UC-NRLF 
 
 $B SfiT E7M 
 
GIFT OF 
 Mrs. Beck 
 
eciprocal Representation 
 in a World's Assembly 
 
 International Bonding 
 
 AND 
 
 .eciprocity Defense Army 
 
 (International) 
 
 Suggestions for the Advocates 
 
 Of and Opponents To the 
 
 League of Nations 
 
 By Emil G. Beck, M. D. 
 
 Chicago, 111. 
 
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The essential points : 
 
 A. AN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE 
 
 BODY WITH JUDICIAL POWERS 
 
 (Chosen by Reciprocal Method) 
 
 Each nation to send a fixed number of Representa- 
 tives, but instead of choosing all from among its own 
 citizens, two of these representatives to be selected 
 from its own country and one from each of the other 
 countries. This RECIPROCAL method of choosing 
 Representatives will create an extraordinary assem- 
 blage of Statesmen, who will constitute an impartial 
 WORLD PARLIAMENT. 
 
 B. All nations to enter into a 
 
 UNIVERSAL ALLIANCE TREATY (Bond) 
 which provided against violation of its terms, 
 the forfeiture of heavy bonds furnished by the 
 co-signers (bonds not their own issue) 
 
 C. A suggestion for the formation and economical 
 maintenance of an 
 
 INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE ARMY 
 (RECIPROCAL) 
 
 829757 
 
 r-^ 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE ADVOCATES AND 
 
 THE OPPONENTS OF THE LEAGUE 
 
 OF NATIONS 
 
 By Dr. Emil G. Beck, 
 Chicago. 
 
 The present conditions in Europe are so threatening 
 that in the turmoil it is hardly possible for men to 
 formulate a perfect agreement for a lasting peace. 
 It would be like asking a man to write his will in a 
 state of delirium. Documents of such paramount 
 importance must be worked out under the most favor- 
 able conditions. Serenity of mind and composure are 
 essential for the discussion of the innumerable phases 
 of this tremendous problem. 
 
 The expression of opinion of the people of each 
 country is also very essential, as they are to be the 
 real bearers of the burdens, and recipients of the 
 benefits resulting from the new order of things. 
 
 This does not mean that the questions should be 
 submitted to a referendum. The matter is too com- 
 plicated, too large, and too intricate to be left to a 
 majority vote of laymen. 
 
 Even authorities on International questions, the ex- 
 perts, are divided in their opinion as to the practicabil- 
 ity and soundness of the covenant of the League. 
 
![:'Trfit\*falla3:y.*.of'such a way of solving the problem 
 is analagous'to' the following: Suppose a man were 
 ill and the best experts were called in consultation 
 but could not agree upon a diagnosis and treatment. 
 If in this dilemma one of the experts should suggest 
 leaving the diagnosis to the members of the family, 
 would we consider that the best way of curing the 
 patient ? 
 
 Our Representatives in Congress, and in the Senate 
 whom the citizens elect to act for them, are no doubt 
 better judges and they should decide whether the 
 covenant should be accepted, modified or rejected. 
 
 While we are waiting for the settlement of Euro- 
 pean affairs, let us have practical suggestions from 
 those who have any to offer. It is possible that from 
 some obscure source, an idea, very simple perhaps, may 
 come which will appeal to those who are now studying 
 the problem and help them to evolve a plan devoid 
 of the objections now raised by the adversaries of the 
 League. May I be permitted at this time to make 
 some suggestions? I wish to bring to the attention 
 of the reader first an abstract of the plan which I 
 submitted two years ago to the State Department at 
 Washington, which plan has also been in the hands 
 of Colonel House and all Senators since January, 
 1917. The two principal suggestions contained therein 
 deal with the very points now being threshed out, and 
 their adoption, possibly in a modified form, may help 
 to solve the problem. 
 
