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 AN APPEAL 
 
 TO 
 
 THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE 
 
 ON THE 
 
 IRectification of Iparliainent 
 
 BY 
 
 SANDFORD FLEMING. G.M.G.. LL.D., Etc 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 1 HE CONDITIONS ON WHICH THE COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE. 
 
 OFFERS TO AWARD 
 
 ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR PRIZE ESSAYS. 
 
 TORONTO : 
 THP: COPF, CLAF^K company, limited. 
 
 1892. 
 
 87 48
 
 AN APPEAL 
 
 TO 
 
 THE CAiNADIAN INSTITUTE 
 
 ON THE 
 
 IRectification of Iparliantent 
 
 BY 
 
 SANDFORD FLEMING, C.M.G., LL.D., Etc. 
 
 TOGETHER WITH THE CONDITIONS ON WHICH THE COUNCIL OF THE IXSTITUTE 
 
 OFFERS TO AWARD 
 
 ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS FOR PRIZE ESSAYS. 
 
 TOKONTU : 
 THE COPP, CLARK COMPANY, Limited. 
 
 1892. 
 
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 CI y<^ 
 
 MEMORANDUM BY THE COUNCIL. 
 
 Early in the present year a letter was received from a member of the 
 ^ Society, Dr. Sandford Fleming, bringing to the attention of the Institute 
 the importance of an enquiry into the possibility of rectifying our electoral 
 and parliam.entary system, with the view of averting many evils now 
 attending it. He appealed to the Institute as a body which, while 
 non-political in its corporate character, is representative through its mem- 
 bers of all shades of opinion. The object expressed was to awaken an 
 interest in a difficult problem, which vitally concerns the whole com- 
 munity, in the hope that some practical and beneficial solution may be 
 obtained. 
 
 The Council has had the matter under serious consideration for some 
 ;; time ; meanwhile an old friend of the Institute, deeply impressed with 
 its importance, and the great public need of a satisfactory solution, has 
 
 c 
 3 
 J placed at the disposal of the Council the sum of one thousand dollars to 
 
 assist, as far as possible, in the attainment of the desired end. 
 
 ^ The matter was formally brought before the Institute, at a largely 
 
 :: attended meeting, on the 20th February last, when after the reading of 
 
 J; Dr. Fleming's communication and the discussion on the "Note" 
 
 <■ attached, the following resolution passed with substantial unanimit\- : — 
 6 
 
 " That the generous offer of a friend (who does not wish his name to 
 be known) to contribute the sum of $i,ooo to aid in obtaining a satis- 
 factory solution of the problem referred to in Di-. Sandford Meming's 
 paper, be accepted with the best thanks of the Institute, and that the 
 Council be empowered to take the necessary ste[)s to obtain essays or 
 treatises, and award the premium to the best workable measure, which, if 
 
 244.^^51
 
 4 MEMORANDUM. 
 
 made law, would give the whole Canadian people equal representation in 
 Parliament, and each elector due weight in the government through 
 Parliament." 
 
 The Council thereupon appointed a .special committee to carefully 
 weigh the whole subject, and consider how best to deal with the matter 
 and carr\- into effect the wishes of the meeting and the authority and 
 trust conferred on it by the Institute. 
 
 After many meetings and conferences, the Council has adopted the 
 recommendations of the special committee, and now appeals to every 
 member of the Institute and to all thoughtful persons within the 
 Dominion, for their assistance in obtaining a complete solution of the 
 problem. 
 
 While the Institute addresses Canadians as being specially interested 
 in the good government of their own land, the prize competition is 
 extended to all persons of whatever country, on equal terms, as set 
 forth in the conditions issued herewith. 
 
 Arthur Harvey, 
 
 President. 
 
 Alan Macdougall, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 Canadian Institute, 
 
 Toronto, April 4th, 1892.
 
 CONDITIONS 
 
 On which The Canadian Institute offers to award prizes for essays on "electoral 
 
 REPRESENTATION AND THE RECTIFICATION OF PARLIAMENT." 
 
 The sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000) has been placed at the disposal of the 
 Council of the Canadian Institute to be awarded in whole or in part by the Institute 
 for the best workable measure (Bill or Act of Parliament) which, if made law, would 
 give the whole Canadian people equal representation in Parliament and each elector 
 due weight in the Government, through Parliament. 
 
 The Council of the Institute accordingly invites essaj's on Electoral Representation 
 and the Rectification of Parliament, accompanied by a draft bill applicable to countries 
 with a Parliamentary System similar in general features to that of Canada. 
 
 The essays will be received by the Council before the first day of July, 1893. As 
 the Transactions of the Institute are printed in Englisli, it is desirable the essays 
 should be in that language. They are to be signed with a motto, and the name and 
 address of the ■uTiter are to be enclosed in a sealed envelope, endorsed with that motto ; 
 the whole under one cover, to be addi-essed 
 
 ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 To Th£ Secretary, 
 
 Canadian Institute, 
 
 Toronto, Canada. 
 
 The sealed envelopes to remain unopened until final adjudication by the Council of the 
 Institute. 
 
 The Council will, immediately after the 1st July, 1893, examine all the Essays 
 received. 
 
 All treatises of merit, to which an apparently "workable measure " is appended 
 (in whicli considoral^le latitude must necessarily be allowed), will then be referred to 
 an independent tribunal for a report. It will be the aim of the Council to liave this 
 tribunal comi)osed of men of the highest sbinding in their several spheres, comprising 
 persons learned in political .science, law and practical politics. 
 
 The Council proposes that one award be given of not less tiian five hundred 
 dollars (S500), and others, proportionate to the merits of the works submitted. 
 
 If the essfiys and draft bills shall not be thought l)y tlie al)ove tribunal of sufficient 
 merit to entitle them to receive the principal" or any premium) or if tlie Council on 
 receiving tlie report sliall bo of that opinion, the Council resei'ves to itself the right 
 not to award any ])remiinn. 
 
 The Canadian Institute reserves U> itself the right to publish the successful essays 
 and draft bills to which iireiuiiniis may bo awarded. 
 
 Canadian In.stitutk, ALAN MACDOUGALL, 
 
 Toronto, .April 4tli, 1802. Secretary.
 
 Ottawa, January ist, 1S92. 
 Alan Macdoiigall, Esq., 
 
 Corresponding Secretary Canadian Institute, Toronto. 
 
 Sir. — I am desirous of bringing to the attention of the Canadian 
 Institute a subject of more than ordinary importance, and to my 
 mind, especially so at this period in our history. I beg leave to 
 refer to the accompanying " Note " by which it may be seen that the 
 design in view is the removal of certain evils which unfortunately beset 
 us as a people. 
 
 I cannot resist the impression that the examination of the facts presents 
 a scientific problem, in no way unworthy the consideration of the 
 Institute ; and if a solution of the difficulties presented be possible, it can 
 best be obtained by bringing the subject to the attention of properly 
 qualified minds. It is the duty of us all to seek the best means of 
 serving our country, and on this ground I appeal to the Institute to 
 extend its consideration to the matter which I respectfully ask per- 
 mission to lay before its members. The Institute, from its recognized 
 character as a scientific and literary body, holds a peculiarly favourable 
 position to entertain the consideration of the subject. It may be briefly 
 described as an inquiry into the possibility of rectifying our electoral and 
 parliamentary system, with the view of averting many evils now attend- 
 ing it, and of promoting the common happiness by terminating party 
 conflict, and assuring political peace and freedom, by the removal of the 
 painful and depressing influences from which we suffer. 
 
 I feel therefore warranted in appealing to the Institute, as a body non- 
 political in its corporate character, but which, nevertheless, is representa- 
 tive through its members of all shades of opinion, to give the weight of 
 its name in directing public attention to the subject. 
 
 I trust I am not too sanguine in expressing the hope, that by the 
 weight and influence of the Institute, so great and so general an interest 
 in the subject m-iy be awakened, as to lead to important and beneficial 
 results. Should a practical solution to the problem be obtained, it will 
 be attended with the happiest consequences, and the Institute will have 
 conferred a lasting benefit on the Dominion. 
 
 Along with the c?ccompan}ing "Note" I enclose a list of writings 
 
 bearing on the subject of this communication, some of which arc of 
 
 deep interest. 
 
 I have the honor to be, Sir, 
 
 Your obedient .servant, 
 (Signed) Sandforu Fleming.
 
 NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION AND THE 
 RECTIFICATION OF PARLIAMENT. 
 
 There are in Canada few men past middle age, who have not long felt 
 the unsatisfactory condition of much which appertains to pubhc Hfe in 
 the Dominion. There are not a few who have from year to year hoped 
 that the unfortunate features in that which we call " politics " would in 
 some way disappear. Recent revelations have, however, rudely dispelled 
 such hope, and have confirmed the fears of those who foresaw that as 
 the tendency of the evils was progressive, we could not reasonably look 
 for an improvement. 
 
 Thoughtful persons, having the welfare of the country at heart, are thus 
 impelled to give serious attention to the subject, with a view of consider- 
 ing the possibility of securing some beneficial change. The examination 
 naturally takes the direction of an enquiry into the origin of the evils 
 with which we are confronted, and the causes which persistently keep 
 them associated with government, which, therefore tends to become 
 mis-government. 
 
 The objects of government may be thus defined : To maintain peace 
 and security, to increase prosperity and wealth, to advance moral and 
 intellectual development, and generally to promote the good and the 
 good-will of the people. 
 
 With us the universal belief is, that the representative system is best 
 calculated to attain these ends. In other conntries the representative 
 system has long been a constitutional reality, and from time to time 
 modifications have been made in the system to render it more workable 
 and more beneficial ; but, notwithstanding the various changes which 
 have been made, it cannot be held that its full and complete development 
 has yet been attained. In Canada we arc familiar with many of the 
 defects of popular government. In the neighboring republic the defects 
 in its adaptation are still more marked, and the political condition 
 is consequently far from satisfactory. In Great Britain, the cradle of 
 modern representative government, where the system should have 
 attained the in'gliest perfection, similar evils have been developed. 
 
 That the political evils which everywhere attract attention are attribut- 
 able to imperfect methods of carrying out the representative system may 
 justly be inferred. The fundamental principle of representative or
 
 10 NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPKESENTATION. 
 
 popular government is, that the sovereign power of a State rests in and 
 proceeds from the people, and that it is exercised by the representatives 
 of the people assembled in Parliament. We have accepted this the 
 democratic theory as our principle of government ; but an examination 
 will show that the methods adopted in carrying it into practice, have 
 failed in their object. We. in fact, follow a course which, in its results, 
 operates in a manner diametrically opposed to the true theory of our 
 political constitution. The theory is that the mass of the electors shall 
 be present in the persons and heard in the voices of those who constitute 
 the national assembly or Parliament. Such undoubtedly is the principle 
 of government which we aim to carry into effect, but it has never in practice 
 been even approximately attained ; moreover, it is impossible of attain- 
 ment so long as members of Parliament continue to be chosen according 
 to the present method of election. The obstacles to obtaining a true repre- 
 sentation of the people in Parliament are due to the combined influence 
 of two causes. The Jirst is the expedient universally adopted in choosing 
 members of the legislature by a majority of votes in each constituency. 
 The second is the division of the people and the representatives into two 
 great parties. The second, indeed, follows in a great measure from the 
 first ; undoubtedly the primary radical error is in assuming that the 
 aggregate numerical majorities in the several constituencies are represen- 
 tative of the whole community. On this assumption, all those who do 
 not vote with the majorities are unrepresented in Parliament. The 
 aggregate majorities represent only a portion, in place of the whole 
 people ; the electors who voted for the defeated candidates, together with 
 those who had no vote, or did not vote, remain unrepresented. Under 
 these circumstances, even if the whole elected body gives its unanimous 
 support to the administration, we do not obtain a true and perfect model 
 of popular government, that is to say, a people self governed. We have but 
 the government of a part over a part ; possibly, but not necessarily, the 
 major over the minor part. It is proper, however, in considering the ques- 
 tion, that we should deduct the members in opposition, and then we still 
 less have the government we are told we possess ; that is the government 
 of the people. We then have practically government by the minor over 
 the major part. It can be conclusively shown that the minor and 
 governing part is but a fraction of the whole, and that we are, as a 
 matter of fact, usually governed by this fractional part. There cannot 
 be a doubt that from this circumstance spring the unhappy forces which 
 so much disturb the harmony of our political machinery. 
 
 It has elsewhere been made clear by actual statistics, that the electoral 
 methods which we follow prevent a large portion of the community from 
 being represented in Parliament, and exclude a still larger portion, gener-
 
 NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 11 
 
 ally the great majority of the people, from any share or participation, 
 directly or indirectly, in the government. It has been likewise established 
 that in place of the supreme power being exercised by the people's 
 representatives, the whole power of the State is absolutely possessed by 
 a minorit}', and practically by an exceedingly small minority. Thus we 
 utterly fail in attaining what is understood to be representative govern- 
 ment ; in its place we have acquired a totally different and perverted 
 system — a system of the character of an oligarchy, and, it is hardly too 
 much to say, exhibiting some of its worst features. We have accepted 
 the fallac}' that a part is equal to the whole. We give supreme 
 authority to a part, numerically in the minority, and we allow it to 
 assume the power which should be exercised by the whole ; at the 
 same time we exclude a large part, generally the majority of the people 
 from the rights and privileges which by theory they possess. 
 
 Is it surprising that this system should result in the constant recur- 
 rence of difficulty ? Would it not rather be a matter of surprise if those 
 excluded from participation in government, or from representation in 
 Parliament, should quietly acquiesce in the injustice .'' It is only natural 
 that they should resent the deprivation, and strive to regain their lost 
 rights and privileges, by waging political warfare against the men who 
 for the moment rule ; hence it is that they employ every means, good 
 and evil, to drive them from power. The dominant party for the time 
 being, on their part strenuously defend the position they hold, and leave 
 nothing undone to thwart the efforts of their adversaries to displace 
 them. On the one side, there is a persistent and relentless attack upon 
 the party controlling the government ; on the other a life and death 
 struggle for political existence. Thus we have the political peace of the 
 communit}' continuallly disturbed, and we witness, in and out of Par- 
 liament, a never-ending conflict with all its concomitant evils. Such 
 to-day is the chronic condition of public life in Canada, whatever party 
 be in power, and it seems to be much the same in all countries similarly 
 circumstanced. In the work of Sir Henry Maine on popular government 
 the condition of party government, is mildly described as "a system of 
 government consisting in half the cleverest men in the country taking 
 the utmost pains to prevent the other half from governing." 
 
 It is easy to be seen that the source to which we may trace our political 
 difficulties is an incomplete, if not absolutely false, electoral system. The 
 method of election which we follow, in its effect disfranchises half the 
 population entitled to representation in Parliament, and, without an>' 
 doubt whatever, it is this grave defect in our political system, which throws 
 all our constitutional machinery out of gear. It is this defect which
 
 12 NOTE ON ELECTOKAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 brings the organized parties of the present day into being, and which 
 animates and intensifies party feeling. It is this defect which leads to 
 party abuses and vices, and while this defect remains, improvement is 
 not probable, indeed, unless humanity changes its nature, it may be 
 affirmed that any marked improvement is not possible. 
 
 Glancing over the pages of history, it cannot be denied that a party had 
 its good side as well as its bad in the early days of representative govern- 
 ment. There were special objects to be attained, and questions of great 
 importance to be settled. But great questions do not last forever, in 
 some way they are disposed of, and one by one disappear from the 
 political surface. If parties had depended on great questions to keep 
 them alive, they would have long since perished, and would not to-da> 
 be known as permanent organizations. With truth it may be said that 
 we stand upon the graves of great questions, and it is impossible to con- 
 ceive that the ghosts of dead issues arc of themselves sufficient to main- 
 tain the vitality of parties for any length of time. But every effect is 
 associated with a cause, and the jtarties which flourish to-day have other 
 and adequate cause for their continued activity. Until this cause be 
 removed, parties will survive as living antagonistic forces to disturb 
 the peace and political harmony of the nation. Until the day comes 
 when Parliament shall be properly constituted, and we have represen- 
 tative government, in fact, we cannot look for a truce in political war- 
 fare ; until the whole electorate be fairly represented in the national 
 assembly — a cessation of hostilities is, in the nature of things, impossible. 
 
 In order clearly to understand a guiding principle of party govern- 
 ment and gain an insight into the ideas of leading party men, let us 
 endeavor to ascertain their aims and aspirations. Suppose we ask those 
 in opposition to the ruling power what their views are with respect 
 to the future. Will they not declare their determination to gain office, 
 and that their hope and desire is to hold - the reins of government 
 permanently ? If we make the same enquiry of the ruling party, will 
 they not tell us that they have no intention of throwing up the power 
 they hold, and that they will, if they can, retain power always. 
 
 Is not the cardinal idea of each party, that it shall exclusively rule ? 
 That is to say, the ideal government of each for itself is a class govern- 
 ment, the class to consist of the men of the party. If this be the logical 
 inference it seems to be indisputable, that party government is utterly at 
 variance with free institutions. 
 
 All history goes to prove, and it is indeed a necessary result of our 
 human nature that the end of government is primarily and essentially
 
 NOTE OX ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 13 
 
 the welfare of the ruling class. It an oligarchy governs, the first and 
 great aim is the benefit of the oligarchy. Similarly with respect to a 
 party, and the consequences are the same whatever party may govern. 
 This rule has always obtained, and we may rest satisfied that it will be 
 the rule to the end of time. If, therefore, our object be the welfare and 
 well being of the whole people, it is perfectly clear that the whole and 
 not a part must govern. It becomes a fundamental necessity, therefore, 
 that some way must be devised by which we shall obtain government 
 by the whole people, or by representatives or deputies of the whole 
 people, if we are to make any advance in the art of government. 
 
 It is quite true that in Canada we follow much the same methods as in 
 Great Britain, where representative institutions took their origin, where 
 the greatest experience has been obtained, and where we look for the 
 highest perfection. It is undeniable that elections determined by the 
 numerical majority of votes, and the division of the electors themselves 
 into two great parties, are methods which have been practised in the 
 mother country more or less since the latter end of the reign of 
 Charles II. It must nevertheless be admitted that the numerical 
 majority system is but a rough and ready means of choosing representa- 
 tives, and that party government is found in the United Kingdom as 
 elsewhere to be productive of serious political evils. Moreover, even if 
 these traditional methods be held to be the only available means of 
 carrying on government in a country which has emerged from feudalism, 
 the circumstances of their application on this side of the Atlantic are not 
 the same. Here the whole people are on equal footing. There is no 
 privileged class, all are equal in the eye of the law, possessing identical 
 rights and privileges. It is our pride to be in close alliance with Great 
 Britain, and our boast to be an integral portion of the British Empire, 
 but in local government we possess the fullest measure of independence, 
 retaining control of our own affairs, untrammelled by the hereditary 
 rights and practice which spring from past social and political con- 
 ditions. In the mother country there arc ways and usages which arc 
 historically intelligible, and among them may be classed the political 
 methods we have named ; the circumstances on this side of the Atlantic 
 are however different, and there will be less difficulty in discarding 
 such ways and usages, if they are found seriously to impede progress or 
 interfere with the essential principles of representative government, "the 
 government of the whole by the whole." 
 
 In Canada we have been accorded full liberty to manage our own 
 affairs .substantially in our own way. There is no cast iron rule which 
 we arc bound to follow ; there are no theoretical impediments to consti-
 
 14 NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 tutional changes which we may generally desire ; no reason can be 
 adduced why we should rigidly adhere to usages of the past, if we have 
 been made to feel that they are productive of evil. 
 
 Feeling clear on these points, two covu'ses are open. First, we may 
 adopt the laisser-aller policy, and allow matters to go on as now, with 
 the prospect, nay, the certainty, that the evils we experience will become 
 greater, and even more confirmed. Second, we may make an honest 
 attempt to rectify Parliament, and obtain a government based on the true 
 principles of popular representation. 
 
 If we are satisfied that some change in our political methods will be 
 advantageous to us, we are not only free to make the amendment, but 
 it is a duty which we owe to ourselves and to our posterity, to endeavour 
 as much as we are able, to perfect the organization of representative 
 government, so that in this Dominion it may attain the fullest develop- 
 ment and most symmetrical form. 
 
 Following the second course, the problem which challenges our 
 attention is : to devise a scheme of electoral representation, by which the 
 whole electorate maybe equally recognized in one deliberative body, and 
 every elector may have an equitable share through Parliament in the 
 general administration of public affairs. It is, in short, to perfect our 
 constitutional system so that every interest within the Dominion shall 
 be fairly represented in its government. 
 
 This problem may be difficult of solution, but considering its vast 
 importance it ought not, in this inventive and constructive age, to be 
 insoluble. What is a party but a portion of the people organized for 
 political purposes ? If it be practicable to organize two political parties 
 in the community, it should be quite possible to form one organization, the 
 outcome of that one organization to be the Parliament we are in search 
 of. We are led to think that political organizations are costly affairs. 
 In the one case, each of the two parties obtains funds from private 
 sources or secretly and improperly from public sources. In the other 
 case the expenditure on a single organization would be purely in the 
 public interests, it could be made openly under the highest authority 
 and be a proper direct charge on the public exchequer. 
 
 The writer has elsewhere given expression to his views on this subject, 
 and has submitted certain principles by means of which Parliament might 
 be constituted so as to represent truly the whole electorate. While he 
 does not attempt to furnish a scheme, complete in all its details, the 
 maturing of which would indeed require much time, much consultation
 
 NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 15 
 
 and much consideration, he ventures to think that such a scheme as the 
 circumstances demand, could, without great difficulty, be arranged and 
 made perfectly workable ; that while conserving all that is good in our 
 present constitution, and without involving any radical or revolu- 
 tionary change, we could have presented to us a plan by which we would 
 realize in our parliamentary system the true idea of representative 
 government. 
 
 In forming a new scheme of electoral representation, the central idea 
 should be to constitute Parliament so that in reality it will be "the nation 
 in essence." With this central idea constantly in view, it would be found 
 that no good purpose could be secured by giving exaggerated import- 
 ance, as is often done at present, to abstract political questions during 
 the period of a general election. It would be in the interest of the whole 
 community to choose men to sit in Parliament who are best qualified by 
 common repute to represent the electoral mind, and to leave the settle- 
 ment of all public questions to the assembled legislature. Representa- 
 tives ought not to be considered mere delegates to echo conclusions, dic- 
 tated perhaps by whim or passion, or formed on insufficient evidence 
 and immature judgment. It is well known that often during general 
 elections one question brought into prominence will decide which 
 party shall rule ; while in Parliament many questions arise, some of 
 which may involve far more important considerations than the one which 
 receives special attention at the moment of the election. It is not suffi- 
 cient that members should represent their constituents on the one question, 
 or on several questions. The electorate should be well and thoroughly 
 represented on all questions which may arise throughout the duration 
 of Parliament. What is needed in a member is a man of rectitude, good 
 ability and good sense, in direct touch with, and in full sympathy with 
 those whom he is called upon to represent. The duty of the electors is to 
 select the men who have the proper qualifications, and leave the final 
 settlement of every public question to Parliament. When Parliament 
 assembles, each re[)resentativc should feel himself unpledged, and free to 
 speak and vote on his own clear convictions, unbiassed by preconceived 
 opinions, formed possibly upon incomplete information. In Parliament a 
 member following a debate has the means of acquiring a more perfect 
 knowledge of the subject under discussion than he previously had, or 
 which the generality of those, who have selected him to represent them, 
 cfjuld possibly have. The position of a member provides the best 
 opportunity of obtaining familiarit)' with all sides of a pubh'c question. 
 He will hear the most eminent men in [)ublic life, he will have access to 
 the best evidence which can be obtained. For all these reasons, repre-
 
 10 NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 sentatives of the people in Parliament should be left free to act accord- 
 ing to the dictates of their own judgment, after full examination, and full 
 consideration of every subject. It is not possible for an electorate to 
 determine in advance, the varied demands for legislation or the conclu- 
 sions which should be reached on the many questions which will arise.* 
 The greater is the necessity, therefore, that they should select men of the 
 proper calibre to represent them, men whose ability and reputation is 
 well established. The representative on his part will owe his constitu- 
 ents the exercise of his best judgment and the maintenance of perfect 
 rectitude in all matters. 
 
 This point has an important bearing on any new scheme of representa- 
 tion. While the electorate has the right, and should whenever necessary, 
 exercise the right to discuss public questions, it is obviously infinitely 
 more important for the constituencies to obtain as members, intelligent 
 independent men, known to be generally sound on vital questions, in 
 preference to those who are willing, in order to obtain a seat, to pledge 
 their opinion on any given question. 
 
 Legislation is not so simple that it may be undertaken by any one. It 
 is not a matter of indifference who undertakes it, or what character of 
 legislation is obtained. We should have as legislators the wisest, the 
 most clear-headed, the best informed, the most just and honest members 
 of the community. The average elector may or may not be well 
 grounded in matters of legislation, or in forming correct opinions on 
 all subjects ; but he can, without any doubt or difficulty, exercise his 
 judgment as to who he can trust, and it becomes him to choose some 
 trustworthy man as his proxy to represent him and deliberate with 
 other trustworthy men ; and having done so, he can leave the decision 
 on all legislative questions with confidence to the Parliament which they 
 would constitute. 
 
 A Parliament so constituted would be a miniature copy of the aggregate 
 
 * It would be absurd to throw on the people at large the actual work of legislation, — ^since 
 the people only form general aims and wishes, for which it is the business of the legislative 
 expert to supply appropriate particular rules fit to be enacted, — but that these general aims and 
 •wishes should be regarded as paramount by a representative legislature. And certainly it would 
 be difficult for the citizens at large to perform effectively the complicated discussion that is 
 often required to mould a legislative scheme into the most acceptable form. Nor would it be 
 practicable for the constituents to direct the action of the representative in every detail during 
 such discussions ; since it would sometimes happen that compromises and modifications were 
 suggested at the last moment, rendering any previously expressed wishes of the constituents 
 irrelevant to the issue finally put to the vote ; while to give time for a reference to the con- 
 stituencies in all cases would involve intolerable delay. — Sidgwkk, Elements of Politics London, 
 i8gi, p. 53g.
 
 NOTE OX ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 17 
 
 electoral mind — a microcosmus of the world it would represent. The 
 legislature of the country would become a focal center, where all the 
 currents of national life would mingle unembittered by party feeling, 
 where all aspirations and impulses would come into friendly contact, 
 where the different rays of public opinion would meet under the most 
 favorable conditions, to modify each other into a unity of expression. 
 
 Among the important consequences to which a rectification of Parlia- 
 ment as proposed, would lead, there would necessarily be a modification 
 in the formation of the executive, and in the relation of the ministry to 
 Parliament and the people. 
 
 In order to maintain the harmonious operation of every branch of 
 gov^ernment, the chief executive and administrative body ought to be in 
 full unison with Parliament ; that is to say, Ministers of the Crown 
 should have the entire confidence of the representatives of the people. 
 As in Great Britain, we retain in the Dominion the form of Monarchy in 
 connection with democratic principles. In all forms of government there 
 must be a central authority, from which the national power for the 
 time emanates ; the same holds true in this respect in a Republic as in a 
 constitutional monarchy; it is from this source appointments to office 
 are made, including those constituting the supreme executive. Follow- 
 ing this principle, ministers should continue to be appointed by the 
 representative of the Sovereign ; public policy, however, would exact 
 that the chief advisers of the Crown should be chosen from and sup- 
 ported by, if not actually nominated by. Parliament. We would thus 
 secure harmonious action and obtain the needed guarantees that " the 
 wishes and interests of the people would on all occasions be faithfully 
 represented and guarded." 
 
 The intimate relations between the Executive, Parliament and the 
 people, between the government and the governed, would give to the chief 
 administrative body, the greatest possible stability. It would stand as a 
 central unit to command universal respect. The government so formed 
 would not be greater than Parliament, it would be the executive of 
 Prrliament to exercise all the power deputed to Parliament by the people. 
 The executive would be supported by and be amenable to Parliament, and 
 for the reason that Parliament would represent the whole people, the gov- 
 ernment would rest on the broad basis of the entire nation. Thus we 
 would establish our constitutional structure in a manner and with material 
 .so good that it could not be easily shaken. Its foundation would consist 
 of a great electoral body comprising the best of the mass of the community. 
 Its superstructure, a representative body of the best of the whole body 
 2
 
 18 NOTK ON ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 of electors. Its summit, a ministerial body the choice of the represent- 
 ative body, and from the apex of this noble political pyramid would be 
 reflected the lustre of the Imperial Crown itself. What constitutional 
 fixhvic could be imagined which would give greater unity, greater solidity, 
 and greater dignity ? 
 
 Many will agree with the writer that it is our duty to face the problem of 
 our political difficulties, and make representative government in practice, 
 what it professes to be in theory — Government of the whole by the 
 whole. He has elsewhere submitted his views and offered suggestions 
 as to the means of overcoming the evils of our present system. He 
 disclaims any pretence to regard the alternative he has submitted as the 
 only or the best solution. In recognizing the gravity of the situation, 
 which indeed is apparent to each of us, he feels that we must, in all 
 earnestness, try to supplement the shortcomings, and eradicate the 
 vices, of politics ; with that view he has ventured to offer to the 
 public the opinions he has formed, simply as a humble contribution to the 
 consideration of a vital question in which we are all concerned. One 
 feature of the proposal may require a word of explanation. An electoral 
 system was suggested by which small groups of electors having identical 
 opinions would select deputies by whom and from whom the ultimate 
 representatives would be chosen, the design being to give every elector an 
 equal interest in the election, and through the members elected, an equal 
 voice in Parliament and an equal indirect share in the government. In 
 order peacefully to overcome every obstacle and remove all possibility of 
 friction in special cases the writer suggested falling back on the Apos- 
 tolic method of settlement by Lot. It is not a new principle of settle- 
 ment in matters where disputes might otherwise arise ; it was favoured 
 by the old Greek philosophers ; it is sanctioned by the Old and New 
 Testament ; it is employed to-day under the Danish electoral law of 
 1867 ; and it has been employed for centuries by the Moravians, in select- 
 ing fit men for the ministerial office. If employed at all in any electoral 
 system, its use should be restricted to those cases in which no decisive 
 judgment could otherwise be formed, and invariably its use should be ex- 
 ercised with due solemnity, if held expedient, before a court of justice. 
 
 The writer has ventured to suggest, as a corollary to the proposed 
 rectification of Parliament, that the executive council should be nomin- 
 ated by the assembled representatives of the people. There are reasons 
 for limiting the term of office of ministers, while at the same time there 
 are important advantages to accrue from a continuity of administration. 
 Both objects might be attained by an arrangement which would necessi- 
 tate the retirement of a certain proportion of ministers by rotation each
 
 NOTE OX ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 19 
 
 year. They might, however, be ehgible for re-appointment. The prin- 
 ciple of retirement by rotation may indeed be applied with advantage 
 to Parliament itself If one-fourth or one-fifth of the representatives 
 retired annually for re-election or to be replaced by others, Parliament 
 would be regularly renewed from year to year, and by this means the 
 Government and Parliament would continually be brought into direct 
 touch with the people, and thus enabled faithfully to interpret the 
 national mind. 
 
 Bearing on the proposal to rectify Parliament, it may be confidently 
 affirmed that the present method of electing members does not furnish a 
 correct reflex of the national mind. If the two parties into which the 
 country is politically divided be evenly balanced, and if at a general 
 election one of the parties, by skilful tactics or other means, succeeds in 
 many of the constituencies in gaining the upper hand, however slightly 
 in each case, the opposite party may be almost excluded from repre- 
 sentation in the assembly. How misleading, therefore, it is to assume 
 that the majority in Parliament represents the aggregate public opinion 
 of the nation ! and yet many are apt to do so until undeceived at the 
 next general election by the movement of the political pendulum to the 
 other side. The consequence of these administrative revolutions is often 
 extremely unfortunate for the country, as each party on accession to 
 power endeavours generally to reverse as much as it can the policy of 
 its predecessor. This condition of unstable equilibriumj inseparable from 
 party government, would, t is believed, be obviated, while continuity of 
 policy, subject only to desirable modifications from time to time, would 
 be secured by the plan suggested. 
 
 Election by majorities, it is obvious, is the immediate cause of this 
 instability. Experience everywhere goes to show that elections arc 
 often carried by exceedingly narrow majorities, so that a compara- 
 tive handful of electors, distributed over the constituencies, could, 
 by reversing their votes, transfer the majority in Parliament from 
 one party to the other, and entirely change the character of the 
 administration. 
 
 This phase of election by majorities has been examined by Mr. II. R. 
 Droop, in a paper read before the Statistical Society in i88i, in connec- 
 tion with the general elections of the United Kingdom of 1868, 1874, 
 and 1880. Mr. Droop points out that in 1868 it would have been possible 
 by the change of only 1,447 votes to have transferred 66 "Seats to 
 opposite sides. In 1874, if but 1,269 voters had reversed their votes, 64 
 seats might have been changed ; and in 1880 if 1,929 electors had reversed
 
 20 NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 their votes 91 seats would have been changed from opposite party sides.* 
 Similar illustrations of the great uncertainty, and the condition of un- 
 stable political equilibrium which results from the system of election by 
 majorities are common among ourselves, establishing how disturbing and 
 unsatisfactory the system proves. We should aim to substitute for these 
 constantly recurring violent changes a means of securing continuity of 
 government by a more natural process. By the annual change of a 
 proportion of the members as proposed, we would obtain a settled 
 government, which would mould itself to the varying needs of the 
 people ; we would, in fact, substitute government by regular evolution 
 for government by party revolution. 
 
 One of the strong arguments advanced by the advocates of party 
 government is that by means of the party organizations an interest is 
 stimulated among the electors in public affairs, and without this stimulant 
 it would be difficult to get voters to go to the polls. If this argument be 
 well founded, the difficulty might be easily overcome through the instru- 
 mentality of properly devised machinery which would carry the polls to 
 the electors. Such a device need not be widely different from the 
 
 * While these pages are passing through the press, a general election has been held in the 
 Province of Quebec, which affords a good illustration of the instability, inseparable from the 
 system of election by majorities. The party until recently in power, under the leadership of 
 Mr. Mercier, had a large majority in the assembly. The general election of March 8th, 1892, 
 resulted as follows : — 
 
 Supporters of De Boucherville . . 54 
 
 Supporters of Mercier 17 
 
 Independents 2 
 
 Total 73 
 
 An examination of all the majorities shows that it would have been possible for 804 electors dis- 
 tributed over twenty constituencies, by reversing their votes, to have made the returns as 
 follows : — 
 
 Supporters of Mercier 37 
 
 Supporters of De Boucherville 34 
 
 Independents . . 2 
 
 Total 73 
 
 If in 32 constituencies 2,066 electors had changed their votes, the returns would have stood as 
 follows : — 
 
 Supporters of Mercier 49 
 
 Supporters of De Boucherville 22 
 
 Independents 2 
 
 Total 73 
 
 On such slight contingencies as the change of a few votes under this system the complexion of the 
 government of a Province has been completely revolutionized. Respicc, aspice, prospice.
 
 NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 21 
 
 means employed for effecting assessment purposes, or for taking the 
 census. 
 
 Since the views of the writer on this subject have been made pubHc, 
 he has had the advantage of examining other schemes which at differ- 
 ent times have been proposed for improving the electoral system. It 
 is recognized by many that the present unsatisfactory system cannot 
 be viewed as permanent, and that it must in the end give place to 
 some better method. 
 
 Among the various proposals the electoral scheme of Mr. Thomas 
 Hare, propounded in England in 1857 for the representation of minorities, 
 appears to have met with the greatest favor. The late Right Honorable 
 Henry Fawcett thus speaks of it : " It can hardly be denied that the 
 advantages of this scheme preponderate immensely over its disadvan- 
 tages, and these last appear insignificant compared with the disadvantages 
 of the present system." In the writings of Mr. Fawcett published in 
 1873, we find a short explanation of Mr. Hare's scheme of representation. 
 The explanation is a clear and concise exposition of the plan, reduced to 
 its simplest elements, and is referred to in connection with Mr. Hare's 
 treatise, by John Stuart Mill, in the following terms : " The more these 
 works are studied, the stronger, I venture to predict, will be the impres- 
 sion of the perfect feasibility of the scheme, and its transcendent advan- 
 tages. Such, and so numerous are these, that in my conviction they 
 place Mr. Hare's plan among the very greatest improvements yet made 
 in the theory and practice of government." 
 
 It is not a little remarkable that a Danish statesman, Mr. Andrae, 
 should have arrived at the same conclusions as Mr. Hare, by a different 
 process and from an entirely different standpoint. That the scheme is 
 capable of practical application, must be admitted from the fact that its 
 main features were embraced in the electoral law of Denmark passed in 
 1855, for the election of representatives to the Rigsraad. Mr. Andrae's 
 method was likewise applied in i<S67 to tlic law for constituting the 
 Landsthing, and it is still in successful operation.* It will be seen then, 
 that the scheme of minority representation, for which we are indebted to 
 Messrs. Hare and Andrae independently of each other, has had the 
 advantage of an experience of over thirty years. Thus establishing be- 
 yond all question, that there is no inherent obstacle in the subject itself, 
 to the securing of an improved system of electoral representation. Mr. 
 Hare's scheme is .so important, that a short explanation of it together 
 with other papers on the subject, is appended. This reference to the 
 
 * His Excellency Count de .Sponneck, Danish minister at Washington, writes March 26th, 1892, 
 " the operation of the election law is generally thought to have been very successful."
 
 22 NOTE OS ELECTORAL REPaESEN I'ATION. 
 
 scheme may be concluded in the author's words : " If by the means pro- 
 posed, or by any which are better and wiser, an electoral system can be 
 established which in the work of forming a representative body, shall 
 succeed in calling into action all the thought and intellect of the nation, 
 the effect would be to create a new object of enquiry and study, extending 
 over a field of which we know not the bounds. All attempts to engage 
 society in political conflicts for abstract principles would be henceforth 
 vain, and statesmen would seek to build their fame on something more 
 solid and durable than party triumphs." 
 
 The great aim and desire of Messrs. Hare, Andrae, Fawcett, Mill, and 
 writers who share their opinions, have been to secure the representation of 
 minorities. Will it beheld as a political heresy to say that there should 
 be no minorities to represent ? But such is the view of the writer who 
 inclines to the opinion that, outside the walls of Parliament, minorities 
 and majorities should practically be unknown ; and moreover that 
 unless the whole electorate, as a body, finds its representation in the 
 national assembly, we do not obtain a true representative Parliament. 
 It is natural that there should be differences of opinion. Such diver- 
 gences of view are to be expected on everj^ question brought forward for 
 decision, when considered on its merits; moreover to act with ordinary 
 prudence and wisdom there should be deliberation in public affairs ; but 
 deliberation to be of any use must precede decision. It may be asked is 
 the public mind in the heat of a general election in the best state to 
 deliberate on all important legislative questions, or on any question ? 
 and can there be any effective deliberation without the electors coming 
 together? Both these queries can only be answered in the negative. 
 It is physically impossible for all the electors to meet in order to 
 deliberate, and in consequence, deliberation can only be effected by 
 deputies or substitutes who assembling in a recognized form will satis- 
 factorily represent the electors, and by their deliberation and decisions 
 will effect substantially the same results as the electors themselves would 
 effect if they had deliberated and voted in one body. Thus it is that 
 Parliament properly constituted becomes the deliberative assembly of 
 the nation, and it is quite obvious, that deliberation and decision on all 
 questions ought to be the function of Parliament alone. This principle 
 being recognised, in Parliament majorities and minorities would be as 
 diversified as the questions discussed. Members in all cases would give 
 their votes according to their own clear, independent convictions, un- 
 fettered by pledges or party ties. A stereotyped majority and minority 
 are not possible in a true deliberative body ; there would, therefore, be 
 none in the free Parliament we have portrayed. If such a parliament
 
 NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 23 
 
 can be constituted, if it be possible to elect members on some better 
 plan than that now followed, and on sounder principles than that 
 of a numerical majority, the foundation of standing parties would dis- 
 appear. Neither inside nor outside of Parliament would there be the 
 same causes to develop the growth of the dualism which now exists. 
 There would be an absence of purpose in any effort to inflame the 
 passions or stimulate antagonism in the community. In place of 
 these evils there would be scope and encouragement for the awaken- 
 ing of a calm patriotism, and the nobler instincts of all classes, and 
 under such conditions, it is believed that men of capacity and wisdom, 
 and of good conscience, with minds evenly balanced, would be pre- 
 ferred and generally would be chosen as representatives. A Parliament 
 thus constituted would, as much as it could be possible, be free from a 
 contentious spirit. Its members would be in a fit state to exercise their 
 highest reason in the positions they had been selected to fill. 
 
 If the means be put in practice of constituting a Parliament of the 
 whole people, by whatever plan may ultimately be found best, the great 
 and permanent cause of political conflict would be removed, inasmuch as 
 no interest would be excluded from the legislative body, and no indi- 
 vidual elector would be deprived of his fair share in the general govern- 
 ment through Parliament, in which he would be represented. Thus it 
 would result that party organizations would lose support, their lines of 
 cleavage would be obliterated, and the party divisions which now form a 
 dualism in the State would disappear and practically become blended 
 into one. No doubt occasions would from time to time arise, when mem- 
 bers in Parliament would differ in opinion on important questions, and 
 those of the same way of thinking would co-operate in order to carry 
 their views to a successful issue. Under such circumstances it might, 
 with truth, be said that the combinations formed would be of the nature 
 of parties, but they would be merely special and temporary associations, 
 to cease in each case as the questions would be disposed of. There would 
 no longer be the same cause to induce the organization of permanent 
 parties with their members arrayed as foemen one side against the other 
 — voting on all questions identically. There would be no raison d'etre 
 for two such antagonistic forces, as now exist, with fixed antipathies, dis- 
 puting under party banners every inch of ground, and mutually wasting 
 their energies in ccasless conflict. 
 
 It will be generally admitted among thoughtful men that one of the 
 
 most pressing needs of the Canadian people at this moment is the satis- 
 
 actory solution of the problem set forth ; and the purpose of these brief
 
 •J-t NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPBESENTATION. 
 
 remarks will have been attained if it be shown that a way may be opened 
 by which the flames of political discord may be extinguished, and the 
 virus of evil which taints our body politic be neutralized. 
 
 A Parliament, fairly representing the whole people, would realize the 
 idea of a true deliberative and legislative unit. Devotion to country 
 would be substituted for devotion to party, and the tendency would 
 be, not to exhaust and neutralize the mental forces of the people's 
 representatives in fruitless agitation and barren debates, but to bring the 
 united energies of the wisest and ablest statesmen on both sides to 
 act with purposes in common. They would no longer appear as political 
 enemies to lead on the rank and file in successive faction fights, and in- 
 terminable struggles ; if ever contentions arose it would be in generous 
 efforts to determine who could accomplish the greatest public good. 
 
 As already pointed out, we have happily in this new land no social 
 complications or traditional impediments to encumber our political 
 constitution, or clog the working of any improvement in our system 
 of government. In Canada we are in a state of general and continuous 
 development. Year by year we advance forward as our fathers did before 
 us. If the methods of our fathers do not serve the purposes of the 
 present generation, we must, as they would have done, abandon the 
 methods of our fathers. When we find defects in our political condition, 
 it is our duty to discover their origin and remove causes of friction by a 
 re-adjustment of the legislative machinery. Now that the foundations 
 of the Dominion are laid broad and deep, we should, by every means in 
 our power, endeavour to prevent and obliterate divisions which tend to 
 cleave us in two. We should have one aim, one aspiration in our 
 political partnership. We should seek to remove the causes which have 
 led to divergence in the past and be animated with one desire, the 
 welfare of Canada as a whole : one determination, to promote her 
 prosperity and maintain her honour. 
 
 If imbued with these sentiments, the sons of Canada approach the 
 consideration of the subject which the writer has humbly endeavored to 
 present — who can doubt that we shall witness the dawning of a new day 
 in public life in this fair land of ours ? Let us with confidence entertain 
 the conviction, that before long there will be a new departure in politics ; 
 that for divisions and weakness and instability, with a long train of 
 evils, there will be the unity, and strength, and security, which proceed 
 from wisdom, and peace, and concord.
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE. 
 
 The writer feels himself called upon to express his great satisfaction 
 that the Canadian Institute has been pleased to entertain the appeal 
 to public opinion, contained in his letter of the 1st of January last, and 
 that the Council has been enabled to bring forward the subject in a form 
 to invite the serious consideration of all interested in the well-being of 
 our common country. 
 
 The appendix contains several pages of extracts, expressing the deliber- 
 ate opinion of well known public writers, which are worthy of careful 
 perusal. They indicate the tone of thought in minds differently con- 
 stituted in our own country, in Great Britain, in the United States and 
 in other countries. In order to make the information as complete as 
 possible, the writer begs leave to add the following excerpts : 
 
 1. A new Plan of Minority Representation by Professor J. R. Commons 
 from the Review of Reviews, November 1891. 
 
 2. Proportional Representation — the Gove System — with Bill before 
 the commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1892. 
 
 3. Restivie of Hare's work on the Representation of Minorities — 
 specially prepared for the present publication. 
 
 4. Translation and abridgement of the constitution and electoral 
 law of Denmark — also specially prepared. 
 
 It is stated in the preceeding "Note" that the scheme of Messrs. 
 Andrae and Hare in its main features was in 1855 included in the 
 electoral law of Denmark constituting the Rigsraad or supreme Council* 
 and that in 1867 it was extended to the Landsthing or upper house of 
 the kingdom. As the new principles of election were first introduced 
 into Denmark and have been in operation in that country for a number 
 of years, it is a matter of the highest interest to ascertain full particulars 
 concerning their application and working; a point of great importance 
 as there is always room for objection against any untried system. The 
 writer accordingly addressed the Danish Minister at Washington on the 
 subject ; the latter was pleased to respond by forwarding the constitution 
 and electoral laws of Denmark; and to add, that the original law of 1867 
 continues to be in force, and that it is generally thought to have been 
 very successful in its operation. 
 
 * The Rigsraad belongs to the history of the past ; it was the ParlianiciU of liie Realm before 
 1867. The Danish Parliament is now known as the " Rigsdag " and is composed of llic Lands- 
 thing and the l"olkething.
 
 26 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE. 
 
 In the " Note" which the undersigned has submitted to the Institute, 
 he has dwelt upon the expediency of tracing to the source whence they 
 spring the poHtical evils which prevail, and upon the necessity of con- 
 tending with the first cause to which the difficulty may be attributed. 
 The writer has continually kept before himself this view, and he has 
 established to his own conviction, that the evils with which we are beset 
 are traceable mainly to defects in the electoral system which prevail, and 
 especially to the method followed in selecting members of Parliament 
 by majorities of votes. This opinion is not confined to the writer. 
 
 Mr. Seaman in his work "The American System of Government" 
 thus expresses himself on the subject: "The system of popular elections 
 which gives all representation and power to majorities, however small, 
 and none to minorities, however large, tends to stimulate both personal 
 and partisan ambition too highly ; to excite rivalship and strife, partisan 
 passions and prejudices ; to divide a people into parties, cliques, and 
 factions ; and to increase and intensify the violence of party spirit. 
 It offers too great temptations to resort to improper means to insure 
 success, for poor, weak, and selfish human nature to resist ; and hence 
 it tends to stimulate secretiveness and duplicity, petty scheming and 
 trickery, falsehood and fraud, — and to encourage social drinking and 
 prodigality, as a means of popularity and of getting votes. It tends to 
 stimulate and sharpen the intellect ; but to paralize the conscience and 
 the moral feelings ; to foster demagogism and a despicable scramble for 
 office, and to demoralize politicians, and great numbers of people." 
 
 Sir Thomas Erskine May, in his Constitutional History of England, 
 points out that party has exercised the greatest influence for good or evil 
 upon the political destinies of the country. " It has guided and control- 
 led, and often dominated over the more ostensible authorities of the 
 state ; it has supported the crown and aristocracy against the people, it 
 has dethroned and coerced kings, overthrown ministers and Parliament, 
 humbled the nobles, and established popular rights." He takes the most 
 favourable view of party, passes lightly over the meaner and more 
 repellent features, which are attributable to it, — and gratefully acknow- 
 ledges all that we owe to its influence. " The Annals of Party em- 
 brace a large portion of the history of England ; — we owe to party most 
 of our rights and liberties : — we recognise in the fierce contentions of our 
 ancestors, the conflict of great principles, and the final triumph of 
 freedom." While thus forcibly admitting all that can be said in its 
 favour he is constrained to add : "In the history of parties, there is 
 much to deplore and condemn, — we observe the evil passions of our natures 
 aroused, — ' envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness.' We see
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE. 27 
 
 the foremost of our fellovvcountrymeii contending with the bitterness ot 
 foreign enemies — reviling each other with cruel words, — misjudging the 
 conduct of eminent statemen, and pursuing them with vindictive 
 animosity. We see the whole nation stirred with sentiments of anger and 
 hostility. We find factious violence overcoming patriotism ; and ambition 
 and self-interest prevailing over the highest obligations of the state. We 
 reflect that party rule excludes one half of our statesmen from the service 
 of their countr}', and condemns them, — however wise and capable — to 
 comparative obscurity and neglect. We grieve that the first minds of 
 every age should have been occupied in collision and angry conflict, 
 instead of labouring together for the common weal." 
 
 Men of both parties, and those who hold themselves apart from all 
 party must assent to the truth as it is expressed in these forcible sentences: 
 Those who so think may not all agree in attributing to the same cause 
 the evils described, but they will acknowledge that our electoral system 
 requires amendment, and that the constitution of parliament calls for 
 rectification, before we can claim that we are in the enjoyment of that 
 national representative body which our political condition demands. 
 The great mass of the people should have perfect confidence in the 
 character and constitution of the Parliament by which our laws are made; 
 and on the part of its members, there should be an earnest and deep 
 sympathy with the people. Neither this confidence, nor this sympathy, 
 is attainable so long as one half of the electors remains unrepresented. 
 This necessary relationship was understood by William Pitt whose words 
 spoken in England a century ago may fittingly be repeated in Canada 
 to-da)'. " How truly important is it to the people of this countr)' that 
 the House of Commons should sympathize with themselves and that 
 their interests should be indissoluble! It is most material that people 
 should have confidence in the legislature. The force of the constitution 
 as well as its beauty depends on that confidence, and on the union and 
 sympathy which exist between the constituent and the representative. 
 The source of our glory and the muscles of our strength are the pure 
 character of freedom which our constitution bears. * * * yjic purity 
 of the representative is the only true and permanent source of such 
 confidence. * * * Prudence must dictate that the certain way of 
 securing their properties and freedom is to purify the source of represent- 
 ation and to establish that strict relation between themselves and the 
 House of Commons which it is the original idea of the constitution to 
 create." 
 
 The question before us to-day is not one of franchise. It is not a 
 question involving any convulsion in our constitution. It is simply to
 
 28 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE. 
 
 determine a practicable plan by which the whole body of electors, can 
 form a standing committee chosen from among themselves, to manage 
 and direct the national affairs. The present system places these affairs 
 in the hands of a committee of a party — not a committee of the nation ; 
 and it is to this condition that we may trace the chronic political 
 difficulties from which we are suffering, and which we would greatly 
 lessen, if not entirely remove, by transferring the power of executive 
 government to a committee, really and truly chosen, from a body of 
 electors representing the whole people. 
 
 It must be only too plain to all, that however desirable a rectification 
 of system may be, it will not be easily attained, for those interested in its 
 non-attainment are many and powerful, holding under control almost 
 the entire press of the country. Nevertheless we should not be deterred 
 from effort by the thought of the obstacles, real, or unreal, before us, nor 
 yield to apathetic indifference as if the remedy were hopelessly unattain- 
 able. Our ancestors succeeded in overthrowing many theories which 
 were destructive of the liberty of the subject and the well-being of the 
 nation. We will be unworthy of our ancestry, if on our part we 
 hesitate to grapple with the theory of party supremacy and injustice, 
 however strongly entrenched by prejudice and interest. No one, whose 
 opinion has weight, will contend that some clumsy machine of primitive 
 times, which served its day and generation, is for ever to be regarded with 
 superstitious reverence. Equally, no one can insist that a rude political 
 contrivance introduced before the reign of Queen Anne is the best that 
 can be conceived for the needs of this Dominion in the second half 
 century of the reign of Victoria. 
 
 Edmund Burke, the orator and philosophic statesman of the last cen- 
 tury, has frequently been alluded to as an advocate of Party government, 
 and his well known definition of Party has been reproduced by nearly 
 every writer on the subject. It must be borne in mind that Burke spoke 
 and wrote in defence of Party, at a period in history when political 
 convulsions were impending, and the attention of the British Parliament 
 was directed to questions of a kind to incite strong feelings ; at a 
 time, when, if ever. Party was justifiable and useful. The circum- 
 stances of Canada and America to-day are entirely different from the 
 circumstances of England and Europe in' Burke's time ; moreover, we 
 must allow that there is such a thing as progression in the views of 
 thinking men. Burke himself did not remain stationary. In a very few 
 years he considerably altered his opinions on several great questions. 
 Before he passed from the political field he deliberately separated himself 
 from his old political friends and completely dis-associated himself from
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE. 29 
 
 the parly in which he had long been prominent. Every rational human 
 being, with freedom of opinion, makes progress, and who will affirm that 
 the intelligence of Burke, would have refused to admit the possibility of 
 some advance in political science, 120 years after his defence of Party 
 government ? 
 
 Burke defined Party to be " a body of men united for promoting by 
 their joint endeavours the national interests upon some particular 
 principle in which they are all agreed." While he approved of this basis 
 of joint action, he did not at any time advocate the party spirit which in 
 modern times has been developed. Burke held in respect the observance 
 of morality in politics, and he could recognize no virtue in the indiscrim- 
 inate support of Ministers, at all times and under all circumstances. He 
 commended the member who acted according to his own judgment, who 
 voted according to the merits of the several measures as they were 
 presented, who felt himself bound to follow the dictates of his conscience, 
 not that of others. He pointed out that the principle of " an indiscrimi- 
 nate support to Ministers is totally corrupt," that it "destroys the very 
 end of Parliament as a controul, and is a general previous sanction to 
 misgovernment." Again he says, " The virtue, spirit and essence of an 
 House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the 
 feelings of the nation." . . "It was not instituted to be a controul 
 upon the people, as of late it has been taught by a doctrine of the most 
 pernicious tendency. It was designed as a controul for the people."* 
 
 In his " History of the English Government and Constitution," Lord 
 John Russell sustains Burke's view of Party, and this authority has like- 
 wise been often quoted. He admits that Party has bad effects, but he 
 disclaims as evils the animosities and violent contentions which proceed 
 from Party feeling. " It is," he says, "from the heat and hammering 
 of the stithy that freedom receives its shape, its temper and its strength." 
 Fallacies often hide under metaphors, and this is a case in point. Every 
 one admits that heat and hammering are good for iron, but no one would 
 say that divisions and animosities are good for men, especially if the men 
 are engaged in a common cause. But accepting the metaphor, we may 
 ask, has not political freedom long been with us an accomplished fact? 
 Is there any need for the empty clangour of the anvil long after the 
 work has received the last effective blow .' is it not time to re-fit the 
 national workshop with new tools, and introduce modern machinery, to 
 be employed in the process of elaborating productions of quite another 
 character, to meet the requirements of quite another age ? 
 
 • IJurke's Thoughts on the Present Discontents, 1770.
 
 30 SUPPI-EMEiNTARY NOTE. 
 
 It has been urged that the Hare scheme of representation has been 
 before the British people since 1857, without being accepted, and there- 
 fore it is inferred, that a departure from the old system of electing 
 members is not required. This is no conclusive argument against a 
 change. Englishmen are especially conservative in their habits of 
 thought, and dislike change even when change is desirable. As an 
 illustration of the national obstinate resistance to change, the reform of 
 the calendar may be instanced. The Gregorian calendar was adopted 
 by the advanced nations of Europe in 1582. It came into force in 
 Scotland in the year 1600, but it was resisted in England for a century 
 and a half longer. Finally after great difficulty an act of parliament 
 was passed and the "new style" of computing time took effect in 1752. 
 
 The advocates of the Party system are in the habit of speaking of 
 those holding more advanced views in the matter of representation, as 
 weak and amiable persons, as dreamers and visionaries. The papers 
 appended establish the increasing tendency on the part of many able 
 men who have seriously considered the subject, to regard improvement in 
 the election system as being both necessary and possible. A society 
 has been organized under the presidency of Sir John Eubbock to pro- 
 mote electoral reform, and nearly 200 members of the British House of 
 Commons have enrolled themselves in its support. This fact is in itself 
 sufficient to set aside the idea that those who aim at a beneficial change 
 are to be regarded as dreamers and visionaries. 
 
 The question is of the utmost concern to this young and aspiring 
 community. However great the obstacles to be overcome it is not for 
 a moment to be said that they are insuperable ; we cannot doubt that 
 they will be eventually set aside if the work be undertaken in a resolute 
 spirit, temperately, wisely, and free from all passionate desire for mere 
 innovation. 
 
 It has been already stated that we do not aim at any radical change 
 in the constitution. There is no thought of any appeal to violence or 
 revolution ; the object is rather to avert any extreme convulsion and 
 even to escape from those administrative revolutions which result on every 
 occasion when the power passes from one party to the other. Instead of 
 the periodical disturbing changes with the violent transitions of authority 
 and the reversals of policy which follow, it is held possible to obtain 
 continuity of government while at the same time carrying into full effect 
 the political constitution we now possess. It must be obvious even to 
 those who have given little reflection to the subject, that until we succeed 
 in so doing, we shall remain in a condition of political immaturity, and
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE. 31 
 
 be subject to the evils which are a necessary consequence of our present 
 imperfectly developed representative system. 
 
 Whatever difficulties may stand in the way of electoral improvement, 
 it is impossible to believe that, in this age of increased enlightenment 
 and progression, we can leave unperformed the task which is imposed on 
 us. The problem which the Canadian Institute submits to the world 
 appeals with peculiar significance to the younger men of this Dominion 
 who, in a few years, will be called upon to exercise their political duties 
 and bear the responsibilities of legislation and government. The appeal 
 is directly made to the sagacity of every true Canadian and British 
 subject, to effect the removal of the hindrances which impede the 
 establishment of the representative system, in accordance with its cardinal 
 principle. The main object in view is to make Parliament an efficient 
 scientific engine of order and progress, so that it may perform its im- 
 portant national work without the bitterness and the waste of power, 
 talent, and time, which result from party warfare. 
 
 The appeal does not affect the Dominion alone. It takes a wider 
 range and possesses a higher import than may at first be discerned. All 
 free communities are closely inter-related in the practical application of 
 sound principles of government. If in Canada we succeed, in attaining 
 an effective development of parliamentary representation, and in 
 eliminating the evil consequences of party strife, we shall achieve results 
 which in their beneficial influences will be felt wherever constitutional 
 government is known. The chief obstacle to be encountered is the 
 spirit of war, — a survival of primitive times, which has come to us 
 through centuries of conflict. The representative principle is based on 
 the more excellent spirit of peace. It was entirely unknown in ancient 
 political life; indeed its application to government is comparatively 
 modern. It is pacific in its conception, and but for its still being 
 associated with contestation and turmoil, through the Party system, its 
 pacific tendencies would permeate society, wherever true representative 
 governments arc established. 
 
 It is natural to expect that Party leaders will be the strongest 
 opponents of any scheme of government which would displace their 
 prc-stige and influence. Such men would i)robably find it difficult to 
 descend to the less prominent positions of peaceful co-workers in state 
 affairs. But in [jointing (Hit tliis difficulty, a well known writer remarks : 
 "If it be objected that we cannot get eminent men to take office together, 
 without party compact, the answer is .simply — let us try. If party 
 leaders will not work together, it seems to me that their services can be 
 dispensed with in favour of others less influenced by individual likings, 
 and more by j)ublic zeal."
 
 32 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE. 
 
 The utility of party in its earlier history depended on political condi- 
 tions which have long since passed away. No one will contend that 
 those conditions Will again return. This at least is indisputable, that the 
 system which we follow is inconsistent with complete representative gov- 
 ernment, and is productive of many and grave evils. The question arises : 
 How long shall it be necessary to endure those evils ? 
 
 A hopeful answer is suggested by a modern writer, Mr. Homersham 
 Cox, in his work, "The British Commonwealth,' and, in words which may 
 fitly conclude these remarks : " If I understand aright anything of the 
 teachings of modern history, they are gradually inculcating the lesson 
 that Party is a rude and barbarous instrument of legislation, only less 
 bad than that legislation by despotic power which it supplanted. We 
 may fain hope that the era is coming — is at hand — when Party having 
 done that great task will itself be at an end." 
 
 SANDFORD FLEMING. 
 Ottawa, April ■^'th, 1892.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 THE CAUSE AND EFFECT OF PARTY. 
 
 From " A Dmjuisition on Government," by John C. Calhoun, 1S49. 
 
 "The first and leading error which naturally arises from overlooking the distinction referred 
 to, is, to confound the numerical majority with the people ; and this so completely as to 
 regard them as identical. This is a consequence that necessarily results from considering the 
 numerical as the only majority. All admit that a popular government, or democracy, is the govern- 
 ment of the people, for the terms imply this ; a perfect government of the kind would be one 
 which would embrace the consent of every citizen or member of the community ; but as this is im- 
 practicable, in the opinion of those who regard the numerical as the only majority, and who can 
 perceive no other way by which the sense of the people can be taken, — they are compelled to 
 adopt this as the only true basis of popular government, in contradistinction to governments of the 
 aristocratical or monarchical form. Being thus constrained, they are, in the next place, forced 
 to regard the numerical majority as, in effect, the entire people ; that is, the greater part as the 
 whole ; and the government of the greater part as the government of tlie whole. . . This 
 radical en or, the consequence of confounding the two, and of regarding the numerical as the only 
 majority, has contributed more than any other cause, to prevent the formation of popular con- 
 stitutional governments, — and to destroy them even when they have been formed." 
 
 "The conflict between the parties, . . . tends necessarily to settle down into a 
 struggle for the honors and emoluments of the Government ; and each, in order to obtain an 
 object so ardently desired, will, in the process of the struggle, resort to whatever measure may 
 seem best calculated to effect this purpose. The adoption, by the one, of any measure, however 
 oljjectionable, which might give it an advantage, would compel the other to follow its example. 
 In such case, it would be indispensable to success to avoid division and keep united ; — and hence, 
 from a necessity inherent in the nature of such governments, each party must be alternately 
 forced, in order to insure victory, to resort to measures to concentrate the control over its move- 
 ments in fewer and fewer hands, as the struggle became more and more violent. This, in pro- 
 cess of time, must lead to party organization, and party caucuses and discipline ; and these, to 
 the conversion of the honors and emoluments of the government into means of rewarding partisan 
 services, in order to secure the fidelity and increase the zeal of the members of the i)arly. The 
 effect of the whole combined, even in the earlier stages of the process, when they exert the least 
 pernicious influence, would be to place the control of the two parties in the hands of their respec- 
 tive majorities ; and the government itself, virtually, under the control of the majority of the 
 flominant I'arty, for the time, instead of the majority of the whole comnnmity ; — where the 
 theory of this form of government vests it. Thus in the very first stages of the process, the 
 government becomes the government of a minority instead of a majority ; — a minority, usually, 
 and under the most favourable circumstances, of not much more than one-fourlii of the whole 
 community. 
 
 " I'ut the i)rocess, as regards the concentration of the power, would not slop at this st;ige. 
 The government would gradually pass from (he hands of tiie majority of tiie party into those of 
 its leaders ; as the struggle became more intense, and the honors and emoluments of the govern- 
 ment the all-absorbing objects. At this sl.ige, principles and policy would lose all influence in
 
 34 APPENDIX. 
 
 the elections; and cunning, faUehood, deception, slander, fraud, and gross appeals to the 
 appetites of the lowest and most worthless portion of the community, would take the place of 
 sound reason and wise debate. After these have thoroughly debased and corrupted the com- 
 munity and all the arts and devices of party have been exhausted, the government would 
 vibrate between the two factions (for such will parties have become) at each successive 
 election." 
 
 " Neither would be able to retain power beyond some fixed term ; for those seeking office 
 and patronage would become too numerous to be rewarded by the offices and patronage at the 
 disposal of the government ; and these being the sole objects of pursuit, the disappointed would, 
 at the next succeeding election, throw their weight into the opposite scale, in the hope of better 
 success at the next turn of the wheel." 
 
 "That the numerical majority will divide the community, let it be ever so homogeneous, 
 into two great parties, which will be engaged in perpetual struggles to obtain the control of the 
 government, has already been established. The great importance of the object at stake, must 
 necessarily form strong paity attachments and party antipathies ; attachments on the part of the 
 members of each to their respective parties, through whose efforts they hope to accomplish an 
 object dear to all : and antipathies to the opposite party, as presenting the only obstacle to 
 success. 
 
 " In order to have a just conception of their force, it must be taken into consideration, that 
 the object to be won or lost appeals to the strongest passions of the human heart, — avarice, ambi- 
 tion, and rivalry. It is not then wonderful, that a form of government, which periodically stakes 
 all its honors and emoluments, as prizes to be contended for, should divide the community into 
 two great hostile parties ; or that party attachment, in the progress of the strife, should become 
 so scrong among the members of each respectively, as to absorb almost every feeling of our 
 nature, both social and individual ; or that their mutual antipathies should be carried to such an 
 excess as to destroy, almost entirely, all sympathy between them, and to substitute in its place 
 the strongest aversion. Nor is it surprising, that under their joint influence, the community 
 should cease to be the common center of attachment, or that each party should find that center 
 only in itself. It is thus, that, in such governments, devotion to party becomes stronger than 
 devotion to country : — the promotion of the interests of party more important than the promotion 
 of the common good of the whole, and its triumph and ascendency, objects of far greater 
 solicitude, than the safety and prosperity of the community." 
 
 "Its effects would be as great in a moral, as, I have attempted to shew, they would be 
 in a political point of view. Indeed, public and private morals are so nearly allied, that it 
 would be difficult for it to be otherwise. That which corrupts and debases the community, 
 politically, must also corrupt and debase it morally. The same cause, w hich, in governments of 
 the numerical majority, gives to party attachments and antipathies such force, as to place party 
 triumph and ascendancy above the safety and prosperity of the community, will just as certainly 
 give them sufiicent force to overpower all regard for truth, justice, sincerity, and moral obligations 
 of every description. It is accordingly, found that, in the violent strifes between parties for 
 the high and glittering prize of governmental honors and emoluments, — falsehood, injustice, fraud, 
 artifice, slander, and breach of faith, are freely resorted to, as legitimate weapons : — followed by 
 all their cornipting and debasing influences. , . . Neither religion nor education can 
 counteract the strong tendency of the numerical majority to corrupt and debase the people."
 
 PARTY GOVERNMENT ADVERSE TO GOOD GOVERNMENT. 35 
 
 PARTY GOVERNMENT ADVERSE TO GOOD GOVERNMENT. 
 From Fraser's Magazine, Vol. XLfX. IS04. 
 
 The very nature of party tactics is fundamental!}^ adverse to good government ; for party 
 tactics are essentially unpatriotic. Their object is simply to gain or hold possession of the 
 Treasury bench. And therefore the measures selected for attack on the one hand will 
 alwaj's be the weakest, that is, the most unpopular, not the worst ; and on the other hand, 
 the measures brought forward will be the most popular rather than the best. That popularity 
 and unpopularity' often coincide with goodness and badness is most true ; that they by no 
 means invariably coincide is assumed by us, when we delegate the functions of legislation 
 instead of exercising them ourselves. 
 
