenefs, other 
 portions of which, occupy the reeds in the bays on the north- 
 eastern bank of the Caspian. 
 
 Together with the Tchurenefs, at the sources of the Uil, and 
 also in the Barkin sands and along the Sagiz, winter the Ujiraefs. 
 
 Below the Barkin, towards the mouth of the Uil, the Isen- 
 temirs. 
 
 Further on, in the desert of Taisugan, tlie Kitins ; and rather
 
 13 
 
 more to the northward, opposite Fort Kahnykof, aU>ng the River 
 Yakslii-Bau, the Alatchins. 
 
 Then, at the mouths of the Uil, the Sagiz, and partly along the 
 Emba, are the winter quarters of the Issyks. 
 
 Then, from Kondoral to the sources of the Emba, the Nazars ;* 
 and opposite Kondoral, in the Jiltau mountains beyond the Emba, 
 the Karakilyaks. 
 
 At the same place, along the left bank of the Emba and on 
 the Ust Urt in the Asmantai-Matai and Sam deserts, and further 
 on close up to the Khivan territory, are the Tchumyshli-Tabyns ; 
 and still further, in Bulatch and Mangyshlak, the Adaefs. f 
 
 The remaining tribes : Altyns, Romadans, Teleufs, Karasakals, 
 and part of the Yappas, Diurtkarins and some others, winter on 
 the Syr Darya, i.e., in Turkestan. 
 
 In passing to the administration of the Kirgeze, we must 
 mention that up to 1869 the Orenburg and Siberian steppes were 
 administered on two different systems, the commencement of which 
 dates from the year 1812. 
 
 Up to that time Russia had scarcely interfered at all in the 
 internal life of the Kirgiz people, striving only to prevent their 
 incursions and to secure its own trade relations with Central 
 Asia. The Khans, at the head of the administration, acted almost 
 uncontrolled, deceived Russia on many occasions, and were the chief 
 instigators of the disturbances and outbreaks among the members 
 of the Horde. In consequence of this, after a lapse of 12 years, 
 the dignity of Khan was abolished, and the M'hole of the steppe 
 within the Orenburg jurisdiction divided into three parts, each 
 under a separate Sultan Governor. But this did not answer, as 
 these Sultan Governors, although under the control of Russian 
 officials, were the same as Kirgeze Khans, with this sole diflerence 
 that while the steppe was previously administered by one, it was 
 now managed by three absolute persons who did not enjoy the con- 
 fidence of the people. As a proof of this we may mention that 
 during the summer peregrinations in the steppe, it was found 
 necessary to have a special escort, consisting ordinarily of a whole 
 sotnia of Ural or Orenburg Cossacks, for the protection of the 
 Sultan Governors. 
 
 In 1837, a tax of 1 rouble 50 copecks (silver) per kibitka was 
 imposed on the Orenburg Kirgeze. The Siberian Kirgeze paid 
 tribute, that is to say, a fixed payment from cattle, which brought 
 in from 2 roubles to 2 roubles 70 copecks per kibitka. 
 
 Generally the system of administration of the Siberian Kirgeze 
 answered well. Twenty years after the abolition of the dignity of 
 Khan, it was found possible to introduce Siberian regulations and 
 institutions among the Kirgeze, and by slow degrees the Russian 
 laws in regard to justice and administration, adapting these laws 
 as far as possible to their peculiar circumstances. 
 
 * Division of the Tchiklin tribe. 
 
 + Part of the Adaefs, the so-called Balaksh, or Yatak people, that is 1o 
 saj, Kirgeze who are not noniadie, pass tlic winter in flic lower part of the Emba.
 
 14 
 
 On tliis basis the nomad population of the Siberian steppe was 
 divided into circles {okrug), with a regular administrative staff 
 { prikaz*), and the circle subdivided into volosts, and this again 
 into aids. 
 
 At the same time bj' populating part of the Kirgiz steppe with 
 Cossacks brought from the Siberian line, a considerable Russian 
 population was transferred into the depth of the steppe, thereby 
 serving as a means of bringing the Kirgeze into closer contact with 
 the Russians, and of disseminating civilised ideas among them ; the 
 formation of bureaux led to the founding of towns^ such as Akmo- 
 linsk, Kopal, Sergiopol, which even in the present day are centres 
 of local administration for the Kirgese. 
 
 But even this system in the course of time demanded fresh 
 additions and modifications. After the translation of our boundaries 
 from the Ural and Irtish more than 1,000 versts into the depths 
 of Asia, and in particular after the formation of the Turkestan 
 General Government, the Kirgiz steppe, at one time forming the 
 frontier territory of Russia, became the interior of the Empire, 
 and attention had now to be turned to gradually identifying this 
 region with Russia. This object could only be attained by the in- 
 troduction of a settled administration, similar in its main principles 
 to the institutions of the Empire, with such differences as were 
 demanded by the character of the nation, their degree of develop- 
 ment, and lastly the economical and political conditions under 
 which the Kirgiz population existed. 
 
 With this object a special commission was formed, the labours 
 of which terminated in 1868 with the issue of "temporary regu- 
 lations for the administration of the Uralsk, Turgaisk, Akmo- 
 linsk, and Semipalatinsk" districts. 
 
 On the basis of this regulation all the lands occupied by the 
 Kirgiz nomads were proclaimed as imperial, and reserved for the 
 sole public use of the Kirgeze. The rights of all Kirgeze in the 
 general imperial service were assimilated to the rights of the 
 ordinary rural populations of the Empire. 
 
 The entire steppe, as we have already seen, forms part of six 
 districts under the chief jurisdiction of the Siberian, Orenburg, 
 and Turkestan General Governments. Each district is adminis- 
 tered on identical principles by a sej)arate military Governor, who, 
 at the same time, is commander of the troops in the district. The 
 districts are divided into iiyezds. In the uyezds the Kirgeze are 
 formed into volosts and aids. In each aid there are from 100 to 
 200 kibitkas, and in each volost ],000 to 2,000 kibitkas. 
 
 For certain crimes, such as treason, murder, highway robbery, 
 intertribal robbery, making counterfeit coin, the Kirgeze are 
 amenable to the general criminal code of the Empire ; but in 
 decisions on purely tribal matters, and also for the examination of 
 claims and litigations, they have a native tribunal which is held 
 
 * Prikaz, or biiroau for civil administration, of which the superintendents were 
 vested with pohtical and judicial powers. Tliev were abolislied on the introduction 
 of the steppe reform in I'SGI-'d.— Translator.
 
 15 
 
 publicly by chosen persons called Biys. The Biys, who are 
 appointed by the choice of the people, serve without any pay, but 
 after pronouncing judgment receive a fine from the guilty, which 
 is determined by tribal customs. 
 
 Having equal rights with the rural populations, the Kirgeze, like 
 them, avoid a great part of the Imperial obligations, paying a tax 
 of 3 roubles per kibitka ; they give no recruits, and furnish no 
 militia, their obligations being limited to providing mounted horse- 
 men at the requisition of the commander of the forces. 
 
 As regards their domestic life it is simply an exact counterpart 
 of the most patriarchal times. The people are in every sense 
 pastoral. Their intellectual development is not high, although it 
 is impossible to deny their natural capacity, evidence of which is 
 given by those who have been educated at the different schools. 
 But only the children of rich parents receive education. All other 
 Kirgeze, even Sultans and Biys, either remain ignorant or can 
 merely read and write Tatar. 
 
 The Kirgeze profess the Mahommedan religion, of the Sunnite 
 sect ; but with it are blended many Pagan procedures, as, for in- 
 stance, the custom of praying to God at the graves of renowned 
 Batyrs* who have perished in wars with our troops. The Kirgeze 
 look upon them as saints (auHe), and as the equals of those who in 
 life as mullahs addressed themselves to the study of the Koran 
 and the tenets of their religion. For instance, when a contagious 
 disease breaks out among the neighbouring flocks, the Kirgeze 
 bring up their herds to the tomb of the renowned batyr Uten, at 
 Issen Berdy, near the mouth of the Emba; they also bring up 
 their sick children and their barren women, and remain at the 
 town for several days passing the time in prayer and sacrifice. 
 
 Like all Asiatics, the Kirgeze are by nature kind-hearted ; they 
 never refuse a traveller lodging and food, but at the same time 
 they are unacquainted with the usages of hospitality in the broad 
 sense understood by our Caucasian mountaineers. Thus they 
 permit every possible fraud, artifice, and perfidy to be practised on 
 their enemies, and consequently in any relations with them it is 
 necessary to be always on one's guard. 
 
 The Kirgeze are little addicted to agriculture, as cattle-breeding 
 has for a longtime served as their chief source of wealth and pros- 
 perity. They breed with success sheep, goats, horses, camels, ard, 
 to the north of the Emba, horned cattle; the latter, however, are 
 few in number. These herds provide them with food, dainty 
 diinks {kumis and airan), clothing, felts, the necessary means of 
 transport, and articles for barter with the Russians. 
 
 Having a large stock of cattle, the Kirgeze naturally cannot 
 provide a sufficiency of grass for them in the uinter. Although 
 of late years, by arrangement with the local government, they 
 make hay and organise public stores of that commodity for winter, 
 yet it is only given to a few of the best horses, camels, and some of 
 the milch cows ; the rest of the herd find their own under-foot 
 
 * " Bravop,"
 
 16 
 
 grass. Instinct in this case aids the animal in saving himself 
 from inevitable death from hunger ; horses, sheep, goats, even 
 horned cattle, scrape away the snoAv with their hoofs in order to 
 find the grass underneath. But if the winter is very severe, the 
 snow deep, and they find an undercrust of ice which they cannot 
 break through with their hoofs, great havoc is caused among the 
 flocks from hunger, and in a very few days the Kirgiz is deprived 
 of all his means of existence. 
 
 As a protection against cold and wind the Kirgeze endeavour to 
 pass the winter in sheltered places, in hollows, or among reeds or 
 sand dunes. They conceal their kibitkas in the reeds, and throw 
 snow over them, so as to protect them from the winds ; but, not- 
 withstanding this, the cold is so penetrating that the Kirgeze are 
 now commencing to build permanent dwellings, usually of turf, 
 plastered with clay, or of stone, like the l^uts of the Caucasian 
 mountaineers ; in some places wooden houses are even met with, 
 but these have chiefly belonged to former Kirgiz sultans. On 
 the return of the first hot weather, the Kirgeze abandon their 
 dwellings and remove to the kibitkas, which are more suited to 
 their mode of life. The kibitka is a simple wood frame, arranged 
 in a circle, and cupola sha])ed ; on the outside it is covered with 
 felt ; at the top, in the centre, is a large round opening, called the 
 thindiuk, which admits light and allows the smoke egress. 
 
 The poorer classes cover their djulameiks with the ordinary 
 grey felt ; but the richer ornament them with large felts, and 
 spread the inside with carpets, rich cloths, silk stuffs, and even 
 velvet. 
 
 Being able to strike and pitch a kibitka in half an hour, the 
 Kirgiz carries it in summer on a camel to wherever he can find 
 sufficient grass and water for his cattle. Nomadising generally 
 commences in early spring and continues all the summer, the 
 Kirgeze returning to their winter camps in late autumn. They 
 nomadise ordinarily in small bodies which are called aids, and 
 are formed of a few families of three to five, and seldom more 
 than 10 kibitkas.* The route of the nomads depends on the time of 
 year, the local conditions and the state of the grass in the steppe. 
 
 Ordinarily the Kirgeze who have passed the winter in the 
 north move southward in the spring, and those of tlie south 
 move to the north. If the grass is good, the summer nomads are 
 distributed pretty equally over the whole steppe; but if there has 
 been little snow during the winter, and the summer, after a short 
 spring, comes on sooner and the temperature rises, then all the 
 southern part of the steppe becomes deserted, and masses of Kirgeze 
 in their search for water and grass, move from the £,outh into the 
 Iletsk, and to the northern part of the Ural and Irgiz tiyezds. 
 To what distances they proceed may be gathered from the fact 
 that tribes which pass the winter on the Syr Darya, reach the 
 Upper Turgai, the Ul-Koyak, and even pass beyond the new line ; 
 
 * The autlioi- is here probably speaking of tlie Orenburg part of the ^tejipc, as 
 in the other part* of the Kirghiz steppe the size of the aids is very mucli Larger.
 
 17 
 
 while on this side of the Emba, along tlie banks of the 
 Sagiz, Uil and Khobda, appear the aids of the Tchumyshli-Tabyns, 
 the Adaefs, and those Kirgeze who migrate to us in summer 
 from the Khivan frontiers. 
 
 With regard to the last mentioned, they do not customarily 
 return to the Khivan frontiers before the middle of September, or 
 even the beginning of October. The Kirgeze who decamp to Khiva 
 before that period are generally fugitives hiding from the conse- 
 quences of the law, and from the punishment which awaits them. 
 
 The Kirgeze during their rambles are not generally allowed to 
 halt, until beyond the Emba, without permission of the com- 
 mander of the district, and if an ml is met with without this 
 permission, the patrols sent out from the troops are obliged to 
 order it to the left bank of the Emba. This rule is based upon 
 the fact that the Kirgeze do not halt on the other side of the 
 Emba for forage for their cattle, as the nearer the north the better 
 the grass ; but in order to capture some horses or to harbour 
 robber gangs, who await in these aids favourable opportunities for 
 pillage. 
 
 In conclusion we will add that^ from a military point of view, the 
 sole merit of the Kirgeze is that they are able to bear fatigues and 
 privations. It is a matter of no importance for a Kirgiz to go 
 without meat for months so long as be has groats and millet^ of 
 which there is always a supply, and, in their absence, roots. With 
 his water also he is not fastidious, and from habit is able to bear 
 thirst for a long time. His sense of sight is so keenly developed 
 that on level ground he can see small objects at 10 versts ; when 
 a European sees only indistinct points, the Kirgiz is able to 
 distinguish the outlines of an object, the colour of a horse, &c. 
 His capacity for finding his way is not less remarkable; the 
 smallest elevation of ground serves as a sign which he never 
 forgets ; if there is no mark, the presence of certain grasses, and the 
 direction in which they grow, show him the road. Eye witnesses 
 relate on this subject that after having lost the road, a Kirgiz 
 has been seen to dismount, tear up a handful of dry grass, and 
 after smelling it, quietly change the direction. These qualities 
 make them valuable for reconnoitring duties; but their military 
 valour and courage are somewhat doubtful. The most warlike of 
 all are the Kirgeze of the Adaef race, but they are nothing but 
 bandits, and are bold only in plundering caravans. The cause 
 of this possibly lies in the very nature of the attack in which 
 pillage and easy gain are the only motors ; but these motors, 
 naturally, cannot make a wlvjle race brave and intrepid. To this 
 we must add that being skilful riders by nature, not iiesitating 
 to mount perfectly unbroken hordes, they are unable to fight on 
 foot, and therefore do not possess the least steadiness in warfare. 
 
 But all these qualities do not prevent them from inflicting 
 serious harm upon the bravest enemy, if not in the open field, by 
 seizing his defenceless people, driving off his herds at the least want 
 of vigilance on the i)art of the sentries, and plundering his baggage. 
 The Kirgeze generally treat their captives with less rigour than 
 
 C
 
 18 
 
 other Asiatics, but this good trait proceeds not so much from 
 kindness of heart as from interested motives, and the desire to 
 sell them as advantageously as possible in the markets of Khiva 
 and Bokhara. 
 
 The arms of the Kirgeze at present are of a primitive descrip- 
 tion. They consist ordinarily of a very straight and thin lance 
 {n'ditd) and a curved Persian sabre {klych) of very slight value. 
 They use fire-arms but little ; although some of the Kirgeze 
 have percussion arms, the majority have the old firelock {beltie 
 umidtiik), which they could only fire, if they would, on foot; 
 and this the Kirgeze never do. Bows and arrows have en- 
 tirely gone out of use, so that of the ancient national arms they 
 have retained only the battle hammer (ai-baltu), a small axe on a 
 straight handle, and the kamcha, or thick whip, a powerful 
 weapon in the adept and strong hands of a Kirgiz. 
 
 Tribes inhabiting Turkestan : — Sarts.^ — The Sarts are a com- 
 plete contrast to the Kirgeze, and are the chief representatives of 
 settled life in our Turkestan possessions. Some suppose that the 
 Sarts are a special race of Persian extraction ; but in Turkestan 
 the Sarts may be taken to include generally all inhabitants of 
 towns and villages. The Sarts are inclined by preference to a 
 quiet life, their principal occupations being agriculture, trade and 
 gardening. To this we must add that the Sarts generally are very 
 religious and have a desire for learning, very few illiterate persons 
 being found among them ; nevertheless this race is exceedingly 
 eff'eminate, cunning, cowardly^ and addicted to petty trade, not 
 unlike our Jews. 
 
 Of the other tribes peopling our Turkestan possessions we 
 must mention the Kara Kirgeze. 
 
 Kara Kirgeze (Black Kirgeze or Dikokamens) form part of 
 the Turk race, and chiefly inhabit the frontiers of the Semire- 
 chinsk province. The descent of the Kara Kirgeze is not known 
 for certain ; l)ut there is reason to believe that they are descend- 
 ants of the same great Uzbeg horde which was brought here by 
 Gengiz Khan. Many ascribe their origin to the same causes as 
 our Cossacks, It is said that they were slaves, homeless and 
 oppressed men, who, at last losing patience, fled to other steppes 
 in order to lead a free and independent life. This race, o^ing 
 to its life in the mountains and its natural taste for pillage, which, 
 however, has decreased considerably with its subjection to Russian 
 power, surpasses all the other Kirgeze in boldness, dash, and 
 military spirit. Their tribal institutions differ from the Kirgeze 
 of other hordes in having no hereditary aristocracy. They devote 
 themselves almost entirely to eattle breeding. 
 
 Turkmen. — Lastlv, in the neighbourhood of the Kirgeze of 
 the Adaef race, who nomadize on the Mangyshlak peninsula, live 
 the Turkmen. Their country extends from the Caspian to the 
 River Amu, and from the south side of the Ust Urt to the Persian 
 
 * Sart is not an ctlmograpbical name, but ajjplies to all the inhabitants of towns 
 eiigaged in trade. The chief mass of the settled population in Turkestan belongs 
 properly to the Tadjiks, a race of ludo-Ii-an extraction. 
 
 I 
 
 I
 
 19 
 
 frontiers. The Turkmen steppe is for the most part a sandy 
 district, in which wells are met with only along certain routes. 
 The southern parts of the steppe, which extend to the Atrek and 
 Giurgen, the branches of the Khorassan mountains, and even the 
 mouths of the Amu, present more conveniences for life, and con- 
 sequently the bulk of the Turkmen congregate at these points. 
 
 Robbing caravans and carrying off captives form the special 
 business of this race, which in fact acknowledges no power, and is 
 subject to no one. Some of the Turkmen, to the number of 
 6,000, are found moreover within our frontiers. This people, in 
 the full sense of the word are horsemen ; they are clothed partly 
 in coats of mail, armed with shields and lances (with pennons of 
 horse's tails), and mounted on stallions ; in comparison with 
 others they may be called warriors. Of late years, in order to attain 
 some influence over this people, and to induce them to trade 
 with Russia, Fort Tash-Arvat-Kal (of which we shall speak later) 
 was founded on the east shore of the Caspian, near the Balkhau 
 mountains. 
 
 III. 
 
 Short History of the Military Operations in the 
 Steppe and in Turkestan. 
 
 Importance of the Kirgiz Steppe to Russia. — Acceptation by the Kirgeze of 
 Russian Supremacy, aud Establishment of the Frontier Line. — Plea- 
 sures taken by the Government for pacifying the Kirgeze, from the time 
 of their coming under subjection until 1836. — Increase of incursions and 
 pillage about this time. — Rebellion of Kenisara Kasimof — Establish 
 ment of our Dominion in the Steppe on a solid basis. — Disorders instigated 
 in the Steppe by Iset Kutebarof. — Insurrection of 1869. — Occupation of 
 Krasnovodsk Bay, and proceedings on the Mangyshlak peninsula. — Mili- 
 tary operations in 1870-71. 
 
 The important position occupied by the Kirgiz steppe, on the 
 trade route between Russia and the Central Asian Khanates, has 
 for a long time attracted the attention of the Russian Government, 
 which aimed at the subjection of the Kirgiz-Kaisats horde. 
 " Although this Kaisats horde,'' said Peter the Great, ''is a 
 " steppe and giddy race, yet this horde is the key and gate to 
 " all Asiatic lands and countries." 
 
 The great regenerator of Russia, with the thought always upper- 
 most of opening a new route for our trade witli the East, did not 
 succeed in realising his cherished idea ; his successors, however, 
 following up the work which he had commenced, succeeded little l^y 
 little in bringing the Kirgiz people to acknowledge their subjection 
 to Russia. In 1732, the Khan Abul-Khair, the administrator of 
 the Little Horde, took the oath of allegiance to the Empress Anne 
 Ivanovna. It is of course understood that this subjection, which 
 was shortly followed by that of the Middle Horde, was merely 
 outward, as the Kirgeze did not give up their incursions even to 
 Sakmara and the Volga. But at first it was necessary to be 
 satisfied with what we obtained. 
 
 C 2
 
 20 
 
 The organization of our south-east frontier was commenced 
 after a few years, in 1735, when the town of Orenburg was founded 
 on the site of the present town of Orsk, becoming ere long the 
 head-quarters of the military governors, and the principal centre 
 of administration of all the Orenburg region.* 
 
 The first administrators of this region were Kirilof, Tatishchef, 
 and then Nepliuyef. Not satisfied with founding a town, they 
 established a fortified line,t which was at that time peopled 
 by the Cossacks of Uphim, Samara and Iset, under the general 
 name of the Orenburg troops,^ This line leaving Orenburg 
 (transferred in 1742 to its present site) extended down the Ural, 
 then called the Yaik, and passed by the forts Cherno-rechensk, 
 Perevobtsk, Tatishchef, and Nijne-ozerny to the River Ilek, 
 where it was terminated by Fort Razcypna. Up the Ural, the 
 fortified line passed from Orenburg bv the Nijni redoubt, Forts 
 Krasnogorsk, Verkhne-ozerny, Guberlinsk and Orsk, up to the 
 Upper Uralsk, and from thence extended to the east as far as the 
 River Tobol, where it was terminated by the Fort Zverinogolovsk. 
 
 But as this frontier line did not entirely protect the region 
 from the incursions of robbers, and the lower course of the Ural 
 still remained exposed, it appeared indispensable to form a similar 
 line on the Lower Yaik. In point of fact, between 1830-40, two 
 for Is were built here, Kalmykof and Kulagin, which in their turn 
 formed the commencement of the advanced posts of the Lower 
 Line {Nizovaya Linya) and presented a fortified chain of posts, 
 distributed on either side of Yaitsk Gorodok, down stream, — as far 
 as the Caspian sea, where there was the fortified town of Guriefi', 
 at that time under Cossack jurisdiction, § and up stream, — 
 as far as the Irtetz advanced post, where the picquets of the Iletz 
 Cossacksjl commenced, which in their turn connected the Irtetz 
 advanced post with Fort Razcypna. The third line was established 
 along the River Sakmara. It commenced at Sakmara Gorodok^ 
 and passed through Forts Prechisten and Vozdvijen in the direc- 
 tion of Yerkhneozerny. 
 
 There is no doubt that all these measures were productive of 
 advantage in due course, but nevertheless the constant insur- 
 rections of the Bashkyrs and Kalmyks, accompanied with dis- 
 orders in the neighbouring Yait force, and afterwards the troublous 
 
 * The Orenburg region included the j^rovinces of Orenburg, Uphim, Iset, and 
 Samara. 
 
 t A line consisted of a chain of Cossack settlements, or advanced posts, 
 frequently strengthened with mud walls, or wooden stockades. There are usually 
 15 to 20 men at each post. The garrisons sometimes consist of as many as 150 men, 
 according to the importance of the post. — Translator. 
 
 X Ultimately the Orenburg forces ■vs'ere organised by Imperial Ukase, 14. 4. 1755, 
 and the first Ataman appomted in the person of Easily Mogutof. 
 
 § Up to that time Grurieff, founded about the middle of the 17th century, had 
 always held a garrison of riflemen for the protection of the fisheries at the mouths of 
 the Yaik from robberies. 
 
 II These were the Yait Cossacks, who, m 1720-30, moved to the River Uek, 
 where they founded Iletzk Gorodok, with some advanced posts. 
 
 IF The foundation of Sakmara Gorodok, which took place at the same time as 
 Iletzk, was laid by the Yait Cossacks, who were shifted here in order to prevent 
 the Kirgeze from canning on their incursions to the River Sakmara.
 
 21 
 
 Pugatchef times drew off the attention of the government from 
 the peaceful development of the country for a time, and only 
 with the gradual establishment of tranquility in the Orenburg 
 region, not earlier than the commencement of the present 
 century, was there at length a possibility of opening trade 
 relations with Khokand and Bokhara. Murders and robberies, 
 however, again suspended this trade. The instigators of these 
 fresh and almost continuous disorders in the steppe were the 
 Khivans, who incited the Kirgeze not only to plunder the 
 caravans, but to make attacks on the line, particularly upon 
 our fishermen, in order to carry them off and sell them in 
 the Khivan markets. 
 
 At first it was hoped that the Kirgeze would be subdued by 
 sending a detachment to punish them for their robberies and 
 depredations; but after the ill success with which two similar 
 expeditions had been attended in 1809, we were convinced that 
 this means was of little use. Then commenced our occupation of 
 the Iletzk ravon, that is to say, the district between the rivers Ural, 
 Ilek, and Berdyanka, where the Berdyan-Kuralinsk line was 
 founded for the defence of the Iletzk salt v/orks. It was also 
 decided that when trade caravans were sent into the steppe they 
 should always be accompanied by a military escort. 
 
 In 1824, the first caravan proceeded to Bokhara under the 
 protection of a detachment of 500 men; but the caravan was met 
 by the Khivans and plundered. Tlie experiment, therefore, did 
 not, unfortunately, succeed, and meanwhile tlie audacity of the 
 Kirgeze reached such a pitch that they commenced to carry off 
 Russians, not only from the line and the Caspian sea, but even 
 from the neighbourhood of Orenburg itself. 
 
 In order to diminish the depredations and incursions from 
 which our fisheries, in particular, suffered, the first Russian fort, 
 called Novo-Alexandrovsk,* was founded in the summer of 1834, on 
 the north-east bank of the Caspian, while for the delence of the 
 other frontiers of the empire, it was almost decided to form a 
 continuous rampart, like the Chinese Wall, which was to extend 
 along the steppe frontier where there was no natural protection. 
 These works were commenced in 1836 ; part of the rampart was 
 completed, but nevertheless the disorders did not cease. 
 
 The proximate causes on this occasion \\ere the surveying of 
 Kirgiz territory for Cossack settlements on the new Orenburg line,t 
 and the attempt to collect the taxes (1 r. 50 c. per kibitka). These 
 measures gave dissatisfaction to the nomads, who formed into 
 gangs, and commenced not only to fall unawares upon the peaceful 
 Kirgeze aids and our frontier line, but even plundered our caravans 
 in the neighbourhood of Novo Alexandrovsk. The principal leaders 
 
 * This fort was afterwards transferred to Tiuk-Ivaragan bav, ou the Mangy- 
 shlak peninsula, and called at first Fort Novo-Petrovsk, and subsequently Fort 
 Alexander. 
 
 t This line was placed in advance of the old, between the Ural and the upper 
 course of the Tobol. It commenced from Orsk, and passed from the north-east 
 through Forts Imperator, Konstantinof, Nikolaieff (now a town), and Mikacloif, from 
 whence it struck the old line between Ust-Uisk and Troitsk.
 
 22 
 
 of these insurrectionary bands at this time were Kaip and Isetai, 
 fugitives from the Bukeyef horde, who had found an asylum and 
 shelter with the Khivan Khan. 
 
 It was then resolved to have recourse to more decisive 
 measures for the punishment of the insurrectionary Kirgeze by 
 force of arms. In fact, Cossack parties penetrated in 1836 to 
 Mangyshlak,* carried reconnaissances into the Barsuk Sands, and 
 up the course of the Khobda, dispersed some gangs, and estab- 
 lished tranquility, which lasted throughout the following year. 
 Before long, however, Kaip and Isetai reappeared with fresh 
 parties to collect taxes from our Kirgeze, and moved along the 
 Rivers Ilek, Khobda, and the Upper Tobol, in proximity to 
 our frontiers. Cossack detachments were again despatched into 
 the steppe, of which one succeeded in falling upon the principal 
 gang at the sources of the Irgiz ; Isetai was killed and Kaip fled to 
 Khiva, where all trace of him was lost. 
 
 But scarcely had we succeeded in getting rid of these insurgents 
 when there appeared a fresh leader, Sultan Kenisara Kasimof, whose 
 name even now occupies a most prominent place in all Kirgeze 
 traditions. His proclamation inflamed the whole steppe; he 
 declared himself Khan of the Ordyn tribe, and commenced a 
 struggle W'hich gave no little trouble to our local administration. 
 
 The military operations on our side were conducted with 
 great want of vigour; they were at one time interrupted by the 
 pretended submission of Kenisara Kasimof, but were again com- 
 menced in consequence of the renewed audacious pretensions of the 
 rebel ; we not only did not succeed in crushing the disorder, but, 
 on the contrary, allowed the movement to take that dangerous 
 character of an unanimous and general insurrection, with which it 
 was not easy to deal ; the more so as it was headed by a daring, 
 clever, and most energetic man. 
 
 Aflfairs remained in the same state until the beginning of 1844, 
 when the military operations from the Orenburg line were 
 directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Lebedef, a man of talent, and at 
 the same time well acquainted with the steppe, and the character 
 of steppe warfare. A series of rapid marches and destructive raids,t 
 which in Lebedef's opinion were the only means for subduing 
 the rebels, quickly acquired for him considerable renown in the 
 steppe ; but astonishment and respect for him increased still more 
 when the Kirgeze saw how cleverly he pursued their leader, 
 harassing him everywhere in spite of the superiority of Kenisara's 
 force and his numerous subterfuges. 
 
 Unfortunately these successes were interrupted at the very 
 outset, as Lebedef was replaced by Colonel Dunikofsky, a man 
 quite unsuited to conduct military operations at such a critical 
 moment. Renouncing the system of raids, Dunikofsky col- 
 lected around him a considerable number of sultans, biys, and 
 
 * This expedition was undertaken by Colonel Mansiirolf, with five sotnias of 
 TJral Cossacks. 
 
 t Lebedef, for the first time, substituted a train of horses and two-wheeled carls 
 for cauu'ls.
 
 23 
 
 other Ordyus of note, of which he formed an advanced guard, on 
 the supposition that these men, by their moral influence alone, 
 without having recourse to arms, would succeed in bringing into 
 subjection the aids which had seceded from us. This calcula- 
 tion proved fallacious. At tlie time when Dunikofsky was 
 vacillating, Kenisara w'as collecting his forces, awaiting the 
 approach of the detachment to the sources of the Tobol. Here 
 he attacked our advanced guard so unexpectedly, that the biys, 
 sultans, and other Ordyns of rank were annihilated almost under 
 the eyes of the detachment, without the latter being able to 
 prevent it. This was not all. Taking advantage of another 
 mistake on the part of Dunikofsky in following the rebels into 
 the depths of the steppe, Kenisara made a raid on our 
 frontiers, where he committed every possible enormity and 
 burnt some Cossack advanced posts, threatening the entire new 
 line " as being wrongfully formed in Kirgeze country.'' 
 
 Such an unfortunate issue to the expedition naturally 
 destroyed the confidence of the Kirgeze in our power, and at the 
 same time inspired them with awe and deference for their 
 invincible Khan, the '* Kirgiz Shamyl," as a contemporary 
 historian calls him. In point of fact we find that the follow'ing 
 year (1845) was one of the greatest glory for this renowned steppe 
 batyr. Haughty and proud Asiatic rulers sought his alliance and 
 friendship. Kenisara, moreover, subjected some tribes of Kirgeze, 
 which nomadised on the frontiers of the Chinese empire, and 
 marched to subdue the Kipchaks ; but here, during an action in 
 the Ala Tau, he was killed by the Kara Kirgeze, who objected to 
 being suljject to his rigorous rule. 
 
 These events, which entailed on our side so obstinate and 
 prolonged a struggle, palpably showed the necessity of a more 
 active and vigorous policy in tiie steppe; the best means for this 
 was considered to be the erection of a series of forts to serve as 
 defensive points. With this object, between 1846-48, were 
 founded the Orenburg, Ural, and Karabutak forts. 
 
 Our advance tended much to the tranquility of the steppe 
 adjacent to the Orenburg line, but had little influence on the 
 Kirgeze who nomadised beyond the River Emba, on the Ust Urt 
 and, in particular, along tlie banks of the Syr Darya. Hence 
 arose the necessity for strengthening our position on the Aral Sea, 
 and in 1847 our first fort called Raim* was built at the mouth of 
 the Syr Darya. In the same year was founded the Russian flotilla 
 for the navigation of the Aral Sea.f 
 
 After this commenced our gradual occupation of the Syr Darya 
 line, so that early in the decade between 1850-60 the chain of 
 Russian forts extended from the side of Siberia, from Irtysh through 
 Kopal to Fort Vernoe; and from the side of the Orenburg line as 
 far as the Aral sea, and further along the Syr Darya to Fort 
 Julek, about which we shall speak presently. At this period was 
 
 * The name of this fort was changed to Aral, and was afterwards trars- 
 f erred higher up the Syr Darya to Kazala, and called Fort No. 1. 
 
 t Steamers were mtrodixced on the Syr Darya in the beginning of 1853.
 
 also founded the Eraba Post, built at the sources of the F-mba, 
 for the better observation of those Kirgeze who nomadised 
 beyond this river and on the Ust Urt. 
 
 In spite, however, of all these measures, and of the fact that 
 Khiva itself was in constant dread for its own safety, as the 
 steamers navigating the Aral showed themselves sometimes near 
 the mouth of the Amu Darya, tranquility in the steppe was 
 violated more than once during the Crimean War, by the 
 reappearance of the batyr I set Kutebarof. The name of Iset 
 gained renown in the steppe in 1820-30, when he took part in all 
 the expeditions of his father Kutebar, the w'ell known Kirgiz 
 barantash.^ Having plundered several caravans from Siberia as 
 well as some from our Cossack lines, Iset, on the death of his 
 father removed into Khiva, from whence he came in 1844 to 
 General Obruchef with the offer of his services to the Russian 
 Government. His services were accepted, and at first Iset was 
 really of use to us by his influence over some of the turbulent 
 Kirgeze ; but this did not last long. Attempts to recommence 
 his depredations, first in 1847 and afterwards in the following 
 year, with the aid of a strong body of Tchiklins, forced us to 
 send a detachment against him. Then Kutebarof tendered his 
 submission, but covertly continued his relations with Khiva, 
 and in the beginning of 1853 again renewed his incursions. 
 Kuteljarof's audacity increased at this time, particularly after his 
 successful attacks upon the Cossack sotnia which was escorting the 
 sultan governor Araslan Jantiurin,t and upon a small detachment 
 despatched to fetch provisions from the Krnba.^ This revolt 
 sjiread far and wide. The whole of 1856 and the beginning of 
 1857 passed in military operations. However, the difficulty and 
 almost the impossibility of capturing Kutebarof, who had 
 confederates everywhere, forced Adjutant-General Katenin, just 
 nominated chief of the Orenburg district, to have recourse 
 to a new means, and to promise Iset pardon in the event 
 of his tendering unconditional surrender. These negotiations 
 were successful, and in the summer of 1857, when General 
 Katenin moved into the steppe, Iset came to oflfer submission. 
 Afterwards Iset Kutebarof was for some time administrator of the 
 Kabftk division of the Tchiklin tribe, and in 1869 was appointed 
 assistant to the chief of the Irgiz Circle in return for the 
 co-operation he had afforded in introducing the new steppe 
 code among the Kirgeze of the Tchiklin tribe. 
 
 * See p. VI and p. 74. 
 
 t Araslan marclied out into the steppe in the summer of 1855 with an escort of 
 a Cossack sotnia and 900 Kirgeze. Oii the 7th Jidy he halted for the night 140 
 vcrsts from Fort Orsk. Here he was attacked by Kiitebarof. A large party went 
 sti'aight to the kibitka of Jantiurin, whilst another surrounded the Cossacks, wl'O 
 were some little distance off. At the first shot our Kirgeze, to the number of 1,000, 
 ran away ; Jantiurin was killed, aU the camp equipage plundered, and Kutebarol 
 made off with his rich booty. The Cossacks retired in skirmishing order to the hne. 
 
 X This detachment, composed of 15 Orenburg Cossacks and seven Kirgeze, 
 with whom was Sultan Tungantchin, was surrovmded by a band of 500 men. The 
 Cossacks dismounted, and, making their camels lie down, commenced firing, but, 
 their cartridges being i-apidly expended, were killed to a man.
 
 25 
 
 Not being distinguished by the capacity of Kenisara Kasimof, 
 Iset was inferior to him as a politician, but when it was a question 
 of daring raids, of leading gangs, committing depredations and high- 
 way robberies, he had no equal. Of colossal stature, extraordinary 
 physical strength, reserved and taciturn, Iset was the true type 
 of a steppe corsair and batyr in the full sense of the words, and in 
 this we must seek the cause of his extraordinary influence and of 
 that popularity which he enjoys in the mass of the nomad population. 
 
 From the time of the submission of Iset up to 1869, that is to 
 say, up to the introduction of the new code of steppe administration, 
 the Kirgeze remained perfectly tranquil. The preparatory arrange- 
 ments for its introduction, and the opposition of the privileged 
 classes, particularly of the priesthood, led to fresh troubles, which 
 grew into an open revolt, and overspread nearly the whole of the 
 Orenburg steppe. 
 
 Rebellion broke out from the very commencement in the Ural 
 district. The commissions despatched into the steppe to introduce 
 the new organisation, met with such opposition from the Kirgeze 
 that they were compelled to return home, without having succeeded 
 in forming half the number of volosts. The organisation of steppe 
 iiyezcls could not be thought of; rebellion spread far and wide, 
 and it was evident that it could only be repressed by armed 
 force, for which the means at hand in the steppe were most 
 insignificant. Since the Orenburg line battalions had been 
 transferred to the Turkestan military district, and a considerable 
 number of sotnias of the Ural and Orenburg cossack troops 
 had been directed to the same place, there remained for the 
 defence of the line only two companies of the Cossack infantry 
 battalion and the 3rd rifle battalion, which had also been appointed 
 for the campaign in Turkestan but was detained in consequence 
 of the disorders which had broken out in the steppe. To these 
 it a])peared possible to add a company of the Orenburg local 
 battalion, a detachment of young soldiers drilled with the same 
 battalion, and some sotnias called up for service by a special 
 order. These were all that were available until the despatch of 
 fresh troops, which could not however arrive from the interior of 
 Russia before the autumn ; and meanwhile the Kirgeze, taking 
 advantage of our weakness, made incursions on the line, drove off 
 the Cossack herds and fell upon the Cossack advanced posts and 
 villages, even those situated on this side of the Ural.* In March 
 their audacity reached such a pitch that they had the temerity to 
 make an open attack upon Lieutenant-ColonelNovo-Kreschchenof's 
 detachment, which had been despatched from Orenburg to 
 strengthen the Emban post at the first intelligence of the revolt 
 in tliat locality. 
 
 This state of affairs, and the appearance of Khivan bands near 
 the Aral Sea with the object as was said of making an attack 
 upon the Ural fort or on the Emban post, forced the commander 
 
 * Thus tlie Kii'geze plundered the flocks of the inhabitants of the Gorja- 
 chcnsk advanced post. About the same time, bands of Kirgeze phmdered the 
 Iletzk lino, and drove oft' 800 horses from th« village of Budran.
 
 26 
 
 of the troops to make every effort to send flying columns into tlie 
 steppe as quickly as possible, while for the prevention of 
 disturbances in the future it was considered necessary to build 
 two more forts in the steppe ; one in the Turgai district on the 
 Upper Ilek at Ak Tiube, and the other in the Ural on the upper 
 course of the Uil, each to contain a garrison of 150 infantry, two 
 guns, and a sotnia of Cossacks. 
 
 The detachments intended for the operations in the steppe 
 Avere ready at the commencement of May, and received the 
 following orders : — two separate detachments under Flugel- 
 Adjutant Colonel Count Borkh and Lieutenant-Colonel Baron 
 Stempel were told off to erect the forts at Ak-Tiube and on the 
 Uil ; two other detachments, each of 3 sotnias of Cossacks, 
 under the command of Lieutenant-Colonels Krutorojin and 
 Rukin, were to escort the commissions while introducing the new 
 code into the Turgai and Ural districts. A special detachment 
 under Major Baikof received instructions to re-establish and main- 
 tain communications along the Orsk-Kazala road. Lastly, the 
 detachments of Count Komarovsky and Lieutenant- Colonel 
 Verevkin were moved into the Ural steppe to operate in the 
 district between the River Ural and the Mugojar Mountains. 
 
 The opportune dispatch of the troops and the rapid 
 appearence of Krutorojin's and Komarovsky's detachments under 
 the supreme command of the military governor of the Turgai 
 district, Major-General Ballinzek, completely paralysed the opera- 
 tions of the Khivans, who had received additional support from 
 the large body of Tchiklins, nomadising at that time near the 
 Barsuks. The Khivans, alarmed at the movements of the troops, 
 and deprived of the support which they had hoped for from the 
 Tchiklins, retraced their steps ; on the withdrawal of the gangs, 
 quiet was not long in being re-established in the greater part 
 of the locality situated on the Ilek, the Upper Emba and the 
 Orsk-Kasala road. After this, the revolt was confined exclu- 
 sively to the Ural district along the rivers Uil, Emba, and Sagiz, 
 where according to report there were 20,000 Kibitkas which 
 were unwilling to submit to the new code. 
 
 The first serious collision with an armed gang occurred on the 
 6th May to the detachment of Baron Stempel,* which was on the 
 march to Uil in order to turn the first sod of the fort proposed at 
 that place. A large (according to Stem pel's report 20,000) gang 
 surrounded the detachment and for 7 days made most desperate 
 attacks upon it. Never in all probability had Orenburg Kirgeze 
 collected in such large force, but nevertheless all their attacks were 
 beaten off and the detachment reached Kazybek with the loss of a 
 few carts. Stempel halted six days at Kazybek, but having 
 expended his supplies, and being unable to replenish them fro::>.i 
 the line, was compelled to withdraw to the Cossack village of 
 Kalmykof. About the i-ame time the flying detachment of Major 
 Priorof (from Count Komarofsky's force) had a severe encounter 
 
 * One companj of the gOTemment battalion; two Co&sack sotnia?, and two guns.
 
 27 
 
 near the Barkiii Desert with the band of Mambet Ali, one of the 
 principal leaders of the Kirgiz insurrection. 
 
 A closer acquaintance with the situation of affairs in the 
 steppe convinced the military governor of the Ural district, 
 Major-General Verevkin, of the necessity for concentrating as large 
 a force as possible in the basin of the Uil, which was of importance 
 both from its central position in the steppe and from its abounding 
 in grass and water. Here in fact were collected all the insurrec- 
 tionary bands of Kirgeze, and should the rebels be routed in this 
 district, their retreat to the North, West, and East would be 
 prevented, as in the first two cases they would be threatened by 
 the Cossack villages of the Ural and Orenburg line, while to the 
 east they would be watched by the detachments in the Turgai dis- 
 trict. Thus, there was but one road open for their retreat beyond the 
 Emba, where vegetation was scanty, and, more important still, where 
 the absence of water did not allow of the insurgents collecting in 
 force. 
 
 In order to carry out this project, Major-General Verevkin 
 gave the following orders :— 
 
 1. Baron Stempel's detachment at Kalmykof to be rein- 
 
 forced by a company and 1^ sotnias of cossacl<s from 
 Uralsk. 
 
 2. Lieutenant-Colonel Rukin's detachment, which had re- 
 
 turned from Iletz Gorodok, to move upon Kalmykof, 
 and to remain within two or three marches of it, in 
 order afterwards to join Baron Stempel and move 
 upon Kazybek up the course of the Uil. 
 
 3. Lieutenant-Colonel Verevkin, posted with a detachment 
 
 of two cossack sotnias and two guns on the river Kyi, 
 to occupy Kazybek ; and 
 
 4. Count Komarofsky, with two cossack sotnias and a com- 
 
 pany of rifles, mounted on horses, to move towards the 
 same point from the Emban Post, down the course of 
 the Uil. 
 
 These and subsequent arrangements decided the fate of the 
 Kirgiz revolt. In fact, scarcely had the rebels heard of the 
 advance of Lieutenant-Colonel Rukin when they marched against 
 him in large bodies; but Baron Stempel's movement from Kalmykof 
 forced them to retire to the middle course of the Uil. Here, at 
 Kazybek, was Lieutenant-Colonel Verevkin. The rebels attacked 
 him from all sides ; but. on hearing of the rapid approach of the 
 military governor, with part of Rukin's and Stempel's detach- 
 ments, they were compelled to disperse. Wherever they turned 
 afterwards they met some of our detachments ready to support 
 each other. Then, seeing no possibility of catching our troops 
 unawares, they eventually lost courage and tied in different direc- 
 tions. Our detachments followed them along the entire course of the 
 Uil and Emba, and quickly cleared this locality of the robbers, who 
 then sought refuge on the Ust Urt. From this time the insurrec- 
 tion mav be considered at an end. In the autumn, two rifle batta-
 
 28 
 
 lions, with a battery of Don Cossacks, arrived from the interior, 
 while two Orenburg line battalions, Nos. 1 and 2, were formed in 
 Orenburg itself. This enabled the garrisons of the steppe forts to 
 be reinforced in winter; the ether troops were called away to 
 the line, and distributed as reserves in the towns of Orenburg, 
 Troitzk, Orsk, Gurief, and Uralsk. 
 
 The participation of the Khivans in the revolt of 18G9 was 
 evidenced by the appearance of their gangs in the Barsuks and the 
 rebellious proclamations which were sent in the name of the Khan 
 to the sultans and biys of the Kirgiz race. This circumstance 
 compelled us to be prepared for the renewal of disturbances in the 
 following year (1870), particularly in the south part of the steppe. 
 
 The best means for the maintenance of tranquility in the 
 whole Trans-Emban district would of course be the formation of a 
 military line of several fortified posts along the north side of the 
 Ust Urt; but this line, although serving as a defence to the 
 frontier in a true military sense, could not bring us any substantial 
 advantage in an administrative respect, as, from its distance, it 
 could not exercise a proper influence over those numerous tribes of 
 Kirgeze which nomadise at one time on the River Emba, at another 
 on the Ust Urt; and, in addition, could not prevent discontented 
 Ordvns, rebels, and Khivan emissaries from concealing themselves 
 as before on the Ust Urt, collecting into gangs and plundering the 
 Kirgeze, particularly those who had submitted to the new code. 
 Hence, without prejudging the question as to the ultimate for- 
 mation of this line, the commander of the troops in Orenburg 
 thought it would be sufficient, in the spring of 1870, to despatch 
 in the direction of the Ust Urt as far as the mouth of the Emba 
 and the River Chagana, near Chuska Kul, two independent detach- 
 ments, whose duty it was, besides military operations, to obtain all 
 possible information as to the intentions of the Khan of Khiva, 
 and to reconnoitre sites for forts. 
 
 Simultaneously with these proposals, bearing upon opera- 
 tions on the Orenburg frontiers, there arose the question of our 
 occupation of some point on the east bank of the Caspian Sea, both 
 for the defence of our trade and branches of industry from the in- 
 roads of Turkmen tribes, and also with the object of directing 
 Central Asian trade by the shortest route to the ports of the 
 Caspian Sea. But as the carr}'ing out of this proposal devolved 
 upon the Caucasus troops, it was resolved to place Mangyshlak 
 and Fort Alexander under the Caucasus government, as communi- 
 cations could be more easily kept up between the garrison and the 
 Caucasus across the Caspian Sea than with Orenburg across the 
 waterless desert of the Ust Urt, difficult both in summer and 
 in winter. 
 
 At the end of 1869 a small detachment of Caucasian troops 
 landed in Krasnovodsk bay. They made several reconnaissances, 
 and after leaving a small garrison at the Muravieff creek, ultmiately 
 marched, in the spring of 1870, to the Balkhan mountains, where, 
 in the bed of the supposed old course of the Amu, they erected the 
 fort called Tash-Arvat-Kala.
 
 29 
 
 Meanwhile, at the commencement of the spring of 1871, the 
 Mangyshlak commissioner, Lieutenant-Colonel Rukin, marched 
 into the steppe in order to introduce the new code among the 
 Adaef Kirgeze. On the shores of Sartysh hay, where he arrived 
 on the 24th March with an escort of 40 Ural Cossacks, he was met 
 by a mass of Kirgeze, who showed themselves very hostile. Parleys 
 led to nothing, and as the Kirgeze would not hear of the new code, 
 and on their part put forward demands which could not be con- 
 ceded, the only course open to Rukin was to return to the fort, 
 which he did in skirmishing order, as the road back was occupied 
 by the rebels. The situation of the detachment, at a distance of 
 120 versts from the fort, was exceedingly critical, but the rifled gun 
 of the cossacks made such an impression on the Kirgeze that after 
 several attempts to stop the detachment they showed a wish to 
 resume parleys. The cossacks dismounted, and were immediately 
 surrounded ; part were killed, and part carried oflF into captivity. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Rukin, not wishing to share their fate, shot 
 himself with his revolver. 
 
 The Kirgeze celebrated this event as a great victory, and 
 expected important results from it. In fact, the annihilation of 
 the detachment, by weakening considerably the garrison* of Fort 
 Alexander, placed it in a very difficult position ; the more so, as, 
 immediately afterwards, the commandant received intelligence of the 
 enemy's intentions to blockade the fort, and, if possible, to seize it 
 before aid could come from the Caucasus. 
 
 The revolt, which commenced in the middle of March, spread 
 with such rapidity that at this time (towards the middle of April) 
 the whole country had risen. The Kirgeze were in arms in the 
 whole of Mangyshlak, — murders, robberies, and every possible 
 violence were rife, and ultimately reached such a pitch that after 
 annihilating Rukin's detachment, capturing and burning Nikolaef 
 and the shore beacons, the Kirgeze besieged Fort Alexander, burnt 
 the suburb, and were preparing for the assault, when the arrival of 
 help from the Caucasus forced them to abandon their intention. 
 
 At the approach of summer, which brings the bulk of the 
 Adaefs to the frontiers of the Ural district, the appeirance cf 
 Adaef aids on the Emba and Sagiz gave apprehensions of fresh 
 disorders in the Orenburg steppe. Simultaneous reports of the 
 intentions of the Khan of Khiva to build forts at Cape Urgu and 
 Karatamak, with the object of moving troops from thence towards 
 the mouth of the Syr and to the Ust Urt, forced the commander of 
 the Orenburg military circle to despatch some detachments in 
 anticipation to the lower course of the Emba. These detachments 
 were distributed as follows, under the supreme command of Major- 
 General Bizyanof : the right, which had marched to the lower part of 
 the Emba, at Isen-Berdy, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Saranchef ; the centre, with which v/as Bizyanof, on the central 
 course of the Eml)a at Kondaral ; and the left, which had proceeded 
 beyond the Emba, at Jebysk, under Lieutenant-Colonel Baikof. 
 
 * Two sotnias of dismounted Uralsk Cossacks, with whom there were about 40 
 hoi-ses, for patrolling purposes ; anuamont, 14 guns.
 
 30 
 
 Besides this, a special reserve was left on the Uil, under 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Novinsky, which was to move according to 
 circumstances, either to the left flank, should the Khivans attempt 
 to move to Karatamak, or to the middle Sagiz, if the Adaefs 
 made their way northward in considerable numbers from Kon- 
 daral. 
 
 The object of these detachments was to drive the Kirgeze 
 bands, who were hostile to the new code, back to the Ust Urt, and, 
 by taking away their flocks, to deprive them of their means of 
 existence. 
 
 This task was accomplished by Saranchef, who, after dispersing 
 the rebels at Lake Mashe, passed beyond the Eniba, and in the 
 course of June succeeded in ridding the district between the lower 
 course of the river and Mertvy Kultuk (a bay in the Caspian) of 
 the insurgents. In the autumn, Lieutenant-Colonel Baikof moved 
 through the Ust Urt, passed lake Asmantai Matai, and reached 
 Myn-Su-Almaz without meeting a single gang; but on his return 
 journey a small part of his force was attacked, of which we shall 
 say a few words. 
 
 On returning from his raid to the point from which he 
 had started, Baikof intended to move at once to Chushka-Kul, 
 where there was good underfoot grass ; but as there were not sufli- 
 cient camels to carry all the baggage, it was proposed to continue 
 the journey in two ecTielons. When the first echelon reached 
 Chushka-Kul the camels, with an escort of 20 Cossacks, were 
 sent back to the River Chagan, to fetch up the baggage of the 
 remaining detachment. The convoy was attacked by a large band 
 of Kirgeze, near Cape Chagrai.* The cossacks defended them- 
 selves for 4^ hours, until assistance arrived, when the robber gang 
 fled into Khivan territory. 
 
 These energetic operations could not fail to have an excellent 
 influence on the general situation of the steppe, and in 1871, tran- 
 quility was broken only by the appearance of marauding gangs 
 on the Orsk-Kazala road. The detachments despatched into the 
 steppe employed tliemselves in throwing up entrenchments on the 
 Lower Emba, near Lake Mashe, and in reconnaissances to the Ust 
 Urt and the banks of the Aral. 
 
 The reconnaissances of Saranclief showed that the entire littoral 
 region of the Aral Sea, commencing from Perovsky bay to Akh-Ty- 
 Kenda, 80 versts below Karatamak, presents no obstacles to the 
 movement of detachments of 500 men and a train of GOO horses 
 and camels, as throughout this district there are wells at not greater 
 distances apart than 30 to 40 versts. According to the informa- 
 tion of Kirgeze well acquainted with the locality, the furtiier road 
 along the shore to the mouth of the Amu is still more favourable, 
 as the grass and water become better the nearer we approach to 
 Kungrad. 
 
 * This cape is one of the high points of the " North Chink."
 
 31 
 
 IV. 
 
 Military operations against the Khivans ; Incursions of the Yait Cossacks. — 
 Expedition of Prince Bekovitch-Tcherkassky ; Campaign of Count 
 Perovsky. — Incursions of Khivans on the Syr Darya line. — Commencement 
 of Collisions with Khokand ; Capture of Ak Mechet, and engagements at 
 Kum-Saat and Fort Perovsky, on the Syr Darya line ; Military opera- 
 tions against the Khokandi from Siberia. — Campaign in Turkestan ; Sue 
 cesses of General Tchernyaeff ; Combat at Irdjar and Capture of Kliod- 
 jent, Ura Tiube, and Djizakh. — Foundation of the Turkestan Military 
 Circle, and the latest military operations therein. — Capture of the towns 
 of Karshi, Kitab, and occupation of Kuldja. 
 
 The first collisions of Russian troops with Central Asian tribes 
 occurred at the end of the 16th century, when the warlike Yait 
 Cossacks settled on the River Yaik, and soon became a terror to 
 their neighbours. 
 
 Not being satisfied, however, with the booty afforded in the 
 wretched steppe, the Cossacks took to plundering the merchant 
 vessels in the Caspian, and destroying the Persian colonies on the 
 coast. During one of these raids they happened to capture some 
 mounted traders, from whom they learnt of the existence of the 
 rich territory of Khiva, and at once resolved to make war upon it. 
 They formed a fresh party, and, crossing the Kirgiz steppe in 
 light order, without any train, and no other baggage than that 
 which could be carried on their saddles, they attacked the chief 
 town, Urgentch, at a time when the Khan and the troops were 
 absent. The town was destroyed. The Cossacks carried ofli a 
 thousand women, and loaded more tlian a thousand carts with a rich 
 booty ; but, in consequence of the incumbrance caused by the train, 
 were overtaken by the Khivans on their return journey. The 
 Cossacks, although surrounded and cut off from water, fought for 
 several days consecutively, quenching their thirst with the fresh 
 blood of the slain, but at length they were nearly all killed by the 
 Khivans. Only a hundred men succeeded in making their wav to 
 the Amu Darya and hiding in the reeds, from whence they calcu- 
 lated upon gaining the Yaik ; but after 15 davs their hiding place 
 was discovered, and not one of them succeeded in reaching his 
 home. 
 
 The Cossacks did not recover very rapidly from this serious blow, 
 but after a time, they once more moved upon Khiva 500 strong, 
 under the command of Ataman Nechai. The raid was made un- 
 awares, but, when retiring with their heavy spoil, the Cossacks were 
 once more overtaken by the Khivans whilst crossing the Syr 
 Darya, and were again slain to a man. 
 
 The third campaign, undertaken by Ataman Shemai, ended 
 still more unfavourably. The Cossacks strayed off the road, and 
 instead of Khiva struck the shores of the Aral ; the winter came 
 on, frosts commenced, storms raged, and the Cossacks had 
 nothing to eat. "At first," says the historian, " the Cossacks killed 
 '■' one another in order to eat the dead body, but at length from
 
 " sheer exhaustion, they sent for the Kliivans and voluntarily gave 
 " tliemselves up into slavery." 
 
 For the fourth time, the Russians moved upon Khiva in the 
 reign of Peter the Great, when the enticing intelligence, that 
 there was auriferous sand in the River Amu, and that the Khivans 
 were purposely concealing that circumstance in dread of bringing 
 the Russians to their countrv, attracted the attention of the Tsar, 
 who, as we know, was occupied at that time with the idea of 
 opening mercantile relations with India through Turan. 
 
 The expedition was entrusted to Prince Bekovitch Tcherkassky, 
 and demanded much preparation, as, before taking the field, de- 
 fensive points had to be selected on the Caspian Sea, and forts 
 constructed at Cape Tiuk-Karagan, and at the entrance to the 
 Alexander and Balkhan bays, as being more suited for main- 
 taining communication with Astrakhan.* 
 
 After securing his position in this n.anner on the eastern bank 
 of the Caspian, Prince Bekovitch collected his forcesf at Gurieff 
 Gorodok, at the embouchure of the Ural, and from thence, in 
 June 1717? marched across the Ust Urt into Khivan territory. 
 At first it was proposed to send simultaneously with this detach- 
 ment a second, from Krasnovodsk bay along the old bed of the 
 Amu, but, probal)ly, the sickness which broke out in the coast 
 forts, and the impossibility of collecting in the steppe on the east 
 bank of the Caspian the necessary number of horses and camels 
 to carry the baggage, forced Bekovitch to give up this intention 
 and to operate with the one detachment from GurieflT. He 
 marched continuously, fearmg lest the underfoot grass should be 
 burnt up, and after two months halted on the River Amu, 150 
 versts from Khiva, having traversed 1,350 versts of sandy steppe 
 in the hottest season, when the heat was terrific, and the only 
 water was that obtained with great difficulty from wells dug at 
 each resting place and night halt. 
 
 In expectation of being attacked by the Khivans, who had 
 approached in considerable force, Bekovitch placed his detachment 
 with its back to the river, and on the other sides surrounded it with 
 a barricade formed of the wagons. After an engagement lasting for 
 three days, the Khivans were repulsed, and hastened to enter into 
 negotiations, promising to comply with all the just demands of 
 Bekovitch ; but scarcely had the latter, trusting to their oaths, 
 gone off to the Khan in order to make his conditions, and at 
 their proposition, consented to divide his detachment into several 
 parts in order to facilitate supply, when the traitors fell upon the 
 Russians and annihilated the detachment in detail to the last man, 
 Tlie troops, who were left in the forts on the Caspian, on hearing 
 of the fate of their companions, and after sufi^ering much misery 
 from insufficiency of water, sickness, and frequent attacks on the 
 part of the Turkmen, hastened to return to Russia. Thus the 
 
 * Tlie^e were Fort St. George, Alexander, and Krasnovodsk. 
 
 t Bekovitcli's detachment consisted of two companies of infantry, mounted on 
 horses, one dragoon regiment, ?,500 Yait and Grcben Cossacks, and also Nogai 
 Tartars and Kalmyks,— in all, 3,300 men and six gnns. Tliree months' provisions, 
 carried on pack camels and horsed carts.
 
 33 
 
 expedition ended very unfortunately ; but it showed, in the first 
 place, that a march across a barren and waterless steppe is pos- 
 sible even for a detachment of 4,000 men, in the hottest season ; 
 in the second place, that the Khivans cannot face our troops 
 under any circumstances; and thirdly, that the ill-success of the 
 campaign, arising from the great want of prudence on the part of 
 Bekovitch, was only due to accident. 
 
 Unfortunately, the preparations for the Persian Campaign 
 which followed, and the campaign itself, turned away Peter's 
 attention from Khiva; home events, and the constant embroilment 
 of Russia in European wars, were the cause of our military 
 operations in Central Asia being deferred until 1839. 
 
 In that year, our troops, under the command of Adjutant- 
 General Perovsky,* were again moved into the steppe, across the 
 Ust Urt, to the Khivan frontiers, in order to occupy the Khanate, 
 liberate the captives, and open the way for trade. But this cam- 
 paign ended very unfortunately, although there were no military 
 operations.f Severe frosts, hurricanes, deep snows, and insuffici- 
 ency of grass, forced the detachment to return when half way 
 from Orenburg, their loss being incalculable ; nearly two-thirds 
 of the effective strength of the men, 9,000 camels, and an im- 
 mense number of horses died on the road of disease, cold and 
 hunger, and the remainder returned to the line in a most pitiable 
 and exhausted state. It was remarkable that the percentage of 
 deaths was particularly high in the infantry and the Orenburg 
 Cossacks, where one out of every three or four men died, whilst 
 among the Ural Cossacks the deaths were only one in SO men, 
 which can only be explained by the latter being accvistomed to 
 hardships and by their special suitability for steppe campaigns. Ti-e 
 cost of this expedition amounted to 6,500,000 paper roubles. 
 But scarcely had the unfortunate detachment reached the line, when 
 the Emperor Nicholas ordered immediate preparations to be made 
 for another campaign against Khiva. This alarmed not only the 
 Khivans but the English, who used all their influence to force the 
 Khan to comply with our legitimate demands, and to issue a 
 firman prohil)iting Russian people from being detained in his 
 dominions against tlieir will. Another campaign was then deemed 
 superfluous, and peaceful relations with Khiva continued up to 
 1847, when our first Aral fort was founded on the banks of the 
 Aral Sea. 
 
 The Khivans could not view with equanimity the consolidation 
 of our sovereignty on the Syr Darya and Aral Sea, and in consequence 
 
 * PerOTsky's detachment consisted of 3J battalions of infantry, 2 regiments of 
 Ural Cossacks, 5 sotnias of Orenburg Cossacks and Easlikirs, 22 guns, and 4 rocket 
 stands, — in all, 4,500 men and a large train, which comprised, besides the horses, 
 more than 10,000 camels and 2,000 Kirgeze camel drivers. For the defence of our 
 magazines, fortified posts were constructed — the Emban fort, on the river of that 
 name, and the Ak-Bvdak fort, at Chushka Kul. 
 
 t On the 18th December, tlie Khivans, to the number of 2,000 to 3,000 men, 
 attacked our advanced fort at Ak-Bulak, and afterwards a small detachment -undej- 
 Captain Erofieff, but in both cases they were repulsed with considerable loss, and 
 fled to Khiva.
 
 34 
 
 liostile collisions became inevitable, especially after they had built 
 Fort Khadji Niyaz on one of the branches of the Kuvan Darya, 
 situated about 85 versts from our present Fort No. 2. Tn 
 August 1847, a band of Khivans, 2,000 strong, crosbed the Syr 
 Darya, attacked our Kirgeze, and pillaged more than a tliousand 
 families. In the middle of November they repeated their incur- 
 sions in the Kara Kum desert, and in March 1848, were bold 
 enough to appear on the right bank of the Syr, where they 
 pillaged and slaughtered the Kirgeze. Three hundred mounted 
 Turkmen made incursions to the very walls of the Aral fort, and 
 afterwards showed themselves on the Syr Darya port. The troops 
 sent out against them put the robbers to flight, and caused Khiva 
 itself to tremble for fear of a Hussian invasion. Their terror was 
 so great that the Khivans became humble and ceased to make 
 raids. Their advanced fort, Khadji Niyaz, was destroyed shortly 
 after. 
 
 Meanwhile, from 1850, hostilities commenced on the part of 
 the Khokandi, who, after building their forts in the district between 
 Karauziak and the Djaman Darya, plundered and oppressed 
 our Kirgeze to such an extent that in the course of a short time 
 they had robbed the latter of 150,000 head of cattle and horses. 
 Although one of our detachments, in following up the Khokandi, 
 captured their fort, Kosh-Kurgan, by storm and destroyed it, the 
 robberies did not cease. It then transpired that the principal 
 incursions were made from Ak Mechet, at the instigation of the 
 local Biy, to whom all the Khokand forts on the Syr were subor- 
 dinated, and that in order to subdue the Khokandi it was necessary 
 to capture Ak Mechet at all costs. 
 
 The first attempt was made in the summer of 1852, but ended 
 unsuccessfully, as the small detachment under Colonel Blaramberg 
 (450 men and 2 guns) was unable to seize the citadel, and was 
 obliged to retire; it had to content itself with the capture of the 
 outer rampart, and the destruction by fire of everything between 
 the outer walls and the citadel. Fresh preparations were subse- 
 quently made in the spring of 1853 for the capture of Ak Mechet, 
 for which purpose a detachment of 1,500 men and 18 guns was 
 assembled under the personal command of Adjutant-General 
 Perovsky.* 
 
 Although the enemy had only 300 infantry and 3 guns to 
 oppose to us, we proceeded to a formal siege of three weeks. 
 This lengthened operation was due to the fact that General 
 Perovsky, who had already met with ill success in the Khivan 
 Campaign, acted with great circumspection and resolved not to 
 storm until the fort walls were sprung by mines ; 20 minutes after 
 this the place was ours. The fort was immediately repaired, 
 armed, occupied by a garrison, and its designation changed to 
 Fort Perovsky. t 
 
 * Tae detachment consisted of a battalion of infantry of 750 men, 400 Ural 
 Cossacks, 150 Orcnbvirg Cossacks, and 30 Baslikirs. The train consisted of 1,440 
 camels and 1,000 carts. 
 
 t This fort was abolished in 1855.
 
 35 
 
 At the same time on the Lower Syr Darya, Forts No. 1, No. 2, 
 and No. 3 were built at Kazala and on the sites of the former 
 Khokand forts at Kormakcha and Kumysh-Kurgan. 
 
 In this way was founded the Syr Darya Une, which secured 
 our frontiers from the attacks of the Khivans and Khokandi, and 
 at the same time established our political and mercantile relations 
 with these Khanates. In an administrative respect all these forts 
 were under a special chief — the Commander of the Syr Darya Line. 
 
 With the loss of Ak Mechet the Khokandi had to renounce all 
 influence over our Kirgeze, but as this influence was of the utmost 
 importance to them, they resolved to renew their attempt to gain 
 possession of that fort in August 1863. A consideraljle gang 
 began to approach Ak Mechet from the side of Tashkend ; but, 
 met at Kum-Suat by a small detachment which sallied from the 
 fort under Colonel Borodin (275 men and 3 guns), it was dispersed 
 and driven to Djulek. 
 
 The Khokandi resolved to repeat their attempt in the winter, and 
 on the 14th December, a mob of 17,000 men surrounded the fort, 
 knowing that at this season of the year we could not get succour 
 from Orenburg. But the commandant of the fort, Lieut.-Colonel 
 OgarefF, recognising the danger of his position, resolved to under- 
 take operations in the open rather than sustain a siege, and to 
 rout the Khokandi by a sudden attack. 
 
 At daybreak on the 18th, a detachment of 500 men and 4 guns, 
 under Major Shkup, issued from the fort, and taking advantage of 
 the bad weather approached the enemy's camp. The Kliokandi 
 gave way at first, but quickly recovering, surrounded the detacli- 
 ment on all sides and commenced to open fire with their guns. But 
 nothing daunted, Major Shkup delivered a vigorous attack straight 
 at the enemy's centre, captured the principal battery, and forced 
 his way into their camp, while two fresh detachments sent out from 
 the fort, each of 80 men and 2 guns, took the enemy in flank. The 
 action did not last long, and the Khokandi fled, leaving in our 
 hands 2,000 killed and 17 guns. 
 
 After these field engagements at Kum-Suat and Fort Perovsky, 
 military operations on the Syr Darya Line were not renewed until 
 1861, when the Governor-General of Orenburg, Adjutant-General 
 Bezak, found it necessary for the security of our frontiers to 
 occupy the Khokand forts; viz., Djulek in the spring, and Yani- 
 Kurgan, lying on the high road to Turkestan, in the autumn. 
 
 Simultaneously wnth the formation of the line along the 
 Syr Darya, we also began to approach Central Asia from the side 
 of Siberia. 
 
 The advanced Siberian line, founded by Peter the Great along 
 the Irtysh, and populated at that time by the Siberian Cossacks, 
 was transferred further south towards the Khokand country, and in 
 1847 was completed by the erection of Fort Kopal. But not 
 being satisfied with the security of our frontiers we occupied all 
 the Trans-Ili district, and at the base of the Tyan-Shan erected 
 Fort Vernoe, and afterwards Kostek, forming, as it were, our 
 advanced barrier against the Khokandi. 
 
 D 2
 
 3G 
 
 The first serious collision on this line occurred in 1860. The 
 Khokandi, to the number of 4,000, arrived unexpectedly at KosteV, 
 calculating to gain possession of the weak forts by a coup de maiiif 
 and afterwards to raise the standard of insurrection among the 
 Kirgeze, and move conjointly upon Vernoe ; a detachnent, how- 
 ever, under Colonel Zimmermann, by an opportune movement, 
 cut them to pieces, and not being satisfied with this exploit 
 marched to the Trans Hi district, where it captured and de- 
 stroyed the Khokand forts of Tokmak and Peshpek.* The siege 
 and capture of the latter stronghold extended over 5 days, con- 
 cerning which we would observe that from the time of the capture 
 of Ak Mechet our military operations against the Central Asian forts 
 became more decisive in their character. As if in revenge for the 
 lost fortresses, the Kliokandi, having collected in the following year 
 to the number of 22,000, made an attack on our Uzun-Agatch post, 
 situated between Kostek and Vernoe ; but being encountered by 
 the commander of the Alatai circle, Lieut.-Colonel Kolpakovsky, 
 vv^ere again repulsed with considerable loss.-f* It is Morthy of 
 notice that in this affair our infantry did not limit themselves to a 
 passive defence against the hostile horsemen, but advanced to the 
 attack and dispersed them with the bayonet. 
 
 After the Uzun-Agatch aflFair, which entailed considerable loss 
 upon the Khokandi, they did not risk any further attack upon us in 
 force, and military operations were not renewed until 1864, when 
 Colonel Tchernyaeff marched into Turkestan. 
 
 Thus, at the end of 1861, our military line towards Khokand 
 ended on the side of Siberia at the Uzun-Agatch post and Kostek, 
 and on the side of Orenburg at Djvilek. The considerable 
 interval (800 versts), which separated the last two forts did not 
 permit of a perfect defence of our frontier from marauders, who 
 were able to penetrate at any point and plunder our Kirgeze. 
 To this we must add that the garrisons of the forts found them- 
 selves in a very disadvantageous position with regard to supplies, 
 as they liad to get everything that was necessary, even provisions, 
 from Orenburg, or from distant Siberian centres; whereas, in the dis- 
 trict between Djulek and Vernoe lay part of the Khokand Khanate, 
 which enjoyed a beautiful climate and great fertility of soil. The 
 acquisition of this district, the consequent union of the disjointed 
 frontiers of the Syr Darya and of the Siberian line, and the 
 supply of our garrisons from the local resources became the object 
 of the expedition of 1864. 
 
 In order to attain this object it was proposed to operate against 
 Khokand — simultaneously with two detachments — from the side of 
 Siberia under Colonel Tchernyaeff, and from the Syr Darya Line 
 under Colonel Verevkin. In June all the preparations of the 
 government were complete. Tchernyaeff took Aulie - Ata, 
 
 * Zimmermann's detachment coDsisted of sis companies of infantry, four sotnias, 
 and 17 guns. 
 
 t Colonel Kolpakovsky's force consisted of three companies, four sotnias, six 
 guns, and two rocket stands. The Emperor promoted KolpakoTsky, and presented 
 him with the 4(h Class of the Order of St. Gcorjre.
 
 37 
 
 Verevkin occupied Turkestan ; the detachments then united 
 under the single command of TchernyaefFand captured Tchenikent. 
 
 Extending our frontiers in this manner we at last issued from 
 the steppe into an agricultural district which enabled us to provide 
 for the troops from local resources, and, consequently, to concen- 
 trate them at will. In spite, however, of these successes, the 
 situation of our expeditionary detachments was unenviable ; the 
 captured district was over-run with robbers; the Khokandi were 
 collecting in considerable force, besides this winter was approach- 
 ing and a scarcity of provisions might set in. These considera- 
 ti3ns induced General TcliernyaefF to act with decision, and while 
 his victories were still fresh to march to Tashkent, the capture of 
 which would not presumably be attended with any special difficulty. 
 On the 2nd October the troops stormed the town, but were 
 repulsed,* and compelled to retire to Tchenikent. 
 
 Encouraged by their success, the Khokandi invaded our fron- 
 tiers. Not daring to attack Tchemkent, in which the main forces of 
 General Tchernyaeff were concentrated, they marched against 
 Turkestan 10,000 strong, but all the efforts of the Khan Alim-Kul 
 proved utter'y futile against the heroic resistance of the Ural sotnia 
 under Captain SerofF at Ikan. The affair took place as follows : — 
 On receiving intelligence of the appearance of the enemy, the com- 
 mandant of Turkestan despatched on the 4th December a sotnia 
 of Ural Cossacks with a mountain howitzer, under the command of 
 Captain Seroif, for the purpose of collecting information. About 
 20 versts from Turkestan, SerofF was surrounded by a gang of 
 10,000 Khokandi. The Urals dismounted, and after linking their 
 horses, laid down in a small ditch, forming an intrenchment on 
 the exposed side with their forage, provisions, and other baggage. 
 In this position they held out for three days, and not until the 
 fourth day, when half the Cossacks were killed, did they resolve, 
 after spiking and abandoning the howitzer, to return to Turkestan. 
 In this they were successful, but of the 112 men who took the 
 field only 15 returned unhurt; of the remainder, 68 men were 
 killed and 29 wounded. 
 
 The heroic resistance of the Urals unquestionably saved 
 Turkestan and forced Alim-Kul to beat a precipitate retreat to his 
 own dominions ;t fkis permitted the government to look to the re- 
 establishment of order in the occupied districts. With this object, 
 at the beginning of 1865, the Turkestan province was formed from 
 the newly conquered region and the old Syr Darya Line, and placed 
 under a special mihtary governor, and at the same time under the 
 supreme jurisdiction of the authorities at Orenburg. 
 
 Meanwhile, about this time, the rumours current of the 
 
 * The storming of Tashkent was beaten off with great loss, as the walls stopped 
 our soldiers, and we had no storming ladders with iis. For the same cause the 
 storming of Ak-Mechet failed in 1852, under Colonel Blaramberg, who, although he 
 had ladders, found them too short. 
 
 t The Emperor promoted Seroff to the rank of Colonel, and inrcsted him with 
 the 4th Class Order of St. George, and all the men received the militarv" order of 
 merit.
 
 38 
 
 assembly of Bokhariot troops on the frontiers of Khokand and the 
 fear lest the Emir of Bokhara, profiting by the internal disorders 
 of the Khanate, might seize Tashkent, situate less than 100 versts 
 from our borders, compelled General TchernyaefF, in order to 
 forestall the Bokhariots, to occupy the Khokand fort of Niyazbek, 
 which commands the waters of Tashkent, and afterwards to under- 
 take another expedition against this city. On the 7th May the 
 troops approached the city, repulsed a strong sortie under Khan 
 Alim-Kul, who received at this time his death wound, occupied 
 Fort Tchinaz, lying on the road to Bokhara, and afterwards resolved 
 to capture Tashkent by a coup de main. 
 
 After three days' fighting on the ramparts and walls Tashkent 
 was forced to surrender. 
 
 As part of the Bokhariot troops, taking advantage of the 
 death of Alim-Kul, succeeded in occupying Tashkent, and during 
 the storming fought against us, in proof of which was the 
 Bokhariot standard captured among the trophies of war, a rupture 
 with that Khanate became inevitable. 
 
 In point of fact, the Emir of Bokhara, nearly simultaneously 
 with our capture of Tashkent, took possession of Khodjent and 
 Khokand, and wrote an insolent letter to General TchernyaefF, in 
 which he demanded that the Russians should immediately quit the 
 cit}^, which formed, so to say, part of the Bokhariot possessions. 
 TchernyaefF's stern reply, however, astonished the Emir, and forced 
 him to enter into peaceful negotiations; but as the embassy which 
 we sent to him was detained, TchernyaefF collected a detach- 
 ment, and in January 1866 marched to Djizakh in order to subdue 
 the Bokhariots by force of arms. 
 
 On receipt, however, of the intelligence that our embassy 
 would at once be returned and that it Mas already on the road to 
 Samarkand, TchernyaeflF, not wishing to expose the troops use- 
 lessly to the privations of a winter in the inhospitable steppe, led 
 them back to Tchinaz ; but meanwhile the Emir not only did not 
 carry out his promise with regard to liberating the embassy, but 
 moved a considerable body of Bokhariot troops after our detach- 
 ment, threatening to attack it. 
 
 Thus, war with Bokhara became inevitable. 
 
 In the spring of 1866, on the arrival of a new military 
 governor, Major-General Romanovsky, appointed in place of 
 TchernyaefF, a proposal was made to the Emir of Bokhara to 
 return our embassy without delay, and to remove all his troops 
 from our borders, but as the Emir sent evasive answers, and 
 mounted Bokhariot robbers appeared close to Tashkent, General 
 Romanovsky, without wasting tirae in useless negotiations, pro- 
 ceeded at once to military operations, and marched along the left 
 bank of the Syr Darya to Irdjar, where the main forces of the 
 Bokhariots were collected. On the 8th May the well known battle 
 of Irdjar took place. 
 
 The army of the Emir? hitherto deemed invincible, was 
 thoroughly routed, and retired to Samarkand in complete disorder. 
 
 After the battle of Irdjar it was open to us either to follow the
 
 39 
 
 routed Bokhariots and go to Djizakh, Samarkand, and so on, or 
 move up the Syr Darya to the forts of Nau and Khodjent. Of these 
 two alternatives the latter was chosen, because the possession of 
 Khodjent would enable us to separate Khokand from Bokhara, 
 which in a military respect offered considerable advantages. After 
 an eight days' siege Khodjent was stormed on the 24th May. 
 
 Our brilliant capture of Khodjent, and in particular, the 
 victory at Irdjar, which was noised all over Central Asia, were 
 insufficient, however, to humble the pride of the Emir of Bokhara 
 who, without deigning any reply to our peaceful proposals, con- 
 tinued to prepare for aggressive operations. 
 
 Then the commander at Orenburg, Adjutant- General Kryja- 
 novsky, visiting Turkestan in person, deemed it necessary to 
 resume military operations in order to occupy the Bokhariot 
 forts of Ui'a-Tiube and Djizakh, situated at the passes of the 
 Kashgar-Davan, and by so doing to deprive the Emir of the last 
 fortified points in the valley of the Syr Darya. In order to carry 
 this into effect, he took a personal part in the expedition, and 
 after a short bombardment, captured both forts by storm. On 
 the 2nd October, Ura-Tiube was occupied, and on the IStli, 
 Djizakh, and thus, towards the end of 1866, our possessions 
 extended to the south as far as the snowy ridges of the Kashgar- 
 Davan, all the captured territory being added, at the request of the 
 inhabitants themselves, to the dominions of Russia. 
 
 After the capture of Ura-Tiube and Djizakh, there still 
 remained one point in the hands of the Emir of Bokhara, the 
 possession of which might guarantee him the valley of the Syr 
 Darya. This was Fort Yani-Kurgan, which from its situation in 
 front of Djizakh, commanded its waters, and completely enabled 
 the Bokhariots. in the event of a siege, to place our garrison in a 
 very critical situation. 
 
 In order to protect themselves from such operations on the 
 part of the Bokhariots, our troops, in the spring of 1867, occupied 
 Yani-Kurgan; but they had scarcely done so when the Bokhariots, 
 45,000 strong, advanced to dislodge them. Twice did they make 
 an attack,* and twice were they defeated by Colonel Abramoff, and 
 were compelled ultimately to abandon their design. 
 
 Such was the position of affairs, when by an imperial decree, 
 the Turkestan district was separated from the Orenburg general 
 government, in consequence of the considerable additions which 
 had been made to our territory ; this district and the Alatai circle, 
 united under the appellation of the Semirechinsk district, became 
 a separate military circle, under the administration of the Governor- 
 General of Tm'kestan and commander of the troops of the Turkestan 
 military circle, to whom was given plenipotentiary power in the 
 conduct of negotiations with the representatives of the Central 
 Asian Khanates, from the side of the Syr Darya and the eastern 
 bank of the Caspian Sea.f 
 
 * 7th June 1867 and 5th July 1867. 
 
 t The Governor-General of Orenburg was afterwards appointed to administer 
 the -western half of the Kirgiz-Kaisats steppe, whilst the Governor-General of 
 Western Siberia was entrusted, with the conduct of our relations with Western 
 China and the defence of oiu* Chinese frontier.
 
 40 
 
 The new commander of Turkestan, Adjutant-General Kauf- 
 mann, arrived at Tashkent on the 7th November 1867, and found 
 the situation of affairs with Bokhara so strained in consequence of 
 the repeated attacks of Bokhariot robbers on our troops* that he 
 was compelled to occupy and destroy the town of Ukhum, and 
 afterwards, in the spring of 1868, to make an expedition into the 
 valley of the Zerafshan, M^here the summer residence of the Emir 
 of Bokhara, Samarkand, known in Asia as the sacred tomb of 
 Tamerlane, M^as situated. 
 
 On the 1st of May, an engagement was fought on the Samar- 
 kand heights, in which the Bokhariot army was defeated, and 
 Samarkand captured without a shot. 
 
 Afterwards, in order to consolidate our position in the Zeraf- 
 shan valley, an expedition was undertaken to the town of Urgut; 
 Katy-Kurgan, about 65 versts from Samarkand on the direct road 
 to Bokhara, was occupied. But in spite of the series of brilliant 
 victories recently gained, the campaign could not be considered 
 as finished, as on the one hand the rumours of the assembly of 
 the Shahr-i-subz people at Kara-Tiube, and on the other, of the 
 Bokhariot forces in front of Katy-Kurgan, showed plainly that the 
 enemy intended to continue the struggle, threatening us simul- 
 taneously at both points. 
 
 The expedition undertaken in May 1868 by Colonel Abramofi' 
 to Kara-Tiube, for the purpose of dispersing the Shahr-i-subz, was 
 not conclusively successful in consequence of the locality enabling 
 the enemy to avoid a decisive engagement ; but meanwhile intel- 
 ligence was received that the Emir of Bokhara, after completing 
 his preparations, was already moving upon Katj'-Kurgan. The 
 commander of the forces, without losing a minute, marched 
 to the succour of our garrison, defeated this Bokhariot Army on 
 the Zerabulak heights, on the 2nd July, and rapidly turning back 
 to Samarkand, relieved the city, which in the aljsence of the 
 Governor- General had been attacked by a band of 50,000 men. 
 
 The defence of the large citadel of Samarkand forms unques- 
 tionably one of the most glorious exploits ever accomplished by 
 our troops in these distant regions. The garrison of the citadel, 
 consisting of 750 men, including non-combatants and musicians, 
 held their ground for seven days against a gang of 50,000, 
 repulsed several assaults, lost 200 men killed and wounded, but 
 
 * Thus, gangs of Bokhariot Kirgeze, under the leaclei-ship of Sadik, the son of 
 the famous Kenisara Kasimoff, made an unexpected attack on'Captain Onchokofi's 
 Cossack sotnia, not far from Fort No. 1, where they cut to pieces 20 unarmed Cos- 
 sacks proceeding to water ; but this fir,st neghgence was atoned for by a heroic 
 defence. Linking their horses, and rapidly entrencliing themselves behind a ditch, 
 Onchokofi' held out for three days. All this time the heat was terrible, and the 
 Cossacks were cut oil' from their supplies, and suffered torturing thirst. To this we 
 must add that the corpses of the dead men and horses commenced to decompose on 
 the first day, and by the fourth day it became impossible any longer to breathe the 
 impure air. Not till then did Captain Onchokoff resolve to commence a retreat. 
 The Kirgeze, intimidated by their losses, did not follow in pursuit ; they returaed 
 to Tchinaz, and, under the walls of the fort, stole a drove of horses. Almost at the 
 same time a second gang took an officer and three men prisonei-s at Tchinaz, and 
 made an attack on the Cossack post at Mnrza-Eabat, which evidently showed a 
 hostile feeling on the part of the Bokhariots.
 
 41 
 
 rnaintaJned to the last their presence of mind, courage and 
 stubbornness, thanks to the abihty of their chiefs, Major Stempel 
 and Lieutenant-Colonel Nazaroff. 
 
 After these defeats the Emir of Bokhara deemed it impossible 
 to continue his military operations, and was forced to conclude a 
 treaty of peace, by virtue of which he acknowledged the right of 
 Russia to all conquests made since 1865, and engaged to pay an 
 indemnity, and to reserve to Russian merchants perfect liberty 
 of trading in all the towns of the Khanate. 
 
 But scarcely were these conditions ratified when a party of 
 malcontents was organized in Bokhara itself, which, with Katy- 
 Tiur, the eldest son of the Emir, at its head, commenced a civil 
 war, the result of which was the defeat of the Bokhariot forces, 
 and the capture of the town of Karshi by the rebels. As an 
 insurrection in a neighbouring kingdom might do us much harm, 
 and involve us in a new war with Bokhara, the commander of 
 the Samarkand circle, Major-General AbramofF, after rapidly 
 assembling the troops at Katy-Kurgan, marched with them to 
 Karshi, and captured that town by assault. The rebels being 
 thus deprived of the greater part of their adherents, fled to the 
 mountains under the protection of the Shahr-i-subz Beks; but in 
 August 1870, the Russian troops opened a campaign in Shahr-i- 
 subz, captured by assault the towns of Shaar and Kitab, and after 
 expelling the rebel Beks, invited the Emir to take over the 
 management of all the country subdued for him. 
 
 In conclusion, we must mention that in 1871 military opera- 
 tions were renewed on the Chinese frontier, under Lieutenant- 
 General Kolpakovsky, and ended, after a long series of engage- 
 ments with the Taranches, by the occupation of the town of 
 Kuldja, and the subjection of the Kuldja Khanate, peopled, in 
 addition to the Taranches, by Tunganees, Chinese, and Kirgeze. 
 The occupation of this Khanate secured the frontiers of the 
 Semirechinsk district from the attacks of robber Taranches, 
 deprived our Kirgeze of the possibility of nomadising by aiils, 
 or even by volosts, in Kuldja, and lastly, assisted in re-establishing 
 equitable trade, which during the last seven years had been exposed 
 to every possible annoyance from the hostility of the Khan of 
 Kuldja, as well as from the constant raids of the Taranches who 
 plundered the trade caravans.
 
 42 
 
 V. "^ 
 
 Organisation and Formation of Detachments for 
 THE Field. 
 
 Objects with which Expeditions are undertaken in the Steppe, and the season 
 for their action. — Strength of Detachments : composition, — Infantry, 
 Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers ; Object and use of Mounted Native Detach- 
 ments ; Trains ; General Character of Steppe Campaigns. — Influence of 
 locality upon us and upon our antagonists. 
 
 Steppe expeditions may be undertaken by us for two reasons ; 
 from the conduct of Central Asian rulers having necessitated hostile 
 operations, or for the punishment of robbers for pillage and murder 
 within our frontiers. There was also at one time a special class 
 of expedition for the purpose of provisioning our steppe forts with 
 warlike and commissariat stores. 
 
 The transport of stores from the principal store depots took 
 place at that period once or more times a year, depending both on 
 military and on purely economical considerations. The troops 
 were added merely as an escort, the size of which was always 
 regulated by the state of tranquillity of the steppe, the security of 
 the road and the size of the convoy. 
 
 At the present time the men sent to relieve the garrisons 
 usually form the escort, and sometimes convoys move without any 
 escort at all. 
 
 Expeditions undertaken for the punishment of Kirgeze bandits 
 are called poisks, and are limited as a rule to the dispersion and 
 anniliilation of the gang, and the capture of their herds, which 
 form their sole wealth. The best season for miUtary operations in 
 the steppe is the spring and autumn, when there is an abundance 
 of water and underfoot grass everywhere. In winter it is 
 dangerous to go out on distant raids, or to undertake serious 
 military operations, instructive examples of which may be derived 
 from the campaigns of General Perovsky to Khiva, and of Tchern- 
 yaeft" to Djizak for the liberation of our mission w^iicli was 
 detained by the Bokhariots. 
 
 The strength of the detachments employed in expeditions 
 against Central Asian Sovereignties must be guided by the 
 obstacles which nature and the foe may oppose ; the fewer men 
 the better, as the difficulties of the march can be overcome more 
 easily, and moreover a Central Asian foe does not inspire us with 
 any great awe. Bokhariots, Khivans, Khokandi, Kirgeze, and other 
 neighbouring races, with which we have to deal, are neither well 
 armed, nor have they any military training, and therefore cannot 
 face a regular line of battle. The largest detachment ever sent 
 into the steppe up to 1866 did not exceed 3.000 to 3,500 men, 
 but after the consolidation of our power on the Syr Darya, where 
 the locality between Tashkent and our southern frontiers presents 
 many cultivated and populated oases, larger detachments seemed 
 possible. The first regular detachment which passed through the
 
 43 
 
 steppe to the number of 6,000 with train and parks, was the 
 detachment of the commander at Orenburg, Adjutant-General 
 Kryjanofsky, which moved in October 1866 for the subjection of 
 the forts of Ura-Tiube and Djizak. 
 
 The composition of the detachment depends, of course, on 
 the object for which it is intended. Raids (poisks) are sometimes 
 effected by Cossack parties alone, but in some cases infantry are 
 added, and even artillery to the extent of a couple of guns. On 
 the other liand an expeditionary force with a serious affair in 
 prospect should have a proportion of all arms. 
 
 From an European point of view it might appear that infantry 
 would not play any great role in Central Asian campaigns, as 
 the foe is generally mounted ; besides, infantry is less suited for 
 bearing the hardships of a steppe campaign than cavalry. But 
 on the other hand, mfantry is indispensable for seizing forts and 
 towns, for the maintenance of captured points, for tiie protection 
 of the train, and so forth. Moreover, Asiatics have a wholesome 
 dread of the bayonet, and hence infantry produces a moral effect 
 which is sometimes so strong that hostile cavalry can be attacked 
 with the cold steel, as was done in the actions at Uzun-Agatch, 
 Irdjar, the Zerafshan heights, and other places. 
 
 In order to give infantry mobility, and enable them to bear an 
 equal share Avith the Cossacks in partisan affairs, they are some- 
 times mounted on horses, either on Cossack horses or on those 
 hired from the Kirgeze ; but when our Cossack troops are armed 
 with rifles, there will hardly be any necessity for this to the same 
 exteiit. In long forced marches infantry are also carried on camels; 
 this has been done more than once by the Orenburg troops, and 
 also in Algiers and in America. 
 
 At other times our steppe infantry generally make satisfactory 
 marches, accomplishing 30 to 40 versts in the 24 hours without 
 any particular fatigue, even in the hottest summer weather, a- id 
 across such localities as the Barsuk deserts and the hungry steppes 
 of Kara-Kum. 
 
 Cavalry, from its mobility and its value for completing the 
 defeat of a dispersed gang, holds a very important place in the 
 composition of a stepjie detachment ; still an excessive amount of 
 it is disadvantageous, because insufficiency of water and grass is 
 very trying for the horses. In order to keep the horses up to 
 their w^ork it is essential to carry corn, which adds much to the 
 transport. The best cavalry for the steppe are our Siberian (part 
 of whom have changed their name to Semirechiiisk), Ural and 
 Orenburg Cossacks ; they are noted for their powers of endurance, 
 their knowledge of the steppe, their skill in accommodating tliem- 
 selves to its ways, while in the hands of a good chief tliey form a 
 trustworthy military force in affairs with undrilled Asiatic armies. 
 
 Regular cavalry are not fitted for steppe campaigns, as remount 
 horses are not suitable, but only such as are accustomed to 
 pass winter and summer under the open sky with scanty underfoot 
 grass, and are able to drink not only marsh but even bitter and 
 salt v,ater,- However much the horses of our Don and Caucasian
 
 u 
 
 Cossacks may be trained to bear privations, they always succumb 
 to the influence of the steppe climate, and in particular to the 
 water, from which they fall sick and die. 
 
 Artillery is necessary for steppe expeditions, more on account 
 of the moral effect which it produces upon Asiatics than for its 
 material advantages ; although in this respect also it may be 
 of considerable use. Sometimes a single well-aimed canister 
 is sufficient to repulse an attack, and put to flight a large body of 
 the enemy. But as artillery impedes, to a certain extent, the 
 movements of a detachment, there is no necessity for any large 
 force of it, unless there is a prospect of a siege. In steppe com- 
 bats, where everything depends on the rapidity and on the unex- 
 pectedness of the attack, it is more convenient to replace guns by 
 rocket stands, the action of which produces a marked impres- 
 sion upon Asiatic cavalry ; on this account it would be very advan- 
 tageous to instruct Cossacks in their use, forming them into 
 mounted rocket parties, as was done in the Caucasus, and during 
 some of the expeditions in Turkestan. 
 
 Engineers must not be omitted from the composition of steppe 
 detachments, being necessary either in the event of a seige, or 
 defence of a fort, or for the erection of temporary entrenchments, 
 repairing roads, bridging rivers, and so forth. 
 
 When there is a scarcity of sappers, it is necessary that the 
 infantry should be provided with a sufficient quantity of entrenching 
 tools, and their effective should include a party, however small, of 
 men who are accustomed to sapper work. It would be advan- 
 tageous to organize such parties among the Cossack sotnias, which 
 are required more than any others to act independently in the 
 steppe. But besides this it is sometimes necessary to have with 
 the detachments a special engineer tram containing pontoons, 
 boats, ferry-boats, &c. Thus at the time of General Perovsky's 
 expedition to Khiva, the detachment carried canvas pontoons, 
 skin and flat-bottom boats, which took to pieces and were packed 
 on the camels. During the campaign at Ak j\Iechet the detach- 
 ment had in addition boats of English caoutchouc bags, which had 
 to be filled with air. But as we are aware, these things were 
 never used ; when they had to cro.ss the place inundated by the 
 Khokandi, near Ak Mechet, the soldiers made rafts of reeds found 
 on the spot with such rapidity that there was no necessity for 
 anything else. 
 
 But besides the military part of the detachment, a few mounted 
 Kirgeze should be attached to every expedition. These are the 
 djigits, vojaks, and chabars. The chabars (courier, from the word 
 chappdk, to run) are used solely as messengers for carrying des- 
 patches from one detachment to another, performing the double 
 duties of post and courier. Some chabars carry out their duties 
 with such zeal and speed as to surpass all belief. Cases are known 
 of chabars from Fort Perovsky having reached Orenburg (1,300 
 versts) in o or 6 days. The vojaks {vastche — at the head) guide 
 the detachment, keeping always in front of it, and pointing out 
 the road to the best wells. The most trustworthv Kirgeze should
 
 45 
 
 be told off as chabars and vojaks, men who are acquainted with 
 the localit}', the robber haunts, and the best halting places. 
 
 Besides vojaks and chabars each detachment should have in- 
 terpreters and, sometimes, according to the locality and object of 
 the movements, a few trusty natives to collect important intelli- 
 gence of what is going on in the vicinity, either from Kirgeze along 
 the road, or by riding away to considerable distances on the flanks; 
 in a word, to make reconnaissances. Patrols from the detachments 
 are not to be compared with natives for this work, as they require 
 both guides and interpreters ; and moreover, if collisions occur 
 with the natives, want of knowledge of the language may lead to 
 unfortunate misunderstandings. 
 
 In confirmation of this we may instance the following case, 
 which occurred in 1869 in Turkestan. 
 
 A detachment was bivouacked on the River Ilek, from whence, 
 in consequence of disturbances in the steppe, the Kirgeze had 
 partly gone off' to their peaceful fellow tribesmen on the Ural, 
 and partly to the rebels on the Uil. One of the officers of the 
 detachment, M'ho was on a fishing excursion with some of his men, 
 saw three Kirgeze approaching along the opposite bank, armed 
 with lances. Being at war with the inhabitants, and unable, from 
 ignorance of the language, to ask their business, the officer sent 
 word to camp that the enemy was in sight ; meanwhile the Kirgeze, 
 after waiting a short time, rode away quietly in the direction of the 
 Ural. Scarcely half an hour had passed l)efore they observed a 
 half sotnia of Cossacks following them in pursuit. Without 
 thinking of what had occurred, but under the influence of fear 
 alone, they set oflF at a gallop ; but the Cossacks did not stop 
 pursuit, and tiie result was, that the latter, after riding more than 50 
 versts, and leaving eight horses dead from fatigue on the road, 
 reached the friendly aul of Biy Biktur, destroyed several of his 
 kibitkas, and, to compensate for the loss of their own horses, 
 seized twenty belonging to the Kirgeze, with which they returned 
 to camp. Meanwhile it transpired that the three Kirgeze, in 
 riding out to see our winter quarters on the Ilek, had approached 
 the officer from curiosity, and were only armed for their personal 
 protection, on account of the disturl^ances prevalent in the steppe. 
 
 Lastly, the most important part in the organization of the de- 
 tachment is the train. 
 
 Those who have taken part in European wars can with diffi- 
 culty form an idea of a march in the steppe. We hardly ever 
 meet with an insufficiency of water on European theatres of war j 
 it is seldom necessary to carry a store even for one or two marches. 
 In Central Asia, on the other hand, the insufficiency of water 
 forms one of the greatest difficulties of a campaign, and to meet 
 this want becomes the chief care of the commander. 
 
 There are no local supplies of food in the steppe, and con- 
 sequently all stores have to be often carried for long distances. 
 
 All these difficulties, which have placed our troops more than 
 once in a critical plight, are quite unknown to Asiatics, who are 
 accustomed to scanty food and bad water. Steppe campaigns for
 
 46 
 
 them are merely ordinary changes of dwelling. Tamerlane 
 traversed the deserts of Asia with half a million of men. 
 
 Our Cossacks, when they first peopled the line, did not yield 
 to Asiatics in this respect, and carried their incursions even to the 
 Khivan territories ; but it is evident that regular troops cannot act 
 in this way, and hence it is that our detachments are unavoidably 
 followed by large trains and convoys. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Organization of the Supply Service, and necessity of forming Store Depots. — 
 Measures for Preserving the Health of the Men ; Sanitary Service ; 
 Clothing, Shelter, Food, Drink, Water, and Purity of Air. 
 
 It is evident from what has preceded, that the supply of 
 the detachment and the procuring of transport present the chief 
 difficulties in the preparations for a campaign. But as the distance 
 over tlie grassless steppe precludes our carrying a sufficiency 
 of stores for the whole march, they have to be replenished from 
 the steppe forts on the road.* Formerly, when these forts were 
 not in existence, the greater part of the supplies had to be carried 
 beforehand as far as possible into the steppe, where temporary 
 depots were formed, protected within entrenchments, which, when 
 they were no longer required, were again abandoned by the 
 troops. 
 
 Such points, at the time of Prince Bekovitch Tcherkassky's 
 march to Khiva, were the forts St. Peter, Alexander, and Kras- 
 novodsk, on the shores of the Caspian sea. With the same object 
 were built the Emban and Ak Bulak Forts in 1839, at the time of 
 Adjutant-General Perovsky's march to Khiva. 
 
 A second most important care of a commander is that of the 
 health of the men, horses, and pack-animals. It is found that 
 during steppe campaigns our losses are chiefly due, not to encounters 
 with the enemy, but to the excessive fatigues, the ignorance as to 
 the best method of accommodating ourselves to the climatic con- 
 
 * Steppe forts are usually built according to one of the two following 
 types : — (1.) A small redoubt, holding about 100 men, with two barbettes, and with 
 powder magazines in the thickness of the ^mrapet. This redoubt serves as a reduit 
 or keep, and is usually placed so as to command the barracks, which are built out- 
 side ; the walls (sun-dried bricks) of the barracks, wbich face the country, are 
 pierced with loopholes. The Emban Post is built on this type. Sometimes a flank 
 defence is given to one of the exterior faces of tlie redoubt, by throwing up a lunette 
 in front, at the sahent of which is a barbette (Uil Fort). (2.) The second type con- 
 sists of uniuhabitated buildings (stables, sheds, armouries, &c.) disposed in a quad- 
 rangle, the walls of the buildings overlooking the country being loopholed. Within 
 this quadrangle are the baiTacks, hospital, commissariat depot, &c. At the comers 
 of tbe quadrangle are constructed lunettes of slight ijrofile, with from one to three 
 barbettes. These lunettes furnish an artdlei-y and musketry defence to the laces of 
 the fort. On this type are built the Ak-Tiube and Lower Emba Forts. The forts 
 are usually armed with eight 12-pr. or rifled M.L. guns. They have also one or two 
 field guns, horsed, for sortie purposes. — Translator.
 
 47 
 
 ditions, and the want of proper treatment of the pack animals. 
 In the present day, when we are fairly acquainted with the steppe 
 and the Asiatic Khanates contiguous to it, our losses are com- 
 paratively insignificant, but formerly they attained a high figure ; 
 as, for example, Prince Bekovitch, in his summer expedition 
 to Khiva in 1717, lost a quarter, and General Perovsky, in the 
 winter of 1839, a third part of his effective. 
 
 The prevailing sicknesses in the steppe among troops are : in 
 summer, simple and hsemorrhoidal dysenteries and intermittent 
 fevers ; scurvy and diseases of the digestive organs, due to long 
 residence in an unhealthy climate, monotony of food, and insuffi- 
 ciency of good water. It is of paramount importance to combat 
 these diseases in the germ ; and, although it is not always possible 
 to observe every hygienic precaution during a campaign, it is 
 necessary, at least, to see that our men get good food, fresh meat 
 (the detachment should have its bullocks and sheep), sufficient 
 rest, and, above all, that they should avoid catching cold, and not 
 lie on the damp ground without a blanket. As some of the dis- 
 eases may take an epidemic character and affect the healthy, the 
 sick should not be retained with their regiments, but should be 
 immediately sent to the field hospitals or lazarets. During the 
 march of large detachments, it would be better to form the sick 
 into separate organized convoys, so as not only to obviate 
 the danger of the epidemic spreading, but also to make the order 
 of march of the sick subservient to hygienic requirements to a 
 greater extent than is otherwise possible. Of course the separa- 
 tion of the sick should only be made when the force is strong 
 enough to allow of an escort being detached for the purpose. 
 
 The importance of a suitable organization of the sanitary service 
 during campaigns is self-evident; but at the same time the officers 
 appointed to command are so little acquainted with the more im- 
 portant medical arrangements, that we consider it not superfluous 
 to touch upon the subject. 
 
 In equipping an expedition for the steppe, surgeons, assistant- 
 surgeons and dressers are appointed in proportion to the number 
 of men. This medical department is provided with the necessary 
 medicines, surgical instruments, and special instructions. Each 
 company should be provided with the company shoulder havresac ; 
 each battalion with a dresser's wallet. Both should contain the 
 articles prescribed in the regulations. 
 
 Should the detachment consist of Cossacks, especially those 
 organized as a temporary measure, and consequently without any 
 pay-chest, they should be furnished with money for the purchase 
 of the necessary medicines, &c. 
 
 For giving shelter to the sick, and convalescents, or for lazarets, 
 Kirgiz kibitkas or djulameiks are used, as there are no houses or 
 even sheds in the steppe. 
 
 It is advantageous to put a plank flooring, raised one or two 
 feet above the ground, inside tents, kibitkas, and djulameiks; but 
 as there is but little wood in the steppe, and its transport is 
 attended with great difficulty, the wooden flooring is often replaced
 
 48 
 
 by a rammed-down floor spread with sand, or by the use of mats. 
 These mats should be frequently changed and beaten to get rid of 
 the dust, which is so injurious to the eyesight. The kibitka should 
 have a channel dug round it to drain off the wet and rain water. 
 
 As regards clothing, the experience of General Perovsky's 
 winter campaign showed that the short jacket made of jebaga 
 (felt of the hair of Kirgeze sheep which is quilted on linen, like 
 wadding) and cloth jackets lined with sheepskin or lambskin, 
 cannot replace the simple sheepskin jacket used in Russia. But 
 as the Russian jackets are heavy, and therefore favour catarrh, it 
 might be better to replace them by the fur of young camels 
 (buta), covered with thick camel cloth, which gives a light and 
 very warm clothing. Besides this jacket the winter clothing of 
 the soldier should include loose cloth trousers with quilted wadding 
 or jebaga knee-guards; and over them it is advantageous to wear 
 broad linen pantaloons, as snow adheres far less to linen, and con- 
 sequently this material dries more quickly than cloth. 
 
 To these we must add high and loose boots and felt goloshes ; 
 the feet, besides this, must be wrapped in woollen bandages, and on 
 the hands gloves should be worn covered with camel or the ordinary 
 peasant cloth. In the cavalry, in order to diminish the effect of 
 cold on the legs, it i§ advantageous to envelope the stirrups with 
 cloth or felt, or, still better, to replace the iron stirrups by the 
 wooden ones in ordinary use among the Kirgeze. 
 
 The best head covering in winter is the warm forage cap, with 
 peak and hind-flap of thick cloth, or the Kirgiz fur hat with 
 ear-flaps, or, lastly, our ordinary Cossack cap (papakha). 
 
 Summer clothing varies in the steppe, according to the local 
 climatic conditions ; the papakhas, both in Orenburg and Turkestan, 
 may be replaced by the forage cap covered \vith white linen and 
 with hind flaps ; stocks are discontinued, and the troops march 
 in their simple shirts with the pouch-belts over. All the winter 
 clothing is carried in the train, but on the approach of twilight 
 it is necessary to wear the cloak or tunic, as without it the troops 
 are liable to catarrh. 
 
 Asiatics protect themselves from sunstroke and the pernicious 
 influence of the winds by wearing several robes one over the 
 other, and sometimes envelope themselves in furs; but although 
 this is a very rational course it demands long habitude, and 
 therefore cannot be recommended for our soldiers. 
 
 The most indispensable part of the clothing of a steppe 
 soldier is the waistband, hood, and leather chambars. 
 
 Soldiers should wear waistbands in summer and winter as, 
 while keeping the abdomen warm, they give better protection than 
 anything else against catarrh ; they are particularly necessary in 
 the southern steppe against the baneful influence of the periodical 
 winds, "angazak" and " shildio," of which we have previously 
 spoken. 
 
 The hood in hot weather should always be worn over the 
 forage cap for the protection of the head from sunstroke. 
 
 Leathern chambars, from their closeness of texture, possess the
 
 49 
 
 property of keeping the body cool in hot weather, and in cold do 
 not let the wind penetrate, thereby preventing rheumatisms, 
 which are prevalent in steppe campaigns. The chambars are 
 worn only by our men in Turkestan ; but as a proof of their 
 advantages the Cossacks provide them at their own expense^ and 
 the local Kirgeze wear no other trousers in a campaign but 
 chambars. 
 
 Lastly, long boots which are good in damp and cold weather 
 are very bad in hot weather, particularly in prolonged marches 
 across sandy steppes ; the legs get rubbed and covered with sores. 
 The best boots for this season of the year are shoes such as those 
 worn by the French in A.lgeria ; they are light, easy, and 
 portable. 
 
 To all this we must add that the blinding brilliancy of the 
 snow in winter, that of the salt marshes in summer, and especially 
 the dust and wind, affect the eye-sight very much and cause 
 serious diseases of the eye, even among the natives ; in spring 
 these diseases are increased by the caustic smoke of the shrubs 
 (saksaul) used as fuel, when the young sap commences to rise. In 
 order to protect the eyes some advise that the eyelids should be 
 blackened with powder, or spectacles of black hair net or of 
 coloured glass should be worn, but the best of all is to wear the 
 papakha, like the Caucasians, the black hair of which protects the 
 eyes as proved by experience, better than any powder or nets. The 
 plain glass spectacles in leather rims, sold in commerce, should be 
 forbidden altogether, as they are more injurious than anything 
 else to the sight. 
 
 For the protection of the men from bad weather in the steppe 
 they are provided with felt Kirgeze djulameiks,* instead of the 
 ordinary canvas tents in the proportion of 1 to 10 or 20 men, 
 according to the season of the year. Besides this, each soldier and 
 Cossack should have a felt which serves as a blanket and gives pro- 
 tection against the dampness of the ground. The opinions as to 
 whether felts protect the men from the bite of tarantula, which 
 thrive in the Kirgiz steppe, particularly on the banks of the 
 Aral Sea, are difficult to reconcile, as the majority of observers 
 affirm that tarantulce not only do not mind felts but move over them 
 freel}', ascending even to the very top of the djulameiks, and on 
 cold nights creep into them for protection. 
 
 Jelieznoff, in his description of the Ural Cossacks says, that 
 the Kirgeze generally cure themselves of a tarantula bite by pre- 
 senting the bitten part to the mouth of a sheep, which, on scenting 
 the odour of this insect, will suck out all the virus from the 
 wound with the greatest gusto. But Mr. Karelin, known from his 
 scientific observations upon Orenburg, recommends as the best 
 
 * In winter, iron ovens sliould be built in the djulameiks, but in order to keep 
 up the heat it is necessary to close the flaps of the djulameiks as tightly as pos- 
 sible ; this arrangement is disadvantageous, as it makes them very dark, and on 
 emerging from them into the sunlight, the eyesight is hable to injury. This is the 
 cause of the eye diseases, from which the Kirgeze ordinarily sulier in spring. If 
 the flaps are not closed the heat will not be retained for more than an hour.
 
 50 
 
 antidote against the bite of this and other reptiles, volatile alkali, 
 in a dry state, — of which two or three grains should be dissolved in 
 half a wine-glass of water and taken internally, the wound being 
 rubbed with spirits of ammonia. This salt has the property of 
 evaporating very rapidly, and should therefore be kept in well 
 stoppered bottles, protected from the light by wrapping in black 
 paper. In the absence of the salt six to ten drops should be taken 
 daily internally.* 
 
 The supply of troops in a steppe campaign is regulated by the 
 special instructions " On military organization in the Kirgiz 
 Steppe," according to which, the following articles are obligatory : 
 biscuit, groats, oats, mustard, laurel leaves, garlic, pepper, salt, 
 horse-radish, essence of vinegar, spirits, tea, sugar, leaf-tobacco 
 and soap. Besides this, as a change of food and as an excellent 
 anti-scorbutic, the troops are supplied with dried sour cabbage. 
 The English in Abyssinia replaced biscuit with bread, which was 
 baked on the march. For this purpose they had portable iron 
 ovens, erected at the different camping places, which were able, in 
 the course of an hour, to bake 145 lb. of bread. No trials of these 
 have been made by us, because in the first place biscuit is acknow- 
 ledged to be more economical, and, secondly, the construction of 
 these ovens is so complicated and bulky that, even in Abyssinia, 
 they had to be carried on pack elephants. 
 
 As regards preserved meats, it is considered in the present day 
 that they should only be resorted to in very extreme cases when 
 fresh meat cannot be obtained, for example, in flying columns, &c. 
 The best according to present experience is the peas-sausage with 
 salt meat, specially prepared for steppe use. 
 
 The ration of wine is necessary for the maintenance of the 
 strength, but on the march and when halted at steppe forts, our 
 soldiers receive spirits ; the French issue wormwood spirit 
 (absinthe), the English issue rum, in the proportion of 1| drams 
 per man in the 24 hours. It should be remembered, however, 
 that under the influence of a high temperature the immoderate 
 use of spirit increases and often renders ordinary illnesses 
 like fevers incurable ; it may lead to insanity, paralysis, and 
 apoplexy. With us the ration of spirit has gradually decreased ; 
 thus in Bekovitch's march in 1717. each man was avowed about 
 5 fluid ounces per day. In Perovsky's march in winter 2 ounces 
 daily. In the present day when the troops receive tea they only 
 get 8 ounces of spirit a month .f 
 
 The use of tea was introduced in 1871, being considered a 
 necessary accompaniment to a steppe march, both from a hygienic 
 and moral point of view. 
 
 Hot tea is an excellent beverage, both in cold and in very hot 
 weather ; but when cold and carried in bottles it forms an agree- 
 
 * Spirits of ammonia, besides this, is useM as an external application for bums, 
 and in cases of delirium tremens 8 to 15 drops in a wine-glass of water for a 
 dose. 
 
 t Spirits are not issued at all in the summer, except on damp days and cold 
 nights. In the cold season, instead of tea, spirit is issued.^— ZVaMS?«^or.
 
 51 
 
 able and refreshing drink on the march, particularly when the 
 water, from its bad quality, can only be used after being boiled ; 
 decoctions of tea, and, in its absence, of liquorice-root, or other 
 similar roots, have long been in use among our steppe soldiers, 
 particularly among the Orenburg Cossacks. 
 
 As regards the proportion of tea, the ration at present is one 
 pound of tea and three pounds of sugar per 100 men a- day in the 
 summer months, i. e., in May, June, July, and August ; in the 
 other months it is reduced to one-third of a pound of tea and one 
 pound of sugar. 
 
 Vinegar is necessary as a seasoning for food, both as the most 
 efifective anti-scorbutic, and for improving bad water. But in hot 
 weather when the thermometer stands at 45° R. in the steppe, 
 the addition of a dash even to good water is grateful. Prince 
 Bekovitch Tcherkassky took with him sufficient vinegar to last 
 three months, allowing each man not less than four ounces 
 a-day. 
 
 In the steppe where there are no running streams, wells are 
 met with nearly everywhere, dug along the routes frequented by the 
 nomad Kirgeze, by the trade caravans, and by our military detach- 
 ments. In some places, for instance, on the Ust Urt, these wells 
 are lined with stone ; and, in order to prevent their becoming 
 filled with sand, or men and cattle from falling into them at night, 
 they are covered with flag-stones with small circular openings 
 for letting down a pail. The water is thus kept good, but the 
 process of getting it is so slow that large caravans must either 
 march in echelons or be provided with special arrangements for 
 drawing water. 
 
 We would remark that the building of these wells is ordinarily 
 ascribed to charitable persons, and is referred to very ancient 
 times, to the era when Arab trade flourished, or to the time of the 
 sovereignty of the Golden Horde. The majority of steppe wtUs 
 built in modern times are not lined and are merely conical pits, 
 which, from being always exposed to the sun's rays and stopped 
 up with sand, mud, and every sort of impurity, yield dirty yellow- 
 green unw^holesome water, which is much more suited for the pro- 
 pagation of disease than for the maintenance of life. Moreover, 
 the majority contain bitterly saline, and almost undrinkable 
 water. 
 
 For the improvement of bad water different means have been 
 suggested. The English, for example, in Abyssinia used a distill- 
 ing apparatus capable of yielding 11,000 vedros daily. With 
 us, if there is wood at hand, or even wormwood, ti)ree or four 
 handfuls of powdered charcoal should be throwMi into the well, 
 a good sized lump of alum placed in each pail, or in the absence 
 of either of these the water should be filtered through cloth or 
 felt. In order to rectify contaminated wells all the water should 
 be pumped out and the bottom cleaned out lightly; the water then 
 trickles through the sand and the well is rehlled, — the operation 
 requiring 24 hours. 
 
 Of late years we have taken into use the portable metal wells 
 
 E 2
 
 52 
 
 tried in the autumn of 1869 ; but in order to be useful they should 
 be substituted for the steppe wells and left at the places where 
 they are inserted, as is done in Algeria. If the wells are far apart 
 and the detachment has not time to dig others, water must be 
 carried with the train in special wooden barrels or in leathern 
 skins (tursuks), made by the Kirgeze for the transport of 
 kumis. 
 
 Besides this, the soldiers must have a store of water with them, 
 if possible, in vessels or bottles, covered with felt. The block- 
 tin kegs, covered with linen like the English, are unsuitable, as the 
 water quickly becomes hot. 
 
 But in the Kirgiz steppe we hardly ever meet with com- 
 pletely waterless places. Cases have occurred when good water 
 has been met with not only in sands and salt marshes but also 
 under layers of salt mud. Its propinquity may be recognized by the 
 presence of musquitos and ilies, or by the vapour seen to issue 
 from the ground an hour after sunrise. 
 
 Besides these indications unglazed clay pots may be buried in 
 the ground, or a fresh sheep skin, and if in the morning they 
 appear damp it is a certain indication that water is not far oflF.* 
 Wells dug under these circumstances generally prove a success — 
 Bekovitch, in his march through the waterless desert, opened 
 10 to 35 wells at each halting place. 
 
 Lastly, it may be said that, in the steppe, nothing is so injurious 
 to the health of the men as want of attention to the well-known 
 hygienic rules as to cleanliness. The exhalations proceeding from 
 badly constructed and imperfectly filled-in latrines, from the decom- 
 position of animal matter, from the accumulation of filth in drains, 
 abattoirs, &c., are rapidly taken up by the atmosphere, and, in the 
 hot weather, may produce a general epidemic with all its pernicious 
 consequences. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Characteristics of Steppe Animals : the Camel ; Local Breeds of Horses, — their 
 maintenance in a Campaign, feeding, and watering. — Bullock Trains. 
 
 Success in every campaign depends to a very great extent 
 upon the condition of the transport of the army, i.e., the 
 train ; in steppe campaigns, upon the good quality and the con- 
 dition of the pack animals whjch represent the train. 
 
 We therefore consider that it will not be superfluous in the 
 first place to make ourselves acquainted with the character and 
 nature of the animals which are ordinarily used in the steppe, both 
 for the transport of baggage, and for the military service. 
 
 The principal are the camel and the horse. 
 
 * The presence of water may be shown by sticking a ramrod m the ground 
 over night; and then seeing if it shows signs of moisture in the morning.
 
 53 
 
 The camel, from its physical constitution, is born for sandy 
 steppes and a dry hot climate. It has been brought into the 
 Kirgiz steppe by the instrumentality of man, and therefore can 
 only exist there in the quality of a domesticated animal, and as 
 such only with very great care. The Kirgeze use camels for the 
 transport of baggage alone^ and lade them with 480 lb. to 720 lb. 
 weight according to the time of the year. With a moderate load, 
 and a good road, a camel can march without resting for 14 or 15 
 hours in succession, and complete 40 to 70 versts ; after this it 
 should have an hour's grazing on good pasturage, when it eats 
 sufficient food to satisfy it for a whole day. 
 
 The favourite food of the camel is wormwood, thistles and 
 coarse prickly and saline grasses, but they easily get accustomed 
 to any sort of food, and do not require more than 30 lb. of hay 
 to keep them in good condition. But in a steppe campaign, 
 camels, when laden, fall off in condition unless they receive 
 other varieties of food besides grass, and unless they are allowed 
 prolonged rests (30 to 40 hours) after each four or five long 
 marches. 
 
 In order to keep up their strength, it is necessary to give them 
 some handfuls of dry forage, or should there be a dearth of it, 
 3 lb. of meal, and 3 ounces of salt. The unfortunate notion that 
 a camel can remain without grass for some days has led to dis- 
 asterous consequences, for example, of the 10,000 camels accom- 
 panying General Perovsky's expedition to Khiva, only 1,000 
 returned, the remaining 9,000 perishing from exhaustion, want 
 of food, and partly from cold. 
 
 A camel can remain without water for seven or eight days if 
 it only gets succulent and vegetable food ; otherwise it can only 
 hold out for four or five days. After this time it will drink 
 12 buckets full. There long existed a superstition that the camel 
 keeps a considerable store of water in its fifth stomach. The 
 naturalist, Buifon, cites an example that in the stomach of a dead 
 camel, which had not been watered for 10 days, was found a pint 
 of pure water, but the possibilit)^ of this is disputed in the 
 present day^ by all naturalists. Brem says that such water 
 would be undrinkable, as water when mixed with food becomes 
 stinking. 
 
 Camels should not be used for work before their fourth or fifth 
 year. The broad feet of these animals, with their tendsr soles, 
 make them suitable for travelling over dry sands, but on rough 
 stony ground, and in marshy places, their feet are sometimes 
 affected with troublesome swellings. They suffer much in the 
 cold weather ; they require felt blankets and, after scraping the 
 snow from under them, mats should be spread for them to lie 
 upon. 
 
 Camels are of two sorts, one-humped (nar) and two-humped; 
 the former are much more enduring, and therefore more costly 
 than the others. 
 
 These animals, which cannot be replaced for steppe service, 
 live for 50 years. Camel's flesh is seldom used as food, but the
 
 54 
 
 milk of the female curdled and diluted with water, affords the 
 natives a light and tasty beverage called "airian." 
 
 The principal local breeds of horses in the steppe are the 
 following : the *' Argamak," the " Kirgiz/' the " Turkmen/^ and 
 the " Bashkir ^^ horses. 
 
 The " Argamaks^^ are bred chiefly by the Turkmen, Khivans, 
 and sometimes by the Bokhariots. They are distinguished by 
 their symmetry of form, reminding us somewhat of the Arab, their 
 extraordinary vivacity, and their agility and rapidity in the galop ; 
 but on the other hand they are exceedingly delicate, impetuous, and 
 on that account are very liable to catch cold. On cold nights, 
 even in summer, they must be wrapped in warm clothing, which 
 is the reason that they do not enjoy any special favour among 
 our Cossacks. 
 
 Much superior to the Argamak, as regards its military 
 qualities, is the steppe Kirgiz horse. Its rough training fits it for 
 all the variations of climate and insufficiency of grass; hence it 
 has extraordinary muscular strength and vigour, but it grows and 
 attains its form slowly. As a general rule the Kirgiz horse does 
 not attain its full development for seven years, and should not 
 be put to heavy work before the completion of its sixth year. 
 The Kirgeze commence to break them in for the saddle in the 
 third or fourth year; but afterwards return them to the herds 
 untilthey are eight or even nine years old. These horses become 
 excellent from this treatment. It may be remarked that the 
 indication of the age by the teeth, according to the ordinary rules, 
 often leads to error, as from the rough underfoot grass, particularly 
 in salt and sandy places, the marks are worn out sooner than 
 would otherwise be the case. 
 
 Kirgiz horses are mostly of a light colour ; black is seldom 
 met with, as it is supposed that black rapidly loses colour from 
 the continuous action of the solar rays, and passes into brown. 
 They are not generally well shaped, are not noted for great I'apidity 
 of pace, but they are of extremely retentive memory, and are 
 capable of traversing considerable distances — ^more than 100 versts 
 in 24 hours — without food, water or rest. An eye-witness, who has 
 studied the Kirgiz-Kaisats horde, states that a certain Sultan, 
 a hero in stature and strength, galloped with a Cossack escort 
 300 versts in 24 hours (on two horses), part of the distance over 
 mountainous and stony ground ; the horses it is true broke down 
 in the legs, but lived and recovered without any treatment.* 
 
 Among Kirgiz horses, amblers are sometimes met with ; they 
 obtain a high price, and form an object of special vanity among 
 rich and influential Kirgeze.' The best breed of Kirgiz horse 
 is the "Adaef," distinguished for beauty of form and size; after 
 this comes the " Tchiklin," with a well developed muscular frame, 
 strong and adapted for rapid and continuous galloping for hundreds 
 
 * Lieutenant- Colonel Vojak, in his description of the Kirgiz horse, says that in 
 April 1869 a C'habar, sent by him on two horses from Aral Chi (north of the Great 
 Barsiits) to Uralsk fort (400 versts), returned in ihe course of a day and a half.
 
 55 
 
 of versts ; and lastely the " Siberian." Horses of the latter 
 breed are met with chiefly in the north-east part of the steppe, 
 and are distinguished by their size ; but they yield in speed and 
 endurance to the "Adaef" and "Tchiklin.'' Generally the 
 improvement of the breed of Kirgiz horses is impeded by the love 
 of the Kirgiz for " Kumis," in consequence of which the mares 
 become speedily exhausted, and the foals, being separated from 
 the mother sooner than they should be, do not get properly 
 nourished. To this it should be added that the horses of the 
 Kirgeze are as a rule badly kept, while their own saddles are so 
 ill-shaped and unsuited, both for the horse and rider, that the 
 Kirgeze prefer to purchase them of the Bokhariots, the Khivans, 
 or from the Cossacks on the line. 
 
 The crossing of an "Argamak" horse with a good "Kirgiz" or 
 "Turkestan" mare, produces an excellent stock known by the name 
 of " Karabair." This breed, possessing the qualities of the 
 " Argamak," with the endurance and strength of the "Kirgiz" 
 horse, is seldom met with, and hence bears a high price, and forms 
 an object of special vanity among the natives. 
 
 The " Bashkir " horse is smaller in size, but more impet- 
 uous, and, therefore, not so enduring as the " Kirgiz." Both 
 these breeds are rather small and seldom attain 14 hands 2| inches. 
 A line composed of such horses cannot have the same force of 
 shock in the charge as a line of bigger horses ; this is the only 
 reason which militates against our regular cavalry being mounted 
 upon Kirgiz horses. 
 
 The herds of Ural and Orenburg Cossack horses, and other 
 local breeds, consist for the most part of crosses of the Kirgiz 
 and Bashkir breeds with the Russian, or of one or other with 
 stallions of the old provincial stables. 
 
 Although the Kirgiz, like all steppe horses, do not require 
 any special care or attention, yet during the severe winter and 
 snow storms at the time of Perovsky's expedition the Cossacks 
 found it necessary to cover their horses with rugs, and by this 
 means preserved them, while camels and other, animals were 
 dying by thousands. A similar precaution should be taken in 
 summer against the sun's rays by using a light cover, which should 
 be slightly wetted with water. Without this precaution it becomes 
 at times impossible to ride, owing to the countless number of gad- 
 flies and gnats. There are some places on the Syr Darya where 
 not only horses, but even camels and horned cattle, which are in 
 a very satisfactory condition in spring, become in summer so 
 exhausted from the attacks of flies and gnats that they perish by 
 scores. On this account the Kirgeze, who nomadise in summer in 
 these localities, only retain with them a limited quantity of cattle, 
 and leave the remainder for the summer months in the Kara Kum 
 desert. 
 
 As a general rule, steppe horses being bred nearly exclusively 
 on sandy or clayey soil, are never shod ; but during a campaign it 
 is necessary to have shoes in store in case of frost or a maich 
 through stonv countrv.
 
 56 
 
 The supply of forage for the horses is a subject of special 
 importance, and demands from the commander not only his 
 constant solicitude, but considerable experience. Observations, 
 deduced from steppe campaigns, have shown that the most 
 enduring and powerful horses quickly lose flesh and become weak 
 if they are not supplied with dry forage. With this object, the 
 English in the Abyssinian expedition carried with the troops a 
 special sort of pressed forage, in which the hay and oats were 
 mixed in the proper proportions. This description of forage 
 proved excellent; being strongly pressed, it occupied little space and 
 hence was very suitable for transport ; it retained its aroma, and in 
 spite of the disadvantageous climatic conditions, very seldom 
 deteriorated. With us, in spite of the fact that the transport of 
 forage is attended with great difficulties, the Cossack horses have 
 been accustomed to receive oats or barley throughout a campaign, 
 but hay only exceptionally. According to the present regulations 
 for the supply of forage, horses in the Kirgiz steppe receive oats ; 
 in Turkestan — barley, or the two mixed. 
 
 The French in their Algerian expeditions do not give oats at all 
 for fear of inducing broken wind, but give their horses underfoot 
 grass in spring, and in autumn barley alcne, to the extent of 
 iO lb. per diem. 
 
 In summer, both barley and oats should be given in linen 
 nose-bags, in winter in cloth as the linen freeze quickly. In 
 winter, however, you may do without the bags altogether, putting 
 the forage on the snow, when the horse will eat up every bit. 
 
 With regard to watering, it is necessary to remark that as at 
 many of the wells there are neither tanks nor stone troughs, it is 
 necessary to provide special troughs made of leather or gutta- 
 percha cloth, as was done by General Perovsky. In places where 
 there is but little water, and where economy is necessary, it is 
 important to fix the ration which just sufltices for sustaining the 
 different animals. The English fix it at 72 gallons for a camel, 
 5 for an ox, and 3| for a horse in the 24 hours, but as it would 
 be inconvenient to measure the quantity, it has been found that a 
 camel drinks half his ration in one minute forty seconds, and a 
 horse in a minute and a half. 
 
 In conclusion, we would add that of all animals used in the 
 train bullocks are the least suited for pack transport ; they move 
 slowly, get knocked up, and fall off in flesh with insufficient food; 
 besides this they are timid, often fall down with their load, and 
 thus create disorder and impede the march of the trains. Con- 
 sequently we only use bullocks in draught and then when no 
 particular speed is required. ■ They have some advantages, as 
 bullock carts can carry a greater load than horse carts.
 
 57 
 
 viir. 
 
 Size and Destination of a Steppe Train ; Causes of its small size in the French 
 Service. — Russian and English Trains. — Establishment of Train for the 
 Kirgiz Steppe, — for a company, sotnia, and battery. — Comparative advan- 
 tages of Camel, Horse, and Bullock Transport. — Pack Transport : its 
 defects. — Troop Camels. — Hospital Transport. 
 
 The amount of train in a steppe campaign depends on the 
 quantity of provisions and other requisites which have to be carried 
 by the expeditionary force. 
 
 The following are the chief articles to be carried : — food, 
 forage, &c., horse equipment, officers' and soldiers' baggage, 
 medicines and hospital stores, felt tents and the so-called camp 
 equipage.* 
 
 Sometimes we have had to carry v/ith us such things as wood, 
 field-forges, bridging material, portable wells, and various iieavy 
 machines ; to carry guns on pack animals ; and lastly, to have a 
 number of spare horses or camels in case of forming sick-convoys, 
 flying detachments, and also for carrying convalescents, stragglers, 
 and so forth. 
 
