THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 IRVINE 
 
 GIFT OF 
 
 Dr . and Mrs . 
 JOHN F. BELL
 
 METAPHYSICS 
 
 lit 
 
 BORDEN P. BOWNE 
 
 PBOF1880R OF PHILOSOPHY IS BOSTON CNIT1BSITT 
 
 NEW YORK : CINCINNATI : CHICAGO 
 
 AMERICAN BOOK COMPANY
 
 Copyright, 1883, by HARPER & BROTHERS 
 
 Copyright, 1898, by HARPER & BROTHERS. 
 Copyright, 1910, by BORDEN P. BOWNB. 
 
 All rightt reicrvtd. 
 
 w. P. 9
 
 PREFACE 
 
 THIS work is a revision of my earlier work on the sub- 
 ject. For " substance of doctrine " the teaching is the same. 
 The chief changes are in the form and exposition. The 
 fundamental doctrine is more systematically set forth, and 
 is unfolded into more detailed inferences; but the general 
 view is unchanged. In spite of many well-meant critical 
 washings, I still remain wallowing in the ancient meta- 
 physical and idealistic mire, and am even confirmed in my 
 error by further reflection. 
 
 The publication of the Theory of Thought and Knowledge 
 made it unnecessary to reproduce the epistemelogical matter 
 of the previous editions. Apart from this fact, the most 
 marked feature of the revision is the greater emphasis laid 
 on the idealistic element. This has been made more prom- 
 inent and more consistently developed. And, on the other 
 hand, it is shown that on the traditional realistic view both 
 thought and being are impossible. 
 
 At the same time, I have sought to save idealism from the 
 misunderstandings which are the great source of popular 
 objections to it, and also to make a place for inductive sci- 
 ence. This is done by the distinction between phenomenal 
 and ontological reality. The latter belongs to metaphysics 
 and must finally be viewed as active intelligence. The 
 former is the field of experience and is perfectly real in 
 that field ; that is, it is common to all and is no individual
 
 i v PREFACE 
 
 illusion. And anything we can do in the way of discover- 
 ing uniformities of coexistence or sequence in that field is 
 so much clear gain. The discovery of these uniformities is 
 the great work of inductive science; and this study it can 
 pursue without being molested or made afraid by meta- 
 physics. Of course, when the scientist sets up these uni- 
 formities as self-sufficient and self-executing laws, he then 
 becomes a metaphysician ; and criticism is in its full right 
 when it reminds him that such doctrine is not science but 
 bad metaphysics. But the distinction between phenomenal 
 and ontological reality enables us at once to save the truth 
 of appearances and such science of them as we may have, 
 and also to go behind them to a deeper realm if thought 
 should demand it. 
 
 At the same time, it must be noted that the final result 
 is to deprive all concrete science of its absolute character. 
 The successive phases of phenomena cannot be deduced from 
 antecedent phenomena by any proper logical process. In 
 every theory we have to find the ground of the seen in the 
 unseen; and we have no insight into that hidden realm 
 which will lift our concrete science into anything more than 
 a practical expectation which serves for living rather than 
 for speculation. There is an agnosticism which springs from 
 a sensational philosophy, and this can only be viewed as 
 the apotheosis of superficiality. But there is an agnosticism, 
 or anti-dogmatism, which springs from a real insight into 
 the nature of reason itself. This agnosticism is more whole- 
 some, both speculatively and practically, than the crude 
 gnosticism of popular thinking. Such fictitious gnosticism 
 is one great obstacle to progress in the world of thought. 
 It is the prolific source of speculative conceits and of mis- 
 chievous practical negations ; and one of the chief duties 
 of criticism is to show its fictitious character. 
 
 The method pursued in the discussion depends on peda-
 
 PREFACE V 
 
 gogical reasons. A direct abstract discussion would be far 
 shorter and, for the practised reader, more satisfactory. But 
 it would be intelligible to only a few, and they would not 
 need it. For the sake of being understood, to say nothing 
 of producing conviction, it is necessary to start from the 
 stand-point of popular thought and to return to it at each 
 new start. In this way it becomes possible to show the 
 thinker on the sense plane the dialectic which is implicit 
 in his own position, and which compels him to move on 
 if thought is to reach anything sure and steadfast. Unless 
 this method is borne in mind it would be easy to find the 
 discussion in constant contradiction with itself. A great 
 deal of the argument is carried on on the basis of the pop- 
 ular realism, but only for the sake of showing the popular 
 speculator the impossibility of reaching anything final on 
 that basis, and thus preparing him to appreciate the more 
 excellent way. This method involves much repetition, but 
 it is pedagogically necessary in the present stage of specu- 
 lative development. 
 
 That there is a place for metaphysics would be more gen- 
 erally admitted now than when the first edition of the work 
 was published. Then metaphysics was to some a stumbling- 
 block, and to others foolishness, and even a mark of mental 
 degeneration. In King Bomba's army, it is said, a part of 
 the drill consisted in making ferocious grimaces, which were 
 expected to strike terror into the enemy. Faccia feroce 
 was the word of command. Many of the opponents of 
 metaphysics would seem to have adopted similar tactics 
 and make ferocious faces whenever the subject is mention- 
 ed. But the device is fast becoming ineffectual. There is 
 a growing insight into the fact that metaphysics underlies 
 all thinking and all science. The important factor in both 
 is not the bare fact of experience, but the metaphysical 
 notions whereby we form and interpret experience. Most
 
 Vi PREFACE 
 
 beliefs are but implications of a system of metaphysics, con- 
 sciously or unconsciously held ; and they run back to that 
 system for their justification. The great debates of the 
 time are essentially metaphysical. The debaters seldom sus- 
 pect it ; and yet both parties are busy with the nature of 
 being, and with the antitheses of matter and spirit, neces- 
 sity and freedom, mechanism and purpose, appearance and 
 reality, finite and infinite. The phenomena of the system 
 are the same for all ; the dispute concerns their interpreta- 
 tion; and this, in turn, depends entirely upon our meta- 
 physics. And, wittingly or unwittingly, we all have a 
 metaphysics. Since, then, we must use metaphysical con- 
 ceptions, whether we will or not, it is well to make these 
 notions the subject of a special inquiry, with the aim of 
 fixing their value and significance. This is all the more 
 desirable from the fact that the pretended renunciation of 
 metaphysics always has the practical result of assuming 
 without criticism a very definite system of metaphysics 
 generally a mechanical and materialistic fatalism. This 
 work is meant as such an inquiry. It is by no means a 
 " mental philosophy," which is the common understanding 
 of metaphysics ; it is rather an exposition of our fundamen- 
 tal philosophical concepts, their contents and implications. 
 The clearing up of these concepts is the supreme condition 
 of philosophical progress. 
 
 We note this first in cosmology. Every one familiar with 
 cosmological speculation will recognize that the bulk of it 
 has rested upon the crudest possible metaphysical concep- 
 tions, and that it would vanish of itself if these conceptions 
 were clarified. Popular theories of evolution, the " new 
 philosophy," etc., operate with vague notions of nature, 
 mechanism, continuity, necessity ; and of course the lower 
 mechanical categories are accepted as first and final with- 
 out the slightest suspicion of their confusion and contradio-
 
 PREFACE vii 
 
 tion when thus regarded. Out of this speculative chaos we 
 can emerge only by subjecting these fundamental notions 
 to a searching criticism. 
 
 But the need of this criticism is most marked in psychol- 
 ogy. Current psychology, especially of the "synthetic" 
 sort, has erred and strayed from the way, beyond anything 
 possible to lost sheep, because of the unclear or inadmis- 
 sible metaphysical notions with which it operates. We have, 
 first, an attempt to construe the mental life in terms of 
 mechanism or of the lower categories. This has led to the 
 most extraordinary mythology, in which mental states are 
 hypostasi/ed, impossible dynamic relations feigned, logical 
 identities mistaken for objective temporal identities; and 
 then the entire fiction, which exists only in and through 
 thought, is mistaken for the generator of thought. Here 
 again nothing but criticism can aid us. We must inquire 
 what our " synthesis " is to mean, and what the factors are 
 which are to be "synthesized," and what are the logical 
 conditions of such a synthesis. This inquiry cannot be dis- 
 pensed with by issuing cards of questions to nurses and 
 young mothers, or by rediscovering world-old items of 
 knowledge by the easy process of constructing new names 
 for them. The dictionary may be enriched in this way, 
 and charming stories gathered concerning the age at which 
 " our little one began to take notice," but this journalistic 
 method is more likely to contribute to the " gayety of na- 
 tions " than to psychological insight. Neither can we long 
 dispense with the inquiry by the severities of quotation- 
 marks, or by assuming a superior manner and claiming for 
 the new psychology everything in sight. This method also 
 is losing its effectiveness. 
 
 The metaphysics and logical structure of psychology are 
 in great need of critical examination. Its practical appli- 
 cations are in equal need of illumination. The mechanical
 
 Viu PREFACE 
 
 psychology of sense-bound thought has overflowed, with no 
 small damage, into the field of popular education. In many 
 cases sheer fictions and illusions are taught for truth, or are 
 made the basis of educational procedure. And when no posi- 
 tive damage is done, the result is still barrenness and waste 
 of time. Much of the information given seems to be about 
 on a level with that which M. Jourdain received from his 
 teacher in philosophy. He learned that there are two 
 classes of letters, vowels and consonants, and two kinds of 
 composition, prose and poetry, and that he had been talk- 
 ing prose all his life without knowing it, and that when he 
 pronounced the vowel O he pursed his lips into a circular 
 form, and elongated them when pronouncing A. He also 
 learned how to tell by the almanac when the moon was 
 shining. M. Jourdain was so enchanted with this informa- 
 tion that he thought hardly of his parents for neglecting 
 his instruction in his youth, and also gave himself great 
 airs, on the strength of the new education, when he met 
 Madame Jourdain and Nicole, the domestic. Not a little 
 of popular pedagogics is of this barren and inflating sort. 
 Knowledge still puifeth up. 
 
 And sometimes the matter is even worse. This thing hav- 
 ing become the fad, the intellectually defenceless among 
 teachers and those who would be thought wise are intimi- 
 dated into accepting it. Hans Christian Andersen's story, 
 a little modified, well illustrates the situation. Two knaves 
 set up a loom in the market-place and gave out that they 
 were weaving fabrics of wondrous beauty and value. To 
 be sure, nothing could be seen ; but they set forth that 
 whoever failed to see the goods was thereb} T shown to be 
 unfit for his place. Accordingly everybody, from the king 
 down, saw the things and praised them ; and nobody dared 
 to let on, for fear of being thought unfit for his place. And 
 they bought the goods, to the knaves' great profit, and ar-
 
 PREFACE ix 
 
 rayed themselves, and marched in procession in their imagi- 
 nary attire. And still nobody dared to let on, until a small 
 boy, of unsophisticated vision, called out : "Why, they haven't 
 got their clothes on !" This broke the spell. Intimidations 
 of this sort are all too common in the pedagogical world at 
 present. And they will remain until an era of criticism sets 
 in. Then we may hope to be freed from the mythologies of 
 the mechanical and synthetic psychology and from the mis- 
 leading or sterile formulas of popular pedagogics. 
 
 For this desirable pedagogical reform, it is necessary that 
 we distinguish more carefully between theoretical and prac- 
 tical psychology. Most theoretical psychology is practically 
 barren. If necessary as a sufficient reason for the facts, it 
 nevertheless often leads to nothing. Power over the facts, 
 whether in education or in society, is not gained by study- 
 ing psychological theories, but by observation and practice 
 and by experience of life and men. Preparing for an ath- 
 letic feat by a detailed study of anatomy would not be more 
 hopeless or irrational than preparation for teaching, or for 
 practically influencing men, by a devout study of psycho- 
 logical theory. By insisting on this distinction we shall 
 put an end to the pathetic and costly illusion which has led 
 to so much misdirected and wasted effort on the part of 
 young teachers. And this is to be desired, even if some 
 chairs of pedagogy have to be declared vacant. 
 
 My previous work, the Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
 finds its completion in this. The two together give an out- 
 line of the problems of speculative thought, and " set forth 
 a general way of looking at things, which, I trust, will be 
 found consistent with itself and with the general facts of 
 experience." 
 
 BOKDEN P. BOWNE. 
 BOSTON, May, 1898.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAO 
 
 INTRODUCTION 1 
 
 Aim and Field of Metaphysics, p. 1 ; Theoretical and Practical Im- 
 portance of the Study, p. 2 ; Relation of Metaphysics to Expe- 
 rience, p. 5 ; Appearance and Reality, p. 7 ; Different Kinds of 
 Reality, p. 8. 
 
 PART I. Ontology 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 THE NOTION OP BEING 13 
 
 Different Meanings of Being, p. 13 ; Pure Being a Logical Abstrac- 
 tion and Impossible in Reality, p. 14 ; Phenomenal and Ontological 
 Reality, p. 16 ; Only Active Being is Ontological, p. 17 ; Doctrine 
 of Inherence, p. 19 ; Power an Abstraction, p. 20. 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 THE NATURE OF THINGS 29 
 
 Terms Defined, p. 29 ; Nature not Found in Sense Qualities, p. 81 ; 
 Herbart Criticised, p. 33 ; Meaning of Quality, p. 34 , Qualities in 
 General cannot Express the Nature of a Thing, p. 36; Nature 
 Found in the Law of Activity, p. 39. 
 
 CHAPTER IH 
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 44 
 
 Change Defined, p. 46; Being as Flowing Process, p. 47; Attempts 
 to Reconcile Change and Identity : Popular View, Physicists' 
 View, Herbart's View, p. 50 ; Meaning of Sameness, p. 54 ; A 
 Changing Thing a Series of Different Things, p. 56 ; Criticism of
 
 Xii CONTENTS 
 
 the Heraclitic View, p. 60 ; Irreconcilability of Change and Iden- 
 tity on the Impersonal Plane, p. 62 ; Solution Possible only in 
 Conscious Intelligence, p. 63 ; Intelligence cannot be Understood 
 through its own Categories, p. 66. 
 
 CHAPTER IV PAG. 
 
 CAUSALITY 68 
 
 Inductive and Productive Causality Distinguished, p. 68 ; Logical 
 Presuppositions of Interaction, p. 71; Popular Explanations of In- 
 teraction, p. 74 ; Interaction of Independent Things a Contradic- 
 tion, p. 79 ; The Interaction of the Many Possible only through 
 the Immanent Action of the One, p. 81 ; Causality in Succession, 
 p. 84 ; Contradictions in the Idea, p. 85 ; Unity and Causality both 
 Impossible on the Impersonal Plane, p. 88. 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 THE WORLD-GROUND 94 
 
 The Infinite not Substance but Cause, p. 94 ; The Finite not a Part 
 or Mode of the Infinite, p. 96 ; Impersonal Things only Phenom- 
 ena, p. 99 ; The Finite Spirit a Creation, p. 99 ; Difficulties in Pan- 
 theism, p. 102 ; The Nature and Purpose of the Infinite the Sole 
 Determining Ground of the Finite, p. 104; Truth itself Depend- 
 ent on the Infinite, p. 107; Nothingness of Non-Theistic Schemes, 
 p. Ill ; Origin of such Schemes in Sense Thinking, p. 113 ; Per- 
 sonality of the Infinite, p. 115. 
 
 PART II. Cosmology 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 SPACE 123 
 
 Three Views of Space, p. 126 ; Difficulties in Popular View, p. 128 ; 
 Space as Order of Independent Relations, p. 134 ; Space as Ideal, 
 p. 137 ; Misconceptions of the Ideal View, p. 137 ; Objections 
 drawn from Epistemology, p. 149 ; Identity of the Object not 
 Secured by Being in Real Space, but by Being a Factor of the Ra- 
 tional World, p. 152 ; Space of N Dimensions, p. 152.
 
 CONTENTS xiii 
 
 CHAPTER II PAGE 
 
 TIME 164 
 
 No Proper Intuition of Time, p. 164 ; Unclearness of Popular View, 
 p. 167 ; Standing and Flowing Time alike Contradictory, p. 169 ; 
 No Assignable Relation between Time and Events, p. 171 ; Un- 
 successful Attempts to Reach Timelessness, p. 175 ; Idealistic View 
 Expounded, p. 180 ; Failure of Ideal View so long as Extra-Men- 
 tal Reality is Allowed, p. 183 ; Time must be Construed with Ref- 
 erence to Self-Consciousness, p. 184 ; Relativity of Time, p. 188 ; 
 Relation of the Infinite to Time, p. 189 ; Result, p. 193. 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 195 
 
 Matter, p. 195 ; Plausibility of Atomism, p. 196 ; Source of the Il- 
 lusion, p. 197 ; Varieties of Atomism, p. 198 ; Strength and Weak- 
 ness of Corpuscular Atomism, p. 200 ; Force, p. 205 ; Confusion in 
 the Notion, p. 206 ; Laws of Force -Variation, p. 210 ; Action at a 
 Distance both Necessary and Absurd, p. 213 ; Motion, p. 217; Laws 
 of Motion no Necessities of Thought, p. 227; Theoretical Mechan- 
 ics an Abstraction, p. 241 ; Mechanics only a Science of Phenom- 
 ena at best, and largely only a Device of Method, p. 241. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 NATURE 244 
 
 Nature as an Idea of the Reason, p. 244; Nature as Matter and Force, 
 p. 247; Nature as Mechanism, p. 248 ; Complexity and Barrenness 
 of Ontological Mechanism, p. 251 ; Nature as the Order of Law, 
 p. 257 ; Nature as Continuous, p. 263 ; Confusion in the Notion 
 of Continuity, p. 263 ; Continuity of Law the Only Continuity, 
 p 267 ; Evolution, p. 271 ; Double Meaning of Evolution, p. 271 ; 
 Evolution as a Theory of Causation is Bad Metaphysics Produced 
 by Bad Logic, p. 276 ; Natural Selection, p. 279; Nature as the 
 System of Finite, p. 283 ; Natural and Supernatural, p. 285 ; Mir- 
 acles, p. 289 ; Nature as Idea, p. 294. 
 
 PART III. Psychology 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 THE SOUL 299 
 
 Meaning of Materialism, p. 300 ; Difficulties of Materialism, p. 303 ;
 
 x i v CONTENTS 
 
 Monism, p. 314 ; Difficulties of Monism, p. 314 ; Psychology of 
 Materialism, p. 316 ; Epistemology of Materialism, p. 319 ; Nat 
 ural Selection as a Principle of Belief, p. 321 ; Kant's Objections 
 to Rational Psychology Considered, p. 332 ; Scruples Concerning 
 the Being and Identity of the Soul, p. 336 ; Result, p. 344. 
 
 CHAPTER II p AO 
 
 SOUL AND BODY 349 
 
 Interaction of Soul and Body as Concomitant Variation of Both, 
 p. 350 ; Conservation of Energy, p. 352 ; Body as Organism, p. 355 ; 
 Origin of the Organism, p. 356 ; Mechanism and Vitalism, p. 357 ; 
 Difficulties in Both, p. 357; A Special Subject Needed for the 
 Apparent Mental Life, p. 367 ; The Infinite the Source of both Soul 
 and Body, p. 368 ; The Concomitance of the Physical and the 
 Mental Series not Absolute, p. 370 ; Origin of Souls, p. 372 ; Un- 
 tenability of Traducianism, p. 373 ; Heredity, its Difficulties, p. 
 375 ; The Future of Souls, p. 378 ; Speculation Destroys Knowl- 
 edge but Makes Room for Belief, p. 379. 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 OP MENTAL MECHANISM 381 
 
 No Mechanical Representation of Mental Activities Possible, p. 383 : 
 Difficulties in the Notion of a Mental Mechanism, p. 384 ; Her- 
 bart's View Criticised, p. 388 ; The English Associationalists, p. 
 390 ; Reproduction, p. 391 ; Memory Explained by Nothing but 
 Itself, p. 393 ; Cerebral Reproduction, p. 396 ; Mechanical Explana- 
 tion in Psychology purely Fictitious, p. 399. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 FKEEDOM AND NECESSITY 404 
 
 Freedom Denned, p. 405 ; Freedom in Intelligence, p. 406 ; Signifi- 
 cance of Freedom for Science and Philosophy, p. 407 ; Metaphys- 
 ics of Necessity, p. 410 ; Mistaken Notions of Freedom, p. 410 ; 
 Freedom and Science, p. 413 ; Freedom and the Law of Causation, 
 p. 414. 
 
 CONCLUSION 431
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 THE problems of speculative philosophy may be summed 
 up in two questions: How is knowledge possible? and, 
 What is reality? The former question belongs to episte- 
 mology ; the latter belongs to metaphysics. The first ques- 
 tion has been discussed in a previous volume, the Theory of 
 Thought and Knowledge. The second question is now to 
 be considered. 
 
 The nature of reality, then, is our subject. But we do 
 not aim at a detailed knowledge of particular things, such 
 as the special sciences might give, but rather at an outline 
 conception of reality, within which all knowledge of par- 
 ticular things must fall, and by which such knowledge must 
 be judged. There are certain general conceptions which 
 make up at once the framework of knowledge and the 
 framework of existence. Such are the categories of being 
 and cause, change and identity, space and time; and our 
 knowledge of particular things will depend on the concep- 
 tion we form of these basal categories. Epistemology has 
 shown them to be principles of thought; metaphysics in- 
 quires into their real significance. Our work will largely 
 consist in a study of the ontological meaning of the cate- 
 gories, either in themselves or in their specifications. Thus 
 we mark off our field from that of the special sciences. 
 
 The need of the metaphysical inquiry has a double root.
 
 2 METAPHYSICS 
 
 In the first place, the categories are primarily principles of 
 thought. Kant claimed that they are only such principles, 
 and have no significance for reality in itself. In this way 
 he overturned his own system ; for reality becomes only a 
 form of words when the categories are denied all objective 
 validity. At the same time, it is clear that there is a great 
 deal that is purely formal and relative in the use of the 
 categories, and that by no means corresponds to any ob- 
 jective fact. We may also be quite sure of the validity of 
 the formal principle, without being clear as to the form in 
 which the principle must be objectively conceived. Thus, 
 we may have no doubt respecting the objective reality of 
 causality or identity, and still be very much in the dark 
 as to the form in which real causality or identity exists. 
 Hence, after epistemology has established the formal prin- 
 ciples, it remains for metaphysics to fix their ontological 
 form and significance. 
 
 In the next place, these fundamental notions are always 
 loosely and often contradictorily conceived in popular think- 
 ing. There is a natural metaphysics in spontaneous thought; 
 but it is not wrought out into any clearly conceived and 
 harmonious system. Our practical thinking is moulded by 
 practical needs; and we never spontaneously give any 
 greater precision to our ideas than practice calls for. More- 
 over, these ideas, in unreflective thought, largely take their 
 form from our sense - experience, and thus acquire a me- 
 chanical and materialistic character. This does little harm 
 while thought remains instinctive ; but when reflection be- 
 gins, and these loose and one-sided notions are taken for 
 the fact, then their parallax with reality is magnified until 
 there results some grotesque absurdity or some pernicious 
 untruth. Then extended matter tends to become the typ- 
 ical and exclusive conception of substance, and mechanical 
 action becomes the sum of causality. The result is a reign
 
 INTRODUCTION 3 
 
 of materialism, or a conflict of science and religion, or some 
 other such unprofitable aberration. These things arise al- 
 most exclusively from imperfect conceptions of the cate- 
 gories, and especially from determining their contents by 
 appeals to sense experience. 
 
 Thus the metaphysical inquiry appears to be a matter of 
 both theoretical and practical importance. It is theoretical- 
 ly important, in order to escape a shallow dogmatism on 
 the one hand, and a self -destructive subjectivism on the 
 other. It is practically important, in order to lift popular 
 thought from the sense-plane, where it is perpetually tempt- 
 ed to run off into necessity, mechanism, and materialism. 
 The aberrations of philosophy are largely due to miscon- 
 ceptions of the categories ; and both the reform and the 
 progress of philosophy depend on a profounder insight into 
 their true meaning and implications. 
 
 The question, What is reality ? can only be answered by 
 telling how we must think about reality. We have no 
 means of dealing with reality other than through the con- 
 ceptions we form of it. This fact has led to the sceptical 
 suggestion that we can never tell whether our conceptions 
 correspond to reality. To this the answer is that this "cor- 
 respondence " is itself a very crude and obscure notion. The 
 only correspondence which our conceptions can have con- 
 sists in their validity for the things. There can be no cor- 
 respondence in the sense that we can first know things by 
 themselves, and then form conceptions of the things already 
 known, and finally compare the things and the conceptions 
 in order to note their correspondence. This would indeed 
 be a roundabout way of knowing, and would involve works 
 of supererogation. The validity is the only correspondence, 
 and this can be determined only by the self - evidence or 
 necessity with which the conception imposes itself upon the 
 mind.
 
 4: METAPHYSICS 
 
 Again, the sceptical suggestion is out of place here. 
 Before we can decide whether our thought of reality is 
 valid for reality, we must first find out what that thought 
 really is. "We have just pointed out that the natural meta- 
 physics of spontaneous thought is loosely and carelessly con- 
 ceived. It serves for practical purposes as long as we con- 
 fine ourselves to the daily round, but it by no means gives, 
 us the final results of the reflective and critical reason. 
 Hence, before we raise the sceptical question, we must make 
 a critical study of thought itself, with the aim of clarifying 
 our ideas, adjusting their mutual relations, and determining 
 what the essential utterances of reason are in matters of 
 metaphysics. To consider the sceptical question before mak- 
 ing this inquiry is to open the way to endless paralogism, 
 and logical inconsequence. And when the final utterances 
 of reason have been reached, if they prove clear and con- 
 sistent among themselves, and cogent in their evidence, there 
 will be little difficulty in getting them accepted in spite of 
 the sceptic. 
 
 What is reality? How can we answer this question 
 otherwise than by opening our eyes and telling what we 
 see? or by looking into experience and reporting what we 
 find ? This is a very natural question, and for all those on 
 the sense plane it is decisive. But, at a very early date in 
 the history of reflective thought, it became clear that the 
 conceptions we spontaneously and unreflectingly form are 
 not those in which we can finally rest. If we attempt to 
 rest in things as they appear, we find ourselves involved in 
 all manner of difficulties; and thus \ve are compelled to 
 revise our conceptions until we make them mutually con- 
 sistent and adequate to the function they have to perform 
 in our thought system. In this way arises the distinction 
 between appearance and reality, or between things as they 
 appear and things as we must think of them; and thus,
 
 INTRODUCTION 5 
 
 finally, the problem of metaphysics becomes a question for 
 thought, and not one which can be answered by sense 
 intuition. 
 
 Nevertheless, the facts of experience furnish the data of 
 the problem. We have no way of creating reality, and we 
 also have no such apriori insight into its nature that we can 
 tell in advance what reality must be. Some speculators, 
 indeed, have fancied that some such thing might be possible, 
 but this dream now finds few upholders. We must wait 
 for reality to reveal itself, and our utmost hope is to under- 
 stand it. 
 
 Our method, then, is critical, not creative. Experience, 
 as a whole, is our datum, and the question is, How must we 
 think about reality on the basis of this experience as inter- 
 preted by thought ? We take, then, everything as it seems 
 to be, or as it reports itself, and make only such changes as 
 are necessary to make our conceptions adequate and har- 
 monious. The reasons for doubt and modification are to 
 be sought entirely in the subject-matter, and not in the 
 possibility of verbal doubt. This method allows reason its 
 full rights, and it also saves the natural sense of reality, 
 which can never be needlessly violated with impunity. We 
 take the theory of things which is formed by spontaneous 
 thought, and make it the text for a critical exegesis in the 
 hope of making it adequate and consistent. The method 
 is one of faith, and not of scepticism. 
 
 This thought deserves further emphasis. Oversight of it 
 is at the bottom of the popular notion that philosophy leads 
 to scepticism, and also of the popular scepticism of philo- 
 sophical conclusions. Neither science nor philosophy denies 
 anything which the senses give ; though both find reason 
 for denying that the senses give as much as uncritical 
 thought assumes. Both make the data of the senses a start- 
 ing-point, and on them they build up a rational system.
 
 6 METAPHYSICS 
 
 But this system is never a matter of the senses, but an in- 
 ference from their data. Both physics and metaphysics 
 carry us at once into a world of realities whose existence 
 and nature can be assured only by thought. The conclu- 
 sions drawn in both cases seem monstrous when judged by 
 the standard of the senses; but, then, they are not to be 
 judged by that standard. And, upon reflection, it turns out 
 that the two sets of views are not properly contradictory. 
 The sense view furnishes the data, the rational view inter- 
 prets them. In so doing it assumes the truth of the sense 
 view within its own sphere. The visible heavens and the 
 astronomical heavens are not in contradiction. The astrono- 
 mer makes the visible heavens his starting-point, and he 
 finds that they force him to affirm the astronomical heav- 
 ens. Each view, in its place, is correct, and neither denies 
 the other. But if the rustic should attempt to demolish 
 the Copernican theory by appealing to the senses, no 
 one would pay any attention to him, for every one now 
 recognizes that the senses have no jurisdiction in the 
 matter. 
 
 The application to philosophical theory is evident. Here, 
 too, we begin with the data of experience, but we do not 
 end with them. We find ourselves compelled to transcend 
 them by giving them a rational interpretation. And as it 
 is no objection to physics and astronomy that the atoms 
 and the ether cannot be seen, or that the heavens seem to 
 contradict Copernicus, so it is no objection to philosophy 
 that its theories cannot be verified by the senses. If, then, 
 in the following discussions, many things are found which 
 are violent and even monstrous paradoxes, when measured 
 by sense-appearance, the reader is begged to remember that 
 we do not recognize that standard as a measure of rational 
 truth, any more than the physicist recognizes it as a test 
 of his theories. In both cases, if the conclusions are soundly
 
 INTRODUCTION 7 
 
 inferred from unquestionable premises, they must be al- 
 lowed, no matter what bends or breaks. 
 
 But, before going further, this distinction of appearance 
 and reality needs a word of elucidation to save us from 
 falling into a verbal snare. Appearance and reality, phe- 
 nomena and noumena, are phrases which are often loosely 
 used. Appearance often has the sense of illusion and decep- 
 tion, a fiction of the disordered fancy, or a product of 
 pathological conditions ; and this meaning has so infected the 
 word itself that it is difficult to use it without suggesting 
 something of the kind. The very antithesis of appearance 
 and reality seems to hand appearance over to unreality, 
 and thus to brand it as fictitious. The antithesis of phe- 
 nomena and noumena, because of its connection with the 
 Kantian theory of knowledge, has the same misleading sug- 
 gestion. The phenomenon is supposed to be something 
 which ought to reveal the noumenon, but instead of so 
 doing hides and distorts it. The noumenon, on the other 
 hand, is something trying to peer through the masking 
 phenomenon, but failing in the attempt. 
 
 Now it is plain that in this sense the apparent or phe- 
 nomenal can lead to no insight whatever. The appearance, 
 as fiction and illusion, can never furnish the premises for 
 valid conclusions respecting reality. The phenomenal, as 
 masking or distorting the noumenal, can never give any 
 insight into the real. There must, then, be a truth in the 
 appearance or the phenomenon, if it is to help us to any 
 knowledge of the real. 
 
 The true order is this. The distinction between appear- 
 ance and reality exists for spontaneous thought only in the 
 form which makes appearance illusion. But as thought be- 
 comes reflective and self-conscious, we discover that some 
 elements of experience are given in sense-intuition, and that 
 others are given only in thought. The former we call ap-
 
 8 METAPHYSICS 
 
 pearances or phenomena ; the latter we call noumena, and, 
 often, reality. If the term noumenon had not acquired a 
 misleading connotation through its Kantian associations, it 
 would exactly express the antithesis. It is the thing as 
 thought, in distinction from the thing as apparent. Keality 
 is an unhappy expression for the antithesis, for it almost 
 inevitably suggests that the appearance is illusion. But 
 the apparent also is real in a way. That is, it is no illusion 
 of the individual, but is a universal or common element in 
 sense-intuition. As such it is real, in distinction from phan- 
 tasm and error. But, as being an effect of non- appearing 
 causes, it is nothing substantial and is only apparent. And 
 reality, as the antithesis of the apparent, can only mean the 
 ontological and causal ground of the apparent. As such it 
 can be reached only by thought, but the data for our in- 
 ference must always be found in the apparent. 
 
 "We may say, then, that both the phenomenal and the 
 noumenal are real, but they have not the same kind of real- 
 ity. The noumena are real as having causality and sub- 
 stantiality. The phenomena are not causal or substantial, 
 but they are real in the sense that they are no illusions of 
 the individual, but are abiding elements in our common 
 sense-experience. It is of the utmost importance for under- 
 standing the movement of thought that these two senses of 
 reality be kept distinct, and that both be distinguished from 
 illusion and error. 
 
 The beginner will get some aid to understanding by re- 
 flecting on the established doctrine concerning the sense- 
 world. There is universal agreement among both scientists 
 and philosophers that a large part of the sense-world has 
 only phenomenal existence. When we inquire into the 
 causality and ontological ground of that world, we are 
 taken behind it into a thought-world, and are told that this 
 is the truly real. But at the same time the phenomenal
 
 INTRODUCTION 9 
 
 world remains real in its way. It forms the contents of 
 our objective experience, and is the field in which we all 
 meet in mutual understanding. It expresses, then, a com- 
 mon element to all, and is no private fiction of the individual. 
 Concerning it the proper question is not, Is it real? but 
 rather, What kind of reality does it have ? 
 
 Let us, then, instead of the antithesis, appearance and 
 reality, or phenomenon and noumenon, rather adopt the 
 antithesis, phenomenal reality and causal or ontological 
 reality ; and let the task of metaphysics be conceived as an 
 attempt by a study of phenomenal reality to pass to a con- 
 sistent and adequate conception of the causal reality. When 
 we study the former we find ourselves unable to rest in it 
 as final ; and thus are compelled to pass behind the intui- 
 tions of sense to the unpicturable constructions of thought. 
 
 We begin, then, with the data of experience and the con- 
 structions of spontaneous thought, and ask what changes 
 the reflective and critical reason calls for in order to reach 
 an adequate interpretation. The philosopher has no recipe 
 for creation, and cheerfully admits that, if reality did not 
 exist, he would be sadly at a loss to produce it. Being is 
 a perpetual wonder and mystery, which our logic can never 
 deduce. We aim, then, to tell, not how being exists or is 
 made, but only how we shall think of it as it exists, or after 
 it is made. If we were trying to deduce the world from 
 the absolute stand-point, we might take the high apriori 
 road ; but as our aim is only to rationalize and comprehend 
 experience, we must begin with experience. And as our 
 most fundamental thought of reality is that it has existence, 
 we begin with an exposition and criticism of the notion of 
 being.
 
 part 1 
 ONTOLOGY
 
 CHAPTER I 
 THE NOTION OF BEING 
 
 BEING, reality, existence, are words of many meanings. 
 In their logical use they are not limited to the substantial, 
 but are affirmed of thoughts, feelings, laws, relations, as well 
 as of things. The thought we think is real, in distinction 
 from others which we do not think, or from others such 
 as contradictions which cannot be thought. So, also, we 
 speak of existing laws and relations as real, in distinction 
 from others which, as imaginary, are unreal. Thus it ap- 
 pears that there are various kinds of reality. It is impor- 
 tant to keep this fact in mind, and to remember the kind of 
 reality which is possible to any given object of thought. 
 Laws, relations, events, appearances are real, but never in 
 the sense in which things are real. The reality of a feeling 
 is in being felt, that of an event is in its occurrence, that of 
 a law is in its validity. The question which metaphysics 
 proposes is, How shall we think of the reality or being of 
 things ? The aim is not to construe or construct existence, 
 but simply to find out what we mean by it, or what con- 
 ditions a thing must satisfy in order to fill out our notion 
 of being. 
 
 And first we must guard ourselves against a logical 
 snare, the fallacy of the class term or the universal. Log- 
 ically considered, every object is a determination of the no- 
 tion of being. The category appears alike in all, and the 
 difference and determination are found in the attributes.
 
 14- METAPHYSICS 
 
 Logically, then, everything is an accident of being ; it is a 
 determination of the general notion to a particular case by 
 means of some specific mark. Hence it is easy to imagine 
 that there is some element of real being, corresponding to 
 the concept, which is common to all objects, and which, by 
 receiving particular determinations, becomes the particular 
 and specific thing. This is pure being, and, as such, is the 
 necessary presupposition of all definite and particular being. 
 The fallacy here, though palpable, has been the source of 
 a great deal of speculation. Logical manipulation has been 
 supposed to be the double of an ontological process. The 
 last abstractions of logic have been mistaken for the basal 
 forms of existence, and logical subordination has passed for 
 ontological implication. We borrow from logic a fe\v prin- 
 ciples bearing on the matter : 
 
 1. Class terms, pure being among the rest, may be valid 
 for reality, but they never can be ontological facts. Only 
 the definite and specific can be real in this sense. The con- 
 cept, conceived as existing, is absurd. 
 
 2. Logical manipulation is formal only, and does nothing 
 to the things. When we gather many individuals into a 
 common class, they remain all that they were before. No 
 identity is created and no difference is abolished. 
 
 3. In concrete and complete thinking it is impossible to 
 pass from complexity to simplicity, or from simplicity to 
 complexity, from definiteness to indefiniteness, or from in- 
 definiteness to definiteness, so long as we remain on the 
 impe^-onal plane. 
 
 These principles set the untenability of the notion of pure 
 being, conceived as something real, in a clear light. Pure 
 being is objectively nothing ; and even if it were a possible 
 existence, we could neither reach nor use it without bad 
 logic. Only the definite can exist ; and only the definite 
 can found the definite. The vast amount of speculation,
 
 THE NOTION OF BEING 15 
 
 ancient and modern, which has resulted from oversight of 
 this principle is a striking testimony to the power of the 
 fallacy of the universal. All the schemes for evolving def- 
 initeness from indefiniteness, difference from identity, heter- 
 ogeneity from homogeneity, are cases of this fallacy ; and 
 all the illustrations of the process consist in mistaking in- 
 definiteness for the senses, or with relation to our plans or 
 insight, for ontological indefiniteness in reality itself. 
 
 But this result is more negative than positive. We learn 
 that being must be conceived as something definite and 
 specific, but we have no insight into the meaning of being 
 itself. And here it may occur to us that no such insight 
 can be given. Being is a simple idea and admits of no 
 explanation. There is no other or deeper idea by which 
 to define it. 
 
 There is something in this, but it is irrelevant to our pres- 
 ent aim ; for if we allow the claim just made, there must 
 always be some mark by which we distinguish being from 
 non-being, or because of which we declare a thing to exist 
 rather than not to exist. We can form the conception of 
 many things, some of which may exist and some of which 
 may not. What, now, is that mark common to the existent 
 and absent from the non-existent? If we can discover this 
 we shall have, if not a definition of being, at least its essen- 
 tial characteristic. 
 
 At first sight this question seems to admit of a very easy 
 answer. Being is what we find given in experience, espe- 
 cially in sense - intuition. All of these things and persons 
 about us are what we mean by being. The mark of being 
 is to be found pre-eminently in sense-phenomena. The real 
 is that which can be seen and touched. But even common- 
 sense would not long be satisfied with this view, for it leads 
 straight to idealism. Common-sense holds that things exist
 
 16 METAPHYSICS 
 
 when unseen and untouched, and that many things exist 
 which can never be seen or touched. Nor would common- 
 sense be content to put the existence even of material ob- 
 jects in their permanent perceptibility by all under the 
 proper conditions. A regular and permanent possibility of 
 phenomena is not what spontaneous thought means by a 
 material object. It holds that perception recognizes rather 
 than makes things, and, hence, that their being is more than 
 their being perceived. 
 
 But this only makes it the more important to know what 
 is the distinguishing mark of being. We cannot place it 
 in the presentation, for then we become Berkeleians. The 
 essence of the presentation is to be presented. Its being 
 lies in its being perceived. In what, then, does the being 
 of the thing, which is more than perception, consist ? After 
 much casting about in thought, it appears that the dis- 
 tinctive mark of being must consist in some power of 
 action. Things, when not perceived, are still said to exist, 
 because of the belief that, though not perceived, they are 
 in interaction with one another, mutually determining and 
 determined. Real things are distinguished from things hav- 
 ing only conceptual existence by this power and fact of 
 action. When this is omitted, the things vanish into pres- 
 entations ; and unpresented things are only the ghosts of 
 possible presentations. 
 
 We reach this conclusion as the only means of saving 
 ourselves from Berkeley. We reach it equally by observing 
 the function of the notion. The phenomenal world mani- 
 fests incessant change and motion, and we posit being as its 
 explanation. We cannot rest in the thought of a groundless 
 show, and we have to pass behind these movements, these 
 entrances and exits, to their abiding ontological ground. 
 We supplement the phenomena by the notion of an agent 
 or agents which cause them. These are the true beings, the
 
 THE NOTION OF BEING 17 
 
 real grounds, in distinction from the phenomenal movement. 
 Thus it appears that we demand of being that it shall con- 
 tain in itself the ground and explanation of the apparent 
 order. "When we grasp this fact it becomes clear that being 
 must be viewed as essentially causal and active ; for any 
 other conception makes it inadequate to its function. 
 
 The formal or logical category of being may possibly 
 imply nothing beyond itself. But when we ask for the 
 metaphysical significance of the category, it turns out that 
 the notion vanishes altogether, unless it take up into itself 
 the thought of definiteness and the thought of causality. 
 Only the definite and only the active can be viewed as 
 ontologically real. 
 
 The great difficulty which common - sense will find in 
 accepting this result lies in its failure to distinguish between 
 phenomenal and ontological reality. This distinction is 
 undreamed of by spontaneous thought, and all the contents 
 of our sense-intuition are viewed as equally real, and as real 
 in the same sense. And among these contents we find a 
 great multitude of objects which are undeniably real, and 
 also undeniably inert and inactive. Neither the notion nor 
 the fact of being, then, has any necessary connection with 
 causality. 
 
 This difficulty vanishes when we~make the distinction 
 referred to. By common consent, there is a great deal in 
 the apparent world which is no ontological fact. If we 
 allow matter itself to be a true substantial existence, and 
 not merely a manifestation of some basal power, we have 
 to admit that its nature is altogether different from what 
 appears. To begin with, the reality of matter as it appears 
 is a multitude of non-appearing elements, and its inaction is 
 only in seeming. Apparent matter has no true being ; the 
 elements only truly exist. And these elements are without 
 the properties of materiality which belong to the mass, but.
 
 ^ 
 
 crv 
 
 18 METAPHYSICS 
 
 by their interactions, they found materiality. Just as the 
 elements of a chemical compound have not the properties of 
 the compound, but produce them, so the elements in general 
 have not the properties of the mass, but produce them. Xor 
 does the mass result from the simple juxtaposition of the 
 elements, as a heap of bricks results from piling single bricks 
 together, but, on the contrary, the relation of the elements 
 is purely dynamic. The solidity of the mass is not the inte- 
 gral of the solidities of the elements, but depends entirely 
 upon a certain balance of attraction and repulsion among 
 the elements. Its resistance to fracture and extension, also, 
 depends not on a rigid continuity of being, but on the attrac- 
 tions which hold the parts together. Hence we may say 
 that materiality is but the phenomenal product of a dynam- 
 ism beneath it. And in this under-realm, as physics teaches, 
 all is incessant activity. Everything stands in the most com- 
 plex relations of interaction to everything else. When this 
 fact is fairly grasped, we see that the alleged experience of 
 inactive being turns out to be only an experience of phe- 
 nomena. Of course no one denies the phenomena of rest 
 and inaction, but physics shows that they are only the phe- 
 nomenal resultants of incessant basal activities. Equilibrium 
 is balanced action. Rest is the resultant of the conspiring 
 energies of the system. This is the view towards which 
 physics tends, and any other would result in making matter 
 a pure phenomenon. Only on the dynamic theory of matter 
 can the proper existence of matter be affirmed. 
 
 But, it will be further urged, surely the law of inertia is 
 one of the best-established laws of matter. All mechanical 
 science is built upon it, and results constantly verify it. 
 This objection, also, is an unfortunate one. It rests upon 
 the etymology of the word rather than a knowledge of its 
 meaning. The doctrine has a double signification. It first 
 denies, not activity on the part of a material element, but
 
 THE NOTION OF BEING 19 
 
 only spontaneity with regard to its own space -relations. 
 An element cannot change its own space-relations without 
 the aid of some other. If at rest, it must remain at rest ; if 
 in motion, it must remain in motion, unless acted upon from 
 without. But the law does not deny that a series of ele- 
 ments may, by their mutual interactions, pass through a 
 great variety of changes. Advantage is often taken of the 
 fact that the name, matter, is one, to forget that the thing 
 is many ; and thus the conclusion is drawn that the law of 
 inertia forbids any action on the part of the elements. The 
 second factor of the doctrine is, that every material thing 
 opposes a resistance to every change of its space-relations ; 
 hence the phrase, force of inertia, which has so scandalized 
 the etymologists. In either sense, the doctrine is far enough 
 from affirming a mere passivity on the part of matter. 
 There is nothing, therefore, in our experience of matter 
 which conflicts with the doctrine that all being is active or 
 causal. 
 
 A consideration of these facts will remove much of the 
 paradox of the claim that substantial being, in distinction 
 from phenomenal being^must be viewed as causal. 
 
 We have carefully put pure being out at the door, and 
 now it threatens to come back through the window. It 
 will be said that our definition of being is not a definition, 
 but only gives a mark which being must have. But back 
 of the power by which being is distinguished from non- 
 being lies being itself, and we seek to know what this is. 
 The notion of cause admits of analysis into the ideas of be- 
 ing and power, and hence cause is the union of the two. 
 The being has the power, and the power inheres in the be- 
 ing. In reply to this objection, we admit the separation of 
 the ideas in thought, but deny that they can be separated in 
 reality. The attempt to separate them in fact leads to in- 
 soluble contradictions, and this shows that the distinction is
 
 20 METAPHYSICS 
 
 a logical one. We have, then, to discuss the metaphysical 
 meaning of inherence. 
 
 To the question, In what sense does a thing have or pos- 
 sess power ? the common answer is, that the power inheres 
 in the thing. But this merely shifts the problem, for the 
 meaning of this inherence is not clear. Uncritical thought 
 contents itself with a few sense-images, and does not pursue 
 the problem further. Spokes in a wheel, or pegs in a beam, 
 or pins in a cushion, serve to illustrate to careless thinking 
 the nature of inherence. Matter, which to the dragon's de- 
 scendants is ever the type of being, is not in itself forceful, 
 but forces inhere in it. Thereby matter becomes active, 
 and force gains an object or fulcrum, etc. These forces do 
 all that is done ; they found all change, quality, and differ- 
 ence ; but the matter is supposed to provide them a resting- 
 place. This is the current conception, and, in some of its 
 forms, it rules most of our scientific speculations. 
 
 In this view there is a division of labor in reality. There 
 is one part which simply exists and furnishes the being. It 
 does nothing but be. The activities are next supplied by 
 force or power, which finds in the^being a seat, home, ful- 
 crum, etc. We have, then, a certain core of rigid reality, 
 which exists unchanged through the changes of the thing, 
 and supplies the necessary stiffening; and around this we 
 have a varying atmosphere of activities, which are said to 
 be due to force. But it is plain that we have fallen back 
 again into the abandoned notion of pure being. The being 
 does not account for the power. It is a pure negation, and 
 is utterly worthless. The power and the being are in no re- 
 lation except that of mutual contradiction. The only pos- 
 sible reason which even thoughtlessness can urge for positing 
 such being would be, that power must have some support ; 
 but it is plain that this passive negation could not support 
 anything. The force, or power, in such a case would be
 
 THE NOTION OF BEING 21 
 
 self-supporting, and thus we should come to the doctrine 
 often held, that reality is nothing but force. The existence 
 of force would never warrant the affirmation of the force- 
 Jess, and the forceless could never be viewed as the origin 
 of force. These difficulties serve to show that the distinc- 
 tion between being and force, or power, is only logical. 
 
 The truth is, that in this separation between a tiling and 
 its power, we are the dupes of language. In order to speak 
 of anything, we must adopt the form of the judgment, and 
 put the thing as the subject and the attribute as the predi- 
 cate. In this wav language makes an unreal distinction be- 
 
 v o o 
 
 tween the thing and its attributes, and unreflecting common- 
 sense mistakes the logical distinction for a real one. Indeed, 
 language often makes a distinction between a thing and it- 
 self. Thus man is often said to have a mind or a soul. 
 Here man appears as the possessor of himself ; and it is not 
 until we ask who this possessor is, and how he possesses the 
 soul, that we become aware that language is playing a trick 
 with us, and that man does not have, but is, a soul. Things 
 as existing do not have the distinction of substance and at- 
 tribute which they have in our thought. They do not con- 
 
 v * 
 
 sist of subjects to which predicates are externally attached, 
 as if they might exist apart from the predicates, but they 
 exist only in the predicates. Thus we say that a triangle 
 has sides and angles ; but though we thus posit the triangle 
 as having the sides, etc., a moment's reflection convinces us 
 that the triangle exists only in its specific attributes. If we 
 should allow that the triangle could be separated, in reality, 
 from its attributes, we should fall into absurdity. We could 
 not tell how the triangle exists apart from attributes, nor 
 how the attributes are joined to it. Now the distinction 
 between a thing and its power is of this sort. It is perfectly 
 valid in thought, but we cannot allow it to represent a real 
 distinction in the thing without falling back into the notion
 
 22 METAPHYSICS 
 
 of pure being and its attendant difficulties. "We come, then, 
 to the conclusion that being and power are inseparable in 
 fact, and that they are simply the two factors into which the 
 indivisible reality falls for our thought. The causal reality 
 cannot be viewed as containing in itself any distinction of 
 substance and attribute, or of being and power. It must be 
 affirmed as a causal unit, and, as such, uncompounded and 
 indivisible. 
 
 In further justification of this view, we next point out 
 that the notion of power is, in every case, a pure abstrac- 
 tion, and, as such, is incapable of inherence. What sponta- 
 neous thought means by this expression is no doubt true, 
 but the meaning is incorrectly expressed. We speak of the 
 soul, or of the physical elements, as having various powers, 
 and thus the thought arises that these powers are true enti- 
 ties in the thing, which underlie all activity. Accordingly, 
 it is not the elements which attract, but the force of attrac- 
 tion. It is not the atoms which act in chemical combina- 
 tion, but affinity does the work. If a heated or an electric 
 body produces sundry effects, the body itself is not the 
 agent, but heat or electricity is called in. Thus the atom 
 appears as a bundle of forces, each of which is independent 
 of all the rest, but all of which, in some strange way, make 
 the atom their home. 
 