 On the other hand, it may be said party gives us emulation and criticism. The 
 emulation is undoubtedly worth much ; it is even difficult to see how its place can be supplied. 
 It would be inestimable, if the prize proposed was not as it is, the popularity of the hour, but 
 the calm approval of distant years. The criticism is defective in this, that it is, and must 
 be, indiscriminate and unjust. Many important acts and measures of government have been 
 seen to be good by most people at the time ; and by all people a few years after. But very 
 few important measures of government have ever received the approbation of the opposite 
 benches. Any presumably fair tribunal — such, for example, as an assembly professedly 
 neutral and impartial — would be really a higher moral restraint upon elevated natures 
 (such as we hope our governors may be) than the censures of an opposition which does not 
 profess to be candid ; and which, therefore, it is always allowable to baffle, evade, or in the 
 last resort, crush, with a vot3 extorted under a threat of resignation. And we must 
 remember the necessity of keeping followers together in this ' generous emulation ' and 
 the price which that necessity entails. 
 
 ' ' Again, party government has made politics a perfect religion of hate — hate which 
 reaches its height in those who, if they are to command our respect, ought to be more free 
 than ourselves from vulgar passions. It is the duty of every Whig or Tory, in proportion as 
 he is active in politics, to see the character and actions of every member of the opposite faction 
 in the worst possible light. If accident hajjpen to throw a man into a different political 
 combination from that which he has been in before, though his measures and sentiments may 
 remain essentially the same, his whole conduct and every feature of his mind undergo a 
 complete metamorphosis in the eyes of his quondam friends. Every blunder of the opposite 
 side is detected with delight, and exposed with exultation ; even blunders which imperil the 
 country in a struggle with a foreign foe. The Tories crip]jle Marlborough, and throw away 
 the fruits of his victories ; the Whigs ' pine at tlie triumphs of Wellington ; ' tlie Peelites 
 embarrass Palmcrston ; the Derbyites embarrass Aberdeen. English manliness and gener- 
 osity come in to supply correctives which have not been supplied in other countries where 
 the party system has been tried. But the system is distinctly one of organized enmity, very 
 fatal to patriotism, and utterly destructive to loyalty. And yet after. all, considering how 
 little political wisilom is ever likely to reacli the mass of the peo[)lo, loyalty towards tlio 
 rulers of men's choice is a principle in politics with whicli wc can scarcely alVord to 
 dispense. 
 
 To this state of enmity is of course to be attributed the immense waste of time and 
 energy in combative oratory, and the most undue value .set on tliat accomplishment. Wliat 
 will a sane posterity tliink of debates in which nolxjdy aims or pretends to aim at enlightening 
 or convincing his neighbour, but only at inflaming the passions and confirming the prejudices 
 of his own faction? What will it think of P.irliain'iitary reputations won, aii<l liigh places 
 in the state oljtained by mere dexterity in wounding the feelings of a rival, without the 
 utterance of a single wise thing, or the performance r>f a single noble act 7
 
 36 APPENDIX. 
 
 A'^ain, party goverument, as it leads to a constant change of persons and principles 
 in the administration, is absolutely fatal to anything like forecast or a far sighted policy, 
 etc., etc. 
 
 We return however to the point from which we started. We have hitherto gone, 
 practically, on the theory of party government. But party principle fails us. As some 
 think, it fails, owing to special accidents, for a time ; but as we think, it will soon fail us, if 
 it is not already failing us, vitally and for ever. We commend the question to political 
 philosophers as one which strongly affects the morality of puljlic life at this moment, and 
 which is big with the most momentous issues for the future. 
 
 CHECHES AND BALANCES. 
 By Earl Russell, 1S54- 
 
 " Now it appears to us that many advantages would attend the enabling the minority 
 to have a part in these returns. In the tii'st place, there is apt to be a feeling of great 
 soreness when a very considerable nixmber of electors, such as I have mentioned, are com- 
 pletely shut out from a shai-e in the representation of one place. . . . But, in the next 
 place, 1 think that the more you have your representation conlined to large population, the 
 more ought you to take care that there should be some kind of balance, and that the large 
 places sending members to the House should send those who represent the commiinity at 
 laige. But when there is a very large body excluded, it cannot be said tha,t the communitj^ 
 at large is fairly represented. 
 
 " HARE ON REPRESENTATIVES," 1857. 
 
 A Resumi hy John Francis Waters, M.A., 1892. 
 
 The three words heading this article form the short title of an excellent work, namely, 
 " A Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal," by Thomas 
 Hare, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, published in 1859, in London, by Longmans, Brown, Green, 
 Longmans & Roberts. 
 
 This work has been reviewed by many persons of distinction, and an excellent synopsis 
 of Mr. Hare's scheme of representation has been given by Millicent Garrett Fawcett, wife of 
 Henry Fawcett, M.P. , so well known as Professor of Political Economy in the University of 
 Cambridge. Mr. Hare has for his great object to remove the anomalies, absurdities, and 
 tyrannies of the present method of electing members of Parliament and municipal representa- 
 tives by giving to each elector a direct, equal and ]3ersonal representation in Parliament. Of 
 course this does not mean that every elector is to represent himself in Parliament, for then 
 Parliament would be but another name for the adult male population of the realm ; but it 
 means that every elector should feel that his vote has done a real substantial good by placing 
 in Parliament some man who shall be the honest exponent of the elector's honest views. In 
 following in the footsteps of the distinguished persons who have written more or less 
 exhaustively about Mr. Hare's scheme, and given compressed reports upon it, it is to be 
 premised that in the limits at my disposal no more can be done than to give an outline of 
 the main shape and symmetry of the plan. The writer cannot therefore enter as fully as
 
 HARE ON REPRESENTATIVES. 37 
 
 he would wish into the analysis of the admirable statement by which Mr. Hare justifies the 
 assumption that our pi-esent methods of parliamentary and municipal elections are faulty, 
 unjust, and even ridiculous. It may be asked here, ' ' Is not the direct, equal and personal 
 representation of every elector guaranteed by the present systen ? " The best reply to this 
 is to state very briefly the substance of Mr. Hare's w'ords on this point : — 
 
 He shows what must be apparent to any one who gives the matter five minutes' con- 
 sideration, that a system like ours which permits the nation to be practically governed by a 
 handful, to the total ostracism of the wishes aiul representation of practically half the com- 
 munity, cannot be other than radically wrong. Thus, to make matters plainer by an illus- 
 tration at home, let us look at the result in Canada of our system of parliamentary elections. 
 Successive contests have shewn that the Liberals in Canada form not far from half the popu- 
 lation. But what share have they in the government of the country as long as the Conserva- 
 tives, by a slight plurality, have entire control of the Treasurj'^ Benches? Therefore, every 
 elector who cast a vote for a Liberal candidate practically wasted it, and really has no repre- 
 sentation in Parliament, since the Liberals in Parliament, with things as they are, have no 
 voice effective in moulding the destinies of the nation. Again, there are thousands of persons 
 interested in special subjects of legislation apart from the moi-e or less well-defined issues 
 separating Grit and Tory ; but those persons are perfectly well aware that, as things are, 
 a vote given for any other than the regular party candidate is utterlj' wasted, since nobody 
 refusing to ally himself with one or the other great political party has any chance of gaining 
 a seat in the House of Commons. The votes, then, of a certain number of Liberal electors 
 are not wasted in one sense since, according to the majority system which prevails, they do 
 succeed in returning a certain number of members to serve in the Commons ; but their votes 
 are really wasted in this sense, that these members, being in the minority in the Connuons, 
 have no power whatever to give effect to the wishes of their constituents One of the 
 absurdities of the present system is perhaps best illustrated by an example. Let us suppose 
 that ten candidates seek the suffrages of a constituency or pocket borough which has fifty 
 voters ; every candidate except one would receive five votes, let us suppose, but one would 
 receive six votes ; ho would, therefore, be elected to represent the borough, that is to say, he 
 represents really six voters, while forty-four are left out in the cold whollj'^ unrepresented. 
 This, of course, is an extreme case, but it shows as well as any other the state of affairs exist- 
 ing under our present system in which there is hardly any provision for the representation of 
 minorities. Even the feeble attempt made by Mr. Mowat for minority representation in 
 Toronto has been the subject of unending ridicule and unjust accusation. But really the 
 Premier of Ontario, by preventing voters from marking a ballot for more than two of the 
 three candidates for the Local Legislature has done no more tlian secure representation for 
 the large Reform minority in the City of Toronto, which otherwise would be left without 
 a voice in the conduct of public affairs. Mr. Hare's scheme is emphatic in providing tliat 
 every elector shall have no more votes than one, l)ecau8e Parliament could not become what 
 he wishes it to become, " the mirror of the nation," unless tiie voting power of every elector 
 weie e()ual. I'mler the present rei/inif a man may vote in every constituency in wliich he 
 has a property qualification. A radical diflurence between Mr. Hare's plan of voting and 
 that in vogue is that, by an elaborate system which he claims, however, to bo quite workable, 
 a voter should have permi.ssion, if the candidates in his own constituency did not suit liini, 
 to vote for candidates according to his clioice in anotlicr constituency. Cantlidatts, tliere- 
 fore, of a kind to poll votes from constituencies in dilFerent parts of tlie realm, and who could 
 not be correctly described as candidates for any particular constituency, miglit l)e classed as 
 " all Eiiglanil " <:andidateM. It is well-known tiiat under our present system a candidate 
 often receives an enorniouH plurality over an opponent less distinguished. Mr. Hare's idea 
 is that a quota of votes necessary to secure the election of a member should bo established, 
 and that no canilidate sliould receive more than the rccjuired innnl)er. It wouhl be ol)jecte<l at 
 once to this that tiie voter, not having the omniscience of Providence, cannot know whether 
 the candidate of his choice will or will not receive the (juota, but Mr. Hare meets this olijection 
 
 244551
 
 38 APPENDIX. 
 
 by providing a form of couditional ballot by which the voter records tirst his preference for 
 his candidate and then directs that "in the event of such candidate being already elected, or 
 not obtaining the quota," the vote should go to a second or third or fourth candidate of 
 his choice in that constituency or in " all England, " as the case maybe. It is obvious, 
 then, that if the proposed system were worked out to its logical conclusion every member of 
 larliament would represent an equal number of voters, and that no votes would have been 
 thrown away, since, in the case of candidates either elected or who h ive failed to receive the 
 required quota, the elector's ballot would be placed to the credit of another eligible candi- 
 date. It is claimed by those who favour this plan of representation that the House of Com- 
 mons would then really be a representative assembly and an assembly of peern in the sense 
 that every constituent member would represent an equal voting power. Of course, the 
 enemies of Mr. Haj'e'sidea claim that the House of Commons, by the adoption of this system 
 of electing its members, would become little better than an assembly of men for ventilating 
 eccentric and crotchety notions, an objection met, in a sort of way, by the counter-statement 
 that the people who have no crotchety notions have it in their power to secure representa- 
 tion as well as the eccentric voters have. It is claimed by the advocates of the system that 
 more public interest wouhl be felt in the constituencies if it were possible to elect parlia- 
 mentary and municipal representatives on the basis proposed ; that voters would study by 
 tlegrees questions of political economy and statecraft ; that they would eagerly scan the list 
 of candidates ; and that bribery and corruption would gradually, but withal speedily, become 
 imknown, because the temptation to bribe and to be bribed would be removed. It is pro- 
 vided that with the exception of a registration fee all expenses of election should be borne by 
 the State, and since no candidate couid receive more than the quota of votes, bribers 
 would not be anxious to spend money in getting ballots marked in all likelihood for 
 men other than the one in whose supposed interest the bribery was perpetrated. 
 Mr. Hare's plan provides for territorial designations as at present, if that be preferred, 
 so that an " all England " candidate receiving votes from every part of the kingdom 
 would be designated as a member for that place in which he would have received a majority 
 of his votes ; this would obviate the difficulty of filling vacancies caused by death or resigna- 
 tion, and would seem to render the retaining of territorial designations necessary ; for other- 
 wise, if members wei'e elected to the House of Commons without territorial designation, how 
 would it be possible to issue a writ for an unnamed constituency ! One writer says naively 
 enough, " perhaps rather an Irish way of getting over the difficulty connected with lilling up 
 those accidental vacancies which occur between general elections, is not to fill them wp at 
 all ; and in order to avoid constituencies remaining long unrepresented, to have triennial, or 
 even annual Parliaments." A further objection to Mr. Hare's scheme is that the "all 
 England " character of the representation would tend to destroy local representation and 
 would prevent members of Parliament from taking that interest in forwarding and expediting 
 the i^rocess of ^jrivate bills dealing with local works, which now members of the diffei'cnt 
 constituencies so zealously evince. 'Ilie counter-statement is that these services could just 
 as well be perfoi'med by members under Mr. Hare's scheme as at present, and that the great 
 centres of shipping and commercial activity would for their own interests combine to send a 
 sufficient number of local members to conserve local interests. Other objectors find great 
 fault with Mr. Hare's plan on the ground that the working of it would be incompatible with 
 voting by ballot. 'I'he objection is not v^^ell founded. But it should lie said here that Mr. 
 Hare himself did not favour voting by ballot, which in one part of his book he speaks of as 
 " a degradation." Further, he maintains that it is a fruitful source of bribery. People will 
 say, ' ' How can the ballot encourage bribery when the person to be bribed votes in secret, 
 80 that the briber cannot know whether or not the bribed voter stuck to his bargain ? " One 
 answer is not far to seek, namely, that payment of bribes could be, and often has been, con- 
 ditional upon the success of the candidate in whose interest the bribery is committed. The 
 bribed voter would then have a guilty interest in sticking to his bargain, since he would not 
 get the bribe unless his candidate were elected ; and, on the other hand, the briber, if he 
 were not elected, would at least have the satisfaction of saving his money.
 
 HARE ON REPRESENTATIVES. 39 
 
 I caimot now do better than quote Mi-s. Fawcett's words regarding what she calls ' ' the 
 only really formidable obstacle to the practical application of Mr. Hare's scheme " : — 
 
 " No completely satisfactory solution," says Mrs. Fawcett, " of this difficulty has as yet 
 appeared ; it is, therefore, desirable that the advocates of the scheme should not disguise the 
 existence of a serious obstacle in the way of its apphcation. Making the difficulty known, 
 and provoking thought and discussion on the subject, are tlie surest means of arriving at the 
 wished-for solution. It has already been stated that no candidate shall be allowed to record 
 more votes than are sufficient for his I'eturn, and that when a candidate has obtained his 
 quota of votes, the voting or balloting jjaper on which his name is the first mentioned shall 
 be reckoned to the score of the second named candidate. The difficulty we have alluded to 
 is this : suppose the necessary quota of votes to be a thousand, and that two thousand voting 
 papers are sent in with Mr. Gladstone's name first, the second name on one thousand of 
 these voting papers being that of Mr. .Jacob Bright, and second name oa the other thousand 
 being that of Sir Wilfred Lawson. In this case Mr. Bright and Sir Wilfred Lawson would 
 occupy exactly similar positions : each is the second choice of a thousand electors, and yet it 
 is possible that the one may obtain his full quota of a thousand votes and be consequently 
 retui-ned, while the other is not able to record a single vote. For if all the voting papers 
 with Mr. Bright's name second are used for Mr. Gladstone's return, the remaining thousand 
 will be reckoned to Sir Wilfred Lawson. It is of course highly improbable that such a i-esult 
 would ever actually take place, as all the papers would be deposited in a balloting urn, to be 
 opened by a responsible authority, and the votes would be recorded in the order in which 
 they were drawn out of the urn. The appearance of all the papers would be exactly similar, 
 and there would consequently be no opportunity for the display of any unjust partiality in 
 the ojjening of the papers. Still, the suspicion of the possibility of an election resulting in 
 a manner approximating to the imaginary case just described, would do much to destroy the 
 moral effect which might be produced by the adoption of Mr. Hare's scheme." 
 
 I shall be glad indeed if giving this quotation in this place will result in some suggestions 
 being offered with a view to overcome this difficulty. 
 
 A good deal of space is devoted in Mr. Hare's work on Representatives to " Represent- 
 ative (joverninent in Municipalities," but the subject is too large to be entered on within my 
 limits : suffice it to say that his general principles remain unaltered. He is emphatic on the 
 question of safeguarding the suffrage, and he very properly considers that in a Christian 
 Kingdom voting day should be hallowed by prayer and supplication of the Almighty, as is 
 the case on the day of the greatest function under the English Oonstitutional system, 
 namely, the coronation of the monarch. 
 
 Our author has strong objections to making the line of demarcation too strongly defined 
 between the electors of boroughs and of counties. While he is strongly imbued with ideas 
 of clas.s distinction, be is quite democratic in insisting that working men should have their 
 own representatives in the House of Gommons, pointing out tliat while wise and good men 
 belonging to other spheres in life may devote their time and means to the amelioration of 
 the condition of the labouring classes, tliuy cannot know the true state of affairs as well as 
 men who have experienced the difl'erent liardsiiips, trials, and discomforts of the poor man's 
 lot. Mr. Hare indignantly puts aside a tiieory advanced by certain vulgar and insolent 
 political economists, to the effect that labouring men would be apt to send to the House 
 representatives ho uncouth and boin-isli tliat tiie reiineil memljcrs of the House would shrink 
 from contact with thiMn, and lie states wliat is true enougli, that real gentlemen would never 
 think of countenancing so base a doctrine. 
 
 A very interesting part of this bof)k is that which treats of the geographical, local, ami 
 corpf)rate (livisions of electors ; but no aliridginent, be it ever so carefully condensed, can 
 do justice to this and other portions of the 'I'reatise, as the author goes very nnich into 
 detail, apparently forgetting nothing. His book contains all the forms, schedules, lists, etc.,
 
 -10 APPENDIX. 
 
 necessary to make it a complete hand-book of the subject. One thing very pleasing in the 
 whole work is its Christian tone, and this in a manly, unaffected, downright sort of way, 
 wholly removed from sanctimonious hypocrisy and cant, and broad enough to be accepted by 
 Christians of every creeil. In this he does no more than follow the illustrious publicist and 
 statesman Edmund Burke, whom he frequently quotes, and with whom he entirely agrees in 
 laying down the fundamental principle that all authority is of God, and that princes and 
 peoples exercise it only as His \acegerents. In fact there has been no great statesman— no 
 man of the highest order of merit in anything — without religion. This was true even before 
 the Christian dispensation, and Cicero and Plato were no less emphatic in recognizing the 
 authority of Heaven according to their lights, than are Mr. Gladstone and the greatest 
 moderns in Church and State in bowing submissively to the authority of the true GOD. 
 The infidel, the atheist, and the agnostic cannot, because of the fatal defect in them, be men 
 of the highest power ; and when they occasionally evince greatness it is because they are 
 not able, with all their malice, to escape from the Christian influences which surrounded 
 their earlier and better years. Therefore, we must most heartily endorse Mr. Hare's 
 proposition as to individual responsibility in the State ; " a soul," says he, " is not a 
 corporate thing. There is no corporate conscience." 
 
 In common with the best minds in the United Kingdom and on the continent our author 
 is opposed to the American system of paying legislators, claiming that this is to degrade 
 politics and, what is still worse, patriotism, to the level of a mere hunt after dollars. This 
 subject, or rather this part of the subject, is one on which there is room for much argument 
 2y)'o and con. Naturally in such a system as Mr. Hare's there would be great need of defining 
 the duties and powers of returning officei's, and he has not failed to attend to tlris with a 
 patience and fullness of detail that must commend his work to the admiration of every 
 student and lover of order and system, even though he may not be able to see " eye to eye " 
 with our author on many points brought up and dealt with. The same remark applies to 
 the very technical portion of the book dealing with the duties of registrars, which, from 
 Mr. Hare's point of view, leaves nothing to be desired as regards fullness and boldness of 
 statement ; for one of our author's most admirable traits is that he does not needlessly beat 
 about the bush, but goes straight to the mark with simple directness and conscious strength. 
 Another notable feature in the work is the excellent power of discrimination shewn by the 
 author in making quotation from the works of men of light and leading, such as Guizot> 
 Edmund Burke, Calhoun, Passow^ and others. It may not be amiss in this connection to 
 say a word or two about the excellence of his own diction ; — he has a style well suited to 
 the exigencies of historical and political essay writing, a style remarkably clear and free, 
 never heavy or ponderous, but also never light or frivolous. It is grave without being 
 severe, and dignified without being bombastic : always interesting —a matter difiiicult of 
 attainment when treating of a subject regarded by most people as dry and uninviting — he 
 has a happy faculty of blending information with philosophical reflection and of clothing his 
 facts with language not unworthy of the diction of historical romance. Perhaps one cannot 
 take a better specimen of his style than his description of London ; — 
 
 "Of what," he asks, "does the Metropolis consist? It contains the abode of the 
 sovereign, and of the regal house and household, and of all who compose the court and 
 council of the Queen. It contains the mansions of an ancient and powerful nobility, and 
 their numerous connexions and dependents. In it are all the chief military and civil depart- 
 ments of the army, the navy, the ordnance, and the control of their vast equipments ; the 
 public treasury, the mint, and the immense ofl&ces which are concerned with the receipt of 
 the revenues of the kingdom from foreign and inland trade, and all the subjects of taxation, 
 and for the appropriation and liquidation of the principal and interest of a puljlic debt 
 equal in amount to the value of the fee simple of the dominions of some not insignificant 
 monarchs, — and with the collection and audit of the public accounts of the empire. In the 
 metropolis are the chief stewardships of the great estates of the Crown and itj palatinates.
 
 DANISH ELECTORAL LAW. 41 
 
 lu it reside all the functionaries connected with the Imperial Parliament, — the secretaries, 
 councils, and otficers, engaged in communication between the Government and its depen- 
 dencies, — the Canadas, Australasia, Africa, and the Indies, — and with foreign nations. In it 
 are the immense establishments of the General Post Office, the great triumph of ci%alization, 
 — sowing daily and hourly, with its thousand hands, the seeds of public and private intelli- 
 gence gathered from every part of the habitable globe. In the Metropolis ai'e the seats of 
 the Courts of Equity and Law, and to it are brought all appeals in the last resort, from every 
 territory and colony. Here reside the Bar, and the other jjrofessors of legal science con- 
 cerned in the supreme administration of justice, and in the settlement and transfer of most 
 of the great properties in the kingdom. In this detail is comprehended but a few of the 
 multitude of conditions aud occupations engaged in the affairs of the Empire. There are 
 classes almost beyond the possibility of recapitulation, — merchants, shipowners, brokers, 
 manufacturers of an infinite variety of fabrics, — traders, capitalists composed of companies 
 and individuals, having ramifications of business with every port, inland town, market, and 
 village. Here are associations, academies, aud museums, for the promotion of learning and 
 science in ail their developments. Ireland sends its brilliant imagination and its romantic 
 bravery ; Scotland its keen intellect and its untiring perseverance. The metropolis attracts 
 to itself much that the kingdom produces of high talent or superior energy, it gathers 
 together the diversities of gifts with which nature endows her most favoured sons. Here 
 the learning of Johnson, the erudition aud wisdom of Burke, the genius of Reynolds, of 
 Lawrence, of Flaxman, and Chantrey, found their home. Here the eloquence of Erskine, 
 of Copley, and of Brougham, had their appropriate theatre. . . . From the metiopolis 
 flows that comprehensive literature, the seemingly ever-increasing and inexhaustible stores 
 of which are daily poured forth in article and volume, to feed and guide the realm of thought. 
 
 Foreigners should behold in the representation of this mighty community a condensed 
 picture of the greatness of our country, and be compelled to recognize in it a triumphant 
 display of the dignity and virtue of its institutions." 
 
 These words of Mr. Hare, and not least his closing allusion to metropolitan representation, 
 should stimulate us all in carrying on the great work of improving our system of electing 
 parliamentary and municipal representatives, looking upcm it as a veritable "labour of love," 
 because a labour of patriotism. For patriotism is based on love ; for which we have the 
 authority of the great Passow, who, speaking of it, saj's, : — "It must rest like every other 
 kind of love on something unutterable and incomprehensible." 
 
 THE DANISH ELECTORAL LAW OF 1855. 
 Bij the kite Lord Lytton, then Mr. Lytton, Secretary of Le<jittion. 1S63. 
 
 r.ii'KMiAiJE.v, July 1, 18G3. 
 
 Witli the details of Mr. Hare's electoral tiicf)ry the purpose of this report is not 
 iniinodiately concerned. 'I'hat purpose is nicn-ly to make intelli};il)le the main features of 
 the Electoral Law established in Denn^iark in the year 1855 for the election of Kcprcsenta- 
 tives to the Kigsraad. 
 
 'I'o <lo tliis, however, the speediest an<l simplest means will bi; to take Mr. Il.irc's 
 Hcheme as a point of comparison and reference. It muII, tliereforo, be neccsHary to state 
 wliat is the substanct; of this sclir'nic. I will endeavour to do so as brii'llv as I can.
 
 42 APPENDIX. 
 
 It \\-iirtlien be possible to contrast this scheme, in its chief characteristics, with that 
 which is now hiw in Denmark, and which I propose to describe, pointing out to what extent 
 the two sj-stems coincide and in what respect they differ. Rightly to appreciate eitlier the 
 one or the other, it is necessary to bear in mind the ends which, in both cases, it has been 
 sought to attain, and the reasons for which these ends have, in each case, appeared desirable. 
 I must, therefore, ask permission to refer in passing to this important part of the subject. 
 I shall do so as rapidly as is compatible with the claim of such a subject to be seriously 
 considered. It will also be necessary, in referring to the Electoral Law of 1855, to point out 
 the peculiar circumstances which, unfortunately, by limiting the application of that law> 
 diminish its value as a pi-actical example. Finally, 1 shall endeavor to record what, so far as 
 I can yet judge, from such conversations as I have been able to hold with persons of 
 intelligence and imjjartiality, interested in the subject, is the general impression in this 
 couutrj', after eight years' experience, of the practical effects of the electoral system devised 
 by Mr. Andrae, and how far the result of it may be considered as having satisfied the 
 intentions of the author. 
 
 I. Notwithstanding the length of time during which Representative Government has 
 existed under various forms, it is not surprising that the majority of questions concerning 
 government by representation should still be open to debate ; for the conclusion to be formed 
 upon any question of this kind must always be in relation to circumstances peculiar to the 
 country in respect of which the question has to be solved. But in regard to the fundamental 
 principle upon which all government by representation is based, and to the complete reali- 
 zation of which every form of Representative Government must approximate, in a greater or 
 less degree according as the development of it is favoured or impeded by local circumstances, 
 thei-e M'ould seem to be no reasonable ground for difference of opinion. It has been admitted 
 on all sides that the completest form of Representative Government must be that in which 
 the greatest number of interests and opinions are completely represented ; that form of 
 government, in short, which most nearly approximates to the government of the whole by 
 the whole. But by those who have arrived at the conclusions which have dictated, in the 
 one case Mr. Hare's electoral scheme, in the other Mr. Andrae's electoral law, it is argued 
 that such a i-esult is incompatible with any system of representation which tends to assume 
 the part as tantamount to the whole ; in other words, to confound the majority with the 
 people. 
 
 If, it is argued, the representatives of the majority be suffered by a political fiction to 
 represent more than the majority, not only an arithmetical misstatement, but also a great 
 jjolitical injustice, takes place. For the minority is then not merely unrepresented, but it is 
 actually misrepresented. It is compulsorily incorporated into the majority ; and this forced 
 fellowship is, to use the words of Mr. Burke, "conquest and not comiDact." If it were 
 possible to suppose (what is never the case) that the whole of a country were, indeed, divided 
 into only two sections of opinion, of which one was more numerous than the other in the 
 proportion of three to two, the minority in that case, adequately represented, would stand 
 in the representation at a proportion of two to three ; but if it should occur, as it naturally 
 would occur without some provision to the contrary, that the majority in each constituency 
 were to dispose of the entire representation of that constituency to a member of the more 
 numerous class, instead of thei'e being in the Legislature two of the less numerous to every 
 three of the more numerous sect, the minority would, in fact, have no means of meeting 
 their adversaries in the Legislative Body at all. "They are," says Mr. Hare, "previously 
 cut off in detail ; " and in qualifj'ing such a result, he cites the authority of M. Guizot, " Si 
 la minorite est d'avance hors de combat il y a oppressiop." 
 
 But the evil, it is further argued, does not stop here. For all customary majorities 
 are, indeed, only an agglomeration of minorities, each of which, rather than remain altogether 
 unrepresented, has preferred to secure a sort of partial and collateral representation as part 
 of an aggregate, which coheres only, perhaps, upon a single and often secondary point. The
 
 DANISH ELECTORAL LAW. 43 
 
 majority is thus onlj^ a majority of a majoritj^ "who may be," says Mr. Mill, "and often 
 are, a minority of the whole." "Any Minority," he adds, " left out, either purposely or by 
 the play of the machinery, gives the power, not to a majority, but to a minority in some 
 other 2)art of the scale. " 
 
 And, although this inequality is, no doubt balanced to a great extent, in a system of 
 representation such as that which obtains in England, by the fact that opinions, predomin- 
 ating in different jilaces, tind rough equivalents for the minorit}^ with wliich thej' are swept 
 away in one place bj^ the majority they secure in another ; yet, if the suffrage were to be 
 extended much further (and it cannot be considered as final at a point which leaves out of 
 direct representation the most numerous class in the country), the danger which, under the 
 present sj'stem, must then arise of government by a single (and that, on the whole, the least 
 educated) class has long been apparent to statesmen of all parties. At the same time it 
 would be palpably unjust and humiliating to advocate the permanent exclusion of this 
 numerous and important class from all direct representation, on no better grounds than 
 those which involve the admission that the whole representative machinery of the country 
 is coustructe<l upon a principle so erroneous that the motive power cannot be augmented 
 without throwing the entire machine out of gear. 
 
 To these considerations is added that of the deterioration of political character to which 
 voters may be exposed bj- any sort of compulsion, to select as their representatives, not 
 those men whom they regard as the most enlightened and most honest exponents of their 
 opinions or interests, but those who seem most likely to conciliate the local, and often ignoble, 
 animosities by wliich majorities themselves are divided. 
 
 II. The above summary, although very imperfect, is sufficient to indicate the principal 
 motives which, both in this country and in England, have suggested to eminent statesmen 
 the necessity of devising, if possible, some modification of the Electoral system, calculated to 
 secure a more adequate representation to the interests of minorities. 
 
 I will now enumerate, within the narrowest possible limits, the most prominent of those 
 provisions by which Mr. Hare proposes to obviate a deficit, the existence of which is 
 liardly disputed, and by which, in the Electoral Law of 1855, for the nomination of Repre- 
 sentatives to the Supreme Council of Denmark, Mr. Andrae has sought to secure the same 
 result, viz., the protection of minorities. 
 
 The essential character of the scheme proposed by Mr. Hare may be thus summed up : — 
 
 1. The number of votes to be divided by the number of members composing the 
 legislative body. The quotient to form the electoral basis, that is to say, every candidate 
 ok)taining the quota of votes shall be returned. 
 
 2. No more than the (juota strictly necessary for liis return is to be counted in favour of 
 any candidate. 'I'im surplusage of the votes given to any elected candidate is to be dis- 
 tributeil in favour of other candidates, in conformity with the principle embodied in the 
 following provisions : — 
 
 (") 'J'hc votes to be given locally ; Imt every elector to ])e entitled to vote for any camli- 
 <late wlio may oiler himself in any part of the country. 
 
 {h) Each elector to deliver a voting paper containing othi;r names in addition to tlia 
 which stands foremost in the order of his choice. His vote is to be counted for only one 
 candidate. But if the candidate whose name stands lirst upon his list HJiali cither fail to 
 inalse up the tjiiota, or shall have made it up without the assistance of his vote, the vote in 
 question may then descend in the order of preference given to it by tlic elector to some other 
 candidate who may stand more in need of it, and in whose favour it shall then count towards 
 <ompleting the necessary (piota. 
 
 (r) 'I'lie question which of the votes obtained liy each candidate shall count for his «iw n 
 return, and which of them sliall be released in favour of other canditlatcs, shall l)c decided in
 
 4-t APPENDIX. 
 
 such way as to secure the representation by the candidate in question of all those who- 
 would not otherwise be represented at all. The remaining votes, not needed for his return, 
 to be disposed of by lot or otherwise. 
 
 (d) The voting papers to be conveyed to some central office and there counted ; first 
 votes being preferred to second votes, second to third and so on. 'I'he voting papers, after 
 being verified, shall remain in public repositories accessible to all. 
 
 This is a very meagre exposition of Mr. Hare's scheme, which is as minute in its details 
 as it is large in its scope. 
 
 It is, however, enough to serve the only purpoose with which it is here alluded to. For 
 the scheme of Mr. Hare is devised with a view to its adaptation to existing circumstances in 
 England ; and this report being only directly concerned with existing circumstances in 
 Denmark, I may at once pass to the consideration of the law of 1855, merely noting by the 
 way that, if the aims and aspirations of Mr. Hare and Mr. Mill be worth realizing, then the 
 extent to which they have been realized by the law, and the general results of such ex- 
 perience of the working of the law as must have been acquired in Denmark during the course 
 of eight years, are subjects well worthy of attention. 
 
 III. The constitutional history of Denmark, although comparatively short, is far from 
 deficient in interesting phenomena. Kurseries of self-government were planted in this country 
 in 1834 by Frederick VI., who then estabhshed Consultative States throughout the kingdom ;. 
 so that when, after the revolutionary movement which convulsed Europe in 1848, it was 
 deemed advisable to expand the basis of government in this country, the population was not 
 whoUy unprepared for increased participation in the management of public affairs. Ihuse, 
 indeed, who at that period were engaged in the work of political reconstruction appeared l» 
 have been disposed to give to the representative element a larger scope than was eventually 
 accorded to it, and they justified their hesitation on the ground that the constituencies were, 
 as yet, too inexperienced. An able writer, who has warmly engaged in the defence of Mr. 
 Andrae's electoral system, has ridiculed this notion by pointing out that the greater the 
 electioneering experience of the constituency (that is to say, the more ruses the electors) the 
 more certainly must the majority (unless some provision exist to the contrary) succeed iu 
 crushing the minority, and monopolizing power. For if, as would have been the case under 
 the system then contemplated, 65 members were to be chosen by 65,000 electors, no one 
 elector being entitled to increase the value of his vote by voting for less than the full number 
 of candidates, it is clear that the majority, consisting of 32,501 electors, would only have to 
 hold firmly together, in order to carry the whole number of the 65 seats in accordance with 
 their choice. And, in that case, no matter how prudently or sagaciously the minority, con- 
 sisting of 32,499 electors, might exercise tlieir franchise, those 32,499 electors would remain 
 without any rei^resentative at aU. How, then, should the real opinions of the electors be 
 ascertained, in order that they may be represented in their just proportion ? Suppose that 
 of these 65,000 electors, a compact majority of 32,501 is opposed to various dispersed minori- 
 ties, amounting altogether to 32,499. If the elections are distributed over 65 districts, it is 
 possible that 32,064 of the majority might be found united in 64 districts against 31,936 of the 
 minority. So that it would be only in the 65th district that the minority could make its 
 voice heard. Nevertheless, the majority could only with strict justice claim 33 seats, and 
 the remaining 32 should, in that case, it is clear, fall to the representation of various 
 opinions, provided those opinions be not so dispersed as to be unable to come together in any 
 place. 
 
 To attain this result, tu secure the adequate representation of every tangible opinion and 
 corjjorate interest, in such way, that, while the majority of the electors shall be able to name 
 the majority of the Kepresentatives, the minority of the electors shall be insured an equiva- 
 lent minority in the representation, this is the great problem which, in 1855, Mr. Andrae 
 undertook to solve.
 
 DANISH ELECTORAL LAW. 45 
 
 Of all men in this country His Excellency was, in many respects, the most fitted by 
 antecedent experience and natural qualifications to succeed in the difficult task ■which he 
 thus spontaneously attempted. 
 
 Mr. Andrae is a man of original and speculative intellect, a keen investigator, a bold 
 thinker, admitted by all his countrymen to be the first mathematician in Denmark, and, 
 from his position as Minister of Finance, experienced in the art of bringing the fundamental 
 principles of abstract calculation practically to bear upon complicated facts. 
 
 The scojDe of his experiment, however, was painfully limited by conditions over which 
 he had no control ; and the law of which he is the sole author forms only the incidental part 
 of an institution shaped rather by the force of uncongenial circumstances than by the 
 deliberate option of the ostensible founders of it. 
 
 According to the Census of ISGO the entire population of the Kingdom and Duchies 
 amounted to 2,604,024, so that it was only for the direct election of 30 members out of a 
 population of upwards of 2,000,000 to an Assembly of 80 members, that the electoral system 
 of Mr. Andrae was empowered to provide.^ Holstein and Lauenburgh have always refused 
 to send members to the Rigsraad. For these Duchies the Constitution of 1855 is 
 suspended ; anil, therefore, 20 members must be deducted from the total of 80 nomiually 
 composing the Rigsraad, and 8 members from the 30 originally contemplated as the quota of 
 direct representation in the Rigsraad ; consequently, it is only the choice of 45 out of 60 
 members that is practically affected by the electoral system of Mr. Andrae. 
 
 This, no doubt, diminishes the value to be attached to the success or failure of the 
 system as an example. It is somewhat like an experiment in a pond upon principles of 
 navigation which, if good for anything, must be good for the ocean. Nevertheless, it is an 
 example ; and, in questions of this sort, an example of any kind is most valuable. Eight 
 years' practical experience of the working of an electoral system devised for the realization 
 of an important principle applicable to all representative institutions is, no matter how 
 " cabined, cribbed, confined " be the sphere of that experience, a great and noteworthy 
 addition to the knowledge of mankind. 
 
 V. Within the comparatively narrow limits to which this report must be confined, it does 
 not appear advisable to add any extracts to those already given from the Danish Electoral 
 Law of 1855. Those extracts, indeed, compi-ise the essence of the law. The subject under 
 consideration is so suggestive and demands for its thorough comprehension an examination 
 80 various and minute, that I cannot possibly hope to do more on the present occasion than 
 indicate gi'ound for furtlier aud fuller inf[uiry. No extensive comment, however, is needed 
 to distinguish the aim and character of the clause above cited. 
 
 I shall now endeavour to state precisely what these clauses are designed to prevent, and 
 what they are designed to secure. It appears to me that the marrow of the whole matter is 
 concentrated in Sections 22 and 2.S. 
 
 There are two ways in which local majorities may, if uni-estraincd l)y law, exercise tlieir 
 power in questions of representation, to tlie detriment no less of minorities tiian of tlieniselves. 
 They may do so both in the selection and in the election of can<lidate8. Tlicy may virtually 
 <lictate the vote of the elector by indirectly circumscribing tiic freedom of his choice. Uy 
 this means, indeed, ajjparent unanimity may be ol>tained ; i)ut the greater the unanimity 
 the greater the mischief, if it be only a unanimous submission to "Hobson's choice — this 
 or none : " and when this is the case, it may be truly said of the majorities tliemselves, 
 
 ' The indirect election of members to the Rigsraad Ijj- the local legislative bodies is, however, coiKhuted 
 iipon the principle, ntid in conformity with the stipulations, of Mr. Andrae 'h Electoral law. This should be 
 home in mind.
 
 46 APPENDIX. 
 
 " (lominationis in alios servitium suum mercedem dant," — "they are content to pay so great a 
 price as their own servitude to purchase the dominatiou over others." ^ For in order to secure 
 unanimity in the choice of the majority, it is previously necessary for the majority itself 
 to abdicate individual action on the part of its own members, Men are more likely to admit 
 unanimity in their passions and prejudices than in their sober judgments : and the candidate 
 thus selected may perhaps represent only a selfish compromise between narrow interests and 
 petty animosities. When this happens majorities, indeed, may show their power by con- 
 verting a bad candidate into a worse representative, but in doing so they will have also 
 shown that their power is incompatible with their freedom ; and that may be said of them 
 wliich Socrates is supposed to say to Polus in the Gorgias, when speaking of other tyrannies, 
 " They do not do what they wish, although they do what they please." 
 
 But, on the other hand, it is undoubtedly true that all political action necessitates a 
 compromise between opinions in matters of minor import. The absence of this compromise 
 is anarchy It is only when the compromise is compulsory, instead of spontaneous, that it can 
 be called tyranny. For the foundation of all society is confidence in others. All human creeds 
 must originate in faith of some sort, and men can do nothing without taking something on 
 trust. In the public business of life, individual action will always be guided and controlled 
 by collective opinion ; and, practically, the opinion of the many is controlled and guided 
 by the wisdom of the few. Every man has a right to think and choose for himself ; 
 but all men are not equally able to think and choose well, or equally disposed to think and 
 choose at all ; so that, as long as there exists in the world that discreet deference to the judg- 
 ment and that wholesome confidence in the character of others without which political com- 
 bination is impossible, no conceivable electoral system will prevent the choice of constitu- 
 encies from being greatly influenced by the bias of those local notables who, by personal 
 capacity or social position, are fitted to guide the conduct of their neighbours. The object of 
 Mr. Andrae's Electoral Law is, not to annihilate this controlling power, but, on the contrary, 
 to give the amplest scope to its natural operation, by relieving it from the crippling circum- 
 scription of arbitrary conditions. Thus, the constituent who demurs to "Hobson's choice," 
 is ensured every reasonable facility for bringing forward the cantlidate he prefers withou- 
 pecuniary sacrifice and without incurring that social martyrdom which, in such cases, some- 
 times seems to justify an assertion of Machiavelli's (whose experience of uncontrolled and 
 triumphant majorities was certainly as great as it was bitter) that, "he who deviates from 
 the common course and endeavors to act as duty dictates, insures his own destruction." 
 
 By enlarging the scope of the voter's choice, moreover, you elevate the quality of his 
 judgment. When he is free to choose whom he will, not constrained to choose merely whom 
 he must, it is probable that if he gives the preference to a person from his own immediate 
 neighborhood, the person thus preferred will be, not simply the slavish nominee of a perhaps 
 insignificant but petulant party, but a man whom the voter regards with affectionate 
 confidence and respect. Surely it would be unwise to extinguish (even were it possible) 
 those kindly influences which infuse into the public life and spirit of a nation the enthusiasm 
 of local affections, whether they be embodied in a respect for noble names and illustrious 
 houses, or in the grateful recognition of those good deeds which not seldom associate a 
 particular family with a particular neighbourhood. But is it not rather the local demagogues 
 than the real local aristoi who would have anything to fear from the most extended com- 
 petition with intelligence and virtue ? In any case, if the voter, by confining his vote to a 
 single candidate, be exposed to the risk of diminishing its value without thereby benefiting 
 the object of his special preference, it is to be presumed that he will extend the scope of his 
 judgment and his sympathies, and provide for those contemplated contingencies in which his 
 countrymen elsewhere may benefit by the exercise of his franchise. In doing so he will have 
 to look further and think more carefully. It is probable that he will select the other objects 
 
 1 Cowley, "Essay on Liberty."
 
 DANISH ELECTORAL LAW. 47 
 
 of his choice from men of eminence and distinction ; because those who are neither eminent 
 nor distinguished cannot then be arbitrarily thrust upon his notice. The voter who does 
 this will elevate his own character and class ; and if the whole class of voters do this, the 
 whole class of candidates will be improved. 
 
 In the next place, it is no doubt intended by the clauses above mentioned to withdraw 
 from the voter every reasonable excuse for disregarding and neglecting the duty of exercising 
 his franchise, as well as to provide for him every reasonable inducement to perform that duty 
 with the most serious reflection, and to the fullest possible extent. 
 
 A further consideration here suggests itself in regard to the relations to be maintained 
 between constituencies and Representatives. Representation has so strong a tendency to 
 dwindle into delegation, that it can only be restrained from doing so, either by great modera- 
 tion on the part of the masses, or else by great elevation of character on the part of the 
 Representative class. These two restraining forces react, and depend upon each other. In 
 proportion as the character of the Representative class is high-minded and scrupulous, it is 
 presumed that the confidence reposed in it by the constituencies will be great ; but, in pro- 
 portion as the freedom of the Representative is cramped and his responsibility impoverished 
 by the exaction, on the part of his constituents, of exorbitant and vexatious pledges, the gene- 
 ral character of the Representative class will be low and subser\'ient, and the confidence it 
 can command will be consequently small. In short, in this, as in all other matters of 
 exchange, the quality and amount of the demand will regulate the quality and amount of the 
 supply. When pledges are recklessly exacted, adventurers will always be found recklessly 
 ready to accept them ; when the character of the compact is mistrustful, the character of 
 those that undertake it will be untrustworthy. In America, the House of Representatives 
 has long been, virtually, a House of Delegates, wherein the fate of almost every measui-e is 
 decided before the opening of the Session, and the majority of speeches made are addressed 
 not to the conviction of the House, but to the passions and prejudices of the constituencies 
 who have sent its members to sit in political fetters. The solemn responsibihty of legislation 
 is thus remitted by those on whose jjart it is a public duty to those on whose part it is only a 
 mischievous assumjjtion. For the nation can impeach its representatives by the voice of its 
 constituencies ; but to whom are the constituencies practically accountable ? The danger of 
 thi.s is in the fact that the intellect and conscience of the nation are not adequately represented 
 in the national puljlic life ; and the vertlict of this intellect and conscience, which must ulti- 
 mately be heard, not having been provided with any constitutional expression, can only find 
 utterance in revolution. The Long Parliament could not have been swept away by a gesture 
 of Cromwell's if the head and heart of the nation had been in that body. The temple which 
 enshrines a constitution cannot long escape from destruction when it begins to be muttered 
 about outside the walls of it, that "the gods are departing." In England the high moral and 
 intellectual standard of the representative class is powerfully promoted and sustained by the 
 unremunerated character of its service ; but under those continental systems of represent- 
 ation in which the representative body is paid by the State, the danger alluded to is not 
 insignificant. Not only, however, is it the object, but I am satisfied that it is also the 
 result of Mr. Andrae's electoral system (so far as that system has l)eeu applied) to facilitate 
 the introduction into the National Legislature of the greatest amount of iiitelligenco and 
 high character, and to hinder the entrance of a great amount of ignorance and passion. I 
 .am disposed to think that, on the wiiole, this system in its practical result attains many of 
 the objects of an educational franchise, without invalidating the salutary iiitlueiice of 
 property. 
 
 Two other results are involved in the arrangements of this law as concerning the 
 qucHtion of personal canvass. It is undoubtedly to be desired that every facility should exi.^t 
 for free personal intercourse and intercliange of rtpiriiou between candidates and voters, ami 
 it IS not to be desired that the candidate shoulil l)e to tiie voter not a man, but merely a 
 name, an abstraction. Whether, however, it be nut possible to provide for tliia reasonable
 
 48 APPENDIX. 
 
 and necessary intercourse withoub exposing it to the possible degradation of degenerating 
 into one of barter and beggary, is a question worthy of consideration. 
 
 A writer, who was not the least distinguished of Milton's contemporaries, has exclaimed, 
 " To what pitiful baseness did the noblest Romans submit themselves for the obtaining of a 
 Praetorship, or the Consular dignity ! They put on the habit of supplicants and ran about 
 on foot, and in dirt, through all the tribes to beg voices ; they flattered the poorest artizans, 
 and carried a nomenclator with them to whisper in their ear every man's name, lest they 
 should mistake it in their salutation ; they shook the hand and kissed the cheek of every 
 popular tradesman ; they stood all day at every market in the public places to show and 
 ingratiate themselves to the rout ; they employed all their friends to solicit for them ; they 
 kept open tables in every street ; they distributed wine, and bread, and money even to the 
 vilest of the people. ' ' £u Eomanos rerum dominos ! — Behold the masters of the world 
 begging from door to door ! " 
 
 Might not these words receive with justice a more modern application ? 
 
 Whether, how"ever, the personal canvass be a good thing or a bad thing, according to 
 this Electoral Law of Mr. Andi-ae it is quite out of the question. 
 
 And with the personal canvass also disappears a very influential personage intimately 
 connected therewith, viz., the electioneering agent. How far the complete efFacement from 
 the electoral dramatis personae of this important but costly character is a result to be admired 
 or condemned, involves a question which will be best answered by those who have had 
 personal experience of the part he plays, both in connection with the pockets of candidates 
 and the morals of voters. 
 
 Finally, it appears to be the intention of this law to increase the sense of individual 
 responsibility in mattei's of public trust ; to place the conscience of each voter in his own 
 keeping and to take it out of the hands of those careless investors of other men's moral capi- 
 tal who flourish in all large communities and who appear to consider themselves a sort of 
 joint-stock company for conscience, with limited liability. Moreover, it may be said that this 
 law is, in its tendency, a civilizing law — for civilization is the parent of variety in opinions ; 
 and it is the intention of this law to provide, not only the amplest expression for all varieties 
 of opinion, but also to utilize to the utmost all manner of ways and means provided by the 
 kindly providence of civilization for the formation of these wholesome varieties. 
 
 That these intentions are wise and good will hardly be denied. The only practical ques- 
 tions that remain are, first, whether these intentions are fully realized by the mechanical 
 operation of the law. 
 
 ****** 
 
 Other and perhaps yet more important considerations, however, are involved in the 
 questions of what are its political results in this country, and how far it may be applicable to 
 other European communities. 
 
 These considerations are hardly within the province to which the present remarks must 
 be confined ; for they raise an infinite number of collateral and secondary inquiries, which can- 
 not be followed out without bringing the inquirer into a disquisition upon the necessity and 
 value of government by party, as well as upon the nature of the various answers which may 
 be returned to the paramount practical question of, " How is the Queen's Government to be 
 carried on ?" 
 
 I may mention, however, that on lately referring to some of these topics in conversation 
 with a Danish gentleman well acquainted with the political life of this country, I was assured 
 that, in the discussion and settlement of great public questions by the Supreme Council of 
 the realm, no disinclination is found to exist upon the part of representative minorities to 
 combine and concur in the formation of a judicial majority for the decision of what is expedi- 
 ent.
 
 MISREPRESENTATION. 49 
 
 I may also mention that I have been assured bj^ Mr. Andrae that, in his opinion, the 
 general standard of representative character supplied by this law is the best and highest in 
 the country ; and that, although he does not consider that a sufficient time has elapsed 
 whereby to test the effects of the law upon the constituencies themselves, he is nevertlieless 
 of opinion that, under its operation, the character of the voter as a class has improved and is 
 improving. I have every reason to believe, moreover, that bribery is almost unknown to the 
 constituencies for the Eigsraad. It appears to me, however, that the permission contained 
 in clause 18 of Mr. Andrae's Law, and which equally appears in Mr. Hare's scheme — to fill 
 up the voting paper in private— might, under very conceivable circumstances, facilitate 
 intimidation. 
 
 A full and complete investigation into the character and operation of this law is a task 
 which I should rejoice to see assumed by some person of known impartiality, capacity and 
 experience. For, whatever may be the character or the consequence of the law, I venture to 
 think that its existence is one of the most remarkable events in the history of representative 
 institutions. 
 
 FAIR REPRESENTATION. 
 
 From a Speech, by Lord She.rhrool-e 1S67. 
 
 . . . There was nothing more worthy of the attention of statesmen in the new state 
 of affairs than anything which would have the tendency to prevent that violent oscillation 
 which they now witnessed. What happened in the United States ? The minority of 
 thousands might as well not exist at all. It is absolutely ignored. Was their country 
 (England) in like manner to be formed into two hostile camps, debarred from each other in 
 two solid and compact bodies? Or were they to have that shading-off of opinion, that 
 modulation of extremes, and mellowing and ripening of right principles, which are among 
 the surest characteristics of a free country, the true secrets of political dynamics, and the 
 true preservatives of a great nation ? He said, then, that what he proposed to the House 
 was in itself just, equal, and fair, founded on no undue and unfair attempt to give a minority 
 an advantage they were not entitled to exercise, and that it was peculiarly applicable to tlie 
 state of things on which they were entering. 
 
 MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 From the Fortnightly Review, Vol. VIII., iSyo. 
 
 " It is evident that it is at least as important that a constituency Ixj not misrepresented ;is 
 that it be represented. A voter's no, therefore, is as important an element in determining his 
 preference as his yes. Hitherto we have entirely ignored this negative element ; and no doubt 
 our habitual indiflerence to principles will prompt us still to ignore it, and lo he content with 
 our ol'l one-sided system, unless it be shown that scri(ju8 evils must inevit.ibly result from .such a 
 course. I propose to .show that one of the most excellent reforms about to be made in our 
 electoral procedure — that of keeping the ])rogress of a contest secret tluring the polling— will lead 
 to the introduction of one of the worst features of American politics, unless special means of pre- 
 vention be adopted. 
 
 4
 
 50 APPENDIX. 
 
 " It is obvious that in all countries in which political feeling runs high, and different parties- 
 divide tiie suffrages of electors, there will always be a demand for organisation within each party 
 for the purpose of advancing its interests. To a certain extent such organisations are necessary 
 and beneficial ; but there is a point at which their activity becomes little else than a mischievous 
 nuisance. The action of a committee is often necessary to promote unity, and to secure the 
 victory even of the strongest party, and the election of the best or most favourite candidate. 
 But when such functions become the sport of mere "wire-pullers" and "caucuses," and the 
 suffrages of parties are demandetl for inferior candidates, nominated for venal motives by venal 
 men, and electors have no choice but to vote for such candidates or to see their party beaten 
 altogether, then the organisation sinks from its original design and use, and becomes an intoler- 
 able evil. To such a height has this evil attained in the United States that " there is now 
 absolutely no choice of representatives, strictly speaking, by the people. Nominations are either 
 bought or obtained by personal or party influence. The whippers-in have full control, and 
 intelligent public opinion has little to do with the result." 
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICIANS. 
 
 From " The American System of Government," by Ezra 0. Seaman, 1870. 
 
 It is idle to talk about principles, without proper men, and men of principle, to cai'ry 
 them into effect. It is very unwise and dangerous, to elect seltish and corrupt men, to carry 
 into effect good principles, and wise policies. The conclusion is obvious — that there is no 
 good reason for maintaining permanent party organizations in our country, or in any country ; 
 and that there is no propriety in tloing so. All political parties should be temporary and 
 changeable — based upon the questions and issues of the day, and upon the opinions of 
 voters of the relative merits of the candidates for President of the United States, for Gover- 
 nors of States, and other high offices. 
 
 So far as political parties and the lines of division between them are produced by differ- 
 ences of opinion in relation to the principles, policies, and measures of government, they will 
 be as permanent as the causes and issues upon which they are based ; and they should be no 
 more so, and should pass away with the causes which produced them. Parties should not 
 be based upon mere abstract principles, which have no direct practical bearing ; nor upon 
 dead issues which have passed by, and are of no practical importance ; nor should they be 
 sustained and made permanent by organization, party machinery, and party creeds, to pro- 
 mote the election and aggrandizement of party leaders, — regardless of the public good. 
 
 The mode of representation and the system of elections in the United States, are both 
 very imperfect and defective. The former is defective, in giving the entire representation 
 and power to majorities, and practically disfranchising minorities, — by allowing them no 
 representation, and no voice in the government : and the latter is defective in omitting to 
 provide any mode of selecting candidates for office, to be voted for by the electors at popular 
 elections. 
 
 In theory, we have a popular government, in which the masses of the people select 
 their own rulers ; but owing to the defects of its organization, system of representation and 
 mode of electing officers, the practice is very different from the theory. 
 
 Officers to be elected by the peoi>le are not selected by any considerable number of 
 the voters, but by the dominant faction or clique of the dominant party — by whom and 
 their associates in nominating conventions, they are presented to the people, to be by them 
 confirmed by formal vote — the masses of the voters having no choice, except between two
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICTAXS. 51 
 
 sets of nominees, presented for their sutfrages, by partisan conventions. In nine eases out 
 of ten, a mere choice of evils is presented to a large portion of the voters, — the candidates of 
 neither party being such as they would have preferred. 
 
 Though nominally a popular government, controlled bj- the voice of the people, practic- 
 ally our government has degenerated into an oligarchy of the leaders of the dominant clique 
 or coterie, of the dominant party of the day ; and the people act a very subordinate part, 
 even in the election of their own representatives — a majority of them merely ratifying and 
 confirming the nominations made, and supporting the measures and policies prep.ired by the 
 party oligarchy — while the minority look on and have no substantial voice or participation 
 in the government. Party organizations and the party character of our government, have 
 been in the process of development gradualW, during a period of nearly fifty years — ever 
 since the inauguration of the State and national, as well as local nominating conventions, the 
 adoption of party creeds and platforms, and the election of Presidential electors by the 
 people — by general ticket. 
 
 The theory of the government is, that it is a representative government — in which all the 
 adult male citizens, (with few exceptions) are equally and fairlj-^ represented, by men of their 
 own choice, and through their representatives have a voice in legislation, and in the govern- 
 ment of the country — making it in some measure a self-government ; a government of the 
 wh:ile people, by the people themselves. But in practice, under our defective electoral 
 system, the majority of the voters in each electoral district elect all the representatives, and 
 the minority none — whereby the minority are unrepresented, and practicallj' disfranchised, 
 have no voice in the government, and no one to represent, advocate or defend, their sjjecial 
 interests and rights. 
 
 It is the characteristic of zealous political partisans, to look at every measure presented, 
 and at every political or national question, from the standpoint of their party ; and to see it 
 and examine it on one side only. With the eyes of the understanding nearly closed, they 
 listen to the argiuueuts of their opponents — not for the purpose of learning what truth they 
 may contain, and what weight should be given to them ; but for the purpose of finding 
 defects in them, or what they may distort and make appear erroneous — in order to destroy 
 their influence. Being accustomed to hear the merits of their own party extolled, and its 
 principles, policies, and measures held up to view as tending to promote the best interests of 
 the country, and the general welfare of the people ; and accustomed to hear the op[)osito 
 party and its principles and policies reviled — as tending to evil, and to evil only,- political 
 partisans usually take one-sided and partial views of all questions and measures of a political 
 or public nature. They seldom view a question in all its aspects and bearings ; and lience 
 they get only partial and imperfect views, and in their reasoning upon them, they necessarily 
 arrive at conclusions more or less erroneous. They often become imbued with enthusiasm in 
 relation to the merits of their own party and party creed, and inclined to attribute all the 
 pro.Hperity of the country to it^ principles, policies, ami measures. They can see no good in 
 the other party — either in itsjjrinciples or its policies, — its leaders or its measures. 
 
 The first object of many partisan legislators, is to promote the success and secure tlic 
 a.scendency of their party, 'i'o promote the general gooil ami welfare of the country, and of 
 the whole ])eople, is with them a secondary consideration — lieiiig regarded by thini r.itlier as 
 a means of promoting the success of their party, than as the proposed end and object of their 
 legislative action. 
 
 The tendency of party spirit is to tolerate no man as a leader, who is not blind to the 
 faults of his own party, and to the merits of his opponents. -Men of nound understandings, 
 who look at both sides of political questions and judge fairly and impartially of their merits, 
 soon lose the confidence of violent partisans, are distrusted by them, and no longer recog- 
 nized as lea<ler8. A fair-minded man, who looks at both sides of jiolitical qnestion.^, and 
 considers them carefully, with a view to judge of their juerits, is unfitted for a jiarty leader,
 
 52 APPENDIX. 
 
 and must stand in the back-ground. Partisan enthusiasts, and men who have one blind side, 
 and are accustomed to see and appreciate the merits of one side only, must occupy the front 
 seats. 
 
 The violent party spirit and party organizations of the present day, tend to make sharp, 
 one-sided, and narrow-minded men, and cunning politicians — but not statesmen. They tend 
 to discourage freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom of speech upon political 
 questions ; to destroy freedom of action ; and to unfit men to become statesmen, however 
 long they may be in public life. Party spirit is, in fact, so wedded to tempoi-ary partisan 
 expetlients, tiiat it can liardl}' tolerate sound statesmanship. 
 
 The power of party organizations and the intensity and violence of party spirit, have 
 greatly increased during the last fifty years. 
 
 Pai-tj' organizations, such as we have in this country, exist in no other, and are not 
 necessary in a well- organized government. They were invented long since the organization 
 of our government, partly to supply the defects of our system of elections, and partly to 
 promote the success of party, and party leaders (as is shown in the first chapter of this work) ; 
 and they can be dispensed with when those defects are supplied by law. The principal evils 
 of our system of government, grow out of these organizations, nominating conventions, and 
 other party machinery, devised to stimulate party spirit, to secure success at elections — 
 either by fair or foul means, and to control the destinies of the country. 
 
 By the caucus and convention system, everything is ai-ranged in secret by a few leaders, 
 ■w-ithout any public discussion in convention, of the resolutions presented, or of the merits or 
 relative merits of the candidates named ; and when they come to vote, the silent vote is 
 cast, without any reasons being assigned. Conventions come together simply to record the 
 decisions of the leaders, when they are united ; and to determine by vote, which faction or 
 section is the strongest, when they are divided. 
 
 Political partisans often justify themselves, and quiet their consciences, in practising 
 deception and falsehood, and other corrupt means, to promote the success of their party, by 
 alluding to the fact, that their opponents do likewise ; that to do so is sanctioned by custom, 
 and necessary to success. Criminals of all grades reason in a verj' similar manner, to apolo- 
 gise to themselves, for their crimes. 
 
 The .bad practices of each party tend to corrupt the other ; and unless some remedy can 
 be devised, to correct the corrupt practices and evils which have grown up under our system 
 of party organizations, nominating conventions and caucuses, and electing public officers, 
 there is great danger of such widespread corruption and distrust of all public officers, and 
 of legislation and the administration of law, that we shall sink into anarchy, and a chronic 
 state of revolution and civil war — as Mexico has done. 
 
 Party organizations tend to foster partj' spirit, a spirit of exclusiveness and intolerance. 
 By means of party creeds and platforms, adopted without debate or much consideration, to 
 fan the flames of class interests, and the prejudices of race and party, and to catch votes, 
 they tend to create and perpetuate artificial distinctions between parties, for mere party 
 purposes. They furnish rules and tests of party faith, by which to determine the fidelity of 
 the members, and to discipline or denounce as unfaithful, those that presume to think for 
 themselves, contrary to the party creed. 
 
 Party organizations and machinery have become so complete, party spirit so intolerant, 
 and party discipline so rigid and efficient, that if a party man, having any position or influ- 
 ence, presumes to express opinions differing from the creed or the policy of his party, the 
 jjarty leaders combine against him, charge him with deserting his friends and the principles 
 of his party, and denounce him as a political heretic. Very few men have popularity and 
 strength sufficient to withstand such attacks, and maintain their position. The result is, that
 
 POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICIANS. 53 
 
 most of the iniblic ofBcers of our country are the mere slaves of party and party leaders — 
 without much freedom of action, or freedom of speech —being accustomed and required, to 
 speak and act, in accordance with the creed and policy, and the supposed exigencies of their 
 party ; and if they fail to do so, they are usually denounced as traitors. 
 
 What is the moral of all this, but that in American politics to-day, there is no place for 
 middle men ? He who would achieve political success must ally himself with a party, abide 
 by its fortunes, and endorse its policy, whether or not it commends itself to him. There can 
 be no hope for promotion in any other line of action. The day for middle-men is past ; the 
 lield for those in this country or in England, who would win power ■v\nthout the sacrifice of 
 independence, is closed. Henceforth, the successful men in our politics are to be the parti- 
 sans who will stick at nothing which is avowed by the party to which they belong. 
 
 Party organizations and creeds, aud party spirit, tend to magnify the importance of 
 many questions of but little real consequence, and to encourage the formation of immaterial 
 issues, in order to miiltiply the differences between parties, — to enable them to maintain 
 party lines as distinctly as possible. They lead men to study the success of their party, and 
 their own success connected with it, rather than the interests of the country ; to consider 
 every question from a party standpoint ; and to regard principally, its bearing upon the 
 future success of the party. In legislative bodies, they induce party leaders to oppose, as a 
 matter of policy, the measures of their opponents, — even if good ; rather than lend their 
 eflforts to improve and perfect them — for fear they may inure the future success of their 
 opponents. 
 
 Party organizations have become so strong, and their machinery so extensive, far-reach- 
 ing and powerful, that they dictate interpretations of the constitution, the creeds and 
 political faith of the people, and the leading measures and policies of the government ; and 
 in a great measure control the action of the government. They have checked and restrained 
 freedom of inquiry aud freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press ; 
 increased the intensity and violence of party spirit ; engendered political intolerance and 
 tyranny ; and nearly destroyed all freedom and independence of official action. 
 
 The machinery and influence of party organizations, tend to form and mould the opinions 
 of the people, in accordance with party creeds ; to form narrow-minded politicians ; and to 
 prevent the development of enlarged views, and a high order of statesmanship— which can 
 spring only from freedom of action, freedom of thought, and very mature deliberation. 
 They are inconsistent with the formation of great statesmen, and noble-minded, self-sacrific- 
 ing patriots. The great civil war, through which our country has passed, developed and 
 formed some great commanders ; but very few statesmen have been produced in our country, 
 during the last forty years. Under our advanced system of party organizations, and party 
 discipline and intolerance, statesmanship is dying out. 
 
 By electing to office, through the agency of party organizations, and subjecting to the 
 domination of such organizations, and to the temjitations to V)ril)ery and corru).tion, great 
 numbers of politicians of pliable consciences an<l easy virtue, and many of bail or doul)tful 
 character, the legislation of the country, all the departments of the national, State, and city 
 governments, and nearly all branches of the public service, have been nn.re or leas corrupted- 
 Kven the judiciary have not always escaped the taint of party inlluences, and partisan 
 preju<licc» and partialities ; nor even the suspicion of bribery, in .some instanci's. Tlie 
 whole tendency of sucli a system is, to corrupt politicians and office-holders, and to .Icinoralizc 
 the people. If the evil be not arrested, it will uii.l.rniinr and destroy tiic stability of our 
 government. 
 
 It is very dcMlrabie, that our system of elections should be so aiiimded and reconstructed, 
 that party committees and nominating conventions, party niacliinery and political leagues 
 and societies, may all be rendered unnecessary, and dispensed with— as not consistent with a
 
 54 APPENDIX. 
 
 free and unhkixM'd exercise of tlie elective franchise ; nor with the right of the people to 
 choose their own rulers ; nor with a fair and upright administration of the government. 
 The people have more i-eason to repose confidence in responsible public officers, either elected 
 or duly api)ointed, and acting publicly, under the sanction of an oath, than in irresponsible 
 ]):vrty committees and political societies, whose operations are carried t)n in secret, for party 
 purposes. 
 
 POLITICAL CORRUPTION. 
 
 F7-om the Canadian Monthly, Vol. //. , i8j2. 
 
 "Corruption grows by what it feeds upon. It will increase, and increase in an ever accelerating 
 ratio, wliile the moral resistance will become continually weaker, till among us, as in other countries, 
 bribery becomes a jest, and corruptionist a name hardly more odious than that of politician. 
 The progress of electoral demoralization is as certain as the increasing volume and rapidity of the 
 descending avalanche. We shall sink to the level of the States, and perhaps below it For cor- 
 ruption is deeper, more complete, and more hopeless in a small nation than in a great one . . 
 Who doubts the unsatisfactory character of the present state of things ? Who believes that the 
 deliberations of a party cabinet have, for their paramount object, the welfare of the country, and 
 not the retention of office ? The Opposition orators and journals thunder indignantly against the 
 questionable acts of the Government. . . Without entering into details, at once needless and 
 disagreeable, we do not doubt the general fact to which these various accusations point. We do 
 not doubt that the present Government of the Dominion subsists, like other governments of the 
 same description, by means which are more or less corrupt. We do not doubt that, even in 
 dealing with the greatest interests of the nation, even in dealing with such momentous undertak- 
 ings as the Pacific Railway, it is influenced by a motive which renders its decisions more or less 
 untrustworthy, and its action more or less injurious to national morality, as well as to the material 
 prosperity of the nation . 
 