 From this list of necessaries it is plain that the train of a 
 steppe detachment must be very numerous. In European war- 
 fare one cart ordinarily suffices for 40 or 50 men ; in steppe cam- 
 paigns it is otherwise, every 2 or 3 men must have an animal, and 
 sometimes more. If we suppose, for example, a Cossack sotnia 
 taking the field with a month's supplies, then, according to calcu- 
 lation, it will require about 80 camels, without counting officers' 
 baggage, carts for the transport of military stores, the sick, &c. 
 This is the reason that military detachments marching in the 
 steppe are nothing else but an escort to their own numerous 
 trains. 
 
 Napoleon's campaign in Egypt, where the transport organized 
 by him was on so reduced a scale that everything could be placed 
 within a small infantry square, cannot serv^e for us as a precedent, 
 because the French were able to transport their food and other 
 stores by the Nile. The same must be remarked respecting the 
 later expeditions in Algeria where the French had seldom to pro- 
 ceed more than 2 or 3 marches from their store depots ; but even in 
 this case, according to the observations of Marshal Bugeaud, 
 there were often more than 1,000 different sorts of animals with a 
 column consisting of 5,000 men under arms. 
 
 As in the boundless steppe there is no means of communication 
 
 * The proportion of this equipage for a company of 170 men is as follows : — 
 6 cast-iron boilers, with hds, 2 white-metal dram cups, 7 water vessels, 7 lb. pepjjer, 
 43 lb. laurel leaves, 100 lb. leaf tobacco, 9 bottles essence of vinegar, 100 lb. 
 onions, 10 lb. garlic, 10 lb. horse radish, 10 lb. soap, 200 lb. salt, 3 wooden 
 troughs, 5 scythes, 170 mats, 300 fathoms rope, 3 hatchets, 3 spades, 3 picks. 7 
 shovels, 2 white-metal mugs, 1 eight-gallon cask, 3 wooden shovels, 1 net, 1 iron pail, 
 170 wooden tea cups. The weight of this is from 1,200 lb. to 1,600 lb.
 
 58 
 
 except by road, nor any habitations except the steppe forts, situated 
 hundreds of versts apart, the trains must be numerous. The 
 smallest train, as we know, was that at the time of the Khivan cam- 
 paign of Prince Bekovitch Tcherkassky, when there was a camel 
 to. every 2 men ; the greatest was in the winter of 1839 in General 
 Perovsky's detachment, where every man had 2 camels, and every 
 2 men approximately had a 3-horse cart. 
 
 The English train in the East Indies, and in Afghanistan, was 
 still more numerous. Suffice it to say that, according to the returns, 
 the train of each battalion of infantry is fixed in time of peace 
 at 1,200 mules and 600 mule-drivers ; in the field these numbers 
 are still further increased. The reason why such vast crowds of 
 servants and immense trains follow in the wake of a detachment, 
 where every elephant, every horse, every camel, and every bullock 
 has his attendant, is partly due to the climate so baneful for 
 Europeans, and still more to the oriental habits, which effeminate 
 the troops. Even the common soldiers had their servants, and 
 thus, in the words of an Englishman, the military camp was turned 
 into a motley show. Similar licensded to pernicious consequences 
 for the English during their second expedition to Afghanistan in 
 the winter of 1841. When the detachment of 4,000 men, under 
 General Elphinstone, was forced to retreat, the train following in 
 rear numbered 12,000 men. This unarmed, dissolute and most 
 demoralised mob, quickly fell into complete disorder, enabling 
 the Afghans to surround the English detachment and destroy it, 
 so that of the 16,000 or 17,000 men only one Englishman, thanks 
 to the rapidity of his horse, succeeded in reaching the fortress of 
 Jellalabad. 
 
 Consequently in the Abyssinian expedition in 1867, the English 
 deemed it necessary to limit the baggage of each officer to 80 lb., 
 and that of each soldier to 20 lb., including bedding. Besides 
 this, they left behind all the officers^ servants, allowing the officers 
 to take a man from the ranks. The result was to reduce the ordi- 
 nary number of mules per battalion from 1,200 to 187, and 100 
 drivers. But with all this, the train of the Expeditionary Force 
 numbered 20,000 various animals. 
 
 For carrying the baggage in steppe campaigns, we use pack 
 animals, tuo-horse or one-horse carts, and lastly, bullock transport. 
 The baggage is so arranged that each pair-horse or pair-bullock 
 cart has not more than 1,400 lb., each one-horse 700 lb., each 
 camel load 680 lb. Naturally the two-horse carls are to be pre- 
 ferred to the one-horse, as with the same number of horses a less 
 number of carts is required. 
 
 The quantity of carts or camels, and consequently the size of 
 the train, is calculated separately for each unit,* so that each com- 
 
 * The following computation is taken from Russian sources : — 
 Assuming the company of infantry at 200 men, inclusive of servants, non-com- 
 batants, and officers, it requires for one month 12,480 lb. of biscuit, net weight ; 
 2,080 lb. of groats, net ; in lieu of five-sixths of the monthly allowance of spirit, 
 60 lb. of tea and 180 lb. of sugar, and 5i gallons of spmt, weighing 80 lb. Oats 
 for the draught horses 600 lb. ; 15 tents (^jularaeiks), being 10 per company, 2 for
 
 59 
 
 pany may have with it, on marching out, besides its food^ medicines 
 reserve ammunition, and camp equipage, its own baggage at the 
 rate of 60 lb. per man. The sotnias have no special carts for their 
 baggage, but carry it with the forage ; the number of carts 
 which they require is much greater than for a company. 
 
 Independently of this, each unit must have its own train, con- 
 sisting ordinarily of 2 or 3 carts per company, and in the sotnia, 
 according to the effective number of Cossacks, calculating a pack 
 horse for every 10 men and a cart for every 20. 
 
 On comparing camel and horse transport, we can only come to 
 the conclusion that each possesses its advantages and disadvan- 
 tages, which depend chiefly on the locality, climate, season of the 
 year, and lastly, upon the character and aim of the expedition. 
 In sandy and waterless regions, a train of pack camels would un- 
 questionably be the best, as the camel bears thirst longer than the 
 horse ; it can find underfoot grass nearly everywhere, and, conse- 
 quently, does not require a special store of water and forage. With 
 a horse train we may, in waterless localities, have to' use the 
 greater part of the pack animals to carry water for their own 
 consumption. Besides this, camels can traverse places without 
 fatigue where a cart could scarcely move, for instance, drifting 
 sands ; but, on the other hand, protracted marching over grassless 
 steppes, and, in particular, great cold, tell disadvantageously upon 
 them. After the Abyssinian expedition the English complained 
 that the camels did not bear the march well, and even the fresh 
 summer nights were very unfavourable for them. 
 
 These considerations lead us to give the preference to horses 
 
 sick, 3 for officers, each weighiug 260 lb. = 3,900 lb.; felts for bedding (10 lb. 
 to 12 lb.) 16,000 lb. ; camp equipage and anti-scorbutic stores, 1,200 lb. to 
 2,000 lb. ; men's kits, at 60 lb., 12,000 lb. ; ammunition, 2,000 lb. In all about 
 16 tons. If this amount of baggage be placed in one-horse carts, 1,000 lb. in each, 
 36 carts wiU be required. Of this number, for food alone (6y tons) 15 carts ; and as 
 the detachments are never gent for less than two months, 50 carts -will be required. 
 To this niimber we must add thi-ee or four additional carts for the apothecaries, 
 medicines, and sick on the marchj — in all, say 56 carts. 
 
 The camel train for the above would be as follows :— Allowing 5 carts as indis- 
 pensable, the remainder of the load would require at least 50 camels (each at 600 lb.), 
 and as a general rule it would be better to have 65 camels (each at 560 lb.) There 
 should be one suare camel to every 6, 7, or 10 camels. 
 
 The foregoing articles do not include all the necessaries of the company. It must 
 have fuel, portable wells, means of crossing rivers, and, besides these, two or three 
 mess carts, and one cart for each officer. The total quantity of transport per com- 
 pany for two months cannot be reckoned at less than 65 one-horse carts, or 10 carts 
 and 75 camels, exclusive of from 8 to 15 spare. 
 
 For a Cossack sotnia, consisting of an estabHshment of 145 men and 3 officers, 
 148 riding and 14 pack horses, much more transport is required than for a company. 
 The food for the men, and oats (84 quarts daily) for the horses, amounts in two months 
 to 120,000 lb., without the sacks. The other baggage is not great ; 10 or 11 jula- 
 meiks,— 7 for the Cossacks, 3 for officers, and 1 tor sick = 2,600 lb., and two or 
 three carts for the apothecary, medicines, and sick. On this computation the number 
 of carts necessary for a sotnia for two months, including sacks and coverings, will 
 amount to 130 or 135. Of camels for the same period, leavuig five carts, there would 
 be required about 200 (each carrying 640 lb.), to which must be added about 30 
 spare. If hay has to be carried, a considerable addition must be made to the 
 transport. 
 
 The baggage of a field battery may be reckoned at the same rat« as for a com- 
 pany, that of a horse artillery battery the same as for a %oim.-,\.—Tra)tslafor.
 
 60 
 
 for a winter campaign, as they are less susceptible of cold ; they 
 move more quickly along a good sledge road and draw a heavier 
 load than camels. But we must remember that winter varies at 
 different parts of the steppe ; places are often met with where 
 there is no snow, and the use of sledges will therefore be limited. 
 
 Wheeled carriages, although unsuited from their little mobility 
 and frequent breakdowns, are under some exceptional circum- 
 stances to be preferred to camels,* the more so as carts are of great 
 use for forming a barricade. As regards bullocks, they should 
 only be used, as before mentioned, when the detachment is not 
 required to make rapid movements, and when the train may march 
 separately from the troops. From what has been said it is easy to 
 conclude that in steppe campaigns, both in summer and in winter, 
 the baggage constitutes the chief impediment to the detachment. 
 
 One of the most important conditions of a well-ordered pack 
 train is a good saddle, hence especial attention should be paid to 
 this subject. The load must be divided into two equal parts, not only 
 as regards weight, but also in dimensions. The pack should be 
 made fast to the longitudinal ties of the camel saddle, and in order 
 that the weight may press less upon the ribs, the upper ends of 
 the packs should be firmly secured by ropes which are suspended 
 over the crutches ; were this precaution omitted, the pack would 
 soon injure the animal's spine or flanks, and render it unfit for work. 
 
 For the better preservation of certain stores from waste, such as 
 groats, oats, and flour, these articles should be placed in double 
 mat sacks, or in woollen sacks ; biscuit, cheese, salt, garlic, horse 
 radish, &c., in boxes covered with mats, and these rolled up in 
 thick felts. Artillery stores, rockets, and medical stores, are 
 generally carried in cases, the medical stores in those boxes in 
 which they are kept in the magazines. 
 
 The packing of artiller}' stores must be done with great care, 
 so that they may be quickly got at; the cases containing the 
 cartridges are usually bound with ropes round the sides and 
 bottom, leaving the top of the box free, so that a round can be at 
 once taken out if required. Mountain and even field-guns, when 
 they are carried on camels, should be placed so that they can be 
 got ready for firing within a quarter of an hour. 
 
 The weight of a camel load should be limited to 700 lb. ; but this 
 weight will depend upon circumstances, according to which loads 
 may be classed into light, medium, or heavy. t 
 
 * Au example of this is given in the operations undertaken in 1844 by Lieut.- 
 Colonel Lebedefl', for the purpose of tranquilizing the Ku-giz steppe, -n-hich had re- 
 volted under Kenisara Kasimoff. Lebedefl' found it useless to follow the hght steppe 
 bands with a heavy detachment, and replaced the camels with horses harnessed to 
 carts. With this train he ti-aversed the steppe without hindi-ance, crossed rivers, 
 and dealt the bands of rebels such rapid blows that he speedily acquired great 
 renown. JEis successor, Colonel Dunikofsky, however, sticking to routine, discarded 
 the carts and replaced them with camels. The result was that he failed not only to 
 touch the insurgents, but had to retire behind the line. 
 
 t As provisions in sacks form our principal load, the weight of the pack will 
 depend on the weight of the sack. Ordinarily a camel is lad<>n with three chetverts 
 of oats or biscuits, or two chetverts of groats.' 640 lb. to 7201b.. — taking the weight 
 of the chetvert of biscuit at 237 lb., oats, 200 lb. to 210 lb., and groats, 335 lb.
 
 61 
 
 The load is generally diminished in the spring when the 
 camels are casting their coats and are weak, and increased in the 
 autumn, particularly if there is a probability of good forage, when 
 the roads are good and when no great speed is required. Then the 
 load mav be increased to 800 and even 880 lb., which is about the 
 weight with our traders' caravans. On the other hand, the English 
 calculate the normal load at 560 lb., and the French and Arabs at 
 800 to 960 lb. In Algeria the French use pack-mules, donkeys, and 
 also carts, which they lade with 1,600 to 3,200 lb.; camels are seldom 
 used except from necessity, owing to the difficulties of lading, and 
 the care which they require. 
 
 The following are the defects of a camel transport : — (I.) The 
 lading and unlading occupy much time. (2.) The different packs 
 are not equally convenient to carry, and it is better to have carts for 
 heavy stores such as guns, powder, and such like. (3.) Large num- 
 bers of hired natives are necessary as drivers (one to every six camels 
 and a head man for the whole train). These men, from their know- 
 ledge of the animal, are indispensable, but they cannot be trusted, 
 and instances have occurred where they have deserted to the enemy 
 at the first shot. Laziness and carelessness often place a detach- 
 ment in a critical position, as was the case with the English in 
 Abyssinia. Kodolitch, in his account of this campaign, says '' the 
 " want of order in the organization of the train parks, and par- 
 " ticularly the absence of proper care on the part of the drivers, 
 *' who were nothing but a rabble, led to great losses among the 
 " animals, and placed the detachment in a very critical situation ; 
 " the want of forage and provisions became every day more 
 " apparent, while the exhausted animals were not in a condition to 
 " make another march, and perished by hundreds, encumbering 
 " the road with their carcasses, and tainting the air, which might have 
 " led to disastrous consequences for the whole expeditionary force." 
 
 As the demand for a large numl^er of camels causes a rise in 
 the tariff for the transport of traders' goods, some Powers, in order 
 to avoid this and to render themselves independent of native 
 drivers, have deemed it advisable to breed their own camels. 
 
 In China, up to the last insurrection, the government main- 
 tained inthesteppe contiguous toourfrontiers, whole herds of camels. 
 
 The East India Company maintained in India 40,000 camels 
 for military purposes. 
 
 The French, after the conquest of Algeria, at once proceeded 
 to breed camels, but their attempts did not meet with success for a 
 long time. At length Marsbal Bugeaud, Governor of Algeria, 
 issued special instructions and rules for breeding these animals, 
 placed this branch under military control, infused strict order into 
 it, and attained remarkable results, the French soldiers proving 
 themselves as well fitted for looking after the camels as the 
 Arabs themselves.* 
 
 * Camels for military purposes were first used by the French during Napo- 
 leon's campaign in Egypt. They were formed into detachments of a hundred, and 
 afterwards of seven hundred dromedaries, which were used both for transport pur- 
 poses and for forming flying infantry columns.
 
 62 
 
 We made similar trials in the Kirgiz steppe, but after some 
 unsuccessful attempts, had to give up the matter. In the event of 
 our requiring them, the requisite number of camels is hired generally 
 through agents, or, under pressing circumstances is requisitioned 
 through the local commands at a special rate of pay fixed on each 
 occasion by trie chief commander of the district.* 
 
 In conclusion, we will sav a word or two about the adaptation 
 of steppe transport to hospital purposes. For the transport of 
 sick and wounded are required : — 
 
 (1.) Soft camel saddles. 
 
 (2.) Pack hammocks and arm chairs for camels or mules. 
 
 (3.) Ordinary and covered litters ; and 
 
 (4.) Carts. 
 
 During Napoleon's march into Egypt the sick were carried 
 upon camels in special boxes, the sides of which folded down 
 so that the wounded might, if necessary, stretch out their legs. In 
 Algeria, the French used at first pack arm-chairs on mules as they 
 are easier than camels, but they afterwards used waggons with 6 
 horses, carrying 10 to 18 sick. 
 
 The English, in addition to their packs and carts, use hand 
 litters, but this is very inconvenient, as. in open litters the sick are 
 exposed to every change of weather, and the closed ones are very 
 heavy and demand instead of 4, 6, or on bad roads 10 to 12 bearers ; 
 at every halt, too, the sick have to be placed on the ground, which 
 cannot fail to be injurious to their health. 
 
 With us during steppe campaigns, cases have occurred where 
 the sick have been wrapped in a felt, and in this way suspended to 
 the camel saddle ; but in Perovsky's winter campaign, hammocks 
 were used filled with hay or camel's hair, with warm felts as cover- 
 ings. Although the sick were more or less cramped in this 
 arrangement none were frost-bitten in spite of the 25° to 35° of cold 
 (Reaum). These hammocks were subsequently replaced by soft 
 camel saddles and kuyafs (two light arm-chairs with a step for 
 the feet ; the chairs connected by iron bands passing through the 
 saddle), but in the present day the sick are carried in ordinary carts. 
 Although the contractors are obliged to provide certain covered 
 carts for the sick, this is not always done, and besides, even the 
 covered Russian telegas offer no conveniences for the sick, 
 especially in long journeys over the steppes where there are no 
 roads. The carriage of medicines is also very inconveniently 
 arranged in our service, as when a certain medicine is wanted from 
 the ordinary medical chest, the entire contents have often to be 
 turned out, causing a loss of time, and damage to the drugs. 
 
 * Camels are used by us not only for pack purposes but in harness for drawing 
 heavy loads. In some parts of the Kara Kum desert, along the Orsk-Kazala high- 
 road, the camels take the place of the post horses, and as such cai-ry both mails and 
 passengers.
 
 63 
 
 IX. 
 
 Field Marches. — Order observed on the March, and Length of the Marches. — 
 March of Count Borkh to the Sam. — Moving from the Night-Halt, Night 
 Marches, Halts, and Rest Days. — Selection of Site for a Bivouac : its form- 
 ation, and distribution of the detachment in it. — Outpost Service. 
 
 We have already said that a military detachment in the steppe 
 of Central Asia is in a strict sense only a caravan or train moving 
 under an armed escort. It is self evident that such movements 
 must be subject to certain rules, and these are mainly dependent 
 upon the formation and march of the train, which forms the essential 
 part of every expedition. 
 
 Were it possible to move in the steppe without dread of attack 
 or of the herds being plundered, it would be unquestionably more 
 convenient to move like the trading caravans, in a few small 
 columns, each of which acts for its own economical and material 
 advantage. But in this case it would have to give up its unity as 
 a detachment, and forego the observance of military regulations 
 and precautions. Evidently such a march would be impossible for 
 a military detachment, which must at all times be ready to repulse 
 the enemy, no matter from which side he may appear.* 
 
 Hence from a military point of view it might appear more suitable 
 for the detachment to move in one general column. This is done 
 in those parts of Turkestan where no difficulty is apprehended about 
 water and grass. In the Kirgiz steppe, on the other hand, we 
 must remember that the movements of large detachments are nearly 
 everywhere attended with much inconvenience. 
 
 Firstly, we cannot everywhere find grass and water in sufficient 
 quantities for the large mass of cattle which ordinarily composes 
 our train. 
 
 Secondly, we have to distribute our animals over a very large 
 area to find pasturage, and consequently it becomes difficult to 
 collect and to defend them. 
 
 Thirdly, in passing ravines and rivers, there being no roads 
 in the steppe, the large train is forced to halt, so as to be formed 
 gradually into a chain ; and the longer the halt the more fatiguing 
 to the animals : and lastly. 
 
 In the fourth place, the various descriptions of animals have 
 different paces ; thus, the camel can accomplish over a sandy road 
 five versts in the hour, the horse only four ; bullocks can never do 
 more than three versts per hour, and are a perpetual cause of the 
 train being lengthened, and of the march being delayed, thus de- 
 priving the other animals of part of their rest. 
 
 Large detachments should be divided, if necessary, into parts 
 or echelons, which follow at one or even two marches distance 
 
 * In dangerous places, when an attack is apprehended, the trade carayans like- 
 wise combine and move forward on a broad front, so as to be able to repel the enemy 
 tit any moment.
 
 64 
 
 from each other. The order of march cannot be made subject to 
 any definite rules, as it depends entirely on the local conditions of 
 the country, the size of the detachment, the character of the enemy, 
 and other causes. The French in Egypt, and afterwards in Algeria, 
 moved ordinarily in the form of several squares, at gunshot dis- 
 tances apart, or in three parallel columns, of which the train formed 
 the centre. But this is only possible with their small trains, and, 
 moreover, it is necessary on account of the spirit of enterprise of 
 the A.rabs. We only use the square for bivouacs, the square being 
 formed of waggon-barricades with the troops within it. 
 
 In order to diminish the depth of the column during the 
 march, the train must move in close sequence and in strict order, 
 extending along both sides of the road in several chains, and so 
 arranged that the camels f<nd carts in one chain carry the same sort 
 of stores. In camel trains, the heavy stores (such as biscuit, 
 flour, &c.), are placed as much as possible on the outer" flanks 
 of the column, so as to form the barricade more quickly, and 
 to cover the men from the enemy's fire.* If the train consists 
 of carts alone, it moves in two or four lines, at such intervals 
 apart that at any minute by a simple wheeling up it can form 
 square. If the train is a mixed one, the camels march in the 
 middle between the lines of carts, and if there are few carts, the 
 latter are formed in one line, the camels being on that flank where 
 the enemy is least expected. 
 
 The Cossacks form the advanced and rearguards; they send out 
 patrols on all sides, and furnish mounted men for the train, who 
 have to aid the drivers in lading the carts or animals, and generally 
 look after the interior economy; without this arrangement any 
 disorder which may take place in one part of the train might be 
 transmitted through the whole of it, and cause delay or confusion 
 in the march. 
 
 The infantry may march either in the centre between the lines 
 or at the side of the train, but in all cases in line at open order, so 
 that those in rear may suffer less from dust. It is only necessary 
 to see that the troops do not lag behind in the steppe but keep 
 near the train, so that if required they may quickly join it. On 
 the other hand, when marching in propinquity to the enemy, the 
 cavalry precedes the detachment, alter it the guns, then the in- 
 fantry, further on the train, and lastly the rear guard, in accord- 
 ance with the usual order of march prescribed for field marches. 
 
 In the event of a sudden attack by the enemy when on the 
 march, the train halts and forms a barricade, endeavouring, if 
 possible, to appui its flanks on some natural obstacle, such as a river 
 or ravine. To form the barricade, the leading carts move from 
 
 * But it sometimes happens that the arrangement of the carriages according to 
 kind is impossible, as in order to equaUze the loads, one superintendent, who is in 
 charge of several carts, is given a varied cargo, and therefore they are distributed 
 throughout the whole detachment. 
 
 t For example, if we have to halt a camel whose pack has shpped, or a broken 
 down cart, they are led away to the side, so as not to impede the others, and then, 
 after readjustment, they rejoin the tail of their chain, or, if not, the rearguard.
 
 Go 
 
 both ends to the left and right, close up and then reversing to the 
 rear so as to protect the horses from the enemy's fire, form the 
 front face; the flank faces are formed of the carts following on tlie 
 sides of the road, and the rear is formed like the front. Cai'ts 
 should lock their wheels together, the horses should be hobbled ; 
 while the defence of the angles should be increased by unharness- 
 ing some carts and placing them in front of the opening, so as to 
 prevent the enemy from penetrating within the barricade.^ 
 
 A camel train forms up in the same way, but the packs are 
 thrown off to form an outer rampart, behind which the camels lie 
 down under cover. It is well to hobble them, otherwise, if there 
 is any firing it is impossible to keep them in a lying position. 
 
 It may not be superfluous to speak of the defence of the trans- 
 port when compelled by reason of the narrowness of the road to 
 march in one chain. In this case all that can be done is to move 
 with part of the force to meet the enemy, and endeavour to detain 
 him on the spot until the whole transport is in a state for defence, 
 and the remainder of the troops have gone inside. Or, better 
 than a single square, it may be formed into small circles near the 
 road along which the troops are moving. Generally, it should be 
 remembered that the duty of every commander of a train is to de- 
 fend it to the last ; it is far better to be repulsed on two or three 
 days with loss of part of the detachment, and lastly, it is better 
 for the whole detachment to perish with honour, than to lose the 
 train, and by that perhaps to endanger the success of the entire 
 expedition. 
 
 The length of a march in the steppe depends chiefly upon 
 the localities where drinkable water can be found, and may be said 
 to vary in extent from 20 to 45 or even to 50 versts. Large 
 transports and detachments of troops can seldom do more than one 
 march in the 24 hours ; but light Cossack parties have accomplished 
 as many as 100 or 150 versts, without suffering particularly from 
 want of food or water. 
 
 An example of a long march, executed rapidly and over 
 difficult ground, was that of Count Borkh to the Sam, in May 
 1870. This campaign was undertaken with the object of exploring 
 the roads leading across the Ust Urt, and, if possible, to seize the 
 afds of the hostile Kirgeze of the Chumishli-Tabyn tribe, which 
 were the chief haunts of all the robber gan^s roamim; here from 
 Kungrad. For this purpose Count Borkh resolved to traverse the 
 northern Chink, and by a rapid forced march to seize those afils 
 which nomadised on the Sam, to which place only small Cossack 
 parties had hitherto penetrated. 
 
 In order to become acquainted with the difficulties which our 
 troops had to overcome during this remarkable campaign, it is 
 necessary to remark that the plateau of the Ust Urt is bounded on 
 all sides by a scarped, steep cliff, which, as v/e have already said, is 
 called the Chink. This cliff', which attains in some places a con- 
 
 * Others find it moi-e convenient to place the carts obKquely to the faces in^teai 
 of perpendicularly, hooking the wlieel of one cart into that of the nest. 
 
 F
 
 66 
 
 slderable height (400 to 600 feet), descends to the low -lying steppe 
 with such steep terraces, encumbered with rocks and boulders, 
 that it is only accessilile at a few known points. At other places 
 the Chink is nearly inaccessible, and only pedestrians and the 
 clever horses of the Kirgeze brigands are able to make their way 
 over the steep cliffs, and the great boulders which overhang terrible 
 precipices. 
 
 In order to avoid encountering the Kirgeze during their 
 peregrinations, Count Borkh resolved not to take the detachment 
 along the roads nor to be encumbered with trains ; he took merely 
 three days' supplies carried on the saddle, and as many rounds as 
 could be packed in the limber-box. 
 
 The detachment consisted of a sotnia of Orenburg Cossacks, 
 60 riflemen mounted on horses, and 1 gun, which was taken for 
 the purpose of seeing if artillery could pass over this country. 
 
 In the first march the troops had to cross in succession 5 or 6 
 precipitous places caused by the sinuous form of the northern 
 Chink. These passes were so bad that men and horses fell every 
 minute. The artillery horses halted at the first pass ; the 
 gunners had to unhook and drag the gun up and down by means of 
 ropes, with the aid of 50 dismounted Cossacks. In spite of these 
 obstacles the detachment marched 90 versts, and did not rest 
 until it had descended to Kurgan-Tchagai on the following day. 
 
 Here commenced the sterile sandy steppe, where there was no 
 underfoot grass and only water at long intervals in the wells, 200 
 feet in depth. Continuing the march, the detachment made 90 
 more versts, and reached Kuskut ; but to proceed further was im- 
 possible, owing to the want of supplies. The aids, wliich nomadised 
 with the Biy Daut-Asauf, one of the most avowed enemies of 
 Russia, had moved off within a few hours of our arrival, and the 
 fresh traces seen in three different directions showed the useless- 
 ness of any further pursuit. Upon this the detachment returned, 
 and on the sixth day reached Jebyske, having traversed more than 
 400 versts of roadless steppe, without water, grass, or supplies. 
 The insufficiency of the latter with the detachment was so much 
 felt that the men, even on the fourth or fifth day of the campaign, 
 were obliged to kill and eat a Cossack horse; but for all these 
 privations, and in spite of the thermometer standing at 38° R. by 
 day and the frosts by night, there was not a man sick, and of the 
 horses only 12 had sore backs, due to the riflemen being un- 
 accustomed to riding. 
 
 As the staple food of the pack animals is underfoot grass, we 
 must in steppe campaigns move out from the night-halts as early 
 as possible, so as to finish the march by daylight, and give time for 
 the pack animals to graze. But if the animals have passed the 
 night within the wagon-barricades, and consequently without grass, 
 the detachment must not march out bef(jre 6 or 7 a.m., so that the 
 animals, driven out to pasture at da\vn, may pick up some food.* 
 
 * In 1869, Greiicral Balliuzek, during his march through the steppe, ordered the 
 purchase of sickles for the Cossack detachment, and as the long marches did not 
 
 I
 
 67 
 
 Large expeditions, accompanied by a considerable quantity of 
 cattle, and moving across the barren steppe or salt lands, must be 
 careful in the selection of night-halts, and should send forward 
 small parties to seek for and clear out the wells, which are often 
 choked up with sand, and are sometimes filled in with rubbish in" 
 order to impede the march of the detachment. 
 
 All marching is usually done by day. The heat of the southern 
 nights, and the circumstance that the heat prevents the pack 
 animals from eating except at night, completely excludes the pos- 
 sibility of a night march. To this we may add, that when men are 
 deprived of their night's rest by a march, and cannot rest by day 
 on account of the heat, they become exhausted much more quickly 
 than when they march in the heat and rest at night. It is of 
 course understood that this rule does not apply to partisan raids, 
 which are frequently executed on the darkest and w'ildest nights. 
 
 Halts and rest-days are to be avoided in the steppe ; the first 
 because they deprive the animals of a considerable part of their time 
 for repose at the night-halt, and the second because they protract 
 the duration of the campaign without any advantage ; they also 
 increase the quantity of forage required, and consequently the 
 amount of transport. Therefore both rest-days and halts are 
 subject to no fixed rules, and depend entirely upon circumstances. 
 Sometimes, particularly in winter, it is advantageous to hasten the 
 pace without halting, lest the camels lose their strength.* In 
 lengthy marches of 40 to 50 versts, it is sometimes necessary to 
 make a long halt after half the journey, and give the camels 
 relief by removing the packs. The privations and losses sustained 
 by the detachments of Colonel Berg in l825,t and of General 
 Perovsky in 1839, were chiefly caused by want of acquaintance 
 with the nature and habits of camels. 
 
 When the route taken by detachments in the steppe passes 
 among Kirgeze volosts, it is necessary for the detachment to be 
 accompanied from one volost to the next by the chief men of the 
 horde, who should, as far as is compatible with military authority, 
 look after the preservation of order between the men and the 
 Kirgeze. 
 
 We will now pass to the question of a bivouac. In selecting a 
 locality in the steppe for this purpose, reasons connected with supplv 
 rather than those of a purely military nature prevail. From a 
 military point of view the steppe is everywhere good, as it ofters no 
 variety of position, nor those local objects which are of importance 
 in engagements in European countries. W^e must only take care 
 that the bivouac is not placed in a valley or ravine, but in high 
 
 admit always of the liorses being driven to pasture, the men mowed the grass and fed 
 the horses inside the wagon-barricade, which helped much to keep them in con- 
 dition. 
 
 * It is known that camels, when there is no store of good grass, are not only 
 not rested by short halts in ^vinter, but lose flesh Tcry fast. 
 
 t This expedition was made for the purpose of making a topographical siu-vey 
 of the steppe between the Ural line, the Caspian and Aral Seas, and Khiva, with a 
 view to reconnoitre the roads and determine the time most suited for an expedition 
 to fhe Khivan Khanate. 
 
 f2
 
 63 
 
 and dry places screened, as far as possible, from the wind. Good 
 water, abundant pasturage, and sufficient fuel are the conditions 
 which steppe bivouacs should fulfil, but which are seldom met 
 with in combination. Thus in the northern part of the Kirgiz 
 steppe good water may be found nearly everywhere, and succulent 
 underfoot grass ; but instead of wood we have to use dung-cakes, 
 or the roots of certain plants. In the south part of the steppe, on 
 the other hand, there is fuel, but no underfoot grass and little water, 
 which is procured from ditches, and for the most part is of bad 
 quality. 
 
 As the selection of the locality for the bivouac exercises great 
 influence on the preservation of the animals, we must not, when the 
 train is large, limit the drivers in their selection of the place which 
 they may think convenient for pasturage, even if we have to stop 
 short of, or pass beyond, the position indicated in the marching 
 route. Of course this rule must not be considered absolute in 
 the presence of the enemy, when the detachment is moving with 
 some definite military object. 
 
 With respect to Turkestan, it should be remarked that, in order 
 to preserve the health of the men during the hot weather, we must 
 refrain from bivouacking on entirely open places, but make use of 
 the gardens which are found in every town and nearly every 
 village. Such bivouacs are not only convenient for the men, but 
 advantageous for outpost duty, as the high walls with which the 
 Sarts usually surround their gardens, aflord a natural shelter ; we 
 have only to throw out small picquets in front of these, walls to 
 give sufficient security to the detachment. 
 
 In the presence of the enemy the detachment ordinarily 
 bivouacs behind a waggon-barricade, formed as on the march. 
 But if the transport be small, and the place selected for the 
 bivouac offers one of its sides to a river, ravine or other 
 obstacle, which is secure from an unexpected attack, the wagon- 
 barricade may, in order to gain internal space, be arranged in the 
 shape of a lunette with its open side towards the natural obstacle. 
 On the other hand, if the traivx be large, it is preferable to form a 
 square, the carts being in several rows, and sufficient room being 
 given for the reception of the horses, not losing sight of the pos- 
 sibility of bringing a fire to bear upon the enemy from behind the 
 carts. The length of each face of the square should be in propor- 
 tion to the number of men defending it. The angular spaces are 
 filled with bales or occupied with guns. 
 
 The troops are ordinarily distributed parallel to the faces of 
 the waggon-barricade, and at such distances apart that between them 
 and the inner row of carts in rear there may be sufficient space, in 
 the event of attack, for bringing up artillery or reserves. 
 
 The men's kits are heaped up in rear of their own particular 
 section, and behind them are piled their muskets. The Cossack 
 horse-lines are in rear of the line of the bivouac, and behind them 
 in the centre of the barricade, are the staff, the artillery park, the 
 engineer and hospital trains, the sutlers, and lastly, if there is 
 room, the drivers with their horses and camels in a separate square.
 
 69 
 
 By day it is necessary to take advantage oi any opportunity of 
 sending out the animals to pasture, but they should be again 
 brought into camp at twilight, and, if possible, placed within the 
 barricade, — the camels near one of the faces most removed from 
 attack and the horses in the horse-lines and hobbled. 
 
 In the event of making a long halt at the same place, the great 
 care of the commander should be directed to the water, as upon 
 its good or bad quality depends in a great measure the health of the 
 detachment. 
 
 If the detachment be encamped on a running stream, the latter 
 should be divided into four sections; of these the upper section should 
 be kept for drinking and cooking purposes, the second for bathing, 
 the third for the hctrses, and the fourth for washing clothes. But 
 if the detachment be halted near wells, or at a lake, where the 
 water is scanty and where it is impossil)le to divide it off, the water 
 for the horses and for washing clothes must be taken out in tubs 
 or pails. The men should never be allowed to drink unfiltered 
 water, as in the steppe it is impregnated with infusoria, nor to lie 
 on the ground during the morning and evening dews ; the quality 
 of the food should also be watched. It is very advantageous to 
 employ the men in slight duties, exercise being the best preventive 
 against disease and scurvy. Thus the Tchushkakul detachment 
 was employed in building quarters for the commanding officer, 
 kitchens, bread-ovens, baths, and underground store rooms. 
 
 For the defence of a camp, both by day and by night, it is 
 necessary to throw out a chain of dismounted posts ; but as a very 
 considerable tract of country can be overlooked from one or two 
 eminences, this circumstance may be often turned to advantage 
 for diminishing the number of posts and lightening the outpost 
 duties. These isolated posts furnished from the Cossacks are 
 called mayaks (signalling stations). Each mayak consists of 3 men ; 
 one of them always remains mounted, while the other two rest ; 
 they go separately to water, to get grass, &c. At night the camp 
 should be surrounded with a chain of sentries, and generally the 
 detachment should be on the qui vive, as the robbers often make 
 a dash at the camp, and, taking advantage of the commotion which 
 ensues, endeavour to carry off the camels and horses, or to seize 
 anything they can. 
 
 In order to support the outposts, pickets, and mayaks, in the 
 event of attack, there should be a mounted detachment always 
 kept in a state of readiness, horses saddled, head collars on, and 
 picketed. 
 
 The patrols should not confine themselves to the road alone, but 
 always ascend the hills from whence they can see the whole of the 
 country bordering the road. They should examine everything, 
 ascend every hill, and search every ravine, valley, or other likely 
 locality in which robbers might be in ambush. 
 
 The protection of the herds, particularly of the horses, forms 
 one of the chief cares of the commander of a detachment. It is 
 necessary to remember that by the least negligence the herd may 
 be cut off bv an insignificant robber ganc, and that it m?y be
 
 70 
 
 scared by the least cause and gallop off into the steppe. The 
 deprivation of their herds may place a detachment in the most 
 awkward plight, as with the loss of its pack animals it cannot 
 move from the spot. 
 
 In order to prevent such accidents stringent measures must be 
 taken : — 
 
 (1.) The herds must be accompanied by day and by night by 
 mounted sentries. 
 
 (2.) Cossacks must establish double sentries round the herds, 
 one of the men remaining always mounted. 
 
 (3.) The horses of the herd must be hobbled. 
 
 (4.) Neither the horses nor any of the animals should be 
 allowed to quit the waggon-barricade for pasture until the watch 
 pickets have taken up their positions, and the patrols have made 
 their reconnaissance in the neighbourhood of the camp. 
 
 (5.) The pickets must not leave their posts until the herds 
 nave been driven back to camp. 
 
 (6.) The Cossacks guarding the herds should be near the chain 
 of sentries, especially at night, and not in the middle of the herd, 
 as the lighting of a pipe, a loud cry, or a restive horse ridden by a 
 Cossack, may be the accidental cause of the herd taking to flight. 
 
 We would observe that if the herd is scared, the camp should 
 not be alarmed nor should any one be allowed to gallop after the 
 herd as it will only cause the animals to increase their speed. The 
 best way is to endeavour to cut it off by making long detours 
 round the flanks. When the herd is thus intercepted, it should 
 not be driven back at once, but an interval should be allowed until 
 the horses recover from their fright, and this is generally known 
 by their beginning to crop the grass. 
 
 In 1869, when Count Borkh was returning from the aul of 
 Amantai Tiuliuf-Bergenef, a herd of 800 horses was frightened. 
 By following the foregoing instructions not a single horse was 
 lost, although they had galloped 12 versts away from the camp. 
 
 Besides the Cossack pickets and sentries for the protection of 
 the herd, guards are placed at the angles of the waggon-barricade. 
 These guards throw out a chain of double sentries, and in the event 
 of attack are the first to meet the enemy. Besides these there are 
 sentries on the horse-lines, the arms, the powder, the artillery park, 
 the commissariat, &c., and when the water is scanty, or at wells, 
 there should be sentries also, or it may happen that the water will 
 not be sufficient for the whole detachment. 
 
 In order to preserve the health of the men they should not be 
 on sentry duty more than 1 out of 3 days. 
 
 In former times the detached Cossack posts, pickets, and 
 small forts along the Siberian line, protected themselves by throw- 
 ing out sentries on commanding eminences, and at night by jDatrols ; 
 but owing to the small number of men and the freqiient alarms, 
 the outpost service was so fatiguing that the Cossacks had recourse 
 to the use of dogs. These dogs were exceedingly watchful, and at
 
 71 
 
 the smallest noise barked and roused the Cossacks. This custom was 
 probably brought from the Caucasus, in fact, from the shores of 
 the Black Sea, where the employment of dogs was in general use 
 and where these animals were regularly rationed and trained. 
 
 X. 
 
 Difference between Military Operations iu the liirgiz Steppe and in Turkestan. 
 — Kirgiz Robbers, Barantas, and the operations of Kirgeze en masse. — 
 System adopted for the Defence of the Steppe. — Composition of the Field 
 Force in Orenburg. — Ural and Orenburg Cossacks : their Mode of Em- 
 ployment. — Military Operations against Armed Bands. — Special Cases of 
 the Use of Infantry. 
 
 In former lectures we have indicated in sufficient detail those 
 peculiarities of the Kirgiz steppe and Turkestan, which, in a 
 measure, regulate the mode of march of the troops, their supply, 
 &c. As regards the mode of conducting warfare and the character 
 of the engagement itself, differences are met with in the operations 
 of our troops against the Kirgeze and against Central Asian powers, 
 which vary with the character and the military organization of our 
 antagonists. 
 
 Although steppe warfare has as yet been imperfectly worked 
 out from a theoretical point of view, the experience derived from 
 prolonged steppe expeditions is so important, that on the whole 
 they must serve as a guide and basis for the operations of our 
 steppe detachments. 
 
 In the open and boundless Kirgeze steppes, where the locality 
 enables the enemy to move in all directions, the success of military 
 operations is dependent mainly on rapidity and surprise. Hence 
 the operations, on the part of the Kirgeze, take the character of 
 raids, and are often accompanied with highway robbery and 
 pillage {barantas). 
 
 In affairs with antagonists, equal in armament and drill, the 
 Kirgeze are sometimes the superior ; but the attacks on our 
 detachments, no matter how unexpected and impetuous they may 
 have been, have seldom succeeded. If there have been contrary 
 cases (for instance, the misfortune of Bekovitch-Cherkassky,* 
 some successes of Kenisara Kasimof or Iset Kutebarof, and lastlj'', 
 the annihilation of Colonel Rukin's detachment at Mangyshlak), 
 they have always arisen from carelessness, proceeding from over 
 self-confidence and contempt for the weakness and insignificance of 
 our antagonists. 
 
 Military operations in the Kirgiz steppe have been of two 
 kinds; (1.) Against large rebel gangs. (2.) Against small robber 
 parties, recruited principally in Khiva from our fugitive Kirgeze. 
 
 * Treacherously murdered by the Kliivans, whose army was composed of Kir- 
 geze and Tiurkmen.
 
 72 
 
 But as these fugitives, in their turn, are subdivided by us into two 
 categories, each of which pursues a particular role, it will not be 
 superfluous to say a few W'ords about them. 
 
 To the first of these categories belong exclusively such men 
 as Khan Galy Araslanof, Sadyk Kenisarin, Nazar Bai, Daiit 
 Asavof, Azbergen Munaitpasof, and others, — these were sultans, 
 honourable biys, descendants of renowned batyrs ; and lastly, 
 the chiefs of some Kirgiz tribes, men who have enjoyed great 
 influence and have gathered around them all the bold and daring 
 spirits among the Kirgiz immigrants. They undertake incursions 
 often from mere audacity or ambition ; but acting under the influ- 
 ence of fanaticism and revenge, they are distinguished by violence, 
 cruelty and fetishism. The custom of bringing in the heads of 
 prisoners, as a proof of their bloody victory, forms the exclusive 
 attribute of the brigands of this category. 
 
 To the second category — the Baigushes, as we call them — 
 belong the rest, that is to say, all those whose only means of 
 existence is their plunder, and whose unlimited love of booty and 
 avarice abase them to a level with highwaymen and horse stealers ; 
 these are the steppe wolves who are not squeamish as to what 
 they get, and destroy everything they cannot carry off. 
 
 It is impossible, of course, to deny that the former element 
 has participated in these steppe disorders, the more so as the 
 Khivan government has its share of the plunder and, consequently, 
 is only too willing to give them countenance. 
 
 With regard to the formation, organization, and mode of 
 operation of the robber gangs, M'e must remark that when pre- 
 paring for a raid the Kirgeze get their horses into excellent order, 
 but in other respects do little. For food they take only a small 
 quantity of sheep cheese {ki'iit), a few handfuls of millet, and, in 
 the event of a successful raid, they get dried meat. The clothing 
 of i^/^/y-^ consists always of a Idialat tucked into their chamhars^ and 
 their armament is a lance, sword, and sometimes a battle-hammer. 
 Their want of knowledge with regard to the manufacture of powder 
 and the difficulties in the way of purchasing it are the causes of 
 the Kirgeze having no fire-arms up to the present day. 
 
 Generally, if a collection of armed Kirgeze, with their 
 khalats in their chamhars and their horses' tails plaited, is observed 
 in any particular aul, it is almost an unmistakable sign that they 
 are preparing for a raid, and on receipt of this intelligence the 
 detachment should be on its guard. 
 
 Isolated marauding enterprises take place ordinarily in spring 
 or autumn after the corn is cut in Khiva, and therefore the most 
 dangerous months are the end of April, May, September, and 
 October. In the spring the robbers find underfoot grass every- 
 where and good water before it has run off the ravines after the 
 melting of the snows ; and in autumn they are helped by the 
 dark and long nights. Besides this, theft is more rife during'the 
 return journeys of the nomad Kirgeze to their winter quarters, 
 particularly in the southern steppe ; firstly, because the robbers, 
 by carrying out their depredations far from tljc centre of their
 
 73 
 
 summer haunts, are better able to conceal the traces of their crime, 
 and secondly, they are compelled to do so from the necessity of 
 preparing their dried horseflesh for the winter. In summer, 
 owing to the heat, the incursions are made less frequently and are 
 mostly the result of exceptional occurrences in the steppe ; for 
 instance, Kirgiz tribal feuds or disorders like those of the insur- 
 rection in 1869. In winter, owing to the difficulty of moving over 
 the deep snow, and the want of underfoot grass, raids are not 
 made. The case of the attack (in February 1869) on Lieut.- 
 Colonel Novokreshchenof ^s detachment, and others similar, may be 
 considered as exceptional, proper only to a certain season and 
 peculiar circumstances. 
 
 The only road by which the gangs can approach us is by the 
 Ust Urt.*"' From thence some of these gangs move through the 
 deserts of Sam and M5'n-Su- Almaz to Emba; others pass 
 through Karatamak, or Kashkar-ata, and afterwards penetrate to 
 the Barsuks, or even to the Mugojar mountains. From these 
 latter points the raids are chiefly made on the Orsk-Kazala road, 
 and are extended eastward as far as the Ul-Koyak river where the 
 summer dwellings of the Kirgeze of the Kazala circle commence, 
 and northward as far as the postal station of Bash-Karabutak, and 
 even to that of Damdynsky situated near the Riv^er Or. 
 
 In all this district the most dangerous localities are the postal 
 station of Katykul, the neighbourhood of the Irgiz, Syrala, and 
 Chulak-Kairakta postal stations, as in their vicinity are many 
 glens and ravines which, extending from thence to the Mugojar 
 Mountains, aft'ord excellent places for concealment and for the 
 sudden raids of marauding gangs. 
 
 These attacks are usually made as follov\ s : after emerging 
 from the Khivan frontiers, the principal bands lie in ambush on the 
 Sam, in the Barsuks, or in the Mugojars ; some small parties then 
 proceed onward and lie concealed in any glens they may find, or 
 among the sandy hillocks, entrusting the capture of the herd to a 
 few selected horsemen. The latter, shouting at the herd, drive it 
 straight to the lurking place of their companions ; these take it up 
 and drive it onward to the main robber camp, and the members of 
 this drive the booty in their turn to the Khivan frontiers. Mean- 
 while the small parties return home by neighbouring roads, and 
 often make an incursion in another direction so as to mislead 
 our patrols. 
 
 But if the party in the open find that they are pursued, they 
 first endeavour to discover the strength of their antagonist, and if 
 this proves insignificant, they leave the herd under the escort of a 
 few horsemen, while the remainder fall upon the adversary, whom 
 they sometimes follow up with great boldness. Thus, in 1871, 40 
 Djigits of the Kabakof division, while following up (on two horses 
 each) a gang of robbers, who had plundered their camels, tell into 
 an ambuscade of 100 men and Avere surrounded on all sides and 
 
 * The author speaks here of the Kii-giz slcppc witliiu the Oreuburg jurisdic- 
 tion.
 
 74 
 
 carried off as prisoners to Kungrad. On the other hand, if the 
 robbers find themselves in presence of a superior force they leave 
 their booty, and dispersing on all sides endeavour to elude 
 jDursuit. 
 
 The raids of large bands, numbering 25 to 100 men, or more, 
 are usually made upon the postal villages, travellers, the mails, 
 and generally where the robbers expect an armed resistance. A 
 raid, directed exclusively upon a peaceful aid with which the 
 robbers have some tribal difference, is called a haranta; the gang 
 approaches the unexpecting aul by night, lies in ambush, and 
 before daylight falls with a loud cry upon the herd, endeavouring 
 before all things to cutoff the horses so as to deprive the adversary 
 of the means of pursuit. Afterwards, in the confusion which 
 ensues, they plunder the aul, seizing everything upon which they 
 can lay hands. This engenders endless enmity among the Kirgeze, 
 and forces them to have recourse, for self defence> to the mainte- 
 nance of patrols, which, under these circumstances, defend the 
 aid with great vigilance in view of their own personal interests. 
 As regards the performance of duties by the Kirgeze, it would be 
 a mistake to trust to Kirgiz patrols alone, when they have to 
 defend the borders of their volosts and nyezds, — (1) because the 
 Kirgeze have no strict notions of the preservation of the public 
 peace, and (2) because a short sojourn of the Kirgeze at fixed 
 points brings no substantial advantage, while they will not remain 
 for long in consequence of the material expenses entailed, and from 
 their being unaccustomed to the monotony and inconvenience of 
 patrol service. Moreover, although they at first take to the work 
 with zeal, they usually cool down in a short time and commence 
 gradually to draw off under various pretexts. 
 
 In 1872, however, attempts were made to form the Kirgeze into 
 a mounted militia, and the experiment was crowned with complete 
 success, owing to the zeal and tact of the chief of the I'ljezd. 
 The Djigits, to the number of 200, were distributed partly at 
 Karatamak and Issen-Chagyl, and partly in Kashkar-ata, and up to 
 the arrival of our detachments continued to patrol the southern 
 frontier, which remained entirely exposed that year in consequence 
 of the Kirgeze taking advantage of the favourable spring to 
 commence their peregrrinations northward sooner than was 
 usual ; the robbers could easily turn this to account by following 
 up without particular difficulty the traces of the arils, not only to 
 the Barsuks but even to the Mugojars. It would not do to be led 
 away by an exceptional case, as it were, and to found on this fact 
 the possibility of forming, as some think, a permanent Kirgiz 
 militia. It seems to us that, this measure in any case would be 
 premature. It is necessary to remember that the maintenance of 
 such a militia would lay a heavy charge on the whole Kirgiz com- 
 munity, and at the same time the advantage of such a force is 
 subject to grave doubt ; it is unfitted for warfare, while for the 
 collection of information trusty spies are the best. 
 
 As a general rule Kirgeze, like all Asiatics, act to much less 
 advantage when in masses than in small parties. They usually
 
 75 
 
 expend their whole store of energy and bravery on the lirst onset, 
 and if the latter fails, particularly if any of their party are killed 
 or wounded, their bravery at once vanishes, and a panic fear 
 ensues. The Kirgeze naturally endeavour to make their attacks in 
 superior force, and then only when they do not expect a serious 
 resistance. To show them a field piece, or, in its absence, the 
 chimney of a samovar,'^ as was done by a caravan of merchants 
 proceeding to Bokhara, produces a great impression. 
 
 The Kirgeze seldom defend themselves in their auls, but 
 endeavour, on the approach of troops, to move off beforehand to 
 the sterile and waterless districts of the steppe. In order to 
 delay pursuit, they fill up the wells after them, or set fire to the 
 steppe, thus destroying the grass and water arrangements. This 
 happened with Tset Kutebarof, who, when eluding the pursuit of 
 Lieut.- Colonel Plotnikof (in 1857), destroyed the wells and grass in 
 the deserts of Asmantai-Matai, and, in consequence was obliged to 
 seek refuge on the Sam, which was then guarded by the Ural Cossacks. 
 The system which may be considered, in the present day, the 
 only one for protecting the steppe from robber gangs, must include 
 the watching of all roads from Kungrad. With this object, at the 
 commencement of early spring in each year, small detachments 
 should be sent into the steppe and distributed at certain points, 
 commencing from the Lower Emba Fort, through Kondoral, to 
 the Emban Post, and from thence past Chushka-Kul and Jebyske 
 to Karatamak. For guarding the Orsk-Kazala road, within the 
 limits of the Irgiz iiyezd, it is proposed to post mobile reserves at 
 certain points in lieu of distributing the Cossacks in small parties 
 at the stations on the post road, as has hitherto been the case;t 
 but these will only be necessary when we have large detachments 
 in the southern part of the steppe. 
 
 The most important points in the Irgiz uyezd to be occupied 
 by our troops are the sources of the Bas-Kainar, lying to the 
 S.W. of the Jalovla station, the crests of the Mugojar mountains, 
 near the River Terebutak, in the direction of Urkach ; and also 
 the locality near the River Yakshi-Kairakta, ManaCdie, Lake 
 Chapta-Kul, and, lastly, the Barsuks, Great and Little, from 
 whence the north shore of the Aral can be watched, and communi- 
 cations maintained with the troops of the Emban uyezd. 
 
 The military forces at the disposal of Orenburg for operations 
 against the Kirgeze, consist, besides the local troops partly dis- 
 tributed in the forts, of two line battalions on a war footing.^ and 
 of the Ural and Orenburg Cossack troops, and the horse 
 artillery attached to the latter. 
 
 The Cossacks, from their number and from the fact that they 
 are the only cavalry in the district, § occupy a very large place in 
 
 * A sort of tea urn on a large scale. — Trayislaior. 
 
 + At the present time each post station, in lieu of Cossacks, has a few Djigits 
 (2 to 6 men), who are required to collect information and warn our mobile detach- 
 ments of the appearance of robber parties. 
 
 X The 3rd Orenburg Une battalion has been since added. 
 
 § Eegidar cavalry are not considered suited for service in the steppe. They arc 
 more costly to maintain than Cossacks, who cost little more than infantry. — Trans- 
 lator,
 
 76 
 
 the military organization of our steppe detachments. In point of 
 fact, all the field duties in the steppe ordinarily devolve upon the 
 Cossacks ; they give the patrols for the pursuit of robber gangs 
 and bear the brunt of the campaigns. They are exceptionally 
 suited for hard work, and are well acquainted with the steppe, but 
 their military value depends greatly on the degree of foresight and 
 ability of their commanders. 
 
 There was a lime when the ceaseless raids of Kirgeze and 
 other neighbouring races forced the Cossacks to be in a con- 
 stant state of preparation for war and sustained their martial 
 spirit. All these Kirgeze, Kalmyks and Bashkirs were then 
 dangerous enemies, persevering, inexorable, and unacquainted 
 with fear or fatigue. Their system of warfare was a constant 
 series of unexi)ected raids. Their braves (djigits) having collected 
 in parties, crossed the Ural, and attacked the Russian villages in 
 the Cis-Ural, and even in the Cis-Volga steppes. The Cossacks 
 concentrated at that time in the little town of Yaitzk, could not 
 evidently anticipate their incursions, and therefore could do no 
 more than destroy the hostile camps, and repay themselves liberally 
 for every pillage and murder. These reciprocal raids were most 
 bloody and led to an endless series of fresh robberies and devas- 
 tations. 
 
 But v.ith the spread of our real influence further and further 
 into the steppe, the building of forts, and the despatch of detach- 
 ments, the Kirgeze became convinced of the impossibility of doing 
 as they pleased with impunity; their incursions ceased, and, by 
 the force of these circumstances, the Cossacks were transformed 
 from turbulent warriors into diligent and peaceful husbandmen. 
 The periodical expeditions into Turkestan served to them as 
 schools of warfare, from which, in conjunction with their glorious 
 traditions and the adoption of measures for improving their military 
 organization, great results in a military sense may be expected. 
 
 With regard to their employment in the field, there are two 
 opposite opinions ; some think that the Cossacks should as a rule 
 act by the charge, with the cold steel ; others recommend the use 
 of fire-arms as the only true means in such cases as j^rsuit. 
 Some Cossack commanders in pursuing Kirgeze make their men 
 dismount and open fire as long as they are wilhin range, deeming 
 this the best mode of proceeding, as the adversary has no fire- 
 arm, whereas he can wield a lance as well as a Cossack. Thus, as 
 both base their opinions on experience, it would be impossible to 
 pronounce a judgment either way. In any case, owing to the 
 special conditions of steppe warfare, the Cossacks should be 
 trained to both systems, so as to give them their necessary 
 independence. 
 
 Cossacks are taught to fight on foot with a two-fold aim : (1) 
 the offensive, and (2) the defensive. The first is inapplicable 
 to warfare in the Kirgiz steppe, and hence we will pass at once to 
 the second, that is to say, linking the horses, which from time 
 immemorial has been in use among the Cossacks. This is usually 
 done as follows : having linked the horses in a circle, the men 
 kneel down and meet the attack with file firing, not with volleys.
 
 77 
 
 The Cossacks know that it is sufficient to pick off a few of the 
 best horsemen, who are generally in the front, in order to cool the 
 ardour of the remainder, and throw the whole gang into disorder. 
 
 If thay have to retire, it must be done step by step, firing and 
 bringing off the linked horses. Sometimes the Kirgeze open 
 out and make the way clear for the Cossacks, in the hope that 
 the latter will mount and gallop off. But the Cossacks, taught by 
 experience, never fall into this trap, knowing that for every man 
 there will be ten Kirgeze, and that it is impossible to cut their 
 way through and escape. 
 
 But if circumstances compel them to a stationary defence, as 
 for instance, when they are expecting succour, it is advantageous 
 to protect their horses even partially from the enemy^s fire by 
 artificial cover, which will at the same time prevent the enemy from 
 approaching the position. Hence the Cossacks should be instructed 
 in field works, at any rate so much as to enable them to throw up a 
 low rampart, or to contrive defences from the materials on the spot, 
 such as carts, packs, provision sacks, &c. 
 
 The Cossacks, when placed in such a position, and resolved 
 to defend themselves to the last, have been seldom conquered 
 by their antagonists. The roll of glorious deeds accomplished 
 in the Caucasus, in Poland, in Turkestan, and lastly in the 
 Kirgiz steppe, bear eloquent testimony to that great moral force 
 which the Cossacks possess. 
 
 As regards the pursuit of robber bands, this is best of all 
 entrusted to Cossacks. But as the horses of the Kirgeze are 
 better trained and prepared, their trappings lighter, and the circum- 
 stance of their men being mounted with two horses enables them 
 to give the latter a rest alternately, and thus accomplish long journeys, 
 the pursuit of the robbers becomes so problematical, and so seldom 
 succeeds, that we must seek some other more likely plan; this plan 
 consists in discovering their haunts, and anticipating the possibility 
 of an irruption of the gangs. All other more or less fortunate 
 attempts at destroying the robbers have been so exceptional, that 
 they cannot and must not be accepted to prove a general rule. 
 
 We will give the following instances of the mode of carrying 
 out' pursuits. 
 
 At the commencement of 1S71, a party of robbers captured 
 a herd of horses belonging to the Kirgeze of the Khodjvkul 
 Volost, and on their homeward journey, between the Kyzyl-Djar 
 and Syrala station, took the station clerk prisoner with his son 
 and the driver. A cart abandoned by the party at the side of 
 the road was the first indication of the crime, and the com- 
 mander of the Irgiz uyezd being acquainted with the habits 
 of the robbers, at once dispatched in pursuit hall a sotnia of 
 Orenburg Cossacks, under Captain Bobrof, with instructions 
 to intercept them by the shortest, but at the same time 
 waterless, road to the Barsuks.* After accomplishing 200 versts 
 
 * It is a curious fact that the i obbers, after a raid made to tlie north of the 
 Karasai station, proceed with their booty to the Mugojars ; if to the south of that 
 station they go to the Barsuks.
 
 78 
 
 in three days, the Cossack advanced guard descried the robbers 
 resting at the Kyzyl Kuduk* spring, 70 or 80 strong. The 
 Kirgeze were nearly all in deep slumber, their horses unsaddled ; 
 the herd was grazing in the steppe, and evidently the moment for 
 attack was exceedingly well-timed; but on the first cry, "Uriis!" 
 the Kirgeze mounted their horses so rapidly that they were 
 already on the road to Karatamak before the Cossacks came up 
 with them. 
 
 In spite of the exhaustion of the Cossack horses, which 
 were evidently no match for the fresh, recently fed and watered, 
 horses of the Kirgeze, Bobrof, leaving 20 men in reserve, 
 at once moved in pursuit with the remainder. The Kirgeze 
 galloped for some distance, but on observing the small number 
 of Cossacks, gradually drew rein, and turning quickly round, 
 charged with their lances. The manoeuvre was so unexpected 
 and sudden that the Cossacks were obliged to dismount in order 
 to repel the attack with their fire-arms. In this skirmish the 
 Kirgeze lost their leader, Kuken, and 25 killed ; but by taking 
 advantage of the time gained, they had succeeded in driving the 
 herd so far away that it was useless to follow it any further. 
 Bobrof and 3 Cossacks were wounded, one mortally, in this aftair. 
 
 It is curious that on this very day one of our sotnias, proceeding 
 to Irgiz, passed the night at a place only 10 or 15 versts from the 
 scene of the skirmish, and although it saw on the next day some 
 articles of Cossack kit, it did not pay any attention to the cir- 
 cumstance, and yet its co-operation would probably have led to 
 the ultimate destruction of the robbers. 
 
 Matters turned out very differently when Captain Agapof 
 was sent by Colonel Sarancheff with half a sotnia of Oren- 
 burg Cossacks to escort a detachment kitchen. Coming un- 
 expectedly in the desert upon a gang of robbers, with a herd 
 evidently plundered from our Kirgeze, Agapof at once abandoned 
 the kitchen and started in ])ursuit with such eagerness, that after a 
 galop of 60 versts he cut off the herd ; but he and his three Cossacks 
 were surrounded by the Kirgeze. Fortunately this handful of 
 brave men succeeded in dismounting, and opening fire, held out 
 till succour arrived. 
 
 From these examples we may conclude that a successful pur- 
 suit depends, above all things, upon the self-dependence, energy 
 and skill of the Cossack officers, and therefore on the habit of 
 distinguishing by the smallest signs, based on a subtle knowledge 
 of Kirgiz usages, the direction taken by the gangs, as well as their 
 strength, the nature of the stolen herd, and other points. 
 
 Besides the pursuit of robber gangs, military detachments may 
 be employed under exceptional circumstances in operations against 
 rebel bands in the steppe. 
 
 In these cases the best means for the protection of the Kirgeze 
 who remain loyal to us, and for the dispersion of the rebels, is to 
 send out in good time a few mobile detachments to patrol a con- 
 
 * In the Dambar Kum desert.
 
 79 
 
 sideraljle portion of the steppe. Lebedef (between 1830-40) acted 
 in this way against Kenisara Kasimof, as did also Major-General 
 Verevkin in repressing the Kirgiz insurrections in the Orenburg 
 steppe in 1869. 
 
 The concentration of the troops into one column, from a fear of 
 being beaten in detail, and from an idea that an undivided detach- 
 ment can act to greater advantage in the steppe than a few small 
 ones, would simply give the Kirgeze the means of eluding our 
 blows. The ill-success which attended Colonel Dunikofsky's de- 
 tachment in 1845 is explained by these causes. 
 
 In regarding this question from a tactical point of view, we find 
 that the Kirgeze, who always attack in superior force, compel our 
 troops to act on the defensive, to form square, and to repulse their 
 attacks with artillery and musketry. Hand-to-hand encounters 
 lead to great losses. Thus, on the 2ist April 1870, the commander 
 of the Mangyshlak detachment, returning to Fort Alexander w4th 
 57 nien of the Dagestan irregular horse, was surrounded when 
 within 12 versts from his destination by a large body of Adaefs, and 
 although the gallant handful of men cut their way through sword in 
 hand, they lost 24 of their number; and at the same time we know 
 many examples where a small body, on being attacked by Kirgeze, 
 has at once opened fire and escaped without suffering any loss. 
 
 As an example of one of the most serious attacks made at any 
 time on our detachments, we may cite tiie case of Baron Stempel, 
 which occurred as follows : — 
 
 A detachment under the command of Baron Stempel, con- 
 sisting of 2 sotnias of Ural Cossacks, a company of the local bat- 
 talion, and 2 guns, with a large train, marched out on the 6th May 
 1869 from Iletz Gorodok to Kazbek, where it was intended to erect 
 the Uil Fort. 
 
 Up to the 20th May all went well with the detachment, but on 
 this day, as the train was descending from Jida Kvil into the valley, 
 a large band of Kirgeze appeared on the neighbouring heights, 
 making straight for the detachment. Five Cossacks, forming a 
 patrol, were killed by their lances. The detachment had hardly 
 halted before the mass of Kirgeze broke in between the train and the 
 rear-guard, and commenced to separate the carts and drive off the 
 oxen. The melee became general. The Cossacks who were with 
 the rear-guard charged, and, passing through the enemy, joined the 
 infantry. A sharp fire of musketry and artillery drove off the 
 assailants, but 13 carts with oats and biscuit remained in the 
 hands of the robbers. 
 
 To march that day to Lake Djaman was impossible. The de- 
 tachment encamped a few versts distance from the scene of the 
 occurrenee, and passed the night v.ithout water, the Kirgeze being 
 between them and the lake. 
 
 On the following day the troops, descending from the heights 
 on which they had passed the night, fought their way to the water, 
 gave the animals drink, and continued the march along the open 
 steppe in sight of a large band amounting to 10,000 or 15,000 
 horsemen. In expectation of being attacked, the Cossacks left
 
 80 
 
 their horses with the train and marched on foot with the infantry. 
 In this order the detachment moved gradually forward, and re- 
 pelling" all attacks, at length reached the Djaman, where, having 
 formed a waggon-barricade, they prepared to remain for some days 
 in order to rest the exhausted oxen. 
 
 On that same daj^, about G p.m., the Kirgeze again attempted 
 to make a raid, but one well-placed shell, which burst in the midst 
 of the hostile band, forced them to turn tail and disperse. 
 
 After their attempts to set fire to the waggon-barricade, which 
 was surrounded with bales of hay, had proved unsuccessful,* the 
 Kirgeze determined to make a fresh attack, which, although a 
 most determined one, was their last. In the evening of the 23rd 
 some large gangs surrounded the detachment, and with piercing 
 cries made a dash at the train. Canister and file-firing were of no 
 avail to stop the attack, and the Kirgeze, galloping up to the train, 
 dismounted and endeavoured to drag asunder the carts with their 
 hands. A hand-to-hand melee ensued at some places, and the 
 contest, accompanied by an incessant roar of artillery and musketry, 
 continued until nightfall, when the exhausted Kirgeze at length 
 retired to their camp. 
 
 The subsequent operations of the Kirgeze, although limited to 
 mere demonstrations, rendered the situation of the detachment a 
 very difficult one, as it was compelled to remain on the alert for 
 several days and nights ;t however, after lingering 2 or 3 days 
 longer round the waggon-barricade, and finding it impossible to 
 destroy the detachment, they gradually dispersed. 
 
 From a tactical point of view, some persons consider the opera- 
 tions of Lieut. -Colonel Stem pel not sufficiently decisive, as he 
 never attempted to pass to the offensive. 
 
 To this it may be replied that had the Kirgeze overpovvered 
 the sotnias charging from the waggon-barricade, or still worse, 
 forced them to dismount in front of it, the infantry, deprived of the 
 possibility of firing, would have been compelled to defend the 
 transport with their bayonets alone, and this might not have 
 been altogether convenient. 
 
 Still more difficult is it to defend the train when its escort 
 consists of cavalry alone. Thus in March 1869, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Novokreschenof with 2 Cossack sotnias had to escort a 
 large camel train, which owing to the deep snow had lensjthened 
 out to such an extent, that when the Kirgeze attacked the detach- 
 ment,:]: the advanced guard did not know of it until the Kirgeze 
 were upon the train cutting away the packs and leading off the 
 camels. It is remarkable that in this affair, when all the chances 
 
 * When the enemy sets fire to the grass in the neighbourhood of tlie camp the 
 best way is to cut the grass in rear of tlie camp and then to transfer the camp into 
 this clear space. 
 
 t Ahhough long experience has taught us that the Kirgeze hardly ever make 
 attacks by night, still there hare been cases when they have stolen up to the camp, 
 killed the sentries, or, tlirowing up an entrenchment in the vicinity, have gained 
 cover from fire. 
 
 X On the ISth March, at Bish TomnV, on the rond to Iho Emban post.
 
 81 
 
 were apparently in favour of the Kirgeze, the Cossacks not only 
 repelled the attack but inflicted considerable loss upon the enemy, 
 and themselves lost only 2 wounded, and some 20 camels carried 
 away by our own drivers. 
 
 These unsuccessful operations on the part of the Kirgeze must 
 be ascribed, firstly, to their entire ignorance of the manner of con- 
 ducting attacks, and secondly, to the character of the operations 
 of our troops, who consider that their strength lies not in offensive 
 but in defensive warfare. On the other hand, if the enemy avoids 
 the encounter with our troops, we inust adopt the rapidity and 
 suddenness of attack of the Kirgeze, remembering that Asiatics 
 when caught unawares lose their presence of mind and become 
 panic-stricken, no matter the smallness of the number b}' which 
 they are attacked. Of course such a mode of operation is only 
 possible with a light and mobile train. In these cases the cavalry 
 as a rule plays the chief role; infantry can only take part in these 
 rapid and often prolonged movements provided there are arrange- 
 ments for mounting the men on horses, camels, or in carts. 
 
 As an example of this we may cite an episode of the year 1870. 
 In early spring a detachment of one company and one sotnia, 
 under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Saranchof, was 
 despatched to the mouth of the Emba in order to select a site for 
 a fort. The detachment had just entered the steppe when news 
 was received of an insurrection at Mangyshlak among the Adaefs, 
 large bodies of whom had begun to assemble on the lower and 
 middle course of the Emba. The detachment, encumbered with a 
 large train, was exceedingly weak for decisive operations against 
 bands of this tribe elated by their successes against Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Rukin's convoy ; nevertheless, to halt the detachment 
 until reinforcements arrived, would have the effect under the 
 present circumstances of giving courage to the rebels. Con- 
 sequently Lieutenant-Colonel Saranchof, disregarding the news of 
 the formation of the Adaefs into gangs for the purpose of cutting 
 off the detachment from water, and, without awaiting orders, con- 
 tinued his march in readiness at any moment to encounter the 
 enemy. However, this was not required ; when the detachment, 
 after an insignificant advanced guard action near Lake Bartyl- 
 dakhta, reached the River Emba, it found, instead of the Adaefs, 
 only the traces of a disorderly and hasty retreat. After complet- 
 ing his reconnaissance, Lieutenant-Colonel Saranchof retired 
 towards Uil fort, and afterwards, on receipt of reinforcements, 
 again marched to the Emba with the object at all hazards of falling 
 upon the enemy's auls, punishing them for their robberies, and 
 forcing them to submission. As there were no pack camels with 
 the detachment, and in consequence the march beyond the Emba 
 to the Ust Urt could not be undertaken owing to the insufficiency 
 of grass and water, it was only important to reach the Emba before 
 the Adaefs, who were watching every movement of the detach- 
 ment, could cross it. With this object in view, spies were sent to 
 reconnoitre the roads in other directions. These spies were captured 
 by the enemy who were in this way deceived as to the real direc-
 
 82 
 
 tioii the detachment was taking; the last 100 versts were accom- 
 plished by a forced march in 21 hours, the heavy baggage being 
 left under escort of part of the detachment, which was ordered to 
 move at the usual pace : the other part, two sotnias, 2 guns and a 
 company of rifles, mounted in carts, marched in light order with 
 three days' provisions. The calculations proved correct; on the 
 18th June the Adaefs were encountered sooner than they expected 
 and from quite a different quarter, and just as they were preparing 
 to escape over the Emba. Their gangs took to flight, but were 
 pursued for 20 versts, and after a few days appeared with pro- 
 fe«sions of submission and gave up some of the captives in their 
 possession. 
 
 But as the conditions of their submission were not ratified by 
 them. Colonel Saranchof, in accordance with his instructions formed 
 a camel train from the herds which he had captured, and in the 
 course of a few days marched beyond the Emba to Uch-Kana in 
 the desert of Djar-Cheke on the sea-shore, where the rebels had 
 collected in large bodies. 
 
 In spite of the rapidity with which the detachment marched, 
 the enemy got wind of their approach and took to flight; some to 
 Myn-Su-Almaz, others to the sea-shore, hoping in the event of 
 pursuit to escape to the islands of the Caspian Sea. Under the 
 supposition that Myn-Su-Almaz was occupied by General 
 Bizyanof's detachment, Saranchof took no thought for the former 
 party and moved towards the Caspian, where the aids of the 
 Jemenefs, considered the most warlike and the greatest robbers of 
 all the Adaef tribe, were situated. 
 
 The locality over which the detachment had to move presented 
 a completely grassless and almost waterless steppe, covered with 
 bare salt marshes or shifting sands, which only afforded dried up 
 stalks of wormwood or kiyak. Tn spite of this, Saranchof passed 
 along the western border of the Ak-Kum desert, and on the 7th 
 July made a reconnaissance to Tchuran's tomb.* On reaching 
 this place, which overlooked the Kirgiz camp, Saranchof sent 
 a half sotnia to each flank, and with the remainder marched 
 south-west in the direction of Janibai's tomb. 
 
 The road from this place became still more diflicult ; the pools 
 ^^ ere so deep and broad that some had to be crossed by swimming 
 against a strong wind, while in others the horses sank to their 
 girths and began to lie down from inability to extricate themselves 
 from the sticky mud. Not wishing, however, to halt before accom- 
 plishing his purpose, Saranchof overcame all obstacles and 
 reached the sea shore; but here the detachment drew up before a 
 fearful scene. Manv horses and camels with their packs lay in the 
 mud on the shore abandoned by their owners, and further on, at 
 2 or 3 versts from the coast, crowds of Adaefs up to their waists in 
 water endeavouring to escape to an island ; leaving to fate not only 
 their herds but their little children, who were abandoned by their 
 mothers in the sci-amble. To continue the pursuit would have led 
 
 * Tlie detachment consisted of two sotnias of Cossacks, a division of artillery, 
 and 50 rillemen, mounted on camels.
 
 83 
 
 to the ultimate destruction of many Adaef families, and therefore, 
 Saranchof, as night was approaching, returned to Janibai^ where he 
 was met by the other half sotnias who had pitched the aids which 
 they found into the sea. 
 
 Thus terminated the expedition. On the following day the 
 Adaefs tendered their submission, binding themselves to pay taxes, 
 to give up the ringleaders and captives, and to return the property 
 plundered by them at Mangyshlak. 
 
 Similar rapidity and secrecy characterised Count Borkh's raid, 
 made by order of the military commander of the Turgai district, 
 upon the aiil of the Kirgiz Amantai, Tiuliup-Bergenef, one of the 
 most renowned robber chiefs who nomadised at that time on the 
 Teress-Akkana, a tributary of the Khobda. 
 
 When Amantai, in the summer of 1869, was nomadising with 
 his aid in the Iletz iiyezd with the secret intention of con- 
 tinuing to encourage brigandage, Count Borkh, who was then con- 
 structing the AkTiube Fort,formed a flying column of 70 Orenburg 
 Cossacks, and accomplishing nearly 200 versts in 2 days by 
 secluded paths and valleys, reached Murtuk. Intelligence was 
 here received that Amantai was nomadising with the aids of his 
 kinsmen the Chiklins; and as the ties of clanship are held in 
 great esteem among the Kirgeze, the whole success of the detach- 
 ment depended upon its falling upon the Chiklins unawares. 
 
 The object of the detachment was favoured by the inclemency 
 of the night, which was such as is seldom experienced in the steppe. 
 Taking advantage of the darkness, Count Borkh ordered the 
 Cossacks to tie up their sabres, cover their stirrup irons, and put 
 nose bags over their horses' mouths to prevent them from neigh- 
 ing. 
 
 In utter darkness and amid the howling of the storm, the 
 Cossacks passed among the sleeping aids, with the assistance of a 
 trusty guide and the constant flashes of the lightening. At day- 
 light the detachment was far on its road, and perceiving on the 
 banks of a rivulet the traces of an aid which had just quitted the 
 spot, it trotted forward and soon descried in a large ravine some 
 aids among which was that of Amantai. 
 
 It was necessary to gallop the distance to the aids as quickly 
 as possible so as not to give the Kirgeze time to recover. For- 
 bidding the Cossacks to fire, Count Borkh dashed at the afd and 
 demanded from the astonished Kirgeze the surrender of Amantai. 
 The Chiklins at first hesitated, but when Count Borkh proceeded 
 to threats, they not only gave him up, but his brother Nazarbai 
 also, with all their eff"ects. 
 
 Apprehending an attack on their return journey, the Cossacks 
 formed a sort of moveable square, and throwing out a chain 
 of skirmishers round the captured herd (about 900 head), pre- 
 pared in the event of attack to dismount and fire over the saddle. 
 The Kirgeze followed at a respectful distance, but observing 
 our cautious proceedings, commenced gradually to drop ofl:'; 
 the detachment reached Ak Tiube in 6 days without contre-tcmps,
 
 84 
 
 after a march both ways of 500 versts and with the loss of only- 
 two lame horses. 
 
 The rapidity shown in both cases by the cavalry gives proof of 
 the indefatigable powers of our Cossacks ; but justice demands an 
 acknowledgment that our steppe infantry does not yield to them 
 in this respect : for instance, the rifles * of Captain Tetgren's de- 
 tachment, in the auturpn of 1870, when hastening to the succour 
 of some Cossacks, ran, not marched, 25 versts in 3 hours. In 
 order, however, to give them this rapidity and mobility in the 
 steppe, without risk to their health, they must be mounted on 
 camels or in carts, or, better still, on horses ; in fact, mounted 
 infantry or dragoons. All the trials in this direction have proved 
 successful, and if the infantry are provided with comfortable 
 saddles, and are trained to dismount rapidly, they have not been 
 found to be behind the Cossacks, and have made marches of 80 
 to 100 or more versts in 24 hours. 
 
 XI. 
 
 Military Operations in Turkestan. — Sketch of Central Asian Armies (Infantry, 
 Cavalry, Artillery). — Field Engagements and Character of the Operations 
 of the Turkestan Battalions.— i?o/e of Riflemen and Artillery in Action. — 
 Mode of Capture of Central Asian Forts. — Defence of our Forts in the 
 Steppe and in Turkestan. 
 
 In the preceding lecture we have spoken of military operations 
 in the Kirgiz steppe. Quite different, however, are the conditions 
 under which similar operations are conducted in Central Asia, 
 v/here there are organized powers, and in consequence towns, 
 fortresses, and standing armies. It is true that centuries of des- 
 potism on the part of their rulers, and the prevailing religion, have 
 reduced the strength of the nation to such a low ebb, that these 
 so-called regular armies appear to us like indisciplined mobs, great 
 in point of number, but as ignorant of the military art as they 
 were in the time of Bekovitch Cherkassky. But, although never 
 failing to suffer defeat in the open field, they possessed sufficient 
 firmness behind the ramparts of their fortresses to defend them- 
 selves at times with considerable obstinacy. 
 
 The armament of the infantry of our neighbouring Central 
 Asian Khanates is rather varied : the Khokandi, for example, are 
 armed in the present day for the most part with matchlocks, while 
 among the Bokhariots we find not only percussion arms and 
 double-barrelled sporting guns, but breech-loading rifles, the front 
 rank being armed with these, while the rear rank have pistols and 
 old fashioned batiks and ai-baltcB. 
 
 The arme blanche of the cavalry is, firstly, the lance, and 
 
 * The Isfc division of the 1st company of the 18th (now the 1th Tni-kestan) rifle 
 battalion, under tlie command of Lieutenant Jivaref. 
 
 I
 
 85 
 
 secondly, a weapon consisting of a cast-iron ball attached to a strap. 
 a battle-axe or a sabre. The cavalry, as an arm, plays usually a 
 most insignificant part, and cannot act at all in winter, as the 
 costly blood argamaks are unable to stand the cold and bad forage. 
 During the Khivan campaign of General Perovsky, a gang of 
 three thousand Khokandi appeared in our Kirgiz steppe, but being 
 overtaken by storms and bad weather, sustained such losses that, 
 according to the reports of the Khivans themselves, scarcely half 
 the men, and those on foot, returned to their native land. 
 
 The artillery, judging from the guns which we captured from the 
 Khokandi, may be said to be in a very low scale of development, 
 and reminds us of that of the middle ages. That of Bokhara is 
 better, due to the fact that they have learnt of late from the 
 Afghans. The military qualities of the Bokhariot artillery were 
 displayed in some engagements, as at Irdjar for instance, where 
 their batteries opened fire at distances of 1,800 or 1,900 yards, 
 and of course would have occasioned us much damage, had our rapid 
 advance not forced the Bokhariots to withdraw their guns. At 
 Ura Tiube and Djizak, they likewise fired with great skill, and the 
 little comparative loss which we sustained at the assault of those 
 places may be explained by our batteries not permitting the enemy 
 to place his guns within close range. 
 
 It remains to say that, besides the fortress and field artillery, 
 the Bokhariots have a description of mountain gun, carried on pack 
 animals, and wall-pieces, which they use both in the defence of 
 their fortresses and in the open field. 
 
 Shahr-i-subz also possesses certain qualities ; the inhabitants of 
 that country are excellent shots, while in energy and bravery they 
 are far superior to the Bokhariots and the inhabitants of the 
 Zerafshan valley. 
 
 With regard to our most easterly neighbours, the Kashgarees, 
 their infantry, according to eye-witnesses, is much better organized 
 than the other Central Asian powers, and has been drilled to a 
 certain extent by immigrants from East India. The Kashgar 
 artillery is more numerous and of better quahty than that of 
 Bokhara or Khokand. The cavalry, besides the sabre and lance 
 use arrows, and are trained to carry a foot soldier on the croup 
 of their horses. Of the moral force of these troops we will say 
 nothing, as some estimate it rather higher, others lower than that 
 of the iSokhariots. 
 
 After reviewing our scanty information of the character and 
 military organization of our Central Asian antagonists, it is not 
 diflicult to come to the conclusion that in military operations in 
 Turkestan it is impossible to do without some moveable columns, 
 as had been done in the Kirgiz steppe. Such an arrangement was 
 only possible there as long as the military operations on our side 
 were limited to a passive defence, or, at the most, to raids. But 
 as the experience of late years has demonstrated that in conse- 
 quence of the special peculiarities of the neighbouring races, and 
 the extent of the frontier line, a successful defence of Turkestan is 
 only possible by opposing to an attack active energetic measures, and
 
 86 - 
 
 thus our detachments required such an effective as to enable them 
 to furnish sufficient gai'risons for the occupation at any rate of the 
 most important strategical points, without weakening the field force 
 to too great an extent. 
 
 From the very nature of warfare in Turkestan, troops may have 
 to take part both in operations in the field and in sieges and 
 assaults of fortresses, in the defence of forts, and lastly in raids and 
 enterprises against robber gangs. As the latter operations — the 
 raids — come under the general conditions of operations in the 
 steppe, of which we have already spoken, we will endeavour to lay 
 down simple rules for the guidance of our men in actions with the 
 enemy. 
 
 The development of the offensive element in troops is the first 
 condition of success in Asiatic warfare. In point of fact, no 
 matter how many Asiatics there may be, they will evade the attack of 
 the smallest column if it only acts with boldness; the sight of "charge 
 bayonets," and cries of hurrah ! produce a strong impression upon 
 the enemy, and force him, as a rule, to seek safety in flight. 
 
 But the proneness of the Turkestan battalions to move straight 
 from the position with the bayonet, despising the co-operation of 
 skirmishers and artillery, has sometimes cost them dearly, and may 
 endanger the success of the enterprise. In the engagement at 
 Zerabulak on the 2nd June 1868, one of our battalions, dashing 
 forward impetuously with the bayonet, was surrounded and so 
 hidden by the dense crowds of the enemy, that the division of 
 artillery in rear., being unable to distinguish it, dared not fire canister 
 at these masses; but luckily the gallant companies made a fresh 
 charge with the bayonet and opened a road for themselves, defeat- 
 ing the enemy with a loss of 17 men. 
 
 Of course the defeat of such a foe as the Bokhariots is not 
 difficult; but it is necessary to remember that these light victories 
 give, as a rule, insignificant results, and while dispersed in one 
 place, these gangs easily and quickly unite at another, often in 
 larger numbers than before. 
 
 In order to secure a decisive victor}'^, it is by no means sufficient 
 to put the enemy to flight ; il is necessary to inflict such loss upon 
 him, that he cannot quickly recover from it ; and this is possible 
 only by a heavy fire. Hence the reason that the most convenient 
 order for our infantry is an extended front, even vi ithout a chain 
 of skirmishers, as this formation gives a greater extent of fire, and 
 at the same time, owing to the little steadiness of the enemy, is 
 quite close enough for a good bayonet charge. 
 
 Generally speaking, in consequence of the small size of our de- 
 tachments, the character of the enemy and of the ground, which 
 both in the Caucasus and in Turkestan often prevent our artillery 
 from taking part in the attack at the same time with the infantry, 
 we ought not to commence the attack from a long distance, 
 and by a premature bayonet charge deprive ourselves of the 
 advantages of our fire, and thereby risk an incomplete and in- 
 decisive victory. 
 
 In proof of this we will mention some characteristic instances. 
 
 S
 
 87 
 
 During the attack of the Samarcand lieiglits (1st May ISGa) the 
 infantry, moving to the attack, went forward at once with the 
 bayonet, masking their own artillery; and although the enemy fled 
 in panic fear, his losses were too slight to make him sensible of his 
 defeat. The same thing was partly repeated at Zerabulak, where 
 the small numher of dead Bokhariots on the left flank served as 
 the best proof that here also we had not turned to account the 
 superiority of our arms as we might hate done, and had not allowed 
 time for shattering the enemy's masses. At the same time we 
 must not let the troops run into the opposite extreme of firing away 
 their cartridges. The Bokhariots sometimes open fire at a very 
 great range, and our soldiers, not to be backward, uselessly 
 expend much powder, and at the same time nothing raises the 
 spirits of the enemy so much as an unsuccessful fire at long ranges. 
 Although field engagements, carried out with greater or less 
 success, are capable to a certain extent of subduing and shaking 
 the power of a Central Asian sovereignty, vet great results n\ war 
 are only to be attained by the occu])ation of a town or fortress, as 
 to the fall of such a point there is attached a sense of territorial 
 loss. From this it is plain that the siege of a fort is the chief and, 
 it may be said, the only operation open to us for the attainment 
 of a decisive success in Turkestan. 
 
 Nearly all the important towns of Central Asia are surrounded 
 with high mud walls, which are flanked in many places by towers 
 of two and even four stories ; the ditches surrounding the walls are 
 in rows, and are filled with water, attaining in some places a depth 
 of 28 feet or more. On the top of the walls, on the outer side, 
 run crenelated galleries 6 feet high, which are loopholed ; the 
 wooden gates are plated with iron, and are protected on the out- 
 side by traverses, while on the inside are corridors running in a 
 serpentine direction. 
 
 It might appear that the capture of such towns, in the event of 
 an obstinate and careful defence, would be an impossibility for a 
 weak antagonist; but it is necessary to bear in mind that the 
 garrisons of the towns, from the extent of the line to be defended, 
 are scattered over a large space, and it therefore appears feasible 
 to capture the works before the enemy has time to concentrate 
 against the attacked point, and also that the artiller)-, however 
 numerous, is dispersed over a line of several versts in length, and 
 cannot act in concert at a given moment. Besides having no idea of 
 turning the locality to account, Asiatics, even in fortresses, defend 
 themselves only behind their ramparts, disregarding such objects for 
 instance as gardens and suburbs, which, from their being mud 
 structures, are not easily fired, while their crooked intersected 
 streets could impede the assailant at every forward step. 
 
 Between 1840-50 our troops had frequently to besiege and 
 capture towns in Central Asia; but at the beginning, having no 
 idea of the means of defence of these fortresses, we acted with 
 great circumspection ; for instance, trenches were opened, 
 approaches made, and by this both time and men were use- 
 lessly lost. Afterwards we changed our tactics and, as a rule,
 
 88 
 
 abandoned the regular siege and had recourse to open escalade. 
 The difference was immense. For instance, in order to capture 
 Ak-Mechet, defended by 300 Khokandi, our detachment of 2,000 
 men required three weeks, but the conquest of Djizak, one of the 
 strongest fortresses in Bokhara, w^as commenced and linished in a 
 week in spite of its being defended by a garrison of 10,000 
 men. 
 
 We will say a few words as to the essence of sucli an opera- 
 tion as the siege of a Central Asian fortress. 
 
 In undertaking the siege of a town it is necessary first of all 
 to surround it on every side in order that the garrison may not only 
 not receive reinforcements but may have no communication with the 
 exterior. In some cases this may be attained by a careful selec- 
 tion of points to be occupied by detachments, which although 
 small should be strong enough to repel any sorties. Then turning 
 to account the carelessness of Asiatics and their want of know- 
 ledge of the importance of sentry duties, breaching batteries 
 should be formed at night as near as possible to the walls, a breach 
 effected and the assault made. As u rule it is sufficient to show a 
 handful of volunteers on the wall of the strongest fortress to 
 ensure its fall. 
 
 The principal rule in the assault falls to the infantry, the 
 cavalry only takes part \\hen the enemy is leaving the fortress, 
 although there have been cases when, from the local circumstances, 
 they have had to share in the assault, vieing with the infantry. 
 Thus a mounted sotnia of Urals, during the assault of Ura-Tiube, 
 after forcing their way through the gates of the fortress, killed 
 the gunners on the barbettes and, after dismantling the guns, 
 arrived opportunely to the aid of the troops attacking the north 
 bastions. 
 
 In the storming of Djizak, the Cossacks sent with Colonel 
 Pistolkors to make a demonstration against the north-west angle 
 of the fortress, dismounted, and with the two guns Avhich they 
 brought with them approached so close to the walls that the 
 Bokhariots made a sortie. They were met, however, by the 
 Cossacks with such a fire of grape that they took to flight. 
 
 Opinions vary considerably as to the importance of artillery in 
 the attack of Asiatic fortresses. According to the opinion of 
 some it is of little relative value because the mud walls of Central 
 Asian defences do not yield readily to our shells, while the 
 irregular form of the w^orks seldom permits the guns to deliver a 
 direct fire ; others say, on the contrary, that artillery can play 
 an important part. In fact, not very long ago, artillery was 
 limited to mere bombardments and demonstrations, but now it is 
 used for breaching. It is true that many still continue to deny 
 the advantage of breaching Ijatteries, believing that the formation 
 of a breach is only suited for Euroi)ean warfare and is entirely 
 superfluous against Asiatics, as it prolongs the duration of the 
 siege and leads to a useless waste of life; but this assertion is 
 opposed to facts. Breaching batteries were tried first at the siege 
 of Ura-Tiube in 186G. and the result was that the column 
 
 I
 
 89 
 
 penetrating through the breach lost 5 men whilst the other whicli 
 stormed the walls with ladders lost 150 men. 
 
 From this it may he concluded that under certain conditions 
 all the rules of the art of siege warfare are applicable in Central 
 Asia, and that the formation of a breach is as a rule necessary. 
 Moreover, owing to the height of the walls, ladders are often found 
 too short, besides that escalade is at all times a dangerous opera- 
 tion. For instance, in 1852, our men were beaten off from Ak- 
 Mechet before they had captured the outer rampart, and, for tlie 
 same cause, one of the columns at the storming of Khodjent was 
 repulsed with a loss of 80 men. 
 
 The best time for the assault, if we take into consideration 
 the carelessness of Asiatics, is daylight. But there are exceptions. 
 In the capture of Djizak our troops had to assault at noon, as the 
 Bokhariots, taught by experience at Ura-Tiube, which was assaulted 
 at dawn a few days before, kept awake until daylight so as not to 
 be taken unawares. At noon no one expected the assault and thus 
 the strongest fortress fell after half an hour's resistance.* 
 
 Although the erection of breaching batteries and the formation 
 of a breach is the best and surest means for capturing a fortress, 
 it cannot for all this be recommended as superior to everything 
 else. If the fortress is small, for instance, and has a strong profile 
 to the walls, a bombardment may be had recourse to, as was done 
 in 1869 at Yani Kurgan, which fell in 23 hours, almost without 
 loss. 
 
 We will now pass to the defence of our own forts in the Kirgiz 
 Steppe and in Turkestan. 
 
 Properly armed and provided with the necessary warlike stores 
 our steppe forts form very secure defensive points, particularly 
 against such antagonists as the Kirgeze. 
 
 Although the distance between our forts is for the most part 
 very considerable, this is no disadvantage, as the security of the 
 Kirgiz steppes does not lie in defensive, but in offensive opera- 
 tions; the forts serving only as points of support for the active 
 enterprises of the garrison quartered in them. The more mobile 
 the detachment the more ensured is the defence of the district. 
 
 None of our forts, with the exception of Fort Alexander, have 
 been attacked by Kirgeze. This exception we will note : — 
 
 Soon after the defeat of Rukin's detachment at Mangyshlak, 
 the commandant of Fort Alexander received intelligence that the 
 Adaefs were collecting in large numbers in order to capture the 
 fort before reinforcements could be brought by steamer from the 
 Caucasus. 
 
 At the end of March large gangs of Adaefs collected about 6 
 versts from the fort in the hilly and intersected country, and on 
 the 3rd April commenced to approach its eastern defences. At 
 
 * At the siege of Djizak the Bek in command, wishing to prercnt all egress from 
 the fortress, ordered the gates to be closed, leaving narrow wickets in soriie of 
 them. When our troops forced their way in the Bokhariots found their line of 
 retreat closed, and surrendered in masses. Some fanatics, however, took refuge in a 
 powder magazine, and blew themselves up.
 
 90 
 
 the first rounds from the garrison the whole band halted, and^ 
 turning to the right, moved in the direction of the Cossack village 
 of Nikolaef. The unarmed villnge was of course unable to offer any 
 resistance, and, therefore, all the inhabitants who could not take 
 refuge in time in Fort Alexander, or escape by boats to the open 
 sea, were killed in a most inhuman and barbarous manner. The 
 Kirgeze afterwards burnt the village and plundered the Armenian 
 shops. 
 
 After a day or two the Adaefs again approached the fort, and 
 this time tried to gain possession of Flagstaff Hill, from which they 
 could see all that was going on in the fort ; but they were foiled in 
 this attempt by the Cossacks. A fire was kept up from the fort 
 until sunset, and the garrison remained all night under arms 
 awaiting the attack. 
 
 On the 7th of the month the day passed quietly ; but the spies 
 who came to the fort brought word that an attack would be made 
 that night on the Armenian shops in the lower fort, from which 
 all the troops had been removed since the commencement of the 
 siege. 
 
 The night was dark, preventing the enemy's approach from 
 being observed, and the garrison could not attempt a sortie as there 
 were but 150 men in all, including labourers, hospital attendants, 
 clerks, meteorologists, &c., who could hold a gun. 
 
 At 10 p.m. the fusillade from the outpost picquet betokened the 
 approach of the enemy. In spite of the heavy fire of grape and 
 small arms directed upon the streets of the Armenian bazaar, the 
 Kirgeze, who had forced their way into the lower fort, plundered 
 it until morning. It was impossible to save the bazaar, and there- 
 fore firing was suspended, especially as we began to run short of 
 ammunition. 
 
 On the 8th the Kirgeze occupied the gardens adjacent to the fort, 
 burnt the bazaar, and appointed the 10th for the final assault. 
 This, however, did not take place, as on the 9th a steamer arrived 
 with 2 Caucasian companies, and the Kirgeze, giving up all idea of 
 attacking the fort, fled to the mountains. 
 
 In Turkestan the enemy has also more than once attempted to 
 seize our forts. For instance, the affairs at Fort Perovsky, Yani 
 Kurgan, and Samarkand, the siege of which by the enemy lasted 7 
 days and caused us consideraljle loss. Formerly, judging from 
 previous instances, an active defence was considered the best 
 means for defending any point in our occupation, and therefore 
 the troops made a sortie from the fortress and endeavoured to attack 
 the besieging force in the open field ; but as it was impossible to 
 do this in the case of Samarkand, this siege afforded us some 
 instructive examples, which must be taken into consideration in 
 future operations in Central Asia : — ■ 
 
 (1.) Excessive confidence in the inhabitants was the cause of 
 the commandant of Samarkand abstaining from the destruction of 
 the houses which adjoined the walls of the citadel ; and by thus 
 depriving the garrison of the possibility of cannonading the enemy, 
 the attacks became long and obstinate. (2.) The immense extent
 
 91 
 
 of the walls both of Samarkand and other fortresses, by giving the 
 adversary the choice of many points for his attack, demands on 
 our side an efficient reserve for opportune employment wherever 
 reinforcement is required. To the excellent arrangements of its 
 reserve the citadel of Samarkand owed its safety. (3.) Artillery 
 fire as the chief means of defence of the garrison must be directed 
 with great skill, or the enemy by taking advantage of the cover 
 afforded by the town buildings will hardly suffer any damage ; and 
 (4.) the commanders must be ready with expedients for repairing 
 breaches, making barricades, and other means of meeting assaults. 
 In conclusion, we must repeat that in spite of the gallantry of 
 the troops, contempt for the enemy, no matter who he may be, 
 and inattention to the teachings of military science and experience, 
 are paid for in useless and irreparable losses, whereas the pre- 
 servation of the men, owing to the difficulty alone of replacing 
 casualties in such remote regions, should always be the first con- 
 sideration in all military operations in Asia.
 
 92 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 NOTES ON THE KHIYAN EXPEDITION, 1873. 
 
 The forces placed at the disposal of General von Kaufmann for the 
 Expedition to Khiva started from three different bases of operation : 
 (1) from the Turkestan District; (2) from the Orenburg District; 
 and (3) from the Caucasiis District. 
 
 The column from Turkestan was formed into two minor columns, 
 the one starting from Djizakh, the other from Kasalinsk ; these two 
 detachments were to unite at the Bakan Mountains, and thence move 
 together upon Khiva. 
 
 The combined column consisted of: — 
 21 companies^' of Infantry. 
 1 company of Sappers (250 men). 
 
 7 sotniasf of Cossacks. 
 
 28 field gi.ms (including 2 mitrailleuses of Noble's construction). 
 
 8 rocket stands. 
 
 Total, 5,247 men, and 1,654 horses. 
 
 Fortified posts were established at Irkibai, Tamdy and Kha] Ata, 
 in which places garrisons were left, and reserve supplies of food, ammu- 
 nition, and other stores accumulated. 
 The Orenburg column consisted of : — 
 9 companies of Infantry. 
 1 Sapper detachment. 
 9 sotnias of Cossacks. 
 12 field guns. (Besides these, 2 rifled muzzle-loading 4-prs, were 
 carried with the train for the armament of the fortified post 
 at Urgu, and 4 small mortars for possible use against Khiva). 
 6 rocket stands. 
 Total, 3,461 men, and 1,797 horses. 
 
 Eortified posts were formed at Djana Kal and Urgu-Murun, a 
 promontory near Lake Aibugir, where garrisons were left and reserve 
 stores concentrated. Large stores were also collected at the Emban 
 Post, the last fortified point on Eussian territory. 
 
 The Caucasus column was split into two main detachments, moving 
 respectively from Krasnovodsk and Mangyshlak. 
 
 The constitution of the Krasnovodsk detachment is omitted, as it will 
 be remembered that this was the column — the only one — which failed in 
 reaching Khiva. It started on its march from the eastern shores of the 
 Caspian, but after persevering in its struggle for some weeks against 
 the most formidable difficulties which nature could oppose to it, was at 
 length compelled to return. No blame fortius failure can be attached to 
 the commander of the column, Colonel Markossoff, an officer of consider- 
 
 * Normal strength of a company, about 200 men. 
 t Normal strength of sotnia, 150 men.
 
 93 
 
 able experience in the steppe ; on the contrary, but for his resolution 
 to return, the whole of the detachment might have perished. The 
 heat was so intense that the thermometers burst at 55° R. (157'' 
 F.), that being the maximum graduation on the stem, and even the 
 Cossacks were dying from sunstroke and want of water. 
 
 The moral force exercised by the presence of this column on its 
 return was, however, of use in overawing the Tekke Turkmen who 
 inhabit the country to the north of the Persian frontier, so that, although 
 it was debarred trom participating in the triumphal entry into Khiva, 
 it still contributed a share to the general success of the campaign. 
 
 The Mangyshlak column, originally intended to be a much larger 
 force, had, owing to the difficulties of obtaining transport, to be reduced 
 in streng-th, which was ultimately as folio vps : — 
 
 12 companies of Infantry. 
 1 Sapper detachment. 
 6 sotnias of Cossacks. 
 6 guns (4 field, 2 mountain). 
 3 rocket stands, and some mounted natives.* 
 
 Total about 2.000 men. There were a few horses, probably under 
 1,000. 
 
 Fortified posts were established at Bish Akhty and Iltedge in con- 
 nection with the base of this detachment on the shores of the Caspian. 
 The operation of landing the stores at Tchikishliar, no easy one, is 
 described in one of the Russian military journals ; the men had to carry 
 the stores for about half a mile in order to land them in consequence 
 of the shallowness of the sea in places. The exposure of the men, breast 
 high in the water, to the scox'ching rays of the sun must have laid the 
 foundation of much sickness. 
 
 The total force of combatants forming the expedition, therefore, 
 numbered nearly 11,000 men, in which are not included the nmnerous '^^'^^P*''* 
 non-combatants, such as train drivers, native camel attendants. j hospital ^^^^"S^™ ^ s- 
 attendants, guides, suttlers, &c. When it is remembered that this large 
 force had to traverse the vast expanse of sandy steppe which separates the 
 Russian frontiers from the Khivan oasis — deserts which are absolutely 
 barren, and can afford no sujiplies whatever, not even water in many 
 cases — some idea may be gained of the amount of transport required. 
 
 The requisite transport could not be obtained, even with all the 
 resources of Russia. Camels were indispensable, as there are often 
 mai'ches of three days' length where no water is to be had, and these 
 are the only animals which con exist without water for any time. 
 The campaign hinged entirely on the transport, and how nearly it broke 
 down from its insufficiency is evident to any one who has read the un- 
 pretending journals of Colonel Kolokoltsoff. 
 
 It is difficult to find out the exact number of camels actually 
 obtained for the use of the troops. Lieutenant Stiimm, the Prussian 
 attache with the Russian forces, mentions 19,200 camels as the total 
 number required, but this aj^pears to be under the mark according to 
 the Russian accounts, which assign 8,800 and 10,320 to the Turkestan 
 and Orenburg columns respectively, and therefore exclusive of the 
 requirements of the Caucasus column. 
 
 Some idea of the quantity of stores required for the use of the ti'oops 
 
 * These men acted as guides aud reconnoitrers. They also formed guards, for 
 patrolling the Une of communications. 
 
 t There was a native driver to every 5 or 7 camels.
 
 94 
 
 may be gathered from the fact thai 2,700 tons of stores of different 
 kinds "vrere sent to the Emhan post for the use of the Orenburg column 
 alone, and for the ti'ansport of this amount upwards of 10,000 camels 
 were stated to be necessary. 
 
 The troops carried on an average two-and-a-half months' supply in 
 their commissariat train, another month's supply was accumulated at 
 the fortified posts, and four months' supply in addition for the garrisons 
 of those posts. 
 
 The ration appointed for the Kussian soldier per dieui, as given in 
 Lieutenant StUmm's account, is as follows : — 
 
 2 lb. bread (hard black biscuit). 
 |- lb. groats, 
 2 oz. salt. 
 7^ oz. meal. 
 -^ oz. dripping. 
 5 oz. pease. 
 5 drams of vinegar. 
 14^ drams of spirit. 
 2 lb. mutton. 
 
 Lieutenant Stumm remarks that this was the ration laid down in the 
 regl^lations, but he expresses a doubt whether a regular supply of 
 these quantities could be sustained in the desert. From the Russian 
 accounts it seems tolerably certain that the men did not get this ration. 
 Colonel Kolokoltsoff, in his diary, mentions that the men's appetites 
 failed in the intensely suffocating heat. They only seemed to mumble 
 their biscuit, and the latter does not appear to have been Tery jialat- 
 able. We are told that native chupatties (unleavened cakes of flour 
 and fat) were obtainable from the suttlers, but that lew could touch 
 them. Sheep were taken with the detachments, and others were pur- 
 chased from friendly Kirgeze. Salt meat was also carried. The Oren- 
 burg detachment brought a small supply of salt meat with it, besides 
 15,300 rations (theii' force was nearly 3,500 men) of preserved meat. 
 Supplies of rice wei'e also obtained on the road (by the Turkestan detach- 
 ment) from the Emir of Bokhara. 
 
 Directly Khivan territory was reached, mnrkets were established 
 and supplies of fresh meat, vegetables, fruits, and other article?, were 
 brought in for sale. 
 
 No Russian can get on without his tea, which is drimk very weak, 
 with acid in it in lieu of milk. Cold tea was found to be the most 
 grateful beverage for allaying the parching thirst, from which the men 
 suffered severely in their march through the desert. The proportion of 
 tea and sugar issued to the troops was 1 lb. tea aud 3 lb. sugar to everj 
 100 men per diem. 
 
 The animals employed for transport purjooses were camels aud 
 horses ; chiefly the former. The field artillery was sometimes drawn 
 by horses and sometimes by two camels harnessed tandem fashion. The 
 mitrailleuses had one camel each for their draught. 
 
 Camels formed the staple transport. >Many were hired from 
 friendly Kirgeze, some were sent by the Emir of Bokhara, and when 
 the natives were unwilling to lend them, they were taken by force. A 
 few were captured from the Turkmen on the road during the skirmishes. 
 The camels procured were as a general rule in bad condition, owing to 
 the scarcity of grain and grass during the preceding winter and early 
 spring. Instead of being able to carry the ordinary load of a good
 
 95 
 
 camel, namely, 600 or 700 lb., they could uot be loaded with more tbau 
 480 lb. under tbe best condition.s, and with onl}' 200 lb, iu some cases. 
 Immense numbers of camels and horses died from exhaustion and 
 privations, chiefly the want of sufficient water, and the columns were 
 reduced to great stx-aits in consequence. Many officers' horses and 
 artilleiy horses died on the road. 
 
 The horses were fed on barley or oats, and hay.* The ration of corn Ration of 
 was 10 lbs. The camels were fed on straw, the refuse of sesame and borses, &c. 
 hay. The Emir of Bokhara sent presents of forage, and other friendly 
 natives brought it in for sale. The main supply, however, had to be 
 cari'ied with the columns. 
 
 The only fodder in the steppe is a coarse prickly grass, which camels 
 will eat, but horses will not touch it. Underfoot grass was met with 
 on the banks of the Oxus and in the Khivan oasis generally. 
 
 Watei', except in the waterless parts of the desert, was obtained on Water, 
 the road, either from wells or springs. These wells had been in some 
 places filled in by the enemy, but were cleared out by the sappers. 
 The water they contained was, in places, barely drinkable ; tea made 
 with it, Colonel Kolokoltsoff tells us, "was bitter to the taste, and had 
 the appearance of coffee.'' His story of the campaign is full of harrowing 
 details, for instance, we find a father suffering the most dreadful 
 tortiires rather than beg a mouthful from his son'.s water-bottle. Vam- 
 bery's accounts of the miseries undergone in the steppe, which, before 
 the campaign, were believed to have been highly coloured, now proved 
 to be only too true. 
 
 During the watei-less marches in the desert, water w^as carried by the 
 train in skins, barrels, and other wooden utensils, and by the men in 
 bidons and bottles. 
 
 In the case of the Krasnovodsk detachment (the one which failed) 
 we are told that the water was carried in skins and in 5-vedro (13^ 
 gallons) casks. 40 of which casks were assigned to each company. This 
 column carried with it 4,000 vcdros, or 10,800 gallons, which was 
 calculated to be sufficient for 6 marches, allowing each man 4 bottles 
 of water in the 24 hours. The allowance for a hoi'se was a vedro 
 (10*8 quarts) per diem. 
 
 Water was found to evaporate very fast from the casks and other 
 utensils with the thermometer standing at 150" F. 
 
 The scarcity of water was so great that Colonel Kolokoltsoff tells us 
 that he dare not wash the dust oixt of his eyes, all he could afford to do 
 was to wipe them with a damp towel. 
 
 Vapour baths on the Russian principle seem to have been estab- 
 lished at some of the permanent halting places. 
 
 The " Norton tube wells," carried by £:ome of the columns, seem to 
 have turned out a failure. The Turkestan troops considered them 
 useless lumber, and abandoned them on the road. The valves appear 
 to have got out of order. 
 
 The medical department of the Turkestan column was organized as Medical 
 follows : — an-angements. 
 
 With the field detachments there was a field-hospital with 270 beds, 
 and at the forts of Irkibai and Tamdy, temporary hospitals with 15 
 
 * The Cossack horses had often to carry 9 days' forage with them (140 lb.) 
 the Cossacks leading them in tliis case (Krasnovodsk detachment).
 
 9G 
 
 beds each. All these hospitals were supplied with a sufficient quantity 
 of the necessary stores, medicines and surgical instruments. 
 
 Besides these, the " Society for the Relief of the Sick and Wounded," 
 under the patronage of the Empress, sent upwards of 5 tons of medical 
 and hygienic stores, accompanied by 2 surgeons and 4 assistants. The 
 Turkestan branch of the society also gi-anted 220^. for the provision of a 
 field ambulance for 20 men. 
 
 In the Orenburg column, besides similar hospital aiTangements, the 
 Orenburg branch of the " Society for the Relief of the Sick and Wounded " 
 supplied a quantity of hospital requisites ; including three ambulance 
 carriages and 50 portable litters, stores of hospital linen, wine, tobacco, 
 anti-scorbutic remedies, extra rations of tea, sugar, some books, journals, 
 writing implements, &c. It also gave 450/. in money. 
 
 The health of the troops seems to have been good on the whole. 
 Some cases of frost-bite occurred at the commencement of the expedition 
 among the Turkestan detachment. There were several cases of sun- 
 stroke, dysentery, and diseases of the eye, produced by the glare of the 
 sun on the snow and, later on, by the reflection of its rays from the 
 sand in the desert. Inflammation of the eyes from the light friable lime 
 dust was of common occurrence in the Krasnovodsk column. Catarrhs 
 were the most frequent ailment, due to the great alternations of tem- 
 perature. 
 
 The ordnance carried by the force was of the lightest description. 
 It was partly of modern and partly of old construction, viz. : — 
 
 3-pr. mountain guns, rifled, breech-loading. 
 
 3-pv. mountain guns, muzzle-loading. 
 10-pr. howitzers tor armament of forts. 
 
 4-pr. field guns, muzzle and breech-loading, rifled. 
 10-pr. mortars. 
 Rockets. 
 Mitrailleuses. 
 
 The guns vvere supplied with a triple complement of service cartridges 
 and projectiles, except for the guns intended for the armament of 
 forts, which received less. In the case of the forts at Irkibai and 
 Tamdy they were provided with 130 rounds fur each 10-pr. howitzer 
 and 200 rounds for each light gun. Loose powder, powder-hose, and 
 other stores were also carried. 
 
 The troo]5s were provided with a triple complement of ball cartridge. 
 Of these the trooi)S carried one complement (60 rounds) in their pouches, 
 the other two being carried on pack animals with the artillery park. 
 
 In the engineer park of tlie Turkestan column, besides the ordinary 
 stores, were carried 4 iron ferry boats, each consisting of tw® boats 
 joined together, and a sjjare boat. 
 
 The Orenburg detachment had two portable bridges, one on trestles, 
 the other partly of pontoons, partly of skins. 
 
 Owing to the great alternations of temperature, the clothing of tlio 
 men comprised a large variety of .articles, which added considerably to 
 the transport. 
 
 The troops belonging to the Turkestan detachment received a 
 sheepskin jacket, fur collars covering the neck and ears, felt boots 
 goloshed with leather, woollen foot-bandages,* and ground blankets to 
 lie upon. 
 
 * The Russian soldicv, like the Prussian, wo.irs no sodis in a campaign, 
 bandages liis feet -with Uuen in the siuumer, and witli Ihuniel in llic -winter. 
 
 but
 
 97 
 
 On the night (13-14th March) that the Djizakh column crossed the 
 river Kli, 4 inches of snow fell and the thermometer stood at 12° F., 
 and was even lower than this during the next few days The men were 
 not allowed to go to sleep at night for fear of being frozen to death. 
 Several cases of frost-bite occurred, but only one native camel driver was 
 frozen to death. When the same column reached the desert in April 
 the thermometer registered 132° F., with a suffocating atmosphere. The 
 changes of the night and day temperature were very trying. In the day 
 the men marched in their gymnasium blouses. The early mornings, 
 however, were often so cold that the mounted men and staff wore their 
 cloaks. 
 
 The Turkestan detachment, which was the most exposed to climatic 
 changes, was pi'ovided with kibitkas (nomad tents) and tentes d'abi-i. 
 Many tents and a great deal of the officers' and men's personal baggage 
 had to be buried or burnt on the march owing to the dearth of transport. 
 
 F. C. H. C. 
 
 Horse Guards, War Office. 
 
 28fk February 1874.
 
 98 
 
 NOTES ON THE TURKMEN RACE. 
 
 (From Ihrahimof s Journals.) 
 
 The Turkmen,* a Mahommedan race of the Sunnite sect; their 
 language a mixture of Turkish and Uzbeg, with many Tatar words, 
 which are not used either by the Sarts ©r Kirgeze of Central Asia. The 
 type, Central Mongol, like the Kara Kirgese^ of high stature, brave, 
 warlike, and strongly addicted to plunder and jnllage. 
 
 They have a saying — 
 
 " Tuyalik yercla tut bulmas 
 Trukmjanlik yerda yurt buhna?." 
 
 (No tree grows where camels browse; no peace where there are Turkmen.) 
 
 Like the Kii'geze they live in felt kibitkas, but the latter are more 
 lofty and of better quality. In winter they live like the TJzbegs in 
 mud huts. They employ themselves in agricultural pursuits and in 
 cattle breedinsr. 
 
 The following is a list of the tribes and subdivisions of the Turkmen 
 which nomadise in the Khivan Khanate. 
 
 (1.) Yomuds, divided into five divisions : (a) Ukuz, 5,000 
 kibitkas; (b) Salak, 20,000 kibitkas; (c) Urchukchi ; 
 {d) Ushak ; (e) Kujuk. 
 
 (2.) Emral, 10,000 kibitkas in all, — divided into(«) Oaradashli ; 
 {b) Karakum ; (r) Berdi Khoja ; (r?) Karatail. 
 
 (3.) Chaudir 17,000 kibitkas. 
 
 (4.) GaradashH 5,000 
 
 (5.) GuJcIen 300 „ 
 
 (6.) Ala-ili 1,000 
 
 (7.) Arhachi 200 
 
 (8.) Afa 9,000 
 
 (9.) Mehhcli 300 
 
 (10.) Dui/achi, and \ oaa 
 
 (11.) Igdir .. / •• •• ^^U „ 
 
 (12.) C/iaudlr 400 
 
 All these tribes nomadise in different parts of the Khanate. Thus, 
 the Yomud on the Kasavat and Kyz-yd takir. At the latter place the 
 Guklen and the Ala-ili tribes. The Emral, Garadashli, Duyachi, Igdir, 
 Chandir and Mekheli near Elagla (Ilyala) ; the Chaudir on the Arna and 
 Porsu ; the Ata on the right bank of the Amu Darya, near Shurakhan ; 
 the Arbachi at Shabbaz-vali. 
 
 We next come to the Turkmen who nomadise in the southern part 
 of the steppe, in the direction of the Afghan and Persian frontiers. 
 
 These latter Turkmen are divided into two great tribes, Sarik 
 (foi-eign sheep), and Tel<e (mountain sheep). 
 
 * Vambery says the word is compounded of Turk, — Turk, and men a suffix ; 
 others state that the men is the personal pronoun T. — Trnnslafor.
 
 99 
 
 The Sarik live lietween Panda and Yulutak, and consider themselves 
 subjects of the Khan of Khiva, although they pay no taxes to him. 
 Their chief is Kariinberdy-Mahsum, son of Ishan-Caliph. 
 
 The Sarik tribe is divided into five great divisions, and each of these 
 again into subdivisions. 
 
 (1.) Suks/ii, 6,000 kib. Chief, Karimberdy-Mahsum, who is 
 
 chief also of all the five divisions. 
 (^.) Khiirascmli, 4,000 kib. Chief, Khalnazar Beg. 
 (3.) Bamtj, 4,000 kib. Chief, Khan Beg. 
 (4.) Erzeke, 10,000 kib. Chief, Yagmir Beg. 
 (5.) Alacha, 6,000 kib. Chief, Suin Khan. 
 
 The division Sukshi is divided into three subdivisions, Irdeua, 
 Dadiguli, and Chemsha. 
 
 The division Khurasanli into four : Mamatai, Kuenji, Kadir, and 
 Kurd. 
 
 The division Bairaj into four : Janybeg, Irki, Siddik, and Murtaza. 
 
 The division Erzeke into six : Kujali, Kyzyl, Beden, Kanglibash, 
 Kuldja, and SuinaU. 
 
 The division Alacha into six : Khoja Nazar, Beshedmess, Auchi, 
 Chalbazan, Almysh, and Apagi. 
 
 The Teke tribe is divided into two great divisions : Toktamysh and 
 Otatnysh. The former has six subdivisions . — 
 
 (1.) Amacha, 3,000 kib. Chief, Shekhli Sardar. 
 
 (2.) Kiikc/ii, 4,000 kib. Chief, Kanslu;t Khan, who is chief as 
 
 well of the whole Teke tribe. 
 (3.) Kunc/ir, 2,000 kib. Chief, Kaib Khan. 
 (4.) Khar, 1,000 kib. C^liief, Kaz^y Khan. 
 (5.) ^ora, 2,000 kib. Chief, Karabai. 
 (6.) Karacha, 1,000 kib. Chief, Uraz Murad Khan. 
 
 All these subdivisions nomadise on the east side of the river Murgab. 
 
 Otamysh has seven subdivisions : — 
 
 (1.) BaksTii, 5,000 kib. Chief, Ana Yar Khan. 
 (2.) Sultan Aziz, 2,000 kib. Chief, Ashur Sardar. 
 (3.) Biirkaa, 3,000 kib. Chief, Khodja-Nafas-Aksakal. 
 (4.) Shitchmas, 6,000 kib. Chief, Batyr Khan. 
 (.5.) EarakJiniat, 5,000 kib. Chief, Berdy JViyaz. 
 (6.) Farryanq, 2,000 kib. Chief, Tuchidshi Sardar. 
 (7.) Tubaz, 500 kib. Chief, Hakim Khan. 
 
 These subdivisions extend their nomadi.sings to the west of the river 
 Murgab. 
 
 Besides the Sarik.s and the Tekes, there are other Turkmen — Yer Sari 
 (i. e., brave blondes), who uomadi,se between Chardjui and Kh'p (Balkh), 
 an agricultural people ; part of tliis tribe owns subjection to Bokhara 
 and part to Kabal. The total number of the. J7?' Sari exceeds 60.000 
 kibitkas. The tribe has tv/o divisions. Kara and Bakaiil ; the chief of 
 the former is SultaD Murad Beg, and of the latter Mad-Tiu'dy-Ishan.
 
 [U299.— 150— 3 I 75.]
 
 THE 
 
 MILITARY ORGANIZATION 
 
 OF 
 
 SWEDEN AND NORWAY. 
 
 (SPECIAL REPORT.) 
 
 Captain W. S. COOKE, 22nd Regiment, 
 
 D.A.Q.M.G. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOE HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, 
 
 BY HARRISON AND SONS, 
 
 PRINTERS IN ORDINARY TO HEI! -MAJESTY. 
 1874. 
 
 •IS two
 
 THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF iSAVEDEN 
 AND NORWAY. 
 
 In continuation of my last Report I have the honor to 
 submit the"folloA\ang* details on the actual org-anization and 
 condition of the military forces of Sweden and Norway, The 
 armies of these two kingdoms differ entu-ely in then- constitu- 
 tion, and must therefore be examined separately ; the former 
 is still based on the old feudal system, while the organization 
 of the latter resembles very closely that of Denmark, detailed 
 in my last report. 
 
 SWEDEN. 
 
 The actual organization of the Swedish army is detailed in 
 full in the appended general report,* which, like that lately 
 handed m on the Danish army, is compiled with a \new 
 to its bemg utihzed, as requu-ed, as a work of reference. 
 I will not, therefore, go into its peculiar featm-es in this 
 special report, but propose m the first place to show where tlie 
 existmg system is deficient in order to provide an efficient 
 force of men adequate to the reqimements of the age, 
 and, at the same time, to examine the reform projects 
 brought forward durmg the last few years by the late 
 War Minister; in the second place to call attention to sucli 
 points, as they exist at present, as are most deserving 
 of notice. 
 
 Before going back to 1869, the year in which ]\raior-General 
 Abelin, the then War Minister, presented to the Diet liis 
 first great reform project for the re-organization of the 
 army, I must observe, that the year just passed, 1873, has not 
 only occasioned no material change in the old organization, 
 but that not even was there any inclination shown or sign made, 
 in the Parhament, of the desire for a change, as has been almost 
 invarjably the case year after year since 18(55. Move than a 
 " sign " or " attempt," indeed, it has never yet attained to, in 
 
 * Tlie two gcnci-al reports here referred to are being now published under the 
 titles oP " Aruietl Strengtli of Denmark," and "Ai-nied Strength of Sweden and 
 Norway." 
 
 B 2
 
 spite of the absolute necessity for an amelioration in the existing 
 military institutions, which has long since been universally 
 recognised. The mainstay, or fulcrum, so to speak, in the 
 organization Kes, as is probably well known, in the so-called 
 " indelta " or distributed portion of the army, the constitution 
 of which will be found in detail in the general report ; this 
 " indelta,'' however, though probably at its formation near 
 300 years ago suited, and adequate, to the requirements, is 
 most assuredly very far from answering to the necessities of 
 modern times ; three or four weeks' annual drill certainly do 
 not suifice in these days for the training of either officers or 
 men, who during the rest of the year are entirely severed from 
 military duty by theh civil occupations. So much for the 
 military side of the question. In an economical point of view, 
 in spite of the protestations of General Abehn, it scarcely 
 seems much more tenable. It is true that the maintenance 
 of the " indelta " does not probably cost the State, out of 
 revenue, more than about 220,000/'., which must be admitted to 
 be a comparatively speaking small sum when it is remembered 
 that it furnishes Sweden with from 20,000 to 25,000 men, 
 always ready for service, even though insufficiently trained; 
 the peasant class, however, on whom the burden of providing 
 and maintaining these men rests, are subjected to an impost of 
 about double this amount, so that, in point of fact, instead of 
 the soldier being one of the cheapest, he really becomes one 
 of the most costly, without at the same time possessing the 
 efficiency of the solcher of a standing army. It is invariably 
 asserted in defence of this system, and these points will be 
 more clearly seen presently when I come to the evaluation of 
 General Abelin's reform project, in which all the arguments 
 pro and con are very lucidly brought forward, that the 
 peasant is vii'tvially by no means oppressed by this obhgation, 
 because he either iidierited or purchased his land with 
 a knowledge of the imposed tax or obhgation ; that he therefore 
 has either been always habituated to it, or otherAvise has 
 acquired the possession at a lower cost by reason of the con- 
 tingent obligation. The fact of the burden caused by this 
 obligation, however, remains none the less for all this ; and 
 moreover it must be said to remain without any commensurate 
 result. Another argument brought forward in defence is that 
 in the " mdelta " soldier the peasant possesses a labourer 
 always at his service ; but this certainly is an ambiguous 
 advantage, for if the soldier declines to work, his landlord 
 cannot compel him, and, moreover, during the period of such 
 employment must give him additional pay. Thus it would 
 appear, that, in its existing condition, the institution of the 
 " indelta '' is unsatisfactory from every point of view, aild this 
 has, I think, been very generally acknowledged ; what, how- 
 ever, to substitute for it, or how to remodel it to suit all classes is 
 a question on which the Government and the representatives 
 of the people cannot agree. The Second Chamber in the Diet
 
 Is iu great part composed of the peasant class ; it at all events 
 forms a strong majority. This class is in favom- of, and proposes 
 a complete aboHtion of the " indelta," but without admitting 
 the justice of the Government plea that the obhgations 
 and burdens hitherto borne by the peasants, subject to its 
 operation, should be diverted to the mamtenance of a military 
 force through other channels. The Government on the other 
 hand, has at one moment proposed to form the permanent 
 cadres on a different basis to the present, at another to 
 aboHsh the " indelta ^' system in consideration of the payment 
 to the State of an annual sum ; a vacillation which has been 
 undoubtedly unfavourable to a solution. At last, however, 
 
 1873 seemed hkely to prove the herald of the long looked 
 for settlement. For Government informed the Diet of its 
 intention to lay before Parhament in 1874 a completely new 
 plan for the organization of the arm}^ the details of which were 
 then bemg elaborated. In reply, the Diet stated that it was 
 prepared to concede the follo^\ang condition in consideration of 
 the abohtion — ^dz., the " Rust " and " Rote-hallare," (those of 
 the peasant class, namely, who furnish men) to pay to the 
 State annually 3 per cent, on the capitahzed value of the 
 impost, the State m return to undertake the obHgation 
 of providmg in toto for the army. The Kuig, before dis- 
 missing the Diet, expressed the hope that the army question 
 would now soon be solved iu a suitable and generally 
 satisfactory manner. 
 
 Appearances mdeed promised tliis, and the opening of the 
 
 1874 session in February was anxiously looked forward to as 
 the begummg of the end to the prolonged differences. But 
 disquieting rumours have since arisen which seem likely to 
 upset completely those hopes ; the present War Minister, 
 namely, Major-General Weidenhielm, purposes brmging for- 
 Avard a plan for subjecting all persons rendered Hable to service 
 hj law to a long training, A\dtli a view to fitting them to form 
 the nucleus of the army about shortly to be newly formed. 
 
 Former experience, together with the repeated assertions 
 made session after session by the representatives of the 
 peasant class, who are mainly mterested in the settlement of 
 the point in dispute, have clearly shown that this demand ^all 
 never be conceded, for they maintam that, even with only a 
 short period of mstruction, the Swede becomes an efficient 
 soldier; but first and foremost they do not want a so-called 
 standuig army, but rather an arming of the nation. As has so 
 often been the case, therefore, it will be next to impossible to 
 arrive at a compromise between these two determmations, they 
 may almost be called ultimata, so diametrically opposed the 
 one to the other, and it is more than probable that all will 
 remain as of old m the Swedish army organization. But it is 
 greatly to be regretted that so really efficient a body of officers, 
 and so splendid a materiel in men, which, with a suitable and 
 satisfactory organization, would without doubt constitute a
 
 6 
 
 magnificent army , should not be ultilized so as to extract the 
 "VN^orth. 
 
 The national characteristics of the Swede, are, namely, 
 emmently favorable to the creation of the soldier. The 
 physique of the men is magnificent : tall, broad-shouldered, 
 powerful, hardy and active, no materiel in the world sur- 
 passes that of Sweden. Though imdoubtedly he has his bad 
 points, among which may perhaps be mentioned his love of 
 strong drink, a faihng common to all northern nations, his 
 jealousy of innovation, his sovereign contempt for every- 
 thing foreign, the good qualities of the Swede shme out 
 strongly m the foreground ; ^vith a rough exterior, he is 
 industrious, honest, detemiined, brave, economical, handy, 
 embued with deep love of country and an excellent mihtary 
 spirit ; though perhaps hard of comprehension, he possesses a , 
 sound practical judgment, and so thorough is the educational 
 system, that you will scarcely find one man in a thousand who 
 cannot read, and, as a rule, write. The " indelta " soldier, (I 
 am speaking rather of this special class than of the enhsted or 
 professional soldier) though during the greater part of the year 
 engaged in his agricultural pursuits, therefore, brings A^^[th him 
 into the field a number of most useful ideas, more particularly 
 in the matter of his daily wants, great physical strength, a 
 certain " savon* faire " invaluable under all circumstances, and 
 many other most useful quahties ; he unites the fidelity and 
 disciplme of the regular soldier with the thrifty inclinations 
 and habits of the industiious and well-trained citizen. A man 
 of this material is capable of being welded mto anytliing. 
 
 Putting on one side the enlisted troops, the number of 
 which is very small, the great evils of the organization as 
 it exists at present and seems likely to remam, may I thuik be 
 summed up as follows : — 
 
 The fulcrum rests in the ^' indelta,^^ which is cpiite in- 
 adequately trained to meet the requirements of the age ; the 
 burden of maintainuig it falls almost enthely on the peasant 
 class, and consequently presses very heavily on this portion of 
 the population; moreover, as the habiUty of niamtaining 
 the soldiers does not rest on every class of peasant alike, but on 
 a .certain number, determined in accordance with ancient 
 custom, the burden is felt the more heavily, the more unevenly 
 it is distributed. Again, the population of the country having 
 very considerably increased since the original introduction of 
 the " Indelningsverk," though the number of " Rote-hallare " 
 or class of peasants furnishing men has in some measure 
 bc^en reformed, it has not been so augmented as to keep 
 pace with the strength in numbers of the " bevaring " or 
 militia, which has doubled itself. Consequently the " indelta " 
 sokhers are not proportioned to the extent of the population, 
 and the cadres no longer suffice to take up the whole of 
 the " bevaring,^' as intended, in case of war. In another point 
 of view, the number of the latter is excessive, for while great 
 
 I
 
 7 
 
 sacrifices with no apparent commensurate gain are made by 
 the State to ensure their training, it must be admitted that a 
 force which m two years can devote only 30 days to drill must 
 be but very unperfectly and superficially instructed, and, as 
 soldiers cannot be improvised, it follows that 80,000 or 90,000 
 such men are not worth 20,000 trained soldiers. 
 