 Now this will never do. These separate forces are 
 only abstractions from different classes of atomic action. 
 If there be any atom, the actor in each case is the atom 
 itself, but the atom is such that its activity is not lim- 
 ited to a single direction, but falls into several classes. 
 This fact we seek to express by the notion of separate in- 
 herent forces, but these are never more than descriptions of 
 the fact mentioned. When we say that an element has a 
 power of gravity, affinity, etc., we say nothing more than 
 that the element can act in these several ways. The powers
 
 THE NOTION OF BEING 23 
 
 are not separate instruments which the thing employs, but. 
 only abstractions from the thing's action. Every act of 
 the atom, in whatever form, is to be attributed to the atom 
 itself, and not to forces in it ; and every act of the atom is 
 an act of the entire atom. Any other conception leads to 
 contradiction. And so we come to the conclusion that power 
 in general is not a thing or an instrument, but only an ab- 
 straction from the activity of some agent. Hence the ques- 
 tion. How can power inhere in being? disappears, because 
 the phrase, inherent power, represents no reality, but only an 
 abstraction. The reality is always an agent. How an agent 
 can be made, we do not claim to know ; but it is plain that 
 it is not made by joining the two abstractions of power and 
 pure being. How an agent can act is also unknown ; but it 
 is plain that we get no insight into the possibility by posit- 
 ing a rigid core of inert reality in the agent.. 
 
 Inherence, then, has no metaphysical meaning. The fact 
 is an agent, one and indivisible, and this agent is active 
 through and through. But, to explain the agency, we are 
 not content with the agent itself, but form the abstraction 
 of power, and smuggle it into the thing. When the forms 
 of agency are many, we form a corresponding number of 
 these abstractions, and give each a separate existence in the 
 thing. Then it becomes a tremendous puzzle to know how 
 these powers inhere in the thing, or how the thing can use 
 them without an additional power of using them. The puz- 
 zle is solved by the insight that these inherent powers or 
 forces are only abstractions from the activity of the one in- 
 divisible agent. The only case in which power is not such 
 an abstraction is where it is used as identical with being, 
 as when we speak of the malign, or heavenly, or invisible 
 powers. Such a use of power, instead of being, has the 
 advantage of escaping the lumpish implications of the latter 
 word ; and it might be of use in freeing ourselves from the
 
 24 METAPHYSICS 
 
 bondage of sense-experience to think always of a real thing 
 as a power. In this sense of the word, we should say that 
 all the realities of the universe are powers, and that the 
 phenomenal universe is but the manifestation of hidden 
 powers. 
 
 When we form the conception of a possible object, in 
 order to realize it, we have to use the material furnished by 
 the outer world. Then we say the thought is set in reality, 
 or is given existence. In this way, as well as by the fallacy 
 of pure being, we are led to think of a back -lying raw 
 material which is simply real, and which serves as stuff for 
 making things. A great many misread analogies of sense- 
 experience lend themselves to this confusion. Thus finally 
 we reach the notion that things exist by virtue of possess- 
 ing a bit of this reality. This is just the reverse of the fact. 
 Things do not exist by having a kernel or core of real stuff 
 in them, but they acquire a claim to be considered real 
 through the activity whereby they affirm themselves as 
 determining factors of the system. Their existence is man- 
 ifested and realized only through their activity. Being and 
 action are inseparable ; .the inactive is the non-existent. 
 
 Hereupon some logical scruples emerge. Thus, it may 
 be asked, must not being exist before action? Certainly, a 
 thing must exist in order to act, but, on this theory, it 
 must act in order to exist, which is absurd. This difficulty 
 rests upon a confusion of logical with temporal antecedence. 
 The postulate of action is an agent, but this agent is not 
 temporally antecedent to the action. Action is a dynamic 
 consequence of being, and is coexistent with it. Neither 
 can be thought without the other, and neither was before 
 the other. Being did not first exist, and then act ; neither 
 did it act before it existed; but both being and action are 
 given in indissoluble unity. Being has its existence only in 
 its action, and the action is possible only through the being.
 
 THE NOTION OF BEING 25 
 
 The common doctrine of inherence makes a kind of spatial 
 distinction between a thing and its activities ; the objection 
 we are considering seeks to make a corresponding temporal 
 distinction. Both views are alike untenable. Metaphysi- 
 cally considered, being is self-centred activity, without dis- 
 tinction of parts or dates. In our thinking, we separate the 
 agent from the agency, but, in reality, both are posited to- 
 gether; indeed, each is but the implication of the other. 
 We would not accept the scholastic doctrine, that being is 
 pure activity ; for the act cannot be conceived without the 
 agent. But we deny that the agent can, in reality, be sep- 
 arated from agency ; each exists, and is possible, only in 
 the other. 
 
 Another scruple is as follows. The idea of being admits 
 of no comparison. The mightiest exists no more than the 
 feeblest. Nothing can be more real than any other thing; 
 and, in so far as things are real, they are all on the same 
 plane. But if to be is to act, it follows that the most active 
 has the most being. This objection rests on confounding 
 the logical notion with real existence. Whatever falls into 
 a class does so by virtue of possessing a certain mark, but 
 this mark may itself vary in intensity, so that, while all the 
 members are alike in the class, they may yet fulfil the con- 
 ditions of membership more or less perfectly. Whatever 
 meets certain conditions falls under the notion of being ; 
 and, in this sense, one thing exists as much as another. 
 But this does not hinder that these conditions should be 
 fulfilled more or less extensive^ and intensively ; and, in 
 this sense, one thing may have more being than another. 
 Whatever moves at all, moves ; and yet it is allowable to 
 say that one thing has more motion than another. What- 
 ever acts, acts ; and yet some things act more intensively 
 and extensively than others, and, in this sense, they have 
 more being than others. Indeed, the only measure of being
 
 26 METAPHYSICS 
 
 is the extent and intensity of its action. Being is not meas- 
 ured by yards or bushels, but solely by its activity. All 
 that we mean by saying that the being of God is infinite, is 
 that his activity is unlimited, both in intensity and range. 
 With this understanding, the notion of the ens realissimum, 
 which many philosophers, notably Herbart, have found so 
 obnoxious, is both admissible and demanded. 
 
 In dealing with detailed objections there is always danger 
 of losing sight of the main points. To escape this, we vent- 
 ure to repeat the argument of the chapter as follows : The 
 notion of being is, in itself, purely formal, and its contents 
 need to be determined. The notion of pure being is reject- 
 ed, (1) as being only a logical concept, and, as such, incapa- 
 ble of real existence ; and, (2) as inadequate to the functions 
 it has to perform. There is no progress from it to definite 
 being, and there is no regress from definite being to it. 
 The notion of passive or inactive being is also rejected as a 
 whim of the imagination, which founds nothing, and falls 
 back into the notion of pure being. Hence, all reality must 
 be causal. But, in the popular thought, reality itself is 
 divided into two factors, being and power. This distinction 
 is only a logical one, and cannot be admitted in reality, 
 without falling back into the doctrine of pure being. Again, 
 in the popular thought, a thing exists by virtue of a certain 
 core of reality which is in it, and which supports the activi- 
 ties and attributes of the thing. We reject this core as 
 a product of sense-bondage, and as accounting for nothing, 
 if allowed. We reverse this popular view by rejecting the 
 notion of a stuff which simply exists, and furnishes things 
 with the necessary reality. For us, things do not exist be- 
 cause of a certain quantity of this reality which is in them, 
 but by virtue of their activity, whereby they appear as 
 agents in the system. How this can be is a question which
 
 THE NOTION OF BEING 27 
 
 involves the mystery of creation or the mystery of absolute 
 being; but creation is not the work of the philosopher. 
 The question we have to answer is, What things shall we 
 regard as existing ? And the answer is, Those things exist 
 which act, and not those which have a lump of being in 
 them ; for there is no fact corresponding to the latter phrase. 
 Things do not have being, but are; and from them the 
 notion of being is formed. These agents, again, have in 
 them no antithesis of passive being and active energy, but 
 are active through and through. Sense-associations and our 
 own feelings of weariness render it difficult to conceive of 
 active being without a central core of inert solidity on which 
 the productive activity may rest. But we may free our- 
 selves from this result of habit by persistently asking, (1) 
 what reason there is for positing such a core, and, (2) what 
 it could do, if posited. 
 
 This view cannot be pictured ; it must be thought. Hence 
 it will not commend itself to minds which think only in 
 sense-images. Such minds will find some relief by ponder- 
 ing on the distinction between phenomenal and ontological 
 reality, to which we have referred, and which science, as 
 well as philosophy, increasingly emphasizes. The moment 
 we grasp this distinction the view proposed becomes almost 
 self-evident, for the moment we go behind phenomena we 
 find ourselves in the presence of unwearying energy and 
 ceaseless activity. The confusion of the phenomenal and 
 the ontological realms leads to corresponding confusion in 
 our notion of being and our doctrine of predication. 
 
 We make no attempt here to draw the line between the 
 phenomenal and the ontological. We only fix the mark by 
 which the line must be drawn. Very possibly inquiry 
 would compel us to view many so-called real things as 
 phenomena ; at present we make no decision. Possibly, 
 also, we may have to transform the notion of causality, and
 
 28 METAPHYSICS 
 
 thus of reality, before we get through. But everything 
 cannot be said at once. As the outcome of the whole dis- 
 cussion, we conclude that every substantive thing, in dis- 
 tinction from both compounds and phenomena, must be 
 viewed as a definite causal agent. 
 
 The net result is not great, but it is something; at all 
 events, we are clear of the lumpish notions of being which 
 infest sense-thinking, and which are so apt to give crude 
 thought a mechanical and materialistic turn. Phenomenal 
 reality is revealed in the contents of sense - intuition ; but 
 ontological reality can be grasped only in the unpicturable 
 notions of the understanding. Its nature is a problem for 
 thought, not for sense. "We must rise from the world of 
 lumps into the world of energy.
 
 CHAPTER H 
 THE NATURE OP THINGS 
 
 IN the previous chapter we have sought to show that 
 being does not exist, but that certain specific things, or 
 agents, are the only realities. Being is only a class-notion, 
 under which things fall, not because of a piece of existence 
 in themselves, but by virtue of their activity. The conclu- 
 sion reached was, that the universal nature of being is to act. 
 But this conclusion determines the nature of things as dis- 
 tinguished from non-existence only, and not as distinguished 
 from one another, or as capable of their peculiar manifesta- 
 tions. The present chapter is devoted to a discussion of 
 nature in the latter sense. 
 
 This which we call the nature of things has been vari- 
 ously denominated as the essence, the what, or the w hat- 
 ness of things ; and all of these terms refer not to the exter- 
 nal properties of things, but to some inner principle, whereby 
 things are what they are. But, whatever the term, the idea 
 is entirely familiar to our spontaneous thinking. We be- 
 lieve that everything is what it is because of its nature, 
 and that things differ because they have different natures. 
 There is one nature of matter and another of spirit. There 
 is one nature of hydrogen and another of chlorine. But we 
 are not content with simply affirming the existence of such 
 a nature ; we also seek to know what it is. The nature of 
 a thing expresses the thing's real essence; and we hold 
 that we have no true knowledge of the thing until we
 
 30 METAPHYSICS. 
 
 grasp its nature. What is the thing? and what is its 
 nature? are identical questions. The doubt of scepticism 
 most often expresses itself by questioning whether the true 
 nature of things does not lie beyond the possibility of 
 knowledge. Such is the theory which we all spontaneously 
 form. It may be that a consideration of the problem of 
 change and becoming will compel us greatly to modify our 
 doctrine of things ; but for the present we allow that things 
 exist in the common meaning of the word, and ask how we 
 are to think of their nature or true essence. What is the 
 general form which our thought of a thing's nature must 
 take on ? 
 
 An answer results directly from the conclusions of the 
 previous chapter. We there found that activity is the 
 fundamental mark of all being. Whatever truly exists, 
 whether matter or spirit, must be viewed as essentially 
 active, and as differing, therefore, only in the form or 
 kind of activity. The so-called passive properties of things 
 all turn out, upon analysis, to depend on a dynamism be- 
 neath them, and leave us only an agent in action. But, in 
 order that being should be definite, this activity must have 
 a definite form or law. Activity in general, like being in 
 general, is impossible. It is merely the logical notion, 
 from which the specific determinations which belong to 
 every real activity" have been dropped. Now this rule or 
 law which determines the form and sequence of a thing's 
 activities, represents to our thought the nature of the 
 thing, or expresses its true essence. It is in this law that 
 the definiteness of a thing is to be found ; and it is under 
 this general form of a law determining the form and se- 
 quence of activity that we must think of the nature of the 
 thing. 
 
 But when we say that things differ only in the form or 
 kind of activity we are not to conclude that they all have
 
 THE NATURE OF THINGS 31 
 
 a common being, for this would be a return to the notion 
 of pure being. We are incessantly tempted to think of a 
 kind of raw material, which, by receiving different determi- 
 nations, becomes different things, and we must guard our- 
 selves against the seduction. Things exist only in their 
 activities, and have no being apart from them. They are, in 
 brief, concreted formulas of action. But this conclusion is 
 so remote from our ordinary modes of thinking that we 
 must, by a criticism of other conceptions, show that we are 
 shut up to it. 
 
 The first thought of common-sense in this matter is to 
 find the nature of things in their sense-qualities. Accord- 
 ingly, when we ask what a thing is in itself, common-sense 
 enumerates its sense - qualities. Vinegar is sour, aloes are 
 bitter, sugar is sweet. But a moment's reflection shows the 
 invalidity of this crude conception. To begin with, it ap- 
 plies only to sense-objects, while the notion of a nature ap- 
 plies to all being. In the next place, sense-qualities never 
 reveal what a thing is, but only how it affects us ; and now 
 we know that sense-qualities are purely phenomenal, and 
 have no likeness to anything in the thing. There is neither 
 hardness in the hard, nor sweetness in the sweet; but cer- 
 tain things, by their action on us, produce in us the sensa- 
 tions of hardness or sweetness. Again, things are in mani- 
 fold interaction with one another; and this interaction, also, 
 is an expression of their nature. This fact renders it strict- 
 ly impossible to find the nature of things in their sense- 
 qualities, or to tell what things are by enumerating their 
 sense-qualities. Things have much more to do than to ap- 
 pear to us. 
 
 Moreover, even crude common-sense finds reason in ex- 
 perience for changing its views. The same thing is found 
 to have different sense - qualities. The vinegar, which is 
 sour, is also colored, fluid, heavy, etc. But these qualities
 
 32 METAPHYSICS 
 
 are incommensurable among themselves ; so that, if one is 
 supposed to reveal the nature, the others do not, unless we 
 suppose that a thing has as many different natures as it has 
 sense-qualities. In that case, a thing with various qualities 
 would not be a unit, but a complex of things. But this 
 supposition so clearly destroys the unity of the thing that 
 it has never been held by common-sense. Thus the attempt 
 to find the nature of a thing in its sense-qualities shatters 
 on its inner contradiction. If the assumption of a thing 
 distinct from a complex of phenomena is to be maintained, 
 the nature of that thing cannot be found in any or all of 
 its sense-qualities. 
 
 This fact led speculators, at a very early date, to adopt 
 another view, according to which the thing retreats behind 
 the qualities, as their support, and the qualities appear as 
 states of the thing. The essence is no longer revealed in 
 
 yS the qualities, but is their hidden and mysterious ground. 
 The thing is no longer colored, extended, etc., but is the 
 unreachable and unsearchable essence which appears as 
 such. Thus we are on the highway to agnosticism and 
 
 I scepticism. The thing in itself has retreated from sight, 
 and reports its existence in manifestations which, after all, 
 do not manifest. And, since the manifestations are all that 
 is immediately given, there seems to be no longer any 
 ground for affirming that dark essence which can never be 
 reached. This notion of a thing with various and changing 
 states is the foundation of most of our spontaneous meta- 
 physics, and of very many of our philosophical puzzles. 
 Like the notion of inactive being with inherent forces, it is 
 an attempt to solve some of the most important problems 
 of metaphysics. The value of the solution will come up 
 for future discussion. The notion is of interest, as showing 
 that the human mind has recognized the problem and has 
 attempted a solution.
 
 THE NATURE OF THINGS 33 
 
 Two views have resulted from the need of putting being 
 back of its apparent qualities, instead of finding it in them. 
 The first is, that being, in itself, is without quality of any 
 sort ; the second is, that being has qualities, but what they 
 are is entirely unknown. The first view is our old friend, 
 pure being, back again. Being is the ground and support 
 of the definite qualities; but in itself, as the unmanifested 
 reality, it is without quality altogether. This view we have 
 sufficiently discussed in the previous chapter, when speak- 
 ing of pure being and of inherence. That which is without 
 quality of any sort can found and support nothing. The 
 formless clay, which we mould into form, is itself a perfectly 
 definite compound of definite elements, and it is suscepti- 
 ble of being moulded only because of its definite and pe- 
 culiar properties. The formless nebula, which condenses 
 into a solar system, is indefinite only in seeming. The 
 reality is a host of definite elements, with definite laws, 
 and in definite relations of interaction with one another. 
 The chemical elements have not, indeed, the qualities of 
 their compounds; but some qualities they must have to 
 make the compounds possible. Neither oxygen nor hy- 
 drogen has any of the properties of water, but both must 
 have fixed properties of their own in order to produce 
 water. 
 
 The second view has been more definitely formulated by 
 Herbart than by any other philosopher ; but the majority 
 of agnostics would accept it in one form or another. Her- 
 bart held that the nature of being is unknown, but that, 
 whatever it may be, it falls under the notion of quality. 
 There is some simple quality, x, which, if we could only 
 reach it, would fully and truly express the nature of the 
 thing. In our sense-experience we never press through to 
 the realities of things. Our experience is of compounds and 
 their qualities ; but we cannot doubt that the realities them-
 
 34 METAPHYSICS 
 
 have qualities which found those of the compounds. 
 Herbart escaped the difficulties involved in the plurality 
 and incommensurability of sense-qualities by viewing things 
 as they appear, as only complexes of phenomena, and by 
 denying plurality of qualities to the real. These conclu- 
 sions he reached by a very ingenious, but highly artificial 
 and ' unsatisfactory, theory of knowing, in which he con- 
 stantly confounds the independent something in sensation 
 with absolute being. In his theory, every real thing is 
 simple, and its true nature is expressed in some simple qual- 
 ity. This quality is not an effect, like sense-qualities, but 
 reveals the essence of the thing. How this can be we may 
 understand from the Cartesian doctrine of attributes. Ac- 
 cording to Descartes, the attribute expresses the essence, 
 
 / and tells what the thing is in itself, and apart from all 
 else. So the universal attribute of matter, and hence its 
 universal essence, is extension. The essence of mind is 
 
 & thought. Each of these attributes tells, not what its subject 
 does, but what it absolutely is. Of course, Herbart did not 
 accept these results, but he held to the notion that some 
 unknown quality exists which expresses the nature of its 
 subject as completely as Descartes thought that extension 
 expresses the essence of matter. 
 
 But, to make this doctrine clear, the meaning of quality 
 must be explained. If by quality only kind be meant, the 
 statement that the nature of everything falls under the no- 
 tion of quality is a pure tautology, for quality is taken to 
 mean nature. The word is often used in this sense. "When 
 we say that all being must have some quality, we mean only 
 that all being must have some definite nature, or be of some 
 definite kind. If this were all Herbart meant by quality, it 
 was not necessary to insist upon it, and he might have con- 
 fined himself to affirming the simplicity of being. But 
 qualities fall into two classes, those which are discerned in
 
 THE NATURE OF THINGS 35 
 
 intuition, and those which are reached by reasoning and 
 comparison. The former class comprise adjectives and the 
 abstract nouns founded upon them ; and it is this class from 
 which the notion of quality is originally obtained. There 
 is, too, a sense of reality in an intuition which no amount 
 of reasoning can ever produce ; and there is also an appa- 
 rent entrance into reality when it is revealed in our senses 
 which we never enjoy in thinking. Hence, when we allow 
 that our senses cannot attain to the true nature of reality, 
 we still cherish the hope that there may be a supersensible 
 intuition possible to other beings, and perhaps to ourselves 
 in some other life, which shall reveal things as they are. 
 In our experience of color, fragrance, and harmony, we 
 enter into their inmost nature, and are conscious that there 
 is no back-lying color or tone "in itself" which refuses to 
 come into knowledge. It never occurs to us to think of the 
 color we perceive as the hiding of another color which 
 remains forever invisible. Such spectres_haunt thought, but 
 not intuition. And so, whenever we conceive of a state in 
 which we shall know things as they are, we always retain 
 this feature of intuition in opposition to reflection. Quali- 
 ties', then, may express some possible intuition, or they may 
 express a complex of relations. Herbart seems to have un- 
 derstood them in the former sense, for in the latter they are 
 incompatible with the basal conceptions of his system. He 
 views his elemental beings as simple and unrelated. Each 
 one has a simple and self-centred existence, and hence can- 
 not have qualities implying relation and complexity. Our 
 senses do not reveal the true nature of things, but only the 
 effect upon us. We say the thing is hot or cold, sweet or 
 bitter, black or white, etc., but none of these things express 
 more than subjective effects, which are referred to some 
 objective cause. But there is some unknown sense which, 
 if we had it, would reveal the thing as it is in itself. In
 
 3t> METAPHYSICS 
 
 that case, the nature would be revealed in intuition, and 
 not in reflection. 
 
 But, however this may be, neither adjectives nor abstract 
 nouns are capable of expressing the true nature of things. 
 We have already pointed out that changeless things will 
 not account for phenomena ; and qualities, in this sense, are 
 essentially changeless. They may come and go, but their 
 content is invariable. Red may give place to black, but 
 red cannot change to black. We say that things change 
 their color, but never that one color becomes another. 
 Common-sense, therefore, has always put change in things, 
 and never in qualities. The latter never change, but are 
 exchanged. As Plato taught, things may glide from the 
 realm of one idea to that of another, but the ideas them- 
 selves are fixed in their contents and mutual relations. 
 Thus they constitute a realm apart from all change, and in 
 this realm alone could Plato find the fixedness which is de- 
 manded by knowledge. It was this constancy of the ideas 
 with which he refuted the Sophists, who sought to draw all 
 things and truths into perpetual flow. If, now, we are to 
 view the nature of things as expressed by a quality of the 
 kind in question, we must bring the thing under this notion 
 of simplicity and unchangeability, and thereby we should 
 make it incapable of explaining change, and hence inade- 
 quate to the demands upon it. We should fall back into 
 the Eleatic doctrine, which excludes all change from being, 
 or we should have to affirm a doctrine of absolute and 
 groundless becoming, and deny the existence of things 
 altogether. Both of these views will be dwelt upon in the 
 next chapter. Here we point out that no theory which ad- 
 mits the reality both of things and of change can view any 
 simple quality as expressing the nature of a thing. 
 
 This fact deserves further consideration. In a perfectly 
 changeless universe, we might think that in some change-
 
 THE NATURE OF THINGS 37 
 
 less quality we discern the true nature of things. Even 
 no\v, when some quality is always present, as the so-called 
 primary qualities of matter, we are apt to view, that quality 
 as expressing the essence. But in a changing world things 
 have a past and a future, as well as a present ; and these, 
 also, must be expressions of the nature. Yet a present qual- 
 ity, at best, only expresses what a thing now is, and not 
 what it has been or will be. Again, in a dynamic system 
 the essential thing is activity, and the law of this activity, 
 also, must be taken into account. Even the uncritical think- 
 ing of daily life recognizes that the same thing may mani- 
 fest the most different properties at different times, yet 
 without losing its identity ; and that very different things 
 may, at times, be indistinguishable by the senses, yet with- 
 out any approach to identity of nature. It may be that no 
 two things in the universe are alike in all respects, and that 
 the apparent likeness, even of the chemical elements of the 
 same class, is but a parallelism within the limits of obser- 
 vation of essentially different things. The attempt to tell 
 what a thing is by its present qualities would confound such 
 cases. It may be that common-sense is mistaken in assum- 
 ing identity under different forms, but the same common- 
 sense which affirms the notion of quality also affirms the 
 identity. We must, therefore, try to reconcile common- 
 sense with itself before declaring it mistaken. But if this 
 identity through change is to be maintained, we must, in 
 determining the nature of a thing, take into account what it 
 has been and what it will be ; just as, in an equation of a 
 curve, we must know the relations of the co-ordinates not 
 merely for one point, but for all points. Any formula 
 which fails to give this universal relation is not the true 
 equation. 
 
 If, then, some quality were present throughout the thing's 
 history, it could not be identified with the nature of the
 
 38 METAPHYSICS 
 
 thing, for the nature must account for the changing, as well 
 as the changeless, qualities. Hence, if we should view ex- 
 tension as an essential quality of matter, we could not re- 
 gard it as expressing the nature of the material elements ; 
 for they, if real, have many other qualities, which must also 
 be founded in the nature ; and, besides, extension is an 
 effect, and not a passive quality. In fact, the view we are 
 combating belongs to the pre-speculative period of thinking, 
 when being was viewed as inactive and changeless. Al- 
 though it was recognized that sense-qualities cannot reveal 
 the essential nature of the thing, still it was conceivable 
 that some occult quality might do so. But as soon as 
 being was seen to be essentially active and changing, this 
 view became untenable. On these two accounts, therefore 
 (1) the unchangeability of qualities, and (2) the necessary 
 changeability of things we deny that any simple quality 
 or combination of qualities can ever represent the nature of 
 a thing. 
 
 The outcome of the previous argument is, that no intui- 
 tion or action of the receptivity can reveal the nature of a 
 thing. This nature must forever remain supersensible, and 
 its determination must always be a problem of reason, not 
 of sense. Hence we must give up all attempts to grasp the 
 nature of reality b}^ asking how it looks. The nature can 
 never be expressed by a quality, but only by a rule or Jaw 
 according to which the thing acts and changes. And this 
 conception, in some of its aspects, is entirely familiar to our 
 daily thinking. When water appears no\v as ice and now 
 as vapor, common -sense never doubts that there is some 
 principle which determines the kind and sequence of these 
 states. Or, when an egg, under the appropriate circum- 
 stances, develops through various stages into the typical 
 form, we say that there is a la\v which determines the form
 
 THE NATURE OF THINGS 39 
 
 and sequence of this development ; and we should unhesitat- 
 ingly view the nature of the bird, not as the external 
 product, but as the law by which the development was or- 
 dered so as to reach the product. Or, when two or more 
 chemical elements enter into various chemical combinations, 
 and manifest particular properties in each, we say that the 
 nature of the elements determines the result. Again, when 
 the soul runs through various stages, and manifests various 
 forms of action, we say that the nature of the soul de- 
 termines the form and sequence of these stages. Thoughts, 
 feelings, and volitions are not lawless and unrelated, but 
 their existence and their inter-relations are determined, by 
 some one principle, which we call the nature of the soul. 
 We utter, then, no strange thought, but one in perfect ac- 
 cord with daily thinking, when we define the nature of a 1 
 f thing as that law or principle which determines the form J 
 V and character of its activity. 
 
 The objection which common-sense has to making this 
 definition universal arises from failing to distinguish phe- 
 nomenal from ontological being. Hence, we seem to have 
 abundant experience of inactive and unchanging things, 
 and, hence again, we must not look upon the nature of 
 things as a law of action. But when the distinction is 
 made the difficulty disappears. 
 
 But, it may be asked, in what are we better off than be- 
 fore ( If then we had to define a thing as that which has 
 certain properties, now we have to define it as that which 
 has a certain law, and thought is in no way advanced. So 
 far as insight into creation is concerned, this is true ; but it 
 is not true for thought. The theory which finds the essence 
 of a thing in some simple quality makes no provision for 
 activity and change ; or, if it provides for change, it makes 
 no provision for identity. That thing whose nature is 
 expressed now by one quality, and now by another and in-
 
 40 METAPHYSICS 
 
 commensurable one, has no identity with itself. The theory 
 which finds the essence of a thing in a law which governs 
 both its coexistent and its sequent manifestations does make 
 provision for activity, and, in some sense, for identity. 
 
 But how, it will be further asked, can a law be the nature 
 of a thing? A law is only a formula in thought, while a 
 thing is a reality. A quality does, at least, represent the 
 way in which a thing appears, or the way in which it affects 
 us. It stands, therefore, closer to the true nature of the 
 thing than a law, which is purely a mental product. If, 
 then, we cannot regard a quality as expressing the nature 
 of a thing, still less can we find in a law the essence which 
 we seek. A law is not, and cannot be, a thing. This ob- 
 jection would have validity against the absolute idealists of 
 the later German philosophy, who identified thought with 
 thing. If it were possible for us to get a perfect formula 
 for the nature of anything, that formula would not be the 
 nature as real, but the nature as conceived. The ineffable 
 difference between a thought and a thing would remain an 
 impassable gulf for human thought. But this is only our 
 ancient admission that we cannot make reality, nor tell how 
 it is made. Hence, whatever the nature of reality may be, 
 whether quality or law, it can appear in our minds only as 
 conceived, and never as the reality itself. And since we 
 can only think about things, not make them, the only pos- 
 sible question is, Must we think of this nature under the 
 form of a quality, or as a law or rule of action ? The at- 
 tempt to think of it as a quality fails, and we decide that 
 the form of our thought must be that of a law of activity. 
 This is the only conception which provides for change and 
 action. The further question, how a law can be set in real- 
 ity so that, from being a thought, it becomes a thing, in- 
 volves the mystery of creation, or of absolute being. We 
 do not pretend to know how being is made. We only know
 
 THE NATURE OF THINGS 41 
 
 that it is not made by taking an idea and stuffing it with a 
 formless reality. But when being is made, it is simply a 
 concrete formula of action. Care, however, must be taken 
 not to overlook the significance of the term concrete, for it 
 contains that mystery of reality which no thought can ever 
 define. 
 
 Without doubt the reader remains unsatisfied, and urges 
 that the being is deeper than the law that it has the law, 
 follows the law, realizes the law, etc. There is needed a 
 stuff, a raw material of some kind, which is to receive the 
 law and substantiate it. But this is only the old error, and 
 i: can be answered only by repeating what we have said 
 again and again. This notion has a certain warrant in our 
 own experience with the outer world. We are not creators, 
 but only users of given material. The notion has a further 
 application to all compounds. These, also, presuppose an 
 antecedent existence, from which they are compounded. 
 But when we apply the theory to a proper reality or agent, 
 we only fall back into the nothingness of pure being. Be- 
 ing could neither have, nor follow, nor realize a law, if the 
 law were not essential to the being, or if the being were 
 other than the realized law. A double temptation besets us 
 here. On the one hand, we are tempted to make the being 
 deeper than the law, and, on the other hand, we are tempted 
 to make the law deeper than the being. In both cases, we 
 mistake the separations of thought and language for separa- 
 tions in the thing. The nature is not in the thing, and the 
 thing does not have the nature. The thing itself is all ; and, 
 as it is not compounded of being and power, no more is it 
 compounded of being and nature. The fact is the unitary 
 thing, and this thing acts in certain definite ways. From 
 the fact of activity we form the notion of power. From 
 the form and sequence of the activity we form a rule, which 
 we call the law of its action. But the definite thing is the
 
 42 METAPHYSICS 
 
 only reality ; and the distinction of thing and law is in our 
 thought. Being without law is nothing; and law without 
 being is also nothing. 
 
 Manifestly this definition of the nature or the essence is 
 purely formal. It tells how we shall think, but never what 
 we shall think. To determine what the nature of any given 
 thing may be, we must fall back upon observation ; and, as 
 this can never be exhaustive, we can never be sure that we 
 have an exhaustive knowledge of anything. The manifes- 
 tations of finite things depend, also, upon their relations to 
 other things, and it is not possible to tell what new proper- 
 ties they might manifest in new relations. It is a common 
 suggestion that the nature of the soul is only faintly re- 
 vealed in consciousness as yet, and that, therefore, we are 
 the profoundest mystery to ourselves. It is often suggested, 
 likewise, that even the physical elements may have many 
 possibilities which are unsuspected. To overcome this un- 
 certainty, it would be necessary to know the purpose for 
 which the thing exists. If this were possible, we should 
 have an exhaustive knowledge of the thing, and we should 
 know that it would never pass beyond the implications of 
 the purpose. But we have no such knowledge. In our 
 experience, everything seems confined to a limited round of 
 manifestation. Things move in closed curves, and not in 
 open ones. But this may be due to the relative constancy 
 and equilibrium of the conditions in which they exist. All 
 things may be framed for some fixed altitude, and they 
 may be comprised in an upward movement. Leibnitz con- 
 ceived of all finite reality as called to endless progressive 
 development. Of course, this applies to the physical ele- 
 ments only on the supposition of their reality. But we have 
 not yet sufficiently determined the notion of being to say 
 whether the physical elements fill out the notion of being. 
 If they do, we must allow the possibility mentioned.
 
 THE NATURE OF THINGS 43 
 
 Being in distinction from non-being finds its mark in 
 causality. Tilings find the definiteness which they must 
 have in Border to exist at all in the law of this causality. 
 Differing things find the ground of their difference in the 
 different laws of the respective causalities. To know this 
 law is to know the thing in itself, or in its inmost essence. 
 The only insoluble question in such a case is how the law 
 can be set in reality or made substantial ; and this question 
 does not belong to human philosophy. It may be that 
 further study may compel us to give up things altogether 
 in distinction from phenomena ; but so long as we hold 
 them, we must view them not as picturable objects, but as 
 concrete and definite principles of action.
 
 // r. x*-- ' ^ 
 
 CHAPTER HI 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 
 
 THE notion of being has already undergone manifold 
 transformations, and the end is not yet. The most promi- 
 nent factor in the common notion of a thing has not yet 
 been mentioned. This is the element of permanence. We 
 think of a thing as active, but still more as abiding. It has 
 changing states, but nevertheless it is always equal to and 
 identical with itself. The laws of thought themselves seem 
 to demand this, for a thing is nothing for us except as it 
 comes under a fixed idea. We have now to inquire wheth- 
 er this element of permanence can be retained ; and if so, 
 how ? This introduces us to a problem of a higher order of 
 difficulty than any yet considered. 
 
 The source of our puzzles on this point is the fact of 
 change. Change is the most prominent feature of experi- 
 ence, and since we view being as the source of all outgo 
 and manifestation, we must provide for change in being. 
 I Otherwise we fall into the Eleatic conception of a rigid, 
 motionless being ; and this conception makes being inade- 
 quate to its function, and, hence, philosophically worthless. 
 But the admission that we cannot positively describe how a 
 thing is made does not allow us to form a notion of things 
 which shall contain an inner contradiction. The notion 
 that we form must be self-consistent, and must meet the de- 
 mands of thought upon it. Yet a manifest contradiction 
 seems to exist in the common notion of a changing thing.
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 4.5 
 
 This assumes not merely a change, as that A should vanish, 
 and B take its place, but that A itself changes, and yet 
 remains the same. The former conception may be illustrat- 
 ed by a change of color. In this case, one color does not 
 become another, but is replaced by another. The blue does 
 not change to black, but is displaced by black. So with 
 every change of qualities ; they are exchanged, but do not 
 themselves change. And no one would think of saying that 
 black can change to white, and still less would one think of 
 saying that, if black did change to white, it would still re- 
 main the same black. If one quality should become anoth- 
 er, it would change through and through ; and we should all 
 regard it as absurd to speak of it as remaining the same 
 quality after the change as before. But why is it any less 
 absurd to speak of a thing as changing, and yet remaining 
 the same, than it is to speak "thus of qualities ? The latter 
 we never do, but the former we all do. Plainly we have 
 here a speculative problem of the profounder sort, and we 
 must attempt its solution. Can change and identity be 
 reconciled, and if so, how ? This is the problem. 
 
 This problem is grievously complicated by the failure to 
 distinguish the several meanings of sameness or identity, 
 and by oversight of the distinction between phenomenal 
 and ontological reality. Thus, we may have logical identity, ) 
 phenomenal identity, and metaphysical identity ; and unless 
 we are on our guard it is very easy to confound them. 
 Logical identity is simply the sameness of definition. 
 Phenomenal identity is often the equivalence of appear- <^ 
 ance, and sometimes it means the continuity of equivalent 
 appearance. Metaphysical identity is quite another thing. J? 
 It applies to the reality behind the appearance. Without it 
 we lose ourselves in a groundless becoming in which phe- 
 nomena, which are phenomena of nothing, come and go 
 without any reason whatever. But how metaphysical
 
 46 METAPHYSICS 
 
 identity is to be conceived is a problem of no easy solution. 
 Possibly we shall better work our way into the problem and 
 better understand the course of spontaneous thought by 
 pursuing a somewhat roundabout method and tracing the 
 dialectic of popular thought. This seems pedagogically 
 more promising than a direct and abstract exposition. 
 
 But, before attacking the problem, we must define more 
 carefully the meaning of change. Change, in the abstract, 
 may denote any and every change, including the most law- 
 less and chaotic sequences, continuous and discontinuous. 
 In this sense, change would be simply a departure from the 
 present order in any direction whatever. But neither science 
 nor philosophy understands by change a lawless and ground- 
 less sequence ; for such a conception would make both im- 
 possible. Both assume a causal continuity between the 
 successive states of reality whereby each is founded in its 
 predecessor, and, in turn, founds its successor. Both alike 
 exclude the positivistic notion of antecedence and 1 sequence 
 as the only relation between past and future ; for this view 
 would reduce everything to an absolute and groundless be- 
 coming. In that case, the present would not be founded in 
 the past, and would not found the future. All continuity 
 would be dissolved, and ever} 7 phenomenon would be a 
 groundless and opaque fact. But even Heraclitus, who first 
 taught that all things flow, and who made becoming the 
 principle of existence, held that the preceding moments in 
 the flow condition the succeeding, and that the course of 
 the flow is subject to inexorable necessity ; something as 
 we might say that the laws of mechanics rule the ongoings 
 of the physical universe. Fixity in the flow, marking out 
 its channel and determining its bounds, was to him as prom- 
 inent a principle as the flow itself. No more does the sci- 
 entist or philosopher regard change as groundless ; it must 
 have both law and ground. Hence it is not a change of
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 47 
 
 anything into everything, but the direction of change, for 
 everything is fixed. For physics we might formulate the 
 doctrine of change as follows : A given element, A, may, 
 under the proper conditions, pass into A v A v A y etc. ; and, 
 by reversing the conditions, we may pass from A 3 back 
 to A again. Likewise another element, B, may, under the 
 proper conditions, run through the series J5 V B y B z , etc. 
 C may pass through the series C V C V C y etc. From any 
 member of the series, as a base, we can pass to any other, 
 l>v properly arranging the conditions. But, throughout 
 this process, there is nothing lawless and groundless. A 
 can pass into A l only under some definite condition, and 
 cannot pass into anything else under that condition. Hence 
 change, in its scientific and philosophic sense, implies causal 
 continuity of being, and is identical with becoming. The 
 past founded the present, and the present founds the future, 
 but everywhere there are ground and law. 
 
 The demand for permanence in being and the necessity 
 of recognizing change and providing for it in being have 
 resulted in two conceptions of the basal reality. At an early 
 date the Eleatics defined the basal principle as being, which 
 they viewed as unitary and changeless existence. They 
 thought under the law r of identity and provided for per- 
 manence. At about the same date Heraclitus defined the 
 basal principle as becoming, which he regarded as a contin- 
 uous process. He thought under the law of connection and 
 sufficient reason and provided for change. For him noth- 
 ing ever is in the sense of a fixed existence, but only in the 
 sense of a continuous becoming. The process alone abides ; 
 its phases, which we call things, are forever coming and 
 going. This view has had such influence in philosophy that 
 it deserves further exposition. 
 
 The Heraclitic conception of being as a flowing process 
 may be illustrated by the case of variable motion. In this
 
 48 METAPHYSICS 
 
 case, the moving body never has a fixed velocity for any 
 two consecutive moments, but is constantly acquiring one; 
 and we measure its velocity at any instant by the space it 
 would pass over in the next moment if its velocity should 
 instantly become uniform. Now at any indivisible instant 
 the body has a fixed velocity, but this fixed velocity is in- 
 cessantly changing to another. We might say, therefore, 
 that the velocity never is, but perpetually becomes. Again, 
 a point moving in a curve has a fixed direction for only one 
 indivisible instant that is, for no time; but we define its 
 direction to be that of the tangent-line to the curve at the 
 point, and instant, of measurement. For purposes of cal- 
 culation, we say that the point moves in a straight line for 
 an infinitesimal distance, but, in truth, the point never moves 
 in a straight line. Now, in this case, we must say that the 
 point has a fixed direction only for an indivisible instant. 
 Any direction which it may have at any instant is inces- 
 santly giving place to another. "We may say here, again, 
 that the direction of the point never is in the sense of en- 
 during, b'ut is forever becoming. 
 
 This illustrates the conception of being which rules in the 
 system of becoming. Nothing is in the sense of enduring, 
 but is always becoming. There are perpetual coming and 
 going ; and as soon as a thing is, it passes, and gives place 
 to its consequent. All being is comprised in an order of 
 antecedence and sequence ; and the antecedent must yield 
 to its consequent, which, in turn, becomes antecedent, and 
 likewise passes. There is nothing fixed but law, which de- 
 termines the order and character of the flow. Even when 
 there is seeming fixedness, as when A remains J., instead 
 of passing into A r A v A y etc., thus producing the appear- 
 ance of change even this is not to be viewed as an ex- 
 ception to the universal flow of being, but is to be regarded 
 as a continuous reproduction of A, so that the series is as
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 49 
 
 real as in the other cases ; only being of the form A, A, A, 
 there is no appearance of change. The J., in this case, is 
 like a wave where two currents meet, or like a musical note. 
 Both appear constant only because they are incessantly re- 
 produced. Or it is like the flame of a lamp when undis- 
 turbed. It seems to be a resting thing ; but it is only the 
 phenomenon of a continuous process of combustion. We 
 call it a thing, while it is really a process. In the case of 
 the changing velocities, no one of them abides ; that which 
 is permanent is the order of change itself. So, in the doc- 
 trine of becoming, the process alone is permanent. The 
 forms of the process, which we call things, are forever com- 
 ing and going. 
 
 Many have sought to find a contradiction in the notion 
 of becoming, but they fail to notice the continuity and uni- 
 versality of the process. Of course, if we affirm a perma- 
 nent and changeless substratum in being, there is no diffi- 
 culty in showing that change cannot be combined with such 
 a factor. But the disciple of Heraclitus denies the existence 
 of any such factor. For him, all is changing, except the 
 changeless laws of change. If A becomes A r the objector 
 conceives A as first ceasing to be J., and then, after a void 
 period, becoming A r Such a notion of change would, in- 
 deed, be absurd ; but the Heraclitic holds no such view. 
 He holds that A does not first cease to be A, and then be- 
 come A v but it ceases to be A in becoming A l j and it be- 
 comes A^ in ceasing to be A ; just as a body with variable 
 motion does not first lose one velocity and then acquire an- 
 other, but it loses one in acquiring another. The losing and 
 the acquiring are the same fact seen from opposite sides. 
 So, also, the ceasing of A and the becoming of A l are the 
 same fact seen from opposite sides. Seen from behind, it is 
 the ceasing of A ; seen from before, it is the becoming of 
 A y Now it is only in this sense that change implies that
 
 50 METAPHYSICS 
 
 A is both A and A l at the same time. There is no indivis- 
 ible instant in which A rests as both A and A v but one in 
 which A ceases to be A and becomes A 1 ; precisely as a 
 moving point never moves with two velocities in the same 
 direction at the same moment ; but, in an indivisible instant, 
 it ceases to move with one velocity and begins to move with 
 J/ another. But the fact that the one indivisible flow divides 
 itself for our thought into two factors a ceasing and a be- 
 coming involves no more contradiction than the fact that 
 the same curve is both concave and convex when seen from 
 opposite sides. With this understanding of the doctrine of 
 change or becoming, we return now to the problem with 
 which we started : Can change and identity be reconciled ; 
 and, if so, how ? 
 
 The Eleatics denied the possibility of reconciliation. Ei- 
 ther, they held, excludes the other; and as being was the 
 exclusive category of their system, they denied the reality 
 of change. This view has been partially reproduced in 
 modern times by Herbart. The Hegelians, also, have held 
 to the necessary contradiction between change and identity, 
 but only with the aim of illustrating their principle, that all 
 reality consists in the union of contradictions. All definite 
 existence, in their view, is formed by the union of being 
 and non-being. The solution of the difficulty furnished by 
 spontaneous and uncritical thinking consists in the notion 
 of a changeless thing with changing states or changing 
 qualities. These change, but the thing remains constant. 
 
 We have in this popular view a division of labor similar 
 to that in the popular conception of being. There we had 
 a rigid core of duration, which simply existed and supplied 
 the being. In addition to this, there was a certain set of 
 forces, in somewhat obscure relations to the being, which 
 furnished the activity. Here we have the same core of
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 51 
 
 duration, which provides for the identity, and a swarm of 
 conditions, states, and qualities, which look after the change. 
 The identity is located in the core of being, and the change 
 is attributed to the states and qualities. Without doubt, 
 the children of the dragon's teeth will find in this view the 
 final utterance of reason and an end of all discussion ; but, 
 still, we must insist that this conception of the changeless ; 
 thing with changing states is only a spontaneous hypothesis 
 of the mind, whose adequacy to the work assigned it must 
 be inquired into. 
 
 A moment's reflection serves to show the untenability of 
 this popular view. A state of a thing is not something ex-> 
 ternally attached to the thing, but is really a state of the 
 thing, and expresses what the thing is at the time. Any 
 other conception throws us back into the external concep- 
 tion of inherence, which we have rejected, and makes the 
 thing useless as an explanation of its states. For, if the 
 thing itself does not change in the changes of its states, 
 there is no reason why the states should change, or why 
 their changes should follow one direction rather than an- 
 other. The thing itself must found and determine its 
 changes, or they remain unfounded and groundless. But, 
 to do this, the thing itself must undergo an essential change; 
 for if A remain J., instead of becoming A r there is no 
 ground why any of the manifestations of A should change. 
 The external change must be viewed as the external mani- 
 festation of an internal change. A change between things 
 must depend upon a change in things. Now when we re- 
 member that the only reason for positing things is to pro- 
 vide some ground for activity and change, it is plain that 
 the changeless core is of no use, and must be dropped as 
 both useless and unprovable. It will, indeed, go very hard 
 with the dragon's children to give up this core of rigid 
 reality, but even they may free themselves from the delu-
 
 52 METAPHYSICS 
 
 sion by persistently asking themselves what proof there is 
 of such a core, and of what use it would be, if it were there. 
 There is no help for it ; if being is to explain change, change 
 must be put into being, and being must be brought into the 
 circle of change. In what sense a thing remains the same 
 we shall see hereafter; here we point out that it is impos- 
 sible to reserve any central core of being from change, but 
 sing must be viewed as changing through and through. 
 Another attempt to solve the problem differs in word 
 rather than in meaning. This theory assumes that things, 
 Y" in themselves, are changeless, but their relations change, 
 and thus there arises for us a changing appearance, which, 
 however, does not affect the underlying realities. This is 
 the common view of physicists. It resolves the phenomenal 
 world into an appearance, and places a mass of changeless 
 and invisible atoms beneath it. This, like the previous 
 view, is sufficient for practical purposes, but it is equally un- 
 tenable, for that change of relations must be accounted for. 
 If we conceive these changeless elements in a given relation, 
 A, there is no reason why they should ever pass into a new 
 relation, B. Conversely, if they do pass into the new re- 
 lation JB, this is thinkable only on the supposition of a 
 change in the activity of some or all of the elements ; and 
 this, as we have seen, implies a change in the things them- 
 selves. Without this admission the relations remain in- 
 dependent of the things, and unexplained by them. It is 
 impossible to find relief in this conception. 
 *f The same criticism applies to Herbart's notion of " acci- 
 dental views" (zufallige Ansichten). According to him, 
 the changes of things are only in appearance, and are due 
 y entirely to the changing position of the observer. Thus 
 the same line might be a side, a chord, a tangent, a sine, a 
 cosine, or a diameter, according to its relation to other lines, 
 and yet it would be the same line in all these relations.
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 53 
 
 The relations would be accidental. According to the posi- 
 tion of the observer, therefore, the same thing may appear 
 in widely different relations, yet without any change in it- 
 self. The change, then, is phenomenal and accidental, rather//^ 
 than essential. But this view, when applied to the exter- 
 nal world, is utterly incredible. It denies all change in the 
 substantial universe, and reduces the manifold changes of 
 the system to occurrences in us. But, even if this view 
 were credible, the difficulty would not be escaped, but trans-, 
 ferred. Change would be removed from the outer world to 
 the inner; but, as the knowing mind also belongs to the 
 realm of being, and is, indeed, the only being of which we 
 have immediate experience, the difficulty remains the same. 
 Apart, then, from the inherent incredibility of Herbart's 
 view, it fails to meet the purpose of its invention. The 
 same considerations apply to the proposition to view change 
 simply as a succession of phenomena, as when qualities suc- 
 ceed one another, or when images succeed one another on 
 a screen. It may be that the physical world is only a suc- 
 cession of phenomena in our minds; but that succession 
 must be caused by something and perceived by something; 
 and thus the change, which is eliminated from the phenom- 
 ena, must be found in the producing agent and in the per- 
 cipient mind. We may, then, locate the change variously, 
 but it is strictly impossible to eliminate change from being, 
 or to reserve any core in being from the cycle of change. 
 We are forced to bring the substances of the universe into 
 the stream of change, and resign them, in some sense, to 
 the eternal flow. Being is process. Things are forever pro- 
 ceeding from themselves, and, in proceeding, they become 
 something else. 
 
