Ex Libris 
 C. K. OGDEN
 
 LECTURES 
 
 METAPHYSICS AND LOGIC
 
 ON EABTH, THERE IS NOTHING GREAT BUT MAN 
 IN MAN, THERE 18 NOTHING GREAT BUT MIND.
 
 LECTURES 
 
 METAPHYSICS AND LOGIC 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN THE 
 I NIVK1DSITV OF KDIXBCRGH 
 
 Advocate, A.M. (Oxon.) Ac.; Corresponding Memberofthe Institute of France; Honorary Member of the 
 American Academy of Arts and Scienca ; and of the Latin Society of Jena, 4c. 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 THE REV. H. L. MANSEL, B.D. OXFORD 
 
 AND 
 
 JOHN VEITCH, M.A. EDINBURGH 
 
 IN FOUR VOLUMES 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS 
 
 EDINBUEGH AND LONDON 
 
 MDCCCLIX 
 
 The Right of TrantMion is raerved.
 
 LECTURES 
 
 METAPHYSICS 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART. 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 THE REV. H. L. MANSEL, B.D. OXFORD 
 
 AND 
 
 JOHN VEITCH, M.A. EDINBURGH 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS 
 
 EDINBURGH AND LONDON 
 
 MDCCCLIX 
 
 2021531 
 
 The Kifild of Tnin*l(tfinii i* rtterveil.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 THE following Lectures on Metaphysics constitute the 
 first portion of the Biennial Course which the lamented 
 Author was in the habit of delivering during the period 
 of his occupation of the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics 
 in the University of Edinburgh. The Lectures on Logic, 
 which were delivered in the alternate years, will follow 
 as soon as they can be prepared for publication. 
 
 In giving these Lectures to the world, it is due, both 
 to the Author and to his readers, to acknowledge that 
 they do not appear in that state of completeness which 
 might have been expected, had they been prepared for 
 publication by the Author himself. As Lectures on 
 Metaphysics, whether that term be taken in its wider 
 or its stricter sense, they are confessedly imperfect. 
 The Author himself, adopting the Kantian division of 
 the mental faculties into those of Knowledge, Feeling, 
 and Conation, considers the Philosophy of Mind as com- 
 prehending, in relation to each of these, the three great 
 subdivisions of Psychology, or the Science of the Phseno- 
 mena of Mind ; Nomology, or the Science of its Laws ;
 
 Vlll PREFACE. 
 
 and Ontology, or the Science of Eesults and Inferences." 
 The term Metaphysics, in its strictest sense, is synony- 
 mous with the last of these subdivisions ; while, in its 
 widest sense, it may be regarded as including the first 
 also, the second being, in practice at least, if not in 
 scientific accuracy, usually distributed among other de- 
 partments of Philosophy. The following Lectures can- 
 not be considered as embracing the whole province of 
 Metaphysics in either of the above senses. Among the 
 Phsenomena of Mind, the Cognitive Faculties are dis- 
 cussed fully and satisfactorily ; those of Feeling are 
 treated with less detail ; those of Conation receive scarcely 
 any special consideration ; while the questions of Ontology, 
 or Metaphysics proper, are touched upon only incidentally. 
 The omission of any special discussion of this last branch 
 may perhaps be justified by its abstruse character, and 
 unsuitableness for a course of elementary instruction ; but 
 it is especially to be regretted, both on account of the 
 general neglect of this branch of study by the entire 
 school of Scottish philosophers, and also on account of 
 the eminent qualifications which the Author possessed for 
 supplying this acknowledged deficiency. A treatise on 
 Ontology from the pen of Sir William Hamilton, embody- 
 ing the final results of the Philosophy of the Conditioned, 
 would have been a boon to the philosophical world such 
 as probably no writer now living is capable of conferring. 
 The circumstances under which these Lectures were 
 written must also be taken into account in estimating 
 
 a See below, Lecture vii., p. 121 et seq.
 
 PREFACE. IX 
 
 their character, both as a specimen of the Author's 
 powers, and as a contribution to philosophical literature. 
 Sir William Hamilton was elected to the Chair of 
 Logic and Metaphysics in July 1836. In the interval 
 between his appointment and the commencement of the 
 College Session (November of the same year), the Author 
 was assiduously occupied in making preparation for dis- 
 charging the duties of his office. The principal part of 
 those duties consisted, according to the practice of the 
 University, in the delivery of a Course of Lectures on 
 the subjects assigned to the chair. On his appoint- 
 ment to the Professorship, Sir William Hamilton ex- 
 perienced considerable difficulty in deciding on the cha- 
 racter of the course of Lectures on Philosophy, which, 
 while doing justice to the subject, would at the same 
 time meet the wants of his auditors, who were ordinarily 
 composed of comparatively young students in the second 
 year of their university curriculum. The Author of the 
 articles on Cousin's Philosophy, ' on Perception? and on 
 Logic, y had already given ample proof of those specula- 
 tive accomplishments, and that profound philosophical 
 learning, which, in Britain at least, were conjoined in an 
 equal degree by no other man of his time. But those 
 very qualities which placed him in the front rank of 
 speculative thinkers, joined to his love of precision and 
 system, and his lofty ideal of philosophical composition, 
 served but to make him the more keenly alive to the re- 
 quirements of his subject, and to the difficulties that lay 
 
 a Edinburgh Review, 1829. /3 Ibid., 1830. y Ibid., 1833.
 
 X PREFACE. 
 
 in the way of combining elementary instruction in Philo- 
 sophy with the adequate discussion of its topics. Hence, 
 although even at this period his methodised stores of 
 learning were ample and pertinent, the opening of the 
 College Session found him still reading and reflecting, 
 and unsatisfied with even the small portion of matter 
 which he had been able to commit to writing. His first 
 Course of Lectures (Metaphysical) thus fell to be writ- 
 ten during the currency of the Session (1836-7). The 
 Author was in the habit of delivering three Lectures 
 each week ; and each Lecture was usually written on the 
 day, or, more properly, on the evening and night, pre- 
 ceding its delivery. The Course of Metaphysics, as it is 
 now given to the world, is the result of this nightly toil, 
 unremittingly sustained for a period of five months. 
 These Lectures were thus designed solely for a tempo- 
 rary purpose, the use of the Author's own classes ; they 
 were, moreover, always regarded by the Author himself 
 as defective as a complete Course of Metaphysics ; and 
 they were never revised by him with any view to 
 publication, and this chiefly for the reason that he in- 
 tended to make use of various portions of them which had 
 not been incorporated in his other writings, in the pro- 
 mised Supplementary Dissertations to Eeid's Works, 
 a design which his failing health did not permit him to 
 complete. 
 
 The Lectures on Logic were not composed until the 
 following Session (1837-8). This Course was also, in 
 great part, written during the currency of the Session.
 
 PREFACE. XI 
 
 These circumstances will account for the repetition, 
 in some places, of portions of the Author's previously 
 published writings, and for the numerous and extensive 
 quotations from other writers which are interspersed 
 throughout the present Course. Most of these have 
 been ascertained by references furnished by the Author 
 himself, either in the manuscript of the present Lec- 
 tures, or in his Common Place Book. These quotations, 
 while they detract in some degree from the originality 
 of the work, can, however, hardly be considered as 
 lessening its value. Many of the authors quoted are 
 but little known in this country ; and the extracts from 
 their writings will, to the majority of readers, have all 
 the novelty of original remarks. They also exhibit, in 
 a remarkable degree, the Author's singular power of 
 appreciating and making use of every available hint 
 scattered through those obscurer regions of thought 
 through which his extensive reading conducted him. No 
 part of Sir William Hamilton's writings more completely 
 verifies the remark of his American critic, Mr Tyler: 
 " There seems to be not even a random thought of any 
 value, which has been dropped along any, even obscure, 
 path of mental activity, in any age or country, that his 
 diligence has not recovered, his sagacity appreciated, 
 and his judgment husbanded in the stores of his know- 
 ledge." 01 Very frequently, indeed, the thought which 
 the Author selects and makes his own, acquires its 
 
 a Princeton Review, October 1855. say on the Progress of Philosophy in the 
 This article has since been republish- Past and in the Future. Philadelphia, 
 <<! with the Author's name, in his Es- 1858.
 
 Xll PREFACE. 
 
 value and significance in the very process of selection ; 
 and the contribution is more enriched than the adopter; 
 for what, in another, is but a passing reflection, seen 
 in a faint light, isolated and fruitless, often rises, in the 
 hands of Sir William Hamilton, to the rank of a great, per- 
 manent, and luminous principle, receives its appropriate 
 place in the order of truths to which it belongs, and 
 proves, in many instances, a centre of radiation over a 
 wide expanse of the field of human knowledge. 
 
 The present volumes may also appear to some dis- 
 advantage on account of the length of time which has 
 elapsed between their composition and their publica- 
 tion. Other writings, particularly the Dissertations 
 appended to Reid's Works," and part of the new matter 
 in the Discussions, though earlier in point of publication, 
 contain later and more mature phases of the Author's 
 thought, on some of the questions discussed in the 
 following pages. Much that would have been new to 
 English readers twenty years ago, has, subsequently, in 
 a great measure by the instrumentality of the Author 
 himself, become well known ; and the familiar exposi- 
 tions designed for the oral instruction of beginners in 
 philosophy, have been eclipsed by those profounder re- 
 flections which have been published for the deliberate 
 study of the philosophical world at large. 
 
 But, when all these deductions have been made, the 
 work before us will still remain a noble monument of the 
 
 a The foot-notet to Reid were for temporaneously with the present Lec- 
 the most part written nearly con- tures.
 
 PREFACE. Xiii 
 
 Author's philosophical genius and learning. In many 
 respects, indeed, it is qualified to become more popular 
 than any of his other publications. The very necessity 
 which the Author was under, of adapting his observa- 
 tions, in some degree, to the needs and attainments of 
 his hearers, has also fitted them for the instruction and 
 gratification of a wide circle of general readers, who 
 would have less relish for the severer style in which 
 some of his later thoughts are conveyed. The pre- 
 sent Lectures, if in depth and exactness of thought 
 they are, for the most part, not equal to the Disserta- 
 tions on Reid, or to some portions of the Discussions, 
 possess attractions of their own, which will probably 
 recommend them to a more numerous class of admirers ; 
 while they retain, in no small degree, the ample learning 
 and philosophical acumen which are identified with the 
 Author's previous reputation. 
 
 Apart, however, from considerations of their intrinsic 
 value, these Lectures possess a high academical and 
 historical interest. For twenty years, from 1836 to 
 1856, the Courses of Logic and Metaphysics were the 
 means through which Sir "William Hamilton sought to dis- 
 cipline and imbue with his philosophical opinions, the 
 numerous youth who gathered from Scotland and other 
 countries to his class-room ; and while, by these prelec- 
 tions, the Author supplemented, developed, and moulded 
 the National Philosophy, leaving thereon the inefface- 
 able impress of his genius and learning, he, at the same 
 time and by the same means, exercised over the intellects
 
 XIV PREFACE. 
 
 and feelings of bis pupils an influence which, for depth, 
 intensity, and elevation, was certainly never surpassed by 
 that of any philosophical instructor. Among his pupils 
 there are not a few who, having lived for a season under 
 the constraining power of his intellect, and been led to 
 reflect on those great questions regarding the character, 
 origin, and bounds of human knowledge, which his teach- 
 ings stirred and quickened, bear the memory of their 
 beloved and revered Instructor inseparably blended with 
 what is highest in their present intellectual life, as well 
 as in their practical aims and aspirations. 
 
 The Editors, in offering these Lectures to the public, 
 are, therefore, encouraged to express their belief, that they 
 will not be found unworthy of the illustrious name which 
 they bear. In the discharge of their own duties as 
 annotators, the Editors have thought it due to the fame 
 of the Author, to leave his opinions to be judged entirely 
 by their own merits, without the accompaniment of 
 criticisms, concurrent or dissentient. For the same 
 reason, they have abstained from noticing such criticisms 
 as have appeared on those portions of the work which 
 have already been published in other forms. Their own 
 annotations are, for the most part, confined to occasional 
 explanations and verifications of the numerous refer- 
 ences and allusions scattered through the text. The 
 notes fall, as will be observed, into three classes : 
 
 I. Original ; notes printed from the manuscript of the 
 present Lectures. These appear without any distinctive
 
 PREFACE. XV 
 
 mark. Mere Jottings or Memoranda by the Author, 
 made on the manuscript, are generally marked as such. 
 To these are also added a few Oral Interpolations of the 
 Author, made in the course of reading the Lectures, 
 which have been recovered from the note-books of 
 students. 
 
 II. Supplied ; notes extracted or compiled by the 
 Editors from the Author's Common Place Book and 
 fragmentary papers. These are enclosed in square 
 brackets, and are without signature. 
 
 III. Editorial ; notes added by the Editors. These 
 always bear the signature "ED." When added as sup- 
 plementary to the original or supplied notes, they are 
 generally enclosed in square brackets, besides having the 
 usual signature. 
 
 The Editors have been at pains to trace and examine 
 the notes of the first and second classes with much care ; 
 and have succeeded in discovering the authorities re- 
 ferred to, with very few and insignificant exceptions. 
 The Editors trust that the Original and Supplied Notes 
 may prove of service to students of Philosophy, as 
 indications of sources of philosophical opinions, which, 
 in many cases, are but little, if at all, known in this 
 country. 
 
 The Appendix embraces a few papers, chiefly frag- 
 mentary, which appeared to the Editors to be deserving 
 of publication. Several of these are fragments of dis- 
 cussions which the Author had written with a view to
 
 Xvi PKEFACE. 
 
 the Memoir of Mr Dugald Stewart, on the editorship 
 of whose works he was engaged at the period of his 
 death. They thus possess the melancholy interest which 
 attaches to the latest of his compositions. To these 
 philosophical fragments have been added a few papers 
 on physiological subjects. These consist of an extract 
 from the Author's Lectures on Phrenology, and com- 
 munications made by him to various medical publica- 
 tions. Apart from the value of their results, these 
 physiological investigations serve to exhibit, in a de- 
 partment of inquiry foreign to the class of subjects 
 with which the mind of the Author was ordinarily 
 occupied, that habit of careful, accurate, and unsparing 
 research, by which Sir William Hamilton was so emin- 
 ently characterised.
 
 CONTENTS OF VOL. I. 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY ITS ABSOLUTE UTILITY. 
 (A) SUBJECTIVE, . 
 
 LECTURE II. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY ITS ABSOLUTE UTILITY. 
 
 (B) OBJECTIVE, 19 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 PHILOSOPHY ITS NATURE AND COMPREHENSION, . . 43 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 PHILOSOPHY ITS CAUSES, 65 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY THE DISPOSITIONS WITH WHICH IT OUGHT 
 
 TO BE STUDIED, 81 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 PHILOSOPHY ITS METHOD, .... 96
 
 XV111 CONTENTS. 
 
 LECTURE VII. 
 PHILOSOPHY ITS DIVISIONS, . . . 
 
 LECTURE VIII. 
 PSYCHOLOGY ITS DEFINITION EXPLICATION OF TEEMS, . 129 
 
 LECTURE IX. 
 
 EXPLICATION OF TEEMS EELATIVITY OF HUMAN KNOW- 
 LEDGE, . . . . . . ' . . ; . 153 
 
 LECTURE X. 
 
 EXPLICATION OF TEEMS, 168 
 
 LECTURE XL 
 
 OUTLINE OF DISTEIBUTION OF MENTAL PHJENOMENA CON- 
 SCIOUSNESS ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS, . . . 182 
 
 LECTURE XII. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS EELATION TO 
 
 COGNITIVE FACULTIES IN GENEEAL, . . .' . 206 
 
 LECTURE XIII. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS EELATION TO 
 
 COGNITIVE FACULTIES IN GENEEAL, . : . . . 222 
 
 LECTURE XIV. 
 CONSCIOUSNESS ATTENTION IN GENEEAL, . . . 246
 
 CONTENTS. XIX 
 
 LECTURE XV. 
 
 EMM 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS ITS EVIDENCE AND AUTHORITY, . . 264 
 
 LECTURE XVI. 
 CONSCIOUSNESS VIOLATIONS OF ITS AUTHORITY, . . 285 
 
 LECTURE XVII. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS GENERAL PHENOMENA ARE WE ALWAYS 
 
 CONSCIOUSLY ACTIVE? 310 
 
 LECTURE XVIII. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS GENERAL PHJ2NOMENA IS THE MIND 
 
 EVER UNCONSCIOUSLY MODIFIED? .... 338 
 
 LECTURE XIX. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS GENERAL PH^ENOMENA DIFFICULTIES 
 
 AND FACILITIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY, . . 364 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 L (A) ACADEMICAL HONOURS, 385 
 
 (B) THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY FRAGMENTS. 
 
 (a) PORTION OF INTRODUCTORY LECTURE (1836), ... 392 
 
 (b) M. JOUFFROY'S CRITICISM OF THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL, . 399 
 
 (c) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL, . 400 
 
 (d) KANT AND REID, 401 
 
 (e) KANT'S DOCTRINE OF SPACE AND TIME, . . . .402 
 II. PHYSIOLOGICAL. 
 
 (a) PHRENOLOGY, 404 
 
 (6) EXPERIMENTS ON THE WEIGHT OF THE BRAIN, . . 418 
 
 (c) REMARKS ON DR MORTON'S TABLES, .... 421 
 
 (d) ON THE FRONTAL SINDS, 424
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS, 
 
 LECTURE I. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY ITS ABSOLUTE UTILITY. 
 (A) SUBJECTIVE. 
 
 GENTLEMEN In the commencement of a course of 
 instruction in any department of knowledge, it is 
 usual, before entering on the regular consideration of to 
 the subject, to premise a general survey of the more uLJ* a 
 important advantages which it affords ; and this with 
 the view of animating the student to a higher assi- 
 duity, by holding up to him, in prospect, some at least 
 of those benefits and pleasures which he may promise 
 to himself in reward of his exertions. 
 
 And, if such a preparation be found expedient for The exhibi- 
 
 i T T f -i T i ' i i tion of these, 
 
 other branches 01 study, it is, 1 think, peculiarly requi- why pec u- 
 site in Philosophy, Philosophy Proper, the Science !"/ ' 
 of Mind. For, in the first place, the most important 
 advantages to be derived from the cultivation of 
 philosophy, are not, in themselves, direct, palpable, 
 obtrusive : they are, therefore, of their own nature, 
 peculiarly liable to be overlooked or disparaged by 
 the world at large ; because to estimate them at their 
 proper value requires in the judge more than a vulgar 
 complement of information and intelligence. But, in 
 
 VOL. I. A
 
 2 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. the second place, the many are not simply by nega- 
 
 tive incompetence disqualified for an opinion ; they 
 
 are, moreover, by positive error, at once rendered in- 
 capable of judging right ; and yet, by positive error, 
 encouraged to a decision. For there are at present 
 afloat, and in very general acceptation, certain super- 
 ficial misconceptions in regard to the end and objects 
 of education, which render the popular opinion of the 
 comparative importance of its different branches, not 
 merely false, but precisely the reverse of truth ; the 
 studies which, in reality, are of the highest value as a 
 mean of intellectual development, being those which, 
 on the vulgar standard of utility, are at the very 
 bottom of the scale ; while those which, in the nomen- 
 clature of the multitude, are emphatically, distinc- 
 tively, denominated the Useful, are precisely those 
 which, in relation to the great ends of liberal educa- 
 tion, possess the least, and least general, utility, 
 utility of a In considering the utili ty of a branch of knowledge, 
 k^wiJge, it behoves us, in the first place, to estimate its value as 
 klmu-^Ab- viewed simply in itself ; and, in the second, its value 
 Rdatire. as viewed in relation to other branches. Considered 
 in itself, a science is valuable in proportion as its 
 cultivation is immediately conducive to the mental 
 improvement of the cultivator. This may be called 
 its Absolute utility. In relation to others, a science is 
 valuable in proportion as its study is necessary for the 
 prosecution of other branches of knowledge. This 
 may be called its Relative utility. In this latter 
 point of view, that is, as relatively useful, I cannot at 
 present enter upon the value of Philosophy, I cannot 
 attempt to show how it supplies either the materials 
 or the rules to all the sciences ; and how, in particular, 
 its study is of importance to the Lawyer, the Physi-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 cian, and, above all, to the Theologian. All this I LECT. 
 must for the present pass by. 
 
 In the former point of view, that is, considered Absolute 
 absolutely, or in itself, the philosophy of mind com- tJoSi! 
 prises two several utilities, according as it, 1, Culti- and J objJct. 
 vates the mind or knowing subject, by calling its 
 faculties into exercise ; and, 2, Furnishes the mind 
 with a certain complement of truths or objects of 
 knowledge. The former of these constitutes its Sub- 
 jective, the latter its Objective utility. These utilities 
 are not the same, nor do they even stand to each 
 other in any necessary proportion. As the special 
 consideration of both is more than I can compass in 
 the present Lecture, I am constrained to limit myself 
 to one alone ; and as the subjective utility is that 
 which has usually been overlooked, though not 
 assuredly of the two the less important, while at the 
 same time its exposition affords in part the rationale 
 of the method of instruction which I have adopted, I 
 shall at present only attempt an illustration of the 
 advantages afforded by the Philosophy of Mind, re- 
 garded as the study which, of all others, best cultivates 
 the mind or subject of knowledge, by supplying to its 
 higher faculties the occasions of their most vigorous, 
 and therefore their most improving, exercise. 
 
 There are few, I believe, disposed to question the Practical 
 speculative dignity of mental science ; but its practi- philosophy. 
 cal utility is not unfrequently denied. To what, it is 
 asked, is the science of mind conducive ? What are 
 its uses ? 
 
 I am not one of those who think that the importance 
 of a study is sufficiently established when its dignity 
 is admitted ; for, holding that knowledge is for the 
 sake of man, and not man for the sake of knowledge,
 
 4 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. it is necessary, in order to vindicate its value, that 
 - every science should be able to show what are the 
 advantages which it promises to confer upon its stu- 
 dent. I, therefore, profess myself a utilitarian ; and it 
 is only on the special ground of its utility that I would 
 claim for the philosophy of mind, what I regard as its 
 The Useful, peculiar and pre-eminent importance. But what is a 
 utilitarian 1 Simply one who prefers the Useful to the 
 Useless and who does not 1 But what is the useful ? 
 That which is prized, not on its own account, but as 
 conducive to the acquisition of something else, the 
 useful is, in short, only another word for a mean 
 towards an end ; for every mean is useful, and what- 
 ever is useful is a mean. Now the value of a mean is 
 always in proportion to the value of its end ; and the 
 useful being a mean, it follows, that, of two utilities, 
 the one which conduces to the more valuable end will 
 be itself the more valuable utility. 
 
 So far there is no difference of opinion. All agree 
 that the useful is a mean towards an end ; and that, 
 cceteris paribus, a mean towards a higher end consti- 
 tutes a higher utility than a mean towards a lower. 
 The only dispute that has arisen, or can possibly arise, 
 iu regard to the utility of means (supposing always 
 their relative efficiency), is founded on the various 
 views that may be entertained in regard to the exist- 
 ence and comparative importance of ends. 
 TWO errora Now the various opinions which prevail concerning 
 iar estimate the comparative utility of human sciences and studies, 
 
 of the com- , r . J 
 
 parative nave all arisen irorn two errors. 8 
 
 human The first of these consists in viewing man, not as 
 
 sciences. 
 
 a With the following observations in his article on the study of mathe- 
 
 may be compared the author's re- matics, Edinburgh Review, voL Lxii., 
 
 marks on the distinction between a p. 409, reprinted in hia Discussions, p. 
 
 liberal and a professional education, 263. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 5 
 
 an end unto himself, but merely as a mean organised LECT. 
 
 for the sake of something out of himself; and, under - 
 
 this partial view of human destination, those branches 
 of knowledge obtain exclusively the name of useful, 
 which tend to qualify a human being to act the lowly 
 part of a dexterous instrument. 
 
 The second, and the more dangerous of these errors, 
 consists in regarding the cultivation of our faculties 
 as subordinate to the acquisition of knowledge, instead 
 of regarding the possession of knowledge as subor- 
 dinate to the cultivation of our faculties ; and, in con- 
 sequence of this error, those sciences which afford a 
 greater number of more certain facts, have been deemed 
 superior in utility to those which bestow a higher cul- 
 tivation on the higher faculties of the mind. 
 
 As to the first of these errors, the fallacy is so pal- Man an 
 pable that we may well wonder at its prevalence. It himself. 
 is manifest, indeed, that man, in so far as he is a mean 
 for the glory of God, must be an end unto himself, 
 for it is only in the accomplishment of his own per- 
 fection, that, as a creature, he can manifest the glory 
 of his Creator. Though therefore man, by relation 
 to God, be but a mean, for that very reason, in 
 relation to all else, is he an end. Wherefore, now 
 speaking of him exclusively in his natural capacity 
 and temporal relations, I say it is manifest that man 
 is by nature necessarily an end to himself, that his 
 perfection and happiness constitute the goal of his 
 activity, to which he tends, and ought to tend, when 
 not diverted from this, his general and native des- 
 tination, by peculiar and accidental circumstances. 
 But it is equally evident, that, under the condition 
 of society, individual men are, for the most part, to 
 a greater or less degree, actually so diverted. To
 
 6 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. live, the individual must have the means of living ; 
 
 and these means, (unless he already possess them), he 
 
 must procure, he must purchase. But purchase 
 with what 1 With his services, {. e. he must reduce 
 himself to an instrument, an instrument of utility to 
 others, and the services of this instrument he must 
 barter for those means of subsistence of which he is 
 in want. In other words, he must exercise some 
 trade, calling, or profession. 
 
 Thus, in the actualities of social life, each man, 
 instead of being solely an end to himself, instead 
 of being able to make everything subordinate to that 
 fall and harmonious development of his individual 
 faculties, in which his full perfection and his true 
 happiness consist, is, in general, compelled to degrade 
 himself into the mean or instrument towards the 
 accomplishment of some end, external to himself, and 
 for the benefit of others. 
 
 Liberal and Now the perfection of man as an end, and the per- 
 fection of man as a mean or instrument, are not only 
 not the same, they are, in reality, generally opposed. 
 And as these two perfections are different, so the train- 
 ing requisite for their acquisition is not identical, and 
 has, accordingly, been distinguished by different names. 
 The one is styled Liberal, the other Professional edu- 
 cation, the branches of knowledge cultivated for these 
 purposes being called respectively liberal and profes- 
 sional, or liberal and lucrative, sciences. By the 
 Germans, the latter are usually distinguished as the 
 Brodwissenschaften,vf\&c\i we may translate, The Bread 
 and Butter sciences. " A few of the professions, indeed, 
 as requiring a higher development of the higher facul- 
 
 a Schelling, Vorlesungen ubcr die Methode des Academiscken Stadium, 
 p. 67 ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 7 
 
 ties, and involving, therefore, a greater or less amount LECT. 
 
 of liberal education, have obtained the name of liberal ! 
 
 professions. We must, however, recollect that this 
 is only an accidental and a very partial exception. 
 But though the full and harmonious development of 
 our faculties be the high and natural destination of all, 
 while the cultivation of any professional dexterity is 
 only a contingency, though a contingency incumbent 
 upon most, it has, however, happened that the para- 
 mount and universal end of man, of man absolutely, 
 has been often ignorantly lost sight of, and the term 
 useful appropriated exclusively to those acquirements 
 which have a value only to man considered in his 
 relative, lower, and accidental character of an instru- 
 ment. But, because some have thus been led to 
 appropriate the name of useful to those studies and 
 objects of knowledge, which are conducive to the Misa PP ii- 
 inferior end, it assuredly does not follow that those m wiu. 
 conducive to the higher have not a far preferable title 
 to the name thus curiously denied to them. Even 
 admitting, therefore, that the study of mind is of 
 no immediate advantage in preparing the student 
 for many of the subordinate parts in the mechan- 
 ism of society, its utility cannot, on that account, be 
 called in question, unless it be asserted that man 
 " liveth by bread alone," and has no higher destina- 
 tion than that of the calling by which he earns his 
 subsistence. 
 
 The second error to which I have adverted, reverses Knowledge 
 the relative subordination of knowledge and of intel- lectuai cui- 
 lectual cultivation. In refutation of this, I shall 
 attempt briefly to show, firstly, that knowledge and 
 intellectual cultivation are not identical ; secondly, 
 that knowledge is itself principally valuable as a
 
 8 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. mean of intellectual cultivation ; and, lastly, that 
 - intellectual cultivation is more directly and effectually 
 accomplished by the study of mind than by any other 
 of our rational pursuits. 
 
 But to prevent misapprehension, I may premise 
 what I mean by knowledge, and what by intellectual 
 cultivation. By knowledge is understood the mere 
 possession of truths ; by intellectual cultivation, or 
 intellectual development, the power, acquired through 
 exercise by the higher faculties, of a more varied, 
 vigorous, and protracted activity. 
 
 Notidenti- j n t h e first place, then, it will be requisite, I con- 
 ceive, to say but little to show that knowledge and 
 intellectual development are not only not the same, 
 but stand in no necessary proportion to each other. 
 This is manifest if we consider the very different con- 
 ditions under which these two qualities are acquired. 
 The one condition under which all powers, and conse- 
 quently the intellectual faculties, are developed, is 
 exercise. The more intense and continuous the exer- 
 cise, the more vigorously developed will be the power. 
 But a certain quantity of knowledge, in other words, 
 a certain amount of possessed truths, does not suppose, 
 as its condition, a corresponding sum of intellectual 
 exercise. One truth requires much, another truth 
 requires little, effort in acquisition ; and, while the 
 original discovery of a truth evolves perhaps a maxi- 
 mum of the highest quality of energy, the subsequent 
 learning of that truth elicits probably but a minimum 
 of the very lowest. 
 
 i s truth or But, as it is evident that the possession of truths, 
 
 XTth?" and the development of the mind in which they are 
 
 cndT r deposited, are not identical, I proceed, in the second 
 
 place, to show that, considered as ends, and in relation
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 9 
 
 to each other, the knowledge of truths is not supreme, LECT. 
 but subordinate to the cultivation of the knowing 
 rnind. The question Is Truth, or is the Mental Exer- 
 cise in the pursuit of truth, the superior end ? this 
 is perhaps the most curious theoretical, and certainly 
 the most important practical, problem in the whole 
 compass of philosophy. For, according to the solution 
 at which we arrive, must we accord the higher or the 
 lower rank to certain great departments of study; 
 and, what is of more importance, the character of its 
 solution, as it determines the aim, regulates from first 
 to last the method, which an enlightened science of 
 education must adopt. 
 
 But, however curious and important, this question Popular >- 
 
 , 111 lutfonofthis 
 
 has never, in so far as I am aware, been regularly question, 
 discussed. Nay, what is still more remarkable, the 
 erroneous alternative has been very generally assumed 
 as true. The consequence of this has been, that 
 sciences of far inferior, have been elevated above 
 sciences of far superior, utility ; while education has 
 been systematically distorted, though truth and 
 nature have occasionally burst the shackles which a 
 perverse theory had imposed. The reason of this is 
 sufficiently obvious. At first sight, it seems even 
 absurd to doubt that truth is more valuable than 
 its pursuit ; for is this not to say that the end is 
 less important than the mean ? and on this super- 
 ficial view is the prevalent misapprehension founded. 
 A slight consideration will, however, expose the 
 fallacy. 
 
 Knowledge is either practical or speculative. In Practical 
 practical knowledge it is evident that truth is notit8eld. dge 
 the ultimate end ; for, in that case, knowledge is, ex 
 hypothesi, for the sake of application. The knowledge
 
 10 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. of a moral, of a political, of a religious truth, is of 
 
 value only as it affords the preliminary or condition 
 
 of its exercise. 
 
 The end of In speculative knowledge, on the other hand, there 
 knowledge, may indeed, at first sight, seem greater difficulty ; but 
 further reflection will prove that speculative truth is 
 only pursued, and is only held of value, for the sake 
 of intellectual activity : " Sordet cognita veritas " is a 
 shrewd aphorism of Seneca. A truth, once known, 
 falls into comparative insignificance. It is now prized, 
 less on its own account than as opening up new 
 ways to new activity, new suspense, new hopes, new 
 discoveries, new self-gratulation. Every votary of 
 science is wilfully ignorant of a thousand established 
 facts, of a thousand which he might make his own 
 more easily than he could attempt the discovery of 
 even one. But it is not knowledge, it is not truth, 
 that he principally seeks ; he seeks the exercise of 
 his faculties and feelings ; and, as in following after 
 the one he exerts a greater amount of pleasurable 
 energy than in taking formal possession of the 
 thousand, he disdains the certainty of the many, and 
 prefers the chances of the one. Accordingly, the 
 sciences always studied with keenest interest are 
 those in a state of progress and uncertainty : absolute 
 certainty and absolute completion would be the para- 
 lysis of any study ; and the last worst calamity that 
 could befall man, as he is at present constituted, 
 would be that full and final possession of speculative 
 truth, which he now vainly anticipates as the consum- 
 mation of his intellectual happiness. 
 
 " Qusesivit ccelo lucem, ingemuitque reperta." a 
 
 a Virgil, JEn. iv. 692. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 11 
 
 But what is true of science is true, indeed, of all LECT. 
 human activity. " In life," as the great Pascal observes, '. 
 
 we always believe that we are seeking repose, while, 
 in reality, all that we ever seek is agitation/" 1 When 
 Pyrrhus proposed to subdue a part of the world, and 
 then to enjoy rest among his friends, he believed that 
 what he sought was possession, not pursuit ; and 
 Alexander assuredly did not foresee that the conquest 
 of one world would only leave him to weep for another 
 world to conquer. It is ever the contest that pleases 
 us, and not the victory. Thus it is in play ; thus it is 
 in hunting ; thus it is in the search of truth ; P thus it is 
 in life. The past does not interest, the present does not 
 satisfy, the future alone is the object which engages us. 
 
 " [Nullo votorum fine beati] 
 Victuros agimus semper, nee vivimus unquam." Y 
 
 " Man never is, but always to be blest." 8 
 
 The question, I said, has never been regularly dis- HOW re - 
 
 J u Ul V * 1 solved by 
 
 cussed, probably because it lay in too narrow a p hiioso- 
 compass ; but no philosopher appears to have ever p 
 seriously proposed it to himself, who did not resolve 
 it in contradiction to the ordinary opinion. A con- 
 tradiction of this opinion is even involved in the very 
 term Philosophy ; and the man who first declared 
 that he was not a 0-0^05, or possessor, 
 
 a Pensces, partie i. art. vii. 1, templer la v6rite* trouve*e, point du 
 
 (vol. ii. p. 34, ed. Faugere) : " Da tout . . . Nous ne cherchons jamais les 
 
 croient chercher sincerement le repos, choses, mais la recherche des choses." 
 
 et ne cherchent en effet que 1'agita- Pascal, Pensces, vol. i. p. 205, ed. 
 
 tion." " Le conseil qu'on donnait a Faugere. ED. 
 
 Pyrrhus, de prendre le repos qu'il y Manilius, Astronomicon, lib. iv. 
 
 allait chercher par tant de fatigues, 4. ED. 
 recevait bien des difficultes." ED. 8 Pope, Essay on Man, i. 96. ED. 
 
 "Rienne nous plait que le combat, t Pythagoras, according to the or- 
 
 mais non pas la victoire . . . Ainsi dans dinary account ; see Cicero, Tusc. 
 
 le jeu, ainsi dans la recherche de la Quoest. v. 3. Sir W. Hamilton, how- 
 
 ve'rite'. On aime a voir dans les disputes ever, probably meant Socrates. See 
 
 le combat des opinions; mais de con- Lecture III., p. 47 ED.
 
 12 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. or seeker of truth, at once enounced the true end of 
 - human speculation, and embodied it in a significant 
 name. Under the same conviction Plato defines man 
 " the hunter of truth," for science is a chase, and in 
 a chase the pursuit is always of greater value than the 
 game. 
 
 " Our hopes, like towering falcons, aim 
 
 At objects in an airy height ; 
 But all the pleasure of the game 
 Is afar off to view the flight" 
 
 " The intellect," says Aristotle, in one passage, " is 
 perfected, not by knowledge but by activity ; "? and 
 in another, "The arts and sciences are powers, but 
 every power exists only for the sake of action ; the 
 end of philosophy, therefore, is not knowledge, but the 
 energy conversant about knowledge." 8 Descending 
 to the schoolmen : " The intellect," says Aquinas, 
 "commences in operation, and in operation it ends ;" 
 and Scotus even declares that a man's knowledge is 
 measured by the amount of his mental activity 
 "tantum scit homo, quantum operatur."^ The pro- 
 
 o This definition is not to be found at rfxvcu *al al voirrriKcu nal fluff- 
 in the Platonic Dialogues ; a passage T^JUM Swdptis dfflv. Lib. viii. c. 8 : 
 something like it occurs in the Euthy- TeAoy 5* it Ivspytia, KCU rovrov x-P iV 
 demut, p. 290. Cf. Diog. Laert., lib. y Swapis \anftdvcrcu- . . . KCU. T^V 6f<a- 
 viii., Pythagoras, 8. 'Ev ry fliip, ol pirriK^v (fxovo-tv) Iva. 6apiaffiv a\\' ov 
 Htv avSpoaroSiaSfis tpvovrai, $6tjs KO! 6fo>povffiv Iva 6fcaprfTiK^)v %x cafftv - ED. 
 A.f ovf^ias thiparai- ol oe <i>i\6ffo<pot, TTJS e This is perhaps the substance of 
 a\7)0f /or ED. Summa, Pars i., Q. Ixxix., art. ii. and 
 
 JB Prior, Lines to the Hon. C. Mon- iii. ED. 
 
 tague. British Poets, voL vii. p. 393, C These words contain the sub- 
 
 (Anderson's ed.) ED. stance of the doctrine of Scotus re- 
 
 y Said of moral knowledge, Eth. garding science, given in his Quces- 
 
 JVic. i. 3 : T'\os ov -yvuffts, oAAa irpais. tiones in Aristotelis Logicam, p. 318 
 
 Cf. Und. i. 7, 13; L 8, 9; ix. 7, 4 ; Super Lib. Post., Q. i. " Scire in actu," 
 
 xi. 9, 7 ; x. 7, 1. Met., xi. 7 : 'H says the subtle doctor, " est quum ali- 
 
 vov ivfpyfia (arfi. ED. quis cognoscitmajorem et minorem, et, 
 
 8 This sentence seems to be made simul cum hoc, applicat prsemissas ad 
 
 up from two separate passages in the conclusionem. Sic igitur patt quod 
 
 Metaphysics, lib. viii. c. 2. Haa-cu actualitas scientiae est ex applica-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 13 
 
 founclest thinkers of modern times have emphatically LECT. 
 
 testified to the same great principle. " If," says '. 
 
 Malebranche, " I held truth captive in my hand, I 
 should open my hand and let it fly, in order that I 
 might again pursue and capture it." a " Did the 
 Almighty," says Lessing, " holding in his right hand 
 Truth, and in his left Search after Truth, deign to 
 tender me the one I might prefer, in all humility, 
 but without hesitation, I should request Search after 
 Truth" ^ " Truth/' says Von Muller, " is the property 
 of God, the pursuit of truth is what belongs to man ; " 7 
 and Jean Paul Kichter : " It is not the goal, but the 
 course, which makes us happy." But there would be 
 no end of similar quotations. 5 
 
 But if speculative truth itself be only valuable as philosophy 
 a mean of intellectual activity, those studies which 8nc 
 determine the faculties to a more vigorous exertion, 
 will, in every liberal sense, be better entitled, ab- 
 solutely, to the name of useful, than those which, with 
 a greater complement of more certain facts, awaken 
 them to a less intense, and consequently to a less 
 improving exercise. On this ground I would rest 
 one of the pre-eminent utilities of mental philosophy. 
 That it comprehends all the sublimest objects of our 
 theoretical and moral interest ; that every (natural) 
 conclusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth 
 and the future destiny of man, is exclusively deduced 
 from the philosophy of mind, will be at once admitted. 
 
 tione causae ad effectum." Compare rirais la main afin de poursuivre en- 
 
 Qusest. il, " An acquisitio scientias core la verite*.' " Mazure, Caters de 
 
 sit nobis per doctrinam," for hia Philosophic, torn. L p. 20.] 
 
 view of the end and means of educa- Eine Duplilc, 1 ; Schriften, edit, 
 
 tion. ED. Lachmann, x. p. 49. ED. 
 
 a [" Malebranche disait avec une y [" Die Wahrheit ist in Gott, uns 
 
 ingdnieuse exage"ration, ' Si je tenais bleibt das Forschen."] 
 
 la verite captive dans ma main, j'ouv- 8 Compare Discussions, p. 40.
 
 14- LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. But I do not at present found the importance on the 
 
 '. paramount dignity of the pursuit. It is as the best 
 
 gymnastic of the mind, as a mean, principally, and 
 almost exclusively, conducive to the highest education 
 of our noblest powers, that I would vindicate to these 
 speculations the necessity which has too frequently 
 been denied them. By no other intellectual applica- 
 tion is the mind thus reflected on itself, and its faculties 
 aroused to such independent, vigorous, unwonted, and 
 continued energy ; by none, therefore, are its best 
 capacities so variously and intensely evolved. " By 
 turning/' says Burke, "the soul inward on itself, its 
 forces are concentred, and are fitted for greater and 
 stronger flights of science ; and in this pursuit, 
 whether we take or whether we lose our game, the 
 chase is certainly of service." 
 
 Application These principles being established, I have only 
 going 3 prin- now to offer a few observations in regard to their 
 con.iuct'of e application, that is, in regard to the mode in which I 
 . conceive that this class ought to be conducted. From 
 what has already been said, my views on this subject 
 may be easily anticipated. Holding that the para- 
 mount end of liberal study is the development of the 
 student's mind, and that knowledge is principally 
 useful as a mean of determining the faculties to that 
 exercise, through which this development is accom- 
 plished, it follows, that I must regard the main duty 
 of a Professor to consist not simply in communicating 
 information, but in doing this in such a manner, and 
 with such an accompaniment of subsidiary means, 
 that the information he conveys may be the occasion 
 of awakening his pupils to a vigorous and varied 
 
 o On the Sublime and Beautiful, Preface, p. 8. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 15 
 
 exertion of their faculties. Self-activity is the indis- LECT. 
 
 pensable condition of improvement ; and education is - 
 
 only education, that is, accomplishes its purpose, 
 only by affording objects and supplying incitements 
 to this spontaneous exertion. Strictly speaking, every 
 one must educate himself. 
 
 But as the end of education is thus something more Universities; 
 
 their main 
 
 than the mere communication of knowledge, the com- end. 
 munication of knowledge ought not to be all that 
 academical education should attempt. Before printing 
 was invented, Universities were of primary importance 
 as organs of publication, and as centres of literary con- 
 fluence : but since that invention, their utility as media 
 of communication is superseded; consequently, to jus- 
 tify the continuance of their existence and privileges, 
 they must accomplish something that cannot be ac- 
 complished by books. But it is a remarkable circum- 
 stance that, before the invention of printing, univer- 
 sities viewed the activity of the pupil as the great 
 mean of cultivation, and the communication of know- 
 ledge as only of subordinate importance ; whereas, 
 since that invention, universities, in general, have 
 gradually allowed to fall into disuse the powerful 
 means which they possess of rousing the pupil to ex- 
 ertion, and have been too often content to act as mere 
 oral instruments of information, forgetful, it would 
 almost seem, that Fust and Coster ever lived. It is 
 acknowledged, indeed, that this is neither the prin- 
 cipal nor the proper purpose of a university. Every 
 writer on academical education from every corner of 
 Europe proclaims the abuse, and, in this and other 
 universities, much has been done by individual effort 
 to correct it. a 
 
 a Compare Discussions, p. 772. ED.
 
 16 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. But though the common duty of all academical 
 instructors be the cultivation of the student, through 
 the awakened exercise of his faculties, this is more 
 
 education. es p ec j a iiy incumbent on those to whom is intrusted 
 the department of liberal education ; for, in this 
 department, the pupil is trained, not to any mere 
 professional knowledge, but to the command and 
 
 Thecondi- employment of his faculties in general. But, more- 
 
 tions of in- , ,,.... . ,, , 
 
 stmction in over, the same obligation is specially imposed upon a 
 
 intellectual ' g.'~A.rt 1 1,'T 1. 1 4-V. V 
 
 philosophy, professor of intellectual philosophy, by the peculiar 
 nature of his subject, and the conditions under which 
 alone it can be taught. The phsenomena of the ex- 
 ternal world are so palpable and so easily described, 
 that the experience of one observer suffices to render 
 the facts he has witnessed intelligible and probable to 
 all. The phsenomena of the internal world, on the 
 contrary, are not capable of being thus described : all 
 that the prior observer can do, is to enable others to 
 repeat his experience. In the science of mind, we 
 can neither understand nor be convinced of anything 
 at second hand. Here testimony can impose no be- 
 lief ; and instruction is only instruction as it enables 
 us to teach ourselves. A fact of consciousness, how- 
 ever accurately observed, however clearly described, 
 and however great may be our confidence in the 
 observer, is for us as zero, until we have observed and 
 recognised it ourselves. Till that be done, we cannot 
 realise its possibility, far less admit its truth. Thus 
 it is that, in the philosophy of mind, instruction can 
 do little more than point out the position in which 
 the pupil ought to place himself, in order to verify, 
 by his own experience, the facts which his instructor 
 proposes to him as true. The instructor, therefore, 
 proclaims, ov <i\o<jo</>t'a, dXXa <t,Xoo-o(/>eu> ; he does not 
 profess to teach philosophy, but to philosophise.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 17 
 
 It is this condition imposed upon the student of LECT. 
 
 doing everything himself, that renders the study of ! 
 
 the mental sciences the most improving exercise of 
 intellect. But everything depends upon the condition 
 being fulfilled ; and, therefore, the primary duty of a 
 teacher of philosophy is to take care that the student 
 does actually perform for himself the necessary pro- 
 cess. In the first place, he must discover, by exami- 
 nation, whether his instructions have been effective, 
 whether they have enabled the pupil to go through 
 the intellectual operation ; and, if not, it behoves him 
 to supply what is wanting, to clear up what has been 
 misunderstood. In this view, examinations are of high 
 importance to a Professor ; for without such a medium 
 between the teacher and the taught, he can never ade- 
 quately accommodate the character of his instruction 
 to the capacity of his pupils. 
 
 But, in the second place, besides placing his pupil in The intei 
 a condition to perform the necessary process, the in- toon* 
 structor ought to do what in him lies to determine the YnfCn 
 pupil's will to the performance. But how is this to be his jTupik 
 effected 1 Only by rendering the effort more pleasur- 
 able than its omission. But every effort is at first 
 difficult, consequently irksome. The ultimate benefit 
 it promises is dim and remote, while the pupil is often 
 of an age at which present pleasure is more persuasive 
 than future good. The pain of the exertion must, 
 therefore, be overcome by associating with it a still 
 higher pleasure. This can only be effected by enlist- 
 ing some passion in the cause of improvement. We 
 must awaken emulation, and allow its gratification only 
 through a course of vigorous exertion. Some rigorists, 
 I am aware, would proscribe, on moral and religious 
 grounds, the employment of the passions in education ; 
 
 VOL. I. B
 
 18 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. but such a view is at once false and dangerous. The 
 affections are the work of God ; they are not radically 
 they are given us for useful purposes, and are, 
 therefore, not superfluous. It is their abuse that is alone 
 reprehensible. In truth, however, there is no alterna- 
 tive. In youth passion is preponderant. There is 
 then a redundant amount of energy which must be ex- 
 pended ; and this, if it find not an outlet through one 
 affection, is sure to find it through another. The aim 
 of education is thus to employ for good those impulses 
 which would otherwise be turned to evil. The pas- 
 sions are never neutral ; they are either the best allies, 
 or the worst opponents, of improvement. "Man's 
 nature," says Bacon, " runs either to herbs or weeds ; 
 therefore let him seasonably water the one, and destroy 
 the other."* Without the stimulus of emulation, what 
 can education accomplish \ The love of abstract know- 
 ledge, and the habit of application, are still unformed, 
 and if emulation intervene not, the course by which 
 these are acquired is, from a strenuous and cheerful 
 energy, reduced to an inanimate and dreary effort ; and 
 this too at an age when pleasure is all-powerful, and im- 
 pulse predominant over reason. The result is manifest. 
 These views have determined my plan of practical 
 instruction. Eegarding the communication of know- 
 ledge as a high, but not the highest, aim of academical 
 instruction, I shall not content myself with the de- 
 livery of Lectures. By all the means in my power I 
 shall endeavour to rouse you, Gentlemen, to the free 
 and vigorous exercise of your faculties ; and shall deem 
 my task accomplished, not by teaching Logic and Philo- 
 sophy, but by teaching to reason and philosophise.? 
 
 o Essay xxxviii. " Of Nature in For Fragment containing the Au- 
 Men." Workt, ed. Montagu, voL i. p. thor's views on the subject of Acade- 
 133. ED. mical Honours, see Appendix I. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 19 
 
 LECTURE II* 
 
 PHILOSOPHY ITS ABSOLUTE UTILITY. 
 (B) OBJECTIVE. 
 
 IN the perverse estimate which is often made of LECT. 
 the end and objects of education, it is impossible 
 
 that the Science of Mind, Philosophy Proper, the <?* study. 
 Queen of Sciences, as it was denominated of old, should 
 not be degraded in common opinion from its pre-emi- 
 nence, as the highest branch of general education ; 
 and, therefore, before attempting to point out to you 
 what constitutes the value of Philosophy, it becomes 
 necessary to clear the way by establishing a correct 
 notion of what the value of a study is. 
 
 Some things are valuable, finally, or for themselves, Ends and 
 these are ends ; other things are valuable, not on me 
 their own account, but as conducive towards certain 
 ulterior ends, these are means. The value of ends is 
 absolute, the value of means is relative. Absolute 
 value is properly called a good, relative value is pro- 
 perly called a utility $ Of goods, or absolute ends, 
 
 a It is to be observed, that the Course. This circumstance accounts 
 
 Lectures here printed as First and Se- for the repetition of the principal 
 
 cond, were not uniformly delivered by doctrines of Lecture I. in the opening 
 
 the Author in that order. The one of Lecture II. ED. 
 or other was, however, usually given [Cf. Aristotle, Eth. Nic., lib. i., 
 
 as the Introductory Lecture of the c. 7, 1.]
 
 20 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. there are for man but two, perfection and happiness. 
 - By perfection is meant the full and harmonious devel- 
 opment of all our faculties, corporeal and mental, in- 
 tellectual and moral ; by happiness, the complement 
 of all the pleasures of which we are susceptible. 
 Human per- Now, I may state, though I cannot at present at- 
 hTpplneM tempt to prove, and I am afraid many will not even 
 understand the statement, that human perfection and 
 human happiness coincide, and thus constitute, in 
 reality, but a single end. For as, on the one hand, 
 the perfection or full development of a power is in pro- 
 portion to its capacity of free, vigorous, and continued 
 action, so, on the other, all pleasure is the concomitant 
 of activity ; its degree being in proportion as that ac- 
 tivity is spontaneously intense, its prolongation in pro- 
 portion as that activity is spontaneously continued ; 
 whereas, pain arises either from a faculty being re- 
 strained in its spontaneous tendency to action, or from 
 being urged to a degree,' or to a continuance, of energy 
 beyond the limit to which it of itself freely tends. 
 
 To promote our perfection is thus to promote our 
 happiness ; for to cultivate fully and harmoniously 
 our various faculties, is simply to enable them by ex- 
 ercise to energise longer and stronger without painful 
 effort ; that is, to afford us a larger amount of a higher 
 quality of enjoyment. 
 
 Criterion of Perfection (comprising happiness) being thus the one 
 1 tudy. ty end of our existence, in so far as man is considered 
 either as an end unto himself, or as a mean to the 
 glory of his Creator ; it is evident that, absolutely 
 speaking, that is, without reference to special circum- 
 stances and relations, studies and sciences must, in 
 common with all other pursuits, be judged useful as 
 they contribute, and only as they contribute, to the
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 21 
 
 perfection of our humanity, that is, to our perfection LECT. 
 simply as men. It is manifest that in this relation 
 alone can anything distinctively, emphatically, and 
 without qualification, be denominated useful ; for as 
 our perfection as men is the paramount and universal 
 end proposed to the species, whatever we may style 
 useful in any other relation, ought, as conducive only 
 to a subordinate and special end, to be so called, not 
 simply, but with qualifying limitation. Propriety has, 
 however, in this case been reversed in common usage. 
 For the term Useful has been exclusively bestowed, in 
 ordinary language, on those branches of instruction 
 which, without reference to his general cultivation as 
 a man or a gentleman, qualify an individual to earn 
 his livelihood by a special knowledge or dexterity in 
 some lucrative calling or profession ; and it is easy to 
 see how, after the word had been thus appropriated to 
 what, following the Germans, we may call the Bread 
 and Butter sciences, those which more proximately and 
 obtrusively contribute to the intellectual and moral 
 dignity of man, should, as not having been styled the 
 useful, come, in popular opinion, to be regarded as the 
 useless branches of instruction. 
 
 As it is proper to have different names for different General and 
 things, we may call the higher utility, or that conducive utility. 
 to the perfection of a man viewed as an end in him- 
 self, by the name of Absolute or General ; the inferior 
 utility, or that conducive to the skill of an individual 
 viewed as an instrument for some end out of himself, 
 by the name of Special or Particular. 
 
 Now, it is evident, that in estimating the utility of 
 any branch of education, we ought to measure it both 
 by the one kind of utility and by the other ; but it is 
 also evident, that a neglect of the former standard will
 
 22 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. lead us further wrong in appreciating the value of any 
 branch of common or general instruction, than a ne- 
 glect of the latter. 
 
 It has been the tendency of different ages, of diffe- 
 rent countries, of different ranks and conditions of 
 society, to measure the utility of studies rather by one 
 of these standards than by both. Thus it was the bias 
 of antiquity, when the moral and intellectual cultiva- 
 tion of the citizen was viewed as the great end of all 
 political institutions, to appreciate all knowledge prin- 
 cipally by the higher standard ; on the contrary, it is 
 unfortunately the bias of our modern civilisation, since 
 the accumulation, (and not too the distribution), of 
 riches in a country, has become the grand problem of 
 the statesman, to appreciate it rather by the lower. 
 
 In considering, therefore, the utility of philosophy, we 
 have, first, to determine its Absolute, and, in the second 
 place, its Special utility I say its special utility, for, 
 though not itself one of the professional studies, it is 
 mediately more or less conducive to them all. 
 
 In the present Lecture I must, of course, limit my- 
 self to one branch of this division ; and even a part of 
 the first or Absolute utility will more than occupy our 
 hour. 
 Philosophy. Limiting; myself, therefore, to the utility of philoso- 
 
 its Absolute , J , ' ,, ,. ' , , * , * ., . 
 
 utility. phy as estimated by the higher standard alone, it is 
 further to be observed, that, on this standard, a science 
 or study is useful in two different ways, and, as these 
 are not identical, this pursuit being more useful in the 
 one way, that pursuit more useful in the other, these 
 in reality constitute two several standards of utility, by 
 which each branch of knowledge ought to be sepa- 
 rately measured. 
 
 The cultivation, the intellectual perfection, of a man,
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 23 
 
 may be estimated by the amount of two different ele- LECT. 
 ments ; it may be estimated by the mere sum of truths - 
 which he has learned, or it may be estimated by the^^S, 
 greater development of his faculties, as determined by ^"kindl 
 their greater exercise in the pursuit and contemplation 
 
 of truth. For, though this may appear a paradox, tiv 
 these elements are not merely not convertible, but are, 
 in fact, very loosely connected with each other ; and 
 as an individual may possess an ample magazine of 
 knowledge, and still be little better than an intellec- 
 tual barbarian, so the utility of one science may be 
 principally seen in affording a greater number of higher 
 and more indisputable truths, the utility of another 
 in determining the faculties to a higher energy, and 
 consequently to a higher cultivation. The former of 
 these utilities we may call the Objective, as it regards 
 the object-matter about which our cognitive faculties 
 are occupied ; the other Subjective, inasmuch as it re- 
 gards our cognitive faculties themselves as the subject 
 in which knowledge is inherent. 
 
 I shall not at present enter on the discussion which 
 of these utilities is the higher. In the opening Lecture 
 of last year, I endeavoured to show that all knowledge 
 is only for the sake of energy, and that even merely 
 speculative truth is valuable only as it determines a 
 greater quantity of higher power into activity. In Philosophy: 
 that lecture, I also endeavoured to show that, on the 
 standard of subjective utility, philosophy is of all our 
 studies the most useful ; inasmuch as more than any 
 other it exercises, and consequently develops to a 
 higher degree, and in a more varied manner, our no- 
 blest faculties. At present, on the contrary, I shall 
 confine myself to certain views of the importance of 
 philosophy, estimated by the standard of its Objective
 
 24- LECTUKES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. utility. The discussion, I am aware, will be found 
 
 somewhat disproportioned to the age and average 
 
 capacity of my hearers ; but, on this occasion, and 
 before this audience, I hope to be excused if I venture 
 for once on matters which, to be adequately understood, 
 require development and illustration from the matured 
 intelligence of those to whom they are presented. 
 The human Considered in itself, a knowledge of the human mind, 
 nUbiat ob- whether we regard its speculative or its practical impor- 
 ^ation? ec tance, is confessedly of all studies the highest and the 
 most interesting. "On earth," says an ancient philosopher, 
 " there is nothing great but man ; in man, there is no- 
 thing great but mind." a No other study fills and satis- 
 fies the soul like the study of itself. No other science 
 presents an object to be compared in dignity, in abso- 
 lute or in relative value, to that which human con- 
 sciousness furnishes to its own contemplation. What 
 is of all things the best, asked Chilon of the Oracle. 
 " To know thyself," was the response. This is, in fact, 
 the only science in which all are always interested, for, 
 while each individual may have his favourite occupa- 
 tion, it still remains true of the species that 
 
 "The proper study of mankind is man." 
 
 sir Thomas " Now for my life," says Sir Thomas Browne, " it is 
 quoted. 6 a miracle of thirty years, which to relate were not a 
 history, but a piece of poetry, and would sound to 
 common ears like a fable. 
 
 " For the world, I count it not an inn, but an hos- 
 pital ; and a place not to live, but to die in. The 
 world that I regard is myself ; it is the microcosm of 
 
 o [Pkavorinus, quoted by Joannes of Phavorinus, see Vossius, De llizt. 
 Picus Mirandulanus, In Astrologiam, Grcec., lib. ii. c. 10. ED. 
 lib. iii. p. 351, Basil, ed.] For notice $ Pope, Essay on Man, ii 2. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 25 
 
 my own frame that I cast mine eye on : for the other, LECT. 
 
 I use it but like my globe, and turn it round some 
 
 times for my recreation. Men that look upon my out- 
 side, perusing only my condition and fortunes, do err 
 in my altitude ; for I am above Atlas his shoulders. 
 The earth is a point not only in respect of the heavens 
 above us, but of that heavenly and celestial part within 
 us. That mass of flesh that circumscribes me, limits 
 not my mind. That surface that tells the heavens it 
 hath an end, cannot persuade me I have any. I take 
 my circle to be above three hundred and sixty. Though 
 the number of the ark do measure my body, it compre- 
 hend eth not my mind. Whilst I study to find how I 
 am a microcosm, or little world, I find myself some- 
 thing more than the great. There is surely a piece of 
 divinity in us ; something that was before the ele- 
 ments, and owes no homage unto the sun. Nature 
 tells me, I am the image of God, as well as Scripture. 
 He that understands not thus much hath not his intro- 
 duction or first lesson, and is yet to begin the alphabet 
 of man."" 
 
 But, though mind, considered in itself, be the noblest Relation of 
 object of speculation which the created universe pre- 
 sents to the curiosity of man, it is under a certain re- 
 lation that I would now attempt to illustrate its uti- 
 lity ; for mind rises to its highest dignity when viewed 
 as the object through which, and through which alone, 
 our unassisted reason can ascend to the knowledge of 
 a God. The Deity is not an object of immediate con- 
 templation ; as existing and in himself, he is beyond 
 our reach ; we can know him only mediately through 
 his works, and are only warranted in assuming his ex- 
 istence as a certain kind of cause necessary to account 
 
 a Browne's Religio Medici, part ii. 11. Discustions, p. 311. ED.
 
 26 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. for a certain state of things, of whose reality our facul- 
 - ties are supposed to inform us. The affirmation of a 
 
 being t nus a regressive inference, from the exist- 
 mference ence a S p ec i a i class of effects to the existence of a 
 
 trom ft spc- -I- 
 
 s P ec i a l character of cause, it is evident, that the whole 
 argument hinges on the fact, Does a state of things 
 really exist such as is only possible through the agency 
 of a Divine Cause \ For if it can be shown that such a 
 state of things does not really exist, then, our inference 
 to the kind of cause requisite to account for it, is ne- 
 cessarily null. 
 
 This being understood, I now proceed to show you 
 
 ciusivefyby[that the class of phaenomena which requires that kind 
 
 of cause we denominate a Deity, is exclusively given 
 in the phenomena of mind, that the phsenomena of 
 matter, taken by themselves, (you will observe the 
 qualification, taken by themselves), so far from war- 
 ranting any inference to the existence of a God, would, 
 on the contrary, ground even an argument to his nega- 
 tion, that the study of the external world taken with, 
 and in subordination to, that of the internal, not only 
 loses its atheistic tendency, but, under such subser- 
 vience, may be rendered conducive to the great con- 
 clusion, from which, if left to itself, it would dis- 
 suade us. 
 
 We must first of all then consider what kind of cause 
 it is which constitutes a Deity, and what kind of 
 effects they are which allow us to infer that a Deity 
 must be. 
 
 The notion The notion of a God is not contained in the notion 
 
 whL. of a mere First Cause ; for in the admission of a first 
 
 cause, Atheist and Theist are at one. Neither is this 
 
 notion completed by adding to a first cause the attri- 
 
 bute of Omnipotence, for the atheist who holds mat-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 27 
 
 ter or necessity to be the original principle of all that LECT. 
 
 is, does not convert his blind force into a God, by - 
 
 merely affirming it to be all-powerful. It is not until 
 the two great attributes of Intelligence and Virtue 
 (and be it observed that virtue involves Liberty) I 
 say, it is not until the two attributes of intelligence 
 and virtue or holiness, are brought in, that the belief 
 in a primary and omnipotent cause becomes the belief 
 in a veritable Divinity. But these latter attributes 
 are not more essential to the divine nature than are 
 the former. For as original and infinite power does 
 not of itself constitute a God, neither is a God consti- 
 tuted by intelligence and virtue, unless intelligence 
 and goodness be themselves conjoined with this ori- 
 ginal and infinite power. For even a creator, intelli- 
 gent, and good, and powerful, would be no God, were 
 he dependent for his intelligence and goodness and 
 power on any higher principle. On this supposition, 
 the perfections of the creator are viewed as limited 
 and derived. He is himself, therefore, only a depen- 
 dency, only a creature ; and if a God there be, he 
 must be sought for in that higher principle, from 
 which this subordinate principle derives its attributes. 
 Now is this highest principle, (ex hypothesi all-power- 
 ful), also intelligent and moral, then it is itself alone 
 the veritable Deity ; on the other hand is it, though 
 the author of intelligence and goodness in another, 
 itself unintelligent, then is a blind Fate constituted 
 the first and universal cause, and atheism is asserted. 
 
 The peculiar attributes which distinguish a Deity Conditions 
 from the original omnipotence or blind fate of the of the e^ 
 atheist, being thus those of intelligence and holiness Goi e 
 of will, and the assertion of theism being only the 
 assertion that the universe is created by intelligence,
 
 28 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. and governed not only by physical but by moral laws, 
 - we have next to consider how we are warranted in 
 these two affirmations, 1, That intelligence stands 
 first in the absolute order of existence, in other words, 
 that final preceded efficient causes ; and, 2, That the 
 universe is governed by moral laws. 
 
 1. is in- The proof of these two propositions is the proof of 
 first in the a God ; and it establishes its foundation exclusively 
 istence? on the phsenomena of mind. I shall endeavour, Gen- 
 
 2. Is the 
 
 universe tlemcn, to show you this, in regard to both these 
 fy moral propositions ; but, before considering how far the phae- 
 nomena of mind and of matter do and do not allow 
 us to infer the one position or the other, I must 
 solicit your attention to the characteristic contrasts 
 which these two classes of phaenomena in themselves 
 exhibit. 
 
 Contrasts of In the compass of our experience, we distinguish 
 mena o*~ two series of facts, the facts of the external or mate- 
 mind, rial world, and the facts of the internal world or world 
 of intelligence. These concomitant series of phaeno- 
 mena are not like streams which merely run parallel 
 to each other ; they do not, like the Alpheus and Are- 
 thusa, flow on side by side without a commingling 
 of their waters. They cross, they combine, they are 
 interlaced ; but notwithstanding their intimate con- 
 nection, their mutual action and reaction, we are able 
 to discriminate them without difficulty, because they 
 are marked out by characteristic differences. 
 
 The phaenomena of the material world are subjected 
 to immutable laws, are produced and reproduced in 
 the same invariable succession, and manifest only the 
 blind force of a mechanical necessity. 
 
 The phaenomena of man, are, in part, subjected to 
 the laws of the external universe. As dependent
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 29 
 
 upon a bodily organisation, as actuated by sensual LECT. 
 
 propensities and animal wants, he belongs to matter, l 
 
 and in this respect, he is the slave of necessity. But 
 what man holds of matter does not make up his per- 
 sonality. They are his, not he ; man is not an or- 
 ganism, he is an intelligence served by organs." For 
 in man there are tendencies, there is a law, which 
 continually urge him to prove that he is more power- 
 ful than the nature by which he is surrounded and 
 penetrated. He is conscious to himself of faculties 
 not comprised in the chain of physical necessity, his 
 intelligence reveals prescriptive principles of action, 
 absolute and universal, in the Law of Duty, and a 
 liberty capable of carrying that law into effect, in 
 opposition to the solicitations, the impulsions of his 
 material nature. From the co-existence of these op- 
 posing forces in man there results a ceaseless struggle 
 between physical necessity and moral liberty ; in the 
 language of Revelation, between the Flesh and the 
 Spirit ; and this struggle constitutes at once the dis- 
 tinctive character of humanity, and the essential con- 
 dition of human development and virtue. 
 
 In the facts of intelligence, we thus become aware 
 of an order of existence diametrically in contrast to 
 that displayed to us in the facts of the material uni- 
 verse. There is made known to us an order of things, 
 in which intelligence, by recognising the unconditional 
 law of duty and an absolute obligation to fulfil it, 
 recognises its own possession of a liberty incompatible 
 with a dependence upon fate, and of a power capable 
 of resisting and conquering the counteraction of our 
 animal nature. 
 
 a [" Mens cujusque, is est quis- Scipionis, c. 8 after Plato.] Cf. 
 que ; lion ea figura, quae digito de- Plato, Ale. Prim. p. 130, and infra, 
 monstrari potest." Cicero, Swnnium p. 164. ED.
 
 30 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. Now, it is only as man is a free intelligence, a moral 
 
 power, that he is created after the image of God, and 
 ^ * s on ty as a spark of divinity glows as the life of 
 our life in us, that we can rationally believe in an In- 
 telligent Creator and Moral Governor of the universe. 
 
 of Theology. jp r, let us suppose, that in man intelligence is the 
 product of organisation, that our consciousness of 
 moral liberty is itself only an illusion ; in short, that 
 acts of volition are results of the same iron necessity 
 which determines the phaenomena of matter, on this 
 supposition, I say, the foundations of all religion, 
 natural and revealed, are subverted. 
 
 The truth of this will be best seen by applying the 
 supposition of the two positions of theism previously 
 stated viz. that the notion of God necessarily sup- 
 poses, 1, That in the absolute order of existence 
 intelligence should be first, that is, not itself the pro- 
 duct of an unintelligent antecedent; and, 2, That 
 the universe should be governed not only by physical 
 but by moral laws. 
 
 First condi- Now, in regard to the former, how can we attempt 
 to prove that the universe is the creation of a free 
 original intelligence, against the counter-position of 
 . *k e atne i s t> that liberty is an illusion, and intelligence, 
 or ^ e adaptation of means to ends, only the product 
 te or<kr ^ a blind fate \ As we know nothing of the absolute 
 
 of existence, order of existence in itself, we can only attempt to 
 infer its character from that of the particular order 
 within the sphere of our experience, and as we can 
 affirm naught of intelligence and its conditions, except 
 what we may discover from the observation of our 
 own minds, it is evident that we can only analogically 
 carry out into the order of the universe, the relation 
 
 a See Ditautwng, p. 623. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 31 
 
 in which we find intelligence to stand in the order of LECT. 
 
 the human constitution. If in man, intelligence be a 
 
 free power, in so far as its liberty extends, intelligence 
 must be independent of necessity and matter ; and a 
 power independent of matter necessarily implies the 
 existence of an immaterial subject, that is, a spirit. 
 If then the original independence of intelligence on 
 matter in the human constitution, in other words, if 
 the spirituality of mind in man, be supposed a datum 
 of observation, in this datum is also given both the 
 condition and the proof of a God. For we have only to 
 infer, what analogy entitles us to do, that intelligence 
 holds the same relative supremacy in the universe Psycholog 
 
 cal Mate- 
 
 which it holds in us, and the first positive conditionpaiismtit 
 of a Deity is established, in the establishment of the 
 absolute priority of a free creative intelligence. On 
 the other hand, let us suppose the result of our study 
 of man to be, that intelligence is only a product of 
 matter, only a reflex of organisation, such a doctrine 
 would not only afford no basis on which to rest any 
 argument for a God, but, on the contrary, would posi- 
 tively warrant the atheist in denying his existence. 
 For if, as the materialist maintains, the only intelli- 
 gence of which we have any experience be a conse- 
 quent of matter, on this hypothesis, he not only 
 cannot assume this order to be reversed in the rela- 
 tions of an intelligence beyond his observation, but, if 
 he argue logically, he must positively conclude, that, 
 as in man, so in the universe, the phenomena of in- 
 telligence or design are only in their last analysis the 
 products of a brute necessity. Psychological mate- 
 rialism, if carried out fully and fairly to its conclu- 
 sions, thus inevitably results in theological atheism ; 
 as it has been well expressed by Dr Henry More,
 
 32 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. nullus in microcosmo spiritus, nullus in macrocosmo 
 - Deus. a I do not of course mean to assert that all 
 
 materialists deny, or actually disbelieve, a God. For, 
 in very many cases, this would be at once an un- 
 merited compliment to their reasoning, and an un- 
 merited reproach to their faith. 
 
 second con- Such is the manifest dependence of our theology on 
 prof of e our psychology in reference to the first condition of a 
 draSrom Deity, the absolute priority of a free intelligence. 
 ff ' But this is perhaps even more conspicuous in relation 
 to the second, that the universe is governed not merely 
 by physical but by moral laws, for God is only God in- 
 asmuch as he is the Moral Governor of a Moral World. 
 Our interest also in its establishment is incompar- 
 ably greater, for while a proof that the universe is the 
 work of an omnipotent intelligence, gratifies only our 
 speculative curiosity, a proof that there is a holy 
 legislator by whom goodness and felicity will be ulti- 
 mately brought into accordance, is necessary to satisfy 
 both our intellect and our heart. A God is, indeed, 
 to us only of practical interest, inasmuch as he is the 
 condition of our immortality. 
 
 Now, it is self-evident, in the first place, that, if 
 there be no moral world, there can be no moral gover- 
 nor of such a world ; and, in the second, that we have, 
 and can have, no ground on which to believe in the 
 reality of a moral world, except in so far as we our- 
 selves are moral agents. This being undeniable, it 
 is further evident, that, should we ever be convinced 
 that we are not moral agents, we should likewise be 
 convinced that there exists no moral order in the uni- 
 verse, and no supreme intelligence by which that moral 
 order is established, sustained, and regulated. 
 
 o Ci Antidotus adrenus AtTieis- vol. ii. p. 143, Londini, 1679) ; and the 
 mum, lib. iii. c. 16, (Opera Omnia, Author's Discussions, p. 788. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 33 
 
 Theology is thus again wholly dependent on Psy- LECT. 
 chology ; for, with the proof of the moral nature of - 
 man, stands or falls the proof of the ^existence of a 
 Deity. 
 
 But in what does the character of man as a moral wherein 
 agent consist ? Man is a moral agent only as he is agency of 
 accountable for his actions, in other words, as he 
 
 the object of praise or blame ; and this he is, only 
 inasmuch as he has prescribed to him a rule of duty, 
 and as he is able to act, or not to act, in conformity 
 with its precepts. The possibility of morality thus 
 depends on the possibility of liberty ; for if man be 
 not a free agent, he is not the author of his actions ? 
 and has, therefore, no responsibility, no moral per- 
 sonality at all. 
 
 Now the study of Philosophy, or mental science, philosophy 
 operates in three ways to establish that assurance of t^e^ays, 
 human liberty, which is necessary for a rational belief ing^a^ur'- 
 in our own moral nature, in a moral world, and in a h^ma^ ii- 
 moral ruler of that world. In the first place, an 1 *' 
 attentive consideration of the phaenomena of mind is 
 requisite in order to a luminous and distinct apprehen- 
 sion of liberty as a fact or datum of intelligence. For 
 though, without philosophy, a natural conviction of 
 free agency lives and works in the recesses of every 
 human mind, it requires a process of philosophical 
 thought to bring this conviction to clear consciousness 
 and scientific certainty. In the second place, a pro- 
 found philosophy is necessary to obviate the difficul- 
 ties which meet us when we attempt to explain the 
 possibility of this fact, and to prove that the datum 
 of liberty is not a mere illusion. For though an 
 unconquerable feeling compels us to recognise our- 
 selves as accountable, and therefore free, agents, still, 
 
 VOL. i. c
 
 34 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. when we attempt to realise in thought how the fact 
 - of our liberty can be, we soon find that this altogether 
 transcends our understanding, and that every effort 
 to bring the fact of liberty within the compass of our 
 conceptions, only results in the substitution in its 
 place of some more or less disguised form of necessity. 
 For, if I may be allowed to use expressions which 
 many of you cannot be supposed at present to 
 understand, we are only able to conceive a thing, 
 inasmuch as we conceive it under conditions ; while 
 the possibility of a free act supposes it to be an act 
 which is not conditioned or determined. The ten- 
 dency of a superficial philosophy is, therefore, to deny 
 the fact of liberty, on the principle that what cannot 
 be conceived is impossible. A deeper and more com- 
 prehensive study of the facts of mind, overturns this 
 conclusion, and disproves its foundation. It shows 
 that, so far from the principle being true, that what 
 is inconceivable is impossible, on the contrary, all that 
 is conceivable is a mean between two contradictory 
 extremes, both of which are inconceivable, but of 
 which, as mutually repugnant, one or the other must 
 be true. Thus philosophy, in demonstrating that the 
 limits of thought are not to be assumed as the limits 
 of possibility, while it admits the weakness of our 
 discursive intellect, re-establishes the authority of 
 consciousness, and vindicates the veracity of our pri- 
 mitive convictions. It proves to us, from the very 
 laws of mind, that while we can never understand 
 how any original datum of intelligence is possible, we 
 have no reason from this inability to doubt that it is 
 true. A learned ignorance is thus the end of philo- 
 sophy, as it is the beginning of theology." 
 
 a See Discussions, p. 634. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 35 
 
 In the third place, the study of mind is necessary LECT. 
 
 to counterbalance and correct the influence of the 
 
 study of matter ; and this utility of Metaphysics 
 rises in proportion to the progress of the natural 
 sciences, and to the greater attention which they 
 engross. 
 
 An exclusive devotion to physical pursuits, exerts Twofold 
 an evil influence in two ways. Tn the first place, it exclusive 
 diverts from all notice of the phaenomena of moral SoSy. * 
 liberty, which are revealed to us in the recesses of the 
 human mind alone ; and it disqualifies from appre- 
 ciating the import of these phaenomena, even if pre- 
 sented, by leaving uncultivated the finer power of 
 psychological reflection, in the exclusive exercise of 
 the faculties employed in the easier and more amus- 
 ing observation of the external world. In the second 
 place, by exhibiting merely the phaenomena of matter 
 and extension, it habituates us only to the contempla- 
 tion of an order in which everything is determined 
 by the laws of a blind or mechanical necessity. Now, 
 what is the inevitable tendency of this one-sided and 
 exclusive study \ That the student becomes a mate- 
 rialist, if he speculate at all. For, in the first place, he 
 is familiar with the obtrusive facts of necessity, and is 
 unaccustomed to develop into consciousness the more 
 recondite facts of liberty : he is, therefore, disposed to 
 disbelieve in the existence of phenomena whose reality 
 he may deny, and whose possibility he cannot under- 
 stand. At the same time, the love of unity, and the 
 philosophical presumption against the multiplication 
 of essences, determine him to reject the assumption of a 
 second, and that an hypothetical, substance, ignorant Physical 
 as he is of the reasons by which that assumption is Lr Jc^no 
 legitimated. In the infancy of science, this tendency h!g tem
 
 36 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. of physical study was not experienced. When men 
 - first turned their attention on the phenomena of 
 nature, every event was viewed as a miracle, for every 
 effect was considered as the operation of an intelli- 
 gence. God was not exiled from the universe of 
 matter ; on the contrary, he was multiplied in propor- 
 tion to its phaenomena. As science advanced, the 
 deities were gradually driven out ; and long after the 
 sublunary world had been disenchanted, they were 
 left for a season in possession of the starry heavens. 
 The movement of the celestial bodies, in which Kepler 
 still saw the agency of a free intelligence, was at 
 length by Newton resolved into a few mechanical 
 principles : and at last even the irregularities which 
 Newton was compelled to leave for the miraculous 
 correction of the Deity, have been proved to require 
 no supernatural interposition ; for La Place has shown 
 that all contingencies, past and future, in the heavens, 
 find their explanation in the one fundamental law of 
 gravitation. 
 
 But the very contemplation of an order and adap- 
 tation so astonishing, joined to the knowledge that 
 this order and adaptation are the necessary results of 
 a brute mechanism, when acting upon minds which 
 have not looked into themselves for the light of which 
 the world without can only afford them the reflec- 
 tion, far from elevating them more than any other 
 aspect of external creation to that inscrutable Being 
 who reigns beyond and above the universe of nature, 
 tends, on the contrary, to impress on them, with 
 peculiar force, the conviction, that as the mechanism 
 of nature can explain so much, the mechanism of 
 nature can explain all.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 37 
 
 "Wonder," says Aristotle, "is the first cause of LECT. 
 philosophy : " a but in the discovery that all existence L 
 is but mechanism, the consummation of science would If an , ex [ 8t : 
 
 once De out 
 
 be an extinction of the very interest from which it mechanism, 
 
 philosophi- 
 
 originally sprang. "Even the gorgeous majesty 
 the heavens," says a great religious philosopher, ei 
 "the object of a kneeling adoration to an infant 
 world, subdues no more the mind of him who compre- 
 hends the one mechanical law by which the planetary 
 systems move, maintain their motion, and even origi- 
 nally form themselves. He no longer wonders at the 
 object, infinite as it always is, but at the human intel- 
 lect alone which in a Copernicus, Kepler, Gassendi, 
 Newton, and La Place, was able to transcend the 
 object, by science to terminate the miracle, to reave 
 the heaven of its divinities, and to exorcise the uni- 
 verse. But even this, the only admiration of which 
 our intelligent faculties are now capable, would vanish, 
 were a future Hartley, Darwin, Condillac, or Bonnet, 
 to succeed in displaying to us a mechanical system of 
 the human mind, as comprehensive, intelligible, and 
 satisfactory as the Newtonian mechanism of the 
 heavens." ^ 
 
 To this testimony I may add that, should Physio- 
 logy ever succeed in reducing the facts of intelligence 
 to Phenomena of matter, Philosophy would be sub- 
 verted in the subversion of its three great objects, 
 God, Free- Will, and Immortality. True wisdom 
 would then consist, not in speculation, but in repress- 
 ing thought during our brief transit from nothingness 
 to nothingness. For why 1 Philosophy would have 
 
 a Metaphysics, book L 2, 9. Com- Jacobi, Werke, vol. ii. p. 52-54. 
 pare Plato, Thecetetus, p. 155. ED. Quoted in Discussions, p. 312. ED.
 
 38 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. become a meditation, not merely of death but of anni- 
 hilation ; the precept, Know thyself, would have been 
 
 n. 
 
 replaced by the terrific oracle to (Edipus 
 
 " May*st thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art ; " 
 
 and the final recompense of our scientific curiosity 
 would be wailing, deeper than Cassandra's, for the 
 ignorance that saved us from despair. 
 
 Coincidence The views which I have now taken of the respective 
 v 8 influence of the sciences of mind and of matter in 
 relation to our religious belief, are those which have 
 been deliberately adopted by the profoundest thinkers, 
 ancient and modern. Were I to quote to you the 
 testimonies that crowd on my recollection to the 
 effect that ignorance of Self is ignorance of God, I 
 should make no end, for this is a truth proclaimed 
 by Jew and Gentile, Christian and Mahommedan. I 
 shall content myself with adducing three passages 
 from three philosophers, which I select, both as articu- 
 lately confirming ah 1 that I have now advanced, and 
 because there are not, in the whole history of specula- 
 tion, three authorities on the point in question more 
 entitled to respect. 
 
 The first quotation is from Plato, and it corrobo- 
 rates the doctrine I have maintained in regard to the 
 conditions of a God, and of our knowledge of his 
 existence. " The cause," he says, " of all impiety and 
 irreligion among men is, that reversing in themselves 
 the relative subordination of mind and body, they 
 have, in like manner, in the universe, made that to be 
 first which is second, and that to be second which is 
 first ; for while, in the generation of all things, intelli- 
 gence and final causes precede matter and efficient 
 causes, they, on the contrary, have viewed matter and
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 39 
 
 material things as absolutely prior, in the order of LECT. 
 existence, to intelligence and design ; and thus de- - 
 parting from an original error in relation to them- 
 selves, they have ended in the subversion of the 
 Godhead." 
 
 The second quotation is from Kant ; it finely illus- Kant, 
 trates the influences of material and mental studies by 
 contrasting them in reference to the very noblest object 
 of either, and the passage is worthy of your attention, 
 not only for the soundness of its doctrine, but for the 
 natural and unsought-for sublimity of its expression : 
 " Two things there are, which, the oftener and the 
 more steadfastly we consider, fill the mind with an 
 ever new, an ever rising admiration and reverence ; 
 the STARRY HEAVEN above, the MORAL LAW within. Of 
 neither am I compelled to seek out the reality, as 
 veiled in darkness, or only to conjecture the possibility, 
 as beyond the hemisphere of my knowledge. Both I 
 contemplate lying clear before me, and connect both 
 immediately with my consciousness of existence. The 
 one departs from the place I occupy in the outer world 
 of sense ; expands, beyond the bounds of imagination, 
 this connection of my body with worlds rising beyond 
 worlds, and systems blending into systems ; and pro- 
 tends it also into the illimitable times of their periodic 
 movement to its commencement and perpetuity. 
 The other departs from my invisible self, from my per- 
 sonality ; and represents me in a world, truly infinite 
 indeed, but whose infinity can be tracked out only by 
 the intellect, with which also my connection, unlike 
 the fortuitous relation I stand in to all worlds of sense, 
 
 o De Legibus, book x. pp. 888, 889. iv. (p. 435 et seq. of voL iii., Lond. 
 Quoted in Discussions, p. 312. Com- ed.), and Eternal and Immut. Moral- 
 pare Cudworth, Intell. System, c. v. ity, book iv., c. vi 6, seq. ED.
 
 40 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. I am compelled to recognise as universal and neces- 
 ! sary. In the former, the first view of a countless mul- 
 titude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my import- 
 ance as an animal product, which, after a brief and 
 that incomprehensible endowment with the powers 
 of life, is compelled to refund its constituent mat- 
 ter to the planet itself an atom in the universe on 
 which it grew. The other, on the contrary, elevates 
 my worth as an intelligence even without limit ; and 
 this through my personality, in which the moral law 
 reveals a faculty of life independent of my animal 
 nature, nay, of the whole material world : at least if 
 it be permitted to infer as much from the regulation 
 of my being, which a conformity with that law exacts ; 
 proposing, as it does, my moral worth for the absolute 
 end of my activity, conceding no compromise of its 
 imperative to a necessitation of nature, and spurning, 
 in its infinity, the conditions and boundaries of my 
 present transitory life." 
 
 jacobL The third quotation is from the pious and profound 
 Jacobi, and it states the truth boldly and without 
 disguise in regard to the relation of Physics and 
 Metaphysics to Keligion. " But is it unreasonable to 
 confess, that we believe in God, not by reason of the 
 nature * which conceals him, but by reason of the 
 supernatural in man, which alone reveals and proves 
 him to exist \ 
 
 " Nature conceals God : for through her whole 
 domain Nature reveals only fate, only an indissoluble 
 chain of mere efficient causes without beginning and 
 without end, excluding, with equal necessity, both 
 
 o Kritik der praldischen Vernunft. of Greek or Latin derivation, are, in 
 
 Beschluss. Quoted in Discussion*, p. general, expressive of the world of 
 
 310. ED. Matter, in contrast to the world of In- 
 
 3 [In the philosophy of Germany, telligence.] Oral Interpolation, sup- 
 
 Fatur, and its correlatives, whether plied from Reid's Works, p. 216. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 41 
 
 providence and chance. An independent agency, LECT. 
 
 a free original commencement within her sphere and 
 
 proceeding from her powers, is absolutely impossible. 
 Working without will, she takes counsel neither of the 
 good nor of the beautiful ; creating nothing, she casts 
 up from her dark abyss only eternal transformations 
 of herself, unconsciously and without an end ; further- 
 ing with the same ceaseless industry decline and 
 increase, death and life, never producing what alone 
 is of God and what supposes liberty, the virtuous, 
 the immortal. 
 
 " Man reveals God ; for Man by his intelligence 
 rises above nature, and in virtue of this intelligence is 
 conscious of himself as a power not only independent 
 of, but opposed to, nature, and capable of resisting, 
 conquering, and controlling her. As man has a living 
 faith in this power, superior to nature, which dwells 
 in him ; so has he a belief in God, a feeling, an expe- 
 rience of his existence. As he does not believe in 
 this power, so does he not believe in God ; he sees, 
 he experiences naught in existence but nature, ne- 
 r, fate." 8 
 
 Such is the comparative importance of the sciences These uses 
 of mind and of matter in relation to the interests of Lgynot 
 religion. But it may be said, how great soever be the bytU e 
 value of philosophy in this respect, were man left 
 rise to the divinity by the unaided exercise of his 
 faculties, this value is superseded under the Christian 
 dispensation, the Gospel now assuring us of all and 
 more than all philosophy could ever warrant us in sur- 
 mising. It is true, indeed, that in Revelation there is 
 contained a great complement of truths of which 
 natural reason could afford us no knowledge or assur- 
 ance, but still the importance of mental science to 
 
 a Von den Gottlichen Dlngen. Werke, iii. p. 421-26. ED.
 
 42 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. theology has not become superfluous in Christianity ; 
 - for whereas anterior to Kevelation, religion rises out of 
 psychology as a result, subsequently to revelation, it 
 supposes a genuine philosophy of mind as the con- 
 dition of its truth. This is at once manifest. Reve- 
 lation is a revelation to man and concerning man ; 
 and man is only the object of revelation, inasmuch as 
 he is a moral, a free, a responsible being. The Scrip- 
 tures are replete with testimonies to our natural 
 liberty; and it is the doctrine of every Christian 
 church that man was originally created with a will 
 capable equally of good as of evil, though this will, 
 subsequently to the fall, has lost much of its primitive 
 liberty. Christianity thus, by universal confession, 
 supposes as a condition the moral nature of its object ; 
 and if some individual theologians be found who have 
 denied to man a higher liberty than a machine, this is 
 only another example of the truth, that there is no 
 opinion which has been unable to find not only its 
 champions but its martyrs. The differences which 
 divide the Christian churches on this question, regard 
 only the liberty of man in certain particular relations, 
 for fatalism, or a negation of human responsibility in 
 general, is equally hostile to the tenets of the Calvinist 
 and Arminian. 
 
 In these circumstances it is evident, that he who 
 disbelieves the moral agency of man must, in consis- 
 tency with that opinion, disbelieve Christianity. And 
 therefore inasmuch as Philosophy, the Philosophy 
 of Mind, scientifically establishes the proof of human 
 liberty, philosophy, in this, as in many other relations 
 not now to be considered, is the true preparative and 
 best aid of an enlightened Christian Theology.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 43 
 
 LECTURE III. 
 
 THE NATURE AND COMPREHENSION OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 I HAVE been in the custom of delivering sometimes LECT. 
 
 together, more frequently in alternate years, two sys- 
 
 tematic courses of lectures, the one on PSYCHOLOGY, 
 that is, the science which is conversant about the 
 phsenomena of mind in general, the other on LOGIC, 
 that is, the science of the laws regulating the mani- 
 festation and legitimacy of the highest faculty of Cog- 
 nition, Thought, strictly so denominated the faculty 
 of Relations, the Understanding proper. As first, or 
 initiative, courses of philosophy, each has its peculiar 
 advantages ; and I know not, in truth, which I should 
 recommend a student to commence with. What, how- 
 ever, I find it expedient to premise to each is an 
 Introduction, in which the nature and general rela- 
 tions of philosophy are explained, and a summary 
 view taken of the faculties, (particularly the Cognitive 
 faculties), of mind. 
 
 In the ensuing course, we shall be occupied with 
 the General Philosophy of Mind. 
 
 You are, then, about to commence a course of philo- what Phi- 
 sophical discipline, for Psychology is pre-eminently a losophy * 
 philosophical science. It is therefore proper, before 
 proceeding to a consideration of the special objects of 
 our course, that you should obtain at least a general 
 notion of what philosophy is. But in affording you this
 
 44 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. information, it is evident that there lie considerable 
 ' difficulties in the way. For the definition, and the 
 divisions of philosophy are the results of a lofty gene- 
 ralisation from particulars, of which particulars you 
 are, or must be presumed to be, still ignorant. You 
 cannot, therefore, it is manifest, be made adequately 
 to comprehend, in the commencement of your philo- 
 sophical studies, notions which these studies them- 
 selves are intended to enable you to understand. 
 But although you cannot at once obtain a full know- 
 ledge of the nature of philosophy, it is desirable that 
 you should be enabled to form at least some vague 
 conception of the road you are about to travel, and 
 of the point to which it will conduct you. I must, 
 therefore, beg that you will, for the present, hypo- 
 thetically believe, believe upon authority, what you 
 may not now adequately understand ; but this only 
 to the end that you may not hereafter be under the 
 necessity of taking any conclusion upon trust. Nor 
 is this temporary exaction of credit peculiar to philo- 
 sophical education. In the order of nature, belief 
 always precedes knowledge, it is the condition of 
 instruction. The child (as observed by Aristotle) 
 must believe, in order that he may learn ; tt and even 
 the primary facts of intelligence, the facts which 
 precede, as they afford the conditions of, all know- 
 ledge, would not be original were they revealed to us 
 under any other form than that of natural or necessary 
 beliefs. Without further preamble, therefore, I shall 
 now endeavour to afford you some general notion of 
 what philosophy is.^ 
 
 In doing this, there are two questions to be an- 
 
 o Soph. Blench, c. 2. ED. inter Antiques, see Brandis, Geschichte 
 
 On comprehension of Philosophy der Philosophic, &c. f vol. i. 6, p. 7, seq.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 45 
 
 svvered : 1st, What is the meaning of the name f and, LECT. 
 2d, What is the meaning of the thing f An answer to 
 the former question is afforded in a nominal definition 
 
 of the term philosophy, and in a history of its em- ph y . 
 ployment and application. 
 
 In regard to the etymological signification of the Philosophy 
 word, you are of course aware that Philosophy is a ~~ 
 
 term of Greek origin that it is a compound o 
 a love)' or friend, and <ro<ta, a wisdom speculative 
 wisdom. Philosophy is thus, literally, a love of wis- 
 dom. But if the grammatical meaning of the word 
 be unambiguous, the history of its application is, I 
 think, involved in considerable doubt. According to Commonly 
 the commonly received account, the designation 
 philosopher (lover or suitor of wisdom) was first 
 assumed and applied by Pythagoras ; whilst of the 
 occasion and circumstances of its assumption, we have 
 a story by Cicero,^ on the authority of Heraclides 
 Ponticus ; f and by Diogenes Laertius, in one place, 5 
 on the authority of Heraclides, and in another,* on 
 that of Sosicrates, although it be doubtful whether 
 the word Sosicrates be not in the second passage a 
 corrupted lection for Heraclides ; f in which case the 
 
 o 2o<pla in Greek, though some- tarn &ov\fvffcurOcu. From the long 
 
 times used in a wide sense, like the commentary of Eustratius, the follow- 
 
 term wise applied to skill in handi- ing extract will be sufficient : 'A\\a rb 
 
 craft, yet properly denoted specula- T'\OJ TOV <ro<pov, 77 Qeiopia. TTJS a\i)8(ias 
 
 tive, not practical wisdom or pru- tffrl, ol T) TOV OVTOS Kard\j^ir ovxl 
 
 dence. See Aristotle, Eth. Nic. lib. 5e n vpcutrbv a.ya66v. Tlpcutrbv ydp 
 
 vi. c. 7, with the commentary of &TTIV ayadbv rb 8a irpa|e&>y KaropBou- 
 
 Eustratius. [AJ> A.t>aay6pat>, KO! oAfjj' nevor, Ofwp'ta 5 trpa^ftas erepa. ED. 
 
 KcuTovsTotovTovs,ffo<povsfi.ei>,<t>pot'ifiovt ft Tusc. Quast. lib. v., c. 3. 
 
 8' oljfpaffii' flvai, 8rav "CSuffiv ayvooviras y Heraclides Ponticus scholar 
 
 ret ffv/j.(pfpov9' favrois- KCU vfpirra fifv, both of Plato and of Aristotle. 
 
 Kal QavuaffTa., xal xoAeira, /cat 8a.ifi.6vta 8 Lib. i. 12. 
 
 dSfvai avrovs tpaffiv, axpriffra 5', 8rt ou e Lib. viii. 8. 
 
 TO avOpAiriva, ayaBa. (IJTOV<TIV. 'H 8e ^ See Menage, Commentary on 
 
 iripl ra ayOpdnriva, KO) rtpl >i> Laertius, viii. 8.
 
 46 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. whole probability of the story will depend upon the 
 trustworthiness of Heraclides alone, for the compara- 
 
 The inter- 
 
 view of tively recent testimony of lamblichus, in his Life of 
 Pythagoras, must go for nothing. As told by Cicero, 
 it is as follows : Pythagoras, once upon a time (says 
 the Eoman orator), having come to Phlius, a city of 
 Peloponnesus, displayed, in a conversation which he 
 had with Leon, who then governed that city, a range 
 of knowledge so extensive, that the prince, admiring 
 his eloquence and ability, inquired to what art he had 
 principally devoted himself. Pythagoras answered, 
 that he professed no art, and was simply a philosopher. 
 Leon, struck by the novelty of the name, again 
 inquired who were the philosophers, and in what they 
 differed from other men. Pythagoras replied, that 
 human life seemed to resemble the great fair, held on 
 occasion of those solemn games which all Greece met 
 to celebrate. For some, exercised in athletic con- 
 tests, resorted thither in quest of glory and the crown 
 of victory ; while a greater number flocked to them 
 in order to buy and sell, attracted by the love of gain. 
 There were a few, however, and they were those dis- 
 tinguished by their liberality and intelligence, who 
 came from no motive of glory or of gain, but simply 
 to look about them, and to take note of what was done, 
 and in what manner. So likewise, continued Pytha- 
 goras, we men all make our entrance into this life on 
 our departure from another. Some are here occupied 
 in the pursuit of honours, others in the search of 
 riches ; a few there are who, indifferent to all else, 
 devote themselves to an inquiry into the nature of 
 things. These, then, are they whom I call students 
 of wisdom, for such is meant by philosopher. 
 
 Pythagoras was a native of Samos, and flourished
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 47 
 
 about 560 years before the advent of Christ," about LECT. 
 130 years before the birth of Plato. Heraclides and - 
 Sosicrates, the two vouchers of this story, if Sosicrates JJXtfS 
 be indeed a voucher, lived long subsequently to the authont y- 
 age of Pythagoras ; and the former is, moreover, 
 confessed to have been an egregious fabulist. From 
 the principal circumstances of his life, mentioned by 
 Laertius after older authors, and from the fragments 
 we possess of the works of Heraclides, in short, from 
 all opinions, ancient and modern, we learn that he# 
 was at once credulous and deceitful, a dupe and an 
 impostor. The anecdote, therefore, rests on very slender 
 authority. It is probable, I think, that Socrates was 
 the first who adopted, or, at least, the first who 
 familiarised, the expression.? It was natural that he Socrates 
 should be anxious to contradistinguish himself from the amto 
 the Sophists, (ot cro^ot, ot oro^tcrral, sophistse), the term, 
 literally, the wise men ; s and no term could more 
 appropriately ridicule the arrogance of these pre- 
 tenders, or afford a happier contrast to their haughty 
 designation, than that of philosopher (i. e. the lover 
 of wisdom) ; and, at the same time, it is certain that 
 the substantives ^tXocro^ta and <i\oo-o<o9, first ap- 
 
 o The exact dates of the birth and y There is, however, the 
 
 death of Pythagoras are uncertain. $i\6ffoq>os I<r6&tos of Hippocrates. But 
 
 Nearly all authorities, however, are this occurs in one of the Hippocratic 
 
 agreed that he " flourished " B.C. 540- writings which is manifestly spurious, 
 
 510, in the times of Polycrates and and.of date subsequent to the father 
 
 Tarquinius Superbus (Clinton, F . H., of medicine. Hippocrates was an 
 
 510.) His birth is usually placed in early contemporary of Socrates. [The 
 
 the 49th Olympiad (B. c. 584). See expression occurs in the Utpl Euo-xn- 
 
 Brandis, Gesch. der Phil. vol. L p. 422. (uxrvvris, Opera Quarto, Classis, p. 41, 
 
 Zeller, Phil, der Griechen., vol. L p. ed. Venice, 1588. ED.] 
 
 21 7, 2d ed. ED. 8 Perhaps rather " the Professors of 
 
 /3 Compare Meiners, Geschichte der Wisdom." See an able paper by Mr 
 
 Wissenschaften in Griechenland und Cope in the Journal of Classical and 
 
 Horn, vol. I p. 118; and Krug, Lexl- Sacred Philology, vol. i. p. 182. 
 
 i-on, vol. iii. p. 211. ED. ED.
 
 48 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. pear in the writings of the Socratic school." It is 
 - true, indeed, that the verb $i\ocro<f>eiv is found in 
 fo'SI? Herodotus, in the address by Croesus to Solon ;* and 
 Herodotus, fa&t too in a participal form, to designate the latter 
 as a man who had travelled abroad for the purpose of 
 acquiring knowledge, (<is <j>iXoo-o<f>ea)v yr\v Tro\\rjv Oeu- 
 pirjs elvtKev eVeX^Xv^a?). It is, therefore, not impos- 
 sible that, before the time of Socrates, those who de- 
 voted themselves to the pursuit of the higher branches 
 of knowledge, were occasionally designated philoso- 
 phers : but it is far more probable that Socrates and 
 his school first appropriated the term as a distinctive ap- 
 pelation ; and that the woi 'd philosophy, in consequence 
 of this appropriation, came to be employed for the 
 complement of all higher knowledge, and, more 
 especially, to denote the science conversant about the 
 principles or causes of existence. The term philosophy, 
 I may notice, which was originally assumed in mo- 
 desty, soon lost its Socratic and etymological signi- 
 fication, and returned to the meaning of ero^ta, or 
 wisdom. Quintiliau'y calls it nomen insolentissimutn ; 
 Seneca, 5 nomen invidiosum; Epictetus* counsels his 
 scholars not to call themselves " Philosophers ;" and 
 proud is one of the most ordinary epithets with which 
 philosophy is now associated. Thus Campbell, in his 
 Address to the Eainbow, says : 
 
 " I ask not proud philosophy 
 To tell me what thou art" 
 
 Philosophy So much for the name signifying ; we proceed now 
 iu e defim ? - to the thing signified. Were I to detail to you the 
 
 a See especially Plato, Phrtdrus, Symposium, p. 204, as nfrav aotyov teal 
 
 p. 278 Tb ntv ffo<p6v, S> *aT5f>, Ka\tw apaBovs. ED. 
 
 tuoiyt pfya flvat 8oKe icai 0e< pAvy /3 Lab. i. 30. 
 
 KpfTTfiv rb 8t tj <f>i\6ffo<f>ov ^ -TOIOVT&V y Inst. Oral. Procem. 
 
 n /taAAoV r &y avrf apn.6rrot Kal ift- 8 Epist. V. 
 
 Ht\f(rrtp<as %x l - Compare also the e Enck. c. 68, ed. Wolf; 46 ed. 
 
 description of the philosopher in the Schweigh.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 49 
 
 various definitions a of philosophy which philosophers LRCT 
 have promulgated far more, were I to explain the - 
 grounds on which the author of each maintains the 
 exclusive adequacy of his peculiar definition I should, 
 in the present stage of your progress, only perplex 
 and confuse you. Philosophy, for example, and I 
 select only a few specimens of the more illustrious de- 
 finitions, philosophy has been defined : The science 
 of things divine and human, and of the causes in 
 which they are contained ;0 The science of effects by 
 their causes ;? The science of sufficient reasons ; 5 
 The science of things possible, inasmuch as they are 
 possible ; * The science of things, evidently deduced 
 from first principles ; f The science of truths, sensible 
 and abstract j* 1 The application of reason to its legi- 
 timate objects; The science of the relations of all 
 knowledge to the necessary ends of human reason ;' 
 
 a Vide Gassendi, i. p. 1, seq. ; Den- cinationem acquisita cognitio. Cf. 
 
 stinger, Instlt. Log. i. p. 40: Scheidler's Arist. Metaph. L 1 : r^v oi/o/ta^iyieVrji' 
 
 Encydop. pp. 56, 75 ; Weisz, Loy. p. 8 ; tro<piav irtpl ra irptara atria KO* ras op- 
 
 Scheiblerus, Op. Log. L p. 1, seq. x as vTfo\a^a.vovffi -rdvrfs. ED. 
 
 Cicero, De OJKciit, ii. 2. Nee 8 Leibnitz, quoted by Mazure, 
 
 quidquam aliud est philosophia, si Cours de Philosophic, torn. i. p. 2; 
 
 interpretari velis, quam studium sa- see also Wenzel,Elementa Philosophies, 
 
 pientise. Sapientia autem est, (ut a torn. i. 7. Cf. Leibnitz, Lettres 
 
 veteribus philosophis definitum est), entre Leibnitz et Clarice, Opera, p. 
 
 rerum divinarum et humanarum, can- 778, (ed. Erd.) ED. 
 
 sarumque quibus hae res continentur, Wolf, Philosophia Rativnalis, 29. 
 
 scientia. Cf. Tv.sc. Quast. iv. 26, v. 3. ED. 
 
 De Fin. ii. 12; Seneca, Epist. 89; C Descartes, Principia, Epistola Au- 
 
 Pseudo-Plutarch, De Plac. Philos. thoris. Cf. Wolf, Phil. Sat. 33. ED. 
 
 Procem. : ol^v oliv Zrwiicol fyaaav r^v TJ CondiUac, L'Art de Raisonner, 
 
 ft.1v ffofyiav dvai Oe'iuv re Kal avdponrl- Cours, torn. iiL p. 3, (ed. 1780). Cf. 
 
 vuv tiriffT-fiw T^V 8e <pt\offo<f>icu/, Scr/ci?- Clemens Alex, Strom, viii. 8, p. 782. 
 
 ffiv Te'x^y ^irjT7)8i(Ju. Cf. Plato, Pha- rj 8^ TWV $i\oa6<p<av irpay/uore/o irepl 
 
 drus, p. 259 ; Rep. vi. p. 486. ED. TC rii vo^fMra /cal TO vrroKf l^va. Kara- 
 
 y Hobbes, Computatio five Loyica, ylvfrcu. ED. 
 
 c. 1 : Philosophia est effectuum sive Compare Tennemann, Geschichte 
 
 Pha2nomenwn ex conceptis eorum der Philosophic, Einleitung, 1 3. ED. 
 
 causis seu generationibus, et rursus i Kant, Krittie der reinen Vernunft, 
 
 generationum qua) esse possunt, ex Methodenlehre, c. 3 ; Krug, Philoso- 
 
 cognitis effectibus per rectam ratio- phisches Lexikon, iii. p. 213. ED. 
 
 VOL. I. D
 
 50 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. The science of the original form of the ego or mental 
 IIL self ; a The science of science f The science of the 
 absolute ;> The science of the absolute indifference 
 of the ideal and real s or, The identity of identity 
 and non-identity, &c. &c. e All such definitions are 
 (if not positively erroneous), either so vague that they 
 afford no precise knowledge of their object ; or they 
 are so partial, that they exclude what they ought to 
 comprehend ; or they are of such a nature that they 
 supply no preliminary information, and are only to be 
 understood, (if ever), after a knowledge has been ac- 
 quired of that which they profess to explain. It is, 
 indeed, perhaps impossible, adequately to define philo- 
 sophy. For what is to be defined comprises what 
 cannot be included in a single definition. For philo- 
 sophy is not regarded from a single point of view, 
 it is sometimes considered as theoretical, that is, in 
 relation to man as a thinking and cognitive intelli- 
 gence ; sometimes as practical, that is, in relation to 
 man as a moral agent ; and sometimes, as com- 
 prehending both theory and practice. Again, philo- 
 sophy may either be regarded objectively, that is, as 
 a complement of truths known; or subjectively, that 
 is, as a habit or quality of the mind knowing. In these 
 circumstances, I shall not attempt a definition of philo- 
 sophy, but shall endeavour to accomplish the end which 
 every definition proposes, make you understand, as 
 precisely as the imprecise nature of the object-matter 
 
 o Krug, Philosophischea Lexikon, y Schelling, Vom Ich ah Princip 
 
 iii p. 213. The definition is substan- der Philosophic, 6, 9 ; Krug, Lexi- 
 
 tially Fichte's. See hia Grundlage ion, iii. p. 213. ED. 
 
 der Gesammten Wissenschaftslehren, 8 Schelling. Bruno, p. 205 (2d ed.) 
 