 " ' Then.' cry the opposition, ' the remedy is obvious. Vote for us. Turn out the Govern- 
 ment ; put us in power. Corruption will vanish, and a reign of purity will commence.' But is 
 it so? The general system, and the mode in which the cabinet is formed — out of a special group 
 of office-seekers — remaining the same, will a mere change of Ministers make much difference in 
 the morality of the Government, or in its method of maintaining itself in place ? . . When 
 Parliament meets, or rather long before Parliament meets, will commence a political auction, at 
 which the articles bid for will be the votes of the unattached members for the smaller provinces, 
 and the bidders will be a ' corrupt ' Government on one side, and a virtuous Opposition on the 
 other. . . The bidding will be high, parties being so evenly balanced, and the stake, under 
 the present circumstances, being so large ; and the expenses, whatever they may be, will be 
 defrayed by the public. . . 
 
 " We have great faith in the honourable intentions of the leaders of the Opposition ; and we 
 are at the same time perfectly convinced that, as soon as they became the heads of a party Gov- 
 ernment, struggling for its life against a hungry and vindictive enemy, nearly a match for it in 
 force, their intentions would give way to the exigencies of their position, and that they would 
 do first things for which they would be sorry, and then things of which they would be ashamed. 
 At last shame itself would cease. 
 
 " Electoral corruption has its source in Parliamentary corruption, which affords inducements 
 to candidates and Ministers to purchase seats ; and the source of parliamentary corruption is the 
 system of making the offices of State, with the patronage annexed to them, the prize of a per- 
 petual conflict between two organized factions, euph mistically styled party government.
 
 POLITICAL CORPUPTION. 55 
 
 " This question has been more than once presented to our readers within the last half-year ; 
 but we wish to keep it before their minds for a time, on account of its transcendent importance 
 to the country, and because it is more likely to command attention while the memory of the 
 elections, and the evil influences revealed by them, is fresh. Moreover, as we have said before, 
 this is the accepted season ; soon the malady may be beyond control, and the last chance may be 
 lost of saving the country from the gulf into which it is too manifestly sinking. 
 
 " Already the sinister forms of American corruption have made their appearance among us. 
 Already some of the most unprincipled members of the community have taken to politics as their 
 congenial trade. The Wire-puller is here. The Log-roller is here. The Ward Politician is 
 here. The Working Man's Friend is here. And at Ottawa, since the recent development of 
 public works, we have seen plainly enough the sinister face of a Canadian Lobby. 
 
 " Party government, in England, dates as a regular institution from the reign of William 
 IIL, who, after vainly attempting to form a cabinet without distinction of pnrty, was compelled, 
 by the factiousness and selfishness of the men about him, and his position as the occupant of a 
 <lisputed throne, to form a cabinet on the party principle. And with party government at once 
 came organized corruption. ' From the day,' says Macaulay, ' on which Caermarthen was called a 
 second time to the chief direction of affairs. Parliamentary corruption continued to be practised, 
 with scarcely any intermission, by a long succession of statesmen, till the close of the American 
 
 war It at length became as notorious that there was a market for votes at the 
 
 Treasury as that there was a market for cattle in Smithfield. Numerous demagogues out of 
 power declaimed against this vile trafiic ; but every one of these demagogues, as soon as he was 
 in power, found himself driven by a kind of fatality to engage in that traffic, or at least to connive 
 at it. Now and then, perhaps, a man who had romantic notions of public virtue refused to be 
 himself the paymaster of the corrupt crew, and averted his eyes while his less scrupulous 
 colleagues did that which he knew to be indispensable and yet felt to be degrading. But the 
 iastances of this prudery were rare indeed. The doctrine generally received, even among upright 
 and honourable politicians was, that it was shameful to receive bribes, but that it was necessary 
 to distribute them. It is a remarkable fact that the evil reached the greatest height during the 
 administration of Henry Pelham, a statesman of good intentions, of spotless morals in private 
 life, and of exemplary disinterestedness. It is not difficult to guess by what arguments he, and 
 other well-meaning men, who like him followed the fashion of their age, quieted their con- 
 sciences. No casuist, however severe, has denied that it may be a duty to give what it is a crime 
 to take. . . . And might not the same plea be urged in defence of a Minister who, when no 
 other expedient would avail, paid greedy and low minded men not to ruin their country.' 
 
 "The only intermission of corruption, during the period mentioned by Macaulay, was when 
 Chatham for a few years put party under his feet, and ruled as the Minister of the n.ition. 
 
 " But the mutual hatred, the mutual slander, and the reckless sacrifice of patriotism to 
 factious passions, which party government brought with it, were worse if possible, than the cor- 
 niption. Chatham himself conspired from merely factious motives — motives which were afterwards 
 atlmitted to have been merely factious by the conspirators themselves — to drive Walpole into the 
 iniquitous and disastrous war with Spain, which, as its natural consequence, brought on the 
 attempt of the Pretender, and a renewal of civil war in England. In the recent controversy 
 respecting the Treaty of Washington, Lord Cairns, a man who had held one of the higiiest offices 
 in the State, supported with the utmost violence and with nil the resources oflegal casuistry at his 
 command, the most outrageous pretensions of the American Government, simi)ly for the purpose 
 of embarrassing the (jovernment of his own country. The same man had ch^ne his utmost, at 
 the time of the American war, to imjjede the efforls of Lord Palmerslon's Ministry to prevent the 
 escape of cruisers and preserve the neutrality which was so essential to us as a commercial nation. 
 Can it be doubted that F>ord Cairns had been taught by the party system to hate Englishmen of 
 the opposite i>arty more than he loved England? Did not Lord Derby, when he look his 
 tremendous 'leap in the dark,' by carrying an extension of the suffrage, which, whether
 
 56 APPENDIX. , 
 
 expedient or not in itself, was contrary to all the avowed principles of his party, and which he 
 must have believed to be fraught with the utmost peril to his country, find comfort in the 
 retlection that he had 'dished the Whigs?' And would not the Whigs have sacrificed the public 
 good with equal facility for the satisfaction of dishing Lord Derby ? 
 
 "In France parly government was introduced with constitutional monarchy, on the 
 restoration of the Bourbons, and reintroduced with the constitutional dynasty of Louis Philippe. 
 There again it bred corruption, (the Government multiplying offices for corrupt purposes, till, 
 under Louis Philippe, the number of officers actually exceeded the number of electors, ) and not 
 only corruption, but, as the fury of the factions increased, civil war and political ruin. Trans- 
 ported with hatrad of his rival Guizot, Thiers, himself an adherent of constitutional monarchy, 
 headed the n ovement which overthrew the constitutional throne. 
 
 " It is needless to show how corruption has attended party government in the United States. 
 But it is equally certain that the spirit engendered by the struggle of the two factions for place 
 contributed in no small degree to prepare the way for the civil war : and if any one feels assured 
 that the possibilities of such calamities in the United States are exhausted, he reads the situation 
 with different eyes from ours. 
 
 " As we have said before, in England party has at least an intelligible basis, and one 
 which may determine the allegiance of a reasonable man and a lover of his country, inasmuch as 
 the great conflict between aristocratic and democratic principles of government, carried on for so 
 many years and with so many vicissitudes, is not yet closed. But in Canada, since the establish- 
 ment of Responsible Government and religious equality, party has had no intelligible basis ; it 
 has been faction and nothing else. In all the speeches and manifestoes of the party leaders 
 during the late contest, it was impossible to discover any principle which could form a per- 
 manent line of demarcation. There were reminiscences of a political past, before the concession 
 of responsible government, when principles were really at stake ; but as regards the present, 
 there were only administrative questions, such as that of the Pacific Railway, which, however 
 important at the time, cannot furnish permanent articles of party faith. Saving such questions, 
 we had nothing but vague though vehement assertions of the necessity of party government, and 
 of the impracticable and visionary character of all who looked beyond it. British institutions, 
 we were told, could not be carried on without party. If by British institutions is meant party 
 government, the proposttion is indisputable, though not profound ; but if it is meant that we 
 cannot possibly have representative assemblies, self-taxation and trial by jury, without putting up 
 the government periodically as the prize of a faction fight, the proposition agrees neither with 
 reason nor with facts. Again, it was laid down that party was necessary because God had so 
 constituted us as to think differently on most subjects. We imagined that God had so con- 
 stituted us as to think alike on all subjects, truth being one, and our faculties being the same ; 
 and that difference of opinion arose from error on one side, or both, which further investigation 
 and discussion would in the end remove. Such has been the case in science and in all rational 
 inquiry. But it seems that in politics Providence has made half the community incapable of 
 ever arriving at truth, in order that there may always be a Parliamentary Opposition. A 
 Ministerial orator avowed his theoretical belief in party, and in the necessity of having a body of 
 ' astute and able men ' as an Opposition, to criticize and control the Government ; but afterwards, 
 coming to parties in Canada, he laid it down that there ought to be only two — one, that of 
 patriots like himself, at once in the best sense Conservative and Reforming, carrying on the 
 government in the highest interest of the whole nation ; the other that of ' Independents, ' 
 'Annexationists,' and other infamous and disloyal persons, making it their business to 'paralyse ' 
 the government and prevent it from promoting the union and prosperity of the country. So that 
 half, or nearly half, of the community are to be always disloyal, enemies of the nation, and 
 devoted to the malignant work of paralysing the efforts of a Government which is labouring 
 successfully for the public good. This is to be the basis of our political system for ever ! 
 
 " On no subject but politics are such absurdities now current. But in former days the 
 scientific world was divided into factions which throttled each other as the political factions do
 
 POLITICAL CORHUPTION". 57 
 
 now. Perha] s, if lucrative offices had been the prize of the conflict, we should still have the 
 parties of Nominalists and Realists wrestling over a psychological question which has long since 
 been settled by mental science, and consigned to the grave of the Middle Ages. . . . 
 
 " In the old country, which we affectionately but somewhat unreflectingly imitate in spite of 
 the great diflference of our circumstances, party government, we repeat, has at least a rational and 
 moral basis. It has also, to temper its evils, antidotes which are wanting here. In England 
 there is a strong and settled public opinion which restrains the excesses of the party chiefs ; there 
 is a great body of independent wealth and intelligence which, though it may to a certain extent 
 belong to the parties, belongs more to the country ; there is a corp- of public men whose tenure 
 of their places in Parliament is practically assured to them for life, and who are deeply imbued 
 with traditions of government, which amidst all their rivalries, they continue to respect ; there 
 are the grave experiences and heavy burdens of an old country, which impose, even on the most 
 unscrupulous, a prudence unknown to political adventurers gambling with the virgin resources of 
 a. young nation ; there is a great Civil Service, which fortunate accident has combined with 
 wisdom to place outside party, and which carries on the ordinary administration of the country 
 almost independently of the party chiefs who form the Cabinet; there is a press in which, though 
 there are plenty of organists and Bohemians ; there are also a great many independent writers on 
 politics of the best kind, furnished in many instances by the numerous fellow-ships of the great 
 universities, which thus exercise, in their way, a critical and corrective power. And yet, even 
 in the old country, how superior to all mere party governments was the government of Sir 
 Robert Peel during that brief hour for which faction permitted him to rule, in some measure, as 
 the Minister of the nation ! How mournfully did the hearts of the people follow the retirement, 
 how anxiously did they expect the return, of the one statesman who aspired to i-ule, not for a 
 faction, but for the country ! 
 
 " A party government is essentially a weak government. It cannot venture to offend or 
 estrange any one who commands votes. It is unable to grapple with the selfishness of local 
 interests, sections, rings — the perpetual enemies of the common weal. It cannot even give its 
 attention steadily to its proper work. The greater part of its energies is devoted to the main- 
 tenance of its own existence against the attacks of the Opposition — the smaller part to the public 
 service. It can contain only half the leading statesmen of the country, while the faculties of 
 the other half are devoted to obstructing and paralyzing the conduct of affairs. Probably it will 
 not contain the greatest administrators of all ; since the temper of the great administrator is 
 peculiarly alien to the narrowness of faction. . . . 
 
 " But the system of government Ijy organized factions is a process by which the most 
 unprincipled members of the community are almost infallibly selected as the holders of power, 
 and as cynosures for the imitation of the community at large. It may safely be said, that no 
 rational being would have thought of instituting such a system if he had not been misled by false 
 examples and blind adlicrence to tradition. 
 
 " It would probably be a further improvement if the election of members for the Dominion 
 Parliament were vested in the Provincial Parliaments, as that of the American Senate is in the 
 .State Legislatures. This would at once settle the relations between the local and central 
 Assemblies, and bind them together in a united whole. It would spare the country one set of 
 pojjular elections without derogating from the electoral supremacy of the people. It woultl, 
 probablj-, act in some measure as an antidote to localism in the choice of representatives, llie preval- 
 ence of which has ruined the character of the representation in the United Slates, and to which 
 there is a marked tendency here. The standard of I'Lnglish statesmanshi]) has been hitherto 
 maintained by keeping the representation national, and freely electing eminent men to seats for 
 constituencies with which they have no local connection, as in the case of the present Premier, 
 and in those of Lord Palmerston and Canning before him. Of late the House of Commons has 
 been invaded to a formidable extent by ' locals,' and the consequence has been such a falling off 
 in ability that, when the present leaders go, it is difficult to say who will take their places. I
 
 58 APPENDIX. 
 
 mi"-ht fliirly he hoped that in elections to the Dominion Parliament, conducted in the manner 
 here siitji^ested, by the menibcrs of the Provincial Parliaments, exercising their electoral power 
 as a trust in presence of the people of the province, while mere wealth would generally 
 prevail, room might sometimes be found for capacity, and that a sufficient succession of statesmen 
 might be provided for the government of the nation. It may perhaps be thought by some that 
 statesmanship has become unnecessary, and that we can get along very well with a Parliament of 
 opulent gentlemen, who subscribe liberally to local objects, and give picnics to their constituents. 
 Those who have studied with attention the critical changes which are now going on in the whole 
 tissue of society, religious, moral, social and industrial, will probably be of a different opinion. 
 
 "There is nothing cloudy or chimerical in the proposal to substitute legal elections for 
 faction, as the mode of selecting the Executive Council out of the Legislature. It is a definite 
 remedy for a specific disease, a remedy for which is urgently needed, and being perfectly feasible 
 in itself, it is a fit subject for practical consideration. That which is cloudy is the theory that 
 Nature or Providence has divided the community into two sections, which are destined to be for 
 ever waging political war against each other without a possibility of agreement. That which is 
 chimerical is the notion that faction, when recognized as the instrument of government, and 
 called by a soft name, will cease to be faction, and, at the height of a furious struggle for power 
 and pelf, curb its own frenzy, and keep its selfish ends in subordination to the paramount claims 
 of the public good." 
 
 PARTY POLITICS. 
 
 /''rom the Canadian Monthly, Vol. II., 1872. 
 
 " A friend of ours was once a good deal puzzled in attempting to explain to a young lady of an 
 enquiring turn of mind the nature of a Parliamentary Opposition. Government she understood 
 and Piirliament, as a deliberative and legislative assembly, she understood ; but the idea of a party 
 of men, whose sole function was to ci/-pose what others /w-posed, seemed to be beyond her grasp. 
 If it could have been explained to her that the so-called Opposition was a mere temporary organiz- 
 ation for a temporary purpose — the government of the country having fallen into bad hands and it 
 being very desirable to harass them into an abandonment of their position — the thing would have 
 been more easily intelligible ; but no, the truth had to be told, that this ' Opposition ' was as per- 
 manent an institution as Government itself, and that the eagerness and bitterness with which it 
 pursued its ends, bore no assignable relation to the merits or demerits of the holders of authority. 
 However faultless an Administration might be, there must still be an Opposition, or the British 
 Constitution would fall to pieces. ' Why don't they content themselves with opposing what is 
 wrong?' was asked, with simvilicity. ' Well, of course, that is what they professs to do,' was 
 the answer. ' Then there is no particular reason for calling them Opposition, for everybody pro- 
 fesses the same thing. I am Opposition, and you are Opposition — we are all Opposition 
 together, if that is what it means.' 
 
 "The difficulty in which our young friend was involved was one which, in some shape or 
 other, presents itself to everybody. Even grown men, tolerably familiar both with the theory 
 and the working of the Constitution, find themselves wondering how the thoroughly artificial 
 distinctions which prevail in the political arena, came to acquire such force and persistence ; 
 wondering, too, whether no new page of political history will ever be turned, and the monot- 
 onous see-saw of party strife — Oppositions becoming Governrtients, and Governments becoming 
 Oppositions, and each with every change of fortune, displaying most, if not all of the faults of 
 those whose places they take — be succeeded by something more in accordance with reason, and 
 more favourable to true progress. The subject is one which a little honest thought will do a great
 
 PAKTY POLITICS. 59 
 
 deal to clear up ; for, to tell the truth, the difficulties that seem to surround it are mainly the 
 creation of those who think they have an interest in the perpetuity of the present state of things. 
 It is commonly assumed, for example, by the defenders of party, that those who are disposed to 
 regard it as out of place in this advanced stage of human culture and reason, are bound to devise 
 a complete new set of institutions for the government of nations ; and having devised them, to 
 -demonstrate their practicability. This assumption we entirely repudiate, for reasons which will 
 sufficiently appear in the course of our argument. What we have to do, is to try and render a true 
 account of party to ourselves, to ascertain what it is and what the conditions are that call it into 
 existence. As we pursue the investigation, we shall see that the conditions which give it its 
 greatest vitality have passed away, and are little likely to return ; and that party, if limited to its 
 natural and legitimate development in these days, would be a very different thing indeed from 
 what we now witness. 
 
 " We cannot do better than take our departure from Burke's well-known definition. 
 'Party,' says the great philosophic statesman, ' is a body of men united for promoting, by their 
 joint endeavours, the national interest, upon some principle n which they are all agreed.' 
 Party, in this sense of the word, is something every one can understand : it calls for no justifica- 
 tion, any more than any other form of association for a worthy object. It will be observed, 
 however, that according to Burke's definition, party is but a means towards an end, and a means 
 which is only available in certain defined circumstances. The end is the national interest, and 
 the condition necessary to give vitality to party, is the agreement of all its members in ' some 
 particular principle' which they wish to see applied in the government of the country, and to 
 which of course, another party in the State is opposed. Burke says not a word to justify the 
 opinion that parties are essential to the well-being of the State, under all circumstances : for that 
 would be simply tantamount to saying hat no country could be prosperous in which there were 
 not those radical differences of opinion upon political subjects, which alone afford a rational basis 
 for party organization. Nearly all the talk we hear in the pi^esent day on the subject of parties, 
 really involves the absurd proposition that, unless a country is divided against itself, it cannot 
 stand. Because parties were once a necessity of the times — the natural expression in Parliament 
 of real and lamentable antagonisms that existed throughout the country, therefore parties must 
 exist for ever ; and if we have not real antagonisms to support them, we must get up sham ones ! 
 The Chinaman, in Charles Lamb's charnting apologue, set his house on fire, in order to have, 
 indirectly, some roast pork. Our roast pork is the party system ; and, in order that we may taste 
 the savour again and again, we set the State on fire with all kinds of false and factitious issues. 
 
 " In Burke's time, and almost down to the present day, in England, there have never been 
 wanting more or less serious causes of division among parties ; moreover, in a country like 
 England — the continuity of whose political history has never been broken by revolution, and 
 •where, consequently, many institutions exist, simply because they have existed, and not because 
 they are peculiarly adapted to the present time — there will alw.ays be a certain opposition 
 between those who wish to preserve what time has handed down, and those who, imbued with 
 the spirit of the present, aim at bringing everything as much into harmony with that spirit as 
 possible. Even in England, however, there are unmistakable signs that the palmy days of the 
 party system have ])assed away for ever. It is in ])olitics, in these days, very much as it is in war : 
 men see the inevitable much sooner than they used to do ; and, when they see the inevitable, they 
 yield to it. This arises simply from the greater sway that reason has over the minds of men, 
 and, particularly, over the minds of those fitted by nature to lead. . . 
 
 "The political circumstances of Canada are very different from those of the Mother Country. 
 '/here, where so much exists which it interests one class to maintain, .ind whicli it seems to 
 interest a much larger class to destroy, there will, for a long time to come, probably, be some 
 real significance in the terms ' Conservative ' and ' Liberal,' or ' Tory ' and ' Radical ; ' though 
 there is every reason to hope that the jiolitical struggles of the future will be mitigated by the 
 influences to which we have just referred. In Canada, however, when the same terms are 
 employed, nothing can exceed the sense of mockery ihey bring to the mind. In old. ii times,
 
 60 APPENDIX. 
 
 when a knot of infiituated men, thought they could govern the country for their own private 
 interest, tlie poUtical designations that had been borrowed from the parent State, were not so- 
 entirely out of place. But in the present day, you who call yourselves Conservatives, do tell us, 
 for heaven's sake, what it is you wish to conserve that anybody else wishes to destroy ? And you 
 also, who call yourselves Liberals, where are we to find proofs of your liberalism or liberality, or 
 whatever it is you pride yourselves upon ? Or, if you prefer to call yourselves Reformers, what 
 is it that you wish to reform ? Your political creed, if we credit your own professions, is one of 
 the intensest conservatism, regarding all the established principles of the constitution. You find 
 fault with nothing, so you say, in the political frame-work of the State, and only complain of a 
 few abuses of executive authority on the part of a set of men whom you hope soon to consign 
 to perpetual oblivion ; and yet you dub yourselves Reformers, just as if there was work to be 
 done for a generation or a century, in the redressing of abuses, the removal of anomalies, and the 
 general reconstitution of a disordered commonwealth. When you have acceded to power and 
 have wrought such improvements as you are able or disposed to do in the management of public 
 affairs, what will there be to hinder you from adopting the title of 'Conservatives,' now appro- 
 priated by and to your opponents ? Nothing in this wide world. And what will there be to 
 hinder them, after you have committed a few blunders, as you are sure to do within a short time, 
 from seizing, if they choose to do it, for political effect, upon your special name of ' Reformers,' 
 on the plea that they are going to put to rights all the things that you have put wrong ? Surely 
 you are both to be congratulated on the peculiar felicity of party designations so chosen that you 
 might make an impromptu ' swap,' and look neither wiser nor more foolish in your new colours 
 than you do at present. . , . 
 
 " It is not the bitterness of political discussion that seems to us the worst result of the party 
 system ; it is its amazing hollowness. A reasonable man is simply lost in wonder as he reads day 
 after day, in ably-edited journals, whole columns of writing in which there is hardly the faintest 
 gleam of sincere conviction to be discerned. Day after day the same miserable evasions, the 
 same varnishing up of unsightly facts, the same reiteration of unproved charges against opponents, 
 the same taking for granted of things requiring proof, and proving things that nobody questioned ; 
 the same hypocritical appeals to the good sense of the electors whom every effort is being used to 
 misinform and confuse ; the same dreary, unmeaning platitudes : in a word the same utter abuse 
 of man's reasoning powers, and of the privileges and functions of a free press. Of course so long 
 as both sides indulge in this kind of thing, each can make out at least a partial case against the 
 other ; and so a constant cross-fire is kept up in the exposure of misrepresentations, and the 
 rectification of all that has been set down in malice on one side or the other. To-day a good 
 point perhaps is made by the Opposition ; to-morrow it will be returned to them, if possible, 
 with interest. Such is the party system of political warfare — a system which ought to have won 
 the admiration of Archdeacon Paley, since it possesses the attribute that was wanting to that 
 celebrated watch of his — the power, namely, of perpetually reproducing itself. Looking simply 
 at the wordy strife between two such organs say as the Globe and the Alail, what is ever to bring 
 it to an end ? There is no termination to their arguments, any more than to a repeating decimal, 
 which, truth to tell, they very much resemble. 
 
 " ' Like everything good,' says the former of the two journals we have just mentioned, 
 ' party may be abused.' We should like very much to know where the proper use of party ends 
 and its abuse begins. The abuse, we suppose, is when men do things in the interest of their 
 party that are not for the interest of the state ; when, for example, the supporters of a Govern- 
 ment convicted of some reprehensible act rally around it to save it from just condemnation ; or 
 when an Opposition, knowing that the Government is dealing with a very difficult and dan- 
 gerous question, walking, to use Horace's metaphor, on hot cinders lightly covered over with 
 ashes, seek to hamper and distress it by every means in their power, even at the risk of fanning 
 the smouldering fires into open conflagration. But if this is abuse, it is of the very essence of 
 party politics. Either the interest of the countiy or the fortunes of their party are to dominate 
 in men's thoughts : if the former, then all party tactics are at an end : if the latter, then it is
 
 PARTY POLITICS. 61 
 
 simply absurd to talk ol party being 'abused.' It is all abuse from first to last. You might as 
 well talk of selfishness being abused, or dishonesty being abused, or of hypocrisy being abused. 
 
 " Let us, however, hear a little more about party from that thorough believer in it whom we 
 have just quoted : — ' All the essential characteristics of parly,' he proceeds to say, ' enter into the 
 very idea of free popular government, and when they are eliminated, such a government is rot 
 only impossible but inconceivable. Who is to say what is really for the good of the nation ? All 
 may be equally patriotic, all equally anxious to lay aside self-seeking and everything mean and 
 unworthy, but they may have different ideas how this greatest national good is to be secured ; 
 nay they will have if they think freely and intelligently. And with what result ? Why, with 
 the formation of more or less distinctly opposing parties, with more or less keenness in their 
 discussions, and more or less divergence in their eventual courses of action. The whole history 
 of the past tells of this : while the ' national principle ' would at best but give us something like 
 the slumberous stillness of a sultry summer noon — quiet and peaceful, but at the same time 
 stagnant and the fruitful parent of injurious miasmata.' 
 
 " Here let us draw breath. Who would have imagined, had we not let out the secret, 
 whence this charming picture of party politics was taken ? There is a touch of idyllic tender- 
 ness and sweetness about it which the great Sicilian poet himself could scarcely have surpassed. 
 ' More or less keenness in their discussions ' — of course ; but then each side is so ' anxious to lay 
 aside everything mean and unworthy ' — among other things, all mean and unworthy suspicions 
 of their opponents — that really their divergences of opinion serve only to procure for those who 
 take part in politics a reasonable and healthful amount of intellectual exercise. Under the 
 'national' system we should all stagnate and be choked by noxious miasmata ; while under tue 
 party system we are braced and vivified by the pure powers of free discussion. What a happy, 
 golden dream, one cannot but exclaim, for the writer to have who was penning an article for the 
 same columns that contained ' Wha wants me ? ' Not more fancy-free was Colonel Lovelace in 
 his prison than is this editor in his sanctum. He cannot for a moment assume the patriotism of 
 his particular political opponents — they are tricksters, corruptionists, deceivers — everything in 
 (act that is morally execrable ; but when he wants to draw a picture of the party system at work, 
 why, all at once the political atmosphere becomes pure if not altogether calm : there is equal 
 patriotism on both sides, and men are only divided by theoretic differences which do not in the 
 least impair the profound respect they entertain for one another. 
 
 " Now the truth of the matter is that what this enthusiastic advocate of party has been 
 here describing is not party at all ; but that very 'national ' system, the application of which to 
 popular institutions he pronounces to be sheerly ' inconceivable ' (though not too inconceivable to 
 allow its miasmatic results to be clearly foreseen). No one pretends that if men could be 
 induced to give up the conscious imposture and rant and gibberish that are now dignified with the 
 name of party controversy, they would forthwith all be of one mind. The great difference would 
 be that men would endeavour to make their opinions triumph by legitimate means ; and 
 further, the expression of all opinions would be very much freer than at present. As things 
 are now a man is not at lilierty at all times to utter the thought that is in him : he has to consider 
 how his party will be affected by what he may say. In this way truths that would be eminently 
 seasonable, so far as the country's interests are concerned, are suppressed as being unseasonable 
 from a party point of view. The credit that a man would, personally, feel inclined to give his 
 opponents for something he knows them to have done well, he withholds out of consideration for 
 his party who would be seriously compromised by any admission in favour of those whom they 
 are steadily trying to undermine in popular favour. It is the rarest thing in the world at iircseiit 
 lo see a man get up in Parliament and seem to utter his real and innermost conviction on any 
 important question. You note his place in the chamber, and i)efore he speaks you know .dmost 
 all he has to say. .Such is the i)arty system. Instead of stimulating thought and teaching inlel- 
 lectual honesty, it does just the reverse — puts a ban on the free exorcise of a man's niiml, and 
 leads people to conceal or misrepresent their real opinions.
 
 (i2 APPENDIX. 
 
 " The great difficulty in arguing the thesis that the public interest is not promoted by an 
 arbitrary division of the legislature and of all those who take an interest in politics, into two 
 oppo-.ing camps, is to avoid saying things that are self-evident. It is perfectly clear that a party 
 would not be a party, as the word is commonly understood, if it were actuated only by a desire 
 for the public good, and if it followed out a strictly honourable line of action towards its adver- 
 saries. Such a body would not and could not display what is called party spirit ; and as to party 
 discipline, it would be lost in the higher and nobler discipline of duty. The agreement that 
 existed amongst its members at any moment, however perfect it might be, c .uld not be held to 
 guarantee their agreement on any new issue ; for ex hypothcsi every man, as often as a new 
 question came u[i, would sliape his course upon it, not with a view to improving the position of 
 his party, but to promoting the advantage of the State. It is understood now that those who act 
 togethei- to-day will act together to-morrow and next day. Why ? Simply because they mean 
 to do so ; that is all about it : they have determined that their opinions shall not differ. For how 
 could they ever hope to gain party triumphs without party organization and party orthodoxy ? 
 If the country does not thrive under such a system ; if the vices of government are not cured ;. 
 if the people are not educated to disinterestedness and high-mindedness : in other words, if 
 patriotism and public spirit are not encouraged — so much the worse for all the interests, moral 
 and material, involved. The British Constitution of which party government (we are told) is 
 the noblest tradition, cannot be allowed to fall through merely because a niiion threatens to go 
 to ruin. 
 
 " When we are told that party is absolutely essential to free, popular government, we cannot 
 help thinking what a vast amount of government is done, and what vast interests are successfully 
 managed, without any help from the p^rty principle. Look at our municipalities ; look at our 
 banks, our railways and other public enterprises ; look at our churches. Would it really be well 
 to see our city corporations, and our county and township councils divided between two 
 parties, each trying to hamper the other to the utmost of its ability? Who would care 
 to hold stock in a bank or railway, whose affairs were made the sport of party struggles ? 
 Whenever party spirit has shown itself in connection with the latter class of corporations, it has 
 been the product of, as it has in turn ministered to, the very grossest and most shameless forms of 
 corruption ani robbery. We see party here assume its final an 1 perfect development as the ring 
 — an association of robbers who have agreed to aid in filling one another's pockets. When how- 
 ever, (as fortunately is most often the case) this horrible disease his not fastened upon a great public 
 company, its administration is a fair type of what the administi-ation of a country's affiirs might 
 be, if the organized selfishness of party were to pass away. Every shareholder knows that the 
 value of his property depends on the successful aiministration of the company's affairs, and the 
 maintenance of its credit before the world. His great anxiety, therefore, is to have the right kind 
 of men as directors, and, when the right men have been found, it generally rests with them to say 
 how long they will remain in the responsible positions assigned to them. Men get thanks for 
 conducting the affairs of a company or association prudently and successfully ; they get none for 
 doing their duty by the State : they get interested and formal praise from their supporters, and 
 unvarying depreciation and abuse from their opponents. The praise affords them no satisfaction, 
 and the abuse, in the long run, hardens them and takes the edge off all finer feelings. The great 
 difference between a member of a joint-stock company and a member of Farliament is, that while 
 the former would lose more then he would gain by pursuing an obstructive course, or in any 
 way trifling with the interests of the society, the latter may pursue a similar line of conduct, and 
 profit by it. His interest as a private citizen in sound legislation, and effective administration may 
 easily be overcome by those special inducements which party leaders can offer. That is precisely 
 the position, and hence it is that party is possible in the Legislature and hardly any where else. 
 Party may therefore be defined with absolute correctness as a body of men whose interest in 
 supporting one another is greater than the interest they have in giving a right direction at all 
 times to public policy. We should scarcely call this, however, a good thing per se. 
 
 " What becomes then of Burke's definition of party as ' a body of men united for promoting
 
 hare's scheme of representation. 63 
 
 by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some principle in which they are all agreed ? ' 
 Is it of no application at all in our day ? Certainly ; as often as a body of men honestly agree in 
 a particular principle, let them unite their efforts to make that principle triumph, and if they 
 choose to call themselves a party, why let them do so. No harm will result from that. Hariia 
 results when men take a license to themselves to do, as a party, things that are not for the national 
 interest at all, and that, in their own consciences, they know are not for the national 
 interest. It is certainly a strange thing that, because a number of men have got hold of one 
 sound principle through which they hope to triumph, they should feel themselves excused in 
 giving their sanction, if not their active support, to a number of evil ones. Yet this is precisely 
 what our parties do ; they have one end in view which perhaps they sincerely think a good one 
 and this end they allow to justify or sanctify the most scandalous means. Such is the party 
 system ; and if any one hints that a system, which not only permits but erects into a code the 
 loosest moral practice, may not be worth perpetuating, he is pronounced at once an enthusiast, a 
 dreamer, a doctrinaire, a person whom all sensible, practical men may complacently laugh at, 
 without troubling themselves in the least to enquire into the value of his ideas. . . 
 
 " We hold that a great portion of the evils from which we suffer are due to a defective 
 political system, and to that confusion of mind on political subjects which the current language 
 in regard to party is so well calculated to produce. The heart of the people is not so unsound 
 as some would have us believe ; and if -the people make up their minds to it, they can have 
 honest men to serve them — men who will prefer honour to office, and the sense of duty performed 
 to personal triumphs however flattering. To preach the cessation of party strife is no doibt, at 
 present, like crying in the wilderness, but our hope is that, like other preaching that has begun 
 in the wilderness, it will end by converting the multitude. Stripped of all verbiage and of all 
 subtleties, the question is simply one between good and evil ; and the good must either gain on 
 the evil, or the evil on the good." 
 
 EXPLANATION OK HARE'S SCHEME OF REPRESENTATION. 
 
 By M. G. Fawcett, 1872. 
 
 The end and object of Mr. Hare's scheme is the direct, equal and personal representation in 
 I'arliament of every elector. If this end were accomplished, Parliament would become the 
 rnirror of the nation, and, in proportion to the extension of the suffrage, all opinions would have 
 in Parliament a strength corresponding to their strength in the country To attain this end it 
 would be necessary that each voter should have an equal amount of electoral power. At present 
 there is nothing to prevent an elector from having a score of votes in different constituencies. 
 Non-residence not being a disqualification for the county franchise, a man may have a vote for 
 every county in the kingdom, if he can possess himself ol the re<iuisile properly qualifications. 
 To remedy this inequality Mr. Hare's plan provides that each elector shall have but one vole ; 
 and in order to enable the elector to obtain real representation, he would be permitted to give 
 this vole to any candidate,' irrespective of the restrictions of local representation. Kor instance, 
 a voter living in Hampshire coulil vote, if he chose, for a candidate standing in Yorkshire, or in 
 any other part of the kingdom. Under this system, those who are willing to serve in Parliameiii 
 might be described as " All England " Candidates, because they could poll voles in every con- 
 stituency in the kingdom. If this i>lan of choosing members of I'arliament were adopted, those 
 candidates would of course be elected who obtained the largest number of voles : but in order to 
 prevent inequality of electoral power through one candidate receiving an immensely large number 
 f>f votes, Mr. Hare's scheme provides that no candidate shall receive more votes llian are sufficient 
 to secure his return. Kor this |»urpose the following arrangement is pro()osed. It is obvious that
 
 64 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 if all electors were allowed to vote for any candidate, well known and popular men, such as Mr. 
 Gladstone and Mr. Bright, would receive a large proportion of the entire number of votes polled. 
 Equality of electoral power, which is one of the main objects of the scheme, would be destroyed 
 if Mr. Gladstone received six times as many votes as any other candidate ; for his constituents 
 would then not be sufficiently represented in proportion to their numbers. It has therefore been 
 proposed to find, by dividing the total number of votes polled by the number of vacancies to be 
 filled, the quota of votes necessary for the return of each member. If 658 members are to be 
 elected, and the total number of votes recorded is 2,632,000, four thousand votes would be the 
 quota necessary for the return of a member. Each elector would vote by a voting paper, which 
 would be drawn up in the following form : — ■ 
 
 Name (of voter) . 
 Address 
 
 Vote, No.. 
 Parish of 
 
 Borou'fh of 
 
 The above-named elector hereby records his vote for the candidate named 
 first in the subjoined list ; or, in the ev^t of such candidate being already 
 elected, or not obtaining the quota, the above-named elector votes for the 
 second-named candidate, and so on, in their numerical order, viz.: 
 
 1. (Name of candidate) 
 
 2. (Ditto of another) 
 
 3. (Ditto of another) 
 
 4. (Ditto of another)^ 
 
 (and so on, addintf as many as the elector chooses). 
 
 The foregoing form, filled up with the names proposed by the voter, expresses in substance 
 this : — I desire to be represented by the candidate whose name I have placed No. I. If he 
 should obtain his quota of votes before mine comes to be counted, or if he should fail to obtain a 
 sufficient number, and therefore cannot be elected, I direct that my vote be transferred to the 
 Candidate I have placed sa No. 2, and under the same conditions, to candidate No. 3, and so on. * 
 
 The above comprises the whole of the so-called complexity of Mr. Hare's system of repre- 
 sentation. The main principles of the scheme might be tabulated as follows : — 
 
 1. All voters to be represented in Parliament. 
 
 2. Each Member of Parliament to represent an equal number of voters. 
 
 3. Each elector to have one vote. 
 
 4. Electors to be allowed to vote for any candidate. 
 
 5. Electors to be allowed to transfer their votes from one candidate to another, so thai no 
 votes are thrown awoy for candidates already elected, or for those who have no chance of obtain- 
 ing the quota. 
 
 The most striking eflects of such a deviation from the traditional method of conducting 
 elections would first be seen in Parliament itself. The House of Commons would then no longer 
 be filled with local magnates, whose names are unknown outside their own boroughs, and whose 
 only recommendation to serve in Parliament consists in their employing a large number of work- 
 men, and being able consequently to command a considerable number of votes. On the contrary, 
 the House of Commons would be filled by really representative men, who would be sent to 
 Parliament not solely on account of their wealth and local influence, but on account of their 
 
 * Pamphlet on Representation Reform, issued by a Committee appointed by the Reform League, p. 9.
 
 hare's scheme of represextatiox. 65 
 
 opinions. A common charge brought against this plan of proportional representation is that it 
 would bring into the House of Commons nobody but the representatives of crotchets. In repl}' 
 to this it may be stated that it will be their own fault if people without crotchets are unrepre- 
 sented ; if, indeed, they are so few as not to be able to secure a quota of votes for their candi- 
 dates, then the House of Commons will justly be composed of crotchety members ; it would not 
 be representative if it were not. 
 
 The effect of Mr. Hare's scheme upon constituencies would be more gradual, but not less 
 beneficial, than its effect on the House of Commons. The present system of selecting candidates 
 leaves little or no choice to the mass of the electors ; they must either support the candidate 
 started by the wire-pullers of their own party or not vote at all. Hence the franchise is too often 
 exercised merely mechanically ; little study is given to political questions. Men vote with their 
 party as a matter of course, and the minimum of political intelligence is evoked. If, on the 
 other hand, electors were free to vote for whom they pleased, they would probably be induced to 
 examine into the respective merits of a considerable number of candidates. Instead of 
 voting blindly, and for no assignable reason, for the local candidate, they would be obliged to 
 make a selection between many different candidates, and would feel that they were acting fool- 
 ishly if they could not justify their choice. An elector is now seldom asked, " Why did you 
 vote for Mr. A ? " If such a question were asked, the reply would probably be, " Mr. A was 
 brought out by the party ; we didn't like him particularly, but we voted for him, because, if we 
 had split, the other side would have got in their man." If electors were free to vote for any 
 candidate, the question, " Why did you vote for Mr. A ? " would receive a very different answer. 
 It would probably be something like this, " I read through his address, and his views on the 
 political questions of the day are those that I hold ; and, as far as one can judge of his character, 
 I believe him to be an honest and independent man." In this way the selection of a candidate 
 would produce an educational and moral influence on each elector, especially as he would be 
 required to name a succession of candidates, and to place them in the order in which he esteemed 
 their merit. The educational effect produced by inducing electors carefully to weigh the respec- 
 tive claims of a large number of candidates would be very considerable, and would probably 
 stimulate a great increase of the mental activity brought to bear on political questions. The 
 moral effect produced by giving a free and independent choice of a representative to each elector 
 would be invaluable. At present a candidate, no matter how bad his personal character may be, 
 is thrust upon a constituency by half-a-dozen active wire-pullers, and the electors frequently have 
 no choice between not voting at all, voting for a man of notoriously bad character, or voting 
 against their political convictions. I'ew electors would deliberately declare that their free and 
 unfettered choice as a representative, the man whom they desired above all others to see in 
 Parliament, was a well-known rou4, a fraudulent director of companies, or one who had been 
 convicted of personal bribery 
 
 The great advantage which Mr. Hare's plan possesses over all other schemes of proportional 
 representation is, that it would give to each elector one vote, and would allow him to give this 
 vote to any candidate he pleased. The choice of an elector would not be restricted to the candi- 
 dates who might happen to present themselves for election in any jiarlicular constituency. By 
 this' means a minority, however locally insignificant, could join its votes with those of other 
 electors in other localities, and thus secure the return of a representative. If, for instance, 600 
 members had to be returned at a general election, and the voters in ail the constituencies 
 amounted to 600,000, any thousand electors, no matter where they resided — ihcy might be 
 -cattered in twos or threes all over the country — coul<l secure the return of a representative. 
 The present restricted choice of constituencies seems to act as a process of natural selecti<jn to 
 weed out from Parliament, and from political activity in constituencies, men whose opinions are 
 characterized by special loftiness or originality. Kven ordinary uprightness and intelligence 
 sometimes deter electors from joining actively in political life. An honest, intelligent and cultivat- 
 ed man is apt to turn in disgust from taking any part in an election, when lie finds that he has to 
 choose between voting for a promoter of false and fraudulent comjianies, a religious bigot, or a 
 
 5
 
 66 APPENDIX. 
 
 mail who has never read a book or had an idea in his life. If such an elector could feel that he 
 was not compelled to submit to the farce of being represented by such candidates, but could 
 choose from among all public men, who were willing to undertake the duties and responsi- 
 bilities of a member of Parliament, he would no longer feel himself shut out from real represen- 
 tation, and a stimulus of the very best kind would thus be given to political activity. In all 
 contests there is enough and to spare of the worst kind of activity and enthusiasm, spring- 
 ing from the meanest and most contemptible of passions ; if political life is to be improved, 
 it is not by crushing out activity and enthusiasm, but by changing the source from which they 
 too often spring. A strong influence would be brought to bear in this direction by affording the 
 means of real representation to all voters, instead of leaving them to the tender mercies of local 
 candidates. 
 
 THE DECLINE OF PARTY GOVERNMENT. 
 By Goldwin Smith. Extract from MacmillatHs Magazine, Vol. XXXVI., iSyj. 
 
 It is curious with what implicit faith we have all reposed upon party, as the normal, permanent 
 and only possible mode of carrying on a free constitution, disregarding not only the objections 
 which reason obviously suggests to the system and the general evidences of its bad effects on 
 politics and political character^ but the facts which showed plainly enough that its foundations 
 were giving way, and that if this was the only basis of government, government was likely to be 
 soon left without a basis. 
 
 In normal times the occupations of legislatures and governments will be matters 
 of current administration, not one of which is likely to form an issue of sufficient importance to 
 swallow up all the rest and form a rational ground for the division of the nation into two 
 organized parties struggling each to place its leaders in exclusive possession of the powers of the 
 state. 
 
 In the second place, questions of expediency, however important, do not last for ever ; in 
 one way or other they are settled and disappear from the political scene. Slavery dies and is 
 buried. Parliamentary Reform is carried out with all its corollaries, and becomes a thing of the 
 past. What is to follow? Another question of sufficient importance to warrant a division of 
 the nation into parties must be found. But suppose no such question exists, are we to manu- 
 facture one? That is the work to which the wire-pullers devote themselves in democracies 
 governed by party. 
 
 . . In Canada, for example, while New World society was struggling to repel the 
 intrusive elements of the old rigime forced upon it by the Imperial country, and to extort self- 
 government, the parties, though not altogether edifying in their behaviour or salutary in their 
 influence upon popular character, were at least formed upon real lines. But the struggle ended 
 with the abolition of the State Church and the secularization of the Clergy Reserves. Since 
 that time there has been no real dividing line between the parties ; they have ceased to be truly 
 directed to public objects of any kind ; their very names have become unintelligible. Politics 
 under such a party system must inevitably sink at last into an " interested contest for place and 
 emolument" carried on by "impostors who delude the ignorant with professions incompatible 
 with human practice, and afterwards incense them by practices below the level of vulgar recti- 
 tude." It is needless to say what effects an incessant war of intrigue, calumny and corruption 
 carried on by such party leaders, with the aid of the sort of journalists who are willing to take 
 their pay, must produce on the political character of a community, however naturally good, and 
 well adapted for self-government. Nobody is to blame. The blame rests entirely on the system.
 
 REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 67 
 
 It is needless to dilate upon the relations of party, its machinery, its strategy, the press 
 which serves it and expresses its passions, to public morality and the general interests of the 
 state ; the facts are always before our eyes. But experience of a colony or of some new country 
 is needed to make one thoroughly sensible of the effects of this warfare upon the political 
 character of the people, and of the extent to which it threatens to sap the very foundations of 
 patriotism and of respect for lawful authority in their minds. 
 
 Party is no doubt indispensable to selfish interests, which by taking advantage of the balance 
 of factions are enabled, to an almost indefinite extent to compass their special objects at the 
 expense of the community. It is indispensable to political sharpers who, without legislative 
 powers or any sort of ability or inclination to serve the public in any honorable way, find 
 subsistence in an element of passion and intrigue. To whom or to what else it is indispensable, 
 no one has been able definitely to say. 
 
 The tendency inherent in party government to supersede the national legislature by the party 
 caucus has long been completely developed in the United States, where it may be said that in 
 ordinary times the only real debates are those held in caucus, congressional legislation being 
 simply a registration of the caucus decision, for which all members of the party, whether they 
 agreed or dissented in the caucus, feel bound by party allegiance to record their votes in the 
 House ; just as the only real election is the nomination by the caucus of the party which has the 
 majority, and which then collectively imposes its will on the constituency ; so that measures and 
 elections may be and often are carried by a majority but little exceeding one-fourth of the house 
 or the constituency, as the case may be. The same tendency is rapidly developing itself in 
 England ; and it is evidently fatal to the genuine existence of Parliamentary institutions. 
 
 So far as England is concerned, the institution of an executive regularly elected by the 
 legislature at large in place of n cabinet formed of the leaders of a party majority would be sub- 
 stantially a return to the old form of government — the Privy Council. Parliament is now the 
 sovereign power, and election by it would be equivalent to the ancient nomination by the crown. 
 The mode of electing and confirming a Speaker shows how the forms of monarchy may be 
 reconciled with the action of an elective institution. 
 
 THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 
 By Leonard Courtney. Extracts from Nineteenth Century, Vol. VI. iSy<p, 
 
 . . . The idea of the representation of minorities is this : that if you have got one 
 thousand electors to elect ten representatives, any hundred of the thousand might combine 
 together to vote for one of the ten, and if they combined you might get the whole thousand 
 electors represented in your ten, each hundred getting a representative. So throughout the 
 whole kingdom the forces might be so distributed that each group will be collected together, 
 and vote for a particular man, sending him to represent them. If that could be realized, you 
 would secure the first object of the representative principle : you would get the representation of 
 the whole. The elected body would have the flexil)ility and the life of the electing body. It 
 would be the electing body itself in miniature. Aa the people in the country would combine, 
 so the elected rei)resentatives would combine, representing every delerniinatioii of (he original 
 body. You have, therefore, under this principle of the reiirescntatiun of minorilies, an assured 
 result— namely, the security that in the body elected there will be an accurate reflection of llic 
 persons who elected them. 
 
 This is only the first reason, though it is one of great importance, why this system should 
 be preferred. What is the effect of the present system on the character of the reiircscntatlvcs
 
 68 APPENDIX. 
 
 chosen ? And again what is the effect on the electors themselves ? How are the men chosen 
 nnder the present majority system? It is a very great difficulty to get a candidate ; you have 
 some experience of that here. How shall you get hold of a proper candidate? Under the old 
 plan, now becoming discredited, there was usually some select committee, who had interviews 
 with certain people, tested them, and then came to a conclusion to run for the constituency. 
 Under the new plan you have election-committees of hundreds by which you intend to make a 
 selection. We don't know what will be the principle of action of these committees. Under the 
 old plan the primary object was generally this : ' We must have a man to keep the party to- 
 -^ether. We want a man who will not lose the support of any section of the party.' This last 
 was the great point held in view. You must keep the party together ; therefore your candidate 
 must have in him nothing that will drive away any members of the party from adhering to the 
 choice of the few. In order to do that you must have a man who will offend nobody — who will 
 be free from all tendency to kick over tlie traces : whether in thought or in action, he must keep 
 well within the party lines. If he will vote steadily and pledge himself to support the leader 
 for the time being, he has the best chance of success. That is the way in which the mass of 
 members have been chosen, and candidates have always been obliged to be.ir this in mind. The 
 first duty of a candidate is to be prudent — not to offend anybody — to subdue his mind as far as 
 possible to the lowest level compatible with any life at all, and to be careful not lo disturb the 
 prejudices of any section at all. That is the necessity of getting a majority of any constituency. 
 The result is to produce a candidate with the gift of mediocrity. You would not find a majority of 
 your constituency to go together for a man who is pronounced in his opinions, or in his character, 
 or in the force of his thought ; and the result is, that the strongest man has to be put aside in order 
 that the moderate man may be run, because the moderate man has the best chance of winning. 
 If this is anything like an accurate representation of the facts, the result must be a degradation 
 of the character of your candidates, and of your electoral body. If you get indifferent materials 
 to work with, you cannot do good work ; and if you send into the Legislature such men as I 
 have described, you will not make a brilliant assembly out of them. 
 
 But the evil goes further than that. Having brought down in this way the temper and 
 mind of candidates, you produce a feeling throughout the country that the thing to be regarded 
 is the movement of the mass of the people. You will find that from the candidates the sense of 
 dependence upon the cohesion of unknown masses passes on until the leaders themselves are 
 affected with the same dependence upon the words and thoughts of the mass of the people. 
 Instead of having leaders inspiring and instructing their followers, you will have leaders waitmg 
 on the swaying hither and thither of the people, waiting for the movement of the masses. 
 
 Now as to one other merit of this system. If you could get it into operation, you would at 
 once get all the persons in the electorate represented in the elected body, because there would 
 be none outside who would not have a representative inside. Under the present system many of 
 those outside, have no representative inside, having no living connection with the governing body 
 of their country. If a person outside has a living connection with those inside — if he can always 
 say, ' I voted for that man ' — he will keep his eye on what is going on inside ; he feels he has an 
 interest in what is going on. Every one can understand what an astonishing effect it has on the 
 interest we take in the House of Commons if we have a relation inside. If this interest was 
 extended to all — if, as I have said, every man could feel that he had some one there for whom he 
 voted, who was his man^then, to use expressive words, every one would feel he was ' built in ' 
 lo the State. The House of Commons would be vivified, and the nation with it, and all would 
 make up one living existence of which the House of Commons was simply the consummation. 
 Instead of having a half-dead-alive country, you would have a living, growing country — you 
 would have fresh and vigorous life bursting forth on all sides throughout the country. Bear in 
 mind also that a Chamber thus representative would be a Chamber of larger information, of 
 broader sympathies, and of wider range of aim than any we can now possess ; that being truly 
 representative, all classes would find their representation in it. 
 
 One great result that would arise from the reform I advocate would be disintegration of
 
 PARTY RULE IN THE UNITED STATES. 69 
 
 party. Parties would not cling together so closely as Conservatives and Liberals do now. 
 Amongst Conservatives you would find differences of opinion as also amongst Liberals, and you 
 would more freely detach men, one by one, from any majority. At present scarcely any member 
 of a party ever dares desert it ; but if a man had not to depend for his seat on mere party 
 cohesion within a limited area — if he knew that his independence would bring support from a 
 wider range — you would have more freedom of thought, and there would be more room for 
 conversion than you now have. Not that men are not converted now. Many are converted in 
 their minds, but they do not change their votes. 
 
 PARTY RULE IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 From "^ True EepubUc." By Albert Stichiey. 
 
 In the minds of the men of 1787 who framed the Constitution of the United States, one 
 idea stood out more strongly than any other. 
 
 The intention was that this Government should be, as the phrase is, a government by 
 the people, that — 
 
 1. The people should choose their own rulers. 
 
 2. The people's offices should be used only in the people's service. 
 The result has been a government by party. 
 
 1. Party has chosen the people's rulers. 
 
 2. The people's offices have been used in the service of party. 
 
 As it seems to me, few men are in the habit of thinking how far these two statements 
 are true, how thoroughly the interests of the people have been sacrificed by our public 
 servants to the needs of the party. It is a point worthy our careful consideration. 
 
 Party did not at once get its full growth. Nor did the system of party rule at once 
 bring its full fruits. Able men wished to serve the people under the Government ; and the 
 people wished and had their services. It took many years for party politics to drive our 
 best men from public life, where they wished to be. 
 
 But the system began its work early. The abuses began as soon as parties got their 
 existence. In the earliest days of party history, party men acted on true party principles. 
 They used the people's offices to pay for party services. They used official power for party 
 ends. 
 
 In theory and in law, the people elect their rulers. In fact, these rulers are not elected 
 by the people, but are appointed by the party leaders. The real working of the (.ioverument 
 is controlled, not by the officials whom the people nominally elect, but by the party 
 managers who really appoint those officials. Tiioae party managers hold, as such, no position 
 known to the law ; they have no duties or responsibilities under the law. Usually they hold 
 some official position for the purpose of drawing a .salary from the people. Hut the; real 
 power they have, not from their official position, but because they control the party policy, 
 and, above all, the party nominations. And they hold their real power in the State, not for 
 any short term of years, but without any limit whatever as to time, 8imi)ly until tyranny 
 becomes unbearable, and we have a peaceful revolution at the ])f>lls. 
 
 When our Constitution of 17H7 w.is formal, the American people; inteii'lcd to use wisely 
 the lessons they had from English history, and from all history. They had learned that
 
 70 APPENDIX. 
 
 irresponsible power in a hereditary monarch certainly made a tyranny. They said, there- 
 fore, we will have no hereditary king, and no tyranny by any man or set of men. They 
 established, as they thought, a true i-epublic — a government, of the people, by the people, 
 for the people. They established, as a matter of fact, a powerful oligarchy, a tyranny, of the 
 people, by party, for party. They kept, as they thought, the real control of tlie Government. 
 They kept, as a matter of fact, nothing but a right of peaceful revolution. Elsewhere 
 tyrann}'' and revolution both violate the law ; with us they both follow it. Often, before 
 our time, revolution has resulted only in a change of tyrants ; with us it is still the same. We 
 rebel against the tyranny of one party ; we simply place ourselves under the rule of the other 
 party ; and then again go through the same cj'cle of tyranny and revolt. 
 
 The Constitution of the United States had been fornied "to secure the blessings of 
 liberty" to the people of the United States in the year 1787, and their posterity after them. 
 We have had the election of our rulers taken from us by party oligarchies. We 
 have had the money of the people stolen and their lives wasted by the officers who should 
 have guarded us from harm. We have had our courts of justice used, not to protect the 
 life, liberty, and property, but to rob honest men, and open prison doors for convicted 
 thieves. 
 
 But, it is sometimes said, the real cause of the present condition of our public aifairs is 
 the fact that we no longer have the same class of men in public life as in years gone by, 
 'N^Tiere are the Websters, the Calhouns, the Cla5's, in our natioiial Government of to-day, it 
 maj' be asked ? It is said we suflfer from our own apathy ; we have in our hands the remedy 
 against these wrongs — we must choose a better class of men for our public officers. 
 
 But why is it that we no longer have the same class of men as of old in public place ? 
 How does it happen that our public men are no longer as able or upright as they were in 
 former j'ears ? For, without imagining all the glory to have passed from the earth, it will 
 be generally admitted that there has been a falling off in the character of the men in our 
 public service. 
 
 This is only another effect of party rule. 
 
 No man can now hold office under our Government for any long time unless he will 
 sacritice the interests of the people to the interests of party. The party leaders wish pliant 
 men who will serve party, and not honest men who will serve only the people. They will 
 not have in official position men whom they cannot control and use. The men they cannot 
 control and use they drive from public life. 
 
 The men who stay in public life are compelled to yield and submit to party. They can- 
 not resist the immense party pressure which surrounds them. We have notably three 
 Presidents — Mr. Lincoln, General Grant, and Mr. Hayes — each of whom, as most men will 
 agree, took office with the purpose of always serving the people without regard to the 
 interests of party. They all at last gave themselves more or less completely to the control 
 of the party men. So long as they tried to do their simple duty to the people, they found 
 themselves in the midst of enemies, without friends. They had to surrender. To resist 
 would take strength more than human. 
 
 But is there any way out of this party tyranny ? May it not be that this party tyranny 
 is a necessary incident of republican institutions in any form, that it is an evil which we must 
 submit to, and bear as well as we can ? May it not be, even that party has its good points, 
 its advantages ? 
 
 To answer these questions, we must consider what are the causes which bring party into 
 existence, the nature of party, and its uses. 
 
 All men will admit that party rule, as we have had it in this country, has been attended 
 with great evils and abuses. But most men think that these evils are merely accidents o
 
 PARTY RULE IN THE UNITED STATES. 71 
 
 the time, that in some way pai'ty govei-nment cau be kept and these evils can be removed, that 
 these evils are far outweighed by the good results which party brings, and that party, with 
 all its CNnls, is a machinery wthout which free government cannot exist. 
 
 I believe this to be a mistake ; that these e^^ls which we have had are not mere acci- 
 dents, but that they are of the very essence of party ; that we cannot rid ourselves of these 
 evils unless we rid ourselves of party ; that M'hat men call the good results of party we 
 should still get if we had no pai-ties ; that party, instead of being a machinerj' necessary to 
 the existence of free government, is its most dangerous foe ; and that in order to get anything 
 which really deserves the name of republican government, we must destroy party altogether. 
 
 Our public servants, who depended for keeping their offices on carrying elections, in the 
 same way gave their best effortsto carrying elections. Whether they wished it or not, our 
 public servants were driven by this point in our system of government to make this Avork 
 of carrying elections their regular profession. In that profession they gained great skill. 
 In that work they were sure to have more skill than the ordinary citizens, who gave their 
 time and thought to other things. The professional must always beat the amateur. These 
 party organizations became vast and powerful . The leaders of these jiarties controlled party 
 action. It came to be the fact (almost without exception), that no man could be chosen to 
 an office without a party nomination, and no man could have a party nomination against the 
 will of the party leaders. And the party leaders would give party nominations to no man 
 Avho did not do party service. The natural and certain result was, that party leaders, for 
 party purposes, controlled the elections of public servants, and the action of public servants 
 after they were elected. 
 
 So it has always been in EngUsh Parliamentary history. Each party has been, at one 
 time or another, on both sides of every important question of government policy. Principles 
 and measures have had little to do with the action of parties in England, except there, as 
 here, the partj^ leaders have used the great questions of the day as battle-cries in the struggle 
 for place. Many great men and honest men in England have been party men. They have, 
 too, done great service to the English people. But they have done that good service always 
 in spite of party and party influences. 
 
 We have in this country developed not only parties, but enormous party machineiy for 
 the mere purpose of carrying elections — a machinery that is intricate, costly, powerful, and 
 tyranni<^al. The man in pubUc place in these days in this countrj' must be, not a statesman, 
 but a man of skill ami capacity in manipulating this election machinery. 
 
 It is said that parties are combinations of citizens for the purpose of carrying measures. 
 I maintain, on the contrary, that these combinations, which we call parties, never can be 
 anything but combinations of office-holders, or office-seekers, to carry elections. 
 
 And with the men mIio manage these parties, however upright may be their intentions, 
 the end wliicli is lirst, in point of time, is to get office for themselves ; to this end they must 
 have the support of other party men ; to this end they must give their support to other party 
 men. The iiarty organization naturally ami certainly becomes an organization of men who 
 combine and work together to secure their own election to the dillurent places under govern- 
 ment. It becomes, try to disguise it as we may, a system of trading in ollice. 
 
 In the affairs, too, of great nations, or even of a single city, there arc, not one or two, 
 but very many, weighty questions of public policy. As a matter of fact, the men composing 
 these large parties cannot all .agree on more tiian one or two of tho.se main questions. Nor 
 <lo they profess to. And as to those one or two main (juestions, tliey ajyree, not on actual 
 measures to be carried, but only on what they are plea.sed to term general principles. 
 
 There is, however, one point on which the party leaders can agree — their candidates for 
 office. And here they do agree. On all other points they must difTer, and tliey do differ.
 
 / L' APPENDIX. 
 
 They do imleed, before eaeh election, say something about "principles;" they make a 
 " platform," as they term it — a collection of " sounding and glittering generalities, " so vague 
 as to mean nothing, by which they think they can catch votes. This word "platform" truly 
 describes the thing for which it is the name. It is something to be put under foot. 
 
 Whatever may be the theory of political parties as they should be, wherever there are 
 man J- offices and many elections, the natural and certain result is that these party organiza- 
 tions, as a fact, are used for the purpose of carrying elections and not measures. Parties do 
 not elect men to put into action certain principles ; they use principles as battle-cries to elect 
 certain men. 
 
 That is not only the working of party rule, it is the theory of party rule as it actually 
 exists. Any other statement is only the theory of party rule as men wish it might be. 
 
 We have seen so much of parties and party contests that we have almost come to look 
 on them as an end in themselves. But what is always the real end to be reached in public 
 affairs ? As we should all agree, it is action of some kind. In order to have that action wise, 
 we need calm thought and discussion before we decide what that action shall be, and united 
 effort after our action is decided. We need at every stage, not strife between two factions, 
 but harmony of all men. We must have the ivorking together, of all men's minds, to get the 
 wisest thought, of all men's wills, to get the strongest action. 
 
 And how does this machinery of party tend to help or hinder us in getting these results, 
 wise thought and strong action, from both the people and their public servants ? 
 
 Parties and party contests make it an impossible thing to get from the people their calm 
 wise thought and action. One party seizes one side of the question, the other party takes 
 the other side, or, oftener, each party takes different sides in different sections of the country. 
 What the party men labor for is not to find out the best thing to be done by the men of all 
 parties, but to catch votes for their own party. And their whole effort is to make men 
 follow party and work for party success, instead of using their minds and their judgments. 
 In pai'ty contests men do not think over measures ; they tight for candidates. We have 
 alwrys strife, not deliberation. 
 
 So it is as to the action and thought of the people themselves. But how is it as to the 
 action of our public servants ? It is our right to have our Senators and Representatives sit 
 down together and give us the best possible results of their combined wisdom. When once 
 they enter our legislative halls they have no right to know that there is such a thing as 
 party in existence. They are bouud to think only what are the best measures for tlie 
 people's interest, and to give us those measures. That is not what they do. Every measure 
 is made a " party question." If the administration party, as it is called, brings forward a 
 wise measure, the opposition party, if it dare, opposes it, for fear their enemies may gain 
 votes through having done the people good service. These party men may be able men ; 
 they may be men of honest intentions. They are driven by the pressure of this vast party 
 machinery to serve party and not the people, whether they wish it or not ; for on party they 
 depend for their future. 
 
 So much as to whether party and party machinery helps or hinders us in getting from the 
 people and their servants wise action. But when measures are once decided and taken, 
 surely no one can claim that party strife as to those measures should go on unceasingly. But 
 it never ends. No question is ever at rest. 
 
 In private affairs, when men have once made a decision, they act. The decision may or 
 may not be wise. Of that they cannot be certain. But when the decision is once made, 
 they do something— they put their decision to a trial ; aud if, upon trial, they find they have 
 made a mistake, then they try something else. In public affairs we should do the same. 
 When a course of action is once determined on, then all men should agree, in putting it to
 
 PARTY BULE IN THE UNITED STATES. 73 
 
 the test of experience If the course of action is not wise, time will so prove ; and then we 
 can try other measures. And so we should do, were it not for party. 
 
 But it is in time of war, when a people should be united, when they must show an un- 
 broken front to, their enemies, that the greatest evils from party have ever come. In every 
 time of danger that the people of the United States have yet had, party has nearly ruined 
 us. Party men, whatever may have been their intentions, have in practice not heeded the 
 needs of the people, have looked at party ends, have brought war on us when it suited their 
 purposes, and, when war has come, have done much to bring on us defeat and destruction. 
 
 In the only two important wars we have had, the war of 1S12 and the war of the rebel- 
 lion, when all men should have united against the common enemy, we have been nearly 
 ruined by party strife. 
 
 The calm opinion of to-day is that the war of 1812 was entirely needless, that it was 
 begun on no sufficient reason, that it was carried on with disgraceful inefficiency, and that it 
 brought no substantial results. That the war ever came, or that it was carried on as it was, 
 was due to the violence of party contest. One party cb-agged us into war for party reasons. 
 The other party, after war had come, did its utmost to cripple the administration and make 
 the war a ruinous failure, for party reasons. 
 
 The war of the rebellion came. As to whether it would have come had it not been for 
 party strife, many men dififer. But after the war once came, as to the disastrous effects of 
 party strife men cannot differ. 
 
 Again, as in the war of 1812, when the nation was in the greatest danger, when we 
 needed, of aU things, that all loyal men should sink their differences of opinion on other 
 matters, and tight together for mere existence, we had nearly half the men at the North 
 arrayed in opposition to the Government, doing all they could, whatever may have been their 
 purpose, to aid the public enemy and destroy the nation. 
 
 In short, at all times, in war and peace, the need of the people is agreement — on some- 
 thing to be done. The need of parties and party men is always strife over what they call 
 " principles." 
 
 We have in this country every four years a convulsion of the whole nation. The entire 
 business of the community stands still at an immense money loss. If the men of a new 
 party come into power, they may adopt a totally new system of levying revenue ; they may 
 bring in a new tariff ; they may overthrow the existing currency, or issue a quantity of irre- 
 deemable paper money. The commercial and banking operations of the whole country 
 may be thrown into utter confusion. Prosperity may be changed to ruin, for large numbers 
 of our citizens, according to tlie particular measures that demagogues think will carry them 
 into office. The mere machinery and labor of a Presidential election cost immense sums of 
 money. This money is paid, in one shape or another, by the people, and out of tlie people's 
 purse. Why should the people pay this iunneuse tax every four years, iiave their pulilie 
 servants at all times doing duty to the party instead of the State, and be subjected to this 
 immense business loss and this enonnous upheaval of tlie wiiole social fabric '! We ni ly, 
 indeed, live through it. The people's liberties may not l)e perinauently destroyed 1))' it. 
 We may be prosi^erous in spite of it. IJut why sliould we have it ? 
 