 But, before going further, some objections must be con- 
 sidered, which have long been struggling for utterance. It 
 will be said that, in the series A, A r A v etc., A v A v etc.,
 
 54 METAPHYSICS 
 
 are all states of A, and that A is the same throughout. 
 The answer is, that A t is no more a state of A than A is a 
 state of A v or of A v etc. Which of these forms shall be 
 taken as the base depends upon experience. When a given 
 form is familiar to us, we regard it as the thing, and other 
 possible forms as its states ; but, in truth, any one form is 
 as much the thing as any other. Thus we view water as 
 the thing, and speak of ice and vapor as states of water; 
 but, in fact, ice and vapor are no more states of water than 
 water is a state of them. But here it will be further urged 
 that, through all these states, the substance remains the 
 same. It is the same essence of being which appears now 
 as J., and now as A v etc. But we have seen, in the previous 
 chapter, that the essence itself is nothing but the concrete 
 law of action, and that there is no rigid core of being in the 
 thing. Hence the identity of a thing does not consist in a 
 changelessness of substance, but in the continuity and con- 
 stancy of this law. 
 
 In further criticism of the objection, we must ask what 
 is meant by sameness ; and, for the sake of progress, we 
 venture the following exposition : A, under the appropriate 
 circumstances, can run through the series A v A v A y etc. 
 B runs through the series B r B v B 3 , etc. C runs through 
 the series C r <? 2 , <7 3 , etc. Now, as long as we remain in 
 the physical realm, these series can be reversed by reversing 
 the conditions, so that from A n we can recover A. But, in 
 thus reversing the series, provided all the other conditions 
 remain the same, there is a complete quantitative and qual- 
 itative equivalence between the members restored in the 
 regress and the corresponding members lost in the progress; 
 that is, A m will be in all respects the same, whether reached 
 by a progress from A m _ } or by a regress from A m+l . The 
 indestructibility of matter means nothing more than the 
 possibility of working these series back and forth without
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 55 
 
 quantitative loss. When it is made to mean more, it is al- 
 ways on the strength, not of facts, but of some alleged in- 
 tuition into the nature of substance. Now the only sense 
 in which A l is the same as A, or in which the substance of 
 A l is the same as that of A, is that A l can be developed 
 from A, and, conversely, A can be developed from A r 
 There is a continuity between A, A v A v etc., which does 
 not exist between A, B, and (7, and that continuity is the 
 fact that A v A v etc., can be developed from A, and not 
 from B or C. These, in turn, can only produce B r B v 
 etc., or C r C v etc. "Without doubt, the disciple of the 
 senses will fancy that there is a core of being which holds 
 A v A v etc., together, and differentiates them from B and 
 (7; but this fancy has been sufficiently considered. Such a 
 core explains nothing to the reason, and is only an embar- 
 rassment. We repeat, then, that in impersonal ontology a 
 thing in different states is the same only in the sense of a 
 continuity of law and relation. Absolute sameness or change- 1 / 
 lessness is impossible in impersonal reality. This concep- p 
 tion of sameness is incompatible with change of any kind, 
 and must be repudiated. 
 
 But our view of change suggests another difficulty, as 
 follows : If A really becomes A r and ceases to exist as J., 
 the unity of the thing seems to disappear, and A, A v A v 
 etc.. appear as different things. This difficulty we have 
 now to consider. The charge that our view cancels the 
 unity of the thing rests upon the assumption that A is com- 
 posed of A l plus A v etc. In this case, A would not be a 
 unit, but the sum of J., plus A v etc. But this view is an 
 error. When A exists, it is simply and solely A, and A v 
 A v etc., have no existence whatever. A is strictly a unit, 
 but such a unit that, under the proper circumstances, it 
 becomes A r A r again, when it has become, is the only 
 member of the series which is real. It does not contain A
 
 56 METAPHYSICS 
 
 concealed within itself; it is purely itself. Misled by the 
 Aristotelian notions of potentiality and actuality, specula- 
 tors have largely assumed that A v A v etc., exist preformed 
 and potentially in A ; but this means only that A is such, 
 not that it will develop A V A V etc., but that it will develop 
 into them ; and when developed into them it is A no long- 
 er. In any other sense, potential existence is no existence. 
 We may say, rhetorically, that the oak exists in the acorn ; 
 but, in truth, the oak does not exist at all, but an acorn 
 exists. This acorn, however, is such that, under the proper 
 conditions, an oak will be developed. The phrase potential 
 /^/existence is due to an effort of the imagination to compre- 
 
 ' hend how one thing can develop into another; and the 
 fancy is entertained that the problem is solved if we con- 
 ceive the future development to be already concealed in 
 the present reality. But, in fact, this view denies develop- 
 
 /> ment ; for, in the case assumed, there is no development, 
 but only a letting loose of potentialities, which are also, and 
 always, realities. Where there is a true development, the 
 
 y thing developed absolutely becomes. Our doctrine of change, 
 therefore, does not conflict with the unity of the thing, for 
 the thing is never A and A^ and A 2 at the same time, but 
 only some one member of the series, and, as such, is one 
 and indivisible. 
 
 But this makes the other part of the objection still more 
 prominent. How can A, A v A v etc., be distinguished from 
 a series of different things ? They do, indeed, follow one 
 another according to a certain law, but each ceases to be 
 when its consequent begins. A l is not A, although it is 
 produced from J., no more than ice is water because it can 
 be produced from water. It is not meant that these differ- 
 ent things are externally produced, for they really proceed 
 from one another ; but when they are produced, they are 
 different things, The members of the series J., A r A v etc.,
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 57 
 
 are related as cause and effect, although, by reversing the 
 conditions, any one may be cause and any one may be effect. 
 But there is no reason for affirming any further unity in the 
 series than this ; and there is no reason for declaring that 
 they are only different states of one and the same thing. 
 One member is as much the thing as any other, and one 
 member is as much a state as any other. And, since the 
 notion of the same thing in different states is well calculated 
 to mislead us, we point out that, in a system of absolute be- 
 coming, this notion of a state is inapplicable. To warrant 
 its use, there must be some permanent factor which can 
 abide through the changes and distinguish itself from them. 
 But in this system there is no such factor. Indeed, the con- 
 scious self is the only thing we know of which is capable of 
 having states. It distinguishes itself from its affections, and 
 affirms itself as abiding through them. But, where all is 
 flow, the thing and the state vanish together; and we can- 
 not speak of the next member as a state of the preceding, 
 for the preceding member has disappeared. A permanent 
 factor of some sort is necessary, to justify the conception of 
 one thing with various states ; and thus it becomes still 
 clearer that A, A v A v etc., must be regarded as different 
 things, having no other connection than a mutual inter- 
 convertibility according to a certain law, like 'the various 
 forms of energy. 
 
 And here we must say that the conception is sufficient 
 for all purposes of science and daily life. The possibility 
 of working the series back and forth, under definite con- 
 ditions, without quantitative loss, is all that the physicist 
 needs to know. Whether it be the same substance through- 
 out the series, or substance incessantly reproducing itself 
 according to a fixed law, is quite indifferent to physical 
 science. Doubtless it would not be difficult to find some 
 one with an " intuition " of the absurdity of the latter view ;
 
 58 METAPHYSICS 
 
 but intuitions are seldom resorted to, unless argument fails. 
 Certainly no one whose opinion deserves attention will 
 claim any intuition on this point. Thus we fall back again 
 into the doctrine that all things flow. Reality is incessant- 
 ly reproducing itself, either in the form A, A, A, thus pro- 
 ducing the appearance of permanence, or in the form ^4, 
 AL, A v etc., thus producing the appearance of change ; 
 but the flow is as real in one case as in the other. Now 
 in the series A, A v A y A y etc., which is the thing ? "We 
 cannot make the thing the sum of the series, for that would 
 destroy the unity of the thing, and would imply that all 
 the members of the series co-exist. The truth is, that each 
 member is the thing, whenever that member acts, and the 
 several members are the same thing only in the sense that 
 each may be developed from the other. In any other sense 
 they are different things. Conceived ontologically, every- 
 thing changes to its centre, and, by changing, becomes 
 something else, similar or dissimilar. 
 
 The current notion of a thing, we have said, is that of a 
 changeless substance with changing states. The change- 
 lessness we have been forced to give up ; and now it seems 
 that we must abandon any ontologicai distinction between 
 the thing and its states. The same thing ontologically, it 
 would seem, cannot exist in different states, for, in taking 
 on a new state, it becomes a new thing. We may illustrate 
 this view by the conservation of energy as rhetorically mis- 
 understood. In the correlations of energy there is nothing 
 which glides unchanged from one phase to another, but 
 each phase expresses the entire energy as long as it lasts ; 
 and when it produces a new phase it vanishes into its 
 effect. Nothing is constant but law and numerical relation. 
 So a thing, viewed ontologically, is identical with its phases 
 while they last, and when it passes from one to another 
 the cause disappears in the effect. We have next to add
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 59 
 
 that this separation of phases is largely arbitrary. In the 
 series A, A v A v A 3 , etc., any one member is as much the 
 thing as any other; but these members are only arbitrary 
 units in a continuous process, like the moments into which 
 we divide time. Time is not composed of moments, but is 
 strictly continuous. So the process which we call a thing 
 is also continuous, and the sections into w r hich we divide it 
 are only products of our thought. A, A v A v A y etc., are 
 only segments of a process which appears now as one 
 member of the series, and now as another. It cannot be 
 detained as any one, and it no sooner comes than it goes. 
 Being in incessant progress, it forces itself from form to 
 form, nor tarries in one stay. This is the conception of 
 being which rules in all systems of philosophical evolution. 
 Being is perpetual process, and exists only in its incessant 
 procession. Motion and change are omnipresent. Things 
 as they appear are only stages of the eternal flow, or 
 transient eddies in the flood. The incessant weaving is 
 attended by incessant unweaving, and sooner or later all 
 things pass, except the procession of being itself. 
 
 This result is in the highest degree paradoxical, and to 
 many must seem absurd. There is no escape from it, how- 
 ever, so long as we conceive the world of things as existing 
 apart from intelligence and founding the world of change. 
 With such a view the world of substances must be brought 
 into the cycle of change and resigned to the eternal flow. 
 Spontaneous thought is very possibly right in demanding 
 permanence and identity, but it is certainly wrong in its 
 way of getting them. It is looking for them apart from 
 intelligence ; and these buffetings result. No reflection 
 upon a world of change, according to the law of the suffi- 
 cient reason, will ever find a world of changeless substances. 
 On this line there is no escape from the Heraclitic flow.
 
 60 METAPHYSICS 
 
 But the Heraclitic must not triumph. For while spon 
 taneous thought cannot find its identities in an extra-mental 
 \vorld, just as little can the doctrine of change be made in- 
 telligible without reference to an abiding intelligence. The 
 extra-mental identities are no worse off in this respect than 
 the extra-mental changes. "When all things flow and pass, 
 without permanence or identity of any sort, the Heraclitic 
 doctrine is intelligible only because it is false. If being 
 were strictly changeless the illusion of change could never 
 arise; and if all things flowed the illusion of permanence 
 would be impossible. There must be some permanent 
 factor somewhere, to make the notion possible. A flow 
 cannot exist for itself, but only for the abiding. The 
 knowledge of change depends on some fixed factor, which, 
 by its permanence, reveals the change as change. If, then, 
 all things flowed the thinking subject as well as the ob- 
 ject the doctrine itself would be logically impossible. It 
 is commonly overlooked by speculators that succession and 
 change can exist, as such, only for the abiding. Something 
 must stand apart from the flow, or endure through it, be- 
 fore change can be conceived. Hence, as a matter of theory, 
 we must have, at least, an abiding or permanent knower, to 
 make the theory intelligible ; and, as a matter of conscious- 
 ness, we have immediate experience of such a knowing sub- 
 ject the conscious self. In what this permanence consists 
 we shall see hereafter. 
 
 Thus it appears that the doctrine of the flow of being 
 must be limited by the permanence, in some sense, of the 
 mental subject. Episternology further reminds us that the 
 flow, if it is to be anything for thought, must be cast in 
 intellectual moulds. A mere flow, external to all thought 
 and expressing no thought, could be no object of cognition, 
 and would indeed be nothing for intelligence. Finally, 
 logic reminds us that formal identity or the fixity of the
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 61 
 
 idea is the absolute condition of any articulate thought 
 whatever. Hence any change which we can recognize must 
 be subject to these conditions. 
 
 With this insight it becomes plain that the question of 
 change and identity must be considered from the stand- 
 point of intelligence, if we would reach any solution. The 
 abstract identity of the Eleatics cannot be found, when we 
 look for it ; and the abstract change of the Heraclitics 
 would make thought impossible. And we must also bear 
 in mind the various sorts of identity, which common-sense 
 never distinguishes. For the entire phenomenal world, the 
 similarity and continuity of appearance are the only identity 
 we have any occasion to affirm. For the physical world, 
 the continuity of law and relation are the sufficient identity. 
 These are the only fixed elements we find, and these are all 
 we need. But for the knowability of that world it is neces- 
 sary that its successive phases shall admit of being gather- 
 ed up into a law-giving expression which shall express for 
 thought the nature of the thing. In the series A, A r A v etc., \l\ 
 no one member f ully expresses the thing, but only the whole ' 
 series and the law which unites and implies the members. 
 Such a thing, however, is absurd and impossible apart from 
 intelligence, while it is perfectly clear on the plane of in- 
 telligence. 
 
 We have here an antithesis of the real and the ideal 
 which is somewhat peculiar, and which demands a word of 
 explanation. Commonly by the real we mean the actual, 
 existing apart from the mind in space and time ; and by 
 the ideal we mean that which exists only subjectively or in 
 idea. But now it begins to appear as if the idea were 
 needed to constitute and define the real, so much so that 
 the real threatens to vanish otherwise. If we understand 
 by the real that which is in time and has its existence in 
 succession, logic shows that the real cannot be known ; for
 
 62 METAPHYSICS 
 
 if A be A only for an indivisible instant, it is not A long 
 enough for us to say anything about it, or to make it worth 
 while to say anything about it. Before we can say it is A, 
 it is no longer A, and thus eludes us altogether. 
 
 We must, then, link the successive phases together by 
 some law-giving idea before we can grasp the thing at all. 
 But this idea, on the other hand, is timeless and thus un- 
 real. Without the idea the changing thing vanishes from 
 thought altogether ; but it is not immediately clear how the 
 idea can take on the temporal form. The thing exists suc- 
 cessively ; the idea has no succession in it. We need the 
 full idea to express the existence of the thing, but the ex- 
 isting thing never expresses or realizes the full idea. Com- 
 mon-sense will not allow the idea to be real, and logic will 
 not allow the thing to be real. 
 
 There is no way out of this puzzle so long as we try to 
 define reality without reference to intelligence. The diffi- 
 culty can be removed only as we conceive the idea to be 
 realized successively, or under the temporal form; and to 
 complete the thought, we are thrown back upon the con- 
 ception of an underlying intelligence which is at once the 
 seat of the idea and the source of the realizing energy. 
 Otherwise we can only oscillate between an impossible real- 
 ism and an impossible idealism. 
 
 With this result reality and identity acquire special mean- 
 ings. The reality of the thing might mean the temporal 
 manifestation of the productive energy, or it might mean 
 the idea expressed thereby, and identity might mean the 
 continuity of the realizing process, or the oneness of the 
 underlying idea. And this is the view to which we 
 must finally come concerning the reality of all impersonal 
 things. They have their existence through an energy not 
 their own, and they have their identity solely through the 
 intellect which constitutes them identical. This will appear
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 63 
 
 more fully later on; meanwhile we get a hint of the diffi 
 culty in defining reality without reference to intelligence. 
 
 The law of the sufficient reason never brings us beyond 
 the continuous in existence. Continuity of some kind is 
 necessary to escape the groundless becoming and the disso- 
 lution of both reason and existence. But this continuity in 
 itself makes no provision for knowledge. Something truly 
 abiding must be found, if we are to escape the eternal flow. 
 And fortunately this something is revealed in experience. 
 In personality, or in the self-conscious spirit, we find the 
 only union of change and permanence, or of identity and 
 diversity. The soul knows itself to be the same, and dis- 
 tinguishes itself from its states as their permanent subject. 
 This permanence, however, does not consist in any rigid 
 sameness of being, but in thought, memory, and self-con- 
 sciousness, whereby alone we constitute ourselves abiding 
 persons. How this is possible there is no telling; but we 
 get no insight into its possibility by affirming a rigid du- 
 ration of some substance in the soul. The soul, as sub- 
 stance, forever changes ; and, unlike what we assume of the 
 physical elements, its series of changes can be reversed only 
 to a slight extent. The soul develops, but it never un- 
 develops into its former state. Each new experience leaves 
 the soul other than it was ; but, as it advances from stage 
 to stage, it is able to gather up its past and carry it with it, 
 so that, at any point, it possesses all that it has been. It is 
 this fact only which constitutes the permanence and identity 
 of self. 
 
 Here it will be urged that this view is only another form 
 of Locke's theory, which made identity to consist in memo- 
 ry ; and as Locke's view was exploded, even in his own gen- 
 eration, our view may be regarded as demolished in ad- 
 vance. The objection to Locke's view is that memory does
 
 64 METAPHYSICS 
 
 not make, but reveals, identity; and, if Locke denied the 
 continuity of being in the sense in which we have explained 
 it, the objection is fatal. Memory does not make, but re- 
 veals the fact that our being is continuous. If our being 
 were discontinuous, or if we were numerically distinct from 
 ourselves at an earlier date, memory would be impossible. 
 But we have seen that continuity is not identity. It is itself 
 a flow, and means only that the being which now is has 
 been developed from the being which was. This is all that 
 is commonly meant by identity. But the question we raise 
 is how to bring a fixed factor into this flow, and thus raise 
 continuity to proper identit}^ or sameness. And this ep" be 
 done only as the agent himself does it ; and the agent does 
 it only by memory and self-consciousness, whereby a fixed 
 point of personality is secured, and the past and present are 
 bound together in the unity of one consciousness. The per- 
 manence and identity, therefore, are products of the agent's 
 own activity. We become the same by making ourselves 
 such. Numerical identity may be possible on the imper- 
 sonal plane; but proper identity is impossible, except in 
 consciousness. And that numerical identity is never for the 
 thing itself, but only for the conscious observer. 
 
 At first view this position is an extravagant and even 
 absurd paradox; but we must remember that the soul, as 
 substance, oomes under the perpetual flow. We are not 
 conscious of a permanent substance, but of a permanent 
 self ; and this permanence is not revealed, but constituted 
 by memory and self-consciousness ; for, if we abolish them, 
 and allow the soul to sink to the level of an impersonal 
 thing, identity is degraded into continuity, and permanence 
 passes into flow. Consciousness, then, does not simply re- 
 veal permanence in change ; it is the only basis of perma- 
 nence in change. Of course, we do not pretend to tell how 
 personality is made ; we leave that for the disciple of the
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 65 
 
 senses. He finds no difficulty in manufacturing a person 
 by simply providing a lump of rigid substance, and then 
 stocking it with divers faculties. But, while nothing can 
 exceed the cheerfulness with which we admit that we can- 
 not construe the possibility of personality, nothing, also, can 
 exceed the stubbornness with which we deny that the rigid 
 substance furnishes the least insight into the possibility. 
 If, then, the idea of being must include permanence as well 
 as activity, we must say that only the personal truly is. 
 All else is flow and process. 
 
 These results are so paradoxical, and so easily misunder- 
 stood, that a final caution must be added. In general, com- 
 mon-sense understands by identity merely numerical identity, 
 or continuity of being. In this sense we, also, affirm iden- 
 tity, and agree entirely with spontaneous thought. But the 
 question we raise lies inside of this numerical identity. The 
 thing which is thus numerically identical and continuous is 
 itself discovered to be a flowing principle of action ; and 
 here our break with the current view begins. Common- 
 sense aims to secure identity in diversity by the doctrine of 
 a permanent or changeless thing with changing states ; and 
 this view we have been forced to reject. Change penetrates 
 to the centre of the thing; the only thing which is per- 
 manent is the law of change, and even this is largely a logi- 
 cal permanence. Reality, then, is process, and yet not a proc- 
 ess in which nothing proceeds ; for being itself proceeds, 
 and, by proceeding, incessantly passes into new forms, and 
 changes through and through. If, by being, we mean some- 
 thing which unites identity and diversity, we must say that 
 the personal only is able to fill out the notion of a thing. 
 
 Logic shows that thought can deal with the temporal 
 only as it brings it under a timeless idea; and when we 
 inquire how the timeless idea can be set in reality we find 
 only one way. An active intelligence must realize the idea
 
 66 METAPHYSICS 
 
 under the temporal form. But when we seek to under- 
 stand intelligence itself we find that intelligence cannot be 
 understood through its own categories, but rather, con- 
 versely, the categories must be understood through our ex- 
 perience of intelligence itself. Apart from this they are 
 purely formal, or else mere shadows of living experience. 
 Only in the unity of consciousness can the category of 
 unity be realized. In the consciousness of self as identical 
 throughout change we have the only example of identity 
 in change. The conception of a permanent thing with 
 changing states is founded as conception, as well as real- 
 ized in being, in the fact of the conscious self. Apart from 
 this personal reference, the categories defy all attempts to 
 give them any metaphysical significance. The formal iden- 
 tities of logic are intelligible on their own plane ; but the 
 metaphysical identities of things are simply shadows of self- 
 identifying intelligence. Instead, then, of interpreting per- 
 sonality from the side of ontology, we must rather interpret 
 ontology from the side of personality. Only personality is 
 able to give concrete meaning to those ontological cate- 
 gories by which we seek to interpret being. Only person- 
 ality is able to reconcile the Eleatic and Heraclitic phi- 
 losophies, for only the personal can combine change and 
 identity, or flow and permanence. The impersonal abides 
 in perpetual process. It may hereafter appear that the im- 
 personal is only a flowing form of activity, to which, because 
 of its constancy, we attribute thinghood, but which is, in 
 reality, only a form of the activity of something deeper 
 than itself. If this should be the case, the conclusion would 
 be that the absolute person, not the absolute being, is the 
 basal fact of existence. 
 
 Here we rest the case at present. The question cannot 
 be finally dismissed until the nature of time has been con- 
 sidered. Meanwhile we see that we must have identity and
 
 CHANGE AND IDENTITY 67 
 
 tve must recognize change; and we also see that the two 
 can never be reconciled on the impersonal plane. As ab- 
 stract principles, change and identity are in mutual contra- 
 diction, and they remain so until they are carried up to the 
 plane of self-conscious thought, and are interpreted not as 
 abstract conceptions, but as concrete manifestations of the 
 living intelligence whicn is tne source and reconciliation of 
 both.
 
 CAUSALITY 
 
 WE have already seen how the conception of the cate- 
 gories in popular thought is confused by the failure to dis- 
 tinguish the phenomenal from the ontological order. The 
 same fact finds further illustration in the case of causality. 
 The popular conception of this category is in the highest 
 degree confused. Minds on the sense plane are prone to con- 
 ceive efficiency itself in a mechanical and materialistic fash- 
 ion ; and, owing to the confusion just referred to, efficient 
 causes and phenomenal conditions are inextricably mingled. 
 The only thing clear is that causality must be affirmed ; 
 but the form under which it is to be conceived, and the 
 place of its location, are left very indefinite. Very much 
 of our metaphysics on this subject has been built up under 
 
 y^the influence of our sense thinking; and for such thinking 
 it is always doubtful if anything exists which cannot be 
 sensuously presented. The first step out of this confusion 
 consists in emphasizing the distinction between causality in 
 the inductive .sense and causality as metaphysical efficiency. 
 As a matter of fact, we find that events occur under 
 certain conditions. When the conditions are fulfilled, the 
 
 V event appears. We may call the total group of conditions 
 the cause, and, upon occasion, we may call any one of the 
 conditions the cause. The complete cause, and the only 
 adequate cause, is the whole group; nevertheless, if the 
 group were given with the exception of one member, we
 
 CAUSALITY 09 
 
 should call that member the cause of the event which would 
 follow its addition to the group. Any event with complex 
 antecedents would have only one adequate cause, but it 
 might also be said to have as many causes as antecedents, 
 for any one of these might, upon occasion, complete the 
 group, and thus be viewed as the cause. This is causality 
 in the inductive sense ; it has nothing to do with efficiency, 
 but only with the order in which events occur. 
 
 Tli at the study of this order is of the utmost practical 
 importance is plain upon inspection. The chief part of 
 practical wisdom lies in a knowledge of it. The study 
 must be pursued inductively and not speculatively. It can 
 be prosecuted on any theory of metaphysics, and need not 
 concern itself except in the most general way about meta- 
 physics at all. It is to be regretted, however, that the 
 name of causation should be given to these phenomenal re- 
 lations. It is not necessary ; for nothing is in question but 
 the empirical conditions under which events occur. And 
 it is misleading: for no one has yet succeeded in talking 
 long about inductive causation without dropping into met- 
 aphysics; while a large number of those who thus talk 
 have simply caught the phrase without understanding it. 
 Striking illustration is found in the case of those psycholo- 
 gists who set out to investigate inductively the interaction 
 of mind and body, and who fail to perceive that, inductive- 
 ly, the causality is mutual. Physical states condition men- 
 tal states no more certainly than mental states condition 
 physical states. Both alike, then, are causes in the induc- 
 tive sense. But the investigators soon let it appear that 
 they have some other conception of causation in mind. 
 Accordingly they allow mental states to attend physical 
 states, but they will not hear of their conditioning them. 
 This uncertainty shows that it is possible to learn a phrase 
 without mastering the corresponding idea.
 
 70 METAPHYSICS 
 
 But whatever we call it, it is clear that the inductive in- 
 quiry should be distinguished from the metaphysical. The 
 phenomenal conditions under which events occur are quite 
 distinct from the metaphysical agency by which they are 
 brought about; and they may be studied by themselves. 
 By insisting on this distinction we make a field for induc- 
 tive study unembarrassed by metaphysical scruples ; and we 
 also rescue the metaphysical problem from the confusion 
 which results from confounding the phenomenal and the 
 ontological points of view. 
 
 Causality, then, in the sense of productive efficiency or 
 dynamic determination, is the subject of the present dis- 
 cussion. As formal category the idea is simple and admits 
 of no definition, but this by no means decides the form in 
 which the concrete category must be conceived. We are, 
 indeed, commanded to look for a causal ground for events ; 
 but it might turn out upon inquiry that that ground must 
 be conceived under a volitional form. It might also appear 
 that such phrases as physical, mechanical, material causa- 
 tion are only crude and untenable applications of the causal 
 idea, which vanish before critical reflection, as either empty 
 or inconsistent. 
 
 In popular thought causation manifests itself in three 
 great forms, the interaction of things, the determination of 
 consequents by their antecedents, and in volitional self- 
 y determination. "We examine these in their order. 
 
 Owing to the form of our sense - experience common- 
 sense never doubts that we are surrounded by a great 
 multitude of mutually independent things, each of which 
 might well continue to exist if all the rest should fall away. 
 Each has its being in itself and has its own hard-and-fast 
 self -identity and individuality. " But common-sense is not 
 long in observing that these things are comprised in an
 
 CAUSALITY 71 
 
 order of mutual change and concomitant variation. This 
 fact, together with the systematic tendency even of spon- 
 taneous thought, soon leads to the conviction that things 
 also form a system, and that the place and functions of 
 the individual are determined by its relations to the whole. 
 But how can things which are mutually so independent 
 and indifferent in their being be brought into any system- 
 atic connection ? According to common-sense, this is done 
 by interaction. Things are endowed with forces whereby 
 they mutually determine one another, and thus the system 
 of things is founded. In estimating this view we must 
 consider, first, the logical presupposition of any system ; / 
 secondly, the given facts of experience ; and, thirdly, the 
 nature of interaction itself. 
 
 In order that any system whatever shall exist for thought, 
 its members must admit of being brought into relations 
 of likeness and difference under the various categories of 
 thought, and of being united into a logical whole. This 
 implies a complex system of logical relations among the 
 members, and a mutual logical dependence. Hence, what- 
 ever the dynamical relations of the members may be, or 
 however those relations may be founded, an amenability to 
 thought and to thought laws is implicit in the conception 
 of an intelligible system. For spontaneous thought there 
 is no mystery or wonder here, for the knowability of things 
 is a matter of course. Reflection, however, .shows that this 
 knowability is one of the greatest wonders of existence, and 
 that it has complex and far-reaching implications. 
 
 Again, a real system, in order to be anything for us, 
 must be a system of law, so that definite antecedents shall 
 have the same definite consequents; and this in turn de- 
 mands an exact adjustment or correspondence of all the 
 interacting members to all the rest. Otherwise, anything 
 might be followed by everything or by nothing. The whole 
 
 i A 
 Tl ^
 
 72 METAPHYSICS 
 
 system of law upon which science builds is but the ex- 
 pression of this metaphysical adjustment or correspond- 
 ence. How this correspondence is secured is an obscure 
 enough problem, but the fact must be affirmed in any case 
 as a postulate of all objective science. Every scientific 
 conception of the causality of the system assumes that sim- 
 'ilar causes must have similar effects, and that there is some 
 ixed quantitative and qualitative relation between the cause 
 and the effect. Tinder given conditions there can be only 
 one result. To any given action every other element must 
 
 ^.correspond with a fixed reaction. But if this is to be the 
 case, then everything must be adjusted to every other in an 
 exact and all-embracing harmony. 
 
 But this general commensurability and adjustedness of 
 tilings, while a pre-condition of system, founds none. It 
 determines the possibility of combination rather than its 
 actuality. In the case of a conceptual system, two things 
 are necessary : first, the commensurability of the contents 
 
 ,. ) of the conceptions themselves ; and, secondly, the unity of 
 ^the thinking mind. The mind must comprise the many 
 conceptions in the unity of one consciousness, must distin- 
 guish, compare, and relate them, and thus unite them into 
 one systematic whole. The unity of the thinker is the su- 
 preme condition of the existence of any conceptual s} T stem. 
 But in popular thought things are not in our minds, nor, 
 for that matter, in any mind. They do not form a concept- 
 ual system, but a real system apart from all mind. And 
 thus it becomes a problem to know what it is in the real 
 system which takes the place of the unitary thinker in the 
 conceptual system, and makes the concrete system possible. 
 If we confine ourselves to the hard-and-fast individuals of 
 popular thought, we reach no system, but only an aggregate, 
 and even this exists only for the observer. If the real sys- 
 tem were founded and maintained by a supreme thinker,
 
 CAUSALITY 73 
 
 we should have the necessary bond, and one analogous to 
 the bond which \ve have in the case of the conceptual sys- 
 tem. But this view is altogether too airy for common- 
 sense. The true systematic bond of things is the fact of 
 interaction. 
 
 The fact itself is, for spontaneous thought, beyond all 
 question clear; but the clearness is illusory. It arises from 
 the superficiality of sense-thinking and the confusion of the 
 phenomenal and the metaphysical points of view. For un- 
 tutored thought things are undeniably given as separate 
 individuals in space; and all the reality there is is there in 
 plain sight. By and by an order of mutual change and 
 concomitant variation is discovered, and this awakens the 
 demand for causation ; and as there is nothing in sight to 
 play the part of cause but the things of sense-perception, 
 very naturally they are intrusted with the role. And all of 
 this is formally correct. There is a demand for causation, 
 and spontaneous thought affirms it. The mutual changes 
 among things demand a causal explanation; and spontane- 
 ous thought finds it in their interaction. But the critical 
 doubt concerns not the reality of causation in the case, but 
 its form and location. It may be that the physical is only 
 phenomenal, and that its causality is not within it, but be- 
 hind or beneath it. Common-sense is quite right in demand- 
 ing a causal ground for the reciprocal changes of things, but 
 one may still doubt whether its theory of that ground be 
 correct. 
 
 And this brings us to the second point mentioned some 
 pages back, the facts of experience in what we call inter- 
 action. The fact is that we have no proper experience of 
 interaction whatever. It may be thought that, in the case 
 of volition producing physical motion, we have immediate 
 experience of interaction between the soul and body ; but 
 this is a mistake. All we experience is that, upon occasion
 
 74 METAPHYSICS 
 
 of a specific volition, certain physical changes occur, but 
 of the nature of the connection we know strictly nothing. 
 To be sure, the physical state does not enter, except as a 
 sequence upon the mental state ; but why the one should be 
 followed by the other, or what the nature of the bond may 
 be, is as unknown as in the case of gravitation. We are 
 often misled, at this point, by our sense -experience. We 
 imagine that we feel our own power flowing over upon the 
 body and controlling it. A certain sense of effort mani- 
 fests itself, and we seem so to permeate the body that our 
 own spiritual force comes in contact with the reality. But 
 the sense of tension and effort in the muscles, in such cases, 
 is but the reaction of the organism against the volition, and 
 has merely the function of teaching us how to measure our 
 activity. In itself, the will is as boundless and as passion- 
 less as the conception, and when the limits of physical pos- 
 sibility are reached it is not the will which has failed, but 
 the machine. That in the physical world we have experi- 
 ence only of mutual change or of antecedence and sequence 
 is too plain to need more than mention. Interaction, then, 
 is a thought problem rather than a datum of experience. 
 
 We come now to consider the various conceptions of in- 
 teraction with the aim of showing that this which we call 
 interaction is not something which takes place between 
 things as independent agents, but rather something which 
 takes place in things as dependent on one fundamental 
 reality. How, then, can things, conceived as mutually 
 independent, interact that is, mutually determine one an- 
 other? 
 
 The answers given to this question by popular thought 
 are such only in appearance. For instance, it is said that 
 a thing transfers its state or condition to the thing acted 
 upon, and this transference is the act. But this notion is
 
 CAUSALITY 75 
 
 due to hopeless bondage to the senses. It is simply one of 
 the spontaneous hypotheses of common-sense, and gives a 
 little comfort to the imagination. Action is conceived as 
 a thing which may be passed along from one to another. 
 But when this view is taken in earnest it meets at once the 
 fatal objection that states, conditions, and attributes are 
 nothing apart from a subject. As such, they admit of no 
 transference. The adjective is meaningless and impossible 
 without the noun. The facts which have led to this notion 
 of transference of conditions are chiefly those of transmitted 
 heat and motion. Here we see effects which may well 
 enough be described as the transference of a condition. 
 The moving body puts another body in motion, and loses 
 its own. The heated body warms another, and cools itself 
 in the same proportion. The magnet brings another body 
 into the magnetic state, and seems to have forced its own 
 condition upon it. These are facts for interpretation. Spon- 
 taneous thought says that the agent, in such a case, trans- 
 fers its condition ; but this is only a description, not an ex- 
 planation. Indeed, it is inexact, even as a description ; for 
 what we really see is propagation, not transmission or trans- 
 ference. A condition cannot be transmitted or transferred, 
 because the notion of a state or condition without a subject 
 is impossible in thought. The fact is, that the moving, or 
 heated, or magnetic body, in some totally mysterious way, 
 propagates its state. Of the inner nature of the process we 
 know nothing, and the pretended explanation is only an in- 
 different description. Even in cases of impact the process 
 is equally mysterious. We see the result, and fancy we 
 understand the method ; but there is nothing whatever in 
 spatial contact to explain the results of impact, unless there 
 be a deeper metaphysical relation between the bodies, which 
 generates repulsion between them. Added to these con- 
 siderations is the further fact that interaction does not
 
 76 METAPHYSICS 
 
 that the effect shall be like the cause ; and, in the 
 mass of interaction, the effect is totally unlike the cause. 
 A new condition is produced in the thing acted upon, but 
 one quite unlike that of the agent itself. 
 
 Empty as this view of the transference of conditions 
 seems, when looked at closely, it has still had a great in- 
 fluence in speculation. The famous phrase " Only like can 
 affect like" is the same view in another form. This pre- 
 tended principle has found its chief application in discuss- 
 ing the interaction of soul and body, and both idealistic and 
 materialistic conclusions have been based upon it. If one 
 started with the reality of the body, the soul was degraded 
 to material existence. If the soul was made the starting- 
 point, of course it was impossible to reach a real body ex- 
 cept by an act of faith. Hence, also, the occasionalism of 
 the Cartesians and Malebranche's theory of the vision of 
 all things in God. Now this maxim, that like affects only 
 , like, is mainly based upon the notion that in interaction 
 / something leaves the agent and passes into the patient. On 
 this assumption we see the necessity of the maxim; for 
 how could a material state pass into a spiritual being ? and 
 how could a spiritual state pass into a material thing ? The 
 spiritual state must partake of the nature of spirit, and the 
 material state must partake of the nature of matter. The 
 wo, then, must be incongruous. Hence, it was concluded 
 that body and soul could not affect each other. No more 
 could any two things affect each other, so far as they were 
 unlike. The only truth in this doctrine is that things to- 
 ^ tally and essentially unrelated can never pass into relations 
 | of interaction, and, hence, that all true being must consti- 
 tute a series, without any absolute oppositions. The real 
 difficulty is, not to know how like can affect unlike, but how 
 any two things can affect each other. Why should the 
 state of one thing determine the state of another ? 
 
 f 
 
 \/t\
 
 CAUSALITY 77 
 
 Another verbal explanation of the problem is found in 
 the notion of a passing influence which, by passing, affects 
 the object. But the same objection lies against this view 
 as against the preceding. If, by influence, we mean only 
 an effect, we have merely renamed the problem ; but, if 
 we mean anything more, we make the influence a thing; 
 and then we must tell, (1) what the thing is which passes; 
 (2) in what this passing thing differs from the things be- 
 tween which it passes; (3) what the relation of the passing 
 thing is to the thing from which it passes; (4) where the 
 acting thing gets the store of things which it emits ; and, 
 (5) how the passing thing could do any more than the orig- 
 inal thing from which it proceeds. An attempt to answer 
 these questions will convince one of the purely verbal char- 
 acter of this explanation by passing influences. The great 
 difficulty with many speculators is to conceive how a thing 
 can act across empty space ; and hence they think, if some- 
 thing would go across the void, and lie alongside of the 
 thing to be acted upon, all difficulty would vanish. They 
 make action at a distance the real puzzle in interaction. 
 But, to reason, the difficulty is, not to act across empty 
 space, but to act across individuality. If we conceive two 
 things, viewed as independent and self-centred, occupying 
 even the same point of space, we have not advanced a step 
 towards comprehending why they should not remain as in- 
 different as ever. Contiguity in space helps the imagina- 
 tion, but not the understanding. It is plain that this notion 
 of a passing influence is a mere makeshift of the imagina- 
 tion, which gives no light when taken in earnest. 
 
 Akin to this view is that current among physicists, ac- 
 cording to which forces play between things and produce 
 effects. But this view also is a device of the imagination, 
 and solves nothing. The fact to be explained, when re- 
 duced to its lowest terms, is this : "When A changes, B, C,
 
 78 METAPHYSICS 
 
 D, etc., all change, in definite order and degree. To ex- 
 plain this fact, it is said that forces play between A, B, C\ 
 etc. But here, as in the case of the influence-theory, the 
 force must be either a mere name for a form of activity, or 
 it must be a thing, and either alternative is inadmissible. 
 If force be a mere name, it explains nothing ; and, if it be 
 a thing, it leaves the problem darker than before. All the 
 questions asked about the influence would arise about the 
 force. Thus our difficulties are increased, and no insight is 
 gained. Besides, we have seen that force is only an ab- 
 straction from the forms of a thing's activity. Things do 
 not act because they have forces ; but they act, and from 
 this- activity the mind forms the abstraction of force. To 
 say that things are held together by their attractions is only 
 to describe the fact. The attractions are nothing between 
 the things, like subtle cords, which bind them together. 
 They are merely abstractions from the fact that coexistent 
 material things, in certain conditions, tend towards one an- 
 other. They do not give the slightest insight into the fact 
 or its possibility. 
 
 Again, things are often said to have spheres of force 
 about them ; but this, too, is only a description of facts. 
 The sole reality is things, and between and beyond them 
 is nothing ; but these things are not mutually indifferent, 
 but are implicated in one another's changes. This relation 
 may be illustrated as follows : If we conceive a perfectly 
 elastic system in equilibrium, any permanent displacement 
 of any part would demand a readjustment of all the other 
 parts, in order to restore equilibrium. Thus, a change in 
 any part would involve a change in all parts. The actual 
 S} r stem implies a like community of being. The position 
 and condition of each have a significance for the whole, and 
 for any change in any one part there is a corresponding 
 change in all the rest. But how can independent things
 
 CAUSALITY 79 
 
 stand in such relations of community and interaction ? The 
 scientific doctrine of forces which play between things 
 merely describes the fact itself ; taken as an explanation, it 
 is grotesquely untenable. Indeed, the admission that these 
 go-between forces are only abstractions from the fact to be 
 explained reduces the physical theory to the harmony of 
 Leibnitz. Each thing is supposed to be individual, and it 
 gives and receives nothing. Things move in parallel lines, 
 and that is all. But this is essentially Leibnitz's theory. 
 The physical theorists have long been oscillating confusedly 
 between this view and some monistic conception of causa- 
 tion. 
 
 The traditional notions of interaction thus appear in their 
 superficiality and untenability. They derive all their force 
 from the conviction that there must be causality some- 
 where, added to the naive assumption of sense-thought that 
 the objects of perception are true ontological beings, and 
 that they are the only realities in the neighborhood. Mean- 
 while the laws of the reciprocal changes of things may be 
 called their interaction, and the inductive study of these 
 laws is confounded with the metaphysical problem. 
 
 This brings us to consider the notion of interaction itself, 
 and to point out the contradiction which lies in the neces- 
 sary interaction of mutually independent things. 
 
 Resuming the thought of a previous paragraph, we point 
 out once more the exact adjustment of every member of an 
 interacting system to every other, so far as interacting. In 
 such a system every member must do what it does, because 
 every other member does what it does. The causality of 
 each is relative to the causality of all. The formula for 
 the activity of any one must be given in terms of the activi- 
 ties of all the rest. But this implies that the being of each 
 is relative to the being of all, for the being itself is irapli-
 
 80 METAPHYSICS 
 
 cated in the activity. We have before seen that there is no 
 lump or core of being in a thing to which the activities are 
 externally attached, or into which they are thrust. Hence, 
 in addition to saying that things do what they do because 
 other things do what they do, we must say that things are 
 what they are because other things are what they are. Both 
 the being and the activity are implicated in the relation ; 
 and it would be impossible to define the being except in 
 terms of the relation. Such being is necessarily relative. 
 It does not contain the ground of its determinations in itself 
 alone, but also in others. And this must be the case with 
 all things which are included in a scheme of necessary in- 
 teraction. 
 
 And thus the contradiction in the notion of the neces- 
 sary interaction of mutually independent things is placed in 
 a clear light. By definition, the independent must contain 
 the ground of all its determinations in itself, and, by anal- 
 ysis, it is plain that whatever is subject to a necessary in- 
 teraction must have the grounds of its determinations in 
 others as well as in itself. The two conceptions will not 
 combine. Every attempt to bridge the chasm between in- 
 dependent things by some passage of forces, or influences, 
 results in a purely verbal explanation which leaves the 
 essential contradiction untouched. 
 
 If, then, A, B, C, Z>, etc., are assumed ontological units 
 which are comprised in an order of necessary interaction, 
 we cannot allow that they are either absolutely or mutually 
 independent. They exist only in relation to one another 
 within the system. What, then, is independent? A de- 
 pendent which depends on nothing is a contradiction ; and 
 equally so is an independent made up of a sum of depen- 
 dents. If A, B, C, and D are severally dependent, then 
 A + B + C+ D are likewise dependent. There is nothing 
 in the sign of addition which is able to transform depen-
 
 CAUSALITY 81 
 
 dence into independence. A first thought would likely be 
 that the system itself is independent, and that the members 
 depend on it ; but this is only a logical illusion, so long as 
 A,B, C, D, etc., are supposed to be the only true existences. 
 In that case the system would be only a sum, or conceptual 
 product, and would be ontologically nothing. And such it 
 would remain unless we reversed the order, and instead of 
 trying to construct the system from A, B, C, etc., as true 
 units of being, rather regarded the system itself as the true 
 existence, and A, 5, (7, etc., as its dependent implications. 
 The self-centred, the true ontological fact would be the sys- 
 tem, and all else would depend upon it. But system is not 
 a good term for this conception. The idea is that of a basal 
 reality which alone is self-existent, and in which all other 
 things have their being. 
 
 The reciprocal changes of phenomena are the fact of 
 experience ; or, if we regard these phenomena as things, 
 then the reciprocal changes of things are the fact of experi- 
 ence. The explanation of these changes is a speculative 
 problem, whose solution is not immediately obvious. But 
 one thing is clear. "We cannot explain them by anything 
 in the phenomena, or in the things themselves. In order 
 to escape the contradiction involved in the necessary inter- 
 action of mutually independent things, and also that in- 
 volved in reaching an independent being by summing up 
 dependent things, we must transcend the realm of the rela- 
 tive and dependent, and affirm a fundamental reality which 
 is absolute and independent, and in the unity of whose ex- 
 istence the possibility of what we call interaction finds its 
 ultimate explanation. The interaction of the many is pos- 
 sible only through the unity of an all-embracing one, which 
 either co-ordinates and mediates their interaction, or of 
 which they are in some sense phases or modifications. 
 
 Two conceptions of the relation of the many to the one 
 
 6
 
 82 METAPHYSICS 
 
 are possible. We may regard the many individuals as on- 
 tologically distinct from the one and from one another, and 
 as brought into interaction only through the mediation of 
 the basal one which posits and co-ordinates them accord- 
 ing to the plan of the whole. The real ground of their co- 
 ordination is not anything which the many themselves do, 
 but rather that which is done for them and with them by 
 the co-ordinating one. Their interaction, then, is only ap- 
 parent, and is, in fact, the direct action of the one in ad- 
 justing them to the demands of the system. This view re- 
 duces to a universal occasionalism, so far as the interaction 
 of the finite is concerned. The one incessantly adjusts and 
 co-ordinates the relations of the many. 
 
 The other possible conception of the relation of the one 
 to the many is that the many have no proper existence or 
 thinghood in themselves, and are only modes or phenom- 
 ena of the one, which alone truly is. In our thought these 
 modes assume the appearance of individual things in inter- 
 action, but in reality there is nothing but the one true be- 
 ing and its modes. In the nature of this being these modes 
 are mutually determined, because they are all modes of the 
 one, and because the same being is present in all as tfheir 
 ground and reality. 
 
 The latter view is the one to which reflection inclines 
 for the physical world ; for thought is rapidly reducing this 
 world to phenomenal existence, and making it the mani- 
 festation of an energy not its own. Besides, in this world, 
 what is given is not individual ontological things, but mani- 
 fold phenomena, and when this fact is grasped it is easy to 
 accept a single ontological ground as their only adequate 
 explanation. But the former view of the relation is the 
 one which must be held in the case of the finite spirit ; for 
 here we have a being endowed with the wonderful power 
 of selfhood, whereby it is enabled to become an individual,
 
 CAUSALITY 83 
 
 in distinction from all others, and to know itself as such. 
 Things whose activities are exhausted in interaction have 
 only being for others, and may well be only phenomenal ; 
 but things which, in addition, have inner life, have being 
 for themselves, and cannot be dissolved into phenomena. 
 
 A great many questions, whose consideration we post- 
 pone for the present, emerge at once in contemplating this 
 result. The one conclusion which now concerns us is that 
 the popular conception of interaction must be transformed. 
 The demand for a causal ground for the mutual changes or 
 reciprocity of things is entirely justified, but the conception 
 which finds that ground in interaction, or the transitive 
 causality of independent things, is untenable. Interaction 
 cannot be conceived as a transitive causality playing be- 
 tween things ; it is rather an immanent causality in a fun- 
 damental unitary being. 
 
 Possibly it may occur to us that the same argument 
 which we have used is equally valid to disprove any inter- 
 action of the finite and the infinite. We have all along as- 
 sumed the possibility of an interaction between the two; 
 and yet the infinite is certainly individual, and the finite is 
 certainly distinct from the infinite. Here, then, we seem 
 to need a new bond to connect these new members, and so 
 on in infinite series. The reply is simple. Our argument 
 has been based on the assumed independence of both mem- 
 bers of the interaction, and applies only to that assumption. 
 "When two things are mutually independent, interaction can 
 take place only through a mediating third, which embraces 
 both of them. But the independent may freely posit the 
 dependent, and may also posit a continuous interaction 
 between itself and the dependent ; but such interaction is 
 throughout a self-determination, and is not forced upon it 
 from without. 
 
 This point seems too obscure for any influence ; and yet
 
 84 METAPHYSICS 
 
 confusion here is at the bottom of the philosophy of tha 
 unconditioned. In particular, Mansel sought to show that 
 God could not be thought of as cause, because as cause he 
 must be related to his effect. He cannot, then, be creator, 
 because as such there must be a relation between God and 
 the world. But this objection overlooks the fact that re- 
 lation in the abstract does not imply dependence. The 
 criticism would be just if the relation were necessary and 
 had an external origin. But as the relation is properly 
 posited and maintained by himself, there is nothing in it 
 incompatible with his independence and absoluteness. 
 
 But this conclusion concerning interaction only makes 
 the problem of causation more obscure and difficult. As 
 long as we had separate and distinct individual things, we 
 could easily picture them in their mutual otherness and ex- 
 ternality, and could as easily supplement the perception of 
 their reciprocal changes by the thought of forces resident in 
 the things; and thus the problem seemed to be satisfacto- 
 rily solved. But now that we are driven out of this notion, 
 we seem to be wandering in unpicturable and impalpable 
 darkness, where all sense of direction and reality is lost. If 
 we think of the many they fuse into the one ; if we think 
 of the one it breaks up into the many. We are in the midst 
 and depths of the Heraclitic flux ; and all its waves and bil- 
 lows go over us. 
 
 This reference to Heraclitus recalls some of the results of 
 the last chapter. We there saw that the thing, A, instead 
 of remaining rigidly A, runs through the series A, A v A v 
 etc. ; and when we asked in what the objective unity of 
 such a thing consists, we found it to consist in the causal 
 continuity whereby the members of the series are bound 
 together. The formal unity of thought is simply the fact 
 that we call the thing one ; and such unity may be given to
 
 CAUSALITY 85 
 
 any plurality whatever. But the real unity lies in the fact 
 of a causal relation ; the earlier members produce the later 
 ones, and in producing them become them or vanish into 
 them. This brings us to consider the second general appli- 
 cation of the causal idea, the transformation of antecedence 
 into causality. 
 