 (Werke, i. p. 283); and his Zweite CL Philosophic der Natur, Einleitung, 
 
 Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre, p. 64, and Zusatz sur Einleitung, p. 
 
 (Werke, i. p. 515.) ED. 65-88 (2d ed.)-Eo. 
 
 Fichte, Uber den Begriff der Wit- e Hegel, Logik, (Werke, iii. p. 64.) 
 
 tentchaftdehre, 1 ( Werke, i. 45.) ED. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 51 
 
 permits, what is meant by philosophy, and what are the LECT. 
 sciences it properly comprehends within its sphere. 1 
 
 As a matter of history I may here, however, paren- Definitions 
 thetically mention, that in Greek antiquity there were antiquity. 
 in all six definitions of philosophy which obtained 
 celebrity. On these collectively there are extant vari- 
 ous treatises. Among the commentators of Aristotle, 
 that of Ammonius Hermiae" is the oldest ; and the 
 fullest is one by an anonymous author, lately published 
 by Dr Cramer in the fourth volume of his Anecdota 
 Grceca Parisiensia.P Of the six, the first and second 
 define philosophy from its object-matter, that which 
 it is about ; the third and fourth, from its end, that 
 for the sake of which it is ; the fifth, from its relative 
 pre-eminence ; and the sixth, from its etymology. 
 
 The first of these definitions of philosophy is, 
 " the knowledge of things existent, as existent," 
 (yvwcrts TO>V ovroiv 77 ovra).^ 
 
 The second is " the knowledge of things divine 
 and human, " (yvwcris Otltov KOU avOpomivtov Trpaypd- 
 TUP).* These are both from the object-matter; and 
 both were referred to Pythagoras. 
 
 The third and fourth, the two definitions of philo- 
 sophy from its end, are, again, both taken from Plato. 
 Of these the third is, " philosophy is a meditation of 
 death/' (/xeXenj Oavdrov) ; e the fourth " philosophy 
 
 o Ammonii in quinque voces For- given by Tzetzes, Chiliads, x. 600. 
 
 phyrii Commentarius, p. 1 (ed. Aid.) ED. 
 
 Given in part by Brandis, Scholia in 7 Cf. Arist. Metaph. iii. 1. ED. 
 
 Aristotelem, p. 9. ED. 5 See ante, p. 49, note 0. ED. 
 
 P. 389. Extracted also in part Phcedo, p. 80 : rovro 5 ovSev AAo 
 by Brandis, Scholia in Aristotelem, p. larrlv t) opBws <f>i\offo<povffa Ka.1 T$ 6m 
 6. This commentary is conjectured rtBvdvai /uXeTw<ro ^fSi'ws* 4) oi> TOVT' &v 
 by Val. Rose (De Aristotelis Lib- eft? pf\fTri Oavdrov; Cf. Cicero TVM. 
 rorum Ordine et Auctoritate, p. 243) Qucest. i. 30; Macrobius, In Som. Set- 
 to be the work of Olympiodorus. The pionis, i. 13 ; Damascenus, Dialectics, 
 definitions quoted in the text are c. 3. ED.
 
 52 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. is a resembling of the Deity in so far as that is 
 - competent to man/' (6/xoiwo-is #e< KO.TOL TO 
 
 The fifth, that from its pre-eminence, was borrowed 
 from Aristotle, and defined philosophy "the art of 
 arts, and science of sciences," (re^r? rexvuv /ecu 
 
 Finally, the sixth, that from the etymology, was, 
 like the first and second, carried up to Pythagoras 
 it defined philosophy "the love of wisdom," 
 
 To these a seventh and even an eighth were some- 
 times added, but the seventh was that by the phy- 
 sicians, who defined medicine the philosophy of bodies, 
 (larpiKri <TTI (j>L\o<ro<f>La (TwfjidTajv) ; and philosophy, 
 the medicine of souls, (<tXocro<ta ecrrlv tarpt/o) T/fv^ajv) . 5 
 This was derided by the philosophers ; as, to speak 
 with Homer, being an exchange of brass for gold, and 
 of gold for brass, (xpvcrea xaX/ceiW) ; and as defining 
 the more known by the less known. 
 
 The eighth is from an expression of Plato, who, in 
 the Theaetetus,* calls philosophy " the greatest music," 
 q), meaning thereby the harmony of 
 
 a Thecetetus, p. 176 : 8iJ> ical wepa<r- rfij q <ro<pia. The nearest approach to 
 
 Bat xpb tvOtvtie tice'iff Qtvyfiv on rd- & definition of Philosophy in the Me- 
 
 X'ffra' <pvy^i 8< dfj.oi<aaris Off Kara rb taphysics is in A minor, c. 1. OpOws 
 
 Svvarfo. ED. 8" f* 61 K <d r ^> Ka\f~tff6a.i r^v <pL\o(ro<f>tav 
 
 3 The anonymous commentator i-Kurr-lt^v rris a\i]6fias. ED. 
 
 quotes this as a passage from the Meta- y See ante, p. 45. ED. 
 
 physics. It does not occur literally, 8 Anon, apud Cramer, Anecdota, 
 
 but the sense is substantially that ex- iv. p. 398 ; Brandis, Scholia, p. 7. 
 
 pressed in Book L c. 2. AKpi&eo-Ta- ED. 
 
 rat Se T>V ^iri(rri]fjiuv at /x<\rra ruv f So quoted by the commentator ; 
 
 irptSneov tlffiv . . . 'AAAa ^v Kal Si8a<r- but the passage occurs in the Phcedo, 
 
 KO\LKI'I yt i) rav aiTi>v 0tup7]TiK^i /xoA- p. 61. Kal Ifiol o\n<a rb ivimviov Sirtp 
 
 \ov . . otrre rrjs rotavrrji a\\T}v XP^I f^pctrrov, rovro (irtK(\(vfiv, povffiKTiv 
 
 yofiifftv rtfjiuirrepav rj y&p Oftordrr) Kal troiftv, &s <t>t\o<ro<(>tas 
 
 rtfjutardrrt. Cf. Eth. Nic. vi 7 : STJAOP novffticri*. ED. 
 Sri fi anpt^effTdrt} av TCOJ/
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 53 
 
 the rational, irascible, and appetent, parts of the soul, LECT. 
 , 0vjj.6<s, 
 
 But to return : All philosophy is knowledge, but 
 all knowledge is not philosophy. Philosophy is, there- pineal 
 fore, a kind of knowledge. What, then, is philosophi- 
 cal knowledge, and how is it discriminated from know- 
 ledge in general ? We are endowed by our Creator 
 with certain faculties of observation, which enable us 
 to become aware of certain appearances or phaenomena. 
 These faculties may be stated as two, Sense, or Ex- 
 ternal Perception, and Self-Consciousness, or Internal 
 Perception ; and these faculties severally afford us 
 the knowledge of a different series of phaenomena. 
 Through our senses, we apprehend what exists, or 
 what occurs, in the external or material world ; by our 
 self-consciousness," we apprehend what is, or what 
 occurs, in the internal world, or world of thought. 
 What is the extent, and what the certainty, of the 
 knowledge acquired through sense and self-conscious- 
 ness, we do not at present consider. It is now suffi- 
 cient that the simple fact be admitted, that we do 
 actually thus know ; and that fact is so manifest, 
 that it requires, I presume, at my hands, neither proof 
 nor illustration. 
 
 The information which we thus receive, that certain Empirical 
 phenomena are, or have been, is called Historical, or what. ^ 
 Empirical knowledge.^ It is called historical, because, 
 in this knowledge, we know only the fact, only that 
 the phaenomenon is ; for history is properly only the 
 narration of a consecutive series of phaenomena in time, 
 or the description of a co-existent series of phaenomena 
 
 a On the place and sphere of Con- /3 Brandis, GeschicTite der Philoso- 
 sciousness, see Discussions, p. 47. phie, voL i. p. 2. [Cf. Wolf, Phil. Rat. 
 ED. 3. ED.]
 
 54 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. in space. Civil history is an example of the one ; 
 
 natural history, of the other. It is called empirical or 
 
 experiential, if we might use that term, because it is 
 given us by experience or observation, and not obtained 
 By-meaning as the result of inference or reasoning. I may notice, by 
 empirical parenthesis, that you must discharge from your minds 
 the by-meaning accidentally associated with the word 
 empiric or empirical, in common English. This term is 
 with us more familiarly used in reference to medicine, 
 and from its fortuitous employment in that science, 
 in a certain sense, the word empirical has unfortu- 
 nately acquired, in our language, a one-sided and an 
 unfavourable meaning. Of the origin of this meaning 
 many of you may not be aware. You are aware, how- 
 ever, that cfjiTreipta is the Greek term for experience, 
 and cfjiireLpiKos an epithet applied to one who uses 
 experience. Now, among the Greek physicians, there 
 arose a sect who, professing to employ experience 
 alone to the exclusion of generalisation, analogy, 
 and reasoning, denominated themselves distinctively 
 ol IpirtipiKoi the Empirics. The opposite extreme 
 was adopted by another sect, who, rejecting observa- 
 tion, founded their doctrine exclusively on reasoning 
 and theory ; and these called themselves ot /ote#oSi/coi 
 or Methodists. A third school, of whom Galen was 
 the head, opposed equally to the two extreme sects of 
 the Empirics and of the Methodists, and, availing 
 themselves both of experience and reasoning, were 
 styled ol Soy/um/coi the Dogmatists, or rational phy- 
 sicians." A keen controversy arose ; the Empirics 
 
 o See Galen, De Sectis, c. 1, and the Dan. Le Clerc, Histoire de la Medc- 
 
 Definitiones Medicce and Introductio cine, part iL, lib. ii., ch. 1 lib. iv., 
 
 * Medicus, ascribed to the same ch. 1. ED. 
 author; Celaus, De Re Medica, Prsef ;
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 55 
 
 were defeated ; they gradually died out ; and their LECT. 
 doctrine, of which nothing is known to us, except 
 through the writings of their adversaries," has probably 
 been painted in blacker colours than it deserved. Be 
 this, however, as it may, the word was first naturalised 
 in English, at a time when the Galenic works were of 
 paramount authority in medicine, as a term of medical 
 import of medical reproach ; and the collateral mean- 
 ing, which it had accidentally obtained in that science, 
 was associated with an unfavourable signification, so 
 that an Empiric, in common English, has been long a 
 synonym for a charlatan or quack-doctor, and, by a 
 very natural extension, in general, for any ignorant pre- 
 tender in science. In philosophical language, the term 
 empirical means simply what belongs to, or is the pro- 
 duct of, experience or observation, and, in contrast to 
 another term afterwards to be explained, is now tech- 
 nically in general use through every other country of 
 Europe. Were there any other word to be found of a 
 corresponding signification in English, it would perhaps, 
 in consequence of the by-meaning attached to empi- 
 rical, be expedient not to employ this latter. But there 
 is not. Experiential is not in common use, and expe- 
 rimental only designates a certain kind of experience 
 viz. that in which the fact observed has been brought 
 about by a certain intentional pre-arrangement of its 
 co-efficients. But this by the way. 
 
 Beturning, then, from our digression : Historical or 
 empirical knowledge is simply the knowledge that some- 
 thing is. Were we to use the expression, the knowledge 
 that, it would sound awkward and unusual in our mo- 
 dern languages. In Greek, the most philosophical of all 
 
 a Le Clerc, Ifistoire dc la Medccine, part ii., lib. ii., ch. 1. ED.
 
 56 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. tongues, its parallel, however, was familiarly employed, 
 ' more especially in the Aristotelic philosophy," in contrast 
 
 to another knowledge of which we are about to speak. 
 It was called the TO ori, that is, 17 yvwtrts OTL ECTTLV^ I 
 should notice, that with us, the knowledge that, is com- 
 monly called the knowledge of ihefact.y As examples 
 of empirical knowledge, take the facts, whether known 
 on our own experience or on the testified experience 
 of others, that a stone falls, that smoke ascends, 
 that the leaves bud in spring and fall in autumn, 
 that such a book contains such a passage, that such 
 a passage contains such an opinion, that Csesar, that 
 Charlemagne, that Napoleon, existed. 5 
 
 Phiiosophi- But things do not exist, events do not occur, isolated, 
 {^dge^ w apart by themselves, they exist, they occur, and 
 are by us conceived, only in connection. Our observa- 
 tion affords us no example of a phenomenon which 
 is not an effect ; nay, our thought cannot even realise 
 to itself the possibility of a phsenomenon without a 
 cause. We do not at present inquire into the nature 
 
 a See Anal. Post. ii. 1. T& rrrov- y [Empirical is also used in contrast 
 
 fttvd tvTiv Iffa rbv api6fii>v Zffairtp four- with Necessary knowledge ; the former 
 
 rdfjieOa. Zirrovfifv 8e rtrrapa, rb Sri, signifying the knowledge simply of 
 
 rb $i6ri, el fort, rl Iffnv. These were what is, the latter of what must be.] 
 
 distinguished by the Latin logicians Oral Interpolation. 
 as the qucestiones scibiles, and were 8 The terms historical and empiri- 
 
 usually rendered quod sit, cur sit, an cal are used as synonymous by Aris- 
 
 sit, quid sit. ED. totle, as both denoting a knowledge of 
 
 /3 This expression in Latin, at least the Sri. (Compare the De Inccssu 
 in Latin not absolutely barbarous, can Animalium, c. 1 ; Melaph. i. 1.) Aris- 
 only be translated vaguely by an ac- totle, therefore, calls his empirical 
 cusative and an infinitive, for you are work on animals, History of Animals; 
 probably aware that the conjunctive Theophrastus, his empirical work 
 quod, by which the Greek Sri is often on plants, History of Plants Pliny, 
 translated, has always a causal signifi- his empirical book on nature in gene- 
 cation in genuine Latinity. Thus, we ral, Natural History. Pliny says : 
 cannot say, scio quod res sit, credo "nobis propositum est naturas rerum 
 quod tu sis doctus : this is barbarous, indicare manifestos, non causas inda- 
 We must say, scio rem esse, credo te gare dubias." See Brandis, Geschichte 
 esse doctum. der Philosophic, i. p. 2.
 
 LECTU11ES ON METAPHYSICS. 57 
 
 of the connection of effect and cause," either in LECT. 
 
 reality, or in thought. It is sufficient for our present 
 
 purpose to observe that, while, by the constitution of 
 our nature, we are unable to conceive anything to 
 begin to be, without referring it to some cause, still 
 the knowledge of its particular cause is not involved 
 in the knowledge of any particular effect. By this 
 necessity which we are under of thinking some cause 
 for every phsenomenon ; and by our original ignorance 
 of what particular causes belong to what particular 
 effects, it is rendered impossible for us to acquiesce in 
 the mere knowledge of the fact of a phsenomenon : on 
 the contrary, we are determined, we are necessitated, 
 to regard each phaenomenon as only partially known, 
 until we discover the causes on which it depends for 
 its existence. For example, we are struck with the 
 appearance in the heavens called a rainbow. Think 
 we cannot that this phaenomenon has no cause, though 
 we may be wholly ignorant of what that cause is. 
 Now, our knowledge of the phaenomenon as a mere 
 fact, as a mere isolated event, does not content us ; 
 we therefore set about an inquiry into the cause, 
 which the constitution of our mind compels us to 
 suppose, and at length discover that the rainbow is 
 the effect of the refraction of the solar rays by the 
 watery particles of a cloud. Having ascertained the 
 cause, but not till then, we are satisfied that we fully 
 know the effect. 
 
 Now, this knowledge of the cause of a phsenomenon 
 is different from, is something more than, the know- 
 ledge of that phsenomenon simply as a fact ; and these 
 two cognitions or knowledges ^ have, accordingly, re- 
 
 a See on this point the Author's [Knowledges is a term in frequent 
 Discussions, p. 609. ED. use by Bacon, and, though now obso-
 
 58 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. ceived different names. The latter, we have seen, is 
 ' called historical, or empirical knowledge ; the former 
 
 is called philosophical, or scientific, or rational know- 
 ledge." Historical, is the knowledge that a thing is 
 philosophical, is the knowledge why or how it is. And 
 as the Greek language, with peculiar felicity, expresses 
 historical knowledge by the on the yvucns on cirri : 
 so, it well expresses philosophical knowledge by the 
 SioYi^ the yvwo-19 8m ecrn, though here its relative 
 superiority is not the same. To recapitulate what has 
 now been stated : There are two kinds or degrees of 
 knowledge. The first is the knowledge that a thing 
 
 is on XPVP ' * <7Tt > rem esse > an( i ^ i s called the 
 knowledge of the fact, historical, or empirical know- 
 ledge. The second is the knowledge why or how a 
 thing is, Stdrt xp^t jia " rrt > cur res sit ; and is termed 
 the knowledge of the cause, philosophical, scientific, 
 rational knowledge. 
 
 Philosophy Philosophical knowledge, in the widest acceptation 
 i^ciTafter of the term, and as synonymous with science, is thus 
 the knowledge of effects as dependent on their causes. 
 Now, what does this imply 1 In the first place, as 
 every cause to which we can ascend is itself also an 
 effect, it follows that it is the scope, that is, the aim 
 of philosophy, to trace up the series of effects and 
 causes, until we arrive at causes which are not also 
 themselves effects. These first causes do not indeed 
 lie within the reach of philosophy, nor even within the 
 sphere of our comprehension ; nor, consequently, on 
 
 lete, should be revived, as, without it, Science, Preface, p. 25, p. 166 et pas- 
 
 we axe compelled to borrow cognitions sim. ED.] 
 
 to express ite import.] Orallnterpo- a Wolf, PKilosophia Rat tonal is, 6; 
 
 lotion. [See Bacon's Advancement of Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
 
 Learning, p. 176, (Works, voL il, ed. Methodenlehre, c. 3 ED. 
 
 Mont.) ; and Sergeant's Method to Arist. A naL Post. ii. 1 ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 59 
 
 the actual reaching them does the existence of phi- LECT. 
 
 losophy depend. But as philosophy is the knowledge 
 
 of effects in their causes, the tendency of philosophy 
 is ever upwards ; and philosophy can, in thought, in 
 theory, only be viewed as accomplished, which in 
 reality it never can be, when the ultimate causes, 
 the causes on which all other causes depend, have 
 been attained and understood." 
 
 But, in the second place, as every effect is only pro- 
 duced by the concurrence of at least two causes, (and 
 by cause, be it observed, I mean everything without 
 which the effect could not be realised), and as these 
 concurring or co-efficient causes, in fact, constitute the 
 effect, it follows, that the lower we descend in the 
 series of causes, the more complex will be the product ; 
 and that the higher we ascend, it will be the more 
 simple. Let us take, for example, a neutral salt. This, 
 as you probably know, is the product the combina- 
 tion of an alkali and an acid. Now, considering the 
 salt as an effect, what are the concurrent causes, the 
 co-efficients, which constitute it what it is 1 These 
 are, first, the acid, with its affinity to the alkali ; 
 secondly, the alkali, with its affinity to the acid ; and 
 thirdly, the translating force (perhaps the human hand) 
 which made their affinities available, by bringing the 
 two bodies within the sphere of mutual attraction. 
 Each of these three concurrents must be considered as 
 a partial cause ; for, abstract any one, and the effect is 
 not produced. Now, these three partial causes are 
 each of them again effects ; but effects evidently less 
 complex than the effect which they, by their concur- 
 
 o Arist. Anal. Post. i. 24. "En /xe- Wpas ri> fcrxarov ^8rj oSrtt Iff-rlv. Cf. 
 
 Xpt TOVTOV frrrovufv rb Sick ri, KO! r6rf Metaph. L 2 : 8 yty ra.{m\v v<av 
 
 ol6fj.f6a fitifvai, Srav ^ rj %TI n &\\o trpiirrtav a.px<av K<d alriuv flvtu 
 
 rovro fl yiv6n(vov ^ 6v T\os yap /col Ki)v. ED.
 
 60 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. rence, constituted. But each of these three consti- 
 1 tuents is an effect, and therefore to be analysed into 
 
 its causes ; and these causes again into others, until 
 the procedure is checked by our inability to resolve 
 the last constituent into simpler elements. But, though 
 thus unable to carry our analysis beyond a limited ex- 
 tent, we neither conceive, nor are we able to conceive, 
 the constituent in which our analysis is arrested, as 
 itself anything but an effect. We therefore carry on 
 the analysis in imagination ; and as each step in the 
 procedure carries us from the more complex to the more 
 simple, and, consequently, nearer to unity, we at last 
 arrive at that unity itself, at that ultimate cause 
 which, as ultimate, cannot again be conceived as an 
 effect." 
 
 Philosophy Philosophy thus, as the knowledge of effects in their 
 causes, necessarily tends, not towards a plurality of 
 
 ^e. a ultimate or first causes, but towards one alone. This 
 first cause, the Creator, it can indeed never reach, as 
 an object of immediate knowledge ; but, as the con- 
 vergence towards unity in the ascending series is mani- 
 fest, in so far as that series is within our view, and as 
 it is even impossible for the mind to suppose the con- 
 vergence not continuous and complete, it follows, un- 
 less all analogy be rejected, unless our intelligence be 
 declared a lie, that we must, philosophically, believe 
 in that ultimate or primary unity which, in our pre- 
 sent existence, we are not destined in itself to appre- 
 hend. 
 
 o I may notice that an ultimate causes to effects, that is, in the pro- 
 
 cause, and a first cause, are the same, gressive order. This synonymous 
 
 but viewed in different relations, meaning of the terms ultimate and 
 
 What is called the ultimate cause in primary it is important to recollect, 
 
 ascending from effects to causes, that for these words are in very common 
 
 is, in the regressive order, is called use in philosophy. 
 the first cause in descending from
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 61 
 
 Such is philosophical knowledge in its most exten- LECT. 
 sive signification ; and, in this signification, all the - 
 sciences, occupied in the research of causes, may be 
 viewed as so many branches of philosophy. 
 
 There is, however, one section of these sciences Sciences 
 which is denominated philosophical by pre-eminence ; nated phi- 
 sciences, which the term philosophy exclusively de- b y pre- 
 notes, when employed in propriety and rigour. What 
 these sciences are, and why the term philosophy has 
 been specially limited to them, I shall now endeavour 
 to make you understand. 
 
 "Man," says Protagoras, "is the measure of the Man's 
 
 ,, -, . /. i . .. r ' i . , knowledge 
 
 universe ; a and, in so tar as the universe is an object relative, 
 of human knowledge, the paradox is a truth. What- 
 ever we know, or endeavour to know, God or the 
 world, mind or matter, the distant or the near, we 
 know, and can know, only in so far as we possess a 
 faculty of knowing in general ; and we can only 
 exercise that faculty under the laws which control 
 and limit its operations. However great, and infinite, 
 and various, therefore, may be the universe and its 
 contents, these are known to us, not as they exist, 
 but as our mind is capable of knowing them. Hence 
 the brocard " Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum 
 recipientis."^ 
 
 In the first place, therefore, as philosophy is a 
 
 a See Plato, Thecetetus, p. 152; tur in patientem secundum modum 
 
 Arist. Metaph. X. 6. ED. patientis. Ibid, part L Q. 14, art. 1 . 
 
 Boethius, De Consol. Phil. v. Scientia est secundum modum cog- 
 
 Prosa iv. Omne enim quod coguos- noscentis. Scitum enim est in sciente 
 
 citur, non secundum sui vim, sed se- secundum modum scientis. Chauvin 
 
 cundum agnoscentium potius compre- gives the words of the text. See Lexi- 
 
 henditur facultatem. Proclus in Plat, con Philosophicum, art. Finitas. See 
 
 Farm. p. 748, ed. Stallbaum : rb yiy- also other authorities to the same ef- 
 
 vwffnov Kara r^v iavrov yiyvibffKti feet quoted in the Author's Discus- 
 
 tyvffiv. Aquinas, Summa, part i. Q. sions, p. 644. ED. 
 79, art. 3. Similitude agentis recipi-
 
 62 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. knowledge, and as all knowledge is only possible 
 - under the conditions to which our faculties are sub- 
 
 J ec t e< l, tne grand, the primary problem of philo- 
 y. sophy must be to investigate and determine these 
 conditions, as the necessary conditions of its own pos- 
 sibility. 
 
 In the second place, as philosophy is not merely a 
 knowledge, but a knowledge of causes, and as the 
 mind itself is the universal and principal concurrent 
 cause in every act of knowledge ; philosophy is, conse- 
 quently, bound to make the mind its first and para- 
 mount object of consideration. The study of mind is 
 thus the philosophical study by pre-eminence. There 
 is no branch of philosophy which does not suppose this 
 as its preliminary, which does not borrow from this 
 
 Branches of its light. A considerable number, indeed, are only the 
 science of mind viewed in particular aspects, or con- 
 
 Logic. sidered in certain special applications. Logic, for 
 example, or the science of the laws of thought, is 
 only a fragment of the general science of mind, and 
 presupposes a certain knowledge of the operations 
 
 Ethics. which are regulated by these laws. Ethics is the 
 science of the laws which govern our actions as 
 moral agents ; and a knowledge of these laws is only 
 possible through a knowledge of the moral agent 
 
 Politic., himself. Political science, in like manner, supposes a 
 knowledge of man in his natural constitution, in order 
 to appreciate the modifications which he receives, and 
 of which he is susceptible, in social and civil life. 
 
 The Fine The Fine Arts have all their foundation in the theory 
 of the beautiful ; and this theory is afforded by that 
 part of the philosophy of mind, which is conversant 
 with the phaenomena of feeling. Religion, Theology, 
 
 mind. in fine, is not independent of the same philosophy.
 
 coun- 
 try. 
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 63 
 
 For as God only exists for us as we have faculties LECT. 
 
 . in 
 capable of apprehending his existence, and of fulfilling 
 
 his behests, nay, as the phsenomena from which we 
 are warranted to infer his being are wholly mental, 
 the examination of these faculties and of these pheno- 
 mena is, consequently, the primary condition of every 
 sound theology. In short, the science of mind, whe- 
 ther considered in itself, or in relation to the other 
 branches of our knowledge, constitutes the principal 
 and most important object of philosophy, constitutes 
 in propriety, with its suite of dependent sciences, 
 philosophy itself." 
 
 This limitation of the term Philosophy to the sciences Migappiic 
 of mind, when not expressly extended to the other termVhif 
 branches of science, has been always that generally th? 8 nu 
 prevalent ; yet it must be confessed that, in this 
 country, the word is applied to subjects with which, 
 on the continent of Europe, it is rarely, if ever, asso- 
 ciated. With us the word philosophy, taken by itself, 
 does not call up the precise and limited notion which 
 it does to a German, a Hollander, a Dane, an Italian, 
 or a Frenchman ; and we are obliged to say the philo- 
 sophy of mind, if we do not wish it to be vaguely 
 extended to the sciences conversant with the phae- 
 nomena of matter. We not only call Physics by the 
 name of Natural Philosophy, but every mechanical 
 process has with us its philosophy. We have books 
 on the pliilosophy of Manufactures, the philosophy of 
 Agriculture, the philosophy of Cookery, &c. In all 
 this we are the ridicule of other nations. Socrates, it is 
 said, brought down philosophy from the clouds, the 
 English have degraded her to the kitchen ; and this, 
 
 a Cf. Cousin, Court df. PHistoire de Programme de la Premiere Partie du 
 la Phil. Mod., Prem. Ser. torn. ii. ; Cours. ED.
 
 64 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. our prostitution of the term, is, by foreigners, alleged as 
 
 a significant indication of the low state of the mental 
 
 sciences in Britain." 
 
 From what has been said, you will, without a defini- 
 tion, be able to form at least a general notion of what 
 is meant by philosophy. In its more extensive signi- 
 fication, it is equivalent to a knowledge of things by 
 their causes, and this is, in fact, Aristotle's defini- 
 tion ; while, in its stricter meaning, it is confined to 
 the sciences which constitute, or hold immediately of, 
 the science of mind. 
 
 o See Hegel, Werke, vi. 13; xiii. Kal ras apxas vTroKapfiavovai vavres. . . 
 
 V2 ; Scheidler, Encyclop. der Philoso- ST( /xer olv fi croQla. irepl -rivas alrtas 
 
 phie, i. p. 27. ED. Kal a.px&s taTiv ^no-TTJyurj, Srj\ot>. Eth. 
 
 /3 Metaph. v. 1 : iratra. tiriffT-liU'n 8to- Nic. vi. 7 : 8e? &pa rbv aofov p^ fn6- 
 
 vorjTtK)) TTpl curias Kal a.px as tffnv ^ vov ra tic TUV apxwv fiStvcu, a\\a Kal 
 
 aKptfifffrfpas t) air\ovffTepas. I. 1 : T^V irtpl ras dp^cty &\T)6(veiv. ED. 
 rtpl ra irpwra afna
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 65 
 
 LECTURE IV. 
 
 THE CAUSES OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 HAVING thus endeavoured to make you vaguely appre- LECT. 
 hend what cannot be precisely understood, the Nature IV ' 
 and Comprehension of Philosophy, I now proceed to he 
 
 another question, What are the Causes of Philosophy ? pty >& the 
 The causes of philosophy lie in the original elements ow con- 
 of our constitution. We are created with the faculty 
 of knowledge, and, consequently, created with the ten- 
 dency to exert it. Man philosophises as he lives. He 
 may philosophise well or ill, but philosophise he must. 
 Philosophy can, indeed, only be assailed through philo- 
 sophy itself. " If," says Aristotle, in a passage pre- 
 served to us by Olympiodorus, a " we must philoso- 
 phise, we must philosophise ; if we must not philoso- 
 phise, we must philosophise ; in any case, therefore, 
 we must philosophise." " Were philosophy, " says 
 Clement of Alexandria, ^ "an evil, still philosophy is 
 to be studied, in order that it may be scientifically 
 contemned." And Averroes, 7 " Philosophi solum est either essen- 
 spernere philosophiam." Of the causes of philosophy 
 
 a Olympiodori in Platonis Alcilla- ft Et Kal &xp"n ffros 
 
 dem Priorem Commentarii, ed. Creu- tCxpi)ff'ro$ 77 TTJJ a\pi}(rrias /8f/3aiaxm, 
 
 zer, p. 144. Kal ApiffTOTf\r)s Iv ry eCxpjjerTos. Stromata, i. 2. ED. 
 
 UpoTpeirrtKf faryev on the <pt\offo(f>ri. y See Discussion*, p. 786. ED. [" Se 
 
 riov, <pi\o<ro<pTjrfov fir* ^ <pi\offo(f>ri- moquer de la philosophic, c'est vrai- 
 
 Ttov, tf>i\offo$T)Ttov ird.vr<as &t <pt\o- ment philosopher." Pascal, Pensfes, 
 
 <ro<pr]T(oi>. Quoted also by the ano- part i. art. xi. 36. Compare Mon- 
 
 nymous commentator in Cramer's taigne, Essais, lib. ii. c. xii. torn. ii. 
 
 A necdota, iv. p. 391. ED. p. 216, ed. 1725 ] 
 
 VOL. I. E
 
 66 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. some are, therefore, contained in man's very capacity 
 
 IY ' for knowledge ; these are essential and necessary. But 
 
 there are others, again, which lie in certain feelings 
 
 with which he is endowed ; these are complementary 
 
 and assistant. 
 
 The fast Of the former class, that is, of the essential causes, 
 ^ ly a PP there are in all two : the one is, the necessity we feel 
 fol(L . to connect Causes with Effects ; the other, to carry up 
 cipie of our knowledge into Unity. These tendencies, however, 
 Effect. if not identical in their origin, coincide in their result ; 
 for, as I have previously explained to you, in ascend- 
 ing from cause to cause, we necessarily, (could we 
 carry our analysis to its issue), arrive at absolute 
 unity. Indeed, were it not a discussion for which 
 you are not as yet prepared, it might be shown, that 
 both principles originate in the same condition ; that 
 both emanate, not from any original power, but from 
 the same original powerlessness of mind. a Of the 
 former, namely, the tendency, or rather the neces- 
 sity, which we feel to connect the objects of our expe- 
 rience with others which afford the reasons of their 
 existence, it is needful to say but little. The nature 
 of this tendency is not a matter on which we can 
 at present enter ; and the fact of its existence is 
 too notorious to require either proof or illustration. 
 It is sufficient to say, or rather to repeat what we 
 have already stated, that the mind is unable to realise 
 in thought the possibility of any absolute commence- 
 ment ; it cannot conceive that anything which begins 
 to be is anything more than a new modification 
 of pre-existent elements ; it is unable to view any 
 individual thing as other than a link in the mighty 
 chain of being ; and every isolated object is viewed 
 
 o This is partially argued in the Discussions, p. 609. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 67 
 
 by it only as a fragment which, to be known, must LECT. 
 be known in connection with the whole of which it 
 constitutes a part. It is thus that we are unable to 
 rest satisfied with a mere historical knowledge of ex- 
 istence ; and that even our happiness is interested in 
 discovering causes, hypothetical at least, if not real, 
 for the various phsenomena of the existence of which 
 our experience informs us. 
 
 " Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas." a 
 
 The second tendency of our nature, of which philo- 2. The love 
 sophy is the result, is the desire of Unity. On this, 
 which indeed involves the other, it is necessary to be 
 somewhat more explicit. This tendency is one of the 
 most prominent characteristics of the human mind. 
 It, in part, originates in the imbecility of our facul- 
 ties. We are lost in the multitude of the objects 
 presented to our observation, and it is only by assort- 
 ing them in classes that we can reduce the infinity of 
 nature to the finitude of mind. The conscious Ego, 
 the conscious Self, by its nature one, seems also con- 
 strained to require that unity by which it is distin- 
 guished, in everything which it receives, and in every- 
 thing which it produces. I regret that I can illustrate 
 this only by examples which cannot, I am aware, as 
 yet be fully intelligible to all. We are conscious of 
 a scene presented to our senses only by uniting its 
 parts into a perceived whole. Perception is thus a uni- 
 fying act. The Imagination cannot represent an object 
 without uniting, in a single combination, the various 
 elements of which it is composed. Generalisation is 
 only the apprehension of the one in the many, and 
 language little else than a registry of the factitious 
 
 a Virgil, Georgia, ii. 490.
 
 68 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. unities of thought. The Judgment cannot affirm or 
 - '. deny one notion of another, except by uniting the 
 two in one indivisible act of comparison. Syllogism 
 is simply the union of two judgments in a third. 
 .Reason, Intellect, vovs, in fine, concatenating thoughts 
 and objects into system, and tending always upwards 
 from particular facts to general laws, from general 
 laws to universal principles, is never satisfied in its 
 ascent till it comprehend, (what, however, it can never 
 do), all laws in a single formula, and consummate all 
 conditional knowledge in the unity of unconditional 
 existence. Nor is it only in science that the mind 
 desiderates the one. We seek it equally in works of 
 art. A work of art is only deserving of the name, 
 inasmuch as an idea of the work has preceded its 
 execution, and inasmuch as it is itself a realisation of 
 the ideal model in sensible forms. All languages ex- 
 press the mental operations by words which denote a 
 reduction of the many to the one. Swecris, TreptX^x//^, 
 crvfatcr^cri?, crweTriyvoicri?, &c. in Greek ; in Latin, 
 cogere, (co-agere), cogitare, (co-agitare), conciperc, 
 cognoscere, comprehendere, conscire,-vfith their deri- 
 vatives, may serve for examples. 
 
 Testimonies The history of philosophy is only the history of 
 of unity, this tendency ; and philosophers have amply testified 
 to its reality. " The mind," says Anaxagoras," " only 
 knows when it subdues its objects, when it reduces 
 the many to the one." " All knowledge," say the 
 Platonists,^ " is the gathering up into one, and the 
 
 a Arist. De Anima, iii. 4 : Ardyicii in part by Trendelenburg on the Dt 
 
 Upa, fafl Teura voti, a/juyi} thai, &<nrtp Anima, p. 466. ED. 
 
 (prifflv 'Aj>aay6pas, Iva tcparrj, rovro $' /3 Priscianus Lydus : Kara TTJV 'i 
 
 i<rr\v Iva. yva>pifj. The passage of iv ffvvaiptffiv, KO\ -ryv aptpiffrov rov 
 
 Anaxagoras is given at length in the yvoxrrov weurij ftpl\tr^nv, airdffijs 
 
 Commentary of Simplicius, and quoted tffraptviis yvufftus. ( M(rd<ppaffis rur
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 69 
 
 indivisible apprehension of this unity by the knowing LECT. 
 mind." Leibnitz" and Kanf 3 have, in like manner, 
 
 defined knowledge by the representation of multitude 
 in unity. " The end of philosophy," says Plato, 7 " is 
 the intuition of unity ; " and Plotinus, among many 
 others, 5 observes that our knowledge is perfect as it 
 is one. The love of unity is by Aristotle applied to 
 solve a multitude of psychological phenomena/ St 
 Augustin even analyses pain into a feeling of the 
 frustration of unity. " Quid est enirn aliud dolor, nisi 
 quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptions impatiens \ 
 Unde luce clarius apparet, quam sit ilia anima in 
 sui corporis universitate avida unitatis et tenax."*" 
 
 This love of unity, this tendency of mind to gene- Love of 
 ralise its knowledge, leads us to anticipate in nature ^4 
 a corresponding uniformity ; and as this anticipation m'philo 
 is found in harmony with experience, it not only p 
 affords the efficient cause of philosophy, but the guid- 
 ing principle to its discoveries. " Thus, for instance, 
 
 &to<f>pd(TTOv Tltpl AurBfifffus Opera yiav tvcaOy . . . . 'Eirt S$J T& irdvra es iv 
 
 Theoph. ed. Basil, p. 273). Thus ren- &ytt, Sri^tovpyovtra xal v\a.T-rovaa /col 
 
 dered in the Latin version of Ficinus : pu>p<pov<ra. KO! avirr&rrovffa. Proclus, 
 
 " Cognitio omnia constat secundum TvStffis ovStvbs (<rrcu ruv ovruv, firy 
 
 quandam in unum congregationem, at- JXT) t<m rb tv . . . . OuSe \6yos forar 
 
 que secundura impartibilem cognosci- cal y&p 6 \6yos IK woAA&ji/ efj, tfirep 
 
 bilis totius comprehensionem." ED. -rt\tios- KO! TJ yvwais, 8rew rb yivaiffKov 
 
 a Monadologle, 14. ED. I* yirrrrau irpbs rb yvwff-r&v. In Pla- 
 
 /3 Kritlk der reinen Vernunft, p. tonit Theologiam, p. 76 (ed. 1618). 
 
 359, ed. 1799. ED. ED. 
 
 y Cf. Philebns, sub init., especially See De Memoria, % 5, for applica- 
 
 p. 16 : Afiv ri/j.as atl fj.iav iSfav irepl iray- tion of this principle to the problem of 
 
 ris 4Kt<TTOT QtfjLevovs fyfrtiv i and Reminiscence. Cf. Reift Works, p. 
 
 Republic, v. p. 475, et geq. ED. 900. See also Problems, xviiL 9, where 
 
 5 Enn. iii. lib. viii. c. 2, on which it is used to explain the higher plea- 
 
 Ficinus says : " Cognoscendi potentia sure we derive from those narrative* 
 
 in ipso actucognitionis unum quodam- that relate to a single subject. ED. 
 modo sit cum objecto, et quo magis De Libero Arbitrio, lib. iii. 23. 
 
 sit unum, eo perfectior est cognitio, [St Augustin applied the principle of 
 
 atque vicissim." ED. Unity to solve the theory of the Beau- 
 
 Enn. vL lib. ix. c. 1 : "ApT^ 8i tiful : " Omnis pulchritudinis forma 
 
 ^i/X>i* STOW df tv, KCU dt fj.iav &fi.o\o- unitas est." Epist. xviii.] Oral Interp.
 
 70 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. when it is observed that solid bodies are compressible, 
 
 1 we are induced to expect that liquids will be found 
 
 to be so likewise; we subject them, consequently, to a 
 series of experiments ; nor do we rest satisfied until 
 it be proved, that this quality is common to both 
 classes of substances. Compressibility is then pro- 
 claimed a physical law, a law of nature in general ; 
 and we experience a vivid gratification in this recog- 
 nition of unconditioned universality. Another ex- 
 ample : Kant, a reflecting on the differences among the 
 planets, or rather among the stars revolving round the 
 sun, and having discovered that these differences be- 
 trayed a uniform progress and proportion, a propor- 
 tion which was no longer to be found between Saturn 
 and the first of the comets, the law of unity and the 
 analogy of nature, led him to conjecture that, in the 
 intervening space, there existed a star, the discovery 
 of which would vindicate the universality of the law. 
 This anticipation was verified. Uranus was discovered 
 by Herschel, and our dissatisfaction at the anomaly 
 appeased. Franklin, in like manner, surmised that 
 lightning and the electric spark were identical ; and 
 when he succeeded in verifying this conjecture, our 
 love of unity was gratified. From the moment an 
 isolated fact is discovered, we endeavour to refer it to 
 other facts which it resembles. Until this be accom- 
 plished, we do not view it as understood. This is the 
 case, for example, with sulphur, which, in a certain 
 degree of temperature, melts like other bodies, but at 
 a higher degree of heat, instead of evaporating, again 
 
 o Allgemeine Naturgetckichte und however, is only true of Venus, the 
 
 Tkeorie des Himmels, 1755; Werte, Earth, Jupiter, and Saturn. The ec- 
 
 voL vi. p. 88. Kant's conjecture was centricity diminishes again in Uranus, 
 
 founded on a supposed progressive and still more in Neptune. Subsequent 
 
 increase in the eccentricities of the discoveries have thus rather weaken- 
 
 planetary orbits. This progression, ed than confirmed the theory. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 71 
 
 consolidates. When a fact is generalised, our discon- LECT. 
 
 tent is quieted, and we consider the generality itself 
 
 as tantamount to an explanation. Why does this 
 apple fall to the ground \ Because all bodies gravi- 
 tate towards each other. Arrived at this general fact, 
 we inquire no more, although ignorant now as pre- 
 viously of the cause of gravitation ; for gravitation is 
 nothing more than a name for a general fact, the why 
 of which we know not. A mystery, if recognised as 
 universal, would no longer appear mysterious. 
 
 " But this thirst of unity, this tendency of mind to Love of 
 generalise its knowledge, and our concomitant belief ^Seot 
 in the uniformity of natural phsenomena, is not only err 
 an effective mean of discovery, but likewise an abun- 
 dant source of error. Hardly is there a similarity 
 detected between two or three facts, than men hasten 
 to extend it to all others ; and if, perchance, the 
 similarity has been detected by ourselves, self-love 
 closes our eyes to the contradictions which our theory 
 may encounter from experience/" 1 " I have heard," 
 says Condillac, " of a philosopher who had the happiness 
 of thinking that he had discovered a principle which 
 was to explain all the wonderful phaenomena of chem- 
 istry, and who, in the ardour of his self-gratulation, 
 hastened to communicate his discovery to a skilful 
 chemist. The chemist had the kindness to listen to 
 him, and then calmly told him that there was but 
 one unfortunate circumstance for his discovery, that 
 the chemical facts were precisely the converse of what 
 he had supposed them to be. ' Well, then/ said the 
 philosopher, ' have the goodness to tell me what they 
 are, that I may explain them on my system/ "P We are 
 
 a Gamier, Cours de Psychologic, p. J8 Trait des Systtmes, chap. xii. 
 192-94. [Cf. Ancillon, Nouv. Melan- (Eurres Philos. torn. iv. p. 146 (ed. 
 ges, i. p. I,et8eq.] 1795).
 
 72 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. naturally disposed to refer everything we do not know 
 - to principles with which we are familiar. As Aristotle 
 observes, the early Pythagoreans, who first studied 
 arithmetic, were induced, by their scientific predilec- 
 tions, to explain the problem of the universe by the 
 properties of number ; and he notices also that a cer- 
 tain musical philosopher was, in like manner, led to 
 suppose that the soul was but a kind of harmony.^ 
 The musician suggests to my recollection a passage of 
 Dr Eeid. " Mr Locke," says he, " mentions an eminent 
 musician who believed that God created the world in 
 six days, and rested the seventh, because there are 
 but seven notes in music. I myself," he continues, 
 " knew one of that profession who thought that there 
 could be only three parts in harmony to wit, bass, 
 tenor, and treble ; because there are but three persons 
 in the Trinity/' 7 The alchemists would see in nature 
 only a single metal, clothed with the different appear- 
 ances which we denominate gold, silver, copper, iron, 
 mercury, &c., and they confidently explained the mys- 
 teries, not only of nature, but of religion, by salt, 
 sulphur, and mercury. 5 Some of our modern zoolo- 
 gists recoil from the possibility of nature working on 
 two different plans, and rather than renounce the 
 unity which delights them, they insist on recognising 
 the wings of insects in the gills of fishes, and the 
 sternum of quadrupeds in the antennae of butterflies, 
 and all this that they may prove that man is only 
 the evolution of a molluscum. Descartes saw in the 
 physical world only matter and motion ; and, more 
 recently, it has been maintained that thought itself 
 
 o Metaph. i. 5. ED. y Intellectual Powers, Ess. vi. chap. 
 
 /3 De Anima, i. 4 ; Plato, Phado, viii. ; Coll. Works, p. 473. 
 
 p. 86. The same theory was after- 8 See Brucker, Hist. Philosophic, 
 
 wards adopted by Aristotle's own pu- vol. iv. p. 677, et teq. ED. 
 
 pil, Aristoienus. See Cicero, Tute. t Principia, pars il 23. ED. 
 Quasi. L 10. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 73 
 
 is only a movement of matter." Of all the faculties LECT. 
 of the mind, Condillac recognised only one, which - 
 transformed itself like the Protean metal of the alche- 
 mists ; and he maintains that our belief in the rising 
 of to-morrow's sun is a sensation.^ It is this ten- 
 dency, indeed, which has principally determined phi- 
 losophers, as we shall hereafter see, to neglect or 
 violate the original duality of consciousness ; in which, 
 as an ultimate fact, a self and not-self, mind know- 
 ing and matter known, are given in counterpoise and 
 mutual opposition ; and hence the three Unitarian 
 schemes of Materialism, Idealism, and Absolute Iden- 
 tity. 7 In fine, Pantheism, or the doctrine which iden- 
 tifies mind and matter, the Creator and the creature, 
 God and the universe, how are we to explain the 
 prevalence of this modification of atheism in the most 
 ancient and in the most recent times \ Simply because 
 it carries our love of unity to its highest fruition. To 
 sum up what has just been said in the words of Sir 
 John Davies, a highly philosophic poet of the Eliza- 
 bethan age : 
 
 " Musicians think our souls are harmonies ; 
 
 Physicians hold that they complexions be ; 
 Epicures make them swarms of atomies : 
 
 Which do by chance into our bodies flee. 
 
 One thinks the soul is air ; another fire ; 
 
 Another blood, diffus'd about the heart ; 
 Another saith the elements conspire, 
 
 And to her essence each doth yield a part. 
 
 Some think one gen'ral soul fills every brain, 
 
 As the bright sun sheds light in every star ; 
 And others think the name of soul is vain, 
 
 And that we only well-mix'd bodies are. 
 
 a Priestley, Disquisitions relating & The preceding illustrations are 
 
 to Matter and Spirit, sect. iii. p. 24, borrowed from Gamier, Psycholoyie, 
 
 et seq ; Free Discussion of Materialism p. 194. ED. 
 
 and Necessity, pp. 258, 267, ft teq. y See the Author's Supplementary 
 
 ED. Dissertations to Reid, note C. ED.
 
 74 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. Thus these great clerks their little wisdom show, 
 
 While with their doctrines they at hazard play ; 
 
 Tossing their light opinions to and fro, 
 To mock the lewd, as learn'd in this as they ; 
 
 For no craz'd brain could ever yet propound, 
 Touching the soul so vain and fond a thought ; 
 
 But some among these masters have been found, 
 
 Which, in their schools, the self-same thing have taught." 
 
 influence To this love of unity to this desire of reducing 
 ceivedfopi- the objects of our knowledge to harmony and system 
 iUetoiore a source of truth and discovery if subservient to 
 imity ' observation, but of error and delusion if allowed to 
 dictate to observation what phenomena are to be 
 perceived ; to this principle, I say, we may refer the 
 influence which preconceived opinions exercise upon 
 our perceptions and our judgments, by inducing us to 
 see and require only what is in unison with them. 
 What we wish, says Demosthenes, that we believe ; 7 
 what we expect, says Aristotle, that we find s truths 
 which have been re-echoed by a thousand confessors, 
 and confirmed by ten thousand examples. Opinions 
 once adopted become part of the intellectual system 
 of their holders. If opposed to prevalent doctrines, 
 self-love defends them as a point of honour, exagge- 
 rates whatever may confirm, overlooks or extenuates 
 whatever may contradict. Again, if accepted as a 
 general doctrine, they are too often recognised, in 
 consequence of their prevalence, as indisputable truths, 
 and all counter appearances peremptorily overruled as 
 manifest illusions. Thus it is that men will not see 
 
 a Lewd, according to Tooke, from y Bov\erat rovff IKOCTOS <caJ olerai, 
 
 Anglo-Saxon, Lcewed, past participle Demosth. Olynth. iii. p. 68. ED. 
 
 of Lcewan, to mislead. It was for- 8 Phet. ii. 1. T< fj.(t> 4-iriQviJ.ovvri KO! 
 
 merly applied to the (lay) people in ev(\iriSi OVTI, tat> $ ri> labptvov TI$V, 
 
 contradistinction from the clergy. See KO! &r erflat /col ayaObv fa-eo-Oai tpaivtrat, 
 
 Richardson, Eng. Diet., v. Lewd. ED. r$ 8' airaOe'i, KCU Svffxfpaivovn, TOVV- 
 
 j3 On the Immortality of the Soul, canlov.Eo. 
 stanza 9, et seq.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 75 
 
 in the phenomena what alone is to be seen ; in their LECT. 
 
 observations, they interpolate and they expunge ; and L_ 
 
 this mutilated and adulterated product they call a 
 fact. And why? Because the real phaenomena, if 
 admitted, would spoil the pleasant music of their 
 thoughts, and convert its factitious harmony into dis- 
 cord. " Quse volunt sapiunt, et nolunt sapere quae vera 
 sunt." a In consequence of this, many a system, pro- 
 fessing to be reared exclusively on observation and 
 fact, rests in reality mainly upon hypothesis and 
 fiction. A pretended experience is, indeed, the screen 
 behind which every illusive doctrine regularly retires. 
 " There are more false facts," says Cullen,' 3 "current 
 in the world, than false theories ;" and the livery of 
 Lord Bacon has been most ostentatiously paraded by 
 many who were no members of his household. Fact, 
 observation, induction, have always been the watch- 
 words of those who have dealt most extensively in 
 fancy. It is now above three centuries since Agrippa, 
 in his Vanity of the Sciences, observed of Astrology, 
 Physiognomy, and Metoposcopy, (the Phrenology of 
 those days), that experience was always professedly 
 their only foundation and their only defence : " Solent 
 omnes illae divinationum prodigiosae artes non, nisi 
 experientise titulo, se defendere et se objectionum 
 vinculis extricare." 7 It was on this ground, too, that, 
 at a later period, the great Kepler vindicated the first 
 of these arts, Astrology. For, said he, how could the 
 principle of a science be false where experience showed 
 that its predictions were uniformly fulfilled I s Now, 
 
 a [St. Hilarii, lib. viii., De Trini- vol. i. c. ii. art. iv., second edition. 
 
 tate, sub init] ED. 
 
 For Cullen's illustrations of the y Opera, vol. ii. c. 32, p. 64 . 
 influence of a pretended experience 8 De Stella Nova, c. 8, 10 ; Har- 
 
 in Medicine, see his Materia Medica, mortice Mundi, lib. iv. c. 7. ED.
 
 76 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. truth was with Kepler even as a passion ; and his, 
 IV ' too, was one of the most powerful intellects that ever 
 cultivated and promoted a science. To him astronomy, 
 indeed, owes perhaps even more than to Newton. And 
 yet, even his great mind, preoccupied with a certain 
 prevalent belief, could observe and judge only in con- 
 formity with that belief. This tendency to look at 
 realities only through the spectacles of an hypothesis, 
 is perhaps seen most conspicuously in the fortunes of 
 medicine. The history of that science is, in truth, 
 little else than an incredible narrative of the substi- 
 tution of fictions for facts ; the converts to an hypo- 
 thesis, (and every, the most contradictory, doctrine has 
 had its day), regularly seeing and reporting only in 
 conformity with its dictates." The same is also true 
 of the philosophy of mind ; and the variations and 
 alternations in this science, which are perhaps only 
 surpassed by those in medicine, are to be traced to a 
 refusal of the real phsenomenon revealed in conscious- 
 ness, and to the substitution of another, more in 
 unison with preconceived opinions of what it ought to 
 be. Nor, in this commutation of fact with fiction, 
 should we suspect that there is any mala fides. Pre- 
 judice, imagination, and passion, sufficiently explain 
 the illusion. " Fingunt simul creduntque.'^ "When," 
 says Kant, " we have once heard a bad report of this 
 or that individual, we incontinently think that we 
 read the rogue in his countenance ; fancy here mingles 
 with observation, which is still farther vitiated when 
 affection or passion interferes." 
 
 " The passions," says Helvetius, 7 " not only concen- 
 trate our attention on certain exclusive aspects of the 
 
 a See the Author's Article " On the Tacitus, Hitt. lib. ii. c. 8. ED. 
 Revolutions of Medicine," Ditcunxions, y De V Esprit. Discours i. chap. ii. 
 p. 242. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 77 
 
 objects which they present, but they likewise often LECT. 
 deceive us in showing these same objects where they 
 do not exist. The story is well known of a parson 
 and a gay lady. They had both heard that the moon 
 was peopled, believed it, and, telescope in hand, 
 were attempting to discover the inhabitants. If I am 
 not mistaken, says the lady, who looked first, I perceive 
 two shadows ; they bend toward each other, and, I 
 have no doubt, are two happy lovers. Lovers, madam, 
 says the divine, who looked second ; oh fie ! the two 
 shadows you saw are the two steeples of a cathedral. 
 This story is the history of man. In general, we 
 perceive only in things what we are desirous of find- 
 ing : on the earth as in the moon, various preposses- 
 sions make us always recognise either lovers or cathe- 
 drals." 
 
 Such are the two intellectual necessities which afford Auxiliary 
 the two principal sources of philosophy : the intel- philosophy 
 lectual necessity of refunding effects into their causes ; a 
 and the intellectual necessity of carrying up our 
 knowledge into unity or system. But, besides these 
 intellectual necessities, which are involved in the very 
 existence of our faculties of knowledge, there is another 
 powerful subsidiary to the same effect, in a certain 
 affection of our capacities of feeling. This feeling, 
 according to circumstances, is denominated surprise, 
 astonishment, admiration, wonder, and, when blended 
 with the intellectual tendencies we have considered, it 
 obtains the name of curiosity. This feeling, though it 
 cannot, as some have held, be allowed to be the prin- 
 cipal, far less the only, cause of philosophy, is, how- 
 ever, a powerful auxiliary to speculation ; and, though 
 
 a [This expression is employed by Sergeant. See Method to Science, p. 222. 
 Cf. pp. 144,145.]
 
 73 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. inadequate to account for the existence of philosophy 
 
 - absolutely, it adequately explains the preference with 
 
 which certain parts of philosophy have been cultivated, 
 and the order in which philosophy in general has been 
 developed. We may err both in exaggerating, and in 
 extenuating, its influence. Wonder has been contemp- 
 tuously called the daughter of ignorance ; true, but 
 wonder, we should add, is the mother of knowledge. 
 Among others, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and Bacon, 
 have all concurred in testifying to the influence of this 
 principle. " Admiration," says the Platonic Socrates 
 in the Thecetetus" " admiration is a highly philoso- 
 phical affection ; indeed, there is no other principle of 
 philosophy but this." " That philosophy," says Aris- 
 totle, " was not originally studied for any practical 
 end, is manifest from those who first began to philoso- 
 phise. It was, in fact, wonder which then, as now, 
 determined men to philosophical researches. Among 
 the phsenomena presented to them, their admiration 
 was first directed to those more proximate and more 
 on a level with their powers, and then rising by de- 
 grees, they came at length to demand an explana- 
 tion of the higher phsenomena, as the different states 
 of the moon, sun, and stars, and the origin of 
 the universe. Now, to doubt and to be astonished, 
 is to recognise our ignorance. Hence it is that the 
 lover of wisdom is in a certain sort a lover of mythi, 
 (<iXo/xv0os TTOJS), for the subject of mythi is the aston- 
 ishing and marvellous. If, then, men philosophise to 
 escape ignorance, it is clear that they pursue know- 
 ledge on its own account, and not for the sake of any 
 foreign utility. This is proved by the fact ; for it was 
 only after all that pertained to the wants, welfare, 
 
 a T. 155.- ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 79 
 
 and conveniences of life had been discovered, that men LECT. 
 
 TV 
 
 commenced their philosophical researches. It is, there- 
 
 fore, manifest that we do not study philosophy for the 
 sake of anything ulterior ; and, as we call him a free 
 man who belongs to himself and not to another, so 
 philosophy is of all sciences the only free or liberal 
 study, for it alone is unto itself an end/' a " It is the 
 business of philosophy," says Plutarch, " to investigate, 
 to admire, and to doubt/' /* You will find in the first 
 book of the De Augmenlis of Bacon, 7 a recognition of 
 the principle " admiratio est semen sapientiae," and copi- 
 ous illustrations of its truth, illustrations which I 
 shall not quote, but they deserve your private study. 
 
 No one, however, has so fully illustrated the play 
 and effect of this motive as a distinguished philosopher 
 of this country, Adam Smith ; although he has attri- 
 buted too little to the principal, too much to the sub- 
 sidiary, momenta. He seems not to have been aware 
 of what had been, previously to him, observed in regard 
 to this principle by others. You will find the discus- 
 sion among his posthumous essays, in that entitled The 
 Principles ivhich lead and direct Philosophical Inqui- 
 ries, illustrated by the History of Astronomy ; to this 
 I must simply refer you. 
 
 We have already remarked, that the principle of Affords an 
 wonder affords an explanation of the order in which of thTorder 
 the different objects of philosophy engaged the atten- objTctL c 
 tion of mankind. The aim of all philosophy is the 
 discovery of principles, that is, of higher causes ; but, 
 in the procedure to this end, men first endeavoured 
 to explain those phsenomena which attracted their 
 
 o MetapTi. lib. i. c. 2. See also for <t>o?s, vol. ii. 385 ; fjrtl 5 rov <t>i\o<ro- 
 
 a passage to a similar effect, Rhetoric, <f>tiv, tfy>7j, rb ^T/TtiV, rb 6av/j.d(iv, oi 
 
 lib. i. c. 11. &irop(7v. ED. 
 
 /3 Plutarch, Tlfpl rov Et rov iv AeA.- y VoL viii. p. 8, (Montagu's ed.)
 
 80 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. attention by arousing their wonder. The child is 
 wholly absorbed in the observation of the world with- 
 out ; the world within first engages the contemplation 
 of the man. As it is with the individual, so was it 
 with the species. Philosophy, before attempting the 
 problem of intelligence, endeavoured to resolve the 
 problem of nature. The spectacle of the external uni- 
 verse was too imposing not first to solicit curiosity, and 
 to direct upon itself the prelusive efforts of philosophy. 
 Thales and Pythagoras, in whom philosophy finds its 
 earliest representatives, endeavoured to explain the 
 organisation of the universe, and to substitute a scien- 
 tific for a religious cosmogony. For a season their 
 successors toiled in the same course ; and it was 
 only after philosophy had tried, and tired, its forces 
 on external nature, that the human mind recoiled upon 
 itself, and sought in the study of its own nature the 
 object and end of philosophy. The mind now became 
 to itself its point of departure, and its principal object ; 
 and its progress, if less ambitious, was more secure. 
 Socrates was he who first decided this new destination 
 of philosophy. From his epoch man sought in him- 
 self the solution of the great problem of existence, and 
 the history of philosophy was henceforward only a de- 
 velopment, more or less successful, more or less com- 
 plete, of the inscription on the Delphic temple TvuBi 
 creavrov Know thyself." 
 
 o Plato, Protagoras, p. 343. ED. [See Geruzez, Nouveau Court de Philo- 
 tophie, p. 1.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 81 
 
 LECTURE V. 
 
 THE DISPOSITIONS WITH WHICH PHILOSOPHY OUGHT 
 TO BE STUDIED. 
 
 HAVING, in the previous Lectures, informed you, 1, LECT. 
 
 What Philosophy is, and 2, What are its Causes, I 
 
 would now, in the third place, say a few words to you 
 on the Dispositions with which Philosophy ought to be 
 studied, for, without certain practical conditions, a 
 speculative knowledge of the most perfect Method of 
 procedure, (our next following question), remains bar- 
 ren and unapplied. 
 
 " To attain to a knowledge of ourselves/' says 
 Socrates, " we must banish prejudice, passion, and 
 sloth;" a and no one who neglects this precept can 
 hope to make any progress in the philosophy of the 
 human mind, which is only another term for the 
 knowledge of ourselves. 
 
 In the first place, then, all prejudices, that is, all First condi. 
 opinions formed on irrational grounds, ought to be study of " 
 
 i- i Tx. ! / i Philosophy, 
 
 removed. A preliminary doubt is thus the iunda- remmcia- 
 mental condition of philosophy ; and the necessity of jSL 1 "* 
 such a doubt is no less apparent than is its difficulty. 
 We do not approach the study of philosophy igno- 
 rant, but perverted. " There is no one who has not 
 grown up under a load of beliefs beliefs which he 
 owes to the accidents of country and family, to the 
 
 o [See Gatien-Arnoult, Doctrine Pkiloaopkique, p. 39.] 
 
 VOL. i. y
 
 82 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. books he has read, to the society he has frequented, to 
 * the education he has received, and, in general, to the 
 
 circumstances which have concurred in the formation 
 of his intellectual and moral habits. These beliefs 
 may be true, or they may be false, or, what is more 
 probable, they may be a medley of truths and errors. 
 It is, however, under their influence that he studies, 
 and through them, as through a prism, that he views 
 and judges the objects of knowledge. Everything is 
 therefore seen by him in false colours, and in distorted 
 relations. And this is the reason why philosophy, as 
 the science of truth, requires a renunciation of preju- 
 . dices, (prae-judicia, opiniones prse-judicatse), that is, 
 conclusions formed without a previous examination of 
 their grounds." In this, if I may without irreverence 
 in this compare things human with things divine, Christianity 
 2dPh!b and Philosophy coincide, for truth is equally the end 
 P hy one. o f ^^jj What is the primary condition which our 
 Saviour requires of his disciples ? That they throw off 
 their old prejudices, and come with hearts willing to 
 receive knowledge and understandings open to convic- 
 tion. " Unless," He says, " ye become as little chil- 
 dren, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." 
 Such is true religion ; such also is true philosophy. 
 Philosophy requires an emancipation from the yoke of 
 foreign authority, a renunciation of all blind adhesion 
 to the opinions of our age and country, and a purifica- 
 tion of the intellect from all assumptive beliefs. Un- 
 less we can cast off the prejudices of the man, and 
 become as children, docile and unperverted, we need 
 never hope to enter the temple of philosophy. It is 
 the neglect of this primary condition which has mainly 
 occasioned men to wander from the unity of truth, and 
 
 a [Gatien-Arnoult, Doct. Phil., pp. 39, 40.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 83 
 
 caused the endless variety of religious and philoso- LECT. 
 phical sects. Men would not submit to approach the Y ' 
 word of God in order to receive from that alone their 
 doctrine and their faith ; but they came in general 
 with preconceived opinions, and, accordingly, each 
 found in revelation only what he was predetermined 
 to find. So, in like manner, is it in philosophy. Con- 
 sciousness is to the philosopher what the Bible is to the 
 theologian. Both are revelations of the truth, and 
 both afford the truth to those who are content to 
 receive it, as it ought to be received, with reverence 
 and submission. But as it has, too frequently, 
 fared with the one revelation, so has it with the other. 
 Men turned, indeed, to consciousness, and professed to 
 regard its authority as paramount, but they were not 
 content humbly to accept the facts which conscious- 
 ness revealed, and to establish these without retrench- 
 ment or distortion, as the only principles of their phi- 
 losophy ; on the contrary, they came with opinions 
 already formed, with systems already constructed, and 
 while they eagerly appealed to consciousness when 
 its data supported their conclusions, they made no 
 scruple to overlook, or to misinterpret, its facts when 
 these were not in harmony with their speculations. 
 Thus religion and philosophy, as they both terminate 
 in the same end, so they both depart from the same 
 fundamental condition. " Aditus ad regnum hominis, 
 quod fundatur in scientiis, quam ad regnum coelorum, 
 in quod, nisi sub persona infantis, intrare non 
 datur." a 
 
 But the influence of early prejudice is the more dan- influence of 
 gerous, inasmuch as this influence is unobtrusive. di^S* 
 Few of us are, perhaps, fully aware of how little we 
 
 o Bacon, Nor. Org. lib. i., aph. IxviiL
 
 84 LECTURES OX METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. owe to ourselves, how much to the influence of 
 
 others. " Non licet," says Seneca, " ire recta via ; 
 
 trahunt in pravum parentes ; trahunt servi ; nemo 
 errat uni sibi sed dementiam spargit in proximos, 
 accipitque invicem. Et ideo, in singulis vitia popu- 
 lomm sunt, quia ilia populus dedit ; dum facit quis- 
 que pejorem, factus est. Didicit deteriora, deinde 
 docuit : effectaque est ingens ilia nequitia, congesto 
 in unum, quod cuique pessimum scitur. Sit ergo 
 aliquis custos, et aurem subinde pervellat, abigatque 
 rumores et reclamet popnlis laudantibus." a 
 source of Man is by nature a social animal. " He is more 
 of'c^m. political," says Aristotle, " than any bee or ant."^ But 
 ciflTJIimai. the existence of society, from a family to a state, sup- 
 poses a certain harmony of sentiment among its mem- 
 bers ; and nature has, accordingly, wisely implanted 
 in us a tendency to assimilate in opinions and habits 
 of thought to those with whom we live and act. There 
 is thus, in every society great or small, a certain gravi- 
 tation of opinions towards a common centre. As in 
 our natural body, every part has a necessary sympathy 
 with every other, and all together form, by their har- 
 monious conspiration, a healthy whole ; so, in the social 
 body, there is always a strong predisposition, in each 
 of its members, to act and think in unison with the 
 rest. This universal sympathy, or fellow-feeling, of 
 our social nature, is the principle of the different spirit 
 dominant in different ages, countries, ranks, sexes, and 
 periods of life. It is the cause why fashions, why 
 political and religious enthusiasm, why moral example, 
 either for good or evil, spread so rapidly, and exert so 
 powerful an influence. As men are naturally prone to 
 imitate others, they consequently regard, as important 
 
 a Epist. xciv. iB Polit. i. 2. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 85 
 
 Or insignificant, as honourable or disgraceful, as true LECT. 
 
 or false, as good or bad, what those around them con- 
 
 sider in the same light. They love and hate what they 
 see others desire and eschew. This is not to be re- 
 gretted ; it is natural, and, consequently, it is right. 
 Indeed, were it otherwise, society could not subsist, for 
 nothing can be more apparent than that mankind in 
 general, destined as they are to occupations incom- 
 patible with intellectual cultivation, are wholly incap- 
 able of forming opinions for themselves on many of the 
 most important objects of human consideration. If 
 such, however, be the intentions of nature with respect 
 to the unenlightened classes, it is manifest that a 
 heavier obligation is thereby laid on those who enjoy 
 the advantages of intellectual cultivation, to examine 
 with diligence and impartiality the foundations of those 
 opinions which have any connection with the welfare 
 of mankind. If the multitude must be led, it is of 
 consequence that it be led by enlightened conductors. 
 That the great multitude of mankind are, by natural 
 disposition, only what others are, is a fact at all times 
 so obtrusive, that it could not escape observation from 
 the moment a reflective eye was first turned upon 
 man. " The whole conduct of Cambyses," says Hero- 
 dotus, a the father of history, " towards the Egyptian 
 gods, sanctuaries, and priests, convinces me that this 
 king was in the highest degree insane, for otherwise 
 he would not have insulted the worship and holy things 
 of the Egyptians. If any one should accord to all 
 men the permission to make free choice of the best 
 among all customs, undoubtedly each would choose 
 his own. That this would certainly happen can be 
 shown by many examples, and, among others, by the 
 
 a Lib. Hi. 37, 38.
 
 86 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. following. The King Darius once asked the Greeks 
 - who were resident in his court, at what price they 
 
 could be induced to devour their dead parents. The 
 Greeks answered, that to this no price could bribe 
 them. Thereupon the king asked some Indians who 
 were in the habit of eating their dead parents, what 
 they would take not to eat but to burn them ; and the 
 Indians answered even as the Greeks had done." Hero- 
 dotus concludes this narrative with the observation, 
 that " Pindar had justly entitled Custom the Queen of 
 the World." 
 
 Sceptical The ancient sceptics, from the conformity of men in 
 fifth? every country, their habits of thinking, feeling, and 
 ofcottnL acting, and from the diversity of different nations in 
 these habits, inferred that nothing was by nature beau- 
 tiful or deformed, true or false, good or bad, but that 
 these distinctions originated solely in custom. The 
 modern scepticism of Montaigne terminates in the same 
 assertion ; and the sublime misanthropy of Pascal has 
 almost carried him to a similar exaggeration. " In the 
 just and the unjust," says he, " we find hardly any- 
 thing which does not change its character in changing 
 its climate. Three degrees of an elevation of the pole 
 reverses the whole of jurisprudence. A meridian is 
 decisive of truth, and a few years of possession. Fun- 
 damental laws change. Eight has its epochs. A plea- 
 sant justice which a river or a mountain limits. Truth, 
 on this side the Pyrenees, error on the other !" This 
 doctrine is exaggerated, but it has a foundation in 
 truth ; and the most zealous champions of the immu- 
 tability of moral distinctions are unanimous in ac- 
 knowledging the powerful influence which the opinions, 
 tastes, manners, affections, and actions of the society 
 
 a Fences, partie i. art vi. 8, (voL il p. 126, ed. Faugere.)
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 87 
 
 in which we live, exert upon all and each of its mem- LECT 
 bers. a v - ' 
 
 Nor is this influence of man on man less unambi- This influ- 
 guous in times of social tranquillity, than in crises of 
 social convulsion. In seasons of political and religious 
 revolution, there arises a struggle between the resisting Sj^Sd" 
 force of ancient habits and the contagious sympathy convuL " on - 
 of new modes of feeling and thought. In one portion 
 of society, the inveterate influence of custom prevails 
 over the contagion of example ; in others, the contagion 
 of example prevails over the conservative force of an- 
 tiquity and habit. In either case, however, we think 
 and act always in sympathy with others. " We re- 
 main," says an illustrious philosopher, " submissive so 
 long as the world continues to, set the example. As 
 we follow the herd in forming our conceptions of what 
 is respectable, so we are ready to follow the multitude 
 also, when such conceptions come to be questioned or 
 rejected ; and are no less vehement reformers, when 
 the current of opinion has turned against former estab- 
 lishments, than we were zealous abettors while that 
 current continued to set in a different direction." P 
 
 Thus it is that no revolution in public opinion is Relation 
 the work of an individual, of a single cause, or of a fe 
 
 day. When the crisis has arrived, the catastrophe "^ 
 must ensue ; but the agents through whom it is ap- 
 parently accomplished, though they may accelerate, 
 cannot originate its occurrence. Who believes that 
 but for Luther or Zwingli the Reformation would not 
 have been 1 Their individual, their personal energy 
 and zeal, perhaps, hastened by a year or two the event ; 
 but had the public mind not been already ripe for their 
 
 a See Meiners, Untersuchungen Ferguson's Moral and Political 
 iiber die Denlckrafte und Willemlcrafte Science, vol. L part L chap. ii. 11 p. 
 des Menschcn, ii. 325, (ed. 1806.) 135.'
 
 88 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. revolt, the fate of Luther and Zwingli, in the sixteenth 
 
 - century, would have been that of Huss and Jerome of 
 
 Prague in the fifteenth. Woe to the revolutionist who 
 is not himself a creature of the revolution ! If he an- 
 ticipate, he is lost ; for it requires, what no individual 
 can supply, a long and powerful counter-sympathy in 
 a nation to untwine the ties of custom which bind a 
 people to the established and the old. This is finely 
 expressed by Schiller, in a soliloquy from the mouth of 
 the revolutionary Wallenstein : 
 
 Schiller. " What is thy purpose ? Hast thou fairly weighed it ? 
 
 Thou seekest ev'n from its broad base to shake 
 The calm enthroned majesty of power, 
 By ages of possession consecrate 
 Firm rooted in the rugged soil of custom 
 And with the people's first and fondest faith, 
 As with a thousand stubborn tendrils twined. 
 That were no strife where strength contends with strength. 
 It is not strength I fear I fear no foe 
 Whom with my bodily eye I see and scan ; 
 Who, brave himself, inflames my courage too. 
 It is an unseen enemy I dread, 
 Who, in the hearts of mankind, fights against me 
 Fearful to me but from his own weak fear. 
 Not that which proudly towers in life and strength 
 Is truly dreadful ; but the mean and common, 
 The memory of the eternal yesterday, 
 Which, ever- warning, ever still returns, 
 And weighs to-morrow, for it weighed to-day ; 
 Out of the common is man's nature framed, 
 And custom is the nurse to whom he cleaves. 
 Woe then to him whose daring hand profanes 
 The honoured heir-looms of his ancestors ! 
 There is a consecrating power in time ; 
 And what is grey with years to man is godlike. 
 Be in possession, and thou art in right ; 
 The crowd will lend thee aid to keep it sacred." 
 
 This may enable you to understand how seductive 
 is the influence of example ; and I should have no 
 
 Wallentteln. (Translated by Mr George Moir.) Act i. scene 4., p. 15.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 89 
 
 end were I to quote to you all that philosophers have LECT. 
 said of the prevalence and evil influence of prejudice - 
 and opinion. 
 
 We have seen that custom is called, by Pindar and Te 
 Herodotus, the Queen of the World and the same phe 
 thing is expressed by the adage " Mundus regitur reclfve4 
 opinionibus." " Opinion," says the great Pascal, " dis- pim< 
 poses of all things. It constitutes beauty, justice, hap- 
 piness ; and these are the all in all of the world. I 
 would with all my heart see the Italian book of which 
 I know only the title, a title, however, which is itself 
 worth many books Delia opinions regina del mondo. 
 I subscribe to it implicitly."* "Coutume," says Re- 
 gnier, 
 
 " Coutume, opinion, reines de notre sort, 
 Vous reglez des mortels, et la vie, et la mort !" 
 
 "Almost every opinion we have," says the pious Char- 
 ron, " we have but by authority ; we believe, judge, 
 act, live and die on trust, as common custom teaches 
 us ; and rightly, for we are too weak to decide and 
 choose of ourselves. But the wise do not act thus."/ 3 
 " Every opinion," says Montaigne, " is strong enough 
 to have had its martyrs;" 7 and Sir W. Raleigh 
 " It is opinion, not truth, that travelleth the world 
 without passport." 5 " Opinion," says Heraclitus, " is 
 a falling sickness;" 6 and Luther "0 doxa! doxa ! 
 quam es communis noxa." In a word, as Hom- 
 inel has it, "An ounce of custom outweighs a ton of 
 reason." ^ 
 
 a Penates, partie i. art. vi. 3. [Vol. 8 Preface to his History of the 
 
 ii. p. 52, ed. Faugere. M. Faugere has World. 
 restored the original text of Pascal Diog. Laert. lib. ix. 7. 
 "fSi may! nation dispose de tout." The ( [Alex. v. Joch (Hommel), Uber 
 
 ordinary reading is L'opinion.ED.] Belohnung und Strafe, p. 111. See 
 
 De la Sagesse, liv. i. chap. xvL Krug, Philoophisches Lexikon, vol. v. 
 
 7 Essais, liv. L chap. xl. - - p. 467, art. Gewhnhcit.]
 
 90 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. Such being the recognised universality and evil ef- 
 feet of prejudice, philosophers have, consequently, been 
 hel^na- unanimous in making doubt the first step towards phi- 
 imous in losophy. Aristotle has a fine chapter in his Metaphy- 
 Srtep 6 w>cs * on tne utility of doubt, and on the things which 
 
 to phiioo- we ought first to doubt of ; and he concludes by es- 
 tablishing that the success of philosophy depends on 
 the art of doubting well. This is even enjoined on us 
 by the Apostle. For in saying " Prove " (which may be 
 more correctly translated test) "Test all things," he 
 implicitly commands us to doubt all things. 
 
 Bacon. " He," says Bacon, " who would become philosopher, 
 
 must commence by repudiating belief ; " and he con- 
 cludes one of the most remarkable passages of his 
 writings with the observation, that " were there a 
 single man to be found with a firmness sufficient to 
 efface from his mind the theories and notions vulgarly 
 received, and to apply his intellect free and without 
 prevention, the best hopes might be entertained of his 
 
 Descartes, success."^ 3 " To philosophise," says Descartes, " seri- 
 ously, and to good effect, it is necessary for a man to 
 renounce all prejudices ; in other words, to apply the 
 greatest care to doubt of all his previous opinions, 
 so long as these have not been subjected to a new 
 examination, and been recognised as true." 7 But it 
 is needless to multiply authorities in support of so 
 
 o Lib. ii. c. 1. ED. congeries. Quod siquis setate matura, 
 /3 " Nemo adhuc tanta mentis con- et sensibus integris, et raente repur- 
 stantia inventus est, ut decreverit, et gata, se ad experientiam, et ad particu- 
 sibi imposuerit, theorias et notiones laria de integro applicet, de eo melius 
 communes penitus abolere, et intellec- sperandum est." Nov. Org. i. aph. 
 turn abrasum et sequum ad particula- xcvii. ; Works, vol. ix. p. 252, (Monta- 
 na, de integro, applicare. Itaqvie ilia gu's ed.) See also omnino A r or. Ory. i. 
 ratio humana quam habemus, ex mill- aph. Ixviii. 
 
 ta fide, et multo etiam casu, nee non y Prin. Phil, pars i. 75. [Cf. 
 
 ex puerilibus, quas primo hausimus, Clauberg, De Dubitatione Cartesiana, 
 
 notionibus, farrago quacdam est, et cc. L ii. Opera, p. 1131. ED.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 91 
 
 obvious a truth. The ancient philosophers refused to LECT. 
 
 admit slaves to their instruction. Prejudice makes ! 
 
 men slaves ; it disqualifies them for the pursuit of 
 truth ; and their emancipation from prejudice is what 
 philosophy first inculcates on, what it first requires 
 of, its disciples.* Let us, however, beware that we 
 act not the part of revolted slaves ; that in asserting 
 our liberty we do not run into license. Philosophi- phiiowphi 
 cal doubt is not an end but a mean. We doubt ca 
 in order that we may believe ; we begin that we may 
 not end with doubt. We doubt once that we may 
 believe always ; we renounce authority that we may 
 follow reason ; we surrender opinion that we may 
 obtain knowledge. We must be protestants, not in- 
 fidels, in philosophy. " There is a great difference," Maiie- 
 says Mallebranche, " between doubting and doubting. 
 We doubt through passion and brutality ; through 
 blindness and malice, and finally through fancy and 
 from the very wish to doubt ; but we doubt also from 
 prudence and through distrust, from wisdom and 
 through penetration of mind. The former doubt is a 
 doubt of darkness, which never issues to the light, but 
 leads us always further from it ; the latter is a doubt 
 which is born of the light, and which aids in a certain 
 sort to produce light in its turn."' 3 Indeed, were the 
 effect of philosophy the establishment of doubt, the 
 remedy would be worse than the disease. Doubt, as 
 a permanent state of mind, would be, in fact, little 
 better than an intellectual death. The mind lives as 
 it believes, it lives in the affirmation of itself, of 
 nature, and of God ; a doubt upon any one of these 
 would be a diminution of its life, a doubt upon the 
 
 a [Cf. Gatien-Arnoult, Doct. Phil., p. 41.] 
 . j8 Recherche de la Verite, liv. L chap. xx. 3. . .
 
 92 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. three, were it possible, would be tantamount to a men- 
 
 * tal annihilation. It is well observed, by Mr Stewart, 
 
 Stewart. t kat it is not merely in order to free the mind from 
 the influence of error, that it is useful to examine the 
 foundation of established opinions. It is such an 
 examination alone, that, in an inquisitive age like the 
 present, can secure a philosopher from the danger of 
 unlimited scepticism. To this extreme, indeed, the 
 complexion of the times is more likely to give him 
 a tendency, than to implicit credulity. In the for- 
 mer ages of ignorance and superstition, the intimate 
 association which had been formed, in the prevailing 
 systems of education, between truth and error, had 
 given to the latter an ascendant over the minds of 
 men, which it could never have acquired if divested 
 of such an alliance. The case has, of late years, been 
 most remarkably reversed : the common sense of 
 mankind, in consequence of the growth of a more 
 liberal spirit of inquiry, has revolted against many 
 of those absurdities which had so long held human 
 reason in captivity ; and it was, perhaps, more than 
 could have been reasonably expected, that, in the first 
 moments of their emancipation, philosophers should have 
 stopped short at the precise boundary which cooler 
 reflection and more moderate views would have pre- 
 scribed. The fact is, that they have passed far beyond 
 it ; and that, in their zeal to destroy prejudices, they 
 have attempted to tear up by the roots many of the 
 best and happiest and most essential principles of our 
 nature. That implicit credulity is a mark of a feeble 
 mind, will not be disputed ; but it may not, perhaps, 
 be as generally acknowledged, that the case is the 
 same with unlimited scepticism : on the contrary, we 
 are sometimes apt to ascribe this disposition to a more
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 93 
 
 than ordinary vigour of intellect. Such a prejudice LECT. 
 
 was by no means unnatural, at that period in the . 
 
 history of modern Europe, when reason first began to 
 throw off the yoke of authority, and when it un- 
 questionably required a superiority of understanding, 
 as well as of intrepidity, for an individual to resist the 
 contagion of prevailing superstition. But, in the pre- 
 sent age, in which the tendency of fashionable opinions 
 is directly opposite to those of the vulgar, the philo- 
 sophical creed, or the philosophical scepticism, of by 
 far the greater number of those who value themselves 
 on an emancipation from popular errors, arises from the 
 very same weakness with the credulity of the multi- 
 tude ; nor is it going too far to say, with Kousseau, 
 that ' he who, in the end of the eighteenth century, 
 has brought himself to abandon all his early principles 
 without discrimination, would probably have been a 
 bigot in the days of the League/ In the midst of 
 these contrary impulses of fashionable and vulgar 
 prejudices, he alone evinces the superiority and the 
 strength of his mind, who is able to disentangle truth 
 from error ; and to oppose the clear conclusions of 
 his own unbiassed faculties to the united clamours of 
 superstition and of false philosophy. Such are the 
 men whom nature marks out to be the lights of the 
 world ; to fix the wavering opinions of the multitude, 
 and to impress their own characters on that of their 
 age."" 
 
 In a word, philosophy is, as Aristotle has justly Aristotle, 
 expressed it, not the art of doubting, but the art of 
 doubting well.^ 
 
 o Coll. Works, vol. ii. ; Elements, vol. airopr)<ro KoXais- i) yap Sffrtpov tinropla 
 
 i. book ii. 1, p. 68, et seq. \v<ris TWV irpdrtpov aTropovptvuv tart, 
 
 )3 Metaph. ii. 1. "'Ecrrt 5 rots fit- \veiv 8" OVK tcrriv ayvoovvras rbt> 5f<r- 
 
 iropriffat fiov\ofj.(i>ois vpoijpyov rb 8<- ft.6v. ED.
 
 94 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. In the second place, in obedience to the precept of 
 - Socrates, the passions, under which we shall include 
 
 sloth, ought to be subjugated. 
 ~ These ruffle the tranquillity of the mind, and conse- 
 
 pions the quently deprive it of the power of carefully consider- 
 ing all that the solution of a question requires should 
 be examined. A man under the agitation of any 
 lively emotion, is hardly aware of aught but what has 
 immediate relation to the passion which agitates and 
 engrosses him. Among the affections which influence 
 the will, and induce it to adhere to scepticism or error, 
 
 sioth. there is none more dangerous than sloth. The greater 
 proportion of mankind are inclined to spare themselves 
 the trouble of a long and laborious inquiry ; or they 
 fancy that a superficial examination is enough ; and 
 the slightest agreement between a few objects, in a 
 few petty points, they at once assume as evincing the 
 correspondence of the whole throughout. Others apply 
 themselves exclusively to the matters which it is 
 absolutely necessary for them to know, and take no 
 account of any opinion but that which they have 
 stumbled on, for no other reason than that they have 
 embraced it, and are unwilling to recommence the 
 labour of learning. They receive their opinion on the 
 authority of those who have had suggested to them 
 their own ; and they are always facile scholars, for 
 the slightest probability is, for them, all the evidence 
 that they require. 
 
 Pride. Pride is a powerful impediment to a progress in 
 
 knowledge. Under the influence of this passion, men 
 seek honour, but not truth. They do not cultivate 
 what is most valuable in reality, but what is most 
 valuable in opinion. They disdain, perhaps, what can 
 be easily accomplished, and apply themselves to the
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 95 
 
 obscure and recondite ; but as the vulgar and easy is LECT. 
 the foundation on which the rare and arduous is built, - 
 they fail even in attaining the object of their ambition, 
 and remain with only a farrago of confused and ill- 
 assorted notions. In all its phases, self-love is an 
 enemy to philosophical progress ; and the history of 
 philosophy is filled with the illusions of which it has 
 been the source. On the one side, it has led men to close 
 their eyes against the most evident truths which were 
 not in harmony with their adopted opinions. It is 
 said that there was not a physician in Europe, above 
 the age of forty, who would admit Harvey's discovery 
 of the circulation of the blood. On the other hand, 
 it is finely observed by Bacon, that " the eye of human 
 intellect is not dry, but receives a suffusion from the 
 will and from the affections, so that it may almost be 
 said to engender any sciences it pleases. For what a 
 man wishes to be true, that he prefers believing."" 
 And, in another place, " if the human intellect hath 
 once taken a liking to any doctrine, either because 
 received and credited, or because otherwise pleasing, 
 it draws everything else into harmony with that 
 doctrine, and to its support ; and albeit there may 
 be found a more powerful array of contradictory in- 
 stances, these, however, it either does not observe, or it 
 contemns, or by distinction extenuates and rejects." P 
 
 a Nor. Org. lib. i. aph. xlix. Hid. aph. xlvi.
 
 96 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECTURE VI. 
 
 THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 LECT. THE next question we proceed to consider is, What 
 
 YL is the true Method or Methods of Philosophy 1 
 
 There is only one possible method in philosophy ; 
 and what have been called the different methods of 
 different philosophers, vary from each other only as 
 more or less perfect applications of this one Method to 
 the objects of knowledge. 
 
 Method a All method" is a rational progress, a progress 
 Sm l towards an end ; and the method of philosophy is the 
 procedure conducive to the end which philosophy pro- 
 poses. The ends, the final causes of philosophy, as 
 we have seen, are two ; first, the discovery of efficient 
 causes ; secondly, the generalisation of our knowledge 
 into unity ; two ends, however, which fall together 
 into one, inasmuch as the higher we proceed in the 
 discovery of causes, we necessarily approximate more 
 and more to unity. The detection of the one in the 
 many might, therefore, be laid down as the end to 
 HM bm p one which philosophy, though it can never reach it, tends 
 ^tS continually to approximate. But, considering philo- 
 
 a [On the difference between Order Methodus ut unam per aliam." Cf. 
 
 and Method, see Facciolati, Rudimenta Zabarella, Op. Log., pp. 139, 149, 223, 
 
 Logicce, pareiv. c. i. note : " Methodus 225 ; Molinseus, Log., p. 234 et teq. 
 
 differt ab Ordine ;-quia ordo facit ut p. 244 et teq., ed. 1613.] 
 rem unain discamus post aliam ;
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 97 
 
 sophy in relation to both these ends, I shall endeavour LECT. 
 to show you that it has only one possible method. 
 
 Considering philosophy, in the first place, in relation This shown 
 to its first end, the discovery of causes, we have u 
 
 seen that causes, (taking that term as synonymous towphy. 
 for all without which the effect would not be), are 
 only the coefficients of the effect ; an effect being 
 nothing more than the sum or complement of all 
 the partial causes, the concurrence of which con- 
 stitute its existence. This being the case, and as 
 it is only by experience that we discover what 
 particular causes must conspire to produce such or 
 such an effect, it follows, that nothing can become 
 known to us as a cause except in and through its 
 effect ; in other words, that we can only attain to 
 the knowledge of a cause by extracting it out of 
 its effect. To take the example, we formerly em- 
 ployed, of a neutral salt. This, as I observed, was 
 made up by the conjunction of three proximate 
 causes, viz. an acid, an alkali, and the force which 
 brought the alkali and the acid into the requisite 
 approximation. This last, as a transitory condition, 
 and not always the same, we shall throw out of 
 account. Now, though we might know the acid and 
 the alkali in themselves as distinct phsenomena, we 
 could never know them as the concurrent causes of 
 the salt, unless we had known the salt as their effect. 
 And though, in this example, it happens that we are 
 able to compose the effect by the union of its causes, 
 and to decompose it by their separation, this is only 
 an accidental circumstance ; for the far greater num- 
 ber of the objects presented to our observation, can 
 only be decomposed, but not actually recomposed, and 
 in those which can be recomposed, this possibility is 
 
 VOL. I. Q
 
 98 LECTURES OX METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. itself only the result of a knowledge of the causes pre- 
 
 ' viously obtained by an original decomposition of the 
 
 effect. 
 
 Analysis. In so far, therefore, as philosophy is the research of 
 causes, the one necessary condition of its possibility 
 is the decomposition of effects into their constituted 
 causes. This is the fundamental procedure of philo- 
 sophy, and is called by a Greek term Analysis. But 
 though analysis be the fundamental procedure, it is 
 still only a mean towards an end. We analyse only 
 that we may comprehend ; and we comprehend only 
 inasmuch as we are able to reconstruct in thought the 
 complex effects which we have analysed into their 
 elements. This mental reconstruction is, therefore, the 
 final, the consummative procedure of philosophy, and 
 Synthesu. it is familiarly known by the Greek term Synthesis. 
 Analysis and synthesis, though commonly treated as 
 two different methods, are, if properly understood, 
 only the two necessary parts of the same method. 
 Each is the relative and the correlative of the other. 
 Analysis, without a subsequent synthesis, is incom- 
 plete ; it is a mean cut off from its end. Synthesis, 
 without a previous analysis, is baseless ; for synthesis 
 receives from analysis the elements which it recom- 
 poses. And, as synthesis supposes analysis as the pre- 
 requisite of its possibility, so it is also dependent on 
 analysis for the qualities of its existence. The value 
 of every synthesis depends upon the value of the fore- 
 going analysis. If the precedent analysis afford false 
 elements, the subsequent synthesis of these elements 
 will necessarily afford a false result. If the elements 
 furnished by analysis are assumed, and not really dis- 
 covered, in other words, if they be hypothetical, the 
 synthesis of these hypothetical elements will consti-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 99 
 
 tute only a conjectural theory. The legitimacy of LECT. 
 
 every synthesis is thus necessarily dependent on the '- 
 
 legitimacy of the analysis which it presupposes, and on 
 which it founds. 
 
 These two relative procedures are thus equally ne- constitute 
 cessary to each other. On the one hand, analysis method. 
 without synthesis affords only a commenced, only an 
 incomplete, knowledge. On the other, synthesis with- 
 out analysis is a false knowledge, that is, no know- 
 ledge at all. Both, therefore, are absolutely necessary 
 to philosophy, and both are, in philosophy, as much 
 parts of the same method as, in the animal body, in- 
 spiration and expiration are of the same vital func- 
 tion. But though these operations are each requisite 
 to the other, yet were we to distinguish and compare 
 what ought only to be considered as conjoined, it is to 
 analysis that the preference must be accorded. An 
 analysis is always valuable ; for though now without 
 a synthesis, this synthesis may at any time be added ; 
 whereas a synthesis without a previous analysis is 
 radically and ab initio null. 
 
 So far, therefore, as regards the first end of philoso- 
 phy, or the discovery of causes, it appears that there is 
 only one possible method, that method of which ana- 
 lysis is the foundation, synthesis the completion. In 
 the second place, considering philosophy in relation to 
 its second end, the carrying up our knowledge into 
 unity, the same is equally apparent. 
 
 Everything presented to our observation, whether Only one 
 external or internal, whether through sense or self- Sod 
 
 i t mi i shown in 
 
 consciousness, is presented in complexity. Ihrough relation to 
 sense, the objects crowd upon the mind in multitudes, end of Phi- 
 and each separate individual of these multitudes is * 
 itself a congeries of many various qualities. The same
 
 100 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. is the case with the phenomena of self-consciousness. 
 
 - Every modification of mind is a complex state ; and 
 
 the different elements of each state, manifest them- 
 selves only in and through each other. Thus, nothing 
 but multiplicity is ever presented to our observation ; 
 and yet our faculties are so limited that they are able 
 to comprehend at once only the very simplest con- 
 junctions. There seems, therefore, a singular dispro- 
 portion between our powers of knowledge and the 
 objects to be known. How is the equilibrium to be 
 restored ? This is the great problem proposed by na- 
 ture, and which analysis and synthesis, in combination, 
 enable us to solve. For example, I perceive a tree, 
 among other objects of an extensive landscape, and I 
 wish to obtain a full and distinct conception of that 
 tree. What ought I to do ? Divide el impera : I 
 must attend to it by itself, that is, to the exclusion of 
 the other constituents of the scene before me. I thus 
 analyse that scene ; I separate a petty portion of it 
 from the rest, in order to consider that portion apart. 
 But this is not enough, the tree itself is not a unity, 
 but, on the contrary, a complex assemblage of ele- 
 ments, far beyond what my powers can master at 
 once. I must carry my analysis still farther. Accord- 
 ingly, I consider successively its height, its breadth, 
 its shape ; I then proceed to its trunk, rise from that 
 to its branches, and follow out its different ramifica- 
 tions ; I now fix my attention on the leaves, and 
 severally examine their form, colour, &c. It is 
 only after having thus, by analysis, detached all these 
 parts, in order to deal with them one by one, that I 
 am able, by reversing the process, fully to compre- 
 hend them again in a series of synthetic acts. By 
 synthesis, rising from the ultimate analysis step by 
 step, I view the parts in relation to each other, and,
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 101 
 
 finally, to the whole of which they are the consti- LECT. 
 tuents ; I reconstruct them ; and it is only through 
 these two counter-processes of analysis and synthesis 
 that I am able to convert the confused perception of 
 the tree, which I obtained at first sight, into a clear, 
 and distinct, and comprehensive knowledge." 
 
 But if analysis and synthesis be required to afford 
 us a perfect knowledge even of one individual object of 
 sense, still more are they required to enable the mind 
 to reduce an indefinite multitude of objects, the infi- 
 nitude, we may say, of nature, to the limits of its own 
 finite comprehension. To accomplish this, it is requi- 
 site to extract the one out of the many, and thus to 
 recall multitude to unity, confusion to order. And 
 how is this performed 1 The one in the many being 
 that in which a plurality of objects agree, or that in 
 which they may be considered as the same ; and the 
 agreement of objects in any common quality being dis- 
 coverable only by an observation and comparison of the 
 objects themselves, it follows that a knowledge of the 
 one can only be evolved out of a foregoing knowledge 
 of the many. But this evolution can only be accom- 
 plished by an analysis and a synthesis. By analysis, 
 from the infinity of objects presented to our observa- 
 tion, we select some. These we consider apart, and, 
 further, only in certain points of view, and we com- 
 pare these objects with others also considered in the 
 same points of view. So far the procedure is ana- 
 lytic. Having discovered, however, by this observa- 
 tion and comparison, that certain objects agree in cer- 
 tain respects, we generalise the qualities in which they 
 coincide, that is, from a certain number of individual 
 instances we infer a general law ; we perform what 
 is called an act of Induction. This induction is induction. 
 
 a [On the subject of analysis and synthesis, compare Condillac, Loyique, cc. L ii.]
 
 102 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. erroneously viewed as analytic ; it is purely a synthetic 
 
 ' process/ For example, from our experience, and all 
 
 experience, be it that of the individual or of man- 
 kind, is only finite, from our limited experience, 
 I say, that bodies, as observed by us, attract each 
 other, we infer by induction the unlimited conclu- 
 sion that all bodies gravitate towards each other. 
 Now, here the consequent contains much more than 
 was contained in the antecedent. Experience, the 
 antecedent, only says, and only can say, this, that, 
 and the other, body gravitate, (that is, some bodies 
 gravitate) ; the consequent educed from that ante- 
 cedent, says, all bodies gravitate. The antecedent 
 is limited, the consequent unlimited. Something, 
 therefore, has been added to the antecedent in order to 
 legitimate the inference, if we are not to hold the con- 
 sequent itself as absurd ; for, as you will hereafter 
 learn, no conclusion must contain more than was con- 
 tained in the premises from which it is drawn. What 
 then is the something f If we consider the inductive 
 process, this will be at once apparent. 
 
 The affirmation, this, that, and the other, body gra- 
 vitate, is connected with the affirmation, all bodies 
 gravitate, only by inserting between the two a third 
 affirmation, by which the two other affirmations are 
 connected into reason and consequent, that is, into a 
 logical cause and effect. What that is I shall explain. 
 All scientific induction is founded on the presumption 
 that nature is uniform in her operations. Of the 
 ground and origin of this presumption, I am not now 
 
 a It may be considered as the one simpler and more convenient point of 
 
 or the other, according as the whole view ; and in this respect Induction ia 
 
 and its parts we viewed in the rela- properly synthetic. See the Author's 
 
 tiona of comprehension or of exten- Discussions, p. 173. ED. 
 sion. The latter, however, is the
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 103 
 
 to speak. I shall only say, that, as it is a principle LECT. 
 which we suppose in all our inductions, it cannot be - 
 itself a product of induction. It is, therefore, in- 
 terpolated in the inductive reasoning by the mind 
 itself. In our example the reasoning will, accord- 
 ingly, run as follows : 
 
 This, that, and the other body, (some bodies), are 
 observed to gravitate ; 
 
 But, (as nature is uniform in her operations), this, 
 that, and the other body, (some bodies), represent all 
 bodies, 
 
 Therefore all bodies gravitate. 
 
 Now, in this and other examples of induction, it is 
 the mind which binds up the separate substances ob- 
 served and collected into a whole, and converts what 
 is only the observation of many particulars into a uni- 
 versal law. This procedure is manifestly synthetic. 
 
 Now, you will remark that analysis and synthesis 
 are here absolutely dependent on each other. The 
 previous observation and comparison, the analytic 
 foundation, are only instituted for the sake of the 
 subsequent induction, the synthetic consummation. 
 What boots it to observe and to compare, if the uni- 
 formities we discover among objects are never gene- 
 ralised into laws \ We have obtained an historical, but 
 not a philosophical knowledge. Here, therefore, analy- 
 sis without synthesis is incomplete. On the other 
 hand, an induction which does not proceed upon a com- 
 petent enumeration of particulars, is either doubtful, 
 improbable, or null ; for all synthesis is dependent on 
 a foregone analysis for whatever degree of certainty 
 it may pretend to. Thus, considering philosophy in 
 relation to its second end, unity or system, it is mani- 
 fest, that the method by which it accomplishes that
 
 104 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. end, is a method involving both an analytic and a 
 
 ' synthetic process. 
 
 The history Now, as philosophy has only one possible method, 
 phy mi so the History of philosophy only manifests the con- 
 ditions of this one method, more or less accurately 
 fulfilled. There are aberrations in the method, no 
 aberrations from it. 
 
 " Philosophy commenced with the first act of reflec- 
 tion on the objects of sense or self-consciousness, for 
 the purpose of explaining them. And with that first 
 act of reflection, the method of philosophy began, in 
 its application of an analysis, and in its application of 
 a synthesis, to its object. The first philosophers natu- 
 rally endeavoured to explain the enigma of external 
 nature. The magnificent spectacle of the material uni- 
 verse, and the marvellous demonstrations of power and 
 wisdom which it everywhere exhibited, were the objects 
 which called forth the earliest efforts of speculation. 
 Philosophy was thus, at its commencement, physical, 
 not psychological ; it was not the problem of the soul, 
 but the problem of the world, which it first attempted 
 to solve. 
 
 " And what was the procedure of philosophy in its 
 solution of this problem 1 Did it first decompose the 
 whole into its parts, in order again to reconstruct them 
 into a system 1 This it could not accomplish ; but 
 still it attempted this, and nothing else. A complete 
 analysis was not to be expected from the first efforts of 
 intelligence ; its decompositions were necessarily par- 
 tial and imperfect ; a partial and imperfect analysis 
 afforded only hypothetical elements ; and the synthe- 
 sis of these elements issued, consequently, only in a 
 one-sided or erroneous theory. 
 
 " Thales, the founder of the Ionian philosophy, de-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 105 
 
 voted an especial study to the phsenomena of the LECT. 
 material universe ; and, struck with the appearances 
 
 
 of power which water manifested in the formation of JJ^i 
 bodies, he analysed all existences into this element, 8cho 1 - 
 which he viewed as the universal principle, the uni- 
 versal agent of creation. He proceeded by an incom- 
 plete analysis, and generalised by hypothesis the law 
 which he drew by induction from the observation of 
 a small series of phsenomena. 
 
 " The Ionic school continued in the same path. They 
 limited themselves to the study of external nature, 
 and sought in matter the principle of existence. 
 Anaximander of Miletus, the countryman and disciple 
 of Thales, deemed that he had traced the primary cause 
 of creation to an ethereal principle, which occupied 
 space, and whose different combinations constituted 
 the universe of matter. Anaximenes found the origi- 
 nal element in air, from which, by rarefaction and con- 
 densation, he educed existences. Anaxagoras carried 
 his analysis farther, and made a more discreet use of 
 hypothesis ; he rose to the conception of an intelli- 
 gent first cause, distinct from the phsenomena of 
 nature ; and his notion of the Deity was so far above 
 the gross conceptions of his contemporaries, that he 
 was accused of atheism. 
 
 " Pythagoras, the founder of the Italic school, ana- p y thagora 
 lysed the properties of number; and the relations iuiic he 
 which this analysis revealed, he elevated into princi- Sd 
 pies of the mental and material universe. Mathe- 
 matics were his only objects ; his analysis was partial, 
 and his synthesis was consequently hypothetical. The 
 Italic school developed the notions of Pythagoras, 
 and, exclusively preoccupied with the relations and 
 harmonies of existence, its disciples did not extend
 
 106 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. their speculation to the consideration either of sub- 
 
 VL 
 
 stance or ol cause. 
 
 " Thus, these earlier schools, taking external nature 
 for their point of departure, proceeded by an imper- 
 fect analysis, and a presumptuous synthesis, to the 
 construction of exclusive systems, in which Idealism, 
 or Materialism, preponderated, according to the kind 
 of data on which they founded. 
 
 Ekatic " The Eleatic school, which is distinguished into two 
 
 branches, the one of Physical, the other of Meta- 
 physical, speculation, exhibits the same character, the 
 same point of departure, the same tendency, and the 
 same errors. 
 
 The Soph- " These errors led to the scepticism of the Sophists, 
 
 Socrates, which was assailed by Socrates, the sage who deter- 
 mined a new epoch in philosophy by directing ob- 
 servation on man himself, and henceforward the study 
 of mind becomes the prime and central science of 
 philosophy. 
 
 " The point of departure was changed, but not the 
 method. The observation or analysis of the human 
 mind, though often profound, remained always incom- 
 plete. Fortunately, the first disciples of Socrates, 
 imitating the prudence of their master, and warned 
 by the downfall of the systems of the Ionic, Italic, 
 and Eleatic schools, made a sparing use of synthesis, 
 and hardly a pretension to system. 
 
 piato and " Plato and Aristotle directed their observation on 
 the phaenomena of intelligence, and we cannot too 
 highly admire the profundity of their analysis, and 
 even the sobriety of their synthesis. Plato devoted 
 himself more particularly to the higher faculties of 
 intelligence ; and his disciples were led by the love 
 of generalisation, to regard as the intellectual whole,
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 107 
 
 those portions of intelligence which their master had LECT. 
 
 analysed ; and this exclusive spirit gave birth to sys- ! 
 
 terns false, not in themselves, but as resting upon a 
 too narrow basis. Aristotle, on the other hand, whose 
 genius was of a more positive character, analysed with 
 admirable acuteness those operations of mind which 
 stand in more immediate relation to the senses ; and 
 this tendency, which among his followers became 
 often exclusive and exaggerated, naturally engendered 
 systems which more or less tended to materialism."" 
 
 The school of Alexandria, in which the systems School of 
 resulting from these opposite tendencies were com- 
 bined, endeavoured to reconcile and to fuse them 
 into a still more comprehensive system. Eclecticism, 
 conciliation, union, were, in all things, the grand 
 aim of the Alexandrian school. Geographically situ- 
 ated between Greece and Asia, it endeavoured to ally 
 Greek with Asiatic genius, religion with philosophy. 
 Hence the Neoplatonic system, of which the last great 
 representative is Proclus. This system is the result Procim. 
 of the long labour of the Socratic schools. It is an 
 edifice reared by synthesis out of the materials which 
 analysis had collected, proved, and accumulated, from 
 Socrates down to Plotinus. 
 