 The ?]ngliah system of government and our own system are both l)ad. We liave a 
 revolution once in four years. They have one whenever tlio ministry are beaten in the 
 House of Commons. I do not yet feel certain which system is tlio worse. 
 
 We come, then, to the nextjviint. Is it a necessary thing to have tliis jiarty strife, in 
 order to keep alive the interest of tiie people in public affairs? 
 
 One of most frequent complaints of the day is that our pco^>le, and especially tlu' edu- 
 cated men, do not take an interest in public affairs. And the complaint is in a measure well
 
 / 4 APPENDIX, 
 
 foundoil. INIen do not take a healtli}'- interest in the affairs of our Government. And why- 
 is it so ? Simply this : the ordinary citizen knows that he has no power, that the party men 
 can and will manage our government affairs very nearly as they choose. But before party 
 machinery and party power became so fully developed, men did take the deepest interest in 
 all tlie affairs of the nation. 
 
 All men in the country, but the educated men more than any others, think and read 
 and talk of public affairs more now than ever befoi-e. As a class, the educated men are more 
 eager than any others to go into public life. Nothing else has for them such fascinations. 
 But they cannot get there. They ai-e kept out by the party leaders. They try again and 
 again, and they fail. What has at times seemed the indifference of elegant leisure is in fact 
 the despair of repeated defeat. 
 
 Is it a possible thing that men of any class should lose their interest in the public affairs 
 of their own country, of their own time ? This government and these laws, we live under 
 them. They make or mar men's fortunes aud the fortunes of their children. Men who 
 read and think at all, read and think of the affairs of every people and of every age. Wher- 
 ever we go, in a railway train or iu the farm-houses, we hear all men discussing matters of 
 European politics. Are we suddenly to lose all interest in the affairs only of our own 
 country, and in the making of our own laws ? On the contrary, remove these party oligar- 
 chies, and the best men in the country would again come into public life. Remove these 
 party contests, and we should have instead of this feverish upheaval once in four years over 
 a mere struggle for office, a steady, healthy interest in questions of public policy. When 
 men found that they really had some power in the affairs of State, they would try to use it. 
 Men in any country have never, under any circumstances, been able to lose their interest in 
 the affairs of their own Governmeut. We are not now to have such a miracle for the first 
 time in the world's history. 
 
 To say that we must have these party contests in order to keep up the interest of the 
 people in public affairs, is to say that a man must have a fever once in four years to keep 
 warm. 
 
 Are these party combinations, then, necessary to preserve free government ? 
 
 All the republics in history have been destroyed b}' party — by these organizations of 
 men who have made a profession of carrying elections. The tyraany of kings has been often 
 overthrown by one people or another iu the history of nations. The tyranny of party is the 
 most dangerous enemy freedom can have. No people has ever yet conquered it. These 
 single royal tyrants, with only one life, are puny things ; but this immense monster party, 
 which is immortal, has the people's own strength. 
 
 But if these were the only evils resulting from party combinations we might be com- 
 paratively at ease. We have not yet the worst point. It is this necessity of carrying elections, 
 under which we put all our public servants, which is the root of all the corruption of our 
 public men. We bind them hand and foot, in the chains of party slavery. And we do 
 more ; we compel them to serve the powerful interests in the land which control votes. Our 
 public servants, on questions of revenue, on all matters of legislation, where we have a right 
 to their honest judgment and honest action, do not give us their honest judgment and honest 
 action. They are driven to look at the next election They say they work for their party. 
 They give it too good a name. They shape their official action in such a way as to gain the 
 support at the next election of the rich and powerful men and corporations. Disguise 
 it as we may, they sell their official action for votes ; aud the next step downward, the sell- 
 ing of official action for money, is one that is easily and often taken. But that is not often 
 the first step. 
 
 Some men have been in the habit of thinking that the corruption which we have had 
 among members of Congress and of State Legislatures was some special fruit of some special
 
 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT I-V ENGLAND. ( 
 
 feature of rejiublicau institutions. This is a mistake. \Yhene\-er, under any system of 
 government, it is necessary for public otiicers to catch votes for elections, they will catch the 
 votes. The votes will be bought and paid for in money, or office, or official action, as the 
 case may be, wljether it be iinder a monarchy or a republic. 
 
 This thing that we call party is the poison which makes a healthy national life an im- 
 possible thing. Tliese great party combinations, instead of being combinations of citizens to 
 carry wise measures in the interest of the people, are only combinations of politicians to 
 carry elections in their own interest. Parties, so far from being necessary to carry measures, 
 to keep alive the intei-est of the people in public affairs, and thus to preserve free govern- 
 ment, are the most powerful hindrances to efficient action, keep alive endless and needless 
 strife, are hot-beds of corruption, and arre the most dangerous enemies that free government 
 can have. 
 
 This party oligarch}^ under which we now suffer is not the creratiou of any one set of men. 
 The present party leaders are not responsible for its existence ; they are not to be blamed 
 for it. It is the natural legitimate fruit of our government system. It is not from choice 
 that our public men sacrifice the interests of the people for those of party. They form these 
 immense and powerful combinations only because our sj'stem of government drives them to 
 it. They miist carry these elections, or they will lose their places. 
 
 The people of the United States have a new and great problem to solve. That they 
 will solve it I make no doubt. 
 
 The immense growth of party which we have had in this country is something new in 
 history. I do not think its eviis have been duly Aveighed ; nor do I think its causes have 
 been carefully studied. 
 
 Party and party rule, as they now exist with us, are, as I believe, great evils — evils 
 which naturally and certainly result from certain features in our political system. 
 
 In private life we find in every profession and employment many men who do their 
 work as well as they know how. We have at times such men in public life ; but, as a rule, 
 our public men do their work, not as well as they know how, but only as well as the interests 
 of jjarty will allow them. Many of those men have good intentions, but thej' are bound in 
 the chains of party. Party controls the selection of our public servants ; it controls their 
 actions. 
 
 I believe all this can be changed. There is somewhere a remedy for this state of things. 
 That remedy can be found. And if the remedy can be found it will be used. I have un- 
 bounded faith in the honesty and sound sense of the peojile. 
 
 REPRE.SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND. 
 
 By David tiymc, iSSr. 
 
 In carrying out such a system as this it is evi<ient tliat the good of tlic country is Hkcly to 
 be sacrificed for the benefit of party. If the governincnt be carried on ]iiuelyin tlic iiitcicsts 
 of party, it is very certain this cannot Ijc to the advantage of the country, Tiie motives and aims 
 in the one case are distinct from, if not incompatible with, the motives and aims in the other, 
 unless we are to assume that the interests of parly and of the country are identical, which would 
 be as correct as to assert that an imlividual in follf)wing his own selfish interests was acting 
 <lisintercstedly or that a pickpocket was a useful and [iatriotic member of society.
 
 76 APPENDIX. 
 
 . . Once the policy of a party has been carried there is no longer a reason for the 
 existence of the party, which should therefore be dissolved. There is a wide distinction between 
 a party which exists solely as the advocate of certain principles, and a party which subordinates 
 all principles to office. Unfortunately the two great political parties in the English Parliament 
 belong to the latter category. Neither of them has ever been distinguished for honesty of 
 purpose, or for strict adherence to any principles. Both of them, on the contrary, have made 
 themselves notorious by their fickleness, by their greed of office, and by their unscrupulous use of 
 means to attain it. They have been trimmers and time-servers ; they have been evei-ything by 
 turns and nothing long. If they have supported a good cause it has generally been from a bad 
 motive. They are ready to advocate one set of principles to-day and another to-morrow, if by 
 so doing they may hope to trip up their opponents. . . . The conduct of neither of the two 
 great parties in the State appears to have been regulated by any principle whatever. Their 
 politics changed with the hour and the opportunity. What one party approved of the other 
 opposed ; whatever action one party took the other condemned. If the Whigs were in office 
 and brought in a measure, the Tories would oppose it as a matter of course ; if the Tories 
 succeeded to office and brought in a similar measure on the same subject, the Whigs would 
 pronounce it to be utterly worthless. And their successors follow precisely the same course. 
 With Liberals and Conservatives alike everything is fair in party warfare. Truth, honour, and 
 fair dealing are alike sacrificed to the exigencies of party. The end justifies the means, according 
 to the ethics of either party, and the supreme end of both parties is to secure or maintain 
 possession of the treasury benches. Government by Party is of a comparatively recent date. 
 It was the outcome of a long series of corrupt Parliaments dating back from the Restoration. 
 There is no trace of its existence till after the Revolution, and it was not till long after that 
 event that it was organized as it now is. Macaulay tells us that political parties had their origin 
 in the Long Parliament. It is true that there were two political parties in the Long Parliament, 
 and that is all that can be said on the matter. They were not parties in the sense understood by 
 the term at the present day. They were not organizations for the mere purpose of securing or 
 holding office. The parties of that day had not become mere place-hunters. Previous to the 
 Revolution the sovereigns of England chose their ministers on personal grounds alone, and often 
 in defiance of Parliament. The king's ministers were the king's friends. William III. was the 
 first sovereign who formed a ministry on a purely political basis, and his example was generally 
 followed during the subsequent reigns. But this was not always the case, and it was not till the 
 present reign that ministers were regularly chosen from the majority in Parliament. The last 
 memorable instance of a sovereign dismissing a ministry which had a majority in Parliament was 
 during the short reign of William IV. Taking advantage of the accession of the premier. Lord 
 Althorp, to the peerage, the king suddenly dismissed his Whig ministers, and entrusted the 
 Duke of Wellington with the formation of a government from the Tory party, who were in a 
 minority in the House of Commons. The defeat of the ministry at the general election which 
 followed showed that they were in a minority in the country as well as in Parliament, and from 
 that time forth the premier, on whom now devolved the task of forming a cabinet, has invariably 
 been chosen from the party which for the time being had a majority in Parliament. 
 
 Government by Party is usually spoken of as if it were the same thing as government by 
 the majority. This is a great mistake. It is true, as I have said, that the government of the 
 day is now chosen from the majority in Parliament, but it by no means follows from this that the 
 government is carried on by a parliamentary majority ; on the contrary, we know that Govern- 
 ment by Party is not government by the majority, but government by the majority of the 
 majority ; that is to say, the majority of the party which has a majority in the House. And 
 this majority of a majority may be, and often is, really a minority of Parliament. Let me 
 explain what I mean by an illustration. Suppose a party in the House brings about a ministerial 
 crisis which results in the leader of the party forming a cabinet. Suppose also the new cabinet 
 has a large majority in the House, and that in attempting to carry out the policy of their party, 
 they introduce a measure which is based on that policy. But the measure may not be acceptable 
 to all the members of the party ; indeed, it would be strange if it were, for there is almost
 
 REPRESEXTATIVE GOVEKNMKNT IN ENGLAND. 77 
 
 invariably a dissentient minority in every party on some question or other. Party organization 
 however, we shall suppose, triumphs over the dissentients, who vote, if they do not believe, with 
 the majority on their own side of the House, and the bill is carried. Now what I wish to point 
 out is that it is 'quite possible that the minority among the government supporters who were 
 secretly opposed to the bill together with the whole of the opposition might make a majority of 
 the House. In such a case the majority of the majority would be a minority of Parliament. 
 Take another case. The government introduce a bill, some of the details of which are not 
 acceptable to more than a bare majority of their supporters. The ministerial minority wish to 
 amend it, and the amendments which they desire would also be acceptable to the whole of the 
 opposition. But ministers refuse to give way, and the bill is eventually carried, the whole of the 
 ministerial following voting for it rather than break up the ministry. In this case the majority 
 of the majority would be a very small minority of whole House. 
 
 Government by Party and government by the majority are therefore two very different things. 
 
 . . . If Government by Party is not government by majority, on what ground can it rest 
 its claims? It cannot be that party government is necessary to the progress of legislation, as we 
 have seen six Reform Bills rejected in succession because they were made party questions, and 
 the seventh only carried because both sides of the House agreed to withdraw it from the sphere 
 of party politics. Nor can it be that party government is necessary for the support of the 
 government of the day, for it is in order to get at the government of the day that ministerial 
 measures are rejected, the opposition preferring to sacrifice even good measures rather than 
 allow ministers to remain in office. Nor can it be said that party government is an essential part 
 of the representative system, because it is evident that representative institutions would work far 
 better without it. Representative institutions flourished in England for centuries before party 
 government was ever heard of. Indeed, party government is a positive hindrance to the effective 
 working of the representative system. The fundamental idea of the representative system is 
 responsibility to the constituent body ; the leading principle of party government is loyalty to 
 party organization. The representative owes allegiance to his constituents and to them only ; the 
 party man sinks the representative in the partisan and votes and acts as his leader directs him. 
 
 The advocates of party government do not indeed deny that their system is at variance with 
 the principle of representation. Nay more, they frankly admit the fact, though, strangely 
 enough, they nevertheless cling tenaciously to their theory. " Parliamentary government," says 
 Earl Grey, " is essentially a government by means of party. . . . The House of Commons 
 owes its success as an active part of the supreme authority, and its peculiar excellencies, to what 
 are regajded as defects and departures from the principle in our representative system . . . and 
 it is chiefly through these defects that the ministers of the Crown have been enabled to obtain the 
 authority they have exercised in the House of Commons." Parliamentary Government and 
 party government are represented as synonymous, a mistake which runs tliroughout Earl Grey's 
 book on the subject. But what we have here more particularly to note is, first, the admission 
 that party government owes its success to "defects and tlc|)ariures " from the luinciple of 
 representation ; and, secondly, the statement that it is owing lo these very defects and departures 
 that " the ministers of the Crown have been enabled to obtain the authority they liave exercised 
 in the House of Commons." According to Earl Grey, therefore, parly government has had tiic 
 hap]>y effect of enabling ministers to obtain "authority" in the House, and it is carried on for 
 the benefit of ministers, and in order lo enable them lo coerce Parliament. And no doubt, in 
 this respect, the system has succeeded admirably. Party Government has placed Parliament al 
 the feet of tlie ministry of the day. We have already seen how a ministry, by means of a i)arty 
 vote, may coerce a majority ; we may also see how a ministry may exercise authority and openly 
 set the House at defiance. 
 
 . . . As a rule, ministers profess great consideration for the opinions of Pariiament. It 
 is only the opposition minority that they treat witii contempt. Where an important vote is 
 pending they first try lo make sure of iheir majority. If tiiere are any signs of disalTection in
 
 78 APPENDIX. 
 
 the ministerial rank and file, they rally their party, an appeal is made to party feeling, the 
 disaffected have to stand out, all the influence at the command of ministers is employed to 
 conciliate them, and when all else fails, a threat of resignation or of a dissolution of Parliament 
 will generally bring them to terms. The ministerial ranks are then closed, and the re-united 
 majority behind the treasury benches are used to crush the opposition minority. To the outside 
 public all seems fair and square, but none the less effectively have ministers exercised their 
 influence and authority to silence the voice of the majority. 
 
 But it is really desirable that ministers of the Crown should exercise authority over Par- 
 liament ? Is it not desirable rather that Parliament should exercise authority over ministers ? Is 
 it not an essential principle of parliamentary government that ministers should be held responsible 
 to Parliament, instead of Parliament being held responsible to ministers? 
 
 But, say the advocates of Party government, the business of the country cannot be carried 
 on without a strong ministry. It is necessary, we are assured, that a government should have a 
 large and pliant majority behind them to enable them to retain their position and to carry their 
 measures through Parliament. We are left in no manner of doubt as to how this majority was 
 got together in the pre-reform era. "The adherents of the ministry," says Todd, "were 
 obtainable from the first by means of various small boroughs which were under the direct control 
 of the Treasury, and of other boroughs which were subject to the influence of certain great 
 families or wealthy proprietors, who were willing to dispose of the same in support of an existing 
 administration." And this majority was, according to the candid admission of another friend 
 and advocate of party government, retained in a still more objectionable manner. " Parlia- 
 mentary government," says Earl Grey, "derives its whole force and power from the exercise 
 of an influence akin to corruption." 
 
 When there is no great question agitating the country, parties in the House are, as 
 a rule, evenly balanced, and ministers are continually changing. A succession of weak 
 administrations is the inevitable result of such a state of things. A notable illustration of this we 
 have in the condition of political parties in the Italian Parliament for some time past. The 
 Parliament of Italy is modelled on the English system of Government by Party, and there have 
 been no less than twenty-five new administrations in that country in eighteen years, or an average 
 of one eveiy eight or nine months. In New Zealand, also, where the worst features of the 
 parliamentary system of the mother country have been adopted, there were in 1872 no less than 
 nine changes of government within seven months. A general election, and a good cry to go to 
 the country with, would have put an end to this state of things. Party government in England 
 has only been saved from merited contempt by the party leaders on either side adroitly seizing on 
 every question of public interest, and turning it to account for party purposes. 
 
 Like the dogma of the divine rights of kings and passive obedience, party government came 
 to the front during the stormy period of the Revolution. The system is indeed so monstrous, 
 that it could only have found a:ceptance at a time when national animosities ran high, and the 
 people were in an abnormal state of excitement. Under no ordinary circumstances is it con- 
 ceivable that the English people would have tolerated a political system so entirely different from 
 that to which they had been so long accustomed, and so opposed to their practice in the affairs 
 of everyday life. To the mass of the people it was, and always will ba, a matter of utter 
 indifference as to who were in office or who out of it, so long as the country is well governed. 
 1 hey had been accustomed to send their representatives to Parliament to confer togethe rand 
 co-operate for the common good of the whole community. It must therefore have shocked their 
 moral sensibilities when they discovered that their representatives, instead of attending to the 
 business of the country for which they had been elected, were devoting them.selves to far other 
 purposes ; that no sooner did they come together than they immediately ranged themselves on 
 opposite sides of the House ; that they openly avowed hostile intentions towards one another ; 
 that they at once proceeded to open acts of hostility ; that they spent their time and energies in 
 vilifying one another, in misrepresenting one another's motives, opinions and actions, and in
 
 ivm 
 
 ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES. 79 
 
 attempting to ruin one another's reputations, to defeat one another's plans, and to delay and 
 mutilate, when they could not reject, one another's measures. And that men eminent for their 
 talents, their eloquence and even their uprightness in other relations of life, should do all this 
 without any sense^of its impropriety and its injustice, was a sight not calculated to raise parlia- 
 mentary institutions in the estimation of right thinking men. Had it been the design of its 
 authors to demoralize the public mind, to impede the public business, to create natural animosities 
 and general anarchy, they could not have better accomplished their end than by the introduction 
 of such a system as this. Nothing can be more obvious to common sense than that the 
 representatives of a great nation could be bound together by the same interests, aims and 
 aspirations as the people themselves, and that they should co-operate with them for the common 
 good of the whole country ; and nothing can be more absurd than to suppose that the common 
 good could be achieved by a system that tends to create and perpetuate party strife and national 
 animosities. We might as well create discord in order to produce harmony, or provoke quarrels 
 for the purpose of promoting friendship and cordiality. The most extraordinary part of the 
 matter is that there are still men to be found who believe such a vicious system is essential to 
 parliamentary government. 
 
 This species of party warfare, too, is peculiar to parliamentary life, I had almost said to 
 English parliamentary life, for it has not fairly established itself in any non-English speaking 
 races, and even in England itself it has found no place in any other departments of public or 
 private service. It is unknown in the Church. Ecclesiastical assemblies, whether established 
 or dissident, have not adopted it, and I am not aware that these assemblies are more disorderly, 
 or that their business is worse conducted on that account. It is also unknown in municipal life, 
 where the representative system is in full vigour. The local representatives do not range them- 
 selves in hostile camps and spend their time and energies in faction fights. On the contrary, 
 they meet, discuss and vote on civic matters, and absolutely ignore parliamentary precedent in 
 their mode of conducting business. Party organization is equally unknown in commercial life, 
 where the representative svstem also exists. The board of directors is a minature parliament 
 elected by the sharehoulders to manage their business for them. But no one ever heard of party 
 organizations in the board-room of a joint stock company. A commercial undertaking 
 conducted on the improved parliamentary model would be doomed to certain ruin. Had 
 Government by Party not come into existence under exceptional circumstances : had it not been 
 the slow growth of generations ; had it not been as^^ociated with the names of our most eminent 
 men and with some of the proudest events of our history and had almost become a part of our 
 natural life, it would find few defenders amongst us at the present day. The system is tolerated 
 because of old associations, and because we have come to think that it is in some way an essential 
 part of our time-honoured Constitution ; but if it were now, for the first time, proposed for our 
 acceptance, I venture to say that it would not recommend itself either to the intelligence or to the 
 moral sense of the community. 
 
 ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES. 
 
 liij 11. It. Droop. From tha Journal of Ilia Statistical Soc'iHij, June ISSl. 
 
 The election of representatives ha.s become, in modern times, a most important jiart nt 
 all political and social machinery. Whenever a nuniiier of persons cannot conveniently 
 meet together to determine how their common affairs should be managed ; whether because 
 they are too numerous, or for want of leisure, or for any other reason, they elect repre- 
 sentatives to act for them. Thus, not only national assemidies like the Mnuse of ('(minKins, 
 and municipal bodies, such as town councils, school boards, and boards of guardians, but
 
 80 APPENDIX. 
 
 also boards of directors for joint stock companies, and committees of voluntary societies, 
 consist either altogether or to a great extent of elected representatives. It is assumed that 
 the electors have it in their power to elect such representatives as will be satisfactorj^ 
 substitutes for themselves, and will, by their delil^erations and votes, yield substantially 
 the same I'esults as if all the electors met and deliberated and voted as a single body. But 
 whether and how far this assumption may be realised, will depend to a great extent upon 
 the mode in which these representatives are elected. Until within the last few years it 
 M-as almost universally taken for granted that there was only one possible mode of electing 
 representatives, viz., that now known as majority' voting, according to which each elector 
 maj'^ vote for as many candidates as there are representatives to be elected, but may only 
 give one of his votes to the same candidate. It is called "majority voting" because 
 whenever a sufficient number of electors to constitute a majority of the constituency agree 
 to vote for the same set of candidates, they can secure the election of their whole set of 
 candidates. 
 
 Of late years, several other methods of electing representatives have been devised as 
 substitutes for majority voting, and some of them have been not merely discussed theoreti- 
 cally, but brought into practical operation. Of these methods, those best known in 
 England are, (1) the limited vote, applied by the Reform Act of 1867 to three-cornered 
 constituencies and the city of London, and since introduced on a much more extensive scale 
 in Brazil, (2) cumulative voting, applied in 1870 to school board elections, and also in use in 
 the Cape Colony (since 1853), and in Illinois and Pennsylvania ; and, (3) the preferential 
 vote of Mr. Hare's scheme, and of M. AndrjB's Danish constitution. . . . 
 
 Obviously these different methods of electing representatives are all practical applica- 
 tions of the science of statistics. They all consist in collecting certain statistical data as to 
 whom the electors wish to have as representatives, and putting together these data so as to 
 construct these into a rei^resentative assembly. 
 
 Majo7'ity Voting. 
 
 The method of majority voting cannot claim to have originated in any scientific con- 
 sideration of the problem how a representative assembly might best be formed. It has 
 manifestly been developed gradually out of the mode in which an assembly decides upon any 
 proposal that may be submitted to it. Until the abolition of the show of hands by the 
 Ballot Act of 1872, the first stage in an English parliamentary election consisted in asking 
 the electors, as to each candidate separately, whether he should be their representative. 
 In the second stage, at the poll, when the votes of the electors were recorded systematically 
 it was convenient to receive the votes for all the candidates at once, and then the 
 majority vote n;le was adopted, being no doubt recommended by the consideration that it 
 would lead to the same practical result as if the electors had voted separately for or against 
 each candidate. According to either process a majority of one more than half the voters in 
 favour of any candidate or candidates secures his or their election. .... 
 
 At the present day, at any rate in electing representatives for parliamentary or municipal 
 assemblies, electors do not seek exclusively or mainly to select the most honest, intelli- 
 gent, and competent of the candidates. On the contrary, with but few exceptions, the 
 electors pay very little attention to the personal qualitications of the candidates, and 
 look only at the views they hold and the measures they promise to support. What they aim 
 at securing is that their views and their measures should prevail in and be carried out by 
 the assembly. 
 
 Majority Voting may completely Exclude Minority. 
 
 It may happen that the same party has the upper hand in every constituency, and that 
 the other party has no representative whatever in the assembly. Thus in Geneva, according 
 to a report presented to the Grand Council in 1870, by three of its members, Messrs. Eoget,
 
 ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES. 81 
 
 Morin, and Bellamj', "the opposition has always numbered more than one-third of the 
 electors, and we have seen it successively represented bj' 0, 7 deputies, and 1 deputy."' 
 This refers to the grand council, which consisted of 10'2 deputies, for the election of which 
 the canton was dl^^ded into three constituencies. The same happened in Maryland in 1868, 
 according to Mr. Simon Sterne's "Personal Representation" (Lippincott, Philadelphia, 
 1870), p. 71. In this election 62,356 votes were cast for democratic candidates, and 30,442 
 for republican, and j'et this republican minority of nearly one-third of the whole body of 
 voters, did not obtain a single representative in either the senate or the house of represent- 
 atives. 
 
 Majority Voting may give Minority Control of Assembly. 
 
 But as a rule the representatives are divided more or less unequally between the two 
 parties, the proportions depending however not upon the comparative strength of the two 
 parties in the constituencies, but on the number of constituencies in which each party 
 happens to have the majority, and the number of representatives returned by these 
 constituencies. This will usually exaggerate the difference between the two parties, and 
 give the stronger party a much larger majority in the assembly than it has in the constitu- 
 encies ; but sometimes on the contrary it assigns the majority in the assembly to the party 
 which is really in a minority in the constituencies. To make my meaning clearer, 1 %vill 
 assume that each constituency has a number of representatives in exact proportion to the 
 number of electors it comprises, an assumption which %vill be very nearly correct in 
 countries where representation is in proportion to population, e. g. , in the United States 
 and in France, and which is being more nearly realized in the United Kingdom by every 
 successive Reform Bill. I will further assume that there are 1,990,000 electors who have to 
 elect 199 representatives, or one representative for each 10,000 electors. Suppose now that 
 100 of these representatives are elected by the A party by narrow majorities of 5,100 to 
 4,900 in constituencies returning only one member, of 10,200 to 9,800 in constituencies 
 returning two members and of numbers in the same proportion of 51 to 49 for constituencies 
 returning three or more members, while the other 99 members are elected by the B party, by 
 unanimous constituencies of in all 990,000. Then the A party which has elected 100 
 representatives, and therefore has a majority in the assembly, will have only received the 
 votes of 510,000 electors, while the B party, which has only 99 representatives, will have 
 received the votes of 490, 000 -f 990, 000 =1,480,000 electors, or more than 74 per cent. /. e., 
 very nearly three-fourths of the 1,990,000 electors. 
 
 This is, of course, an extreme and improbable case, imagined to illustrate what majority 
 voting may possibly do in the way of putting the minority in the place of "the majority, but 
 many very much more probable distributions of votes might be suggested, which would 
 produce substantially the same result, i. e., that the majority of representatives would 
 correspond to the minority among the electors. Moreover, such cases arc known to have 
 repeatedly occurred in practice. In the United States the President is not ikctod l>y a 
 direct vote of all citizens entitled by the franchise, but by a body of electors in a repre- 
 sentative assembly, of whom a certain numljer, from 35 in New York to 1 in Nevada, are 
 elected by each State, all the citizens of a State voting as a single constituency. At three 
 of the four presidential elections next preceding the civil war of 1H71, the successful 
 candidate only received a minority of the popular vote. Thus (iencral Taylor hail only 
 1,362,242 votes, when Cass and Van liurun had between tlicin I,.Tir),173 votes. Mr. 
 Buchanan, again, had only 1,838,229 votes, wiiile Fremont and Fillmore ha<l l)etwtcn them 
 2,21."),789 votes. So Lincoln had f.nly 1,860,452 votes, while Douglas, Bell, and Brccken- 
 ridge, who were all opposed to liini on the slavery question, obtained between them 
 2,813,741 votes, or nearly a million more. 
 
 The following a<lditional instances are taken from an article, by .Mr. Dudley Fiild, in 
 "Putnam's Magazine' for June, 1870, p. 712: "In New York, in the Assembly, 76 
 6
 
 82 APPENDIX. 
 
 republican members were elected in 1868 by o97,899 votes, while only 52 democratic 
 members were elected by 431,510 votes." Proportionally there ought to have been 67 
 democrats, and 61 republicans. In the same year, " In California the republicans elected 
 23 members by 54,592 votes, while the democrats elected 97 members by a less number, 
 that is by 54,078." 
 
 In Belgium, according to M. Leon Pety de Thoz(^e, " R^forme Electorale," p. 8, 
 Bruxelles. 1874, "In the elections of 14th June, 1870, 18,737 electors voted for the liberals, 
 and onlj^ 14,096 for the catholics, and yet only 31 liberal members were elected, against 30 
 catholics, and if a very small number of votes had been changed at Charleroi, there would 
 have been only 29 liberal members to represent 57 per cent, of the electors, and 32 catholics 
 to represent the minority of 43 per cent. 
 
 These instances show that majority voting is not always able to ensure that the 
 majority of representatives is on the same side with the majority among the electors. 
 
 Instability under Majority Voting. 
 
 Moreover, when an assembly is elected by majority voting the relative strength of the 
 different parties is much more unstable and fluctuating than it would be under such a 
 system of proportional representation as I have just referred to. Then the fluctuations 
 would only be in proportion to the changes of opinion which time and cii'cumstances might 
 produce among the electors. Under majority voting it often happens (indeed much more 
 frequently than would be anticipated a priori) that elections are decided by very narrow 
 majorities, so that if only a very few votes changed sides the representation would be 
 transferred to the other party. 
 
 Narrow Majorities under Majority Voting. 
 
 To illustrate this, I have prepared tables showing for the last three general elections for 
 the United Kingdom, those of 186S, 1874, and 1880, (1) how many seats were won by 
 majorities not exceeding 100, and (2) how many seats were won by majorities not exceeding 
 10 per cent, of the votes polled for the successful candidate. 
 
 From Tables I and II it appears that in 1868 34 conservatives and 33 liberals owed their 
 success to majorities of less than 100, while 48 conservatives and 48 liberals gained their 
 seats by majorities less in each case than 10 per cent, of the votes polled for the successful 
 candidate. I have further calculated how many voters must change sides in order to 
 transfer these seats to the other party. I find from Table I (of majorities under 100) that 
 the 34 conservative seats would be transferred to the liberals if 790 voters changed sides, 
 and that the 32 liberal seats would be transferred to the conservatives if 657 voters changed 
 sides. 
 
 Instability Resulting from Narrow Majorities. 
 
 It is easy to understand how a slight change in political opinion among the electors 
 may produce a very considerable change in the balance of parties among their representa- 
 tives. The political system is in fact always in a state of unstable equilibrium, liable to be 
 turned upside down Ijy anything that may make the one party popular or the other 
 unpopular at the time of a general election. This makes the leaders of parties extremely 
 sensitive to fluctuations of public opinion, and unwilling to risk even a slight amount of 
 temporary unpopularity ; while on the other hand it makes popular agitators much more 
 influential than they would be if the elections did not so often depend upon small majorities, 
 and thus come to be decided by that class among the electors whose votes are most readily 
 affected by temporary fluctuations of opinion.
 
 ELECTING REPRESENTATIVES. 83 
 
 Corruption Due to Narroiv Majorities. 
 
 The tables of narrow majorities (Xos. I to VI) will also explain why electors under 
 majority voting &re so liable to be influenced by bribery, treating, intimidation, and other 
 undue influences. The bulk of the electors in a constituency may be too honest to be bribed 
 or corrupted, and too independent to be intimidated, but there will alwajs be some few who 
 are accessible to such influences, and whenever the honest and independent electors are 
 di\nded into two nearly equal parties, supporting two rival candidates, or sets of candidates, 
 the election is really left in the hands of the corrupt or dependent residue. . 
 
 It occasionally happens, as election investigations have shown, that not only a small 
 residue, but a considerable fraction, perhaps a majority, of a constituency has become corrupt. 
 But in these cases it will usually be found that the corruption has gradually increased from 
 small beginnings. A few voters having been bribed to turn an election, graduallj'^ more 
 and more insist on being paid. If the election managers had not been tempted at first to 
 bribe a few, the constituency would have remained pure. 
 
 Majority voting is also responsible for a great part of the expenditure incurred by 
 candidates in retaining election agents, having committee rooms, advertising, and bringing 
 voters to the poll. Within certain limits, expenditure for these purposes is legitimate, as 
 contributing to make the views and claims of the candidates known to the electors : but, 
 unquestionably, a very large portion of this expenditure is only incurred because elections 
 depend upon narrow majorities, and it is, therefore, woi'th Avhile to incur a verj' considerable 
 expenditure for the chance of securing a few additional votes. 
 
 Gerrymandering. 
 
 There is another mode in which the circumstance that under majority voting elections 
 frequently depend upon a small balance of votes, may be used to transfer seats from one 
 party to the other. This is by altering the constituency, and either adding or taking away 
 some class of electors which is supposed to be much more favourable to the party than to the 
 other. This may be done either by altering the boundaries of the electoral districts or by 
 enfranchising or disfranchisiug a particular set of electors. The alteration of boundaries for 
 this purpose is extensively practised in the United States, under the name of gerrymandering. 
 
 Division into Two Parties. 
 
 Thus far I have reasoned on the assumption that the division into two, and only two 
 parties, which is found almost everywhere under majority voting, will not be afTectcd by the 
 change to another mode of voting. But in fact, as I believe, this limitation of electoral 
 contests to only two parties is due mainly to majority voting, and would be more or less 
 broken in upon if any method of voting were substituted which enabled smaller sections of 
 the clect<^)rs to obtain separately tlieir respective shares of the representation without being 
 compelled to combine together to form a majority party. That majority voting by thus 
 compelling smaller sections to combine togetlier, on pain of being left unre|)rcscnted, tends 
 t<j limit to only two the number of parties computing at an election, I have shown in a 
 previous part of this paper. It may be thought, however, that this, tliough an ade(juato 
 cause, may not be the oidy possible cause. It is. a prevailing opinion among tlio.se who 
 confine their attention to I^iglisli party divisions, that tliougli the creeds of tiie lilteral and 
 conservative parties may vary from time to time in tiieir details, tliey correspond substanti- 
 ally to two opposite tendencies of thought, which produce naturally two opposite sets of 
 opinions and two opposing parties. I'>ut even without j^oing outside Kngli.sli politics, 
 anyone who examines carefully the opinions from time to time advocated \>y these two 
 parties on those questions of domestic and foreign policy which from time to time j>romin- 
 ently occupy jniblic attention, will, F think, come to the conclusion that Jiot nnfntjuently 
 the members of each party are kept in agreement with each otiier far more by reluctance
 
 84 APPENDIX. 
 
 to separate from their common organization (which under majority voting is the condition 
 of their exercising any political influence) than by any of the principles which they hold in 
 common. And when we look beyond the United Kingdom to other countries where 
 representative government with majority voting has been for a long time in operation, to 
 the United States, to Switzerland, or to Belgium, we shall find everywhere the same 
 di\nsion into two and only two parties, but the character of the party division varying in 
 different countries. In the United States the distinguishing characteristics of the rival 
 parties have nothing whatever in common with those of our Liberals and Conservatives, 
 and this is also true of the Independents and Radicals of Geneva. We find, moreover, that 
 the same party divisions usually run through all elections, whether federal, State, or 
 municipal, or, as the case may be, national or municipal, though there is no connection 
 between the questions to be dealt with by the different sets of representatives. These 
 phenomena I cannot explain by any theory of a natural division between opposing tendencies 
 of thought, and the only explanation which seems to me to account for them is that the two 
 opposing parties into which we find politicians divided in each of these countries have been 
 formed and are kept together by majority voting. 
 
 PARTIZAN GOVERNMENT. 
 
 By Wm. D. LeSneur. From the North American Eeview ; Vol. GXXXIT. (1881). 
 
 In an article already referred to as written some years ago, we expressed ourselves as 
 follows, on the subject of party journalism: "It is not the bitterness of political discussion 
 that seems to us the worse result of the party system ; it is its amazing hollowness. A 
 reasonable man is simply lost in amazement as he reads, day after day, in ably edited 
 journals, whole columns of writing in which there is hardly the faintest gleam of sincere 
 conviction to be discerned. Day after day the same miserable evasions, the same varnishing 
 over of unsightly facts, the same leiterations of unproved charges against opponents, the 
 same taking for granted of things requiring proof, the same proving of things that nobody 
 questions, the same hypocritical appeals to the good sense of electors whom every effort is 
 being used to misinform and confuse, the same dreary, unmeaning platitudes, — in a word, 
 the same ixtter abuse of the reasoning faculty and of the functions and privileges of a free 
 press. Of course, so long as both sides indulge in this kind of thing, each can make out at 
 least a partial case against the other ; and so a constant crossfire is kept up in the exposure 
 of misrepresentations and the rectification of all that has been set down in malice or 
 unduly extenuated on one side or the other. To-day, a good point is made by the oppo- 
 sition ; to-morrow, it will be returned to them, if possible, with interest. Such is the 
 paity system of political warfare — a system which ought to have won the admiration 
 of Archdeacon Paley, since it possesses the crowning attribute which was lacking to that 
 celebrated watch of his, the power, namely, of perpetually reproducing itself." 
 
 Now, in so far as this language is applicable to the political controversies of to-day, — 
 and few will deny it a certain apijlicability, — it becomes the duty of all who have it in their 
 power to influence public opinion independently of party, to call attention in season and 
 out of season to the utter insincerity of the whole performance. If people answer that 
 they do not look for sincerity in political journals, and that for their own part all they want 
 is to hear aU possible good of their own side and all possible evil of the other, nothing 
 more can be said ; they must die, if they are determined to do so, in their sins. Some, it 
 must be allowed, though they are not likely to make such an avowal, might do so with 
 truth ; for there are misguided individuals in the community who outdo in party bigotry
 
 PROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION. 85 
 
 the most ^^olent of their leaders, just as there are lay devotees who far outdo their priests 
 in superstition. On the other hand, there are many who have a tincture of fair-mindedness, 
 and some respect for their own understandings, and who would be inclined to resent any 
 deliberate attempts to befog and befool them. To these an appeal on behalf of rational and 
 decent methods in political discussion may hopefuUj- be made ; not in the expectation, as 
 we have before said, of doing away ^^^th parties and caucuses, with managers and wire- 
 pullers, but of leading these to recognize some limit to their powers. 
 
 That parly controversy, is in general the merest parody of anything like legitimate and 
 serious political argument, is easily shown to any one who is not himself a hopeless thrall 
 to party ; and not less demonstrable is it that the systematic depreciation and abuse of 
 public men tends to poison the whole political atmosphere and to educate the rising 
 generation in a sicklj^ cynicism by robbing them of all opportunity of recognizing and 
 admiring public virtue in their own land and time. Let genuine, unmistakable corruption 
 be exposed and lashed ; and, if possible, let the operation be performed by some one who 
 hates corruption in a friend even more than in a foe ; but let not errors of judgment 
 receive the denunciation due only to deliberate misdoing. Where public services have been 
 rendered, let them be cheerfully and unstintedly acknowledged ; and where a man has won a 
 general character for uprightness, let his character be reckoned the property of the nation, 
 and not a foot-ball for faction. Is not our country's richest inheritance, to-day, the 
 character of the men who laid the foundations of her national greatness ? And shall it be 
 said that the United States have ceased in the beginning of the second century of their 
 independence to lay up this particular form of wealth ? It is sad to think to what a trade 
 calumny has been reduced, and that instead of a growing faith in those who are called to 
 the service of the republic, there should be an established conventional tone of mockery and 
 distrust. Yet who is there, practically conversant with public affairs, who does not know, 
 that, many as are the evils that fasten themselves on government, the general state of 
 things is not as bad, or nearly as bad, as is conventionally represented, that public men in 
 general are far more honest than they get the credit of being, and that we are really, to a 
 large extent, walking in a vain show of political wickedness, produced wholly and solely by 
 the persistent falsifications of unscrupulous party journals ? A vain show in one sense, for 
 wickedness in the measure alleged does not exist ; but a most serious reality in another, 
 for this constant talk about evil begets evil by begetting despair of good. 
 
 PROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION. 
 
 By Frederick Seebohm. The Contemporary Review, Vol. XLIV., 18S3. 
 
 In the first place, it must be recognized that a Parliament is only a device for conveniently 
 arriving at the will of the nation after proper discussion. 
 
 If a nation were one vast constituency, and could declare its will like a vestry, by a majority 
 of direct votes on every question submitted to it, no system of representation would be needed. 
 The process might be clumsy, and the proper discussion of each question imperfect, biil tin- 
 result would be simple, and in theory it would be a true government by the majority. 
 
 Put in practice such a mode of government by pWmcite would be full of evils. A nation 
 cannot deliberate and act en masse, and hence arises the necessity for a system of representation. 
 
 Now it is obvious that if instead of deciding each question by the direct vote of the whole 
 nation, a certain number of members of Parliament were chosen by the majority of votes of the
 
 86 APPENDIX. 
 
 whole nation acting as one great constituency, Parliament would consist of members representing 
 only the majority — i.e., the larger half of the people — whilst the smaller half of the people would 
 l>e unrepresented. The discussion in Parliament might be thus all on one side, and it would be 
 possible that the conclusion arrived at ])y a majority of votes in such a Parliament might express 
 tiie opinion of little more than a fourth of the people. 
 
 This, in a country pretty evenly divided in its political interests, would be recognized by 
 every one as an altogether pernicious result — a complete failure of fair popular representation. 
 For supposing, for instance, that there happened to be a contention of interests between trade 
 and land, and that voters representing land had for the time the majority over those interested 
 in trade. Parliament might find itself composed solely of landowners of various shades of 
 opinion. The majority of these landowners might be the more bigoted half of their class ; and 
 thus a Parliament of bigots as regards land, representing little more than a fourth of the nation, 
 might adopt a policy of Protection and cripple trade in the supposed interests of land, even 
 against the will of the better though smaller half of their own class. 
 
 This is an extreme case, no doubt, but it is useful to put it, so that it may be seen clearly 
 that government by the majority of a majority is no true popular representation. And further 
 because it brings out [the fact that the division of the nation into a multitude of separate 
 constituencies is, after all, a device for securing that fair representation, which dealing with the 
 nation as one great constituency would fail to secure. In old times, when only certain privileged 
 classes had votes, it was the only device thought needful to obtain true representation. And it 
 remained so till the introduction of the rough attempt, contained in the last Reform Bill, to 
 provide for the representation of minorities in three-cornered constituencies. 
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Bij Robert B. Hayiuood. From The Nineteenth Century, Vol. XV. (1884). 
 
 Mr. Cowen, in his fresh and vigorous speech at Newcastle, has seized this aspect of the 
 question of reform, and well expressed it in the following words : — 
 
 " What is it we want ? Is it not government of the people by the people for the people ? 
 Parliament should mirror the spirit, wisdom, and interest not of a section only, but of the 
 entire nation. The elected should be an epitome of the electors. The majority must govern, 
 but the minority should be heard. That is scarcely the case now, and every year it gets less 
 so." 
 
 This then is real representation — that Parliament should be an epitome of the nation in 
 all its variety. And does not this imply, when expressed in more formal, though less 
 picturesque, language, that every group of electors who have common interests and common 
 political sympathies and sentiments, should be represented in Parliament in due proportion 
 to its numerical strength in the country ? 
 
 This is what is intended by the phrase " Proportional Representation." Strictly speak- 
 ing the word proportional is superfluous, for representation, so far as it is real and fair, must 
 be proportional, and if it deviates very widely from proportionality, it ceases to be in any 
 true sense reprenentation at all. But this word having been extended, or rather appropriated 
 to the existing system, which I shall take the liberty of distinguishing in this paper as 
 majority rei/resentation, and the phrase minority representation having been misunderstood or 
 misrepresented, by those who are the slaves of phrases and catchwords, as implying that the 
 minority should rule and not merely that it should be heard, the phrase " proportional re^jre- 
 sentation " may be acce25ted as expressing the ideal representation which has been above 
 described.
 
 THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SOCIETY. 87 
 
 THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESEXTATIOX SOCIETY. 
 
 By Sir John Lubbock. From The Nineteenth Century, Vol. XV. flSS4). 
 
 Is there any way bj"- which we can reconcile these views, — by which we can secure for 
 the majority the power which is their right, and at the same time preserve for the minority 
 that fair hearing to which they are justlj' entitled ? 
 
 The present system, then, renders the result of a general election uncertain, and to a 
 large extent a matter of chance ; it leads to violent fluctuations in the balance of political 
 power, and consequently in the policy of the country. In fact the present system may be 
 good or may be bad, but it is not representation ; and the question is whether we wish for 
 representation in fact or in name only. 
 
 The adoption of proportional representation moreover would raise and purify the whole 
 tone of political contests. What do we see now when there is a contest in any of our great 
 northern cities ? The majority of the Irish electors, instructed by the honourable member for 
 Cork, withhold their votes. They do not consider the prosperitj' of the Em[jire as a whole, 
 but what they regard as the advantage of Ireland. I do not blame them. They do not seem 
 to me wise : yet I can sympathise with their devotion, mistaken though I think it is, to 
 their own island. Then some deputy in the conlidence of the Home Rule party has more or 
 less clandestine and secret interviews with the candidates or their leading supporters. We 
 hear the most opposite accounts of what has occurred. Each side accuses the other of 
 truckling to the Home Rule Party, and selfishly imperilling the integrity of the Empire. It 
 must be very unsatisfactory to all concerned ; and it would be far better if Liverpool had 
 eight votes, and the Home Rulers there are sufficiently strong to return a Home Rule mem- 
 ber, than that they should extract doubtful pledges from reluctant candidates. 
 
 Moreover, the geographical differentiation of political views tends to become more and 
 more accentuated, and might, I think, constitute a real danger. At present Scotland is 
 overpoweringly Liberal, while the south-eastern counties of England, with scarcely an 
 exception, are rejjresented by honourable members sitting on the opposite side of the House. 
 It is but a small consolation to the unrepresented Liberal of Kent to be told that the Con- 
 servatives of Scotland sliare the same grievances, and are as badly off as they are. 
 
 But further than this, it will be a great misfortune to the country if one part becomes 
 and continues overwhelmingly Liberal and another Conservative — if their distinctive differ- 
 ences become questions of geography and locality rather than of opinion. Tlie different por- 
 tions of our Empire are not yet so closely fused that we can afford to despise this danger. In 
 my own county we look upon the shires as distinctly lower aiul less civilised than wc are. 
 
 America might have been spared a terrible civil war if the ]jrinciplo of proportional 
 representation had been recognized in the composition of the House of Representatives. 
 This was forcildy pointeil out in the report unaiuinously adopted by the Conimittce of the 
 United States Senate appointed in 1809 to consider the question of representative reform. 
 
 "The absence (they say) of any provision for the representation of minorities in the 
 States of the South when rebelliou was plotteil, and when open steps were taken to break 
 the Union, was unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men of those States together, 
 an<l Wf)ulil have given tlicin a voice in the electoral colleges and in Congress. I5ut they were 
 fearfully overborne by the plurality rule of elections, and were swept forward hy the course 
 of events into impoteney or open hostility to our cause. By this rule they were shut out of 
 the electoral colleges. Dispersed, unorganized, unrcjiresented, without dm; vf)iee and power, 
 they could oppose no effectual resistance to secession ami to civil war." 
 
 We shall ourselves make the same mistake and run the same rink of civil war if we 
 neglect all warning, and allow the loyal minority in Ireland to be altogether silenced and
 
 88 APPENDIX. 
 
 exclinled. This is in my humble judgment perhaps the greatest danger with which England 
 is now threatened. 
 
 The Proportional Representation Society has indeed hitherto confined itself to the adop- 
 tion as the basis of its constitution of the following resolution : " That without prejudging 
 how far the principle may be subsequently carried out, it is indispensible, as a first step 
 towards securing the true representation of the electors, that whenever a constituency 
 returns more than two members some form of proportional representation should be adopted." 
 
 I regret that this question has been so often argued as if the great or even the main 
 reason for it was to admit representatives of small minorities. Indeed, it is often said that 
 any such system would merely admit members who are in favour of crotchets. It is no 
 doubt difficult to say what is really a crotchet. When Mr. Grote brought up the question of 
 the Ballot was that a crotchet ? When Mr. Villiers brought forward Free Trade was that a 
 crotchet ? Many and many of the opinions now generally entertained were regarded as 
 crotchets when things first made their appearance. Everything must have a beginning, and 
 almost everything, even proportional representation itself, has been regarded as a fad and a 
 crotchet. 
 
 But in my humble judgment the representation of small sections is a very small part of 
 the question. Whether small minorities represent the temporary delusion of the moment, 
 or a great, although as yet unrecognized truth, the House of Commons is scarcely the proper 
 sphere for their exertions. What I am much more anxious about is that the great parties in 
 the State should be adequately represented in the difl'erent districts of the Empire. 
 
 Those who object to the fair representation of minorities do not seem to realize the 
 difference between an executive government and a representative assembly. A government 
 of course must be as far as possible homogeneous and of one mind, but a representative 
 assembly should be a mirror of the nation. The exclusion of the minority, which is a 
 necessity in the one case, would be tyranny and injustice in the other. We are told by those 
 who have not studied the question that we wish to give the minorities the power which 
 rightly belongs to the majorities. The very reverse is the case. An untrammelled system 
 of proportional representation is, as Mr. Mill has truly said, ' ' not only the most complete 
 application of the democratic principle that has yet been made, but its greatest safeguard." 
 I trust that under the new Bill we may secure for the new voters, as well as those already 
 on the register, the right not merely of recording their vote, but of doing so in such a manner 
 as may give to it all just and reasonable effect. If this be done, the Parliament of 1880 will 
 have given effect to a great principle, and we shall have for the first time a really represen- 
 tative assembly. I venture to recommend the system of proportional representation to the 
 House of Commons and to the country because it would give its just political weight to the 
 vote of every elector ; it would elevate and purify the whole tone of electoral contests ; 
 would obtain for the minority a fair hearing ; and last, not least, because it is the only mode 
 of securing for the majority that preponderance to which of course they are justly entitled. 
 
 The following Members of Parliament have already joined the Proportional Representa- 
 tion Society : — 
 
 C. T. Dyke Acland Rowland P. Blennerhassett Francis Wm. Buxton 
 
 Henry G. Allen - Thomas William Boord James A. Campbell 
 
 R. L. Allman Chai-les Bradlaugh William C. Cartwright 
 
 EUis Ashmead-Bartlett Henry A. Brassey Lord E. Cecil 
 
 •lohu E. F. Aylmer J. Brinton Sir Thomas Chambers, M.P. 
 
 Arthur James Balfour Hon. St. John Brodrick W. L. Christie 
 
 Thomas C. Baring Alexander Brogden Edward Clarke 
 
 Col. Barne M. Brooks Arthur Cohen 
 
 The Earl of Bective Sir IT. Harvey Bruce Sir E. Colebroke 
 
 Michael Biddulph James R. Bulwer Eugene Collins
 
 THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SOCIliTY. 
 
 8& 
 
 Thomas Collins 
 Colonel Colhurst 
 James Porter Corry 
 Alderman Cotton 
 George Courtauld 
 Leonard Henry Courtney 
 Joseph Cowen 
 Hon. H. F. Cowper 
 Ralph Creyke 
 Viscount Crichton 
 James Cropper 
 
 C. Dalrymple 
 David Davis 
 James Dickson 
 Thomas A. Dickson 
 
 Hon. John Charles Dundas 
 
 Viscount Ebrington 
 
 Henry Edwards 
 
 Lord Elcho 
 
 Hon. A. D. Elliott 
 
 George Errington 
 
 T. W. Evans 
 
 Wm. Ewart 
 
 Archibald Orr Ewing 
 
 Rt. Hon. Henry Fawcett 
 
 William Findlater 
 
 Sir W. H. B. Ffolkes 
 
 Viscount Folkestone 
 
 R. X. Fowler (Lord Mayor) 
 
 D. F. Gabbett 
 
 Rt. Hon. Edward Gibson 
 Sir A. Gordon 
 Daniel Grant 
 William Grantham 
 T. Greer 
 G. B. Gregory 
 Albert H. G Grey 
 Montague John Guest 
 Robert Thomhagh Gurdon 
 Lord George Hamilton 
 Mitchell Henry 
 The J Ion Sydney Herbert 
 J. M. Maxwell Heron 
 ' ord A. Hill 
 Sir H. T. Holland 
 A^t.-Col. D. Milne Home 
 NV'illiam H. Houldsworth 
 ;. Stafford Howard 
 William Lawies Jackson 
 
 Sir J. J. Jenkins 
 
 Hubert E. H. Jerningham 
 
 Coleridge J. Kennard 
 
 Colonel Kennard 
 
 Sir John Kennaway 
 
 Edward R. King-Harman 
 
 Colonel Kingscote 
 
 Dr. Kinnear 
 
 F. Winn Knight 
 
 Sir Rainald Knightley 
 
 Samuel Laing 
 
 Hon. F. W. Lambton 
 
 Sir J. Clarke Lawrence 
 
 Thomas Lea 
 
 Sir E. A. H. Lechmere 
 
 Hon. G. Leigh 
 
 Sir Baldwin Leighton 
 
 Stanley Leighton 
 
 Lord H. Lennox 
 
 Lord Lewisham 
 
 Sir Robert Lloyd Lindsay 
 
 Morgan Lloyd 
 
 Robert Loder 
 
 Rt. Hon. J. Lowther 
 
 Hon. W. Lowther 
 
 J. W. Lowther 
 
 Sir John Lubbock 
 
 Sir Andrew Lusk 
 
 Sir W. Mc Arthur 
 
 Sir Thomas McClure 
 
 James Carlile M'Coan 
 
 Sir J. McGarel-Hogg 
 
 David Maclver 
 
 Colonel Makins 
 
 R. B. Martin 
 
 T. W. Master 
 
 Charles Henry Meldon 
 
 Sir Charles Henry Mills 
 
 Sir. F. G. Milner. 
 
 F. Monckton 
 
 Samuel Morley, M.P. 
 
 Arthur Moore 
 
 J. Mulholland 
 
 R. H. Muutz 
 
 E. Noel 
 
 J. S. North 
 
 rJharics Morgan Norwooii 
 
 Colonel O'Buirne 
 
 R. H. Paget 
 
 Robert William C. Patrick 
 
 Arthur Pease 
 
 Sir Henry Peek 
 
 E. L. Pemberton 
 
 John Pender 
 
 Frederick Pennington 
 
 Earl Percy 
 
 Lord Algernon Percy 
 
 Rt. Hon. Sir Lyon Playfair 
 
 Rt. Hon. David R. Plunket 
 
 Hon. W. Henry B. Portman 
 
 G. E. Price 
 
 John Henry Puleston 
 
 Pandeli Ralli 
 
 Sir John Ramsden 
 
 James Rankin 
 
 William Rathbone 
 
 Sir E. J. Reed 
 
 Sir Matthew W. Ridley 
 
 Chas. Campbell Ross 
 
 J. Round 
 
 Lord Arthur Russell 
 
 Thomas Salt 
 
 Bernhard Samuelson 
 
 Chas. Seeley 
 
 William Shaw 
 
 Henry B. Sheridan 
 
 Sir J. G. T. Sinclair 
 
 Rt. Hon. Wm. H. Smith 
 
 P. J. Smyth 
 
 Marquis of Stafford 
 
 C. H. Strutt 
 
 Henry Villiers Stuart 
 
 Charles Beilljy Stuart- Wortley 
 
 Christopher Sykes 
 
 John Gilbert Talbot 
 
 Jolm Pennington Tlioniasson 
 
 W. E. Murray Tomliuson 
 
 W. T. M. Torrens 
 
 Colonel Tottenham 
 
 .Sir Richard Wallace 
 
 Sir S. H. Waterlow 
 
 Sir E. Watkin 
 
 licnjamin Wliitwortli 
 
 E. \V. lirydgrs Willyams 
 
 Chas. H, Wilson 
 
 Henry de Worms 
 
 J. R. Yorke
 
 90 APPENDIX. 
 
 REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 Westminster Beview, Vol. LXV., ISS4. 
 
 A Society has recently been established under the presiJency of Sir John Lubbock, with 
 offices at Palace Cliambers, Westminster, for the purpose of securing, as far as possible, the 
 recognition of the principle of proportional representation in Parliamentary elections, and 
 other representative institutions of the country, and has already received the support of 
 nearly 200 members of Parliament. The Society as yet has expressed no opinion as to the 
 best form of proportional representation, since this may depend upon the particular circum. 
 stances of each case, nor does it insist that the system should be applied in the first instance 
 to all the constituencies. The main object is to secure that in all constituencies returning 
 more than two members, which after a redistribution of seats are likely to become more 
 numerous, some system of proportional representation shall be retained. 
 
 The programme of this Society so forcibly expresses the need of a change in our present 
 system that it is worth quoting at length: "The extension of the Franchise which is 
 proposed in the Bill which Her Majesty's Government have introduced renders the con- 
 sideration of the system under which members of Parliament are elected a matter of urgent 
 importance, it being obvious that the present system of voting will under a uniform franchise 
 tend to diminish that variety in the representation which has hitherto been considered 
 essential to the constitution of the House of Commons. 
 
 " This system is also open to grave objections because, while it does not in all cases 
 obtain for majorities their due predominance in the Legislature, it fails to secure for 
 minorities that proportion of representation to which their numbers fairly entitle them. 
 The present system of voting, no matter how the constituencies are arranged, may bring 
 about either, on the one hand, the rule of the minority or, on the other, the political 
 extinction of the minority. 
 
 "It renders therefore the result of a general election uncertain and to a large extent a 
 matter of chance ; it leads to violent fluctuations in the balance of political power and 
 consequently in the policy of the country. 
 
 "These objections will be greatly aggravated if large constituencies are to return a 
 number of members at all in proportion to their magnitude, unless some plan of proportional 
 representation be adopted. Thus, if Liverpool were to return eight members as an undivided 
 constituency it would be obviously unjust that 31,000 electors belonging to either of the 
 great parties in the State should return eight members while .30,000 belonging to the other 
 should be altogether shut out from representation. 
 
 " It would also be most objectionable that it should be in the power of a few voters by 
 changing sides to transfer eight seats from one party to the other, making a difference of 
 sixteen votes on a division. 
 
 " Unless some method of proportional representation be adopted, it is probable that 
 Ireland will be greatly misrepresented, and that those who hold moderate and loyal 
 opinions, although numbering more than one-third of the whole electorate, may be every- 
 where out-voted and reduced to silence. 
 
 " On the other hand the Irish electors in England have been hitherto almost entirely 
 excluded from direct representation. It would be far better that the Irish electors in our 
 great cities should return members of their own than that their votes should be the subject 
 of more or less secret negotiation with the leaders of the different parties. 
 
 "The Proportional Representation Society, in preparing or supporting any measure
 
 REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESEXTATIO.V. 91 
 
 dealing with the actual details of voting and the machinery of elections, will keep in view 
 the following practical requisites : 
 
 (aj That the majority of the representation be secured to the majority of the 
 electors. 
 
 (bj That the minority be secured a fair hearing. 
 
 Cc) That the mode of voting be one easy to be understood and put in practice by the 
 average elector. 
 
 (dj That every vote should have its due weight in determining the result of the 
 election. 
 
 " Whilst mainly directing its efforts to the improvement of parliamentai-y representa- 
 tion, the Society will use its best endeavours to maintain the same principles in the election 
 of other representative bodies, .such as the municipalities and School Boards of the kingdom, 
 and to supjjort an}' amendment which maj- render our representative system still more just 
 -and efficient. 
 
 " Under any true theory of representation, the elected body should be, as far as is 
 practicable, an accurate reflection of the state of opinion in the country. Without therefore 
 prejudging how far the principle may be subsequently carried out, this Society deems it 
 indispensable, as a first step towards securing the true representation of the electors, that 
 whenever a constituencj^ returns more than two members some form of proportional 
 representation should be adopted. 
 
 "The Proportional Representation Societj' is based upon the acceptance of the foregoing 
 
 principles, and has been formed for the purpose of promoting, by all means in its power, the 
 
 • adoption by Parliament of such measure of reform in the representation of the people as will 
 
 secure that, while the majority should govern, every considerable section of the electors 
 
 should be sure of a hearing in Parliament." 
 
 Local associations in conuection with the parent Society are already beginning to be 
 formed, and it is hoped before long to organize in this way the friends of proportional 
 representation throughout the countr}\ 
 
 In conclusion, it may be well to point out how this system of representation might be 
 introduced into the country without any violent change, and so as to include in itself some 
 of the advantages of equal electoral districts. Let the new Reform Bill provide, in the case 
 of all boroughs returning more than two members, that they be divided into electoral wards 
 equal in number to the members to be elected ; and to such boroughs let the system of 
 alternative voting be applied ; the members, after they have been elected by the voters of 
 the whole borough, choosing for which ward they will sit ; in case of a by-election the voters 
 belonging to the ward of the deceased or retiring member being alone allowed to vote. It 
 would not be necessary that the wards should be the same size, since their only object wouM 
 he to replace a member who died or retired, and they would have no ell'ect on the answer 
 given by the country to any question submitted at a general election. If this system 
 worked smoothly it might in a few years be extended to all single-member constituencies 
 throughout the country. Lastlj', when public opinion had liecome ripe for it, and the 
 county government system iiad become lirmly eHtabii.ylicd, a Hill might be passed enabling 
 each voter to vote for any candidate standing for any of the seats in the county, whether 
 boroughs or divisions of the county ; the elected membcr-s choosing which of the constitu- 
 encies in the county, if more than one, for which tliey had been pmpo.seil they would 
 represent. In order not to lose the advantages of municipal life, all Iwroughs large enough 
 to return three or more members should be excluded from the county and made counties 
 of themselves. 
 
 To summarize the result at which we liavf arrived : We have siiown that our ]>re.s( iit 
 system is delicient, since it docs not secure cither that the majority slionlil (^'ovcrn, or that
 
 92 APPENDIX. 
 
 the minority should be heai-il, while it prevents a large part of the electors expressing their 
 views on social and other questions which are not matters of party politics, and places the 
 choice of candidates almost entirely in the hands of party organizations. We have pointed 
 out that these difticulties are likely to be increased by the Franchise Bill. We have 
 examined the proposal to form equal electoral tlistricts and have shown that it ■«ill not 
 accomplish its objects while it will introduce fresh evils. We have examined the schemes 
 for proportional representation and have shown that they would all secure that the majority 
 would govern on party questions ; that all considerable sections of the nation would be 
 heard ; and that two of these schemes have been proved by experience to present no practical 
 difficulty in working. We have stated the objections which have been alleged against the 
 third plan — that of alternative or transferable voting — and shown that they can all be 
 avoided, and that this scheme is free from any objection that is found in the present system 
 or in the systems of limited and cumulative voting. We have pointed out the few simple 
 rules which would make its working certain and rapid ; and lastly, we have shown that it 
 could be introduced gradually without any sudden changes, and also without the loss of the 
 political life and political history which are to be found in many of our present constit- 
 uencies. 
 
 This is no party question ; it is in the truest sense conservative, securing that no one 
 class shall overwhelm the other by its numbers, and preventing any extreme party 
 obtaining from a wave of popular feeling a control over the legislature ; but it is equally a 
 liberal measure, providing for the growth and improvement of our institutions, giving to all 
 parties and classes their share in the government of the country, and enabling the majority 
 of the people always to rule. 
 
 Societies for the promotion of these views are now to be found in most of the nations of 
 Europe, and the support they have received seems to point to the near approach of the time 
 when they will be everywhere recognized as necessary to secure a good representative 
 system. England, which has taught the principles of freedom to all other nations, will not, 
 it maj^ be hoped, be the last in recognizing the importance of these improvements in securing 
 that the House of Commons shall be the true exponent of the people. 
 
 PARTY STRUGGLES. 
 
 From " Ungland and Canada," ISSJf. 
 
 By Sand ford Fleming, 
 
 The diflSculty with our present system lies in the fact that the interests of party must 
 be consulted, whatever the cost, whatever the sacrifice. Party takes precedence of every 
 other consideration. Party seems to cloud the judgments of men who, in many instances, 
 are irreproachable in private life. Public men seem to act on the principle that there is one 
 creed and language for the hustings, the press and parliament, and another for social inter- 
 course. 
 
 The Canadian Pacific Railway has been considered a political question during three 
 administrations, and has played an important part in party warfare. Every year, since 
 1871, motion after motion has been made in Parliament relating to engineering operations 
 and the mode of conducting the work. Seldom have there been such acrimonious discussions. 
 Frequently the whole debate was dictated by the party results supposed to be obtainable. 
 Committee followed Committee, year after year, in the Senate and House of Commons, 
 nominally to investigate matters, in reality to create party capital. Who now can point out
 
 THE DESPOTISM OF PARTY. 93 
 
 the slightest result from all these efforts ? Two Koyal Commissions of special enquiry were 
 appointed. The first made no report ; the second prolonged its sittings for two years, at a 
 cost of some $40,000 to the country. What remains of the labours of those Commissions 
 beyond the items of their cost in the public accounts ? The report of the second Commis- 
 sion was contained in two bulky volumes. The record of an attempt for partj' ends to blast 
 the reputation of men who had given the best years of their lives to the performance of 
 public duty. When this report was considered it was held to be so valueless that it has 
 never been circulated. 
 
 In Canada we enjoy a liberal constitution, and it may be affirmed that it is the ordy 
 principle of authority which, as a people, we would tolerate. It cannot, however, be said 
 that in its present form our system of government is an unmixed blessing. 
 
 We may ask if representative government is ever to be inseparable from the defects 
 which form the most striking feature in its application and administration, especially on this 
 continent. Must a country constitutionally governed be inevitably ranged into two hostile 
 camps ? One side denouncing their opjjonents and defaming the leading public men of the 
 other, not hesitating even to decry and misrepresent the very resources of the community 
 and to throw obstacles in the way of its advancement. Never was partyism more abject or 
 remorseless. Its exigencies are unblushingly proclaimed to admit the most unscrupulous 
 tactics and the most reprehensible proceedings. Is there no escape from influences so degrad- 
 ing to public life and so hurtful to national honor ? 
 
 It is evident that the evils which we endure are, day by day, extending a despotism 
 totally at variance with the theory and principles of good government. Possibly Canada 
 may be passing through a phase in the earlier stage of her political freedom. Can we cheer 
 ourselves by the hope that institutions inherently good will clear themselves from the slough 
 into which they unfortunately may be immersed ? May not the evils of partyism at last 
 become so intensified that their climax will produce a remedy ? As by natural laws a 
 liquid in the j)rocess of fermentation purifies itself by throwing off the scum and casting the 
 dregs to the bottom, so may we be encouraged to believe that we are approaching the turn- 
 ing period in the political system we have fallen into, and that year by year Parliament will 
 Vjecome less and less a convention of contending party men and be elevated to its true 
 position in the machinery of representative government. Public life will then become more 
 ennobling ; it will, indeed, be an object of ambition foi-^ieu of honour and character to fill 
 places_in the Councils of the Nation, when rectitude of purpose and patriotism and truth wil^ 
 be demanded in all and by all who aspire to positions of national trust and dignity. 
 