 And here, as elsewhere, the two points so often referred 
 to must be borne in mind. We must distinguish between 
 the phenomenal and the metaphysical question. We must 
 also distinguish between the conviction that causality is 
 really in play, and the form in which we try to conceive it. 
 Without doubt there must be some dynamic bond under- 
 lying the successive phases of the thing, but the form in 
 which we must think it is not immediately evident. 
 
 Let us take, then, the series, A, A v A v A y etc., which we 
 call a thing, and see what we can make of it. The causal- 
 ity is now within the series, not beyond it. The cause pro- 
 duces, and, in producing, becomes the effect. This concep- 
 tion is often illustrated by reference to the transformations 
 of energy ; in which, it is said, one phase of energy pro- 
 duces another phase, and thus passes into it, so that the 
 cause vanishes into the effect, or rather reappears in the 
 effect. 
 
 We are certainly standing here, if we do stand, in slip- 
 pery places. It is only by the help of the formal identi- 
 ties of thought that we can express this doctrine at all. In 
 order to think, we must have a subject and a predicate; 
 but in the case supposed the real subject vanishes as the 
 predicate comes; and the predicate does not arrive until 
 the subject has gone. The subject, then, is the subject of a 
 not-yet-existing predicate ; and the predicate is the pred- 
 icate of a no-longer-existing subject. We overlook this 
 from holding the subject in our thought, treating of it as 
 the thing or the series, and viewing it as the same thing or
 
 8G METAPHYSICS 
 
 series throughout. As soon as we guard ourselves against 
 this illusion, it becomes evident that no metaphysical pred- 
 ication whatever, causal or otherwise, is possible until we 
 bring the entire metaphysical movement within the range 
 of thought and view it as constituted by thought. Logic 
 shows that the temporal and changing can be grasped only 
 through a timeless and unchanging idea. If the changing 
 be vie\ved as the temporal realization of an idea by a fun- 
 damental intelligence, it lies within the range of thought 
 and is constituted by thought. Otherwise all positive pred- 
 ication is absurd. Epistemology also shows that thought 
 can never recognize anything which has not its origin in 
 thought somewhere, and that the conception of a reality ex- 
 isting by itself, apart from thought, independent of thought, 
 and having separate ontological laws of its own, is a fiction 
 of the first magnitude ; and we have just seen that, in a 
 world of change, such a fiction results in cancelling predica- 
 tion altogether. 
 
 All predication, then, must take place within the sphere 
 of intellect, and with reference to intellect. Any concep- 
 tion of reality, which is at once intelligible and tenable, runs 
 back to intelligence as its necessary implication and presup- 
 position. Every other conception must lose itself either in 
 mere phenoraenality or in the vanishing flux of Heraclitus. 
 The existence of things, then, has no meaning except with 
 reference to intelligence ; for if we subtract from the world 
 of real things those constitutive elements which thought con- 
 tributes, and which have no meaning apart from thought, 
 there is nothing intelligible left. And thus we see that the 
 deepest thing in existence is neither being nor causation, as 
 abstract categories, but intellect as the concrete realization 
 and source of both. That is, intellect cannot be construed 
 from the categories of being and causation as something 
 deeper than itself ; on the contrary, they are categories of
 
 CAUSALITY 87 
 
 intellect, and are realized only in and through the activity 
 of the intellect. And to find the ontological meaning of 
 these categories, we must have recourse to our experience 
 of intellect, and not to any analysis of abstract ideas. Not 
 until we raise them to the form of living and working in- 
 telligence do we reach any concrete meaning which the 
 dialectic of thought will not dissolve and dissipate. 
 
 Again returning to our series, A, A v A v etc., we find an 
 additional difficulty as follows : The A which is to become 
 A v etc., must have some essential relation to the later mem- 
 bers of the series, otherwise we lose the notion of ground 
 altogether. When we are dealing with dependent things 
 the easiest solution of the problem is to view the series as 
 the realization in temporal form of an idea which under- 
 lies the series. When we are dealing with the fundamental 
 reality the best account of the successive stages is to refer 
 them to the continuous self-determinations of the absolute 
 intelligence, according to an abiding plan. But spontane- 
 ous thought chooses another way. It has not learned the 
 dialectic of the metaphysical categories, when conceived on 
 the impersonal plane, and thinks to find the solution of the 
 problem in the notion of potentiality. The later members 
 of the series were potential in the earlier. 
 
 But so far as any insight is concerned, this is a purely 
 formal solution. It is simply a declaration that there must 
 be a determining connection somewhere, and a resolve to 
 find it in the earlier stages of the thing. But, as was point- 
 ed out in discussing the categories in the Theory of Thought 
 and Knowledge, this notion of potentiality is exceedingly 
 elusive on the impersonal and necessary plane, and gains 
 a positive content only as we base it on free intelligence. 
 The impersonal potentiality must be an existing determina- 
 tion of being of some sort, and what it is, or how it passes 
 into actuality, is beyond us. The only thing we can say is
 
 88 METAPHYSICS 
 
 that the unpicturable nature of a thing is such that, under a 
 given condition, a?, it passes into a new state, and under an- 
 other condition, y, it passes into another state ; and these 
 two states may be said to be potential in the thing, but 
 only in the sense that they will be developed under the 
 conditions x and y. 
 
 At first sight this view seems to help the matter, but 
 it soon appears that we are not much further on. It is, 
 first, plain that it does not escape the difficulties concern- 
 ing metaphysical predication in a changing world ; indeed, 
 these remain untouched, and even unsuspected, because of 
 the formal identity involved in the language. But apart 
 from these we also need to know what and where these 
 conditions x and y are to be found. If they lie outside of 
 the series in some other series, then we have the problem 
 of interaction ; and the potentialities of A become compli- 
 cated with the question of its dependence on the fundamen- 
 tal reality. If they lie within A itself, vve are grievously 
 puzzled to know what " within " means, or how within the 
 unity of A there can be these antitheses of A and its con- 
 ditions. If they are always there, their consequences must 
 always be there; and if they arise in time there must be 
 some further condition of their emergence. Thus we start 
 on the infinite regress, and thought collapses. And it will 
 stay collapsed until we reach a conception of causation 
 which provides for a beginning ; that is, until we rise to 
 the conception of self-determining intelligence as the true 
 and only type of proper causality. 
 
 Thus it appears the causality which manifests itself in 
 the form of antecedence and sequence eludes us so long as 
 we regard it as an impersonal activity under the temporal 
 form. In that case it is an activity without a subject, for 
 the subject disappears in the flow. Neither is it activity, 
 but activities. Both the " it " and the activity vanish into
 
 CAUSALITY 89 
 
 indefinite plurality, and thought vanishes along with them. 
 Or, if thought remains, it is because existence is not thus 
 constituted, but has its essential root and bond in active 
 intelligence. 
 
 We reach the same conclusion from a consideration of the 
 category of unity. We have frequently referred to unity as 
 if its meaning were self-evident and admitted of no ques- 
 tion. In particular we have maintained that there must 
 be a fundamental reality which is ontologically, and in the 
 strictest sense, one in order to explain the fact of system 
 and the reciprocity of things. Unities of classification, or 
 formal unities which arise when thought calls many things 
 one, will not suffice. A true substantive unity is required, 
 and the form in which substantial" or metaphysical unity 
 must be thought begins to be a problem. 
 
 The notion of real unity has several elements. The first 
 and lowest is negative It denies composition and divisi- 
 bility. A compound is not a thing, but an aggregate. The 
 reality is the component factors. Hence the divisible is 
 never a proper thing, but only an aggregate or sum. The 
 thought of a compound is impossible without the assump- 
 tion of component units; and if these in turn are com- 
 pounds, we must assume the other units ; and so on, until we 
 come to ultimate and uncompounded units. Hence proper 
 unity and proper reality can be found only in the uncom- 
 pounded and indivisible. All else is formal or phenomenal. 
 
 But this result forbids us to find proper unity in anything 
 spatial. An extended body exists only as its parts exist. 
 This is true, whether we regard the body as atomic or as 
 continuous. If the body have an atomic constitution, the 
 truth is self-evident ; for then the body is but the aggregate 
 of the parts, and exists in them just as number exists only 
 in its component units. But if the body be viewed as con- 
 tinuous and not compounded, its existence in space allows
 
 90 METAPHYSICS 
 
 us to divide the volume into different parts, each of \vhich 
 exists in its own space, and is distinct from all the other 
 parts. Thus the body, though continuous, appears as the 
 Integra] of its parts, and exists only as these parts exist. 
 But it cannot exist as the sum of these parts without 
 positing an interaction among the parts. That the part B 
 shall maintain itself between and against A and (7, it must 
 be able to prescribe to A and C their positions relative to 
 itself. The same is true for all other parts ; and the con- 
 clusion is, that the extended body, though continuous, is yet 
 a complex of interacting forces. This conclusion remains 
 valid even if the body be indivisible ; for such indivisibility 
 would not rest upon a true unity of the thing, but only upon 
 the greatness of the cohesion between the parts. The body 
 would still be a system of interacting forces. Hence no 
 body which exists extended in space can be a unit. It will 
 always be possible to distinguish separate points in the vol- 
 ume of the thing ; and these can be held together and apart 
 only as these points are made the centres of cohesive and 
 repulsive forces. But in order that a thing shall be a true 
 unit, it must allow no distinction of parts, and no activities 
 which are activities of parts only. But this distinction of 
 parts will always be possible so long as a thing is regarded 
 as having real extension. 
 
 And now it begins to be clear that there can be no real 
 unity on the impersonal plane. Logic shows that on this 
 plane we reach neither the one from the many nor the 
 many from the one. Thinking on the plane of necessity, 
 and under the law of the sufficient reason, we can never log- 
 ically escape our starting-point, whatever it may be. If 
 we assume unity we are unable to take one step towards 
 plurality, for the unitary necessity refuses to differentiate or 
 to move at all. Conversely, if we start with plurality we 
 never escape it, for logic compels us to carry the many into
 
 CAUSALITY 91 
 
 their antecedents. If we trace the plurality to some be- 
 ing which we call one, we are forced to carry the plurality 
 implicitly into the unity by assuming some complexity of 
 nature, and some complex antithesis and mechanism of meta- 
 physical states in the one being. But in that case, though 
 we confidently talk about unity, \ve are quite unable to tell 
 in what the unity of such a being consists. The truth is, it 
 has no unity but the formal unity we give it in calling it one. 
 
 This puzzle can be solved only as \ve leave the mechanical 
 realm for that of free intellect. The free and conscious self 
 is the only real unity of which we have any knowledge, and 
 reflection shows that it is the only thing which can be a true 
 unity. All other unities are formal, and have only a mental 
 existence. But formal and real unities alike exist only for 
 and through intelligence. 
 
 And here we come again upon a fact which we have be- 
 fore d welt upon namely, that active intelligence cannot be 
 understood through the metaphysical categories, 'but these 
 categories must be understood as realized in active intelli- 
 gence. We have seen this illustrated in the case of being 
 and causation, and now it finds further illustration in the 
 case of unity. "We can make nothing of the abstract cate- 
 gory of unity. Thought is not possible through a pre- 
 existing unity, but unity is realized through thought in 
 action. Just as little can we abstractly combine unity 
 with the complexity and variety which are needed to save 
 thought from the deadlock of a monotonous simplicity. 
 This problem is solved for us in our experience of free in- 
 telligence. Here we find a unity which produces plurality 
 without destroying itself. Here the one is manifold without 
 being many. Here the identical posits an order of change 
 and abides unchanged across it. But this perennial wonder 
 is possible only on the plane of free and self-conscious in- 
 telligence.
 
 92 METAPHYSICS 
 
 Interaction between the many must be replaced by im- 
 manent action in the one. Impersonal causality vanishes 
 hopelessly in the Heraclitic flux. The impersonal itself falls 
 asunder into a plurality either in space or time, and we seek 
 in vain for any substantial bond. Living, active intelli- 
 gence is the condition both of conceptual and of meta- 
 physical unity. Volitional causality, that is, intelligence 
 itself in act, is the only conception of metaphysical causality 
 in which we can rest. Science may study the laws of se- 
 quence and reciprocal change under the name of causation, 
 and there is no objection, so long as we understand that 
 this is not causation at all. But when we come to proper 
 efficiency, it is either volitional causality or nothing. And 
 if we are to escape the abyss of the infinite regress, and are 
 not to make shipwreck of reason on the problem of error, 
 this volitional causality must be viewed as self-determining 
 or free. 
 
 Thus we get an insight into the profound speculative 
 significance of free intelligence. Logic shows that without 
 freedom we can never solve the problem of error or satisfy 
 any of our rational demands. Explanation is possible only 
 through free intelligence. Unity, identity, and causality 
 are possible only through free intelligence. Truth itself 
 is possible only through free intelligence. The difficulty 
 which popular thought finds in this conception arises, first, 
 from its misinterpreted sense-experience, which is common- 
 ly taken to be law -giving for metaphysical thought; and, 
 secondly, from a superficial conception of its own categories. 
 Criticism removes much of the paradox from our result by 
 pointing out the distinction between the phenomenal and 
 the metaphysical points of view, and completes the work 
 by showing that the metaphysical categories contradict 
 themselves until they are realized in active intelligence. 
 
 What we call the interaction of the many is possible only
 
 CAUSALITY 93 
 
 through the immanent action of the one fundamental reality. 
 This being, as fundamental and independent, we call the 
 infinite, the absolute, the world-ground. In calling it the 
 infinite, \ve do not mean that it excludes the co-existence 
 of the finite, but only that it is the self -sufficient source of 
 the finite. In calling it the absolute, we do not exclude it 
 from all relation, but deny only external restriction and 
 determination. In calling it the world-ground, we do not 
 think of a spatial support, and still less of a raw material 
 out of which things are made, but rather of that basal 
 causality by which the world is produced and maintained. 
 Everything else has its cause and reason in this being. 
 Whatever is true, or rational, or real in the world must be 
 traced to this being as its source and determining origin. 
 But this point we reserve for the next chapter.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 THE WORLD-GROUND 
 
 IN the last chapter we reached the conclusion that all 
 things depend in some way upon one basal being which 
 alone is self -existent. But this conclusion raises many 
 questions and not a few difficulties. In particular, the re- 
 lation of the world to its metaphysical ground, or the re- 
 lation of the finite to the infinite, demands further spec- 
 ification. Conversely, we need to determine more closely 
 the relation of the world -ground to the finite, or to fix 
 its significance for the system by virtue of its position as 
 basal and infinite. . But, instead of immediately applying 
 the results already reached, we shall find our advantage in 
 returning to some extent to the stand -point of popular 
 thought. Thus we shall trace the dialectic of crude think- 
 ing, and better understand its confusions. Meanwhile we 
 can apply the results of criticism as a corrective upon occa- 
 sion. Logically, there is a shorter way ; but pedagogically 
 the plan proposed seems more promising. 
 
 The discussions of the first chapter have freed us from 
 the superstition of passive substance or pure being. We 
 there found that the notion of substance is entirely ex- 
 hausted in the notion of cause, and that agents only can 
 lay any claim to existence. The infinite, then, is not to be 
 viewed as a passive substance, but as a unitary and indivis- 
 ible agent. Indeed, the misleading connotations of the no- 
 tion of substance are such that we shall do better to drop
 
 THE WORLD-GROUND 95 
 
 it altogether, and replace it by cause, or agent. We are 
 compelled to do this by critical reflection ; and the advan- 
 tages are great. The notion of substance carries with it 
 many implications of the imagination ; and these are peren- 
 nial sources of error. It is largely conceived as a plastic 
 something, or as a kind of stuff which can be fashioned into 
 many things. These implications, rude and crude as they 
 are, have modified disastrously most pantheistic speculation. 
 The infinite has been viewed almost as a kind of raw ma- 
 terial out of which the finite is made, and hence as at least 
 partly exhausted in the finite. Sometimes the representa- 
 tion is less coarse; and the infinite appears as a kind of 
 background of the finite, something as space appears as the 
 infinite background and possibility of all finite figures in it. 
 The infinite is further said to produce, or emit, the finite 
 from itself ; or, by a process of self-direraption, to pass from 
 its own unity into the plurality of finite things. It is the 
 pure being which appears in all things as the reality of their 
 existence. 
 
 The finite, on the other hand, is spoken of as parts or 
 modifications of the infinite, or as emanations from the in- 
 finite, or as partaking of the infinite substance. Many pan- 
 theistic speculators have spoken of God as making the world 
 out of himself. Others, again, have found the world in God 
 prior to creation ; and creation they view as the escape of 
 these hidden potentialities into realization. Both alike have 
 applied the notion of quantity to the problem, and have 
 greatly exercised themselves \vith_ the inquiry whether God 
 before creation be not equal to God plus the world after 
 creation. This entire class of views rests mainly upon a 
 false and uncritical notion of substance which identifies it 
 with pure being or stuff; and they appear at once in their 
 crudity and untenability when the stuff -idea is exploded. 
 There is no stuff in being. The infinite substance means
 
 96 METAPHYSICS 
 
 the infinite agent, one and indivisible. To explain the uni- 
 verse, we need not a substance but an agent, not substantial- 
 ity but causality. The latter notion expresses the meaning 
 of the former, and is, besides, free from sense-implications. 
 
 This necessity of viewing all true existence as causal and 
 unitary cancels at once a host of doctrines which have 
 swarmed in pantheistic speculation. When we speak of 
 the infinite as substance, the misleading analogies of sense- 
 experience at once present it as admitting of division, ag- 
 gregation, etc. ; but when we think of it as an agent, these 
 fancies disappear of themselves. As an agent, it is a unit, 
 and not a sum or an aggregate. It is, then, without parts ; 
 and the notions of divisibility and aggregation do not ap- 
 ply. Hence we cannot view the finite as a part of the in- 
 finite, or as an emanation from the infinite, or as partaking 
 of the infinite substance; for all these expressions imply 
 the divisibility of the ^finite, and also its stuffy nature. 
 No more can the finitr be viewed as produced by any self- 
 diremption of the infinite ; for this, too, would be incompat- 
 ible with its necessary unity. All of these views really 
 deny the infinite and replace it by an aggregate. The one 
 divides itself into the many, and thereafter is only the sum 
 of the many. But thereby the one disappears and the 
 many alone exist. The difficulty is double. First, the notion 
 of division has no application to true being, but only to 
 aggregates ; and, second, if it had application, the result of 
 dividing the infinite would be to cancel it, and replace it by 
 the sum of the finite. But this would be to return to the 
 impossible pluralism of uncritical speculation. The attempt 
 to divide and retain the unity at the same time is as if one 
 should speak of the mathematical unit as producing num- 
 ber by self-direraption, and as remaining a unit after divis- 
 ion. The necessary unity of the infinite forbids all attempts 
 to identify it with the finite, either totally or partially. If
 
 THE WORLD GROUND 97 
 
 the finite be anything substantial, it must be viewed as 
 ontologically distinct from the infinite, not as produced 
 from it, but as created by it. Only creation can reconcile 
 the reality of the finite in this sense with the unity of the 
 infinite. For the finite, if thus real, is an agent; and as 
 such cannot be made out of anything, but is posited by the 
 infinite. How this can be we do not pretend to knc T ; but 
 any other view is wrecked by its own contradiction - 
 
 Similar objections lie against all views which speak of 
 the finite as a mode of the infinite. We have ourselves 
 used this expression, and it is all the more necessary to de- 
 fine its meaning. In its ordinary use it is based on the 
 notion of passive substance, or pure being. Being is said 
 to be one in essence, but various in mode ; as the same raw 
 material may be built into many forms. Accordingly all 
 finite things are called modes, or modifications of the in- 
 finite. But it is hard to interpret this language so as to es- 
 cape the absurdity of pure being and remain in harmony 
 with the necessary unity of the infinite. The notion gen- 
 erally joined with such language is that each thing is a par- 
 ticular and separate part of the infinite ; just as each wave 
 of the sea is not a phase or mode of the entire sea, but only 
 of that part comprised in the wave itself. But the unity 
 of being is compatible with a plurality of attributes only 
 as each attribute is an attribute of the entire thing. Any 
 conception of diverse states which are states of only a part 
 of the being would destroy its unity. The entire being 
 must be present in each state; and this cannot be so long 
 as the notion of quantity is applied to the problem. Hence, 
 in speaking of finite things as modes of the infinite, we must 
 not figure the relation as that of the sea to its waves, or 
 as that of material to the form impressed upon it. If, then, 
 finite things are modes of the infinite, each thing must be 
 a mode of the entire infinite; and the infinite must be 
 7
 
 98 METAPHYSICS 
 
 present in its unity and completeness in every finite thing, 
 just as the entire soul is present in all its acts. Any other 
 view of the modes would cancel the unity of the infinite 
 and leave the modes as things in interaction. The infinite, 
 then, cannot be viewed as a sum of modes, nor as parti} 7 in 
 one mode and partly in another; but it must be present 
 alike IL each and every mode. Neither can the modes be 
 viewed ^.s forms or moulds into which the infinite substance 
 is poured. Even this gross conception has not been with- 
 out influence in the history of speculation ; but it needs no 
 criticism. In general, the phrase, modes of being, is mis- 
 leading. It is allied with the imagination ; and the mind 
 always seeks to picture it. Just as we tend to conceive 
 substance as a kind of raw material out of which things are 
 made, so we tend to think of a mode as a mould into which 
 the raw material is cast. Of course, the attempt to picture 
 instead of to think results in absurdity. The view that be- 
 ing is cause cancels these misconceptions. Indeed, no other 
 view can meet the demands made on the modes. The only 
 way in which a being can be conceived as entire in every 
 mode is by dropping all quantitative conceptions and view- 
 ing the being as an agent, and the modes as forms of its 
 activity. Hence the doctrine that things are modes of the 
 infinite can only mean that things are but constant forms 
 of activity on the part of the infinite, and that their thing- 
 hood is purely phenomenal. Of course, it is impossible to 
 tell how the one can act in various ways so as to produce 
 the appearance of a world of different and interacting 
 things; but this is only the impossibility of telling how 
 there can be unity in variety, and, conversely, how there 
 can be variety in unity. 
 
 "We reach, then, the following conclusion : The infinite 
 is not a passive substance, but the basal cause of the uni- 
 verse. As such, it is one and indivisible, and is "forever
 
 THE WORLD-GROUND 99 
 
 equal to itself. Of the finite, two conceptions are logi- 
 cally possible. We may view it merely as a form of ener- 
 gizing on the part of the infinite, so that it has a purely 
 phenomenal existence ; or we may view it as a substantial 
 creation by the infinite. But in no case is it possible to 
 identify the infinite with the finite, either totally or par- 
 tially. 
 
 The decision between these two views of the finite, as 
 already pointed out, can be reached only by studying the 
 facts of experience. If any finite thing can be found which 1 
 is capable of acting from itself and for itself, it has in that 
 fact the only possible test of reality, as distinguished from? 
 phenomenality. But this possibility can be found only in 
 the finite spirit. It avails nothing against this conclusion 
 to say that the world-ground may posit impersonal agents 
 as well as personal ones ; for the notion of the impersonal 
 finite vanishes, upon analysis, into phenomenality. In seek- 
 ing for identity, we found it only in the personal. In seeking 
 for causality, we found it only in the personal. In study- 
 ing interaction, we found that the causality of the finite 
 cannot properly extend beyond its own subjectivity, and 
 the impersonal has no subjectivity. On all these accounts 
 we must hold the impersonal is possible only as dependent 
 phenomenon, or process of an energy not its own. Only 
 selfhood serves to mark off the finite as substantial reality, 
 and to give it any ontological otherness to the infinite. 
 Apart from this, there is essentially nothing but the in- 
 finite and its manifold activities. The impersonal finite 
 attains onty to such otherness as a thought or act has to 
 its subject. 
 
 But the personal finite, the spirit, must be viewed as 
 created. It is not made out of pre- existent stuff, for the 
 stuff notion has disappeared. It is not made out of any-
 
 100 METAPHYSICS 
 
 thing, not even out of nothing ; it is caused to be. Crea- 
 tion has a positive and a negative meaning. Positively, it 
 means to posit in existence something which before was 
 ) not; negatively, it denies that this something is made out 
 of pre-existent material, or that the creator is less after the 
 creative act than before. This is all that creation means; 
 and to this we are shut up by the contradiction of any 
 other view. Of course, no one can hope to tell how crea^ 
 tion is possible, but we can clearly see that the alternative 
 views are impossible. 
 
 Without some mental steadiness at this point it is easy to 
 fall into some species of pantheism. In spite of the demon- 
 strable inapplicability of the category of quantity to the re- 
 lation of the finite to the infinite, a swarm of metaphors and 
 imaginings based on this category are sure to spring up in 
 uncritical minds, and impose on them their fictitious solu- 
 tions. As the one space or time includes all finite spaces 
 or times, so we may easily fancy that the infinite includes 
 the finite as its constituent parts. Logical relations also 
 lend themselves to the illusion. For, as all particulars are 
 logically but accidents or specifications of the universal, 
 which embraces them all, we may readily suppose that all 
 particular beings are but specifications of the universal 
 being. Critical vigilance is the price of liberty in the 
 case of these illusions. We must see that quantity is a 
 self-destructive category when applied beyond phenomena. 
 We must also distinguish between logical subordination and 
 ontological implication. The universal, which applies to all 
 the particulars, implies none of them. 
 
 A more subtle source of error concerning this matter lies 
 in the necessary dependence of the finite. The finite is de- 
 pendent on the infinite, and is also a member of a system to 
 which it is continually subject. The result is that the finite 
 spirit has only a limited and relative existence at best. As
 
 THE WORLD-GROUND 101 
 
 compared with the infinite, it has only a partial and incom- 
 plete existence. In the fullest sense of the word, only the 
 infinite exists; all else is relatively phenomenal and non- 
 existent. 
 
 By thinking along this line in an abstract way it is easy 
 to come to this conclusion ; and every reader acquainted 
 with the history of speculation will recall how often men 
 have stumbled into pantheism at this point. Nor is it easy 
 to escape this conclusion so long as we dwell on the abstract 
 categories of finite and infinite, dependent and independent, 
 phenomenal and real, existence and non-existence. The 
 truth is we have no insight into these categories which will 
 enable us to decide what is concretely possible in this case. 
 We have to fall back on experience, and interpret the cate- 
 gories by experience, instead of determining experience by 
 the categories. Any other method is illusory and the pro- 
 lific source of illusions. 
 
 Adopting this method, we discover that, while we can- 
 not tell how the finite can be, it nevertheless is. The finite 
 may not exist in the full sense of the infinite, but for all 
 that, in a small way, it is able to act and is acted upon. 
 In the sense of self-sufficiency there is but one substance, 
 as Spinoza said ; but it does not follow that all other things 
 are only powerless shadows, for there are a great many sub- 
 stances which can act and be acted upon. It matters little 
 what we call these, provided we bear this fact in mind. 
 They are not substances, if substance means self-sufficiency. 
 They are substances, if substance means the subject of ac- 
 tion and passion. If, then, we bear our meaning careful \y in 
 mind, we may say that only the infinite exists or truly is, 
 that the finite has only partial, relative, incomplete, non- 
 existent existence ; and there would be a sort of truth in 
 the saying. But these utterances are so easily misunder- 
 stood that they should be reserved for esoteric use. and
 
 102 . METAPHYSICS 
 
 frugality is to he recommended even there. In these oper- 
 ations we must proceed antiseptically, and sterilize our ver- 
 bal instruments by careful definition before we begin. 
 "Now when we consider life at all reflective^ we come 
 
 i upon two facts. First, we have thoughts and feelings and 
 volitions ; and these are our own. We also have a measure 
 of self-control or the power of self-direction. Here, then, 
 in experience we find a certain selfhood and a relative in- 
 dependence. This fact constitutes us real persons, or rather 
 it is the meaning of our personality. The second fact is 
 
 r that we cannot regard this life as self-sufficient and inde- 
 pendent. How the life is possible we do not know ; we 
 only know that it is. How the two facts are put together 
 is altogether beyond us. We only know that we cannot 
 interpret life without admitting both, and that to deny 
 either lands us in contradiction and nonsense. It is no 
 doubt fine, and in some sense it is correct, to say that God 
 is in all things; but when it comes to saying that God is 
 all things and that all forms of thought and feeling and 
 conduct are his, then reason simply commits suicide. God 
 thinks and feels in what we call our thinking and feeling; 
 and hence he blunders in our blundering and is stupid in 
 our stupidity. He contradicts himself also with the utmost 
 freedom; for a deal of his thinking does not hang together 
 from one person to another, or from one day to another in 
 the same person. Error, folly, -and sin are all made divine; 
 and reason and conscience as having authority vanish. The 
 only thing that is not divine in this scheme is God ; and he 
 vanishes into a congeries of contradictions and basenesses. 
 
 For note the purely logical difficulties in the notion, not 
 to press the problem of evil and error just referred to. 
 
 . Suppose the difficulty overcome which is involved in the 
 inalienability of personal experience, so that our thoughts 
 and life might be ascribed to God. What is God's relation
 
 THE WORLD-GROUND 103 
 
 as thinking our thoughts to God as thinking the absolute 
 thought ? Does he become limited, confused, and blind in 
 finite experience, and does he at the same time have abso- 
 lute insight in his infinite life? Does he lose himself in the 
 finite so as not to know what and who he is; or does he 
 perhaps exhaust himself in the finite, so that the finite is all 
 there is ? But if all the while he has perfect knowledge of 
 himself as one and infinite, how does this illusion of the finite 
 arise at all in that perfect unity and perfect light ? There 
 is no answer to these questions, so long as the infinite is 
 supposed to play both sides of the game. We have a series 
 of unaccountable illusions and an infinite playing hide-and- 
 seek with itself in a most grotesque metaphysical fuddle- 
 ment. The notion of creation may be difficult, but it saves 
 us from such dreary stuff as this. How the infinite can 
 posit the finite, and thus make the possibility of a moral 
 order, is certainly beyond us ; but the alternative is a lapse 
 into hopeless irrationality. "We can make nothing of either 
 God or the world on such a pantheistic basis. Accordingly, 
 we find writers who incline to this way of thinking in un- 
 certain vacillation between some "Eternal Consciousness" 
 and our human consciousnesses and without any definite 
 and consistent thought concerning their mutual relation, 
 but only vague and showy phrases. 
 
 The illusion is completed by taking thought abstractly 
 and forgetting the personal and volitional form of concrete 
 thinking. The infinite thought "as conception of course 
 embraces all things, but it must embrace them as what they 
 are. On the side of the infinite we have not a resting 
 thought, but a thinker and a doer. And on the side of 
 the finite spirit also we have no mere conceptions of the 
 divine understanding, but thinkers and doers also; and in 
 that fact they have an inalienable individuality and person- 
 ality. When we sweep all these together into one concep-
 
 104 METAPHYSICS 
 
 tion, " Thought " or " Consciousness," we only fall a prey 
 to the fallacy of the universal. 
 
 Such is the relation of the finite to the infinite. We next 
 consider the relation of the infinite to the finite. 
 
 By virtue of its position as world - ground, the infinite 
 must be viewed as the primal source of all finite existence. 
 Since the finite has no ground of being in itself, its nature 
 and relations must be originally determined by the infinite ; 
 and hence the finite can be properly understood or compre- 
 hended only from the side of the infinite. The finite may 
 be viewed as the outcome or expression of a plan or purpose 
 on the part of the infinite ; and it may be viewed as a con- 
 sequence of the infinite. In the former case, the basal pur- 
 pose will contain the ground or reason for all the determina- 
 tions of the system ; and a knowledge of the system will 
 depend upon a knowledge of the purpose for whose expres- 
 sion and realization the system exists. No member of the 
 system will have any ontological or other rights, except such 
 as its position and significance in the system secure for it. 
 Freedom apart, every finite thing is what it is, and where it 
 is, and when it is, solely and only because of the requirements 
 of the fundamental plan. 
 
 And even if we should conceive the infinite as unintelli- 
 gent, we must still view the finite as an expression of the 
 nature of the infinite. Atheism and theism alike must re- 
 gard the finite as dependent on the world-ground. Theism 
 finds the order of dependence expressed in a plan, atheism 
 would found it in the nature of the infinite. This nature 
 then becomes the determining principle of all finite exist- 
 ence. The system and its members will be in every respect 
 what this nature may demand ; and a knowledge of what 
 can be or cannot be will depend upon a knowledge of this 
 nature. The meaning or significance of the infinite at any
 
 THE WORLD-GROUND 105 
 
 particular moment will be the sole conditioning ground of 
 all things and events in the system. If movement takes 
 place, it will be because the nature of the infinite calls for 
 it. If it take place in one direction rather than another, it 
 will be because the nature of the infinite would not be satis- 
 fied by motion in any other direction. Of course, it is im- 
 possible to get any exhaustive formula for this conditioning 
 nature ; but the conclusion follows not from any insight into 
 the nature, but solely from the formal position of the infinite 
 in the system. 
 
 All speculators alike, then, must pass behind the finite and 
 find the conditioning principle of the finite in the infinite. 
 If, for example, we allow the physical elements to be as real 
 as the physicist assumes, we have still to allow that their 
 number and nature and the order of their appearance are 
 not determined by any ontological necessity in the ele- 
 ments themselves, but only by the demands which the 
 infinite makes upon them. If the system exist for the 
 realization of a plan, the elements will be in all respects 
 what the plan of the system demands. If there be no plan, 
 and the infinite be only a blind energizing, still this energiz- 
 ing will be such as the nature of the infinite demands for its 
 realization. From this point, also, the elements will be pro- 
 duced in just such number, order, and kind as the significance 
 of the infinite demands. Apart from a knowledge of this 
 nature, we cannot know anything about the system. "We 
 cannot say that the present order has alwa} T s existed ; no 
 more can we deny it. We cannot say that the members of 
 the system were all produced at once, nor that they were 
 successively originated. No more can we know anything 
 about the future. Whether the members of the system 
 will alwa} T s continue, or whether they will instantaneously 
 or successively disappear, are questions which lie beyond all 
 knowledge. We do not know what direction the future will
 
 106 METAPHYSICS 
 
 take in any respect whatever. The facts in all of these cases 
 depend upon the plan or nature of the infinite; and unless 
 we can get an insight into this plan and nature, our knowl- 
 edge of both past and future must be purely hypothetical. 
 No natural law, in and of itself, can give any hint of the 
 time and circumstances of its origin. If the arch of being 
 were sprung at a word, the laws of the system would still 
 have a virtual focus in the past, just as the rays of light 
 from a convex mirror seem to meet behind the mirror, but 
 do not. Or if any new order should arise at any point of 
 cosmic history, this new order would also have a virtual 
 focus in an imaginary history. Of course, " demonstra- 
 tions " abound concerning what has been and what will be ; 
 but the fact which they really demonstrate is quite other 
 than the demonstrators think. If we assume the uniformity 
 of nature, we may indeed reach a certain insight; but the 
 result is purely hypothetical. This uniformity is contin- 
 gent ; and, so far as we know, a complete reversal of all 
 observed methods may occur at any moment. The reason 
 is, that the determining principle of the course of nature 
 lies beyond all observation in the hidden plan or nature of 
 the infinite. Every system which denies the independence 
 of the finite must allow these conclusions. The system will 
 be at all times and in all respects what this plan or nature 
 demands. The finite will come and go, change and become, 
 in accordance with the same rule. The result is that an 
 apriori knowledge of the system must be declared impos- 
 sible; for such a knowledge demands an insight which no 
 finite being possesses. In addition, even deductions from 
 experience are only hypothetically valid. 
 
 Quite a swarm 'of objections spring up at once. To begin 
 with, the crude speculator of popular science takes umbrage 
 at the suggestion that the physical elements are not neces- 
 sarily fixed quantities. Having heard frequently of the in-
 
 destructibilitv of matter, the two ideas have stuck together 
 
 v CJ 
 
 in what he is pleased to call his mind ; and now he professes 
 himself unable to separate them. But this mental impotence 
 need not delay us. The indestructibility of matter, in the 
 only sense in which it is proved, is compatible with the com- 
 plete phenomenal ity of matter. And how long it shall re- 
 main true, even in this sense, depends entirely upon the 
 infinite. 
 
 In the next place, the crude philosophical dogmatist will 
 claim that the necessity which rules in nature excludes a 
 view which leaves things at such loose ends. Omitting to 
 inquire whether this necessity be anything more than a 
 shadow of unclear thinking, we point out that in any case 
 the necessity in nature can only mean that. existing laws, 
 facts, and events are expressions of necessity, but there is 
 nothing in this fact to assure us that necessity always will 
 express itself in just these forms. That the necessity is 
 compatible with change we know from experience ; and 
 what future changes may yet become necessary no one can 
 tell. So far as founding the order and fixity of nature is 
 concerned, chance itself could not leave us more in the 
 dark than necessity ; unless we dogmatically declare the 
 present order to be changelessly necessary, and let our will 
 stand for a reason. Critical thought can find no rational 
 security for uniformity and continuity in anything but ra- 
 tional purpose ; and as long as we are unable to read the 
 purpose and its implications, we must be content to confine 
 our science to a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent 
 cases ; that is, to cases bearing on practice. 
 
 A weightier objection comes from the side of the intel- 
 lectualist, who urges that our view is a relapse into vulgar 
 empiricism. If this objection were well founded, it would 
 be a serious one ; and as it is, it makes it necessary more 
 clearly to define our meaning. In the first place, intellect-
 
 108 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ualism, if universally valid, is purely formal. Suppose we 
 allow that all phenomena must appear in space and be sub- 
 ject to the laws of space; there is nothing in this fact to 
 determine which of many possible phenomena shall appear 
 in space. The most diverse phenomena are compatible with 
 the laws of space ; and hence these laws do not determine 
 what phenomena shall be realized. This must be deter- 
 mined by something beyond space ; and to know the out- 
 come, we must know more than the formal laws of space. 
 Again, allow that the law of causation is universal, there is 
 nothing in this formal law to decide what shall be caused. 
 Here, again, we must go outside of the law to find the rea- 
 son for any specific event. The same is true for all other 
 intellectual first principles. They are purely formal and 
 determine no specific content. The system of logical cate- 
 gories merely outlines a knowledge of possibility and does 
 not give any insight into the specific nature of reality. A 
 multitude of real systems would be compatible with these 
 categories; and hence these categories do not explain why 
 one of these possible systems should be real rather than 
 another. Within each of these possible sj'stems, also, there 
 is a deal of contingent matter, and this can be. learned only 
 from experience. If, then, we were justified in viewing 
 first principles as universally valid, we should still have only 
 a formal knowledge, and not a knowledge of reality. We 
 should have to consult experience to learn what the reality 
 is which exists within these formal limits. 
 
 Again, those first principles themselves must be founded 
 in the nature of the infinite. Just as what is real is founded 
 in the infinite, so also what is true is founded in it. In our 
 finite experience we find ourselves working under a system 
 of laws and principles which condition us, and which all 
 our acts must obey. And these laws are not of our making, 
 but rule us even against our will. Under this experience
 
 THE WORLD-GROUND 109 
 
 there grows up the notion of a realm of impalpable and in- 
 visible laws, to which all reality is subject. "We think of 
 them as ruling over being, and not as founded in being. 
 And thus first principles particularly are conceived as a 
 kind of bottomless necessity, which depend on nothing for 
 their validity, and which would exist if all reality were 
 away. But the untenability of this view is palpable. Laws 
 of every sort, thought-laws among the rest, are never any- 
 thing but expressions of the nature of being. Eeality, by 
 being what it is and not something else, founds all ac- 
 tivity and all law. If a realm of law, apart from being, 
 were anything but a mere abstraction, it could not rule be- 
 ing except as it came into interaction with being. To rule 
 rightly, the law must be affected by the changing states 
 of being, otherwise it might command one thing as well 
 as another. Nor would the command itself be enough ; it 
 must enforce the command by its action upon its subjects. 
 But this would make the law a thing. It would act and 
 be acted upon , and this is precisely the definition of a 
 thing. 
 
 It is, then, a mere delusion when we fancy that there 
 can be anything deeper than being, or anything outside of 
 being. If outside of being, being must remain indifferent 
 to it, unless this outsider be able to act upon and influence 
 being. But this brings it at once under the definition of 
 being. Hence, all laws, principles, phenomena, and all finite 
 reality must be viewed as consequences or manifestations 
 of the basal reality. First truths also, even as formal truths, 
 can be viewed only as expressions or consequences of this 
 reality, and never as its antecedent, or as independent. It 
 may be possible for us to perceive truths which shall be 
 universally valid in the system, true alike for the finite and 
 the infinite ; but it is quite absurd to ask what would be 
 true apart from the system. When we ask such a question,
 
 HO METAPHYSICS 
 
 we are always present with our thought-laws, derived from 
 the real system ; and our imaginary system is always con- 
 structed on the basis of the present system, and this we 
 mistake for an insight into the nature of systems quite dis- 
 tinct from ours. But the answer to such questions always 
 consists in telling what is now true for us as determined by 
 the actual system of reality. The infinite is, and being 
 what it is, the system of law and truth is what it is ; and 
 the thought of other and unrelated systems is a pure ab- 
 straction from our imaginary constructions. 
 
 Some speculators have affected to find a limitation of the 
 infinite in the claim that it is subject to law of any kind ; 
 but this is only an overstraining of the notion of indepen- 
 dence or absoluteness which defeats itself. It is necessary 
 to the thought of any agent that it have some definite way 
 of working. Without this the thought vanishes and the 
 agent is nothing. This mode, or law. of action, however, 
 is not imposed from without ; but is simply an expression 
 of what the being is. As such it is no limitation. The 
 mind is not limited by the laws of thought; but realizes 
 itself in and through those laws. Apart from them it is 
 nothing; and they apart from it are also npthing. The 
 laws are simply expressions of the essential nature of mind. 
 In the same way the laws of the infinite, instead of limiting, 
 but express what the infinite is. They are not antecedent 
 to it, nor separate from it, nor distinct in it. The only re- 
 ality is the being in a definite mode of activity ; and from 
 this fact we form the notion of law, nature, etc. But the 
 fact is always the being in action. 
 
 The conclusion, then, is that there is one basal being in 
 action as the source of the system and of all its laws, prin- 
 ciples, and realities. And this monism extends not only to 
 things, but to principles also. It has been very common in 
 English speculation to assume any number of principles,
 
 THE WORLD-GROUND HI 
 
 alike independent of one another and of reality. Space and 
 time, especially, have been posited in mutual independence, 
 and also as independent of all reality, finite and infinite 
 alike. A common way of putting it is that space and time 
 would continue to exist if God and the world were both 
 away. But this view violates the necessary unity of fun- 
 damental being. Whatever space and time may be, they 
 cannot be independent and original existences; but both 
 alike must be viewed as consequences in some way of fun- 
 damental being. This results necessarily from the unity of 
 the basal reality, and from the fact that the nature of this 
 reality must be the determining principle of all secondary 
 existence and of all law and manifestation. 
 
 That the world-ground must be conceived as free and ac- 
 tive intelligence is the result to which thought continually 
 comes, whatever the line of investigation. If we seek a 
 tenable theory of knowledge we find it only as we reach a 
 basal intelligence. If we seek to bind the many together in 
 an all-embracing system, it is possible only in and through 
 intelligence. If we seek for unity in being itself we find it 
 only in intelligence. If we seek for causality and identity 
 in being we find them only in intelligence. If we would 
 give any account of the intelligible order and purpose-like 
 products of the world, again intelligence is the only key. 
 If, finally, we ask for the formal conditions of reality we 
 find them in intelligence. The attempt to define reality 
 itself fails until intelligence is introduced as its constitu- 
 tive condition. The mind can save its own categories from 
 disappearing, can realize its own aims and tendencies, can 
 truly comprehend or even mean anything, only as it relates 
 everything to free intelligence as the source and adminis- 
 trator of the system. 
 
 Against this theistic view there is properly no competing
 
 112 METAPHYSICS 
 
 view whatever. There seem to be such views, indeed, but 
 they are really only forms of words, sonorous and swelling 
 often, but without any rational substance. To see this, we 
 need only consider the atheistic attempt to refer the world, 
 its order and products, to mechanical necessity. We pass 
 over the deeper logical difficulties involved in this notion 
 of impersonal reality and mechanical causation. We also 
 pass over the epistemological difficulties involved in the 
 problem of error on such a scheme. We say nothing of 
 the puzzle concerning the relation of the human personality 
 to its mechanical ground. We simply point out the empti- 
 ness of the doctrine itself when considered as an account 
 of things. 
 
 Logic shows how extremely dark and elusive the notion 
 of metaphysical necessity is ; here we point out, in addition, 
 its complete barrenness. For necessity, as formal category, 
 contains nothing specific. Nothing can be deduced from it. 
 It gets a concrete content, therefore, only as we apply it to 
 a given matter. We know that the world is necessary, not 
 by deducing it from the abstract category of necessity, but 
 rather by applying the category to the world. Thus the 
 necessity itself is hypothetical, and its contents are learned 
 from experience. That is, it is not necessity in general 
 which explains the world, but the necessity of the world 
 itself which explains it. We know by hypothesis that the 
 world is necessary ; and we know that necessity fully ex- 
 plains the world, because that necessity is just the necessity 
 of the world. We simply call things necessary ; and, so far 
 as any insight is concerned, we end where we began. 
 
 Logic shows that any explanation which does not root in 
 purpose is equally empty. The antecedents which imply 
 a consequent cannot be adequately expressed without tak- 
 ing into account the consequent which they imply. The 
 causes must be defined in terms of their effects, and the
 
 THE WORLD-GROUND 113 
 
 effects must be made potential in their causes. In that 
 case explanation consists simply in affirming or assuming a 
 set of causes such and in such relations that they must pro- 
 duce the effect in question, to the exclusion of every other. 
 Certainly with such causes we could explain the effect ; but 
 it must be plain that we have merely postponed the prob- 
 lem. Here also, so far as any insight is concerned, we end 
 where we began. 
 
 Some problems admit of competing solutions. Some 
 solutions may be better than others ; but all may have some 
 positive value. Non-theistic solutions of world problems, 
 however, are not of this sort. They have no value. Criti- 
 cally examined, they vanish into absolute nothingness, as 
 bubbles when they are touched. Nevertheless, they have 
 been thought to be very weighty. They have caused many 
 a theologian great heart-searching, and have passed for the 
 sura of wisdom itself with herds of popular speculators. 
 This makes it interesting and profitable to trace the source 
 of the illusion. 
 
 And we have not far to go to find it. The crude meta- 
 physics of sense-thinking leads to the fancy that we see 
 causes in immediate perception, and see them to be material. 
 Thus the substance and causality of the world are provided. 
 In the next place we discover an order of law, and this is 
 viewed as necessary as a matter of course. Thus the order 
 of the world is explained as due to the reign of law ; and as 
 this is necessary, no questions may be asked about it. The 
 necessary is self-sufficient. A remark or two about the 
 indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy 
 make it plain that this system not only needs no supervision 
 by intelligence, but that it will not even tolerate it. Thus 
 the system of law and nature and the realm of mind are set 
 in mutually exclusive antithesis, so that the more we have 
 of the former the less we must have of the latter. By this
 
 
 METAPHYSICS 
 
 time theistic faith is in a most forlorn condition, and the 
 finishing stroke is given by the fallacy of the universal. 
 By calling everything necessary we make it clear that no 
 questions ought to be raised ; and by the aid of the fallacy 
 mentioned we show that there are really no questions to 
 raise. Existence as given is, indeed, quite complex, but we 
 reduce it to simplicity with the utmost ease. Matter and 
 force serve our purpose handsomely, matter representing 
 the existential aspect of reality, and force representing its 
 causal side. Moreover, both of these are scientific terms ; 
 and thus we secure the prestige of science for our view, 
 which is no small gain. But in these terms, matter and 
 force, we see nothing but pure simplicity, and hence noth- 
 ing that needs to be accounted for; nothing, indeed due 
 account being taken of the indestructibility of both matter 
 and force that may not well be eternal. Our data, then, 
 raise no question and excite no surprise ; and that they are 
 perfectly adequate to the administration of the world is 
 plain, for by virtue of the great principle of evolution the 
 like becomes unlike, the simple becomes complex, the 
 low lifts itself to the high, and, in fine, the indefinite, in- 
 coherent homogeneity changes to a definite, coherent hete- 
 rogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integra- 
 tions. This is the great fallacy-mill which has ground out 
 most of our showy cosmological speculation. 
 
 The fictitious nature of this performance is familiar to us. 
 The necessity which explains all is the necessity which con- 
 tains all. We reach the necessity from the all, not the all 
 from the necessity ; and the necessity itself is hypothetical. 
 The simplifications also are purely verbal, and result from 
 mistaking the abstractions of logic for realities of existence. 
 When we think concretely we can never pass from the com- 
 plex to the simple or from the simple to the complex until 
 we rise to the plane of free and active intelligence. On the 
 
 V *s
 
 THE WORLD GROUND 115 
 
 impersonal and mechanical plane we must always in princi- 
 ple end where we beginJJ 
 
 "We conclude that all non-theistic schemes have their root 
 in unclear thought, or in the verbal illusions thence result- 
 ing. What they call for is not positive disproof, but rather 
 to clarify thought itself and bring it to a consciousness of 
 its own aims and implications. When this is done they 
 vanish of themselves, and leave not even a rack behind. 
 
 The results reached in the previous discussion may be 
 held with all conviction. The attempt to understand or 
 even to define the world of things leads to the insight that 
 it is nothing except with reference to intelligence, and that 
 it must be viewed as existing only through a supreme in- 
 telligence which is its constitutive condition. In like man- 
 ner the finite spirit can make nothing of itself until it 
 reaches the thought of a supreme creative spirit in which 
 all finite existence roots. But can we understand, or in 
 any way represent to ourselves, the existence of that su- 
 preme being ? And if not, if thought loses itself in mystery, 
 if the light we seem to have, upon examination, turns to 
 darkness, theism shades away into agnosticism, and we 
 have our work for nothing. That this is the last result of 
 criticism is a frequent contention. This raises the question 
 concerning the divine personality and the inner thought- 
 life of God. 
 
 This discussion has been greatly darkened by confusion of 
 ideas, by applying to God the limitations of the finite, and 
 by mistaken expectations and demands. In popular thought 
 there has been a more or less explicit confusion of person- 
 ality with corporeality, or at least with form of some kind, 
 combined with spatial limitation and separation. This is 
 helped by the spatial metaphors in which religious speech 
 abounds, and by the fact that in all sense-thinking spatial
 
 11C METAPHYSICS 
 
 separation is the great principle of individuation. A very 
 superficial criticism serves to show the untenability of such 
 a view ; and the conclusion is drawn that God is not a per- 
 son or individual of any kind. 
 
