would entail for Austria-Hungary. He remarked that our demand required rigid scrutiny on account of the grave consequences that might arise in Austria-Hungary from the point of view of internal and external policy, which were at all costs to be avoided. Therefore sufficient time in which to reflect and decide should be allowed to himself and the competent Austrian and Hungarian agents. He certainly had no wish to increase the embarrassments of the Royal Italian Government but that Government should be able to understand those in which the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment also found itself, and it should do nothing on its own side to increase these. On this subject Baron Burian informed me that in his interviews with the Chancellor of the Empire and with Herr von Jagow and Herr Zimmermann, he had pointed out to them the grave difficulties evoked by the question of compensation in con- sequence of the delicate grounds on to which this had been carried by Italy, whence arose the necessity on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government seriously to consider it before coming to a decision. The German Government had entirely convinced itself of these difficulties and had undertaken to place them before the Royal Italian Government urging upon the latter that moderation and prudence which had been urged upon itself. Baron Burian finally divulged to me that the German Government was determined to strive to the end that an agreement between Austria - Hungary and Italy might be reached and that he did not himself despair of seeing this attained. Germany and Austria-Hungary now formed one single person, and it was their desire that the alliance with Italy might continue in the future, this being also his own ardent wish. But the two Governments, the Austrian and the Hungarian, seem at present to hesitate to accept ovir aspirations, as is shown by the language employed by Baron Burian himself, and this on account of the consequences to which the cession of territories belonging to Austria might give rise throughout the entire Monarchy. AVARNA. 32 No. 17. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegram.) Rome, 2nd February, 1915. AT the weekly reception yesterday Prince von Biilow asked me whether there was news of Baron Burian and of his conver- sations with the Duke of Avarna. I read out to him the greater part of the Duke of Avarna' s last telegram. I pointed out how extremely discouraging is all this to those who desire to come to an understanding ; since although Baron Burian had joined the Government, if not to treat of this very question, at least with full knowledge of it, yet after visiting German Headquarters and discussing the said question with the Emperor William and with the German Government, he could to-day find nothing more definite to say to us than that he felt the need calmly to consider it further. In answer to Prince von Billow's questions, I repeated that we shall not present our demands until we know that Austria- Hungary accepts for discussion the question of the cession of terri- tories at present belonging to the Monarchy, and that until that day I shall define nothing and exclude nothing, whether concern- ing the Trentino, Trieste, Istria, or any other territory ; and I begged him to urge all concerned to expedite a decision, because the greater the delay, the greater would be the difl&culties and the higher our demands. SONNINO. No. 18. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italiati Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, ith February, 1915. BARON MACCHIO having come to see me upon another matter, I introduced the subject of the interview between your Excellency and Baron Burian after his return from Berlin — an interview from which it appeared that all remained still uncertain and overclouded — concerning the question of compensation covered by Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple AlHance. And I seized the opportunity to repeat what I had said to Prince von Biilow (my telegram of the 2nd February), namely that to the reproach addressed to us of not defining our demands, we must answer that until it should become clear that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment would admit as a subject for discussion the eventual cession of territories now possessed by the Monarchy, it was not possible for us to define anything ; but that we should do so as soon as that subject was admitted to discussion. SONNINO. 33 No. 19. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, 1th February, 1915. AS is shown by your Excellency's telegram of the 28th January last, your Excellency had drawn Baron Burian's attention to the fact that it was advisable that the Italo-Aiistrian conversations on the subject of the compensation as provided by Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance should not be protracted with- out conducing to a practical and positive result before events should have matured. I am therefore surprised that ten days should have elapsed without my having received either from Baron Macchio or from your Excellency any fresh advices on the subject. I beg of you to see Baron Burian again, representing to him the urgency and the necessity of an early reply on the question of principle regarding the territories now possessed by Austria- Hungary, upon which we have requested that the discussions should turn. SONNINO. No, 20. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, 9th February, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 10th. IN reminding Baron Burian of what I had submitted in our interview of the 28th January last, I conveyed to him the sub- stance of your Excellency's instructions. Baron Burian repeated all that he had told me in our last interview, namely that the question was one which concerned both the Governments of the Monarchy ; in the first place the Austrian Government, which was directly interested, and in the second place the Hungarian Government. Therefore, to shelter his own responsibihty he must come to an understanding with the said two Governments. He had already entered into an exchange of views on the subject with the Austrian Government. The President of the Council of Ministers, Count Sturgck, had made known to him that he was not favourably disposed towards our plans and that he did not consider justified the reasons we put forward for claiming the cession of territories belonging to Austria-Hungary ; Count Sturgck had shown himself very uncompromising on the subject, but he had declared that he would submit it to the Council of Ministers, so that our demands might be examined and discussed. With regard to the Hungarian Government, Baron Burian in- formed me that during the sojourn of Count Tisza in Vienna, he had been unable through lack of time to do more than give him a simple outline of our demands, and Count Tisza had not looked upon these with any favour. He intends however to visit Buda- pest one of these days to see the Hungarian Government and to 34 discuss the question calmly and at length with Count Tisza, and he would subsequently advise me of the attitude of the latter towards it. I drew Baron Biirian's attention to the fact that it was necessary to expedite a decision on the question of principle involved, because a further delay might give rise to fresh diffi- culties in view of the imminent reopening of Parliament. This delav was certainly not encouraging to those who desired to arrive at an understanding. It could not fail to occasion uncertainty as to the attitude of the Imperial Government, and to create, through the excitement and demonstrations to which it might lead, a situation of great difficulty for the Royal Italian Govern- ment, which would have been unable to hold out anything of a concrete and definite nature to appease the national aspirations. It was hence desirable that the Imperial and Royal Government should put an end to this uncertainty, affording us an answer frankly and at the earliest opportunity, so that the respective exchange of views might be embarked upon. Baron Burian replied that he was working, and that he would continue actively to work, to the end that he might discuss and examine the question with both Governments ; but he observed that an uncommonly persuasive force would be needed to induce him to enter into the point of view of the Royal Italian Govern- ment. He then remarked that to accept the discussion of the question as it had been presented by the Royal Italian Govern- ment was not as easy as it appeared, since it would, in his view, have implied on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government an undertaking towards us to listen to our proposals. And he concluded by saying that he was not yet in a position to listen to them, as conversations on the subject were still being continually held by the Austrian and the Hungarian Governments. Baron Burian then said that he desired to carry our conver- sation to another subject. In recalHng the reasons, logical and political, given in your Excellency's telegram of the 7th January, he remarked that he associated himself fully with all that your Excellency urged on poHtical grounds, namely to create between Austria-Hungary and Italy a situation calculated to eliminate the continual friction and misunderstanding between the two nations, and to establish reciprocal relations upon a basis of sympathy and cordiality. And he added that he was a thorough partisan of the Triple Alliance. Referring then to Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, he observed that in consequence of a fresh and careful examination of the text of the article itself and of various documents relating to our temporary occupation of Valona and the Dodecanesus, he had formed the conviction that those occupations imposed upon Italy the obligation of a preliminary agreement with Austria-Hungary based upon the principle of compensation. I considered it advisable in this connection to remind Baron Burian of what I had already stated to him in our interview of the 17th January, namely that it did not appear to me that 35 Article VII. could be invoked in relation to the said occupations. The occupation of Valona had been occasioned by the ^^eneral state of disorder prevailing in Albania, and had for object to safeguard the deliberations of the Conference of London, Italy being the only Power that was not implicated in the war. For the rest, the efforts of the Royal ItaHan Government were being applied at- this moment to the preservation as far as possible of the Albanian status quo, pending the deliberations which would be held con- cerning Europe at the conclusion of the war. With regard to the occupation of the Dodecanesus, it was well known how this had come about. If it had not yet been possible for the Royal' Italian Government to abandon those islands, this was due to the fact that Turkev had not fulfilled the oblioations imposed upon her by the Treaty of Lausanne, failing in them inasmuch as there were still in Libya numerous officers and soldiers belonging to the Ottoman army. To my further observations that those islands were, unless memory failed me, in the Mediterranean, Baron Burian remarked that eight of them were in the ^Egean Sea, and were therefore covered by Article VII. And he added that my objections did not diminish the grounds of his assertion, which was fully justified by the stipulations of Article VII., which gave the Imperial and Royal Government, in consequence of the aforesaid occupations, a clear and absolute right to a preliminary agreement based upon the principle of compensation. For the rest, Article VII. made no distinctions or restrictions of any kind between temporarv and permanent occupation. Its text was explicit and left no doubt whatever that our occupations came under the provisions of it. He added that our occupation of Valona had been aggravated by the despatch thither of further troops and by the measures taken by our authorities which had established themselves there. Passing on to speak of the discussion with Count Berchtold regarding distinctions between temporary and momentary occupation, Baron Burian said that any occupation of Serbia effected by the Imperial and Royal Government in consecjuence of military opera- tions by the Austro-Hungarian troops, gave us the right to discuss compensation in accordance with Article VII. I replied to Baron Burian that by this declaration, of which I took note, he abandoned the proposition sustained by Count Berchtold, which drew a distinction between a temporary and a momentary occupation, and that he came thus to recognise as exact the interpretation placed by us upon Article VII. Baron Burian concluded by saying that he had thought it well to oppose to our demands for compensation the two above-mentioned counter- proposals for compensation, which certainly, however, did not aim at hindering the discussion of those presented by us. But the moment had seemed to him opportune to formulate them, with a view to removing all questions pending between us, and to clearing the ground of anything that might in future give rise to friction. He added that he deemed it advisable specially to insist upon 36 this point, but he assured me that his counter-proposals were not on that account to be interpreted as indications of ill-will or of an unfriendly spirit towards us. As your Excellency will have gathered, Baron Burian was not yet able to-day to afford a complete answer to our demands, entrenching himself behind the difficulty of inducing the Austrian and the Hungarian Governments to consider these demands. AVARNA. No. 21. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, 12th February, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. V3th. WITH reference to our interview of the 9th instant. Baron Burian has just sent me a memorandum of the grounds upon which the Austro-Hungarian counter-proposals are based. Memorandum. At the outset of the conversations which have been current for some time between Austria-Hungary and Italy on the subject of the compensation which Italy might claim on the basis of Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance, in case of territorial or other advan- tages accruing to Austria-Hungary from her action against Serbia and Montenegro, the Italian Government had developed the idea that the political reasons in favour of such a discussion were the creation of good faith between the two States, so as to eliminate continual friction and to render possible the co-operation of the two nations towards objects of general policy. The Austro-Hungarian Government, sincerely actuated by the same propensities, recognises as fully the advantages of clearing the ground of any element that might in the future trammel the development of cordial relations be- tween the two States. With this end in view it is considered neces- sary in the first place to bring about an agreement upon all questions regarding our reciprocal rights arising out of Article VII. of our Treaty of Alliance, and particularly upon two questions, one of which goes back several years, whilst the other is of recent date, both of them closely affecting our well-founded interests. We are concerned with the question of the islands in the ^?^^gean occupied by Italy, and with that of Italy's action in Albania. As for the first of these questions, it would be superfluous to recapitu- late here the various })hases, quite fresh in our minds, of the conver- sations which took place on the subject in 1911 and 1912 between Vienna and Rome, and which should be found recorded in the archives of the Consulta. It will suffice to state the following points : (1) Notwithstanding the obvious danger introduced by the modification of the status quo in consequence of the occupation by Italy of the Dodecanesian islands, which would sooner or later be reflected in the Balkan Peninsula, Austria-Hungary did not formally oppose it, since it was not her wish to trammel in any way the operations of her ally. 37 (2) Nevertheless, the Austro-Hunwarian Government called attention at the time to Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance, and declared to the Italian Government on several occasions, on the 6th, 7th and Uth November, 1911, on the 13th, 15th and 20th April, 1912, on the 20th, 21st and 31st May, 1912, and on the 5th June, 1912, that the fact of these occupations, declared to be of a temporary character, brought into force Austria-Hungary's right to a pre- liminary agTcement, based upon the principle of compensation, formulated in the said article, and that we reserved to ourselves the right of claiming its fulfilment at a given time. With regard to the duration, in any case irrelevant, of these occupations which should constitute a sound title to compensation, Italy assured the Austro- Hungarian Government several times, and in the most categorical manner, that these occupations were no more than transient, and that they would come to an end after the cessation of hostilities between Italy and Turkey. The question was even discussed of a written declaration on the subject which the Italian Govern- ment should dehver to the Austro-Hungarian Government, with- out, however, its having been possible to agree to the terms of this document. Nevertheless the Austro-Hungarian Government desires to reproduce here the following text of that declaration as it was proposed by the Italian Government : '"It is understood that in the mind of the Italian Government the occupation so far efEected, or which might be efTected hereafter, in the islands of the iEgean Sea, is of a provisional character, and that the said islands will be restored to Turkey after the cessation of hostiUties between Italy and Turkey, and, consequently, after the evacuation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica by the Ottoman troops and officers, and as soon as the conditions indicated to the Great Powers in the Itahan note of the 15th March, 1912, shall have been realised. It is equally understood that the present declaration which arises out of the provisions of Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance shall be considered strictly secret and confidential by the Austro-Hun- garian Government and also by the Itahan Government, since other- wise it would not achieve the common object of the two Powers, which is to hasten and facilitate ■ peace." It results from this declaration, on the one hand, that the conditions to which Italy had subordinated the evacuation of the Dodecanesus at present no longer obtain, and also that although nearly three years have elapsed since then, Italy has not yet restored these islands to Turkey. On the other hand, this declaration proves that Italy recog- nised the correlation existing between these occupations and Article VII. of the Treaty of Alhance. It seems, therefore, evident that if the Government desires to discuss at once the compensation to which the article in question would entitle it in the case of a future and, as it happens, uncertain Austro-Hungarian occupation, the Austro-Hungarian Government may in its turn demand, and with still greater reason, a discussion of the compensation to which it is already entitled in consequence of the prolonged occupation of the Dodecanesus on the part of Italy. 