 THE DESPOTISM OF PARTY. 
 
 Bu Herbert Tuttle. From Atlantic MotUhly, Vol. LIV., ISS4. 
 
 The party becomes a species of impermiii in impe.rio. Its form-:, its agents, its organs 
 are closely patterned after those of the state ; it exercises the groat fuiictiDtisof govorninent ; 
 it has its hierarchy of officials, acting within the circumscriptions, and ranging tlirough all the 
 grades which obtain in our political system. These officials feel the responsibility of tlicir 
 positions, which they compare to places of trust in civil adniini.stration. 'I'lie Htrugi,de8 for 
 place within the party are scarcely less keen than tlie stnigglcs for political life ; the same 
 arts of intrigue and persuasion are used ; the same acquiescenco in the result of a contest is 
 always expected, and rarely withheld. Thus the force of ima^,'inatinn alone, excited I)y the 
 constant spectacle of this vast macliine, completely equipped and manned and alw.ayH in 
 movement, leads people to regard it as a pennanent institution, having a corjwrate existence
 
 9-J- APPENDIX. 
 
 in the state, and therefore entitled to be treated as an end in itself, and not as a means to th& 
 attainment of an end. 
 
 It is not, however, by the imagination alone that this illusion is maintained. This of 
 itself would make the error dangerous ; but it has, besides that, led to the announcement of 
 certain audacious propositions, and even to measures of actual legislation, which grossly 
 confuse the distinction between a political party and a political commonwealth, and disclose 
 a fatal tendency toward the very evil against which Mr. Webster ao solemnly warned his 
 countrymen 
 
 Let us inquire for a moment to what, if pushed to its logical consequences, the politi- 
 cians' view of party would lead. It is known that they abhor independents, and often 
 express the patriotic opinion that every citizen should join a party. The majority in each 
 party should again control its action, and the minority should frankly obey. A careful 
 organization, with executive agents and representative assemblies would furnish the 
 machinerj' for making the system effective. This seems to be a fair statement of the 
 politicians' ideal. Now what would be the result if this ideal were realized ? The result 
 would be to collect the voters of the country into two or three great parties, held together 
 by inflexible rules of discipline and fealty, and each forbidden in effect to allow desertion or 
 to receive deserters. As no changes of allegiance could take place, the relative strength of 
 parties would be changed from year to year only by the death of existing members, and the 
 enrollment of new ones fi'om young men just reaching their majority, and from newly 
 natui-alized immigrants. But even this element of uncertainty can be somewhat reduced. 
 The annual death-rate would probably bear the same ratio to the total membership in all the 
 parties. Again, young men generally follow in the ijolitical footsteps of their fathers ; and as 
 the birth-rate in the various parties would be also approximately equal, the balance of power 
 would be little affected from this cause. We are confined, therefore, to the immigrants ; 
 they would hold the key to the situation. If now it be assumed that the Irish would in 
 general go to one party, and the Germans to the other, the issue would really lie between 
 these two classes, which compose the great body of our foreign population. The problem of 
 immigration would assume a new and startling interest. One party would find a potent ally 
 in Irish famines, which encourage emigration from the Emerald Isle. The other would have 
 a keen sympathy with the high taxes and the military system of Germany, which drive so 
 many excellent men from the fatherland. The battles of American politics would be fought 
 out by immigration agents and runners for the rival steamship lines, all liberally supplied 
 with money from the campaign funds of the parties, and perhaps also with platforms, to be 
 posted in the leading seaports and distributed by colporteurs in the interior. 
 
 REPEESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 By John Stuart Alill, 1884- 
 
 Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name democracy. The pure 
 idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by the 
 whole people, equally represented. Democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto prac- 
 tised, is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively 
 represented. The former is synonymous with the equality of all citizens ; the latter, 
 strangely confounded with it, is a government of privilege, in favour of the numerical majority, 
 who alone possess practically any voice in the State. This is the inevitable consequence of 
 the manner in which the votes are now taken, to the complete disfranchisement of minorities. 
 
 The confusion of ideas here is great, but it is so easily cleared up, that one would suppose
 
 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. 95 
 
 the slightest indication would be sufficient to place the mattei- in its true light before any 
 mind of average intelligence. It would be so, but for the power of habit ; owing to which 
 the simplest idea, if unfamiliar, has as great difficulty in making its way to the mind as a far 
 more comphcated one. That the minority must yield to the majorit)', the smaller number to 
 the greater, is a familiar idea ; and accordingly men think there is no necessity for using 
 their minds any further, and it does not occur to them that there is any medium between 
 allowing the smaller number to be equally powerful with the greater, and blotting out the 
 smaller number altogether. In a representative body actually deliberating, the minority 
 must of course be oveiTuled ; and in an equal democracy (since the opinions of the con- 
 stituents, when they insist on them, determine those of the I'epresentative body) the majority 
 of the people, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and 
 their representatives. But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives 
 at all ? Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all 
 the votes, the minority none ? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard ? 
 Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless 
 injustice. In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not dis- 
 proportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a 
 majority of the representatives ; but a minority of the electors would always have a minority 
 of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully repi-esented as the majority. 
 Unless they are, there is not equal government, but a government of inequality and 
 privilege : one part of the people rule over the rest : there is a part whose fair and equal share 
 of influence in the representation is withheld from them ; contrary to all just government, but 
 above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root 
 and foundation. 
 
 The injustice and violation of principle are not less flagrant because those who suffer by 
 them are a minority ; for there is not equal suffrage where every single individual does not 
 count for as much as any other single individual in the community. But it is not only a 
 minority who suffer. Democracy, thus constituted, does not even attain its ostensible object, 
 that of giving the powers of government in all cases to the numerical majority. It does some- 
 thing very different : it gives them to a majority of the majority ; who may be, and often 
 are, but a minority of the whole. All principles are most efifectually tested by extreme cases. 
 Suppose then, that, in a country governed by equal and universal suffrage, there is a con- 
 tested election in every constituency, and every election is carried by a small majority. The 
 Parliament thus brought together represents little more than a bare majority of the people. 
 Ihis Parliament proceeds to legislate, and adopts important measures by a bare majority of 
 itself. What guarantee is there that these measures accord with the wishes of a majority of 
 the people ? Nearly half the electors, having been outvoted at the hustings, have had no 
 influence at all in the decision ; and the whole of these may be, a majority of them probably 
 are, hostile to the measures, having voted against those by whom tiiey have been carried. 
 Of the remaining electors, nearly half have chosen representatives who, by 8U)>position, have 
 voted against the measures. It is possible, therefore, and not at all improbable, that tlie 
 opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to a minority of the nation, though a majority 
 of that portion of it, whom the institutions of the country have erected into the ruling class. 
 If democracy means the certain ascendancy of the majority, there are no means of insuring 
 that, but by allowing every individual figure to tell cfiually in the sunnning uji. Any 
 minority left out, either purpo.sely or by the play of tlie machinery, gives tlie power not to 
 the majority, but to a minority in some other part of the scale. 
 
 . . . Is it not a great grievance, that in every Parliament a very numerous portion of 
 the electors willing and anxious to be represented, have no member in tiic House for 
 whom tlicy have voted? Is it just that every elector of Maiyleboiu; is obliged to be 
 represented )>y two nominees of the vestries, every elector of Kinsbury or l.aml)etli by tliose 
 (as is generally believed) of the publicans '! The coustituenciea to which most of the higiily
 
 96 APPENDIX. 
 
 educated and public spirited persons in the country belong, those of the large towns, are now, 
 in great part, either unrepresented or misrepresented. The electors who are on a different side 
 in party politics from the local majority, are unrepresented. Of those who are on the same side, 
 a large proportion are misrepresented ; having been obliged to accept the man who had the 
 greatest number of supporters in their political i^arty, though his opinions may differ from theirs 
 on every other point. The state of things is, in some respects, even worse than if the minority 
 were not allowed to vote at all ; for then, at least the majority might have a member who 
 would represent their own best mind ; M'hile now, the necessity of not dividing the party, 
 for fear of letting in its ojjponents, induces all to vote either for the first person who presents 
 himself wearing their colours, or for the one brought forward by their local leaders ; and 
 these, if we pay them the compliment, which they very seldom deserve, of supposing their 
 choice to be unbiassed by their personal interests, are compelled, that they may be sure of 
 mustering their whole strengh, to bring forward a candidate whom none of the party will 
 strongly object to — that is, a man without any distinctive peculiarity, any known opinions 
 except the shibboleth of the party. This is strikingly exemplified in the United States ; 
 where at the election of President, the strongest party never dares put forward any of its 
 strongest men, because every one of these, from the mere fact that he has been long in the 
 public eye, has made himself objectionable to some portion or other of the party, and is there- 
 fore not so sure a card for rallying all their votes, as a person who has never been heard of 
 by the public at all until he is produced as the candidate. Thus, the man who is chosen, 
 even by the strongest party, represents perhaps the real wishes only of the narro w margin by 
 which that party outnumbers the other. Any section whose support is necessary to success, 
 possesses a veto on the candidate. Any section which holds out more obstinately than the 
 rest, can compel all the others to adopt its nominee ; and this superior pertinacity is un- 
 happily more likely to be found among those who are holding out for their own interest, than 
 for that of the i:)ublic. The choice of the majority is therefore very likely to be determined 
 by that portion of the body who are the most timid, the most narrow-minded and prejudiced, 
 or who cling most tenaciously to the exclusive class-interest ; in which case the electoral 
 rights of the minority, while useless for the purposes for which votes are given, serve only 
 for compelling the majority to accept the candidate of the weakest or worst portion of 
 themselves. 
 
 That while recognising these evils, many should consider them as the necessary price paid 
 for a free government, is in no way surprising : it was the opinion of all the friends of freedom, 
 up to a recent period. But the habit of passing them over as irremediable has become so 
 inveterate, that many persons seem to have lost the capacity of looking at them as things 
 which they would be glad to remedy if they could. From despairing of a cure, there is too 
 often but one step to denying the disease ; and fi-om this follows dislike to having a remedy 
 proposed, as if the proposer was creating a mischief instead of offering relief from one. 
 People are so inured to the evils, that they feel as if it were unreasonable, if not wrong, to 
 complain of them. Yet, avoidable or not, he must be a purblind lover of liberty on whose 
 mind they do not weigh ; who would not rejoice at the discovery that they could be dis- 
 pensed with. Now, nothing is more certain, than that the virtual blotting out of the minority 
 is no necessary or natural consequence of freedom ; that far from having any connexion with 
 democracy, it is diametrically opposed to the first principle of democracy, representation in 
 proportion to numbers. It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be 
 adequately represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is 
 possible without it. 
 
 Those who have seen and felt, in some degree, the force of these considerations, have 
 proposed various expedients by which the evil may be, in a greater or less degree, mitigated. 
 Lord John Piussell, in one of his E.eform Bills, introduced a pi-ovision, that certain constitu- 
 encies should return three members, and that in these each elector should be allowed to vote 
 only for two ; and Mr. Disraeli, in the recent debates, revived the memory of the fact by
 
 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. 97 
 
 reproaching him for it ; being of opinion, apparently, that it befits a Conservative statesman 
 to regard only means, and to disown scornfully all fellow-feeling with any one who is 
 betraj^ed, even once, into thinking ends. Others have proposed that each elector should be 
 allowed to vote only for one. By either of these plans, a minority equalling or exceeding a 
 third of the local constituency, would be able, if it attempted no more, to return one of the 
 three members. The same result might be attained in a still better way, if, as proposed in 
 an able pamphlet b}' Mr. James Garth Marshall, tlie elector retained his three votes, but 
 was at liberty to bestow them all upon the same candidate. These schemes, though inlinitely 
 better than none at all, are yet but makeshifts, and attain the end in a very imperfect 
 manner ; since all local minorities of less than a third, and aU minorities, however numerous, 
 which are made up from several constituencies, would remain unrepresented. It is much to 
 be lamented, however, that none of these plans have been carried into effect, as any of them 
 would have recognized the right principle, and prepared the way for its more complete appli- 
 cation. But real equality of representation is not obtained, iinless any set of electors 
 amounting to the average number of a constituency, wherever in the country they happen to 
 reside, have the power of combining with one another to return a representative. This 
 degree of perfection in representation appeared impracticable, until a man of great capacity, 
 fitted alike for large general views and for the contrivance of practical details — Mr. Thomas 
 Hare — had proved its possibility by drawing up a scheme for its accomplishment, embodied 
 in a Draft of an Act of Parliament ; a scheme which has the almost unparalleled merit, of 
 carrying out a gi'eat principle of government in a manner appi'oaching to ideal perfection as 
 regards the special object in view, while it attains incidentally several other emls, of scarcely 
 inferior importance. 
 
 According to this plan, the unit of representation, the quota of electors who would be 
 entitled to have a member to themselves, would be ascertained by the ordinary process of 
 taking averages, the number of voters being divided by the number of seats in the House : 
 and every candidate who obtained that quota would be returned, from however great a 
 number of local constituencies it might be gathered. The votes would, as at present, be 
 given locally ; but any elector would be at liberty to vote for any candidate, in whatever 
 part of the country he might offer himself. Those electors, therefore, who did not wish to 
 be represented by any of the local candidates, might aid by their vote in the return of the 
 person they liked best among all those throughout the country, who had expressed a willing- 
 ness to be chosen. This Avould, so far, give reality to the electoral rights of the otlierwise 
 virtually disfranchised minority. But it is important that not those alone who refuse to vote 
 for any of the local candidates, bat those also who vote for one of them and are defeated, 
 should be enabled to find elsewhere the representation whicli they have not succeeded in 
 obtaining in their own district. It is therefore provided that an elector may deliver a voting 
 paper containing other names in addition to the one which stands foremost in his preference. 
 His vote would only be counted for one candidate ; but if the object of his first choice failed 
 to be returned, from not having obtained the quota, his second perhaps might bo more 
 fortunate. He may extend his list to a greater number, in the order of his preference, so 
 that if the names which stand near the top of the list either cannot make up the quota, or 
 are able to make it up without his vote, the vote may still be used for some one whom it may 
 assist in returning. To obtain tlie full number of mcmliers re(|uired to complete the House, 
 as well <a.s to prevent very popular candidates from engrossing nearly all the sulfrage.s, it is 
 necessary, however many votes a candidate may obtain, that no more of them than the (juota 
 should be counted for his return : the remainder of those who voted for him would have their 
 votes counted for the next person on their resijective lists who needed them, and could by 
 their aid complete the quota. To determine wliich of a candidate's votes should be used for 
 his return, and which set free for others, several methods are pro^tosed, into which we shall 
 not here enter. lie wouM of course retain the votes of all those wlio wouhl not otherwiso bo 
 represented ; and fur the remainder, drawing lots, in default of better, wnuld be an unobjec- 
 tionable expedient. The voting papers would be conveyed to a central office, where tho 
 
 7
 
 98 APPENDIX. 
 
 votes would be counted, the number of first, second, third, and other votes given for each 
 candidate ascertained, and the quota would be allotted to every one who could make it up, 
 \intil the number of the House was complete ; first votes being preferred to second, second to 
 third, and so forth. The voting papers, and all the elements of the calculation, would be 
 placed in jjublic repositories, accessible to all whom they concerned ; and if any one who had 
 obtained the quota was not duly returned, it would be in his power easily to prove it. These 
 are the main provisions of the scheme. 
 
 In the first place, it secures a representation, in proportion to numbers, of every division 
 of the electoral body : not two great parties alone, with perhaps a few large sectional 
 minorities in particular places, but every minority in the whole nation, consisting of a 
 sufficiently large number to be, on principles of equal justice, entitled to a representative. 
 Secondly, no elector would, as at present, be nominally represented by some one whom he 
 had not chosen. Every member of the House would be the representative of an unanimous 
 constituency. He would represent a thousand electors, or two thousand, or five thousand, or 
 ten thousand, as the quota might be, every one of whom would have not only voted for him, 
 but selected him from the whole country ; not merely from the assortment of two or three 
 perhaps rotten oranges, which may be the only choice offered to him in his local mai'ket. 
 Under this relation the tie between the elector and the representative would be of a 
 strength, and a value, of which at present we have no experience, Eveiy one of the electors 
 would be personally identified with his representative, and the representative with his con- 
 stituents. Every elector who voted for him, would have done so either because, among all 
 the candidates for Parliament who are favourably known to a certain number of electors, 
 he is the one who best expresses the voter's opinions, or because he is one of those whose 
 abilities and character the voter most respects, and whom he most willingly trusts to think 
 for him. The member would represent persons, not the mere bricks and mortar of the town 
 — the voters themselves, not a few vestrymen or parish notabilities merely. All, however, 
 that is worth preserving in the representation of places would be preserved. Though the 
 Parliament of the nation ought to have as little as possible to do with purely local afi'aii's, 
 yet, while it has to do with them, there ought to be members specially commissioned to 
 look after the interests of every important locality : and these there would still be. In 
 every locality which could make up the quota within itself, the majority would generally 
 prefer to be represented by one of themselves ; by a person of local knowledge, and residing 
 in the locality, if there is any such person to be found among the candidates, who is other- 
 wise well qualified to be their representative. It would be the minorities chiefly, who being 
 unable to return the local member, would look out elsewhei'e for a candidate likely to obtain 
 other votes in addition to their own. 
 
 Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be constituted, this one 
 affords the best security for the intellectual qualifications desirable in the representatives. 
 At present, by universal admission, it is becoming more and more difficult for any one, who 
 has only talents and character, to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only 
 persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their way by 
 lavish expenditure, or who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are 
 sent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs, as men whose votes the 
 party can depend on under all circumstances. On Mr. Hare's system, those who did not 
 like the local candidates, or who could not succeed in carrying the local candidate they pre- 
 ferred, would have the power to fill up their voting papers by a selection from all the jiersons 
 of national reputation, on the list of candidates, with whose general political principles they 
 were in sympathy. Almost every person, therefore, who had made himself in any way 
 honourably distinguished, though devoid of local influence, and having sworn allegiance to 
 no political party, would have a fair chance of making up the quota ; and with this encour- 
 agement sucli persons might be expected to offer themselves, in numbers hitherto undreamt 
 of. Hundreds of able men of independent thought, who would have no chance whatever of
 
 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. 99 
 
 being chosen by the majority of any existing constituency, have by their writings, or their 
 exertions in some field of public usefulness, made themselves known and approved by a few 
 persons in almost every district of the kingdom ; and if every vote that would be given for 
 them in every place could be counted for their election, they might be able to complete the 
 number of the quota. In no other way which it seems possible to suggest, would Parliament 
 be so certain of containing the very dlite of the country. 
 
 And it is not solely through the votes of minorities that this system of election would 
 raise the intellectual standard of the House of Commons. Majorities would be compelled to 
 look out for members of a much higher calibre. When the individuals composing the 
 majority would no longer be reduced to Hobson's choice, of either voting for the person 
 brought forward by their local leaders, or not voting at all ; when the nominee of the leaders 
 would have to encounter the competition not solely of the candidate of the minority, but of 
 all the men of established reputation in the country M'ho were willing to serve ; it would be 
 impossible any longer to foist upon the electors the first person who presents himself with the 
 catchwords of the party in his mouth, and three or four thousand pounds in liis pocket- 
 The majority would insist on having a candidate worthy of their choice, or they would carry 
 their votes somewhere else, and the minority would prevail. The slavery of the majority to 
 the least estimable portion of their number would be at an end : the very best and most 
 capable of the local notabilities would be put forward by preference ; if possible, such as 
 were known in some advantageous way beyond the locality, that their local strength might 
 have a chance of being fortified by sti'ay votes from elsewhere. Constituencies would become 
 competitors for the best candidates, and would vie with one another in selecting from among 
 the men of local knowledge and connexions those who were most distinguished in every other 
 respect. 
 
 The natural tendency of representative government, as of modern civilization, is towards 
 collective mediocrity : and this tendency is increased by all reductions and extensions of the 
 franchise, their effect being to place the principal power in the hands of classes more and 
 more below the highest level of instruction in the community. But though the superior 
 intellects and characters will necessarily he outnumbered, it makes a great difference whether 
 or not they are heard. In the false democracy which, instead of giving representation to all, 
 gives it only to the local majorities, the voice of the instructed minority may have no organs 
 at all in the representative body. It is an admitted fact that in the American democracy, 
 which is constructed on this faulty model, the highly cultivated members of the community, 
 except such of tliem as are willing to sacrifice their own opinions and modes of judgment, 
 and become the servile mouth-pieces of their inferiors in knowledge, seldom even oiler tlicm- 
 selves for Congress or the State Legislatures, so little likelihood have tliey of being returned. 
 Had a plan like Mr. Hare's by good fortune suggested itself to the enlightened and patriotic 
 founders of the American Republic, the Federal and State Assemblies would liave contained 
 many of these distinguisheil men, and democracy would have been spared its greatest 
 reproach and one of its most formidable evils. Against this evil tlie system of personal 
 representation, proposed by Mr. Hare, is almost a siiecific. The minority of instructed minds 
 scattered through the local constituencies, would unite to return a number, projiortioned to 
 their own numbers, of the very ablest men the country contains. Tiiey would be iukUt the 
 strongest inducement to choose such men, since in no other mode could they make their 
 small numerical strength tell for anything considerabif. 'I'lic representatives of the majority, 
 besides tliat they would themselves be improved in fjuality by the ojieratioti of the sysietn, 
 wouM no longer have the whole field to thcin.selves. They wouM indeed outnumber the 
 other.%, as much as the one cliiss of electors outnumbers the other in the country : they could 
 always outvote them, but they would speak and vote in their presence, and subject to their 
 criticism. When any difTerence arose, they would have to meet the arguments of the in- 
 structefl few, by reasons, at least ajujarently, as cogent ; and since they could nut, as those 
 do who are speaking to persons already unanimous, simply assume that they are in the right
 
 100 APPENDIX. 
 
 it would occasionally happen to them to become convinced that they were in the wrong. As 
 they would in general be well-meaning (for thus much may reasonably be expected from a 
 fairly-chosen national representation), their own minds would be insensibly raised by the 
 minds with which they were in contact, or even in conflict. The champions of unpopular 
 doctrines would not put forth their arguments merely in books and periolicals, read only by 
 their own side ; the opposing ranks would meet face to face and hand to hand, and there 
 would be a fair comparison of their intellectual strength, in the presence of the country. 
 It would then be found out whether the opinion which prevailed by counting votes, would 
 also prevail if the votes were weighed as well as counted. The multitude have often a true 
 instinct for distinguishing an able man, when he has the means of displaying his ability in a 
 fair field before them. If such a man fails to obtain at least some portion of his just weight, 
 it is through institutions or usages which keep him out of sight. In the old democracies 
 there were no means of keeping out of sight any able man ; the bema was open to him ; 
 he needed nobody's consent to become a public adviser. It is not so in a representative 
 government ; and the best friends of representative democracy can hardly be without mis- 
 givings, that the Themistocles or Demosthenes whose counsels would have saved the nation, 
 might be unable during his whole life ever to obtain a seat. But if the presence in the 
 representative assembly can be insured of even a few of the first minds in the country 
 though the remainder consist only of average minds, the infiuence of these leading spirits 
 is sure to make itself sensibly felt in the general deliberations, even though they be known 
 to be, in many respects, opposed to the tone of popular opinion and feeling. I am unable 
 to conceive any mode by which the presence of such minds can be so positively insured, 
 as by that proposed by Mr. Hare. 
 
 PARTY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 By Mathew Macjie. From The Contemporary Review, Vol. XL VL , ISS4. 
 
 If Parties were associated unswervingly with the same set of principles, even though 
 these should sometimes happen to be erroneous, the spectacle of Party greed and reciprocal 
 bitterness would, perhaps, be somewhat more endurable. But both Liberals and Tories 
 have been notoriously fickle and time-serving. Too often have both supported a good cause 
 from a bad motive, ever ready to advocate a new set of principles if by so doing the one 
 party could deal a blow to the other. 
 
 We look in vain for principle regulating the conduct of the two great Parties in the 
 State, Truth, honour, and fair dealing, as a rule, are alike surrendered to party convenience. 
 An example of demoralized ethics is thus daily set by our statesmen, which if carried out in 
 the relations of private life would be unsparingly condemned, and the combined religious 
 teaching of the 90,000 preachers of all denominations in the country utterly fails to neutralize 
 the effect of the moral injury thus publicly inflicted. 
 
 If Government by Party were identical with Government by the Majority in the 
 Lower House, the faults of the system might perhaps be treated with great leniency. But 
 it has not — although it is fallaciously said to have — even this redeeming feature in its 
 favour. While the Government of the day is chosen from the side showing a majority in 
 Parliament, it is simply a majority of the party which has a majority in the House, and not 
 the majority of the whole House, which governs. Indeed, this majority of a majority, 
 relatively to the totality of members may be, and often is, an actual minority. More than 
 one case could be adduced, since the present Ministry was formed, in which a measure has 
 been introduced, not acceptable to all the members on the Liberal side. Party organization.
 
 PARTY FKELING. 101 
 
 however, for the most part has triumphed over the dissentients. But it has undoubtedly 
 happened sometimes that the dissentient minority among the Government supporters, 
 secretly opposed to a given measure, when added to the whole force of the Opposition, has 
 represented a distinct majority of the entire House. Clearly, in such a case, therefore, the 
 majority of the majority by whose influence the Bill is carried, would constitute a minority 
 of Parliament. The effect of temporizing Party tactics under such conditions, is that the 
 views of the majority are really misrepresented. 
 
 Not the least potent objection to Party Government is that the arrangement is cliamet- 
 rically at variance with the principle of representation. The cardinal idea of the repre- 
 sentative system is responsibility to the constituent body only. The basis of Party Govern- 
 ment is loyalty to party organization. The Party man merges his representative individuality 
 in the partisan, and votes as an unthinking machine under the direction of his leader. An 
 amusing illustration of this pliant conformity is given in the experience of one of the rank 
 and file who once confessed "that he made it an invariable rule never to be present at a 
 debate or absent on a division, and that he only once, during the course of a long parlia- 
 mentary life, ventured to vote according to his conscience, and on that occasion he had 
 voted wrong." 
 
 PARTY FEELING. 
 From "Popular Government." By Sir Henry S. Maine, 1884. 
 
 The Wire-puUer is not intelligible imless we take into account one of the strongest 
 forces acting on human nature — Party feeling. Party feeling is probably far more a survival 
 of the primitive coml)ativeness of mankind than a consequence of conscious intellectual 
 differences between man and man. It is essentially the same sentiment which in certain 
 states of society leads to civil, intertribal, or international war ; and it is as universal as 
 humanity. It is better studied in its more irrational manifestations tlian in those to which 
 we are accustomed. It is said tliat Australian savages will travel over half the Australian 
 continent to take in a fight the side of combatants who wear the same Totem as themselves. 
 Two Irish factions who broke one another's heads over the M'hole island are said to have 
 originated in a quarrel about the colour of a cow. In Southern India, a series of dangerous 
 riots are constantly arising through the i-ivalry of parties who know no more of one another 
 than that some of them belong to the party of the right h.md and others to that of the left 
 hand. Once a year, large numbers of English ladies and gentlemen, who have no serious 
 rea.son for preferring one university to the other, wear dark or light blue colours to signify 
 good wishes for the success of Oxford or Camljridge in a cricket-match or bi>at-nvcc. Party 
 differences, properly .so-called, are supposed to indicate intellectual, ur mtiral, or historical 
 preference ; but these go a very little way down into the population, and by the bulk of 
 partisans they are hardly understood and soon forgotten. "(Juelf " and " (ihilK'liine" had 
 once a meaning, but men were under perpetual banishment from their native lanil for 
 belonging to one or the other of these parties long after nobody knew in what the diffcronco 
 consisted. Sonic men are Tories or Whigs by conviction ; but thousands upon tliou.sands of 
 electors vote simply for yellow, blue, or purple, caugiit at most Ity the appeals of some 
 popular orator. 
 
 It is through this great natural tendency to take sides that the Wire-puller works. 
 Without it ho wouM be powerless. His business is to fan its (lame; to keep it constantly 
 acting upon the man who has ftnce declared himself a partisan ; to make escape from it difii- 
 cult and distasteful. His art is that of a Nonconformist preacher, who gave importance to
 
 102 APPENDIX. 
 
 a body of comnionplaoe religionists by persuading them to wear a uniform and take a mili- 
 tary title, or of a man who made the success of a Temperance Society by prevaihng on its 
 members to wear always and openly a blue ribbon. In the long-run, these contrivances 
 cannot be confined to any one party, and their effects on all parties and their leaders, and on 
 the whole ruling democracy, must be in the highest degree serious and lasting. The first of 
 these effects will be, I think, to make all parties very like one another, and indeed in the 
 end almost indistinguishable, however leaders may quarrel and partisan hate partisans. In 
 the next place, each party will probably become more and more homogeneous ; and the 
 <ipinions it professes, and the policy which is the outcome of these opinions, will less and 
 less reflect the individual mind of any leader, but only the ideas which seem to that mind 
 to be more likely to win favour with the greatest number of supporters. 
 
 Historically speaking. Party is probably nothing more than a survival and a conse- 
 quence of the primitive combativeness of mankind. It is war without the city transmuted 
 into war within the city, but mitigated in the process. The best historical justification 
 which can be offered for it is that it has often enabled portions of the nation, who would 
 otherwise be armed enemies, to be only factions. Party strife, like strife in arms, develops 
 many high but imperfect and one-sided viitues ; it is fruitful of self-denial and self-sacrifice. 
 But wherever it prevails, a great part of ordinary morality is unquestionably suspended ; a 
 number of maxims are received, which are not those of religion or ethics ; and men do acts 
 which, except as between enemies, and except as between political opponents, would be very 
 genei'ally classed as either immoralities or sins. 
 
 Party disputes were originally the occupation of aristocracies, which joined in them 
 because they loved the sport for its own sake ; and the rest of the commuiiity followed one 
 side or the other as its clients. Now-a-days, Party has become a force acting with vast 
 energy on multitudinous democracies, and a number of artificial contrivances have been 
 invented for facilitating and stimulating its action. Yet, in a democracy, the fragment of 
 political power falling to each man's share is so extremely small, that it would be hardly 
 possible, with all the aid of the Caucus, the Stump, and the Campaign newspaper, to rouse 
 the interests of thousands or millions of men, if Party were not coupled with another political 
 force. This, to speak plainly, is Corruption. * * 
 
 Whether Hamilton looked forward to an era of pui-ity in his own country, cannot be 
 certainly known. He and his coadjutors undoubtedly were unprepared for the rapid develop- 
 ment of Party which soon set in ; they evidently thought that their country would be poor ; 
 and they probably expected to see all evil influences defeated by the elaborate contrivances 
 of the Federal Constitution . But the United States became rapidly wealthy and rapidly 
 populous ; and the universal suffrage of all white men, native-born or immigrant, was soon 
 established by the legislation of the most powerful States. With wealth, population, and 
 widely diffused electoral power, corruption sprang into vigorous life. President Andrew 
 Jackson, proclaiming the principle of "to the victors the spoils," which all parties soon 
 adopted, expelled from office all administrative servants of the United States who did not 
 belong to his faction ; and the crowd of persons filling these offices, which are necessarily 
 very numerous in so vast a territory, together with the groups of wealthy men interested in 
 puVjlic lands and in th2 countless industries protected by the Customs tariff, formed an 
 extensive body of contributors from whom great amounts of money were levied by a species 
 of taxation, to be presently expended in wholesale bribery. 
 
 It is obvious, then, that the simple device of dividing the country into small constituencies, 
 the majority in each of which returns members to Parliament, is at best a clumsy and a haphazard 
 way of approaching the fair representation of the people. In the case of the Metropolis a 
 district more than half Tory threw the balance of its influence in Parliament against the Tory 
 Government, the minority being over-represented and counting as a majority. In the second 
 case the majority had all the members, and the minority was not represented at all. During the
 
 PARTY FEELING. 103 
 
 last Session, in which the Agricultural Holdings Act was passed through the House, a number 
 of Liberal voters in five agricultural counties, greater than the number of Liberal voters in 
 Birmingham, had actually no voice at all, whilst the party representing the landlord's side of the 
 question was represented by twenty-four votes. Had these five counties been divided into twice 
 as many sections, it is impossible to say whether the result would have been better ; it certainly 
 could not have been worse. 
 
 These illustrations are enough, I think, to show that the fair representation of the people 
 ■would not necessarily be secured by the division of the country into equal electoral districts with 
 one or two members to each. I will not here more than simply allude to the still graver, and, 
 as I think, fatal objections which may be urged against the proposal to divide our large con- 
 stituences into wards ; the utterly artificial character of an arrangement which would break up 
 into fragments a greater political unit like Birmingham, and make Mr. Bright the member for 
 Ward No. i or No. 2, and the tendency it would have to provincialize Parliament and to ex- 
 aggerate petty local interests at the expense of far greater national ones. 
 
 If the system cannot be relied on to secure even to the majority its proper weight in 
 Parliament, it is surely self-condemned, apart from the other grave reasons which may be urged 
 against it ; and, therefore it is not necessary here to urge them. The nation will hardly be 
 pursuaded to break up its natural political units, and to sacrifice much of its best political life, for 
 an object which cannot after all be attained by the sacrifice. 
 
 Are we then to fall back upon large constituencies w'tthoiU any direct attempt to secure 
 proportionate voting? Is a bare majority in a large constituency to return all the members of one 
 colour to Parliament? 
 
 This brings us back to the point that a system by which the minority in each constituency is 
 eliminated and the majority only is represented in Parliament, cannot be made to secure a fair 
 representation of the people. The objections to it become still more apparent and morally 
 serious when we look at the character of the representation produced by it in each individual 
 constituency, whether small or large — when we consider how easily it may fail in securing a fair 
 representation of the majority itself, and also how often it may give undue representation to 
 elements in the nation which certainly ought not to be over-represented. 
 
 It so happens in England, and probably wherever there is government by parties, that in a 
 great number of constituencies the voters are nearly evenly divided between the two parties. In 
 Liverpool and Manchester, for example, two or three thousand voters — a tenth, perhaps of the 
 whole number — swinging over from one side to the other — can convert a minority into a majority, 
 and have done so over and over again. In many boroughs a still smaller fraction holds tlie key 
 to the result of the election in its own hands ; and Professor Fawcett has long ago pointed out 
 with great force and truth that this fraction — this miserably small minority — is thus infinitely 
 over-represented, and has artificially placed in its hand a power for good or for evil, altogether 
 disproportioned to its numbers or legitimate influence. 
 
 This oscillating class of voters, swinging like a ferry-lioat from side to side of the stream, is 
 not conqiosed of the sober-minded men of solid opinion, whether Tory or Liberal. It is too often 
 composed of injured or frightened interests, or of dissatisfied spirits, or of cliques representing 
 special crotchets, and the result of an election at any given time depends far loo much upon 
 which way it may cast its votes. It is bad enough that a fickle fraction of the people should 
 have it in th ir power, by fits and starts, to change the lines of the Government of England, 
 when the bulk of the nation has not changed. But it becomes still worse when a compact and 
 organized clirpte is tem|)ted to make a test point of its special crotchet or objecl. however 
 honestly pursued. It is a mockery of representative Government that such a cli<iue should have 
 the power d liberalcly to force its views upon political parties by pulling them in the position of 
 choosing between success and defeat according as they accept or reject its dictates. 
 
 This is, in truth, an interference with fair popular representation. It ia .in act of intimida-
 
 104 APPENDIX, 
 
 tion analogous to tliat of llie highwayman who demands your purse, pohiting a pistol at your 
 breast. It is undue influence of the worst kind, all the more demoralizing in its results, because 
 the stake is so large. And why should we allow so corrupt a practice to continue ? The fact 
 is that tlie power of this fraction of voters, in the absence of proportionate voting, is simply and 
 unnaturally magnified in a large constituency by the unjust and clumsy and artificial arrangement 
 that a bare majority shall shift the whole representation over in a lump from one side to the 
 other, instead of the representation corresponding with the proportionate strength of parties. . . . 
 
 I have purposely treated this question from a Liberal point of view. But it is not a party 
 question. When the result of the imperfect system of representing only majorities is considered 
 from a broad point of view, its dangers and its evils are found to be by no means counteracted 
 by the mere subdivision of constituencies, by trusting to the laws of chance, or to the correction 
 which is sometimes obtained in an average result. The last two or three elections have already 
 given proof enough of the reality of the danger of exaggerating the influence of the class of 
 oscillating and dissatisfied voters. For six years the nation was dragged by a majority in the 
 House of Commons, which probably did not represent the majority of voters,* into a line of 
 foreign policy which the conscience of a majority of the nation condemned, and from which it is 
 now found possible altogether to retire. 
 
 And there is another national danger from which we may be anxious to protect our country — 
 viz., the tendency of minorities remaining long unrepresented hopelessly to retire from political 
 life, leaving the majority without that natural and just and wholesome restraint which the presence 
 of an active minority puts upon their actions. Our faith in the democracy of the future, if it rest 
 upon a rational basis, rests chiefly upon the fair representation of the whole people ; upon the 
 success with which the mass of sound political conviction, which we believe to lie at the bottom 
 of our national life, is secured its due weight by means of fair representation in Paidiament ; 
 upon keeping the best minds in the nation interested in politics, and upon the growth in the 
 constituencies of a solid and stable public opinion, which will have its due influence in steering 
 the vessel of the State in a steady course. To attain this object, to save the democracy of the 
 future from the rocks which, in the experience of other nations, have wrecked it in the past, it 
 seems to be essential that true popular representation should be steadily aimed at and as far as 
 possible secured. Nor do I see how to secure that Parliament shall represent the sober sense of 
 the majority of voters in the nation with anything like substantial correctness, without proportionate 
 voting in large constituencies. The question remains how this can best be attained ? 
 
 . . . A Parliament representing only local majorities, shifted from side to side by the 
 oscillation of the least stable and the kast intelligent class of fluctuating voters, is no fair 
 representation of the nation — it may, at certain crises in national history, become government by 
 the mob. A system which robs the sober mass of the nation of its due weight and power in 
 controlling its own destinies, and which puts it in the power of a mere tithe of the nation 
 periodically to drag it against its will into lines of action, which, when the mischief is done, it 
 has at the first opportunity to repudiate, and the evil results of which even a long repentance 
 cannot wipe out, whatever else it is, is hardly in any true sense democratic. And surely the 
 time when the franchise is extended, and a redistribution of seats becomes necessary, is the right 
 time to consider how the sober and solid mass of the nation can best make its voice heard, so 
 that the democracy we are creating may at least be a real one. To refuse to do this because it 
 involves some fresh effort of thought, and some deviation from old-fashioned ways, would be, in 
 my humble opinion, to shrink a responsibility which rightly rests upon the shoulders of this 
 generation of statesmen. 
 
 *There were about 300,000 more Liberal than Tory votes polled in 1874 in the contested constituencies.
 
 REPRESENTATION. 105 
 
 REPRESENTATION. 
 
 By Sir John Lubbock, Bart, M.P., F.B.S., B.C.L., LL.D.. (1SS5). 
 
 Sir G. C. Lewis, in his work " On the Best Form of Government," tells us that neither 
 his profound study of ancient history, nor his great experience in national affairs, had 
 enabled him to arrive at a decided opinion on this important question. 
 
 "The controversy," he saj's, "is one consisting of a debtor and creditor account ; the 
 difficulty lies in striking the balance fairlj'. The weights in one scale may be less heavy 
 than the weights in the other scale, but they are nevertheless weights. . . . The 
 difficulty is to determine which of two sets of valid arguments preponderates." 
 
 The remarkable saying of the late Prince Consort that Representative Institutions are 
 on their trial has been so often quoted, that I almost hesitate to do so again. 
 
 Yet it might well have seemed that government "of the people, for the people, and by 
 the people," was so obviously wise and just, that it must almost of necessity work well in 
 any intelligent community. This, however, has certainly not been the general experience. 
 
 Why, then, has Democracy so often failed in the past? Why have we seen that in 
 State after State power has oscillated from one extreme to the other — from the Tyrant to the 
 Demagogue, and back again from the Demagogue to the Tyrant ? The true reason, I believe, 
 is to be found, not in any fault of the principle, but because the principle has not been 
 correctly applied — because, in fact, no country has ever yet adopted a true system of Re- 
 presentation. 
 
 This has been well pointed out by a distinguished American statesman, Mr. Calhoun. 
 
 "The effect," he says, "of the ordinary systems of representation, is to place the control 
 of the parties in the hands of their respective majorities ; and the (Government itself, 
 virtuallj', under the control of the majority of the dominant party, for the time, instead of 
 the majority of the whole community ; — where the theory of this form of government vests 
 it. Thus, in the very first stage of the process, the government becomes the government of 
 a minority instead of a majority — a minority, usually, and under the most favourable 
 circumstances, of not much more than one-fourth of the whole community," 
 
 John Stuart Mill has stated the case still more forcibly. 
 
 "In a representative body," he says, "actually deliberating, the minority must of 
 course be overruled : and in an equal democracy (since the opinions of the constituents, 
 when they insist on them, determine those of the representative body) the majority of the 
 people, through their reyjresentatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and their 
 representatives. 
 
 "But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all? Because 
 the majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority hav*; all i\\v. votc^, the 
 minority none? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard? Notliing Ijut 
 habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. 
 
 " In a really equal democracy every or any section would be represented, nut dJHiiro- 
 portionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors wouhl always have a majority 
 of the representatives ; but a minority of the elcctuis would always havt^ a minority of the 
 representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully re{)reseiited as the m.ajoiity. Unkss 
 they are, there is not equal government, but a government of ine(|uality anrl privilege : one 
 |)art of the people rule over the rest ; there is a i)art whose fair and e<|ual share of inlliience 
 in the representation is withheld from them contrary to the principle of democracy, which 
 professes equality as its very root and foundation."
 
 lOG APPENDIX. 
 
 And again — 
 
 " 'I'lie majoritj-," he says, "would indeed outnumber the others, as much as the one 
 class of electors outnumbers the other in the country. They would always outvote them, 
 but they would speak and vote in their presence, and subject to their criticism. When 
 any difference arose, they wovild have to meet the arguments of the instructed few by 
 reasons at least apparently as cogent ; and since they could not, as those do who are 
 speaking to persons already unanimous, simply assume that they are in the right, it would 
 occasionally happen to them to become convinced that they were in the wrong. 
 
 "Now, nothing is more certain than that the virtual blotting-out of the minority is no 
 necessary or natui-al consequence of freedom ; that, far from having any connection with 
 democracy, it is diametrically opposed to the first principle of democracy — representation in 
 proportion to numbers. It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be 
 adequately represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is 
 possible without it ." 
 
 This evil is remedied by the system of Proportional, or, as it is sometimes called, 
 "Minority" representation. The latter name is, however, misleading. 
 
 The supporters of proportional representation have no desire to give the minority a 
 larger share of political power than that to which their numbers justly entitle them. On 
 the contrary, as Lord Sherbrooke said during the debate of 1867 in the House of Commons, 
 he did not " argue for any protection to the minority . . . but that between the 
 members of the constituency there should be absolute equality ; the majority should have 
 nothing given to it because it was a majority." 
 
 Mr. Fawcett, again, in his last speech to his constituents at Hackney, truly pointed 
 out that 
 
 " Far from those who advocate j^roportional representation wishing to give to the 
 minority the power which properly belongs to the majority, I think I shall have no difficulty 
 in showing that one of the chief dangers which the advocates of proportional representatation 
 desire to guard against, is the minority obtaining a preponderance of representation which 
 ought to belong to the majority." 
 
 Nay, so far from this, a true system of proportional representation is — in the words of 
 Mill — "not only the most complete application of the democratic principle that has yet 
 been made, but its greatest safeguard." 
 
 In fact, although it may seem a paradox, it is nevertheless true that the system of 
 representation hitherto adopted, not merely through inequalities of area or restrictions on 
 the right of voting, but as a consequence necessarily ensuing from the system of voting 
 hitherto adopted, has had the effect of placing power in the hands, not of the majority, but 
 of a minority. 
 
 Lord Spencer also has pointed out in the House of Lords that "in America for many 
 years past great complaints have been made that large numbers of persons, men of influence, 
 of intellect, of wealth and position, refrained from taking any part in political life. Why 
 was that? Because they felt that they were a hopeless minority, whose opinions were 
 crushed by the overwhelmirig mass of the majority." 
 
 It is hardly necessary to point out how the system of single seats limits the freedom of 
 the elector. The Liberal Committee put forward one candidate, the Conservative another, 
 and all the elector can do is to choose between them . Perhaps the elector does not approve 
 of either. This is no doubt one reason why, in large constituencies, we see so many 
 abstentions. But, however little he may be disposed to either candidate, he cannot bring 
 forward a third without dividing his party, and generally ensuring the return of a political 
 opponent. 
 
 I
 
 REPRESENTATION. 107 
 
 Professor Ware, of Columbia College, New York, has forcibly pointed out that under 
 this system, though the elector is "nominally free to vote for whom he pleases, the 
 knowledge that his vote is thrown away unless it is given for the regular candidate binds 
 him hand and foot. " 
 
 Again, this system has a tendency to promote bribery. It often hajjpens that in a 
 constituency the two great parties are evenly balanced, and a few votes suffice to turn the 
 scale. There may be, say, 2,500 Liberals, 2,500 Conservatives, and 250 persons with no 
 political views. In the hands of these last, then, the whole representation rests. If the 
 agent of either party purchases 100, or 50, nay, even 10 of them, the weight of the constituency 
 is thrown into the scale of the pax-ty for which he acts. 
 
 Those who support the single member system appear to be under the impres.sion that if 
 constituencies were equalized the present mode of voting would — roughly, indeed, but surely 
 — secure that the majority of electors would rule the country. But this is not so. A majority 
 of electors in every constituency is by no means the same thing as a majority of all the 
 electors. Suppose, for instance, a community of 60,000 electors is divided into three 
 divisions, each containing 20,000, and that there are ,32,000 Liberals and 28,000 Conservatives, 
 the division might be, and very likely would be, as follows: — 
 
 1st Division. 2nd Division. 3rd Division. 
 
 Liberals . 15,000 9,000 8,000 
 
 Conservatives .. 5,000 11,000 12,000 
 
 20,000 20,000 20,000 
 
 And thus, though in a minority, the Conservatives would actually return two members out 
 of three. This is no hypothetical case. 
 
 By the constitution of 1841 Geneva was divided into four colleges. The liberal electors 
 were massed in one ward, which they carried by an immense majority; while the Con- 
 servatives, though in a minority, secured the other three ; and the extreme dissatisfaction 
 thus created greatly contributed to the revolution of 1846. In fact, as already stated, a 
 majority of electors in each constituency is by no means the same thing as a majority in all 
 the constituencies. 
 
 . The recent history of America has peculiar significance. The committee of the 
 United States Senate, to which I have already referred, were of opinion, that if America had 
 ailopted proportional representation, instead of single seats, their disastrous- civil war might 
 have been prevented. 
 
 "The absence of proportional representation," they say, "in the States of the South 
 when rebellion was plotted, and wlien open steps were taken to break the Union, was 
 unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men of those States together, and would have 
 given them voice in the electoral colleges and in congress. But they were fearfully overborne 
 by the plurality rule of election, and were swept forward by tlic course of events into 
 impotency or open liostility to our cause. By tliat rule they were deprived of representation 
 in Congress. By tliat rule tlioy were shut out of tlie electoral colleges. Dispersed, unorgan- 
 ized, unrepresented, without due voice and power, they could interpose no effectual resist- 
 ance to secession and civil war. 
 
 "Tlieir leailers were struck down at unjust elections an<l could not apeak for tliem, or 
 act for them in tlieir own States, or at the cajiital of tlic nation. By facts well known to us 
 we are assured that the leaders of revolt, with much difficulty, carried their States with 
 them. p]ven in Georgia, the empire State of the South, the scale was almost balanced for a 
 time between patriotism and diHlioiumr ; ami in most of those States it reipiired all tlu' 
 machinery and influence of a vicious electoral system to organize the war against ns aiid hold 
 those communities compactly as our foes ,"
 
 108 APPENDIX. 
 
 PARTY AND PRINCIPI.E. 
 
 Quarterly Review, Vol. CLXIII, 1S86. 
 
 A growing contempt and impatience of the whole machinery of Party ; disgust with a 
 method which compels us to accept bad rulers instead of good at the hands of a class, which 
 is as yet incompetent to distinguish good from bad ; and shame at the waste of time, the 
 interminable wrangling, and the ignoble ambitions which, in spite of certain sjilendid 
 exceptions, have marked the course of Party government for some years past, are certainly 
 the most conspicuous phenomena of the present day 
 
 Yet what are we to say ? If parties in their old form have died out in the country, it 
 is useless to try to prolong their existence in Parliament by artificial means. If, to repeat 
 what we hare already said, the public no longer see sufficient difference between Whig and 
 Tory Conservatives to make them enthusiastic partisans of either, and if parties cannot be 
 I'edivided into Constitutionalists and Radicals, into those, that is, who wish to preserve, 
 with all necessary improvements, the existing constitution of society, and those who are 
 anxious to subvert it, why go on playing at parties in the House of Commons which corres- 
 pond to nothing outside of it ? This game of ghosts can hardly be expected to satisfy a 
 living people, inspii'ed by a new order of ideas, and anxious for a new kind of political life 
 which shall allow their convictions free play 
 
 In the eyes of jthe independent public, we fear the antagonism of parties has latterly 
 seemed little better than a tight for place, to which everything else is sacrificed. What did 
 even Mr. Cowen say on the subject not two months ago ? "I am indifferent," he said, " to 
 Party organization : I think the objects which lead men to union very paltry. They bring 
 out the worst features of human nature." We may depend upon it the feeling is spreading 
 very widely. Place ! Place ! Place ! Si possis recte, si 11011 quocunque modo. That is the 
 sole meaning which large masses of the nation are beginning to attach to politics 
 
 The division of the country into Liberals and Conservatives has long been an utterly 
 unmeaning one, a mere form out of which the spirit has departed ; and it has been pro- 
 longed, as it has been on former occasions, 'by mechanical contrivances to suit the convenience 
 of particular classes and individuals. Artificial differences have been cultivated where no 
 natural ones existed ; and, what has been worse, the Whigs, having no differential policy to 
 mark them off from the Tories, have been obliged from time to time to fall in with the 
 designs of the Radicals, in order to impart to their own position some semblance of reality. 
 After the various reforms which have been accomplished, some by one party and some by 
 another, during the last fifty years, there is little left to quarrel over now but the funda- 
 mental institutions of the country 
 
 The Party system, then, can no longer be conducted on these terms, terms which 
 compel lionourable men to stoop to evasions and subterfuges, which in any other walk of 
 life they would despise ; and produce on the public mind the unfortunate conviction, that 
 the game of politics is played only for selfish objects, in which principles have no part.
 
 PARTY AND PATRIOTISM. 109 
 
 PARTY AXD PATRIOTISM. 
 
 By Sydney E. Williams, 1SS6. 
 
 It is the simplest of truths that the aim of politics— like the object of good government 
 and the raison (Velre of parties —is the welfare of the nation. Yet ob\nous as it is, the truth 
 fails to exercise anything like its due influence over men's thoughts and actions. Xor is it 
 less true, nor less disregarded, that the good of the nation depends, not upon this or that 
 particular nostrum, nor this or that parochial programme, but upon the development of the 
 national life by means of measures planned not for partial interests but the general benefit, 
 upon the elevation, the unselfishness, the help of all classes and all interests, and upon the 
 greatness and well-being of the empire with which all alike must stand or fall. And this 
 being so it matters little by what party or by what government we are brought nearer the 
 common goal. No government has a monopoly of wise legislation ; nor has any party a 
 monopoly of sound principles. Each has its aspirations and its errors, and each must be 
 judged by its deeds 
 
 It has been said, with unconscious sarcasm, that our system of government by party 
 does not lay claim to absolute perfection, and that its greatest admirers will bear to be told 
 that it has its drawbacks. But outside the circle of its admirers, which includes few except 
 party politicians, there are many who are beginning to doubt whether its advantages outweigh 
 its disadvantages and whether its use is more conspicuous than its abuse. "Nay, I find 
 England in her own big dumb heart, whenever yon come upon her in a silent, meditative 
 hour, begins to have dreadful misgivings about it." 
 
 Its chief defect — and a sufficiently grave one in any institution — is that it defeats the 
 very object for which it is intended. Its main object, and the only one that can justify its 
 existence, is to promote the national good. But so little does it attain this end that its chief 
 tendency is to divert the national energy from national objects. It aims at the general welfare 
 by the conflict of opposing parties, each of which claims that it alone is able to promote it, 
 each of w-hich holds out to us the hope of infinite bliss or the dread of infinite woe. We ai'e 
 in sliort told by the admirers of party government that the only way to attain a common 
 purpose is to wrangle over the means of effecting it. No wonder that the main object is lost 
 sight of. An institution which attracts so much superstitious reverence naturally becomes 
 an end in itself 
 
 " Party," says Burke in a well-known passage, "is a body of men united for promoting 
 by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some principle in which tliey are all 
 agreed." And to the institution as thus defined little exception can be taken. But it is 
 manifestly of the essence of the definition as well as of the institution that the ol)ject should 
 be to promote the national interests, and to promote them upon some principle in wliicli we 
 are all agreed. How little the institution, as at present seen, answers to this definition wc 
 all know. Kven Burke, with his exaggerated reverence for the constitution and parliamentary 
 government, might well have had his faith shaken by the j)resent state of allairs. \\'luii 
 we see the ol^ject of tlie "joint endeavours" to lie the furtherance not of national l>ut i>f 
 mere party interests, upon principles which are neither sound, stable, or generally believed 
 in, we may well be excused for doubting whether this " excellent mechanism "is " tlie most 
 satisfactory that the wit of man has yet devised for the management of the all'airsof a state." 
 
 Every one is expected nowad.ays to sacrifice his judgment, and even In's conscieuce, 
 at tlie shrine of party, even though his party liave no policy, and be guided liy no intelligent 
 principles. Having once given his adherence he will be expected to support it for all time, 
 however it may change its policy or depart from its ](riin'ip!cH ; ho will be expccti.d In cHpouHc 
 its quarrels, condone its blunders, and credit it with a monnpoly of wisdom and right motives. 
 This, it is obvious, is not so much allegiance as mental slavery. Combined action is no doubt
 
 110 APPENDIX. 
 
 necessary in onler to cany into effect common opinion. But the necessity for combined 
 action ceases the moment the opinion ceases to be common. Party spirit ought not to be 
 merely esprit tie corps, but an entente cordiale. 
 
 The extent to which party dominates poUtics in the present day is almost unexampled 
 in our history. Party considerations inspire our political programmes, determine the policies 
 of our governments, and decide the result of most divisions. Each party trims its sails to 
 catch the poi^ular breeze, each member gives his vote to keep in office or retain his seat. 
 Hardly a thought is given to the national interest, Init rather is it openly avowed that a 
 particular line is taken in the interests of party, and apart from higher considerations. 
 
 . . Public spirit is crushed out by party spirit, and with few exceptions our legislators 
 lack the courage to be honest. They seldom, if ever, speak fi'eely the thing they feel, and 
 we \vait in vain for a frank expression of jjersonal conviction. When occasions arise which 
 call for plain speaking, our politicians are dumb ; and we can only conclude that they do not 
 know or ai'e too cowardly to say. Nor is this all. What makes matters worse is that there 
 is so little attempt to disguise the fact, and so little general feeling among professional 
 politicians, that the whole thing is unedifying and discreditable. Our High Court of Parlia- 
 ment scarcely affects to be actuated by high motives. Oi)portunism is the thing thought of, 
 and statesmanship is becoming a byword. What is expedient for the party at the moment, 
 not what is expedient for the country in the long run, is the dominant factor in parliamentary 
 calculations. " Political considerations must prevail," though other and higher objects have 
 to be sacrificed. To get the better of one's opponents is the highest of political ambitions, 
 and to divest oneself of pi-inciples likely to jeopardise electoral prospects is the first duty of 
 the modern statesman 
 
 The chief objection to political organisations is, that though they profess to give ex- 
 pression and effect to public opinion, they in fact do much to control and stifle it. Public 
 opinion is the growing, fluctuating, ever-varying sentiment of society. It is a highly- 
 sensitive and impressionable entity, swayed at times by a breath or moved deeply by a 
 thought, liable both to gradual change and to violent transformation. It it obvious that no 
 permanent organisation with fixed aims can ever hope to represent so intangible a quantity. 
 Nor can any organisation however perfect do otherwise than destroy its mobility, which is 
 really its life and essence. Least of all can any political association with its party name, its 
 party shibboleths, and party prejudice, hope to represent its finer shades, or even, for long, 
 its bolder outlines ; and certainly none such can be trusted to form and mould it. 
 
 The natural tendency of all such organisations, whatever their professed object may be, 
 is to manufacture, not represent, public opinion. They can but imperfectly represent it, and 
 must inevitably tend to mar it. They both force and check the common feeling by driving 
 divergent opinions into one rigid mould. They crystallise a sentiment which ought to remain 
 free, and arrest a current which should continue to flow. They encourage mental indolence 
 by supplying electors with a ready-made political creed, and destroy independent thought by 
 asking them to surrender the right to form an opinion. 
 
 These are evils almost necessarily inherent in any system of organisation, but they are 
 greatly aggravated in the case of party organisations, by joining which a man undertakes to 
 blindly follow one side and as blindly oppose the other ; to support everything done or 
 proposed to be done by one party, and denounce everything done or proposed to be done by 
 the other. He shuts himself out from taking a true and impartial view of jjolitics by 
 entering an association which encourages political ignorance by looking at questions from 
 only one point of view and by suppressing unpalatable truths. He, in short, rehnquishes all 
 cliim to that love of fair play which is supposed to be characteristic of Englishmen. 
 
 Besides the danger of a mechanical working of the vote in obedience to a small knot of 
 wire-pullers, who are rather partisans than politicians, there is the further danger of a
 
 PARTY GOVERNMENT. Ill 
 
 mechanical -working of Parliament in obedience to the same high authorit}' ; the practical 
 effect of organisation being to enable a small body of voters to dictate on the one hand to 
 electors for whom they shall vote, and on the other hand to Parliament for what it shall vote. 
 Thus supreme power is vested in an oligarchy who usurp the right of electors on the one hand 
 and the functions of Parliament on the other 
 
 A member of Parliament is a representative or nothing. He goes to Parliament to 
 represent a constituency, and can never be whollj' independent. On the other hand, he is 
 not a mere delegate, the mere mouthpiece of a caucus. If he were wholly independent the 
 country would be unrepresented, and if a mere delegate Parliament would be a mere voting 
 machine. It is impossible for the electorate to determine the details of government and 
 legislation, and any attempt to usurp this function would inevitably tend to lower the 
 character of Parliament 
 
 Parliament is a deliberative assembly, not a mere voting machine, nor ought its members 
 to be mere lay-figures. They ought, to the best of their ability, to form an honest opinion, 
 upon the arguments placed before them, as to what is best for the whole community. And 
 how can this be possible, as Burke pertinently asks, " when one set of men deliberate and 
 another decide." 
 
 A member of Parliament, moreover, ought to be able to see, and does generally see, 
 further and more clearly than his constituents. He should be, and generally is, able to 
 interpret the national will moi'e correctly and more courageously than a caucus 
 
 It is surely time that the world began to realise how false is the sentiment which would 
 have us believe that to stifle our judgments and our consciences is a high political virtue, and 
 that to possess common courage and honesty is a political stigma. The sentiment is the 
 direct result of party spirit. The party virus has spread over the whole political system till 
 no part of it is free from the taint. And if we do not crush the evil, it will assuredly crush us. 
 
 Party spirit, with its evil influence, is more or less inseparable from party govern- 
 ment 
 
 . . . The a Ivantages of party discipline are almost insignificant beside its evils, 
 beside its moral cowardice and insincerity, its want of principle and indifl'erence to the public 
 interest, .no one can view without some feeling of disgust the cavilling and bickering, the 
 maligning misrepresentation and calumny, which pass for political criticism, and which are 
 the chief artifices of party warfare. The party system is rotten at the core. Vet this is the 
 system by which we test the purity and usefulness of our institutions and tlie value of 
 our legislation. 
 
 . . . We cannot wonder that high-minded men should shrink from the prospect of 
 becoming mere party hacks and of giving up their self-respect for the sake of being mere 
 puppets on the parliamentary stage. As well might we e.xpect a Salvini to conform to the 
 taste of a transpontine gallery. And it i.s to the party politician and wirepuller that we owe 
 this deplorable state of things. Between them they are doing their best to make the most 
 independent assembly in the world a mere raacliine impelled by unworthy motives, and arc 
 converting an honourable pursuit into a trade of sharp ])ractice and trickery. 
 
 PAi; TV COVKK.NMK.NT, 
 
 Froiii Wentmbniter llevinv, Vol. J.XIX, issr,. 
 
 At first sight, a system of government by i)arty ueems unfcignediy ridiculous. But the 
 fact that it exists, and th.-it the enthuHia.sni of most men i.s attached to tlie one side or the 
 other, the absurdity of tlie arrangement must have been painfully evident long ago. That the
 
 112 APPENDIX. 
 
 work of govermiieiit should be done for a time by one set of men, while another set do 
 nothing but cavil at them, and that when their criticisms have brought about some catas- 
 trophe the cavillers should do the work of governing the nation, while those who were 
 latel}'^ in power become the critics, does not, at first sight, commend itself to one's mind as 
 at all a rational system. It is difficult to believe that the country has, at any one time at 
 its disposal, two sets of men equally capable of governing ; and even if we were convinced 
 of the fact that it was so fortunate, we should think it a curious waste of the highest moral 
 and intellectual power which the country can produce, that while the one set were doing the 
 work, the other set should be doing their best to make it impossible for the first to discharge 
 their all-important diities. Such a method has never been tried in the transaction of any 
 other business than that of government. Had it had any inherent excellence, surely we 
 should have found it in other departments of affairs. Its continued existence in relation to 
 the art of governing is to be accounted foi-, as we shall see, not by its efficiency, but by 
 other circumstances which of themselves go far to discredit it, as an institution. But 
 against this view, we have no doubt the startling fact that party government is not a new 
 thing, and that it seems on the whole to have worked fairly well, or at least without positive 
 disaster to the country. We confess our entire allegiance to facts, and are willing to admit, 
 as a rule, that that which works well is a great deal better than that which can be reasoned 
 well about. But the fact that government by i^arty has not been productive of disaster, is 
 only to be accounted for by the circumstance that, whenever an emergency has arisen which 
 would test the efficiency of the system and find it wanting, the common sense of men in and 
 out of office, came to the front, and that which was necessary to be done was done by all 
 concerned without any regard to the system of govei-nment by party. Every reader of the 
 daily prints has become familiar with the phrase, "this is not a party question," applied 
 with increasing frequency to matters which would formerly have been regarded, and which 
 in many instances are still regarded, as fair fields for party tights. But that of itself seems 
 to indicate that this system of government is like an unsea worthy ship which may sail well 
 enough on smooth seas, but which will go to pieces under any stress of weather. The 
 wisdom of those on board has been shown in the past by deserting the good ship — Party — 
 whenever the skies threatened 
 
 It is surely too obvious that if party government is the system of ruling, the object of 
 the ins will be scarcely so much to govern well as to keep office. The objects of the " outs " 
 will be not to see that the ins govern well, but to make it impossible for them to govern at 
 all, and to demonstrate their incapacity to the country, and to secure the power for 
 themselves 
 
 Now the position that the existence of party is essential to healthy parliamentary 
 government does not seem to us to be at all a strong position. And if we can disprove the 
 necessary connection between the existence of popular government and the organization of 
 parties in the State, we shall have disposed of the only reason which seems to be urged for 
 an institution which it is admitted on all hands, has little else to recommend it, and has 
 innumerable features, as these writers have shown, which discredit it. 
 
 We have pointed out that at one time, when great dynastic and other questions impor- 
 tant to the very life of the nation were in the arena of politics, there was a reason for parties 
 in politics. No doubt civil war can only be carried on by means of parties, but it does not 
 therefore follow that government can only be carried on by a sort of smothered ci\al war. 
 In our time, were it not that party is a means of raising the temperature of lukewarm 
 enthusiasm — were it not that the war of parties is a foolish survival of primitive savagery 
 which serves the purpose of the few ambitious men who are able to make themselves the 
 leaders of these factions, we are convinced that parties would cease to exist. No doubt 
 when civil war was in question the currents of thought might be well compared to two main 
 streams. They are like rivers which made their own ways through the obstructions of the 
 land. Now, however, party thought is like a watercourse which is made to flow in a certain
 
 PARTY GOVERNMENT. 113 
 
 <lirection, like a canal, by the artificial banks and locks of partj' discipline. As it is, as we 
 have tried to show, the interests of the country, the interests of the rank-and-file of 
 politicians, are sacrificed to the ambition of their leaders in much the same way as the 
 common people and the soldiery used to be sacrificed to the pride of kings. It is for this 
 purpose, then, that the irrational distinction between the two parties is maintained. We 
 constantly, in this foolish warfare, hear of tactics, of manceuvres, of party moves, and one 
 leader is proud of the appellation " old parliamentary hand ; " and while most of these tricks 
 and tactics are turned against the opposite party, the greatest dupes of all are the parties 
 themselves. The ordinary politician toils years in the vain hope of rising to a position in which 
 he ^vill merit the rewards which it is in the power of party to bestow, and only a few of 
 them ever have the loaves and the fishes which are the end and aim of what by a fine ironj'^ is 
 called practical politics. The principle which we have stated as being the ethical foundation 
 of parties — namely, that men may honestly sacrifice minor matters of principle for the sake 
 of party— seems to us to be immoral. We have said that great danger may justify the losing 
 sight of individual opinion. On a battlefield private judgment must be at a minimum. But 
 wh}' in these times we should still keep up this semblance of war in order to make these 
 sacrifices a necessity it is difficult to see. The trick by means of which the juggle of parties 
 is constantly played is that men magnify the points of difference between themselves and 
 their fellows, and shut their eyes to the far more impoi-tant points of agreement — a process 
 which is dishonest to your antagonist and unfair to yourself. But further, on this matter of 
 sacrificing minor matters of principle at the high behests of party interests, is it not difficult 
 to say where such a process, once inaugurated, is to stop ? The advocates of the sj^stem say 
 in " small matters," in " minor matters," a man may sacrifice his principles for the sake of 
 the organization. But there is an indefiniteness about this rule which gives spacious latitude 
 to ambitious consciences. It is very dangerous to begin ijaltering, and when a man has 
 given in the mint and the anise and the cummin for the sake of party, and for the hopes 
 that adhesion to party rear in men's minds, he may easily enough be induced to sacrifice 
 more weighty matters. Where there is room for a conscience in party spirit most candid 
 people have failed to see. But then it is said you cannot work j^our representative and 
 democratic institutions unless you are willing to put up with these inconveniences. That, 
 as we have seen, is the position which the advocates of party government take up. Well, in 
 the first instance, it is not the highest praise which can be bestowed upon popular government 
 that it can only be worked by means of this immoral and foolish machinery 
 
 Surely the fact that so much in English political life depends upon these party organiza- 
 tions and upon these captains of votes, the wire-pullers, is sufficient of itself to condt^mn tlie 
 system and to recommend that which we are here urging as a substitute — the government of 
 the country l)y the best men, irrespective of party consideration, the permanent tenure of all 
 the great offices during efficiency and good behaviour, and the obedience of tlie Ministers of 
 the Crown to the expressed wishes of the representatives of the people. Against this system 
 we do not know any reasons of any cogency which can be urged. That there would be less 
 " Hfiund and fury" in ])olitics is one of the recommendations of the system— all the "sound 
 and fury " at j)re8ent signify ufitliing ; that there would be les.s entliusiaHm l)r()ugiit to bear 
 upon national affairs may be true, but the enthusiasm which arises out of politics in conse- 
 quence of the war of ])artie8, is like that which is j)roduccd on religion by perHoeiition. We 
 may buy our entluisiasm too dear. But to say that there would not remain enougli of interest 
 in national affairs to induce the best men to take part in them is, wo think, untrue and 
 libellous. While there is great work to be done — and the good government of a country like 
 ours is great work — there will not be wanting the great men to do it. But the party strife, 
 with its cliicanery and cunning which form hucIi a large jiart of jiarty warfare, is a means of 
 keeping some of the beat men of the country apart from tlie work of governing altogether. 
 It is well known that there are many eHi)eciaIly able men in America who already keej) 
 themselves apart from the din and iuistle of politics. 'Ilic jiroportion of j)erHonH who do not 
 aspire to honour by the road which leads through St. Stephen's is in this country every year 
 8
 
 114 APPENDIX. 
 
 becomiuo- "veater. That these men would be attracted to the services of the State if they 
 were no loiif^er the reward of party tactics, but were the recognition of special capacity 
 and practical experience, we think none can doubt. Indeed, the objections to the one 
 system are so many, and the objections to the other so few, that it is almost like weakness 
 to argue the matter. It is in deference, not to the reasons which can be urged for govern- 
 ment by party that we have said so much, but because we are aware of the long roots which 
 the system has struck into the national life, and of the lirm hold it has over the minds of 
 contemporary politicians. 
 