A. RECIPROCAL REPRESENTATION IN A 
 WORLD'S ASSEMBLY. 
 
 B. INTERNATIONAL BONDING. (Origin- 
 ally published in 1917.) 
 
 The main barrier to a lasting pease is the unfor- 
 tunate circumstance that nations do not trust one 
 another sufficiently to allow matters of dispute to be 
 adjusted by a Court of Arbitration. They are not 
 yet willing to submit vital issues for arbitration to a 
 body of judges delegated by the different nations, 
 unless they are convinced that in the hands of these 
 judges their interests will be safeguarded to at least 
 the same degree as they would be by force of arms. 
 They fear that even men with the highest ideals ; with 
 the greatest respect for the rights of others, and with 
 the strongest desire to be impartial, would when their 
 native land is threatened, unconsciously decide in favor 
 of their own country. 
 
 Quoting Prof. Adler: 
 
 "The Judges you secure may be upright men, but 
 the bias in the blood will tell. We had this exem- 
 plified among ourselves in the case of the Hayes- 
 Tilden Commission. The country was on the verge 
 of civil war. It was finally decided to pass the 
 matter in dispute over to fifteen jurists, the best in 
 the country. No one doubted their uprightness nor 
 their disposition to be fair; but every time they 
 voted on a material question, the Commission stood 
 
eight to seven. Eight Republicans to seven Demo- 
 crats. And the impartial historian says that it was 
 the bias of party which in this crucial instance, 
 though they were not conscious of it, gave direction 
 to the legal mind." 
 
 It will be very difficult to secure an absolutely im- 
 partial Court of Arbitration; a Court constituted to 
 guard against possible formation of cliques, the mem- 
 bers of which in deciding vital issues, might cast their 
 votes for the country which they favor or to which 
 they owe allegiance. It is thus evident that before a 
 League of Nations or any other form of affiliation of 
 nations can succeed, this one obstacle must be elim- 
 inated. To overcome this vital objection, I make the 
 following suggestion : 
 
 As a basis for working out a plan, I have applied 
 two fundamental principles, namely: 
 
 1. THAT RECIPROCITY IS THE MOST PO- 
 TENT FACTOR IN RETAINING THE 
 FRIENDSHIP OF A NEIGHBOR. 
 
 2. THAT A BOND STRENGTHENS A PROM- 
 ISE. 
 
 The two principles are applied in the formation of 
 
 A. AN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE 
 BODY WITH JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE 
 POWERS. (CHOSEN RECIPROCALLY) 
 
B. THE SIGNING OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
 TREATY AGAINST WARS, SECURED BY 
 HEAVY BONDING, EACH NATION TO 
 FURNISH FOREIGN BONDS. 
 
 A. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE BODY 
 WITH JUDICIAL POWER (RECIPROCAL) 
 
 INSTEAD OF EACH NATION SELECTING 
 ITS REPRESENTATIVES FROM AMONG ITS 
 OWN CITIZENS, EACH SHOULD CHOOSE 
 TWO FROM ITS OWN, AND FIVE OR MORE 
 ADDITIONAL REPRESENTATIVES FROM 
 OTHER NATIONS, BUT NO MORE THAN ONE 
 FROM ANY ONE FOREIGN COUNTRY. THUS 
 ALL NATIONS WOULD HAVE AN OPPOR- 
 TUNITY OF CHOOSING MEN WELL KNOWN 
 TO THEM, IN WHOSE INTEGRITY AND HON- 
 ESTY THEY HAVE THE FULLEST CONFI- 
 DENCE AND TO WHOM THEY WOULD 
 UNHESITATINGLY SUBMIT MATTERS OF 
 INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE. 
 
 In England the members of Parliament are not 
 always chosen from the counties and boroughs in 
 which they live. Why can not the same principle be 
 used internationally? 
 
By employing this system of choosing Representa- 
 tives, the danger of partiality to one's own country 
 would materially diminish. Each representative would 
 consider it a point of honor to deal fairly with the 
 country which placed implicit confidence in him. For 
 self interest he would act impartially, because his own 
 country, in turn, is dependent upon the honesty and 
 fairness of that foreign representative which it has 
 selected. Such interlocking representation would 
 undoubtedly fuse the interests of nations and the per- 
 sonal contact of the representatives would inevitably 
 result in friendly relationship among nations. Recip- 
 rocity of delegates would thus create the strongest 
 bond possible between the powers. A simple illustra- 
 tion may serve to show how this principle of recip- 
 rocity and allegiance to both sides operates between 
 man and man. 
 
