The Humanizing of the Brute 
 
 OR 
 
 The Essential Difference between the Human and 
 
 Animal Sowl proved from their 
 
 Specific Activities 
 
 BY 
 H. MUCKERMANN, S. T. 
 
 WITH FIVE PLATES 
 
 St. Louis, Mo., and Freiburg, (Baden) 
 
 Published by B. HERDER 
 1906
 
 NIHIL OBSTAT. 
 S. Ludovici, die 4. Sept. 1906. 
 
 IMPRIMATUR. 
 S. Ludovici, die 6. Sept. 1906. 
 
 JOANNES J. GLENNON, 
 Archiepiscopus Sti. Ludovici. 

 
 To 
 
 THE REV. ERIC W ASM ANN, S.J., 
 this little volume 
 
 is 
 gratefully dedicated. 
 
 "Und was man tst, 
 das blitb man andern schuldig." 
 Goethe.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Chapter i. The Humanizing of the Brute 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Instinct and Intelligence differ essentially. 
 
 Chapter n. Instinct and Final Tendency . 
 
 Chapter in. Instinct and Consciousness of 
 Finality .... 
 
 Chapter iv. Instinct and Sensuous Cogni- 
 tion 
 
 Chapter v. Instinct and Sense-Experience 
 
 Chapter vi. Instinct and Intelligence . 
 
 PART II. 
 Animals have no Intelligence. 
 
 Chapter vn. The "Intelligence" of "The 
 
 Lower Animals" 
 Chapter vni. The "Intelligence" of "The 
 
 Higher Animals" 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 NOTE: The author is indebted to the Rev. Fr. John J. Wynne, S. J., 
 Editor of the Messenger, and to the Editor of the Scientific American 
 for their kind permission to make use of several papers which origi- 
 nally appeared in their periodicals.
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 The Humanizing of the Brute. 
 
 T T is a well-known fact that in the homes of the 
 "upper ten thousand" special servants in charge 
 of animal pets play an important part. It is the in- 
 teresting duty of these favored mortals to rouse the 
 lovely poodles, pugs, and pussies from pleasant slum- 
 bers, to attend to their toilet and attire, to take them 
 out for a drive on bright and sunny days, or lead them 
 a-promenading down a cool and shady avenue, and, 
 last not least, to dance humble attendance upon their 
 charges when feasting at a lordly and luxurious table. 
 Houses of refuge and asylums for orphaned cats have 
 been erected at Berlin, and it was reported from Paris 
 that at the time of the last exposition a cemetery for 
 dogs, cats, birds, and other domestic animals had been 
 opened. This city of the dead, with its resplendent 
 monuments in honor of the noble departed, is said to 
 rival a fairy-palace in beauty. Indeed, as J. G. Hol- 
 land expresses his sentiments in very pathetic terms to 
 his "dear dog Blanco:" 
 
 "I look into your great, brown eyes, 
 Where love and loyal homage shine, 
 
 And wonder where the difference lies 
 Between your soul and mine 
 
 (7)
 
 8 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 I clasp your head upon my breast 
 
 The while you whine and lick my hand 
 And thus our friendship is confessed 
 
 And thus we understand. 
 Ah, Blanco! Did I worship God 
 
 As truly as you worship me, 
 Or follow where my Master trod 
 
 With your humility: 
 Did I sit fondly at his feet 
 
 As you dear Blanco sit at mine, 
 And watch him with a love as sweet, 
 
 My life would grow divine." 
 
 These few but telling facts furnish a striking illus- 
 tration of the senseless mania of regarding the animal 
 as a brother of man, his equal in nature aud essence. 
 Indeed, the intelligence of animals is almost universally 
 defended by modern naturalists. Some of them, as 
 Buechner, Eimer, Marshall, and a host of others, 
 whom Prof. W. M. Wheeler justly styles "popular- 
 izers," ascribe even to animals as low as ants a high 
 degree of mental activity, in some respects superior to 
 that of man. Others, as A. Bethe and Uexkuell, 
 maintain that only the higher animals, such as dogs, 
 are endowed with intelligence, whilst the lower ones, 
 as for instance insects, are mere reflex machines, desti- 
 tute of all psychic qualities. Others, finally, as Em- 
 ery, Forel, Morgan, Romanes, Peckham and so forth, 
 attribute intelligence to all animals without exception, 
 but add that this intelligence, though not differing in 
 quality from that of man, is infinitely inferior to it in de~ 
 gree. Only a few, such as Wasmann and Wundt, are 
 convinced that there is no trace of true intelligence, 
 either in the lower or in the higher animals. Prof. 
 Wheeler seems to hold that there is no evidence of
 
 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 9 
 
 ratiocination in animals. It is true, he ascribes what 
 he calls "simple intelligence" to animals, and main- 
 tains that this term implies "choice on the part of the 
 individual organism." *) But his term "choice" 
 can hardly mean choice in as far as it supposes the 
 abstract comparison of two objects. For he declares 
 with reference to ants ' 'that there are no evidences of 
 anything resembling abstract thought, cognition or 
 ratiocination as manifested in man." 2 ) Prof. Ed- 
 ward L,. Thorndike of Columbia University is a de- 
 cided adversary of animal intelligence. After a most 
 careful examination of the question, he "failed to find 
 any act that even seemed due to reasoning, " 3 ) and 
 that "even after leaving reason out of account, there 
 are tremendous differences between man and the higher 
 animals." 4 ) 
 
 But abstracting from such few authors the late zoo- 
 logist Prof. A. S. Packard is correct when he states: 
 "Those naturalists who observe most closely (?) and 
 patiently the habits of animals do not hesitate to state 
 their belief that animals, and some more than others, 
 possess reasoning powers which differ in degree rather 
 
 l ~) "The Compound and Mixed Nests of American Ants," 
 The American Naturalist, Vol. XXXV. (1901), p. 809. 
 
 2 ) I.e., p. 813. 
 
 3 ) "Animal Intelligence; an Experimental Study of the 
 Associative Processes in Animals." Series of Monograph 
 Supplements to Psychological Review Vol. II., No. 4, June, 
 1898, p. 46. 
 
 4 ) 1. c., p. 87. Thorndike, at times, speaks of animals as 
 if he ascribed intelligence to them. But, in reality, he means 
 nothing else than what we would call "plastic instinct."
 
 10 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 than in kind from the purely intellectual acts of 
 man." J ) 
 
 Now upon investigation into the cause underlying 
 this erroneous principle we might, as far as the more 
 popular circles are concerned, discover one reason in 
 the nervous sentimentalism of our days. At the be- 
 ginning of the twentieth century, no less than towards 
 the end of the eighteenth, people have become ex- 
 tremely sensitive to any sort of pain. Pain like a 
 haunting spectre is dreaded with the utmost anxiety 
 and avoided even to a nicety; and since the human 
 heart is inclined to find some correspondence between 
 external circumstances and its own apprehensions and 
 emotions, it kindles in sympathy wherever pain is no- 
 ticed, whether real or imaginary. This inclina- 
 tion will grow stronger as soon as there is question of 
 animated beings that are attached to man and afford 
 him sensuous pleasure, and leave upon him the im- 
 pression of a certain helplessness. Of course, as is 
 attested by daily experience, one of the first and fore- 
 most places among such cherished creatures must be 
 assigned to the animals known as our "domestic com- 
 panions." Besides there exists a certain analogy be- 
 tween the manifestations of pain in man and in the 
 brute, between the expression of man's spiritual affec- 
 tions and the corresponding merely sensuous feelings 
 indicated in the features of animals. Thus it hap- 
 pens that from the expression visible in the eye of a 
 faithful dog the inference is drawn, not to an empty 
 stomach, but rather to a heart oppressed by sorrow 
 
 )A. S. Packard, M. D. Ph. D., Zoology (10th ed.) p. 
 680.
 
 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 11 
 
 and even weariness of life. In other words, it is from 
 sheer sentimentality that the spiritual affections prop- 
 er to man alone are under similar circumstances 
 attributed to animals; hence it follows that a genuine 
 consciousness of pain, presupposing reason and intel- 
 lect, is ascribed to them. 
 
 "Human folk," says Thorndike in his admirable 
 monograph on animal intelligence, "are as a matter of 
 fact eager to find intelligence in animals. They like 
 to. And when the animal observed is a pet belonging 
 to them or their friends, or when the story is one that 
 has been told as a story to entertain, further implica- 
 tions are introduced. " l ) 
 
 A second reason for this universal anthropomor- 
 phism is touched upon by Peckham when he speaks 
 "of the futility of any attempt to understand the 
 meaning of the actions of animals until one has be- 
 come well acquainted with their life habits. " 2 ) Many 
 animal actions, to all appearances, bear such traces of 
 intelligence that they are almost involuntarily attri- 
 buted to an intellectual principle. A more careful 
 examination and comparison with other actions 
 of the same animal will soon convince us of our 
 error. 
 
 "Thousands of cats on thousands of occasions, sit 
 helplessly yowling, and no one takes thought of it; 
 but let one cat claw at the knob of a door, supposedly as 
 asignal to be let out, and straightway this cat becomes 
 the representative of the cat-mind in all the books. 
 
 ') Thorndike, 1. c., p. 4. 
 
 2 ) G. W. Peckham and E. G. Peckham. Oil the Instincts 
 and Habits of the Solitary Wasps, Madison, 1898, p. 230.
 
 12 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 The unconscious distortion of the facts is almost harm- 
 less compared to the unconcious neglect of an animal's 
 mental life until it verges on the unusual and marvel- 
 lous." 1 ) 
 
 The defective philosophical training and superficial 
 education, so prevalent in our times, suggest a third 
 reason for this mania of ascribing intelligence to ani- 
 mals. Ever since the destructive attempts of Kant 
 and his disciples to shake and shatter the realms of 
 ideas, the true object of philosophy is ignored and 
 lost. The noble queen, the exalted offspring of etern- 
 al wisdom, has been stripped of her royal dignity; and 
 while ruthless hands have snatched the crown from 
 off her head, she has "been degraded to be the 
 cringing handmaid of experimental science. And 
 what was the unavoidable result? That very soon the 
 principles of the old and sound philosophy fell into 
 contempt, whilst in their stead there rose a confus- 
 ion and obscurity of ideas which oftentimes led to the 
 defense of most obvious errors permeating certain 
 branches of science. Thus our modern psychology, as 
 upheld by many of its advocates, is a veritable monstro- 
 sity. Wundt can not refrain from blaming mod- 
 ern psychology for its "premature application of no- 
 tions insufficiently determined" and for its "ignor- 
 ance of systematic psychological methods. ' ' Thus he 
 explains the fact "that the psychic processes of 
 brutes are not taken for what they appear in imme- 
 diate and unprejudiced observation, but that the ob- 
 server's reflections are transferred to the animal. If 
 any vital action has the appearance of possibly 
 
 1 ) Thorndike, 1. c. p. 4.
 
 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 13 
 
 being the result of a number of reasonings and 
 conclusions, this is taken as a cogent proof that such 
 reasoning and conclusion actually occurred. And 
 thus all the psychic activity is resolved into logical 
 reflections. " x ) 
 
 The above mentioned reasons, however, do not 
 offer us the final and fundamental explanation for the 
 persistent tendency of assigning a difference between 
 man and animal, not of kind but of degree. 
 
 The assumption of animal intelligence, as every 
 other error, is essentially rooted in the will. It does 
 not require much depth or breadth of intellect to see 
 that the humanizing of the brute is a mere corollary 
 of materialistic evolution. Materialism denies the 
 existence of a vital principle apart from matter, and 
 maintains that life is merely the resultant of attracting 
 and repelling forces. Everything, therefore, is pure 
 matter, and there can be no essential difference be- 
 tween the animal soul and that of man, since neither 
 can exist independently of matter. But if there is no 
 essential difference between the animating principles 
 of man and brute, why assume any between the facul- 
 ties and manifestations of these principles? In other 
 words, if human actions are guided by intelligence, 
 the same holds true for those of animals. 
 
 It follows that the theory of animal intel- 
 ligence is the natural outcome of materialism, and as 
 such must be traced back to the same source from 
 which materialism ultimately springs. To speak 
 plainly, the first promulgators of "animal intelligence" 
 
 1 ) W. Wundt, Vorlesungen ueber die Menschen=und 
 Tierseele, 3. ed, 1897, p. 387.
 
 14 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 and those "popularizers," as Wheeler justly calls 
 them, who now uphold it with such tendentious tenac- 
 ity often seem to have no other purpose in view 
 than to establish a theoretical justification for des- 
 cending practically to a level with the brute. 
 
 These reasons we believe clearly prove the deplor- 
 able character of this modern tendency which aims at 
 leveling the difference between animal and man, a 
 tendency which, because of its universality and the 
 warm support it receives, calls for most strenuous 
 opposition. 
 
 It is our intention to contribute in some small 
 share to the controversy, and to prove in a simple and 
 clear manner the essential difference which has ever 
 been upheld by Catholic philosophy with reference to 
 the souls of man and brute. Man and brute belong to 
 two different realms of life, separated by a spanless 
 chasm. This is the thesis we propose to the consid- 
 eration of the reader, and in order to demonstrate it, 
 we shall confine ourselves to the specific activities of 
 man and brute, basing our entire argumentation on 
 the following simple syllogism: 
 
 True instinct and intelligence * ) differ essentially. 
 Now the brute possesses merely instinct and no trace of 
 intelligence. Therefore man and brute differ essentially. 
 
 In the first part of the essay we shall develop 
 the concept of instinct, then explain the true 
 
 *) That is "rational intelligence." To avoid misunder- 
 standings we may note here that by the term intelligence, we 
 always mean intelligence in its proper signification, that is 
 rational intelligence.
 
 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 15 
 
 criterion which invariably separates instinct and in- 
 telligence, and prove that this criterion involves an 
 essential difference. In the second part -we shall 
 make use of the criterion established and prove that 
 there is no trace of intelligence in animals.
 
 PART I. 
 
 INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE DIFFER ESSEN. 
 TIALLY. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Instinct and Final Tendency. 
 
 'THE views of scientific men on the nature of instinct 
 and instinctive activity are so widely divergent that 
 any endeavor of securing general acceptance for a pre- 
 cise definition of the terms seems to be a hopeless task. 
 Still it is necessary to make the attempt; for without 
 clear definitions and premises it is impossible to treat a 
 question fairly or to arrive at clear conclusions. The 
 clear sky lies beyond the clouds and the haze of the 
 atmosphere. What, then, do we understand by in- 
 stinct? Sense experience or well observed facts, and 
 not preconceived ideas, are to furnish the necessary 
 data from which we determine the characteristics act- 
 ually common to all instinctive activity. But in 
 appealing to facts and common sense it is well to re- 
 main on neutral ground; we shall restrict our present 
 investigation to actions that are not and cannot be 
 modified by any experience and are acknowledged 
 alike by friend and foe to belong to the category ot 
 instinctive activity. In this supposition we shall 
 show first of all that all actions proceeding from in- 
 stinct necessarily involve a final tendency. 
 
 (16)
 
 INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 17 
 
 It is obvious that the influence of "purpose," or a 
 final tendency, is met with everywhere in the universe. 
 The recognition of this truth is forcibly brought home 
 to us by the study of the laws of inorganic matter 
 in the wonderful cycle of carbon in the realm of nature, 
 the numeric proportions according to which atoms com- 
 bine and separate, the peculiar quality of water in 
 reaching its maximum density at 4 C. It is clearly 
 demonstrated by the laws of organic life in general, 
 and especially by the study of the human body, its 
 organs and functions, the eye, the heart, the circulation 
 of the blood, the activity of brain and nerves. But 
 nowhere is the recognition of final tendency demanded 
 more emphatically than in the explanation of the act- 
 ivity of animals which originates in their instinctive 
 faculties. Indeed, we meet with so many actions ap- 
 propriate to specific ends that, if anywhere in nature, 
 then surely in the domain of instinct, "final tendency' ' 
 holds the sceptre of sovereignty. 
 
 Countless illustrations offered by natural history 
 show that the tendency, which is characteristic of all 
 instinctive activity, refers to the preservation of the 
 individual animal and of its distinctive species. Con- 
 sequently, there are three principal groups of instinc- 
 tive actions: those which refer to the nutrition of the 
 individual, those which tend to its defence, and 
 those which are directed toward the propagation 
 of the species. As it is impossible to investigate 
 every instinctive action in detail, we shall con- 
 fine our study to these three groups, and we shall 
 find abundant evidence to prove that "final tendency" 
 is an essential constituent of every activity that is 
 acknowledged to belong to the realm of instinct.
 
 18 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 In studying the first group of instinctive actions, 
 those by which animals nourish themselves and their 
 progeny, we are struck by two main facts: the peculiar 
 fitness of the nourishment for the digestive organs of 
 the animal and the appropriate manner in which it is 
 procured. I^et us take as an example the develop- 
 ment of the beetle Sitaris humeralis (muralis), which 
 has been so admirably described by the French natur- 
 alist Fabre. x ) In its first larval stage this interesting 
 blister-beetle of the family of the Meloidae cannot live 
 except on the egg of a bee, whereas the indispensable 
 food of the second stage is honey , which would have 
 been virulent poison to the beetle in its earliest exist- 
 ence. The following organs are at the disposal of our 
 beetle to secure possession of the egg: six strong legs, 
 well adapted for climbing and clinging to other objects, 
 fully developed mandibles and feelers, and finally good 
 eyes. But after the transformation of the first larval 
 stage into the second, the wormlike grub is blind 
 and has almost lost its legs and feelers, but is endowed 
 with a large mouth admirably adapted for sipping the 
 honey which is necessary for its subsistence in this 
 second stage of development. The spot where Sitaris 
 first beholds the light of day is near the entrance of 
 the bee's habitation. The larva is hatched toward the 
 end of September or early in October, and remains 
 quietly on the same spot throughout the winter with- 
 out any food until the bee leaves its home in early 
 spring. Then the moment for action has arrived, and 
 it is highly interesting to observe how our beetle pro- 
 cures its suitable nourishment in the most appropriate 
 manner. 
 
 ') J. H. Fabre, Nouveaux Souvenirs Entomologiqnes, 
 Paris, 1882, Vol. II., p. 262.
 
 INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 19 
 
 When the male-bees are about to leave the nest 
 they must necessarily pass the spot where our little 
 larva has patiently lurked, as it were, for six months. 
 It seems to have anticipated this fact, and when the bee 
 unsuspectingly approaches the entrance of the nest, 
 the larva vaults with the greatest ease on the bee's 
 back, and off it goes on an interesting journey through 
 the beautiful realm of new-born spring. But at 
 once it is confronted by a new difficulty; for it will 
 never succeed in finding an egg on the back of the 
 male-bee, especially as the latter never returns to the 
 nest. Yet our little rider knows very well what to do. 
 At the moment when the male-bee on his journey 
 meets the female, the larva swaps horses, and having 
 returned to the nest on the back of the female, slides 
 along the drawn out abdomen directly onto the first 
 egg she deposits in the carefully prepared cell. With 
 the usual signs of satisfaction, the bee then closes the 
 cell, in which the embryo bee and the bold intruder 
 have been immured, and the larva can now consume 
 the egg without fear of disturbance. Resting on the 
 floating island of "eggshells," it passes into the sec- 
 ond stage and then enjoys the sweet honey in per- 
 fect security from all danger for the following stages 
 of its extraordinary metamorphosis. 
 
 Not less remarkable are those instinctive actions of 
 animals by which they provide for their defence and 
 propagation. But these actions must not be separated 
 from the circumstances which influence their perfor- 
 mance. Indeed, if these circumstances were always 
 taken into consideration, no one would dare affirm 
 that instinctive actions of animals are inappropriate in
 
 20 THK HUMANIZING OF THB BRUTE. 
 
 their nature, though sometimes for the sake of a high- 
 er end they may fall short of their immediate purpose. 
 
 A classical example admirably adapted to illustrate 
 the point at issue is the life-history of the famous 
 leaf-roller Rhynchites betulse L. ; for in constructing 
 the cradle for its young this tiny black snout-beetle 
 has for ages been carrying out a problem which, at 
 least in its entirety, was not known to man before the 
 year 1673, when the great mathematical genius, Huy- 
 gens, published his celebrated "Horologium Oscilla- 
 torium. ' ' 
 
 L,et us give a brief account of the famous beetle 
 and its problem, basing our remarks on the investiga- 
 tions and writings of Debay l ) and of Wasmann a ) 
 and upon observations made by ourselves many years 
 ago in Holland. 
 
 In early spring, as soon as the Rh, betula 3 ) has 
 emerged from the ground, it climbs up a birch-tree, 
 where, after mating, the female at once proceeds to con- 
 struct from the pliant young birch leaves a little house 
 for her offspring. Carefully examining the edge of a 
 leaf, the beetle suddenly stops and begins to cut the out- 
 lines of what is to be the cradle for its little ones. It 
 starts at the upper margin of one side of the leaf. 
 Directing its head toward the upper part of the central 
 rib, it cuts with its admirably adapted mandibles an 
 S-shaped curve, whose terminal touches the leaf's 
 
 1 ) Dr. Debay, Beitraege zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der 
 Ruesselkaefer aus der Familie der Attelabiden, Bonn, 1846. 
 
 J ) Erich Wasmann, S. J., Der Trichterwickler, Muenster, 
 1884. The following account was first published in the 
 Scientific American, April, 1901. 
 
 3 ) From betula, birch-tree.
 
 INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 21 
 
 central rib. Then, after having made a slight incision 
 into the main nerve of the leaf, in order to impair the 
 flow of the sap, it cuts across the other half of the 
 leaf a corresponding but more horizontal curve which 
 terminates a little higher on the central rib. After 
 repassing the line of the entire cut to trim the 
 edges and to cut through some nerves still connected, 
 it once more stations itself at the starting-point of the 
 whole operation. With the claws of its legs, whose 
 femurs are powerful levers, it next grasps the edge of 
 the leaf, and walking now downward, now to the 
 middle, it rolls up in less than two minutes one- 
 half of the leaf into a sort of funnel, opening down- 
 ward. After a short repast, which very prudently is 
 taken from parts close to the main ribs, our little 
 worker hastens to roll up the other side of the leaf 
 around the funnel just formed, in which operation it 
 uses its legs in a manner just the reverse of the former. 
 
 Now, after 30 minutes' work, the main prepara- 
 tions have been completed for depositing the eggs. The 
 beetle crawls into the funnel's interior, cuts out three 
 or four little pockets and introduces an egg into each. 
 After this has been done, nothing remains but to close 
 the precious chamber as firmly as possible. To ac- 
 complish this, it walks first to the upper end of the 
 funnel and pierces the different layers of the leaf in 
 such a way as to make them adhere to each other. 
 Then it returns to the lower end of the leaf, and grasp- 
 ing its apex, forms a second funnel, with its opening 
 directed upward and fitting exactly into the larger one 
 (Plate I., fig. 1). 
 
 In doing all this our little architect, otherwise of so
 
 22 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 timid a nature, exhibits such an interest and fervor 
 that, as I myself more than once have observed, it 
 does not desist from its ingenious work once begun, 
 even though taken into the observer's hand. 
 
 Now in what does the real problem of the beetle 
 consist, and what has it to do with the conservation of 
 its species? 
 
 Unrolling the leaf and spreading it on a plain sur- 
 face (Fig 2), we shall find that the exterior margin 
 of the leaf and the S-curve cut by the beetle are in 
 the same relation to each other as the two curves of 
 higher mathematics, the involute and evolute, i. e., 
 v w, t u, r s, p g, I m are almost perpendicular to 
 the exterior margin w u s q m, and are equal to 
 the corresponding curves v y g, t y g, r y g, p y g, 
 lyg, respectively. In other words, our little mathe- 
 matician cuts its S-curve so that the length of the cut 
 made and the distance from the exterior margin always 
 remain the same. This problem coincides with the task 
 of higher mathematics, from a given involute to con- 
 struct the corresponding evolute, and consequently in- 
 volves a most complicate combination of differential 
 calculus and geometry. 
 
 But to what kind of curve does the evolute of Rh. 
 betula belong? As Prof. Heis first discovered, the 
 evolute in this case is nothing else than an unfinished 
 circle, which has its terminals in the joints g and 
 y. According to the same authority, the more 
 horizontal curve of the second half of the leaf is to 
 be considered as a very appropiate flattening of the 
 first curve, which has a more perpendicular position. 
 For, since the broader exterior windings A, B, C>
 
 INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 
 
 PLATE No. I. 
 
 OO 
 i<j 
 
 Fig. 1. The Scientifically Constructed Nest 
 of the Rhynchites Betulae. (After Wasmann.) 
 
 Fi?. 2. (After Wasmann modified.) Fig. 3. (After Wasmann.) 
 
 The curve g w' u' e' q' o' in' k' h' Vepr^ents the mathemalical hivdute belonging 10 
 the evolute g i 1 n p r t v y.
 
 INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 25 
 
 correspond to the smaller interior //, G, F, without 
 being shortened (i. e. a b and cd are equal iolm and 
 z" k respectively) , the second S-curve must necessarily 
 lie in a more horizontal position. 
 
 This is one part of our little builder's problem. 
 The other consists in the suitableness of the chosen 
 curve to the formation of a funnel. Supposing that 
 the beetle wished to construct from the birch leaf the 
 largest and strongest funnel possible, and that, too, 
 in the shortest time and with the expenditure of the 
 least amount of its limited strength, it could really 
 not choose a more suitable curve. 
 
 The funnel may be considered as a surface coiii- 
 cally evolvable which, when spread out upon a plane, 
 coincides with it in all its points. Now such a sur- 
 face can be rolled up in two ways, so that the lines 
 of convolution meet either in one point or in a row of 
 points, lying in a straight or curved line (Fig. 3). 
 To have them meet in one point is, in our case, alto- 
 gether out of question. For apart from the fact that 
 the central rib would most probably tear in the course 
 of the operation, it would exceed the strength of our 
 little beetle to handle the whole surface o a at once. 
 Therefore, the second manner of convolution had to be 
 chosen. Yet here again it would not do to have the 
 upper margin in a straight line, for in rolling up the 
 leaf, the upper and lower openings would have to be- 
 come either equal in their respective diameters, and 
 we would have no funnel, but only a useless cylinder; 
 or they would be unequal, the larger opening being 
 either above or below. If above, the funnel, be- 
 cause reversed, evidently would not serve its purpose ;
 
 26 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 if below, the length of the side o a would either not 
 correspond to that of the outer edge a g or at least 
 the oblique position of the funnel would make it im- 
 possible to wind the other half of the leaf around it. 
 The margin, therefore, must be a curved line. But 
 this curved line again would be either convex or con- 
 cave; or partly convex, partly concave. Of these pos- 
 sible cases, the first two would be impractical; for the 
 merely convex margin has all the disadvantages of a 
 straight one, and, besides, would make the poor 
 beetle do superfluous work in rolling up a part of the 
 leaf (0 b a c) that is of no use in the formation of the 
 funnel. A funnel with a merely concave margin 
 would have too many windings closely packed at the 
 top, and thus overtax the strength of the builder; 
 and the funnel, which is subsequently to serve also 
 as food for the larvae, would perhaps have dwindled 
 down too much in size. 
 
 There remains only the concavo-convex line 
 of section, in which again either the convex or 
 the concave part might be longer. And here, as Was- 
 mann justly remarks, "the technical ingenuity of our 
 architect shows itself in its brightest light. ' ' For what 
 would be the result if the convex part were longer? 
 We need only cut such a funnel from paper and see. 
 First of all, it is not pointed enough. Besides, the 
 part h b is not in the spiral of the point, as it should 
 be, but along the vertical axis, and thereby the curve 
 o cb d will no longer have the required length. And 
 the part c a b d would most unsuitably protrude above 
 the funnel's apex. At any rate, the funnel would be
 
 INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 27 
 
 lacking in firmness and could not be closed so tightly 
 as it should be. 
 
 But if, as is actually the fact, our architect chooses 
 to make the concave part of the margin longer in the 
 above mentioned proportion to the leaf's outer mar- 
 gin, then all requirements are most admirably met, 
 and not a trace of the disadvantages of the former 
 methods can be discovered. Without wishing to main- 
 tain that no other curve might possibly bring about 
 the same result, there is certainly none so simple and 
 yet so wonderfully appropiate. 
 
 To understand this still more clearty, we may finally 
 direct our attention for a moment to the purpose 
 which the funnel has. What is the real destiny of this 
 artistic house? To insure the preservation of the 
 species of Rhynchites betulce, it is absolutely necessary 
 that in its larval stage the young progeny should be 
 guarded against all harmful influences resulting from 
 atmospheric changes. Now it has been experimentally 
 proved that every larva, in spite of abundant v food, 
 simply dries up when taken out of the tightly rolled 
 and well-sealed funnel. Moreover, on account of the 
 constitution of its stomach , the larva can feed only on 
 dry leaves, supplied by its habitation. That the birch 
 leaf might be dry in due time, the mother beetle 
 wisely provided by making the incision in the 
 leaf's central rib. Finally, because the number of its 
 progeny is so exceedingly small, it had to guard them 
 well against all insectivorous animals. But who can 
 suggest a hiding-place better adapted to its purposes 
 than a dry, meaningless leaf, rolled up and closed with 
 so great care?
 
 28 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 A great many other examples of a less impressive 
 but similar nature could be enumerated, all 
 evincing the self same conclusion that the instinct- 
 ive actions of animals are of themselves highly appro- 
 piate to their purpose and reveal a true final tendency. 
 
 Or, for what other reason but to seek protection 
 from danger do worms contract the segments of their 
 body, hedgehogs roll themselves into balls bristling 
 with spikes, snails retire into their shells, turtles with- 
 draw their heads and legs and hide themselves in the 
 sand, young snakes jump into the mouth of their par- 
 ent, chickens seek protection under the wings of the 
 hen? 
 
 Nor can any other explanation than "purpose" be 
 given for those actions by which animals preserve 
 their species. Or, why do they always deposit their 
 eggs in places which offer the most suitable food for 
 their offspring? Why do mosquitoes drop their eggs 
 into water, the only place where the young can devel- 
 op, cabbage-butterflies deposit them on the under side 
 of the cabbage leaf, Sitaris in the nest-entrance of An- 
 tophoras? Why does the fly Gastrus equi paste them 
 on the breast of a horse, where they are licked up ty 
 the horse's tongue and forwarded into its stomach, 
 the only place where the maggots find their specific and 
 necessary nourishment? Why do several species of 
 solitary wasps fasten their eggs on the bodies of living 
 but paralyzed spiders, caterpillars and grasshoppers? 
 
 Why does the great water-scavenger, Hydrophilus 
 piceus build a little boat for its eggs, and Lomechusa, 
 Xenodusa, Atemeles . . . bring them into the 
 nests of ants; why in short does every species find
 
 INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 29 
 
 those places and conditions, which are best adapted 
 to secure the welfare of its offspring? There can be 
 no question of chance where such a universal exper- 
 ience confronts us with such wonderful facts, and it is 
 consequently evident that a "purpose" in finding 
 suitable nourishment, in protecting the individual 
 and propagating the species is an essential constituent 
 of all instinctive actions of animals.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Instinct and Consciousness of Finality. 
 
 I NSTINCTI VE actions are essentially of a purposeful 
 and seemingly intelligent character being directed, 
 as we have shown, toward the welfare of individual 
 and species. We must now examine what relation 
 instinctive actions have to the agent's cognition and 
 appetency? For the answer to this question will de- 
 termine the specific character of instinctive actions in 
 contradistinction to all other kinds of actions performed 
 by man or animal. Hence we ask whether we are 
 justified to infer that the final tendency which is evi- 
 dently manifested in the case of the instincts is as such 
 or in itself an object of cognition and volition on the 
 part of the agent. Some believe that it is impossible to 
 answer this question in a satisfactory manner. Ladd 
 says of instinctive actions that "they seem like the 
 deeds of intelligent will striving to realize ideas held 
 up by imagination and thought." But, "how far an 
 actual examination of the data of consciousness justi- 
 fies the seeming, is a question which can probably 
 never be answered satisfactorily. " l ) 
 
 ') George Trumbul Ladd, Psychology, descriptive and 
 explanatory, 4. ed., New York, 1903, p. 598. 
 
 (30)
 
 INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 31 
 
 We believe that this is not so. It is certainly im- 
 possible to determine in detail how the single instinc- 
 tive actions are performed and how they originated. 
 But the simple fact whether or not they proceed from 
 an intellectual or a merely sensuous principle or from 
 no principle of cognition at all can, we believe, be 
 easily ascertained. I^et us see. 
 
 Our first proposition is that, as in the instincts of 
 man so also in the instincts of animals, the connection 
 of the action and its final purpose is entirely uncon- 
 scious; or as James says: "Instinct is usually defined 
 as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce 
 certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and with- 
 out previous education in the performance. " 2 ) 
 
 We are led to this conclusion first of all by the 
 perfect analogy that exists between the instinctive ac- 
 tions of animals and of man himself. For there are 
 many actions of man of an instinctive nature and per- 
 fectly similar to the corresponding acts of animals. 
 Consequently, if the instinctive actions of man are un- 
 conscious, the same must be asserted of the instinctive 
 actions of animals. The hungry babe endeavors to 
 suck, or gives expression to its feelings by crying, un- 
 til its mother has appeased its craving. It is evident 
 that these actions are appropriate to the purpose; nor 
 is it less evident that they are the result of instinct and 
 not of reason. But how? Is the babe conscious of the 
 final tendency of its actions? Does it cry because it 
 knows that crying is a means to induce its mother, 
 
 2 ) W.James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. II. 1904, 
 p. 383. James' definition is incomplete, as we shall point 
 out below.
 
 32 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 to satisfy its hunger? Evidently not. For our own 
 experience proves that as children we were not con- 
 scious of the suitability of such acts. Moreover, the 
 supposition of consciousness on the part of the child 
 involves a contradiction. Its knowledge of the 
 appropriateness of the action would have to be derived 
 from nature or from experience or from personal re- 
 flection. The first assumption is inadmissible; for 
 there are no innate ideas. Nor can there be a question 
 of experience; for the new-born babe cries previously 
 to all experience of the result of its wailing. Nor can 
 we fall back upon reflection; for the child is incapable 
 of using its mental faculties. Therefore, the cry of 
 hunger is entirely unconscious. The same must be 
 said of all our instinctive actions even of those which 
 are performed after we have attained the use of reason. 
 Our consciousness offers unmistakable testimony 
 that we do not reflect in extending our hands or closing 
 our eyes on the sudden and unexpected approach of a 
 dangerous object. This fact leads to the inference 
 that animals, likewise, have not the remotest idea of 
 the appropriateness of their instinctive activity. 
 
 But here we are confronted by some who reject this 
 conclusion from analogy and entirely disregard the 
 fact, that it is the only way of gaining insight into the 
 functions of the animal soul. 
 
 It is under the influence of this opinion that Pro- 
 fessor Ziegler writes in his treatise on the nature of 
 instinct: "We must leave aside the notion of con- 
 sciousness, if we wish to acquire a useful concept of 
 instinct. ' ' For, ' 'who can tell whether a dog, a lizard, 
 a fish, a beetle, a snail, a worm act consciously or un-
 
 INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 33 
 
 consciously? In the natural sciences it is a very doubtful 
 proceeding to admit into a definition any mark which 
 cannot be judged upon empirically." 
 
 On the contrary, we must insist on a principle well 
 explained by Romanes in his "Animal Intelligence." 
 "Taking it for granted," he says, "that the external 
 indications of mental processes which we observe in 
 animals are trustworthy, so that we are justified in in- 
 ferring particular mental states from particular bodily 
 actions, it follows that in consistency we must every- 
 where apply the same criteria. . . . It is, of course, per- 
 fectly true that the less the resemblance, the less is the 
 value of any analogy built upon the resemblance, and 
 therefore that the inference of an ant or a bee feeling 
 sympathy or rage is not so valid as is the similar in- 
 ference in the case of a dog or a monkey. Still it is 
 an inference, and, so far as it goes, a valid one being, 
 in fact, the only inference available. That is to say, 
 if we observe an ant or a bee apparently exhibiting 
 sympathy or rage, we must either conclude that some 
 psychological state resembling that of sympathy or 
 rage is present, or else refuse to think about the sub- 
 ject at all; from the observable facts there is no other 
 inference open. ' ' Romanes adds that the analogy from 
 human to brute psychology becomes weaker and weak- 
 er as we recede through the animal kingdom down- 
 wards from man; but he insists that "it is the only 
 analogy available" and "that when we get down as 
 low as the insects I think the most we can confidently 
 assert is that the known facts of human psychology 
 furnish the best available pattern of the probable facts 
 of insect psychology. " * ) 
 
 ') P. 8.
 