 THE DANGER OF PARTY. 
 
 By Frederic Harrison. From the Contemporary Revieto, Vol. XLIX., 1886. 
 
 There is urgent need to form a public opinion, independent of Parliament and of all 
 electoral machinery whatever. The tierce rivalry of parties, and the way in which party 
 absorbs all political thought amongst us, is a growing danger. It may be agreed that the 
 healthy organization of party is an essential condition of Parliamentary government. As 
 practised with us, the organization of party tends to crush and stifle the free play of public 
 opinion. Members of Parliament feel it a duty not to embarrass their party leaders by 
 discussing any question which the leaders do not sanction, or by ever criticising anything 
 they do or omit to do. Party men and politicians outside Parliament follow the same cue 
 and encourage the members in silent discipline. The journalists and publicists usually have 
 their party side, and make it a point of honour to stir no awkward topic, but with their 
 whole force to support the party side. Thus, as the whole political energy of our day runs 
 into Parliamentary channels, and is organized with military discipline to secure party 
 victories (and the same thing is even more conspicuous in the United States), the free 
 formation of public opinion is almost as difficult as under the despotism of a Czar or a 
 Napoleon. 
 
 In the name of Freedom and Progress let some of us at least keep out pf the Parlia- 
 mentary race-course, out of the pai-ty caucus, out of party journalism. Let us in this place 
 attempt to do M^hat we can to organize a real Moral Bbrce. I would claim for Positivists 
 this much : that they are the only organized body of politicians in the kingdom who 
 systematically strive to build up public opinion on other than party lines, with other than 
 Ministerial victories as their aim. Positivism, in its essence, means simply the formation of 
 some moral power as the inspirer of active life, without any coarse stimulus of rivalry or 
 ambition. The Churches busy themselves with theological and celestial questions only. 
 Here is the failure of merely celestial religion. Let us with such help as Conservative, 
 Whig, or Radical will give, try to form high and right canons of pviblic judgment ; let us 
 insist on making the plain moral law dominant in national politics ; let us urge the clear 
 intelligences and the just spirits everywhere to make their voices heard and not slavishly to 
 submit to the loud cries of the many, and the gross verdict of a wooden ballot-box ; let us 
 insist that the lirst and most crying of public duties is to teach, guide, and lead the people, 
 and as a means to that teaching, to make the people teachable. Let us raise up the spirit of 
 enlightened education in things public and national, strengthening in the people everywhere 
 the idea of being taught and led, convinced and elevated. Politics are not, any more than 
 astronomy or medicine, the province of the mass. They are the province of wise guidance 
 and intelligent co-operatiou.
 
 PARTY OR EMPIRE. 115 
 
 PAETY AND PATRIOTISM. 
 
 B>/ Alfred Austen. From tlie National Review, Vol. VII. 1SS6. 
 
 1 see symptoms of this demoralization of the public conscience in every direction, and I 
 trace it, for the most part, to the corrupting influence of Party politics, in which un- 
 fortunately, the whole community now take part. ... If one mercilessly thinks it out 
 does it not become painfuUy apparent, that by the very operation of Party politics, every 
 prominent politician in the House of Commons is being perpetually tempted and tormented 
 by his friends not to be honest, and perpetually assailed and harrassed by his foes in order 
 to be made not to appear honest ? Government by Party necessarily entails the continual 
 surrender by a man of his convictions, in order to keep his party together ; and if he be in 
 the Cabinet, or in the Ministry, he will be fortunate if he be not called upon at times to 
 defend in debate what he has opposed in council. This is what he has to thank his friends 
 for. As for his foes, they try to trip him up on every possible occasion, to make him look 
 inconsistent, incapable, and generally contemptible. In a word, and to put the operation of 
 Party politics in as succinct a form as possible, each half of the nation is employed, morning, 
 noon, and night, from year's end to year's end, in proving the other half fools and tricksters. 
 For this end, no shaft of ridicule, no craft of speech, no device of invective is spared. 
 
 And does anyone suppose that you can demoralize a people politically, and leave them 
 moral and manly in matters into which politics do not or should not enter? ... Of 
 cleverness in political life, there is an unfailing supply. But one ounce of character is worth 
 a ton of ability, and, unhappily, it is character that is wanting. Conviction, courage, and a 
 tranquil but immovable Mill, these are the constituents of character. When are we to look 
 for them in public life ? . . . 
 
 PARTY OR EMPIRE. 
 
 From the National Review, August 1SS6. 
 
 The days of Party Government in the old constitutional sense, are numbered. The 
 reign of its decrepitude is to be read alike in the growth and in the collapse of the caucus. 
 . . . We are aware that many will scout the bare idea of such a possi})ility, and they will 
 point to America as a country in which the Party system has continued to work, tliough the 
 division of parties has long ceased to carry with it any rational signiticance. Hut we deny 
 that any conclusion applicable to England can be drawn from the United Slates, a nation not 
 weighted with the necessity of a foreign policy, not connected in a common syHtcni with a 
 number of independent and alien States, a Government in which the E.xecutive is practically 
 independent of the Legislature and in which the popular House of Representatives plays a 
 comparatively unimportant part. We repeat that in Enghmd the tiays of Party Govern- 
 ment are nuiidjered because ncitlier the mechanical ingenuity of the wire-puller, nor the 
 mendacious plirases of the rhetorician can continue to holil together nssociatioiis of men no 
 longer dependent on principles corresponding with the realities of things. They are numbered 
 because the old causes of division between the two great historical I'articH in tlie Htato liavc 
 been removed, and because the Imperial questions that on ail sides are pressing for Hdlutiiui 
 are not of a kind that can be thrown with safety into the arena of party strife.
 
 116 APPENDIX. 
 
 THOUGHTS ABOUT PARTY BV LORD SELBORNE. 
 
 Extract from Conleiiiporaiy Revieiv, Vol. LI., 1887. 
 
 " Mr. Justii\ M'Carthy, in his ' History of the Four Georges,' predicts that 'the principle 
 of Government by party will some time or other come to be put to the challenge in English 
 political life.' 
 
 " He refers (I think justly) the origin of the modern form of that system to the days of 
 Pulteney and Walpole. There had been, of course, earlier parties, exercising a powerful influ- 
 ence upon government ; but they had been of a different kind — constitutional, dynastic, or 
 religious. 
 
 "'With Pulteney and his tactics,' says Mr. M'Carthy, 'began the party organization 
 which inside the House of Commons and outside, works unceasingly with tongue and pen, with 
 open antagonism and underhand intrigue, with all the various social as well as political 
 influences— the pamphlet, the Press, the petticoat, even the pulpit— to discredit everything done 
 by the men in office, to turn public opinion against them, and, if possible, to overthrow them. 
 . . . Inside the House he made it his business to form a party which should assail the 
 Ministry on all points, lie in wait to find occasion for attacking it, attack it rightly or wrongly, 
 attack it even at the risk of exposing national weakness or bringing on national danger, keep 
 attacking it always. . . . Pulteney and his compan ions set themselves to appeal especially to 
 the prejudices, passions, and ignorance of the vulgar herd. They made it their business to create 
 a public opinion of their own. They dealt in the manufacture of public opinion. They set up 
 ipolitical shops to retail the article which they had thus manufactured.' 
 
 " This Mr. M'Carthy declares to have been ' unquestionably the policy of all our more 
 -modern English parties ; ' though he thinks that an English Opposition would be, in our time^ 
 more scrupulous than Pulteney and his supporters sometimes were. Some of the outlines and 
 colours of this picture might be taken from life at the present day : the ' social as well as the 
 political influences' — (clubs, 'Primrose Leagues,' whatever may be the name of the imitated 
 article upon the other side) — ' the manufacture of public opinion ' — and the ' political shops set 
 up to retail the manufactured article.' We have learned better manners (I hope, because we 
 have worthier thoughts of, and more generous feelings towards, the less-instracted multitudes of 
 our countrymen) than to talk of ' the vulgar herd ; " but appeals from ' classes ' to ' masses ' are 
 still not unknown. The art may have been improved since Pulteney's time ; neither party has a 
 monopoly of it ; nor is it, by any means, conlined to the party which may be, for the time being, 
 in opposition 
 
 " The Liberal party has also been deemed, by some who have led or who have aspired to 
 lead it, to require a new education, of which the result may perhaps be to accelerate the time 
 foretold by Mr. M'Carthy, when the principle of government by party may be put upon its trial. 
 
 " I have alluded in the outset of this paper to what is popularly known as the ' Caucus 
 system,' introduced from abroad into this country, not long since, under high Liberal auspices. 
 It is, I think, an important question whether that system, in any of the forms which it has 
 assumed or may assume, can be permanently reconciled with true Liberality. I cannot myself 
 dissociate political Liberality from Liberty, or Liberty from honest independence of thought and 
 judgment on the part of constituencies, and also of their represen'atives. It is not, at all 
 events, the old Liberal idea, which would remove the centre of gravity of the constitutional 
 system from Parliament to a federation of delegates of political unions ; which would practically 
 limit the choice of Liberal electors, in every constituency, to persons who had first approved 
 themselves to the managers of an inner conclave, holding the local party in leading strings ; 
 which may tend to transform leaders of party and Ministers of State into dictators, by enabling 
 them, through these outside agencies, to ostracise all who, even on subjects vital to the public
 
 A PROBLKM IX POLITICAL SCIENCE. 117 
 
 welfare, have dared in the House of Commons to speak and vote as they think. Formerly, a 
 member who so manifested his independence might have had to justify himself to his constitu- 
 ents, and he generally would have succeeded in doing so if they thought him an honest man, and 
 if he could give good reasons for the course which he had taken. Now, if there were among 
 Liberals no power of patriotism stronger than the bond of party association, he would have to 
 justify himself before some 'council of three hundred,' or two hundred, or whatever else the 
 number may be ; that council itself being under the influence — perhaps in the leading-strings — 
 of a larger ' federation,' of which a veiy few individuals may be (probably are) the wire-pullers 
 and masters. 
 
 " The system of party government will be essentially changed in character, and may soon 
 cease to be tolerable, if it cannot be emancipated from this slavery 
 
 '■ On all such subjects, the profession of Liberal politics cannot justify a man in making any 
 political leader or wire-puller the keeper of his conscience, or absolve him from the duty and 
 necessity (if he is honest) of making up his mind for himself ; he must act as he thinks, what- 
 ever others who pass by the same party name may do. If he approves such measures, he will 
 support them, not because he belongs to a party, but because he thinks them right. If he dis- 
 approves, he is under a moral as well as a political obligation to oppose them. That duty is one 
 which no honest man is at liberty to sacrifice to a party name." 
 
 A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 By Sandford Fleminrj. From Trans. Boy. Soc. Canada, Vol. VII. , 1SS9. 
 
 I propose to direct attention to a scientific question wthin the domain of politics or 
 civil government which appears to me to be of great interest. It presents a problem 
 which up to the present time remains unsolved. 
 
 The institution of Parliament, as we all know, is of ancient date. In England a general 
 assembly or council of the nation has been held immeinorially under various names. Before 
 the Conquest three designations were at various times assigned to it : — 
 
 1. Mycel Synoth, or great synod. 
 
 2. Mycel Gemot, or great council. 
 
 3. Witenagemot, or council of the wise men. 
 
 The name of " Parliament" was not given to the National Council in England until after 
 the Conquest, when the French language was exclusively used by the dominant class, ami 
 French became the official language of the English nation. 
 
 Parliament has greatly changed since its early days. It has grown and devtlopi'd from 
 century to century, and it may be said to be still in a condition of growth and dcvoloinncnt. 
 
 Whatever may have been the character of the meetings of the wise men before the Con- 
 (|ue8t, or of the Parliaments whicii followed, the central idea of Parliament at the present 
 day, is an assembly of individuals representing the whole nation. The functions of Parlia- 
 inont are to act on behalf of the nation as the supreme authority, and -rci)rt'senting tho 
 nation — it possesses every power and every right anil every attribute wliicii the nation 
 possesses. The fundamental idea and guiding principle of Parliament is, that it cmi)race» all 
 the separate parts which compose the realm, that in fact it is the nation in essence. 
 
 This is the theoretical and proper idea of Parliament, but it cannot bo affirmed that the 
 ideal Parliament has ever yet been realized. Indeed it may be held that the means t.-ikon
 
 118 APPENDIX. , 
 
 to constitute Parliament cannot, in the nature of things, result in producing a national 
 assembly in which every indivitiual elector may be fairly represented and his voice heard. 
 As a matter of fact, under the existing system, it is not practicable to have in the 
 elective house every part of the nation represented : some parts must necessarily remain 
 unrepresented. 
 
 Such being the case, the problem which science may be asked to solve, is simply this : 
 to devise the vieans of forming an elective assembly which practically as ivell as theoretically will 
 be the nation in essence. 
 
 What is commonly known as the " Government " or the " Administration," and how it 
 may be constituted, form no part of the problem, but are separated questions which I do not 
 propose to discuss. I merely submit as a general principle, that the Government may l)e 
 considered in the light of a committee of Parliament, or executive council to carry into effect 
 the acts and resolutions of Parliament and administer affairs to the approval of Parliament. 
 
 Nations differ in their social and political circumstances, but in all free countries, at 
 least, it is generally recognised that the elective assembly is of the first importance. The 
 theory of the elective assembly, is that the whole people or such of the people as are duly 
 qualified to vote shall be equally r epresented. It cannot be said that hitherto this object 
 has been even approximately attained. Its attainment may indeed be impracticable, but the 
 question is of so much importance that it cannot be unworthy of grave consideration. May 
 we not ask if it be possible to devise some means, by which the whole people of the realm 
 may be brought to a central point, to a focus so to speak, in a deliberative assembly or 
 Parliament. 
 
 The question of electing representatives to sit in Parliament has received the attention 
 of many political writers and has likewise been investigated at length by many celebrated 
 geometers, who have recorded their dissent from the practices followed. Under the present 
 system, members are elected by a part of the community only, while their election is opposed 
 by another part. It is quite true that the intention is to have the majority of the people 
 represented, but even this is not a necessary result of the existing system ; moreover it does 
 not follow that the majority of members returned will hold the views and opinions of the 
 majority of the people on any subject. It may happen and frequently does happen, as a 
 direct result of the present system, that legistative power is placed, not in the representatives 
 of a majority, but in those who represent a minority. Sir John Lubbock gives an apt illustra- 
 tion of this result. He supposes a country in which there are 1,200,000 electors who vote 
 with party A, and 1,000,000 who vote with party B. Now if the two parties are evenly dis- 
 tributed over the whole country, it is clear that, under the ordinary system of representation, 
 the weaker party will be utterly swamped. To use a familiar illustration (he remarks) 
 whenever you drop a bucket into the sea, you will bring up saltwater. In such a case there- 
 fore the 1,000,000 will be practically unrepresented. But we must carry the matter a little 
 further. In the House so elected, let the majority bring forward some bill of an advanced 
 character and carry it by two to one, i.e., by the votes of members representing 800,000 
 electors and against those representing 400,000 ; in such a case it is clear that the minority 
 in the House would have with them also the 1,000,000 in the country who were left un- 
 represented; so that in fact the measure would represent the wishes of only 800,000 electors, 
 and would be opposed by those of 1,400,000. Thus he points out that the result of a system 
 "of Government by majorities, is, on the contrary, to enable a minority of 800,000 to over- 
 rule a majority of 1,400,000." 
 
 This illustrates only one of the many defects in the present system, but it is quite 
 sufficient to show that the principle of Representative Government, which is inherently good, 
 has not been realised. It is obvious from the very nature of the system practised in electing 
 members, that, every Parliament, not the whole but only a part of the electors are rejjre- 
 sented, and that the representatives of a minority may frequently over-rule a majority of the 
 people.
 
 A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. 119 
 
 'J'ake the present Parliament of our own Dominion, and in doing so we have a case in 
 which all will acknowledge that the Administration at the present moment is supported by 
 a large working majority of members. At the last General Election (Feb. 1SS7) the total 
 number of voters on the lists in all the constituencies where contests took place was 948,5'24. 
 Of this number the votes polled for one party were 370,342 and for the other 354,714. That 
 is to say, 39 per cent, of the whole represents one party, and 37 per cent, the other party in 
 Parliament. As the representatives of the 37 per cent, are swamped in Parliament and are in 
 no way recognized in the administration of affairs, it follows that 39 per cent, of the electors 
 through their representatives have complete control, and the remaining 01 per cent, have 
 practically no voice in the government of the country. Moreover, as the election of members 
 representing the 39 per cent, of votes was in every instance opposed by the voters who 
 number 37 per cent, of the whole, it follows that on all questions settled on strict party 
 lines, Parliament speaks and acts in its decisions by the members who represent but two per 
 cent, of the whole body of electors. This is not an accidental but a common and, indeed, a 
 necessary result, of the present system, which must continue so long as we follow the 
 ordinary method of electing members to sit in Parliament. 
 
 The question presented is this : Is there any means whatever by which a national 
 assembly can be formed approximating more closely to the ideal Parliament ? 
 
 Let us begin the inquiry by assuming that the electorate consists of oulj' two electors, 
 t^at they are equal in all respects, in ability, integritj^ in worldly means, in puljlic spirit ; 
 that they have each equal claims and equal desires to act as representatives, and each is 
 equally willing to be represented the one by the other. 
 
 Under such circumstances what course would be followed Ijy the two to settle the 
 question? Would not the natural method be to cast lots? Assuming that the two electors 
 w'ere left to their own resources, removed from all outside intlueuces, would not this be the 
 only rational means by which they could make a choice ? 
 
 There are doubtless some minds who would have an innate feeling against resorting to 
 such practice ; the casting of lots being more or less associated with dice-playing, lotteries 
 and games of chance, to which objections are taken on good and sufficient grounds ; but in 
 the case presented there remains no way of reaching a decision e.\cept by lot. What other 
 course could be followed ? A contest would not mend matters ; a trial of physical strength 
 and endurance would be at once futile and indefensible. If the object be to turn the two 
 into a single representative unit, unanimity is essential, and while agreeing in nothing else 
 they could agree in casting lots. Is the principle of sottlenic-nt by casting lots in itself 
 •objectionable? Was it not considered wise and good in ancient times? And would it not 
 be equally good to-day ? It is certainly a time-honored usage for determining diflicult 
 questions, and is exemplified in many i)assages in Holy Scripture ; indeed the uniform voice 
 of Scripture goes to show that decisions thus oljtained are not oidy wholly unobjectionable in 
 themselves, but that tliey were considered to have been overruled and directed by 8i)ccia 
 providential interposition. 
 
 I shall cit'^ but one example, tlie selection of an apostle to take tlie i)lace of .Indus 
 Iscariot. An account of tliis election by casting lots is given in the " Acts of tin; .ApostliM," 
 •Chap. I, verses 15-26. It is stated that about a hundred and twenty persons were called 
 upon to select one of their number. They jirocecded with delil)erato wisdom to follow a 
 usage regarded by them as a means of obtaining the divine mind. They determined by lot 
 who should be the twelfth ai»OHtle, and thus they made a selection to which a clieerful 
 acquiescence was unanimously given. 
 
 I have assumed a case of two electors, and pointed out the course which might be 
 followed— indeed, the only rational course which could be followed. If the i)riiicipl<- laid 
 <lown be sound, could it not be applied in other cases? Let us assume that the electorate
 
 120 APPENDIX. 
 
 consists of twenty voters, what could be clone in this case? If individual votei's in the elec- 
 torate were equal in all respects, as in the first case referred to, the question would be a very 
 simple one, as it might be settled by casting lots for one of the twenty equally eligible per- 
 sons. It may be taken for granted that under the circumstances no one would object t" 
 make the selection in this way, as being the simplest and best mode of making a choice. It 
 would remove antagonism and promote unanimity ; and, by the very act of casting lots, each 
 one of the twenty taking part therein would be an assenting party to the choice made. Men 
 as we ordinarily find them are, however, not alike ; they differ much in their qualifications, 
 and their opinions are not the same ; we must therefore consider cases in which equal eligi- 
 bility and uniformity of mind in the whole electorate is not the rule. 
 
 First, let us suppose that among the twenty electors, five votes favor the choice of A, 
 another five B, another C, and the remainder D. We should have A, B, C, D each equally 
 desired and preferred as the representative of the twenty. 
 
 (A+ B+ C + D)-i-i would therfore be the representative unit of the whole. We cannot, 
 however, take one quarter of A, B, C, and D, and combine these quarters so as to form one 
 individual, but we can reduce the four to one by the principle of casting lots. One of the 
 four can be selected by what may be termed the ' ' Apostolic " method, and the person so 
 selected would be recognized as chosen by the twenty electors as the common representative 
 of the whole. 
 
 Secondhj, let us suppose a case in which there is less diversity of opinion ; two groups of 
 five electors each favor A, one group of five prefer B, another C. The selected men would 
 thus stand A, A, B and C, and the representative unit of the whole would be {2A +B+ C)-r-4. 
 As in the previous case, this complex would be reducible to a single individual by casting 
 lots, and it is obvious that the probability of the lots falling upon A would be as two to one. 
 
 Third, suppose three groups of five electors desire to be represented by A and one gx'oup 
 by B. In this case we should have (.3^ + B)-r-i, as the representative unit : in selecting one 
 by lot, there is undoubtedly a possibility of the lot falling upon B, but the probability of 
 A's being chosen would be three times greater than the probability in B's case. True it may 
 be said that there should be no possibility of B's being chosen in a constituency where three- 
 fourths of the electors desire A. We must, however, bear in mind that the object is not so 
 much to have particular sections of the country, as to have the whole nation, fairly repre- 
 sented in parliament. If we look a little further, if we take four constituencies precisely 
 similar to the one under consideration, according to the mathematical theory of probabilities, 
 there would be returned out of the four, three members in sympathy with A and one 
 member in sympathy with B. Again, if we carry the matter still further if we take into 
 consideration every one of the constituencies into which for convenience the whole nation 
 may be divided, it M'ould be found as a general result that the representatives returned to sit 
 in Parliament would collectively represent the nation and fairly embody the reason contained 
 in the whole community. 
 
 There is one peculiarity of the system suggested which may be noticed ; in every case 
 the election of a representative would be efi'ected deliberately and without conflict. It 
 would be accomplished in fact with unanimous assent. Each individual voter would con- 
 tribute toward a common result — a result which would be reached on principles equally just 
 and fair to all, and thus command general acquiescence. 
 
 , These results are attainable only by bringing to bear, on matters of doubt or difficulty, 
 the principle of settlement adopted by the Apostles. That principle cannot be objected to 
 on scientific grounds, and those who hold the belief that mundane affairs are over-ruled and 
 directed, should have no ditficulty in accepting it as a means of jjromoting harmony and 
 advancing the common good. The belief in a Providence, who takes cognizance of the 
 affairs of men, is the foundation of all religion ; communities therefore, the social fabric of
 
 A PROBLEM IX POLITICAL SCIENCE. 121 
 
 which is based on Christianity, should have no hesitation in leaving matters of the highest 
 moment to the arbitrament of an infinitely wise Providence rather than to the settlement of 
 men with all their individual interests and seltish views, all their prejudices, all their 
 passions, and all their errors of judgment. 
 
 I have so far, for the purpose of the argument, assumed hj^jothetical cases ; it remains 
 to be considered how the principles laid down may be applied practically. Let us take for 
 example the election of a single representative in a constituency of 2,000 voters. It is desir- 
 able in the lirst place that each voter, or group of voters of one mind, should have perfect 
 freedom of choice in the nomination. Suppose, in order to accommodate every shade of 
 opinion, it be arranged that each hundred voters of one way of thinking name the person 
 whom they would wish to represent them. 'this would separate the constituency into 
 twenty groups of voters, who would each nominate whomsoever they most favored. It does 
 not necessarily follow that there would be twenty persons nominated in the constituency, as 
 two or more groups might nominate the same person : a circumstance which would iucrease 
 the probability of his selection exactly in proportion to the number of groups making him 
 their nominee. On the twenty nominations being made, the next step would be for the 
 person nominated to proceed on the principles above set forth, to select one of themselves. 
 
 If unable to make an unanimous choice, they might, as in the case of the twenty elec- 
 tors choosing a representative, sort themselves into smaller groups and, by the application of 
 the principles set forth, proceed to reduce the number of voting uuits, and finally, by the 
 apostolic method, determine the election of one person. The person so chosen would be held 
 to be the common choice of the whole 2,000 to represent the constituency in Parliament. 
 
 In the carrying out of such a system, there would be, as in every system, a number of 
 possible contingencies for which provision would have to be made ; these I have not deemed 
 it necessary at present to enter into. My object has been briefly to suggest leading principles 
 by which, as it appears to me, the central idea may be realized. If the principles submitted 
 )je sound, I venture to think that it is not impracticable to devise proper machinery to elect 
 representatives who, when brought into one delibei'ate gathering, would, so far as such a 
 thing is possible, be a mathematical concentration of the whole electoral body — would in fact 
 constitute an assembly which would closely approximate to the ideal Parliament. 
 
 Referring to the present system an eminent writer asks : " Is government only possible 
 by the conflict of opposing principles?" The familiar expression, "government of the 
 people by the people " cannot be held to mean government of the whole by a part or Ijy the 
 conflict of host'le parts. It must be obvious the united energy and wisdom of a whole nation 
 ilirected towards one end can only be fully realized, when the supreme p(.wer is vested in a 
 Parliament chosen Ity the whole people, and fairly representing the whole people. This is 
 the great problem for solution and it is manifest that if such a Parliament is ever tn be 
 constituted, the people, in choosing members to represent them, must in some way be brought 
 to act not in contestation and conflict, but in concert and in concord. 
 
 If it be one of the first of political desiderata to liave no large minorities left unrepresented 
 in the national a.ssenddj', it aijpears to me essential to sock for some means of securing the 
 co-operation of the wliole body of the electors in the electi<m of members to sit in the Uigli 
 Court of Parliament. To obtain this result it is obviously expe<lient to adopt a syHtem wliich 
 necessarily does not develop animosity or provoke hostility ; the aim .should be to promote 
 fiiendliness and agreement in a matter which concerns all alike. It cannot be denied tiiat 
 the whole community is concerned in having in I'arliament, not men of extreme views, but 
 mojf rate- minded men of good common sense and good conscienci', capable of rcprcMenting 
 the more eidightened electoral mind. J5y electing representatives on the ]irinciple» laid down, 
 these desirable objects would undoubteilly in a large measure bo attaineil ; every step woul 1 
 be deliberately taken, free from the excited and heated feelings which mo frequently nccomixmy 
 ordinary elections. In every stage of the proceedings there would be a tendency to nl urn
 
 122 APPENDIX. 
 
 only the best men. At the very first step it is obvious that a candidate must be a person 
 respected and supported by a hundred electors. It is presumable that no hundred electors 
 of any class or race or creed would deliberately put forward a base or unworthy or even an 
 inferior individual ; it is not to be su^jposed that they would choose one of the least 
 intelligent or least honest or least reputable among them as their representative in the 
 candidature. As a rule, electors of one mind would arrange themselves into groups of one 
 hundred, and each group would select some man, who, on his merits as a citizen, would 
 creditably represent them, or who as a statesman would commend himself to their favour. 
 In their turn, those selected by the hiindreds would follow the same course, selecting 
 generally the best, the worthiest and wisest men until the ihial choice was reached and a 
 member selected to represent the constituency in Parliament. 
 
 It can scarcely be doubted that if such a system could be put in force, the tendency 
 would be upwards from first to last, and that there would be drawn to the legislature 
 accomplished statesmen, men endowed with wisdom and patriotism, practical knowledge and 
 experience. 1'he inevitable effect would be to allay the spirit of faction and remove political 
 rancour. In a higher degree than under the ordinary method of electing members, the 
 system would attract within the pale of Parliament men in generous sympathy not with a 
 part only, but with the whole people. Thus might be constituted an august body which as 
 closely as possible would be a true mirror of the enlightened mind of the nation to reflect its 
 opinions, its wisdom, and its virtues. 
 
 In a Parliament so constituted, perfect unanimity on all questions, perhaps on any 
 question, is not to be looked for, and each separate question would have to be settled, as it 
 arose, by the voice of a majority. Hence it may be said that as every question would in the 
 end have to be determined by a majority, the Parliament as proposed would be no improve- 
 ment on the present. It will, however, readily be seen that there is a wide difference 
 between a parliament representing the whole people, deciding questions by a majority of its 
 own members, and a Parliament in which a part only of the electors has any voice. The 
 proposed assembly would not consist of men placed in their seats in direct opposition to a 
 large number of the people, but a Parliament formed through the co-operation and assent of 
 the whole body of the electors, to promote their common welfare ; it would approximately 
 be a microcosm, so to speak, of the nation. In and through this Parliament each and every 
 elector would have an equal voice in public affairs. 
 
 The proposal is to substitute in our Parliamentary elections the principle of co-operation 
 for the principle of antagonism, and by this means to choose representatives, who when 
 brought together in a deliberative assembly would realize the true idea of Parliament — a 
 " Witenagemot or great council of wise men," representing every part of the realm, and im- 
 bued with the spirit of the whole, to act in the name of the whole, and speak the voice of the 
 united nation. 
 
 If such a Parliament be an object to be desired ; if it be a fundamental principle that 
 all who bear the taxation should share in the representation ; if it be the sacred right of 
 every elector to have a just and proper i-epresentation in Parliament ; then it must be 
 recognized as a paramount duty, and an object worthy of the highest efforts of the progressive 
 statesman, to find some means by which such a legislative body may be realized. A complete 
 solution of the problem may be remote, but as has been stated, Parliament is a growth and 
 development, and in all matters into which the principle of growth enters, the element of 
 time must also enter. The question vitally concerns all free communities, and any change 
 must in the nature of things be preceded by a deliberate and impartial enquiry. I have 
 ventured to submit a scientific solution ; it may not be the best means of attaining the 
 desired end, and I offer it with all diflSdence merely as a contribution to the general dis- 
 cussion, in the hope that it may not be wholly barren of utility. I cannot but think that 
 f the strictly scientific habit of mind be brought to bear on the question, some practical
 
 THE DEGRADATION OF OUR POLITICS. 123 
 
 method of solving the problem will slowly and surely be evolved, ^^'hateve^ the solution, I 
 humbly think that it must be based on principles which -n-ill not beget the conflicts and 
 contestations which resiilt from political acti\aty under the present system. 
 
 It is held by the most eminent political economists t'lat by co-operatiug two men will 
 do more work and do it better than four men, or four times four men acting in opposition. 
 Is not the rule of universal application ? Can there be co-operation without harmony ? Can 
 there be antagonism without discord ? And are not discord and harmony in the state likened 
 unto disease and health in the human budy? This much will be conceded; the chronic 
 feuds between tribes and races which characterized the history of the human familj' in a less 
 advanced stage of civilization no longer exist. War is manifestly not the normal condition of 
 society in our time. Is it not therefore an anachronism to perpetuate hostility in the internal 
 affairs ot a nation ? Is it not in the highest interest of the state that each member of the 
 commuuitj', in every matter which concerns him as a citizen, should have the fullest 
 opportunity of acting up to the injunction, "Live j)eaceably with all men?" If the age of 
 belligerency has passed away, is it not eminently lit and proper that we should seek the 
 removal of the last vestiges of a belligerent age which still remain in our political system ': 
 
 THE DEGRADATIOX OF OUR POLITICS. 
 
 Bti Dr. F. A. P. Barnard, in " The Forum," Vol. IX. 1S90. 
 
 Under the early presidents, appointments to ofhce were made in the true spirit of the 
 Constitution. A certain service was to be performed in the interest of the public, and a man 
 possessing the requisite capacity and tried character was looked for to perform it. Appoint- 
 ment as a reward of partisan service, and removal as a punishment for difl'ereuce of political 
 opinion, were unknown. In the first division of parties, the strength was \t-ith the Federal- 
 ists, and George Washington, their candidate, was elevated to the presidental chair. But 
 <ieorge Washington was lirst of all a patriot, and only in the second place a Federalist ; and 
 his earliest executive act was to appoint to the leading place in his cabinet his most conspic- 
 uous political opponent, since known as the father of American Democracy, Thomas 
 Jefferson ; while Alexander Hamilton, the champion of the party which had just triumphed 
 in his own election, was assigned to a lower seat at the same council board. And in this 
 large and liberal and magnanimous spirit were made all the appointments to office during 
 the a<lministratifm of that great man. If under his earlier successors (lie same noble niagiian- 
 iniity was not the invariable rule, there was at least no large departure from it for more tiian 
 thirty years. There came a time at length, however, when the chair of state was filled by a 
 man who chose to make himself the chief of a party and not of the country, or, rather, in whoso 
 view no country existed exce])t the party supporting him. Under the iron rule inaugurated 
 by this energetic chief, ever}' incund^ent of a federal utiice, no matter liow insignilicant, wlio 
 was jtresunied not to have been favorable to the revolution wliich brought the new dyiuisty 
 into power, was unceremoniously ejected from the puljlic service ; and in Idling the nniltitude 
 of j)laf.es thus vacated, the (lualitications demanded were no longer lioni-sty, competency, 
 and fidelity to the Constitution, but, instead of these, activity and zeal in the service of 
 the party and devotioAto the party chief. 
 
 From that time to the present, the character of tlie civil service of the country has 
 been steadily falling lower and lower. Among the h< rvants of tlic public, the jtublic interest 
 is the last thing thought of. I'ather, on the other iiand, tlie public treasure is regarded by 
 those into whose hands it has fallen not otherwise than as tiio merchandise of a rich caravan 
 is regarded by the Bedouins of the desert— a legitimate booty, to be seized w^itli favoring
 
 124: APPENDIX. 
 
 opportunity and divideil aniong the members of the successful baud. Not even in the 
 beginning was any attempt made to conceal the mercenary character of the new system. It 
 was even defended as a just system in the highest legislative council of the nation, l)y a 
 very prominent leader of the part}' which first profited by it, whose pithy enunciation of its 
 fundamental principle will never pass from the memory of man — "To the victors belong the 
 spoils." But it is no longer the system of a particular party. It has become the recognized 
 system of all parties, until the continually-recurring political struggles by which the country 
 is agitated have ceased to be contests over great questions of constitutional law or govern- 
 mental jjolicy, but have degenerated into discreditable squabbles to determine which of two 
 bodies of political cormorants, both equally unworthy, shall be permitted to prey upon the 
 public. Under its operation the very character of our government has been changed. 
 
 This violation of the spirit of the Constitution in prostituting the power of appointment 
 to be an instrument of reward and punishment, oi-iginated as we have seen, in the will of a 
 single man, strong enough in an abnormal popularity to force his own measiires upon the 
 country in spite of a hostile legislature, and to convert the government for a time into a 
 practical despotism. He was accustomed indeed to speak of the government as ' ' my gov- 
 ernment," and of himself as one " born to command" ; and had he been asked to define the 
 state, would, probably, like Louis XIV., have answered, L'Hat c'est mot. But his 
 imperial mantle fell upon a successor fashioned in a far inferior mould and infinitely less 
 daring in temper, who, though not suited to the bold role of avowed dictator, was possessed of 
 an astuteness which amply compensated for this defect. It was his boast to tread in the foot- 
 steps of his illustrious predecessor, and in some respects he certainly improved upon the 
 example his predecessor had set him. To him is believed to have been due an important 
 discovery, if not in the science of political economy, at least in the economy of scientific 
 politics— that the power of governmental patronage may be indefinitely increased by the 
 ingenious expedient of employing middle men in its dispensation. The middle man, who 
 must be a man worth buying, is bought by the privilege of bestowing the benefaction ; the 
 final recipient is bought by the benefaction itself. The men most woith buying by this 
 participation in the power of appointment are naturally to be found, and they were found, 
 among the members of the legislative body ; and by firmly attaching a sufficient number of 
 these, in interest as well as in sympathy, to the recognized head of the party in power, there 
 was secured to the executive the incalculable advantage of a never-failing and indiscriminate 
 support, in that body, of all his measures. The system thus introduced speedily and 
 effectually took i-oot, and has since become the established system of American politics. No 
 matter what party is in power, it is always practiced. But it has wrought, in the experience 
 of years, a consequence which the inventor certainly never anticipated ; for the privilege 
 which the middle men ab first received with thankfulness, they now, in virtue of a long- 
 undisturbed possession, boldly demand as a right. The spoils of victory are claimed as the 
 common property of the victorious band ; the right of the chief to control its distribution is 
 set at defiance ; and thus the executive, with which the system originated, has been shorn 
 by it of the power to name its own subordinates, and the government of the Constitution 
 has practically ceased to exist. 
 
 In its place has grown up something which adinits of no classification among systems of 
 government ancient or modern. Republican in form, as nominally representative, it is yet 
 not a republic ; for its representatives, though chosen by the people, are not the people s 
 choice. Democratic in methods, as seemingly resting on universal suffrage, it is yet not a 
 democracy ; for the periodical appeal to the popular voice is a ceremohy as empty and unreal 
 as a plebiscite under the Second Empire. Though the government of a class, it is not an 
 aristocracy ; for it is largely composed of elements least of all deserving of respect. And 
 though the government of a few, it is not an oligarchy de jure, though it is such de facto : 
 for it exists by no recognized right, and its existence is not even confessed. The imperfection 
 of language "has necessitated the invention of a new form of words to describe it ; and this
 
 THE DEGRADATION OF OUR POLITICS. 125 
 
 has been supplied, bj' those most familiar with its workings, in the felicitous expression, 
 " machine government. " No phrase could have been better chosen. A machine is a con- 
 trivance in which numerous separate elements are combined for the eflfective application of 
 force to a determinate object. Such is the poHtical machine. It is composed of a class of 
 men who make politics a profession, and whose ruling aim in life is to make their profession 
 profitable. In order to do this, it is necessary to secure the possession of all places of trust 
 and emolument under the government to men of their own class. And in order to do this 
 again, it is further necessary that the people shall be deprived of the option to clioose other 
 men. The effectiveness of the machine is most strikingly illustrated in the thoroughness 
 with which this object is accomplished. So long as forms of popular election are maintained, 
 party di\'isions among the people are, of course, inevitable. And it is as true of parties as 
 of armies, that without organization, unity of purpose, and concert of action, there can be 
 no success. To control the party organization is therefore the aim of the professed politician, 
 and experience has shown that this is comparatively easy. The process is a curious combina- 
 tion of fraud and farce. 
 
 The first step in it, is what is known as "engineering the primaries." The primaries 
 are in theory assemblies of the sovereign people. Their province is to select delegates to a 
 representative convention, having for its function to set forth publicly the principles for 
 which the party ostensibly contends and to name its standard-bearers. The primaries are 
 easily engineered. Their business is carefully prepared for them in advance, even to the 
 designation of their own officers. At the appointed hour, the cajitains of tens and the cap- 
 tains of fifties are prompt in attendance ; a machine politician is called to the chair by a vote 
 without a count ; a machine politician proposes the nominees ; the nominations are declared 
 to be adopted ; and the engineering of the primary is complete. The management of the con- 
 vention is almost equally simple. Being made uj) of machine politicians, it knows very well 
 what it has to do, and it docs it. The really important part of its work has been prepared 
 for it in anticipation of its meeting by a process conducted in secret, known among machine 
 l»oliticians as "making up a slate." In general, the slate, after the observance of certain 
 decorous formalities, is duly ratified ; but occasionally, as there will now and then l)e 
 factions within factions, the slate may be broken, and a new one produced — a result, how- 
 ever, of no importance to the country, since it is perfectly understood that the winning party 
 in any case shall have the use of the macliine. The portion of the work of tlie convention 
 which is designed for popular effect, is the declaration of principles, technically calleil a 
 " platform." This is a beautiful piece of composition, glowing in every line witli patiiotii' 
 an 1 virtuous sentiment, setting forth with earnest emphasis a variety of indisputable propo- 
 sitions, and embellished with a clioice selection of those glittering generalities which sound 
 so well and, when we think of it, seem to mean so little. These may be varied from time to 
 time according to circumstances ; l)ut there are one or two specifications wliicli, as being 
 always in place and particularly well-sounding, are ([uite indisijensable to any properly- 
 constructed platform. These are, first, a peremptory demand for the retrenchment of tlic 
 public expenditure ; and, secondly, a proper denunoiatif)n of the ungrateful miscreants who 
 would rob our brave soldiers and sailors of tlieir •well-merited pensions. The i)latforni l)eing 
 duly promulgated, the work of the convention is done. 
 
 In tiie meantime, the opposing party lias been going ihrougli with a performance entirely 
 similar ; and the result is that the simple citizen, or the " man outside of politics," lins no 
 alternative but to stay outside altogether, or to choose the machine with which lie will run. 
 There remains, of course, the expedient of independent action ; but such action in only labor 
 wasted, unless it be so wisely concerted, so tlion.ugldy organized, and so energetically prose- 
 cuted as to become powerful enough to break both machines. It must be attempted, if 
 at all, under enormous disadvantages. The a<lvantage of ex|)enence in against it ; if 
 must oppose raw volunteers to disciplined and veteran trooi)8. 'J'lie advantage of poHJti.tn 
 is against it ; one of the parties is already in possession of the government. The
 
 126 APPENDIX. 
 
 advantage of instrumentalities is against it ; the custom house, the post oflice, the internal- 
 revenue bureau, the land office, and all the other ramilications of the civil service, 
 are so many engines in the hands of the enemy. And, finally, the advantage of access to the 
 public ear is against it ; for the periodical press is largely either subsidized by existing 
 parties or in sympathy with them 
 
 It would be an oflSce wholly ungracious thus to set forth the evidences of our moral and 
 political decadence, were there not a hope behind, that, out of the unpleasing exhibit, there 
 might grow some suggestion of good. It is only l)y portraying the evil in its fullest magni- 
 tude that we can be thoroughly impressed with the lesson of its accompanying danger. For 
 there is before us a danger greater and graver than any we have yet encountered. Hitherto 
 the forms of our Constitution have been respected, though the spirit has been perverted. 
 Hitherto our personal rights have been secure, though our political franchises have been 
 practically lost. We need but travel a little further on the downward road, and even those 
 relics of our liberties will be swept away. In the grand corruption which made for a time 
 the commercial metropolis of our country an illustration of the ills the people suffer 
 when the wicked bear rule, we had almost reached the point at which law itself ceases 
 to have efficacy, and the most sacred rights of person and property become the sport 
 of the caprice of any adventurer bold enough and bad enough and strong enough to throttle 
 justice in her own temples. The example of that tyranny was typical of the system which 
 rules the country. It was only a little in advance of the general progress. But nothing is 
 more surely written in the book of destiny than that, unless effectual remedies be speedily- 
 devised to arrest this downward tendency, what was true of New York in 1870 wiU, long 
 before the close of another century, be true universally ; and more than that, the career of 
 defiant corruption will culminate inevitably in the downfall of all law, and a sea of auarchj^ 
 and a social chaos will engulf all rights of the citizen, personal or political. 
 
 Are there, then, remedies for these evils ? Undoubtedly there are, but they are remedies 
 which, if applied at all, must be applied by the people themselves, and which can only, or 
 will only, be applied by a people thoroughly aroused to their danger and their duty. 
 
 The wide departure from the principles of the Constitution which is the source of all our 
 woes, has been owing to the abuse of power in the hands of the men who hold it. We need, 
 therefore, no change in the Constitution, but a return to the Constitution ; no change in the 
 laws, but a great change in methods of administration ; and to this end we must have men 
 in power not wedded by habit to existing abuses, or bound to them by interest. How shall 
 this object be secured ? 
 
 We should teach our youth, therefore, that the first duty of every good citizen is at 
 present to use his most energetic efforts for the breaking up of machine government ; for it 
 is through the political machine that the people have been practically divested of their 
 rights, and subjected to the rule of a usurping and unscrupulous oligarchy. 
 
 In order to this, effort must begin at the bottom. If the system of what is called 
 regular nominations is to be continued, the nominations must be honest nominations of honest 
 men. The pi-imary meetings in which they originate must be I'eally meetings of the honest 
 voters, must be organized and controlled by the honest voters, and must express the will of 
 the honest voters ; instead of being what they have so long been heretofore, close caucuses 
 of petty pot-house politicians, employed to give the outward forms of regularity to corrupt 
 arrangements already perfected in secret. And this they will be, as soon as honest voters do 
 their duty, by direct and personal participation in the selection of the men who are in turn 
 to name their rulers. 
 
 Our young men should also be instructed as to the nature and use of parties in poli^al 
 affairs, and taught to distinguish the limitations within which the action of such is healthful, 
 and beyond which it may be destructive of the ends of good government. Upon every great 
 measure of public policy, and upon every great question of constitutional interpretation.
 
 PARLIAMENTARY VS. PARTV GOVERNMENT. 1:^7 
 
 opinions will necessarily be divided ; and on these divisions will inevitably arise opposing 
 parties, which, in spite of their differences, may be equally honest and equally patriotic. 
 But it is in the nature of things human that these points of difference cannot be eternal. 
 Questions of public policy cease with the occasion out of which they grew. Questions of 
 constitutional law umst in some form or other be at length adjudicated. But though with 
 the disappearance of the originjil cause of difference the reason of their being is itself removed, 
 it is rarely the case that parties recognize the fact that their usefulness has ceased, and 
 voluntarily dissolve themselves. For while the questions dividing them were living ques- 
 tions, it was unavoidable that the struggle over these should take the practical form of a 
 struggle for the possession of the government, and these being lost, the possession of the 
 government becomes itself the object of contention, the greed of gain becomes the bond of 
 union, and selfishness takes the place of patriotism as the ruliu" motive. 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY VS. PARTY GOVERN.MENT. 
 
 Address ai Queen's University, by Chancellor Fleming, iSgi. 
 
 The matter which I take upon myself to bring to your notice involves the consideration of 
 an evil to which it is impossible to shut our eyes, and in the removal of which every hones 
 minded person i.N directly interested ; and tliis fact will I am sure be accepted as my reason for 
 dealing with it specifically. Wherever there is a public evil, there is a public wrong to be 
 riglued ; and it becomes a duty, which we owe to the community, to apply our utmost intelli- 
 gence to discover the proper remedy, and act with energy in its application. The theme of 
 my address is Party Government versus Parliamentary Government. 
 
 At the recent prolonged meeting of parliament at Ottawa, there was brought to light a series 
 of transactions, which have given a shock to the moral sense of many of our people. These 
 revelations will little surprise those who are familiar with public affairs in the United States. 
 
 I believe I am correct in saying, that in Canada we have not reached the length which our 
 neighbours have attained in what passes by the name of "politics." Methods and practices 
 
 have, however, been introduced into our public life, in some respects the same as theirs, and if 
 
 our system has not yet reached the same development we may reasonably e.xpect that if wc 
 
 continue on the path which they have followed and which we have entered upon, we shall in 
 
 course of no long time arrive at the same goal. 
 
 In a work recently issued from the press, " Bryce's American Commonwealih," tliere arc 
 twenty-three chapters devoted exclusively to the subject of government by party, and many of 
 the otlier chapters have a bearing on the same matter. Within the pages of tiiis valuable and 
 instructive work we find a full and detailed account of the party system which prevails among 
 our neighbours. The author describes at length the business of tlie politician, the macliinery of 
 parties, how it works an<l what it effects. lie reveals the fact that the niachinery has many and 
 costly ramifications, and that a great deal of money is required to keeji it in motion. Wlierc the 
 money comes from is anotlier question. He points out that " the politicians themselves belong 
 to, or emerge from a needy class " and the funds generally nuist come from other sources than 
 the pockets of the men m(jst actively engaged, but from whatever source money may in the first 
 place be obtained, the startling conclusion is irresistibly reached that " the whole cost in the long 
 run is thrown on the public." 
 
 At the first glance it is not easy to sec that this conclusion can apply to the party out of 
 power and in no position to help themselves. The author, however, exjilains that its members 
 live on hope ; they hope that they will eventually succec<l in overthrowing their opponents
 
 128 APPENDIX. 
 
 and are buoyed up with the belief that the minority of to-day will be the majority of to-morrow. 
 He points out that as a fund must be raised meanwhile to carry on the struggle, the vassals of 
 the party are assessed and subscriptions levied on manufacturers, contractors, office seekers and 
 expectants generally. Thus, claims are established on the spoils which sooner or later will come 
 under the control of the party. When the victorious day arrives, the expectants do not as a rule 
 allow their claims to be forgotten. 
 
 One thing clearly brought out by the author is that enormous sums are expended by each 
 party contending for the mastery. Those, engaged in the conflict, maintain journals, employ 
 writers, speakers, canvassers and agitators ; in fact an army of professional politicians finds 
 employment in this kind of warfare. The necessity of a party fund is apparent. If money is 
 the root of all evil, it is likewise the main-spring of party activity ; the greater the activity, the 
 larger the demand on the purses of those who have something to give, or something to expect. 
 
 Party organizations on both sides are on an elaborate scale, and nothing is left undone by 
 each contestant to advance party interest. It is civil war on a gigantic scale. There are hostile 
 camps everywhere. The nation is formed into two divisions, each division contending and 
 struggling for the supremacy. The rank and file are drilled by the professional politicians, who 
 manage the nominations, dictate who are to be the candidates, and generally direct the contest so 
 as to carry the elections. The party managers are, for the most part, men who make politics the 
 sole, or chief business of their lives, and who live and flourish by the occupation. The list, not 
 seldom, includes ministers of state, or those who expect to be ministers, members of congress, or 
 those who expect to be members ; it also comprises those, who make the party to which they are 
 attached a stepping stone to power and place ; and who if they do not at once attain their ends, 
 are rewarded meanwhile if in no other way by the excitement which is stimulated by contest. 
 
 The fullest and most painstaking enquiry into the whole system leads the author to describe 
 the general result in the following words : " The tremendous power of party organization has 
 been described. It enslaves local officials, it increases the tendency to regard members of con- 
 gress as mere delegates, it keeps men of independent character out of local and national politics, 
 it puts bad men into place, it perverts the wishes of the people, it has in some places set up a 
 tyranny under the form of democracy." 
 
 This conclusion arrived at by the latest independent authority is not disputed in any quarter. 
 It is supported by every writer of any note. Albert Stickney in " Democratic Government," 
 1885, says : "The practical result of the present political system in the United States, which at 
 first sight seems in form so thoroughly democratic, has been to develop the most ingenious and 
 remarkable tyranny known in all political history. . . . The political life of the nation 
 is a never-ending struggle for political power between rival factions — all of them brought into 
 existence by the same cause, obeying the same laws, using the same methods, compelled, whether 
 they wish to or not, to prostitute the power of public ofhce to personal ends. The result is a 
 new kind of tyranny— the tyranny of the election machine. Under this system political 
 freedom for the citizen cannot exist." 
 
 Henry George in "Social Problems,' 1890, writes: "Speaking generally of the whole 
 country from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the lakes to the gulf, our government by the 
 people has in large degree become, is in larger degree becoming, government by the strong and 
 unscrupulous. . . . Money and organization tell more and more in elections. In some 
 sections bribery has become chronic, and numbers of voters expect regularly to sell their votes 
 In some sections large employers regularly bulldoze their hands into voting as iliey like. In 
 Municipal, State and Federal politics the power of the ' machine ' is increasing. In many 
 places it has become so strong that the ordinary citizen has no more influence on the 
 government under which he lives than he would have in China. He is, in reality, not 
 one of the governing classes but one of the governed. . . . And he is beginning 
 to accept the situation and leave politics to politicians, as something with which an honest, 
 self-respecting man cannot afford to meddle. . . The type of the rising party leader.
 
 PARLIAMENTARY VS. PARTY GOVERNMENT. 129 
 
 is not the orator or statesman of an earlier day, but the shrewd manager who knows how 
 to handle the 'workers," how to combine pecuniary interests, how to obtaiu money and how to 
 spend it." The same writer in another place referring to the party organization, says : "Its 
 members carry wards in their pockets, make up the slates for nominating conventions, distribute 
 offices as they bargain together, and— though they toil not neither do they spin— wear the best 
 of raiment and spend money lavishly. And who are these men? The wise, the good, the 
 learned ; men who have earned the confidence of their fellow-citizens by the purity of their lives, 
 the splendour of their talents, their probity of public trust, their deep study of the problems of 
 government ? No ; they are gamblers, saloon keepers, pugilists, or'worse, who have made a trade 
 of controlling votes and of buying and selling offices." 
 
 An equally well-known writer, Dr. Goldwin Smith, remarks: "A national conflict every 
 four years for the Presidency, and the enormous patronage that is now annexed to it, must bring 
 everything that is bad to the top, and will end in the domination of scoundrels. The moral 
 atmosphere is darkened with calumny, bribery and corruption and all their fatal effects upon 
 national character. How can the political character of any nation withstand forever the virus of 
 evil passion and corruption which these vast faction fights infuse ?" 
 
 We have thus described to us the character of the machinery which controls political affairs 
 in the republic. Writers generally affirm that public life has become so foul that the best men 
 and the finest intellects take no part in the business of the nation ; that these have been driven 
 off the field and politics have now to a large extent become a prey to unprincipled plunderers. 
 
 It is well to know something about the road we are travelling, and I read these extracts so 
 that we may understand whither we are going, and what is before us if we continue as we have 
 commenced. So long as we travel smoothly and pleasantly we do not think of making enquiries 
 concerning the Way. But when we come to "bad spots," then we ask the next traveller we 
 meet the condition of the road before us. This is exactly our case in political affairs. We have 
 stumbled on a stretch of rough ground ; we enquire the character of the way we have to pass 
 over, and those familiar with it tell us, that it becomes worse and worse, terminating in a quag- 
 mire. With this information, unless we are fatuously blind and criminally indifferent to our fate, 
 we call a halt and consider as to the attempt we should make to find a better route. 
 
 The political path followed in the United States, is "partyism," and we plainly see where it 
 has landed our neighbours. In Canada we have not yet travelled so far, but if anything be 
 wanting to show that we are hurrying on in the same direction, let me read a few sentences from 
 a good authority, the Halifax Herald, the chief organ of one of the parties in Nova Scotia. 
 Within the last few days (Oct. 12), that newspaper, in a leading article, expressed these opinions: 
 "Those who are acquainted with the jiolitical methods of either j^arty might, we presume, furnish 
 the public with an interesting experience of the use and abuse of campaign funtls. . . Party 
 government is an institution in itself, recognized under the political constitution of the country. 
 The organization of a party, its maintenance, and successful working all necessitate large financial 
 outlay. , . The money must be raised, and those who refuse to contribute their fair share, 
 only increase the temptation ever present to the party workers to obtain funds from those who 
 have a financial interest in the success of one party or the other. It is useless to ignore existing 
 conditions. The struggle between rival parlies will continue. Funds for political ])urpo>cs must 
 be raised. It is, therefore, the duty of all good citizens to contribute according to their moans ; 
 and if they fail to do so, the political organizations of rival iiarties must be thrown more and 
 more into the hands of those who contribute to their support from corrupt or selfish motives," 
 
 I lielieve I am warranted in saying that in Canada partyism is not yet developed to tiic 
 extent ficscribcd in the United .States, but recent disclosures show the tendency in |nililic life, and 
 it is perfectly clear that if we act on similar princijilcs and follow the same headlong course, wc 
 cannot fail to reap the same or similar evil consequences. 
 
 We know that there are good men on l)oth sides of politics. It is not tlic want of men, 
 patriotic, public-spirited and able, that we have to deplore, it is the malign influences of the 
 
 9
 
 130 APPENDIX. 
 
 system by which they are enslaved. The best men are draj^ged downwards by the party mael- 
 strom, and once within its vortex they become powerless to escape from its baleful embrace. 
 
 The low tone of public life which we Canadians have already reached, is evidenced by the 
 fact, that no ordinary man in his private dealings, would do that which by a singular obliquity 
 of moral sense is considered unobjectionable in party ethics. It seems to be well understood on 
 both sides, that dishonesty in almost any form only becomes an offence when detection follows ; 
 and if we judge our politicians as described by themselves or by the partisan press, there are few 
 indeed of whose public or private character it is possible to form an exalted opinion. 
 
 It is not necessary to go far a field for evidence of the demoralizing tendency of the 
 political system practised in our own land. The proceedings of the last few months clearly 
 indicate that we have already made a most disquieting progress in our downward course. Can 
 nothing be done to turn it in a right direction? The universal law is that there must be progress. 
 Nothing remains stationary. If we permit the system to remain as it is, the progress will con- 
 tinue downwards ; and the experience of onr neighbors teaches us that as time rolls on we will 
 make the descent at a greatly accelerated speed. 
 
 We may one and all ask the question what in this emergency are we to do ? We do not 
 want retrogression or degradation. We do not desire to go from bad to worse. Our object 
 should be improvement and advancement. 
 
 If this be our aspiration there are certain things which we must not do. We must not fold 
 our hands in despair and leave politics and political affairs wholly to the politicians. We must 
 not close our eyes to the misdeeds which have been brought to light in our own land, or to the 
 experience derived from the United States. The past history of politics in both countries will be 
 of benefit to us if we only determine to profit by it. We must not listen to that school of politi- 
 cians, who tell us that government by party is the only means of carrying on free institutions ; 
 that it is impossible to attain to good government without opposing parties. We must be pre- 
 pared to dismiss from our minds the dogma that partyism is a necessity, however ably or by what- 
 ever number the assertion be made. 
 
 Government by party has been practised in the United States for a hundred years ; in 
 England for two centuries ; in Canada it may be traced from the first year of her legislative 
 existence. In all three countries it has been tried and found wanting. I think I cannot be 
 wrong in laying down the axiom, that no system, however deeply rooted by long usage, however 
 strengthened by prejudice, if founded on evil or productive of evil, can be considered a finality. 
 
 The party system divides a nation into t\\ o halves ; in itself an evil. It is based on princi- 
 ples which nurture some of the worst passions of our nature. It is productive, as everyone must 
 admit, of intolerable evils ; and on every ground we are warranted in the conclusion, that this 
 system should not be held as sacred, or unassailable and unalterable. 
 
 If that much be conceded to us, we may venture a step further and consider if it be at all 
 possible to make a change for the better, a wise and beneficial change. It must be clear to 
 everyone that we cannot continue in the old way, shutting our eyes to what is going on around 
 us. Do not all the facts, all the testimony from every quarter, establish that the old way leads 
 downwards to a lower and lower plane of political demoralization ? 
 
 It is historically true, that the spirit and force of party organizations have, in past genera- 
 tions, been an essential, possibly in some cases, the chief factor in Government. At this day, 
 the system is upheld by men of eminence whose opinions deserve to carry weight. There is 
 indeed a traditional idea of wide prevalence, that the party system alone will suit a free people ; 
 and that the principles upon which it is based are essential to purity of government. Do the 
 facts, may we ask, establish that the party system has resulted at any period of our history in 
 purity of pul)lic life, or has it effected the opposite result ? Has it been proven, that the conten- 
 tions and discords and conflicts of partyism are in any way conducive to our national well- 
 being? Is it the case that subjection to traditional party spirit is indispensable to our freedom? 
 
 Let every thoughtful man, whatever his predilections, consider these questions care- 
 fully and dispassionately, and it will become more and more clear to him, that the party
 
 PARLIAMENTAKY VS. PARTY GOVERNMENT. 131 
 
 system of government, which we have inherited as the accompaniment of representative institu- 
 tions, is no longer a necessity ; that its usefulness has come to an end, th-it it has in its latest 
 development grown to be a positive evil ; and that it should now be replaced by another system 
 better adapted to the improved intelligence and altered circumstances of the age. 
 
 Within the present century, scientific methods have made conquests over traditional methods 
 in nearly every sphere of life. In agriculture, in commerce and in mechanical art the traditional 
 spirit has disappeared, and given place to the scientific spirit. We find that in spinning^ weav- 
 ing, printing, lighting, heating, telegraphing, travellmg by land and sea, and in nearly every 
 human engagement we can name, the scientific method has irrevocably superseded traditional 
 methods. Is the great question we are now discussing to prove an exception ? Is the art of 
 government to remain outside the pale of progress ? Surely parliamentary development has not 
 reached its ultimate stage, and public affairs for ever must be administered according to the 
 principles of the prize ring. Heaven forbid ! Can we not discern some little glimmerings of 
 light, following perhaps the deepest darkness preceding the dawn ? Is it not the case that in 
 modern times the power of tradition has been weakened and that its authority is steadily declin- 
 ing? May we not, therefore, cherish the hope that it may be dethroned in political life ; that 
 we shall not always remain victims of a superstitious belief in the system of government by party ; 
 and that this fair land shall not forever be the battlefield of gregarious politicians ? What this 
 young nation wants is not endless political conflict with all its accompanying evils, but settled 
 rest and peace. 
 
 Our people essentially democratic, and attached to representative institutions, will bear in 
 mind that parliamentary government and party government are not identical, indeed, that they 
 are totally distinct. True they have been so long associated that they have come to be considered 
 inseparable, but reflection will make it clear to us that the connection, even if it be historical, is 
 accidental, and that it is an erroneous popular notion, that a connection between them is a 
 necessary consequence. 
 
 The tendency of events suggests that important changes must eventually be made in the 
 structure of parliament itself Such changes are needed in the direction of unity, simplicity and 
 strength. Our parliament is supposed to represent the nation ; but as at present constituted it 
 practically comprises hut the representatives of two parties. The theory of parliament is an 
 assembly of persons chosen by the whole body of electors with supreme authority to speak and 
 act for the nation. The ideal parliament is the nation in essence, but the system followed in the 
 election of members utterly fails to attain this desired end. Under the party system it is abso- 
 lutely impracticable to attain even an approximation to the ideal parliament. It is true that 
 parliament, formed by means of the existing system, assumes the functions of a perfectly consti- 
 tuted national assembly ; but its memliers represent only a part of the nation, and those who 
 support the administration of the day, and keep it in power, form a still smaller reiircscntative 
 part. Take for example the parliament formed after the general election of 18S7. i'he govern- 
 ment had on this occasion the largest support given to any adniinstration since Canada became a 
 Dominion ; and yet, including every vote polled for government candidates who were defeated at 
 the elections, the supporters of the administration represented only 39 per cent, of the whole 
 bofly of electors. The opposition members represented 37 per cent, of the whole, counting .also 
 the votes polled for the defeated candidates on their side. Thus it becomes jjcrfectly obvious, 
 that a large majority of the people, whatever party may rule, has no jiart whatever through 
 representatives, in the administr.ition of public affairs. In the case referred to 61 iierccnt.of 
 the whole body of electors had no share in the government of the country. The .-idininisir.ilion 
 was supported by the representatives of 39 per cent, and it was opposeil by those of 37 jjer cent, 
 in every measure carried in the house by a party vole ; leaving as a net bal.ance the representa- 
 tives of only two per cent, of the electors to determine legislation, to soltle the policy of the 
 government, and to speak ami act for the nation with the whole weight and supreme authority of 
 parluiment. • I have presented no extreme case. If we take the results of the recent general 
 elections (1891), it will be found that the number of votes cast for government cindidates wjis 
 only 33 per cent, of the electors, and the government net m.ijority in the house rei)resents but
 
 132 APPENDIX. 
 
 one-aml-a-half per cent, of tlie total number of voters on the list. As a matter of fact, the system 
 of government by party enables a minority, frequently a small minority, to seize and hold control 
 of the affairs of state, and award to its friends office, power and patronage with every one of the 
 prizes of party victory. All outside the lines of the successful party are systematically ignored. 
 Do not the facts prove that pany government is opposed to the true theory of parliamentary 
 government ? Is it surprising that in working out the party system the struggle becomes so fierce, 
 and that ways and means are resorted to « hich shock the sensibility of even party men when 
 they come to be exposed to the light of day ? 
 
 What IS the remedy for the state of things which now prevails ? It is not far to seek, and 
 it involves no great constitutional change. We have simply to obey the law of perpetual evolu- 
 tion so that our parliament may become freer and better than it ever has been. We have only 
 to free it from the trammels of party and obtain an assembly which will represent the people in 
 fact as well as in name. Hitherto we have had the shadow, now let us have the substance. In 
 all previous parliaments a part only of the electors, and not necessarily the best part, has been 
 represented. Why should any portion be excluded ? Should not the supreme national assembly 
 command the confidence and reverence of the whole people ? To obtain their confidence and 
 reverence it is obvious that our parliament should represent the \\ hole, and consist as far as 
 possible of the wisest and best men the entire nation has to offer. 
 
 This is the true conception of a parliament for a democratic people such as we are, and we 
 must seek to obtain such a parliament if we wish to escape from the evils which at present beset 
 us. Denouncing the politicians for the inevitable consequences of a bad system, as some of our 
 people do, is an easy matter ; but it is folly to suppose that this alone will bring any permanent 
 remedy. Politicians are human as we are, and they become precisely what the people make 
 them, or allow them to make themselves. If the people so will, and take the proper course to 
 effect their purpose, the school of politicians which flourishes to-day will disappear. 
 
 Having the clearest evidence that we have never had and never can have a perfectly consti- 
 tuted parliament under existing political usages ; having the best grounds for the belief that the 
 system which prevails is hastening us to a condition of political subjection, to an oligarchy of the 
 worst kind, such as we find in the United States ; being satisfied on these points, every good 
 citizen must feel the responsibility resting upon him that he should do his utmost to avert such a 
 national calamity. 
 
 The first important step is to take means to have a perfectly constituted parliament. In 
 Canada we have accepted the great fundamental principle that " the people is the source of all 
 law and all power," we must therefore strive to constitute our parliament so that it will represent 
 not a part, as now, but the whole nation. This step cannot be taken without effecting other 
 changes which would tend to the common welfare ; the chief of which would be that a new com- 
 plexion would be given to the government. We would no longer have a party government ; the 
 executive would proceed from the national assembly and thus would be the veritable focal point 
 of the whole nation. The best and wisest members returned by the people could be chosen by 
 parliament from its own members to sit at the same council board to guard public interests, 
 administer the laws, and speak and act for the nation. 
 