 A and B, two life-long friends make a vow never to 
 quarrel over business matters. To provide against 
 a possible break in their friendship A suggests that in 
 the event of a dispute they leave the matter to a third 
 party; a mutual friend of both. This third party (C), 
 however, happens to be a relative of B. C agrees to 
 be arbitrator and promises that he will be loyal to both 
 his friend and his relative, in case a dispute should 
 ever arise. The unexpected happens; A and B have 
 fallen out on account of a misunderstanding in a large 
 financial deal. C is called to act as arbitrator. He is 
 morally bound to his friend to be just and fair, and 
 at the same time is very anxious to safeguard the 
 interests of his relative. His allegiance is divided. 
 
It is in such a situation that each delegate to the Inter- 
 national Court of Arbitral Justice would find himself. 
 He owes his allegiance to his country; but he is also 
 in honor bound not to betray the nation which placed 
 such confidence in him in selecting him as its repre- 
 sentative, with full knowledge that he was a citizen 
 of a foreign country. 
 
 This principle of choosing Representatives, once 
 adopted, would open the way for further elaboration 
 of details, which must, of course, be worked out by 
 statesmen such as those composing the Advisory 
 Board, now gathering to work out a feasible plan. 
 
 The members of this international assembly might 
 select from their midst a smaller number to form an 
 INTERNATIONAL SUPREME COURT OF AP- 
 PEALS to whose final decision any dispute would be 
 referred, should it fail to obtain satisfactory settle- 
 ment by the International Court of Justice. 
 
 Whether all countries should be admitted to the 
 League and whether all countries should have an equal 
 number of representatives is a matter for the Advis- 
 ory Board to establish. It is my humble opinion that 
 there should be an equal but small number of Repre- 
 sentatives; not more than seven from each nation. 
 The voting power of all nations should, however, not 
 he the same. The latter should be based on the fol- 
 lowing conditions: 
 
 (A) Population 
 
 (B) Commerce (shipping, banking, manufactur- 
 ing, mining) 
 
 9 
 
(C) Wealth (Natural resources, Accumulated im- 
 proved property) 
 
 (D) Educational qualifications (possibly based on 
 literacy) 
 
 To grant each nation, whether large or small, rich 
 or poor, the giant or dwarf in Commerce and Finance, 
 the same voting power, would lead to great inequality 
 and injustice. It cannot be based on one factor alone, 
 several factors must be taken into account. If popu- 
 lation alone were the guide, then China with four 
 millions of inhabitants would have a voting power 
 four times as great as the United States, and eighty 
 times as great as Switzerland ; and similar inequalities 
 would arise if commerce or wealth alone were taken 
 as a guide for establishing the number of votes to 
 which each country should be entitled. 
 
 If, therefore, by proper calculation, each country 
 were allotted a number of voting units based upon 
 each of the above mentioned factors, no one could 
 find fault with the method, especially if reciprocal 
 representation were in operation ; for this alone would 
 insure to the nation having small voting power the 
 security of justice. 
 
 B. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE TREATY 
 
 What measures shall be taken to compel a nation 
 to live up to its new treaties? NEW TREATIES 
 will have to be entered into and here difficulties will 
 
 10 
 
arise. At present treaties are not regarded with the 
 same confidence and respect by the powers as they 
 were before this war. We have striking examples to 
 prove this fact. The Allies will be reluctant to sign 
 new treaties unless absolute assurance is given that 
 some power even greater than the sword will compel 
 the co-signers to live up to their agreements. They 
 will demand a positive guarantee that the signing of 
 the papers is not a mere formality and that the treaty 
 will not become a mere scrap of paper when its terms 
 conflict with the interests of one of the co-signers. 
 What satisfactory guarantee could be given? I make 
 the following suggestion: 
 
 LET THE NATIONS ENTER INTO A TREATY 
 WHICH EMBODIES PRACTICALLY A CODE 
 OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS, TO BE WORKED 
 OUT BY THE INTERNATIONAL ASSEMBLY, 
 THIS TREATY BINDING THE NATIONS TO 
 ITS OBSERVANCE BY A SUBSTANTIAL 
 BOND OF THE SIGNERS. 
 