 34 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 Romanes is correct in insisting upon this analogy. 
 For from like effects we may and must conclude to like 
 causes, and consequently it is sound logic to maintain 
 that, if two actions have the same manifestation in man 
 and animal, they must be similar in their nature. He 
 who denies this principle can make no statement on 
 animal instinct, since by internal experience he is ac- 
 quainted only with his own instinctive actions, whilst 
 he has no knowledge whatever of their nature in other 
 men, much less in animals. 
 
 But we may go still further than Romanes. We 
 need not compare the instinctive actions of man and 
 animal in every respect, but may restrict our present 
 consideration for instance to the manifestation of con- 
 sciousness of finality. Now human psychology fur- 
 nishes us with a number of data taken from circum- 
 stances which clearly demonstrate that the actions in 
 question cannot possibly involve any cognition of final 
 tendency as such. Hence, if we can show the pres- 
 ence of the same identical data in the instinctive ac- 
 tions of animals, we have a perfect analogy and hence 
 a reliable conclusion. 
 
 Our first argument in support of this statement is 
 taken from the very performance of instinctive actions 
 on the parts of animals. 
 
 Let us return to the illustration taken from the 
 larva of Sitaris humeralis. Whence does it know 
 that in its first larval stage it can live only on the egg of 
 a bee? Whence is it aware that it may indeed start out 
 on its trip on the back of the male, but must in the 
 course of it pass over to the female bee and finally 
 glide down upon the egg? Whence does it know that
 
 INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 35 
 
 in its second stage honey and only honey is to be taken 
 as nourishment, though precisely this same honey 
 would have caused its death in the first stage? Does 
 it know it perhaps from experience? But only once 
 in its life does our larva undertake this journey 
 through the air, only once does it feed on the bee's 
 egg, only once on the honey of the cell. Moreover 
 any attempt at experiments would have resulted in 
 death. Therefore, Sitaris does not know from its own 
 experience, how and where it has to provide for its 
 development. Nor is it less ridiculous to assume that 
 a very good memory aided our larva in finding its 
 proper food. That would indeed be a unique memory 
 which remembers facts that have never been exper- 
 ienced. But somebody else, perhaps a careful mother, 
 might have given her darling definite instructions as 
 to the future before it departed from home. Indeed, an 
 idyllic idea! It is too bad that professor Sitaris had to 
 die before even one of her disciples could leave the egg. 
 Therefore, we must either suspect with the elder Ag- 
 assiz that instinct is a faculty of a much higher kind 
 that the intellect of man, or take refuge in the ridicu- 
 lous caricatures of Brehm's intelligent dolls, which pre- 
 vious to any experience excogitate by aprioristic reason- 
 ing the actions most appropiate for their future life. 
 But as these suppositions are evidently absurd, we must 
 necessarily assume that Sitaris performs these instinct- 
 ive actions without any knowledge or consciousness 
 of their purpose; for a purpose which cannot be appre- 
 hended is not apprehended de facto. The same con- 
 clusion is forced upon us by the action of the Rhyn- 
 chites betulae in cutting a curve into the leaf of a
 
 36 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTK. 
 
 birch-tree, whose construction, if performed by man, 
 implies the application of geometry and calculus. 
 The same explanation is demanded by the action ot 
 the male-larva of the stag-beetle (Lucanus elaphas), 
 which spins a cocoon for its future antlers twice as 
 large as does the female larva; the same of the so- 
 called silk-worms which when constructing their 
 double-walled cocoon for the winter season leave a 
 true but well closed door for escape in early spring. 
 (Plate II. Fig. 1.) 
 
 Nor can any other reasonable interpretation be 
 given of the actions of birds which after their very 
 first mating begin to gather blades of grass and like 
 material for their future nest, deposit their eggs in it 
 and hatch out their offspring. Nor does the apparent 
 sagacity of domestic animals in distinguishing so well 
 and at once between hundreds of poisonous and nutri- 
 tious herbs warrant any other conclusion. In fine, all 
 instinctive actions of animals at least at their first oc- 
 currence and previous to experience cannot be ex- 
 plained otherwise than by the conclusion that under 
 the mere impulse of instinct animals are entirely un- 
 conscious of the final tendency, so brilliantly mani- 
 fested in their highly appropriate activity. 
 
 A second proof that animals cannot know the pur- 
 pose of their instinctive actions has often been derived 
 from their peculiar and constant regularity. "A still 
 more important reason," says Wundt, "which op- 
 poses the derivation of merely instinctive actions from 
 conscious reasoning, may be found in the fact that 
 they are repeated by all individuals of the same spec- 
 ies with great regularity, though there is no possibility
 
 INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINAIJTY. 3T 
 
 PLATE II. 
 
 Fig. 1. The silk-worm Attacus Cecropia and Its cocoon. (Original.) 
 
 Fig 2. A Solitary Wasp "using stone to pound down earth over nest." 
 
 (Peckham.)
 
 INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 39 
 
 of proving that between the single individuals there 
 exists any connection which might explain the per- 
 fect agreement in their behavior. ' ' And the zoologist 
 Schneider adds in still clearer terms, "that in the 
 habits of insects a regularity and predetermination 
 should be observed which cannot be detected in the 
 conscious actions of man. In opposition to merely 
 instinctive habits precisely those associations which 
 are formed by ratiocination are characterized by a con- 
 stant variation, whilst the instincts of the individuals 
 of the same species remain constant. " 1 ) 
 
 Here is an illustration of this well known fact, 
 mentioned by Peckham. The solitary wasp Sphex- 
 ichneumonea leaves her grass-hopper (which is to 
 serve as food for the young) just at the entrance to 
 the excavation (of her nest) and first enters to see 
 that all is right within. In experimenting with a 
 French Sphex, which has the same habit, Fabre (the 
 famous French naturalist mentioned above) moved 
 the creature a little way off; the wasp came out, 
 brought it to the opening as before, and went in a 
 second time. This was repeated again and again un- 
 til the patience of the naturalist was exhausted, and 
 the persistent wasp took her booty in after her appro- 
 piate fashion. She must place the grass-hopper just 
 so close to the doorway, she must then descend and 
 examine the nest and after that must come out and 
 drag it down. Nothing less than the performance 
 of these acts in a certain order satisfies her impulse. 
 
 ') Cf. T. Pesch.S. J., Die grossen Weltraetsel, 1883, vol. 
 I., p. 426.
 
 40 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 There must be no disturbance of the regular method 
 or she refuses to proceed. 1 ) 
 
 This argument is rendered still more efficacious, 
 if we consider how often this very regularity of the 
 action destroys its appropriate character, although in 
 common circumstances every instinctive action is 
 adapted to its purpose. It may happen that these cir- 
 cumstances are disturbed by man or some other cause. 
 Now if the animal were conscious of its instinctive 
 actions, it evidently would either desist from acting or 
 adapt its action to the changed conditions. But as 
 many facts have proved, animals prefer to exhibit the 
 most stupid performances rather than change their 
 usual course of procedure. A goose deprived of its 
 embryo goslings continues with great zest to hatch on 
 the dunghill, and hens will do the same on pseudo-eggs 
 and iron chains. Birds, that have seen their offspring 
 killed before their eyes, continue to gather food for 
 their fledglings. Altum vouches for the fact, that 
 some northern birds when deprived of their eggs go so 
 far in phenomenal stupidity as to collect food and dis- 
 gorge it in the nest when the time has arrived for the 
 appearance of their brood, as if it were actually present; 
 or they offer food to the eggs which have become add- 
 led by excessive hatching. 2 ) Chickens have the in- 
 stinct of scratching which ordinarily serves to expose 
 their food or prepare their nest. But they also scratch 
 on a stone floor or on the top of a heap of grain, and do 
 not pickup a single morsel without dashing a dozen or 
 more against the opposite wall. Insects which in case of 
 
 1 ) I.e., p. 212. 
 
 2 ) Dr. B. Altum, Der Vogel und sein L,eben, 6. ed., p. 200.
 
 INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 41 
 
 danger simulate death and drop on the ground do ex- 
 actly the same if instead of firm ground there is a pool 
 of water below them. Even ants, in spite of their high- 
 ly developed faculty of adaptation, do not act less 
 stupidly. Generally speaking they adopt in observa- 
 tion nests the same line of instinctive actions which 
 were useful to them in their natural state, although in 
 the changed conditions those actions are often useless 
 and even harmful. 
 
 Instances such as these could be multiplied indefi- 
 nitely. At present let us add but two striking illus- 
 trations which Peckham enumerates as "errors of in- 
 stinct. ' ' Cerceris ornata is the name of a solitary wasp, 
 which is known to kill certain bees of the genus Haly- 
 ctus by means of its sting, to carry them into its nest 
 of sand and place an egg upon the ventral side of 
 the bee. One day "while Cerceris was away hunting, 
 some dry sand was thrown into the nest, and the en- 
 trance was then stopped with damp sand. She returned 
 laden with prey, and seeing herself forced to resume 
 the profession of a miner, abandoned her victim, cleared 
 the entrance, penetrated within, came out again and 
 flew off in search of new prey. After two successive 
 trips she penetrated a third time into her dwelling and 
 began to reject the dry sand which had been thrown in. 
 In the midst of this sand was a bee (which she had drop- 
 ped before). Presently the wasp flew away. The hours 
 passed on and she returned without a bee, entered and 
 threw out the other one which she now considered an 
 encumbering object. Thus of two victims which were 
 procured with great trouble, one was abandoned on 
 the thresh-hold, and the other was dropped halfway
 
 42 THE HUMANIZING OP THE BRUTE. 
 
 in neither served as food for larvae. What of that? 
 Cerceris had given the sting that was enough. At 
 another time a nest, one of the cells of which was not 
 entirely provisioned, was destroyed at evening. On 
 the next morning Cerceris brought a newly stung bee 
 and placed it in the hole. On the following day she 
 came agaia charged with prey and dropped her bee 
 which rolled to the bottom of the excavation. She had 
 not brought the full number for provisioning the nest. 
 Instinct commanded her to bring them, and she obey- 
 ed but not knowing where to put them, let them fall. " l ) 
 
 From such instances we must conclude that instinc- 
 tive actions as such are never connected with con- 
 sciousness of final tendency. For these cases of in- 
 appropriateness do not occur only now and then, but 
 may be occasioned in any kind of instinctive actions. 
 They cannot be the result of a misleading reflection 
 or of an erroneous judgment influenced by will power, 
 or by the appearance of truth; for of this there can be 
 no question in actions so stupid, useless, and often in- 
 jurious. 
 
 ') I.e., p. 219-220.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Instinct and Sensuous Cognition. 
 
 IN the preceding chapter we have proved that, in 
 spite of their eminent appropriate ness, the instinct- 
 ive actions of animals do not betray the slightest trace 
 of consciousness of finality. But we are not allowed 
 to infer that all unconscious actions which manifest a 
 final purpose have to be classified as instinctive. If this 
 conclusion were legitimate, many vegetative processes 
 and vital actions which are merely automatic would 
 have to be referred to the domain of instinct. In 
 fact, some scientists admit a so-called organic instinct. 
 But at the very first glance it is evident that the term 
 is not used in its proper meaning. Or is the action of 
 plants instinctive, when they take in sap by their roots 
 or carbon-dioxide by their leaves? This would be as 
 incorrect as to maintain that the beat of the heart and 
 the respiration of the lungs are guided by instinct. 
 For, neither vegetative processes nor reflexive activit- 
 ies can be termed instinctive actions, but only such as 
 are connected with sensuous cognition and appetency. 
 Now, first of all, there can be no doubt of the fact that 
 instinctive actions are at least in some way determined 
 by sensitive cognition. For as experience shows, ani- 
 mals distinguish very well in their instinctive actions 
 between the different objects that surround them and 
 administer to their wants. Birds never take the insects 
 which supply their food for the material out of which 
 
 (43)
 
 44 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 they build their nests. Who ever saw a swallow con- 
 structing its nest of flies or mosquitoes and feeding its 
 young with mud? What else, than some kind of 
 sensuous cognition guides the hawk when it swoops 
 down from on high and grasps its prey with unfailing 
 certainty? What else always impels the hen to gather 
 its chicks under its protecting wing on the first ap- 
 proach of such a dangerous visitor? Indeed, Descartes, 
 misled by the regularity of instinctive actions, spoke 
 of animals as of automatic beings and thought that he 
 could explain animal activity by his ' 'spiritus vitales, ' ' 
 certain liquids of a merely mechanical nature. But in 
 doing so he disregarded the fact that animals have real 
 organs that produce effects similar to those which are 
 brought forth by the sensitive cognition of man and he 
 forgot how variable within the limits of a certain reg- 
 ularity instinctive actions may be. Therefore, the fact 
 that some kind of sensitive cognition determines the 
 animal, when acting instinctively, is beyond all doubt. 
 Nevertheless, there are some modern scientists of 
 no small reputation who follow the example of Des- 
 cartes and maintain that instinctive actions are in no 
 wise influenced by sensitive cognition, but are of a 
 merely mechanical nature. One of these scientists is 
 Prof. Jacques L,oeb *) of the University of California, 
 well known on account of his experiments regarding 
 artificial parthenogenesis. 2 ) L,oeb boldly asserts: 
 
 1 ) Studies in General Physiology, Chicago, 1905, vol. I. 
 pp. 1114. 
 
 2 ) We may note here that these experiments have nothing 
 to do with the great question of primo-genesis. For, all ex- 
 periments of I/oeb suppose life, and there is none among them
 
 INSTINCT AND SENSUOUS COGNITION. 45 
 
 "What has been taken for the effect of 'will' or 'in- 
 stinct' is in reality the effect of light, of gravity, of fric- 
 tion, of chemical forces, etc." And so he speaks of 
 heliotropism, when the direction of the rays of light 
 determines the direction of the movements of an ani- 
 mal or its orientation; of geotropism, when gravity, or 
 of stereotropism, when contact with solid bodies deter- 
 mines the orientation, and so forth. 
 
 Heliotropism, geotropisni, and stereotropism may 
 be positive or negative. They are positive, if the ani- 
 mal's motion is towards the light, the earth, or a solid; 
 negative, if in the opposite direction. In further de- 
 scription of his purely mechanical theory, Prof. I^oeb 
 uses the following altogether "unequivocal" phrases: 
 "By the help of light the botanist controls the orienta- 
 tion of a plant at will. Why should he maintain that the 
 'will' or 'instinct' of a plant [ ! ] cooperates with the rays 
 of light when the orientation is determined solely and 
 unequivocally by the latter? The movements of an ani- 
 mal toward the light are, however, .... identical 
 point for point with the movement of a plant toward 
 the light. Wherever the orientation of plants has been 
 satisfactorily controlled experimentally, light has in- 
 deed been considered the sole determining factor; but 
 in the case of animals, in which in similar experiments 
 light is without doubt also the sole determining factor, 
 'instinct' and 'freewill' [sic!] have still been considered 
 to play a role. ' ' 
 
 that could be interpreted as having any connection whatever 
 with spontaneous generation. Cf. our paper on "Modern 
 Science and the Origin of Life"in the New York Messenger, 
 April, 1906.
 
 46 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 Loeb grants that life-phenomena are ' ' not dependent 
 solely upon the external causes acting upon the organ- 
 ism at a given moment, but upon these and upon the 
 conditions present within the organism taken together; 
 and the latter conditions are in themselves variable." 
 
 But this does not affect in any way the mechanical 
 character of his theory. The manifestation of helio- 
 tropism changes, but it remains pure and unequivocal 
 heliotropism. Thus "a large number of animals be- 
 come positively heliotropic, when they are left in the 
 dark for a long time. If they are brought into light 
 of sufficient intensity, they become negatively helio- 
 tropic after a time and this the more quickly the more 
 intense the light." "We do not therefore always 
 meet with simple conditions in analyzing the causes 
 which determine the voluntary movements of an ani- 
 mal; but however complicated they may be, the vol- 
 untary movements of animals are nevertheless, as our 
 experience indicates, always unequivocally determined 
 only by such circumstances as determine also the 
 movements of bodies of inanimate nature. ' ' 
 
 On what facts does L,oeb base his theory? L,et us 
 give at least one characteristic example. 
 
 The caterpillars of Porthesia chrysorrhoea pass the 
 winter in their nests in fruit trees and bushes, which 
 they leave as soon as it becomes warm. Then they 
 creep up to the tips of branches to the small buds 
 which serve as their food. Now, as Loeb expressly 
 states, it is merely positive heliotropism and negative 
 geotropism which compels the caterpillars to creep 
 upward, where they are held fast on the small buds 
 by contact-irritability. For you can make the cater-
 
 INSTINCT AND SENSUOUS COGNITION. 47 
 
 pillars starve by trie aid of light in close proximity of 
 food. "The animals move to the window-side or to 
 the top of a test-tube in which they are kept. If, 
 then, a branch, covered with buds, is pushed into the 
 test-tube on the room side, the animals nevertheless 
 remain where light and gravity have compelled them 
 to go and are holding them. If, however, they once 
 are on the buds, the latter act as a stimulus which 
 may be even stronger than light. It is in such a case 
 impossible to draw the animals away from the food by 
 means of light. ' ' Besides these animals retain their 
 positive heliotropism only as long as they have not 
 yet eaten anything. ' 'As soon as they have eaten and 
 are about to moult, their irritability decreases and at 
 the time of moulting it is almost impossible to show 
 any effect of light or gravity upon them. ' ' 
 
 We believe that Prof. Loeb's explanation contains 
 his refutation. For, if his theory were correct, all 
 caterpillars would be doomed in consequence of posit- 
 ive heliotropism. Caterpillars usually commence eat- 
 ing the buds of the highest twigs, and having devoured 
 all in their reach above them, they rest for some time, 
 until all is more or less digested. Now in order to 
 get new food, they must necessarily creep down to 
 another twig or tree. But this is impossible. For, 
 their "stomachs" being empty, the caterpillars are 
 positively heliotropic, and consequently they will all 
 die on the spot. This, however, is directly opposed 
 to the facts. There are no caterpillars in nature that 
 die in consequence of heliotropism or geotropism. 
 As long as they are hungry, they creep from one 
 branch to another and in all possible directions, until
 
 48 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 they find the desired food. That they did not do so 
 in case of L,oeb's test-tubes is merely due to the fact 
 that they were not aware of the food, since this was 
 at an altogether unusual and dark place. Hunger, 
 and nothing else than hunger, is the cause which im- 
 pels the animal to follow the guidance of its senses in 
 order to appease that craving. This is the sole rea- 
 son why, as soon as the caterpillars have eaten, and 
 at the time of moulting, "it is almost impossible to 
 show any effect of light or gravity upon them. ' ' It 
 is not heliotropism, but hungertropism, or, to speak 
 still more scientifically limotropism, that accounts for 
 the caterpillars creeping upward. 
 