 But this conclusion is valid only for persoualitj 7 conceived 
 as implying corporeity, form, and spatial separation. It 
 has no bearing whatever upon personality as self-conscious- 
 ness, self-knowledge, and self-control ; and this is the es- 
 sential meaning of personality. In affirming that God is 
 personal, critical thought would mean only to affirm that 
 he knows and determines himself and his activities. This 
 fact, however mysterious in its possibility, is perfectly clear 
 in its meaning, and the necessity of its affirmation is obvious. 
 
 That God is not a person or individual has been further 
 maintained, on the ground that then he would be one of a 
 kind, would be comprised in a class, and so would lose his 
 infinitude and absoluteness. If we rule out the notion of 
 form and spatial separation, which is implicit in this objec- 
 tion, there is nothing left but logical confusion. If infinite 
 meant only, and absolute meant unrelated, the conclusion 
 might be drawn ; but the real infinite is not the all, and the 
 real absolute is not unrelated. And though there be but 
 one infinite and absolute being, yet is it one of a kind and 
 stands in relations posited by itself. As existing, it is of 
 the being kind. As active, it is of the causal kind. As 
 knowing, it is of the knowing kind. To the objection that 
 the first cause cannot be classed, and hence cannot be known, 
 since there can be only one first cause, the answer has been 
 very properly returned that the first wheelbarrow is in the 
 same predicament, and is unknowable for the same reason. 
 Such argument is throughout a play on the etymology of 
 the words, in complete ignorance of their philosophical 
 meaning. Mr. Mill said it was hard to believe it seriously 
 meant.
 
 THE WORLD-GROUND 117 
 
 It is further maintained that we cannot view the infinite 
 as personal, because personality implies consciousness, and 
 consciousness implies the antithesis of subject and object. 
 Hence the infinite as one and only has no object, and hence, 
 again, cannot be viewed as conscious. Consciousness then 
 is necessarily a contradiction when ascribed to the infinite. 
 
 Here we have confusion again. The antithesis in ques- 
 tion is purely a logical or psychological form, and does not 
 involve an ontological otherness. Ps\ T chologically, the sub- 
 ject is subject only as there is an object ; and the object is 
 object only as there is a subject. But this denotes only the 
 antithetical form of consciousness in general, and is as valid 
 for self-consciousness as for any other. But subject may 
 also denote a particular knowing subject, and object may 
 mean some independently existing object ; and in unclear 
 thought it is easy to confuse these meanings and infer a 
 variety of things. We may conclude to the impossibility 
 of self -consciousness, or to the denial of the infinite person- 
 ality^ Or, by short and easy steps, we may conclude that 
 God and the world mutually imply each other. For is not 
 God subject, and is not a subject a contradiction without 
 an object ? Likewise is not the world very much of an ob- 
 ject, and must it not have a fitting subject? Thus by duly 
 considering and appropriately manipulating the fundamental 
 antithesis of subject and object we may get a rich variety 
 of important speculative truths. JBut that the infinite should 
 know itself and thus make itseTT its own object, or by its 
 activity should give itself objects, is a conception to which 
 this profound psychology is quite irrelevant.^/ 
 
 Further difficulties arise from transferring to the infinite 
 the limitations of the finite. Our intellect is limited in 
 range and in methods. Where direct insight fails we have 
 to resort to roundabout methods, induction, proof, etc. Our 
 intellect is developed also ; and some speculators have been
 
 118 METAPHYSICS 
 
 pleased to define intelligence in such a way as to make de- 
 velopment a part of the definition. Our consciousness also 
 begins and is conditioned by a great variety of circum- 
 stances beyond our control. It is easy to see that these 
 conditions cannot be applied to the infinite being ; and then 
 it is easy to say that conscious intelligence cannot be attrib- 
 uted to the infinite. 
 
 But the essential meaning of intelligence is the power to 
 know. It is no part of the notion that it must begin, or 
 that it should be developed, as a progressive "adjustment 
 of inner relations to outer relations," or that it should use 
 certain methods. The only thing essential to intelligence 
 is that it should be able to know. Likewise, it is no essen- 
 tial factor of consciousness that it should begin or should be 
 externally conditioned, but only that it should be conscious. 
 So far as speculation goes, an eternal or unbegun conscious- 
 ness is at least as thinkable as an eternal or unbegun any- 
 thing; and what the fact in the case may be is certainly 
 not to be decided by representing the accidents of human 
 thought and consciousness as essential factors of all thought 
 and consciousness. 
 
 And now looking away from this bad logic and psychol- 
 ogy, and recalling the essential meaning of personality as 
 self -consciousness, self-knowledge, and self-control, it is clear 
 that the traditional dogma of superficial criticism on this 
 point must be reversed. Instead of saying that personality 
 is impossible to the infinite, we must rather say that it is 
 possible in its fullest sense only to the infinite. The finite, 
 because of its necessary dependence and subordination, must 
 alwaj^s have an imperfect and incomplete personality. Com- 
 plete self-knowledge and self-control are possible only to 
 the absolute and infinite being ; and of this finite personal- 
 ity can never be more than a faint and feeble image. 
 
 We come now to the mistaken expectations and demands
 
 THE WORLD GROUND 119 
 
 referred to as sources of unsteady thought on this subject. 
 To begin with, we must not attempt to construe the infinite 
 spatially, whether in itself or in its relation to the world. 
 In the next chapter we shall see that space is only phenom- 
 enal and has no application to ontological reality. With 
 this result it follows that the world is neither in, nor out of, 
 God in a spatial sense; and that God is neither in, nor 
 apart from, the world in a spatial sense. The world de- 
 pends unpicturably upon God, as our thoughts depend un- 
 picturably upon the mind, and God is in the world as the 
 mind is in its thoughts, not as a pervading aura or spatial 
 presence, but as that active subject by which all things 
 exist. 
 
 Again, we may not seek to construe the infinite mind, but 
 must content ourselves with recognizing it. We have al- 
 ready seen the impossibility of construing our own minds. 
 The attempt to understand intelligence as the result of its 
 own categories has revealed itself as inverting the true order. 
 The categories are the forms of intelligence, not its com- 
 ponents ; and what intelligence is can be known only in 
 experience. Particularly do we need to bear this in mind 
 in thinking of the infinite. Otherwise we shall be tempted 
 to pass behind the absolute consciousness and feign a set of 
 impersonal metaphysical abstractions with which to explain 
 the living God. Our thought must content itself with rec- 
 ognition. Its last word must be God. As it was in the 
 beginning, is now, and ever shall be, God is that with which 
 all our inquiry must end. 
 
 And even the recognition is full of mj T stery. A thought 
 life so different from ours eludes any but the vaguest appre- 
 hension on our part. As soon as we ask for its relation to 
 time we begin to grope. If we eliminate time from it alto- 
 gether the conception of that tideless fulness of life is hard 
 to grasp. If we admit time into it, the thought of a devel-
 
 120 METAPHYSICS 
 
 oping God is a scandal to reason. And the inner life of 
 thought and feeling, unchanging, yet without monotony; 
 the structure of the absolute reason, also, which determines 
 the eternal contents of the divine thought how mysterious 
 all this is, how impenetrable to our profoundest reflection ! 
 Whatever conception we form in this field is of the nature 
 of a limit rather than of a veritable apprehension. "We see 
 that certain lines of thought tend to, or have their limit in, 
 certain affirmations. At the same time we see that, how- 
 ever necessary they may be, they always in a sense lie be- 
 yond us. The asymptote approaches but never touches the 
 curve. 
 
 "Whatever more is to be said on this subject we hand over 
 to the philosophy of religion. We content ourselves with 
 discussing the general metaphysical principles which must 
 underlie that philosophy.
 
 part 11 
 COSMOLOGY
 
 CHAPTER I 
 SPACE 
 
 WE have confined our attention thus far to the notion of 
 being in itself; and the results reached are valid for any 
 and all being. We leave now these more general consider- 
 ations and pass to the cosmic forms and manifestations of 
 being. Of course we have no thought of deducing these 
 forms as necessary logical consequences of being. Episte- 
 raology shows that there is no apriori road from ontology to 
 cosmology, and that there is a large contingent element in 
 experience. The attempt to reduce this contingent factor / 
 to logical necessity is, first, a failure so far as any insight 
 we have is concerned ; and, secondly, it shatters reason it- 
 self. We must, then, wait for experience to reveal the 
 forms of cosmic manifestation. After this revelation, how- 
 ever, it is open to criticism to examine these forms with the 
 aim of determining more accurately their nature and sig- . 
 nificance. 
 
 Our method, then, will be critical as usual. We take the 
 common-sense theory of a world of material things in space 
 and time as the text for a critical exegesis with the aim of 
 seeing what changes the previous discussion and further 
 analysis may make necessary. But in this theory space and 
 time constitute a kind of pre-condition of the world, and of 
 all possible worlds ; or they appear as determining princi- 
 ples of all cosmological manifestation. The things in space 
 and time might conceivablv have been altogether different.
 
 METAPHYSICS 
 
 Many widely diverse cosmic systems are possible in thought; 
 but for all alike space and time would be conditioning prin- 
 ciples. This is the position which they hold in spontaneous 
 thought ; and this makes it necessary to consider them in 
 the beginning of our cosmological study. 
 *i The present chapter deals with space, and the question is, 
 What is the metaphysical nature of space, and how is it 
 related to the things which are said to be in it? We exclude 
 all inquiry into the psychological genesis of the idea as ir- 
 relevant ; for the history of a notion never decides its mean- 
 ing and validity when it appears. Every idea has a psy- 
 chological history which might conceivably be written ; but 
 the meaning and worth of an idea can be determined only 
 by study of the idea itself as given in consciousness. Neither 
 the geometrical nor the metaphysical properties of space 
 can be discovered by either physiological or psychological 
 theorizing. 
 
 In the Theory of Thought and Knowledge it has been 
 shown that space, whatever else it may be, is primarily a 
 mental principle according to which the mind projects and 
 relates the objects of external experience. However real 
 space may be, it becomes real for us only as the space-law 
 is immanent in the mental activity itself. This fact makes 
 it unnecessary to have a real space in order that we may 
 have spatial experience. This experience is primarily a 
 mental product according to mental laws. We as little 
 need a real space to see things in as we need a real space 
 to dream things in. In both cases the spatial form is pri 
 marily a mental imposition from wjthin, and not a passive 
 reception of something existing without. 
 
 But to conclude from this fact that space is only a men- 
 tal form would be hasty. The study o'f perception shows 
 that all objective knowledge must arise in the same wav.
 
 SPACE 125 
 
 Knowledge cannot_pass ready-made into a passively recep- 
 tive mind, but must arise within the mind itself as the 
 result of its own activity. All perception is but an unfold- 
 ing of the inner mental nature upon occasion of certain ex- 
 citations. It is the reaction of the mind against external 
 action. But as this fact does not warrant us in denying 
 the object perceived, so neither does the necessity of space as 
 a mental principle warrant us in denying that space may 
 also be an objectively existing fact. For this conclusion we 
 need to show that space is a mental principle and that it is 
 absurd and impossible when conceived as having ontological 
 existence. The decision of this question must rest upon an 
 analysis of space conceived as something existing. If re- 
 flection upon the contents of the space-idea should reveal 
 it to be incapable of proper existence, then, and only then, 
 would its subjectivity be established. 
 
 The one thing which the subjectivity of space, as a prin- 
 ciple of intuition does accomplish, is to deprive the argu- 
 inent for its objectivity, from the alleged necessity of the 
 intuition, of all its force. If space be such a principle, of 
 course we cannot intuite things apart from it : but the ne- 
 cessity would lie in the nature of the mental subject, and 
 would equally exist whatever the nature of the object. The 
 nature of our sensibility determines us to perceive vibrating 
 objects as colored, and we cannot perceive them otherwise ; 
 but the necessity is in ourselves. On this account the argu- 
 ment that things are colored because we must perceive them 
 as such, loses all weight ; and on the same account the argu- 
 ment that things are in space because we must intuite them 
 spatially, loses all its weight. The result is, logically, a 
 drawn battle between the two views, even if the doctrine 
 of the objectivity of space were self -consistent. The ideal- 
 ist could show that there is no need to assume an objective 
 space to explain our intuition ; and the realist could show
 
 126 METAPHYSICS 
 
 that the subjectivity of space does not exclude its objectivity, 
 and that the latter view is far more in harmony with spon- 
 taneous thought. To overturn this balance of opinion and 
 reach a conclusion, it is necessary to examine the contents 
 of the space- idea. 
 
 And here,. for the sake of the weak brother, and also in 
 order not to seem to be manifestly raving, it is permissible 
 to refer once more to the distinction between phenomenal 
 and ontological reality. There can be no^ question concern- 
 ing the phenomenal reality of space. The space ancT space 
 relations are as manifest and undeniable parts of the phe- 
 nomenon as the things themselves ; and if the former were 
 removed the latter would also disappear. The question 
 must concern, not the fact of reality, but the kind of reality 
 which space possesses. Has it only phenomenal reality, or 
 has it in~ addition ontological reality ? The idealist would 
 allow the phenomenal reality, but would deny that it has 
 any other. For him space, objectively considered, is simply 
 tlie~7orm of external experience. It is not something in 
 which things are, but only the form of experience itself ; 
 and when the things are abstracted a real space is left be- 
 hind as little as a real space is left behind when dream- 
 objects. break up and vanish. For the realist, on the other 
 hand, space is something ajoart Jfrqm.,j^hin^swhich holds 
 things, or in which things exist. But for both speculators 
 alike the spatial order of experience is an undeniable datum ; 
 and for both alike the question concerns nothing that can 
 be given in experience, but rather, and only, the interpre- 
 tation of what is given in experience. 
 
 What, then, is space objectively considered ? Three views 
 are possible. First, it is something quite sui generis, inde- 
 pendent of all things, and of all that we understand by sub- 
 stantial or causal reality. Secondly, it is a peculiar order
 
 SPACE 127 
 
 of relations among things, which order, however, exists 
 objectively and independently of any thinker. Thirdly, 
 space is the form of objective experience, and is nothing in 
 abstraction from that experience. Which of these views 
 is to be held? 
 
 At first sight the first of the three views mentioned is 
 the true one. Space is not a thing, but the place of things, 
 and as such is a necessary condition of their existence ; for 
 things must have place in order to exist. At the same 
 time, space is not a nothing, but a peculiar kind of existence, 
 which can be described only in terms of itself. Something 
 and nothing, in the ordinary sense of the terms, do not form 
 a complete disjunction ; for, besides these, a third concep- 
 tion, space, is also possible ; and this cannot be defined in 
 terms of the other two. This is the view of common-sense ; 
 and it seems forced upon us by the simplest experience. 
 This view finds its expression in the oft-used phrase, that if*"? 
 fall being were away, space would still remain with all its J 
 (properties unchanged. Full or empty, space remains the ^^ 
 same, changeless an (internal- For though space conditions 
 being, being does not condition space. When the intui- 
 tion ist is looking around for a striking illustration of the 
 impossible with which to confound the empiricist, he often 
 lights upon the statement that God himself can neither 
 make nor unmake space, or do other than submit to its 
 necessity. The proposition frequently recurs in philosophy 
 to regard space as a datum objective to all being, and with J 
 
 which being must get along as best it may. Space is not V^ 
 a system of relations, for relations are changing while space 
 is changeless. It is not a property of things ; for it is inde- 
 pendent of things. It cannot be identified with any actual 
 form, for it is rather the formless principle of all form. It 
 is "the mysterious background of forms and relations, and 
 is identical with none. In this view, which is the view of
 
 128 METAPHYSICS 
 
 common-sense, space appears as a fathomless and indepen- 
 dent necessity, to which even the basal reality must submit. 
 
 At first sight, this view is sun-clear, but on closer inspec- 
 tion it is seen to be full of difficulty. The clearness is due 
 entirely to confounding the phenomenal and the ontological. 
 The space-law is the same for all phenomena, and remains 
 unchanged through all their modifications. Hence it is 
 easy to abstract it from phenomena as something by itself, 
 independent, all-embracing, and eternal. And as the phe- 
 nomenal application is always perfectly clear, we fail to 
 notice the grievous difficulties in which this notion of a 
 real and independent space involves us. If we should tell 
 one to meet us at such a time and place, not even the way- 
 faring man would have any difficulty in understanding us. 
 This is the phenomenal side of the matter. But if we ab- 
 stract the ideas of time and space from the phenomena of 
 which they are the form, and consider them as entities by 
 themselves, then, as Berkeley has it, we are " lost and em- 
 brangled in inextricable difficulties." This is the ontological 
 aspect of the case. 
 
 To begin with the difficulties in the case of a real space, 
 the conception of space as an all-containing form is an in- 
 consistent metaphor borrowed from our sense-experience. 
 Forms must always be the forms of something ; and when 
 there is no reality to produce and limit the form, the form 
 exists only in conception. When one vessel contains an- 
 other, it is not the form which contains, but the vessel ; and 
 if we cancel the reality of the latter there is no more con- 
 taining. To the conception of containing there is necessarv 
 the thought of a limit, either real or conceptual ; and with- 
 out this we have only an inconsistent imagination. The 
 fancy is due entirely to the fact that the spatial synthesis 
 applies to all phenomena, and this is mistaken for a form 
 which holds them.
 
 SPACE 129 
 
 Again, the asserted reality of space cannot be maintain- 
 ed without conflicting with the space intuition itself. For 
 space as real must come under the law of reality in general ; 
 that is, it must be able in some way to assert itself as a de- 
 termining factor in the system of things. No matter how- 
 nameless or ineffable a substratum we may assume for space, 
 this demand cannot be escaped. Unless we endow space 
 with activity and regard it as a peculiar something in inter- 
 action with other things, the affirmation of its existence 
 becomes absurd ; and its existence would be in no way dis- 
 tinguishable from its non-existence. But if we do thus en- 
 dow it, the affirmation becomes equally absurd ; for to view 
 space as active and possessing causal efficiency would be a 
 grievous affront to common-sense, which holds that space is 
 not a thing, but the place of things. 
 
 But if space have no effect upon things, and if there be 
 no reciprocal determination between space and things, we 
 are quite at a loss to know in what its alleged reality con- 
 sists, and what the relation may be between space and 
 things. That which does nothing, determines nothing, nei- 
 ther acting nor being acted upon, most certainly is noth- 
 ing. If we set out to define or give the marks of nothing 
 we could find no others than just those mentioned as the 
 marks of space. 
 
 And here, very possibly, some one may say that space is 
 nothing. "Well, then, why maintain its existence? Does 
 the nothing, the non-existent, nevertheless exist, and have 
 three dimensions and divers geometrical properties? The 
 respondent would be far from allowing the identity of the 
 space -nothing with the thing- nothing or the mathemat- 
 ical nothing ; and this proves that, while he calls space noth- 
 ing, he still has some indefinite positive existence in mind, 
 which is distinct from pure nothing, and which has peculiar 
 properties of its own. For if we view space as pure noth- 
 
 9
 
 130 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ing it is plainly absurd to affirm its existence, to endow it 
 with properties, and distinguish it from other nothings. 
 And yet if space does nothing and determines nothing, in 
 what does its reality consist ? 
 
 Now to this question, and to the other concerning the 
 relation of things to space, common-sense has an answer. 
 The reality of space consists in its being just what it is 
 seen to be, unbounded room for things ; and the relation of 
 things to space is equally simple ; they are in space. Xoth- 
 ing could be more manifest or less mysterious. 
 
 ' So it seems, no doubt, so long as we fail to distinguish 
 between the phenomenal and the ontological stand-point. 
 Space and space relations are perfectly clear as phenom- 
 enal; they express the general form of objective experience 
 and the relations which obtain among our objects. But as 
 phenomenal they have only mental existence, and our in- 
 quiry concerns a supposed ontological space. And we ask 
 what is its metaphysical nature, and what is the metaphys- 
 ical relation between this real space and the things said 
 to be in it? And to these questions there is no answer 
 which does not either conflict with the space intuition itself 
 or else deny all real relation. If we endow space with effi- 
 ciency we outrage common- sense ; and if we do not thus 
 endow it we deny all reality to space itself and all real rela- 
 tion between it and things. Thus we become "lost and em- 
 brangled in inextricable difficulties" in our search for a real 
 space in distinction from the apparent order of experience. 
 
 And the further we go the worse we fare ; for the inner 
 structure of this supposed real space teems with unman- 
 ageable paradox. It is easy to say that space is one, but 
 it is not so easy to say in what its unity consists. Onto- 
 logical jmity, we have seen, is possible only to intelligence ; 
 and~the unity of space, for thought, depends on the pos- 
 sibility of comprehending all our phenomena in a single
 
 SPACE 131 
 
 scheme, and of uniting all diversities of position in a re- 
 lated whole. But this unity exists for thought only, and 
 only through the mental synthesis itself. But in the real 
 space apart from mind, this synthesis is lacking ; in what, 
 then, does its unity consist? The fact is, it has none. The 
 law of space is the mutual externality of every part to 
 every other. Space exists only as the parts exist. They 
 are the realities and it is their sum. *ut what binds them 
 together into a whole? What determines their mutual 
 positions and fixes them in changeless relations? If this 
 were done by thought it would be intelligible, but it is al- 
 together unintelligible when supposed to be done apart 
 from thought. To posit a dynamic relation among the in- 
 finite positions, whereby each prescribes its place to every 
 other, would be monstrous ; and a logical relation is mean- 
 ingless apart from thought. 
 
 A second difficulty with the doctrine which regards space 
 as real, apart from things, is that it leads to a hopeless dual- 
 ismof first principles. If space be a reality aparTTrom 
 things, it is something uncreated and eternal. No one 
 would be hardy enough to maintain a proper creation of 
 space conceived of as an infinite void, for no meaning can 
 be attached to the phrase ; indeed, the idea itself negatives 
 creation. Those speculators who have taught a creation of 
 space have generally abandoned the common conception, 
 and regarded space as a system of relations, or as a prop- 
 erty of things. In such a case 3 the creation of the things 
 would be the creation of space. But the common notion of 
 an independent~space is repugnant to creation, for the ne- 
 cessity would ever pursue us of positing a previous space 
 for the reception of the created one. Accordingly, spon- 
 taneous thought has always regarded space as one of the 
 eternal and self-existent necessities which even God himself 
 cannot escape.
 
 132 METAPHYSICS 
 
 But this view is contradicted by the necessary unity 
 of the basal reality. English and American thinkers, in 
 general, have paid very little attention to the general 
 problem of knowledge ; and hence they have had little 
 hesitation in allowing any number of independent prin- 
 ciples. Many have proposed to view space and time as 
 mutually independent, and as equally independent of God ; 
 and now and then a speculator proposes to add matter to 
 the list. Indeed, the materialists general!} 7 view space, 
 time, and matter as mutually independent and self-sufficient 
 existences. But we have seen, in discussing the relation of 
 the infinite to the system, that all principles and all mani- 
 festation alike must flow from the infinite, and that the 
 infinite must be one. If we should posit anything aside 
 from the infinite as alike independent, the second something 
 could not manifest itself in our system without an inter- 
 action between the two. But this would make them both 
 dependent, and would force us to assume some other being, 
 deeper than both, as their common source or foundation. 
 
 e cannot, then, view space and being as mutually inde- 
 pendent ; for in that case being and space must be in inter- 
 action, if space is to affect our system."~jBut this would de- 
 stroy the independence of both, and would also make space 
 an active thing, and not space. 
 
 It is conceivable that some person should still be found 
 who might think it enough to say that the only relation 
 between space and being is, that being is in space ; but if 
 they be mutually independent, existence in space can have 
 no significance for being. Both being and space would go 
 on in complete indifference, and there would be no possi- 
 bility of communication between them. In that case no 
 meaning -whatever could be attached to the proposition 
 that being is in space. But it is absurd to speak of being 
 as dependent on space, and hence we must view space
 
 SPACE 133 
 
 as dependent on being. Further, it is impossible to view 
 space, conceived as extended emptiness, as created or de- 
 pendent. Hence space cannot be viewed as such emptiness, 
 but must be in some sense a principle in being which is the 
 root of spatial manifestation.Tinstead of saying, then, that 
 being is in space, we must rattier say that space is in being."*? 
 It is strictly impossible to regard space as a self-existent 
 reality, for the conclusions reached in the ontology make it 
 impossible to posit more than one basal and independent 
 existence. All else is a consequence of this one reality, 
 either as a creation or as a principle of activity and mani- 
 festation. But space, as commonly conceived, admits of no 
 creation. If, then, the popular thought has rightly grasped 
 the contents of the space-idea, we can view space only as 
 some principle in being. 
 
 The above conclusion is drawn from the impossibility of 
 having more than one fundamental existence. It results 
 also from a consideration of the unity of being. If space 
 be a real objective existence, then the infinite, or rather 
 God, is in space, and possesses bulk and diameter. For 
 whatever exists in space must exist either as a point or as 
 a volume ; and as no one would think of ascribing a punc- 
 tual existence to God, there is nothing to do but to ascribe 
 volume. But nothing possessing volume in space can be 
 a unit. Points and component volumes can always be dis- 
 tinguished in the volume of such a thing, and thus the thing 
 appears as made up of parts. But such a conception applied 
 to the infinite cancels both its unity and its omnipresence. 
 That which is omnipresent in space cannot be extended in 
 space, for such extension would imply merely the presence 
 of the being part for part, or volume for volume, in the oc- 
 cupied space. Philosophy cannot reconcile the necessary 
 unity of the infinite with existence in space, and theology 
 cannot reconcile its conception of the non-spatial mode of
 
 134 METAPHYSICS 
 
 the divine existence with existence in space. But if space 
 be real it must be infinite, and God must exist in space, and 
 the indicated conclusions must follow. These conclusions 
 apply especially to Newton's and Clarke's conception of 
 space. They, in effect, made it an attribute of God ; and 
 Clarke framed a theistic argument on this conception. But 
 this view simply affirms extension of God, and leads to the 
 difficulties mentioned. 
 
 On all these accounts, therefore, we hold that space can- 
 not be viewed as a real existence. Its reality is incompati- 
 ble with the unity of being, and with the unity of all prin 
 ciples in one fundamental being. To maintain its reality, 
 we must despatialize it, and make it an active thing; and 
 thus we conflict with our space-intuition, which at once de- 
 mands a second space to contain the first. Finally, we can- 
 not bring space, and the things which are said to be in it, 
 into any articulate relation without positing an interaction 
 between them. Thus we fall back into the previous diffi- 
 culty, and despatialize space. The declaration that space is 
 real, and that things are in it, which seemed so sun-clear, 
 turns out, upon inquiry, to be in the highest degree unclear 
 and untenable. 
 
 These difficulties have led many thinkers to abandon the 
 common notion of space for the second view mentioned 
 that space is a certain order of relations among realities. 
 They allow that space apart from things is nothing, and 
 hence that, if things were away, there would be strictly 
 nothing remaining. But things, when they exist, exist in 
 certain relations, and the sum, or system, of these relations 
 constitutes space. Things, then, do not exist in space ; but 
 they exist in space -relations, and with space - properties. 
 These relations and properties are the constituents of the 
 space-idea, and by abstraction from them we come to the
 
 SPACE 135 
 
 notion of a single unitary space. But while space is thus 
 dependent upon things, these relations and properties of 
 things are quite independent of our thinking. This view, 
 then, agrees with the preceding one in regarding these rela- 
 tions as independent of the mind and as objectively exist- 
 ing among things. 
 
 If this view were correct we should have no unity what- 
 ever in space ; for the space relations of things are perpet- 
 ually changing, and thus space itself is perpetually becom- 
 ing something else. It also makes no provision for the 
 myriad ideal and possible space relations which are implicit 
 in the space intuition, but are not realized. All of these 
 would have to be handed over to subjectivity as having 
 only mental existence; while the real space would become 
 a variable thing without any unity or continuity whatever. 
 Moreover, the view has some very curious implications. A 
 single thing could not be in space at all ; and any system of 
 things which always maintained the same relations would 
 be in the same space. Our solar system, conceived by it- 
 self, would always be in the same space, so long as the 
 same relations of its members were maintained. Either, 
 then, the whole system could not move, or, if it did move, 
 it would still be in the same space. Following out this line 
 of thought, we should come upon some unusually hard and 
 dark sayings. 
 
 But the view is untenable in any case ; for formal rela- 
 tions are incapable of real existence. It might conceivabty 
 be contended that relations of interaction may exist apart 
 from thought ; but formal relations exist only in and through 
 thought. And as it would hardly occur to any one to at- 
 tribute causal efficiency to space relations, we can only 
 conclude that they are formal relations, and as such are 
 necessarily subjective. Hence, if space be only a system of 
 relations, it is purely subjective ; and thus the view passes
 
 136 METAPHYSICS 
 
 over into the third one, which makes space only phe- 
 nomenal. 
 
 This subjectivity of formal relations is easily misunder- 
 stood through a pardonable oversight. There are many re- 
 lations among the objects of thought which are seen to 
 be universal; and because they do not exist for one more 
 than for another, we say that they exist independently of 
 the mind. Thought or unthought, the relations exist among 
 the realities ; and the realities are really related. This fact 
 we seek to express by saying that the relations themselves 
 are independent of all thought. But all that we can mean 
 here is to affirm the universality of the relation. There is 
 a great difference between being-independent of our thought 
 and being independent of all thought. And when we ask 
 what the ontological fact is underlying a formal relation 
 when abstracted from all reference to a constitutive in- 
 telligence, there is strictly nothing to be found. However 
 relatable things may be in themselves, they are related only 
 in the relating act of thought; and that relatability also, if 
 pursued, would be found to refer back to thought some- 
 where for its origin and meaning. 
 
 This subjectivity of relations, however, must be carefully 
 distinguished from any doctrine which makes them individ- 
 ual or arbitrary. It allows the possibility that objects of 
 thought may be so constituted that in clear thought only 
 certain relations can be instituted, as in the case of number 
 and geometrical figures. The relations, while subjective, 
 may be also necessary. It is equally possible that the 
 objects of thought may be such that whenever they are 
 conceived by any intelligence anywhere the same relations 
 shall be instituted. The relations, while subjective, may 
 also be universal. It follows only from this subjectivity 
 that it is absurd to speak of relations as objectively existing. 
 And what is thus true of relations in general must be true
 
 SPACE 137 
 
 also of space - relations. In so far as space is a system of 
 relations, in so far it has only a subjective existence. If 
 space-relations are to have objective existence, they must be 
 more than relations ; they must be a series of interactions 
 among things. But in that case we should deny the in- 
 difference of things to space, and fall back again into the 
 view which makes space active. We must then dismiss 
 the doctrine that space is a series of objective relations 
 among things which exist independently of thought. Space 
 is neither a real thing nor an ontological predicate. 
 
 The two first views of the nature of space proving unten- 
 able, we seem shut up to the third, which makes space a 
 form of intuition, and not a mode of existence. According 
 to this view, things are not in space and space-relations, 
 but appear to be. In themselves they are essentially non- 
 spatial ; but by their interactions with one another, and 
 with the mind, they give rise to the appearance of a world 
 of extended things in a common space. Space-predicates, 
 then, belong to phenomena only, and not to things in them- 
 selves. But while shut up to this view by the failure of 
 the others, we seem shut out from it by its own overwhelm- 
 ing absurdity. Certainly, before the doctrine can be made 
 to seem anything but the most grievous outrage on com- 
 mon-sense, the paradox must be explained away, or at least 
 relieved ; and this we now hope to do. The chief difficulties 
 are due to a swarm of misconceptions, which have clustered 
 around the doctrine; and a large part of the argument for its 
 validity must consist in removing these misunderstandings. 
 
 In the first place, the doctrine is commonly made to mean 
 that our space-intuition is something arbitrary, and with- 
 out any determining factor in the world of causality. The 
 mind is conceived as standing with its space-forms waiting 
 to impose them upon reality without any regard whatever
 
 138 METAPHYSICS 
 
 for the peculiar nature or circumstances of reality. These 
 forms are purely external impositions, and might as well 
 have been anything else whatever. They are the mental 
 spectacles through which the mind looks, and, for all we 
 .know, other beings may have altogether different spectacles. 
 This doctrine of the spectacles implies absolute nescience 
 and universal relativity of knowledge ; for, of course, we 
 cannot tell how things would look if the spectacles were 
 off; nor how things may look to other beings who may 
 have different spectacles. 
 
 But the obnoxious feature of the doctrine is that the 
 spectacles are viewed as having only an arbitrary relation 
 to reality, and hence one which might as well be changed 
 as not. Even Kant, the first pronounced teacher of the 
 ideality of space, is chargeable with this misunderstand- 
 ing and extravagance. Doubtless many passages could be 
 adduced which would show that he viewed the order and 
 sequence of phenomena as objectively determined ; but in 
 so doing he was inconsistent with his own doctrine of 
 causation, which denies determination to things in them- 
 selves ; and, besides, the conception of the mind, as arbitra- 
 rily related to things, incessantly reappears. The result is 
 that his theory of perception breaks down in the attempt 
 to bring the mental form into use. The mental form is 
 compatible with the most varied applications. In itself it 
 does not determine whether a given object shall appear 
 as a cube or as some other figure ; and there is nothing in 
 Kant's exposition which supplies a principle of discrimina- 
 tion, or makes the choice between the various forms other 
 than arbitrary. The disciples of Kant were more obliv- 
 ious of this difficulty than Kant himself, and in general 
 they left the application of the mental form to pure chance. 
 It was necessary, therefore, that the system should pass 
 into the subjective idealism of Fichte.
 
 SPACE 139 
 
 But the human mind has no such liberty in the use of its. 
 subjective forms. The positions and relations of things in 
 our subjective space are independent of our volition ; and 
 their spatial changes take place without any consent of ours. 
 The source of their movement and the ground of their rela- 
 tive arrangement are not in us alone. The subjective image 
 of things in space at any point and time is a fixed one. We 
 cannot exchange the right for the left, the up for the down, 
 the far for the near. Least of all can we eliminate the idea 
 of distance from our subjective space, and think of things 
 as equidistant from ourselves or from one another. The 
 same thing has happened with the subjectivity of space as 
 with the subjectivity of sense-qualities. It is very common, 
 when the beginner in psychology has learned rather than 
 mastered the latter doctrine, to hear him affirming that they 
 are nothing but mental affections, in complete ignorance of 
 the fact that, while subjective effects, they still have an ob- 
 jective cause, which, though not like them, nevertheless de- 
 termines them. In affirming the subjectivity of space we 
 have equally to admit something beyond ourselves which is 
 a determining factor in our spatial experience. 
 
 This objective factor may be conceived in two ways. 
 We may regard it as a non-spatial system with which we 
 are in interaction ; or we may regard it as God himself, who 
 is reproducing in finite thought the order which exists in 
 his infinite thought. In the former case we can affirm the 
 subjectivity of space only in the following form. The re- 
 lation of things to us is such that when they strike upon 
 our senses they produce certain sensations of light, heat, 
 and sound. These sensations, however, are not copies of 
 anything objective, but are the subjective symbol, or trans- 
 lation, of certain phases of the object. Now in the same 
 way things and their unpicturable interactions are such 
 that they produce in perceptive beings an intuition of space,
 
 140 METAPHYSICS 
 
 which intuition, again, is not a copy of anything objective, 
 but only the subjective symbol or translation into the forms 
 of sense -intuition of unpicturable realities beyond them. 
 The intuition, however, is not independent of the realities, 
 but for each change in the latter there is a definite change 
 in the former. Just as a rise or fall in the rate of vibra- 
 tion is attended by a rise or fall of the tone heard, or the 
 color seen, so any change in the metaphysical interactions of 
 things is attended b} T a corresponding change in the appar- 
 ent space-relations. Or as the dark ether tides flash into a 
 sphere of light when they strike upon an eye, so the ineffa- 
 ble tides of cosmic causality, when they strike the soul, 
 appear ;:s a world of things in space and space-relations. 
 The subjective intuition has its objective ground ; but that 
 ground, though unlike its mental translation, yet stands in 
 certain definite relations to it, so that a given state of the 
 object allows only one space-translation, just as a given rate 
 of vibration can be heard only as one tone. This fixed con- 
 nection between reality and its spatial phenomena allows 
 us to deal with the latter as if they were real objects, and 
 to predict their course with as much certainty as if they 
 were things in themselves. It produces the same reign of 
 law among phenomena and the same possibility of prevision 
 which would exist if phenomena were things. Mechanics 
 and astronomy run no risk of being falsified or displaced 
 by the subjectivity of space. 
 
 This is a possible view of the subjectivity of space, but 
 it cannot be regarded as adequate in this form. There is 
 in it an assumption of impersonal finite agents, and this we 
 have come to regard as a great heresy. The view arises 
 from approaching the subject from the side of causality 
 before we have raised causality to the volitional and intel- 
 lectual form. For us, apart from the finite spirit, there is 
 nothing but the infinite mind and its activities; and the
 
 SPACE 1-tl 
 
 objective determining ground of our space order must be 
 sought here rather than in any unpicturable finite exist- 
 ence. In this view the impersonal and non- spatial finite 
 falls away entirely as a reality by itself, and leaves only 
 the infinite agency and the phenomena it produces. This 
 gives an entirely different aspect to the whole question, as 
 will appear in the discussion of the next objection. 
 
 A second misconception is that this view makes space a 
 delusion, and thus destroys all confidence in the mind. This 
 error has several roots. The first is the failure to distin- 
 guish between phenomenal and ontological reality ; and a 
 second is the confounding of subjectivity with delusion. 
 The first point has been sufficiently referred to already. 
 No one proposes to deny the phenomenal reality of space 
 or its universal validity in our experience. Doubt attaches 
 only to that ontological space of traditional dogmatism ; 
 and on this point experience can decide nothing. 
 
 The second confusion rests upon an easy oversight of 
 spontaneous thought concerning the relation of mind to 
 reality. In all of our objective knowing we seem to be 
 dealing with a reality which was there before we thought 
 about it, and which is quite independent of our thought. 
 Thus we are easily led to think of mind as non-essential to 
 reality, as adding and constituting nothing, and as at best 
 only copying a reality which would exist just the same, if 
 all mind were away. The theistic realist would of course 
 admit that the reality had its origin in the divine thought, 
 but he would find no present function for that thought be- 
 yond knowing things existing in their own right beyond it. 
 
 But while the origin of this notion is obvious, and while 
 spontaneous thought should not be blamed for resting in it, 
 it becomes an uncritical prejudice when advanced as a spec- 
 ulative dogma. It has long been one of the great questions 
 of philosophy whether mind can be viewed as thus super-
 
 142 METAPHYSICS 
 
 fluous, or whether, on the contrary, reality can have its 
 full existence anywhere but in mind. Episteraology shows 
 that nothing can exist for mind which does not have its 
 root in mind. And logic shows that reality is unintelligible 
 and impossible except with reference to mind. Every def- 
 inition of reality which is not reality for mind either shat- 
 ters on the rocks of the Eleatic Scylla or is ingulfed in the 
 whirlpools of the Heraclitic Charybdis. The conception 
 of extra-mental existence is simply a shadow of our convic- 
 tion that our objects are not created by us ; and this inde- 
 pendence of our mind is mistaken for an independence 
 of all mind a notion which destroys itself. We conclude, 
 then, that subjectivity, in the sense of dependence on 
 mind, is universal; and that objectivity, in the sense of 
 non-dependence on mind, is a fiction, a shadow of crude 
 thinking. 
 
 Now from this point of view the subjectivity of space is 
 far enough from making space a delusion. For sponta- 
 neous thought all our objects are real in an extra- mental 
 sense. The confused synthesis of experiences which makes 
 up the world- view of common-sense is regarded as alike 
 real and as real in the same sense. And when criticism be- 
 gins, the true question is not whether this mass of raw 
 material be real, but what kind of reality it possesses, and 
 whether different parts have not different kinds of reality. 
 And the inquiry once started, we soon find ourselves com- 
 pelled to disturb the uncritical rest of common-sense. The 
 entire world of sense-qualities is first discovered to have no 
 extra-mental and ontological existence, but only a phenom- 
 enal reality. They do not thereby become unreal and de- 
 lusive ; for all that was ever true of them remains true of 
 them still. Their nature and relations are undisturbed ; 
 and their immense significance for our practical life is as 
 undeniable as ever. We have learned not that they are un-
 
 SPACE 143 
 
 real, but that they have their reality only in and for mind. 
 And this reality for mind is not only a very important kind 
 of reality, but when we look closely into the matter we find 
 ourselves somewhat at a loss to discover anything more 
 real this side of the spiritual causality on which all finite 
 reality depends. 
 
 In the same manner, when we come to consider the spatial 
 order of things, we discover not that it is unreal, but that 
 it is real only for mind. But it does not therefore become 
 a delusion. Space is still the form of our objective experi- 
 ence, and is as law-giving for that experience as ever. It is 
 not then a delusion ; for all that was ever true of space and 
 space - relations, and of objects in space -relations, remains 
 true still. We have merely discovered that there is some- 
 thing deeper than space, and that spatial phenomena are 
 nothing in which we can rest as ontologically ultimate, or 
 as existing apart from mind. Apparent reality exists spa- 
 tially ; but proper ontological reality exists spacelessly and 
 without spatial predicates. And this conclusion is not 
 forced upon us against reason, but by reason itself. We 
 do not deny the truth of appearances as appearing. They 
 furnish the starting-point but not the stopping-point ; for 
 we find in the appearances themselves the necessity of go- 
 ing behind them to something which, though their ground, 
 is still without the predicates of the appearances. Whoever 
 will bear in mind that reality as it exists for reason does 
 not contradict reality as it appears will see that there is 
 nothing sceptical in the conclusion, provided it be solidly 
 deduced. On the contrary, the refusal to go where thought 
 points is the true and only scepticism. 
 
 Well, then, is the real world spatial or non-spatial? That 
 depends altogether on what we mean by the real world. If 
 we mean the world of experience, it most certainly is spatial. 
 If we mean a world of ontological substances other than
 
 144 METAPHYSICS 
 
 spiritual existences, it certainly is not spatial. But it is per- 
 mitted to doubt whether such a world exists. Experience 
 reveals the apparent world, and reflection shows its phe- 
 nomenal character ; but reflection also shows that for the 
 explanation of this world we do not need a noumenal world, 
 but rather the infinite and its unpicturable causality. The 
 noumenal world behind the apparent world, trying to peer 
 through it but hopelessly masked by it, is something for 
 which speculation has no longer any use. Nor may we call 
 the causality on which the apparent world depends the real 
 world ; for that causality finds its meaning only in the ap- 
 parent world which it founds. In abstraction from this 
 effect which it realizes, we can make nothing of it whatever. 
 And thus, in a very important sense, it appears that the 
 apparent is the reality of the non-apparent. 
 
 The source of these paradoxes, which we seem to have 
 been heaping up without conscience or remorse, lies in the 
 attempt to define reality without reference to intelligence. 
 The real world, we fancy, is not the apparent world, for 
 that is phenomenal and exists only for intelligence. The 
 real world, then, is the noumenal world of impersonal things 
 in unpicturable relations of interaction. Into this world we 
 cannot enter by any spatial intuition ; only the pure reason 
 can gain admission here. Luckily, the pure reason, before 
 seeking admission, bethinks itself to examine the notion of 
 this world ; and then it turns out that this world, if it ex- 
 ists, does so only in and for intelligence. All such reality 
 is constituted by intelligence, and has no meaning apart 
 from intelligence. In this sense this noumenal world is 
 phenomenal, and yet, unfortunately, it is not phenomenal 
 to any assignable percipients. From this stand-point the 
 so-called noumenal world begins to take on a fictitious look, 
 while the phenomenal world is as undeniable as ever. And,
 
 SPACE 145 
 
 indeed, as soon as we see the impossibility of defining the 
 reality of things except with relation to a constituent idea 
 and a constituting intelligence, phenomenal reality is all we 
 are permitted to look for in the world of things. Thus the 
 apparent world becomes the only world there is, and is just 
 as real as it proves itself to be. To be sure, it has not onto- 
 logical existence, but it is the seat and substance of prac- 
 tical experience. And when we aim to explain it we are 
 not to look for a fictitious noumenal world, but rather for 
 its substantial cause and ground ; and this cause must be 
 non-spatial. 
 
 These considerations go a long way towards saving the 
 truth of appearances. We are not in a world of illusions 
 and fictions ; we are rather in the world of mind. And in 
 this world the space order has its place and value. More- 
 over, the demand to think of ontological reality as without 
 relation to space is, after all, not so foreign to our thought. 
 We have only to reflect upon our own existence to see that 
 in any case space applies only to the objects of sense-in- 
 tuition. It never occurs to us, at least when thought is 
 fairly critical, to give the inner life spatial predicates. We 
 think of our thoughts as neither in the soul nor out of it, 
 but only as dependent upon it. We do not think of them 
 as to the right or the left, above or below one another, but 
 only as co-existent and sequent in logical relations. In the 
 same way we think of the fundamental being which we 
 have been forced to posit, as without form of any kind ; and 
 we think of the finite, spatial and non-spatial alike, as ex- 
 isting in it as non-spatially as our thoughts and feeling ex- 
 ist in the mind. And as the soul and its products cannot 
 be pictured in their proper existence, so the infinite and its 
 products cannot be pictured in their proper existence. In 
 thinking in this field we must use concepts and not images. 
 We also point out once more that if we do view space as 
 10
 
 146 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ontologically real, the infinite itself must be viewed as spa- 
 tial, and thus would disappear altogether. There is no way 
 of maintaining the unity and reality of the infinite apart 
 from the essential phenomenality of space. On this point 
 popular thought has attained to no consistent conception. 
 Once in a while a speculator can be found who maintains 
 that all things, finite and infinite, material and spiritual, 
 are in space ; but in general the tendency has been to limit 
 space to material things only. But there has been little 
 effort to reconcile the non-spatiality of spiritual existence 
 with the ontological reality of space. Indeed, their incom- 
 patibility is the unsuspected source of most of our material- 
 istic speculation. 
 
 Shall we say, then, that space is the form under which 
 we intuite objects ? There is no objection, provided we do 
 not conceive the objects as something apart from the intui- 
 tion and as warped by the intuition into forms foreign to 
 their true nature. These " things in themselves " are myths 
 engendered by the Kantian epistemology, which still held 
 the fancy that there can be reality which is not reality for 
 intelligence. This fancy, combined with the phenomenality 
 of space, gave the unknowable noumena as a matter of 
 course. The phrase proposed becomes less misleading if we 
 change it to read that space is the form of objective intui- 
 tion, or the form of objective experience. At the same time 
 we maintain its strict phenomenality. Neither the mind 
 nor things are in space ; we have experience under the 
 spatial form. And this spatial experience, considered as a 
 mental event or form of psychical activity, is non-spatial. 
 To ascribe spatial properties to it would be as absurd as to 
 say that the thought of length must itself be long or the 
 thought of fire must be hot. 
 
 When we are considering the space world as object we 
 are not to view it as a translation of reality into forms of
 
 SPACE 147 
 
 appearance. It is simply what \ve find it to be. But when 
 we consider it from the epistemological stand-point, then it 
 is permitted to use this metaphor of translation. For the 
 knowledge of space arises in the mind through a spaceless 
 reaction against spaceless affections of the sensibi]it\ T . More- 
 over, the world itself as product rests continually upon the 
 producing energy of the infinite. In this system of activity 
 we have our place ; and in the inductive sense we are in 
 interaction with it. And out of this unpicturable dynamic 
 relation arises the stimulus to all objective knowing. Space 
 itself is not a translation, but our knowledge of space is not 
 improperly called a translation of dynamic relations into 
 forms of appearance. 
 
 Some final misconceptions may soon be warded off. It 
 is not to be expected that daily language should be modified 
 to suit this view; indeed, if it were, it would almost cer- 
 tainly be false ; for daily life deals only with things in in- 
 tuition, and space is a form of intuition. It is only when 
 we pass into the ontological realm that we must drop our 
 space-conceptions. It would be absurd pedantry to refuse 
 to say that the sun rises and sets, and yet when it comes to 
 an ultimate explanation we must forsake the phenomenal 
 stand-point and put ourselves at the centre. It would be 
 excessively tedious and stupid if, instead of calling a thing 
 red or green, we should say that it emits vibrations of a 
 certain length. "When dealing with phenomena, phenome- 
 nal language only is in place. Yet even here it is at times 
 necessary to drop our phenomenal expressions and deal with 
 the fact in thought-terms. So also in metaphysics we use 
 and must use the language of space in dealing with phenom- 
 ena ; but when we seek for an ultimate explanation we are 
 forced to abandon this language as having only phenomenal 
 application. 
 
 Yet, after all, it will be urged, this view is totally foreign
 
 148 METAPHYSICS 
 
 to the appearance. Of course it is, and no one denies it. 
 Space as the form of appearance can never be emptied out 
 of appearance. It is a complete misconception of our aim 
 to suppose that we are trying to intuite things out of space. 
 Any attempt to construe the doctrine to the imagination 
 must necessarily fail ; for space is the form of the imagina- 
 tion. All such attempts are excluded by the terms of the 
 doctrine, and hence involve a misunderstanding of it. We 
 cannot, therefore, pierce behind space by the imagination 
 which is limited to the forms of space, and tell how the non- 
 spatial realities look in their non-spatial existence. They 
 do not look at all. Pure thought only can enter that un- 
 imaginable realm, and with its non-spatial categories deter- 
 mine how we shall think of the unpicturable reality which 
 founds all relations and all appearances. When, then, one 
 asks, Are all things together in space? or when I seem to 
 be moving am I really sitting still ? he shows thereby that 
 he has not grasped the doctrine, and he even awakens the 
 suspicion that he may not be entitled to any opinion in this 
 matter. 
 
 It will be further urged that this is not the impression 
 which experience makes on spontaneous thought. But what 
 of that? Spontaneous thought is busied only with things 
 as they appear; and space is real in appearance. More- 
 over, there is scarcely a single doctrine of science, from 
 the theory of matter to the theory of astronomy, which 
 agrees with the impressions of spontaneous thought. If our 
 senses rightly report to us the phenomenal world, and make 
 a platform on which life can go on, we can excuse them 
 if they do not give us the ultimate metaphysical truth. For 
 practical purposes they give us something a great deal bet- 
 ter; and sane metaphysics when it comes does not dis- 
 credit the senses, but only the hast} 7 inferences based upon 
 them. In truth, it is not a case of sense against reason, but
 
 SPACE 
 
 of one system of metaphysics against another; both of 
 which must find their raw material in sense itself. 
 