 The solution of the question m dispute involves the total 
 abohtion, or the re-construction on an improved basis of the 
 " mdelta " system. The Grovernment party has decided 
 unanmiously against the abolition ; the peasant class, througli 
 then- representatives in the Second Chamber, have declared for it. 
 A glance at how this abolition could be afiected may be 
 of interest. There are two modes possible : — 1st. Pure and 
 simi^le abolition ; 2nd. Re-purchase, as it may be termed, of 
 serfdom by a grant in favour of the State. The first mode 
 would be not only impracticable, but unjust ; impracticable, 
 because the State in abandoning its ancient rights would 
 suffer material financial loss ; unjust, because it would free the 
 " Rote " and " Rust-hallare " from the legal obligation under 
 which they pm'chased or inherited their lands, at an unjustifi- 
 able cost to theh fellow-citizens. The second mode, m order to 
 occasion no financial loss to the State, entails the raismg of a 
 grant of nearly 4000,000/., which, distributed among the present 
 number of "Rote" and "Rust-hallare,'^ would amount to about 
 140/. a-head. It is a question whether such a levy would find 
 more favour' -with the owners of the soil than the existmg 
 system of service, or indeed whether it would be possible to 
 enforce the levying of the tax. 
 
 I am not aware that ]\Iajor-General Abehn's reform 
 project has ever been fully reported on, or that, at all events, 
 the details of his scheme have been elucidated. It ^\t.11. I think, 
 be of interest to understand it, and I therefore propose to 
 examine it thoroughly. No person recognised more thoroughly 
 than he the valuable qualities innate in the " indelta " army, or 
 how inadequate it was in its existing state to modern 
 requirements. To any person who has ^dtnessed the splendid 
 material available, it wiU ever be of interest to study the 
 question of how it is to be developed. 
 
 The problem is, given the finest material in the world, both 
 as regards morale and physique, how is it to be utilized so as to 
 extract a maximum A^alue compatible with comparatively small 
 cost and a miuimiun loss of labour ^ 
 
 Major-General Abelin brought forward two projects, the 
 first in 181)9, the second in 1871 ; the latter was similar in most 
 respects to the former in prmciple, differing chiefly only in the 
 duration of the periods of training. 
 
 He connnences vaih laymg down the strength the Reform 
 
 army should possess m order to repel invasion, and to arrive at p'^°^*''\*^, ^[. 
 
 this, estmiates the maximum number of men an enemy could in tvauipj j^ ' 
 
 all probability operate vriih. 0^\angto the isolated position of 1868; prc- 
 
 Sweden, her sea-frontier, her immcjisc extent in proportion to ^('"^cf^ *« ih-^ 
 
 ' ^ ^ Diet in I'- •;
 
 8 
 
 her population and cultivation, conditions -wliicli must always 
 sensibly restrict the magnitude of a military expedition directed 
 against her by reason of the extreme difl&culties attending the 
 transport and feeding of an invading army, he estimates the 
 maximum of the latter at 100,000 men, and considers, therefore, 
 that Sweden must be in a position to oppose these with a force 
 at all events of equal strength. The main field army must 
 consequently be 100,000 strong, while to disturb the enemy's 
 communications, to w^ard off collateral attacks, (w^hich would 
 probably be directed with a view to occupyuig certain pomts of 
 vantage and to induce a dissemmation of the defending army,) 
 &c., he takes another 20,000 men as necessary, making a total 
 of 120,000 men, m first line, i.e., uTespective of organised and 
 trained rehefs and depots to fill up vacancies. By the terms of 
 the compromise with Norway, the latter is bound to furnish a 
 contmgent of 20,000 men for the defence of the common 
 country; Sweden, therefore, would have to provide 100,000. 
 This force, which should suffice for all the requh-ements of the 
 field army, he terms the " full w'ar establishment.'' 
 
 It might not, however, be in every case needful to mobiHze 
 so large a force ; e,g., Sw^eden might be di'awn indirectly into 
 a war w^aged between other European powers, or internal 
 political troubles might necessitate a partial mobihzation ; 
 therefore, provided the macliinery is such as to admit of a rapid 
 expansion, he considers that there should be a second war- 
 estabhshment, which he calls the " smaller war estabhshment." 
 It is not easy to fix definitely the hmits of this estabhshment, 
 dependmg as it must on the cu-cumstances which have called 
 for the mobihzation, but as it is essential to have some normal 
 standard, he estimates it at about two-thirds of the " full war 
 estabhshment," or about 68,000 men. The " peace establish- 
 ment," i.e., the effective maintained and drilled en permanence, 
 the cadres required to carry out the mihtary training in peace, 
 and to form the nucleus of the war establishment in case of 
 war, he calculates at about 40,000 of all ranks, of winch about 
 Thus, the organization he proposes is : — 
 
 36,000 "I Exclusive of Officers, N. C. O., military 
 68,000 > and ciril officials and employes, and 
 100,000 J personnel of the train ; 
 
 36,000 rank and file. 
 
 (a.) Peace Establishment. . 
 
 (S) Smaller AVar Establishment. . 
 
 {c.) Full War Establishment . . 
 
 wliile the effective of the " troupes de r em-placement^^ i.e., 
 reliefs and depots, cannot be estimated at under one half of 
 the field army — viz., 50,000 men. Moreover, to garrison the 
 fortresses, &c., there must be a further force organised to 
 defend its hearths and homes in every part of the country ; part 
 of this third force should have a stronger organization than the 
 remainder, both m order to furnish a reserve to the field army 
 should this meet with a disaster and its owoi reserve prove 
 insufficient for its w^ants, to garrison the fortified places, and to 
 constitute the nucleus of the local defence ; it should, there- 
 fore, be formed in two categories — viz. : («) The War Keserve ; 
 {b) The Landsturm ; the former cannot be estimated at under
 
 40,000 strong- ; the latter should number from 100,000 to 
 120,000 men. 
 
 This is the basis on which the project is constructed, viz : — 
 
 Men. 
 
 Field-army 100,000, 
 
 Reliefs and dep6ts 50,000, 
 
 War Reserve 40,000, 
 
 Landsturm 120,000. 
 
 Total 310,000. 
 
 The next question is how is this force to be com- Composition 
 posed ? All enhsted army is out of the question ; there re- oi the Army. 
 mains only the system of obligatory military service, which 
 must be so applied as to fall equally on all persons made 
 Hable by law, while furnislmig a maximum number of drilled 
 men. The conscription, as understood in Germany, Austria, 
 and France must be discarded as opposed to the spirit of the 
 nation ; moreover the excellent moral force of the people 
 requires only to be developed. The principle of obligatory 
 military service Avill, he holds, be best faltilled by abohshing 
 the system of providing substitutes and of exemptions, and by 
 develojjing the actual organization of the " beviiring " or 
 mihtia into a larger number of classes of age and completmg it 
 up to the figure requu-ed for the local defence. 
 
 Ser\ace to be compulsory on all persons, with some 
 exceptions to be determmed on, capable of bearing arms, from 
 the age of 20 to 40 completed, the first 10 in the Land wehi-, the 
 last 10 in the Landsturm. The 10 classes of age thus formmg 
 the Landwehr, to be divided into, — the 3 junior classes to form 
 the recruits and rehefs ; the next 4, the 1st and 2nd reserve of 
 the active army ; the last 3, the war reserve. The man vdW 
 then pass into the Landsturm Avhich "u-ill be organised in 
 tactical units by governments (departments), and provided 
 Avith the necessary cadres. Finally, in the event of war, every 
 Swede not otherwise engaged in the defence of liis country 
 will necessarily belong to the Landsturm. The army Avill thus 
 be composed of : — 
 
 («.) The line, i. e., the active army, Avith its recruits and 
 
 rehefs : 
 (6.) The Avar reseiwe ; 
 (c.) The Landsturm. 
 
 The actiA^e army, comprising the men continuously drilled, 
 equipped and ready for the field, aa^U be formed by the 
 permanent troops, i.e., the peace estabhshment, and by a 
 certam number of " bcA^aring " classes of age — A'iz., those 
 most recently and thoroughly trained, — according as tlie 
 army is placed on the " full " or the " smaller Avar establish- 
 ment." The component elements will be these : — Deductmg 
 men for depots, reported unfit, &c., we cannot estimate the
 
 10 
 
 '' peace establishment " at over 32,000 men fit to take the 
 field; each class of the " bevaring " has of late years reached 
 an average of 21,000 ; as it will, however, be necessary to be 
 more strict in passing these men in future, in order that 
 valuable time, trouble and expense may not be lost in training 
 incapable men, it will b.e nearer the mark if the 1st class of 
 bevaring is taken at 19,000; classes 2 and 3, at 18,500 each; 
 classes 4 and 5, at 18,000 ; classes 6 and 7, at 16,000; classes 
 8, 9 and 10, 14,000; classes 11 to 20, 10,000. 
 
 Thus, the peace estabhshment being 32,000, we should get 
 the " smaller war establishment " in classes 4 and 5 (those, 
 namely, destined to form the Ist reserve), furnisliing 36,000 
 men, which, added to the 32,000 of the peace estabhshment, 
 give the requhed effective, — viz., 68,000. And by adding to 
 this, classes 6 and 7 (those, namely, destined to form the 2nd 
 reserve), furnishing 32,000 men, we should get the "full war 
 estabhshment," — viz., 100,000. When the army is on the 
 " smaller Vv^ar establishment," classes 6 and 7, and when 
 on the " full war estabhshment,'^ classes 2 and 3, ^vill form the 
 " troupes de r emplacement,^^ i.e., reliefs, while the 1st class of age, 
 being the men of the least physique and training, would only 
 be taken in case of emergency. 
 
 The War Reserve, formed by classes 8, 9 and 10, 42,000 
 men, would be employed either as a reinforcement to the field 
 army, as garrison troops, or as a nucleus for the Landsturm. 
 
 The Landsturm, comprising all the men between 20 and 40 
 years of age, not other^vise engaged in the defence of the 
 country, would, in conjunction with the War Reserve, con- 
 stitute the local defence. 
 
 The population of Sweden is something over 4,000,000 : the 
 " peace estabhshment," therefore, is about '9 per cent. ; the 
 " smaller war establishment," 1'65 per cent. ; the " full war 
 establishment," 2'5 per cent. ; rehefs and recruits, 1*0 per cent., 
 or incluchng the 1st class ot age, 1'5 per cent. ; War Reserve, 
 1*0 per cent. ; Landsturm, 3*1 per cent. 
 
 Now comes the miportant question of givmg the army the 
 necessary sohdity and discipline. General Abehn proposes a 
 cadre of framed soldiers, who, by reason of then- longer contin- 
 uous and stable service, should be able to communicate to the 
 annual classes of age, constantly coming and going, that dis- 
 ciphne and solidarity, which they otherwise could not acquire 
 without a much more complete training than it is possible to 
 give them. There are two modes of forming these cadre troops, 
 — viz., conscription and enhstment : the first must, as aheady 
 pomted out, be at once discarded; the enhsted soldier brmgs 
 Avith him that aptitude and love for Ins trade, which can never 
 exist in the soldier compulsorily enrolled. With us, the War 
 Minister says, it is moreover of especial importance m a social 
 point of view to unite, as far as possible, the duties of the soldier 
 with those of the private citizen ; to combine, in the enlisted man, 
 the soldier and the active and industrious civilian ; to preserve to
 
 11 
 
 society the great part of his best characteristics ; to ensure to 
 
 those who devote themselves to the mihtary profession 
 
 the benefit of the active hfe of the citizen. A force of 
 
 this nature we aheady possess in the " indelta " anny ; Yaluc of the 
 
 it combines to a high degree the above ennumerated qualities, "Indelta" 
 
 which we consider as desiderata. The numerous qualities j^^°t'fry''a ™1 * 
 
 which make the " indelta " soldier so greatly superior to the social point of 
 
 soldier obtained by consciiptiou, which malre of him a truly view. 
 
 national soldier in the fullest sense of the term, uniting to the 
 
 fidehty of the professional warrior the tasies and aptitude 
 
 of the civihan, active and dihgent in his peace-occupations, and 
 
 who therefore justly enjoys the esteem and confidence of the 
 
 whole nation, need not to be recapitulated here. The various 
 
 occupations to which he is given in peace, the laborious 
 
 and arduous toil to which he is required to devote himself, are 
 
 peculiarly fitted to give hira that multiplicity of so to speak 
 
 " small talents," that dexterity, that inventive genius, that 
 
 faculty of taking care of himself under the most varied 
 
 cu-cmiista"nces, that aptitude for providing for his manifold 
 
 wants, that patience m privation, m short, all those innumerable 
 
 and inappreciable quahties, which are ever valuable and 
 
 essential in every phase of war. It is this distinctive merit of 
 
 the " indelta " system, an institution in every respect 
 
 consistent with the pacific and social development of the 
 
 country, clothmg the soldier with the double character 
 
 of citizen and warrior, which continues to retain for him 
 
 the unbounden confidence of the people. Among the points 
 
 which perhaps contribute more particularly to this feeling may be 
 
 mentioned, his permanent home, his almost unrestricted liberty 
 
 between his periods of training, the habit acqiiired of providmg 
 
 for his livuig (these short periods of course excepted), the 
 
 position he occupies in relation to his superiors and the other 
 
 classes of his fellow-citizens, the length of his service, 
 
 the fact of his being domiciled in the midst of the people whose 
 
 defence he becomes m the hour of danger, and many others. 
 
 These numerous conditions are in my opinion, says General 
 
 Abehn, of such extreme value as to demand careful fostering 
 
 m dealing with any modifications in the " indelta " system. 
 
 Doubtless the system has its bad points, but these are happily 
 
 of such a nature as to be capable of ready ehminatiou by 
 
 means of the few altera^tions Avhich will presently be stated. 
 
 The advantages mihtate most strongly in favour of the 
 
 maintenance of an institution crowned with the most glorious 
 
 reminiscences of Swedish history, and to which the " beviiring " 
 
 classes will ever attach themselves with a confidence nurtm'ed 
 
 m their hcmas from mfancy. 
 
 Having thus stated his views with reference to the mihtary Yalue of the 
 side of the question, he passes to the economical aspect, and ''I"'^<^lt«'" 
 sub-divides the expense of the "mdelta" under three lieads— ,^^^°™p^1 ^"^^ 
 training, equipment, maintenance. The two first, he says, of view.
 
 12 
 
 need ii<>t be dwelt upon, for they are inseparable from a cadi-e 
 force, however constituted. 
 
 The cost of maintenance rests, in various forms, on the class 
 of citizens reqiiired to furnish men. Deducting grants made by 
 the State towards the mamtenance of the cavalry regiments, 
 armament, &c., he states the total cost of the " indelta,^^ in 
 accordance with the calculations of a committee appointed to 
 examine the question in 1867, as 180,966Z., which, divided among 
 the total effective, 26,881, gives about 61. 15s. a head. A study 
 of the elements on which the calculation is based shows that 
 the pi-incipal part of this sum is, in general, represented by 
 the evaluation in money of the returns of the " torp " or farm 
 assigned to the soldier. But to obtain a correct impression of 
 the real sacrifice imposed on the furnisher of the soldier 
 by the cession ot the farm, it must be remembered that 
 the latter has been brought under cultivation by the soldier 
 himself, that originally it was generally speaking marked out on 
 the extreme limit of the " hemmam," i.e., property required 
 to furnish the soldier, and more often than not on the uncul- 
 tivated, or at all events most sterile, land in the "hemmam" — 
 land, in point of fact, which in its existing state was worth 
 nothing; this fact most materially tends to diminish the sum 
 represented as the returns of the soldiers' farm. It becomes 
 indeed a question, whether the cession of land to an industrious 
 and active labourer, accustomed to order and a regular mode of 
 hfe, attached permanently to the land which he has reclaimed by 
 the sweat of his brow, is not rather an advantage on the side of 
 the landlord, while being, in an economical aspect, an undoubted 
 gain to the nation at large. Nor must it be forgotten 
 that the vast extent of the land under cultivation, sprinkled 
 here and there with soldiers' " torps," i.e., farms, has by no 
 manner of means been arrived at through a sacrifice imposed 
 on the " hemmam " ; it is indeed rather a proof of the 
 industry, activity and energy of the soldier on the one hand, 
 of the self-interest of the owner of the soil on the other. 
 With the figures above-mentioned before us, it is, he con- 
 tinues, quite evident that the maintenance of a force of this 
 strength in permanent garrison would be infinitely more 
 onerous, both in point of cost and of loss of labour, than 
 as at present. Irrespective of the expense connected with the 
 construction of barracks, the purchase and keep of horses, the 
 increase of pay to officers, &c., &c., the same number of men 
 would cost about 514,462/., and the annual loss m labour would 
 amount to 8,897,611 days. I think, then, he concludes 
 this part of his argumentation, that the reason of economy may 
 be added to those already pointed out m favour of preserving 
 the " mdelta " system. 
 
 It is constantly argued, he continues, that the " indelta " 
 should be abolished, because the cost of its maintenance rests 
 unjustly on the land. It is thought that the projected extension
 
 13 
 
 of obligatory military service should at the same time fi'ee that institution of_ 
 class of peasants, now reqnii'ecl to furnish and maintain *^^ "Indelta. 
 men, fi'om such a portion of the charge as woiild be equivalent 
 to the new obligations which would be imposed on it in 
 common vntli the other classes of society. A glance, however, 
 at the liistorical side of the question shows that, far from 
 the one excluding the other, the two systems of personal 
 mihtary service and of military service attached to the soil 
 have marched more or less side by side since the most remote 
 periods of Swedish liistory, and that the duty of rendeiing 
 personal service in defence of the country is neither a ne\v 
 obHgation nor one foreign to our customs. The idea of 
 attaching to the proprietorship of the soil the duty of creating 
 and maintaining the permanent army, (originated and put in 
 practice under the reign of Charles XI. in virtue of a convention 
 voluntarily entered into between him and the people), Avas no 
 innovation but the natural result of what had long been the 
 habits of the nation; tliis sovereign merely developed and 
 organised more completely a fact which was already m full 
 process of development, and, fi-om the first, the modifications 
 introduced by him sprang from the du-ect wishes of the 
 people. To go mto the whole history of the growth of the 
 system would occupy too much time ; it must suffice to state 
 that after the disastrous wars of Cliarles XII. the organization 
 instead of succumbing was still further consolidated by 
 successive Diets. Thus, far from the " indelta ^' system 
 being the fr-eak of, or the result of laAvs dictated by, an 
 absolute monarch, it was a patriotic institution based on ancient 
 usage, springing from the spirit of the people, and enjojdng 
 their love and confidence. Such an institution, groAAang Avith 
 the development of society, voluntarily accepted by the 
 proprietors of the soil, and established at then- instance by 
 the supreme authority of the country, cannot, therefore, be 
 said to be a burden resting unjustly on the land. ]\IoreoA^er, 
 history agam shoAvs, that, side by side Avith the institution 
 of a permanent army, the ancient duty of rendering personal 
 military serAace continued ; that at A^arious epochs of time, 
 a certain Landsturm organization existed, and was frequently 
 called into operation. Both before and after the creation of 
 the " indelta,'* obligatory military serAace invariably accom- 
 panied the ordinary IcAaes, whether made in relation to popula- 
 tion or to soil. The class of peasants furnishing foot and horse 
 soldiers are, therefore, incoiTect in fancying that the contracts, 
 in virtue of which they are required to supply soldiers to 
 the " indelta " in retm-n for their land, should free them from 
 rendering personal military ser\nce. The two points are per- 
 fectly different. 
 
 The contracts signed by their predecessors certainly 
 liberated them from liability to the ordinary IcAdes, in use 
 preAaous to the introduction of the '• indelta " system, and
 
 14 
 
 replaced these levies by the obligation to furnish to the 
 permanent army, in return for then' land, a man, with his 
 maintenance, equipment, &c. ; but they in no respect concerned 
 the rendering of personal military service on supreme occasions, 
 where every one must join in the defence of the country. The 
 project of development about to be examined, therefore, 
 is based on the very same historical foundation as of old, 
 — Yiz., obligatory military service for every class of citizens. 
 Thus, so far as history is concerned, it is evident that the 
 obligation imposed on the land of furnishing men for the 
 permanent army never implied liberation from rendering 
 personal military service. So far as concerns the justice 
 or injustice of the bm'den imposed on the land, it must 
 be remembered that in the transactions of sale and purchase, 
 the property is bought at a diminished capital value corres- 
 ponding to the obligation imposed on it, and that consequently 
 the buyer is in reality no loser ; the land is charged with a burden 
 of which the buyer frees himself on selling, w^hereas it is in his 
 relation as a citizen that he is liable to obligatory military 
 service, and this obligation he can neither buy nor sell. 
 
 It is therefore erroneous to suppose that the extension of 
 obligatory military service in the militia ought to cany with it 
 an alleviation in the burden imposed on the " Rote-hallare " 
 (the class fui'nishmg foot soldiers), still more eiToneous is it to 
 make the same claim for the *' Rust-hallare " (the class 
 furnishing mounted men), who enjoy special privileges. 
 
 After now examinmg the only possible modes by which the 
 
 Modifications " indelta " could be abolished, and which I have already 
 
 desirable in ^^ pointed out (page 7), and remarking that, with his fii-m 
 
 the 'Indeta (jonviction that (so far as those factors of it are concerned 
 
 which are its main characteristics and the value of which are 
 
 essential to an army of national defence) it should be retained 
 
 intact, he naturally has no form of abolition of his own to 
 
 recommend, he proceeds to point out the modifications 
 
 he considers necessary. 
 
 The most urgent of these he considers to be a revision of 
 the relations between the furnishers of the soldiers and 
 the soldiers themselves, having the object of alleviatmg the 
 biu'den imposed on the fu'st, of placing both on a better 
 footing of respective dependence, and finally of altering 
 the mode of recruiting. 
 
 The contract entered into between the furnisher and the 
 soldier still contains, as wdll be seen on reference to the 
 general report, these conditions : — 
 
 (a.) Dwelhng-house and outbuildmgs on the property ; 
 (b.) A certain proportion of land, or an equivalent m kind, 
 (2 tons of corn, 2 loads of hay, and sufiicient straw) ; 
 (c.) Bounty and pay ; 
 
 {d.) Obligation to work in preference, for the furnisher, 
 in return for additional pay.
 
 15 
 
 These conditions vaiied very muclt iu value with the 
 different parts of the country. General Abelin considers that 
 it would be to the interest of the State as well as of the 
 individuals to put an eiid to these uncertain charges and 
 to replace them by a nonnal and uniform standard. The fii-st 
 step to take is to transfer to the State the duty of recruiting 
 now imposed on the furnishers, a step he considers advisable 
 both from an economical and mihtary point of view : the 
 maximum age of the recruit to be 25 years ; the additional 
 cost to the State of charging itself with the recruiting 
 and payment of bomity he estimates at 3,200/., a sum which 
 should be well compensated for by the results obtained. 
 The second step is to fix a normal contract for the whole 
 country, which should contain two piincipal clauses : — 
 
 (a.) Dwelling-house (as before) ; 
 
 (b.) Salaiy in kuid, to replace all existing allowances, 
 
 consistmg of a certain grant of corn — half rye, 
 
 half barley. 
 
 The contract should also contain a clause allowing of the 
 salary in cereals being commuted (w^holly or in part) for 
 a certain amount of land to be determined by the contracting 
 parties. 
 
 An annual sum of about lis., to be deducted fi-om tlie pay 
 (more properly speaking from the money value of the salary 
 in kind), to be placed in the pro\'iucial savings bank, and to be 
 given on discharge. 
 
 Annual pay, or money value of the salary in kind, to be 
 51. lis. ; this is calculated on the average value of the actual 
 allowances throughout the country, on the one hand, and on 
 the new charges the prolongation of service and the extension 
 of the militia training will tlu^ow upon the fm-nishers, on 
 the other; the fh'st item is estimated at 61. 15s.; the latter 
 divides itself into indu'ect and direct charges ; the fu'st 
 arising from the loss of labour dming the periods of training is 
 estimated at about 12s. Ad. -per soldier; the second, arising from 
 the expenses imposed on the fiu'nisher, in common with 
 all other classes, towards the Government expense resultmg 
 from the extensi(m of the mihtia training, is estimated "at 
 2s. Qd. per soldier. The sum of these two items should there- 
 fore be deducted from the actual pay so as not to augment the 
 obligation imposed on the furnisher. This would leave a 
 larger sum than the above, but in order to alleviate as much 
 as possible the mipost placed on the furnishers, he proposes to 
 fix it at 5/. lis. This sum of 5/. lis. to be distributed as 
 follows : — To be paid in money, for keej)mg house, &c., in 
 repair, 12s. 4r/. ; to be paid in kind, 4/. 18s. Sd. — viz., 45 cubic 
 feet of grain, valued at about 2.v. 2^d. per cubi 3 foot. 
 
 This pay is certainly not large, but considering that
 
 16 
 
 the soldier receives a free residence, commensurate witii 
 his wants, can employ the long interval between his annual 
 trainings in work, and receives a certain pension from the 
 State on his discharge, moreover, should have saved a 
 considerable sum by the termination of his service, he may, 
 General Abelin thinks, await the future with sufficient 
 confidence. 
 
 As far as the furnishers of the men are concerned, it 
 brings them certainly a sensible alleviation. 
 
 The proposed modifications are, therefore, shortly these : — 
 
 (a.) Abolition of all uncertain charges, which have crept in 
 since the mtroduction of the system ; 
 
 {b.) Transfer to the State of the duty - of recruiting 
 and payment of bounties ; 
 
 (c.) Estabhshment of a normal uniform contract, securing 
 to the soldier, — 
 
 1. Dwelling-house ; 
 
 2. Salary, consisting of 45 cubic feet of grain, — half 
 
 rye, half barley. 
 
 Desirable aug- The modifications proposed in the eftective and com- 
 t^''"r^'*(i°" °^ position of the army demand, 1st an augmentation m the 
 Troops. cadre troops ; 2nd, measures for providing the necessary 
 
 number of horses ; 3rd, a more convenient arrangement 
 and centralization in the regimental districts ; 4th, the 
 definite transformation into infantry of the old regiments 
 of dismounted cavalry, 
 1. "ludelta." The General therefore proposes to do away with the 
 former blank numbers in the " indelta '^ and to fill up 
 with combatants those at present assigned to bandsmen, 
 artificers, &c. ; to transform the old " indelta " sailor companies 
 (now of no use to the navy) into infantry; and to establish 
 " ordinary rote," on that part of the land hitherto exempt 
 luider the system of '• extra-rotering," (for details see General 
 Report). These measures will, he calculates, give him 
 4,112 additional men. The " smaller war establishment " 
 necessitates, according to calculation, the employment of 
 10,000 draught horses, while the actual number of horses 
 provided by the present " extra-rote " is only 2,261 ; it 
 is- proposed, therefore, that all landed and real estates 
 both urban and rural should be required, on the outbreak of 
 war, to furnish one horse for every 11,000^., rateable, the State 
 to pay a fixed sum for each animal produced. A system of this 
 kind would enable the " extra-rote '' to be utilized in another 
 manner ; e.g., instead of furnishing horses, they might be re- 
 quired to provide a sum in cash, equivalent to the former 
 obligation. 
 
 The proposed augmentation to the " indelta," and the 
 necessity for concentrating each regiment in a well defined 
 district in order to effect a closer connection between the cadre 
 and militia forces, (\all for considerable alteration in the
 
 17 
 
 actual distribution. For example, some of the infantry 
 regiments, formed out of the old dismounted cavalry regiments, 
 are scattered by companies and even individuals through several 
 governments, in the midst of the ordinary infantry of these 
 governments. This is incompatible vnth good admmistration 
 and the unity it is deshable to bring about in the relations 
 between the cadre and mihtia forces. It is, therefore, 
 proposed to assunilate these old dismoimted cavalry regunents 
 with the ordinary infantry regiments, taxhig the " rote- 
 hiillare " with a smn equivalent to the amount they would 
 have to furnish if the regunents were re - estabhshed 
 as cavalry. The charge per " rote " would be about 12/., 
 but supposing it to be fixed at 11/., this would make for 
 the 3,000 " rote " about 33,000/., wliich is about 12,000/. less 
 than the amount to Avliich the landlords would be hable should 
 these regiments be re-mounted, and is about 9,000/. in excess 
 of the sum they now pay in return for being provisionally 
 exempt from maintamiug horses. Fui'ther, the " indelta " 
 must be more evenly distributed. Two provinces, Halland and 
 West Norrland, now furnish no men to tliis force. With 
 the " rote " of the " indelta " sailors, (to be transformed mto 
 infantry) and the new " ordinary rote," two new regiments may 
 easily be estabhshed, e.g., one of rifles in Halland of 525 men, 
 and a reghnent of the line in Norrland of 1,069 men. 
 
 So much for the "indelta," but it is also necessary to make „ a-p i-,^. !■ 
 some modifications m the " enlisted " troops, for the " indelta '^ ' 
 cannot exclusively answer the object of '" cadi*e "-soldiers. 
 The artillery and engineers require long framing and instruc- 
 tion to ensure efficiency, and it is desirable to have a certain 
 proportion of garrisoned cavalry ; moreover, there are some 
 localities where cadre infantry cannot be derived from 
 the " indelta," e.g., the provinces of Wermland and Blekinge, 
 which have no " indelta," and more especially the capital. 
 The War Minister proposes, therefore, to retam the following 
 enlisted corps, — viz., 2 regiments of foot guards, the lancer 
 regiment of the guard, the hussar regiment Charles XV., the 
 artilleiy, the engineers, and the Wermland Chasseurs-a-pied. 
 For the garrison of Blekinge, he proposes to transform the 
 regiment of marines (now discarded for the fleet), into a corps 
 of 500 men, mfantry, Avhich will constitute a cadre troop fi>r the 
 Blekinge militia and garrison Carlserona. On account of the 
 great expense attaching to the maintenance of an enlisted 
 force, it is proposed to reduce the strength of these regiments 
 and corps to only what is strictly necessary, — viz., the Werm- 
 land Chasseurs and each of the guard infantry regiments in 
 Stockholm, to 500. Tliis ^oll be sufficient to carry out the 
 training of, and to embody, the militia, and the saving in 
 money may be advantageously employed in defraying the 
 expenses of calhng out " indelta " troops every now and then 
 to take their tm'n at garrison duty. 
 
 With a view to increasing the mobility and vigour of the 
 
 c
 
 18 
 
 Proposed re- army, some modifications must also be made witli respect to 
 
 strictioii with i-etirements, and after mature reflection on the various points 
 
 length of to be considered, the War Minister proposes that after 45 years 
 
 service. of age completed and 20 years^ service, the " indelta " soldier 
 
 with the Wermland rifleman (who, thongh belonging to the 
 
 enlisted force is not garrisoned), and after 40 years' completed 
 
 and 15 years' service, the enhsted garrisoned soldier, should be 
 
 discharged compulsorily ^dth pension. 
 
 " Bevariug," As regards the " bevaring," or mihtia, the following funda- 
 
 or Militia. mental conditions are proposed : — 
 
 1. Service in the mihtia to be compulsory, with certain 
 
 prescribed exemptions. 
 
 2. Liability to commence from the year following that in 
 
 wliich the man completes liis twentieth year, and to 
 extend to the age of 40 ; the first 10 years to be 
 spent m the Landwehr, the second 10 in the 
 Landsturm. The 7 youngest classes of age to 
 belong to the active army, — viz., 1st class, recruits; 
 2nd and 3rd classes, depots and rehefs ; 4th and 5th 
 classes, 1st reserve ; 6th and 7th classes, 2nd reserve ; 
 the 3 next classes of age to form the " War Reserve," 
 not to be mobilized until the 1st and 2nd reserves and 
 the depots and reliefs in the same province have been 
 called to arms. 
 
 3. The Landsturm will be filled, in war, by all capable 
 
 men not otherwise engaged in the general defence. 
 
 4. The country to be divided into as many militia dis- 
 
 tricts as there are regiments or corjjs of permanent 
 troops (infantry). (The special arms will have distinct 
 militia-districts, formed by towns having no infantry 
 garrison ; the men for these arms to be selected from 
 militiamen voluntarily presenting themselves for 
 such em-olment). The men will be distributed to 
 each regiment, and borne on the company or other 
 rolls in the same manner as the cadie-troops with 
 wliich they are incorporated. 
 
 5. The "bevaring" will swear allegiance to the colours, 
 
 and be placed, when called out, imder military law. 
 G. With the exception of the " War Reserve" and the 
 Landsturm, wliich will be summoned by the civil 
 governor of the province, the call to arms will be 
 issued by mihtary authority. 
 
 7. Here follow the categories exempted from service in 
 
 the militia in peace and war. 
 
 8. With the exception of only sons of poor or aged parents, 
 
 all persons exempt in peace will pay a certain fine. 
 
 9. Medical students and other departmental personnel, 
 
 possessing certificates of competence in their profes- 
 sion, will be borne as such on the rolls, but not 
 exempted from serving the prescribed traming.
 
 19 
 
 10. The militiamen, when called out in time of war, will 
 
 be retained until the termination of hostilities. 
 
 11. The militia hitherto belonging to the navy will for the 
 
 future be incorporated in the land army. 
 
 12. The minimum period of training cannot be taken at 
 
 less than 60 days. This is the most difficult point, 
 perhaps, in the whole project of reorganization to 
 determine, so as to have neither too much nor too 
 httle, enough to give the necessary instruction while 
 reducing to a minimum the cost and the loss of labour. 
 Of the 60 days' enthe period of training, 30 days to 
 be in the 1st year, and 15 in each of the 2nd and 3rd 
 years, the men to be mcorporated the whole tuno 
 with the cadi-e-troops. This, however, refers to the 
 infantry; in cavahy and special arms, the 60 days 
 are proposed to be divided into two periods of 30 
 days in two successive years. The only reason, says 
 the War Minister, which enables me to fix the period 
 so low as 60 days, is that the men vdll be incorporated 
 with a cadi'e force endowed with the excellent qualities 
 which distinguish the Swedish sokher. 
 
 As regards the Landsturm, it is proposed that each govern- Laudstm-m, 
 ment should form one or more districts. The Landsturm can 
 only be called out through the provincial governor on an 
 order from the Sovereign in Council ; it will then be placed 
 'under military law. Govermnent will furnish arms to those 
 without any of then- own. The men vrHl clothe and feed 
 themselves. Any classes of mihtia, not simimoned to the 
 army, will join the Landsturm of then* district. The Land- 
 sturm vnll be organized by battalions and companies, the latter 
 to be at least 100 strong, with a cadi'e of 1 captain and 
 2 Serjeants, and for every 50 men a subaltern, for every 25 men 
 a corporal. The battalion to consist of at least 500 men. 
 Battalion commanders to be appointed by the Sovereign on 
 the recommendation of the provmcial governor ; captains and 
 subalterns by the latter ; Serjeants and corporals by the 
 captain of the company. In all matters of military rewards 
 and pensions for ser\'ice, the men of the Landsturm to enjoy 
 the same rights as the rest of the army. There will be no 
 traming in peace. The extension of service m the militia, he 
 adds, will render a very strict registry of, and a very close 
 surveillance over, this branch necessary ; severe penalties 
 must be enforced in case of evasion, wliile at the same time 
 the right of every militiaman to transfer his abode Avhen he 
 pleases Avill not be interfered with. 
 
 Such are the general principles of the proposed organiza- Orgauizatiou 
 tion : we must now turn for a moment to the organization of tlie army 
 itself. The peace estabHshment, 36,000 rank and file, '• indelta " "' Woi?osed. 
 and enlisted troops, it is proposed to compose as follows : — 
 Infantry, •27,566: cavalry, 4,717; artillery. 2.810; engineers. 
 
 c 2
 
 20 
 
 840 = 35,933. This is exclusive of cadres of officers and non 
 commissioned officers, and civil officials. Tlie organization will 
 be more easily understood by taking tlie arms seriatim. Thus 
 commencing with tlie infantry : — 
 Infantry ^^ ^^^® ^^^ ^^^' establishments, the ^' smaller '' is to comprise 
 
 56,000 men; the "full," 86,000. The peace organization 
 is based on 50 battalions (46 mdelta, 4 enhsted) ; it is pro- 
 posed to form each of these into 2 when the army is mobilized, 
 at an effective of 560 or 860 men, accordmg as the army is 
 placed on the " smaller" or the " full " war estabhshment. 
 
 Deducting non-combatants, the peace effective of the 
 infantry will be 26,316 men, i.e., 3,576 more than at present, 
 distributed into — 
 
 *' Indelta" — 20 regiments at 2 battalions = 40 battahons. 
 
 6 corps 1 battahon =6 „ 
 
 " Enlisted''— 4 „ 1 battalion = 4 
 
 Total 50 
 all of 4 companies. 
 
 It is scarcely possible, owing to the distribution of the 
 " mdelta " battalions and companies, to give each battalion 
 the same establishment, which would have been deshable ; the 
 effective of the " indelta " battalions will, however, average 
 555 corporals and rank and file ; the effective of the " enlisted" 
 battalions, 499 rank and file. In order to provide for the 
 mcorporation of the Landwehr classes in time of war, each 
 battalion ought to have a cadi'e of officers and non-commis- 
 sioned officers on permanent pay sufficient to form two 
 battalions ; owing to the increased cost this would however 
 involve, it is proposed to give to each a cadi'e for 1^ battahons, 
 i.e., a sufficient cadi-e to form 3 battalions per regiment. With 
 the exception of the battahon adjutants, sufficient only for 
 2 battahons, the regiments aheady possess a staff for 3 bat- 
 tahons, while to form 4 battahons an additional major and 
 2 adjutants are requhed ; it is proposed to nominate one of the 
 company captains to the grade of major, who, however, will 
 remain on captain's pay, and do duty m that rank when not 
 required to serve in the superior grade ; the adjutants to be 
 taken fi'om the company officers. Each company to have 
 5 officers -and 5 non-commissioned officers on permanent pay, 
 wdiich will allow 3 respectively per company of 138 men (the 
 minimum number compatible \\ath efficiency), and furnish a 
 sufficient staff for an additional half battahon, as well as for 
 filling up such various posts in the staff of Divisions, brigades, 
 &c., as are indispensable on a mobilization. Exclusive of the 
 actual regimental staff, therefore, each battahon of 4 companies 
 will comprise 4 captains commanding companies; 3 second cap- 
 tains; 4 first heutenants; 5 second lieutenants; 4 sub-heutenants; 
 4 serje ants-major ; 6 fii'st Serjeants ; 6 second ■ Serjeants ; 
 4 quartermaster-Serjeants. It is further proposed to augment 
 the number of corporals per company from 6 to 9, with an
 
 21 
 
 equal number of lance-corporals. Notwithstanding this, the 
 officers for the 4th battaHon per regiment are entirely deficieut 
 {i.e., 25 battahons in the whole of the infantry are unprovided 
 for), besides officers to take charge of the depots, &c., in time 
 of war. Officers who have retu-ed on the pension list, with a 
 Kability for service in time of war, may well be employed m the 
 latter duty; the superior officers and some of the captahis, at 
 all events, may be taken from these classes ; but they would 
 not furnish the subaltern officers and non-commissioned officers. 
 Here, then, the cadi-es on half-pay and the officers of reserve 
 must come into play ; it is proposed, therefore, that each regi- 
 ment should have 3 captams and 4 first heutenants, and each 
 corps, 2 captams and 2 first heutenants, attached to it from the 
 half-pay list. The officers of reserve, taken from the classes of 
 the militia, will probably vary greatly in number in the different 
 regiments ; it must be left to the general officer commanduig 
 in chief to distribute them accordmg to requirements. 
 
 A few words of explanation are here necessary as regards 
 these half-pay cadi-es and reserve officers. Recognising the 
 necessity for strong cadres in time of war, the War Minister 
 proposes to provide for the increase to the very weak cadres 
 prescribed by reasons of economy in the peace establishment 
 by two methods — 
 
 (a.) Organization of cadi-es on half-pay, which A^dll be com- 
 bined with the permanent army ; 
 
 (6.) Organization of reserve cadi'es, to be taken fr-om the 
 militia, to which they are attached in peace. 
 
 The first will be formed of officers who, though, owing to 
 various reasons, anxious perhaps to retire from permanent ser- 
 vice, will nevertheless be glad to continue servmg and do duty 
 during the period of traming fixed for the cadres, the mihtia, 
 and regiments, m return for the receipt of hah-pay. No officer 
 'will, however, be permitted to retire on this half-pay list till he 
 has served 10 years, and the number of officers ^vi\\ be hmited 
 to the requu'ements of each arm. They will continue to be 
 borne on the roster of their regiments or corps, and to take 
 part in the regular run of promotion, and on attaining the 
 maximum age will be equally available for pension. The 
 resources of the State ^Yi\\ not, however, allow of the extension 
 of tliis class of officers to the numbers required even for the 
 " smaller," still less for the " full, war establisliment." The 
 deficit it is proposed to supply in the reserve officers and non- 
 commissioned officers, who will be taken from the militia ; the 
 former will be required to undergo similar exammations as 
 candidates for admission to the military school ; the latter, the 
 test now apphcable for promotion to the rank of non-commis- 
 sioned officer in the cadre troops. The conditions for appoint- 
 ment will be these : — 
 
 Every person aspiring to the post of officer or non-commis- 
 sioned officer of reserve will be required to forward to the chief
 
 22 
 
 of the regiment or corps of bis district, two years previous to the 
 date of bis habiHty for enrohneiit in the miHtia, an apphcation for 
 such post accompanied by the certificates of examination named 
 above ; the year following that in which he becomes 18 years 
 of age, he will be summoned to undergo a 42 days' recruit 
 school, with the recruits of the cadre-troops ; the next year, he 
 will attend a 75 days' school of instruction ; the third year, he 
 will go through a 20 days' regimental diill with the cadre- 
 troops. During these trainmgs, he will receive the pay of a 
 non-commissioned officer and an allowance for clothing. The 
 trainings of the second and tlih-d years of liis virtual miHtia 
 service (foiurth and fifth of his actual service), will be carried out 
 vnth the class of age of the mihtia to which he belongs, after 
 which, provided he satisfies the requirements, he will continue 
 to be employed as an officer or non-commissioned officer at each 
 successive mihtia-training up to ten in all, i.e., as long as he 
 belongs to this portion of the army. He will then pass on in 
 the regiilar course to the Landsturm, and may hold any post 
 in the force not inferior to that he held in the militia. In peace, 
 he may advance as high as the rank of captain ; in war, to any 
 superior rank. Moreover, any officer of reserve deshous of 
 entering the cadre troops will be allowed to do so on passmg 
 the examination prescribed for the officers on permanent pay. 
 
 These systems will furnish the army with a good supply of 
 trained officers on a mobilization. Should, however, there be a 
 still further deficit, it must be made good by appointments from 
 the senior students of the military school, or by promotion of 
 non-commissioned officers, &c. 
 
 Reverting again to the infantry organization, it is proposed 
 that each company shall have, as at present, 4 sappers, 8 men 
 trained as sharpshooters, and a certain number of hospital 
 orderhes, moreover, that the system of vohmteers (1 per 
 company of the " mdelta") should be continued. Vide General 
 Report. 
 
 On passing to the " smaller war establishment," classes 
 4 and 5 of the militia (^the 1st reserve) will be summoned to 
 the active army, classes 6 and 7 to the depots ; (the latter 
 classes will be summoned to the active army, if it is to be 
 mobilized on the "full war estabhshment"); these will thus 
 furnish a depot battalion for each battahon of the permanent 
 (cadre) army, i.e., 50 depot battahons in all, of an average 
 effective of 600 men, or a total of 30,000 men. Each battahon 
 of the cadre troops will furnish 60 men to form the corporals 
 of the depot battahons. 
 
 When on the " full war estabhshment," the 50 depot bat- 
 tahons will go to form the 100 field battahons of the active 
 army, each being augmented from the effective of the " smaller 
 war estabhshment," 560, to 860 men, giving 86,000 men for 
 the 100 battalions, while the strength of the depots will be 
 taken at about one-third of the entire strength of the active 
 army, and formed by the third class of age, wliich, after
 
 23 
 
 deducting men for the special arms, should furnish about 
 17,000 men. Each battalion of tlie active army will thus have 
 1 depot company, of the strength of about one-fourth of the 
 battaHon. The battaKons of the cadre troops will furnish the 
 necessary staff of corporals, — viz., about 3,000 men ; maldng 
 the total strength of the depots about 20,000 men, which may 
 be distributed into 100 companies of 200 men each. Should 
 the requirements of the army necessitate the incorporation 
 with the active army of the third class of age, the second class 
 vnll be called out to the depots ; and should it be imperative to 
 mobilize the " war reserve," then the eighth class ; the fii'st 
 class must never be called up to the active army. 
 
 To recapitulate, the infantry ^vill be organised as follows : — 
 
 " Smaller war estabhshment," 100 field battalions, at 
 560 men = 56,000. Reserve, 50 depot battaHons, at 600 men= 
 30,000. 
 
 " Full war establishment," 100 field battalions, at 860 men= 
 86,000. Reserve, 100 depot companies, at 200 men = 20,000. 
 
 Sweden has not a sufficient force of cavalry to correspond 2. Cavalry. 
 to the needs even of the smaller war establishment. The 
 actual effective consists of 4,280 sabres, of which 980 enlisted, 
 3,300 " indelta." The intersected nature of the country and 
 other causes, however, do not make the same proportion as 
 maintained in most European armies necessary. The Minister 
 estimates the requirements at one-fifteenth of the war strength 
 of the army; but to obtain this force in war, the peace effective 
 requires considerable augmentation. To re-establish the old 
 dismounted cavalry regiments would be to diminish the force of 
 infantry, and to create a new force, a matter of too great expense. 
 The most simple method appears to be to refill with combatants 
 the numbers on the j^resent effective, which have been with- 
 drawn from then- ori2;inal purport in order to provide for 
 bandsmen (52), keep of stallions (59), veterinary service (37), 
 non-commissioned officers (148), trumpeters (109), m all 405, 
 All these duties should be provided for in another manner. 
 This arrangement, with others of a minor character, would 
 easily admit of the cavalry being increased to 4,576 men 
 (3,592 " indelta," 984 enlisted), i. e., about 300 more than at 
 present, a number equivalent to 3 squadrons. Tlie actual 
 organization of the cavalry is certainly sensibly deficient in 
 uniformity as regards administration, but, from reasons of 
 economy, General Abelin proposes to retain the present state 
 of things, viz. : — 
 
 (2 regiments at 10 squadrons = 20 squadrons. 
 
 3 corps at 5 squadrons = 15 „ 
 
 1 corps (Norrland) = 2 ,, 
 
 T-. 1- , 1 f 1 corps (Gruard) = 4 „ 
 
 Enlisted . • i 1 • .. fi 
 
 L 1 regnnent = b „ 
 
 47
 
 24 
 
 The actual strength of the squadron is, as a rule, about 100 
 men, but, owing to the numbers withdrawn from their legitimate 
 purposes by the causes before stated, does not average virtually 
 over 89 or 90. The proposed augmentation will admit of the 
 average being brought to from 96 to 99. Otherwise it is not 
 proposed to make any alterations, except to do away with some 
 small irregularities in the staff establishments, and, with a view 
 to the provision of sufficient cadres of officers to take charge 
 of the train and other equipages in time of war, to institute 
 the same system of officers on half-pay as in the infantry, each 
 cavalry battalion (the 47 squadrons may be considered to con- 
 stitute 9^ battahons) having one captain and two lieutenants 
 of this categoiy attached to it. 
 
 In passing to the " smaller war establishment," each bat- 
 talion would furnish 4 squadrons, i. e., 38 from the whole arm, 
 with the same staff of officers and non-commissioned officers, 
 as in peace, and 100 sabres, inclusive of corporals, to form the 
 field force ; the remainder of the battalion, with the mobilized 
 militia, would form the depot of the battalion, and suj)ply the 
 wants of the field squadrons. This depot would be composed 
 of classes 3, 4, 5, and 6, of which the three fu'st would be in- 
 corporated in the squadrons, wliile the 6tli, and the greater 
 part of the *' reserve cavalry men " would be attached to the 
 train, and serve as a cadre troop to this branch. 
 
 On the " fiill war establishment," 50 sabres from the cadi'e 
 (permanent) troops, together with 150 militia cavalry men 
 (who, on the " smaller war establishment," belonged to the 
 depots), would be taken to form 2 reserve squadrons for each 
 battalion, i.e., in all 20 squadrons, which would be employed to 
 augment the field strength of the active army. The depot 
 commanding personnel would be taken in part out of the cadres 
 (officers and non-commissioned officers) of the " smaller war 
 estabhshment " and the non-commissioned officers of the field 
 squadrons; the rank and file would be obtained by calling up 
 two new militia classes of age, the 2nd and the 7th. If these 
 numbers do not suffice, the war reserve would be mobihzed, but 
 the 1st class of age is not to be taken for field-service. 
 
 In the mobilization of this arm, " reserve cavalry men," not 
 only for the dep6ts,but also for the squadron of orderlies furnished 
 by the hussar regiment of enlisted cavahy, are wanted. The 
 simplest method of procuring these men would be to select in 
 each squadron, from among the men dismissed on furlough, two 
 yearly, who, in return for an annual pay of say 17^., would 
 engage to remain five years in the cadres, with an obligation to 
 serve in time of war. This would give 10 men per squadron, 
 or 470 in all. The existing regulations for the " indelta " army 
 requiring that the furnisher of the man should also suj^ply his 
 horse, no essential mocHfication is necessary with regard to the 
 number of horses available for the " indelta " cavalry ; in the 
 " enlisted " cavahy, there would be a few horses per squadi'on
 
 25 
 
 deficient ; these would be bought for the depot when the army 
 was mobilized. 
 
 The artillery, as will be seen in the General Report, has 3. Ai-tillery 
 been reconstructed since the " reform-project,^' of General 
 Abelin was introduced, and, in some respects, veiy much on liis 
 proposal. He suggested 25 field batteries and 8 reserve 
 batteries, of 6 gmis, as the minimum proportion lor the 
 " smaller war establishment ; " 36 and 12, for the " fuU war 
 estabhshment,'' which would allow 2i guns per 1,000 men. 
 But considering the great expense involved in the maintenance 
 of the personnel and materiel for the " full war establishment," 
 and that the role of Sweden being defensive, the enemy would 
 necessarily be comparatively weak in artillery, he deemed it 
 essential to provide the effective for the " smaller war establish- 
 ment " only. Moreover, he proposed the transformation of the 
 existing horse-batteres into field-batteries, both on economical 
 and tactical groimds. Excepting slight augmentation in the 
 cadi'es (ofiicers and non-commissioned ofiicers) and in the whole 
 efiective, the artillery was to retain its actual organization. 
 The strength proposed amounted to 3,369 ofiicers, non-com- 
 missioned officers and men (agamst the then efiective of 3,215), 
 with 23 field and 2 mountain batteries, all of 6 guns. 
 
 He further proposed, in order to have availal^le a sufficient 
 personnel for rapid expansion in case of a mobilization, to 
 attach a certain number of officers on half-j)ay also to this 
 arm, and fixed the number at 8 captains and 16 heutenants ; 
 these, though not sufficient for the 8 reserve batteries to be 
 be formed, woidd meet the necessity to some extent and could 
 be supplemented by promotion of students from the mihtary 
 school, or of non-commissioned officers. The requirements in 
 corporals, trumpeters, and men of the permanent army would 
 be provided for as in the cavahy, i. e., by re-engagement of 
 men for 6 years, with a liability for service in case of war in 
 retm-n for a small annual pay. With 75 such re-engagements 
 annually, 450 reserve men would be available at the end of 
 6 years. His mobilization scheme demanded the incorporation 
 of 2,140 mihtia men, including two classes of age only, since 
 the " smaller war establishment " is alone provided for ; this 
 would give 1,070 men in each class ; it would be necessary, 
 however, to increase this number to, certainly, 1,200, in order 
 to allow for casualties. 
 
 As soon as the mobihzation is ordered, the peace effective 
 of the batteries would be completed to the strength prescribed 
 for the field effective ; the horses required would be fiu'iiished 
 by the method already pointed out (page 16) ; classes 3 and 4 
 of the mihtia, summoned to the field batteries ; classes 5 and 6, 
 to the depots to form the reserve batteries, the cadre personnel 
 of which would be augmented by pupils from the military 
 school, the employment of certain pensioned classes of non- 
 commissioned officers, &c. 
 
 Sliould it be imperative to mobilize the " full war establish-
 
 '2(S 
 
 ment," the reserve batteries must take the fiekl in first hue, 
 and there will be only 2 guns per 1,000 men. This might 
 suffice, pro^dded the effective can be maintained complete, 
 but there Avould be no available reserve. The materiel for this 
 should be provided, for though men and horses may always be 
 procured with more or less difficulty, it is different mth guns 
 and carriages. 
 
 The proposed plan for the " smaller war establishment " 
 gives 150 guns (25 batteries) for the fieid, or first line of 
 artillery, and 48 guns (8 batteries) for the reserve artillery — 
 total 198 guns, while the requu*ements of the "full war 
 establishment," neglected only from reasons of economy, de- 
 mand 288 guns, — viz., 36 field batteries = 216 'guns, and 
 12 reserve = 72 guns. 
 
 The organization of the artillery, now in process of bemg 
 carried out, provides for 30 batteries of 6 guns = 180, to form 
 the artillery of Istlme, and 9 batteries = 54, to form the reserve 
 artillery, total 234 guns; this it ■^^dll be seen presently is what the 
 Minister proposed in liis second project. 
 
 I will not go into his proposal for increasing the efficiency of, 
 and augmenting, the engineer service, for this arm has since, 
 as will be seen by the " General Report," been augmented and 
 placed on a more satisfactory basis, very much in accordance 
 with the Minister's '^^dshes. 
 Tactical clis- "^^^ Order to facilitate the passage from the peace to a 
 
 tribution iuto War establishment, which is so greatly dependent on the 
 Commands, organization of the army, in peace, in army-corps. Divisions 
 and brigades, each under its own chief, he proposed the 
 sub-division into 3 corps, each under a general officer — viz., 
 a southern, a western, and a northern corps. Each corps 
 would comprise 2 Divisions, and each Di\dsion 2 or 3 brigades. 
 But as the pecuhar system of the " mdelta " would nullify 
 any advantage to be gained from a combmation into Divisions 
 and brigades in peace, these Avould only be formed on a mobili- 
 zation, the chiefs being taken from regimental commanders, 
 who, however, would be already nominated in peace and 
 assigned the rank of brigadier-general. Allowing 1 general 
 officer per corps, 1 as chief of the staff, and 1 in charge of the 
 cavalry, artillery, and engineers, the total number proposed for 
 the peace establishment is 7, who would have a fixed salary of 
 about 600Z. per amnim. 
 
 I have no intention of examinmg his proposal for a 
 " general staff," this important d(ipartment having been lately 
 reconstructed, vide General Report, page 19, on a thoroughly 
 soimd basis, nor will I enlarge this already too long review by 
 attempting to go into the various admuiistiative and educa- 
 tional branches, the latter being of an emmently high standard, 
 &c., which are all dealt with seriatim. 
 Military train- It is, however, imperative to consider the amount of military 
 i'lgofthe^ training which the "indelta, " in particular, is intended to 
 undergo under this scheme. As a rule, up to the present time, the 
 
 Indelta.
 
 27 
 
 infantry recruit has been required to perform 2 recniit schools, 
 each of 42 days duration, and 1 regimental training of 20 
 days, total 104 days' drill, before being regarded as a trained 
 soldier. This the War Minister deems sufficient if well 
 employed, and he proposes to retain it, distributing the time 
 over 2 years ; the recruits not to be incorporated ^\ath the 
 cadre companies during their first regimental framing. In 
 addition to the recruits, estimated at about 5*5 per cent, of the 
 effective of the regiment, those men will be called up to 
 undergo an additional recruit school, who, though admitted 
 into the ranlcs, are not considered sufficiently proficient ; in- 
 clusive of these, he estimates the number of men attending a 
 recruit school each year, at 10 per cent, of the effective. Up 
 to the present time, 24 men per company have always been 
 summoned for the 10 days' recapitulatory com-se of the officers 
 and non-commissioned officers ; this number he proposes to 
 increase to 30. The annual regimental di-ills and the musketry 
 drills for the shai-pshooters to remain as before, — viz., 20 and 
 8 days respectively. Thus the infantry annual drills will be as 
 follows : — 
 
 Kecapitiilatory Cadre Course, -with all the Officers aud Non-Corn- 1 o^ r 
 missioned Officers, and 30 men per company . . . . . , j ' *' 
 
 Eecmit School, 10 per cent, of effectiTe . . . . . . . . 42 „ 
 
 Musketry Course for Sliarpshooters.. .. .. .. .. 8 „ 
 
 Eegimental Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 „ 
 
 exclusive of days of arrival and departure. 
 The cavalry annual drills : — 
 
 Eecapitidatoiy Com'se, witli aU Officers and Non-Comniissioued "I ,^ , 
 
 Officers, trumpeters, and 12 sabres per squadi'on . . . , J ' ' "' 
 
 Eecruit School, with 60 men per squadron. , . . . . . . 90 ,, 
 
 Squadron Course (dismoimted) . . . . . . . . . . 6 „ 
 
 Eegimental Exercise . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 ,, 
 
 As regards the training of the bevarmg or militia, he pro- 
 poses that, mth a view to devoting the greatest amount of Training of 
 time possible to purely military exercises, in the strict sense of *;1^'' "Bera- 
 the term, (which can only be carried out with large bodies already "" 
 to a certain degree organized, and would not commence till after 
 the in coi-p oration of the men in the militia), preparatory drills 
 should take place by parishes, which it should be obhgatory on 
 all young men to attend previous to then enrolment. After 
 their enrolment in the militia-proper, the traming in the infantry 
 to be : — 
 
 1st Year. — Eecruit School 30 days. 
 
 2nd „ — Eepetitiou of Eecruit School, and drill in the ranks \ ^^ 
 
 of the Cach'e Troops. . . . . • . . / " 
 
 3rd „ — Training with the Cach-e Troops . . . . . . 15 „ 
 
 Total 60 „ 
 
 The cavalry, artillery, and engineer militia will sub-di^-ide 
 this 60 days into 2 "periods only, each of 30 days in two suc- 
 cessiv(^ vears.
 
 28 
 
 For the purpose of carrying out grand manoeuvres lie 
 further proposes that a Divisional camp of instruction be held 
 ever}^ year for a duration of 15 days, the arrangements to be 
 such that every regiment or corps may attend once in 6 years, 
 when its regimental exercises will be omitted. 
 
 After dealing then with the military organization of the 
 island of Gotland, which he places on a more efficient basis 
 than at present, he concludes with his estimate of the cost 
 involved in the carrying out of the scheme. " This," he says, 
 " will be in part transitory, in part permanent, the former item 
 dealing with the fii-st equipment, clotliing, armament, mount- 
 ing, &c., of the augmentation; the other, with the annual 
 charges on the military estimates for the maintenance of the 
 increased effective. Neither, however, demands the immediate 
 outlay of the whole charge, since the augmentation is in- 
 tended to be carried oiit gradually and spread over 6 years. 
 The amount of the estimates for the new organization will 
 certainly be considerable in proportion to the resources of the 
 country, but look at the results obtained. In place of the 
 30,000 men forming the actual effective, with, in second line, 
 about 83,000 militia, insufficiently trained and sensibly deficient 
 in equipment, you will have a force of 68,000 men, capable of 
 ready expansion to 100,000, exclusive of about 98,000 men 
 forming the reserves and depots, and a Laiidstm-m of over 
 100,000 men, all of whom will have received a certain degree 
 of military training ; a sufficiently large, well-instructed, and 
 equitably paid body of cadres (officers and non-commissioned 
 officers) ; and an_ advanced work in the Baltic, Gotland, pro- 
 vided with a military organization wliich may afford good 
 grounds for leg-itimate hope that we may be able to defend 
 successfully this important post. 
 
 Recognising strongly the imperative necessity of basing 
 our national defences on our available resources, and on such 
 additional sacrifices in money and labom- as we can impose on 
 ourselves without peril, I have in all cases endeavoured to 
 make what is desirable accord with what is possible ; what is 
 indispensable, with the minimum of cost. The scheme before 
 you is the equilibrium sought between the pressing need of a 
 strong national defence on the one side, and the no less legi- 
 timate exigencies of the strictest economy on the other. If 
 the project, looked at with the eye of the financier, would 
 appear midesirable, owing to the considerable augmentation it 
 necessitates in the ordinary army expenditure, I must repeat 
 again, that the creation of a system of defence, which shall 
 secure our liberty and independence, cannot in my opinion be 
 attained without this increase. 
 
 Moreover, compared with the budgets of those States whose 
 conditions correspond most closely with our own, our futui'e 
 army budget is, relatively to the results obtained, neither out 
 of proportion, nor unnecessarily op])rcssive.
 
 29 
 
 Inclusive of the cost and admimstration of the " indelta," 
 the annual army estimates, with the scheme proposed, 
 will amount to about 941,782/., the number of days' di'ill to 
 3,872,862. 
 
 The application to Sweden ol the organization lately 
 adopted in Denmark, wovild give us a total force of only 
 125,400 men, vnth. 37,000 not available on the theatre of 
 war, while the number of days' di'ill would be 7,900,985, 
 and the cost about 1,183,166/., exclusive of the immediate 
 expenditure of about 1,000,000/. required for building barracks 
 necessitated by the system. 
 
 The application of the system in use in Belgium would 
 furnish us with 84,000 men, inclusive of reserves and depots, 
 also with a national guard of 30,000, but would cost about 
 1,200,000/., and 10,806,000 days of labour. 
 
 Thus the proposed re-organization of our defensive system 
 clearly demands but a relatively moderate expenditure ; besides, 
 as has been before pomted out, the money devoted to the 
 military educatioii of the Swedish people cannot be considered 
 as an expense without fruit. It is, therefore, with less appre- 
 hension of the magnitude of the sacrifices demanded, but above 
 all, with the hope of the patriotic assent of the nation which is 
 fully sensible to the importance of this grave question, that I 
 now present the scheme of a defence strong enough to secui-e, 
 provided we do not neglect it and do not abandon ourselves, 
 the most precious possession of the Swedish people — "inde- 
 pendence and liberty." 
 
 After the rejection of this project by the Diet m 1869, Modifications 
 General Abelin msisted, at a State Council held in October p'J.J?;^^^'^^!' 
 13th, 1870, on the urgent necessity of a total re-organization (i^^ced iu the 
 of the army, and was again charged by the kuig with the 2nd Project 
 elaboration on certain given bases of a complete scheme. '^^ ■'■^'•'■• 
 These bases differed in no way fi-om those laid down in the 
 former project, and a second project was, therefore, con- 
 structed in which the principal alterations are briefly 
 sketched. 
 
 As regards the men, in place of the proposed preparatory Militia, 
 course of instruction previous to enrolment, which seemed to 
 involve some practical difficulties, the total period of training 
 to be 82 days for infantry, artillery and engineers, and 90 days 
 for cavalry. The 20 years' service to be divided into seven 
 years Landwehr, 13 Landstm-m. 
 
 As regards the formation of officers and non-commissioned 
 officers of reserve, the aspirant to be allowed to make liis 
 application in the ordinary year in which his military service 
 would commence, and to be capable of qualifying for the 
 post m two years, the same amount of training as before being- 
 distributed over two instead of three years. 
 
 With the object of giving the Landsturm a more solid Laudstui-m, 
 organization, and of providhig it with more efficient cadi'es, it is
 
 30 
 
 proposed to make the following modifications in the former 
 project : — 
 
 According to the new proposal there will be 13 classes of 
 age in the Landsturm; these will be formed into two cate- 
 gories, with different obligations and service. The 1st category 
 to consist of five classes, — viz., the tln-ee which in the former 
 project constituted the war reserve, and the two following, 
 i.e., of the men from 25 to 32. This category, to form the 
 new war reserve, will comprise all arms, and be so organised 
 as to be capable of independent action. It will not only 
 serve to fill up the vacancies in the depots, and reliefs 
 of the active army, but will garrison the fortresses and 
 co-operate in the general defence where needed. Only exer- 
 cised militiamen, or men incorporated in the tram, will belong 
 to this category; in other words, only those called upon to 
 pass on into the Landsturm at the expnation of then line 
 service. The importance of this category will be relatively 
 speaking a high one ; it will, therefore, be necessary to make 
 detailed and comprehensive arrangements in order to know 
 always its exact strength and composition ; it will, moreover, 
 though not drilled, be required to undergo annual inspections 
 by battaHons or companies, according to the locahty. 
 
 The second category will comprise the men from 33 to 40 
 years of age, as well as all persons within the prescribed 
 limitations as to age, who belong neither to the Ime nor to the 
 first category, or are not otherwise engaged in the national 
 defence. This category will be employed for local defence 
 only ; the men in peace mil be told off" to companies or 
 battalions, but there will be no further organization. 
 
 The approximate force will be : — 
 
 First category 62,000 
 
 Second category . . . . . . 82,000 
 
 Total .. .. 144,000 men. 
 
 The first category will form 82 battalions, with an average 
 effective of 680 men; 10 to 15 squadrons of cavaliy at 100 
 men; 12 batteries of field artillery; 15 companies of garrison 
 artillery ; and 4 companies of engineers. 
 
 Tlie second category will only be composed of infantry, 
 forming 116 battalions of about 750 men. 
 
 In peace there will be no drill ; there will be a central depot 
 for arms and equipment in each district. 
 
 Each battahon will have a staff of a commander and 2 adju- 
 tantsj one of whom will be a non-commissioned officer; the 
 company will have a cadi-e of 1 captain and 3 seijeants, 
 wdtli 1 subaltern for every 25 men. These cadres will be 
 formed by officers, non-commissioned officers and corporals who 
 have served their time in the hue, and by retired officers. The 
 first category will have arms and food furnished by the State
 
 31 
 
 when mobilized ; the second, which cannot be removed from its 
 district, Avill provide its own equipment and food. 
 
 By the transfer to the land forces of the "indelta" sailor "Indelta" 
 companies, already proposed m the 1868 Project, and by other I^^aiitT- 
 muior modifications, two regiments and one corps to be formed, 
 brmging the number of " indelta '^ battalions to 48, which, at 
 an effective of 500 men, will give the force of " indelta " infantry 
 a total of 24,000. The 1868 Project proposed the battalion effec- 
 tive at 550 men; 500 has now been decided on, both on tactical 
 considerations, and ^\ath a view to regulatmg and augmenting 
 the pay of the " mdelta," by incorporatmg in other ways the 
 blank numbers in regiments over 1,000 strong. The number 
 of blanks thus affected will be 1892. 
 
 The 1868 Project proposed the reduction of the effective of Enlisted 
 the two guard regiments to two battalions of 500 men each. Infantry. 
 Various considerations have mduced the maintenance of these 
 corps on their actual effective ; the Wermland battalion of 
 chasseurs-a-pied, however, to be reduced to 500, and the regi- 
 ment of marines (now no longer required, as proposed m the 
 1868 Project, to form a cadre troop for the Blekinge militia) 
 to be transformed into an artillery troop. The actual number 
 of battalions (6) will thus be reduced to 5, and the total force 
 of cadre mfantry will be 26,100 men, while by re-mcorp ora- 
 tion in the guard regiments (whose actual effective of 800 
 will be retained), in time of war, of old soldiers belonging to 
 the enlisted army who are under 28 years of age, the total 
 force ^\all be 26,500 men, distributed into 53 battalions. As 
 the deficit m officers and non-commissioned officers, on a 
 mobiKzation, may, at all events in the infantry, be provided for 
 by the reserve personnel, the system of attaching half-pay 
 officers will only be retained for the special arms. 
 
 The 1868 Project to stand as before, excepting that the Cavalry, 
 augmentation, by 296 men, therein provided for will not be 
 carried out ; this arm will thus consist of 4,280 men, distributed 
 into 47 squadrons, of which 10 enlisted, 37 "mdelta." 
 
 The 1868 Project proposed, from reasons of economy, Ai-tillery. 
 that the number of guns, calculated at 2| per 1,000 men, should 
 be provided only for the " smaller war establislunent," i.e., 
 150 field guns in aU. This has been proved by late events to be 
 insufficient ; it is proposed, therefore, to raise the number of 
 field guns to 180, by forming 5 new batteries, besides an artillery 
 reserve of 54 guns ; the companies of garrison artillery also to 
 be raised from 5 to 6. There A\all then be 30 batteries of field 
 artillery and 9 batteries of reserve artillery. The marine regi- 
 ment will be transformed into artillery, and incorporated with 
 one of the present regiments. The total effective of artillery 
 A\dll by this change be raised by 796 men, and stand at 4,011 
 in place of 3,215. 
 
 The 1868 Project to stand as before, with some sUght Engineers, 
 modifications in details. 
 
 The training of the "indelta " infantry to stand as before, Training.
 
 32 
 
 with the exception of some modifications in the field exercises, 
 common to all arms, wliich will be noticed directly. 
 
 The " indelta" cavalry to go through a training as follows : — 
 Cadre course, with all officers and non-commissioned officers 
 and 12 corporals and rank and file per squadron, 20 days; 
 recruit school, 90 days ; regimental exercise, 26 days. As in the 
 former project, the recruits will be requhed to pass two such 
 recruit schools, making the total recruit course 206 days, while 
 the dismounted squadi-on course will be abohshed. 
 
 The infantry militia will have an 82 days' di-ill in their first 
 three years, viz. : — 
 
 1st year. — Recruit com'se . . . . . . 42 days. 
 
 2nd year. — Recapitulatory course and di'ills 
 
 with the cadre troops . . . . 20 „ 
 
 3rd year. — Training with the cadre troops . . 20 „ 
 
 Total 82 days. 
 
 The cavalry mihtia will go through then* training in two 
 years ; the first year during 60 days ; the second year, 30 
 days ; total 90 days. 
 
 The artillery and engmeers will also go through their 
 training m two years ; the first year durmg 52 days ; the 
 second year, 30 days ; total 82 days. 
 
 As regards the field training of all arms, it is proposed that 
 the annual 15 days' Divisional camp of mstruction be held in 
 the autumn, so as not to interfere with the orduiary training, 
 which Avill consequently not be omitted by those regiments and 
 corps required to take part in it. 
 
 In other respects, the 1870 Project differed in no manner 
 from that of 1868. With the exception, indeed, of the increase 
 in the artillery, it would not appear to present superior advan- 
 tages to the former project. It was, however, also rejected by 
 the Diet. The advantages offered by both projects are obvious. 
 In the first place, the plan proposed allows of the gradual aug- 
 mentation of the cadre troops according to requirement, as well 
 as of carrying out protracted operations by a system of incor- 
 porating successively the various classes of age forming the 
 militia estabhshment, wliich would receive a far more efficient 
 training ; in the second place, it has the advantage of preserving 
 the peculiar system of the " indelta," and extractmg from it a 
 double gain, fii'st, with regard to financial economy, secondly, 
 with regard to the sphit of the nation ; moreover, it increases 
 considerably the exercises of this body. The leaduig principle 
 of universal service, on which it is based, however, is the 
 rock on which it is wrecked ; and in the present temper of the 
 Second Chamber, it seems unlikely that any project of this 
 description will be accepted, without a simultaneous abolition 
 of the obligations under which the class of peasants, charged 
 with the furnishina: and maintenance of the " indelta," labours.
 
 33 
 
 Though the study of these projects of the late War Almistcr 
 will, I fear, have proved rather a tedious business, I cannot help 
 thhildng it -udll, taken in conjunction ^vith the general report, 
 tend to throw more light ujDon the peculiarities, and the good 
 and bad points, of the system of organization in operation in 
 Sweden. 
 
 I vnW now add a few words on the actual condition of the 
 army. 
 
 I was not able to be present at any great parades or 
 exercises, for these were all over when I reached Stockholm. 
 I, however, saw the two foot-guard (enlisted) regiments in 
 their barracks, and some small detachments at chill. The 
 barracks are very well arranged, and ererythmg kept in good 
 order ; each contains a large gymnasimn and covered-in drill 
 shed, where the men can be exercised in -winter. The clothing 
 of the men is serviceable and good ; and the food struck me as 
 being extremely hberal in quantity and good it quahty. 
 
 I observed the same thing in this army as in the Danish 
 army, that is to say, how thoroughly the authorities recognise 
 the necessity of having a really efficient body of non-commis- 
 sioned officers; the schools for training these ranks are of a 
 very high order, and the results obtamed from the system of 
 instruction are apparent throughout. The details of these 
 schools Avill be found in the " General Report.'^ 
 
 The cavahy regiment of the guard has a very fine barrack, 
 with good airy ranges of stabling ; the horses are purchased 
 separately in each squadron, the average price now being about 
 35/. The equipment consists of saddle and bridle; wallets, 
 fastened to the pommel, containing the cleaning articles and 
 horse -shoes ; valise, contaming the man's kit, carried as with us ; 
 cloak, rolled over wallets ; and shabracque. "\ATien forage is 
 carried, the corn sack is thrown over the seat of the saddle, the 
 corn being divided equally in either end, and the man sits upon 
 it ; the hay is carried, bound with the forage cord, over the 
 vahse, to which it is fastened; this system does not appear 
 sound or advantageous. Of the horse equipment, the saddle 
 only is kept in the stable ; the bridle, in the barrack-room. The 
 regiment is a lancer coi-jis, and has at the present moment a 
 lance of ash ; the English bamboo lance has, however, been 
 approved and is about to be introduced. 
 
 As regards the drill of these troops, which all belong to the 
 enlisted portion of the army, there is nothing particular to 
 remark. From what I saw, they appeared smart and steady 
 under arms, as all troops so constituted and wdth long service 
 should not fail to be. The officers told me they were now beg-in- 
 nmg to experience considerable difficulty in getting recruits, 
 o^ving to the great demand for labour and the increased 
 wages offered. It is with them, in point of fact, as with us ; 
 under a system of voluntary enhstment, where they must 
 compete with the labour market, they must offer greater 
 inducements and higher pay than formerly. 
 
 D
 
 34 
 
 The armament of infantiy, cavaliy and artillery is excel- 
 lent ; the Remington rifle has a rather smaller cahbre than 
 that of Denmark; the cavalry sword is heavy, while not 
 unwieldy ; the artillery armament is equally good. I do not 
 enter into particulars here, as all details A\dll be found in the 
 General Report. 
 
 I wish particularly to call attention to the supplementary 
 pontoon and engineering equipment provided to the infantry, 
 and which in a country like Sweden, so mtersected with lakes 
 and rivers, is of very liigli importance, rendering the infantry 
 independent in great measure of the auxiliary technical 
 service. The details of this equipment are given in the 
 " General Report," page 29. 
 
 The new organization of the " General Staff" came into 
 operation on the 1st of the present year, and it A\all necessarily 
 be some time before it gets fully into working order, and 
 can enable any opinion to be formed on its practical bearing. 
 The system is certainly based on sound principles, and, con- 
 sidering the peculiar constitution of the army, seems the best 
 method of extracting and having available a good material for 
 this important department. 
 
 The cadet school at Carlberg has been recently re-organized 
 and will for the future receive as cadets men, — as a rule 
 " volunteers,^' — from the ranks who aspire to commissioned 
 rank. Therefore, as in Denmark, though not altogether on 
 the same system, the officers are now compelled to work 
 their way up from the lowest grade. Whether this system 
 will work in Sweden, where so much of the old aristocratic 
 element still remains, seems doubtful. 
 
 The schools of all classes are detailed in the " General 
 Report " ; they are in every respect admirably constituted, 
 and, more particidarly the non-commissioned officers' schools, at 
 Stockholm for the cavalry, and at Carlsborg for the infantry, of 
 the " indelta " army, are deserving of notice. The latter has a 
 four months' course, with a personnel of about 600 men ; 
 I visited tliis school, and here had an opportunity of seeing a 
 sample of the " indelta '' army. The men going through the 
 course were certainly picked men, i.e., men selected for promo- 
 tion in then- regiments, but I was assured they were a very 
 fair sample of the whole " indelta." If so, it is undeniable 
 that the material is very excellent. The men are here diilled 
 and worked to all manner of duties, and their performances 
 were such as could not fail to call for commendation from the 
 most critical observer. Great attention is paid to gymnastics, 
 jumping, bayonet-fencing, sword-exercise, &c., the squads 
 being exercised very much in the same manner as has been 
 aheady spoken of in the Report on the Danish army. They 
 go through a com-se of musketry, reconnaissance duty, survey- 
 ing, outpost duty, and all the various branches of field-service, 
 as well as a complete theoretical course of study indoorg. I 
 was shown some of the drawings and reports of the men then 
 
 I
 
 35 
 
 undergoing instruction, not any picked out for especial ex- 
 cellence but taken here and there as they came, and was very 
 much struck with then performances. There is no doubt that 
 the school trains a most efficient body of cadres for the infantry 
 of the " indelta " army ; and, though in the cavalry school 
 at Stockliolm the same results were not quite so apparent, this 
 also does its work well for that arm. 
 
 While speaking of Carlsborg, I may add that it is intended 
 to make of this great mland depot a very strong place ; 
 the works progress but slowly on account of the expense. It 
 stands on the western shore of Lake Wettem, near the head 
 of the lake ; the southern front, now being constructed, has a 
 length of 2,400 feet, which will be in one straight hue, 
 and will cover the long range of casemated barracks running 
 inside ; the eastern and western fronts are 3,000 feet long, 
 and broken inwards, ha^ung large capoimieres at the re-entering 
 angles ; the northern front is also to be broken inwards Avith a 
 defensible caponniere. It contains large depots of clothing, 
 arms, commissariat stores, &c., an arsenal with 150,000 stand of 
 Remington rities, besides a large quantity of artiUery material. 
 The money, however, for carryuig on the works is voted so 
 slowly that it tvuII be many years yet before they are com- 
 pleted. 
 
 In conclusion, I must mention the defences to the approach 
 to the capital from the sea. There are, or rather were, three 
 distinct channels available for ships of war, which may 
 be termed the northern, central, and southern. The northern 
 channel has been already closed, barred with masonry banks, 
 and mined; 5 feet of water are allowed over the banks to admit of 
 the navigation by small craft, the numerous river-steamers, &c. ; 
 the approach is also commanded by batteries. The central 
 passage Kes between the island of Waxhohn and the fortress of 
 that name, which stands on the soHd rock about midway 
 between the islands of Waxholm and Fredericksborg : this 
 passage, about 100 yards across, will be barred in the same 
 manner as the northern as soon as the fortress of Fredericks- 
 borg, now building to defend the third or southern channel, is 
 completed. The southern channel will then form the only hue 
 of approach, accessible by ships of war. The rough sketch on 
 Plate I. will show approximately the position of these three 
 channels, and of the defending works. 
 
 The fortress of Waxholm has only quite lately been com- 
 pleted, having been many years in buildmg ; it is a very strong 
 masonry work, mounting 250 guns in 5 tiers of casemates, and 
 is flanked by two armoiu-plated batteries on the ground level : 
 the passage is further defended by a battery immediately 
 below the village of Waxholm, "which stands directly opposite 
 to the fortress on the island of the same name, as well as by 
 two additional batteries cro^^uiing two of the numerous islands 
 Avith which the inlet from the sea abounds. These batteries 
 sweep the water below the fortress, and in coniunction with 
 
 D 2
 
 36 ' 
 
 some lines of minor importance on the Fredericksborg island 
 to the south, afford a very strong flanking defence to the main 
 Waxholm fort. Owing to the enormous power given to 
 modern naval ordnance, and to ships' armour, since the 
 plans for these defences were first laid down, the fortress of 
 Waxholm is, however, already becoming obsolete. The gims 
 are of various systems and cahbres, but the fortress, as well as 
 the batteries, is provided with a certain proportion of the 
 heaviest guns, — viz., 9-in. or 27 cm. cahbre. The thickness of 
 the masonry-walls is 11 feet, and the fort contains large roomy 
 casemated barracks, magazines, &c. Like the northern pas- 
 sage, the Waxholm channel, when baired, will allow 5 feet of 
 water for the navigation of the pleasure-steamers and other 
 vessels of small draught. It Avill probably be finally closed in 
 about two years' time. 
 
 The only channel then left for large ships will pass by the 
 southern extremity of the Fredericksborg island. Here the 
 fortress of Frederickborg is now building ; it consists of an 
 armour-plated battery with orillon and flank on the ground 
 level, where the rock has been cleared away, and of an 
 upper work built m the rock itself, which is to be provided 
 with guns in Moncriefi" pits. The fi'ont face of the armour- 
 plated battery is covered with three plates of 6-m. armour, 
 with 5-in. intermediate brick and asphalte, wliile at the iron 
 shield of the embrasm-e the intervals between the plates are 
 filled in with four thin iron plates cemented with lead ; the 
 thiclaiess of the masonry is 13 feet : the height of the 
 casemates also 13 feet ; this face will mount 9 guns of 9-in. 
 or 27 cm. calibre. The flank on the reverse of the orillon 
 will be protected by three plates of 6-m., 5-in., and 5-in. tliick- 
 ness, and will mount four guns of the same cahbre. 
 
 The height of the battery from the ground level»to the top 
 of the covering bank of earth is to be 50 feet. The height of 
 the upper adjoining work is 160 feet from the ground level; it 
 connects with the lower work by two subterranean stau'cases 
 hewn m the soHd rock. Tliis upper work consists of an 
 irregular pentagon, with at the front and rear apices a capon- 
 niere pierced on each side for six guns to flank the ditches, 
 and also for musketry; the scarps also are galleried for 
 musketry fire. On the right and left of the fi-ont caponnier^ 
 are three Moncrieff pits for 27 cm. guns; the sm-rounduig chtch is 
 40 feet Avide and runs doAvn to the water IcA^el in front of the 
 armour-plated 9-gun battery. The rough sketch on Plate II. 
 may give some idea of the work as intended. 
 
 The width of the channel between this work and the main- 
 land is about 300 yards. On the southern bank stands an old, 
 but extremely solid, round tower of old date, mounting several 
 tiers of guns. Tliis, though of httle value to the defence, is, 
 however, to be left standing, more possibly as a memorial of 
 the past. The passage is to be, indeed already is, banked 
 across with masonry, leaving a cut in the centre 50 feet Avide,
 
 37 
 
 and of sufficient depth to allow of the passage of the largest 
 vessels. Otherwise the draft of water will be 5 feet only, as 
 in the other passages. 
 
 Major Ryding, representing the War Minister, who Avas 
 absent m Norway, kindly gave me permission to go over the 
 works, and I was conducted by the commandant of the Wax- 
 holm fort, at present placed in joint charge. I had also an 
 opportunity of glancing at the plans, but so hurriedly as to 
 give Uttle possibility of carr^dng away any very accurate 
 impression of the measurements and general details. The 
 works themselves are being pressed forward, but are still 
 very incomplete, and render it difficult to get a clear idea of 
 the defences as a whole. The armour-plates are bemg fitted 
 by an EngHsh engineer from the Atlas works at Sheffield, 
 where they were made. 
 
 Unfortunately the day of my visit proved stormy, and 
 the works are only accessible by private boat, which neces- 
 sitated a chfficult passage m my conductor's yacht. The 
 innumerable rocky islands and dips m the land make the 
 navigation very dangerous, owing to the sudden gusts issuing 
 out of these regular funnels, and it was only after a long- 
 beating about that we reached the landing-place. The time 
 available was thus considerably restricted, and I was disap- 
 pointed m not havmg the necessary leisure to examine 
 thoroughly these very strong and mteresting defences. The 
 labour is being carried out in great part by regularly organised 
 civil penal companies of men convicted of drunkenness and 
 other minor offences, Tvho receive a very small rate of pay. 
 The stone is on the spot. The cost of the works will, there- 
 fore, not be of so very large an amount. 
 
 NORWAY. 
 
 The organization of the Norwegian army resembles very 
 closely that of the Danish army, already reported on ; the 
 portion of each arm obtamed by voluntary enlistment corre- 
 sponding to the winter duty and school effisctive selected after 
 the annual drills by ballot in Denmark. The enhsted portion 
 of the Norwegian army serves mamly for garrison duty and as 
 a training cadre to the annual contingent of conscripts, who 
 are dismissed to their homes after the usual periods of 
 training. Like the Danish army, therefore, the men are but 
 superficially drilled and trained to the use of their arms, and, 
 in the same way, the mounted branches are but uidiiferently 
 horsed. Takuig into consideration the difficulties and draw- 
 backs under which the organization labours, the men of all 
 branches of the service attam to a vcrv fair standard of
 
 38 
 
 efficiency in military exercises. I was present for two days at 
 the camp at Gaardemond, tlie exercising ground of the 
 " Akershus" brigades, about 25 miles distant from Christiania, 
 and saw very fair work done by the three arms separately, but 
 no exercises of the combined arms. The mfantry (2 battalions) 
 showed themselves apt in seeking cover and utiHzmg ground, 
 and worked very v^ell in the attack, the skirmisliing bodies 
 making rushes to the front by alternate divisions, according as 
 the nature of the terrain permitted. There was, however, no 
 opportunity of seeing anything done on a large scale. The 
 cavalry are organised as mounted riflemen, but I did not see 
 any dismounted practice, the actual exercises being then more 
 particularly restricted to riding diill. The weather had broken, 
 and the plam (about the only open ground to be fomid in the 
 country) was terribly heavy, and in some places under water, 
 rendering manoeuvring very laborious and disagreeable. The 
 batteries present (2 field and 1 horse battery), considering the 
 imperfect trainmg of the horses, struck me as being more 
 efficiently worked and served than the artillery of the Danish 
 army ; the system of horsing is, however, decidedly unfavour- 
 able to this arm, though to a less degree than to the cavalry. 
 Horses cannot fail to lose their handiness and efficiency for 
 mihtary purposes when only retained at duty for the short 
 annual traimngs, and durmg the rest of the year employed for 
 agricultural and lumbermg work. As a sample of the Nor- 
 wegian army, the troops I saw at Gaardemond certamly looked 
 and wo]-ked well ; except in the matter of physique, which is far 
 superior to that of the Danish race, they did not present many 
 points of difference to the Danish troops. The characteristics 
 in the matter of morale and physique, already dwelt upon in 
 the report on the Swedish army, are in every respect equally 
 apphcable to the Norwegian troops. A finer, better discipHned 
 and conducted, set of men one could not wish to see. Con- 
 sidering the very small amount expended on the army, the 
 organization undoubtedly provides a fairly efficient defensive 
 force, well adapted to fight for i^s hearths and homes. I cannot 
 fancy, however, that much reliance could be placed on the 
 Norwegians as an auxiliary force for the defence in Sweden of 
 the jomt kingdom, for there is no mistakmg the ill-feeling, 
 still broodmg below the surface, and often cropping above it, 
 which they still cherish agamst their old enemies the Swedes. 
 They are not yet, and most probably never will be, reconciled 
 to the partition of Norway from Denmark, and their transfer to 
 Sweden ui virtue of the treaty of Kiel in 1814. Moreover, the 
 poHtical sentiments are strangely at variance m the two 
 countries, Sweden still retaining so much of the old aristocratic 
 privileges and temperament, whereas only democratic elements 
 are recognised in Norway. Here alone, however, of the 
 three 'Scandinavian countries does the system still prevail of 
 officering the army direct from the mihtary schools instead of 
 reqmring a severe noviciate in the ranks as a primary test of
 
 39 
 
 the man's efficiency and aptitude for commissioned ranlc, and to 
 be a leader of men, as is now the system in both Sweden and 
 Denmark, but more especially ui the latter. The Norwegian 
 officers I happened to meet showed decidedly very liigh social 
 and professional qualities, and the worst dunce in the " war 
 school" was most unmistakeably of an extraordinarily high 
 standard. The school was not assembled at the time of my 
 visit, but I was shown the di'awings, surveys, and plans, both 
 theoretical and practical studies, of the class just passed out 
 and commissioned, as well as of the junior division, and was 
 exceeduigly struck "vvith their very great excellence ; more 
 particularly, perhaps, when the performances of one student 
 were exhibited, who had failed to attam the necessary predicate 
 in these studies, but whose drawings were indubitably above 
 average merit. 
 
 All the officers with whom I was able to converse, impressed 
 me with their high culture and intelHgence ; many spoke 
 EngHsh, French and German perfectly, — one of the chief Euro- 
 pean languages at all events they were masters of. But more 
 particularly was the training of the officers of the general staff 
 apparent ; very high qualifications and tests of aptitude and 
 fitness for the manifold and varied duties of a staff officer 
 are requh'ed before the aspnant to staff employ can be finally 
 admitted to the roster of general staff officers. After com- 
 pleting a course of study at the Military High School, the 
 highest step in the educational ladder, the aspnant is attached 
 to the other arms to which he does not belong for a really 
 complete course of departmental training; afterwards, for a 
 term of thi-ee to four years, according to his general aptitude, 
 to the army command bureau, in order to learn all the details 
 and routine of office work ; and finally, for one or two years 
 to the topograpliical department, to gain acquaintance "u^ith all 
 the details of the cadastral survey, &c. Even after he is 
 appointed to the junior grade of adjutant on the staff, there is 
 yet another severe practical test in the duties of a staff officer 
 in the field to be passed before he is finally admitted a 
 member of the corps. To persevere through all these difficul- 
 ties and tedious prehminaries requu'es a really earnest, hard- 
 worldng, painstaking man, mth his heart thoroughly in the 
 service he aspires to. 
 
 From the highest to the lowest ranks of fife, education in 
 Norway is on a very high scale ; all childi-en are compelled to 
 attend school fi-om 7 to 14 years of age, the rich merchant as 
 well as his portier having equally to fill in the retm-ns and 
 answer the questions of the educational inspectors, when these 
 make their periodical visits, with regard to the school attended 
 by their cliildren, then progress, &c. ; and should piivate tuition 
 be resorted to instead of public, then to satisfy the inspectors 
 that the education given comes up to the prescribed standard 
 for the Government schools. Even m the "wildest parts of 
 Norway it is difficult to find a pei'son who cannot write a faii'ly
 
 40 
 
 legible hand, and scarce one that cannot read the Bible, which 
 is their constant study. 
 
 There it very little of importance to remark on in this 
 army, and, moreover, my time was so limited when I reached 
 Norway that I had little leisure to do more than examme and 
 inquire into the general organization and more prominent 
 details, which will be found in the attached " General Report." 
 The misfortune of being but slightly acquainted with the 
 somewhat similar, but yet in many points, more especially of 
 pronunciation, very different languages of the three countries, 
 and the absence of any official pubhshed works on the organi- 
 zation and various military institutions, made it somewhat 
 difficult to get readily at the information necessary for compihng 
 these reports, and to analyze the material kindly placed at my 
 disposal by the respective miHtary authorities. Such as they 
 are, however, they give a fairly accm^ate account of the 
 military force at the present moment, nor is there much 
 probability of any proximate change, unless indeed any com- 
 promise is effected in the present Swedish Diet on the army 
 question of that country. 
 
 In conclusion, I would beg to express my sense of the kind 
 manner in which I was received, and of the attention shown 
 to me by the War Departments of the three countries, the 
 representatives of which afforded me every faciHty possible for 
 prosecutmg my inquiries, and furthered my object in every 
 way in their power. 
 
 William S. Cooke, 
 
 Toj)ographical Department, Captain, 22nd Regiment, 
 
 Horse Guards, War Office, D.A.Q.M.G. 
 
 November 1874.
 
 -flaobe 
 
 P
 
 Sketch sheivuu3 the. approcclntate positvon of the three, ckannels . The. s0u.th.er7v '^"^v 1 s i<' ie^ l&ft operv to sJtLps. 
 
 draw I no n w 5 fP of water. The cervtraL choLnnei/ wiii he hanJced/ cuitL rrbutnaL cus soon, as the Fortress of FrederuJcsbp. 
 
 is completed The r.crt/iern is already barred. 
 
 A N 
 
 B /^rederlck^borq Isla*uL 
 
 C WtLOftwlm Fortress, defkridtn*^ Central Fas sttqe 
 
 D.^ FrecLerLokshora Fortress.^ noiv oen^*ncijunn) to de/rndr SovLUberTvPasstiqe 
 E.— Hciuid- Tcwcr on- opposite bcuhk, of f.ka7uvel'( of I'&ry oUC daiej. 
 F. — Batteries corruna/uUrLO CvitraL Chojuv&h- 
 
 r
 
 Plate II 
 
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 ^■•'P-f^;^
 
 MEMORANDUM 
 
 ON THE 
 
 SYSTEM OF MILITARY EDUCATION 
 IN AUSTRIA. 
 
 (f'ojipiled at the topogeaphical and statistical defarxmeyt 
 
 of the w\k office, by captain ^v. s. cookf, 
 
 22nd regiment.) 
 
 1372, 
 
 LO-NDON : 
 
 Printed for IIfe Majesty's Stationery Office, 
 
 BY irAREISON & SONS, 
 
 Printers in Ordinary to Htr Majesty. 
 
 1872.
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The following Memorandum on the Austrian System of 
 Military Education has been compiled by Captain W. S. Cooke, 
 22nd Regiment, in the Topographical and Statistical Department, 
 from the instructions published by the Austrian War Department, 
 for the use of the various Regimental Schools (" Instruction fiir 
 "die Truppen-Schulen, des K. K. Heeres"). 
 
 At a time when our own system of Military Education is 
 attracting so much attention, that of Austria, which has been 
 entirely re-constructed since the campaign of 1866, is well worthy 
 of examination. 
 
 Attention is specially called to Part VII, which relates to the 
 education of Officers and Cadets by a well organized system of 
 Lectures, Conferences, Essays, Reconnaissances, &c. 
 
 C. W. Wilson, 
 
 Captain, Royal Engineers. 
 
 \9th Junvarij, 1872.
 
 MEMORANDUM 
 
 ON THE SYSTEM OF 
 
 MILITARY EDUCATION IN AUSTRIA. 
 
 GENEEAL KEYIEW OF THE SYSTEM OF MILITAEY EDUCATION 
 
 IN AUSTEIA. 
 
 There are three distinct classes of schools in the military- 
 education system in Austria. 
 
 1st. The Military Colleges and Academies^ which are four in Ciass I. 
 number, viz.: — The Military 
 
 (a) The Military Technical School at Weiszkirchen, which AcadSes"'^ 
 
 supplies students for the Military Technical Academy, 
 and the Artillery Cadet School. This course is for 
 three years. At the completion of the course, those, 
 who have passed successfully, are transferred to the 
 Academ}^, as far as there are vacancies, the remainder 
 are appointed to the Artillery as Non-commissioned 
 Officers, and are admitted to the Cadet School after 
 one year's service. Students, who have not passed satis- 
 factorily, enter the Artillery as privates. The number of 
 the Students at the school is not to exceed 480. 
 
 (b) The Mihtary College at St. Polten, which supplies 
 
 Students for the Military Academy^ at Wiener-Neustadt. 
 The number of Students is not to exceed 200. The 
 course is for two years. 
 
 (c) The Military Technical Academy at Vienna, which furnishes 
 
 Officers for the Artillery, Engineers, and Pioneers. The 
 course is far four years, and the number of Students 
 limited to 280. 
 {d) The Military Academy at Wiener-Neustadt, which 
 furnishes a small proportion of the Officers for the 
 Infantry, Jagers, Cavah'y, and Pioneers. The course 
 is also for four years, and the number of Students 
 limited to 400. 
 
 Admission to both Academies is not confined to Candidates 
 from the Military Technical School and Military College, but is also 
 open to those who pass a good entrance examination, based on 
 the programme of instruction of the Upper Gymnasia and 
 Polytechnic Schools. At the termination of the course in each, 
 
 B
 
 Class II. 
 
 The Eegi- 
 
 mental 
 
 Schools. 
 
 (Tiuppen- 
 
 Schulen.) 
 
 the successful Students receive Commissions as Lieutenants, the 
 unsuccessful Students pass into the Army as Non-commissioned 
 Officers. 
 
 Admission to the Military Technical School and the Military 
 College is open to candidates who produce satisfactory certi- 
 ficates from a lower Gymnasium or Polytechnic School, or 
 failing these, pass a successful entrance examination, based on the 
 programme of instruction at these Civil Schools. 
 
 These four establishments are intended for the education of 
 sons of deserving or needy Officers of the Imperial Army. The 
 Students are divided, according as their maintenance and 
 education are paid for out of the Military Chest, the funds of 
 Charitable Institutions, or by their parents or guardians, into 
 three classes : — 
 
 (a) Military Pupils. 
 
 (b) Charity Pupils. 
 
 (c) Paying' Pupils. 
 
 The («) class is again subdivided into (« 1). Those wholly 
 dependent on the Military Chest, 
 
 {a 2). Those semi-dependent on the Military Chest, half the 
 expense being borne by their parents or guardians. 
 
 The (a 1) subdivision is eligible for all the schools. The {a 2) 
 to all excepting the Military Technical School. 
 
 A noticeable feature in these schools is the system of support 
 given by Government, or some corporation or foundation in 
 aid of the education of boys, both prior to and during their resi- 
 dence at the institutions. 
 
 The support is given in form of a stipend, which, according to 
 the nature of the case, may be either 1st or 2nd class. A stipend 
 of the 1st class gives claim to admission to the Military College 
 and the Military Academies ; a stipend of the second class to the 
 Military Technical School only, provided, of course, that the 
 prescribed qualifications for admission are fulfilled. 
 
 In the {a) and {b) classes, each boy has to sign, jointly with his 
 parents or guardians, an obligation to serve in the xArmy one year 
 over the prescribed period, for every year or part of a year passed 
 at the school. The (a 1) subdivision of class («), however, viz.: 
 those semi-dependent on the Military Chest, is required to serve 
 half a year only over the prescribed period, for each year or part 
 of a year passed at the school. Class (c) are only required to 
 serve an additional year, if their education has lasted 4 years or 
 upwards. In no case is the total service to exceed 10 years. 
 
 2nd. The Regimental Schools, the details of which are given 
 in the accompanying papers. 
 
 Each arm of the Service, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillerj^, Engineers, 
 Pioneers, Military Train, and Sanitary Corps, forms its own 
 Schools by Companies, Squadrons, or Batteries, for the training of 
 its Non-commissioned Officers and Men. 
 
 The Captains of Companies, &c., are solely responsible for the 
 schooling of their Subordinates, and are assisted by their Subal-
 
 terns, Subatitutes, Cadets, and other senior and duly qualified 
 Non-commissioned Officers. The time allowed for the training of 
 the company being only from October 1st to ^lay 31st, the 
 principal object sought is to instruct the man thoroughly in all his 
 duties as a soldier in barracks, on the march, and in the field. The 
 Captain of the Company is responsible for the complete training 
 of his men, both in school and drill, during this period, the other 
 months of the year being devoted to battalion and regimental drill, 
 field manoeuvres, &c. Marriage not being permitted in the Standing 
 Army, there are no children to be provided for, therefore, no 
 occasion for the appointment of Regimental Schoolmasters. 
 The Regimental Schools are divided into — 
 
 Part I. Schools for the Rank and File, and for the Non-com- 
 missioned Officers. 
 
 „ II. Schools for Non-commissioned Officers and Men, 
 
 for special branches. 
 „ III.* Training Schools for Non-commissioned Officers. 
 „ IV. Schools and lectures for the One-year Volunteers. 
 „ v.* Preparatory Schools. 
 „ VI.* Cadet Schools. 
 „VII. Instructive occupations for Officers and Cadets. 
 
 As before mentioned, the first four classes are established by 
 each arm of the Service. 
 
 Each Line Infantry Regiment, the Imperial Jager Regiment, 
 and every two JUger Battalions, form Preparatory Schools, in 
 which Non-commissioned Officers and Men of promising talent 
 and excellent conduct, and Regimental Pupils (Truppen-Eleven), 
 are prepared for transfer to a Cadet School. The Engineer Corps 
 also forms its own Preparatory School, but none exist in the other 
 branches of the Service. Candidates from the Cavalry, Military 
 Train, and Sanitary Corps are admitted into the Infantry Prepara- 
 tory Schools. Entrance to the Artillery and Pioneer Cadet 
 School is not dependent on qualification at a Preparatory School, 
 but on the production of satisfactory certificates from a gymnasium 
 or technical school ; or failing these, on passing a satisfactory exami- 
 nation, based on the programme of study at such schools. 
 
 The Infantry Cadet Schools are 13 in number, 6 of which are 
 also open to candidates from the Cavalry and Military Train, all to 
 candidates from the Sanitary Corps. 
 
 The Artillery, Engineers, and Pioneers, form their own Cadet 
 Schools. Excepting in the latter, where it is for four, the course 
 is for two years. 
 
 Candidates are admitted on production of the Certificate of 
 Examination of the Regimental Preparatory School, or on passing 
 an entrance examination similar to the final examination in the 
 
 * It is distinctly laid down that in these schools the theoretical insfruclion is not 
 to last for more than six hours daily, and no one study or lecture for more than an 
 hour and a half, excepting drawing, which is to be for two hours. 
 
 B 2
 
 4 
 
 Preparatory School, or on production of satisfactory certificates of 
 the course of study and examination undergone at a civil school 
 or lower gymnasium. After passing the final examination, they 
 are nominated cadets, and serve as such until their turn for pro- 
 motion to Lieutenant. 
 
 Candidates are admitted direct from civil life on passing the 
 entrance examination, or producing satisfactory certificates from 
 one of the civil schools. 
 
 The " Instructive occupations for OfHcers and Cadets/' which 
 are given in detail in Part VII., speak for themselves. Such a 
 system must be highly beneficial. The dissertations and debate's 
 on the various essays, schemes, reports, reconnaissances, &c„ 
 cannot fail to bring out and extend the power to grasp the subject 
 on hand ; the interchange of ideas tends to produce a logical 
 reasoning, and a correct solution of the various problems in the 
 game of war. Every point in these "instructive occupations" seems 
 full of instruction and adv^antage. The scheme is so comprehensive, 
 that nothing requisite for the higher development of the know- 
 ledge already possessed by the Officers and Cadets seems to be 
 lost sight of. The system of establishing Infantry Equitation 
 Schools, in which all Officers of Dismounted Corps are in turn 
 instructed in riding, in the shape of the horse, his maladies, &c., 
 is also excellent. 
 
 The paper on these " instructive occupations " is translated 
 from the Infantry section ; those for the other arms are framed 
 much on the same model ; the principle modifications in each are 
 appended. 
 
 The Cavalry form " Brigade Officers' Schools " for the special 
 training of Subaltern Officers, each Regiment in the Brigade 
 sending the six seniors who have not previously passed the 
 course. 
 
 The Artillery form Regimental Equitation Schools for the 
 training of Subalterns and Cadets in a uniform system of 
 riding, &c. 
 
 3rd. The institutions for the professional training of Officers, 
 which comprise — 
 
 {a) The War School at Vienna. 
 
 (b) The Advanced Artillery Course at Vienna. 
 
 (c) The Advanced Engineer Course at Vienna. 
 
 (d) The Central Infantry Course at Vienna. 
 
 (e) The Central Cavalry Course at Vienna. 
 {f)The Intendance Course at Vienna. 
 
 Iff) The Artillery Central Equitation School at Vienna. 
 (h) The Military Veterinary Institution at Vienna. 
 
 The War School is established with the view of training 
 Officers for the higher Commands, and for employment on the 
 General Staff. 
 
 Admission is open to all Officers not above the rank of 
 Captain, and is dependent on passing an entrance examination, 
 and a previous service of three years on active employment. At
 
 present 40 students are admitted annually, but this number is to 
 be increased. The course of study is for two years; it comprises 
 all the higher branches of military art. The hope of more rapid 
 promotion is a great inducement to Officers to qualify at the War 
 School. A Lieutenant passing out with the certificate of 
 "excellent" is promoted at once to IsL Lieutenant; Officers 
 passing out with the certificate of " very good " are placed in the 
 first category for " Promotion out of Turn." Every 4th step above 
 Field Rank, and every 6th below it, is given by promotion out of 
 turn; in fact, by selection. It is open to Officers to qualify 
 themselves for the first category of promotion by passing the 
 final examination at the War School, without having gone through 
 the course, but it is of very rare occurrence. 
 
 The Chief of the Staff is President of the School, the total 
 strength of the Staff of Superintending Officers, Professors, 
 House-servants, and Riding Establishment, is 57 persons, and 30 
 horses. 
 
 The Advanced Artillery Course, the Advanced Engineer m^ . , , 
 
 Course, and the Intendance Course, have been lately re-organized. Artillery and 
 and are not yet permanently determined. They are all under the Engineer 
 control of the ISIilitary Technical and Administrative Committee, bourses, and 
 whose special duty it is to collect all information, and act as j^^jg Com-gg. 
 advisers to the Government in all matters bearing on the technical 
 and administrative business in the Artillery, Engineers, and Liteu- 
 dance. The Committee is in immediate correspondence with the 
 War Minister. The President superintends the three courses, 
 the Instructors being selected from the Officers composing the 
 several sections of the Committee. 
 
 Candidates for admission to any one of the courses must have 
 a previous service of at least two years, and for the Artillery and 
 Engineer Courses, be under the rank of Captain. 
 
 The object sought is to train Officers of special aptitude for 
 qualification for employment in the scientific branches of their 
 several Arms. 
 
 Candidates for admission to the Intendance Course may be 
 either Captains of Infantry or Cavalry, or Accountants, and must 
 not be more than 36 years of age. 
 
 The course is for two years, the object being to train men for 
 employment in the Intendance. 
 
 The instruction is both practical and theoretical, the students 
 being required to attend all experiments, and visit all objects of 
 miUtary interest and importance in Vienna or the vicinity, and, at 
 the completion of the course, to travel through the several 
 kingdoms forming the Reich srath, in company with the instructors, 
 for the purpose of inspecting the technical and manufacturing 
 establishments. 
 
 Officers are permitted to attend this course as extra students, 
 provided there is room, and no expense is incurred by the Govern- 
 ment. When travelling for instruction, they must pay their own 
 expenses.
 
 The Artillery 
 Central 
 Equitation 
 School. 
 
 Officers attending the Advanced Artillery or Engineer Courses, 
 who at the tnal examination gain the certificate of " Excellent," 
 are at once promoted, those who are reported '' qualified " are 
 placed in the first category for promotion. 
 
 The Central Infantry Course is established with the view of 
 training the Senior Captains of Infantry in the higher branches of 
 Military art, and of enabling them to qualify for " Promotion out 
 " of Turn." It is also open to them to qualify for this class 
 of promotion by passing the final examiration without having 
 previously gone through the course. A certificate of "Excellent/' 
 in addition to high practical qualifications, is necessary to render 
 the Officer eligible for the first category. 
 
 All Captains have to attend in turn, those only being excepted 
 who have passed the War School, or the Advanced Artillery or 
 Engineer Course, or have undergone the final examination at either. 
 
 There is no examination for admission. The course lasts for 
 eleven months, from November 1st to September 30th. The 
 total strength of the Staflf of Superintending Officers, Professors, 
 House -servants, and Riding Establishment, is 27 persons and 
 10 horses. The number of Officers attending the course is fixed 
 annually by the War Ministry. 
 
 At the final examination, the Officers are classified in two Lists, 
 those who have gained the certificate of " Excellent" are placed in 
 the first category for " Promotion out of Turn""; those who are 
 reported "Qualified" are placed on the List for " Promotion by 
 S(Miiority." Those on the 1st List are permitted to enter the War 
 School for the second year's course as extra students. All Officers 
 must pass the final exatnination at the Infantry School before 
 they can be promoted. Those failing to qualify are passed over, 
 when it comes to their turn. 
 
 The Central Cavalry Course is an institution for the training 
 of Cavalry Officers, as the foregoing is for that of Infantry. 
 
 The Instructors at the Brigade Officers' School are usually taken 
 from Officers, who have passed the Central Cavalry course. 
 
 The Stafli^" of the School consists of 61 persons and 4 horses. 
 The Students bring their own horses with them. 
 
 All Captains of Cavalry must pass the final examination, 
 whether they have gone through the course or not, before they can 
 obtain promotion. The certificate of ^' Excellent " renders them 
 eligible for promotion out of turn, and also for admission as extra 
 students to the second year's covu'se at the War School. 
 
 The Artillery Central Equitation School is established with 
 the view to training Instructors for the Regimental Riding 
 Schools, and to ensure a uniform system being adopted in riding, 
 driving, &c. 
 
 The number of Officers attending this course, varies according 
 to circumstances, but it is intended that it should be limited to 1.5, 
 each of the 12 Regiments of Field Artillery sending one Officer, 
 and the Garrison Artillery Battalions three between them. 
 
 The school is attached as an independent Corps to the 11th 
 R'?^-imcnt of Field Artillery.
 
 Each Field Artillery Regiment sends, yearl}', three Privates 
 and four Remo\nits. The whole Artillery Corps has also to furnish 
 a Staff of 13 Professional Soldiers, eight of whom as Rough Riders, 
 two Farriers, one Saddler, one Tailor, and one Shoemaker. 
 The Remount Depot is required to send 12 remount draught 
 horses. 
 
 The Officers attending the school, must be below the rank of 
 Captain, and are selected for their phj'sical and moral qualifications. 
 They must have a natural aptitude for riding, &c., be of excellent 
 character, and possess an inate ability for imparting instruc- 
 tion. They must also have passed satisfactorily a course at one of 
 Regimental Equitation Schools. 
 
 They are admitted at first on a month's probation ; if, during 
 this time, they do not show the necessary qualifications they are 
 sent back to their Regiments. 
 
 The course is for eleven months, commencing with May 1st. 
 Tlie Students of the Artillery Cadet School attend for riding drill. 
 Riding, driving, and the breaking of horses ; harnessing, the care 
 of horses, the study of their anatomy, age, &c. ; the principles of 
 shoeing, the treatment of the common forms of disease ; 
 the elements of construction of carriages, the theory of draught ; 
 practical exercises on the march, &c., and the art of imparting 
 instruction in riding, form the principle subjects of study. 
 
 A trial examination is held, at which the qualifications of the 
 Officers are ascertained and reported on. 
 
 The Military Veterinary Institute trains men as Veterinary rpj^^ Military 
 Surgeons, for employment both in military and civil life, and also Veterinary 
 supplies thoroughly qualified farriers to the Army. Institute. 
 
 A Veterinary Hospital is attached to the Institute, in which 
 horses are received for treatment. 
 
 The Institute can grant Diplomas to Veterinary Surgeons 
 and Farriers, after passing an examination, subjecting them to a 
 very severe test. 
 
 It is conducted by a Committee of Direction, and is under the 
 control of a Commandant, who is immediately subordinate to the 
 War Minister. A Director of Studies is also appointed, who is 
 in direct correspondence with the Civil Departments of the 
 Government. The total Staff of the Institute consists of 84 
 persons. 
 
 Admission is subject to an entrance examination, held by a 
 Board, appointed by the AVar Minister, in October. The Civil 
 Students at the school enjoy the same privileges as the One-year 
 Volunteers. There are three courses : — 
 
 1st. A six months' course for Shocing-smiths, commencing on 
 January 2nd and July 1st of each year, for those 
 Candidates wishing to qualify as Shoeing-smiths. 
 
 2nd. A two years' course for Farriers, commencing on Novem- 
 ber 1st. The Candidate must be able to read and write, 
 and have a thorough knowledge of the German 
 Language.
 
 In these two courses the period spent at the Institute does not 
 count for service with the colours. 
 
 3rd. A three years' course for Veterinary Surgeons and Farriers 
 who have not passed their 30th year. 
 
 The 1st and 2nd courses are for men selected from the Army. 
 The 3rd for Candidates both from military and civil life. The time 
 spent at the Institute does not count for service. Men who have 
 previously obtained diplomas at other Veterinary Establishments 
 may pass it in two years. 
 
 William S. Cooke, 
 
 Captain, 22nd Regiment.
 
 Precis of the " Instruction fur die Truppen-Schulen des 
 " K. K. Heeresr Containing Parts I, II, III, IV, F, 
 and VI, of the Infantry Section, viz. : — 
 
 Part I. — Company Schools for the Rank 
 and File, and for Non-commissioned 
 Officers. 
 
 Part II. — Schools for Non-commissioned 
 Olilcers and Men for Special Branches. 
 
 Part ITT.^Training Schools for Non- 
 commissioned Oiilcers. 
 
 Part IV. — Schools and Lectures for the 
 One-year Volunteers. 
 
 Part V. — Preparatory Schools. 
 
 Part VI.— Cadet Schools. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Company Schools for the Rank and File, and for the 
 Ngn-Cowmissioned Officers. 
 
 The period from the commencement of the Recruits' Drill, in General 
 October, to the end of May, is appointed for the training of the Conditions, 
 company. 
 
 The Company School for the Rank and File is established for 
 the purpose of giving the soldier a thorough training in the duties 
 of his profession theoretically, as well as practically : the Com- 
 pany School for Non-commissioned Officers, for the purpose of 
 impressing on the Non-commissioned Officers attending it, the 
 responsibilities of their posts by extending their knowledge, and 
 of training a thoroughly competent set of private soldiers to fill 
 the Non-commissioned Officer ranks. 
 
 As the drilling of the Recruits fully employs a considerable 
 number of the Non-commissioned Officers and older soldiers till 
 the latter part of November, the theoretical schools do not open 
 till December 1st. They may be closed at any time, but the 
 course must be completed by the end of May. 
 
 At the termination of the Recruits' Drill in November, the 
 Captain of the Company employs the intervening time up to 
 the opening of the schools in training the Senior Serjeants to act 
 as Instructors. 
 
 He is solely responsible for the training of his men ; per- 
 fect freedom and independence are therefore to be allowed him, 
 and he alone has the power of framing the programme and dis- 
 tributing the time, in accordance with the limitations prescribed. 
 
 Cramming and learning by heart are to be specially avoided; 
 to arouse a power of thought and reflection is the great aim of the
 
 10 
 
 schools, so that, whatever it may be, the man may comprehend 
 the value of what he does, and express clearly and in few words 
 the object and meaning of his various duties. 
 
 This can only he attained by the very closest combination of 
 theory and practice. Only what it is absolutely impossible to 
 demonstrate practically, must be left to pure theory : in all else 
 theory and practice must walk hand in hand. 
 
 The moral education of his men must occupy the attention of 
 the Company Commander not less than their practical and 
 theoretical training. He must therefore avail himself of every 
 opportunity of impressing on them the value of strict disci- 
 pline, unconditional obedience, an honourable feeling, and true 
 military spirit; the requisite attributes of the soldier both on and 
 off duty. 
 
 In the Company Schools, Reports are to be framed daily, 
 detailing the subjects of instruction and the men attending. At 
 the end of the course the qualifications of each student are 
 registered in a few words, and serve as a guide for future promotion 
 or employment. 
 
 The schools are held in the men's rooms, the men appearing 
 in regimentals, with side-arms, the cap being taken off during the 
 instruction. 
 Special Eegu- All soldiers who are not required to enter the Company Schools 
 lations for the for Non-commissioned Officers or the Non-commissioned Officers' 
 SchooL^for Training Schools, must attend the Company Schools for the Rank 
 Rank and File, and File. 
 
 The instruction is carried out by the Company Officers, Sub- 
 stitutes, Cadets, and other duly qualified Non-commissioned 
 Officers, in accordance with orders prescribed by the Colonel of 
 the Regiment, excepting in matters relating specially to the 
 soldiers' duties in barracks, which is imparted by the Serjeants of 
 the Company Sections.* 
 
 The whole Company is either instructed together in the 
 German language, or, when several nationalities occur in the 
 Company, in divisions. It is obligatory on the soldier to leai-n the 
 words of Command and the names of all subjects most necessary 
 to him in the German tongue. 
 
 In the 4th and 5th Battalions of the Regiment, the permanent 
 strength being very small, the schools for Rank and File are 
 carried on by Battalions at the discretion of the Reserve Com- 
 mandant. 
 
 The instruction embraces the following heads : — 
 
 Orders and Regulations. 
 
 All the prescribed duties of the soldier, service regula- 
 tions, &c. 
 General duties of each rank. 
 
 * The Austrian Company is composed of 4 sections (Ziige).
 
 11 
 
 Special regulations for the Infantry tJoldier, Rifleman, 
 
 Company Drummer, Bugler, &c. 
 Instruction in the conduct of Courts-Martial, Military 
 
 and Civil Law. 
 On the daily routine of duty, various periodical duties and 
 
 all other special duties. 
 Saluting. 
 Garrison Duty. 
 Duty on the Line of March. 
 Barrack Service. 
 Marching Regulations. 
 Railway and Steamboat Service. 
 
 Drill Instruction. 
 Knowledge of the word of Command. 
 The Drum and Bugle Calls. 
 Theoretical Training in the employment of the Soldier 
 
 in Skirmishing, so far as is needed to supplement his 
 
 practical instruction. 
 
 Service in the Field. 
 
 The Special Duties of the Soldier in Camp. 
 
 Discipline on the Line of March in time of War, Duties on 
 
 Patrol, on Outpost, in the Field, in time of Repose, or 
 
 on the March, in Action, and other special operations. 
 (The instruction to be given theoretically to supplement 
 
 the previous practical instruction.) 
 Special importance is laid on a correct delivery of orders, 
 
 both in writing and verbally. 
 
 In Musketry Drill. 
 
 Knowledge of the several parts of the Rifle, their object 
 
 and uses, also of the cleaning articles. 
 Care, cleaning, taking to pieces and putting together 
 
 again of the Rifle. 
 Care of the ammunition ; loading, &c. 
 The rudiments of aiming and trajectory. 
 
 In addition to these heads, instruction is given from the 
 " Articles of War" and the '* Army Regulations;" on the Duties 
 and prescribed Orders for men on Furlough, and of the Reserve ; 
 on the general organization of the Army, specially that of the 
 Regimental system ; on matters relating to the health of the soldier, 
 and the rendering of assistance in case of accidents. 
 
 The Serjeants finally instruct the men in the following points : — 
 
 Barrack Discipline. 
 Dress. 
 
 Care of Clothing, Arms, Equipment and necessaries. 
 To know their Superiors by rank, name, and their several 
 duties. 
 The Company Drummers and Buglers must also attend the
 
 Schools. 
 
 12 
 
 School, and receive special instruction from the Battalion Drum 
 or Trumpet Major, in hours fixed for the purpose, under the super- 
 vision of the Adjutant. 
 
 Officers' Servants have also to attend. 
 Special Eegu- W[ Non-commissioncd Officers, including Lance-Corporals, 
 Company Non^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^"^^ Private Soldiers as may be selected by the Company 
 commissioned Commanders for future promotion to Non-commissioned Officers, in 
 Officers' consequence of individual ability, zeal, and earnest good-will, and 
 
 who are not required to attend the Regimental or Battalion Training 
 Schools for Non-commissioned Officers, must enter the Company 
 Non-commissioned Officers' Schools. 
 
 The Company Commander conducts the instruction himself, 
 assisted, when possible, by one or other of the Company Officers, 
 to whom he assigns certain branches, or sometimes a division of 
 the students ; he is further assisted by duly qualified Cadets or 
 some of the senior Non-commissioned Officers, who may be 
 charged with the repetition of any one subject with the 
 younger students. 
 
 The instruction is given, when practicable, in German, but may 
 be arranged according to the several nationalities of the students. 
 The Non-commissioned Officers and Men must, however, 
 master the rudiments of the German language, and be able to 
 make themselves understood in it, and to give orders in it. 
 The instruction comprises : — 
 
 Orders and Regulations. 
 
 In addition to the instruction given in the Company Schools 
 for the Rank and File, all orders and regulations comprised in the 
 sphere of duty of a Non-commissioned Officer, the special duties 
 of the Soldier up to the rank of Serjeant and Serjeant-Major, and 
 further the prescribed regulations for the conduct of Non-com- 
 missioned Officers' inspections. 
 
 In Drill. 
 
 Section Drill in close and skirmishing order, and Company 
 drill, so far as to be able to command a section when forming 
 part of a Company. 
 
 Special stress is to be laid on the training of the Non- 
 commissioned Officers to command small detachments of all 
 kinds, and particularly on the training of all ranks in the art of 
 skirmishing. 
 
 In Field Service. 
 
 Duties in Camp, discipline on the Line of March in time of 
 war, Patrol and Outpost duty in the Field, both in time of repose 
 and on the Line of March, duties in Action, and in other special 
 operations, so far as they relate to the Non-commissioned Officers' 
 Rank. 
 
 Thorough practice in the delivery of verbal orders, and the 
 framing of correct and precise written information respecting any 
 dispositions made.
 
 13 
 
 The reading of maps and plans, so as to be able to trace and 
 distinguish roads, paths, hills, and plains, watercourses, bridges, 
 houses, &c. 
 
 Also to be able to draw roughly and delineate on paper the 
 route to be taken on patrol, marking the more important objects 
 which may serve as a guide. 
 
 In Musketry. 
 
 All matters connected with the use and cave of the rifle and 
 ammunition; aiming and trajectory. 
 
 In Army Organization. 
 
 The organization and tactical distribution of the Army in 
 general, and his own special branch in particular. 
 
 Further, all those, who are not already proficient, are taught to 
 read quickly various handwritings, to write a clear and legible 
 hand, the four elementary rules of Arithmetic, to compile such 
 returns as come within the province of a Non-commissioned Officer's 
 duties, and to make written reports and accounts. 
 
 The Articles of War are read out usually once a-week to the 
 whole Company. 
 
 Aiming Drill, Judging Distance, and Target Practice, are to 
 be carried on whenever practicable, also Bayonet Exercise, Gym- 
 nastics, &c. 
 
 The men are also to be trained in Jumping, Climbing, and 
 Running in full marching order. 
 
 Three or four Non-commissioned Officers or Lance-Corporals 
 in each Company are trained as Instructors in Gymnastics, and 
 all athletic exercises. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Schools for Non-commissioxed Officers and Men for 
 Special Branches. 
 
 A certain number of Non-commissioned Officers and Men are p^r the Duties 
 trained annually in the special duties of Pioneers. In the three of Pioneers. 
 Field Battalions of a Line Infantiy Regiment two Corporals per 
 Battalion and three Privates per Company go through a course of 
 instruction. The 4th and 5tli Battalions do not furnish men for 
 instruction in this branch. 
 
 Non-commissioned Officers and Men in their first years 
 Service are, if possible, to be selected for this training; they must 
 possess the necessary physical qualifications, and should be chosen
 
 14 
 
 from those wlio have been accustomed to this khid of work by their 
 previous calling. One forester and two agricultural labourers are 
 usually taken from each Company. 
 
 The Commanding Officer entrusts the instruction to an Officer 
 possessing the necessary practical and theoretical qualifications. 
 
 The theoretical instruction is carried on three times a-week, 
 for an hour and a half each time, between December 1st and 
 May 3] St. 
 
 The first three months are devoted exclusively to the training 
 of the Non-commissioned Officers and those Private Soldiers, 
 who are selected for promotion : these men are subsequently em- 
 ])loycd in charge of the working parties at the practical instruction. 
 On March 1st the preliminary training for the practical 
 execution of Pioneer work is commenced. All the men selected 
 for Pioneers attend the instruction, which comprises the most 
 simple fundamental principles, the tracing of ordinary field w^orks 
 and the method of placing houses, &c., in a state of defence. 
 
 The instruction is carried on at the Regimental Head-Quarters, 
 but must not interfere with the progress of the other Regimental 
 Schools, nor are the men exempted from drill and other duties. 
 
 The practical training begins on June 1st, and lasts for two 
 months ; five working hours are assigned for each day's instruc- 
 tion ; the men are exempted during these two months from all 
 drills and other duties. When practicable, the training is carried on 
 with the nearest detachment of a Technical Corps, and under the 
 direction of the Officers of that branch. If no such detachment 
 is in the vicinity, the necessary plant and tools are supplied from 
 a fund, in aid of which a certain fixed sum is granted annually to 
 each regiment, but when possible the plant of the Technical Corps 
 is to be used. 
 
 At the manoeuvres, the men under training are en)ployed 
 in their special duties. 
 
 At the termination of the practical training, the Officer in 
 Charge is required to send in a report to the Officer Commanding 
 on the efficiency of the men of the Regiment who have under- 
 gone the course of instruction. 
 For the Duties Each Company of Infantry and Jiigers is required to send 
 O P"f-^*^^^ annually one Corporal and three to four Privates, who are in 
 Bearers of their third (consequently last) year's service, to undergo a course 
 Stretchers and of training in these duties, at the Regimental or Battalion Head- 
 Wounded. Quarters, under the Surgeon -Major. 
 
 The instruction is carried on twice a-week, for an hour and a 
 half or two hours each time, and generally lasts for six weeks, a 
 report on the efficiency of the men being made to the Commanding 
 Officer at the completion of the course. 
 For the Duties A school of instruction is established at the nearest Military 
 of the Train. Train Squadron, to which each Infantry Regiment of the Line is 
 required to send annually one Non-commissioned Officer to 
 undergo a three months' training, from January 1st to March 30th, as 
 Wagon-Master ; one Private (who by calling is saddle-maker, 
 collar-maker, or boot-maker-) for a six weeks' training in his
 
 15 
 
 trade, from February 16th to March 30th; and one Private 
 (a smith by calHng) for a three months' training in farriery, &c., 
 from January 1st to March 30th. Each Jager BattaUon is re- 
 quired to furnish a similar number of men, but only every second 
 year. At the completion of the course, the Military Train Com- 
 mander makes a report to the Officer Commanding the Regiment, 
 on the efficiency of the men. 
 
 A certain number of men are trained annually as Drivers, at 
 the Regimental Head-Quarters, by the Wagon- Masters who have 
 undergone a course of instruction with the Military Train. The 
 training is confined to a knowledge of the various parts of the 
 wagons, the harness, and putting to of the horses, &c., when Troopers 
 are available. 
 
 Each Infantry Regiment of the Line is required to furnish Duties of the 
 annually two, each Jager Battalion one, Non-commissioned Officer Gendarmerie. 
 or man for training in the Field Gendarmerie Service. 
 
 These men are assembled in Detachments, and put through 
 a course of instruction by specially appointed Officers, both 
 previous to, and during the larger manoeuvres, in Camps, &c. 
 
 At the termination of their training, the men return to their 
 Corps, or are placed on the strength of the Depot, or Reserve 
 Establishment. 
 
 Commanding Officers of Regiments, or Battalions, are required 
 to send in annually to the War Ministry a report on those men 
 who have undergone this course of training. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Training Schools for Non-commissioned Officers are established Nou-commis- 
 at the discretion of Regimental Commanders, according to re- sionedOtEcers' 
 quirements. Battalions separated from the Regimental Head- Training 
 Quarters may establish Training Schools of their own. 
 
 In these Schools all men selected by the Company Com- 
 manders tor future promotion to the Non-commissioned Officer 
 ranks, and who are approved of by the Regimental Commander, 
 but who do not possess sufficient proficiency to enter the 
 Company Non-commissioned Officers' Schools, are trained for 
 Non-commissioned Officers. 
 
 The School opens on December 1st, and the duration of 
 the course is fixed by the Regimental Commander according to 
 the progress and proficiency of the men under instruction, but on 
 no account is it to extend beyond the end of May. 
 
 By the end of the course the men must have made them- 
 selves so far acquainted with tlie duties of a Non-commissioned 
 Officer, and otherwise qualified themselves, that they may be 
 employed to fill any posts that may be assigned to them, 
 and require further instruction in the elementary subjects of 
 study only.
 
 16 
 
 To enable them to attain tliis standard, the men under instruc- 
 tion are exempted from all company duties during the covirse, and 
 the periods of study are increased. 
 
 The instruction is carried out in all branches by a specially 
 qualified officer, who is assisted, if necessary, in the elementary- 
 sections, viz., Reading, Writing, Summing, and the German 
 Language, by one or more Cadets or Non-commissioned Officers. 
 
 The School is under the immediate supervision of the Regi- 
 mental Commander ; he fixes the days and hours of attendance, 
 assigns a suitable recreation ground, and apportions the time for 
 practical instruction in the open air. 
 
 The programme, combining theory with practice, is similar to 
 that for the Company Non-commissioned Officers' Schools, special 
 care being taken by the officer to whom the school is entrusted 
 that the importance of maintaining discipline, morality, an honour- 
 able feeling, and true Military spirit is impressed on the Students. 
 
 The instruction is imparted in the German language, as soon 
 as the Students have made sufficient proficiency in it ; otherwise in 
 the national dialect of the Regiment or Battalion. 
 
 The following elementary branches are taught in addition to 
 the subjects forming the programme of the Company Non-com- 
 missioned Officers' Schools : — 
 
 The German Language. 
 
 Writing from dictation and fair copy" 
 
 Reading and. . 
 
 Summins: . . . . 
 
 In the national dialect, 
 and, as far 2s possible, in 
 the German Language. 
 
 At the termination of the course the Regimental Commander 
 holds an examination in presence of the Battalion and Company 
 Commanders, after which the Students are classified according to 
 their capabilities, diligence, and progress in the several subjects of 
 instruction as *' Excellent," "Very Good," "Good," or " Un- 
 '' satisfactory." 
 
 Accountants' 
 Schools (Pay- 
 Serjeants). 
 
 Accountants^ Schools. 
 
 Every Company is required to have at least one Non- 
 commissioned Officer trained for the post of Accountant Serjeant- 
 Major (Pay Serjeant). 
 
 To this end, whenever a fresh vacancy occurs, a Non-com- 
 missioned Officer or Soldier, possessing the requisite qualifications 
 in reading, writing, and accounts, is to be practically trained, for 
 the duties of accountant. 
 
 He is instructed in the regulations relating to administration 
 and book-keeping by the Accountant Serjeant-Major (Pay-Serjeant) 
 and takes part in his work, thus acquiring practical acquaintance 
 with the duties of the office. He is not, however, exempted from 
 drill or any company duty. 
 
 During the Winter months the Commanding Officer may 
 assemble the men so selected in each company, and have them
 
 17 
 
 trained in the duties of Pay-Serjeant at the Non-commissioned 
 Officers' Training School at Head-Quarters, in order to ensure an 
 uniform system being adopted. 
 
 The Commanding Officer regulates the sphere of instruction 
 and its duration as he thinks fit; it must he held two or three 
 times a-week in the afternoon or evening, and is conducted 1)\' an 
 officer, usuallj^ the Junior Paymaster, or by a specially qualified 
 Pay Serjeant under his superintendence. 
 
 Where a Non-commissioned Officers' Training School is estab- 
 lished, the room given up to it may be used, otherwise one of the 
 men's rooms must be taken temporarily. 
 
 In Regiments or Corps, vvhere a sufficient number of men pos- 
 sessing the requisite qualifications for filling up the vacancies in 
 the office of Pay Serjeant cannot be found, and whicii have no 
 Non-commissioned Officers' Training School, separate Accountant 
 Schools may be established. 
 