 But a synthesis is of no greater value than its rela- 
 tive analysis ; and as the analysis of the earlier Greek 
 philosophy was not complete, the synthesis of the 
 Alexandrian school was necessarily imperfect. 
 
 In the scholastic philosophy, analysis and observa- The Scho- 
 tion were too often neglected in some departments ' 
 
 philosophy, and too often carried rashly to excess in 
 others. 
 
 After the revival of letters, during the fifteenth 
 
 a Geruzez, Xouveau Court de Philosophic, p. 4-8. Paris, 1834, (2d ed.)
 
 108 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. and sixteenth centuries, the labours of philosophy 
 were principally occupied in restoring and illustrating 
 
 fromthe hy tne Greek systems ; and it was not until the seven- 
 kS f teenth century, that a new epoch was determined by 
 the genius of Bacon and Descartes. In Bacon and 
 Bacon and Descartes our modern philosophy may be said to ori- 
 ginate, inasmuch as they were the first who made the 
 doctrine of method a principal object of consideration. 
 They both proclaimed, that, for the attainment of 
 scientific knowledge, it is necessary to observe with 
 care, that is, to analyse ; to reject every element as 
 hypothetical, which this analysis does not spontane- 
 ously afford ; to call in experiment in aid of observa- 
 tion ; and to attempt no synthesis or generalisation, 
 until the relative analysis has been completely accom- 
 plished. They showed that previous philosophers had 
 erred, not by rejecting either analysis or synthesis, 
 but by hurrying on to synthetic induction from a 
 limited or specious analytic observation. They pro- 
 pounded no new method of philosophy, they only 
 expounded the conditions of the old. They showed 
 that these conditions had rarely been fulfilled by phi- 
 losophers in time past ; and exhorted them to their 
 fulfilment in time to come. They thus explained the 
 petty progress of the past philosophy ; and justly 
 anticipated a gigantic advancement for the future. 
 Such was their precept, but such unfortunately was 
 not their example. There are no philosophers who 
 merit so much in the one respect, none, perhaps, who 
 deserve less in the other. 
 
 Result of Of philosophy since Bacon and Descartes, we at 
 
 ricai sketch present say nothing. Of that we shall hereafter have 
 
 rfphiio, K f re q uent occas i on to speak. But to sum up what this 
 
 historical sketch was intended to illustrate. There is
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 109 
 
 but one possible method of philosophy, a combina- LECT. 
 tion of analysis and synthesis ; and the purity and - 
 equilibrium of these two elements constitute its per- 
 fection. The aberrations of philosophy have been all 
 so many violations of the laws of this one method. 
 Philosophy has erred, because it built its systems upon 
 incomplete or erroneous analysis, and it can only pro- 
 ceed in safety, if, from accurate and unexclusive obser- 
 vation, it rise, by successive generalisation, to a com- 
 prehensive system.
 
 110 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECTURE VII. 
 
 THE DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 LECT. I HAVE already endeavoured to afford you a general 
 - notion of what Philosophy comprehends : I now pro- 
 ceed to- say something in regard to the Parts into 
 which it has been divided. Here, however, I must 
 limit myself to the most famous distributions, and to 
 those which, as founded on fundamental principles, 
 it more immediately concerns you to know. For, 
 were I to attempt an enumeration of the various Divi- 
 sions of Philosophy which have been proposed, I should 
 only confuse you with a multitude of contradictory 
 opinions, with the reasons of which you could not, at 
 present, possibly be made acquainted. 
 
 Expediency Seneca, in a letter to his young friend Lucilius, 
 of Phiiow- n expresses the wish that the whole of philosophy might, 
 like the spectacle of the universe, be at once submit- 
 ted to our view. " Utinam quemadmodum universi 
 mundi facies in conspectum venit, ita philosophia tote 
 nobis posset occurrere, simillimum mundo spectacu- 
 lum." a But as we cannot survey the universe at a 
 glance, neither can we contemplate the whole of philo- 
 sophy in one act of consciousness. We can only master 
 it gradually and piecemeal; and this is in fact the 
 reason why philosophers have always distributed their 
 
 a Epiit. Izxxix.
 
 LECTURES OX METAPHYSICS. Ill 
 
 science, (constituting, though it does, one organic whole), LECT. 
 
 into a plurality of sciences. The expediency, and even 
 
 necessity, of a division of philosophy, in order that 
 the mind may be enabled to embrace in one general 
 view its various parts, in their relation to each other, 
 and to the whole which they constitute, is admitted by 
 every philosopher. " Res utilis," continues Seneca, 
 " et ad sapientiam properanti utique necessaria, dividi 
 philosophiam, et ingens corpus ejus in membra dis- 
 poni. Facilius enim per partes in cognitionem totius 
 adducimur."" 
 
 But, although philosophers agree in regard to the 
 utility of such a distribution, they are almost as little 
 at one in regard to the parts, as they are in respect to 
 the definition, of their science ; and, indeed, their dif- 
 ferences in reference to the former, mainly arise from 
 their discrepancies in reference to the latter. For 
 they who vary in their comprehension of the whole, 
 cannot agree in their division of the parts. 
 
 The most ancient and universally recognised distinc- The most 
 tion of philosophy, is into Theoretical and Practical. Sn into 
 
 Theoretical 
 
 These are discriminated by the different nature ofand 
 their ends. Theoretical, called likewise speculative/* 
 and contemplative, philosophy has for its highest end 
 mere truth or knowledge. Practical philosophy, on 
 the other hand, has truth or knowledge only as its 
 proximate end, this end being subordinate to the 
 ulterior end of some practical action. In theoretical 
 philosophy, we know for the sake of knowing, scimus 
 ut sciamus : in practical philosophy, we know for the 
 sake of acting, scimus ut operemur.P I may here 
 
 a Epist. Ixxxix. roes has it, Per speculativam scimus 
 
 /3 eeoipT/TiKTjy fj.tr fjrKm^tijj rt\os nt tciamus, per practicam scimus nt 
 
 aArjflfia, irpaKTiKTjs 8* tpyov. Arist. operemur." Discussions, p. 134. 
 
 Metaph. A minor, c. 1 ; " or as Aver- ED.
 
 112 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. notice the poverty of the English language, in the 
 - want of a word to express that practical activity 
 ArtiJT 1 which is contradistinguished from mere intellectual 
 or speculative energy, what the Greeks express by 
 Trpdo-o-tLv, the Germans by handeln. The want of 
 such a word occasions frequent ambiguity ; for, to 
 express the species which has no appropriate word, 
 we are compelled to employ the generic term active. 
 Thus our philosophers divide the powers of the mind 
 into Intellectual and Active. They do not, however, 
 thereby mean to insinuate that the powers called 
 intellectual are a whit less energetic than those spe- 
 cially denominated active. But, from the want of a 
 better word, they are compelled to employ a term 
 which denotes at once much more and much less 
 than they are desirous of expressing. I ought to 
 observe that the term practical has also obtained with 
 us certain collateral significations, which render it in 
 some respects unfit to supply the want. a But to 
 return. 
 
 Hutory of This distinction of Theoretical and Practical philo- 
 tion of sophy, was first explicitly enounced by Aristotle ; and 
 .ndFfcSi- the attempts of the later Platonists to carry it up to 
 Plato, and even to Pythagoras, are not worthy of 
 statement, far less of refutation. Once promulgated, 
 the division was, however, soon generally recognised. 
 The Stoics borrowed it., as may be seen from Seneca : 7 
 "Philosophia et contemplativa est et activa; spectat, 
 simulque agit." It was also adopted by the Epicu- 
 reans ; and, in general, by those Greek and Roman 
 
 o Cf. Reid's Workt, p. 51 1, n. f. ED. ed by Plato ; PoUtieus, p. 258 : Tavrr. 
 
 /3 Metaph. v. 1 : nSo-a Stdvoia t) roivvv, a-vfivaffas txiffT-fifias Staipti, r^v 
 
 -rpcucriK^i $ iroirrrtK^i $ QtuptrriK-}). Cf, pir irpaKriK^v rpofffiiruy, -rty Sf p&vov 
 
 Metaph. x. 7 ; Top. vL 6, viil 3. But yvaffriicfiv. ED. 
 the division had been at least intimat- 7 Ep. xcv. 10.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 113 
 
 philosophers who viewed their science as versant either LECT. 
 in the contemplation of nature (^vo-i/o)), or in the 
 regulation of human action (r)0LKrj) ; a for by nature 
 they did not denote the material universe alone, but 
 their Physics included Metaphysics, and their Ethics 
 embraced Politics and Economics. There was thus 
 only a difference of nomenclature ; for Physical and 
 Theoretical, Ethical and Practical Philosophy, 
 were with them terms absolutely equivalent. 
 
 I regard the division of philosophy into Theoretical The dm- 
 and Practical as unsound, and this for two reasons. losophy iut<> 
 
 The first is, that philosophy, as philosophy, is only JjJ^Jf- 
 cognitive, only theoretical : whatever lies beyond the sound, 
 sphere of speculation or knowledge, transcends the 
 sphere of philosophy ; consequently, to divide philo- 
 sophy by any quality ulterior to speculation, is to 
 divide it by a difference which does not belong to it. 
 Now, the distinction of practical philosophy from 
 theoretical, commits this error. For, while it is ad- 
 mitted that all philosophy, as cognitive, is theoretical, 
 some philosophy is again taken out of this category 
 on the ground, that, beyond the mere theory, the 
 mere cognition, it has an ulterior end in its applica- 
 tion to practice. 
 
 But, in the second place, this difference, even were 
 it admissible, would not divide philosophy ; for, in 
 point of fact, all philosophy must be regarded as prac- 
 tical, inasmuch as mere knowledge, that is, the mere 
 possession of truth, is not the highest end of any 
 
 o Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. vii. 14: rifts Kal rbv Ev'iKovpov rdrrovffiv us 
 
 Twv 8e 5ifj.fpfi ryv <pi\offo<pidi' faroff- Kal rtjv \oyiKrjv Bfiepiav tK0d\\ovra. 
 
 TTjffa/xfVwp Ef voQavris ntv 6 Ko\o<piavios, Seneca, Ep. Ixxxix. : '' Epicure! duaa 
 
 rb (pvffiKbv o/xa Kal \oyix6v, us <paffi partes philosophise putaveruut esse, 
 
 rivfs, /j.fr ripxtro, Ap\(^cu>s 6 & A07/- Naturalem. atque Moralem : Ratio- 
 
 vaios rb QVCTIKOV Kal r\QiK6v peff ov nalem removerunt." ED. 
 
 VOL. I. H
 
 114 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. philosophy, but, on the contrary, all truth or know- 
 - ledge is valuable only inasmuch as it determines 
 
 the mind to its contemplation, that is, to practical 
 energy. Speculation, therefore, inasmuch as it is not 
 a negation of thought, but, on the contrary, the highest 
 energy of intellect, is, in point of fact, pre-eminently 
 practical. The practice of one branch of philosophy 
 is, indeed, different from that of another ; but all are 
 still practical ; for in none is mere knowledge the 
 ultimate, the highest end. 
 
 controversy Among the ancients, the principal difference of 
 opinion regarded the relation of Logic to Philosophy 
 and its branches. But as this controversy is of very 
 phy. subordinate importance, and hinges upon distinctions, 
 to explain which would require considerable detail, I 
 shall content myself with saying, that, by the Plato- 
 nists, Logic was regarded both as a part, and as 
 the instrument, of philosophy ; by the Aristotelians, 
 (Aristotle himself is silent), as an instrument, but not 
 as a part, of philosophy ; by the Stoics, as forming 
 one of the three parts of philosophy, Physics, or theo- 
 retical, Ethics, or practical philosophy, being the other 
 two. a But as Logic, whether considered as a part of 
 philosophy proper or not, was by all included under 
 the philosophical sciences, the division of these sciences 
 which latterly prevailed among the Academic, the 
 Peripatetic, and the Stoical sects, was into Logic as 
 the subsidiary or instrumental doctrine, and into the 
 
 a Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Stoics. See Laertius, vii. 39 ; Pseudo- 
 
 Anal. Prior, p. 2, (ed. 1520). Ammo- Plutarch, De Plat. Phil. Proocm. It 
 
 nius, In Categ. c. 4 ; Philoponus, In is sometimes, but apparently without 
 
 Anal. Prior, f. 4 ; Cramer's Anecdota, much reason, attributed to Plato. See 
 
 voL iv. p. 417. Compare the Author's Cicero, Acad. Qiutst. i 5 ; Eusebius, 
 
 Discussions, p. 132. The division of Prcef. Evan. xi. 1 ; Augustin, De Cir. 
 
 Philosophy into Logic, Physics, and Dei. viii. 4. ED. 
 Ethics, probably originated with the
 
 terms 
 d 
 Science. 
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 115 
 
 two principal branches of Theoretical and Practical LECT. 
 Philosophy/ 
 
 It is manifest that in our sense of the term prac- 
 tical, Logic, as an instrumental science, would be 
 comprehended under the head of practical philo- 
 sophy. 
 
 I shall take this opportunity of explaining an Application 
 anomaly which you will find explained in no work Art and 
 with which I am acquainted. Certain branches of 
 philosophical knowledge are called Arts, or Arts and 
 Sciences indifferently; others are exclusively denomi- 
 nated Sciences. Were this distinction coincident with 
 the distinction of sciences speculative and sciences 
 practical, taking the term practical in its ordinary 
 acceptation, there would be no difficulty ; for, as 
 every practical science necessarily involves a theory, 
 nothing could be more natural than to call the same 
 branch of knowledge an art, when viewed as relative 
 to its practical application, and a science, when viewed 
 in relation to the theory which that application sup- 
 poses. But this is not the case. The speculative 
 sciences, indeed, are never denominated arts ; we may, 
 therefore, throw them aside. The difficulty is exclu- 
 sively confined to the practical. Of these some never 
 receive the name of arts ; others are called arts and 
 sciences indifferently. Thus the sciences of Ethics, 
 Economics, Politics, Theology, &c., though all prac- 
 tical, are never denominated arts ; whereas this appel- 
 lation is very usually applied to the practical sciences 
 of Logic, Rhetoric, Grammar, &c. 
 
 That the term art is with us not coextensive 
 with practical science, is thus manifest ; and yet these 
 are frequently confounded. Thus, for example, Dr 
 
 a Sext. Empir. adv. Math. vii. 16. ED.
 
 116 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. Whately, in his definition of Logic, thinks that Logic 
 
 - L- is a science, in so far as it institutes an analysis of 
 
 the process of the mind in reasoning, and an art, in 
 so far as it affords practical rules to secure the mind 
 from error in its deductions ; and he defines an art 
 the application of knowledge to practice.* Now, if 
 this view were correct, art and practical science would 
 be convertible terms. But that they are not employed 
 as synonymous expressions is, as we have seen, shown 
 by the incongruity we feel in talking of the art of 
 Ethics, the art of Religion, &c., though these are 
 eminently practical sciences. 
 
 The question, therefore, still remains, Is this restric- 
 tion of the term art to certain of the practical sciences 
 the result of some accidental and forgotten usage, or 
 is it founded on any rational principle which we are 
 able to trace \ The former alternative seems to be the 
 common belief ; for no one, in so far as I know, has 
 endeavoured to account for the apparently vague and 
 capricious manner in which the terms art and science 
 are applied. The latter alternative, however, is the 
 true ; and I shall endeavour to explain to you the 
 reason of the application of the term art to certain 
 practical sciences, and not to others. 
 
 it* histori- You are aware that the Aristotelic philosophy was, 
 ongin. f or manv centuries, not only the prevalent, but, dur- 
 ing the middle ages, the one exclusive philosophy in 
 Europe. This philosophy of the middle ages, or, as 
 it is commonly called, the Scholastic Philosophy, has 
 exerted the most extensive influence on the languages 
 of modern Europe ; and from this common source has 
 been principally derived that community of expression 
 
 a See Discussions, p. 131. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 117 
 
 which these languages exhibit. Now, the peculiar LECT. 
 
 application of the term art was introduced into the ' 
 
 vulgar tongues from the scholastic philosophy ; and 
 was borrowed by that philosophy from Aristotle. This 
 is only one of a thousand instances which might be 
 alleged of the unfelt influence of a single powerful 
 mind, on the associations and habits of thought of 
 generations to the end of time ; and of Aristotle is 
 pre-eminently true, what has been so beautifully said 
 of the ancients in general : 
 
 " The great of old ! 
 
 The dead but sceptred sovrans who still rule 
 Our spirits from their urns." a 
 
 Now, then, the application of the term art in the 
 modern languages being mediately governed by cer- 
 tain distinctions which the capacities of the Greek 
 tongue allowed Aristotle to establish, these distinc- 
 tions must be explained. 
 
 In the Aristotelic philosophy, the terms irpafa and n p ^. 
 77-pa/m/co?, that is, practice and practiced, were em- 
 ployed both in a generic or looser, and in a special or 
 stricter signification. In its generic meaning irpafa, 
 practice, was opposed to theory or speculation, and it 
 comprehended under it, practice in its special mean- 
 ing, and another co-ordinate term to which practice, 
 in this its stricter signification, was opposed. This 
 term was Trofycris, which we may inadequately trans- no.V'*- 
 late by production. The distinction of Tr/m/m/co? 
 and TTOOJTIKOS consisted in this : the former denoted 
 that action which terminated in action, the latter, 
 that action which resulted in some permanent pro- 
 duct. For example, dancing and music are practical, 
 
 a Byron's Manfred, Act ill scene iv.
 
 118 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. as leaving no work after their performance ; whereas, 
 VIL painting and statuary are productive, as leaving some 
 
 product over and above their energy. a 
 
 whyEthics, Now Aristotle, in formally defining art, defines it 
 JXfS- as a habit productive, and not as a habit practical, 
 SSi; ? TTOIIJTI/O) /Aero, Xoyou ; and, though he has not 
 toriJ'aST always himself adhered strictly to this limitation, his 
 definition was adopted by his followers, and the term 
 in its application to the practical sciences, (the term 
 practical being here used in its generic meaning), 
 came to be exclusively confined to those whose end 
 did not result in mere action or energy. Accordingly 
 as Ethics, Politics, &c., proposed happiness as their 
 end, and as happiness was an energy, or at least the 
 concomitant of energy, these sciences terminated in 
 action, and were consequently practical, not produc- 
 tive. On the other hand, Logic, Rhetoric, &c., did 
 not terminate in a mere, an evanescent action, but 
 in a permanent, an enduring product. For the end 
 of Logic was the production of a reasoning, the end 
 of Rhetoric the production of an oration, and so 
 forth.' 3 This distinction is not perhaps beyond the 
 reach of criticism, and I am not here to vindicate its 
 correctness. My only aim is to make you aware of 
 the grounds of the distinction, in order that you may 
 comprehend the principle which originally determined 
 the application of the term art to some of the practical 
 
 o See Eth. Nic. i. 1. Aia<popa 5e nificare ejusmodiactionem,quaexpal- 
 
 TJJ <f>aiv(Tcu Totv ri\uv rii plv yap pabili materia opus aliquod efficitur 
 
 furty ivtfryfuu- rk 8e Top' auras Zpya quod etiam post actionem permanet. 
 
 rani. Ibid. vi. 4 ; Magna Moralia, i. Nam Poetica dicta est curb TOV troitiv 
 
 35. Cf. Quintilian, Institut. lib. ii. quae tamen palpabUem materiam non 
 
 c - 18. ED. tractat, neque opus facit ipsa Poetoe 
 
 3 Cf. Burgersdyck, Institut. Log. fictione durabilius. Quod enim poe- 
 
 lib. L 6. Logica dicitur -KOKW, id mata supersint, id non est abea actione 
 
 est, facere sive efficcre syllogismos, de- qua efficiuntur, sed a scriptione. At- 
 
 finitiones, &c. Neque enim verum est, que hiec de genere. See also Scheibler, 
 
 quod quidam aiunt, *oiw semper Big- Opera, Tract. Procem. iii. p. 6. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 119 
 
 sciences and not to others, and without a knowledge LECT. 
 of which principle the various employment of the term - 
 must appear to you capricious and unintelligible. It 
 is needless, perhaps, to notice that the rule applies only 
 to the philosophical sciences, to those which received 
 their form and denominations from the learned. The 
 mechanical dexterities were beneath their notice ; and 
 these were accordingly left to receive their appellations 
 from those who knew nothing of the Aristotelic pro- 
 prieties. Accordingly, the term art is in them applied, 
 without distinction, to productive and unproductive 
 operations. We speak of the art of rope-dancing, 
 equally as of the art of rope-making. But to return. 
 
 The division of philosophy into Theoretical and Universality 
 Practical is the most important that has been made ; sion of Phi- 
 and it is that which has entered into nearly all toTheorT 
 the distributions attempted by modern philosophers. Practical. 
 Bacon was the first, after the revival of letters, who Bacon, 
 essayed a distribution of the sciences and of philo- 
 sophy. He divided all human knowledge into His- 
 tory, Poetry, and Philosophy. Philosophy he distin- 
 guished into branches conversant about the Deity, 
 about Nature, and about Man ; and each of these had 
 their subordinate divisions, which, however, it is not 
 necessary to particularise. 
 
 Descartes' 3 distributed philosophy into theoretical Descartes 
 and practical with various subdivisions ; but his fol- lowers. 
 lowers adopted the division of Logic, Metaphysics, 
 Physics, and Ethics. 7 Gassendi recognised, like the 
 
 o Advancement of Learning, Worts, Philosophic, contenant la Logique, la 
 
 vol. ii. pp. 100, 124, (ed. Montagu.) De Metaphysique, la Physique, et la Mo- 
 
 Aug mentis Scientiarum, lib. ii. c. 1, rale. Cf. Clauberg : " Physica .... 
 
 lib. iii. c. 1 ; Works, vol. viii. pp. 87, Philosophia Naturalis dicitur ; dis- 
 
 152. ED. tincta a Supernatural! seu Metaphy- 
 
 See the Prefatory Epistle to the sica, et a Rationali seu Logica, nec- 
 
 Principia. ED. non a Morali seu Practica. Disput. 
 
 y See Sylvain Regis, C'vurs entier de Phys. L, Opera, p. 54. ED.
 
 120 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. ancients, three parts of philosophy, Logic, Physics, and 
 
 Ethics," and this, along with many other of Gassendi's 
 
 Gassendi. doctrines, was adopted by Locked Kant distinguished 
 K^t. 6 philosophy into theoretical and practical, with various 
 subdivisions; 7 and the distribution into theoretical 
 Fichtc. and practical was also established by Fichte. 8 
 
 conclusion I have now concluded the Lectures generally in- 
 ory n Lec- uc troductory to the proper business of the Course. In 
 these lectures, from the general nature of the subjects, 
 I was compelled to anticipate conclusions, and to 
 depend on your being able to supply a good deal of 
 what it was impossible for me articulately to explain. 
 I now enter upon the consideration of the matters 
 which are hereafter to occupy our attention, with 
 comparatively little apprehension, for, in these, we 
 shall be able to dwell more upon details, while, at the 
 same time, the subject will open upon us by degrees, 
 so that, every step that we proceed, we shall find the 
 progress easier. But I have to warn you, that you 
 will probably find the very commencement the most 
 arduous, and this not only because you will come less 
 inured to difficulty, but because it will there be 
 necessary to deal with principles, and these of a 
 general and abstract nature ; whereas, having once 
 mastered these, every subsequent step will be com- 
 paratively easy. 
 
 Order of the Without entering upon details, I may now sum- 
 marily state to you the order which I propose to 
 follow in the ensuing Course. This requires a pre- 
 liminary exposition of the different departments of 
 
 o Syntagma Philosophium,, Lib. y Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Me- 
 Procem. c. 9 (Opera, Lugduni, 1658, thodenlehre, c. 3. ED. 
 vol. L p. 29.) ED. $ Grundlage der gesammten Wit- 
 
 /3 Estay, book iv. cb, 21. ED. temchaftslehre, 4 (Wcrlv, voL i. p. 
 
 126.) ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 121 
 
 Philosophy, in order that you may obtain a compre- LECT. 
 hensive view of the proper objects of our consideration, - 
 and of the relations in which they stand to others. 
 
 Science and philosophy are conversant either about Distribution 
 Mind or about Matter. The former of these is Philo- Lophicai 
 sophy properly so called. With the latter we have 
 nothing to do, except in so far as it may enable us to 
 throw light upon the former, for Metaphysics, in 
 whatever latitude the term be taken, is a science, 
 or complement of sciences, exclusively occupied with, 
 mind. Now the Philosophy of Mind, Psychology 
 or Metaphysics, in the widest signification of the 
 terms, is threefold; for the object it immediately 
 proposes for consideration may be either, 1, PHENO- 
 MENA in general ; or, 2, LAWS ; or, 3, INFERENCES, 
 RESULTS. This I will endeavour to explain. 
 
 The whole of philosophy is the answer to these The three 
 three questions : 1, What are the Facts or Phsenomena fousoT** 
 to be observed ? 2, What are the Laws which regulate 
 these facts, or under which these phenomena appear 1 
 3, What are the real Results, not immediately mani- 
 fested, which these facts or phaenomena warrant us 
 in drawing \ 
 
 If we consider the mind merely with the view of i. 
 
 observing and generalising the various phenomena it Mhld. og> 
 reveals, that is, of analysing them into capacities or 
 faculties, we have one mental science, or one depart- 
 ment of mental science ; and this we may call the 
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND. It is commonly called 
 PSYCHOLOGY EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY, or the INDUC- 
 TIVE PHILOSOPHY of MIND ; we might call it PHE- 
 NOMENAL PSYCHOLOGY. It is evident that the divi- 
 sions of this science will be determined by the 
 classes into which the phaenomena of mind are distri- 
 buted.
 
 122 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. If, again, we analyse the mental phenomena with 
 the view of discovering and considering, not contin- 
 
 
 i"gy N oT~ g ent appearances, but the necessary and universal 
 Mini facts, i.e. the Laws, by which our faculties are gov- 
 erned, to the end that we may obtain a criterion by 
 which to judge or to explain their procedures and 
 manifestations, we have a science which we may 
 call the NOMOLOGY of MIND, NOMOLOGICAL PSYCHO- 
 subdi- LOGY. Now, there will be as many distinct classes of 
 Nomological Psychology, as there are distinct classes 
 of mental phaenomena under the Phsenomenological 
 division. I shall, hereafter, show you that there are 
 Three great classes of these phsenomena, viz. 1, The 
 phsenomena of our Cognitive faculties, or faculties of 
 Knowledge ; 2, The phaenomena of our Feelings, or the 
 phsenomena of Pleasure and Pain ; and, 3, The phae- 
 nomena of our Conative powers, in other words, the 
 phaenomena of Will and Desire. (These you must, for 
 the present, take upon trust). Each of these classes 
 of phaenomena has accordingly a science which is 
 conversant about its Laws. For as each proposes a 
 different end, and, in the accomplishment of that end, 
 is regulated by peculiar laws, each must, consequently, 
 have a different science conversant about these laws, 
 that is, a different Nomology. 
 
 i.Nomo- There is no one, no Nomological, science of the 
 c^dtive 6 Cognitive faculties in general, though we have some 
 older treatises which, though partial in their subject, 
 afford a name not unsuitable for a nomology of the 
 cognitions, viz. Gnoseologia or Gnostologia. There 
 is no independent science of the laws of Perception ; if 
 there were, it might be called Esthetic, which, how- 
 ever, as we shall see, would be ambiguous. Mnemonic, 
 or the science of the laws of Memory, has been elabo- 
 
 a See infra, Lect. XI. p. 183, et se<i __ ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 123 
 
 rated at least in numerous treatises : but the name LECT. 
 
 VII 
 
 Anamnestic, the art of Kecollection or Eeminiscence, 
 
 might be equally well applied to it. The laws of the 
 .Representative faculty, that is, the laws of Associa- 
 tion, have not yet been elevated into a separate nomo- 
 logical science. Neither have the conditions of the 
 Regulative or Legislative faculty, the faculty itself of 
 Laws, been fully analysed, far less reduced to system ; 
 though we have several deservedly forgotten treatises, 
 of an older date, under the inviting name of Noologies. 
 The only one of the cognitive faculties, whose laws Logic, 
 constitute the object-matter of a separate science, is 
 the Elaborative, the Understanding Special, the 
 faculty of Eelations, the faculty of Thought Proper. 
 This nomology has obtained the name of LOGIC among 
 other appellations, but not from Aristotle. The best 
 name would have been DIANOETIC. Logic is the 
 science of the laws of thought, in relation to the end 
 which our cognitive faculties propose, i. e. the TRUE. 
 To this head might be referred Grammar, Universal 
 Grammar, Philosophical Grammar, or the science 
 conversant with the laws of Language as the instru- 
 ment of thought. 
 
 The Nomolooy of our Feelings, or the science of the 2.Nomoiogy 
 
 , i t r ,_ of the Feel- 
 
 laWS which govern our capacities ot enjoyment, in ings. 
 
 relation to the end which they propose, i. e. the 
 PLEASURABLE, has obtained no precise name in our 
 language. It has been called the Philosophy of Taste, 
 and, on the Continent especially, it has been denomi- 
 nated ^Esthetic. Neither name is unobjectionable. 
 The first is vague, metaphorical, and even delusive. 
 In regard to the second, you are aware that aur^cris 
 in Greek means feeling in general, as well as sense in 
 particular, as our term feeling means either the sense 
 of touch in particular, or sentiment, and the capacity
 
 124 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. of the pleasurable and painful in general. Both terms 
 are, therefore, to a certain extent, ambiguous ; but 
 
 this objection can rarely be avoided, and ^Esthetic, if 
 not the best expression to be found, has already been 
 long and generally employed. It is now nearly a 
 century since Baumgarten, a celebrated philosopher of 
 the Leibnitzio-Wolfian school, first applied the term 
 ^Esthetic to the doctrine which we vaguely and peri- 
 phrastically denominate the Philosophy of Taste, the 
 theory of the Fine Arts, the science of the Beautiful 
 and Sublime," &c., and this term is now in general 
 acceptation, not only in Germany, but throughout the 
 other countries of Europe. The term Apolaustic would 
 have been a more appropriate designation. 
 3. Nome- Finally, the Nomology of our Conative powers is 
 cSt?v? e Practical Philosophy, properly so called ; for practical 
 philosophy is simply the science of the laws regula- 
 tive of our Will and Desires, in relation to the end 
 which our conative powers propose, i. e. the GOOD. 
 Ethic, This, as it considers these laws in relation to man as 
 an individual, or in relation to man as a member of 
 society, will be divided into two branches, Ethics and 
 Politics ; and these again admit of various subdivisions. 
 So much for those parts of the Philosophy of Mind, 
 which are conversant about Phenomena, and about 
 Laws. The Third great branch of this philosophy is 
 that which is engaged in the deduction of Inferences, 
 or Results. 
 
 in. Onto- In the First branch, the Phenomenology of mind, 
 
 iSrtiphy. philosophy is properly limited to the facts afforded 
 
 ST ' in consciousness, considered exclusively in themselves. 
 
 But these facts may be such as not only to be objects 
 
 of knowledge in themselves, but likewise to furnish us 
 
 o Baumgarten'a work on this subject, entitled ^Esthctica (two vols.), w;is 
 published in 1750-58. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 125 
 
 with grounds of inference to something out of them- LECT. 
 selves. As effects, and effects of a certain character, 
 they may enable us to infer the analogous character 
 of their unknown causes ; as phaenomena, and phae- 
 nomena of peculiar qualities, they may warrant us in 
 drawing many conclusions regarding the distinctive 
 character of that unknown principle, of that unknown 
 substance, of which they are the manifestations. Al- 
 though, therefore, existence be only revealed to us in 
 phaenomena, and though we can, therefore, have only 
 a relative knowledge either of mind or of matter ; 
 still, by inference and analogy, we may legitimately 
 attempt to rise above the mere appearances which 
 experience and observation afford. Thus, for example, 
 the existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul 
 are not given us as phaenomena, as objects of imme- 
 diate knowledge ; yet, if the phaenomena actually 
 given do necessarily require, for their rational expla- 
 nation, the hypotheses of immortality and of God, we 
 are assuredly entitled, from the existence of the former, 
 to infer the reality of the latter. Now, the science 
 conversant about all such inferences of unknown being 
 from its known manifestations, is called ONTOLOGY, or 
 METAPHYSICS PROPER. We might call it INFERENTIAL 
 PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 The following is a tabular view of the distribution 
 of Philosophy as here proposed : 
 
 f Facts,- Phenomenology, ( Cognitions. 
 Empirical Psychology. J Feelings. 
 
 V. Conative Powers (Will and Desire). 
 
 / Cognitions, Logic. 
 Laws,-Nomology,Ra- I jSKJJ-j 
 
 Conscious- 
 ness affords 
 
 tl onal Psychology. 
 
 philosophy 
 
 Political Philosophy. 
 
 Results, Ontology, In- ( Being of God. 
 L ferential Psychology. \ Immortality of the Soul, &c.
 
 126 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. In this distribution of the philosophical sciences, 
 VIL you will observe that I take little account of the cele- 
 th^S f brated division of philosophy into Speculative and 
 Practical, which I have already explained to you, a for 
 I call only one minor division of philosophy practical, 
 viz. the Nomology of the Conative powers, not be- 
 cause that science is not equally theoretical with any 
 other, but simply because these powers are properly 
 called practical, as tending to practice or overt action. 
 Such is the distribution of Philosophy, which I ven- 
 ture to propose as the simplest and most exhaustive, 
 and I shall now proceed, in reference to it, to specify 
 the particular branches which form the objects of our 
 consideration in the present course. 
 
 pistribu- The subjects assigned to the various chairs of the 
 j^te*in 8U Philosophical Faculty, in the different Universities of 
 Phii u o2nhy Europe, were not calculated upon any comprehensive 
 rersitiesof view of the parts of philosophy, and of their natural 
 ' urope ' connection. Our universities were founded when the 
 Aristotelic philosophy was the dominant, or rather the 
 exclusive, system, and the parts distributed to the dif- 
 ferent classes, in the faculty of Arts or Philosophy, 
 were regulated by the contents of certain of the Aris- 
 totelic books, and by the order in which they were 
 studied. Of these, there were always Four great divi- 
 sions. There was first Logic, in relation to the Orga- 
 non of Aristotle ; secondly, Metaphysics, relative to 
 his books under that title ; thirdly, Moral Philosophy, 
 relative to his Ethics, Politics, and Economics ; and, 
 fourthly, Physics, relative to his Physics, and the col- 
 lection of treatises styled in the schools the Parva 
 N<tturalia. But every university had not a full comple- 
 ment of classes, that is, did not devote a separate year 
 
 a See ante, p. 113. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 127 
 
 to each of the four subjects of study ; and, accordingly, LECT. 
 
 in those seats of learning where three years formed the : '-~ 
 
 curriculum of philosophy, two of these branches were 
 combined. In this university, Logic and Metaphysics 
 were taught in the same year ; in others, Metaphy- 
 sics and Moral Philosophy were conjoined; and, when 
 the old practice was abandoned of the several Eegents 
 or Professors carrying on their students through every 
 department, the two branches which had been taught 
 in the same year were assigned to the same chair. 
 What is most curious in the matter is this, Aristotle's 
 treatise On the Soul being, (along with his lesser trea- 
 tises on Memory and Reminiscence, on Sense and 
 its Objects, &c.), included in the Parva Naturalia, and, 
 he having declared that the consideration of the soul 
 was part of the philosophy of nature," the science of 
 Mind was always treated along with Physics. The pro- 
 fessors of Natural Philosophy have, however, long aban- 
 doned the philosophy of mind, and this branch has been, 
 as more appropriate to their departments, taught both 
 by the Professors of Moral Philosophy and by the Pro- 
 fessors of Logic and Metaphysics, for you are not to 
 suppose that metaphysics and psychology are, though 
 vulgarly used as synonymous expressions, by any 
 means the same. So much for the historical accidents 
 which have affected the subjects of the different 
 chairs. 
 
 I now return to the distribution of philosophy, which Subjects a r - 
 I have given you, and, first, by exclusion, I shall tell STtEi" 
 you what does not concern us. In this class, we have 
 nothing to do with Practical Philosophy, that is, 
 
 a De Anima, i. 1. Qvcrticov -rb Otu- iced &pifcrdcu, iced St6rt iced irepl $vx*i s 
 
 pilffcu iffpl ^i/XT)y, ^ -xdarris ^ TTJJ rot- ivlas Ofwprjcrcu TOV cpvcriicov, Sffri /u^ 
 
 i/Tijy. Cf. Metapk. v. 1. ATJA.OV irus &vtv TT;J uAijs iarlv, ED. 
 5e? iv ro7? <pvcriKO~s rb rt tern forttv
 
 128 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. Ethics, Politics, Economics. But, with this exception, 
 -^ there is no other branch of philosophy which is not 
 either specially allotted to our consideration, or which 
 does not fall naturally within our sphere. Of the 
 former description, are Logic, and Ontology or Meta- 
 physics Proper. Of the latter, are Psychology, or the 
 Philosophy of Mind in its stricter signification, and 
 ^Esthetic. 
 
 These subjects are, however, collectively too exten- 
 sive to be overtaken in a single Course, and, at the 
 same time, some of them are too abstract to afford the 
 proper materials for the instruction of those only com- 
 mencing the study of philosophy. In fact, the depart- 
 ment allotted to this chair comprehends the two ex- 
 tremes of philosophy, Logic, forming its appropriate 
 introduction, Metaphysics, its necessary consumma- 
 tion. I propose, therefore, in order fairly to exhaust 
 the business of the chair, to divide its subjects between 
 two Courses, the one on Phenomenology, Psychology, 
 or Mental Philosophy in general ; the other, on Nomo- 
 logy, Logic, or the laws of the Cognitive Faculties in 
 particular. 
 
 o From the following sentences, Manifestations of Mind, Phsenomen- 
 which appear in the manuscript lee- ology, or Psychology. I shall then 
 tore as superseded by the paragraph proceed to Logic, the science which 
 given in the text, it is obvious that considers the Laws of Thought ; and 
 the Author had originally designed to finally, to Ontology, or Metaphysics 
 discuss specifically, and with greater Proper, the philosophy of Results, 
 detail, the three grand departments of ^Esthetic, or the theory of the Plea- 
 Philosophy indicated in the distribu- surable, I should consider subsequent- 
 tion proposed by him : " The plan ly to Logic, and previously to On- 
 which I propose to adopt in the distri- tology." On the propriety of accord- 
 bution of the Course, or rather Courses, ing to Psychology the first place in 
 is the following : the order of the philosophical sciences, 
 
 " I shall commence with Mental see Cousin, Cours de I'ffistoire de la 
 
 Philosophy, strictly so called, with the Philosophic, Deuxieme Serie, torn. ii. 
 
 science which is conversant with the p. 71-73 (ed. 1847). ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 129 
 
 LECTUKE VIII. 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY, ITS DEFINITION. EXPLICATION OF TERMS. 
 
 LECT. 
 VTII 
 
 I NOW pass to the First Division of my subject, which 
 
 will occupy the present Course, and commence with 
 a definition of PSYCHOLOGY, THE PHENOMENOLOGY 
 OF MIND. 
 
 Psychology, or the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Definitionof 
 strictly so denominated, is the science conversant about PS: 
 the phenomena, or modifications, or states of the Mind, 
 or Conscious-Subject, or Soul, or Spirit, or Self, or Ego. 
 
 In this definition, you will observe that I have pur- Expiiov- 
 posely accumulated a variety of expressions, in order terns, 
 that I might have the earliest opportunity of making 
 you accurately acquainted with their meaning ; for 
 they are terms of vital importance and frequent use 
 in philosophy. Before, therefore, proceeding further, 
 I shall pause a moment in explanation of the terms 
 in which this definition is expressed. Without re- 
 stricting myself to the following order, I shall con- 
 sider the word Psychology; the correlative terms 
 subject and substance, phenomenon, modification, state, 
 &c., and, at the same time, take occasion to explain 
 another correlative, the expression object, and, finally, 
 the words mind, soul, spirit, self, and ego. 
 
 Indeed, after considering these terms, it may not 
 be improper to take up, in one series, the philosophical 
 
 VOL. I. I
 
 130 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. expressions of principal importance and most ordinary 
 
 occurrence, in order to render less frequent the neces- 
 sity of interrupting the course of our procedure, to 
 afford the requisite verbal explanations. 
 The term The term Psychology is of Greek compound, its 
 elements ^v^, signifying soul or mind, and Xoyo?, 
 
 signifying discourse or doctrine. Psychology, there- 
 fore, is the discourse or doctrine treating of the 
 human mind. But, though composed of Greek ele- 
 ments, it is, like the greater number of the compounds 
 of Xoyos, of modern combination. It may be asked, 
 why use an exotic, a technical name ] Why not be 
 contented with the more popular terms, Philosophy of 
 Mind, or Mental Philosophy, Science of Mind or Men- 
 tal Science \ expressions by which this department 
 of knowledge has been usually designated by those 
 who, in this country, have cultivated it with the most 
 distinguished success. To this there are several an- 
 swers. In the first place, philosophy itself, and all, or 
 almost all, its branches, have, in our language, re- 
 ceived Greek technical denominations ; why not also 
 the most important of all, the science of mind \ In the 
 second place, the term psychology is now, and has long 
 been, the ordinary expression for the doctrine of mind 
 in the philosophical language of every other European 
 nation. Nay, in point of fact, it is now naturalised 
 in English, psychology and psychological having of 
 late years come into common use ; and their employ- 
 ment is warranted by the authority of the best Eng- 
 lish writers. It was familiarly employed by one of 
 our best writers, and most acute metaphysicians, 
 Principal Campbell of Aberdeen;" and Dr Beattie, 
 likewise, has entitled the first part of his Elements 
 of Mwal Science, that which treats of the mental 
 
 a Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. i. p. 143, (1st ed.) ; p. 123, (ed. 1816.) ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 131 
 
 faculties, Psychology. To say nothing of Coleridge, LECT. 
 the late Sir James Mackintosh was also an advocate - 
 for its employment, and justly censured Dr Brown 
 for not using it, in place of his very reprehensible 
 expression, Physiology of Mind, the title of his un- 
 finished text-book. But these are reasons in them- 
 selves of comparatively little moment : they tend 
 merely to show that, if otherwise expedient, the no- 
 menclature is permissible ; and that it is expedient, 
 the following reasons will prove. For, in the third 
 place, it is always of consequence for the sake of 
 precision to be able to use one word instead of a 
 plurality of words, especially, where the frequent 
 occurrence of a descriptive appellation might occasion 
 tedium, distraction, and disgust ; and this must neces- 
 sarily occur in the treatment of any science, if the 
 science be able to possess no single name vicarious of 
 its definition. In this respect, therefore, Pyschology 
 is preferable to Philosophy of Mind. But, in the 
 fourth place, even if the employment of the descrip- 
 tion for the name could, in this instance, be tolerated 
 when used substantively, what are we to do when we 
 require, (which we do unceasingly), to use the deno- 
 mination of the science adjectively 1 For example, I 
 have occasion to say a psychological fact, a psycholo- 
 gical law, a psychological curiosity, &c. How can we 
 express these by the descriptive appellation "? A psycho- 
 logical fact may indeed be styled a fact considered 
 relatively to the philosophy of the human mind, a 
 psychological law may be called a law by which the 
 mental phenomena are governed, a psychological 
 curiosity may be rendered by what, I really do not 
 know. But how miserably weak, awkward, tedious, 
 
 a Dissertation on the Progress of psedia Britamiica, vol. L p. 399, (7th 
 Ethical Philosophy, in the Encyclo- ed.) ED.
 
 132 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. and affected, is the commutation when it can be made ; 
 - 1- not only do the vivacity and precision of the original 
 
 evaporate, the meaning itself is not even adequately 
 conveyed. But this defect is still more manifestly 
 shown when we wish to place in contrast the matters 
 proper to this science, with the matters proper to 
 others. Thus, for example, to say, this is a psycho- 
 logical, not a physiological, doctrine this is a psycho- 
 logical observation, not a logical inference. How is 
 the contradistinction to be expressed by a periphrasis "? 
 It is impossible, for the intensity of the contrast 
 consists, first, in the two opposite terms being single 
 words, and second, in their being both even technical 
 and precise Greek. This necessity has, accordingly, 
 compelled the adoption of the terms psychology and 
 psychological into the philosophical nomenclature of 
 every nation, even where the same necessity did not 
 vindicate the employment of a non-vernacular expres- 
 sion. Thus in Germany, though the native language 
 affords a facility of composition only inferior to the 
 Greek, and though it possesses a word (Seelenlehre) 
 exactly correspondent to i/n^oXoyia, yet because this 
 substantive did not easily allow of an adjective 
 flexion, the Greek terms, substantive and adjective, 
 were both adopted, and have been long in as familiar 
 use in the Empire, as the terms geography and geogra- 
 phical, physiology and physiological, are with us. 
 The terms What I have now said may suffice to show that, to 
 L^phS, supply a necessity, we must introduce these words 
 to t a h p e p p'hf- into our philosophical vocabulary. But the propriety 
 SKnap- of this is still further shown by the inauspicious 
 propnate. attem p ts tnat j^ve ^ een recen tly made OIL the name 
 of the science. As I have mentioned before, Dr 
 Brown, in the very title of the abridgment of his lec- 
 tures on mental philosophy, has styled this philosophy,
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 133 
 
 " The Physiology of the Human Mind ;" and I have LECT. 
 
 also seen two English publications of modern date, 
 
 one entitled the " Physics of the Soul" the other " In- 
 tellectual Physics." a Now the term nature, (Averts, 
 natura), though in common language of a more exten- 
 sive meaning, has, in general, by philosophers, been 
 applied appropriately to denote the laws which go- 
 vern the appearances of the material universe. And 
 the words Physiology and Physics have been specially 
 limited to denote sciences conversant about these laws 
 as regulating the phaenomena of organic and inorganic 
 bodies. The empire of nature is the empire of a 
 mechanical necessity; the necessity of nature, in 
 philosophy, stands opposed to the liberty of intelli- 
 gence. Those, accordingly, who do not allow that 
 mind is matter, who hold that there is in man a 
 principle of action superior to the determinations of a 
 physical necessity, a brute or blind fate must regard 
 the application of the terms Physiology and Physics 
 to the doctrine of the mind as either singularly inap- 
 propriate, or as significant of a false hypothesis in 
 regard to the character of the thinking principle. 
 
 Mr Stewart objects' 3 to the term Spirit, as seeming Spirit, Soul, 
 to imply an hypothesis concerning the nature and 
 essence of the sentient or thinking principle, altogether 
 unconnected with our conclusions in regard to its 
 phenomena, and their general laws ; and, for the same 
 reason, he is disposed to object to the words Pneu- 
 matology and Psychology ; the former of which was 
 introduced by the schoolmen. In regard to Spirit 
 and Pneumatokgy, Mr Stewart's criticism is perfectly 
 just. They are unnecessary ; and, besides the etymo- 
 
 a Intellectual Physics, an Essay concerning the Nature of Being. 1803. 
 
 concerning the Nature of Being and By Governor Pownall. ED. 
 
 the Progression of Existence. London, Philosophical Essays, Prelim. Dis- 
 
 1795. Intellectual Physics, an Essay sert. ch. 1 ; Works, vol. v. p. 20.
 
 134- LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. logical metaphor, they are associated with a certain 
 * IIL theological limitation, which spoils them as expressions 
 of philosophical generality." But this is not the case 
 with Psychology. For though, in its etymology, it is, 
 like almost all metaphysical terms, originally of phy- 
 sical application, still this had been long forgotten 
 even by the Greeks ; and, if we were to reject philo- 
 sophical expressions on this account, we should be 
 left without any terms for the mental phenomena 
 at all. The term soul (and what I say of the term 
 soul is true of the term spirit), though in this countiy 
 less employed than the term mind, may be regarded 
 as another synonym for the unknown basis of the 
 mental phaenomena. Like nearly all the words sig- 
 nificant of the internal world, there is here a metaphor 
 borrowed from the external ; and this is the case not 
 merely in one, but, as far as we can trace the analogy, 
 in all languages. You are aware that 1/^17, the Greek 
 
 Correspond- term for soul, comes from t/n/vo>, / breathe or blow, 
 
 ing terms in . . 
 
 other lan- as 7n>eu/Aa in Greek, and spiritus in Latin, from verbs 
 of the same signification. In like manner, anima and 
 animus are words which, though in Latin they have 
 lost their primary signification, and are only known 
 in their secondary or metaphorical, yet, in their ori- 
 ginal physical meaning, are preserved in the Greek 
 eu/f/zos, wind or air. The English soul, and the Ger- 
 man Seele, come from a Gothic root saivalaP which 
 signifies to storm. Ghost, the old English word for 
 
 o [The terms Psychology and Pneu- p neumato i o f 1 - Theologia( Naturalis). 
 
 matoloffy, or Pneumatic, are not equi- . p 1 2. Aiigelographia, Dae- 
 
 valents. The latter word was used 0^^ " j monologia. 
 
 for the doctrine of spirit in general, 1 3. Psychologia, 
 
 which was subdivided into three See Theoph. Gale, Loyica, p. 455. 
 
 branches, as it treated of the three (1681).] 
 
 orders of spiritual substances, God, /3 See Grimm, Deutsche Grammatik, 
 
 Angels, and Devils, and Man. voL ii. p. 99. In Anglo-Saxon, Sa-wel, 
 
 Thus Saval, Saw/, Saul. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 135 
 
 spirit in general, and so used in our English version of LECT. 
 
 the Scriptures, is the same as the German Geist," and 
 
 is derived from Gas, or Gescht, which signifies air. In 
 like manner, the two words in Hebrew for soul or 
 spirit, nephesh, and ruach, are derivatives of a root 
 which means to breathe ; and in Sanscrit the word 
 atmd (analogous to the Greek dr/uos, vapour or air) 
 signifies both mind and wind or air? Sapientia, in 
 Latin, originally meant only the power of tasting ; as 
 sagacitas only the faculty of scenting. In French, 
 penser comes from the Latin pendere, through pen- 
 sare to weigh, and the terms, attentio, intentio, (en- 
 tendement), comprehensio, apprehensio, penetratio, 
 understanding, &c., are just so many bodily actions 
 transferred to the expression of mental energies. 7 
 
 There is, therefore, on this ground, no reason to re- By whom 
 ject such useful terms as psychology and psychological ; latlon^V 
 terms, too, now in such general acceptation in the phi- employed, 
 losophy of Europe. I may, however, add an histori- 
 cal notice of their introduction. Aristotle's principal 
 treatise on the philosophy of mind is entitled Hepl 
 ^ V X^ S but the fi rs * author who gave a treatise on the 
 subject under the title Psychologia, (which I have ob- 
 served to you is a modern compound), is Otto Cas- 
 mann, who, in the year 1594, published at Hanau his 
 very curious work, " Psychologia Anthropologica, sive 
 Anirnce Humana Doctrina" This was followed, in 
 two years, by his " Anthropologies Pars II., hoc est, 
 de fabrica Humani Corporis" This author had the 
 
 o Scotch, Ghaist, Gastly. Prichard, Review of the Doctrine of 
 
 /3 [See H. Schmid, Versuch einer a Vital Principle, p. 6-6.] 
 
 Metaphysik der inneren Natur, p. 69, y [On this point see Leibnitz, Nouv. 
 
 note. Scheidler-s Psychologie, pp. 299- Ess. lib. iii. c. i. 5 ; Stewart, Phil. Es- 
 
 301, 320, et seq. Cf. Theop. Gale, tays Works, vol. v. Essay v. ; Brown, 
 
 Philosophia Generalis, pp. 321, 322. Human Understanding, p. 388, et seq}
 
 136 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. merit of first giving the name Anthropologia to the 
 
 ' science of man in general, which he divided into two 
 
 parts, the first, Psychologia, the doctrine of the Human 
 Mind ; the second, Somatologia, the doctrine of the Hu- 
 man Body ; and these, thus introduced and applied, still 
 continue to be the usual appellations of these branches 
 of knowledge in Germany. I would not say, however, 
 that Casmann was the true author of the term psycho- 
 logy, for his master, the celebrated Kudolphus Gocle- 
 nius of Marburg, published, also in 1594, a work en- 
 titled, " "^v^oXoyta, hoc est, de Hominis Perfections, 
 Anima, &c," being a collection of dissertations on the 
 subject; in 159 6 another, entitled " De pracipuis Ma- 
 teriis Psychologids ;" and in 1597 a third, entitled 
 "Authores Varii de Psychologies," so that I am in- 
 clined to attribute the origin of the name to Goclenius." 
 Subsequently, the term became the usual title of the 
 science, and this chiefly through the authority of AVolf, 
 whose two principal works on the subject are entitled 
 " Psychologia Empirical' and " PsycJiologia Ration- 
 alls." Charles Bonnet, in his " Essai de Psychologic? & 
 familiarised the name in France ; where, as well as in 
 Italy, indeed, in all the Continental countries, it is 
 now the common appellation. 
 
 In the second place, I said that Psychology is con- 
 versant about the phenomena of the thinking subject, 
 &c., and I now proceed to expound the import of the 
 correlative terms phcenomenon, subject, &c. 
 
 But the meaning of these terms will be best illus- 
 trated by now stating and explaining the great axiom, 
 that all human knowledge, consequently that all human 
 philosophy, is only of the relative or phsenomenal. In 
 
 o [The term psychology is, however, prefixed to his Ciceronianus, 1575. 
 used by Joannes Thomas Freigius in See also Gale, Logica, p. 455.] 
 the Cataloyut locorum Communium, /3 Published in 1755. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 137 
 
 this proposition, the term relative is opposed to the LECT. 
 term absolute ; and, therefore, in saying that we know 
 
 only the relative, I virtually assert that we know no- JJ* t c 
 thing absolute, nothing existing absolutely; that is, in 
 and for itself, and without relation to us and our facul-2id bj' 
 ties. I shall illustrate this by its appli cation. Oi 
 knowledge is either of matter or of mind. Now, what "2 
 is matter 1 What do we know of matter 1 Matter, 
 or body, is to us the name either of something known, 
 or of something unknown. In so far as matter is a 
 name for something known, it means that which ap- 
 pears to us under the forms of extension, solidity, divi- 
 sibility, figure, motion, roughness, smoothness, colour, 
 heat, cold, &c. ; in short, it is a common name for a 
 certain series, or aggregate, or complement, of appear- 
 ances or phaenomena manifested in coexistence. 
 
 But as these phaenomena appear only in conjunction, 
 we are compelled by the constitution of our nature to 
 think them conjoined in and by something ; and as 
 they are phaenomena, we cannot think them the phae- 
 nomena of nothing, but must regard them as the pro- 
 perties or qualities of something that is extended, 
 solid, figured, &c. But this something, absolutely and 
 in itself, i.e. considered apart from its phaenomena, 
 is to us as zero. It is only in its qualities, only in 
 its effects, in its relative or phaenomenal existence, that 
 it is cognisable or conceivable ; and it is only by a 
 law of thought, which compels us to think something, 
 absolute and unknown, as the basis or condition of 
 the relative and known, that this something obtains 
 a kind of incomprehensible reality to us. Now, 
 that which manifests its qualities, in other words, 
 that in which the appearing causes inhere, that to 
 which they belong, is called their subject, or sub- 
 stance, or substratum. To this subject of the phae-
 
 138 LECTUEES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. nomena of extension, solidity, &c., the term matter or 
 material substance is commonly given ; and, there- 
 fore, as contradistinguished from these qualities, it is 
 the name of something unknown and inconceivable. 
 
 The same is true in regard to the term mind. In 
 so far as mind is the common name for the states of 
 knowing, willing, feeling, desiring, &c., of which I am 
 conscious, it is only the name for a certain series of 
 connected phenomena or qualities, and, consequently, 
 expresses only what is known. But in so far as it 
 denotes that subject or substance in which the phse- 
 nomena of knowing, willing, &c., inhere, something 
 behind or under these phenomena, it expresses what, 
 in itself or in its absolute existence, is unknown. 
 
 Thus, mind and matter, as known or knowable, are 
 only two different series of phsenomena or qualities ; 
 mind and matter, as unknown and unknowable, are the 
 two substances in which these two different series of 
 phaenomena or qualities, are supposed to inhere. The 
 existence of an unknown substance is only an inference 
 we are compelled to make, from the existence of known 
 phsenomena ; and the distinction of two substances is 
 only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the 
 two series of phenomena to coinhere in one. 
 
 Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is thus, 
 as we have said, only relative ; of existence, absolutely 
 and in itself, we know nothing; and we may say of 
 man what Virgil says of ^Eneas, contemplating in the 
 prophetic sculpture of his shield the future glories of 
 Rome 
 
 " Rerumque ignarus, imagine gaudet." a 
 
 This is, indeed, a truth, in the admission of which 
 philosophers, in general, have been singularly har- 
 
 a ^Eneid, viii. 730. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 139 
 
 monious ; and the praise that has been lavished on Dr 
 Eeid for this observation, is wholly unmerited. In 
 fact, I am hardly aware of the philosopher who has not 
 proceeded on the supposition, and there are few who go 
 have not explicitly enounced the observation. It is 
 only since Reid's death that certain speculators have 
 arisen, who have obtained celebrity by their attempt 
 to found philosophy on an immediate knowledge of 
 the absolute or unconditioned. I shall quote to you a 
 few examples of this general recognition, as they hap- 
 pen to occur to my recollection ; and, in order to 
 manifest the better its universality, I purposely over- 
 look the testimonies of a more modern philosophy. 
 
 Aristotle, among many similar observations, remarks Testimonies, 
 in regard to matter, that it is incognisable in itself ; a totie. 
 while in regard to mind he says, " that the intellect 
 does not know itself directly, but only indirectly, in 
 knowing other things ;"P and he defines the soul from 
 its phsenomena, " the principle by which we live, and 
 move, and perceive, and understand." 7 St Augustin, st Augu*. 
 the most philosophical of the Christian fathers, admir- tm 
 ably says of body, " Materiam cognoscendo ignorari, 
 et ignorando cognosci;" 5 and of mind, "Mens se 
 cognoscit cognoscendo se vivere, se meminisse, se intel- 
 ligere, se velle, cogitare, scire, judicare." e "Non i 
 currunt," says Melanchthon, "ipsse substantise in oculos, th 
 sed vestitoe et ornatse accidentibus ; hoc est, non pos- 
 
 a Metaph. lib. vii. (vi.) c. 10 : [^ S\rj 5 Confess, xii. 5. " Dum sibi hsoc 
 
 HyvwffTos Kaff afn-nv. ED.] dicit humana cogitatio, conetur earn 
 
 /3 Metaph. xiL (xi.) 7. A-inkf 8e (materiam) vel noase ignorando vel 
 
 voel 6 vovs KOT& fjLfrd.\ij^/iv rov voTfrov- ignorare noscendo." ED. 
 I/OTJTOS yap yiyverat Qiyyavuv (coi vouv. t From the spurious treatise attri- 
 
 Cf. De Anima, iii 4. Kol ainls 8i buted to StAxistin, entitled DeSpiritu 
 
 voTfr6s Iffnv &<rirfp TO. voTfrd. ED. et Anima, c. 32 ; but see De Trini- 
 
 y De Anima, Lib. ii. c. 2. 'H ij/i/x^ *"*, lib. x. 16, torn. viii. p. 897, (ed. 
 
 rovroit &purrcu, OpevriK^, alff(hiTiK$, Ben.) 
 
 VJlfffl. ED.
 
 140 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. sumus, in hac vita, acie oculorum perspicere ipsas sub- 
 
 stantias : sed utcunque, ex accidentibus quse in sensus 
 
 exteriores incurrunt, ratiocinamur, quomodo inter se 
 differant substantial" 
 
 The eider It is needless to multiply authorities, but I cannot 
 refrain from adducing one other evidence of the gene- 
 ral consent of philosophers to the relative character of 
 our knowledge, as affording a graphic specimen of the 
 manner of its ingenious author. " Substantiae non a 
 nobis cognoscuntur," says the elder Scaliger, "sed 
 earum accidentia. Quis enirn me doceat quid sit 
 substantia, nisi miseris illis verbis, res subsistens? 
 Scientiam ergo nostram constat esse umbram in sole. 
 Et sicut vulpes, elusa a ciconia, lambendo vitreum vas 
 pultem haud attingit : ita nos externa tantum acci- 
 dentia percipiendo, formas internas non cognoscimus."' 3 
 So far there is no difference of opinion among philoso- 
 phers in general. We know mind and matter not in 
 themselves, but in their accidents or phsenomena. 7 
 AH relative Thus our knowledge is of relative existence only, 
 
 existence . . . . 
 
 not com- seeing that existence in itself, or absolute existence, is 
 what isrc- no object of knowledge. 5 But it does not follow that 
 
 lative to us. 
 
 all relative existence is relative to us ; that all that can 
 be known, even by a limited intelligence, is actually 
 cognisable by us. We must, therefore, more precisely 
 limit our sphere of knowledge, by adding, that all we 
 know is known only under the special conditions of 
 our faculties. This is a truth likewise generally ac- 
 
 a Erotemata Dialectices, lib. i., Pr. 8 [Absolute in two senses : 1, As 
 
 Substantia. [This is the text in the opposed to partial ; 2, As opposed to 
 
 edition of Strigelius. It varies consi- relative. Better if I had said that 
 
 derably in different editions. ED.] our knowledge not of absolute, and, 
 
 /3 De Subtllltate, Ex. cccviL 21. therefore, only of the partial and rela- 
 
 7 For additional testimonies on this tive.] Pencil Jotting on Blank Leaf 
 
 point, see the Author's Discussions, of Lecture. 
 p. 644. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 141 
 
 knowledged. " Man," says Protagoras, " is the measure LECT. 
 
 of the universe," (jraimaiv -^prjp.dTojv perpov avOpomos), ' 
 
 a truth which Bacon has well expressed : " Omnes 
 perceptiones tarn sensus quam mentis, sunt ex analogia 
 hominis, non ex analogia universi : estque intellectus 
 humanus instar speculi insequalis ad radios rerum, qui 
 suam naturam naturae rerum immiscet, eamque dis- 
 torquet et inficit." a " Omne quod cognoscitur," says 
 Boethius, " non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cog- 
 noscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem ;"P and 
 this is expressed almost in the same terms by the two 
 very opposite philosophers, Kant and Condillac, " In 
 perception" (to quote only the former) "every thing is 
 known according to the constitution of our faculty of 
 sense." 7 
 
 Now this principle, in which philosophers of the This princi- 
 
 ... ,, T. . , ,,. pie has two 
 
 most opposite opinions equally concur, divides itselt branches, 
 into two branches. In the first place, it would be un- 
 philosophical to conclude that the properties of exist- 
 ence necessarily are, in number, only as the number of 
 our faculties of apprehending them ; or, in the second, 
 that the properties known, are known in their native 
 purity, and without addition or modification from our 
 organs of sense, or our capacities of intelligence. I shall 
 illustrate these in their order. 
 
 In regard to the first assertion, it is evident that i. The num- 
 nothing exists for us, except in so far as it is known propertiet 
 to us, and that nothing is known to us, except certain noises' 1 - 00 
 properties or modes of existence, which are relative or ' e 
 
 analogous to our faculties. Beyond these modes 
 know, and can assert, the reality of no existence. But ' 
 
 a Novum Organum, lib. i., Aph. y Kritik dcr rdnen Vernunft, Vor- 
 
 xlL ED. rede zur zweiten Auflage. Quoted in 
 
 /3 De Consol. Phil. lib. v. Pr. 4. Discussions, p. 646. Cf. Hid. Transc. 
 
 Quoted in Discussions, p. 645. ED. JEsth. 8. ED. 
 
 S10I1.
 
 142 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. if, on the one hand, we are not entitled to assert as 
 
 actually existent except what we know ; neither, on 
 
 the other, are we warranted in denying, as possibly 
 existent, what we do not know. The universe may be 
 conceived as a polygon of a thousand, or a hundred 
 thousand, sides or facets, and each of these sides or 
 facets may be conceived as representing one special 
 mode of existence. Now, of these thousand sides or 
 modes all may be equally essential, but three or four 
 only may be turned towards us or be analogous to our 
 organs. One side or facet of the universe, as holding 
 a relation to the organ of sight, is the mode of lumin- 
 ous or visible existence ; another, as proportional to 
 the organ of hearing, is the mode of sonorous or aud- 
 ible existence ; and so on. But if every eye to see, if 
 every ear to hear, were annihilated, the modes of ex- 
 istence to which these organs now stand in relation, 
 that which could be seen, that which could be heard, 
 would still remain ; and if the intelligences, reduced 
 to the three senses of touch, smell, and taste, were 
 then to assert the impossibility of any modes of being 
 except those to which these three senses were analo- 
 gous, the procedure would not be more unwarranted, 
 than if we now ventured to deny the possible reality 
 of other modes of material existence than those to the 
 perception of which our five senses are accommodated. 
 I will illustrate this by an hypothetical parallel. Let 
 us suppose a block of marble, a on which there are four 
 different inscriptions, in Greek, in Latin, in Persic, 
 and in Hebrew, and that four travellers approach, each 
 able to read only the inscription in his native tongue. 
 The Greek is delighted with the information the 
 
 o This illustration is taken from losophie (Euvres Philosopkiques, vol. 
 F. Hemsterhuis, Sophyle ou de la Phi- i. p. 281, (ed. 1792.) ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 143 
 
 marble affords him of the siege of Troy. The Eoman LECT. 
 
 finds interesting matter regarding the expulsion of the 1_ 
 
 kings. The Persian deciphers an oracle of Zoroaster. 
 And the Jew is surprised by a commemoration of the 
 Exodus. Here, as each inscription exists or is signi- 
 ficant only to him who possesses the corresponding 
 language ; so the several modes of existence are mani- 
 fested only to those intelligences who possess the corres- 
 ponding organs. And as each of the four readers would 
 be rash if he maintained that the marble could be sig- 
 nificant only as significant to him, so should we be rash, 
 were we to hold that the universe had no other phases 
 of being, than the few that are turned towards our facul- 
 ties, and which our five senses enable us to perceive. 
 
 Voltaire, (aliud agenda), has ingeniously expressed illustrated 
 this truth in one of his philosophical romances, taire. 
 " Tell me," says Micromegas, an inhabitant of one of 
 the planets of the Dog-Star, to the secretary of the 
 Academy of Sciences in the planet Saturn, at which 
 he had recently arrived in a journey through the 
 heavens, " Tell me, how many senses have the men 
 on your globe ? " " We have seventy-two senses," 
 answered the academician, " and we are, every day, 
 complaining of the smallness of the number. Our 
 imagination goes far beyond our wants. What are 
 seventy-two senses ! and how pitiful a boundary, even 
 for beings with such limited perceptions, to be cooped 
 up within our ring and our five moons. In spite of 
 our curiosity, and in spite of as many passions as can 
 result from six dozen of senses, we find our hours hang 
 very heavily on our hands, and can always find time 
 enough for yawning." " 1 can very well believe it," 
 says Micromegas, " for, in our globe, we have very near 
 one thousand senses ; and yet, with all these, we feel
 
 144 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. continually a sort of listless inquietude and vague de- 
 
 sire, which are for ever telling us that we are nothing, 
 
 and that there are beings infinitely nearer perfection. 
 I have travelled a good deal in the universe. I have 
 seen many classes of mortals far beneath us, and many 
 as much superior ; but I have never had tjie good for- 
 tune to meet with any, who had not always more de- 
 sires than real necessities to occupy their life. And, 
 pray, how long may you Saturnians live, with your 
 few senses V continued the Sirian. " Ah ! but a very 
 short time indeed!" said the little man of Saturn, 
 with a sigh. " It is the same with us," said the tra- 
 veller ; " we are for ever complaining of the shortness 
 of life. It must be an universal law of nature." 
 " Alas !" said the Saturnian, " we live only five hun- 
 dred great revolutions of the sun, (which is pretty 
 much about fifteen thousand years of our counting). 
 You see well, that this is to die almost the moment 
 one is born. Our existence is a point, our duration 
 an instant, our globe an atom. Scarcely have we 
 begun to pick up a little knowledge, when death 
 rushes in upon us, before we can have acquired any- 
 thing like experience. As for me, I cannot ven- 
 ture even to think of any project. I feel myself 
 but like a drop of water in the ocean ; and, especially 
 now, when I look to you and to myself, I really feel 
 quite ashamed of the ridiculous appearance which I 
 cut in the universe." 
 
 " If I did not know you to be a philosopher," replied 
 Micromegas, " I should be afraid of distressing you, 
 when I tell you, that our life is seven hundred times 
 longer than yours. But what is even that 1 ? and, 
 when we come to the last moment, to have lived a 
 single day, and to have lived a whole eternity, amount
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. Ho 
 
 to the same thing. I have been in countries where LECT. 
 
 they live a thousand times longer than with us ; and - 
 
 I have always found them murmuring, just as we do 
 ourselves. But you have seventy-two senses, and 
 they must have told you something about your globe. 
 How many properties has matter with you 1 ?" "If 
 you mean essential properties," said the Saturnian, 
 " without which our globe could not subsist, we count 
 three hundred, extension, impenetrability, mobility, 
 gravity, divisibility, and so forth." " That small 
 number," replied the gigantic traveller, " may be suf- 
 ficient for the views which the Creator must have had 
 with respect to your narrow habitation. Your globe 
 is little ; its inhabitants are so too. You have few 
 senses; your matter has few qualities. In all this, 
 Providence has suited you most happily to each other." 
 
 " The academician was more and more astonished 
 with everything which the traveller told him. At 
 length, after communicating to each other a little of 
 what they knew, and a great deal of what they knew 
 not, and reasoning as well and as ill as philosophers 
 usually do, they resolved to set out together on a 
 little tour of the universe." 
 
 Before leaving this subject, it is perhaps proper to 
 observe, that had we faculties equal in number to all 
 the possible modes of existence, whether of mind or 
 matter, still would our knowledge of mind or matter 
 be only relative. If material existence could exhibit 
 ten thousand phsenomena, and if we possessed ten 
 thousand senses to apprehend these ten thousand 
 phsenomena of material existence, of existence abso- 
 lutely and in itself, we should be then as ignorant 
 as we are at present. 
 
 o Micromfgas, chap. ii. ED. 
 VOL. I. K
 
 U6 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. But the consideration that our actual faculties of 
 
 ' knowledge are probably wholly inadequate in number 
 
 J^Swof " to the possible modes of being, is of comparatively less 
 n^kn^n importance than the other consideration to which we 
 tiU h purit now proceed, that whatever we know is not known 
 as it is, but only as it seems to us to be ; for it is of 
 less importance that our knowledge should be limited 
 than that our knowledge should be pure. It is, there- 
 fore, of the highest moment that we should be aware 
 that what we know is not a simple relation appre- 
 hended between the object known and the subject 
 knowing, but that every knowledge is a sum made 
 up of several elements, and that the great business of 
 philosophy is to analyse and discriminate these ele- 
 ments, and to determine from whence these contribu- 
 tions have been derived. I shall explain what I mean, 
 lUustrated by an example. In the perception of an external 
 of percep- object, the mind does not know it in immediate rela- 
 tion to itself, but mediately in relation to the material 
 organs of sense. If, therefore, we were to throw these 
 organs out of consideration, and did not take into 
 account what they contribute to, and how they modify, 
 our knowledge of that object, it is evident, that our 
 conclusion in regard to the nature of external percep- 
 tion would be erroneous. Again, an object of percep- 
 tion may not even stand in immediate relation to the 
 organ of sense, but may make its impression on that 
 organ through an intervening medium. Now, if this 
 medium be thrown out of account, and if it be not con- 
 sidered that the real external object is the sum of all 
 that externally contributes to affect the sense, we 
 shall, in like manner, run into error. For example, I 
 see a book, I see that book through an external 
 medium, (what that medium is, we do not now in-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. H7 
 
 quire), and I see it through my organ of sight, the LECT. 
 
 eye. Now, as the full object presented to the mind, - 
 
 (observe that I say the mind), in perception, is an 
 object compounded of the external object emitting 
 or reflecting light, i. e. modifying the external me- 
 dium, of this external medium, and of the living 
 organ of sense, in their mutual relation, let us sup- 
 pose, in the example I have taken, that the full or 
 adequate object perceived is equal to twelve, and that 
 this amount is made up of three several parts, of 
 four, contributed by the book, of four, contributed 
 by all that intervenes between the book and the 
 organ, and of four, contributed by the living organ 
 itself/ 
 
 I use this illustration to show, that the phaenomenon 
 of the external object is not presented immediately to 
 the mind, but is known by it only as modified through 
 certain intermediate agencies ; and to show, that sense 
 itself may be a source of error, if we do not analyse 
 and distinguish what elements, in an act of perception, 
 belong to the outward reality, what to the outward 
 medium, and what to the action of sense itself. But 
 this source of error is not limited to our perceptions ; 
 and we are liable to be deceived, not merely by not 
 distinguishing in an act of knowledge what is contri- 
 buted by sense, but by not distinguishing what is con- 
 tributed by the mind itself. This is the most difficult 
 and important function of philosophy ; and the greater 
 number of its higher problems arise in the attempt to 
 determine the shares to which the knowing subject, 
 and the object known, may pretend in the total act 
 of cognition. For according as we attribute a larger or 
 
 o This illustration is borrowed in an See his Sophyle ou de la Philosophic 
 improved form from F. Hemsterhuia. (Surra Philosopkiques, L 279. ED.
 
 148 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. a smaller proportion to each, we either run into the 
 
 extremes of Idealism and Materialism, or maintain an 
 
 equilibrium between the two. But, on this subject, it 
 would be out of place to say anything further at 
 present. 
 
 in what From what has been said, you will be able, I hope, 
 m^Tknow- to understand what is meant by the proposition, that 
 relit!, all our knowledge is only relative. It is relative, 1, 
 Because existence is not cognisable, absolutely and in 
 itself, but only in special modes ; 2, Because these 
 modes can be known only if they stand in a certain rela- 
 tion to our faculties ; and, 3, Because the modes, thus 
 relative to our faculties, are presented to, and known 
 by, the mind only under modifications determined 
 by these faculties themselves. This general doctrine 
 being premised, it will be proper now to take some 
 special notice of the several terms significant of the re- 
 lative nature of our knowledge. And here, there are 
 two opposite series of expressions, 1, Those which 
 denote the relative and the known ; 2, Those which 
 humLn denote the absolute and the unknown. Of the former 
 class, are the words phenomenon, mode, modifica- 
 tion, state, words which are employed in the defi- 
 nition of Psychology ; and to these may be added the 
 analogous terms, quality, property, attribute, acci- 
 dent. Of the latter class, that is, the absolute and the 
 unknown, is the word subject, which we have to ex- 
 plain as an element of the definition, and its analogous 
 expressions, substance and substratum. These opposite 
 classes cannot be explained apart ; for, as each is cor- 
 relative of the other, each can be comprehended only 
 in and through its correlative. 
 
 The term The term subject (subjectum, vTrooracris, VTTO/CCI- 
 ject ' paw) is used to denote the unknown basis which lies
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 149 
 
 under the various phsenomena or properties of which LECT. 
 
 we become aware, whether iu our internal or external 
 
 experience. In the more recent philosophy, especially 
 in that of Germany, it has, however, been principally 
 employed to denote the basis of the various men- 
 tal phenomena ; but of this special signification we are 
 hereafter more particularly to speak." The word sub- 
 stance (substantia) may be employed in two, but two Substance, 
 kindred meanings. It may be used either to denote 
 that which exists absolutely and of itself ; in this sense 
 it may be viewed as derived from subsistendo, and as 
 meaning ens per se subsistens ; or it may be viewed as 
 the basis of attributes, in which sense it may be re- 
 garded as derived from substando, and as meaning id 
 quod substat accidentibus, like the Greek vTrdcrracrts, 
 vTroKtiptvov. In either case it will, however, signify 
 the same thing, viewed in a different aspect. In the 
 former meaning, it is considered in contrast to, and in- 
 dependent of, its attributes ; in the latter, as conjoined 
 with these, and as affording them the condition of ex- 
 istence. In different relations, a thing may be at once 
 considered as a substance, and as an attribute, quality, 
 or mode. This paper is a substance in relation to the 
 attribute of white ; but it is itself a modein relation 
 to the substance, matter. Substance is thus a term 
 for the substratum we are obliged to think to all that 
 we variously denominate a mode, a state, a quality, an 
 attribute, a property, an accident, a phenomenon, an 
 appearance, &c. These, though expressions generi- 
 cally the same, are, however, used with specific dis- 
 tinctions. The terms mode, state, quality, attribute, 
 
 o For the history and various mean- p. 806. See also Trendelenburg, 
 ings of the terms Subject and Object, Elementa Logices Arittotelicce, 1. 
 see the Author's note, Reid's Works, ED.
 
 150 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. property, accident, are employed in reference to a sub- 
 VIIL stance, as existing ; the terms plwenomenon, appear- 
 ance, &c., in reference to it, as known. But each of 
 these expressions has also its peculiar signification. A 
 Mode. mode is the manner of the existence of a thing. Take, 
 for example, a piece of wax. The wax may be round, 
 or square, or of any other definite figure ; it may also 
 be solid, or fluid. Its existence in any of these modes 
 is not essential ; it may change from one to the other 
 without any substantial alteration. As the mode can- 
 not exist without a substance, we can accord to it only 
 a secondary or precarious existence in relation to the 
 substance, to which we accord the privilege of existing 
 by itself, per se existere ; but though the substance be 
 not astricted to any particular mode of existence, we 
 must not suppose that it can exist, or, at least, be con- 
 ceived by us to exist in none. All modes are, there- 
 fore, variable states ; and though some mode is ne- 
 cessary for the existence of a thing, any individual 
 Modifka- mode is accidental. The word modification is properly 
 the bringing a thing into a certain mode of existence, 
 but it is very commonly employed for the mode of 
 state. existence itself. State is a term nearly synoymous 
 with mode, but of a meaning more extensive, as not 
 exclusively limited to the mutable and contingent. 
 Quality, Quality is, likewise, a word of a wider signification, 
 SriS- f r there are essential and accidental qualities." The 
 dentaL essential qualities of a thing are those aptitudes, those 
 manners of existence and action, which it cannot lose 
 without ceasing to be. For example, in man the facul- 
 ties of sense and intelligence ; in body, the dimensions 
 of length, breadth, and thickness ; in God, the attri- 
 
 a The term quality should, in strict- butes. See the Author's note, Reid's 
 ness, be confined to accidental attri- Works, p. 836. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 151 
 
 butes of eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, &c. By LECT. 
 
 accidental qualities, are meant those aptitudes and 
 
 manners of existence and action, which substances 
 have at one time and not at another ; or which they 
 have always, but may lose without ceasing to be. For 
 example, of the transitory class are the whiteness of a 
 wall, the health which we enjoy, the fineness of the 
 weather, &c. Of the permanent class are the gravity 
 of bodies, the periodical movement of the planets, &c. 
 
 The term attribute is a word properly convertible Attribute. 
 with quality, for every quality is an attribute, and 
 every attribute is a quality ; but, in our language, 
 custom has introduced a certain distinction in their 
 application. Attribute is considered as a word of 
 loftier significance, and is, therefore, conventionally 
 limited to qualities of a higher application. Thus, 
 for example, it would be felt as indecorous to speak 
 of the qualities of God, and as ridiculous to talk of 
 the attributes of matter. 
 
 Property is correctly a synonym for peculiar qua- Property. 
 lity ; a but it is frequently used as coextensive with 
 quality in general. Accident, on the contrary, is an Accident, 
 abbreviated expression for accidental or contingent 
 quality. 
 
 Phenomenon is the Greek word for that which 
 appears, and may therefore be translated by appear- 
 ance. There is, however, a distinction to be noticed. 
 In the first place, the employment of the Greek term 
 shows that it is used in a strict and philosophical 
 application. In the second place, the English name is 
 associated with a certain secondary or implied mean- 
 
 a In the older and Aristotelian sense TOV irpdy/jMros. By the later Logi- 
 of the term. See Topics, L 5 : "iSiov cians, the term property was less car- 
 s' i<n\v 6 fjii) Srj\ol fjitv rb ri ^v flvat, rectly used to denote a necessary qua- 
 fj.6vtf 8' inrdpxft KO! iurrtKarrjyopfiTai lity, whether peculiar or not. ED.
 
 152 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. ing, which, in some degree, renders it inappropriate as 
 a precise and definite expression. For the term ap- 
 pearance is used to denote not only that which reveals 
 itself to our observation, as existent, but also to 
 signify that which only seems to be, in contrast to 
 that which truly is. There is thus not merely a certain 
 vagueness in the word, but it even involves a kind of 
 contradiction to the sense in which it is used when 
 employed for phenomenon. In consequence of this, 
 the term phaenomenon has been naturalised in our 
 language, as a philosophical substitute for the term 
 appearance.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 153 
 
 LECTURE IX. 
 
 EXPLICATION OF TERMS RELATIVITY OF HUMAN 
 KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 AFTER giving a definition of Psychology, or the Phi- LECT< 
 losophy of Mind, in which I endeavoured to com- 
 
 prise a variety of expressions, the explanation of Rpituia- 
 which might smooth the way in our subsequent pro- 
 gress, I was engaged, during my last Lecture, in 
 illustrating the principle, that all our knowledge of 
 mind and matter is merely relative. We know, and 
 can know, nothing absolutely and in itself : all that 
 we know is existence in certain special forms or 
 modes, and these, likewise, only in so far as they may 
 be analogous to our faculties. We may suppose ex- 
 istence to have a thousand modes ; but these thou- 
 sand modes are all to us as zero, unless we possess 
 faculties accommodated to their apprehension. But 
 were the number of our faculties coextensive with 
 the modes of being, had we, for each of these thou- 
 sand modes, a separate organ competent to make it 
 known to us, still would our whole knowledge be, 
 as it is at present, only of the relative. Of existence, 
 absolutely and in itself, we should then be as ignorant 
 as we are now. We should still apprehend existence 
 only in certain special modes, only in certain rela- 
 tions to our faculties of knowledge. 
 
 These relative modes, whether belonging to the
 
 154 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. world without or to the world within, are, under dif- 
 H ferent points of view and different limitations, known 
 under various names, as qualities, properties, essence, 
 accidents, phenomena, manifestations, appearances, 
 and so forth; whereas the unknown something of 
 which they are the modes, the unknown ground, 
 which affords them support, is usually termed their 
 substance or subject. Of the signification and dif- 
 ferences of these expressions, I stated only what 
 was necessary in order to afford a general notion 
 of their philosophical application. Substance, (sub- 
 stantia), I noticed, is considered either in contrast 
 to its accidents, as res per se subsistens, or in connec- 
 tion with them, as id quod substat accidentibus. It, 
 therefore, comprehends both the Greek terms ova-la 
 and vTroKCLpevov, ovcria being equivalent to substantia 
 in the meaning of ens per se subsistens; vTroKei/xevoi/ 
 to it, as id quod substat accidentibus! 1 The term 
 subject is used only for substance in its second mean- 
 ing, and thus corresponds to vTroKt'ipevov ; its literal 
 signification is, as its etymology expresses, that which 
 lies, or is placed, under the phenomena. So much for 
 the terms substance and subject, significant of unknown 
 or absolute existence. 
 
 I then said a few words on the differences of the 
 various terms expressive of known or relative exist- 
 ence, mode, modification, state, quality, attribute, pro- 
 
 a "rWo-Towns, here noted, by way of vero cum quodam discrimine his vo- 
 
 intcrpolation, as of theological applica- cabulis utitur. Nam vocabulum *- 
 
 tion. [On this point see Melanchthon, sentice significat id quod revera est, 
 
 Erot. Dial. (Strigelii) p. 145, et seq. etiamsi est communicatum. "IW- 
 
 " In philosophia, generaliter nomine ffraffis autem seu Persona est subsis- 
 
 Essentice utimur pro re per sese consi- tens, vivum, individuum, intelligens, 
 
 derate, sive sit in prsedicamento sub- incommunicabile, non sustentatum in 
 
 stantijc, sive sit accidens. At inr6- alio." Compare the relative annota- 
 
 araffis significat rem subsistentem, quae tion by Strigelius, and Hocker, Clavis 
 
 opponitur , accidentibus. Ecclcsia Phil Arist. p. 301. ED.]
 
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 155 
 
 perty, phenomenon, appearance ; but what I stated LECT. 
 I do not think it necessary to recapitulate. 
 
 I at present avoid entering into the metaphysics of P 
 substance and phaenomenon. I shall only observe in feiien into 
 general, that philosophers have frequently fallen into t erro 
 one or other of three different errors. Some have Substance. 
 denied the reality of any unknown ground of the 
 known phsenomena ; and have maintained that mind 
 and matter have no substantial existence, but are 
 merely the two complements of two series of associated 
 qualities. This doctrine is, however, altogether futile. 
 It belies the veracity of our primary beliefs ; it leaves 
 unsatisfied the strongest necessities of our intellectual 
 nature ; it admits as a fact that the phsenomena are 
 connected, but allows no cause explanatory of the 
 fact of their connection. Others, again, have fallen 
 into an opposite error. They have attempted to 
 speculate concerning the nature of the unknown 
 grounds of the phaenomena of mind and matter, apart 
 from the phaenomena, and have, accordingly, trans- 
 cended the legitimate sphere of philosophy. A third 
 party have taken some one, or more, of the phsenomena 
 themselves as the basis or substratum of the others. 
 Thus Descartes, at least as understood and followed 
 by Mallebranche and others of his disciples, made 
 thought or consciousness convertible with the sub- 
 stance of mind ; a and Bishops Brown and Law, with 
 Dr Watts, constituted solidity and extension into the 
 substance of body. This theory is, however, liable to 
 all the objections which may be alleged against the 
 firat.^ 
 
 a Principia, pars L 98, 51-53. On & Encyclopedia Britannica, art. 
 this point see Stewart, Works, vol. ii. Metaphysics, pp. 615, 646, (7th ed) 
 p. 473, note A. ED. [Cf. Descartes, Principia, para L 53, 
 
 pare ii. 4. ED.]
 
 156 LECTURES OX METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LEOT. I defined Psychology, the science conversant about 
 - the phenomena of the mind, or conscious-subject, or 
 raS"" se tf> or e 9' The former parts of the definition have 
 been explained ; the terms mind, conscious-subject, self, 
 and ego, come now to be considered. These are all 
 only expressions for the unknown basis of the mental 
 phenomena, viewed, however, in different relations. 
 Mini Of these the word mind is the first. In regard to 
 
 the etymology of this term, it is obscure and doubt- 
 ful ; perhaps, indeed, none of the attempts to trace it 
 to its origin are successful. It seems to hold an ana- 
 logy with the Latin mens, and both are probably de- 
 rived from the same common root. This root, which 
 is lost in the European languages of Scytho-Indian 
 origin, is probably preserved in the Sanscrit mena, to 
 know or understand. The Greek vovs, intelligence, is, 
 in like manner, derived from a verb of precisely the 
 same meaning (voeco). The word mind is of a more 
 limited signification than the term soul. In the 
 Greek philosophy, the term ^v^rj, soul, comprehends, 
 besides the sensitive and rational principle in man, 
 the principle of organic life, both in the animal and 
 vegetable kingdoms ; and, in Christian theology, it is 
 likewise used, in contrast to irvevfjia or spirit, in a 
 vaguer and more extensive signification. 
 
 Since Descartes limited psychology to the domain 
 of consciousness, the term mind has been rigidly em- 
 ployed for the self-knowing principle alone. Mind, 
 therefore, is to be understood as the subject of the 
 various internal phsenomena of which we are con- 
 scious, or that subject of which consciousness is the 
 general phaenomenon. Consciousness is, in fact, to the 
 mind what extension is to matter or body. Though 
 
 a On etymology of mind, Sec. see Scheidler's Psycholoyie, p. 325.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 157 
 
 both are phenomena, yet both are essential qualities ; LECT. 
 for we can neither conceive mind without conscious- _ 
 
 ness, nor body without extension. Mind can be de- J^ 
 fined only a posteriori, that is, only from its mani- 
 festations. What it is in itself, that is, apart from its 
 manifestations, we, philosophically, know nothing, 
 and, accordingly, what we mean by mind is simply that 
 which perceives, thinks, feels, wills, desires, &c. Mind, 
 with us, is thus nearly coextensive with the Rational 
 and Animal souls of Aristotle ; for the faculty of 
 voluntary motion, which is a function of the animal 
 soul in the Peripatetic doctrine, ought not, as is gen- 
 erally done, to be excluded from the phaenomena of 
 consciousness and mind. 
 
 The definition of mind from its qualities is given 
 by Aristotle ; it forms the second definition in his 
 Treatise on the Soul," and after him, it is the one 
 generally adopted by philosophers, and, among others, 
 by Dr Reid.^ That Reid, therefore, should have been 
 praised for having thus defined the mind, shows only 
 the ignorance of his encomiasts. He has no peculiar 
 merit in this respect at all. 
 
 The next term to be considered is conscious sub- 
 ject. And first, what is it to be conscious ? With- 
 out anticipating the discussion relative to conscious- 
 ness, as the fundamental function of intelligence, I 
 may, at present, simply indicate to you what an act 
 of consciousness denotes. This act is of the most 
 
 a De Anima, ii. 2. 'H ^vx^l 8t al iy4pytuu n Kpoevrvyxa.vofi.tv yap av- 
 
 rovro $ faucv ical aX<T0aj>6/j.(Oa KO! 5a- raTs, Kal ras Swa/xfis curb rovrtay l*i- 
 
 voovpfBa. vpuT-us. Cf. Themistius. voovptv. In lib. ii. De Anima, p. 76, 
 
 E Sf XP*1 ^fjft" rl fKao-rov rovruv, (Aid. Fol.) ED. 
 
 oloif T'I rb vorrriKbv, ^ rt rb atff6rrruckv, ft Intellectual Powers, Essay L c. 2 ; 
 
 Ttpfofpov lieiffKfKTfov, -rl rb VO(H>, Kcd Works, p. 229. " By the mind of a man, 
 
 rt rb al<r6dv(ff8cu- irp6r(pcu yap KO\ <ra- we understand that'm him which thinks, 
 
 <pfffrepai irpbs ^uy ruv Swdfj.u>v fi<r remembers, reasons, wills." ED.
 
 158 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. elementary character ; it is the condition of all know- 
 
 ' ledge ; I cannot, therefore, define it to you ; but, as 
 
 you are all familiar with the thing, it is easy to enable 
 you to connect the thing with the word. I know, 
 I desire, I feeL What is it that is common to all 
 these ? Knowing and desiring and feeling are not the 
 same, and may be distinguished. But they all agree 
 in one fundamental condition. Can I know, without 
 knowing that I know ? Can I desire, without knowing 
 that I desire 1 Can I feel, without knowing that I 
 feel I This is impossible. Now this knowing that I 
 know or desire or feel, this common condition of 
 self-knowledge, is precisely what is denominated Con- 
 sciousness." 
 
 So much at present for the adjective conscious 
 now for the substantive, subject, conscious-subject. 
 Though consciousness be the condition of all internal 
 phsenomena, still it is itself only a phenomenon ; and, 
 therefore, supposes a subject in which it inheres ; 
 that is, supposes something that is conscious, some- 
 thing that manifests itself as conscious. And, since 
 consciousness comprises within its sphere the whole 
 phaenomena of mind, the expression conscious-subject 
 is a brief, but comprehensive, definition of mind itself. 
 
 I have already informed you of the general mean- 
 ing of the word subject in its philosophical applica- 
 tion, viz. the unknown basis of phaenomenal or 
 manifested existence. It is thus, in its application, 
 common equally to the external and to the internal 
 worlds. But the philosophers of mind have, in a 
 manner, usurped and appropriated this expression to 
 themselves. Accordingly, in their hands, the phrases 
 conscious or thinking subject, and subject simply, mean 
 
 o Compare Discussions, p. 47. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 159 
 
 precisely the same thing; and custom has prevailed LECT. 
 so far, that, in psychological discussions, the subject is 
 a term now currently employed, throughout Europe, 
 for the mind or thinking principle.* 
 
 The question here occurs, what is the reason ofuseofthe 
 this employment 1 If mind and subject are only con-ject vindi- 
 vertible terms, why multiply synonyms ? Why ex- 
 change a precise and proximate expression for a vague 
 and abstract generality ? The question is pertinent, 
 and merits a reply ; for unless it can be shown that 
 the word is necessary, its introduction cannot possibly 
 be vindicated. Now, the utility of this expression is 
 founded on two circumstances. The first, 'that it 
 affords an adjective ; the second, that the terms sub- 
 ject and subjective have opposing relatives in the terms 
 object and objective, so that the two pairs of words 
 together, enable us to designate the primary and most 
 important analysis and antithesis of philosophy, in a 
 more precise and emphatic manner than can be done 
 by any other technical expressions. This will require 
 some illustration. 
 
 Subject, we have seen, is a term for that in which Terms Sub- 
 the phsenomena revealed to our observation, inhere ; objective; 
 what the schoolmen have designated the materia &S? 
 in qua. Limited to the mental phsenomena, subject, in 
 therefore, denotes the mind itself ; and subjective, that 
 which belongs to, or proceeds from, the thinking sub- 
 ject. Object, on the other hand, is a term for that about 
 which the knowing subject is conversant, what the 
 schoolmen have styled the materia circa quam; while 
 objective means that which belongs to, or proceeds 
 from, the object known, and not from the subject 
 knowing ; and thus denotes what is real in opposition 
 
 o See the Author's note, Rcufs Works, p. 806. ED.
 
 160 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. to what is ideal, what exists in nature, in contrast 
 - to what exists merely in the thought of the in- 
 dividual. 
 
 Now, the great problem of philosophy is to analyse 
 the contents of our acts of knowledge, or cognitions, 
 to distinguish what elements are contributed by 
 the knowing subject, what elements by the object 
 known. There must, therefore, be terms adequate to 
 designate these correlative opposites, and to discrimi- 
 nate the share which each has in the total act of 
 cognition. But, if we reject the terms subject and 
 subjective, object and objective, there are no others 
 competent to the purpose. 
 
 Errors At this stage of your progress, Gentlemen, it is not 
 
 easy to make you aware of the paramount necessity of 
 such a distinction, and of such terms, or to show you 
 how, from the want of words expressive of this primary 
 antithesis, the mental philosophy of this country has 
 been checked in its development, and involved in the 
 utmost perplexity and misconception. It is sufficient 
 to remark at present, that to this defect in the lan- 
 guage of his psychological analysis, is, in a great 
 measure, to be attributed the confusion, not to say 
 the errors of Reid, in the very cardinal point of his 
 philosophy, a confusion so great that the whole 
 tendency of his doctrine was misconceived by Brown, 
 who, in adopting a modification of the hypothesis of 
 a representative perception, seems not even to have 
 suspected, that he, and Reid, and modern philosophers 
 in general, were not in this at one." The terms sub- 
 jective and objective denote the primary distinction in 
 consciousness of self and not-self, and this distinction 
 
 a See on this question the Author's Supplementary Dissertations to ReliTs 
 Discussions, p. 45, et seq., and his Works, notes B and C. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 161 
 
 involves the whole science of mind ; for this science LECT. 
 is nothing more than a determination of the subjective 
 
 and objective, in themselves and in their mutual rela- 
 tions. The distinction is of paramount importance, and 
 of infinite application, not only in Philosophy proper, 
 but in Grammar, Khetoric, Criticism, Ethics, Politics, 
 Jurisprudence, Theology. I will give you an example, 
 a philological example. Suppose a lexicographer had 
 to distinguish the two meanings of the word certainty. 
 Certainty expresses either, the firm conviction which 
 we have of the truth of a thing ; or the character of the 
 proof on which its reality rests. The former is the 
 subjective meaning ; the latter the objective. By what 
 other terms can they be distinguished and described I 
 
 The distinction of subject and object, as marking History of 
 out the fundamental and most thorough-going anti- 
 thesis in philosophy, we owe, among many other im- 
 portant benefits, to the schoolmen, and from the 
 schoolmen the terms passed, both in their substantive 
 and adjective forms, into the scientific language of 
 modern philosophers. Deprived of these terms, the 
 Critical Philosophy, indeed the whole philosophy of 
 Germany and France, would be a blank. In this 
 country, though familiarly employed in scientific lan- 
 guage, even subsequently to the time of Locke, the 
 adjective forms seem at length to have dropt out of 
 the English tongue. That these words waxed ob- 
 solete, was, perhaps, caused by the ambiguity which 
 had gradually crept into the signification of the sub- 
 stantives. Object, besides its proper signification, 
 came to be abusively applied to denote motive, end, 
 final cause, (a meaning, by the way, not recognised by 
 Johnson). This innovation was probably borrowed 
 from the French, in whose language the word had 
 
 VOL. I. L
 
 162 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. been similarly corrupted, after the commencement of 
 the last century. Subject in English, as sujet in 
 French, had not been rightly distinguished from ob- 
 ject, taken in its proper meaning, and had thus 
 returned to the original ambiguity of the correspond- 
 ing term (v-rroKei^vov) in Greek. It is probable that 
 the logical application of the word, (subject of pre- 
 dication), facilitated, or occasioned this confusion. 
 In using the terms, therefore, we think that an ex- 
 planation, but no apology, is required. The distinction 
 is expressed by no other terms ; and if these did not 
 already enjoy a prescriptive right as denizens of the 
 language, it cannot be denied, that, as strictly analogi- 
 cal, they are well entitled to sue out their naturalisa- 
 tion. We shall have frequent occasion to recur to 
 this distinction, and it is eminently worthy of your 
 attention. 
 
 Self, Ego The last parallel expressions are the terms self and 
 from piato. ego. These we shall take together, as they are abso- 
 lutely convertible. As the best preparative for a 
 proper understanding of these terms, I shall trans- 
 late to you a passage from the First Alcibiades of 
 Plato." The interlocutors are Socrates and Alci- 
 biades. 
 
 " Socr. Hold, now, with whom do you at present 
 converse 1 Is it not with me \ Alcib. Yes. 
 
 Socr. And I also with you "? Alcib. Yes. 
 
 Socr. It is Socrates then who speaks \ Alcib. As- 
 suredly. 
 
 Socr. And Alcibiades who listens 1. Alcib. Yes. 
 
 P. 129. The genuineness, how- Schleiennacher's Introduction, traus- 
 
 ever, of this Dialogue is questionable, lated by Dobson, p. 328 ; Brandis, 
 
 See Hitter, Hist, of Ancient Philosophy , Gesch. der Gr. Rom. Philosophic, voL 
 
 vol. ii. p. 164, (English translation) ; ii. p. 180. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 163 
 
 Socr. Is it not with language that Socrates speaks ? LECT. 
 Alcib. What now ? of course. 
 
 Socr. To converse, and to use language, are not 
 these then the same ? Alcib. The very same. 
 
 Socr. But he who uses a thing, and the thing used, 
 are these not different '? Alcib. What do you 
 mean? 
 
 Socr. A currier, does he not use a cutting knife, 
 and other instruments ? Alcib. Yes. 
 
 Socr. And the man who uses the cutting knife, is 
 he different from the instrument he uses? Alcib. 
 Most certainly. 
 
 Socr. In like manner, the lyrist, is he not different 
 from the lyre he plays on ? Alcib. Undoubtedly. 
 
 Socr. This, then, was what I asked you just now, 
 does not he who uses a thing seem to you always 
 different from the thing used ? Alcib. Very different. 
 
 Socr. But the currier, does he cut with his instru- 
 ments alone, or also with his hands ? Alcib. Also 
 with his hands. 
 
 Socr. He then uses his hands ? Alcib. Yes. 
 
 Socr. And in his work he uses also his eyes ? 
 Alcib. Yes. 
 
 Socr. We are agreed, then, that he who uses a 
 thing, and the thing used, are different ? Alcib. 
 We are. 
 
 Socr. The currier and lyrist are, therefore, different 
 from the hands and the eyes, with which they work ? 
 Alcib. So it seems. 
 
 Socr. Now, then, does not a man use his whole 
 body ? Alcib. Unquestionably. 
 
 Socr. But we are agreed that he who uses, and that 
 which is used, are different ? Alcib. Yes.
 
 164; LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. Socr. A man is, therefore, different from his body ? 
 ^^ Alcib. So I think. 
 
 Socr. What then is the man ? Alcib. I cannot say. 
 ocr. You can at least say that the man is that 
 which uses the body \ Alcib. True. 
 
 Socr. Now, does anything use the body but the 
 mind? Alcib. Nothing. 
 
 Socr. The mind is, therefore, the man 1 Alcib. 
 The mind alone." 
 
 To the same effect, Aristotle asserts that the 
 mind contains the man, not the man the mind." 
 " Thou art the soul," says Hierocles, " but the body is 
 thine." ft So Cicero "Hens cuj usque is est quisque, 
 non ea figura quae digito demonstrari potest ; " y and 
 Macrobius " Ergo qui videtur, non ipse verus homo 
 est, sed verus ille est, a quo regitur quod videtur." 5 
 
 No one has, however, more beautifully expressed 
 Arbuthnot. this truth than Arbuthnot. e 
 
 " What am I, whence produced, and for what end ? 
 Whence drew I being, to what period tend ? 
 Am I th' abandou'd orphan of blind chance, 
 Dropp'd by wild atoms in disorder'd dance ? 
 Or, from an endless chain of causes wrought, 
 And of unthinking substance, born with thought ? 
 Am I but what I seem, mere flesh and blood, 
 A branching channel with a mazy flood ? 
 The purple stream that through my vessels glides, 
 Dull and unconscious flows, like common tides, 
 The pipes, through which the circling juices stray, 
 Are not that thinking I, no more than they : 
 
 a That the mind is the man, is 26 : 2u yAp e7 ^ ^vxt 1 ^ * <rM ^". 
 
 maintained by Aristotle in several ED. 
 
 places. Ci.Eth. Nic. ix. 8; x. 7; but 7 Somnium So'plonis, 8. ED. 
 
 these do not contain the exact words 8 Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis, 
 
 of the text ED. lib. ii. c. 12. ED. 
 
 /3 In A urea PythayoreorumCarmina, t Know thyself. See Dodsley's Col- 
 lection, vol. i. p. 180. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 165 
 
 This frame, compacted with transcendent skill, LECT 
 
 Of moving joints, obedient to my will ; IX. 
 
 Nursed from the fruitful glebe, like yonder tree, 
 Waxes and wastes, I call it mine, not me. 
 New matter still the mould'ring mass sustains ; 
 The mansion chang'd, the tenant still remains ; 
 And, from the fleeting stream repair'd by food, 
 Distinct, as is the swimmer from the flood." 
 
 But let us come to a closer determination of the The seir 
 point ; let us appeal to our experience. " I turn my relation u, 
 attention on my being, and find that I have organs, gani/Md 
 and that I have thoughts. My body is the comple- 
 ment of my organs ; am I then my body, or any part 
 of my body 1 This I cannot be. The matter of my 
 body, in all its points, is in a perpetual flux, in a 
 perpetual process of renewal. I, / do not pass 
 away, I am not renewed. None probably of the 
 molecules which constituted my organs some years 
 ago, form any part of the material system which I 
 now call mine. It has been made up anew ; but I 
 am still what I was of old. These organs may be 
 mutilated ; one, two, or any number of them may be 
 removed ; but not the less do I continue to be what 
 I was, one and entire. It is even not impossible to 
 conceive me existing, deprived of every organ, I, 
 therefore, who have these organs, or this body, / am 
 neither an organ nor a body. 
 
 " Neither am I identical with my thoughts, for they 
 are manifold and various. I, on the contrary, am 
 one and the same. Each moment they change and 
 succeed each other ; this change and succession takes 
 place in me, but I neither change nor succeed myself 
 in myself. Each moment, I am aware or am conscious 
 of the existence and change of my thoughts : this 
 change is sometimes determined by me, sometimes by
 
 166 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. something different from me; but I always can dis- 
 - tinguish myself from them : I am a permanent being, 
 an enduring subject, of whose existence these thoughts 
 are only so many modes, appearances, or phsenomena ; 
 I who possess organs and thoughts am, therefore, 
 neither these organs nor these thoughts. 
 
 " I can conceive myself to exist apart from every 
 organ. But if I try to conceive myself existent with- 
 out a thought, without some form of consciousness, 
 I am unable. This or that thought may not be per- 
 haps necessary ; but of some thought it is necessary 
 that I should be conscious, otherwise I can no longer 
 conceive myself to be. A suspension of thought is 
 thus a suspension of my intellectual existence ; I am, 
 therefore, essentially a thinking, a conscious being ; 
 and my true character is that of an intelligence, an 
 intelligence served by organs." 
 
 But this thought, this consciousness, is possible 
 only in, and through, the consciousness of Self. The 
 Self, the I, is recognised in every act of intelligence, 
 as the subject to which that act belongs. It is I that 
 perceive, I that imagine, I that remember, I that 
 attend, I that compare, I that feel, I that desire, I 
 that will, I that am conscious. The I, indeed, is only 
 manifested in one or other of these special modes ; 
 but it is manifested in them all ; they are all only 
 the phsenomena of the I, and, therefore, the science 
 conversant about the phaenomena of mind is, most 
 simply and unambiguously, said . to be conversant 
 about the phenomena of the / or Ego. 
 
 This expression, as that which, in many relations, 
 best marks and discriminates the conscious mind, has 
 now become familiar in every country, with the ex- 
 
 a Gatien-Arnoult, [Doct. Phil., p. 34-36. ED.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 167 
 
 ception of our own. Why it lias not been naturalised LECT. 
 
 with us is not unapparent. The French have two words 
 
 for the Ego or I Je and Moi. The former of these 
 is less appropriate as an abstract term, being in sound 
 ambiguous ; but le moi admirably expresses what the 
 Germans denote, but less felicitously, by their Das Ich. 
 In English, the I could not be tolerated ; because, in 
 sound, it would not be distinguished from the word 
 significant of the organ of sight. We must, therefore, 
 either renounce the term, or resort to the Latin Ego; 
 and this is perhaps no disadvantage, for, as the word 
 is only employed in a strictly philosophical relation, 
 it is better that this should be distinctly marked, by 
 its being used in that relation alone. The term Self 
 is more allowable ; yet still the expressions Ego and 
 Non-Ego are felt to be less awkward than those of 
 Self and Not-Self. 
 