 A final objection is drawn from epistemology. Subject 
 and object, it may be said, form a necessary antithesis in 
 thought ; and the object is external to the subject. And 
 what do we mean by the external world, a phrase which 
 the idealist himself is compelled to use, but a world out- 
 side of the subject ? The subject is here, the world is there, 
 yonder, all about us. No amount of speculative hasheesh 
 can long blind us to this fact; and so long as this fact re- 
 mains, the subjectivity of space can never be more than 
 an idol of the speculative den. 
 
 The objector is earnest, but, however full of sweetness, is 
 somewhat lacking in light. To begin with, he seems to 
 confuse his body with himself; and as he finds the body 
 to exist in spatial relations to other bodies, all of which as 
 spatial are mutually external, he apparently fancies that 
 objects are spatially outside of the subject. This concep- 
 tion, if it were valid, would make knowledge altogether 
 impossible. The truth is, the relation of subject and object 
 is absolutely unique and can only be experienced. . It ad- 
 mits of no spatial representation. 
 
 As to what we mean by the external world, the ideal- 
 ist has an easy answer. It may mean the order which is 
 independent of our thought. It is the not -self, not in the 
 sense of existing apart from all mind, but in the sense of 
 being independent of us. Or it may mean, and in this con- 
 nection it would mean, those factors of our experience to 
 which we give space relations. Some elements of experi- 
 ence have the spatial form, and some have only the tem- 
 poral form. It is this fact which underlies the distinction 
 of internal and external in psychology ; but we reach noth- 
 ing extra-mental in this way. 
 
 There is a deep -lying mystery here whose implicit but
 
 150 METAPHYSICS 
 
 unconscious presence is the source of much of our uneasi- 
 ness in this matter. Without a common-to-all, knowledge 
 breaks up into self-destructive individualism ; and to found 
 this common -to-all, we seem to need a common object. And 
 then, in order to secure its identity in itself and its exist- 
 ence for all, nothing seems so promising as to plant it in 
 one space where everybody may have free access to it. 
 Thus the identity and community of the object are secured 
 and insured, and knowledge is made possible. 
 
 This view is clear because it admits of being pictured ; 
 and its hopeless absurdity is revealed only to critical reflec- 
 tion. And reflection has nothing to put into its place which 
 will compare with it for easy understanding. The world is 
 one only for and in the divine thought ; and the world has 
 its place, not in space, but in the divine mind. And our 
 theory of knowledge must ultimately run back to the di- 
 vine thought and will for its definition of reality, for the 
 unity and identity of the object, and for the possibility of 
 knowledge in general. Thus we are introduced to a world 
 of unpicturable relations and of impenetrable mystery, in 
 comparison with which the sense-view is sun-clear and self- 
 evident ; that is, in advance of reflection. And yet, after 
 all, this difficult view turns out to represent the line of log- 
 ical least resistance, when thought becomes critical and re- 
 flective. And if it seems to suggest Malebranche and the 
 vision of all things in God, it is none the worse for that. 
 
 And now that the question is raised, it seems well to 
 come to some definite understanding on this matter of phe- 
 nomenal knowledge. From the stand-point of the sense- 
 bound philosopher, phenomenal knowledge can hardly seem 
 to be knowledge at all, but only a recitation of individual 
 experiences. Phenomena as such are only in the mind ; 
 and when many persons perceive the same phenomena there 
 is no more objectivity than when many persons dream the
 
 SPACE 151 
 
 
 
 Same dream. We might possibly get on with the phenom- 
 enality of sense-qualities, because, though subjective, they 
 may be related to real and common objects in space. But 
 when these objects are also made phenomenal, then all re- 
 ality, community, and identity of the object disappear; and 
 nothing is left but a multitude of individual dreams, more 
 or less overlapping and coincident perhaps, but having no 
 other connection. To this failure and overthrow of real 
 knowledge the phenomenal doctrine must come. 
 
 We touch here upon a real difficulty and a profound mys- 
 tery. At first sight the objections urged seem conclu- 
 sive ; and there appears to be no way out, except to put the 
 real objects back into real space, and let every one come 
 forward and know them as they are. Only thus can the 
 reality and identity of the object be secured. 
 
 So it undoubtedly seems, but the matter grows obscure 
 upon reflection. In the first place, the phenomenality of 
 sense-qualities is not so easily conceived, and yet it must be. 
 admitted. The notion that, apart from eyes and ears, the 
 world is neither dark nor light, neither sounding nor silent, 
 is fairly hard to realize. And we are not much helped in 
 the realization by being told that the things are really there, 
 only they are altogether different from what they appear. 
 "Transfigured realism" is a broken reed. The distinction 
 of primary and secondary qualities will not work. But if 
 we can have an experience of a common-to-all in sense, even 
 when there is no extra-mentality in the object, we might 
 equally have it in connection with spatial phenomena in 
 general. 
 
 The real problem here divides into two. First, can we 
 have an experience of an order, or of thought contents and 
 relations, which shall be valid for all ? Secondl}*, how can 
 we have such experience? The first is simply a question of 
 fact; and the answer must be in. the affirmative. To the
 
 152 METAPHYSICS 
 
 second question no answer can be given. We do not know 
 how we reach the common-to-all ; we only know that we 
 reach it. This is the deep mystery which is involved in the 
 community of finite minds ; and its solution must finally be 
 sought in the realm of the infinite. 
 
 But to the second question common-sense thinks it gives 
 an answer. This illusion is due to picturing the object in 
 space with other bodies about it which represent the know- 
 ing subjects. With this image well in mind, it is easy to 
 see how they all have the same object ; for they are all gath- 
 ered round the object and everybody sees it to be one and 
 the same. But this delusive clearness disappears when 
 we remember the process of perception. We never can get 
 nearer the object than our thought will carry us ; and the 
 object exists for us as anything independent of our thought 
 only through the rational necessity we find of positing the 
 object as an independent and universal content. This ne- 
 cessity is the bottom fact in the case ; and it can be referred 
 to nothing else. But this is quite as possible with the ex- 
 perience of phenomena as with any other. The identity of 
 the object is not secured by having a real thing in a real 
 space, but only by its being a factor of that rational world 
 which is the meaning and substance of the phenomenal 
 world, and which is the presupposition of every theory of 
 knowledge which understands itself and its problem. 
 
 We have now to decide between the views of space. In 
 any case, space must be a principle of intuition. One fact, 
 which makes the objectivity of space so unquestionable to 
 unreflective thought, is that we have apparently an imme- 
 diate perception of its existence, so that our perception of 
 space is as direct and immediate as our perception of things. 
 On the other hand, it is made an objection to the subjective 
 theory that it implies a deal of mental mechanism and men-
 
 SPACE 153 
 
 tal activity of which we are totally unconscious. Both po- 
 sitions are worthless as arguments. The apparently imme- 
 diate perception of space is, in any case, the result of non- 
 spatial activities. The existence of space would not account 
 for its perception. We must in some way be affected b} T it. 
 But space itself does not act upon the mind ; only things do 
 that. Hence our knowledge of space is a mental interpre- 
 tation of the action of things upon the mind. In this ac- 
 tion, spatial properties are displaced by varying intensities 
 of activity, and these variations are translated by the mind 
 into space-terms. These considerations show that our space 
 intuition must in any case arise within, and that the objec- 
 tive space is no factor of sense perception whatever. There 
 is no need of the real space to explain our experience. 
 
 But we have further seen that the realistic view is in- 
 consistent, and upon analysis even unintelligible. It hovers 
 between making space something and nothing, and both 
 views are absurd. It also conflicts with the unity of being, 
 and forces us to regard the infinite as composed of parts. 
 Finally, it implies a hopeless dualism of first principles, in 
 that it implies the coexistence of two necessary and mutual- 
 ly independent principles. But this view is strictly impos- 
 sible, and any doctrine which leads to it must be rejected. 
 The attempt to regard space as a system of relations be- 
 tween things we found to be an impossible compromise be- 
 tween the subjective and the objective view. The objective 
 existence of space, then, is not only not proven, but it is in 
 itself unclear, inconsistent, and impossible. "We reject it, 
 therefore, for the view that space is ultimately a principle 
 of intuition, and, secondarily, a mode of appearance. But 
 though subjective, it is not arbitrary or individual. A given 
 state of being may allow of only one space-translation, and 
 this translation may be universal and changeless in all intui- 
 tion, whether divine or human. However that may be, the
 
 154 METAPHYSICS 
 
 universe can have its spatial properties and relations only in 
 the mind, which not only belongs to the system, but is both 
 its foundation and its crown. 
 
 So, then, space is phenomenal. It is not a boundless void 
 in which things exist, but only the general form of objective 
 experience. But all that was ever true of it is true still ; 
 and the laws of space are as binding upon us as ever. We 
 cannot slip into the non-spatial and get about without mov- 
 ing. We may still go on making appointments to meet at 
 any given place, and there will be no obscurity about our 
 meaning. Within the phenomenal, space relations have the 
 clearest possible meaning. But when we abstract them from 
 things and set them up as realities by themselves, we are 
 "lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties." 
 
 The relation of the infinite to space calls for brief men- 
 tion. We have affirmed that space, as the form of intuition, 
 may exist for the infinite as well as for the finite; and this 
 may easily be mistaken for a limitation of the infinite. But 
 this would be to confound space as principle with space as 
 limitation. For human beings space has a double aspect. 
 It represents not only a principle of intuition, but also a 
 limitation of our agency. The organism which conditions 
 our mental activity has space relations, and thus we natu- 
 rally appear to be located and limited in space. But this 
 location is of the organism only, and this limitation is only 
 the result of our dynamic limitations. It consists solely in 
 the fact that our immediate action upon reality is limited. 
 Far and near are terms which depend entirely upon the 
 amount of mediation necessary to affect any given reality. 
 Wherever we act immediately, there we are ; so that, instead 
 of saying we can act only where we are, we ought rather to 
 say we are wherever we act. But our immediate action ex- 
 tends to only a few things, and this fact appears as spatial 
 limitation. In this sense of limitation, space cannot be af-
 
 SPACE 155 
 
 firmed of the infinite. It comprises all reality in the unity 
 of its immediate activity, and hence is everywhere. For by 
 omnipresence we can mean nothing more than this immedi- 
 ate action upon all reality. The conception of omnipresence 
 as a boundless space-filling bulk is a contradiction, for that 
 which is in space and fills space cannot be omnipresent in 
 space, but different parts must be in different places. Each 
 part, then, would be in its own place and nowhere else. 
 Thus the unity and omnipresence of the infinite would dis- 
 i\ ppear. 
 
 This modification of the spatial judgment by our organic 
 experience introduces a large element of relativity into it. 
 It is only the pure spatial judgment, as in geometry, which 
 can be regarded as universal. All beyond that is affected 
 by the general limitation of the finite and by our organic 
 connections. 
 
 Our general view of space can hardly fail to suggest the 
 much-debated question concerning the dimensions of space. 
 Of late years the claim has often been made by mathema- 
 ticians that space may not be restricted to three dimensions, 
 and elaborate discussions have been made of the properties 
 of non-Euclidian space. The most curious conclusions have 
 been drawn as to what would be true in such spaces, and 
 the impression has become very general that the conception 
 of space as having only three dimensions is mistaken. We 
 have now to inquire whether the principle of space is such 
 as necessarily to restrict it to three dimensions. 
 
 The principle of space has no such universality as the 
 laws of formal thought. These condition all our thinking, 
 but the principle of space conditions only our intuition of 
 objects. We must further allow that all forms of external 
 experience are not alike calculated to awaken the mind to 
 react with a spatialization of its objects. We must also ad-
 
 156 METAPHYSICS 
 
 mit that our nature may contain mysterious possibilities 
 Avhich are at present entirely hidden. It is, then, possible 
 that, under certain forms of experience, the mind would 
 never come to the space intuition. It is equally possible 
 that, under other forms of sense-experience, the mind should 
 arrange its objects according to some altogether different 
 principle, so as to have a new form of intuition. This new 
 form, however, would not be space, but something quite 
 peculiar. As such, it would be related to the space-intui- 
 tion, as our sense of color is to that of sound. This, of 
 course, is a mere logical possibility, but there is certainly 
 no ground for saying that the space-intuition is the only one 
 possible in the nature of being. If there were any ground 
 for affirming the existence of such a new form, there would 
 be nothing apriori incredible in it. It is entirely possible, 
 however, to hold, along with this admission, that the space- 
 intuition cannot be changed in its essential laws and nature. 
 
 In affirming that the dimensions of space are necessarily 
 three, and only three, it is important to premise that the 
 planes of reference are perpendicular each to the other two. 
 Without this assumption, the dimensions of space may be 
 as many as we please. But, with this assumption, the claim 
 is that the position of any point in space can be defined by 
 straight lines drawn to each of these planes of reference. 
 These straight lines are called the co-ordinates of the point, 
 and they tell us ho\v far the point is from each of the planes. 
 The three planes represent the dimensions of space. ' Thus 
 far nothing has appeared in the affirmative which is not 
 purely hypothetical, or which does not confound the dimen- 
 sions of things in space with the dimensions of space itself. 
 
 The first class of arguments consists entirely of illustra- 
 tions drawn from analytic formulas. It is well known that 
 the formulas of analytics are independent of geometrical rep- 
 resentation. So far as the analytic reasoning goes, we are
 
 SPACE 157 
 
 free to choose n planes of reference, if \ve make no attempt 
 at spatial representation. These formulas, however, admit 
 of such representation when there are only three perpendic- 
 ular planes of reference ; and if n such planes were possible, 
 then a formula involving n planes would also be represent- 
 able. But this is far enough from proving that n planes 
 are possible; it only deduces a consequence from an as- 
 sumption. 
 
 But there is no need to have recourse to elaborate 
 formulas to deduce this small conclusion. There is to the 
 uninitiated a certain air of mystery in an involved and 
 transcendental formula, and especially in a formula for a 
 " pseudo-spherical " surface, which may serve to impose on 
 the illogical mind, but the argument from such a formula 
 is in nothing better than the following: In algebra, a can 
 be represented by a line in space, a" by a plane surface, and 
 a' by a cube ; a 4 and all higher powers are unrepresentable. 
 So far as algebra is concerned, it is a mere coincidence that 
 #, a 3 , and a 3 are spatially representable, and the algebraic 
 analysis goes on in complete independence of space. It 
 deals with numbers and their relations, and these are log- 
 ical, and not spatial. But it would be quite easy to say 
 that, if space had n dimensions, then a u could be spatially 
 represented as well as a or a? or a 3 , and the argument would 
 be just as forcible as the mass of what is uttered on this 
 subject. In fact, mathematicians have fallen a prey to their 
 own terminolog} 7 in this matter. Through desiring to give 
 the utmost generality to their analytic formulas, they have 
 constructed them without any regard to actual space. Then 
 they have discovered that, to make them representable, cer- 
 tain limitations must be made. Thus actual space is made 
 to appear as a special case; and this is called flat space, 
 Euclidian space, etc. But, by applying an adjective to 
 space, they have suggested to themselves the possibility of
 
 158 METAPHYSICS 
 
 other spaces, and forthwith any given set of analytic as- 
 sumptions passes for a space of the nth order. By this time 
 the illusion is complete, and the request for a proof that 
 those spaces of the nth order represent anything but ana- 
 lytic assumptions is resented as unkind. 
 
 The other class of arguments confounds the dimensions 
 of things in space with the dimensions of space itself. If 
 we omit reference to the three perpendicular planes of ref- 
 erence, a thing may have any number of dimensions. The 
 various utterances concerning a curvature of space are all 
 instances of this confusion. What is meant by a curvature 
 of space itself is something which defies all comprehen- 
 sion, as much so as a curvature of number. It is assumed 
 that, in case of such curvature, straight lines would at last 
 return into themselves; but the simple fact would be, not 
 that space is curved, but that the line is not straight, but 
 curved. This would be quite intelligible, while the doctrine 
 of a curved space is quite unintelligible. If it be said that 
 straight lines never occur in reality, we have no objection, 
 provided the claim be proved ; but this is different from 
 affirming that truly straight lines are not straight, but 
 curved. The geometer does not assume anything about 
 the reality of lines, but contents himself with showing what 
 would be true of such lines, if they did exist. To determine 
 the content and implications of our space-intuitions is his 
 only aim ; and, knowing that these intuitions are purely 
 mental products, he is entirely free from doubts whether, 
 in some outlying regions of space, these principles may not 
 be invalid. Space being in the mind, and space-figures be- 
 ing mental constructions, they will always have the mean- 
 ing which the mind assigns to them, and hence can never 
 be twisted out of their proper significance. 
 
 This principle of a curvature of space has been invoked to 
 save the universe from finally running down. If space be
 
 SPACE 159 
 
 curved, then the outgoing energy will at last be restored, 
 and the system may keep agoing. But there is no need of 
 the unintelligible assumption of a curvature of space to ex- 
 press this result. We can simply say that, if the nature of 
 reality be such that radiant energy moves in curved lines, 
 then it will at last come back to the point of departure. Of 
 course, to make this assumption of any use, we should have 
 to make many others, but, such as it is, it is an attack, not on 
 our space-intuition, but on the first law of motion. In short, 
 all the illustrations of a space of n dimensions can be brought 
 into entire harmony with our space-intuition by substitut- 
 ing for a curvature of space a curvature in space, and for n 
 dimensions of space n dimensions of things in space. This 
 part of the doctrine seems to be largely due to the pestilent 
 practice of viewing straight lines as segments of circles 
 with an infinite radius. This custom, together with the 
 allied one of viewing parallel lines as meeting at an infinite 
 distance, has its practical advantage, but when it results in 
 confounding all definitions and in uttering complete non- 
 sense, it is high time to inquire whether the advantage be 
 not too dearly purchased. 
 
 A poor argument, however, though a suspicious circum- 
 stance, is not a disproof of the thing to be proved. The 
 doctrine of n dimensions can be tested only by a direct at- 
 tempt to realize its assumptions. Where, then, is the nth 
 dimension to be found ? One writer, in his explanation of 
 the disappearance of material bodies in spiritistic perform- 
 ances, assumes a fourth dimension of space, into which the 
 bodies are drawn by the spirits. If there were beings who 
 could observe only two dimensions of space, then a body 
 which moved in the third dimension would disappear from 
 their vision. If, now, there be a fourth dimension, then the 
 spirits have only to draw the body into the fourth dimen- 
 sion to render it invisible. It would seem, then, that the
 
 160 METAPHYSICS 
 
 fourth dimension interpenetrates the three dimensions. The 
 solid body which disappeared was not out of the room, hut 
 out of its three dimensions. And yet there was no point in 
 the room which could not be defined in a space of three 
 dimensions. The fourth dimension, therefore, is not some- 
 thing added to the three dimensions, but is something co- 
 incident with them ; that is, it is not a space-dimension at all, 
 but, if anything, it would be a state of matter in which it 
 would not appear in any way. The necessity of putting the 
 fourth dimension within the three dimensions deprives it of 
 all right to be called a dimension of space. Upon the whole, 
 it is not likely that the performances of sleight-of-hand 
 tricksters will contribute much to philosophic discovery. 
 
 The relation of the doctrine to geometry is not clearly 
 settled in the minds of its holders Some would view it 
 simply 'as an extension of our present geometry, while 
 others would view it as an attack upon it If we conceive 
 of beings dwelling in a plane and limited to conceptions of 
 lines in a plane, it is possible that such beings should form 
 a valid plane geometry ; and if afterwards they should ad- 
 vance to a conception of the third dimension of space, their 
 early geometry would be extended nerely, and would be 
 as valid as ever. Now, in the same way, it may be claim- 
 ed that a new dimension of space would only extend our 
 present geometry without in any way discrediting it. In 
 that case the doctrine could be tested only by inquiring 
 whether the notion of a new dimension represents any- 
 thing more than a gratuitous assumption which defies all 
 construction and comprehension. But many holders of the 
 view regard it as conflicting with received geometry, and 
 this position makes it possible to test the view by reflecting 
 upon the character of geometrical truth. If that truth be 
 strictly true, then any doctrine which conflicts with it is 
 false. The believer in n dimensions will have to disprove
 
 SPACE 161 
 
 geometry before he can maintain his theory. If he insist 
 that straight lines return into themselves, that only shows 
 that he means by straight lines what others mean by curves. 
 If he claim that parallel lines may meet, it only shows that 
 he means by parallel lines what others mean by converging 
 lines. Xor must he be allowed to make irrelevant appeals 
 to the nature of things, for geometry does not concern itself 
 with the nature of things, but with the nature and implica- 
 tions of our space-intuition. 
 
 A final word must be said concerning the unity of our 
 space-intuition. It is often assumed that there may be be- 
 ings which see things in only one or two dimensions, and 
 they would, of course, be as positive about the impossibility 
 of a third dimension as we are about a fourth. We know, 
 however, that they would be mistaken, and what better right 
 have we to insist on our view. If the fourth dimension be 
 assumed to contradict what we know of the three dimen- 
 sions, we should have the best right for rejecting it : and 
 even if it were assumed only to extend our view, we should 
 have a right based on the unity of our space-intuition. For 
 these beings who see things only in one or two dimensions 
 are pure myths, and their possibility is far from apparent. 
 To begin with, the assumption that reality admits of any 
 number of space-intuitions falls back into the popular form 
 of Kantianism, according to which reality itself is quite in- 
 different to the forms of thought. But this is to divorce 
 thought and reality entirely, and to leave the thought with- 
 out any ground or explanation. But if reality is to explain 
 thought, then a given phase of reality admits only of a given 
 representation in thought. This notion that thought can 
 shift about and view reality in any and every way betrays 
 a total lack of appreciation of causation ; it is the supersti- 
 tion of a time which had no conception of law whatever. 
 
 Further, our intuition of space is not built up by adding 
 11
 
 162 METAPHYSICS 
 
 one dimension after another; but the first and second dimen- 
 sions are reached by abstracting from the unitary intuition 
 of a space of three dimensions. Given this intuition, it is 
 easy to attend to one dimension to the exclusion of the other 
 two ; but they could not be directly reached for the follow- 
 ing reasons : Suppose a being with an intuition of only one 
 dimension of space. At first we are tempted to think of 
 that one dimension as a line ; but this it could not be, because 
 to see it as a line, the being must be outside of the line, and 
 the line must be across the direction of vision. But this 
 would imply two dimensions of space the direction of the 
 line of vision and that of the line perceived. If we confine 
 him strictly to one dimension, the line must take the direc- 
 tion of the line of vision, and this would become a point. 
 But this point again could never be known as such, except 
 in relation to other points outside of the line, and as this is 
 contrary to the hypothesis, it could never be known as a 
 point at all. The line itself is without breadth or thickness, 
 and the being, if it knew itself as related to the line, must 
 know itself as in the line ; and all its other objects must be 
 in the line, and hence all alike must be known as without 
 breadth or thickness. For us who have the full space- 
 intuition, it is easy to abstract from two dimensions and 
 consider only the line, but for the being who has only the 
 one dimension the space-intuition would be impossible. 
 
 The same is true for the two dimensions. In this case 
 the being would be in a plane, but without any thickness. 
 He cannot rise above the plane to look at it, for this would 
 be to invoke the third dimension. He must stay then in 
 the surface, and must find all his objects in that surface. 
 But there can be no doubt that we are led to the conception 
 of a surface only by our experience with solids; we reach it 
 by abstraction of the third dimension. If there were no 
 third dimension, we should certainly never have to come to
 
 SPACE 163 
 
 the notion of either line or surface. This being, however, 
 who is in the surface, and who knows nothing of any points 
 outside of the surface, would never know the surface at all. 
 The surface is conceivable only as a limit between different 
 parts of space, and, as these are impossible, the limit between 
 them is also impossible. We view our space -intuition as 
 properly a unit, and not as compounded of separate factors, 
 and these factors which we separate in thought are abstrac- 
 tions, which are possible only through the unity of space as 
 a form of three dimensions. All our dealing with the first 
 and second dimensions of space implies the three dimensions. 
 For the present, those who affirm that space may have n 
 dimensions must be judged either to be calling a series of 
 analytic assumptions by the misleading name of space or 
 eise simply to be making a noise.
 
 CHAPTER H 
 
 TIME 
 
 ACCORDING to the popular view, the world is in space and 
 has its history in time. We have found ourselves compelled 
 to deny that the world is in space, for spatiality is only phe- 
 nomenal. We have next to inquire whether the world's 
 history in time is an ontological or only a phenomenal fact. 
 Kant made the same argument do for both space and time ; 
 but there are many difficulties in the case of time which do 
 not exist in that of space, and which compel a separate dis- 
 cussion. The subjectivity of time is by no means involved 
 in that of space. At the same time much that was said in 
 the previous chapter will apply here. 
 
 As in the case of space, we distinguish between the onto- 
 logical and the psychological question. We do not ask how 
 we come to the notion of time, but what it stands for after 
 we get it. Is it an existence, or a mode of existence, or only 
 a mode of our thinking? 
 
 Kant set the example of calling space and time forms 
 of intuition, and this has led to a very general assumption 
 among philosophers that we have a proper intuition of time, 
 such as we have of space. It is, therefore, a matter of great 
 surprise, on looking around for this intuition, to find it want- 
 ing. We grasp coexistences in a single space-image which 
 is sui generis' and when we think the things away, we are 
 still able to outline the space as such. With time this 
 is impossible. We cannot comprehend events in a single
 
 TIME 165 
 
 temporal image, and when the events are thought away 
 there is nothing remaining, even in imagination, which has 
 a temporal character. As has often been pointed out, all 
 our representations of time are images borrowed from 
 space, and all alike contain contradictions of the time-idea. 
 We think of it as an endless straight line, but the concep- 
 tion fails to fit ; for the points of such a line coexist, while 
 of the time-line only the present point exists. We think of 
 it also as a flowing point which describes a straight line, but 
 here also we implicitly assume a space through which the 
 point moves ; and without this assumption the illustration 
 loses all meaning. Or if we wish to form a conception of 
 earlier and later, we do it by positing a line over which we 
 are to move in thought; and we measure the time by the 
 motion and its direction. The temporal before-and-after is 
 represented only by the spatial before-and-after. Xor are 
 we content to borrow figures from the one dimension of 
 space; in dealing with the system we generally have two 
 dimensions, and sometimes three. Since space is filled with 
 coexistences, all of which are alike in the same time, the 
 time-line is extended to all these. Thus the line becomes a 
 cylinder and the point becomes a plane; while the time 
 passed over by the moving plane remains behind as a kind 
 of third dimension. But in all these cases we have only 
 space-images, which are applied to time only by metaphor. 
 We cannot, then, properly call time a form of intuition, as 
 we have properly no special presentation corresponding to it. 
 In itself it is rather a certain unpicturable order of events. 
 Whenever we attempt to picture it we replace temporal se- 
 quence by spatial sequence. 
 
 What, then, is time? The popular view of time closely 
 resembles that of space. Time is conceived as an existence 
 sui generis, which exists apart from things, losing nothing 
 by their absence and gaining nothing by their presence. It
 
 166 METAPHYSICS 
 
 is independent, and hence without any essential relation to 
 being, but moves on in ceaseless and steady flow forever. 
 Like space, it is one of the necessities which being can nei- 
 ther create nor annihilate, and to which it must submit. 
 
 This view seems self-evident in its clearness at first glance, 
 and it would not be surprising if some speculator should 
 order up an intuition in support of it. But, in spite of the 
 intuition and the apparent self -evidence, the clearness of 
 this view turns out, upon inquiry, to be delusive. It is un- 
 tenable on two accounts : (1) By making time independent 
 of being it sins against the law of reason, which forbids all 
 plurality of independent principles. This fact, which we 
 have sufficiently illustrated in previous chapters, is conclu- 
 sive against the independence of time. Whatever time may 
 be, it is no independent reality apart from being. (2) The 
 view which regards time as a real existence is hopelessly 
 unclear and inconsistent in its assumptions and implications. 
 Many qualities and functions are attributed to time in spon- 
 taneous thinking, which have only to be pointed out to be 
 rejected, because they are inconsistent with the time-idea. 
 This fact we proceed now to illustrate. 
 
 But before beginning it seems necessary to refer again to 
 the ever-recurring distinction between the phenomenal and 
 the ontological fact. Time as the form of experience or as 
 the form of change is a perfectly clear and self-sufficing no- 
 tion. In this sense our experience is in time, and there can 
 be no question of having a timeless experience, or of describ- 
 ing experience apart from temporal relations. The question 
 concerns that abstract and independent time which is more 
 than the form of experience, which is rather a something in 
 which events occur ; and the claim is that this time is a fic- 
 tion arising from separating the form of experience from 
 experience itself. When we are dealing with time as the 
 form of experience all is perfectly clear, and every one under-
 
 TIME 167 
 
 stands what is meant. An engagement to meet at a certain 
 time and place has no mystery for the understanding of any 
 one; but when we abstract from the particular concrete 
 things and relations, and attempt to conceive time by itself, 
 then once more we are " lost and embrangled in inextrica- 
 ble difficulties,'' and are " miserably bantered " and buffeted 
 by the absurdities which emerge. 
 
 In illustration of the unclearness of popular thought on 
 this subject, it is not plain whether time be regarded as 
 standing or flowing. Sometimes it is said to comprehend 
 in its unity past, present, and future alike ; and in its to- 
 tality it is identical with eternity. There is but one time, 
 as there is but one space ; and all particular times are but 
 parts of the one time. Sometimes it is said to flow, and 
 sometimes it is mentioned as the standing condition of all 
 flow. In one view time itself flows, and events flow with 
 it; and in another view time stands, and events flow in it 
 as a space or through it as a channel, or move across it as 
 a background. All of these conceptions appear in the pop- 
 ular thought of time, and all are attended with great diffi- 
 culties. If we regard time as a whole as existing, and thus 
 embracing past, present, and future, then time as a whole 
 stands, and the flow is put in things and not in time. In 
 that case the distinction between past and future would 
 not be in time itself, but in things, and especially in the 
 observer's stand-point. The past would not be the non- 
 existing, but that which has been experienced. The future 
 also would not be the non-existing, but simply that which 
 we have not yet experienced. There would be nothing in 
 this view to forbid the thought that things might coexist 
 at different points of the temporal sequence. There would 
 also be nothing in it to forbid the conception of a being 
 which should fill out the totality of time, as the omnipres- 
 ent fills out space, and for whose thought the past and the
 
 METAPHYSICS 
 
 future should alike coexist. Thus quite unexpectedly we 
 come down to the notion of the eternal now. But this is 
 just the opposite of what the popular view means to say. 
 Common-sense insists that time itself flows as well as the 
 events within it. In truth, this notion of an empty time, 
 with things flowing through it, is simply the image of empty 
 space which has been mistaken for that of time. 
 
 But, on the other hand, if we do not regard time as ex- 
 isting as a whole, then we are shut up to the affirmation 
 that only the present exists. This view also is held by 
 spontaneous thought ; and upon occasion it is stoutly af- 
 firmed that all existence is contained in the narrow plane 
 of the present. But the present has no duration, and is not 
 time at all. It is but the plane which, without thickness, 
 divides past and future. Time, then, is not made up of 
 past, present, and future, but of past and future only ; and, 
 as these do not exist, time itself cannot exist. It avails 
 nothing against this* conclusion to call the present the pas- 
 sage of the future into the past ; for this passage must re- 
 quire time, or it must not. If it require time, then it is 
 itself susceptible of division into past and future. If it be 
 timeless, then time once more falls into past and future, and 
 has no existence whatever. Besides, it is not easy to see 
 how we can speak of the passage of the future into the past 
 when both alike are non-existent. Such a passage can be 
 represented only by a reality moving across a certain line, 
 but which is equally real on both sides of the line ; and this 
 notion is inapplicable to time. When the moving reality is 
 real only on the line, it cannot cross it. 
 
 It is equally hard to see how, on this view, time can have 
 any duration. The past was once present, so that past time 
 is made up of moments which once were present. But if 
 the present have no duration, no sum of present moments 
 can have any duration. Nor does it relieve the matter to
 
 TIME 169 
 
 say that time, like space, is continuous, and that units of 
 both are but arbitrary sections of the indivisible. Space 
 can, indeed, be divided by a plane into right and left, so 
 that the space to the right and that to the left shall make 
 up all space ; but this does not represent the relation of past 
 and future, for the two divisions exist as real in the case of 
 space, while in time they are non-existent. If the space oc- 
 cupied by the plane were alone real, then space also could 
 not exist, for the plane is only a limit, and occupies no 
 space. And if the plane should move under such circum- 
 stances, it would not pass over any space or generate any 
 volume, for each integral of volume would perish as fast as 
 born. The plane would continue to be all, and space would 
 be nothing. This is the case with time. The plane is all, 
 and duration is never reached. When we attempt to con- 
 ceive duration, we must have recourse to space-illustrations, 
 which are implicit contradictions of the time-idea. Time 
 cannot exist, and things cannot exist in time. But if, to 
 escape these difficulties, we allow that the present is a mo- 
 ment with proper duration, it is plain that this moment 
 must lie partly in the past and partly in the future, or else 
 that duration is not indefinitely divisible. Either assump- 
 tion would swamp us by bringing the time-idea into con- 
 tradiction with itself. 
 
 If we say that time as a whole stands we deny the time- 
 idea. Past, present, and future coexist ; and there is no 
 assignable reason for the change from the future to the 
 past. It is equally impossible to find in a standing time any 
 ground for change. But we fare no better with the notion 
 of a flowing time. If we say that time flows we must ask 
 whence and whither. From the future to the past, or from 
 the past to the future ? But both past and future are di- 
 mensions of time ; and it seems absurd to speak of time as 
 flowing into or out of itself. Such a view is as impossible
 
 170 METAPHYSICS 
 
 as the thought of a moving space. A space which should 
 start sideways, so as to leave spacelessness on one side and 
 penetrate or telescope itself on the other, would not be a 
 more absurd notion than this of a moving time. And, final- 
 ly, when we say that time as a whole flows we need another 
 time for it to flow in. Otherwise, the flow of time is time- 
 less ; and there is no good reason why the flow of things 
 may not be timeless also. 
 
 Perhaps we may say that the moments of time flow, and 
 not time as a whole ; but then we have a puzzle in deciding 
 what the relation may be between the standing time and its 
 flowing moments. A time which is not the sum, or integral, 
 of its moments is a difficult conception, and, allowing it, we 
 see no reason in the standing time for the flowing moments. 
 We should also need to know the whence and whither of 
 the flowing moments and in what their flow in pure time 
 would be distinguishable from their non-flow. We should 
 have a movement in which there is neither moved nor mover, 
 a movement without whence or whither, a movement which 
 stops as soon as we attempt to conceive it as moving, and a 
 rest which moves as soon as we attempt to conceive it as 
 resting. The notion of a standing time contradicts the time- 
 idea ; and the notion of a flowing time results in a mental 
 vacuum. Both views involve not merely mystery, but in- 
 consistency and contradiction. Their exceeding clearness 
 and self-evidence are due to the space-metaphors in which 
 the doctrines are expressed ; and these metaphors, upon ex- 
 amination, turn out to be inconsistent and inapplicable. 
 
 Plainly we are " embrangled " and most " miserably ban- 
 tered" in our attempt to conceive time as independently 
 existing; but the embranglement and bantering become 
 still worse when we seek to determine the relation of this 
 independent time to the things and events said to be in it. 
 To begin with, it is impossible to see how anything articu-
 
 TIME 171 
 
 late can exist at all in a real time. Things cannot exist in 
 the past, or in the future ; but in such a time the present is 
 nothing ; and hence they cannot exist at all. In discussing 
 causality we found that no metaphysical predication what- 
 ever is possible until we bring the entire metaphysical move- 
 ment within the range of thought, and view it as consti- 
 tuted by thought. Existence in time is a vanishing and 
 perishing shadow which eludes all apprehension and all sig- 
 nificance. Rightly enough, then, did Berkeley say of this 
 abstract time, that it led him " to harbour odd thoughts " 
 of his own existence ; and he might have added, of all other 
 existence as well. 
 
 Again, what is the relation of the independent time to 
 events ? The movement of time is not supposed to be the 
 movement of events, and the movement of events, though 
 in time, is not supposed to be due to the movement of time, 
 but to the causes at work. In what relation are these two 
 orders of movement ? If one might go faster than the other, 
 then our time, which is taken entirely from the order of 
 events, would be no measure of that absolute time back of 
 events. To explain the connection, a number of vague fan- 
 cies, borrowed from space, arise in the mind, as that the 
 stream of time floats events along with it ; and these no- 
 tions often impose upon us their imaginary solutions. But 
 the more we reflect upon the matter the more difficulty we 
 have in finding any connection between time and the events 
 said to be in it. 
 
 But here it may occur to us that the relation between 
 time and events is that the former conditions the latter; 
 and this will certainly seem to many minds a sufficient and 
 final answer. But one must confess inability to get any 
 notion of what this conditioning may be, unless it is of a 
 dynamic character, and such a conditioning cannot be recon- 
 ciled with the notion of time. That time is causal and does
 
 172 METAPHYSICS 
 
 anything is as great a scandal to common -sense as could 
 well be conceived ; and when the notion of doing something 
 is left out, one is quite at a loss to know what the condition- 
 ing is. But here it will certainly be asked if we are not 
 aware of the distinction between a cause and a condition ; 
 and we reply that the distinction is a familiar one, but that 
 it helps us here is the point which seems doubtful. That 
 a thing should be conditioned by its own nature, or law, is 
 a conception which involves no causal determination ; but 
 that a thing should be conditioned or in any way deter- 
 mined by another thing without dynamic influence seems 
 to be an utterly vacuous conception. Hence if we deny to 
 this real time all influence upon events, no one can tell what 
 he means by events being in that time; and if we attribute 
 an influence to time we contradict the notion of time and 
 shut ourselves up to an endless regress, unless we suppose 
 that time can act timelessly, or without time to act in. 
 
 And now, to complete the confusion, we point out that if 
 time be real and without causal influence, the whole series 
 of events runs off instantaneously ; for on this view the con- 
 ditions of change are not to be found in time, but in the in- 
 teractions of things ; and when the dynamic conditions of 
 change are fulfilled- there is no reason why the change 
 should delay. If we suppose that time does something 
 which was lacking, or breaks down some hinderance to the 
 change, or exercises some repressive action, we make time 
 a thing with active powers; and this view is contrary to the 
 supposition. But if we do not do this there is no escape 
 from admitting that the fulfilment of the conditions and 
 the entrance of the change are absolutely coexistent. For 
 empty time can do nothing; and one cannot see why, in 
 such a case, a greater flow of time, provided the phrase in 
 general meant anything, should be more effective than a 
 lesser flow-. Certainly n minutes could do no more than
 
 TIME 173 
 
 any fraction of a minute; and infinite time would furnish 
 nothing not contained in infinitesimal time.. The integral 
 of emptiness is always emptiness, and no addition of zeros 
 can produce a sum. We must, then, regard the event as 
 coincident with the fulfilment of its conditions. Hence 
 the beginning and the end must coincide in time. Every 
 effect is given simultaneously with its conditions, and each 
 effect in turn becomes the cause of new effects, and these 
 are likewise simultaneously given ; and thus the whole se- 
 ries exists in a point of time without any real before and 
 after in it. 
 
 If, then, we conceive inactive time as either resting or 
 flowing, it is quite impossible to assign any articulate rela- 
 tion in which it can stand to things or events. It neither 
 acts nor is acted upon, but remains a mere ghost outside of 
 being, contributing nothing and determining nothing. It 
 does not even measure anything, for our units of time are 
 not taken from time, but from some change in things a 
 revolution of the earth, the swing of a pendulum, etc. If, 
 on the other hand, we conceive time as active we contra- 
 dict the time-idea. 
 
 Finally, the believer in a real time will affirm with great 
 positiveness that our mental life itself bears witness to the 
 reality of time. However we may confuse ourselves about 
 the world-process, we know that we have lived through a 
 real past r and that we are now able to compare it with a 
 real present. Any attempt to deny time, it is said, must 
 shatter on this fact. But this objection largely depends on 
 overlooking the distinction between the phenomenal and the 
 ontological. No one can think of denying the relations of 
 time in experience. But these relations are established by 
 the mind itself, and if there were not something non-tempo- 
 ral in the mind they could not exist for us at all. The suc- 
 cession in consciousness to which the realist appeals so confi-
 
 174 METAPHYSICS 
 
 dently is the very thing the knowledge of which makes his 
 realistic view impossible. If there were nothing unchanging 
 and timeless in the mind, the knowledge of succession could 
 never arise. The mind must gather up its experiences in a 
 single timeless act in order to become aware of succession. 
 The conceptions which are arranged in a temporal order 
 must coexist in the timeless act which grasps and arranges 
 them. The conception of sequence not only does not involve 
 a sequence of conceptions, but it would be impossible if it 
 did. The perception of time, then, is as timeless as the 
 perception of space is spaceless. The things which are per- 
 ceived in time must yet coexist in timeless thought in order 
 to be so perceived. The admission of ontological temporal 
 differences in thought would make thought impossible. It 
 only remains that time be restricted to phenomenal exist- 
 ence, and that thought instead of being in time be regarded 
 as the source and founder of temporal relations, which are 
 the onlv time there is. And the supposed ontological time 
 is merely a shadow of experience, and its necessit}' is merely 
 a consequence of the temporal law as a rule of mental pro- 
 cedure. 
 
 Thus the notion of time as a separate ontological exist- 
 ence shows itself on every hand as a congeries of contradic- 
 tions, and must be given up. The impossibility of more 
 than one independent principle forbids us to admit the in- 
 dependent existence of time. Whatever it may be, it de- 
 pends on being as a consequence or creation. But the at- 
 tempt to think of time as a substantive fact breaks down 
 from its inherent unclearness and contradiction. This view 
 of time, when analyzed, is always found to deny itself. 
 Conceived as resting or flowing, time is absurd. Con- 
 ceived as ontological, it cannot be brought into any re- 
 lations to things without positing an interaction between 
 them ; and then we need a new time as the condition of
 
 TIME 1 75 
 
 this interaction, and this would lead to an endless regress. 
 Time, then, cannot be viewed as a substantive fact created 
 or uncreated. As a whole, time does not exist,, and sub- 
 stantive reality is not in time any more than it is in space. 
 
 This result we may hold with clear conviction, but it 
 would be very easy to misinterpret it. We are by no 
 means out of the woods yet. Reality certainly is not in 
 time as something independent; but for all that yet appears 
 time might be in reality as a law of existence. If there 
 were a being which had its existence in succession, such 
 being would not be in time, but its existence would be tem- 
 poral. Moreover, when we say that reality is not in time, 
 reality is a word of uncertain meaning. It might mean all 
 reality, finite and infinite alike; or it might mean finite re- 
 ality; or, finally, it might mean the objective cosmic order. 
 In the last case we run a very serious risk of confounding 
 the apparent order, which is temporal, with an assumed 
 noumenal order which'is very possibly fictitious. We shall 
 need, then, to look well to our goings, or we shall fall a prey 
 to some verbal illusion. 
 
 The common conclusion from these facts is that time, 
 like space, is only the subjective aspect of things and proc- 
 esses which are essentially non-temporal. In this putting 
 there is an implicit reference to the Kantian noumena which 
 lie as realities beyond the "subjective aspect"; and this as- 
 pect is supposed to belong to us, constituting a veil rather 
 than a revelation of existence. For the present we will not 
 insist on the doubtful character of these noumena, but sim- 
 ply consider the attempts to make the subjectivity of time 
 acceptable. This will finally lead us to a better under- 
 standing of the form which the doctrine must assume in 
 order to be tenable. The traditional idealistic view is almost 
 as obnoxious to criticism as the traditional realistic view.
 
 176 METAPHYSICS 
 
 Since the time of Kant the ideality of time has been held 
 as being as well established as the ideality of space ; but in 
 fact it is a much more difficult doctrine. We have a clear 
 experience of the possibility of thinking and feeling apart 
 from space. We do not regard our souls as spatial ; and 
 space-relations do not enter into our internal experience in 
 any way. That there should be existence apart from space 
 is not, therefore, so difficult a conception. With time the 
 case is different. It enters into our entire mental life, and 
 cannot by any means be escaped. Hence we cannot appeal 
 to any non-temporal experiences to aid our thought ; and 
 nothing remains but to analyze the notion, and see if we 
 cannot reach a stand-point from which the difficulties may, 
 at least to some extent, disappear. The holders of the doc- 
 trine have* taken it all too easy in this respect. They have 
 contented themselves with arguments which show the ideal- 
 ity of space, and have not bestowed upon time the attention 
 which the peculiar difficulties of the problem demand. We 
 proceed to examine the attempts to make the subjectivity 
 of time credible. 
 
 And first we mention a rhetorical device. Long and 
 short, it is said, are relative terms, and our estimate of dura- 
 tion is purely subjective. The time which is long to one is 
 short to another, according to the state of mind. With God 
 a thousand years are as one day ; and even to the old man 
 a long life is as a tale that is told, or as a watch in the 
 night. The whole of human history is nothing to the peri- 
 ods of geology ; and these, again, shrink to insignificance 
 when we ascend to the cycles of astronomy. What, then, 
 it is said, are all finite periods to Him who inhabits eternity \ 
 Remarks of this kind have a certain value in arousing the 
 feeling of wonder ; but they are valueless in philosopical 
 speculation. No doubt our estimate of the length of time 
 is purely relative and subjective; indeed, if the world-proc-
 
 TIME 177 
 
 ess did not exist as a common time-keeper, every man would 
 have his own time. Time is one only because we measure 
 it by reference to the same objective process, or to the same 
 consciousness. But the before-and-after of things is not a 
 matter of feeling. Kelatively, the whole measure of finite 
 existence may shrink to a span, but the time-order remains 
 unchanged. Something more powerful, therefore, must be 
 found, if we are to succeed in reducing time to a purely 
 subjective existence. 
 
 If reality were a changeless system of things in change- 
 less relations, like the members of a thought-system, or like 
 the ideas of Plato's philosophy, it would be easy to view 
 the sequence of things in our experience as only a sequence 
 of knowledge, and as due entirely to our finiteness. Thus, 
 mathematical truths coexist ; but we grasp them successive- 
 ly, not because they really succeed in time, but because our 
 finite minds are unable to grasp them all at once. Hence 
 we are often tempted to think that the earlier propositions 
 in geometry precede and found the later. But a moment's 
 reflection convinces us that the only relation in this case 
 is that of logical sequence, and that the apparent temporal 
 sequence is merely the reflection of our own finiteness, 
 which compels us to grasp successively what exists simulta- 
 neously. A perfect insight into truth would grasp it in one 
 changeless intuition, and the illusion would not exist. If 
 now the world were such a system of logical relations, it 
 would be entirely credible that time is not only subjective, 
 but exists only for the finite, being in every case but a re- 
 flex of limited power. It might be said that even in this 
 case we could not dispute the reality of time, for time is 
 given not merely in the movement of the outer world, but 
 also and pre-eminently in the movement of thought. But 
 this objection would be invalid, for this psychologic time 
 would be nothing but a subjective fact, and would have no 
 
 12
 
 178 METAPHYSICS 
 
 significance for the changeless reality, or for the omniscient 
 mind which should grasp it in its changeless intuition. Time 
 would be simply a movement in the finite mind, while for 
 the infinite there would be an eternal now. 
 
 Unfortunately, this illustration is not entirely applicable 
 to the case in hand, at least unless we adopt the Eleatic no- 
 tion of being. For the Eleatics there is no need of time. 
 Action and change do not exist, and things are but the 
 eternal consequences of being, just as all mathematics is 
 eternally existent in the basal axioms and intuitions. In 
 such a scheme time cannot be anything but an unaccount- 
 able illusion in finite thought. But we are already com- 
 mitted to the Heraclitic view of being so far as change is 
 concerned. For us, things are not resting in changeless 
 logical relations, but are active and changing ; and hence it 
 is impossible to reach the ideality of time by eliminating 
 change from being. "We must have motion in things as 
 well as in the observer. But, on the other hand, the notion 
 of time seems the great dividing-wall between Heraclitus 
 and the Eleatics. When we exclude time, cause and effect 
 must coexist; and then the effect is not produced by the 
 cause, but is only its logical implication. Without a real 
 before-and-after it seems impossible to prevent the dynamic 
 relations of reality from vanishing into purely logical rela- 
 tions; and this would be to abandon Heraclitus and return 
 to Spinoza and the Eleatics. The alternative can be escaped 
 only by showing that change does not imply time as an 
 actual existence, but that time is only the subjective appear- 
 ance of change. If this can be made out, there will be no 
 difficulty in accepting the ideal theory. 
 
 But before passing to this question we must consider an 
 objection springing out of the illustration from a changeless 
 system. It may be said that we confound time with dura- 
 tion. Time itself may be viewed as a correlate of change ;
 
 TIME 179 
 
 but if there were no change the changeless would still en- 
 dure. If, then, \ve should adopt the Eleatic conception of 
 changeless being, so that all the consequences of being should 
 changelessly coexist with it, being as a whole would still 
 have duration. There would be no sequence, but there 
 would be duration. This distinction between time and du- 
 ration, though it has often appeared, especially in theology, 
 we cannot view as tenable. For duration can only mean 
 continuous existence through time, and without the notion 
 of time duration loses all significance. The only reason for 
 distinguishing separate times in the changeless would be the 
 sequence of mental states in ourselves ; and this sequence 
 itself is change, and hence contrary to the hypothesis. We 
 can give duration significance, as applied to the changeless, 
 only on the assumption of an independent flowing time, 
 which moves on ceaselessly and carries being with it. But 
 this view we have found empty and impossible, and hence 
 we do not allow that duration has any application to change- 
 less existence. Such being simply is, and the distinction of 
 past and future does not exist. Even the " is " we view as 
 an affirmation of being, and not as a present tense. The 
 difficulty in accepting this view is due partly to an implicit 
 return to the notion of an independent time, and partly to 
 the fact that even in such a fixed state we assume ourselves 
 as present with all our mental changes. 
 