 In these, instruction is given in all branches and duties rclatinty 
 to Kegimental interior economy and admii 'titration, and in 
 company accounts, in addition to elementary instruction in 
 grammar, composition, orthography, and summing. 
 
 These s'^hools commence on December 1st, and close as soon 
 as the men have attained the requisite standard; they are in no 
 case to remain open beyond four months. 
 
 During the course the men under instruction are given up 
 entirely to it, and are relieved from guard and other duties. 
 
 The Commanding Officer details an officer as superintendent, 
 and, if necessary, a Non-commissioned Officer to assist him. 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 Schools and Lectures for the One-Year 
 Volunteers. 
 
 The Schooling of the One-year Volunteers is to take place, as far General Con- 
 as possible, apart from the Non-commissioned Officers and men. ditions. 
 The instruction is to be entrusted to a thoroughly qualified officer, 
 and if the number of students is large one or more additional 
 officers with a certain staff of Non-commissioned Officers may be 
 be detailed to assist him. 
 
 In all matters of duty and discipline the One-year Volunteers 
 rank with the remainder of the Company. The conditions of the 
 Service require that they shall attain such a standard in Military 
 training and educational knowledge by the termination of the 
 Winter Course, that they may be fit for employment in various 
 Non-commissioned Officers' posts within 14 days of the opening 
 of the drill season. During the short time available for their 
 Military Schooling, they must, therefore, go through the course of 
 instruction prescribed for the Schools for the Rank and File, and 
 
 c
 
 1; 
 
 Lectures for 
 those Volun- 
 teers wlio 
 aspire to Com- 
 missioned 
 Eank in the 
 Eeserve. 
 
 for the Non-commissioned Officers. After the first 14 days of the 
 drill season, they are distributed in various Non-commissioned 
 Officers^ posts, and those who aspire to become Officers of 
 Reserve, and who must therefore be placed in Commissioned 
 Officers' posts during the latter part of the Summer, must further 
 acquire the necessary subjects for qualification, under the In- 
 structors of a Preparatory School. 
 
 For this purpose lectures, commencing with December 1st, 
 are arranged so as to enable the volunteers to attend both courses, 
 I.e., the course necessary for qualification for the post of a Non- 
 commissioned Officer, and also that necessary for the post of an 
 officer, both courses to be completed by the commencement of 
 the manoeuvres. 
 
 Should an aspirant to commissioned rank be guilty of any 
 serious breach of good conduct or discipline during the period of 
 his Military Schooling, he may be disqualified for candidature to 
 the post of Office'', of Eeserve, and be reduced to the lower class, 
 viz., that in Avhich the Volunteers are not aspirants to the post of 
 Commissioned Officers of Reserve. 
 
 These lectures comprise the following subjects : — 
 
 Military Style (Reports, Correspondence, &c.) 
 
 Topography. 
 
 Military Drawing. 
 
 Practical Surveying. 
 
 Pioneer Duties. 
 
 Fortification. 
 
 Study of the Arms in Use. 
 
 Tactics and Field Service., 
 
 Military Administration. 
 
 Army Organization. 
 
 Drill Regulations. 
 
 Army Regulations. 
 
 The same text books are used as at the Cadet School. In 
 large garrison towns the Volunteers of all the Regiments quartered 
 in them may be assembled at one place for these lectures. 
 Examinations. The Examination of aspirants to Commissioned Rank in the 
 Reserve takes place between September 15th and October 
 15th. 
 
 The Board consists of — 
 
 The Brigadier, as President. 
 Members. 
 
 The Chief of the Staff of the Division. 
 Two Field Officers of the Division. 
 The Commandant and two Instructors of the Cadet 
 School at the Station. 
 
 If there is no Cadet School at the station, three Regimental 
 Officers of the Preparatory School are to sit on the Board in place 
 of the three last mentioned. 
 
 As laid down for the Cadet 
 School.
 
 19 
 
 The Volunteers are examined practically and theoretically in 
 all the subjects above mentioned, and also in the German laii<;uao'e ; 
 and are also required to write an essay from the sphere of duty of a 
 subaltern officer to test their knowledge of military style. 
 
 The List of Precedence is determined by marks, for the certifi- 
 cate of '•' Excellent/' a total of 80 is necessary, for " Qualified," 60. 
 
 The Volunteers who do not aspire to ofticer's rank are examined 
 by a Board, consisting of OT«e Field Officer, and two Captains of 
 the Regiment, which decides whether, and for what posts in the 
 Non-commissionpd Officer rank, they are qualified. 
 
 One-year Volunteers, who have failed to qualify for Commis- 
 sioned Officers' Rank in the Reserve, may present themselves for 
 re-examination after one year, but they cannot be allowed a third 
 trial except under exceptional circumstances. 
 
 PART V. 
 
 The object of the Preparatory Schools is to prepare Soldiers, or Preparatory 
 Regimental Pupils, of promising talent and ability, but who as Schools, 
 yet are not qualified for direct entrance to a Cadet School, for 
 transfer to it. With this view one such school is established at 
 the Head-Quarters of each Line Infantry Regiment and of every 
 two Jiiger Battalions. 
 
 Soldiers from the Cavalry and Military Train desirous of Composition 
 qualifving themselves for entrance into a Cadet School, are ad- and Or^^'auiza- 
 mitted, unc'er certain circumstances, into the Preparatory School *^'^^" 
 of an adjacent Line Lifaiitrv Regiment. 
 
 The Commandant of a Preparatory School is held responsible 
 that in each year a proportionate number of students is prepared 
 for transfer to a Cadet School, in order to fill the vacancies 
 occurring. 
 
 The number of students is not limited, for, though many of 
 them may be unable to qualify for transfer to the Cadet School, 
 yet, if thoroughly conversant with the military branches of instruc- 
 tion, they may, in times of emergency, make valuable Non- 
 commissioned Officers. 
 
 Entrance into a Preparatory School is dependent on passing Conditions for 
 an Examination, which, for Candidates from the ranks, takes place Entrance. 
 in the end of October, for Candidates entering as Regimental 
 Pupils, in the latter part of September. 
 
 Each Candidate has to show that he possesses such capal)ilities 
 as will enable him to profit by the instruction imparted at the 
 school. 
 
 A thorough knowledge of German is not required, but he must 
 he so far conversant with it as to be able to follow and under- 
 stand the lectures given in it. 
 
 c 2
 
 20 
 
 staff of 
 Instructors 
 &c., in the 
 Pieparatory 
 School. 
 
 The entrance Examination takes place at the Preparatory 
 School. 
 
 The Board of Examination consists of the Commandant and 
 Instructors of the School, and of two Regimental Officers. 
 
 At the close of the Examination, they report immediately 
 upon each Candidate, stating whether he is unanimously found 
 " Qualified," or by a majority of votes only. 
 
 Candidates found " Not Qualified " may, if they desire it, 
 come up for examination a second time after the lapse of one 
 year. 
 
 The Staff of Instructors, &c., is appointed by the Commander of 
 the Regiment, and comprises : — 
 
 One Captain as Commandant. 
 
 Two Subalterns as Instructors. 
 
 One IN on -commissioned Officer to assist in Superin- 
 tendence; and 
 
 A certain number of Soldiers for household purposes, 
 usually one to every five Students. 
 
 This Staff is exempted from all Regimental or Garrison Duty, 
 with the exception of the Commandant who still remains in charge 
 of his Company. 
 
 When necessary to attach additional officers as Instructors in 
 special subjects, these are not exempted from Regimental duty. 
 
 The Commandant is not only in Military charge of the 
 Students, Staff, &c., but is also Director of the theoretical and 
 practical instruction ; he conducts the instruction himself in 
 various branches, and thus obtains the most thorough knowledge 
 of the capabilities, zeal, and diligence of each Student. 
 
 He frames the programme of study, in conjunction with the 
 Instructors, and distributes the time, &c., subject to the approval of 
 the Commander of the Regiment. 
 
 Special attention is to be directed against useless cramming, 
 or learning by heart; every opportunity is to be given to the 
 Students to use their own ideas and reflections, and care is to be 
 taken that each one learns practically the actual duties and train- 
 ing necessary to a Soldier in the Field. 
 
 With this view the Commandant is generally selected, not 
 only for his purely educational qualifications, but also for experience 
 in the field in time of war. He is immediately subordinate to the 
 Commander of the Regiment, to whom he has to report all 
 matters of importance. 
 
 The Instructors are required to support the Commandant 
 with every means in their power, to bring to his notice anything 
 that may be required, and to forward the interests of the school to 
 the utmost. 
 
 The Non-commissioned Officer, generally one of the Senior 
 Cadets, holding the post of Serjeant-Major, is selected for general 
 experience and tact ; he maintains order and discipline in the 
 school, is responsible for the moral tone of the Students, and 
 looks after them out of school, assisting them with his advice and
 
 21 
 
 counsel where required. He may, if necessary, be also employed 
 
 as Instructor. 
 
 Tiie Course commences on November 1st, and terminates Duration of 
 
 on the 30th of the following August, inclusive of the final ^^^ Course. 
 
 ° ° Proorrainme of 
 
 exammation. _ Study, &c-. 
 
 September ?nd part of October are given up to practical 
 training. 
 
 The course of study comprises the following heads : — Theoretical. 
 
 German Language and Writing. 
 Military Style, i. e., Reports, &c. 
 Mathematics, comprising the four Elementary Rules : 
 
 also Involution, Evolution, and Proportions. 
 The Elements of Military Topography. 
 Military Drawing, including Plotting, the Conventional 
 
 Signs, and the Reading of Maps and Plans. 
 Geography. 
 
 History (Ancient and Modern). 
 Study of the Arms in use. 
 Field Service and Out-post Duty. 
 Drill Regulations. 
 Army Orders and Regulations. 
 Short-hand Writing. 
 
 Practical Instruction is given in: — PracticaJ. 
 
 Drill in Close and Skirmishing Order. 
 Field Service and Out-post Duty. 
 Gymnastics. Fencing, and Swimming. 
 Manoeuvres. 
 Judging Distance. 
 Rough Drawing in the Field. 
 Musketry. 
 
 The Students are to be constantly drilled during the Course, 
 both in Close and Skirmishing Order, and tht theory of Field 
 and Out-post Duties is to be practically explained on the 
 ground. They are also to be frequently practised in Gymnastics, 
 Fencing, &c. 
 
 In September the Students join their Companies to take part ManoeuTres. 
 in the manoeuvres, and are placed in such posts as tliey are 
 qualifiod to fill. In October they re-assemble, and are put 
 through a course of Judging Distance and Musketry Practice, 
 and also receive some instruction in finishing off rough sketches 
 in the field. 
 
 When this is completed, short Leave of Absence is granted to Leave. 
 Instructors and Students. 
 
 During the course of instruction at a Preparatory School, the 
 Students are exempted from all Guards or Garrison Duty. 
 
 They provide their own books, drawing and writing materials. Books, &o. 
 excepting in certain cases, where the scholars are entirely without 
 means, when school requisites are provided out of the Govern- 
 ment Funds for that purjiose.
 
 22 
 
 Periodical Frofii the very commencement of the course, the Instructors 
 
 Tests of ^j.g required to test the capabilities and progress of each Student, 
 
 by frequent conversations, questions, minor examinations, &c., in 
 order that they may be able to form an opinion by the end of 
 December, whether owing to want either of mental power or 
 of due zeal and industry, any Student would appear unlikely to 
 profit from the instruction given, but rather prove a drag on the 
 progress of his fellow students. 
 
 Any Student, whose capabilities or industry are reported 
 "Doubtful" is called up by the Commandant in presence of the 
 Instructors and the result explained to him. He is then allowed 
 two months for improvement, during which time he must pass a 
 satisfactory examination in the subjects he has neglected, or been 
 reported deficient in. 
 
 If reported "Not Qualified"'^ by the end of the two months, 
 he is dismissed the school. 
 
 In the same manner, Students who, during the course of 
 the year, are reported for any irregularity, or bad conduct, are 
 allowed two months for improvem^ent, failing which, they are 
 dismissed. 
 
 Students who exhibit downright incapabilitj'^, or idleness, or 
 commit themselves in any very serious matter, are dismissed at 
 once; if from the ranks, they return to their duty with their 
 Regiments; if Regimental Pupils, they are sent back to their 
 parents. 
 
 To assist the Commandant in determining the position of the 
 Students, each Instructor is required to keep a note book, in which 
 he registers the capabilities, zeal, progress, performances, and 
 conduct of each one. 
 
 The Commandant sums up the remarks of each Instructor, 
 for his own special information, the books being laid before him 
 usually every two months. 
 Final In the second half of August the final examination takes 
 
 Examination. p]jjce, the result of which determines the number of Students 
 qualified for transfer to the Cadet School ; those who are to he 
 referred back for a second course; those who are to be sent back to 
 their Regiments; and in the case of Regimental Pupils, those who 
 are to be returned to their parents. 
 
 'I his examination does not constitute the sole test ; the notes 
 and remarks of the several Instructors during the course are also 
 taken into account. 
 
 The examination is condiicted in presence of a Board, of which 
 the Commander of the Regiment is President. 
 
 The Members consist of the — 
 
 Commandant of the School. 
 Two Instructors, and 
 One Regimental Officer. 
 
 The examination is both vivct voce and written, the result being 
 determined by the votes of the Members of the Board. 
 
 I
 
 23 
 
 The predicate of ^' Excellent '' counts for 5 marks. 
 „ " A^ery Good " „ 4 „ 
 
 " Good " 
 
 }) 
 
 3 
 
 '' Moderate '" 
 
 jj 
 
 1 
 
 "Bad" 
 
 5? 
 
 
 
 If the Members cannot agree in the choice of any one predi- 
 cate, the values of all the predicates are to be taken and the 
 average assigned as the mark. 
 
 In '^Military Style," "Mathematics," "Elements of Topo- 
 graphy," and " Field Service," the predicates bear a double value. 
 
 In determining the final result, those Candidates only are to 
 be reported as " Thoroughly Qualified ^' who have obtained the 
 predicate of " Very Good " in all the more important subjects, 
 viz., those in which the predicates carry a double value, and have 
 not been assigned a predicate of " Moderate" or "Bad'^ in any of 
 the less important subjects, and have made a total of at least 64 
 marks. 
 
 To be reported "Qualified" the student must have made a 
 total of 48, with not more than two unsatisfactory predicates in 
 the less important subjects, which again must be compensated for by 
 " Very Good " or " Excellent " predicates in the more important 
 ones. 
 
 Those Students only, who are reported " Thoroughly Qualified," 
 are transferred at once to the Cadet School : those reported 
 " Qualified" are required to compete for admission at the regular 
 Entrance Examination. 
 
 At the termination of the examination a general report is 
 framed by the Board, and is kept by the Commander of the 
 Regiment. 
 
 In the cases of Students who do not belong to the Regiment, 
 the report on each is sent to their respective Commanders. 
 
 The result of the examination is read out to the Students by 
 order of the Commander of the Regiment in the presence of the 
 whole Staff; at the same time it is pointed out to those who have 
 been reported " Qualified " onlj% that admission to the Cadet 
 School is still open to them on passing the entrance examination, or 
 they maj' go through a second course at the "Preparatory School." 
 
 Those reported "Not Qualified" can only be jocrmitted a 
 repetition of the course under exceptional circumstances, viz., 
 in cases of illness or unavoidable interruption in the previous 
 course; they must have proved themselves steady, zealous, and 
 industrious. 
 
 Regimental Pupils of proved zeal and industry, who are re- 
 quired to pass a second year at the school, owing to long illness, 
 may be exempted from serving the additional year with the Army 
 on recommendation by the Board of Examination.
 
 24 
 
 PART VI. 
 
 Cadet Schools 
 for Infiintry, 
 Ja2:ers, Cavalry 
 Sanitary Corps, 
 and Military 
 Train. 
 
 Stations and 
 Composition 
 of the Schools. 
 
 The object of these Schools is to train young men of suitable 
 acquii'ements, and who devote themselves with zeal and readiness 
 to their profession, as Candidates for the rank of Commissioned 
 Officers, and to give them such an education as shall fit them for 
 their future position, and enable them, with private study, to qualify 
 for the higher posts of the Service. 
 
 There are at present 13 Cadet Schools, for Candidates for 
 Conmiissions in the Infantry and the Jagers, of which six are 
 also open to the Cavalry. 
 
 The following are the Stations of the Schools : — 
 
 1st. Vienna, for Infantry, Jagers, and Cavalry. 
 
 2nd. Gratz, for Infantry and Jagers. 
 
 3rd. Briinn, for Infantry, Jagers, and Cavalry. 
 
 4th. Prague, „ „ „ 
 
 5th. Lemberg „ „ „ 
 
 6th. Ofen-Pesth „ „ ,, 
 
 7th. Preszburg, for Infantry and Jagers. 
 
 8th. Kaschau ,, „ 
 
 9th. Temesvar, for Infantry, Jagers, and Cavalry. 
 lOth. Agram, for Infantry and Jagers. 
 11th. Innspruck, ,, ,, 
 
 12th. Hermanstadt, „ 
 
 13th. Zara „ „ 
 
 Each Cadet School is under the immediate Command of the 
 General of the military district in which it is established ; he may, 
 however, delegate the duty of personal supervision to the Divi- 
 sional Commander of the Station. Each school admits a certain 
 number of Candidates from the regiments belonging to the 
 military district, provided they possess the necessary qualifica- 
 tions, whether they be soldiers or regimental pupils. 
 
 Each Line Infantry Regiment may send five yearly. 
 Each Frontier ,, „ „ „ five „ 
 
 Each Jager Battalion „ ,, two „ 
 
 Each Cavalry Regiment „ ,. five „ 
 
 If more Candidates are eligible from one regiment than the 
 above stated number, they may be admitted with the sanction of 
 the General Commanding, provided the difference is equalized by 
 a smaller number from another regiment. 
 
 Candidates from the Sanitary Corps and the Military Train, 
 are not limited in number, and are apportioned by the General 
 Commanding to the nearest school, those of the Military Train to 
 the school allotted for Cavalry Candidates. 
 
 4
 
 26 
 
 In view of the advantages to be derived from a training at a Conditions of 
 Cadet Sehool, applications are entertained from those only who Entrance into 
 manifest a thorough earnestness in their profession, and are of ^^^^J 
 irreproachable conduct and demeanour. For every year, or part 
 of a year, spent at a Cadet School, the Student must serve one 
 year in addition to the obligatory period of service. Candidates 
 found '^ Thoroughly Qualified " at the final examination at a 
 Preparatory School are admitted to a Cadet School without further 
 examination. Soldiers and Candidates from civil life, desirous of 
 entering direct into a Cadet School, must produce satisfactory 
 certificates from a Lower Practical School or Lower Gymnasium, 
 otherwise they must undergo an entrance examination. This is 
 also obligatory on those Candidates who, at the final examination 
 at the Preparatory School, have been certified " Qualified " oidy. 
 
 The entrance examination comprises the subjects of the final 
 examination at the Preparatory School ; it is conducted in presence 
 of a Board, consisting of the Commandant of the Cadet School 
 as President, two Professors of the school, and also two Regimental 
 Ofiicers (members). 
 
 The entrance examination for Candidates from civil life takes 
 place at the end of September, for all other Candidates at the end 
 of October. Of the former class, all applications have to be sent 
 in by Regimental Commanders before September 15th, of 
 the latter before October 15th. All applications must be accom- 
 panied by the before-mentioned school certificates. 
 
 Candidates who, though found "qualified,^' cannot be admitted 
 from want of further vacancies, and those found " not qualified," are 
 sent back at once to their Regiments or Corps ; the latter may, 
 however, come up for examination a second time, or may qualify 
 themselves at a Preparatory School ; the former may be admitted 
 to a Cadet School of another district, provided there are unfilled 
 vacancies, or they may be brought in to fill any vacancies that may 
 occur in the school of their own district, shortly after the com- 
 mencement of the course, or, failing this, they may be admitted 
 the following year, if they continue to show the same good 
 conduct, and a thorough earnestness in the study of their 
 profession. 
 
 Direct entrance to the second year's course is not permitted, 
 the instruction in the military subjects necessitating a systematic 
 progress from the elementary to the higher branches. Students, 
 however, who exhibit adequate proficiency in the ordinary sul^jects, 
 are permitted to attend the lectures of the second year's course, in 
 addition to the military instruction of the first year, ti.us 
 affording them the opportunity of qualifying in one year. 
 
 The hours for lectures, &c., are specially arranged to enable 
 Cadets to work in both classes. St ff f 
 
 The Staff of Professors, &c., is chosen by the General Com- Cadet School 
 manding the District, from the troops attached, and consists of in Professors, 
 the following : — **^' 
 
 ] Major or Captain, as Commandant. 
 An adequate number of Officers, as Professors.
 
 26 
 
 1 Non-commissioned Officer to superintend the Quarter- 
 master's duties, and the accounts, and a certain number 
 of privates as house servants, &c. One man to every 
 5 Students. 
 
 Those Cadet Schools open to Cavalry Candidates have also an 
 Officer of Cavalry attached, to give instruction in Cavalry Regu- 
 lations, riding, &c., also one Cavalry Non-commissioned Officer to 
 superintend the grooming, &c., and one private to ever two 
 horses. 
 
 Tactics, drawing, and surveying, are taught by Officers of the 
 General Staff. 
 
 This Staff, with the exception of the Officers of the General 
 Staff, belongs exclusively to the Cadet School, and is exempted 
 from all Regimental or Garrison duty. 
 
 The Commandant is in direct communication with the General 
 
 Commanding, through the Chief of the Staff, and has equal power 
 
 in matters of discipline over the whole Staff with a Battalion 
 
 Commander, 
 
 Horses. Candidates from the Cavalry and Military Train must bring 
 
 their horses with them. 
 Stuir^ D" t •■- ^'^^'^ course of study is for two years, each year's course extending 
 bution of time, from November 1st to July 15 th, inclusive of the examinations 
 Programme of in the theoretical course. The period from July 15th to the end 
 Study, &e. q£ September is devoted to practical instruction and manoeuvres. 
 Since one professor cannot adequately instruct or superintend 
 more than 50 Students, in those schools where the number is large, 
 they are to be subdivided into two or three sections, and the Staff 
 of Instructors increased and assigned accordingly. 
 Theoretical. The programme of study embraces the following heads: — 
 
 Military Style (Reports, Correspondence, &c.) 
 Mathematics, including Algebra, Logarithms, Geometry, 
 
 Trigonometry. 
 Natural and Experimental Sciences. 
 Military Topogra2:)hy, and the use of Instruments. 
 Plan Drawing. 
 Practical Surveying. 
 Geography. 
 
 History (General and Military). 
 Pioneer Service. 
 
 Fortification (Field, Permanent, and tlie Attack). 
 Study of the Arms in use. 
 Tactics of all Arms. 
 Field ^ervice, including Out-posts. 
 Militai^y Administration and Organization. 
 Drill (Section, Company, and Battalion). 
 Army Orders and Regulations. 
 
 Military Law, including the Mutiny Act, and Criminal Law, &c., 
 is taught by the Judge Advocate of tlic District.
 
 27 
 
 Practical instruction is given in — 
 
 Drill in Close and Skirmishing Order. 
 Out-post Duty. 
 
 Gymnastics, Swimming, and Fencing. 
 Judging Distance and Target Practice. 
 
 Students from the Cavalry and Military Train have also an 
 hour's daily instruction in riding. Practical surveying is taught 
 in each year's course, from July 15th to the end of August. 
 
 The Students of the first year are instructed in the use of 
 instruments and levelling, also in the simple forms of field 
 fortification and pioneer duty. 
 
 The Surveying is conducted in parties of 20 to 25 Students, 
 under the direction of qualified Officers. 
 
 Every Student in the first year's course receives seven entire 
 days' practical instruction on the plane-table, and seven days' in- 
 struction in levelling. The day's instruction commences at 
 5 A.M., and lasts till 4 p.m. 
 
 Working pay and allowances are granted to the Officers, 
 students, and assistants, while engaged in these 14 days' practical 
 training. 
 
 The Students of the second year's course continue the training 
 in the higher branches of surveying, triangulation, measuring 
 altitudes, and reconnaissance, from July l5th to the end of 
 August. 
 
 The period from 15th to the end of July, is spent in prepara- 
 tion, the students divided into parties, each under an Officer, being 
 instructed in the principles of triangulation, the use of the instru- 
 ments, the regulation of the pace ; in fact, in all the details necessary 
 to enable them to execute, unaided, the survey of any given tract of 
 country. 
 
 The instruction is carried on in the neighbourhood of the 
 Garrison, and, commencing at 5 a.m., is to last at the beginning 
 for 6 hours, then for 7, and finally for 9 hours, without interrup- 
 tion, the Students returning to dinner after the day's work. 
 
 During this period, Officers and Students receive working pay 
 and allowances. It is considered that 7 days should suffice for this 
 preliminary instruction. In the month of August, a certain tract 
 of country is allotted to each student, who, working independently, 
 makes the survey, which must be completed in 30 working days. 
 If the tract of ground allotted to each individual is one-eighth square 
 mile (Austrian*) or ov-er, it is quite impossibe that one Officer can 
 duly superintend and correct the work of more than 10 or 13 
 students; arrangements are, therefore, generally made to place two 
 together, one being a skilful draughtsman, the other less experienced; 
 they then work the survey together. 
 
 The Students are, for this purpose, usually divided into two 
 sections, number one section consisting of the best draughtsmen, 
 each of whom is required to execute at least one-eighth of a square 
 mile (Austrian*) of varied country. This section is not to consist of 
 
 * The Aus'riau square mile equals 22 English square miles, nearly.
 
 28 
 
 Practical 
 Engineering. 
 
 Manceuvres. 
 
 Artillery 
 Drill. 
 
 Inspection of 
 military 
 objects of 
 interest. 
 
 Leave of 
 Absence. 
 
 Exemption of 
 Students from 
 Duty, &c. 
 
 more than one-half of the number of the Students of the second 
 year's course. On economical grounds, the district chosen for the 
 survey is not to be more than nine miles (Austrian*) distant from 
 the school, in order to avoid unnecessary expense in travelling. 
 If necessary to triangulate the district beforehand, an Officer with 
 four Students, and two assistants, are to perform the Avork from 
 8 to 14 days previously. The Officers and Students receive work- 
 ing pay and allowances. 
 
 To the second section, comprising the remainder of the 
 Students, is allotted a district closer to the station, to each one 
 being assigned a portion according to his powers. The survey must 
 be executed in 30 days, the working hours for each section being 
 from 5 A.M. to 4 p.m., with an hour^s rest in the middle of the day 
 for dinner. These hours are to be strictly held to, in order that 
 the students may accustom themselves to such exertions. 
 
 The practical training in engineering and fortification is canned 
 on with the students of the first year's course between July 15th 
 and August 30th, at the discretion of the Commandant, on ground 
 immediately adjoining the school. The Students are instructed in 
 the simplest and most ordinary work of the Infantry Pioneers, e.^., 
 tracing and profiling field works, throwing up cover, making use of 
 shelter of various kinds, constructing huts of branches of trees or 
 reeds, the formation of columns of march and attack, &c. 
 
 >io allowances are granted. 
 
 If an Engineer or Pioneer Corps is stationed in the neighbour- 
 hood, the students are required to inspect the work executed by it 
 during the course of the year, explanations and instruction being 
 imparted by an Officer of the Technical Service. The Students 
 have also to attend all experiments in mining and pontooning. 
 
 The Students of both years attend the manoeuvres in Septem- 
 ber, and for this purpose are distributed among the Regiments in 
 the Garrison, acting as leaders of Company Sections. 
 
 The Students of the first year also attend the Artillery exercises 
 for a few days. Should there be no Field Artillery in the neigh- 
 bourhood they are instructed in the handling and working of 
 field guns in the Garrison. 
 
 When opportunity offers, they are taken to visit objects of 
 military interest in the neighbourhood, such for instance as for- 
 tresses, defiles, battle-fields, &c., and any public or industrial 
 establishments, in order to demonstrate practically, what they 
 have been taught theoretically, and, above all, to enlarge the sphere 
 of their experience in military, technical, and scientific matter. 
 
 In October both instructors and deserving students are granted 
 a short leave of absence. 
 
 To prevent any interruption in their studies, the students are to 
 be exempted from all Garrison duty or guards, and even though tiieir 
 Regiments should leave the Garrison they are to remain at the 
 school until the completion of their second year's course. 
 
 * About 43 English miles.
 
 29 
 
 The Commandant and Professors are also not to be changed Books, &c. 
 during the course. 
 
 Books, drawing and writing materials, are provided by the 
 students themselves. In the case of Students without adequate 
 means, the necessary hooks, &c., are supplied from the Govern- 
 ment Fund, as also school requisites, instruments, &c. 
 
 Each Cadet School is recommended to collect a small library 
 of military and generally useful books. 
 
 To test the progress made by the Students, examinations are Periodical 
 held periodically, under the same regulations as those of the ExamiLation. 
 *' Preparatory Schools." The first examination is held in the end 
 of December, and every subsequent quarter. 
 
 In addition to viva voce examinations, written essays, are 
 required from students on various subjects. There are no stated 
 days for writing these essays ; the students may be required to 
 write them at any moment, in presence of the instructor, who 
 allows adequate time, then collects them, delivering his criticism 
 on them the following; day. 
 
 As in the Preparatory Schools, all the instructors make 
 periodical reports on the ability, performance, zeal, progress, and 
 conduct of each student. These reports assist the School Com- 
 mandant in framing his General Report of Qualification. 
 
 Ai^plication for the removal of students on account of unsatis- 
 factory conduct or progress, has to be made by the School 
 Commandant to the General Commanding the District, or to the 
 Divisional General entrusted by him with the supervision of the 
 school. 
 
 The yearly and final examinations take place in the beginning Yearly and 
 of July ; candidates from the ranks who are desirous of obtaining FinalExami- 
 appointments as Cadets without having passed through the Cadet °^^^°'^^- 
 School, and Candidates for Cadetships from civil life, must attend 
 at the latter examination. 
 
 From the result of these examinations the Board decides — 
 1st. What students of the first year's course are eligible for 
 
 transfer to the second year's course. 
 2nd. (a) What students of the second year's course — 
 
 (b) What students of the first year's course, who, having been 
 
 permitted to combine the second with the first year's 
 course, have undergone the final examination — 
 
 (c) What candidates from military or civil life, who have 
 
 presented themselves for examination for direct 
 
 appointment as Cadets — are qualified for such posts. 
 
 3rd. What students are to be permitted a repetition of one 
 
 or other course. 
 4th. What students are to return to their duty with their 
 
 Regiments as unqualified. 
 
 5th. The list of precedence of all those students and 
 
 candidates who have qualified themselves. 
 
 The Board consists of a Divisional or Brigadier- General 
 
 as President, the Chief of the Staff of the General Commanding 
 
 the District, or Chief of the Staff of the Divisional Commander,
 
 30 
 
 to whom the supervision of the school has been entrusted by the 
 former, two Field Officers from the Division, the Commandant 
 and two Professorsof the School (members.) 
 
 In the case of candidates from the Sanitary Corps or Military 
 Train, an Officer of each of these branches is appointed in addition. 
 The members are appointed by the General Commanding. 
 
 All the Professors have to attend. The examination of the 
 students of the first year's course is more for the purpose of 
 testing their progress ; in those subjects only which are completed 
 is the examination a searching one ; in the other subjects, those 
 students only are examined, who may be picked out by the pre- 
 sident, or may themselves request to be examined, in order to im- 
 prove their places on the List of Qualifications during the past year. 
 The final examination for appointments as Cadets, not only 
 comprises the subjects prescribed in the second year's course, but also 
 those of the first year's, and even those of the Preparatory School. 
 This examination is obligatory on those candidates for Cadet- 
 ships who have neither passed a Preparatory nor the Cadet 
 School, as also on those students of the first year's course who 
 present themselves at once for final examination as Cadets. 
 
 Not only must the candidate have a thorough theoretical 
 knowledge of all subjects, but he must show that he practically 
 understands all the duties of an Officer. 
 
 In the conduct of the examination, the result and final reports, 
 framed in accordance with the individual votes of the Members of 
 the Board, the same regulations hold good as for the examinations 
 in the Preparatory Schools. 
 
 For the transfer of students from the first to the second year's 
 .course, the conditions require that the student must not have 
 more than two unsatisfactory predicates (moderate or bad) in the 
 less important subjects, and these two predicates must be compen- 
 sated for by " very good " or " excellent " ones in the more 
 important subjects. 
 
 In the final examination of the second year's students for 
 
 appointment as Cadets, the minimum number of marks for the 
 
 certificate of " Excellent Qualification " is 116, for '' Qualified " 87. 
 
 To each subject the predicate "excellent" counts 5 marks, 
 
 " very good" 4, " good " 3, " moderate" 1, " bad" 0. 
 
 Should the Members of the Board not agree in their 
 vote, the average is be taken, and the value given accordingly. 
 
 The value of the predicates is doubled in the following more 
 important subjects : — 
 
 1st. Military Style (Reports, Correspondence, &c.) 
 
 2nd. Mathematics. 
 
 3rd. Topography. 
 
 4th. Engineering. 
 
 5th. Fortification. 
 
 6th. Tactics. 
 
 7th. Field Service. 
 
 8th. Army Organization. 
 
 9th. Militarv Administration.
 
 31 
 
 Mathematics is to be considered as a single subject, but the 
 votes are first to be taken on arithmetic, algebra, and geometry, 
 separately, and the final value decided by the average of the 
 three. 
 
 In the following subjects the predicates carry only a single 
 value : — 
 
 1st. German Language. 
 
 2nd. Natural Sciences. 
 
 3rd. Use of Instruments, and Theoretical Principles of 
 
 Surveying. 
 4th. Plan Drawing. 
 5th. Geography. 
 6th. History. 
 
 7th. Study of the Arms in use. 
 8th. Squad Drill. 
 
 9th. Drill (Company and Battalion). 
 10th. Regulations and Orders of the Service. 
 
 In the case of candidates from Cavalry or Military Train, 
 riding and driving, and the treatment of horses, are to be similarly 
 reported on, but the values of the predicates in these subjects do not 
 count towards the General Total in the List of Precedence, but only 
 in giving precedence to students with their own several branches. 
 
 The Report on the examination of the first year's course is 
 sent to the General Commanding the District, the students being 
 classified as qualified, or otherwise to enter the second year's 
 course. 
 
 In the Report on the examination for Cadetships, the candi- 
 dates are to be classified in three sections : — 
 
 1st. The students of the Cadet School. 
 
 2nd. The remaining candidates fi'om the Army. 
 
 3rd. Candidates from civil life. 
 
 Precedence in each section being given according to the marks 
 obtained. 
 
 Two certificates are framed for each candidate, one by the 
 President and one member of the Commission, to be given to the 
 candidate himself; the other by the Commandant of the school, 
 to be sent to the Regiment or Corps to which the candidate 
 belongs. 
 
 The reports on examinations are sent to the War Department 
 by September 15th following. 
 
 Successful candidates for Cadetships from civil life, who have 
 received no practical training in surveying, are permitted, later 
 on, to join the surveying classes of the school at their own 
 expense, the result being recorded in the examination cer- 
 tificate. 
 
 Should these candidates neglect to avail themselves of such 
 opportunity, they will be required, after entering the service, to go 
 through a course of practical surveying at a Cadet School, without
 
 32 
 
 any claim to allowances. This obligation is notified on the 
 certificate, and the Commander of the Regiment or Corps to which 
 the Cadet is posted, is held responsible that he is sent to the 
 nearest school for the requisite training, the lesult being brought 
 to the knowledge of the VVar Minister. 
 
 Candidates from civil life reported "Unqualified" may present 
 themselves for a second examination after the lapse of at least 
 one year. A second repetition can only be permitted in very 
 special cases, on the recommedation of the War Minister. 
 
 Students of either year's course of the Cadet Schools, reported 
 ''Unqualified/' are only permitted a repetition of the course if 
 they have failed through sickness, or other unavoidable causes, and 
 have shown diligence and eagerness in their studies. 
 
 Students of irreproachable conduct and unflagging perseverance, 
 who have failed to qualify themselves, either for transfer to the 
 second years course, or to pass the final examination, owing to 
 sickness, lasting over two months, for which they cannot be held 
 accountable, may, if recommended by the Board of Examiners, be 
 exempted from the additional year's service for the lost year, if 
 sanctioned by the War Minister. 
 ■D . « All reports regarding the strength of the schools at the com- 
 
 mencement of the year, the Staff of Instructors, the stores of 
 instruments, &c., are sent periodically to the War Minister. 
 
 When practicable, the Cadet Schools are to be established in 
 special buildings ; otherwise they must be in a block of the barracks 
 entirely separated from the Regiment, rooms and lecture halls 
 being allotted according to requirements.
 
 33 
 
 Precis of the ^^Instruction fur die Triippen'Schulen, des 
 K, K. Heeres," containing : — 
 
 Part IV of the Pioneer Section : " The 
 ^ Cadet School." 
 
 Part V of the Engineer Section : " The 
 Cadet School." 
 
 Parts V and IV of the Artillery Section : 
 "The CadefSchool," and ' TheArtiikry 
 Regimental Equitation Schools ;" and 
 
 Part VI of the Cavalry Section: "The 
 Brigade Oillcers' School." 
 
 The Pioneer Cadet School is established at Hainburg on the The Pioneer 
 
 Danube. Cadet School. 
 
 The object of this school is to provide a set of trained men to 
 
 fill the vacancies in the Commissioned ranks of the Pioneer Re2,i- 
 
 ment, also to provide qualified officers to take charge of the Pioneer 
 
 Detachments established at the Head-Quarters of every Infantry, 
 
 Jager, or Cavalry Corps. 
 
 The Students are classified as follows : — Classification 
 
 oftheStudents. 
 
 («.) Non-commissioned Officers and men of the Pioneer 
 
 Regiment. 
 (b.) Regimental Pupils borne on the strength of the Pioneer 
 
 Kegiment. 
 (c.) Supernumerary Regimental Pupils borne on the strength 
 
 of the School. 
 (d.) Non-commissioned Officers and men, or Regimental 
 
 Pupils from other branches of the Service. 
 
 The number of Students from the active strength of the 
 Regiment is on no account to exceed 80. The total number at 
 the school is not to exceed loO. 
 
 Non-commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, who may be 
 Candidates for admission to the Pioneer Cadet School, are required 
 to bind themselves, before entering, to serve an additional year 
 over and above the three years obligatory period of Service, for 
 each year spent, or only commenced, during the third and fourth 
 year's courses. 
 
 Each Regimental Pupil is required to bind hims elf through 
 his parents or guardians — 
 
 1st. To enter the Army voluntarily as soon as he attains 
 the qualificatory standard of age and physical fitness. 
 
 2nd. To serve an additional year over and above the three 
 years obligatory period of service, for each year or part 
 of a year spent at the school.
 
 34 
 
 3rd. To enter the Army voluntarily or by the regular 
 conscription, should he for any reason be sent back to 
 his parents. 
 
 4th. To subject himself voluntarily to all the prescribed 
 regulations for the School, and especially those 
 relating to the discipline of the K. K. Army. 
 
 Conditions for Candidates for entrance to the first year's course, must have 
 Admission. completed their fifteenth year, and must produce satisfactory 
 certificates from a Preparatory School, a Lower Practical School, 
 or Lower Gymnasium. 
 
 For entrance to the second year's course, they must have 
 passed the fifth class of an Upper Practical School or the sixth 
 class of an Upper Gymnasium. 
 
 For entrance to the third year's course, they must have com- 
 pleted the entire course of study at an Upper Practical School, or 
 Upper Gymnasium. 
 
 Direct admission to the fourth year's course is not permitted ; 
 but Students of the third year's course are permitted to combine 
 the fourth year with the third, if they show themselves, by their 
 zeal, industiy, perseverance, and general knowledge, deserving 
 of this privilege. 
 Applications Applications for admission must, in all cases, be addressed to 
 
 for Admission, tbe Pioneer Regimental Head-Quarters, each Candidate stating in 
 his application the course he intends to enter upon, and enclosing 
 his School Certificates, and also a Medical Certificate declaring 
 him to possess the necessary physical qualifications. 
 
 The Commandant of the Pioneer Regiment examines into the 
 claims and qualifications of eacb, and reports to the War Depart- 
 ment whicb Candidates he recommends for direct admission, and 
 which to be subjected to an entrance examination. 
 Entrance Tliis examination embraces those subjects only, which form the 
 
 Examination, course of study at the civil schools before mentioned. 
 
 Candidates for admission to the first year's course can un- 
 dergo the examination at the Head-Quarters of a Pioneer Bat- 
 talion, or at the school at Hainburg. 
 
 Admission to a higher course is dependent on an examination 
 at the school only. 
 
 The examinations take place between the 26th and 30th 
 September. The Board assembled at the Head-Quarters of a 
 Pioneer Battalion consists of the Commanding Officer, two 
 Captains and two Subalterns : at the School, of the Commandant 
 and four Professors. The Board determines whether or no the Can- 
 didate is qualified for admission to that year's course for which he 
 has presented himself for examination. If found not qualified, he 
 may come up again the following year : if found not qualified 
 for admission to one of the higher courses, but qualified for one 
 below it, he may be admitted to such lower course accordingly. 
 
 Successful Candidates from civil life are required to enter the 
 school on October 1st, those from the ranks of the Pioneer 
 Regiment or other branches of the Service on October 28th.
 
 35 
 
 Successful Candidates, who cannot be admitted from want of 
 further vacancies are noted for subsequent admission ; but should 
 they wish afterwards to enter a higher year's course than that for 
 which they were previously examined and found qualitied, they 
 must undergo a further examination. 
 
 The period of study is for four years, each year's course l^uration of 
 commencing on November lst,and terminating on September 30th. 1.-° , T'^^^t'^ 
 The month or October is employed in imparting the rudiments or of Time. 
 Military training to those Candidates entering from civil life. 
 
 The following is the weekly distribution of time of each year 
 in Summer and Winter. 
 
 First Year. 
 
 Arithmetic, Algebra, and Elementary Geometry 
 
 Geometrical Drawing 
 
 Practical Geometry 
 
 Physics 
 
 Geography 
 
 History 
 
 German Language 
 
 French 
 
 Landscape Drawing 
 
 Hungarian or Bohemian 
 
 Study of the Arms in Use 
 
 Kegulations of the Serrice 
 
 Drill Eegulations . . 
 
 Military Bridging 
 
 Free-Hand Drawing 
 
 Stenogi'aphy 
 
 Total . . 
 
 Winter. 
 
 39 
 
 Summer. 
 
 hovirs. 
 
 hours. 
 
 9 
 
 9 
 
 3 
 
 , , 
 
 , , 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 H 
 
 3i 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 n 
 
 u 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 40 
 
 Second Year. 
 
 Plane and Spherical Trigonometry and the L^pper 
 
 
 
 Course of Geometry ,. 
 
 n 
 
 7^ 
 
 Practical Geometry 
 
 H 
 
 3* 
 
 Chemistry. . 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 Use of Instruments 
 
 u 
 
 u 
 
 Geography 
 
 3 
 
 [i 
 
 History 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 German . . 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 French 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Hungarian or Bohemian. . 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Landscape Drawing 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 Study of the Arms in Use 
 
 Ih 
 
 u 
 
 Regulations of the Service 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 Drill Regulations. . 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 Military Bridging 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 Free-Hand Drawing 
 
 >7 
 
 2 
 
 Stenography 
 
 1 
 
 39 
 
 1 
 
 Total 
 
 ■10 
 
 D 2
 
 36 
 
 Third Year. 
 
 
 Winter. 
 
 Summer. 
 
 
 hours. 
 
 hours. 
 
 Mechanics . • . . . . t . 
 
 Vi 
 
 6 
 
 Practical Greometry 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 Chemistry . . 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 Use of Instruments 
 
 1^ 
 
 u 
 
 Architecture, General Principles and Drawings 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 Field Fortification 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Construction of Camps . . 
 
 1 
 
 .. 
 
 Geography 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 History 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Military Style (Eeports, Correspondence, &c.) 
 
 U 
 
 u 
 
 French 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Hungarian or Bohemian. . 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Landscape Drawing 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 Theory of Surveving and Military Topography 
 
 H 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 Army Organization 
 
 n 
 
 
 Service in the Field 
 
 n 
 
 
 Begulations of the Service 
 
 1 
 
 
 Drill Regulations. . 
 
 1 
 
 
 Military Bridging . . . . 
 
 1 
 
 
 Total.. 
 
 43 
 
 40 
 
 Fourth Year. 
 
 Analvsis : Elements of Differential and Integral 
 
 
 
 Calculus. . 
 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 Instruction in Engineering and Engineering Drawing. 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 Telegraphy 
 
 
 14 
 
 .. 
 
 Construction of Roads and Railroads . . 
 
 
 4i 
 
 44 
 
 C' instruction of Aqueducts and Viaducts, Bridges 
 
 &c. 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 Permanent Fortification . . 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Geography 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 History . . 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Military Style (Reports, Correspondence, &c.) 
 
 
 li 
 
 1 
 
 French . . 
 
 
 H 
 
 14 
 
 Hungarian or Bohemian. . 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Landscape Drawing 
 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 Theory of Surveying, MiUtary Topography 
 
 and 
 
 
 
 Mapping 
 
 
 H 
 
 1 
 
 Military Administration , . 
 
 
 n 
 
 1 
 
 Tactics 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 MiUtary and Civil Law . . 
 
 
 U 
 
 1 
 
 Manoeuvres 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 Military Bridging 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 Mihtary Bridging of Foreign Armies . . 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 Total 
 
 43i 
 
 41 
 
 French, Stenography, and Free-hand Drawing are not obligatory 
 subjects, but their importance is impressed upon the Students. 
 
 The practical instruction is carried on partly during, partly 
 after, the completion of the course of study.
 
 37 
 
 It comprises : — 
 
 (a.) Drill in close and skirmishing order. 
 
 (b.) Instruction in Field Service. 
 
 (c.) Gymnastics. 
 
 {d.) Target Practice. 
 
 {e.) Throwing up Field Works, &c. 
 
 (/.) Judging distance, and the finishing of Sketches in the 
 
 .field. 
 (g.) Practical Surveying. 
 (h.) Military Mapping. 
 
 Excursions, varying in time and distance, are made to objects 
 of Military or technical interest in the neighbourhood, viz., 
 fortresses, battle-fields, camps, defiles, passages of rivers, bridges, 
 railway stations, industrial establishments, &c., including tho 
 manoeuvres of the garrison, the construction of important bridges 
 by the Pioneer Regiment, &c. 
 
 In these excursions the journey both ways is to be employed 
 in making Military Reconnaissances. 
 
 Every opportunity is to be taken advantage of, to demonstrate 
 practically what has been taught theoretically, in order to enlarge 
 the military, technical, and scientific knowledge of the Students 
 in the most impressive and agreeable manner. 
 
 Drill in close and skirmishing order is carried on during each 
 year's course, also duties in the field and on out-post, the theo- 
 retical instruction being illustrated by practical examples. 
 
 Every Student in the fourth year's course must be able to lead 
 a company section. 
 
 Great importance is laid on Gymnastic Exercises, Swimming, 
 and Fencing. Every day one or the other is to be practised. 
 
 Students unable to swim are required to attend for instruction 
 half an hour each day until they become strong swimmers. After- 
 wards they attend once a week, if not oftener. 
 
 Target practice is carried on immediately after the examin- 
 ations. 
 
 Students of the third year's course are required to attend the 
 Artillery exercises after the examination, and, when practicable, 
 they are themselves to take part in serving the guns. 
 
 One of the chief objects of the Pioneer Cadet School is to 
 give the Students a sound theoretical and practical training in 
 every branch of the technical duties of the Pioneer Service. 
 
 With this view, during the Summer, the time from 4 to 7 p.m. 
 of each day is, if possible, to be devoted to this branch of instruc-_ 
 tion. The Students are first trained as oarsmen, and are kept at it 
 until they become perfect. They are then practically instructed 
 in anchoring boats, and throwing bridges on different kinds of 
 water. Special rapiditv or precision are not sought for, but an. 
 exact knowledge of all the details is made a sine qua non for 
 qualification. This forms part of the instruction of the first and 
 second year's course, and sometimes also of the third.
 
 38 
 
 The construction of camps forms a part of the third ye?r's 
 course ; it is carried on occasionally in the afternoon in the spring. 
 
 Immediately after the termination of the examinations, the 
 Students of the third and fourth year's course go through a course 
 of Tracing, Profiling, and Defilading of Redoubts, and other 
 important field works. 'I'he first and second year's Students, and 
 also some of the third throw up some minor field works, and all 
 are thoroughly practised in the construction of temporary or half 
 permanent bridges. 
 
 Judging distance and the finishing of sketches in the field is 
 practised during the theoretical course. 
 
 The instruction in Practical Geometrical Surveying is divided 
 into two parts, and forms a branch of the second and third year's 
 course. The first part is taken once a week during June and 
 July, with the object of teaching the Students all the important 
 details connected with the execution of Geometrical Survey, and 
 the use of the instruments employed, the rectification of such 
 instruments, &c., so as in time, to enable them to take part 
 in a regular cadastral survey. The practical is based on the 
 theoretical instruction. 
 
 The second part of the instruction comprises a Geometrical 
 Survey on a large scale, executed by the combined Students of the 
 second and third year's courses, and occupies about three weeks in 
 September. 
 
 The Students are divided into parties of from 10 to 20 ; each 
 party, consisting of Students of the same year's course, and of 
 equal capabilities, is under the direction of an officer, the Senior 
 Officer having the direction of the whole. Each year a district of 
 about 715 acres* (l^ English square-mile) is executed, the 
 country being selected for its varied features, hill and plain, &c. 
 The second year's Students are employed in the plain, the third 
 year's in the hills. 
 
 The day's work begins every morning at 5 and lasts till 4 p.m. 
 when the Students return home to dinner. 
 
 The fourth year's Students carry out their practical surveying 
 after the final examination. It lasts for six weeks, from August 
 15th to the end of September, and the work comprises : — 
 
 1st. A Reconnaissance of the whole district appointed for 
 the Survey. 
 
 2nd. Fixing of the points necessary for the Triangulation 
 of the district. 
 
 3rd. General and detailed Triangulation, and measure- 
 ment of the Altitudes of the Triangulated Points. 
 
 4th. Fundamental Principles of Hill Sketching. 
 
 5th. HiU Sketching. 
 
 6th. Plotting and Modelling. 
 
 The theoretical lectures on Military Topography and Surveying 
 are illustrated by models and drawings, the steps from one priu- 
 
 * 500 Joch. The Austrian Joch is equal to 143 acres.
 
 39 
 
 ciple to another being carefully explained, including the measure- 
 ment of altitudes, contouring, &c. 
 
 The preparations for tlie General Survey are made during 
 the year's course of study; the Cadastral Survey is reduced to the 
 scale required, the boundaries fixed, and a certain number of 
 stations marked, generally from one to seven, according as the 
 filling in presents greater or less difficulty. The reduction from the 
 Cadastral Survey, which, at the same time, teaches the Students 
 the use of the Pantograph, is made in order that too much time 
 may not be lost in fixing a great number of points on the 
 ground. 
 
 To a certain extent it is necessary to work the points out 
 practicallj', in order to teach the Students the use of the necessary 
 instruments, and to fix some very important stations. 
 
 The skeleton map then serves as a guide in tilling in the 
 ground. 
 
 The number of parties employed depends on the number of 
 officers available as directors, the number and abilities of the 
 students, and the instruments in store. 
 
 If three officers are available as directors, one of whom is in 
 head charge, and the number of Students about 30, three parties 
 would be formed, each of an Officer and 10 Students. 
 
 Each party would execute one third of the district com- 
 prising the general reconnaissance and triangulation. 
 
 The Students are instructed in the principles of Hill Sketching 
 by the several directors, the Survey being completed under their 
 superintendence. 
 
 Hainburg and the neighbourhood, south of the Danube, has 
 been fixed on as the first district to be executed. In the following 
 years, additions will be made to this Central District, so that in 
 time a survey of the whole country round Hainburg will be com- 
 pleted on double the Military scale ; a map of this kind will prove 
 of very great value to the school for use in the solution of tactical 
 and technical problems, the practical study of field service, &c. 
 
 The extent of the district depends of course on the number 
 and capabihties of the Students, the time at their disposal, and 
 the nature of the ground. 
 
 Allowing one week and a half to two weeks for the Pre|:)aratory 
 work on the Plane Table, from four to four and a half weeks 
 remain for the Sketching. 
 
 It is considered that in this time a beginner can execute at 
 least from Jg to \ square mile (Austrian).* 
 
 The 30 men should therefore execute some uirec square miles 
 (Austrian) between them. 
 
 As soon as they have been grounded in the method of filling in 
 the ground, each Student is to be left to work independently, 
 unless it is found that some cannot master the art, when two 
 Students will be placed together. 
 
 * From U to 3 English square milee. The Austrian square mile equals 22 
 English square miles, nearly.
 
 40 
 
 The work commences at 5 a.m. and lasts till 4 p.m., an hour's 
 rest being allowed in the middle of the day. 
 Examinations. Periodical examinations take place each year at Christmas, 
 Easter, and again before the General Examination. 
 
 The Annual Examinations and the Final Examination take 
 place in the first half of August. 
 
 The Annual Examination in the first, secondj, and third year's 
 course is chiefly for the sake of testing the Student's progress, 
 and those subjects only which are completed in each course are 
 made matter of searching examination. 
 
 The Board consists of the Commander of the Pioneer Regiment, 
 or a Field Officer of the Regiment appointed by him as President, 
 the Commandant of the School and the whole Staff of Professors. 
 
 In some cases ol failure to qualify for transfer to the next 
 j-ear's course, where such failure has arisen from illness or other 
 cause for which the Student cannot be held to blame, a subsequent 
 examination may be allowed shortly before the commencement of 
 the next year's course, otherwise a Student failing to qualify cannot 
 be re-examined. 
 
 The Board which conducts the Final Examination consists of 
 a General Officer, appointed by the War Department, who must 
 have served as Colonel on the General Staff, or belong to one of 
 the Technical Branches, as President, the Commander of the 
 Pioneer Regiment, a Field Officer of the Regiment, and the whole 
 Staff of Professors as Members. 
 
 The examination is both viva voce and written, each Member 
 of the Board having the right to put questions. 
 
 Each Member records his predicate in the several subjects, that 
 of " Excellent" counting 5 units ; " Very Good," 4 ; " Good," 3 ; 
 « Moderate," 1 ; " Bad," 0. 
 
 The value of the predicate is doubled in the following 
 subjects: — 
 
 Military Style (Reports, Correspondence, &c.) 
 
 Lower Mathematics. 
 
 Upper Mathematics. 
 
 Practical Geometry. 
 
 Technical Mechanics. 
 
 Engineering and Engineering Drawing. 
 
 Practical Geometrical Surveying (Geodesy). 
 
 Military Bridging. 
 
 Field Fortification. 
 
 General Architecture. 
 
 Construction of Bridges and Aqueducts. 
 
 Construction of Roads and Railroads. 
 
 Tactics. 
 
 Field Service. 
 
 Army Organization. 
 
 Military Administration. 
 
 For the classification of " Excellent Qualification" the Student 
 must gain a total numher of 17U marks ; in all the more important
 
 41 
 
 subjects he must ubtain the predicate of '* Very Good," and in no 
 single one must he have a " Moderate," or " Bad " predicate. 
 
 For the classification of "Qualified" a total number of 135 
 marks is necessary ; more than two unsatisfactory predicates in 
 the less important subjects will disqualify, and these must be com- 
 pensated for by "Very Good/' or "Excellent'^ ones in the more 
 important subjects. 
 
 The Students who attain these classifications are appointed 
 Cadets in the Pioneer Regiment. 
 
 Students from other branches of the Service return to their 
 Regiments, unless specially appointed to any posts by the War 
 Minister. 
 
 A repetition of any one year's course is permitted only in case 
 of illness, &c., as previously mentioned. 
 
 In Military, Scientific, and Administrative matters the School Commandant 
 is under the sole charge of the Conmiandant, a Captain. Ten ^°^ ^*|^^ *^^ 
 Subalterns are appointed as Instructors. 
 
 The Commandant takes part in the practical and theoretical 
 instruction. 
 
 The Commandant and Instructors are appointed by the 
 Chief of the General Staff, on recommendation by the Com- 
 mandant of the Pioneer Regiment. They must have passed the 
 War School, one of the special technical courses, or some other 
 upper class institution. 
 
 Non-commissioned Officers are appointed to instruct in Fenc- 
 ing, Swimming, and Gymnastics. 
 
 A Surgeon, a Serjeant-Major and a Corporal or Lance 
 Corporal as Pay Serjeant and Office Clerk ; one Serjeant- Major 
 as House Steward ; three Non-commissioned Officers to assist in the 
 superintendence; and 30 Pioneers as servants, cooks, buglers, &c., 
 are also attached to the school. 
 
 The whole staff is taken from t])e Pioneer Regiment. 
 The Commandant, seven of the Subalterns, and three of the 
 Non-commissioned Officers are borne on the supernumary strength, 
 the remainder on the permanent strength of the Regiment 
 
 The Students are divided into four divisions, each division 
 being placed in charge of a Student of the fourth year's course, who 
 holds the rank of Serjeant-Major, and is selected for his experience 
 and general qualifications. The senior Student in each year's course 
 is responsible for the maintenance of order during study hours. 
 
 The Engineer Cadet School is established permanently at The Engineer 
 Vienna, and attached to the Engineer Battalion in the garrison ; the ^ ^ --c oo . 
 Commander of the Battalion acts as Chief Director of the School. 
 
 The Director-General of Engineers, the Brigadier, and the 
 Commandant of the Regiment of Engineers to which the Battalion 
 belongs, are also required to visit the Establishment personally 
 in their tour of duty. 
 
 The school admits aimually a certain numljer of Students, 
 varying according to the number of vacancies occurring in the 
 Engineer Corps; on an average 16.
 
 42 
 
 Conditions for 
 Admission. 
 
 Commandant 
 and Staff of 
 the School. 
 
 Duration of 
 the Course, 
 and Pro- 
 gramme of 
 Instruction. 
 
 Admission is obtained, either by qualification at the Pre- 
 paratory Engineer School, or in the case of candidates from the 
 ranks or from civil life desirous of entering direct into the 
 school, by producing satisfactory certificates declaring the 
 applicant to have passed the second year's course of the general 
 division of a technical institute, or by passing an Entrance Ex- 
 amination, comprising the subjects in the general division of a 
 technical institute. 
 
 This Entrance Examination takes place in presence of a Board 
 consisting of the Commander of the Engineer Battalion at Vienna, 
 as President, the Commandant of the School and three Pro- 
 fessors of the Cadet or Preparatory School as Members. 
 
 All candidates must bind themselves to serve one additional 
 year for every year, or part of a year, spent at the school. 
 
 The Entrance Examination takes place in the middle of 
 August, the Report being sent to the War Department by 
 August 30th. 
 
 Candidates found qualified, but for whom there are no further 
 vacancies, may be admitted to fill any vacancies that may occur 
 shortly after the commencement of the course, or they will be 
 admitted the following year. 
 
 Candidates who fail to qualify may present themselves a second 
 time, after the expiration of one year, or it is open to them to 
 qualify at the Preparatory School. 
 
 Direct entrance to the second year's course is not permitted, 
 but Students who have passed a technical school are permitted 
 to combine the second Avith the first year's course. 
 
 The Staff of Professors, &c., is taken partly from the Engineer 
 Regiment, partly from the Technical Military Academy. 
 
 The following belong to the Engineer Regiment : — 
 
 One Captain, as Commandant; he is at the same time 
 
 Commander of the Field or Reserve Company at 
 
 Vienna. 
 Two Subalterns, as Instructors in those branches which 
 
 do not form a part of the Course at the Technical 
 
 Academy. 
 One Serjeant-Major, as Pay Serjeant and Instructor in 
 
 Gymnastics and Fencing ; and 
 One Private to every five Students, to act as servants, 
 
 cooks, &c. 
 
 The Staff belongs exclusively to the school, and is exempted 
 from all duty. 
 
 The period of study is for two years, each course commencing 
 on October 1st, and terminating on the 15th September following, 
 inclusive of the yearly examination, and practical instruction. 
 
 The following are the branches of study : — 
 
 1. French (Voluntary). 
 
 2. Analytical Algebra (Voluntary), Geometry, Advanced 
 
 Course of Analysis.
 
 43 
 
 3. Geometrical Drawing. 
 
 4. Practical Geometry. 
 
 5. Chemistry. 
 
 6. Physics. 
 
 7. Mechanics. 
 
 8. General Elements of Engineering. 
 
 9. Superstructure with practical construction. 
 
 10. Encyclopaedia of Engineering Science. 
 
 11. Architectural History. 
 
 12. Study of the Arms in Use. 
 
 13. Field Service and Tactics. 
 
 14. Fortification and Siege Works. 
 
 15. Sapping. 
 
 16. Mining. 
 
 17. Pioneer Service. 
 
 18. Topography. 
 
 19. Regulations of the Service. 
 
 20. Drill Regulations. j 
 
 21. Manoeuvres. 
 
 22. Military Administration. 
 
 23. Army Organization. 
 
 24. Military Reports. 
 
 25. Landscape Drawing. 
 
 26. Ornamental Drawing. 
 
 27. Riding. 
 
 28. Fencing. 
 
 29. Gymnastics. 
 
 Instruction in Practical Geometry, Chemistry, Physics, Super- 
 structure with practical construction, Encyclopaedia of Engineer- 
 ing Science, Architectural History, Field Service and Tactics, 
 Fortification and Siege Works, Topography, and Landscape 
 Drawing, is conducted by the Professors of the Technical Academy ; 
 the Students of the Cadet School attending the lectures with the 
 pupils of the Academy. 
 
 The Preparatory School, the Technical Academy, and the 
 Cadet School are more or less combined and worked in unison, 
 the Students at the latter attending the instruction at the other 
 two according to requirement, viz. : — 
 
 Riding drill is carried on at the Academy. 
 
 Fencing at the Preparatory School, Gymnastics at both. 
 
 Practical training in drill. Field Service, and target practice 
 is carried on at the discretion of the Commandant 
 during the course. 
 
 Practical Surveying, Levelling, and Mapping, Eye Sketch- 
 ing, &c., are carried on at the Academy, or with the 
 Engineer Regiment, or sometimes in independent 
 parties. The Surveying and Levelling belong to the 
 first year's course ; the Mapping and Eye Sketching 
 to the second vear's.
 
 44 
 
 At the termination of the examination and of the instruc- 
 tion in Practical Surveying of the first yearns course, the Students 
 are distributed for technical training among the Engineer Com- 
 panies at Vienna. 
 
 The Students of both years are required to attend all experi- 
 ments in Mining and Siege Works, those of the second year 
 being also taken to visit all interesting technical establishments, 
 buildings, &c. 
 
 The Instructors are required to test the progress and proficiency 
 of the Students by periodical viva voce and written examinations, 
 making a report on each one to the Commandant. 
 
 Any Student showing idleness, or a want of mental power, or 
 bad conduct is dismissed. 
 
 The final examination is conducted on the same principle 
 as that of the Infantry Cadet Schools : to gain the certificate of 
 "Excellent^' the Student must count 183 marks, "Qualified" 
 147. 
 
 The value of the predicates is doubled in German, Military Style, 
 Lower Mathematics (Algebra, Geometry, Analytical Algebra), 
 Analytical Geometry and the Advanced Course of Analysis, 
 Mechanics, General Elements of Engineering, Phvsics, Chemistry, 
 Geometrical Drawing, Practical Geometry, Superstructure, Ency- 
 clopaedia of Engineering Science (road making, construction of 
 aqueducts, bridges, and railroads). Fortification and Siege Works, 
 Mining, Field Service, Tactics, Military Topography, Study of 
 the Arms in use. 
 
 In the remaining subjects they carry a single value, viz. : — 
 
 *' Excellent,'^ 5 marks. 
 « Very Good,'' 4 „ 
 « Good,'' 3 „ 
 
 " Moderate," 1 „ 
 " Bad," „ 
 
 The Students are classified in the List of Precedence accord- 
 ing to the above scale. 
 
 Students failing to qualify are sent back at once to their duty, 
 unless they are recommended for a repetition of the year's course, 
 or their names are submitted to the War Minister for a considera- 
 tion of their failure, owing to unforeseen circumstances. Those 
 sent back to their duty may apply for re-examination after the 
 lapse of one year. 
 
 A second repetition of the .examination, or a repetition of the 
 whole course can be permitted only on very strong grounds on 
 application to the War Minister. 
 
 The Board may recommend Students of irreproachable con- 
 duct and industry, vi^ho, owing to sickness extending over two 
 months, and for which they cannot be held accountable, have 
 failed to qualify for transfer to the second year's course or 
 at the final examination, for a remission of the obligation
 
 46 
 
 to serve the additional year with the colours in place of the year 
 lost at the school. 
 
 The school is established in the Engineer Barracks at Vienna. 
 
 The Artillery Cadet School is establislied at Vienna; it is The Artillery 
 under the immediate control of the Director-General of Artillery Cadet School, 
 at Head-Quarters. Number of 
 
 The number of Students is not limited, but, as a rule, it is not Students. 
 to exceed 150 in both years' courses. Duration of 
 
 The period of study is for two years, each course commencing Course, 
 with Nov. Ist, and terminating with July 31st, inclusive of the 
 examination in the theoretical branches. From the 1st August 
 to 30th September is employed in practical instruction. Conditions for 
 
 Admission to the school is suljject to an examination held in Admission. 
 October of each year, in presence of a Board composed of the 
 Director-General of Artillery as President, the Commandant of 
 the school and three Professors, members. 
 
 Direct admission to the second year's course is open to can- 
 didates who pass a satisfactory examination in those subjects 
 which form the programme of study in the first year's course. 
 
 Candidates from civil life are exempted from examination in 
 the military subjects. 
 
 Regimental Pupils who can produce satisfactory certificates 
 from an Upper Gymnasium or other practical civil school may be 
 admitted without examination of any kind. 
 
 Returns, showing the number of candidates, and specifying for 
 which year's course they desire to be examined, also those who 
 aspire to admission without examination on production of satis- 
 factory school certificates, have to be forwarded by Commanding 
 Officers of Regiments of Field Artillery and Battalions of Garrison 
 Artillery by the 15th August of each year. 
 
 Candidates failing to pass the entrance examination are per- 
 mitted a second trial after the lapse of one year. Commandant 
 
 The Staff of the school consists of: — and Staff. 
 
 One Major or Captain, as Commandant. 
 
 The requisite number of Oflficers, as Instructors. 
 
 One Serjeant-Major to superintend the Quartermaster's 
 
 duties and accounts. 
 One Serjeant or Corporal, as Office-clerk ; and 
 One Private to every five Students, as house-servants, 
 
 cooks, &c. 
 
 The whole of this Staff is given up entirely to the school, and 
 
 is exempted from all Garrison or other dutv. _ 
 
 m c i. J • ' Proajramme of 
 
 The programme ot study comprises : — Study 
 
 1st. Mathematics, including Spherical Trigonometrv, Ana- 
 lytical Geometry, and Mechanics, with the Elements 
 of Engineering Science. 
 
 2nd. Geometrical Drawing and Perspective. 
 
 3rd. Military Style (Reports, Correspondence, &c.) 
 
 4th. Natural Sciences ; Chemistrv, and Phvsics.
 
 Practical 
 Instruction. 
 
 46 
 
 5tli. Practical Surveying ; use of the Plane Table and 
 instruments ; Levelling ; Measurement of Altitudes ; 
 Triangulation ; Eye Sketching ; Contouring and Hill 
 Shading. 
 6th. Military Drawing and Topography ; Study and appre- 
 ciation of ground in a Military point of view; Oro- 
 graphy; Hydrography, &c. 
 7th. Geography. 
 
 8th. History (general and modern). 
 9th. Mihtary Administration. 
 10th. Drill Regulations. 
 llth. Army Regulations. 
 12th. Army Organization. 
 
 13th. Tactics and Field Service; the Art of War; Employ- 
 ment and Tactics of the three Arms ; Outpost Duty, 
 Encampments and Bivouacs ; Military History ; 
 Principles of Strategy ; Mountain Warfare, &c. 
 14th. Field Fortification. 
 
 15th. Permanent Fortification and the Attack of fortresses. 
 16th. Study of the Arms in use. 
 17th. Artillery. 
 
 The Practical Instruction comprises : — 
 
 Drill. 
 
 Aiming and Trajectory. 
 Gunnery. 
 Judging Distance. 
 Construction of Batteries. 
 
 Riding, including harnessing, saddling, bitting, the putting 
 on of appointments, &c. 
 
 The Students also attend all important experiments carried out 
 by the Technical and Administrative Military Committee, and the 
 Exercises of the Artillery in garrison at Vienna, also the larger 
 manoeuvres. 
 
 The Examinations, Yearly and Final, are conducted on the 
 same system as those of the Infantry Cadet Schools ; and the 
 same regulations as regards discipline, interior economy apply to 
 all these institutions. 
 
 . .,, . r. The Artillery form Regimental Equitation Schools, in which 
 
 gimental Equi- Officers, Cadets, and Non-commissioned Officers receive practical 
 
 tation Scliools. and theoretical instruction in riding, driving, and all matters 
 
 relating to their sj^ecial branch ; the chief object of these schools 
 
 is to ensure an uniform system of instruction being carried out in 
 
 the batteries. 
 
 A certain number of the remounts of the Regiment are broken in 
 at the school, and all riding and draught horses reported unsteady 
 with the batteries are sent to the school for further training. 
 
 Each Field Artillery Regiment forms one such school, to be 
 established when possible at the Head-Quarter station- 
 
 A
 
 47 
 
 In addition to Officers and Cadets, a certain number of Non- 
 commissioned Officers are admitted. 
 
 Officers and Cadets of the Garrison Artillery may be ad- 
 mitted by permission of the Director-General of Artillery, but 
 they must have completed at least one year's active service with 
 their Corps. 
 
 Previous to admission the applicants must undergo a medical 
 examination to test their physical fitness. 
 
 Unless circumstances render it advisable to raise the number 
 of Students, it is not to exceed 20 nor be less than 15. 
 
 The Staff consists of : — ■ 
 
 One Subaltern as Commandant and Senior Instruclor in 
 
 Riding. 
 One Subaltern as Second Instructor. 
 One Veterinary Surgeon or Farrier to instruct in the 
 
 Veterinary subjects. 
 One Serjeant- Major, who must have previously passed 
 
 the course, to superintend the Stables, &c., to assist in 
 
 the instruction and to act as Clerk. 
 
 One Corporal. '^ -r , r ^.i Ci. i i 
 
 rn T7 4. n^ r' r J-n charge or the btabies. 
 
 Ivvo lirst Class uunners.J ° 
 
 One Trumpeter. 
 
 One Saddler. 1 -^ 
 
 r\ oi • o ■.■[ ^trunners. 
 
 One Shoeing Smith. J 
 
 Tw^o Privates (cooksl. 
 
 One Driver to every two riding or draught horses ; and 
 
 Two or three additional men. 
 
 The Commandant and Second Instructor are to be chosen 
 from Officers who have already passed the course, and possess the 
 requisite qualifications. 
 
 The Commandant exercises equal power with the Commander 
 of a Battery, over the whole Staff and the Students of the 
 school. 
 
 The number of riding and draught horses is to be such, that, 
 three may be allowed to each Student, and two be left spare. 
 There must be sufficient draught horses to form two six-horsed 
 teams. The horses are to be supplied by the Artillery Regiment, 
 as a rule one-half, both of the riding and draught horses, being 
 trained, the remainder remounts. 
 
 Each of the two Instructors is provided with an unbroken or 
 unsteady horse ; if none such are forthcoming, then a horse 
 requiring a second course of training. 
 
 No remount is to be sent to the school later than December 1st, 
 in order that all the attached horses may be thoroughly schooled 
 by the end of the course. 
 
 Tlie instruction commences on October 1st and terminates on 
 March 30th. 
 
 The Commandant regulates the duties of each month, subject 
 to the sanction of the Commander of the Regiment. The dis- 
 tribution is based on the following conditions.
 
 48 
 
 From five to six hours daily, according to the time of year, 
 are to be given up to practical instruction in riding and driving. 
 
 In the theoretical instruction, no lecture is to be for more 
 than an hour and a half, the number of lectures in each subject 
 being fixed in proportion to its importance. As a rule one such 
 lecture is to be given daily. Four days in the week are appointed 
 for practical and theoretical instruction in equitation alone, the 
 remainder for instruction in Veterinary subjects. 
 
 An hour and a half or two hours are allowed in the middle of 
 the day for dinner and recreation. 
 
 The Gunners and Drivers attached to the Stafl" of the school 
 are also instructed in grooming, saddling, bitting, and harnessing. 
 
 The course at the school is divided into two periods, the first, 
 from October 1st to the end of November, is occupied in 
 elementary training, lunging, riding with or without stirrups or 
 bridles, &c. 
 
 The second period comprises the more advanced training. 
 
 Gymnastics and Fencing, Leaping, &c., form also part of the 
 course. 
 
 The Students are exempted from all guards and duties. 
 
 A Field Officer of the Regiment is appointed Inspector, and 
 the Commandmg Officer of the Regiment, with the Director- 
 General of Artillery, are required to visit the school from time to 
 time, to ensure a proper system being carried out. 
 
 At the end of the first month of the course, the Students 
 are examined in the presence of the Field Officer of the 
 Regiment, appointed Inspector, and any one found " unfitted" to 
 continue the course is removed. Such vacancies mav be filled up 
 by any applicants in the Regiment, who are willing to make up 
 the lost month by extra work. After the first month no vacancies 
 occurring can be filled up. 
 
 The Commandant makes a report at the end of each month to 
 the Regimental Commander, such report being previously sub- 
 mitted to the Inspecting Field Officer. The report notifies the 
 progress of each Student as "Excellent," "Very Good," " Good," 
 or " Unsatisfactory. 
 
 Towards the end of March a final examination is held in 
 presence of the Inspecting Field Officer, the Commander of the 
 Regiment, and, when possible, the Director General, at which 
 all the Students are examined in the practical and theoretical 
 branches of instruction, the horses are mustered and their thorough 
 fitness for Regimental work tested. 
 
 The Students are classified according to their attainments, and 
 the school is then broken up, men and horses returning to their 
 Batteries. 
 
 Cavalry Brigade Officers' Schools are established for the 
 theoretical and practical training of Subaltern Officers. 
 
 One of the special objects of these schools is to ensure an 
 uniform system in riding, grooming, breaking, the treatment 
 and care of horses ; at the same time the Students are given the
 
 49 
 
 opportunity of acquiring information and enlarging their military 
 kno\vledg3, in all that relates to Cavalry duties and the art of 
 command. 
 
 Each Cavalry Brigade formi one such school, after the termi- 
 nation of the autumn manoeuvres. 
 
 The course lasts for six months^ and commences usually on 
 October 1st. 
 
 The Brigadier has charge of the School, but Officers Com- Commandaat 
 manding Regiments are empowered to visit it from time to time, ^^'^ Staff. 
 to inform themselves of the progress made by their Officers who 
 are attached to it for instruction. 
 
 The Brigadier appoints the station at which the school is to 
 be formed, the Commandant and Professors, also the Students, 
 subject to the sanction of the War jNIinister ; the place of 
 assembly and names of the Staff, &c., n^ust be submitted to the 
 latter each year by the 15th August. 
 
 At the commencement of the course the Brigadier is required 
 to send in a report, showing the nominal strength of the school, 
 &c., and any change occurring during the year has to be imme- 
 diately notified. 
 
 When possible, the School is to be formed at the Brigade 
 Head-Quarter Station, in order that the Brigadier may be enabled 
 personally to inform himself of the due efficiency of the school. 
 
 A covered-in riding school, a suitable parade ground, an open 
 manege for jumping, a lecture and fencing -hall, and the requisite 
 allowances for the maintenance of the staff of horses are provided 
 for each School. 
 
 The most highly qualified Officer among the Lieutenant- 
 Colonels or Majors in the Brigade is selected as Commandant. 
 
 Two Captains are appointed as Instructors, one of whom 
 must be specially qualified for imparting instruction in the various 
 branches of education, and must have passed the Central Cavalry 
 Course; the other is selected for qualifications in riding and train- 
 ing of horses, &c. 
 
 The Commandant and the Professors instruct in those branches 
 for which each is specially qualified. 
 Each Brigade details also — 
 
 One Veterinary Surgeon to lecture on hippology, and to 
 give theoretical and practical instruction in farriery. 
 
 One Serjeant-Major (dismounted) to superintend the 
 attached men and horses. 
 
 One Non-commissioned Officer (dismounted) as Pay- 
 Serjeant. 
 
 One Shoeing-smith. 
 
 Three Corporals (dismounted). 
 
 One Trumpeter (dismounted) ; and 
 
 Twelve privates from each regiment, with their horses. 
 
 When there is a Deputy Judge-Advocate at the station, he 
 lectures on the Articles of War, on Military Law, and the Mutiny 
 
 B
 
 50 
 
 Act. If there is no such person at the station, these lectures 
 must be delivered by the Professors. 
 
 Each Regiment in the Brigade sends the six Senior Sub- 
 alterns, who have not previously gone through the course, to the 
 school. Any Officer who has passed the Central Cavalry Course 
 since 1866-67, oi* the Brigade Equitation Course at Ems or Udine, 
 may be exempted from attendance. 
 
 Officers, who, on whatever grounds, are considered unqualified 
 for promotion, are not required to go through the course. 
 
 Each Student brings his own private horse, in addition to the 
 troop horse assigned to him. 
 
 Each Regiment in the Brigade is also required to send six 
 remounts in the first period of training, and also six whose 
 training is not thoroughly completed, for schooling. 
 
 The chief branches of the theoretical instruction consists of: — 
 
 1. Regulations (Cavalry). 
 
 2. Tactics, with special regard to Cavalry duties. 
 
 3. Service in the Field, great importance being given to 
 
 Outpost and Reconnoitring duty. 
 
 Lectures on Tactics and Service in the Field must be illustrated 
 by examples from Military History. 
 
 Each Student is required to write during the course an essay 
 on a given tactical proposition based, according to his capa- 
 bilities, either on the sphere of duties of a Captain, or on that 
 of a Subaltern, and to draw up short reports on various subjects 
 forming part of a Cavalry soldier's duty in the field. 
 
 The lectures on hippology treat on the exterior form of the 
 horse, the grooming, care, tending, and diseases of the horse. 
 Great stress is laid on farriery, both as a theoretical and practical 
 study. 
 
 The study and knowledge of the arms in use, target practice, 
 throwing up field worlds, so far as this comes within the duties of 
 the Pioneers, military topography, and drawing also form part of 
 the programme. 
 
 Where practicable, the theoretical instruction is to be always 
 supplemented by practical examples. 
 
 The practical instruction consists principally in riding 
 drill. 
 
 The Students are practised in covering great distances under 
 various circumstances, in order to teach them to make such shifts 
 and halts, and so to husband their own strength and that of their 
 horses, as to get the greatest amount of work out of them, while 
 preserving their efficiency. This is done, firstly, by single horse- 
 men, and afterwards by detachments. Expeditions of this kind are 
 combmed with outpost and reconnoitring duties, and take place 
 nT)ce a- week. Short reports are sent in by each Student either 
 the following morning or within 48 hours, each report being 
 accompanied by a sketch, which is to be made practically in the 
 field, either on foot or on horseback.
 
 51 
 
 The Students are also required to perfect themselves in riding 
 across country, and in fencing hoth on foot and on horseback. 
 
 The distribution of the hours of study is regulated yearly by 
 the Cavalry Inspector-General, in conjunction with the ^Ya^ 
 Minister. 
 
 The same text books are used at each Brigade School. 
 
 The instruction is to be conducted in accordance with the pre- 
 scribed distribution of time, no change being made unless neces- 
 sitated by special circumstances. 
 
 The number of hours allotted to study each day, is on no 
 account to be increased or diminished. 
 
 No leave is to be granted during the course to either Professors 
 or Students. 
 
 The Brigadier is required to inform himself repeatedly during 
 the course of the progress attained by the Students, and at the 
 termination to subject all to a proportionate examination. 
 
 The Commandant of the school draws up a report on all the 
 Students, giving for each one — 
 
 Regiment. 
 
 Rank. 
 
 Name. 
 
 Previous Acquirements. 
 
 The subjects of theoretical and practical instruction im- 
 parted. 
 Zeal and diligence. 
 General result of the Course, 
 Remarks. 
 
 The Students are classi^ed as " Excellent," " Very Good," 
 "Good," or "Unsatisfactory." 
 
 Students who, owing to illness, to want of diligence,or to unsatis- 
 factory capabilities, have not attained the standard of qualification, 
 are, unless otherwise recommended, referred back by the Brigadier 
 for a second course. 
 
 At the termination of the course the school is broken up, and 
 the whole staff returns to duty. 
 
 PART VII. 
 
 Instructive Occupations for Officers and Cadets. 
 
 The main object of these occupations is to enlarge and 
 improve the military knowledge of Regimental Officers and 
 Cadets, both with reference to tactics, and also to the regulations 
 of the Service, to enable them to form a correct militarv judgment, 
 
 ■ E 2
 
 52 
 
 to arouse in them a desire to extend and improve their 
 scientific knowledge, and also to give them an opportunity of 
 acquiring the necessary efficiency in the use of arms, and in 
 riding. 
 
 These ends are sought to be gained by — 
 
 Conferences and Lectures. 
 
 Reports on any manoeuvres that have taken place. 
 
 Written essays on given tactical propositions. 
 
 Reconnaissances. 
 
 Fencino; and Target Practice. 
 
 Equitation. 
 
 Conferences These comprise lectures on military science, with special 
 
 and Lectures, reference to the tactics of that branch of the service to which the 
 Student belongs ; discourses on the continuous progress in the 
 military art, &c. ; on Army Regulations recently introduced 
 with regard to organization, administration, tactics, and field 
 service ; on the arms in use ; on Army Service Regulations, dis- 
 cipline, &c., with special reference to Officers on detached 
 duty; dissertations on lessons taught by manoeuvres which 
 have taken place, and on the written tactical essays of the 
 Students. 
 
 Each Officer must make himself thoroughly conversant with 
 the Army Regulations. It is the duty of Commanders of Sub- 
 divisions of the Army to impress upon the minds of their 
 subordinates the necessity of acquiring this information. 
 
 The present being recognized as a state of transition as 
 regards the professional acquirements of Officers, the lectures, 
 &c., are to be regulated accordingly, those who are backward 
 having their attention chiefly directed to the most essential 
 subjects. 
 
 The lectures and dissertations take place twice a week, usually 
 for an hour and a half each time. Meetings of the Officers for 
 debates are not included in this distribution of time. 
 
 Commencing at the beginning of December, they last till the 
 end of March, but may be held also at other times, provided they 
 do not interfere with the regular practical exercises and 
 manoeuvres. 
 
 The lectures on official duties, regulations, &c., are conducted 
 by the Commanding Officer of the Regiment, by Commanders of 
 Battalions, or by Senior (Mounted) Captains ; on arms, &c., by 
 the Officer Instructor in that branch, or, in exceptional cases, by 
 some other duly qualified Officer ; the hctures on matters of 
 general military interest being confided to Officers of any rank 
 who possess the necessary knowledge. 
 
 The lecturers are to be nominated during the summer, in order 
 to give them time to prepare their subjects, and to enable the 
 material for the programme and course of lectures to be ready 
 by the 1st of November. 
 
 The Commanding Officer then frames the programme for
 
 53 
 
 the winter season, which programme is to be strictlv adhered to, 
 except in cases of special importance. 
 
 All Officers and Cadets are required to attend the scientific 
 lectures and dissertations on matters of general interest, the Com- 
 manding Officer permitting some of the Non-Com missioned 
 Officers to attend at his discretion. 
 
 The lectures are arranged regimentally, but if, when a Regiment 
 is broken up into detachments, the Officers of the three Field 
 Battalions cannot conveniently be collected, they are to be held by 
 Battalions ; when even thisi*' not feasible, dissertations and debates 
 are to be held in each Company. 
 
 When several Jiiger Battalions are quartered at one station, the 
 course is to be conducted by the Senior Field Officer. 
 
 The Commanding Officers of Regiments are required to attend 
 these assemblies frequently, even though they may not themselves 
 lecture, thereby stimulating their Officers to increased efforts by 
 their personal influence. In their absence one of the Field 
 Officers or Senior Captains is always to be present. 
 
 The lectures are on no account to be confined to the dry 
 reading of theoretical dissertations, but are rather to enunciate the 
 spirit of the subject, and bring it into strong relief by forcible 
 examples from military history, and personal experience, thereby 
 arousing the interest of their audience, giving opportunities for 
 discussion, and promoting a spirit of reflection and private 
 study. 
 
 Each Regiment should possess a library of authentic works on 
 military science, to enable the Students to follow up the study of 
 their profession whenever opportunity offers. 
 
 The lectures on tactics, and the fundamental principles of war, 
 on which they are based, must be illustrated by criticisms from 
 authentic military historians, by historical facts, by various 
 periods of warfare, and further by maps and plans, so as to create 
 a striking and impressive picture out of the general interchange 
 of ideas- 
 
 T)ie lectures on the Regulations for the Service and discipline 
 of the Army, are to bear more on the practical carrying out of such 
 orders as may be issued, than on the mere formal wording of 
 them. 
 
 A journal bearing on the lectures and dissertations held at 
 each meeting, and recording the subjects for debate, and the names 
 of the lecturers, &c., for each day, is ordered to be kept and 
 retained at the Head-Quarters. 
 
 No examinations are held in connection with these dissertations 
 and lectures, but the Superintending Officers have, during the 
 course of the discussions, ample opportunities of forming an 
 accurate estimate of the capabilities of the Officers attending 
 them. 
 
 Special importance is to be paid to a thorough knowledge of 
 the language used in the Regiment, every Officer being required 
 to attain the necessary standard by private study. In certain casea, 
 a duly qualified Senior Officer may be detailed to give instruction
 
 54 
 
 Reports on 
 Manoeuvres 
 that have 
 taken place. 
 
 AYritten 
 Essays on 
 given Tac- 
 tical Propos 
 
 to such as may need it. He would usually be taken from the 
 Staff of the Preparatory School. 
 
 A room is allowed for these lectures, where the Officers' 
 library is kept. 
 
 Captains, Subalterns, and Cadets acting as such, have to send 
 in, dui'ing the time of the practical manoeuvres, reports of the 
 operations on any day on which they have held a separate com- 
 mand, or have had to carry out some minor operations in connec- 
 tion with a larger command ; these reports are to be confined to 
 their own part in the operations, the general course of the 
 manoeuvres being traced, only so far as is necessary for explanation. 
 The reports are to be given in to the Commanding Officer within 
 2J< hours. Captains detached with their Companies are to report on 
 any special movement or march they may have undertaken. 
 
 Such reports are to be made on forms used on service before 
 an enemy, and shovdd give the object to be attained, the disposi- 
 tions made, explaining the motives of each in a few words, the 
 progress of the movements, step by step, with the time of each ; 
 the reports must be accompanied by rough sketches. 
 
 Conciseness, precision, a general outline, and a clear logical 
 view of the movements undertaken, should specially characterise 
 these reports. When they have been criticised by the Com- 
 manders of Battalions, the reports are to be handed in to the 
 Commanding Officer of the Regiment, and retained by him as a 
 guide in forming the List of Precedence in the Qualification 
 Returns. 
 
 Captains and Subalterns of proved ability in such work may 
 be intrusted with the preparation of those reports on manoeuvres, 
 which have to be forwarded to the higher authorities. Such 
 reports are signed by the writer, and submitted by the Colonel, 
 with his own remarks, concurring or otherwise. 
 
 Every Captain, Subaltern, and Cadet, has also to write an 
 essay during the winter, on a given tactical proposition. There 
 are some exceptions, e.g., certain Officers on detached duties, the 
 Commandants and Instructors of the Cadet Schools and Prepara- 
 tory Schools, Officers engaged in instructing the One- year 
 volunteers, also those who during the summer have voluntarily 
 and successfully taken part in the larger reconnaissances. Regi- 
 mental and Battalion Adjutants, Commissariat and Depot Officers, 
 finallj'' those Senior Captains who are mounted, and those of 
 all ranks who have passed the War School with the mark of 
 " excellent." 
 
 Officers and Cadets sick or on leave, have to make up these 
 essays on their recovery or return to duty; they can only be 
 exempted if sick during the whole winter season. 
 
 The propositions for the tactical essays are drawn up by the 
 Battalion Commanders, and are given out on November I5th: 
 Captains may set the subjects for the younger Officers and Cadets, 
 that is, provided they are themselves exempt in consequence of 
 having received very excellent qualifications in former years.
 
 55 
 
 In drawing up the propositions it must specially be borne in 
 mind that an appropriate solution must be always dependent on 
 a correct military comprehension of the subject, which becomes 
 impossible if the proposition rests on false principles, or is wanting 
 in clearness or common sense. 
 
 The material for the propositions is to be taken from the province 
 of tactics, and is to bear specially on practical duties in time of war. 
 
 The placing of out-posts ; the opening of an engagement, either 
 in advance or retreat; the measures to be -taken for a halt or a 
 bivouac ; the means to be adopted in arranging ambuscades or 
 surprises; the covering of convoys; foraging; taking precaution for 
 the safety of a supposed column on the line of march, by taking 
 up a position, or by engaging the enemy with small detachments, 
 either as advance, flanking, or rear-guard ; the attack and defence 
 of villages, and strong tactical positions ; the pursuit of an enemy ; 
 rear-guard actions, &c., may all be taken as subjects for these 
 tactical essays, importance being given, according to the nature of 
 each case, to the opening of the engagement, the maintenance of 
 the fight by the advanced posts, the gradual development of the 
 action, the advance of the main body, and the exact combination 
 of time and place. 
 
 A general supposition must be given as the basis in each 
 proposition, the actual essay being a development of the 
 scheme proposed. 
 
 The supposition should not go into extensive combinations, 
 but should state the military situation as concisely as possible, 
 and determine the line of communication which is of paramount 
 importance in all military operations. ^ 
 
 The proposition is to be worded as a military order ; it must 
 define what is required clearly and distinctly, and must give the 
 strength of the forces on either side, the position of the enemy, 
 and the object of the operations. 
 
 The sphere of operations should be fixed on a well-known 
 ground, which should be selected in the immediate neighbourhood 
 of the garrison, for a correct solution of the proposition naturally 
 depends on a thorough knowledge, and appreciation of the theatre 
 of war. 
 
 Sometimes a theatre will have to be assigned on a map of 
 sufficient detail. A comprehensive knowledge of the country is 
 indispensable to those Officers who have to draw up the 
 propositions, in order that they may be suited to the conditions of 
 the ground, and that the examining officers may be enabled to 
 pass a correct judgment on the essays, as to whether or no they 
 are really applicable to the situation. 
 
 The strength of the force on either side must be commensurate 
 with the object to be obtained. 
 
 The strength of the several arms must be similarly propor- 
 tioned to the nature of the operations, and of the ground. 
 
 As a rule, a mixed force uf all arms is to be assigned, the pre- 
 ponderance being given to that arm uf the service to which the 
 Officer belongs.
 
 56 
 
 The proposition must also be commensurate with the rank 
 and capabilities of the Officer, his military experience, &c. 
 
 Generally speaking, a Captain will be given a force of from 
 1 to 2 Battalions, 2 Squadrons of Cavalry, and | Battery of 
 Artillery; a Subaltern, 2 to 4 Companies, 1 to 2 sections of Cavalry, 
 and 2 guns, but no definite rule can be laid down on these points. 
 
 Unless otherwise ordered, the strength of the detachment is 
 always to be that of the War Establishment. 
 
 If, in drawing up the propositions, one general scheme or idea 
 is taken as the common basis, on which separate essays are to 
 form component parts of more or less simultaneous operations, it 
 is indispensable, not only to define the positions at the commence- 
 ment of the operations with great clearness, but also to point out 
 their general course, so as to regulate the issue of the minor 
 operations, and prevent confusion. The same holds good, if the 
 general scheme is to be M'orked out by the Officers, divided into 
 the attacking and defending force. It will sometimes be found of 
 advantage to assign the same proposition to two or more Officers 
 of proved zeal, thus giving rise to an interchange of ideas, logical 
 reasoning, and a spirit of emulation. 
 
 The essay must hold strictly to the proposition, all drawing 
 on the imagination must be avoided, and nothing more be inserted 
 than is absolutely demanded. 
 
 It must be drawn up in the form of a report to the Battalion 
 Commander (in the case of a varied force to the Brigadier) de- 
 scribing the ground, detailing movements, and giving the reasons 
 for each separate operation. It should, therefore, go into greater 
 detail than the " Reports on Field Days " before mentioned. 
 
 The writer must avoid all non-essentials, all superfluities, and 
 anything not bearing on the immediate matter in hand, and must 
 endeavour to make use of concise military expressions. When 
 completed, it is to be broken off at once, nothing beyond the 
 bare report being required. 
 
 A military description of the ground, its gradients and general 
 accessibility for all arms, is to form the introduction ; any further 
 description of positions, villages, &c., which may appear 
 necessary in order to give a clear comprehension of the movements, 
 and the reasons for them, may be brought in when required. 
 
 The rough sketch accompanying it must show all positions, 
 roads, villages, hill features, &c., mentiond in the report. 
 
 After detailing the nature of the ground, with special regard 
 to the slopes of the hills, it will proceed to give the general 
 disposition of the troops, and the course of the operations, showing 
 the outposts, the line and order of march, the arrangements for feel- 
 mg for and containing the enemy, the preparations for the engage- 
 ment, its progress, the gradual development of the attack, the 
 division and distribution of the force, with a view to bringing a 
 tactical preponderance to bear on the decisive point at the right 
 moment, and, lastly, the measures taken to secure the result, 
 with the subsequent steps necessary for pursuit, retreat, or 
 maintenance of the position.
 
 57 
 
 The time of each movement is to be given precisely ; it is one 
 of the most important considerations that enter into the game of 
 war, in order to secure a successful result. 
 
 The writer is not permitted to assign false positions to the 
 enemy, nor are moral considerations, such as panics, losses, &c., to 
 be taken into account in arriving at the solution. This must be 
 obtained by a due appreciation of the actual truth, and, to a certain 
 degree, be accepted as a logical necessity resulting from the 
 measures taken, the comparative strength of the opposing forces, 
 and a correct employment of the relative strength of each. 
 
 In order to obtain uniformity in these essays, they are required 
 to be written according to a prescribed form. The first page is to 
 contain a verbatim copy of the order, the second the commence- 
 ment of the essay, which is to be written on half margin, the 
 blank side of each sheet to be dated when completed. 
 
 The outer sheet is to be filled in according to the following 
 form : — 
 
 Page I. 
 
 Regiment. Battalion. 
 
 Tactical Proposition for Lieutenant N. N. 
 
 (Here follows the given proposition, word for word). 
 
 (Signed) M. M. 
 Name and Rank of Officer. 
 
 Page II. 
 
 Regiment. Lieutenant N. N. 
 
 To Colonel X. X. " (Here follows the essay, half margin)." 
 
 Barracks. 
 
 Garrison. 
 
 (Signed) Lieutenant N. N. 
 
 To be Docketted. 
 
 Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant N. N. 
 
 Tactical Essay, 
 
 Winter Season, 1869-70. 
 
 The essay is to be in the Officer's own hand-writing, and to 
 be plainly and distinctly written, a blank sheet at the end being 
 left for the Superintending Officer's criticisms. 
 
 The sketch, which is not required to be an elaborate drawing, 
 but must be distinct and comprehensive, is to be executed on 
 the ground by eye-sketching, unless permission is given to make 
 the copy from a map, in which case it must be compared and 
 corrected on the ground ; under any circumstances it must be the 
 work of the Officer himself. 
 
 As a general rule the sketch is to be on a scale of 500 paces to 
 the inch* (Vienna). If a larger or smaller scale would appear 
 more suitable, it is to be notified in the proposition. 
 
 * The Vienna inch is equal to 103 Engli.-:h inches.
 
 58 
 
 The north point is to be at right angles to the upper edge of the 
 sketch; the ground work of the sketch shoidd be in indian-ink, 
 colours being used to dehneate certain features, and the ground 
 being sketched in in pencil. 
 
 The successive positions taken up, and the line of march of the 
 troops should be clearly denoted in different colours — the positions 
 according to the formation and to scale, references explaining the 
 colouring being appended at the lower corner of the sheet. 
 
 The printing or writing on the sketch is to be parallel to the 
 north side, excepting in the case of rivers and roads, where the 
 names are to run parallel to their course. 
 
 In order to avoid extensive details and repetitions in the report, 
 any disconnected features of country, or other objects, as well as 
 the positions taken up, may be marked on the sketch with distinct 
 capitals, the same letters being used in the report, for reference. 
 All names or letters introduced into the latter must appear on 
 the sketch. 
 
 The scale and north point niust be always inserted on the 
 sketch, the name of the Officer, his Regiment, and also the head- 
 ing "Sketch to accompany the Tactical Essay of the Year 18 — " 
 being specified on the back. 
 
 The essays are to be given in by December 15th, at latest, 
 to those Officers by whom the several propositions were drawn up; 
 great attention must be paid by them to the criticisms and judg- 
 ment they may j)ass ; the criticism should be temperate and 
 kind, never sarcastic or harsh. 
 
 The reasons for all difi'erences of opinion or corrections must 
 be carefully explained ; any faulty combinations or dispositions 
 suggested by the writer must be refuted in a convincing manner, 
 and the sources should be pointed out, from which he may further 
 instruct himself on such matters. Only in cases where the writer 
 has stumbled against the positive nature of the proposition, or 
 violated the fundamental principles of tactics, is the essay to be 
 condemned, but where he has not actually taken decidedly faulty 
 measures, but is at variance with his critic only in matters of 
 superficial detail, the criticism should by no means take the form 
 of censure, but should be recorded purely as a matter of difference 
 of 0])inion. 
 
 Attention should also be paid to the style of writing, and to the 
 correctness of the expressions used. The same applies to the 
 sketch . 
 
 The remarks of the Examining Officer are to be accompanied 
 by a general criticism, Avhich should be short and to the point, 
 stating whether or not the proposition has been correctly conceived 
 and worked out; anything in the essay deserving of special praise 
 or censure is to be noticed. 
 
 Essays not in the Officer's own hand-writing, or of a very super- 
 ficial character, or of an unsatisfactory nature, or which may 
 wilfully or involuntarily deviate from the spirit of the proposition, 
 or anv, that are decidedlv faultv in theorv, are to be re-written.
 
 59 
 
 Those essays, which are criticised by the Senior Captains, have 
 to be sent in to the Battalion Commander within three weeks ; 
 he then adds his own remarks, and forwards them (together with 
 those essays, for which he himself drew up the propositions) 
 to the Officer Commanding the Regiment, by January l5th, 
 accompanied by a tabular return showing — 
 
 The Officers' names. 
 
 „ rank. 
 
 The proposition given. 
 Criticism on the essay by — 
 Battalion Commander. 
 Regimental Commander. 
 Remarks. 
 
 Under the heading Officers' Rank and Names, all Officers and 
 Cadets borne on the strength of, or doing duty with, the Battalion 
 are to be inserted. 
 
 Under the next heading, the subject for the essay is to be 
 specified in a few words, giving the locality and the strength of the 
 force, e.//., forest fighting at X, with two Companies, and two 
 guns as the defending force ; three Companies, two Sections 
 Cavalry, and two guns, attacking force. 
 
 Under the heading for " Criticisms " the remarks of the 
 Battalion Commander (appended to those of the Captains 
 in those cases M'here the propositions have been set by the 
 latter) are to be inserted fully in his own hand-writing ; the 
 Commanding Officer of the Regiment then attaches his own 
 remarks. 
 
 Under the last heading the reasons are to be given if no essays 
 have been sent in by any of the Officers ; and, further, those essays 
 are to be specified, which are recommended to be forwarded to the 
 higher authorities. 
 
 The Commanding Officer of the Regiment is allowed till the 
 1st of March for the examination of the essays ; if he concurs with 
 the remarks of the Captains and Battalion Commanders, he appends 
 his signature only ; if he diflfers from them, he adds a comprehensive 
 criticism on the treatment of the subject. 
 
 After March 1st the tactical essays form subjects for de- 
 bate at the " Officers' Assemblies," the debate being introduced 
 either by the Commanding Officer himself, or in his absence by 
 the Battalion Commander. At these meetings it is open to the 
 writer to substantiate his own views and ideas by fundamental 
 principles and arguments ; the discussions arising from such 
 debates are full of instruction and usefulness. 
 
 The best essays are forwarded to the Brigadier, and afterwards 
 to the Divisional Commander, all being returned to the writers 
 by April 15th. 
 
 Incases of repeatedly proved ability, the Divisional Commander 
 may order Officers to be exempt from the obligation of working 
 out these tasks for the future.
 
 60 
 
 The essays serve as a guide in filling up the Officers' Qualifica- 
 tion Lists for promotion. 
 
 The reconnaissances, which are carried out by Battalions and 
 sometimes also in larger bodies, with all the Officers and Cadets, 
 in the neighbourhood of the Garrison, form, unquestionably, the 
 most agreeable and advantageous means of enabling them to 
 acquire a true military judgment, and to master the art of placing 
 troops in position. They should, therefore, be undertaken as 
 often as possible. 
 
 The district selected for the reconnaissance should be thoroughly 
 examined, both by reconnoitring parties, and also by single indi- 
 viduals, who should traverse it with reference to a supposed 
 theatre of opei'ations, the selection of positions for defence, 
 the placing of out-posts, &c. 
 
 Reconnaissances on a larger scale are carried out every year in 
 each division ; these are planned by Staff or other Officers of 
 experience, and may occupy a wide range of country at a con- 
 sideral)le distance from the Head- Quarter station, the object 
 being not merely to give practical experience to the Officers form- 
 ing the reconnoitring party, but also to examine the country 
 itself, and check and correct the existing staff maps by inserting 
 new roads, alterations, &c. 
 
 Attention is directed chiefly to the tracts of country about the 
 great lines of military communication, and to the passes, &c., in 
 mountain districts. 
 
 These reconnaissances, which may extend over eight or ten 
 days, are arranged by Divisional and other Commanders, so as 
 not to interfere with the larger manoeuvres or other military 
 routine, the time being chosen when Officers can best be spared 
 from regimental duty, and the district selected with reference 
 to the troops quartered in it, the means of lodging the Officers, 
 of communication, and the funds at the disposal of the War De- 
 partment for this purpose. 
 
 A small sum is allowed to each Officer to cover necessary 
 expenses, &c. 
 
 The reconnoitring detachments, unless otherwise ordered, are 
 made up by Brigades ; each Battalion furnishes an Officer and a 
 Non-commissioned Officer, and, in addition, all those Non-com- 
 missioned Officers and Men who have undergone training for the 
 Field Gendarmerie service are required to attend ; if possible, a 
 Cavalry and also an Artillery Officer should accompany each party, 
 as well as Officers from the Engineers and Pioneers, if opportunity 
 for the exercise of their professional knowledge is likely to be 
 offered. 
 
 One servant may be taken for every two Officers. 
 
 A Field Officer or Captain on the Staff of the Division is 
 appointed as director of each party. This Officer draws up the pro- 
 gramme for his detachment, in accordance with the General 
 Programme; he details the work and distributes the necessary 
 instruments. The Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers are
 
 61 
 
 selected by the several Regimental Commanders, preference being 
 given to those who vohinteer for the duty. 
 
 During the allotted time, all the circumstances of the country, 
 with reference to the movements, the camping, or the engagement 
 of a l)ody of troops, composed according to the nature of the 
 ground (usually of the three arms, with train, of the strength of a 
 Brigade), must be examined and recorded. 
 
 All strong positions must be marked, though not described 
 in detail. 
 
 For tliis purpose the following points must be noticed : — 
 
 («) The March. 
 
 Examination and description of the lines selected, the practica- 
 bility of the main roads, the roads parallel thereto, and the cross- 
 communications, with special reference to distances of one place 
 from another, the time necessary for passing defiles, ascending hill 
 passes, &c., the nature of the country on either side of the road 
 within tactical range, its passability for the three arms, and the 
 facilities for deployment in event of an unexpected encounter 
 with the enerny, also all obstacles or difficulties on the line of 
 march. 
 
 [h) Camping. 
 
 To find and report upon all camping grounds with regard to 
 water and fuel supply, and other requisites. 
 
 (c) Engagement. 
 
 Examination and evaluation, from a tactical point of view, of 
 all features of military importance, such as natural or artificial 
 conditions or circumstances which, by their character or relative 
 situation, afford good sites for positions, points of support, or 
 barriers to an enemy's progress, also to mark all valuable points 
 for the passage of streams, for ambuscades, &c. 
 
 The director of the reconnaissance, while keeping in view the 
 main object to be attainted, should so distribute the parties or 
 individual Officers that each one may be practised in every 
 kind of country. 
 
 "When possible, the Officers should be collected at certain 
 pre-determined spots, to debate on the military advantages of the 
 districts under examination; at these debates the notes and 
 sketches should be produced for general criticism and con- 
 sideration. 
 
 The reports framed on the material collected, and accompanied 
 by plans, should be short and to the point. 
 
 Descriptions of important military positions are to be appended 
 to the General Report, but entirely distinct from it, and must 
 be illustrated by sketches on a scale of 500 paces to the inch* 
 (Vienna) ; the distribution of the troops required to occupy each 
 position should be clearly defined. 
 
 * The Vienna inch is equil to 1-03 English inches.
 
 62 
 
 Fencing. 
 
 Target Prac- 
 tice. 
 
 Infantry 
 Equitation. 
 
 All important errors in the existing staff maps, or corrections 
 rendered necessary by the construction of new roads, &.C., are to 
 he distinctly marked, and a special report made upon them. 
 
 The reports of all the Officers and Cadets (accompanied by a 
 short introductory statement by the Directing Officer, touching the 
 performance of each one) are to be sent to the Officer Command- 
 ing the Division, within fourteen days of the completion of the 
 reconnaissance ; they are, subsequently, to be submitted to the 
 Commandant of the District. 
 
 The results are reported to the War Ministiy, in common witli 
 those of the annual autumn manoeuvres ; the sketches showing 
 the error.5 or alterations required in the map are also forwarded 
 for the information of the military authorities. 
 
 The reports may be returned to the Officers tor temporary use 
 during the winter conferences and debates. 
 
 The Junior Officers and Cadets are assembled twice a 
 week to practice fencing, &c., under the superintendence of a 
 Field Officer, or one of the Senior Ca])tains. All the Officers of 
 the Regiment are recommended to join this class, but it is 
 obligatory on the juniors only. The instruction is conducted by 
 a duly qualified Officer or Non-commissioned Officer who has been 
 trained as a Fencing Master, and who acts in that capacity at the 
 Regimental Preparatory School. 
 
 The hall used for the lectures is to be employed for fencing 
 lessons also. 
 
 All Officers and Officers' Substitutes are required to attend 
 for target practice once a week during the fine season of the 
 year. The Cadets go through the course with the men, but may 
 attend the Officer's course in addition. 
 
 The course of instruction in equitation comprises the following 
 sections : — 
 
 1. Training in riding across country for Regimental Officers 
 and Substitutes of Infantry, Jiigers, Engineers, Pioneers, and the 
 Sanitary Corps ; for Military Surgeons ; and for Officers of the 
 Intendauce and Supply Department. 
 
 This course has also to be attended on appointed days by the 
 Adjutants of all Dismounted Corps, with their troop-horses ; by 
 Regimental Officers and Substitutes of Military Train stationed at 
 the Garrison, with their troop-horses ; and also, optionally, by all 
 Regimental Officers of Infantry and Dismounted Corps, and the 
 Staff with their private horses. 
 
 2. A short theoretical and practical course in cross-country 
 riding in general, in saddling, bitting, and putting on Officer's 
 horse appointments, &c. 
 
 3. A short theoretical and practical course on the horse, his 
 age, shape, maladies, and shoeing. 
 
 4. A course of instruction for Officers' servants and grooms 
 of Field and Mounted Regimental Officers, in grooming, in the 
 care and treatment of horses, saddling, bitting, and putting on of 
 appointments. 
 
 5. A course of schooling for previously broken but unsteady
 
 63 
 
 horses, for Infantry Adjutant's Remounts, and for young horses 
 the private property of Field aud Regimental Officers, so far 
 as there are available rough-riders. 
 
 On the present establishment there are 53 regularly furnished 
 Infantry Equitation Schools, and 50 others which are held 
 periodically. 
 
 In all Garrison towns where Cavalry Depot-Cadres are 
 quartered, these have the establishing of the Infantry Equitation 
 Schools, and the control of the necessary funds and plant, even 
 though the instruction should not be carried out by the Depot 
 Commander, but by an Officer of another Regiment. 
 
 The Officers and Non-commissioned Officers of the Depot- 
 Cadre are employed, according as they are required, as in- 
 structors, &c. 
 
 The three troop-horses of the Depot Cadre are used in the 
 school as well as the Infantry Adjutants' and other horses before- 
 mentioned; should any more horses be required, or more men to 
 groom them, they are furnished by the nearest Cavalry Regiment. 
 
 In towns where no Cavalry Regiment or Depot-Cadi-e is 
 stationed, the Staff of Instructors, grooms, &c., is taken from the 
 nearest Cavalry Regiment. 
 
 Officers of the Reserve or "^ Ruhe-stand " may be employed as 
 instructors in riding, and in the theoretical and practical courses, 
 but they have no claim to pay or compensation. Instruction in 
 hippology is given by the Veterinary Surgeons and Farriers of the 
 Garrison. 
 
 The Cavalry Brigadier or a Field Officer of Cavalry, Artillery, 
 or Military Train, superintends the Infantry Equitation School. 
 
 Commanding Officers of Regiments are required to send in a 
 return to their several Brigade Head-Quarters by the loth of 
 October, showing the Regimental Officers and Substitutes they 
 recommend for a course of instruction. 
 
 As a rule, Captains aspiring to promotion to the rank of Field 
 Officer, or to employment on the Staff, and Subalterns who are 
 candidates for appointment as Regimental or Battalion Adjutants, 
 as Regimental Commissariat Officers, or for employment as orderlies 
 or on the General Staff, are to have a prior claim. 
 
 The Studentsat one of these Equitation Schools are divided into — 
 
 (a) Those who have previously had no instruction in 
 riding, and have no troop or private horses, aud have 
 to be trained on the riding-school horses. 
 
 {h) Those having troop or private horses, and who, there- 
 fore, ride them in the school. 
 
 (c) Those who have previously had riding lessons, but 
 
 require more practice. 
 
 [d) Those who are only required to attend the practical 
 
 and theoretical instruction in Sections 2 and 3. 
 
 The number of Officers, Substitutes, Surgeons, and military 
 officials required to attend at the school in each garrison town is 
 fixed bv the Commandant of the District.
 
 64 
 
 Instructive 
 Occupations 
 for Cavalry 
 OflScers and 
 Cadets. 
 
 Instructive 
 Occupations 
 for Artillery. 
 
 Instructive 
 Occupations 
 for Engineers, 
 
 Subjects for 
 Tactical 
 
 Essays. 
 
 The number of Candidates in tlie classes (a) and (c) (viz.; 
 those who are instructed on the riding-school horses) must 
 necessarily depend on the number of horses available^ two 
 Students being allowed to each liorse. 
 
 The schools open on November Isfc, and close on April 
 30th, during which period two or three separate classes should be 
 trained. 
 
 The necessary plant for the schools is maintained out of 
 a fund; to which the Officers attending contribute two or four 
 shillings a month. 
 
 The General and Field Officers entrusted with the supervision 
 of the schools are required to inform themselves from time to 
 time of the progress of the Officers attending them, the condition 
 of the Riding-school horses, the schooling of the remounts and 
 Adjutant's horses, &c., and at the termination of the course to 
 hold an examination, and report to the Commandant of the 
 District on the general state of the school, the plant fund, &c. 
 
 The latter has to send in his own reports on the results of the 
 schools to the War Ministry by May 15th. 
 
 Modifications in these " Occupations " for Cavalry, Artillery, 
 Engineers, Military Train, and Sanitary Corps. 
 
 In the Cavalry, the essays on tactical propositions are designed 
 to embrace the more extended operations peculiar to the arm, 
 which recent experiences in war have shown to be so necessary. 
 Tracings from the staff" maps of the country are to be substituted 
 for original sketches. 
 
 In the Artillery, the lectures and conferences should have for 
 their object, in part at least, the discussion of Artillery subjects, 
 viz., the different natures of guns, and their use in the field, and 
 in the attack and defence of fortresses, the equipment of Artillery 
 Reserves, the peculiarity of Artillery of Foreign Armies, &c. 
 
 The essays may deal with propositions peculiar to artillery, 
 instead of tactical subjects ; a minute description of the works to 
 be thrown up in attack and defeoce, detailing the progress of con- 
 struction, the men and material required, &c., should be added. 
 
 In the Engineers, the following channels of instruction are 
 recommended, in addition to those of other branches of the 
 Service : — 
 
 Technical Field Manoeuvres. 
 
 Practical instruction in the superintendence of the execution 
 
 of works by the men. 
 Study of the practical execution of civil or mihtary 
 
 buildings. 
 Acquisition of professional knowledge by travelling. 
 
 In the tactical essays the following subjects should form a 
 prominent part. 
 
 1st, Demolition of bridges in general, and detail in carry- 
 ing out demolition of bridges of stone, iron and 
 wood.
 
 05 
 
 2nd. Demolition of buildings. 
 
 3rd. Placing the out-posts of a Brigade or Division, with 
 the detail of the necessary engineering works : detail 
 and drawings of field fortifications, of works for cover- 
 ing a camp, of temporary bridges, of the mode of 
 establishing communication, demolitions, &c., neces- 
 sary to facilitate the operations of a force, with a 
 given object on a known site, if possible, in the 
 vicinity of the garrison. 
 
 4th. Project for a system of field works on an extensive scale, 
 with the scheme of defence, showing time and 
 means required ; project of a system of temporary 
 mines, placing a line of fortification in a state of 
 defence, attack and defence of the mines of a 
 detached fort ; tetes du pont ; and laying out of 
 military lines of communication. 
 
 In addition to taking part in the manoeuvres in the field for all Technical 
 arms, technical field manoeuvres are to be carried out also by the Field Manoeu- 
 Engineer Corps alone. To this end a supposed force, with a ^^es. 
 given object, is placed in position with a view to carry out a series 
 of operations on ground in the vicinity of the garrison. 
 
 Each year such operations as the following should be carried 
 out, and reports made : — 
 
 (a) The detail of the technical operations necessary in 
 taking up a position for a whole army, both with a 
 view to offensive and defensive operations ; to be 
 worked out by the whole body of Officers, with the 
 aid of the Regimental Staff. 
 
 {b) The detail of similar operations, but for a Corps 
 d' Armee only ; to be worked out by the Commander 
 of a Battalion and his Officers independently. 
 
 (c) The detail of similar operations for a Division of the 
 Army ; to be worked out by a Captain and his 
 Company Officers. 
 
 The field work of these exercises should be executed within 
 the day, and the reports and sketches sent to the Ministry for War 
 within 14 days. 
 
 In the Pioneer Service, the necessary professional knowledge justj^jcti^g 
 of the Officers is kept up by the same means as in the other Occupationa 
 services, but with the addition of — for Officers 
 
 and Cadets of 
 Detailed reports on rivers and lines of railways. the Pioneers. 
 
 Detaching of Officers to the Polytechnic Institution at 
 Vienna. 
 The written essays are drawn up with special reference to the 
 peculiar duties of the Pioneers, the building of bridges, road and 
 railway construction, &c. 
 
 The War Ministry prescribes each year what river tracts are to j^ppoj-tg qq 
 be examined and reported on. Only thoroughly qualified Officers River and 
 are to be employed on this duty, receiving an allowance of pay Railway Lines.
 
 66 
 
 Officers to be 
 attached to 
 the Polytech- 
 nic Institu- 
 tion at 
 Vienna. 
 
 Instructive 
 Occupations 
 for Officers and 
 Cadsts of Mili- 
 tary Train. 
 
 Instructive 
 Occupations 
 for Sanitary 
 Corps. 
 
 similar to that of the Officers of the General Staffs wheu em- 
 ployed on special reconnaissances. 
 
 Captains and First Lieutenants noted for employment in the 
 Field Railway Corps, are allowed to travel for six or eight weeks, 
 on various lines of railway, in order to acquire a more extended 
 knowledge of railway construction and management. They 
 receive every facility and encouragement from the Railway 
 Companies to whom they are recommended. 
 
 Any two Officers of high talents and military zeal, who may 
 volunteer for the office, are attached for a course of instruction to 
 the Polytechnic Institution at Vienna. They are destined after- 
 wards to supply instructors to the Pioneer Cadet School. 
 
 In the Military Train, the system of " Instructive Occupations" 
 is very similar to that of the Infantry, the lectures, essays, &c., 
 being directed especially to the duties of that particular branch. 
 
 In the Sanitary Corps, there is no prescribed system of essays, 
 &c., but the Junior Officers are assembled to hear lectures occa- 
 sionally, and the value of constant study is impressed on them. 
 They are trained in riding at the Equitation Schools, and are 
 specially enjoined to acquire a sound fundamental knowledge of 
 natural science, tactics, military organization and administration, 
 and also in the study and comprehension of military plans and 
 drawing, and topography in general. 
 
 200 3 I 72— H & S 
 911wt>
 
 V 
 
 MILITAKY EEPOETS: 
 
 ADDRESSED TO THE FRENCH WAR MINISTER 
 
 COLONEL BARON STOFFEL, 
 
 French Mililartf Ailachc in Prussia. 
 
 1866-1870. 
 
 (Translated at the ToroGKAPHicAi and Statistical Department of the 
 War Ori'iCE, by Captain Home, Eoyal Engineers.) 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 TRINTED FOR HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, 
 
 By HARRISON AND SONS, 
 
 ^rinttrs xn #rbmarji to fcr Pnjcsln. 
 
 1872. 
 (20wf.)
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 War in Eoheraia and Prussian Ai'mv ; Report of tlie 8tli September, 
 
 1866 ' .. 
 
 I. Incapacity of the Austrian General 
 II. Superiority of the Prussian Army 
 Influence of the Needle-Grun . . 
 Attacks of Cavalry against Artillery . . 
 Report of 4th October, 1866 , , 
 Railways in a Military Point of View 
 Railway Companies . . . . . . • 
 
 Advantages of Elementary Instruction in an Army . , 
 
 Instructions to be obtained by a Study of the Prussian Army 
 
 I. Intellectual Value of the Army 
 
 II. Principles of Justice and Morality 
 
 Replies to various Questions concerning the Landwehr. Report 
 of the 15th October, 1866 
 
 Volunteers of a Year as Officers . . 
 
 A Permanent Chief of the Staff, and the Decay of Austria. Report 
 
 of the 25th October, 1866 
 
 1. Advantages which the Office of a Chief of the Staff 
 confers on a great Mihtary State . . . . . . 
 
 II. Is Austria Decaying ? . . . . 
 
 Note on the Military Organization of Prussia. Report of Novem- 
 ber, 1866 
 
 Organization of 1814 . . 
 
 Faults of the Organization of 1814 
 
 Reorganization of 1860 . . 
 
 Reduction of the Period of Service to Twelve Tears 
 
 New Division of the Teri'itory of the North Grerman Confederation 
 into Landwelu" Battalion Districts, and Reorganization of the 
 Landwehr. Report of 2nd December, 1867 
 
 Division of the Territory into Landwelrr Battalion Districts 
 
 Necessity for a New Organization of the Landwehr 
 
 Inconvenience of the Old Division 
 
 New Organization extending to all the Confederation 
 
 Replies to Questions about Cavalry, Artillery, Miscellaneous. Report 
 of the 20tli February, 1868 . . . . ' 
 
 I. Cavalry . . 
 
 II. Artillery 
 
 III. Miscellaneoxis . . 
 
 The Elements of Prussian Militaiy Superior 
 ment. Report of the 23rd April, 1868 
 Elements of Moral Superiority 
 Elements of Material Superiority 
 Disarmajuent 
 Table 
 
 ity, and on Disarm a- 
 
 1 
 2 
 2 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 6 
 8 
 8 
 
 9 
 11 
 12 
 
 13 
 14 
 
 17 
 
 17 
 19 
 
 20 
 20 
 23 
 24 
 
 27 
 
 28 
 28 
 29 
 30 
 31 
 
 34 
 34 
 
 38 
 40 
 
 42 
 43 
 48 
 57 
 59
 
 IV 
 
 Forces of the Soutlieini States, and Replies to tlie Artille 
 mittee. Report of the 8tli May, 1868 
 
 I. Forces of tlie Soutli Grerman States , 
 II. Replies to the Artillery Committee . . 
 
 ry Com- 
 
 Post- 
 
 60 
 60 
 62 
 
 The Quantity of Ammunition an Army must carry witli it 
 
 Office Service in 1866. Report of the 28th May, 1868 . . 66 
 
 I. Should a Change in the Quantity of the Ammvmition 
 
 of an Army be made ? • . . . . . . , . 66 
 
 II. Post-Office in the War of 1866 69 
 
 Military Forces of the North German Confederation. Report of the 
 
 21st June, 1S68 71 
 
 I. Peace Footing of the Federal Army . . . . . . 75 
 
 II. War Footing of the Federal Army . . . . . . 78 
 
 III. Change from Peace to War Footing . . . . . , 80 
 
 Remarks on the Prussian Army. Report of the 22nd July, 1868 . . 82 
 
 Bronze Field Guns ; Cast-Iron Guns ; Suppression of Shrapnel; 
 Arms of the Landwehr; Two Details of Instruction. Report of 
 
 the 9th Jiily, 1868 94 
 
 I. Bronze Field Guns . . . . . . . . . . 94 
 
 II. Cast-iron Guns 94 
 
 III. Suppression of Shrapnel .. .. .. .. 95 
 
 IV. Ai'ms of Landwehr . . . . . , . . . . 95 
 V. Two Details of Instruction . . . . . , . . 95 
 
 Return to Bronze ; Activity of the King ; and Convention with 
 
 Mecklenbiu'g-Schwerin, Report of the 31st August, 1868 . . 96 
 
 I. Readoption of Bronze , . . . . . . . . . 96 
 
 II. Activity of the King 96 
 
 III. Convention with Mecklenburg-Schwerin . . . . 97 
 
 Reply to a Kote sent by Order of the Emperor. Re^jort of the 
 
 ieth November, 1868 97 
 
 Competitive Practice between the English 9-inch Gun and the 
 Prussian 96 and 72-pr. Guns. Reports of the lOtli July and 
 22nd November, 1868 
 
 Experiments with the Steel 72-pr. 
 
 Experiments to Test the Endurance of Guns 
 
 Experiments with the Steel 24-pr. 
 
 Projectiles 
 
 Prismatic Powder 
 
 Bomb-proof and Shielded Casemates for Coast Defences 
 
 Field Guns, Bronze . . 
 
 106 
 111 
 113 
 113 
 115 
 116 
 117 
 118 
 
 Military Study of Railways, and Organization of the Reserve and 
 
 Landwehr Officers. Report of the 12th December, 1868 . . 118 
 
 I. Military Study of Railways . . . . . . . . 118 
 
 II. Organization of Reserve and Landwehr Officers . . 130 
 
 The Two Religions ; Winter Drill ; New Army List. Report of the 
 
 19th December, 1868 122 
 
 I. Ecclesiastical Organization . , . . . . . . 122 
 
 II. Winter Drill for Reserve and Landwehr Men . . 124 
 
 III. New Army List for 1869 . . 124 
 
 Reduction of the Period of Service to 12 Years ; Remarks on the 
 
 Names of Places. Report of the 14th June, 1869 . . . . 126 
 
 I. Reduction of the Period of Service to 12 Years . . 126 
 
 II. Remarks on the Names of Places . . . . . . 128
 
 PAGE. 
 Law of the Ist February, 1868, Prospects of War, Report of 
 
 the 12th August, 1869 129 
 
 I. Law of the 1st Februai'y, 1868, on Recruiting the Araiy 
 
 and Organizatiou of tlie National Guard "Mobile" 129 
 
 II. Prospects of War . . . . . . . . . . I3i 
 
 Manoeurres of the 1st and 2nd Army Corps and Improvements 
 
 in the Infantry Rifles. Report of the 25th September, 1869 . . 146 
 
 I. Manceuvres of the 1st and 2ud Ai-my Corps. . . . 146 
 
 11. Improvement 6f the Infantry Rifle . . , . . . 149 
 
 Fire of Field Artillery and Armament of the Federal Army. 
 
 Report of tlie 25th October, 18G9 150 
 
 I. Fire of Field Artillery 150 
 
 II. Ntimber of Gruns of the Federal Army . . . . 153 
 
 Military Telegraphs, Telegraphs in Berhn, and Military Convention. 
 
 Report of 17th November,. 1869 153 
 
 I. Reorganization of the Military Telegraphs .. .. 153 
 
 II. Military Telegraphs in Berlin. . . . . . . . 155 
 
 III. Berhn Contingent in 1869 157 
 
 IV. Mihtary Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 157 
 
 Instruction of Recruits and Cavalry Details ; Progress of Amalga- 
 mation. Report of 9th January, 1870 .. .. .. .. 160 
 
 I. Instruction of Recruits and Cavalry Details. . . . 160 
 
 II Progress of Amalgamation . . . . . . . . 163 
 
 III. Staff Joiu-neys 164 
 
 Fortresses, Educational Establishments, Naval Armaments. Report 
 
 of 22nd January, 1870 165 
 
 I. Fortresses .. .. .. ,. ., ,. 165 
 
 II. Schools and Educational Establishments . . . . 166 
 
 III. Naval Armaments, Bronze, Steel, Iron . . . . 167 
 
 IV. Armament of Ships . . . . . . . . . . 167 
 
 Length of Service in the Active Army — Three Years, Two Years. 
 
 Report of the 14th February, 1870 169 
 
 Disarmament. Report of 28th February, 1870 170 
 
 I. Prussia can only Disarm by Violating the Principle 
 
 of Compulsory Service . . . . . . . . 171 
 
 II. Prussia cannot Abolish nor Evade the Principle of 
 
 Compulsory Service .. .. .. .. ..173 
 
 III. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 
 
 IV. Objections 178 
 
 Some Fortresses in the Valley of the Rhine. Report of the 16tli 
 
 January, 1870 . . " 181 
 
 Mayence. . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 182 
 
 Cologne 183 
 
 Wesel 183 
 
 Germersheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 
 
 Rastadt 183 
 
 Conz .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 184 
 
 Application of the Law of 1861, and Economical Measurea. 
 
 Report of the 24th June, 1870 . . . . 134 
 
 I. How far the Law of Military Organization of 1861 
 
 has been applied . . . . . . . . . . 184 
 
 II. Economical Measures ; Sending Back Men by Antici- 
 pation; Delayed Contingents ; Royal Furloughs.. 18!^ 
 
 Manoeuvres of 1870, and Miscellaneous. Report of the 1st Jidy, IS/O 1 90 
 
 Manoeuvres of the ]Oth Army Corps (19th and 20th 
 
 Divisions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
 
 Appendix . . 
 
 PAGE. 
 190 
 191 
 191 
 191 
 192 
 192 
 192 
 192 
 
 193 
 193 
 196 
 196 
 197 
 198 
 
 200 
 
 I. Length of time taken to Mobilize various E-egiments 
 
 in 1866 200 
 
 II. Telegraphic Despatches. . . . . . . . . . 202 
 
 Manoeuvres of the 9th Army Corps (l7th and 18th Divisions) 
 
 Divisional Manojuvres . . . . , . . . . . 
 
 Pioneer Drills , . . . . . . . . . » . 
 
 Staff Journeys . . . . . . . . . . , . 
 
 Embarking and Disembarking Drill . . . . . . 
 
 Intendancc . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 Eemounts . . . . ... . . . . , . 
 
 School of Anclam 
 
 Artillery and Miscellaneous. Report of the 5th Jidy, 1870 . . 
 
 I. Field Artillery 
 
 II. Conversion of Wagons of all kinds . . 
 
 III. Siege and Garrison Artillery . . 
 
 IV. Naval Ai-tillery . , 
 V. Miscellaneous
 
 MILITARY REPORTS. 
 
 THE WAR IN BOHEMIA AND THE PRUSSIAN WAR. 
 
 Report dated 8 th September, 1866. 
 
 The many questions arising from the war between Prussia 
 and Austria just terminated, may be studied to great advantage 
 in Bohemia, where the greatest portion of the Prussian army is 
 at present in cantonments. On leavuig Berlin I proceeded to 
 Prague, the Head-Quarters of Prince Frederick Cliarles, from 
 which place, thanks to the assistance given to me, I have 
 travelled through the country in every direction, and obtained 
 information on those points which appeared to me desu-able to 
 study.* 
 
 During three weeks I have seen almost the entire Prussian 
 army, and I have been allowed to obtain information as to 
 incidents of the war and other matter from a great number of 
 officers of all ranks, as well as fi-om non-commissioned officers 
 and soldiers, prisoners, and wounded men. The follo^dng report 
 is a summary of my observations. 
 
 The armies of a power that had not luade war for 50 years, 
 encamped in Saxony and Silesia, forced the defiles of Bohemia 
 m the face of an Austrian army of more than 200,000 men, 
 drove back, after several bloody engagements, all the coips 
 which attempted to oppose them, and crushed in a single 
 battle, eight days after the beginning of the campaign, the 
 whole of the hostile army ; and, finally, in two months, dictated 
 peace to Austria under the walls of Vienna. These results 
 appear marvellous. But, for those who study the character 
 and phases of the great struggle, the maiwellous disappears, 
 and the causes of this dazzling and rapid success may be stated 
 as follows : — 
 
 An army, taken as a whole, is nothing more than a weapon 
 put into the hand of one man. In this war, on one side (that of 
 Austria), an inferior weapon was put into the hands of a General 
 incapable of using it. On the other side (that of Prussia) a 
 
 * Towards the end of July, 1866, the Emperor had sent Colonel StoflTol, his 
 orderly officer, to Bohemia, with directions to study and report on the history of the 
 war. The Minister, witli the view of facilitating this object, gave M. StotVel the 
 title of ?/Iilitary Attache. He afterwards received ordern to remain in Berlin 
 fulfilling the duties of this office. He remained there for fovr- y, ni-'*, leaving ou 
 the 18th July, 1870. [Ed.]
 
 superior weapon, carefully prepared for many years, was placed 
 in the hands of an able leader. Or, on one side, there was an 
 army inferior in every respect, commanded by a man who did 
 not possess the qualities requisite for a Commander-in-Chief. 
 On the other side, an army superior in every respect, commanded 
 by able, well-taught, and energetic leaders. It is requisite, 
 therefore, that the following questions should be discussed : — 
 
 Was the Austrian Leader really incompetent ? 
 