 In a paper published in Volume VII. of the Royal Society proceedings under the heading 
 *•' A problem in political science," I have endeavored to show that by the scientific adjustment of 
 votes and the application of sound principles, the true parliament could be constituted.* I can- 
 
 *The object of my paper "A problem in Political Science," was simply to demonstrate that Parliament 
 could be formed so as to represent truly the whole nation. 
 
 I do not wish it to be thoujjht that I have sciven the only solution to the problem. I merely wish it to be 
 understood, that having established the possibility of constitutinfr the national assembly with scientific 
 accuracy, I felt warranted in urging that an effort should be made to abolish government by party and 
 substitute government by the whole people. 
 
 I do not doubt that features open to objection in the solution presented in my Royal Society paper can he 
 eliminated or that better means may be devised, of attaining the desired object. If a " will " become apparent 
 in the public mind, a " way " will not be wanting:, S. F. 
 
 J
 
 PARLIAMENTARY VS. PARTY GOVERNMENT. I3'i 
 
 not here enter into any extended explanation of the proposition. I must content myself with the 
 statement, that in my judgment it is perfectly practicable by the proposed- plan, even if no better 
 can be devised, to extend to every elector full and equal representation, thus removing the anom- 
 alies I have pointed out. 
 
 The details of the machinery cannot here be discussed. Indeed, it would be premature to 
 deal with details in advance of principles ; but the machinery may be of the simplest character, 
 and being entirely national the cost would be made a direct charge on the state, as the cost of 
 taking the census or of any other public service is borne by the public exchequer. The practical 
 working of the system would be conducted by public officials, specially appointed and held 
 responsible for the proper performance of their duties in the manner of other public officials. 
 The cost of the proposed system of choosing representatives might be considerable : but it 
 would fall far short of the cost of the present system, when the expenditure under two party 
 organizations and every accessory charge are taken into account. Moreover, the whole would be 
 open and above suspicion, and there would be no room for improper practices. Whatever the 
 cost, it would render party organization nugatory, and the gain to the public would be incal- 
 culable. Legislation would certainly be greatly simplified. The sessions of parliament would 
 no longer be prolonged through the interminable and profitless discussions which proceed from 
 party strife. There would be great economy of time and money ; but however great this 
 economy, it would be of small moment compared with the more important benefits which 
 would result generally from the overthrow of a pernicious system, entirely out of joint with the 
 march of events. 
 
 Partyism has an historical origin. It was born in troublesome times, when the spirit of 
 antagonism between the classes was general, and when the masses of people were in a ruder con- 
 dition than they now are. As the ages succeed each other, the spirit of humanity changes with 
 the advance of civilization. We have long passed out of the age of fierce and cruel persecutions. 
 We have left behind us the spirit of conflict and destruction, and have entered the marvellous 
 period of construction and production. Our lives are now more happily passed in the peaceful 
 era of human justice and human reason. If we have left behind the belligerent ages, would it be 
 in advance of our time to abandon political methods in civil life, which keep alive the spirit of 
 conflict and maintain usages which are opposed to true progress ? In intelligent communities at 
 the present day partyism can be viewed only as an anachronism. 
 
 Consider for a moment the consequence if partyism were introduced into modern commercial 
 life. Take a bank, an insurance company or any large business concern. Introduce the prin- 
 ciple of partyism into the management, what would follow ? We should in each case have a 
 house divided against itself, and how long would it stand ? 
 
 Suppose the directors of a railway company were divided, as jiarlies are ranged in parlia- 
 ment. The persistent endeavour of one portion of the board would be directed to keeping the 
 trains in motion ; while the other portion as persistently would do their utmost to throw 
 obstacles in the way. Would the public reap any advantage from the antagonism ? Would the 
 shareholders receive dividends ? 
 
 Take this university. How long would it prosper, how long would it maintain its ground 
 and be useful to the community, if partyism gained a footing so as to cause continual contentions 
 and strife among the trustees, or the senate, or the council ? 
 
 Consider the consequences if partyism were allowed to enter into the proceedings of the 
 great annual assemblies of the several religious denominations. Would it be justifiable on any 
 ground? Would any one of these important bodies perform its functions so speedily and so well? 
 Each one of these great gatherings jiartakcs of the character of parliament, and might with 
 advantage in some respects be imitated. An enormous amount of business is brought before 
 them, and ordinarily they do more in one week than they could in ten weeks if party tactics, 
 such as are displayed at Ottawa, prevailed.
 
 131 APPENDIX. 
 
 Take a much Inunliler well-known illustration. Take an ordinary row boat, allow the crew 
 to fight among themselves, or suppose the rowers determine to pull in opposite directions. It is 
 needless to say there would be much agitation of the water, but little or no satisfactory progress. 
 
 These several illustrations will bring out the well est.iblished fact, that to the extent that 
 conflict is provoked, satisfactory results are lessened ; and that under all ordinary circumstances, 
 conflict is a wasteful expenditure of force. This rule must apply to political and national affairs 
 as to everything else ; and viewing the question before us from all points, we are led to the con- 
 clusion that there is no logical justification for partyism in this age. In order to supersede 
 partyism, it is not at all necessary to broach any new doctrine, revolutionary in its character. In 
 reality the opposite is the case. The desire is to maintain the institution of parliament and make 
 it inore efficient, more perfect and more stable. The design is to realize the ideal national 
 assembly in which every elector may have an equal voice. The aim is to maintain all that is 
 good in the ]->arliamentary system of government, and take away all that is defective and bad ; 
 to remove the worn out vestures of the past which are ill adapted to the growth of the nine- 
 teenth century. The great primary object is to establish unity and promote amity, and thus 
 remove far from us the desolation which proceeds from, a "kingdom divided against itself.'' 
 
 In my humble judgment the question of parliamentary representation is capable of scientific 
 treatment, and it is safe to say that if so treated, partyism, as it now exists, with its banefiu 
 influences and demoralizing effects, would irrevocably be swept away. There are few questions 
 which more deeply affect society and civilization. In the heat of party warfare it cannot be dis- 
 cussed fruitfully, and it is only in the intervals between conflicts, or under conditions removed 
 from the struggle that calm reflection will avail. Iliis question is the great problem of to-day ; 
 it has the strongest possible claim on the attention of every well-wisher of his country who has 
 the qualifications to consider it carefully and dispassionately. I fear it has small chance of being 
 so considered by those who place party triumph higher than country, or who regard fealty to 
 party more binding than the laws of the decalogue. Such hien are wanting in intellectual 
 freedom to approach this subject appreciatively. Even those whose relations with political 
 organizations are not close, so far as they are partisans are they wanting in the qualifications 
 necessary to take a disinterested view of it ? There are many men with whom party advance- 
 ment and success have been the ruling motives ; such men will naturally have a settled unwilling- 
 ness to part company with old associations and the party spirit inherent to them. They will 
 cling with tenacity to their deeply rooted habit of thought. They will extol the atlvantages of 
 party government. They will reiterate that government by party is the only possible means of 
 carrying on representative institutions. They will declare that the abolition of party would 
 mean an end of all order and progress, and would prove the beginning of general desolation. 
 Certain it is that government by party will never be reformed from within, and we may be well 
 assured that every honest attempt to effect a change will be ridiculed as Utopian or branded as a 
 mischievous innovation. True partisans are not the men to yield without a struggle. They will 
 never pull down their own ramparts and surrender their own citadel. The stronghold of 
 partyism can only be sapped and mined by the slow process of public education, and eventually 
 demolished through the common sense of the nation. 
 
 Whatever the present political condition, we may rest satisfied that the great heart of Canada 
 is sound. We may depend upon it that so soon as the nation comes to understand the true 
 nature of the malady, and that a remedy is possible and applicable, from that moment party 
 government will be doomed. 
 
 There is Vjut one cure for the disease under which we suffer. Laws may be passed to prevent 
 scandals begotten of party exigencies ; but ways will be found to elude them, let them be ever so 
 stringent, so long as partyism exists. There is a rankling sore in the body politic. We may 
 heal an ulcer on the surface, but the ulcer is but one of the symptoms, and so long as the deep- 
 seated disease remains it will again break out in another spot or appear in another form. The 
 true physician directs his attention to the source of the ailment, and by proper treatment removes 
 the first cause of the evil and thus purifies the whole system. In this national matter in order to
 
 PARLIAMENTARY VS. PAR I'Y GOVERNMENT. 135 
 
 succeed, the same course must be followed ; and whenever the mind of the nation becomes 
 satisfied that it is the only effective means of getting rid of our political evils, then, and not till 
 then, will partyism be dethroned. 
 
 How is the mind of the nation to be reached on this cardinal problem? The national mind 
 is made up of many indivdual minds, each one of which is a minute fraction of the whole. 
 These fractional parts must in tire first place be moulded and instructed by men of recti- 
 tude, whose powers have been matured by study and observation, men who are watchful 
 of the highest interests of the people. What class better qualified by the nature of their calling 
 for this noble and patriotic duty, than teachers, both liy and clerical, throughout the land ? 
 Obviously we must look mainly to the school, the college and the pulpit for the agencies to 
 enlighten and elevate the individual mind, and, through the individual, the collective mind of the 
 nation. We must first form private opinion, from which pul^lic opinion will slowly and surely 
 form itself. 
 
 It may be objected that ministers of the gospel should not meddle with politics. If politics, 
 degenerating into partyism, have become vicious and impure, so muck the more is it the impera- 
 tive duty of clergymen to employ every proper means to promote a sound and healthy moral tone 
 for the benefit of the community. Is not Canada a Christian land? Does not the census inform 
 us that, with the exception of a kw tribes of Pagan Indians and a few hundred Jews, we are 
 from sea to sea all Christians ? On what ground then should a Christian teacher be debarred 
 from assuming all the duties of his office ? Can he indeed throw off the grave responsibility 
 which rests upon him ? Can he neglect the high duty of using every opportunity to restore 
 public life to a healthy and more upright character? Merely party issues in which no moral 
 element is involved should be absolutely excluded from every pulpit discourse ; but a great 
 question, such as this, in which the public morality, the purity, the honour and the lasting 
 welfare of the whole nation is involved, should be fearlessly dealt with by every clergyman in the 
 land. The influence of the pulpit has been and always will be great, and no better or more 
 eflfective means can be found of enlightening the masses and elevating public opinion to a higher 
 level. It was written a century ago : " the true cure for darkness is the introduction of light." 
 Who better able to introduce light than t'lose who have obtained its possession — the wise and 
 the learned ? Who more fitted to purge politics of its evils than those whose lives have been 
 dedicated to morality and uprightness ? 
 
 In this young country it is only in harmony with nature that everything should be in a con- 
 dition of healthy growth. I know of no reason why our parliamentary system should not 
 partake of the general improvement and advancement. At Ottawa a corner of the curtain has 
 been raised sufficiently high to admit of our seeing evidences of fundamental defects in govern- 
 mental methods, and traces of grave obstacles to our progressive well being. I ask should it not 
 be the earnest aim of every Canadian with the true patriotic spirit to seek to eradicate these 
 defects and remove every obstacle which retards our growth and elevation as a people. 
 
 If this be a Christian country surely the entire moral code of Christianity should be binding 
 on all, and on none more than our law-makers. It is of unspeakable importance iliat wc should 
 find effective means to purify the fountain of legislation. It is a matter of ])ublic economy, 
 public morality and public honour, and our hojies must rest on the three great educational factors 
 which I have nanicfl. In this question, is involved the first and last needs of the Dominion, and 
 we must appeal to our best teachers of all creeds and in all places to set about the task of lifting 
 politics out of partyism into a loftier and healthier atmosphere. True, there arc enormous 
 difficulties to be overcome, but the task is as noble as it is necessary and it i-i rcndercti nobler 
 even if more difficult by the fact that we shall look in vain for a precedent, no other nation having 
 led the way in any successful attempt to bring parliament up to its true ideal condition. The 
 scientific movement of the nineteenth century has accoin|)lished marvellous success, it has been 
 crowned with peaceful victories far more wonderful and far more glorious than military conquests. 
 If, in the new field, the calm voices of science an<l of reason can be heard through the din of
 
 136 APPENDIX. 
 
 party strife, it may be that Canada will do something to accomplish her destiny, by establishing 
 a precet-Ient which all nations possessing free institutions may follow. 
 
 ^Ve remember the familiar phrase " Canada f.rst." These two short words have a strong 
 sterling ring about them. Let Canada be the first in a movement towards a rectification of the 
 national administration, and a recognition of happier political methods. Let the sons of Canada 
 determine to be fii'st in all that is good, to be in the front rank of the great family of British 
 nations. What loftier ambition can we have than to elevate our countiy, and present Canada 
 before all the nations of the earth, a bright example of vigorous, upright youth, in every respect 
 worthy of the historic races from which we spring ? 
 
 PLAN FOR MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 
 
 By Prof. J. R. Commons in "Review of Reviews," Vol. IV., i8gi. 
 
 One of the features of the Australian ballot reform is the provision whereby parties or groups 
 of men, whose numbers give them little political significance, can yet secure representation upon 
 the common public ballots. This provision, however, is incidental to the character of the Austra- 
 lian ballot, and was not the main argument for the striking popular approval of that measure. 
 It was the promise of freedom from bribery and corruption that led to this approval. The 
 American people are not yet sufficiently alive to the rights of minorities to make thoughtful efforts 
 to bring about minority or proportional representation for its own sake. Yet if some plan at once 
 simple and efificient were devised, it is probable that the advantages of such representation would 
 be clearly brought to view. If you can show how to do a good thing, it doesn't take long for the 
 people to see why it should be done. The difficulty with all projects of minority representation 
 has been their awkwardness. It requires a professor of mathematics to apply them. They are 
 not suited to the rough needs of our democratic mass-meetings. This is true of the Hare 
 system, the only one that has received anything like wide attention. This system is now 
 employed in the election of alumni trustees for Amherst and Harvard Colleges, where its 
 unwieldiness is not apparent, since these elections are conducted by correspondence. What is 
 wanted is a plan that can be used not only in elections for college trustees, but in turbulent poli- 
 tical meetings, in all kinds of conventions, societies, and corporations, so that the plan can 
 become a part of the popular habit, just as the motion for the previous question or the distinction 
 between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government is a part of popular habit 
 or way of thinking. In this way such a plan could gradually grow into favor and finally win its 
 way into the highest political organizations, such as Congress and the legislatures. 
 
 Among the multitude of new things proposed or adopted at the recent state convention of 
 the People's party of Ohio was a plan for minority representation which seems to meet these 
 requirements. This plan was devised by Dr. L. Tuckerman, an alumnus of Amherst College. 
 and a prominent Nationalist and labor reformer of Cleveland, Ohio. Dr. Tuckerman has been 
 experimenting upon this plan and perfecting it for several years. He had a definite project 
 before him ; how to harmonize and unite the different incongruous labor elements of the city of 
 Cleveland, such as Nationalists, Socialists, Knights of Labor, Trades Unionists, etc. Under the 
 current plan of elections, the result of attempts to unite such elements resulted in something as 
 follows : Suppose that at a union meeting of these organizations it was voted to elect a committee 
 of five to draft a series of resolutions. Each clique would put forward its own ticket. But only 
 one ticket could be elected. This might include representatives of the two strongest elements, 
 but those which were in the minority would be left out. Consequently a bolt and hopeless 
 antagonisms would be the result. This evil of unrestricted majority-rule is apparent especially in 
 political conventions. Suppose we have a convention of one hundred delegates, divided into two
 
 PLAN FOR MINORITY REPRESENTATION. 137 
 
 factions. It is proposed to elect a committee of five for some purpose. If one faction numbers 
 fifty-five delegates and the other forty-five, the first faction will elect the entire committee and the 
 faction numbering almost half, will have no voice in moulding or tempering the action of the 
 convention. Their only recourse is to bolt, and thus risk the defeat of their party altogether. 
 The evil is recognized by our political conventions, and recourse is taken to the Czar-like policy 
 of putting the nominations of committees in the hands of the chairman. As a result the minority 
 gets representation, but it is in the person of some insignificant figure, who is wholly ignored by 
 the strong characters of the majority. The committees of the American House of Representatives 
 offer an exhibition of this fact. 
 
 The Tuckerman plan provides for wnghing the choices of each elector. If there are five 
 offices to be filled the elector writes on his ballot the names of five candidates in the order of his 
 preference. Then the tellers, in counting the ballots, allot to each name on the ballot a weight 
 of choice corresponding to the position held by that name on the ballot. Thus if the candi- 
 dates A, B, C, D, E, are written on a single ballot in the order given, candidate A will have five 
 units credited to him, candidate B will have four units, C three units, D two units, and E one 
 unit. After all the ballots are counted the units opposite the names of the candidates are 
 added up, and the five having the highest number of units are declared elected. Thus only one 
 ballot is required to elect five officers. Continuing the example given, suppose the candidates 
 A, B, C, D, E are voted for in the order named by each of the fifty-five delegates. The 
 weight of choice would be as follows : — 
 
 Choice. 
 
 Units. 
 
 
 Electors. 
 
 Total Units. 
 
 A. 
 
 5 
 
 X 
 
 55 
 
 275 
 
 B. 
 
 4 
 
 X 
 
 55 
 
 220 
 
 C. 
 
 3 
 
 X 
 
 55 
 
 165 
 
 D. 
 
 2 
 
 X 
 
 55 
 
 no 
 
 E. 
 
 I 
 
 X 
 
 55 
 
 55 
 
 But candidates F, G, H, I, K receive the support of the minority of forty-five electors. 
 The preponderance of choice will run : — 
 
 Candidates. 
 
 Units. 
 
 
 Electors. 
 
 Total Units. 
 
 F. 
 
 5 
 
 X 
 
 45 
 
 225 
 
 G. 
 
 4 
 
 X 
 
 45 
 
 180 
 
 H. 
 
 3 
 
 X 
 
 45 
 
 135 
 
 I. 
 
 2 
 
 X 
 
 45 
 
 90 
 
 K. 
 
 I 
 
 X 
 
 45 
 
 45 
 
 Consequently the successful candidates are A, B, C, F, and G. The majority faction has 
 three representatives, and the minority has two — their first and second choice. According to 
 the current method they would have been unrepresented : but with this plan they can in no pos- 
 sible way be excluded so long as they numl)er one-fifth of the total electors. In such case their 
 first choice would receive one hundred units, bringing him in ahead of the fifth choice of the 
 majority. 
 
 In the manifold applications of the plan there would be variations from the examples given, 
 but the principle is eminently simple. Its results are about iho same as those of the Hare 
 system, so far as the representation of the minority is concerned — in fact the plan is merely a 
 simplification of that methcjd. It diflfers from the Hare |)lan in the device of em])loying the 
 units to compare the weight of choice, and tiicreby tlocs away with recounting the ballots and 
 dropping the names of the lower candidates on the scale. Its i^est results are found in the elec- 
 tion of boards and committees consisting of more than one mcmlier. But where only one odicer 
 is to be chosen, as president fir chairman, the gain comes in the prevention of a deadlock, and 
 this is no small gain, because, as every one knows, it is in the attempt to break a deatllock that 
 our legislatures in electing senators have been the scenes of bargaining and bribery. 
 
 In municipal, state or national elections for representative assemblies, the operation of (he
 
 138 APPENDIX. 
 
 plan would be the same, ami can he illustrated by taking the typical example of a state house of 
 representatives. Let the State for the purpose of electing members of the lower house be divided 
 into districts of such a number that each district would elect five representatives, this being the 
 most convenient number. Then each elector would vote for five representatives in the order of 
 his choice, with the result above shown in the election of committees. If there were three parties 
 in the field, it is probable that the third party would elect members from different districts, by 
 means of this cumulative voting, and the state legislature would be in fact an exact mirror of 
 public opinion. 
 
 Among the other advantages of the general adoption of this plan might be mentioned the 
 following : — 
 
 It would prevent one-man rule such as that exercised by the Speaker of the House of 
 Representatives. Committees could be elected on a general ticket at a single balloting. Mino- 
 rities would have no excuse for bolting conventions, since they would have their ablest men on 
 the committees. Committees would be truly representative. This would also prevent many of 
 the opportunities for ring rule in politics. 
 
 Electors of a minority or third party, besides securing their own first choice, could throw 
 some weight in the scale between the candidates of the other parties. 
 
 In the case of private corporations tliis plan vi^ould seem to offer the means of avoiding some 
 of the most flagrant abuses. It furnishes a very simple device for cumulative voting for directors 
 and officers. 
 
 Finally, the freedom from machine rule, and the possibility of selecting the ablest men of 
 the community without recourse to bargains, is one of the first necessities for the reform of our 
 politics. Cumulative voting and minority representatives would bring this about. If this kind of 
 voting can be simplified, as it has been done by Dr. Tuckerman, there seem to be conclusive 
 reasons for adopting it. Perhaps in the election of city councils and boards of aldermen is the 
 place to begin. 
 
 PARTV' SPIRIT AND ITS VICES. 
 By E. de Laveleye, from " De7nocratic Government" iSgi. 
 
 THE SPIRIT OF PARTY AND ITS DEFECTS. • 
 
 The spirit of party is the necessary motive power of the representative system, and is at the 
 same time its scourge, when institutions in place of combating its excesses aid in its develop- 
 ment by the offer of encouragement and reward. 
 
 The spirit of party resembles the spirit of sect ; it calls into being a special conscience which 
 believes everything permissible for the good cause. The faults of friends are never avowed ; they 
 are never even perceived. The good faith of its adversaries can never be admitted. On their 
 side are only seen fraud, falsehood, injustice, perfidious plots. The desire is to repress them, or 
 without pity to strike them down ; because while they were leading to the abyss of ruin, on the 
 other side the true interests of the country were being defended. With the republican every 
 monarchist is an obscurantist, an abettor of despotism, one full of ambition greedy for favour, an 
 ignoble soul aspiring for servitude. Eor the monarchist every republican is an apostle of disorder, 
 a disciple of guilloiine — the grandson of Marat. Parties engaged in this contest, under the form 
 adapted to the political manners of our days, are nothing elss than those hordes of antiquity who 
 in the heart of the forest disputed for their prey, or the factions which fought with arms in their 
 hands in the Italian republics of the middle age.
 
 PARTY SPIRIT AND ITS VICES. 139 
 
 The spiiit of party is so intolerant, and the creJo so rigid, that whoever fails to defend it as 
 a whole is a traitor. All independence of thought disappears ; every one becomes the slave of 
 the official programme. The statesman with originality of mind becomes a peril ; he is " a horse 
 which kicks out in the ranks " — he must be reduced to the yoke or expelled. 
 
 The government of party appoints to the vacant offices its partizans only, without regard to 
 merit or the claim to consideration. On their side those thus appointed to office only act to 
 increase the influence of their friends and to maintain them in power without thought of the 
 general good. 
 
 To win numbers with a democracy, what is needed is a simple and striking watch-word, a 
 general idea, which resumes and makes manifest the whole facts by their most salient side. 
 Those who place themselves without scruple and without reserve in obedience to this watch-word 
 and who know skillfully in the matter to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the crowd, are 
 the destined ringleaders of parties. 
 
 Those eminent minds which consider affairs under all their phases, which desire that 
 circumstances should be considered, which, knowing the past foresee the future, are held in 
 distrust. 
 
 Parties in the struggle must organise themselves, as hostile armies. Their partizans are 
 brigaded into the ;issociation ; committees which direct the campaign are placed at their head ; 
 blind obedience must be given to these chiefs ; the strictest discipline is imposed under penalty 
 of ruin. Two or tiiree large masses advance to the vote in serried columns under the same flag. 
 The most numerous carry the day, and govern in the name of national sovereignty. 
 
 The sovereign then is not reason, but number. 
 
 As the representative system is the condition of a free government, and party spirit is the 
 indispensable motive power, there can be no question as to its suppression ; but it is essential 
 that the attempt should be made to prevent its attendant abuses. Experience indicates the 
 means of attaining this result, 'ihey are the following: Representation of minorities ; system 
 of voting by which the secret of the vole and its sincerity is assured ; to take from the govern- 
 ment in the most effective manner the disposal of offices to bestow on its political friends. 
 
 UNJUST INFLUENCES IN ELECTIONS. 
 
 When the interference of government is present by threats or promises, it lowers or corrupts 
 the national character. In England in the eighteenth century, the votes of deputies were 
 purchased by favours, or by even ready money. To-day the proceeding is different ; it is the 
 body of electors which is purchased, by the promise of public works, a post, a wharf, a ro.id, 
 a railway, subsidies for the corporations. 
 
 Every candidate for parliament promises that government will dispense millions for their 
 district. When the Inidget for the public works is presented it is an interminable narrative of 
 such requirements. 
 
 The minister replies to all, concedes all or part, promises what is desired, in order to obtain 
 the votes of members and, above all, that of the electors. Everyone desires to dip into ihc 
 public chest, as if it were replenished by its own force. It is not understood that each province 
 l)ays its j)art in the local outlay. The .State gives. Hut who ]iays ? Always the laxjiaycrs. 
 'ihere is an illusion that it is a gratuitous gift as it conies from the public chest. Ohcn to accunl 
 to each province an equal part of the cake, works entirely useless are voted and hastily 
 determined.
 
 1-10 APPENDIX. 
 
 THE POLITICIANS OF TO-DAY. 
 
 From " The American Commonwealth,'''' by James Bryce, i8qi. 
 
 The greatest parties are the Repubhcans and the Democrats. What are their principles, 
 their distinctive tenets, their tendencies ? Which of them is for free trade, for civil service reform, 
 for a spirited foreign policy, for the regulation of telegraphs by legislation, for a national bankrupt 
 law, for changes in the currency, for any other of the twenty issues which one hears discussed in 
 the country as seriously involving its welfare? 
 
 This is what a European is always asking of intelligent Republicans and intelligent Democrats. 
 He is always asking because he never gets an answer. The replies leave him in deeper perplexity. 
 After some months the truth begins to dawn upon him. Neither party has anything definite to 
 say on these issues ; neither party has any principles, any distinctive tenets. Both have tra- 
 ditions. Both claim to have tendencies. Both have certainly war cries, organizations, interests 
 enlisted in their support. But those interests are in the main the interests of getting or keeping 
 the patronage of the government. Tenets and politics, points of political doctrine and points of 
 political practice, have all but vanished. They have not been thrown away but have been 
 stripped away by Time and the progress of events, fulfilling some policies, blotting out others. 
 All has been lost, except office or the hope of it 
 
 The chief practical issues which once divided them have been settled. Some others h^ve 
 not been settled, but as regards these, one or other party has so departed from its former attitude 
 that we cannot now speak of any conflict of principles. 
 
 When life leaves an organic body it becomes useless, fetid, pestiferous : it is fit to be cast 
 out or buried from sight. What life is to an organism, principles are to a party. When they 
 which are its soul have vanished, its body ought to dissolve, and the elements that formed it be 
 regrouped in some new organism ; 
 
 " The times have been 
 That when the brains were out the man would die." 
 
 But a party does not always thus die. It may hold together long after its moral life is 
 extinct. Guelfs and Ghibelines warred in Italy for nearly two centuries after the Emperor had 
 ceased to threaten the Pope, or the Pope to befriend the cities of Lombardy. Parties go on 
 contending because their members have formed habits of joint action, and have contracted 
 hatreds and prejudices, and also because the leaders find their advantage in using these habits 
 and playing on these prejudices. The American parties now continue to exist, because they 
 have existed. The mill has been constructed, and its machinery goes on turning, even when 
 there is no grist to grind 
 
 In America we discover a palpable inducement to undertake the dull and tiresome work of 
 election politics. It is the inducement of places in the public service. To make them attractive 
 they must be paid. They are paid, nearly all of them, memberships of Congress and other 
 Federal places. State places (including memberships of State legislatures), city and county places. 
 Here then is the inducement, the remuneration for political work performed in the way of 
 organizing and electioneermg. Now add that besides the paid administrative and legislative 
 places which a democracy bestows by election, judicial places are also in most of the States 
 elective, and held for terms of years only ; and add further, that the holders of nearly all those 
 administrative places. Federal, State, and municipal, which are not held for a fixed term, are 
 liable to be dismissed, and have been hitherto in practice dismissed, whenever power changes 
 from one party to another, so that those who belong to the party out of office have a direct 
 chance of office when their party comes in. The inducement to undertake political work we 
 have been searching for is at once seen to be adequate, and only too adequate. The men for the 
 work are certain to appear because remuneration is provided. Politics has now become a gainful 
 profession, like advocacy, stockholding, the dry goods trade, or the getting up of companies.
 
 THE POLITICIANS OF TO-DAY. 141 
 
 People go into it to live by it, primarily for the sake of the salaries attached to the places they 
 count on getting, secondarily in view of the opportunities it affords of making incidental and 
 sometimes illegitimate gains. Every person in a high administrative post, whether Federal, 
 State, or municipal, and, above all, every member of Congress has opportunities of rendering 
 services to wealthy individuals and companies for which they are willing to pay secretly in money 
 or in money's worth. The better officials and legislators — they are the great majority, except in 
 large cities — resist the temptation. The worst >uccumb to it, and the prospect of these illicit 
 profits renders a political career distinctly more attractive to an unscrupulous man. 
 
 We find therefore that in America all the conditions exist for producing a class of men 
 specially devoted to political work and making a livelihood by it. It is work much of which 
 cannot be done in combination with any other kind of regular work, whether professional or 
 commercial. Even if the man who unites wealth and leisure to high intellectual attainments 
 were a frequent figure in America, he would not take to this work ; he would rather be a philan- 
 thropist or cultivate arts and letters. It is work which, steadily pursued by an active man, offers 
 an income. Hence a large number of persons are drawn into it, and make it the business of 
 their life ; and the fact that they are there as professionals has tended to keep amateurs 
 out of it 
 
 Having thus seen what are the causes which produce professional politicians, we may return 
 to inquire how large this class is, compared with the corresponding class in the free countries of 
 Europe, whom we have called the Inner Circle. 
 
 In America the Inner Circle, that is to say, the persons who make political work the chief 
 business of their lives, includes : — 
 
 Firstly. All members of both Houses of Congress. 
 
 Secondly. All Federal ofifice-holders except the judges, who are irremovable, and who have 
 sometimes taken no prominent part in politics. 
 
 Thirdly. A large part of the members of State legislatures 
 
 Fourthly. Nearly all State office-holders, excluding all judges in a few States, and many of 
 the judges in the rest. 
 
 Fifthly. Nearly all holders of paid offices in the greater and in many of the smaller cities, 
 and many holders of paid offices in the counties 
 
 Sixthly. A large number of people who hold no office but want to get one. This category 
 includes, of course, many of tlie "workers" of the party which does not command the majority 
 for the time being, in State and municipal affairs, and which has not, through the President, tlie 
 ]:)atronage of P'ederal posts. It also includes many expectants belonging to the party for the 
 time being dominant, who are earning their future places by serving the parly in the meantime. 
 
 All the above may fairly be called professional or Inner Circle politicians, but of their 
 number I can form no estimate, save that it must be counted by hundreds of thousands, inasmuch 
 as it practically includes nearly all office-holders and most expectants of public office. 
 
 It must be remembered that the "work" of politics means in America the business of 
 winning elections, and that this work is incomparably heavier and more complex than in Eng- 
 land, because: — 
 
 (i) The voters are a larger proportion of the population ; (2) Tlic government is more 
 complex (Federal, State, and local) and the places filled by election are therefore far more 
 numerous ; (3) Elections come at shorter intervals ; (4) The machinery of nominating candi- 
 dates is far more complete and intricate ; (5) The methods of fighting elections are far more 
 highly developed, i.e., they are matters requiring more tecimical knowledge and Hkill ; 
 (6) Ordinary private citizens do less election work, because they are busier than iu England, and 
 the professionals exist to do it for them.
 
 142 APPENDIX. 
 
 I have observed that there are also plenty of men engaged in some trade or profession who 
 interest themselves in politics and work for their party without any definite hope of office or 
 other pecuniary aim. They correspond to what we have called the Outer Circle politicians of 
 Europe. It is hard to draw a line between the two classes, because they shade off into one 
 another, there being many farmers or lawyers or saloon-keepers, for instance, who, while pursuing 
 their regular calling, bear a hand in politics, and look to be some time or other rewarded for 
 doing so. When this expectation becomes a considerable part of the motive for exertion, such 
 an one may fairly be called a professional, at least for the time being, for although he has 
 other means of livelihood, he is apt to be impregnated with the habits and sentiments of 
 the professional class 
 
 I shall presently return to the Outer Circle men. Meantime let us examine the professionals 
 somewhat more closely ; and begin with those of the humbler type, whose eye is fixed on a 
 municipal or other local office, and seldom ranges so high as a seat in Congress. 
 
 This species, like the weeds which follow human dwellings, thrives best in cities, and even 
 in the most crowded parts of cities. It is known to the Americans as the " ward politician," 
 because the city ward is the chief sphere of its activity, and the ward meeting the first scene of 
 its triumphs. A statesman of this type usually begins as a saloon or bar-keeper, an occupation 
 which enables him to form a large circle of acquaintances, especially among the "loafer " class 
 who have votes but no reason for using them one way more than another, and whose interest in 
 political issues is therefore as limited as their stock of political knowledge. But he may have 
 started as a lawyer of the lowest kind, or lodging-house keeper, or have taken to politics after 
 failure in storekeeping. The education of this class is only that of the elementary schools : if 
 they have come after boyhood from Europe, it is not even that. They have of course no com- 
 prehension of political questions or zeal for political principles ; politics mean to them merely a 
 scramble for places. Thev are usually vulgar, sometimes brutal, more rarely criminal, or at 
 least the associates of criminals. They it is who move about the populous quarters of the great 
 cities, form groups through whom they can reach and control the ignorant voter, pack meetings 
 with their creatures 
 
 These two classes do the local work and dirty work of politics. They are the rank and file. 
 Above them stand the officers in the political aimy, the party managers, including the members 
 of Congress and chief men in the State legislatures, and the editors of influential newspapers. 
 Some of them have pushed their way up from the humbler ranks. Others are men of superior 
 ability and education, often college graduates, lawyers who have had practice, less frequently 
 merchants or manufacturers who have slipped into politics from business. There are all sorts 
 among them, creatures clean and unclean, as in the sheet of St. Peter's vision, but that one may 
 say of politicians in all countries. What characterizes them as compared with the corresponding 
 class in Europe is that their whole time is more frequently given to political work, that most of 
 them draw an income from politics and the rest hope to do so, that they come more largely from 
 the poorer and less cultivated than from the higher ranks of society, and that they include but 
 few men who have pursued any of those economical, social, or constitutional studies which form 
 the basis of politics and legislation, although many are proficients in the arts of popular oratory, 
 of electioneering, and of party management 
 
 In this general description I am simply repeating what non-political Americans themselves 
 say. It is possible that with their half-humorous tendency to exaggerate they dwell too much on 
 the darker side of their public life. My own belief is that things are healthier than the news- 
 papers and common talk lead a traveller to believe, and that the blackness of the worst men in 
 the large cities has been allowed to darken the whole class of politicians as the smoke from a few 
 factories will darken the sky over a whole town. However, the sentiment I have described is no 
 doubt the general sentiment. "Pohtician" is a term of reproach, not merely among the 
 " superfine philosophers " of New England colleges, but among the better sort of citizens over 
 the whole Union. " How did such a job come to be perpetrated ? " I remember once asking a 
 casual acquaintance who had been pointing out some scandalous waste of public money. " Why, 
 what can you expect from the politicians ? " was the surprised answer.
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION THE GOVE SYSTEM. 143 
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION— THE GOV^E SYSTEM. 
 
 Extracts from Notes on Electing Representatives by John AI. Berry, Worcester, Mass., 1S93. 
 
 . . . In the general chorus of national pride, is there not a constant undertone of 
 dissatisfaction bewailing political decadence ? Is it not evident to all that we are too much 
 exposed to mercenary influences ? . . . . 
 
 It may almost be said that political corruption is getting to be deemed the rule rather than 
 the exception ; we expect even more than we lament it. The affairs of state are prostituted 
 to serve the ends of those in power. Office is not the free gift and choice of an intelligent 
 constituency. It is secured by barter between those who would protit by it. Candidates 
 climb to leadership by the promise of spoils. Bribery has become so common in legislative 
 bodies that it no longer surprises any one. Political rings and lobbyists direct and control 
 the legislature for personal gain and aggrandizement. Scarcely a matter that comes up is 
 fairly and honestly considered upon its merits without prejudice or influence. High minded 
 and honorable men in the legislature find themselves sadly at variance with their surroundings, 
 and sometimes feel that the censure of the legislative body is no disgrace, but that its 
 fellowship and good will niaj^ be. But yesterday, as it were, we saw a member of the 
 legislature of one of our oldest and proudest states, a state second to none for legislative 
 virtue and honor, resign his seat, disgusted at the unworthy and trifling manner in which 
 his associates were accustomed to deal with important public matters. If the ordinary 
 construction of language can be applied to the reported utterances of Senator Ingalls, in a 
 recent speech*, he boldly avows that jiolitics is a battle in which any means are justified 
 which enable the party using them to win. When such an open confession is made to the 
 world by the president pro tempore of the senate without protest from his fellow members of 
 congress, it is unnecessary to seek further for proof of political degeneracy and the need of 
 radical reform. 
 
 The place where this reform is most needed is in our system of representation, condemned 
 by such vile products. Had we sunk so low as a people as we must if the legislativii bodies 
 just spoken of fairly represented us, sad, indeed, would be our condition, and hard the task 
 to discover a remedy. But it is not so. Our legislators are the real choice of but a few. 
 The fault is in our defective system of election. It is an essential feature of our government 
 that it professes to be representative. In that essential point it has failed, and reform is 
 bitterly needed. The right to vote, indeed, is carefully guarded by the constitution. But 
 voting does not necessarily secure representation. It should do so ; that is its proper object ; 
 but the means are so poorly adapted to the end that it almost conii)letely fails. Of what 
 avail is tiie dropping of a ballot if it does not count to elect a representative ? 
 
 At the last general election (1888) overlive million citizens voted for ropreseutativos in 
 congress, yet failed te secure representation ; and in some states these formed a majority of 
 those who voted. In round numbers eleven million votes were cast for representatives in 
 congress in all the states ; three million of tliese elected the Republican majority and 
 therefore control legislation, while more than live million wiio votuil did not elect u 
 representative. It is estimated that five million more of voting age and sex omitted to vote 
 at all, largely influenced we may fairly infer l)y the feeling, warranted by the above facts, 
 that such action would be futile, a result sure to occur if they belonged to .i liopiU-Hs 
 
 •"The puriflcalioM of iiolilics Ih an iridcKfeiit (Ireiiiii. fJoveninieMt in fori-f. PoliticM ih a Imlilo tm- 
 supreniaoy. Partii-s are the ariiiito. The <Je<,aloi:iie and t\u- k<Mvu rule liave no jiliue in a polillcnl caniiiaiKn. 
 The ohjeet ix success. To defeat the «Ilta^'oni»t and ex]i(l tlie parl.v in i)Ower Ih \\w pnrpoHo. In war it in law- 
 ful to deceive the aflversar.v, to hire HeBKianH, to purchase niercenaheB, to niulilate, to kill, to iloMlroy. The 
 commander who lost a battle through the activity of his moral nature would ho the derision ond Jest of hlKtory. 
 This nifKlern cant ahout the corniption of politics is fatii;uini{ iti the extreme. It proceeds from the tea-cugtar<l 
 and syllabuh dilettanteism, the frivolous and desultory serilimentalisiii of epicenes. '
 
 144: APPENDIX. 
 
 minority in their respective districts. Over one-seventh of the Northern representatives 
 were elected by an actual minority (although a comparatively lai'ge one) of voters in their 
 districts. 
 
 Political parties are so equally divided that the sum of the voters on the losing side in 
 the various districts comprises nearly one-half of those who vote, and none of these have a 
 rejjresentative, or rather they are misrepresented by one whose views are opposed to theirs. 
 In reply to this consideration it is mistakenly urged, by some who do not justly appreciate 
 true representation, that the defeat of a given party in one district is balanced and com- 
 pensated by its success in another, so that the parties are fairly represented after all. Were 
 this so, the individual voter still loses his right to a voice in the selection 
 
 To the unrepresented members of the defeated one of the two great parties in each 
 district are to be added the members of still smaller parties. If these vote, they do it with 
 almost the certainty of failing to secure representation, and in the present congress none of 
 these minor parties has even a single representative. Taking both of these elements'together 
 the wholly unrei^resented often form a majority of all who vote at any election. Yet these 
 unrepresented citizens contribute their share toward the expenses of government. Thus we 
 have taxation without representation, the very thing which was thought by our forefathers 
 just cause for war. If under a king this was just cause for a bloody revolution, it is not a 
 greater wrong under a free representative government where the people are supposed to be 
 guaranteed equal rights, and is it not time to seek if possible, means for a peaceful revolution 
 in this respect ? The whole population of the colonies was less than two million, yet here at 
 the present time are over five million of unrepresented tax payers who voted, and if we add 
 to their number those who did not vote, it swells our unrepresented population to nearly 
 two-thirds of the inhabitants having the right of suffrage. 
 
 It may be said that it is the privilege of the citizen to vote only and that many must 
 necessarily be outvoted, yet that they have no ground for complaint, as the majority must 
 rule. This is no answer to the complaint of loss of votes cast for a representative. If the 
 votes were directly upon a proposed law or measure, as in voting upon a proposed amendment 
 to a state constitution, the principle would be as stated ; but in voting for representatives, 
 the people are not voting directly, but are choosing delegates to vote for them upon measures. 
 Consequently if one's vote does not count to elect a representative, he is not merely outvoted ; 
 he loses his vote altogether upon the questions brought before the legislature ; he has no voice 
 directly or indirectly in the making of the laws. Our legislative system is not a government 
 by majority. It is government of a majority of pluralities in separate districts. Consequently 
 we have actually minority rule. It is customary to call the plans proposed for remedying 
 the evil, plans to secure minority representation. The term is a misleading one. The plans 
 do aim to give a voice to those now left in the minority in the various districts, but the final 
 result aimed at is the rule of the majoi-ity through the equal representation of all. 
 
 It is usual to attribute such results to gerrymandering. That the evil is 
 occasionally aggravated by this cause is unfortunately true, but the main reason for it lies 
 far deeper. Let districts be arranged as justly as possible, a minority usually large in each, 
 must necessarily be defeated and left without representation, the sum of these minorities 
 being usually sufficient to elect several representatives. Moreover, the party in the minority 
 in the state will usually obtain much less than its fair proportion of representatives, while 
 it is always possible that it may obtain far more than the fair proportion. The e\nl is 
 inherent in the system itself, which is radically defective. 
 
 The result of the last election shows the district system to be unjust and delusive. 
 Unjust, because less than half who voted at the North, secured 202 of the 211 representatives 
 from that portion of the country. * 
 
 \ 
 
 * The Southern States are purposely omitted to avoid any complication on account of :,the alleged sup- 
 pression of the negro vote. If the whole country were included the showing would undoubtedly be far worse.
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION — THE GOVE SYSTEM. 145 
 
 Delusive, because the popular belief is that a majority of those who vote control through 
 the representatives they elect. 
 
 Yet in the election of the present congress in the Northern states, new states included, — 
 
 3,172,999 citizens elected 167 representatives, a majority of the 332 in congress from all the 
 states both North and South, while — 
 
 3,301,692 who voted in 167 Northern districts, failed to elect anj' 
 
 One half the Northern Representatives were elected by less than a quarter of the 
 Northern voters, and more than twice as many who voted in the same states did not elect 
 even one. To secure anything like justice or equality the result should be far different. 
 One quarter of the voters should elect one quarter of the representatives, and twice as many 
 voters should elect twice as many representatives. 
 
 It may be that men like Senator Ingalls, disregarding all broad considerations of justice 
 and public welfare, may see in these figures only a satisfactory partisan advantage. But the 
 majority party itself can by no means afford to look with equanimity upon this unjust 
 method, although for the moment gaining an unfair advantage from it. Its position is too 
 precarious. No very great change of vote, whether from change of opinion or from corruption 
 of voters, instead of making a proportionate change in the representation, might completely 
 reverse the relative position of the parties. Less than three per cent, of the Northern 
 vote could have been so changed as to tip the scale and give an entirely different majority 
 in congress for all the states. The power of so few voters to change entirely the complexion 
 of congress is too strong a temptation to be left open to unscrupulous politicians, and hangs 
 a Damocles sword over the head of the winner 
 
 Some object to the representation of all, on the ground that the ignorant so far out- 
 number the wise that they would rule, but this objection cannot be sustained. The ignorant 
 are found in all parties, and so far from making common cause against the educated, would 
 almost without exception vote for the ablest man of their own party if they knew who lie 
 was. But even if the objection was well founded, the remedy would be an educational 
 quaUfication, or some change in the law instead of devices to cheat a voter by giving him 
 the appearance of political power without the reality. In any case intelligence will rule. 
 At present we are ruled by intelligent demagogues, and if the same amount of brain power 
 now applied to personal and party ends was applied to lofty unseKish statesmanship we 
 should be ruled by intelligent patriots. 
 
 Aristotle argued that the wisdom of the whole people included and exceeded the wisdom 
 of the few who were wise. Therefore let us utilize the wisdom of the mass by granting to all 
 their right of representation. All the great beneficial movements among mankind liave been 
 the work of determined minorities. Therefore let the wiser minority also be rupreseiited. 
 
 Various attempts have been ma<le to secure a more just system of representation and 
 much thought has been expended upon it. It is only necessary for us to become once 
 thoroughly alive to its importance and a way can readily be devised to apply an effective 
 remedy. We have seen how the present system fails. Let us in conclusion take a glance 
 at some of the propositions made to introduce a better one. 
 
 In 1869 the United States Senate appointed a committee on representative reform. 
 
 The committee were of opinion that had there been equal representation, our 
 disastrous civil war might have been prevented 
 
 In 1870 Mr. Marshall proposed a measure to give equal representation and waa supported 
 by Mr. S. S. Cox, Mr. Garfield and others, an<l almost carried the House with liini. . . . 
 
 There has been in Denmark for tliirty-live years reprcBcntation by th(! Mingle transferable 
 vote. An estimate is made of the number require<l to elect, by divi.ling the votes cast, by 
 lO
 
 146 APPENDIX. 
 
 the number of representatives. Any candidate receiving this number is declared elected, 
 and any surplus or ineffective votes are transferred to assist in electing others of the 
 same principles. This system, (Mr. Andrse's, best known as Mr. Hare's) is endorsed by 
 Mr. John Stuart Mill, Sir John Lubbock and others, and seems the most just of any yet 
 put to practical test. Harvard College and some other institutions and corporations have 
 elected officers by this method. By this plan there is the least possible loss and waste of 
 votes, and the greatest possible number of individual voters represented. 
 
 Retaining all these excellencies and including some new and desirable features, is a 
 system offered and recommended to the Massachusetts Legislature in 1888. 
 
 The New York Evening Post in commenting on it, says : 
 
 ' ' It presents a scheme which seems to us the most complete and practical that we have 
 seen. It is worked out in detail with great care and elaboration so as, we should think, to 
 leave no loophole for blunder or fraud. The fundamental principle is that of Mr. Hare's 
 plan, the transference of surplus votes to other candidates, by which every representative 
 has an equal constituency, and every voter has a representative for whom he voted. But 
 while Mr. Hare distributes the surplus votes by a complicated and perplexing method, the 
 plan before us requires each candidate before the election to say to whom his unnecessary 
 votes shall be transferred. Each voter, therefore votes for a single name, but with the 
 knowledge that his vote for A, may count for B, C or D, and the transference of the surplus 
 votes is made by a simple rapid process, always to a candidate or candidates in general 
 agreement with the one voted for." 
 
 So general is the conviction among the best thinkers that some reform in representation 
 is demanded, that the time is not far distant when it must come. Remedies have been 
 sought in other coi;ntries as well as our own, a system of voting by which no votes shall be 
 lost, or at least no considerable number, and every vote shall count for the election of a 
 person who is the choice of the voter. 
 
 Appeal has been made to congress, but a system that elects legislators, too often blinds 
 them to its injustice. Only the opposition of men conscious of their unfitness for the places 
 they occupy, and conscious that in a fair and just representation of all voters other and 
 better men would supersede them, has so long delayed reform. When that comes, and 
 every citizen exerts an influence, true statesmen will hold the suffrage of the peojile and 
 legislation will be for their benefit and the best good of the country, and not to conciliate 
 parties or sections with a view to re-election. Then the purest and best men will stand at 
 the helm, their aspirations satisfied in a true statesmanship, free from debasing intrigues 
 which now excludes many of them from all participation in matters of government. . . . 
 
 A majority of representatives in the present congress (52nd 1892) were elected by less 
 than 21 per cent, of the votes, while over twice as many cast at the same election did not 
 elect any. 
 
 In the Northern States at that election, using round numbers, 33 hundred thousand 
 Democratic votes elected 121 representatives, while 34 hundred thousand Republican votes 
 cast in the North elected only 83 representatives. 
 
 In the Northern states — 
 2,703,976 votes elected 167 representatives a majority of congress from both North and 
 
 South, while 
 3,420,246 in the North voting at the same time could not elect even one. 
 
 Other countries suffer from the same evil . In Great Britain there are — 
 6,067,133 registered voters. 
 
 The House of Commons has G70 members. In the present House 449 seats 
 were contested, 221 were uncontested. 
 3,160,755 votes were cast for the 449 contested seats.
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION THE GOVE SYSTEM. 147 
 
 1,302,081 votes are represented, having elected 355 members (19 more than a majority of the 
 ■whole House) while a larger number — 
 
 1,303,812 votes cast at the same elections are unrepresented being wasted on defeated 
 candidates 
 
 THE GOVE BILL.— LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Commonwealth of Massachcsett.-^, ) 
 
 In the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred > 
 
 and Ninety-one. ) 
 
 RESOLVE. 
 
 To amend the Constitution relative to the Election of Senators and Representatives. 
 
 Besolved, 'By both houses, that it is expedient to alter the constitution of this Common- 
 wealth by the adoption of the subjoined article of amendment ; and that the said article, 
 being agreed to by a majority of the senators and two-thirds of the members of the house of 
 representatives present and voting thereon, be entered on the journals of both houses, with 
 the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the general court next to be chosen ; and 
 that the said article be jjublished, to the end that if agreed to in the manner provided by 
 the constitution by the general court next to be chosen, it may be submitted to the people 
 for their approval and ratification, in order that it may become a part of the constitution of 
 the Commonwealth. 
 
 Article of Amendment. 
 
 Section 1. In order to provide for a representation of the citizens of this Common wealtli, 
 founded upon the principle of equality ; any resident of this Commonwealth, eligible under 
 the constitution to the office of senator, may be nominated as a candidate for said office by 
 any person. 
 
 No such nomination shall be valid unless the following conditions are complied with : — 
 
 (1.) The nomination shall be in writing, signed by the person making it, and shall 
 contain the name and ]jlace of residence of the candidate. 
 
 (2. ) An acceptance of the nomination signed by the candidate shall be endorsed thereon. 
 
 (3. ) It shall be deposited in the office of the secretary of the Commonwealth not more 
 than three months nor less than live weeks before the day of election. 
 
 (4.) There shall be deposited with the nomination the sum of fifty dollars, or sucli 
 other sum not exceeding one hundred dollars, as the legislature may hereafter by law direct. 
 
 Stc. 2. Not less than four weeks before the day of election, the secretary of the Common- 
 wealth shall furnish to each candidate and to every voter who shall rcriuest it, a printed list 
 containing the names of all the candidates in alphabetical order with the place of residence 
 of each, and the name of the person by whom each was nominated. 
 
 Stcl. 3. At any time after his nomination and not less than tliree weeks before the day 
 of election, any of said candidates may furnish to the secretary of the Connnonwealtli a 
 statement in writing, signed by himself and ackno\vK;dged licforo any magistrate autliorized 
 to take ackiiowleilgment of .deeds, which statement shall contain tlic names of one or more 
 others of said candidates with whom he believes himself to be in accoril upon tlu- most 
 important public questions, 'and to one or more of wliom he wishes to transfer any ineffective 
 votes cast for himself. 
 
 Hf'Ct. Ih The secretary shall prepare a n(!W list of candidates similar to that named in 
 section two of this article, but containing also against the name of each candidate the names 
 in aljjhabetical order of all candidates named in the list, if any, furnislu-d by tliat candiflate, 
 as provided in section three ; and he shall, not less than two weeks Iteforo the day of
 
 148 APPENDIX. 
 
 election, furnisli to the clerk of everj' city or town a sufficient number of copies of said new 
 list. Every such clerk shall, immediately upon the receipt thereof, jiost conspicuously, and 
 open to the inspection of the public, one copj' of said list at each and every place in his city 
 or town where votes are to be received at said election, and shall also immediately furnish 
 one copy to every legal voter resident in said city or town who shall demand the same. 
 
 Sect. 5. Every les^al voter wherever resident, shall be entitled to cast his vote for senator 
 in favour of any person whose name appears in the aforesaid list of candidates ; but no person 
 shall vote for more than one candidate, nor for any person whose name does not appear upon 
 the aforesaid list of candidates. 
 
 But whenever a candidate duly nominated [is omitted from the list published by the 
 secretary of the Commonwealth, votes may be cast for him with the same effect as if his name 
 appeared on said list. 
 
 If the secretary shall make such omission intentionally or through wilful neglect of duty, 
 he shall, upon conviction thereof, be ever after incapable of holding any office of trust or 
 profit under the Commonwealth. 
 
 Stct. 6. The returns of votes having been transmitted to the secretary of the Common- 
 wealth as provided by the constitution, the secretary shall make a list of all candidates 
 voted for, with the vote received by each candidate in each precinct or voting place, and his 
 total vote, and said list shall be transmitted, published and distributed in the same manner 
 provided in section four, concerning the list therein named ; and after the secretary shall 
 have ascertained who are the persons who appear to be elected, he shall make a list of the 
 successful candidates with the computation by which their election has been ascertained, 
 and shall forthwith furnish a copy of the same to each candidate and also to every voter who 
 shall request it. 
 
 Sect. 7. Ineffective votes shall be transferred according to the request of the candidate 
 for whom they were originally cast, to a person named in the list furnished by said candidate 
 as provided by section three. 
 
 The forty candidates then having the highest number of votes shall be declared elected 
 and the secretary shall issue certificates of election to them. 
 
 In case two or more candidates have the same nixmber of votes, the candidates residing 
 at the greatest distance from the state house shaU be deemed, for the purpose of election, to 
 have the highest number. 
 
 Sect. 8. The following shall be deemed ineffective votes, and shall be transferred in 
 the order named : — 
 
 (1.) Any votes cast for a candidate in excess of one-fortieth of the entire vote cast, 
 beginning with the candidate receiving the largest vote, and proceeding to the one next 
 highest and so on. 
 
 In the case of two or more receiving the same vote, the transfer shall be from each 
 alternately, in alphabetical order. 
 
 (2.) Votes cast by candidates who have since their nomination died or become ineligible 
 in the same order. 
 
 (3. ) Original votes cast for candidates who fail of election, beginning with the candidate 
 receiving the smallest total vote, and proceeding to the next lowest, and so on ; in case of 
 two or more receiving the same vote the transfer to be made from each alternately in 
 alphabetical order. 
 
 No votes shall be transferred from any candidate who has not furnished the statement 
 named in section three. 
 
 Sect. 9. Every ineffective vote of a candidate shall be transferred to the candidate
 
 PARTIES AND PARTY GOVERNMENT. 149 
 
 named in his said list, li^Tiig and eligible at the time of counting the vote, for whom the 
 largest number of votes were originally cast and whose vote by transfer or otherwise does 
 not equal one-fortieth of the whole vote cast, until all are transferred as far as possible. 
 
 If the same number of votes were origmally cast for two or more candidates named in 
 said list, the candidate residing nearest the one from whom the votes are to be transferred 
 shall be preferred. 
 
 Sect. 10. The secretary shall at once transmit to the treasurer and receiver-general all 
 sums of money received as pi-ovided in section one. 
 
 Immediately after declaring the names of the pei-sons elected senators, he shall draw on 
 the treasurer and receiver-general a warrant for the payment of the sum received with one 
 nomination, and issue the same to the person nominating each candidate who shall appear by 
 the returns to have received one thousand or more original votes, and all such warrants shall 
 be paid by the treasurer and receiver-general on presentation. The remainder of the sums 
 paid under section one shall be and remain the property of the Commonwealth. 
 
 Sect. 11. In case a vacancy shall occur in the senate after the declaration of election 
 provided in section seven, the votes cast for the member whose seat shall have become vacant 
 together with any ineffective votes assigned to him, shall be re-distributed in the same 
 manner as if he had died or become ineligible before the canvassing of the votes, and the 
 candidate not before elected, who, after returning to him any votes originally cast for him, 
 shall then appear to have largest number of votes shall be declared elected. 
 
 Sect. 12. The supreme judicial court, upon the petition of twenty-five legal voters, shall 
 have jurisdiction to enforce by mandamus the correction of any ernmeous or improper issue 
 of such certificate of election, when siich error can be made to appear from the face of the 
 returns issued by the secretary as provided in section six, upon canvasing said returns in the 
 manner provided in section seven, eight and nine. 
 
 But the senate shall continue to be the final judge of the election of its members. 
 
 Sect. 13. The legislature may at any time provide l)y law that representatives be 
 elected in substantially the same manner as is herein provided for senators, and by such law 
 may, if it so decides, divide the Commonwealth into not exceeding six electoral districts, 
 from each of which the candidates voted for in that district must be taken, and by voters 
 within which such candidates must be nominated. The number of voters in each of these 
 districts to be as nearly equal as possible. 
 
 PARTIES AND PARTY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 By Henry Sidgwick. From " The Elements of Politics," tSgt. 
 
 The dual system seems to have a dangerous tendency to degrade the profession of politics : 
 partly from the inevitable insincerity of the relation of a party leader to tiie members of his own 
 party, partly from the insincerity of his relation to the ])arty ojiposed to him. To keep up the 
 vigour and zeal of his own side, he ha.s to maintain the fiction that under the heterogeneous 
 medley of opinions and sectional interests represented l)y the " ins" or the "outs" at any par- 
 ticular time there is a fundamental underlying agreement in sound political prmciples ; ami he 
 has to attribute to the other side a similar agreemenl in unsound doctrines. Thus the l)est i>oliti- 
 cal talent and energy of the country acquires a fatal bias in tlie direction of insincere .idvoc.icy ; 
 indeed the old objection against forensic advocacy as a means of obtaining riglit judici.d conclu- 
 sions — that one section of the experts employed are professionally required to make the worse
 
 150 APPENDIX. 
 
 seem the better reason — applies with much more real force here than in the case of the law- 
 courts. For in the case of the forensic advocate this attitude is frankly avowed and recognized 
 by all concerned : every plain man knows that a lawyer in court is exempt from the ordinary 
 rule that binds an honest man only to use arguments which he believes to be sound ; and that it 
 is the duty of every member of a jury to consider only the value of an advocate's arguments, and 
 disregard, as far as possible, the air of conviction with which they are uttered. The political 
 advocate or party leader tends to acquire a similar professional habit of using bad ai'guments with 
 an air of conviction where he cannot get good ones, or when bad ones are more likely to be 
 popularly effective ; but, unlike the forensic advocate, he is understood, in so doing, to imply his 
 personal belief in the validity of his arguments and the truth of the conclusions to which he 
 desires to lead up. And the case is made worse by the fact that political advocacy is not con- 
 trolled by expert and responsible judges, whose business it is to sift out and scatter to the winds 
 whatever chaff the pleader may mingle with such grains of sound argument as his brief affords ; 
 the position of the political advocate is like what that of a forensic advocate would be, if it was 
 his business to address a jury not presided over by a judge, and largely composed of persons 
 who only heard the pleadings on the other side in an imperfect and partial way. 
 
 What has just been said applies primarily to the leading members of a party who undertake 
 the task of advocacy. But the artificiality of combination which the dual system involves has to 
 some extent a demoralising effect on other members of the legislature ; they acquire a habit either 
 of voting frankly without conviction at the summons of the "whip," or of feigning convictions 
 which they do not really hold in order to justify their votes. 
 
 And the same cause impairs the security for good legislation, apparently furnished by the 
 fact that a measure can only be passed if it has the approval of a majority of the legislators ; 
 since it increases the danger that measures may be passed which are only desired and really 
 approved by a minority — it may even be a small minority if sufficiently fanatical or selfish ; — such 
 measures being acquiesced in by the rest, under the guidance of their leaders, in order to maintain 
 the party majority. 
 
 Of the gravity of these disadvantages it is difficult to form a general estimate, as it depends 
 largely on the condition of political morality, which is influenced by many causes more or less 
 independent of the form of government : but we may reasonably regard the disadvantages as 
 sufficiently grave to justify a serious consideration of the means of removing or mitigating them. 
 The available remedies are partly political, partly moral : the former will naturally vary much 
 according to the precise form of government adopted. If the Supreme Executive is practicallj- 
 dismissible at any time by a Parliamentary majority — even with the possibility of appealing to the 
 country — the danger of transient and shifting Parliamentary majorities is so great and obvious, 
 that a nation in which the two-party system is firmly established is hardly likely to abandon it. 
 But the case is different with other forms of Representative Government. For instance, where 
 there is a supreme executive appointed for a fixed period, without the power of dissolving Parlia- 
 ment, there is less manifest need of this system ihan where the executive holds office on the 
 English tenure, and less tendency, ceteris paribus, to promote its development : since, in the 
 former case, the party struggle in parliament is not kept always active— as it is in the latter case — 
 by the consciousness that the Cabinet or the Parliament may come to an end at any moment. 
 It is true that the example of the United States might be quoted on the other side, since there 
 the fixed tenure of the Presidency has not interfered with the fullest development of dual party 
 government that the modern world has seen. Here, however, I conceive that the election of the 
 President by the people at large, and the "spoils" system, have operated powerfully to foster 
 this development : if there were a Supreme Executive elected by the legislature, with subordinate 
 officials holding office independently of party ties, I think it probable that the tendency to a dual 
 division of parties — and generally the influence of party on government — would be materially 
 reduced. 
 
 Assuming that a Parliamentary Executive is retained, the bad effects of two-party govern- 
 ment might still be mitigated in various ways. Substantial portions of legislative and administra-
 
 
 burke's defence of party. 151 
 
 tive work might be withdrawn from the control of the party system, under the influence of public 
 opinion, aided by minor changes in parliamentary rules and in the customary tenure of executive 
 offices. Firstly, as I have before suggested, on certain important questions, not closely connected 
 with the business of the executive departments, the preparation of legislation might be entrusted 
 to parliamentaiy committees other than the executive cabinet : and the natural tendency to 
 different lines of divisions on diflferent subjects might thus be allowed fair play. 
 
 Secondly, certain headships of departments, in which a peculiar need of knowledge, trained 
 skill, and special experience was generally recognized, might be filled by persons not expected 
 normally to retire with their colleagues, when the parliamentary majority supporting the govern- 
 ment of which they were members was turned into a minority ; but only expected to retire when-.- 
 the questions on which issue was joined between the parties related to the administration of their 
 special departments. 
 
 Again, it would seem possible, by certain changes in the customary relation between the 
 Cabinet and Parliament, to reduce the danger of excessive instability of government consequent 
 on allowing free play to the natural tendency to a multiplicity of parties. Thus, it might be the 
 established custom for ministers not to resign office because the legislative measures proposed by 
 them were defeated, — unless the need of these measures was regarded by them as so urgent that 
 they could not conscientiously carry on the administration of public affairs without them — but 
 only to resign when a formal vote of want of confidence was carried against them in the House 
 of Representatives. This change would at once promote, and be facilitated by, an increased 
 separation of the work of legislation from that ot administration. 
 
 Again, the introduction of the "Referendum" — even to the limited extent suggested in 
 chapter xxvii. — would at any rate reduce the danger that a minority, concentrating its energies 
 on narrow political aims, may force through legislation not really approved by a majority of the 
 assembly that adopts it. 
 
 Finally, the operation of the party-system might be checked and controlled — more effectually 
 than it now is in England and the United States by a change in current morality, which does not 
 seem to be beyond the limits of possibility. It might be regarded as the duty of educated persons 
 generally to aim at a judicial frame of mind on questions of current politics, whether they are 
 inside parties or outside. If it is the business of the professional politician to prove his own side 
 always in the right, it should be the point of honour of the "arm-chair" politician, if he belongs 
 to a party, to make plain when and why he thinks his party in the wrong. And probably the 
 country would gain from an increase in the number of persons taking a serious interest in politics 
 who keep out of party ties altogether. 
 
 BURKE'S DEFENCE OF PARTY. 
 
 By Dr. Goldwin Smith. Ffoin " The North American Review,'' Vol. CLIV., i8g2. 
 
 The great sponsor for the morality and the necessity of parly is Burke, whoso words in 
 *' Thoughts on the Present Discontents " have l)een cited a thousand times. Hurkc is a m.ignifi- 
 cent writer, but unless read with reference to lime and circumstance he is very ajU to niisle.nd. 
 Me is the Prince of Pamphleteers, but he is a pamphleteer, and, like all panii)hlcteers, to some 
 extent makes his philosophy for the occasion. " Thoughts on the Present Discontents" is the 
 manifesto of the Rockingham connection of Whigs against the cabal of " King's Friends," who 
 were striving to put an end to constitutional govcrimient, and instal the personal government of 
 George III. in its place by V>ackstairs intrigue, jobbery and corruption. To vindicate any
 
 152 APPENDIX. 
 
 connection of constitutional statesmen against backstairs intrigue, jobbery, corruption, and the 
 personal government of George III. was not difficult. But as a general vindication of the party 
 system, if it was so intended, this renowned passage will not bear examination. "Party," says 
 Burke, "is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest 
 upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed." The particular principle appar- 
 ently can be nothing but their joint opinion on the great question or questions of the day. But 
 the great question or questions of the day will in time be settled. When they shall have been 
 settled, what will there be to render the bond of party moral or rational ; what will there be left 
 to hold the connection together but the common desire of political power and pelf? The party 
 ;.will then become a machine, and its cohesion will be maintained either by mere personal associa- 
 tion or by motives and influences more or less corrupt. By the philosophy which is always forth- 
 coming in defence of existing arrangements, particularly those arrangements in which many 
 persons have an active interest, it has been alleged that men are naturally and almost providen- 
 tially divided from their birth into conservatives and liberals. But this bi-section of humanity is 
 a politician's dream. Temperaments vary through an infinite series of gradations, and the same 
 man is conservative on one subject and liberal on another. Youth as a rule, perhaps, is prone to 
 innovation, while age is reactionary. Yet nobody is so violently reactionary as a young aristocrat. 
 Is the community then to be artificially divided into two sections, at perpetual war with each 
 other, for the purpose of carrying on the system ? How is the apportionment to be made, and 
 why, if the existence of the two parties is necessary, should each of them be always traducing 
 and striving to annihilate the other ? Burke's glowing language about a generous contention for 
 power on manly and honorable maxims, and without proscription of opponents, sounds like a 
 satire on party politics as they are. The reality is that which he would exclude by contrast, — 
 "delusion of the ignorant by professions incompatible with human practice and followed by 
 practices below the level of vulgar rectitude." If he could only have seen the machine and the 
 bosses ! If he could only have looked into the office of Mr. Schnadhorst ! If he could only 
 have been present at a nominating convention for the Presidency or witnessed a general election 
 in the England of these days ! A convention of Whig magnates gathered round the dinner 
 table of the Marquis of Rockingham to settle the policy of the connection, and distribute the 
 pocket-boroughs at its command, was the only sort of convention that he had ever seen. Party, 
 unless there is some great question, such as parliamentary reform or slavery, to justify its exist- 
 ence, can be nothing but a fine name for faction, of wliicli ihe ties are passion and corruption, and 
 which always must be in the end, as it always has been, the ruin of the commonwealth. 
 