 Time, then, depends on change. In a changeless world 
 time would have no meaning. But the actual world is not 
 changeless, and thus the question arises concerning the rela- 
 tion of change to time. That it cannot be in time, as some- 
 thing independent of itself, we have already seen. In that 
 case the whole temporal series would exist at once without 
 any temporal sequence, and thus the assumed reality of 
 time would give us a curious form of the ideality of time, in 
 that it would find the succession of things entirely in our
 
 180 METAPHYSICS 
 
 minds and not in things themselves. But while change is 
 not in time, its factors are successive, and thus change has 
 the temporal form. Its members cannot be brought to- 
 gether in temporal coexistence, and the attempt to do so 
 involves a tacit affirmation of the time which is denied. 
 Time, then, cannot relate to any independent flow outside of 
 things, but it does relate to these phases of change. These 
 cannot be related as coexistences, but only as sequences ; 
 and time expresses these relations. The date of an occur- 
 rence is not a moment of absolute time, but expresses a rela- 
 tion within the changing series. How shall we conceive 
 this relation ? 
 
 The problem now takes on the following form. As long 
 as we apply the law of the sufficient reason on the imper- 
 sonal plane, change in appearance is impossible without 
 change in reality. There is then an order of real change, 
 and the idealist has to show that time is but the subjective 
 aspect of that order, or the form under which we conceive 
 change. 
 
 The idealist now has the floor and offers the following 
 exposition. As the dynamic relations of things are space- 
 less, yet demand that things should appear in space, so the 
 dynamic relations of things are timeless, but demand that 
 they shall appear under the form of time. The notion may 
 be presented as follows : "We have before pointed out that 
 change does not occur in an independent time, and that 
 in the series A, A r A v . . . A n , by which we represent the 
 world-process, only dynamic relations are concerned. We 
 have simply a relation of cause and effect without any ad 
 mixture of time-elements ; and the notion of time can only 
 be the translation of this causal connection into terms of 
 sequence. If, now, we suppose some perceptive being in the 
 midst of this process, say at A m , who could discern the order
 
 TIME 181 
 
 of dependence among the members of the series, he would 
 perceive that each member is conditioned by the preceding 
 one, and conditions the succeeding one. A m is conditioned 
 by -4 m -i- and conditions A m +i. The attempt to represent 
 this relation in thought results in their arrangement in a 
 temporal scheme, in which the cause is made the antecedent 
 and the effect the consequent. Antecedence and sequence 
 is the universal form under which the mind represents to 
 itself causation ; but, when we reflect upon the matter, we 
 find that time does not enter into the reality, but only into 
 the appearance. To return, now, to our being at A m < his own 
 position will constitute for him the present. He will per- 
 ceive, too, that A m conditions all the higher members of the 
 series, and hence he will locate them in the future, and he 
 will make them far or near, according to the complexity of 
 their conditionedness. Am+\ will be conditioned only by 
 A m , while J.m+2 w ill be conditioned by both A m and A m +\', 
 hence it will be put further on in the series. This being 
 will further perceive that all the lower members of the 
 series condition A m , or his present, and hence he will put 
 them in the past and at greater or less distances, according 
 to their relations to A m . If, in the series, this being should 
 discover an unconditioned member, the regress would stop 
 at that point, and that member would appear as eternal. 
 Thus a tendency to represent dependence b} T temporal ante- 
 cedence and sequence would produce in such a being the 
 perception of a temporal order, even in a perfectly timeless 
 system. That there is such a tendency in the human mind 
 cannot be denied, for it is so strong that we are always 
 tempted to resolve logical and dynamic sequence into tem- 
 poral sequence. But we have seen that the dynamic se- 
 quence bears no marks of time, and hence we must con- 
 clude that the temporal order of things exists only in 
 thought, and is purely a product of the observing mind.
 
 182 METAPHYSICS 
 
 There may be some truth in this view, but it does no*; 
 seem to be well put ; or rather the exposition is not without 
 ambiguity. The result is to show how, in a timeless system 
 of conditioning and conditioned members, the appearance 
 of time might arise as the way in which we represent de- 
 pendence. But we set out to discover the relation of time 
 to change, and that is not clearly the same matter. There 
 is one fact in our temporal experience which is fatal to 
 the attempt to make dependence take the place of change. 
 It is, indeed, conceivable that in a changeless system the 
 relation of dependence should be represented as that of 
 before-and-af ter ; so that for every being at different points 
 in the system, all the lower members should seem to be in 
 the past, and all the higher members should seem to be in 
 the future. But in such a case every being would have a 
 fixed present. The being at A m would always have his 
 present at A m , and past and future would be fixed quanti- 
 ties in experience. But this is not the case. A m does not 
 remain the present, but forthwith gives place to A m+l ; and 
 this in turn is displaced by A m+2 . Thus the future is ever 
 becoming present and vanishing into the past. But this 
 fact is impossible so long as there is no change in reality. 
 Hence change can never be made phenomenal only, but is 
 a fact of reality itself. 
 
 We are certainly not getting on very fast, but we are 
 making some progress, though it may not be apparent. The 
 net result thus far is about as follows : There is no inde- 
 pendent time in which change occurs and by which change 
 is measured ; but change is nevertheless real, and time as 
 the form of change is also real. Time dates and measures 
 do not refer to an independent time, but they express real 
 facts and relations within the changing series. The series 
 -4, A v A z , A y . . . A n is not in time ; and between A and 
 4 n there is no time. Neither is A earlier than A n in anv
 
 TIME 183 
 
 absolute time, for that which makes a thing earlier or later 
 is its position in the series. But A and A n , though not sepa- 
 rate in any absolute time, are nevertheless not coexistent, 
 for their relations are such that the existence of either ex- 
 cludes that of the other. The objective fact is being passing 
 from state to state, and these states are mutually exclusive. 
 Change does not, indeed, require time ; but it results in a 
 new state which excludes, and hence succeeds, its prede- 
 cessor. This fact of change is basal. It is not in time, 
 and it does not require time ; but it founds time ; and time 
 is but the form of change. In the common thought time 
 exists as a precondition of change ; in our view change is 
 first, and time is but its form. It has no other reality. 
 
 The view thus reached is a compromise between the ideal 
 and the current view. Absolute time, or time as an in- 
 dependent reality, is purely a product of our thinking. In 
 this sense, then, the world is not in time. But change is 
 real, and change cannot be conceived without succession. 
 In this sense, the world-process is in time. But distinctions 
 of time do not depend on any flow of absolute time, but 
 on the flow of reality, and on the position of things in this 
 flow. To say that there is time between distant members 
 of the series, means only that reality changes in passing 
 from one state to another ; and the amount of time is not 
 simply measured by the amount of change, but is nothing 
 but the amount of change. The rate of change is the rate 
 cf time ; and the cessation of change would be the cessa- 
 tion of time. 
 
 This, we have said, is about the net result of the previous 
 discussion ; but that we have not yet reached any final 
 resting-place appears on a little reflection. Thought itself 
 disappears, if we do not allow some sort of changeless- 
 ness or timelessness across all change or temporality. The
 
 184 METAPHYSICS 
 
 changing world must in some way be paced to the change- 
 less, or thought collapses. In treating of change and iden- 
 tity we found that the two can never be reconciled on the 
 impersonal plane. The Eleatic was able to refute the Her- 
 aclitic; and the Heraclitic was equally able to refute the 
 Eleatic. Meanwhile thought was seen to demand both ele- 
 ments, but the discovery was also made that their union 
 could be effected only as we abandoned the abstract cate- 
 gories of the impersonal understanding, and rose to the con- 
 ception of active intelligence as furnishing the only possible 
 concrete union of the categories in question, and as being 
 indeed the only true reality and the place of all subordinate 
 realities. 
 
 These results must be recalled here. The truth is that 
 the common notion of an extra-mental reality of some sort, 
 which we have already exorcised and cast out, has unwit- 
 tingly come back into our thought and darkened the dis- 
 cussion. This reality, which is supposed to be changing 
 apart from thought, we have sought to reduce to timeless- 
 ness, and, as might have been expected, with very imper- 
 fect success. And we have tacitly assumed that this chang- 
 ing reality is something possible on its own account, and 
 that its temporal relations can be determined within the 
 changing series itself and without any reference to intelli- 
 gence. In all this we have forgotten our earlier studies, 
 and by consequence have erred and strayed from the way. 
 But in fact change is nothing except with reference to an 
 abiding intelligence. As an idea it eludes us until it is 
 contrasted with the unchanging ; and as a reality it is noth- 
 ing until it is subordinated to active intelligence, which is 
 the only causal reality and which can recognize nothing but 
 itself and its own products. The attempt to find a present 
 in the changing series apart from reference to intelligence 
 is equally a failure. Considered as temporal and extra-
 
 TIME 185 
 
 mental, the series falls asunder into past and future, leaving 
 the present only as the plane of division between them. 
 With this result, the extra-mental time vanishes altogether. 
 Hence the doctrine of time must be construed not with ref- 
 erence to an extra -mental existence, but from the stand- 
 point of self-conscious intelligence. Only thus can we 
 escape the intellectual scandals and contradictions and im- 
 possibilities which haunt both the traditional and the ideal- 
 istic view of time, so long as any extra-mental existence is 
 allowed. 
 
 Now from this point of view the question assumes a very 
 different aspect. Time, as the form of our subjective ex- 
 perience, takes its origin from the stand-point of conscious 
 intelligence, which constitutes its own present. This pres- 
 ent is not in time as anything independent of itself; it is 
 simply a relation in consciousness. The mind relates its 
 actual experience to itself, and thus constitutes the only 
 present there is. When we attempt to have experience in 
 the present, considered as a point or section of a real time, 
 we fall into contradiction. We escape this by the insight 
 that the present can only mean the actual in experience ; 
 and past and future get all their meaning by being related 
 to this actual. Experience, then, is not in the present, but 
 the present is in experience. If we would know what the 
 present means we must not look for a point in abstract time 
 by which to define it ; we must rather look into experience 
 itself for the meaning of the relation. 
 
 And this which is true for our subjective time is equally 
 true for objective or cosmic time. This time also can be 
 understood and defined only from the stand-point of con- 
 scious intelligence. Taken abstractly, or by itself, it makes 
 both the world and thought impossible. And they remain 
 impossible until it is seen that time is neither an ontologi- 
 cal reality nor an cntological process, but rather and only a
 
 186 METAPHYSICS 
 
 thought-relation which has neither existence nor meaning 
 apart from thought. 
 
 And thus we come again upon the fact, often referred to 
 in previous chapters, that thought cannot be understood 
 through its own categories. That is, the categories are 
 nothing which precede intelligence and make it possible; 
 they are rather the categories of intelligence, and for their 
 concrete meaning we are referred, not to a formal analysis 
 of abstract ideas, but to our experience of living intelligence. 
 We have seen this to be the case with the categories of be- 
 ing, identity, unity, and causality ; and now we find the 
 same fact in the case of time. Thought is the source of 
 temporal relations; and for their meaning we must fall, 
 back upon experience, rather than any reflection on the ab- 
 stract temporal category. 
 
 Time, then, is not an ontological fact but is essentially a 
 function of self-conscious- intelligence. Shall we say, then, 
 that intelligence itself is timeless ; and, if we do say so, 
 have we not fallen into absolute unintelligibility, if not 
 into downright raving? Surely, considering the nature of 
 our experience, the brevity and changefulness of our exist- 
 ence, it would seem that no one can be serious who denies 
 our temporality. A little paradox is permissible; but it 
 becomes an insufferable affront to good sense when it is 
 carried to such shocking extremes. 
 
 This remonstrance has something in it ; but for the most 
 part it rests on overlooking the distinction between the 
 phenomenal and the ontological reality. We have repeat- 
 edly declared that no one can deny time as a form of our 
 experience, and, in this sense, as a fact of reality. But 
 this time exists only in the experience of a self-conscious in- 
 telligence ; and it is permitted to inquire whether it has exist- 
 ence or meaning apart from that relation. It never occurs to 
 the idealist to have experiences without temporal relations
 
 TIME 187 
 
 among their elements, but these exist only in and for 
 thought. 
 
 There is a somewhat complicated thought underlying the 
 remainder of the remonstrance. The purely temporal form 
 and relation are complicated with the limitations of the 
 finite; and thus two questions quite distinct are confused. 
 There is also an implicit effort to conceive the non-temporal 
 temporally, or to make temporal coexistence the antithesis 
 of temporality. For the sake of untangling the matter, 
 we must divide the questions, and consider the relation of 
 time, first, to the finite intellect ; secondly, to the finite 
 spirit as existing ; and, thirdly, to the infinite and absolute 
 being. 
 
 And, first of all, the finite intelligence, in so far as it is 
 intelligence, is timeless ; that is, it has no real before-and- 
 after in it, but it establishes temporal relations. If we say 
 that such a being is unthinkable m abstraction from tem- 
 poral relations, that can only mean that an abstract sub- 
 ject which did nothing, and hence did not manifest itself as 
 mind, would be nothing for thought. But if we mean that 
 this mind which establishes temporal and other relations, 
 and thus produces an articulate thought-life, is itself com- 
 prised in those temporal relations, as something apart from 
 and antecedent to thought, we must say that this view is 
 truly unthinkable and leads to the destruction of thought. 
 What is this being? It is the subject of the thought-life, 
 and it knows and reveals itself in this life. If we ask how 
 it can be a self-conscious subject and manifest itself in the 
 establishment of the forms and relations of thought, the 
 
 answer must be that there is no answer. Realitv cannot 
 
 / 
 
 be" deduced ; it is ; and the only work of speculation must 
 be to discover what the reality is which is. To recognize 
 and describe, not to deduce or comprehend, must be our 
 aim.
 
 188 METAPHYSICS 
 
 The pure temporal form does not involve the knowing 
 subject, whether finite or infinite. When in a dream the 
 mind gives the spatial form to its objects, the mind is the 
 source of the form, but it is not included in it. Through 
 our connection with an organism, however, we acquire a 
 new relation to space. The organism exists in spatial re- 
 lations, and thus we seem to have a location. This, as we 
 have said in the previous chapter, is only an expression of 
 our finitude, and is no essential part of the space intuition. 
 The same fact appears in the case of time. The purely 
 temporal form alone does not involve the subject. But we 
 are also members of a system which is independent of us, 
 and we are to a very great extent subordinated to that sys- 
 tem. This relation manifests itself in a certain temporal 
 character of our experience. The self is limited ; it comes 
 and goes, has beginnings and endings, and unpicturable 
 pauses and variations which are imposed upon it from with- 
 out. In this sense our life is temporal ; and in this sense 
 temporality is only the shadow of our finitude and limita- 
 tion, and our subordination to the total system and order 
 of finite existence. And this temporality is not in time; 
 it is simply an aspect of our experience. 
 
 From this point of view time is seen to be largely rela- 
 tive in any case. Time is primarily the form of individual 
 experience, and would remain relative to the individual 
 were it not for the existence of the cosmic order which 
 marks the cosmic time, and furnishes the common time- 
 piece by which our individual times are regulated. But 
 even this does not remove the relativity of time. We have 
 seen that this process gives no time order until it is related 
 to conscious intelligence ; and the temporal judgment will 
 vary with the powers of the one judging. 
 
 First of all, the present is relative. "We have seen that 
 we cannot have experience in the present, but we consti-
 
 TIME 189 
 
 tute the present by the actual in experience But the range 
 of this experience varies with the range of our powers. 
 One able to comprehend a large body of objects or events 
 within the field of consciousness would have a more exten- 
 sive present than another who could grasp but a few. If 
 \ve could retain all the objects of experience in equal vivid- 
 ness and immediacy they would be alike present. A mind 
 which could do this would have no past. Again, a mind 
 in full possession of itself, so that it does not come to itself 
 successively would have no future. Such a being would 
 have a changeless knowledge and a changeless life. It 
 would be without memory or expectation, so far as itself 
 was concerned, yet it would also be in the absolute enjoy- 
 ment of itself. For such a being the present alone would 
 exist, and its now would be eternal. 
 
 The present, then, is no point in absolute time, but a re- 
 lation in conscious experience; and its measure and con- 
 tents depend on the range of our powers. Every intellect 
 transcends time as mental form ; but the finite mind re- 
 mains under the law of time as limitation, by virtue of its 
 finitude. When we speak of transcending time this double 
 aspect of the question must be borne in mind. The com- 
 plete transcendence of time in both senses is possible only 
 to the absolute person. Here only do we find the absolute 
 independence and changeless self-possession which are need- 
 ed to constitute the timeless life. Finite minds, on the 
 other hand, are in time in a sense. Change penetrates into 
 their life. But this time is not something which contains 
 them, or which precedes and conditions the change; and 
 the changing life is only an expression of our subordination 
 and finitude. 
 
 What we have said of the timelessness of the absolute 
 being might possibly be allowed so far as its own self- 
 knowledge and self-possession are concerned ; but what of
 
 190 METAPHYSICS 
 
 the will whereby the cosmic process is realized and carried 
 on ? This process, we may say, is essentially changing and 
 progressive, and hence essentially temporal There is suc- 
 cession in the process, and there must be succession in the 
 realizing will. 
 
 This seems perfectly clear at first sight, but grows cloudy 
 on reflection. If the world-process is to be in time in any 
 sense, it must be in time for some one. Its temporality has 
 no meaning in itself. Without doubt the cosmic process 
 has the temporal form for us ; and very possibly it has the 
 temporal form for the Creator. Temporally considered, it 
 is successive. Temporally considered, it is impossible to 
 reduce it to coexistence. But the temporal form as little 
 requires temporal succession in the realizing activity as 
 the spatial form requires spatial extension in the realiz- 
 ing activity. In both cases we come upon an unpicturable 
 ground of the order, but we are not permitted to carry 
 the factors of the phenomenal order into its ontological 
 ground. Unless we are to lose ourselves in the infinite 
 regress, all change must at last be referred to the change- 
 less, the unchanging source of change. The change must 
 be found in the effects, and not in the cause. When we 
 come to the unconditioned cause, further regress becomes 
 absurd. But such a changeless cause is a contradiction on 
 the plane of impersonal necessity. Nothing will meet the 
 case except the conception of the absolute person, which 
 freely posits a changing world-order without being himself 
 involved in the change. 
 
 If, however, we persist, and insist that even this absolute 
 cause may still change himself and would change himself 
 in the case mentioned, we find ourselves unable to make out 
 our own meaning. From what to what would the change 
 be? There is no developing life within the infinite by 
 which to measure it. If we say it is at least from inactivity
 
 TIME 191 
 
 to actir : ty, or from one phase of activity to another phase 
 of activity, we can make nothing of this except by referring 
 to the products. We would hardly feign a sub-conscious 
 substance with divers modifications in it; and if we dismiss 
 this fiction, then the only assignable change falls among the 
 effects ; that is, within the temporal order. We conclude, 
 then, that the activity whereby the temporal order is real- 
 ized has no temporality in itself. Such temporality as the 
 world may have other than the thought order would exist 
 not for the creator, but only for the finite spirits which are 
 comprehended in the cosmic process. 
 
 And now it will doubtless occur to the dealer in abstrac- 
 tions that all this is hopelessly contradictory. The tracing 
 of change to the changeless, and the deduction of change 
 from the changeless, what is this but contradiction ? That 
 is indeed what it is on the plane of impersonal abstractions. 
 Change and changelessness are contradictory ideas, and 
 neither can be viewed as the source of the other; for no 
 reflection on either will reveal the other except as its con- 
 tradictory opposite. And thus we find ourselves in a great 
 embarrassment. On the one hand, reflection shows that 
 the admission of ontological change into intelligence would 
 destroy it, and on the other, logic refuses to accept the 
 changeless as the explanation of change. There is no way 
 out of this deadlock on the impersonal plane. On this 
 plane, by the law of the sufficient reason, we can only come 
 to the Heraclitic flux and the destruction of thought. The 
 solution of the puzzle is found in leaving the impersonal 
 abstractions, and rising to the plane of free personality. 
 Change does not arise from abstract changelessness, but the 
 free mind initiates change without being itself involved in 
 it. Thus the contradiction disappears. How this is possi- 
 ble is quite beyond us; but it is something to see that it is 
 nevertheless aciual, and that thought is hopelessly stalled
 
 192 METAPHYSICS 
 
 on any other view. And when, instead of taking change 
 and changelessness abstractly and verbally manipulating 
 them, we take them as they are given in the mind's living 
 experience of itself, the problem solves itself. The solution 
 by walking is the great practical solution ; and the abstract 
 thinker who wants something deeper only mistakes his 
 fictitious abstractions for reality. 
 
 It is something of a relief to remember again that these 
 difficult questions refer in no way to experience, but only 
 to its ontological ground. And however sure we may be 
 that the essential ground of experience is neither spatial 
 nor temporal, but founds both spatial and temporal rela- 
 tions, we are under no obligation to tell how it is done, and 
 we may go on making engagements to meet at times and 
 places with as much certainty of our meaning and security 
 as to the fulfilment as if the ideality of space and time had 
 never been dreamed of. And thus after our long wander- 
 ings we come back in a way to the common view. Having 
 got clear of all extra-mental realities, we have only to take 
 account of mental realities. We are no longer haunted by 
 those back-lying noumena which ought to.be known, but 
 which cannot be because of the masking mental form. "We 
 are allowed, then, to take the existence of things for intel- 
 ligence as their true and only existence, and hence in know- 
 ing this existence, so far as tilings are concerned, we know 
 all there is to know. And thus the mind is face to face 
 with reality after all. Only we must remember that there 
 nre realities and realities. Phenomenal realities are not to 
 be mistaken for ontological ones; and the categories of phe- 
 nomena must not be applied to their ontological ground. 
 Every one can see that the thought of length is not long ; 
 and it is just as clear on reflection that the thought of time 
 is not temporal. Finally, our judgments of phenomenal 
 time have in them so much of relativity, owing to the lim-
 
 TIME 193 
 
 ited range of our consciousness and our general dependence 
 and finitude, that we cannot be too circumspect in trans- 
 ferring them to the infinite. 
 
 For the sake of clearness we may sum up briefly what we 
 conceive to be the outcome of the discussion : 
 
 1. Time is primarily an order of relations in our experi- 
 ence. This order admits of no question or denial. 
 
 2. There is no ontological time separate from things and 
 events, in which they exist or occur. 
 
 3. There is no order of ontological change of which time 
 is the form and to which time may be referred, without ref- 
 erence to intelligence. 
 
 4. Both time and change must be referred to intelligence, 
 as their source. 
 
 5. Neither time nor change can be carried into intelli- 
 gence as such without making thought impossible. 
 
 6. Neither time nor change can be construed with refer- 
 ence to any extra-mental fact, but only from the stand-point 
 of self-conscious intelligence. 
 
 7. Hence the temporal judgment becomes relative to the 
 range and contents of self-consciousness. 
 
 8. Non-temporality is not to be conceived as a temporal 
 coexistence, as if one should say that the earth is on all 
 sides of the sun at the same time, but rather as the imme- 
 diate possession of the objects by the conscious mind. This 
 relation cannot be construed in temporal terms, but must be 
 experienced. 
 
 9. What this may mean may be gathered from reflection 
 on what we call present experience. This is not temporal 
 in the sense of having a real before and after in it. It is 
 temporal in the sense of having the temporal form. It is 
 non-temporal in the sense that the conscious self grasps all 
 its elements in an indivisible act, and thus makes conscious- 
 ness possible. 
 
 13
 
 194 METAPHYSICS 
 
 10. But still experience has the temporal form ; and we 
 may resume our temporal language with all confidence, 
 only guarding ourselves against mistaking this form for an 
 ontological fact, and also against overlooking the relativity 
 in the temporal judgment due to our limitation.
 
 CHAPTER HI 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 
 
 THE phenomenality of space implies of course the phe- 
 nomenality of all that appears in space or in spatial form, 
 flatter, then, in the sense of the apparent bodies about us, 
 together with their apparent movements, must be reckoned 
 t'o the apparent rather than the real, the phenomenal rather 
 than the ontological. This does not, indeed, imply their il- 
 lusory or fictitious character, for they constitute the chief 
 factor of objective and universal experience. As phenome- 
 na they are real in their way, and as phenomena they have 
 their laws. A knowledge of their nature and laws is al- 
 most the sum of practical wisdom, and this knowledge can 
 be acquired on an empirical basis. The only caveat in- 
 volved in our doctrine lies against taking these material 
 phenomena as substantial or ontological facts. With this 
 understanding, physical and mechanical science has a most 
 important field for practical investigation and one which it 
 may cultivate without being molested or made afraid by 
 metaphysics. 
 
 Matter 
 
 The current notions of matter, as we should expect, are a 
 heterogeneous product of sense thinking and superficial re- 
 flection. The thought is mainly determined by sense expe- 
 rience and its spatial forms ; and whatever other metaphys-
 
 196 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ical element is added is adjusted to them, and takes on 
 something of their character. We shall find our advantage 
 in a study of the popular notion. 
 
 For a person on the sense plane matter presents no prob- 
 lem whatever. Our senses reveal various bodies in space, 
 and all we have to do is to read off the sense report. There 
 is no mystery in the case, for everything is visibly there. 
 But reflective thought, even in its crude stages, finds itself 
 compelled to work over the sense appearance and modify 
 our spontaneous conceptions. Accordingly, all theories of 
 matter from hylozoism to atomism have in them a specu- 
 lative element which transcends and modifies the sense 
 report. 
 
 For spontaneous thought bodies in space are undeniably 
 given. The divisibility of body is also given as a fact ol 
 experience. It is, however, impossible to divide something 
 into nothing ; and the thought of infinite division admits 
 of no completion. We always have something left when 
 we stop. On all these accounts thought naturally takes the 
 direction of some form of the atomic theory. Again, as so- 
 lidity seems to be undeniably given in experience as a prop- 
 erty of matter, and as actual bodies admit of expansion 
 and contraction, the corpuscular philosophy, with its two fac- 
 tors of the atoms and the void, naturally emerges. The 
 little lumps supply the being, and the void space founds the 
 possibility of form and motion. For a long time nothing 
 more was thought necessary, unless possibly a prime mover 
 were occasionally demanded. The atoms, moving and com- 
 bining in the void, were the sole reality in matter, and the 
 sufficient ground of material phenomena. When the de- 
 mand for causation became more prominent, instead of find- 
 ing it in a prime mover, it was finally resolved to carry it 
 into the atoms themselves under the form of moving forces. 
 These were supposed to inhere in the atoms and found their
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION . 197 
 
 changes. The true material realities are the atoms and their 
 inherent forces, and all explanation results from their com- 
 position and interaction. Physical science is generally based 
 on some form of this theory. 
 
 There is a certain formal completeness and superficial 
 plausibility in this view. For one interpreting sense expe- 
 rience by spatial and mechanical categories, it is hard to see 
 how any other view is possible. We cannot rest in visible 
 bodies as final. The mere fact of divisibility alone would 
 reduce them to compounds. But as we hold to real space 
 and real extension, we may well rest in corpuscles, or little 
 bodies, as final. These lie so far below the range of expe- 
 rience that we can easily ignore the logical difficulties in 
 the notion ; and we can use them without critical molesta- 
 tion. Thus we seem to secure a solid foundation of reality, 
 and satisfy the category of being. And these little bodies 
 are in space, and admit of various movements and combi- 
 nations. With this outfit we may well explain visible body 
 by their composition, the all - explaining category of the 
 imagination. Finally, causation is provided for by the 
 moving forces, and nothing more seems to be needed for 
 successful and adequate speculation. Indeed, we may even 
 doubt if anything more can be allowed. The void is the 
 negation of being ; and what is there in the void but the 
 atoms? Certainly there is nothing in sight but bodies, and 
 reflection on the established facts of experience teaches 
 us that these are atomic compounds. Atoms we know, and 
 the void we know, and what is there besides? 
 
 How naive all this is is already familiar to us. Material 
 phenomena are mistaken for ontological facts ; and the at- 
 tempt is made to interpret the causal reality in phenomenal 
 forms. Space and space relations are supposed to be inde- 
 pendent existences, and mechanical causation is assumed as 
 a matter of course. But this transparent clearness vanishes
 
 198 METAPHYSICS 
 
 as soon as we recall the distinction between phenomenal 
 and ontological reality, and between the formal necessity of 
 a category and the concrete form in which it exists. Being 
 there must be, no doubt, but it does not follow that it can 
 be thought in the form of lumps. Causality there must be 
 even for material phenomena, but for all that it may be im- 
 possible to conceive it under the form of moving forces in- 
 hering in solid corpuscles. This uncertainty of physical 
 metaphysics deserves further illustration. Instead of dis- 
 missing the doctrine at once on the strength of our previous 
 discussions, it seems better, and more likely to produce con- 
 viction, to show its essential confusion on its own plane, as 
 soon as it transcends phenomena and their relations. 
 
 Scientists are agreed as to the necessity of the atomic 
 theory as opposed to the spatial continuity of matter. If 
 apparent matter be a true ontological existence, it has an 
 atomic structure. There is, however, no agreement as to 
 the correct conception of the theory ; and in application it 
 takes on different forms according to the character of the 
 facts on which it is based. Physics and chemistry, miner- 
 alogy and biology, would lead to widely differing concep- 
 tions, and these would agree in little more than in affirming 
 atomism. For the astronomer, the atoms are simply centres 
 of gravity ; and for him molecular forces and ethereal media 
 are non-existent. Each atom attracts every other with an 
 intensity which varies inversely as the square of the dis 
 tance ; and he needs no other assumption. But the physi- 
 cist who studies other phenomena needs other assumptions. 
 For him the atoms split up into two great classes of ponder- 
 able and imponderable, and are endowed with various mo- 
 lecular forces as well as with the universal force of gravity. 
 Even these conceptions will be modified according as he 
 studies heat or light or electricity or magnetism. The con- 
 ceptions which are all-sufficient for one realm do not suf-
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 199 
 
 fice for another. The chemist also builds up an atomic 
 theory from the facts of chemistry, but his conception dif- 
 fers very widely from that of the physicist. The physicist 
 makes much of the ether ; while the chemist has very little 
 use for it. The physicist conceives of the atoms as endowed 
 with universal forces ; while the chemist endows them with 
 selective forces. Except that the theories of both are atom- 
 ic, they have very little in common. The mineralogist and 
 physiologist in like manner introduce new conceptions. 
 
 Unfortunately, very little attention has been paid by stu- 
 dents of physical science to comparing and supplementing 
 the several partial views which have thus arisen. Indeed, 
 it is not clear that these views admit of being united into 
 a consistent theory. Thus the doctrine is held in each de- 
 partment with only such exactness as the facts of that de- 
 partment call for ; and if the conception prove a fruitful one 
 in practice, or even a convenient one for representing the 
 facts to the imagination, little attention is paid to theoreti- 
 cal consistency or to agreement with the results in other 
 departments. But, as thus held, the atomic theory can be 
 viewed only as a convenient practical fiction like that of 
 fluids and currents in electricity ; for it would be intolera- 
 ble that every department of physical study should have its 
 own peculiar set of atoms. 
 
 These partial views might conceivably be united in one 
 view which should embrace them all. But there are still 
 deeper differences which touch the essential nature of the 
 atoms themselves. Accordingly, atomism has all forms 
 from the corpuscular philosophy of the Greeks to the cen- 
 tres of force of Boscovich and the vortex-rings of Sir Will- 
 iam Thomson. The most common form is a modification 
 of the corpuscular philosophy. In this view the atoms and 
 the void play their familiar part ; but the atoms are enabled 
 to play the part by the addition of moving forces, which in
 
 200 METAPHYSICS 
 
 some mysterious way dwell in the atoms without being a 
 consequence of them and yet are inseparable from them. 
 Sometimes the atom is spoken of as the seat, or fulcrum, of 
 the force, and the force is viewed as imparted, implanted, 
 located, etc. In this view the most prominent feature is 
 the crude working of the categories of being and causation 
 under spatial conditions, and a still cruder conception of in- 
 herence. 
 
 It is also variously proposed to view the atoms as alike 
 in essence but unlike in form, or as alike in form but as 
 unlike in size, or as alike in form and size but unlike in 
 grouping, or as alike in these respects but unlike in energy 
 or in intensity of action ; so that difference of atomic weight, 
 for example, shall not depend on a difference of size or quan- 
 tity of matter, but on a different intensity of attraction ; 
 and, finally, it is proposed to view the atoms as qualitatively 
 unlike apart from all quantitative and geometrical relations. 
 Some of the atomic theories view the atoms as having all 
 the properties of the bodies about us; and others view them 
 as essentially unlike the bodies which they found. The 
 former are more in harmony with our spontaneous think- 
 ing, while the latter are more speculative and critical. But 
 whenever any of these views claim to be more than con- 
 venient practical fictions, they must at least be self-consist- 
 ent, and they must also meet those general demands which 
 we make upon all reality. To determine the specific prop- 
 erties of the atoms will always belong to inductive science ; 
 to determine their general outline is the work of meta- 
 physics. 
 
 The corpuscular, or lump, conception of the atoms has 
 one very great advantage ; it is easily pictured to the imag- 
 ination, and calls for no effort of thought. It takes only 
 the conceptions of space, form, and solidity with which we 
 are familiar, and, with these, claims to solve all the prob-
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 201 
 
 lems which phenomenal matter presents. But, on the other 
 hand, it has a methodological difficulty in that its explana- 
 tions are but repetitions in the mass of what is given in the 
 unit. On this theory there can be no explanation of any 
 property of body which is not first assumed in the atom. 
 This is especially the case with extension and solidity. The 
 extension of the mass is viewed as the sum of the exten- 
 sions of the atoms, and the solidity of the mass is viewed as 
 resulting from the solidity of the elements. Moreover, this 
 theory has always had an idealistic factor in it by virtue of 
 its excess of materialism. Looking at the moving atoms 
 with the eye of pure reason, we see nothing but quantitative 
 distinctions and relations. Qualitative distinctions and re- 
 lations are contributed by the mind of the spectator, and 
 these constitute the chief problem for explanation. With- 
 out the spectator the problems would not only not be raised ; 
 they would not even exist. A mind which could completely 
 grasp the moving elements as they are in themselves, but 
 not as they appear, would miss the most important problems 
 of the system. Thus we reach the paradox that an absolute 
 knowledge of the system would find in it very little that 
 would demand interpretation. 
 
 The corpuscular philosophy finds its purest illustration in 
 the atomism of the ancient Greeks. The two factors of 
 their view were the atoms and the void. The atoms were 
 viewed as absolutely solid, and as secure in their solid single- 
 ness against all division and destruction. Moving forces 
 were left out of the account altogether. But, apart from 
 the fact that the mutual independence ascribed to the atoms 
 made all interaction, even of impact, impossible, it has 
 long been recognized that such atoms would explain noth- 
 ing. In particular, the facts of chemistry call for an atomic 
 conception which has little but the name in common with 
 the ancient atomism. The atoms which modern science
 
 202 METAPHYSICS 
 
 calls for are atoms which are not in mutual independence 
 and indifference, but which are parts of a whole, and which 
 are not left to chance as the ground of their orderly com- 
 binations. On this account the new conception of motor- 
 forces has been added. But these forces have generally 
 been added in a very clumsy way. A passive solidity has 
 been assumed as a foundation ; and then forces have been 
 imparted to this inert lump in a highly mysterious fashion. 
 No information is given as to where the forces come from, 
 or what their inner relation is to the matter which they are 
 said to inhere in or inhabit. And yet, though matter and 
 force are thus brought together by an act of pure violence, 
 and though neither seems to give any account of the other, 
 an edict is issued against separating them, and it even passes 
 into a first principle that there is no matter without force, 
 and no force without matter. Meanwhile the corpuscular 
 conception of the atom as absolutely solid and as having a 
 changeless volume is retained ; and then, to make room for 
 motion ^and to account for the form and coherence of bod- 
 ies, these atoms are held apart and together by their forces, 
 and at distances compared with which the diameters of the 
 atoms themselves are very small. 
 
 But from this stand-point the need of viewing the atoms 
 as corpuscles, or minified matter, disappears entirely. The 
 phenomenal solidity of bodies, which is the only solidity of 
 which we have any knowledge, is JIG longer the integral of 
 the solidities of the atoms, but is purely a product of a cer- 
 tain balance of attractive and repulsive forces between the 
 elements, and dpes not represent any property of the ele- 
 ments themselves. If we allow that the elements have an 
 absolute form and solidity, we have also to allow that they 
 never come into play in accounting for the properties of 
 body ; and that these properties are all the outcome of a 
 dynamism which in itself is totally unlike the properties
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 203 
 
 which it founds. Each element excludes others from its 
 o\vn space, not by a passive solidity, but by an active re- 
 pulsion. Indeed, solidity considered simply as space-filling 
 could offer no resistance at all to the entrance of other 
 bodies into the same place. If there were things between 
 which no relation of repulsion existed, there is no assignable 
 reason why they should not absolutely penetrate ; and some 
 speculators have suggested that chemical union may be of 
 this sort. The mistake of this notion does not lie in a met- 
 aphysical impossibility, but in its inadequacy to the facts, 
 pre-eminently those of isomerism. On the other hand, a 
 solid without cohesive forces could not exist, for in every 
 such solid it would be possible to distinguish different parts ; 
 and the only reason for the coherence of these parts must 
 be found in cohesive forces between these parts. Hence, in 
 any case, solidity must be second, and not first. The facts, 
 then, are (1) that in determining the properties and form of 
 bodies we are referred, not to similar properties and forms 
 of the elements, but to their dynamic relations, whereby 
 they found the properties and forms of bodies ; and (2) 
 that solidity, by its very nature, must be a product and not 
 an original and changeless attribute. No atom can be re- 
 garded as having an absolute and changeless extension, 
 but rather by its own energy it asserts for itself a certain 
 position and volume, from which only a greater power can 
 drive it. These simple facts serve to show that the chief 
 qualities of bodies, which we may sum up under the term 
 materiality, are products of the interactions of the elements, 
 and not properties of the elements themselves. 
 
 The chief reason which remains for the corpuscular con- 
 ception is that which originally produced it. This is not its 
 scientific value, but its picturability. The atom as a dynamic 
 element, or a centre of force, is as unpicturable as a soul. 
 The imagination, therefore, is relieved if allowed to give it
 
 204 METAPHYSICS 
 
 an extremely small but fixed form and volume. It seems 
 easy, then, to tell what it is and where it is; while the 
 dynamic conception is comparatively hard to realize ; and 
 withal the dynamic vie\v seems so to dematerialize matter 
 as to be scarcely distinguishable from idealism. These con- 
 siderations more than anything else have kept the corpus- 
 cular conception from universal rejection. The general 
 tendency of physics is towards the dynamic conception of 
 the atom in so far as the atom is retained as real, but 
 in sluggish minds the old view maintains a more or less 
 undisturbed existence. The tendency towards dynamism 
 is partly due to the general unwillingness to explain the 
 same by the same, which is the case with the corpuscular 
 theory, and partly due to the fact that the latter theory is 
 involved in the gravest metaphysical difficulties. If the 
 atom be real it must be an agent, and its properties must 
 depend upon its agency. It must also be a unit. But in a 
 previous chapter we have seen that the extended cannot 
 be a unit. An extended body is possible only as the parts 
 cohere, and this, again, is possible only as they are con- 
 nected by a system of attractive forces. In such a case the 
 atom appears as a system of attracting and repelling points, 
 each of which is the centre of forces distinct from those of 
 all the rest ; and thus we should be led directly to the con- 
 ception of centres of force. Possibly we might retain the 
 indivisibility of the atom in such a case, but only by mak- 
 ing the attractions greater than any possible dividing force. 
 But even this very questionable notion would not save the 
 unity of the atom. It would have a unitedness rather than 
 a unity. Only that is a unit whose states are states of the 
 entire being. Any conception of states which are states of 
 parts only and not of the whole, as when atoms are con- 
 ceived as having opposite forces at opposite ends, cancels 
 the unity and with it the reality.
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 205 
 
 So long, then, as a passive and extended solidity is viewed 
 as an attribute of the elements their unity cannot be main- 
 tained. Hence we conclude that the corpuscular conception, 
 even in its modern form, must be abandoned both as un- 
 necessary and as hostile to the unity, and thus to the reality 
 of the atom itself. Either we must regard the atom as a 
 convenient, practical fiction, or else we must view it as a true 
 agent, which, Tby its activity, founds without having the 
 properties of phenomenal matter. 
 
 But we are certainly not out of the woods, even with this 
 result, so long as we allow that the atoms are really in space. 
 In that case the atom becomes merely a punctual agent, 
 having location without extension; and this notion, when 
 closely looked into, grows more and more bizarre. But if 
 we carry the atoms into the non-spatial realm as a set of 
 unpicturable agents, they lose all representative value for 
 the imagination, all logical value for the understanding in 
 its explanation of phenomena, and finally metaphysics pro- 
 ceeds to dissolve them away into forms of an energy not 
 their own, thus cancelling them altogether as ontological 
 facts. These are specimen difficulties in the notion of mat- 
 ter as having more than phenomenal reality. 
 
 Force 
 
 This general uncertainty of physical teaching concerning 
 the nature of matter appears equally in the doctrine re- 
 specting its forces. Here, too, the metaphysics of physics 
 is hopelessly confused, owing to the superficialities of sense- 
 thought uncorrected by critical reflection. The notion of 
 force arises from the need of importing causality into the 
 problem, and as the atoms are easily fancied to be the only 
 things concerned, the force is distributed among them as its 
 subjects. This is done in a way which causes no practical
 
 206 METAPHYSICS 
 
 mischief, but which leaves things metaphysically at very 
 loose ends. The current notions and phrases about force 
 are supposed to be justified by the formal necessity of 
 affirming causation. It is worth while to consider, if we 
 are to speak of atoms at all, how we must conceive of them 
 and their forces. 
 
 In discussing being we pointed out that force, as com- 
 monly conceived as inhering in things, is purely an abstrac- 
 tion from certain forms of activity ; we have now to at- 
 tempt some nearer determination. The common conception 
 is that separate forces reside in the thing, and that the 
 thing is the home or seat of the forces. But this view rests 
 on the notion of pure being and on a hypostasis of force. 
 The result is an impossible dualism, in which the being does 
 not explain the force, and yet the force is nothing apart 
 from the being. To this absurdity we are led by mistaking 
 the distinctions of language for metaphysical facts. Scarce- 
 ly better is the definition of force as the unknown cause of 
 phenomena. This makes force at once a thing, for only 
 things can be causes ; and it also dispenses with everything 
 but force, for the sole aim of speculation is to find the 
 causes of phenomena. But this view at once proceeds to 
 stultify itself by next providing something else, which, in 
 some mysterious way, possesses or supports or uses the 
 force. The fact, however, is that the elements are so re- 
 lated to one another that, when certain conditions are ful- 
 filled, they manifest peculiar activities, which activities, how- 
 ever, are always the activities of the things themselves, 
 and not of some inherent forces. Of course, they could not 
 act as they do if they were not what they are ; but the 
 power to do what they do is developed in the moment of 
 the action. 
 
 We must here refer to our general conception of the 
 system as composed of a set of things which mutually
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 207 
 
 change as the plan of the system requires, so that each 
 thing is what it is, and does what it does, because all the 
 rest are what they are, and do what they do. In such a 
 case, the being of everything changes from moment to mo- 
 ment, and its possibilities vary with it; indeed, its possi- 
 bilities and its actualities are strictly identical. We do 
 not conceive being, then, as having inherent forces, but 
 as passing from one form of manifestation to another as 
 its circumstances vary. We should say, then, that a new 
 activity does not spring from an inherent power coiled 
 up w r ithin it, but from a pow'er acquired in the moment 
 of manifestation. We may illustrate this by the intensity 
 of attraction between two elements. At each new dis- 
 tance they attract with new intensities. These were not 
 something in the thing, nor something put into the thing ; 
 they are developed at every point. Any given intensity 
 represents the energy of action which the general relation 
 between the two calls for at any given point. In the 
 same manner, the different forces of things, as well as the 
 different intensities of the same force, are acquired at the 
 time of action, and represent only the forms of action which 
 the nature of the system calls for in their special relations. 
 But, since these activities fall into certain classes, we ab- 
 stract a specific cause, which is not merely the thing, but 
 some cause in the thing. This is a confusion of cause with 
 ground. The cause of an act is the agent itself. The 
 ground of the act is that peculiarity of nature which, under 
 the fitting conditions, makes it the cause of that act, and 
 not of some other. 
 
 We may say, then, that a thing is perpetually acquir- 
 ing new forces and losing others, according as its rela- 
 tions change. The conditions of some of these manifesta- 
 tioTiS may always be fulfilled, as in the case of gravitation. 
 The conditions of some others may be fulfilled only here
 
 208 METAPHYSICS 
 
 aim tnere, and now and then. Such are the chemical, mag- 
 netic, and electric manifestations. Coexistence in the in- 
 finite seems enough to secure the first manifestation ; the 
 conditions of the others are far more complex. When we 
 know the order of their appearance, we have their law 
 to a certain extent. When, in addition, we know the law 
 of their variation, which, in physical forces, is some func- 
 tion of the space between the interacting bodies, then we 
 have a formula which can be used for mathematical de- 
 duction. It is this fact which constitutes the fruitfulness 
 of the law of gravitation compared with the law of affinity 
 or of cohesion. The former law admits of exact mathemat- 
 ical expression, and its conditions are simple ; in particular, 
 the mass admits of being treated as a unit located in a point. 
 The problem of three bodies fails to give a hint of the 
 unmanageable complexity of astronomical problems which 
 would result if this were not the case. But the law and the 
 circumstances being simple, and admitting of mathematical 
 statement, they admit of deductive calculation. In the case 
 of affinity, the circumstances are not so simple, and the law 
 admits of no mathematical formulation, and here we are 
 practically restricted to observation. 
 
 Our conclusion, then, is that force as used in the physical 
 sciences is not to be regarded as a something resident in 
 the atoms, but rather as an abstraction from the various 
 forms of atomic activity, and the laws of force are only the 
 formulas which express the conditions of these forms of 
 activity, and sometimes the rate of their variation. This, 
 of course, on the supposition that the atoms may be viewed 
 as ontologically real, and that we are to speak of them as 
 having forces. The alternative view is to drop the language 
 of causality altogether except in an inductive sense and 
 confine ourselves to studying the laws of physical changes. 
 
 Physical metaphysics finds a still graver difficulty in the
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 209 
 
 relation of the atoms and their forces to space. To sense 
 thought, of course, it seems sufficient to say that the atoms 
 are in space, but we have seen that this is a very dark say- 
 ing when metaphysically understood. Sense thought finds 
 it equally a matter of course that the forces should vary 
 with the distance. But more or less of empty space does 
 not seem, upon reflection, to contain the least ground for 
 the variation of force. The idea attributes a kind of resist- 
 ance to space which must be overcome before the object 
 can be reached. And since, on the most realistic view, space 
 does nothing, the existence of a thing in this or that point 
 in space is no ground for change in the thing itself. Space- 
 position, therefore, on any theory, must be viewed not as a 
 cause, but an effect ; it is the result of the interactions of 
 things whereby they prescribe to one another the position 
 they shall have in real or apparent space. But this place- 
 determining power is a purely metaphysical one ; it is not 
 determined by position, but determines position. Its own 
 determining ground must be sought for in the idea, or na- 
 ture, of the whole, which is the ultimate source of all law 
 and order. We cannot take any other view without eith- 
 er reasoning in a circle or making space an active thing. 
 Hence it follows, as we have seen in discussing the nature 
 of the infinite, that the whole cannot be construed as the 
 result of its parts, but the parts can be understood only 
 from the side of the whole. The parts are not independent 
 seats of independent forces which by combination generate 
 an apparent whole ; but the parts have their existence and 
 their properties, or forces, only as demanded by the mean- 
 ing or nature of the whole. But though space itself can 
 never be regarded as the real ground of force-variation, it 
 may be treated as its measure in calculation, because the 
 changing space - relations are accurate exponents of tjie 
 changing metaphysical relations. Hence we can deal with
 
 210 METAPHYSICS 
 
 the former with as much certainty as if they were the 
 latter. 
 
 Nevertheless, the fancy is entertained by many that emp- 
 ty space itself is a sufficient reason for force- variation. Our 
 physical experience teaches us that we can act directly only 
 on things within reach ; and even then we must not be at 
 arm's-length. This most vulgar fact seems to be at the bot- 
 tom of our notion that force must vary with space. This 
 fact is further aided by an alleged explanation drawn from 
 the geometrical nature of space itself, and the result is a 
 claim that all central forces must necessarily vary as the 
 inverse square of the distance. The explanation and the 
 claim are totally baseless. They are founded on the notion 
 that force is something streaming out from the element as 
 a kind of aura flowing from a centre. If this view were 
 allowed there would be a certain explanation both of the 
 diminution of force with the space and of the law of the 
 inverse square; for as the surface of a sphere varies as the 
 square of the radius, it follows that with twice the radius 
 the surface would be four times as great. Hence the out- 
 flowing aura would be distributed over a fourfold surface, 
 and hence, again, it would only be one-fourth as intense on 
 the unit of surface. But we are freed from this notion, 
 which is plainly only a product of the imagination. Noth- 
 ing streams out from being, and force is only an abstrac- 
 tion from a thing's activity, and never a thing itself. But 
 the imagination always wants a bridge on which to cross, 
 and hence it forms the notion of a passing and repassing 
 thing, and thus exchanges the notion of force acting at a 
 distance for the old view of action by impact. 
 
 If, however, the passing force be a real something, we must 
 know where it comes from, and how the atom can forever 
 generate this reality so as to fill space with it. If the force 
 be only an influence, then we have simply a figure of speech
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 211 
 
 as the cause of effects ; but if the force were allowed to be a 
 real something, which passes from thing to thing and pro- 
 duces effects, our difficulties would be greater than ever. An 
 outgoing ether would not explain attraction, and if it did it 
 ought to be as attractive on the farther as on the nearer side 
 of the body to be moved. No body cuts off the influence 
 of gravitation by interposition, and hence the force which, 
 reaching the earth from the sun, attracts it towards the sun, 
 forthwith emerges on the other side, and ought to attract it 
 from the sun. There seems also to be no reason why the 
 force should attract in the line of its own motion rather 
 than in any other. This theory does not conceive force as 
 a tense cord, but as a moving something ; and hence when 
 it reaches a body and causes motion that motion might be 
 in any direction. Some have sought to escape these whim- 
 sical difficulties by the additional fancy that a resting sphere 
 of force is encamped around every atom ; but this view 
 disposes entirely of the attempt to deduce the law of force- 
 variation from the nature of space, as that rests on the as- 
 sumption of movement from a centre. This attempt is fur- 
 ther forbidden by the fact that, if space be the real ground 
 of variation, there can be on\y one law of variation, as space 
 is always and everywhere the same. And if only one law, 
 then there can be only one, or no, force in the system. For 
 if there were both attraction and repulsion, and they were 
 balanced at one point, they would be balanced at all points, 
 and would cancel each other. If, on the other hand, one 
 were stronger than the other at one point, it would be so at 
 all points, and would banish the other. 
 