 Was the Prussian Army really superior to the Austrian ? 
 
 How, and why ? 
 
 I. The Incapacity of the Austnan Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 I would not have thought it requisite to enter into this 
 subject if public ignorance in France, and elsewhere, had not 
 attributed the success of the Prussian army, almost entirely to 
 the needle-gun. Nevertheless, to those who really know the 
 facts, the cause of this success lies far deeper, and without 
 wishing to deny the advantage that the breech-loader gave the 
 Prussians, I feel convinced that the result Avould have been the 
 same had the Austrians possessed a similar weapon. 
 
 At a future time I will explain the general cause of the 
 disasters of Austria. At present I will confine myself to the 
 enumeration of many acts which prove the incompetence of the 
 Austrian General. 
 
 [In this Report, an account of, and an examination into, 
 many acts which demonstrate the mcapacity of the Austrian 
 Commander-in-Cliief is given. We omit this, as we will in 
 general omit in the following reports all details which do not 
 treat directly of the Prussian army, and which, fi'om their pm'ely 
 technical character, would not interest the reader.] 
 
 II. On the Superiority of the Prussian Army. 
 
 I do not pretend, after my short visit to Bohemia, to 
 thoroughly understand the Prussian army; however, a cursory 
 examination shows at once, its undeniable superiority over the 
 Austrian army. 
 
 The political and social institutions of the two countries, 
 their moi-al state, their military organization, are evidently the 
 chief causes of this superiority. They require deep study ; and 
 I confine myself at present to point out in a general way the 
 effects which these have produced, and which at once strike an 
 observer. 
 
 The superiority of the Prussian army is displayed in every 
 grade. The body of oflficers is superior, especially the higher 
 oflficers and company commanders. The non-connnissioned 
 officers are superior. The soldiers are superior. 
 
 Officers. — I have been surprised to find siich a large number 
 of well educated, thoughtful, and distinguished men. I do not 
 allude so much to military education (although this is very 
 complete with them), but rather to general education. They 
 have a taste fur their profession, know it thoroughly, and reason
 
 well about it ; and, above all, show themselves anxious to know 
 the progress that is being made by, and the improvements intro- 
 duced into, foreign armies. 
 
 N on-Commissioned Officers. — The non-oommissioned officers 
 are excellent : their military instruction leaves nothing to be 
 desired. The non-commissioned officers, it appears to me, 
 excel ours, because of their superior education. 
 
 Soldiers. — The military organization of Prussia should be 
 known from the reports of my predecessors. Witliout examining 
 the inconvenience which it offers, it is impossible to deny that 
 the principle on which it is founded, universal compulsory service, 
 puts in the ranks of the army an element of the highest value. 
 
 The application of this principle places in the ranks of the 
 army a large number of persons well brought up and educated, 
 belonging to the better classes, and thus increases the intelli- 
 gence and moral value of the army by the aggregate of the 
 intelligence and moral value of these individuals, to which 
 should be added the healthy and direct influence which these 
 persons bring to bear on tlie soldiers of an inferior class. I 
 bring this particularly to notice, because it gives the Prussian 
 army an element of superiority which no other European army 
 possesses. 
 
 The Prussians like to call then- army the nation in arms. 
 Universal military service renders the description a just one, 
 and they do not deceive tliemselves as to the great power the 
 army derives from the presence in its ranlvs of persons well 
 educated and well brought up, belonging to the better classes, 
 who, as officers, non-commissioned officies, and soldiers, devote 
 to the defence of theii* country their intellects and lives. 
 
 When I expressed to several General Officers my regret 
 that in France the richer classes do not bring into the array their 
 quota of intellectual and moral faculties, one of them replied to 
 me very gravely, although smiling, "Do not adopt the principle 
 " of universal military service, for, if you do, you will once 
 " more dictate laws to all Europe." 
 
 It is requisite to acknowledge the fact that our army, what- 
 ever qualities may distinguish it, is not the best that France 
 could produce. 
 
 Without adopting the principle of compulsory military 
 service as in Prussia, could it not at least be applied to those 
 drawn by lot? This at least would be a first step on the road 
 to equality, justice, and a better constitution of the arm3\ At 
 the present moment the young men of the richer classes escape 
 military service by the system of substitutes. If the army 
 cannot be with us, as in Prussia, the nation in arms, at least it 
 should represent the miniature of the nation, that is to say, that 
 all classes without exception should in proportion to their 
 numbers serve in the ranks, at least so for as the ballot would 
 render this possible. 
 
 By these means young men of the rich classes could not 
 legally escape military service by the length of their purses ; and
 
 the French Army, whatever may be said of it, would not then 
 be a mass of the poorest and most ignorant Frenchmen, on whom 
 the more favom'ed classes had thrown the task of fighting for 
 the nation, I will not here refer to the dangers produced by our 
 military organization at periods of internal trouble as June 1848, 
 when a civil war filled the streets with blood. Our soldiers 
 were called on to fight with men who, like themselves, were dis- 
 inherited by fortune, and who did not fail to spread in the army, 
 by all methods, doctrines subversive of everything. 
 
 [The report here touches on the foot that Prussia, as com- 
 pared with Austria, is inhabited by a homogeneous race, which 
 is peopled by different races ; on the social state of the two 
 countries ; on the qualities which distinguish the two nations ; 
 on the degree of education so elevated in the one, so inferior 
 in the other. Which considerations can explain the causes 
 of the moral and material superiority of the Prussian army.] 
 
 The superiority of the Prussian over the Austrian army is 
 undeniable and great in every respect. This, and the incapacity 
 of the Austrian General, were the two main causes of the 
 Prussian victories. 
 
 On the Influence of the Needle- Gun, 
 
 People have assigned to the weapons of the Prussian Infantry 
 the greatest share in its victories. But it is a great error. The 
 superiority of the weapons has been only a secondary course. 
 Indeed, it may be said that it is only another proof of the 
 intellectual superiority of Prussia, for it cannot be denied that a 
 nation which alone m Europe, fifteen years ago, dared to adopt, 
 an improved rifle, has manifested by that very fact that it 
 excelled the others in judgment, in warlike knowledge, one had 
 'almost said hi boldness. I Avill now describe the kind of influence 
 the breech-loader has had on the battle-field. 
 
 The advantages that the Prassian army has obtained from 
 the superiority of the arms of its infantry, while much exag- 
 gerated are undeniable. But they are due less to the rajDidity of 
 fire than to the confidence the Prussian soldier has in his weapon. 
 I will exJDlain. For more than fifteen years every eftbrt has 
 been made in Prussia to convince the soldier that he possessed 
 an imrivalled weapon, and what brought home this conviction 
 to him was the great care taken in rifle practice. Each Infantry 
 soldier fired annually more than 100 rounds of ball cartridge. 
 Thanks to these eflbrts, the most complete confidence in his 
 weapon has been given to the soldier, and this confidence has 
 produced results, the importance of which cannot be over-esti- 
 mated. It cannot be described better than by saying that the 
 Prussian infantry, composed of young soldiers who never before 
 made war, had the calm and steady fire of veteran troops. 
 Being desirous of obtaining a fair opmion of how much the 
 Prussian success is due to the needle-gun, I sought information 
 from numbers of ofi&cers of all grades. I have interrogated (more
 
 particularly at Prague and elscwlK-re) a groat minibtr of lieu- 
 tenants and non-commissioned officers, who, M'lien actually under 
 fire, are most in contact with the soldiers. I have spoken with 
 Austrian prisoners and Austrian wounded, and, allowing for the 
 wounded self-love of the one, and the excited vanity of the 
 others, I have, as the result of this exammation, arrived at the 
 conclusion that the influence the needle-gun exercised in 186G 
 was that described above. 
 
 It would be a mistake, then, to believe that if the Austrians 
 never attacked the Prussians hand-to-hand, it was on account 
 of the rapid firing of the latter. It was rather due to the 
 firmness and coolness which the conviction that they could 
 not be approached gave to the Prussian troops, armed as they 
 were with a rifle, which the first shot fired gave them, thanks 
 to the rapidity of the loading a second, and, if needs be, a 
 third. Let us repeat. It was tliis coolness and steadiness, 
 sprung from that confidence m his weapon, which for fifteen 
 years had been instilled into him, which enabled the Prussian 
 infantry, composed of soldiers havuig no experience in war, to 
 fire as calmly and accurately as if they had been veteran 
 troops. Such a thing is too important for us to pass it lightly by. 
 
 The Prussians distinguish volley fuing, which they term 
 salvoes (section, company, or battalion fire) fi'om independent 
 firing, which they term rapid fire (schnell feuer). Usually they 
 receive an enemy with a volley, followed at once by inde}>en- 
 dent firing. It is these volleys that are so formidable. It is 
 impossible to quote a single instance where the Austrians have 
 attacked with the bayonet, notAvithstanding the advice given 
 by General Benedek in his proclamations. The first Prussian 
 volley always stopped the Austrian advance, and they generally 
 retired in disorder, when, thanks to the rapidity of loading, 
 the independent fire completed then- defeat. It is easy to 
 conceive the effect of this last on troops already broken and 
 decimated by the volley. The enormous Austrian losses during 
 this war may be thus explained. 
 
 Attacks of Cavalry against Infantry. 
 
 As a proof of the confidence possessed by the Prussian 
 Infantry in the effect of its fire, I must not forget to refer to 
 the attacks of cavalry which have been repulsed without forming- 
 square; I believe this to be the first instance of such a feat in 
 the history of war. 
 
 Colonel Berger, an excellent officer, and a man worthy of 
 credence, told me the following incident which lia})pcned during 
 the battle of Jicin. He commanded the 8th Grenadier 
 Regiment of the 5th Division ; he went forward to the top of 
 a small rising ground to reconnoitre the country, when he saw 
 ten Austrian squadrons which, with a fi-ont of two squadrons, 
 advanced at a trot towards him. He rejoined, as quickly as 
 possible, the only battalion of his regiment that was then at 
 Iiand ; and which the rising ground had until preA-iously
 
 6 
 
 concealed from the enemy. He allowed the cavalry to advance 
 within 200 paces, receiving them with a volley from the entire 
 battalion, followed at once by independent firing. At the first 
 volley 50 to fiO Austrian troopers fell, and the two squadrons at 
 the head of the column turned tail. Independent firing was 
 kept up on the next two squadrons which came within 100 
 paces of the battalion, and then dispersed, drawing the entire 
 column after them in confusion, 
 
 I would add that for a long time the Prussian infantry has, 
 in time of peace, been taught that it has nothing to fear fi-om 
 the attacks of cavalry, which may be received in line without 
 forming square. The order being to allow cavalry to approach 
 within 200 paces, and to receive it with a volley, followed by 
 independent firing. 
 
 I have been assured that at other battles, as well as that of 
 Jicin, the Prussian infantry has succeeded in this way in re- 
 pulsing cavalry. 
 
 [We suppress the end of this report, the information here 
 given as to the Prussian cavalry and artillery, as well as the 
 part it played in the war of 1866, does not now offer the same 
 interest as when it was written. — Ed.] 
 
 On Railways from a Military Point of View. 
 Seport of the Uh October, 1866. 
 
 It has been said that during the war of 1866, the Prussian 
 armies manoeuvred on entirely new principles, seizing imi^ortant 
 points situated on railways, and that this was the great cause 
 of their success. This is an error, which disappears when facts 
 are inquired into. The Prussians, as we will see, have acted 
 very simply, and only as circumstances required. 
 
 When the Prussian armies, the Ist or Prince Frederick 
 Charles's, the 2nd or the Crown Prince's, were in Saxony and 
 Silesia, they used without hinderance not only the Prussian rail- 
 ways, but also that from Dresden to Breslau. It may be here 
 remarked that this latter railway was of the greatest use to them, 
 as it allowed them to send troops and stores from Saxony to 
 Silesia, or vice versa. There being no other cross line between 
 the two railways from Berlin to Dresden, and from Berlin to 
 Breslau. If, therefore, the Prussians had not been masters of this 
 railway, they would have been compelled to send everything 
 round by Berlin, an immense circuit. Had Saxony preserved 
 her neutrality at the beginning of the war, the Prussians would 
 have found some reason for violating it with the sole object of 
 seizing the line from Dresden to Breslau. 
 
 From the 23rd of June, the day the first army crossed the 
 Bohemian frontier by marching on Reichenberg. imtil the 3rd 
 July, the day the battle of Koniggratz was fought, railways
 
 played no pari in the war, the Prns.sianR confining- tlieinselvoH 
 to repairing that at Reiehenberg, which the enemy liad eiit 
 between that town and Zettan. 
 
 After Koniggratz Benedek hastened to rallv the fragments 
 of his army at Ohiiutz. The various corps were moved by 
 railway from Pardubitz to Olmutz, and the 9th July they 
 were united at that place, having broken up the line and 
 destroyed the bridges behind them. On their side, the 
 Prussian army marched on Pardubitz, as it was evident they 
 must do, this important railway junction being on the road 
 they wished to take leading on Olmutz and Vienna. 
 
 Having crossed the Elbe at Pardubitz and Prelauc, they 
 divided, the 2nd Army forming the left marched on Olmutz to 
 attack the Austrian army, while the other two armies marched 
 on Vienna, the 1st or centre by Briinn, that of the Elbe or right 
 by Iglau. These bold but (^aewing the demoralized state of the 
 Austrian army) well-conceived movements could not fail to 
 produce one of the two following results. If Benedek remained 
 at Olmutz, the Crown Prince would watch and cut him from 
 Vienna ; if, on the other hand, he marched to help the capital 
 threatened by the right and centre Prussian armies, the three 
 united would advance freely into the valley of the Danube. 
 The Austrians began to evacuate Olmutz on the 13th July, 
 and during the 13th and 14th trains took troops incessantly 
 to Vienna. But on the 15th this was stopped, for the advance 
 guard of the Crown Prince had passed Olmutz, and by the 
 action at Tobitschau had seized Prerau, cutting thus the com- 
 munication between Olmutz and Vienna. As for the first army, 
 its advanced guard, proceeding by ordinary marches, occupied 
 Lundenbourg on the 16th July, upon the railway between 
 Olmutz and Vienna. There was nothing extraordinary in this 
 movement. It was quite natural that the Crown Prince, 
 entrusted with the duty of containmg the Austrian army at 
 Olmutz, should try and cut the Vienna Railway, by which the 
 Austrian army could, in two days, be moved to the Danube, 
 It was equally natural that Prince Frederick Charles should 
 seize Lundenbourg as quickly as possible, it being an important 
 point on the Vienna line. The Crown Prince, by occupying 
 Prerau, succeeded in preventing three Austrian Army Corps from 
 reaching Vienna ; these corps made forced marches towards 
 Kremsier and Hradisch, and as Lundenbom-g was already occu- 
 pied by Prince Fi-ederick Charles, they were prevented from 
 advancing between the Carpathian Mountains and the Marchfeld, 
 and consequently had to retire into Hungary by the Jawoniik 
 pass. 
 
 The manoeuvre by Avhicli the Prussians thus cut the railway 
 between Olmutz and Vienna was creditable, but I repeat it was 
 a self-evident operation. The Austrian army might have been 
 all moved to Vienna had it begun its movement three days 
 sooner.
 
 Bail wo f/ Corps. 
 
 But while it is quite true that the Prussians have been 
 
 guided hj the simplest piinciples, the means they adopted 
 
 to rapidly repair destroyed railways should be described. 
 
 Each army corps has a detachment composed of 1 officer, 
 
 1 serjeant-major, 3 Serjeants, 6 master artificers, and 48 men 
 of the engineers, 1 superior employe of a railway company, 
 
 2 architects, 2 fitters, and 7 platelayers, or 74 men in all. This 
 detachment is placed under the orders of the commanding 
 engineer of the Army Corps. Its special functions are to 
 repair railways and put them into working order. These com- 
 panies, called " Railway Corps,'' are most useful during a cam- 
 paign. 
 
 The Prussians attach so much importance to this duty that 
 in peace time troops placed near railway stations select 
 annually from each battalion of infantry 2 non-commissioned 
 ofiicers, who receive for a month the instruction requisite to 
 enable them to replace ordinary railway employes. 
 
 Advantage of Elementary Instruction in an Army. 
 
 It is a universal principle in Prussia to instruct soldiers, 
 non-commissioned officers, and even officers to some extent 
 in certain special duties. Thus each year every regiment sends 
 1 lieutenant and 2 non-commissioned officers to a battalion of 
 engineers, where they are taught, for two months, road-making 
 and field fortification, &c. 
 
 Similarly each infantry battalion sends 1 non-commissioned 
 officer and 1 soldier to an artillery command, where they learn 
 how to pack and unpack infantry ammunition boxes. This 
 instruction is useful, for in war each battalion is accompanied 
 by its ammunition wagon. The rule which directs that the 
 wagon follows the battalion everywhere has undoubtedly 
 both advantages and disadvantages. The general officers whose 
 opinions I have sought, on this subject, are not agreed as to its 
 advisability. Some approve of the rule, and think that the 
 wagon should be, during an action, always within reach of the 
 battalion ; others would rather see it with the reserve artillery. 
 
 I have already said in my first report that elementary instruc- 
 tion is more generally diffused in the Prussian than in any other 
 European army ; this gives it a very great superiority. Almost 
 all the men know how to read and write, a consequence of com- 
 pulsory education ; hence it is very easy to teach them certain 
 details. 
 
 Models are shown to them, or chalk drawings of things 
 are made for their instruction. In this way they are given 
 ideas as to encampments, the construction of field kitchens 
 and huts, &c. How many soldiers are there in the French 
 army capable of understanding and profiting by such lessons ? 
 
 The most striking proof of the intelligence of the Prussian 
 Army is given by the way, they use the breech-loader. 
 
 What have foreigners generally thought, would result from 
 
 J
 
 the introduction of this arm ? They believed tliat the men would 
 quickly expend their ammunition, by an ill-judged fire, and 
 that the weapon would deteriorate from rough usage, &c., &c. 
 The needle-gun has done good ser\nce, and the number of 
 rounds consumed has been very small, being on an average 
 only 7 cartridges per man actually engaged, and only 3 if the 
 whole number of troops employed is taken mto account. These 
 numbers were given to me by General Hindersin, who com- 
 manded the Prussian artillery. The cause of this astonishing 
 result can only be sought in the education and consequent 
 intelligence of the Prussian soldier, who has understood the 
 improved weapon given to him, and known how to avoid its 
 ill effects. 
 
 This is a new proof of the advantage which elementaiy 
 education, diffused amongst non-commissioned officers and men, 
 confers on an army. It would be folly to give a needle-gun to 
 an army of savages, but it may be entrusted to the Pnissian 
 army. And the more the soldier is educated the more can the 
 rifle he is armed with be improved. 
 
 Lessons to be Learnt from a Study of the Prussian Army. 
 
 What useful hints can we obtain by a study of the Prussian 
 army ? 
 
 Material condition of the Army. — From this point of view our 
 soldiers are in a better state then the Prussians, being better 
 clothed, paid, and fed. 
 
 Discipline. — Our ulterior economy is better. But it may be 
 fairly asked, Is it not advisable to alter our rules of discipline ? 
 Do we not punish the French soldier too much ? Can w^e find 
 no means of increasing, amongst our non-commissioned officers 
 and soldier, that feehng of duty, which so distinguishes the 
 Prussian army, and which causes punishment to be so rare ? 
 I am astonished at the small quantity of punishment which 
 is given in the Prussian army, and yet no one can say that it is 
 ill-disciplined. It is well known that in Prussia neither the non- 
 commissioned officers nor the subalterns can inflict punishment. 
 Tins duty devolves on tlie company commanders, who cannot 
 even punish a subaltern. The commanding officers of regiments 
 alone can punish an officer. I do not urge that we should 
 adopt the Prussian system in its integrity. I confliie myself to 
 observing that the number of punishments inflicted ui the 
 French ai*my is prodigious Mdien compared with those of the 
 Prussian army. 
 
 Administration. — Under this head we have nothing to learn 
 fi-oni Prussia, our own is, I think, based on better principles, it 
 has more unity and is less complicated. The Sous-Intendant 
 Bages, now at Berlin, is employed in study mg tins subject, 
 and will doubtless place in a clearer light what I here merely 
 touch on. 
 
 To foreigners, great praise is bestowed, on the Prussian
 
 10 
 
 Intendance aud the services it rendered during- the last war, 
 but, by degrees, it has leaked out that there is ample room for 
 improvement. During my journeys in Bohemia I have been 
 often told that during the first eight days of the campaign 
 neither food nor forage could keep up Avith the army, and that it 
 was forced to Hve on the country ; and it is now understood 
 that this state of things lasted for three weeks, that is to say, 
 for the greater part of the campaign. During all this time the 
 issues, when they did not entirely fail, were made in an irregular 
 manner. Certain cavalry brigades have, on several occasions 
 received no forage for days together. 
 
 Medical Service. — The medical service caii give us useful 
 hints. During the war, the number of sm'geons Avas, it is true, 
 insufficient ; but the Austrians abandoned all theii" wovnided, 
 who had to be looked after. 
 
 In every way the medical service has acted well. The 
 organization of both the small and large ambulances was well 
 iniderstood. The places selected were suitable ; chosen near 
 streams of water and railways. The removal of patients from 
 the small to the great ambulances, always a difficult thing, was 
 well carried out. 
 
 M. Bages is collecting all the information requisite for the 
 study of this important matter. 
 
 Company of Bem-ers of the Wounded. — Each Army Corps 
 has attached to it a company of 180 men, whose duty it is to 
 give the first help to the wounded on the field of battle, and 
 carry them to the ambulances. These companies are composed 
 of Landwehi' men, selected for previous good conduct, and thus 
 affiirding an assurance that the duty will be properly per- 
 formed. 
 
 Each Company is commanded by a captain of the train bat- 
 talion belonging to the Army Corps, and is divided into three 
 sections ; these sections are told off, one to each division, and 
 one to the advanced guard, and are each commanded by an 
 officer and a sm-geon ; the men wear the infantry uniform and 
 carry a carbine. 
 
 The following are their duties : They go on the battle-field 
 and give the first care to the wounded, apply di-essings to stop 
 bleeding, and arrange bandages and splints in case of broken 
 limbs, select the wounded from the dead, carry the former 
 with as much care as possible on stretchers to where they can 
 receive attention. The men fonning these companies receive a 
 special education in peace time upon all these details. 
 
 Exact models of the carriages, barrows, stretchers, and 
 other things employed in the service, will be sent when I can 
 procure them ; meantime I send herewith a rough dra^Aing of 
 the means of transport used for badly Avounded men. 
 
 Some such organization should be thought of in France. 
 The musicians, who perform this duty with us, are evidently 
 not a sufficient provision. For, as soon as a man is wounded, 
 three or four of his comrades quit the ranks under pretext of
 
 11 
 
 helping liim. The great irregularities eansetl hy tlii.s would be 
 mueh dimiiiished. if we had a special service well organized for 
 the purpose. 
 
 Railway Corps. — I have already described the composition of 
 the detachments charged with repairhig, destroying, or putting 
 in working order the various Imes of railway. The Prussians, 
 in adopting them, have copied the corps organized by the United 
 States during the war of the Secession. 
 
 But the most important lesson to be obtained by a study 
 of the Prussian army is that comiected with its morale. Two 
 things are very striking : — 
 
 1. The intellectual value of the army. 
 
 2. The principle of justice and morality which is the 
 
 basis of its organization. ^ 
 
 I. The Intellectual Value of the Army. 
 
 This is due to the intellectual state of Prussia, Avhich is 
 very high, and to the effects produced by the law of compulsoiy 
 service, which causes all the talent of the country without 
 exception to serve in the army. 
 
 Prussians are not remarkable for either the elevation or 
 nobleness of then ideas. Greatness of soul, generosity, and the 
 attractive gifts of mind are not their inheritance. But they 
 possess, in a marked degree, sterling qualities : industry, a strong- 
 sense of duty, a love of order, economy, and obedience. Then- 
 Electors and their Kings have almost always been an uicarnation 
 of the national character. Wanting nobleness and greatness of 
 soul, this nation would never have produced a Louis XIV. 
 But it must be admitted that neither would it have produced 
 a Louis XV. The army represents the nation much more than 
 the French army does the French nation, and it possesses all 
 the sterling qualities I have named. 
 
 Under the head of general education it is far superior to the 
 French army, and, as I have already pointed out in my first 
 report, this superiority is to be found in every grade. The 
 officers are better educated than ours, so are the non-com- 
 missioned officers ; and finally, the soldiers sm-pass the French 
 not by theii- natural intelligence, which is certainly as great 
 amongst us, but because their primary education is less super- 
 ficial. 
 
 I have said that Prussian officers are generally better 
 educated than those of the French army. One cause of this is 
 the system, by which these officers are obtained, which rarelv 
 allows a non-commissioned officer to attain the rank of officer ; 
 but it should be added that, as might be expected amongst 
 a people, so much in earnest, the greater part of the officers 
 continue to study after leaving school, wliile the French officers 
 rest contented with what they there learned. In Prussia 
 officers are encouraged to study by every possible means. For 
 this purpose most garrisons have societies called 3Iilitarv 
 Societies, where the officers often meet together for lectures.
 
 12 
 
 The King and the Princes belong to the Berhn Mihtaiy 
 Society, and visit it frequently. 
 
 I will here give an instance which seems to me to be very 
 characteristic of this difference between Prussian and French 
 officers. There is a military book — none more valuable has 
 ever been produced by the brain of man ; ]\Iarshal Marmont 
 says of it, " He who thmks over, and understands it, will have 
 an instinctive knowledge of war ;" I allude to the " Memou-es de 
 Napoleon." How many French officers are there who have 
 studied this book. It is sad to say that officers of high rank, 
 even those in command of divisions and brigades, are ignorant 
 even of its existence. Very few assuredly have read it. The 
 number who have thought over it may be counted on the 
 fingers. 
 
 Now (I do not wish to exaggerate) I have found in Prussia, 
 during the time I have been here (two months), more officers 
 who have studied the Memoires of Napoleon than I have found 
 in France during 25 years. 
 
 The Prussian staff officers are, above all others, well taught. 
 The greater number know the liistory of all wars thoroughly, 
 and reason on military matters in a remarkable manner. 
 
 H. Principle of Justice and Morality. 
 
 Prussia has given the brightest example of justice and 
 morality, by appljdng the principle of compulsory service for all 
 her citizens. On this basis her mihtary institutions rest. 
 
 How is it possible to compare an organization based on a 
 principle so just, so pregnant with valuable results, Avith the 
 French organization, bearing on its face the horrible stain of sub- 
 stitution by means of money payments. A thing which de- 
 morahzes the army, nay the nation itself. We do not reflect on 
 the dangers of this fatal institution ; men gifted with common 
 sense have long ago discerned, and said all that can be said 
 against a prmciple so unjust, so immoral, and which, in the long 
 run, saps the very foundations of the nation. 
 
 Prussia has proclaimed loudly that military service is the first 
 duty of the citizen; that nothing is more demoralizing to a nation 
 than allowing the rich, by reason of their wealth, to fi'ee them- 
 selves from this duty. For, say they, how can a nation but 
 believe that all duty may be bought and sold, if this the most 
 sacred of all duties is so treated? What a gulf do not such prin- 
 ciples open between the rich and the poor ? How can it be hoped, 
 if such principles are allowed, that the army can enjoy that 
 respect and that consideration, which is so essential to its 
 very existence'? It is impossible to describe, how the considera- 
 tion in which Prussia holds her army strikes one ; it can only be 
 explained by the application of universal military service, which 
 fuses, as it were, the nation and the army. The army monopo- 
 lizes all the honours, all the favours, and all the advantages in 
 the State. A man who (for whatever reason) has not served in 
 the army obtains no employment. In the country he is an 
 
 I
 
 13 
 
 object of ridicule and contempt to his fellows. As there are 
 very few families who have not a son, a brother, or a relation 
 serving in the army, it follows in exact opposition to what is 
 the case in France, that the army is not viewed as an institu- 
 tion apart from the country; but, on the contrary, all clasfies of 
 the population, men, women, and children are deeply hiterestod 
 in, devoted to, and ready to make all lands of sacrifices 
 for their army. 
 
 The recent Austrian war has afforded a remarkable proof of 
 this._ Prussia has offered the edifying sight of a great State, 
 looking after 30,000 sick and wounded men without its costing 
 one sixpence, thanks to voluntary gifts coming from all parts 
 of the Empire- 
 
 Replies to various Questions about the Landwehr, 
 
 Report, 15th October, 1866. 
 I reply to the questions sent to me by the Emperor. 
 
 I. — Q. How are the Landwehr Officers chosen and ap- 
 pointed ? 
 
 A. These officers are taken — First, from amongst " the volun- 
 *'teers for one year," Avho,having served that year, have received 
 a certificate of fitness to discharge the duties of Landwehr Oflfi- 
 cers ; secondly, from amongst officers of the army, who, having 
 reached the age fixed for the Landwehr, wish to quit the army, 
 
 " Volunteers for One Year." 
 
 The institution of volunteers for one year is as follows : — 
 Every person who wishes . to serve for one year onli/ in place 
 of three, goes before a Departmental Committee of Examina- 
 tion, before which he is compelled to prove either by a certificate 
 or actual examination that he possesses the knowledge laid 
 down in the fixed programme. They are less severe on those 
 young men who are studying some science or art which de- 
 mands their "whole time, than on those who labour in a work- 
 shop or manufactory. 
 
 Those who pass satisfactory examinations receive a certifi- 
 cate, and have then the right to perform one year only of 
 military service, either as privates in the ranks, as surgeons, 
 as veterinary surgeons, or apothecaries in some hospital. They 
 are further allowed to choose the branch of the service, the 
 regiment, the garrison, or military establishment they wish to 
 join. They are free to perform this year of service when they 
 please between the ages of 21 and 24. Duiing the year they 
 must clothe, equip, feed, and lodge themselves at their own 
 cost, arms alone being supplied by the corps in which they 
 are serving; but they are bound to keep these in repair, and 
 return them in a good state at the end of the year. 
 
 The number of these volunteers who enter each year into 
 
 " D
 
 14 
 
 tlip army is about 2,000* ; each company or squadron can re-~ 
 ceive only four such vohmteers annually. 
 
 During their service these volunteers learn the duty of a 
 soldier, the duty of a non-commissioned ofiicer, and in part 
 that of a Lieutenant of Landwehr. One officer in each battalion is 
 entrusted with their education, both theoretical and practical ; 
 those who manifest zeal and intelligence are appointed super- 
 numerary lance coi'porals, after six months' service. 
 
 Before the expiry of the year, the volunteers are examined, 
 by a board composed of one captain and two lieutenants ; those 
 Avho are considered capable of performing the duty of Lieutenant 
 in the Landwehr receive a certificate to that ettect from the 
 commanding ofiicer. 
 
 But before being appointed officers they have to serve 
 during a training of 8 to 15 days with the Landwehr, or six 
 weeks with a Line regiment; their fitness for the position being 
 acknowledged, they receive at first the grade of non-commis- 
 sioned officer, then are (if approved of by the officers of the 
 battalion in which they wish to serve) nominated as Second 
 Lieutenants, and finally commissioned as such by the King. 
 
 Of the 2.000 volunteers who enter each year into the army, 
 about 700 receive certificates as officers, and from amongst 
 these the greater number of Landwehr officers are selected. 
 
 Officers Leaving the Army. 
 
 Officers (that is to say captains and lieutenants) who have 
 reached the landwehr age, 27, and who are in good health, may 
 quit the army, and join the Landwehr, preserving their grade. 
 
 Apphcations to this effect are made sometimes m the 
 infantry, but more generally in the cavalry, when officers who 
 have estates desire to live on them. 
 
 Volunteers for a Year as Officers. 
 
 I have pointed out in a former report the advantages and 
 disadvantages of the system of " Volunteers for a Year." The 
 advantages are of various kinds. As for the disadvantages 
 they are shown when the army is mobilized. 
 
 In the Prussian army, for economy and other reasons, the 
 number of officers in peace is not sufficient ; for example, there 
 are only four instead of five officers per company. 
 
 It follows, then, that when the army is mobilized, field 
 officers are selected to command battalions and squadrons of 
 Landwehr, and a large number of subalterns are transferred 
 from the Army to the Landwehr, to give the latter more 
 steadiness ; in addition to which the army has to provide officers 
 for garrisons, depots, and various military establishments. All 
 these vacancies in the army, some due to the common peace 
 
 * Tliis figure refers to the Prussian armj' before 1866 ; for in a subsequent Report 
 the number of these Volunteers for a year is stated to be, in 1868, for the army of the 
 North German Confederation, about 12,000. — [Ed.]
 
 15 
 
 footing, others produced by the mobilization, are filled either by 
 promotion, or by transferring from the Landwehr to the Army, 
 the mnnber of subalterns removed from the latter to the former. 
 
 These alterations, which a change from a peace to a war 
 footing entails, constitutes a great disturbance amongst the 
 the officers, and presents manifest disadvantages. However, 
 many Prussian officers do not wish to alter the system. They 
 say that the presence of oti cers of the line in the Landwehr, 
 give it a steadiness which makes it equal to the Regular Army, 
 and that the latter does not sensibly suffer by the introduction 
 of a certain number of volunteers for a year as officers. 
 
 But many officers who commanded battalions of landwehr 
 in the last war have, on the other hand, declared that with 
 some exceptions the " volunteers for a year " have not shown 
 themselves fitted to perform the duties of an officer. 
 
 IT. Q. How are the Non-commissioned Officers of the Land- 
 wehr obtained? 
 
 A. The non-commissioned officers of the Landwelir come — 
 
 1. From non-commissioned officers supplied from the Regular 
 Army. 
 
 2. From private soldiers who, during their third year of 
 service in the army, have received the instruction requisite to 
 enable them to fulfil the duties of a non-commissioned officer 
 of Landwehr (each company in the army trains two men for 
 this purpose during then* last year of service). 
 
 3. PVom men of the Landwehr ; those who display zeal and 
 fitness for the post being selected. 
 
 HI. Q. What is the composition of the Cadi-es of the Land- 
 wehr ? 
 
 A. Infanti-y. — In time of peace, the 32 Infantry and 4 Guard 
 Regiments of Landwehr, have neither staff nor permanent 
 cadres, the officers and men being on fm'lough, but each 
 battalion has a depot, composed as follows : — 
 
 1 Commandant (always an Officer of the Arm j). 
 
 1 Lieutenant. 
 
 4 Serjeants-Major. 
 
 6 Non-Coimiissioned Officers. 
 
 4 Lance ditto. 
 
 2 Privates. 
 
 Total, 2 officers and 16 men. 
 
 In war time the Cadres of Landwehr regiments are assimi- 
 lated to those of regiments of the line. 
 
 Cam /ry.— There are 12 Regiments of Landwehr Cavalry, but 
 without staff or cadres. Each squadron in peace time has a 
 depot, composed as follows : — 
 
 1 Lieutenant. 
 
 2 Non-Commissioned Officers. 
 2 Lance ditto. 
 
 Total, 1 officer and 4 men. 
 
 d2
 
 16 
 
 Id addition, one officer of tlie regular ai'my commands four 
 squadrons, and there is also a paymaster and clerk to take 
 charge of the accounts. 
 
 IV. Q. Are the Landwehr Horses bought and fed by the 
 State? 
 
 A. Prussia (I do not here refer to the provinces recently 
 annexed) is divided into eight great military divisions, in each 
 of which an Army Corps of all arras, both Regular and Land- 
 wehr is stationed, and from which it recruits. 
 
 Each division is generally divided into 13 districts, called 
 Landwehr battalion districts; this district is the true unit for 
 recruiting the military forces of Prussia, for superintending the 
 Reserve men, and those of the Landwher, as well as for all ( ther 
 questions refeiiing to the change from a peace to a war footing 
 (mobilization as the Germans term it). The men composing the 
 Landweln', live at home on furlough, but can, during any portion 
 of then* service, be recalled for a training of 8 to 15 days. 
 
 Landwehr cavalry is formed in squadrons, which correspond 
 with the districts of infantry battalions. The horses required 
 during the manoeuvres are furnished by private persons, or 
 by the parishes who buy them where they can. When the 
 manoeuvi-es are completed the parishes sell the horses again. 
 The loss which ensues represents the tax imposed on the 
 different parishes. 
 
 The tax is much heavier in war time, for, m- addition to the 
 Cavalry of the Landwehr, the parishes must furnish the horses 
 requisite for the baggage and hospital trains of the army. 
 
 In peace, as in war, the State feeds the horses. 
 
 In Prussia, horses as ^well as men are liable to compulsory 
 military service. Eveiy horse in the country, the horses of 
 private persons not excepted, is borne on hsts furnished 
 officially to Government by the local authorities. During war, 
 the State, to avoid public discontent, prefers to buy horses either 
 in Prussia or elsewhere. But if the price is thought too high, 
 horses are obtained fi-om private individuals, at prices fixed 
 by the Government itself. 
 
 Last spring, when the army was mobilized for war T\4th 
 Austria, the State purchased the horses requisite to place the 
 Regular Cavalry and Artillery on a war footing. The horses for 
 the Landwelir Cavalry, the pares, hospitals, &c., were supphed 
 by the parishes at their own expense. 
 
 VII. Q. What is the Uniform of the Landwehr ? 
 
 A. It only differs from that of the regular army in the 
 headdress. All the infantry of the army have a helmet, except 
 the battalions of rifles, who have a leather shako, with a double 
 peak of black leather. The Landwehr have the same shako 
 with a white cross in front, as a distinguishing mark.
 
 17 
 
 Upon a Perivlinent Chief of the Staff, and on the Decay 
 
 OF Austria. 
 
 Report of the 25th October, 1866. 
 
 I. The advantages which a great Military State deri\^s 
 FROM A Permant:nt Chief of the Staff. 
 
 The Prussian Army, the brigades, divisions, and army- 
 corps of which are permanently formed, has also a perma- 
 nent chief of the staff. Would not this institution have its 
 advantages in other countries, even although tlieir military 
 organization may be entirely different from that of Prussia ? 
 
 General Moltke is Chief of the Prussian Staff. He is looked 
 on as the ablest military man in Prussia, and I have been 
 much struck by the qualities which distinguish him. At a 
 single glance, his correct and unerring judgment, his great 
 common sense, and his very extensive military knowledge, may 
 be detected. His well-known integrity, his great conscien- 
 tiousness, and the services he has for many years rendered, have 
 won for him the respect of all. King, Army, and Nation. 
 
 Not only does General Moltke understand the Prussian 
 army completely, but he also understands the composition and 
 organization of foreign armies, the resources of other countriee 
 'their military genius, and history. Thanks to an unwearying 
 industry, be knows the smallest details of the geograph}' of all 
 the countries in Europe, and his continual study of modern cam- 
 paigns, has given him a very high degree of warlike knowledge. 
 Such the man. The folloAving are his duties : under his chief 
 direction the officers of the Prussian staff are educated and 
 formed. The organization of the Prussian staff differs entirely 
 from ours. It is not, as in the French army, a distinct corps. 
 The officers are, on the contrary, selected, without distinction, 
 from all arms of the service. Having served f<u- three years 
 as Lieutenants in then- regiments, and then for three years as 
 pupils at the War Academy, these officers enter the head- 
 quarter staff at BerHn, which is under the direction of General 
 IMoltke, who there makes them study the organization of 
 foreign amiies, modern military geography, history, topography, 
 tactics, and strategy. He himself dh-ects their studies, proposes 
 problems to solve, and memoirs to di-aw up, exammes and 
 criticises then- laboiu-s. He thus learns to know the merits and 
 qualifications of all these officers. He nommates them for pro- 
 motion, and appoints them to the staff of the various divisions 
 and army corps. 
 
 The head-quarter staff at Berlin is perfectly organized tor 
 instructing officers. There is collected, everything requisite for 
 the study of the different European armies, and the countries 
 which may become the theatre of war. All the mihtary books 
 and newspapers, the pamphlets, publications, maps, and plans
 
 18 
 
 which appear in Europe are there collected and classified. It 
 possesses, in addition, the most complete information upon the 
 countries contiguous to Prussia. 
 
 The foreign countries which actually bound Prussia have 
 been examined in the most detailed manner. Reconnaissances 
 of the most minute kind have been made, embracing the 
 resom-ces of the country, its topography, the roads, towns, 
 villages, then* population and their resources ; watercourses, their 
 direction, their depth, then- width, the places for crossing, &c. 
 I doubt much if the Depot de la Guen-e has anything so com- 
 plete. If to-moiTOW, for example, a French army invades the 
 Palatinate, how many French officers could supply the important 
 information which constitutes the object of mihtary recon- 
 naissance '? None doubtless ; for either we have not got the 
 requisite documents to study in peace time, or what we have 
 are msufficient. The Pnissian Scafi", on the contrary, possesses 
 and collects beforehand everything relative to neighbouring 
 countries, and each day this information is improved by adding 
 the roads, railways, and other changes that may have been 
 made ; consequently I have not been surprised to find that a 
 large number of the Prussian staiF officers know our north- 
 eastern frontier better than any French officer, and others knew 
 the frontier of Bohemia as well, doubtless, as the Austrian 
 officers themselves. 
 
 But to return to General Moltke. He must be viewed as 
 occupying a tiwo-fold office : instructor to, and director of 
 the entire staff of the army. 
 
 It is easy to understand the great services which such a man 
 can render to his country both before and dm'ing a war, trained 
 for so many years to perform the duty of chief of the staff, and 
 aided in his duties by a chosen body of officers selected and 
 taught by himself. 
 
 The French Army has no Permanent Chief of the Staff. 
 When war is imminent, the Minister or Sovereign selects one 
 from the available marshals or generals. But the selected 
 person, how great soever may be his personal merit, cannot be 
 sufficiently prepared to fulfil the important duties thus suddenly 
 thrust on him. To make a good Chief of the Staff, a man must 
 not only have a certain natural aptitude for the post, but he 
 must have the most extensive and varied knowledge, such as 
 can only be acquired by long study. No point concerning the 
 organization, composition, and resources of his own or foreign 
 armies slioidd escape him. He must be intimately acquainted 
 with military geography, topog-raphy, administration of troops, 
 the principles of tactics and ■ strategy, and of the probable 
 theatre of war, &c. In addition to which he should laiow per- 
 fectly all the Generals of the Army, and niore especially the 
 Staff Officers, in order that he may detail officers possessed of 
 the requisite knowledge for the Staff of the Divisions and 
 Army Corps. How is it possible that any General can fulfil 
 such a duty, if he is not prepared for it, by study and labour ?
 
 19 
 
 The advantages which accrue from having a Permanent Chief 
 of the Staff are very evident. War suddenly breaks out. 
 Nothing is then left to chance ; no person is taken unawares. 
 The Sovereign or Head of the Army is not embarrassed by 
 having to select an officer for this most important post, at a 
 moment that is always critical. He finds him there on the spot, 
 ready to carry out well-defined duties, andcapaVjle of selecting, 
 what at the present day are all-impoi"taiit, good Slajfs, yenerulor 
 special. 
 
 ,\lthough our military organization differs in every essential 
 point from that of Prussia, and although our army is not divided 
 into divisions in peace time, there is nothing to prevent us, so 
 far as I know, from instituting in our army an office so useful, 
 so important as that of a Permanent Chief of the Stafi: 
 
 II. Is AusTRLv IX A State of Decay? 
 
 The more light that is shed on the events of 1866, the more 
 we are induced to ask if Austria has not begun to decline. 
 
 But we hesitate to reply, fearing lest we should assign to 
 the magnitude of sudden disaster many deplorable evidences 
 of decay, which are now kno^vn to us. The following mark a 
 weakness of character and the beginnmg of moral disorganiza- 
 tion :— 
 
 1. It is now an established fact, that, o"UTng to the treason 
 of the employes and Austrian officers, the Prussians were able 
 to obtain before, and during the war, exact accounts of the 
 effective strength and position, of the Aiistrian Army. At 
 Florence the Itahan Government knew by the same means <"he 
 exact composition of the army of Verona ; and I could name 
 a Prussian officer who Tvas sent to Florence before the war, 
 and sent daily to Berlin, an account of all the movements that 
 took place round Verona. 
 
 2. The number of Austrian prisoners was enormous; amongst 
 the officers more than 500 were made prisoners unwounded. 
 
 3. The foUo^\TLng is a fact, for the truth of Avhich I can vouch. 
 The day after the battle of Sadowa the Crown Prince of 
 Prussia, counting on the moral effect of that great victory, sent 
 a major with a flag of truce to Koniggratz, to demand its 
 surrender. Whilst the officer waited for the Governor, an 
 Austrian Captain entered into conversation with him, and told 
 him that the place was not in a fit state to resist ; that the 
 gan-ison was demorahzed; and that aU the Austrian Army 
 wished for peace. The Prussian officer was present at the Council 
 of War, presided over by the Governor, which consented to 
 the surrender of the town. One article only gave rise to dis- 
 cussion. He asked to refer it to the Crown Prince, and went 
 to find him. As chance would have it, while these things were 
 going on, General Gablenz, commg from the Prussian Head- 
 quarters, passed Koniggratz. On learning what had taken 
 place, he expressly forbade the Governor to surrender the town. 
 But for this accident Koniggratz would have capitulated on a 
 simple summons that very day.
 
 20 
 
 4. At the battle of Tobitscliau, fought on the l5th July, a 
 regiment of Prussian Cuirassiers captured two Austrian bat- 
 teries. They inckided a captain, two heutenants, 200 gunners, 
 16 guns, and as many wagons. They marched under escort of 
 25 Prussian curassiers upon BiTinn, about four days march 
 from Tobitschau. The fourth day, when the batteries were 
 only three leagues from Brunn, they were met by a Prussian 
 officer sent to the town by order of the Crown Prince. 
 What was his astonishment to see two hostile batteries 
 marching quietly on the road, as if route marching in peace 
 time ! Taking advantage of a halt, he opened some of the 
 lim.ber boxes ; they were filled ! To guard against accidents, 
 and lest the Austrians should attempt to recapture them, he 
 drowned the cartridges. Thus three Austrian officers, 16 guns, 
 and as many wagons fully equipped, allowed themselves to be 
 led quietly as prisoners, for four days, by 25 Pi-ussian horse- 
 men, Tvathout it coming into their heads, that they might get 
 rid of their escort, break or burn, if requisite, the materiel, and 
 rejoin their army ! 
 
 5. I will finish by a fact which is not the least important of 
 those I adduce. In the ambulances that I visited at Nachod, 
 at Koniginhof, at Pardubitz, at Jicin, 1 have convinced myself 
 that the conduct of the Austrian officers towards their men was 
 by no means free from blame. They were there treated and 
 looked after, side by side with Austrian soldiers, often men 
 of their own battalions, without ever asking if they needed 
 anything, or appearing to care about them. Officers and sol- 
 diers hved in the same ambulance as strangers to one another. 
 I have heard Prussians speak of this conduct in severe terms. 
 
 Such things cannot be entirely attributed to the demorah- 
 zation that great mihtary disasters always produce. They 
 point, rather, as I have already said, to a degradation of 
 character, and a true moral decline. 
 
 Note on the Military Orgaaization of Prussia. 
 
 Report of November, 1866. 
 
 Judging from the newspapers, the most erroneous ideas 
 musi prevail in France upon the military organization of Prussia. 
 The object of the present report is to describe the general heads 
 of this organization. It ^vill be convenient to begin with that of 
 1814, which lasted, with but slight modifications, for 45 years, 
 and then to point out the great changes which took place in 
 1859 and 18(50. 
 
 Organization q/'1814. 
 
 After our disasters in 1814, Prussia had a population of 
 10,000,000, and a revenue of 10,7oO,000/. sterhng. She could 
 not then keep up a permanent army equal to that of the great
 
 21 
 
 powers, her neighbours. The men whose duty it was to orga- 
 nize her niihtary forces sought to compensate for her inferiority 
 in men and money by the advantages which would follow from 
 the application of principles of morality and justice. 
 
 They procladied compulsory service for all citizens. 
 
 Witnesses of the great services whicli the Landwehr (thanks 
 to its excited patriotism) had rendered in 1J:^13 and 1814, they 
 adopted a second principle (which is evidently erroneous), that 
 men who had passed a certain portion of their youth with the 
 colours could, when called on, at the moment war breaks out, 
 take the place of regular troops. Hence the institution of 
 the Landwehr of 1814. In consequence of this false principle 
 the army was, in peace time, intended to be the war school of 
 the nation. Its object was, in short, to train men for the 
 Landwehr. It was consequently decided that the annual con- 
 tingent should serve in the army for a certain time. But for 
 how long ? Three years were considered sufficient to give each 
 man the requisite military instruction. 
 
 It is difficult to admit that this was really the conviction of 
 the founders of this organization, and it is more reasonable to 
 believe that so short a service was fixed for a double reason, 
 viz., the number of the annual contingent (40,000 men in 
 1814), and the sum that Prussia could give to its military forces 
 (.'il millions). Whatever may have been the cause, three 
 years were fixed as the period of actual mihtary service. These 
 three years being completed, the men then passed two years 
 in the reserve, and were finally transferred to the Landwehr. 
 
 The law of the 3rd September, 1814, relative to compulsory 
 service, and the order of the 21st November, 1815, relating to 
 the Landwehr, direct that all men known as fit for service should 
 serve as follows : — 
 
 T ,, Ti 1 A - j> on i o- r 3 years of actual Service. 
 
 In the Regular Army, o years, Irom 20 to lo years ■< „ • 4.1 t> 
 
 o . ' . ' •' [ 2 years m the Reserve. 
 
 T ,1 T 1 1 T < r or i on ) 7 years in tlie 1st Class. 
 
 In the Landwehr, 14. years, irom 25 to 39 years . . < _ • ... ^ ji r^^ 
 
 ' J ' '' j^ 7 years m the 2nd Class. 
 
 1. Regular Army. — The annual contingent, composed of 
 all young men fit for service of 20 years of age, being 40,000 
 men. The regular army was three times as strong, or 120,000 
 men ; to this addmg the officers, workmen, &c., about, 130,000, 
 it was composed of: — 
 
 45 Regiments of Infantry. 
 TO Battalions of Rifles. 
 38 Regiments of Cavalry. 
 
 9 Regiments of Ai-tillery. 
 
 9 Divisions of Pioneers (Engineers and Poutoniers). 
 
 2. Reserve. — The men of the reserve should have been 
 80,000(2 X 40,000); but deaths, invaliding, the necessity of 
 leaving a certain number at the depots, reduced the number to 
 60,000. The strength of the army could thus in war time be 
 raised from 130,000 to 190,000.
 
 22 
 
 3. Landwehr {\st class) — Was composed of men from 25 to 
 32 years of age. It could furnish 150,000 Cavaliy and Infantry 
 for War, viz. : — 
 
 36 Regiments of Infantry. 
 34 Eegiments of Cavalry. 
 
 represented, however, in peace, by but very weak cadres, the 
 men being on furlough. The rifles, artillery, and pioneers of the 
 Landwehr were not organized, estimated at about 20,000 men ; 
 they were scattered throughout the army at the moment of 
 mobilization. 
 
 Regiments of Infantry, as well as regiments of Cavahy, were 
 brigaded two regiments together. In consequence of the 
 alteration, mtroduced by the law" of 1852 these regiments, were 
 brigaded each with a regiment of the Line. 
 
 The Regular Army, and the fii'st class of the Landwehr 
 united together formed the army for active operations in the 
 field. Its strength was 360,000 men, or deducting 30,000 men, 
 for garrisonuig fortresses, there remained 330,000 men. The 
 depots were about 50,000 strong ; these were partly composed 
 of recruits and jJartly of reserve men. 
 
 4. Landwehr {2/id class.) — Had no cadi-es ; during war it could 
 supply 110,000 men. Infantry and Cavahy, w^ho, wdth the 30,000 
 of the first class iust referred to, were entrusted with ganison- 
 ing the fortresses. 
 
 The following table shows the strength of the Prussian 
 military forces, during the period of this fii-st organization : — 
 
 Men. Men. 
 
 fl. EegixlarArmy ] 30,000 
 
 I 2. Eeserves 60,000 
 
 A. Field Army . . -{ 3. Kifles, Ai'tillery, and Pioneers of 
 
 I tlie 1st Class'of the Landwehr 20,000 
 1^4. Infantry and Cavalry of the 1st 
 
 Class of the Landwehr. . .. 150,000 
 
 Total 360,000 
 
 Deduct left for Garrisons. . 30,000 
 
 Eemaining for Field Army 330,000 330,000 
 
 B. Troops at the Depdts (Eecruits, Landwehr 1st Class) . . . . 50,000 
 
 C. Troops intended I ^ gnd Class of Landwehr . . . . 110,000 
 
 for home de-^ 2. Deducted above 30,000 
 
 fence. J _____ 
 
 Total 140,000 140,000 
 
 General Total 520,000 
 
 Of these 520,000 men, w^hich represented ^-oth of the then 
 population of Prussia, one-fourth only composed the regular 
 army paid by the State. The authors of this system beheved 
 that they had solved the problem of the best luihtary organi- 
 zation for Prussia. They had a cheap army in peace, a large 
 army in war.
 
 23 
 
 What are the distinctive characteristics of this organization ? 
 The regular army, did not represent an independent mihtary 
 force, capable of acting in fh-.st hne. Too weak numerically to 
 act this part, since, reserve included, it was only 190,000 men, it 
 was not sufficiently strong to take the field until it was united 
 to the 1st class of the Landwehr, 170,000 men, which, fonned in 
 regiments brigaded with the Line, constituted, as has been 
 shown, almost one-half of the whole force. 
 
 The regular army had really only one object, that of being 
 a mihtary school for the nation, or otherwise a training school 
 for Landwehr men. In short, the system of 1814 was entirely 
 a " Landwehrian system." 
 
 Faults of the Organization of 1814. 
 
 The faults of this organization are so patent that it may be 
 asked,how did it last forty-five years ? They showed themselves 
 durmg the campaign of 1848 and 1849 in Schles^\'ig, and the 
 Grand Duchy of Baden, and also in the mobilization of 1850 
 and 1859, in the most deplorable manner. 
 
 The prime defect was the necessity, on the outbreak of war, 
 of calling for. and brigadiugmth the regular army 170,000 Land- 
 wehr men. Experience showed, that on account of losses of all 
 kinds, it was requisite even to procure this niimber, to call on all 
 the Landwelir men, of the 1st class, 25 to 32 years of age. How 
 was it possible in war to place dependance on men Avho had 
 left the army, some two, some three, and so on, up to nine 
 years, and of whom one-half were mamed. Prussian statistics 
 give the following figures : — 
 
 Married fi-om 25 to 26 years 
 
 30 per cent. 
 
 29 30 „ 
 
 . • 46 „ 
 
 31 32 „ 
 
 . . 63 „ 
 
 A great number of these men were compelled to leave their 
 famihes deprived of all support, and depending on the charity 
 of the parish. Thus the Landwehr men rephed with great 
 reluctance, and discontent, to the summons in 1848, 1850, and 
 1859. 
 
 The most deplorable scenes took place ; positive acts of 
 insubordination occurred in presence of the enemy. As for those 
 Landwehr men who continued faithful to their honour, they 
 showed that they were entirely unfit for war. It was evident 
 that the authors of the organization of 1814 Avere deceived in 
 believing that the Landwehr would, on all occasions, display 
 the enthusiasm it did ui 1813. Another fault of this organization 
 arose from the composition of the brigades. As each was com- 
 posed of two regiments, one regular and one landwehr, it was 
 impossible to form, if requisite, a body of select troops (either 
 brigade or diA^sion) into the composition of wliich the Landwelu- 
 did not enter. 
 
 It should also be added that the want of military instruc- 
 tion amongst the officers and non-commissioned officers of the 
 Landwehr, rendered it necessary to transfer many to the regular
 
 24 
 
 army, and vice versa. It was a manifest defect to have such 
 a number of changes at the very moment of placing the army 
 on a war footing. 
 
 Finally, it is requisite to point out that the organization 
 of 1814 entailed, when a mol^ilization took place, enormous 
 expenses, upon the parishes which were compelled to support 
 the necessitous families of Landwehr men. In 1859, 55,000 
 families had to be supplied in this way at a cost of 40,000/. 
 per month ; in 1859 the amount rose to 80,000Z. per month, 
 not counting the voluntary gifts, which amounted to the same 
 sum. 
 
 These marked defects were so serious as to render a 
 reorganization of the army requisite. It was begun in 1859, 
 and continued during the following years, despite the struggle 
 so well knoAvn, which, since then, has placed the Pi'ussian 
 Assembly in antagonism with the Government. 
 
 Reorganization o/" 1860. 
 
 Before determining on the best means for coiTecting the 
 faults of the old organization, the men whose duty it was to 
 investigate this question, resolved to return to the rigorous 
 appHcation of the principle of universal compulsory service — a 
 principle which had been continually violated since 1814. For 
 while the population of Prussia had increased in an extra- 
 ordinary manner during the 45 years that elapsed since 1814 
 (from 10,000,000 to 18,000,000), the strength of the regular 
 army continued without alteration, never exceeding 130,000 to 
 140,000 men, so that the annual contingent (40,000 men) 
 remained the same as in 1814. Hence it followed that every 
 year a large number of young men, able to perform military 
 service, never served T\ath the colours. Thus, in 1859, the 
 annual contingent was 63,000, but of this number more 
 than one-thu'd were exempted. The injustice of this became 
 manifest in a striking manner when the army was mobilized ; 
 because Landwehr men of 25 to 32 years of age, who had 
 already served, were compelled to march with the army, whilst 
 young men from 20 to 25 years of age never payed their debt 
 of ser^ace to the State. 
 
 The reorganizers determined to return first of all to the 
 principle of universal compulsory ser'^ace in its integrity. • 
 
 It was determined that the whole annual contingent of 
 63,000 men should enter the army, and three years were fixed, 
 as before, for the duration of active service. By this measure 
 the regular army received at once a considerable augmentation, 
 and the following additional cadres were formed : — 
 
 36 Eegiment? of Infantry. 
 
 9 Battalions of Kifles. 
 10 Regiments of Cavalry. 
 
 5 Divisions of Artillery. 
 
 The regular army, then about 130,000 strong, was thus 
 raised to 210,000, a force which Prussia could easily maintain,
 
 25 
 
 as her revenue had increased from 10,750,000/. to 19,500,000/, 
 Thej then sought to remedy the defects of the ohl organization. 
 The Landwehr was indeed preserved, but its functions and 
 its character were completely changed. It was decided thai it 
 should cease to form an integral portion of tJie field urnnj. Up to 
 this date the fLrst class had formed one-half of the held army. 
 For the future its functions were reduced to home defence, or 
 the first class of the Landwehr was to perform, the duties that 
 the law of 1814 assigned to the second class. As 370,<JOO 
 men was considered the requisite number for the field army, 
 ^^^thout dramng on the Landwehr, it became requisite to 
 increase the period men spent in the reserve from two to four 
 years. 
 
 Thus all men fit for service were classed under the follow- 
 ing heads : — 
 
 Regular Army, 7 years, 20 to 27 years of age . i ^ ^"^''^ ?" ,\^^ ^^'^^^^ 
 ° ' ' •' ' •' " I 4 years in the Reserve. 
 
 ( 5 T 
 
 Landwehr, 12 Tears, 27 to 39 years . . . . ^ - • 
 
 ' " ' •' I / y 
 
 ears in the 1st Class, 
 years in tlie 2nd Class. 
 
 Before going fm-ther, let us compare the organization of 
 1814 with that of 1860. 
 
 There is common to the two the follo^^ang : — 
 
 1. Compulsory ser"sdce for all citizens. 
 
 2. Military instruction in the ranks for a fixed period. 
 
 3. Obhgation to render further service mitil a fixed age, 
 
 fh'st in the reserve, then in the Landwehr. 
 
 As for the differences, they are striking. By the law of 
 1814, the regular army was only the military school of the 
 nation ; to form a field army, its strength had to be doubled, 
 ^vith regiments of Landwehr, composed of men of 25 to 32 
 years of age, unaccustomed to war, and one-haH" of whom were 
 married. By the law of 1860, the regular army was equally 
 the war school of the State ; but it, itself, by the addition 
 of the reserves, formed the field army. The Landwehr no longer 
 figured in that capacity, its part being limited to home defence. This 
 is the great modification introduced mto the ancient organiza- 
 tion. Prussia thus obtams the great advantage ot having a 
 larger field ai-my, composed entu-ely of men from 20 to 27 
 years of age. Men from 27 to 32, who generally estabhsh 
 themselves in life or get married, no longer fear to be called on 
 for a mobihzation for an ordhiary war, being entrusted \\\\\\ home 
 defence only. They know that they need fight in second fine 
 to the regular army only in cases of great emergency. The 
 results of these changes have been very favourable for the 
 general interests of the country, esspecially for agriculture. 
 
 In France people appear to t\\mk that the Landwehr 
 takef^ the same part as it did, prior to the reorganization. 
 Because the Landwehr figiired m the Danish Wtir, and n^ore 
 recently in Bohemia, it is imagined ^hat it forms a part of the 
 army, and fights side by side with it. This requires explanation.
 
 26 
 
 The law which fixed four years as the length of time to 
 be spent in the reserve, came into force in October, i860, con- 
 sequently the reserve time of the various contingents is as 
 follows : — 
 
 For the Contingent of 1859, October 1863 to October 1864. 
 
 „ „ 1860 „ 1863 „ 1867. 
 
 1861 „ 1864 „ 1868. 
 
 „ „ 1863 „ 1865 „ 1869. 
 
 „ „ 1863 „ 1866 „ 1870. 
 
 Hence, when the last war broke out (June 1866), Prussia 
 had only ready to hand the reserves of three years, or those of 
 1863, 1864, 1865. This is the reason Avhy she was then com- 
 pelled to draw on her Landwehr to complete the battaHons 
 of the regular army. 100 Landwehr men per battalion of 1,000 
 were generally taken. 
 
 But it should be remarked that they need not have taken 
 these men if they could have put their hands on the reserves of 
 four years. It is only from the end of the present year (1866) 
 that the organization of 1860 comes fully into play. Prussia 
 can now dispose of the reserves of four consecutive years. 
 She will therefore (in theory) no longer draw on the Landwehr 
 to complete the battalions and squadrons of the regular army. 
 She Tvdll only use it for special pui'poses, such as railway com- 
 panies, companies of sick bearers, telegraph companies, &c. 
 
 It is most important, therefore, to point out clearly that 
 Prussia is now (end of 1866) in full enjoyment of the military 
 resources conferred on her by the organization of 1860. The 
 whole of her forces (not counting the recently annexed pro- 
 vinces) are shown in the following Table : — 
 
 Men. 
 
 A. Field Army composed of — 
 
 1. EegularArmy 210,000 
 
 2. Reserve of 4 years . . . . . . . . 160,000 
 
 370,000 
 
 B. Depot Troops, partly Recruits partly Reserve . . . . 110,000 
 
 C. Troops for Home Defence — 
 
 Landwehr, 1st Class 150,000 
 
 Total 630,000 
 
 In addition to which the 2nd class of the Landwehr could, if 
 required, furnish 150,000 to 200,000 men.* 
 
 Thus Prussia can put into the field 370,000 men, not count- 
 ing 110,000 men at the depots, or 480,000 men, ^athout having 
 recourse to the Landwehr. This number is greater than that 
 mobihzed in 1850 and 1859, or for small wars, as those in Baden 
 
 * This report, from our Military Attache at Berhn, is dated the month of 
 November 1866. No account is taken in it of the troops of the three provinces just 
 annexed by Prussia, into which her military organization was being introduced. 
 Pi-ussia so enlarged, and the other Btates of the North German Confederation, can 
 dispose of 960,000 men, whilst the length of service has been reduced from 19 to 12 
 years, the 2nd Class of the Landwehr being suppressed. [Ed]
 
 27 
 
 and Denmark. But if Prussia had a great war on hand, for 
 which its active army was not sufficient, or if she met with a 
 disaster she could employ the 1st class of the Landwehr, 
 either to fill up gaps, or as a second line, dra^\ang from the 
 Ist class, the youngest men (27 to 29 or 30 years.) In 
 the last war, for example, when Prussia was compelled to 
 place in hue very large forces, many battaHons and regiments 
 of the Landwehr formed a portion of the army of the ^lain. 
 Two Landwehr divisions occupied Saxony, and the division of 
 Landwehr infantry of the guard 12 battalions (or about 10,000 
 men) entered Bohemia, when it joined the field army on the 
 2nd July ; the 3rd July, during tlie battle of KoniggTatz. this 
 division was a march in rear. If the Prussians had gained an 
 undecided victory, or sustained a defeat, it would have rendered 
 valuable ser\aces. 
 
 This di^dsion (Landwehr of the Guard) is composed of the 
 finest troops that can be conceived. Composed entirely of men 
 from 27 to 32 years of age, with a manly and powerful appear- 
 ance, it offers a magnificent military spectacle. It is doubtful 
 if it would support the fatigues of a long campaign, but well 
 employed for a definite purpose, it would form a most valuable 
 force. 
 
 Reduction of. the Ti:me of Service to 12 Ye.\rs. 
 
 The period of ser^dce, which was 19 years in 1814, has 
 been reduced to 12 by the law of the 9th November, 1867. 
 This reduction of the number of years' service takes place in 
 "he Landwehr, in which men wiU now serve for 5 instead of 
 12 years. The period of service in the Federal Ai-my is thus 
 iivided at present : — 
 
 T .1 T) 1 A ^ r 3 witb the Colours. 
 
 in the Itegular Army, v years . . ■{ . -.i ,, t> 
 
 In the Landwehr, 5 years. 
 Total . . 12 
 
 3ut this new law does not entirely free the Landwehr men of 
 12 years' service. On the contrary, the Government reserves to 
 'tself the right of releasing them by degrees according to the 
 necessities of the State, beginning ^vith the older contingents. 
 
 I will, in another report, give fuUer details of the uuportant 
 law of the 9th November, 1867.* 
 
 * Vide the Keport of the I4th June, 1869.— [Ed.]
 
 28 
 
 New Division of the Territory of the North German Con- 
 federation INTO Land^\tehr Battalion Districts, and 
 Reorganization of the Landwehr. 
 
 Report '2nd December, 1867.* 
 
 Prussia, while she is extending her mihtary system to the 
 territory annexed in 1866, and to the States which, with her, 
 constitute the North German Confederation, is organizing her 
 Landwehr and that of these States upon a new basis. 1 propose 
 to point out the essential characteristics of this organization, and 
 to be still more clear I will first recall the basis on which the 
 military force of Prussia, was recruited prior to tbese annex- 
 ations. 
 
 Division of the Country into Landwehr Battalion Districts. 
 
 The territory of the Prussian monarchy before 1866 was 
 divided into eight large military districts, in each of which an 
 army corps of all arms of the service was recruited and 
 stationed. But these military districts were not conterminous 
 with the eight Prussian provinces, as is generally believed in 
 France, where, it is stated, each province furnishes an army 
 corps. For example, the second corps is recruited partly in 
 three provinces, embracing portions of Pomerania, Prussia, and 
 Posen, while the fifth corps is recruited, one-half in Posen, one- 
 half in Silesia, &c. 
 
 The administrative division of these provinces into districts 
 for local government (there are 25 such districts to 8 provinces) 
 has nothing in common with the divisions of the great mihtary 
 commands into military districts, which serve as the basis for 
 recruiting all the forces of Prussia. 
 
 The number of these districts was fixed in 1842, in 
 accordance with that of the infantry regiments of the fine, 
 and rifles which then composed the regular army, viz. : — 
 
 32 Regiments of Infantry of the Line of 3 battalions. 
 8 Regiments of Rifles, t 
 
 The territory of tlie monarchy was divided in such a manner 
 that there was one district for each battalion of infantry of the 
 hne and regiment of rifles, or 96 4- 8 = l04 districts. These were 
 termed Landwehr battalion districts to distinguish them from 
 
 * There are two other reports written in 1866 by our Military Attache bearing 
 the title?, "Pares and Baggage of the Prussian Army ;" the other, "Force Mobilized 
 by Prussia in 1866 and force disposable in 1867." During the year 1867, the year of 
 the Paris Exhibition, we have only two reports, the first is a detailed account of the 
 Bohemian war, which has lost much interest since the publication of the official 
 Austrian and Prussian accounts of the campaign. The second is that which we 
 here give. — [Ed.] 
 
 t There were in addition five regiments of Infantry of the Guard.
 
 29 
 
 the 25 districts for local g'overnment, and because each had to 
 furnish, in case of mobilization, — 
 
 1 Battalion Landwehr, 1st Class. 
 1 „ „ 2nd Class. 
 
 1 Squadron „ 
 
 Of these 104 districts, 96 grouped in threes furnished the 
 recruits for the 32 regiments of the Line, and 8 others furnished 
 those for the 8 rifle regiments. The men having served three 
 years ^\dtl^ the colours, returned home on furlough with the 
 obligation to serve for 2 years more in the reserve, and It more 
 in the Landwehr. The three battalions of the Landwehr of 
 the 1st class, belonging to a group of three districts, formed a 
 regiment, as did the three battalions of the second class. The 
 battahons and regiments had in each district the same number, 
 both battalion and regimental, as in the coiTcsponding regi- 
 ment of the Line. 
 
 The Landwehr battalion district is the true territorial unit 
 for recruiting and administrative purposes. To facilitate 
 operations it is sub-divided into several company districts. It 
 is by these Landwehr battalion districts that recruiting for the 
 army is carried on, and the lists of the reserve and Landwehr men 
 are kept there. A permanent depot is formed in each Landwehr 
 battalion district. Generally, it is charged with keeping the 
 and preserving in a good state the great coats, accoutrements, 
 and rifles of the Landwehr. It calls m and assembles the 
 men and those of the reserve W'hen the manoeuvres and annual 
 drills take place, and in case of mobilization it takes all 
 measures requisite, to change the Army from a peace to a 
 war footing, both as regards men and horses.* When the 
 army was reorganized in 1860, 36 new regiments of Infiintry 
 of the Line were formed, making a total of 32 + 36 = 68 or 34- 
 brigades. But, as no change was made in the division of 
 Landwehr battalion districts, it followed that the battalions of 
 the Landwehr, which formerly corresponded with a regiment 
 of Infantry, now corresponded with a brigade. The numbers of 
 the newly formed regiments, were not then represented in the 
 Landwehr. 
 
 Necessity for a New Organization of the Landwehr. 
 
 The first care of Prussia after the peace of 186(5 was to 
 introduce her military organization into the pro\unces she had 
 annexed, Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, and Hesse, and before 
 thuiking of the civil organization, she divided the country into 
 Landwehr battalion districts. This division was only pro^■i- 
 sional, it being always desirable that the military divisions 
 should coincide as nearly as possible with the divisions for local 
 administration, which could only be subsequently arranged. 
 
 As the civil administration came to be defliiitely arranged, 
 the divisions into Landwehr battahon districts in the three 
 
 * Vide pages 35 and 36 for the composition of these depots. — [Ed.] 
 
 E
 
 30 
 
 provinces, where the new Army Corps (9th, 10th, and 11th) 
 are recruited, was modified. 
 
 The necessity of numerous changes in the division into 
 districts, of the mihtary connnands of old Prussia (prior to 1866) 
 has been acknowledged as a necessary sequence, to the intro- 
 duction of the Prussian mihtary system into the small States 
 of the North German Confederation. 
 
 A complete re-arrangement throughout the whole of Prussia 
 of the Landwelu- battalion districts is now in progress. It will 
 be, perhaps, useful to observe that looking only to Prussia 
 proper (before 1860), such a revision had become absolutely 
 requisite on account of the inconveniences produced, as we 
 shall see from the old territorial division. 
 
 Inconvenience of the Former Division. 
 
 1. The number of Landwehr battalion districts fixed in 
 1842, was no longer sufficient, on account of the increase and 
 removals of the population, in addition to which the annual 
 contingent had been raised in 1851), on the reorganization of 
 the army, from 40,000 to more than 60,000 men, from which it 
 followed that a much larger number of men were sent on fui- 
 lough each year into the reserve and Landwehr.* For these 
 reasons the duties of the commandants of districts had become 
 very severe. 
 
 2. The increase of population since 1842 had been very 
 different in the various districts, so that, at last, some company 
 districts became more populous, than battahon districts belong- 
 ing to the same regiment. 
 
 3. The boundaries of these districts, and the head-quarters 
 of the depots, had been fixed with reference to the means of 
 communication existing in 1842, so that in case of mobiliza- 
 tion the men on furlough, might be collected together and sent 
 to their respective regiments as quickly as possible. These 
 boundaries, and head-quarters were no longer the most 
 convenient, owing to the great changes made in the network 
 of roads, and especially by the construction of railways. 
 
 4. There was not that coincidence which is so desirable 
 between the civil administrative divisions and circles (of which 
 there are 340 in the eight provinces) and the division into Land- 
 wehr battalion districts. Thus it sometimes happened that por- 
 tions of the same chcle belonged, without any necessity, to 
 several Landwehr battalion districts, from which mconvenience 
 often resulted. 
 
 5. It was also >tnuch to be desired that each regiment of 
 infantry of the line sliould have its own district for recruiting, 
 which had not been the case since the reorganization of 1860, 
 since which period three districts, recruited two regiments. 
 
 * The o-lleei't; ana mou of the reserve, as well as those of the Landwehr, live at 
 home. They are said in Prussia to be " en position de conge " on furlough.
 
 31 
 
 This circumstance alone would have been sufficient, to neces- 
 sitate an entire re-arrangement of these districts. 
 
 Neui Organizalion Embracwg the Entire Confederation. 
 
 For these reasons it was determined, Avhen extending the 
 Landwehr system to the other states of tlie Confederation to 
 reorganize the Prussian Landwehr on a fresh basis. 
 
 This basis, which now extends over the Avhole North German 
 Confederation, is the following : — 
 
 1. To each regiment of Infantry of the Line of the Federal 
 Army (there are 93 of three battalions each, in the 12 Army 
 Corps) will be assigned a regiment of Landwehr of two bat- 
 tahons, which will have the same number and provincial desig- 
 nation as the line regiment, and to each regiment of rifles 
 (there are 12 of three battalions) will correspond a battalion of 
 Landwehr Reserve. Thus the Landwehr Infantry of the North 
 German Confederation A^dll count for the future, when its 
 organization is completed : — 
 
 Battalions. 
 93 Regiments of Landwehr of 2 Battalions each . . 186 
 
 12 Battalions of Landwehi* Reserve . . . . . . 12 
 
 Total 198 
 
 This number of battalions does not include those of the 
 Grand Duchy of Hesse, which are not yet orgaiiized, nor those 
 of the 12 battalions of Landwehr of the Royal Guard, which, 
 as is well known, have no particular district for recruiting. 
 The Kingdom of Saxony and the Grand Duchy of Hesse, have 
 provisionally Landwehr regiments, composed of three battalions, 
 namely, in Saxony four regiments, in Hesse two reguuents. 
 From which it follows that for some time the Landwehr of the 
 North German Confederation Tidll be composed as follows : — 
 
 Bats. 
 In the 1st 11 Army Corps, 85 Regiments at 2 Battalions each . . 170 
 
 In the 12th Corps, Saxon, 4 Regiments at 3 Battalions each . . 12 
 
 In the 25th Division, Hesse, 2 Regiments at 3 Battalions each . . 6 
 
 Total .. ..188 
 
 Adding to these 12 battalions of Landweln- Reserve newly 
 created, there will be a grand total of 200 Landwehr battalions. 
 
 2. The North German Confederation will thus have 200 
 Landwehr battalion districts. The extent of these districts 
 has been fixed by the population; so that the two districts 
 which compose a Landwehr regiment can furnish the nirmber 
 of men requisite for recruiting, and placing on a war footing 
 the corresponding regiment of the Line, as also the number of 
 men requisite for recruitmg the Guard, the Rifles, the special 
 Arms, and the Marines, &c. 
 
 3. In fixing the boundaries of the new districts, the pro- 
 
 E 2
 
 32 
 
 bable future increase of population of the various countries 
 composing the Confederation has been considered. But it 
 being quite impossible to foresee the alterations which the 
 removals of the inhabitants may produce in the population 
 of the various districts, and in case the population of many 
 of these districts (perhaps the whole of those con-esponding 
 to an Army Corps) should increase only, by the diminution 
 of others, it became requisite to provide some means to 
 compensate, and allow for these alterations, so that the 
 various Army Corps may be placed on a war footing. This 
 difficulty has been met by forming in each of the great military 
 commands a Landwehr Reserve battalion district, intended 
 to supply the men requisite to complete those districts the 
 popTilation of which may have diminished. 
 
 Each of these Landwehr Reserve battalion districts fur- 
 nishes any men that may be requisite to complete any Army 
 Corps. 
 
 Drawing from all the Landwehr battahon districts to supply 
 deficiencies is thus obviated. Those |3ortions of the country 
 Avliere, according to experience, the population undergoes the 
 greatest fluctuations, have been selected as LandAvehr Reserve 
 battahon districts, and are generally those where men, quitting 
 their original district, come to live for a longer or shorter 
 period, and who would, but for this arrangement, have had 
 to join the corps to which they originally belonged. 
 
 The Commandants of these Landwehr Reserve battahon 
 districts have manifestly more difficult duties to perform than 
 those of common districts, conseijuently they are helped by a 
 larger staff. 
 
 It is clearly understood that these Landwehr Reserve bat- 
 talions will not be embodied if the other districts forming 
 portions of the Army Corps have, after furnishing the requisite 
 contingents, a sufficient number of men; hence these battalions 
 are embodied only by a special order. 
 
 4. The boundaries of the Landwehr battalion and company 
 districts will coincide Avith those of the administrative divisions ; 
 and for the future, parts of the same circle Avill never be included 
 in several Landwehr battalion districts. In general, each cu'cle 
 will form one or two companies. 
 
 5. The adoption of this principle has necessitated a departure 
 from the old plan by which each Landwehr battalion district was 
 divided into four company diistriets ; now the number of com- 
 pany districts varies from three to six in each battahon district. 
 The total number of company districts is very much greater 
 than formerly ; hence the Commandants can keep the rolls of 
 men on furlough much more exactly, and it is far easier for the 
 men to attend roll-call before the district non-commissioned 
 officer. There is one rifle regiment to each Army Corps. For 
 the future Army Corps will recruit and complete when put on 
 a war footing not only then- Rifle regiment but also their 
 Artillery and Engineers from their own districts.
 
 33 
 
 I attach to this report a table, shoAvniif:^ the division into 
 Landwehr battahon districts of the entire Confederation. This 
 new organization of the Landwehr of the North German Con- 
 federation, the chief pecuharities of which I have pointed out, 
 comes into force on the 1st January, ISH."^. 
 
 The ten-itorial divisions are fixed, the district Commandants 
 and their Staff are named, and ah-eady perform tlieir duties, 
 making rolls, completing or forming magazines of clothes, 
 accoutrements, and arms. The Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg- 
 Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz (89th and 90th Regiments) 
 are the only places where the division into Landwehr battalion 
 districts is not yet quite settled. 
 
 Saxony (12th Corps d'Armee) has only 12 Landwehr battahon 
 districts. But, as I have ah-eady said, this division is only 
 provisional, and the number of districts will be very shortly 
 increased and determined. 
 
 Thus, from the 1st January, 1868, the new division into 
 Landwehr battalion districts will afford a basis for recruiting 
 the entire military force of the Confederation, as well as for all 
 the details of the organization of the Reserve, the Landwehr, 
 and the Reserve Substitutes. 
 
 Before concluding, it is desu*able to point out some other 
 alterations. For the future the Landwehr will only present 
 themselves once a year (in autumn) at the head-quarters of the 
 district to verify the roUs ; but the men ot the reserve, the men 
 on leave from the Regular Army, and those on whose position 
 the councils of revision have passed no definite opinion, ^nXX 
 present themselves tivice a year (in spring and autumn). The 
 men of the reserve substitutes are not obliged to present them- 
 selves to verify the rolls. 
 
 As a retrospective measui'e it has been decided that men 
 can only enter the Landwehr after having completed, in accord- 
 ance with the law of 18(30, seven years' service, of which three 
 must have been with the colours and four in the reserve. 
 Accordingly those men, who under the old law had completed 
 their five years' service, three with the colours and two with 
 the reserve, and who had actually received their certificates as 
 LandAvehr men, are now obliged to serve two years more in the 
 reserve. From the 1st January, 1868, the Landwehr will no 
 longer be divided into first and second classes ; the contingents 
 of which it is composed, will be disthiguished only by the years' 
 service passed in the Landwehr. For example, Landwehr of 
 the first year, Landwehr of the second year, and so on.
 
 34 
 
 Replies to Questions about Cavalry, Artillery, and 
 Various IMatters. 
 
 Report of the 2')tli February, 1868.* 
 
 In the fii'st portion of this report entitled Cavalry, I reply to 
 various questions addressed to me by the Minister of War, under 
 date 13th January last. 
 
 T. — Cavalry. 
 
 I. Q. What in Prussia is the composition of the ration for 
 horses of all arms of the sei'vice in hay, oats, and straw ? Has 
 the regimental ration been recently increased ? and by how 
 much ] 
 
 A. In time of Peace. — In peace time there are three kinds of 
 rations, viz., the fuU, half, and light ration. The composition 
 of each varies according as the troops are on the line of march 
 or in garrison. In garrison the rations are as follows : — 
 
 Oats ,. 
 
 8-96 lbs 
 
 !> Full ration. 
 
 Hay .. 
 
 4-51 „ 
 
 Straw. . 
 
 6-71 „ 
 
 Oats .. 
 
 9-62 ., 
 
 1 
 
 Hay .. 
 
 4-51 „ 
 
 >-Half ratiou. 
 
 Straw. . 
 
 r.-7i ., 
 
 J 
 
 Oats .. 
 
 8-8 „ 
 
 1 
 
 Hay .. 
 
 4-51 „ 
 
 > Light ration 
 
 Straw. . 
 
 6-71 „ 
 
 J 
 
 General Officers, Staff Officers, and Adjutants,t Officers 
 attached to the War Office, Cavalry of the Guard, the Cavalry 
 School, Horse Artillery of the Guard, Cuirassiers, Draught 
 Horsesof the Artillery, Military Police, Intendance, and Draught 
 Horses of the Train receive the full ration. 
 
 The Lancers of the Line receive the half ration. 
 
 AU troops not named, such as Hussars and Dragoons, and 
 officers and employes not mentioned previously, receive the 
 hght ration. 
 
 The composition of these rations is that fixed on the 1st April, 
 1867; previous to that date each ration v,"as about i lb. oats 
 less. Thus, since the war of 1866, the ration for aU mihtary 
 horses has been increased by \ lb. of oats. 
 
 The quantities of hay and straw remain the same. 
 
 The Minister for War can authorize the substitution of 
 another kind of forage for the oats, or a part of it. 
 
 * We have 18 reports from Colonel Stoffel for the year 1 868, some on technical 
 questions and experimental manceuTres. We publish only 13. 
 
 t There is in each Prussian battalion a Lieutenant, whose duty it is to transmit 
 to the battalion the orders o;iTen by the officer commanding tlie regiment ; this latter 
 has, in the same way, an officer, Captain, or Lieutenant, who is the channel of com- 
 munication with superior authority. These officers are called " Adjutants."
 
 35 
 
 In such a case, 2*2 lbs. of oats is considered as equivalent 
 to 2-4 lbs. of barley, 2-8 lbs. of rye, 1-98 lb. of meal, 1-54 lb. of 
 ground biscuit, 6*16 lbs. of hay, or 12-82 lbs. of straw. 
 
 During marches -through the country, and in cases where 
 the forage is supplied by the State or by contractors, the 
 rations are composed of the following : — 
 
 Oats 
 
 11 -055 lbs 
 
 I Full ration. 
 
 Hay 
 
 2-310 „ 
 
 Straw 
 
 2-365 „ 
 
 Oats 
 
 10-725 „ 
 
 1 
 
 Hav 
 
 2-310 „ 
 
 > Half ration. 
 
 Straw 
 
 2-365 „ 
 
 J 
 
 Oats 
 
 10-010 „ 
 
 1 
 
 Hay 
 
 2-310 „ 
 
 > Light ration 
 
 Straw 
 
 2-365 „ 
 
 J 
 
 If, however, the parishes furjiish the ration, they are allowed 
 to supply the oats by measure in place of weight. 
 
 When horses are carried on railways, the ration is increased 
 by 3-30 lbs. of hay and 7-7 lbs. of straw ; if the journey exceeds 
 eight hours, the quantity of hay is increased to 6" (5 lbs. 
 
 2. In War time. — In war time, there is only the fidl and hght 
 ration : — 
 
 Oats 
 
 .. 12 -375 lbs. 
 
 ] 
 
 Hay 
 
 2-310 „ 
 
 )■ Full ration. 
 
 Straw 
 
 2-365 „ 
 
 J 
 
 Oats 
 
 .. 10 10 „ 
 
 I 
 
 Hay 
 
 2-310 „ 
 
 } Light ration 
 
 Straw 
 
 2-368 „ 
 
 J 
 
 The full ration is given to aU the Cavalry and Artillery 
 horses. The only horses that receive the hght ration are the 
 Infantry officers' horses, and those of the officers and employes 
 of the Intendance. 
 
 If cux-umstances render it desirable, the General com- 
 manding can alter the ration, by substitutmg other tilings for 
 it in the proportions abeady given. Durmg railway jom-neys, 
 or when travelling in steamers, the ration is increased both in 
 hay and straw. 
 
 To give an idea of the economical spuit that reigns in the 
 Prussian Army, each squadron and battery has on its strength 
 three or four horses, called "kriimper," for which no forage is 
 drawn ; the commanding officers of batteries and squadi'ons are 
 obHged to feed these horses, by taxing the forage of the others. 
 
 II. Q. Do glanders (which make such great ravages in our 
 regiments) exist to any extent m the Prussian Army, or in the 
 stables of the peasantry ? 
 
 A. There is no hst of the number of glander cases kept at 
 the Prussian War Office in Berhn, consequently 1 have been 
 unable to obtain exact information. I have been informed that 
 about 100 horses are lost each year from glanders, or about 
 2 per 1,000, if the total number of horses in the Prussian Army 
 be assumed at 50,000, which it was before 18(j(3. 
 
 The only thing that is done to prevent the spread of
 
 36 
 
 glanders is killing the horse, on the least appearance of the 
 disease. 
 
 Veterinary Surgeons are expressly forbidden from attempt- 
 ing the cure of such cases. 
 
 During the six months following the war of 186(3 tlie number 
 of glander cases increased much, but I have been unable to 
 obtain any official information on the subject. 
 
 Glanders is a scourge in the stables of the peasantry. 
 
 I have been informed that in one part of Eastern Prussia 
 several landed proprietors sustamed in 1855 considerable losses 
 from this cause. 
 
 III. Q. If possible, obtain the number of horses injured, 
 either during marches, or durmg the last campaign 'i 
 
 A. There is no return on the subject at the A\'ar Office. 
 
 All the Cavalry Officers, with whom I have spoken, have 
 confirmed the opmion at which I arrived during the armistice 
 of 1866 in Boliemia, that the number of injured horses was 
 very considerable. I counted 60 in one squadron alone ; all 
 the other squadrons counted 10 to 15 on an average. 
 
 Cavalry Officers were so struck with the great number of 
 injured horses, that a short time after the war a Commission of 
 Cavalry Generals met at Berlm to study the subject. 
 
 One of the members of tlie Commission has recently mformed 
 me of the result of theu* deliberations, which is in the following 
 words: — "We are decidedly con^dnced that the only efficacious 
 " means of preserving horses from injury during a campaign con- 
 " sists in the continual and intclhgent supervision of the officers 
 " and non-commissioned officers. The correctness of this is 
 " manifest, since we saw in I>ohemia and Austria, Cavalry regi- 
 " ments of the same kind, luounted on the same class of horse, 
 " and placed in identical situations, and yet the number of 
 " injured horses was three or even four times as gi*eat in some 
 " regiments as it was in others. We do not deny that the fact 
 " of horses falhng out of condition durmg a campaign tends to 
 " increase the habihty to injury". And this reason has mduced 
 " Tis to increase the ration of oats by ^ lb. But horses will 
 " fall off m the field, no matter what precautions are taken, the 
 " saddles do not then fit properly over the loms and withers, 
 " and the habihty to injury consequently is much increased, 
 " and the injuiies will be the more numerous, as the supervision 
 " of the officers and non-commissioned officers is careless." 
 
 The only method proposed to guard against the saddles not 
 fitting, is that each squadron should have a certain number of 
 spare blankets to cut up. Wheui, from any cause, a saddle does 
 not fit exactly, the soldier should make it fit by placing under 
 it one or more pieces of blanket, and sewing them on if 
 requisite. A special instruction on this subject is given to the 
 soldiers. 
 
 IV. Q. AVhat is the average length of ser\'ice of a troop horse? 
 A. The average period is 9 years, and I have tried to find
 
 out if this has always been the case, and I am infoimed that no 
 sensible alteration has taken place for 50 years. Prussia is far 
 from ha^ang made as much progress as we have in improving 
 her breed of horses. The greater nmnber of Prussian officers, 
 who have visited France of recent years, often express their 
 admiration of the quality of our cavalry horses. 
 
 V. Q. How are troop horses accommodated? What space 
 is alloAved for each horse ? What means of ventilation are 
 adopted in stables ? What sanitary measures are used to keep 
 troop horses in good health ? 
 
 A. In Prussia cavalry baiTacks have been built at various 
 dates, and the stables have not all the dimensions at present 
 approved of. The accompanying sketch shows the most recent 
 construction and the regulated dimensions. 
 
 M 
 
 M 
 
 Length of each stall, including the manger 10' 7^' 
 
 Width of each stall if bails are used ... ... ... ... 5' 1|' 
 
 Width of each stall if (exceptionally) the horses are sepa-) ,, „„ 
 
 rated by paititions ) 
 
 Width of centre passage ... ... ... ... 13' 6^' 
 
 Width of stable in the clear 34' 9 J" 
 
 Height of the stable 14' 8" 
 
 The height never to be less than 12' 4i" 
 
 The stable of each squadron has four doors to facihtate 
 cleaning, and also that the horses may be rapidly got out 
 in case of fire. In all the stables I have seen the means 
 of ventilation are similar to those used in France. Common 
 openings are used which are made in the long sides of the
 
 38 
 
 stable, close under the tiling, they are from 9^ to 10 inches 
 square. 
 
 So far as relates to sanitary measures, the veterinary 
 surgeons with whom I have spoken have told me nothing of 
 importance. They have recourse to methods similar to those 
 used in France. I have observed that they isolate with great 
 care the sick horses, from those fit for duty, never leaving 
 them in the same part of the stable, as is sometuues done in 
 our cavalry regiments. 
 
 II. — Artillery. 
 
 Report upon the Contpeiitive Trials made with the Prussian and 
 Austrian Field Gun. 
 
 I attach to this report a German report of much interest 
 upon the compeiitive trials made at Berlin during the last 
 year with the Austrian and Prussian field guns. Guns taken 
 from the Austrians during the last war have been used for 
 these trials, which have been most carefully made. I do not 
 give a resume of this report, it is requisite that it should 
 be translated. The superiority of the Prussian gun over the 
 Austrian gun has been completely established, a similar supe- 
 riority, unfortunately, exists over our gun. I have been unable 
 to procure the 19 tables which are attached to the German 
 report, but fortunately they may be dispensed with ; the 
 measures are in Prussian feet. 
 
 Bronze v. Steel. 
 
 Should cast steel be employed for gims of the size of 4-pr8. 
 and 6-prs., or should the employment of bronze be resumed? 
 
 This question divides more than ever the officers of the Prussian 
 artillery, and towards the end of January almost all the 
 artillery ofiicers present in Berlin were ordered by the General 
 Commanding-in-Chief the Artillery to attend to hear a descrip- 
 tion of the maimfacture of steel guns at Essen, given by a 
 captain. This officer having been sent for several months to 
 study the manufacture of steel, in the great manufactory of 
 M. Krupp. 
 
 I have already pointed out in one of my reports in 1866 
 why this important subject as to the employment of bronze or 
 steel produced much excitement after the Austrian war, in 
 Prussia. I Avas then a;Uowed to see 11 steel guns which had 
 burst, six before the war, with proof charges, and five during 
 the war. All except one had burst at the breech, the single 
 exception being a gun which' had burst in front of the trunnion 
 at the battle of Skalitz. In this case the ofiicers imagined that 
 the gun had been previously struck by a shot. The truth of 
 this supposition can hardly be determhied by a cursory in- 
 spection. From whatever cause they may have arisen, these 
 five accidents occurring during the war, caused much dis- 
 cussion amongst the artillery officers.
 
 39 
 
 Towards the cud of l<5i)(), Prince Charles, the Cliief of the 
 Artillery, held several meetings of the principle Generals of 
 this arm of the service, to examine into the subject. The 
 discussions were very keen. The partisans of steel pointed 
 out that all the guns having burst at the breech was no reason 
 for concluding that steel was not the best material. That it 
 was necessary to improve the breech-closing mechanism by 
 giving it greater strength, p^nd rounding off certain right 
 angled arises. They also added that Prussia, having gone to 
 very great expense to complete its materiel in steel, it was 
 foolish to return to bronze, until these improvements had been 
 tried. . 
 
 The opponents of steel rephed that it was (piite unpossible 
 to find out from the external appearance of the steel mtended 
 for a gun if it were sufficient!}' homogeneous, and bad conse- 
 quently the requisite strength ; that it was absolutely impossible 
 to ignore the effect produced on the morale of the artillery by 
 the accidents which had happened during the war. Even 
 assuming that the gini whi'h had burst in front of the 
 trunnions had been jDreviously struck by a shot, this gave only 
 another reason for ceasing to employ steel, that the cost of 
 steel was so great, that the estimates were much increased, &c. 
 They further expressed theu' doubts of the success of steel 
 in the future, as follows : " Is it notlikely that after the lapse 
 of time, after a number of rounds have been fired, or after long 
 marches, the steel will undergo a change similar to that which 
 takes place in non when subjected to repeated vibrations, 
 either by being struck by a hammer, or otherwise?- Will not 
 the particles get disintegrated and the steel become brittle V 
 
 The nature of the discussions that have taken place here 
 among the Chiefs of the Artillery, can be best apjDreciated by 
 bearing in mind that the numbers of the opponents of steel 
 have been greatly mcreased by the subordinate officers who 
 took part m the war of 1866. They state their opinion on 
 this subject very expressively, by saying to the disputing 
 Generals, " Give us wooden guns if you like, provided only they 
 " do not burst." 
 
 The opponents of steel as a material for making guns, say 
 very forcibly that M. Krupp, by the interest he possesses, 
 especially with the King, has succeeded in preventing any 
 artillery officers from overseeing his manufactory ; on account 
 of the great outcry made after the war on this subject, 
 M. Krupp has been compeUed to consent to receive the officer 
 previously referred to. 
 
 The storm produced by these disputes has been much in- 
 creased since the meeting held during the last days of January, 
 at which meeting the officer sent to Essen, made a report 
 unfavourable to the employment of steel. Judguig from all 
 the facts that have come to my laiowledge, I am induced to 
 beheve that if Prussia had no field artillery, and if she had 
 to create one, she woidd not hesitate to adopt bronze.
 
 40 
 
 Foundry at Spandau. 
 
 The foundry at Spandau has always continued fo make 
 bronze guns for the navy and for fortifications. It has recently 
 cast 8 12-prs., with which experiments have been made, to 
 ascertain if there was any truth in the complaint made against 
 the foundry, that it cast guns at too low a temperature. 
 
 Four of these guns have been cast at a temperature of 
 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit, four at a temperature of 1,400 degrees, 
 and it is proposed to ascertain if there be any difference between 
 the two. Each group of guns has fired 1,500 rounds, and as 
 yet, without any difference being detected. I will report the 
 results which may come to my knowledge. 
 
 It does not, however, appear to me that these experiments 
 have any real value, for such slight differences of temperature 
 can have no influence upon the material ; the only important 
 thing being that the castmg must be homogeneous and of 
 sufficient density. 
 
 I II. — Miscellaneous. 
 
 Eurploijinent of Officers according to their Aptitude for Service, 
 Independently of their Bank. 
 
 While referring to the foundry at Spandau, I must not 
 omit to point out a characteristic of the Prussian Army. 
 
 This foundry is a large establishment, where all the artillery 
 materiel for the army and navy is made. Now, what would be 
 the astonishment of French officers to learn that such an estab- 
 lishment is directed by one captain, assisted by two lieutenants ! 
 The captain-director of the foundry at Spandau is removable 
 only by the Minister, and for several years he has discharged 
 his duties to the satisfaction of all. A similar custom is very 
 common in Prussia. I could name several other establishments, 
 and positions of great responsibility under the War Ofiice, 
 which are directed or filled by officers of very inferior rank. 
 
 They never allow themselves to be fettered as m France (at 
 least m appointments other than those of the regular army) by 
 a kind of strained connection between the rank and functions 
 of an officer ; but on the contrary, when an officer, no matter 
 what his rank, shows any special aptitude, they employ him m 
 the line for which he shows a fitness. The director of the 
 foundry at Spandau is an example of this ; he is only a captain, 
 we in France would place at the head of such an estabhshment 
 a colonel, aided by six or seven officers. The captain of the 
 foundry at Spandau will in all probabihty be continued in that 
 employment when he obtains higher rank. 
 
 Anxiety to Improve the \eedle-Gun. 
 
 Mr. Norris, an American, has just left Berhn after a short 
 stay. He is a traveller for a mercantile house in the United 
 States. I do not think that much credence can be given to all
 
 41 
 
 that he says of his visit to Paris, his interview with the Emperor, 
 and the orders his Majesty gave him. He has proposed to the 
 Prussian Government a scheme for improving the needle-gun 
 (at a cost of Gs. Sd. per rifle), by which the mechanism would 
 be simphfied, and the range increased. 
 
 His proposal has not been accepted ; l)ut it is not the less 
 true, that Prussia has the greatest wisli to improve the arms of 
 her infantry. 
 
 Men who understand the subject recognize the superiority 
 of the Chassepot rifle on account of its greater range, and they 
 would be glad to make an equivalent improvement in then* arms. 
 It is considered in Prussia, however, that the needle-gun is 
 more rough and ready, that is to say, less liable to break than 
 our rifle. I have been much surprised &,t hearing Prussian 
 soldiers say exactly what I have heard French soldiers say duiing 
 the campaign of Italy. " At close quarters we are not so foohsh 
 " as to use the bayonet, for at the very moment we make a 
 " thrust we expose ourselves to be killed from behind. We 
 " use in preference the butt, clubbing the rifle, and thus pre- 
 " venting the enemy from coming near." The Prussians think 
 that under such circumstances then rifle would be better than 
 ours, being heavier, and not so fragile. 
 
 Instruction of Recruits. 
 
 Last week I accompanied the King of Prussia to Potsdam, 
 where His Majesty each year inspects the recruits of one com- 
 pany of each of the three battahons of the 1st Regiment of 
 Foot Guards, of which he is the chief. Each year, at this period, 
 or more exactly, twelve weeks after the fresh amiual contingent 
 joins, the commanding oflicers of companies and squadrons 
 bring before the commanding oflScers of then* regiments the 
 recruits they have instructed. In the Prussian army this pre- 
 hminary instruction of recruits is mvariably given by the com- 
 pany or squadron, while in the French army it is given by the 
 regiment, under the orders of the captain-instructor. The 
 method of instruction by company or squadron ofiers so many, 
 and such undeniable advantages, that I can only attribute our 
 adherence to the regimental system, as a consequence of long- 
 estabhshed routine. But this, however, is a personal opinion, 
 upon which I do not insist. 
 
 The conscripts of 1867 having been enrolled the 1st 
 November, those of the 1st Regiment of Foot Guards had a 
 httle more than three months' instruction when they were 
 inspected by the King last week. I could only admire the 
 progress obtained in so short a time. Recruits joining the French 
 Army could not after the same period have been classed with 
 them. The way in which they handled their arms, and per- 
 formed company and hght infantry movements, left nothing to 
 be desired. These men had already begun rifle shooting. 
 
 The biggest men in all Prussia are chosen for the 1st Regi-
 
 42 
 
 ment of Foot Guards, of which the King is chief. Big men 
 being generally less handy than men of an average height, 
 I was the more surprised at the amount of instruction of 
 the recruits of this regiment. Subsequently I visited other 
 regiments of infantry, and cavalry, when the colonels inspected 
 the recruits ; amongst all, the instruction was in a very forward 
 state. These results are due to the great zeal displayed by the 
 officers and non-commissioned officers of the companies and 
 squadrons. " They slave hke niggers ! " the Crown Prince said, 
 when I expressed to him my astonishment at what I saw at 
 Potsdam. 
 
 What Constitutes the Superiority of the Prussian Army ; 
 AND ON Disarmament. 
 
 Report of the 2'drd April, 1868. 
 
 Amidst the studies to which an officer holding my position 
 gives himself up, one question unceasingly presents itself to his 
 mind. 
 
 If war were to break out, suddenly, between Prussia, and 
 France, would the Prussian be superior, to the French army, 
 either by its organization, its instruction, its military spirit, or 
 its arms'? If it does possess the elements of superiority, what 
 are they ? Lastly, what steps should we take in order that we 
 may no longer remam in a state of inferiority '? 
 
 It will be seen that I omit, in enunciating this problem, 
 those elements which cannot be estimated beforehand, such as 
 the talents of the Commander-in-Chief, undoubtedly the most 
 important. The efiective forces both nations could put into the 
 field, the resources of all kinds possessed by both countries, &c., 
 &c. For the sake of argument, I will suppose that so far as these 
 things are concerned, both nations are on a par. Even granting 
 this, the question I wish to discuss is still most comphcated, for 
 it embraces all the details of the constitution of the two armies. 
 My desire is to reduce the subject to its simplest shape, and yet to 
 avoid laying it down in an absolute form, such as the following — 
 Which of the two armies is the most perfect ? Generally, such 
 questions are only put forward by superficial persons, who are 
 unable to understand that a reply is impossible, so numerous 
 are the points of comparison, that many mu^t escape obser- 
 vation. I will tlierefore limjt myself to pointing out what 
 in case of war would, classed under the heads above enume- 
 rated, give the Prussian army a real superiority. One army 
 may be superior to another in two distinct ways. 
 
 1st. Morally. — By the character of the nation, its tempera- 
 ment, its traditions, its history, and its general instruction. 
 
 2nd. Materially. — By its organization the amount of military 
 instruction, its officers, non-commissioned officers and men
 
 43 
 
 possess, by its war materiel, armament, aud eciuipment. 1 need 
 not speak of the French Army under cither of these two heads. 
 The quahties which distinguish it are well known. 
 
 In Prussia, all enlightened mihtary men acknowledge that 
 our soldiers excel all others m greater individuality, in a 
 keener intelligence, and in an incomparable entliusiasm. 
 They consider carelessness and French gaiety as valuable 
 qualities in war, and they declare that our soldiers are more 
 ingenious, and better marchers.^ They also admit the ad- 
 vantage which the French Army obtams from the longer period 
 of service with the colours, and the presence of old soldiers in 
 the ranks. They envy above all things the composition of our 
 body of non-commissioned officers.f 
 
 I need not speak of the armament of the infantry. I have 
 already pointed out how preoccupied they are in Prussia with 
 the superiority of our new rifle, and the attempts they are 
 making to improve the needle-gun. 
 
 I proceed to make observations on the Prussian Army. 
 
 ElerrK^nts of Moral Superiority. 
 
 Under the head of moral superiority, two things have given 
 the Prussian Army an undeniable advantage over all European 
 Armies. 
 
 Ist, The princij^le of compulsory military service. 
 
 2nd. The general instruction diilused through all classes of 
 society. 
 
 Compulsory Service. 
 
 It is needless to point out again (1 have already done so in 
 my reports of 18(3(3) the moral superiority which the pre- 
 sence m the ranks of all classes of society, and the respect 
 that the army and landwehr taken together represent the 
 entire nation under arms, confer on the Prussian Army. What- 
 ever faults may be found with Prussian military organization, 
 it is impossible not to admire a people, who, having recog- 
 jiized the truth, that for nations, as for indi^saduals, the first 
 necessity is existence, have determined thnt the army should 
 be the chief, the most honoured, of all its institutions, that all 
 healthy citizens should share the danger and the honour of 
 defending the country, increasing its power, and that they 
 
 * Prussia is generally a level country ; every one knows that the dvrcllers in 
 plains are not such gooa marchers as those who live in a hilly country. This diU'erence 
 has been shown in the war of 1866. The Army Corps Irom Eastern Prussia, 
 Pomerauia, and Brandenburg, suiT'ered much mure from the marches, through the 
 defiles of iJohemia, than the corps from Silesia, for example. 
 
 t The Prussian Army, indeed, numbers in its ranks some old non-commissioned 
 officij-s, but the number is very limited, on account of coinpidso.y service, which 
 necessitates each year the whole contingent entering the ranks.
 
 44 
 
 should be respected and esteemed before all others.* To speak 
 only of the officers, what an excellent example they give to other 
 classes ! In Prussia those privileged by birth or fortune do not, as 
 elsewhere, spend their lives in deplorable idleness Far from it, 
 men of the richest families, the most illustrious names, serve as 
 officers, enduring the labours and exigencies of military life, 
 instructing by example. When such a spectacle is seen, not 
 only does one feel respect for this rough but grave people, but 
 dread also, for the power such institutions give its army. 
 
 Compulsory Education. 
 
 The principle of compulsory education has been adopted 
 in Prussia for more than 30 years ; it may even be said since 
 the time of Frederick the Great, consequently the Prussian 
 nation is the most enlightened in Europe, in the sense that 
 education is diffused among all classes of society. 
 
 The Polish provinces, alone continue in a state of compara- 
 tive ignorance. In France, even where everything connected 
 with foreign countries is completely ignored, the amount of 
 intellectual labour, of which North Germany is the theatre, is 
 acknowledged. Elementary schools abound, and while in 
 France the foci of intellectual life and activity are con- 
 fined to some large cities. North Germany is covered with 
 such centres of learning ; to count them would be but to 
 enumerate all the cities of the third, even the fourth class. 
 
 I will not dwell too long on the advantages which the army 
 derives from a high standard of education beuig diffused tln-ough- 
 out the nation. But is not it extraordinary that persons in France, 
 even those considered enlightened men, should refuse to acknow- 
 ledge them '? Is it possible that they wish to deny that educa- 
 tion and knowledge develop the faculties of men, and ennoble 
 their ideas, by givmg them a higher estimate of their own 
 dignity? These people say artlessly that an army of ignorant, 
 but warlike soldiers, would defeat an army of well-educated 
 men, wanting experience in war. They do not understand that 
 to weigh such questions fairly, all other things, except those 
 under discussion should be considered as identical, and if an 
 attempt is made to convince them of their error, it can only be 
 done by a reductio ad ahsurdum. Now, I ask where is the 
 general who would hesitate a moment if, other things, such as 
 physical strength, disciphne, niimber of years' service, &c., were 
 identical, he had to choose between commanding an army of 
 100,000 men, composed entirely of pupils of the Ecole Polytech- 
 nique or Saint Cyr, and a similar army, composed of peasants 
 from Limousin and Berry ? Why, if he thought only of the 
 
 * I have already said that in Prussia all the honours, all the advantages, all the 
 favours, are for the army, or for those who have served in it. He who for any cause 
 has not been a soldier receives no employment. Both at home and abroad he is an 
 object of contempt to his fellow citizens.
 
 45 
 
 advantages arising from the rapid instructiijn of recruits, lie 
 would not hesitate for a moment. But there is much more than 
 this, for in moral force the former army would exceed the 
 latter tenfold. In support of this I will quote what Prussian 
 officers and non-commissioned officers repeatedly said to me in 
 Bohemia in 1866. Proud of their success, they attributed it in 
 great measure to the intellectual superiority of the men, and 
 they said, " When after the first battles our soldiers came in 
 '* contact with the Austrian prisoners, and on speaking to them 
 " found that many hardly knew their right hand, from tlieir 
 " left, there was not one who did not look on himseh" as a 
 " god, in comparison with such ignorant beings, and this convie- 
 " tion increased our forces in a tenfold degree.'' 
 
 Feeling of Duty. 
 
 I cannot omit to mention one quahty which characterizes 
 the whole Prussian nation, and which helps to augment the 
 moral value of the army, — it is the feeling of duty. It exists 
 to such an extent amongst all classes in tlie country, that the 
 more the nation is studied the more one is astonished at it. 
 This not beuig the place to examme into the causes of this 
 trait of character, I limit myself to referring to it. 
 
 The most remarkable proof of this attachment to duty is 
 supplied by the Government employes of every grade, paid 
 with a parsimony truly surprising, encumbered often Avith 
 families. These employes labom" all day long, with an inde- 
 fatigable energy, "VAdthout any complaint, and without any 
 apparent ambition for a less laborious lot. ]\I. Bismarck said to 
 me the other day, " We are very careful not to interfere with this 
 " hard-worldng and ill-paid bureaucracy, which performs the 
 " best part of our work, and forms one of our chief sources of 
 " strength.^' 
 
 Material Superiority. — Special Services permanently organized. 
 
 One element of material superiority wliich Prussia possesses, 
 is the facility which its military organization affi^rds for forming- 
 certain special services, such as companies of carriers of the 
 wounded, railway corps, telegraph corps, &c. I have already 
 pointed out in my reports in 1866 all the details connected Avitli 
 these services. 1 liave indicated their duties, and the compo- 
 sition of their personnel and materiel. 
 
 Here I will confine myself, to stating tliat, thanks to the insti- 
 tution of the Landwehr, these serHces can be organized As-ithout 
 diminishing the eftbctive strength of the army by one man, and 
 that they are always formed in time of peace, as a permanent 
 institution. 
 
 One word with reference to the companies of bearers of 
 the wounded. We do not use them in France, but I believe 
 it is proposed to select at the beginning of a campaign four or 
 five men in each comjiany of infantry, for the duty of remo\ang 
 
 F
 
 4G 
 
 the wc anded. This is some tlnng ; but it must be allowed that 
 companies formed beforehand, with well-defined duties, and 
 educated for these duties, must render better service. If the 
 formation of companies of carriers of the wounded, was only 
 for a philanthropic object, it might be neglected ; but their 
 utility in action is undeniable. What have we seen on the 
 Italian fields of battle f The moment a man was wounded, 
 three or four of lus comrades feU out, under pretext of removing 
 him. Would not this dangerous UTegularity be diminished, if 
 the soldier knew that a special service, organized beforehand, 
 and competent to aid the womided on the field of battle, 
 existed 1 In Prussia these companies are formed from men 
 of the Landwehr whose character, offers a sufficient guarantee 
 of their morahty and good conduct. It is to be feared that the 
 four or five men selected from each of our companies do not 
 afford the same guarantee. 
 
 Infantry Fire. 
 
 If our new rifle (pattern 1866) possesses all the good qualities 
 claimed for it, not only has France no cause for envy, but 
 she is actually superior to Prussia. 
 
 It must, however, be confessed that when the temperament 
 of the two nations is compared, there can be no doubt that the 
 fire of the Prussian infantry, other things bemg equal, will be more 
 formidable, than that of the French. The Prussian soldier is less 
 excitable than ours, and fires with greater coolness and more 
 precision. This opinion is widely disseminated in the Prussian 
 army ; I have heard it often expressed. We should pay very 
 great attention to rifle practice. In Prussia it is carefully studied. 
 Each battalion receives 120 cartridges per year, per man, 
 whatever may be the length of his service, in addition to 4,000 
 cartridges for general drills. In addition to which, the artillery 
 gives to each battalion that returns one-third of the weight 
 of bullets fired, a certain additional number of cartridges, 
 which are fired by the most skilful marksmen ; from which 
 it follows that each soldier fires nearly 130 rounds annually. 
 All the regimental officers take part in the practical instruction, 
 and are borne on the rifle shooting register. 
 
 The Colonels and Generals are present at the exammations 
 at the end of the year, to mark the importance attached to this 
 drill. In Prussia they have long ago recognized that the more 
 the weapon of the infantry soldier is improved, the greater the 
 necessity that exists for instructing him in its use. 
 
 Artillbry Fire. 
 
 If war breaks out, we should clearly understand that the 
 Prussian artillery materiel is very superior to ours. In truth, 
 our carriages are lighter than the Prussian carriages, our field 
 guns are more mobile, but the two Prussian guns (the 4 and 
 6-poundcr) are much more accurate, and have a greater 
 range.
 
 47 
 
 The German report, which I enclosed with my report of 
 the 26th February last, leaves no doubt whatever on this 8u]> 
 ject. In addition to wliicli the Prussian guns can fire more 
 rapidly than ours. How does it happen that a great number of 
 our artillery officers do not consider rapidity of fire an advan- 
 tage, and declare that our giuis fire sufficiently fast? Is it 
 possible that in war there are no circumstances when it may 
 be desirable to hurl at troops, or artillery, in a given time a 
 fourth or fifth more projectiles ? 
 
 The accuracy of the Prussian Artillery is a pomt of such 
 importance that I shall make it the subject of a special 
 report. So far as the personnel of the Prussian Artillery is 
 concerned, its military education is inferior to ours, cliiefly 
 because the Prussian gunners serve only two years ^vith the 
 active army. So far as the officers are concerned, while they 
 (the reverse of what we see in France) are less thought of, 
 than those of the other aims, their mihtary education is equal 
 in every point, to that of French Artillery officers. 
 
 Austnan and Prussian Artillery. 
 
 This is the placeto speak (as a digression) of an error commonly 
 received since the war of 1866. It is usually stated that the 
 Austrian Ai-tiUery was superior to the Prussian. Tliis opinion 
 comes from an Austrian source, and should therefore be 
 distrusted. The error is manifest to those who knoAv the facts 
 of the Bohemian campaign and wish to tell the truth. If it 
 were only said that during the war of 1866 the Austrian Artillery 
 caused greater loss than the Prussian, it would be quite true. 
 The reason of this should be explained. 
 
 1. In the spring of 1866 Prussia had not yet completely 
 re-armed her Artillery with steel guns (4 and 6-prs.) She was 
 compelled therefore to begin the war ^^dth brass smooth-bore 
 12-prs. These guns were of no use, for on no occasion could 
 they be brought into action, under the fii'e, of the long range 
 rifle guns of the Austrian Artillery. 
 
 All the Prussian officers of Artillery have repeatedly assured 
 me that these guns, Avere nothing but an uicumbrance, from the 
 first to the last day of the campaign. 
 
 2. From strategic causes, the offensive, in almost every 
 action was taken by the Prussians. At Nachod, at Skahtz, at 
 Trautenau, then- divisions, deboucliing fi-om defiles, found the 
 Austrians already in position ; consequently the Prussian 
 Artillery had to find out proper positions for their gmis on an 
 unknown field of battle. 
 
 The battle of Koniggratz offers a strildng example. The 
 Austrian Artillery covered by epaulments, occupied before- 
 hand all the commanding positions extending from ]\Iaslowed 
 to Prim, whilst the Prussian Artillery, w^hich attacked, had to 
 overcome the difficulties consequent on a rapid selection of 
 favourable positions upon a commanded field of battle. 
 
 Thus the Prussian Artillerv during the Bohemian war. 
 
 F 2
 
 48 
 
 could only use two-thirds of its guns, and it lias had 
 to play, what in all battles is the most difficult part. These 
 are the reasons why the Austrian Artillery produced greater 
 effects than the Prussian Artillery. But, I repeat, it is 
 false to pretend that the former is suj^erior. The report I 
 furnished on on the 20th February last, shows that the Prussian 
 materiel is the best. The Prussian officers are better trained 
 than the Austrians ; I do not know that there is much difference 
 in the instruction of the men. My object in making this digres- 
 sion is to remove an error which is each day becoming more 
 widely spread. The fact that at Koniggratz a portion of the 
 Austrian artillery showed heroic devotion, in endeavouring to 
 cover the retreat of the army, has contributed much to produce 
 this erroneous impression. 
 
 To recapitulate ; the various elements of superiority that the 
 Prussian army possesses are : — 
 
 The strong and healthy spirit, that compulsory service 
 spreads in the army, which includes in its ranks all the 
 manly portion, all the intelligence, all the living force of the 
 nation, and which consequently looks on itself as the nation 
 in arms. 
 
 Thanks to the extensive general education, disseminated 
 through all classes of society, the intellectual level of the army 
 is much higher than in any other countr3^ Amongst all ranks 
 the feeling of duty is much greater than in France. Special 
 services (companies of bearers of the wounded, railway and 
 telegraph corps) are permanently organized, with the greatest 
 care, and without trenching on the number of combatants. 
 
 The fire of the infantry is more formidable, thanks partly 
 to the peculiar temperament of the North Germans, partly to 
 the great care bestowed on rifle practice. The mattriel of the 
 field artillery is much superior to ours, both as regards 
 accuracy, range, and rapidity of fii'e. 
 
 Superiority of the Prussian Staff. 
 
 But of all the elements of superiority which Prussia, in case 
 war broke out, would possess, the greatest and the most 
 iindeniable, will be that she will obtain, from tlie composition 
 of her corps of staff officers. 
 
 It should be loudly proclaimed as an astounding truth, that 
 the Prussian staff" is the best in Europe ; ours cannot be com- 
 pared with it. I have never ceased to insist upon this in my 
 first reports of 18G6, and to express my opinion that it was a 
 matter of urgent necessity, to take some stej^s to raise our staff 
 corps to the level of the Prussian staff. Firmly persuaded that 
 in an approaching war the North German army would, from 
 the composition of its staff, obtain important advantages, 
 and that we would, perhaps, have serious cause to regret 
 our inferiority, 1 venture again to draw attention to this 
 subject, which in my opinion is the most important of all. 
 I will not conceal that my conviction is so strong that I raise
 
 49 ■ . 
 
 a warning voice, caveant consults. Were I to do otherwise, I 
 should fail in carrying- out my duty. 
 
 I propose, then, to point out how the Prussian Staff is con- 
 stituted, and the princij)les on which it is based ; the reasons 
 of its superiority over the French will then be sufficiently 
 apparent. 
 
 When I reached Prague in 1866 I fii'st came in contact with 
 staff officers. I Avas at once struck with their merits. All, 
 without exception, possessed remarkable intelligence, and the 
 most extended military knowledge. In proportion as I knew 
 more of these officers my astonishment increased ; in all ranks 
 I found thoughtful, well-educated, and judicious men. It was 
 therefore very interesting to investigate the causes which pro- 
 duced such results ; and I set to work to study the organiza- 
 tion of the Prussian Staff Corps. 
 
 Composition of the Prussian Staff. 
 
 In Prussia neither rule, nor regulation, as to the composition 
 of the Staff exists. They have started from a well-founded 
 principle, that of all the officers in the army, Staff Officers 
 should be the most intelligent, and the best educated. They 
 say, it is a matter of but small importance if an officer command- 
 ing a company or squadron has not a very extensive military 
 education ; it is far otherAvise with a Staff Officer. His multi- 
 farious duties, the influence that his reports of all kinds, may 
 exercise on the decisions of Generals, — more especially now, 
 that armies are so large, and the theatre of war so extended, 
 renders it absolutely requisite, that he should have an ex- 
 tended knowledge, and a special fitness for his duties.* 
 
 Admit the principle that of all officers in the army. Staff 
 Officers should be the ablest, what steps should be taken to 
 apply it ? 
 
 They draw these officers from the entire army, no matter, 
 to what arm they belong, and while solid advantages in the 
 way of promotion are offered as rewards to young men, the 
 authorities reserve to themselves the power of at any moment 
 removing from the Staff those officers who do not show zeal 
 and aptitude for special duties. 
 
 The consequence of these arrangements arc, that only 
 young, ambitious, intelligent, and laborious, officers seek em- 
 ployment on the Staff. Ambitious, because they seek rapid 
 promotion ; intelligent and laborious, because they know that 
 if they do not give satisfaction, in the studies required from 
 them they will expose themselves to be sent back for serAnce 
 in the arm to which they belong. To understand clearly 
 the kind of advantage that is given to Staff Officers, it is 
 requisite to remember, that there are no rules for promotion, 
 that officers are promoted only by seniority. In practice the 
 
 * Frederick, in his memoirs, insists ranch on the necessity of liaving Staff OtTlcers 
 well tau;;bf, and inte'l!2;e;it. lie alt; ibu'es the loss of Malpla.|r.ot and Leuthen to 
 faults on the ii -rt of Sla!f Oilieers.
 
 50 
 
 King reserves to himself the light of selecting for a superior 
 grade any officer he pleases; but he exercises this right very 
 rarely. And as the number of officers so promoted, does not 
 exceed one-thirtieth to one-fortieth of the whole, it may be 
 said, I repeat, that promotion takes place only by seniority. 
 Officers admitted to the staff gain, on an average, from seven 
 to eight years over other officers. 
 
 Method of obtaining Officers for the Staff. 
 
 I will now describe in detail, the method by which the Staff 
 Corps is formed in Prussia. 
 
 The Prussian Army, at present the army of the North 
 German Confederation, is formed, as is known, of permanent 
 Army Corps, and, has also a Permanent Chief of the Staff, 
 General Moltke. He is in addition the almost absolute Chief 
 of the Staff Corps considered as a separate body. He selects 
 the officers for admission and employment ; he nominates them 
 for promotion from one grade to another (the Minister merely 
 ratifying his nomuiation.) Finally, it is he who details them, 
 for the various duties of the army. His power, so to speak, 
 is discretionary, and such a state of affairs, hardly to be 
 understood in France, appears perfectly natural here, as 
 nmch on account of the integrity and recognized merits of 
 General IMoltke, as of the formation of the army into perma- 
 nent corps. 
 
 Every lieutenant, no matter what branch of the service he 
 belongs to, has the power, after three years spent in that 
 rank with his regiment, to offer himself as a candidate for the 
 war academy (Krieg's Akademie) at Berlin. This is a school 
 for higher military education, unequalled in Em'ope, as much by 
 the merits of its professors as for the nature and extent of its 
 studies. It is by no means a special school for the Staff; its 
 aim is far larger. It aims at familiarising selected well-disposed 
 officers, with the higher parts of the art of war, giving them an 
 education which may serve as the basis of futiu-e mtellectual 
 development, and which may render them fit for Staff duties 
 and the superior command of troops.* 
 
 I attach to this report a syllabus of the instruction given at 
 this school, which has been recently published, and which gives a 
 complete programme of the studies. I will only say that it 
 includes tactics (theoretical and practical), mihtary history, 
 armaments, fortifications (both field and permanent), history of 
 sieges, the theory and practice of plan drawing, the duties of 
 the staff, military geography and administration ; and as 
 subordinate sciences, mathematics, geology, universal history, 
 hterature, the elements of philosophy, general geography, 
 chemistry, experimental physics, and finally, French, Enghsh, 
 
 * At present almost all the Generals of the Prussian Army are old pupils of the 
 *ar school ; three-fourtlis of thrm have b.»rved on the Staff. The proportion goes 
 on increasing. TIic Polytechnic School, tliosc of Mctz and St. Cyr, are but 
 epecial scl;ot)]s, compared with the immense extent of ground covered by the War 
 Acadomv.
 
 51 
 
 and Russian. At the conclusion of a difficult examination, at 
 which about 120 lieutenants present themselves each year (I 
 take the average number), about 40 enter the school, all with 
 the wish more, or less avowed, of seeking the career of Staff 
 Officers. The studies last three years from the 1st October. The 
 com-se during the first year lasts for nine months, after which 
 these officers return to their regiments for three months, namely, 
 from 1st July to 1st October, to take part in the autumn 
 manoeuvres. The second year is the same. In the third year 
 the pupils receive more particularly the instruction requisite 
 for staff officers. The tenth month is spent m studying during 
 a journey termed " the staff journey," mider the guidance of 
 the professors, and usually in an undulating portion of the 
 country, reconnaissance, studies of ground, military sketches, 
 encampments of troops, and the solution of military problems. 
 
 First Selection made amongst the Pupils of the Academy. 
 
 Three years having elapsed: the lieutenants, without a final 
 examination, and without any class fists, are sent back to their 
 regiments. The professors, and the dnector of the academy 
 name to General Moltke those who have shown themselves the 
 ablest, and the most studious. Twelve of these are selected, 
 care being taken that amongst this number should be off cers of 
 the different arms of the service (infantry, cavalry, and artillery), 
 and diu'ing the course of the year follo^ang then* departm'o 
 from the school, they are attached for six or nine months each 
 to a regiment, not belonging to his own branch of the service. 
 Those who during this stage display the greatest zeal, and the 
 requisite aptitude, are selected by General Moltke, who sum- 
 monses them to Berlin, to the grand head-quarters for duty (as 
 they say here). They continue, however, to wear the uniform 
 of, and belong to then regiments. The time that these officers 
 spend at the grand head-quarters (a year or a year and a half) 
 exercises an important influence over their future career. They 
 are then at a higher special Staff School, of which General 
 Moltke hunself is the head. He, while teaching, learns to know 
 and appreciate them; he carefully familiarises them successively 
 with tlie duties of each of the subdivisions, composing the grand 
 head-quarters. He lectures to them, gives them memons to 
 draw up, upon subjects selected by himself, reads and criticises 
 their productions before the whole of the officers, the names of 
 the authors being concealed, as much to avoid hurting the 
 feelings of the less competent, as to avoid exciting the vanity 
 of the more able. 
 
 Second Selection. 
 
 After the stay of these officers at the grand head-quarters. 
 General Moltke makes his selection, but the officers are ignorant 
 of it. He might give at once the position of staff officer to those 
 whom he thouaht best fitted for tlie service, but to avoid
 
 52 
 
 wounding the feelings of the others, he sends back all the 
 officers without distinction, to their regiments. The inferior 
 men are left there, and remain in then- own arm of the service, 
 preserving, only the remembrance of the instruction they have 
 undergone. The others are promoted after some months to the 
 rank of Captain, and named Staff Officers, wearing the staff 
 uniform. 
 
 Promotion by selection to the rank of Captain. 
 
 General Moltke always, as Permanent Chief of the Staff of 
 the Army, divides these Captains according to the requu-ements 
 of the service. He keeps some at the grand head-quarters, 
 employing them, on those duties for which they have shown 
 a special aptitude. He sends the largest nimiber to the 
 Staff of the Army Corps and Divisions, where they have 
 to learn their special duties ; but great care is taken not to 
 burden these officers, with clerks' duties, which only waste 
 their time. These duties are performed by non-commissioned 
 officers, and soldiers only, under the sm'veillance of the officers, 
 Avho can thus (the reverse of what we see in France) devote 
 their time, to those subjects which are more useful and worthy 
 of them. 
 
 At the end of two years or two and a-half years, these Cap- 
 tams cease to perform the duties of Staff Officers ; and to avoid 
 putting them in contact with theii" former comi'ades, over whose 
 heads they have gone, they are posted to regiments other than 
 those ui which they have served, as Lieutenants ; they each, 
 according to his arm of the service, perform the duty of Com- 
 pany, Battery, or Squadron Commandant. 
 
 Promotion by selection to the rank of Major. 
 
 After an average of two years' duty with their regiments, 
 they are promoted by selection, to the rank of Major, and resume 
 the status and uniform of Staff Officers. General Moltke employs 
 them as such, according to the wants of the service, either on 
 the Staff of the Army Corps, or at Berlin, on the head-quarter 
 Staff. 
 
 I draw attention to the continued system of trials and 
 selections to which the Staff Corps is subjected. If it is remarked 
 at any time, that amongst the Captains employed, as I have 
 already said, either on the head-quarter Staff or on the Divisional 
 or Army Corps Staff, the zeal of any slackens, or that his 
 merit has been too highly estimated, he is not selected as 
 Major, but is left to do duty in that branch of the service to 
 which he belongs, without being ever again employed as a 
 Staff Officer. 
 
 Before going further, I would draw attention to the fact 
 that the great advantage Staff" Officers have, is the rapid step 
 from Captain to Major ; they gain in tliis grade 6 to 7 years, and 
 as they already had gained 1 year in their promotion to Captain, 
 or they gain 7 to 8 years altogether.*
 
 53 
 
 Staff and Regimental Duty alternatehj. 
 
 The rank of Major once obtained, StaiF Officers have, as 
 regards promotion, no further advantages. But it is well Avorthy 
 of remark that at every stage of their progress, they are hi va- 
 riably obhged to leave the Staff, and serve hi a reghnent of 
 their arm of the service, for at least one year, before obtaining 
 promotion. Thus one year at least, before the time a Staff Major 
 is promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, he receives the 
 actual command of a battalion, several squadi-ons, or several 
 batteries. In the same way the Lieutenant-Colonel is placed at 
 the head of a regiment of infantry, cavalry, or artillery, for one 
 year before his promotion to the rank of Colonel. These officers 
 thus retam the habits requisite for riding, and commanding 
 troops. 
 
 Selected Officers obtained from the Entire Army for the Staff. 
 
 But the exertions made to obtain a good body of Staff Officers 
 do not stop here. The officers to whom we have hitherto 
 referred have alia common orighi; they are the 12 selected, 
 from the 40 who have been admitted to the war academy, out of 
 the 120 who origmally competed. Now, it is evident that 
 amongst the large number of Lieutenants, in the army haAang 
 three years service, there must be some excellent officers who, 
 for some reason or another, have not tried to enter the war 
 academy and even amongst the 180 imsuccessful candidates 
 there may be some very able men. Not "SAdsliuig to lose any 
 chance, for obtaunng good officers for the Staff, the following 
 steps are taken : — 
 
 The Colonels of the army are called on, to name to the 
 Generals, and the latter to General Moltke, the officers of their 
 regunents who are most remarkable for breadth of information, 
 taste, or fitness for their profession, and it must be remarked 
 that it is requisite to moderate rather than excite the zeal of 
 Commandmg Officers, who usually desire to push their officers 
 forward, and procure rapid promotion for them. 
 