 Prof. I,oeb takes the liberty of sneering at the use of 
 words like "instinct" to designate causes of move- 
 ment, and says that such causes stand upon the same 
 plane "as the supernatural powers of theologians, 
 which are also said to determine motions, but upon 
 which an engineer could not well rely. " He more- 
 over declares the method of Scholastic thinking a 
 "handicap" which, by phrases like "instinct" serves 
 to ignore or conceal the true problem involved. 
 
 Prof. Loeb forgets that there are two kinds of prob- 
 lems to be solved: the one referring to the more re- 
 mote and ultimate causes of phenomena; the other 
 pertaining to their proximate causes and relations. 
 Both are objects worthy of the intellect of man, and 
 neither is opposed to the other. But while the second 
 is of interest to the specialist only, and has no bearing 
 on the great questions of human life, the other is of 
 interest to every man who is anxious to study the 
 foundations upon which his relations to his fellow-
 
 INSTINCT AND SENSUOUS COGNITION. 49 
 
 creatures are based and on which his final des- 
 tinies depend. Indeed, if Prof. Loeb would take the 
 trouble to study the definition which St. Thomas 
 gives of the vis aesti mativa in animals, he would find 
 more wisdom in that one definition than his previous 
 unacquaintance with that author had ever permitted 
 him to suspect. This unacquaintance with the 
 Scholastic method of thinking is the very handicap 
 which makes him "conceal the problem' ' beneath the 
 veil of a few Greek phrases. 
 
 Loeb as well as Bethe, Uexkuell and others men- 
 tion a great many facts 1 ) of a nature similar to the 
 one explained. But it is unnecessary to enter upon 
 tljem. For far from demonstrating that the move- 
 ments of animals are merely due to mechanical causes, 
 they show rather the evident fact that some kind ol 
 sensitive cognition guides the animal in the perfor- 
 mance of its instinctive activity. 
 
 But we may ask, does sensitive cognition suffice to 
 explain the phenomena of instinct? The exterior sen- 
 ses as such certainly do not. For the mere preception 
 of something green will not induce the cow to eat; for 
 in that case the cow would eat any kind of green mat- 
 ter, poisonous herbs or only colored paper. But 
 this does not agree with facts. On the contrary, just 
 as hens when threatened by a bird of prey are at once 
 aware of their danger, but never call their young when 
 
 l ) Cf. E. Wastnann, S. J., Instinkt und Intelligenz im 
 Tierreich, Third edition, (Herder 1905), p. 136-168. 
 
 This edition of Wasmann's work is practically a new book. 
 
 Morever, Wasmann, Die psychischen Faehigkeiten der 
 Ameisen; Zoologica, Heft 26 (1899).
 
 50 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 the bird soaring over them is not inimical, thus also do 
 cows on entering a meadow for the first time distinguish 
 most exactly between nutritious and poisonous herbs. 
 Experiments begun by Linne have brought out 
 the fact, that of all herbs within their reach cows se- 
 lect about 276, whilst about 218 are passed by; and 
 precisely those 276 correspond to the cow's organism, 
 whilst as experience proved many of the other 218 are 
 of a poisonous character. If, therefore , the exterior sen- 
 ses alone are not sufficient to explain the facts, will the 
 interior sense give us a satisfactory answer to the 
 question, how animals are enabled with such unfail- 
 ing certainty to distinguish between the beneficial and 
 harmful? Will an interior sense (sensus communis) 
 suffice to explain that wonderful sagacity of animals, 
 by which they choose their proper nourishment, by 
 which they adopt the most appropriate means of de- 
 fence and propagation? If the animal's interior sense 
 is exactly the same as that of man, then, indeed, we 
 must confess that the phenomena put before us are al- 
 together inexplicable; for the interior sense of man 
 as such, without the guidance of reason, is not suffi- 
 cient even to preserve us from the greatest dangers. 
 The child in the forest smiles, when it takes the 
 poisonous berry; and its tender life is preserved only 
 by the care of a loving mother, who is endowed with 
 reason, until its own dormant intellect is active and 
 begins to be its guide. Must we then fall back on an in- 
 tellect to explain facts otherwise inexplicable in the 
 instinctive actions of animals! Must we defend 
 Brehm's ridiculous dolls? If so, we must go farther 
 than Brehm went, and ascribe to animals an intelli-
 
 INSTINCT AND SENSUOUS CONGITIOX. 53 
 
 gence far superior to our own; we must bow down be- 
 fore the animal, which manifests from the very first 
 day of its existence a degree of wisdom that men 
 acquire only after years of experience and labor- 
 ious study. Let us not forget the example of the 
 Rhynchites betulae, but remember how this tinj^ 
 beetle "without any study solves mathematical 
 and technical problems, which the mind of man has 
 brooded over for centuries; how at the very first trial 
 it performs its work with the greatest perfection, 
 though no parents, no brothers or sisters were its 
 teachers, though no experience extending over years 
 developed the use of its faculties; how with mar- 
 vellous anticipation it provides for future circumstan- 
 ces, of which it could have no notion whatsoever 
 either by its own experience or by human ratioci- 
 nation; how in fine under ordinary circumstances it 
 communicates to its work such manifold perfection and 
 such appropriateness for the desired purpose that the 
 thousands of specimens of man's art and industry seem 
 to be the unfinished work of an apprentice." l ) 
 Undoubtedly an intelligence is manifest in the instinc- 
 tive actions of animals which evidently surpasses that 
 of man. And yet the elder Agassiz and his followers 
 err in attributing this intelligence to the animal itself 
 and in maintaining that in the question of spiritual 
 faculties man should not arrogate to himself a privi- 
 leged position in the animal creation. This sup- 
 position not only destroys the dignity of man and 
 elevates the animal to a sort of God-like being, but 
 brings us into collision with indisputable facts. In- 
 ') E. Wasmann, S. J., Der Trichterwickler, 1884, p. 56.
 
 52 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 deed, as we have proved, there is no greater error 
 imaginable, than to attribute to animals, when acting 
 instinctively, an intellect similar to that of man. If 
 then the animal acting under the laws of instinct can- 
 not boast even of a human intelligence, then all in- 
 telligence of a higher kind is a fortiori excluded. 
 No, the superhuman intelligence, radiating, as it were, 
 from all instinctive activity, does not abide in the ani- 
 mal itself. On the contrary, we are impelled with 
 logical necessity by most evident facts to acknowledge 
 a being which many nowadays are so surprisingly loath 
 to admit, namely, a divine Intelligence, distinct from 
 the animal and from the whole creation, a personal 
 God, infinitely wise and powerful. But since it is re- 
 pugnant that this God personally governs the animal's 
 instinctive activity by endless miracles, we have to as- 
 sume that the Infinite has inscribed in the animal as 
 in every living being an immanent law according to 
 which the animal by its own activity performs its in- 
 stinctive actions. And wherein does this law consist? 
 As we have seen the facts do not allow us to assign to the 
 animal when acting instinctively a higher faculty than 
 sensitive cognition and appetency. Consequently, we 
 have to infer that the law imprinted in the animal-soul 
 consists in this very sensitive cognition and appetency, 
 qualified in such a way that, as St. Thomas says, 
 "what is the specific object of pleasure to the animal" 
 is at the same time "the best and most appropriate ob- 
 ject of its well being. ' ' 
 
 What, therefore, is our definition of instinct? L,add 
 says: "The simple fact is that we find men and the 
 lower animals generally, using the structure with
 
 INSTINCT AND SENSUOUS COGNITION. 53 
 
 which they are gifted by nature, in ways significant of 
 feelings of craving, of anticipations of ends, and of 
 adaptation of means which considered in themselves 
 imply far higher degrees of conscious ideation than, so 
 far as we can judge, really exists. To such complex 
 conditions of consciousness with their motor accom- 
 paniments we give the term instincts. " x ) In other 
 words: Instinct consists in the sensuous cognition 
 and appetency of the agent, which . enables it to per- 
 form purposeful actions without becoming conscious 
 of the purpose as such. The satisfaction of the ani- 
 mal's cravings guided by sense-experience normally 
 coincides with its general welfare. How instinctive 
 actions are actually performed by the agent, which 
 nerves and which parts of the spinal cord and brain 
 come into play, how external stimuli affect the end- 
 organs of sense and set up a nerve-commotion that is 
 propagated to the brain and finally acts upon the ani- 
 mal soul to elicit a purposeful action, all this is "sec- 
 ondary and of no moment for our present dissertation. 
 For our purpose it is sufficient to have brought out the 
 principal characteristics of instinct and instinctive ac- 
 tivities which are (1) final tendency without con- 
 sciousness of final tendency; (2) sensuous cognition 
 and appetency normally combining "the specific object 
 of pleasure to the animal" "with the best and most 
 appropriate object of its well-being. ' ' 
 
 l ) I.e., p. 600.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Instinct and Sense-Experience. 
 
 J NSTINCTIVE actions are not absolutely uniform 
 and infallible. On the contrary, they may be mod- 
 ified by experience. Ants kept in artificial nests 
 generally fall with fury upon any strange object intro- 
 duced into their midst. But this behavior may be 
 modified. If a piece of ice is thrown among them, 
 they first attack it violently. Soon, however, they 
 experience the fatal cold and retreat, taking sooner or 
 later a "lesson" for the future. The question is 
 whether this element of experience changes the nature 
 of an instinctive action and elevates it to the rank of 
 such as proceed from intelligence. 
 
 As we have indicated, it is the general opinion of 
 modern naturalists, that only those actions of animals 
 are instinctive which immediately arise from heredi- 
 tary disposition, whilst all those which pre -suppose 
 individual experience are due to intelligence. 
 
 Mr. George W. Peckham of Milwaukee, who has 
 written some interesting papers on spiders and a splen- 
 did monograph on the instincts and habits of wasps, 
 explains this general opinion as follows: "Under the 
 term instinct we place all complex acts that are per- 
 formed previous to experience and in a similar manner 
 by all members of the same sex and race, leaving out 
 as non-essential, at this time, the question of whether 
 
 (54)
 
 INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 55 
 
 they are or are not accompanied by consciousness. 
 Under intelligence we place those conscious actions 
 which are more or less modifiable by experience. " * ) 
 
 Therefore, whenever an animal makes use of a for- 
 mer experience or adapts its manner of acting to the 
 changed conditions of its surroundings, its actions are 
 manifestations of intellect; and vice versa, whenever 
 the animal is determined by inherited impulses its ac- 
 tions are merely instinctive. In other words, if we 
 have to decide in a given case whether an animal acts 
 instinctively or intellectually, we must answer the 
 question: "Did any previous or actual experience 
 modify the action or not?" If the answer is affirm- 
 ative, that is to say, if the animal was influenced by 
 experience to adopt an appropriate deviation from its 
 general way of acting, the action is said to be the re- 
 sult of intelligence; if the answer is negative, the ac- 
 tion must be ascribed to instinct. 
 
 What are we to think of this criterion? 
 
 Let us see: A criterion is a sign or characteristic 
 mark which enables us to discriminate with certainty 
 and under all circumstances between two or more ob- 
 jects or actions. Consequently, its first and most es- 
 sential quality consists in this, that the mark or sign 
 of distinction is not common to the objects or actions 
 between which we have to discriminate. Hence, if it 
 can be proved, that there are actions which in spite of 
 modification by experience are undoubtedly of instinc- 
 tive nature, the generally accepted criterion of distinc- 
 tion between instinctive and intellectual activity is 
 
 !) 1. c., p. 231.
 
 56 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 evidently false, because the characteristic sign of dis- 
 crimination is common to both species of actions. Is 
 this the case? 
 
 Speaking of the so-called Pelopaei (Mud- Daubers), 
 Mr. Peckham says, that "originally they built under 
 overhanging rocks and in hollow trees. " And now, 
 "when near human habitations these wasps make use 
 of the more convenient positions which they offer. ' ' 
 ' 'The spot chosen for the nest may be in a barn up 
 among the rafters, in an outhouse, under the roof of a 
 porch, or, indeed, in any sheltered place where it will 
 be protected." x ) According to Mr. Peckham's 
 criterion, the former mode of building in hollow trees 
 is instinctive, whereas the latter mode of building in 
 house -chimneys is an intelligent act. For the former 
 does not depend on any experience whatsoever, whilst 
 the latter is a modification of the former, due to actual 
 experience. And in reality Mr. Peckham enumerates 
 this example among the instances which he advances 
 for the intelligence of wasps. 
 
 But does the experience which influenced the for- 
 mer mode of action change its instinctive nature? 
 
 Every wasp is endowed with instinct. Hence it pos- 
 sesses the inherited faculty of forming associations of 
 sense perceptions and feelings necessary for the preser- 
 vation of its species. But the single associations as 
 such are not inherited. For, if this were the case, we 
 would have to assume special innate forms of cognition 
 representing the exterior objects of every one of 
 the thousands and thousands of instinctive actions of 
 animals. But this assumption is as extravagant as it 
 
 >) I.e., p. 177.
 
 INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 57 
 
 is uncalled for. If, then, our wasp is wont to build 
 its -house of loam in a hollow tree, this act is not de- 
 termined by an innate representation of this or that 
 tree, but by an instinctive faculty which enables the 
 wasp, unconsciously, to combine with its impulse to 
 build a nest the representation of any hollow tree. 
 Otherwise we would have to assume that an immense 
 "picture-gallery" of all possible kinds of hollow trees 
 pre-existed in the soul and ganglion centres of the 
 wasp. For these wasps do not restrict their nest-build- 
 ing to trees of a special shape and form, but select 
 any trees that seem fit for the purpose. It is 
 evident that the wasp's action in selecting chimneys, 
 where they are to be found, must be explained by the 
 very same psychological laws which influence the se- 
 lection of a hollow tree where no more convenient 
 object is to be met with. For, if the wasp has the instinc- 
 tive faculty of combining the sensuous perception of any 
 appropriate object with the corresponding sensitive im- 
 pulse, why should this faculty not suffice for selecting 
 any other appropriate place instead of a tree? Indeed, 
 the only difference between the two actions lies in 
 this, that the perception of a chimney is more readily 
 combined with the respective instinctive impulse than 
 the perception of a hollow tree. 
 
 Consequently, the wasp's second action, which is 
 modified by sensuous experience, belongs equally to 
 the domain of instinct, and the above-mentioned cri- 
 terion does not express the real difference between in- 
 stinctive and intelligent activity. 1 ) 
 
 *) The following examples illustrate the same conclusion: 
 Everybody admits that children instinctively shrink from a
 
 58 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 We may affirm this conclusion with still greater 
 confidence, as almost all the examples brought for- 
 ward by Mr. Peckham are similar to the one we have 
 
 chosen Even when there is question of a whole 
 
 series of sense perceptions which are associated with 
 each other and modify the action of the animal, the 
 criterion of the defenders of animal intelligence cannot 
 be admitted, as instinct always implies the faculty of 
 combining any sensuous perception unconsciously with 
 its corresponding impulse. Hence it is an arbitrary 
 assertion to maintain that this faculty does not suffice 
 or that it loses its character, when there is question. of 
 many sensitive perceptions or of those which arise in 
 the sensitive memory of the animal. As long as we 
 remain within the realm of merely sensuous cognition, 
 there is no reason for calling upon a higher faculty. 
 But, there is one example in Mr. Peckham's book 
 which seems to be of a different nature from the one 
 explained above. Let us shortly consider the inter- 
 esting case. Peckham's description is as follows: 
 
 red hot iron. But this manner of acting is due to experience. 
 For, as we all know, children shrink from a glowing piece of 
 iron only after having experienced the painful consequence 
 of touching it on a former occasion. "A burnt child shuns 
 the fire." Hence an action, though modified by experience, 
 does not necessarily lose its instinctive character. Moreover, 
 the above mentioned criterion eliminates from the realm of 
 instinctive activity every action, from which the element of 
 experience cannot be dissociated. As soon as a new-born pup 
 begins to suck, ^.experiences the pleasant taste of its mother's 
 milk, and its experience enters into and influences the con- 
 tinuation of the action. Consequently, an instinctive action 
 would cease to be instinctive, as soon as it commences.
 
 INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 59 
 
 "Just here must be told the story of one Httle wasp 
 whose individuality stands out in our mind more dis- 
 tinctly than that of any of the others. We remember 
 her as the most fastidious and perfect little worker of 
 the whole season, so nice was she in her adaptation of 
 means to ends, so busy and contented in her labor of 
 love, and so pretty in her pride over her completed 
 work. In filling up her nest she put her head down 
 into it and bit away the loose earth from the sides, 
 letting it fall to the bottom of the burrow, and then, 
 after a quantity had accumulated jammed it down 
 with her head. Earth was then brought from the out- 
 side and pressed in, and then more was bitten from 
 the sides. When, at last, the filling was level with 
 the ground, she brought a quantity of fine grains of 
 dirt to the spot and picking up a small pebble in her 
 mandibles, used it as a hammer in pounding them 
 down with rapid strokes, thus making this spot as 
 hard and firm as the surrounding surfaces (Plate II, 
 Fig. 2) . Before we could recover from our astonish- 
 ment at this performance she had dropped her stone 
 and was bringing more earth. We then threw our- 
 selves down on the ground that not a motion might 
 be lost, and in a moment we saw her pick up the peb- 
 ble and again pound the earth into place with it, 
 hammering now here and now there until all was 
 level. Once more the whole process was repeated, 
 and then the little creature, all unconscious of the 
 commotion that she had aroused in our minds, uncon- 
 scious indeed of our very existence and intent only on 
 doing her work and doing it well, gave one final,
 
 60 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 comprehensive glance around and flew away." *) 
 We do not believe that Mr. Peckham's interpreta- 
 tion of the facts is warranted by what he actually saw. 
 The simple fact seems to be as follows: The pebble 
 happened to be somewhat larger than the other ma- 
 terial used in closing the nest. Anxious to fill up the 
 burrow as perfectly as possible the wasp made a num- 
 ber of attempts to press the pebble into the ground. 
 But all was in vain. The wasp did not succeed in 
 forcing the pebble into the ground, so that all would 
 be perfectly level. Hence after repeated trials she 
 abandoned the pebble altogether. The fact that the 
 wasp took up a pebble somewhat larger than usual is 
 not wonderful at all, since it often makes use of a 
 pebble of considerable size to deposit it into the lower 
 part of the newly made nest. Hence we are not dis- 
 posed to accept Peckham's claim that the wasp "im- 
 provised a tool and made intelligent use of it". 
 