 The objection may be raised that should a real 
 emergency arise a nation might repudiate its bond. 
 This objection may be met by providing that the bonds 
 furnished by a nation shall not be paper of its own 
 issue but securities bought of other countries, thus 
 making their repudiation practically impossible. 
 
 To illustrate the latter proposition: Japan, for in- 
 stance, would deposit securities purchased from other 
 countries. The amounts purchased from each coun- 
 
 11 
 
try to be so proportioned as to furnish a certain per- 
 centage of securities of as many countries as possible, 
 for instance: 
 
 10% of French Bonds, 
 
 10% of English Bonds, 
 
 10% of U. S. Bonds, 
 
 5% of Swiss Bonds, 
 
 5% of Argentine Bonds, 
 
 60% of other countries. 
 
 ^' Government 
 
 or 
 Industrial 
 
 England, Russia, United States, and all other coun- 
 tries entering the League to do likewise. The aggre- 
 gate deposit by each nation must be so large as to 
 make it prohibitive for that nation to forfeit it. 
 
 The bonds shall be placed in the hands of an IN- 
 TERNATIONAL BOARD OF TRUSTEES, chosen 
 by all the countries which enter into this international 
 agreement. 
 
 Special treaties between individual nations need not 
 be secured by any additional bonds, because all ques- 
 tions of dispute would be settled by an International 
 Court of Arbitration and its decision would be binding. 
 
 12 
 
c. 
 
 A RECIPROCITY ARMY 
 
 We must, however, bear in mind that in the present 
 turmoil it would be inexpedient to make a very radical 
 reduction in the naval or military strength of the 
 world. Radical changes must not be made suddenly. 
 For this reason, it will be necessary for the present, 
 for each country to maintain a certain military and 
 naval force until there is a readjustment of present 
 international affairs. Time will change conditions; 
 the relations among nations will again become fra- 
 ternal; but until such time, we must retain a weapon 
 aside from these agreements. A more potent re- 
 straint must be kept in order to check an ambitious 
 belligerent who might suddenly break all rules and 
 promises should he become involved in a controversy 
 which he beHeves is not ad judicable. 
 
 If, then, for the present, it is absolutely necessary 
 to retain a certain amount of force as a safeguard, 
 could we suggest some practical and economical main- 
 tenance of a RECIPROCITY DEFENSE ARMY? 
 
 If the nations were assured that they could count 
 upon each other for their combined but small forces 
 against an aggressor, it would be entirely superfluous 
 for each of them to maintain a large military organ- 
 ization. On the other hand, if each nation must indi- 
 vidually protect its own rights and interests, each 
 would be obliged to maintain an army so large that at 
 any time it might be pitted against a combination of 
 
 13 
 
other powers who are equally prepared. This stu- 
 pendous competition in preparedness has in the past 
 absorbed a large part of the energy and the savings 
 of the human race. Why can not the powers combine 
 their forces and keep them in readiness for an emer- 
 gency? A small force allotted to each nation in its 
 proper proportion would be just as effective as a large 
 force on each side, and it would be vastly more econ- 
 omical. I would, therefore, suggest a plan most econ- 
 omical and at the same time sufficiently effective to 
 check any attempt on the part of any nation to create 
 war. 
 
 A. Each nation to have a small standing army of 
 well trained, well paid soldiers, not larger than is ac- 
 tually necessary to protect itself against internal dis- 
 turbances. 
 
 B. The armies of all countries should have a com- 
 bined general staff so that the armies may be trained 
 on the same principles of warfare and should be so 
 organized that at the shortest notice a call would bring 
 together a force large enough to check aggression. 
 