 General Moltke sends to the officers so selected, questions 
 to study and problems to solve, and if he thinks them qualified 
 he orders them to Berlin, to the grand head-quarters. If 
 they there show that they have real ability, General IMoltke 
 appoints them as Staff Officers, and employs them accordhigly. 
 
 If such be not the case they are sent back to then- regiments, 
 where, doubtless, they are for some time exposed to the "chaff" 
 of then comrades. 
 
 I have already said that in the Staff of Army Corps and 
 Divisions, the clerical labour, a useless Avork for officers, is 
 performed by non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and thus 
 
 * As might be expected these Officers are objects of envy to the ijcst of the 
 Army. But such feelings arc limited, becausethe real merit of the Staff, is appreciated, 
 as also the incessant labour Staff Officers undergo.
 
 54 
 
 the officers are allowed to employ their time in a more useful 
 manner. Practically, the Generals give them military questions 
 (not in the actual routine of duty) to study, and once a year 
 the Chief of the Staff of each Army Corps takes a joiu'ney, 
 termed the " Staff journey," with all the Staff Officers, to 
 improve or extend their information. 
 
 The officers of the Head-Quarter Staff at Berlin make a 
 similar journey annually, under the personal direction of General 
 Moltke, sometimes in one provhice, sometimes in another ; this 
 journey lasts a fortnight or three weeks. 
 
 Causes of the Superiority of the Prussian Staff. 
 
 The reasons of the superiority of the Prussian Staff can be 
 easily understood from what I have just described. 
 
 1. The selection is made throughout the entire army 
 without distmction of corps, all Lieutenants bemg asked to 
 compete. 
 
 2. Only ambitious, intelligent, and hard-working officers 
 come forward ; ambitious because they seek rapid promotion, 
 intelligent and laborious because they know that they must 
 submit durmg all their career to a contmual system of selection 
 and labour. 
 
 Thus starting from a correct idea, that Staff Officers should 
 be the best in the army, and using the simple means of giving 
 these officers more rapid promotion than others, Prussia has 
 formed the best instructed body of Staff Officers in Em-ope. The 
 more I compare them with ours the more am I struck ^\dth their 
 superiority. Not that oiu' Staff Corps does not embrace officers 
 as good as the best m Prussia, but there arc no mediocrities 
 amongst the latter, and how many whose instruction is vejy 
 insufficient are not included m the ranks of our Staff? How 
 many are there with us who do not know how to read a map, 
 or who have no knowledge of the manoeuvres of the various 
 arms of the service, who have never studied a modern cam- 
 paign, and who (as was shown in the war of 3859) do not know 
 how to form a suitable camp for a brigade of infantry, or a 
 regiment of cavalry i* There is nothing like that, in this 
 country, such officers would not be admitted on the Staff, or 
 rather, they would be removed, the moment then- ignorance was 
 known. 
 
 It is not my place to point out the means requisite to 
 
 * It may be thought that I exaggerate, and it may be said, perhaps, that so 
 far as the selection of proper encampments for troojjs, the Prussian officers who 
 have not seen war cannot le better than ours. Jiut can any one deny the 
 advantao-es of the Staff journeys made either by the pupils of the War Academy, 
 by the "staif Officers of Ai'my Corps, or by those of the Head-Quarter Staff, 
 under the direction of General Moltke, journeys when all kinds of questions as to 
 the knowledge of ground, the encampment of troops, fortifications, &c., ai-e jiroposed 
 and solved.
 
 55 
 
 improve our Staff Corps. But I look in vain for any principle 
 on which it is based. Do we admit, as in Prussia, that Staff 
 Officers should be the elite of the army ^ Certainly not. With 
 us, the only test for Staff Officers is the chance one, of a single 
 examination passed at 21 years of age, since we select the 
 largest number, from those wdio are liighest on the class list 
 leaving St. Cyr. 
 
 Frankly, have we the smallest guarantee of sound judgment, 
 a marked inclination for labour, or a special fitness for a career 
 which, according to a Prussian maxim, does not admit of 
 mediocrity? Nevertheless, these young men are, and will 
 remain Staff Officers until they rethe from the army. If, after 
 they leave the military schools, they show no taste for a military 
 life, no aptitude for their special duties, and give themselves 
 up to idleness and live in ignorance, what matters it? We will 
 trust in war to these incapable, or negligent officers, duties 
 which require the greatest activity, the greatest judgment, and 
 the most extensive knowledge. This is how we act, with an 
 entire absence of piincipal. How differently these important 
 duties are regarded in Prussia. 
 
 I repeat again, they w411 excuse sluggishness or mediocrity 
 in any officer except a Staff Officer. To speak only of physical 
 fitness, does any one think that he will fuid here, as in France, 
 officers mifit to ride a mile at full speed? I am well acquainted 
 with the Prussian Staff, and I can affii'm that General Moltke 
 would at once remove fi'om the Staff any officer unfit for duty 
 on horse back. He himself sets the example, and rides every 
 
 In general (and it is requisite not to ignore the fact in 
 France), the most incessant and minute care is taken in this 
 country with all things, civil as well as mUitary. The details 
 of the organization, and execution approach perfection. But 
 their care is bestowed more particularly on the army. The 
 principal bequeathed by the Great Frederick to his successors 
 is continually applied. " Prussia must be always on outpost 
 duty." If a simile chosen fi'om the racmg stable be allowed, 
 I would say that the Prussian nation is at the present 
 day in complete "traimng." I do not propose to point out 
 in detail the defects of om- Staff Corps, under both the 
 heads of its organization and education. My object is to 
 point out the reasons which make the Prussian Staff so 
 much superior to ours. Nevertheless, how is it possible not 
 to regret, the positions occupied in France by so many 
 officers, who pass whole years, those when men are_ in 
 then- prime, in Staff offices occupied exclusively with clerical 
 labour, which may be done just as well by non-commissioned 
 officers ? What lost time, what wasted talents ? And how can 
 it be wondered at that our officers serve as objects of richcule 
 even to Austrian newspapers, as can be seen by reading the 
 nimibers of the " Camarade " published at Vienna. They are 
 termed "rusted," their duties are deemed unworthy of an 
 officer, and they laugh at their appearance before troops. As
 
 56 
 
 for Prussian officers, they are the more astonished at the 
 organization of our Staff, as they render full justice to our 
 army in other respects. 
 
 But they are unable to understand how any one can be 
 considered a Staff Officer, by simply passing a good exami- 
 nation on leaving school at 21 years of age. They do not 
 admit that any man can be a good Staff Officer who cannot ride 
 many miles at a gallop, and who does not speak at least one 
 foreign language,* or who has never commanded a company, a 
 regiment, or a battalion. They often express their astonishment 
 at this. And, now, should we adopt for our Staff the Prussian 
 organization.^ Certamly not. If it were thought of, the method 
 of promotion amongst our officers, which is quite different, 
 would entirely forbid it. But the same problem (liere the 
 formation of the best Staff) has often many solutions, all based 
 on the first data. Let it be once granted that we acknowledge 
 the necessity of miproving our Staff. The first question to answer 
 will be, is not the principle laid down in Prussia which requires 
 that the Staff should be the elite of the army undoubtedly 
 correct'? This principal admitted the consequences as to how 
 it should be applied, will follow without great difficulty. 
 
 I will termmate the report by statmg that, in my opinion, 
 it 18 very urgent to take some steps to elevate our Staff Corps 
 from its state of mferiority. I beg agam to say that this 
 mferiority is too real, too apparent, to any one who takes the 
 trouble to study the Prussian Staff, and it is ^athout exagge- 
 ration, after much study and careful thought, that I express 
 these opinions. ♦ 
 
 The composition of the Prussian Staff will, in the next war, 
 constitute the most formidable element of superiority in favour 
 of the Prussian Army. I have had the means, when in Bohemia 
 and since, of knowing many facts, which from their personal 
 character caimot find a place in the official account of the war 
 of 1866. From these I consider it as an undoubted truth that the 
 Prussian armies have owed a great part of theii" success to the 
 Staff" Officers. I do not exaggerate m saying that it was these 
 officers alone who directed the campaign of 1866. How many ex- 
 amples could Inot quote where the officers who composed either 
 the Head-Quarter Staff or the Army Corps Staff have given the 
 most complete proof of correct judgment, true warlike talents, 
 and extreme zeal. Not to speak of General Moltke, where is 
 the G eneral-m-Chief, who would not deem himself most fortu- 
 nate to have as Chief of the Staff either General Voigts-Rhetz 
 or General Blumenthal, officers of the highest distinction, who 
 discharged the functions of Chiefs of the Staft" to the 1st and 
 2nd Armies. And what precious qualities, what uiformation of 
 all kinds amongst the Staff Officers mider then- orders, Colonels, 
 
 * Firfe on this subject p. 65 of " tho lustruction," attached to my report. The 
 reasons why it is requisite that a Prussian Stalf Olllcer should know French ; for 
 exactly tlie sa^Jie reason as Frencli StafF Officers should understand Geriiian.
 
 57 
 
 Majors, Captains! I do nut know one that any General would 
 not be delighted to employ in Avar. What a guarantei;, J 
 would almost say, what absolute security, and coolness of 
 conception, Staffs composed of olHcers so able, so Avell taught, 
 and so devoted to their duties, must give to a Ge:ieral Com- 
 manding-in-Cliief during war. My conviction on tliis point is 
 so strong that I would once more express it, Let us distrust the 
 Prussian Stoff. 
 
 On Disarmament. 
 
 The Prussian Government has decided, from motives of 
 economy, that on the 1st of next May 12,000 men of the army 
 shall be sent home on furlough. This reducti(ju is merely 
 provisional. 
 
 It, however, induces me to say a few woi-ds on that curious 
 question, "the disarmament of the Great Powers," a subject 
 which is occasionally discussed, and with which the newspapers 
 are now specially occupied. AVhat a want of connnon sense 
 there is in the articles with which these journals feed the 
 public ! What ignorance of the institutions of foreign countries ! 
 They do not even ask what is meant by the disarmament of a 
 power, and they confound this word A\ath the discharge of 
 soldiers. 
 
 No precise definition of the word disarmament has ever 
 been given. 
 
 Fii'st, as no two powers have the same military oi-ganization, 
 it cannot mean the same for all powers. To consider one Power 
 only, France for example, what is it which fau-ly constitutes a 
 disarmament, and where does it begin ? Is it discharging 
 soldiers which is usually looked on as equivalent to a dis- 
 armament ? But it is requisite to know what soldiers are 
 discharged. Is it a portion of the army ^\i\h. the colours, or a 
 pcjrtion of the reserve ? Is the discharge provisional, or final 
 Avithout possible recall % All this is vague. 
 
 When a definition of the word disarmament, is sought Avhich 
 shall be appHcable to every country, the following only can lie 
 found: a diminution in the number of men that a I'ower teaches, 
 or sets apart for Avarhl^e pm'poses. A disarmament would be 
 partial if a Power diminished its effective strength in a certain 
 proportion ; it Avould be total, if it did not train a single soldier, 
 and hmited itself, to keeping up a kind of poHce, for duty in 
 the interior. 
 
 Now that which our newspaper Avriters do not dream 
 of is, that a partial or complete disarmament may be con- 
 ceived, that is to say, is possible in France, Austria, Italy, and 
 England, in a word for all Powers ; but it is absolutely impos- 
 sible for one, Prussia. The Avord disarmament can apply 
 to Prussia in no sense whateA^er. Why? On account of 
 the principle of uniA^ersal compulsory serA^cc, the fiuidamental 
 principle of Prussian military institutions, and, it may be added,
 
 58 
 
 of the social eustoniK of the nation. It requires that all healthy 
 citizens should spend three years in the active army, as in a 
 school for war, and then serve four years in the reserve, and 
 five years in the Landwehr. In other words, that all the 
 healthy young men 20 years of age, that is to say, 93,000 men 
 (the contmgent of 1868 for the North German Confederation 
 was 92,886 men) enter the army each year, and are taught the 
 profession of arms for three years ; this instruction havuig been 
 received, they remam nine years at the disposal of the State. 
 The North German Confederation has consequently 300,000 
 men from 20 to 23 years of age who are being taught the art 
 of war, and more than 600,000 men from 23 to 32 years of 
 age who have been completely taught, total 900,000 men. What, 
 then, is the meanmg of disarmament as apphed to Prussia? 
 Does any one propose that she should diminish the number of 
 men with the colours % She would reply, I am unable to do so, 
 because the fundamental principle of compulsory military 
 service compels me to take 93,000 young men each year mto 
 my army, and to keep them there three years. Now the actual 
 strength of my army, and its cadi'es, are only just sufficient to 
 enable me to do this. 
 
 Does any one propose that Prussia should shorten the 
 duration of military service ? To that she might perhaps 
 consent ; but then the question must be asked — Service in which 
 branch of the army is it proposed to shorten % 
 
 Is it service ^^dth the colours (three years), or in the 
 reserve (four years), or m the Landwehr (five years) % It is 
 quite evident that if Prussia does not reduce the total dura- 
 tion of service, 12 years (20 to 32 years of age), and merely 
 reduces the number of years spent in the reserve or with the 
 colours, the only result woidd be that the military education 
 of her soldiers would not be quite so complete, but the total 
 number would be unaltered, viz., 900,000 men in the active 
 army, reserve, and Landwehr. Woidd this alteration be a 
 disarmament % Certainly not ; it would be rather, so to 
 speak, a reduction of the warlike force of the 900,000 men. 
 To take an extreme case — If Prussia should adopt a service of 
 one year in the ranks, two in the reserve, and nine in the Land- 
 wher, she would have her soldiers badly trained, and a great 
 mass of Landwehr soldiers, but she would still have 900,000 
 men, who would have been trained one year in the army and 
 two in the reserve. 
 
 A diminution of the entu-e force of 900,000 men, that is to 
 say, a disarmament in the proper acceptation of the word could 
 not take place in Prussia unless she reduced the hmits of age 
 in the Landwehr, as for instance from 30 to 28 years. 
 
 But the comparison would be entirely deceptive, for if a 
 serious war w^ere to break out, there would be no difficulty in 
 again obtainmg the men of 29, 30, 31, and 32 years of age as 
 easily as if they belonged to the Landwehr. It cannot too 
 often be pointed out, that the corner stone of Prussian military
 
 59 
 
 organization consists in the military training for a certain num- 
 ber of years (three) of all the healthy young men in the country 
 who have completed 20 years of age. The number of years 
 passed in the reserve, and in the Landwehr, is in comparison 
 "with this of minor importance. 
 
 It follows, from this fundamental principle, that all the 
 healthy young men of the country, are either actually soldiers 
 or old soldiers. 
 
 Thus the armed force of the North German Confederation, 
 (active army, reserve, and Landwehr) taken as a A\'liole, offers 
 a phenomenon quite unique in Europe. 
 
 This may, perhaps, be simplified to the eye by the annexed 
 diagram. The 12 straight lines are intended to shew — 1st, the 
 men of 20 years ; 2nd, those of 21 years ; and so on. The 
 first represent the active army, the four following the reserve, 
 the five last the Landwehr. These lines, by then- decreasing 
 leng-th, represent the loss of men by deaths each year, and the 
 thickness of the fines represents the fitness for war of each 
 contingent. 
 
 Thus the soldiers of the 3rd year, ^dth those of the 1st and 
 2nd years of the reserve are ux the best condition as regards 
 age and military instruction. 
 
 1st Year 'N Army with the 
 
 ~ " I Men. 
 
 4th 
 5th 
 
 Reserve 
 6th 
 
 7th 
 8th 
 9th 
 lOih 
 nth 
 12th 
 
 
 } Landwehr ... 330,000 
 Total ... 955,000 
 
 It may be easily seen fruni the foregoing pages that the 
 word disarmament can apply to Prussia in no exact sense, and 
 that of all Em-opean Powers Prussia alone, on account of her 
 institutions, is unable to disarm. K Prussia has to disarm, she 
 must alter her institutions, and no person thinks of asking her 
 to do so.* 
 
 * Vide Keport, 28tli February, 1870, entitled " Disarmament."— [Ed.]
 
 GO 
 
 Forces of the Southern States, and Replies to the 
 arth.lery committee. 
 
 Report 8th May, 1868. 
 
 I. Forces of the Southern States of Ger^iany. 
 
 The States of South Germany are bound by the treaties 
 conchided in 1866, to put, in case of war, according to circum- 
 stances, theii' mihtary forces at the disposal of the King of 
 Prussia. I gave in December of last year, as the strength of 
 these forces, figures which could only ])e taken as approximate, 
 because the various Southern States were then reorganizing 
 their armies. This reorganization is now complete, and the 
 exact force at their disposal can be stated. 
 
 The States of South Germany are in order of importance 
 — the Kingdom of Bavaria, the Kingdom of Wm'temburg, the 
 Grand Duchy of Baden, the Grand Duchy of Hesse (situated 
 south of the Main). Prussia has for more than a year exerted 
 all her influence, to induce them to adopt her organization, the 
 strength of her regiments, her arms, and even her uniform. 
 Baden has been more than willing to accept everythmg, and 
 her Government has gone so far as to receive a Prussian 
 General Officer, as War Minister. At this moment officers and 
 non-connnissioned officers of Prussian Landwehr, directed by 
 Colonel Bliicher, are employed in the Grand Duchy, organizing 
 the Landwehr, and teaching it its duties. Hesse is also modelled 
 on Prussia, the same strength of battalions, the same arms, 
 the same regulations, the same dress. Bavaria and Wurtem- 
 burg, the last in particular, have been less subservient, and 
 have refused to adopt the Prussian uniform. Bavaria has also 
 refused to adopt the Prussian rifle. 
 
 The following tables show the forces now at the disposal of 
 these States. I repeat that the strength of battahons, squad- 
 rons, &c., both on a peace and war footing, are the same as in 
 Prussia. 
 
 Bataeia. 
 
 16 Regiments of Infantry, each 3 Battalions • • 1 Ra Battalions 
 
 10 Battalions of Rifles . . . . . . . . J 
 
 10 Regiments of Cavalry, 5 Squadrons . . . . 50 Squadrons. 
 
 4 Regiments of Field Artillery, with 8 Batteries 1 go batteries 
 
 each . . . . . . . . . . • • J 
 
 20 Companies of Grarrison Artillery . . . . 20 Companies. 
 
 1 Regiment of Pioneers, 10 Companies . . . . 10 „ 
 
 These forces, except a slight excess in the number of rifle 
 battahons and squadrons of cavalry, are exactly equal to two 
 Prussian Army Corps.
 
 61 
 
 As for the Laiidwelir, they are now forming 30 battahons. 
 
 WUETEMBURa. 
 
 8 Regiments of Infantry, each 2 Battalions 
 
 3 Battalions of Rifles 
 
 4 Regiments of Cavaliy of 4 Squadrons 
 
 1 Regiment of Field Artillery, 9 Batteries 
 
 5 Companies of Grarrison Artillery 
 
 2 Companies of Pioneers . . 
 
 19 Battalions. 
 
 IG Squadrons. 
 9 Batteries. 
 5 Companies. 
 2 
 
 These troops are formed into an Army Corps, of which the 
 strength is rather less, than that of a Prussian Army Corps. 
 Ten battahons of Landwehr are now being organized. 
 
 Baden. 
 
 6 Regiments of Infantry, 3 Battalions 
 3 Regiments of Cavalry, 5 Squadrons 
 10 Field Batteries . . " . . 
 5 Companies of GaiTison Artilleiy 
 2 Companies of Pioneers , . 
 Landwehr . . 
 
 18 Battalions. 
 15 Squadrons. 
 10 Batteries. 
 
 5 Companies. 
 
 2 
 12 Battalions. 
 
 Hesse. 
 
 4 Regiments of Infantry, 2 Battalions 
 2 Battalions of Rifles 
 
 2 Regiments of Cavalry, 5 Squadrons 
 
 5 Field Batteries 
 
 1 Company of Pioneers . . 
 
 1 Division of Train 
 Landwehr , . 
 
 • 10 Battalions. 
 
 10 Squadi'ons. 
 5 Batteries. 
 1 Company. 
 1 Division. 
 4 Battalions. 
 
 The total military force of South Germany is, therefore, as 
 
 folloAvs : — 
 
 105 Battalions. 
 81 Squadrons. 
 
 56 Batteries of Field ^Vi-tillery, or 336 guns. 
 30 Companies of Garrison Artilleiy. 
 15 Companies of Pioneers. 
 
 This represents on a war footing about 128,000 men. 
 The following round numbers show pretty nearly the actual 
 force of each State : — 
 
 Bavaria 
 Wurtemburg 
 Baden 
 Hesse 
 
 70,800] 
 12,000j 
 
 It will be observed that Wurtemburg and ITesse are the 
 only States Avhich have mfantry regiments with two batta- 
 lions. It is wished at Berlin that they should adopt regiments 
 with three battalions, in conformity with the States of the 
 North German Confederation. The Hessian Infantry will be 
 shortly formed as follows : — 
 
 3 Regiments of Infantry, 3 Battalions 
 1 Battalion of Rifles 
 
 10 Battahons.
 
 62 
 
 As it is, the Hessian force forms, in accordance with a Con- 
 vention, the 25th Division of the Army, of the North German 
 Confederation ; and they flatter themselves here with the hope 
 that the day is not far off when this 25th Division, united to 
 the Baden force, now termed the 26th Division, will form the 
 I'dth German Army Corjjs. 
 
 II. Replies to the Artillery Commttee. 
 
 I now reply to the various questions addressed to me by 
 the Artillery Committee, in a note which was attached to the 
 Ministerial letter of the 11th March last. 
 
 1st, 2)1(1, and Zrd Questions. — Have any improvements in 
 the needle-gun been proposed i What are they '? AVhat is 
 the cost of the proposed alterations 1 
 
 Reply. — I cannot give a better answer to these questions 
 than by giving an account of my last interview with the King. 
 
 On the 25th April, after a parade at Potsdam, where I had 
 the honour to accompany the King, His Majesty asked me if it 
 was true that in France we were not quite satisfied with our rifle 
 (pattern of 1866), and that the newspapers contained various 
 articles on the subject, and even spoke of an order given to an 
 American firm for 100,000 Remmington rifles by the French 
 Government. I replied to the King, that I was left in entire 
 ignorance of everything connected with our new armament ; 
 but, having been present last year at the reviews at Chalons, I 
 believed I was justified in stating that our rifle, notwithstanding 
 certain defects, the greater number of which could be remedied, 
 was looked on as an excellent weapon. I added that it was 
 quite possible that more extended trials had revealed certain 
 defects hitherto unkno^vn. 
 
 " I look on your rifle," said the King, " as a capital arm, but 
 " in my opinion there is much room for improvement in the 
 " cartridge." 
 
 I then gave the King some details, and I asked his permis- 
 sion to speak to him again on this subject, after having 
 obtained some information on a subject that seemed to interest 
 His Majesty. 
 
 The 3rd May, the King havuig condescended to place me 
 by his side at breakfast, I took the opportunity of returning to 
 tliis subject, and, thanks to the information I had received, I 
 spoke with great frankness, and as nearly as possible in these 
 words : — 
 
 " Certain people have sought to depreciate the Chassepot 
 " rifle ; newspaper articles, written with interested motives, 
 " have spoken badly of it. But the rifle works perfectly. Its 
 " accuracy is very great, and it has an effective range of 1,000 
 " yards. The manufacture of the cartridge requues un- 
 " doubtedly care and time, and it must fit accurately. Some- 
 " times the india-rubber disc is cut by the needle in the needle- 
 " case. In cold weather the breech is occasionaUy not quite closed, 
 " but after a round or two, the india-rubber softens by tlie
 
 63 
 
 " heat. These defects, however, rarely show themselves, and 
 " viewed as a whole the French rifle is superior to the Prussian 
 " in the proportion of 10 to 7. The latter, on account of the 
 " imperfect closing of the breech, caimot be firod ^vith a lieavy 
 " charge. For a military rifle at the present day, there are two 
 " mdispensable conditions : — 1st, To load quickly and without 
 " trouble, which gives the soldier great confidence in action ; 
 " 2nd, that the bullet should have a high velocity, or in other 
 " words a flat trajectory." 
 
 " That is very true," replied the King, " and in those 
 " respects our rifle is far from being perfect. We seek some 
 " altei-ation which will give us a higher initial velocity, and, if 
 " possible, a more rapid means of loading. Several have been 
 " proposed, but as yet I have been unable to decide on any. It 
 *' is no light matter to alter a million rifles, especiaUy if the 
 " proposed alteration does not ofl'er advantages commensurate 
 " with the cost." 
 
 This statement of the King, who was certainly as open 
 with me, as I had been with him, leaves no doubt as to the 
 state of the question. In other words, no alteration of the 
 Prussian rifle has been as yet determined on. 
 
 The efforts made to arrive at a method of improving the 
 needle-gun date from the adoption by France of the rifle of 
 1866 ; and they are unceasingly prosecuted. So much do they 
 occupy themselves with the superiority of the armament of 
 our infantry. It would not be interesting to state the various 
 alterations proposed, since none of them have been adopted. 
 They tend, as the King said, to afford above all a greater 
 range, and a flatter trajectory. 
 
 They desire also to lighten the weapon and make the 
 loading more rapid. With reference to this last condition, I 
 would here give some details, which show how justly they 
 appreciate in Prussia the peculiar advantages a breech-loadmg 
 weapon gives. 
 
 In August 1866, having, when in Bohemia, sought to 
 determme the effects that might justly be attributed to the 
 needle-gun, I arrived at the conclusion that rapidity of fire 
 had given the Prussians comparatively but a slight advantage. 
 I had on the contrary clearly seen that the true advantage, lay in 
 the coolness and self-possession, that men, armed with a rifle 
 which can be rapidly loaded, preserve in action. 
 
 " This coolness and self-possession," I then wrote, " was so 
 " great that the Prussian mfantry, composed of young men 
 " who had never made war, fii-ed \vith the tranquility and pre- 
 " cision of veteran troops." I was speaking the other day on 
 this subject with General Kessel, who, as Colonel, commanded 
 during the campaign the regiment of Fnot Guards. He is 
 one of those well-informed, thoughtful, and painstaking officers, 
 so many of whom are to be found in the Prussian Army. His 
 regiment covered itself with glory. He agreed with me that 
 the advantage that the Prussian infantry possessed in the war 
 
 ?
 
 64 
 
 of 18Gfi was not due exactly to rapidity of fire, but rather 
 to the confidence the men, had in their weapons. " Our 
 " soldiers," he said, to me, " had rarely recourse to a rapid 
 " fire, and the proof of this is, the small average number of 
 " rounds expended per man duiing the campaign ; but for 
 " many years we have lost no opportunity of convincing the 
 " men that they carried a weapon superior to that of all other 
 " European armies ; and the paiiis we took with rifle practice 
 " only strengthened this conviction. This confidence was 
 " increased, and strengthened after the first actions, when they 
 *' found the security afforded by an arm which loads rapidly. 
 " People speak," added tlie General, " continually of o^ap'd fire, 
 " the expression is not correct, and gives a false notion, they 
 " should rather say rapid loading. For the true advantage 
 " of breech-loading arms, is they are easier to load, and can be 
 " loaded more rapidly than others." 
 
 General Kessel gave me the following curious details on 
 this subject. 
 
 The 29tli June, 1866, at the attack on Koniginhof, his rifle 
 battalion had a sharp engagement with the enemy ; after the 
 action, which took place in fields covered with high corn, 
 Colonel Kessel went over the ground ; Avhat was his astonish- 
 ment to find five or six Austrian bodies for every Prussian. 
 The Austrian killed had almost all been hit in the head, the 
 wounds being frightful. However, his men, far from firing fast, 
 had hardly fired as many rounds as the enemy. Colonel Kessel 
 received from the Austrian officers who were made jirisoners 
 an explanation which fully accounted for this, the same even- 
 ing. •' Our soldiers are demoralized," said they to him, " not 
 " by the rapidity of your fire, fur we could find some means 
 " perhaps to counterbalance that, but because you are always 
 " ready to fii-e. This morning your men, \^ke ours, were 
 " concealed in the corn ; but in that position yom^s could, witli- 
 " out being seen, load their rifles easily and rapidly ; ours, on 
 " the other hand, were compelled to stand up and show them- 
 " selves when they loaded, and you then took the opportmiity to 
 " fii-e on them. Thus we had the greatest difficulty in getting 
 " om' men to stand up at all ; and such "was their terror, when 
 " they did stand up to load, that their hands trembled and 
 " they could hardly put the cartridge into the ban-el. Our 
 " men feel the advantage that the quick and easy loading of 
 " the needle-gun gives you ; it is this which demoralizes them. 
 " In action they feel themselves disarmed the greater part of 
 " the time, whereas you, are always ready to fire." 
 
 The above facts show clearly the kind of influence to be 
 justly attributed to the needle-gun in the action of 1866. 
 
 Easy and rapid loading forms, at the present day the 
 essential condition of warlike arms, and this is as true of 
 artillery as it is of small-arms. 
 
 ^th Question. — Ts it true that Prussia intends to give 
 explosive bullets as a j)ortion of the infantry soldier's 
 
 I
 
 65 
 
 equipment, and that she purposes to use them in war to fire on 
 troops ] 
 
 Rephj. — There is no idea of using explosive bullets to fire 
 on troops ; they only use them to fire on ammunition wagons, 
 \vith the object of blowing- them up. The best proof of this 
 is that they do not diill the soldiers in filing such bullets. 1 
 am assm-ed that this year the drill will be the same as in 
 previous years, five cartridges with explosive bullets are given 
 per battalion per officer of all ranks, but the non-commissioned 
 officers and men do not receive any. At the autumn drills each 
 officer fires his five bullets, at a distance of 200 yards, at 
 ammmiition wagons filled with paper coated ^vith inflammable 
 composition. 
 
 I would add that it may be asked in vain, what advantage 
 would Prussia obtain by firing explosive bullets at troops ? 
 
 This nation, endowed with so many sound and most esti- 
 mable qualities, is wanting in all generous or delicate feelings, 
 and it would not hesitate for a moment to use anything, no 
 matter what, no matter how it might be opposed to public 
 opinion ; but at the same time it is not so foolish as to do so, 
 if it were not to obtain some compensating advantage. An 
 officer of rank said recently to me on this subject : — " In the 
 " Crimean War you confined yourselves to bombarding Odessa 
 " very feebly. You should have reduced it to ashes, for it was 
 " at Odessa that the Russian divisions, were formed which all 
 " but flung you into the sea the day of the battle of Inker- 
 " man." 
 
 bth Question. — 'What is the "shell rifle" that the. newspapers 
 have been speaking of for some time ? 
 
 Reply. — 1 have described in one of my reports of the month 
 of December last this rifle, improperly termed a " shell rifle." 
 It is only a wall piece, called here Wallbiichse. The Prussians 
 used this weapon duiing the Schleswig war in 18G4. The 
 bullet is made to burst. The weapon is mounted on a very 
 light carriage, which allows it to be moved easily from place 
 to place. It is fired when the carnage is placed on a support 
 such as a tree or a wall, the man filing from the shoulder by 
 means of a hollow cut in the butt. It Avas proposed last year 
 to improve this weapon, and issue some to each company of 
 infantry. 
 
 6iA Question. — Have all the Cavalry breech-loading arms; 
 what method is adopted I 
 
 Reply. — All the Cavalry of the Federal Army are suj^plied 
 with breech-loading carbines on the same plan as the infantry 
 rifles. In the war of 18(36, the Prussian cavalry was supplied 
 ■with these carbmes ; and they have since been issued to the 
 cavalry of the new Army Corps. The pistol is not a breech- 
 loader, but a pattern of a needle-pistol has been proposed ; 
 they have also recently proposed to adopt a revolver m place 
 of the pistol, but nothing is as yet decided.
 
 66 
 
 The Quantity of Arbiunition required by an Army, and 
 Postal ARRANGEivtENTS during the War of 1866. 
 
 Report of the 2Sth May, 1868. 
 
 I. Is it Requisite to Alter the Quantity of Alimunition 
 Carried by an Army. 
 
 The great alterations which the arms used by all the 
 Powers of Europe have undergone, cannot but exercise a very- 
 marked influence over tactics, and the question at once arises, 
 is it requisite to alter the quantity of ammunition an army 
 carries with it in the field 1 
 
 At the first glance one is incHned to answer this question 
 in the affirmative. For if we grant that the quantity of am- 
 munition hitherto carried by an army was sufficient, it would 
 appear that it can no longer be so, if, m consequence of the 
 improvement in weapons, tactics undergo any very great 
 change. 
 
 This general problem appears to me to be of the greatest 
 importance, and should be solved before France is again 
 involved in war. In Prussia, where everything is studied so 
 carefully, tliis question has been discussed for some time. I 
 gather from a perusal of the numerous mihtary tracts published 
 in Germany, and from conversation with the most intelligent 
 officers, that there are two distinct opmions on the subject, or 
 rather an inclmation in two opposite directions, one to diminish, 
 the other to increase, the quantity of ammiuiition. 
 
 The former say, " The improvements in small-arms, the care 
 " bestowed on rifle drill, the great attention given to officers, 
 " non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, must have the effect 
 " of reducing the quantity of ammunition consumed in battles. 
 " We are no longer in 1812, when at the Moskowa the French 
 " army fired 1,400,000 rounds. In 18G6, the Prussian infantry 
 " did not fire on an average seven rounds per man, and it is 
 " probable that this quantity would not have been exceeded if 
 " the Austrians had been armed with breech-loaders ; it is 
 " desnable, therefore, to make armies more mobile by reducing 
 " the amount of materiel they cany." 
 
 Those who hold the opposite opinion say that it is quite im- 
 possible to foretell what, so far as the expenditure of ammuni- 
 tion will be, the result of the employment of breech-loadmg 
 arms, in a war between two armies, both provided with those 
 weapons. They think that as there is a doubt about the 
 matter, prudence requires tliat the quantity of ammunition, 
 should not be reduced, and they incline rather to increase it. 
 
 The views of the latter party appear to have prevailed, for 
 the foUowing alterations, have been made in the quantity of 
 ammiinition carried by the Army Corps of the North German 
 Confederation.
 
 67 
 
 During the war of 180(3, each Prussian infantry scjldier liacl 
 GO rounds (20 in each of the two pouches he carried, and 20 in 
 his knapsack), in addition to 3(5 paper cases, and 30 sabots 
 made of pasteboard in the knapsack.* 
 
 Since that date, moved thereto by the fact that the French 
 soldier carries more than 60 rounds, it has been directed for 
 the future, that tlie German soklier shouUl carry 20 more rounds, 
 that is to say, 80 in all ; but he no longer carries the cases or 
 pasteboard sabots. 
 
 Each battahon has, as is known, an ammunition wagon, 
 that follows it, on the line of march, and wliich should remain 
 close to it in action. In 18(j(i, this wagon cantained, according 
 to the pattern used, 20,000 or 17,000 rounds, or about 20 rounds 
 per man ; experience has shown that this wagon is too heavy, 
 and it wiU for the future be lightened by removing from it 3^ 
 rounds per man. The number of rounds carried by the reserve 
 artillery, has also undergone an alteration, but, before pointing 
 it out, I beg to refer to the description given in my Report of 
 the 29th March last, on the composition of this reserve. 
 
 The difference between the composition of a French and 
 ■ Prussian battery on a war footing is well known. The first 
 marches with, its own reserve, while the second carries with it 
 only 16 carriages (6 guns, 6 ammmiition wagons, 2 store wagons, 
 1 baggage wagon, and 1 forge), and leaves the other Avagons 
 with the reserve artillery of the Army Corps. The whole of 
 these wagons, for all the batteries of the Anny Corps are 
 formed into nine ammunition columns, including the ammuni- 
 tion wagons of the artillery, the small-arm annnuiiition wagons, 
 the spare carriages, the battery wagons, and the forge wagons, 
 maldiig altogether 22S carriages or 25 to 26 carriages per 
 column. The reserve artillery of a Prussian Anny Corps is 
 thus composed of these nine ammunition columns, added to 
 six reserve batteries (viz., foiu' field and two horse 
 batteries). 
 
 Until last year each of these nine columns Avas composed 
 partly of gun ammunition wagons, and partly of small-arm 
 ammmiition wagons, but it is now thought preferable to divide 
 these two kinds of ammunition, and in place of nine mixed 
 columns, they now have five columns of gun ammunition and 
 four colmnns of small-arm ammunition.! The small-arm am- 
 miuiition columns vnW for the future carry a duninished 
 number of romids (11 ^ rounds per man less), or in other words 
 they will carry 71^ rounds per man in place of 83. Let us now 
 compare the number of rounds carried at present, and in 18()(i. 
 
 * Tliese cases and sabots are given to the soldier, avIio, if requisite, can make 
 cartridges himself. Tha Prussian cartridges, which are very inijierfect, oflVr, on 
 account of their simplicity, one advantage, tlio soldier can himself make them. 
 
 t It should beremarkedthat in the three new Prussian Corps (9th, 10th, lUh), this 
 proportion is reversed (their being 4 gun ammunition columns and 5 small-arm 
 ammunition columns). The reason of tliis is. these corps are supi)lied with carriages 
 taken from the enemy.
 
 68 
 
 In 1866, for each Infantry soldier, there were : — 
 
 Eounds. 
 Carried by tlie man . . . . . . . . 60 
 
 In the Battalion Ammunition Wagon . . 20 
 
 With the Ammunition Column , . . . 83 
 
 Total 163 
 
 At present, for each Infantry soldier, there is : — 
 
 Rounds. 
 
 Carried by the Man 80 
 
 In the Battalion Ammunition Wagon . . IGi 
 
 With the Ammunition Column . . . . 714 
 
 Total 168 
 
 The general character of these changes are, an increase of 
 the number of rounds carried by the soldier, a diminution of 
 the number of rounds carried by the battalion ammunition 
 wagon, and the ammunition column, and an augmentation of the 
 total mimber of rounds 2^ er man by 5. 
 
 As for the Cavalry ammunition, the number of rounds carried 
 by each man has not been altered, but the number carried in 
 the wagons, of the ammunition columns have been much re- 
 duced. This decrease amounts to 14 rounds per man. Con- 
 sequently, at present, these ammunition columns convey : — 
 
 Hounds. 
 For each man of the Light Cavalry . . . . 21 
 
 For each man of the Heavy Cavalry . . . . 60 
 
 This decrease is a very wise measure, and we might copy 
 it with advantage. 
 
 I come now to the changes in the quantity of gun annnuni- 
 tion. The number of rounds carried by the battery is unaltered, 
 being : — 
 
 156 Rounds per gun in 4-pr. Batteries. 
 120 Rounds per gun in 6-pr. Batteries. 
 
 But the change made in the composition, of the ammunition 
 columns just described, has led to an increase in the number of 
 rounds, both for the 4 and 6-pounder guns. 
 
 A-pounders. — The ammunition column includes 45 wagons, 
 carrying 4-pr. ammunition, and 12 spare 4-pr. carriages. These 
 carriages carry now for the 9 4-pr. batteries of the Army 
 Corps, 112 rounds jyer gun. 
 
 h-pounders. — There are in the ammunition columns 40 ammu- 
 nition wagons, and 6 to 8 spare 6-pr. carriages for the 6 6-pr. 
 batteries of the Corps d'Armee. This supply gives 109 rounds 
 per gun. If we compare the number of romids carried now, 
 and in 1866, we find the following increase : — 
 
 Rounds. 
 An increase for each 4-pr. of . . , . . . 42 
 
 An increase for each 6-pr. of , . , . . . 11
 
 69 
 
 If to this incioased number we add the number carried Ijy 
 the battery itself, which has not been altered, we get — 
 
 Rounds. 
 For eac'i 4-pr. (instead of 226 Rounds) . . 268 
 For each 6-pr. (instead of 218 Rounds) . , 229 
 
 When a Prussian Army has, in addition, a general artillery 
 reserve, it carries 100 rounds per gun. 
 
 To reca23itulate, the following alterations have been 
 made : — 
 
 The number of rounds, for the infantry and artillery has 
 been increased. The number of rounds, for the cavalry has 
 been reduced. 
 
 II. — Postal Service of the Prussian Army during the 
 War of 1866. 
 
 Having considered, that it would be interesting to know 
 the post office organization of the Prussian Army during the 
 war of 1866. The follo^ving report, lias been compiled from the 
 information, furnished to me by the functionaries, who were 
 employed on this duty. 
 
 To each Army Corps there was attached a central adminis- 
 tration composed of (I use the German names) : 1 postmaster, 5 
 secretaries, 2 sub-employes, 12 postilions, and 10 train soldiers. 
 
 This administration has under its orders, 3 branch offices, 
 one Tvith each division of uifantry, the third "with the reserve 
 artillery, each composed of 2 employes, 2 sub-employes, 3 
 postilions, and 3 train soldiers. 
 
 At the head-quarters of each army (1st, Prince Frederick 
 Charles, and the 2nd, Crown Prince) a staff of 2 employes, 2 sub- 
 employes, 3 postilions, and 3 train soldiers, were employed. 
 
 At the Royal Head-Quarters a special staff carried out the 
 duties, composed of 1 chief postmaster, 3 employes, 2 sul>- 
 employes, 12 postihons, and 9 train soldiers. Special post 
 offices were also established with each cavalry corps of the 
 1st army, and with each detached corps in Saxony and Silesia. 
 
 As it was known beforehand, that the nimiber of articles 
 (letters, money, &c.) sent from the interior of Prussia to the 
 army Avould be very great, the general post office in l>L'rlin 
 formed two distinct Imes of post offices. One was established 
 along the Bohemian frontier, and was intended to receive 
 military documents, private letters, and newspapers, addressed 
 to officers and employes ranking as such. 
 
 The second hue of post offices was placed a little behind the 
 frontier. To these all letters for non-commissioned officers, and 
 soldiers, and all letters containing money were sent. The post 
 offices in the interior of the monarchy, after sorting the letters, 
 Bent them to one, or other, of these two lines, from which 
 they were forwarded to the army. 
 
 As regarded the actual postal service of the army, a method 
 which had given much satisfaction in the Schleswig-Holstehi 
 war was adopted.
 
 70 
 
 This consisted in forming numerous branch post offices, 
 intended for the correspondence of the troops detached from 
 the mass of the army, and especially at the hospitals formed on 
 the lines of conmiunication. The despatch of the letters was 
 not altogether successful, especially during the first part of the 
 campaign, and the frequent delays gave rise to many com- 
 plaints. These delays might, perhaps have been avoided by 
 sending the letters and packets direct to the hospitals and 
 detachments. But they were sent to the army post offices, 
 which sent them back to the branch offices. This was however 
 necessary, in order that the secret of the military operations, 
 might be preserved, which would have been divulged if the 
 position of the troops, had been known to too many people. 
 In the opposite direction, that is to say, from the theatre of 
 war towards Prussia, the post office transactions were very 
 great. At the single post office of Gorlitz, 20 employes were 
 at work day and night. 
 
 It was only by the re-establishment of the railways, particu- 
 larly that from Dresden to Brunn, md Prague and Pardubitz, 
 that it became possible to suppress a certain number of the 
 post offices, and to use travelhng post offices on the railways, in 
 "wliicli a portion of the labour of sorting letters was performed. 
 
 During the first period of the operations, the post office 
 authorities had to contend agamst great obstacles, to main- 
 tain a regular postal communication between Prussia and the 
 army, for Bohemia had no kind of transport, the country bemg 
 hilly, and the roads bad. 
 
 A great number of horses, and post office carts, had to be 
 brought from Prussia, and were established in relays along the 
 great imperial road leading from Gorlitz, via Wilfersdorf on 
 Vienna. This was the chief Ime of postal communication. 
 Other lines Avere formed from Landshut to Horitz, via Trautenau, 
 from Tornau to Prague, from Koliii to Iglau, and from Brunn to 
 Znaim. The rapid advance of the Prussian armies added to 
 the difficulties. It happened more than once that the employes 
 in the moving post offices, only reached the places where the 
 branch post offices were, after the latter had left for another 
 place, or that the troops omitted to take the letters addi'essed 
 to them. This inconvenience was to a certain extent met by 
 organizing a service of postilions, whose duty it was to over- 
 take the troops, and bring them, their letters. The following 
 facts will give an idea of the amount of labour tkro'wn on the 
 post office authorities. The office at Gorlitz which forwarded 
 the letters and despatches addi'essed to the King, had for this 
 duty one delivery daily. Private letters, letters "\vitli money, 
 and newspapers arrived there in such quantities that to send 
 them regularly to the army, required two or three carriages 
 daily. After the battle of Koniggratz, the post office had to 
 pay in one day to the 9th Division of the 5th Corps d'Armee 
 4.800/., sent to the men by their families in Prussia. 
 
 In principle, the post office undertook to send forward on!}"
 
 71 
 
 official and private letters, and newspapers. It agreed, how- 
 ever, to undertake the delivery of parcels, and it organized 
 special offices for the purpose. 
 
 Military Force of the North German Confederation. 
 
 Report of the '2Uh June, 18G8. 
 
 The North German Confederation makes rapid strides in the 
 organization of its military forces. 
 
 Prussia has laboured for two years, unceasingly to improve 
 and complete, even to the smallest detail, the three new army 
 corps formed in the three provinces, that she amiexed m 186(3, 
 and has given to them, as well as to the Saxon contingent, 
 Prussian consistency. 
 
 It is useful to report from time to time, how this work 
 proceeds. 
 
 The writings published m Germany upon the state and 
 composition of the military forces of the North German Con- 
 federation are not remarkable for then* clearness. And of these 
 the Austrian publication " Streffleur " (February number) gives 
 the most erroneous account. 
 
 The following tabular view of the miHtary forces of the 
 North German Confederation, sliOT\ang then- composition and 
 distribution, in June 1868, will, I think, be found clear and 
 correct. 
 
 The States composing the Confederation are — 
 
 
 
 Population 
 
 I. 
 
 Prussia . . 
 
 21,061,210 
 
 II. 
 
 The Kingdom of Saxony 
 
 2,420,795 
 
 III. 
 
 Hesse (North) 
 
 257,273 
 
 IV. 
 
 Mecklenburg-Schvreriu 
 
 500,578 
 
 V. 
 
 Saxe-AVeimar . . 
 
 282,856 
 
 VI. 
 
 Mecklenburg-Strelitz . . 
 
 98,698 
 
 VII. 
 
 Oldenburg 
 
 316,960 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Brunswicii 
 
 304-,039 
 
 IX. 
 
 Saxe-Meiningen. . 
 
 180,193 
 
 X. 
 
 Saxe-Akenburg . . 
 
 141,050 
 
 XI. 
 
 Saxe-Cobiu'g Gotha 
 
 168,290 
 
 XII. 
 
 Anhalt , . 
 
 196,858 
 
 XIII. 
 
 Schwarzbourg-Rudolstadt 
 
 75,132 
 
 XIV. 
 
 Scliwarzbourg-Soiidersbausen . 
 
 67,542 
 
 XV. 
 
 Waldeck 
 
 57,050 
 
 XVI. 
 
 Reuss (elder branch) . . 
 
 44,172 
 
 XVII. 
 
 Reuss (younger branch) 
 
 89,974 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 Schaumbourg-Lippe 
 
 31,168 
 
 XIX. 
 
 Lippe 
 
 112,599 
 
 XX. 
 
 Lubeck . . 
 
 48,439 
 
 XXI. 
 
 Breme 
 
 108,792 
 
 XXII. 
 
 Hambourg 
 
 302,599 
 
 
 Grand Total 
 
 29,974,779 
 
 The military forces ^of the N(>rth German Confederation, 
 comprise the whole mihtary force, of these States.
 
 72 
 
 None of them, except Prussia, and Saxony, has a sufficient 
 population to form an Army Corps. 
 
 Prussia, taking advantage of this chcumstance, has induced 
 all, except Saxony, to allow theh forces to be enrolled, as an 
 integral part of her Army Corps, of which there are 11 m 
 addition to the Guard. 
 
 For example, the troops of the Duchy of Anhalt and those 
 of the Thm-ingian States form portions of the 4th and 5th 
 Army Corps; those of the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg form 
 part of the 9th Corps ; those of Oldenburg and Brunswick are 
 swallowed up in the 10th Corps, &c., &g. 
 
 Alone of all the States, of tlie Confederation, the Kingdom 
 of Saxony has formed its troops mto an Army Corps, termed 
 the 12th. 
 
 To these 12 Army Corps, and the Guard forming the 
 Federal Army, the contingent of Hesse must be added, which 
 has by a special arrangement placed all its troops, both those 
 of the portion south as well as north of the Main, at the chs- 
 posal of the North German Confederation, under the denomi- 
 nation of the 25th Division. 
 
 It may therefore be said that the King of Prussia has at 
 his disposal mihtary forces, forming three distinct and very 
 unequal portions. 
 
 1st. Those of Prussia and the other States (Saxony ex- 
 cepted) formed in ll Army Corps and the Guard, and forming 
 the real Prussian Army. 
 
 2nd. Those of Saxony formmg the 12th Army Corps. 
 
 3rd. Those of Hesse, under the denomination of the 25tli 
 Division. 
 
 Before giving the detail of the actual strength, I will re- 
 capitulate several leading points. 
 
 General Synopsis. 
 
 Population of the North German Confederation, 29,974,770. 
 
 Proportion of the mihtary force to the population : — 
 
 1st. Strength according to the estimates y^-g-, not countmg 
 officers ; -^ if officers be included. 
 
 2nd. Strength of the army on a war footing, 3L. 
 
 Number of young men reacliing the age of 20 each year, 
 from 300,000 to 330,000. 
 
 Annual contingent on an average, about 93,000. 
 This contingent is ^^ of the popidation. 
 Duration of military service, 12 years ; namely : — 
 
 Three years with the colours (from 20 to 23 years of 
 age). 
 
 Four years m the reserve. 
 
 Five years m the Landwehr. 
 From 17 to 42 years in the Landstrum. 
 
 I need not agam describe the principles, on Av]iich the
 
 73 
 
 military forces of North Germany are organized. Tlie Con- 
 federation is divided into 12 great cii'cles (1 last year furnished 
 a tabular account of them), each of these circles, recruits, 
 organizes, and gives its name to one complete Army Corps. 
 By Army Corps is understood in Prussia, the enthe mass of the 
 military forces furnished by the cucle, including the troops 
 belonging to the Regular Army, the lieserve, and Landwehr ; that 
 is to say, if requisite of all the men m the circle, aged from 
 20 to 32 years, who have served, or are sei-ving. Thus, the 
 Prussians say, with a certam amount of pride, that their Army 
 Corps are composed of 70,000 men. 
 
 Each of these great Army Corps districts, is divided mto 
 four brigade districts, wliich correspond -sA-ith the four Army 
 Corps brigades. Each brigade district is di\dded mto Land- 
 welu- battahon districts. The Landwehr battahon district is the 
 true centre, both for recruiting and organization, and embraces, 
 as already reported, a permanent depot. 
 
 I pomted out in my report of December 1867 the new 
 division of the territory of the Confederation into Landwehr 
 battahon districts, and I now recapitulate the basis on which 
 these have been fixed : — 
 
 1st. Each regiment of Infantry of the Lme of three battahons, 
 corresponds with a regiment of Landwehr composed of two 
 battahons, which bears the same number, and the same pro- 
 vincial name as the regular regiment. 
 
 2nd. Each regiment of rities of the Regular Army, corres- 
 ponds vnth. one battahon of infantry of Landwehr reserve 
 bearing the same number. 
 
 3rd. The di\dsion of the Landwehr into first and second 
 classes no longer exists. The men belong to the Landwehr until 
 they are 32 years of age. 
 
 Two Landwehr battalion districts furnish the men for one 
 regiment of itifontry of the Line of three battahons, and of 
 one regiment of Landwehr of two battalions. 
 
 I append table A, which gives for each Army Corps the 
 number of mfantry regiments, both Lme and Landwehr ; also the 
 cavahy and artillery regiments, formmg a portion of it. I 
 continue to observe the distuiction of the three groups, which 
 I have pre\dously pomted out, viz., the Prussian Army proper, 
 the Saxon Army, and the Hessian division.
 
 74 
 
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 75 
 
 This table gives the exact coraposition of each Army 
 Corps. It shows that the territory of the Confederation, 
 including Hesse, on the left bank of the Main, is divided mto 
 200 Landwehr battalion districts and 12 Landwelu* reserve 
 b&ttahon districts {vide report dated 2nd December, 1867), 
 Prussia proper and the other States, not including Saxony, are 
 divided into 170 such districts, Avliich, taken two and two, 
 furnish 84 regiments of infantry of the Lme of three battalions, 
 and 85 regiments of Landwehr of two battalions. These States 
 have also 11 Landwehr reserve battalion districts, corresponding 
 with the 11 regiments of rifles. 
 
 I. Tiffi Peace Strength (or that borne on the estimates) 
 OF THE Federal Army. 
 
 Article 60 of the Federal Constitution has fixed, until 31st 
 December, 1871, the strength of the army on a peace footing at 
 1 per cent, of the population of 1867, officers not mcludecl, and 
 as the population in 1867, amounted to 29,900,000, it follows 
 that the strength of the army (officers not mcluded) should be 
 299,000 men. If to this the number of officers (12,985), pay- 
 masters, veterinary sm-geons, armourers, and saddlers, be added 
 the number is raised to 313,583, which is the actual number 
 borne on the estimates. 
 
 I append to this report an extract from the army estimates 
 of 1869. It will be seen that the strength of the Federal army 
 is m accordance with the number fixed by the Constitution. No 
 notice is taken of the reduction of 12,000 men, made in ]\Iay 
 last, because the estimates were printed prior to that date. 
 This reduction being only provisional. 
 
 I have drawn up table B with the greatest care ; it shows 
 the strength fixed, throughout the whole Confederation, for 
 battaHons, squadrons, batteries, and regiments of the different 
 arms. 
 
 I mclude the musicians, as is done in Prussia, amongst the 
 combatants. 
 
 The columns headed non-combatants include surgeons, 
 veterinary surgeons, armourers, Avorkmen, hospital orderlies, 
 and soldiers of the train.
 
 76 
 
 Table B. — Strength on a Peace Footing. 
 
 COBFS. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Soldiers. 
 
 Non- 
 Combatants, 
 
 Ilorses. 
 
 1 Battalion of the five old Regiments of Foot 
 Guards (o) 
 
 1 of the five old Regiments of Foot Guards ('/) .. 
 
 I Battalion of the four other Regiments of In- 
 fantry of the Guard and of all the Regiments 
 of the Line ... 
 
 1 of these Regiments 
 
 1 Battalion of Rifles 
 
 1 Squadron of Cavali-y 
 
 1 Regiment of Cavalry (c) 
 
 1 Battery Horse Artillery 
 
 1 Battery Field Artillery, 4-pounders 
 
 1 Battery Held Artillery, 6-pounders 
 
 I Regiment Field Artillery 
 
 1 Company of Garrison Artillery 
 
 1 Regiment of Garrison Artillery , 
 
 1 Battalion of Pioneers 
 
 1 Battalion of Train 
 
 57 
 
 22 
 
 5 
 
 28 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 84 
 
 4 
 
 45 
 
 18 
 
 12 
 
 6C2 
 2,035 
 
 514 
 
 1,553 
 514 
 137 
 679 
 90 
 109 
 109 
 
 1,581 
 
 99 
 
 835 
 
 483 
 
 72 
 
 24 
 
 5 
 
 42 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 80 
 
 1 
 
 41 
 
 24 
 
 230 
 
 1.39 
 744 
 72 
 40 
 40 
 734 
 
 7 
 123 
 
 I. Peussian Army (11 Corps and the Guard). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 Regiments of Foot Guards 
 
 96 Regiments of Infantry of the Line 
 
 14 BatUlions of Rifles 
 
 573 
 
 5,472 
 308 
 
 16,425 
 
 149,088 
 
 7,196 
 
 708 
 
 6,912 
 
 336 
 
 252 
 
 2,688 
 98 
 
 Total for the Infantry 
 
 6,353 
 
 172,709 
 
 7,956 
 
 3,038 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 Regiments of Cavalry of the Guard 
 
 60 Regiments of Cavalry of the Line 
 
 230 
 1,680 
 
 5,501 
 41,220 
 
 336 
 2,520 
 
 6,000 
 45,000 
 
 Total for the Cavalry 
 
 1,910 
 
 46,721 
 
 2,856 
 
 51,000 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 Regiments of Field Artillery 
 
 9 Regiments and 3 Divisions of Garrison Artillery 
 
 1,008 
 460 
 
 18,972 
 8,706 
 
 984 
 384 
 
 8,808 
 247 
 
 Total for the Artillery 
 
 1,468 
 
 27,678 
 
 1,368 
 
 9,055 
 
 Total for the Pioneers (12 Battalions) ... 
 
 216 
 
 5,796 
 
 288 
 
 84 
 
 Total for the Train (12 Battalions) 
 
 144 
 
 
 2,760 
 
 1,476 
 
 Grand Total for the Prussian Army 
 Proper (rf) 
 
 \ 10,091 
 
 252,904 
 
 15,228 
 
 64,653 
 
 11. Saxon Akmt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Grand Total for the Saxon Army (12th 
 Corps) 
 
 } 886 
 
 22,026 
 
 1,326 
 
 5,534 
 
 III. Hessian Division. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Grand Total for the Hessian or 25th 
 Division 
 
 1 276 
 
 7,141 
 
 448 
 
 1,853 
 
 Total for the whole Confederation 
 
 11,253 
 
 282,071 
 
 17,002 
 
 72,040 
 
 (<j) Tlie five old regiments of Foot Guards are : the 1st Regiment, the 2nd Regiment, the 1st Regi- 
 ment of Grenadiers, Emperor Alexander, tlie 2nd Regiment of Grenadiers, Emperor Francis, and tlie 
 Rifle Regiment. These are stronger than the four other regiments of the Guard, (b) The 1st Regiment 
 of Foot Guards has one Captain more on its Staff than ttu; others, (c) The Regiment of Life Guards 
 has 34 oflicers, 6ii2 combatants, and 42 non-combatants, (d) It will be observed that these numbers 
 are less than those given in the estimates, the cause of this is that they do not include the Staff and the 
 various Military Establishments, &c.
 
 77 
 
 Table 0. — Strength on a War Footing. 
 
 COKPS. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Sol, 
 
 iers. 
 
 Horses. 
 
 Carriages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Com- 
 
 Xon-Com- 
 
 
 
 
 
 batants. 
 
 1,002 
 
 batants. 
 
 
 
 1 Pattalion of Infantry of the Guard or Line 
 
 90 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 1 of the five old Refriments of Infantry of the 
 
 I 69 
 
 ?,055 
 
 90 
 
 
 
 Guard, and the 4th Grenadier Regiment ... 
 
 121 
 
 16 
 
 1 of the 99 otlier Iiilantry Regiments («) 
 
 69 
 
 3,017 
 
 90 
 
 121 
 
 16(6) 
 
 1 Battalion of Rifles 
 
 22 
 
 1,002 
 
 31 
 
 40 
 
 10 
 
 1 Squadron of Cavalry 
 
 5 
 
 150 
 
 8 
 
 152 
 
 
 1 Regiment of Cavalry (f) 
 
 28 
 
 7.52 
 
 60 
 
 880 
 
 8 
 
 1 Battery Horse Artillery (4-pounders)* 
 
 4 
 
 143 
 
 7 
 
 207 
 
 15 (J) 
 
 1 Field Battery (4-pounders) ... 
 
 4 
 
 139 
 
 6 
 
 124 
 
 16(e) 
 
 1 Field Battery (6-pounders) 
 
 4 
 
 145 
 
 6 
 
 126 
 
 16(/) 
 
 1 Regiment of Field Artillery 
 
 69 
 
 2,051 
 
 174 
 
 1,937 
 
 237 (g) 
 
 1 Company of Garri:!on Artillerv 
 
 4 
 
 203 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 J Regiment of Garrison Artillery 
 
 42 
 
 1,633 
 
 99 
 
 12 
 
 
 1 'iattalion of Pioneers 
 
 18 
 
 602 
 
 51 
 
 44 
 
 14 
 
 I Battalion of Train 
 
 25 
 
 
 1,532 
 
 1,330 
 
 231 
 
 I. PKnssiAN Abmy (11 Corps and the Guard). 
 
 Infantr]!/. 
 
 9 Regiments of Foot Guards 
 
 96 Regiments of Infantry of the Line 
 
 14 Battalions of Rifles 
 
 622 
 
 6,624 
 
 308 
 
 27,381 
 
 289,632 
 
 14,028 
 
 808 
 
 8,640 
 
 434 
 
 1,089 
 
 11.016 
 
 560 
 
 1,50 
 
 1,602 
 
 140 
 
 Total, Infantry 
 
 7,554 
 
 331,041 
 
 9,882 
 
 13,265 
 
 1,892 
 
 Cai-alri/. 
 
 8 Regiments of Cavalry of the Guard 
 60 Regiments of Cavalry of the Line 
 
 231 
 1,680 
 
 6,027 
 45,120 
 
 487 
 3,600 
 
 7,040 
 .52,800 
 
 64 
 480 
 
 Total, Cavalry 
 
 1,911 
 
 51,147 
 
 4,087 
 
 59.840 
 
 544 
 
 Artilln-t/. 
 
 12 Regiments of Field Artillery, not including 
 
 the Ammunition Columns 
 
 9 Regiments of Garrison Artillery, and 3 
 Divisions ... ... 
 
 j 828 
 I 432 
 
 24,612 
 17,049 
 
 2,088 
 2,915 
 
 23,244 
 120 
 
 2,844 
 
 Total, Artillery 
 
 1,260 
 216 
 300 
 
 41,661 
 
 .3,003 
 
 23,364 
 
 2,844 
 
 Total for the Pioneers (12 Battalions) 
 
 7,224 
 
 612 
 
 876 
 
 168 
 
 Total for the Train (12 Battalions) ... 
 
 
 18,684 
 
 15,960 
 
 2,784 
 
 Grand Total for the Prussian Army 
 Proper 
 
 II. Saxon Akmt. 
 
 Grand Total for the Saxon Army, 
 I2th Corps 
 
 III. Hessian Division. 
 
 Grand Total for the Hessian or 2oth 
 Division 
 
 } 11,241 
 \ 983 
 ]• 303 
 
 431,073 
 37,259 
 12,264 
 
 36,268 
 
 2,993 
 
 731 
 
 113,305 
 9,784 
 2,855 
 
 8,232(A) 
 715 
 257 
 
 Grand Total for the whole Confedera- 
 tion 
 
 I 12,i30 
 
 480,596 
 
 39,992 
 
 125,944 
 
 9,204 
 
 (a) The 34th Rifles h.as 3,036 corabattnts. (b) The Rifle regiments have 22 carriages, (c) The 
 regiment of Life Guards has 35 officers, 763 combatants, and 67 non-combatants, (d, e,f) The 6 guas 
 included, (g) The 90 guns included. (A) The 1,080 guns included. 
 
 * Hitherto the batteries both field and horse, have in war liad only 3 offlcers, because the fourth is lefk 
 with the ammunition columns. For the future the battery will retain its 4 officers, and the only officers 
 with the ammunition columns will be Train officers. 
 
 H
 
 78 
 
 II. War Strength of the Federal Army. 
 
 The strength of the battahons, squadrons, and batteries, as 
 well as that of the reghnents of the various arms of the service, 
 pioneers and tram, are shown in Table C. 
 
 An Army Corps on a war footing includes : 
 
 A. 2 Divisions of Infantry. 
 
 B. 2 Brigades of Cavalry. 
 
 C. 1 Eoserve of Artillery. 
 
 D. 1 Battalion of Pioneers. 
 
 E. Provision Train. 
 
 F. Ambulance Train. 
 G-. Various Services. 
 
 A. — Two Divisions of Infantry. 
 
 Each division is composed of two brigades of two or three 
 regiments and four field batteries, two 4-pr. and two ()-pr. 
 batteries. The rifle battahon is attached, according to circum- 
 stances, to one or other of these divisions. The Guard and the 
 i)th Corps form an exception in having each two battalions of 
 rifles {vide Table A.) 
 
 B. — Two Cavalry Brigades. 
 
 Each of the two brigades detach one regiment with one of 
 the infantry divisions of the Army Corps. 
 
 The guard alone has three brigades (eight regiments) which 
 form a division. 
 
 One or two batteries of horse artillery are attached, according 
 to circumstances, to each cavalry brigade. 
 
 C. — Reserve Artillery. 
 
 The arrangements Avhich I here give are not m accordance 
 ivith those described in books Avritten on this subject. They 
 are, nevertheless, those now in use, and were adopted, when the 
 Prussians gave up the 12-pr. smooth-bore guns. 
 
 The artillery of an Army Corps is composed of the fifteen 
 batteries (each of six guns) of the regiment of field artillery 
 belonging to the corps, in peace time. 
 
 These fifteen batteries are divided into four chvisions ; and, 
 when the mobihsation takes place — 
 
 The Ih'st chvision of field artillery (four batteries) is attached 
 to the fia'st infantry division. 
 
 The second division of field artillery (four batteries) is 
 attached to the second infiintry division. 
 
 One horse battery (sometimes two) is attached to the two 
 cavalry brigades ; and the remaining six batteries, viz., two 
 horse, two of 4-pr., two of 6-pr., form the reserve artillery. 
 
 The chvisional batteries march with only sixteen carriages, 
 viz., six guns, six wagons, one forge, two store wagons, one 
 baggage wagon. 
 
 The reserve artillery is cfjinposed — ■
 
 79 
 
 1. Of the six batteries referred to. 
 
 2. Of nine ammunition columns. 
 
 An Army Corps has, therefore, at present — 
 
 Eight batteries with the two infantry divisions. 
 
 One or two batteries with the two brigades of cavahy. 
 
 Five or six reserve batteries. 
 
 Total fifteen batteries, or 90 guns. 
 The proportion is not quite three guns per thousand, for an 
 Army Corps is composed of 36,000 men of all arms. 
 
 The Prussians have not, then, on a war footing, a more 
 numerous artillery than ours ; but it is divided differently. 
 The divisional artillery is twice as numerous as oui's, and the 
 reserve artillery much weaker. The power wliich the Prussians 
 thus possess of beginnuig an action, ^vith an artillery twice as 
 numerous as oui's, deserves serious consideration, and has been 
 the subject of many of my despatches to Paris. We must 
 consider how we are to contend in the fii-st phases of a battle, 
 Avith an artillery which, leaving out of consideration its greater 
 range, and much greater accin'acy, tvtII be twice as numerous 
 as ours. 
 
 Of what use is a strong reserve, if at the beguming and 
 during the first portion of the battle, our divisional artillery is 
 unable to sustain the contest ? 
 
 D. — The Battalion of Pioneers, 
 
 In the army of the North German Confederation the pioneers 
 perform the duties both of engineers and pontoniers. In war 
 they are also charged with the repair and demohtion, of 
 railways, and the telegraphic service. Each Army Corps has : 
 the battalion of pioneers proper, one bridge equipage, for 
 the advance guard, one train of tools and articles for en- 
 campment, one railway company, and, in addition for each 
 army, one telegraph train. 
 
 I have described the composition of the various trams, m 
 my report of 1866, as well as the provision trains, hosjjital 
 trains, and various services (commissariat, treasm-e, post- 
 office, printmg-press, &c., &c.) 
 
 I now give two detailed tables of the strength of the 
 Guard and some other Army Corps on a Avar footing.* 
 
 The cavalry regiments are composed of only four squadrons, 
 the fifth being broken up, to raise the other four to a war 
 footing. 
 
 The entire number of combatants, in an Army Corps may 
 be summed up as follows : — 
 
 The combatants of the two infantry diAasions. 
 
 The combatants of the two cavahy brigades. 
 
 Those of the reserve artillery. 
 
 Those of the pioneer battahon. 
 
 * We have omitted these Tables (Editor). 
 
 \i 2
 
 80 
 
 Or, altogether, for the Guard, 956 officers and 37,(i)(i3 men. 
 If to these are added the Staff, the total will be, in round 
 numbers, 39,000 men. 
 
 For each of the First and Second Corps it is 883 officers 
 and 35,201 men, or, in round nmnbers, 36,000 men. 
 
 III. Passage from a Peace to a War Footing. 
 
 The Table B gives the strength of the North German 
 Army, with the colours on a peace footing. To pass fi-om a 
 peace to a war footing, the battalions, squadi'ons, batteries, 
 &c., are completed by calhng up the reserve men. 
 
 1 again beg to point out a very important subject, on which 
 I have aheady reported in 1866, in a despatch entitled " Note 
 on the MiHtary Organization of Prussia." This point is, that 
 Prussia can place all her Army Corps on a war footing, by 
 calhng up the reserves, and without calhng on the Landwehr. 
 The mihtaiy organization of 1860 had chiefly this object in 
 view, and it was attained by simply increasing the length of 
 service in the reserve by two years. At present, the Landwehr 
 is intended for the defence of the fortresses in the mterior. 
 It will not be caUed on to fight, with the anny even in 
 second hne, except in extreme cases, and Prussia will (in 
 theory, at least) only call on it to form railway companies, 
 companies of bearers of the wounded, the telegraph service, &c. 
 
 Prussia can place all the Army Corps of the Confederation 
 on a war footing by calhng up only the Prussian reserves. 
 
 If the Tables B and C are compared, it will be found that — 
 
 1. To complete one battalion of infiintr}^ it is necessary 
 to call up on an average 490 combatants. There are 368 
 battalions (350 of the Lme and 18 rifles), or, 490 x 368 = 180,320 
 combatants. 
 
 2. To complete one squadron of cavahy 13 men are re- 
 quired. There are 380 squadi-ons ; 380 x 13 = 4,940 men. 
 
 3. To complete the thirteen regiments of field artillery 
 6,123 men are required. 
 
 4. To complete the thirteen battalions of pioneers 1,547 
 combatants are required. 
 
 The total number to caU up is, therefore, in round numbers, 
 193,000 men. 
 
 Now, what is the actual strength of the reserve at the 
 disposal of the Confederation ? 
 
 The exact number is very easy to fix for old Prussia, but 
 rather difficult for the provinces recently annexed, and for those 
 "which with Prussia comprise the Confederation, for none of 
 these States adopted, the Prussian military organization before 
 1866. 
 
 But if Avo regard Prussia as she was prior to 1866, we 
 laid that her annual contingent was 63,000 men, she can 
 therefore, put her hands on 4x63,000 = 252,000 reserve men;
 
 81 
 
 deducting four per cent, for losses by death of one year, Avith 
 another, a high per centage, we get more than 20i),()i)i) men 
 as the number at her disposal. Prussia, therefore, can com- 
 plete the Army Corps of the entu-e Confederation with her 
 reserves alone. 
 
 In case of war, Prussia Avould act, witliout doubt, as she 
 did in 18()(5, when she organized ^vith ease the largest possible 
 number of depot troops. She would call up in advance, the 
 annual contingent, and would retain tt) instruct it a portion 
 of the reserve. If this part proved insufficient m number, 
 she Avould call up the men of the first year of the Landwehr. 
 
 In continuation, I cannot point out too clearly that at 
 present the Landwehr acts no longer in regunents brigaded with 
 those of the Line, as it did prior to the reorganization of 1S()(). 
 It is of no importance to find out, in what proportion it would be 
 employed, if circumstances required its employment to complete 
 the strength of the Line battahons to a war footing. Whatever 
 hapj^ens, tliis proportion wdll be less than it was iii 18()B, when 
 it amounted only to one-tenth. Now, these Landwehr men, 
 mixed m small numbers in the ranks of the battahons, will 
 not only be equal to the best soldiers, but all the officers have 
 told me that in 1866 they usually proved themselves to be 
 better than others. 
 
 It is idle, therefore, to ask in what propoitions the men 
 of the Regular Army, Reserve, and the Landwelu-, may be mixed 
 in the ranks of the army of the Confederation. 
 
 As I pointed out in my report of the 2ord April last, the 
 whole of the military force of Prussia offers this peculiar 
 homogenity, that the men are either soldiers, with the colours, 
 or old soldiers of three years' actual seiwice ; and if the best 
 contingents are considered as those in the thnd year of scrsace 
 and those m the first two years of the reseiwe, {2'6, 24, and 25 
 years of age), it must be acknoAvledged, at the same tune that 
 the reserves of the thnd and fourth years (men of 26 and 27 
 years of age) and the Landwehr men of the first and second 
 years (men of 28 to 29 years of age) are, as good soldiers, as 
 the recruits, and those of the second year. 
 
 In order to miderstand clearly the entire force, that the 
 Confederation could mobilize, in case of a gTcat war, we must 
 not lose ourselves m details nor in supptisitions. The Federal 
 Army can be only compared with some gigantic machine, all 
 the parts of which resemble one another, and are regularly 
 prepared beforehand, so that they may be put together as 
 rapidly as possible. 
 
 In composition the various Army Corps are almost identical 
 with one another. Haste or alteration made at the moment 
 of entering into action might interfere with the working of 
 the machme. The Confederation can always complete its Arnn- 
 Corps to a war footing, by caUing up the Reserve, and, if requi- 
 site, a portion of the Landwehr. 
 
 If, then, the number of combatants only, is considered, and
 
 82 
 
 the strength of the Army Corps placed at 36,000 each and 
 the Guard at 39,000, the North German Confederation has on a 
 war footmg a force of — 
 
 Men. 
 
 The Guard, 39,000 combatants 39,000 
 
 12 Army Corps of 36,000 combatants. . . . 432,000 
 
 The Hessian Division of 12,000 . . . . 12,000 
 
 Total 483,000 
 
 Or, in roiuid numbers, including non-combatants, 540,000 men. 
 
 Such is the approximate strength of the active army which 
 the Confederation can put in first line. 
 
 But as I have abeady pointed out, in previous Reports, the 
 entu'e force at her disposal consists of twelve contingents, or 
 about 955,000 men, viz. : — 
 
 Men. 
 
 3 Contingents with the Coloiirs . . . . 315,000 
 
 4 „ „ Eeserve .. .. 310,000 
 
 5 „ „ Landwehr .. .. 330,000 
 
 12 „ Total 955,000 
 
 It follows from this, that, in addition to the 540,000 just 
 referred to, as forming the active army, there are still disposable 
 more than 400,000 men. 
 
 A portion of these would be formed, as in 18(56, into one or 
 more Reserve Corps, and the remainder would be used for 
 the mstructional depots and home defence. If the strength of 
 these Reserve Corps is estimated at 80,000 men, the following 
 table may be drawn up as representing pretty nearly, the 
 general distribution of the military forces which the North 
 German Confederation could dispose of, in case of a great 
 European war. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Army in the Field 540,000 
 
 Reserve Corps 80,000 
 
 Dep6t Troops, and for Home Service . . . . 333,000 
 
 Total 953,000 
 
 Remarks upon the Prussian Army. 
 
 Report of the 22nd July, 1868. 
 
 I am very desirous of bringing to notice some facts con- 
 nected with the Prussian Army, in order that its qualities, the 
 spirit that animates it, in short, its moral state, may be clearly 
 understood. I am the more anxious to do this, as I am con- 
 vinced that people ui France live in the greatest ignorance 
 of all, that concerns Prussia, the Prussian nation, and the 
 Prussian Army.
 
 83 
 
 How can it be otlierwise, wlien the young men in France 
 are taught nothing of that important portion of history which 
 treats of the institutions, character, genius, and procHvities 
 of modern nations ; when no foreign language is taught 
 thoroughly ; and when a taste for study of any kind is 
 never given? 
 
 It foUows that one generation succeeds another, lvno\\'ing 
 nothing whatever, of neighbouring nations, except their 
 existence, the rehgion they profess, and the names of the 
 chief towTiis. Thus, for example : Is there one person, in 
 France, who has followed the extraordinary development of 
 the Prussian nation since 1815 ? Here is a people full of 
 vigom', who, m fifty years, has doubled its population ; who, 
 basing its uistitutions on two great pruiciples — compidsory 
 education, and compulsory mihtary service, for all citizens 
 — as, upon tAvo majestic columns, has placed itself in the first 
 rank, amongst the enlightened nations of Europe; which has 
 organised a formidable army, pro\aded with, an unrivalled 
 armament, and led by the best instructed ofhcers in the 
 world: and all this remained mmoticed until, it was revealed 
 by the thunderbolt of 1866 ! 
 
 Now, we begin to study the causes of these astonishing 
 events. But already this mitable, energetic, and unscrupulous 
 nation, numbering thu-ty milhons of people, and wliicli can ])ut 
 in the field, a million of sokhers, has pushed its frontiers nine 
 marches on the road to Paris, no natural obstacle intervening. 
 
 I must not be accused of exceeding the bounds, of my 
 Military Mission in givmg utterance to the opinions which a 
 careful study of the Prussian nation has induced me to form. 
 
 Nowhere, are the army, and the nation, more entirely 
 blended together ; nowhere, do we find the qualities of the 
 one, more faithfully reflected in the other. I would add. that 
 a careful observer learns more, by livmg in Prussia than he 
 can learn by readhig, any number of books. Precisely as a 
 man is never thoroughly known, except by liis daily associates. 
 Details, apj^arently of no importance, even slight changes of 
 manner greatly aid the judgment, as regards both nations and 
 individuals. The study of historic facts, confirms and completes 
 the opinion so forDied. 
 
 Any unbiassed person, gifted "^dth common clear-sighted- 
 ness, can, without difficulty, discern the quahties which mark 
 the North German character — energy, boldness, and a deep 
 conviction of their own importance. This judgment is con- 
 firmed by history. Twice in a hmich-ed years Prussia has 
 surprised, and astonished the world. Under the great Frederick, 
 with a population of barely four milhons, she struggled for 
 seven years agamst Austria, backed at one time by Russian, 
 at another tune by French armies; and, although Napoleou 
 the First, in his '■'■J^Iemoires" has cleared aAvay the halo wliich 
 surrounded this period, yet it is not the less true that it bears 
 ample testimony to the indisputable energy of the Prussian
 
 84 
 
 nation, maintained and directed by the genius of her King. 
 A hundred years afterwards, Prussia, with nineteen millions of 
 inhabitants, a second time di'ew on herself the astonishment 
 of the world, by defeating Austria, and her allies. No one 
 can deny, that her conduct, durmg recent events, has not 
 been marked, now as then, by boldness of conception, and 
 vigour in execution. 
 
 During the period which separated these two epochs, the 
 Prussian nation suffered the complete defeat of Jena. No 
 period of her history, shows more clearly the energy which 
 characterizes her. 
 
 Prussia was annihilated at Jena, the Emperor compelhng 
 her, to retire behmd the Elbe, and imposing crushing war 
 contributions, unfortunately humiliating her, by requiring that 
 for the future her army, should not exceed 40,000 men. Then 
 this manly nation, bowing to stern necessity, collected herself 
 together. She studied the causes, that had produced this 
 great disaster, firmly resolved to overcome them, and avenge 
 herself. The most distinguished Generals, formed a com- 
 mission, which reformed abuses, and organized the army, on 
 just principles, fruitful of great results. Eminent men, excited 
 the patriotism of the country, and formed secret societies full 
 of hatred to France. The richest famihes gave examples of 
 self-sacrifice, by giving a portion of then- fortune, to the State. 
 Supported by the feelings of the nation, and led by men of 
 spirit, Prussia prepared to profit, by the first favoiu-able 
 opportunity, and baffle the humiliating conditions imposed 
 by the Emperor, by unceasingly teaching her new Landwehr 
 troops. When 1812 came, Prussia furnished to the coalition 
 200,000 men, remarkable for an unequalled exasperation, who 
 pursued France, with a hatred, which exists at the present 
 day in full vigour, amongst the descendants of these people. 
 
 One cannot but admire the energy of a nation, who converted 
 an overwhelming defeat into a source of national regeneration. 
 This opinion is so true, that the greater number of the Prussian 
 books which give the history of the 19th century, express it. 
 Many eminent men have said to me : — 
 
 " It is to France, we owe our awakening, our greatness ; 
 Jena caused us to relect, and we have profited by the lesson." 
 
 The energy of the people of North Germany may be better 
 estimated if the history just sketched, be compared with that 
 of Austria at the same period. 
 
 Twice in four years, in 1805 and in 1809, the Emperor 
 crushed Austria. Did she di-aw from these repeated disasters 
 any instruction whatever? Did she feel the necessity of in- 
 vigorating herself, by strong institutions ? No ; this amiable, 
 sympathetic, but pleasure-seeking nation continued to live 
 on its daily round, without even feehng towards its con- 
 querors, those sentiments of hatred which befit a vigorous 
 race. Have we not all seen, durmg the Bohemian war, all 
 the theatres and places of pubhc amusement in Vienna open,
 
 85 
 
 and filled with crowds of people just as usual i BerHii would 
 have offered a different appearance if Prussia had met with 
 disaster. 1 have brought this comparison to notice, as it 
 appears to me to mark the sohd and maidy quahties of the 
 Prussian nation; qualities, whicli I again repeat are dissemmated 
 throughout the army. 
 
 To these national C|ualities, must be added incessant 
 vigilance, a love of progress, and a spirit of apphcation, 
 pushed to the utmost limits. To demonstrate the truth of 
 this, I Avill make another comparison, which is not to the 
 advantage of France. During the last fifteen years we have 
 had two great wars, what military instruction have we ob- 
 tained fi'om these wars ? Have we sought to perfect one of 
 our institutions ; to improve one of our services *? It may, 
 perhaps, be said that they were as good as they could be, 
 seeing that we have been victorious ; that we defeated first 
 Russia, then Austria. Nevertheless, we should carefully medi- 
 tate on the example that Prussia offers us. She, too, Avas 
 victorious m 186G, does she conclude that the organization 
 of her army has reached the hmits of perfection i If any 
 persons think she does, they must be profoundly ignorant of 
 the character of this people, so serious, so watchful, so eager 
 to unprove. 
 
 ]\Iore truly may it be said that the war of 1866, smce its termi- 
 nation, has been looked on by all intelhgent Prussian officers as 
 an opportunity aftbrded to Prussia to test her military institutions. 
 Many Generals have said to me, " We have not made a great 
 war since 1815, and as our organization appeared to us to be 
 good, we were very anxious to test it ; but we committed 
 many faults m 186(5, and ^ve see many details that may be 
 much improved." 
 
 In fact, for two years they have, with the view of improving 
 the various branches of the army, lalioured unceasingly, \\"ithout 
 noise, without ostentation, but with much care, and thought, 
 at the ^Var Office, at the liead-quarter Staffs of the various 
 Army Corps, in the various branches, of the Service and its 
 admuiistration ; to this end Commissions, composed of officers, 
 who served in the campaign, study and examine everything, 
 m order that the experience gained may be utilized. 
 
 I will describe m detail hereafter the modifications that 
 have been introduced. Here I confine myself to enimierating 
 them. They are — 
 
 The reorganization of the Railway Companies. 
 
 The modification of the Hospital Ser\Tlce. 
 
 The reorganization of the Companies of Bearers, of the 
 Wounded. 
 
 The reorganization of the Telegraph Service. 
 
 Alteration of the composition of the Annnunition Columns, 
 and Artillery Reserves. 
 
 Changing the amount of Ammunition for the Infantry, 
 Cavahy, and Artillery.
 
 86 
 
 Augmentation of the Cavahy. 
 
 Increased attention to the Cavah"y Sword Exercise; because, 
 in 1866, it was observed, that when Cavahy were opposed to 
 Cavalry, hand-to-hand fighting frequently ensued. 
 
 The formation of an Engineer Committee. 
 
 Forming Commissions for obtaining remount horses. 
 
 Creatmg a model Farriers' estabhshment, for instructional 
 purposes. 
 
 Making alterations in the dress of Cavalry soldiers. 
 
 Creating two new Military Schools, two new Cadet Schools, 
 and a new School for Non-commissioned Officers. 
 
 In adcUtion to all this, the creation of a School for Mihtary 
 Telegraphy and a Railway School is in contemplation. 
 
 The service of vivandiers, to secure the better feeding of 
 the troops, on the Ime of march, and the important question of 
 the baggage of the army is also under consideration. 
 
 To which must be added, as being already accomplished, 
 the folloA\dng : — The new division of the territory of the North 
 German Confederation into Landwehr battalion districts. — ( Vide 
 Report of the 2nd December, 1867.) 
 
 The removal to Spandau of all Artillery establishments. 
 
 The improvement in soldiers' messing. 
 
 The mcrease of the officers' pay. 
 
 To say nothing about the mcessant experiments, that are 
 being made with artillery, as well as small-arms, both for army 
 and navy purposes. 
 
 When we compare this labom-, the fruit of the experience 
 obtained in one fortunate war, with what we in France, have 
 done smce the Crimean and Italian Wars, we cannot but be 
 much struck with the difference. In general, the activity 
 displayed throughout the Army ; what is being done in the 
 War Office, by Commissions, by the Staff; what is being 
 done in the detached and general instruction of the troops, 
 as regards manoeuvres, and studies, of all kinds, the activity 
 displayed, I say, is prodigious. No European Army shows 
 anything lil^e it. They are hke a swarm of bees. 
 
 To understand this incessant labour, the distinctive quahties 
 of the nation must be remembered. Its sentmient of duty, 
 application, taste for labour, are pusbed to extreme limits, 
 as it were, by the necessity recognized by everyone, of com- 
 pleting the military mstruction of the men, in a very short 
 period, on an average not exceeding two and a half years. 
 
 But these reasons are not of themselves sufficient to explain 
 the extraordinary activity prevailing in the army. The great 
 personal influence of the King' must be taken into account. 
 Tliis is a very curious point, and one, I believe, of which 
 foreigners are enthely ignorant. 
 
 The King of Prussia occupies, in reference to the Army, 
 a situation unknown in any other country, Russia excepted. 
 He is, in every acceptation of the word the Chief of the 
 Army (der Kriegsherr, as the Germans say). It is universally
 
 87 
 
 admitted, that the present occupant, of the Prussian throne, 
 has such a passionate love, for the inihtary profession, to the 
 exchision of everythmg else, that his subjects, even those most 
 devoted to him, reproach him with it. 
 
 Last year, during the Exliibition, I was in a carriage with 
 General Moltke, when M. Hausseman did the honom'S of Paris 
 to his ]\Iajesty, The Kuig and all his officers were astonished. 
 General Moltke, who never says anything, but what he thinks, 
 addi-essed me as follows : — "I am very glad the King has seen 
 the magnificence of Paris ; he occupies himself almost entirely 
 Avitli the army. He can to day see tliat a monarch may, Avithout 
 neglecting the army (for yours is excellent), interest himself 
 in. all that contributes to the greatness of a nation." And the 
 General added, "I, perhaps, may be alloAved more than any- 
 one else to speak thus, for I have no cause, to complain of 
 the Kmg's love for the army. 
 
 But in speakuig thus. General Moltke forgot, that with a 
 man like the King, seventy-two years old, tastes and 
 passions do not alter ; and the Kmg remams the same as he 
 was prior to his visit to Paris in 1867 ; that is to say, that 
 he occupies himself with the army in preference to everything 
 else, and his passion for mihtary things has not decreased. 
 Always amiable and kuid, he well knows how to render this 
 passion entrancing and contagious. As prince, that is to say, 
 for twenty years, he gave all his thouglit-s to the army ; as 
 regent for ten years, and since he ascended the throne, in 
 1861, he has used his sovereign power but to carry out the 
 projects previously conceived and studied. 
 
 It is he who is the instigator of all the reforms, made m the 
 army during the last fifteen years, more especially, the great 
 reorganization of 1860. It is he, and only he, who, by his 
 boundless activity, has raised the army, to that pitch of tmining. 
 to wliicli I have pre\aously referred. 
 
 The personal and direct influence of the Kmg is so great, 
 that there is no doubt, but that under another monarch more 
 than one sprmg, of the huge machme would more or less 
 slacken. 
 
 It is well known how active, and mdefatigable. the King, 
 despite his great age, is. The Prussians say, laughingly, that 
 this is due to his stomach, as with all the Hohenzollerns. 
 Every day, and generally during several hom-s m each day, 
 he labours either with the Minister of War, General ]\Ioltke. 
 or with General Treskow, the chief of the IMihtary Council.* 
 As a proof that this is no exaggeration, it is only recpiisite 
 to obtain a collection, of the back numbers of Prussian 
 ncAvspapers, and run over that part of the collection, termed 
 the Hot" Journal (Court Journal), where a diary of the daily 
 
 * It is kuown that the iustilutiou of tlie Military Council lias boou koonly 
 criticised by the opposition. The King never separates hunself from General 
 TreSkow, Chief of the Council. He is with him now diu-ing his stay at Ems.
 
 acts of the sovereign is kept. Reading it is monotonous, 
 for everj day, tlie same stereotyped phrases occur — " The 
 King has worked to day with the Minister of War." " The 
 King has conferred with the Chief of the Mihtary Council." 
 
 From another point of view, the King may be looked on 
 as the Permanent hu-pector General of the Army. In the month 
 of February of each year, when the recruits have received 
 about three months' instruction, he begins his inspection at 
 Berhn, Potsdam, and Spandau, which are garrisoned by the 
 Guard. He inspects, in the depth of winter, even single 
 companies ; thus, tliis year, during a severe frost, he went 
 to Potsdam, to inspect, according to liis custom, in the most 
 minute manner, the two companies of the regiment of which 
 he is chief. This caused the Crown Prince to say to me, 
 " Is not the King astonishing % I do not think I should have 
 the same courage." 
 
 Later, the King inspects separately the battalions of the 
 Guard, numbering no less than 27. Then follow the regi- 
 mental inspections, for the different arms, which take place in 
 May. During three months the King thus sees passmg before 
 him all the troops of the Guard, and follows the progress of 
 their instruction at every stage. The reviews proper are in 
 addition to these inspections. As the infantry of the Guard is 
 stationed at Berhn, Potsdam, and Spandau, the cavalry at 
 Berhn and Potsdam, the King visits these places, and holds 
 each winter eight reviews, called here "Parades," viz., three for 
 the infantry — one at Berlin, one at Potsdam, one at Spandau; 
 four for the cavalry — two at Berhn and two at Potsdam (the 
 cavalry at each of these towns is mspectcd twice, once mounted 
 and once dismounted) ; lastly, one for the artillery and pioneers. 
 The Khig, in addition to these, inspects the School of Musketry 
 at Spandau, the Battalion of Instruction at Potsdam, and the 
 Company of the Bearers of the Wounded at Berlin. I ought 
 not to forget to mention the meetings of the Military Society 
 at Berhn, which take place every 15 days in winter, and at the 
 greater number of which the King is present to encourage 
 a taste for study and labour amongst the officers. It is worthy 
 of remark that at all these inspections and parades the Sovereign 
 is accompanied by the Princes, Generals, and a crowd of other 
 officers, sometimes by the Ministers and civil functionaries, who 
 may have rank in the Landwehr. The King is always attentive, 
 and obliging, fuU of enthusiasm and good humour during these 
 exercises, and it is easy to understand the stimulus this 
 gives everyone, from the General to the private soldier. I 
 have been allowed to accompany the Kmg this winter at 
 least 20 times. Finally, in the month of June, at Potsdam, 
 the Battalion of Instruction celebrates its formation by an 
 annual fete. The King, who attaches great importance to 
 this solemnity, because it, as it were, puts him ui contact with 
 the whole army, goes each year with the Queen, the Princes, 
 and Princesses.
 
 89 
 
 This instructional battalion is composed of five or six men 
 selected from each regiment of infantry of the North German 
 Ai'my. These men almost all engage to serve for more than 
 three years, and remain with the battahon during the summer 
 and return in winter to their respective regimentn. The object 
 of this institution is to give the army an elemejit favoiu'able to 
 a uniform instruction. 
 
 But the greater number of officers witli whom 1 have spoken 
 on this subject deny the utihty of this institution, and they would 
 willingly see this battahon suppressed, if its organization had 
 not a higher object — that of brmghig togetlier for some months, 
 men of different regiments, and above all aft'ording the King an 
 opportunity of putting himself into personal contact with the 
 representatives of the whole army. His i\Iajesty neglects 
 nothing to give the annual fete of the Battalion of Instruction 
 all possible solemnity. Divine service is performed that day, 
 the battalion is reviewed; there is a special dinner; and 
 rejoicings in the evening. The King, Queen, Princes, and 
 Princesses, mix with the sohliers and share their food. 
 
 What I have described gives an idea of the activity of the 
 Kmg during winter and spring, but this activity never relaxes 
 dui'ing the autumn. I append to my report a programme of the 
 exercises to be performed by the Guard, betAveen the 20th 
 of August and 13th September. The King will be present on 
 his return from Ems. Then the manoeuvres of chvision 
 against division folloAV. To explain the causes of the state of 
 enthusiasm that this army has reached, I should add that the 
 King is seconded in his task, by the Princes and Commandants 
 of the Army Corps, whose zeal is contmually exerted by their 
 deshe to gratify their Sovereign. It is usually in June that 
 each of them inspects the troops under his command. The 
 Crown Prince has just mspected the 2nd Corps ; Prince Frederick 
 Charles the ord. The object of these Army Corps uispections 
 is to ascertain the amount of ^^^t^.s^/aricor (that is the word 
 used) that the troops have acquhed. For everything else, the 
 Commander-in-Chief receives the reports of the Generals placed 
 under his orders, and the latter those of the Commandants 
 of Regiments, Avho hold a different position and have a far greater 
 responsibility, than the Colonels in the French army. 
 
 The officers who accompanied the Crown Prince, and Prince 
 Frederick Charles, in their inspections, have given me informa- 
 tion, which confirms in every respect that which, I witnessed at 
 Berlin and hi the neighbourhood, with reference to the exercises 
 of the Guard. Everywhere the same activity, the same prmciples 
 by which the actual duty of the troops in war, is kept steadly 
 in vicAv. The troops are exercised, in the open country, one 
 day in one place, another day in another. The infantry being 
 exercised in firing as skhmishers in drfterent kinds of ground. 
 The cavalry in reconnaissance and outpost duty. The artillery 
 in firing at targets, the positions, both of batteries and targets, 
 being contmually altered, so that the officers may judge the
 
 90 
 
 distances, and correct the range. Both artillery and cavalry- 
 are exercised ui crossing obstacles — ditches, hedges, and brush- 
 wood — at great speed. 
 
 Of all the Corps -Generals, the Commander of the 3rd, 
 Prince Frederick CJharles, requires the least stimulus. As 
 passionately devoted to the profession of arms, as the King, he 
 well knows how to connnunicate his enthusiasm, to the soldiers 
 of the 3rd Corps, who have the greatest confidence in him. 
 
 All these details show clearly the kind of activity that 
 reigns here. In a word, the spectacle that Prussia offers to an 
 observer, is on the one hand a nation full of stamina and energy, 
 educated as no other nation m Europe is ; wanting it is true all 
 amiable or generous qualities, but endowed with others more 
 sohd ; ambitious to excess, uncrupulous, bold, and trained for 
 many years under a military regime. On the other hand, a 
 man who, for twenty years as prince and for ten years as 
 regent, has given all his thoughts to the army with an 
 eagerness, a passion, and a zest which have made it a 
 most formidable weapon. It was tliis army that won 
 Koniggriitz. 
 
 This spectacle is so striking, that I cannot but accuse those 
 foreigners, who were not struck Avith it prior to 1866, of folly 
 or culpable neglect ; and if I express so plamly this conviction, 
 it is not for the vain pleasure of casting blame, but rather to 
 attempt to divide it. To refuse the evidence of my senses, to 
 neglect to report the true state of affairs, would be to leave 
 my duty unfulfilled. Now, I again repeat, in Prussia the 
 nation and the army display a s^^irit, an energy, a discipline, 
 and an instruction so great, that they will be, when we 
 come to settle accounts with them, the most formidable 
 opponents. " We can no longer despise Prussia," Prince 
 Napoleon said to me, during his visit to Berlin. And I would 
 add, "We should never have despised her. Everytliing that 
 ignorant people have said of the Prussian nation did not 
 prevent her from having the first breech-loading arm. Such 
 things are only a visible manifestation of the intelhgence of a 
 nation. A curious comcidence is, that once before, during the 
 seven years' war, Prussia owed a portion of her success, to an 
 improvement in small-arms. I allude to the employment of the 
 uon ramrod." 
 
 It is the fasliion in France to oveiTate the Austrian Army, 
 and those who do not, di'aw on themselves the common-place 
 reproach, " In decrying the Austrian Army, you diminish our 
 glory." That is not the question ; we would only be embar- 
 rassed by a Aveight of evidence were we to seek historic facts, 
 to prove that the Austrian Army, despite its qualities, is the 
 least formidable army in Europe. Prince Frederic Charles, who 
 esteems them but lightly, said to me, " The Austrians are accus- 
 tomed to defeat" 
 
 For my pai't, I liave for two years carefully studied and 
 compared the Austrian and Prussian Armies, and can say with
 
 91 
 
 great confidence, "Let us be careful, if war break out, not to 
 think that we will have to do with Austrian troops. The 
 Prussian Army will oppose us with a vigour, a boldness, and a war- 
 Hke science that we never encountered in Italy." Can anyone 
 think, that events would have occurred in Italy in bSoD as they 
 did, if, in place of an Austrian, we had had to deal wath a 
 Prussian Army ? AMien war broke out, it would have been in 
 Tm'in, before a single French soldier had crossed the Alps. 
 At Solferino, the 4th Corps, despite its heroic efforts, would 
 have been pierced in the middle of the day. This cannot 
 be questioned, if we remember the energy displayed by the 
 Prussian soldiers, and the inteUigence their leaders showed in 
 the war of 1866. 
 
 This war offers, amongst others, three struggles, which 
 could with difficulty be surpassed, in the history of any other 
 nation. On the 28tli June, at the action, of Soor a bat- 
 tahon of the 2nd Grenadier, Emperor Francis Regiment, 
 attacked an entire Austrian brigade, composed of seven bat- 
 tahons (the brigade Grivicic), and, notwithstanding enormous 
 losses, gave time for anotlier Prussian battahon to come up, and 
 disperse the seven hostile battalions, which were never heard 
 of agam during the campaign. 
 
 The 3rd July, the Division Fransecky, at Koniggratz, 
 nmnbering about 9,000 men, struggled for several hours, at 
 first against one, then against two, Austrian Army Corps, and 
 yet held its ground. The same day, the 1st Infantry Di\nsion 
 of the Guard carried the heights of Chlun, and defended 
 itself there for three quarters of an hour, against the attacks, 
 badly du-ected it is true, of the two Austrian Reserve Corps 
 still intact.* I will conclude by some remarks on the manoeuvring 
 quahties of the Prussian Army, and the warlike intelligence 
 which study and labour develops amongst the officers. There 
 is but one opinion, amongst the numerous foreign officers 
 assembled at Berhn, that of admiration for the precision of the 
 manoeuvres of the young soldiers composing this army. It is 
 astonishmg to see the results obtained in this respect with so 
 short a service. The troops have given brilhant proofs of their 
 manoeuvrmg powers in the war of 1866. In Bohemia, Prussian 
 Generals have related several things to me, which, allowmg for 
 exaggeration, leave much to admire. They praise above all 
 the coolness with which their soldiers closed their ranks, when 
 rendered requisite by the enemy's fu-e. At the action of Skalitz, 
 
 * The rcsistanee of tlie 1st Division of the Guard -n'oukl bo iiioxpHcabk^ if wo did 
 not know that Bencdek was at that momont far from Chhm ; that tlie two Austrian 
 Eeserve Corps only attempted to retake the position by disconnected ellbrts, and 
 that a fine raiu prevented the Austrians from seeing that thev liad to do with only 
 a single Division, but the defence of the Division (Ililler) is not the less, one of the 
 most wonderful feats of modern war. This General liad received orders to halt 
 before Horenowes and ^A•ait orders there ; but stung by certain reproofs, the Prince 
 of Wurtemburg, commanding the guai'd, on the2 8tb June, at the beginning of the 
 action of Snor, had given hira, he disobeyed, and attacked with his single division the 
 heights of Chlun.
 
 92 
 
 the 47tli Infantry Regiment, advanced iii line, drums beating, 
 under avery heavy artillery fii'e, against the troops of the Austrian 
 General Fragern. The precision, the coolness, of the advance 
 was such that this General, who believed, hl^e everyone else, 
 that the Prussian troops were good only for parade movements, 
 cried with contempt to his men, " See there, those dirty pigs 
 think they are on parade." He was killed, and his exclamation, 
 reported by his orderly officer, who was captured, has become 
 historic in the Prussian Army. 
 
 Would the Prussian troops preserve their regularity of ma- 
 noeuvres before the dash of our troops. I do not doubt it. We 
 unfortunately have m France, a school of officers who deny 
 the advantage of precision of manoeuvre, and who seek to 
 erect impetuosity, and disorder into a principle. God grant 
 that our Generals would ponder well, what Napoleon the 1st 
 has written on manoeuvi-es, and would lean more on him. 
 His soldiers had, at least as much dash as ours now have. Our 
 impetuous (hsorder has succeeded against Austrians, but it will 
 be very different against steady troops, such as the EngHsh, 
 or Prussians. We may have to regret all this, when it is 
 too late. 
 
 Science and warlike intelligence, I have aheady said, are 
 fully developed amongst the Prussian Generals. Proofs of this 
 abound, but I will confine myself to a veiy characteristic com- 
 parison, which a study of the war of 18()(5 has suggested, and 
 which relates to the division mto Army Corps. Napoleon the 
 1st has written, " Hmnan faculties aresohmited that no General 
 can command on the same theatre of war more than five 
 distinct units." Now, what do we see in 1866 ? Benedek had a 
 disposable force of 7 Austrian Army Corps, the Saxon Army, 4 
 cHvisions of cavalry, and a reserve of artilleiy, iu all 13 units. 
 Did he ever think of forming them mto several groups or 
 armies ? Not at all. He attempted to give dhect orders, 
 without any intermediate agency, to each of these 13 indepen- 
 dent units. What a want of cohesion ; what losses of time ; 
 what orders, and counter-orders resulted from this, during this 
 short campaign, so fatal for Austria? 
 
 And what a contrast, with the dispositions made at BerKn. 
 The three armies, that is to say, only three distinct units, received 
 the general orders emanating from the head-quarters of the 
 King. Each of the Commanders of Armies, preserved enthe 
 liberty m execution, and moved only four cr five distinct units 
 or Army Corps. Everytliing was simple and logical. 
 
 Singular fact, Austria, as regards the distribution of her 
 army, committed m 1859 and in 1806 two faults the exact oppo- 
 site of one another. In 1859 she formed two distinct armies. 
 This is one of the worst possible arrangements, smce there is 
 neither centre nor wings, at least without breakmg up the large 
 commands. She adopted in 1866 a formation still more vicious, 
 that of 13 distmct units without any bond of union between 
 them. Do not such traits clearly prove the superiority of the
 
 03 
 
 intelligeuce of the Prnssiaii over the Aiistriuu Army, for if 
 in the latter, officers of hig-h rank are ignorant, of the essential 
 principles of war, which the greatest (Japtain has laid down 
 in his memoirs, what can be expected from the officers of lower 
 rank i 
 
 As can be seen, all that I liave said of the Prussian Army, 
 and in particular of its superiority, over the Austrian Army, 
 follow in the clearest manner from the coml^ined study of the 
 character and institutions of the two nations. 
 
 I defy any officer, who will compare and study these things, 
 not to be struck in the same way. He vrould observe in the 
 Prussian Army, which embraces the intelligence, and the moral 
 force of the enthe natioii, first the distinctive qualities, of 
 the races of North Germany — energy, boldness, discipline, 
 frugality, a feeluig of duty and chgnity ; then unity, instruc- 
 tion, the science of rnanocuvruig, an excellent armament ; the 
 best taught Staff in Europe, Avarhke laiowledge developed 
 amongst the officers by study and toil; all these things ho 
 would not find in the Austiian Army, or would find them in a 
 far less degree. 
 
 It is almost useless to add that the military events of 186G, 
 have not only inceased in the Prussian Army, the idea of its 
 own value, long before this period nothing was neglected to 
 give the army absolute confidence in itselfj to honour and en- 
 circle it with all poissiblc consideration. All favom's are for 
 it, and everything tends to make it, in the eyes of the 
 country a fundamental — I had almost said a sacred — msti- 
 tution, the military music borrows a religious character in the 
 selection of sacred airs, such as the " National H\inn " and 
 the " Retreat of the Army." During chvme service it is upon 
 the Kmg and the army the mmister calls down before all 
 others, the blessing of the Most High. The great bodies of 
 the State are oidy named afterwards. The labours I have 
 desciibed are carried out with that cahn dignity, A^^th that 
 earnestness, v/hicli stamp so essentially this grave, enci'getic, 
 and Avell-taught people whose country reaches from the Yistula 
 to the Rhine. What a contrast with the position filled by 
 the army in France, Avhere it is but a mass of men, the 
 outcasts of fortune, who lose every day more and more disci- 
 pline and mihtary spirit.
 
 04 
 
 Field Guns of Bronze; Cast-iron Guns; Abandon:\ient of 
 Shrapnel Shell; Arms of the Landwehr; Two Details 
 OF Instructions. 
 
 Beport of the 2iHh July, 18G8. 
 
 I. Bronze Field Guns. 
 
 On the 20tli of la«t Februaiy, I refeiTod to the ideas which 
 divided the partisans of bronze, from those who approved of 
 steel, as a material for field guns. 
 
 I alluded to the importance of this subject, both to the 
 Prussian Army, and to Prussian maimfacturers. To say nothuic; 
 of its importance to the Government, who, having just completed 
 its field material in steel, found itself compelled to consider if it 
 had not been too hasty, m abandoning bronze. 
 
 As I pointed out, the number of partisans of steel diminished, 
 and those of bronze increased daily. 
 
 It can therefore be easily imagined how much interest was 
 attached to the trials made by the Connnission with breech- 
 loading bronze guns. 
 
 Six of these had been cast, two of which were (Vprs., and 4 
 4-prs. One of the requirements that these guns had to fulfil 
 Avas, that they should fit the 6 and 4-pr. gun carriages actually 
 in use, the projectiles and the rifling being the same. The 
 method of closing the breech bemg a double wedge^ as in the 
 4-pr. steel gun. The breech block is in copper, as in the siege 
 guns. 
 
 The 4 4-pr. guns weigh each, 605 ll)s., the breech apparatus 
 included ; two of these guns are 6'OG in length. The two others 
 5'181 in length, and, consequently, are somewhat stronger than 
 the others. The weight of the charge is 1 lb. I5 oz. The 
 initial A^elocity is not yet determined. 
 
 The two 6-prs. weigh each 946 lbs. ; the length is 6' 4'3" ; 
 weight of charge, 1 lb. 5^ oz. ; initial A^elocity, lOOo'GS per 
 second. I was allowed to be present at one of these experi- 
 ments, when the 4-pr. guns were tried. They had previously 
 fired 1,300 rounds each, with satisfactory results, both as 
 regards accuracy and durability both of gmis and carriages. 
 After 1,600 romids have been fired these experiments will 
 cease. 
 
 II. Cast-Iron Guns. 
 
 M. Gruzon sent to the Paris Universal Exhibition of 
 1867 a cast-iron 4-pr. gun, surrounded with a steel jacket. 
 The Prussian Government has consented, on the request ot 
 M. Gruzon, to experiment with this gun. Practice w^as begun
 
 95 
 
 Avith cliarges of 1 lb. 15^ oz., it Ijcing proposed to increase the 
 charges to 3 lbs. 5^ oz., but tlie gim burst with a charge of 
 21b. 12 oz. 
 
 III. DiSCOXTIXUAN-CE OF THE UsE OF ShRAPXEL ShELL. 
 
 Up to tlie present time the Tkjx of the limber of the 4-pr. and 
 that of the wagon each held 48 rounds, of which thu-ty-two were 
 common shell aiid sixteen shrapnel. The Artillery not being 
 satisfied with the fuzes hitherto proposed, the shrapnel has been 
 given up, and. for tlie future, the fortv-eight rounds in the limber 
 boxes, will hold forty-ibur common shell, and four case shot. 
 
 IV. Arms of the Laxdwehr. 
 
 I, some time ago, pointed out that the Landwehr would be 
 all armed with the needle-gun ui the course of the summer 
 of 1868. This measure is now completed. Partly to hasten 
 the operation, and partly for economy, the Prussian (Tovern- 
 ment has converted the rifles, taken from tlie Austriaus, in 
 1806. The number of these, I beheve. is about 20,000. 
 
 V. Two Details of Ixstructiox. 
 
 I am ignorant of the alterations made iji our rifle drill duiing 
 the last two years ; the Prussian drill differs from oiU"s in the 
 following details : — 
 
 1. With us, the soldier fires his weapon holding the right 
 elbow on the same level as tlie shoulder. The Prussian nile, 
 on the contrary, directs that the elbow should be raised as 
 much as possible. 
 
 All the officers I have consulted agree in stathig that tlic 
 butt of the rifle is much steadier Avith the elbow thus raised, 
 owing to the hollow so produced in the shoulder joint, 
 
 2. Formerly the intonation, of the order to fire, was the same 
 Avith the Prussians as with us ; but for several years orders 
 have been given to alter the mtonation of the word Fire I It is 
 now given in alow, long tone Avith reference to the of her Avords 
 Ready! Present! — Avliich precede it. It is said here, and justly, 
 that the AA'ord Fire ! should not surprise the firer, Avhich must 
 happen, more or less, if it is giA'en in a sharp, loud tone of 
 \"oice. 
 
 I 2
 
 96 
 
 Return to Bronze; Activity of the King; Con\t:ntion 
 WITH ]\,Iecklenberg-Schwerin. 
 
 Report of olst August, 1868. 
 
 I. Return to the Ejiployjient of Bronze. 
 
 To day, the 31st August, a decision of the greatest im- 
 portance has been come to at Berhn. It is the return to the 
 empkiyment of bronze for the manufactm-e of field guns. 
 
 I refer to my reports of the 20th February and 29th July. 
 1868, to explain this result; and if I hasten to let it be known, 
 it is because this decision will exercise great influence over the 
 decision to vdiicli we in France, must come as to the material, 
 bronze or steel, to be used in oiu" future field artillery. 
 
 The return to the use of bronze, which the Prussian Artillery 
 have determined on. is a fortunate thing for France, which has 
 no steel foundry comparable to that of Krupp, and which pos- 
 sesses considerable suppHes of bronze. I gave, on the 29th 
 July, some details of the firing (before the Experimental Com- 
 mittee) at Tegel of six bronze breech-loading guns, four 4-pr. 
 and tAvo 6-pr. In consequence of the satisfactory results then 
 obtained, the Connnittee met to day, and unanimously decided 
 to return to bronze, in the manufacture of field artillery, and to 
 adopt the experimental 4 and 6-pr. 
 
 The cpiestion Avill be shortly submitted to, what is called 
 here, the " General Artillery Inspection," presided over by Prince 
 Charles; but the decision of the Committee is not doubtful. 
 It is requisite also, prior to such an important measure being 
 finally settled, that the Kmg should give his approval. 
 
 A dozen field gmis of the new pattern will be commenced 
 at once. 
 
 II. AcT^v^TY of the King. 
 
 I have already in a previous report pointed out the great 
 activity of the King, and the influence he consequently exercises 
 over the army. This is simply prodigious, and is a subject of 
 astonishment, not only to the general pnbHc, but to those 
 persons who habitually surromid'the Sovereign. His stay at 
 Ems completed, the King, taking Frankfort, Tlmringia, Erfurt, 
 and Weimar, en route, returned to Berlin on the 27th August, 
 after inspecting in 22 days the troops in all the towns and 
 surrounding country through Avhich he passed. The King 
 said recently, with evident satisfaction, '• Since I left Ems I 
 have inspected 87 battalions. 
 
 The King at present is engaged Avitb the brigade movements
 
 of the Guard. This morum*^ General Goltz (brother of the 
 Ambassador at Paris), who commands eiglit regiments of cavahy 
 of the Guard, manoeuvred five of his regiments. The various 
 movements were performed, with a precision and accuracy, 
 which our cavahy of the Imperial Guard is far from equalling. 
 I repeat again, that one can only wonder at the results, obtained 
 in regiments of all arms of the service, in the Prussian Army, 
 notwithstanding the short period of service. These manoeuvres, 
 and those of the divisions, have attracted a very great number 
 of foreign officers to Berlin. 
 
 III. Treaty with Mecklexburg-Schwerin. 
 
 Prussia has just concluded vnth the Duchy of Mecklenburg- 
 Schwerin, a ]\Iilitary Convention, m virtue of which the officers 
 of the Mecklenburg contingent, can serve in the Prussian Army 
 and vice versa. Prussia thus obtains the advantage of com- 
 manding the troops of ^Mecklenbin-g by Prussian Officers, and 
 the officers of the Duchy are also placed in a position more 
 favom'able, to their promotion, on account of their being enrolled 
 in the Prussian Army. 
 
 Reply to a Note sent by Order of tiie Ejiperor. 
 
 Report oj the l*otfi November. 1868. 
 
 This note was to the follo-v\4ng effi?ct : '•' The Army of the 
 " Confederation is composed of 330,000 men. The French Army 
 " is comjDOsed of 400,000 men, the number of regiments is almost 
 " identical. But in Prussia a battalion is composed of 000 to 700 
 " men, a squadron of 130 horses ; whilst in France the battalion 
 '• is composed of 400 men, and a squadron of 100 horses." 
 
 Reply. The numljer representing the exact effisctive 
 strength of the Federal Army must be corrected. It is 315.000 
 men, and not 330,000. 
 
 Vide my report on tliis sul^ject to the War ^linistcr, dated 
 24th June, 1868, with the attached tables, one of which is au 
 extract from the war estimates of 1869, giving the exact 
 official strength of the army of the Xorth German Confedera- 
 tion ujDon a j)eace footing. This extract shows the number 
 estimated for as 313,585, but it includes neither the Surgeons 
 nor Pay Department ; taking them into account, the niunber is 
 315,000. But it must be remarked that this number does not 
 include the troops of the Grand Duchy of Hesse-Dannstadt 
 forming the 25th division. This Duchy is divided by the ^lain 
 into two portions, that situated on the right bank belongs to 
 the Confederation, that on the left banlc is independent but
 
 9S 
 
 the troops of the •25t\i division are not inchided in the estimate. 
 I will take as a baas the ofncial figures, ;>15.000 men, ov the 
 number of the Federal Army, not including the troops of the 
 Duchy of Hesse Darmstadt. 
 
 It is undoubtedly the fact, as the note to which I reply 
 states, that the number of regiments in the two armies is 
 almost the same, but the numbers given as the effective strength 
 of the battalions and squadrons are far from being exact, and 
 should be corrected. 
 
 I will begin by pointing out that the effective strength of a 
 battalion, and squadron, is not calculated nor fixed in France as 
 ni Prussia, and the difference is sufficient to produce a great 
 difference, when the effective strength of the two armies is 
 compared. 
 
 In France, when the effective strength of a regiment is 
 spoken of, the regimental staff, the staff of non-commissioned 
 officers, and " the company not in the ranks," are not counted, 
 and consequently are not included in the effective strength of 
 the battaHon. 
 
 If we look, for example, at a three-battalion regiment 
 quartered in France, we will find — • 
 
 rRegimental staff 18 "I 
 
 T r> . i. /• o T> i-i. J Statf Non-CommissioneclOlRcers. . 59 V 152 
 
 1 Regiment of 3 Batt.. < ^ *. • *.i u i r^- \ 
 
 ° I Company not m the Kinks ., /oj 
 
 L 3 Battalions of 616 1,8^8 
 
 Total 2,000 
 
 By this method of counting there are 152 men in a regi- 
 ment who are not borne on the effective strength of the 
 battalions ; consequently, the ejfective strength of a battalion is 
 far from being one-third of the effective strength of a regiment. 
 
 In Prussia, on the contrary, they have no staff non-com- 
 missioned officer.-!, or " company not in the ranks," or more 
 correctly, they are divided between the battalions and included 
 in their effective strength, whence it results, that the effective 
 strength of a battalion is almost exacthj one-third of that of the 
 regiment. 
 
 The effective strength of an infantry regiment of the Line 
 may be analysed as follows : — 
 
 T T> • i- r o T3 ii- f Regimental Staff . . 20 
 
 lEeg,mentof3Batt..|3g-.^^^^^.^^^^^f55^ .. 1,662 
 
 Total 1,682 
 
 Thus, in Prussia there are only 20 men in a regiment who 
 are not borne on the effective strength of the battalions. 
 Whilst in a French regiment there are 152. But in Prussia, I 
 repeat, each battalion of 554 men includes one-third of the 
 total number of workmen, (tailors and shoemakers), armoiu'ers, 
 hospital orderlies, -Sec. of the entire regiment.
 
 28 y 
 
 8G 
 
 48 1 
 
 
 532 
 
 1,59G 
 
 99 
 
 A regiment has only 10 imisicians paid as such ou the 
 estimates, tlie 30 otliers are taken from tlic ranks, and a certain 
 simi is added to their pay hy snbscription amongst tlie officers. 
 These 10 musicians are hichided in the regimental staff, and are 
 looked on as combatants. The 554 men in a battalion may be 
 analysed as follows : — 
 
 f 532 Combatants, vi/., 18 Officers, 53 Xon-Commis- 
 
 I sioned Officers, 461 Soldiers (of whom IG 
 
 1 Battalion . , •{ arc fifers and di-ummers) . 
 
 I 22 Nou-Combatants (workmen, annourers, hospital 
 
 L orderlies) . 
 
 Total . . 554 men. 
 
 If it is desired to analyse a Prussian regiment exactly as is 
 done in the French ser^^ce, the following table results : — 
 
 {Regimental Staff 
 Stalf Non-Commissioned Offi,.ers. , 
 tompauy not m the lianka 
 3 Battalions of 
 
 Total 1,682 
 
 Thus the battalion of 554 men is reduced to 532 ; but this 
 analysis has no signification, because the staff non-commissioned 
 officers, and the company not in the ranks, do not exist as 
 separate bodies, but are divided amongst the battalions. 
 
 From what I have just stated, it is apparent that to compare 
 the effective strength of the French and Federal iVrmies. the 
 umuber and strength of the regiments, must be compared 
 rather than the number and strength of the battalions. How- 
 ever, I give in the annexed table the two lands of comparison. 
 
 This table shows that the Federal Army has 114 regunents 
 of infantry, and 16 battalions of rifles. The French Army has 
 115 regiments, and 21 l)attalions of rifles, also 3 battalions of 
 African light infantry. The total nmnber of Federal battaHons 
 being 358 and French 372. and the effective strength of the 
 two infantries is — 
 
 Men. 
 
 Infantry of the Confederation 203,28G 
 
 French* Infantry 263,000 
 
 The latter being thus 59,714 men stronger, because its 
 regiments are stronger. 
 
 I do not know the exact number of uifantry regiments in 
 Algiers at present, I assume it to be 10. In the tables comparing 
 the armies by battalions, I have taken the strength of the 
 Gennan battalions as they are counted in Prussia, -s-iz.. oue- 
 tliird of the strength of the regiment, less 20 men ; and for the 
 French battalions, the strength has been taken as in France, 
 one-third of the strength of the reghnent, less 152 to 1(50 men 
 (152 if the regiment is composed of 2,000 men). These tables 
 show the correction which should be made in the strength of 
 the French, and Prussian battalions, referred to in the note to
 
 100 
 
 which I reply. If the cftoeiive .strength of a hattahon is taken 
 as the unit, on whicli to baRe the comparison l)etween the two 
 armies, the average effective strength of a battaHon mnst be 
 used. 
 
 Now the tables show that the infantry of the Federal Army 
 is composed of 358 battalions of 560 men (the strength of a 
 battalion being counted as in Prussia). The French infantry is 
 composed of 372 battalions of 664 men (the strength being- 
 counted as in France). 
 
 The eifective strength of the cavalry, gives rise to similar 
 observations, or in other words, the effective strength of a 
 squadron, is not based on the same data in France, as in Prussia. 
 In France, the staff non-commissioned officers, and the troop 
 not in the ranks, are counted separately ; while in Prussia they 
 are di^dded amongst the squadrons, and included in the effec- 
 tive strength. AVheiice it follows that the effective strength of 
 a German squadron is much nearer one-fifth of a regiment 
 (there are five squadrons in a regiment) than the effective 
 strength of a French squadron is to one-fifth or one-sixth of a 
 regiment (according as there are five or six squadrons in a 
 regiment). The following table shows this : — 
 
 Men. Horses. 
 fEcfrimental Staff, Staff Nou-] 
 
 Commissioned OfRccrs, and > 110 
 Troop not in the Ranks . . J 
 5 Squadrons of 1,140 men, and 1 ^^^ r^r. 
 110 hoi'scs . . . . . . J 
 
 Total 810 550 
 
 1 French Eegiment of 
 5 Squadrons . . 
 
 fEegimcntal Staff, Staff jSTon- 
 
 , _, , _ . . /« Commissioned OtRccrs, and 
 
 1 French Regiment of ' r^ ^^^^ .^^ ^,^^ ^,^^^^^ _ _ j 
 
 6 Squadrons . . ^ g Squadrons of 110 men and "l 
 
 'i^ 110 liorses . . . . , , J 
 
 Men. 
 
 Horses 
 
 113 
 
 •• 
 
 840 
 
 660 
 
 953 
 
 660 
 
 Total 
 
 The strength of the regiment exceeds, therefore, the strength 
 of the five or six squadrons by 110 to 113 men. 
 
 f 142 Combatants, viz., 5 Officers, 16 Non- 
 
 I Commissioned Officers, 121 men, 
 
 1 German Squrdi'on. -j (including 3 trumpeters), and 
 
 139 horses. 
 (^ 5 Non-Conibatauts. 
 
 Total . . 147 men, and 139 horses. 
 
 Men. Horses. 
 
 r Regimental Staff 14 
 
 1 Geiman Regiment ■< 5 Squadrons of 147 men and 139 1 ,^o- gg- 
 [ horses . . , . . . . . J 
 
 Total 749 695 
 
 Here there is a difference onlv of 14 men between the
 
 101 
 
 actual strength of a regiment, and five times the actual Btreugth 
 of a squadron. 
 
 I have estimated in the accompanying tables the strengtli 
 of the German squadron, as is done in Prussia, including the 
 staff non-commissioned officers, and the troop not in the ranks, 
 and I have preserved for the French squadrons our systen.i (jf 
 calculation. The following are the results : — 
 
 For the Cavalry of the Federal Army — ■ 
 
 370 Squadrons of 147 Men and 139 Horses. 
 For the French Cavalry — 
 
 318 Squadrons of 141 Men and 111 Ilorseg. 
 
 Thus, we have not only fewer sqnadi-ons, but a smaller 
 average strength per squadron, and, nevertheless, the total 
 force of our cavalry is greater. This follows, 1 again repeat, 
 from the method we adopt, of not hicluding in the strength 
 of the squadrons, the staff non-commissioned officers, and the 
 troop not in the ranks, which are included in Prussia. 
 
 The recapitulation at the end of these tables gives the total 
 effective strength of the Regular Army — infantry, cavalrv, 
 artillery, engineers, and train. The Federal Army being 301,784 
 men, is 13,000 below the strength provided in the estimate 
 (315,000). The French Army is 27,500 below its strength. 
 The "gendarmerie" alone accounting for 21,55<j of the last 
 figure.
 
 102 
 
 FRENCH ARMY (400.000 Men 
 
 Infantet. 
 
 115 Eegiments, 110 icith 3 Bn., 1 imtJi 2 Bn., 4 with 4 B/i 
 
 21 Battalions of Eifles 
 
 3 Battalions of African Liglit lufantry . . 
 
 .. U72Bn. 
 
 Effective STEEXGTn estimated bt the Regiments. 
 
 Men. 
 
 f 90 in France liaTC . . . . 2,000~ 
 
 10 in Algiers have . . . . 2,300 
 
 I 1 (Foreign Regiment) has. . 3,000 
 
 115 Regiments . , ■{ 3 ZouaTc in Algiers have . . 3,500 
 
 3 Rille in Algiers have . . 4,000 
 
 7 of the Gnard have . . 2,139 
 
 1 „ „ has . . 1,388 j 
 
 " 18 in France hare . . . . 800 | 
 
 21 Bn. of Rifles -I 2 in Algiers have . . . . 900 
 
 1 of the Guard has . . 996 | 
 
 3 Bn. of African Light Infantry liave. . , . 900 J 
 
 Total of the 115 Regts. 
 
 and 24 Bn., 264,000. 
 263,000 in our estimates. 
 
 Effective Steei^gth estimated bt Battalions, 
 
 Bn. 
 90 Regiments of the Line stationed in France 270 
 10 ., „ „ Algiers 30 
 
 The Foreign Regiment 
 3 Regiments of Zouaves of the Line 
 3 Regiment^ of Native Ritlos 
 7 Regiments of the Guard . . 
 
 Regiment of Zouaves of the Guard 
 IS Battalions of Rifles in France 
 
 2 ,, ,, Algiers 
 Battalion of Rifles of the Guard . . 
 
 3 Battalions of African Light Infantry 
 
 Total .. 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 12 
 
 21 
 
 2 
 
 18 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 Men. 
 at 616~ 
 „ 712 
 „ 700 
 „ 1,100 
 „ 945 
 „ 665 
 „ 650 
 „ 800 
 „ 9^0 
 „ 996 
 „ 900 
 
 372 Bn. 
 
 Total 372 Bn. 
 246,971. 
 
 This gives an average per Battalion of 664 men. 
 
 It may be therefore said that the French Army consists of 372 Battalions 
 composed of an average q/'664 men. 
 
 BemarTc. — The difference between the total sti'cngth, 264,000 of the Infantry 
 and that of the 372 Battalions (246,971), arises from the 152 or 160 men -who in each 
 regiment are not borne on the strength of the Battalions, r/c?e page 99.
 
 103 
 
 FEDERAL ARMY (315,000 Men). 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 11-4 Regiments (of 3 Battahonn) .. ■ . 1 m . i o-o -o Li ^■ 
 
 -iovf^v FT>n > Total, 3o8 Battalions. 
 
 16 l>attauoii3 of limes . . . . . . J ' 
 
 Effectiyi: Strength estijiated et Regiments. 
 
 Men. 
 r 105 have .. .. 1,6821 
 
 lU Regiments { 4 „ .. .. 1,694 
 
 5 " • * • • g'^gg J. Total, 203,286 men. 
 
 16 Battalions of Rifles hare . . . . '560 J 
 
 Effective Steength esti^iated by Battalions. 
 
 105 Regiments -witli 1,682 Men liaye 315 Battalions with 554 Men. 
 
 4 „ „ 1,694 „ „ 12 „ „ 558 „ 
 
 5 „ „ 2,188 „ „ 15 „ „ 710 „ 
 16 Battalions of Rifles have 16 ,, „ 560 „ 
 
 Total .. ..358 „ 200,816 „ 
 
 This gives an average of 560 men per Battalion. 
 
 It may be therefore said that the Federal Armv consists of 35S Battalions v.'ith 
 an average of 560 men. 
 
 Semark. — The difierence between the total effective strength (203.286) and that 
 of the 358 Battalions (200,816), arises from the 20 men who in each regiment are not 
 borne on the effective strength of the Battahons, vide page 98.
 
 104 
 
 FREXCn CAVALRY. 
 
 63 Regiments ofw'!nch 30 have o Siinadrons, 33 have 6 Squadrons ; total, 318 Squad. 
 
 Men. 
 30 Regiments with 5 Squadrons hare 
 
 33 
 
 Regiments with 5 Squadrons hare .. .. 811) ri^>roAn,,^„ 
 
 T, . , ..IPC! T r 24 in Franco have 953 [ TotaW ^Z';;^" f ®"- 
 Regiments with 6 Squads. | g j^ ^j^-^^^ ^^,^^^ ^ -^^^ ( \ 4o,000 liorsei 
 
 54 Regiments in France hare 291 Squadrons with 140 men and 110 horses. 
 9 „ Algiers „ 54 „ „ 166 „ 120 „ 
 
 „,oc< ^ 1- r 50,924 n 
 
 348 Squadrons, making -i. gg goQ |j 
 
 124 men. 
 orses. 
 
 This gives an average of 14 (■ men and 111 horses to each Squadron ; or it may 
 be said, the French Cavah-y consists of 348 Squadrons o/144 men and 111 horses. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 22 Regiments (incUiding Poutoniers) have 202 Batteries and companies. 
 Effective strength 36,700 men, 19,200 horses. 
 
 ENaI^^EERS. 
 3 Regiments, effective strength . . . . 6,70* men and 699 horses 
 
 TRAIN. 
 
 13 Squadrons {TraSwaJons}^^*'^^ strength, 8,954 men, 7,710 hor 
 
 fses. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavah-y 
 
 Ai-tillery 
 
 Engineers 
 Train 
 
 EECAPITI 
 
 Total .. 
 
 JLATION. 
 
 Men. 
 
 .. 263,000 
 
 .. 57,200 
 
 .. 36,700 
 
 6,704 
 
 8,954 
 
 Horses. 
 
 45,000 
 
 19,200 
 
 699 
 
 7,710 
 
 
 .. 372,558 
 
 72,608 
 
 The difference between these figures and the number given in the estimates, is 
 27,500 men ; this number represents the Gendarmes at home and in the colonies — 
 
 The Gendarmes of the Guard 21,556 
 
 The Paris Guard . . . . ' 2,896 
 
 The Fire Brigades 1,572 
 
 The Yetci'an Companies, Discipline Companies, and Remount "1 , .^/. 
 Depots / ^'^'^ 
 
 Total 
 
 27,500
 
 105 
 
 FEDERAL CAVALRY. 
 
 Total. 
 74 Regiments with 5 Squadrons 370 squadrons. 
 
 The 74 Regiments Lave 749 men and 744 horses -f ?^^!2 i'"^"' 
 
 L 00,088 horses. 
 
 (Account is taken of the slightly greater strengtli of the regiments of Life Guards.) 
 Eacli Squadron has 147 men and 139 horses. 
 
 o^-A a 1 ^ r o4,o00 men. 
 
 370 Squadrons hare < ri <or> i 
 
 ^ I 51,430 horses. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 '12 of Field Artillery, each -nitli 15 Batteries, one with 16 Batteries— 
 
 oo T> • i I 19'' Batteries. 
 
 zd Itegmients < -,r^ r n ■ 4 -n -.i « /-i • , „ t^- . . 
 
 '^ I lOot (jrarrison Ariihcry, with S Companies, and 3 Divisions or 92 
 
 L companies. 
 Total Efloctive Strength 33,105 men and 10,000 horses. 
 
 ENGINEERS. 
 