 So much in explanation of the terms involved in 
 the definition which I gave you of Psychology.
 
 168 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECTURE X. 
 
 EXPLICATION OF TERMS. 
 
 LECT. I NOW proceed, as I proposed, to the consideration of 
 . a few other words of frequent occurrence in philo- 
 sophy, and which it is expedient to explain at once, 
 before entering upon discussions in which they will 
 continually recur. I take them up without order, 
 except in so far as they may be grouped together by 
 their meaning ; and the first I shall consider, are the 
 terms hypothesis and theory. 
 
 Hypothesis. When a phaenomenon is presented to us which can 
 be explained by no cause within the sphere of our 
 experience, we feel dissatisfied and uneasy. A desire 
 arises to escape from this unpl easing state ; and the 
 consequence of this desire is an effort of the mind 
 to recall the outstanding phsenomenon to unity, by 
 assigning it, ad interim, to some cause or class, to 
 which we imagine that it may possibly belong, until 
 we shall be able to refer it, permanently, to that 
 cause, or class, to which we shall have proved it 
 actually to appertain. The judgment by which the 
 phaenomenon is thus provisorily referred, is called an 
 hypothesis, a supposition. 
 
 Hypotheses have thus no other end than to satisfy 
 the desire of the mind to reduce the objects of its 
 knowledge to unity and system ; and they do this in 
 recalling them, ad interim, to some principle, through
 
 LECTUKES ON METAPHYSICS. 169 
 
 which the mind is enabled to comprehend them. LEGT. 
 
 From this view of their nature it is manifest, how far '- 
 
 they are permissible, and how far they are even useful 
 and expedient, throwing altogether out of account 
 the possibility that what is at first assumed as hypo- 
 thetical, may subsequently be proved true. 
 
 An hypothesis is allowable only under certain con-Twocondi- 
 ditions. Of these the first is, that the phaenomenon ti^ 
 to be explained, should be ascertained actually to 
 exist. It would, for example, be absurd to propose an 
 hypothesis to account for the possibility of appari- 
 tions, until it be proved that ghosts do actually ap- 
 pear. This precept, to establish your fact before you 
 attempt to conjecture its cause, may, perhaps, seem to 
 you too elementary to be worth the statement. But 
 a little longer experience will convince you of the 
 contrary. That the enunciation of the rule is not 
 only not superfluous, but even highly requisite as an 
 admonition, is shown by great and numerous exam- 
 ples of its violation in the history of science ; and, 
 as Cullen has truly observed, there are more false 
 facts current in the world than false hypotheses to 
 explain them. There is, in truth, nothing which men 
 seem to admit so lightly as an asserted fact. Of this 
 I might adduce to you a host of memorable examples. 
 I shall content myself with one small but significant 
 illustration. 
 
 Charles II., soon after the incorporation of the 
 Royal Society, which was established under his pa- 
 tronage, sent to request of that learned body an expla- 
 nation of the following phsenomenon. When a live 
 fish is thrown into a basin of water, the basin, water, 
 and fish do not weigh more than the basin and water 
 before the fish is thrown in ; whereas, when a dead
 
 170 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. fish is employed, the weight of the whole is exactly 
 
 - equal to the added weights of the basin, the water, 
 
 and the fish. Much learned discussion ensued regard- 
 ing this curious fact, and several elaborate papers, 
 propounding various hypotheses in explanation, were 
 read on the occasion. At length a member, who was 
 better versed in Aristotle than his associates, recollected 
 that the philosopher had laid it down, as a general 
 rule of philosophising, to consider the an sit of a fact, 
 before proceeding to investigate the cur sit; and he 
 ventured to insinuate to his colleagues, that, though 
 the authority of the Stagirite was with them, the 
 disciples of Bacon, of small account, it might possibly 
 not be altogether inexpedient to follow his advice on 
 the present occasion ; seeing that it did not, in fact, 
 seem at variance with common sense, and that none 
 of the hypotheses proposed were admitted to be alto- 
 gether satisfactory. After much angry discussion, some 
 members asserting the fact to be in itself notorious, 
 and others declaring that to doubt of its reality was 
 an insult to his majesty, and tantamount to a con- 
 structive act of treason, the experiment was made, 
 when lo ! to the confusion of the wise men of Gotham, 
 the name by which the Society was then popularly 
 known, it was found that the weight was identical, 
 whether a dead or a living fish were used. 
 
 This is only a past and petty illustration. It would 
 be easy to adduce extensive hypotheses, very gene- 
 rally accredited, even at the present hour, which are, 
 however, nothing better than assumptions founded on, 
 or explanatory of, phenomena which do not really 
 exist in nature. 
 
 The wcond. The second condition of a permissible hypothesis is, 
 that the phenomenon cannot be explained otherwise 
 than by an hypothesis. It would, for example, have
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 171 
 
 been absurd, even before the discoveries of Franklin, LECT. 
 
 to account for the phaenomenon of lightning by the ' - 
 
 hypothesis of supernatural agency. These two condi- 
 tions, of the reality of the phsenomenon, and the neces- 
 sity of an hypothesis for its explanation, being fulfilled, 
 an hypothesis is allowable." 
 
 But the necessity of some hypothesis being con- criteria of 
 ceded, how are we to discriminate between a good lencToTan 
 and a bad, a probable and an improbable hypo- ^ 
 thesis ? The comparative excellence of an hypothesis 
 requires, in the first place, that it involve nothing 
 contradictory, either internally or externally, that is, 
 either between the parts of which it is composed, or 
 between these and any established truths. Thus, the 
 Ptolemaic hypothesis of the heavenly revolutions be- 
 came worthless, from the moment that it was contra- 
 dicted by the ascertained phenomena of the planets 
 Venus and Mercury. Thus the Wernerian hypothesis 
 in geology is improbable, inasmuch as it is obliged to 
 maintain that water was originally able to hold in 
 solution substances which it is now incapable of dis- 
 solving. The Huttonian hypothesis, on the contrary, 
 is so far preferable, that it assumes no effect to have 
 been produced by any agent, which that agent is not 
 known to be capable of producing. In the second 
 place, an hypothesis is probable in proportion as the 
 phsenomenon in question can be by it more com- 
 pletely explained. Thus, the Copernican hypothesis 
 is more probable than the Tychonic and semi-Tychonic, 
 inasmuch as it enables us to explain a greater number 
 of phsenomena. In the third place, an hypothesis is 
 probable, in proportion as it is independent of all 
 subsidiary hypotheses. In this respect, again, the 
 
 a [On the conditions of legitimate Sturm, Pytica Electiva, Diss. Prselim. 
 hypothesis compare John Christopher art. 3, torn. i. p. 28.]
 
 172 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. Copernican hypothesis is more probable than the 
 - Tychonic. For, though both save all the phenomena, 
 the Copernican does this by one principal assumption ; 
 whereas the Tychonic is obliged to call in the aid of 
 several subordinate suppositions, to render the prin- 
 cipal assumption available. So much for hypothesis. 
 
 I have dwelt longer on hypothesis than perhaps 
 was necessary ; for you must recollect that these 
 terms are, at present, considered only in order to 
 enable you to understand their signification when 
 casually employed. We shall probably, in a subse- 
 quent part of the Course, have occasion to treat of 
 them expressly, and with the requisite details. I 
 shall, therefore, be more concise in treating of the 
 cognate expression, theory. This word is employed 
 by English writers, in a very loose and improper 
 sense. It is with them usually convertible with hypo- 
 thesis, and hypothesis is commonly used as another 
 term for conjecture. Dr Reid, indeed, expressly does 
 this ; he identifies the two words, and explains them 
 as philosophical conjectures, as you may see in his 
 First Essay on the Intellectual Powers, (Chapter III.)" 
 This is, however, wrong ; wrong, in relation to the 
 original employment of the terms by the ancient 
 philosophers ; and wrong, in relation to their employ- 
 ment by the philosophers of the modern nations. 
 Theory, The terms theory and theoretical are properly used 
 in opposition to the terms practice and practical; in 
 this sense they were exclusively employed by the 
 ancients ; and in this sense they are almost exclu- 
 sively employed by the continental philosophers. Prac- 
 tice is the exercise of an art, or the application of a 
 science, in life, which application is itself an art, for it 
 
 o Worl-, p. 235 ; eee also p. 97. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 173 
 
 is not every one who is able to apply all he knows ; LECT. 
 
 there being required, over and above knowledge, a 
 
 certain dexterity and skill. Theory, on the contrary, 
 is mere knowledge or science. There is a distinction, 
 but no opposition, between theory and practice ; each 
 to a certain extent supposes the other. On the one 
 hand, theory is dependent on practice ; practice must 
 have preceded theory ; for theory being only a gener- 
 alisation of the principles on which practice proceeds, 
 these must originally have been taken out of, or ab- 
 stracted from, practice. On the other hand, this is 
 true only to a certain extent ; for there is no practice 
 without a theory. The man of practice must have 
 always known something, however little, of what he 
 did, of what he intended to do, and of the means by 
 which his intention was to be carried into effect. He 
 was, therefore, not wholly ignorant of the principles of 
 his procedure ; he was a limited, he was, in some degree, 
 an unconscious, theorist. As he proceeded, however, in 
 his practice, and reflected on his performance, his theory 
 acquired greater clearness and extension, so that he 
 became at last distinctly conscious of what he did, and 
 could give, to himself and others, an account of his 
 procedure. 
 
 " Per varies usus artem experientia fecit, 
 Exemplo monstrante viarn." 
 
 In this view, theory is, therefore, simply a know- 
 ledge of the principles by which practice accomplishes 
 its end. 
 
 The opposition of Theoretical and Practical philo- Theoretical 
 sophy, is somewhat different ; for these do not stand caiViC-' 
 simply related to each other as theory and practice. ** y ' 
 Practical philosophy involves likewise a theory, a 
 
 [a Maniliug, i. 62.]
 
 174 LECTURES OX METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. theory, however, subordinated to the practical appli- 
 
 cation of its principles ; while theoretical philosophy 
 
 has nothing to do with practice, but terminates in 
 mere speculative or contemplative knowledge." 
 
 The next group of associated words to which I 
 would call your attention is composed of the terms, 
 power, faculty, capacity, disposition, habit, act, opera- 
 tion, energy, function, &c. 
 Power. Of these the first is powei\ and the explanation of 
 
 Reid's cnti- . . 
 
 cism of this, in a manner, involves that of all the others. 
 
 Locke. 
 
 I have, in the first place, to correct an error of 
 Dr Reid, in relation to this term, in his criticism of 
 Locke's statement of its import. You will observe 
 that I do not, at present, enter on the question, How 
 do we acquire the notion of power ? and I defend the 
 following passage of Locke, only in regard to the 
 meaning and comprehension of the term. " The 
 mind," says Locke, " being every day informed, by the 
 senses, of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes 
 in things without, and taking notice how one comes to 
 an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist 
 which was not before ; reflecting also on what passes 
 within itself, and observing a constant change of its 
 ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects 
 on the senses, and sometimes by the determination of 
 its own choice ; and concluding from what it has so 
 constantly observed to have been, that the like changes 
 will, for the future, be made in the same things, by 
 like agents, and by the like ways ; considers, in one 
 thing, the possibility of having any of its simple ideas 
 changed, and, in another, the possibility of making 
 that change ; and so comes by that idea which we call 
 power. Thus we say, fire has a power to melt gold, 
 
 a See ante, p. 113 ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 175 
 
 that is, to destroy the consistency of its insensible LECT. 
 
 parts, and consequently its hardness, and make it '. 
 
 fluid, and gold has a power to be melted : that the sun 
 has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be 
 blanched by the sun, whereby the yellowness is de- 
 stroyed, and whiteness made to exist in its room. In 
 which, and the like cases, the power, we consider, is 
 in reference to the change of perceivable ideas ; for 
 we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or 
 operation upon, anything, but by the observable change 
 of its sensible ideas ; nor conceive any alteration to 
 be made, but by conceiving a change of some of its 
 ideas. Power, thus considered, is twofold viz. as able 
 to make, or able to receive, any change : the one may 
 be called active, and the other passive power." " 
 
 I have here only to call your attention to the dis- Active and 
 tinction of power into two kinds, active and passive Power, 
 the former meaning, id quod potest facere, that which 
 can effect or can do, the latter id quod potest fieri, 
 that which can be effected or can be done. In both 
 cases the general notion of power is expressed by the 
 verb potest or can. Now, on this, Dr Reid makes the 
 following strictures./ 3 " On this account by Locke," 
 he says, " of the origin of our idea of power, I would beg 
 leave to make two remarks, with the respect that is 
 most justly due to so great a philosopher and so good 
 a man." We are at present concerned only with the 
 first of these remarks by Dr Reid, which is as follows, 
 "Whereas Locke distinguishes power into active 
 and passive, I conceive passive power is no power at 
 all. He means by it, the possibility of being changed. 
 To call this power, seems to be a misapplication of the 
 
 a Essay, Book ii. ch. 21, 1. ED. Active Powers, Essay i. ch. 3 ; 
 HVfo, p. 519. ED.
 
 176 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. word. I do not remember to have met with the phrase 
 
 ! passive pwver in any other good author. Mr Locke 
 
 seems to have been unlucky in inventing it ; and it 
 deserves not to be retained in our language. Perhaps 
 he was unwarily led into it, as an opposite to active 
 power. But I conceive we call certain powers active, 
 to distinguish them from other powers that are called 
 speculative. As all mankind distinguish action from 
 speculation, it is very proper to distinguish the powers 
 by which those different operations are performed, 
 into active and speculative. Mr Locke, indeed, ac- 
 knowledges that active power is more properly called 
 power : but I see no propriety at all in passive 
 power ; it is a powerless power, and a contradiction 
 in terms." 
 
 These observations of Dr Reid are, I am sorry to 
 say, erroneous from first to last. The latter part, in 
 which he attempts to find a reason for Locke being 
 unwarily betrayed into making this distinction, is, 
 supposing the distinction untenable, and Locke its 
 author, wholly inadequate to account for his halluci- 
 nation : for, surely, the powers by which we specu- 
 late are, in their operations, not more passive than 
 those that have sometimes been styled active, but 
 which are properly denominated practical. But in 
 the censure itself on Locke, Reid is altogether mis- 
 taken. In the first place, so far was Locke from 
 being unlucky in inventing the distinction, it was 
 invented some two thousand years before. In the 
 second place, to call the possibility of being changed a 
 power, is no misapplication of the word. In the third 
 place, so far is the phrase passive power from not 
 being employed by any good author, there is hardly 
 a metaphysician previous to Locke, by whom it was
 
 LECTURES OX METAPHYSICS. 177 
 
 not familiarly used. In fact, this was one of the most LECT. 
 celebrated distinctions in philosophy. It was first 
 
 formally enounced by Aristotle," and from him was 
 universally adopted. Active and passive power are 
 in Greek styled Swa/u? TTOLT^TLIC^, and Swa/xt? ira0r)TLicij', 
 in Latin, potentia activa, and potent ia passiva.P 
 
 Poiver, therefore, is a word which we may use both 
 in an active, and in a passive, signification, and, in 
 psychology, we may apply it both to the active facul- 
 ties, and to the passive capacities, of mind. 
 
 This leads to the meaning of the terms faculties, Faculty. 
 and capacities. Faculty (facultas) is derived from 
 the obsolete Latin facul, the more ancient form of 
 facilis, from which again facilitas is formed. It is 
 properly limited to active power, and, therefore, is 
 abusively applied to the mere passive affections of 
 mind. 
 
 Capacity (capacitas), on the other hand, is more Capacity, 
 properly limited to these. Its primary signification, 
 which is literally room for, as well as its employment, 
 favours this ; although it cannot be denied, that there 
 are examples of its usage in an active sense. Leibnitz, 
 as far as I know, was the first who limited its psycho- 
 logical application to the passivities of mind. In his 
 famous Nouveaux Essais sur V Entendement Humain, 
 a work written in refutation of Locke's Essay on the 
 
 a See Metaph. iv. (v.) 12 ; viii. ruinations in nicts, those for passive 
 
 (ix.) 1 . ED. power by terminations in r6s. Thus 
 
 /3 This distinction is, indeed, estab- TrornTiKfc, that which can make ; wonj- 
 
 lished in the Greek language itself. r6v, that which can be made ; KIVTTTI.- 
 
 That tongue has, among its other K&V, that which can move; itivirrtv, 
 
 marvellous perfections, two sets of that which can be moved; and so 
 
 potential adjectives, the one for active, irpaKTii<6s and irpcucrJy, aiV07)TK<Js and 
 
 the other for passive power. Those a!ff(hrr6s, voirrints and POT/T^S, oiVo- 
 
 for active power are denoted by ter- SO^TJTJKIJS and (UKoSo/uTj-rdy, &c. 
 
 VOL. I. M
 
 178 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. same subject, he observes : " We may say that power 
 
 ! (puissance), in general, is the possibility of change. 
 
 Now the change, or the act of this possibility, being 
 action in one subject and passion in another, there 
 will be two powers (deux puissances}, the one passive, 
 the other active. The active may be called faculty, 
 and perhaps the passive might be called capacity, or 
 receptivity. It is true that the active power is some- 
 times taken in a higher sense, when, over and above 
 the simple faculty, there is also a tendency, a nisus ; 
 and it is thus that I have used it in my dynamical 
 considerations. We might give to it in this meaning 
 the special name of force"" I may notice that Reid 
 seems to have attributed no other meaning to the 
 term power than that of force. 
 
 Power, then, is active and passive ; faculty is 
 active power, capacity is passive power. 
 Disposition, The two terms next in order, are disposition, in 
 Greek, 8ux0ecris ; and habit, in Greek, eis. I take these 
 together as they are similar, yet not the same. Both 
 are tendencies to action ; but they differ in this, that 
 disposition properly denotes a natural tendency, habit 
 an acquired tendency. Aristotle distinguishes them 
 by another difference. " Habit (e^s) is discriminated 
 from disposition (Siatfeo-t?) in this, that the latter is 
 easily movable, the former of longer duration, and 
 more difficult to be moved."' 3 I may notice that 
 habit is formed by the frequent repetition of the same 
 action or passion, and that this repetition is called 
 consuetude, or custom. The latter terms, which pro- 
 perly signify the cause, are not unfrequently abusively 
 employed for habit, their effect. 
 
 I may likewise observe that the terms power, 
 
 a Xoureanx Essai's, liv. ii. ch. 21. 1. ED. 3 Categ. ch. 8.- ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 179 
 
 faculty, capacity, are more appropriately applied to LFXT. 
 natural, than to acquired, capabilities, and are thus x ' 
 
 inapplicable to mere habits. I say mere habits, for 
 where habit is superinduced upon a natural capability, 
 both terms may be used. Thus we can say both the 
 faculty of abstraction, and the habit of abstraction, 
 the capacity of suffering, and the habit of suffering ; 
 but still the meanings are not identical. 
 
 The last series of cognate terms are act, operation, Act, o P e- 
 energy. They are all mutually convertible, as alliLagy. 
 denoting the present exertion or exercise of a power, 
 a faculty, or a habit. I must here explain to you the 
 famous distinction of actual and potential existence, Potential 
 
 - , , . , . , . . . and Actual 
 
 tor, by this distinction, act, operation, energy, are Existence, 
 contradiscrirninated from power, faculty, capacity, 
 disposition, and habit. This distinction, when divested 
 of certain subordinate subtleties of no great conse- 
 quence, is manifest and simple. Potential existence 
 means merely that the thing may be at some time ; 
 actual existence, that it now is. a Thus, the mathe- 
 matician, when asleep or playing at cards, does not 
 exercise his skill ; his geometrical knowledge is all 
 latent, but he is still a mathematician, potentially. 
 
 " Ut quamvis tacet Hermogenes, cantor tamen atque 
 Optimus est modulator ; ut Alfenus vafer, omni 
 Abjecto instrument artis, clausaque taberna, 
 Sutor erat." 
 
 Hermogenes, says Horace, was a singer, even when 
 silent ; how ? a singer, not in actu but in posse. So 
 Alfenus was a cobbler, even when not at work ; that 
 is, he was a cobbler potential ; whereas, when busy in 
 his booth, he was a cobbler actual. 
 
 a. This distinction is well illustrated in the learned note of Trendelenburg 
 on Arist. de Anlma, ii. 1. ED. Horace, Sat. i. 3, 129, ED.
 
 180 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. In like manner, my sense of sight potentially 
 x ' exists, though my eyelids are closed ; but when I open 
 them, it exists actually. Now, power, faculty, capa- 
 city, disposition, habit, are all different expressions for 
 potential or possible existence ; act, operation, energy, 
 for actual or present existence. Thus the power of 
 imagination expresses the unexerted capability of ima- 
 gining ; the act of imagination denotes that power 
 elicited into immediate, into present existence. The 
 different synonyms for potential existence, are exist- 
 ence iv Swot/m, in potentia, in posse, in power ; for 
 actual existence, existence ev tvepyda, or tv emeXexeta, 
 in actu, in esse, in act, in operation, in energy. The 
 term energy is precisely the Greek term for act or 
 operation ; but it has vulgarly obtained the meaning 
 of forcible activity. 
 
 Function. The word functio, in Latin, simply expresses per- 
 formance or operation ; functio muneris is the exer- 
 tion of an energy of some determinate kind. But with 
 us the word function has come to be employed in the 
 sense of munus alone, and means not the exercise, but 
 the specific character, of a power. Thus the function 
 of a clergyman does not mean with us the performance 
 of his duties, but the peculiarity of those duties them- 
 selves. The function of nutrition does not mean the 
 operation of that animal power, but its discriminate 
 character. 
 
 a But there is another relation of he is a singer in actu, in relation to 
 
 potentiality and actuality which I may himself, before he had acquired the 
 
 notice, Hermogenes, Alfenus, before, accomplishment. This affords the 
 
 and after, acquiring the habits of distinction taken by Aristotle of first 
 
 singer, and cobbler. There is thus a and second energy, the first being 
 
 double kind of potentiality and actu- the habit acquired, the second the 
 
 ality, for when Hermogenes has ob- immediate exercise of that habit, 
 
 tained the habit and power of sing- [Cf. De Anima, lib. ii. c. 1. ED.] 
 ing, though not actually exercising,
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 181 
 
 So muck by way of preliminary explanation of the LECT. 
 
 psychological terms in most general and frequent use. * 
 
 Others, likewise, I shall, in the sequel, have occasion to 
 elucidate ; but these may, I think, more appropriately 
 be dealt with as they happen to occur.
 
 182 LECTUKES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECTURE XI. 
 
 OUTLINE OF DISTRIBUTION OF MENTAL PHENOMENA : 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS. 
 
 LECT. I NOW proceed to the consideration of the important 
 - subject, the Distribution of the Mental Phaenomena 
 
 Distribution ',.> i i T i 
 
 of the men- into their primary or most general classes. In regard 
 JSt"*"" to the distribution of the mental phsenomena, I shall 
 not at present attempt to give any history or criti- 
 cism of the various classifications which have been 
 proposed by different philosophers. These classifica- 
 tions are so numerous, and so contradictory, that, in 
 the present stage of your knowledge, such a history 
 would only fatigue the memory, without informing 
 the understanding ; for you cannot be expected to 
 be as yet able to comprehend, at least many of the 
 reasons which may be alleged for, or against, the dif- 
 ferent distributions of the human faculties. I shall, 
 therefore, at once proceed to state the classification 
 of these, which I have adopted as the best. 
 Conscious- In taking a comprehensive survey of the mental 
 pheenomena, these are all seen to comprise one essen- 
 cn- tial element, or to be possible only under one necessary 
 condition. This element or condition is Conscious- 
 ness, or the knowledge that I, that the Ego exists, 
 in some determinate state. In this knowledge they 
 appear, or are realised as phsenomena, and with this
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 183 
 
 knowledge they likewise disappear, or have no longer LECT. 
 a phsenomenal existence ; so that consciousness may XL 
 be compared to an internal light, by means of which, 
 and which alone, what passes in the mind is rendered 
 visible. Consciousness is simple, is not composed of 
 parts, either similar or dissimilar. It always resem- 
 bles itself, differing only in the degrees of its inten- 
 sity ; thus, there are not various kinds of conscious- 
 ness, although there are various kinds of mental 
 modes, or states, of which we are conscious. What- 
 ever division, therefore, of the mental phaenomena 
 may be adopted, all its members must be within con- 
 sciousness ; that is, we must not attempt to divide 
 consciousness itself, which must be viewed as compre- 
 hensive of the whole phenomena to be divided ; far 
 less should we reduce it, as a special phenomenon, 
 to a particular class. Let consciousness, therefore, 
 remain one and indivisible, comprehending all the 
 modifications, all the phenomena, of the thinking 
 subject. 
 
 But taking, again, a survey of the mental modi- Three grand 
 
 /? . i_ c / i_ classes of 
 
 ncations, or phenomena, of which we are conscious, 
 these are seen to divide themselves into THREE great 
 classes. In the first place, there are the phenomena 
 of Knowledge ; in the second place, there are the 
 phenomena of Feeling, or the phenomena of Pleasure 
 and Pain ; and, in the third place, there are the pheno- 
 mena of Will and Desire." 
 
 Let me illustrate this by an example. I see a pic- 
 ture. Now, first of all, I am conscious of perceiv- 
 ing a certain complement of colours and figures, 
 I recognise what the object is. This is the pheno- 
 menon of Cognition or Knowledge. But this is not the 
 
 a Compare Stewart's Works, vol. ii., Advertisement by Editor. ED.
 
 184 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LEGT. only phenomenon of which I may be here conscious. 
 
 ! I may experience certain affections in the contempla- 
 tion of this object. If the picture be a masterpiece, 
 the gratification will be unalloyed ; but if it be an 
 unequal production, I shall be conscious, perhaps, of 
 enjoyment, but of enjoyment alloyed with dissatisfac- 
 tion. This is the phenomenon of Feeling, or of Plea- 
 sure and Pain. But these two phenomena do not yet 
 exhaust all of which I may be conscious on the occa- 
 sion. I may desire to see the picture long, to see it 
 often, to make it my own, and, perhaps, I may will, 
 resolve, or determine so to do. This is the complex 
 phenomenon of Will and Desire. 
 
 Their no- The English language, unfortunately, does not afford 
 
 menclature. ,. . . 
 
 us terms competent to express and discriminate, with 
 even tolerable clearness and precision, these classes of 
 phenomena. In regard to the first, indeed, we have 
 comparatively little reason to complain, the synony- 
 mous terms, knowledge and cognition, suffice to distin- 
 guish the phenomena of this class from those of the 
 other two. In the second class, the defect of the lan- 
 guage becomes more apparent. The word feeling is 
 the only term under which we can possibly collect the 
 phenomena of pleasure and pain, and yet this word is 
 ambiguous. For it is not only employed to denote 
 what we are conscious of as agreeable or disagreeable 
 in our mental states, but it is likewise used as a 
 synonym for the sense of touch." It is, however, 
 principally in relation to the third class that the defi- 
 ciency is manifested. In English, unfortunately, we 
 have no term capable of adequately expressing what is 
 
 a [Brown uses feeling for conscious- of feelings, every new feeling being a 
 
 ness. Oral Interp.] ; e. g. Philoso- change of its state." Second edition, 
 
 phy of the Human Mind, Lecture xi. voL L p, 222. ED. 
 " The miiid is susceptible of a variety
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 185 
 
 common both to will and desire ; that is, the nisus LECT. 
 
 or conatus, the tendency towards the realisation of 
 
 their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by 
 desire a blind and fatal, tendency to act. a Now, to 
 express, I say, the tendency to overt action, the 
 quality in which desire and will are equally contained, 
 we possess no English term to which an exception 
 of more or less cogency may not be taken. Were we 
 to say the phenomena of tendency, the phrase would 
 be vague ; and the same is true of the phenomena of 
 doing. Again, the term phenomena of appetency is 
 objectionable, because, (to say nothing of the unfami- 
 liarity of the expression,) appetency, though perhaps 
 etymologically unexceptionable, has both in Latin and 
 English a meaning almost synonymous with desire. 
 Like the Latin appetentia, the Greek o/oets is equally 
 ill-balanced, for, though used by philosophers to com- 
 prehend both will and desire, it more familiarly sug- 
 gests the latter, and we need not, therefore, be soli- 
 citous, with Mr Harris and Lord Monboddo, to natu- 
 ralise in English the term orectic.P Again, the phrase 
 phenomena of activity would be even worse ; every 
 possible objection can be made to the term active 
 powers, by which the philosophers of this country 
 have designated the orectic faculties of the Aristo- 
 telians. For you will observe, that all faculties are 
 equally active ; and it is not the overt performance, 
 but the tendency towards it, for which we are in 
 quest of an expression. The German is the only lan- 
 guage I am acquainted with, which is able to supply 
 the term of which philosophy is in want. The ex- 
 
 a Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. i. 10 : BovAij- fl See Lord Monboddo's Ancient 
 <m, fitra \6yov op(is aya6ov, &\oyoi Metaphysics, book ii. chaps. viL ix. 
 5' opeeis, opyi] KO! fTriBvu'ia. ED. ED.
 
 186 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. pression Bestrebungs Verm'ogen, which is most nearly, 
 though awkwardly and inadequately, translated by 
 
 striving faculties, faculties of effort or endeavour, 
 is now generally employed, in the philosophy of Ger- 
 many, as the genus comprehending desire and will. 
 Perhaps the phrase phenomena of exertion is, upon 
 the whole, the best expression to denote the manifes- 
 tations, and exertive faculties, the best expression to 
 denote the faculties of will and desire. Exero, in 
 Latin, means literally to put forth, and, with us, 
 exertion and exertive are the only endurable words 
 that I can find which approximate, though distantly, 
 to the strength and precision of the German expression. 
 I shall, however, occasionally employ likewise the 
 term appetency, in the rigorous signification I have 
 mentioned, as a genus comprehending under it both 
 desires and volitions. 
 
 By whom This division of the phenomena of mind into the 
 foiddistri- three great classes of the Cognitive faculties, the 
 tatum am peeling^ or capacities of Pleasure and Pain, and the 
 Exertive or Conative Powers, I do not propose as ori- 
 ginal. It was first promulgated by Kant ;0 and the 
 felicity of the distribution was so apparent, that it has 
 now been long all but universally adopted in Germany 
 by the philosophers of every school ; and, what is 
 curious, the only philosopher of any eminence by whom 
 it has been assailed, indeed, the only philosopher of 
 
 a 1848. The term Conative (from acquire more and more power over 
 Conari) is employed by Cudworth in them." The terms Conation and Con- 
 bis Treatise on Free Will, published afire are those finally adopted by the 
 some years ago from his MSS. in the Author, as the most appropriate ex- 
 British Museum. [A Treatise on pressions for the class of phenomena 
 Free Will, by Ralph Cudworth, D.D., in question. ED.] 
 edited by John Allen, M.A. Lon- Kritik dcr Urtheilskraft, Einlei- 
 don, 1838, p. 31. " Notwithstanding tung. The same division is also 
 which, the hegemonic of the soul adopted as the basis of his Anthropo- 
 may, by conatives and endeavours, loyic. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 187 
 
 any reputation by whom it has been, in that country, LECT. 
 rejected, is not an opponent of the Kantian philosophy, 
 
 but one of its most zealous champions." To the psy- 
 chologists of this country it is apparently wholly un- 
 known. They still adhere to the old scholastic divi- 
 sion into powers of the Understanding and powers of 
 the Will ; or, as it is otherwise expressed, into Intel- 
 lectual and Active powers/ 
 
 By its author, the Kantian classification has received objection to 
 no illustration ; and by other German philosophers, it cationTb- 
 has apparently been viewed as too manifest to require 
 any. Nor do I think it needs much ; though a few 
 words in explanation may not be inexpedient. An 
 objection to the arrangement may, perhaps, be taken on 
 the ground that the three classes are not co-ordinate. 
 It is evident that every mental phsenomena is either 
 an act of knowledge, or only possible through an act 
 of knowledge, for consciousness is a knowledge, a 
 phsenomenon of cognition ; and, on this principle, many 
 philosophers, as Descartes, Leibnitz, Spinoza, Wolf, 
 Platner, and others, have been led to regard the know- 
 ing, or representative faculty, as they called it, the 
 faculty of cognition, as the fundamental power of 
 mind, from which all others are derivative. To this 
 the answer is easy. These philosophers did not observe 
 that, although pleasure and pain although desire and 
 volition, are only as they are known to be ; yet, in 
 these modifications, a quality, a phsenomenon of mind, 
 absolutely new, has been superadded, which was never 
 
 a This philosopher is Kriig, \vho fiihl and Seelenlcrafte. A fuller ac- 
 
 attaeked the Kantian division in hia count of this controversy is given by 
 
 Gru.nd.laye zu einer neuen Theorie der Sir W. Hamilton in a subsequent Lec- 
 
 Gefiihle und des sogenannten Gefiihls- ture. See VoL II., Lectures on the 
 
 rcrmogens, Konigsberg, 1823. See Feelings. ED. 
 also his I/andworterbiKh der Philo- & See below, Lect. XX. ED. 
 sophischoi Wisscnschaften, art. Ge-
 
 188 LECTUEES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. involved in, and could, therefore, never have been 
 
 XI 
 
 '- evolved out of, the mere faculty of knowledge. The 
 faculty of knowledge is certainly the first in order, in- 
 asmuch as it is the conditio sine qua non of the others ; 
 and we are able to conceive a being possessed of the 
 power of recognising existence, and yet wholly void of 
 all feeling of pain and pleasure, and of all powers of 
 desire and volition. On the other hand, we are wholly 
 unable to conceive a being possessed of feeling and 
 desire, and, at the same time, without a knowledge of 
 any object upon which his affections may be employed, 
 and without a consciousness of these affections them- 
 selves. 
 
 We can farther conceive a being possessed of know- 
 ledge and feeling alone a being endowed with a 
 power of recognising objects, of enjoying the exercise, 
 and of grieving at the restraint, of his activity, and yet 
 devoid of that faculty of voluntary agency of that 
 conation, which is possessed by man. To such a being 
 would belong feelings of pain and pleasure, but neither 
 desire nor will, properly so called. On the other hand, 
 however, we cannot possibly conceive the existence of 
 a voluntary activity independently of all feeling ; 
 for voluntary conation is a faculty which can only be 
 determined to energy through a pain or pleasure, 
 through an estimate of the relative worth of objects. 
 
 In distinguishing the cognitions, feelings, and con- 
 ations, it is not, therefore, to be supposed that these 
 phsenomena are possible independently of each other. 
 In our philosophical systems, they may stand separated 
 from each other in books and chapters ; in nature, 
 they are ever interwoven. In every, the simplest, modi- 
 fication of mind, knowledge, feeling, and desire or will, 
 go to constitute the mental state ; and it is only by a
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 189 
 
 scientific abstraction that we are able to analyse the LECT. 
 
 xi 
 
 state into elements, which are never really existent 
 
 but in mutual combination. These elements are found, 
 indeed, in very various proportions in different states, 
 sometimes one preponderates, sometimes an other; but 
 there is no state in which they are not all coexistent. 
 
 Let the mental phaenomena, therefore, be distributed 
 under the three heads of phsenomena of Cognition, or 
 the faculties of Knowledge ; phaenomena of Feeling, or 
 the capacities of Pleasure and Pain ; and phaenomena 
 of Desiring or Willing, or the powers of Conation. 
 
 The order of these is determined by their relative Order of 
 consecution. Feeling and appetency suppose know- 
 ledge. The cognitive faculties, therefore, stand first. 
 But as will, and desire, and aversion, suppose a know- 
 ledge of the pleasurable and painful, the feelings will 
 stand second as intermediate between the other two. 
 
 Such is the highest or most general classification of conscious- 
 the mental phaenomena, or of the phaenomena of which first 'object 
 
 f . ,1 ofconside- 
 
 we are conscious, -but as these primary classes are, ration, 
 as we have shown, all included under one universal 
 phaenomenon, the phsenomenon of consciousness, 
 it follows that Consciousness must form the first 
 object of our consideration. 
 
 I shall not attempt to give you any preliminary 
 detail of the opinions of philosophers in relation to 
 consciousness. The only effect of this would be to 
 confuse you. It is necessary, in the first place, to 
 obtain correct and definite notions on the subject, 
 and having obtained these, it will be easy for you to 
 understand in what respects the opinions that have 
 been hazarded on the cardinal point of all philosophy, ac^'iiS 
 are inadequate or erroneous. I may notice that Dr 
 Reid and Mr Stewart have favoured us with no special
 
 190 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. or articulate account of consciousness. The former, 
 indeed, intended and promised this. In the seventh 
 
 chapter of the first Essay On the Intellectual Powers, 
 which is entitled Division of the Powen^s of the Mind, 
 the concluding paragraph is as follows : 
 
 " I shall not, therefore, attempt a complete enume- 
 ration of the powers of the human understanding. I 
 shall only mention those which I propose to explain, 
 and they are the following : 
 
 " 1 st, The powers we have by means of our External 
 Senses ; 2dly, Memory ; 3dly, Conception ; 4thly, The 
 powers of Eesolving and Analysing complex objects, 
 and compounding those that are more simple ; Sthly, 
 Judging; 6thly, Reasoning; 7thly, Taste; Sthly, Moral 
 Perception ; and, last of all, Consciousness/" 1 
 
 The work, however, contains no essay upon Con- 
 sciousness ; but, in reference to this deficiency, the 
 author, in the last paragraph of the book, states, 
 *' As to Consciousness, what I think necessary to 
 be said upon it has been already said; Essay vi., 
 chap, v." P the chapter, to wit, entitled On the First 
 Principles of Contingent Truths. To that chapter you 
 may, however, add what is spoken of consciousness in 
 the first chapter of the first Essay, entitled, Explica- 
 tion of Words, 7. 7 "We are, therefore, left to glean 
 the opinion of both Reid and Stewart on the subject 
 of consciousness, from incidental notices in their writ- 
 ings ; but these are fortunately sufficient to supply 
 us with the necessary information in regard to their 
 opinions on this subject. 
 
 conscious- Nothing has contributed more to spread obscurity 
 over a very transparent matter, than the attempts of 
 philosophers to define consciousness. Consciousness 
 
 o Works, p. 244. ED. 76. p. 508. ED. y 11. p. 222. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 191 
 
 cannot be defined, we may be ourselves fully aware LECT. 
 
 what consciousness is, but we cannot, without confu- 
 
 sion, convey to others a definition of what we our- 
 selves clearly apprehend. The reason is plain. Con- 
 sciousness lies at the root of all knowledge. Conscious- 
 ness is itself the one highest source of all comprehen- 
 sibility and illustration, how, then, can we find 
 aught else by which consciousness may be illustrated 
 or comprehended ? To accomplish this, it would be 
 necessary to have a second consciousness, through 
 which we might be conscious of the mode in which 
 the first consciousness was possible. Many philoso- 
 phers, and among others Dr Brown, have defined 
 consciousness a feeling. ' But how do they define a 
 feeling ? They define, and must define it, as some- 
 thing of which we are conscious ; for a feeling of 
 which we are not conscious, is no feeling at all. Here, 
 therefore, they are guilty of a logical see-saw, or circle. 
 They define consciousness by feeling, and feeling by 
 consciousness, that is, they explain the same by the 
 same, and thus leave us in the end no wiser than 
 we were in the beginning. Other philosophers say 
 that consciousness is a knowledge, and others, again, 
 that it is a belief or conviction of a knowledge. 
 Here, again, we have the same violation of logical law. 
 Is there any knowledge of which we are not conscious'? 
 Is there any belief of which we are not conscious ? 
 There is not, there cannot be ; therefore, conscious- 
 ness is not contained under either knowledge or belief, 
 but, on the contrary, knowledge and belief are both 
 contained under consciousness. In short, the notion 
 of consciousness is so elementary, that it cannot pos- 
 
 a Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture xi. ; vol. i. p. 227237. 
 Second edition. ED.
 
 192 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. sibly be resolved into others more simple. It cannot, 
 ' therefore, be brought under any genus, any more 
 
 general conception ; and, consequently, it cannot be 
 defined. 
 
 Conscious- But though consciousness cannot be logically de- 
 
 ofphiioso- fined, it may, however, be philosophically analysed. 
 
 aiys? s . an This analysis is effected by observing and holding 
 
 fast the phenomena or facts of consciousness, compar- 
 
 ing these, and, from this comparison, evolving the 
 
 universal conditions under which alone an act of 
 
 consciousness is possible. 
 
 It is only in following this method that we can 
 attain to precise and accurate knowledge of the con- 
 tents of consciousness ; and it need not afflict us if 
 the result of our investigation be very different from 
 the conclusions that have been previously held. 
 what kind But, before proceeding to show you in detail what 
 wo^fcon- the act of consciousness comprises, it may be proper, 
 rTei3r/ed in the first place, to recall to you, in general, what 
 Md e whtt ; u kind of act the word is employed to denote. I know, 
 ives. c What is it that is necessarily 
 
 involved in all these 1 It requires only to be stated 
 to be admitted, that when I know, I must know that 
 I know, when I feel, I must know that I feel, when 
 I desire, I must know that I desire. The knowledge, 
 the feeling, the desire, are possible only under the 
 condition of being known, and being known by me. 
 For if I did not know that I knew, I would not 
 know, if I did not know that I felt, I would not 
 feel, if I did not know that I desired, I would not 
 desire. Now, this knowledge, which I, the subject, 
 have of these modifications of my being, and through 
 which knowledge alone these modifications are pos- 
 sible, is what we call consciousness. The expressions 
 / know that I know, / know that I feel, / know
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 193 
 
 that I desire, are thus translated by, / am conscious LECT. 
 
 that I know, / am conscious that I feel, / am con- - 
 
 scious that I desire. Consciousness is thus, on the 
 one hand, the recognition by the mind or ego of its 
 acts and affections ; in other words, the self-affirma- 
 tion, that certain modifications are known by me, and 
 that these modifications are mine. But, on the other 
 hand, consciousness is not to be viewed as anything 
 different from these modifications themselves, but is, 
 in fact, the general condition of their existence, or of 
 their existence within the sphere of intelligence. 
 Though the simplest act of mind, consciousness thus 
 expresses a relation subsisting between two terms. 
 These terms are, on the one hand, an I or Self, as the 
 subject of a certain modification, and, on the other, 
 some modification, state, quality, affection, or opera- 
 tion belonging to the subject. Consciousness, thus, 
 in its simplicity, necessarily involves three things, 
 1, A recognising or knowing subject; 2, A recognised 
 or known modification ; and, 3, A recognition or 
 knowledge by the subject of the modification. 
 
 From this it is apparent, that consciousness and conscious- 
 knowledge each involve the other. An act of know- 
 ledge may be expressed by the formula, / know ; an 
 act of consciousness by the formula, / know that I 
 know: but as it is impossible for us to know without 
 at the same time knowing that we know ; so it is 
 impossible to know that we know without our actually 
 knowing. The one merely explicitly expresses what 
 the other implicitly contains. Consciousness and know- 
 ledge are thus not opposed as really different. Why, 
 then, it may be asked, employ two terms to express 
 notions, which, as they severally infer each other, are 
 really identical? To this the answer is easy. Realities 
 
 VOL. I. N
 
 194 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 may be in themselves inseparable, while, as objects 
 of our knowledge, it may be necessary to consider 
 them apart. Notions, likewise, may severally imply 
 each other, and be inseparable even in thought ; yet, 
 for the purposes of science, it may be requisite to 
 distinguish them by different terms, and to consider 
 them in their relations or correlations to each other, 
 illustrated Take a geometrical example, a triangle. This is a 
 tncL g ^- me whole composed of certain parts. Here the whole 
 cannot be conceived as separate from its parts, and 
 the parts cannot be conceived as separate from their 
 whole. Yet it is scientifically necessary to have diffe- 
 rent names for each, and it is necessary now to con- 
 sider the whole in relation to the parts, and now the 
 parts in correlation to the whole. Again, the consti- 
 tuent parts of a triangle are sides and angles. Here 
 the sides suppose the angles, the angles suppose the 
 sides, and, in fact, the sides and angles are in them- 
 selves in reality, one and indivisible. But they are 
 not the same to us, to our knowledge. For though 
 we cannot abstract in thought, the sides from the 
 angle, the angle from the sides, we may make one or 
 other the principal object of attention. We may either 
 consider the angles in relation to each other, and 
 to the sides ; or the sides in relation to each other, 
 and to the angles. And to express all this, it is neces- 
 sary to distinguish, in thought and in expression, 
 what, in nature, is one and indivisible. 
 
 By the dis- As it is in geometry, so it is in the philosophy of 
 conscious- mind. We require different words, not only to express 
 knowledge, objects and relations different in themselves, but to 
 express the same objects and relations under the diffe- 
 rent points of view in which they are placed by the 
 mind, when scientifically considering them. Thus, 
 in the present instance, consciousness and knowledge
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 195 
 
 are not distinguished by different words as different LECT. 
 
 things, but only as the same thing considered in XL 
 
 different aspects. The verbal distinction is taken for 
 the sake of brevity and precision, and its convenience 
 warrants its establishment. Knowledge is a relation, 
 and every relation supposes two terms. Thus, in the 
 relation in question, there is, on the one hand, a sub- 
 ject of knowledge, that is, the knowing mind, and 
 on the other, there is an object of knowledge, that 
 is, the thing known ; and the knowledge itself is the 
 relation between these two terms. Now, though each 
 term of a relation necessarily supposes the other, 
 nevertheless one of these terms may be to us the 
 more interesting, and we may consider that term as 
 the principal, and view the other only as subordinate 
 and correlative. Now, this is the case in the present 
 instance. In an act of knowledge, my attention may 
 be principally attracted either to the object known, 
 or to myself as the subject knowing; and, in the latter 
 case, although no new element be added to the act, 
 the condition involved in it, / know that I know, 
 becomes the primary and prominent matter of con- 
 sideration. And when, as in the philosophy of mind, 
 the act of knowledge comes to be specially considered 
 in relation to the knowing subject, it is, at last, in 
 the progress of the science, found convenient, if not 
 absolutely necessary, to possess a scientific word in 
 which this point of view should be permanently and 
 distinctively embodied. But, as the want of a tech- 
 nical and appropriate expression could be experienced 
 only after psychological abstraction had acquired a 
 certain stability and importance, it is evident that 
 the appropriation of such an expression could not, in 
 any language, be of very early date. And this is 
 shown by the history of the synonymous terms for
 
 196 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. consciousness in the different languages, a history 
 which, though curious, you will find noticed in no 
 
 History of publication whatever. The employment of the word 
 
 the term * . . . 
 
 conscious- conscientia, of which our term consciousness is a 
 translation, is, in its psychological signification, not 
 older than the philosophy of Descartes. Previously 
 to him, this word was used almost exclusively in the 
 ethical sense expressed by our term conscience, and 
 in the striking and apparently appropriate dictum of 
 its use by St Augustin, " certissima scientia et clamante con- 
 st,Augus- sc i en ti a a which you may find so frequently paraded 
 by the continental philosophers, when illustrating the 
 certainty of consciousness ; in that quotation, the 
 term is, by its author, applied only in its moral or reli- 
 gious signification. Besides the moral application, 
 the words conscire and conscientia were frequently 
 employed to denote participation in a common know- 
 ledge. Thus the members of a conspiracy were said 
 conscire, and conscius is even used for conspirator ; 
 and, metaphorically, this community of knowledge is 
 attributed to inanimate objects, as, wailing to the 
 rocks, a lover says of himself, 
 
 " Et conscia saxa fatigo." /3 
 
 I would not, however, be supposed to deny that 
 these words were sometimes used, in ancient Latinity, 
 in the modern sense of consciousness, or being con- 
 scious. An unexceptionable example is afforded by 
 Quintilian in his Institutiones^ lib. xii., cap. xi. ; 7 and 
 
 o De Trinitate, xiii. 1. ED. tia potuerim inquirere, candide me 
 /3 Compare Virgil, ^fneid, ix. 429 : atque simpliciter in notitiam eorani, 
 " Ccelum hoc et conscia sidera tea- si qui forte cognoscere voluissent, pro- 
 tor." tulisse." This sense, however, is 
 7 " Conscius sum mihi, quantum not unusual. Cf. Cic. Tusc. ii. 4 : 
 mediocritate valui, quseque antea " Mihi sum conscius, nunquam me 
 scierim, quseque operis hujusce gra- nimis cupidum fuisse vitse." ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 197 
 
 more than one similar instance may be drawn from LECT. 
 Tertullian, and other of the Latin fathers.' 
 
 Until Descartes, therefore, the Latin terms conscire Pint ud 
 and conscientia were very rarely usurped in their cartes in 
 present psychological meaning, a meaning which, it psySo- 
 is needless to add, was not expressed by any term in hj g a m 
 the vulgar languages ; for, besides Tertullian, I am 
 aware of only one or two obscure instances in which, 
 as translations of the Greek terms o-waLarOdvoncu and 
 <rvraicr#i7cri9, of which we are about to speak, the 
 terms conscio and conscientia were, as the nearest 
 equivalents, contorted from their established significa- 
 tion to the sense in which they were afterwards em- 
 ployed by Descartes. Thus, in the philosophy of the 
 West, we may safely affirm that, prior to Descartes, 
 there was no psychological term in recognised use for 
 what, since his time, is expressed in philosophical 
 Latinity by conscientia, in French by conscience, in 
 English by consciousness, in Italian by conscienza, 
 and in German by Bewusstseyn. It will be observed 
 that in Latin, French, and Italian (and I might add 
 the Spanish and other Romanic languages), the terms 
 are analogous ; the moral and psychological meaning 
 being denoted by the same word. 
 
 In Greek there was no term for consciousness until NO term for 
 the decline of philosophy, and in the later ages of the SThT M " i 
 language. Plato and Aristotle, to say nothing of other the decide 
 philosophers, had no special term to express the know- Jhy. ' ' 
 ledge which the mind affords of the operations of its 
 faculties, though this, of course, was necessarily a fre- 
 
 [o DeTestimonio Anim.(f,c. 5: "Sed "Sed satis erat illi, inquis, conscien- 
 
 qui ejusmodi eruptiones animae non tia sua." Cf. Augustin, De Trinitate, 
 
 putavit doctrinam esse naturae et con- x. c. 7 : " Et quia sibi bene con- 
 
 genitse et ingenitae conscientiaa tacita scia est principatus sui quo corpus 
 
 commissa." De Carne Christi, c. 3 : regit."]
 
 198 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. quent matter of their consideration. Intellect was 
 supposed by them to be cognisaut of its own opera- 
 tions ; it was only doubted whether by a direct or by 
 a reflex act. In regard to sense, the matter was more 
 perplexed ; and, on this point, both philosophers seem 
 to vacillate in their opinions. In his Thecetetus* Plato 
 accords to sense the power of perceiving that it per- 
 ceives ; whereas, in his Charmidesf this power he denies 
 to sense, and attributes to intelligence, (vovs.) In like 
 manner, an apparently different doctrine may be found 
 in different works of Aristotle. In his Treatise on the 
 Soul he thus cogently argues : " When we perceive that 
 we see, hear, &c., it is necessary that by sight itself we 
 perceive that we see, or by another sense. If by an- 
 other sense, then this also must be a sense of sight, 
 conversant equally about the object of sight, colour. 
 Consequently there must either be two senses of the 
 same object, or every sense must be percipient of itself. 
 Moreover, if the sense percipient of sight be different 
 from sight itself, it follows either that there is a regress 
 to infinity, or we must admit at last some sense per- 
 cipient of itself ; but if so, it is more reasonable to ad- 
 mit this in the original sense at once/' 7 Here a con- 
 sciousness is apparently attributed to each several sense. 
 This, however, is expressly denied in his work On Skcp 
 and Waking? to say nothing of his Problems, which, 
 I am inclined, however, to think, are not genuine. It 
 
 a " Accedit testimonium Pktonis /3 P. 167, etseq. Cf . Conimbricenses, 
 
 in Theseteto, ubi ait sensum sentire 1. c. Plato, however, merely denies 
 
 quod sentit et quod non sentit." that there can be a sense which per- 
 
 Conimbricemes in Arist. de Anim. ii. ceives the act of sensation without 
 
 2. The passage referred to is pro- perceiving its object. ED. 
 
 bably Theatt.,?. 192 : 'Mvvarov ... y De Anima, iii. 2. ED. 
 
 f, trtptv ri &v alffBaixTai, 5 De Somno, c. 2. 4. The passage 
 eivcu, Kal i> al<T0dveTai, >v n in the Problems, which may perhaps 
 This passage, however, have the same meaning, though it ad- 
 is not exactly in point mils of a different interpretation, is
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 199 
 
 is there stated that sight does not see that it sees, LECT. 
 
 neither can sight or taste judge that sweet is a quality I 
 
 different from white ; but that this is the function of 
 some common faculty, in which they both converge. 
 The apparent repugnance may, however, easily be re- 
 conciled. But, what concerns us at present, in all these 
 discussions by the two philosophers, there is no single 
 term employed to denote that special aspect of the 
 phaenomenon of knowledge, which is thus by them 
 made matter of consideration. It is only under the Terms tan- 
 later Platonists and Aristotelians that peculiar terms, cowimu- 
 tantamount to our consciousness, were adopted into edby the'" 
 the language of philosophy. In the text of Diogenes tonists ata 
 Laertius, indeed, (vii. 85), I find crwetS^crts manifestly anT 
 employed in the sense of consciousness. This, how- 
 ever, is a corrupt reading ; and the authority of the 
 best manuscripts and of the best critics shows that 
 crvVSeo-is is the true lection." The Greek Platonists 
 and Aristotelians, in general, did not allow that the 
 recognition that we know, that we feel, that we 
 desire, &c., was the act of any special faculty, but 
 the general attribute of intellect ; and the power of 
 reflecting, of turning back upon itself, was justly 
 viewed as the distinctive quality of intelligence. It 
 was, however, necessary to possess some single term 
 expressive of this intellectual retortion, of this CTTL- 
 cTTpcxfrr) irpos eavrov, and the term orwcucr^crig was 
 adopted. This 1 find employed particularly by Proclus, 
 Plotinus, and Simplicius.^ The term (rwfi'S^cri?, the 
 
 sect. xi. 33 : Xo>piff6e7ffa 5 a1aOi)<ns proposes, on the authority of Laertius, 
 
 Siavolas Ko.6a.irfp a.vai<r6r)Toi' irAvov ex fl - to read ffwt tSriffis for ff6t>$f<rts in Sui- 
 
 See further, Discussions, p. 51. das. ED. 
 
 ED. [P Plotinus, Enn. v. lib. iii. c. 2. 
 
 o The correction avvtifffis is made Proclus, Inst. Theol. c. 39. Simpli- 
 
 by Menage on the authority of Suidas, cius, In Epict. Enchir. p. 28, Heins. 
 
 r. 6prf. Kuster, on the other hand, (p. 49, Schweigh.)] In the two first
 
 200 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. one equivalent to the comcientia of the Latins, re- 
 - mained like conscientia itself, long exclusively applied 
 
 to denote conscience or the moral faculty ; and it is 
 only in Greek writers who, as Eugenius of Bulgaria, 
 have flourished since the time of Descartes and Leib- 
 nitz, that <rvvdT)cn<s has, like the conscientia of the 
 Latins, been employed in the psychological meaning of 
 consciousness." I may notice that the word <rwe- 
 iriyv<t)(ri<s, in the sense of consciousness, is also to be 
 occasionally met with in the later authors on phi- 
 losophy in the Greek tongue.. The expression o-waur- 
 #770-19, which properly denotes the self-recognition of 
 sense and feeling, was, however, extended to mark con- 
 Ceruin of sciousness in general. Some of the Aristotelians, how- 
 
 the Aristo- , ., . ., , " . , . 
 
 teiians at- ever, like certain philosophers in this country, attri- 
 buted this recognition to a special faculty. Of these 
 I have been able to discover only three : Philoponus, 
 in his commentary on Aristotle's treatise Of the Soul;? 
 Michael Ephesius,in his commentary on Aristotle's trea- 
 tise of Memory and Reminiscence ; y and Michael Psel- 
 lus, in his work on Various Knowledge* It is doubted, 
 
 of these passages, trwcuff(h)ffis appears same sense. The title of his work is, 
 
 to be used merely in its etymological 'H \oyu<)) IK iraXaleavre KM vturtpuv 
 
 sense of perception of an object in a-wtpaviffOe'iffa.- wJ> Evyevtov Sicuc6vov 
 
 conjunction with other objects. In rov Eov\yapf<DS- iv An{^ TTJJ 3aovias. 
 
 the last, however, it seems to be *ET |^s. (1766.) ED. 
 
 fully equivalent to the modern con- j8 On lib. iii. c. 2. He mentions 
 
 sciousness ; as also in Hierocles, In this as the opinion of the more recent 
 
 A urea Pyth. Carm. 41, p. 213, ed. interpreters. ED. 
 
 1654. Seitus Empiricus, Adv. Math. y Rather in the Commentary on 
 
 ix. 68 (p. 407, Bekker). Michael Ephe- the Nicomadiean Ethics, usually at- 
 
 sius, In Arist. de Memoria, p. 134. tributed to Eustratius, p. 160, b. 
 
 Plutarch, De Profectibus in Virtute, It is not mentioned in the Com- 
 
 c. 1, 3. Plotinus, Enn. iii. lib. 4, c. 4. mentary on the De Memoria. ED. 
 
 Simplicius, In Arist. Catcg. p. 83, 8 [Psellus, De Omnifaria Doctrina, 
 
 b. ed. 1S51. ED. 46 :] Tlpoffox*) t(rr\ Koff *, irpofft- 
 
 a See the Logic of Eugenius, p. x o P ev TO ' J tpyois ols -wpiTToptv KO! 
 
 113. He also uses ffvveriyvoxns in the TOJJ \6yoi j ofy \fyofjLtv. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 201 
 
 however, whether the two last be not the same person ; LECT. 
 
 and their remarkable coincidence in the point under con- !_ 
 
 sideration, is even a strong argument for their identity. 
 They assign this recognition to a faculty which they 
 call TO irpocreKTiKov, that is TO TrpocreKTLKov /^e/ao?, the 
 attentive part or function of mind. This is the first 
 indication in the history of philosophy of that false 
 analysis which has raised attention into a separate 
 faculty. I beg you, however, to observe, that Philoponus 
 and his follower, Michael Ephesius, do not distinguish 
 attention from consciousness. This is a point we are 
 hereafter specially to consider, when perhaps it may be 
 found that, though wrong in making consciousness or 
 attention a peculiar faculty, they were right, at least, 
 in not dividing consciousness and attention into differ- 
 ent faculties. 
 
 But to return from our historical digression. We '"jj'jjy* 
 
 may lay it down as the most general characteristic of <**- 
 . , , & . . , , . , . tic f con - 
 
 consciousness, that it is the recognition by the thinking sciousness. 
 
 subject of its own acts or affections. 
 
 So far there is no difficulty and no dispute. In this The special 
 
 conditions of 
 
 conscious- 
 
 all philosophers are agreed. The more arduous task 
 remains of determining the special conditions of con- 
 sciousness. Of these, likewise, some are almost too 
 palpable to admit of controversy. Before proceeding 
 to those in regard to which there is any doubt or diffi- 
 culty, it will be proper, in the first place, to state and i. Those 
 dispose of such determinations as are too palpable to Lotted. 
 be called in question. Of these admitted limitations, 
 the first is, that consciousness is an actual and not a Conscious- 
 potential knowledge." Thus a man is said to know, i^Si 16 
 i.e. is able to know, that 7 + 9 are = 16, though that 
 
 a Compare Reid's Coll. Worlt, p. 810. ED.
 
 202 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. equation be not, at the moment, the object of his 
 
 ! thought ; but we cannot say that he is conscious of 
 
 this truth unless while actually present to his mind. 
 
 2. imme- The second limitation is, that consciousness is an 
 ledge. n w immediate, not a mediate knowledge. We are said, 
 
 for example, to know a past occurrence when we repre- 
 sent it to the mind in an act of memory. We know 
 the mental representation, and this we do immediately 
 and in itself, and are also said to know the past occur- 
 rence, as mediately knowing it through the mental 
 modification which represents it. Now, we are con- 
 scious of the representation as immediately known, 
 but we cannot be said to be conscious of the thing 
 represented, which, if known, is only known through 
 its representation. If, therefore, mediate knowledge 
 be in propriety a knowledge, consciousness is not co- 
 extensive with knowledge. This is, however, a problem 
 we are hereafter specially to consider. I may here 
 also observe, that, while all philosophers agree in mak- 
 ing consciousness an immediate knowledge, some, as 
 Keid and Stewart, do not admit that all immediate 
 knowledge is consciousness. They hold that we have 
 an immediate knowledge of external objects, but they 
 hold that these objects are beyond the sphere of con- 
 sciousness. B This is an opinion we are, likewise, soon 
 to canvass. 
 
 3. contrast, The third condition of consciousness, which may be 
 nation of held as universally admitted, is, that it supposes a con- 
 frTmVn- trast, a discrimination ; for we can be conscious only 
 
 other. ". 
 
 inasmuch as we are conscious of something ; and we 
 are conscious of something only inasmuch as we are 
 
 a See Reid, Intellectual Powers, Philosophy, part i. 1, 2 ; Collected 
 Essay vi. ch. 5, 1, 6. Works, pp. Works, vol. ii. p. 12. ED. 
 442, 445. Stewart, Outlines of Moral
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 203 
 
 conscious of what that something is, that is, dis- LECT. 
 
 tinguish it from what it is not. This discrimination ! 
 
 is of different kinds and degrees. 
 
 In the first place, there is the contrast between the This discri- 
 two grand opposites, self and not-self, ego and non- ^o^ n ' 
 ego, mind and matter ; (the contrast of subject and degrees. 
 object is more general.) We are conscious of self only 
 in and by its contradistinction from not-self ; and are 
 conscious of not-self only in and by its contradistinc- 
 tion from self. In the second place, there is the dis- 
 crimination of the states or modifications of the internal 
 subject or self from each other. We are conscious 
 of one mental state only as we contradistinguish it 
 from another ; where two, three, or more such states 
 are confounded, we are conscious of them as one ; and 
 were we to note no difference in our mental modifica- 
 tions, we might be said to be absolutely unconscious. 
 Hobbes has truly said, " Idem semper sentire, et non 
 sentire, ad idem recidunt."* In the third place, there 
 is the distinction between the parts and qualities of 
 the outer world. We are conscious of an external 
 object only as we are conscious of it as distinct from 
 others, where several distinguishable objects are con- 
 founded, we are conscious of them as one ; where no 
 object is discriminated, we are not conscious of any. 
 Before leaving this condition, I may parenthetically 
 state, that, while all philosophers admit that conscious- 
 ness involves a discrimination, many do not allow it 
 any cognisance of aught beyond the sphere of self. The 
 great majority of philosophers do this because they 
 absolutely deny the possibility of an immediate know- 
 ledge of external things, and, consequently, hold that 
 
 o Elementa Philosophic, part iv. voL i. p. 321. English Worts, vol. i. 
 c. 25, 5. Opera, ed. Molesworth, p. 394. ED.
 
 204 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. consciousness in distinguishing the non-ego from the 
 ego, only distinguishes self from self ; for they main- 
 tain, that what we are conscious of as something differ- 
 ent from the perceiving mind, is only, in reality, a 
 modification of that mind, which we are condemned to 
 mistake for the material reality. Some philosophers, 
 however, (as Reid and Stewart), who hold, with man- 
 kind at large, that we do possess an immediate know- 
 ledge of something different from the knowing self, still 
 limit consciousness to a cognisance of self ; and, con- 
 sequently, not only deprive it of the power of dis- 
 tinguishing external objects from each other, but even 
 of the power of discriminating the ego and non-ego. 
 These opinions we are afterwards to consider. With 
 this qualification, all philosophers may be viewed as 
 admitting that discrimination is an essential condition 
 of consciousness. 
 
 4. Judg- The fourth condition of consciousness, which may 
 be assumed as very generally acknowledged, is, that 
 it involves judgment. A judgment is the mental 
 act by which one thing is affirmed or denied of an- 
 other. This fourth condition is in truth only a 
 necessary consequence of the third, for it is impos- 
 sible to discriminate without judging, discrimination, 
 or contradistinction, being in fact only the denying 
 one thing of another. It may to some seem strange 
 that consciousness, the simple and primary act of in- 
 telligence, should be a judgment, which philosophers, 
 in general, have viewed as a compound and derivative 
 operation. This is, however, altogether a mistake. 
 A judgment is, as I shall hereafter show you, a simple 
 act of mind, for every act of mind implies a judg- 
 ment. Do we perceive or imagine without affirming, 
 in the act, the external or internal existence of the 
 
 ment.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 205 
 
 object \ a Now these fundamental affirmations are the LECT. 
 affirmations, in other words, the judgments, of con- XI ' 
 sciousness. 
 
 The fifth undeniable condition of consciousness is 5. Memory, 
 memory. This condition also is a corollary of the 
 third. For without memory our mental states could 
 not be held fast, compared, distinguished from each 
 other, and referred to self. Without memory, each 
 indivisible, each infinitesimal, moment in the mental 
 succession, would stand isolated from every other, 
 would constitute, in fact, a separate existence. The 
 notion of the ego or self, arises from the recognised 
 permanence and identity of the thinking subject in 
 contrast to the recognised succession and variety of 
 its modifications. But this recognition is possible 
 only through memory. The notion of self is, therefore, 
 the result of memory. But the notion of self is in- 
 volved in consciousness, so consequently is memory. 
 
 a See Reid's Works, pp. 243, 414, with the Editor's Notes. ED.
 
 206 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECTURE XII. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS I RELATION 
 TO COGNITIVE FACULTIES IN GENERAL. 
 
 LECT. So far as we have proceeded, our determination of 
 
 the contents of consciousness may be viewed as that 
 Recapituia- universally admitted ; for though I could quote to 
 you certain counter-doctrines, these are not of such 
 importance as to warrant me in perplexing the dis- 
 cussion by their refutation, which would indeed be 
 nothing more than the exposition of very palpable 
 mistakes. Let us, therefore, sum up the points we 
 have established. We have shown, in general, that 
 consciousness is the self-recognition that we know, or 
 feel, or desire, &c. We have shown, in particular, 
 1, That consciousness is an actual or living, and not 
 a potential or dormant, knowledge ; 2, That it is 
 an immediate and not a mediate knowledge ; 3, That 
 it supposes a discrimination; 4, That it involves a 
 judgment; and, 5, That it is possible only through 
 memory. 
 
 ii. Special We are now about to enter on a more disputed 
 territory ; and the first thesis I shall attempt to 
 establish, involves several subordinate questions. 
 
 I state, then, as the first contested position which I 
 am to maintain, that our consciousness is coextensive
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 207 
 
 with our knowledge. But this assertion, that we have LECT. 
 no knowledge of which we are not conscious, is tan- 
 
 tamount to the other that consciousness is coexten- i. OUT om- 
 
 . , ../%.. ii> sciousness 
 
 sive with our cognitive faculties, and this again iscoexten- 
 convertible with the assertion, that consciousness iso'Jn^ow- 
 not a special faculty, but that our special faculties of 
 knowledge are only modifications of consciousness. The 
 question, therefore, may be thus stated, Is conscious- 
 ness the genus under which our several faculties of 
 knowledge are contained as species, or, is conscious- 
 ness itself a special faculty co-ordinate with, and not 
 comprehending, these 1 
 
 Before proceeding to canvass the reasonings of those Error of DT 
 who have reduced consciousness from the general 
 condition, to a particular variety, of knowledge, I may 
 notice the error of Dr Brown, in asserting that, " in 
 the systems of philosophy which have been most gen- 
 erally prevalent, especially in this part of the island, 
 consciousness has always been classed as one of the 
 intellectual powers of the mind, differing from its 
 other powers, as these mutually differ from each 
 other."" This statement, in so far as it regards the 
 opinion of philosophers in general, is not only not true, 
 but the very reverse of truth. For, in place of con- 
 sciousness being, " in the systems most generally pre- 
 valent," classed as a special faculty, it has, in all the 
 greater schools of philosophy, been viewed as the uni- 
 versal attribute of the intellectual acts. Was con- 
 sciousness degraded to a special faculty in the Platonic, 
 in the Aristotelian, in the Cartesian, in the Lockian, 
 in the Leibnitzian, in the Kantian philosophies ? These 
 are the systems which have obtained a more general 
 authority than any others, and yet in none of these is 
 
 a Philosophy of the Human Mind, lecture xi., vol. i. p. 225, 2d edit. ED.
 
 208 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. the supremacy of consciousness denied ; in all of them 
 
 it is either expressly or implicitly recognised. Dr 
 
 Brown's assertion is so far true in relation to this country* 
 that by Hutcheson, Eeid, and Stewart, to say nothing 
 of inferior names, consciousness has been considered 
 as nothing higher than a special faculty. As I regard 
 this opinion to be erroneous, and as the error is one 
 affecting the very cardinal point of philosophy, as it 
 stands opposed to the peculiar and most important 
 principles of the philosophy of Eeid and Stewart 
 themselves, and has even contributed to tlirow around 
 their doctrine of perception an obscurity that has 
 caused Dr Brown absolutely to mistake it for its con- 
 verse, and as I have never met with any competent 
 refutation of the grounds on which it rests, I shall 
 endeavour to show you that, notwithstanding the high 
 authority of its supporters, this opinion is altogether 
 untenable. 
 
 Reid and As I previously stated to you, neither Dr Reid 
 conKiou n nor Mr Stewart has given us any regular account 
 of consciousness ; their doctrine on this subject is 
 to be found scattered in different parts of their 
 works. The two following brief passages of Eeid 
 contain the principal positions of that doctrine. 
 The first is from the first chapter of the first 
 Essay On the Intellectual Powers : " Consciousness 
 is a word used by philosophers to signify that im- 
 mediate knowledge which we have of our present 
 thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the pre- 
 sent operations of our minds. Whence we may ob- 
 serve that consciousness is only of things present. 
 To apply consciousness to things past, which some- 
 times is done in popular discourse, is to confound 
 
 a Works, p. 222.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 209 
 
 consciousness with memory ; and all such confusion LECT. 
 
 of words ought to be avoided in philosophical dis- 
 
 course. It is likewise to be observed, that conscious- 
 ness is only of things in the mind, and not of external 
 things, tt is improper to say, I am conscious of the 
 table which is before me. I perceive it, I see it ; but do 
 not say I am conscious of it. As that consciousness by 
 which we have a knowledge of the operations of our 
 own minds, is a different power from that by which 
 we perceive external objects, and as these different 
 powers have different names in our language, and, I 
 believe, in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully 
 to preserve this distinction, and never to confound 
 things so different in their nature." The second is 
 from the fifth chapter of the sixth Essay On the 
 Intellectual Powers? " Consciousness is an operation 
 of the understanding of its own kind, and cannot be 
 logically defined. The objects of it are our present 
 pains, our pleasures, our hopes, our fears, our desires, 
 our doubts, our thoughts of every kind ; in a word, 
 all the passions and all the actions and operations of 
 our own minds, while they are present. We may 
 remember them when they are past ; but we are con- 
 scious of them only while they are present." Besides 
 what is thus said in general of consciousness, in his 
 treatment of the different special faculties Reid con- 
 trasts consciousness with each. Thus in his essays 
 on Perception, on Conception or Imagination, and on 
 Memory, he specially contradistinguishes conscious- 
 ness from each of these operations ;P and it is also 
 incidentally by Reid, 7 but more articulately by 
 
 a Works, p. 442. 340, 351 ; Essay iv. Works, p. 368. 
 
 See Intellectual Powers, Essay ED. 
 
 ii. Works, p. 297, and Essay i. y See Works, p. 239. Compare 
 
 Works, p. 222 ; Essay iii. Works, pp. pp. 240, 258, 347, 419-20, 443. ED. 
 
 VOL. I. O
 
 210 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. Stewart, discriminated from Attention and Reflec- 
 
 XII. , . 
 
 . tion. 
 
 Conscious- According to the doctrine of these philosophers, 
 ciaTfLK, consciousness is thus a special faculty, co-ordinate with 
 S Md to the other intellectual powers, having like them a par- 
 ticular operation and a peculiar object. And what is 
 the peculiar object which is proposed to consciousness'?' 3 
 The peculiar objects of consciousness, says Dr Reid, 
 are all the present passions and operations of our 
 minds. Consciousness thus has for its objects, among 
 the other modifications of the mind, the acts of our 
 cognitive faculties. Now here a doubt arises. If 
 consciousness has for its object the cognitive opera- 
 tions, it must know these operations, and, as it knows 
 these operations, it must know their objects : conse- 
 quently, consciousness is either not a special faculty, 
 but a faculty comprehending every cognitive act ; or 
 it must be held that there is a double knowledge of 
 every object, first, the knowledge of that object by its 
 particular faculty, and second, a knowledge of it by 
 consciousness as taking cognisance of every mental 
 operation. But the former of these alternatives is a 
 surrender of consciousness as a co-ordinate and special 
 faculty, and the latter is a supposition not only un- 
 philosophical but absurd. Now, you will attend to the 
 mode in which Reid escapes, or endeavours to escape, 
 from this dilemma. This he does by assigning to 
 consciousness, as its object, the various intellectual 
 operations to the exclusion of their several objects. 
 " I am conscious," he says, " of perception, but not of 
 the object I perceive ; I am conscious of memory, but 
 not of the object I remember." By this limitation, if 
 tenable, he certainly escapes the dilemma, for he would 
 
 o Coll. Works, voL ii. p. 134, and See the same argument in the 
 pp. 122, 123 ED. Author's Discussions, p. 47. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 211 
 
 thus disprove the truth of the principle on which it LECT. 
 proceeds viz., that to be conscious of the operation of XI1 ' 
 a faculty, is, in fact, to be conscious of the object 
 that operation. The whole question, therefore, turns j 
 upon the proof or disproof of this principle, for if it jjjj untcn- 
 can be shown that the knowledge of an operation 
 necessarily involves the knowledge of its object, it 
 follows that it is impossible to make consciousness 
 conversant about the intellectual operations to the 
 exclusion of their objects. And that this principle 
 must be admitted, is what, I hope, it will require but 
 little argument to demonstrate. 
 
 Some things can be conceived by the mind each NO con- 
 separate and alone ; others only in connection with of'a^o^i- 
 something else. The former are said to be things withotit'a 
 absolute ; the latter, to be things relative. Socrates, H^frffo 
 and Xanthippe, may be given as examples of the for- bj 
 mer ; husband and wife, of the latter. Socrates, 
 and Xanthippe, can each be represented to the mind 
 without the other ; and if they are associated in 
 thought, it is only by an accidental connection. Hus- 
 band and wife, on the contrary, cannot be conceived 
 apart. As relative and correlative, the conception 
 of husband involves the conception of wife, and the 
 conception of wife involves the conception of husband. 
 Each is thought only in and through the other, and it 
 is impossible to think of Socrates as the husband of 
 Xanthippe, without thinking of Xanthippe as the wife 
 of Socrates. We cannot, therefore, know what a husband 
 is without also knowing what is a wife, as, on the 
 other hand, we cannot know what a wife is without 
 also knowing what is a husband. You will, therefore, 
 understand from this example the meaning of the 
 logical axiom, that the knowledge of relatives is one, 
 or that the knowledge of relatives is the same.
 
 212 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. This being premised, it is evident that if our intel- 
 
 -J^ lectual operations exist only in relation, it must be 
 
 impossible that consciousness can take cognisance of 
 one term of this relation without also taking cognisance 
 of the other. Knowledge, in general, is a relation be- 
 tween a subject knowing and an object known, and 
 each operation of our cognitive faculties only exists by 
 relation to a particular object, this object at once 
 calling it into existence, and specifying the quality of 
 its existence. It is, therefore, palpably impossible that 
 we can be conscious of an act without being conscious 
 of the object to which that act is relative. This, how- 
 ever, is what Dr Reid and Mr Stewart maintain. 
 They maintain that I can know that I know, without 
 knowing what I know, or that I can know the know- 
 ledge without knowing what the knowledge is about ; 
 for example, that I am conscious of perceiving a book 
 without being conscious of the book perceived, that 
 I am conscious of remembering its contents without 
 being conscious of these contents remembered, and 
 shown in so forth. The unsoundness of this opinion must, how- 
 MfMtto ever, be articulately shown by taking the different 
 rent co Ji- faculties in detail, which they have contradistinguished 
 tics. from consciousness, and by showing, in regard to each, 
 that it is altogether impossible to propose the operation 
 of that faculty to the consideration of consciousness, 
 and to withhold from consciousness its object, 
 iroagina- I shall commence with the faculty of Imagination, 
 to which Dr Reid and Mr Stewart have chosen, under 
 various limitations, to give the name of Conception. 
 This faculty is peculiarly suited to evince the error 
 of holding that consciousness is cognisant of acts, but 
 not of the objects of these acts. 
 
 a Reid, Intellectual Pmcers, Essay Elements, vol. i. ch. 3 ; Works, vol. ii. 
 iv. ch. 1 ; Worlct, p. 360. Stewart, p. 145. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 213 
 
 " Conceiving, Imagining, and Apprehending," says LECT. 
 Dr Keid, " are commonly used as synonymous in our XI1 ' 
 language, and signify the same thing which the logi- 
 cians call Simple Apprehension. This is an operation 
 of the mind different from all those we have men- 
 tioned [Perception, Memory, &c.] Whatever we per- 
 ceive, whatever we remember, whatever we are con- 
 scious of, we have a full persuasion or conviction of its 
 existence. What never had an existence cannot be 
 remembered ; what has no existence at present cannot 
 be the object of perception or of consciousness ; but 
 what never had, nor has any existence, may be con- 
 ceived. Every man knows that it is as easy to con- 
 ceive a winged horse or a centaur, as it is to conceive 
 a horse or a man. Let it be observed, therefore, that 
 to conceive, to imagine, to apprehend, when taken in 
 the proper sense, signify an act of the mind which im- 
 plies no belief or judgment at all. It is an act of the 
 mind by which nothing is affirmed or denied, and 
 which therefore can neither be true nor false." And 
 again : " Consciousness is employed solely about ob- 
 jects that do exist, or have existed. But conception 
 is often employed about objects that neither do, nor 
 did, nor will, exist. This is the very nature of this 
 faculty, that its object, though distinctly conceived, 
 may have no existence. Such an object we call a crea- 
 ture of imagination, but this creature never was created. 
 
 " That we may not impose upon ourselves in this 
 matter, we must distinguish between that act or ope- 
 ration of the mind, which we call conceiving an 
 object, and the object which we conceive. When we 
 conceive anything, there is a real act or operation of 
 the mind ; of this we are conscious, and can have no 
 doubt of its existence. But every such act must have 
 
 a Tronb,p.223.
 
 214 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. an object ; for he that conceives must conceive some- 
 
 ' thing. Suppose he conceives a centaur, he may have 
 
 a distinct conception of this object, though no centaur 
 ever existed." a And again : " I conceive a centaur. 
 This conception is an operation of the mind of which 
 I am conscious, and to which I can attend. The sole 
 object of it is a centaur, an animal which, I believe, 
 never existed." P 
 
 Now, here it is admitted by Reid, that imagination 
 has an object, and, in the example adduced, that this 
 object has no existence out of the mind. The object 
 of imagination is, therefore, in the mind, is a modifi- 
 cation of the mind. Now, can it be maintained that 
 there can be a modification of mind, a modification of 
 which we are aware, but of which we are not con- 
 scious \ But let us regard the matter in another aspect. 
 We are conscious, says Dr Reid, of the imagination of 
 a centaur, but not of the centaur imagined. Now, 
 nothing can be more evident than that the object and 
 the act of imagination, are identical. Thus, in the 
 example alleged, the centaur imagined and the act of 
 imagining it, are one and indivisible. What is the 
 act of imagining a centaur but the centaur imaged, or 
 the image of the centaur ; what is the image of the 
 centaur but the act of imagining it 1 The centaur is 
 both the object and the act of imagination : it is the 
 same thing viewed in different relations. It is called 
 the object of imagination, when considered as repre- 
 senting a possible existence, for everything that 
 can be construed to the mind, everything that does 
 not violate the laws of thought, in other words, every- 
 thing that does not involve a contradiction, may be 
 conceived by the mind as possible. I say, therefore, 
 
 a Works, p. 368. Worts, p. 373.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 215 
 
 that the centaur is called the object of imagination, LECT. 
 
 when considered as representing a possible existence ; L 
 
 whereas the centaur is called the act of imagination, 
 when considered as the creation, work, or operation, of 
 the mind itself. The centaur imagined and the ima- 
 gination of the centaur, are thus as much the same 
 indivisible modification of mind as a square is the 
 same figure, whether we consider it as composed of 
 four sides, or as composed of four angles, or as pater- 
 nity is the same relation whether we look from the 
 son to the father, or from the father to the son. We 
 cannot, therefore, be conscious of imagining an object 
 without being conscious of the object imagined, and 
 as regards imagination, Keid's limitation of conscious- 
 ness is, therefore, futile. 
 
 I proceed next to Memory : " It is by Memory," Memory. 
 says Dr Eeid, " that we have an immediate knowledge 
 of things past. The senses give us information of 
 things only as they exist in the present moment ; and 
 this information, if it were not preserved by memory, 
 would vanish instantly, and leave us as ignorant as if 
 it had never been. Memory must have an object. 
 Every man who remembers must remember some- 
 thing, and that which he remembers is called the 
 object of his remembrance. In this, memory agrees 
 with perception, but differs from sensation, which has 
 no object but the feeling itself. Every man can dis- 
 tinguish the thing remembered from the remembrance 
 of it. We may remember anything which we have 
 seen, or heard, or known, or done, or suffered ; but the 
 remembrance of it is a particular act of the mind 
 which now exists, and of which we are conscious. To 
 confound these two is an absurdity which a thinking 
 man could not be led into, but by some false hypo-
 
 216 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. thesis which hinders him from reflecting upon the 
 
 1_ thing which he would explain by it." a "The object of 
 
 memory, or thing remembered, must be something 
 that is past ; as the object of perception and of con- 
 sciousness, must be something which is present. What 
 now is, cannot be an object of memory ; neither can 
 that which is past and gone be an object of perception, 
 or of consciousness."' 3 To these passages, which are 
 taken from the first chapter of the third Essay On the 
 Intellectual Poivers, I must add another from the 
 sixth chapter of the same Essay, the chapter in 
 which he criticises Locke's doctrine in regard to our 
 Personal Identity. " Leaving," he says, " the conse- 
 quences of this doctrine to those who have leisure to 
 trace them, we may observe, with regard to the doc- 
 trine itself, first, that Mr Locke attributes to con- 
 sciousness the conviction we have of our past actions, 
 as if a man may now be conscious of what he did 
 twenty years ago. It is impossible to understand the 
 meaning of this, unless by consciousness be meant 
 memory, the only faculty by which we have an imme- 
 diate knowledge of our past actions. Sometimes, in 
 popular discourse, a man says he is conscious that he 
 did such a thing, meaning that he distinctly remem- 
 bers that he did it. It is unnecessary, in common 
 discourse, to fix accurately the limits between con- 
 sciousness and memory. This was formerly shown to 
 be the case with regard to sense and memory. And, 
 therefore, distinct remembrance is sometimes called 
 sense, sometimes consciousness, without any inconve- 
 nience. But this ought to be avoided in philosophy, 
 otherwise we confound the different powers of the 
 mind, and ascribe to one what really belongs to an- 
 
 o Works, p. 339. /3 Works, p. 340.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 217 
 
 other. If a man be conscious of what he did twenty LECT. 
 years or twenty minutes ago, there is no use for 
 memory, nor ought we to allow that there is any such 
 faculty. The faculties of consciousness and memory 
 are chiefly distinguished by this, that the first is an 
 immediate knowledge of the present, the second an 
 immediate knowledge of the past." a 
 
 From these quotations it appears that Reid dis- 
 tinguishes memory from consciousness in this, that 
 memory is an immediate knowledge of the past, con- 
 sciousness an immediate knowledge of the present. 
 We may, therefore, be conscious of the act of memory 
 as present, but of the object of memory as past, con- 
 sciousness is impossible. Now, if memory and con- 
 sciousness be, as Reid asserts, the one an immediate 
 knowledge of the past, the other an immediate know- 
 ledge of the present, it is evident that memory is a 
 faculty whose object lies beyond the sphere of con- 
 sciousness ; and, consequently, that consciousness can- 
 not be regarded as the general condition of every 
 intellectual act. We have only, therefore, to examine 
 whether this attribution of repugnant qualities to con- 
 sciousness and memory be correct, whether there be 
 not assigned to one or other a function which does not 
 really belong to it. 
 
 Now, in regard to what Dr Reid says of conscious- 
 ness, I admit that no exception can be taken. Con- 
 sciousness is an immediate knowledge of the present. 
 We have, indeed, already shown that consciousness is 
 an immediate knowledge, and, therefore, only of the 
 actual or now-existent. This being admitted, and pro- 
 fessing, as we do, to prove that consciousness is the one 
 generic faculty of knowledge, we, consequently, must 
 
 a Works, p. 351.
 
 218 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. maintain that all knowledge is immediate, and only of 
 ' the actual or present, in other words, that what is 
 called mediate knowledge, knowledge of the past, 
 knowledge of the absent, knowledge of the non-actual 
 or possible, is either no knowledge at all, or only a 
 knowledge contained in, and evolved out of, an imme- 
 diate knowledge of what is now existent and actually 
 present to the mind. This, at first sight, may appear 
 like paradox ; I trust you will soon admit that the 
 counter doctrine is self-repugnant. 
 
 Memory I proceed, therefore, to show that Dr Eeid's assertion 
 mediate" of memory being an immediate knowledge of the past, 
 o? Sfi^SL is not only false, but that it involves a contradiction 
 
 in terms. 
 
 Conditions Let us first determine what immediate knowledge is, 
 dtohTknow- and then see whether the knowledge we have of the 
 past, through memory, can come under the conditions 
 of immediate knowledge. Now nothing can be more 
 evident than the following positions : 1, An object 
 to be known immediately must be known in itself, 
 that is, in those modifications, qualities, or phaeno- 
 mena, through which it manifests its existence, and 
 not in those of something different from itself ; for, if 
 we suppose it known not in itself, but in some other 
 thing, then this other thing is what is immediately 
 known, and the object known through it is only an 
 object mediately known. 
 
 But, 2, If a thing can be immediately known only 
 if known in itself, it is manifest, that it can only be 
 known in itself, if it be itself actually in existence, 
 and actually in immediate relation to our faculties of 
 knowledge. 
 
 Such are the necessary conditions of immediate 
 
 o Compare Discussions, p. SO ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 219 
 
 knowledge ; and they disprove at once Dr Reid's LECT. 
 
 assertion, that memory is an immediate knowledge ! ' 
 
 of the past. An immediate knowledge is only con- 
 ceivable of the now existent, as the now existent alone 
 can be known in itself. But the past is only past, 
 inasmuch as it is not now existent ; and as it is not 
 now existent, it cannot be known in itself. The 
 immediate knowledge of the past is, therefore, im- 
 possible. 
 
 We have, hitherto, been considering the conditions 
 of immediate knowledge in relation to the object ; let 
 us now consider them in relation to the cognitive act. 
 Every act, and consequently every act of knowledge, 
 exists only as it now exists ; and as it exists only in 
 the now, it can be cognisant only of a now-existent 
 object. Memory is an act, an act of knowledge; it 
 can, therefore, be cognisant only of a now-existent 
 object. But the object known in memory is, ex Application 
 hypothesi, past ; consequently, we are reduced to the ditions to 
 dilemma, either of refusing a past object to be known ledge we 
 in memory at all, or of admitting it to be only medi- Memory, 
 ately known, in and through a present object. That 
 the latter alternative is the true, it will require a very 
 few explanatory words to convince you. What are 
 the contents of an act of memory 1 An act of memory 
 is merely a present state of mind, which we are con- 
 scious of not as absolute, but as relative to, and repre- 
 senting, another state of mind, and accompanied with 
 the belief that the state of mind, as now represented, 
 has actually been. I remember an event I saw, the 
 landing of George IV. at Leith. This remembrance 
 is only a consciousness of certain imaginations, in- 
 volving the conviction that these imaginations now 
 represent ideally what I formerly really experienced.
 
 220 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. All that is immediately known in the act of memory, 
 !_ is the present mental modification ; that is, the repre- 
 sentation and concomitant belief. Beyond this mental 
 modification, we know nothing ; and this mental 
 modification is not only known to consciousness, but 
 only exists in and by consciousness. Of any past 
 object, real or ideal, the mind knows and can know 
 nothing, for, ex hypoihesi, no such object now exists ; 
 or if it be said to know such an object, it can only be 
 said to know it mediately, as represented in the pre- 
 sent mental modification. Properly speaking, how- 
 ever, we know only the actual and present, and all 
 real knowledge is an immediate knowledge. What 
 is said to be mediately known, is, in truth, not known 
 to be, but only believed to be~; for its existence 
 is only an inference resting on the belief, that the 
 mental modification truly represents what is in itself 
 beyond the sphere of knowledge. What is immedi- 
 ately known must be ; for what is immediately known 
 is supposed to be known as existing. The denial of 
 the existence, and of the existence within the sphere 
 of consciousness, involves, therefore, a denial of the 
 immediate knowledge of an object. We may, accord- 
 ingly, doubt the reality of any object of mediate know- 
 ledge, without denying the reality of the immediate 
 knowledge on which the mediate knowledge rests. In 
 memory, for instance, we cannot deny the existence of 
 the present representation and belief, for their exist- 
 ence is the consciousness of their existence itself. To 
 doubt their existence, therefore, is, for us, to doubt the 
 existence of our consciousness. But as this doubt it- 
 self exists only through consciousness, it would, conse- 
 quently, annihilate itself. But, though in memory we 
 must admit the reality of the representation and belief,
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 221 
 
 as facts of consciousness, we may doubt, we may deny, LECT. 
 
 that the representation and belief are true. We may 
 
 assert that they represent what never was, and that 
 all beyond their present mental existence is a delusion. 
 This, however, could not be the case if our knowledge 
 of the past were immediate. So far, therefore, is me- 
 mory from being an immediate knowledge of the past, 
 that it is at best only a mediate knowledge of the past ; 
 while, in philosophical propriety, it is not a knowledge 
 of the past at all, but a knowledge of the present and 
 a belief of the past. But in whatever terms we may 
 choose to designate the contents of memory, it is 
 manifest that these contents are all within the sphere 
 of consciousness. 
 
 a What I have said in regard to immediate object of this conception 
 Dr Reid's doctrine of memory as an is four hundred miles distant ; and I 
 immediate knowledge of the past, have no reason to think that it acts 
 applies equally to his doctrine of con- upon me, or that I act upon it ; but 
 ception or imagination, as an im- I can think of it notwithstanding." 
 mediate knowledge of the distant, a This requires no comment. I shall, 
 case which I deferred noticing, when subsequently, have occasion to show 
 I considered his contradistinction of how Reid confused himself about 
 that faculty from consciousness. " I the term object, this being part 
 can conceive," he says, " an individual and parcel of his grand error in con- 
 object that really exists, such as St founding representative or medi- 
 Paul's Church in London. I have an ate, and intuitive or immediate know- 
 idea of it ; that is, I conceive it. The ledge.
 
 222 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECTURE XIII. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, ITS SPECIAL CONDITIONS : RELATION 
 TO COGNITIVE FACULTIES IN GENERAL. 
 
 LECT. WE now proceed to consider the third faculty which 
 
 ' Dr Reid specially contradistinguishes from Conscious- 
 
 Sbusn^s ness, I mean Perception, or that faculty through 
 ^fthTJT 6 which we obtain a knowledge of the external world. 
 Rdd cot C Now, you will observe that Reid maintains against 
 gddia^m- the immense majority of all, and the entire multitude 
 f^per- f modern, philosophers, that we have a direct and 
 ception. immediate knowledge of the external world. He thus 
 vindicates to mind not only an immediate knowledge 
 of its own modifications, but also an immediate know- 
 ledge of what is essentially different from mind or 
 self, the modifications of matter. He did not, how- 
 ever, allow that these were known by any common 
 faculty, but held that the qualities of mind were 
 exclusively made known to us by Consciousness, the 
 qualities of matter exclusively made known to us by 
 Perception. Consciousness was, thus, the faculty of 
 immediate knowledge, purely subjective ; perception, 
 the faculty of immediate knowledge, purely objective. 
 The Ego was known by one faculty, the Non-Ego by 
 another. " Consciousness," says Dr Reid, " is only of 
 things in the mind, and not of external things. It is 
 improper to say, I am conscious of the table which is 
 before me. I perceive it, I see it, but do not say I
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 223 
 
 am conscious of it. As that consciousness by which LECT. 
 we have a knowledge of the operations of our own XI1L 
 minds, is a different power from that by which we 
 perceive external objects, and as these different pow r ers 
 have different names in our language, and, I believe, 
 in all languages, a philosopher ought carefully to pre- 
 serve this distinction, and never to confound things 
 so different in their nature." a And in another place 
 he observes : " Consciousness always goes along with 
 perception ; but they are different operations of the 
 mind, and they have their different objects. Conscious- 
 ness is not perception, nor is the object of conscious- 
 ness the object of perception." P 
 
 Dr Reid has many merits as a speculator, but the Principal 
 
 i'ii' i i / i merit ac ~ 
 
 only merit which he arrogates to himself, the princi- corded to 
 
 pal merit accorded to him by others, is, that he was the philosopher, 
 first philosopher, in more recent times, who dared, in 
 his doctrine of immediate perception, to vindicate, 
 against the unanimous authority of philosophers, the 
 universal conviction of mankind. But this doctrine 
 he has at best imperfectly developed, and, at the same 
 time, has unfortunately obscured it, by errors of so 
 singular a character that some acute philosophers, 
 for Dr Brown does not stand alone, have never even 
 suspected what his doctrine of perception actually is. 
 One of these errors is the contradistinction of percep- 
 tion from consciousness. 
 
 I may here notice, by anticipation, that philosophers, Modem 
 at least modern philosophers, before Reid, allowed to CSfeT 
 the mind no immediate knowledge of the external trine of re- 
 
 T mi i i i 'i i i presentativo 
 
 reality, ihey conceded to it only a xepresentative or perception, 
 mediate knowledge of external things. Of these some, o'theT oftwo 
 
 forms. 
 
 a Intellectual Powers, Essay i., chap. )3 Ibid., Essay ii., chap. iii. Coll. 
 i. Coll, Works, p. 223. Work*, p. 297.
 
 224 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. however, held that the representative object, the 
 XIIL object immediately known, was different from the 
 
 mind knowing, as it was also different from the reality 
 it represented ; while others, on a simpler hypothesis, 
 maintained that there was no intermediate entity, 
 no tertium quid, between the reality and the mind, 
 but that the immediate or representative object was 
 itself a mental modification." The latter thus grant- 
 ing to mind no immediate knowledge of aught be- 
 yond its own modification, could, consequently, only 
 recognise a consciousness of self. The former, on the 
 contrary, could, as they actually did, accord to con- 
 Reid e^ sciousness a cognisance of not-self. Now, Eeid, after 
 objEof 6 asserting against the philosophers the immediacy of 
 FromThlT our knowledge of external things, would almost appear 
 wn^fo^. to have been startled by his own boldness, and, instead 
 of carrying his principle fairly to its issue, by accord- 
 ing to consciousness on his doctrine that knowledge 
 of the external world as existing, which, in the doc- 
 trine of the philosophers, it obtained of the external 
 world as represented, he inconsistently stopped short, 
 split immediate knowledge into two parts, and bestow- 
 ed the knowledge of material qualities on percep- 
 tion alone, allowing that of mental modifications to 
 remain exclusively with consciousness. Be this, how- 
 ever, as it may, the exemption of the objects of per- 
 ception from the sphere of consciousness, can be easily 
 shown to be self-contradictory. 
 
 What ! say the partisans of Dr Reid, are we not to 
 distinguish, as the product of different faculties, the 
 knowledge we obtain of objects in themselves the 
 
 o For a full discussion of the van- tary dissertations to Reid's works, 
 ous theories of knowledge and per- Notes B and C. ED. 
 ception, see the Author's supplemen-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 225 
 
 most opposite 1 Mind and matter are mutually sepa- LECT. 
 
 rated by the whole diameter of being. Mind and 
 
 matter are, in fact, nothing but words to express two 
 series of phsenomena known less in themselves, than 
 in contradistinction from each other. The difference 
 of the phoenomena to be known, surely legitimates a 
 difference of faculty to know them. In answer to 
 this, we admit at once, that, were the question merely 
 whether we should not distinguish, under conscious- 
 ness, two special faculties, whether we should not 
 study apart, and bestow distinctive appellations on 
 consciousness considered as more particularly cog- 
 nisant of the external world, and on consciousness 
 considered as more particularly cognisant of the in- 
 ternal, this would be highly proper and expedient. 
 But this is not the question. Dr Eeid distinguishes 
 consciousness as a special faculty from perception as 
 a special faculty, and he allows to the former the 
 cognisance of the latter in its operation, to the exclu- 
 sion of its object. He maintains that we are conscious 
 of our perception of a rose, but not of the rose per- 
 ceived. That we know the ego by one act of know- 
 ledge, the non-ego by another. This doctrine I hold 
 to be erroneous, and it is this doctrine I now proceed 
 to refute. 
 
 In the first place, it is not only a logical axiom, but That in thi 
 a self-evident truth, that the knowledge of opposites 
 is one. Thus, we cannot know what is tall without 
 knowing what is short, we know what is virtue only FhL 
 as we know what is vice, the science of health 
 but another name for the science of disease. Nor do 
 we know the opposites, the I and Thou, the ego and 
 non-ego, the subject and object, mind and matter, by 
 a different law. The act which affirms that this par- 
 
 VOL. i. P
 
 226 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. ticular phenomenon is a modification of Me, virtually 
 
 _^ affirms that the phsenomenon is not a modification of 
 
 anything different from Me, and, consequently, implies a 
 common cognisance of self and not-self ; the act which 
 affirms that this other phsenomenon is a modification 
 of something different from Me, virtually affirms that 
 the phsenomenon is not a modification of Me, and, 
 consequently, implies a common cognisance of not-self 
 and self. But unless we are prepared to maintain 
 that the faculty cognisant of self and not-self is diffe- 
 rent from the faculty cognisant of not-self and self, 
 we must allow that the ego and non-ego are known 
 and discriminated in the same indivisible act of know- 
 ledge. What, then, is the faculty of which this act 
 of knowledge is the energy 1 It cannot be Reid's con- 
 sciousness, for that is cognisant only of the ego or 
 mind, it cannot be Reid's perception, for that is cog- 
 nisant only of the non-ego or matter. But as the 
 act cannot be denied, so the faculty must be admitted. 
 It is not, however, to be found in Reid's catalogue. 
 But though not recognised by Reid in his system, its 
 necessity may, even on his hypothesis, be proved. 
 For if with him we allow only a special faculty im- 
 mediately cognisant of the ego, and a special faculty 
 immediately cognisant of the non-ego, we are at once 
 met with the question, By what faculty are the ego and 
 non-ego discriminated ? We cannot say by conscious- 
 ness, for that knows nothing but mind, we cannot 
 say by perception, for that knows nothing but matter. 
 But as mind and matter are never known apart 
 and by themselves, but always in mutual correlation 
 and contrast, this knowledge of them in connection 
 must be the function of some faculty, not like Reid's 
 consciousness and perception, severally limited to mind
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 227 
 
 and to matter as exclusive objects, but cognisant of LECT. 
 them as the ego and non-ego, as the two terms of a - 
 relation. It is thus shown that an act and a faculty 
 must, perforce, on Reid's own hypothesis, be admitted, 
 in which these two terms shall be comprehended toge- 
 ther in the unity of knowledge, in short, a higher 
 consciousness, embracing Reid's consciousness and per- 
 ception, and in which the two acts, severally cogni- 
 tive of mind and of matter, shall be comprehended, 
 and reduced to unity and correlation. But what is 
 this but to admit at last, in an unphilosophical com- 
 plexity, the common consciousness of subject and 
 object, of mind and matter, which we set out with 
 denying in its philosophical simplicity \ 
 
 But, in the second place, the attempt of Reid to 2, Reid's 
 make consciousness conversant about the various cog- o'fTon- l n 
 nitive faculties to the exclusion of their objects, is !Ti!5d 
 equally impossible in regard to Perception, as we have trin^of^ 
 shown it to be in relation to Imagination and Me- aLte^ow 
 mory ; nay, the attempt, in the case of perception, Slm^ 11 
 would, if allowed, be even suicidal of his great doctrine wo 
 of our immediate knowledge of the external world. 
 
 Reid's assertion, that we are conscious of the act of it first of 
 perception, but not of the object perceived, involves, 
 
 first of all, a general absurdity. For it virtually asserts ab ' 
 that we can know what we are not conscious of know- 
 ing. An act of perception is an act of knowledge ; 
 what we perceive, that we know. Now, if in percep- 
 tion there be an external reality known, but of which 
 external reality we are, on Reid's hypothesis, not con- 
 scious, then is there an object known, of which we are 
 not conscious. But as we know only inasmuch as we 
 know that we know, in other words, inasmuch as we 
 are conscious that we know, we cannot know an object
 
 228 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. without being conscious of that object as known ; con- 
 
 !_ sequently, we cannot perceive an object without being 
 
 conscious of that object as perceived. 
 
 And, se- But, again, how is it possible that we can be con- 
 d^nfysthe scious of an operation of perception, unless conscious- 
 of conSous- ness be coextensive with that act ; and how can it be 
 coextensive with the act, and not also conversant 
 with its object ? An act of knowledge is only possible 
 in relation to an object, and it is an act of one kind 
 or another only by special relation to a particular 
 object. Thus the object at once determines the exist- 
 ence, and specifies the character of the existence, of the 
 intellectual energy. An act of knowledge existing 
 and being what it is only by relation to its object, 
 it is manifest that the act can be known only through 
 the object to which it is correlative ; and Eeid's suppo- 
 sition that an operation can be known in consciousness 
 to the exclusion of its object, is impossible. For ex- 
 ample, I see the inkstand. How can I be conscious 
 that my present modification exists, that it is a per- 
 ception, and not another mental state, that it is a 
 perception of sight to the exclusion of every other 
 sense, and, finally, that it is a perception of the ink- 
 stand, and of the inkstand only, unless my conscious- 
 ness comprehend within its sphere the object, which at 
 once determines the existence of the act, qualifies its 
 kind, and distinguishes its individuality ? Annihilate 
 the inkstand, you annihilate the perception ; annihilate 
 the consciousness of the object, you annihilate the con- 
 sciousness of the operation. 
 
 whence the It undoubtedly sounds strange to say, I am con- 
 sc i us f * ne inkstand, instead of saying, I am con- 
 sc i us f the perception of the inkstand. This I 
 a( ^ m i fc ' but the admission can avail nothing to Dr 
 perception." Reid, for the apparent incongruity of the expres-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 229 
 
 sion arises only from the prevalence of that doctrine LECT. 
 
 of perception in the schools of philosophy, which it 
 
 is his principal merit to have so vigorously assailed. 
 So long as it was universally assumed by the learned, 
 that the mind is cognisant of nothing beyond, either, 
 on one theory, its own representative modifications, 
 or, on another, the species, ideas, or representative 
 entities, different from itself, which it contains, and 
 that all it knows of a material world is only an 
 internal representation which, by the necessity of its 
 nature, it mistakes for an external reality, the sup- 
 position of an immediate knowledge of material phaeno- 
 mena was regarded only as a vulgar, an unphiloso- 
 phical illusion, and the term consciousness, which was 
 exclusively a learned or technical expression for all im- 
 mediate knowledge, was, consequently, never employed 
 to express an immediate knowledge of aught beyond 
 the mind itself ; and thus, when at length, by Keid'a 
 own refutation of the prevailing doctrine, it becomes 
 necessary to extend the term to the immediate know- 
 ledge of external objects, this extension, so discordant 
 with philosophic usage, is, by the force of association 
 and custom, felt at first as strange and even contradic- 
 tory. A slight consideration, however, is sufficient to 
 reconcile us to the expression, in showing, if we hold 
 the doctrine of immediate perception, the necessity of 
 not limiting consciousness to our subjective states. In 
 fact, if we look beneath the surface, consciousness was 
 not, in general, restricted, even in philosophical usage, 
 to the modifications of the conscious self. That great 
 majority of philosophers who held that, in perception, 
 we know nothing of the external reality as existing, 
 but that we are immediately cognisant only of a repre- 
 sentative something, different both from the object 
 represented, and from the percipient mind, these
 
 230 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. philosophers, one and all, admitted that we are con- 
 XIH ' scions of this tertium quid present to, but not a modi- 
 fication of, mind, for, except Eeid and his school, I 
 am aware of no philosophers who denied that con- 
 sciousness was coextensive or identical with imme- 
 diate knowledge. 
 