38 Passing on to the question of Italy's action in Albania, the Austro- Hungarian Government desires to state that it has received on this subject only two communications from the Itahan Govern- ment. On the 23rd October last the Duke of Avarna informed Count Berchtold that, in view of the penury manifested among the refugees in Valona and of the anarchy prevailing there, Italy saw herself induced to provide, by the dispatch of a small sanitary police mission, for " certain necessary police operations and humani- tarian measures in favour of the refugees, without giving these operations the character of a militarv expedition amounting to an occupation, in the proper sense of the term, of the city of Valona." The Duke of Avarna was desired to add that, in conformity with the declarations which she had made at the commencement of the present war, Italy would continue to remain faithful to the agrreement in force between herself and Austria-Hungary concern- ing Albania and the Epirus, and to maintain the decisions of the Conference of London particularly in what concerned the neutrality and the frontiers of Albania. The Austro-Hungarian Government made a note of this com- munication. On the 26th December last the Duke of Avarna informed Count Berchtold that, to put an end to the local anarchy, the Italian Government found it necessary to disembark a detach- ment of sailors at Valona. It would be a matter of purely pro- visional measures which would not extend beyond the city of Valona, The declarations quoted above were renewed on this occasion. Count Berchtold confined himself to making a note of this communication. Now, since then the action of Italy in Albania has been gradually changed and, above all, intensified. The disembarkation of a detachment of ItaUan sailors at Valona was followed by the dispatch of Italian infantry and artillery and of a considerable quantity of war material. The city of Valona, as well as Kanina and Svernez, have been occupied m a military sense. The number of Italian warships in Albanian waters has con- stantly increased. When the invasion of Durazzo by the enemies of Essad Pasha was feared, one of these ships fired upon the besiegers, a thing which last year, and in very much graver circum- stances, the Italian Government had considered its duty to refuse to do in conjunction with the Austro-Hungarian Government. Apart from this military action, Italy has also taken possession of the civil administration of Valona, where the prefecture, the financial administration, the police and the municipahty are controlled by agents of the Italian Government, some of whom are invested with the title of Royal Commissioners. An analogous measure has just been applied to the Custom House at Valona. Another pro- vision of the Italian Government requires that all persons repair- ing to Valona shall be supplied with a passport bearing the Italian vise. Although in our view the aggregate of these measures is not at all in accordance with the terms and meaning of the reiterated Italian declarations, the Austro-Hungarian Government abstains 39 for the moment from all protest, but it finds itself obliujed to state that the action of Italy comes unquestionably under the definition of a temporary occupation, according to our interpretation of Article VII., and, like the occupation of the Dodecanesus, gives us at once the right to compensation. The case of the Italian occupation of Valona ceasing to be entirely transient has not yet arisen, but it follows naturally that that alternative, since it is incompatible with the Italo-Austro- Hungarian agreement concerning Albania, and since it produces a modification of the Adriatic equilibrium so often cited by the Italian Government, would give Austria-Hungary also an additional right to adequate compensation. To sum up the foregoing, the Austro-Hungarian Government is of the opinion that the conversations so happily embarked upon between Italy and Austria-Hungary on the subject of compensation might be pursued still more advantageously if they were to take into consideration also the compensation to be accorded Austria- Hungary for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesus and for the Italian occupation, though it be only temporary, of Valona. AVARNA. No. 22. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, February I2th, 1915. WITH regard to the temporary occupations of the Dode- canesus and Valona, which according to Baron Burian imposed upon Italy the obligation of a preliminary agreement with Austria- Hungary based upon the principle of compensation, I must point out the following : (1) Dodecanesian Islands. — Your excellency was informed by telegram on the 20th May, 1912, that the islands already occupied by the ItaUan troops were the following : Astylalaea, Rhodes, Casos, Carpathos and Chalce ; and that those to be occupied immediately were Syme, Piscope, Nisyros, Calymna, Leros, Lypsos and Patmos. By our telegram of the 21st May, 1912, Your Excellency was informed that we were proceeding immediately to the occupation of Cos. By your telegram of the 23rd May, your Excellency informed us that you had made the respective communication to Berchtold. Count Berchtold repHed, " that such a decision was opposed not only to the declarations previously made to us but also to the engagements into which we had entered by virtue of Article VII. of the Triple Alliance," and that " he would have the right to demand, on the basis of the said article, compensation for these occupations. In view, however, of the considerations submitted to him, and to show his goodwill and his sincere desire to refrain as far as possible at the moment from placing obstacles in the way of our freedom of action, Count Berchtold would not raise any opposition to the aforesaid occupations and would not avail 40 himsdj on this occasion of the due right to compensation. He must, however, formally declare that if he were to proceed to the ulterior occupation of islands in the ^gean it would not be possible for him to consent, on account of the grave consequences which might result, and in leaving upon us the full responsibility of such eventual occupation, he must reserve himself the right to compensation, of which he might avail himself should the occasion arise." It results from the foregoing that Count Berchtold declared to Your Excellency that he waived the right to avail himself of the clause relating to compensation so far as Rhodes and the Dodecanesus were concerned. Such a declaration obviates the necessity of ascertaining if and how many of the islands occupied by Italy are in the Mediterranean or the ^Egean, having regard to Article VII. which concerns the ^gean only. Further, however, in view precisely of Austria's opposition, and in consequence of the aforesaid declaration that "ulterior occupation " w^ould render operative the clause relating to com- pensation, the Royal Italian Government took the grave resolve to abstain from the occupation of Chios and Mitylene, notwith- standing that from news received and from facts ascertained it was clear that it was precisely the occupation of Chios and Mity- lene that would have stricken our enemy in a manner calculated to weaken his resistance and to constrain him to enter into peace negotiations to set an end to the war. Italy, therefore, respected the obligations imposed by Article VII. with the result of grave detriment to herself by consequent protraction of the war. The occupation of Rhodes and the Dodecanesus was prolonged for reasons of two kinds : (a) The evacuation of the islands is subject to the fulfilment by Turkey of the terms of the treaty of Lausanne, to the obliga- tions of which Turkey has not so far submitted. Nor has Turkey yet submitted to the obligation, which she herself recognised, of indemnifying Italy by concessions in Asia Minor, for the expendi- ture borne in consequence of the protraction of Italian military occupation of islands. (6) By the occupation of the islands, Italy rendered a signal service to Turkey inasmuch as those islands would inevitably have been conquered by Greece, as were Chios, Mitylene and other islands now in possession of Greece. And it follows that Turkey was extremely eager that the Italian occupation should continue, nor did she ever request us to evacuate the islands, clearly perceiving that in the prevaihng uncertain political situation and in view of the precariousness of Graeco-Turkish relations, grave indeed would be the danger incurred by the islands if they were restored to Turkey while militarily incapable of defending them. Therefore the occupation of the islands during the Balkan war and during the present European conflict, in which Turkey is participating, constituted and constitutes a service rendered by Italy to the ally of Austria-Hungary. 41 (2) Occupation of Valona. — The Italian occupation of Valona arises out of and is based upon the actual situation in which the Powers that were signatories of the Treaty of London found them- selves as a result of the European war. By that treaty Albania was created and her frontiers were defined in relation to the con- tiguous Balkan States. The Italian Government has maintained ever since the commencement of the present war that the treaty of London con- cerning Albania should continue valid and obligatorv. Italy alone, as a neutral Power, was in a position to undertake to safeguard the Treaty of London, and this explains and justifies the fact that from no quarter were any objections raised when we provisionally occupied Sasena and Valona with the object of preserving those important Albanian localities from events which would have produced grave internal consequences. It is, in fact, well-known that Valona was imminently threatened by disorders in consequence of the conflicting ambitions of the Geghs and Epirotes. The Epirotes were disowned by the Government of Athens, but there can be no illusions on the score of the conse- quences which would have followed an Epirote occupation of Valona. If so far as Valona was concerned it was indispensable to pro- ceed to a provisional military occupation, so far as the rest of Albania was concerned diplomatic measures proved sufficient to curb the ambitions of the neighbouring Balkan States. The urgent representations made to the Governments of Belgrade, of Athens and of Cettinje have had the happy effect of restraining those Governments so far from any incursions or military operations. It is therefore thanks to the firm attitude of the Italian Government that Albania, as established by the conference of London, suffered no radical curtailment. After answering thus the " counter- proposals " formulated by Baron Bvu'ian, which, as I have shown have no place in the present nesotiations, I submit what follows : X^More than two months have elapsed since, we put the question concerning Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance before' the Austro-Hung^rian Government, iliviting a friendly discussion of the subject of the compensation to be accorded to Italy for the disturbance provoked by that Government in the Balkan equilibrium. Although we have never received a precise refusal to treat, weeks and months are elapsing and we have not yet succeeded in obtaining a reply even on the preliminary subject of the principle involved, namely, as to whether the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment would be disposed to accept discussion on the ground of the cession of territories at present possessed by Austria-Hungary. On the contrary, whilst on the one hand fresh questions and subjects for debate are being propounded, with the evident object of evading all discussion of the question submitted by us and of prolonging matters, on the other hand fresh military expeditions into the Balkans are meanwhile being prepared. 42 In view of this persistently dilatory attitude towards us, it is no longer possible to entertain illusions regarding the practical issue of the negotiations. Hence, the Royal Itahan Government finds itself constrained, in order that it may preserve its own dignity, to withdraw its every proposal or initiation of discussion, and to confine itself strictly to the provisions of Article VII., declaring that it considers directly opposed to the article itself any mihtary action entered into from to-day by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, whether against Serbia, Montenegro or another, unless there should be a previous agreement as that article demands. It is not necessary for me to observe that should the Austro- Hungarian Government display in the event a disregard of this declaration and of the provisions of Article VII., such a course might lead to grave consequences, the responsibility for which is forthwith disclaimed by the Royal Itahan Government. On this subject it is as well to recall the intimations made to -Italy on several occasions during the Libyan war by the Austro- Hungarian Government. Count Aehreiithal declared to your Excellency on the 5th November, 1911, that "action by us upon the Ottoman coast of Turkey in Europe, or upon the islands of the ^gean Sea, could not be permitted either by Austria-Hungary or by Germany, because contrary to the Treaty of Alhance." (Your Excellency's telegram of the 5th November, 1911.) And on the 7th November of the same year your Excellency telegraphed : " Aehrenthal considers bombardment of ports of Turkev in Europe such as Salonica, Ca valla, etc., as contrary to Article VII." In 1912 our navy, being at the entrance of the Dardanelles, and having been bombarded by the forts of Kum Kale, replied with damage to the forts. Count Berchtold complained of the event, adding that " if the Government desired to regain its hberty of action, the Imperial and Royal Government could do the same.^^ Therefore he would be unable to admit that in the future we should undertake similar operations or indeed any operations that were opposed to the point of view manifested in the previous interviews. Should any similar operation be undertaken by us " it migJd lead to grave consequences." Your Excellency will kindly convey the foregoing to that Government. SONNINO. No. 23. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, Uth February, 1915. I CONVEYED to Baron Burian the matter of your Excellency's instructions. Baron Burian said that he was entirely in ignorance that Count Berchtold could have renounced his ridit to avail himself of the 43 clause of compensation with regard to our occupations of Rhodes and the Dodecanesus. When I then showed him, in confirmation of the statement contained in your Excellency's teleyram, the letter addressed to me by Count Berchtold of the 22nd May, 1912, in which he expressed himself in the very terms which I textually reproduced, Baron Burian remarked that such a renunciation would be not only contrary to the opinion held by the Imperial and Royal Ministry upon Article VII., but also to the provisions of the article itself, and that no document was in existence at the Ballplatz in which it was stated that the right to compensation had been waived. He added that in his opinion the expression used by Count Berchtold, " that he would not avail himself on this occasion of the due right to compensation " was to be interpreted as meaning that he did not intend to avail himself of the right to compensation at the time when the occupation of the islands had taken place or at the time when he discussed the matter with me, but that he retained the power of avaihng himself of it in proper season. I disputed this interpretation, remarking that if that had been what Count Berchtold had meant he could not have failed to add that he retained the power to avail himself of the right to compensation at another time, whilst the expression used instead by Count Berchtold could have no other meaning but that which we placed upon it, as was clearly shown by the next sentence in which, with reference to ulterior occupation by us on islands in the Mgean Sea, he did reserve the right to compensation so that he might eventually avail himself of it. Coming then to speak of the decision taken by the Royal and Imperial Government to withdraw its every proposal or initiation ot discussion and to confine itself strictly to the provisions of Article VII., Baron Burian remarked that the first question of principle, regarding which your Excellency complained of not having yet received a reply, re-opened the whole matter. He had consented to enter into a discussion with the Royal Italian Government so as to arrive at an agreement, being actuated therein by the best intentions. And he proposed to go to Budapest on the day after to-morrow to discuss the matter with Count Tisza. The Royal Italian Government should, however, recognise that it had placed the matter upon very thorny gTOunds, and it certainly could not demand that the Imperial and Royal Government should proceed to an immediate discussion of a question aft'ecting the interests of the Monarchy. Baron Burian informed me that he took note of the communi- cation I made to him in your Excellency's name. But just as the Imperial and Royal Government never desired to depart from the provisions of Article VII., so it would not fail, in the eventual continuation of the campaign against Serbia, to bear in nnnd the stipulations of that article. I considered it proper to point out to Baron Burian that the article itself imposed upon the Imperial and Royal Government 44 the obligation, before initiating any military operations, of pro- ceeding to an agreement that should be preliminary to and not contemporary with or consecutive to those operations. AVARNA. No. 24. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, 17th February, 1915. FROM the answer given by Baron Burian to the communication your Excellency made to him concerning the mistrust of any Austro- Mungarian military action in the Balkans without a previous agreement with the Royal Italian Government, it is evident that there is the intention of permitting such military action to precede the discussion of the indemnities which are the subject of Article VII. I approve of your Excellency's reply. And I beg you to avail yourself of the very first opportunity clearly to repeat to Baron Burian, so as to avoid regrettable and dangerous misapprehensions, that the clear interpretation of Article VII. imposes that the agree- ment should be previous to the action, unless the other party consents to a different procedure. In the present circumstances the Royal Italian Government cannot give any such consent ; hence the communication made by us to the Imperial and Royal Government amounts precisely to a veto, opposed by us to any military action of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans until the agree- ment demanded by Article VII. concerning compensation should have been reached. It is necessary to make it quite clear that any other proceeding on the part of that .Government could not now be interpreted by us as other than an open violation of the terms of the Treaty and a manifestation of that Government's intention to resume its liberty of action, in which case we should account ourselves fully justified also in resuming our own full liberty of action so as to safeguard our interests. SONNINO. No. 25. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegram.) Rome, 18th February, 1915. IN an interview on the day before yesterday with Prince von Biilow I told him of the communications made by the Duke of 4varna to Baron Burian regarding the withdrawal on our part of all discussions of the compensation with which Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance is concerned and of our mistrust of any Austro-Hungarian action in the Balkans whenever there was no previous agreement with ourselves. The Prince, after taking a note of what I told him, asked me in confidence whether, speaking between ourselves and not officially, I myself beheved that in the suppositious event of Austria's persisting to refuse any concessions concerning the Trentino, there were no other territories, either in Albania or elsewhere, that might be discussed 45 in connection with the advantages to be ensured to Italy so as to avoid the great calan ity of a war between our countries. I answered that I had always spoken to him in the fullest sincerity, and that I was quite ready to express, apart from all official character, my oM'n intimate and profound conviction ; I did not now wish to enter into discussions regarding the extent of the concessions that might suffice to ensure our neutrality by satisfying in some measure our national aspirations ; that on this score there might be greater or less doubt or difference of opinion ; but that outside of this basis of concessions no negotiations were possible. It was not a question of the lust of conquest or of megalomaniac ambitions ; but of the appreciation of the popular mind and the national sentiment. The Monarchy of Savoy, as I had previously pointed out to him, find its strongest roots in the personification of the national ideals, and these roots were so strong as to have been able to hold firmly and to prevail against the prolonged contentions with the Papacy and the spread of socialism in its most revolutionary period. Therefore, apart from concessions calculated to satisfy, at least in some degree, the national sentiment, there is no basis of discussion. That all this did not depend upon the will or caprice of this or that Ministry ; the tide of public opinion would overwhelm any other question, would sweep away any other force, would over- throw all obstacles ; and no subtle arguings, or gloomy presages or exaggeration of dangers would avail to restrain it. At Vienna they either could not or would not convince them- selves of this situation, and they accounted it mere hluff on our part, or else just the fantastic dreams of Prince von Biilow. In these circumstances the responsibility weighing upon men who direct the Government was enormous. I was conscious of having done everything possible on the one hand to curb im- patience and moderate aspirations, and on the other to represent the situation in its crude reality both to Vienna and Berhn. SONNINO. No. 26. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegram.) Rome, 2lst February, 1915. I SAW Prince von Biilow yesterday. Since he expressed a doubt whether Baron Burian might not have gathered from the communications made to him in the name of the Royal Italian Government by the Duke of Avarna, a very different impression from that which he himself (von Biilow) had gathered from all that I had told him on the subject, I repeated to him the substance of the communications made to Vienna, formulating them in a textual resume, as follows : ■' The Government has declared throughout that it could not admit the utility of any discussion concerning the compensation which forms the subject of Article VII., unless this were to relate 46 to the cession of territories at present in the possession of Austria- Hungary ; because such discussions, since they could not in any way satisfy Italian national sentiment, could not lead to any agreement. " Until now the two Governments have discussed rather vaguely Balkan events which have already taken place or which may lie in the future. " By confining itself to Article VII., according to the last com- munication made by the Duke of Avarna to Baron Burian, and by withdrawing all previous proposals of discussion, the Itahan Government desired clearly to establish the following : the Itahan Government does not consent in the future to any military action by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans unless an agreement, as demanded by Article VII. , should have been previously reached on the subject of compensation, an agreement which it would be idle to hope to reach otherwise than upon the basis of the cession of territories at present in the possession of Austria-Hungary. If the Austro- Hungarian Government were not in the subsequent events to take into account this declaration of the Itahan Government, the latter would perceive in this the proof that Austria-Hungary had resumed its liberty of action with regard to the provisions of the Treaty, and this would justify the Italian Government in resuming its liberty of action also." SONNINO. No. 27. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Miyiister for Foreign Affairs. Viemia, 22nd February, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 23rd. I HAVE communicated to Baron Burian what your Excellency telegraphed me, and in adhering scrupulously to your Excellency's instructions I endeavoured to make clear to him the various points involved. Baron Burian told me that he would reply in the first place to the interpretation placed by your Excellency upon Article VII., according to which the agreement concerning the eventual indemnities was to be concluded, and not merely initiated, before the inception of any mihtary operations of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. In this connection he remarked that the con- clusion of the prehminary agreement would have depended upon us, that we might have prolonged the discussion and that in the meanwhile Austria-Hungary would have been exposed to every attack on the part of Serbia without being able to reply. Further, the compensation to be accorded to Italy should be equivalent to the advantages which might accrue to Austria-Hungary. But before settling the compensation it was desirable to establish and to proportion the advantages. These two causes showed, in his opinion, the impossibihty of reaching an agreement antecedently to Austria's military operations in the Balkans. I pointed out to Baron Burian that the term "■ previous agreement " showed in itself that this was to be con- cluded, and not merely initiated, before the inception of those 47 operations. In fact, the word " agreement " meant definite consent upon a given point, and this meaning acquired greater force from the preceding word, which signified that the thing was to be decided and determined before proceeding further. If that were not the meaning to be attributed to the aforesaid expression by the nego- tiators of the Treaty, then the conditions to which Article VII. subordinated every modification of the s/a^i/sji/o would be of no effect. Further, if the preliminary agreement were not to be concluded, what guarantee would there be for the other contracting party that the agreement itself once it were initiated would be concluded during mihtary operations ? Differences of opinion might render impossible its conclusion, in which case the condition provided by Article VII. would not have been fulfilled, and the other contract- ing party would have incurred the risk of remaining uncompensated. Baron Burian replied that whilst finding my observations reason- able, he, nevertheless, could not admit them or consider them to be in accordance with the spirit or the letter of the Treaty, because by such reasonings the liberty of action of one of the contracting parties might be trammelled, a state of things which certainly could not agree with the intentions of the negotiators of the Treaty. Xor yet could he admit that the non-conclusion of the agreement before any military operations should have laken place constituted a negation of guarantees for the other contracting party. The word of the contracting party which had engaged itself to enter into negotiations regarding the preliminary agree- ment seemed to him a sufficient guarantee. Baron Burian added that in his view Article VII. did not permit of a formal and absolute veto of any military operations by Austria in the Balkans, but that it established the need for and the right to compensation for the advantages which might accrue therefrom. After referring to the intimations addressed to us by the Imperial and Royal Government on various occasions during the Italo- Turkish war, I observed that it was beyond doubt that the Royal Italian Government was entitled to pronounce this veto in the absence of an agreement regarding the compensation as provided by Article VII., which agxeement should moreover be carried to a conclusion, and not merely initiated, before the inception of mihtary operations. And in reminding him of what I had already said, namely that any other procedure on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government might be interpreted by us as an open violation of the terms of the Treaty, I conveyed to him the actual substance of your Excellency's instructions. To this Baron Burian replied that in his \'iew the agTeement should certainly be initiated before the inception of military operations, but that it should be elaborated afterwards in accordance with the progress of those operations. He recognised, however, that it was possible to outline the general basis of the preliminary agrreement, determining the subject of the compensation which the Royal Italian Government desired to obtain. And he declared to me that it was not at all his intention to avoid the obligations imposed by Article VII., to which he desired to 48 / submit with all goodwill. But he could not agree to the interpre- tation, placed by your Excellency upon that article, whereby the preliminary agreement must be determined in all its particulars before any military operation is undertaken by Austria-Hinigary in the Balkans, because this, might place the Imperial and Royal Government in an impossible position. And he repeated that the protraction of the conversations, even irrespectively of the wishes of the Royal Itahan Government, would place Austria at the mercy of Serbia, since she would be unable to defend herself from Serbian attacks for as long as the negotiations lasted. Baron Burian then turned to the question of the uselessness of opening a discussion of the eventual compensation unless it concerned the cession of territories now possessed by Austria- Hungary. And he told me that if the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment were in a position to enter into negotiations for a preliminary agreement with Italy before undertaking any military operations in Serbia, he would not fail to announce it opportunely to the Royal Italian Government so as to set on foot the conversations regarding that agreement ; but he could not at present bind himself concerning the basis of the compensation to which your Excellency had alluded. In insisting that he should pronounce upon this point I repeated all that I had already said to him, namely that if the Imperial Government were to show hereafter in the events that it did not take our declarations seriously into account, the Royal Italian Government would perceive in that a violation of the Treaty of Alliance, and the consequences might be extremely grave. Baron Burian answered me that the question of the basis of the compensation had not at present any character of actuality. He remarked further that if your Excellency had the right to interpret the Treaty, he also had a similar right, and that a transient difference of opinion or of interpretation could not be considered as a violation of the Treaty itself. Notwithstanding my repeated and urgent insistence. Baron Biuian persisted in his refusal to agree to your Excellency's point of view regarding the interpretation of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple AUiance and the basis of the compensation to which we are entitled. On this last point it is idle to entertain illusions. The Imperial and Royal Government will never, under present conditions, consent to the cession of territories belonging to the Monarchy. AVARNA. No. 28. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, 2bth February, 1915. I APPROVE the answers given by your Excellency to Baron Burian. The text of Article VII. speaks of a preliminary agreement {accord prealable) respecting the compensation, and not of a 49 discussion regarding an agreement to be concluded later, when one of the parties should have completed its operations in the Balkans and should already have obtained the advantages sought, when it would be at libertv to cavil indefinitely about the compensation to be accorded to the other contracting party.' The word " prealable " shows that it is exacted by Article VII. that, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the agreement, by which is meant the concurrence of the parties determining the quality and quantity of the indemnity, should be concluded prior to any action. There is nothing to forbid, in given circum- stances, when both sides consent and the facts of the case render it advisable, that the agxeement may even be formulated in a conditional manner, proportioning the compensation to the future results that may actually be yielded by the military operations to be undertaken ; but Article Vil. further admits that compensation may also be exacted upon the simple fact of the initiation of action in the Balkans. It would be entirely opposed to the spirit, as well as to the letter of Article VIL, and contrary to all the interpretations put upon it in 1911 and 1912 by Austria-Hungary during the Libyan war, to admit, as Baron Burian would now desire, that the article itself provides that before determining the compensation it is neces- sary to be able to make a valuation of the advantages actually yielded by given action in the Balkans of one of the contracting parties. Otherwise one of the parties might undertake and carry through a war in the Balkans before the other party should so much as have a claim to know with certainty whether it was entitled in theory to any compensation, whilst in practice it might never, even after the conclusion of operations, receive any compensation at all In these circumstances the Royal Italian Government, with a view to eliminating future protractions of the discussion of the agreement, such as might trammel in too grave a manner the military action of Austria-Hungary, has clearly declared as from noW', without awaiting the effectuation of any such new under- taking of Austria-Hungary's in the Balkans, that any future pro- posal to discuss compensation not concerned with the cession of territories now actually possessed by Austria-Hungary, could lead to no practical result, since it would thus be impossible ever to reach that agreement which should precede the intended action. Upon the gxounds indicated by us, however, such an agree- ment between the tw^o States might presumably be reached ; and if the Austro-Hungarian Government were to admit at once the principle of basing eventual discussions upon these gi'ounds, such a course must render the negotiations easier and more fruitful, and lead to the agreement itself. SONNINO. 50 No. 29. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Berlin. (Telegram.) Rome, 2bth February, 1915. IN your telegram of the 21st in.stant your Excellency com- municates that the Chancellor Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg had declared to you that " from what he had been told by Baron Burian, he considered himself authorised to state that the Austro-Hungarian Government was also of opinion that the agreement in question should be completed before the military operations should have begun." The Italian Ambassador at Vienna transmits me a series of arguments by Baron Burian which aim at showing that the Austro- Hungarian Government is not at all of this opinion, " being unable to admit the interpretation of Article VII. according to which the preliminary agreement must be determined in all its particulars before any military operation is undertaken by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans." We insist upon our interpretation as the only one possible, and as being in accordance with that which Herr von Bethman- Hollweg stated was also admitted by Austria-Hungary ; but it seems to me desirable that your Excellency should draw that Government's attention to the above-mentioned contradiction. SONNINO. No. 30. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rome, 2ith February, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 25th. I THINK it well to correct a shght error which occurred in my last telegram. I said therein that Baron Burian refused to a niit your Excellency's point of view regarding the interj^retation o£ Article VII. of the Treaty of Triple Alliance and regarding the basis of the compensation to which we are entitled. Although it is correct that Baron Burian refused to admit the first of these points of view it is not strictly correct to say the same of the second one, since his reply was not in the negative, but merely evasive. AVARNA. No. 31. The Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, 2()th February, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 21th. OUR interpretation on the subject of the necessity that the preliminary agreement covered by Article VII. should be carried to a conclusion and not merely initiated, had been admitted by the Chancellor not merely implicitly, but exphcitly and repeatedly. For, to the inquiry which on two occasions he addressed to me as to 51 whether the statement he had made to me of the communication presented by the Duke of Avarna to Baron Burian was exactly in conformity with the fact, I had repHed that the only point to be cleared up was precisely the one above mentioned, and he had answered that he agreed with our interpretation and added that he accounted himself authorised to assert that it was also the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government that the agreement should be accomplished {erfolgt) and completed {volJcommen) before the military operations were begun. And Herr von Jagow, to whom I subsequently submitted this, confirmed to me the words of the Chancellor. Therefore in speaking to him this morning I manifested my surprise at the declarations made by Baron Burian to the Duke of Avarna in a sense entirely opposed to these assurances. Herr von Jagow, who also could not understand how this could have happened, supposed that in the interview between Baron Burian and the Chancellor there might have been some misunderstanding, to clear up which he would telegraph at once to Herr von Tschirscky. The better to explain to him the ideas of the Royal Itahan Govern- ment I read to him the telegram addressed by your Excellency to the Duke of Avarna. He made a note of the essential points therein and told me that he would submit them to a careful examination. BOLLATI. No. 32. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, 26th Fehruary, 1915. ■{Telegram.) reed. 21th. I HAVE communicated to Baron Burian the various con- siderations put forward by your Excellency, and in conveying to him the substance of your instructions, I expressed the trust that he would persuade himself of the reasonableness of those considerations. Baron Burian told me that the arguments adduced by your Excellency, to show that the discussion of an agreement to be reached subsequently when one of the parties should have completed its operations in the Balkans and obtained the advan- tages sought, might be indefinitely protracted on the subject of the compensation to be accorded to the other contracting party, might similarly be adduced even if the agreement were to be con- cluded before any military operations were undertaken. And he recalled in this connection what he had pointed out in our interview of the 22nd instant. In his view, if the negotiations regarding' the agreement were begun in due season, before the inception of any military operations, it would be possible, granted the goodwill of both parties, to establish quickly the bases of the actual negotiations. But in settHng the details of the agreement it might happen that delays might ensue independently of the will of either party. And there would certainly be no justification in that for suspending the military operations until the agreement 52 ■ / should be concluded. If, therefore, your Excellency's interpreta- tion of Article VII. were to be admitted, Austria-Hungary would be exposed to" detriment in her military operations in Serbia with which she was at war and against which she must continue to combat. In fact, if Austria-Hungary did not attack Serbia but were attacked by Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government would find itself in an impossible position, because it would not be able to defend itself. He considered it advisable to submit to me these considerations in support of his proposition that the agree- ment was to be initiated but not carried to a conclusion before any military operations were undertaken. Baron Burian further pointed out that without following the rigid interpretation given by your Excellency to Article VII., it was not yet possible to adopt the idea to which your Excellency alluded, and he accepted the principle, namely that in given circum- stances, when both sides consent and the facts of the case render it advisable, the agreement may be even formulated in a conditional manner proportioning the compensation to the results which may in effect accrue from a military action to be undertaken. And he added that the special circumstances for Austria-Hungary lay in the fact which he had already pointed out that she was at war with Serbia and exposed to the attacks of this Power from which she would be unable to defend herself in the event of her being compelled to conform to the interpretation given by your Excel- lency to Article VII., a fact which would have placed Austria- Hungary in the impossible situation aforesaid. And your Excellency would find it impossible to do other than agree with him in this. Proceeding, Baron Burian remarked that if both parties were actuated by goodwill, a circumstance not to be doubted, it would be possible thus, conditionally to establish the lesser details of the agreement in proportion to the future or possible result of the action to be undertaken. It was impossible to define compensation on the eve of military operations the advantages accruing from which were not to be foreseen. Moreover, the adoption of your Excellency's idea would avoid all delays, and it would also avoid that either Austria-Hungary or Italy should be baulked ; therefore he could not but associate himself with that idea because it would lessen the difficulties to be overcome in arriving at an agreement in the event of its being necessary to adhere to your Excellency's aforesaid interpretation. In declaring to me, therefore, that he was inclined to accept the idea itself and to put it into practice, he desired me to beg your Excellency to make known to him your views on the subject. Baron Burian then informed me that he persisted in the point of view which he had manifested in the interview of the 22nd inst., namely, that before settling the compensation it is necessary lo be able to estimate the advantages accruing in effect from given action in the Balkans on the part of one of the contracting parties. I indicated to Baron Burian that this point of view, as I had already stated, was opposed not only to the spirit and to the letter of 63 Article VII., but further to the interpretation given to it by Austria-Hungary in 1912 and 1913. Referring to what he had said to me in the above mentioned interview, Baron Burian stated that the idea expressed by vour Excellency, which he thought it would be in the interests of both Governments to adopt if it were practicable, might eliminate the divergencies of opinion existing between your Excellency .and himself in connection with that argument. Replying then to my remarks that any proposal to discuss compensation that did not concern the cession of territories at present possessed by Austria- Hungary would never lead to that agreement which should precede the intended action, Baron Biu'ian replied that he must refer me on the subject to what he had already said in our interview of the 22nd inst., namely, that he could not at present bind himself regard- ing the basis of the compensation, such a question possessing at the moment no character of actuality. Having then repeated to him the declaration contained in the last part of your Excellency's telegram, Baron Burian recalled what he had said to me in the interview of the 22nd, that is to say that a transient difference of opinion or of interpretation could not be looked upon as a violation of the Treatv. AVARNA No. 33. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, 27th February, 1915. FOR the reasons several times expressed in my telegrams, it is not possible in the present case to anticipate a discussion on the agreement to be concluded antecedently to any mihtary action whatever by Austria-Hungary against Serbia and Montenegro,_ even though it were question of an agreement proportioning the compensation, in all or in part, to the advantages accruing in effect from the action itself, because the Royal Italian Government, for the reasons repeatedly advanced, cannot accept any discussion that does not concern the cession of territories already now in the possession of Austria-Hungary ; and on this point it has not succeeded during three months in obtaining a reply even on the question of principle, namely, whether the Imperial and Royal Government \\nll accept the discussion upon such grounds ; so much is this the case, that to preserve its own dignity the Royal Italian Government has been constrained to withdraw all its proposals of such discussion. The special circumstance to which Baron Burian appeals, that in the case of Austria-Hungary's being already at war with Serbia the eventual agreement should be framed in a conditional and proportional manner, does not seem to me to be in vocable in the present case, since that war was undertaken by Austria-Hungary without any previous concert with Italy, but, on the contrary, against all the advice proffered by her and in opposition to the majority of Italy's political 54 interests. At most that circumstance might be invoked in con- nection with only one part of the compensation to be agxeed, namely, the proportional one, but not in connection with all compensation, since the fact itself of the inception of fresh military operations in the Balkans, would constitute in our eyes a sufficient reason for claiming a minimum of territorial compensation independently of the results to be obtained. All this, however, remains subordinate to the initial question of principle, that is to say of the grounds upon which all discussion of compensation should take place. Until Austria- Hungary can make clearly known her views on this question of principle, which concerns the nature of the eventual compensation, it is quite useless to initiate or prolong any discussion concerned with the amount of the compensation itself or with proportion- ing it, in all or in part, to the eventual results of the mihtary operations, because such a discussion could never lead to any useful issue. SONNINO. No 34. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, '3rd March, 1915. reed. 3rd. I HAVE conveyed to Baron Burian the substance of the in- structions imparted to me by your Excellency's telegram. Baron Burian expressed to me his regret at being unable to share your Excellency's opinion that the special circumstance to which he had appealed, namely that Austria-Hungary was already at war with Serbia, should not be invocable in the present instance, adding that it certainly could not be denied that a state of war existed between Austria -Hungary and Serbia. I remarked that what he said was certainly true, but that nevertheless, he could not fail to recognise the sound basis of your Excellency's reasons which I had conveyed to him. Further- more, he was not to forget that upon several occasions I had begged him to note that we were interested in the maintenance of the poUtical and economical independence of Serbia and of the Balkan equilibrium. It was beyond doubt that war was undertaken by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, threatening her independence and the aforesaid equihbrium and that this could not be considered by us as other than opposed to our vital interests. Baron Burian expressed himself as recognising that before embarking upon a dis- cussion of the question of compensation it was necessary to establish the basis of it. But he must recognise at the same time that the question of compensation in general, like that placed by the Royal ItaUan Government upon grounds of the cession of territories possessed at present by the Monarchy, had no character of actuality. Therefore he could not pronounce at present upon this because the Imperial and Royal Govenmient was not yet in a position to undertake a military action against Serbia. I remarked 55 that it did not seem to me that he had considered the question of compensation in the same light when I had declared to him that it was carried by the Royal Italian Government on to the ground of the cession of territories eflfectively belonging to Austria- Hungary. On that occasion he had, in fact, declared to me that he was disposed to enter into discussion with us, and that he was actuated by the best wishes to arrive at an agreement. But Baron Burian, proceeding, added that as soon as the time should have come to initiate the said action against Serbia he would not fail to keep our declaration before him, and seeing that the diplomatic measures would keep pace with the military action, no operation would be undertaken before the agreement should be initiated. I remarked that the question of compensation had, in my view, not only the character of actuality, but even of urgency, and it was desirable to take it up since all delay could not be other than detri- mental. On this subject I pointed out to him that the question of the eventual satisfaction to be given by us to our national aspirations, ranks in importance above all other considerations, and that this question could not be left without an early solution, because in view of the state of mind of our public opinion it might give rise to grave dangers. To this Baron Burian replied that the considerations I sub- mitted to him were certainly of importance to us, but that Italy should also take into consideration the position of the Imperial and Royal Government, and he added that we had estabhshed a limit which would be reached automatically, Austria-Hungary being at war with Serbia. The military actions of the Austro- Hungarian troops against that Power could certainly not be de- layed, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would not fail then to fulfil its obhgations, which should reassure us on every score. I answered that it did not seem to me that these statements could reassure us. In the first place, in fact, he had declared to me that he could not admit our interpretation of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, namely that the agreement contemplated by that article should be not merely initiated but actually carried to its conclusion before the inception of any military operations against Serbia and Montenegro. In the second place he persisted in declining to bind himself at once on the subject of the basis of the compensation to which we were entitled, asserting that such a question had no character of actuality. Baron Burian rejoined that it was certainly true that, in his view, the agreement should be only initiated, and not carried to its conclusion, before any military operations were undertaken against Serbia ; he would, however^ do everything possible to carry it to a conclusion, and it was only in the event of this proving impracticable that the military opera- tions would nevertheless have to pursue their course. It was also true that he did not consider himself able to pronounce at once upon the subject of the basis of the compensation, but he would do so when the proper time should have arrived. 56 I told Baron Burian, in answer, that it was useless to speak of initiating at what he should consider the proper moment a dis- cussion concerning the agreement, considering that he was not disposed to make a pronouncement upon the subject of the basis of the compensation proposed by us. Such a discussion, as I had already intimated to him, could not be accepted by the Royal Itahan Government for the reasons which I had previously stated, on several occasions, saving only when it should concern such com- pensation as the cession of territories actually possessed by Austria- Hungary. Baron Burian replied that in his opinion the moment had not yet arrived for a pronouncement upon the question, but that when that happened he would keep this declaration in sight and that he would take care to make a pronouncement before the initiation of the negotiations for the agreement. Deeming it advisable, finally, to repeat once more to Baron Burian that the Royal Itahan Govern- ment maintained the declaration in the last part of your Excellency's telegram, he told me that he would not fail to bear it in mind at the proper time. Baron Burian's replies show once more how little he is disposed, at least at present, to adopt your Excellency's views on the subject of the question of principle and of the interpretation of Article VII. of the Treaty of AlHance. My conversations with him on this subject might be indefinitely prolonged without attaining any practical result, since he would always formulute new arguments in support of the proposition which he advances. It would therefore be idle, notwithstanding all my endeavours, to believe it possible to induce him to a change of attitude. AVARNA. No. 35. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, ith March, 1915. I, TOO, conclude that there is nothing to be expected from the protraction of the discussion with Baron Burian regarding territorial compensation under Article VII. But I think that it may not be without purpose clearly to recapitulate the following settled points in the declarations successively made by us in the course of the interviews : (1) That no miUtary action by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans may be undertaken unless the agreement relating to compensation should antecedently have been carried to its conclusion, we adhering rigidly to the text of Article VII. ; (2) That any infraction of the above would be considered by us as an open violation of the treaty, in view of which Italy resumes her full hberty of action so as to protect her proper rights and interests ; (3) That no proposal to discuss compensation can conduce to any agreement unless it has in view the cession of territories actually possessed by Austria-Hungary ; 57 (4) That availing ourselves of the provisions of Article VII., we insist on compensation on the ground of the inception of military action by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, independently of any result to which such action may lead ; not excluding, however, that other indemnities may be stipulated for conditionally and pro- portionately to the advantages which Austria-Hungary may, in effect, succeed in obtaining. (5) That the fixed quota of compensation correlative to the actual inception of military action independently of its results, far from being kept secret, should be given effect to by the actual transference of the ceded territories and their immediate occupation on the part of Italy. (6) That we do not admit any discussion of compensation on our part regarding the occupation of the Dodecanesus and Valona, and this for various reasons already submitted by your Excellency to Baron Burian. SONNINO. No. 36. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. . (Telegram.) Rome, ith March, 1915. THE Italian Charge d' Affaires at Cettinje telegraphs that the Minister for Foreign Affairs there has made the following com- munication : " At 3 o'clock this morning five Austrian torpedo-boats invaded port Antivari, sank Royal Yacht, disembarked during bombard- ment sailors with mitrailleuses, which they fired to keep back Montenegrins whilst they set fire to the Government depot, only succeeding, however, in burning a small part of it. One person killed, three others wounded." It is desirable that your Excellency should see the Minister for Foreign Affairs there regarding these military operations of Austro- Hungarian forces against Montenegro, which are in open conflict with our communications of the 22nd February last to that Govern- ment, and also with the declarations of Baron Burian. SONNINO. No. 37. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, 1th March, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 1th. BARON BURIAN informed me spontaneously that his reply to our question of principle would not be long delayed. I remarked that his consistent refusal until now to pronounce upon this point, repeated to me even in our interview of the 2nd March, certainly had not encouraged me to hope that he would make me to-day a similar communication. Baron Burian replied that he could not find this remark of mine other than just, but that he should point out that in the said interview he had assured me that when the proper 58 moment arrived he would pronounce upon this question which it was desirable to clear up so as to provide some result from the present situation. AVARNA. No. 38. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin. and Vienna. (Telegram.) Rotne, 8th March, 1915. PRINCE VON BULOW informs me that he has received dis- patches from Berlin which after informing him that the German Government had laboured strenuously at Vienna to induce Austria- Hungary to enter into negotiations with Italy, was able to assure him that at last the attitude of Vienna had undergone a change to such an extent that there was every hope that the said negotiations might be carried to a satisfactory conclusion. I replied that the Duke of Avarna had also telegraphed me to the same effect, having received news of this from Herr Tschirscky and that, further, Baron Burian had told him the day before yester- day that he hoped soon to afford him an answer on the question of principle concerning the grounds upon which the negotiations might be conducted. SONNINO. No. 39. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassadors at Berlin and Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, 9th March, 1915. PRINCE VON BULOW has communicated to me a dispatch re- ceived from his Government in the following tenour : " Baron Burian has begged us to declare to the Italian Government that Austria-Hungary is ready to enter into negotiations with Italy, in accordance with the proposal of Baron Sonnino and on the basis of the cession of Austrian territory. The declaration to be made to the Italian Parliament would be edited in concert with Vienna. Baron Burian will do all possible to the end that the formula may be edited by mutual concurrence as quickly as possible." I pointed out to Prince von Biilow that it was necessary to avoid all misapprehensions, and that I had never referred to declarations to be made to Parliament concerning the opening of negotiations, but to the necessity of not keeping secret the agreement regarding compensation as soon as this should be concluded. Prince von Biilow made the following note : " Baron Sonnino has no objection, once the agreement is con- cluded, to the respective declaration which is to be presented to Parliament being prepared in concert with Baron Burian, but he has no intention of making any declaration to Parliament of the fact that negotiations had begun or were being transacted. " This because, according to Baron Sonnino, any declaration of that nature would render more difficult the issue of those 59 negotiations by exciting public opinion. He, too, desires that all dispatch should be employed." I added to Prince von Billow that I would await the communica- tion from the Duke of Avarna on the conference which he may have to-day with Baron Burian. SONNINO. No. 40. The Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, 9th March, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. lOth. HERE VON JAGOW has just informed me that Baron Burian had begged him to convey to us his answer in the affirmative to the question of principle which we had submitted. The Austro- Hungarian Government definitely consents, in conformity with the demands of the Royal Italian Government that the discussion regarding the compensation arising out of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance should be carried on to the ground of the cession of territories at present belonging to the Monarchy. Baron Burian expressed the wish to place himself at the earliest moment in communication with the Italian Ambassador at Vienna, so as to come to an understanding regarding the declaration which the Royal Itahan Government might desire to make to ParUament on the subject. BOLLATI. No. 41. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, 9th March, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 9th. BARON BURIAN has informed me that the Imperial and Royal Government consented to discuss the question of compensa- tion covered by Article VII. of the Triple Alliance on the actual basis proposed by the Italian Government, that is to say on the ground of the cession of territories belonging to the AiLstro- Hungarian Monarchy. He indicated in this connection the careful examination to which that question had been submitted by the Imperial and Royal Government and to the great difficulties which it had been necessary to overcome so as to arrive at the said decision. And he pointed out that this decision resulted from the desire to come to an understanding with the Royal Italian Government that should maintain good reciprocal relations, avoiding all friction, and thus rendering possible the co-operation of the two Govern- ments towards common aims of general policy. This point of view which he had several times manifested to me was that by which he had always been guided and it corresponded to what I had sub- mitted at our first interview, of the 17th January last, on this subject of compensation, when I spoke to him of the logical and political reasons involved. Baron Burian next remarked that the various particulars con- cerning the question, such, for instance, as those concerned with 60 the stipulation of a previous agreement, should in his opinion be examined in our further conversations. Finally, Baron Burian told me that if your Excellency thought it advisable, from considerations of expediency, to make public the fact that the two Governments had already entered into conver- sations on the question of compensation, he begged your Excellency to divulge to him in confidence the actual terms of that publication. I repHed that I was in ignorance of your Excellency's intentions, but that as a matter of my own personal opinion I supposed that as long as the negotiations lasted your Excellency would desire to keep secret the fact that they were taking place and the object at which they aimed. Nevertheless, I would refer his request to your Excellency. AVARNA. II No. 42. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, 10th March, 1915. THE Italian Government had already withdrawn all proposals of discussion on the subject of the compensation covered by Article VII., but the general situation is too serious and the matter too impor- tant to permit to-day of any question of mere form ; therefore we accept the discussion upon the basis at length admitted by the Imperial and Royal Government. We do not intend to make any communication to Parhament or to the pubhc regarding the incep- tion of the negotiations. Now that the divergence on the score of principle, regarding the basis of the negotiations, has been removed, I hope that we shall enter immediately into treaty and that this may be carried speedily forward so that we may reach an agreement, the conclusion of which must absolutely precede, in accordance with my reiterated declarations, any Austro-Hungarian mihtary action in the Balkans. These negotiations are to be conducted directly between the two Governments without the intervention of third parties. The points of departure to be made clear previously are : (1) Absolute secrecy regarding the negotiations. Any indis- cretion concerning their inception or progress would compel the Royal Italian Government to withdraw its proposals and to break off all discussion. (2) When the agreement is concluded it should immediately be given effect. Otherwise the Royal Italian Government would lack the necessary political force to obtain from the nation that moral ratification which would be indispensable for the performance of the concluded agreement. (3) To eliminate fresh contention or friction and the recurrence of regrettable incidents, and at the same time to leave the necessary 61 liberty of action to the Imperial and Royal Government in the conduct of the war, it is necessary that the agreement should cover the whole duration of the said war in all that regards the possible invocation of Article VII. Given that Government's acceptance of these bases, we declare ourselves ready to specify our demands, restricting ourselves to that minimum of compensation which we consider indispensable to fulfil the actual aims of the agreement invoked, namely to eliminate permanently between the two States all subject of discord, creating instead between them a normal condition of cordiality and of possible co-operation towards common aims of general pohcy. And in the great and common interest of speedily reaching an agreement, eliminating from the outset all suspicion of intentional dilatoriness, I would suggest that a term of say two weeks should be established for the conduct of the negotiations, and if at the end of that term no conclusion should have been reached, it should be understood that all proposals made by either of the parties would be withdrawn and considered as of no effect, the parties returning to the status quo ante of reciprocal liberty. SONNINO. No. 43. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Vienna, V2>th March, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. IM. I HAVE conveyed to Baron Burian the various points con- tained in the telegram of the 10th March, expressing myself in accordance with the instructions communicated to me by jour Excellency. Baron Burian informed me that he took note of the intentions of your Excellency not to make any communication to Parliament or to the public concerning the inception of the negotiations. W ith regard to the declaration several times repeated by your Excel- lency that the conclusion of the agreement must absolutely precede all military operations by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, Baron Burian indicated that he could not change his opinion regarding the interpretation of Article VII. of the Treaty of Alliance, the reasons for which he had had occasion to explain to me in previous conversations. I remarked that the objection by virtue of which he withheld his consent that the agreement should be carried to a conclusion before any military operation took place in the Balkans did not appear to me now to have any foundation after the hope manifested by your Excellency that we should enter immediately into treaty and that this might be speedily carried forward. To this Baron Burian replied that he recognized that his objection was, in fact, eliminated by the considerations put forward by your Excellency, according to which both parties were to establish a term within which the negotiations concerning the agreement were to be concluded. He would therefore strive, in accordance with your Excellency's wishes, to expedite the negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement. 62 With regard to the three points previously to be made clear^ Baron Burian told me : (1) That he agreed to preserve absolute secrecy on the subject of the negotiations but with the condition that Germany should be kept informed, for the reasons aforementioned. (2) That if Article VII. provided that the agreement should be anticipatory, it did not, however, provide that its fulfilment should also be anticipatory because thus in the main the meaning of that article would be violated. I pointed out that if he admitted that the agreement should be anticipatory of, and not contemporary with, or consecutive to the action, he could not avoid admitting at the same time that the substance of this agreement in which the compensation was defined must be considered as of like character. Therefore the fixed quota of the compensation correlative to the inception of military operations in the Balkans independently of their results, should not be kept secret but rather should be given effect by the actual transference of the territories ceded and by the immediate occupation of these on the part of Italy. I had already conveyed to him the considerations of a political order which rendered necessary the effective transference of the territories ceded. Further, I thought it well to remind him of what 1 had said in our first interview, on the 17th January, namely that to direct public opinion in Italy and to dispose it favourably towards the agreement, it was necessary to show at the outset a minimum of advantages that were sure and tangible and not merely dependent upon uncertain and remote eventualities. Baron Burian replied that in the case with which we were concerned it would be impossible for the Imperial and Royal Government to admit the transference of any territory of the Monarchy until peace should be concluded, and this owing to several considerations rendered imperative by the very nature of things. He added that the reasons of internal policy which I had advanced might be of importance to us, but that for the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment there also existed reasons which on his side he could not disregard. He concluded by manifesting the hope that the Italian Govern- ment would not refuse to reconsider this second point. As for the third point raised. Baron Burian informed me that he associated himself entirely with all that your Excellency set forth in it, namely that the agreement should cover the whole duration of the war in all that regards the possible invocation of Article VII. Finally, on the subject of your Excellency's proposals to establish a term of two weeks for the conduct of the negotiations. Baron Burian said that if that statement of a term was the expression of your Excellency's wish that the negotiations should be conducted in a speedy manner, he entirely concurred, but it seemed to him that it would be very difficult to decide at the outset upon a given number of days. In the course of the interview Baron Burian, having incidentally referred to his counter-proposals of compensation on the score of our occupation of Valona and of the Dodecanesus, 63 I judged it advisable to declare to him that for the reasons already set forth we could not admit any discussion of compensation on our part in connection with those occupations. To this Baron Burian replied that he maintained his right to compensation in connection with those occupations, in accordance with Article VII., and that he would in due season return to the subject. As your Excellency will have gathered, Baron Burian expressed himself to me in such explicit terms with regard to the second point raised, that it is to be doubted if he can subsequently modify the opinion given, namely that he cannot consent that the agree- jnent, when concluded, shall be given immediate effect. AVARNA. No. 44. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. \st March, 1915. HAVING carefully examined the proposals put forward by Baron Burian as the iDasis of an agreement, I find them on the one side too vague and indefinitive, and, on the other, absolutely in- adequate to attain the object at which both parties aim, namely, to create a situation which, by consohdating their reciprocal rela- tions and eliminating all causes of friction, should render possible their cordial collaboration towards common ends of general policy. 78 I put aside for the moment the very grave question regarding the immediate or postponed fulfilment of the eventual agreement, which, whatever it may be, according to its alternative settlement, will inevitably afEect the actual merits of the compacts to be made. On the part of Italy, Baron Burian claims in the first place an undertaking to observe a friendly neutrality from the political and economical point of view. On this score it is necessary that we should have a clear understanding. If by these words is meant an undertaking to continue to maintain a perfect and sincere neutrality, such as we have hitherto maintained, I should have no objection to raise ; but I must point out that the geographical situation of Italy in the Mediterranean forbids her showing any favour to one group of belligerents that might provoke reprisals on the part of the other who dominates the sea, unless she wishes to jeopardise the whole of her economical existence, subjecting her people to all the actual evils of a war, or else to be dragged, despite herself, into the struggle. Baron Burian requests further that with regard to Albania, the agreement existing between Austria-Hungary and the decisions of the Conference of London should remain in force. Now it is not possible for Italy to accord liberty of action to Austria-Hungary in the Balkans without at least obtaining that Austria-Hungary should completely cease to interest herself in Albania. Coming next to the substance of the cession offered, I would refer merely in passing to some of the lesser and secondary questions enumerated by Baron Burian, because it is impossible to discuss them profitably until we are agTeed upon the main point — that of the extent of the territories to be ceded. I do not understand what justification there can be for the request for a lump sum as compensation for the investments made by the State in the territories to be ceded. Such investments, in so far as they were not repaid by the taxes levied upon the said territories, were necessarily repaid through the emission of the Public Debt, so that the point is covered by the quota of this pubhc debt which we should come to assume. Moreover, when Burian speaks of a pubhc debt, of which a proportionate quota is to be assigned to Italy, to what period does he refer ? Does he refer to the debt such as it was at the begin- ning of the war, or such as it is now when the cession comes to be agreed, or, yet again, such as it may be at the end of the war, to which time Baron Burian would adjourn the fulfilment of the agreement ? I may point out that, so as to hope to arrive at an understanding upon questions of this nature, it is absolutely neces- sary to bring the discussion down to precise and settled figures. From the expressions employed by Baron Burian I cannot so much as infer what may be the extent of the territory he offers us in Southern Tyrol. Even independently of any appraisement, on the possibihty of the compensation being confined only to a cession 79 in the Tyrol, the phrase employed by Baron Burian, in which he refers to the City of Trent alone, adding that, in being more definite, it would be necessary to take into account the strategical exigencies of the Monarchy and the economic needs of the popula- tion, appears to me so sibylline that I cannot understand what it really is that the Imperial and Royal Government intends to offer us. And the reference subsequently made to a covenant regard- ing the navigation on Lake Garda renders the offer still more un- certain, since it seems to imply that even after the cession of kSouthern Tyrol the Imperial territory would reach as far as that lake. If it is really desired to create a situation of harmony and cor- diality between the two States for eventual future co-operation towards common ends of general pohcy, it is indispensable to ehminate for ever all serious grounds upon which may be repro- duced the frequent outbursts of irredentism, besides establishing conditions of greater equality and common security in the frontiers between the two States and in the Adriatic ; and to effect this the cession of a strip of land in the Trentino would certainly not be sufficient. For these reasons I repeat that even apart from the question of the more or less prompt fulfilment of the eventual agreement, I must consider Baron Burian's proposals altogether insufficient as a basis of negotiations, inasmuch as they do not sufficiently satisfy national aspirations, appreciably improve our military conditions, or represent compensation adequate to the liberty of action accorded during the present war in the Balkans, the fate of which cannot but represent a primary political and economical interest for Italy. SONNINO. No. 59. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, \st April, 1915. THE ItaHan Minister at Cettinje telegraphs as follows : " Last night an aeroplane dropped several bombs, doing some slight damage and wounding four persons. Two bombs fell in the neighbourhood of the Royal Palace. Population greatly alarmed." I beg your Excellency to see Burian in accordance with instruc- tions contained in my telegram of the 4th March (Document No. 36). SONNINO. No. 60. The Italian Minister at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, 2nd April, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 2nd. I COMMUNICATED to Baron Burian the result of the careful examination to which your Excellency submitted the proposals formulated by him as a basis of an agreement, and in conveying 80 to him the substance of your Excellency's telegram I intimated that you considered those proposals vague, indefinite and abso- lutely insufficient to reach the object aimed at by both Powers. Baron Burian told me that in pointing out that Italy should assume the undertaking to observe a friendly neutrality from the political and economical point of view, he had referred to the provisions of Article IV. of the Treaty of Alliance, but that by this demand he had not meant that Italy should absolutely act in such a manner as to expose herself to the danger of reprisals from other belligerent States. As for your Excellency's demand that Austria-Hungary should completely cease to interest herself in Albania, Baron Burian remarked that this was contrary to the interests of the Monarchy, as Italy herself had recognised by the engagements assumed by the two Powers in accordance with the known understanding. Therefore Austria-Hungary could not agree to that demand. Baron Burian recognised that the material settlement of the questions of the investments made by the State in territories to be ceded, and of the Public Debt upon which the quota to be as- signed to Italy was to be proportioned, were matters entirely subordinate to the essential point, namely the extent of those same territories. It was therefore useless to occupy ourselves at present with these questions, which would be examined in due season and in detail, and which will not hinder the two Govern- ments from arriving at an understanding. Referring then to what I had pointed out to him, namely that from the expressions he had employed, your Excellency could not succeed in ascertain- ing what was the extent of the territory which he offered in Southern Tyrol, Baron Burian gave me a brief memorandum indicating the limits of these cessions. And he added that he had already intended to give me this memorandum before I had requested an audience to-day, so that he might thus follow up his communication of last Saturday. I transcribe here the text of this memorandum. " The territories which Austria-Hungary would be disposed to cede to Italy on the conditions indicated would comprise the districts {Politische Bezirke) of Trent, Rovereto, Riva, Tione (with the exception of Madonna di Campiglio and its surroundings), as well as the district of Borgo. In the valley of the Adige the frontier should reach to La vis, a locality which would belong to Italy." When I then referred to the sentence uttered by him in our interview of Saturday and reproduced in your Excellency's tele- gram, namely, that it was necessary to take into account strategic exigencies and the economic needs of the population. Baron Burian observed that he had spoken of those two elements because not only in the interests of Austria-Hungary, but also in those of Italy, it was necessary to take them into consideration in tracing the frontier. As for his mention of a covenant regarding navigation on Lake Garda, Baron Burian said that he had thought it well to mention this because that covenant, like the others existing 81 between the two nations with regard to border commerce, would be submitted to revision, and naturally that which related to Lake Garda would cease to be in force, since Lake Garda would be comprised within the territories to be ceded to Italy. Baron Burian further stated that he agreed with all that your Excellency said regarding the expediency of creating in reality a situation of harmony and cordiality between the two States for their eventual future co-operation towards common aims of general policy. That corresponded entirely with his own views, and he had several times so expressed himself to me ; but he found it difficult to follow your Excellency's ideas where you mention the possibility of the repetition of outbursts of irredentism, and the need to establish conditions of greater equality and of common security on the frontier between the two States and in the Adriatic. And he added that it certainly was not right to speak of the cession of " a strip of territory in Southern T}to1 " when he was offering all the districts forming what is commonly known as the Trentino. Having finally repeated to him the declaration contained in the last part of your Excellency's telegram. Baron Burian expressed the hope that when your Excellency was acquainted with the extent of the territory he offered you would change your opinion as to the importance of the cession, which could not be described as a mere strip of territory. AVARNA. No. 6L The Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 'Berlin, 2nd Afril, 19L5. (Telegram.) reed. 3rd. FROM certain indications clearly confirmed from an authori- tative source, I gather that Germany would not refuse to treat for peace with Russia. BOLLATI. No. 62. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, 6th April, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 1th. BARON BURIAN begged me to visit him to-day at the Ball- platz. He asked me whether I had received from your Excellency an answer to what he had communicated to me in our interview of the 1st instant, and when I had replied in the negative, he ex- pressed the wish to address the following request to you : Since your Excellency had considered vague and insufficient his first proposal and had not yet replied to his precise proposal, he begged you to make known in your turn what were your own proposals, so as to enable him to endeavour to come to a reciprocal under- standing on the question regarding the cession of territory. AVARNA. 82 No. 63. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, 8th April, 1915. TELEGRAMS from Cettinje communicate that yesterday an aeroplane dropped four bombs on Podgoritza with several casualties, dead and wounded, amongst whom many soldiers. I beg your Excellency to see Baron Burian in accordance Avith previous instructions, pointing out that this is a fresh violation on the part of Austria-Hungary of the agreements between the two Governments. SONNINO. Xo. 64. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, 8th April, 1915. TO satisfy the wish expressed by Baron Burian I here formulate the conditions which the Royal Italian Government considers indispensable if a normal and enduring situation of reciprocal cordiality and of possible future co-operation towards common aims of general policy is to be created between the two States. Yom" Excellency will more fully explain to Baron Burian the reasons that support each of the proposals, in formulating which I have taken fully into account the various observations laid before me in the past regarding the needs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. I trust that the Imperial Government w^ill grant us with the least possible delay an answer which I hope may be acceptable. Article I. is inspired by an important historical precedent, as well as by obvious reasons of a mihtary character regarding the tracing of the new frontier. Article II. is also justified by military considerations, as well as by ethnological reasons. Article III. represents the only possible compromise between the announced exigencies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and those of the national principle. Article IV. aims at slightly lessening the painful conditions of inferiority in which Italy finds herself in the Adriatic. Article V. represents the condition sine qua non by which any agreement may to-day be concluded ; without it no Government in Italy could seriously undertake tor the whole dm'ation of the war the engagements with which the last two articles, X. and XL, are concerned. Articles VI. and VII. remove for the future a subject of friction and of disagreement between the two States, legitimately safe- guarding Itahan interests in the Adriatic without hurting those of Austria-Hungary. Articles VIII. and IX. explain themselves. 83 Here follows the text of the articles : Article I. Austria-Hungary cedes to Italy the Trentino with the frontiers which were those of the Italian Kingdom in 1811, that is to say, after the Treaty of Paris on the 28th February, 1810. Note to Article I. : The new frontier detaches from the ^present one at Mount Cevedale ; it follows for some way the counterfort hettveen Vol Venosta and Vol Del Noce ; then it descends the Adige to Gargazone between Merano and Bolzano, reascends the higher ground on the left hank, divides the Val Sarentina and the Valley of the Isarco at Chiusa and the dolomitic territory on the right hank of the Avisio ; excluding the valleys of Gardona and Badia and including Ampezzano, it rejoins the fresent frontier. Article II. Italy's eastern frontier is to be corrected in her favour, so as to bring the cities of Gradisca and Gorizia within the ceded territory. From Troghofel the new frontier is to detach from the present one, and to run eastwards as far as Osternig, thence descending from the Carnic Alps down to Saifniz. Thence by the counterfort between Seisera and Schliza it is to ascend the Wirsehberg and then to follow the present frontier as far as the summit of Nevea, and to run down from the base of the Rombone to the River Isonzo, passing to eastward of Plezzo. It is then to follow the line of the Isonzo as far as Tolmino, where it leaves the Isonzo to pursue a more easterly line, which passing on the eastern side of the heights of Pregona-Planina and following the track of the Chiappovano runs up to eastward of Gorizia and crossing the Carso di Comen ends at the sea between Monfalcone and Trieste in the neighbourhood of Nabresina. Article III. The city of Trieste with its territory, which is to be extended on the north until it includes Nabresina, so as to reach to the new Italian frontier (Article II.), and on the south until it includes the present judiciary districts of Capo d'Istria and Pirano, is to be constituted an autonomous and independent State in all that regards its internal, military, legislative, financial and adminis- trative pohcies, and Austria-Hungary shall renounce all sovereignty over it. It is to remain a free port. It should not be entered by either Austro-Hungarian or Italian soldiers. It should assume a quota of the present Austrian Public Debt proportionate to its population. Article IV. Austria-Hungary cedes to Italy the Archipelago of Curzola, including Lissa (with the neighbouring islets of St. Andrea and Busi), Lesina (with Spalmadori and Torcola), Curzola, Lagosta (with the neighbouring islets and rocks), Cazza, Meleda and Pelagosa. 