 We distinguish therefore two kinds of instinctive 
 actions, both proceeding from the self-same sensuous 
 cognition and appetency. But while the first group 
 springs directly from the inherited dispositions of the 
 agent's sensitive faculties, the second group implies a 
 modification of the actions through sense-experience. 
 We do not insist upon mere names; and if any one 
 prefers to introduce another phrase for designating in- 
 stinctive action modified by sense-experience, he may 
 do so. But no matter what term he may choose, the 
 word "intelligence" (that is rational intelligence) is 
 out of place, unless of course the word is taken in a 
 
 *) 1. c., p. 22-23. There is a second fact recorded by Mr. 
 Williston, which is of a similar nature.
 
 INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 61 
 
 merely analogous sense. For that word conveys the 
 idea that all actions modified by sense-experience nec- 
 essarily imply consciousness of finality, which is posi- 
 tively false. Prof. Wheeler says against Wasmann 
 "that he has overshot the mark and attempted to in- 
 clude too much in his conception of instinct." "I 
 should continue, therefore," he adds, "to emphasize 
 the difference between activities which are compelled 
 by inherited mechanism and those which imply choice 
 on the part of the individual organism. For the latter 
 the term "intelligence" has been so very generally 
 used that it seems both hopeless and idle to restrict it, 
 as Wasmann so emphatically desires, to the ratiocina- 
 tive process in its clearest manifestations. " x ) We do 
 not deny that true choice supposes intelligence. But 
 we do deny that instinctive actions modified by sense- 
 experience necessarily imply choice. What is 
 "choice?" The Standard dictionary answers "that 
 power of the will by which one freely prefers and se- 
 lects as an end of action some one good out of those 
 presented to the mind. ' ' This definition is clear and 
 to the point. It evidently supposes that the one who 
 chooses compares two or more objects with each other 
 and having understood the relation of them to himself 
 freely selects the one and rejects the rest. Here is an 
 illustration w 7 ell adapted for our purpose: On May 
 5th, 1905 we arranged an ant nest for I^asius interjectus 
 consisting of two compartments connected by a small 
 opening. Compartment No. 1 was dark, dry and with- 
 out earth ; compartment No. 2 was light and contained 
 earth. About 100 ants with some 40 young larvae 
 l ) 1. c., p. 809.
 
 62 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 were introduced into compartment No. 2. Within 15 
 minutes all had withdrawn into the dark compartment 
 No. 1. On the following day the earth in compart- 
 ment No. 2 was moistened. Soon the ants moved 
 over from No. 1 into No. 2. But after some six hours 
 the ants commenced with carrying over the moist earth 
 from No. 2 into No. 1 which now was moist, dark and 
 contained earth and thus was most comfortable. The 
 action of the ants implies "choice" in as far as the 
 one compartment is preferred to the other. But this is 
 not "choice" in its proper meaning. The ants simply 
 do and must do what they experience to be more 
 agreeable to their senses. The concrete moist and 
 dark compartment affects them more pleasantly than 
 the other, and this concrete perception awakens the 
 concrete desire to be in the more comfortable com- 
 partment, which again is followed by the appropriate 
 locomotion of certain organs. But there is no indica- 
 tion of the ants becoming conscious of the abstract 
 relation between the various conditiona of the two 
 compartments to each other and to their own welfare. 
 Nor is there any trace of a free determination upon 
 some alternative. 
 
 Choice implies logical thought and the power 
 of abstraction. For without becoming conscious of 
 the purpose of the action as such, without knowing 
 and understanding why the one object is to be pre- 
 ferred to another, a true and free choice is impossible. 
 It is clear, therefore, that instinctive actions modified 
 by sense-experience do not necessarily imply 
 choice. Otherwise we would have to admit that the 
 wasp mentioned above compares hollow trees and
 
 INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 63 
 
 chimneys and, having studied and understood at least 
 some advantages afforded by either, freely decides to 
 depart from the traditions of its race and select chimneys 
 for its future nest. We need not repeat that such an 
 assumption is unwarranted. The ' ' choice ' ' of the wasp 
 is no real "choice." In fact, it implies no more 
 "choice" than many an action preceeding from in- 
 herited dispositions, such as distinguishing true food 
 from poison and all indifferent material. The wasp 
 "selects" a chimney, simply because it has the in- 
 herited faculty at a suitable time to react appropriately 
 upon a concrete sensitive impression made upon it by 
 a concrete suitable object without becoming conscious 
 of the appropriateness of the action. It is anything 
 but sensitive cognition and appetency, and there is no 
 reason for attributing it to a higher faculty of abstrac- 
 tion and logical thought. 
 
 We agree, therefore, with Prof. Wheeler when 
 he calls choice a characteristic mark of intelligence, but 
 we differ from him when he asserts that modification 
 by sense-experience necessarily implies choice. Be- 
 sides we believe Prof. Wheeler does not lay sufficient 
 stress on the fact above demonstrated that instinctive 
 activities even in as far as they proceed from an inherit- 
 ed mechanism are directed by sensuous cognition and 
 appetency and hence that they differ from merely re- 
 flex actions which include no sensuous consciousness 
 whatever. For Wheeler simply speaks of "actions 
 compelled by inherited mechanism, ' ' a definition which 
 is certainly incomplete and characteristic of reflex 
 actions. 
 
 We conclude, therefore, that Prof. Wheeler,
 
 64 THE HUMANIZING OP THE BRUTE. 
 
 as well as most modern naturalists, defend a con- 
 cept of instinct which does not apply to instinct 
 at all, but to intelligence and to reflex actions. Let 
 us now proceed to define more accurately the true dis- 
 tinction and criterion of discrimination between in- 
 stinct and intelligence.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Instinct and Intelligence. 
 
 "VW" HAT is the true criterion of distinction between 
 instinct and intelligence? 
 
 A brief exposition of the nature of an intelligent 
 act will furnish an answer to this question. We may 
 define intelligent, in opposition to instinctive, activity 
 as one that is performed with perfect consciousness of 
 its tendency, and is consequently guided by a purely 
 spiritual faculty of cognition and appetite. 
 
 The first part of this definition is self-evident, 
 and sufficiently characterizes intelligent activity. 
 Moreover, it is generally admitted. Thus Emery 
 describes intelligence as the faculty of abstracting 
 general ideas from the multiplex phantasms which 
 have been acquired by experience, and of utilizing 
 them in connection with sensuous images to perform 
 actions which imply a conscious final tendency. And, 
 strange as it may sound, all our opponents without 
 exception, notwithstanding their own false criterion, 
 endeavor to prove the intelligence of animals by 
 ascribing to them a consciousness of final tendency. 
 They do not commit the absurdity of denying the ne- 
 cessity of this tendency for such actions as the plan- 
 ning of houses, the framing of laws, the solution of 
 mathematical problems and all purely intelligent act- 
 ivity, but readily admit that this very consciousness 
 
 (65)
 
 66 THK HUMANIZING OK THE BRUTE. 
 
 of finality raises these actions to the level of intelli- 
 gence. It would, therefore, be a quixotic fight 
 against wind-mills to prove that the essence of an in- 
 telligent action demands the consciousness of its final- 
 ity. No, the question at issue reaches much further. 
 Wasmann lodges the complaint against Romanes, 
 that he claims intelligence for all actions of animals 
 that are based on sensuous experience, although he 
 simultaneously acknowledges that intelligence con- 
 sists in the power of drawing logical conclusions. 
 
 Wheeler, too, as we have seen, makes "intelli- 
 gence" dependent on manifestations of ''choice" and 
 Peckham declares that intelligence is the power which 
 "enables an insect to seek, accept, refuse, choose, 
 to decline to make use of this or to turn to account 
 some other thing. " l ) But both Wheeler and Peckham 
 maintain at the same time that modification in con- 
 sequence of sense-experience renders instinctive ac- 
 tions intelligent. It is this deplorable contradiction 
 which touches the vital point in the argumentation of 
 eve n the most moderate defenders of animal intelli- 
 gence. 
 
 They consider consciousness of purpose as inseparable 
 from ///e utilization of experience; wherever there is 
 sensuous]experience there is consciousness of purpose, 
 and vice -versa. Their criterion states that every ac- 
 tion is intelligent that is appropriately modified by any 
 kind of experience; and still they insist on the con- 
 sciousness of final tendency as the real essence of in- 
 telligent activity. Hence in their view the appropriate 
 modification of an action by experience and conscious- 
 
 '; 1. c., p. 231.
 
 INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 67 
 
 ness of its finality are so intimately connected that 
 the one necessarily presupposes the other. But this 
 is the fundamental tenet of materialism and destroys 
 the true nature of an intelligent act. Consciousness of 
 piirpose is impossible without spiritual cognition. They 
 are identical, and therefore our definition adds that an 
 intelligent act is guided by a purely spiritual faculty 
 of cognition and appetite. The whole question de- 
 pends on the proof of this last inference. 
 
 Let us open the argument with an illustration. 
 We select that of the babe in the cradle. Its reason- 
 ing faculty is still dormant. It is hungry and cries. 
 Its mother puts a milk bottle into its hands. For a 
 moment its desires are appeased. But soon the same 
 scene has to be repeated, until finally the child finds 
 the bottle of itself, when it feels the pangs of hunger. 
 No one will dare to affirm that it has attained the use 
 of reason, and yet no one can deny, that in conse- 
 quence of repeated experience in some way or other 
 the feeling of hunger and the milk-bottle are connect- 
 ed in the child's perception. Otherwise it is impossi- 
 ble to explain why the child constantly grasps the bot- 
 tle when it is hungry. But who will maintain that 
 the babe acts with consciousness of the finality of its 
 action? 
 
 Here is another example. When Rhynchites be- 
 tulse feels the natural impulse to lay eggs, it in- 
 variably prepares a funnel-shaped depository and 
 lays its eggs in the folds of this artistic bed. It evi- 
 dently perceives in some way a connection between 
 the funnel and its impulse to lay eggs. Otherwise 
 this beetle would neither prepare the funnel nor al-
 
 68 THE HUMANIZING OP THE BRUTE. 
 
 ways place its egg precisely in the requisite folds, but 
 would at least, once in a while, deposit them else- 
 where, on a more convenient spot. But, does this 
 perception warrant the conclusion that R. betulae acts 
 with consciousness of finality? Undoubtedly not. 
 For an action that is guided by "purpose" and per- 
 formed with "consciousness" demands far more than 
 a me re combination of the phantasms of things which 
 are related to each other as means and end. This very 
 relation of end and -means must be clearly recognized 
 as such. Or, as St. Thomas puts it: "The perfect 
 knowledge of an end demands not only the perception 
 of the object which constitutes that end, but its recog- 
 nition as an end and its relation to the means used to 
 attain it." But this evidently implies the formal 
 cognition of finality, the clear perception of the ab- 
 stract relation between means and end. When a man 
 wants to enjoy his breakfast with consciousness of final- 
 ity, it is not sufficient to combine in his imagination 
 the concrete things before him and his concrete im- 
 pulse to eat them, a combination which naturally pro- 
 duces an agreeable feeling and calls forth an appro- 
 piate exercise of the limbs towards the breakfast 
 table, but he must understand the abstract relation 
 between the savory beef-steak as the means and the 
 satisfaction of his hunger as the end, and guided by 
 this cognition he must eat his breakfast. 
 
 Therefore, every action that is guided by "purpose' ' 
 and directed by "consciousness of purpose" presup- 
 poses as least requisite the cognition of means and end as 
 such, of relations as such, and consequently implies 
 universal ideas. Thus far few of our opponents will find
 
 INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 69 
 
 any difficulty in admitting our argument. But our 
 way s separate , when we put the question : Is a sensitive 
 power of cognition able to form general notions or not? 
 
 To answer this question we must first of all inquire 
 into the nature of a universal idea and investigate its 
 main difference from a so-called common phantasm. 
 When Clarke 1 ) calls the distinction between the 
 abstract idea and the common phantasm of the imag- 
 ination "the very touchstone of a philosophical sys- 
 tem", he enunciates a truth that is of paramount im- 
 portance in our present investigation. Everywhere in 
 the writings of those who defend animal intelligence, 
 abstract ideas and common phantasms are essentially 
 alike or, at the most, described as different degrees of one 
 and the same faculty of abstraction. Dr. Forel even 
 calls a universal idea "a general sensory idea" "like 
 the idea 'ant enemy" 2 ); and L,add, who is one of 
 the least offenders in most of his philosophical views, 
 deplores the fact that "much confusion has always 
 arisen in psychological discussion on account of the 
 very natural use of the word 'idea' for both the con- 
 crete sensuous image and the concept or product oi 
 thought" 3 ). 
 
 What, then, is a common phantasm? 
 
 When, before sunrise, a fisherman unmoors his 
 boat in the pleasant anticipation of a rich haul, his 
 imagination is naturally enough occupied with the 
 picture of a fine fish. In spite of the general resem- 
 
 *) Richard F. Clarke, S.J., Logic, ed. 3., p. 123. 
 
 2 ) Ants and Some other Insects, (Religion of Science 
 Library) No. 56, p. 22. 
 
 3 ) 1. c., p. 378.
 
 70 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 blance to the fishy tribe this imaginary fish is alto- 
 gether void of any universality, and represents merely 
 an individual fish. Let us try to eliminate the quali- 
 ties in which it differs from other fish and bring out 
 those which it has in common with them. Can this 
 image now be called universal? Or must we not con- 
 cede, that in spite of a great similarity with fish in 
 general the image is still concrete and individual? It 
 may be that the discriminating marks are less promi- 
 nent, but the common marks of all fish, as form, color, 
 fins, are still, as it were, in the foreground of our 
 imagination. The image is and remains the represen- 
 tation of an individual fish. We may make as many 
 efforts as we like, as long as the fish remains a product 
 of our imagination we can never deprive it of all definite 
 shape and color, and of definite extension. "I can con- 
 sider," says Berkeley, "the hand, the eye, the nose, 
 each by itself abstracted and separated from the rest 
 of the body. But, then, whatever hand or eye I -im- 
 agine, it must have some particular shape and color' ' x ) . 
 As long as the representation of an object possesses 
 color and extension it is not universal. What infer- 
 ence have we to make from this conclusion? It is 
 this, that there are no real universal phantasms, 
 and that the abstractive faculty of the imagination 
 consists merely in the weaker or stronger representation 
 of sensitive perceptions. 
 
 The common phantasm, either as an act or the rep- 
 resentation of an object, is and remains individual. 
 Or, as Clarke has it: "The common phantasm is not 
 really common at all. It is simply an individual 
 
 l ) Michael Maher, S.J., Psychology ed. 4., p. 236.
 
 INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 71 
 
 phantasm, rendered so vague and indistinct by the 
 separation from it of its distinguishing characteristics 
 that it will stand just as well, or just as badly, for one 
 individual as another". x ) 
 
 The case is -very different with universal ideas. It 
 is true, that they are so closely connected with com- 
 mon phantasms that we are unable to form a universal 
 idea without beginning with the perception of the 
 senses and without being accompanied in our mental 
 activity by phantasms of the imagination. Nor do we 
 deny that the common phantasm by a kind of analog- 
 ous universality bears some resemblance to the corres- 
 ponding universal idea. Nevertheless, they are very 
 different in their real nature. 
 
 In what does this difference consist? 
 
 As every one concedes, the propositions: "the 
 angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, the 
 cow belongs to the vertebrates, man is mortal," in- 
 volve universal ideas. For when pronouncing these 
 truths we do not restrict them to any particular trian- 
 gle or cow or man, but to all triangles, cows and men 
 without exception and in the very same sense. Now, 
 what must and what must not be attributed to these 
 universal ideas, in as far as they are opposed to the 
 corresponding common phantasms? To say nothing 
 of less important distinctions, as the sharp and precise 
 clearness of the idea and the vague obscurity of the 
 common phantasm, the -main difference lies in the 
 fact, that the universal idea is really and essentially 
 universal and free from, any definite extension^ whilst 
 the common phantasm, even when it is so "universal" 
 
 ) Clarke, 1. c., p. 137.
 