 3, A sup- But, in the third place, we have previously reserved 
 on S whh a supposition on which we may possibly avoid some 
 ^f- e contr!l! of the self-contradictions which emerge from Keid's 
 proposing as the object of consciousness the act, but 
 excluding from its cognisance the object of percep- 
 tion; that is, the object of its own object. The suppo- 
 sition is, that Dr Reid committed the same error in 
 regard to perception, which he did in regard to me- 
 mory and imagination, and that in maintaining our 
 immediate knowledge in perception, he meant nothing 
 more than to maintain, that the mind is not, in that 
 act, cognisant of any representative object different 
 from its own modification, of any tertium quid minis- 
 tering between itself and the external reality ; but 
 that, in perception, the mind is determined itself to 
 represent the unknown external reality, and that, on 
 this self-representation, he abusively bestowed the 
 name of immediate knowledge, in contrast to that more 
 complex theory of perception, which holds that there 
 intervenes between the percipient mind and the ex- 
 ternal existence an intermediate something, different 
 from both, by which the former knows, and by which 
 the latter is represented. On the supposition of this 
 mistake, we may believe him guiltless of the others ; 
 and we can certainly, on this ground, more easily con- 
 ceive how he could accord to consciousness a know- 
 ledge only of the percipient act, meaning by that act 
 the representation of the external reality ; and how he
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 231 
 
 could deny to consciousness a knowledge of the object LECT. 
 of perception, meaning by that object the unknown 
 reality itself. This is the only opinion which Dr Brown 
 and others ever suspect him of maintaining ; and a 
 strong case might certainly be made out to prove that 
 this view of his doctrine is correct. But if such were, 
 in truth, Reid's opinion, then has he accomplished 
 nothing, his whole philosophy is one mighty blunder. 
 For, as I shall hereafter show, idealism finds in this 
 simpler hypothesis of representation even a more 
 secure foundation than on the other ; and, in point of 
 fact, on this hypothesis, the most philosophical scheme 
 of idealism that exists, the Egoistic or Fichtean, 
 is established. 
 
 Taking, however, the general analogy of Reid's sys- Thisauppo 
 tem, and a great number of unambiguous passages tenable" 
 into account, I am satisfied that this view of his doc- 
 trine is erroneous ; and I shall endeavour, when we 
 come to treat of mediate and immediate knowledge, to 
 explain how, from his never havingformed to himself an 
 adequate conception of these under all their possible 
 forms, and from his historical ignorance of them as 
 actually held by philosophers, he often appears to 
 speak in contradiction of the vital doctrine which, in 
 equity, he must be held to have steadily maintained. 
 
 Besides the operations we have already considered, Reid and 
 Imagination or Conception, Memory, and Perception, 
 
 which Dr Reid and Mr Stewart have endeavoured touonand n 
 discriminate from Consciousness, there are further to be 
 considered Attention and Reflection, which, in like S, or C on- e 
 
 manner, they have maintained to be an act or acts, not 
 subordinate to, or contained in, Consciousness. But, nes 
 before proceeding to show that their doctrine on this 
 point is almost equally untenable as on the preced-
 
 232 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. ing, it is necessary to clear up some confusion, and 
 
 XIIL to notice certain collateral errors. 
 
 certain coi- In the first place, on this head, these philosophers 
 LSd!" " are not at one ; for Mr Stewart seems inadvertently 
 Stewart t h av e misrepresented the opinion of Dr Reid in re- 
 wmts Reid's gQj.^ to the meaning and difference of Attention and 
 
 doctrine of c 
 
 id e ffer ing ^flection. Reid either employs these terms as syno- 
 tenUon atd n y mous expressions, or he distinguishes them only by 
 Reflection. ma king attention relative to the consciousness and 
 perception of the present ; reflection, to the memory 
 of the past. In the fifth chapter of the second Essay 
 on the Intellectual Powers? he says, " In order, how- 
 ever, to our having a distinct notion of any of the 
 operations of our own minds, it is not enough that 
 we be conscious of them, for all men have this con- 
 sciousness : it is farther necessary that we attend to 
 them while they are exerted, and reflect upon them 
 with care while they are recent and fresh in our 
 memory. It is necessary that, by employing ourselves 
 frequently in this way, we get the habit of this atten- 
 tion and reflection/' &c. And in the first chapter of 
 the sixth Essay, " Mr Locke," he says, " has restricted 
 the word reflection to that which is employed about 
 the operations of our minds, without any authority, 
 as I think, from custom, the arbiter of language : for 
 surely I may reflect upon what I have seen or heard, 
 as well as upon what I have thought. The word, in 
 its proper and common meaning, is equally applicable 
 to objects of sense, and to objects of consciousness. 
 He has likewise confounded reflection with conscious- 
 ness, and seems not to have been aware that they are 
 different powers, and appear at very different periods 
 of life/' ft In the first of these quotations, Reid might 
 
 a Coll. Worlat, p. 258. $ IbLl, p. 420. 
 

 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 233 
 
 use attention in relation to the consciousness of the LECT. 
 present, reflection, to the memory of the past ; but - - 
 in the second, in saying that reflection "is equally 
 applicable to objects of sense and to objects of con- 
 sciousness," he distinctly indicates that the two 
 terms are used by him as convertible. Keid (I may Reid wrong 
 notice by the way) is wholly wrong in his strictures sure of 
 on Locke for his restricted usage of the term reflec- 
 
 tion; for it was not until after his time that the term Reflection. 
 came, by Wolf, to be philosophically employed in a 
 more extended signification than that in which Locke 
 correctly applies it. a Reid is likewise wrong, if we A"* y- 
 literally understand his words, in saying that reflec- Reflection is 
 
 . , employed 
 
 tion is employed in common language in relation to in relation 
 
 , . - T . 11 to objects 
 
 objects oi sense. It is never employed except upon of sense. 
 the mind and its contents. We cannot be said to 
 reflect upon any external object, except in so far as 
 that object has been previously perceived, and its 
 image become part and parcel of our intellectual fur- 
 niture. We may be said to reflect upon it in me- 
 mory, but not in perception. But to return. 
 
 Reid, therefore, you will observe, identifies attention 
 and reflection. Now Mr Stewart, in the chapter on 
 Attention in the first volume of his Elements? says, 
 " Some important observations on the subject of 
 attention occur in different parts of Dr Reid's writ- 
 ings ; particularly in his Essays on the Intellectual 
 Powers of Man, p. 62, and his Essays on the Active 
 Powers of Man, p. 78 et seq. To this ingenious 
 
 o [Wolf, Psychologies Empirica, successive ad ea quae in re percepta 
 
 257 : " Attentionis successiva direc- iiisunt, pro arbitrio dirigendi."] Reid 
 
 tio ad ea quse in re percepta insunt, is further criticised in the Author's 
 
 dicitur Reflexio. Unde simul liquet edition of his works, pp. 347, 420. 
 
 quid sit facultas reflectendi, scilicet ED. 
 quod sit facultas attentionem suam & Works, voL ii. pp. 122, 123.
 
 234 LECTURES OX METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. author we are indebted for the remark, that attention 
 
 XITT 
 
 to things external is properly called observation ; and 
 
 attention to the subjects of our consciousness, reflec- 
 tion.'" 1 
 
 Locke not I may, however, notice a more important inadvert- 
 use'thlltem ence of Mr Stewart, and this it is the more requisite 
 in C its C ps3- to do, as his authority is worthy of high respect, not 
 SSL. on ly on account of philosophical talent, but of histo- 
 rical accuracy. In various passages of his writings, 
 Mr Stewart states that Locke seems to have con- 
 sidered the employment of the term reflection, in its 
 psychological acceptation, as original to himself ; and 
 he notices it as a curious circumstance that Sir John 
 Davies, Attorney-General to Queen Elizabeth, should, 
 in his poem on the Immortality of the Sold, have 
 employed this term in the same signification. How 
 Mr Stewart could have fallen into this error, is wholly 
 inconceivable. The word, as employed by Locke, was 
 in common use in every school of philosophy for 
 fifteen hundred years previous to the publication of 
 the Essay on the Human Understanding. It was a 
 term in the philosophy both of Descartes,/ 3 and of 
 Gassendi; 7 and it was borrowed by them from the 
 schoolmen, with whom it was a household word. 5 From 
 
 o This distinction has been at- 7 [Gassendi, Physica, iii. Meinb. 
 
 tempted by others. [See Keckermann, Post., lib. ix. c. 3. (Opera, Leyden, 
 
 Opera, torn. i. p. 1612, where he dis- 1658 ; vol. ii. p. 451.) Ad secundam 
 
 tinguishes reflection, intellect re- vero operationem praesertim spectat 
 
 flexa, interna, per quam homo intel- ipsa intellectus ad suam operationem 
 
 ligit suum intellectual, from the in- attentio, reflexione ilia supra actionem 
 
 tellectio externa, qua intellectus alia propriam, qua se intelligere intelligit, 
 
 res extra se positas percipit. See cogitatve se agitare."] 
 
 also Mazure, Cours de Philosophic, 5 [We have the scholastic brocard 
 
 torn. L p. 381. ED.] pointing to the difficulties of the study 
 
 /3 [Descartes, Epist., P. ii., Ep. iv. of self : " Reflexiva cogitatio facile fit 
 
 (See Gruyer, Eaais Philosophiques, deflexiva." See Keckermann, Opera, 
 
 torn. iv. p. 118.) De la Forge, De Mente torn. L p. 466.] 
 Humana, Prsef., p. 9.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 235 
 
 tlie schoolmen, indeed. Locke seems to have adopted LECT. 
 
 XIII 
 
 the fundamental principle of his philosophy, the de- 
 
 rivation of our knowledge through the double medium 
 of sense and reflection, at least, some of them had 
 in terms articulately enounced this principle five 
 centuries previous to the English philosopher, and 
 enounced it also in a manner far more correct than 
 was done by him ; a for they did not, like Locke, re- 
 gard reflection itself as a source of knowledge, thus 
 reducing all our knowledge to experience and its gen- 
 eralisation, but viewed in reflection only the channel 
 through which, along with the contingent phsenomena 
 of our internal experience, we discover the necessary 
 judgments which are original or native to the mind. 
 
 There is, likewise, another oversight of Mr Stewart 
 which I may notice. " Although," he says, " the con- 
 nection between attention and memory has been fre- 
 quently remarked in general terms, I do not recol- 
 lect that the power of attention has been mentioned 
 by any of the writers on pneumatology in their enu- 
 meration of faculties of the mind ; nor has it been 
 considered by any one, so far as I know, as of sufficient 
 importance to deserve a particular examination."' 3 So 
 far is this from being the case that there are many 
 previous authors who have considered attention as a 
 
 a [See Scotus, Super Universalibus regarded as threefold : Jtectus, Col- 
 
 Porphyrii, Qu. iii. : " Ad tertium lativus, Reflexus. See Constantius 
 
 dico quod ilia propositio Ariatotelis, (a Sarnano), Tract, de Secundis Inten- 
 
 nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit tionibus ; Scoti Opera, p. 452.) See 
 
 in sensu, vera est de eo quod est also Philip Mocenicus, Contempla- 
 
 primum intelligibile, quod est scilicet tiones (1581), passim. Goclenius, Lexi- 
 
 quod quid est rei materialis, non con Philosopkicum, v. Reflexus. Keck- 
 
 autem de omnibus per se intelligibi- ermann, Opera, torn. i. pp. 1600, 1612. 
 
 libus ; quia multa per se intelligun- Conimbricenses in A rist. de A nima, 
 
 tur, non quia speciem faciunt in sensu, pp. 370, 373.] 
 
 sed per reflexionem intellectus." (By )3 Elements, L c. 2. Collected Worts, 
 
 the Scotists the act of intellect was vol. ii. p. 122. ED.
 
 236 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. separate faculty, and treated of it even at greater 
 
 ' length than Mr Stewart himself. This is true not 
 
 only of the celebrated Wolf," but of the whole Wolfian 
 school ; and to these I may add Condillac,^ Contzen, 7 
 Tiedemann, 5 Irwing, 6 Malebranche/ and many others. 
 But this by the way. 
 
 I* Attention Taking, however, Attention and Reflection for acts 
 of the same faculty, and supposing, with Mr Stewart, 
 that reflection is properly attention directed to the 
 phsenomena of mind, observation, attention directed 
 to the phaenomena of matter ; the main question 
 comes to be considered, Is attention a faculty dif- 
 ferent from consciousness, as Reid and Stewart main- 
 tain? As the latter of these philosophers has not 
 argued the point himself, but merely refers to the 
 arguments of the former in confirmation of their 
 common doctrine, it will be sufficient to adduce the 
 Reid quoted following passage from Reid, in which his doctrine on 
 
 in reference i i i 7 -IT t 
 
 tothisques- this head is contained. i return, he says, " to what 
 I mentioned as the main source of information on 
 this subject, attentive reflection upon the operations 
 of our own minds. 
 
 " All the notions we have of mind and its opera- 
 tions, are, by Mr Locke, called ideas of reflection. A 
 man may have as distinct notions of remembrance, of 
 judgment, of will, of desire, as he has of any object 
 whatever. Such notions, as Mr Locke justly observes, 
 are got by the power of reflection. But what is this 
 
 o Psychologist Empirica, 234, et 8 Handbuch der Psychologic, p. 121. 
 
 seq. ED. ED. 
 
 /3 Origine des Connoissances Hu- t Erfahrungen und Untersuchungen 
 
 maines, part. i. ii. ch. 2. ED. #&* den Menschen, von karl Franz 
 
 y Prelectiones Loyicce et Metaphy- von Irwing, Berlin, 1777, b. i. p. 411; 
 
 sicce, auctore Adamo Contzen ; Mech- b. ii. p. 209. ED. 
 lin, 1830; vol. iii. p. 31. (Originally C De la Recherche de la Veritt, 
 
 published in 1775-1780.) ED. lib. iii ch. 4; lib. vi. ch. 2. Traitt 
 de Morale, ch. 5. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 237 
 
 power of reflection \ * It is,' says the same author, LECT. 
 
 ' that power by which the mind turns its view inward, !_ 
 
 and observes its own actions and operations/ He 
 observes elsewhere, ' That the understanding, like the 
 eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other 
 things, takes no notice of itself ; and that it requires 
 art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its 
 own object/ 
 
 " This power of the understanding to make its own 
 operations its object, to attend to them, and examine 
 them on all sides, is the power of reflection, by which 
 alone we can have any distinct notion of the powers 
 of our own or of other minds. 
 
 " This reflection ought to be distinguished from 
 consciousness, with which it is too often confounded, 
 even by Mr Locke. All men are conscious of the 
 operations of their own minds, at all times while they 
 are awake ; but there are few who reflect upon them, 
 or make them objects of thought." a 
 
 Dr Reid has rightly said that attention is a volun- what At- 
 tary act. This remark might have led him to the 
 observation, that attention is not a separate faculty, 
 or a faculty of intelligence at all, but merely an act of 
 will or desire, subordinate to a certain law of intelli- 
 gence. This law is, that the greater the number of 
 objects to which our consciousness is simultaneously 
 extended, the smaller is the intensity with which it is 
 able to consider each, and consequently the less vivid 
 and distinct will be the information it obtains of the 
 several objects/ This law is expressed in the old adage, 
 
 " Pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sensus." 
 
 o Intellectual Powers, Essay i., $ [Cf. Steeb, Uber den Menschen, ii. 
 chap. v. Coll. Works, p. 239. 673; and Fries, Anthropologie, i. 83.]
 
 238 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. Such being the law, it follows that, when our inte- 
 
 !_ rest in any particular object is excited, and when 
 
 we wish to obtain all the knowledge concerning it in 
 our power, it behoves us to limit our consideration to 
 that object, to the exclusion of others. This is done 
 by an act of volition or desire, which is called atten- 
 tion. But to view attention as a special act of intel- 
 ligence, and to distinguish it from consciousness, is 
 utterly inept. Consciousness may be compared to a 
 telescope, attention to the pulling out or in of the tubes 
 in accommodating the focus to the object ; and we 
 might, with equal justice, distinguish, in the eye, the 
 adjustment of the pupil from the general organ of 
 vision, as, in the mind, distinguish attention from 
 consciousness as separate faculties. Not, however, that 
 they are to be accounted the same. Attention is con- 
 sciousness, and something more. It is consciousness 
 voluntarily applied, under its law of limitations, to 
 some determinate object ; it is consciousness concen- 
 trated. In this respect, attention is an interesting 
 subject of consideration ; and having now finished 
 what I proposed in proof of the position, that con- 
 sciousness is not a special faculty of knowledge, but 
 coextensive with all our cognitions, I shall proceed to 
 consider it in its various aspects and relations ; and 
 Attention as having just stated the law of limitation, I shall 20 on 
 
 a general . 
 
 phenome- to what 1 nave to say in regard to attention as a gene- 
 
 non of con- . - ... 
 
 sciousness. ral pnaenomenon ot consciousness. 
 
 can we at- And, here, I have first to consider a question in 
 
 more than which I am again sorry to find myself opposed to 
 
 ob^f at many distinguished philosophers, and, in particular, to 
 
 one whose opinion on this, as on every other point of 
 
 psychological observation, is justly entitled to the 
 
 highest consideration. The philosopher I allude to is 
 
 Mr Stewart. The question is, Can we attend to more
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 239 
 
 thaii a single object at once"? For if attention be LECT. 
 nothing but the concentration of consciousness on a _ ! 
 smaller number of objects than constitute its widest 
 compass of simultaneous knowledge, it is evident that, 
 unless this widest compass of consciousness be limited 
 to only two objects, we do attend when we converge 
 consciousness on any smaller number than that total 
 complement of objects which it can embrace at once. 
 For example, if we suppose that the number of objects 
 which consciousness can simultaneously apprehend be 
 six, the limitation of consciousness to five, or four, or 
 three, or two, or one, will all be acts of attention, dif- 
 ferent in degree, but absolutely identical in kind. 
 
 Mr Stewart's doctrine is as follows : " Before," he Stewart 
 says, " we leave the subject of Attention, it is proper to 
 
 take notice of a question which has been stated with tion. q 
 respect to it ; whether we have the power of attending 
 to more than one thing at one and the same instant ; 
 or, in other words, whether we can attend, at one and 
 the same instant, to objects which we can attend to 
 separately I This question has, if I am not mistaken, 
 been already decided by several philosophers in the 
 negative ; and I acknowledge, for my own part, that 
 although their opinion has not only been called in 
 question by others, but even treated with some degree 
 of contempt as altogether hypothetical, it appears to 
 me to be the most reasonable and philosophical that 
 we can form on the subject. 
 
 " There is, indeed, a great variety of cases in which 
 the mind apparently exerts different acts of attention 
 at once ; but from the instances which have already 
 been mentioned, of the astonishing rapidity of thought, 
 it is obvious that all this may be explained without 
 supposing those acts to be coexistent ; and I may 
 even venture to add, it may all be explained in the
 
 240 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. most satisfactory manner, without ascribing to our 
 
 intellectual operations a greater degree of rapidity 
 
 than that with which we know, from the fact, that 
 they are sometimes carried on. The effect of practice 
 in increasing this capacity of apparently attending to 
 different things at once, renders this explanation of the 
 phenomenon in question more probable than any other. 
 
 " The case of the equilibrist and rope-dancer already 
 mentioned, is particularly favourable to this explana- 
 tion, as it affords direct evidence of the possibility of 
 the mind's exerting different successive acts in an in- 
 terval of time so short, as to produce the same sensible 
 effect as if they had been exerted at one and the same 
 moment. In this case, indeed, the rapidity of thought 
 is so remarkable, that if the different acts of the mind 
 were not all necessarily accompanied with different 
 movements of the eye, there can be no reason for 
 doubting that the philosophers whose doctrine I am 
 now controverting, would have asserted that they are 
 all mathematically coexistent. 
 
 " Upon a question, however, of this sort, which does 
 not admit of a perfectly direct appeal to the fact, I 
 would by no means be understood to decide with con- 
 fidence ; and, therefore, I should wish the conclusions 
 I am now to state, to be received as only conditionally 
 established. They are necessary and obvious conse- 
 quences of the general principle, * that the mind can 
 only attend to one thing at once ;' but must stand or 
 fall with the truth of that supposition. 
 
 " It is commonly understood, I believe, that in a con- 
 cert of music, a good ear can attend to the different 
 parts of the music separately, or can attend to them 
 all at once, and feel the full effect of the harmony. If 
 the doctrine, however, which I have endeavoured to
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 241 
 
 establish be admitted, it will follow that in the latter LECT. 
 
 XIII 
 
 case the mind is constantly varying its attention from 
 the one part of the music to the other, and that its 
 operations are so rapid as to give us no perception of 
 an interval of time. 
 
 " The same doctrine leads to some curious conclu- 
 sions with respect to vision. Suppose the eye to be 
 fixed in a particular position, and the picture of an 
 object to be painted on the retina. Does the mind 
 perceive the complete figure of the object at once, or 
 is this perception the result of the various perceptions 
 we have of the different points in the outline ? With 
 respect to this question, the principles already stated 
 lead me to conclude that the mind does at one and 
 the same time perceive every point in the outline of 
 the object, (provided the whole of it be painted on 
 the retina at the same instant), for perception, like 
 consciousness, is an involuntary operation. As no 
 two points, however, of the outline are in the same 
 direction, every point by itself constitutes just as dis- 
 tinct an object of attention to the mind, as if it were 
 separated by an interval of empty space from all the 
 rest. If the doctrine, therefore, formerly stated be 
 just, it is impossible for the mind to attend to more 
 than one of these points at once ; and as the percep- 
 tion of the figure of the object implies a knowledge 
 of the relative situation of the different points with 
 respect to each other, we must conclude that the per- 
 ception of figure by the eye is the result of a number 
 of different acts of attention. These acts of attention, 
 however, are performed with such rapidity, that the 
 effect, with respect to us, is the same as if the per- 
 ception were instantaneous. 
 
 " In farther confirmation of this reasoning, it may 
 
 VOL. I. Q
 
 242 LECTUEES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. be remarked, that if the perception of visible figure 
 
 . were an immediate consequence of the picture on 
 
 the retina, we should have, at the first glance, as dis- 
 tinct an idea of a figure of a thousand sides as of a 
 triangle or a square. The truth is, that when the 
 figure is very simple, the process of the mind is so 
 rapid that the perception seems to be instantaneous ; 
 but when the sides are multiplied beyond a certain 
 number, the interval of time necessary for these dif- 
 ferent acts of attention becomes perceptible. 
 
 " It may, perhaps, be asked what I mean by a point 
 in the outline of a figure, and what it is that consti- 
 tutes this point one object of attention. The answer, 
 I apprehend, is that this point is the minimum 
 visibile. If the point be less, we cannot perceive it ; 
 if it be greater, it is not all seen in one direction. 
 
 "If these observations be admitted, it will follow 
 that, without the faculty of memory, we could have 
 had no perception of visible figure." a 
 
 Brown coin- On this point, Dr Brown not only coincides with 
 Stewart. Mr Stewart in regard to the special fact of attention, 
 but asserts in general that the mind cannot exist at 
 the same moment in two different states, that is, in 
 two states in either of which it can exist separately. 
 " If the mind of man," he says, " and all the changes 
 which take place in it, from the first feeling with 
 which life commenced to the last with which it closes, 
 could be made visible to any other thinking being, a 
 certain series of feelings alone, that is to say, a cer- 
 tain number of successive states of mind, would be 
 distinguishable in it, forming indeed a variety of sen- 
 sations, and thoughts, and passions, as momentary 
 states of the mind, but all of them existing individu- 
 
 a Elementt, vol. L chap. 2. Works, vol. ii. p. 140-143.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 243 
 
 ally, and successively to each other. To suppose the LECT. 
 mind to exist in two different states, in the same XI11 ' 
 moment, is a manifest absurdity."" 
 
 I shall consider these statements in detail. 
 
 Stewart's first illustration of his doctrine is drawn doctrine." 
 from a concert of music, in which, he says, " a good 
 ear can attend to the different parts of the music 
 
 separately, or can attend to them all at once, and feel of ' 
 the full effect of the harmony." This example, how- 
 ever, appears to me to amount to a reduction of his 
 opinion to the impossible. What are the facts in this 
 example 1 In a musical concert, we have a multitude 
 of different instruments and voices emitting at once 
 an infinity of different sounds. These all reach the 
 ear at the same indivisible moment in which they 
 perish, and, consequently, if heard at all, much more 
 if their mutual relation or harmony be perceived, they 
 must be all heard simultaneously. This is evident. 
 For if the mind can attend to each minimum of sound 
 only successively, it, consequently, requires a minimum 
 of time in which it is exclusively occupied with each 
 minimum of sound. Now, in this minimum of time, 
 there coexist with it, and with it perish, many mi- 
 nima of sound which, ex hypoihesi, are not perceived, 
 are not heard, as not attended to. In a concert, 
 therefore, on this doctrine, a small number of sounds 
 only could be perceived, and above this petty maxi- 
 mum, all sounds would be to the ear as zero. But 
 what is the fact "? No concert, however numerous its 
 instruments, has yet been found to have reached, far 
 less to have surpassed, the capacity of mind and its 
 organ. 
 
 But it is even more impossible, on this hypothesis, 
 
 a Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, Lect. xi. p. 67, (ed. 1830). ED.
 
 244 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. to understand how we can perceive the relation 
 ' IIL of different sounds, that is, have any feeling of the 
 
 raCarfs narmon y f a concert. In this respect, it is, indeed, 
 doctrine, to f^fo fa se ft j s maintained that as we cannot attend 
 
 understand * 
 
 ; once to two sounds, we cannot perceive them as 
 coexistent, consequently, the feeling of harmony of 
 which we are conscious, must proceed from the feel- 
 ing of the relation of these sounds as successively 
 perceived in different points of time. We must, there- 
 fore, compare the past sound, as retained in memory, 
 with the present, as actually perceived. But this is 
 impossible on the hypothesis itself. For we must, in 
 this case, attend to the past sound in memory, and to 
 the present sound in sense at once, or they will not 
 be perceived in mutual relation as harmonic. But 
 one sound in memory and another sound in sense, are 
 as much two different objects as two different sounds 
 in sense. Therefore, one of two conclusions is inevit- 
 able, either we can attend to two different objects at 
 once, and the hypothesis is disproved, or we cannot, 
 and all knowledge of relation and harmony is impos- 
 sible, which is absurd. 
 
 His second The consequences of this doctrine are equally star- 
 tling, as taken from Mr Stewart's second illustration 
 from the phaenomena of vision. He holds that the 
 perception of figure by the eye is the result of a 
 number of separate acts of attention, and that each 
 act of attention has for its object a point the least 
 that can be seen, the minimum vmbile. On this hypo- 
 thesis, we must suppose that, at every instantaneous 
 opening of the eyelids, the moment sufficient for us 
 to take in the figure of the objects comprehended in 
 the sphere of vision, is subdivided into almost in- 
 finitesimal parts, in each of which a separate act of
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 245 
 
 attention is performed. This is, of itself, sufficiently LECT. 
 
 inconceivable. But this being admitted, no difficulty is 
 
 removed. The separate acts must be laid up in memory, 
 in imagination. But how are they there to form a 
 single whole, unless we can, in imagination, attend 
 to all the minima visibilia together, which in percep- 
 tion we could only attend to severally ? On this 
 subject I shall, however, have a more appropriate 
 occasion of speaking, when I consider Mr Stewart's 
 doctrine of the relation of colour to extension.
 
 24-6 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECTURE XIV. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, ATTENTION IN GENERAL. 
 
 IN the former part of our last Lecture, I concluded the 
 argument against Reid^ analysis of Consciousness into 
 a special faculty, and showed you that, even in rela- 
 tion to Perception, (the faculty by which we obtain a 
 knowledge of the material universe), Consciousness 
 is still the common ground in which every cogni- 
 tive operation has its root. I then proceeded to prove 
 the same in regard to Attention. After some observa- 
 tions touching the confusion among philosophers, more 
 or less extensive, in the meaning of the term reflec- 
 tion, as a subordinate modification of attention, I 
 endeavoured to explain to you what attention properly 
 is, and in what relation it stands to consciousness. I 
 stated that attention is consciousness applied to an 
 act of will or desire under a particular law. In so 
 far as attention is an act of the conative faculty, it is 
 not an act of knowledge at all, for the mere will or 
 desire of knowing is not an act of cognition. But 
 the act of the conative faculty is exerted by relation 
 to a certain law of consciousness, or knowledge, or 
 intelligence. This law, which we call the Law of 
 Limitation, is, that the intension of our knowledge 
 is in the inverse ratio of its extension, in other 
 words, that the fewer objects we consider at once,
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 247 
 
 the clearer and more distinct will be our knowledge of LECT. 
 them. Hence the more vividly we will or desire XIV ' 
 that a certain object should be clearly and distinctly 
 known, the more do we concentrate consciousness 
 through some special faculty upon it. I omitted, I 
 find, to state that I think Reid and Stewart incorrect 
 in asserting that attention is only a voluntary act, 
 meaning by the expression voluntary, an act of free- 
 will. I am far from maintaining, as Brown and others 
 do, that all will is desire ; but still I am persuaded Atution 
 that we are frequently determined to an act of atten- wthout an 
 tion, as to many other acts, independently of our free win. 
 and deliberate volition. Nor is it, I conceive, possible 
 to hold that, though immediately determined to an 
 act of attention by desire, it is only by the permission 
 of our will that this is done ; consequently, that every 
 act of attention is still under the control of our voli- 
 tion. This I cannot maintain. Let us take an ex- 
 ample : When occupied with other matters, a person 
 may speak to us, or the clock may strike, without our 
 having any consciousness of the sound; but it is 
 wholly impossible for us to remain in this state of un- 
 consciousness intentionally and with will. We cannot 
 determinately refuse to hear by voluntarily withhold- 
 ing our attention ; and we can no more open our eyes, 
 and, by an act of will, avert our mind from all per- 
 ception of sight, than we can, by an act of will, cease 
 to live. We may close our ears or shut our eyes, as we 
 may commit suicide ; but we cannot, with our organs 
 unobstructed, wholly refuse our attention at will. It, 
 therefore, appears to me the more correct doctrine to 
 hold that there is no consciousness without attention, 
 without concentration, but that attention is of three 
 
 a See Reid, Active Powers, Essay ii ch. 3. W&rkt, p. 587. ED.
 
 248 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. degrees or kinds. The first, a mere vital and irre- 
 LlV * sistible act ; the second, an act determined by desire, 
 
 Attention of w hich, though involuntary, may be resisted by our 
 grees or w yj . ^ ne third, an act determined by a deliberate voli- 
 tion. An act of attention, that is, an act of con- 
 centration, seems thus necessary to every exertion of 
 consciousness, as a certain contraction of the pupil is 
 requisite to every exercise of vision. We have formerly 
 noticed, that discrimination is a condition of con- 
 sciousness ; and a discrimination is only possible by 
 a concentrative act, or act of attention. This, how- 
 ever, which corresponds to the lowest degree, to the 
 mere vital or automatic act of attention, has been 
 refused the name ; and attention, in contradistinction 
 to this mere automatic contraction, given to the two 
 other degrees, of which, however, Reid only recognises 
 the third. 
 
 Nature and Attention, then, is to consciousness, what the con- 
 oTattStion. traction of the pupil is to sight ; or to the eye of the 
 mind, what the microscope or telescope is to the 
 bodily eye. The faculty of attention is not, therefore, 
 a special faculty, but merely consciousness acting 
 under the law of limitation to which it is subjected. 
 But whatever be its relations to the special faculties, 
 attention doubles all their efficiency, and affords them 
 a power of which they would otherwise be destitute. 
 It is, in fact, as we are at present constituted, the 
 primary condition of their activity. 
 
 Can we at- Having thus concluded the discussion of the ques- 
 
 thanasingu tion regarding the relation of consciousness to the 
 
 on j ce c ? at other cognitive faculties, I proceeded to consider 
 
 various questions which, as not peculiar to any of the 
 
 special faculties, fall to be discussed under the head 
 
 of consciousness, and I commenced with the curious
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 249 
 
 problem, Whether we can attend to more than a single LECT. 
 
 object at once. Mr Stewart maintains, though not !_ 
 
 without hesitation, the negative. I endeavoured to 
 show you that his arguments are not conclusive, and 
 that they even involve suppositions which are so 
 monstrous as to reduce the thesis he supports ad 
 impossibile. I have now only to say a word in answer Brown's 
 to Dr Brown's assertion of the same proposition, 
 though in different terms. In the passage I adduced 
 in our last Lecture, he commences by the assertion, 
 that the mind cannot exist, at the same moment, in Jnt states. 
 two different states, that is, in two states in either of 
 which it can exist separately, and concludes with the 
 averment that the contrary supposition is a manifest 
 absurdity. I find the same doctrine maintained by This doc- 
 Locke in that valuable, but neglected, treatise entitled tlinedTy" 
 An Examination of Pere Malebranche's Opinion 
 of Seeing all Things in God. In the thirty -ninth 
 section he says : " Different sentiments are different 
 modifications of the mind. The mind or soul that 
 perceives, is one immaterial, indivisible substance. 
 Now, I see the white and black on this paper, I hear 
 one singing in the next room, I feel the warmth of 
 the fire I sit by, and I taste an apple I am eating, and 
 all this at the same time. Now, I ask, take modifica- 
 tion for what you please, can the same unextended, 
 indivisible substance have different, nay, inconsistent 
 and opposite, (as these of white and black must be), 
 modifications at the same time ? Or must we suppose 
 distinct parts in an indivisible substance, one for 
 black, another for white, and another for red ideas, 
 and so of the rest of those infinite sensations which 
 we have in sorts and degrees ; all which we can dis- 
 tinctly perceive, and so are distinct ideas, some whereof
 
 250 LECTUEES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. are opposite as heat and cold, which yet a man may 
 XIY ' feel at the same time 1 " Leibnitz has not only 
 given a refutation of Locke's Essay, but likewise of 
 his Examination of Malebranche. In reference to 
 the passage I have just quoted, Leibnitz says : " Mr 
 opposed by Locke asks, ' Can the same unext ended, indivisible 
 Leibmtz. su k stance) h ave different, nay, inconsistent and oppo- 
 site modifications, at the same time V I reply, it can. 
 What is inconsistent in the same object, is not incon- 
 sistent in the representation of different objects which 
 we conceive at the same moment. For this there is no 
 necessity that there should be different parts in the soul, 
 as it is not necessary that there should be different 
 parts in the point on which, however, different angles 
 Aristotle rest." a The same thing had, however, been even better 
 said by Aristotle, whose doctrine I prefer translating to 
 
 you, as more perspicuous, in the following passage from 
 His view, Joannes Grammaticus, (better known by the surname 
 ^Ja^dby Philoponus), a Greek philosopher, who flourished to- 
 ' nus ' wards the middle of the sixth century. It is taken 
 from the Prologue to his valuable commentary on 
 the De Anima of Aristotle ; and, what is curious, the 
 very supposition which on Locke's doctrine would 
 infer the corporeal nature of mind, is alleged, by the 
 Aristotelians and Condillac, in proof of its immate- 
 riality. " Nothing bodily," says Aristotle, " can, at 
 the same time, in the same part, receive contraries. 
 The finger cannot at once be wholly participant of 
 white and of black, nor can it, at once and in the 
 same place, be both hot and cold. But the sense at 
 the same moment apprehends contraries. Wherefore, 
 it knows that this is first, and that second, and that 
 it discriminates the black from the white. In what 
 
 a Remarques gur le Sentiment du Pere Malebranche; Opera Ph ilosophica, 
 edit. Erdmann, p. 451. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 251 
 
 manner, therefore, does sight simultaneously perceive LECT. 
 contraries 1 Does it do so by the same \ or does it x 
 by one part apprehend black, by another white ? If 
 it does so by the same, it must apprehend these with- 
 out parts, and it is incorporeal. But if by one part it 
 apprehends this quality, and by another that, this, he 
 says, is the same as if I perceived this, and you that. 
 But it is necessary that that which judges should be 
 one and the same, and that it should even apprehend 
 by the same the objects which are judged. Body 
 cannot, at the same moment and by the same part, 
 apply itself to contraries or things absolutely different. 
 But sense at once applies itself to black and to white ; 
 it, therefore, applies itself indivisibly. It is thus 
 shown to be incorporeal. For if by one part it appre- 
 hended white, by another part apprehended black, it 
 could not discern the one colour from the other ; for 
 no one can distinguish that which is perceived by 
 himself as different from that which is perceived by 
 another." So far, Philoponus. 
 
 Dr Brown calls the sensation of sweet one mental criticism of 
 state, the sensation of cold another ; and as the one of doctrine, 
 these states may exist without the other, they are con- 
 sequently different states. But will it be maintained 
 
 a The text of Aristotle here partially ovv oi>x ol6v re /cx a >P i<r A (6 ''' ' s xpiveiv 
 
 paraphrased, (Procem, 36 ed. 1535), ra Kexoipifffj.eva, STJAOP- Sri 8' ouS* ev 
 
 and more fully in Commentary on texts, cx o >P' <r M <F ' > "ii> XP^"V tvrtvOev. "fltrirfp 
 
 144, 149, is as follows : r H Kal ST/ADV yap rb avrb \eyei Sri erepov, rb ayadbv 
 
 Sri ri ffap OVK tffri rb eo~xarov alffOij- Kal rb KctKoV, ovria Kal ore Odrepov \eyti 
 
 rfoiov afdyKfi yap $v airr6p.evov avrov Sri trtpov Kal 6drfpov, ov Kara <rvfi/3e- 
 
 KplveivrbKp'ifov.OijreS^KfX^P^^fi'ois jEbj/cbs rb Sre- Kfyta 8*, olov vvv \eyw 
 
 lv$tx*Tai Kplvtiv Sri trtpov rb y\VKv Sri ertpov, ov pfirroi Sri vvv (repov. 
 
 rov \evKov, aAAa Set ivi nvi &n<t><a STJAO 'AAA' ovrw \tyei, Kal vvv, Kal Sri vvv 
 
 elvai. Ovru fjiev yap Kav el rov /iev tyia o/ia &pa. "flare axtapiffrov Kal e"v 
 
 rov 8e ffv afoBoio, SrjAoi/ &v eft? Sri ax<aptffrif XP OV V- D f Anima, lib. iii. 
 
 trepa iAA^Awv. AtTSirJ) tv \eyeiv Sri c. 2, 11. Cf. 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 
 
 trfpov erepov yap rb y\vKv rov \ev- with the relative commentary by Phi- 
 
 KOV. A.ey(i apa rb avrA- "flffre ws \eyei, loponus. ED. 
 ovrta Kal votl Kal alffQaixrai. "On pir
 
 252 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. that we cannot, at one and the same moment, feel the 
 sensations of sweet and cold, or that sensations forming 
 
 apart different states, do, when coexistent in the same 
 subject, form only a single state ? 
 
 On this The doctrine that the mind can attend to, or be con- 
 
 pa^scS- scious of, only a single object at a time, would, in fact, 
 involve the conclusion that all comparison and dis- 
 crimination are impossible ; but comparison and dis- 
 crimination being possible, this possibility disproves 
 the truth of the counter proposition. An act of com- 
 parison or discrimination supposes that we are able to 
 comprehend, in one indivisible consciousness, the dif- 
 ferent objects to be compared or discriminated. Were 
 I only conscious of one object at one time, I could 
 never possibly bring them into relation ; each could be 
 apprehended only separately, and for itself. For in 
 the moment in which I am conscious of the object A, 
 I am, ex hypoihesi, unconscious of the object B ; and 
 in the moment I am conscious of the object B, I am 
 unconscious of the object A. So far, in fact, from con- 
 sciousness not being competent to the cognisance of 
 two things at once, it is only possible under that cog- 
 nisance as its condition. For without discrimination 
 there could be no consciousness ; and discrimination 
 necessarily supposes two terms to be discriminated. 
 
 No judgment could be possible were not the subject 
 and predicate of a proposition thought together by the 
 mind, although expressed in language one after the 
 other. Nay, as Aristotle has observed, a syllogism 
 forms in thought one simultaneous act ; a and it is only 
 the necessity of retailing it piecemeal and by succes- 
 
 a This is said by Aristotle of the iced rb a\y6fs, vvvOeffis ns ^ 
 
 act of judgment ; but the remark rwv Sxnrtp $v Zvrtav ..... Tb 
 
 applies to that of reasoning also. See 8i tv voiovv, rovro 6 vovs (KCUTTOV. 
 
 De Anima, iii. 6 : 'Ev ofs rJ> tytvSos ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 253 
 
 sion, in order to accommodate thought to the imper- LECT. 
 
 fection of its vehicle, language, that affords the ap- 1_ 
 
 pearance of a consecutive existence. Some languages, 
 as the Sanscrit, the Latin, and the Greek, express 
 the syntactical relations by flexion, and not by mere 
 juxtaposition. Their sentences are thus bound up into 
 one organic whole, the preceding parts remaining sus- 
 pended in the mind, till the meaning, like an electric 
 spark, is flashed from the conclusion to the commence- 
 ment. This is the reason of the greater rhetorical 
 effect of terminating the Latin period by the verb. 
 And to take a mere elementary example, " How could 
 the mind comprehend these words of Horace, 
 
 ' Bacchum in remotis carmina rupibus 
 Vidi docentem,' 
 
 unless it could seize at once those images in which 
 the adjectives are separated from their substantives l" a 
 
 The modern philosophers who have agitated this This ques- 
 
 , ,-,., tion can- 
 
 qUeStlOn, are not aware that it was one canvassed like- vassed in 
 
 wise in the schools of the middle ages. It was there of the mid- 
 expressed by the proposition, Possitne intellectus noster 
 plura simul intelligere.P Maintaining the negative, 
 we find St Thomas, Cajetanus, Ferrariensis, Capreolus, 
 Hervaeus, Alexander Alensis, Albertus Magnus, and 
 Durandus ; while the affirmative was asserted by Scotus, 
 Occam, Gregorius Ariminensis, Lichetus, Marsilius, 
 Biel, and others. 
 
 Supposing that the mind is not limited to the simul- HOW many 
 taneous consideration of a single object, a question thfmlnd 11 
 arises, How many objects can it embrace at once 1 once? 
 
 a [Bonstetten, Etudes de FHmnme, De. Anima, lib. i. c. 22, p. 134, fol. a 
 
 torn. ii. p. 377, note.] (ed. Aid.) Nemesius, De Natura, 
 
 $ [See Aquinas, Summa, pars i., Q. Hominis, c. vii. p. 1 84 ed. Mat- 
 
 85, art. 4. Cf. Alex. Aphrodisiensis, thsci.]
 
 254 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. You will recollect that I formerly stated that the 
 ' greater the number of objects among which the atten- 
 tion of the mind is distributed, the feebler and less 
 distinct will be its cognisance of each. 
 
 " Pluribus intentua, minor est ad singula sensus." 
 
 Consciousness will thus be at its maximum of intensity 
 when attention is concentrated on a single object ; 
 and the question comes to be, how many several ob- 
 jects can the mind simultaneously survey, not with 
 vivacity, but without absolute confusion 1 I find this 
 problem stated and differently answered, by different 
 philosophers, and apparently without a knowledge of 
 each other. By Charles Bonnet" the mind is allowed 
 to have a distinct notion of six objects at once ; by 
 Abraham Tucker' 3 the number is limited to four ; while 
 Destutt-Tracy 7 again amplifies it to six. The opinion 
 of the first and last of these philosophers, appears to 
 me correct. You can easily make the experiment for 
 yourselves, but you must beware of grouping the ob- 
 jects into classes. If you throw a handful of marbles 
 on the floor, you will find it difficult to view at once 
 more than six, or seven at most, without confusion ; 
 but if you group them into twos, or threes, or fives, you 
 can comprehend as many groups as you can units ; 
 because the mind considers these groups only as units, 
 it views them as wholes, and throws their parts out 
 of consideration. You may perform the experiment 
 also by an act of imagination. 
 
 a [Essai de Psychologic, c. xxrviii. who allows us to embrace, at one 
 
 p. 132. Compare his Essai Analytique view, five unities. D'Alembert, Me- 
 
 tur VA me, torn. L c. xiii. p. 163 et seq.] langet, vol. iv. pp. 40, 151. Ancillon, 
 
 $ [Light of Nature, c. xiv. 5.] Noureaux Melanges, torn. ii. p. 135. 
 
 y [Ideologic, torn. i. p. 453. Com- Malebranche, Recherche, liv. iii. c. 2 
 
 pare Degerando, Des Signes, L 167, torn, i p. 191.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 255 
 
 Before leaving this subject, I shall make some ob- LECT. 
 serrations on the value of attention, considered in its IV ' 
 
 highest degree as an act of will, and on the importance 
 of forming betimes the habit of deliberate concentra- 
 tion. 
 
 The greater capacity of continuous thinking that a Value of 
 
 , , ., . attention 
 
 man possesses, the longer and more steadily can he considered 
 follow out the same train of thought, the stronger is de^U'L 
 his power of attention ; and in proportion to his power 
 of attention will be the success with which his labour 
 is rewarded. All commencement is difficult ; and this 
 is more especially true of intellectual effort. When we 
 turn for the first time our view on any given object, a 
 hundred other things still retain possession of our 
 thoughts. Even when we are able, by an arduous 
 exertion, to break loose from the matters which have 
 previously engrossed us, or which every moment force 
 themselves on our consideration, even when a reso- 
 lute determination, or the attraction of the new object, 
 has smoothed the way on which we are to travel ; 
 still the mind is continually perplexed by the glimmer 
 of intrusive and distracting thoughts, which prevent 
 it from placing that which should exclusively occupy 
 its view, in the full clearness of an undivided light. 
 How great soever may be the interest which we take 
 in the new object, it will, however, only be fully esta- 
 blished as a favourite when it has been fused into 
 an integral part of the system of our previous know- 
 ledge, and of our established associations of thoughts, 
 feelings, and desires. But this can only be accom- 
 plished by time and custom. Our imagination and 
 our memory, to which we must resort for materials 
 with which to illustrate and enliven our new study, 
 accord us their aid unwillingly, indeed, only by com-
 
 256 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. pulsion. But if we are vigorous enough to pursue 
 1_ our course in spite of obstacles, every step, as we ad- 
 vance, will be found easier ; the mind becomes more 
 animated and energetic ; the distractions gradually di- 
 minish ; the attention is more exclusively concentrated 
 upon its object ; the kindred ideas flow with greater 
 freedom and abundance, and afford an easier selection 
 of what is suitable for illustration. At length, our 
 system of thought harmonises with our pursuit. The 
 whole man becomes, as it may be, philosopher, or his- 
 torian, or poet ; he lives only in the trains of thought 
 relating to this character. He now energises freely, 
 and, consequently, with pleasure ; for pleasure is the 
 reflex of unforced and unimpeded energy. All that is 
 produced in this state of mind, bears the stamp of ex- 
 cellence and perfection. Helvetius justly observes, 
 that the very feeblest intellect is capable of compre- 
 hending the inference of one mathematical position 
 from another, and even of making such an inference 
 itself." Now, the most difficult and complicate de- 
 monstrations in the works of a Newton or a Laplace, 
 are all made up of such immediate inferences. They 
 are like houses composed of single bricks. No greater 
 exertion of intellect is required to make a thousand 
 such inferences than is requisite to make one ; as the 
 effort of laying a single brick is the maximum of any 
 individual effort in the construction of such a house. 
 Thus, the difference between an ordinary mind and the 
 mind of a Newton, consists principally in this, that the 
 one is capable of the application of a more continuous 
 attention than the other, that a Newton is able 
 without fatigue to connect inference with inference in 
 one long series towards a determinate end ; while the 
 man of inferior capacity is soon obliged to break or let 
 
 a De VEsprit Discours iii. c. iv ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 257 
 
 fall the thread which he had begun to spin. This is, LECT. 
 
 in fact, what Sir Isaac, with equal modesty and shrewd- 1 
 
 ness, himself admitted. To one who complimented jf 'JJUJJ 
 him on his genius, he replied that if he had made any 
 discoveries, it was owing more to patient attention 
 than to any other talent." There is but little analogy 
 between mathematics and play-acting ; but I heard 
 the great Mrs Siddons, in nearly the same language, 
 attribute the whole superiority of her unrivalled talent 
 to the more intense study which she bestowed upon 
 her parts. If what Alcibiades, in the Symposium? of 
 Plato, narrates of Socrates were true, the father of Socrates. 
 Greek philosophy must have possessed this faculty of 
 meditation or continuous attention in the highest de- 
 gree. The story, indeed, has some appearance of ex- 
 aggeration ; but it shows what Alcibiades, or rather 
 Plato through him, deemed the requisite of a great 
 thinker. According to this report, in a military expe- 
 dition which Socrates made along with Alcibiades, the 
 philosopher was seen by the Athenian army to stand 
 for a whole day and a night, until the breaking of the 
 second morning, motionless, with a fixed gaze, thus 
 showing that he was uninterruptedly engrossed with 
 the consideration of a single subject : " And thus," 
 says Alcibiades, " Socrates is ever wont to do when 
 his mind is occupied with inquiries in which there are 
 difficulties to be overcome. He then never interrupts 
 his meditation, and forgets to eat, and drink, and 
 sleep, everything, in short, until his inquiry has 
 reached its termination, or, at least, until he has seen 
 some light in it." In this history there may be, as I 
 have said, exaggeration ; but still the truth of the 
 principle is undeniable. Like Newton, Descartes arro- Descartes. 
 
 a See Reid's Works, p. 637. P. 220. ED. 
 
 VOL. I. R
 
 258 LECTURES OX METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. gated nothing to the force of his intellect. What he 
 
 1_ had accomplished more than other men, that he attri- 
 
 Bacon. buted to the superiority of his method ; a and Bacon, 
 in like manner, eulogises his method, in that it places 
 all men with equal attention upon a level, and leaves 
 little or nothing to the prerogatives of genius.' 3 Nay, 
 genius itself has been analysed by the shrewdest ob- 
 servers into a higher capacity of attention. " Genius," 
 Helvetia*, says Helvetius, whom we have already quoted, " is 
 nothing but a continued attention," (une attention 
 Buffon. suivie. y ) " Genius," says Buffon, 5 "is only a protracted 
 patience," (une longue patience.) " In the exact sci- 
 Cuvier. ences, at least," says Cuvier, 6 " it is the patience of 
 a sound intellect, when invincible, which truly consti- 
 chester- tutes genius." And Chesterfield has also observed, 
 that " the power of applying an attention, steady and 
 undissipated, to a single object, is the sure mark of a 
 superior genius." t 
 
 These examples and authorities concur in establish- 
 ing the important truth, that he who would, with suc- 
 cess, attempt discovery, either by inquiry into the 
 works of nature, or by meditation on the phenomena 
 of mind, must acquire the faculty of abstracting him- 
 self, for a season, from the invasion of surrounding 
 objects, must be able even, in a certain degree, to 
 emancipate himself from the dominion of the body, 
 
 instant of anc ^ ^ VG * as ^ were > a P ure intelligence, within the 
 the power circle of his thoughts. This faculty has been mani- 
 tion. fested, more or less, by all whose names are associated 
 
 a. Discoun de laMethode,p. 1. ED. t [Eloge Historique de M. ffaiiy, 
 
 /8 Nov. Org., lib. i. aph. 61 ED. quoted by Toussaint, De la Pensee, 
 
 y De I Esprit, Discours iii. chap. iv. p. 219.] 
 
 ED. Letters to Us Son. Letter Ixxxix. 
 
 8 [Quoted by Ponelle, Manuel, p. [Compare Bonnet, Essal Analytique, 
 
 371.] torn, i., preface, p. 8.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 259 
 
 with the progress of the intellectual sciences. In some, LECT 
 
 indeed, the power of abstraction almost degenerated L 
 
 into a habit akin to disease, and the examples which 
 now occur to me, would almost induce me to retract 
 what I have said about the exaggeration of Plato's 
 history of Socrates. 
 
 Archimedes,* it is well known, was so absorbed in a Archimede 
 geometrical meditation, that he was first aware of the 
 storming of Syracuse by his own death-wound, and 
 his exclamation on the entrance of Roman soldiers 
 was, Noli turbare circulos meos. In like manner, 
 Joseph Scaliger, the most learned of men, when a Joseph 
 Protestant student in Paris, was so engrossed in the 
 study of Homer, that he became aware of the mas- 
 sacre of St Bartholomew, and of his own escape, only on 
 the day subsequent to the catastrophe. The philoso- 
 pher Carneades^ was habitually liable to fits of medi- Cameades 
 tation so profound, that, to prevent him sinking from 
 inanition, his maid found it necessary to feed him like 
 a child. And it is reported of Newton, that, while Newton, 
 engaged in his mathematical researches, he sometimes 
 forgot to dine. Cardan, 7 one of the most illustrious of Cardan, 
 philosophers and mathematicians, was once, upon a 
 journey, so lost in thought, that he forgot both his way 
 and the object of his journey. To the questions of his 
 driver whither he should proceed, he made no answer ; 
 and when he came to himself at nightfall, he was sur- 
 prised to find the carriage at a stand-still, and directly 
 under a gallows. The mathematician Vieta was some- vieu. 
 times so buried in meditation, that for hours he bore 
 more resemblance to a dead person than to a living, 
 
 a See Valerius Maximus, lib. viiL /3 Ibid., lib. viii. c. 7. ED. 
 c. 7. ED. 7 [Steeb, Uber den Menschen, ii. 671.]
 
 260 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. and was then wholly unconscious of everything going 
 L_ on around him. On the day of his marriage, the great 
 
 Budaeus forgot everything in his philological specula- 
 tions, and he was only awakened to the affairs of the 
 external world by a tardy embassy from the marriage- 
 party, who found him absorbed in the composition of 
 his Commentarii. 
 
 Male- It is beautifully observed by Malebranche, "that 
 
 q^ted the discovery of truth can only be made by the labour 
 Fm^ort" of attention ; because it is only the labour of atten- 
 tent e io n . a tion which has light for its reward;"" and, in an- 
 other place : " The attention of the intellect is a na- 
 tural prayer by which we obtain the enlightenment of 
 reason. But since the fall, the intellect frequently expe- 
 riences appalling droughts ; it cannot pray ; the labour 
 of attention fatigues and afflicts it. In fact, this labour 
 is at first great, and the recompense scanty ; while, at 
 the same time, we are unceasingly solicited, pressed, 
 agitated by the imagination and the passions, whose 
 inspiration and impulses it is always agreeable to 
 obey. Nevertheless, it is a matter of necessity ; we 
 must invoke reason to be enlightened ; there is no 
 other way of obtaining light and intelligence but by 
 the labour of attention. Faith is a gift of God which 
 we earn not by our merits ; but intelligence is a gift 
 usually only conceded to desert. Faith is a pure 
 grace in every sense ; but the understanding of a 
 truth is a grace of such a character that it must be 
 merited by labour, or by the co-operation of grace. 
 Those, then, who are capable of this labour, and who 
 are always attentive to the truth which ought to 
 guide them, have a disposition which would undoubt- 
 
 a Trait4 de Morale, partie i. chap. ft Ibid., partie i. chap. v. 4. 
 vL 1. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 261 
 
 edly deserve a name more magnificent than those LECT. 
 
 bestowed on the most splendid virtues. But although !_ 
 
 this habit or this virtue be inseparable from the love 
 of order, it is so little known among us that I do 
 not know if we have done it the honour of a parti- 
 cular name. May I, therefore, be pardoned in calling 
 it by the equivocal name of force of intellect. To 
 acquire this true force by which the intellect sup- 
 ports the labour of attention, it is necessary to begin 
 betimes to labour ; for, in the course of nature, 
 we can only acquire habits by acts, and can only 
 strengthen them by exercise. But perhaps the only 
 difficulty is to begin. We recollect that we began, 
 and that we were obliged to leave off. Hence we get 
 discouraged ; we think ourselves unfit for meditation ; 
 we renounce reason. If this be the case, whatever we 
 may allege to justify our sloth and negligence, we 
 renounce virtue, at least in part. For without the 
 labour of attention, we shall never comprehend the 
 grandeur of religion, the sanctity of morals, the little- 
 ness of all that is not God, the absurdity of the pas- 
 sions, and of all our internal miseries. Without this 
 labour, the soul will live in blindness and in disorder ; 
 because there is naturally no other way to obtain the 
 light that should conduct us ; we shall be eternally 
 under disquietude and in strange embarrassment ; for 
 we fear everything when we walk in darkness and 
 surrounded by precipices. It is true that faith guides 
 and supports ; but it does so only as it produces some 
 light by the attention which it excites in us ; for light 
 alone is what can assure minds, like ours, which have 
 so many enemies to fear." 
 
 I have translated a longer extract than I intended 
 when I began ; but the truth and importance of the
 
 262 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. observations are so great, and they are so admirably 
 expressed in Malebranche's own inimitable style, that 
 it was not easy to leave off. They are only a frag- 
 ment of a very valuable chapter on the subject, to 
 which I would earnestly refer you, indeed, I may 
 take this opportunity of saying, that there is no phi- 
 losophical author who can be more profitably studied 
 than Malebranche. As a thinker, he is perhaps the 
 most profound that France has ever produced, and as 
 a writer on philosophical subjects, there is not an- 
 other European author who can be placed before him. 
 His style is a model at once of dignity and of natural 
 ease ; and no metaphysician has been able to express 
 himself so clearly and precisely without resorting to 
 technical and scholastic terms. That he was the author 
 of a celebrated, but exploded hypothesis, is, perhaps, 
 the reason why he is far less studied than he otherwise 
 deserves. His works are of principal value for the 
 admirable observations on human nature which they 
 embody ; and were everything to be expunged from 
 them connected with the Vision of all things in the 
 Deity, and even with the Cartesian hypotheses in gene- 
 ral, they would still remain an inestimable treasury of 
 the acutest analyses, expressed in the most appropriate, 
 and, therefore, the most admirable eloquence. In the 
 last respect, he is only approached, certainly not sur- 
 passed, by Hume and Mendelssohn. 
 
 I have dwelt at greater length upon the practical 
 bearings of Attention, not only because this principle 
 constitutes the better half of all intellectual power, 
 but because it is of consequence that you should be 
 fully aware of the incalculable importance of acquir- 
 ing, by early and continued exercise, the habit of
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 263 
 
 attention. There are, however, many points of great LECT. 
 
 moment on which I have not touched, and the depen- I_ 
 
 deuce of Memory upon Attention might alone form an 
 interesting matter of discussion. You will find some 
 excellent observations on this subject in the first and 
 third volumes of Mr Stewart's Elements* 
 
 a See Workt, ii. ; Elements, I p. 122 et teq., and p. 352. ED.
 
 264 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 , 
 
 LECTURE XV. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, ITS EVIDENCE AND AUTHORITY. 
 
 LECT. HAVING now concluded the discussion in regard to 
 
 what Consciousness is, and shown you that it con- 
 
 B Tthe US stitutes the fundamental form of every act of know- 
 ledge ; I now proceed to consider it as the source 
 from whence we must derive every fact in the Philo- 
 sophy of Mind. And, in prosecution of this purpose, 
 I shall, in the first place, endeavour to show you that 
 it really is the principal, if not the only source, from 
 which all knowledge of the mental phenomena must 
 be obtained ; a in the second place, I shall consider 
 the character of its evidence, and what, under differ- 
 ent relations, are the different degrees of its autho- 
 rity ; and, in the last place, I shall state what, and of 
 what nature, are the more general phenomena which 
 
 a Under the first head here speci- examination of the Nervous System, 
 fied, the Author occasionally delivered and that the doctrine, or doctrines, 
 from the Chair three lectures, which which found upon the supposed paral- 
 contained " a summary view of the lelism of brain and mind, are, as far 
 nervous system in the higher animals, as observation extends, wholly ground- 
 more especially in man ; and a state- less." These lectures, as foreign in 
 ment of some of the results obtained their details from the general subject 
 [by him] from an extensive and ac- of the Course, are omitted in the pre- 
 curate induction on the size of the sent publication. A general summary 
 Encephalus and its principal parts, of the principal conclusions to which 
 both in man and the lower animals, the researches of the Author on this 
 serving to prove that no assistance is subject conducted him, will be found 
 afforded to Mental Philosophy by the in Appendix II. ED.
 
 conscious- 
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 265 
 
 it reveals. Having terminated these, I shall then LECT. 
 
 descend to the consideration of the special faculties of 
 
 knowledge, that is, to the particular modifications of 
 which consciousness is susceptible. 
 
 We proceed to consider, in the first place, the The possibi- 
 authority, the certainty of this instrument. Now, losophy ; m - 
 it is at once evident, that philosophy, as it affirms its veracity O f 
 own possibility, must affirm the veracity of conscious- ness. 
 ness ; for, as philosophy is only a scientific develop- 
 ment of the facts which consciousness reveals, it fol- 
 lows, that philosophy, in denying or doubting the tes- 
 timony of consciousness, would deny or doubt its own 
 existence. If, therefore, philosophy be notfelo de se, 
 it must not invalidate the integrity of that which is, 
 as it were, the heart, the punctum saliens, of its being ; 
 and as it would actively maintain its own credit, it must 
 be able positively to vindicate the truth of conscious- 
 ness : for, as Lucretius" well observes, 
 
 "... Ut in Fabrica, si prava est Regula prima, 
 Normaque si fallax rectis region ibus exit, 
 Omnia mendose fieri, atque obstipa necessum est ; 
 Sic igitur Ratio tibi rerum prava necesse est, 
 Falsaque sit, falsis qusecunque ab Sensibus orta est." 
 
 And Leibnitz truly says "If our immediate internal 
 experience could possibly deceive us, there could no 
 longer be for us any truth of fact (veritd defait), nay, 
 nor any truth of reason (verit$ de raison)" 
 
 So far there is, and can be, no dispute; if phi- 
 losophy is possible, the evidence of consciousness is 
 authentic. No philosopher denies its authority, and 
 even the Sceptic can only attempt to show, on the 
 hypothesis of the Dogmatist, that consciousness, as at 
 
 a De Rerum Natura, lib. iv. 516. 
 
 Nouveaux ssais, lib. ii. c. 27, 13. ED.
 
 266 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. variance with itself, is, therefore, on that hypothesis, 
 xv. . Jr 
 mendacious. 
 
 But if the testimony of consciousness be in itself 
 confessedly above all suspicion, it follows, that we 
 inquire into the conditions or laws which regulate the 
 legitimacy of its applications. The conscious mind 
 being at once the source from which we must derive 
 our knowledge of its phsenomena, and the mean 
 through which that knowledge is obtained, Psycho- 
 logy is only an evolution, by consciousness, of the 
 facts which consciousness itself reveals. As every 
 system of Mental Philosophy is thus only an exposi- 
 tion of these facts, every such system, consequently, 
 is true and complete, as it fairly and fully exhibits 
 what, and what only, consciousness exhibits. 
 Conscious- But, it may be obj ected, if consciousness be the only 
 c^VioVoT revelation we possess of our intellectual nature, and if 
 MtJmffy y ' consciousness be also the sole criterion by which we 
 ^g. can interpret the meaning of what this revelation 
 contains, this revelation must be very obscure, this 
 criterion must be very uncertain, seeing that the 
 various systems of philosophy all equally appeal to 
 this revelation, and to this criterion, in support of 
 the most contradictory opinions. As to the fact of the 
 variety and contradiction of philosophical systems, 
 this cannot be denied, and it is also true that 
 all these systems either openly profess allegiance 
 to consciousness, or silently confess its authority. 
 But admitting all this, I am still bold enough to 
 maintain, that consciousness affords not merely the 
 only revelation, and only criterion of philosophy, but 
 that this revelation is naturally clear, this criterion, 
 in itself, unerring. The history of philosophy, like the 
 history of theology, is only, it is too true, the history 
 of variations, and we must admit of the book of con-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 267 
 
 scionsness what a great Calvinist divine a bitterly LECT. 
 confessed of the book of Scripture, 
 
 " Hie liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque ; 
 Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua." 
 
 In regard, however, to either revelation, it can be Cause of 
 
 variation 
 
 shown that the source of this diversity is not in the m phiioso- 
 book, but in the reader. If men will go to the Bible, 
 not to ask of it what they shall believe, but to find in 
 it what they believe already, the standard of unity and 
 truth becomes in human hands only a Lesbian rule.0 
 And if philosophers, in place of evolving their doc- 
 trines out of consciousness, resort to consciousness only 
 when they are able to quote its authority in con- 
 firmation of their preconceived opinions, philosophical 
 systems, like the sandals of Theramenes, 7 may fit 
 any feet, but can never pretend to represent the 
 immutability of nature. And that philosophers have 
 been, for the most part, guilty of this, it is not 
 extremely difficult to show. They have seldom or 
 never taken the facts of consciousness, the whole facts 
 of consciousness, and nothing but the facts of con- 
 sciousness. They have either overlooked, or rejected, 
 or interpolated. 
 
 Before we are entitled to accuse consciousness ofweare 
 being a false, or vacillating, or ill-informed witness, inquire 
 we are bound, first of all, to see whether there be any iLre fe- 
 rules by which, in employing the testimony of con- j^w^c", 
 sciousness, we must be governed ; and whether philo- ln g e the y 
 sophers have evolved their systems out of conscious- f n> 
 ness in obedience to these rules. For if there be 
 
 gov 
 
 o S. Werenfels, Dissertationet. Am- TOV \l6ov nfTOKivt'irat Kal ol p.fvfi & 
 
 Btel. 1716, vol. il p. 391. ED. Kavfo. ED. 
 
 Aristotle, Etli. Nic., V. 10: ToO y er/pa/ieVij? Sia rb /xi) ^6vifiov a\\a 
 
 yap aoplffTov adpiffTos Kal 6 KO.VWV iffnv, Kal 4ira/j.(pOTfpiov ael rfj irpoaipeffft rijs 
 
 &ffirfp Kal TTJS Jifffflias o//coSo/t7Js 6 iroAn-ei'as,&re(cA.^0Tj K.66opvos. Plutarch, 
 
 tvos Ko.v<av irpbs yap rb (TXW Nicias, vol. i. p. 524 (ed. 1599). ED.
 
 268 LECTUEES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. rules under which alone the evidence of consciousness 
 
 XV 
 
 - can be fairly and fully given, and, consequently, under 
 which alone consciousness can serve as an infallible 
 standard of certainty and truth, and if philosophers 
 have despised or neglected these, then, must we 
 remove the reproach from the instrument, and affix it 
 to those blundering workmen who have not known 
 how to handle and apply it. In attempting to vindi- 
 cate the veracity and perspicuity of this, the natural, 
 revelation of our mental being, I shall, therefore, first, 
 endeavour to enumerate and explain the general rules 
 by which we must be governed in applying conscious- 
 ness as a mean of internal observation, and there- 
 after show how the variations and contradictions of 
 philosophy have all arisen from the violation of one 
 or more of these laws. If I accomplish this at pre- 
 sent but imperfectly, I may at least plead in excuse, 
 that the task I undertake is one that has not been 
 previously attempted. I, therefore, request that you 
 will view what I am to state to you on this subject 
 rather as the outline of a course of reasoning, than as 
 anything pretending to finished argument. 
 
 Three grand In attempting a scientific deduction of the philoso- 
 er phy of mind from the data of consciousness, there are, 
 in all, if I generalise correctly, three laws which afford 
 the exclusive conditions of psychological legitimacy. 
 These laws, or regulative conditions, are self-evident, 
 
 !U? aen " and yet they seem never to have been clearly proposed 
 to themselves by philosophers, in philosophical spe- 
 culation, they have certainly never been adequately 
 obeyed. 
 
 i. The law The First of these rules is, That no fact be assumed 
 
 mony. as a fact of consciousness but what is ultimate and 
 simple. This I would call the law of Parcimony.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 269 
 
 The Second, that which I would style the law of LECT. 
 
 xv. 
 
 Integrity, is That the whole facts of consciousness be 
 
 taken without reserve or hesitation, whether given asi'nu^rit a y wof 
 
 constituent, or as regulative data. 
 
 The Third is, That nothing but the facts of con- s. The law 
 sciousness be taken, or, if inferences of reasoning be 
 admitted, that these at least be recognised as legiti- 
 mate only as deduced from, and in subordination to, 
 the immediate data of consciousness, and every posi- 
 tion rejected as illegitimate, which is contradictory of 
 these. This I would call the law of Harmony. 
 
 I shall consider these in their order. 
 
 I. The first law, that of Parcimony, is, That no i. The law of 
 fact be assumed as a fact of consciousness but what is 
 ultimate and simple. What is a fact of consciousness ? Fact of con- 
 This question of all others requires a precise and arti- what?"* 
 culate answer, but I have not found it adequately 
 answered in any psychological author. 
 
 In the first place, every mental phsenomenon may 1. Primary 
 be called a fact of consciousness. But as we distin- ai. 
 guish consciousness from the special faculties, though 
 these are all only modifications of consciousness, only 
 branches of which consciousness is the trunk, so we 
 distinguish the special and derivative phaenomeua of 
 mind from those that are primary and universal, and 
 give to the latter the name of facts of consciousness, as 
 more eminently worthy of that appellation. In an act 
 of perception, for example, I distinguish the pen I hold 
 in my hand, and my hand itself, from my mind per- 
 ceiving them. This distinction is a particular fact, 
 the fact of a particular faculty, perception. But there 
 is a general fact, a general distinction, of which this is 
 only a special case. This general fact is the distinc- 
 tion of the Ego and non-Ego, and it belongs to con-
 
 270 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. sciousness as the general faculty. Whenever, there- 
 XY - fore, in our analysis of the intellectual phaenomena, we 
 arrive at an element which we cannot reduce to a gene- 
 ralisation from experience, but which lies at the root 
 of all experience, and which we cannot, therefore, re- 
 solve into any higher principle, this we properly call 
 a fact of consciousness. Looking to such a fact of 
 consciousness as the last result of an analysis, we call 
 it an ultimate principle ; looking from it as the first 
 constituent of all intellectual combination, we call it a 
 primary principle. A fact of consciousness is, thus, a 
 simple, and, as we regard it, either an ultimate, or a 
 primary, datum of intelligence. It obtains also various 
 denominations ; sometimes it is called an a priori 
 principle, sometimes a fundamental law of mind, some- 
 times a transcendental condition of thought," &c. &c. 
 
 2. Neces- But, ^ n *^ e secon( l place, this, its character of ulti- 
 mate priority, supposes its character of necessity. It 
 must be impossible not to think it. In fact, by its 
 necessity alone can we recognise it as an original 
 datum of intelligence, and distinguish it from any 
 mere result of generalisation and custom. 
 
 3 Given ^ n *^ e third place, this fact, as ultimate, is also given 
 * us w ^h a mere belief of its reality ; in other words, 
 consciousness reveals that it is, but not why or how 
 it is. This is evident. Were this fact given us, not 
 only with a belief, but with a knowledge of how or 
 why it is, in that case it would be a derivative, and 
 not a primary datum. For that whereby we were 
 thus enabled to comprehend its how and why, in 
 other words, the reason of its existence, this would be 
 relatively prior, and to it or to its antecedent must we 
 ascend, until we arrive at that primary fact, in which 
 
 a See Reid's Work*, p. 755 et seq. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 271 
 
 we must at last believe, which we must take upon LECT. 
 trust, but which we could not comprehend, that is, xv ' 
 think under a higher notion. 
 
 A fact of consciousness is thus, that whose exist- 
 ence is given and guaranteed by an original and ne- 
 cessary belief. But there is an important distinction 
 to be here made, which has not only been overlooked 
 by all philosophers, but has led some of the most dis- 
 tinguished into no inconsiderable errors. 
 
 The facts of consciousness are to be considered in The facts of 
 two points of view ; either as evidencing their own nes 
 ideal or phsenomenal existence, or as evidencing the tw 
 objective existence of something else beyond them." A 
 belief in the former is not identical with a belief in their own g 
 the latter. The one cannot, the other may possibly ence, or the 
 be refused. In the case of a common witness, we can- existed 
 not doubt the fact of his personal reality, nor the fact thingTe- 
 of his testimony as emitted, but we can always doubt yo! 
 the truth of that which his testimony avers. So it is 
 with consciousness. We cannot possibly refuse the HOW far 
 fact of its evidence as given, but we may hesitate to possible in 
 admit that beyond itself of which it assures us. I ITfact of 
 shall explain by taking an example. In the act of 
 External Perception, consciousness gives as a conjunct 
 fact, the existence of Me or Self as perceiving, and the ercept101 
 existence of something different from Me or Self as 
 perceived. Now the reality of this, as a subjective 
 datum, as an ideal phsenomenon, it is absolutely im- 
 possible to doubt without doubting the existence of 
 consciousness, for consciousness is itself this fact ; and 
 to doubt the existence of consciousness is absolutely 
 impossible ; for as such a doubt could not exist, except 
 in and through consciousness, it would, consequently, 
 
 a See ReicCa Works, Note A, p. 743, et scq.Eo.
 
 272 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. annihilate itself. We should doubt that we doubted. 
 ' As contained, as given, in an act of consciousness, the 
 
 contrast of mind knowing and matter known cannot 
 be denied. 
 
 But the whole phaenomenon as given in conscious- 
 ness may be admitted, and yet its inference disputed. 
 It may be said, consciousness gives the mental subject 
 as perceiving an external object, contradistinguished 
 from it as perceived : all this we do not, and cannot, 
 deny. But consciousness is only a phaenomenon ; 
 the contrast between the subject and object may be 
 only apparent, not real ; the object given as an ex- 
 ternal reality, may only be a mental representation, 
 which the mind is, by an unknown law, determined 
 unconsciously to produce, and to mistake for some- 
 thing different from itself. All this may be said and 
 believed, without self-contradiction,- nay, all this has, 
 by the immense majority of modern philosophers, been 
 actually said and believed. 
 
 in the case In like manner, in an act of Memory consciousness 
 lory * connects a present existence with a past. I cannot 
 deny the actual phaenomenon, because my denial would 
 be suicidal, but I can, without self-contradiction, assert 
 that consciousness may be a false witness in regard to 
 any former existence ; and I may maintain, if I please, 
 that the memory of the past, in consciousness, is no- 
 thing but a phaenomenon, which has no reality beyond 
 the present. There are many other facts of conscious- 
 ness which we cannot but admit as ideal phaenomena, 
 but may discredit as guaranteeing aught beyond their 
 phaenomenal existence itself. The legality of this doubt 
 I do not at present consider, but only its possibility ; 
 all that I have now in view being to show that we 
 must not confound, as has been done, the double im- 
 port of the facts, and the two degrees of evidence for
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 273 
 
 their reality. This mistake has, among others, been LECT. 
 made by Mr Stewart. " The belief," he says, " which ' 
 
 accompanies consciousness, as to the present existence 
 of its appropriate phsenomena, has been commonly con- 
 sidered as much less obnoxious to cavil, than any of 
 the other principles which philosophers are accustomed 
 to assume as self-evident, in the formation of their 
 metaphysical systems. No doubts on this head have 
 yet been suggested by any philosopher, how sceptical 
 soever ; even by those who have called in question 
 the existence both of mind and of matter. And yet 
 the fact is, that it rests on no foundation more solid 
 than our belief of the existence of external objects ; or 
 our belief, that other men possess intellectual powers 
 and faculties similar to those of which we are conscious 
 in ourselves. In all these cases, the only account that 
 can be given of our belief is, that it forms a necessary 
 part of our constitution ; against which metaphysicians 
 may easily argue, so as to perplex the judgment, but 
 of which it is impossible for us to divest ourselves for 
 a moment, when we are called on to employ our rea- 
 son, either in the business of life, or in the pursuits of 
 science. While we are under the influence of our 
 appetites, passions, or affections, or even of a strong 
 speculative curiosity, all those difficulties which be- 
 wildered us in the solitude of the closet, vanish before 
 the essential principles of the human frame." 
 
 With all the respect to which the opinion of so dis- Criticism of 
 tinguished a philosopher as Mr Stewart is justly en- view, 
 titled, I must be permitted to say, that I cannot but 
 regard his assertion, that the present existence of 
 the pheenomena of consciousness, and the reality of 
 that to which these phaenomena bear witness, rest on 
 
 o Phil. Essays. Works, vol. v. p. 57. 
 VOL. I. S
 
 274 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. a foundation equally solid, as wholly untenable. The 
 
 ' second fact, the fact testified to, may be worthy of all 
 
 credit, as I agree with Mr Stewart in thinking that 
 it is ; but still it does not rest on a foundation equally 
 solid as the fact of the testimony itself. Mr Stewart 
 confesses that of the former no doubt had ever been 
 suggested by the boldest sceptic ; and the latter, in 
 so far as it assures us of our having an immediate 
 knowledge of the external world, which is the case 
 alleged by Mr Stewart, has been doubted, nay denied, 
 not merely by sceptics, but by modern philosophers 
 almost to a man. This historical circumstance, there- 
 fore, of itself, would create a strong presumption, that 
 the two facts must stand on very different foundations ; 
 and this presumption is confirmed when we investi- 
 gate what these foundations themselves are. 
 
 The one fact, the fact of the testimony, is an act 
 of consciousness itself ; it cannot, therefore, be invali- 
 dated without self-contradiction. For, as we have fre- 
 quently observed, to doubt of the reality of that of 
 which we are conscious is impossible ; for as we can 
 only doubt through consciousness, to doubt of con- 
 sciousness is to doubt of consciousness by conscious- 
 ness. If, on the one hand, we affirm the reality of the 
 doubt, we thereby explicitly affirm the reality of con- 
 sciousness, and contradict our doubt ; if, on the other 
 hand, we deny the reality of consciousness, we impli- 
 citly deny the reality of our denial itself. Thus, in 
 the act of perception, consciousness gives as a conjunct 
 fact, an ego or mind, and a non-ego or matter, known 
 together, and contradistinguished from each other. 
 Now, as a present phaenomenon, this double fact can- 
 not possibly be denied. I cannot, therefore, refuse the 
 fact, that, in perception, I am conscious of a phsenome-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 275 
 
 non, which I am compelled to regard as the attribute LECT. 
 
 of something different from my mind or self. This I 1_ 
 
 must perforce admit, or run into self-contradiction. 
 But admitting this, may I not still, without self-con- 
 tradiction, maintain that what I am compelled to view 
 as the phenomenon of something different from me is 
 nevertheless, (unknown to me), only a modification of 
 my mind \ In this I admit the fact of the testimony 
 of consciousness as given, but deny the truth of its 
 report. Whether this denial of the truth of conscious- 
 ness as a witness, is or is not legitimate, we are not, 
 at this moment, to consider : all I have in view at 
 present is, as I said, to show that we must distinguish 
 in consciousness two kinds of facts, the fact of con- 
 sciousness testifying, and the fact of which conscious- 
 ness testifies ; and that we must not, as Mr Stewart 
 has done, hold that we can as little doubt of the fact 
 of the existence of an external world, as of the fact 
 that consciousness gives, in mutual contrast, the phe- 
 nomenon of self, in contrast to the phenomenon of not- 
 self." 
 
 Under this first law, let it, therefore, be laid down, in Results of 
 the first place, that by a fact of consciousness properly Pammouy. 
 so called, is meant a primary and universal fact of our 
 intellectual being ; and, in the second, that such facts 
 are of two kinds, 1, The facts given in the act of 
 consciousness itself ; and, 2, The facts which conscious- 
 ness does not at once give, but to the reality of which 
 it only bears evidence. And as simplification is always 
 a matter of importance, we may throw out of account 
 
 a The only philosopher whom I says the evidence of consciousness of 
 have met with, touching on the ques- an external world is not self-contradic- 
 tion, is Father Buffier, and he seems tory ; by no means, he is only mad." 
 to strike the nail upon the head. He Traiti des Premieres Vtritts, c. xi. 
 says, as I recollect," He who gain- 89. [See Reid's Works, p. 787. ED.]
 
 276 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. altogether the former class of these facts ; for of such 
 ' no doubt can be, or has been, entertained. It is only 
 
 the authority of these facts as evidence of something 
 beyond themselves, that is, only the second class of 
 facts, which become matter of discussion ; it is not the 
 reality of consciousness that we have to prove, but its 
 veracity." 
 
 H. The Law The second rule is, That the whole facts of con- 
 rit y n * sciousness be taken without reserve or hesitation, 
 whether given as constituent, or as regulative, data. 
 This rule is too manifest to require much elucidation. 
 As philosophy is only a development of the phenomena 
 and laws of consciousness, it is evident that philosophy 
 can only be complete, as it comprehends, in one har- 
 monious system, all the constituent, and all the regu- 
 lative, facts of consciousness. If any phenomenon or 
 constituent fact of consciousness be omitted, the sys- 
 tem is not complete ; if any law or regulative fact is 
 excluded, the system is not legitimate. 
 
 in. The The violation of this second rule is, in general, 
 mom " connected with a violation of the third, and we 
 shall accordingly illustrate them together. The third 
 is, That nothing but the facts of consciousness be 
 taken, or if inferences of reasoning be admitted, that 
 these at least be recognised as legitimate only as 
 deduced from, and only in subordination to, the im- 
 mediate data of consciousness, and that every position 
 be rejected as illegitimate which is contradictory of 
 these. 
 
 Stedin" 8 " ^e tmt h an( i necessity of this rule are not less 
 
 conjunction, evident than the truth and necessity of the preceding. 
 
 Philosophy is only a systematic evolution of the con- 
 
 a See Reid's Works, pp. 743-754, tt $eq.Eo.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 277 
 
 tents of consciousness, by the instrumentality of con- LECT. 
 
 sciousness ; it, therefore, necessarily supposes, in both ! 
 
 respects, the veracity of consciousness. 
 
 But, though this be too evident to admit of doubt, HOW Sce P - 
 and though no philosopher has ever openly thrown out of P ar- 
 off allegiance to the authority of consciousness, we m***j+ 
 find, nevertheless, that its testimony has been silently 
 overlooked, and systems established upon principles 
 in direct hostility to the primary data of intelligence. 
 It is only such a violation of the integrity of con- 
 sciousness, by the dogmatist, that affords, to the 
 sceptic, the foundation on which he can establish his 
 proof of the nullity of philosophy. The sceptic cannot 
 assail the truth of the facts of consciousness in them- 
 selves. In attempting this he would run at once into 
 self-contradiction. In the first place, he would enact 
 the part of a dogmatist, that is, he would positively, 
 dogmatically, establish his doubt. In the second, 
 waiving this, how can he accomplish what he thus 
 proposes ? For why 1 He must attack conscious- 
 ness either from a higher ground, or from conscious- 
 ness itself. Higher ground than consciousness there 
 is none ; he must, therefore, invalidate the facts of 
 consciousness from the ground of consciousness itself. 
 On this ground, he cannot, as we have seen, deny the 
 facts of consciousness as given ; he can only attempt 
 to invalidate their testimony. But this again can 
 be done only by showing that consciousness tells diffe- 
 rent tales, that its evidence is contradictory, that 
 its data are repugnant. But this no sceptic has ever 
 yet been able to do. Neither does the sceptic or 
 negative philosopher himself assume his principles ; 
 he only accepts those on which the dogmatist or 
 positive philosopher attempts to establish his doc-
 
 278 LECTURES OX METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. trine ; aiid this doctrine he reduces to zero, by show- 
 . ' ing that its principles are, either mutually repug- 
 nant, or repugnant to facts of consciousness on 
 which, though it may not expressly found, still, as 
 facts of consciousness, it cannot refuse to recognise 
 \vithout denying the possibility of philosophy in gene- 
 ral. 
 
 violations I shall illustrate the violation of this rule by ex- 
 cond C and amplcs taken from the writings of the late ingenious 
 in tL ^rit- Dr Thomas Brown. I must, however, premise that 
 Thomas this philosopher, so far from being singular in his easy 
 way of appealing to, or overlooking, the facts of 
 consciousness, as he finds them convenient or incon- 
 venient for his purpose, supplies only a specimen of 
 Browne the too ordinary style of philosophising. Now, you 
 Ertemai f must know, that Dr Brown maintains the common 
 doctrine of the philosophers, that we have no imme- 
 diate knowledge of anything beyond the states or 
 modifications of our own minds, that we are only 
 conscious of the ego, the non-ego, as known, being 
 only a modification of self, which mankind at large 
 are illusively determined to view as external and 
 different from self. This doctrine is contradictory of 
 the fact to which consciousness testifies, that the 
 object of which we are conscious in perception, is the 
 external reality as existing, and not merely its repre- 
 sentation in the percipient mind. That this is the 
 fact testified to by consciousness, and believed by the 
 common sense of mankind, is admitted even by those 
 philosophers who reject the truth of the testimony 
 and the belief. It is of no consequence to us at pre- 
 sent what are the grounds on which the principle is 
 founded, that the mind can have no knowledge of aught 
 besides itself ; it is sufficient to observe that, this prin- 
 
 inconsist- 
 ency.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 279 
 
 ciple being contradictory of the testimony of conscious- LECT. 
 ness, Dr Brown, by adopting it, virtually accuses con- - 
 sciousiiess of falsehood. But if consciousness be false 
 in its testimony to one fact, we can have no confidence 
 in its testimony to any other ; and Brown, having 
 himself belied the veracity of consciousness, cannot, 
 therefore, again appeal to this veracity as to a cred- 
 ible authority. But he is not thus consistent. Although 
 he does not allow that we have any knowledge of the 
 existence of an outer world, the existence of that 
 world he still maintains. And on what grounds 1 He 
 admits the reasoning of the idealist, that is, of the 
 philosopher who denies the reality of the material 
 universe, he admits this to be invincible. How, 
 then, is his conclusion avoided \ Simply by appealing 
 to the universal belief of mankind in favour of the 
 existence of external things, that is, to the autho- 
 rity of a fact of consciousness. But to him this appeal 
 is incompetent. For, in the first place, having already 
 virtually given up, or rather positively rejected, the 
 testimony of consciousness, when consciousness de- 
 posed to our immediate knowledge of external things, 
 how can he even found upon the veracity of that 
 mendacious principle, when bearing evidence to the 
 unknown existence of external things ? I cannot but 
 believe that the material reality exists ; therefore, 
 it does exist, for consciousness does not deceive us, 
 this reasoning Dr Brown employs when defending his 
 assertion of an outer world. I cannot but believe 
 that the material reality is the object immediately 
 known in perception ; therefore, it is immediately 
 known, for consciousness does not deceive us, this 
 
 a Philosophy of the Human Mind, this argument further pursued in the 
 lecture xxviii., p. 50, 2d edition. See Author's Discussions, p. 92. ED.
 
 280 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. reasoning Dr Brown rejects when establishing the 
 foundation of his system. In the one case, he main- 
 
 tains, this belief, because irresistible, is true ; in the 
 other case, he maintains, this belief, though irresist- 
 ible, is false. Consciousness is veracious in the former 
 belief, mendacious in the latter. I approbate the one, 
 I reprobate the other. The inconsistency of this is 
 apparent. It becomes more palpable when we con- 
 sider, in the second place, that the belief which Dr 
 Brown assumes as true rests on, is, in fact, only the 
 reflex of, the belief which he repudiates as false. 
 Why do mankind believe in the existence of an outer 
 worldl They do not believe in it as in something 
 unknown ; but, on the contrary, they believe it to 
 exist, only because they believe that they immediately 
 know it to exist. The former belief is only as it is 
 founded on the latter. Of all absurdities, therefore, 
 the greatest is to assert, on the one hand, that con- 
 sciousness deceives us in the belief that we know any 
 material object to exist ; and, on the other, that the 
 material object exists, because, though on false grounds, 
 we believe it to exist. 
 
 The same i I may give you another instance, from the same 
 B^WS author, of the wild work that the application of this 
 personal rule makes, among philosophical systems not legiti- 
 mately established. Dr Brown, with other philoso- 
 phers, rests the proof of our Personal Identity, and of 
 our Mental Individuality, on the ground of beliefs, 
 which, as " intuitive, universal, immediate, and irresist- 
 ible," he, not unjustly, regards as the " internal and 
 never-ceasing voice of our Creator, revelations from 
 on high, omnipotent, [and veracious], as their Author." a 
 
 a Philosophy of the Human Mind, also Sir W. Hamilton's Duscutsions, p. 
 lecture xiii., p. 269, 2d edition. See 96.^Eo.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 281 
 
 To him this argument is, however, incompetent, as LKCT. 
 contradictory. 
 
 What we know of self or person, we know only as 
 a fact of consciousness. In our "perceptive conscious- 
 ness, there is revealed, in contrast to each, a self and 
 a not-self. This contrast is either true or false. If 
 true, then am I conscious of an object different from 
 me, that is, I have an immediate perception of the 
 external reality. If false, then am I not conscious 
 of anything different from me, but what I am con- 
 strained to regard as not-me is only a modification 
 of me, which, by an illusion of my nature, I mis- 
 take, and must mistake, for something different from 
 me. 
 
 Now, will it be credited that Dr Brown, and be it 
 remembered that I adduce him only as the represen- 
 tative of a great majority of philosophers, affirms or 
 denies, just as he finds it convenient or inconvenient, 
 this fact, this distinction of consciousness? In his 
 doctrine of perception, he explicitly denies its truth, 
 in denying that mind is conscious of aught beyond 
 itself. But, in other parts of his philosophy, this false 
 fact, this illusive distinction, and the deceitful belief 
 founded thereupon, are appealed to, (I quote his expres- 
 sions), as " revelations from on high, as the never- 
 ceasing voice of our Creator," &c. 
 
 Thus, on the veracity of this mendacious belief, Dr 
 Brown establishes his proof of our personal identity. 
 Touching the object of perception, when its evidence 
 is inconvenient, this belief is quietly passed over, as 
 incompetent to distinguish not-self from self ; in the 
 question regarding our personal identity, where its 
 testimony is convenient, it is clamorously cited as an 
 inspired witness, exclusively competent to distinguish
 
 282 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. self from not-self. Yet why, if, in the one case, it 
 
 XV 
 
 L_ mistook self for not-self, it may not, in the other. 
 
 mistake not-self for self, would appear a problem not 
 of the easiest solution. 
 
 And of our The same belief, with the same inconsistency, is 
 ity. l called in to prove the Individuality of mind. a But if 
 we are fallaciously determined, in our perceptive con- 
 sciousness, to regard mind both as mind and as matter, 
 for, on Brown's hypothesis, in perception, the object 
 perceived is only a mode of the percipient subject, if, 
 I say, in this act, I must view what is supposed one and 
 indivisible, as plural, and different, and opposed, how 
 is it possible to appeal to the authority of a testimony 
 so treacherous as consciousness for an evidence of the 
 real simplicity of the thinking principle 1 How, says 
 the materialist to Brown, how can you appeal 
 against me to the testimony of consciousness, which 
 you yourself reject when against your own opinions, 
 and how can you, on the authority of that testimony, 
 maintain the unity of self to be more than an illusive 
 appearance, when self and not-self, as known to con- 
 sciousness, are, on your own hypothesis, confessedly 
 only modifications of the same percipient subject 1 
 If, on your doctrine, consciousness can split what you 
 hold to be one and indivisible into two, not only dif- 
 ferent but opposed, existences, what absurdity is 
 there, on mine, that consciousness should exhibit as 
 phaenomenally one, what we both hold to be really 
 manifold 1 If you give the lie to consciousness in 
 favour of your hypothesis, you can have no reasonable 
 objection that I should give it the lie in favour of 
 mine. If you can maintain that not-self is only an 
 illusive phaenomenon, being, in fact, only self in dis- 
 
 o Lecture xii. vol. L p. 241, 2d edition. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 283 
 
 guise ; I may also maintain, a contra, that self itself is LECT. 
 only an illusive phaenomenon, and that the apparent XV ' 
 unity of the ego is only the result of an organic har- 
 mony of action between the particles of matter. 
 
 From these examples, the truth of the position I The abso- 
 maintain is manifest, that a fact of consciousness can mod 
 only be rejected on the supposition of falsity, and that, 
 the falsity of one fact of consciousness being admitted, b 
 the truth of no other fact of consciousness can be main- **" 
 tained. The legal brocard, Falsus in uno,falsus in omni- 
 bus, is a rule not more applicable to other witnesses than 
 to consciousness. Thus, every system of philosophy 
 which implies the negation of any fact of conscious- 
 ness, is not only necessarily unable, without self-con- 
 tradiction, to establish its own truth by any appeal to 
 consciousness ; it is also unable, without self-contra- 
 diction, to appeal to consciousness against the false- 
 hood of any other system. If the absolute and uni- 
 versal veracity of consciousness be once surrendered, 
 every system is equally true, or rather all are equally 
 false ; philosophy is impossible, for it has now no 
 instrument by which truth can be discovered, no 
 standard by which it can be tried ; the root of our 
 nature is a lie. But though it is thus manifestly the 
 common interest of every scheme of philosophy to 
 preserve intact the integrity of consciousness, almost 
 every scheme of philosophy is only another mode in 
 which this integrity has been violated. If, therefore, 
 I am able to prove the fact of this various violation, 
 and to show that the facts of consciousness have 
 never, or hardly ever, been fairly evolved, it will 
 follow, as I said, that no reproach can be justly ad- 
 dressed to consciousness as an ill-informed, or vacil- 
 lating, or perfidious witness, but to those only who
 
 284 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. were too proud, or too negligent, to accept its testi- 
 
 - inony, to employ its materials, and to obey its laws. 
 
 And on this supposition, so far should we be from 
 despairing of the future advance of philosophy from 
 the experience of its past wanderings, that we ought, 
 on the contrary, to anticipate for it a steady progress, 
 the moment that philosophers can be persuaded to 
 look to consciousness, and to consciousness alone, for 
 their materials and their rules.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 285 
 
 LECTURE XVI. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, VIOLATIONS OF ITS AUTHORITY. 
 
 ON the principle, which no one has yet been found LECT. 
 bold enough formally to deny, and which, indeed, 
 requires only to be understood to be acknowledged, J 
 viz. that as all philosophy is evolved from conscious- 
 ness, so, on the truth of consciousness, the possibility |J 
 of all philosophy is dependent, it is manifest, at 
 once and without further reasoning, that no philoso- 
 phical theory can pretend to truth except that single 
 theory which comprehends and develops the fact of 
 consciousness on which it founds, without retrench- 
 ment, distortion, or addition. Were a philosophical 
 system to pretend that it culls out all that is correct in 
 a fact of consciousness, and rejects only what is erro- 
 neous, what would be the inevitable result ? In the 
 first place, this system admits, and must admit, that 
 it is wholly dependent on consciousness for its consti- 
 tuent elements, and for the rules by which these are 
 selected and arranged, in short, that it is wholly de- 
 pendent on consciousness for its knowledge of true and 
 false. But, in the second place, it pretends to select a 
 part, and to reject a part, of a fact given and guaran- 
 teed by consciousness. Now, by what criterion, by 
 what standard, can it discriminate the true from the 
 false in this fact 1 This criterion must be either con-
 
 286 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. sciousness itself, or an instrument different from con- 
 
 WT 
 
 ' sciousness. If it be an instrument different from 
 consciousness, what is it \ No such instrument has 
 ever yet been named, has ever yet been heard of. If 
 it exist, and if it enable us to criticise the data of con- 
 sciousness, it must be a higher source of knowledge 
 than consciousness, and thus it will replace conscious- 
 ness as the first and generative principle of philosophy. 
 But of any principle of this character, different from 
 consciousness, philosophy is yet in ignorance. It re- 
 mains unenounced and unknown. It may, therefore, 
 be safely assumed not to be. The standard, therefore, 
 by which any philosophical theory can profess to regu- 
 late its choice among the elements of any fact of con- 
 sciousness, must be consciousness itself. Now, mark 
 the dilemma. The theory makes consciousness the 
 discriminator between what is true and what is false 
 in its own testimony. But if consciousness be as- 
 sumed to be a mendacious witness in certain parts of 
 its evidence, how can it be presumed a veracious wit- 
 ness in others 1 This it cannot be. It must be held 
 as false in all, if false in any ; and the philosophical 
 theory which starts from this hypothesis, starts from a 
 negation of itself in the negation of philosophy in 
 general. Again, on the hypothesis that part of the 
 deliverance of consciousness is true, part false, how 
 can consciousness enable us to distinguish these ? This 
 has never yet been shown ; it is, in fact, inconceivable. 
 But, further, how is it discovered that any part of a 
 datum of consciousness is false, another true ? This 
 can only be done if the datum involve a contradiction. 
 But if the facts of consciousness be contradictory, 
 then is consciousness a principle of falsehood ; and the 
 greatest of conceivable follies would be an attempt
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 287 
 
 to employ such a principle in the discovery of truth. LECT. 
 
 And such an act of folly is every philosophical theory 1 
 
 which, departing from an admission that the data of 
 consciousness are false, would still pretend to build out 
 of them a system of truth. But, on the other hand, if 
 the data of consciousness are not contradictory, and 
 consciousness, therefore, not a self-convicted deceiver, 
 how is the unapparent falsehood of its evidence to be 
 evinced ? This is manifestly impossible ; for such 
 falsehood is not to be presumed ; and, we have pre- 
 viously seen, there is no higher principle by which the 
 testimony of consciousness can be canvassed and re- 
 dargued. Consciousness, therefore, is to be presumed 
 veracious ; a philosophical theory which accepts one 
 part of the harmonious data of consciousness and 
 rejects another, is manifestly a mere caprice, a chimera 
 not worthy of consideration, far less of articulate dis- 
 proof. It is ab initio null. 
 
 I have been anxious thus again to inculcate upon 
 you this view in regard to the relation of Philosophy 
 to Consciousness, because it contains a preliminary 
 refutation of all those proud and wayward systems 
 which, though they can only pretend to represent the 
 truth, inasmuch as they fully and fairly develop the 
 revelations vouchsafed to us through consciousness, 
 still do, one and all of them, depart from a false or 
 partial acceptance of these revelations themselves ; 
 and because it affords a clear and simple criterion of 
 certainty in our own attempts at philosophical con- 
 struction. If it be correct, it sweeps away at once a 
 world of metaphysical speculation ; and if it curtail 
 the dominions of human reason, it firmly establishes 
 our authority over what remains. 
 
 In order still further to evince to you the import-
 
 288 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. ance of the precept, (viz. that we must look to con- 
 _ sciousness and to consciousness alone for the materials 
 
 o? the' 'aT an( ^ ru l es f philosophy), and to show articulately how 
 cSoii ^ tae variations of philosophy have been determined by 
 "raTed lus ^ 3 n 6glect, I will take those facts of consciousness which 
 lie at the very root of philosophy, and with which, con- 
 sequently, all philosophical systems are necessarily and 
 primarily conversant ; and point out how, besides the 
 one true doctrine which accepts and simply states the 
 fact as given, there are always as many various actual 
 theories as there are various possible modes of distort- 
 The Duality ing or mutilating this fact. I shall commence with 
 "ciousness. that great fact to which I have already alluded, that 
 we are immediately conscious in perception of an ego 
 and a non-ego, known together, and known in con- 
 trast to each other. This is the fact of the Duality of 
 Consciousness. It is clear and manifest. When I con- 
 centrate my attention in the simplest act of percep- 
 tion, I return from my observation with the most irre- 
 sistible conviction of two facts, or rather two branches 
 of the same fact ; that I am, and that something 
 different from me exists. In this act, I am conscious 
 of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external 
 reality as the object perceived ; and I am conscious of 
 both existences in the same indivisible moment of in- 
 tuition. The knowledge of the subject does not pre- 
 cede, nor follow, the knowledge of the object, neither 
 determines, neither is determined by, the other. 
 The fact of Such is the fact of perception revealed in conscious- 
 mony of ness, and as it determines mankind in general in their 
 
 conscious- 
 
 ce^ion ai er ~ a ^ nost 6( l ua l assurance of the reality of an external 
 jowedby world, as of the existence of their own minds. Con- 
 
 thofte who 
 
 tauil iu sc i us ness declares our knowledge of material qualities 
 to be intuitive or immediate, not representative or
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 289 
 
 mediate. Nor is the fact, as given, denied even by those LECT. 
 who disallow its truth. So clear is the deliverance, __ Lj_ 
 that even the philosophers who reject an intuitive per- 
 ception, find it impossible not to admit, that their doc- 
 trine stands decidedly opposed to the voice of con- 
 sciousness, to the natural convictions of mankind. 
 I may give you some examples of the admission of this 
 fact, which it is of the utmost importance to place 
 beyond the possibility of doubt. I quote, of course, 
 only from those philosophers whose systems are in con- 
 tradiction of the testimony of consciousness, which 
 they are forced to admit. I might quote to you con- 
 fessions to this effect from Descartes, De Passionibus, 
 article 23, and from Malebranche, Recherche, liv. iii. 
 c. 1. To these I only refer you. 
 
 The following is from Berkeley, towards the con- Berkeley, 
 elusion of the third and last Dialogue, in which his 
 system of Idealism is established : " When Hylas is 
 at last entirely converted, he observes to Philonous, 
 ' After all, the controversy about matter, in the strict 
 acceptation of it, lies altogether between you and the 
 philosophers, whose principles, I acknowledge, are not 
 near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense 
 of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours.' Philonous 
 observes in the end, 'That he does not pretend to 
 be a setter-up of new notions ; his endeavours tend 
 only to unite, and to place in a clearer light, that 
 truth which was before shared between the vulgar 
 and the philosophers ; the former being of opinion, 
 that those things they immediately perceive are the 
 real things ; and the latter, that the things imme- 
 diately perceived are ideas which exist only in the 
 mind ; which two things put together do, in effect, 
 
 VOL. i. T
 
 290 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. constitute the substance of what he advances/ And 
 
 ' he concludes by observing, * That those principles 
 
 which at first view lead to scepticism, pursued to a 
 certain point, bring men back to common sense.' " 
 
 Here you will notice that Berkeley admits that the 
 common belief of mankind is, that the things imme- 
 diately perceived are not representative objects in the 
 mind, but the external realities themselves. Hume, 
 in like manner, makes the same confession ; and the 
 confession of that sceptical idealist, or sceptical nihilist, 
 is of the utmost weight. 
 
 Hume. " It seems evident that men are carried by a natural 
 instinct or prepossession to repose faith in their senses ; 
 and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before 
 the use of reason, we always suppose an external uni- 
 verse, which depends not on our perception, but would 
 exist though we and every sensible creature were ab- 
 sent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are 
 governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of 
 external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and 
 actions. 
 
 " It seems also evident that, when men follow this 
 blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always 
 suppose the very images presented by the senses, to 
 be the external objects, and never entertain any sus- 
 picion that the one are nothing but representations of 
 the other. This very table, which we see white, and 
 which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent 
 of our perception, and to be something external to our 
 mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not 
 being on it, our absence does not annihilate it. It 
 preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent 
 of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or 
 contemplate it. 
 
 a See Reid's Works, p. 284. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 291 
 
 " But this universal and primary opinion of all men LECT. 
 is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which XVL 
 teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the 
 mind but an image or perception, and that the senses 
 are only the inlets through which these images are 
 conveyed, without being able to produce any imme- 
 diate intercourse between the mind and the object. 
 The table, which we see, seems to diminish as we re- 
 move farther from it ; but the real table, which exists 
 independent of us, suffers no alteration ; it was, there- 
 fore, nothing but its image which was present to the 
 mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason ; and 
 no man who reflects, ever doubted that the existences 
 which we consider, when we say, this house and that 
 tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and 
 fleeting copies or representations of other existences, 
 which remain uniform and independent 
 
 " Do you follow the instincts and propensities of 
 nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of 
 sense I But these lead you to believe that the very 
 perception or sensible image is the external object. 
 Do you disclaim this, principle, in order to embrace a 
 more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only 
 representations of something external ? You here 
 depart from your natural propensities and more obvi- 
 ous sentiments ; and yet are not able to satisfy your 
 reason, which can never find any convincing argu- 
 ment from experience to prove that the perceptions 
 are connected with any external objects."" 
 
 The fact that consciousness does testify to an imme- 
 
 a Essays, vol. ii. pp. 154-155, 156- 370; and the same thing is acknow- 
 
 157 (edit 1788). Similar confessions ledged by Kant, by Fichte, by Schel- 
 
 are made by Hume in his Treatise of ling, by Tennemann, by Jacobi. Seve- 
 
 Human Nature, vol. i. pp. 330, 338, ral of these testimonies you will find 
 
 353, 358, 361, 369, (original edit.) ; extracted and translated in a note of 
 
 in a word, you may read from 330 to my Discussions on Philosophy, p. 92.
 
 292 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. diate knowledge by mind of an object different from 
 
 1 any modification of its own, is thus admitted even by 
 
 those philosophers who still do not hesitate to deny 
 the truth of the testimony ; for to say that all men 
 do naturally believe in such a knowledge, is only, in 
 other words, to say that they believe it upon the 
 authority of consciousness. A fact of consciousness, 
 and a fact of the common sense of mankind, are only 
 various expressions of the same import. We may, 
 therefore, lay it down as an undisputed truth, that 
 consciousness gives, as an ultimate fact, a primitive 
 duality ; a knowledge of the ego in relation and con- 
 trast to the non-ego ; and a knowledge of the non- 
 ego in relation and contrast to the ego. The ego and 
 non-ego are, thus, given in an original synthesis, as 
 conjoined in the unity of knowledge, and, in an origi- 
 nal antithesis, as opposed in the contrariety of exist- 
 ence. In other words, we are conscious of them in an 
 indivisible act of knowledge together and at once, 
 but we are conscious of them as, in themselves, differ- 
 ent and exclusive of each other. 
 
 The Ego Again, consciousness not only gives us a duality, 
 
 E^ogfon but it gives its elements in equal counterpoise and 
 
 SouTness independence. The ego and non-ego, mind and 
 
 cot^teiise matter, are not only given together, but in absolute 
 
 ^ndTn C e e . coequality. The one does not precede, the other does 
 
 not follow ; and, in their mutual relation, each is 
 
 equally dependent, equally independent. Such is the 
 
 AS many fact as given in and by consciousness. Philosophers 
 
 different - 
 
 phiiosophi- have not, however, been content to accept the fact in 
 originate in its integrity, but have been pleased to accept it only 
 as it admits under such qualifications as it suited their systems to 
 
 of various . . 
 
 possible devise. In truth, there are just as many different 
 
 tions. philosophical systems originating in this fact, as it 
 
 admits of various possible modifications. An enume-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 293 
 
 ration of these modifications, accordingly, affords an LECT. 
 enumeration of philosophical theories. 
 