84 Article V. Italy should immediately occupy the ceded territories (Articles I., II. and IV.), whilst Trieste and its territory (Article III.) should be evacuated by the Austro -Hungarian authorities and military forces, with the immediate discharge of all soldiers and sailors derived from one and the other. Article VI. Austria-Hungary is to recognise Italy's full sovereignty over Valona, and its bay comprising Sasseno, together with such terri- tory in the hinterland as may be required for their defence. Article VII. Austria-Hungary is to cease completely to interest herself in Albania as comprised within the frontiers traced by the Conference of London. Article VIII. Austria-Hungary is to grant a complete amnesty followed by the immediate release of all those prosecuted and convicted upon military and political grounds who are natives of the ceded terri- tories (Articles I., II. and IV.) and of the evacuated territories (Article III.). Article IX. For the delivery of the ceded territories (Articles I., II. and IV.) from their quota of responsibility in the Austro-Hungarian Public Debt as well as in the debt resulting from pensions to retired Imperial and Royal functionaries, and against the integral and immediate transference to Italy of all domanial property, movable or immovable, Avith the exception of arms, situated in the said territories, and in compensation for every State right concerned Avith the said territories, in all that may refer to them whether at present or in future, without any exception whatsoever, Italy will pay Austria-Hungary the capital sum in gold of 200,000,000 Italian lire. Article X. Italy undertakes to maintain perfect neutrality throughout all the present war with regard to Austria-Hungary and Germany. Article XL For the entire duration of the present war Italy renounces all power subsequently to invoke in her own favour the provisions of Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance ; and Austria- Hungary is to make the same renouncement in all that regards Italy's effected occupation of the islands of the Dodecanesus. SONNINO. No. Go. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, lOth April, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. llth. I HAVE communicated to Baron Burian your Excellency's proposals contained in the eleven articles ; and in explaining to 85 him in the most detailed possible manner the reasons supporting those proposals, I pointed out to him that in formulating them your Excellency had taken into the fullest account the various observations submitted to yoii in the past regarding the needs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. I have expressed to him the hope that he would let me have a reply as soon as possible on the subject, and also the hope that this might be acceptable. At his request I then left him a written note in French giving the text of the said articles. After attentively listening to me, Baron Burian confined himself to saying that he would examine with the greatest care your Excel- lency's proposals and would let me know his answer at the earliest possible moment. AVARNA. No. 66. The Italian Ambassador at Nisch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Nisch, 10th Afril, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 10th. ACCORDING to confidential information a separate peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia might be possible. SQUITTI. No. 67. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, 13th April, 1915. IT is most urgent that your Excellency should expedite a reply to our demands. SONNINO. No. 68. The Italian Ambassador at Sofia to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sofia, ISth April, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. lith. RUMOURS are in circulation of a possible separate Austro- Russian peace. In Viennese political circles there is talk of peace between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and even that it is with the object of being free to deal with Italy. CUCCHI. No. 69. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, lith April, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. Uth. I SAW Baron Burian to-day, and I requested a reply to our demands which we accounted most urgent. Baron Burian said that he hoped to give me a reply on Friday evening. AVARNA. I 86 No. 70. The Italian Ambassador at Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Berlin, I5th April, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 16th. THE rumours of a movement towards a separate peace between Germany and Austria-Hungary and Russia are persistently main- tained and are constantly gaining ground. BOLLATI. No. 71. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, 16th April, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 11th. BARON BURIAN asked me to go to the Ballplatz to-day so that he might communicate to me his reply to yom' Excellency's proposals. He began by saying that the proposals of the Italian Government had been submitted to a careful examination on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government, which had been com- pelled with keen regret to record that for political, ethnological, strategical, and economical reasons, into which it would be super- fluous to enter, a gTeat part of these proposals, especially those formulated in Articles II., III. and IV. were unacceptable. The aggregate of these proposals would, in fact, create for the Imperial and Royal Government a situation irreconcilable with its vital interests, and would be but little calculated to attain the object at which the Italian Government had always declared that it aimed, namely that of consolidating the reciprocal relations be- tween Austria and Italy, basing them upon complete good faith, eliminating every source of friction and rendering possible the collaboration of the two States in questions of general policy. On this subject Baron Burian pointed out that a modification of the frontier towards the Isonzo would render difficult the military defence of that frontier of the Monarchy and would bring the Italian frontier too close to the city of Trieste. Then the detach- ment of this city from Austria-Hungary would deprive the latter of her most important maritime outlet and would place in the hands of Italy the principal communications between that port and Germany. Finally, the question of the islands of Curzolari, which dominated Dalmatia, would render Italy mistress of those regions, whilst the Adriatic would become an Italian sea from the moment that Italy retained possession of Valona. Baron Burian added that being sincerely actuated by the above considerations which he had submitted to me, upon which he considered it necessary to insist, and which had already been placed before your Excellency, and wishing to attest to Italy to the furthermost possible limits his desire to arrive at a definite and lasting understanding, the Imperial and Royal Government was disposed for its own part with regard to the territories of Southern Tyrol to extend the cession to which he had consented in the communication made to me on the 1st instant. 87 According to this fresh proposal the future line of frontier would detach from the present one near the Zufallspitze, and would follow for a distance the line between the district of Cleo on the one side and the districts of Schlanders and of Merano on the other, namely the line of the watershed between Noce and the Adige as far as Illmenspitze. The line of frontier would pass to the west of Proveis, so that this commune would continue to form part of the Tyrol, it would rejoin the Pescara torrent and follow the Thalweg of the latter to its confluence with the Noce, whence the northern frontier would detach from the district of Mezzolombardo and would rejoin the Adige to the south of Salorno. It would ascend the Geiersberg, follow the watershed of the valley of the Avisio by Castiore and would run towards the Horspitze and Mount Comp. It would turn thence to the south, describing a semicircle which would leave the commune of Altrei to the Tyrol and would reascend as far as the hills of San Lugano. It would follow the confines between the districts of Bolzano and Cavalese, namely, the watershed between the valleys of the Avisio and the Adige and it would pass over Rocca and the Grimmjoch to Latemar. From the Carnon hill it would run down to the Avisio crossing this river between the communes of Moena and Forno, and rising again towards the water- shed between the valleys of San PellegTino on the north and of Tra"vagnolo on the south. It would rejoin the present frontier on the east of the heights of Bocche. Consequently the Imperial and Royal Government would not be prepared to accept the line of frontier indicated by Article I. of your Excellency's proposals. With regard to the proposal contained in Article V., according to which the territories ceded by Austria-Hungary would be immediately transferred to Italy, Baron Burian pointed out that the provinces accompanying that proposal, which even in time of peace would be impracticable for various reasons of general adminis- tration, etc., would be so in an even greater degree in time of war. And in this connection he added that without attempting to cite other historical instances, it sufficed to recall the procedure adopted on the occasion of the cession of Nice and Savoy to France in 1860, in which case also after peace had been concluded a certain number of months elapsed between the settlement of the respective covenants and the effective transference of the territories ceded. I pointed out to Baron Burian that the precedent of Nice and Savoy did not apply to the present case. But Baron Burian after replying that he could not agree with me on that point, added that nothing on the part of the Imperial and Royal Government opposed the acceptance of the proposal con- tained in Article VIII., regarding the amnesty to be accorded to persons belonging to the territories ceded to Italy and sentenced or subjected to prosecution upon mihtary and political grounds. Coming next to speak of the question of Albania in general and that of Valona in particular, Burian told me that the Imperial and Royal Government could not do other than place upon record 88 that it would be difficult to reconcile the proposal formulated hy the Royal Italian Government in Articles VI. and VII. with the engagements undertaken by the Italian Government on four different occasions, namely : the Austro-Hungarian-Itahan agree- ment of 1900 and 1901, and the decisions of the Conference of London ; Italy's declaration of the 4th August of last year that she would remain faithful to the engagements assumed towards Austria-Hungary as well as to the decisions of the Conference of London, and that she did not wish to derive any profit in Albania from the fact that Austria-Hungary was engaged in war ; and her formal declarations on the occasion of the Italian occupation of Valona. On the other hand, the Imperial and Royal Government, im- pressed on its side by the necessity of maintaining the reciprocal rights and obligations resulting from the agreements in force and of persevering in the attitude always maintained towards the Albanian question, could not cease to be interested in Albania, a region so close to the sphere of Austria-Hungary's own " most perceptible " interests, to the creation of which she had contributed together with Italy not only politically but also by means of very notable sacrifices of a military (the partial mobihsation of 1913), economical and financial order. For the rest, in accordance with the Conference of London, the Albanian question had become a European question, so that no single Power could dispose of it either alone or in agreement with others, since the existence and neutrahty of Albania had been guaranteed by Europe. Therefore it is only with the consent of the Powers — an un- reahzable eventuality during the war — that the poUtical situation of Albania could be modified. Notwithstanding this, the Imperial and Royal Government, faithful to the spirit of the Austro-Hungarian-Italian agreement regarding Albania, perceiving in the Albanian question one of the problems of general poHcy regarding which the collaboration of Austria-Hungary and Italy might eventually continue in the future, declares itself still disposed to discuss with the Royal Italian Government reciprocal interests in Albania on the basis of the present situation, or to submit to revision the mutual agreements whenever future poHtical changes should make this appear necessary to one or the other of the parties. Passing on to examine the engagements to be undertaken by Italy, Baron Burian intimated to me that the Imperial and Royal Government desired to draw attention to the fact that Turkey having united herself to Austria-Hungary by the fact of her par- ticipation in the war, the neutrality which Italy would engage herself to maintain until the end of the war must similarly include the Ottoman Empire. With regard to Article XL, Baron Burian informed me that the Imperial and Royal Government would accept the proposals formulated, in it, provided that in the said article after the words " present war " were inserted the phrase : " and with regard also 89 to territorial or other advantages that might accrue to Austria- Hungary from the treaty of peace that will terminate the present war." And he added that the waiving on the part of the Imperial and Royal Grovernment of compensation for the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesian Islands would also be subordinate to the same condition. With regard, finally, to Article IX., Baron Burian informed me that without yet being in a position precisely to state the quota of the Public Debt concerning the territories to be ceded to Italy, or the lump sum to be claimed by Austria-Hungary as compensa- tion for State investments in the territory in question, the Imperial and Royal Government must nevertheless at once declare that the figure proposed by the Royal Italian Government would be entirely insufiicient and would not represent even approximately an equitable compensation. And he added that, to cite only one point, he should state that the value of the military buildings alone, situated in the territory be ceded to Italy, notably surpasses the total sum proposed by the Royal Italian Government. Not desiring, however, to trammel the conclusion of the agreement by contentions of a financial nature, the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment declared itself ready to submit the question of pecuniary indemnity, in the event of a disagreement with Italy, to the Arbitra- tion Court of the Hague. In handing me then a memorandum of the matters communi- cated to me, Baron Burian concluded by expressing the hope that your Excellency would appreciate the sentiment which had induced the Imperial and Royal Government to make this further sacrifice in favour of Italy. I answered Baron Burian that I would hasten to telegraph to your Excellency all that he had said to me in reply to the proposals vou had formulated. AVARNA. No. 72. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna . (Telegram.) Ronm, 2lst April, 1915. I HAVE examined the replies given to your Excellency by Baron Burian regarding the cessions which Austria-Hungary would be disposed to make, and I regret to have to declare that they do not appear to me to form an adequate basis for an agreement which is to create between the two States that enduring and normal situation which is mutually desired. On one point only, that which regards the Trentino, has the Imperial and Royal Government shown itself disposed to cede a little more than in its first proposals ; but even in this there is no provision that will overcome the main disadvantages of the present situation, whether considered from the linguistic, the ethnological or the mihtary point of view. i 90 On all the other demands Baron Burian answers us with a complete negative which takes no heed of all the reasons urged by us. With regard to Albania and Valona, the argument put forward by Baron Burian to sustain his refusal is that various compacts already exist between Italy and Austria-Hungary and that there is, moreover, a European agreement on the subject. What we demanded was exactly that those previous agreements with Austria- Hungary should be modified by mutual consent, the Imperial and Royal Government ceasing entirely to interest itself in whatever we might agree regarding this with the rest of Europe, just as we cease to interest ourselves {see Article XL proposed) in what Austria- Hungary might settle with respect to the Balkans at the end of the war. With regard to Article XI. it was already my own notion that the renouncement to invoke the provisions of Article VII. should refer not only to the war, but also to advantages which from the treaty of peace might result to one side or the other in the Balkans and the Dodecanesus respectively. As to Article IX., I admit that it is possible still to discuss the matter of the amount of the quota to be assumed of the Public Debt of the Empire, but we cannot take into account the value of the investments that may have been made by the State in the ceded territories, and this for the reasons already expounded in my tele- gram of the 8th April. 1 Where disagreement appears to be insurmountable is on the subject of Article V. regarding the date of the eventual fulfilment of the agreement that might be reached. On this subject, too, I can do no more than refer to the reasons already stated why no Italian Government could make itself responsible for the integral fulfilment of an undertaking, which fulfilment had been postponed until the end of the war. SONNINO. No. 73. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, 2lst April, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 22nd. I HAVE conveyed to Baron Burian the substance of your Excellency's telegram, intimating to him that his replies in our interview of last Friday regarding the cessions that Austria-Hungary was disposed to make, did not appear to your Excellency to afford a suitable basis for an agreement such as is mutually desired ; and I then communicated to him the various observations which your Excellency has to offer upon those replies. Baron Burian said that he took note of the communication, and as he desired attentively to examine your Excellency's obser- vations, he would postpone making known his answers, but that he would let me have these as soon as possible. AVARNA. (^) See Document No. 64. 