 72 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 as almost to vanish from our imagination, still retains 
 a definite extension , and remains essentially individual. 
 The universal concept of a man or a triangle can be 
 applied not only to a redskin or a negro, not only to 
 this or that triangle, obtuse or equilateral, but to all 
 men and all triangles without any exception, 
 whilst the phantasm of a triangle even in the most 
 extreme case can never be identified with any other 
 triangle. It even disappears from our imagination, if 
 we eliminate its sides of a definite length, its obtuse 
 or acute angles. But the universal idea of a triangle 
 is independent of all this. It can be identified with 
 any existing or possible triangle, even if the latter be 
 so large that its three vertices rest on three different 
 fixed stars, or so small that we can perceive it only by 
 means of a microscope, if its sides be green or blue, 
 its angles obtuse or acute. These are merely casual 
 differences, and do not affect its nature as a triangle. 
 The universal idea expresses that which constitutes a 
 being, denotes its essence, its nature, whilst the pic- 
 ture in the imagination merely represents a being, 
 colored in such and such a way, of this or that exten- 
 sion. The color and extension of things, even of one 
 and the same class, may be different; but the nature of 
 things must be the same in all. A man deprived of his 
 essence, of that which makes him what he is, would 
 no longer be a man, and a triangle no longer a trian- 
 gle. Still, we do not wish to say that the universal 
 idea of human nature exists in the same way, that is, as 
 universal, in every individual human being. That is 
 the error of the ultra-realists. Every finite being that 
 exists, or can be called into existence, is necessarily
 
 INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 73 
 
 individual and realizes the universal idea of that being 
 in its own way. Every human being is a man, but 
 never the same man. My own individual human na- 
 ture is not identical with the individual human nature 
 of anybody else. But we do want to say that every 
 finite essence can be deprived of its individuality by ab- 
 straction; that by this process we attain a universal idea, 
 the so-called metaphysical essence of the Scholastics, 
 which is one and the same, and can be predi- 
 cated of every individual being belonging to that 
 class. l< The physical is not the same, but perfectly 
 alike in all; the metaphysical essence is nothing else 
 than the physical essence inadequately conceived by 
 us. ' ' Nor is this universal idea a mere fiction of the 
 mind. It is based on the perfect likeness of individ- 
 uals of the same essence. In forming it, our mind 
 does not produce but presupposes this perfect likeness 
 as something entirely independent of all intellectual 
 activity. 
 
 For all men, no matter what their stature, color, 
 and so forth may be, are true men and have what we 
 call a "human nature"; and all triangles possess, as a 
 matter of fact and independently of the mind that 
 which makes them triangles. The only thing that 
 the intellect produces is the iiniversality as such. For 
 the intellect has the power of perfect abstraction. It 
 is capable of omitting all differences between the objects 
 under consideration, including that property which 
 makes every object individual, and of conceiving or 
 retaining merely what is truly common to all of them. 
 
 What, therefore, is the true nature of the univer- 
 sal idea and the common phantasm?
 
 74 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 Both are acts of the mind and as such they are in- 
 dividual, just as any other existing object or property. 
 But, in as far as their objective contents are concerned, 
 that is, in as far as they are representations of objects, 
 the common phantasm is and remains individual and 
 extended, while the universal idea is universal and 
 inextended, even though the object in its actual state 
 of existence possesses the quality of extension. For, 
 as long as we do not eliminate any and every vestige 
 of extension, the representation of the object is devoid 
 of the character of universality. True universality 
 absolutely demands that even the last trace of individual- 
 ity disappears. 
 
 What, therefore, is our answer to the question : Is a 
 sensitive faculty able to form general notions? 
 
 It must be negative. For as one of our best psych- 
 ologists puts the argument: "We are capable of ap- 
 prehending and representing to ourselves abstract and 
 universal ideas. But such operations could not be 
 states of a faculty exerted through, or intrinsically de- 
 pendent on, a bodily organ. A power of this kind 
 can only react in response to physical impressions, 
 and can only form representations of a concrete charac- 
 ter, depicting contingent individual facts. But, uni- 
 versality, possibility, logical sequence, general rela- 
 tions, do not constitute such a physical stimulus, and 
 consequently could not be apprehended by an organic 
 faculty. Consequently these higher mental functions 
 must be admitted to be of a spiritual character; they 
 thus transcend the sphere of all actions depending in- 
 trinsically or essentially by their nature on a natural 
 instrument." x ) 
 
 x ) Maher, 1. c., p. 471.
 
 INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 75 
 
 In other words: A sensuous faculty is by its very 
 nature extended, and can represent only extended ob- 
 jects. But universal ideas as such are completely inde- 
 pendent of every vestige of definite extension. There- 
 fore^ a sensuous faculty is imable to form general ideas. 
 
 What is the necessary conclusion? 
 
 Perhaps that there are no universal ideas? But the 
 foregoing explanations prove that this is absurd. 
 With logical necessity, therefore, and not because 
 "some peculiar bias has influenced our philosophical 
 views", we have to assert that any one who is able to 
 form universal ideas by abstraction must be endowed 
 with a faculty which trancends the power of the senses, 
 with a faculty capable of representing inextended ob- 
 jects, and extended ones in an inextended manner. In 
 other words, the cognition of universal ideas is insep 
 arably connected with a supersensuous , immaterial, 
 spiritual intellect. 
 
 Perhaps many an adversary will reject this conclu- 
 sion, because it leads with inevitable necessity to the 
 acknowledgment of a spiritual soul in man, which, 
 even in the eyes of so eminent a scientist as Emery, is 
 a mysterious being, whose existence man may recog- 
 nize or deny, according to his views of the universe 
 and of the nature of man. 
 
 But, if a spiritual faculty is necessary to form uni- 
 versal ideas, it is equally necessary to act with con- 
 sciousness of finality; for, as we have proved, this con- 
 sciousness implies universal ideas. Again, as "piir- 
 pose," supposes consciousness of finality, there can be 
 no action directed by ' 'purpose' ' without a spiritual
 
 76 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 faculty. Herewith we have proved our definition 
 that intelligent activity involves essentially a perfect con- 
 sciousness of final tendency, and is guided by a purely 
 spiritual cognition arid appetite, 
 
 What, therefore, is the essential criterion of distinc- 
 tion between instinctive and intelligent activity? An 
 intelligent action implies necessarily consciousness of fina- 
 lity, whilst an instinctive one does not. Does this criter- 
 ion postulate an essential difference? Yes, an instinc- 
 tive action is of a sensuous, an intelligent act of a spiri- 
 tual character.
 
 PART II. . 
 ANIMALS HAVE NO INTELLIGENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 The "Intelligence" of "The Lower Animals". 
 
 I Tis true, that most modern naturalists, as was men- 
 tioned before, deny the difference in quality 
 between the human mind and the animal soul which 
 is strenuously upheld by Catholic philosophy. They 
 consider themselves and their ideas as a "product and 
 a subject of universal evolution". "Surely," as Pro- 
 fessor W. M. Wheeler says, when commenting on 
 Wasmann's views, "the sciences of comparative phy- 
 siology, anatomy and embryology, not to mention 
 paleontology, distribution and taxonomy must have 
 been cultivated to little purpose during the nineteenth 
 century, if we are to rest satisfied with the scholastic 
 definition of ratiocination as an adequate and final 
 verity. And surely no one who is conversant with 
 modern biological science will accept the views that 
 the power of abstract ratiocinative thought, which is 
 absent in infants and young children, scarcely deve- 
 loped in savages, and highly developed and generally 
 manifested only in the minority of civilized men, has 
 miraculously ( ! ) sprung into existence in full panoply 
 like the daughter of Jove. " 1 ) 
 
 l ) The American Naturalist, vol. XXXV (1901), p. 873. 
 (77)
 
 78 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 We fail to see how the results of the sciences en- 
 umerated by Prof. Wheeler could ever change the def- 
 inition of intelligence developed in the preceding 
 pages, since that definition rests on totally different 
 grounds and belongs to a sphere which even a science 
 like physiology can only approach, but never reach. 
 The fact that intelligent actions can only proceed from 
 an inextended spiritual faculty is indeed a final verity, 
 which, it is true, may find a much deeper and more 
 adequate explanation as true human psychology ad- 
 vances, but which will never be changed in the point 
 it emphasizes. 
 
 We have seen in the first part of this essay that the 
 essential criterion for discriminating instinctive and 
 intelligent actions from each other lies in the fact 
 whether or not the animal evinces consciousness of the 
 finality guiding its actions. This criterion we shall 
 apply in our present investigation, which proposes to 
 show that neither the lower nor the higher animals 
 betray the slightest vestige of intelligence. "High 
 animals" are distinguished from "low animals" by 
 the fact that the bodies of the latter are less different- 
 iated than those of the former. Practically the dis- 
 tinction will coincide with the division of the animal 
 kingdom into invertebrates and vertebrates. 
 
 In order to establish the proposition that the lower 
 animals are void of intelligence we propose to enter 
 upon a most remarkable psychic contrast observed in 
 the life-history of two ant-species, Polyergus and For- 
 mica sanguinea. The latter easily holds the first place 
 among all ants and, in general, among all lower ani- 
 mals. This fact is freely granted by the best observ-
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS". 79 
 
 ers of ants. Some even, as Sir John Lubbock, main- 
 tain that in a certain sense the Formica sanguinea 
 stands next to man. Hence, to substantiate the prop- 
 osition that the lower animals are void of intelligence, 
 it is but necessary to prove that this famous ant does 
 not possess any higher faculty than mere animal in- 
 stinct. Another reason, why we give preference to 
 ants as subjects of our inquiry, is because the actions 
 of no other animal have been so much misinterpreted 
 for upholding the doctrine of animal intelligence. 
 
 This is especially true of the ant-species Polyergus, 
 which we have selected as first example. x ) 
 
 It is a warm sunny day in June. In a colony of 
 the Polyergus rufescens (Plate III., Fig. 1) feverish 
 activity is displayed. The Amazons (this is their 
 popular name in Europe), having spent well nigh the 
 whole morning in preening their legs and feelers, rally 
 upon their battlements, that is on the top of their nest, 
 and with great haste and evident excitement descend 
 for a warlike expedition. Within about 50 paces of 
 their castle there is in a meadow a settlement of the 
 Formica rufibarbis. Already some time before some 
 roving members of the Polyergus household have ac- 
 cidentally hit upon this formicary, and now under 
 their guidance a goodly array of about 1000 "slave- 
 hunters" may be seen marching in an almost straight 
 line upon their destined prey. Having arrived with- 
 in 10 cm. of the enemy's stronghold, the vanguard 
 comes to a stop, giving a violent signal with their feel- 
 ers to the ranks immediately behind them. With in- 
 
 J ) The following description was originally published in 
 the Scientific American Supplement.
 
 30 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 credible rapidity a number of emissaries hurry through 
 the main body of the army, and in less than 30 seconds 
 the forces are ready for the attack. In a twinkling 
 they scale the walls of the F. rufibarbis bulwark. With 
 indescribable celerity the Amazons fall upon their en- 
 emy. And there we may behold a twofold spectacle. 
 While one part of the Polyergus warriors is murdering 
 the defenders of the hostile nest, the other and greater 
 part is rushing through every opening into the interior 
 of the enemy's citadel. Some minutes have passed. 
 A double stream of ants is issuing from the interior of 
 the nest. Both are loaded down with cocoons, the 
 "papooses" of ants, one consisting of F. rufibarbis en- 
 deavoring to save what may be saved, the other of the 
 Polyergus troops hastily returning with their booty. 
 There is no useless shedding of blood. The crania of 
 the F. rufibarbis are trepanned only in so far as they 
 refuse to yield up their progeny. Suddenly the scene 
 is changed. The F. rufibarbis, noticing the hasty 
 flight of the ravishers, at once pursue them to make 
 them give up their precious burden. There is a fierce 
 pulling and struggling hither and thither. The F. 
 rufibarbis plunge their mandibles into the legs and 
 feelers of the Amazons and cover them with venomous 
 ejections from their abdomens. But only some of the 
 Amazons' rearguard are constrained by superior num- 
 bers to deliver up the ravished cocoons, while one or 
 the other of their warriors remains a corpse upon the 
 field. In about ten minutes everything is over. The 
 scattered F. rufibarbis forces return to their dwelling 
 to restore everything, if possible, to its pristine state. 
 The stolen cocoons, however, are handed over by the 
 Polyergus to their slaves, already present in the nest,
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF "THE LOWER ANIMALS". 81 
 
 for further care and development, or for consumption. 
 They themselves again squat on their four hindlegs, 
 to renew their comical cleaning operations, which 
 they interrupt only to extort food from some pass- 
 ing slave. The young ants, which are fortunate 
 enough to come safely out of their cocoons, are 
 in reality not treated by the colony as slaves (which 
 in this case is a wrong appellation) , but as full-fledged 
 citizens. However, it is their lot, at least in the nests 
 of the Polyergus, which are unfit for any work, to take 
 upon themselves the construction of the nest, the rear- 
 ing of the brood, and the victualizing of the whole 
 community. And this task they undertake with mas- 
 terly skill and rare devotion. Entirely forgetful, as it 
 were, of their home and kindred, they are absorbed 
 in caring for strangers. They are unconcerned even 
 about the propagation of their own species, they sac- 
 rifice that for which animals strive to the utmost mere- 
 ly in order to preserve the race of their oppressors, 
 which would otherwise be doomed to certain destruc- 
 tion. 
 
 This is the exterior appearance of one of the most 
 splendid expeditions ever observed by Huber, Forel or 
 Wasmann, and certainly the fact narrated seems to 
 betray a high degree of intelligence. For, first of all , 
 by their warlike expeditions the Amazons seem to 
 intend to supply their household with new auxiliaries. 
 Moreover, the means applied for the purpose are most 
 appropriate. "Scouts" have explored the hostile nest 
 and seem to lead the whole army. At the right mo- 
 ment the signal for the attack is given. The attack 
 itself takes place on a sudden, with great celerity and 
 by all at once. Thus the enemy will be surprised and
 
 82 THE HUMANIZING OP THE BRUTE. 
 
 the number of cocoons captured will be more consid- 
 erable. No blood is shed without purpose. More- 
 over, the Polyergus seem to distinguish very well be- 
 tween the useful cocoons of workers and the useless 
 and harmful ones of the females and males. Finally, 
 the ants apparently succeed in determining their 
 slaves to desist from the care of the preservation 
 of their own species, and to devote all their strength, 
 yea, even their very life, for the benefit of the colony 
 and the progeny of their ravishers. 
 
 These few facts, indeed, seem to throw a brilliant 
 light upon the psychic faculties of the ants; and though 
 some of them may be explained by very simple proc- 
 esses, there are scarcely any others in the life-history 
 of animals which present to us a more intellectual 
 appearance. The question now arises: Must these 
 facts in reality be attributed to true intelligence; do 
 they really involve true consciousness of finality? 
 A short consideration of the dark side in the life-his- 
 tory of these very same ants will convince us that this 
 question cannot be answered in the affirmative with- 
 out evident contradiction. 
 
 As will be known to many of our readers, the 
 mandibles of the Amazons are of a peculiar construc- 
 tion. They are not like those of other ants adapted 
 for many functions necessary to sustain the life of the 
 individuals and commonly exercised by those organs 
 (Plate III., Figs. 2 and 3). Hence the Amazons 
 essentially depend on the assistance of their help- 
 mates in many of their actions. This essential depen- 
 dence goes so far that throughout life the Polyergus 
 are even nourishedby their slaves. This fact is
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS' ' . 83 
 
 PLATE III 
 
 Fig 1. A Polyergus (Polyergus bicolor Wasm.) (Original.) 
 
 Fig. 2. Head and Mandibles of a 
 Formica seen from Below. 
 (Original.) 
 
 Fig. 3. Head and Mandibles of a 
 Polyergus seen from Below. 
 (Original.) 
 
 Fig 4. Lower Lip of a Formica 
 (labium). (Wasemann.) (a = 
 labial palpi ; b = ligula; c = 
 paraglossze.) 
 
 Pig. 5. Lower Lip of a Polyergus- 
 
 (Wasmann.) a == labia 1 palpi I 
 = ligula; c = paraglossse.)
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF " THE LOWER ANIMALS " . 85 
 
 sufficiently established by the observations of Huber, 
 I^espeo, Forel, Adlerz, Wasmann, etc. 
 
 The writer, too, had, occasion to verify the same 
 with regard to Polyergus bicolor Wasm. , a newly dis- 
 covered American Amazon. The process of feeding 
 takes place in the following manner. The hungry 
 Polyergus first violently buffets and strokes with feel- 
 ers and forelegs the head of a passing slave. If the 
 slave has sufficient food in its little crop, it causes a 
 drop of the prepared liquid to appear on its lower lip, 
 where it is licked off by the Amazon. Now it is cer- 
 tainly a very rare case that an animal so much de- 
 pends on others that it must even be fed by them dur- 
 ing its whole existence. And thus the two interesting 
 questions present themselves: First, what will happen 
 to the Polyergus if deprived of their slaves? And 
 secondly, are they at all able to obtain food independ- 
 ently of any exterior aid? As to the second question, 
 Wasmann sums up the results of a minute examina- 
 tion of the Amazon's mouth -parts in the following 
 statements: 1. By the construction of their mouth- 
 parts, and especially by the shortness of their palpi, 
 the Amazons show, indeed, that they are less adapted 
 for independent feeding than other ants related to 
 them (Figs. 4 and 5). 2. There is, however, no or- 
 ganic impossibility in the way of their independent 
 nutrition. For other ants with organs not less imper- 
 fect feed themselves without being assisted by others. 
 3. The structure of the so-called paraglossae seems 
 even to indicate that the Polyergus are able to obtain 
 food in an extraordinary manner (Figs. 4 and 5). Yet 
 these inferences from the construction of the mouth-
 
 86 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 parts of the Polyergus would in themselves not be 
 sufficiently warranted, unless actual experiment had 
 corroborated them. Examining the mandibles of the 
 Polyergus, we find that on the interior side they have 
 a slight excavation widening toward the head (Fig. 
 1). But as the Amazons are endowed with great pred- 
 atory instinct, they take delight in exercising their 
 mandibles upon their foes; and if then these organs 
 happen to be inserted into the body of ants or their 
 cocoons, the channels contained in them convey the 
 liquid to the lower parts of the mouth. Now Was- 
 mann with sufficient frequency observed the following 
 fact: While the mandibles of a Polyergus, having 
 pierced the body of an enemy, were resting quietly in 
 the same position, their palpi and lower lips were 
 moving in regular intervals toward the inside, this 
 movement lasting from three to five minutes But 
 precisely this motion of the palpi and lip constitute 
 the eating operation of ants. Moreover, Adlerz, Was- 
 mann and the writer himself have noticed how in ob- 
 servation nests Polyergus accidentally coming into 
 contact with the glass panes of the walls licked off the 
 drops of precipitation found upon them. From this it 
 follows that the Polyergus are actually capable of in- 
 dependent nutrition. What should we, therefore, na- 
 turally expect of them, if they are robbed of their 
 slaves? Most assuredly that impelled by hunger they 
 would make use of their power of eating and would 
 make an independent effort to partake of the food 
 placed before them. But what are the actual facts? 
 The result of numberless experiments is the following: 
 Although the Polyergus are able to eat and accident-
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS". 87 
 
 ally do eat now and then, they must absolutely be fed 
 by their slaves, if they are to remain alive. You may 
 prepare for them the most pleasant dwelling and the 
 most exquisite nourishment; if you neglect to provide 
 them with slaves, they are doomed. Their desire for 
 nourishment impels them only to seek it from their 
 slaves, but never to make an attempt at independent 
 nutrition. Therefore, this ant apparently so intelli- 
 gent in its warlike operations, is so abnormally stupid 
 and helpless in private life, as not to be able to estab- 
 lish the simple relation between the promptings of ap- 
 petite and independent nutrition, and prefers death to 
 making use of its faculty of eating. But a being that 
 is capable of eating and from experience knows how 
 to eat, yet even in the greatest necessities with unex- 
 ceptional regularity, prefers to die than to eat 
 independently, is a rather poor specimen of ant 
 intelligence. There can be no question here of 
 some error of judgment, as may occur in man en- 
 dowed with intelligence. Real error cannot be a nor- 
 mal occurence; it is never found in all individuals of 
 the same species; it cannot be committed, unless there 
 is at least some appearance of truth and some influence 
 of passion or prejudice. Regarding the actions in 
 question, however, all the circumstances point not to 
 an accidental error, but to an entire absence of intelli- 
 gence. For in the first place, these actions are entire- 
 ly useless for the individuals performing them. Sec- 
 ondly, they occur with all the individuals so far 
 observed both in Europe and in America. Finally, 
 there can be no question of the influence of their will 
 under the stress of some passion or predilection. For
 
 88 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 every natural desire would prompt them to do the op- 
 posite. Thus we are forced by inexorable facts to 
 deny to the great warrior ant, the much lauded Ama- 
 zon, the faculty of acting with the consciousness of 
 final purpose and to assign her a place in the realms 
 of mere animal instinct. 
 