 In the first place, there is the grand division of phi- i. Those 
 losophers into those who do, and those who do not, 
 accept the fact in its integrity.* Of modern philoso- 
 pliers, almost all are comprehended under the latter 
 category, while of the former, if we do not remount to 
 the schoolmen and the ancients, I am only aware of ne ' 
 a single philosopher^ before Reid, who did not reject, 
 at least in part, the fact as consciousness affords it. As 
 it is always expedient to possess a precise name for a 
 precise distinction, I would be inclined to denominate 
 those who implicitly acquiesce in the primitive dual- canedNa- r 
 
 , , T , -r, ,. tural Real- 
 
 ity as given in consciousness, the .Natural Realists or istsor Na 
 
 Natural Dualists, and their doctrine, Natural Realism iS 
 or Natural Dualism. 
 
 In the second place, the philosophers who do not The latter, 
 accept the fact, and the whole fact, may be divided ^ 
 and subdivided into various classes by various prin- 
 ciples of distribution. 
 
 The first subdivision will be taken from the total, or 
 partial, rejections of the import of the fact. I have 
 previously shown you, that to deny any fact of con- 
 sciousness as an actual phsenomenon is utterly impos- 
 sible. But, though necessarily admitted as a present 
 phsenomenon, the import of this phaenomenon, all 
 beyond our actual consciousness of its existence, may 
 be denied. We are able, without self-contradiction, 
 to suppose, and, consequently, to assert, that all to 
 which the phsenomenon of which we are conscious 
 refers, is a deception, that, for example, the past, to 
 
 a See the Author's Suppl. Disser. sequently referred to by Sir W. Hamil- 
 
 to Reid's Works, Note C. ED. ton, as holding a similar doctrine in 
 
 /3 This philosopher is doubtless a paradoxical form. See below, vol. 
 
 Peter Poiret. John Sergeant is sub- ii. pp. 92, 124. ED.
 
 294 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 L x\CT' which an act of memory refers, is only an illusion 
 - involved in our consciousness of the present, that 
 the unknown subject to which every phenomenon of 
 which we are conscious involves a reference, has no 
 reality beyond this reference itself, in short, that all 
 our knowledge of mind or matter, is only a conscious- 
 
 sts ness of various bundles of baseless appearances. This 
 
 and Nihil- . r *. 
 
 sts. doctrine, as refusing a substantial reality to the phse- 
 nomenal existence of which we are conscious, is called 
 Nihilism ; and, consequently, philosophers, as they 
 affirm or deny the authority of consciousness in guar- 
 anteeing a substratum or substance to the manifesta- 
 tions of the ego and non-ego, are divided into Eealists 
 or Substantialists, and into Nihilists or Non-Substan- 
 tialists. Of positive or dogmatic Nihilism there is 
 no example in modern philosophy, for Oken's deduc- 
 tion of the universe from the original nothing, the 
 nothing being equivalent to the Absolute or God, is 
 only the paradoxical foundation of a system of real- 
 ism ; and, in ancient philosophy, we know too little of 
 the book of Gorgias the Sophist, entitled liepl TOV py 
 Giro?, f) Trepl <frvcreo)s,P Concerning Nalureor the Non- 
 Existent, to be able to affirm whether it were main- 
 tained by him as a dogmatic and bona fide doctrine. 
 But as a sceptical conclusion from the premises of 
 previous philosophers, we have an illustrious example 
 of Nihilism in Hume ; and the celebrated Fichte ad- 
 mits that the speculative principles of his own ideal- 
 ism would, unless corrected by his practical, terminate 
 in this result. 7 
 
 ctSeeOken'sPky&iophilosophy, irons- y See a remarkable passage in the 
 
 lated for the Ray Society by Tulk, Bestimmung des Menschen, p. 174, 
 
 31-43. ED. (Werlx, vol. ii. p. 245), translated by 
 
 See Sextus Empiricus, A dr. Math. Sir W. Hamilton, Reid's Works, p. 
 
 vii. 65. ED. 129. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 295 
 
 The Eealists or Substantialists are again divided LECT. 
 into Dualists, and into Unitarians or Monists, accord- !_ 
 
 ing as they are, or are not, contented with the testi- 
 mony of consciousness to the ultimate duplicity of sub- J 
 ject and object in perception. The Dualists, of whom an 
 we are now first speaking, are distinguished from the 
 Natural Dualists of whom we formerly spoke, in this, 
 that the latter establish the existence of the two 
 worlds of mind and matter on the immediate know- 
 ledge we possess of both series of phaenomena, a 
 knowledge of which consciousness assures us ; whereas 
 the former, surrendering the veracity of consciousness 
 to our immediate knowledge of material phsenomena, 
 and, consequently, our immediate knowledge of the 
 existence of matter, still endeavour, by various hypo- 
 theses and reasonings, to maintain the existence of an 
 unknown external world. As we denominate those 
 who maintain a dualism as involved in the fact of 
 consciousness, Natural Dualists ; so we may style those 
 dualists who deny the evidence of consciousness to our 
 immediate knowledge of aught beyond the sphere of 
 mind, Hypothetical Dualists or Cosmothetic Idealists. 
 
 To the class of Cosmothetic Idealists, the great ma- The majo- 
 jority of modern philosophers are to be referred. De- 
 
 nying an immediate or intuitive knowledge of the ex- ' 
 
 ternal reality, whose existence they maintain, they, 
 course, hold a doctrine of mediate or representative abided ac- 
 perception ; and, according to the various modifica- their ylew 
 tions of that doctrine, they are again subdivided into presentation 
 those who view, in the immediate object of perception, tk>u. erce 
 a representative entity present to the mind, but not a 
 mere mental modification, and into those who hold 
 that the immediate object is only a representative mo- 
 dification of the mind itself. It is not always easy to 
 determine to which of these classes some philosophers
 
 296 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. belong. To the former, or class holding the cruder 
 
 ' hypothesis of representation, certainly belong, the 
 
 followers of Democritus and Epicurus, those Aris- 
 totelians who held the vulgar doctrine of species, 
 (Aristotle himself was probably a natural dualist"), 
 and in recent times, among many others, Malebranche, 
 Berkeley, Clarke, Newton, Abraham Tucker, &c. To 
 these is also, but problematically, to be referred Locke. 
 To the second, or class holding the finer hypothesis of 
 representation, belong, without any doubt, many of 
 the Platonists, Leibnitz, Arnauld, Crousaz, Condillac, 
 Kant, &c., and to this class is also probably to be 
 referred Descartes.' 3 
 
 Monists, The philosophical Unitarians or Monists, reject the 
 ' testimony of consciousness to the ultimate duality of 
 the subject and object in perception, but they arrive at 
 the unity of these in different ways. Some admit the 
 testimony of consciousness to the equipoise of the men- 
 tal and material pheenomena, and do not attempt to 
 reduce either mind to matter, or matter to mind. 
 They reject, however, the evidence of consciousness to 
 their antithesis in existence, and maintain that mind 
 and matter are only phaenomenal modifications of the 
 into, i. same common substance. This is the doctrine of Ab- 
 hoia the solute Identity, a doctrine of which the most illus- 
 
 doctnne of 
 
 Absolute trious representatives among recent philosophers are 
 Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin. Others again deny the 
 evidence of consciousness to the equipoise of the sub- 
 ject and object as co-ordinate and co-original elements ; 
 
 o Aristotle's opinion is doubtful, ledge. See the Author's Notes, Reid's 
 
 In the De Anima, i. 5, he combats the Works, pp. 300, 886 ; and M. St 
 
 theory of Empedocles, that like is Hilaire's preface to his translation of 
 
 known by like, and appears as a natu- the De Anima, p. 22. ED. 
 
 ral realist. But in the Nicomachean $ See the Author's Discussions, 
 
 Ethics, vi. 1, he adopts the principle p. 57 seq. ED. 
 of similarity as the basis of all know-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 297 
 
 and as the balance is inclined in favour of the one LECT. 
 relative or the other, two opposite schemes of psycho- - 1_ 
 logy are determined. If the subject be taken as the 
 original and genetic, and the object evolved from it as 2. idealists; 
 its product, the theory of Idealism is established. On 
 the other hand, if the object be assumed as the original 3. Mate- 
 and genetic, and the subject evolved from it as its m 
 product, the theory of Materialism is established. 
 
 In regard to these two opposite schemes of a one- HOW a phi- 
 sided philosophy, I would at present make an observa- 
 
 tion to which it may be afterwards necessary to recur ventU* from 
 viz. that a philosophical system is often prevented MM 
 from falling into absolute idealism or absolute mate- abtoiu r 
 rialism, and held in a kind of vacillating equilibrium, ma 
 not in consequence of being based on the fact of con- 
 sciousness, but from the circumstance, that its mate- 
 rialistic tendency in one opinion happens to be coun- 
 teracted by its idealistic tendency in another ; two 
 opposite errors, in short, co-operating to the same 
 result as one truth. On this ground is to be ex- 
 plained, why the philosophy of Locke and Condillac 
 did not more easily slide into materialism. Deriving 
 our whole knowledge, mediately or immediately, from 
 the senses, this philosophy seemed destined to be fairly 
 analysed into a scheme of materialism ; but from this 
 it was for a long time preserved, in consequence of 
 involving a doctrine, which, on the other hand, if not 
 counteracted, would have naturally carried it over 
 into idealism. This was the doctrine of a representa- 
 tive perception. The legitimate issue of such a doc- 
 trine is now admitted on all hands, to be absolute 
 idealism ; and the only ground on which it has been 
 latterly thought possible to avoid this conclusion, 
 an appeal to the natural belief of mankind in the 
 existence of an external world, is, as I showed you,
 
 298 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. incompetent to the hypothetical dualist or cosmothetic 
 ' idealist. In his hands such an appeal is self-contradic- 
 tory. For if this universal belief be fairly applied, 
 it only proves the existence of an outer world by dis- 
 proving the hypothesis of a representative perception. 
 Recapituia- To recapitulate what I have now said : The philo- 
 
 tion of fore- . r 
 
 going. sophical systems concerning the relation of mind 
 and matter, are coextensive with the various possible 
 modes in which the fact of the Duality of Conscious- 
 ness may be accepted or refused. It may be accepted 
 either wholly and without reserve, or it may not. 
 The former alternative affords the class of Natural 
 Bealists or Natural Dualists. 
 
 Those, again, who do not accept the fact in its 
 absolute integrity, are subdivided in various manners. 
 They are, first of all, distinguished into Eealists or 
 Substantialists, and into Nihilists, as they do, or do 
 not, admit a subject, or subjects, to the two opposite 
 series of phsenomena which consciousness reveals. The 
 former class is again distributed into Hypothetical 
 Dualists or Cosmothetic Idealists, and into Unitarians 
 or Monists. 
 
 The Hypothetical Dualists or Cosmothetic Idealists, 
 are divided, according to their different theories of the 
 representation in perception, into those who view in 
 the object immediately perceived, a tertium quid dif- 
 ferent both from the external reality and from the 
 conscious mind, and into those who identify this 
 object with a modification of the mind itself. 
 
 The Unitarians or Monists fall into two classes as 
 they do, or do not, preserve the equilibrium of sub- 
 ject and object. If, admitting the equilibrium of these, 
 they deny the reality of their opposition, the system 
 of Absolute Identity emerges, which carries thought
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 299 
 
 and extension, mind and matter, up into modes of LECT. 
 ., i XVI - 
 the same common substance. 
 
 It would be turning aside from my present purpose, 
 were I to attempt any articulate refutation of these 
 various systems. What I have now in view is to 
 exhibit to you how, the moment that the fact of con- 
 sciousness in its absolute integrity is surrendered, 
 philosophy at once falls from unity and truth into 
 variety and error. In reality, by the very act of 
 refusing any one datum of consciousness, philosophy 
 invalidates the whole credibility of consciousness, and, 
 consciousness ruined as an instrument, philosophy 
 is extinct. Thus, the refusal of philosophers to accept 
 the fact of the duality of consciousness, is virtually an 
 act of philosophical suicide. Their various systems 
 are now only so many empty spectres, so many 
 enchanted corpses, which the first exorcism of the 
 sceptic reduces to their natural nothingness. The 
 mutual polemic of these systems is like the warfare of 
 shadows ; as the heroes in Valhalla, they hew each 
 other into pieces, only in a twinkling to be reunited, 
 and again to amuse themselves in other bloodless and 
 indecisive contests. 
 
 Having now given you a general view of the various Hypotheses 
 systems of philosophy, in their mutual relations, as regard to 
 founded on the great fact of the Duality of Conscious- intercourse 
 ness, I proceed, in subordination to this fact, to give Mind and 
 you a brief account of certain famous hypotheses 
 which it is necessary for you to know, hypotheses 
 proposed in solution of the problem of how inter- 
 course of substances so opposite as mind and body 
 could be accomplished. These hypotheses, of course, 
 
 a This simile is taken from Kant, Kritlk der reinen Vemunft, p. 784 (edit. 
 1799).-Eo.
 
 300 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. belong exclusively to the doctrine of Dualism, for in 
 XVL the Unitarian system the difficulty is resolved by the 
 Four in annihilation of the opposition, and the reduction of 
 the two substances to one. The hypotheses I allude 
 to, are known under the names, 1, Of the system of 
 Assistance or of Occasional Causes ; 2, Of the Pre- 
 established Harmony ; 3, Of the Plastic Medium ; 
 and, 4, Of Physical Influence. The first belongs to 
 Descartes, De la Forge, Malebranche, and the Car- 
 tesians in general ; the second to Leibnitz and Wolf, 
 though not universally adopted by their school ; the 
 third was an ancient opinion revived in modern times 
 by Cudworth and Leclerc ; a the fourth is the common 
 doctrine of the Schoolmen, and, though not explicitly 
 enounced, that generally prevalent at present ; among 
 modern philosophers, it has been expounded with great 
 perspicuity by Euler/ We shall take these in their 
 order. 
 
 i. occasion- The hypothesis of Divine Assistance or of Occa- 
 sional Causes, sets out from the apparent impossibi- 
 lity involved in Dualism of any actual communication 
 between a spiritual and a material substance, that is, 
 between extended and non-extended existences ; and 
 it terminates in the assertion, that the Deity, on 
 occasion of the affections of matter of the motions 
 in the bodily organism, excites in the mind corre- 
 spondent thoughts and representations ; and on occa- 
 sion of thoughts or representations arising in the 
 mind, that He, in like manner, produces the corre- 
 spondent movements in the body. But more explicitly : 
 " God, according to the advocates of this scheme, 
 
 a Cudworth, InteUectttal System of sur la Principe de Vie. Opera, edit. 
 
 the Universe, b. i. c. iii. 37. Leclerc, Erdmann, p. 429. ED. 
 
 Billiotheque CTioistt, vol. ii p. 107, et /3 Lettres a une Princesse fAlle- 
 
 seq. See also Leibnitz, Considerations m ayne, part ii. let. 1 4, edCournot. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 301 
 
 governs the universe, and its constituent existences, LECT. 
 
 by the laws according to which He has created them ; 1 
 
 and as the world was originally called into being by a 
 mere fiat of the divine will, so it owes the continu- 
 ance of its existence from moment to moment only to 
 the unremitted perseverance of the same volition. 
 Let the sustaining energy of the divine will cease but 
 for an instant, and the universe lapses into nothing- 
 ness. The existence of created things is thus exclu- 
 sively maintained by a creation, as it were, incessantly 
 renewed. God is, thus, the necessary cause of every 
 modification of body, and of every modification of 
 mind ; and his efficiency is sufficient to afford an ex- 
 planation of the union and intercourse of extended 
 and unextended substances. 
 
 " External objects determine certain movements hi 
 our bodily organs of sense, and these movements are, 
 by the nerves and animal spirits, propagated to the 
 brain. The brain does not act immediately and really 
 upon the soul ; the soul has no direct cognisance of 
 any modification of the brain ; this is impossible. It 
 is God himself who, by a law which he has established, 
 when movements are determined in the brain, pro- 
 duces analogous modifications in the conscious mind. 
 In like manner, suppose the mind has a volition to 
 move the arm ; this volition is, of itself, inefficacious, 
 but God, in virtue of the same law, causes the answer- 
 ing motion in our limb. The body is not, therefore, 
 the real cause of the mental modifications ; nor the 
 mind the real cause of the bodily movements. Never- 
 theless, as the soul would not be modified without the 
 antecedent changes in the body, nor the body moved 
 without the antecedent determination of the soul, 
 these changes and determinations are in a certain 
 sort necessary. But this necessity is not absolute ;
 
 302 LECTUKES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. it is only hypothetical or conditional. The organic 
 
 ' changes, and the mental determinations, are nothing 
 
 but simple conditions, and not real causes ; in short, 
 they are occasions or occasional causes." a This doctrine 
 of occasional causes is called, likewise, the Hypothesis 
 of Assistance, as supposing the immediate co-operation 
 or intervention of the Deity. It is involved in the 
 Cartesian theory, and, therefore, belongs to Descartes ; 
 but it was fully evolved by De la Forge, Malebranche, 
 
 and other followers of Descartes. It may, however, 
 be traced far higher. I find it first explicitly, and in 
 all its extent, maintained in the commencement of 
 the twelfth century by Algazel, 7 or Elgazali, of Bagdad, 
 surnamed thelmaun of the world; from him it passed 
 to the schools of the West, and many of the most illus- 
 trious philosophers of the middle ages maintained that 
 God is the only real agent in the universe. 5 To this 
 doctrine Dr Eeid inclines/ and it is expressly main- 
 tained by Mr Stewart.*" 
 
 This hypothesis did not satisfy Leibnitz. " He re- 
 2.pre-estab-proaches the Cartesians with converting the universe 
 mony. " into a perpetual miracle, and of explaining the natural, 
 by a supernatural, order. This would annihilate philo- 
 sophy; for philosophy consists in the investigation 
 
 o [Laromiguiere, Lefons de Philo- is given in Tennemann's Geschichte 
 
 sophie, torn. ii. p. 255-6.] der Philosophic, voL viii. p. 887 et seq. 
 
 /3 See Descartes, Principia, part ii. See also Degerando^i'stoe're Comparte, 
 
 36. De la Forge, Traite de F Esprit vol. iv. p. 226. ED. 
 
 de FHomme, c. xvi. Malebranche, 8 Averroes, 1. c. p. 56 : " Agens 
 
 Recherche de la V&rite, lib. vi. part. iL combustionis creavit nigredinem in 
 
 c. 3, Entretitn* sur la Metaphysique, stuppa et combustionem in partibus 
 
 Ent. vii. ED. ejus, et posuit earn combustam et 
 
 7 In his Destructio Pkilosophorum, cinerem, et est Deus gloriosus medi- 
 
 now only known through the refuta- antibus angelis, aut immediate." See 
 
 tion of it by Averroes/called Destruc- Tennemann, L c. p. 405. ED. 
 
 tio Destructionis, preserved in a bar- See Works, pp. 257, 527. ED. 
 
 barous Latin translation, in the ninth See Works, vol. ii. pp. 97, 476 
 
 volume of Aristotle's Works, Venice, 479 ; vol. iii. pp. 230, 248, 389391. 
 
 1 550. A full account of this treatise Eix
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 303 
 
 and discovery of the second causes which produce the LECT. 
 
 various phenomena of the universe." You degrade 
 
 the Divinity, he subjoined ; you make him act like 
 a watchmaker, who, having constructed a timepiece, 
 would still be obliged himself to turn the hands, to 
 make it mark the hours. A skilful mechanist would 
 so frame his clock that it would go for a certain 
 period without assistance or interposition. So when 
 God created man, he disposed his organs and faculties 
 in such a manner that they are able of themselves 
 to execute their functions and maintain their activity 
 from birth to death." 
 
 Leibnitz thought he had devised a more philosophi- 
 cal scheme, in the hypothesis of the pre-established or 
 predetermined Harmony, (Sy sterna Harmonics Prcesta- 
 bilitce vel Prcedeterminatce.) This hypothesis denies 
 all real connection, not only between spiritual and 
 material substances, but between substances in gene- 
 ral ; and explains their apparent communion from a 
 previously decreed coarrangement of the Supreme 
 Being, in the following manner : " God, before creat- 
 ing souls and bodies, knew all these souls and bodies ; 
 he knew also all possible souls and bodies. 7 Now, in 
 this infinite variety of possible souls and bodies, it 
 was necessary that there should be souls whose series 
 of perceptions and determinations would correspond 
 to the series of movements which some of these pos- 
 sible bodies would execute ; for in an infinite number 
 of souls, and in an infinite number of bodies, there 
 would be found all possible combinations. Now, 
 
 a Systlme Nouveau de la Nature, y Systeme Nouveau de la, Nature, 
 
 13. Opera, ed. Erdmann, p. 127. Cf. 14. TKtodicee, 62. These pas- 
 
 Theodic&e, 61. Ibid., p. 520. ED. sages contain the substance of the 
 
 ft [Laromiguiere, Lefons, ii. 256-7] remarks in the text, but not the 
 
 Troisieme Edaircissement. Opera, ed. words. ED. 
 Erdmann, p. 134. ED.
 
 304 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. suppose that, out of a soul whose series of modifications 
 
 1_ corresponded exactly to the series of modifications 
 
 which a certain body was destined to perform, and of 
 this body whose successive movements were corre- 
 spondent to the successive modifications of this soul, 
 God should make a man, it is evident, that between 
 the two substances which constitute this man, there 
 would subsist the most perfect harmony. It is, thus, 
 no longer necessary to devise theories to account for 
 the reciprocal intercourse of the material and the spir- 
 itual substances. These have no communication, no 
 mutual influence. The soul passes from one state, 
 from one perception, to another, by virtue of its own 
 nature. The body executes the series of its move- 
 ments without any participation or interference of the 
 soul in these. The soul and body are like two clocks 
 accurately regulated, which point to the same hour and 
 minute, although the spring which gives motion to the 
 one is not the spring which gives motion to the other." 
 Thus the harmony which appears to combine the soul 
 and body is, however, independent of any reciprocal 
 action. This harmony was established before the crea- 
 tion of man ; and hence it is called the pre-established 
 or predetermined harmony." 
 
 It is needless to attempt a refutation of this hypo- 
 thesis, which its author himself probably regarded 
 more as a specimen of ingenuity than as a serious 
 doctrine. 
 3. Plastic The third hypothesis is that of the Plastic Medium 
 
 M fT 
 
 between soul and body. " This medium participates of 
 the two natures ; it is partly material, partly spiritual. 
 As material, it can be acted on by the body ; and as 
 spiritual, it can act upon the mind. It is the mid- 
 
 o Troisitme Edaircissement. Opera, [Laromigui^re Lemons, torn. ii. 
 edit. Erdmann, p. 135. ED. p. 257-8.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 305 
 
 die term of a continuous proportion. It is a bridge LECT. 
 
 thrown over the abyss which separates matter from 
 
 spirit. This hypothesis is too absurd for refutation ; 
 it annihilates itself. Between an extended and unex- 
 tended substance, there can be no middle existence ; 
 [these being not simply different in degree, but contra- 
 dictory.] If the medium be neither body nor soul, it 
 is a chimera ; if it is at once body and soul, it is con- 
 tradictory ; or if, to avoid the contradiction, it is said 
 to be, like us, the union of soul and body, it is itself in 
 want of a medium." a 
 
 The fourth hypothesis is that of Physical Influence, 4. Physical 
 (Influxus Physicus). "On this doctrine, external ob- m 
 jects affect our senses, and the organic motion they 
 determine is communicated to the brain. The brain 
 acts upon the soul, and the soul has an idea, a per- 
 ception. The mind thus possessed of a perception 
 or idea, is affected for good or ill. If it suffers, it 
 seeks to be relieved of pain. It acts in its turn upon 
 the brain, in which it causes a movement in the ner- 
 vous system ; the nervous system causes a muscular 
 motion in the limbs, a motion directed to remove or 
 avoid the object which occasions the sensation of pain. 
 
 " The brain is the seat of the soul, and, on this hypo- 
 thesis, the soul has been compared to a spider seated 
 in the centre of its web. The moment the least 
 agitation is caused at the extremity of this web, the 
 insect is advertised and put upon the watch. In like 
 manner, the mind situated in the brain has a point 
 on which all the nervous filaments converge ; it is in- 
 formed of what passes at the different parts of the 
 body ; and forthwith it takes its measures accordingly. 
 The body thus acts with a real efficiency on the mind, 
 
 o [Laromigutere, Lemons, torn. ii. p. 253-4.] 
 VOL. I. U
 
 306 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. and the mind acts with a real efficiency upon the body. 
 
 This action or influence being real, physical, in the 
 
 course of nature, the body exerts a physical influence 
 
 upon the soul, the soul a physical influence upon the 
 
 body. 
 
 " This system is simple, but it affords us no help in 
 explaining the mysterious union of an extended and 
 an unextended substance. 
 
 ' Tangere enina et tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res.' 
 
 Nothing can touch and be touched but what is ex- 
 tended ; and if the soul be unextended, it can have 
 no connection by touch with the body, and the physi- 
 cal influence is inconceivable or contradictory." ft 
 Historical If w consider these hypotheses in relation to their 
 thS hy- historical manifestation, the doctrine of Physical In- 
 RjS" fluence would stand first ; for this doctrine, which 
 fi n ret u . ence ' was on ly formally developed into system by the later 
 Peripatetics, was that prevalent in the earlier schools 
 of Greece. The Aristotelians, who held that the soul 
 was the substantial form, the vital principle, of the 
 body, that the soul was all in the whole and all in 
 every part of the body, naturally allowed a reciprocal 
 influence of these. By influence, (in Latin influxus), 
 you are to understand the relation of a cause to its 
 effect, and the term, now adopted into every vulgar 
 language of Europe, was brought into use principally 
 by the authority of Suarez, a Spanish Jesuit, who 
 flourished at the close of the sixteenth and beginning 
 of the seventeenth centuries, and one of the most 
 illustrious metaphysicians of modern times. By him 
 a cause is defined, Principium per se influens esse in 
 
 a Lucretius, i. 305. ED. 
 
 [Laromiguifcre, Lefons, torn. ii. p. 251-3.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 307 
 
 aliud." This definition, however, and the use of the LECT. 
 
 XVI 
 
 metaphysical term influence, (for it is nothing more), 
 
 are not, as is supposed, original with him. They are 
 to be found in the pseudo-Aristotelic treatise De 
 Causis. This is a translation from the Arabic, but a 
 translation made many centuries before Suarez.P 
 But this by the way. 
 
 The second hypothesis in chronological order, is Plastic 
 that of the Plastic Medium. It is to be traced to second. ' 
 Plato. That philosopher, in illustrating the relation 
 of the two constituents of man, says that the soul is 
 in the body like a sailor in a ship ; that the soul em- 
 ploys the body as its instrument ; but that the energy, 
 or life and sense of the body, is the manifestation of 
 a different substance, of a substance which holds a 
 kind of intermediate existence between mind and 
 matter. This conjecture, which Plato only obscurely 
 hinted at, was elaborated with peculiar partiality by 
 his followers of the Alexandrian school, and, in their 
 psychology, the o^os, or vehicle of the soul, the me- . 
 dium through which it is united to the body, is a 
 prominent element and distinctive principle. 7 To 
 
 a Disputationet Metaphysics, Disp. <ra>yua cSdo-ay K.T.\. Thifl passage, as 
 
 xii., ii. 4. ED. well as the simile of the chariot in 
 
 /3 The Libellus de Causis is printed the Phcedrus, p. 246, were interpreted 
 in a Latin'version made from a Hebrew in this sense by the later Platoniste. 
 one, in the seventh volume of the See Ficinus, Theoloyia Platonica, lib. 
 Latin edition of Aristotle's Works, xviiL c. 4 : " Ex quo sequitur ration- 
 Venice, 1550, f. 144. It has been ales animas tanquam medias tales esse 
 attributed to Aristotle, to Avempace, debere, ut virtute quidem semper 
 
 to Alfarabi, and to Proclus. The separabiles sint, actu autem 
 
 above definition does not occur in it sint semper conjunctse, quia familiare 
 
 verbatim, though it may be gathered corpus nanciscuntur ex acthere, quod 
 
 in substance from Prop. I. ED. servant per immortalitatem propriam 
 
 7 The passage referred to in Plato immortale, quod Plato currum turn 
 
 is probably Tim&us, p. 69 : Of 8 deoruin turn animarum vocat in Phjc- 
 
 fjufnovfufvoi irapoAa/ScWej px*7*' tyvXV* dro, vehiculum in Timsco." The ship 
 
 aOdvarov, rb ^erek rovro Oirqrbv trwfto is more definitely expressed by Maxi- 
 
 atTTj TTfpt(r6pv(vffav ox'JM* T < >' T & nm Tyrius, Diss. xl. (referred to by
 
 308 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. this opinion St Austin, among other Christian fathers, 
 ' was inclined, and, in modern times, it has been re- 
 vived and modified by Gassendi/ Cudworth, 7 and 
 Le Clerc. 8 
 
 occasional Descartes agrees with the Platonists in opposition 
 third. ' to the Aristotelians, that the soul is not the substan- 
 tial form of the body, but is connected with it only 
 at a single point in the brain, viz. the pineal gland. 
 The pineal gland, he supposes, is the central point at 
 which the organic movements of the body terminate, 
 when conveying to the mind the determinations to 
 voluntary motion/ But Descartes did not allow, 
 like the Platonists, any intermediate or connecting 
 substance. The nature of the connection he himself 
 does not very explicitly state ; but his disciples have 
 evolved the hypothesis, already explained, of Occa- 
 sional Causes, in which God is the connecting prin- 
 ciple, an hypothesis at least implicitly contained in 
 his philosophy. f 
 
 pre-esta- Finally, Leibnitz and Wolf agree with the Carte- 
 HaiSny, sians, that there is no real, but only an apparent in- 
 tercourse between mind and body. To explain this 
 apparent intercourse, they do not, however, resort to 
 
 Stallbaum, on the Tirruzus, 1. c.) : j8 Gassendi, in his Physica, divides 
 
 Oux fy >d T^ * v r *i Oa\aT-rji ir\ovv, the human soul into two parts, the 
 
 (lyOa 6 ft.lv icu/JepHjTTjs Spx ei > " s ^"X^ one rational and incorporeal, the other 
 
 o-^juaroy, 3} 5 vovs 4px Tat > " s ^ corporeal, including the nutritive and 
 
 tyvxfi* ff&pa. Cf. also Proclus, Inst. sensitive faculties. The latter he re- 
 
 Theol. c. 206 et seq. ; Cudworth, Intel- gards as the medium of connection 
 
 lectual System, b. i. c. v. 3. Platner, between the rational soul and the 
 
 Phil. Aphorismen, i. p. 627. ED. body. See Opera, vol. il p. 256. 1658. 
 
 a St Augustin seems to have adopt- ED. 
 
 ed the ancient and Platonic dogma 7 See above, p. 300, note a. ED. 
 
 that matter (&ATJ) is incorporeal (curta- 8 See above, p. 300, note o. ED. 
 
 /iaroy.) He regarded matter as " quid- e De Passionibus Animce, art. 31, 
 
 dam inter formatum et nihil, nee 32. De Homine, art. 63. ED. 
 
 formatum nee nihil, informe prope C See above, p. 302, note a. ED. 
 nihiL" Confessions, lib. xii. c. vL ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 309 
 
 the continual assistance or interposition of the Deity, LECT. 
 
 but have recourse to the supposition of a harmony be- 1 
 
 tween mind and body, established before the creation 
 of either." 
 
 All these theories are unphilosophical, because they The* h y - 
 all attempt to establish something beyond the sph 
 of observation, and, consequently, beyond the sphere 
 of genuine philosophy ; and because they are either, 
 like the Cartesian and Leibnitzian theories, contradic- 
 tions of the fact of consciousness ; or, like the two 
 other hypotheses, at variance with the facts which 
 they suppose. What St Austin so admirably says of 
 the substance, either of mind or of body, " Mate- 
 riam spiritumque cognoscendo ignorari et ignorando 
 cognosci," I would exhort you to adopt as your 
 opinion in regard to the union of these two existences. 
 In short, in the words of Pascal, 7 " Man is to him- 
 self the mightiest prodigy of nature ; for he is unable 
 to conceive what is body, still less what is mind, but 
 least of all is he able to conceive how a body can be 
 united to a mind ; yet this is his proper being." A 
 contented ignorance is, indeed, wiser than a presump- 
 tuous knowledge ; but this is a lesson which seems 
 the last that philosophers are willing to learn. In 
 the words of one of the acutest of modern thinkers* 
 " Magna immo maxima pars sapientiae est, qusedam 
 sequo animo nescire velle." 
 
 o [On these hypotheses in general, y Penslet, partie i. art. vi, 26. Vol. 
 
 see Zedler's Lexicon, v. Seele, p. 1098 ii. p. 74, edit. Faugere. ED. 
 
 et seq.] 8 Julius Casar Scaliger. The pas- 
 
 $ Confessions, xii. 5. See ante, p. sage is quoted more correctly in the 
 
 139. ED. Author's Discussions, p. 640. ED.
 
 310 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECTURE XVII. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, GENERAL PHENOMENA, ARE WE 
 
 ALWAYS CONSCIOUSLY ACTIVE 1 
 
 LECT. THE second General Fact of Consciousness which we 
 
 XVII 
 
 shall consider, and out of which several questions of 
 
 great interest arise, is the fact, or correlative facts, of 
 LmcL the Activity and Passivity of Mind. 
 NO pure There is no pure activity, no pure passivity in 
 
 activity or f J r x 
 
 passivity in creation. All things in the universe of nature are 
 
 creation. \ 
 
 reciprocally m a state of continual action and counter- 
 action ; they are always active and passive at once. 
 God alone must be thought of as a being active with- 
 out any mixture of passivity, as his activity is sub- 
 jected to no limitation. But precisely because it is 
 unlimited, is it for us wholly incomprehensible. 
 Activity and Activity and passivity are not, therefore, in the 
 ai^a^con- manifestations of mind, distinct and independent phae- 
 
 joined in the 
 
 manifest^ nomena. This is a great, though a common, error. 
 
 mind. They are always conjoined. There is no operation of 
 mind which is purely active ; no affection which is 
 purely passive. In every mental modification, action 
 and passion are the two necessary elements or factors 
 of which it is composed. But though both are always 
 present, each is not, however, always present in equal 
 quantity. Sometimes the one constituent preponde- 
 rates, sometimes the other ; and it is from the pre- 
 ponderance of the active element in some modifica- 
 tions, of the passive element in others, that we dis-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 311 
 
 tinguish these modifications by different names, and LECT. 
 consider them as activities or passivities according as XVIL 
 they approximate to one or other of the two factors. 
 Thus faculty, operation, energy, are words that we 
 employ to designate the manifestations in which 
 activity is predominant. Faculty denotes an active 
 power ; action,' operation, energy, denote its present 
 exertion. On the other hand, capacity expresses a 
 passive power ; affection, passion, express a present 
 suffering. The terms mode, modification, state, may 
 be used indifferently to signify both phaenomena ; 
 but it must be acknowledged that these, especially the 
 word state, are now closely associated with the pas- 
 sivity of mind, which they, therefore, tend rather to 
 suggest. The passivity of mind is expressed by 
 another term, receptivity; for passivity is only the 
 condition, the necessary antecedent of activity, only 
 the property possessed by the mind of standing in 
 relation to certain foreign causes, of receiving from 
 them impressions, determinations to act. 
 
 It is to be observed, that we are never directly con- w e arc 
 scions of passivity. Consciousness only commences rectiy con- 
 
 . - . scious of 
 
 with, is only cognisant ot, the reaction consequent passivity, 
 upon the foreign determination to act, and this re- 
 action is not itself passive. In so far, therefore, as 
 we are conscious, we are active ; whether there may 
 be a mental activity of which we are not conscious, is 
 another question." 
 
 There are certain arduous problems connected with 
 the activity of mind, which will be more appropriately 
 considered in a subsequent part of the course, when 
 we come to speak of the Inferences from the Phaeno- 
 menology of Mind, or of Metaphysics Proper. At 
 present, I shall only treat of those questions which 
 
 a See below, Lect. xviii. p. 338. ED,
 
 312 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. are conversant about the immediate phsenomena of 
 
 XVII 
 
 - activity. Of these, the first that I shall consider is 
 one of considerable interest, and which, though vari- 
 ously determined by different philosophers, does not 
 tion, q Arl seem to lie beyond the sphere of observation. I al- 
 
 wns a ciousiy lude to the question, Whether we are always con- 
 active? . . \ 
 
 raised. SClOUSly active { 
 
 Distinguish- It is evident that this question is not convertible 
 
 ed from . . 
 
 other ques- with the question, Have we always a memory of our 
 consciousness ? for the latter problem must be at 
 once answered in the negative. It is also evident, that 
 we must exclude the consideration of those states in 
 which the mind is apparently without consciousness, 
 but in regard to which, in reality, we can obtain no 
 information from experiment. Concerning these we 
 must be contented to remain in ignorance ; at least 
 only to extend to them the analogical conclusions 
 which our observations on those within the sphere of 
 experiment warrant us inferring. Our question, as 
 one of possible solution, must, therefore, be limited to 
 the states of sleep and somnambulism, to the exclusion 
 of those states of insensibility which we cannot ter- 
 minate suddenly at will. It is hardly necessary to 
 observe, that with the nature of sleep and somnam- 
 bulism as psychological phaenomena, we have at pre- 
 sent nothing to do ; our consideration is now strictly 
 limited to the inquiry, Whether the mind, in as far as 
 we can make it matter of observation, is always in a 
 Treatment state of conscious activity. The general problem in 
 tiLn h by q phT- regard to the ceaseless activity of the mind has been 
 one agitated from very ancient times, but it has also 
 been one on which philosophers have pronounced less 
 Plato and on grounds of experience than of theory. Plato and 
 niL. a< the Platonists were unanimous in maintaining the 
 continual energy of intellect. The opinion of Aris-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 313 
 
 totle appears doubtful, and passages may be quoted LECT. 
 from his works in favour of either alternative. The - 
 Aristotelians, in general, were opposed, but a consider- an<Tthe e 
 able number were favourable, to the Platonic doctrine, n^s. 
 
 This doctrine was adopted by Cicero and St Augustin. 
 " Nunquam animus," says the former, " cogitatione et 
 motu vacuus esse potest."" "Ad quid menti," says 
 the latter, "praeceptum est, ut se ipsam cognoscat, 
 nisi ut semper vivat, et semper sit in actu."' 3 The 
 question, however, obtained its principal importance 
 in the philosophy of Descartes. That philosopher Descartes. 
 made the essence, the very existence, of the soul to 
 consist in actual thought, 7 under which he included 
 even the desires and feelings ; and thought he denned 
 all of which we are conscious. 5 The assertion, there- 
 fore, of Descartes, that the mind always thinks, is, 
 in his employment of language, tantamount to the 
 assertion that the mind is always conscious. 
 
 That the mind is always conscious, though a funda- 
 mental position of the Cartesian doctrine, was rather 
 assumed, than proved by an appeal to fact and experi- 
 ence. All is theoretical in Descartes ; all is theoreti- 
 cal in his disciples. Even Malebranche assumes our Maie- 
 consciousness in sleep, and explains our oblivion only 
 by a mechanical hypothesis/ It was, therefore, easy 
 
 a De Divinatione, ii. 62 : " Natu- cogitet, et secundum naturam suam 
 
 ram earn dico, qua nunquam animus vivat." But in the De Anima et ejut 
 
 insistens, agitatione et motu esse va- Origine, lib. iv. c. vi. 7, t. x. p. 391, 
 
 cuus potest." ED. (edit. Ben.), occurs the following ex- 
 
 /3 Eugenios, Vvxo\oyla, p. 129. plicit statement : " Sicut motus non 
 
 [Book iii. of his 2Toix< T^S Mera- cessat in corde, undo se pulsus dif- 
 
 cpucriKTjs, (edit. 1805). The reference fundit usquequaque venarum, ita non 
 
 in Eugenios is to De Trinitate, 1. x. quiescimus aliquid cogitando versare." 
 
 c. v., where a passage occurs, resem- ED.] 
 
 bling in words the one quoted in the y Principia, part i. 53. ED. 
 
 text, but hardly supporting the doc- 5 Principia, part i. 9. ED. 
 
 trine in question. It is as follows : Recherche de la V6rite, lib. iii. 
 
 " Ut quid ergo ei prseceptum est, ut se c. 2. ED. 
 ipsam cognoscat ? Credo ut se ipsam
 
 31 4 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. for Locke to deny the truth of the Cartesian opinion, 
 and to give a strong semblance of probability to his 
 
 Locke> own doctrine by its apparent conformity with the 
 phaenomena. Omitting a good deal of what is either 
 irrelevant to the general question, or what is now 
 admitted to be false, as founded on his erroneous doc- 
 trine of personal identity, the following is the sum of 
 Locke , g Locke's argument upon the point. " It is an opinion," 
 j^ e ent he says, a " that the soul always thinks, and that it has 
 negative, the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly, as 
 long as it exists ; and that actual thinking is as in- 
 separable from the soul, as actual extension is from 
 the body ; which if true, to inquire after the beginning 
 of a man's ideas, is the same as to inquire after the 
 beginning of his soul. For by this account, soul and 
 its ideas, as body and its extension, will begin to exist 
 both at the same time. 
 
 " But whether the soul be supposed to exist ante- 
 cedent to, or coeval with, or some time after, the first 
 rudiments, or organisation, or the beginnings of life in 
 the body, I leave to be disputed by those who have 
 better thought of that matter. I confess myself to 
 have one of those dull souls that doth not perceive 
 itself always to contemplate ideas ; nor can conceive 
 it any more necessary for the soul always to think 
 than for the body always to move : the perception of 
 of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul, what motion 
 is to the body ; not its essence, but one of its opera- 
 tions. And, therefore, though thinking be supposed 
 ever so much the proper action of the soul, yet it is 
 not necessary to suppose that it should be always 
 thinking, always in action. That perhaps is the privi- 
 lege of the infinite Author and Preserver of things, 
 who never slumbers nor sleeps ; but is not competent 
 
 a Essay, book ii. chap, i., 9, 10, 14 et seq.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 315 
 
 to any finite being, at least not to the soul of man. LECT. 
 We know certainly by experience that we sometimes XVIT ' 
 think, and thence draw this infallible consequence, 
 that there is something in us that has a power to 
 think : but whether that substance perpetually thinks 
 or no, we can be no further assured than experience 
 informs us. For to say that actual thinking is es- 
 sential to the soul and inseparable from it, is to beg 
 what is in question, and not to prove it by reason ; 
 which is necessary to be done if it be not a self- 
 evident proposition. But whether this, ' that the soul 
 always thinks/ be a self-evident proposition, that 
 everybody assents to at first hearing, I appeal to 
 mankind. It is doubted whether I thought all last 
 night or no ; the question being about a matter of 
 fact, it is begging it to bring as a proof for it an 
 hypothesis which is the very thing in dispute ; by 
 which way one may prove anything ; and it is but 
 supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, 
 think ; and it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt, 
 that my watch thought all last night. But he that 
 would not deceive himself, ought to build his hypo- 
 thesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible 
 experience, and not presume on matter of fact, be- 
 cause of his hypothesis ; that is, because he supposes 
 it to be so ; which way of proving amounts to this, 
 that I must necessarily think all last night because 
 another supposes I always think, though I myself 
 cannot perceive that I always do so." . ..." It will 
 perhaps be said that ' the soul thinks even in the 
 soundest sleep, but the memory retains it not.' That 
 the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment 
 busy a-thinking, and the next moment in a waking 
 man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of 
 all those thoughts, is very hard to be conceived, and
 
 316 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. would need some better proof than bare assertion to 
 
 XVII 
 
 make it be believed. For who can, without any more 
 
 ado but being barely told so, imagine that the greatest 
 part of men do, during all their lives for several hours 
 every day, think of something which, if they were 
 asked even in the middle of these thoughts, they could 
 remember nothing at all of 1 Most men, I think, pass 
 a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once 
 knew a man that was bred a scholar and had no bad 
 memory, who told me he had never dreamed in his 
 life till he had that fever he was then newly recovered 
 of, which was about the five or six and twentieth year 
 of his age. I suppose the world affords more such 
 instances ; at least every one's acquaintance will fur- 
 nish him with examples enough of such as pass most 
 of their nights without dreaming." .... And again, 
 " If they say that a man is always conscious to 
 himself of thinking ; I ask how they know it ] ' Con- 
 sciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's 
 own mind. Can another man perceive that I am con- 
 scious of anything, when I perceive it not myself?' 
 No man's knowledge here can go beyond his experi- 
 ence. Wake a man out of a sound sleep, and ask him 
 what he was that moment thinking on. If he himself 
 be conscious of nothing he then thought on, he must 
 be a notable diviner of thoughts that can assure him 
 that he was thinking : may he not with more reason 
 assure him he was not asleep 1 This is something be- 
 yond philosophy ; and it cannot be less than revela- 
 tion that discovers to another thoughts in my mind 
 when I can find none there myself ; and they must 
 needs have a penetrating sight who can certainly see 
 what I think when I cannot perceive it myself, and 
 when I declare that I do not. This some may think 
 to be a step beyond the Eosicrucians, it being easier
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 317 
 
 to make one's self invisible to others, than to make LECT. 
 another's thoughts visible to one which are not visible XVIL 
 to himself. But it is but defining the soul to be " a 
 substance that always thinks/' and the business is 
 done. If such definition be of any authority, I know 
 not what it can serve for, but to make many men 
 suspect that they have no souls at all, since they find 
 a good part of their lives pass away without thinking. 
 For no definitions that I know, no suppositions of any 
 sect, are of force enough to destroy constant experi- 
 ence ; and perhaps it is the affectation of knowing 
 beyond what we perceive that makes so much useless 
 dispute and noise in the world." 
 
 This decision of Locke was rejected by Leibnitz in Locke's 
 the Neiv Essays on the Human Understanding? the powder 
 great work in which he canvassed from beginning to 
 end the Essay, under the same title, of the English 
 philosopher. He observes, in reply to the supposition 
 that continual consciousness is an attribute of Him 
 " who neither slumbereth nor sleepeth," * that this af- 
 fords no inference that in sleep we are wholly without 
 perception/ To the remark, " that it is difficult to 
 conceive, that a being can think and not be conscious 
 of thought," he replies, * that in this lies the whole knot 
 and difficulty of the matter. But this is not insoluble.' 
 "We must observe," he says, "that we think of a 
 multitude of things at once, but take heed only of 
 those thoughts that are the more prominent. Nor 
 could it be otherwise. For were we to take heed of 
 everything, it would be necessary to attend to an 
 infinity of matters at the same moment, all of which 
 make an effectual impression on the senses. Nay, I 
 assert that there remains always something of all our 
 past thoughts, that none is ever entirely effaced. Now, 
 
 a Lib. ii. ch. 1. ED,
 
 318 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. when we sleep without dreaming, and when stunned 
 v IL by a blow or other accident, there are formed in us 
 
 an affinity of small confused perceptions." And again 
 he remarks : " That even when we sleep without dream- 
 ing, there is always some feeble perception. The act 
 of awakening, indeed, shows this : and the more easily 
 we are roused, the clearer is the perception we have 
 of what passes without, although this perception is 
 not always strong enough to cause us to awake." 
 
 Now, in all this it will be observed, that Leibnitz 
 does not precisely answer the question we have 
 mooted. He maintains that the mind is never with- 
 out perceptions, but, as he holds that perceptions 
 exist without consciousness, he cannot, though he 
 opposes Locke, be considered as affirming that the 
 mind is never without consciousness during sleep, 
 
 woif. in short, does always dream. The doctrine of Wolf 
 on this point is the same with that of his master," 
 though the Nouveaux JEssais of Leibnitz were not 
 published till long after the death of Wolf. 
 
 Kant. But if Leibnitz cannot be adduced as categorically 
 asserting that there is no sleep without its dream, 
 this cannot be said of Kant. That great thinker dis- 
 tinctly maintains that we always dream when asleep ; 
 that to cease to dream would be to cease to live ; and 
 that those who fancy they have not dreamt have only 
 forgotten their dream.' 3 This is all that the manual 
 of Anthropology, published by himself, contains upon 
 the question ; but in a manuscript in my possession, 
 which bears to be a work of Kant, but is probably 
 only a compilation from notes taken at his lectures 
 on Anthropology, it is further stated that we can 
 dream more in a minute than we can act during a 
 day, and that the great rapidity of the train of 
 
 a PfiifloJoyia Ratimtali*, 59. ED. & Aiirtiropnlof/ie, 30, 36. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 319 
 
 thought in sleep, is one of the principal causes why LECT. 
 we do not always recollect what we dream." He else- IL 
 where also observes that the cessation of a force to 
 act, is tantamount to its cessation to be. 
 
 Though the determination of this question is one The a ue8 - 
 that seems not extremely difficult, we find it dealt with wg by l 
 by philosophers, on the one side and the other, rather phmra- 
 by hypothesis than by experiment ; at least, we have, hypothesis 
 with one partial exception, which I am soon to quote experiment. 
 to you, no observations sufficiently accurate and de- 
 tailed to warrant us in establishing more than a very 
 doubtful conclusion. I have myself at different times conclusion 
 turned my attention to the point, and, as far as my rln^u 1 * 
 observations go, they certainly tend to prove that, ifa Author, 
 during sleep, the mind is never either inactive or 
 wholly unconscious of its activity. As to the objec- Locke's as- 
 tion of Locke and others, that, as we have often no th^Xn-* 
 recollection of dreaming, we have, therefore, never andTeTe- 
 dreamt, it is sufficient to say that the assumption in of conSus- 
 this argument, that consciousness, and the recollec- convertible, 
 tion of consciousness, are convertible is disproved i 
 the most emphatic manner by experience. You have 
 all heard of the phsenomenon of somnambulism. In bul 
 this remarkable state, the various mental faculties 
 are usually in a higher degree of power than in the 
 natural. The patient has recollections of what he has 
 wholly forgotten. He speaks languages of which, 
 when awake, he remembers not a word. If he use a 
 vulgar dialect when out of this state, in it he em- 
 ploys only a correct and elegant phraseology. The 
 imagination, the sense of propriety, and the faculty of 
 
 o The substance of this passage is byStarke in 1831, from Kant's Lec- 
 published in the Mensckenkunde oder tures. See p. 164. ED. 
 Philosophische Anthrnpologie, edited
 
 320 LECTUKES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. reasoning, are all in general exalted. The bodily 
 IL powers are in high, activity, and under the complete 
 
 control of the will ; and, it is well known, persons in 
 this state have frequently performed feats of which, 
 when out of it, they would not even have imagined 
 the possibility. And what is even more remarkable, 
 the difference of the faculties in the two states, seems 
 not confined merely to a difference in degree. For it 
 happens, for example, that a person who has no ear 
 for music when awake, shall, in his somnambulic crisis, 
 sing with the utmost correctness and with full enjoy- 
 ment of his performance. Under this affection per- 
 sons sometimes live half their lifetime, alternating 
 between the normal and abnormal states, and per- 
 forming the ordinary functions of life indifferently in 
 both, with this distinction, that if the patient be dull 
 and doltish when he is said to be awake, he is com- 
 paratively alert and intelligent when nominally asleep. 
 I am in possession of three works, written during the 
 crisis by three different somnambulists.^ Now it is 
 evident that consciousness, and an exalted conscious- 
 ness, must be allowed in somnambulism. This cannot 
 conscious- possibly be denied, but mark what follows. It is 
 , the peculiarity of somnambulism, it is the differential 
 quality by which that state is contradistinguished 
 fr m the state of dreaming, that we have no recol- 
 lection, when we awake, of what has occurred during 
 its continuance. Consciousness is thus cut in two ; 
 memory does not connect the train of consciousness 
 in the one state with the train of consciousness in the 
 other. When the patient again relapses into the state 
 
 a For some interesting illustrations $ Of these works we have failed to 
 of this state, see Abercrombie On the discover any trace. ED. 
 Intel. Powers, pt. ii. iv. 92. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 321 
 
 of somnambulism, he again remembers all that had LECT. 
 
 occurred during every former alternative of that state ; 
 
 but he not only remembers this, he recalls also the 
 events of his normal existence : so that, whereas the 
 patient in his somnambulic crisis, has a memory of 
 his whole life, in his waking intervals he has a me- 
 mory only of half his life. 
 
 At the time of Locke, the phsenomena of somnam- Dreaming 
 bulism had been very little studied ; nay, so great is wthout 
 the ignorance that prevails in this country in regard me 
 to its nature even now, that you will find this, its dis- 
 tinctive character, wholly unnoticed in the best works 
 upon the subject. But this distinction, you observe, 
 is incompetent always to discriminate the states of 
 dreaming and somnambulism. It may be true that 
 if we recollect our visions during sleep, this recollec- 
 tion excludes somnambulism, but the want of memory 
 by no means proves that the visions we are known by 
 others to have had, were not common dreams. The 
 phaenomena, indeed, do not always enable us to dis- 
 criminate the two states. Somnambulism may exist 
 in many different degrees ; the sleep-walking from 
 which it takes its name is only one of its higher phe- 
 nomena, and one comparatively rare. In general, the 
 subject of this affection does not leave his bed, and 
 it is then frequently impossible to say whether the 
 manifestations exhibited, are the phsenomena of som- 
 nambulism or of dreaming. Talking during sleep, for 
 example, may be a symptom of either, and it is often 
 only from our general knowledge of the habits and 
 predispositions of the sleeper, that we are warranted 
 in referring this effect to the one and not to the other 
 
 a This deficiency has been ably Principles of Human Physiology, 
 supplied by Dr Carpenter. See his 827. ED. 
 
 VOL. I. X
 
 322 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. class of phenomena. We have, however, abundant 
 evidence to prove that forgetfulness is not a decisive 
 
 criterion of somnambulism. Persons whom there is 
 no reason to suspect of this affection, often manifest 
 during sleep the strongest indications of dreaming, 
 and yet, when they awaken in the morning, retain no 
 memory of what they may have done or said during 
 the night. Locke's argument, that because we do not 
 always remember our consciousness during sleep, we 
 have not, therefore, been always conscious, is thus, on 
 the ground of fact and analogy, disproved. 
 
 That the But this is not all. We can not only show that 
 the fact of the mind remaining conscious during sleep 
 is possible, is even probable, we can also show, by an 
 
 by exe- articulate experience, that this actually occurs. The 
 following observations are the result of my personal 
 experience, and similar experiments every one of you 
 is competent to institute for himself. 
 
 Results of In the first place, when we compose ourselves to 
 
 the Author's 1,1 < n -i i 
 
 personal ex- rest, we do not always tall at once asleep, but remain 
 for a time in a state of incipient slumber, in a state 
 intermediate between sleep and waking. Now, if we 
 are gently roused from this transition-state, we find 
 ourselves conscious of being in the commencement of 
 a dream ; we find ourselves occupied with a train of 
 thought, and this train we are still able to follow out 
 to a point when it connects itself with certain actual 
 perceptions. We can still trace imagination to sense, 
 and show how, departing from the last sensible im- 
 pressions of real objects, the fancy proceeds in its work 
 of distorting, falsifying, and perplexing these, in order 
 to construct out of their ruins its own grotesque 
 edifices. 
 
 In the second place, I have always observed, that
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 323 
 
 when suddenly awakened during sleep, (and to ascer- LECT. 
 
 tain the fact I have caused myself to be roused at dif- 
 
 ferent seasons of the night), I have always been able 
 to observe that I was in the middle of a dream. The 
 recollection of this dream was not always equally 
 vivid. On some occasions, I was able to trace it back 
 until the train was gradually lost at a remote dis- 
 tance ; on others, I was hardly aware of more than 
 one or two of the latter links of the chain ; and, some- 
 times, was scarcely certain of more than the fact, that 
 I was not awakened from an unconscious state. Why 
 we should not always be able to recollect our dreams, 
 it is not difficult to explain. In our waking and our 
 sleeping states, we are placed in two worlds of thought, 
 not only different but contrasted, and contrasted both 
 in the character and in the intensity of their represen- 
 tations. When snatched suddenly from the twilight 
 of our sleeping imaginations, and placed in the meri- 
 dian lustre of our waking perceptions, the necessary 
 effect of the transition is at once to eclipse or obliterate 
 the traces of our dreams. The act itself also of rous- 
 ing us from sleep, by abruptly interrupting the cur- 
 rent of our thoughts, throws us into confusion, disqua- 
 lifies us for a time from recollection, and before we 
 have recovered from our consternation, what we could 
 at first have easily discerned is fled or flying. 
 
 A sudden and violent is, however, in one respect, 
 more favourable than a gradual and spontaneous wak- 
 ening to the observation of the phsenomena of sleep. 
 For in the former case, the images presented are fresh 
 and prominent ; while in the latter, before our atten- 
 tion is applied, the objects of observation have with- 
 drawn darkling into the background of the soul. We 
 may, therefore, I think, assert, in general, that whether
 
 324 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. we recollect our dreams or not, we always dream. 
 
 XVTT 
 
 -1_ Something similar, indeed, to the rapid oblivion of 
 our sleeping consciousness, happens to us occasionally 
 even when awake. When our mind is not intently 
 occupied with any subject, or more frequently when 
 fatigued, a thought suggests itself. We turn it lazily 
 over and fix our eyes in vacancy ; interrupted by the 
 question what we are thinking of, we attempt to 
 answer, but the thought is gone ; we cannot recall it, 
 and say that we were thinking of nothing. 
 General The observations I have hitherto made tend only 
 from fore- to establish the fact, that the mind is never wholly in- 
 active, and that we are never wholly unconscious of 
 its activity. Of the degree and character of that acti- 
 vity, I at present say nothing ; this may form the sub- 
 ject of our future consideration. But in confirmation 
 of the opinion I have now hazarded, and in proof of 
 something more even than I have ventured to main- 
 tain, I have great pleasure in quoting to you the sub- 
 stance of a very remarkable essay on sleep by one of 
 the most distinguished of the philosophers of France, 
 living when the extract was made, but now unfortu- 
 
 quoted in _ _ 
 
 confirma- nately lost to the science of mind which he cultivated 
 Author's with most distinguished success, I refer to M. Jouffroy, 
 lun p d' 00 Ither wno > a ^ OII g with M. Eoyer Collard, was at the head of 
 conclusions, the pure school of Scottish Philosophy in France. a 
 The mind " I have never well understood those who admit 
 e^n that in sleep the mind is dormant. When we dream, 
 we are assuredly asleep, and assuredly also our mind 
 is not asleep, because it thinks ; it is, therefore, mani- 
 fest, that the mind frequently wakes when the senses 
 are in slumber. But this does not prove that it never 
 sleeps along with them. To sleep is for the mind not 
 
 . o Melanges, p. 318, [p. 290, second edition. ED.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 325 
 
 to dream ; and it is impossible to establish the fact, LECT. 
 that there are in sleep moments in which the mind XYIL 
 does not dream. To have no recollection of our dreams, 
 does not prove that we have not dreamt ; for it can 
 be often proved that we have dreamt, although the 
 dream has left no trace on our memory. 
 
 " The fact, then, that the mind sometimes wakes Probable 
 while the senses are asleep, is thus established ; whereas 
 
 the fact, that it sometimes sleeps along with them is aw^e! 
 not ; the probability, therefore, is, that it wakes always. 
 It would require contradictory facts to destroy the 
 force of this induction, which, on the contrary, every 
 fact seems to confirm. I shall proceed to analyse 
 some of these which appear to me curious and striking. 
 They manifestly imply this conclusion, that the mind, 
 during sleep, is not in a peculiar state, but that its 
 activity is carried on precisely as when awake. 
 
 " When an inhabitant of the province comes to induction 
 Paris, his sleep is at first disturbed, and continually support of 
 
 , , , , , . . .. .. . this conclu- 
 
 broken, by the noise ot the carriages passing under his sion. 
 window. He soon, however, becomes accustomed to 
 the turmoil, and ends by sleeping at Paris as he slept 
 in his village. 
 
 " The noise, however, remains the same, and makes 
 an equal impression on his senses ; how conies it that 
 this noise at first hinders, and then, at length, does not 
 hinder him from sleeping 1 
 
 " The state of waking presents analogous facts. 
 Every one knows that it is difficult to fix our atten- 
 tion on a book, when surrounded by persons engaged 
 in conversation ; at length, however, we acquire this 
 faculty. A man unaccustomed to the tumult of the 
 streets of Paris is unable to think consecutively while 
 walking through them ; a Parisian finds no difficulty.
 
 326 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. He meditates as tranquilly in the midst of the crowd 
 x ^ and bustle of men and carriages, as he could in the 
 
 centre of the forest. The analogy between these facts 
 taken from the state of waking, and the fact which I 
 mentioned at the commencement, taken from the state 
 of sleep, is so close, that the explanation of the former 
 should throw some light upon the latter. We shall 
 attempt this explanation. 
 
 Analysis " Attention is the voluntary application of the mind 
 ^tio" of* to an object. It is established, by experience, that we 
 norana^l' cannot give our attention to two different objects at 
 - the same time. Distraction (etre distrait) is the re- 
 moval of our attention from a matter with which we 
 are engaged, and our bestowal of it on another which 
 crosses us. In distraction, attention is only diverted 
 because it is attracted by a new perception or idea, 
 soliciting it more strongly than that with which it is 
 occupied ; and this diversion diminishes exactly in 
 proportion as the solicitation is weaker on the part of 
 the intrusive idea. All experience proves this. The 
 more strongly attention is applied to a subject, the 
 less susceptible is it of distraction ; thus it is, that a 
 book which awakens a lively curiosity, retains the 
 attention captive ; a person occupied with a matter 
 affecting his life, his reputation, or his fortune, is not 
 easily distracted; he sees nothing, he understands 
 nothing, of what passes around him ; we say that he is 
 deeply preoccupied. In like manner, the greater our 
 curiosity, or the more curious the things that are 
 spoken of around us, the less able are we to rivet our 
 attention on the book we read. In like manner, also, 
 if we are waiting in expectation of any one, the 
 slightest noises occasion distraction, as these noises 
 may be the signal of the approach we anticipate. All
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 327 
 
 these facts tend to prove that distraction results only LECT. 
 
 when the intrusive idea solicits us more strongly than L 
 
 that with which we are occupied. 
 
 " Hence it is that the stranger in Paris cannot think 
 in the bustle of the streets. The impressions which 
 assail his eyes and ears on every side being for him 
 the signs of things new or little known, when they 
 reach his mind interest him more strongly than the 
 matter even to which he would apply his thoughts. 
 Each of these impressions announces a cause which may 
 be beautiful, rare, curious, or terrific ; the intellect can- 
 not refrain from turning out to verify the fact. It turns 
 out, however, no longer when experience has made it 
 familiar with all that can strike the senses on the streets 
 of Paris, it remains within, and no longer allows itself 
 to be deranged. 
 
 "The other admits of a similar explanation. To 
 read without distraction in the midst of an unknown 
 company, would be impossible. Curiosity would be 
 too strong. This would also be the case if the sub- 
 ject of conversation were very interesting. But in a 
 familiar circle, whose ordinary topics of conversation 
 are well known, the ideas of the book make an easy 
 conquest of our thoughts. 
 
 " The will, likewise, is of some avail in resisting 
 distraction. Not that it is able to retain the attention 
 when disquieted and curious ; but it can recall, and 
 not indulge it in protracted absences, and, by con- 
 stantly remitting it to the object of its volition, the 
 interest of this object becomes at last predominant. 
 Rational considerations, and the necessity of remain- 
 ing attentive, likewise exert an influence ; they come 
 in aid of the idea, and lend it, so to speak, an helping 
 hand in concentrating on it the attention.
 
 328 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. " But, howsoever it may be with all these petty in- 
 fluences, it remains evident that distraction and non- 
 
 distraction are neither of them matters of sense, but 
 koth matters of intelligence. It is not the senses which 
 intelligence, become accustomed to hear the noises of the street and 
 the sounds of conversation, and which end in being 
 less affected by them ; if we are at first vehemently 
 affected by the noises of the street or drawing-room, 
 and then little or not at all, it is because at first at- 
 tention occupies itself with these impressions, and 
 afterwards neglects them ; when it neglects them it is 
 not diverted from its object, and distraction does not 
 take place ; when, on the contrary, it accords them 
 notice, it abandons its object, and is then distracted. 
 
 " We may observe, in support of this conclusion, that 
 the habit of hearing the same sounds renders us some- 
 times highly sensible to these, as occurs in savages and 
 in the blind ; sometimes, again, almost insensible to 
 them, as exemplified in the apathy of the Parisian for 
 the noise of carriages. If the effect were physical, 
 if it depended on the body and not on the mind, there 
 would be a contradiction, for the habit of hearing the 
 same sounds either blunts the organ or sharpens it ; 
 it could not at once have two, and two contrary 
 effects, it could have only one. The fact is, it neither 
 blunts nor sharpens ; the organ remains the same ; the 
 same sensations are determined ; but when these sen- 
 sations interest the mind, it applies itself to them, and 
 becomes accustomed to their discrimination ; when 
 they do not interest it, it becomes accustomed to ne- 
 glect, and does not discriminate them. This is the 
 whole mystery ; the phsenomenon is psychological, not 
 physiological. 
 
 " Let us now turn our attention to the state of sleep,
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 329 
 
 and consider whether analogy does not demand a LECT. 
 similar explanation of the fact which we stated at the XVI1 ' 
 
 commencement. What takes place when a noise Application 
 
 r ^ of the fore- 
 
 hinders us from sleeping \ The body fatigued begins ^'^g^y- 
 
 to slumber ; then, of a sudden, the senses are struck, P f h * mena 
 and we awake ; then fatigue regains the ascendant, 
 we relapse into drowsiness, which is soon again inter- 
 rupted ; and so on for a certain continuance. When, 
 on the contrary, we are accustomed to noise, the im- 
 pressions it makes no longer disturb our first sleep ; 
 the drowsiness is prolonged, and we fall asleep. That 
 the senses are more torpid in sleep than in our waking 
 state, is not a matter of doubt. But when I am once 
 asleep, they are then equally torpid on the first night 
 of my arrival in Paris as on the hundredth. The noise 
 being the same, they receive the same impressions, 
 which they transmit in equal vivacity to the mind. 
 Whence comes it, then, that on the first night I am 
 awakened, and not on the hundredth 1 The physical 
 facts are identical ; the difference can originate only 
 in the mind, as in the case of distraction and of non- 
 distraction in the waking state. Let us suppose that 
 the soul has fallen asleep along with the body ; on this 
 hypothesis, the slumber would be equally deep, in both 
 cases, for the mind and for the senses, and we should 
 be unable to see why, in the one case, it was aroused 
 more than in the other. It remains, therefore, certain 
 that it does not sleep like the body ; and that, in the 
 one case, disquieted by unusual impressions, it awakens 
 the senses to inquire what is the matter ; whilst in the 
 other, knowing by experience of what external fact 
 these impressions are the sign, it remains tranquil, and 
 does not disturb the senses to obtain a useless ex- 
 planation.
 
 330 LECTUKES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. " For let us remark, that the mind has need of the 
 
 XVII 
 
 ~ senses to obtain a knowledge of external things. In 
 
 sleep, the senses are some of them closed, as the eyes ; 
 the others half torpid, as touch and hearing. If the 
 soul be disquieted by the impressions which reach it, it 
 requires the senses to ascertain the cause, and to relieve 
 its inquietude. This is the cause why we find our- 
 selves in a disquieted state, when aroused by an ex- 
 traordinary noise ; and this could not have occurred 
 had we not been occupied with this noise before we 
 awoke. 
 
 "This is, also, the cause why we sometimes feel, 
 during sleep, the efforts we make to awaken our senses, 
 when an unusual noise or any painful sensation dis- 
 turbs our rest. If we are in a profound sleep, we are 
 for a long time agitated before we have it in our power 
 to awake, we say to ourselves, we must awake in 
 order to get out of pain ; but the sleep of the senses 
 resists, and it is only by little and little that we are 
 able to rouse them from torpidity. Sometimes, when 
 the noise ceases before the issue of the struggle, the 
 awakening does not take place, and, in the morning, 
 we have a confused recollection of having been dis- 
 turbed during our sleep, a recollection which becomes 
 distinct only when we learn from others that such and 
 such an occurrence has taken place while we were 
 
 illustrated " I had given orders some time ago, that a parlour 
 
 JnaUxpe- adjoining to my bedroom should be swept before I 
 
 theater, was called in the morning. For the first two days the 
 
 noise awoke me ; but, thereafter, I was not aware of 
 
 it. Whence arose the difference I The noises are the 
 
 same and at the same hour, I am in the same degree 
 
 of slumber, the same sensations, consequently, take 

 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 331 
 
 place. Whence comes it that I awoke, and do no LECT. 
 
 XVII 
 
 longer awake 1 For this, it appears to me, there is 
 but one explanation, viz. that my mind which wakes, 
 and which is now aware of the cause of these sensa- 
 tions, is no longer disquieted, and no longer rouses my 
 senses. It is true that I do not retain the recollection 
 of this reasoning ; but this oblivion is not more extra- 
 ordinary than that of so many others which cross our 
 mind both when awake and when asleep. 
 
 " I add a single observation. The noise of the brush 
 on the carpet of my parlour is as nothing compared 
 with that of the heavy waggons which pass under my 
 windows at the same hour, and which do not trouble 
 my repose in the least. I was, therefore, awakened by 
 a sensation much feebler than a crowd of others, which 
 I received at the same time. Can that hypothesis 
 afford the reason, which supposes that the awakening 
 is a necessary event ; that the sensations rouse the 
 senses, and that the senses rouse the mind I It is 
 evident that my mind alone, and its activity, can ex- 
 plain why the fainter sensation awoke me ; as these 
 alone can explain why, when I am reading in my study, 
 the small noise of a mouse playing in a corner can 
 distract my attention, while the thundering noise of a 
 passing waggon does not affect me at all. 
 
 " The same explanation fully accounts for what Experience 
 occurs with those who sleep in attendance on the sick, tenant <m 
 All noises foreign to the patient have no effect on* 6 
 them ; but let the patient turn him on his bed, let 
 him utter a groan or sigh, or let his breathing become 
 painful or interrupted, forthwith the attendant awakes, 
 however little inured to the vocation, or interested in 
 the welfare of the patient. Whence comes this dis- 
 crimination between the noises which deserve the
 
 332 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. attention of the attendant, and those which do not, 
 ^I^L if, whilst the senses are asleep, the mind does not re- 
 main observant, does not act the sentinel, does not 
 consider the sensations which the senses convey, and 
 does not awaken the senses as it finds these sensations 
 disquieting or not 1 It is by being strongly impressed, 
 previous to going to sleep, with the duty of attending 
 to the respiration, motions, complaints of the sufferer, 
 that we come to waken at all such noises, and at no 
 others. The habitual repetition of such an impression 
 gives this faculty to professional sick-nurses ; a lively 
 interest in the health of the patient gives it equally to 
 the members of his family. 
 
 Awaking at " It is in precisely the same manner that we waken 
 edhour. at the appointed hour, when before going to sleep 
 we have made a firm resolution of so doing. I have 
 this power in perfection, but I notice that I lose it if 
 I depend on any one calling me. In this latter case, 
 my mind does not take the trouble of measuring the 
 time or of listening to the clock. But in the former, 
 it is necessary that it do so, otherwise the phseno- 
 menon is inexplicable. Every one has made, or can 
 make, this experiment ; when it fails it will be found, 
 if I mistake not, either that we have not been suffi- 
 ciently preoccupied with the intention, or were over- 
 fatigued ; for when the senses are strongly benumbed, 
 they convey to the mind, on the one hand, more 
 obtuse sensations of the monitory sounds, and, on the 
 other, they resist for a longer time the efforts the 
 mind makes to awaken them, when these sounds have 
 reached it. 
 
 " After a night passed in this effort, we have, in 
 general, the recollection, in the morning, of having been
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 333 
 
 constantly occupied during sleep with this thought. LECT. 
 The mind, therefore, watched, and, full of its resolu- VIL 
 tion, awaited the moment. It is thus that when we 
 go to bed much interested with any subject, we re- 
 member, on wakening, that during sleep we have 
 been continually haunted by it. On these occasions 
 the slumber is light, for, the mind being untranquil, 
 its agitation is continually disturbing the torpor of 
 the senses. When the mind is calm, it does not sleep 
 more, but it is less restless. 
 
 " It would be curious to ascertain, whether persons 
 of a feeble memory, and of a volatile disposition, are 
 not less capable than others of awakening at an ap- 
 pointed hour ; for these two circumstances ought to 
 produce this effect, if the notion I have formed of the 
 phsenomenon be correct. A volatile disposition is 
 unable strongly to preoccupy itself with the thought, 
 and to form a determined resolution ; and, on the 
 other hand, it is the memory which preserves a recol- 
 lection of the resolution taken before falling asleep. 
 I have not had an opportunity of making the experi- 
 ment. 
 
 " It appears to me, that from the previous observa- General 
 tions, it inevitably follows : 
 
 1, That in sleep the senses are torpid, but that the 
 mind wakes. 
 
 2, That certain of our senses continue to transmit 
 to the mind the imperfect sensations they receive. 
 
 3, That the mind judges these sensations, and that 
 it is in virtue of its judgments that it awakens, or does 
 not awaken, the senses. 
 
 4, That the reason why the mind awakens the 
 senses is, that sometimes the sensation disquiets it,
 
 33-J- LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. being unusual or painful, that sometimes the sensa- 
 - tion warns it to rouse the senses, as being an indica- 
 tion of the moment when it ought to do so. 
 
 5, That the mind possesses the power of awaken- 
 ing the senses, but that it only accomplishes this by 
 its own activity overcoming their torpor ; that this 
 torpor is an obstacle, an obstacle greater or less as 
 it is more or less profound. 
 
 " If these inferences are just, it follows that we can 
 waken ourselves at will and at appointed signals ; 
 that the instrument called an alarum (reveil-matin) 
 does not act so much by the noise it makes as by the 
 association we have established in going to bed be- 
 tween the noise and the thought of wakening ; that, 
 therefore, an instrument much less noisy, and emitting 
 only a feeble sound, would probably produce the same 
 effect. It follows, moreover, that we can inure our- 
 selves to sleep profoundly in the midst of the loudest 
 noises ; that to accomplish this it is perhaps sufficient, 
 on the first night, to impress it on our minds that 
 these sounds do not deserve attention, and ought not 
 to waken us ; and that by this mean, any one may 
 probably sleep as well in the mill as the miller him- 
 self. It follows, in fine, that the sleep of the strong 
 and courageous ought to be less easily disturbed, all 
 things equal, than the sleep of the weak and timid. 
 Some historical facts may be quoted in proof of this 
 last conclusion." 
 
 ouffroy's I shall not quote to you the observations of M. 
 roSSby Joufiroy on Reverie, a which form a sequel, and a con- 
 , of those he has made upon sleep. Before 
 
 alle ' terminating this subject, I may, however, notice a 
 rather curious case which occurs to my recollection, 
 
 a See Melanges, p. 304 et seq.Eo.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 335 
 
 and which tends to corroborate the theory of the LECT. 
 French psychologist. I give it on the authority of XV "' 
 Junker, a celebrated physician and professor of Halle, 
 who flourished during the first half of last century, 
 and he says that he took every pains to verify the 
 facts by frequent personal observation. I regret that 
 I am unable at the moment to find the book in which 
 the case is recorded, but of all its relevant circum- 
 stances I have a vivid remembrance. The object of 
 observation was the postman between Halle and a 
 town, I forget which, some eight miles distant. This 
 distance the postman was in the habit of traversing 
 daily. A considerable part of his way lay across a 
 district of unenclosed champaign meadow-land, and 
 in walking over this smooth surface the postman was 
 generally asleep. But at the termination of this part 
 of his road, there was a narrow foot-bridge over a 
 stream, and to reach this bridge it was necessary to 
 ascend some broken steps. Now, it was ascertained 
 as completely as any fact of the kind could be, the 
 observers were shrewd, and the object of observation 
 was a man of undoubted probity, I say, it was com- 
 pletely ascertained : 1, That the postman was asleep 
 in passing over this level course ; 2, That he held on 
 his way in this state without deflection towards the 
 bridge ; and, 3, That just before arriving at the 
 bridge, he awoke. But this case is not only deserving 
 of all credit from the positive testimony by which it 
 is vouched ; it is also credible as only one of a class 
 of analogous cases which it may be adduced as repre- 
 senting. This case, besides showing that the mind 
 must be active though the body is asleep, shows also 
 that certain bodily functions may be dormant, while 
 others are alert. The locomotive faculty was here in
 
 336 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. exercise, while the senses were in slumber. This sug- 
 gests to me another example of the same phsenomenon. 
 case of It is found in a story told by Erasmus" in one of his 
 letters, concerning his learned friend Oporinus, the 
 celebrated professor and printer of Basle. Oporinus 
 was on a journey with a bookseller ; and, on their road, 
 they had fallen in with a manuscript. Tired with 
 their day's travelling, travelling was then almost 
 exclusively performed on horseback, they came at 
 nightfall to their inn. They were, however, curious to 
 ascertain the contents of their manuscript, and Opori- 
 nus undertook the task of reading it aloud. This he 
 continued for some time, when the bookseller found it 
 necessary to put a question concerning a word which 
 he had not rightly understood. It was now discovered 
 that Oporinus was asleep, and being awakened by his 
 companion, he found that he had no recollection of 
 what for a considerable time he had been reading. 
 Most of you, I daresay, have known or heard of 
 similar occurrences, and I do not quote the anecdote 
 as anything remarkable. But, still, it is a case con- 
 curring with a thousand others to prove, 1, That one 
 bodily sense or function may be asleep while another 
 is awake ; and, 2, That the mind may be in a certain 
 state of activity during sleep, and no memory of that 
 activity remain after the sleep has ceased. The first 
 is evident ; for Oporinus, while reading, must have 
 had his eyes and the muscles of his tongue and fauces 
 awake, though his ears and other senses were asleep ; 
 and the second is no less so, for the act of reading 
 supposed a very complex series of mental energies. I 
 
 o This story is told by Felix Platerus terns. See Bohn, Noctambulatio ; 
 
 (Obsercatimes, lib. L p. 11). The per- (Haller, Disputationes ad Morborum 
 
 son to whom Oporinus read, was the Hist, et Curat., t. vii. p. 443.) ED. 
 father of the narrator, Thomas Pla-
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 337 
 
 may notice, by the way, that physiologists have ob- LECT. 
 
 served, that our bodily senses and powers do not fall 1 
 
 asleep simultaneously, but in a certain succession. 
 We all know that the first symptom of slumber is the 
 relaxation of the eyelids ; whereas, hearing continues 
 alert for a season after the power of vision has been 
 dormant. In the case last alluded to, this order was, 
 however, violated ; and the sight was forcibly kept 
 awake while the hearing had lapsed into torpidity. 
 
 In the case of sleep, therefore, so far is it from 
 being proved that the mind is at any moment uncon- 
 scious, that the result of observation would incline us 
 to the opposite conclusion. 
 
 VOL. I.
 
 338 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECTURE XVIII. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, GENERAL PHENOMENA, IS THE 
 MIND EVER UNCONSCIOUSLY MODIFIED \ 
 
 LECT. I PASS now to a question in some respects of still 
 
 XVITT 
 
 1 more proximate interest to the psychologist than that 
 
 - discussed in the preceding Lecture ; for it is one 
 ~ which, according as it is decided, will determine the 
 character of our explanation of many of the most 
 important phenomena in the philosophy of mind, and, 
 in particular, the great phsenomena of Memory and 
 Association. The question I refer to is, Whether the 
 mind exerts energies, and is the subject of modifica- 
 tions, of neither of which it is conscious. This is the 
 most general expression of a problem which has 
 hardly been mentioned, far less mooted, in this coun- 
 try ; and when it has attracted a passing notice, the 
 supposition of an unconscious action or passion of the 
 mind, has been treated as something either unintelli- 
 gible, or absurd. In Germany, on the contrary, it 
 has not only been canvassed, but the alternative 
 which the philosophers of this country have lightly 
 considered as ridiculous, has been gravely established 
 as a conclusion which the phenomena not only war- 
 rant, but enforce. The French philosophers, for a 
 long time, viewed the question in the same light 
 as the British. Condillac, indeed, set the latter the
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 339 
 
 example ; * but of late a revolution is apparent, and LECT. 
 
 two recent French psychologists P have marvellously L. 
 
 propounded the doctrine, long and generally estab- 
 lished in Germany, as something new and unheard of 
 before their own assertion of the paradox. 
 
 This question is one not only of importance, but of 
 difficulty ; I shall endeavour to make you understand 
 its purport by arguing it upon broader grounds than 
 has hitherto been done, and shall prepare you, by some 
 preliminary information, for its discussion. I shall 
 first of all adduce some proof of the fact, that the mind 
 may, and does, contain far more latent furniture than 
 consciousness informs us -it possesses. To simplify 
 the discussion, I shall distinguish three degrees 
 this mental latency. 
 
 In the first place, it is to be remembered that the The first, 
 riches, the possessions of our mind, are not to be 
 measured by its present momentary activities, but by 
 the amount of its acquired habits. I know a science, 
 or language, not merely while I make a temporary 
 use of it, but inasmuch as I can apply it when and 
 how I will. Thus the infinitely greater part of our 
 spiritual treasures, lies always beyond the sphere of 
 consciousness, hid in the obscure recesses of the mind. 
 This is the first degree of latency. In regard to this, 
 there is no difficulty, or dispute ; and I only take it 
 into account in order to obviate misconception, and 
 because it affords a transition towards the other two 
 degrees which it conduces to illustrate. 
 
 The second degree of latency exists when the mind The second, 
 contains certain systems of knowledge, or certain 
 
 o Essai sur VOrigme des Cmnois- /3 Cardaillac and Damiron. See be- 
 tancei Humaines. Sect. ii. ch. 1. 4- low, p. 363. ED. 
 13. ED.
 
 340 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. habits of action, which it is wholly unconscious of 
 
 !_ possessing in its ordinary state, but which are revealed 
 
 to consciousness in certain extraordinary exaltations 
 of its powers. The evidence on this point shows that 
 the mind frequently contains whole systems of know- 
 ledge, which, though in our normal state they have 
 faded into absolute oblivion, may, in certain abnormal 
 states, as madness, febrile delirium, somnambulism, 
 catalepsy, &c., flash out into luminous consciousness, 
 and even throw into the shade of unconsciousness 
 those other systems by which they had, for a long 
 period, been eclipsed and even extinguished. For 
 example, there are cases in which the extinct me- 
 mory of whole languages was suddenly restored, and, 
 what is even still more remarkable, in which the 
 faculty was exhibited of accurately repeating, in 
 known or unknown tongues, passages which were 
 never within the grasp of conscious memory in the 
 normal state. This degree, this phsenomenon of 
 latency, is one of the most marvellous in the whole 
 compass of philosophy, and the proof of its reality 
 will prepare us for an enlightened consideration of 
 the third, of which the evidence, though not less 
 certain, is not equally obtrusive. But, however re- 
 markable and important, this phaenomenon has been 
 almost wholly neglected by psychologists," and the 
 cases which I adduce in illustration of its reality have 
 never been previously collected and applied. That in 
 madness, in fever, in somnambulism, and other abnor- 
 mal states, the mind should betray capacities and ex- 
 tensive systems of knowledge, of which it was at other 
 
 o These remarks were probably writ- He collects some very curious in- 
 ten before the publication of Aber- stances, see p. 314, 10th edition. 
 crombie on the Intellectual Pmcers. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 34)1 
 
 times wholly unconscious, is a fact so remarkable that LECT. 
 it may well demand the highest evidence to establish 
 
 its truth. But of such a character is the evidence 
 which I am now to give you. It consists of cases 
 reported by the most intelligent and trustworthy ob- 
 servers, by observers wholly ignorant of each other's 
 testimony ; and the phenomena observed were of so 
 palpable and unambiguous a nature that they could 
 not possibly have been mistaken or misinterpreted. 
 
 The first, and least interesting, evidence I shall Evidence 
 adduce, is derived from cases of madness ; it is given 
 by a celebrated American physician, Dr Eush. 
 
 " The records of the wit and cunning of madmen," 
 says the Doctor, "are numerous in every country. 
 Talents for eloquence, poetry, music, and painting, 
 and uncommon ingenuity in several of the mechanical 
 arts, are often evolved in this state of madness. A 
 gentleman, whom I attended in an hospital in the 
 year 1810, often delighted as well as astonished the 
 patients and officers of our hospital by his displays of 
 oratory, in preaching from a table in the hospital yard 
 every Sunday. A female patient of mine who became 
 insane, after parturition, in the year 1807, sang hymns 
 and songs of her own composition during the latter 
 stage of her illness, with a tone of voice so soft and 
 pleasant that I hung upon it with delight every time 
 I visited her. She had never discovered a talent for 
 poetry or music, in any previous part of her life. 
 Two instances of a talent for drawing, evolved by 
 madness, have occurred within my knowledge. And 
 where is the hospital for mad people, in which elegant 
 and completely rigged ships, and curious pieces of 
 machinery, have not been exhibited by persons who 
 never discovered the least turn for a mechanical art,
 
 342 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. previously to their derangement ? Sometimes we ob- 
 xvm - serve in mad people an unexpected resuscitation of 
 knowledge ; hence we hear them describe past events, 
 and speak in ancient or modern languages, or repeat 
 long and interesting passages from books, none of 
 which, we are sure, they were capable of recollecting 
 in the natural and healthy state of their mind." a 
 From cases The second class of cases are those of fever ; and 
 the first I shall adduce is given on the authority of 
 the patient himself. This is Mr Flint, a very intelli- 
 gent American clergyman. I take it from his Recol- 
 lections of the Valley of the Mississippi. He was 
 travelling in the State of Illinois, and suffered the 
 common lot of visitants from other climates, in being 
 taken down with a bilious fever. " I am aware," he 
 remarks, "that every sufferer in this way is apt to 
 think his own case extraordinary. My physicians 
 agreed with all who saw me that my case was so. 
 As very few live to record the issue of a sickness 
 like mine, and as you have requested me, and as I 
 have promised, to be particular, I will relate some of 
 the circumstances of this disease. And it is in my 
 view desirable, in the bitter agony of such diseases, 
 that more of the symptoms, sensations, and sufferings 
 should have been recorded than have been ; and that 
 others in similar predicaments may know, that some 
 before them have had sufferings like theirs, and have 
 survived them. I had had a fever before, and had 
 risen, and been dressed every day. But in this, with 
 the first day I was prostrated to infantine weakness, 
 and felt, with its first attack, that it was a thing very 
 different from what I had yet experienced. Paroxysms 
 of derangement occurred the third day, and this was 
 
 a Beasley, On the Mind, p. 474.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 343 
 
 to me a new state of mind. That state of disease in LECT. 
 which partial derangement is mixed with a conscious- xvm ' 
 ness generally sound, and a sensibility preternaturally 
 excited, I should suppose the most distressing of all 
 its forms. At the same time that I was unable to 
 recognise my friends, I was informed that my memory 
 was more than ordinarily exact and retentive, and 
 that I repeated whole passages in the different lan- 
 guages which I knew, with entire accuracy. I recited, 
 without losing or misplacing a word, a passage of 
 poetry which I could not so repeat after I recovered 
 my health." 
 
 The following more curious case, is given by Lord CMC of the 
 Monboddo in his Antient Metaphysics* Laval. 
 
 " It was communicated in a letter from the late Mr 
 Hans Stanley, a gentleman well known both to the 
 learned and political world, who did me the honour 
 to correspond with me upon the subject of my first 
 volume of metaphysics. I will give it in the words 
 of that gentleman. He introduces it, by saying, that 
 it is an extraordinary fact in the history of mind, 
 which he believes stands single, and for which he does 
 not pretend to account ; then he goes on to narrate 
 it : ' About six-and-twenty years ago, when I was in 
 France, I had an intimacy in the family of the late 
 Mare*chal de Montmorenci de Laval. His son, the 
 Comte de Laval, was married to Mademoiselle de 
 Maupeaux, the daughter of a Lieutenant-General of 
 that name, and the niece of the late Chancellor. This 
 gentleman was killed at the battle of Hastenbeck ; his 
 widow survived him some years, but is since dead. 
 
 " ' The following fact comes from her own mouth. 
 She has told it me repeatedly. She was a woman of 
 
 o VoL ii. p. 217.
 
 3M LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. perfect veracity, and very good sense. She appealed 
 
 1_ to her servants and family for the truth. Nor did 
 
 she, indeed, seem to be sensible that the matter was 
 so extraordinary as it appeared to me. I wrote it 
 down at the time ; and I have the memorandum 
 among some of my papers. 
 
 " ' The Comtesse de Laval had been observed, by 
 servants who sate up with her on account of some 
 indisposition, to talk in her sleep a language that 
 none of them understood ; nor were they sure, or, 
 indeed, herself able to guess, upon the sounds being 
 repeated to her, whether it was or was not gibberish. 
 " ' Upon her lying in of one of her children, she 
 was attended by a nurse, who was of the province of 
 Brittany, and who immediately knew the meaning of 
 what she said, it being in the idiom of the natives of 
 that country ; but she herself, when awake, did not 
 understand a single syllable of what she had uttered 
 in her sleep, upon its being retold her. 
 
 " ' She was born in that province, and had been 
 nursed in a family where nothing but that language 
 was spoken ; so that, in her first infancy, she had 
 known it, and no other ; but, when she returned to 
 her parents, she had no opportunity of keeping up 
 the use of it ; and, as I have before said, she did not 
 understand a word of Breton when awake, though she 
 spoke it in her sleep. 
 
 " ' I need not say that the Comtesse de Laval 
 never said or imagined, that she used any words of 
 the Breton idiom, more than were necessary to express 
 those ideas that are within the compass of a child's 
 knowledge of objects,'" &c. 
 
 Case given A highly interesting case is given by Mr Coleridge 
 ridge. in his Biographia Literaria.* 
 
 a Vol. L p. 117, (edit 1847).
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 345 
 
 "It occurred," says Mr Coleridge, "in a Roman LECT. 
 
 Catholic town in Germany, a year or two before my 1 
 
 arrival at Gottingen, and had not then ceased to be a 
 frequent subject of conversation. A young woman of 
 four or five and twenty, who could neither read nor 
 write, was seized with a nervous fever ; during which, 
 according to the asseverations of all the priests and 
 monks of the neighbourhood, she became possessed, 
 and, as it appeared, by a very learned devil. She con- 
 tinued incessantly talking Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, 
 in very pompous tones, and with most distinct enun- 
 ciation. This possession was rendered more probable 
 by the known fact that she was or had been a heretic. 
 Voltaire humorously advises the devil to decline all 
 acquaintance with medical men ; and it would have 
 been more to his reputation, if he had taken this ad- 
 vice in the present instance. The case had attracted 
 the particular attention of a young physician, and by 
 his statement many eminent physiologists and psy- 
 chologists visited the town, and cross-examined the 
 case on the spot. Sheets full of her ravings were 
 taken down from her own mouth, and were found to 
 consist of sentences, coherent and intelligible each for 
 itself, but with little or no connection with each other. 
 Of the Hebrew, a small portion only could be traced 
 to the Bible, the remainder seemed to be in the Rab- 
 binical dialect. All trick or conspiracy was out of the 
 question. Not only had the young woman ever been 
 a harmless, simple creature ; but she was evidently 
 labouring under a nervous fever. In the town, in 
 which she had been resident for many years as a ser- 
 vant in different families, no solution presented itself. 
 The young physician, however, determined to trace 
 her past life step by step ; for the patient herself was 
 incapable of returning a rational answer. He at length
 
 346 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. succeeded in discovering the place where her parents 
 XVIIL had lived : travelled thither, found them dead, but an 
 uncle surviving ; and from him learned that the pa- 
 tient had been charitably taken by an old Protestant 
 pastor at nine years old, and had remained with him 
 some years, even till the old man's death. Of this 
 pastor the uncle knew nothing, but that he was a very 
 good man. With great difficulty, and after much 
 search, our young medical philosopher discovered a 
 niece of the pastor's, who had lived with him as his 
 housekeeper, and had inherited his effects. She re- 
 membered the girl ; related that her venerable uncle 
 had been too indulgent, and could not bear to hear the 
 girl scolded ; that she was willing to have kept her, 
 but that, after her patron's death, the girl herself re- 
 fused to stay. Anxious inquiries were then, of course, 
 made concerning the pastor's habits ; and the solu- 
 tion of the phenomenon was soon obtained. For it 
 appeared that it had been the old man's custom, for 
 years, to walk up and down a passage of his house 
 into which the kitchen-door opened, and to read to 
 himself, with a loud voice, out of his favourite books. 
 A considerable number of these were still in the 
 niece's possession. She added, that he was a very 
 learned man, and a great Hebraist. Among the books 
 were found a collection of Kabbinical writings, to- 
 gether with several of the Greek and Latin fathers: 
 and the physician succeeded in identifying so many 
 passages with those taken down at the young woman's 
 bedside, that no doubt could remain in any rational 
 mind concerning the true origin of the impressions 
 
 ^^ made on her nervous system." 
 
 craifact These cases thus evince the general fact, that a 
 
 these cases 
 
 establish, mental modification is not proved not to be, merely
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 347 
 
 because consciousness affords us no evidence of its ex- LECT. 
 istence. This general fact being established, I now xvm ' 
 proceed to consider the question in relation to the 
 
 third class or degree of latent modifications, a class i*y. 
 in relation to, and on the ground of which alone, it 
 has ever hitherto been argued by philosophers. 
 
 The problem, then, in regard to this class is, Are The P rob- 
 there, in ordinary, mental modifications, i. e. mental **** 
 activities and passivities, of which we are unconscious, stated! 
 but which manifest their existence by effects of which 
 we are conscious 1 
 
 I have thus stated the question, because this ap- TO be con- 
 pears to me the most unambiguous form in which it itseV aid 
 can be expressed ; and in treating of it, I shall, in the loVy? 
 first place, consider it in itself, and, in the second 
 place, in its history. I adopt this order, because the 
 principal difficulties which affect the problem arise 
 from the equivocal and indeterminate language of 
 philosophers. These it is obviously necessary to avoid 
 in the first instance ; but having obtained an insight 
 into the question itself, it will be easy, in a subse- 
 quent historical narrative, to show how it has been per- 
 plexed and darkened by the mode in which it has been 
 handled by philosophers. I request your attention to 
 this matter, as in the solution of this general problem 
 is contained the solution of several important ques- 
 tions, which will arise under our consideration of the 
 special faculties. It is impossible, however, at the 
 present stage of our progress, to exhibit all, or even 
 the strongest part of, the evidence for the alternative 
 which I adopt ; and you must bear in mind that there 
 is much more to be said in favour of this opinion than 
 what I am able at present to adduce to you. 
 
 In the question proposed, I am not only strongly
 
 348 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. inclined to the affirmative, nay, I do not hesitate to 
 maintain, that what we are conscious of is constructed 
 out of what we are not conscious of, that our whole 
 knowledge, in fact, is made up of the unknown and 
 the incognisable. 
 
 TO the affir- This at first sight may appear not only paradox- 
 objrction! ical, but contradictory. It may be objected, 1, How 
 can we know that to exist which lies beyond the one 
 condition of all knowledge, consciousness. And 2, 
 How can knowledge arise out of ignorance, conscious- 
 ness out of unconsciousness, the cognisable out of 
 the incognisable, that is, how can one opposite pro- 
 ceed out of the other. 
 
 The first In answer to the first objection, how can we know 
 obSed that of which we are unconscious, seeing that con- 
 sciousness is the condition of knowledge, it is 
 enough to allege, that there are many things which 
 we neither know nor can know in themselves, that 
 is, in their direct and immediate relation to our facul- 
 ties of knowledge, but which manifest their existence 
 indirectly through the medium of their effects. This 
 The mental is the case with the mental modifications in question ; 
 tioMim they are not in themselves revealed to conscious- 
 ness, but as certain facts of consciousness necessarily 
 suppose them to exist, and to exert an influence in 
 t8 ' the mental processes, we are thus constrained to admit, 
 as modifications of mind, what are not in themselves 
 Established phaenomena of consciousness. The truth of this will 
 nTt^e 0* be apparent, if, before descending to any special illus- 
 
 conscious- , . . . . . 
 
 ness itself, tration, we consider that consciousness cannot exist 
 independently of some peculiar modification of mind ; 
 we are only conscious as we are conscious of a de- 
 terminate state. To be conscious, we must be con- 
 scious of some particular perception, or remembrance,
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 349 
 
 or imagination, or feeling, &c. ; we have no general LECT. 
 consciousness. But as consciousness supposes a special XVIIL 
 mental modification as its object, it must be remem- 
 bered, that this modification or state supposes a 
 change, a transition from some other state or modi- 
 fication. But as the modification must be present, 
 before we have a consciousness of the modification, it is 
 evident, that we can have no consciousness of its rise 
 or awakening ; for its rise or awakening is also the rise 
 or awakening of consciousness. 
 
 But the illustration of this is contained in an answer The second 
 to the second objection which asks, How can know- 
 ledge come out of ignorance, consciousness out of 
 unconsciousness, the known out of the unknown, 
 how can one opposite be made up of the other ? 
 
 In the removal of this objection, the proof of the The special 
 thesis which I support is involved. And without the affima- r 
 dealing in any general speculation, I shall at once V 
 
 descend to the special evidence which appears to me, 
 not merely to warrant, but to necessitate the conclu- 
 sion, that the sphere of our conscious modifications is 
 only a small circle in the centre of a far wider sphere 
 of action and passion, of which we are only conscious 
 through its effects. 
 
 Let us take our first example from Perception, the T. External 
 perception of external objects, and in that faculty, let 
 us commence with the sense of sight. Now, you i. The sense 
 either already know, or can be at once informed, what of 
 it is that has obtained the name of Minimum Visibile. Minimum 
 You are of course aware, in general, that vision is the 
 result of the rays of light, reflected from the surface 
 of objects to the eye ; a greater number of rays is 
 reflected from a larger surface ; if the superficial ex- 
 tent of an object, and, consequently, the number of
 
 350 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. the rays which it reflects, be diminished beyond a 
 
 certain limit, the object becomes invisible ; and the 
 
 minimum visibik is the smallest expanse which can be 
 seen, which can consciously affect us, which we 
 can be conscious of seeing. This being understood, 
 it is plain that if we divide this minimum visibile into 
 two parts, neither half can, by itself, be an object 
 of vision, or visual consciousness. They are, severally 
 and apart, to consciousness as zero. But it is evident, 
 that each half must, by itself, have produced in us a 
 certain modification, real though unperceived ; for as 
 the perceived whole is nothing but the union of the 
 unperceived halves, so the perception, the perceived 
 affection itself of which we are conscious, is only the 
 sum of two modifications, each of which severally 
 eludes our consciousness. When we look at a distant 
 forest, we perceive a certain expanse of green. Of 
 this, as an affection of our organism, we are clearly 
 and distinctly conscious. Now, the expanse of which 
 we are conscious is evidently made up of parts of 
 which we are not conscious. No leaf, perhaps no 
 tree, may be separately visible. But the greenness of 
 the forest is made up of the greenness of the leaves ; 
 that is, the total impression of which we are conscious, 
 is made up of an infinitude of small impressions of 
 which we are not conscious. 
 
 2. Sense of Take another example, from the sense of hearing. 
 Mb[mum In this sense, there is, in like manner, a Minimum 
 Audibile, that is, a sound the least which can come 
 into perception and consciousness. But this mini- 
 mum audibile is made up of parts which severally 
 affect the sense, but of which affections, separately, we 
 are not conscious, though of their joint result we are. 
 We must, therefore, here likewise admit the reality of
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 351 
 
 modifications beyond the sphere of consciousness. To LECT. 
 take a special example. When we hear the distant vm ' 
 murmur of the sea, what are the constituents of the 
 total perception of which we are conscious? This 
 murmur is a sum made up of parts, and the sum 
 would be as zero if the parts did not count as some- 
 thing. The noise of the sea is the complement of the 
 noise of its several waves ; 
 
 irovrluv re Kv/jidruv 
 'Arfipi6f<i.oi> 7 f Xewr/ia 
 
 and if the noise of each wave made no impression 
 on our sense, the noise of the sea, as the result of 
 these impressions, could not be realised. But the 
 noise of each several wave, at the distance we suppose, 
 is inaudible ; we must, however, admit that they pro- 
 duce a certain modification, beyond consciousness, on 
 the percipient subject ; for this is necessarily involved 
 in the reality of their result. The same is equally the s. The other 
 case in the other senses ; the taste or smell of a dish, sei 
 be it agreeable or disagreeable, is composed of a mul- 
 titude of severally imperceptible effects, which the 
 stimulating particles of the viand cause on different 
 points of the nervous expansion of the gustatory and 
 olfactory organs ; and the pleasant or painful feeling 
 of softness or roughness is the result of an infinity of 
 unfelt modifications, which the body handled deter- 
 mines on the countless papillae of the nerves of touch.0 
 
 Let us now take an example from another mental n. Associ- 
 process. We have not yet spoken of what is called KM. 
 the Association of Ideas ; and it is enough for our 
 present purpose that you should be aware, that one 
 thought suggests another in conformity to certain 
 
 o ^Eschylus, Prometheus, 1. 89. ED. Avant-Propos, p. 8-9, (ed. Raspe) ; and 
 See Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, lib. ii. c. i. 9 et eq. ED.
 
 352 LECTUEES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. determinate laws, laws to which the succession of 
 L our whole mental states are subjected. Now it some- 
 times happens, that we find one thought rising im- 
 mediately after another in consciousness, but whose 
 consecution we can reduce to no law of association. 
 Now in these cases we can generally discover by an 
 attentive observation, that these two thoughts, though 
 not themselves associated, are each associated with 
 certain other thoughts ; so that the whole consecution 
 would have been regular, had these intermediate 
 thoughts come into consciousness, between the two 
 which are not immediately associated. Suppose, for 
 instance, that A, B, C, are three thoughts, that A and 
 C cannot immediately suggest each other, but that each 
 is associated with B, so that A will naturally suggest 
 B, and B naturally suggest C. Now it may happen, 
 that we are conscious of A, and immediately thereafter 
 of C. How is the anomaly to be explained 1 It can 
 only be explained on the principle of latent modifica- 
 tions. A suggests C, not immediately, but through 
 B ; but as B, like the half of the minimum visibile or 
 minimum audibile, does not rise into consciousness, we 
 are apt to consider it as non-existent. You are pro- 
 bably aware of the following fact in mechanics. If a 
 number of billiard balls be placed in a straight row 
 and touching each other, and if a ball be made to 
 strike, in the line of the row, the ball at one end of 
 the series, what will happen ? The motion of the im- 
 pinging ball is not divided among the whole row ; 
 this, which we might a priori have expected, does not 
 happen, but the impetus is transmitted through the 
 intermediate balls which remain each in its place, to 
 the ball at the opposite end of the series, and this ball 
 alone is impelled on. Something like this seems often
 
 LECTUKES ON METAPHYSICS. 353 
 
 to occur in the train of thought. One idea mediately LECT. 
 
 suggests another into consciousness, the suggestion 
 
 passing through one or more ideas which do not them- 
 selves rise into consciousness. The awakening and 
 awakened ideas here correspond to the ball striking 
 and the ball struck off ; while the intermediate ideas 
 of which we are unconscious, but which carry on 
 the suggestion, resemble the intermediate balls which 
 remain moveless, but communicate the impulse. An 
 instance of this occurs to me with which I was recently 
 struck. Thinking of Ben Lomond, this thought was 
 immediately followed by the thought of the Prussian 
 system of education. Now, conceivable connection 
 between these two ideas in themselves, there was none. 
 A little reflection, however, explained the anomaly. 
 On my last visit to the mountain, I had met upon its 
 summit a German gentleman, and though I had no 
 consciousness of the intermediate and unawakened 
 links between Ben Lomond and the Prussian schools, 
 they were undoubtedly these, the German, Ger- 
 many, Prussia, and, these media being admitted, 
 the connection between the extremes was manifest. 
 
 I should perhaps reserve for a future occasion, steward 
 noticing Mr Stewart's explanation of this phseno- of t 
 menon. He admits that a perception or idea may As 
 pass through the mind without leaving any trace i 
 the memory, and yet serve to introduce other ideas 
 connected with it by the laws of association. Mr 
 Stewart can hardly be said to have contemplated the 
 possibility of the existence and agency of mental 
 modifications of which we are unconscious. He grants 
 
 o Elements, part ii. chap. ii. ; Works, vol. ii. pp. 121, 122. 
 VOL. I. Z
 
 354 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. the necessity of interpolating certain intermediate 
 xvm ' ideas, in order to account for the connection of thought, 
 
 which could otherwise be explained by no theory of 
 association ; and he admits that these intermediate 
 ideas are not known by memory to have actually 
 intervened. So far, there is no difference in the two 
 doctrines. But now comes the separation. Mr 
 Stewart supposes that the intermediate ideas are, for 
 an instant, awakened into consciousness, but, in the 
 same moment, utterly forgot ; whereas the opinion I 
 would prefer, holds that they are efficient without 
 rising into consciousness. Mr Stewart's doctrine on 
 
 Difficulties this point is exposed to all the difficulties, and has 
 none of the proofs in its favour which concur in 
 establishing the other. 
 
 In the first place, to assume the existence of acts 
 of consciousness of which there is no memory beyond 
 
 there ia no the moment of existence, is at least as inconceivable 
 an hypothesis as the other. But, in the second place, 
 it violates the whole analogy of consciousness, which 
 the other does not. Consciousness supposes memory ; 
 and we are only conscious as we are able to con- 
 nect and contrast one instance of our intellectual 
 existence with another. Whereas, to suppose the 
 existence and efficiency of modifications beyond con- 
 sciousness, is not at variance with its conditions ; for 
 consciousness, though it assures us of the reality of 
 what is within its sphere, says nothing against the 
 
 s. Presump- reality of what is without. In the third place, it is 
 
 vourofia- demonstrated, that, in perception, there are modifica- 
 tions, efficient, though severally imperceptible ; why, 
 therefore, in the other faculties, should there not like- 
 wise be modifications, efficient, though unapparent ?
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 355 
 
 In the fourth place, there must be some reason for LECT. 
 the assumed fact, that there are perceptions or ideas 
 of which we are conscious, but of which there is 
 memory. Now, the only reason that can possibly be 
 assigned is that the consciousness was too faint 
 afford the condition of memory. But of conscious- 
 ness, however faint, there must be some memory, 
 however short. But this is at variance with the 
 phenomenon, for the ideas A and C may precede and 
 follow each other without any perceptible interval, 
 and without any the feeblest memory of B. If there 
 be no memory, there could have been no conscious- 
 ness ; and, therefore, Mr Stewart's hypothesis, if strictly 
 interrogated, must, even at last, take refuge in our 
 doctrine ; for it can easily be shown, that the degree 
 of memory is directly in proportion to the degree of 
 consciousness, and, consequently, that an absolute ne- 
 gation of memory is an absolute negation of conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 Let us now turn to another class of phenomena, in. our 
 which in like manner are capable of an adequate 
 
 explanation only on the theory I have advanced ; I m 
 mean the operations resulting from our Acquired 
 Dexterities and Habits. 
 