 C. Finally, a number of regiments of the army of 
 one country should be stationed in diiferent sections 
 of foreign countries for a stated period. For illus- 
 tration — an American soldier would serve one year 
 at home, six months in France and six months in 
 Italy and the French or Italian soldier would have a 
 like experience. This would give all armies an equal 
 chance to perfect themselves in military training and 
 
 14 
 
become acquainted with the military tactics of all 
 countries. At the same time, the military force of all 
 countries would become familiar with the terrain of 
 the various countries, which, in case of a sudden out- 
 break of war, would be a great advantage to the 
 combined powers in checking the aggressor. 
 
 This plan is not intended to replace other plans — 
 it merely offers some suggestions based upon fund- 
 amental principles which may be incorporated into the 
 plans already under consideration. 
 
 Only the most optimistic could have hoped that the 
 Covenant of the League of Nations drafted at Ver- 
 sailles would pass without opposition. No sooner did 
 the text appear in the press than opposition rang out 
 in the Senate of the United States. Convincing argu- 
 ments by the opponents clashed with equally convinc- 
 ing arguments by the President and the advocates of 
 the League. Let us not doubt the sincerity of those 
 who oppose or advocate its adoption; and listen to 
 both sides. If the League in its present form is not 
 perfect, let us improve it so as to make it acceptable 
 to all. It will probably never be perfect. All nations 
 will have to make some concessions if the world is to 
 be spared a repetition of such a catastrophe as we 
 have just gone through. 
 
 The League must fulfill certain requirements: 
 
 I. It must prevent future wars, for that is its main 
 object. 
 
 15 
 
2. It must not impair to any considerable degree 
 the sovereignty of any nation. 
 
 3. It must simplify rather than complicate inter- 
 national relations. 
 
 4. It must create more friendly relations between 
 nations. 
 
 If the present constitution of the League of Nations 
 had fulfilled these requirements, so many objections 
 from the Senators would not have arisen for these gen- 
 tlemen would welcome a covenant which gave assurance 
 against war, providing it did not seriously conflict with 
 the traditions of the United States of America. While 
 there are a great many objectors to the League of 
 Nations in its present form, very few people are abso- 
 lutely opposed to some sort of a League. 
 
 Why cannot the chosen Representatives of partici- 
 pating nations draft an agreement so wisely and so 
 carefully as to make it accepable and safe for all? 
 They can, but it cannot be done in haste. 
 
 OTHER SUGGESTIONS: 
 
 The League of Nations should make its start in the 
 most simple form. Its main object for the present 
 should be the prevention of future wars. Other in- 
 ternational questions (except those which are essential 
 to the initial program of the League of Nations, as 
 
 16 
 
for instance, disarmament) should be left out for the 
 present. The League once in operation would admit 
 of additions later on. 
 
 Let us then make a start and gradually enlarge its 
 scope as we see it work. Questions of labor and 
 capital, immigration, and of trade may be included 
 later, if the nations so desire. By including too many 
 problems in the initial document of the League of 
 Nations, we invite too many objections and objectors. 
 After the fundamentals have been accepted, other 
 questions will readily yield to inclusion because the 
 machinery will then be in operation. 
 
 Has not the League Document in its present form 
 raised too many questions? Note the opposition and 
 the arguments advanced against the League by the 
 Senators : 
 
 "It will conflict with the Monroe Doctrine" is one. 
 
 "It will give England too great a voting power" is 
 another. 
 
 "It will invite war instead of preventing it" another, 
 and quite a number of very potent and justifiable ob- 
 jections. If no one invalidates these objections — the 
 League of Nations is likely to stand alone and take 
 the chance that all nations will remain friendly to us, 
 even if we are very careful not to offend them. Could 
 we in the case of an American-Mexican controversy 
 be sure that Japan would keep her hands off American 
 
 17 
 
shores? And since time changes the relations and 
 feelings of men, we cannot know who will be our 
 friends and who our enemies fifty years hence. 
 