 The second psychic contrast, which strongly con- 
 roborates the conclusion suggested by the first, is taken 
 from the life-history of Formica sanguinea. This ant, 
 it is true, does not exhibit the brilliant intrepidity char- 
 acterizing the warlike expeditions of the Polyergus. 
 According to Forel sixty amazons can put to flight 
 thousands of the Formica sanguinea. Again their 
 warlike tactics do not present the same certainty and 
 unity, at least not if there is question of more popu- 
 lous slave-nests. Finally the number of expeditions, 
 in the case of the Polyergus about 44 in 33 days with 
 a result of 40,000 cocoons, is in the case of the Formica 
 sanguinea comparatively insignificant. But in spite of 
 these facts, which are partially due to the independence 
 of the Fornica sanguinea from its auxiliaries, some 
 features in the expedition of this ant exteriorly seem 
 to indicate a superiority in psychic endowments. We 
 mention only a single instance. Whilst Polyergus 
 makes its attack in serried ranks and with all the forces 
 actually engaged in the expedition, Formica sanguinea 
 uses only a part of its troops for purposes of assault. 
 The rest, as if intending to blockade the hostile formi- 
 cary, distribute themselves in squadrons around it. 
 If, then, the inhabitants of the nest try to save their 
 young by flight, they are at once pursued and cap- 
 tured by the outlying posts. It is evident that this
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS". 89 
 
 procedure is admirably adapted to secure the desired 
 cocoons. For the nest of Formica fusca, the princi- 
 pal auxiliary of Formica sanguinea, is in most cases 
 not very large, and its inhabitants are cowards, at 
 least if alone. Thus it happens that a few of the 
 Formica sanguinea are sufficient to bring about a 
 universal flight. If, consequently, Formica sanguinea 
 would not divide its army, but make its attack with 
 all the forces, this kind of action would not only 
 waste the strength of the aggressive power, but also 
 most probably result in little success. For, ere the 
 Formica sanguinea could have succeeded in reaching 
 the interior of the hostile nest, the majority of the 
 fleet-footed Formica fusca would most probably have 
 left it. 
 
 But, however imposing the wonderful array of the 
 apparently intelligent actions of the Formica sanguinea 
 may be, it can be easily shown that there is no more 
 intelligence in them than in Polyergus. For the pur- 
 pose of proving this statement we intend to refer to 
 the relation existing between the Formica sanguinea 
 and one of its lavorites, tJie beetle "Lomechusa strum- 
 osa." This most interesting relation was discovered 
 and described by Eric Wasmann, S.J. , x ) and has of 
 late been verified with reference to the respective rep- 
 
 *) Of the numerous publications of E. Wasmann, S.J., on 
 this subject, we mention especially "Vergleichende Studien 
 ueber das Seelenleben der Ameisen und der hoeheren Tiere" 
 (Herder), 2d ed., 1900. Moreover, "Die Ergatogynen Formen 
 bei den Ameisen und ihre Erklaerung," Biologisches Cen- 
 tralbl., XV., pp. 606-646, and "Neue Bestaetigungen der Lome- 
 chusa-Pseudogynentheorie," Verhandlungen der Deutschen 
 Zoologischen Gesellschaft, 1902, pp. 98-108, etc.
 
 90 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 resentatives of the two European species in America. 
 L,et us see in what this relation consists. It is the 
 custom of the Formica sanguinea not only to adopt 
 related species of ants as their auxiliaries, but also to 
 receive a number of other insects, notably the L,ome- 
 chusa strumosa, as genuine guests into their house- 
 hold. This hospitable relation between ant and beetle 
 is based on various reasons. Unable to raise its own 
 brood, the Lomechusa has the instinctive desire to 
 have itself and its young fed by the Formica san- 
 guiaea. On the part of the Formica sanguinea the 
 relation to its guest is based in part on the circum- 
 stance that its maternal instinct is aroused by the 
 sight of the helpless beings before it. Then, by ac- 
 tive and passive mimicry, the L,omechusae imitate the 
 attitudes and behavior of their hosts and furnish them 
 some pleasurable sensations for their gustatory and 
 olfactory organs. Besides, in order to understand the 
 facts to be explained presently, we must remember 
 that there are four distinct periods in the life-history 
 of beetles and ants. Not unlike our birds, the young 
 offspring passes the first days of its short-lived existence 
 in the dark and narrow enclosure of the egg. Scarcely 
 has the baby-beetle escaped from its precious en- 
 closure, when it starts upon the second most precarious 
 period of its life. A tiny mass of pulp, the helpless 
 creature, now called larva, lies in the nest of the ants. 
 Totally dependent on their "loving care", it ever and 
 again opens its mouth, to be fed by its "kind" host. 
 After its bodily size has assumed the proper propor- 
 tions, the larva is carried by the ants to a suitable 
 place and covered with earth. In its temporary
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS". 91 
 
 grave, however, it does not return to dust, but having 
 spun a dense web or cocoon around itself, it soon 
 changes its bulky form into the so-called pupa, indi- 
 cating in more or less distinct outlines the form and 
 structure of the future beetle. Finally, the periods of 
 development come to an end. The pupa tries to ex- 
 tricate itself from the narrow confinement of its little 
 house and makes its appearance as a lively beetle, 
 somewhat smaller than represented in the accompany- 
 ing illustration (Plate IV, Fig. 1). 
 
 Now, in supporting its guest, the Formica san- 
 guinea, as a rule, commits two blunders betraying such 
 a profound stupidity as to furnish us very clear 
 proof that in those ants not a trace of consciousness 
 of final tendency can be found. 
 
 For, in the first place, through the hospitality ac- 
 corded to the I,omechusa, the Formica sanguinea 
 bring about the ruin of their colony and the gradual ex- 
 tinction of their species. This is done in a twofold 
 way. 
 
 (1) There is perhaps no animal which cares so 
 much for its young as does the ant. For no sooner 
 is the nest attacked than its inhabitants before all else 
 hurry off with their tender young to a place of secur- 
 ity. And not unfrequently they suffer themselves to 
 be deprived of head and limb rather than deliver up 
 the larvae to the enemy. Even if placed in a vial 
 filled with alcohol, they may often be found still hold- 
 ing the dead larvae between their mandibles. And 
 yet, what a strange spectacle do we behold! The 
 ants which were wont to defend their young with so 
 much enthusiasm and bravery have undergone a com-
 
 92 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 plete change. Ever since that strange guest entered 
 the nest and deposited its eggs, all the care of the 
 ants is lavished upon the brood of the intruder, which 
 manifests an almost fabulous appetite and grows with 
 great rapidity. To satisfy the hunger of their "be- 
 loved" guests, the ants even allow them freely to de- 
 vour their own eggs and larvae, otherwise so precious 
 to them; yea to hasten the work of destruction, they 
 themselves carry the larvae of the L,omechusae to the 
 places where the eggs and the larvae of the ants are 
 stored up. 
 
 Whence this strange phenomenon? Year after 
 year passes by. The conditions of the flourishing 
 colony become more and more threatening. But the 
 "most intellectual" ant is unable to see that its action 
 must necessarily result in the final ruin of the ant- 
 colony and species, and this the more so since the 
 beetles are quite numerous and their appetite most 
 voracious. 
 
 (2) Nor is this all. To the rearing of the L,ome- 
 chusa by the Formica sanguinea it is also due that in 
 the colonies of the latter an abnormal form of ants is 
 produced, which in the course of time must neces- 
 sarily do additional damage to the colonies and species 
 of the Formica sanguinea. These abnormal forms are 
 called "ergatogynes," a word which according to its 
 Greek origin ( tpyAfriuu =to work, yvirf= female; part- 
 ly worker; partly female) fitly characterizes them. 
 Wasmann distinguishes six different forms, the most 
 important of which are the so-called pseudogynes 
 (t^evSijs = false) (Figs. 2-4). These animals are evi- 
 dently ruined existences. Unable, either to lay eggs
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS" . 93 
 
 PLATE IV 
 
 Fig. 
 
 EXPLANATION OF PLATE IV. 
 
 Fig. I. Xenodusa cava Lee. (original). Fig. 2. Formica sanguined 
 subsp. rubicunda, Em. a female ; b pseudogyne ; c normal worker 
 (original) . Fig. 3. Thorax of a normal worker of F. rubicunda (original) . 
 Fig, 4 .--Thorax of a treudogyne of F rubicunda (original) .
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS". 95 
 
 or to discharge the functions of workers, they are use- 
 less members of the ant community and must finally 
 effect a degeneration of the entire species of the Formica 
 sanguinea. Now Wasmann has shown by a great num- 
 ber of facts, that the existence of these pseudogynes 
 must be ascribed to the rearing of the guest Lome- 
 chusa. l ) As regards the explanation of this pheno- 
 menon nothing certain has as yet been ascertained. 
 Wasmann is of the opinion, as we have stated else- 
 where, that the repeated rearing of the beetle causes 
 a gradual change in the brooding instincts of the ants, 
 so that the pseudogynes are but a developmental stage 
 of such larvae as were originally destined to become 
 females, but were in the course of their later develop- 
 ment transformed into workers. Be this as it may, the 
 fact that these encumbrances on the commonwealth 
 come into existence and multiply with such rapidity, 
 is the fault of the Formica sanguinea itself. We should 
 expect, therefore, that at least this circumstance would 
 rouse the attention of the ants and make them realize 
 the deplorable condition of their colony. But no! 
 Instead of murdering their hostile guests one by one, 
 they continue to give them their best attention, to 
 sacrifice for their sake hundreds of their own offspring 
 and to make out of the rest degenerated creatures, 
 good for nothing. And not one of the numerous in- 
 habitants of the various colonies becomes aware of these 
 
 1 ) How far the very same may be proved for the corres- 
 ponding American species we have shortly explained in our 
 paper on "Formica sanguinea, subsp. rubicunda, Em. and 
 Xenodusa cava Lee, etc.," Entomological News, December, 
 1904.
 
 98 THE HUMANIZING OP THE BRUTE. 
 
 most senseless and self-ruining actions. Is not this a 
 clear indication, that there cannot be any trace of true 
 consciousness of finality in them? Or, could we im- 
 agine an entire class of beings endowed with intellect 
 taking delight in overcoming the strongest impulse of 
 nature in spite of innumerable and most disastrous 
 losses? But this is only the first stupid action of the 
 Formica sanguinea. The second is no less flagrant, 
 and when combined with the first leaves no doubt 
 whatever as to the total absence of an intellectual faculty 
 in ants. 
 
 The second blunder committed by the Formica san- 
 guinea in the rearing of their guests consists in this 
 that, notwithstanding their excessive tenderness to- 
 wards the I^omechusa , the Formica sanguinea are con- 
 tinually active in exterminating not only their own 
 brood, but also the brood of their guests. For, the 
 larvae of beetles require a treatment totally different 
 from that needed by the ant larvae. Scarcely have the 
 latter, toward the close of their larval stage, been em- 
 bedded in the earth, when they envelop themselves in 
 a close and firm cocoon. There is, consequently, no 
 difficulty in their being soon after extracted again 
 from the earth and carried about at will by their fel- 
 lows. But this stereotype procedure is entirely unsuit 
 able for the young L,omechusa. For these spin only 
 a thin silken cocoon, requiring exceedingly gentle 
 handling and sure to tear whilst being extracted from 
 the earth. Hence, to drag the cocoons to the surface 
 before the pupae are completely formed, is evidently 
 out of place. And yet, despite their strong affection for 
 their guests, and despite all possible experience, the For-
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF " THE LOWER ANIMALS " . 97 
 
 mica sanguinea year after year fall into the same sense- 
 less "error" and can neither see nor learn , that their 
 guests require a different breeding from that of their 
 own offspring. True, after having torn the cocoons 
 of their darlings, they carefully replace them in the 
 earth. But is it perhaps to grant them now the neces- 
 sary rest for transformation? On the contrary! The 
 same process is repeated, until the larvae wither and 
 die. But if through the carelessness of their hosts 
 some larvae succeed in reaching their pupal stage, 
 even then they are often brought to the surface, to be 
 eaten up by their anxious nurses in an excess of affec- 
 tion! 
 
 In the first place, then, the Formica sanguinea 
 are so foolish as to lavish their care upon the I/ome- 
 chusa with the result that their own brood is dis- 
 troyed and their species degenerated. Secondly , they 
 refuse to give to their darlings the necessary time and 
 rest for their development, exterminate them by an 
 inappropriate treatment and finally devour them in 
 their pupal stage. 
 
 But these two facts present many and insoluble diffi- 
 culties in the way of ascribing to the ants the faculty 
 of recognizing the appropriateness or inappropriate- 
 ness of their actions. For, no matter from what point 
 of view we consider the case, we cannot help but find 
 an unfailing and evident contradiction. If one should 
 say that the Formica sanguinea lavish such tender- 
 ness upon their guests, because the latter afford them 
 some sense-gratification, we ask: If this be the case, 
 why do they exterminate and devour the young Lome- 
 ohusae and thus frustrate the accomplishment of such
 
 98 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 a purpose? But if it be rejoined that the Formica 
 sanguinea exterminate the I^omechusa because of the 
 damage inflicted, we ask: Why then do the Formicae 
 sanguineae bestow such care upon their guests, as to 
 neglect and sacrifice their own colony, their offspring 
 and their species? 
 
 Thus the life-history of the Formica sanguinea, 
 "the most intellectual ant", affords an example of how 
 from a more universal contemplation of ant-life, we are 
 necessarily led to adopt conclusions quite different 
 from those reached by certain "pseudo-psychologists" 
 of our day. Of course, it is still a mystery, in what 
 manner the single actions proceed from instinct. For 
 on this point the analogy between animal and man, 
 from which we must always proceed, becomes more 
 remote the further we "recede through the animal- 
 kingdom downwards from man. ' ' Still the fact re- 
 mains, that the faculty by which the activity of ants 
 is to be explained is not intelligence, but instinct, and 
 on this very point analogy retains its full force. But 
 if evident contradictions are to be avoided, this in- 
 stinct is not to be conceived as the power of mere 
 automatic reaction, but rather as a faculty guided by 
 sensuous cognition and modifiable within the limits of 
 this cognition by external experience. 
 I The high degree of objective finality which is 
 manifest in innumerable actions of the Formica san- 
 guinea does not proceed as such from the ant itself, 
 but from God's eternal Wisdom. That Wisdom, too, 
 can alone account for the double play of stupidity 
 which we have explained above. For, as Wasmann 
 profoundly remarks: "That supreme Wisdom which
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF "THE LOWER ANIMALS". 99 
 
 has made use of the senseless 'love' of the Formica 
 sanguinea towards the Lomechusae and their larvae 
 to keep the propagation of the ants within due limits, 
 has made use of the same senseless 'love' of the ants 
 to prevent the excessive multiplication of the beetle. 
 Such are the mild and yet powerful measures, by 
 which a divine Wisdom is able to preserve the 
 equilibrium in nature, animal intelligence and ani- 
 mal-morality standing before such phenomena in 
 impotent perplexity. ' '
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 The "Intelligence" of "The Higher Animals". 
 
 We now pass over to some striking proofs in sup- 
 port of the fact that the proposition which we have 
 defended with reference to the "most intellectual" of 
 the lower animals applies equally well to the "most 
 intellectual" individuals of the so-called higher ani- 
 mals. Our observations are based principally on some 
 of the clever experiments which Prof. Thorndike and 
 others made with dogs, cats, and monkeys under the 
 most favorable circumstances. We could, of course, 
 adduce similar instances against the intelligence of 
 the higher animals, as we have explained in the 
 proceeding chapter. We could remind our readers of 
 that wonderful dog which, being deprived 'of her 
 young, lavished her maternal ministrations on a pair 
 of old slippers; or of those loving apes which adopt 
 other animals, defend and caress them and clean them 
 of their fleas, but let them die the death of starvation. 
 Our proof against the intelligence of animals would 
 be even more cogent than the one furnished by Mr. 
 Martin, the able editor of a voluminous work on 
 "Natural History", in favor of animal intelligence. 
 Says the worthy Darwinist: "When visiting the 
 zoological garden in Berlin I perceived how the 
 beginnings of a human smile really played on the 
 (100)
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE ' ' HIGHER ANIMALS. ' ' 101 
 
 almost humanlike visage of the Chimpanzee." *) 
 But we prefer to make use of the strictly scientific 
 experi ments of Prof . Thorndike, firstly, because they are 
 very simple and entirely free from any subjective ele- 
 ment; secondly, because they admit of no doubt what- 
 ever as to the reality of the facts as well us to their 
 interpretation. 
 