91 No. 74, The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, 25th April, 1915. ALTHOUGH I have always endeavoured in my interviews with Baron Burian to convince him of the necessity of not delaying to satisfy our national aspirations and of agreeing to your Excel- lency's proposals, pointing out to him the grave consequences by which a refusal on his part might be attended, he has continued to persist in idle discussions until now, as your Excellency will have been able to perceive, and he does not appear exactly to grasp the real state of things with us. But what cannot fail in particular to occasion surprise is the illusion under which Baron Burian still labom's that the Royal Italian Government must end by being con- vinced of the gxeat sacrifice made by the Imperial and Royal Government if it consents to the cessions of territory in Southern Tyrol, and of the impossibility of its extending those concessions. Moreover, Baron Burian, as he has several times given me to under- stand, cannot yet realise the necessity in which the Royal Itahan Government might find itself, in the event of its demands not being in- tegrally accepted, of going to war with Austria-Hungary and Germany. It is perhaps to be expected that as a result of the renewed and more insistent pressure the exertion of which on the part of the German Government is to be foreseen, Baron Burian may be in- duced to extend in part the cessions of territories in Southern Tyrol and to make some concession on the side of our eastern frontier. But even admitting that Baron Burian should be induced to make concessions and to extend them as far as the actual limits traced by the Royal Italian Government, there would still remain to be determined the other important questions, namely of the establishment of Trieste as an autonomous State, of the cession of the Curzolare Islands, and of the Monarchy's desire to interest itself in Albania, regarding which, if the inchnations mani- fested to me by Baron Burian are to be taken into account, it is doubtful that the Imperial and Royal Government will give way. If then, through unforeseen circumstances, the Imperial and Royal Government should end by submitting at the last moment even on these matters, as it has already done on the question of principle, there would still remain to settle the grave question of the immediate fulfilment of the agreement. Regarding this question, which is by us considered a sine qua non of the said agxeement, it is to be deemed beyond all measure difficult, as your Excellency asserts, that the dissensions existing between the Royal Italian Government and the Imperial and Royal Government on the subject should be settled after the decisive opposition offered by Baron Bmian on this same question. Therefore an agreement with Austria-Hungary on the basis of the proposals formulated by your Excellency seems almost un- realizable in the present state of things. AVARNA. 92 No. 75. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Vienna, 29th April, 1915. (Telegram.) reed. 30th. I PROCEEDED to-day to the Ballplatz at the request of Baron Burian, and he told me that he had begged me to visit him so that he might inform me of his opinion regarding the observations made by your Excellency upon the replies given by him to the proposals formulated by the Royal Italian Government which I had com- municated to him in our interview on the 21st inst. In recalling that those replies had not seemed to your Excellency to constitute in the aggregate a basis likely to ensure that good understanding and enduring harmony which was the aim of both Governments, Baron Burian informed me that he had to record that the sincere desire which he had several times expressed to me to reach a definite agreement with Italy had met with a serious obstacle, in the fact that some of the said proposals affected Austria- Hungary's vital interests. Now the relinquishing of those interests would create for the Monarchy such a situation, not only towards Italy, but also towards the other Powers, that its share in the political collaboration which was your Excellency's object would naturally be diminished. He observed therefore, to begin with, on the "score of Trieste, that by virtue of the Austro-Hungarian constitution, this city enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy. It formed a territory apart, and its Communal Council was invested with the functions of the provincial diets. The Italian element was largely repre- sented in the autonomous administration of the city. Its numbers, the level of its education, and its economic position, assured for it, apart from its constitutional guarantees, an existence satisfactory in all respects. By detaching Trieste and its surroundings from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and creating it into a separate State, a mortal blow would be struck at the economic prosperity of that city, which, deprived of its hinterland, would lose all its importance, a prospect not in any way to be modified even by annexation to Italy for which it would merely represent a superfluous port. Trieste had always been an object of particular solicitude to the Imperial and Royal Government, which, in the interests, it is understood, of the State, would continue also in the future to favour its material and intellectual progress in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, whose prosperity depended entirely upon the bond uniting it to Austria-Hungary, which, whilst exacting the loyalty of its citizens, had never done anything to the detriment of their national character. I could not refrain from pointing out to Baron Burian, as my own personal opinion, that we could not possibly admit in any way what he asserted, namely that the Imperial and Royal Government had done nothing to the detriment of the national character of the 93 population of Trieste. And I reminded him on this subject of the interminable question of the Italian University in Trieste, which had given rise to frequent lengthy discussions and confidential measures between the two Governments and had provoked on several occasions strong agitations in Italy, besides the favoured treatment shown to the Slav schools at the expense of the national Italian culture in that city. But Baron Burian, proceeding, dealt with the proposal regarding the cession to Italy of the Curzolare Islands and he observed that this question also brought us up against insurmountable obtacles. Abstracted from the purely Slav nationality of their inhabitants, those islands, in the hands of Italv, would constitute a strateyic position that would dominate on the one hand the upper part of • the Adriatic, where there could no longer be a question of equiUbrium for Austria-Hungary, and would threaten on the other the very possession of the adjacent coast. With regard to the cession of territories proposed in Austrian Friuli, Baron Burian pointed out that this would deprive Austria of a frontier that was indispensable to her for the defence not only of a part of her littoral, but also of several of her central provinces, and that it would moreover bring the Italian frontier nearer to her principal port. Besides this, the Italian element was only feebly represented, at least in a great part of the territory in question, which was peopled by Slavs. Finally, referring to Tyrol, Baron Burian informed me that if, in accordance with its future delimitation, such as it was outlined in the last Austro-Hungarian proposal, part of the valley of the Noce, besides the valleys of Fassa and Ampezzo, were excluded from the cession of territories, the reasons which had prevailed in that respect were certainly not those of wishing to retain some region in which Italian was spoken. This was not the case, particularly regarding the valleys of Fassa and Ampezzo, the population of which was Ladinian (Grrisons), and desired with all the strength of its soul to remain united to Austria-Hungary, gravitating as it did towards the north from the point of view of all its exclusive interests. Imperative strategic reasons created the necessity for Austria- Hungary to retain the eastern side of the valley of the Noce, which would remain insecure without possession of the heights protecting the region of Bolzano. And, he added, that supposing that we on our side should oppose his point of view regarding one or the other of these locahties with arguments more or less analogous, it was necessary not to lose sight of the fact that the question for Austria- Hungary was one of a friendly cession of a part of her time-honoured possessions, and that the arguments of him who in the present instance relinquishes secure boundaries, should, in the nature of things, take precedence of the arguments of him who acquires them. Coming then to speak of the demand concerning immediate execution of the territorial cessions, Baron Burian told me that he did not abandon the hope that your Excellency upon submitting 94 tlie matter to a searching examination would recognise tlie material impossibility of such a provision. The absolute secrecy of the negotiations forbade until the con- clusion of the agreement all the mihtary, administrative, and other preparations which must precede the transference of the territory ceded. All these preparatory measures demanded a certain amount of time, and could not be improvised at the last moment. And this leaving out of all account the situation that would be created for Austria-Hungary if possession were taken by Italy of the territory in question at a moment in which the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was engaged in a vast war, and in which, consequently, the greater part of her territory was deprived of means of defence, her army being concentrated in the various theatres of operations. Wishing, however, to render as easy as possible the position, at a given moment, of the Italian Government before Parliament and public opinion, provisions might be considered that would demonstrate in the eyes of all, the real and serious desire which existed faithfully to discharge the engagements assumed. To that end, as soon as the agreement were concluded it would be possible to proceed to appoint a joint commission which would be entrusted with the settlement of the many questions of detail resulting from the cession of territories. The appointment and operation of this commission could not leave a shadow of doubt regarding the integrality and conclusiveness of the cession itself. Baron Burian added that if your Excellency on your own side desired to propose any other provisions towards the same end, he would not fail to examine them with the best intentions and to accept them as far as might be possible. I told Baron Burian that notwithstanding these good intentions I must remind him with regard to this question of all that I had already laid before him in previous interviews, namely, that the immediate execution of the agreement was a condition sine qua non of the agreement itself, so that I could only refer him to the reasons already given him why no Italian Government could become guarantor of the integral execution of all the engagements assumed, the fulfilment of which was to be postponed until the end of the war. Passing on to speak of the proposals of your Excellency in Article IX., Baron Burian said that although it would be easy to prove that the sum offered by the Italian Government as a quota of the Public Debt and as compensation was by a great deal inferior to the value of the public effects would that be ceded to Italy, he shared the opinion expressed by your Excellency that such a question should not trammel the understanding provided that this were established upon all other points of the projected agreement. It was precisely because he was inspired by ideas of this order, and to afford yet another proof of his desire to sui-round the cession of territories by external and reassuring guarantees that he pro- posed to submit if necessary the financial controversy to an international tribunal, namely, to the Court of the Hague. 95 On the subject of the Albanian question Baron- Burian repeated the expressions of his sincere desire to discuss with your Excellency reciprocal interests in Albania, taking into account the circum- stances which had undergone a change during the present war, and to reach a fresh understanding on the subject with the Royal Italian Government which might, in placing things again upon European grounds, lead to Austria-Hungary's disinteresting her- self, provided that Italy would similarly disinterest herself, in Albania with the exception of Valona and the sphere of interests that had their centre there, and provided that sufficient guarantees might be established against undertakings by any other Powers in Albania, an eventuaHty as menacing to the poHtical and maritime interests of Austria-Hungary as to those of Italy. I told Baron Burian that I would lose no time in acquainting your Excellency with the replies he had made to me regarding your communications, but that for my own part I thought it well to point out to him that with the exception of certain formal sugges- tions made by him on the subject of some of the proposals he persisted in pronouncing himself in the negative, particularly with regard to those formulated in Articles I., II., III., IV. and V. AVARNA. No. 76. The Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Italian Ambassador at Vienna. (Telegram.) Rome, 3rd May, 1915. I BEG your Excellency to convey the following communication to the Minister for Foreign Affairs there, of which you will leave him a written copy : The alliance between Italy and Austria-Hungary proclaimed itself, from the first, to be an element and a guarantee of peace, aiming first of all as the principal object at common defence. In view of subsequent events and of the new situation arising out of them, the two countries found it necessary to propose a new object no less essential, and in course of the successive renewals of the treaty, they devoted themselves to safeguarding the continuity of their alliance, stipulating the principle of preHminary agreements regarding the Balkans, with a view to reconcihng the divergent interests and propensities of the two Powers. It is very evident that these stipulations, loyally observed, would have sufficed as a sohd basis for a common and fruitful action. But Austria-Hungary, in the summer of 1914, without coming to any agreement with Italy, without even giving her the least intimation, and without taking any notice of the counsels of moderation addressed to her by the Royal Itahan Government, notified to Serbia the ultimatum of the 23rd July, which was the cause and the point of departure of the present European conflagration. Austria-Hungary by disregarding the obHgations imposed by the Treaty profoundly disturbed the Balkan status quo, and created a situation from which she alone should profit to the detriment of interests of the greatest importance which her ally had so often affirmed and proclaimed. 96 So flagrant a violation of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty not only justified Italy's refusal to place herself on the side of her allies in a war provoked without previous notice to her, but at the same time deprived the alhance of its essential character and of its raison d'etre. Even the compact of friendly neutrality for which the Treaty provides was compromised by this violation. Reason and senti- ment alike agree in preventing friendly neutrality from being maintained when one of the allies has recourse to arms for the purpose of realising a programme diametrically opposed to the vital interests of the other ally, interests the safeguarding of w^hich constituted the principal reason of the alliance itself. Notwithstanding this, Italy exerted herself for several months to create a situation that should be favourable to the re-establish- ment between the two States of these friendly relations which constitute the essential foundation of all co-operation in the domain of general policy. With this aim and in this hope the Royal Itahan Government an- nounced its wiUingness to come to an arrangement having for its basis the satisfaction in an equitable degree of the legitimate national as- pirations of Italy and serving at the same time to reduce the disparity existing in the reciprocal position of the two States in the Adriatic. These negotiations did not lead, however, to any appreciable result. All the efforts of the Royal Italian Government met with the resistance of the Imperial and Royal Government, which even now, after several months, has consented only to admit the special interests of Italy in Valona, and to promise an insufficient con- cession of territory in the Trentino, a concession which in no way admits of the normal settlement of the situation, whether from the ethnological, the pohtical or the mihtary point of view. This concession, moreover, was to be carried into effect only in an indeterminate epoch, namely not until the end of the war. In this state of things the Italian Government must renounce the hope of coming to an agreement, and sees itself compelled to withdraw all its proposals for a settlement. It is equally useless to maintain for the alliance a formal appear- ance which could only serve to dissemble the reality of continual mistrust and daily opposition. For these reasons Italy, confident of her just rights, affirms and proclaims that she resumes from this moment her complete liberty of action, and declares as cancelled and as henceforth without effect her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary. SONNINO. No. 77. The Italian Ambassador at Vienna to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. (Telegram.) Vienna, ith May, 1915. I HAVE made to-day to Baron Burian the communication prescribed by your Excellency. AVARNA. Printed in Great Britain by Wyman & Sons Ltd., London and Reading. THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY WILL INCREASE TO SO CENTS ON THE FOURTH DAY AND TO $1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY OVERDUE. Afa ij, ^Bm M^r^hW m 25193 ^^ ,'W U imJL^j r\ no 'jH'WS^^^ l*. |f< | ftfegp MAR . , B ■ IW-i' m r.T la w =«M- ^PK 23 1^^ 6Waf'6lSS ^B^ioj^ FFBoQ . Y-' NOV 26 IMS LD21- U. C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES CD511ED57D €64 UNIVERSITY. 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