 13 Battalions. Total Effective Strength, 6,747 men and 91 horses. 
 
 TRAIX. 
 
 13 Battalions. Total Eflcctive Strength, 3,107 men and 1,599 horses. 
 
 Infantry 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Artillery 
 
 Engineers 
 
 Train 
 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Horses. 
 
 203,286 
 
 
 55,449 
 
 55,088 
 
 33,195 
 
 1,000 
 
 6,747 
 
 91 
 
 3,007 
 
 1,590 
 
 Total 
 
 301,784 
 
 66,778 
 
 The difference between these figures and those shown in the estimates, or 13,000 
 men, is made up as follows : — 
 
 Men. 
 2,845 
 3,910 
 
 Instructional Battalion, School for N.-C. O., Rifle Schools, "1 
 Cavalry School . . . . . . . . . . . . J 
 
 Landwehr Cadres . . . . 
 
 Officers not on the Strength of Regiments . . . . . . 1.500 
 
 Invalids, various Troops (Companies of Discipline and the I ^ ^^~ 
 Palace Guard) . . . . . . . • ■ • • • J 
 
 Total 
 
 13,000
 
 106 
 
 Competitive Trials between the English 9-inch Gun and 
 THE Prussian 96 and 72-poltnders. 
 
 Reports of the 10th July and '2'2nd Novemher, 166^.* 
 
 The artillery experiments of every land whicli have been 
 made during the last year in Prussia have been on a very 
 extensive scale, almost unequalled in any other country. The 
 expense of these experiments has been enormous. A single 
 iron shield, to winch I will hereafter refer, costing no less than 
 16,000/. But the Prussian Government hesitates at no sacrifice 
 to obtain the folloAving information : — 
 
 1. The guns ^-ith which its ships must be eventually 
 armed. 
 
 2. The best guns for, and the best coast defences. 
 
 Such is the object of these continued and costly experi- 
 ments, Avliicli are in the highest degree interesting to the 
 artillery, the navy, the numerous artizans employed in the iron 
 and steel works, and, indeed, to the whole country. 
 
 The results hitherto obtamed have surpassed all expectation, 
 and filled all classes of the nation Avith pride and satisfaction. 
 
 The newspapers entertain no doubt but that the young 
 German Navy Avill shortly be able to struggle against the 
 other European navies ; and all celebrated with deUght the 
 victory which, according to their views, the Prussian iron and 
 steel manufacturers have obtained over those of England. 
 
 Prior to 18()6. Prussia, deprived of harbours, had obtained 
 from a little neighbouring State (the Duchy of Oldenburg) the 
 cession of the harbour of Jade, to the west of the mouth of the 
 Weser. She is there attemptmg to make a great naval estab- 
 lishment. Since 1864, the Government has made many ex- 
 periments at this place with iron plates, fired at by both bronze 
 and iron 72-prs. 
 
 But since the events of 1866 created the ISorth German 
 Confederation, this Confederation has assumed the position 
 of a great naval power, and Prussia has redoubled her efforts 
 to increase, and develop her }'oung navy. In everytliing that 
 relates to the armament of ships, and coast batteries, she 
 seeks to determine the kind of gun to adopt, for both ser^aces. 
 
 * We liiiTc tliought it desirable (o throw these two reports into one. It appears 
 from that, of the 10th July, that Colonel Stoffel -nas not allowed by the Prussian War 
 Minister to see the experiments referred to, and he expresses his regret at not being 
 able to give as accurate an account of them as was desirable. 
 
 In the mouth of January, 1870, he sent to the Minister of War at Paris a copy of 
 a pamphlet, which is a German translation of an article published in Russia, in the 
 second volume of the Journal of Artillery, written by M. Uoppelmair, Captain of the 
 Horse Artillery of the Russian Imperial C4uard, who had been authorized to witness 
 the experiments at Tegel, near Berlin. Colonel Sloflel asked the War Minister to 
 have the pamphlet translated into French, as it was very accurate and a very good 
 account, of these interesting experiments, — [Ed."]
 
 107 
 
 111 England, 'Mr. Armstrong having, after many trials and 
 an expenditure of more than a million sterling, siieeeeded in 
 demonstrating the power of his ij-inoh muzzle-loading gun, 
 termed the Wooh^-ich gun; Prussian officers were sent to England, 
 and returned, convinced that this gun, was the gun, of the future, 
 and that Prussia should simply adopt it. But jM. Krupp and a 
 great number of officers protested. " Are you going," said they, 
 " ^^dtllout even daring to make a competitive trial, to acknoAv- 
 '• ledge the inferiority of the steel guns made at Essen, and 
 *' entu-ely abandon the undoubted advantage of breech-loaders'? 
 " Are you going to destroy a manufactm-e of which Prussia is 
 '•' so justly proud, and render this country for ever tributary 
 " to a foreign state f 
 
 These reasons carried the day ; and it Avas decided to make 
 competitive trials with the two gmis, and, with this view, 
 the Naval Department at Berlin piu-chased in England a 9-inch 
 Armstrong giui for 1,620/. 
 
 The experiment of ffiing this i)-inch gun and the Oli-pr. 
 against plates of iron was shortly after begun at the Tcgel 
 range. 
 
 The following are the principal dimensions of the guns : — 
 
 English yun, termed the 9-inch, or Wooh^ich gun, of wrought- 
 iron, with a steel lining ; calibre, 9-inch ; weight, 28,820 lbs. ; 
 muzzle-loaduig, firing cast-iron Palliser projectiles ; weight of' 
 shell, loaded, 24:9'7 lbs.; weight of charge of shell. 2*7 lbs.; 
 weight of charge of gun, 4oi lbs. of English large grain 
 powder. 
 
 Prussian gun, termed the 96-pr., made of cast-steel ; caHbre, 
 9*27 inches (9 Prussian inches) ; breech-loading; breech closed 
 by a cyluidi-o prismatic wedge ; weight, inchicHng breech- 
 loading apparatus, 32,230 lbs., firing Krupp projectiles of cast- 
 steel, or Gruzon projectiles of cast-iron; average weight of the 
 latter, loaded, 33G'4 lbs. ; Avcight of lead coating, 59*8 lbs. ; 
 weight of charge of gun, 4(ro lbs. of Prussian powder, which 
 is equivalent to 39 lbs. of English powder. 
 
 M. Krupp made tAvo 9H-prs. especially foi* these trials, 
 strengthened at the breech by steel rings. They Avere sent 
 to Tegel, where three shields Avere made to represent the side 
 of ii'on-clads, AAdth plates 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 inches, backed by tunber 
 of 30 to 15 niches in thickness. 
 
 A begmimig Avas made by firing the Prussian guns, to 
 determine the initial A^elocity that could be obtained, preser\'ing 
 sufficient accuracy of fire. "With a charge of 4(3*3 lbs. 
 Prussian powder, the initial A'clocity of the projectile, measured 
 by the Boulonge apparatus, AA^as 1,142 feet per second, much 
 beloAv that of the AVoohvich gun. Avhicli was 1,324 feet per 
 second. Several trials AA^ere then made, Avith the object of 
 increasing the initial velocity, first by increasing the charge 
 of Prussian poAvder, then by using Enghsh large grain poAvder, 
 Avhicli biu-ns more rapidly. But the results Avere not deemed 
 satisfactory ; the English poAvder Avas thought too strong for
 
 108 
 
 the 96-pr. gun ; and it "was fuund, that with a charge of 
 49*6 lb. of Prussian poAvder, the accuracy began to diminish, 
 while the increase of initial velocity did not exceed 19*68 feet. 
 
 The first competitve trial, between the rival guns took 
 place on the 2nd June. 
 
 The Enghsh gun, fired with a charge of 43|- lbs., four blind 
 Palliser shells, weighing 250*3 lbs., the initial velocity being 
 1,324 feet per second. The first was fired at a range of 
 988*3 yards, agahist a 6-inch plate ; tAvo others were fired at 
 a range of 781 yards, against a 7-inch plate ; and the fourth 
 at a range of 514*1 yards, against an 8-inch plate. The four 
 projectiles passed completely through the shields, breaking up, 
 so to speak, as they came out. 
 
 The Prussian gun (96-pr.) fired, "wdth a charge of 49*6 lbs. 
 of Prussian powder, two Gruzon projectiles, Aveighing 336*4 lbs. 
 with an initial velocity of 1,151 feet per second; one at a range 
 of 988*3 yards, against a 5-incli plate, the other at a range 
 of 514*1 yards, against the 8-inch plate. The first pierced the 
 plates and the backing, breaking into three pieces ; the second 
 remained fixed in the backing. This first trial was evidently 
 entirely in favour of the English gun. 
 
 It would be very difficult for us in France to conceive the 
 emotion, not only of Berlin, but all Prussia, at the result. The 
 Cloverimient, the manufacturer, the Artillery Avere, for a moment, 
 struck Avith consternation. Was the Government to be tram- 
 melled in its attempts to develop the rising naA^y of North 
 Germany ? Was all the money hitherto spent in armmg the 
 ships throAvn aAv^ay ? This steel manufacture, so much ahead 
 of the rest of the Avorld, of Avliich Prussia AA'as so proud, was 
 it all at once going to fail ? By a sort of paradox, as is often 
 obser\^ed AAdien the passions are greatly excited, the conse- 
 quence of this trial Avas to rencAV the disputes which 
 divided the Priissian Artillery into hostile factions, the partisans 
 of steel and those of 1)ronze. The latter reproached their 
 opponents, first, with alloAving themselves to be beaten by the 
 English Avith a gun costing one-half that of the Prussian gun ; 
 next, with liaAdng compromised the manufacture for Avliich 
 Prussia is celebrated. General Neuman, the* creator of the 
 neAV steel materiel, and the partisans of M. Krupp, replied to 
 these attacks almost as follows : — 
 
 " The trials of the 2nd June are not couclusiA^e, because 
 " they haA'o not been made under similar conditions. The 
 " English gun has fired Ax-ith largo grain powder, Avhilst Ave 
 " have used our common poAvder. Noav the first has a gi-eater 
 " expansive force, whence it follows that the English projectile 
 " acquires an initial velocity of 164 feet per second greater than 
 '• the Prussian projectile, in addition to Avhich the head of the 
 '• English shell is sharper than otus. Let us make a second 
 *' trial, and let us use piismatic poAvder Avitli large grains ; let 
 '* us change the shape of the head of our })rojectiles. Let us 
 <' diminish the Aveight of the lead envelope, so that the loss of
 
 109 
 
 " vis viva may bo less when impact takes place. Do this, 
 ■' and the yG-pomider gun Avill beat the Eugh.sh gun. " 
 
 *• AVe are in a poi^ition to guarantee this, for by the latest 
 " Kus>sian accounts, a Kru])p Dlj-pounder gun has been fired 
 '■ with prismatic powder, and has given wonderful results, thanks 
 •• to an initial velocitv, exceeding that of the Armstrong 
 '• gun.* Our projectile is heavier than the English, which, with 
 '' equal velocities, is a great advantage. 
 
 '• Finally, for equal weights, English po^^'der gives a pressm'e 
 '• of 5,900 atmospheres, which is dangerous to the gun, while 
 " prismatic powder gives a pressure of 4,000 atmospheres which 
 '• our gun will resist. So far as cost goes, if the Prussian gun 
 '• costs twice as much as the Enghsli gun, Avhich is of u'on, it 
 *• will undoubtedly last twice as long."' 
 
 New trials were then undertaken, A^'ith the view of increasing 
 the vis viva of the Prussian projectiles. 
 
 They began by altering one of the 9G-pr. guns, so as to 
 make it a central-fire gun, and, on the 2nd July, fired it with 
 charges of prismatic powder. The initial velocities were found 
 much increased, for two Gruzon projectiles, weighing 33G"4 lbs., 
 when fired, one Avith a charge of 49*6 lbs. of prismatic poAvder, 
 the other A^dth a charge of 52'9 lbs., gaA^o the former an initial 
 A^elocity of 1,243*8 feet per second, the latter a velocity of 
 1,286*4 feet per second. A projectile Aveighing 29o*6 lbs., fired 
 AA'ith a charge of r)2'9 lbs., gave an initial A-elocity of 1,345*5 
 feet per second. And it Avas found that the 96~pr., fired Avith 
 such heaA'y charges of prismatic poAvder, retained A^er}- great 
 accuracy. 
 
 The form of the Gruzon projectiles Avas next altered, its 
 head Avas lengthened, its diameter at the base increased, and 
 the lead cnA^elope Avas replaced by scA^eral belts of lead. 
 
 As the initial A^elocities obtained on the 2nd July Avere 
 superior to those giA^en by the English gun, the hopes of the 
 Prussian officers and artizans Avere raised. They Avaited Avith 
 the greatest anxiety for the next competitiA'c trial of the tAvo 
 guns. This took place on the 7th July, in presence of the "War 
 J\linister, xVdmiral Jachman, the Experimental Committee, and 
 a great number of officers. 
 
 The "Woohvich gun fired tAvo projectiles at a range of 514 
 yards against a 9-incli plate, the first Avtighing 242 lbs., 
 pierced the plate and penetrated two inches into the timber 
 backing. The head of the projectile remaining there, and the 
 cylincbical portion breakmg iq? into several portions. The second 
 projectile also pierced the plate, and penetrated 3*9 inches into 
 the timber backing. The head remauiing fixed there, the 
 remainder came out of the hole. Four rounds Avere then fired 
 from the 9G-pr. gun, AA'ith a ch;irge of 52*9 lbs. prismatic 
 poAvder, tAvo Gruzon and one Krupp projectile, against an 
 
 * In a trial recently made at Essen with prismatic powder, au initial Telocity 
 superior to tliat of the Kussian trials was obtained. 
 
 K
 
 no 
 
 8-iiicli plate, and one Knipp against a D-incli })late ; the range 
 being 514 yards. The heads of the projectiles having been 
 modified to give a better penetration. The first Clruzon pro- 
 jectile pierced the plate, the head remained fixed in the 
 Avood, and the cylindrical part l)roke up into several fragments. 
 The second Gruzon projectile pierced the shield entirely, and 
 broke into fragments. The Krupp projectile, the head of 
 which had been altered so as to give an angle of 60° pierced 
 the iron plate and the timber backing, destroying a large 
 portion of it. It was fonnd almost intact 100 yards in rear. 
 Lastly, the Krupp projectile fired at the D-inch plate, pierced it 
 and penetrated .3'-4 inches into the timber. 
 
 It would be imprudent to generahze on trials such as these, 
 Avhich arc only competitive between one individual gun and 
 another. However this may be, at Berlin it was considered 
 that the trials of the 7th July with the 96-pr., fired at a range 
 of 514 yards, proved that it would penetrate as far into an 
 iron-clad covered Ayith 8 inches of iron as the ^^'oolwich gun, 
 and that it would destroy the wooden backing more completely, 
 making a larger hole ; and it was added, that if none of the 
 rival projectiles had penetrated the shield with the 9-inch plates 
 completely, yet the 9(i-pr. projectiles had penetrated more deeply 
 than those from the English gun. 
 
 Everywhere the results of the trial of the 7th July were 
 received with the keenest satisfaction. The partisans of the 
 Prussian gun looked on these residts as a victory obtained, by 
 the Prussian artillery, and Prussian manufacturers. 
 
 They pretend that the latter, left to their own resources, have 
 excelled the English manufacturers, who have received fi'oni 
 the State 2,000,000/. sterling for improving and perfecting 
 heavy artillery. They also declare that the Enghsh have never 
 been able to make a breech-loading 7-incli Armstrong gun, 
 which only corresponds to guns firing projectiles of 121 lbs,, 
 while the Prussian manufacturers have constructed 96-pr. guns, 
 throwing projectiles weighmg 330'9 lbs. 
 
 That Avhich gratified them most in these experiments made 
 at Tegel, Avas that the Prussian projectiles pierced an 8-inch 
 plate with an initial A^elocity of 1,286*4 feet per second, and 
 consequently it Avas not requisite to luxA^e recourse to an initial 
 A^elocity of 1,415 feet per second, which corresponded to a 
 pressure of gas, dangerous for the gun. 
 
 On the 4th August neAV experiments Avere carried out to 
 determine the effects of Gruzon projectiles, coA'ered with a thin 
 coatiiig of lead, because the previous experiments, had caused 
 the idea of replacing it with leaden belts to be giA^en up. 
 
 They also AAdshed to try the effect of an elongated Palliser 
 projectile, and to compare the effects produced by the various 
 projectiles Avhen loaded. 
 
 The first rounds were fired against the 8-incli plate at a 
 range of 514 yards. The 9()-pr. gun. loaded Avith 52*9 lbs. of 
 prismatic powder, fired a Gruzon projectile, Ayhich pierced the
 
 Ill 
 
 plate and penetrated the timber backing, entering* some inches 
 into it. The Woolwich gun, fired Avith 43 lb.s. of English 
 powder and an elongated PalHser projectile Aveighing 242 lbs., 
 penetrated the plate, the projectile entering 7*<S inches into the 
 tiniljer Inicking. 
 
 Loaded shells Avere next fired against the 7-incli plate at a 
 range of 782 yards. 
 
 Weight of loaded Palliser sliell. 2.'!>0-o lbs.; weight of charge, 
 5-8 lbs. 
 
 Weight of loaded Jvrnpp sheih 277*0 lbs,: Aveight of charge. 
 7*1 lbs. of poAA'der. 
 
 Weight of loaded (iruziiii shell. ;U()*2 lbs. : Aveight of charge, 
 2*6 lbs. of poAvder. 
 
 The charges of poAvder for tlie gnns Avere 52*9 lbs. of pris- 
 matic powder for the *J(i-pr. gun. and 43^- lbs. of English poAvder 
 for the Woohvich gun. 
 
 The object of these trials Avas to compare the effects pro- 
 duced by the Gruzon and Krupp shells when loaded and Avhen 
 blind. The first Avas much more successful than the second, 
 for it pierced completely the shield, and, bursting inside, would 
 liaA^e produced serious effects. 
 
 The Krupp shell. OAving to its lieaA-y cliarge, produced a 
 large opening. 
 
 The Palliser shell produced the rcA^erse efiect, or in other 
 Avords, the loaded did less damage than the blind shell. 
 
 At the conclusion of these experiments, further trials were 
 made to determine the best kind of poAvder to use. the Aveight 
 of the charge, and the shape of the projectile. The Artillery 
 Officers of the Committee seemed to thiidi that the 72-pr. gun, 
 Avith a calibre of only 8 inches, AA'ould compare favom-ably Avith 
 the English O-incli giui. 
 
 EXPERDIEXTS WITH THE StEEL 72-POUXDER. 
 
 As I liaA^e already said, the Prussian Artillery had. pricn* to 
 18(j(), made some experimental practice Avith the 72-pr. gun 
 against shields representing sections of iron-clads. For experi- 
 mental practice at Tegel, M. Krupp made tAvo steel 72-prs., 
 Avith a cylindro prismatic breech-closing apparatus. Avith a 
 double wedge. One of these guns Avas lieaA^er than those 
 formerly made, because it Avas obserA^ed that the cariages Avere 
 damaged; the other Avas strengthened Avith steel rings in 
 order that it, too, might fu*e lieaA^ charges. The folio Aving 
 are the chief chmensions of these guns. 
 
 72-pr. gun not belted; cast steel; calibre, 8 inches; Aveight, 
 breech-closmg apparatus included, 10.8r)-t lbs. : Ih'ing Gruzon 
 and Knipp projectiles; weight of Gruzon shell, loaded, 22()*() lbs.; 
 Aveight of lead euA^elope, 48*5 lbs.; Aveight of charge, 24*2 lbs. 
 of Prussian poAvder. 
 
 72-pr. belted gun; cast-steel, llt*() i]:ches longer than the 
 former grm, Avith a somcAvhat la)-ger chamber ; calibre. 8 inches; 
 Aveight, Avith breech-closing apparatus, 14.8110 lbs.; firing Krupp 
 
 k'2
 
 112 
 
 and Gruzoii projectiles ; ■\veig'lit of the Gruzun shell, filled, 
 220*6 lbs. ; Aveight of the lead envelope, 48'5 lbs. ; weight of 
 the charge, 1 9*8 lbs. of Prussian powder. 
 
 Practice was begun by firing both guns with different 
 charges both of connnon and prismatic powder, to ascertain 
 their initial A^elocities. It was observed that Avlien the charges 
 did not exceed 22'06lbs. or 24*2 Gibs, of powder, the two kmds 
 of powder gave nearly the same velocity (1,050 to 1,083), but 
 when larger charges were used, the velocities due to the 
 prismatic powder mcreased much more rapidly than those due 
 to the ordinary powder. 
 
 The following results were arrived at, preserving the re- 
 quisite accuracy of fire, and not exceeding the strength of the 
 two guns : — 
 
 72-pr. gun unbelted, fh-ed with 28"678 lbs. of prismatic 
 powder, gave an initial velocity of 1222'5 feet per second. 
 
 72-pr. gun belted, fii'ed with 37'5lbs. of powder, gave a 
 velocity of 1.378 feet per second. 
 
 It was decided to employ the latter of these charges when 
 firing against iron plates, the projectiles being similar in con- 
 struction to those recently used with the 96-pr. gun. 
 
 On the 22nd September experiments were begun by firing 
 against shields made to resemble sections of vessels. 
 
 1. Practice with the 72-pr. gun not belted; seven Gru/on 
 projectiles Avere fired, from this gun at a range of 164 yards Avith 
 charges of 24*2 lbs. and 28" 6 lbs., some of common, and some of 
 prismatic poAvder. 
 
 Results : Tavo shells, with 24*2 lbs. of poAvder, completely 
 penetrated the 5-inch plate, and a portion of the backing ; tAvo 
 shells, fired Avitli 24*2 lbs. of poAvder, one Avith common the other 
 Avith prismatic poAvder, penetrated the 6-incli plate and remained 
 fixed in the Avood. Lastly, tAvo shells, fired with 24*2 lbs. and 
 28*67 lbs. of prismatic poAvder, completely penetrated the 6-inch 
 plate and a portion of the backing. 
 
 2. Practice with the 72-pr. belted gun : — 
 
 This practice was carried on against 8-incli and 9-inch plates 
 at 514 yards, with a charge of 37'5 lbs. of prismatic poAvdcr. 
 
 Results„- A Krupp projectile struck the 9-incli plate and 
 penetrated scA^en inches; a Gruzon projectile completely pierced 
 the 8-incli plate and the 32 inches of timber backing, its cylin- 
 drical portion falling 200 yards beloAV the target. 
 
 Another Gruzon projectile struck the 9-inch plate, pierced 
 it, and penetrated 6*3 inches into the backing. 
 
 The results obtained Avitli the. belted gun are truly astonish- 
 ing ; and it is not to be Avondered at that they liaA^e been most 
 gratifyhig to the Artillery officers, Avho already look upon this 
 gun as the Aveapon the large A'cssels of the German NaA^y Avill 
 carry. 
 
 The salient point of these facts behig that the 72-pr. gmi, 
 filled Avith 37.^- lb. of prismatic poAvder, penetrated the target 
 Auth as much ease as the 96-pr. gun did. The cpiestion of
 
 113 
 
 belting all tlie heavy 72-pr. guni-i, and altering tlieir breecli- 
 apparatus, is now being discnssed, in order that tliey may be 
 nsed as the armament of large vessels. 
 
 The officers have no doubt but that the 72-pr., which has 
 penetrated the 8-inch plate, ^^dll also penetrate the D-inch plate, 
 which no projectile has yet penetrated, if Krupp's steel sheila 
 be used. 
 
 They also say, that the greater number of foreign iron- 
 clads are covered vnth 4|- to 5-incli plates only, that a very 
 small number carry 8-incli plates, and that the 72-pr. gun, 
 adopted as a Prussian naval gun, can penetrate almost all the 
 iron-clads in the world. 
 
 Experi:mexts to Test the Exduraxce of the Gun. 
 
 It was determined, with the view of testing the strength 
 of the guns to fire five or six hundred rounds from each gun, 
 firing the Wool^dch gun with 43i lb. of Enghsh powder, and 
 the 96-pr. gun with b'2d lb. of prismatic powder. These trials 
 began on the Gth October. The 96-pr. gun, after 170 rounds 
 had been fired, showing signs of deterioration at the breech, 
 the wedge and the Broadwell ring were replaced. 
 
 The Enghsh gun showed, after 140 rounds, signs of de- 
 terioration at the vent. After some more rounds liad been 
 fired, a chstinct longitudinal crack was observed. These trials 
 Avere resumed on the 21st October. The crack extended, after 
 the 290th round, it was 20*48 inches long. lo'48 inches in front 
 of the vent and 5 inches behind it. 
 
 It increased still more after a few rounds, and it was thought 
 dangerous to continue the fire. 
 
 The 9(3-pr. gun has fired up to the present time 40() rounds 
 without accident or sensible deterioration. 
 
 Whilst these experiments were going on, the 72-pr., fired 
 with 22 lb. of prismatic powder, pierced a plate of Austrian 
 manufacture, 8 inches thick, and destroyed it entirely at the 
 third roimd. The 96-pr., fired with half the ser-s^ce charge, 
 pierced, Avithout penetrating, a compound English plate, 7 
 inches thick, composed of 3 inches of steel and 4 inches of iron. 
 It is probable that it would have penetrated it. if it had been 
 fired Avith the full charge. 
 
 Experdiexts made with a 24-pr. Steel Grs. 
 
 The success obtamed in the experiments made Avith steel 
 96 and 72-prs., thanks to the employment of prismatic poAvder 
 and the improA^ed shape giA'en to the projectiles, caused the 
 steel 24-pr. to be tried against the iron plates. 'M. Krupp, 
 who, by his success as a manufacturer of artillery, has acquired 
 fresh titles to the gratitude of his country, had a lieaA^y 24-pr. 
 made at Essen, Aveighing 6,710 lbs., predicting that the gun, 
 notAvithstanding its small calibre, would pierce sliields coA'ered 
 with 5, or cA^en 6, inches of iron. These experiments Avere 
 carried out at Tegel on the 1st of last September.
 
 114 
 
 Heavy 24-pr. ,steel gim. iuil)elted, 5"8-incli in calibre, 
 l)recch-closecl, with a double Avedge on Kreiner's plan, weight 
 (),71() lb., firing common .shell, Krnpp whell, and Grnzon shell, 
 weighing respectively 61 lb,, 72\S lb., and 70 lb. 
 
 The first experiments made were to determine the proper 
 charge of prismatic powder, as also the initial velocity. 
 
 It was found that, with 13*2 lb, of prismatic powder, the 
 initial velocity was 1341'9 feet per second; with a charge of 
 15*4 lb, the initial velocity was 1460'4 feet per second. 
 
 Five bhnd shells were fired, on the 1st September, at a 
 range of 164 yards, A Grnzon shell, fired ^\ath a charge of 
 13'2 lbs, powder, completely penetrated the plate and the 
 timber backing ; splinters of the shell were found thirty yards 
 in rear of the target. The four other shells were fired at the 
 G-inch plate. The two first were Gruzon shells ; one, fired 
 with 13*2 lbs. f;f powder, penetrated the plate, and entered 
 o'2 inches into the timber backing; the other, fired with 
 15*4 lbs, of powder, penetrated the plate, the point of the shell 
 showing through the timber backing. The two other rounds 
 (Krupp shell) were fired, one with 13*2 and the other with 
 15*4 lbs, of powder; the first pierced the plate, and penetrated 
 some inches into the timber, the second penetrated both 
 plate and timber backing. The conclusions to be drawn ft-om 
 these experiments are : — that the 24-pr. gnn, fired with 13*2 lbs, 
 of prismatic powder, at a range of 1 64 yards, would completely 
 and easily pierce vessels plated ^A^tli 5-inch iron ; and fired 
 with a charge of 15*4 lbs. would penetrate vassels plated with 
 6 inches of iron. 
 
 It is proposed to make another 24-pr. gun, heavier than the 
 former, and to fit it with Krupp's cylindro prismatic breech- 
 closing apparatus, in order to increase its pov/er. These results, 
 which no person six months' previously had expected, raised 
 to the liighest pitch the satisfaction of all concerned, artillery 
 officers, naval officers, and manufacturers of iron and steel. 
 The 24-pr, being the gun with which the screw corvettes of 
 the German Navy are armed, even small gunboats armed with 
 this gun might be expected to defy the largest vessels, as they 
 are not usually plated Avith more than five inches of iron. 
 
 This is what everyone here imceasingly repeats; and 
 they add, that the last of the experiments has not yet been 
 heard. For, by folloAving the path pointed out, namely, 
 strengthening that part of the gun where the greatest effect of 
 the discharge is felt, so that it may fire very heavy charges of 
 prismatic powder, smaller guns even than the 24-pr. can be made 
 to penetrate 5 and (i-incli plates; and that, consequently, an 
 entire revolution in the construction of ships of war must be 
 made. 
 
 This, then, is the present state of these important experi- 
 ments in Prussia, They will be stopped during the cold season, 
 but will again be resumed in s^ning. 
 
 Next Saturday, for example, tlie 2Sth Novemlier, they will
 
 fire witli a lM)-pr, gun against plates placofl obliquely to the 
 plane of the trajectorv. The case when a projectile ntrike a 
 vessel at right angles with its surface must be exceptionable ; 
 and these trials of oblique fire are being made to determine, 
 both the effects of the impact, and the proper shaped head the 
 projectiles should have. 
 
 Projectiles. 
 
 The projectiles employed in the experiments at Tegel are 
 well known ; they are, for the English gun, the Palliser pro- 
 jectile, and for the Prussian gun, the Krupp projectile, made at 
 Essen, and the Gruzon projectiles made at Biiekau, near 
 Magdebourg. 
 
 The Palhser projectiles are of hard cast-iron, but the mate- 
 rial is hardened only for a portion of its depth ; they have no 
 lead envelope, the "Woolwich gun being a muzzle-loader. The 
 Krupp projectiles arc of steel, with a head of the same metal, 
 and a lead envelope ; this last weighs ()l*y lbs. for the shell of 
 the 96-pr., and 48*5 lbs. for the shell of the 72-pr. gun. 
 
 The Gruzon projectiles are formed entirely of very hard 
 cast-iron ; it is this which makes the difference between them 
 and the Palliser shell, they have a thick leaden envelope. 
 
 As I have already pointed out, the form of the Gruzon pro- 
 jectile has been much modified during the coiuse of these 
 experiments. The head has been lengthened ; the thameter of 
 the base has been increased ; the shape of the hollow in the 
 shell has been altered ; and lastly, an attempt has been made 
 to give less Aveight to the leaden envelope, and so diminish the 
 loss of vis viva at the moment of impact. The best form of 
 head has been found to be that described by an arc, with a 
 radius double the calibre of the prcijectile. 
 
 The Palliser shells have shown themselves to have less re- 
 sistance than the Gruzon shells. They almost always broke on 
 impact, crumblmg into little pieces, so to speak. The Gruzon 
 shells, on the other hand, either did not break, or if they did, 
 broke up mto a small number of pieces. The shape of the 
 interior cavity is one cause of the greater resistance oftered by 
 the Gruzon shell, tlu' thickness of metal being far greater 
 towards the head than the base of the shell. 
 
 The Krupp shells are steel, and, as might be expected, are 
 far stronger than the others. They never break, and only un- 
 dergo slight alterations of shape. These projectiles excel not 
 only on account of their greater strength, but because they 
 take a larger charge of powder, which produces more dan- 
 gerous splinters. But the smaller cost of the Gruzon shell 
 has caused them to be adopted in place of the Krupp. A 
 Krupp shell for the 9()-pr. gun costs 9/. Ss. ; a Gruzon shell 
 costs 3/. ; and it is allowed that Krupp shells can only be 
 issued in small numbers for special cases, amongst the ammu- 
 nition of ships of war or coast batteries. However, the officers 
 of the Naval xVi'tillery do not concur in this idea; they declare
 
 iir, 
 
 that if the Captain of a luan-ru'-wav has t'svo kinds of projectiles 
 at his disposal, he ^vill ahvay^ begin by lining the Krupp shells, 
 as they are the best, and that the State may just as well at 
 once flice the cost, and adopt steel projectiles. 
 
 Pris3L\tic Powder. 
 
 I do not know if prismatic poAvder has been studied in 
 France. If it has not, after the important results obtained by 
 its use during the recent experiments at Tegel, it will be a 
 matter of great interest to study it in our turn. It has been 
 seen that at the trial of the 2nd June the Prussian 96-pr. gun, 
 fired with common powder, gave a result very inferior to the 
 Woolmch gun, and that at the trials of the 7th July, thanks to 
 to the employment of prismatic powder, Avhich gives a higher 
 initial velocity, its superiority over the English gun was estab- 
 lished. In fact, at the trial of the 2nd June, when the 0!)-pr. 
 gun was fired with 49'7 lbs. of common Prussian poivder, the initial 
 velocity was only 1151-9 feet per second, when tlie same gun 
 was fired on the 7th July "with 53 lbs. of prismatic powder the 
 initial velocity was raised to 1414 feet per second ; and not- 
 withstanding this, the pressure of the gas during the second 
 discharge was 1000 atmospheres less than during the first. It is 
 therefore an incontestable and important fact that prismatic 
 powder, while its action on the gun is far less destructive than 
 common powder, allows a heavier charge to be used, aiul gives 
 to the projectile a liigher initial velocity. 
 
 At present the Prussian Government obtains prismatic 
 powder from M. Krupp's manufactory at Dusseldorf, but it will 
 he made on a large scale at Spandau. 
 
 Prismatic powder is only common jiowder compressed into 
 cakes of a hexagonal shape. Each mould has six little cylinders 
 on it, which leave in the cake as many holes, piercing it from 
 one side to the other. A grain of powder is thus a flat hexagonal 
 cake pierced with six holes. The dimensions are 2*7 mches 
 long and '975 inch thick {vide sketch, full size). To make a 
 charge the grains are laid in beds.
 
 117 
 
 It may be safely predicted tliat at Biickau the employment 
 of prismatic powder Avill bo profoundly studied. It offers a 
 new and interesting field for stud}-. The si/>e, the shape, the 
 weight, the number of openings in the cakes are all points 
 involved in the subject, and Avill doubtless be found to vary 
 ^Yith. the calibre of the different guns used. It may be even 
 requisite to employ for each gun a special prismatic poAvder, to 
 obtain the maxhnum useful effect, Avithout endangering the gnn. 
 
 Bomb-proof and Iron Shield Case:\iate3 to protect Gi^'s 
 
 MOUNTED IN COAST BATTERIES. 
 
 I can only give an imperfect description of the bomb-proof 
 iron shield casemate, Avhicli has been made at Tegel, and Avhich 
 is proposed for coast batteries, as I have not been alloAved to 
 see it. M. Gruzon is the inventor and constructor of this 
 casemate. He has built enormous furnaces at Tegel, capable 
 of casting masses of u'on weighmg 105,000 lbs. (the largest 
 ever yet cast) to form one of the piers of the casemate. He 
 is reported to haA^e succeeded capitally. The weight of metal 
 employed being in case of necessity 198,000 lbs. It may be 
 said generally that this shielded casemate is intended to 
 protect a steel 96-pr. breech-loading gun. It is composed of 
 two vertical piers parallel to the axis of the gnn, a bomb-proof 
 roof coA^ering them, AAdth a oonA^ex shield placed in front, and 
 proA'ided Avith an opening to admit the muzzle, and, lasth*, 
 a door to close the casemate at the rear. These A\^rious parts 
 are formed of enormous blocks of cast-iron, similar to those 
 cast on the 9th October last. The blocks AAdiich compose 
 these tAA''0 piers are attached to one another by enormous bolts, 
 so that the blow of a projectile striking the rcA^etment, cannot 
 shake the mass or wound the gunners. The shield is 27^ inches 
 thick. The openhig is only sufficien.tly large for the muzzle of 
 the gun, and the interior space alloAvs the gun to be worked. 
 The door which closes the casemate is of gigantic dimensions. 
 M. Gruzon who is not a military man, and Avho is not baclvAA^ard 
 in claimmg all imaginable merits for his uiA'ention, says this 
 door AA'ill protect the gunners completely from surprise, and 
 render them secure from anything Imt famine, or a regular 
 siege. 
 
 As the muzzle of the gun has only a A'ory slight moA-ement 
 in the embrasure, a special carriage has been made to alloAv a 
 sufficient lateral range. When this casemate is completed, it 
 Avill be fm-ther protected by a strong earthen epaulement. 
 
 The experiments Avill be of two kinds : — 
 
 1st. They Avill practice from the casemate Avith the gun it is 
 intended to protect, and 
 
 2nd they Avill fire against the casemate Avitli the heaviest 
 guns to test its resisting power. 
 
 Looking at smiilar constructions and proofs, one is led to ask 
 if th.e bomids of what is reasonable and useful are not passed.
 
 118 
 
 and if tlie advantages to be obtained from such constructions 
 are not more tlian counterbalanced by tlie enormous expense 
 they entail ? Will it be possible to establish on coasts, where 
 the ground at favourable points is generally very soft, founda- 
 tions sufficiently sohd to support such blocks of cast-iron ? 
 
 Field Guns, Bronze. 
 
 My report of the 22nd July gave an account of the trials 
 made by the Experimental Committee with bronze field guns. 
 I also reported on the 31st August the unanimous opinion of 
 the Experimental Committee that l)ronze should be used in the 
 manufacture of field guns, and I added that the decision of the 
 " General Inspection of Artillery "' was not doubtful. This 
 Superior Conmiittee has approved of the ad\ace given by the 
 Experimental Committee last September. The authority of the 
 King is now all that is required. 
 
 Contrary to what I Avas informed, no more bronze guns, are 
 now being cast. During the experiments, the charges and 
 velocities of these guns have been — 
 
 Gov un J Charge, 2 -4 lbs. 
 
 '1 ■ ^ ■ ■ ( Initial velocity, 951 feet per second. 
 
 4- r o- m i ^'lia^'ge> 2-2 lbs, 
 
 "Pr- b ^ ^ '• "I Initial velocity, 1,209 feet per second. 
 
 The Experimental Committee continues to try many experi- 
 ments vnih these guns. 
 
 After having fired 2,000 rounds with the gun 5 feet li inches 
 long, and weighing ()(iO ll)s., they began gradually to diminish 
 the thickness of metal, lightening the gun by 128 lbs. The 
 bronze is, nevertheless, so malleable, notwithstanding the 
 great number of roimds fired, that it acts perfectly. 
 
 I do not know if the Prussian regulations of the 5th June, 
 18C)7, on the subject of civil employes, is known to the Minister 
 for War at Paris. I attach a copy to this Keport ; it is inte- 
 resting to compare it with the Decree of the 24th October, 
 1868. 
 
 Military Study of Railways, and the Organization of the 
 Officers of the Reserve and Landwehr. 
 
 Report of the 12th December. 
 
 I. ]\riLiTARY Study of Railways. 
 
 It is knoAvn that at the beginning of the year 18G6 the 
 Prussian army Avas much better prepared for Avar, than the 
 Austrian army, and that this Avas one of the cliief causes of the 
 adA^antages it obtained. I cannot draAA^ too much attention to 
 the continual care that is taken here to be ready at any moment 
 to m ike A\ar AAath cA^ery prospect of success. 
 
 1 ho Gormaii language nas even a Avord, Kreigsbereitschaft,
 
 119 
 
 to express tlio stato oi preparation for Avar tliat an array, Avliich 
 fulfils its mission, should l)e ahvars in. To Iceep tlio army 
 continually ready for war, and that without iiej;-lecting' one of 
 the numerous small details that such a statu of thhigs requires, 
 is the object towards which all the efforts of thf Prussian 
 Government tend. 
 
 Tliis is the cause of the continual labour on the part of every 
 one, from the King to the junior Sub-Lieutenant, or employe. 
 Tliis is the cause of the continual studies, cliiefly on the part of 
 the Staff Officers, of the War Minister, and the various com- 
 mittees. This is the cause of the experiments of every kind ; 
 this is the cause, in a word, of the great military activity which 
 reigns in all North Germany. 
 
 Amongst the questions, the study of wliich keeps the State 
 ready for war, that of the railways particularly attracts the 
 attention of Government. 
 
 I have already reported that an enquiry, was tliis year 
 made by a Committee of Staff Officers Avith the view to the 
 examination of all the railways in North Germany, and draAving 
 up a report on the serA^ce they, in a mihtary pomt of A'icAv, 
 can render. Quite recently M. Delbriick, aa^Iio succeeded 
 M. Bismarck as Federal Chancellor, has brought before the 
 Federal Council a proposition to the folloAving effect : — 
 
 "• The Federal Council is asked to du'cct that a report, on a 
 '' particular form, giving an account of the resources of CA^ery 
 " kind possessed by the raihvays of the North German Con- 
 '• federation for mihtary purposes be prepared. This report to 
 " be furnished to the Federal Chamber CA^ery tAvo years, be- 
 " ginning in January 1870 for all raihvays then in existence, 
 '• and on the opening of all raihvays Avhich may Ijc hereafter 
 " constructed." 
 
 The form referred to includes a A'ast number of questions 
 liaA'ing reference to the extent and chrection of the railways ; 
 their gradients ; the quantity of rolling stock ; the configuration 
 of the adjacent country; the roads, not railroads, Avhich run 
 close alongside or cross the raihvays ; the bridges ; the possi- 
 bihtv of fortifyhig certain pomts, or destroying others. It asks, 
 also", the name of the cluef stations; their area; the most faA'om- 
 able places for concentrating troops, and bringing them to the 
 stations. The law^s, bye-la avs, rules, and military tariff of the 
 lines. Finally, the amelioration or alterations proposed for the 
 future. 
 
 I Avould remark that Germany, prior to 18G(l took all these 
 precautions. The German Federal Assembly caused a similar 
 report to be furnished each year, and I merely mention 
 M. Delbriick's proposal to shoAv the great importance attached 
 here, to the study of raihvays in a mihtary point of Anew, 
 and as further proof of the incessant vigilance of tlie Prussian 
 GoA'ernment.
 
 120 
 
 IT. Organizatiox of Officers of the Reser\'e and of the 
 
 LAXD\Mi:HR. 
 
 I have liithoi'to omitted to refer to an importaut measure, 
 tletermiued on last summer, and wliicli was the subject of a 
 Kojal Edict, dated 4th July, 18G8. 
 
 It relates to the position of officers on furlough, that is to 
 say, to the officers of the Reserye, and those of the Landwehr, 
 (officers and sokUers of the Reserve and Landwehr live at home ; 
 they are said, in Prussia, to be officers and soldiers on furlough 
 — €71 positio)i de conge). Prussia has not a sufficient number 
 of officers, regard being had to the enormous force at her dis- 
 posal. The cause of tliis is her whole armed force does not 
 fall, far short of a million of men, and the officers are drawn as 
 much as possible from the nobility and gentry (de la grande et 
 de la petite noblesse). 
 
 Frederick the Great, influenced by his profound knowledge 
 of men, formed the body of officers on these conditions. " The 
 " nobles alone," he was accustomed to say, " have honour in 
 *' their bellies ;" and his successors have all remained faitliful to 
 this precept. The King said to me last summer, " I am very 
 " proud of the character of my corps of officers, and I seek to 
 " maintain it. It is composed of the elite of the nation in social 
 " position, education, and instruction, and we find it quite 
 " natural that they should command the other classes." 
 
 In France our social state is so confused, and our n.iilitary 
 organization so defective, that we imfortunately cannot apply 
 this just and reasonable principle ; l^ut the application of any 
 principle, however sensible, usually produces some inconve- 
 nience. The inconvenience, Avhich is a natural sequence of the 
 Prussian system of recruiting the corps of officers, is felt chiefly 
 after a long and bloody war. For how then is it possible to 
 obtain officers from the ranks of the nobihty alone ? Thus 
 the Great Frederick found, particularly after the great disasters 
 of Kollin and Kunersdorf, much difficulty in filling up his losses 
 in officers. This deficiency in officers, which is inherent in the 
 principle on Avliich they are recruited, Avas felt all through the 
 wars of the Empne. Since 1815 it has increased with each 
 successive enlargement of the Prussian territory, and more 
 especially from the institution of compulsory military ser^-ice, 
 which at the present time gives the King the control of such 
 enormous armies. It may consequently be understood how 
 Prussia has Ijeen compelled to depart from the principle which 
 requires, that all the officers should be taken from the ranks 
 of the nobility ; and practically, the officers of the artillery and 
 engineers, belong at present chiefly to the middle classes.* 
 
 Bourgeoisie.
 
 121 
 
 HoAvever, as the corps of officers is in general recniited from 
 the same famihes at the present day as it was 100 years ago, 
 it may be said that it is now the same as it was in the days 
 of Frederick the Great ; with this difterence. that it has l)cen 
 stretched and extended, so to speak, i]i order that it may be 
 (hssemmated throiig'hout a large army. 
 
 In 18(>H, when the war did not last more tlian two montlis, 
 the want of officers was felt ; and I wonld refer here to 
 Avhat I reported on the loth October, 1868, of the nmneroiis 
 changes of officers v/hicli had taken place from the Line to the 
 Landwehr. and vice versa, and of the confusion thus introduced 
 amongst the corps of officers.* 
 
 After the war, this state of tilings produced serious thought 
 here ; and it was asked, Avas there no method of avoiding 
 tins confusion at the moment of mobilization, and hoAV a corps 
 of officers could be maintained during a campaign of long 
 duration. The order of the 4th July, 1868, is an attempt to 
 solve tliis problem : I send a copy of it hercAAath. 
 
 It is requisite to knoAV. in order that it may be understood, 
 that hitherto the position of offi.cers of the ReserA-e, AA-as not 
 distinct from that of officers of the Landvv'ehr, neither Avere 
 their relations to the Regular Army defined. The Edict of the 
 4ih July defines their position^ and really creates a body of Reserve 
 officers. It should be translated, for it is A^ery interesting to 
 knoAv all its details. I confine myself to pointing out the prin- 
 cipal pomts. 
 
 1. Officers on furlough are, for the futiue, intended AA'hcn 
 an augmentation of the effectiA^e strength of the army, or 
 a mobilization takes place, to complete the number of officers 
 required, and they Avill be employed as instructors for the men 
 of the ReserA^e and LandAvehr. 
 
 2. The length of serA-ice of officers, Avhether of the ReserA-e 
 or LandAvelii', is the same as that of the men, that is to say, 
 an officer remains in the ReserA^e until he is 27 years of age, and 
 in the LandAvehi- from 27 to 32 years of age. 
 
 3. The number of officers appointed to the ReserA^e and 
 LandAA-ehr is unlimited. 
 
 4. AVhen an officer is appointed to the Reseiwe, he is posted 
 to a company in the Regular Army, and he consequently bears 
 its designation. A LandAA-ehr officer, on the other hand, is knoAA'n 
 only by his LandAvehr title. 
 
 5. Officers of all arms liA^ing in a Landwelu- BattaHon district 
 on furlough compose the corps of officers of the district, under 
 the orders of the Commandant of the district. 
 
 6. The persons AA-ho maybe appointed officers of the Reserve, 
 &c., vide the Edict. 
 
 7. EA^ery person proposed as a Landwehr officer is presented 
 
 * Vide page 126, Report of the 19th December, 186S, for fuller details about tl;c 
 Corps of Officers.
 
 122 
 
 to tliu corps of ofiicers of the Landwehr battalion by the Com- 
 mandant, &c., vide the Ediet. 
 
 I attach to this report — 
 
 A copy of the Edict of the 4th July, l^tiS. 
 
 A supplement of the Staats Anzeiger of the 28th November, 
 1868, Avliich contains an official hst of the German fleet. 
 
 CllAPLAlXS OF THE TwO RELIGIONS; WINTER DrILL ; 
 
 Xew Ar:my List. 
 Report of l*dth December, 1868. 
 
 I. Chaplains of the Two Pir.LioiONs. 
 
 The North German Confederation (the Grand Duchy ot 
 Hesse not included) has a population of 2D,oO(),0()0 inhabitants ; 
 19,500,000 belonging to the Keformed and t»,500,()00 to the 
 Catholic Creed ; or hi a proportion of two to one. This 
 proportion is preserved in the Army of the Confederation, if 
 the number of sohUers of the two creeds be compared ; conse- 
 quently, the Army must have both lAitheran and Catholic 
 Chaplains. The organization of the first has never caused 
 anv thfficulty, but it has been different as regards the Catholic 
 Chaplains. The Prussian Govermnent has been compelled to 
 struggle with what are termed the pretensions of the Holy See. 
 On one hand, the Pope desires to enjoy absolute power in ;dl 
 that concerns the appomtment of Army Chaplains ; on the 
 other, the King of Prussia, as sovereign of a coimtry Avhere 
 the reformed religion is predominant, cannot consent to allow 
 the Pope too great latitude. A chspute, wliich has lasted three 
 years, and has oidy recently terminated, has been the coiise- 
 sequence. A Papal Bull, addressed to the Prussian Govern- 
 ment, and not yet published, settles everything to the satis- 
 faction of both parties. The Holy Father, A\dtli the concurrence 
 of the King, has appointed ]\Ionseigneur Nanczanowski, Bishop 
 in partihus, C^haplain ui Cliief to the ^Vrmy, conferring full 
 powers on liim. This Prelate appoints the CatlioHc emjjloyes 
 in the Army ; but always on the conchtion of consulting with 
 the Ministers for War and Public Worship. All conflicts may 
 thus be avoided, if both sides tliink only of the good of the 
 service. 
 
 The chaplains of both creeds are organi/^ed as folloAvs : — 
 Dlvialonal Chaplains. — The Army of the North German 
 Confederation is formed of tAventy-four Divisions of Infantry 
 (the Hessian Division not included). Each Division has on an 
 average three; and, consequently, each Cor]is d'Armce has 
 six Lutheran and Catholic Chaplains. But the proportion i^ 
 not constant for all Corps d'Armee. In those which arc
 
 123 
 
 recruited in provinces ^vhere the Liitlieran Creed prevails, as 
 tlie Ibt (Province of Prussia) and the ord (Province of Bi-anden- 
 burg-), the number of T'rotestants is far greater than that of 
 Catholic soldiers, and these corps have not a single Catholic 
 Chaplam ; while other two corps, the 5th (Province of Posen) 
 and the 8tli (Province of the Rhine), are chiefly composed of 
 Catholics. In short, for the twenty-fom- Divisions there are 
 fifty Lutheran and twenty-one Catholic Chaplains — seventy-one 
 in all. 
 
 Each minister and eacli chaplain is helped by a cm'ate. 
 The pay of these ministers and chaplains varies, according to 
 their rank in the army, from 75/. to 120/. : and is the same for 
 equal grades for both creeds. 
 
 It was at one time proposed to reduce the })ay of the 
 Catholic Chaplains, Ijecause they have not, as the Protestant 
 clergy have, to support families ; but tliis idea was given up, 
 lest the Government should be suspected of favouring one 
 religion at the expense of the other. 
 
 In each Corps d'Armee, whatever may be the number of 
 men of each creed, one of the Protestant Divisional Chaplains, 
 generally the oldest, has the title of first uiinister, (U- first 
 preacher {Oberp)'edir/er), and has a salary of 155/. to 180/. 
 yearly. The Chaplains General of both creeds receive 330/. ; 
 the pay of the curates of both creeds is 30/. a year. The 
 chaplains and curates have a lodging allowance of 82/. for the 
 Chaplains in Chief, and Wl. to 221. for the subordinate ranks. 
 
 Garrison Chaplahis. — In addition to the seventy-one Pro- 
 testant and Catholic Chaplains, there are fifteen Protestant and 
 twelve Catholic Chaplains, termed Garrison Chaplains, who 
 belong to the head-quarters of corps in large fortresses, such 
 as ]\Iagdebourg, Danzig, Graudenz, C^oblentz. They belong 
 to the army, and camiot exercise their functions elsewhere. 
 They have the same pay as the Divisional Chaplains, and have 
 each a curate, but are not called on to take the fiekl Avitli 
 the army, and may be selected from elderly infirm men ; Avhile 
 the Divisional Chaplains, avIio have to take the field, must, 
 if requisite, ride and endure privations. 
 
 These two descriptions of chaplains, viz., the Divisional and 
 Garrison Chaplains, l)elong to the Army ; in addition to winch, 
 there is a certain number of pastors Avho, without being Army 
 Chaplains, are, notwithstanding, paid from the AVar Estimates. 
 • They are those who, in small districts, are entrusted with 
 the rehgious care of small detachraents. They receive for this, 
 pay from the War Office, and are termed Civil Clergy, to dis- 
 tinguish them from the regidar Chaplains. 
 "The cost of the Civil C'lergy is l.S«);)/. 
 
 When the Army takes the field, the two Chaplains-General, 
 Protestant and Catholic, attach as many additional clergymen 
 as they think requisite. A Protestant clergyman told me that 
 a perfect swarm of them were attached at the outbreak of the 
 war of 1866 ; almost all followed the army. The State
 
 124 
 
 supplies, eacli for liiinself and liis curate, with two draft horses, 
 one carriage, and one driver. 
 
 The figures, Avhich I have given in the report, give the pay 
 and allowances of chaplains as at present fixed. Almost all the 
 old salaries have been increased. The Wa-v Estimates have 
 been consequently raised by about 1,600/.; or, hi other words, 
 the mihtarv chaplains, who cost, in 18G8, 13.500/., will cost, in 
 1869, 15,200/. 
 
 II. "W'lXTER Drill for Reserve and Laxdwehr ^Iex. 
 
 'Die IDth of last November, the King signed a cabinet order 
 which demonstrates Avhat care is taken in this coimtry that men 
 on furlough lose as little as possible of the military instruction 
 they have acquired during then' three years of active service. As 
 is known, the men of the Reserve are bound to take a part in 
 two trainings, each not exceeding two weeks, during their period 
 of service in the Reserve. And the men of the Infantry of the 
 Landwehr may be called up tAvice for framing, for periods of 8 
 to 15 days each, during their period of live years' service in the 
 Landwehr. All the regulations on the subject, and in general 
 all those concerning the organization of the Landwehr, and the 
 duties of men on furlough, are contained in the order of the otli 
 September, 1867, a copy of w^hich I attach. It happens tliat 
 hitherto many men have not taken part in the siunmer training, 
 being exempted for the various reasons stated in the 53rd 
 paragraph of the order referred to. The object of the cabmet 
 order of the 19th November, 1868, is to remedy the defect. 
 It directs that the men on furlough who do not participate 
 ill the sunmier training, shall be assembled and trained in 
 January and February 1869, in accordance with paragraphs 
 49, 50, 51, of the order of the 5th September. 1867. The 
 Minister for AVar has recently brought this decision to the 
 knowledge of flie Army, adding that in future these winter 
 exercises will take place each year. 
 
 III. New Annual Ar31y List, 1869. 
 
 The Germans love statistics. There have been several 
 criticisms on the New Prussian Annual Army List of 1869. 
 
 People are gratified by comparing it ^dth that of 1859, 
 which gives an idea of the increase of Prussian military power, 
 during the last ten years. 
 
 Firstly, comparing the forces of Prussia in 1858 vntli those 
 of Prussia of 1868, which embraces Ilanover, the Duchies of 
 the Elbe, electoral Hesse, Nassau, and Frankfort, the comparison 
 stands as follows : — 
 
 {Infantry, 168 Battalions of the Guard and Line. 
 ,. 67 ,, of Landwehr. 
 
 Cavalry, 168 Squadrons of Guard and Landwelir. 
 Decrease.. ,, 136 „ of Landwehr. 
 
 It may be remarked that amongst the increase, 41 battalions
 
 125 
 
 and 34 squadrons only, form the military force of the countries 
 annexed since 1866 by Prussia. Prussia proper has now 127 
 battalions of Guard and Line, and 150 squadrons ot Cavalry, 
 more than she had in 1858. 
 
 Secondly, it is known that Prussia has concluded ■wntli all 
 the States of the North German Confederation, except the 
 Duchy of Brunsmck, and the Kingdom of Saxony, military- 
 Conventions, in virtue of which the military forces of these 
 States are really an integral part of the Prussian Army. The 
 new Army List includes these. They are — 
 
 22 Battalions of Infantry, viz., 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96 Eegiments, and 
 
 the 13th Battalion of Eifles. 
 15 Squadrons, viz., 17, 18, and 19 Eegiments of Dragoons. 
 
 If the forces now swallowed up in the Prussian Army are 
 taken into account the comparison vnll be as follows : — 
 
 {Infantry, Guard and Line, 136 Battalions ; Landwchr, 
 116 Battalions ; total, 252 Battalions. 
 Cavalry, Gruard and Line, 152 Squadrons ; Landwehr, 
 136 Squadrons ; total, 288 Squadrons. 
 (^Infantry, Guard and Line, 324 Battalions ; Landwehr, 
 182 Battalions, of which 14 belongs to the smaller 
 In 1868 .. -I States ; total, 506 Battalions. 
 
 I Cavab'y, Guard and Line, 334 Squadrons ; Landwehr, ; 
 [_ total, 334 Squadi'ons. 
 
 Thus the infantiy has been more than doubled during the 
 ten years ; and it is the same with the Cavalry, if account is 
 taken of the 136 squadrons of Landweln* Cavalry which were 
 suppressed only in 1867. 
 
 Thirdly, as the Duchy of Brunswick has not made a military 
 Convention with Prussia, its contingent has not been included 
 in the Army List. It is composed of the 92nd regiment of 
 Infantry, the 1st regiment of Landwehr, and the 17th regiment 
 of Hussars. 
 
 The 12th Corps d'Armee (Kingdom of Saxony) and the 
 25th division (Grand Duchy of Hesse) are neither included in 
 the Army List. 
 
 These three States have — . 
 
 42 Battalions of Line. 
 
 29 „ of Landwehr. 
 
 45 Squadrons. 
 
 If these forces are added to those mentioned before, Prussia 
 has now, not including men as substitutes or for depots, 557 
 battalions (Guard, Line, and Landrvehr), 379 squadrons (Guard 
 and Line) ; or, 325 battalions and 91 squadrons more than she 
 had in 1858. 
 
 The statistic-mongers have not failed to note how much 
 the middle class element has, during the last ten years, invaded 
 the corps of officers. Practically, amongst the 13,000 officers 
 of the Federal Army not more than one-tliird belong to the 
 nobility, the other two-thu-ds have come from the middle 
 
 L
 
 12 i] 
 
 classes.* Hence, it cau be no longer said that the corps of 
 officers is recruited from among the nobility. This large 
 increase of the middle class element is the consequence of the 
 fusion into the Prussian Army of the contingents furnished 
 by the small States of the North German Confederation. 
 
 I give the following table, which is interesting. There are 
 in the Army — 
 
 r Infantry 49-^ 
 
 Generals . . . . ■< Lieutenant . . . . . . 57 
 
 [Major 99 
 
 f Infantry 146 
 
 Cavalry ^H Total 1,382 
 
 Colonels . . .. ■{ Artillery . . . . . . o^ 
 
 1 Engineers . . . . . . 17 
 
 l^Traiu . . . . • . 3 
 
 Lieiit.-Colonels .. 228 
 
 Majors . . . . 696 
 
 Captains and Lienteuants 10,000, about. 
 
 The nobihty are more largely found in the Cavahy and 
 Infantry, m the proportion of 92 per cent. _ The middle class in 
 the Artillery and Engineers in the proportion of 75 per cent. 
 
 Amongst the 1,382 General and Field Officers, there are 36G 
 Officers who belong to the middle classes, viz. : — 
 
 2 Lieutenant-G-enerals. 
 5 Major-Grenerals. 
 46 Colonels. 
 78 Lieutenant-Colonels. 
 235 Majors. 
 
 and amongst these, 171 belong to the Artillery and Engineers. 
 
 Reduction of the Period of Service to 12 Years, and a 
 Remark on the Na:mes of Places.! 
 
 Reporl of the lAth June, 1869. 
 J. Reduction of the Period of Service to 12 Years.' 
 
 The law by which the length of military service in Prussia 
 was reduced from 19 to 12 years bears date the 9th November, 
 
 • Bourgeoisie. 
 
 t We liave, dated 1869, nine Reports from our Military Attache, that of the 
 15th July is entitled : " The time requisite for the mobilization of the Corps (TArmee 
 " of North Germany, and the concent ratioa of her Army on the frontier of France.^' 
 Colonel StoJi'el points ovit the practical details of the mobilization of the diiferent 
 a'"::jS, Brigades and Divisions, as well as the time reqviisite to concentrate on one point 
 sereral Army Corps ; and he demonstrates that Prussia could, in 3 loeelcs, mass on 
 cur frontier several armies, each of 100,000 men. Another Report, dated October 
 18'^9, treats of the alterations in the Prussian rifles which were being carried out 
 nhen the war of 1870 broke out. We have not deemed it desirable to publish these 
 two Reports, as from their technical nature there is little to interest the gerieral 
 reader. We publish five of the reports of 1869. — [Ed.]
 
 127 
 
 1867. Tliis reduction consists, as is well-known, in the number 
 of years service in the Landwehr, which has been reduced from 
 12 to 5 ; but, as I then pointed out, tliis important measure was 
 by no means intended to mean that all the Landwehr men who, 
 when the law was promulgated had served 12 years, were to be 
 dispensed with. Prussia by no means intended to deprive 
 herself of seven Landwelu' contingents. On the contrary, the 
 Government proposed to liberate gradually, and accordmg as 
 circumstances might permit, the various Landwehr contingents 
 of more than 12 years' service, beginning with the oldest. 
 
 At the present moment, by successive discharges, by antici- 
 pation as it were, there are no Landwehr men in the army 
 older than 36 or of 16 yeai's' service, and the measure that is 
 proposed for the future, and to which I draw attention, is 
 the following. Beginning in the autumn of this year (1869), 
 two Landwehr contingents will be discharged each year, 
 so that the reduction of service to \2 years will he accomplished in 
 October 1872. This wall be better seen by the following 
 Table :— 
 
 Dates of Discharge. 
 
 Autiimn, 1869 
 1870 
 1871 
 1872 
 
 Number of 
 
 Contingents 
 Discharged. 
 
 Contingents. 
 
 Length 
 of Service of 
 
 these 
 Contingents. 
 
 Years. 
 16 to 15 
 15 „ 14 
 14 „ 13 
 13 „ 12 
 
 Age of the 
 Men. 
 
 Years. 
 36 to 35 
 35 „ 34 
 34 „ 33 
 33 „ 32 
 
 As will be seen, the army mil after October, 1872, no longer 
 include men older then 32 years, and the reduction of the dura- 
 tion of service to 12 years will be completed. From autumn 
 1873, only one contingent of the Landwehr 'wdll be discharged 
 annually, that composed of men who have completed their 
 32nd year. 
 
 It should be clearly understood that tliis applies only to the 
 provinces of Prussia proper, or to 81 regiments of Infantry 
 if tliis arm only is considered. In the recently annexed 
 provinces temporary arrangements, will continue for some time. 
 Thus, in these provinces, the period at which men pass from 
 the Reserve to the Landwelu- is not yet fixed, but is subordinate 
 to the consideration that the number of reserve men will allow 
 the various corps to be completed to a war footing, if requisite. 
 
 Landwehr Officers who, on the 1st October, 1869. have 16 
 years' service, are entitled to ask for their pension ; the same 
 fgr those who have 15 years' service in 1870, and so on. 
 
 Generally, it should be observed, that the year 1869 marks 
 the period when Prussia will have her military institutions on a 
 normal footiag, which the war of 1866, the reforms introduced, 
 
 l2
 
 128 
 
 and economical motives, have hitherto prevented. It may be 
 remarked, for example, that in 18()(> the Government made 
 two levies of recruits, one in anticipation m spring, the other 
 in October. A part of the fh'st has already been sent to the 
 reserve (autumn of 18G8), even though it had not completed its 
 three years' service with the colours ; the remainder of the first 
 levy, and that of October 1860, were sent to the reserve this 
 year (1869). 
 
 Fm-loughs in anticipation, have been given for three years, to 
 very many men, but it is proposed to return to the normal state 
 beginning next autumn, that is to say, furloughs in anticipation 
 will no longer be given (except to 5 or 10 men per company) 
 as was done prior to 1866. 
 
 The custom before 1866 was to train each year in autumn 
 two Army Corps in great Divisional and Army Corps manoeu- 
 vres. This, excejot for the Guard, did not take place ui 1867 or 
 1868. Tins year the ordinary custom, wliich directs two coi*ps 
 to be trained in great manoeuvres, will be adliered to next 
 autumn with the 1st and 2nd Corps. 
 
 This year the Landwehr will be trained in greater numbers 
 than usual, for the following reasons : 1st. The Landwehr has 
 only been armed wath the needle rifle durmg the last year, 
 and it is requisite to familiarise it '\\dth the new weapon. 
 2nd. The division of the country into Landwehr battahon 
 districts has been altered. 3rd. The number of battalions of 
 Landwehr has been increased (there being 20 more now in 
 Prussia than before 1866). 
 
 The battalions will be composed of 300 men ; tliis for 102 
 battalions will give 30,000 men who "vvill this year take part in 
 the training for 8 to 15 davs, directed in the paragraphs 6 and 
 7 of the law of the 9th November, 1867. 
 
 II. Note on the Names of Places. 
 
 Amongst other ftiults that the Germans reproach us with, 
 ignorance of geography and history are often mentioned. 
 
 liooking at these things more closely, one sees that the 
 Germans might be a little more modest. But it is true that 
 in everytliing they do, study or publish, they display much more 
 care than we do. Their books, for example (I speak here of 
 military books of history and geography), do not make, as 
 ours do, innumerable mistakes in proper names, both of persons 
 and places. I Avould not insist on this detail if it were not of 
 importance, for independently of such blunders being discredit- 
 able to a book, are they not often a cause of loss of time to the 
 reader who seeks to follow the detail on a map, and likely to 
 impart erroneous information ? 
 
 How^ many officers are there who understand the words 
 cu'cumvallation and contravallation, because in books pubhshed 
 even by authority, these words are used as synonymous ? 
 Well got up books, such as the Commentaries of Napoleon I.,
 
 129 
 
 printed at the Imperial Stationery Office, are full of faults of 
 proper names, and a Prussian Officer told me yesterday that 
 when reading the account of the events of 1813, in the memoires 
 of Marshal Marmont, he lost an hour looking on the map for the 
 names of two places situated in Prussia, so much had the 
 spelling of the names been altered m these memoires. 
 
 These remarks were suggested to me by reading the lectures 
 given at the Depot de la Guerre at Paris. These lectures are 
 intended to be read and studied by a gi-eat number of our 
 officers. Is it not to be ^^dshed that in the mterests of the 
 healthy impulse given to military study two years ago, that no 
 detail should be neglected ? Now, in the lecture " on the 
 ]\Iilitary Organization of Germany" at page 9, where the 
 fortresses of Germany are enumerated, the constant error of all 
 French mihtary books is repeated, by which the tcte de pout of 
 Mayence is called Cassel in place of Castel. This tete de pont 
 is too important a place for those of our officers who study these 
 lectm-es not to know its proper name, even, perhaps, confounding 
 it Avath Cassel, capital of Lower Hesse. 
 
 The Law of the 1st February, 1868, and the Prospect 
 
 OF War. 
 
 Report of the I'lth August, 1869. 
 
 I. The Law of the Ist February, 1868, upon the Recruiting 
 of the Armv, and the Organization of the National 
 Guard " Mobile." 
 
 The War Minister has asked me to inform him, what is 
 thought in Prussia of our new law of military organization, 
 dated the 1st February, 1868, more especially of the institution, 
 of the National Guard " Mobile." I rephed in my report of the 
 29th March, 1868 ; but my rephes were very brief, as I pro- 
 posed to report in person on the subject in Paris. I return 
 now to this important question. 
 
 AMien the laAv Avas promulgated last year, it was at first 
 thought at Berhn that its appHcation would augment the 
 mihtary resources of France; but, after a closer study, the 
 opinion at first conceived is now greatly modified. In Prussia, 
 where the application of the prmciple of compulsory service, 
 has taken deep root in the country, and contributed so 
 materially to its greatness, they generally consider om- new 
 law of military organization as a step in advance, so far as 
 it enunciates, although only for Avar, the principle, so just, 
 so moral, of compulsory military service, for all citizens. But 
 they cannot understand the inconceivable inconsistency, by 
 Avhich a statesman having admitted the principle can stop
 
 130 
 
 there. For the law does not allow the National Guard 
 " Mobile " to receive any military instruction. Looking at it 
 in a broad point of view, it is thought nonsense, or rather an 
 abortive law, adding notliing to the power of France, but 
 rather on the contrary, weakening her resources. As will be 
 seen, this view of our new mihtary organization, a view taken 
 here by practical reflecting people, is unfortunately too true. 
 
 This law having put at the disposal of the country, as an 
 ausihary to the army, a force of 500,000 men, under the name 
 of National Guard " Mobile," adds this indefensable Article 
 (Article 9) :— 
 
 *' The young men of the Guard "Mobile" have (except 
 absent with leave) to attend — 
 " 1. The drills which take place in the parishes where 
 " they live or are domiciled. 
 " 2. The company or battahon meetings which take 
 
 " place m the company or battalion districts. 
 " 3. Each drill or meeting must not cause the yoimg 
 " men who attend it a greater loss of time than one 
 " day. 
 " These drills and meetings can be repeated only fifteen 
 " times a year." 
 
 One is perfectly confounded, when one thinks that a pro- 
 posal so absurd could have been brought forward and seriously 
 discussed by the Parliament of a great country, and that a 
 Government could be found wilhng to consent to accept and 
 introduce such a law. 
 
 How ! Was there not one man in the Assembly who could 
 say to his fellows, " This law that you are going to enact is 
 " a deception. Be assured, you deceive yourselves, you de- 
 " ceive France. Hoav ! You wish to increase the mihtary force 
 " of the comitry by several himdi-eds of thousands of 3^oung 
 " men, under the name of National Guard " Mobile," and you, 
 " at the same time, take away every means for instructing 
 *' these young men ! For what mihtary instruction is it possible 
 " to give a man who, in the greater number of the departments, 
 " must, in one single day, go four or six miles m the morning 
 " from his home to the place of assembly, and return the same 
 " distance at night; and who, in the same day, must be present 
 " at the roll calls, parades of all kinds, issues of arms, clothing, 
 " and equipment '? Do you not see that it is a physical un- 
 " possibihty to find in this same day a single quarter of an 
 " hour for drill, properly so called ? If you do not wish that 
 " the young men of the National Guard ]\Iobile should sj)end 
 " more than one day at such things, then alter the proposal 
 " from top to bottom, or return simply to the law of 1832. For 
 " I again repeat, what you propose is impossible — is simply 
 " nonsense." 
 
 And the speaker who, I suppose, to convince the Assembly, 
 would detail what takes place in Prussia at the trainings of
 
 131 
 
 the Reserves and Landwehr. Here I will invent nothing, but 
 I ^vill simply confine myself to report what every officer and 
 soldier in the Prussian Army knows. 
 
 In Prussia, the men of the Reserve, and those of the 
 Landwehi", who live, as is known, at home, undergo, during 
 then" period of service m the Reserve and Landwehr, trainings, 
 the object of wliich is to maintam amongst them, the military 
 instruction that they have previously received during the years 
 they spent with the colours. 
 
 By Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Law of the 9th November, 
 1867, every man of the Reserve is bound to undergo, during 
 liis ser"sdce with the Reserve, two tramings, each of wliich is 
 not to exceed a fortnight ; and the men of the Infantry of the 
 Landwehr can be recalled twice, during their period of service 
 with the Landwehr, for trainings of eight to fifteen days by 
 companies or battahons. Now tilings are carried out as 
 follows : — The first day, the men leave home in the morning, 
 and go to the head-quarters of the district where the trauiing 
 takes place (this is an average distance of five to six miles) ; 
 when they arrive, they answer to the roll call, are marched 
 to the clothing store, where they receive their clotlihig ; then 
 to the armoury, where they get their arms and equipment. 
 These various operations, wliich take longer than people are 
 generally inclined to think, are hardly finished in the afternoon ; 
 and tliis first day is never employed in drilling the men, who 
 are th'ed T\dth the distance they have come, and the tune they 
 have to stand on parade. 
 
 In addition to which, the second day is often also lost 
 for drill, because the assembling of the men, the roll calls, and 
 the issues of all kinds are not completed the fii-st day. 
 
 To which must be added, that the men come fit'om various 
 portions of the district, and pleased to see one another after 
 the lapse of some time, meet in groups the day they arrive at 
 the pubhc-houses, where they sing and get di'unk, wliich 
 renders them mifit for drill the following day. 
 
 The officers generally wink at tliis, and the second day is 
 likcAvise looked on as lost for drill, and manoeuvre, and they do 
 not begin until the third day. 
 
 This is the course of events m Prussia, a country accustomed 
 to these annual drills for many years. The men, as is seen, 
 spend all the fu-st day in marcliing, in ansAvering the roll-call, 
 receiving then- clothes, arms, and equipments ; hardly do the 
 di'ills begin the second, or CA^en the third day. 
 
 Is it not CAddent that in France the young men of the 
 National Guard " Mobile," who are summoned to di'ill in the 
 parishes where they reside, or to the meetmgs in the districts 
 of then' companies and battalions, Avail find themselA'es the first 
 day placed in exactly the same condition as the men of the 
 Prussian Reserve or Landwehr ? Or, in other Avords. must 
 they not first make a march (usually fiA'c to pix miles) to 
 reach the named place, and then must be present at parades.
 
 162 
 
 roll-calls, issues of arms, &c. ? If, then, it is remembered that 
 Article 9 of the new Law requires that, after all these various 
 operations, these very men must, the same day, repeat these 
 operations, in order that they may go home, it must be acknow- 
 ledged that it is physically impossible that any drill can take 
 place that day. Nothing more is requisite to show that, so 
 long as Article 9 is in force, the mstitution of the National 
 Guard " Mobile " is a deception. 
 
 But, say some, the National Guard Mobile may be di'illed 
 during war itself ; to which it is only requisite to reply — How, 
 if the war be of sliort duration ; if France is smitten icith sudden 
 disaster at the outset, and finds herself suddenly invaded, hoiv can 
 you then give these young men, assembled in haste, that cohesion, 
 discipline, and instruction, ivhich is so requisite ? 
 
 Thus common sense condemns at once oiu' new law of 
 military reorganization, so far as the National Guard "Mobile" 
 is concerned ; yet this law has been enacted by the Chambers ! 
 
 Thus one has seen (an incredible thing) a great nation give 
 itself solemnly, by means of its representatives, an increase 
 of 500,000 men for the defence of the country, and at the same 
 moment, \)j a strokt; of the saiue pen, so to speak, deprive 
 these men of all means of obtaining military instruction. 
 
 I do not believe that any assembly in any country ever 
 gave such a flagrant proof of inconsistency and levity. 
 
 How can we be astonished after this if foreigners criticise 
 us severely ? 
 
 How can we be astonished that here, and in all Germany, 
 they tax the French nation \rd\\ ignorance and vain presump- 
 tion, and that they proclaim, with ill-disguised satisfaction, 
 in books seriously ^vi'itten, the" downfall of the Latin races % 
 I declare that all intelligent and studious officers (and the 
 Prussian Army has a great number) "\^dth whom I have spoken 
 on our new mihtary laAV, judge it with great practical sense to 
 be simply without results of any kind. 
 
 But we, we do not limit oiirselves to making a defective 
 law. From presumption, as much as from ignorance, we 
 deceive ourselves, and declare it to be perfect, and superior to 
 all others ! It is sad to say it, but it is nevertheless true, for 
 any one who has hved amongst foreigners and followed the 
 development, both moral and intellectual of other nations for 50 
 years, that the French, not^\'ithstanding the eminent qualities 
 for which they are remarkable, live above all others in igno- 
 rance and presumption, each of these faults tending to increase 
 the other. These words continually recur when one compares 
 Fi'ance with other countries, especially Prussia, so well-taught, 
 serious, and keen for her interests. 
 
 One proof amongst a thousand is furnished to me by what 
 is written in France upon the new military law, and upon the 
 institution of the National Guard " IMobile," in particular. 
 
 The}/ write in the military newspapers, and elsewhere, and 
 they say in the army, that the National Guard "Mobile" will give
 
 133 
 
 France a very formidable force, and that it will equal, if it does 
 not surpass, the Landwehr of the Conferation of North Germany. 
 It is deplorable, when men thus deceive themselves, from igno- 
 rance, or lie to themselves fi*om presumption. 
 
 My duty necessitates that I should point out these dange- 
 rous errors, for the ignorant and vain crowd, are only too much 
 disposed to beheve those who flatter them. I consider this 
 duty as imperative, because I flunk a war between France 
 and Prussia inevitable, as I shall seek to demonstrate hereafter. 
 I therefore say that no comparison, can possibly be made 
 between the Landwehr, composed entu'ely of trained soldiers, 
 in the prime of life, taught the trade of amis, well disciphned 
 and completely organized, and the National Guard " Mobile, " 
 composed of young men, to whom the law refuses any mihtary 
 traming. 
 
 Perhaps it may be useful to repeat what I have already 
 pointed out in many of my reports to the War ]\Iuiister, what the 
 Landwelu- really is. 
 
 The Landwelu- is not, as so many persons m France beheve, 
 a kind of national guard like ours, or a body of old soldiers 
 disused to service, and for the most part married. 
 
 As is knoTVTi, all able-bodied citizens of the North German 
 Confederation owe military service to the State for 12 years 
 (from 20 to 32 years of age) : — 
 
 3 years witli tlie Colours (20 to 23.) 
 
 4 years with the Reserve (23 to 27). 
 
 5 years with the Landwehr (27 to 32). 
 
 Thus giving 12 contingents for the Mdiole of the Federal 
 forces. The first seven contmgents form the active or field army, 
 while the five last, still preservmg the name of Landwehr, 
 are mtended for the defence of the ulterior, and do not act 
 wdtli the Regular Army, except in case of extreme necessity. 
 
 The men composing the Reserve, as well as those of the 
 Landwehr, live at home on furlough. Both may marry ^\-ithout 
 leave. The number of marriages is small in the Reserve, 
 because the men know that they are hable to be recalled in 
 case of mobihzation. 
 
 They are more numerous amongst the Landwehr. I have 
 in a pre\aous report given the proportion of married men in both 
 the Reserve and Landwehr. 
 
 Reserve men must, during then- period of service in the 
 reserve (four years), undergo two trainings, each of which lasts 
 only two weeks ; and the men of the Infantry of the Landwehr 
 may be called up for training, tlnice duruig their period of 
 ser\ace \\dtli the Landwelu*, by companies or battalions ; these 
 trainings must not exceed 8 to 15 days each. 
 
 The North German Confederation will in 1870 have 
 320,000 Landwehr men. 
 
 I have repeated these leading pomts the better to show that 
 these 320,000 Landwehr men, are all ready-made soldiers, who 
 have served thi-ee years with the colours (from 20 to 23 years),
 
 134 
 
 and have thus acqmred not only miHtaiy ideas and discipline, but 
 also that thorough training that Prussia knows how to give her 
 troops, have then spent four years at home (23 to 27), durmg 
 wliich time care has been taken to mamtain and confirm all 
 these acqmred quaHties, and it must be remembered, too, that a 
 portion of the Reserve men are recalled, each year to complete, 
 during the autumn manoeuvres, the effective strength of the 
 battahons, squadrons, and batteries of the Regular Army, and 
 that another portion is called up for the trainings of 8 to 15 
 days ah-eady referred to. 
 
 It may therefore be said that the LandAvehr is composed of 
 soldiers of seven years' service, the greater portion of whom 
 are not married. These men are in the prime of hfe, 27 to 32 
 years of age, well drilled and trained to manoeuvres, animated 
 wdth feelings of esprit cle corps, and who take mto their families 
 a spirit of order and thi'ift, a feeling of diity, and a respect for 
 the laws and authority ; tilings which the greatest care is taken 
 to develop amongst the soldiers of the Federal Army. 
 
 The Prussian Landwehi- has given worthy proofs of this in 
 1866, and more than one officer has told me, that he would as 
 wilHngly command Landwehr as Regular Troops. 
 
 Tliis being the case, how is it possible to compare the 
 Landwehr with our National Guard "Mobile," composed of young 
 men that the law, by an impracticable clause, will not allow 
 to be trauied or manoeuvred, and. whose instruction must be 
 improvised during war itself. We must do the best we can, 
 now that the law is enacted, but the National Guard " Mobile " 
 will remam a dead letter so long as Article 9 exists in its present 
 shape. 
 
 Let us alter it, directing that young men may be trained for 
 a week or a fortnight in place of one day. Even then it will 
 be absm-d to compare the Guard " Mobile " \^dth the Prussian 
 Landwehr. 
 
 It is sad to think that such comparisons are openly made in 
 France, officially even, so far as to say that the National 
 Guard " Mobile " Tvdll form a formidable force, superior to the 
 Prussian Landwehr. Saying so, men deceive themselves, they 
 deceive the pubhc, who on such serious matters should be 
 enhghtened. 
 
 11. Prospects of War. 
 
 I have always hitherto, in my reports to the War Minister, 
 taken care not to exceed the limits of my purely military func- 
 tions, and have abstained entirely fi-om everytliing of a political 
 natm-e ; but the Emperor having been good enough to ask me, 
 dm-ing my recent stay in Paris, what, in my opinion, were the 
 prospects of war with Prussia, I beg to submit some ideas on 
 tliis subject, for which I alone am responsible, to complete and 
 define those wliich I have already given viva voce. 
 
 The principal points that I seek to make clear are : — 
 ] . ^^'ar is inevitable, and at the mercy of an accident.
 
 135 
 
 2. Prussia has no intention of attacking France ; she does 
 not seek war, and will do all she can to avoid it. 
 
 3. But Prussia is farsighted enough to see that the war she 
 does not T^dsh will assuredly break out, and she is, therefore, 
 domg all she can to avoid being sui'prised when the fatal 
 accident occurs. 
 
 4. France, by her carelessness and levity, and above all by 
 her ignorance of the state of afiahs, has not the same foresight 
 as Prussia. 
 
 1. War is Inevitable. 
 
 Prussia, both from ambition and conscious strength, has 
 for many years looked on herself as destined to unify and 
 subdue Germany. This tendency may be traced tln-ough all 
 the phases of her history since 1813, the period when she dis- 
 played greater energy than any other German State in seeming 
 the common fi-eedom. She employs, speaking of herself, an 
 expression wliich perfectly describes these feelings ; she calls 
 herself the German nucleus (Der Kern Deutschlancls), and it 
 must be admitted that she has by the energy of her race, her 
 education, and her soimd qualities, which in many respects 
 have placed her in the fii'st rank amongst powers, earned this 
 appellation. 
 
 Until 186G Prussia had a population of only 18,000,000, and 
 her pretensions to rule Germany were Imiited, both on account 
 of the number of her population and the size of her territory, 
 which reduced her to the rank of a second-rate power. 
 
 But all at once the thunderbolt of 1866 revealed this power 
 both to herself and to the world. Hercules felt himself a 
 man. Then the pretension to rule all the Germanic races knew 
 no bounds ; what before was an aspiration became a faith ; and 
 now the deshe to realize German unity pervades, and ^411 
 pervade all Prussia, despite of all tilings, and it must not be 
 imagined that tliis belief can be altered or weakened ; on the 
 contrary, it is firmly rooted, and time will but strengthen it. 
 This fact admitted, there is yet another wliich is forcibly 
 brought to the notice of an observer. When one asks, why 
 Prussia did not seize all the German States after the battle 
 of Koniggratz, or why she does not display more boldness, in 
 welchng the Southern States to the North German Con- 
 federation ? Every one at once replies, because war ^^-ith 
 France is feared ; and, in short, on whatever side Prussia looks, 
 she sees that it is France, and France only, that interferes "uith 
 the fulfilment of her wdshes. 
 
 When it is remembered that the Prussian nation is frill of 
 pride, vigour, and ambition; that it estunates its ovm im- 
 portance at the highest pomt ; that it looks on France as its 
 historic and natural enemy, the feelings of suspicion, bitter- 
 ness, and even hate, that spring up towards France, when it 
 regards the state of affahs following on the events of 1866 may 
 be easily understood.
 
 136 
 
 It would, perhaps, be more accurate to say that these 
 events have developed and rendered bitterer the feeHngs 
 I have described; for such feelings have always existed, 
 and they can easily be seen by any attentive observer, who 
 seeks to appreciate the true feehngs of Prussia towards 
 France. 
 
 I may, perhaps, give a clearer idea of these feelings if 
 I assume the Prussians as divided into three classes. Those 
 who compose the first class (the least numerous of the three, 
 it is true), feel towards France a double measure of hatred and 
 envy, in the full acceptation of both these words. 
 
 These implacable enemies of France are to be found in the 
 old Prussian provinces, chiefly those of the north and east, 
 amongst the descendants of those famihes who were most 
 concerned in the events of 1800 and 1815, or who have 
 suffered the most fi-om the French occupation, and have felt 
 most keenly the humiliation inflicted on Prussia after Jena. 
 They follow France ^\it]l a bhnd hatred, wliich prevails over 
 everything ; and although then- fathers have twice entered 
 Paris, they do not consider that they have been avenged, and 
 they burn with a desue to humihate and even annihilate 
 France. 
 
 The second class is the most numerous. It embraces all 
 those amongst whom the feelings I have described exist, but 
 in a minor degree. Like the first, they have not forgiven France 
 the humihation that Prussia received at her hands. But with 
 them hatred and envy have limits. It may be said they do 
 not love France, and are jealous of her. 
 
 The third class are also very numerous. They are chiefly 
 business people, merchants, or people whose employment 
 takes away the hatred and rivah-y of nation against nation. 
 
 They do not show any dishke or ill-^vill to France. They 
 would even like to live on terms of friendsliip ^\itli her. 
 But they are Prussians; they are jealous for the greatness 
 of their- country, and they are anxious to see her fulfil her 
 mission (according to a phi'ase used in Prussia), that is to say, 
 the unification of Germany, and France is inconvenient to them, 
 as being the sole obstacle that prevents the fulfilment of then- 
 wishes. This explains why this third section of the Prussian 
 people, the best disposed towards us, are, nevertheless, 
 animated vnth feehngs of uneasiness and suspicion. 
 
 The foregoing statement, wliich I beheve to be true, may 
 be summed up as follows : — At the present moment, France, 
 far fi-om being an object of good feehng in Prussia, is, on the 
 contrary, hated by some, envied by others, suspected and 
 doubted by all. 
 
 I chiefly insist on this miiversal feehng of doubt and sus- 
 picion which at the present moment ahenates aU Prussia from 
 us, and is the fatal result of the events of 1866. Tins uneasi- 
 ness is, perhaps, deeper than in France. Everyone feels, in 
 a manner more or less vague, that the present state of things
 
 137 
 
 cannot last ; doubt and fear are in all minds ; trade languishes ; 
 ever}i;bing declines. The universal feelmg thus produced may 
 be translated as follows : — 
 
 " Everything will change if France will only not interfere 
 with oiu' affau's." And then a hmidred accusations are 
 brought against France. They reproach her with the part 
 she played, durmg the Armistice of 1866, m preventing 
 Prussia dictating peace at Vienna. Her jealousy excited by 
 the success of the Prussian Army, her unfounded u-ritability, 
 her pretended armament, her pretensions to interfere with the 
 affairs of foreign comitries, &c. 
 
 There is nothing to be sm-prised at in this state of aflfau-s. 
 It is the natural consequence of circumstances and the rivahy 
 of the two nations. And I have described the nature of 
 these feehngs the better to show that unfortunately they 
 must produce war. 
 
 Those who, in France or elsewhere, thmk peace possible, do 
 not perhaps know, or sufficiently understand, the Prussian 
 character. Yet, it must be granted, the characters of the two rival 
 nations, then- good and bad qualities, are the most important 
 elements from which to predict, if peace or war will follow, any 
 given state of affau-s. 
 
 It is exactly similar to the case of two mdividuals who have 
 a dispute, they will quarrel or agree accordmg to their tempe- 
 raments, there good or bad qualities. 
 
 Now the Prussians are quite as irritable as the French, quite 
 as proud, more imbued ^dth the belief in then- own importance. 
 They are energetic, tenacious, ambitious, full of good estimable 
 solid quahties, but rude, arrogant, and entu-ely wanting in 
 generosity. And it is this people that has undertaken to solve 
 at any cost the question of German unity, whether France will, 
 or ^\il\ not consent, and this dispute, so miportant, has already 
 begun between two nations equally mitable, proud, ambitious, 
 and powerful, who inflicted on one another at the beginning 
 of the century bloody insults, between two nations who are 
 entirely different in language, incluiations, rehgion, and 
 character. 
 
 How is it possible to hope for peace between them ? The 
 man who has such hopes is but a pohtical or sentimental 
 dreamer. AVar must be expected, break out it will some day or 
 other, terrible and bloody. 
 
 It is not, however, likely that it will break out upon the 
 question of German unity, so long at least as M. Bismarck 
 controls the affau'S of the Confederation. This great man, a 
 remarkable instance of the most perfect balance, between 
 intelligence, energy, and force of ^^aQ, vnW never, one can be 
 quite sure commit a fault from impatience. He knows too well 
 that time is his best ally, and that in a war with France he 
 might compromise the work of 1866. In a recent conversation, 
 he told me he in language full of good sense, the reasons which 
 compel Prussia neither to provoke nor desire war, and he thus
 
 138 
 
 concluded : " We will never make war on yon, you must come 
 " and fii-e rifle sliots point blank at us fii'st." 
 
 The gravity of the situation is not then in the question of 
 German unity, but in the attitude which Prussia and France 
 have assumed towards one another on the question, an attitude 
 which is marked by suspicion, jealousy, and excited irritabihty, 
 a situation these Powers T^dll preserve so long as this dispute 
 exists. 
 
 Such a state of afFau's can only grow worse. This general 
 uneasiness, followed by an increase of distrust and jealousy, 
 must increase daily. This state of men's minds may be better 
 understood when one hves in Prussia. Even now things have 
 reached such a pass, that the smallest thing, the most insigni- 
 ficant event will produce a rupture, or in other Tvords, war is at 
 the mercy of an accident. Whatever that accident may be, 
 superficial minds will doubtless call it the cause of war, but the 
 true cause hes far deeper, and is much more complicated. The 
 mutual hostility of the two nations, hostihty continually 
 increasing, can only be compared to a ripening fruit, and the 
 accident that ^\all bring about a rupture is but the accidental 
 shock that causes the ripe fi-uit to fall fi-om the tree. 
 
 2. Prussia has no Aggressive Ideas. 
 
 I have already said that Prussia has not only, no intention 
 of attacldng France, but that she will do all she can, compatible 
 with her honour, to avoid war. 
 
 I am not ignorant how much this opinion, diifers fi'om that, 
 wliich some people of indifferent judgment, who know nothing 
 of Prussia, who substitute their passions, and then* own wishes, 
 for those of an entire people, and who base their opmions 
 on idle tales, wish to spread in France. 
 
 If these people would only take the trouble to visit Prussia, 
 and study things there, without passion or preconceived ideas, 
 they would change their opinions. 
 
 What has not been said, and what \\dll not yet be said, of 
 the ambition of Prussia, her arrogance and her formidable 
 mihtary preparations ? Truly she is ambitious, arrogance does 
 not fail her, and her mihtary preparations are formidable ; but 
 why conclude without any proof, that these preparations have 
 an aggressive character 1 Once more, one has to deplore the 
 detestable ignorance in wliich the great majority of the French 
 people wallow, for it, as will be seen, is the source of all these 
 errors. 
 
 How many people Avere there in France before 1866 who 
 studied Germany, or sought to understand German questions"? 
 The Rhuie, was it not, is it not, for us all, a great wall of China ? 
 and, nevertheless, writers, jom-nalists, and others, who have not 
 even lived in Germany, who have studied neither her history 
 nor her institutions, write and discuss usque ad nauseum all these 
 subjects, pronounce opinions on all thmgs, and thus lead 
 a public more ignorant if possible than themselves. They
 
 139 
 
 see ill the military activity which reigns iii Prussia prepara- 
 tions for war, without coiisiderhig that this activity, is of long 
 stancUiig; that it is continuous, inherent, so to speak, in the Hfe 
 of the nation. The only tlung that is true, is, that it is greater 
 now, than ever, because of the labour Prussia is compelled to 
 take, to assimilate the three annexed provinces to herself. I 
 will explain myself. 
 
 Before 1866, the French public ignored entu-ely anything 
 relating to the organization of the Prussian Army, and the im- 
 mense stride the King had in 1860 compelled the country to 
 take. The army reorganized and much increased ; compulsory 
 ser^dce rigorously enforced, so as to give 600,000 trained 
 soldiers. The gi-eater part of the services improved ; the un- 
 ceasmg labours of committees ; great autumn manoeuvi-es every 
 year ; training of the Reserve and Landwehr ; the adoption of 
 a new system for mobilizing the army, of a new breech-loading 
 steel artillery ; the incessant experiments T\dth artillery ; in a 
 word, a great military activity. All that, was it not, almost 
 unknown in France I 
 
 The events of 1866 followed. People could no longer ignore 
 Prussia, and the French public began to study her ; but as 
 might have been foreseen they beheved that all they saw was 
 new, and dated from 1866. Thanks, then, to the feehngs of 
 mutual distrust that the events of tliis year produced between 
 the two nations, the French pubhc was mcluied to tliinlc the 
 mihtary activity of Prussia, activity of wliich it then for the 
 first time heard, aggressive, and directed against France. This 
 mihtary acti^dty was merely a continuance of the constant care 
 bestowed on the army that the country might never be taken 
 unawares. Great manoeuvres and nimiberless experiments of 
 all kinds took place, the public caUed WiQia preparaiions for war, 
 the object being an attack on France. 
 
 It is right to point out one subject that tended to deceive 
 the French public ; Prussia, in 1866, had annexed Hanover, 
 Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse Cassel, Nassau, and Frankfort, none 
 of which had her military organizaticn, her rules, nor her 
 artillery or small-arms. She had to introduce all these into the 
 three provinces. The labour and the time requisite to make 
 such an assimilation can be easily understood; is it to be 
 wondered at, therefore, that Prussia sought to do it, as quickly 
 as possible % 
 
 In addition to which, she had concluded with Bavaria, "VVur- 
 temburg, and Baden, treaties offensive and defensive, by which 
 these States bound themselves to adopt more or less her 
 organization, rules, and arms. Tliis point should be remembered 
 if the great military activity of which Germany is now the 
 theatre is to be rightly understood. 
 
 But I repeat that it is a mistake to think Prussia displays all 
 this military activity, TAath the view of bruiging on a war. 
 Common sense ; a knowledge of the state of attairs ; of the 
 interests of Prussia ; the T^^se judgment of her King and his
 
 140 
 
 government ; the great intelligence of M, Bismarck, all demon- 
 strate the falseness of such ideas. 
 
 3. Foresight of Prussia. 
 
 But if it is true that Prussia cherishes no secret aggressive 
 desires, it is equally true that her mihtary activity is more than 
 usually excited by the probabihty of war with France, or more 
 exactly, by the universal behef that war is fated, and inevitable. 
 I speak here of what is exceedingly important. I wish to speak 
 clearly of the pamful contrast presented on the one hand by 
 the foresight of Prussia, united to its attendant vigilance, and 
 on the other hand, the bhndness, the recklessness of France, 
 wliich prevents her from seemg that war will undoubtedly take 
 place, and that all other questions should be subordinated to 
 this, the most important. 
 
 I have already given my opinion as to the probabihty of 
 war when I said it will undoubtedly break out one of these 
 days. I am not therefore surprised to find the same opinion 
 shared here by many. As a man who loves his country, I can 
 only feel saddened at the foresight of our future enemies. 
 
 Prussia, I have said, looks on herself as called on to fulfil 
 a mission — to luiify Germany, and she has firmly resolved to 
 devote herself to the task. 
 
 She is by no means ignorant that tliis project Avill not be 
 regarded by France with indifference, that her success in 1866 
 has awakened the initabihty of her old enemy, and that the 
 mutual feelings of mistrust, have reached such proportions, that 
 the smallest accident may produce a rupture. 
 
 And as Prussia is both thoughtful and vigilant, she carefully 
 watches not to be sm-prised the day the conflict begins, re- 
 solved, as she is, to accept battle with all the force at her 
 disposal. 
 
 Hence it is that military activity is redoubled throughout all 
 Prussia. Hence the haste to assimilate as quickly as possible 
 the three new corps, and that of Saxony, by the introduction 
 of her organization, her rules, and arms, to her own. Hence 
 the large expenditure, the improvements of all kinds, resulting 
 from the experience obtained in 1866; the costly expeiiments 
 of all kinds, and the great eflfbrts made to create a powerful 
 navy. AVe must so comport oui'selves as not to be siu'prised 
 by Prussia. Her military organization which allows her to 
 concentrate upon our frontiers, in 20 to 25 days, several armies, 
 each composed of 100,000 men, the watchfulness of the Govern- 
 ment which presides over her . destinies, its behef in the 
 probabihty of a great struggle A^ath France, are all so many 
 reasons v/hy we should be thoroughly prepared, when the fatal 
 moment arrives. 
 
 4. Want of Foresight of France — Fatal Consequences. 
 France, does she show amid these grave circumstances the
 
 141 
 
 same foresiglit as Prussia ? Unfortunately not. Sad thing to 
 confess. No one can say when, the fatal blindness with which 
 France is struck, vnW end. Thus, then, a frightful war is seen 
 dimly in the distance, and threatens to break out at any 
 moment. Our formidable enemy sees his terrible opportunity ; 
 lie watches the moment for the struggle, Avhich he does not 
 seek, but he is yet ready to support it icith all the manly force 
 of the nation. Y\'itli 1,000,000 of the most disciplined, most war- 
 like, and best organized soldiers in the world ; and in France, 
 where 40,000,000 of men ought to be convinced as the Prussian 
 people are convmced, that the fatal war is at the mercy of an 
 accident, when everytliing ought to fade away before one 
 idea, that of national secmity, there are but a few people who 
 have tliis idea, clearly before them, and v\^ho comprehend the 
 magnitude of the danger. This it is that causes me appre- 
 hension. 
 
 It is tliis striking contrast between the foresight of Prussia 
 and the blindness of France — nations, like individuals, can only 
 protect themselves from danger by being conscious of it ; 
 otherwise they remain inactive at the risk of experiencmg the 
 most cruel disappointments. Thus we see Prussia makes 
 everything subordinate to the vital question — preparation for 
 war — and keeps itself ever ready to enter the lists mtli France 
 at the head of the formidable force at her disposal ; while 
 France weakens herself more and more as if heedless of her 
 own safety. When such a spectacle is seen, one is unable to 
 refrain from loudly impugning that fatal ignorance, that abomin- 
 able infatuation which prevents us seeing what Prussia clearly 
 sees. War is inevitable and is predestined. The contrast 
 between the two nations is unfortunately seen at every point. 
 In the Chambers, in the press, as well as in their moral state. 
 In the Prussian Chambers, the diiferent parties, how divided 
 soever they may be upon questions of home poHtics, are 
 all with one mind united against France, and against what 
 they call her ambition and her presumption in meddling •\\dtli 
 Gei-man affaii'S. All animated ^Yii\\ ardent patriotism and 
 full of clear-sighted susceptibility, are ready to sacrifice then.' 
 private feelings, and support and encoui'age the Government, 
 in the efforts it is maldng to organize a formidable army, to 
 create an imposing nav}' ready for the decisive moment. 
 
 What, on the contrary, do we see in France ? A Chamber 
 that boasts itself as representing the people, and which is its 
 reflection, so far as levity and inconsistency are concerned. 
 Witness the law on the National Guard "Mobile," and the 
 obstinacy with whicli it ^411 not see in Germany the storm 
 which unceasingly increases, and threatens to overwhelm 
 the country. A \iiaiority, formed almost entirely of unedu- 
 cated men, without character, without that elevation of senti- 
 ment or that knowledge so requisite for statesmen ; an opposi- 
 tion Avliere vain and ambitious lawyers lead, whose patriotism 
 consists of spiteful recrimination, or premeditated malice ; who
 
 142 
 
 hide tlieir incapacity and impotence under flowers of rhetoric, 
 who pretend that they alone are anxious for the well-being of 
 the country, and who, to gam a factious popularity, dispute with 
 the Government over one soldier, one franc ; men that one can 
 only execrate if they are aware of then* criminal conduct, for 
 while they seek to weaken France, they betray her into the 
 hands of her most formidable enemy. To them may be applied 
 the words of a Avarrior, "Modern Thersites, they bite but with 
 " then tongues ; feeble of heart and arm, they are fitter to 
 "■ speak than fight.''* The press of the two countries offers a 
 sunilar contrast. While the Prussian press, edited usually by 
 well-taught grave men, neglects nothing to excite feehngs of 
 envy and hatred against France ; while it stops at no insult, 
 no calumny : Avliile it shows itself unanimous in keeping up in 
 the pubhc, hostile passions towards France, by representmg her 
 as the only irreconcilable enemy that Germany has, and while it 
 supports the Govermnent with all its mfluence in carrymg out 
 the measures it takes to be ready for any contingency. What 
 passes in France ? 
 
 There a press, always vain and empty, whose leading 
 joiu-nals descant on the most important subjects Avithout in 
 the least comprehending them, seeldng to serve parties, 
 not France — a press without sincerity and disunited, even 
 before the foreigner — is mcessantly occupied m breaching 
 the fimdamental institutions of the country, m seeking to 
 disseminate insubordination and demorahzation throughout 
 the army, and pushing its madness even to the pomt of 
 clamourmg for a reduction of the army, or a disarmament, 
 when France has urgent need of all her force, all her energy, 
 the union of all parties, to meet a struggle, very near, perhaps, 
 but, in any case, a most formidable one. 
 
 If now, one tliinks of the moral state of the two countries, 
 one must acknowledge that the Prussian nation, so clear- 
 sighted, so watcliful, so enthusiastic in the pursuit of its 
 mission, is, at the same time, the best educated in Em-ope, 
 the best disciplined; that it is full of stamina, energy, and 
 patriotism, not yet corrupted by the necessity for sensual 
 enjoJ^nent ; and that it preserves an ardent faith in, and 
 respect for all things, that should be respected. 
 
 Pamful contrast ! France has laughed at everything ; things 
 the most venerable are no longer respected; virtue, family 
 ties, love of country, honour, rehgion, are all ofiered as fit 
 subjects of richcule to a frivolous and sceptical generation. 
 The theatres have become schools of cjaiicism and base- 
 ness. A vulgar, indecent hterature, conducted by men who 
 have lost then- status in society, and are devoid of principle, 
 who seek but to make money, or reap an evil celebrity, or sell 
 
 * In tlie publication made by the newspapers of tlic Ecport of our late 
 Military Attaelic, many passages at the end arc suppressed, or softened. Wc give 
 the original text. [Ed.]
 
 143 
 
 their mercliaiiclise on tlie felag'c, teaching' yonth to contemn 
 and despise everything. Immoral and obscene novels are 
 pubHshed and sold, veiled by a seductive talent, as being- 
 instructive studies of morals. And Avho Avill beheve it i 'J'his 
 sickening literature, these unhealthy novels, are greedily read 
 by the greatest part of the pubKc, to the exclusion of almost all 
 other hterary productions ! Ai-e not these things palpable signs 
 of real decay ? Thus poison filters, di'op by dro|), in every 
 direction thi'ough the veins of an ignorant and blase society, 
 Avanting mtelligence and energy to change its institutions, to 
 adopt new laws, based on justice and right, winch may be 
 conformable A^ith the spirit of moderndays, such as educate and 
 elevate society. 
 
 Thus all the great quahties of the nation, generosity, loyaK^", 
 the charm of Avit, the aspirations of the heart, Ijecome weaker, cr 
 gradually disappear, to such an extent, that the noble French 
 race, Avill soon be known only by its faults ; and during thirj 
 time France, does not see that other nations are passing hev 
 on the road to improvement, and that she lags behmd. 
 
 These opinions \nil be distateful in France ; but they are 
 true. 
 
 I Avisli that some enlightened Frenchmen, free from pre- 
 judice, Avould come, and see, and study, Prussia. They would 
 very soon recognize in her a nation grave, Avise, and strong-; 
 Avanting, it is true, in all attractiA^e gifts, in all charms, in all 
 delicate and generous feeHngs; but, as a compensation, en- 
 doAved AAath the most estimable qualities, loA^e of labour, study, 
 and appHcation, the spuit of order and economy, patriotism, 
 tlie feeling of duty and indiA^dual dignity, lastly, the respect 
 for authority and obedience to the laAA'. 
 
 They Avill see a country admii-ably administered, goA^erned 
 by strong, healthy, moral institutions, AAdiere the higher 
 classes sIioav themselA^es worthy of their rank, and preserve 
 the mfluence AAdiich is then- due because they are the most en- 
 lightened, givmg examples of self-sacrifice, and dcA^oting them- 
 seU^es continually to the serA'ice of the State. A country, in 
 short, where each thing- is in its place, and AAdiero the most 
 perfect order reigns in all portions of the social body. 
 
 Perhaps these observers might, involuntarily, compare 
 Pi-ussia to an unposing, massiA^e building, strongly constructed 
 fi-om turret to foundation; in Avliich each stone is so laid 
 as to contribute to the stability of the A\-liole. An edifice 
 which may be admired for the rigidity of its outline, but where 
 there is nothing to gratify the eye, or excite the feelings. 
 
 AVhat a contrast Avith the disorder reigning- in the social 
 condition of France, where CA'-erything is mixed, confased, 
 and upset ; Avhere, under pretext that each may pretend to 
 occupy the liighest position, no care is taken in selecting- 
 men possessed of that just balance betAveen education, 
 morahty, and instruction, Avliich is so requisite ; Avlience it 
 foUoAvs that posts the most lionom-able, and of the highest 
 
 M 2
 
 144 
 
 consideration, are as often filled by men badly educated, but 
 gifted with certain talents, as by ignorant men, witli no other 
 claim to them than their social position, and knowledge of the 
 ^vorld. Fatal, demorahzing spectacle ! Tliis is the cause why 
 we meet in France so many men sunk in the social scale, and 
 envious of others ; so many broken spirits, each groping liis 
 way mthout finding it. Under this head, our confused social 
 condition may, in opposition to that of Prussia, be compared 
 to one of the masterpieces of ancient Greek architectm-e, 
 Avhich an earthquake has shaken to its foundations, breaking, 
 confusmg, and scattering everything. The traveller admires 
 the mighty ruins, heaped j'^eZ/mg// on the ground, and goes 
 away with a charmed mind but a saddened heart. I repeat it, 
 it appears to me impossible that anyone who will study 
 Prussia cannot but be struck by the contrast I have attempted 
 to point out ; and he wUl see the truth of Vvdiat I have pointed 
 out in one of my preceding reports, namely, that, as compared 
 with Prussia, France is fifty years behind, so far as general 
 instruction and institutions are concerned ; whilst, so far as 
 relaxation, desire for material pleasm'e, and social dissolution, 
 she is two hundred years in advance ! 
 
 How can I avoid being profoundly affected by these com- 
 parisons, believmg as I do that war is inevitable ? But (it must 
 never be forgotten) in this war, Prussia, or rather the North 
 German Confederation, will dispose of 1,000,000 trained dis- 
 ciplined and strongly organized soldiers, while France has barely 
 300,000 to 400,000 men,* But the Federal Army embraces all 
 the manly portion, all the intelligence, all the vis viva of a nation 
 full of faith, energy, and patriotism, while the French Army is 
 almost entirely composed, of the poorest, and most ignorant 
 portion of the nation, 
 
 The German Army, from the fact that it does embrace, 
 without any exception, all the manly portion' of the nation, feels 
 itself strengthened and supported by the unequalled esteem 
 and consideration it enjoys in the country, while the French 
 Army, looked on by some as a useless institution attacked by 
 others, who sow corruption and iiisubordination in its ranks, 
 feels itself bowed down by a want of consideration, and has 
 no consciousness of the mission it has to fulfil. 
 
 Once more I must insist upon the contrast which the 
 mihtary forces of the two countries, the two nations themselves 
 present. I cannot conceal it. It forms for me, and for some 
 Frenchmen who deem war inevitable, and who live in Berlhi, 
 the subject of our most painful thoughts, our continual grief. 
 
 I would exceed the limits of my province were I to point' 
 out the great measures that must be taken to remedy this 
 deplorable state of affairs. 
 
 * It is said that the institution of the National Guard "Mobile" will raise the 
 military forces of France to more than 800,000 men ; but I hare ah'eady explained 
 in the first part of this Report what may be expected of that abortire institution.
 
 145 
 
 But liow can I avoid being struck l^y tJio moral dissolution 
 which makes such frightful strides in France, and hov\' c-an I 
 avoid seeing the torpor, tlie blind presumjition, in which the 
 nation lives, and -which blinds it to its danger .^ 
 
 The Government must undertake the Avork of regeneration, 
 become so indispensable, and it can succeed in this noble enter- 
 prise only by altering from top to bottom many of our essential 
 institutions, or rather by replacing them by others better 
 qualified to instruct and morahze the people and develop in 
 them manly quaHties. 
 
 Chief amongst these regenerative institutions there are two, 
 as the history of Prussia superabundantly proves, compulsory 
 military service, compulsory universal education. 
 
 To speak only of compulsory service, we must first ask, 
 Has the French nation tlie requisite qualities to adopt and 
 apply it ? The reply, unfortunately, is not fencouraging. In- 
 fatuated vath itself, and perverted by egotism, the nation "N^-ill 
 with difficulty conform to an institution of wliich it does not even 
 suspect the strong and fi'uitful principal, and the application of 
 wliich requires vii'tues it does not possess, self-denial, self- 
 sacrifice, love of duty. Like individuals who correct nothmg 
 in their lives, except taught by the stern lessons of experience. 
 Nations never improve the institutions wliich govern them, until 
 compelled to do so by the rudest trials. Jena was requisite 
 in order that Prussia might probe herself, and feel the necessity 
 of invigorating herself with healthy manly institutions. She 
 then adopted the principal of universal compulsory service for 
 all her citizens. And it must be allowed that if this institution 
 did not now exist, Prussia would find it impossible to 
 introduce it. 
 
 Once only in 50 years has France been in a position favour- 
 able for the introduction of compulsory ser^ace. In 1848, when, 
 thanks to the rapid growth of ideas produced by the revolu- 
 tion of February, the National Assembly found itself m an 
 excellent position to show, by the adoption of universal service, 
 that it imderstood how to apply practically those principles of 
 equality that it so loudly vamited. It did indeed, attempt 
 something in this sense by seeking to abolish the hideous 
 plague spot of mihtary substitution, and it named a Commission 
 of which General Lamoriciere was reporter. Tliis law M^ould 
 have been adopted, but for the interference of M. Thiers, 
 who made himself in the Chamber the champion of the 
 egotistical and paltry ideas of the bourgeois. By thus prevent- 
 ing France from entering in 1849 on the path which would 
 have led her later on to adopt compulsory service, so fruitful, 
 so moralising, so suited to regenerate her, this man, to whom 
 nature has denied feelings of true greatness, firm convictions, 
 or the power of serious thought; this man, I repeat, has been 
 more fatal to his country, than 20 disasters.
 
 Ul) 
 
 Max(euvres of the 1st ,'iXd 2xd Army Corps, and Improve- 
 :.iext ix the ixfaxtry ivifle. 
 
 Report oj tlie '2bth September, 18G9. 
 I. Manoeuvres of tlie 1st and 2ncl Army Corps. 
 
 The great autumn manoeuvres at which the King, accom- 
 panied by all the Princes of the Prussian Court, the Princess 
 Royal, many Generals, amongst them, General !&Ioltke, and 60 
 Officers from all the coiuitries of Europe, Spain excepted, were 
 present, lasted from the Gth to 18th September, viz. : — 
 
 Those of the 2ik1 Armj Corps (Pomeranians) from the 6 th to 
 
 the 11th, near Stargai'd. 
 Those of the 1st Armv Corps (ProTince of Prussia) from tho 
 
 13tli to the ISth/ncur Brannsherg. 
 
 The six days each of these manoeuvres lasted were employed 
 as follows : — 
 
 1st Daj, EcTiew of the Army Corps by the King. 
 
 2nd Day, Manceuvres of the 2nd Division against a skeleton enemy. 
 
 3rd Day, Rest. 
 
 4th, 5th, 6th Days, Manoeuvres of the Divisions against one another. 
 
 I attach to this Report two maps of the theatre of man- 
 oeuvres, as well as the progrannne distributed to the foreign 
 officers. 
 
 Those French officers who desue to have an idea of the 
 operations A\dll find a detailed account of them in Nos. 78 
 and folloA\dng, of the MiliUir Wochenhlatt, to which our Depot de 
 la Guerre subscribes. The battalions were, on an average, 
 about 500 strong and the strength of the Armv Corps was from 
 17,000 to 18,000 men. 
 
 The second day the two divisions manoeuvred agamst a 
 skeleton enemy. The greater part of the Prussian Generals do 
 not approve of this method of exercising troops. They say 
 that it gives officers of all ranks false ideas, both with regard to 
 the extent of ground that troops in reahty would occupy, and 
 the time requisite to perform real movements. Officers, they 
 say, cannot accustom themselves to measure accurately the space 
 occupied by a regiment, a brigade, or a di\dsion, when acting 
 against a skeleton enemy ; in addition to Avhich they conceive 
 an erroneous idea, of the time taken by a regiment of Infantry 
 or Cavalry to pass over a certain distance, because the com- 
 pany or troop representing them moves so much more rapidly. 
 These are well known faults, found for a long tune with such 
 manoeuvres. 
 
 The last tlu-ee days have been devoted to the manoeuvres 
 of division agamst division. They have been quite as inte- 
 resting as those executed last year by the Guard Corps. As I 
 have given a full account of the latter, I will limit myseU
 
 147 
 
 here to a eucciiict account of tlie general nature of the move- 
 ments. The two hostile dmsions bivuuack(.^d iu tlie open 
 country Avitliout tents, and in selected positions. 
 
 The out-post duty was performed exactly as in Avar. During 
 the night the Army Corps General sent to each of the Divisional 
 Generals, who were opposed to one another, the general idea 
 which would serve as a basis for the operations of the f(JlloA^dng 
 day. Each of the Divisional Generals was at perfect hberty to 
 take any course he chose to obtain his object. The Ai-my 
 Corps General reserved to hunself the power of modifying at 
 any moment, either by telegraphic orders or orderhes, the dis- 
 positions hrst given. Generals not belonging to the Army 
 Corps are detached to each division as judges. 
 
 At the end of each manoeuvi-e, the Commander-in-Chief 
 designates new camping ground, and in the course of the 
 evening or the night he sends to the Di^dsional Generals a 
 sketch for the manoeuvres of the folloAA-ing day. 
 
 The troops thus manoeuvre each day over different ground 
 unknown to the Generals and officers. The space worked over 
 during the three days may be taken as a square of some 13 or 
 14 miles. I have been struck this year, quite as much as last, by 
 the fact that the infantry is ahvays handled better both by its 
 Generals and officers of all ranks than the (^avahy or Ai-tillery. 
 I would agam bring prominently to notice the excellence of the 
 Company Commandants. By their general and professional know- 
 ledge, by then- zeal, and the spuit of progress, Avhich anunates 
 them, they are the soul and nerves of the Prussian Infantry, 
 and greatly contribute to render it formidable. 
 
 It might be easily seen hoAv in these manoeuAn-es they sought 
 to aA^oid the faults committed during the battles of 18(i6, AA^hen 
 all the troops, and even the reserA'e, scattered themseh^es into 
 long Hues of sldi-mishers. 
 
 They, howcA^er, fell into the opposite fault, for it more 
 than once happened that the troops Avere placed under ffi-e, 
 in deep columns, at considerable distance in the hue of 
 battle ii'om one another. As usual, great use was made of 
 company columns, and columns of attack. 
 
 It is acknoAvledged that the Prussians Avere not at all satisfied 
 A^dtll the part played m the war of 1866 by then- Ai-tillery. 
 Since then a great manA' pamphlets liaA'e appeared upon the use 
 of Field Artillery. 
 
 General Officers liaA^e been called on to famiharize them- 
 selves A^^th the judicious use of this arm of the SerA'ice, and the 
 last autumn manoeuAa-es haA-e been made a practical study of 
 the subject. The King, who is accustomed after each manoeuATe 
 to assemble round him the Generals and Field Officers to criti- 
 cise the moA^ements, blamed the action of the Artillery on 
 many occasions. One day he blamed them for changing their 
 positions too frequently during an action ; the foUoAvhig day he 
 complained of the opposite fault, because a battery had, durmg 
 the entire day remained in one place, 3.000 yards from the
 
 14^ 
 
 enemy. I refer to these tiling":^ to .show liow great a desh'e 
 the Prussian Army has to study the nao of Artillery in war. 
 The chief fault the General Officers commanding the divisions, 
 in the manoeuvres at which I was present, appear to me to have 
 comixdtted, was, they did not distinguish between the cliief 
 phases of the action, and did not take the measm-es those phases 
 rendered requisite. I mU explain myself. The average duration 
 of these manoeuvres was three hours ; noAv it almost invariably 
 happens that in actual battles lasting so long, there are moments 
 when, for some reason or the other the Commander-in-Chief 
 ought above all tilings strive to reform his line of battle, either 
 by supporting it with the reserve, fresh troops or some 
 natural obstacle. It did not appear to me that the Generals 
 took any notice of this necessity when it happened. They 
 alloAved the battle to continue all along the line ^athout inter- 
 ruption, and AAathout even taldng time to reform the troops 
 when such was requisite. 
 
 The manoeuvre of the 9th September was a strildng 
 example of tliis. One of the two divisions had been forced 
 back and compelled to retreat ; 2,000 yards in the rear of its 
 line there was a position strong in itself, and which extended 
 between two villages, well placed to support the mngs. 
 The defeated division should then have fallen back on this 
 position, covered by a rear-guard, and without loss of time. 
 In place of doing this its General continued, although pushed 
 by superior forces, to defend himself along his whole line, in 
 the open country, and the judge decided he was beaten, before 
 he had crossed one-half the space that separated, the strong 
 position, from that at first occupied. 
 
 The annual manoeuvres, termed the autumn manoeuvres, 
 are a school for officers and men, it is therefore but reasonable 
 to expect faults to be committed. Instances where the Generals 
 alloAved the movements to be influenced by the very fact that 
 the manoeuvi'es were sham, might be cited. 
 
 At the manoeuvres of the 11th of September, for mstance, 
 one of the Divisional Generals surprised liis opponent and placed 
 himself perpendicularly on his left flank. Unfortunately the 
 movement Avas made so close to the enemy's fine that the 
 turning division was for three parts of an hour overwhelmed 
 by Artillery and Musketry. The General who was being- 
 turned, ordered a change of front to the rear on his right, 
 but he had not tune to affect it, owmg to the short flank 
 march made by his opponent, who received neither shells 
 nor bullets. 
 
 So far as the men are concerned, I can only again aclaiow- 
 ledge the amount of instruction imparted to them, which, 
 when the short service of the Prussian Army is taken into 
 account, is truly astonishing. This result, as I abeady pointed 
 out in previous reports, is due to the particular pains taken 
 Avith their training during winter, as well as the zeal and good- 
 will Avhich animates every ojie. 1 will report another time on
 
 140 
 
 the attempts which hare boon made to introduce certain altera- 
 tions into the telegraphic service. 
 
 It is a very mteresting thing, especially for a stranger, to 
 observe the clifferent Prussian Army Corps -with reference to 
 the physical and moral quahties which distinguish them from 
 each other, for being recruited in different provinces, each has 
 its own characteristic features. 
 
 Exactly as would happen in France, if wo had entire iVi-my 
 Corps composed some of Limousins, others of Bretons or 
 Alsatians, each, v.-ould have its own pecuhar physiognomy. The 
 various corps of the Prussian Army differ so much both 
 physically and morally, that the General Officers arc compelled 
 to alter the principles of leadmg, and commanding them. 
 
 The 2nd Army Corps, Avhich the Crown Prmce commands, 
 is recruited in Pomerania, and is composed of an energetic 
 laborious race, a httle heavy, perhaps ; they arc generally of 
 an average height, but bony, and strongly built. The Crown 
 Prince said to me, " They are proud men, who ^dll not endiu'e 
 " an injustice ; but well led, everything may be exacted from 
 " them in war, provided their bellies are full."' 
 
 II. Improvement of the Infantry P.ifle. 
 
 I have ah-eady on several occasions referred to the attempts 
 made, since 1867, to improve the mfantry rifle. The superiority 
 of our weapon has been acknowledged for some time by intelli- 
 gent Prussian officers ; as proved by my' conversation with the 
 Kmg, of the 25th April, 1868 {vide report of the 8th Slay, 1868. 
 The King then said to me — " We seek an improvement that 
 '' \\'ill allow us to load more rapidly, and give a greater 
 " initial velocity. Several have been' proposed to me, but 
 '• hitherto I have been unwillmg to adoi^t anv. It is no 
 '' hght matter to alter 1,000,000 rifles, if it is not quite clear 
 " that the proposed alterations, ofier a real and incontestable 
 " advantage." 
 
 Since then, an oflicer of the School of Musketry, has. I 
 beheye, proposed an improvement, which has been adopted. 
 
 Five battahons of Ave different regiments have been supplied 
 A'dth the altered arm, Avith orders to try it thoroughly, both 
 for endm-anceand accuracy, so that the' trials may'termiuate 
 towards the middle of October. 
 
 I hope, if authorised, to study the details of this altera- 
 tion, and forAvard the results in 'a short time. At present 
 I confine myself to pointing out the nature of the proposed 
 alterations ; one refers to the rifle, the other to the cartridge. 
 The improvement in the rifle has for its object rapiditv 
 of loadmg by suppressing one motion, and increasing the 
 elastic force t>f the gas by a method of breech-closing, 
 smiilar to that of our rifle (pattern 1866). The change made 
 m the cartridge consists partly in a diminution of the Aveight 
 of the l)ullet. and partly an increase in the depth to v.-hich
 
 150 
 
 the bullet is enclosed in the paper sabot. It follows from these 
 two conditions that the initial velocity is greatly increased, 
 and that the rotatory motion of the sabot is more completely 
 communicated to the bullet, by wliicli means greater range, a 
 Hatter trajectory, and greater accuracy are obtained.* 
 
 Fire of Field Artillery and Arms of the Feder.vl Ar:my. 
 Rejjort of the 2oth October, 1869. 
 I. Fire of Field Artillery. 
 
 I am deshous of once more pointing out the extreme care 
 taken here with Field Artillery practice. 
 
 It may almost be said that Prussian Artillery officers con- 
 sider their breech-loading guns as perfect instruments, and 
 seek to obtain as much advantage from them as possible. 
 That which above all, continually strikes me is the great care 
 that the field officers, take to make Battery officers judge 
 distance, and instantly correct their fu-e. It has been recog- 
 nized for a long time in the Prussian Artillery, that the officers 
 and non-commissioned officers of a battery will neglect these 
 details much less in war, if they are thoroughly impressed with 
 their importance in peace, if they practise such things often 
 enough, they will finally be done from habit. 
 
 I have been present occasionally at the practice of the regi- 
 ment of Field Artillery of the Guard, under the conmiand 
 
 * The documents Colonel Stoffel has been good enough to place at our disposal 
 are all drawn up in the form of the Reports we publish. We find amongst them one 
 which takes the form of a private letter written to the War Minister, and as it is 
 dated 20th September, 1869, we believe it accompanied the foregoing Report. 
 Colonel Stoffel gives some details of his joui-ney to Pomerania and the great 
 manoeuvres of the 2nd Army Corps which took place there, and to which the King of 
 Prussia had asked more tlian 60 for^-ign officers of every country in Europe. He 
 praises the truly royal hospitality olfered by the King to his numerous guests, and 
 the perfect order that existed everywhere, and the arrangements made to render to 
 the stay in the country as pleasant as possible to every one. 
 
 Our Military Attaclie informed the War Minister why he only attended the 
 manoeuvres of the 2nd Armv Corps in Pomerania, and why he did not follosv the 
 King into the Province of Prussia where the mano?uvres of the 1st Corps took place. 
 
 We extract a passage from his letter. 
 
 " The Court and the guests went to Stettin on the 8th September. That day I 
 " passed through the town in an open carriage alone, and in imiform, when several 
 " persons, forgetting that I was the guest of their King, followed me, using abusive 
 " language, and calling me " French dog. " Stones and mud were flung into my 
 " carriage. I took care to say nothing of this scene to any one, but resolved to return 
 " to Berlin, so soon as the manoeuvres of the 2nd Army Corps were completed. 
 " Consequently, on the lltli September, under the pretence of urgent private 
 " affairs, I took leave of the King, and expressed my regret at not going witli 
 " liim to Xonigsberg. 
 
 " I should add that the people of Prussia proper, are those "n'ho preserve 
 " feelirgs of the greatest hatred against France, and that no French uniform lias 
 " appeared there since 1813. It appeared to me, therefore, imdesirable to expose 
 " myself to fresh perhaps more serious insidts, than those I encountered at Stettin. 
 
 " M. do Pismarek, who had come to see the King at Stargard on the 11th 
 " September, was good enough to ask me to go with, him to Yarzin when he 
 " returned, and where I was his guest for some days."
 
 151 
 
 of General Ilolieiilolie. Tliirs meritorious, energetic, and able 
 officer exercises his batteries at field practice, as follows : — 
 The Battery Commandment, so soon as he arrives at the range 
 with liis guns, rmlimbers at a place pointed out by a field 
 officer, and lie judges the distance between the guns and the 
 target. Each battery has a regimental telescope, which has 
 its fixed place in one of the hmber boxes. The Battery Com- 
 mandant judges the distance, suppose 1,500 yards. He then 
 orders, by a special word used at drill, to lay No. 1 gun Avitli 
 a range of 1,400 yards, No. 2 with 1,500. No. 3 with I'.BOO, and 
 No. 4 with 1,700.* 
 
 The first gun is then fired. Of three tlnngs, one must 
 happen; the range is too long, too short, or the target is 
 struck. In the first case the Battery Commandant can tell, 
 thanks to the accm-acy of the Prussian guns, that the range 
 is less than 1,400 yards, and he therefore directs the tlu-eo 
 other guns to be relaid, according to the distance the shot has 
 struck beyond the target. The second gun would then be 
 laid at 1,300 yards, the tlnrd at 1,200, the fourth at 1,100. The 
 second gun would then l3e fired ; and if the range was still too 
 long, the Battery Commandant Avould again correct tlie other 
 two guns, and so proceed until the proper range was obtained. 
 In the second case, if the first roimd was too short, the Battery 
 Commandant would conclude that the target was more than 
 1,400 yards, and would at once correct the ranges of the other 
 guns, lading them, for example, at 1,500, 1,(500, 1,700 yards. 
 The second gun would then fire, and so on. 
 
 If the first round, when iu-ed at 1,400 yards, struck the 
 target, showing that the distance had been correctly judged 
 at the first attempt, the other three guns would not fire. 
 They would remam loaded, the limbers Avould come up, and 
 the battery would moye off at a trot, either to the rear or the 
 front, and take up a new position, pointed out by a field 
 officer. Then the guns would again come into action, and the 
 Battery Commandant, in a new position, would have to judge 
 the distance of other taryets, without reference to the first. 
 He has then to act as I have described, and is compelled to 
 judge the distance by the telescope, and ccu-rect the la;\'ing of 
 the guns at each round until the target is hit. The rule is 
 invariably adhered to, that once the target is struck, the other 
 gnins, although loaded, do not fire at that range. They 
 see no instruction in firing them, and prefer rather to reserve 
 these rounds for exercising officers and men in firing at other 
 ranges. Tliis is very different, indeed, from the routine method 
 in Avhich the practice of our field artillery is carried out. 
 
 I have been surprised every time I have been present at 
 such practice by the accuracy of the Prussian field guns. Tlieir 
 sensibility (if I may use such a word) is so great, that I have 
 seen a battery at practice sliift its position five times before it 
 
 * In peace, Batteries bare only four gnus in Pnisiia.
 
 152 
 
 fired 12 rounds, or, in otlier words, the target had been struck 
 after only two rounds {vide for details of the accuracy of the 
 Prussian guns, the German memoire attached to my Report of 
 the 20th February, 1808). 
 
 What I desire chiefly to bring to notice is the stress that in 
 Prussia is laid on tliQ correction of the range, and the care 
 displayed by the officers and non-commissioned officers in 
 forming this habit. 
 
 I have more than once, when in Paris, discussed these 
 details with Artillery Officers. The rephes they made are but 
 another instance of our infatuation, and of that detestable pre- 
 tension that we have notliing to learn. " It is not requisite to 
 " be a Prussian to know that in vrar the range must be cor- 
 " rected," said one officer to me. '• All our officers know that 
 " without being taught." This is tantamount to saying, it is 
 not requisite to teach men to march, preserve their dressing, or 
 manoeuvre, for when requisite they will know enough of these 
 tilings. 
 
 In Prussia, it is said that many inevitable causes make 
 officers Hable to misjudge distance, and neglect the correction 
 of then* ranges, and the sound method to counteract tliis neglect 
 is to teach these important details unceasingly, and -wdth such 
 care, that the habit once formed remains in all contingencies. 
 
 General Hohenlohe, who takes the greatest care in instruct- 
 ing the batteries composing liis brigade of Artillery, made last 
 summer in the ranges a moveable target, and he was good 
 enough to ask me to be present at the trials. He obtained 
 fi."om a raihvay company some worn out rails, sufficient to make 
 a road 500 yards long. He obtained from the Artillery stores, 
 some condemned rope, and thus at a cost of 16?. he made a 
 moveable target. As is seen on the sketch, the rope to Avliieh 
 the target is attached runs from one end of the railway to 
 another, being supported so as to diminish the friction of the 
 ground by httle cyhnders of wood, c, c, c, spaced along the 
 line. At the end of the hue it turns round a kind of pulley 
 fixed firmly in the ground, and at the end of the rope, horses 
 are attached, who move the target, which is mounted
 
 153 
 
 on two wheels rimning on the rails. When the tarp^et reaches 
 the end of the railway towards A, it is made again to go back 
 by hooking the horses in at D. 
 
 Grape is fired against the target in motion, when the horses 
 walk to imitate Infantry, and when they trot to imitate Cavalry. 
 These experiments have been most interesting, and have 
 succeeded so well, that General Hohenlohe is going to lengthen 
 the railway next year by an additional 500 yards. 
 