 To explain these, three theories have been advanced. TO explain 
 The first regards them as merely mechanical or auto- tfeefad 
 matic, and thus denying to the mind all active or The fin*, 
 voluntary intervention, consequently removes them 
 beyond the sphere of consciousness. The second, The second, 
 again, allows to each several motion a separate act of 
 conscious volition; while the third, which I would The third, 
 maintain, holds a medium between these, constitutes 
 the mind the agent, accords to it a conscious volition
 
 356 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. over the series, but denies to it a consciousness and 
 xvm - deliberate volition in regard to each separate move- 
 ment in the series which it determines. 
 
 The first The first of these has been maintained, among 
 
 kaHheo^", others, by two philosophers who, in other points, 
 Tv^Reid^nd are not frequently at one, by Keid and Hartley. 
 " Habit," says Eeid, " differs from instinct, not in its 
 nature, but in its origin ; the last being natural, the 
 first acquired. Both operate without will or inten- 
 tion, without thought, and therefore may be called 
 mechanical principles." a In another passage, he ex- 
 presses himself thus : " I conceive it to be a part of 
 our constitution, that what we have been accustomed 
 to do, we acquire not only a facility but a proneness 
 to do on like occasions ; so that it requires a par- 
 ticular will or effort to forbear it, but to do it requires 
 very often no will at all/'P 
 
 The same doctrine is laid down still more explicitly 
 by Dr Hartley. " Suppose," says he, " a person, who 
 has a perfectly voluntary command over his fingers, to 
 begin to learn to play on the harpsichord. The first 
 step is to move his fingers, from key to key, with a 
 slow motion, looking at the notes, and exerting an 
 express act of volition in every motion. By degrees 
 the motions cling to one another, and to the im- 
 pressions of the notes, in the way of association, so 
 often mentioned ; the acts of volition growing less and 
 less express all the time, till, at last, they become 
 evanescent and imperceptible. For an expert per- 
 former will play from notes, or ideas laid up in the 
 memory, and at the same time carry on a quite differ- 
 ent train of thoughts in his mind ; or even hold a con- 
 versation with another. Whence we conclude, that 
 
 a Active Powers, Essay iiL, part i. chap. 3; Coll. Works, p. 550. /3 Hid.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 357 
 
 there is no intervention of the idea, or state of mind LECT. 
 called will." Cases of this sort Hartley calls " tran- XVIIL 
 sitions of voluntary actions into automatic ones."" 
 
 The second theory is maintained against the first by The e- 
 Mr Stewart ; and I think his refutation valid, though maintained, 
 not his confirmation. " I cannot help thinking it," against the 
 he says, " more philosophical to suppose that those Stewart. 
 actions which are originally voluntary always continue 
 so, although in the case of operations, which are be- 
 come habitual in consequence of long practice, we may 
 not be able to recollect every different volition. Thus, 
 in the case of a performer on the harpsichord, I appre- 
 hend that there is an act of the will preceding every 
 motion of every finger, although he may not be able 
 to recollect these volitions afterwards, and although 
 he may, during the time of his performance, be em- 
 ployed in carrying on a separate train of thought. For 
 it must be remarked, that the most rapid performer 
 can, when he pleases, play so slowly as to be able to 
 attend to, and to recollect, every separate act of his 
 will in the various movements of his fingers ; and he 
 can gradually accelerate the rate of his execution till 
 he is unable to recollect these acts. Now, in this in- 
 stance, one of two suppositions must be made. The 
 one is, that the operations in the two cases are carried 
 on precisely in the same manner, and differ only in the 
 degree of rapidity ; and that when this rapidity ex- 
 ceeds a certain rate, the acts of the will are too mo- 
 mentary to leave any impression on the memory. The 
 other is, that when the rapidity exceeds a certain rate, 
 the operation is taken entirely out of our hands, and 
 is carried on by some unknown power, of the nature 
 of which we are as ignorant as of the cause of the cir- 
 
 a Vol. L pp. 108, 109. [Observations on if an, prop, xxi. ED.]
 
 358 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. culation of the blood, or of the motion of the intestines. 
 
 The last supposition seems to me to be somewhat simi- 
 lar to that of a man who should maintain, that al- 
 though a body projected with a moderate velocity is 
 seen to pass through all the intermediate spaces in 
 moving from one place to another, yet we are not en- 
 titled to conclude that this happens when the body 
 moves so quickly as to become invisible to the eye. 
 The former supposition is supported by the analogy 
 of many other facts in our constitution. Of some of 
 these I have already taken notice, and it would be 
 easy to add to the number. An expert accountant, 
 for example, can sum up, almost with a single glance 
 of his eye, a long column of figures. He can tell the 
 sum, with unerring certainty, while, at the same time, 
 he is unable to recollect any one of the figures of which 
 that sum is composed ; and yet nobody doubts that 
 each of these figures has passed through his mind, or 
 supposes that when the rapidity of the process becomes 
 so great that he is unable to recollect the various steps 
 of it, he obtains the result by a sort of inspiration. 
 This last supposition would be perfectly analogous to 
 Dr Hartley's doctrine concerning the nature of our 
 habitual exertions. 
 
 " The only plausible objection which, I think, can be 
 offered to the principles I have endeavoured to estab- 
 lish on this subject, is founded on the astonishing 
 and almost incredible rapidity they necessarily sup- 
 pose in our intellectual operations. When a person, 
 for example, reads aloud, there must, according to this 
 doctrine, be a separate volition preceding the articu- 
 lation of every letter ; and it has been found by actual 
 trial, that it is possible to pronounce about two thou- 
 sand letters in a minute. Is it reasonable to suppose
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 359 
 
 that the mind is capable of so many different acts, in LECT. 
 an interval of time so very inconsiderable ? 
 
 " With respect to this objection, it maybe observed, 
 in the first place, that all arguments against the fore- 
 going doctrine with respect to our habitual exertions, 
 in so far as they are founded on the inconceivable 
 rapidity which they suppose in our intellectual ope- 
 rations, apply equally to the common doctrine con- 
 cerning our perception of distance by the eye. But 
 this is not all. To what does the supposition amount 
 which is considered as so incredible ? Only to this, 
 that the mind is so formed as to be able to carry on 
 certain intellectual processes in intervals of time too 
 short to be estimated by our faculties ; a supposition 
 which, so far from being extravagant, is supported by 
 the analogy of many of our most certain conclusions 
 in natural philosophy. The discoveries made by the 
 microscope have laid open to our senses a world of 
 wonders, the existence of which hardly any man would 
 have admitted upon inferior evidence ; and have gra- 
 dually prepared the way for those physical specula- 
 tions which explain some of the most extraordinary 
 phsenomena of nature by means of modifications of 
 matter far too subtile for the examination of our organs. 
 Why, then, should it be considered as unphilosophical, 
 after having demonstrated the existence of various in- 
 tellectual processes which escape our attention in con- 
 sequence of their rapidity, to carry the supposition a 
 little farther, in order to bring under the known laws 
 of the human constitution a class of mental operations 
 which must otherwise remain perfectly inexplicable'? 
 Surely our ideas of time are merely relative, as well 
 as our ideas of extension ; nor is there any good reason 
 for doubting that, if our powers of attention and me-
 
 360 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. mory were more perfect than they are, so as to give us 
 
 L the same advantage in examining rapid events, which 
 
 the microscope gives for examining minute portions of 
 extension, they would enlarge our views with respect 
 to the intellectual world, no less than that instrument 
 . has with respect to the material."" 
 
 Thepnn- This doctrine of Mr Stewart, that our acts of 
 Stew^t's knowledge are made up of an infinite number of acts 
 rajysh^m of attention, that is, of various acts of concentrated 
 centre? consciousness, there being required a separate act of 
 attention for every minimum possible of knowledge, 
 I have already shown you, by various examples, to 
 But here involve contradictions. In the present instance, its 
 Sfatei 7 admission would constrain OUT assent to the most 
 monstrous conclusions. Take the case of a person 
 reading. Now, all of you must have experienced, if 
 ever under the necessity of reading aloud, that, if the 
 matter be uninteresting, your thoughts, while you are 
 going on in the performance of your task, are wholly 
 abstracted from the book and its subject, and you are 
 perhaps deeply occupied in a train of serious meditation, 
 Here the process of reading is performed without inter- 
 ruption, and with the most punctual accuracy ; and, 
 at the same time, the process of meditation is carried 
 on without distraction or fatigue. Now this, on Mr 
 Stewart's doctrine, would seem impossible, for what 
 does his theory suppose 1 It supposes that separate 
 acts of concentrated consciousness or attention, are 
 bestowed on each least movement in either process. 
 But be the velocity of the mental operations what it 
 may, it is impossible to conceive how transitions be- 
 tween such contrary operations could be kept up for 
 a continuance without fatigue and distraction, even if 
 
 a Elements, vol. i. chap, ii.; Works, voL ii. p. 127-131.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 3G1 
 
 we throw out of account the fact that the acts of at- LECT. 
 tention to be effectual must be simultaneous, which on XVIIL 
 
 Mr Stewart's theory is not allowed. 
 
 We could easily give examples of far more complex 
 operations ; but this, with what has been previously 
 said, I deem sufficient to show, that we must either 
 resort to the first theory, which, as nothing but the 
 assumption of an occult and incomprehensible prin- 
 ciple, in fact explains nothing, or adopt the theory 
 that there are acts of mind so rapid and minute as to 
 elude the ken of consciousness. 
 
 I shall now say something of the history of this History of 
 opinion. It is a curious fact that Locke, in the passage ofun^n" 11 * 
 I read to you a few days ago, attributes this opinion taimodi- n 
 to the Cartesians, and he thinks it was employed by 
 them to support their doctrine of the ceaseless activity 
 of mind." In this, as in many other points of the Car- 
 tesian philosophy, he is, however, wholly wrong. On 
 the contrary, the Cartesians made consciousness the 
 essence of thought ; and their assertion that the mind 
 always thinks, is, in their language, precisely tanta- 
 mount to the assertion that the mind is always con- 
 scious. 
 
 But what was not maintained by the Cartesians, and Leibnitz 
 even in opposition to their doctrine, was advanced by P iaim 
 Leibnitz. 7 To this great philosopher belongs the honour trine. 00 " 
 of having originated this opinion, and of having sup- 
 plied some of the strongest arguments in its support. 
 He was, however, unfortunate in the terms which he 
 employed to propound his doctrine. The latent modi- 
 fications, the unconscious activities of mind, he de- 
 
 o Essay on Human Understanding, $ Descartes, Principia, pt.i. 9. ED. 
 
 book ii. c. 1, 18, 19. The Cartesians 7 Nouveattx Essais, ii. 7. Monado- 
 
 are intended, though not expressly loyie, 14. Principes de la Nature 
 
 mentioned. ED. et de la Grace. 4. ED.
 
 362 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. nominated obscure ideas, obscure representations, per- 
 XVIH. . . . . ^ . 
 ceptiom wit/wut apperception or consciousness, in- 
 
 lute'fothe sensible perceptions, &c. In this he violated the 
 Soyed universal usage of language. For perception, and idea, 
 nate"!!?' and representation, all properly involve the notion of 
 consciousness, it being, in fact, contradictory to speak 
 of a representation not really represented, a percep- 
 tion not really perceived, an actual idea of whose 
 presence we are not aware. 
 
 Fate of the ^he close affinity of mental modifications with per- 
 Fraroaiui ceptions, ideas, representations, and the consequent 
 Britain, commutation of these terms, have been undoubtedly 
 the reasons why the Leibnitzian doctrine was not 
 more generally adopted, and why, in France and in 
 Britain, succeeding philosophers have almost admitted 
 as a self-evident truth that there can be no modifica- 
 tion of mind, devoid of consciousness. As to any 
 refutation of the Leibnitzian doctrine, I know of none. 
 Condiiiac. Condillac is, indeed, the only psychologist who can be 
 said to have formally proposed the question. He, 
 like Mr Stewart, attempts to explain why it can be 
 supposed that the mind has modifications of which we 
 are not conscious, by asserting that we are in truth 
 conscious of the modification, but that it is imme- 
 Th e doc- diately forgotten. In Germany, the doctrine of 
 Leibritz Leibnitz was almost universally adopted. I am not 
 Gey? aware of a philosopher of the least note, by whom it 
 has been rejected. In France, it has, I see, lately 
 DC cardan- been broached by M. de Cardaillac,' 3 as a theory of 
 his own, and this, his originality, is marvellously 
 Damiron. admitted by authors, like M. Damiron, whom we 
 might reasonably expect to have been better in- 
 
 a Origine des Connoissances Hu,- Etudes EUmentaires de Philoso- 
 mainct, sect. ii. c. 1, 4-13. ED. pUe, t. ii. pp. 138, 139.
 
 LECTURES OX METAPHYSICS. 363 
 
 formed. It is hardly worth adding, that as the doc- LECT. 
 
 trine is not new, so nothing new has been contributed L 
 
 to its illustration. To British psychologists, the opinion 
 would hardly seem to have been known. By none, 
 certainly, is it seriously considered.^ 
 
 o In the second edition of Dami- Reinhold, Theorie des Menschlichen 
 
 ron's Psychologic, voL L p. 188, Leib- Erkenntnistvermogent und Metaphy- 
 
 nitz is expressly cited. In the first tik, L p. 279 et teq. Fries, Anthro- 
 
 edition, however, though the doctrine poloyie, L p. 77, (edit. 1820). Schulze, 
 
 of latency is stated, (t i. p. 190), there Philosophische Wissenschaften,i. p. 16- 
 
 is no reference to Leibnitz. ED. 17. H. Schmid, Versuch einer Meta- 
 
 /3 Qualified exception ; Kames' Es- physlk der inneren Natur, pp. 23, 232 
 
 says on (he Principles of Morality and et teq. Damiron, Court de Philosophic, 
 
 Natural Religion, (3d edit), p. 289 to L p. 190, (edit 1834). Haass, Einbild- 
 
 end, Ess. iv., on Matter and Spirit, ungskraft, 24, p. 65 et ?.,(edit. 
 
 [With Kames compare Carus, Psycho- 1797). Sulzer, Vermischte Schriften, 
 
 loyie, il p. 185, (edit. 1808). Tucker, L pp. 99, 109, (edit 1808). Denzinger, 
 
 Light of Nature, c. 10, 4. Tralles, Institutiones Logiae, 260, L p. 226, 
 
 DeImmortalitateAnimte,Tp.39etseq. (edit 1824). Beneke, Lehrbuch der 
 
 On the general subject of acts of mind Psychologie, 96 et seq^ p. 72, (edit 
 
 beyond the sphere of consciousness, 1833). Platner, Philotophische Apho- 
 
 compare Kant, Anthropologie, 5. ritmen, i. p. 70.]
 
 364 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECTURE XIX. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. GENERAL PHENOMENA. DIFFICUL- 
 TIES AND FACILITIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY. 
 
 LECT. IN our last Lecture we were occupied with the last and 
 JX ' principal part of the question, Are there mental agen- 
 
 c ' eg b e y On( j ^he sphere of Consciousness \ in other 
 words, Are there modifications of mind unknown in 
 themselves, but the existence of which we must 
 admit, as the necessary causes of known effects "? In 
 dealing with this question, I showed, first of all, that 
 there is indisputable evidence for the general fact, 
 that even extensive systems of knowledge may, in 
 our ordinary state, lie latent in the mind, beyond the 
 sphere of consciousness and will ; but which, in certain 
 extraordinary states of organism, may again come 
 forward into light, and even engross the mind to the 
 exclusion of its everyday possessions. The establish- 
 ment of the fact, that there are in the mind latent 
 capacities, latent riches, which may occasionally ex- 
 ert a powerful and obtrusive agency, prepared us for 
 Are there, the question, Are there, in ordinary, latent modifi- 
 iat^nfiWi- cations of mind, agencies unknown themselves as 
 SdTon- phaenomena, but secretly concurring to the produc- 
 tbTpSc- tion of manifest effects ? This problem, I endeavoured 
 manifLt to show you, must be answered in the affirmative. I 
 took for the medium of proof various operations of 
 mind, analysed these, and found as a residuum a
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 365 
 
 certain constituent beyond the sphere of conscious- LECT. 
 ness, and the reality of which cannot be disallowed, 
 as necessary for the realisation of the allowed effect. 
 My first examples were taken from the faculty of Proof from 
 External Perception. I showed you, in relation to all of Ex^ai 
 the senses, that there is an ultimate perceptible mini- 
 mum ; that is, that there is no consciousness, no per- 
 ception of the modification determined by its object 
 in any sense, unless that object determines in the 
 sense a certain quantum of excitement. Now, this 
 quantum, though the minimum that can be con- 
 sciously perceived, is still a whole composed even of 
 an infinity of lesser parts. Conceiving it, however, 
 only divided into two, each of these halves is unper- 
 ceived, neither is an object of consciousness ; the 
 whole is a percept made up of the unperceived halves. 
 The halves must, however, have each produced its 
 effect towards the perception of the whole ; and, 
 therefore, the smallest modification of which con- 
 sciousness can take account, necessarily supposes, as 
 its constituents, smaller modifications, real, but elud- 
 ing the ken of consciousness. Could we magnify the 
 discerning power of consciousness, as we can magnify 
 the power of vision by the microscope, we might 
 enable consciousness to extend its cognisance to modi- 
 fications twice, ten times, ten thousand times less, 
 than it is now competent to apprehend ; but still 
 there must be some limit. And as every mental 
 modification is a quantity, and as no quantity can be 
 conceived not divisible ad infinitum, we must, even 
 on this hypothesis, allow, (unless we assert that the 
 ken of consciousness is also infinite), that there are 
 modifications of mind unknown in themselves, but 
 the necessary coefficients of known results. On the
 
 366 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. ground of perception, it is thus demonstratively 
 XIX ' proved that latent agencies, modifications of which 
 we are unconscious, must be admitted as a ground- 
 work of the Phenomenology of Mind. 
 
 The fact of The fact of the existence of such latent agencies 
 ence of la- being proved in reference to one faculty, the presump- 
 tion is established that they exert an influence in all. 
 And this presumption holds, even if, in regard to 
 
 they exert some others, we should be unable to demonstrate, in 
 m aiL so direct and exclusive a manner, the absolute neces- 
 sity of their admission. This is shown in regard to 
 Association the Association of Ideas. In order to explain this, I 
 The laws of stated to you that the laws, which govern the train 
 or consecution of thought, are sometimes apparently 
 violated ; and that philosophers are perforce obliged, 
 in order to explain the seeming anomaly, to interpo- 
 late, hypothetically, between the ostensibly suggest- 
 ing and the ostensibly suggested thought, certain 
 connecting links of which we have no knowledge. 
 Now, the necessity of such interpolation being admit- 
 ted, as admitted it must be, the question arises, How 
 have these connecting thoughts, the reality of which 
 is supposed, escaped our cognisance t In explanation 
 of this, there can possibly be only two theories. It may 
 be said, in the first place, that these intermediate ideas 
 did rise into consciousness, operated their suggestion, 
 and were then instantaneously forgotten. It may be 
 said, in the second place, that these intermediate ideas 
 never did rise into consciousness, but, remaining la- 
 tent themselves, still served to awaken into conscious- 
 ness the thought, and thus explain its suggestion. 
 
 The former of these theories, which is the only one 
 whose possibility is contemplated in this country, I 
 endeavoured to show you ought not to be admitted,
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 3G7 
 
 being obnoxious to the most insurmountable objec- LECT. 
 
 tions. It violates the whole analogy of consciousness ; 
 
 and must at last found upon a reason which would 
 identify it with the second theory. At the same 
 time it violates the law of philosophising, called the 
 law of Parcimony, which prescribes that a greater 
 number of causes are not to be assumed than are 
 necessary to explain the phaenomena. Now, in the The anoma- 
 
 . /. . ]./ ly solved by 
 
 present case, if the existence of unconscious modinca- the doctrine 
 
 of latent 
 
 tions, of latent agencies, be demonstratively proved agencies, 
 by the phenomena of perception, which they alone 
 are competent to explain, why postulate a second 
 unknown cause to account for the phenomena of 
 association, when these can be better explained by 
 the one cause, which the phenomena of perception 
 compel us to admit \ 
 
 The fact of latent agencies being once established, 
 and shown to be applicable, as a principle of psycho- 
 logical solution, I showed you, by other examples, 
 that it enables us to account, in an easy and satisfac- 
 tory manner, for some of the most perplexing pheno- 
 mena of mind. In particular, I did this by reference "^ 
 to our Acquired Dexterities and Habits. In these 
 the consecution of the various operations is extremely 
 rapid ; but it is allowed on all hands that, though we 
 are conscious of the series of operations, that is, of the 
 mental state which they conjunctly constitute, of the 
 several operations themselves as acts of volition we 
 are wholly incognisant. Now, this incognisance may 
 be explained, as I stated to you, on three possible 
 hypotheses. In the first place, we may say that the 
 whole process is effected without either volition, or even 
 any action of the thinking principle, it being merely 
 automatic or mechanical. The incognisance to be
 
 368 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. explained is thus involved in this hypothesis. In the 
 second place, it may be said that each individual act 
 
 of which the process is made up, is not only an act of 
 mental agency, but a conscious act of volition ; but 
 that, there being no memory of these acts, they, con- 
 sequently, are unknown to us when past. In the 
 third place, it may be said that each individual act 
 of the process is an act of mental agency, but not of 
 consciousness and separate volition. The reason of 
 the incognisance is thus apparent. The first opinion is 
 ' unphilosophical, because, in the first place, it assumes 
 an occult, an incomprehensible principle, to enable us 
 to comprehend the effect. In the second place, ad- 
 mitting the agency of the mind in accomplishing the 
 series of movements before the habit or dexterity is 
 formed, it afterwards takes it out of the hands of the 
 mind, in order to bestow it upon another agent. This 
 hypothesis thus violates the two great laws of philo- 
 sophising, to assume no occult principle without 
 necessity, to assume no second principle without 
 necessity. This doctrine was held by Eeid, Hartley, 
 and others. 
 
 The second hypothesis, which Mr Stewart adopts, 
 is at once complex and contradictory. It supposes a 
 Memory, consciousness and no memory. In the first place, in 
 this it is altogether hypothetical, it cannot advance 
 a shadow of proof in support of the fact which it 
 assumes, that an act of consciousness does or can take 
 place without any, the least, continuance in memory. 
 In the second place, this assumption is disproved by 
 the whole analogy of our intellectual nature. It is a 
 "-ad law of mind, that the intensity of the present conscious- 
 the direct ness determines the vivacity of the future memory. 
 
 ratio of each,, J _. T 
 
 other. Memory and consciousness are thus in the direct ratio
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 369 
 
 of each other. On the one hand, looking from cause to LECT. 
 
 XIX 
 
 effect, vivid consciousness, long memory; faint con- 
 
 sciousness, short memory; no consciousness, no me- 
 mory : and, on the other, looking from effect to cause, 
 long memory, vivid consciousness ; short memory, faint 
 consciousness ; no memory, no consciousness. Thus, 
 the hypothesis which postulates consciousness without 
 memory, violates the fundamental laws of our intellec- 
 tual being. But, in the third place, this hypothesis is 
 not only a psychological solecism, it is, likewise, a 
 psychological pleonasm ; it is at once illegitimate and 
 superfluous. As we must admit, from the analogy of 
 perception, that efficient modifications may exist with- 
 out any consciousness of their existence, and as this 
 admission affords a solution of the present problem, the 
 hypothesis in question here again violates the law of 
 parcimony, by assuming without necessity a plurality of 
 principles to account for what one more easily suffices. 
 
 The third hypothesis, then, that which employs The theory 
 the single principle of latent agencies to account for sho^Tu? 
 so numerous a class of mental phaenomena, how does phanomeifa 
 it explain the phsenomenon under consideration \ No- Mc^^th 
 thing can be more simple and analogical than its *" 
 solution. As, to take an example from vision, in the 
 external perception of a stationary object, a certain 
 space, an expanse of surface, is necessary to the mini- 
 mum visible, in other words, an object of sight can- 
 not come into consciousness unless it be of a certain 
 size ; in like manner, in the internal perception of a 
 series of mental operations, a certain time, a certain 
 duration, is necessary for the smallest section of con- 
 tinuous energy to which consciousness is competent. 
 Some minimum of time must be admitted as the con- 
 dition of consciousness ; and as time is divisible ad in- 
 
 VOL. i. 2 A
 
 370 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. finitum, whatever minimum be taken, there must be 
 
 XIX 
 
 ' admitted to be, beyond the cognisance of conscious- 
 ness, intervals of time, in which, if mental agencies 
 be performed, these will be latent to consciousness. If 
 we suppose that the minimum of time to which con- 
 sciousness can descend, be an interval called six, and 
 that six different movements be performed in this 
 interval, these, it is evident, will appear to conscious- 
 ness as a simple indivisible point of modified time ; 
 precisely as the minimum visibile appears as an indi- 
 visible point of modified space. And, as in the ex- 
 tended parts of the minimum visibile, each must 
 determine a certain modification on the percipient 
 subject, seeing that the effect of the whole is only the 
 conjoined effect of its parts, in like manner, the pro- 
 tended parts of each conscious instant, of each dis- 
 tinguishable minimum of time, though themselves 
 beyond the ken of consciousness, must contribute to 
 give the character to the whole mental state which that 
 instant, that minimum, comprises. This being under- 
 stood, it is easy to see how we lose the consciousness 
 of the several acts, in the rapid succession of many of 
 our habits and dexterities. At first, and before the 
 habit is acquired, every act is slow, and we are con- 
 scious of the effort of deliberation, choice, and volition ; 
 by degrees the mind proceeds with less vacillation and 
 uncertainty ; at length the acts become secure and 
 precise : in proportion as this takes place, the velocity 
 of the procedure is increased, and as this acceleration 
 rises, the individual acts drop one by one from con- 
 sciousness, as we lose the leaves in retiring further and 
 further from the tree ; and, at last, we are only aware 
 of the general state which results from these uncon- 
 scious operations, as we can at last only perceive
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 371 
 
 the greenness which results from the unperceived LECT. 
 leaves. 
 
 I have thus endeavoured to recapitulate and vary 
 the illustration of this important principle. At pre- 
 sent, I can only attempt to offer you such evidence 
 of the fact as lies close to the surface. When we 
 come to a discussion of the special faculties, you will 
 find that this principle affords an explanation of many 
 interesting phsenomena, and from them receives con- 
 firmation in return. 
 
 Before terminating the consideration of the general 
 phaenomena of consciousness, there are Three Principal to be noticed 
 
 in connec- 
 
 Facts which it would be improper altogether to pass tum with^ 
 over without notice, but the full discussion of which phenomena 
 
 ofconscious- 
 
 I reserve for that part of the course which is conver- . 
 sant with Metaphysic Proper, and when we come to 
 establish upon their foundation our conclusions in 
 regard to the Immateriality and Immortality of Mind ; 
 I mean the fact of our Mental Existence or Sub- 
 stantiality, the fact of our Mental Unity or Individu- 
 ality, and the fact of our Mental Identity or Person- 
 ality. In regard to these three facts, I shall, at present, 
 only attempt to give you a very summary view of 
 what place they naturally occupy in our psychological 
 system. 
 
 The first of these, the fact of our own Existence, 1 1. 
 have already incidentally touched on, in giving you a l 
 view of the various possible modes in which the fact 
 of the Duality of Consciousness may be conditionally 
 accepted. 
 
 The various modifications of which the thinking 
 subject, Ego, is conscious, are accompanied with the 
 feeling, or intuition, or belief, or by whatever name
 
 372 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. the conviction may be called, that I, the thinking 
 ' subject, exist. This feeling has been called by philo- 
 sophers the apperception or consciousness of our own 
 existence, but, as it is a simple and ultimate fact of 
 consciousness, though it be clearly given, it cannot be 
 defined or described. And for the same reason that 
 it cannot be defined, it cannot be deduced or demon- 
 Descartes' strated ; and the apparent enthymeme of Descartes, 
 Cogito ergo sum, if really intended for an inference, 
 if really intended to be more than a simple enuncia- 
 tion of the proposition, that the fact of our existence 
 is given in the fact of our consciousness, is either 
 tautological, or false. Tautological, because nothing- 
 is contained in the conclusion which was not ex- 
 plicitly given in the premise, the premise, Cogito, 
 I think, being only a grammatical equation of Ego 
 sum cogitans, / am, or exist, thinking. False, inas- 
 much as there would, in the first place, be postulated 
 the reality of thought as a quality or modification, 
 and then, from the fact of this modification, inferred 
 the fact of existence, and of the existence of a subject ; 
 whereas it is self-evident, that in the very possibility 
 of a quality or modification, is supposed the reality 
 of existence, and of an existing subject. Philoso- 
 phers, in general, among whom may be particularly 
 mentioned Locke and Leibnitz, have accordingly found 
 the evidence in a clear and immediate belief in the 
 simple datum of consciousness ; and that this was like- 
 wise the opinion of Descartes himself, it would not 
 be difficult to show. 
 
 o That Descartes did not intend to Sur le vrai sens du coyito ergo sum ; 
 
 prove the fact of existence from that printed in the earlier editions of the 
 
 of thought, but to state that personal Fragments Philosophiques, and in vol. 
 
 existence consists in consciousness, is i. p. 27 of the collected edition of his 
 
 nhown in M. Cousin's Dissertation, works ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 373 
 
 The second fact, our Mental Unity or Individuality, LECT. 
 is given with equal evidence as the first. As clearly : 
 
 as I am conscious of existing, so clearly am I con- 
 scious at every moment of my existence, and, (never 
 more so than when the most heterogeneous mental 
 modifications are in a state of rapid succession,) that 
 the conscious Ego is not itself a mere modification, nor 
 a series of modifications of any other subject, but that 
 it is itself something different from all its modifica- 
 tions, and a self-subsistent entity. This feeling, belief, 
 datum, or fact of our mental individuality or unity, is 
 not more capable of explanation than the feeling or 
 fact of our existence, which it indeed always involves. 
 The fact of the deliverance of consciousness to our 
 mental unity has, of course, never been doubted ; but ^ 
 philosophers have been found to doubt its truth. Ac- doubted - 
 cording to Hume," our thinking Ego is nothing but Hume, 
 a bundle of individual impressions and ideas, out of 
 whose union in the imagination, the notion of a whole, 
 as of a subject of that which is felt and thought, is 
 formed. According to Kant/ it cannot be properly Kant, 
 determined whether we exist as substance or as acci- 
 dent, because the datum of individuality is a condition 
 of the possibility of our having thoughts and feelings ; 
 in other words, of the possibility of consciousness, and, 
 therefore, although consciousness gives, cannot but 
 give, the phenomenon of individuality, it does not 
 follow that this phsenomenon may not be only a neces- 
 sary illusion. An articulate refutation of these opinions 
 I cannot attempt at present, but their refutation is, in 
 fact, involved in their statement. In regard to Hume, 
 his sceptical conclusion is only an inference from the 
 
 a Treatise of Human Nature, part ft KritikderrcinenVernunft, Trans, 
 iv. sect, v., vi ED. Dial b. ii. c. 1. ED.
 
 374 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. premises of the dogmatical philosophers, who founded 
 their systems on a violation or distortion of the facts 
 
 of consciousness. His conclusion is, therefore, refuted 
 in the refutation of their premises, which is accom- 
 plished in the simple exposition that they at once found 
 on, and deny, the veracity of consciousness. And by 
 this objection the doctrine of Kant is overset. For if 
 he attempts to philosophise, he must assert the possi- 
 bility of philosophy. But the possibility of philosophy 
 supposes the veracity of consciousness as to the con- 
 tents of its testimony ; therefore, in disputing the 
 testimony of consciousness to our mental unity and 
 substantiality, Kant disputes the possibility of phi- 
 losophy, and, consequently, reduces his own attempts 
 at philosophising to absurdity. 
 
 3. Mental The third datum under consideration is the Identity 
 of Mind or Person. This consists in the assurance we 
 have, from consciousness, that our thinking Ego, not- 
 withstanding the ceaseless changes of state or modifi- 
 cation, of which it is the subject, is essentially the same 
 thing, the same person, at every period of its exist- 
 ence. On this subject, laying out of account certain 
 subordinate differences on the mode of stating the fact, 
 philosophers, in general, are agreed. Locke, a in the 
 Essay on the Human Understanding; Leibnitz/ in the 
 Nouveaux Essais; Butler, 7 and Keid, 5 are particularly 
 worthy of attention. In regard to this deliverance of 
 consciousness, the truth of which is of vital importance, 
 affording, as it does, the basis of moral responsibility 
 and hope of immortality, it is, like the last, denied 
 by Kant to afford a valid ground of scientific certainty. 
 
 a Book ii. c. 27, especially 9 et y Analogy, Diss. i. Of Personal 
 seq. ED. Identity. ED. 
 
 Liv. ii. c. '27 ED. 5 Int. />oMwr*,Essayiii.cc.iv. vi ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 375 
 
 He maintains that there is no cogent proof of the sub- LECT. 
 
 stantial permanence of our thinking self, because the L_ 
 
 feeling of identity is only the condition under which 
 thought is possible. Kant's doubt in regard to the 
 present fact is refuted in the same manner as his doubt 
 in regard to the preceding, and there are also a number 
 of special grounds on which it can be shown to be 
 untenable. But of these at another time. 
 
 We have now terminated the consideration of Con- 
 sciousness as the general faculty of thought, and as 
 the only instrument and only source of Philosophy. 
 But before proceeding to treat of the Special Faculties, e ^ecu- 
 it may be proper here to premise some observations in ties and fa- 
 relation to the peculiar Difficulties and peculiar Facili- psychoiogi- 
 ties which we may expect in the application of con- gation. 
 sciousness to the study of its own phaenomena. I shall 
 first speak of the difficulties. 
 
 The first difficulty in psychological observation arises i. Difficui- 
 from this, that the conscious mind is at once the ob- 
 serving subject and the object observed. What are the 
 consequences of this 1 In the first place, the mental 
 energy, instead of being concentrated, is divided, and 
 divided in two divergent directions. The state of i. The con- 
 mind observed, and the act of mind observing, are at once the 
 mutually in an inverse ratio ; each tends to annihilate subject and 
 the other. Is the state to be observed intense, alloi*en4d. 
 reflex observation is rendered impossible; the mind 
 cannot view as a spectator ; it is wholly occupied as 
 an agent or patient. On the other hand, exactly in 
 proportion as the mind concentrates its force in the 
 act of reflective observation, in the same proportion 
 must the direct phsenomenon lose in vivacity, and, 
 consequently, in the precision and individuality of its
 
 376 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. character. This difficulty is manifestly insuperable in 
 those states of mind, which, of their very nature, as sup- 
 
 pressing consciousness, exclude all contemporaneous 
 and voluntary observation, as in sleep and fainting. 
 In states like dreaming, which allow at least of a 
 mediate, but, therefore, only of an imperfect observa- 
 tion, through recollection, it is not altogether exclu- 
 sive. In all states of strong mental emotion, the passion 
 is itself to a certain extent a negation of the tranquil- 
 lity requisite for observation, so that we are thus 
 impaled on the awkward dilemma, either we possess 
 the necessary tranquillity for observation, with little 
 or nothing to observe, or there is something to observe, 
 but we have not the necessary tranquillity for obser- 
 vation. All this is completely opposite in our obser- 
 vation of the external world. There the objects lie 
 always ready for our inspection ; and we have only 
 to open our eyes and guard ourselves from the use of 
 hypotheses and green spectacles, to carry our obser- 
 vations to an easy and successful termination. 
 2. want of In the second place, in the study of external nature, 
 
 mutual co- J . 
 
 operation, several observers may associate themselves in the pur- 
 suit ; and it is well known how co-operation and mutual 
 sympathy preclude tedium and languor, and brace up 
 the faculties to their highest vigour. Hence the old 
 proverb, unus homo, nullus homo. " As iron," says 
 Solomon, " sharpeneth iron, so a man sharpeneth the 
 understanding of his friend." " In my opinion," says 
 Plato, 7 " it is well expressed by Homer, 
 
 ' By mutual confidence and mutual aid 
 Great deeds are done, and great discoveries made ;' 
 
 a [Cf. Biunde, Versuch einer syste- j8 Proverbs, xxvii. 17. The autho- 
 matischen Behandlung der empirisch- rised version is countenance. ED. 
 en Psychologic, i. p. 55.] y Protagoras, p. 348. ED.
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 377 
 
 for if we labour in company, we are always more JLECT. 
 prompt and capable for the investigation of any hidden - 
 matter. But if a man works out anything by solitary 
 meditation, he forthwith goes about to find some one 
 with whom he may commune, nor does he think his 
 discovery assured until confirmed by the acquiescence 
 of others." Aristotle, in like manner, referring to 
 the same passage of Homer, gives the same solution. 
 " Social operation," he says, "renders us more energetic 
 both in thought and action ; " a sentiment which is 
 beautifully illustrated by Ovid,' 3 
 
 " Scilicet ingeniis aliqua est concordia junctis, 
 
 Et servat studii fcedera quisque sui. 
 Utque meis numeris tua dat facundia nervos, 
 Sic venit a nobis in tua verba nitor." 
 
 Of this advantage the student of Mind is in a great 
 measure deprived. He who would study the internal 
 world must isolate himself in the solitude of his own 
 thought ; and for man, who, as Aristotle observes, 7 is 
 more social by nature than any bee or ant, this isola- 
 tion is not only painful in itself, but, in place of 
 strengthening his powers, tends to rob them of what 
 maintains their vigour, and stimulates their exertion. 
 
 In the third place, " In the study of the material 3 - No fact 
 
 m t * ofcouscious 
 
 universe, it is not necessary that each observer should ^ c ^ ^ 
 himself make every observation. The phenomena are 8eco d - 
 here so palpable and so easily described, that the 
 experience of one observer suffices to make the facts 
 which he has witnessed intelligible and credible to all. 
 In point of fact, our knowledge of the external world 
 is taken chiefly upon trust. The phsenomena of the 
 internal world, on the contrary, are not thus capable 
 
 a Eth. NIC., viii. 1. Cf. ibid., ix. 9. $ Epitt. ex Ponto, ii. 5, 59, 69 ED. 
 
 ED. y Polit. i. 2. ED.
 
 378 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. of being described ; all that the first observer can do 
 XIX> is to lead others to repeat his experience : in the 
 science of mind, we can believe nothing upon autho- 
 rity, take nothing upon trust. In the physical sciences, 
 a fact viewed in different aspects and in different cir- 
 cumstances, by one or more observers of acknowledged 
 sagacity and good faith, is not only comprehended as 
 clearly by those who have not seen it for themselves, 
 but is also admitted without hesitation, independently 
 of all personal verification. Instruction thus suffices 
 to make it understood, and the authority of the testi- 
 mony carries with it a certainty which almost pre- 
 cludes the possibility of doubt. 
 
 " But this is not the case in the philosophy of mind. 
 On the contrary, we can here neither understand nor 
 believe at second hand. Testimony can impose no- 
 thing on its own authority ; and instruction is only 
 instruction when it enables us to teach ourselves. A 
 fact of consciousness, however well observed, however 
 clearly expressed, and however great may be our con- 
 fidence in its observer, is for us as nothing, until, by 
 an experience of our own, we have observed and re- 
 cognised it ourselves. Till this be done we cannot 
 comprehend what it means, far less admit it to be 
 true. Hence it follows that, in philosophy proper, 
 instruction is limited to an indication of the position 
 in which the pupil ought to place himself, in order by 
 his own observation to verify for himself the facts 
 which his instructor pronounces true." a 
 
 In the fourth place, the phenomena of consciousness 
 are not arrested during observation, they are in a 
 ceaseless and rapid flow ; each state of mind is in- 
 
 a Cardaillac, Jit tides de Philosophic, i. p. 6. 

 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 379 
 
 divisible, but for a moment, and there are not two LECT. 
 
 XIX 
 
 states or two moments of whose precise identity we 
 
 can be assured. Thus, before we can observe a modi- 4. Phamo- 
 fication, it is already altered ; nay, the very intention conscious- 
 of observing it, suffices for the change. It hence re- arrested 
 suits that the phenomena can only be studied through aeration, 
 
 . . l J - & but only to 
 
 its reminiscence ; but memory reproduces it olten be studied 
 very imperfectly, and always in lower vivacity and memory. 
 precision. The objects of the external world, on the 
 other hand, remain either unaltered during our ob- 
 servation, or can be renewed without change ; and 
 we can leave off at will and recommence our investi- 
 gation without detriment to its result." 
 
 In the fifth place, " The phsenomena of the mental s. Presented 
 world are not, like those of the material, placed by cession. 
 the side of each other in space. They want that form 
 by which external objects attract and fetter our atten- 
 tion ; they appear only in rows on the thread of time, 
 occupying their fleeting moment, and then vanishing 
 into oblivion ; whereas, external objects stand before 
 us steadfast, and distinct, and simultaneous, in all the 
 life and emphasis of extension, figure, and colour."' 3 
 
 In the sixth place, the perceptions of the different 6. Naturally 
 qualities of external objects are decisively discrimi- e l other, 
 nated by different corporeal organs, so that colour, 
 
 sound, solidity, odour, flavour, are, in the sensations cot 
 themselves, contrasted, without the possibility of con- 
 fusion. In an individual sense, on the contrary, it is 
 not always easy to draw the line of separation be- 
 tween its perceptions, as these are continually running 
 into each other. Thus red and yellow are, in their 
 extreme points, easily distinguished, but the transition 
 
 a [Ancillon, Nouv. Melanges, ii. 102. [Biuiide, Ptycholoyie, vol. i p. 
 Cardaillac, Etudes de Philos., i. 3, 4.] 56.]
 
 380 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. point from one to the other is not precisely deter- 
 
 ' mined. Now, in our internal observation, the mental 
 
 phsenomena cannot be discriminated like the percep- 
 tions of one sense from the perceptions of another, but 
 only like the perceptions of the same. Thus the 
 phaenomenon of feeling, of pleasure or pain, and the 
 phenomenon of desire, are, when considered in their 
 remoter divergent aspects, manifestly marked out 
 and contradistinguished as different original modifica- 
 tions ; whereas, when viewed on their approximating 
 side, they are seen to slide so insensibly into each other, 
 that it becomes impossible to draw between them any 
 accurate line of demarcation. Thus the various quali- 
 ties of our internal life can be alone discriminated by 
 a mental process called Abstraction ; and abstraction 
 is exposed to many liabilities of error. Nay, the 
 various mental operations do not present themselves 
 distinct and separate ; they are all bound up in the 
 same unity of action, and as they are only possible 
 through each other, they cannot, even in thought, be 
 dealt with as isolated and apart. In the perception of 
 an external object, the qualities are, indeed, likewise 
 presented by the different senses in connection, as, for 
 example, vinegar is at once seen as yellow, felt as 
 liquid, tasted as sour, and so on ; nevertheless, the 
 qualities easily allow themselves in abstraction to be 
 viewed as really separable, because they are all the 
 properties of an extended and divisible body ; where- 
 as in the mind, thoughts, feelings, desires, do not 
 stand separate, though in juxtaposition, but every 
 mental act contains at once all these qualities, as the 
 constituents of its indivisible simplicity. 
 
 In the seventh place, the act of reflection on our 
 internal modifications is not accompanied with that
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 381 
 
 frequent and varied sentiment of pleasure, which we LECT. 
 experience from the impression of external things. 
 Self-observation costs us a greater effort, and has less 
 excitement than the contemplation of the material 
 world ; and the higher and more refined gratification 
 which it supplies when its habit has been once formed, 
 cannot be conceived by those who have not as yet 
 been trained to its enjoyment." "The first part of our 
 life is fled before we possess the capacity of reflective 
 observation ; while the impressions which, from earliest 
 infancy, we receive from material objects, the wants 
 of our animal nature, and the prior development of 
 our external senses, all contribute to concentrate, 
 even from the first breath of life, our attention on the 
 world without. The second passes without our caring 
 to observe ourselves. The outer life is too agreeable 
 to allow the soul to tear itself from its gratifications, 
 and return frequently upon itself. And at the period 
 when the material world has at length palled upon 
 the senses, when the taste and the desire of reflection 
 gradually become predominant, we then find ourselves, 
 in a certain sort, already made up, and it is impossible 
 for us to resume our life from its commencement, and 
 to discover how we have become what we now are."' 3 
 "Hitherto external objects have exclusively riveted 
 our attention ; our organs have acquired the flexi- 
 bility requisite for this peculiar kind of observation ; 
 we have learned the method, acquired the habit, and 
 feel the pleasure which results from performing what 
 we perform with ease. But let us recoil upon our- 
 selves ; the scene changes ; the charm is gone ; diffi- 
 culties accumulate, all that is done is done irksomely 
 
 a [Biuude, PsycJwlogie, i. p. 56.] $ [Ancillon, Nour. M flanges, t. ii. p. 103.]
 
 382 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 LECT. and with effort ; in a word, everything within repels, 
 everything without attracts ; we reach the age of man- 
 hood without being taught another lesson than read- 
 ing what takes place without and around us, whilst 
 we possess neither the habit nor the method of study- 
 ing the volume of our own thoughts." a "For a long 
 time, we are too absorbed in life to be able to detach 
 ourselves from it in thought ; and when the desires 
 and the feelings are at length weakened or tran- 
 quillised, when we are at length restored to ourselves, 
 we can no longer judge of the preceding state, because 
 we can no longer reproduce or replace it. Thus it is 
 that our life, in a philosophical sense, runs like water 
 through our fingers. We are carried along lost, 
 whelmed in our life ; we live, but rarely see ourselves 
 to live. 
 
 " The reflective Ego, which distinguishes self from 
 its transitory modifications, and which separates the 
 spectator from the spectacle of life, which it is con- 
 tinually representing to itself, is never developed in 
 the majority of mankind at all, and even in the 
 thoughtful and reflective few, it is formed only at a 
 mature period, and is even then only in activity by 
 starts and at intervals."' 3 
 
 ii. The fa- But Philosophy has not only peculiar difficulties, it 
 phliOTophi- has also peculiar facilities. There is indeed only one 
 external condition on which it is dependent, and that 
 is language ; and when, in the progress of civilisation, 
 a language is once formed of a copiousness and 
 pliability capable of embodying its abstractions with- 
 out figurative ambiguity, then a genuine philosophy 
 may commence. With this one condition all is given ; 
 
 a [Cardaillac, Etudes de Philosophic, $ [Ancillon, Nour. Melanges, t. ii. 
 t. i. p. 3.] pp. 103, 104, 105.]
 
 LECTURES ON METAPHYSICS. 383 
 
 the Philosopher requires for his discoveries no preli- LECT. 
 mi nary preparations, no apparatus of instruments - 
 and materials. He has no new events to seek, as the 
 Historian; no new combinations to form, as the Mathe- 
 matician. The Botanist, the Zoologist, the Mineralo- 
 gist, can accumulate, only by care, and trouble, and 
 expense, an inadequate assortment of the objects neces- 
 sary for their labours and observations. But that 
 most important and interesting of all studies, of which 
 man himself is the object, has no need of anything 
 external ; it is only necessary that the observer enter 
 into his inner self in order to find there all he stands 
 in need of, or rather it is only by doing this that he 
 can hope to find anything at all. If he only effec- 
 tively pursue the method of observation and analysis, 
 he may even dispense with the study of philosophical 
 systems. This is at best only useful as a mean to- 
 wards a deeper and more varied study of himself, and 
 is often only a tribute paid by philosophy to erudi- 
 tion." 
 
 a[Cf. Fries, Loyik, 126, p. 587 V Etude de la Philosophic, t. i. Disc. 
 (edit. 1819). Thurot, Introduction d Pr&. p. 35.] 
 
 VOL. I. 2 B
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 I. A. FRAGMENT ON ACADEMICAL HONOURS (1836). 
 (See VoL I. p. 18.) 
 
 BEFORE commencing the Lecture of to-day, I would occupy a few 
 minutes with a matter in which I am confident you generally feel 
 an interest ; I refer to the Academical Honours to be awarded to 
 those who approve their zeal and ability in the business of the Class. 
 After what I formerly had occasion to say, I conceive it wholly 
 unnecessary now to attempt any proof of the fact, that it is not 
 by anything done by others for you, but by what alone you do for 
 yourselves, that your intellectual improvement must be determined. 
 Heading and listening to Lectures are only profitable, inasmuch as 
 they afford you the means and the occasions of exerting your facul- 
 ties ; for these faculties are only developed in proportion as they 
 are exercised. This is a principle I take for granted. 
 
 A second fact, I am assured you will also allow me to assume, 
 is, that although strenuous energy is the one condition of all 
 improvement, yet this energy is, at first and for a long time, 
 comparatively painful. It is painful, because it is imperfect. But 
 as it is gradually perfected, it becomes gradually more pleasing, 
 and when finally perfect, that is, when its power is fully developed, 
 it is purely pleasurable ; for pleasure is nothing but the concomi- 
 tant or reflex of the unforced and unimpeded energy of a faculty 
 or habit, the degree of pleasure being always in proportion to the 
 degree of such energy. The great problem in education is, there- 
 fore, how to induce the pupil to undertake and go through with a 
 course of exertion, in its result good and even agreeable, but imme- 
 diately and in itself, irksome. There is no royal road to learning. 
 " The gods," says Epicharmus, a " sell us everything for toil ; " and 
 
 o Xenophon, Memorabilia, ii. 1. 20. ED.
 
 386 APPENDIX. 
 
 the curse inherited from Adam, that in the sweat of his face man 
 should eat his bread, is true of every human acquisition. Hesiod, 
 not less beautifully than philosophically, sings of the painful com- 
 mencement, and the pleasant consummation, of virtue, in the pas- 
 sage of which the following is the commencement : 
 
 Trjs S" 'ApeTTjs ISpSna 6eol TrpopdpoiOfif 
 
 (a passage which, it will be recollected, Milton has not less beauti- 
 fully imitated) ; and the Latin poet has, likewise, well expressed 
 the principle, touching literary excellence in particular : 
 
 Gaudent sudoribus artes 
 
 Et sua difficilem reddunt ad lirniua cureum." <y 
 
 But as the pain is immediate, while the profit and the pleasure are 
 remote, you will grant, I presume, without difficulty, a third fact, 
 that the requisite degree and continuance of effort can only be 
 insured, by applying a stimulus to counteract and overcome the 
 repressive effect of the feeling with which the exertion is for a sea- 
 son accompanied. A fourth fact will not be denied, that emula- 
 tion and the love of honour constitute the appropriate stimulus in 
 education. These affections are of course implanted in man for the 
 wisest purposes ; and, though they may be misdirected, the in- 
 ference from the possibility of their abuse to the absolute inexpe- 
 diency of their employment, is invalid. However disguised, their 
 influence is universal : 
 
 " Ad has se 
 
 Romanus, Graiusque, et Barbarus induperator 
 Erexit : causas discriminis atque laboris 
 Inde habuit ; " 8 
 
 and Cicero shrewdly remarks, that the philosophers themselves pre- 
 fix their names to the very books they write on the contempt of 
 glory.* These passions actuate most powerfully the noblest minds. 
 " Optimos mortalium," C says the father of the Senate to Tiberius, 
 " Optimos mortalium altissima cupere : contemptu famse contemni 
 
 a Opera et Dies, 287. ED. 7 B. Mantuanus, Carmen de suscepto 
 
 & Sir W. Hamilton here probably Theologico Magisterio, Opera, Antver- 
 
 refers to the lines in Lycidas, pise, 1576, torn. L p. 174. ED. 
 
 " Fame is the spur that the clear spirit 5 Juvenal, Sat. x. 138. ED. 
 
 doth raise," &c. Pro Archia, c. 11. ED. 
 
 ED. Tacitus, Ann. iv. 38. ED.
 
 APPENDIX. 387 
 
 virtutes." " Natura," says Seueca, "gloriosa est virtus, et anteire 
 priores cupit;" and Cicero P, in more proximate reference to our 
 immediate object, " Honor alit artes omnesque incenduntur ad 
 studia gloria/' But, though their influence be universal, it is 
 most powerfully conspicuous in the young, of whom Aristotle has 
 noted it as one of the most discriminating characteristics, that they 
 are lovers of honour, but still more lovers of victory. 7 If, there- 
 fore, it could be but too justly proclaimed of man in general: 
 
 ' Quis enim virtutem amplectitur ipeam, 
 
 Prsemia si tollas !" 8 
 
 it was least of all to be expected that youth should do so. " In 
 learning," says the wisdom of Bacon, " the flight will be [low and] 
 slow without some feathers of ostentation/'* Nothing, therefore, 
 could betray a greater ignorance of human nature, or a greater 
 negligence in employing the most efficient mean within its grasp, 
 than for any seminary of education to leave unapplied these great 
 promoting principles of activity, and to take for granted that its 
 pupils would act precisely as they ought, though left with every in- 
 ducement strong against, and without any sufficient motive in 
 favour of, exertion. 
 
 Now, I express, I believe, the universal sentiment, both within 
 and without these walls, in saying, that this University has been 
 unhappily all too remiss, in leaving the most powerful mean of 
 academical education nearly, if not altogether, unemployed. You 
 will observe I use the term University in contradiction to indivi- 
 dual Professors, for many of these have done much in this respect, 
 and all of them, I believe, are satisfied that a great deal more ought 
 to be done. But it is not in the power of individual instructors to 
 accomplish what can be only accomplished by the public institu- 
 tion. The rewards proposed to meritorious effort are not suffi- 
 ciently honourable ; and the efforts to which they are frequently 
 accorded, not of the kind or degree to be of any great or general 
 advantage. I shall explain myself. 
 
 A distinction is sought after with a zeal proportioned to its 
 value ; and its value is measured by the estimation which it holds 
 in public opinion. Now, though there are prizes given in many of 
 
 a De Beneficiis, iii. 36. ED. 5 Juvenal, Sat. x. 141. ED. 
 
 6 Tusc. Quasi, i. 2. ED. Essay liv. Of Vain Glory. ED. 
 
 y Rhet. ii. 12. ED.
 
 
 388 APPENDIX. 
 
 our classes, nothing has been done to give them proper value by 
 raising them in public estimation. They are not conferred as mat- 
 ters of importance by any external solemnity ; they are not con- 
 ferred in any general meeting of the University ; far less under 
 circumstances which make their distribution a matter of public 
 curiosity arid interest. Compared to the publicity that might 
 easily have been secured, they are left, so to speak, to be given in 
 holes and corners ; and while little thought of to-day, are wholly 
 forgotten to-morrow; so that the wonder only is, that what the 
 University has thus treated with such apparent contempt, should 
 have awakened even the inadequate emulation that has been so 
 laudably displayed. Of this great defect in our discipline, I may 
 safely say that every Professor is aware, and it is now actually 
 under the consideration of the Senatus, what are the most expe- 
 dient measures to obtain a system of means of full efficiency for 
 the encouragement and reward of academical merit. It will, of 
 course, form the foundation of any such improvement, that the dis- 
 tribution of prizes be made an act of the University at large ; and 
 one of the most public and imposing character. By this means a 
 far more powerful emulation will be roused ; a spirit which will 
 not be limited to a certain proportion of the students, but will 
 more or less pervade the whole ; nay, not merely the students 
 themselves, but their families ; so that when this system is 
 brought to its adequate perfection, it will be next to impossible 
 for a young man of generous dispositions not to put forth every 
 energy to raise himself as high as possible in the scale of so hon- 
 ourable a competition. 
 
 But, besides those which can only be effected by an act of the 
 whole University, important improvement may, I think, be accom- 
 plished in this respect in the several classes. In what I now say, 
 I would not be supposed to express any opinion in regard to other 
 classes ; but confine my observations to one under the circum- 
 stances of our own. 
 
 In the first place, then, I am convinced that excitement and re- 
 wards are principally required to promote a general and continued 
 diligence in the ordinary business of the class. I mean, therefore, 
 that the prizes should with us be awarded for general eminence, 
 as shown in the Examinations and Exercises ; and I am averse on 
 principle from proposing any premium during the course of the
 
 APPENDIX. 389 
 
 sessional labours for single and detached efforts. The effect of 
 this would naturally be to distract attention from what ought to 
 be the principal and constant object of occupation ; and if honour 
 is to be gained by an irregular and transient spirit of activity, 
 less encouragement will necessarily be afforded to regular and 
 sedulous application. Prizes for individual Essays, for Written 
 Analyses of important books, and for Oral Examination on their 
 contents, may, however, with great advantage, be proposed as 
 occupation during the summer vacation ; and this I shall do. But 
 the honours of the Winter Session must belong to those who have 
 regularly gone through its toils. 
 
 In the second place, the value of the prizes may be greatly en- 
 hanced by giving them greater and more permanent publicity. A 
 very simple mode, and one which I mean to adopt, is to record 
 upon a tablet each year, the names of the successful competitors ; 
 this tablet to be permanently affixed to the walls of the class-room, 
 while a duplicate may, in like manner, be placed in the Common 
 Reading-Room of the Library. 
 
 In the third place, the importance of the prizes for general 
 eminence in the business of the class may be considerably raised, 
 by making the competitors the judges of merit among themselves. 
 This I am persuaded is a measure of the very highest efficiency. 
 On theory I would argue this, and in practice it has been fully 
 verified. On this head, I shall quote to you the experience of my 
 venerated preceptor, the late Professor Jardine of Glasgow, a 
 man, I will make bold to say, who, in the chair of Logic of that 
 University, did more for the intellectual improvement of his 
 pupils than any other public instructor in this country within 
 the memory of man. This he did not accomplish either by great 
 erudition or great philosophical talent, though he was both a 
 learned and an able thinker, but by the application of that pri- 
 mary principle of education, which, wherever employed, has been 
 employed with success, I mean the determination of the pupil to 
 self-activity, doing nothing for him which he is able to do for him- 
 self. This principle, which has been always inculcated by theor- 
 ists on education, has, however, by few been carried fully into effect 
 
 " One difficult and very important part," says Mr Jardine, "in adminis- 
 tering the system of prizes, still remains to be stated ; and this is the 
 
 a Outlines of Philosophical Education, &c., pp. 384, 385 ; 387, 389.
 
 390 APPENDIX. 
 
 method by which the different degrees of merit are determined ; a point in 
 which any error with regard to principle, or suspicion of practical mistake, 
 would completely destroy all the good effects aimed at by the establishment 
 in question. It has been already mentioned, that the qualifications which 
 form the ground of competition for the class prizes, as they are sometimes 
 called, and which are to be distinguished from the university prizes, are 
 diligence, regularity of attendance, general eminence at the daily examina- 
 tions, and in the execution of themes, propriety of academical conduct, and 
 habitual good manners ; and, on these heads, it is very obvious, a judg- 
 ment must be pronounced either by the professor, or by the students 
 themselves, as no others have access to the requisite information. 
 
 "It may be imagined, at first view, that the office of judge would be 
 best performed by the professor ; but, after long experience, and much 
 attention to the subject in all its bearings, I am inclined to give a decided 
 preference to the exercise of this right as vested in the students. "Were 
 the professor to take this duty upon himself, it would be impossible, even 
 with the most perfect conviction, on the part of the students, that his 
 judgment and candour were unimpeachable, to give satisfaction to all par- 
 ties : while, on the other hand, were there the slightest reason to suspect 
 his impartiality, in either of these points, or the remotest ground for insinu- 
 ation that he gave undue advantage to any individuals, in bringing forward 
 their claims to the prejudice of others, the charm of emulation would be 
 dissolved at once, and every future effort among his pupils would be en- 
 feebled. 
 
 ******* 
 
 " The indispensable qualities of good judges, then, are a competent know- 
 ledge of the grounds upon which their judgment is to rest, and a firm 
 resolution to determine on the matter before them with strict impartiality. 
 It is presumed that the students, in these respects, are sufficiently qualified. 
 They are every day witnesses of the manner in which the business of the 
 class goes on, and have, accordingly, the best opportunities of judging as 
 to the merits of their fellow-students ; they have it in their power to ob- 
 serve the regularity of their attendance, and the general propriety of their 
 conduct ; they hear the questions which are put, with the answers which 
 are given ; their various themes are read aloud, and observations are made 
 on them from the chair. They have, likewise, an opportunity of comparing 
 the respective merits of all the competitors, in the extemporaneous exer- 
 cises of the class ; and they, no doubt, hear the performances of one another 
 canvassed in conversation, and made the subject of a comparative estimate. 
 Besides, as every individual is, himself, deeply interested, it is not possible 
 but that he should pay the closest attention to what is going on around 
 him ; whilst he cannot fail to be aware that he, in like manner, is con- 
 stantly observed by others, and subjected to the ordeal of daily criticism. 
 In truth, the character, the abilities, the diligence, and progress of students, 
 are as well known to one another, before the close of the session, as their
 
 APPENDIX. 391 
 
 faces. There cannot, therefore, be any deficiency as to means of informa- 
 tion, to enable them to act the part of enlightened and upright judges. 
 
 "But they likewise possess the other requisite for an equitable decision ; 
 for the great majority have really a desire to judge honourably and fairly 
 on the merit of their fellows. The natural candour and generosity of youth, 
 the sense of right and obligations of justice, are not yet so perverted, by 
 bad example and the ways of the world, as to permit any deliberate inten- 
 tion of violating the integrity on which they profess to act, or any wish to 
 conspire in supporting an unrighteous judgment. There is greater danger, 
 perhaps, that young persons, in their circumstances, may allow themselves 
 to be influenced by friendship or personal dislike, rather than by the pure 
 and unbiassed sense of meritorious exertion, or good abilities ; but, on the 
 other hand, when an individual considers of how little consequence his 
 single vote will be among so many, it is not at all likely that he will be 
 induced to sacrifice it either to friendship or to enmity. There are, how- 
 ever, no perfect judges in any department of human life. Prejudices and 
 unperceived biasses make their way into the minds even of the most up- 
 right of our fellow-creatures ; and there can be no doubt that votes are 
 sometimes thrown away, or injudiciously given, by young students in the 
 Logic class. Still, these little aberrations are never found to disturb the 
 operation of the general principle on which the scale of merit is determined, 
 and the list of honours filled up." 
 
 Now, Gentlemen, from what I know of you, I think it almost 
 needless to say, that, in confiding to you a function on the intelli- 
 gent and upright discharge of which the value and significance of 
 the prizes will wholly depend, I do this without any anxiety for 
 the result. I am sure at least that if aught be wanting, the defect 
 will be found neither in your incompetency nor want of will 
 
 And here I would conclude what I propose to say to you on 
 this subject ; (this has extended to a far greater length than I anti- 
 cipated) ; I would conclude with a most earnest exhortation to 
 those who may be discouraged from coming forward as competi- 
 tors for academical honours, from a feeling or a fancy of inferiority. 
 In the first place, I would dissuade them from this, because they 
 may be deceived in the estimate of their own powers. Many 
 individuals do not become aware of their own talents, till placed 
 in circumstances which compel them to make strenuous exertion. 
 Then they and those around them discover the mistake. In the 
 second place, even though some of you may now find yourselves 
 somewhat inferior to others, do not for a moment despair of 
 the future. The most powerful minds are frequently of a tardy
 
 392 APPENDIX. 
 
 development, and you may rest assured, that the sooner and more 
 vigorously you exercise your faculties, the speedier and more com- 
 plete will be their evolution. In the third place, I exhort you to 
 remember that the distinctions now to be gained, are on their own 
 account principally valuable as means towards an end, as motives 
 to induce you to cultivate your powers by exercise. All of you, 
 even though nearly equal, cannot obtain equal honours in the 
 struggle, but all of you will obtain advantage equally substantial, 
 if you all, what is wholly in your own power, equally put forth 
 your energies to strive. And though you should all endeavour to 
 be first, let me remind you, in the words of Cicero, that : " Prima 
 sequentem, pulchrum est in secundis, tertiisque consistere." 
 
 B. FKAGMENTS ON THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY. 
 (a.) PORTION OF INTRODUCTORY LECTURE (1836.) 
 
 Before entering on the proposed subjects of consideration, I 
 must be allowed a brief preliminary digression. In entering on a 
 course of the Philosophy of Mind, of Philosophy Proper, we 
 ought not, as Scotsmen, to forget that on this is, and always has been, 
 principally founded the scientific reputation of Scotland ; and, 
 therefore, that independently of the higher claims of this philosophy 
 to attention, it would argue almost a want of patriotism in us, 
 were we to neglect a study with the successful cultivation of which 
 our country, and in particular this University, have been so honour- 
 ably associated. 
 
 Whether it be that the characteristic genius of our nation, the 
 prcefervidum Scotorum ingenium, was more capable of power- 
 ful effort than of persevering industry, and, therefore, carried us 
 more to studies of principle than studies of detail ; or, (what is 
 more probable), that institutions and circumstances have been 
 here less favourable, than in other countries, for the promotion of 
 erudition and research ; certain it is that the reputation for intel- 
 
 o Orator, c. i.
 
 APPENDIX. 393 
 
 lectual capacity which Scotland has always sustained among the 
 nations of Europe, is founded far less on the achievements of her 
 sons in learning and scholarship, than on what they have done, or 
 shown themselves capable of doing, in Philosophy Proper and its 
 dependent sciences. 
 
 In former ages, Scotland presented but few objects for scientific 
 and literary ambition ; and Scotsmen of intellectual enterprise 
 usually sought in other countries, that education, patronage, and 
 applause, which were denied them in their own. It is, indeed, an 
 honourable testimony to the natural vigour of Scottish talent, that, 
 while Scotland afforded so little encouragement for its production, 
 a complement so large in amount and of so high a quality should 
 have been, as it were, spontaneously supplied. During the six- 
 teenth and seventeenth centuries, there was hardly to be found a 
 Continental University without a Scottish professor. It was, 
 indeed, a common saying, that a Scottish pedlar and a Scottish 
 professor were everywhere to be met with. France, however, was 
 long the great nursery of Scottish talent ; and this even after the 
 political and religious estrangement of Scotland from her ancient 
 ally, by the establishment of the Eeformation and the accession of the 
 Scottish monarch to the English crown ; and the extent of this 
 foreign patronage may be estimated from the fact, that a single 
 prelate, the illustrious Cardinal Du Perron, is recorded to have 
 found places in the seminaries of France for a greater number of 
 literary Scotsmen than all the schools and universities of Scotland 
 maintained at home. 
 
 But this favour to our countrymen was not without its reasons ; 
 and the ground of partiality was not their superior erudition. 
 What principally obtained for them reputation and patronage 
 abroad, was their dialectical and metaphysical acuteness ; and this 
 they were found so generally to possess, that philosophical talent 
 became almost a proverbial attribute of the nation. 3 
 
 During the ascendant of the Aristotelic philosophy, and so long 
 as dexterity in disputation was considered the highest academical 
 accomplishment, the logical subtlety of our countrymen was in 
 high and general demand. But they were remarkable less as 
 writers than as instructors ; for were we to consider them only in 
 the former capacity, the works that now remain to us of these 
 
 o See Discussions, p. 120. ED. /3 See Discussions, p. 119. ED.
 
 394 APPENDIX. 
 
 expatriated philosophers, these Scoti extra Scotiam agentes, 
 though neither few nor unimportant, would still never enable 
 us to account for the high and peculiar reputation which the 
 Scottish dialecticians so long enjoyed throughout Europe. 
 
 Such was the literary character of Scotland, before the establish- 
 ment of her intellectual independence, and such has it continued 
 to the present day. In illustration of this, I cannot now attempt 
 a comparative survey of the contributions made by this country 
 and others to the different departments of knowledge, nor is it 
 necessary ; for no one, I am assured, will deny that it is only in 
 the Philosophy of Mind that a Scotsman has established an epoch, 
 or that Scotland, by the consent of Europe, has bestowed her name 
 upon a School. 
 
 The man who gave the whole philosophy of Europe a new 
 impulse and direction, and to whom, mediately or immediately, 
 must be referred every subsequent advance in philosophical specu- 
 lation, was our countryman, David Hume. In speaking of this 
 illustrious thinker, I feel anxious to be distinctly understood. I 
 would, therefore, earnestly request of you to bear in mind, that 
 religious disbelief and philosophical scepticism are not merely not 
 the same, but have no natural connection ; and that while the one 
 must ever be a matter of reprobation and regret, the other is in 
 itself deserving of applause. Both were united in Hume ; and this 
 union has unfortunately contributed to associate them together 
 in popular opinion, and to involve them equally in one vague con- 
 demnation. They must, therefore, I repeat, be accurately dis- 
 tinguished ; and thus, though decidedly opposed to one and all 
 of Hume's theological conclusions, I have no hesitation in asserting 
 of his philosophical scepticism, that this was not only beneficial in 
 its results, but, in the circumstances of the period, even a necessary 
 step in the progress of Philosophy towards truth. In the first 
 place, it was requisite in order to arouse thought from its lethargy. 
 Men had fallen asleep over their dogmatic systems. In Germany, 
 the nationalism of Leibnitz and Wolf ; in England, the Sensualism 
 of Locke, with all its melancholy results, had subsided almost into 
 established faiths. The Scepticism of Hume, like an electric 
 spark, sent life through the paralysed opinions ; philosophy awoke 
 to renovated vigour, and its problems were again to be considered 
 in other aspects, and subjected to a more searching analysis.
 
 APPENDIX. 395 
 
 In the second place, it was necessary in order to manifest the 
 inadequacy of the prevailing system. In this respect, scepticism is 
 always highly advantageous ; for scepticism is only the carrying 
 out of erroneous philosophy to the absurdity which it always 
 virtually involved. The sceptic, qua sceptic, cannot himself lay 
 down his premises ; he can only accept them from the dogmatist ; 
 if true, they can afford no foundation for the sceptical inference ; 
 if false, the sooner they are exposed in their real character the 
 better. Accepting his principles from the dominant philosophies 
 of Locke and Leibnitz, and deducing with irresistible evidence 
 these principles to their legitimate results, Hume showed, by the 
 extreme absurdity of these results themselves, either that Philo- 
 sophy altogether was a delusion, or that the individual systems 
 which afforded the premises, were erroneous or incomplete. He 
 thus constrained philosophers to the alternative, either of sur- 
 rendering philosophy as null, or of ascending to higher principles, 
 in order to re-establish it against the sceptical reduction. The 
 dilemma of Hume constitutes, perhaps, the most memorable crisis 
 in the history of philosophy ; for out of it the whole subsequent 
 Metaphysic of Europe has taken its rise. 
 
 To Hume we owe the philosophy of Kant, and, therefore, also, 
 in general, the latter philosophy of Germany. Kant explicitly 
 acknowledges that it was by Hume's reductio ad absurdum of 
 the previous doctrine of Causality, he was first roused from his 
 dogmatic slumber. He saw the necessity that had arisen, of plac- 
 ing philosophy on a foundation beyond the reach of scepticism or 
 of surrendering it altogether ; and this it was that led him to those 
 researches into the conditions of thought, which -considered, whether 
 in themselves or in their consequences, whether in what they 
 established or in what they subverted, are, perhaps, the most re- 
 markable in the annals of speculation. 
 
 To Hume, in like manner, we owe the Philosophy of Eeid, and, 
 consequently, what is now distinctively known in Europe as the 
 Philosophy of the Scottish School 
 
 Unable to controvert the reasoning of Berkeley, as founded on 
 the philosophy of Descartes and Locke, Reid had quietly resigned 
 himself to Idealism ; and he confesses that he would never have 
 been led to question the legitimacy of the common doctrine of 
 Perception, involving though it did the negation of an external
 
 396 APPENDIX. 
 
 world, had Hume not startled him into hesitation and inquiry, by 
 showing that the same reasoning which disproved the Existence of 
 Matter, disproved, when fairly carried out, also the Substantiality 
 of Mind. Such was the origin of the philosophy founded by Reid, 
 illustrated and adorned by Stewart ; and it is to this philosophy, 
 and to the writings of these two illustrious thinkers, that Scotland 
 is mainly indebted for the distinguished reputation which she at 
 present enjoys, in every country where the study of Mind has not, 
 as in England, been neglected for the study of Matter. 
 
 The Philosophy of Reid is at once our pride and our reproach. 
 At home mistaken and undervalued ; abroad understood and 
 honoured. The assertion may be startling, yet is literally true, 
 that the doctrines of the Scottish School have been nowhere less 
 fairly appreciated than in Scotland itself. To explain how they 
 have been misinterpreted, and, consequently, neglected, in the 
 country of their birth, is more than I can now attempt ; but as I 
 believe that an equal ignorance prevails in regard to the high 
 favour accorded to these speculations by those nations who are 
 now in advance, as the most enlightened cultivators of philosophy, 
 I shall endeavour, as briefly as possible, to show that it may be for 
 our credit not rashly to disparage what other countries view as 
 our chief national claim to scientific celebrity. In illustration of 
 this, I shall only allude to the account in which our Scottish Philo- 
 sophy is held in Germany and in France. 
 
 There is a strong general analogy between the philosophies of 
 Reid and Kant ; and Kant, I may observe by the way, was a 
 Scotsman by proximate descent. Both originate in a recoil 
 against the Scepticism of Hume ; both are equally opposed to the 
 Sensualism of Locke ; both vindicate with equal zeal the moral 
 dignity of man ; and both attempt to mete out and to define the 
 legitimate sphere of our intellectual activity. There are, however, 
 important differences between the doctrines, as might be antici- 
 pated from the very different characters of the men ; and while 
 Kant surpassed Reid in systematic power and comprehension, 
 Reid excelled Kant in the caution and security of his procedure. 
 There is, however, one point of difference in which it is now 
 acknowledged, even by the representatives of the Kantian philo- 
 sophy, that Kant was wrong. I allude to the doctrine of Percep- 
 tion, the doctrine which constitutes the very corner-stone of the
 
 APPENDIX. 397 
 
 philosophy of Reid. Though both philosophies were, in their 
 origin, reactions against the scepticism of Hume, this reaction was 
 not equally determined in each by the same obnoxious conclusion. 
 For, as it was primarily to reconnect Effect and Cause that Kant 
 was roused to speculation, so it was primarily to regain the worlds 
 of Mind and Matter that Reid was awakened to activity. Accord- 
 ingly Kant, admitting, without question, the previous doctrine of 
 philosophers, that the mind has no immediate knowledge of any 
 existence external to itself, adopted it without hesitation as a 
 principle, that the mind is cognisant of nothing beyond its own 
 modifications, and that what our natural consciousness mistakes 
 for an external world, is only an internal phenomenon, only a 
 mental representation of the unknown and inconceivable. Reid, 
 on the contrary, was fortunately led to question the grounds on 
 which philosophers had given the lie to the natural beliefs of 
 mankind ; and his inquiry terminated in the conclusion, that there 
 exists no valid ground for the hypothesis, universally admitted by 
 the learned, that an immediate knowledge of material objects is 
 impossible. The attempt of Kant, if the attempt were serious, to 
 demonstrate the existence of an external and unknown world was, 
 as is universally admitted, a signal failure ; and his Hypothetical 
 Realism was soon analysed by an illustrious disciple, Fichte, 
 into an Absolute Idealism, with a logical rigour that did not 
 admit of refutation." In the meanwhile, Reid's doctrine of 
 Perception had attracted the attention of an acute opponent 
 of the Critical Philosophy in Germany ;0 and that doctrine, 
 divested of those superficial errors which have led some in- 
 genious reasoners in this country to view and represent 
 Reid as holding an opinion on this point identical with 
 Kant's, was, in Kant's own country, placed in opposition against 
 his opinion, fortified as that was by the authority of all modern 
 philosophers. And with what result ? Simply this ; that the 
 most distinguished representatives of the Kantian school now 
 acknowledge Kant's doctrine of Perception to be erroneous, and 
 one analogous to that of Reid they have adopted in its stead. 
 
 a Some fragmentary criticisms of the ft Schulze, in his ^Enesidemus, pub- 
 Kantian philosophy in this respect, will lished in 1 792 ; and again in his 
 be found appended to this dissertation. Kritik der theorctischen Philosophie, 
 See below, p. 401. ED. 1801. See field's Work*, p. 797. ED.
 
 398 APPENDIX. 
 
 Thus, while, in Scotland, the fundamental position of Eeid's philo- 
 sophy has been misunderstood, his criticism of the ideal theory 
 treated as a blunder, and his peculiar doctrine of perception repre- 
 sented as essentially the same with that of the philosophers whom 
 he assailed ; in Germany, and by his own disciples, Kant's theory 
 of perception is admitted to be false, and the doctrine of Reid, on 
 this point, appreciated at its just value, and recognised as one of 
 the most important and original contributions ever made to philo- 
 sophy. 
 
 But in France, I may add Italy, the triumph of the Scottish 
 school has been even more signal than in Germany. The philo- 
 sophy of Locke, first recommended to his countrymen by the bril- 
 liant fancy of Voltaire, was, by the lucid subtlety of Condillac, 
 reduced to a simplicity which not only obtained an ascendant over 
 the philosophy of Descartes, but rendered it in France the object 
 of all but universal admiration. Locke had deduced all knowledge 
 from Experience, but Condillac analysed every faculty into Sense. 
 Though its author was no materialist, the system of transformed 
 sensation is only a disguised materialism ; and the import of the 
 doctrine soon became but too apparent in its effects. Melancholy, 
 however, as it was, this theory obtained an authority in France 
 unparalleled for its universality and continuance. For seventy 
 years, not a single work of an opposite tendency made the smallest 
 impression on the public mind ; all discussion of principles had 
 ceased ; it remained only to develop the remoter consequences of 
 the system ; philosophy seemed accomplished. 
 
 Such was the state of opinion in France until the downfall of 
 the Empire. In the period of tranquillity that followed the Restora- 
 tion, the minds of men were again turned with interest towards 
 metaphysical speculation ; and it was then that the doctrines of 
 the Scottish Philosophy were, for the first time, heard in the public 
 schools of France. Recommended by the powerful talent and 
 high authority of Royer-Collard, these doctrines made converts 
 of some of the loftiest intellects of France. A vigorous assault, in 
 which the prowess of Cousin was remarkable, was made against 
 the prevalent opinions, and with a success so decisive, that, after a 
 controversy of twenty years, the school of Condillac is now, in its 
 own country, considered as extinct ; while our Scottish philosophy 
 not only obtained an ascendant in public opinion, but, through the
 
 APPENDIX. 399 
 
 influence of my illustrious friend M. Cousin, forms the basis of 
 philosophical instruction in the various Colleges connected with 
 the University of France. It must not, however, be supposed, that 
 the French have servilely adopted the opinions of our countrymen. 
 On the contrary, what they have borrowed they have so ably 
 amplified, strengthened, simplified, and improved, that the common 
 doctrines of Reid and Stewart, of Eoyer-Collard and Jouffroy, (for 
 Cousin falls under another category), ought in justice to be denom- 
 inated the Scoto-Gallican Philosophy, a name, indeed, already 
 bestowed upon them by recent historians of philosophy in Germany. 
 
 (6.) M. JOUFFBOY'S CRITICISM OF THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL. 
 
 (Probably 1837, or a little later. See (Euvres de Reid, vol. i. Preface, 
 p. clxxxvi-cxcix. ED.) 
 
 * * * * I must be allowed to make an ob- 
 
 servation in reference to the criticism of M. Jouffroy. 
 
 Dr Reid and Mr Stewart not only denounce as absurd the 
 attempt to demonstrate, that the original data of Consciousness 
 are for us the rule of what we ought to believe, that is, the criteria 
 of a relative, human, subjective, truth ; but interdict as unphilo- 
 sophical all question in regard to their validity, as the vehicles of 
 an absolute or objective truth. 
 
 M. Jouffroy, of course, coincides with the Scottish philosophers 
 in regard to the former ; but, as to the latter, he maintains, with 
 Kant, that the doubt is legitimate, and, though he admits it to be 
 insoluble, he thinks it ought to be entertained. Nor, on the ground 
 on which they and he consider the question, am I disposed to dis- 
 sent from his conclusion. But on that on which I have now placed 
 it, a I cannot but view the inquiry as incompetent. For what is the 
 question in plain terms? Simply, Whether what our nature 
 compels us to believe as true and real, be true and real, or only a 
 consistent illusion ? Now this question cannot be philosophically 
 entertained, for two reasons. 1, Because there exists a presump- 
 tion in favour of the veracity of our nature, which either precludes 
 
 a See Reid's Works, p. 746. ED. 
 VOL. I. 2 C
 
 400 APPENDIX. 
 
 or peremptorily repels a gratuitous supposition of its mendacity. 
 2, Because we have no mean out of Consciousness of testing 
 Consciousness. If its data are found concordant, they must be 
 trustworthy ; if repugnant, they are already proved unworthy of 
 credit. Unless, therefore, the mutual collation of the primary data 
 of Consciousness be held such an inquiry, this is, I think, manifestly 
 incompetent. It is only in the case of one or more of these ori- 
 ginal facts being rejected as false, that the question can emerge in 
 regard to the truth of the others. But, in reality, on this hypo- 
 thesis, the problem is already decided ; their character for truth is 
 gone ; and all subsequent canvassing of their probability is profit- 
 less speculation. 
 
 Kant started, like the philosophers in general, with the non-ac- 
 ceptance of the deliverance of Consciousness, that we are imme- 
 diately cognisant of extended objects. This first step decided the 
 destiny of his philosophy. The external world, as known, was, 
 therefore, only a phenomenon of the internal ; and our knowledge 
 in general only of self, the objective only subjective ; and truth 
 only the harmony of thought with thought, not of thought with 
 things ; reality only a necessary illusion. 
 
 It was quite in order, that Kant should canvass the veracity of 
 all our primary beliefs, having founded his philosophy on the pre- 
 sumed falsehood of one ; and an inquiry followed out with such 
 consistency and talent could not, from such a commencement, ter- 
 minate in a different result. 
 
 (c.) GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL. 
 
 (Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR DUGALD STEWART. 
 On Desk, May 1856 ; written Autumn 1855. ED.) 
 
 The Scottish School of Philosophy is distinctively characterised 
 by its opposition to all the destructive schemes of speculation ; in 
 particular, to Scepticism, or the uncertainty of knowledge ; to 
 Idealism, or the non-existence of the material world ; to Fatalism, 
 or the denial of a moral universe. Reid has the merit of originat-
 
 APPENDIX. 401 
 
 ing this movement, and Stewart the honour of continuing, and 
 promoting, and extending it. 
 
 In the philosophy which prevailed before Descartes, in whose 
 doctrines it may be affirmed that modern speculation took its rise, 
 we find all these schemes, indeed, but all marked and modified in 
 a peculiar manner. In antiquity, we have the scepticism of Pyrrho 
 and ^Enesidemus ; but this, however ingenious its object, never 
 became popular or dangerous, and, without a formal or decisive 
 refutation, gradually died out. 
 
 In the scholastic ages, Idealism was [countenanced] by the 
 dominant psychology, and would perhaps have taken root, but for 
 the check it encountered from the Church, to the dogmas of which 
 all philosophy was then voluntarily subjected. The doctrine of 
 Representative Perception, in its cruder form, was generally ac- 
 cepted, and the question often mooted, " Could not God main- 
 tain the species in the sensory, the object (external reality) being 
 annihilated ? " This problem, as philosophy affirmed, theology 
 denied. It was possible, nay probable, according to the for- 
 mer; impossible, because heretical, according to the latter." 
 
 Finally, on the other hand, the Absolute Decrees of God might, 
 at the first view, be thought, not only to favour, but to establish, a 
 doctrine of unconditioned Fatalism. But this inference was dis- 
 avowed by the most strenuous advocates of Prescience and Pre- 
 destination ; and the Freewill of man asserted no less vehemently 
 than the Free Grace of God. 
 
 (rf) KANT AND REID. 
 
 (Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR STEWART. On Desk, 
 
 May 1856 ; written Autumn 1855. ED.) 
 
 * 
 
 In like manner, Kant assailed Scepticism, and the scepticism of 
 
 Hume ; but with a very different result. For, if in one conclusion 
 
 he controverted scepticism, he himself introduced and patronised 
 
 the most unexclusive doubt. He showed, indeed, that Hume's 
 
 rejection of the notion of Causality was groundless. He proved 
 
 a See Discussions, p. 1 98, second edi- of Transubstantiation were incompat- 
 tion, why Idealism and the doctrine ible.
 
 402 APPENDIX. 
 
 that, although this notion was not, and could not be, constructed 
 from experience, still Causality was a real and efficient principle, 
 native and necessary in human intelligence ; and that although 
 experience did not explain its genesis, experience always supposes 
 its operation. So far so good. But Kant did not stop here. He 
 endeavoured to evince that pure Eeason, that Intelligence is natu- 
 rally, is necessarily, repugnant with itself, and that speculation ends 
 in a series of insoluble antilogies. In its highest potence, in its 
 very essence, thought is thus infected with contradiction ; {ind the 
 worst and most pervading scepticism is the melancholy result. If 
 I have done anything meritorious in philosophy, it is in the attempt 
 to explain the phsenornena of these contradictions ; in showing that 
 they arise only when intelligence transcends the limits to which its 
 legitimate exercise is restricted ; and that within those bounds, 
 (the Conditioned), natural thought is neither fallible nor menda- 
 cious 
 
 " N"eque decipitur, nee decipit umquam." 
 
 If this view be correct, Kant's antinomies, with their consequent 
 scepticism, are solved ; and the human mind, however weak, is 
 shown not to be the work of a treacherous Creator. 
 
 Keid, on the contrary, did not subvert the trustworthiness of the 
 one witness, on whose absolute veracity he relied. In his hands 
 natural, (and, therefore, necessary), thought, Consciousness, Com- 
 mon Sense, are always held out as entitled to our implicit and 
 thorough-going confidence. The fact of the testimony sufficiently 
 guarantees the truth of what the testimony avouches. The testi- 
 mony, if delivered, is to be believed pro tanto impeccable. 
 
 (e) KANT'S DOCTRINE OF SPACE AND TIME. 
 (Fragments from early Papers. Probably before 1836. ED.) 
 
 Kant, 1, Made our actual world one merely of illusion. Time 
 and Space, under which we must perceive and think, he reduced to 
 mere subjective spectral forms, which have no real archetype in the 
 noumenal or real universe. We can infer nothing from this to that. 
 Cause and Effect govern thing and thought in the world of Space
 
 APPENDIX. 403 
 
 and Time ; the relation will not subsist where Time and Space 
 have no reality. (Lines from Fracastorius). Corresponds with 
 the Platonic, but more thorough-going. Kant, 2, Made Reason, In- 
 telligence, contradict itself in its legitimate exercise. Antilogy, 
 antinomy, part and parcel of its nature ; not only " reasoning, but 
 to err/' but reason itself. 
 
 Thus, the conviction that we live in a world of unreality and 
 illusion, and that our very faculty of knowledge is only given us 
 to mislead, is the result of our criticism ; Scepticism. 
 
 On the contrary, my doctrine holds, 1, That Space and Time, as 
 given, are real forms of thought and conditions of things ; 2, That 
 Intelligence, Reason, within its legitimate limits, is legitimate ; 
 within this sphere it never deceives ; and it is only when tran- 
 scending that sphere, when founding on its illegitimate as on its 
 legitimate exercise, that it affords a contradictory result ; " Ne 
 sapiamus ultra facilitates." The dogmatic assertion of necessity, 
 of Fatalism, and the dogmatic assertion of Liberty, are the counter 
 and equally inconceivable conclusions from reliance on the illegiti- 
 mate and one-sided. 
 
 ****** 
 
 Kant holds the subjectivity of Space (and Time), and, if he does 
 not deny, will not affirm the existence of a real space, external to 
 our minds ; because it is a mere form of our perceptive faculty. 
 He holds that we have no knowledge of any external thing as 
 really existing, and that all our perceptions are merely appearances, 
 i. e. subjective representations, subjective modifications, which 
 the mind is determined to exhibit, as an apparently objective oppo- 
 sition to itself, its pure and real subjective modifications. Yet, 
 while he gives up the external existence of space, as beyond the 
 sphere of consciousness, he holds the reality of external material 
 existences, (things in themselves), which are equally beyond the 
 sphere of consciousness. It was incumbent on him to render a 
 reason for this seeming inconsistency, and to explain how his 
 system was not, in its legitimate conclusions, an universal Idealism ; 
 and he has accordingly attempted to establish, by necessary in- 
 ference, what his philosophy could not accept as an immediate fact 
 of consciousness. 
 
 a See below, vol. ii. lect. xxi. p. 33. ED.
 
 404 APPENDIX. 
 
 In the second edition of his Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, he 
 has accordingly given what he calls a "strict, and, as he is con- 
 vinced, the only possible, demonstration for the objective reality 
 of our external perceptions ; " and, at the same time, he declares 
 that it would be the eternal scandal of Philosophy, and the general 
 reason of mankind, if we were compelled to yield our assent to the 
 existence of an external world, only as an article of Faith, and 
 were unable to oppose a satisfactory refutation to any sceptical 
 objections that might be suggested touching their reality (Vor- 
 rede, p. xxxix). The demonstration which is thus exclusively and 
 confidently proposed, attempts to prove, that the existence of an 
 external world is involved in the very consciousness of self, that 
 without a Thou, there could be no /, and that the Cogito ergo 
 sum is not more certain than the Cogito ergo es. 
 
 IT. PHYSIOLOGICAL. (See Vol. I., p. 264.) 
 (a.) PHRENOLOGY. 
 
 Such is a very general view of that system [the Nervous] and its 
 relations, which physiologists and philosophers in general have 
 held to be the proximate organ of the thinking principle, and 
 many to be even the thinking principle itself. That the mind, in 
 its lower energies and affections, is immediately dependent on the 
 conditions of the nervous system, and that, in general, the develop- 
 ment of the brain in the different species of animals is correspon- 
 dent to their intelligence, these are conclusions established upon 
 an induction too extensive and too certain to admit of doubt. But 
 when we attempt to proceed a step farther, and to connect the 
 mind or its faculties with particular parts of the nervous system, 
 we find ourselves at once checked. Observation and experiment 
 seem to fail ; they afford only obscure and varying reports ; and 
 if, in this uncertainty, we hazard a conclusion, this is only a theory 
 established upon some arbitrary hypotheses, in which fictions stand 
 in place of facts. The uncertainty of such conclusions is shown
 
 APPENDIX. 405 
 
 by the unexampled diversity of opinion that has always reigned 
 among those who, discontented with a prudent ignorance, have 
 attempted to explain the phsenomena of mind by the phaenomena 
 of organisation. 
 
 In the first place, some, (and their opinion is not, certainly, the 
 least philosophical), hold that, in relation to the body, the soul is 
 less contained than containing, that it is all in the whole, and all 
 in every part. This is the common doctrine of many of the Fathers, 
 and of the scholastic Aristotelians. 
 
 In the second place, others have attempted to connect the con- 
 scious principle in general with a particular part of the organism, 
 but by very different relations. Some place it there, as in a local 
 seat ; others make it dependent on that part, as on its organ ; 
 while others hold that the mind stands in a more immediate rela- 
 tion to this part, only because it is the point of convergence where 
 all the bodily sensations meet. I shall not attempt to enumerate 
 the hundred and one conjectures in regard to the point in the 
 corporeal organism, in proximate connection with the mind. It 
 would occupy more than our hour to give you even a summary 
 account of the hypotheses on this subject. 
 
 In the third place, no opinion has been more generally prevalent 
 than that different faculties and dispositions of the mind are de- 
 pendent on different parts of the bodily organism, and more espe- 
 cially on different parts of the nervous system. Under this head, 
 I shall state to you one or two of the more famous opinions. The 
 most celebrated doctrine, that which was more universally adopted, 
 and for a longer period, than any other, was that which, with 
 certain modifications, assigned different places in the Encephalos to 
 Memory, Imagination, Sense, and the Locomotive Faculty, Reason 
 or Intelligence being left inorganic. This opinion we trace upward, 
 through the Latin and Arabian schools,^ to St Austin,? Nemesius, 5 
 the Greek physician Aetius, and even to the anatomists Rufus and 
 Posidonius. Memory, on this hypothesis, was placed in the sub- 
 stance of the cerebellum, or in the subjacent ventricle ; and as the 
 phrenologists now attempt to prove that the seat of this faculty 
 
 a See above, vol. ii. leci xx. p. 7. ED. y De Genesi ad Literam, L vii. caps. 
 
 j8 [See Gassendi, Pkysica, iii. memb. xvii. xviii. ED. [See Tenneman, t. x. 
 
 post. L viii. Opera, t. ii. pp. 400-401. p. 241.] 
 
 Averroes,Destruct.Destructionum.Arist. S De Natura Hominis, c. xiii. p. 204. 
 
 Opera, t. x. p. 340. Venice, 1560.] edit. Matthsei. ED.
 
 406 APPENDIX. 
 
 lies above the eyebrows, by the alleged fact that, when a man 
 wishes to stimulate his recollection, he rubs the lower part of his 
 forehead, so, of old, the same conclusion was established on the 
 more plausible assertion, that a man in such circumstances natu- 
 rally scratches the back of his head The one indication is at 
 least as good as the other. 
 
 Among modern physiologists, Willis was the first who attempted 
 a new attribution of mental functions to different parts of the 
 nervous system. He placed Perception and Sensation in the corpus 
 callosum, Imagination and Appetite in the corpora striata, Memory 
 in the cerebral convolutions, Involuntary Motion in the cerebellum, 
 &c. ; and to Willis is to be traced the determination, so conspicuous 
 among subsequent physiologists, of attributing different mental 
 uses to different parts of the brain. 
 
 It would be bootless to state to you the many various and con- 
 tradictory conjectures in regard to these uses. To psychologists 
 they are, with one exception, all comparatively uninteresting, as, 
 were they even ascertained to be something better than conjec- 
 tures, still, as the physical condition is in all of them occult, it 
 could not be applied as an instrument of psychological discovery. 
 The exception which I make is, the celebrated doctrine of Gall. 
 If true, that doctrine would not only afford us a new instrument, 
 but would in a great measure supersede the old. In fact, the 
 psychology of consciousness, and the psychology founded on Gall's 
 organology, are mere foolishness to each other. They arrive at 
 conclusions the most contradictory ; insomuch that the establish- 
 ment of the one necessarily supposes the subversion of the other. 
 
 In these circumstances, no one interested in the philosophy of 
 man can be indifferent to an inquiry into the truth or falsehood 
 of the new doctrine. This doctrine cannot be passed over with 
 contempt. It is maintained not only by too many, but by too 
 able advocates, to be summarily rejected. That its results are re- 
 pugnant to those previously admitted, is but a sorry reason for not 
 inquiring into their foundation. This doctrine professes to have 
 discovered new principles, and to arrive at new conclusions ; and 
 the truth or falsehood of these cannot, therefore, be estimated 
 merely by their conformity or disconformity with those old results 
 which the new professedly refute. To do so would be mere pre- 
 judice, a mere assumption of the point at issue. At the same
 
 APPENDIX. 407 
 
 time, this doctrine professes to be founded on sensible facts. Sen- 
 sible facts must be shown to be false, not by reasoning, but by 
 experiment ; for, as old Fernelius has well expressed it, "Insipien- 
 tis arrogaiitise est argumentations necessitatem sensuum testhnoiiio 
 anteponere." To oppose such a doctrine in such a manner is not 
 to refute, but to recommend ; and yet, unfortunately, this has been 
 the usual mode in which the organology of Gall and his followers 
 has been assailed. Such an opinion must be taken on its own 
 ground. We must join issue with it upon the facts and inferences 
 it embraces. If the facts are true, and if the inferences necessarily 
 follow, the opinion must be admitted ; the sooner, therefore, that 
 we candidly inquire into these the better, for it is only thus that 
 we shall be enabled to form a correct estimate of the evidence on 
 which such a doctrine rests. 
 
 With these views I many years ago undertook an investigation 
 of the fundamental facts on which the phrenological doctrine, as it 
 is unfortunately called, is established. By a fundamental fact I 
 mean a fact, by the truth of which the hypothesis could be proved, 
 and, consequently, by the falsehood of which it could be disproved. 
 Now, what are such facts ? The one condition of such a fact is, 
 that it should be general. The phrenological theory is, that there 
 is a correspondence between the volume of certain parts of the 
 brain, and the intensity of certain qualities of mind and character ; 
 the former they call development, the latter manifestation. Now, 
 individual cases of alleged conformity of development and mani- 
 festation could prove little in favour of the doctrine, as individual 
 cases of alleged disconformity could prove little against it ; because, 
 1, The phrenologists had no standard by which the proportion of 
 cerebral development could be measured by themselves or their 
 opponents ; 2, Because the mental manifestation was vague and 
 indeterminate ; 3, Because they had introduced, as subsidiary 
 hypotheses, the occult qualities of temperament and activity, so 
 that, in individual cases, any given head could always be ex- 
 plained in harmony with any given character. Individual cases 
 were thus ambiguous ; they were worthless either to establish or 
 to refute the theory. But where the phrenologists had proclaimed a 
 general fact, by that fact their doctrine could be tried. For example, 
 when they asserted as the most illustrious discovery of Gall, and 
 as the surest inference of their doctrine, that the cerebellum is the
 
 408 APPENDIX. 
 
 organ of the sexual appetite, and established this inference as the 
 basis of certain general facts which, as common to the whole animal 
 kingdom, could easily be made matter of precise experiment ; by 
 these facts the truth of their doctrine could be brought to the test, 
 and this on ground the most favourable for them. For the general 
 probability of their doctrine was thus estimated by the truth of its 
 best-established element. But, on the other hand, if such general 
 facts were found false, their disproval afforded the most satisfactory 
 refutation of the whole system. For the phrenologists themselves 
 readily admit, that their theory is exploded, if their doctrine of the 
 function of the cerebellum is disproved. Because, therefore, an 
 examination of the general facts of Phrenology was at once decisive 
 and comparatively easy, I determined, on this ground, to try the 
 truth of the opinion. I shall state to you very generally a few 
 results of the investigation, of which I may, without boasting, 
 affirm that no inquiry of the kind was ever conducted with greater 
 care or more scrupulous accuracy. 
 
 I shall commence with the phrenological doctrine of the cere- 
 bellum, on which you will see the propriety of dwelling as briefly 
 as I can. I may mention that the extent of my experiments on 
 this organ is wholly unconnected with Phrenology. My attention 
 was, indeed, originally turned to the relation of the after-brain to 
 the other parts of the nervous system, when testing the accuracy 
 of the phrenological doctrine on this point ; but that end was very 
 soon accomplished, and it was certain discoveries which I made in 
 regard to the laws of development and the function of this organ, 
 and the desire of establishing these by an induction from as many 
 of the species as possible of the animal kingdom, that led me into 
 a more extensive inquiry than has hitherto been instituted by any 
 professional physiologist. When I publish its results, they will 
 disprove a hundred times over all the phrenological assertions in 
 regard to the cerebellum ; but this will be only an accidental cir- 
 cumstance, and of comparatively little importance. I may add, 
 that my tables extend to above 1000 brains of above 50 species of 
 animals, accurately weighed by a delicate balance ; and you will 
 remark that the phrenologists have not a single observation of any 
 accuracy to which they can appeal. The only evidence in the shape 
 of precise experiment on which they can found, is a table of Serres, 
 who is no phrenologist, affording the general averages of certain 
 weighings, said to have been made by him, of the brain and cere-
 
 APPENDIX. 409 
 
 bellum, in the human subject. I shall prove that table an imagi- 
 nary fabrication in support of a now exploded hypothesis of the 
 author. 
 
 The alleged facts on which Gall and his followers establish their 
 conclusion in regard to the function of the cerebellum, are the 
 following : 
 
 The first is, that in all animals, females have this organ, on an 
 average, greatly smaller, in proportion to the brain proper, than 
 males. Now, so far is this assertion from being correct, it is the 
 very reverse of truth ; and I have ascertained, by an immense 
 induction, that in no species of animal has the female a proportion- 
 ally smaller cerebellum than the male, but that in most species, 
 and this according to a certain law, she has a considerably larger. 
 In no animal is this difference more determinate than in man. 
 Women have on an average a cerebellum to the brain proper, as' 
 1:7; men as 1 : 8. This is a general fact which I have completely 
 established." 
 
 The second alleged fact is, that in impuberal animals the cere- 
 bellum is in proportion to the brain proper greatly less than in 
 adults. This is equally erroneous. In all animals, long previous 
 to puberty, has the cerebellum attained its maximum proportion. 
 And here, also, I am indebted to the phrenologists for having led 
 me to make the discovery of another curious law, and to establish 
 the real function of the cerebellum. Physiologists have hitherto 
 believed that the cerebella of all animals, indifferently, were, for a 
 certain period subsequent to birth, greatly less, in proportion to 
 the brain proper, than in adults ; and have taken no note of the 
 differences in this respect between different classes. Thus, com- 
 pletely wrong in regard to the fact, they have necessarily overlooked 
 the law by which it is governed. In those animals that have from 
 the first the full power of voluntary motion, and which depend 
 immediately on their own exertions, and on their own power of 
 assimilation for nutriment, the proportion of the cerebellum is as 
 large, nay larger than in the adult. In the chicken of the common 
 fowl, pheasant, partridge, &c., this is the case ; and most remark- 
 ably after the first week or ten days, when the yolk, (corresponding 
 in a certain sort to the milk in quadrupeds), has been absorbed. In 
 the calf, kid, lamb, and probably in the colt, the proportion of the 
 
 o See helow. (ft), On Weight of Brain, p. 419. ED.
 
 410 APPENDIX. 
 
 cerebellum at birth is very little less than in the adult. In those 
 birds that do not possess at once the full power of voluntary motion, 
 but which are in a rapid state of growth, the cerebellum, within a 
 few days at least after being hatched, and by the time the yolk is 
 absorbed, is not less or larger than in the adult ; the pigeon, 
 sparrow, &c. &c., are examples. In the young of those quadru- 
 peds that for some time wholly depend for support on the milk of 
 the mother, as on half-assimilated food, and which have at first 
 feeble powers of regulated motion, the proportion of the cerebellum 
 to the brain proper is at birth very small ; but by the end of the 
 full period of lactation, it has with them as with other animals, 
 (nor is man properly an exception), reached the full proportion of 
 the adult. This, for example, is seen in the young rabbit, kitten, 
 whelp. &c. ; in them the cerebellum is to the brain proper at birth 
 about as 1 to 14 ; at six and eight weeks old, about as 1 to 6. 
 Pigs, &c., as possessing immediately the power of regulated motion, 
 but wholly dependent on the milk of the mother during at least 
 the first month after birth, exhibit a medium between the two 
 classes. At birth the proportion is in them about 1 to 9, in the 
 adult as 1 to 6. This analogy, at which I now only hint, has never 
 been suspected ; it points at the new and important conclusion, 
 (corroborated by many other facts), that the cerebellum is the in- 
 tracranial organ of the nutritive faculty, that term being taken in its 
 broadest signification ; and it confirms also an old opinion, recently 
 revived, that it is the condition of voluntary or systematic motion.* 
 
 The third alleged fact is, that the proportion of the cerebellum 
 to the brain proper in different species, is in proportion to the 
 energy of the phrenological function attributed to it. This asser- 
 tion is groundless as the others. There are many other fictions in 
 regard to this organ ; but these, I think, are a sufficient specimen of 
 the truth of the doctrine in regard to the function of the cere- 
 bellum ; and the cerebellum, you will recollect, is the citadel of 
 Phrenology. 
 
 I shall, however, give you the sample of another general fact. 
 The organ of Veneration rises in the middle on the coronal surface 
 of the head. Women, it is universally admitted, manifest religious 
 feeling more strongly and generally than men ; and the phrenolo- 
 
 a From a communication by the of the Brain, pp. 6, 7- See below (I) On 
 Author, printed in Dr Munro's Anatomy WeigJi t of Brain. ED.
 
 APPENDIX. 411 
 
 gists accordingly assert, that the female cranium is higher in pro- 
 portion in that region than the male. This I found to be the very 
 reverse of truth by a comparative average of nearly two hundred 
 skulls of either sex. In man, the female encephalos is considerably 
 smaller than that of the male, and in shape the crania of the sexes 
 are different. By what dimension is the female skull less than the 
 male ? The female skull is longer, it is nearly as broad, but it is 
 much lower than the male. This is only one of several curious 
 sexual differences of the head. 
 
 I do not know whether it be worth while mentioning, that, by a 
 comparison of all the crania of murderers preserved in the Anato- 
 mical Museum of this University, with about nearly two hundred 
 ordinary skulls indifferently taken, I found that these criminals ex- 
 hibited a development of the phrenological organs of Destructiveness 
 and other evil propensities smaller, and a development of the higher 
 moral and intellectual qualities larger than the average. Nay, 
 more, the same result was obtained when the murderers' skulls 
 were compared, not merely with a common average, but with the 
 individual crania of Eobert Bruce, George Buchanan, and Dr 
 David Gregory. 
 