 Yet how under the representative and elective system are we to dispense with the party 
 machine ? There is the problem. How are the individual votes to be combined and directed so 
 as to elect the representatives and form the basis for the government ? 
 
 PARTY GOVEUNMENT. 
 
 By Charles Richardson. From Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
 
 Science, January, 1892. 
 
 Among the most important functions of these organizations are the selection of candi- 
 dates and the adoption of a platform or declaration of principles. These responsible duties 
 are intrusted to conventions, composed of delegates chosen for the purpose at the party 
 elections, known as the primaries. 
 
 Those who have so far conformed to the rules of a party as to be entitled to vote at its 
 primaries may be divided into two classes, as follows : I. Citizens who have no special 
 advantages to gain, and whose only motive for participation is their desire for good govern- 
 ment. '
 
 
 PAKTY GOVERNMENT. 153 
 
 2. Those who are actuated by personal ambition or hopes of securing office, contracts or 
 pecuniary benefits. 
 
 In order to carry the primaries a considerable amount of time and labor must neces- 
 sarily be expended. The votei-s must communicate with each other : views must be 
 compared and harmonized ; candidates suggested, interviewed and agreed upon ; tickets 
 prepared and supplied, and concert of action secured. 
 
 This labor is undertaken with eagerness and enthusiasm by the men who are working 
 for the offices or other personal benefits, and are actuated by purely selfish motives. But 
 the majority of citizens, engrossed as they are with private business and family cares, have 
 neither time nor inclination for such tasks. And when their reluctance is overcome, as it 
 occasionally is bj^ their sense of public duty, they are likely to find that their opponents 
 have no hesitation in resorting to misrepresentation, trickery or fraud, in order to control 
 the result. Under these circumstances a small, biit well-disciplined, energetic and un- 
 scrupulous minority can generally defeat the honorable and patriotic majority. It is 
 therefore not surprising that honest and industrious citizens are apt to conclude that it is 
 useless for them to take part in such contests. 
 
 The growth of this feeling is particularly noticeable in our large cities. Efforts to arrest 
 it are only successful in rare instances, and it seems incAntable that the primaries must 
 continue to be gradually abandoned more and more to the control of the class generally 
 designated as politicians. 
 
 These gentlemen may have great abilities and many good qualities, but for the reasons 
 just stated, their positions cannot, except in rare cases, be either Avon or retained unless 
 their dominant motives are personal and partisan advantage ; moral principles and the 
 interests of the public being secondary' considerations. Public offices, contracts and patron- 
 age are what they work for and what they must have, by fair means if possible, but if not, 
 then by whatever means may be necessary. For this purpose they are obliged to combine 
 among themselves and submit to such leaders as may seem best able to direct their efforts, 
 and to secure and apportion among them the prizes they covet. Having once acquired 
 complete control of a nominating convention, their natural desire, is of course, to nominate 
 such candidates as will best servo their own personal interests, and in the absence of 
 factional fights among themselves, the only real check upon this desire is their fear of losing 
 enough of the more independent voters to turn the scale in the general elections. 
 
 This confiict between what they would like to do and what thej' dare to do, usually 
 results in their nominating such men as have no more honesty and independence tlian may 
 seem to be absolutely necessary for ultimate success. And if they can secure candidates 
 who are generally believed to be able and honorable, but who will really obey and assist the 
 spoilsmen, the temptation to nominate them, and thus deceive and outwit the people, can 
 hardly be resisted. 
 
 In the construction of a party platform the leaders are naturally governed by similar 
 motives, and, instead of publishing a frank statement of their real objects and intentions, 
 they are disposed to adopt whatever may seem most likely to attract the voters. In their 
 effort to do this they seek to treat almost every subject of public interest, but there are 
 necessarily some points in regard to wliich even tlie members of tiieir own party are divided, 
 and it is one of tlie defects of party government tliat while many voters find sentiniuntH 
 which they disapiirove in each platform, they can see no alternative but t<i cant tlieir bailotH 
 for one or the other, and thus seem to endorse and support ideas to wliidi tin y are really 
 opposed. 
 
 It would appear, therefore, that our system of political parties must neccsHarily tend to 
 place the selection of our candidates and the declaration of our principh-s in the liands of a 
 small minority of able but comparatively selfish and unscrupulous men. If this tendency
 
 154 APPENDIX. 
 
 M'as confined to either party, it might be possible to hold it in check by voting for the 
 nominees of the other ; but the present system practicallj'' confines the choice of the people 
 to ithe candidates of the two principal parties, all of them having been selected and nomin- 
 ated by similar methods, and therefore characterized by a similar lack of unselfish patriotism 
 and moral principle. However dissatisfied the voters may be with the candidates of their 
 own pai'ty, they are naturally disposed to believe that the candidates of the other party, 
 having been chosen in the same way, are at least as bad. They have therefore no means of 
 expressing their preference for better men, and their votes must be determined by the 
 attractions of a more or less 'unsatisfactory and untrustworthy political platform, rather 
 than by any considerations of personal honor or fitness. 
 
 Under such a system, if a candidate belongs to a party which happens to be on the most 
 popular side of some leading question, like the tariff or silver coinage, his lack of integrity 
 or personal ability must be very glaring to prevent his election. And when he takes his 
 seat in a legislative body, and it becomes his duty to make a careful study of some important 
 question, to sift the evidence and reach a wise and just conclusion, he, who should be like 
 an impartial judge or an unprejudiced juryman, may find that he is only the bond servant of 
 the leaders of his party, a mere automaton for the registering of their decrees. It is in this 
 way that our legislative assemblies are slowly losing their character as deliberative bodies, 
 and yielding more and more to the dictation of irresponsible partisan chiefs, or the decrees of 
 a secret caucus. 
 
 While (it is true that there are many 'exceptional instances, and occasional popular 
 uprisings, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that our general submission to the rule of 
 political parties tends to lower our moral standards, corrupt our people, and subject our 
 National, State, and Municipal governments to a class of men who care far more for personal 
 and partisan success than for either the honor or material interests of those they profess to 
 serve. 
 
 PKOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 By Professor J. R. Commons. From Annals of the American Academy of Political 
 
 and Social Science, March 1892, 
 
 An earnest effort to abolish the " gerrymander " will probably lead to the conclusion 
 that the district system must be abandoned. To do this in Congressional elections, it will 
 not be necessary to return to the system of a general state ticket elected by the majority 
 party of each state, which was the custom in the first quarter of the century, and which is 
 still employed in the case of the presidential electors. A modification of that discarded 
 system could be adopted by introducing some simple device of proportional representation. 
 
 Proportional representation is not a new thing in politics, although it has heretofore 
 received but limited application. Twenty years ago there was abundant discussion of plans 
 for minority and proportional representation, and out of the discussion in our own country a 
 crude plan of cumulative voting was adopted by some of the municipalities of Pennsylvania, 
 and for the election of members of the lower house of the Illinois legislature. This plan is 
 still in force. It has been recently applied to all private corporations by the new constitu- 
 tions of Kentucky, North and South Dakota and Montana. The Illinois system for the 
 election of state representatives was submitted to the people by the Constitutional Conven- 
 tion of South Dakota, but was defeated at the polls. In Denmark, another plan of minority 
 representation has been in force since 1856. But the most important application of pro- 
 portional representation has been made by the Canton of Neuchatel, in Switzerland, and
 
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 155 
 
 more recently by the Canton of Ticino. Something like the Swiss plan could be profitably 
 adopted in the election of all our representative assemblies and boards. 
 
 For Congressional elections, let each state elect its entire quota of representatives on a 
 general ticket. Let each party in the state convention nominate the entire list, or as many 
 candidates as it could probably elect, adding a few names for favorable contingencies. 
 Then, in canvassing the returns, let the representatives be assigned to each party in pi'opor- 
 tion to the popular vote of the party, giving preference to the candidates according to their 
 standing on the vote. 
 
 For example, Ohio, in the elections of 1890, cast 713,152 votes for Congressmen. The 
 number of Congressmen to be elected was twenty-one. This gives a quota of 3.3,959 votes 
 to each Congressm:\n. The Republicans cast 362,624 votes, which gives them ten represent- 
 atives and a remainder of 23,034 votes. The Democrats cast 350,528 votes, giving them 
 ten representatives and a remainder of 10,928' votes. The Prohibition vote was 21,891, 
 and the Union Labor vote 3,223. There being twenty-one representatives to elect, and 
 the Republicans having a remainder above their ten quotas larger than the Democratic 
 remainder, and larger than the total Prohibition or Union . Labor vote, they get the 
 additional representative. Thus, the Ohio delegation would stand eleven Republicans 
 and ten Democrats. At present, under the gerrymander of 1890, it is seven Republicans 
 and fourteen Democrats. 
 
 In the election of state legislatures, the state could be divided into districts, each 
 electing five, seven, or some odd number of representatives, and the electors of each district 
 would vote for the entire list of names on their party ticket, the quotas and proportions 
 being obtained as above. For example, the county of Cuyahoga (including the citj' of 
 Cleveland) sends repeatedly a solid delegation of six Republicans to the Ohio State Legisla- 
 ture, elected on a general county ticket, and not one Democrat. By the proportional 
 system, there would be three Democrats and three Republicans. The county of Hamilton 
 (including the city of Cincinnati) sends to the Sixty-ninth General Assembly a solid delega* 
 tion of nine Democrats. The Kepublicaus of that county are unrepresented. Witli propor- 
 tional voting, the delegation would stand five Democrats, four Republicans. Other counties 
 in the state send one representative each. They could be grouped into districts of five, and 
 could then vote on the proportional plan. 
 
 In cities, election districts for councils and boards of aldermen could be constructed on 
 a similar basis. Where there are two branches of tlie city legislature, the smaller brancii 
 could be chosen on a general ticket for the city at large by the proportional system, and the 
 more numerous branch by districts of five. 
 
 In all elections upon this plan, tlie different party tickets could be printed on a single 
 ballot, according to the form of the Australian ballot. The order of names on each ticket 
 would be determined by the state convention of each party, and this would indicate the 
 order of preference of the party. Voters would not vote for individuals, l)ut for the ticket. 
 If inilividual voters took the liberty of changing the order of names, tlicy wouUl l<we their 
 vote altogetlnr. This provision is ncces.sary in order to simplify tiie counting of tiio liailots. 
 But " bolters " could nominate a new ticket, ami at the same time assist in electing the party 
 ticket, simply by placing their first choice at the head of their ticket and following it by 
 names taken from the regular ticket. If they were suUiciently numerous to comply witii 
 the law, the privilege could be obtained of having this new ticket printed separately on the 
 Australian ballot. If, now, the voters of this ticket could comraatid a ([uota of the entire 
 vote, they would elect their first choice, and any remainder aliove the (piota would go to the 
 next name, thus helping to elect one of tiic r<-gular party nominees. Tlie new Hystem woulil 
 thus involve no waste of votes. 
 
 The plan here outlined is a modification of one devised by Dr. L. I'.. TiickiTman. of 
 Cleveland, Ohio, who has developed it with special reference to the election of conunittecH
 
 156 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 by conventions or mass-meetings. In such assemblies the one-man power of the chainnan is 
 done away with, and each party can be fairly represented on committees by its own first 
 choice. 
 
 To set forth all the advantages of proportional representation would require an extended 
 study of politics and parties, and a careful weighing of remote causes. For the present, it is 
 possiljle to point out only a few of the patent benefits it would confer. In the first place, the 
 gerrymander woidd be absolutely abolished. Ko other feasible plan can be thought of that 
 will do this. The gerrymander inheres in the district system. So long as it is possible to 
 redistrict a state, it is hoijeless to expect that a party in power will refrain from doing so to 
 its own advantage. The changes in population necessitate redistricting at least once in ten 
 years. If legislatures be prohibited from passing such an act within a period less than ten 
 years, the party which happens to be in control of the legislature at the legal time will fasten 
 its own gerrymander on the people for a decade, with no possible chance for redress. It is 
 better to let the two parties play against each other. 
 
 Public opinion cannot stop the gerrymander, because public opinion rejoices in this kind 
 of tit-for-tat. The fact that one party has infamously cut up the state is good reason for the 
 other party to retrieve itself when it gets the power. If Congress should take the matter 
 out of the hands of the State Legislature, it would be simply to do its own gerrymandering, 
 while state and municipal gerrymandering would still go on as before. Constitutional 
 restrictions, requiring equal population and contiguous territory, are easily evaded. Not- 
 withstanding such restrictions, the populations of Congressional districts in New York vary 
 from 107,844 to 312,404. In no state is the Constitution on this point observed. And as for 
 contiguity, a glance at the diagram of the English district of North Carolina or the First and 
 Third districts of South Carolina will show on what a slender thread this fiction may be 
 made to hang. 
 
 It seems plain that with proportional representation abler men would be attracted into 
 legislative careers. The area of choice would be enlarged, and the leaders of a party could 
 not be driven from legislative halls where their ability is needed, as was done at the last 
 Congressional election. The feehng of responsibility to the whole people would be increased 
 in the leaders of parties, because they could stand on their record before the state at large, 
 and not be compelled to dicker with petty local magnates. A man is at present elected to 
 Congress, not on account of public service, but according to his ability in turning spoils and 
 appropriations into his district. He does not represent before the country any great policy 
 on which to stand or fall. He must depend on local wire-pulling and the exchange of favors. 
 If he has done some distinguished service for his party, or has reached eminence in politics, 
 the whole strength of the National party of the opposition is thrown into his district, and if 
 possible, he is gerrymandered out of oiiice. 
 
 Right here, however, will arise the principal popular objection to this plan, namely, 
 that districts would not be represented. But a slight thought will show that this objec- 
 tion has no force. The gerrymander has taken nearly all the virtue out of a district that it 
 may ever have possessed. There are few Congressional districts that have a unity of any 
 kind, either economical, political, topographical, geographical or historical. The county of 
 Huron, in Ohio, has been in five different combinations during the past twelve years, and 
 now it is in the western part of a district one hundred and twenty miles long and twenty 
 wide ; its Congressional representative lives sixty miles away, and had, previous to the last 
 gerrymander, very little knowledge of or interest in the county. In this, and hundreds of 
 other cases, the candidates in some districts at the other end of the state are better known 
 to the voters of the district than are the candidates in their own district. On the other 
 hand, the state is a historical and political unit. Its great men belong to no one district. 
 At present only two of them can go to the United States Senate, and others are shelved as 
 governors, or are compelled to seek some Presidential appointment. Under proportional
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 157 
 
 representation those who are unavailable for Senators would lead their party delegations in 
 the House. 
 
 Arguments for proportional representation have usually been advanced in behalf of 
 minorities. But they are equally valid as a defence of the majority. Under the system of 
 districts and primaries less than ten per cent, of the voters of a party often ilictate the policy 
 of the party. Machines and ward bosses are the party rulers, and the majority does not 
 dare to " bolt " at the polls, because the opposite party would then come into power. Pro- 
 portional representation would permit independent movements within the party ^\•ithout 
 risking the defeat of the entire ticket, simply by allowing the nomination of a new ticket 
 composed partly of independents and partly of the regular ticket. If the independent can- 
 didates are elected and there is a surplus of voters above the quota, the surplus goes to the 
 regular ticket. The majority of the party would be benefited as often as the minority. The 
 present system on the face of it means the rule of the minority. The gerrymander over- 
 throws majority rule. 
 
 The fact that voters could not vote for individuals, but must cast their ballots for the 
 straight ticket, may seem at first sight a serious objection. But the objection is not vahd as 
 against the present system, because even now the voter has no choice except between party 
 tickets, while under the proposed plan independent movements are made possible %\4thout 
 risking the complete defeat of the party. 
 
 Other objections might be noted. A small third party would be likely often to hold the 
 balance of power. The probability is, however, that there would be no occasion for third 
 ]iarties, because reforms inside the old parties would promptly gain a hearing, and com- 
 promises would head off radical ' ' bolts. " 
 
 The strongest objections are those which come from inertia and the dread of change. 
 Constitutional amendments will be necessary in some cases, though Congress has complete 
 power in the matter of National representatives. Nevertheless, representative government 
 is not something absolute and fixed in the nature of things. It is the result of circumstances 
 and experiments without any great amount of political analysis or design. It grew out of 
 the primitive mass-meeting, or folk-moot, simply because distant electors could not con- 
 veniently come up to the annual meetings. In the folk-moot the minority was, of course, 
 fully represented. How they should be represented in the delegate assembly was at first a 
 problem, but its solution was abandoned. The history of Colonel Maryland shows, in an 
 interesting way, how this came about. The original deliberative and legislative body was a 
 primal y assembly, where any freeman might speak and vote. In the second assembly— 1G38 
 — voting by proxy was allowed to those freemen who could not l)e present in person. 
 Abuses of this device led to the issuing of writs to the local divisions, instructing them to 
 return representatives. But realizing that those vvho did not vote for the successful candi- 
 dates would be unrepresented, individuals who were in the minority were allowed to appear 
 in their own right. The third assemlily was therefore an anomalous body, comprising; tlie 
 governor and his nominees, the duly elected representatives of localities, tliose in.livi.luals 
 who had not consented to the election of representatives, and the proxies of otlier unrepre- 
 sented individuals. Such a heterogenous mass was neither representative nor jiriinary, and 
 was so threatening to tiie reiiresentativo element that the hope of minority rei.re.sent.ation 
 was given up in despair and the assembly <lelined its own constitution by limiting popular 
 representation to the elected deputies, and ruling out proxies. Doubtlesa <.ther colonies 
 went through similar experiences. 
 
 The system finally adopted is rigid in the extreme. It has cn.lure.l b.causc tli.To has 
 been no special strain. Fiut the growing intensity of class divisions an.l tlu. i.nmenHily <.f 
 the interests involved call for a more elastic system. Proportional representation scums t.. 
 meet this requirement in every essential particular.
 
 1;"J8 APPENDIX. 
 
 THE CONSTITUTION AND ELECTORAL LAW OF THE KINGDOM 
 
 OF DENMARK. 
 
 Abstract and Analysis made and translated by i?. J. Wicksteed, LL. D., B.C.L., &c. Barrister, 
 
 THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 (Adojited I849, revised and promulgated 28th July, 1866.) 
 
 Section \. The form of government is a limited monarchy. 
 
 2. The legislative power is exercised concurrently by the King and the Rigsdag. The 
 executive power belongs to the King, Judicial power is exercised by the tribunals. 
 
 13. The King appoints and dismisses his ministers. 
 
 15. The Assembly of the ministers forms the Council of State. The King presides. 
 
 19. The King each year convokes the Eigsdag, for its ordinary session. 
 
 20. He may summon the Eigsdag for an extraordinary session. 
 
 22. The King may dissolve one or both of the chambers of the Eigsdag. 
 
 24. The consent of the King is necessary to give the force of law to a resolution of the 
 Eigsdag. The King orders its promulgation, and superintends its execution. 
 
 29. The Eigsdag is composed of two Chambers, the Folkething and the Landsthing. 
 
 30. Every person is an elector to the Folkething who possesses an unblemished 
 reputation, who is a citizen, and of the full age of 30 years, provided always he is not in the 
 service of a private person and has no household of his own ; that he has not received or is not 
 in receipt of public assistance, which he has not been forgiven or which he has not paid 
 back ; that he can dispose of his own property ; that he has had a domicile for one year 
 previous to the election, in the electoral district or town wherein he resides. 
 
 31. Any jjerson is eligible to be returned as a member of the Folkething, with the 
 exceptions one, two and three mentioned in the last preceding section, who possesses a 
 blameless character, is a citizen, and is of the full age of 25 years. 
 
 32. The number of the members of the Folkething bears the proportion to that of the 
 inhabitants of 1 to 16000. The elections are carried out in electoral districts. Each 
 disti'ict elects a representative. 
 
 33. The members of the Folkething are elected for 3 years. They receive a daily 
 indemnity. 
 
 34. The number of the members of the Landsthing is 66, — of whom 12 are appointed by 
 the King, — 7 by Copenhagen, — and 45 by the electoral districts, 1 by Bornholm and 1 by 
 Faroe. 
 
 35. No person can take part directly or indirectly in the elections of the Landsthing, 
 unless he has fulfilled the conditions required of the electors of the Folkething. 
 
 36. In Copenhagen the united electors appoint electors of the second degree, in the 
 proportion of 1 to 120. An equal number of electors of the second degree are appointed by 
 the electors who the preceding year were in receipt of a taxable income of, at least, 2000 
 rixdollars. These two classes of electors of the second degree proceed together with the 
 election of the Landsthing for Copenhagen. 
 
 1
 
 ELECTORAL LAW OF DENMARK. 159 
 
 37. In the country parts the united electors appoint one elector of the second degree 
 in each rural commune. 
 
 Provisions as to certain towns. 
 
 38. All are eligible for election to the Landsthing who are eligible to the Folkething. 
 
 39. The royal members are appointed for life ; but must be chosen from among those 
 who have been or who are elected members of the representative Chambers of the Kingdom. 
 The other members of the Landsthing are elected for S years, — the moiety of the members 
 is renewed every four j'ears. The members of the Landsthing receive the same indemnity 
 as those of the Folkething. 
 
 40. The elections for the Landsthing are conducted according to the proportional 
 system. The electoral law fixes the other provisions respecting the elections. 
 
 THE ELECTORAL LAW. 
 
 The law of elections put in force on July 12th, 1867, in the reign of Christian tlte Ninth, 
 at Copenhagen. 
 
 1. FOLKETHING. 
 Electoral PiIghts and Privileges. 
 
 Section 1. All persons of unblemished reputation, possessing the right of citizenship, 
 and of the full age of 30 years, are electors to the Folkething. 
 
 2. No one is considered as enjoying a spotless reputation who has been found guilty, by 
 a court, of an act dishonorable to the man, in the eyes of the public. 
 
 3. No one in the service of a private person can enjoy electoral rights, unless he has a 
 household of his own. 
 
 4. No one who has received assistance from the Government, which has not been repaid 
 or forgiven, can exercise electoral rights. 
 
 5. No person in pupillage or bankruptcy can be an elector. 
 
 6. One year's domicile within the city or electoral circle where he resides at tlic time of 
 the election, is rec^uired. Those who are domiciled in various places may themselves elect 
 the place where they will vote. 
 
 7. Every person is eligible for election to the Folkething who enjoys au unl)lemi8lu'(l 
 reputation, has the right of citizenship and is of the full age of 25 years, — unless he conies 
 within the provisions of sections 3, 4, and 5. 
 
 Electoral Lists. 
 
 Section 8. The governing bodies in the Communes are obliged to prepare the lists of tl>o 
 elect<^tr3 domiciled within each commune. 
 
 9. The names of the electors are in ali)habetical order on the electoral lisi^* : wliirli 
 ought also to include their name, age, business and domicile. 
 
 10. The electoral lists are prepared every year. A special list is prepared of those wlio 
 have not fully accomplished the required conditions, 
 
 11. The electoral lists must be complete<l within the last fortnight of February. 
 Doubtful points are decided by the communal government. 
 
 12. From the Iwt to the 8th of March, inclusive, the electoral liBts arc exitosed in a 
 convenient place to the public view.
 
 160 APPENDIX. 
 
 13. Complaints respecting errors are made, within three days of the exposure of the 
 lists, to the communal autliorities. 
 
 14. The claims and protests ai"e examined by the communal authorities at a session 
 witliin the following fortnight ; to which are summoned the complainants and the parties 
 complained of. 
 
 15. The president of the commune which does not contain the place for holding the 
 election, sends certified copies of his election lists to the president of the commune where 
 tlie election is held. 
 
 16. The president of the commune where the election is held is bound, within the three 
 days following the 1st of April, to inform a qualified bailiff what lists are wanting. 
 
 17. The bailiff, by imposing suitable penalties, procures the missing lists. 
 
 IS. If the lists are not revised in the manner authorised by law, a bailiff compels the 
 communal authority, by means of a penalty, to conform to the provisions of the law, the 
 legal delays being shortened. 
 
 19. Examinations of protests in Copenhagen. 
 
 20. If the communal authority refuses the right of voting to any person, the latter may 
 appeal to the courts. 
 
 21. The electoral lists are available for elections from the 1st of April to the 31st of 
 March in the following year. 
 
 Electo7-al Circles and Committees. 
 
 22. Each electoral circle returns a member to the Folkething. 
 
 23. In each circle is formed an electoral committee, composed of delegates from all the 
 communes belonging to the circle. Each commune elects one member of the committee 
 whatever its population. The communes of 3,000 souls appoint two, and one more for each 
 1,500 of population. The members of the committees are elected by the communal 
 authorities, so soon as the circle is called together for an election. 
 
 24. The member or members of the committee elected by the commune where the election 
 is to take place make all the preparations, receive the notifications of the candidates, &c. 
 
 25. The original electoral lists are brought by the members of each commune represent- 
 ing it, to the electoral committee. 
 
 26. If the original list is wanting recourse is had to a true copy. 
 
 27. The electoral commit ee in each of the electoral circles of Copenhagen. 
 
 28. The electoral committee where the election is had, keeps a minute book of pro- 
 ceedings, correspondence, &c. This is kept by the communal authorities where the election 
 takes place. Eight days after an election, the president of the electoral committee forwards 
 to the proper minister a certified copy of these minutes, who in turn presents this copy to 
 the Folkething. 
 
 Electoral Candidates. 
 
 29. No person can be elected to the Folkething unless presenting himself as a candidate ; 
 He must also be recommended by one of the electors of the circle, who is not a member of 
 the electoral committee. 
 
 30. The candidate must present a written notification of his intention to be a candidate. 
 He must also present himself, on the pain of nullification, on the day of the election. 
 
 31. The candidate need not justify before the electoral committee. 
 
 32. No person can offer himself as candidate in more than one electoral circle.
 
 ELECTORAL LAW OF DENMARK. 161 
 
 Election Meetings. 
 
 33. Elections for the Folkething are made for each circle in electoral meetings which 
 are open to the public. 
 
 34. The day, hour, and place of meetings are announced, S daj's in advance, in the 
 official Journal of the locality, or, in rural communes, in the churches, for two Sundaj's 
 preceding the election. 
 
 35. At the meetings, the president presents the candidates and their sureties to the 
 meeting. The candidates and their sureties address the meeting in alphabetical order. 
 They also answer questions. Xo member of the committee is allowed to speak. 
 
 Voting by Uplifted Hands. 
 
 36. Voting for the candidates then takes place. The electors voting in alphabetical 
 order. The one obtaining the majority of votes is elected member of the circle for the 
 Folkething. 
 
 37. If there is only one candidate he must obtain more tlian one-half the votes in order 
 to be elected. 
 
 Voting by Names. 
 
 38. A defeated candidate, or his sureties, may demand a vote by names. When only 
 one candidate, fifty electors present may demand a vote by names. This demand must be 
 made within one quarter of an hour after the proclamation of the result. 
 
 39. In voting by names the electors decide between the candidate elected by the show 
 of hands and the opposing candidates. 
 
 40. The various electoral lists are distributed among the members of the committee, 
 who collect the votes. 
 
 41. The electors give verbally their votes in the order in which they come forward. 
 The member of the committee iu charge of the list inscribes on it opposite the name of the 
 elector, the name of the candidate for whom he votes. Before the elector retires the name 
 of the candidate for whom he has voted is read over to him. 
 
 42. When all present have voted, the chairman declares the election closed. The 
 members of the committee sign the lists and give them to the chairman. 
 
 43. The committee, when met, again proceed to examine the lists and add them up. 
 The result of the vote is recorded in the electoral register and announced to the meeting. 
 The electoral lists and the lists of votes are returned to the respective communes, — signed 
 by the members of the committee. 
 
 45. Elections in the Bailiwick of Holbaek. 
 
 46. Elections in the Faroe Islands. 
 
 2. LANDSTFIlXn. 
 
 Electoral Rnmrs and Qualification.s. 
 
 47. Electors to have the same qualifications as those to the Folkething. 
 
 48. Members of the Landsthing to possess the same qualifications as those of the 
 Folkething. 
 
 Circles of llir LandMl/iing. 
 
 49. Besides the 12 members appointed by the King, the Landsthing is made up of 54 
 members elected by circles. 
 
 II
 
 162 APPENDIX. 
 
 50. The elected members of the Landsthing are elected for 8 years, — one half being 
 renewed every four years. 
 
 Election Committees. 
 
 51. The Landsthing elections are directed by special committees for each circle. 
 
 52. The committees are composed of a chairman, appointed \>y the King, and of two 
 members for each of the bailiwick councils comprised within the electoral circle, and of one 
 member of the communal authority of the largest town of each of the bailiwicks of the 
 circle. Special provisions as to Copenhagen and divided Bailiwicks. 
 
 Electoral Lists. 
 
 53. As the basis of the electoral lists, the proper minister publishes yearly, before the 
 15th January, the number of rural communes throughout the country, and within each 
 circle of the Landsthing. 
 
 54. In the elections of electors of the second degree, the electoral lists in use for the 
 Folkething are employed, with supplementary ones respecting the electors of the first degree. 
 
 55. These supplementary lists are prepared in the same manner as those of the 
 Folkething. 
 
 56. Preparation of the lists of the electors of the first degree in Copenhagen. Exposure, 
 protests, &c. , same as in the case of lists for the Folkething. 
 
 57. Lists of electors of the second degree prepared in other towns, by the communal 
 authority. Exposures, claims, and protests as in Folkething. 
 
 58. Any person whom the electoral committee refuses to put on the lists mentioned in 
 sections 56 and 57, may aj^peal to the courts as in section 20. 
 
 59. The lists of those electors in the country parts who are most highly taxed and who 
 take part directly in the Landsthing elections are prepared by the committees of their 
 respective circles (see sections 51 and 52). 
 
 60. In the preparation of these lists the revenue officers must, before the 15th January 
 m each year, forward to the electoral committees a statement of the rate-payers who have 
 paid to the state and to the commune of the bailiwick the highest taxes, — giving three times 
 the number of such ratepayers as there are rural communes in the district served by the 
 inland revenue office. This statement contains the amount of the taxes paid, and the rural 
 commune where the ratepayer has his domicile. 
 
 61. The electoral committees have, before the 1st February, with the assistance of the 
 statements before mentioned, to prepare a list of the ratepayers, who, in the proportion of 
 two for each of the rural communes in the corresponding circle of the Landsthing, are 
 allowed to take part directly in the elections of the Landsthing, ranking them according to 
 the value of their taxes. Printed copies of this list are sent to each communal council of the 
 circle as soon as possible to be exposed for the same time and at the same place as are those 
 for the Folkething. Protests are invited to be fyled within 3 days following the conclusion 
 of the exposure, The committee pronounces upon the protests at a meeting in the end of 
 March ; summoning the interested parties to it, three days in advance. 
 
 62. Any person who is refused enrolment on the list may appeal to the courts. 
 
 63. Immediately after the sitting mentioned in section 61 at least before the end of March, 
 the committee prepares the final list of electors who pay the highest taxes, which contains a 
 number ec^ual to that of the rural communes of the circle. To provide for vacancies, a 
 supplementary list is prepared, on which are placed the names equal to half the number of 
 the rural communes of the circle, of those next in order of highest taxation.
 
 ELECTORAL LAW OF DEXMARK, 163 
 
 64. Notice is given to the direct electors of their being such, and of the time and place 
 of election. The list of the direct electors must be prepared at least 8 days before the 
 election of the electors of the second degree. The electors are bound to present themselves 
 on pain of penalty. 
 
 65. The calculation of taxes. All the taxes that a person pays to the state, no matter 
 where the properties are situate, are reputed as being paid in the locality in which he is 
 entered as an elector to the Folkething. 
 
 Election of Electors of the Second Degree. 
 
 66. These elections, in Copenhagen, are carried out as in the elections to the Folkething. 
 Outside they are carried out by each commune separately, xmder the direction of their 
 respective communal authorities. The same lists are used as in the Folkething elections. 
 The domiciled electors in the commune or the circles can alone be electors of the second 
 degree. The electors of the'second degree may be chosen by the highest ratepayers from 
 out of the general body of the electors. 
 
 67. The elections of the electors of the second degree are fixed by the electoral colleges 
 at Copenhagen, and by the highest ratepayers in the other to^v^ls. The day and place are 
 announced as in section 84. 
 
 68. At Copenhagen all the electors on the Folkething lists appoint the electors of the 
 second degree in the proportion of one to 120. An equal number of electors of the second 
 degree are appointed by the ratepayers who had, the previous year, a taxable revenue of at 
 least 2000 EixdoUars,— they are divided among the different circles of the Folkething, as 
 much as possible proportionately to the number of the highest ratepayers in each circle. 
 A list of those elected in the first manner is sent to the circles to prevent dual elections. 
 
 69. In the country places all the electors appoint one elector of the second degree in 
 each rural commune. The committee of each circle sends to all the communal authorities 
 within the circle a list of all the highest ratepayers who take a direct part in the Landsthing 
 elections, and who therefore cannot be elected as electors in the second degree. 
 
 70. Elections in towns. 
 
 71. The voting takes place openly in a convenient place. The circles may be divided 
 into several voting divisions. The electors each vote for as many electors of the second 
 degree as have to be elected within the circle. 
 
 72. Three hours after the opening, if no one offers to vote, the election is declared 
 closed. The majority decides. In case of a tie the decision is by lot. 
 
 73. The names of those elected are inscribed on a register authorisetl by tlir comuiunal 
 authority. 
 
 74. Every person appointed an elector of the second degree is bound to accept the trust 
 unless he can plead a legal objection. 
 
 75. Every elector of the second degree who makes default or abstains from voting is 
 subject to a penalty of 20 rixdoUars,— which penalty is absorbed by the ]H,ur box of the 
 commune ; or tlie municipal treasury. 
 
 7(;. 'Jlie duties of the electors of tlie second degree terminate with elections of tlio 
 Landstliiiig— unless a re-election is ordered. 
 
 77, The electors of the second degree are not bf.iuul by the inBtructions of tlicir con- 
 stituents nor by any engagements they may have ni.idc with them rcHpecting tlie elections. 
 
 78. The electors of the second degree receive an indemnity of 48 skillingH per mil.', from 
 their domicile to the place of voting ff.r the LandHthing.
 
 1G4 APPENDIX. 
 
 Elections of the Members of the Landsthiug. 
 
 79. The place of election of certaiu circles is fixed by the King. The day, hour, and 
 place is announced bj'^ the electoral committee, as in section 34. 
 
 80. The electors of the second degree and the direct electors must be present at the 
 place, and hour of election. 
 
 81. The election meeting is public. All the electors are present, and, after identification, 
 receive a ballot paper containing as many divisions as there are members to elect. 
 
 82. The elections for the Landsthing are conducted according to, what is known as, the 
 proportional system. The electors proceed to vote by filling up their ballots. The 
 number of ballot papers handed in to the chairman divided by the number of members 
 of the Landsthing to be elected, forms a quotient which is taken as the basis of 
 election. After the ballots have been lodged and cast into an urn, the chairman draws 
 them out one by one and reads out in a loud voice the name which stands at the head 
 of each ballot. So soon as a name obtains the number of votes equal to the quotient above 
 mentioned the reading is stopped, the ballots verified, and the candidate proclaimed elected. 
 The reading of the remaining ballots is continued, taking care to consider the name of the 
 candidate already elected, and which may be found at the head of the list, as effaced, and to 
 consider the next name at the head of the list. A second candidate is obtained, as before, 
 when his name reaches the quotient ; — and so on until the ballots are all drawn out. 
 
 83. If there still remain members to be elected, the names of those who have obtained 
 the greatest number of ballots are selected to fiU the remaining places, provided always that 
 the person to be elected must obtain at least one-half of the quotient in the number of votes 
 •cast for him. In case of ties the lot must decide. 
 
 84. If there still remain elections to be completed, the ballots are read over again, and 
 out of the candidates placed at the head of the ballots, who have not already been elected, a 
 sufficient number is taken to fill the number of members required. 
 
 85. Special provisions as to Bornholm and Faroe. 
 
 86. The committee cannot reject votes because they have been given to men whose 
 qualifications are doubted. The Landsthing determines questions of this kind, when they 
 present themselves before it. 
 
 87. All that passes at the election meeting is entered in the Register, and examined by 
 the chairman. This Register must contain exact and particular information, — the number 
 of ballots cast, the number of those who were elected, and the number of votes given to each, 
 the ballots rejected and the reasons therefor. The ballots are then sealed up and preserved. 
 The chairman then notifies the elected members of their election. If they do not refuse to 
 act within 8 days they are taken to consent. 
 
 Eight days, thereafter, the Chairman sends a copy of the Register to the Minister in 
 charge. He, in turn, lays it before the Landsthing when they meet. 
 
 General Provisions. 
 
 88. General elections, every three years for the Folkething, and every four years for the 
 moiety of elective members of the Landsthing. 
 
 89. A member of the Rigsdag elected to replace another serves for the time that the 
 member whom he replaces would have served. 
 
 90. The king fixes the day of the general elections. Tlie elections for the Folkething 
 coming first. For bye-elections the date is fixed by the proper minister, 
 
 91. Every person elected to the Rigsdag receives a letter, signed by the electoral 
 committee to that effect.
 
 VOTING BY COMMAND. 165 
 
 92. Any person, neglecting the duties imposed by the present law, is subject to a fine of 
 from 10 to 200 rixdoUars ; unless a severer penalty has been imposed. 
 
 93. The costs of the elections to the Folkething are.'broadly speaking, paid by the 
 treasurer of the commune. 
 
 94. Travelling allowances of 48 skillings per mile are allowed to the members of the 
 electoral committees for verifying hsts, &c. The electors votmg directly are not allowed any 
 kind of indemnity. This refers to the Landsthing. 
 
 95. All the costs of the Landsthing elections are paid by the chairman of the electoral 
 committee. He prepares a statement which is veritied by the council of the Bailiwick, 
 where the election occurs. 
 
 i'6. After this statement is verified, the chairman divides the costs of the election among 
 the communes of the circle, according to the number of electors of the second degree each 
 commune has to appoint. One month after the receipt of notice the communal authorities 
 are obliged to reimburse the chairman the proportion to be paid by them, under a penalty. 
 
 97. The chairman of the committee of each'of the Landsthing circles (except Copenhagen 
 and Faroe) is authorised to secure an advance from the treasury of the Bailiwick where the 
 election occurs of the necessary sum, on condition of repayment within 3 months following 
 the election. 
 
 98. Costs of elections how paid in Copenhagen and Faroe. 
 
 99. Every member of the Rigsdag receives an indemnity of three rixdollars per diem 
 while the session lasts. Travelling expenses are also allowed. 
 
 100. Repeal of laws. 
 
 VOTING BY COMMAND. 
 
 By Dr. Wicksteed. From " The Week" May 13th, 1S92. 
 
 In order that the Canadians may fully appreciate the importance of tlie ((uestion of 
 compulsory voting, I desire to place before them the following statements submitted to the 
 members of the Select Committee of the House of Commons of Canada, to whose consider- 
 ation has been referred the Bill of the present session entitled, " An act to make voting 
 compulsory": — 
 
 Relying upon the desire wliich actuates tlic members of this committee, tlie desire to 
 calmly and thoroughly investigate and pass upon the principles involved in the Bill before 
 them, I venture to put forward, in writing, a few extracts from the works of others, bearing 
 upon the subject of compulsory voting in elections for the House of Connnons. 
 
 The question wliether an elector in Cana<la sliould be compelletl to vote may lie diacussuil 
 from four standpoints, viz. : the moral, the ethical-political, the ideal-political and the 
 practical-political. 
 
 Extract "A," in the appendix hereto, from the pen of Dr. I!. W. Dale, a Congregational 
 minster of Birmingham, England, is a good example of the argument on rcligiouH groundH. 
 
 In extract " 15," we have tlie views of the late Dr. Francis Mclicr, jw expri-HHeil in his 
 "Manual of Political Ethics." The " Encyclop.edia i'.ritannica" inchiduM tliis work wlicn 
 stating : " The political writings of Francis Liober are lield in great eatiinatiou hy all 
 publicists."
 
 166 APPENDIX. 
 
 Nearly one-third of the electors of Canada refrained from voting in the elections of 1891, 
 as is shown in (luotation " C." 
 
 All scriptures, both sacred and the honest profane, are written for our learning ; and he is a 
 foolisli statesman who acts without informing himself beforehand, from the history of nations 
 and the writings of their best men, what had been advocated under similar circumstances by 
 rulers and philosophers, and how their teachings wei-e borne out and resulted when put to 
 actual test. 
 
 Extract " D," taken from that dialogue of Plato called "Laws" is given as showing 
 the compulsory manner of voting enjoined by this philosopher in his ideal commonwealth for 
 the Athenians, written about 350 years before Christ. This is the philosopher of whom it 
 has been said that "he has anticipated nearly all the questions that have swelled into 
 importance in the meta-physical and ethical speculations of these later ages ." 
 
 The only modern instance, we can discover, of the compulsory voting being made use of 
 in state elections is that of the kingdom of Denmark. In 1866, a new electoral law was 
 passed, in which the principles of compulsory voting and proportional representation were 
 embodied. According to the Danish ambassador at Washington, this law has worked 
 well ; and according to the " Encycloptedia Britannica " " notwithstanding her dismember- 
 ment (in 1864) Denmark has prospered to an astonishing degree, and her material fortunes 
 have been constantly in the ascendant." 
 
 Let us return to Canada. Under the Dominion Elections Act it is provided that all 
 persons possessing certain qualifications "on the day of the polling at any election for any 
 electoral district, shall be entitled to vote at any such election for such electoral district, 
 and no other persons shall be entitled to vote thereat." How does this Act work in practice ? 
 In 1891, as shown by appendix " G," out of 1,132,201 electors on the lists, only 730,457 
 voted. This fact might not be so much deplored but for the prophecy of the wise Lieber : 
 " they whose voting is the least desirable are the surest to be at the poll." In Canada the 
 surest to be at the poll are the venal, the bribed, the boodler, the place-hunter, the weak, 
 the worthless, while the brains, the sinew, the substance of the State keep away from the 
 poll. The latter do not answer to the question. What are the duties of your station ? as does 
 the elector in Bolingbroke's political catechism: "to endeavour, so far as I am able, to 
 preserve the public tranquility, and, as I am an elector, to give my vote to the candidate 
 whom I judge most worthy to serve his country." 
 
 The law of the land governs all : it declares that (for good reasons) certain persons (the 
 majority) shall not vote ; and declares that certain others — the privileged, the representative 
 minority, the trustees of the Dominion people at large — are entitled to vote. What we want 
 from the Bill is to substitute the words "must vote" for the words "shall be entitled to 
 vote." The reason why they were not substituted at first was the argument that, although all 
 electors could vote, yet some of them abstained ; still the machinery of the law would not be 
 affected, inasmuch as sufficient votes would be cast to carry out the intentions and the 
 provisions of the Act. The bare provisions, as expressed in words, perhaps, but surely not 
 the intentions of our law-makers. But we find that the machinery, for want of or from 
 improper feeding, although it works, turns out bad work or inferior work. The work turned 
 out by the electoral machine is not representative of the truest and best manhood of Canada 
 — which it would be in time if the one-third laggards were whipped to the polling booth, and 
 some of the now voters were whipped at it. If the army machine of England were not fed 
 with sufficient recruits of good quality — what would happen ? why, at once, a compulsory 
 recruiting or conscription Act would be passed. 
 
 We have seen that on religious, moral, ethical, political, historical and practical grounds 
 all electors should vote or be punished. We therefore call upon the members of the House 
 of Commons to pass the Bill making voting compulsory. We ask those members who are
 
 VOTING BY COMMASD. 167 
 
 ready to punish one of their number, who, having heard the question in the House, declines 
 to vote ; we ask them to punish electors in their electoral districts, who, ha\-ing heard the 
 pronouncements and appeals of the various candidates, decline to vote. In what do these 
 two bodies dififer ?— they are both representatives, they are both trustees— the electors of the 
 nation, the Commoners of the electors. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Authorities, Citations, Opinions and Extracts in favour of . 
 
 A. — "The great outlines of national legislation and policy are laid down, not in 
 Parliament, not in the Cabinet, but at the polling booths. It is the electors who make war 
 or maintain peace, who repeal old laws and pass new oaes, who interfere, justly or unjustly, 
 between landlords and tenants, masters and servants, parents and childten. Those who 
 abstain from voting, determine the national jjolicy as truly as those who vote. The 
 
 responsibility of the Parliamentary franchise cannot be evaded According 
 
 to the Divine order civil authority is necessary to the existence of civil society. Civil rulers 
 are ' ministers of God.' But they are not designated to their office by a voice from heaven. 
 In this country the sovereign and the peers inherit their position by birth ; the rest have to 
 be selected, directly or indirectly, by those who possess the franchise. It is surely a part of 
 God's service to determine who shall be ' God's ministers,' and for the manner in which we 
 discharge this ser\nce we are responsible to God. Not to vote is to act the part of the 
 unfaithful servant who hid his talent in the earth and made no use of it. To vote corruptly 
 is felony ; it is to appropriate to our own purposes what we have received as trustees for the 
 town or the nation. " — From the Laws of Christ for Comvion life, by Dr. R. W. Dale. 
 
 B. — " The question has been made, whether a citizen, possessing the right to vote, ought 
 not to be legally bound to vote for general elections, as the citizen is obliged to serve on juries 
 Why, it is asked, shouli^ those for instance, who possess most property and receive the full 
 benefit of the law, from indolence, superciliousness or cowardice be allowed to refuse to join 
 in that manner of expressing public opinion or of appointing law-makers which the law of 
 the land establishes ? It cannot bo denied that affixing a penalty for uncxcnsed omission of 
 voting would have this advantage at least, that the public opinion respecting tlie obligation 
 of every citizen lawfully to aid in the politics of his country, and the discountenance given 
 
 to |K)liticial inditferentism, would be lixedly pronounced l)y law We have 
 
 treated already of the bad motives and mischievous tondenoy of political apathy or 
 superciliousness. A man who from indolence or blaniable disdain does not go to tlie ballot- 
 box knows little of the importance of the whole institution of the State, or must l)e 
 animated by very little public spirit ; or he deserves the mantle of lead which Dante 
 apportions to cowards in the lower regions. There seem to nie to be two rules of perfect 
 soundness and elementary importance in jiolitics : — 
 
 1. There is no safer means of preventing facti(nis movements of any kiml, and tlie State 
 from falling a gradual prey to calamitous .lisordurs, wherever tlie francliiao is enjoyed on an 
 extensive scale, than the habitual steady voting of all who have the votive right at nil 
 primary elections. 
 
 2. The moral obligation of depositing without fail one's vote increases in the same 
 ratio as the right of Hudrago exteiidH, which riglit will necessarily more and more extend 
 with modern civilization, h<j that with incre.'iaiiig civilization this obligation of voting 
 
 increases. 
 
 There is no great principle whicli has ever actuated mankind that has not had
 
 168 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 likewise its inconvenience for the individual ; so has the main moving principle of our times ; 
 but we are not on that account absolved from conscientiously acting upon it and acting it 
 out. Therefore, if we have a mind honestly to join in the great duties of our period, we 
 must act as conscientious citizens, and, if we mean to do this, we must go to the poll. It is, 
 I repeat it to my readers, of primaiy importance, and the more they read history the more 
 they will feel convinced of it. The more extended the franchise is, the more it must likewise 
 extend to those persons to whom time is of little value, to people who make a feast-day, 
 perhaps a riotous day, of the election time. They whose voting is the least desirable are the 
 surest to be at the poll ; but the industrious mechanic, the laborious farmer, the man of 
 study, the merchant and professional man — in short, all those who form the sinew and 
 substance of the State, feci it a sacrifice of time to go to the place of voting, where they are 
 not unfrequently delayed for a long time, by the other class, from depositing their vote, 
 especially in populous places. They are, therefore, the more imperatively called upon to 
 keep constantly before their minds how important it is that they should vote, and not leave 
 the election to be decided by those who have the smallest stake in the society. Let no man 
 be prevented from voting by the consideration of the loss of a day's labour, or the incon- 
 venience to which he may expose himself in going to the poll. —i'Vom Manual of Political 
 Ethics, by Dr. Francis Lieber. 
 
 C. — The total votes on the lists on which the elections of 1891 were run numbered in all 
 Canada 1,132,201, of which 730,457 voted. In 1887 the voters numbered 993,914, of which 
 725,056 voted. 
 
 D. — "The Council shall consist of 360 members — this will be a convenient number for 
 sub-division. If we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety 
 counsellors for each class. (Note. The Athenians were divided into four classes, according 
 to their rated property. ) First, all the citizens shall vote for members of the council taken 
 from the first class ; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly lined. 
 When the candidates have been elected, some one shall mark them down ; this shall be the 
 business of the first day. And on the following day the election shall be made from the 
 second class in the same manner and under the same conditions as on the previous day ; and 
 on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which every one may, if 
 he likes, vote, and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote ; but the fourth and 
 lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of this class who does not vote 
 shall not be punished. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the 
 fourth and smallest class ; they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall 
 suffer no penalty, nor he of the third, if he be not willing to vote ; but he who is of the first 
 or second class, if he does not vote, shall be punished ; he who is of the second class shall 
 pay a fine triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple 
 On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, in the presence of all bhe 
 citizens, and every man shall choose out of them, under pain, if he do not, of suffering the 
 first penalty ; and, when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose 
 one-half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny ; these are to form the council for the 
 year." — From the Dialogues of Plato. "Laws," Book 6. 
 
 E. — Provisions of the election law of Denmark, of 1867 : Section 64. Notice is given to 
 the direct electors of the Landsthing of their being such, and of the time and place of 
 election The electors are bound to present themselves on pain of penalty. 
 
 Section 74. Every person appointed an elector of the second degree is bound to accept 
 the trust, unless he can plead a legal objection. 
 
 Section 75. Every elector of the second degree who makes default or abstains from 
 voting is subject to a penalty of 20 rix-dollars — which penalty is absorbed by the poor-box 
 of the commune or the municipal treasury.
 
 COMPULSORY VOTING. 1G9 
 
 Section 78. The electors of the second degree receive an indemnity of 48 skilliugs per 
 mile, from their domicile to the place of voting for the Landsthing. 
 
 Section SO. The electors of the second degree and the direct electors must be present 
 at the place and at the hour of election. 
 
 Section 92. Any person neglecting the duties imposed by the present law is subject to 
 a fine of from 10 to 200 rLx-dollars : unless a severer penalty has been imposed. 
 
 COMPULSORY VOTING. 
 
 By Sydney Fisher, in the Montreal Herald, May 24th, 1S92. 
 
 I cannot agree with the view that this compulsory voting, will be an effectual or even 
 partial cure. Such an expedient may force some few to an unwilling and unintelligent 
 compliance ^vith the law, but it will not in any way remove the cause of the evil, therefore 
 cannot be effective. At the same time compulsory voting may easily cause hardship and 
 may lower the morale of numbers of the electorate. It must be remembered in discussing 
 the plan of forcing every man to vote that under our present laws a voter can only vote for 
 one of certain duly nominated individuals and in consequence of the consent of the candidate 
 being required and a large money deposit being exacted to nominate a man, it is not easy to 
 secure the nomination of more than two or three candidates. Thus the average elector would 
 be obliged to vote for a candidate in whose nomination he has had no part, unless indeed 
 as one of the rank and (lie of a great political party, autl of whom very probably he does not 
 approve. Suppose for instance an honest voter who believes in protection finds two 
 candidates nominated in his constituency, one a free trader and the other a boodler or a 
 drunkard, consequently men neither of whom lie can honestly support, nor does he consider 
 either worthy to represent his views on public (questions. Wliy, under such circumstances, 
 should the voter be forced to cast his vote or lose his franchise or pay a fine ? Suppose again 
 a voter is a prohibitionist and finds no candidate who will agree to vote for Prohibition, why 
 should he be forced to vote for a man who is opposed to what he considers the most important 
 public question ? It would be a hardship to make him lose liis right to vote when other 
 candidates are in the field. I see it is proposed by some that religious scruples sliall relieve 
 a voter from being forced to vote. I fear that in election times there would be great, if 
 insincere, accession of religious fervour and I doubt tlie moral improvement of many ol those 
 who thus would shirk the vote. Another point which would largely nullify any benefit 
 that might be obtained by compulsory voting is the secrecy of the ballot. It is sonutliing 
 like the oM adage, "One may bring the horse to water, but a huiulrod cannot make him 
 drink." You may make tlie man go into the polling booth and go through all the motions 
 of voting, but you cannot tell whetlier he votes or not. 
 
 I believe a l^etter remedy would be to adopt an expeiliont by wliich the elector would 
 have to appreciate his privilege in the franchise, and tlic only way I can tliiuk of to accomplisli 
 this, is to tlirow the responsibility of securing his riglit to vote on the citizen liimself. I>et 
 only those vote who value the privilege sufficiently U) make an effort, only a slight om- but 
 still an active step, to secure the privilege. Tliis may at first sight aj>pear reactionary iw it 
 is radical, but the mode I HUggest of carrying tlie plan out is not n-actionary at all. I would 
 place tlie right to vote within the reach of every male IJritinh siibjeot of twenty-one years 
 of age who lives in Canada, but I would exact of him the active stop of appcarintf personally 
 before the proper ofiicial ami entering his name on the list. If any resident of Canada be not 
 willing to take so much trouble as this once a year to secure the right to have his nay in the
 
 170 APPENDIX. 
 
 management of our public affairs, either he is so ignorant of the duties and privileges of citizen- 
 sliip that he is not competent to vote intelligently or he does not take sufficient interest in 
 the affairs of the communitj-- to study them enough to vote properly. If a man has thus 
 taken the trouble to obtain the right to vote, he is pretty sure to make use of it if he 
 conscientiously can. 
 
 There are but iew difficulties in the way of this reform, while nearly all the objectionable 
 features of our present arrangememts would disappear. The scheme I would suggest, after 
 considerable thought given to it during several years of active participation in election work 
 is this : That in a certain month of the year, say May or September, the secretary-treasurer 
 of the municipality, or in large cities an officer appointed for the purpose, should during 
 certain hours of the day keep open a register for voters. Any man who would appear before 
 him and make oath (the official being empowered ex-officio to adminster oaths) that he was 
 a British subject, twenty-one years of age, a resident in the municipality at that time, and 
 that he had not registered anywhere else that year, should have his name entered as a voter. 
 In case of confinement to the house by sickness during the whole of the month, a doctor's 
 certificate under oath would entitle the applicant to registration without personal appearance, 
 and absence from Canada during the whole month, properly established by oath would do 
 the same. This list should come in force at the end of the given month and be valid for one 
 year. The same process for a new list being gone through each year. 
 
 This list would cost hardly anything, there being no labor on the part of the officer to 
 hunt up names, no enquiry into qualification, no revision. The man making oath would be 
 liable to prosecution for perjury, if swearing falsely, which would be sufficient check on 
 improper registration. 
 
 This plan involves the principle of one man one vote, which is the only true principle of 
 a democratic franchise. No doubt at first the number of voters would be lessened, but it 
 would be the indifferent or ignorant who would be left off, just the men who now either do 
 not vote or put up their vote for sale. 
 
 A further enactment ought to go with this scheme ; namely, that paying a man for his 
 time and trouble in registering or inducing him to register, would, in the first place deprive 
 him of the right to vote, and also be punishable by a fine or imprisonment for either party 
 to the bargain. I do not suppose that this or any other expedient will do away with bribery 
 in elections until the voters themselves become honest, but I do believe that it would greatly 
 lessen the evil of corrupt elections. The time of registration would not usually be in the 
 heat of a contest and men would not be so easily induced to pledge themselves to an unknown 
 candidate or to a future contest as they now are willing to sell themselves for cash clown 
 within a few days or a few hours of voting. A politician or a party even would not be so 
 willing to pay out money to men for an uncertain return, and consequently bribery would be 
 made more risky. This scheme is put forward as a reform, which I am confident would do 
 more than any other so far suggested to improve our election work, while at the same time 
 it would remove nearly all the expense and labor, and waste of time involved in the making 
 up of our voters lists and so render corruption more difficult. 
 
 Certainly some reform in these matters is absolutely necessary if Canada is to be governed 
 by her people in their own interests, and the most just and most effective mode is to shut 
 out the ignorant, indifferent and corrupt from the power to control the election of the 
 representatives.
 
 POSTSCRIPT. 
 
 The foregoing excerpts present in a condensed form the views of 
 many public men who have given much attention to the subject sub- 
 mitted for consideration. It is beHeved they will not be unacceptable 
 to some of those readers who do not live within reach of public libraries, 
 where they could have access to the original works. 
 
 While they were passing through the press, two articles have appeared 
 which the writer deems it expedient to add to the list. The first in the 
 " Week" of May 13th, by Dr. Wicksteed. of Ottawa, under the heading 
 " Voting by Command;" the second in the " Montreal Herald" of May 
 24th, by Mr. Sydney Fisher, for many years member of the Dominion 
 House of Commons, under the heading " Compulsory Voting." The first 
 expresses the convictions of that section of the community which in 
 order to obtain the voice of the people advocates the introduction of a 
 law by which electors would be compelled to vote or be punished. The 
 second takes a different view and with the design of shutting out the 
 ignorant, indifferent and corrupt, from the power of controlling elections, 
 submits a plan which he thinks would have that effect ; he is of opinioii 
 too that it would tend to raise the franchise so as to embrace chiefly, 
 those who are sufficiently inttelligent to value their political privileges 
 and are patriotic enough to exercise them properly. These articles 
 together with the introduction of a Bill in the Canadian Parliament to 
 enact the principle of compulsory voting and the appointment of a special 
 committee to consider the expediency of adopting the principle, arc at 
 least hopeful indications that among members of the House of Commons 
 of Canada the feeling is arising that some amendment of our electoral 
 system is imperatively called for. The Proportional Representation 
 Society has already been alluded to (page 30) : a list of members of 
 the British House of Commons who had joined this organization will 
 be found at page 88, and in this list will be noticed the names of no less 
 than twelve members who arc, or were, ministers of the Crown, and of 
 these, four ranked as "cabinet" ministers in Lord Salisbury's adminis- 
 tration. Such facts attest that the public conscience in both countries 
 is being awakened to the necessity of some radical change in electoral 
 methods. 
 
 The writer is unable himself to recognize that any extraordinary 
 results of a beneficial character would be achieved by the enforcement of
 
 172 POSTSCRIPT. 
 
 a system of compulsory voting. Taken by itself as explained in Dr. 
 Wicksteed's paper, it would give no freedom of choice to the elector. 
 Compulsory voting would not touch the real difficulty, which leads to 
 party organization, and its outcome, the caucus system by which the 
 choice is determined. The candidates would be selected as at present, 
 and as a rule by coteries of party politicians. The ordinary independent 
 voter would not have the remotest voice in the selection, and many will 
 consider it a monstrous proposal that an elector should be forced by legis- 
 lative enactment, under threat of fine, to vote for one of the two party can- 
 didates, in neither of whom he could place confidence. For this is 
 practically what he would be reduced to, if he were dragged in his 
 despite to the polls, and compelled to choose between two evils. His 
 alternative would be to pay the penalty, or go through an empty form 
 which would render his vote of no effect whatever. Would not high 
 minded men, rich and poor alike, feel themselves humiliated and degraded 
 in being thus coerced ? If compulsory voting could be effectively 
 enforced, its tendency would be to drive all composing the voting com- 
 munity, whether they will or not, to take sides with one party or the 
 other. It would by no means remove the evils of party government. Its 
 direct consequence would be to separate the community more completely 
 than even at present, into two great political divisions. In what 
 way then would it effect good ? Would it not tend to intensify 
 party bitterness? Would it not consolidate and perpetuate the dualism 
 which we deplore ? Would it not always leave unrepresented in parlia- 
 ment that great mass of the electors who had supported the defeated 
 candidates ? 
 
 High authorities have expressed the opinion that representative 
 government is on its trial. We may ask the question ; has true repre- 
 sentative government ever yet been tried.-' The writer is profoundly 
 convinced that our present duty is to make every effort to obtain this 
 ideal government, and seek for nobler ideas of public life than now 
 prevail, that is to say if we are to be freed from the political ills from 
 which we suffer. The issue, with greater accuracy, may be set forth 
 that it is government by party which is on its trial. Can we doubt what 
 the verdict will be, when we have something better to take its place ? 
 
 The foregoing pages indicate the views which begin to dominate on 
 both sides of the Atlantic on this subject ; the lesson is inculcated that we 
 have reached the stage when we should aim to lay aside the spirit of 
 antagonistn mid ivrong which we have acquired by transmission from the 
 distant past, and substitute the spirit of amity and right, in national, as 
 we do in almost all other human affairs. We recognize that we are in an
 
 POSTSCRIPT. 173 
 
 age of evolution : the arts and sciences are expanding civilization in 
 every sphere of activity, and it appears inconsistent with the law of 
 progress that the domain of government should remain non-progressive 
 or become retrogressive. 
 
 The evidence before us leads to the conviction that to enter on the path 
 of progress, popular government must stand on a broader and sounder 
 basis than that of party. We must hope for a political evolution which 
 will enable every man in the land to feel that the acts of the government 
 are his acts, that the laws made by parliament are made by those who 
 represent him. We must look for a political development based on the 
 fundamental principles of our constitution ; one which will bind every 
 individual life, in the common life of the state ; a development which 
 removing the causes of chronic internal dissensions, will benefit societ)', 
 will give strength and stability to the commonwealth, and enable it the 
 better to stand the test of time. 
 
 To determine the best means of effectively promoting this high 
 public purpose is the end and object of the appeal which the Canadian 
 Institute submits to the world of thought and constructive statesmanship. 
 It cannot be doubted that this object will find earnest sympathy with 
 every well wisher of his country. 
 
 S. F. 
 Ottawa, May 26th, 1892.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 Memorandum by the Council, of the Canadian Institute, April 4th, 1892 3 
 
 Conditions on which prizes will be awarded 5 
 
 Letter to the Canadian Institute, from Sandford Fleming 7 
 
 "Note " Accompanying Mr. Fleming's letter q 
 
 Supplementary Note by Mr. Sandford Fleming 25 
 
 PAPERS AND EXTRACTS. 
 
 1 ■> 
 
 jj 
 
 1 Cause and Effect of Party, from a Disquisition on Government, by J. C. Calhoun, 1849. 
 
 2 Party Government Adverse to Good Government, Eraser's Magazine, Vol. 49, 1854. 35 
 
 3 Checks and Balances, by Earl Russell, 1854 36 
 
 4 Hare on Representatives, 1S57, A Resume by John Francis Waters, M. A 36 
 
 5 The Danish Electoral Law of 1855, by the late Lord Lytton, 1863 41 
 
 6 Fair Representation, from a speech by Lord Sherbrooke, 1867 49 
 
 7 Mis-representation, from the Fortnightly Review, Vol. 8, 1870 49 
 
 8 Political Parties and Politicians, from "The American System of Government," by 
 
 E. C. Seaman 1870 50 
 
 9 Political Corruption, from the Canadian Monthly, Vol. 2, 1872 54 
 
 10 Party Politics, from the Canadian Monthly, Vol. 2, 1872 58 
 
 11 Explanation of Hare's Scheme of Representation, by M. G. Fawcett, 1872 63 
 
 12 Decline of Party Government, by Gold win Smith Macmillan's Mag., Vol. 36, 1877. 66 
 
 13 Representation of Minorities, by Leon'd Courtney. Nineteenth Century, Vol. 6, 1879. 67 
 
 14 Party Rule in the United States, from "a True Republic," by Albert Stickney, 1879.. 69 
 
 15 Representative Government in England, by David Syme, 1881 75 
 
 16 Electing Representatives, by H. R. Droop, from Journal of Statistical Society, 1881. . ' 79 
 
 17 Partizan Government, by Wm. D. Le Sueur. North American Review, 1881 84 
 
 18 Proportionate Representation by F. Seebohm, Contemporary Review, Vol. 44, 1883. 85 
 
 19 Proportional Representation, from The Nineteenth Century, Vol, 15, 1884 86 
 
 20 Proportional Representation Society, from " " Vol. 15, 1884.. 87 
 
 21 Representation and Misrepresentation, from The Westminster Review, Vol. 65, 1S84. 90 
 
 22 Party Struggles, from England and Canada, by Sandford Fleming, 1884 92 
 
 23 The Despotism of Party, by Herbert Tutlle, the Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 54, 1SS4 93 
 
 24 Representative Government, by John Stuart Mill, 1884 94 
 
 25 Party Government, Ijy Mathew Macfie, The Contemporary Review, Vol. 46, 1884. . . 100 
 
 26 Parly Feeling, from "Popular Government," by Sir Henry S. Maine, 1884 101 
 
 27 Representation, by Sir John Lubbock, 1885 105 
 
 28 Party and Principle, from the Quarterly Review, Vol. 163, 1886 108 
 
 29 Party and Patriotism, by Syrlney E. Williams, 1886 109 
 
 30 Party Government, from the Westminster Review, Vol. 69, 1S86 1 1 1 
 
 31 The Danger of Parly, by Frederic Harrison, Contemporary Review, Vol. 49, 1886., 114 
 
 32 Party and Patriotism, from The National Review, Vol. 7, 1886 115 
 
 33 Party or Empire " " " 115 
 
 34 Thoughts about Party, by I.ord Seli)ornc, The Contemporary Review, Vol. 51, 18S7. . 1 16 
 
 35 A Political Problem, by Samlfonl Fleming. iVans. Rcjy. Soc. Canad.i, Vol. 7, 18S9. . 1 17 
 
 36 The Degradation of Politics, by Dr. F. A. P. Uarnard, in The Forum. Vol. 9, 1890.. 123 
 
 37 Parliamentary vs. Party Government, address by Sandford Fleming at Queen's Univer- 
 
 sityj 1891 '27
 
 176 CONTENTS. 
 
 Page. 
 
 38 Plan for Minoi"ity Representation, by Prof. J. R. Commons, in Review of Reviews 
 
 Vol. 4, 1891 136 
 
 39 Party Spirit and its Vices, from "Democratic Government," by E. de Laveleye, 1891 . . 138 
 
 40 The Politicians of To-day, by James Bryce. The American Commonwealth, 1891.. 140 
 
 41 Proportional Representation — The Gove System, 1892 143 
 
 42 Parties and Party Government, from " Elements of Politics" by Henry Sidgwick, 1892 149 
 
 43 Burke's defence of Party, by Dr. Gold win Smith, North American Review, No. 426, 
 
 1892 151 
 
 44 Party Government, by Charles Richardson, Annals Am. Academy, Jan., 1892 152 
 
 45 Proportional Representation, by Prof. J. R. Commons, Annals Am. Acad., Mar., 1892 I54 
 
 46 The Electoral Law of Denmark. Translated and Analysed by Dr. Wicksteed, 1892. . 158 
 
 47 Voting by Command, by Dr. Wicksteed, from " the Week" May 13th, 1892 165 
 
 48 Compulsory Voting, by Sydney Fisher 169 
 
 Postscript by Sandford Fleming, May 26th, 1892 171
 
 I 
 
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