 For many reasons Prof. Thorndike finds fault with 
 most of the modern books on animal intelligence. 
 These books, he says, do not give us a psychology , but 
 rather a eulogy of animals. They have all been about 
 animal intelligence, never about animal stupidity. 
 Moreover, according to him, the facts have generally 
 been derived from anecdotes which give really the ab- 
 normal or supernormal psychology of animals. Fin- 
 ally, even with good observers often only a single case 
 is studied, the conditions of the case are not perfectly 
 regulated, and the previous history of the animal in 
 question is not known. Hence there is no sufficient 
 reason for generalization, nor can the influence of 
 previous experiences be estimated. All these various 
 faults Thorndike wishes to avoid, and in our opinion 
 he has succeeded admirably. 
 
 ) "Illustrierte Naturgeschichte der Tiere," Leipzig, 1882, 
 p. 11. It is, of course, evident at what Mr. Chimpanzee really 
 smiled! Many authors like Martin maintain that monkeys 
 use sticks and stones as weapons and give similar evidence of 
 intelligence. This is not so. No less an authority than the 
 editor of the third edition of Brehm's "Tierleben," Mr. Pech- 
 nel-Iyoesche, who has made most careful observation to this 
 effect in the southwestern part of Africa assures us that, as a 
 matter of fact, monkeys "never do such a thing". Animals 
 do not understand the use of tools.
 
 102 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 us see. The following is the ingenious method 
 of experimentation he adopted. He took a good num- 
 ber of dogs, cats, and chicks, and having deprived 
 them of food for some time, put them in enclosures 
 from which they could escape by some simple act, 
 such as pulling at the loop of a cord, pressing a lever, 
 or stepping on a platform. A model of a box used in 
 the experiments is given in the accompanying draw- 
 ing (Plate V). Food was left outside in sight of the 
 animal. The animal \ then, had to form in each case 
 some few simple associations between the representation 
 of the interior of the box and the various movements 
 which would enable it to satisfy its hunger. The ob- 
 server made sure that the animal was free from his 
 influence and had never been subjected to the same or 
 a similar experiment. Moreover, the animals were 
 healthy, the main data of their life-history were known, 
 and they all were in the same state of absolute hunger 
 when subjected to the experiment. 
 
 Now, what are the results of Thorndike's experi- 
 ments? As far as they pertain to the present subject, 
 they prove, in the first place, that dogs and cats are un- 
 able of themselves to form associations which imply the 
 understanding of the finality of actions. For if they 
 succeeded in opening the door of their cage, they suc- 
 ceeded BY ACCIDENT, not by intellectual inference. 
 
 L,et us give one typical example. The successes 
 and failures of two cats, No. 1 and No. 6, are ex- 
 pressed in the following table: i) 
 
 .') 1. c., p. 45.
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OFT HE "HIGHER ANIMALS' 
 
 PLATE V. 
 
 103
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE ' ' HIGHER ANIMALS' ' . 105 
 
 13.00 Failed. 
 
 9.30 Succeeded. 
 
 1.40 
 
 .50 
 
 15.00 
 
 6.00 Failed. 
 
 14.00 Succeeded. 
 20.00 Failed. 
 4.30 Succeeded. 
 20.00 Failed. 
 20.00 
 15.00 
 
 60.00 
 
 No. 1. 13.00 Failed. No. 6. 17.50 Succeeded. 
 
 3.30 
 9.00 
 2.10 
 1.45 
 1.55 
 13.00 
 
 5.00 
 
 2.30 
 15.00 
 10.00 Failed. 
 
 5.00 Succeeded. 
 15.00 Failed. 
 
 10.00 
 10.00 " 
 
 The figures in the columns represent the time (in 
 minutes and seconds) the animal was in the box be- 
 fore being taken out if it failed to escape. Double 
 lines represent an interval of 24 hours. 
 
 "Surely", Mr. Thorndike says, "if one and six 
 had possessed any power of inference they would not 
 have failed to get out after having done so several 
 times. Yet they did. If they had even once, much 
 less if they had six or eight times, inferred what was 
 to be done, they would have made the inference the 
 seventh or ninth time. And if there were in these 
 animals any power of inference, however rudimentary, 
 however sporadic, however dim, there should have 
 appeared among the multitude some cases where an 
 animal seeing through the situation , knows the proper 
 act, does it and from then on does it immediately upon 
 being confronted with the situation . . . Now the
 
 106 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 scores of cases recorded show no such phenomenon. The 
 cat does not look over the situation, much less think 
 it over, and then decide what to do. It bursts out at 
 once into the activities which instinct and experience have 
 settled on as suitable reactions to the situation, 'confine- 
 ment when hungry with food outside. ' " 1 ) 
 
 The second fact which is brought to undeniable 
 evidence by Mr. Thorndike's experiments is the fol- 
 lowing: Animals are incapable of learning by imita- 
 tion such associations as would imply on their part the 
 understanding of the finality of actions. Of the many 
 experiments which Prof. Thorndike describes we 
 mention only one or the other. 
 
 Eight chicks were successively put in a box, where 
 they were left alone from sixty to eighty seconds. 
 Then another chick which knew how to get out was 
 introduced with each of them into the box, and upon 
 its performing the act both were allowed to escape. 
 No cases, as Thorndike expressly states, were counted 
 unless the imitator clearly saw the other do the thing. 
 Besides, it was evident, that the imitators wanted to 
 get out when left alone. The result of the numerous 
 experiments is as follows: Chick No. 84 saw its com- 
 panion escape 129 times, but failed completely to imi- 
 tate it. Similarly chick No. 85 failed after 30 trials, 
 chick No. 86 after 44 trials, No. 87 after 26, No. 80 
 after 54 trials, etc. 
 
 Only one, No. 82, performed the act: but this was 
 accidental. Thorndike says: "I have no hesitation 
 in declaring 82's act in stepping on the platform the 
 
 !) I.e., p. 45.
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE " HIGHER ANIMALS " . 107 
 
 result of mere accident and am sure that anyone who 
 had watched the experiments would agree. " l ) 
 
 In the case of cats the experiment was so arranged 
 that through a screen the cat which was to imitate 
 another one could see its guide pull the string, go out 
 through the door thus opened and eat the food out- 
 side. The result was the same, as in the case of the 
 chicks. There was not the slightest difference be- 
 tween their behavior and that of those who were put 
 into the same position without ever having seen an- 
 other one escape from it. "No one, I am sure, who 
 had seen them, would have claimed that their con- 
 duct was influenced by what they had seen. When 
 they did hit the string, the act looked just like the 
 accidental success of the ordinary association experi- 
 ments." 2 ) 
 
 Dogs, too, completely failed to comprehend the 
 simple idea "that what gives another food will give it 
 to them also. ' ' 
 
 No. 3, for instance, had been found to be unable 
 to escape from a box of himself. A chance was given 
 him to learn it from No. 1. No. 3 could see and 
 study every move of No. t. And yet what was the 
 result. Here is the record: 8 ) 
 
 ') 1. c., p. 54. 
 
 2 ) I.e., p. 57. 
 
 3 ) 1. c.,p. 60.
 
 108 
 
 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 Times 
 No. 1 did the 
 action. 
 
 Times No. 3 
 surely saw 
 the action of 
 No. 1. 
 
 Times No. 3 
 probably saw 
 the action of 
 No. 1. 
 
 Times No. 3 
 in box 
 alone. 
 
 Result. 
 
 30 
 
 7 
 
 14 
 
 3 minutes. 
 
 Failed. 
 
 After i hour: 
 35 
 
 9 
 
 14 
 
 3 minutes. 
 
 Failed. 
 
 After i hour: 
 10 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 5 minutes. 
 
 Failed. 
 
 After 24 hours: 
 20, 30 
 
 6, 8 
 
 8, 13 
 
 6 minutes. 
 
 Failed. 
 
 After 48 hours: 
 25, 25, 25 
 
 8, 6, 9 
 
 11, 12, 7 
 
 8, 6,10min 
 
 Failed. 
 
 After 24 hours: 
 30 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 40 minutes 
 
 Failed. 
 
 Though No. 3 saw No. i surely 66 times, it failed 
 in all cases. Prof. Thorndike explains many similar 
 experiments most minutely. All lead to the same 
 conclusion that even the highest animals are absolutely 
 incapable of understanding the finality of actions. But 
 Thorndike's experiments do not refer only to cats, 
 dogs and chicks. In a special monograph 1 ) on the 
 "mental life" of three South American monkeys of 
 the genus Cebus, published in 1901, he shows clearly 
 that "a negative answer to the question 'do the 
 monkeys reason?' seems to be inevitable." Very- 
 many simple acts similar to those enumerated above 
 were not learned by the monkeys in spite of again 
 and again having seen them performed by Thorndike 
 and by their own kind. Similarly, "after having 
 abundant opportunity to realize that one signal meant 
 
 ') "The Mental Life of the Monkeys." The Psycholo- 
 gical Review. Monograph Supplement No. 15.
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE "HIGHER ANIMALS". 109 
 
 food at the bottom of the cage and another none, a 
 monkey would not act from the obvious inference and 
 consistantly stay up or go down as the case might be, 
 but would make errors such as would be natural if he 
 acted under the growing influence of an association 
 between sense impression and idea, but quite incom- 
 prehensible if he had compared the two signals and 
 made a definite inference. V Finally "after experience 
 with several pairs of signals, the monkeys yet failed 
 when a new pair was used, to do the obvious thing 
 to a rational mind; viz, to compare the two, think 
 which meant food, and act on the knowledge directly. ' ' 
 Certainly animals can learn to perform new and even 
 complicated actions, but only if one succeeds in asso- 
 ciating in the soul of each individual a definite im- 
 pulse with the representation of a definite motion. 
 Thus, as Wasmann narrates in his book "Instinct and 
 Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom," x ) "L,ub- 
 bock's poodle Van finally learnt to 'read,' by being 
 trained to fetch the card with the word when it was 
 hungry. ' ' But ' ' in spite of its long course of training 
 Van often brought the wrong card, when it 
 was hungry. This fact shows that it never un- 
 derstood the relation between the graphic symbols and 
 their meaning. Nor did it occur to Van to give 'read- 
 ing lessons' to Patience, the lap-dog. Nor did Pa- 
 tience hit upon the idea of profiting by Van's experi- 
 ence, although she had often witnessed the reward 
 which Van received for fetching the proper card. ' ' 
 Besides, Mr. A. J. Kinnman 2 ) has applied Mr. 
 
 ) 2 ed. (Herder, St. Louis), p. 165. 
 
 2 ) "Mental Life of two Macacus Rhesus Monkeys in cap- 
 tivity," Amer Journal of Psychology, XIII., 1902.
 
 110 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 Thorndike's method to monkeys, and with the same 
 result. There was not even the semblance of thought 
 to be noticed; less adapted methods were not replaced 
 by more improved ones; the monkeys did not experi- 
 ment, did not know how to make use of favorable cir- 
 cumstances to obtain a definite end; the female utterly 
 failed to learn by imitating the male. All was wild 
 and restless activity without reflection. 
 
 The same conclusion is reached by Mr. Hob- 
 house, who after numerous experiments declares that 
 the highest animals grasp events merely in concrete 
 series, so far as they are relevant to immediate practi- 
 cal interests. "Caution, cunning and sagacity of the 
 kind which 'animal stories' are so full do not as a 
 rule imply anything more or less than the "concrete 
 experience,' that we have described." Hobhouse 
 explicitly states that the "world of ideas" or of uni- 
 versals is "the distinctive property of humanity." x ) 
 
 Nor can examples like that- of "Clever Hans" be 
 accepted as proofs of animal intelligence. It is true 
 that von Osten's famous stallion performed actions 
 that seemed to manifest a degree of intelligence per- 
 haps never recorded of any other animal. But a 
 scientific test of the performances of Clever Hans has 
 shown that they must be explained without appealing 
 to any reasoning faculty. Dr. Stumpf, president of the 
 Psychological Institute of Berlin, writes as follows: 2 ) 
 
 Clever Hans was examined experimentally by Dr. 
 E. von Hornbostel, O. Pfungst, and myself. The 
 horse was at our disposal even in the case of his own- 
 
 ') Mind in Evolution, p. 281, p. 298. 
 
 2 ) E. Wasmann, Instinkt und Intelligenz, 3. ed., p. 220.
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE "HIGHER ANIMALS". Ill 
 
 er's absence. The result of our inquiry is as follows: 
 If the solution of a problem is not known to anyone 
 present, Hans is unable to find it. Hence Hans is un- 
 able to count, figure, and read himself. Moreover, Hans 
 is unable to solve a problem, if he cannot see the persons 
 who know the solution of the problem. l ) Hence, Hans 
 depends on optical assistance. But this assistance is, 
 in the present case, of a merely instinctive character. 
 In the course of a long training the horse has become 
 acquainted with the slightest changes of bodily posi- 
 tion, accompanying the thoughts and reasoning of his 
 master. Mr. Pfungst, whose observing powers con- 
 cerning very short impressions of sight have been es- 
 pecially well developed on account of a long laboratory 
 1 ) The following facts originally published in the weekly 
 edition of the Koelnische Volkszeitung are suggestive: 
 
 1. A watch was presented to "clever Hans." Without 
 conedscending to look at it, he immediately gave the correct 
 answer by stamping eleven times it happened to be 11 
 o'clock. I repeat, the animal did not even glance at the 
 watch. 
 
 2. Mr. X, who was among the spectators, wrote an example 
 of arithmetic on a slip of paper in such a way that no one 
 present, not ever the owner of the horse, knew the figures of 
 the problem. The paper was then presented to the horse 
 with the request to paw the solution. The animal started 
 pawing ad infinitum. 
 
 3. On a certain wall near by fourteen boys were sitting in 
 two rows. Hans was asked by Mr. Schillings how many 
 boys were sitting on the wall. Without really looking in the 
 direction of the wall and counting, Hans pawed fourteen 
 times. 
 
 4. Another time, a captain of the army gave Hans a very 
 simple problem in addition, but made sure that his owner 
 could not influence the horse. Hans failed completely. 
 Then the owner got hold of him, and lo! Hans solved the 
 problem correctly. (Koeln. Volksz. No. 36, p. S.)J
 
 112 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 training, succeeded in analyzing the motions which 
 actually caused the clever answers of Hans. In fact, 
 he was able by mere motions and without putting any 
 question to make Hans perform anyone of his former ex- 
 hibitions. Prof. Stumpf concludes his criticism by 
 stating that the case of Hans is so far from proving the 
 intelligence of animals that it rather proves the con- 
 trary. For if not even the training powers and pati- 
 ence of a man like von Osten are capable of eliciting 
 the expression of a single concept from a horse like 
 clever Hans, then, indeed, we are confronted by a first 
 class proof in favor of the old and general opinion that 
 animals are devoid of intelligence. 
 
 "The animal's self," as Thorndike himself states, 
 "is not a being 'looking after and before', but a direct 
 practical association of feelings and impulses. So far 
 as experiences come continuously, they may be said to 
 form a continuous mental life, but there is no contin- 
 uity imposed from within. " l ) 
 
 This is the reason why animals have never invent- 
 
 ') At one place (p, 73) Mr. Thorndike has the following 
 very interesting sentence: "Perhaps the entire fact of asso- 
 ciation in animals is the presence of sense impressions with 
 which are associated by resultant pleasure certain impulses, 
 and that therefore, and therefore only, a certain situation 
 brings forth a certain act." If Mr. Thorndike would take 
 the trouble to study Wasmann's works, he would find that 
 this sentence, correctly understood, has ever been the doc- 
 trine of scholastic philosophy. Of course, he will blame that 
 philosophy for not being able to support its statements by 
 experimental facts just as he has furnished them. But is it 
 not strange that the old scholastic philosophers arrived at 
 the same conclusions as Mr. Thorndike, though they merely 
 relied on the simple facts of daily experience?
 
 THE INTELLIGENCE OP THE ' ' HIGHER ANIMALS' ' . 113 
 
 ed even so simple a tool as the ancestors of the human 
 race employed during the so-called stone-age of the 
 Paleolithic epoch, this the reason why they are incap- 
 able of rational language. Parrots may be trained to 
 utter articulate sounds and even entire phrases. In 
 general, there is perhaps no class of animals that could 
 not furnish a great many external signs as a foundation 
 for intellectual intercommunication. But the invention 
 of tools as well as of language implies the knowledge 
 of the universal, which is the "distinctive property of 
 humanity. " 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 Animals, then, do not possess intelligence in its gen- 
 uine meaning. They are mere sense-beings. But this 
 inevitably leads to ' 'the admission of a qualitive differ- 
 ence between the human and animal psyche. ' ' For, 
 as we have proved before, the specific actions of man 
 and animal are essentially different from each other. 
 Even "plastic instinct" or "simple intelligence," as 
 others call it, is but a material faculty, intrinsically de- 
 pendent on the nervous system, whereas the intellect 
 with its true intelligent actions is of an immaterial, a 
 spiritual nature. Consequently, there is an essential, a 
 qualitative difference between the human and the animal 
 soul. For, as a being acts, so it is. 
 
 Moreover, it is equally plain that we must reject the 
 supposition of Wundt and of almost all modern scient- 
 ists, that the psychic faculties of man have been evolved 
 from the psychic faculties of the animal. Such an evolu- 
 tion of "mere association" to "conscious intellectual 
 activity," x ) of "nature" to "culture," x ) would be 
 
 1 ) Wilhelm Wundt, "Vorlesungen ueber die Menschen
 
 114 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 
 
 an absolute impossibility, since matter and sense are es- 
 sentially inferior to spirit and intellect. For the origin 
 of our "intellectual and moral faculties" we can only 
 find "an adequate cause in the unseen universe of 
 Spirit." 2 ) 
 
 und Tierseele." Hamburg und Leipzig, 1897, 3d ed., p. 419. 
 It is remarkable that Wundt has arrived at the same conclusions 
 concerning the "intelligence of animals" as Thorndike. 
 Wundt even considers it as very improbable that some species 
 or individuals of the present animal kingdom will ever pass 
 the limit separating sense and intelligence; on the other hand, 
 he assumes, as we have stated, that the human species in the 
 course of its evolution has actually taken that important step! 
 2 ) Alfred Russell Wallace, "Darwinism," Humboldt ed. 
 Part IT., p. 322.
 
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