 II. Number of Guns in the Federal Army. 
 
 I have already reported, that since the beginning of this year 
 all the Artillery of the Army of the North German Confedera- 
 tion is provided '\\^th steel breech-loading guns. The Regular 
 Army on a war footing requires 1,284 guns. 
 
 In case of mobilization each regiment of Field Artillerv 
 forms tlu'ee depot batteries ; 89 in all for the 13 Army Corps, 
 and three other batteries, called reserve batteiies ; these 78 
 batteries or 468 guns will be provided ^dth the converted guns 
 of the small States of the Confederation. If to these be added 
 the guns of the Regular Army, there is a total of 1,752 guns ; hi 
 addition to which Prussia has 500 or GOO guns forming the 
 reserve materiel, making 2,300 guns in all. All this field 
 materiel is complete and in perfect order. To it may be added 
 the 200 guns captured from the Austrians in 18G(i, and now 
 being converted into breech-loaders. 
 
 As for the small-arms of the North German Confederation, 
 they consist of 1,500,000 of needle rifles, and 140,000 carbines, 
 supposmg aU the mihtary forces of the Confederation fuUy 
 armed, 500,000 rifles and 50,000 carbines will remain as a 
 reserve. 
 
 Military Telegraphy — The Berlin TeleC4raph, and the 
 Military Cox\"extiox. 
 
 Report of the 17 ih November, 1860. 
 I. Reorganization of the Mihtary Telegraplhc Service. 
 
 The Mihtary Telegraphic Service has been reorganized on 
 nev\r piinciples. The reason being that its importance was 
 thoroughly appreciated hi the war of 1866, and that people 
 were not quite satisfied with the way it worked. The first 
 army, (Prhice Frederick Charles), was the only one where, thanks 
 to the zeal of the staft', the telegraphic service has completely 
 performed its duties, but elsewhere it has left much to be 
 deshed. It happened, as I can testify, when the Emperor sent 
 me on a mission to Bohemia during the armistice of 1866, that 
 on several occasions, the telegraph poles were used as fire wood, 
 and the wke to tie horses "\^dth.
 
 154 
 
 Prussia is too watchful and too anxious for progress, not to 
 seek and profit by tlie experience acquii-ed in 186(i, to improve 
 this important service. She has laboured at it for tlu-ee years, 
 last year at the autumn manoeuvres of the Guard some experi- 
 ments were made. They were resumed this year during 
 the grand manoeuvres of the Second Army Corps in Pomerania ; 
 and as they were considered satisfactory, the reorganization 
 may be considered as now completed and adopted. The 
 essential difference between the new and the old system 
 consists in dividing the telegraph service of the army into 
 two clistinct porti(nis. 
 
 1. That of the Field Telegraph Division. 
 
 2. That of the Telegraph Division termed '• etappen." The 
 latter keeps up the communication from the rear of the army 
 v'ith the telegraphic system of the country. While the Field 
 Telegraph Divisions freed fi'om tliis labour, are attached to the 
 army and solely employed in mihtary operations, During the 
 Avar of 18G6 the Telegraph Divisions performed both duties, but 
 experience showed that it was very difficult and very fatiguing 
 for them to follow the movements of the army, and at tlie isame 
 time work the hues ah'eady estabhshed. The division of duties 
 referred to above, was therefore deemed indispensable. 
 
 I had intended to make a special report on this reorgaui2ia- 
 tion of the telegraphic service of the North German Army, but 
 Avhile I was collecting the requisite information the 22nd 
 A'olume of the collection called " Mihturische Bliitter," otli paper, 
 November 18()9, appeared, which contahied a chapter giving 
 detailed information on tliis subject, and thus rendered my 
 labour needless. I attach a copy of the 22nd volume to this 
 report. The chapter refen-ed to is written by an Officer of 
 Engineers who formed a portion of the Telegraph Diviision 
 attached to the Second Army Corps, during the great autumn 
 manoeuvres, when the new system was tried. He explains the 
 reorganization, and points out the composition of the Field 
 Telegraph Division, both in personnel and material, as well as 
 the results obtained. Tliis article is vv^ell worthy of translation 
 for the instruction of our officers in general, and those charged 
 with the telegraphic service in particular. I sent on the 20tli 
 September last a map of the country manoeuvred over by the 
 Second Army Corps, which will serve as a guide for the account 
 of the telegraphic operations contained in the " ]\lihtarische 
 Blatter." 
 
 I will confine myself to sayuig that ui case of a great war 
 the 13 Army Corps of the North German Army, would form four 
 armies, each of which will have its 'telegraphic service, or as they 
 say in Prussia, its telegraph column. Each column will be com- 
 posed of tln-ee divisions. One, the Etappen Telegraphic Division, 
 is destined to estabhsh and secure the communication of the 
 great Head-Quarters Arith the rear, and the network of State 
 Telegraphs (as has just been said). The other two termed Field 
 Telegraph Divisions, are charged Avitli duties connected Avith
 
 155 
 
 the operations of the army reeonnais8ance, subsistence, com- 
 munications of the Head-Quarters with the vaiious Army 
 Corps, &c. 
 
 One detail given in the chapter ah'eady quoted of the 
 " MiHtiirische Blatter," is that the 92 Sappers (see page 373) 
 which form a portion of the Telegraph Detachment, are taken 
 from the Landwelu*. An apphcation of the principle to which 
 I have so often referred, that hi Vi-uBsm the pei so/mel of the 
 various exceptional ser\dces (companies of bearers of the sick, 
 railway companies, and telegraphic divisions), are formed for 
 Avar without decreasing the effective strength of the active 
 army by draAving on the Landwher as on a great reservou*. So 
 much importance is attached to the telegraph service that it is 
 proposed to increase the ah-eady very large number of estabhsh- 
 ments for mihtary instruction in Prussia by making a special 
 telegraphic school. Now telegraphy is a branch of instruction 
 in all the mihtary schools of the State, and it has been decided 
 to have in Avinter, for Officers in the great garrisons, a course 
 both of theoretical and practical telegraphy, gi\^en by a superior 
 ewploye of the civil telegraph serAace. 
 
 In the same garrisons telegraphy is taught to the non- 
 commissioned officers of the A^aiious regiments, Avho, in case 
 of mobilization, vrill be employed on the telegraph lines of 
 the State, Avhere they AA^ould replace ciAal emploijes, avIio, in 
 then" turn, Avould join the army to be attached to the tele- 
 graphic service. 
 
 An increase of pay is giA^en to these iion-connnissioned 
 officers as an encouragement. 
 
 II. IMihtary Telegraph Communication AA^th Berlin. 
 
 Since the beginning of my mission in Prussia, I have 
 scA^eral times pointed out, Avhen in Paris, both to the Emperor 
 and the War Minister, as aat'11 as to other people, a fact that 
 appears to me AA^orthy of attention and AA^ell-deserAang of study. 
 There undoubtedly must be reasons Avliy nothijig has folloAved 
 from my obserA^ations, but as I do not knoAv these reasons I 
 again return to the subject. I AAdsh to speak of the existence 
 at Berhn of a telegraphic communication direct from all the 
 barracks to the Kmg's Cabinet, the War Office, and the Main 
 Guard. There are in each regiment tAveh^e non-connnissioned 
 officers exercised in working the apparatus, who take the 
 telegraphic duty betAveen them AA^eek about. In ordinary 
 times this institution is not of A'ery great utiHty. But is it 
 possible to deny the great adA^antages that miglit accrue 
 from it if disturbances broke out, and had to be repressed? 
 These adA^antages are too CAadent to make it requisite for me 
 to enumerate them. It may be said, perhaps, that in time of 
 trouble, the telegraphic communication aa'OuUI be quickly 
 broken; but is there anything to prcA^ent its being carried 
 underground, safe from all attempts to destroy it ? 
 
 There are besides frequent occasions, cA^en in ordhiary times,
 
 15B 
 
 Avhen a method of telegraphic communication, such as exists 
 at Berhn, offers undoubted advantages. I spoke last year 
 with one of the Princes of the Prussian Court on the subject: — 
 " These telegraphs," he said to me, '• do not cost much 
 " money to construct, and you would hardly believe the profit 
 " we obtain from them, or rather the expenses of another 
 '' kind that they save us. Let us suppose a great review 
 '• ordered ; and some hours before the moment when the 
 " King should go out, it begins^ to rain, will the review take 
 "place — Yes or No? Having at his disposal the telegraph, 
 '■ wliicli communicates from his cabinet to the various barracks, 
 " the King can wait before deciding until the moment when 
 '" the troops should march, and, if requisite, he can counter- 
 '• mand the review in time. We thus ]3revent the arms and 
 " accoutrements of eight to ten thousand men bemg damaged 
 *' by rain or mud. Tliis is equivalent to a large smn ; and 
 " if what the State has saved in this way, since the barrack 
 " telegraphs were constructed, was added up, it would be found 
 " that their construction has been profitable." When one 
 tliinks of the advantages of every kmd wliich the establish- 
 ment at Paris, at such a small cost, of such telegraphs, one can 
 hardly understand why we do not follov/ the example of Prussia. 
 
 One of the distinctive quahties of Prussia is foresight. 
 She ^^'ishes to be always ready, so that in any crisis she 
 may get on a Avar footing as quicldy as possible. She there- 
 fore has organized and prepared beforehand all that is useful 
 and necessary. In France, Ave say, If Ave Avere iuA^olved m 
 a great war, avo AA^ould very quickly, in case of necessity, 
 establish m our strong places, Paris, Lyons, Metz, and 
 others, a netAvork of telegraphs, to communicate betAveen 
 these places and the surrounding forts. Here they reason 
 differently. They say, AA'hen Avar breaks out, the number 
 of things to l>e done is very great, and they organize as 
 much as possible beforehand. Thus Mayence, Coblentz, 
 Cologne, and several places m Silesia, are suppHed with a 
 netAvork of telegraphs, either completed or in course of 
 construction, Avliich put these towns in communication with 
 the detached forts. Thus cA^erything m the A^arious military 
 magazines of North Germany is ready, even to a spade-heh'e 
 and a nail. 
 
 I would add, that at Berhn the Prefecture of PoHce is 
 equally in telegraphic conununication with the Police and Fhe 
 Stations. I spoke some days ago A^dth the Prefect of PoHce, 
 ^L Wurmb, Avho has just returned from Paris, AAdierc he went 
 to study the organization of the French Pohce. He Avas 
 astonished that Ave had not at Paris a telegrapliic netAvork 
 for pohce purposes. He told me he had expressed his astonish- 
 ment to the Parisian authorities. " What did they reply ? " I 
 asked. " We do not Avant it."
 
 157 
 
 III. Berlin Contingent 1869. 
 
 The best informed newspapers say that last spring the 
 Council of Revision, sittmg at Berlin, examined 20,000 young 
 men, twenty years of age, and found only 3,200 fit for military 
 service, or one in seven. This has been much commented on, 
 and several newspapers have raised a cry of alarm. Some 
 parts of Berlui have not even furnished one recruit out of 
 eleven young men "^"ho came forward. Scrofulous diseases 
 have been the chief cause of this small number of sound men. 
 
 IV. Military Conventions. 
 
 Brunswick and Mecklenburg Strelitz. — The only States of the 
 North German Confederation which have not now concluded a 
 military convention with Prussia are Bruns^%dck and j\lecklen- 
 burg Strelitz. The mihtary relations of these Duchies vdtli 
 Prussia is governed only by the Federal Constitution (Para- 
 graphs 63 and 64). These Ducliies continue to administer 
 thek troops themselves. They do not form an integral part 
 of the Prussian Army, as those of the Thiiiingian States, the 
 Hanseatic Towns, and the Duchy of Oldenburg do. Prussia 
 is by no means pleased that these two little States thus 
 pretend to a kind of independence. The newspapers reproach 
 them on every occasion, turning them into ridicule, and seeldng 
 to influence the officers of the two Duchies, by asking how 
 they can consent to be contented with the slow promotion 
 of an insignificant contingent, m place of sharing m the 
 general promotion of the great Prussian Army ? 
 
 Kingdom of Saxony. — Saxony has concluded, as is loio-wm, a 
 mihtary convention with Prussia. Nevertheless, on account 
 of the importance of this kingdom, she has retained the aclmuiis- 
 tration of her ot\ti troops; and the Saxon officers are promoted 
 only amongst themselves. 
 
 In accordance with the 4th Paragraph of the Federal 
 Constitution, the fortress of Konigstem and the fortifications 
 of Dresden belong to the Confederation. The former has had, 
 ever since 1860, a Prussian garrison. The 1st January, 1870, 
 the fortress was occupied by the 1st Company of the 5th Bat- 
 tahon of Silesian Rifles. 
 
 Grand Duchy of Hesse. — The mihtary convention of Hesse 
 with Prussia dates the 7th August, 1867. It has been much 
 spoken of since what took place this autumn at Bergen, 
 during the manoeuvres in presence of the Kuig, when, for 
 the fu'st time, Prussian and liessian troops were united to- 
 gether. The 4th September after these manoeu^a-es, the King 
 said to me that the instruction of the Hessian troops had 
 not fully satisfied him ; and, a feeling of pride minghng -udth 
 his discontent, he added, " They have yet much to learn 
 " before they equal my troops." The King then, without 
 doubt, determined to use the right that the 4th Para- 
 graph of the Military Convention gave him, that of sub-
 
 158 
 
 etituting Prussian for Hessian officers. For lie directed several 
 Hessian officers to be retii-ed, and their places to be filled by- 
 Prussian officers, who he named to commands in the 25th 
 Division. Thus, for example, a decision of the 7th November 
 last, gave the command of the Brigade of Hessian Cavalry 
 to the Prussian General Schlotheim, Chief of the Staff of 
 the 8th Ai-my Corps. The Prussian newspapers ^aite that 
 this must not stop there, that the Hessian Division must be 
 purged. The officers of this Division (they allude chiefly to 
 the field officers) who are not, according to Pru> sian ideas, 
 equal to the duties, must simply be sent on fui lough, and 
 the others must not be promoted, until they have served a 
 certain time in a Prussian regiment. 
 
 These measures have caused considerable discontent m the 
 Duchy of Hesse Darmstadt, vdth which Prussia had liitherto 
 kept on good terms, despite the taunts levelled at her. IShe is 
 accused of bemg favourable to Austria; of ignoiing the 
 existence of a North German Confederation ; of having news- 
 papers, amongst others the Allgemeine Militdr Zeitung, edited by 
 discontented officers. She is reproached vath not wisliing to 
 organize her mihtary force in accordance with the basis adopted 
 by Prussia, and in adhering to two-battalion regiments (4 
 regiments of two battalions and two battahons of rifles), whilst 
 the remahider of the Federal Army has three battalion regi- 
 ments. 
 
 Prussia vashes to substitute 3 three-battalion regiments and 
 one battahon of rifles. Wliich three regunents would take the 
 vacant numbers 97, 98, 99, which are wanting m the series of 
 regunental numbers. 
 
 Hesse has hitherto refused to yield to the wish of Prussia ; 
 but sooner or later she will see herself compelled to peld, for 
 she cannot sustain a prolonged struggle on account of the 
 precarious position resulting fi-om the events of 1866. 
 
 The step taken by the King iii replacing Hessian by Prussian 
 officers is important, when it is ^dewed in connection with the 
 method in which Prussia accomphshes her work of absorption. 
 
 Wlule the King has only acted as he was empowered to do 
 by the Military Convention of the 7th August, 1867, it is not 
 the less true that more than two years elapsed before he exer- 
 cised this right. This fact is but a fresh example of the pohcy 
 of Prussia as regards all the small States of the North German 
 Confederation, as well as those of the South. 
 
 This policy consists on the one hand, in the use of tact 
 hastening notliing, risking nothmg, so that discontent should 
 never exceed moderate hmits ; and on the other hand acting 
 imceasingly, both openly and secretly, letting no opportunity 
 pass, for placing these States, more and more, in a condition of 
 depenlence on Prussia. 
 
 In truth there is in Prussia a party who would desue to 
 hasten matters, and settle the unification of Germany at the 
 risk even of a war with France ; but it is powerless to influence
 
 159 
 
 the Government or the wise and moderate party ; these, headed 
 by M. Bismarck, clearly see that time is then- best auxiliary. 
 
 They vd\l do nothing that will give France much cause of 
 alarm ; they vdll watch the events wliich they themselves bring 
 about, seekuig to increase unceasingly the absorbing mfluence 
 of Prussia, and they reckon that the day will come when, under 
 the shelter of accompHshed and accepted facts, the last step to 
 complete the unification of Germany under their leadership, 
 may be taken as a natmal sequence from previous events, a 
 consequence so simple and natui'al, that no Power can find cause 
 to complain of it. 
 
 These opinions are not mine alone, they are those of a 
 great number of sensible people, to whose opinion some weight 
 is due. I could cite the ministers of various countries at Berlin, 
 who are ahnost m a state of consternation at the rapid 
 progress made by Prussia in three years on this road; I 
 see that this progress is very evident and real. Prussia exer- 
 cises over all the States surrounding her a very considerable 
 attractive power, due to the education and intelhgence of the 
 nation, to her energy, force of voLl, and the faith she has in 
 what she believes to be her mission. She knows that the 
 discontent actually existing in the annexed States, and in those 
 of the south, ^n\\ gradually decrease, and finally disappear. 
 She counts on time, her address, and, if need be, on her 
 strength. 
 
 I would remark, besides, that people deceive themselves in 
 exaggerating the discontent Tvhich exists in the small States of 
 North Germany, consequent on the forcible annexations of 1866. 
 AVithout denymg the existence of discontent, it should be clearly 
 understood that it is felt only by a small portion of the people. 
 Compulsory military service has been cited as the chief motive 
 for the discontent of the inhabitants of the small States. Tliis 
 is true only to a certain extent, for I have heard it said by rich 
 well-to-do people in Hanover and the Hanseatic towns, that 
 they thought it fortunate that their sons, when they reach the 
 age of 17, should be compelled to serve for at least one year. 
 
 " Our childi-en," these persons said to me, " are compelled 
 " to labour mth greater zeal than formerly to be able to pass 
 " the examiaation required from those who seek to benefit by 
 " the advantages granted to the volunteers of a year, and we 
 " do not murmer at then having to pass a year in the army 
 " at an age when they might feel disposed to spend then- time 
 " badly. This year spent in the army as a school of morality 
 " and honour, is at the same time the best school they can have 
 " for discipline and obedience to the laws." 
 
 To anyone understanding the German character, this opinion 
 is not astonishing. The German yields easily to every exigency, 
 even the hardest, when he sees its necessity and utility. 
 
 I attach to tliis report — 
 
 1. A copy of the 23rd volume of the " Militarische Blatter," 
 5th number, November 1869. 
 
 N 2
 
 160 
 
 2. A copy of a History of the School of Musketry at 
 Spanclan. 
 
 3. A copy of the Composition of the Army Corps and 
 Stations of the Federal troops (Autmnn 1869). 
 
 4. A copy of "Instruction for Riflemen," by Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Hautelman. 
 
 IXSTKUCTIOX OF RECRUITS; DETAILED INF0R1L\TI0X AS TO THE 
 CAVALRY; AilALGAMTION OF THE ArIVHES OF OTHER STATES. 
 
 Report of the 11th January, 1870.* 
 
 I. Instruction of Recruits and Detailed Information as to the 
 Cavalry. 
 
 The instruction- of recruits carried out every year with a zeal 
 and care, unequalled m any other army, is this winter pushed 
 forward with redoubled vigour. Orders have been given 
 dhecting that every effort is to be made to enable the recruits 
 to take then- places in the ranks by the end of February. I do 
 not thinlc there is any other reason for this beyond the lact that, 
 for economical motives it is proposed to give a number of 
 furloughs in each army corps, to the men of different arms, 
 Cavahy excepted. 
 
 I have ah*eady pointed out, that consequent on the short 
 service in Prussia, the Cavahy histruction demands the greatest 
 care and attention. 
 
 Every Cavahy Officer knows that he can only fulfil his task 
 by the greatest activity and zeal. 
 
 Hence in each squadi-on Officers are on an average six or 
 seven hours on duty daily, and the regimental riding schools 
 are (as is never done in France) hghted at night, and the 
 recruits succeed one another in batches all day long. Com- 
 manding Officers of Cavalry Regiments are du'ected not to lose 
 time in maldng inspections and reviews, but to saciifice every- 
 thing to so called practical instruction. I beg to di*aw atten- 
 tion to the arrangement by v/hich they seek to induce Cavahy 
 soldiers to remain four years in place of three in the regular 
 army. Those who consent to do so, serve only thi'ee years in 
 the Landwehr, in place of five, and further, during then period 
 of service in the reserve they escape the two trainings of eight 
 weeks prescribed for reserve meii. In adcUtion to which they 
 receive during the fourth year spent with the coloms the increase 
 of pay paid on re-engagement, and may be promoted to the 
 fii'st class, or even to the rank of Non-Commissioned Officer. 
 
 * We have nine Reports dated 1870. We publish the follcsving fire as the most 
 interesting. — [Ed.]
 
 161 
 
 Officers conunanding regiments are requested to induce as 
 many men as possible to re-engage. 
 
 I think it well to point out the error made with reference to 
 tliis subject in several French books, where it is stated that the 
 length of service in Prussia v\ith the colom's is four years in the 
 Cavahy and Ai-tillery m place of three as Avith the Infantry. 
 The persons who \<n.ite .thus must have misunderstood the 
 order of the 6th September, 1866, Avhich is worded thus : 
 '• Cavahy soldiers, who on the completion of the third year of 
 " service shall re-engage for a fourth year, perform two years 
 " less service with the Landwehi-, and are also exempted from 
 *' appearing at reserve or Landwehi* traitiings." Paragraph 4 
 of the Instruction on Recruitmg is thus worded : " Cavahy 
 " soldiers who voluntarily engage to serve a fourth year, serve 
 " only three years in the Landwehi-. 
 
 Fencing and Gymnastics. — Commanding Officers of Cavahy 
 Regiments pay now more attention to fencmg and gpnnastics. 
 This arises (as I pointed out in my report of the 22nd July, 
 1868) from the experience gained in the war of 1866, when in 
 several battles the Prussian and Aiistrian Cavahy got mixed 
 after ha'^^ing charged, and it is thought that sldll and activity 
 cannot be too much cultivated by a Cavahy soldier. 
 
 Thus gymnastics have been made compulsory in Cavalry 
 regiments, under the superintendence of the Conunanding 
 Officers of Squadi'ons, and a manual of gynmastic instruction 
 for mounted troops has been di'awn up. 
 
 This book has an appendix, giving a Hst of the articles that 
 each corps must have to practice gymnastics. As for instruc- 
 tion m fencing in the Cavahy, much greater attention has been 
 paid to it since 1866. 
 
 I have always from personal inclination, as well as duty, 
 paid much attention to the instruction in fencing and lidiug in 
 the Cavahy Regiments of the Guard and Line, being convinced 
 that other things being equal, that which forms the essential 
 difference between one trooper and another, is skill in handling 
 his horse and his sword. 
 
 The result of my observation, has invariably been the same, 
 it is, that after equal periods, the Prussian recruit becomes a 
 better horseman than the French, but on the other hand, the 
 latter undoubtedly excels in the use of his . sword. One with 
 another, the Prussian trooper sits his horse better than the 
 French, and makes better use of the aids, thanlj:s to the con- 
 tinual and intelHgent mstruction in riding given by the Officers 
 and Non-Commissioned Officers of the squadron. But with 
 regard to the use of the sword, it is curious to observe how 
 justly and without prejudice the Prussian Officers see the 
 truth. I have not met one who has not frankly acknow- 
 ledged, that theh' efforts to make the men acquii-e the proper 
 amount of skill were fruitless. 
 
 " It is impossible," say they, " to accustom our troops to use 
 •' the point, they have an unconquerable propensity to strike great
 
 162 
 
 " blows, exposing themselves." In this respect they are at a 
 marked disadvantage with the French soldier, who uses his 
 weapon with more skill, and thrusts. I was speaking yesterday 
 to a General who commanded a Brigade of Cavahy in Bohemia 
 in 1866. He aheady knew of the Imperial edict of the 
 27th December, 1869, which dh-ects the gratuitous and com- 
 pulsory instruction of fencing m the French Army, and he 
 acknowledged that tliis order, if properly earned out, would 
 still further increase the superiority of our troopers. 
 
 The Army of the North German Confederation has 74 
 Cavahy regiments composed of 5 Squadrons, or rather 76, if 
 the 2oth Hessian Division be included. This gives a force on a 
 peace footmg with the colours of 55,500 men and 55,000 horses, 
 or in other words one quarter of the effective strength of the 
 Infantry {vide Table B attached to my Report, 24th June, 
 1868). Tliis large proportion of Cavahy is due to the creation 
 of 16 regunents in 1866, and the addition of a 5th squadron to 
 each of the old regunents, wliich, prior to 1866, had only 4. 
 The Generals have not altogether approved of the great hicrease 
 in the Cavalry, and many would have much preferred to have 
 seen the money spent on the Artillery. Tlie formation of four 
 Cavahy Regiments in the Thuringian States, spoken of some 
 time ago, appears to have been given up. 
 
 I do not know the reasons which have determmed Prussia 
 to increase her Cavahy so much beyond the proportion hitherto 
 laid down in the formation of armies as correct. Perhaps it may 
 be inferred that in Prussia they do not beheve that modern 
 improvements in Artillery and smaU-arms have reduced the 
 part played by Cavalry in war. 
 
 Doubtless people have said, that at the present day the 
 greater number of the countries in Europe have been so altered 
 by the j)rogress of agriculture, by the construction of railways 
 and telegraphs, and communications of all kinds, that Cavahy 
 can never be sufficiently active nor vigilant to be in the full 
 acceptation of the words, the eye and ear of the army. But if 
 we reflect on the consequence of the changes of all kinds in 
 various countries, we must admit that armies at the present day 
 must be covered in theh advance at far greater distances than 
 formerly, and it appears therefore that Prussia has sho^vn 
 wisdom in increasing the proportion of her Cavahy. 
 
 Certain German pubhcations are 'discussing the important 
 question what is the best method of dividing Cavalry in 
 modern armies ? Should large Cavahy corps be formed, or is it 
 better to distribute the Cavahy by giving a brigade of two or 
 three regiments to each Infantry division } The latter opuiion 
 appears to be preferred, and the inaction of Cavahy m recent 
 wars is attributed to the formation of large corps, which the 
 Generals could not handle. 
 
 Landwehr Cavalry. — I mentioned two years ago the altera- 
 tion made in the organization of the Landwelu' Cavalry after 
 the war of 1866. The formation by squadi'ons having replaced
 
 163 
 
 that by regiments, they no longer distinguish the various kinds 
 of Cavahy from one another, and it was proposed for war to 
 attach to each of the 76 regiments of the Federal Cavahy two 
 or tlu-ee squadrons of Landwehi', forming Gth, 7th, and 8th 
 squadi'ons. However, the old organizations are now pre- 
 ferred, and the squadi'ons of Landwehr Cavahy wiU, in case of 
 mobihzation, be formed into regiments wliich will be attached to 
 the various Army Corps. Tliis Cavalry vnW be employed in the 
 fortresses in the interior, and recourse Avill not be had to it, to 
 complete the squadrons of the regular army, except in excep- 
 tional cases. 
 
 In time of peace the LandAvehr Cavahy is not formed into 
 corps as the Landwehr Infantry is, it only appears on the muster 
 lists. 
 
 It is the same with the Landwehi- men of the Artillery and 
 Engineers, they are intended in time of war to complete the 
 Artillery and Engineers in fortresses, and to instruct troops at 
 the depots of these two arms. 
 
 Cavalry School. — I have ah'eady detailed in a previous report 
 the composition of the Cavalry School (corresponding mth our 
 school at Saumur). It embraces the Staff of the school and 
 two district schools for officers, and non-commissioned officers, 
 fornnng a total of more than 350 horses, 400 officers, non- 
 commissioned officers and grooms, &c. Until 1867 the Cavahy 
 School was at Schwedt, a small town situated on the Oder, but 
 after the annexation of the Kingdom of Hanover, it was 
 removed tO the town of Hanover, a central position where there 
 were already spacious well arranged buildings. Now it is pro- 
 posed, notAvithstanding the beauty and suitabihty of the build- 
 ings, to break up the school, and divide it amongst several 
 garrisons of the second class. 
 
 The partisans of this measure support it on the ground of 
 the great cost of living in Hanover, which allows only officers 
 with private fortunes to Hve m consonance with their rank, and 
 they are further of opition, that by creating several Cavahy 
 schools (one for two or three Army Corps), the mstruction of 
 the officers and non-commissioned officers would be improved 
 on account of the emulation of the schools. This is open to 
 argument. I only mention it because it is being actively 
 discussed. It may be here remarked that Prussia does 
 not admit the principal of centrahzing estabhshments of tliis 
 nature, there being seven war schools in as many difterent 
 towns. In breaking up the Hanover School of Cavahy, and 
 forming a school for two or three Army Corps, the principal 
 adopted for war schools would be followed. 
 
 II. Progress of Army Amalgamation. 
 
 As is known, the troops of the various smaU States of the 
 North German Confederation are almost entnely modelled on 
 those of Prussia in everything connected with rules, tactics,
 
 164 
 
 arms, and equipment. Prussia believed herself called on to 
 grant concessions only to the troops of the Kingdom of 
 Saxony (12th Army Corps) and the Duchy of Hesse (25th 
 Division), wliich preserve some special administrative details. 
 But even these are daily becommg more and more assimilated 
 to the Prussians, as the follomng fact proves :— In the 
 Prussian Army the cost of a soldier's messing is composed, 
 per man, per day, of two distinct poi-tions ; one which never 
 alters, and is fixed at 1-9 pence daily ; the other, wliich is 
 fixed every tln-ee months, in each garrison, according to the 
 price of provisions, and forms an increase to the messing. 
 — Verpflegungs-Zuschuss.^ 
 
 A table of these additions to the messing is pubHshed each 
 quarter, showing the amount fixed for that quarter in each 
 garrison town m North Germany. That which governs the 
 first three months of the year 1870 shows that at Berlin, for 
 example, the addition to the messmg is l^d,, whence it 
 follows that the expense of a soldier's messing at BerHn is 3|^. 
 Now, what I want to draw attention to is, that the ofiicial table 
 of the additions to the messing, as well as the allowances of 
 bread and forage, includes, for the first time, the garrisons of 
 the Kingdom of Saxony, and the Duchy of Hesse. Hence, we 
 must conclude, that Saxony, and Hess©- have made one step 
 more in assimilating the administration of then troops to that 
 of Prussia ; and that the work of amalgamation, which for 
 three years has gone on in various portions of the Federal 
 Army approaches more and more towards completion. 
 
 Staff Journeys. 
 
 The Stafi' journeys, to which I have several times alluded 
 this year, take place in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 12th Army 
 Corps. 
 
 The Staff" will tliis year endeavour to complete the trian- 
 gulation of certain parts of the Confederation. A sum of 8,000/. 
 has been granted for the purpose. 
 
 I attach to this Report — 
 
 1. A new Pamphlet by M. Becker upon his Method 
 
 of Treatmg Fractures. 
 
 2. A Pamphlet by Colonel Taubert, upon the Employ- 
 
 ment of Artillery in the Field and at Sieges. 
 
 3. The Prussian Rules for Conducting Great Manoeuvres. 
 
 * These additions to the messing differ much at the same time, according to the 
 locality. The additions is \d. t9 ^d. in East Prussia, and 3rf. in the Ehine Provinces. 
 At Berlin it is now \\d.
 
 165 
 
 Fortresses ; Educational Establishjients ; 
 Ar:*ia]mexts. 
 
 Naval 
 
 Report of the 22nd January, 1870. 
 
 I. Fortresses. 
 
 Lately 
 pressed. 
 
 four fortresses have been dismantled and sup- 
 
 Jiiliers (Province of tlie Rluiie). 
 Schweiclnitz (Silesia). 
 Silberborg (Silesia). 
 Eeudsbourg (Holsteiii). 
 
 The North German Confederation has now nme first-class 
 fortresses, viz. : — 
 
 Upon the Rhine , . . , 
 
 Upon the Elbe 
 
 Upon the Oder 
 
 Upon the Wortha 
 
 Near the mouth of the Vistula 
 
 Upon the Prague 
 
 r Mayence. 
 < Coblentz. 
 [. Cologne. 
 f Konigstein. 
 \ Magdebom-g. 
 Stettm. 
 Posen. 
 Dantzic. 
 Eonigsberg. 
 
 AU these fortresses are on Prussian soil, except ]\Iayence 
 and Konigstein; the latter, situated m Saxony, a simple fort 
 commanding the course of the Elbe, has been only placed 
 m the first class to gratify Saxony. Stettin, near the mouth 
 of the Oder will probably be soon dismantled. This town is in 
 the same state as many other European fortresses. Its popu- 
 lation and manufactures have increased so largely during 
 the last forty years, that it has so to speak outgrown its fortified 
 enciente, consequently the mhabitants have contmually petitioned 
 the King to siippress Stettin as a fortress. The warm 
 reception they gave then sovereign last autumn ^^dll, doubtless, 
 induce him to take an interest in the toT^^l. 
 
 It is acknoAvledged that the trace of all the fii'st-class 
 fortresses must be altered. But, for the present, they ^xHW. 
 hmit the alterations to the construction of detached forts, 
 without interfering with the enciente. At Mayence, Cologne, and 
 Madgebourg, these works are either in progress, or the projects 
 for them have been approved. 
 
 Since the adchtion of Sonderbourg, Duppel, and Kiel- 
 Friedrichsort, there are fourteen second-class fortresses, xtl. : — 
 
 Upon the Sarre 
 
 Sarrelouis. 
 
 
 Rhine 
 
 . . Wesel. 
 
 
 "VVeser 
 
 Mindeu. 
 
 
 Gera 
 
 . . Erfurt. 
 
 
 Elbe 
 
 Torgau. 
 
 
 Spree 
 
 Spaudau. 
 
 
 Oder 
 
 G-logau. 
 
 
 Neisse 
 
 Glatz, Keisse. 
 
 
 Vistula 
 
 , . Thorn. 
 
 'Sonderboiu'g Duppel 
 
 )j 
 
 Baltic 
 
 J Kiel Friedrichsort. 
 " " 1 Stralsuud. 
 .Colberg.
 
 166 
 
 It must not be forgotten that the North German Confedera- 
 tion is shoAving- great activity, not only in improving the works 
 of existing fortresses, but also in fortifying its ports, coasts, 
 mouths of rivers, and straits. 
 
 The works m course of execution Avill place Kiel and Jade 
 (Heppens) in the fii'st rank. I have aheady reported that it is 
 proposed to employ 5,000 men this sprmg at Jade, with the 
 intention of completing, towards the end of the year, not only 
 the harbour, but also the fortifications. 
 
 The defences of Kiel, and the construction of the military 
 establishments there, will also be pushed Avith great vigour. 
 It is also proposed to build several men-of-war, the total cost 
 of which ^dll be 600,000/. 
 
 The port of Kiel is not yet classed, nor are the forts at 
 Boyen and Memel, both m course of construction. 
 
 It is the same Tvith the works at Dresden, the tete du pont 
 at Dusseldorf, Marienburg, and Dischau, and those which are 
 now bemg built, or projected, at the mouth of the Weser 
 or Elbe. 
 
 There are six fortresses of the thud class, viz. : — 
 
 Upon the Elbe . . . . Wittenberg. 
 n, 1 f Kosel. 
 
 " ^'^^^' •• ••iKustrm. 
 
 „ Vistula . . Graudenz. 
 
 Baltic 
 
 r Swiuemunde. 
 t PiUau. 
 
 If the North German Confederation should mobilize all 
 its forces for a great war, the strength of the garrisons of 
 these fortresses would be about 60,000 men and 1,700 
 officers. 
 
 II. Schools and Educational EstabKshments. 
 
 It would be useless to recapitulate in this place what Germany 
 has done to spread instruction amongst all classes of the nation. 
 So far as military education is concerned, the following list of 
 educational estabhslunents will give a good idea of what has 
 been done. I have itaHcised those created suice 1866 : — 
 
 r: 
 
 At Berlin . . ■{ 
 
 "War Academy. 
 
 School of ArtUlery aud Engineers. 
 Central School of Gymnastics. 
 School of Griinnery. 
 Laboratory School. 
 Medical and Surgical Institute. 
 I Veterinary School. 
 \_Instructional Forge. 
 Hanover . . Cavaby School. 
 
 Spandau . . School of Musketry. 
 
 Kiel . . . . Naval School. 
 
 Potsdam . . Instructional Battalion. 
 
 7 "War Schools at Potsdam, Neisse, &c. 
 7 Cadet Houses at Berlin, &c. 
 4 Non-Commissioned Officer Schools at Berlin, &c. 
 3 Military Orphanages at Potsdam, Annabourg, 
 and Pretsch Castle.
 
 167 
 
 It is proposed to form, in addition, — 
 
 1 School of Military Telegraphy. 
 
 1 Railway School. 
 
 1 Fifth Non- Commissioned Officer School. 
 
 1 Special School for Artillery Non-Commissioued Officers. 
 
 In addition to which, the Kingdom of Saxony has — 
 
 1 Cadet House at Dresden. 
 1 Cavalry School at Dresden. 
 1 Orphanage at Struppen. 
 
 The greater part of the schools and estabhshments of the 
 North German Confederation have, since 1866, been greatly 
 angmented, and, at the same time, an organization better 
 suited to then wants has been su23phed. 
 
 Wishing to have some idea of the total number of officers, 
 non-commissioned officers, and pupils, who receive mstiiiction 
 in the various establishments, I have procui'ed from the War 
 Office the requisite information, deducting the fom- Orphanages, 
 which include 1,200 childi-en, there are in romid numbers — 
 
 Personnel employed in teaching . . . . . . 600 
 
 Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Pupils . . 7,500 
 
 The eight Cadet-houses have 1,800 pupils, and the four 
 schools for non-commissioned officers 2,000. 
 
 If the 1,200 childi-en in the Orphanages be added, the total 
 number wiU reach 9,000, M^liich represents the number of 
 teachers and taught the North German Confederation considers 
 requisite to keep its mihtary instruction up to the mark. 
 
 III. Naval Armaments. 
 Bronze, Steel, Iron. 
 
 IV. Armament of Ships. 
 
 Bronze, Steel, Iron. 
 
 The Prussian Artillery and Navy have watched ^dth great 
 interest the result of the recent experiments tried at Steinfeld, 
 near Vienna, ■^^dth heavy guns, both in bronze and steel. 
 
 The Artillery officers of the Experimental Committee, with 
 whom I have discussed these experiments, thuik that xlustria 
 will finally determine to arm her men-of-war vdth. Krupp steel 
 guns. Prussia has led the way in experimenting ■s\ath bronze 
 and steel guns of large calibre. The trials made at Stemfeld 
 on the 11th October last, when bronze guns were ffi-ed with 
 charges of 24*2 lbs. and 28*6 lbs. of powder, were not new to the 
 Pnissian Artillery, who had fired the 8-inch bronze guns -u-ith 
 similar charges some years ago. But it was then acknowledged 
 that such charges were insufficient, and that it was absolutely 
 requisite to attain the desired object (that of penetrating a 
 6-inch plate) to increase these charges to 37"4 and 39'6 lbs. The 
 question to be determined, is to know, is it possible to construct
 
 168 
 
 guns of bronze capable of resisting sucli charges, without being 
 too heavy and of extravagant dimensions? It may be said that 
 the problem had been solved, if it is considered that the 
 steel 24-pr. and the bronze 8-incli gun produced almost the 
 same effect, penetrating the 6-mch plate (experiments of Sep- 
 tember 1866 at Tegel and of October 1869 at Steinfeld). Yet 
 the comparative weight of these two guns is striking. 
 
 Weight of 24-pr. Prussian gun . . . . . . 7,150 lbs. 
 
 „ 8-incli Austrian gun . . . . . . 19,800 „ 
 
 If my information is correct, Austria decided, on the con- 
 clusion of the Steinfeld experiments, to adopt for her Navy, 
 steel Krupp guns, and already she is arming her new iron- 
 clad frigate, the Lissa, with 9-inch steel breech-loading guns. 
 In Prussia, people are very proud of this result, which is looked 
 on as a fresh triumph of Prussian mtelligence and industry ; 
 and it is stated Vv4th pride that four Powers have now 
 adopted the Krupp guns — Germany, Russia, Belgium, and 
 Austria. 
 
 However, this feeling of pride is not unmixed with fear, lest 
 the problem of naval armament, be solved elsewhere by the use 
 of a less costly metal than steel, which would cause Prussia to 
 deplore the heavy expense she has incurred, and is still incurring, 
 and would deal a mortal blow to the manufacture developed by 
 M. Krupp. Thus the trials made in Sweden, at Finspang, with 
 iron guns are watched with a mixture of interest and anxiety. 
 It is known that in these trials the 11-inch gun, and even the 
 9-incli gun has completely penetrated a 10-inch plate, and that 
 these iron guns are adopted at this moment not only by Sweden 
 and Norway, but also by Holland and Denmark. 
 
 Has Austria really adopted the Krupp steel guns for her 
 Navy, or does she prefer the English guns ? All that I can say 
 for certam is, that the Austrian Government has given M. Krupp 
 an order for 96-pr. guns (9-inch), the manufacture of which is 
 completed, and the number of guns ordered is upwards of 20 ; 
 these are evidently not for new experiments. 
 
 I only know of the experiments made by order of the War 
 Mmister with Petroleum as a preservation against mites, from the 
 military newspaper Militdr Wochenblatt. 
 
 I do not know if such experiments have taken place 
 in France, and I attach herewith No. 106 of the Militdr 
 Wochenblatt, wlrich gives an account of these experiments. The 
 opinion of the Committee entrusted with the experiments is 
 given in this newspaper.
 
 169 
 
 Length of Service in tiie Ranks — three ye.\jrs, two years. 
 
 Report of the 14th February, 1870. 
 
 The Cliamber of Deputies of the Grand Duch}'^ of Baden 
 has just arrived at a decision, the importance of which cannot 
 be concealed, on account of the influence that it must, some day 
 or another, exercise upon the mihtary organization of the other 
 States of Southern Germany (Bavaria and Wurtemberg) and 
 even perhaps on that of the North German Confederation. By 
 this decision, which has received the approval of the Prussian 
 General Beyer, War ^Minister to the Grand Duchy of Baden, the 
 Chamber has reduced the length of service in the ranks to two 
 years. It should be remarked also that, as in the previous year, 
 the war estimate and the contingent of 4,700 men has been 
 voted only for two years, so that the estimate and the number 
 of the contingent will again be discussed in 1871. 
 
 Tliis tendency to shorten the length of service in the ranks 
 is sufficiently "u^despread m Germany to merit some remarks. 
 Referring to the year 1867, the three States of Southern Ger- 
 many fixed (on the 5th of February, at the Stuttgart Conference), 
 on thi-ee years as the length of service with the colours. 
 However, \Vurtemberg, despite this decision, fixed two years 
 w^hen she published her law of military organization; and 
 although Bavaria and Baden have not done as much, it is 
 known from recent debates in the Chambers that these two 
 States had practically reduced the length of service to two 
 years, or two years and soine months. Now the Grand Duchy 
 of Baden has followed Wurtemberg, and fixed by law two 
 years as the length of service. Will this example be followed 
 by Bavaria 1 I am inchned to think that the day is not far 
 distant when all Southern Germany, "^411 fix on two years as 
 the hmit of service in the ranks. 
 
 If I call attention to this possible and probable fact, I do so 
 because already in Berhn people are discussing it. Everyone 
 who foresees or hopes for the annexation of the Southern 
 States, under some form or other, to the North German Con- 
 federation, says that these States must be taken M-ith their exist- 
 ing mihtary laws, and consequently with the term of two years' 
 service m the ranks. Now it is asked ^^dll not Prussia, and the 
 Northern States, where legally the soldier spends thi-ee years 
 with the colours, be compelled to reduce the period of service 
 to two years also ? 
 
 And I would add that the numerous partisans of such a 
 reduction have received with pleasure the news that Baden 
 has adopted tliis law, because they hope to induce the Prussian 
 Government to follow the example given by the Southern 
 States. 
 
 Whatever happens, this question of reducing the dm-ation of
 
 170 
 
 military service will occupy men's minds for some time. It has 
 already, prior to 1866, formed the subject of a conflict between 
 the Crown and the Chambers, and it will agam give rise to an 
 attack on the Prussian Government, which is determined not to 
 yield this point, for it considers this period of three years as 
 indispensable for the proper training of the army. It is 
 believed that very keen discussions on this subject ^vill arise in 
 1871, when the Reichstag will again fix the effective strength 
 of the army in peace time, and also the quota to be paid by 
 each State per amium per man. {Vide Article 60 and 62 of the 
 Federal Constitution). 
 
 [We suppress the remainder of this Report m which various 
 questions of secondary importance only are discussed.] 
 
 DlSARMAJtENT. 
 
 Report of the 28tk February, 1870.* 
 
 The question of a European Disarmament has continually, for 
 some years, occupied all minds. I propose to discuss it as far 
 as Prussia is concerned, but being deshous of confining myself 
 to my purely mihtary functions, I will abstain from all pohtical 
 considerations. Although my long stay in Prussia has placed 
 me in a position to follow German affahs, I will not discuss if 
 in the actual state of Europe a disarmament would be deshable, 
 or opportune, neither will I seek to explain the reasons why the 
 North German Confederation, such as the Treaty of Prague made 
 it, is not born to Hve, or why the general opinion m Germany 
 now is, that great events must shortly and infalhbly happen ; 
 events which will imperiously compel France, more than ever to 
 be watchful, and remain armed to the teeth. I will merely confine 
 myself to exammmg, what the disarmament of Prussia really 
 means, I mil, I think, have no trouble to show, that Prussia 
 cannot disarm, unless she consents to alter from top to bottom 
 her essential institution's, which is tantamount to sayuig she 
 cannot disarm, however much she may deshe it, and any 
 Government that should propose such a thmg to the Prussian 
 Government would merely give e\ddence of the most culpable 
 ignorance, of the mihtary organization, and institutions of 
 Prussia. 
 
 I will fii'st show that Prussia, having adopted the prin- 
 ciple of universal compulsory service for all her citizens, cannot 
 
 * The " Journal des Debats " was the first that pubHshed this Eeport, and intro- 
 duced it with the following words : " We publish the 37th Report wi'itten from 
 " Berlin by our late Military Attache. It will be doubtless remembered that the 
 " beginning of 1870 the French Government, had an intention of sending to Berlin, 
 " through the English Government, proposals for disarmament. A perusal of this 
 " interesting document shows that our Military Attache was consulted, on the 
 " chances of success such a proposal had.
 
 171 
 
 disarm unless slie abolish or evade that principle. Then next, 
 I T^dll explain the grave reasons why Prussia cannot think of 
 abohshing' or evading the principle of compulsory service. The 
 logical sequence of which is that Prussia cannot disarm. 
 
 I. Prussia can only Disarm by Violating the Principle of 
 Compulsory Service. 
 
 No one who knows the mihtary organization of Prussia can 
 have any doubt on this subject. I have aheady touched shghtly 
 on it in my report of the 23rd April, 1868, when for the first 
 time reports of a European disarmament were heard, but now 
 that these rumours again spring up and that proposals for dis- 
 armament have been presented both to the Prussian and Saxon 
 Chambers, I take this subject up more fully. 
 
 I said in the report aheady refen-ed to, " It is requisite to 
 " observe first, that people have hardly taken the trouble to 
 " give the word ' Disarmament ' a proper definition, and that 
 " in any case it cannot mean the same for all powers, since 
 " the mihtary organization of no two is identical. If we seek an 
 " exact definition of the word ' Disarmament ' we only find this, 
 " a reduction of the number of men that a State trains and 
 " reserves for war. Disarmament wiU be partial, if it reduces 
 " this number in certam proportions ; it "uiU be total if it trams 
 " no soldiers at all, or limits itself to keeping up a pohce for 
 " home service. In this sense it is easy to conceive a Dis- 
 " armament of France, Italy, England, or Russia. These 
 " Powers need only reduce the number of theh annual contin- 
 " gents, reducing thus the number of men trained for war, and 
 " consequently they would, to a certam extent disarm. But 
 " nothing of this sort can be done in Prussia, where the number 
 " of the annual contingent, in plaee of depending on the vote 
 " of the Chambers or the a^tII of the Sovereign, is, on the con- 
 " trary, fixed once for aU by a fundamental and invariable law." 
 The 1st paragraph of the Law of Mihtary Service runs thus : — 
 
 " Every citizen of North Germany owes military service to 
 " the State, and cannot employ a substitute to perform this 
 " duty." In consequence of this law each year, all tlie citizens 
 who are thought fit for mihtary service are incorporated in the 
 Army. The obhgation to serve begins on the 1st .lanuary 
 of the year when the 20th year is completed, and lasts for 
 12 years, countmg fi'om the 1st October of the same year, seven 
 of which are spent m the Regular Army, or Reserve and five in 
 the Landwehi-, the seven years of ser^dce m the regular army, 
 being three in the ranks and four in the reserve. 
 
 Thanks to the basis of this organization, North Germany 
 has 12 contingents forming a total of more than 900,000 men. 
 
 -D 1 A r 3 Coiitmj;ent3 with the Colours . . 315,000 
 
 Kegular Armv . < . ^ . „ qi nnnn 
 
 " * I •!■ •< m Reserve . . . . iJlO,OUU 
 
 625.000 
 
 Landwehr ..5 „ 330,000 
 
 Total 955,000
 
 172 
 
 Looking at this fact, and granting tliat, the principle of 
 compulsory service remains intact, how is it possible that the 
 North German Confederation can disarm. Is it not evident that 
 whatever she does, short of reducing the number of years 
 service, she will always have a force composed of 12 successive 
 annual contingents. But reducmg the number of years service 
 would in no sense be a disarmament, for suppose it to be fixed 
 at ten years, or that the men should serve thi-ee in place of five 
 years in the Landwehr, it is certain that in case of war the 
 Landwehr contmgents so suppressed, could be recalled, for the 
 law dhects in such a case that all men up to 42 years of age 
 must serve. In addition to which such a reduction would 
 produce no great savmg in the estimates, for the Landwehr 
 costs next to nothing. There is, however, a method by wliich 
 Prussia, preserving the principle of compulsory service, could 
 maintain a smaller number of men with the colours, and at the 
 same time relieve her finances ; this would be to reduce fi-om 
 three to two years the period of service with the colom'S, 
 augmenting as a compensation the time in the reserve to five 
 instead of four years. But would this alteration be a disarm- 
 ament in the proper sense of that word? Certainly not, for the 
 North German Confederation would still dispose of not less than 
 12 contingents or 950,000 men. The only consequence of the 
 change would be to weaken the military training of these 
 955,000 men since they would be trained with the colours to the 
 profession of arms for only two, in place of three years. 
 
 The singular remark may be made, Prussia is the only nation 
 in the world which can, without disarming m the true sense of 
 the word, reduce the strength of the army with the colom's and 
 diminish the war estimates, but this, on the condition of giving 
 a less complete training to her young soldiers. I should add, 
 however, that the Prussian Government has obstinately refused 
 for ten years this concession, to a certain portion of the 
 Chambers. It is true that practically this period lasts for 
 Infantry soldiers only about two and a-half years ; and, if they 
 acquired during this time a degree of instruction considered 
 sufficient, it is due to the zeal and efforts of the Ofiicers and 
 Non-Commissioned Ofiicers. All the competent military autho- 
 rities consider the legal period of three years cannot be 
 diminished, more especially as regards the ArtiUery, and 
 Cavalry, and the Government on its side appears resolved 
 to make no concessions, notwithstanding the example recently 
 given by the Grand Duchy of Baden and Kingdom of Wurtem- 
 berg, where the duration of service with the Regular Aimy 
 has been shortened to two years. ( Vide my report of the 
 14th February, 1870.) 
 
 It must be seen fi-om what has been just stated that 
 Prussia cannot disarm, if she Avishes to preserve intact the 
 principle of compulsory Service, and that she can disarm, only by 
 violating this principle. Supposing she consents to do so, she 
 would then merely place herself in the same position as other
 
 173 
 
 powers ; and it would then be sufficient that she should place 
 annually beneath the colours, not the whole of the young men 
 of twenty years of age, but such a number only as would 
 produce a disarmament in a greater or less degree. But I will 
 presently show that Prussia could not act thus, or, m other 
 words, that she never can consent to abohsh or evade the 
 principle of compulsory service. 
 
 11. Prussia can neither Evade nor Abolish the Principle of 
 Compulsory Universal Service. 
 
 Would it not be madness to thmk that any nation would 
 consent, of its own accord, to abandon so fruitfal a principle, 
 which, taken as the basis of one of its fundamental institutions, 
 has contributed more than any other, to the development of its 
 power and greatness^ Now it cannot too often be repeated 
 that it is compulsory service joined to compulsory education, 
 wliich, for sixty years (since 1815) perseveringly adhered to, 
 have led Prussia, by slow and imperceptible degrees, to that 
 moral and intellectual development, wliich make her the most 
 enlightened and discipHned nation in Europe, and placed her 
 all at once in the first rank among Powers. And let it be said, 
 as a digression, that Prussia having just adopted universal 
 suffrage, no one can foretell where the destinies of this educated, 
 energetic, and ambitious people will stop ; a nation ha^vdng — 
 
 Universal Compulsory Mihtary Serv-ice ; 
 Universal Compulsory Education ; 
 Universal Sufh-age ; — 
 
 Three unmovable columns on which to support the whole 
 edifice of its institutions. 
 
 But is it true that the principle of compulsory service is an 
 element of power, and that its apphcation has contributed 
 so much to Prussian greatness '? A complete essay might be 
 written on tliis subject. If this principle of compulsory service 
 is looked at only as the basis of a military organization, it is 
 open to argument, and it may be thought that a military 
 organization, not based on this principle (that of France, for 
 example) affords the means of forming an army as formidable, 
 more formidable, perhaps, than the Prussian Army ; but that is 
 not the train of thought I wish to follow. I deshe rather 
 to look at the principle of compulsory service, with reference 
 to the influence that it exercises on the character of the nation, 
 its education, its customs; and from these points of view, 
 the prmciple does not appear to me to be questionable. 
 
 The remarks which follow form the difficult portion of the 
 task which I desire to fulfil in tliis report, for I must pomt 
 out facts that, almost unknown to foreigners, are completely 
 ignored in France, the very natm-e of which it is difficult 
 to understand, so much does French national genius differ 
 from that of the Germans. It is requisite, to thoroughly 
 understand these things, to have lived in Germany, to speak 
 

 
 174 
 
 the language, to study and compare, to live, in some degree 
 tlie life of the nation, and to have to a certain degree an 
 intuitive comprehension of German genius. 
 
 From the stand-pomt which I take, I am anxious to show 
 how the creators of Prussian militaiy organization have used 
 the principle of compulsory service to make of the army, not 
 only a military institution, but also a social institution — a double 
 office which no other army in Europe fills. 
 
 In other countries, the army, formed of contmgvnts, com- 
 posed only of a portion of the healthy young men, the army, 
 I say, is an institution apart from the nation ; it is a war 
 machine destined to repel all aggression, to fight for the great- 
 ness and interests of the country. It is, in other words, if you 
 will, the sword of the nation. It can have, from its composi- 
 tion, no other use, no other character. 
 
 In Prussia it is difl'erent. The army, with its organization 
 based on the principle of compulsory service, whilst it is, as in 
 other countries, a war macliine, offers this distinctive character- 
 istic—it is a school of morality, obedience to the sovereign, to 
 authority, to the laws, and of general discipline in all the things 
 of life, a school for all healthy citizens of what social condition 
 soever they may be. It may be urged that other European 
 armies, more or less, offer all the same characteristics, as a 
 natural sequence of mihtary institutions. To this I reply, 
 that this character has been forcibly given to the Prussian 
 Army by the authors of its organization, chief amongst whom 
 was General Scharnhorst. 
 
 This illustrious man, and his successor, General Boyen, 
 as well as the other creators of this military organization, 
 have sought in establishing the principle of compulsory service, 
 that the army should be not merely a mihtary institution, 
 but rather a school where all the subjects of the monarchy, 
 from the most mdependent, either by bh-th or fortune, to the 
 poorest and most dependent, might learn, during three years 
 of actual contact one with another, sound ideas of obedience 
 to the sovereign and to authority, as well as ideas of duty, 
 honour, and morahty, which might serve them for the rest ol 
 then- lives. 
 
 These great ideas, which were the object of profound dis- 
 cussion in various Committees charged with the preparation of 
 the law of army organization, are expressed in all the works 
 treating of the military mstitutions, and I hear them continually 
 spoken of, in my conversations ^vith intelHgent officers. 
 
 The creators of this organization, with their profound 
 knowledge of German character, saw at a glance what national 
 benefits, both moral and physical, must follow fi'om the com- 
 pulsory mingling together of all the young healthy men at an 
 age when body and mind are still susceptable of being deve- 
 loped by exercise and healthy labom-, during a period of three 
 years, a period too short to dread the effects of the idle habits 
 which often follow from a military life spent in peace time.
 
 175 
 
 They saw that Avith a grave people of docile habits, disposed 
 to obedience and to feeHngs of duty, thi-ee years might be em- 
 ployed most beneficially to improve, develope, and confirm 
 these qnaUties for the rest of their fives. 
 
 And it must be acknowledged that these ideas have not 
 been allowed to remain a dead letter ; on the contraiy, they 
 have penetrated deeply into the nation, and into the army, 
 where they have exercised and are exercising daily the most 
 happy mfluence. Nothing is neglected to make the army not 
 merely a military school, but rather a school for morals, general 
 education, and improvement, or, so to speak, a college lohere the 
 elementary education, the young men have obtained at the schools in 
 the country prior to joining the army is coii^pleted. 
 
 In no other army do they pay so much attention to bodily 
 exercises — ST^dmming, riding, fencing, g;sTnnastics ; in no other 
 army are lectm-es, courses of study of all kinds, so numerous 
 so well attended. Nowhere, in short, are ideas of honour and 
 dignity amongst the soldiers, and non-commissioned officers more 
 kept up, and developed than they are in tliis country by a 
 serious and well-taught body of officers, composed of the elite 
 of the nation. 
 
 It should not be forgotten that it is the healthy part of the 
 nation, winch has for successive generations been submitted for 
 three years to these exercises, developing both body and 
 mind. If this be remembered, an idea of the advantages the 
 country obtains J&'om this system may be obtamed. They are 
 so undoubted and so generally recognised that at the present 
 day in Prussia they are spoken of as axioms. All the books on 
 the subject recount, explain or comment on them. All praise an 
 institution, which, based on the principle of universal mifitary 
 services give the following results. 
 
 The development of health and physical strength amongst 
 all the healthy men of the country, a development especially 
 profitable to the lower classes. 
 
 The impossibihty for young men to marry before 24 years 
 of age. 
 
 A common Hfe for tlu-ee years, led by all citizens of the various 
 classes in the nation. 
 
 The reciprocal and healthy influence, that flows from the 
 intercourse of these young men at a period antecedent to their 
 entry into practical Hfe. 
 
 The exercise of all the ATi'tues of a good citizen. 
 
 Frugality, obedience to the laws, discipline, respect for 
 authority, feehngs of duty. 
 
 I would add that in Prussia, such sayings as the foUoT\ang 
 are household words : — 
 
 " The army is a school which finishes and confirms for use in 
 " practical life the mstruction obtained in other schools." 
 
 " The army has done more to raise the status of the lower 
 " classes than all the laws." 
 
 "The Prussian mifitary institutions put at the disposal 
 
 2
 
 176 
 
 " of the King for war all the intellectual force of the 
 " kingdom." 
 
 The followiag pln-ases, which have a very profound meaning, 
 are added : — 
 
 " The Prussian Army is the people in arms." 
 " Prussia is not a country which has an army ; it is an army 
 " Avhich has a country." 
 
 " If you adopt in France the principle of compulsory service, 
 " you will once again dictate to all Europe." This was said to 
 me by a Prussian General, a most intelligent man. 
 
 It must be acknowledged, the more the liistory and institu- 
 tions of Prussia are studied, the more it will be seen that its 
 military organization, precisely because it is based on compulsory 
 service, has poAverfuUy contributed to develope the faculties, the 
 education, and the energy of the nation. 
 
 There is nothing even to the institution of " Vohmteers 
 for a Year," which compels a large number of young men 
 of the wealthy classes to serious preparatory study, that does not 
 tend to gradually raise the level of general instruction. It is 
 known that young men who are anxious to be allowed to serve 
 only one year, are obliged to pass certain special examinations. 
 Now the number of volunteers for a year being limited, and the 
 number of young men seeking to be such, being considerable 
 tliis benefit is only given to the best, whence results for all an 
 emulation most valuable to the progress of then- studies. This 
 fact is clearly proved by the following. 
 
 In 1867, the standard of education in the new provinces 
 annexed by Prussia was by no means so high as in the old 
 provinces. Now in 1869 all the examining committees for 
 " Volunteers for a Year," which have examined in the new pro- 
 vinces, report that the standard of education has been sensibly 
 raised during the last three years. 
 
 How can one not feel deeply when such things are compared 
 with what passes in France ? What lives do the large number 
 of young men of 20 years of age, who for one reason or another 
 are not called on to serve, lead 1 What do they do ? 
 
 How many amongst the number are there who are ill-disposed 
 to work, ignorant, whose existence is useless to the country ? 
 What power, what lost power, they would call this in Prussia. 
 
 If I have succeeded in shomng by what I have just said 
 that the application of the principle of compulsory service is for 
 Prussia an element of power and greatness — by its effect on 
 the various classes of succeeding generations, improvmg 
 their physical strength, shaping them to disciplme, duty, and 
 respect to the laws, imparting feelings of honour and morahty 
 amongst them, compelling all the young men of the wealthy 
 classes to labour and study, and producing a constant and 
 healthy reaction of military institutions on civil, and vice versa. 
 — it maybe understood how this Power, thanks to this principle 
 and that of compulsory education, has raised itself to the posi- 
 tion it now fills.
 
 177 
 
 And Prussians are not ignorant of all they owe to the appli- 
 cation of these principles, it may therefore be safely affirmed 
 that in no case, \vill they consent to aboHsh or evade either of 
 the two, nor even that one, which serves as the basis of their- 
 miHtary organization, that is to say, the prmciple of compulsory 
 service. 
 
 III. Conclusion. 
 
 If, therefore, on the one hand, Prussia can only disarm by 
 giving up the principle of compulsory service ; and, if on the 
 other hand, everytliing forbids her giving it up, one is forced to 
 conclude that Prussia cannot disarm. 
 
 Such a conclusion must necessarily call for the folloMong 
 reflections. It may be said, if Prussia cannot disarm, is she, 
 and consequently all other Powers, compelled to maintain 
 for ever numerous armies, and devote to then- maintenance 
 crushing estimates. 
 
 That is not admissible. The countries of Europe desii-e 
 peace, and cannot allow themselves to be ruined, by continual 
 outlay on the chances of war, &c. 
 
 My duty is not to repty to such questions. I simply vnsh to 
 point out that Prussia, thanks to her institutions, finds herself 
 placed in a situation where nnder certain contingencies, every- 
 thing as I have just pointed out is to her advantage. 
 
 Thus, for example, the principal of compulsory service gives 
 her the means of reducing the amount of her war estmiates 
 without disarming, that is to say, ^s^dthout ceasmg to teach the 
 trade of arms to all men fit for service. This means con- 
 sists in diminishing for the Infantry only the length of time 
 spent wdth the colours, not the legal period of tlu-ee years, but 
 the actual period, and wdiich is now only two years and some 
 months, and to send home such men as may be deemed suffi- 
 ciently taught. 
 
 However it may be, the Prussians do not admit even that 
 Prussia could be asked to disarm, for every one knows that the 
 most vital of all her mstitutions, compulsory mihtary service, 
 renders disarmament impossible. " As w'ell ask us to speak 
 " another language than our own," said a Prussian to me one 
 day. 
 
 I attach to my report an article of the " North German 
 Gazette," the organ of M. Bismarck, where the view taken of 
 the question of disarmament may be seen. I have underscored 
 the phrase. 
 
 " For the North German Confederation, a disarmament is a 
 " renunciation of compulsory miHtary service, and that is an 
 " impossibility." 
 
 This impossibihty of disarming in Avhich Prussia finds her- 
 self, gives rise to the gravest reflections. 
 
 One is almost afi-aid to think that we have at our gates a 
 lival power, wdiich, the moment it finds us the least inconvenient, 
 whenever that may be, can dispose of more than 900,000 soldiers
 
 178 
 
 all trained to the profession of arms. I insist on, and I repeat 
 the words, all trained to the jyrofession of arms. This is no ques- 
 tion of National Guard " Sedentahe " or National Guard 
 " Mobile," but of soldiers who have served during tlu-ee years, 
 and after having served, are kept up to the mark by annual 
 training until they are 32 years of age. 
 
 How then, deduction being made for our inferiority, how 
 then shall we, with the few hundreds of thousands of men 
 forming our army, struggle with an army so thoroughly knit 
 together, double, nay triple, ours ? 
 
 Thus each time the question of a European disarmament is 
 brought forward, one has to consider if France and the other 
 Great Powers wiU not see themselves compelled to adopt sooner 
 or later, the principles of Prussian mihtary organization, which 
 alone will permit them to raise forces as great as those the 
 North German Confederation disposes of, without taking into 
 consideration (all honour to Prussia), that these principles are 
 based on justice, morality, and true equahty. 
 
 IV. Objections. 
 
 Persons are not wanting in France and elsewhere who, for 
 want of knowledge of Prussian institutions, think that a disarm- 
 ament of this Power is a possible thmg. They acknowledge 
 it is true that the principle of compulsory service offers an 
 obstacle to disarmament, but they do not think it insuperable. 
 *' Prussia," say they, " has never applied, and does not now 
 " apply this principle in all its rigoiu'. She does not incorporate 
 " in her army the total number of healthy men of 20 years of age, 
 " the proof of wliieh is that Article (50 of the Constitution of the 
 *' North German Confederation, fixes the actual nmnber of the 
 " army on a peace footing imtil 31st December, 1871, at 1-100 
 " of the population in 1867 ; this supposes an annual contingent 
 " of 100,000 men, while in North Germany there are each year 
 " 160,000 young men fit for duty. If, then, Prussia does not 
 " apply the principle in all its rigour, it is possible for her to 
 *' evade it still more by reducing the number of the contingent 
 " to 80,000 or even 70,000." 
 
 This objection is based on an imperfect knowledge of the real 
 state of affahs. Prussia by no means evades the application of 
 the principle of compulsory service. Article 60 of the Federal 
 Constitution fixes the number of the Army mth the colours in 
 peace at 1-100 of the population in 1867, but it should be kno^Ti 
 that this proportion of 1 per cent, has been so arranged that 
 the principle of universal service shall be fully applied. 
 
 The authors of the Constitutioii were not ignorant of the 
 statistical fact that in Prussia before 1866, the epoch at which 
 the Army organized on the principle of compulsory service was 
 200,000 men out of a population of 20,000,000 or 1 per cent. 
 Hence they have sunply adopted this proportion in fixing the 
 number of the Federal Army. That the number of young men 
 of 20 years of age fit for service varies from one year to
 
 179 
 
 another, even to a sensible extent, and that consequently all 
 the healthy young men, without one single exception, are not 
 enrolled each year, does not weaken the apphcation of the 
 principle of compulsory service. Is not it evident that there 
 can be no hard and fast line between the sound and unsound 
 young men which will allow the former to be selected from the 
 latter? A certain elasticity, a certain amount of play is requisite. 
 Thus in Prussia the councils of revision sent back, sometimes 
 for thi-ee years in succession, a large number of young men 
 before finally deciduig on then- fate. 
 
 In addition, has not an army certain elements which must 
 remain fixed, cadres for example, and are there not in a great 
 country various exigencies which renders it requisite to alter 
 the number of men m certain categories, as for instance those 
 who are excused mihtar}^ service? It is precisely these exi- 
 gencies, some mihtary, some social, which have caused the 
 creation of the reserve of substitutes (Ersatz Reserve.) It is 
 composed of all the young men exempted li'om active service 
 in ordinary times, those for example the lot of whom, on 
 account of physical defects the Counsel of Revision has not 
 settled neither the first, the second, nor the thu-d year, those 
 who have undergone punishment, or are entangled in the 
 meshes of the laAv, however, these are only exempted in ordinary 
 times and may be called out in case of mobilization. 
 
 Those who refuse to admit that Prussia cannot disarm, 
 strengthen theh argument by a reference to the proj)osals for 
 disarmament recently presented. One to the Saxon Chamber, 
 the other in Prussia to the Chamber of Deputies by M. Yuchow. 
 How they ask could such proposals have been made by Prussian 
 Deputies if the Norih German military institutions wiU not 
 admit of a disarmament ? 
 
 In reply to this objection I would say, that in Piaissia as in all 
 other countries, there are persons who are opposed to standing 
 amiies, and in Genuany standing armies are attacked by a horde 
 of dreamers and theorists, who do not luiderstand the reason of 
 then- existence, and deplore their state of miproductiveness. 
 Others, while they admit the necessity of standing armies and 
 acknowledge the advantages that they possess, believe that 
 Government overshoots the mark, and that armies fulfilling aU 
 the requisites, can be made at a smaller cost. It is these last 
 who have brought forward propositions for disarmament m the 
 German Chambers, with the avowed intention of inducing the 
 Government to reduce its mihtary expenses, but (it should be 
 remarked) without expressing an opinion that this reduction 
 should be made by a disarmament properly so called. The 
 word Abrustung used by these people is not sATionjnnous T\'ith 
 Entwafiimng. The idea of the author of this proposition was 
 simply this : our mihtary expenses are too great, we ask the 
 Government to reduce them, no matter how. Mr. Yuchow and 
 his followers were well aware that then- proposal had no pros- 
 pect of being received, since the mihtary expenses have been
 
 180 
 
 fixed until the 31st December, 1871, by Articles 60 and 62 of 
 the Constitution, they only hoped to make a first attack, 
 which they hoped to renew, when the Reichstag would have to 
 discuss new Articles intended to replace those just referred to. 
 
 They hoped to gain their object in the important discussion 
 which must take place in 1871, and succeed in diminishmg the 
 proportion of 1 per cent., on the one hand, and 33/. 15^. on the 
 other, which each State must pay per year per man. 
 
 These hopes of disarmament, entertained by a certain party 
 in Germany, hopes which cannot be realized so far as Prussia 
 is concerned, are in France shared by many people. One has 
 only to read recent articles in the Moniteur and Constitutionel. 
 After speaking of the intention of the French Government to 
 reduce the number of the contingent, these newspapers use the 
 following language : — 
 
 " But France is justified in demanding that other countries 
 " should do as much. Prussia, why does not she give a proof 
 " of her pacific intentions. Why will she not reduce her con- 
 " tingent, beginning from 1872, as she may do, when she 
 " revises Articles 60 and 62 of the Constitution, &c." 
 
 If our newspaper wiiters knew Prussia and her institutions a 
 httle better, they would not MTite such things. 
 
 They would know that tliis Power is not fi-ee to increase 
 or reduce her annual contingent, and that she, on account 
 of her institutions, can give no guarantees of her peaceful 
 intentions. 
 
 She can only do so in words, which ■\\dll never be deemed 
 sufficient. She is tied — chamed, if you like it — by the prin- 
 ciples of compulsory service. Things being so, it is requisite 
 that foreigners should be convinced of it, and act accordingly. 
 
 To sum up, I have sought to show — 
 
 1. That Prussia can only disarm by giving up compulsory 
 eervice. 
 
 2. That m no case can she give up the principle which, 
 with compulsory education, constitute the essential elements 
 of her power ; whence I have concluded that Prussia cannot 
 disarm. 
 
 I have thus tried to refute certain objections, made against 
 the appHcation of the principle of compulsory service. If I 
 have succeeded in making myself understood, it will be seen 
 in what a false position a government "will place itself wliich 
 is sufficiently ill-advised to send to BerHn a proposal for dis- 
 armament. By such a step it would voluntarily place itself 
 on the horns of a dilemma ; it would meet vdih. a refusal, or 
 be cheated. 
 
 Of two tilings, one would happen, either the Prussian 
 Government would be sincere, or it would not be sincere. If, 
 in the hope of profiting by the good faith and ignorance of a 
 foreign government, it did not wish to be sincere, it might 
 promise to reduce the eff'ective strength with the colom-s by 
 sending home a certain number of men in anticipation. It
 
 181 
 
 might even promise to give the reduction a peimanent character. 
 All tliis would not, as I have already shown, be disarmament, it 
 would only be a reduction of the standard of military histruction. 
 So that the Prussian Government would realize the amount of 
 the saving -unthout disarming, while the foreign government 
 reducing its contingent would also save a certain amoimt, but 
 would actually disarm. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the Prussian Government wished 
 to show itself sincere, it would reply that a disarmament would 
 entail in Prussia a renunciation of the principle of compulsory 
 service, and it would explain the grave reasons why it 
 could not make the sacrifice. Thus its reply would be a formal 
 refusal. 
 
 In one case only would a proposal for disarmament have 
 any sense whatever. 
 
 That is, if the government making the proposal wished 
 to bring about a rupture. 
 
 It may even be stated that there is no question better fitted 
 to bring about such a thmg, for it would produce discussions, 
 disputes of every kmd, and, finally, a status quo. The situa- 
 tion of the two governments might be compared to that of 
 two men, one of whom calls on the other, as a pretext for a 
 quarrel, to do something impossible. The last M^ord would then 
 be, " Do you not wish to disarm l Well, let us fight." 
 
 But, I repeat, a government which should make at Berlin 
 a proposal for a disarmament in an open, loyal manner could, 
 if the Prussian Government were sincere, be only met by a 
 refusal. The latter, in its reply, would point to compulsory 
 service, as an unanswerable argument; it woidd explain its 
 motives for adhermg to this principle. And of this, I am well 
 assured, that to all proposals, all objections, all entreaties, 
 it would give a mihtary non possumus as obstinate as the 
 rehgious non possumus uttered on the banks of the Tiber. 
 
 On some Fortresses in the Valley of the Ehine. 
 
 Report of the i6th June, 1870. 
 
 Napoleon I, in the instructions addressed to General 
 Clarke, termed Mayence, Cologne, and AVesel, the three bridles 
 of the Rhine, meaning that he, who held these places is master, 
 and ought to contmue master, of the Rhine. The numerous 
 Imes of railway converging towards Mayence, Cologne, Duis- 
 bourg and Neuss, have still further increased the military 
 importance of these three points, and the striking language 
 of the Emperor is, perhaps, still more true at the present day. 
 Mayence, Cologne, and Wesel — ]\Iayence especially — will play 
 a conspicuous part in any future war.
 
 182 
 
 It was therefore only natural, that Prussia should ask 
 herself, at the end of 1866, if these places, and in general 
 those of the valley of the Rhine, were adapted to the exigencies 
 of modern war, and more particularly those consequent on the 
 improvements in artillery. I ^vi\l briefly point out, what has 
 been, or is proposed to be done, to these places. 
 
 Mar/ence. 
 
 Prussia, as is known, occupies Mayence by virtue of a 
 convention concluded in 1866 with the Grand Duke of Hesse 
 Darmstadt. The fortress is now nearly ui the same state 
 that it was before the war. This may appear strange; for 
 so great is the importance of Mayence, owing to the position 
 it occupies at the confluence of the Rhine and the Main, 
 that the first care of Prussia should have been to modify 
 the works, and construct a great intrenched camp, as we are 
 domg at Metz. 
 
 It is thought that Prussia would have aheady done this, if 
 Mayence and the surrounding coimtry on the left bank of the 
 Rhine belonged to the North German Confederation. But this 
 country is situated m that part of Hesse which remains inde- 
 pendent, and Prussia dare not push her boldness so far as to 
 erect works there, for fear of provoking the complaints of the 
 Grand Duke and perhaps the jealousy of France. I do not think 
 that there is any other reason for this, and this is also the 
 reason why she does not fortify the Hechtshemi heights {vide the 
 plan I here^\dth send). This height is situated to the south of 
 Mayence upon the road which a French invading army would 
 follow, at 2,000 yards only from the advanced works, and 2,500 
 fi-om the enceinte, and at the same distance fi-om the skew 
 railway bridge over the Rhine. The importance of the 
 Hechtsheim heights has not escaped German engineers, and 
 during the year 1867 a keen dispute was kept up m the 
 newspapers on the necessity of buildmg detached forts there, 
 but the subject has since di-opped. It is evidently very 
 advantageous for us that these heights have not been fortified, 
 for the greater the reason why we should not knock om* 
 heads against Mayence if it were a great intrenched camp ; the 
 more reason is there in the actual state of things, the passage 
 of the Sarre being forced, that we should march straight on 
 Mayence. Once in possession of the Hechtsheim heights, we 
 may, thanks to modern artillery, after a short siege, be master 
 of Mayence, for batteries established at Hechtsheim command 
 the town, and take the skew bridge over the Rhine en echarpe. 
 As I have said, Mayence is in the same state now, that 
 it was in 1866, and no Avorks have been constructed on the 
 Hechtsheim heights. But it is a settled thing that the town is 
 to be enlarged. The 8th of last April the Municipal Council, 
 after a keen discussion, decided to pay the 400,000/. asked by 
 Prussia for the ground requisite for this enlargement, and at
 
 183 
 
 the end of April placards have been put up in the town giving 
 a ground plan of the space purchased. The enceinte will then 
 be carried further to the north, so as to include that part 
 of the plain called the Gartenfeld, which I have marked red 
 on the attached plan. The estimate for these works is 500,000/. 
 and 900,000/. for the land. 
 
 It is beheved that these works will begin next autimin. 
 
 Cologne. 
 
 Cologne, situated on the direct road from Paris to Berhn, 
 and a point where numerous railways converge possesses 
 great importance. For four years the question of increasing 
 the defences of tliis place have been discussed. The project 
 actually adopted appears to be, to rase the exterior forts, to 
 replace them by others further from the town, and at the same 
 time extending the enceinte of the town by inclurling several 
 of the surrounding places. The cost of doing this, including 
 the purchase of land, is estimated at 1,300,000T. to 1,500,000/. 
 
 Wesel. 
 
 Wesel, the other bridle of the Rhine, is not a railway junction. 
 Railways converge a little higher : 1st. Towards Neuss and 
 Dusseldorf, 50 miles from Wesel, and, 2nd. Towards Duisbom-g, 
 25 miles from AVegel, consequently it has been decided to leave 
 Wesel as it is, and substitute two great tetes de pant, one at 
 Hamm, opposite Neuss, the other at Duisbourg. This is an 
 application of the principle long ago adopted in Prussia of 
 fortifjang the more important railway junctions. 
 
 The tete de pont of Hamm ^t11 form a very large and 
 strong Avork. It is considered that its erection will last three 
 years. It is well advanced now. I suppose French Officers 
 have already been directed to study it. The tete de pont at 
 Duisbourg is not yet begun, I believe. I -udU finish this report 
 by some remarks on other fortresses m the basin of the Rhine. 
 
 Germersheim. 
 
 A very strong fortress, has been some years ago made at 
 this place, situated onthe Rhme, above Spire, and intended to 
 defend the course of the river. It has been improved by five 
 advanced works, constructed on the banks of, and three 
 batteries sweeping, the Rhine. 
 
 Rastatt. 
 
 This place is well known m all its details. I limit myself to 
 repeating that dm-ing the last Session of the Baden Chambers, 
 a sum of money sufficient to increase the armament, and 
 improve the works was voted.
 
 184 
 
 Conz, 
 
 Conz is situated at the confluence of the Sarre and Moselle. 
 After the evacuation of Luxembourg by the Prussians, it was 
 much discussed if Prussia should replace the Luxembourg 
 fortress, by another strong place situated near our frontier, 
 opposite Thionville, and Metz, for some time it was pro- 
 posed to make an intrenched camp at Conz. I have visited the 
 position at Conz, and I cannot understand how the question of 
 placing an intrenched camp there could ever have been dis- 
 cussed, for it offers none of the necessary conditions. The 
 idea is at present abandoned, Prussia with justice thinks she 
 can better employ her resources in improving the existing 
 fortresses on the Rhine. I attach to this report : — 
 
 1. A plan of the envii'ons of Mayence. 
 
 2. A copy of a book termed " Der Lifanterie Piomiier Dienst ;" 
 this book is published with authority. 
 
 Every Office]" here is authorised to "wi-ite on any subject, and 
 to publish books likely to spread mformation in the Army. 
 When a book is approved of by the Minister of War, the Officer 
 is allowed to publish it ivith authority. The author of the book 
 in question has had for his object, the instruction of Officers and 
 and Non-Commissioned Officers of Infantry in such portions of 
 the duty of Engineers as it appears useful for them to know. 
 
 3. The new navy list of the North German Confederation. 
 
 Application of the Law of 1861, and Reduction of 
 Expenditure. 
 
 Report of the 24/A June, 1870. 
 
 1. The Apphcation of the Law of 1861 on Mihtary Organiza- 
 tion. 
 
 When a power adopts a new law of military organization, 
 as Prussia did in 1861, and France in 1868, a certam 
 number of years must elapse, before this law can be apphed in 
 all its details. Thus, for example, the law of the 1st February, 
 1868, will not produce its complete effects in France for several 
 years. So far as the Prussian Army is concerned it is requisite 
 if one A\dshes to know it, to give an account from time to time 
 of the successive changes, which the application of the law of 
 1861 has introduced, into its component parts. The year 1871 
 will mark an important epoch, as it will terminate for that 
 portion of the army belonging to old Prussia, a transition 
 period ; in other words, in 1871 this portion of the Prussian 
 Army will be constituted in all its details, in conformity \v4th 
 the law of 1861, modified by that of 1867. 
 
 To explain this more clearly, I will first state the general 
 heads of the law of 1861. The reasons which induced the
 
 185 
 
 Prussian Government to alter the law of the 3rd September, 
 1814, are known; they were the radical defects Avhich were 
 ob^dous, defects which displayed themselves in a deplorable way 
 dming the campaigns of 1848, and 1849, in Baden, and the 
 Schleswig campaign and the mobilizations of 1850, and 1859. 
 (Vide my report ot November 1866). A real and declared 
 ambition, and a vague feeling, that its power would, when 
 opportunity offered, enable it to play a considerable part in 
 Europe, produced the ^dsh to increase the military power of 
 the country. Events since then have rewarded Prussia for her 
 foresight. And the King, when judged by history, -\^dll be 
 acknowledged as the persevering organizer of the powerftd 
 army that astonished the world m 1866. The Prussian Govern- 
 ment had a sufficient reason to make the desired augumentation 
 of the army acceptable ; this was the return to the strict apphca- 
 tion of the principle of compulsory ser^ace for all citizens, 
 which had suice 1814 been conthiually evaded. So that until 
 1859, that is to say for 45 years, the annual contingent 
 remained the same as m 1814 (about 40,000 men). Whilst the 
 population of Prussia had gradually increased during the same 
 period from 10 to 18,000,000, the Government resolved first to 
 apply the principle of compulsoiy ser^dce in all its rigour, and 
 consequently it has brought mto the ranks, since 1859, con- 
 tmgents of 63,000 men,* and has created 36 regunents of 
 Infantry and 1 regiments of Cavalry, making the number of 
 the first 81, and of the latter 48. 
 
 Another important measure gave the new law its true 
 character. It was decided that the Landwehr should no longer 
 form a portion of the active field army, and this object was 
 attauied by addmg two contingents to the reserve, or increasing 
 the period spent m the reserve, by men quitting the regular 
 amiy, from two to four years. 
 
 As for the Landwehi-, the part it had to play was reduced 
 in theory to home defence. The general aiTangements of the 
 new organization were as follows :— 
 
 1. A considerable increase of the army, l^y making the 
 annual contingents stronger. 
 
 2. The exclusion of the Landwehi- from the field army. 
 The duration of service being 19 years. 
 
 Tj 1 A hr f 3 with the Colours. 
 
 Eegular Army, 7 years | ^ -^ ^^^ ^^^^^^^ 
 
 TJ110 [5 in the 1st Class. 
 
 Landwehr, 12 years • • 1 7 i^ the 2nd Class. 
 
 This law was promulgated in 1861, but the gi*eat increase of 
 the cadi-es of which I have spoken took place in 1859-60. 
 The law had been m force for about six years when the 
 war of 1866 broke out, and it had not then attained its fuU 
 development, for Prussia had not at that time, at her chsposal 
 
 * The number called in 1858 was only 26 per cent, of the number of young men 
 fit for service ; it was raised to 40 per cent, in 1859.
 
 186 
 
 four contingents of Reserve men, but only three, namely, those 
 of 1860, 1861, 1862, and she was consequently compelled to 
 complete her battalions to a war footing with men of the 
 Landwehr. After the war Prussia, enlarged by three provinces, 
 Hanover, Schleswig-Holsteui, and Hesse, naturally increased her 
 military strength. The number of Infantry regiments was raised 
 from 81 to 105, that of Cavalry from 48 to 68, &c., but the law 
 of 1861 underwent only a slight modification, in \Ti-tue of 
 which the leng-th of ser^'ice was reduced from 19 to 12 years 
 (law of the 9th March, 1867). Tliis reduction was made in the 
 number of years spent in the Landwehr-, which was reduced 
 from 12 to 5, the 2nd class being enthely suppressed. The 
 periods of service are now — 
 
 In the Regular Army, 7 years | ^ ^J^^^ ^.j^^ 
 
 with the Colours. 
 Reserve. 
 In the Landwehi' 
 
 12 
 
 After having recapitulated the foregoing facts, it is requisite 
 to point out the progress, made in working the law of 1861, 
 modified by that of the 9th November, 1867. The actual Prussian 
 Army, with its permanent Army Corps recruited in each mihtary 
 division, corresponding more or less with a province of the 
 Kingdom, may be regarded as composed of two distinct 
 portions. The first is composed of the eight Army Corps 
 belonging to the eight di^^sions of old Prussia, in addition to 
 the Guard, which is recruited throughout the whole monarchy ; 
 the second is formed of the three Army Corps furnished by the 
 pro\T^nces annexed in 1866. As the last have only been sub- 
 mitted to Prussian mihtary institutions since then conquest, they 
 are naturally beliind the other eight, in the application of the 
 new law. These two portions of the Prussian Army should be 
 examined separately. 
 
 1. Prussia before 1866. — In ^difue of the law of 1861, the 
 contingent of 1863 (that which took part in the Austrian war 
 during its thhd year) will pass into the Landwehr on the 1st 
 October, 1870, the latter, wliich corresponds to the 81 Infantry 
 regiments of old Prussia, wiU be composed then of the sm-vivors 
 of the five contingents of 1859, 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863 ; that of 
 1859 being the last of the weak contingents of 40,000 men 
 raised since 1814, so that it is only on the 1st October, 1871, 
 that the Landwehr vn\\. embrace the survivors of five strong 
 contingents of 63,000 men. 
 
 This date marks, therefore, an interesting epoch, viz., 
 that when the new mihtary law will be completely at work for 
 that portion of the Prussian Army recruited in the old pro- 
 vinces. Then all the Landwehr men will have been enrolled 
 in strong contingents, and wall have served three years with 
 the colours and four years ^vath the Reserve. 
 
 It is interesting to ask what, in October 1871, will be the 
 effective strength of the Landwehr. To do this, we must allow
 
 187 
 
 for the losses each contingent of 63,000 men has STistained 
 after seven, eight, nine, ten, and eleven years. 
 
 In France, Ave estimate the losses at four per cent, per 
 annum ; but this proportion seems too high for Prussia, where 
 I thhik it may be estimated at three and a half per cent. We 
 arrive thus at a strength of 229,000 men, as representing the 
 strength of the five contingents of Landwehr on the 1st 
 October, 1871. If the number is required on the Ist October, 
 1870, only, a period when the Landwehr -udll still include 
 the survivors of one weak contmgent, that of 1859, the number 
 vdW be a little less, or 214,000 men. One-half of this number 
 is more than sufficient to put all the Landwehr Battalions 
 of Old Prussia on a war footing. It will be remarked that 
 a battaHon of Landwehr on a war footmg is composed of 
 600 men, and each Infantry Regiment of the Line of three 
 battalions corresponds with two battahons of Landwehr ; to 
 put on foot the 162 battalions, corresponding with the 81 regi- 
 ments of Old Prussia, 162 x 600 = 97,200 men are required; 
 the Landwehr A\dll give a number of men, on the 1st October, 
 1870, exceeding this number by 100,000 ; and these will, if 
 requisite, be used to complete the Landwehr Battalions, formed 
 in the provinces annexed, and in the other States of the 
 Confederation. 
 
 2. The Three Provinces Annexed in 1866. — The Prussian 
 organization was only introduced into these provinces after 
 the conquest, so that the law of 1861 Mali not be m force 
 until 1878, or 1880. 
 
 Now, the Army Corps of these provinces do not include, 
 more than two contmgents of reserve men, those of 1865 
 and 1866. That part of the law of 186], wliich makes four 
 reserve contingents requisite, to put the army on a war footmg, 
 a part wliich is most imjiortant for its proper organization, 
 cannot therefore be fully carried out until 1st October, 1871 ; 
 and even during the approachmg autumn, these troops can, m 
 case of mobilization, complete the strength of their battahons 
 to a war footing, by calling on their own reserves, M^ithout 
 having recourse to those of the eight provinces of old Prussia. 
 The date of the 1st October, 1871, is, therefore, most interesting 
 under more than one head, so far as the results, that follow 
 from the law of 1861 are concerned. 
 
 3. The other States of the Confederation.- — The small States 
 of North Germany are m the same condition as the Provinces 
 annexed by Prussia ; that is to say, that they have been 
 submitted to the Prussian laws only since 1866, and that it is 
 during the coming autumn that they ^dll be able to })lace 
 their troops on a war footing, by the incorporation of their 
 own reserves. 
 
 So far as the Landwehi* of these States is concerned, its 
 organization cannot be completed before 1878 or 1880. In 
 case of war, the battalions ^dll be raised to 600 men by 
 incorporating in them the excess of the Prussian Landwehr.
 
 188 
 
 I sliould here observe, that the Landwelu* battahons 
 recently formed, as well as those of the three annexed 
 Provuices, and those of the small States of the Confedera- 
 tion, are far from having the requisite number of officers. 
 The Landwehr officers, as is known, are chiefly recruited from 
 the " Volunteers of a year ;" but as the Prussian military 
 institutions have only been in operation in the new Provinces 
 and the small States for a few years, the institution of " Volun- 
 teers of a year" has hitherto been able to furnish only a 
 small number of officers. At present there is only about one- 
 half the requisite number; and, in all probability, eight or 
 ten years must elapse before the body of officers of the 
 new Landwehr battahons can reach the regulated number. 
 In case of mobilization, they would be compelled to detach 
 from the regular army to the Landwehr a sufficient number 
 of subaltern officers, as was done m 1866. 
 
 It might, perhaps, be suitable, to complete this report, by 
 recalling how the Prussian Government has gradually carried 
 out the reduction of the length of service from nineteen to 
 twelve years; but as I have given a complete account of this 
 in my report of the 2nd June, 1869, I simply refer to it. 
 
 I have thus shown the gradual development of the applica- 
 tion of the military law of 1861, and have tried to show the 
 importance of the year 1871. This year will not only form the 
 subject of the debates of the approaching Reischtag, under the 
 Articles 60 and i)'! of the North German Confederation, but it 
 will mark, as I have tried to explain, an interestmg date at 
 which all the Prussian Army ^^^I1 be organized in accordance 
 with the law of 1861. I conclude by recapitulating the progress 
 made in this dh'ection. 
 
 The 1st October, 1871, the army will be finally organized in 
 conformity with the new law of organization. 
 
 1. For Old Prussia — 
 
 -p , ., , ., (3 Contingents •withtlie Colours. 
 
 ° • I 4 „ in the Keservc. 
 
 Laudvrelir . . 5 „ 
 
 That is to say, the whole of the military forces. 
 
 2. For the three new Provinces, and for aU the States of the 
 Confederation — 
 
 Regular Ai-my . . | ^ Oontbigents witli tlie Colom-s. 
 ° '' L "^ )) '"'itJi the Reserve. 
 
 The complete formation of the Landwehr will not be 
 acliieved until 1880 ; but the battahons can be placed on a 
 war footing (600 men) by means of the overplus of the 
 Landwehi- of Old Prussia. 
 
 II. Economical Measui'es. 
 
 Sending Men Home before their Tune is completed. 
 Delaymg the Annual Contingent. 
 Furloughs granted by the King.
 
 189 
 
 The 1st October is the nominal date at which the Con- 
 tingent of the thii'd year passes into the lieserve, to be 
 replaced by the new Contingent. But for several years the 
 Prussian Government has, from economical motives, sent the 
 three years' men into the Reserve in anticipation, at the same 
 time that it has not called up the new levy until after the 
 1st October. A double saving results from this, which is the 
 greatest of all those that the Government makes ; for it repre- 
 sents, on an average, the pay and keep for thi'ee months ol 
 one-third of the Infantry of the Line, and Foot Artillery. 
 
 This year, the dispositions, taken by order of the Kmg, on 
 the 17th Febniary, to send men to the Reserve by anticipation, 
 are the same as last year. The manoeu\Tes wall be concluded in 
 all the Army Coi-ps by the 15th September at latest ; and the 
 Commandants have been ordered to send on farlough those 
 men who have taken part in the autumn manoeuvres the fu'st 
 or second day after then completion, or immechately after their 
 return to garrison. The order of the 17th February lixes the 
 number of recruits that each corps must receive to replace 
 those sent to the Reserve. The total number forming the 
 Contingent of this year is 95,540, including 477 men for the 
 Navy. These 95,540 men are — 
 
 Men. 
 
 Actual Contingent 86,860 
 
 Engaged Volunteers . . . . . . 8,680 
 
 Total 95,540 
 
 The 86,860 men are divided as follows : — 
 
 Men, 
 
 Prussia 69,691 
 
 Saxony , . . . . . , , . . 7,720 
 
 Hesse .. .. .. .. .. 795 
 
 Other States 8,654 
 
 Total 86,860 
 
 The incorporation of the Contingent of 1870 will take place 
 as foUows : — Cavalry, Horse Artillery, and Train Recruits must 
 join on the 15th October; the Foot-Guards on the 3rd November; 
 the line on the 15th December. 
 
 But the necessity for economy is so great, that they speak 
 in Prussia of another, which consists m giving temporary fur- 
 loughs to a large nmnber of men in their second year. These 
 in Prussia are called King's Furloughs. This measure, to 
 which I have already referred in my report of the 2nd 
 December, 1869, and which is only provisional, dates from 
 1868. I here recall the arragements. 
 
 Each company of Infantry sends on furlough five men, each 
 battalion of Rilies sixty-four men, &c. ( Vide my report of the 
 20th December, 1869.
 
 190 
 
 Autumn Manceuvres in 1870, and Various Matters. 
 
 Report of \st July, 1870. 
 
 I here give tlie date and the place where next September 
 the great autumn, army corps manoeuvres will take place in 
 presence of the King, m case it may be considered advisable 
 to send this year as last, one or more French officers. 
 
 These manoeuvres will be carried out by the lOth Corps 
 (Hanover) and the 9th Corps (Schleswig-Holstein). 
 
 Manoeuvres of the lOth Armij Corps (\9th and 20th Divisions) 
 
 The King will arrive at Hanover on the 4th September ; by 
 that time the Army Corps "will have completed then- regimental, 
 brigade, and divisional manoeuvres. The brigade manoeuvres 
 win take place the 12th to 19th August, namely, for Infantry 
 in the neighbourhood of Hanover, Hildesheim, Neinbourg and 
 Ohof (vide annexed map) ; for Cavalry at Walsrode. 
 
 The 24th August, the troops of each division will be con- 
 centrated, and each division manoeuvred until the 31st August, 
 the 19th division between Neundorf and Eldagsten, the 20th 
 division between Wechelde, Peine, and Sarstedt. 
 
 The 2nd September, one division will manoeuvre against 
 another at Pattensen and Arnum, both encamped round 
 Hanover. 
 
 The 3rd September, the Army Corps Avill manoeuvre agamst 
 a skeleton enemy upon the river Ihme. 
 
 The 4th September rest, the King vnll arrive at Hanover ; 
 the 5th September, the King vnll review the Corps. 
 
 The 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th, great manoeuvres upon the 
 Lome. 
 
 A detachment of the telegraphic service will take part in 
 the Army Corps manoeuvres. 
 
 Manoeuvres of the 9th Army Corps (Xlth and \Qth Divisions). 
 
 Unless some alterations are made, the Kmg will be present 
 on the 13th and 16th September at the manoeuvres of the 9th 
 Corps. Before the arrival of His Majesty the regimental and 
 brigade manoeuvres, as well as thqse of the combined Arms, 
 will have taken place. For the last, for example, from the 30th 
 August to the 2nd September, the 33rd Brigade, the 11th 
 Lancers, and four batteries, will manoeuvre upon the Httle 
 river Corbeck, 20 miles to the east of Hamburg. The 27th 
 to the 30th August the 34th Brigade, two regiments of Dra- 
 goons, and four batteries, will manoeuvre at Boitzenbourg.
 
 191 
 
 Tliese two brigades will then unite, and the division will 
 manoeuvre, on its own account, on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of 
 September between Poppenbuttel, Duvenstedt, Quickljorn, and 
 Ellerau ; it will bivouac during the manoeuvres. 
 
 Towards the 8th of September, the two divisions ^dll be 
 concentrated to the south of the little town of Itzehoe, situated 
 on the Stor, a river which joms the Elbe near Gliickstadt, lower 
 than Stadt (vide annexed map). The King Avill arrive in all pro- 
 babihty on the 12th or loth September. 
 
 Reviews and manoeuvres in the vast tract of country called 
 the Lockfiedler Haide, near Itzehoe, will take place on the 14th, 
 loth, 16th, and 17th September. 
 
 Last year more than 60 foreign officers attended the autumn 
 manoeuvres carried out in presence of the King. I am told that 
 at least as many, wiU a]3pear this year. They will continue the 
 experiments made last year on the employment of preserved 
 and compressed meats, as food for soldiers. These experiments 
 will be on a large scale this tune, that is to say, four divisions 
 at once. 
 
 Divisional Manoeuvres. 
 
 The 9th and lOth Corps alone ^'vdU manoeuvre division 
 against division, or with an Army Corps against a skeleton 
 enemy. In aU the other corps, including the Guard, the 
 manoeuvres will only be those of a single division. I send 
 annexed the programme of those of the Guard ; a large number 
 of Baden, Bavarian, and Wurtemberg officers of aU arms -^dll 
 be present. They have been at Berhn for some time ; and have 
 been attached to various corps, for duty. 
 
 Exercises for the Engineers. 
 
 In the month of August, special exercises for the Engineers 
 MdU take place at Graudenz, on the Vistula ; the miner companies 
 of the pioneer battahons of six Army Corps and two companies 
 of sappers, ^\all be assembled there. 
 
 This month several companies of pontoniers manoeuvre on 
 the Spree, at Kopenick, near Berlin. 
 
 Staff Journeys. 
 
 This year the journeys of the Staft', intended for the 
 practical instruction of officers, under the du*ection of the 
 Chief of the Staff, will take place in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 
 6th, and 11th Corps, and Guard. The Staff officers of the 
 25th, or Hessian, division will be attached to the 11th Corps. 
 The Staff will continue this year the triangulation of that part 
 of the comitry that has not yet been surveyed. 8,000/. has 
 been allowed for the execution of this work. 
 
 P 2
 
 192 
 
 Railway Drill. 
 
 During this month the chiferent arms of the Guard Corps 
 — Infantry, Cavahy, and Artillery — have been exercised at 
 embarking and disembarking in railway carriages. Similar 
 di'ill takes place each year in the other corps. 
 
 They follow almost exactly to the letter, the rules laid down 
 in the French Army. 
 
 Intendance. 
 
 A step has been taken by which the organization of the 
 Intendance will to a certain extent be assimilated to ours. 
 Until now the Officers of the Army were not allowed to fill 
 the post of Intendant. However, since the war of 1866, an 
 attempt has been made to train Officers for those fmictions, as 
 well as for Judge Advocates. Quite recently the Minister has 
 declared that the highest posts in the Intendance can only 
 be fiUed by Officers from the Army who preserve their rank. 
 The subordinate employments are reserved for aspirants to the 
 post of Paymaster. 
 
 It is proposed to train a greater number of Officers in 
 telegraphy and the use of railways. 
 
 Remounts. 
 
 The territory of the North German Confederation has been 
 divided uito four zones, each presided over by a Remount 
 Committee. 
 
 Ist Zone. East Prussia and Lithuania. 
 
 2nd „ Between the Oder and Vistula. 
 
 3rd „ Between the Oder and Elbe, including Schleswig-Holstein. 
 
 4th „ Between the Elbe and Rhine. 
 
 These committees work from the 1st July to the 30th 
 August in the provinces where Prussia buys horses for the 
 Army. In 1869 the number of horses purchased was 5,800; 
 this year it wiU be 5,750, namely : — 
 
 For the Cavalry 4,392 
 
 For the Artillery 862 
 
 For various Services . . . . . . . . 495 
 
 Total 5,750 
 
 School at Anclam. 
 
 The new war school estabhshed at Anclam will open on the 
 ist of next August.
 
 193 
 
 Artillery and Various Matters. 
 Report of the 5th July, 1870. 
 
 I. Field Artillerv. 
 
 System of 1869. — Bronze has, as is known, replaced steel in 
 the manufacture of the Field Artillery of the Federal Army. 
 However the King has not yet signed the order making 
 this change definite, and the numerous partizans of bronze 
 begin to reproach him for liis hesitation. As I have already 
 pointed out, this retm-n to bronze does not involve the abandon- 
 ment of steel guns, it only means that as steel guns are 
 worn out they mil be replaced by bronze. Although the 
 North German Confederation has a very large quantity of old 
 bronze, the Spandau Foundry has cast only a very small 
 number of new guns. The greater part have been sent to the 
 various Artillery depots, and four 4-prs. have been issued to one 
 of the Horse Batteries of the Field Artillery Regiment of the 
 Guard. I would recall the fact {vide my report, 22nd July 
 1868) that the bronze guns adopted have the same cahbre as the 
 steel guns, one of the requuements being that the old pro- 
 jectiles should be utilized ; the same carriages and the same 
 rifling as for the 4-pr. and 6-pr. steel guns have been preserved. 
 The breech-closing apparatus is a double wedge, as in the 
 4-pr. steel guns, the breech-piece is of copper ; and to prevent 
 the destruction of the bronze a steel ring is let in at the mouth 
 of the breech-closmg apparatus. The follo^uTiig are some of the 
 details of these new bronze guns. 
 
 ( Weight of the Gruu witli breech-closing iipparalus, COS lbs. 
 A (± } Weight of charge, I'l lb. 
 
 pr. un. < jj-iji-jg^i velocity not vet measured. 
 ( Length of the Gun, 59 feet. 
 
 {Weight of the Gun, 946 lbs. 
 Weight of the Charge, 1-32 lbs. 
 Initial TclocitT, 1,003 feet per second. 
 Length of the Gun, 636 feet. 
 
 This new system of Field Artillery bears the name of the 
 1869 pattern. The proportion of 4-pr. to 6-pr. is the same 
 in the 15 batteries composing all the Regiments of Field 
 Artillery in the Federal Army, or in other words there are per 
 regiment — 
 
 3 Horse Artillery Batteries, 4-prs. 
 12 Foot Batteries {gofe-prs." 
 
 Total . . 15 Batteries (9 4-pr8. and 6 6-pr6.)
 
 194 
 
 An order issued by the King, dated tlie 9tli June, 1870, 
 orders tliat all Foot Batteries* shall be described as follows : — 
 
 4-pr. batteries as Light Foot Batteries. 
 
 6-pr. batteries as Heavj Foot Batteries. 
 
 Ofi Reducing all Calibres to One. — Ideas in vogue. The return 
 to bronze has re\dved the hopes of those, who would hke to 
 have but one cahbre for field guns. I will give some details on 
 this subject, which cannot but be interesting as giving the 
 ideas in current amongst Prussian officers. 
 
 The partizans of one cahbre propose to take advantage of 
 the alterations being made in the materiel to retain only one 
 field ^\n, and they prefer the 4-pr. They support themselves 
 by pouiting to the efforts made elsewhere, to arrive at umty of 
 cahbre, particularly in Italy, where Mattel Rossi has just pro- 
 posed a new system of artillery. They give the following 
 reasons : — 
 
 1. The 4-pr. gim forms now thi-ee-fifths of the field artillery 
 of the Federal Army, smce each regiment embraces nine 4-pr. 
 batteries and six (3-pr. batteries ; m addition to which tliis gun 
 has been adopted as a movable gun for coast defence. 
 
 2. As regards rapidity of fire, the 4-pr. gun which can fire a 
 properly pointed round every 26 seconds is superior to all 
 known guns. 
 
 3. As regards hghtness, the Prussian 4-pr. it is true is 
 hea\aer than foreign guns of the same cahbre, since it weighs, 
 complete, with gumiers mounted, 4,283 lbs., wliilst the Austrian 
 4-pr. only weighs 3,302 lbs., and the French 4-pr. 3,520 lbs., but 
 on the other hand it is horsed ^\'ith six horses, wliich makes it 
 more mobile than the latter. 
 
 4. The ammrmition box of the 4-pr. rifled gun carries a 
 larger number of rounds than the correspondmg box of other 
 Powers. It carries 48 rounds, the French box 40, the Austrian 
 39, and the Russian only 18. 
 
 5. So far as accuracy is concerned, it is well laiown to be 
 superior to the guns of foreign nations. 
 
 To aU these reasons the partisans of unity add another, 
 perhaps the best of aU, that the difference of effect produced by 
 the 4-pr. and ()-pr. is not sufficiently great to justify the reten- 
 tion of two cahbres, and they propose, m case these ideas are 
 not accepted, to replace the 6-pr. by a more powerful gun — an 
 8-pr. perhaps. 
 
 I have given here a resume of the discussions, Avhich have 
 come to my knowledge, not onlyin my conversation with artillery 
 officers, but also by reading several pamphlets which have 
 appeared this year. 
 
 The intelhgent and working portion of the body of artillery 
 officers elaborates ideas of another nature, Avhich occupy at this 
 moment the attention of the distmguished officers forming the' 
 Experimental Committee. They ask, if it is not possible to alter 
 
 * That 13 to say, Mounted Batteries (Field Batterie^).
 
 195 
 
 the construction of the fiekl guns, so as to give a flatter trajec- 
 tory. Rifled field artillery has, according to an expression used 
 in Germany, a very great " defensive force," but its " offensive 
 force " requu-es to be increased, in order that batteiies may j)lay 
 a more efficacious part, and act oftener and more directly during 
 the different phases of a battle. The reason why these ideas 
 now occupy the minds of artillery officers, is that they are in 
 general httle satisfied with the part that their arm took m the 
 war of 1866. 
 
 " We have always fu-ed in battles at too great a range," 
 a General said to me one day, "rifled artillery offers this 
 " inconvenience, that its efficiency depends too much on the 
 " accuracy wdth which distances are estunated, and judging 
 " distances in the field is always very difficult in war, as our 
 " officers well know ; one great improvement will be the 
 " construction of a field gun whose effect wiU depend less on 
 *' an accurate estimation of range." I repeat these words 
 because they express the ideas, which occupy the minds of 
 Prussian artillery officers, and in particular the Experimental 
 Committee. 
 
 Divestmg these ideas of the German words surromiding 
 them, always a little vague as " defensive effect " and " offen- 
 " sive effect," they "wish to have flatter trajectories, or, m other 
 words, higher initial velocities. 
 
 This subject has been so much agitated, that M. Krupp has 
 proposed to the ]\lmister to construct a 4-pr. steel gun which 
 will give an initial velocity of 1,541 to l,7o8 feet per second. 
 M. Krupp, ha^ang taken this step, shoAvs he is making eftorts to 
 prevent the hostihty to steel increasing. I do not know what 
 reply the Minister made. 
 
 The Experimental Committee also studies the effect of grape. 
 In consequence of the exj)erience acquired in the war of 1866, 
 when grape was only employed in those rare cases when Austrian 
 cavalry charged a battery, people say, What is its use ? It is only 
 efficacious at 400 to 500 yards, and troops rarely approach so 
 near batteries i 
 
 I give these ideas for what they are worth, but it is not the 
 less true that the Expermiental Committee is about to try if it 
 is not possible to make graj)e efficacious at greater ranges. 
 
 The Committee obtained the following results in experiments 
 to test rapidity last month. 
 
 Common Shell fire . . . . 4 rounds in 3 minutes. 
 
 Grape . . . . ' . . . . 2 ,, 1 minute. 
 
 Re-adopiion of Shrapnel. — When the war of 1866 broke out 
 Prussia had not yet completed the transformation other Artillery, 
 this compeUed her to take the field with one-tlurd of her 
 Artillery composed of smooth-bore bronze guns, wliich strangely 
 enough were attached to the Cavalry. These batteries, and 
 those of the 6-pr. rifled steel guns, were supplied with >;hiapnel, 
 whilst the 4-pr. batteries had only common shell and grape.
 
 196 
 
 The smooth-bore batteries hardly fired at all, whilst the Shrapnel 
 shell, fired with a percussion fuze, did so httle damage that in 
 1868 they resolved to discontinue its use. I reported this on 
 the 22nd July 1868. However, experiments have been made 
 to obtain a time fuze. Captain Richter has proposed one wliich 
 gives very good results. But recently a member of the Experi- 
 mental Committee, Captam Lancelle, has succeeded in altermg 
 tliis fuze, and rendering Shrapnel fire so satisfactory that the 
 Committee has proposed to re-adopt this projectile. This 
 has been approved by the ]\lmister. The only question not yet 
 decided is the proportion of Shrapnel to common shell. I will 
 report this ivhen fixed. The re-adoption of Shrapnel will 
 cause curved fire to be discontinued, and also get rid of small 
 charges from the hmbers. 
 
 II. Alterations of Carriages of all kinds. 
 
 Since 1866, the foundry at Spandau, and the Artillery work- 
 shops have done much work. This "vxdU be easily imderstood, 
 when it is remembered that Prussian materiel had to be intro- 
 duced into the pro\ances annexed by Prussia, and also into the 
 small States of the Confederation. This work has been com- 
 pleted, and the War Office has undertaken another, wliich con- 
 sists in altering all military wagons except gun and ammunition 
 carriages. Store wagons, baggage wagons, field forges, car- 
 riages of the different trains, pares, and supply columns 
 (f/e louche). A commencement was made by altermg the store 
 wagons and forges. 
 
 The store wagon carried three spare wheels, fixed on a 
 vertical axis, consequently carried horizontally. Experience 
 showed that this arrangement did not give steadiness enough 
 to the wheels, and that it required a difficult operation to load 
 and unload them. The hmber has been altered so as to admit of 
 the wheels being placed there ; in addition to which the two 
 horses which drew this wagon were not found to be enough. 
 For the future it will be horsed by four horses. For the field 
 forge, a smaller pattern on an improved system has been made ; 
 the old forge Avas open, the new is covered. These alterations 
 are for the store wagons and forges of the 4-pr. batteries ; 
 they are far advanced, and will be followed by similar altera- 
 tions in the ()-pr. batteries. The artillery have still some wagons 
 of the old pattern of 1842 and 1861. AU the carriages wall be 
 replaced by the present pattern of 1864. The materiel so 
 replaced is intended in case of mobilization to be used by reserve 
 batteries. 
 
 The way in which the wheels locked in 1866 was not satis- 
 factory ; experiments are being made to test a ucav method. 
 
 III. Siege and Garrison Artillery. 
 
 It would be difficult to give any idea of the confusion in 
 which the siege and garrison artillery of Prussia at present is.
 
 197 
 
 There are many calibres of various metals— iron, bronze, and 
 steel. Smooth-bore and rifled gmis, with all kinds of breech 
 apparatus and carriages of every pattern. 
 
 If this Artillery be classified it will be found to be composed 
 as follows : — 
 
 I 1 Iron smoolh-bore. 
 
 4 natures of 6-prs. . J } Bronze smooth-bore. 
 
 '■ 1 Iron rilled. 
 
 II Steel rifled. 
 
 fl Short brass smooth-bore. 
 I 1 Iron smooth-bore. 
 
 5 natures of 12-pr8. • • "i 1 Iron rifled. 
 
 I 1 Bronze rifled. 
 (_1. Converted rifled gun. 
 fl Short smooth-bore iron. 
 I 1 Long „ ., 
 
 I 1 Long bronze smootli-bore. 
 7 natures of 24-pr8. ■ • -=| 1 Iron rifled. 
 
 1 Bronze rifled. 
 
 1 Steel rifled. 
 
 1 Converted riCed bronze. 
 I 1 7-pi\ Smooth-bore bronze. 
 
 4 Howitzers .. ..•< i .t- ^^' " " 
 
 j 1 2.3-pr. 
 
 Ll 50-pr. „ „ 
 
 2 Shell Guns . . . . | } f.t^""- ^'°'' ^^^o^^^h-bore. 
 
 1.1 5U-pr. „ „ 
 
 11 V-Jir. Bronze. 
 
 1 25-pr. „ 
 
 1 2o-pr. Iron. 
 
 1 50-pr. Bronze. 
 1 Pierrier ., .. Bronze. 
 
 Adoption of an Iron 24-/7r. — The Prussian Artillery desires, as 
 is known, to reduce the number of cahbres composing its siege 
 and garrison material ; and has consequently experimented for 
 several years with a cast-iron gun called the 5-895-inch gun, 
 intended to replace the heavy, smooth-bore howitzers, the 24-pr. 
 guns, and the 25-pr. shell gun. The new gun just adopted is 
 a short 24-pr. rifled gun, with a caHbre of 5*895 inches ; a breech- 
 loader, on the double wedge (Kreiner) system. It is seven cahbres 
 shorter than the old 24-pr. gun, and can be fii-ed "v\'ith a greater 
 elevation ; it weighs 2,750 lbs. at least. Intended for ricochet 
 fire, it will be employed both as a siege, and garrison gun, and 
 it wiU be used both in breaching batteries and counter batteries, 
 where there would be a difficulty in placing the old 24-pr. The 
 carriage is 6' 6-6' inches high; the weight of the projectile is 
 61-6 lbs ; the greatest range 6,594 to 7,1 1 1 yards. 
 
 IV. Naval Artfllery. 
 
 If steel has fallen into disrepute in the construction of field 
 guns, there appears to be a similar tendency, so far as naval 
 guns are concerned, iron and bronze gainmg ground. The 
 Federal Xavy has already adopted bronze rifled guns for a 
 portion of the armament of its screw boats, and whilst the 
 Artillery of the Iron Clads is altogether of steel, the 
 " Arminius " has just been armed with bronze 72-prs. It may
 
 198 
 
 be remembered that during the trials of last year a 72-pr. 
 projectile fired with a charge of 24*2 lbs. of powder, penetrated 
 a 5-inch plate at a range of 547 yards. 
 
 The l^'ederal Navy has actually the following calibres : — 
 
 Smooth-bores. 
 
 24-prs. 
 
 30-pr3. 
 
 36-pr3. 
 
 68-pr8. 
 
 Shortl2-prs.U^^ 
 
 Liong la-prs. J 
 
 ;mall Vessels. 
 
 Rifled Guns. 
 Iron 12-prs. 
 
 „ 24-prs. 
 Steel, 24-prs. 
 
 „ 36-prs. 
 
 „ 72-prs. 
 Bronze 4-pr8. for small Ships. 
 
 Practice against Iron Plates.— I have given an account in my 
 reports of the lOth July and 22nd iSovember, 1868, of the 
 experiments made at Tegel agamst iron plates, they will be 
 contmued again this autumn with a steel 11 -inch gun. 
 
 Pi'actice against Bomb-proof and Shielded Casemates. — I gave 
 sonie details on the 22nd November, 1868, on the bomb-proof 
 and shielded iron casemate made at Tegel by ]\I. Gruson, and 
 designed for the protection of Coast Artillery. This erection 
 has cost more than 16,000/., and has necessitated castmgs 
 weigliing 1 65,000 lbs. Apparently ashamed of tliis extravagance, 
 I have not hitherto been able to obtain information as to the 
 experiments that have taken place. [Shortly, the experiments 
 have been of two kinds ; they have fired a 72-pr. gun beheved to 
 be protected, from within the casemate, and have then proceeded 
 to tire against the casemate. The gun withm the casemate 
 was fired with 'l&'o lbs. of powder at the rate of one round per 
 minute ; the gas caused much mconvenience to the gunners. 
 The apparatus for dischargmg the gun was not satisfactory, 
 and the impossibility of usmg so short a gun on accoimt of 
 the force of the detonation and the back stroke of the gas was 
 acknowledged ; the model of the carriage was satisfactory. 
 
 Practice was begun at the outside with a 24-pr. gun, firing 
 eohd steel shot at a range of 547 yards ; it was then continued 
 with the 72-pr. gun, at a range of 1,094, and a charge of 
 33 lbs. of powder. The effects were nil. The Krupp projectile 
 fired at a range of 1,094 yards fi-om a 96-pr. gun, produced, at the 
 back of the casemate, a crack 23 mches long ; a second shot 
 strildng just above enlarged the crack by 6 mches. The 72-pr. 
 and l)6-pr. were then advanced to within 382 and 218 yards 
 of the casemate, and many portions of it were comjjletely 
 broken up and dislocated. Last month the walls were tired at 
 with an angle of inclination, and this autumn projectiles, weigh- 
 ing 495 lbs., will be used this not so much with the object of 
 testing the resistance of the casemate, as for ascertaining the 
 penetration of heavy projectiles. 
 
 According to Mr. Gruson, the United States propose to 
 adopt his plan for casemates for coast defence. It is proposed to 
 renew the experiments at Tegel. 
 
 V. Miscellaneous. 
 
 School for Non-commisfioned Officers. — North Germany has
 
 199 
 
 four schools for Infantry non-commissioned officers, and one 
 school for Cavah'Y non-commissioned officers forming a portion 
 of the Cavalry school at Hanover. The regulated duration of 
 this course is three years, or two only for those who distinguish 
 themselves. The pupils of these schools are soldiers who pre- 
 pare themselves for the functions of non-commissioned officers. 
 The course at the school gives them, however, no right to the 
 grade. It is proposed to form a- school for non-commissioned 
 officers of artillery. 
 
 Distinctions awarded to the Best Shots. — The King has just 
 issued an order sho^^dng the importance attached to good shooting. 
 He has ordered that a distmctive badge be given to gunners who 
 shoot well, as is already done to Infantry soldiers. This badge 
 is awarded ui the proportion of one non-commissioned officer 
 per battery and one private per company of Infantry. 
 
 Alteration in Dress. — By the order of the 19th May, 1870, 
 the di'ess of the horse artillery, the officers of field batteries, 
 and train has been modified. The long trousers with boots over 
 them have been replaced by short trousers strapped with 
 leather and knee-boots. 
 
 This alteration had been already ordered for Drag-oons and 
 Lancers on the 24:th March, 1870. 
 
 Whip, Cuttincj Whip. — -The drivers have in heu of a whip a 
 long cutting-whip with a lash. The officers, non-commissioned 
 officers, and men prefer the whip as being more convenient ; it 
 is less expensive than our whip, but perhaps does not last so 
 long. 
 
 Railwaii Committee. — A Committee composed of officers and 
 civil employes from both Northern and Southern States has 
 been sitting at Berlin for three weeks to draw up rules for the 
 transport of troops and stores of all kinds, in case of war, on the 
 railways belonging to the cHfferent States. 
 
 The offensive and defensive treaties made in 1866, between 
 the North German Confederation and the Southern States, 
 explains and justifies this Committee. 
 
 I attach to this report — 
 
 1. Two copies of a plan, not quite correct, of the harbour of 
 Wilhemsha ven . 
 
 2. A map of Hanover and Brunswick to attach to my former 
 report. It Avill allow the ground for the manoeuvres of the lOth 
 Corps to be studied. 
 
 3. A copy of the regulations of the Sanitary Corps. 
 
 4. A copy of a pamphlet termed " Uber die Thiitiglvcit und 
 " Verwendung der Cavallerie un Feldzuge von J 800." It 
 deserves translation. It is anonymous, and is said to be by the 
 Staff officer Avho w^rote two years ago the " Taktische Riick- 
 blicke."
 
 200 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 I. — EXAIMPLES OF THE LENGTH OF TIME TAKEN TO MoBHjIZE 
 
 VARIOUS Regiments in 1866.* 
 
 1*^ Regiment of Grenadiers {\st Army Corps, East Prussia), 2 Battalions at 
 Konigsbery, 1 Battalion at Pillau. 
 
 Order to Mobilize arrived at Konigsberg in the 
 
 evening of the 8tli Maj ; thi s day may count as 
 
 the first day of Mobilizatiou . . . . . . 8tli May. 
 
 Transfer of OtHcers to the depot battalion and 
 
 Landwehr . . . . . . . . . . . , 9th May. 
 
 2nd Battalion received additional arms. . . . . . lltli and 12th May. 
 
 Ist Battalion and Rifl-i Battalion received additional 
 
 arms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14th May. 
 
 Sharpening swords. 
 
 r District of Konigsberg 13th, 14th, 16th May. 
 
 Reserves J „ Wehlaw . . , . . . 16th May. 
 
 called up | „ Bartenstein . . . . . . 16th, 17th May. 
 
 I „ TUsit 17th May. 
 
 Dcpdt Battalion finally formed of 69 non-commissioned 
 
 officers, 429 soldiers, and 90 workmen. On the 
 
 2nd June it was increased by 210 recruits . . 16th May. 
 
 The horses anel men of the train for the statf and 
 
 battalions told off . . . . . . . . . . 15th and 16th May. 
 
 War materiel received for the 1st Battalion . . . . 18th May. 
 
 „ „ „ 2nd and 3rd Battalions 19tli ]\Iay. 
 
 Mobilization completed . . . . . . . . . . 20th May. 
 
 Length of time taken to Mobilize . . . . . . 11 days. 
 
 42,nd Regiment of Infantry of the Line {2ind Corps, Pomerania), 2 Battalions at 
 Stralsund, 1 Battalion at Swinemunde. 
 
 Order to Mobilize the 2nd Army Corps . . . . 7th May. 
 
 Order for the 42nd Regiment reached Stralsuud . . 9th May, in the morning. 
 
 Comuiander-m-Chief of 2nd Corps ordered the mobil- 
 ization to be counted from the 8th May . . . , 8th May. 
 
 The work began in accordance with the scheme for 
 Mobilization. 
 
 Reserve men to complete the battalion arrived. . . . 16th, 17th, 18th May. 
 
 Formation of the depot battaUon and the company of 
 
 workmen . . . . . . , . . . . . 18th May. 
 
 Miscellaneous drills, company firing at targets, drill 
 for conduct ng train wagons, supply of cartridges 
 60 per mun, and 20 in the battalion ammunition 
 wagon ISth to 21st May. 
 
 * We think that these Tables will interest the jjublic ; they were attached to the 
 Report of the lolh July, 1869, entitled. Time requisite for the Mobilization of the 
 North German Army Corps, and their Concentration on the Frontier of France. — 
 [Ed.J
 
 201 
 
 Mobilization completed . . . . . , , , . . 21st May. 
 
 Length of Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . 14 days. 
 
 72nd Regiment of Infantry of the Line {4:th Corps, Province of Saxony) at Torgau, 
 
 EeceiTed the same orders on the same dates as the 
 
 47th Regiment . . . . . . . . . . {See below). 
 
 Mobilization dated from the . . . . . . . . 4th May. 
 
 „ completed . . . . . . . . . . 11th May. 
 
 Length of Mobilization . . . , . . . . . . 11 days. 
 
 The 6th May the Eifle Battalion was sent to encamp at 
 Schildau to gain room. 
 
 4!7th Regiment Infantry of the Line (bth Corps, PosenJ. 
 
 Order for the 5th Corps to place the Infantry Batta- 
 lions, Rifle BattaHons, and Pioneers on a war 
 footing, and form the Cadres of substitutes. 
 
 Order arrired at Posen . . . . . . . . . . 4th May. 
 
 Order to Mobilize 5tli Corps arrived . . . . . . 6th May. 
 
 Commandant Ainny Co'-ps decided the Mobdization 
 
 should count from the . . . . . . . . 4th May. 
 
 Arrival of Reserve men from the Landwehr districts ; 
 arrival of arms and ammunition from the ArtiUery 
 dep6t at Schweidnitz ; arrival and distribution of 
 saddle-horses, bought for the Officers and Sur- 
 geons entitled to them ; and to carriages and 
 draught -horses . . . . . . . . . . 8th to 11th May. 
 
 Formation of battalion of substitutes .. .. .. 11th May. 
 
 DrO], distribution of ammunition; Mobilization com- 
 pleted 13th May. 
 
 Length of Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . 10 days. 
 
 Remark. — Train soldiers to drive the wagons and 
 look after the horses were wanting ; they joined 
 some days after, when the Regiment was on the 
 line of march. 
 
 51*^ Regiment of Infantry of the Line {6th Corps), Silesia; 1 Battalion at Breslau; 
 1 Battalion at Qlatz ; Rifle Battalion at Silberberg, 
 
 Order to mobilize reached the Regiment . . . . 6th May. 
 
 Mobilization completed . . . . . . . . . . 14th May. 
 
 By a Cabinet Order of the 8th May, the 6th Army 
 Corps was directed to concentrate the 11th Divi- 
 sion at Frankenstein, the 12th at Neisse ; the 
 14th May, the 1st Battalion of the 51st Regiment 
 began its march. 
 
 Length of mobilization . . . . , , . . . . 9 days. 
 
 2nd Regiment of Foot Guards. 
 
 Order to complete aU the Guards to a war footing and 
 
 form the depot battalions . . . . . . . . 3rd May. 
 
 Order to mobilize 5th May. 
 
 Reserve men arrived daily from all parts of the 
 
 Monarchy ; they are clothed, equipped, armed, 
 
 exercised at riHe practice, and route marching; 
 
 formation of depot battalion, and company of 
 
 workmen completed . , . . . . . . . . 11th May, 
 
 Reception and telling off horses and men of the train, 
 
 saddle horses for officers and surgeons, repairs of 
 
 wagons . . . . . . . . . . . . 14th, 15th, 16th May. 
 
 Mobilization completed . . . . . . . . . . 18th May. 
 
 Length of Mobilization 14 days.
 
 202 
 
 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards at Dantzic. 
 
 During tlie time of preparation for war this battalion 
 had received a portion of its reserve men, raising 
 its eifective strength on the 6th May to 55 non- 
 commissioned officers, 25 musicians, and 602 men, 
 including hospital orderlies. 
 
 Order to Mobilize arrived at Dantzic . . . . . . 6th May. 
 
 Formation of depot commenced . . . . . . . . 11th May. 
 
 The battalion detailed for the purpose, 1 officer, 9 non- 
 commissioned offi ers, 4 musicians, and 69 men. 
 
 Formation of supernumerary company. 
 
 Battalion handed over its barrack . . . . . . 12th May. 
 
 Greatest number of resei-ve men rejoined . . . . 13th May. 
 
 The number was 30 non-commissioned officers, 1 
 musician, 358 grenadiers and 9 train soldiers, and 
 2 hospital orderlies, 3 non-commissioned officers 
 and 14 grenadiers of the oldest contingent were 
 sent to the depot. 
 
 The battalion had to receive in addition 12 train 
 soldiers, 32 horses, to horse the battalion wagona • 
 and mount the officers and surgeons. 
 
 1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants and 3 non-commissioned 
 
 officers sent to Landwehr Battalion at Konigsberg 20th May. 
 
 Mobilization completed . . . . . . . . . . 20th May. 
 
 Length of Mobilization . . . . . . . . . , 15 days. 
 
 Battalion of Rifles of the Guard at Berlin. 
 
 Order to prepare for war . . . . . . . . . . 4th May. 
 
 Order to Mobolize . . . . . . . . . . 5th May. 
 
 Contingent of 1857 detached for the dep6t company. 
 Cartridges arrived from Spandau ; Mobilization com- 
 pleted.. .. ., .. .. .. .. 19th May. 
 
 Length of Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . 15 days. 
 
 Regiment of Hussars of the Guard at Potsdam. 
 
 Order to Mobilize . . . . . . . . . . . . 7th May. 
 
 First Reserve men rejoined . . . . . . . . 8th May. 
 
 Several Officers and \ on-commissioned officers sent to 
 seek for and bring up horses ; Mobilization com- 
 pleted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23rd May. 
 
 Length of Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . 17 days. 
 
 Regiment of Field Artillery of the Guard, Berlin. 
 
 Order to Mobilize . . . . . . . . . . 5th May. 
 
 Mobilization completed . . . . . . . . . . 24th May. 
 
 Length of Mobilization .. .. .. .. .. 20 days. 
 
 II. Telegraphic Despatches. 
 
 We have fomicl amongst the papers which Colonel Stoffel 
 has been good enough to entrust to us minutes of the 
 telegraphic despatches in cipher which he sent to the War 
 Minister on the 14th and 17th July, 1870; that is to say, during 
 the days which immediately preceded the declaration of war. 
 These are the despatches referred to in the letter written by our 
 late Military Attache forming the Preface to this book. 
 
 They informed the Minister that everyone thought that
 
 203 
 
 France had surprised Prussia, and that they expected to see a 
 French Army cross the Rhine, and that the minds of everyone 
 were disquieted. Our Attache also reported that the order to 
 mobihze had been issued to all the Army Corps on the morning 
 of the 15th July; that it extended to all the military forces of 
 Germany, and that, an account of the urgency of the case, the 
 period of Mobilization for each corps had been reduced to 
 11 days, counting from and including the 15th July. 
 The despatch of the 1 6th July finished thus : — 
 " I have pointed out in my report of the 15th July, 1869, 
 " that 8 or 9 days is the time requisite for the transport of 
 " several Army Corps, mobilized each in its province, by railwavs 
 " to a g-iven point of concentration ; thus, after '2,0 days, counting 
 " fi'om the 15th July, Prussia A\dll have upon several points of 
 " our frontier, several armies of 100,000 to 120,000 men each." 
 
 Our readers will be struck, as we were, by the exactness of 
 this information, for about 20 days after the 15th July the 
 action at Wissemberg, and the battles ot Forbach and Worth 
 took place.
 

 
 
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