 Another valid objection to our conclusion from 
 the League is the fact that preparedness is not a suffi- 
 cient security against war. War has taught its pupils 
 a fine lesson — one man may kill a thousand with one 
 stroke. Science may yet invent such effective instru- 
 ments of death that one aeroplane, obscured by the 
 clouds, may, by dropping one poisonous bomb, exterm- 
 inate all animate matter within a radius of a mile or 
 more. It would not require a large equipped army to 
 do the damage. One man can do that if he is daring 
 and skillful and thus a small and poor nation such as 
 Mexico, might hold a weapon which would be a con- 
 stant terror, no matter how strong and well prepared 
 we might be. 
 
 The only factor deterring one nation from attack- 
 ing another in the future, will be the fear of offending 
 the concert of nations. Those who isolate themselves 
 and proclaim that they are ready to take care of 
 themselves in all emergencies, will be deprived of this 
 one and all important protection. 
 
 The opponents to a League must be convinced that 
 its adoption is inevitable. Their opposition, however, 
 is also necessary because it will bring out the weak 
 points in the League and lead to the perfection of the 
 document. 
 
 18 
 
The suggestions here offered will, I believe, over- 
 come some of the objections advanced by our Sena- 
 tors: 
 
 1. The reciprocal method of choosing the Repre- 
 sentatives would, in a measure, remedy the "unbal- 
 anced vote question." The comments by the most 
 conservative statesmen upon this novel method indi- 
 cates that there is considerable merit in such a system. 
 It balances the obligation of fidelity of each delegate. 
 It may not be perfect but it may be a practical founda- 
 tion for further developments. 
 
 2. The bonding of nations is a guarantee against 
 breaking treaties. Bankers and leaders in interna- 
 tional law have, as a rule, commented favorably upon 
 the feasibility of this feature and its practical applica- 
 tion ; but others have objected to it, claiming that the 
 nations would prefer a gentleman's agreement to pen- 
 alty methods. 
 
 This objection may be valid but it is open to ques- 
 tion. Is the requirement of a bond a reflection upon 
 the integrity of a nation? The most reverend gentle- 
 man in the country — even the Chief Justice of the 
 Supreme Court, — if he wished to make a large loan, 
 would be asked by the banker to schedule his prop- 
 erty or give a guarantee. Past experiences has shown 
 that all nations cannot be trusted on a gentleman's 
 agreement. 
 
 Without a thorough study of the appHcation of bond- 
 
 19 
 
ing, one is apt to discard it by the very simple com- 
 ment : "Money did not keep the nations from the last 
 war, why should it in the future?" This is a very 
 superficial argument — it lacks the knowledge of 
 psychology. A nation once in the struggle will spend 
 its last dollar to win, — it does not count the cost or 
 consider how it will pay its debts. 
 
 Quite different would be their attitude if a large 
 sum would have to be forfeited the moment they 
 start to fight. The aggressor would deliberate, before 
 he made his first move, knowing that the moment he 
 broke his word and started a conflict, he would forfeit 
 an enormous sum. 
 
 The psychology of recklessness of man when in 
 danger and the conservatism when in security may be 
 illustrated by comparing the usual attitude of man 
 when he is well or when very ill. When he is well, 
 he is apt to hesitate to spend a dollar to prevent sick- 
 ness, but let him be overtaken by a serious illness and 
 he will ask for the most expensive consultant. So a 
 nation will hesitate to start a conflict with the uncer- 
 tainty of winning and the absolute certainty of for- 
 feiting its bonds whether they win or lose. Would 
 the bonding not be at least a formidable deterrent to 
 war? 
 
 Judging from the opinions of statesmen and pro- 
 fessors of international law to whom a previous copy 
 of this paper has been submitted, I am confident that 
 
 20 
 
an INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE BODY 
 chosen by the RECIPROCAL method and a diplo- 
 matically drawn-up JOINT TREATY OF ALL NA- 
 TIONS (with the additional safeguard of a heavy 
 BOND against its violations) would be a certain step 
 towards the realization of a lasting peace. 
 
 21 
 
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