 I omit all notice of many other decisive facts subversive of the 
 hypothesis in question ; but I cannot leave the subject without 
 alluding to one which disproves, at one blow, a multitude of organs, 
 affords a significant example of their accuracy of statement, and 
 shows how easily manifestation can, by the phrenologists, be accom- 
 modated to any development, real or supposed. I refer to the Frontal 
 Sinuses. These are cavities between the tables of the frontal bone, 
 in consequence of a divergence from each other. They are found 
 in all puberal crania, and are of variable and, [from without], wholly 
 inappreciable extent and depth. Where they exist, they of course 
 interpose an insuperable bar to any estimate of the cerebral devel- 
 opment ; and their extent being undiscoverable, they completely 
 baffle all certain observation. Now, the phrenologists have fortu- 
 nately, or unfortunately, concentrated the whole of their very small- 
 est organs over the region of the sinus ; which thus, independently 
 of other impediments, renders all phrenological observation more or 
 less uncertain in regard to sixteen of their organs. Of these cavi- 
 ties the anatomists in general seem to have known not much, and 
 the phrenologists absolutely nothing. At least, the former are
 
 412 APPENDIX. 
 
 wrong in many of their positions, the latter wrong in all. I shall 
 give you a sample of the knowledge and consistency of the phreno- 
 logists on this point. 
 
 Gall first of all answered the objection of the sinus by assert- 
 ing, that even when it existed, the plates of the frontal bone were 
 still parallel. The truth is, that the cavity is only formed by their 
 divergence from parallelism, and thus it is now described by the 
 phrenologists themselves. In his latest works, Gall asserted that 
 the sinus is frequently absent in men, and seldom or never found in 
 women. But Spurzheim carried the negation to its highest climax, 
 for he avers, (I quote his words), " that children and young adult 
 persons have no holes between the two tables of the skull at the 
 forehead, and that they occur only in old persons, or after chronic 
 insanity." He did not always, indeed, assert as much, and in some 
 of his works he allows that they throw some uncertainty over the 
 organs of Individuality and Size, but not much over that of Locality. 
 
 Now the fact is, as I have established by an inspection of several 
 hundred crania, that no skull is without a sinus. This is, indeed, 
 the common doctrine of the anatomists. But I have also proved 
 that the vulgar doctrine of their increasing in extent, in proportion 
 as the subject advances in life, is wholly erroneous. The smallest 
 sinus I ever saw was in the cranium of a woman of a hundred 
 years of age. 
 
 The two facts, the fact of the universal existence of the sinus, 
 and its great and various and inappreciable extent, and the fact of 
 the ignorance of the phrenologists in regard to every circumstance 
 connected with it, these two facts prove that these observers have 
 been going on finding always manifestation and development in 
 exact conformity ; when, lo ! it turns out, that in nearly half their 
 organs, the protuberance or depression apparent on the external 
 bone has no connection with any correspondent protuberance or 
 depression in the brain. Now, what does this evince ? Not merely 
 that they were wrong in regard to these particular observations 
 and the particular organs established upon the mistake. Of course, 
 the whole organs lying over the sinuses are swept away. But this 
 is not all ; for the theory supposes, as its condition, that the amount 
 of the two qualities of mental manifestation and cerebral develop- 
 ment can be first accurately measured apart, and then compared 
 together, and found either to be conformable or disconformable ;
 
 APPENDIX. 413 
 
 and the doctrine, assuming this possibility, proves its truth only by 
 showing that the two qualities thus severally estimated, are, in all 
 cases, in proportion to each other. Now, if the possibility thus 
 assumed by Phrenology were true, it would at once have discovered 
 that the apparent amount of development over the sinus was not 
 in harmony with the mental manifestation. But this it never did ; 
 it always found the apparent or cranial development over the 
 sinus conformable to the mental manifestation, though this bony 
 development bore no more a proportion to the cerebral brain than 
 if it had been looked for on the great toe ; and thus it is at once 
 evident, that manifestation and development in general are, in their 
 hands, such factitious, such arbitrary quantities, that they can 
 always, under any circumstances, be easily brought into unison. 
 Phrenology is thus shown to be a mere leaden rule, which bends 
 to whatever it is applied ; and, therefore, all phrenological observa- 
 tion is poisoned, in regard even to those organs where a similar 
 obstacle did not prevent the discovery of the cerebral development. 
 Suppose a mathematician to propose a new method for the solution 
 of algebraical equations. If we applied it and found it gave a 
 false result, would the inventor be listened to if he said, " True, my 
 method is wrong in these cases in which it has been tried, but it is 
 not, therefore, proved false in those in which it has not been put to 
 the test?" Now, this is precisely the plea I have heard from the 
 phrenologists in relation to the sinus. " Well ! " they say, " we admit 
 that Gall and Spurzheim have been all wrong about the sinus, and 
 we give up the organs above the eyes ; but our system is untouched 
 in the others which are situate beyond the reach of that obnoxious 
 cavity." To such reasoning there was no answer. 
 
 I should have noticed, that, even supposing there had been no 
 intervening caverns in the forehead, the small organs arranged, like 
 peas in a pod, along the eyebrows could not have severally mani- 
 fested any difference of development. If we suppose, (what I make 
 bold to say was never yet observed in the brain,) that a portion of 
 it so small in extent as any one of the six phrenological organs of 
 Form, Size, Weight, Colour, Order, and Number, which lie side by 
 side upon the eyebrows, was ever prominent beyond the surround- 
 ing surface, I say, supposing the protuberance of so small a spot 
 upon the cerebral convolutions, it could never determine a corre- 
 sponding eminence on the external table of the skull What would
 
 414 APPENDIX. 
 
 be the effect of such a protrusion of brain upon the cranium ? It 
 would only make room for itself in the thickness of the bone which 
 it would attenuate. This is shown by two examples. The first is 
 taken from the convolutions themselves. I should, however, state, 
 that convolution, and anfractuosity or furrow, are correlative terms, 
 like hill and valley, the former (convolutions) being applied to 
 the windings of the cerebral surface as rising up, the latter 
 (anfractuosity, or furrow) being applied to them as sinking in. 
 Convolutions are the winding eminences between the furrows; 
 anfractuosities the winding depressions between the convolutions. 
 This being understood, we find, on looking to the internal surface 
 of the cranium, that the convolutions attenuate the bone which is 
 sometimes quite transparent, diaphanous, over them, whereas it 
 remains comparatively thick over the anfractuosities ; but they 
 cause no inequality on the outer surface. Yet the convolutions, 
 which thus make room for themselves in the bone without elevat- 
 ing it externally, are often broader, and of course always longer, 
 than the little organs which the phrenologists have placed along 
 the eyebrows. A fortiori, therefore, we must suppose that an 
 organ like Size, or Weight, or Colour, if it did project beyond the 
 surrounding brain, would only render the superincumbent bone 
 thinner, without causing it to rise, unless we admit that nature 
 complaisantly chaoges her laws in accommodation to the new 
 doctrine. 
 
 But we have another parallel instance still more precisely in 
 point. In many heads there are certain rounded eminences, (called 
 Glandulce Pacchioni}, on the coronal surface of the brain, which 
 nearly correspond in size with the little organs in question. Now, 
 if the phrenological supposition were correct, that an elevation on 
 the brain, of so limited an extent, would cause an elevation on the 
 external table of the bone, these eminences would do so far more 
 certainly than any similar projection over the eyebrows. For the 
 frontal bone in the frontal region is under the continual action of 
 muscles, and this action would tend powerfully to prevent any 
 partial elevation ; whereas, on the upper part of the head, the 
 bone is almost wholly exempt from such an agency. But do the 
 glands, as they are called, of Pacchioni, (though they are no glands), 
 do they determine an elevation on the external surface of the 
 skull corresponding to the elevation they form on the cerebral
 
 APPENDIX. 415 
 
 surface ? Not in the very least ; the cranium is there outwardly 
 quite equable, level, uniform, though probably attenuated to 
 the thinness of paper to accommodate the internal rising. 
 
 The other facts which I have stated as subversive of what the 
 phrenologists regard as the best-established constituents of their 
 system, I could only state to you on my own authority. But 
 they are founded on observations made with the greatest accuracy, 
 and on phsenomena, which every one is capable of verifying. If 
 the general facts I gave you in regard to the cerebellum, &c., are 
 false, then am I a deliberate deceiver ; for these are of such a nature 
 that no one with the ordinary discourse of reason could commit 
 an error in regard to them, if he actually made the observations. 
 The maxim, however, which I have myself always followed, and 
 which I would earnestly impress upon you, is to take nothing upon 
 trust that can possibly admit of doubt, and which you are able to 
 verify for yourselves ; and had I not been obliged to hurry on to 
 more important subjects, I might have been tempted to show you 
 by experiment what I have now been compelled to state to you 
 upon authority alone. a 
 
 I am here reminded of a fact, of which I believe none of our 
 present phrenologists are aware, at least all their books confidently 
 assert the very reverse. It is this, that the new system is the 
 result, not of experience but of conjecture, and that Gall, instead 
 of deducing the faculties from the organs, and generalising both 
 from particular observations, first of all excogitated a faculty a 
 priori, and then looked about for an organ with which to connect 
 it. In short, Phrenology was not discovered, but invented. 
 
 You must know, then, that there are two faculties, or rather 
 two modifications of various faculties, which cut a conspicuous 
 figure in the psychologies of Wolf and other philosophers of the 
 Empire : these are called in German Tiefsinn and Scharfsinn, 
 literally deep sense and sharp sense, but are now known in 
 English phrenological language by the terms Causality and Com- 
 parison. Now what I wish you to observe is, that Gall found 
 these two clumsy modifications of mind, ready shaped out in the 
 previous theories of philosophy prevalent in his own country, and 
 then in the language itself. Now, this being understood, you 
 
 a See below (rf) On Frontal Sinus, p. 424. ED. 
 VOL I. 2 D
 
 416 APPENDIX. 
 
 must also know that, in 1 798, Gall published a letter to Retzer of 
 Vienna, wherein he, for the first time, promulgates the nature of 
 his doctrine, and we here catch him, reum confitentem, in the 
 very act of conjecturing. In this letter he says : " I am not yet so 
 far advanced in my researches as to have discovered special organs 
 for Scharfsinn and Tiefsinn, (Comparison and Causality), for the 
 principle of the Representative Faculty, ( Vorstellungsvermogen, 
 another faculty in German philosophy), and for the different varie- 
 ties of judgment, &c." In this sentence we see exhibited the real 
 source and veritable derivation of the system. 
 
 In the Darstellung of Froriep, a favourite pupil of Gall, under 
 whose eye the work was published in the year 1800, twenty-two 
 organs are given, of which the greater proportion are now either 
 translated to new localities, or altogether thrown out. We find 
 also that the sought-for organs had, in the interval, been found for 
 Scharfsinn, (Comparison), and Tiefsinn, (Causality) ; and what fur- 
 ther exhibits the hypothetical genealogy of the doctrine, is, that a 
 great number of organs are assumed, which lie wholly beyond the 
 possible sphere of observation, at the base and towards the centre 
 of the brain ; as those of the External Senses, those of Desire, 
 Jealousy, Envy, love of Power, love of Pleasure, love of Life, &c. 
 
 An organ of Sensibility is placed above that of Amativeness, 
 between and below two organs of Philoprogem'tjveness, an organ 
 of Liberality, (its deficiency standing instead of an organ of Avarice 
 or Acquisitiveness), is situated above the eyebrows, in the position 
 now occupied by that of Time. An organ of Imagination is inti- 
 mately connected with that of Theosophy or Veneration, towards 
 the vertex of the head ; and Veracity is problematically established 
 above an organ of Parental Love. An organ of Vitality is not to 
 be forgotten, situated in the medulla oblongata, the development 
 of which is measured by the size of the foramen magnum and the 
 thickness of the neck. These faculties and organs are all now 
 cashiered ; and who does not perceive that, like those of Causality 
 and Comparison, which are still suffered to remain, they were first 
 devised, and then quartered on some department of the brain ? 
 
 We thus see that, in the first edition of the craniological hypo- 
 thesis, there were several tiers or stories of organs, some at the 
 base, some about the centre, and others on the surface of the brain. 
 Gall went to lecture through Germany, and among other places he
 
 APPENDIX. 117 
 
 lectured at Gb'ttingen. Here an objection was stated to his 
 system by the learned Meiners. Gall measured the development 
 of an external organ by its prominence. " How/' says Meiners, "do 
 you know that this prominence of the outer organ indicates its 
 real size ? May it not merely be pressed out, though itself of 
 inferior volume, by the large development of a subjacent organ ? " 
 This objection it was easily seen was checkmate. A new game 
 must be commenced, the pieces arranged again. Accordingly, all 
 the organs at the base and about the centre of the brain were 
 withdrawn, and the whole organs were made to run very con- 
 veniently upwards and outwards from the lower part of the brain 
 to its outer periphery. 
 
 It would be tiresome to follow the history of phrenological 
 variation through the works of Leune and Villars to those of Bisch- 
 off and Blode, which last represent the doctrine as it flourished 
 in 1805. In these, the whole complement of organs which Gall 
 ever admitted is detailed, with the exception of Ideality. But 
 their position was still vacillating. For example, in Froriep, Bisch- 
 off, and Blode, the organ of Destructiveness is exhibited as lying 
 principally on the parietal bone, above and a little anterior to the 
 organ of Combativeness ; while the region of the temporal bone, 
 above and before the opening of the ear, in other words, its present 
 situation, is marked as terra adhuc incognita. 
 
 No circumstance, however, is more remarkable than the succes- 
 sive changes of shape in the organs. Nothing can be more oppo- 
 site than the present form of these as compared with those which 
 the great work of Gall exhibits. In Gall's plates they are round 
 or oval, in the modern casts and plates they are of every variety 
 of angular configuration ; and I have been told that almost every 
 new edition of these varies from the preceding. We may, there- 
 fore, well apply to the phrenologist and his organology the line of 
 Horace * 
 
 " Diruit, sodificat, mutat quadrata rotundis," 
 
 with this modification, that we must read in the latter part, mutat 
 rotunda quadratis. 
 
 So much for Phrenology, for the doctrine which would substi- 
 tute the callipers for consciousness in the philosophy of man ; 
 and the result of my observation, the result at which I would 
 a Epist. L. i. ep. i. 100. ED.
 
 418 APPENDIX. 
 
 wish you also to arrive, I cannot better express than in the lan- 
 guage of the Roman poet a 
 
 " Materiae ne quaere modum, sed perspice vires 
 Quas ratio, non pondus habet." 
 
 In what I have said in opposition to the phrenological doctrine, 
 I should, however, regret if it could be ever supposed that I enter- 
 tain any feeling of disrespect for those who are converted to this 
 opinion. On the contrary, I am prompt to acknowledge that the 
 sect comprises a large proportion of individuals of great talent ; 
 and I am happy to count among these some of my most valued 
 and respected friends. To the question, how comes it that so 
 many able individuals can be believers in a groundless opinion ? 
 I answer, that the opinion is not wholly groundless ; it contains 
 much of truth, of old truth it must be allowed ; but it is assur- 
 edly no disparagement to any one that he should not refuse to 
 admit facts so strenuously asserted, and which, if true, so neces- 
 sarily infer the whole conclusions of the system. But as to the 
 mere circumstance of numbers, that is of comparatively little 
 weight, argumentum pessimi turba, and the phrenological doc- 
 trines are of such a nature that they are secure of finding ready 
 converts among the many. There have been also, and there are 
 now, opinions far more universally prevalent than the one in 
 question, which nevertheless we do not consider on that account 
 to be undeniable. 
 
 (6.) AN ACCOUNT of EXPERIMENTS on the WEIGHT and RELATIVE PRO- 
 PORTIONS of the BRAIN, CEREBELLUM, and TUBER ANNULARE in 
 MAN and ANIMALS, under the various circumstances of Age, Sex, 
 Country, <fec. 
 
 (Published in Dr MONRO'S Anatomy of the Brain, p. 4 8. 
 Edinburgh, 1831. ED.) 
 
 The following, among other conclusions, are founded on an induc- 
 tion drawn from above sixty human brains, from nearly three 
 hundred human skulls, of determined sex, the capacity of which, 
 by a method I devised, was taken in sand, and the original weight 
 of the brain thus recovered, and from more than seven hundred 
 brains of different animals. 
 
 a Manillas, iv. 929. F.D.
 
 APPENDIX. 419 
 
 1. In man, the adult male Encephalos is heavier than the female ; 
 the former nearly averaging, in the Scot's head, 3 Ib. 8 oz. troy, 
 the latter, 3 Ib. 4 oz. ; the difference, 4 oz. In males of this 
 country, about one brain in seven is found above 4 Ib. troy ; in 
 females, hardly one in one hundred. 
 
 2. In man, the Encephalos reaches its full size about seven years 
 of age. This was never before proved. It is commonly believed 
 that the brain and the body attain their full development together. 
 The Wenzels rashly generalised from two cases the conclusion, that 
 the brain reaches its full size about seven years of age ; as Scem- 
 mering had, in like manner, on a single case, erroneously assumed 
 that it attains its last growth by three. Gall and Spurzheim, on 
 the other hand, assert that the increase of the encephalos is only 
 terminated about forty. The result of my induction is deduced 
 from an average of thirty-six brains and skulls of children, com- 
 pared with an average of several hundred brains and skulls of 
 adults. It is perhaps superfluous to observe, that it is the greater 
 development of the bones, muscles, and hair, which renders the 
 adult head considerably larger than that of the child of seven. 
 
 3. It is extremely doubtful whether the cranial contents usually 
 diminish in old age. The vulgar opinion that they do, rests on no 
 adequate evidence, and my induction would rather prove the 
 negative. 
 
 4. The common doctrine, that the African brain, and in parti- 
 cular that of the Negro, is greatly smaller than the European, is 
 false. By a comparison of the capacity of two Caffre skulls, male 
 and female, and of thirteen negro crania, (six male, five female, and 
 two of doubtful sex), the encephalos of the African was found not 
 inferior to the average size of the European. 
 
 5. In man, the Cerebellum, in relation to the brain proper, comes 
 to its full proportion about three years. This anti-phrenological 
 fact is proved by a great induction. 
 
 6. It is extremely doubtful whether the Cerebellum usually 
 diminishes in old age ; probably only in cases of atrophia senilis. 
 
 7. The female Cerebellum is, in general, considerably larger in 
 proportion to the brain proper, than the male. In the human 
 subject, (the tuber excluded), the former is nearly as 1 to 7.6 ; the 
 latter nearly as 1 to 8.4 : and this sexual difference appears to be 
 more determinate in man than in most other animals. Almost
 
 420 APPENDIX. 
 
 the whole difference of weight between the male and female ence- 
 phali lies in the brain proper ; the cerebella of the two sexes, 
 absolutely, are nearly equal, the preponderance rather in favour of 
 the women. This observation is new ; and the truth of the phreno- 
 logical hypothesis implies the reverse. It confirms the theory of 
 the function of the cerebellum noticed in the following para- 
 graph. 
 
 8. The proportion of the Cerebellum to the Brain proper at birth, 
 varies greatly in different animals." 
 
 9. Castration has no effect in diminishing the cerebellum, either 
 absolutely or in relation to the brain proper.^ The opposite doc- 
 trine is an idle fancy ; though asserted by the phrenologists as their 
 most incontrovertible fact. Proved by a large induction. 
 
 1 0. The universal opinion is false, that man, of all or almost all 
 animals, has the smallest cerebellum in proportion to the brain 
 proper. Many of the commonest quadrupeds and birds have a 
 cerebellum, in this relation, proportionally smaller than man. 
 
 11. What has not been observed, the proportion of the Tuber 
 Annulare to the Cerebellum, (and, a majore, to the brain proper), is 
 greatly less in children than in adults. In a girl of one year, (in 
 my table of human brains), it is as 1 to 16.1 ; in another of two, 
 as 1 to 148 ; in a boy of three, as 1 to 15.5 ; and the average of 
 children under seven, exhibits the pores, in proportion to the cere- 
 bellum, much smaller than in the average of adults, in whom it is 
 only as 1 to 8, or 1 to 9. 
 
 12. In specific gravity, contrary to the current doctrine, the 
 encephalos and its parts vary very little, if at all, from one age to 
 another. A child of two, and a woman of a hundred years, are, in 
 this respect, nearly equal, and the intermediate ages show hardly 
 more than individual differences. 
 
 13. The specific gravity of the brain does not vary in madness, 
 (if one case of chronic insanity is to be depended on), contrary to 
 what has been alleged. In fever it often does, and remarkably. 
 
 14. The cerebellum, (the converse of the received opinion), has 
 
 a For the remainder of this section, the cerebellum. See the experiments 
 
 see above, Appendix II. (a) p. 411, recorded by M. Leuret, cited by Sir 
 
 "Physiologists," Ac., to p. 412, "mo- Benjamin Brodie, Psychological In- 
 
 tion." ED. quiries, note H. ED. 
 
 /3 The effect is, in fact, to increase
 
 APPENDIX. 421 
 
 a greater specific gravity than the brain proper ; and this difference 
 is considerably more marked in birds than in man and quadrupeda 
 The opinion also of the ancients is probably true, that the cere- 
 bellum is harder than the brain proper. 
 
 15. The human brain does not, as asserted, possess a greater 
 specific gravity than that of other animals. 
 
 (c.) REMARKS ON DE MORTON'S TABLES ON THE SIZE OF THE BRAIN. 
 
 (Communicated to the Editiburgh New Philosophical Journal, conducted 
 by Professor JAMESON. See Vol. XL VIII., p. 330 (1850). For Dr 
 MORTON'S Tables, see the same Journal, Vol. XLVIIL, p. 262. ED.) 
 
 What first strikes me in Dr Morton's Tables, completely invali- 
 dates his conclusions, he has not distinguished male from female 
 crania. Now, as the female encephalos is, on an average, some 
 four ounces troy less than the male, it is impossible to compare 
 national skulls with national skulls, in respect of their capacity, 
 unless we compare male with male, female with female heads, or, 
 at least, know how many of either sex go to make up the national 
 complement. 
 
 A blunder of this kind is made by Mr Sims, in his paper and 
 valuable correlative table of the weight of 253 brains (Medico 
 Chirurgical Transactions, vol. xix.) He there attacks the result 
 of my observation, (published by Dr Monro, Anatomy of the Brain, 
 &c., 1831), that the human encephalos, (brain proper and after- 
 brain), reaches its full size by seven years of age, perhaps some- 
 what earlier. In refutation of this paradox, he slumps the male and 
 female brains together ; and then, because he finds that the average 
 weight of his adults, among whom the males are greatly the more 
 numerous, is larger than the average weight of his impuberals, 
 among whom the females preponderate, he jumps at once to the 
 conclusion, that I am wrong, and that the encephalos continues to 
 grow, to diminish, and to grow again (!), for, I forget how long, 
 after the period of maturity. Fortunately, along with his crotchets, 
 he has given the detail of his weighings ; and his table, when 
 properly arranged, confutes himself, and superfluously confirms 
 me. That is, comparing the girls with the women, and the boys 
 with the men, it appears, from his own induction, that the cranial
 
 422 APPENDIX. 
 
 contents do reach the average amount, even before the age of 
 
 Tiedemann, (Das Him des Negers, &c., 1837, p. 4), notes the 
 contradiction of Sims' result and mine ; but he does not solve it. 
 The same is done, and not done, by Dr Bostock, in his Physiology. 
 Tiedemann, however, remarks, that his own observations coincide 
 with mine (p. 10) ; as is, indeed, evident from his Table, (p. 11), 
 " Of the cranial capacity from birth to adolescence," though, unfor- 
 tunately, in that table, but in that alone, he has not discriminated 
 the sex. 
 
 Dr Morton's conclusion as to the comparative size of the Negro 
 brain, is contrary to Tiedemann's larger, and to my smaller, induc- 
 tion, which concur in proving, that the Negro encephalos is not 
 less than the European, and greatly larger than the Hindoo, the 
 Ceylonese, and sundry other Asiatic brains. But the vice, already 
 noticed, of Dr Morton's induction, renders it, however extensive, 
 of no cogency in the question. 
 
 Dr Morton's method of measuring the capacity of the cranium, 
 is, certainly, no " invention " of his friend Mr Philips, being, in 
 either form, only a clumsy and unsatisfactory modification of mine. 
 Tiedemann's millet-seed affords, likewise, only an inaccurate ap- 
 proximation to the truth ; for seeds, as found by me, vary in 
 weight according to the drought and moisture of the atmosphere, 
 and are otherwise ill adapted to recover the size of the brain in 
 the smaller animals. The physiologists who have latterly followed 
 the method of filling the cranium, to ascertain the amount of the 
 cranial contents, have adopted, not without perversion, one-half of 
 my process, and altogether omitted the other. After rejecting 
 mustard-seed, which I first thought of employing, and for the 
 reasons specified, I found that pure silicious sand was the best mean 
 of accomplishing the purpose, from its suitable ponderosity, incom- 
 pressibility, equality of weight in all weathers, aud tenuity. Tiede- 
 mann, (p. 21), says, that he did not employ sand, " because, by its 
 greater specific gravity, it might easily burst the cranial bones at 
 the sutures." He would, by trial, have found that this objection is 
 futile. The thinnest skull of the youngest infant can resist the 
 pressure of sand, were it many times greater than it is ; even 
 Morton's lead shot proved harmless in this respect. But, while 
 nothing could answer the purpose better than sand, still this
 
 APPENDIX. 423 
 
 afforded only one, and that an inadequate, mean towards an end. 
 Another was requisite. By weighing the brain of a young and 
 healthy convict, who was hanged, and afterwards weighing the 
 sand which his prepared cranium contained, I determined the pro- 
 portion of the specific gravity of cerebral substance, (which in all 
 ages and animals is nearly equal), to the specific gravity of the 
 sand which was employed. I thus obtained a formula by which 
 to recover the original weight of the encephalos in all the crania 
 which were filled ; and hereby brought brains weighed and skulls 
 gauged into a universal relation. On the contrary, the comparisons 
 of Tiedemann and Morton, as they stand, are limited to their 
 own Tables. I have once and again tested the accuracy of this 
 process, by experiment, in the lower animals, and have thus perfect 
 confidence in the certainty of its result, be the problem to recover 
 the weight of the encephalos from the cranium of a sparrow, or 
 from the cranium of an elephant. 
 
 I may conclude by saying, that I have now established, apart 
 from the proof by averages, that the human encephalos does not 
 increase after the age of seven, at highest. This has been done, 
 by measuring the heads of the same young persons, from infancy 
 to adolescence and maturity ; for the slight increase in the size of 
 the head, after seven (or six) is exhausted by the development to 
 be allowed in the bones, muscles, integuments, and hair. 
 
 (The following is an unpublished Memorandum in reference to 
 preceding. ED.) 
 
 March 23, 1850. 
 
 Found that the specific weight of the sand I had employed for 
 measuring the capacity of crania, was that the sand filling 32 cubic 
 inches, weighed 12,160 grains. 
 
 Found at the same time that the millet-seed occupying the same 
 number of cubic inches, weighed 5665 grains. 
 
 Thus the proportion of millet-seed to sand, in specific gravity, is 
 as 1 : 2.147. 
 
 One cubic inch thus contains 380 grains sand ; and 177 grains 
 millet-seed.
 
 4?24 APPENDIX. 
 
 (<7.) ORIGINAL RESEARCHES ON THE FRONTAL SINUSES, WITH OBSER- 
 VATIONS ON THEIR BEARINGS ON THE DOGMAS OF PHRENOLOGY. 
 
 (From The Medical Times, May 1845, Vol. XII., p. 159 ; June 7, 1845, 
 VoL XII. p. 177 ; August 1845, Vol. XII. p. 371. ED.) 
 
 Before proceeding to state in detail the various facts and fictions 
 relative to the Frontal Sinus," it will be proper to premise some 
 necessary information touching the nature and relations of the 
 sinuses themselves. 
 
 The cruces phrenologorum are two cavities, separated from each 
 other by a perpendicular osseous partition, and formed between the 
 tables of the frontal bone, in consequence of a divergence of these 
 tables from their parallelism, as they descend to join the bones of 
 the nose, and to build the orbits of the eye. They are not, however, 
 mere inorganic vacuities, arising from the recession of the bony 
 plates ; they constitute a part of the olfactory apparatus ; they are 
 lined with a membrane, a continuation of the pituitary, and this, 
 copiously supplied with blood, secretes a lubricating mucus which 
 is discharged by an aperture into the nose. 
 
 Various theories have been proposed to explain the mode of 
 their formation ; but it is only the fact of their existence, frequency, 
 and degree, with which we are at present interested. In the foetus, 
 manifested only in rudiment, they are gradually, but in different 
 subjects variously developed, until the age of puberty; they appear 
 to obtain their ultimate expansion towards the age of twenty-five. 
 They are exclusively occasioned by the elevation of the external 
 
 o It ia proper to observe, that the worthy of a serious refutation ; and 
 notes, of which the following is an ab- should the detail of my observations ou 
 stract, were written above sixteen years these points be ever published, it will 
 ago, and have not since been added to, not be done in a polemical form. My 
 or even looked at. They were intended notes on the frontal sinuses having, 
 for part of a treatise to be entitled, however, been cast in relation to the 
 " The Fictions of Phrenology and the phrenological hypothesis, I have not 
 Facts of Mature." My researches, how- thought it necessary to take the labour 
 ever, particularly into the relations of of altering them, especially as the 
 the cerebellum, and the general growth phrenological fiction is, in truth, a com- 
 of the brain, convinced me that the plement of all possible errors on the sub- 
 phrenological doctrine was wholly un- ject of these cavities.
 
 APPENDIX. 425 
 
 table, which determines, in fact, the rise of the nose at the period 
 of adolescence, by affording to the nasal bones their formation and 
 support. 
 
 Sundiy hypotheses have likewise been advanced to explain their 
 uses, but it will be enough for us, from the universality of their 
 appearance, to refute the singular fancy of the phrenologists, that 
 these cavities are abnormal varieties, the product of old age or 
 disease. 
 
 But though the sinuses are rarely if ever absent, their size in 
 every dimension varies to infinity. Laying aside all rarer enormi- 
 ties, and speaking, of course, only of subjects healthy and in the 
 prime of life, in superficial extent the sinus sometimes reaches 
 hardly above the root of the nose, sometimes it covers nearly the 
 whole forehead, penetrates to the bottom of the orbit, and, turning 
 the external angle of the eyebrow, is terminated only at the junc- 
 tion of the frontal and parietal bones. Now, a sinus is small, or 
 almost null upon one side, on the other it is, perhaps, unusually 
 large ; while in no dimension are the two cavities, in general, 
 strictly correspondent, even although the outer forehead present 
 the most symmetrical appearance. In depth (or transverse dis- 
 tance between the tables) the sinus is equally inconstant, varying 
 indeterminably in different heads, from a line or less to half an 
 inch and more. Now, a sinus gradually disappears by a gradual 
 convergence of its walls ; now these walls, after running nearly 
 parallel, suddenly unite. Now, the depth of the cavity decreases 
 from centre to circumference ; now, the plates approximate in 
 the middle and recede farther from each other, immediately 
 before they ultimately unite. In one cranium, a sinus, collected 
 within itself, is fairly rounded off; in another, it runs into meander- 
 ing bays, or is subdivided into separate chambers, these varying 
 without end in their relative capacity and extent. In depth, as 
 well as in extent, the capacity of the sinus is thus wholly indeter- 
 minable ; and no one can predict, from external observation, 
 whether the cavity shall be a lodging scanty for a fly or roomy 
 for a mouse. 
 
 It is an error of the grossest, that the extent of the sinus is in- 
 dicated by a ridge, or crest, or blister, in the external bony plate. 
 Such a protuberance has no certain or even probable relation to 
 the extent, depth, or even existence, of any vacuity beneath. Over
 
 426 APPENDIX. 
 
 the largest cavities there is frequently no bony elevation ; and 
 women, in whose crania these protuberances are in general absent 
 or very small, exhibit the sinuses as universally existent, and not, 
 perhaps, proportionably less extensive than those of men. The ex- 
 ternal ridge, however prominent, is often merely a sudden outward 
 thickening of the bony wall, which sometimes has a small, some- 
 times no cavity at all, beneath. Apart also from the vacuity, 
 though over the region of the sinus, no quarter of the cranium 
 presents greater differences in thickness, whether in different sub- 
 jects or in the same head, than the plates and diploe of the frontal 
 bone ; and I have found that the bony walls themselves presented 
 an impediment which varied inappreciably from three to thirteen 
 lines : "fronti nulla fides." 
 
 But the "fronti nulla fides'' in a phrenological relation, is 
 further illustrated by the accidents of its sinus, which all concur 
 in manifesting the universality and possibly capacious size of that 
 cavity. That cavity is sometimes occupied by stony concretions, 
 and is the seat of ulcers, cancer, polypus, and sarcoma. When 
 acutely inflamed the sensibility of its membrane becomes painfully 
 intense ; and every one has experienced its irritation when simply 
 affected with catarrh. The mucosity of this membrane, the great 
 extent and security of the caverns, joined with their patent open- 
 ings into the nose, render the sinuses a convenient harbour for the 
 nidulation, hatching, and nourishment of many parasitic animals ; 
 indeed, the motley multitude of its guests might almost tempt us 
 to regard it as 
 
 -" The cistern for all creeping things 
 
 To knot and gender in." a 
 
 " Chacun a son Vercoquin dans la teste " " Quemque suus 
 vellicat Vermis " are adages which, from the vulgarity of the 
 literal occurrence, would seem more than metaphorically true. & 
 With a frequency sometimes epidemic,')' flies and insects here 
 
 a " Or keep it as a cistern for foul Voigtel, ffandb. d. Pathol. Anat. 1804, 
 
 toads vol. i. p. 292. I quote him, instar 
 
 To knot and gender in." omnium, as one of the best and one of 
 
 Othello, act iv. sc. 2. ED. the most recent authorities. 
 
 3 In the frontal sinuses worms and y Forestus, Obs. Med., lib. xxi. schol, 
 
 insects are not unfrequently found. 28.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 427 
 
 ascend to spawn their eggs, and maggots (other than phrenological) 
 are bred and fostered in these genial labyrinths. Worms, in every 
 loathsome diversity of slime and hair reptiles armed with fangs, 
 crawlers of a hundred feet, ejected by the score, and varying 
 from an inch to half an ell in length, cause by their suction, bur- 
 rowing, and erosion, excruciating headache, convulsions, delirium, 
 and phrensy. With many a nameless or nondescript visitor, the 
 leech, the lumbricus, the ascaris, the ascarius lumbricoides, the 
 fasciola, the eruca, the oniscus, the gordius, the forficula, the scolo- 
 pendra, the scorpiodes, and even the scorpion,* are by a hundred 
 observers recorded as finding in these " antres vast," these " spe- 
 lunci ferarum," a birthplace or an asylum. And the fact, suffi- 
 ciently striking in itself, is not without significance in relation to 
 the present inquiry, that these intruders principally infest the 
 
 a Hollerius, De Morb. Int. lib. i. c. 1 ; 
 Gesner, Hist. Anat., lib. v. ; Boneti, 
 Sepul. 06s., 121 ; Ferretti. I here refer 
 to the scorpion alone. 
 
 Long before the sinus was anatomi- 
 cally described by Carpi, this pathologi- 
 cal fact had been well known to physi- 
 cians. The prescription of the Delphic 
 oracle to Demosthenes of Athens for his 
 epilepsy shows that the Greeks were 
 aware of the existence of worms in the 
 frontal sinuses of the goat. (Alex. 
 Trallian, lib. i. c. 15.) Among the Ara- 
 bians, Avicenna (Fenestella, lib. iii. tr. 2, 
 c. 3) tells us it was well known to the 
 Indian physicians, that worms were 
 generated in the forehead immediately 
 above the root of the nose, were fre- 
 quently the cause of headaches ; and 
 Rhazes (Continet, lib. i. c. 10) observes 
 that this was the opinion of Schare and 
 others. Among the moderns, my medi- 
 cal ignorance suggests more authorities 
 than I can almost summon patience 
 simply to name. The curious reader 
 may consult, among others, Valescus de 
 Taranta, Nicolaus de Nicolis, Vega, 
 Marcellus Donatus, Trincavelli, Bene- 
 detti, Hollerius, Duretus, Fabricius 
 Hildanus, Zacuta Lusitanus, Hercules 
 de Saxonia, Petrus Paulua Magnus, An- 
 gellinus, Alsarius, Cornelius Gemma, 
 
 Gesner, Benevenius, Fernelius, Rio- 
 lanus, Forestus, Bartholinus, Ferretti, 
 Rolfinck, Olaus Wormius (who himself 
 ejected a worm from the nose was it a 
 family affection ?) Smetius (who also 
 relates his own case), Tulpius, Heurnius, 
 Roussfeus, Monardis, Schenk, Senertus, 
 Montuus, Borelli, Bonetus, Hertodius, 
 Kerkringius,Joubert,Volkammer,Wohl- 
 farth, Nannoni, Stalpert, Vander Wiel, 
 MorgagnijClericus, De Blegny, Salzmann, 
 Honold, Hill, Kilgour, Littre, Maloet, 
 Sandifort, Henkel, Harder, Stocket, 
 Slabber, Nil Rosen, Razoux, Schaar- 
 schmidt, Quelmatz, Wolf, Blumenbach, 
 Ploucquet, Baur, Riedlin, Zacharides, 
 Lange, Boettcher, Welge, Wrisberg, 
 Troia, Voigtel, Rudolphi, Bremser, &c., 
 Ac. ; and of journals Ephem. Misc. ; 
 A eta et Nova A eta Curios. Nat. ; Corn- 
 mere. Liter., Nov. 2 ; Breslauer Samm- 
 lung ; Duncan's Med. Journ.; Edinb. 
 Med. Essays; London Chronicle; Phi- 
 ladelphia Transactions; Blumenbach's 
 Med. Bibl, &c., &c. 
 
 1 may here mention, that the nidula- 
 tion of the oestrus ovinus (which occa- 
 sionally infects the human sinus) forms 
 a frequent epidemic among sheep and 
 goats. The horse, the dog (and pro- 
 bably most other animals) are similarly 
 afflicted.
 
 428 APPENDIX. 
 
 sinuses of women, and more especially before the period of full 
 puberty. 
 
 Such is the great and inappreciable variation of the frontal 
 sinus and its walls, that we may well laugh at every attempt to 
 estimate, in that quarter, the development of any part of the sub- 
 jacent hemispheres, were that part larger than the largest even of 
 the pretended phrenological organs. But this is nothing. Behind 
 these spacious caverns, in utter ignorance of the extent, frequency, 
 and even existence of this impediment, the phrenologists have 
 placed, not one large, but seventeen of their very smallest organs ; 
 and have thus enabled an always insurmountable obstacle to ope- 
 rate in disproof of their system in its highest intensity. 
 
 By concentrating all their organs of the smallest size within the 
 limits of the sinus, they have, in the first place, carried all those 
 organs whose range of development was least, behind the obstacle 
 whose range of development was greatest. Where the cranium 
 is thinner and comparatively more equal in thickness, they have 
 placed all the organs, (those of the propensities and sentiments), 
 which present the broadest surface, and, as they themselves assure 
 us, varying in their development from the centre to circumference 
 by an inch and upwards ; while all the organs, (those of the intel- 
 lect), which have the narrowest expansion, and whose varying range 
 of development from the centre is stated to be only a quarter of 
 an inch, (less even than the fourth of the variation of the others), 
 these have been accumulated behind an impediment whose ordi- 
 nary differences are far more than sufficient to explain every 
 gradation of the pretended development of the pretended organs 
 from their smallest to their largest size. 
 
 In the second place, they have thus at once thrown one half of 
 their whole organology beyond the verge of possible discovery and 
 possible proof. 
 
 In the third place, by thus evincing that their observations on 
 that one half had been only illusive fancies, they have afforded a 
 criterion of the credit to be fairly accorded to their observations 
 in relation to the other ; they have shown in this, as in other parts 
 
 a Combe's System, &c., p. 31. "The amounts to an inch and upwards ; and 
 
 difference in development between a to a quarter of an inch in the organs of 
 
 large and a small organ of the propen- intellect, which are naturally smaller 
 
 sities and some of the sentiments, than the others."
 
 APPENDIX. 429 
 
 of their doctrine, that manifestation and development are quanti- 
 ties which, be they what they may, can on their doctrine always 
 be brought to an equation. 
 
 Nay, in the fourth place, as if determined to transcend them- 
 selves to find " a lower deep beneath the lowest deep," they have 
 even placed the least of their least organs at the very point where 
 this, the greatest obstacle, was in its highest potency, by placing 
 the organs of configuration, size, weight, and resistance, &c., to- 
 wards the internal angle of the eyebrow, the situation where the 
 sinus is almost uniformly deepest." 
 
 Nor, in the fifth place, were they less unfortunate in the location 
 of the rest of their minutest organs. These they arranged in a 
 series along the upper edge of the orbit, where, independently even 
 of the sinus, the bone varies more in thickness, from one indivi- 
 dual and from one nation to another, than in any other part of the 
 skull ; and where these organs, hardly larger, are packed together 
 more closely than peas in a pod. These pretended organs, if they 
 even severally protruded from the brain, as they never do if no 
 sinus intervened and if, instead of lying under the thickest, they 
 were situate under the thinnest bone of the cranium ; these petty 
 organs could not, even in these circumstances, reveal their develop- 
 ment by determining any elevation, far less any sudden elevation, 
 of the incumbent bone. That bone they could only attenuate at 
 the point of contact, by causing an indentation on its inner surface. 
 This is shown by what are called the glands of Pacchioni, though 
 erroneously. These bodies, which are often found as large as, or 
 larger than, the organs in question, and which arise on the coronal 
 surface of the encephalos, attenuate to the thinnest, but never ele- 
 vate in the slightest, the external bony plate, though there the 
 action of the muscles presents a smaller impediment to a partial 
 elevation than in the superciliary region. This I have frequently 
 taken note of. 
 
 As it is, these minute organs are expected to betray their dis- 
 tinct and relative developments through the obstacle of two thick 
 bony walls, and a large intervening chamber ; the varying differ- 
 
 o Every oae who has ever examined in loco fere ossium laminae a se inricem 
 
 the sinus knows that what Schulze has maxime distant." (De Cav.Cranii,Acta 
 
 observed is true "in illo angulo qui Phyg. Med. Acad. Ccfi., i. p. 508.) 
 ad nares est, cavitatis fundus est, et hoc
 
 430 APPENDIX. 
 
 ence of the impediment being often considerably greater than the 
 whole diameter even of the organs themselves. The fact, however, 
 is, that these organs are commonly, if not always, developed only 
 in the bone, and may be cut out of the cranium, even in an impu- 
 beral skull destitute of the sinus, without trenching on the confines 
 of the brain itself. At the external angle of the eyebrow at the 
 organ of slumber, the bone, exclusive of any sinus, is sometimes 
 found to exceed an inch in thickness. 
 
 How then have the phrenologists attempted to obviate the objec- 
 tion of the sinus ? 
 
 The first organs which Gall excogitated, he placed in the region 
 of the sinus ; and it is manifest he was then in happy unacquaint- 
 ance with everything connected with that obnoxious cavity. In 
 ignorance, however, Gall was totally eclipsed by Spurzheim ; who, 
 while he seems even for a time unaware of its existence as a nor- 
 mal occurrence, has multiplied the number and diminished the 
 size of the organs which the sinus regularly covers. By both the 
 founders, their organology was published before they had discovered 
 the formidable nature of the impediment, and then it was too late 
 to retract. They have attempted, indeed, to elude the objection ; 
 but the manner in which they have floundered on from blunder to 
 blunder, blunders not more inconsistent with each other, than 
 contrary to the fact, shows that they have never dared to open 
 their eyes on the reality, or never dared to acknowledge their con- 
 viction of its effect. The series of fictions in relation to the frontal 
 sinus, is, out of Phrenology, in truth, unparalleled in the history of 
 science. These fictions are substituted for facts the simplest and 
 most palpable in nature ; they are substituted for facts contra- 
 dicted by none, and proclaimed by every anatomical authority ; 
 and they are substituted for facts which, as determining the com- 
 petency of phrenological proof, ought not to have been rejected 
 without a critical refutation by the founders of that theory them- 
 selves. But while it seemed possible for the phrenologists to find 
 only truth, they have yet continued to find nothing but error 
 error always at the greatest possible distance from the truth. But 
 if they were thus so curiously wrong in matters so easy, notorious, 
 and fundamental, how far may we not presume them to have gone 
 astray where they were not, as it were, preserved from wandering ? 
 
 The fictions by which phrenologists would obviate the objection
 
 APPENDIX. 431 
 
 of the frontal sinus, may, with the opposing facts, be divided into 
 four classes ; as they relate 1, to its nature and effect ; 2, to 
 its indication; 3, to its frequency ; and 4, to its size. 
 
 I. NATURE AND EFFECT OF THE SINUS. 
 
 Fact. The frontal sinus only exists in consequence of the 
 recession of the two cranial tables from their parallelism ; and as 
 this recession is inappreciable, consequently, no indication is 
 afforded by the external plate of the eminence or depression of the 
 brain, in contact with the internal. 
 
 To this fact, Gall opposed the following 
 
 Fiction. The frontal sinus interposes no impediment to the 
 observation of cerebral development ; for as the walls of this 
 cavity are exactly parallel, the effect of the brain upon the inner 
 table must consequently be expressed by the outer. 
 
 Authorities for the Fiction. This fiction was originally ad- 
 vanced by Gall, in his Lectures, and, though never formally re- 
 tracted, has not been repeated by him or Spurzheim in their works 
 subsequently published. I therefore adduce it, not as an opinion 
 now actually held by the phrenologists, but as a part only of that 
 cycle of vacillation and absurdity which, in their attempts to elude 
 the objection of the sinus, they have fruitlessly accomplished. 
 That it was so originally advanced, is shown by the following 
 authorities ; which, as beyond the reach of readers in general, I 
 shall not merely refer to, but translate. 
 
 The first is Froriep ; and I quote from the 3d edition of his 
 Darstellung, &c., which appeared in 1802. This author was a 
 pupil and friend of Gall, on whose doctrine he delivered lectures, 
 and his work is referred to by Gall, in his Apologetic Memorial to 
 the Austrian Government, in that very year, as containing an 
 authentic exposition of his opinions. " Although at this place the 
 frontal sinuses are found, and here constitute the vaulting of the 
 forehead, nevertheless, Gall maintains that the brain, in conse- 
 quence of the walls of the sinuses lying quite parallel (? !), is able 
 to affect likewise the outer plate, and to determine its protuber- 
 ance." P. 01. The doubt and wonder are by the disciple him- 
 self. 
 
 The second authority is Bartels, whose Antliropologische 
 VOL. I. 2 E
 
 432 APPENDIX. 
 
 Bemerkungen appeared in 1806. "In regard to the important 
 objection drawn from the frontal sinuses, Gall's oral reply is very 
 conformable to nature. ' Here, notwithstanding the intervening 
 cavity in the bones, there is found a parallelism between the ex- 
 ternal and internal plates of the cranium.' " P. 125. 
 
 Proof of the Fact. In refutation of a fiction so ridiculous, it is 
 unnecessary to say a single word ; even the phrenologists now 
 define the sinus by " a divergence from parallelism between the 
 two tables of the bone/' 
 
 It was only in abandoning this one fiction, and from the con- 
 viction that the sinus, when it existed, did present an insuperable 
 obstacle to observation, that the phrenologists were obliged to 
 resort to a plurality of fictions of far inferior efficacy ; for what 
 mattered it to them, whether these cavities were indiscoverable, 
 frequent, and capacious, if, in effect, they interposed no obstacle 
 to an observation of the brain ? 
 
 II. INDICATION OF THE SINUS. 
 
 Fact. There is no correlation between the extent and existence 
 of a sinus, and the existence and extent of any elevation, whether 
 superciliary or glabellar ; either may be present without the 
 other, and when both are coexistent they hold no reciprocal pro- 
 portion in dimension or figure. Neither is there any form what- 
 ever of cranial development which guarantees either the absence 
 or the presence of a subjacent cavity. 
 
 To this fact the phrenologists are unanimous in opposing the fol- 
 lowing 
 
 Fiction- The sinus, when present, betrays its existence and 
 extent by an irregular elevation of a peculiar character, under the 
 appearance of a bony ridge, or crest, or blister, and is distinguished 
 from the regular forms under which the phrenological organs are 
 developed. 
 
 Authorities for the fiction. It is sufficient to adduce Gallfl 
 and Spurzheim,7 followed by Combe, 8 and the phrenologists in 
 general. In support of their position, they adduce no testimony 
 by anatomists, no evidence from nature. 
 
 o Combe, System, p. 32. y Phys. Syst., p. 236 ; Exam, of 
 
 /3 Anat. et Phys., t. iv. p. 43, et seq. ; Object, p. 79 ; Phren., p. 115. 
 and, in the same terms, Sur les Fwict. 5 Syst., pp. 21, 35, 308.
 
 APPENDIX. 433 
 
 Proof of the fact. All anatomical authority, as will be seen in 
 the sequel, is opposed to the fiction, for every anatomist concurs 
 in holding that the sinuses are rarely, if ever, absent ; whereas the 
 crests or blisters which the phrenologists regard as an index of 
 these cavities, are of comparatively rare occurrence. It must be 
 admitted, however, that some anatomists have rashly connected 
 the extent of the internal sinus with the extent of the external 
 elevation. The statement of the fact is the result of my own 
 observation of above three hundred crania ; and any person who 
 would in like manner interrogate nature, will find that the largest 
 sinuses are frequently in those foreheads which present no super- 
 ciliary or glabellar elevations. I may notice, that of the fifty skulls 
 whose phrenological development was marked under the direction 
 of Spurzheim, and of which a table is appended, the one only head 
 where the frontal sinuses are noted, from the ridge, as present, is 
 the male cranium No. 19 ; and that cranium, it will be seen, has 
 sinuses considerably beneath even the average extent 
 
 III. FREQUENCY OF THE SlNUS. 
 
 Fact. The sinuses are rarely, if ever, wanting in any healthy 
 adult head of either sex. 
 
 To this fact, the phrenologists oppose the three following 
 inconsistent fictions : 
 
 Fiction I. The sinuses are only to be found in some male 
 heads, being frequently absent in men until a pretty advanced age. 
 
 Fiction II. In women the sinuses are rarely found. 
 
 Fiction III. The presence of the sinus is abnormal ; young 
 and adult persons have no cavities between the tables of the frontal 
 bone the real frontal sinuses occurring only in old persons, or 
 after chronic insanity. 
 
 Authorities for fiction I. This fiction is held in terms by 
 Gall. The other phrenologists, as we shall see, are much further 
 in the wrong. But even for this fiction they have adduced no 
 testimony of other observers, and detailed no observations of their 
 own. 
 
 Proof of the fact in opposition to this fiction. All anatomists 
 there is not a single exception concur in maintaining a doc- 
 
 a As quoted above.
 
 434 APPENDIX. 
 
 trine diametrically opposed to the figment of the phrenologists, 
 that the sinuses are, even in men, frequently or generally absent. 
 Some, however, assert that the sinus in a state of health is never 
 wanting ; while others insist that, though very rarely, cases do 
 occur in which it is actually deficient. 
 
 Of the latter opinion, Fallopius holds that they are present "in 
 all adults," except occasionally in the case of simous foreheads, an 
 exception which Riolanus/s and others have shown to be false. 
 Schulze,? Winslow,s Buddeus,* "that they are sometimes absolutely 
 wanting in cases where the cranium is spongy and honeycombed" 
 Palfyn, C " that they are sometimes, though rarely, absent." Wit- 
 tich, *> " that they are almost always present, though it may be 
 admitted, that in some very rare cases they are wanting ;" and 
 Stalpart Van der "Weil fl relates, that "he had seen in Nuck's 
 Museum, preserved as a special rarity, a cranium without a fron- 
 tal sinus." Of more recent authorities, Hippolyte Cloquet 1 ob- 
 serves, "that they are seldom wanting;" and the present Dr 
 Monro * found, in forty-five skulls, that while three only were with- 
 out the sinus, in two of them, (as observed by Schuke, Winslow, 
 and Buddeus), the cavity had merely been filled up by the deposi- 
 tion of a spongy bone. 
 
 Of the former opinion, which holds that the sinus is always pre- 
 sent, I need only quote, instar omnium, the authority of Blumen- 
 bach, A. whose illustrious reputation is in a peculiar manner asso- 
 ciated with the anatomy of the human cranium, and who even 
 celebrated his professional inauguration by a dissertation, in some 
 respects the most elaborate we possess, on the Frontal Sinuses 
 themselves. This anatomist cannot be persuaded, even on the 
 observation of Highmore, Albinus, Haller, and the first Monro, 
 that normal cases ever occur of so improbable a defect ; " for," he 
 says, " independently of the diseases afterwards to be considered, I 
 can with difficulty admit, that healthy individuals are ever wholly 
 destitute of the frontal sinus ; on the contrary, I am convinced 
 
 o Opera. C Ost., p. 105. 
 
 Comm. de Oss., p. 468. i) De Olfactu, p. 17. 
 
 y De Sin. Oss. Cap. A eta Phys. Med- 6 Obs. Rar. Cent. Post, pare prior, 
 
 Leap. Cat., vol. i. obs. 288. obs. 4. 
 
 8 Expos. Anat. tr. des Oss. Sees., sec. < Anat. Descr., sec. 153, ed. 1824. 
 
 30. K Elem. of Anat. i. p. 134. 
 
 * 06*. Anat. Sel, obs. 1. A De Sin. Front., p. 5.
 
 APPENDIX. 435 
 
 that these distinguished men have not applied the greatest dili- 
 gence and research." In this opinion, as observed by the present 
 Dr Monro, a Blumenbach is supported by the concurrence of Ber- 
 tin, Portal, Sommering, Caldani, &c. Nor does the fiction obtain 
 any countenance from the authors whom Blumenbach opposes. I 
 have consulted them, and find that they are all of that class of 
 anatomists who regard the absence of the sinus, though a possible, 
 as a rare and memorable phenomenon. Highmore^ founds his 
 assertion on the single case of a female. Albums,? on his own 
 observation, and on that of other anatomists, declares that " the 
 sinuses are very rarely absent." The first Monro, 8 speaking of 
 their infinite variety in size and figure, notices as a remarkable 
 occurrence that he had " even seen cases in which they were ab- 
 solutely wanting." And Haller* is only able to establish the 
 exception on the case of a solitary cranium. 
 
 My own experience is soon stated. Having examined above 
 three hundred crania for the purpose of determining this point, I 
 have been unable to find a single skull wholly destitute of a sinus. 
 In crania, which were said to be examples of their absence, I 
 found that the sinus still existed. In some, indeed, I found it 
 only on one side, and in many not ascending to the point of the 
 glabellar region, through which crania are usually cut round. The 
 only instances of its total deficiency are, I believe, those abnormal 
 cases in which, as observed by anatomists, the original cavity has 
 been subsequently occupied by a pumicose deposit. Of this de- 
 posit the only examples I met with occurred in males. 
 
 Authorities for fiction II. This fiction also is in terms main- 
 tained by Gall. C Neither he nor any other phrenologist has ad- 
 duced any proof of this paradox, nor is there, I believe, to be found 
 a single authority for its support ; while its refutation is involved 
 in the refutation already given to fiction I. Nannoni,^ indeed, 
 says " the opinion of Fallopius that the frontal sinuses are often 
 wanting in women, is refuted by observation ; " but Fallopius says 
 nothing of the sort. It is also a curious circumstance, that the 
 great majority of cases in which worms, &<x, have been found 
 
 a Elem., vol. i. p. 133. 8 Osteol. par Sue, p. 54. 
 
 Disq. Anat. lib. iii. c. 4. c Elem. Phys. v. p. 138. 
 
 7 Annot. A cad., lib. i. c. 11, et Tab. C As above. 
 
 Oaa. ij Trattato de Anatomic, 1788, p. 55.
 
 43G APPENDIX. 
 
 in the sinus, have occurred in females. This is noticed by Salz- 
 mann and Honold." 
 
 My own observations, extending, as I have remarked, to above 
 three hundred crania, confirms the doctrine of all anatomists, that 
 in either sex, the absence of this cavity is a rare and abnormal 
 phenomenon, if not an erroneous assertion. I may notice, by the 
 way, the opinion of some anatomists, that the sinuses are smaller 
 in women than in men, seems to be the result of too hasty an 
 induction ; and I am inclined to think, from all I have observed, 
 that proportionally to the less size of the female cranium, they 
 will be found equally extensive with the male. 
 
 Authorities for fiction III. This fiction was maintained by 
 Spurzheim while in this country, from one of whose publications? 
 it is extracted. It is, perhaps, one of the highest flights of phreno- 
 logical fancy. Nor has it failed of exciting emulation in the sect. 
 " While a man/' says Sir George Mackenzie, 5 " is in the prime 
 of life, and healthy, and manifests the faculties of the frontal 
 organs, such a cavity very seldom exists "(!)*****" We 
 have examined a GREAT MANY skulls, and we have not yet seen 
 ONE having the sinus, that could be proved to have belonged to a 
 person in the vigour of life and mind." (! !) Did Sir George ever 
 see any skull which belonged to any " person in the vigour of life 
 and mind " without a sinus ? Did he ever see any adult skull of 
 any person whatever in which such a cavity was not to be found ? 
 
 Proof of the fact, in opposition to this fiction. This fiction 
 deserves no special answer. It is already more than sufficiently 
 refuted under the first. 
 
 It is true, indeed, the doctrine that the frontal sinuses wax large 
 in old age is stated in many anatomical works. I find it as far back 
 as those of Vidus Vidius and Fallopius, but I find no ground for 
 such a statement in nature. This I assert on a comparative exa- 
 mination of some thirty aged skulls. In fact, about the smallest 
 frontal sinus that I ever saw, was in the head of a woman who 
 was accidentally killed in her hundred and first year. (See also 
 the appended Table.) I take this indeed for one of the instances 
 in which anatomical authors have blindly copied each other ; so 
 
 a De Verm. e. Nar. Excuss. (Haller, y Answer to Objections against the 
 
 Di*p. Med. Pract. i. n. 25.) Doctrines of Gall, &c., p. 79. 
 
 In-star omnium, v. Sommering, De 8 Illustrations, p. 228. 
 P. C. E. i. sec. 62.
 
 APPENDIX. 437 
 
 that what originates in a blunder or a rash induction, ends in 
 having, to appearance, almost catholic authority in its favour. A 
 curious instance of this sequacity occurs to me. The common 
 fowl has an encephalos, in proportion to its body, about as one to 
 five hundred ; that is, it has a brain less, by relation to its body, 
 than almost any other bird or beast. Pozzi (Puteus), in a small 
 table which he published, gave the proportion of the encephalos 
 of the cock to its body, by a blunder, at about half its amount ; 
 that is, as one to two hundred and fifty. Haller, copying Pozzi's 
 observation, dropt the cipher, and records in his table, the brain 
 of the common fowl as bearing a proportion to the body of one to 
 twenty-five. This double error was shortly copied by Cuvier, 
 Tiedemann, and, as I have myself noticed, by some twenty other 
 physiologists ; so that, at the present moment, to dispute the fact 
 of the common fowl having a brain more than double the size of 
 the human, in proportion to its body, would be to maintain a 
 paradox counter to the whole stream of scientific authority. The 
 doctrine of the larger the sinus the older the skull, stands, I believe, 
 on no better footing. Indeed, the general opinion, that the brain 
 contracts in the decline of life, is, to say the least of it, very doubt- 
 ful, as I may take another opportunity of showing. 
 
 As to the effect of chronic insanity in amplifying the sinuses, I 
 am a sceptic ; for I have seen no such effect in the crania of mad- 
 men which I have inspected. At all events, admitting the phreno- 
 logical fancy, it could have no influence on the question, for the 
 statistics of insanity show, that there could not be above one 
 cranium in four hundred where madness could have exerted any 
 effect. 
 
 IV. EXTENT OF THE SINUS. 
 
 Fact. While the sinus is always regularly present, it, however, 
 varies appreciably in its extent. For whilst, on the average, it 
 affects six or seven organs, it is, however, impossible to determine 
 whether it be confined to one or extended to some seventeen of 
 these. 
 
 This fact is counter to three phrenological fictions : 
 
 Fiction I. The frontal sinus is a small cavity. 
 
 Fiction II. The frontal sinus, when present, affects only the 
 organ of locality.
 
 438 APPENDIX. 
 
 Fiction III. When the sinus does exist, it only extends an 
 obstacle over two organs, (Size and Lower Individuality), or at 
 most, partially affects a third, (Locality). 
 
 Authorities for fiction I. Mr Combe a maintains this fiction, 
 that the frontal sinus " is a small cavity." 
 
 Authorities for fiction II. Gall ^ contemplates and speaks of 
 the sinus as only affecting locality ; and the same may be said of 
 Spurzheim, in his earlier English works.? 
 
 Authorities for fiction III. This fiction is that into which 
 Spurzheim modified his previous paradoxes, when, hi 1825, he 
 published his " Phrenology." 8 Mr Combe allows that the sinus, 
 in ordinary cases, extends over locality, as well as over size and 
 lower individuality. 
 
 All these fictions are, however, sufficiently disproved at once by 
 the following 
 
 Proof of the fact. The phrenologists term the sinus, (when they 
 allow it being), " a small cavity." Compare this with the descrip- 
 tion given by impartial anatomists of these caverns. Vidus 
 Vidius e characterises them by " spatium non parvum ; " Ban- 
 hinus C styles them " cavitates insignes ; " Spigelius, 7 ' " cavernse 
 satis amplce ; " Laurentius, 8 " sinus amplissimi ; " Bartholinus,' 
 " cavitates amplissimce ; " Petit,* " grands cavite's irregulieres ; " 
 Sabatier, A " cavite's larges et profondes;" Sb'mmering,M " cava 
 ampla ;" Monro, primus, v "great cavities ; " and his grandson,! 
 " large cavities/' 
 
 The phrenologists further assert, that in ordinary cases the 
 frontal sinus covers only two petty organs and a half ; that is, 
 extends only a few lines beyond the root of the nose. But what 
 teach the anatomists ? "The frontal sinuses," says Portal, "are 
 much more extensive than is generally believed." " In general," 
 says Professor Walther,* " the sinuses ascend in height nearly to 
 the middle of the frontal bone." Patissierp observes, that "their 
 
 a System, p. 32. i Anat. lib. iv., c. 6. 
 
 /3 As quoted above. it Palfyn An. ch. i. p. 52. 
 
 7 Phys. Syst., p. 236, and Exam, of A. Anat. 
 
 Obj. p. 79. M De Fob. L sec. 35. 
 
 5 P. 115. v Osteol. par Sne, p. 54. 
 Anat. lib. ii. c. 2. { Elements. 
 
 C Anat. lib. iii. c. 5. e Anat. Med. i. pp. 102, 238. 
 
 U De Fabr. lib. ii. c. 5. Abh, r. trokn. Kn., p. 133. 
 
 6 Hist. Anat. lib. ii. c. 9. p Diet, ties Sc. Med., t. 51, p. 372.
 
 APPENDIX. 439 
 
 extent varies to infinity, is sometimes stretched upwards to the 
 frontal protuberances, and to the sides, as far as the external 
 orbitar apophyses, as is seen hi many crania in the cabinet of the 
 Paris Faculty of Medicine." Bichat a delivers the same doctrine 
 nearly in the same words ; which, contradicted by none, is main- 
 tained by Albinus,0 Haller,? Buddeus, 5 Monro primus* and 
 tertius Blumenbach, 7 ' Sommering, Fife,' Cloquet," Velpeau,* 
 and, in a word, by every osteologist ; for all represent these 
 cavities as endless in their varieties, and extending not unfre- 
 quently to the outer angles of the eyebrow, and even to the 
 parietal bones. To finish by a quotation from one of the last and 
 best observers : " In relation," says Voigtel,^ " to their abnormal 
 greatness or smallness, the differences, in this respect, whether in 
 one subject as compared with another, or in one sinus in relation 
 to the opposite of the same skull, are of so frequent occurrence 
 that they vary almost in every cranium. They are found so small, 
 that their depth, measured from before backwards, is hardly more 
 than a line ; in others, on the contrary, a space of from four, five, 
 to six lines, (i. e. half an inch), is found between the anterior and 
 posterior wall. Still more remarkable are the variations of these 
 cavities, in relation to their height, as they frequently rise from 
 the trifling height of four lines to an inch at the glabella." M. 
 Velpeau, speaking of this great and indeterminable extent of the 
 sinus, adds : " this disposition must prevent us from being able to 
 judge of the volume of the anterior parts of the brain by the 
 exterior of the cranium ; " an observation sufficiently obvious 
 in relation to Phrenology, and previously made by the present Dr 
 Monro." 
 
 On the sinus and its extent, two anatomists only, as far as I am 
 aware, have given an articulate account of their inductions 
 Schulze, and the present Dr Monro. 
 
 The former, who wrote a distinct treatise On the Cavities or 
 Sinuses of the Cranial Bones, examined only ten skulls, and does 
 
 a Anat. Desc., c. i. p. 102. Anat. Descr. 1. 1, sec. 153, edit. 3. 
 
 Annot. Acad., lib. i. c. ii. (?) i Traite d'Anat. Chir. 
 
 y Elem. v. p. 138. K De Sin. Fr., p. 3. 
 
 8 Obs. Anat., sec. 8. X De Fab. c. ii. t. sec. 94. 
 
 Osteol. par Sue, p. 54. M Path. Anat. i. p. 289. 
 
 C Elements. v Elem. p. 133. 
 
 7? Anat. { Loc. cit.
 
 44-0 APPENDIX. 
 
 not detail the dimension of each several sinus. After describing 
 these cavities, which he says, " plerisque hominibus formantur," 
 he adds, that " when of a middling size they hardly extend towards 
 the temples beyond the centre of the eye, where the orbital vault 
 is highest ; and if you measure their height, from the insertion of 
 the nasal bones, you will find it equal to an inch. Such is the 
 condition of this cavity when moderate. That there are sinuses far 
 greater, was taught me by another inspection of a cranium. In 
 this case, the vacuity on the right did not pass the middle of the 
 orbit, but that on the left stretched so far that it only ended over 
 the external angle of the eyebrow, forming a cavity of at least two 
 inches in breadth. Its depth was such as easily to admit the 
 least joint of the middle finger. Its height, measured from the 
 root of the nose on the left side, exceeded two inches, on the right 
 it was a little less ; the left sinus was, however, shallower than the 
 right. On the left side I have said the cavity terminated over the 
 external angle of the orbit. From this place, a bony wall ran 
 towards the middle of the crista Galli, and thus separated the 
 sinus into a posterior and an anterior cavity. The posterior ex- 
 tended so far towards the temples, that it reached the place where 
 the frontal and sincipetal bones and the processes of the sphenoidal 
 meet. It covered the whole arch of the orbit, so that all was here 
 seen hollow," &c. 
 
 After describing sundry appearances which the sinuses exhi- 
 bited in another skull, he observes : " It was my fortune to see 
 and to obtain possession of one cranium in which of neither of 
 the frontal nor the sphenoidal cavities was there any vestige what- 
 soever. In this specimen the bones in which these vacuities are 
 situated were thicker than usual, and more cavernous ; " an obser- 
 vation, as we have seen, made by other anatomists. However sub- 
 versive of the phrenological statement, it will soon be seen that 
 Schulze has understated the usual extent of the impediment. 
 
 Dr Monro, B after mentioning that there " were forty-five crania 
 of adults in the Anatomical Museum, cut with a view to exhibit 
 the different sizes and forms of the frontal sinuses," says : " I 
 measured the breadth or distance across the forehead ; the height 
 or distance upwards from the transverse suture, where it divides 
 
 a Elements i., p. 134.
 
 APPENDIX. 441 
 
 the frontal bones and bones of the nose ; and also the depth of the 
 frontal sinuses ; in nine different skulls in which these sinuses 
 were large." Omitting the table, it is sufficient to say, that in 
 these crania the average is as follows : Breadth, within a trifle 
 of three inches ; height, one inch and five-tenths ; depth, above 
 one inch. Here the depth seems not merely the distance between 
 the external and internal tables, but the horizontal distance from 
 the glabella to the posterior wall of the sinus. These nine crania 
 thus yield an average, little larger than an indifferent induction ; 
 and though the sinuses are stated to have been large, the skulls 
 appear to have been selected by Dr Monro, not so much in 
 consequence of that circumstance, as because they were so cut 
 as to afford the means of measuring the cavity in its three 
 dimensions. 
 
 By the kindness of Dr Monro and Mr Mackenzie, I was per- 
 mitted to examine all the crania in the public anatomical museum, 
 and in the private collection of the Professor ; many were, for the 
 first time, laid open for my inspection. I was thus enabled to 
 institute an impartial induction. A random measurement of 
 above thirty perfect crania (laying aside three skulls of old per- 
 sons, in which the cavity of the sinus was almost entirely occu- 
 pied by a pumicose deposit) gave the following average result : 
 breadth, two inches four-tenths ; height, one inch and nearly five- 
 tenths ; depth (taken like Dr Monro), rather more than eight- 
 tenths of an inch. What in this induction was probably acciden- 
 tal, the sinuses of the female crania exhibited an average, in all the 
 three dimensions, almost absolutely equal to that of the male. 
 The relative size was consequently greater. 
 
 Before the sinuses of the fifty crania of Dr Spurzheim's collec- 
 tion, (of which I am immediately to speak), were, with the sanction 
 of Professor Jameson, laid open upon one side, I had measured 
 their three dimensions by the probe. This certainly could not 
 ascertain their full extent, as, among other impediments, the probe 
 is arrested by the septa, which so frequently subdivide each sinus 
 into lesser chambers ; but the labour was not to be undergone a 
 second time, especially as the proportional extent of these cavities 
 is by relation to the phrenological organs articulately exhibited in 
 the table. As it was, the average obtained by the probe is as fol- 
 lows : In the thirty-six male crania (one could not be measured
 
 442 APPENDIX. 
 
 by the probe), the breadth was two inches and nearly four- 
 tenths ; the height, one inch and nearly three-tenths ; the depth, 
 rather more than one inch. In the twelve female crania (here, 
 also, one could not be measured by the probe), the breadth was 
 one inch, and rather more than nine-tenths ; the height, nearly 
 one inch ; the depth, within a trifle of nine-tenths. 
 
 I should notice that in all these measurements, the thickness of 
 the external plate is included in the depth. 
 
 So true is the observation of Portal, that the "frontal sinuses 
 are much more extensive than is generally believed." 
 
 The collection of fifty crania, of which the average size of the 
 frontal sinuses has been given above, and of which a detailed table of 
 the impediment interposed by these cavities to phrenological obser- 
 vation now follows, was sent by M. Royer, of the Jardin des Plautes, 
 (probably by mistake), to the Royal Museum of Natural History in 
 Edinburgh ; the skulls, taken from the catacombs of Paris, having, 
 under Dr Spurzheim's inspection, been selected to illustrate the 
 development of the various phrenological organs, which develop- 
 ment is diligently marked on the several crania. 
 
 Thus, though I have it in my power to afford a greatly more 
 extensive table, the table of these fifty crania is, for the present 
 purpose, sufficient. For 
 
 1, They constitute a complete and definite collection ; 
 
 2, A collection authoritative in all points against the phreno- 
 logists ; 
 
 3, One to which it can be objected by none, that it affords only 
 a selected or partial induction in a question touching the frontal 
 sinus ; 
 
 4, It is a collection patent to the examination of the whole 
 world ; 
 
 5, In all the skulls a sinus has on one side been laid open to 
 its full extent ; the capacity of both is thus easily ascertained ; 
 and, at the same time with the size of the cavity, the thickness 
 and salience of the external frontal table remains apparent. 
 
 Table exhibiting the variable extent and unappreciable im- 
 pediment, in a phrenological relation, of the Frontal Sinuses ; in 
 a collection of fifty crania, selected, and their development marked, 
 under the direction of Dr Spurzheim :
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 443 
 
 ill 
 
 sL 
 
 5 
 
 J 
 
 Bz^h^^a^^ .-JfS-^a. 
 
 Numl..T nrKkul 
 ii- t- arranged, ac 
 ing to KZ and i 
 
 i 
 
 p 
 
 P 
 
 
 
 
 
 _ 
 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 am 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 L. 
 
 w. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 b 
 
 1 
 
 viii 
 
 
 
 
 t 
 
 t 
 
 t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 xii 
 xiii 
 
 
 
 
 ! 
 
 
 
 
 
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 4 
 
 xvi 
 
 
 
 t 
 
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 5 
 
 xxvi 
 
 
 1 
 
 t 
 
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 * 
 
 
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 6 
 
 
 
 
 
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 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 xxxvi 
 
 
 
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 8 
 
 xxxvii 
 
 
 
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 xxxv 
 
 
 
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 11 
 
 xxxix 
 
 
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 iv 
 
 
 
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 xiv 
 
 
 
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 xlii 
 
 
 
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 29 
 
 xliii 
 
 
 
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 30 
 
 xliv 
 
 
 
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 31 
 
 xlv 
 
 
 
 
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 xlvii 
 
 
 
 f 
 
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 33 
 
 xlviii 
 
 
 
 t 
 
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 34 
 
 xxii 
 
 
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 35 
 
 xlix 
 
 
 ^ 'S s* ^ 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 xxxiii 
 
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 37 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 Old 
 
 t 
 
 t 
 
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 39 
 
 XV 
 
 xxxii 
 
 T" 
 
 {Young} 
 
 t 
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 * 
 
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 xxxviii 
 
 
 Ml 
 
 t 
 
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 41 
 
 xi 
 
 Male? 
 
 
 t 
 
 t 
 
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 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42 
 
 xviii 
 
 
 13 
 
 f 
 
 f 
 
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 T 
 
 t 
 
 
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 43 
 
 xix 
 
 
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 xxiv 
 
 
 
 
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 xxxi 
 
 
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 33 
 
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 47 
 
 xlvi 
 
 
 s 
 
 t 
 
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 48 
 
 i 
 
 
 !?,- 
 
 ; 
 
 t 
 
 
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 XX 
 
 1 
 
 l- s 
 
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 iii 
 
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 Old 
 
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 (1) The organs denoted by these numbers : ix. 7, Constructiveness; xx 32, Mirthfulnessor Wit; xxii. 19 (2), Individual- 
 ity, Lower Individuality ; xxiii. 20, Configuration, Figure; xxiv. 21 , Sire ; xxv. 22, Weight, Resistance; xxvi. 23, Colour; 
 xxvii. 24, Locality; xxviii. 26, Calculation, Number; xxix. 25, Order; xxx. 190), Kventuality, Upper Individuality; 
 xxxi. 26, Time ; xxxii. 28, Melody, Tune j xxxiii. 29, Language this organ Gall divides in two, to wit, into the organ of 
 La7)gunge and the organ of Words ; xxx v. 30, Comparison : xxxv. 31, Causality. The order of the numbers in this table 
 was taken from that of a more extensive and general table : so that whilst here xx. 32, Las not been affected at all, there 
 it was affected more frequently than ix. 7.
 
 444 APPENDIX. 
 
 In these circumstances it is to be observed 
 
 In the first place, that, as already noticed, while the develop- 
 ments of all the crania have been carefully marked, the presence of 
 the frontal sinuses has been signalised only in one skull (the male 
 No. 19, xiv.), in which they are, however, greatly below even the 
 average. 
 
 In the second place, that the extent of the sinus varies inde- 
 terminably from an affection of one to an affection of sixteen 
 organs. 
 
 In the third place, in this induction of thirty-seven male and 
 thirteen female crania, the average proportional extent of the 
 sinuses is somewhat less in the female than in the male skulls ; the 
 sinus in the former covering 4'4, and affecting T2 organs ; in the 
 latter covering 5, and affecting 2.1 organs. This induction is, how- 
 ever, too limited, more especially in the female crania, to afford a 
 determination of the point, even were it not at variance with other 
 and more extensive observations. 
 
 In the fourth place, the male crania exhibit at once the largest 
 and the smallest sinuses. The largest male sinus covers 12, and 
 affects 4 ; while the largest female sinus covers 7, and affects 3 
 organs : whereas, whilst the smallest male sinus affects only 1, 
 the smallest female sinus covers 2 organs. 
 
 In the fifth place, so far from supporting the phrenological 
 assertion that the sinuses are only found, or only found in size, in 
 the crania of the old, this their collection tends to prove the very 
 reverse ; for here we find about the smallest sinuses in the oldest 
 heads. 
 
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 SCENES OF CLERICAL LIFE. 
 
 THE SAD FORTUNES OP AMOS BARTON; MB GILFIL'S LOVK-STORV; 
 JA NUT'S RBPBNTANCB. 
 
 By George Eliot. 
 In Two Volumes, Post Octavo, 21s. 
 
 " The combination of literary perfection in these three Tales is quite extraordinary. Whelhfr the 
 author invents his own plots or tales, or finds them ready-made, is of uo more consequence in the s-ini 
 of his merit than such a question is to the fame of Shakespeare. He has made his work what it is " 
 The Globt. 
 
 ADAM BEDE. 
 
 By George Eliot, 
 Author of " Scenes of Clerical Life." 
 In Three Volumes, Post Octavo, price 31s. 6d. 
 
 THE MOOR AND THE LOCH. 
 
 CONTAINING MINUTE INSTRUCTIONS IN ALL HIGHLAND SPORTS, WITH \VAVPKRTMGS 
 OVER CRAG AND CORREI, FLOOD AND PELL. 
 
 By John Colquhonn, Esq. 
 Third Edition, in Octavo, with Illustrations, price 12s. 6d. 
 
 SALMON-CASTS AND STRAY SHOTS: 
 
 BEING FLY-LEAVES FROM THE NOTE-BOOK OF 
 John Colquhoun, Esq., 
 Author of the " Moor and the Loch," &c. 
 A New Edition, Foolscap Octavo, price 5s. 
 
 "This is a true British Sportsman's Book, cheerful with anecdote and general good humour, full of 
 man tofiUot 11 ''-'? 1116 "* f "^ naturalist and of a keen relish for 8uch fi eld-sports as it best becomes a 
 
 SONNETS. 
 
 By the Bev. John Eagles, A.Y. Oxon. 
 
 Crown Octavo, Pa.
 
 MESSES BLACKWOOD AND SONS PUBLICATIONS. 5 
 
 INSTITUTES OF METAPHYSIC. 
 
 The Theory of Knowing and Being. 
 By James P. Ferrier, B.A., Oxon., 
 
 Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy, St Andrews. 
 Second Edition, Crown Octavo, price 10s. 6d. 
 
 " This is no ordinary book. It we mistake not, its publication will mark au epoch in philosophical 
 speculation in this country. "SrUiih Quarterly Jlevieie. 
 
 HISTORY OF GREECE UNDER THE ROMANS, 
 
 B.C. 146-A.D. 717. 
 By George FMay, LL.D. 
 A New Edition. Octavo, 16s. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE BYZANTINE AND GREEK EMPIRES. 
 
 716 145& 
 
 By George Finlay, LL.D. 
 Two Vols. Octavo, 1, 7s. 6d. 
 
 MEDIEVAL GREECE, 
 
 12041461. 
 
 By George Finlay, LL.D. 
 Octavo, 12s. 
 
 GREECE UNDER OTHOMAN AND VENETIAN DOMINATION. 
 
 14431821. 
 
 By George Finlay, LL.D. 
 Octavo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 "It is the most complete and elaborate history of the Byzantine and Greek Empires that has 
 appeared in an English form." Leader. 
 
 " Mr Finlay's solid and careful works will be welcomed by all who read to be informed." Athtnceum. 
 
 STORY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF SEBASTOPOL. 
 
 Written in the Camp. 
 By Lieut.-Col. E. Bruce Hamley. 
 Octavo, with Illustrations drawn in Camp by the Author, 21s. 
 
 " It is a book unlikely to be ever superseded. Its truth is of that simple and startling character 
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 bequeathed to us by the great writers of antiquity who took part in the wars they have described." 
 The fresi. 
 
 LADY LEE'S WIDOWHOOD. 
 
 By Lieut.-Col. E. Bruce Hamley. 
 
 Second Edition, Crown Octavo, with 13 Illustrations by the Author, 6s. 
 
 " A quiet humour, an easy, graceful style, a deep, thorough, confident knowledge of human nature 
 in its better and more deflMtng aspects, a delicate and exquisite appreciation of womanly diameter, 
 an admirable faculty of description, and great tact, am the qualities that command the reader's interest 
 and respect from beginning to end of ' Lady Lee's Widowhood.' " Tht Timet.
 
 6 MESSES BLACKWOOD AND SONS PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 LECTCBES OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BAET. 
 
 Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, University of Edinburgh. 
 
 Embracing the Metaphysical and Logical Courses ; with Notes from Original Materials, and 
 Appendix containing the Author's Latest Development of his new Logical Theory. 
 
 Edited by the Bev. H. L. Mansel, B.D., Oxford ; and 
 John Veitch, M.A., Edinburgh. 
 
 In Four Volumes, Octavo. Vols. I. and II., containing the Metaphysical Lectures, are published, 
 price 24s. 
 
 THE POETICAL WORKS OF MRS HEMANS. 
 
 Complete in One Volume, large Octavo, with Portrait engraved by FINUEK, 21s. 
 
 Another Edition in Six Volumes, Post Octavo, 24s. 
 
 Another Edition, with Life by her Sister, Seven Volumes, Foolscap Octavo, 35s. 
 
 " Of no modern writer can it be affirmed with less hesitation, that she has become an English Classic, 
 nor, until human nature becomes very different from what it now is, can we imagine the least probability 
 that the music of her lays will cease to soothe the ear, or the beauty of her sentiment to charm the 
 gentle heart." SlacLteood's Magazine. 
 
 MOTHER'S LEGACY TO HER UNBORNE CHILDE. 
 
 By Mrs Elizabeth Joceline. 
 
 Edited by the Very Bev. Principal Lee. 
 
 32mo, 4s. fid. 
 
 " This beautiful and touching legncie." Athenceum. 
 
 " A delightful monument of the piety and high feeling of a truly noble mother." Horning Adver- 
 tiser. 
 
 THE CHEMISTRY OF COMMON LIFE. 
 
 By James J. F. W. Johnston, M.A., F.R.SS. L. and E., &c. 
 With 113 Illustrations on "Wood, and a copious Index. Two Vols. Crown Octavo, 11s. fid. 
 
 "At the same time that we commend this book for the curious use which it makes of common f:u-ts, 
 it is necessary to state that it is eminently of a practical character. The information it contains cannot 
 fail, if properly adopted, to be highly influential in regulating health and preventing disease. It is just 
 one of those books which will best serve to show men how minute is the provision which has been mnde 
 for human support, and that if the laws prescribed by Nature are duly observed, she, on her part, will 
 see to it that her functions are performed with fidelity and success." Durham Chronicle. 
 
 By the same Author. 
 
 CATECHISM OF AGRICULTURAL CHEMISTRY AND GEOLOGY. 
 
 Crown Octavo, Forty-third Edition, Is. 
 
 ELEMENTS OF AGRICULTURAL CHEMISTRY AND GEOLOGY. 
 
 A New Edition, greatly enlarged, Foolscap Octavo, 6a 6d. 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOILS. 
 
 Third Edition, Crown Octavo, 2s. 
 
 NOTES ON NORTH AMERICA : AGRICULTURAL, ECONOMICAL, 
 
 AND SOCIAL. 
 Two Volumes, Post Octavo, 21s.
 
 MESSRS BLACKWOOD AND SONS' PUBLICATIONS. 7 
 
 SEA-SIDE STUDIES AT 1LFRACOMBE, TENBY, THE SCILLY 
 
 ISLES, and JER.SF.Y. 
 By George Henry Lewes, 
 
 Author of " A Biographical History of Philosophy," ie. 
 In Octavo, with Illustrations by the Author, and a Glossary of Technical Terms, 10s. Gd. 
 
 " 'While the matter is thoroughly scientific, the form is purely literary, the papers abounding with 
 touches of a pleasant personality, with vivid descriptions of scenery and sketches of adventure, with 
 quaint and lively fancies, grave ironical reflections and light shafts' of social satire, with learned refer- 
 ences and apt literary illustrations, interspersed here and there with noble moral truth* springing 
 from the depths of a rich aud wide experience." The Leader. 
 
 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF COMMON LIFE. 
 
 By George Henry Lewes, 
 
 Author of " Sa-Side Studies," the " Life of Goethe." ic. 
 
 In Monthly Numbers, price Sixpence each, to form Two Vols., Crown Octavo, uniform with Pro- 
 fessor Johnston's ' ' Chemistry of Common Life." 
 
 No. I. HUNGER AND THIRST. 
 
 No. II. FOOD AND DRINK. 
 
 4 ' ' The Physiology of Common Life ' U a good subject in good hands. In the present 
 
 number Mr Lewes says all that he has to say of Hunger and Thirst. It is a perfect essay in itself, 
 and there are few people to whom it will not give more than sixpence worth of welcome information. " 
 Exa mi ner. 
 
 RURAL ECONOMY OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND IRELAND. 
 
 By Leonce de Lavergne. 
 
 Translated from the French. With Notes by a Scottish Farmer. 
 In Octavo, 12s. 
 
 " When we consider the fulness of matter, the variety of information, the importance of the sub- 
 ject, and the vigour and picturesqueness with which the.whole is presented to the reader, the 'Rural 
 Economy of England ' may be pronounced one of the best works on the philosophy of agriculture and 
 of agricultural political economy that has appeared." Spectator. 
 
 WORKS OF THE REV. THOMAS M'CRIE, D.D. 
 
 Edited by his Son, Professor M'Crie. 
 
 A new and uniform Edition. 
 Four Volumes, Crown Octavo, 24s. 
 
 Each Work maybe had teparatcty, viz . 
 
 LIFE OF JOHN KNOX. 
 
 Containing Illustrations of the History of the Reformation in Scotland. 
 Crown Octavo, 6s. 
 
 LIFE OF ANDREW MELVILLE. 
 
 Containing Illustrations of the Ecclesiastical and Literary History of Scotland in the Sixteenth and 
 
 Seventeenth Centuries. 
 Crown Octavo, 6s. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE PROGRESS AND SUPPRESSION OF THE REFORMA- 
 TION IN ITALY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 
 Crown Octavo, 4s. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE PROGRESS AND SUPPRESSION OF THE REFORMA- 
 TION IN SPAIN IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. 
 
 Crown Octavo, 3s. 6d. 
 
 SERMONS, AND REVIEW OF THE "TALES OF MY LANDLORD." 
 
 In One Volume, Crown Octavo, 6s.
 
 8 MESSRS BLACKWOOD AND SONS' PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 THE BOOK OF THE GAEDEN. 
 
 By Charles M'lntosh. 
 Two large Volumes, Royal Octavo, embellished with 1353 Engravings. 
 
 Each Volume may be had separately viz. 
 
 I. ARCHITECTURAL AND ORNAMENTAL. On the Formation of Gardens Construction, 
 Heating, and Ventilation of Fruit and Plant Houses, Pits, Frames, and other Garden Struc- 
 tures, with Practical Details, Illustrated by 1073 Engravings, pp. 776. 2, 10s. 
 II. PRACTICAL GARDENING contains Directions for the Culture of the Kitchen Garden, 
 the Hardy-fruit Garden, the Forcing Garden, and Flower Garden, including Fruit and Plant 
 Houses, with Select Lists of Vegetables, Fruits, and Plants. Pp. 863, with 279 Engravings. 
 1, 17s. 6d. 
 
 " In the construction of every kind of building required in a garden, the ' structural ' section of the 
 work will be found to contain a large amount of information suitable alike for buildings and garden*. 
 Mr M'lntosh being himself one of the most experienced gnrden architects of our time, minute details 
 are given, so that the expense of even a pit, up to a garden replete with every necessary erection, may 
 be at once ascertained, a matter of no small importance to gentlemen about either to form new gar- 
 dens, or improve such as already exist. ... On the whole, this volume on structural gardening, 
 both in compilation and artistical execution, deserves our warmest commendation. 
 
 " The second volume is of a cultural character, and has been got up with great care and research. It 
 embodies the opinions and practice of the older writers on Horticulture, and al-n, what is of more im- 
 portance, the experience of our eminent modern gardeners on the subject, together with the opinions 
 of our author, who has studied and practised the art for upw>rds of half a century, both in this 
 country and on the Continent . . . We therefore feel justified in recommending Mr .M'lutosU'a 
 two excellent volumes to the notice of the public." Gardener's Chronicle. 
 
 A MANUAL OF MODERN GEOGRAPHY. 
 
 By the Eev. Alexander Mackay, A.M. 
 
 For the use of Teachers and Advanced Classes. Embracing the Topography, Orography, Hydro- 
 ' y, Climatology, Geology, Botany, Zoology, and Ethnography of the various Countries of the 
 
 In Crown Octavo. 
 
 POETICAL WORKS OF DAVID M. MOIR (DELTA). 
 
 Including Domestic Verses." With Portrait and Memoir by THOMAS AIRD. 
 Two Volumes, Foolscap Octavo, 14s. 
 
 "These are volumes to be placed on the favourite shelf, in the familiar nook that holds the books 
 we love, which we take up with pleasure and lay down with regret." Edinburgh CouraiU. 
 
 LECTURES ON THE POETICAL LITERATURE OF THE PAST 
 
 HALF-CENTURY. 
 
 By David M. Moir (Delta). 
 
 Third Edition, Foolscap Octavo, Es. 
 
 " A delightful volume. "Morning Chronicle. 
 
 " Exquisite in its taste and generous in its criticisms." Hugh Miller. 
 
 RUSSIAN SHORES OF THE BLACK SEA, IN THE AUTOIX 
 
 OF 1852. With a Voyage down the Volga, and a Tour through the Country of the Don Cossacks. 
 
 By Laurence Oliphant. 
 Octavo, with Map and other Illustrations, Fourth Edition, 14s. 
 
 MINNESOTA AND THE FAR WEST. 
 
 By Laurence Oliphant. 
 Octavo, Illustrated with Engravings, 12>. Cd
 
 MESSRS BLACKWOOD AND SONS' PUBLICATIONS. 9 
 
 KATIE STEWART: A TRUE STORY. 
 
 By Margaret Oliphant. 
 Second Edition, Foolscap Octavo, with Frontispiece and Vignette, 6a. 
 
 " A singularly characteristic Scottish story, most agreeable to read and pleasant to recollect. The 
 chnrni lies in the faithful and life-like pictures it presents of Scottish character aud customs, and 
 manners and modes of life." Tail's Magazine. 
 
 THE QUIET HEART. 
 
 By Margaret Oliphant. 
 Second Edition, Post Octavo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 "We cannot omit our emphatic tribute to 'The Quiet Heart, 1 a story which, with its deep clear 
 insight, its gentle but strengthening sympathies, and its pictures so delicately drawn, has captivated 
 numerous readers, aud will confer on many a memory a good and plea-ant influence." Exctlsinr. 
 
 ZAIDEE : A ROMANCE. 
 
 By Margaret Oliphant. 
 Three Volumes, Post Octavo, Jt'l, 11s. 6d. 
 
 THE ATHELINGS : OR, THE THREE GIFTS. 
 
 By Margaret Oliphant. 
 Three Volumes, Post Octavo, 31s. 6d. 
 
 PRAYERS FOR SOCIAL AND FAMILY WORSHIP. 
 
 Prepared by a COMMITTED OP THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CHURCH or SCOTLAND, and spe- 
 cially designed for the Use of Soldiers, Sailors, Colonists, Sojourners in India, and other Persons, 
 at Home or Abroad, who are deprived of the Ordinary Services of a Christian Ministry. Pub- 
 lished by Authority of the Committee. Crowu Octavo, 4s. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY TEXT-BOOK OF GEOLOGY. 
 
 By David Page, F.G.S. 
 With Illustrations. Third Edition, Crown Octavo. Price One Shilling and Sixpence, bound in cloth. 
 
 " Of late it has not often been our good fortune to examine a text-book on Scieu.ce of which we could 
 express an opinion so entirely favourable." Atheiuewii. 
 
 ADVANCED TEXT-BOOK OF GEOLOGY, DESCRIPTIVE AND 
 
 INDUSTRIAL. 
 By David Page, F.G.S. 
 
 Crown Octavo, with Illustrations, 5s. 
 
 "An admirable book on Geology. It is from no invidious desire to underrate other work", it is the 
 simple expression of justice, which causes us to assign to Mr Page's ' Advanced Text-Book ' the very 
 first place among geological works addressed to students, at least among those which have come before 
 us. We have read every word of it, with care and with delight, never hesitating as to its meaning, 
 never detecting the omi&sion of anything needful in a popular and succinct exposition of a rich aud 
 varied subject." Leader. 
 
 INQUIRY INTO THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE CHARGES 
 
 BROUGHT BY LORD MACAULAY AGAINST WILLIAM PENN. 
 By John Paget, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. 
 In Crown Octavo, price 4s. 6d.
 
 10 MESSRS BLACKWOOD AND SONS PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 CURRAN AND HIS CONTEMPOBABIES. 
 
 By Charles Phillips, Esq. 
 A New Edition, Crown Octavo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 " Certainly one of the most extraordinary pieces of Biography ever produced. ... No library 
 should be without it." Lord Brougham. 
 
 THE COURSE OF TIME : A POEM, 
 
 By Robert Pollok, A.M. 
 
 Twenty-second Edition, Foolscap Octavo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 THE COURSE OF TIME. AN ILLUSTRATED EDITION. 
 
 By Robert Pollok, A.M. 
 
 The Designs by BTRKET FOSTER, JOHN TENNIEL, and JOH.V R. CLAYTON. Engraved by EDMUND 
 EVANS, DALZIBL BROTHERS, GREEN, etc. 
 
 In Square Octavo, bound in cloth, richly gilt, 21s. 
 
 "At last this superb poem has received an honour too long deferred, of being presented in a form 
 commensurate with its intrinsic value. There has been no modern poem in the English language of the 
 class to which ' The Course of Time ' belongs, since Milton wrote, that can be compared with it. In 
 the present instance the artistic tnlents of Messrs Forster, Clayton, Tenniel, Evans, Dalziel, Green, and 
 Woods, have been employed in giving expression to the sublimity of the language by equally exquisite 
 illustrations, all of which are of the highest class." Bell's Messenger. 
 
 THE GEOLOGY OF PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 A GOVERNMENT SURVEY ; with a General View of the GEOLOGY op THE UNITED STATES, Essays on 
 the Coal-Funnation and its Fossils, and a Description of the Coal-Fields of North America and 
 Great Britain. 
 
 By Henry Darwin Rogers, 
 
 State Geologist, Professor of Natural History in the University of Glasgow j F.R.S., Hon. 
 F.R.S.E., F.G.8. 
 
 In Three Volumes Royal Quarto, with Seven large Maps, and numerous Illustrations, engraved on 
 Copper and on Wood. 
 
 DIVERSITIES OF CHRISTIAN CHARACTER. 
 
 Illustrated in the Lives of the Four Great Apostles. 
 By the Very Rey. E. B. Ramsay, M.A., F.R.S.E. 
 Dean of the Diocese of Edinburgh. 
 In Foolscap Octavo, price 4s. 6d. 
 
 A HANDY BOOK ON PROPERTY LAW. 
 
 By the Right. Hon. lord St Leonards. 
 
 Sixtli Edition, Crown Octavo, 2s. 6d. 
 
 " Less than 200 pages serve to arm us with the ordinary precautions to which we should attend in 
 selling, buying, mortgaging, leasing, settling, and devising estates. We are informed of our relations 
 to our property, to our wives and children, and of our liabilities as trustees or executors, in a little book 
 for the million, a book which the author tenders to the profanum. vulpus as even capable of ' beguiling 
 
 a few hours in a railway carriage.' His authority goes with his work, and makes it more 
 
 acceptable than a work equally good from a writer more obscure." Tint**. 
 
 POEMS AND BALLADS OF SCHILLER. 
 
 Translated by Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, Bart. 
 Second Edition, Octavo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 " The translations are executed with consummate ability. The technical difficulties attending a task 
 great and intricate have been mastered or eluded with a power and patience quite extraordinary ; 
 id the public is put in possession of perhaps the best translation of a foreign poet which exists in our 
 language. Indeed, we know of none so complete' and faithful. "Morning C/trun iclc.
 
 MESSRS BLACK WOOD AND SONS' PUBLICATIONS. 11 
 
 THORNDALE; OR, THE CONFLICT OF OPINIONS. 
 
 By William Smith. 
 Second Edition, Crown Octavo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 " This volume is sure sooner or later to have many readers, notwithstanding its defects, to which we 
 shall refer. The subjects treated of, and the style, always chaste aod beautiful, often attractively quaint, 
 in which they are clothed, will not foil to secure the attention of the class for whom the work is 
 
 avowedly written It deals with many of those higher forms of speculation characteristic of 
 
 the cultivated minds of the age." North British, Review, Feb. 1853. 
 
 STABLE ECONOMY. 
 
 A Treatise on the Management of Horses. 
 By John Stewart, V.S. 
 A New Edition. Foolscap Octavo, (is. <Jd. 
 
 ADVICE TO PURCHASERS OF HORSES. 
 
 By John Stewart, V.S. 
 18mo, Plates, 2s. Gd. 
 
 LIVES OF THE QUEENS OF SCOTLAND. 
 
 By Agnes Strickland. 
 Eight Volumes, Post Octavo, 10s. 6d. each. 
 
 THE BOOK OF THE FARM: 
 
 Detailing the Labours of the Farmer, Farm-Steward, Ploughman, Shepherd, Hedger, 
 Cattle-man, Field-worker, and Dairy-maid, and forming a safe Monitor fur Students in 
 Practical Agriculture. 
 
 By Henry Stephens, F.E.S.E. 
 
 A New Edition in Two Volumes, Royal Octavo, price 3, handsomely bound in cloth, with upwards 
 of 600 Illustrations. 
 
 " The best practical book I have ever met with." Professor Johnston. 
 
 " We assure agricultural students that they will derive both pleasure and profit from a diligent 
 perusal of this clear directory to rural labour. The experienced fanner will perhaps think that Mr 
 Stephens dwells upon some matters too simple or too trite to need explanation ; but we regard this as a 
 fault leaning to virtue's side in an instructional book. The young are often ashamed to ask for au 
 explanation of simple things and are too often discouraged by un indolent or supercilious teacher if they 
 do. Hut Mr Stephens entirely escapes this error, for he indicates every step the young farmer should 
 
 take, and, one by one, explains their several bearings We have thoroughly examined 
 
 these volumes ; but to give a full notice of their varied and valuable contents would occupy a larger 
 space than we can conveniently devote to their discussion ; we therefore, in general terms, commend 
 them to the careful study of every young man who wishes to become a good practical farmer." Time*. 
 
 THE BOOK OF FARM IMPLEMENTS AND MACHINES, 
 
 By James Slight and Robert Scott Burn, Engineers. 
 Edited by Henry Stephens, F.E.S.E., 
 Author of " The Book of the Farm," ic. 
 
 Illustrated with upwards of 700 Engravings. In One Volume large Octavo, uniform with the " Book 
 of the Farm," price 42s. 
 
 " Full, complete, and perfect in all its parts, honestly compiled, and skilfully illustrated with nume- 
 rous and valuable engravings and diagrams, it is not saying too much to state, 'that there is no parallel 
 to this important work in any country of, Europe; and that its value to the agriculturist is 
 incalculable.'-Otoewr.
 
 12 MESSRS BLACKWOOD AND SONS' PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 CATECHISM OF PEACTICAL AGRICULTURE. 
 
 By Henry Stephens, FJLS.E. 
 
 With Numerous Illustrations, Crown Oc\avo. A new Edition, Is. 
 
 " We feel perfectly assured that this Catechism is precisely the thing which at this moment is wanted 
 in every rural and National School in England." Notts Guardian. 
 
 TESTER DEEP LAND-CULTURE. 
 
 By Henry Stephens, P.E.S.E. 
 
 Being a Detailed Account of the method of Cultivation which has been successfully practised 
 for several years by the Marquess of Tweeddale at Tester. 
 
 In small Octavo, with Engravings on Wood, 4s. 6J. 
 
 TALES FROM " BLACKWOOD." 
 
 In Monthly Numbers, price 6d. ; and in Quarterly Volumes, bound in cloth, price One Shilling and 
 Sixpence, Numbers I. to XL, and Volumes I. to IV., are published. 
 
 THEISM; THE WITNESS OF REASON AND NATURE TO AN 
 
 ALL-WISE AND BENEFICENT CREATOR. 
 
 By the Eev. John Tnlloch, D.D. 
 
 Principal of St Mary's College, St Andrews. 
 In One Volume Octavo, 10s. 6d. 
 
 " Dr Tulloch's Essay, in its masterly statement of the real nature and difficulties of the subject, its 
 logical exactness in distinguishing the illustrative from the suggestive, it lucid arrangement of the 
 argument, its simplicity of expression, is quite unequalled by any work we have seen on the subject." 
 Claristian Remembrancer. 
 
 THE EIGHTEEN CHRISTIAN CENTURIES. 
 
 By the Eev. James White. 
 
 Post Octavo, 7s. 6d. 
 
 "He has seized the salient points indeed, the governing incidents in each century, and shown 
 their received bearing as well on their own age as on the progress of the world. Vigorously and briefly, 
 often by a single touch, has he marked the traits of lending men; when needful, he touches >liglitly 
 their biographical career. The state of the country and of society, of arts and learning, aud more than 
 all, of the modes of living, are graphically sketched, and upon the whole with more fulness than any 
 other division." Spectator. 
 
 THE HISTORY OF FRANCE. 
 
 By the Eev. James White, 
 
 Author of " The Eighteen Christian Centuries," &c. 
 In Post Octavo, price 9s. 
 
 WORKS OF SAMUEL WARREN, ESQ., D.C.L. 
 
 A Cheap Edition, Five \\lumes, Crown Octavo, 24s. 
 Sold separately viz. : 
 
 THE DIARY OF A LATE PHYSICIAN. 
 
 TEN THOUSAND A-YEAR 
 
 NOW AND TIIKX. 
 
 MISCELLANIES: CRITICAL, IMAGINATIVE, AND JURIDICAL.
 
 MESSRS BLACKWOOD AND SONS' PUBLICATIONS. 13 
 
 THE WORKS OF PROFESSOR WILSON. 
 
 Edited by Ms Son-in-Law, Professor Terrier. 
 In Twelve Vols. Post Octavo, price 3, 12. cloth. 
 
 THE NOCTES AMBBOSIANiJ. 
 
 By Professor Wilson. 
 
 With Notes and .1 Glossary. 
 In Four Vols., Post Octavo, 24s. 
 
 ESSAYS, CRITICAL AND IMAGINATIVE. 
 
 By Professor Wilson. 
 In Four Vols., Post Octavo, 21s. 
 
 RECREATIONS OF CHRISTOPHER NORTH. 
 
 By Professor Wilson. 
 In Two Vols., Post Octavo, 12s. cloth. 
 
 TALES BY PROFESSOR WILSON. 
 
 Comprising THE LIGHTS AND SHADOWS OF SCOTTISH LIFE; THE TRIALS 
 
 OF MARGARET LYNDSAY ; and THE FORESTERS. 
 In One Vol., Post Octavo, 6s. cloth. 
 
 POETICAL WORKS OF PROFESSOR WILSON. 
 
 Complete in One Vol., Post Octavo, 6s. cloth. 
 
 PORTRAIT OF PROFESSOR WILSON AS CHRISTOPHER NORTH 
 
 IX HIS SPORTING JACKET. 
 Engraved from a Painting by Duncan. 21s. 
 
 HISTORY OF THE FRENCH PROTESTANT REFUGEES. 
 
 By Charles Yfeiss, 
 
 Professor of History at the Lycc'e Buonnparte'. 
 
 Translated by F. Hardman, Esq. 
 In Octavo, 14s. 
 
 " We have risen from the perusal of Sir Weiss's book with feelings of extreme gratification. The 
 period embraced by this work includes the most heart-stirring times of the eventful History of Pro- 
 testuutum, and is of surpassing interest Britannia. 
 
 NARRATIVE OF A JOURNEY THROUGH SYRIA & PALESTINE. 
 
 By Lieut. Van de Velde. 
 
 Two Volumes Octavo, with Mnps, &c., 1, 10s. 
 
 " He has contributed much to the knowledge of the country, and the unction with which he spenks 
 of the holy places which he has visited, will commend the book to the notice of all religious readirs. HU 
 illustrations of Scripture are numerous and admirable." Daily Xacf.
 
 14 GEOGRAPHICAL PUBLICATIONS. 
 
 GEOGRAPHICAL WORKS. 
 
 This day is published, Part I. of 
 
 KEITH JOHNSTON'S 
 
 ROYAL ATLAS 
 
 MODEKN GEOGKAPHY: 
 
 Exhibiting, in a Series of entirely Original and Authentic 
 
 Maps, the Present Condition of Geographical Discovery and Research in 
 
 the several Countries, Empires, and States of the World. 
 
 WITH A SPECIAL INDEX TO EACH MAP, 
 
 ARRANGED SO AS TO OBVIATE TUB INCONVENIENT METHOD OK REFERENCE BY 
 DEGREES AND MINUTES OF LONGITUDE AND LATITUDE. 
 
 BY 
 
 ALEXANDER KEITH JOHNSTON, 
 
 F.E.S.E. F.G.S. ETC. 
 
 Geographer to the Queen for Scotland ; Author of the ".Phjjical Atlas," " Dictionary of 
 
 Geography," Ac. Ac. ; Honorary and Corresponding Member and Fellow of the 
 
 Geographical Societies of London, Berlin, Paris, Vienna, and Xew Tort. 
 
 The Work, engrraved cm copper in the finest style, and printed and coloured with all 
 the advantages of modern artistic skill, will form, when finished, a handsome portable 
 volume, size, folded, '20 inches by 13J inches. It will be issued in Ten Parts, price 
 Half-a-Guinea each. Nine Parts will each contain Five Maps, and Ten to Fifteen Pages 
 of Index ; and the Tenth Part will contain Three Maps, and conclusion of Index, with 
 Titles, Contents, &c. &c. The publication will be continued at intervals of two months 
 till completed. 
 
 Part I. contains 
 
 MAP AND INDEX OF FRANCE. 
 
 SOUTH ITALY. 
 
 NORTH ITALY. 
 
 SWITZERLAND. 
 
 GREECE. 
 
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