 In speaking of space as a ground of force-variation we 
 denied that it can be such ground. But may it not make 
 all action at a distance impossible? If related to force at 
 all, it seems better able to bar its action than anything else. 
 This has long been a vexed question, almost a black beast,
 
 212 METAPHYSICS 
 
 in physical speculation ; and certainly on the received theory 
 which locates individual atoms in a real and empty space, 
 it is a rather tough problem. If we conceive a multitude 
 of individual atoms separated from one another by an ab- 
 solute void, it is utterly impossible to bridge over the abyss 
 between them by anything but a pre-established harmony ; 
 and this would only simulate action at a distance. The void 
 would imply and express the absence of all essential relation. 
 Xewton, therefore, in his letter to Bentley, insisted that no 
 one with a moderate reflective power could imagine that the 
 gravitation of the elements is due to any action of the atoms 
 themselves. And, indeed, it does seem incredible that the 
 infinitesimal atom is really filling space with its influence 
 to the farthest atom of ether or star-dust, and yet without 
 any knowledge of itself, or its fellows, or the spaces across 
 which it acts, and yet adjusting itself absolutely, instantane- 
 ously, and incessantly to each minutest change of distance, 
 in not only one but all the atoms of the system. Accord- 
 ingly, there has always been with physicists an anxiety to 
 fill up the void with something through which action should 
 be transmitted, and the result has been the generation of a 
 more or less numerous family of ethers. This anxiety, how- 
 ever, rests upon the notion that action is more intelligible 
 when between contiguous things than when between things 
 separate in space. But we have seen, in discussing inter- 
 action, that contiguity in space does not remove the diffi- 
 culty of interaction, as this lies in the opposition of the no- 
 tions of independence and community ; so that not action at 
 a distance, but action at all between two things assumed to be 
 independent, is what reason finds so difficult. The attempt to 
 dispense with action at a distance must really deny all at- 
 tractive and repulsive forces to the elements, and either appeal 
 at once to a co-ordinating and moving force in matter which is 
 not of matter, or it must reduce all material action to impact
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 213 
 
 The latter alternative has often been chosen by physicists. 
 When the dynamic view of matter was first proposed, the 
 general objection to it was that it was a return to the scho- 
 lastic doctrine of occult qualities. The present conception, 
 which endows matter with moving forces, was for a long 
 time resisted on this ground, and the demand was made that 
 all material phenomena be explained b}^ the laws of motion 
 and impact. The same unrest with the mysterious impli- 
 cations of gravity often reappears in attempts to explain 
 gravitation by the impact of some assumed ether atoms. To 
 begin with, these attempts are all utter failures. The phe- 
 nomena of cohesion and affinity utterly defy any attempt to 
 explain them as the results of impact; while the implica- 
 tions of the impact theory are without a shadow of warrant. 
 But, in the next place, impact is far from being so simple as 
 this theory assumes. On the ordinary theory, there is no 
 contact whatever of the elements, and they are held apart 
 by repulsive forces of such a kind that only an infinite force 
 could bring the elements in contact. On this theory, then, 
 impact itself assumes action at a distance. And, in general, 
 if force acts at all between the atoms, it must act at a dis- 
 tance. An attractive force which did not act at a distance 
 could never make itself known as attraction ; and a repul- 
 sive force which did not act at a distance would not be 
 repulsion at all. 
 
 To see this, conceive two solid cubes endowed with re- 
 pulsion which, however, cannot act at a distance. If these 
 cubes occupied the same space, their repulsions could not 
 result in motion, no matter how intense they might be, be- 
 cause they would be balanced in every direction. If now 
 they be pressed together, there is not the slightest reason 
 why they should not telescope each other. In the first 
 place, such bodies would meet only in the geometrical plane 
 which separates them, and all the resistance to interpene-
 
 214 METAPHYSICS 
 
 tration must lie in that plane. But the plane itself is noth- 
 ing but an imaginary surface without resistance ; and hence 
 the resistance must come from the parts on either side of 
 the plane. If, however, we should allow that each body 
 has a certain part of itself in the plane, then those parts 
 which are in the plane would strictly coincide, and, as co- 
 inciding, there would be no reason why the repulsion be- 
 tween these parts should take one direction rather than 
 another ; and it would practically be cancelled, so that the 
 true repulsion would still lie between those parts on either 
 side of the plane and external to each other. But as by 
 hypothesis these parts cannot repel because at a distance, 
 there is nothing to hinder the two bodies from sliding to- 
 gether under pressure. This result would be reached even 
 if we should allow the atoms to be solid and in absolute 
 contact. We should still have to posit action at a distance. 
 But, as we have frequently seen, there is no reason for sup- 
 posing that atoms are solid ; they are rather the immaterial 
 ground of phenomenal solidity. So, then, we seem shut up 
 to affirm action at a distance. 
 
 But here a new difficulty emerges. If we allow the gen- 
 eral possibility of action at a distance, we seem likewise 
 shut up to the paradoxical admission that there is no long- 
 er any reason for believing that a thing is in one place 
 rather than in another. How do we know that the things 
 which, by resisting our effort and coercing our sensations, 
 create in us the perception of a world about us are not real- 
 ly located beyond the bounds of our solar system ? Crude 
 common -sense, of course, would reply that it is directly 
 cognizant of the very being and location of things ; but ev- 
 ery one competent to speculate at all knows better. He 
 knows that we cognize things only through their activities 
 upon us, and that if these activities were maintained, our 
 world-vision would remain unaltered, no matter what hap
 
 MA1TER, FORCE, AND MOTION 215 
 
 pened to the things. But since action may take place at a 
 distance, why may not the things which act upon us be lo- 
 cated at any point whatever in space? And since, in the 
 popular theory at least, the void is no bar to action, why 
 may not things be in some extra-siderial region, and only 
 manifest themselves in our neighborhood? 
 
 If it be said that existence in space means only that a 
 thing acts at a certain point, common-sense is disturbed, for 
 it thinks it means more than this by existence in space, and 
 in addition the difficulty is not removed ; for if a thing ex- 
 ists in space at all, then, on the hypothesis of action at a dis- 
 tance, the fact of action at a point does not prove that a thing 
 is there. Moreover, the atom acts at many points ; is it in all 
 of them ? By our unfortunate admission of action at a dis- 
 tance, \ve have deprived ourselves of every valid test of the 
 true whereabouts of things. We may fancy that in resist- 
 ance we have such a test, but this, too, is untenable. Both 
 attraction and resistance may point to a certain centre, but 
 this is far from proving that the agent is really there ; for 
 since action may take place at a distance, it is quite possi- 
 ble to view the point as the radiating centre of atomic man- 
 ifestation only. The claim that the atom must be at the 
 crossing of the lines of attraction and repulsion depends on 
 an assumption which is not self-evident. This assumption 
 is that an atom can cause another to move only on the line 
 which joins them ; but, on the hypothesis of action at a dis- 
 tance, it is especially hard to see why the movement might 
 not take place on any other line whatever. Of course, at- 
 traction means a drawing-to; but etymology will not help 
 us in this matter. If, then, action at a distance be allowed, 
 it is theoretically possible to claim that, for all we know, 
 the real agents of the system are removed from it by the 
 whole diameter of space. But this is so revolting a para- 
 dox that it would hardly seem more irrational to claim that
 
 216 METAPHYSICS 
 
 things may act in some other time than the present. Be- 
 sides, on this admission, the bottom would fall out of the 
 atomic theory itself. The great reason for admitting sep- 
 arate atoms is the desire to locate an agent at the centre of 
 attractions and repulsions ; if we locate the agent elsewhere, 
 the only theory which would be satisfactory in any way 
 would be one which allowed one and the same agent to do 
 all the work. To complete the paradox, we must add that 
 if we insist that a thing is wherever it acts, then we have 
 to attribute a kind of omnipresence to every atom ; as every 
 atom is said to attract every other, that is, to act upon every 
 other. This view would be embarrassing enough. It would 
 lead at once to the previous conclusion, that there is no war- 
 rant for saying that the atom is in one place rather than in 
 another. It would, indeed, be in every place and everywhere 
 as one and the same atom. Thus we should have a very pe- 
 culiar kind and case of omnipresence. 
 
 These bizarre difficulties are specimens of the rational 
 scandals, offences, and impossibilities which infest the meta- 
 physics of physics. The attempt to construct a system out 
 of atoms and the void alone shatters on these and similar 
 absurdities, and it is impossible to escape all of them on any 
 theory which allows the substantive reality of space. Prac- 
 tically, as we have said, these notions work no mischief, for 
 the important work of science consists in finding the laws 
 of phenomena; and in this work these metaphysical crudi- 
 ties remain harmless in the background. But when they 
 are brought out of this retirement and paraded as scientific 
 and final, then it is in place to point out that they are neither 
 data nor inferences of any sound science, but only hyposta- 
 ses of unreflective sense-thinkinp-. With the best of wills it 
 
 o 
 
 is impossible to save them from destructive metaphysical 
 criticism, when they claim to represent the ontological fact 
 of existence.
 
 .MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 217 
 
 Motion 
 
 The traditional doctrine of motion and its relation to mat- 
 ter contains various difficulties which deserve to be men- 
 tioned before setting forth its phenomenality. We return to 
 the view of spontaneous thought and work away from it. 
 
 Motion is indefinable, except in terms of itself. Like be- 
 ing, change, and action, it must be accepted as an idea which 
 cannot be constructed out of anything else. If we define 
 motion as a change of place, or as a passage from one point 
 of space to another, we but define the same by the same. 
 The change of place, or the passage from point to point, is 
 unintelligible without the intuition of motion itself. To one 
 who has the intuition, such definitions serve to unfold its 
 implications, but to one without the intuition they are as 
 useless as a definition of sight is to the blind. 
 
 The Eleatic Zeno's claim that motion implies contra- 
 diction is sufficiently disposed of by a correct doctrine of 
 change. In modern times a series of even more superficial 
 objections have been based on the antithesis of absolute and 
 relative motion. Absolute motion is declared impossible, 
 and the universe, as a whole, is said to rest. Rest and mo- 
 tion, then, are alike relative and real only as relative. These 
 objections may have puzzled many, but have probably con- 
 vinced none. They simply leave the mind in that most un- 
 comfortable position of being sure that there is a fallacy 
 without being able to point it out. But, in this case, it is 
 not difficult to detect both the error of statement and the 
 fallacy of argument. The former is discovered by simple 
 definition. Absolute rest can only be defined as continuous 
 existence in the same position in absolute space. Absolute 
 motion, therefore, would be the successive occupation of dif- 
 ferent positions in absolute space. If, now, there is no ab-
 
 218 METAPHYSICS 
 
 solute motion, then all things are absolutely at rest, or re- 
 main in the same points in absolute space. In that case, 
 relative motion, which is declared to be real, becomes a mere 
 delusion, with no ground whatever. If, then, we hold that 
 motion of any kind is more that a phenomenon, we must 
 affirm the reality of absolute motion, and view relative 
 motion only as the way in which sundry absolute motions 
 appear from our stand-point. 
 
 The fallacy of the argument against absolute motion is no 
 less easily detected. It consists in assuming that the mental 
 co-ordinates by which thought grasps the fact are necessary 
 to the fact itself. We are told, for example, that absolute 
 motion is indistinguishable from absolute rest, because mo- 
 tion implies fixed points of reference, and in absolute space 
 there are no such points. All the points of space are alike ; 
 there is no here and no there, for these terms are purely rel- 
 ative to the spectator. But motion is a passage from here 
 to there, and hence is always relative to the spectator, and 
 therefore impossible in pure space. To all this the reply is 
 that motion is, indeed, grasped and measured in thought 
 only by setting up some point or axes of reference; but 
 these mental co-ordinates are nothing to the motion itself ; 
 least of all do they make the motion. We cannot define or 
 represent a motion to ourselves, without assuming some 
 stand-point in relation to which the motion is to be meas- 
 ured ; but the motion itself is under no obligation to be rep- 
 resented, and moves on according to its own laws, whether 
 we think of it or not. It certainly never occurs to the as- 
 tronomer to fancy that the celestial equator and meridian, 
 to which he refers the stellar motions, make the motions. 
 He recognizes that these planes of reference are but the 
 makeshifts of our minds in order to grasp the fact. If, then, 
 absolute space were real, there need not be the least diffi- 
 culty in admitting absolute motion. The fact that every point
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 219 
 
 m such space is distinct from every other point would suf- 
 fice for its affirmation. The entire system might be viewed 
 as journeying through infinite space, or as revolving in it. 
 Such a conception of the entire system, of course, could 
 never be tested, for no facts whatever could prove or dis- 
 prove it. Nothing short of a revelation would suffice for a 
 decision. Applied to our solar system, however, it would 
 represent the fact. Its centre of gravity is in motion, and 
 the system, as a whole, revolves. In addition, the planets 
 themselves are revolving on their own axes in absolute space. 
 To conceive such motions, we need points of reference ; but 
 the existence of the motions, if space be real, is quite inde- 
 pendent of our thought and its scaffolding. Possibly it may 
 be urged that motion is, at least, relative to space itself, and 
 that when space itself is reckoned as a part of the system, 
 motion can only be relative. This may be admitted. Space 
 does not move, and motion is in space. But this motion 
 would change the definition, and cancel the problem alto- 
 gether, in any intelligible sense. 
 
 Concerning the relation of motion to reality, the history 
 of speculation shows a complete change of view. The an- 
 cients, without exception, held that the natural state of 
 things is rest. Things are put in motion only by external 
 agency, and, resigned to themselves, come quickly to resl 
 again. Motion was regarded as a "violent state" of thingSj 
 and the moving thing was supposed to have an inner strug- 
 gle to escape from it. The source of this belief is evident. 
 In our sense-experience, we have abundant illustrations of 
 the cessation of motion and of the difficulty of initiating it. 
 Besides, we find in ourselves a weariness, resulting from 
 continued effort, which compels us to seek repose ; and 
 this, by a kind of mechanical anthropomorphism, is easily 
 transferred to things. 
 
 This view of earlier speculators has given rise in later
 
 220 METAPHYSICS 
 
 times to the opposite idea, that motion is the natural state 
 of things. The conception of matter as having no principle 
 of movement in itself, and as tending to rest, led necessarily 
 to the doctrine of at least a prime mover in the universe, 
 who should also be immaterial. But such a view could hard- 
 ly help giving aid and comfort to theistically inclined spec- 
 ulators, and could not fail, therefore, to be obnoxious to such 
 as did not share such tendencies. These side-issues have 
 not been without their effect in mechanical speculations. A 
 more respectable ground of the view is the desire to escape 
 admitting any moving forces in matter. With this aim, 
 various theories of molecular vortices have been invented, 
 in which atoms originally endowed with motion are made 
 to produce all material phenomena by simple variations of 
 the rate and direction of motion. But, whatever the source 
 of the doctrine, it is hard to give to natural any clear meaning 
 in this connection, and, in its obvious sense, the doctrine is 
 false. If motion were an essential and inalienable endow- 
 ment of every element, and not a variable product of mov- 
 ing forces, it might be called natural to matter. In such a 
 case, any element left to itself would move with a fixed ve- 
 locity, as a result of its own nature. But this view is un- 
 tenable, and leads to results directly contradicted by the 
 facts. It may well be that motion is a universal fact, as an 
 effect of the moving forces of the elements; but this is far 
 from making it an inherent and essential attribute of mat- 
 ter. In fact, motion is neither natural nor unnatural, but a 
 condition in which matter may or may not be ; and in this 
 sense matter may be said to be indifferent to motion. If 
 in motion, it remains in motion ; and if at rest, it remains 
 at rest. This is the only view which does not conflict with 
 the law of inertia a law which, whether an apriori truth or 
 not, is still too well attested by consequences to be ques- 
 tioned as to its validity. The motions of the elements
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 221 
 
 are the products of their interaction, and the condition of 
 any element, whether in motion or at rest, has its external 
 ground. 
 
 But this indifference of matter to motion must not be 
 confounded with the claim that matter is strictly the same, 
 whether at rest or in motion. This view rests partly upon 
 the abstractions of mechanics, in which matter appears as 
 the rigid and indifferent subject of motion, and partly on 
 the fact that matter can begin and cease to move without 
 any change of its prominent qualities. Hence unreflective 
 thought, which thinks mainly under the law of identity, 
 holds that matter in motion is the same as matter in rest. 
 Now, whatever view we may take of motion, this view is 
 false. The motion of a thing is simply its successive ap- 
 pearance at the successive points of its course. But this 
 succession must have some ground. A moving body, at :i 
 given point of its path, differs from the same body at rest 
 in the same point ; otherwise the effect would be the same. 
 It is idle to say that the difference is that one moves and 
 the other rests, for the movement of the first is but its pas- 
 sage from the point in which it is at any instant to the con- 
 tiguous one, and there is no ground for this passage, unless 
 the moving body have a different internal state from that 
 of the resting one. .No more does it avail to say that the 
 groun.d of the motion is the attraction of other bodies, for 
 this attraction acts by no external grip or drawing, but by 
 producing a new state in the thing, and this state is the im- 
 mediate ground of the new manifestation. Motion, there- 
 fore, is but the spatial manifestation of a peculiar meta- 
 physical state in the moving thing itself, and this state 
 is what distinguishes the moving from the resting thing. 
 Without this admission, we cannot escape Zeno's conclusion 
 that motion is impossible ; for, at any point of time, the 
 moving body is at a given point in space, and if at that
 
 222 METAPHYSICS 
 
 time and point it is metaphorically the same as if at rest \n 
 the same point, then the moving body rests, and can never 
 move. Both the law of inertia and that of causation would 
 forbid its motion. The latter would forbid it for the lack 
 of any ground for the motion, and the former would forbid 
 it because the body, being at rest in a point, must continue 
 so. We must, then, admit that, even in the indivisible 
 point of time in which there can be no spatial manifestation, 
 the moving body differs from the resting one by an internal 
 state, which is the true ground of the motion. To this 
 state we give the name of velocity. In itself, velocity is 
 not motion any more than a force is a line. Motion is a 
 measure of velocity, just as force may be represented by a 
 line, but both alike are forever different from either mo- 
 tions or lines. If velocity itself were motion instead of its 
 ground, then, in a point of time, a moving body could have 
 no velocity, and hence no ground for passing from the point 
 of space in which it might be. But, at any instant, a mov- 
 ing body has velocity which is not made, but measured, by 
 the space passed over in the unit of time. If the velocity 
 be variable, then it is measured by the space passed over in 
 the unit of time, supposing the velocity to become fixed at 
 the instant of measurement. This facu implies that velocity 
 itself is quite different from its .neacure. It is that inner 
 state of a thing of greater or less intensity which impels it 
 incessantly to change its place. While, then, we can repre- 
 sent it as the quotient of the space and time, or as the first 
 differential coefficient of the space and time, we must not 
 identify it with either. Such a blunder would be like iden- 
 tifying the lines and differential coefficients which represent 
 force with force itself. 
 
 This necessity, supposing that material things are onto- 
 logical realities, of referring all change and movement to 
 metaphysical states in the things, leads to a peculiar para
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 223 
 
 dox when we affirm a real motion in a real space. Motion 
 is the result of an internal state; and direction is given in 
 the same state. Motion and direction are inseparable, and 
 both are the outcome of a peculiar inner state. This fact 
 leads to a rather odd conclusion. Spontaneous thought 
 finds no difficulty in affirming the existence of a thing in 
 space, and also the mutual indifference of the thing and 
 space. Space is not altered by the thing's presence or ab- 
 sence, and the thing is not affected by change of place. It 
 is, then, quite indifferent to the thing whether it be in one 
 point or another. The solar system moves through space, 
 but remains the same. But, curiously enough, this indiffer- 
 ence cannot be maintained when the things begin to move; 
 for then difference of direction, as well as difference of po- 
 sition, becomes possible. The first impulse is to say that 
 difference of direction also makes no difference to the thing, 
 that a thing moving north is in no respect different from 
 one moving west. But this impulse is misleading. The 
 difference of direction must have some ground in the mov- 
 ing things, and this can only be found in some peculiarity 
 of internal condition, which holds one to its northerly and 
 the other to its westerly direction. Without this assump- 
 tion there is no reason why direction should not incessantly 
 change. If we should fall back on the law of the sufficient 
 reason, we should be especially unfortunate; as the lack of 
 any state determinative of direction could only result in the 
 thing's coming at once to a standstill. It will likely be 
 urged that there is sufficient reason for the thing's going, 
 straight ahead, in that it is actually moving in that direction. 
 If, then, a thing moving west were internally exactly like 
 one moving north, still each would continue its proper mo- 
 tion because already in it. This seems clear, but is really 
 unconvincing. For motion is simply the successive exist- 
 ence of a body at successive points; and the fact that a
 
 224 METAPHYSICS 
 
 body has been at points J., B, C, etc., is no reason why it 
 should pass through the points X, Y, and Z. At any given 
 point of time, there must be some reason why the next in- 
 crement of the path should be in one direction rather than 
 another. The path passed over is not in the thing, but be- 
 hind it. Direction, geometrically considered, cannot deter- 
 mine anything. Why, then, shall the body at any point of 
 its path take one direction rather than another? There is 
 nothing to do but to declare that motion and direction are 
 given as inseparable elements of the same internal state, 
 and that this state varies with the direction. But, on the 
 other hand, possible directions are numberless ; and we are 
 shut up to the affirmation that for each one of the direc- 
 tions there is a special and peculiar inner state. Thus we 
 should have to give up the indifference of things to space, 
 and declare that all directions, if not all positions, in abso- 
 lute space have their representatives in the metaphysical 
 states of matter. Tin's paradox the realist might find it 
 hard eitherto escape or to admit. 
 
 Before speaking of the general laws of motion, a word 
 must be said about its continuity. This is an idea more 
 often mentioned than understood. A familiar misunder- 
 standing makes it mean that motion has a constant quan- 
 tity, a fancy which has long been superannuated in physics. 
 Those who hold it seem to think that they have the support 
 of physical science ; but the conservation of energy, which 
 they apparently have in mind, is a totally different doc- 
 .trine. 
 
 But the continuity of motion is itself an ambiguous 
 phrase, as it may refer to space or to velocity. A very 
 excellent work on mechanics contains the following defini- 
 
 O 
 
 tion : " Motion is essentially continuous ; that is, a body 
 cannot pass from one position to another without passing 
 through a series of intermediate positions ; a point in mo-
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 225 
 
 tion, therefore, describes a continuous line." Here the doc- 
 trine is referred to space alone. But as originally expressed 
 by Leibnitz, and as commonly understood, it refers rather 
 to velocity, and means that a moving body, in passing from 
 one velocity to another, passes through all intermediate ve- 
 locities. In this sense of the law Leibnitz and his followers 
 regarded it as a self-evident truth, and from it they deduced 
 a number of propositions, notably that absolutely solid bod- 
 ies cannot exist, as the collision of such bodies would also 
 collide with the law of continuity. Others have deduced 
 from the same law both the necessity of moving forces in 
 matter which act at a distance, and also the punctual char- 
 acter of the elements. It is plain that if two absolutely 
 solid bodies collide, the change of velocity must be instan- 
 taneous ; for the moment of collision is indivisible, and if 
 they rested for two consecutive instants the law of inertia 
 would keep them at rest forever. There would, then, be an 
 instantaneous passage from motion to rest, or from rest to 
 motion, or from one velocity to another, and thus the law 
 of continuity would be broken. Hence bodies must begin 
 to act upon one another before the time of geometrical con- 
 tact ; and hence must be endowed with moving forces which 
 can act at a distance. 
 
 In neither of these senses is the continuity of motion a 
 necessity of thought. The ideality of space makes it en- 
 tirely possible that phenomena should appear in one position 
 and reappear in another without appearing at the interme- 
 diate positions. If such is not the order of experience we 
 must view it simply as a fact, and not as a rational necessity. 
 
 Just as little is the continuity of velocity a rational ne- 
 cessity. The reasons given for the doctrine are mostly in- 
 consistent with one another. It is said, for example, that 
 velocity cannot increase by leaps without implying that the 
 same body has two different velocities at the same instant; 
 
 15
 
 226 METAPHYSICS 
 
 but this is the same fallacy which appeared in the objec- 
 tions to change. Instant is taken to mean a short duration, 
 whereas in the case assumed it would not be a duration of 
 any sort, but a limit. It would express the point of time 
 when one motion ceases and another begins. On one side 
 of the point the velocity would be v, on the other side it 
 would be v r Moreover, these objections are inconsistent. 
 They do not rest on the greatness of the increment, but on 
 the fact of any increment whatever. Hence v + dv is just 
 as obnoxious to this objection as v+v r where v l is a finite 
 velocity and dv is an infinitesimal. If. then, the objection 
 were allowed, the changelessness of the Eleatics would be 
 the necessary conclusion; and a variable velocity of any 
 kind would be impossible. 
 
 The end aimed at in this argument is much better reached 
 by saying that no finite force can generate a finite velocity 
 in less than finite time. This statement will always be tol- 
 erably secure from attack, because the intensity of a force is 
 measured by the velocity it can generate in a finite unit of 
 time. If, then, a force should generate a finite velocity in 
 infinitesimal time, it would generate an infinite velocity in 
 finite time, and thus by definition would be infinite. But 
 this conception, again, assumes that the force shall act inces- 
 santly like gravitation. In the case of absolute solids, im- 
 pact would be attended by the generation or destruction of 
 a finite velocity in a point of time ; yet the force would not 
 be infinite, because such impact would necessarily be instan- 
 taneous in its action. Through overlooking this fact, some 
 speculators have affirmed that in case of impact the force 
 must be infinite; but their argument has always consisted 
 in confusing action by impact with action by moving forces. 
 And hence we conclude once more that the continuity of 
 velocity is a doctrine which holds only in a cystem which 
 derives all motion from moving forces, which forces, again,
 
 MATTER, FOKCE, AND MOTION 227 
 
 act not only through space, but also through time. And 
 even in such a system the doctrine assumes the reality of 
 time, as if time itself had a significance for action. In our 
 view of time, difference in the members of the same series 
 is time itself. It follows, then, that any series which admits 
 of division in thought will necessarily appear to be in time ; 
 and as we can carry the division of velocity to any desired 
 extent, velocity must appear as reached by infinitesimal in- 
 crements whose sum becomes perceptible only in finite time. 
 "We view velocity as quantity, and measure it by number. 
 But quantity admits of indefinite division ; and hence we are 
 forced to make the final units indefinitely small. But after 
 we have posited such a divisibility, we must of course view 
 the whole as the sum of the infinitesimal parts implied in 
 our position. Their summation in reality, however, must 
 be successive. Hence, even in the case of impact of proper 
 solids, if a body should instantaneously pass from velocity 
 two to velocity four, we should seek to divide the increment 
 into parts which must all be passed through, and should then 
 try to reach the instantaneousness of the passage by increas- 
 ing its rate to infinity. It is this fact, that the divisibility 
 of a series is time, which makes the continuity of velocity 
 apparently self-evident. 
 
 We leave now these general considerations and pass to 
 the more specific laws of motion. And fortunately we are 
 not left to invent or discover these laws for ourselves, for 
 the science of mechanics has done the work for us. We 
 have, then, only to examine those laws which are found 
 necessary in interpreting phenomena, and which are justi- 
 fied by experience. We remain for the present on the real- 
 istic platform. 
 
 The first and basal law of motion is that of inertia, ac- 
 cording to which a body cannot start or stop itself. If at
 
 228 METAPHYSICS 
 
 rest, it remains at rest ; and if in motion, it remains in uni- 
 form motion in a straight line unless interfered with from 
 without. Many attempts have been made to show this law 
 to be a necessity of thought, but without success. If the 
 non-spontaneity of the elements be allowed, the law is, of 
 course, an identical judgment, for the law is simply a denial 
 of spontaneity with regard to space-relations. A change of 
 condition is always an effect, and presupposes some cause; 
 and if an element has no influence over its own states, of 
 course all change must come from without. But when the 
 point is to know whether the law is an a/priori necessity, we 
 must inquire whether there is any ground for saying that 
 the elements must be of this sort. That they are such may 
 be allowed ; but that they must be such is not made to ap- 
 pear. The apparent self-evidence in the case is largely due 
 to the abstraction of a material point with which mechanics 
 is wont to begin. This point is conceived as the inert and 
 rigid subject of possible motion, and in itself is so emptied 
 of all quality as to contain no ground of activity of any sort. 
 The deduction of the law from this conception is easy enough ; 
 but this conception is a pure figment of the imagination. 
 As applied to a real element, even the first part of the law, 
 which asserts that a body at rest will remain at rest unless 
 moved by something outside of it, is not self-evident. It is 
 not self-evident that an element, if it could exist alone in 
 space, could not, whatever its nature, begin motion; for 
 motion, as we have seen, is but the spatial expression of an 
 internal state, and if that state were given, motion would 
 result. It is not self-evident that the inner changes of such 
 a thing could never result in that state which expresses it- 
 self in motion. 
 
 The common proof of the first part of the law consists in 
 bidding us conceive a single element in void space, and in 
 pointing out that there is no more reason why it should
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 229 
 
 move in one direction rather than in another. Then the 
 conclusion is drawn that the element will remain at rest. 
 But the law of the sufficient reason, to which appeal is here 
 made, is a very treacherous ally. We could use it with 
 equal propriety to prove that the atom could not be in space 
 or in time. For every point of space or time is like every 
 other, and hence there is no reason why it should be in one 
 rather than in any other; and hence it cannot be in either 
 space or time. It is well known that Leibnitz, the formu-. 
 lator of this law, was perpetually on the verge of pantheism 
 because of its influence. But we may allow that there 
 would be no reason in space itself for motion in one direc- 
 tion rather than in another ; yet that would not prove that 
 there might not be a reason in the thing. In no case does 
 space determine the direction of motion; this is due to the 
 interaction of things, and the point here is to know why 
 an element might not of itself pass into that internal state 
 which appears as motion. It is said that if it did, the mo- 
 tion would not' arise from rest, but from an internal motion ; 
 but the series of metaphysical changes in things are mo- 
 tions only in a rhetorical sense. If, then, a thing could exist 
 alone and maintain a series of inner changes in its solitary 
 existence, it is not inconceivable that it should pass into mo- 
 tion alone. For all we can say, there might be a tendency 
 in things to seek a certain state, as in elastic bodies, where 
 any departure from equilibrium results in an effort to re- 
 store the balance. A better illustration is found in our own 
 mental life, where every state is not compatible with inner 
 harmony, and in which there is a corresponding effort to re- 
 store the internal equilibrium. Things, then, might be such 
 as to be in conflict with themselves when forced out of a 
 certain state, and hence they might have an inner tendency 
 towards that state, and this state might be one which should 
 manifest itself as either rest or motion, according to its nature.
 
 230 METAPHYSICS 
 
 But it has been further said that motion could not result 
 even in this case, because direction is necessary to motion. 
 If, then, this state which implies motion should exist, it 
 could not produce motion because there would be nothing 
 to determine its direction. Motion would be possible in any 
 one of an indefinite number of directions, and as every one 
 would have as good a claim as every other, the motion could 
 not begin at all. This is a return to the doctrine of the 
 sufficient reason, and does not reach the difficulty. Since 
 motion involves direction, we should simply say that the 
 state supposed to be produced would be one which should 
 contain the ground of direction in it. Of course, the ques- 
 tion comes up, Why one direction rather than another? 
 And the answer must be a confession of ignorance. But 
 for one w r ho believes in the reality of space and time, the 
 same question would arise concerning the existence of the 
 element. It would be easy to develop a great astonishment 
 over the fact that the atom should be in any one point 
 rather than in some one of the countless other points, each 
 of which has as good a right to its presence. And this as- 
 tonishment would have as much ground as the wonder over 
 the atom's motion in space. Provided the existence of an 
 atom in space meant anything intelligible, its movement 
 and direction would be no more wonderful than its exist- 
 ence in a fixed point. The fact, whichever it might be, 
 would simply have to be admitted. Even in the actual sys- 
 tem we come down to the same difficulty. It might be 
 said that no thing can cause another to move by any attrac- 
 tive force, because the possible directions are infinite. The 
 word attraction must not mislead us into overlooking this 
 difficulty. It is by no means self-evident that motion must 
 take place' along the line which joins the bodies. For all 
 we can say, it might be on any other line whatever. Hence 
 the attracting body must also determine the direction, and
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 231 
 
 by the law of the sufficient reason this is impossible. But 
 by the law of fact the conclusion is absurd. Indeed, the 
 entire process by which this law is deduced is purely ficti- 
 tious. The single atom in void space is a contradiction, be- 
 cause the atoms have their existence and properties only in 
 the system of which they are parts or implications. The 
 sole use of such a fiction is to impress the law upon the im- 
 agination. It should never be tolerated for an instant as 
 an argument. But if we will resort to such a fiction, we 
 must declare that, for aught any philosopher or physicist 
 knows, a single element in space might be such as to set 
 itself in motion. 
 
 The second part of the law is just as little an apriori 
 truth on the current view of matter. To the unreflecting, 
 indeed, it even seems false ; but this is due entirely to the 
 bondage of the senses. First, the constant direction is no 
 necessity of thought. Direction itself is given from within, 
 and not from without. Of course, in reality the direction 
 is primarily determined from without, but only through an 
 internal state, so that the thing is not drawn, but driven 
 from within towards a certain point. The immediate reason 
 why a thing is moving in a certain direction and at a cer- 
 tain rate is not found in external things, but in its own inner 
 state. This is especially apparent on the current view that 
 if outer things should all fall away, the thing would con- 
 tinue to move in the same direction and at the same rate. 
 Direction, then, is finally given in the inner state of the 
 moving thing. There is, therefore, no absurdity in suppos- 
 ing that a thing should change its own direction. That it 
 does not do so is a fact, not a necessity. Here, also, appeal 
 is made to the principle of the sufficient reason, and it is 
 urged that there is no reason why the change should be on 
 one side rather than on the other, etc. Of course, there is 
 no reason in space, but to say that there is none in the
 
 232 METAPHYSICS 
 
 thing is simply to beg the question. This part of the law 
 also is manifestly no necessity, but at most only a fact. 
 
 It remains to consider the last factor of the law of 
 inertia, the uniformity of motion when not interfered with 
 by external objects. This also follows necessarily from the 
 assumption that a material element cannot change its own 
 state; but it is no more a necessary truth than the other 
 factors of the law. But, curiously enough, a better argument 
 can be made for this part of the law than for the others. If 
 we assume that a finite change is reached only through suc- 
 cessive increments, and hence that a given change is only 
 the sum of the increments, then it is plain that there could 
 be no change without the law ; and hence motion could 
 never begin nor end, as this beginning or ending would be 
 a form of change. If, then, motion can begin or cease, the 
 law of inertia must be admitted as an implication of this 
 fact. Taking the case of beginning motion, it is plain that 
 if every increment perished as fast as produced, there could 
 be no sum. Each new increment would begin with zero, 
 and could never get beyond it. Let us take the case of a 
 body falling from rest. At the end of the first unit of time, 
 which may be taken as infinitesimal, the body has a certain 
 velocity from gravitation. In the second instant, the body 
 is supposed to retain the velocity acquired in the first, and 
 to gain an additional increment ; and so on in successive in- 
 stants. If, now, we suppose the acceleration uniform, the 
 velocity at the end of a given time will be the velocity ac- 
 quired in the unit of time multiplied by the number of 
 units. But it is plain that this could not be the case if the 
 law of inertia did not hold ; for the first increment of ve- 
 locity, dv, in the first instant, dt, would perish at once ; and 
 hence the next increment of velocity would begin not with 
 c?y, but with plain zero. Hence at the end of any time, t, 
 the velocity would still be zero, and the body would not
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 233 
 
 have moved. It may at first appear as if the body should 
 have moved some during the several instants, dt, but this is 
 seen to be a mistake, when we remember that as long as dt 
 expresses a real duration, we cannot assume that dv remains 
 constant through dt without assuming the law of inertia. 
 The untruth of the law would make even this impossible, 
 and hence each minimum increment of velocity would per- 
 ish as soon as born. While, then, we cannot directly prove 
 this part of the law of inertia, we can show that without it 
 no motion could ever begin. 
 
 Respect for those who have urged this argument would 
 incline us to accept it, if we held the realistic view, especial- 
 ly as it is by far the best argument advanced. It does not 
 aim to show that the law is a necessity of thought, but that 
 it is a necessary implication of admitted facts. It depends, 
 however, entirely upon the assumed truth of the law of con- 
 tinuity, or on the assumption that no natural force can in- 
 stantaneously produce or destroy a finite velocity. If, how- 
 ever, gravity were capable of instantaneously generating 
 any finite velocity, motion would be possible without the law 
 of inertia ; for velocity would be renewed as fast as lost, and 
 this would be equivalent to the constancy of the original 
 velocity. In a fountain under constant pressure the column 
 of water stands always at the same height. There is, in- 
 deed, incessant going, but there is also incessant coming; 
 and the one balances the other. If gravity were a constant 
 force, no acceleration could occur under such circumstances; 
 but if gravity itself varied, variable velocity would result. 
 Nor would gravity in such a case be an infinite force ; for 
 it would never generate an infinite velocity. The summa- 
 tion of the finite velocities instantaneously produced into an 
 infinite sum would be impossible without assuming the law 
 of inertia. This law not holding, the velocity would remain 
 finite, and the present order would remain unchanged.
 
 234 METAPHYSICS 
 
 There is no need to consider the pretended proof from 
 experience. Nothing remains at rest absolutely, and noth- 
 ing moves with uniform velocity in a straight line. If a 
 body be thrown into the air, it quickly loses its motion even 
 in the absence of that friction which plays so prominent a 
 part in the alleged experimental proofs of the law. As- 
 suming the law to be correct, we must account for these 
 variations by external forces ; and we throw on these forces 
 the burden of explaining the variations. But why might 
 we not assume the forces, and throw the burden of expla- 
 nation on the laws of motion ? Or might we not, in the 
 spirit of Leibnitz's monadology, find the ground of all 
 change in each element alone, so that they shall have vari- 
 ous laws of motion according to the demands of the system ? 
 In that case the laws both of force and motion would be 
 only the components into which the facts fall for purposes 
 of our calculation ; and the agreement of fact and calcula- 
 tion would only prove the practical validity of the laws, 
 not their reality. If things can exist independently, this 
 view is as good as any. 
 
 Thus far we have considered this law from the common 
 stand-point of a real space with things moving in it. This 
 view we have found to involve some peculiar paradoxes 
 concerning the relation of space to motion and direction. 
 In addition we have found reason to complain of the meth- 
 od of proof. This consists in setting the moving subject 
 apart in unreal abstraction, and then deducing laws for 
 reality from purely fictitious and impossible cases. Thus 
 the idea of a system is overlooked entirely, and the attempt 
 is made to find the laws of the system by denying in effect 
 that a true system exists. The individual has been assumed 
 as capable of existing by itself; and against this view our 
 previous criticisms are valid. Of such elements, one law 
 would antecedently be no more probable than another ; and
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 235 
 
 the validity of a law up to a certain point would be no war- 
 rant for its universality. If any deduction of this law is 
 possible, it must be from considering the nature of the 
 system and not from reflecting on those parts which have 
 been hypostasized into an unreal and impossible indepen- 
 dence. It may, then, be allowed to inquire whether any 
 rational insight into this law of motion can be reached from 
 the general character of the system. 
 
 Cosmology deals only with the system of nature, or with 
 what we mean by the physical system. But in discussing 
 interaction we have seen that it is impossible to construct 
 a system out of mutually independent elements. The nat- 
 ure and action of each thing must be determined by the 
 nature and idea of the whole. But this idea itself can de- 
 termine nothing except as it is set in reality. Hence the 
 logical implications of the idea are realized in the actual 
 members of the system ; and the demands of the whole 
 upon each are realized through the mutual interaction of 
 the members. Each, then, is what it is, and does what it 
 does, because all the rest are what they are and do what the}' 
 do. Interaction in general means simply the determination 
 of one thing by another; and in a system where there is 
 nothing but interaction the activities of each thing are nec- 
 essarily objective, and the determinations of each thing are 
 necessarily from without. But this is the conception we 
 must form of the physical system. In it we know of noth- 
 ing but interaction, or mutual determination. There is no 
 ground for affirming any subjectivity or self-determination 
 in them ; and they are members of the system only as each 
 is what the system demands. If in addition to their cos- 
 mological activity they also maintain an inner life, they be- 
 long by this element to the realm of psychology and not to 
 cosmology. But a cosmology is possible only as the mem- 
 bers interact and determine one another. Law and svstem
 
 236 METAPHYSICS 
 
 \vould not otherwise exist. Hence the law of inertia in its 
 fullest extent must reign in such a system. No element 
 can change its own state whatever it may be ; but the 
 ground of change must always be found outside of the ele- 
 ment itself. If it were otherwise, then the state of an ele- 
 ment at any moment would not be an expression of the 
 demands of the system upon it ; and this is contrary to 
 the notion of a system. Not even the suggestion already 
 made that things may tend to a certain state can be longer 
 allowed ; for things have no right to any state on their own 
 account, but only to such as the state of the system as a 
 whole demands. Hence change of any and every kind in a 
 physical element must be referred to external causes. This 
 is the law of inertia in its very broadest sense ; and its ap- 
 plication to motion is only a special and limited case. And 
 we reach this conclusion not by considering such hyposta- 
 sized impossibilities as the existence of a single element in 
 void space, but by reflecting on the demands which a phys- 
 ical system must make upon each of its members. In so 
 far as any of them are capable of independent action, they 
 become rebels against the sj'stem or seceders from it. These 
 considerations do not, indeed, prove the law to be an onto- 
 logical necessity, for the system itself is no necessity ; but 
 they do prove that there can be no physical system without 
 the law. We need not, then, doubt this law because we 
 know nothing about the mysterious nature of things ; for 
 the existence of a system at all implies the law. Nor need 
 the conclusion be confined to the physical elements alone. 
 Even the finite spirit, to a very large extent, comes under 
 this law ; and so far as it does not, it exists in relative inde- 
 pendence of the physical system. If the mental life were 
 absolutely determined by our interaction with the system, 
 the law of inertia, in its broadest sense, would be absolute 
 for mind as well as for matter.
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 237 
 
 The law of inertia is the basal law of motion. In addi- 
 tion, two others are commonly given, which are as much 
 laws of force as of motion. The first of these, the second 
 law of Newton, is that the amount of motion is propor- 
 tional to the moving force, and is in the direction of its 
 action. The first part of this law is simple enough. Mo- 
 tion being an effect, must of course vary with its cause ; 
 and, besides, the intensity of the force is measured by the 
 motion it causes. This part of the law could hardly fail to 
 be exact. But the second part of the law contains implicitly 
 the doctrine of the parallelogram of forces, and this is not so 
 self-evidently true. We postpone its consideration, and pass 
 to the next law, Newton's third law of motion, the equality 
 of action and reaction. This is not properly a law of mo- 
 tion, but of action. In speaking of being, we pointed out 
 that there can be no action without reaction. In such a 
 case the object would in no way determine the agent, and 
 the effect would be created outright. Hence all interaction 
 involves, reaction, and we may lay it down as an axiom of 
 metaphysics that there can be no action without reaction 
 But this axiom in no way determines the nature and form 
 of the reaction, and is far from giving us the third law of 
 motion. This law of motion is, besides, thoroughly ambigu- 
 ous, and is self-evident only in one, and that its least impor- 
 tant, sense. The action and reaction may be purely static. 
 as when one thing rests on another. In this sense the law 
 is a necessity of equilibrium. If the table did not press up 
 as much as the weight on it presses down, it would be broken. 
 The foundations must meet the downward pressure of the 
 building by an equal upward pressure, or motion and col- 
 lapse will result. But action and reaction may be dynamic 
 also, as when the earth attracts the sun and the sun attracts 
 the earth ; and in this case the law is no self-evident neces- 
 sity. It is common to speak of this as a case of tension, and
 
 238 METAPHYSICS 
 
 to illustrate by a tense cable. If a person in one boat pulls 
 at another boat, each boat moves towards the other, and ac- 
 tion and reaction are equal. At any point whatever in the 
 cable there is equal tension in both directions. But this il- 
 lustration is of no use until it is shown that attraction takes 
 place through a cable. There is no difficulty in conceiving 
 that a magnet should attract iron without being attracted 
 by it. The magnet causes in the iron a state which tends 
 to translate itself into motion towards the magnet, but this 
 in no way implies that the iron must cause a similar state in 
 the magnet. Neither act implies the other. The same is 
 true for attraction in general. The attraction of any one 
 element does not imply the attraction of any other. This 
 is all the more evident from the fact that many physicists 
 have spoken very freely of repulsive elements which meet 
 attraction with repulsion. It is, indeed, a grave misuse of 
 language to speak of anything as reaction which is not di- 
 rectly elicited by the preceding action. Repulsion due to 
 pressure, or to repulsive forces called into play by previous 
 motion, is properly described as reaction, because it results 
 from the previous action ; but the attraction of one element 
 upon another is in no sense a reaction from the attraction of 
 the other upon it. This confusion of so many things under 
 a common term is what makes this law such an inexhaus- 
 tible min? of truth in the view of English physicists. That 
 the law, in this wide sense, is based entirely upon induction 
 needs no further proof. 
 
 The next law of motion which calls for consideration is 
 that relation to the composition of motions. This law is 
 implicit in Newton's second law of motion. If the abstrac- 
 tions of kinematics were realities, we might at once allow 
 the parallelogram of motions to be a rational necessity. If 
 the tendency to move in each of two directions is to be sat- 
 isfied, it can only be as the motion is along the diagonal of
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 239 
 
 the parallelogram on the lines representing the tendencies 
 and directions. But, in reality, it is not a question of com- 
 pounding motions, but of finding the resultant of forces 
 which tend to cause the motions; and this introduces new 
 difficulties into the question. The law is sufficiently justified 
 in practice to exclude any doubt of its validity in all molar 
 motions. Its necessity, however, is quite another thing, and 
 depends on certain assumptions which are far from self- 
 evident. The chief one is that each force shall have its full 
 and proper effect in a crowd as well as when acting alone. 
 Thus if A and B both attract (7, the law assumes that each 
 shall have its proper influence without regard to the other. 
 On this assumption the resultant must be represented by 
 the diagonal of the parallelogram on A and B. But this is 
 so far from necessary that it is antecedently improbable. ^It 
 would seem as if the effect of a new impulse ought to de- 
 pend on the previous state of the subject. This is the case 
 in the only subject of which we have direct knowledge. 
 The effect of a new thought or desire depends very largely 
 on the character of the thoughts and desires already in the 
 mind. The same thing affects us diversely according to our 
 mood or preoccupation. It is, therefore, a surprise to find 
 that the elements are never preoccupied, but are always 
 open to any new impulse whatever. This is so strange, and 
 from the stand-point of the mental life so paradoxical, that 
 we can allow the law only as a fact, and only so far as it is 
 justified by experience. It is possible that in the molecular 
 realm, especially in chemistry and biology, the law may be 
 modified. 
 
 Another assumption is commonly read into this law which 
 does not belong in it. The law itself says nothing of the 
 nature or origin of the forces, but views them all alike as 
 moving forces. They may be qualitatively distinct other- 
 wise ; but as moving forces they all stand on the same plane,
 
 240 METAPHYSICS 
 
 and their effects are combined according to the parallelo- 
 gram of motions. But it is generally further assumed that 
 the forces themselves act in the same way, whether singly 
 or in a crowd. The action of a given element is not affected 
 by aggregation, but only by its own position in space. The 
 same amount of matter, at the same distance from the earth, 
 will attract with the same intensity whatever its form may 
 be. But this also is no necessity of thought, and from the 
 stand-point of human experience it is antecedently improb- 
 able. If such variation were allowed, it would, indeed, 
 increase the difficulty of calculation indefinitely ; but this 
 proves nothing. As it is, we regard the action of a com- 
 pound as the sum of the acts of the components, and we 
 reach the total action by summing up the effects of the sep- 
 arate factors. If it were otherwise, we should have a prob- 
 lem immeasurably more complex than that of three bodies. 
 In the latter case we have to find the positions of bodies 
 from forces which depend on the positions which are to be 
 found; but in the former case we should have the addi- 
 tional difficulty of not knowing even the law of the forces. 
 The parallelogram of forces might still be valid, but it 
 would be useless. The actual forces would depend upon 
 the aggregation or velocity of the elements, and could be 
 known only from their resultant. Nevertheless, the inde- 
 pendent action of each element as assumed in mechanics is 
 so far from a necessary truth that it is not even known to 
 be true at all except in the case of gravity. In particular 
 it has been suggested as a help to the mechanical theory of 
 life that possibly the elements in the organism no longer 
 work under this law, but under some other which expresses 
 the idea of the organism. In that case the elements would 
 owe their properties to the mode of aggregation. It is dif- 
 ficult to get any clear idea from this theory beyond the 
 negative suggestion that the common assumption of the
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 241 
 
 independent action of each element may not be true. At 
 all events, it is plain that if the common doctrine is correct, 
 it cannot be viewed as a rational necessity, but only as a 
 fact. 
 
 So much for mechanics from the realistic stand -point. 
 Our own metaphysical doctrine changes all this, and we 
 have now to say a word concerning mechanics on the ideal- 
 istic view. 
 
 Theoretical mechanics is purely an abstract science, and 
 as an abstraction would be perfectly valid for logic, if it 
 had no significance for reality. The manipulation of the 
 assumed data is quite independent of concrete facts. But 
 when it comes to regarding these abstractions as realities, 
 it is then in place to inquire into their true nature. Pur- 
 suing this inquiry, we find that neither matter nor force 
 nor motion has any such existence as we have attributed to 
 them. Mechanics, then, must be looked upon at best as 
 only a science of phenomena, and a good part of it must be 
 viewed as of the nature of a device for calculation. A 
 great many problems in mathematics cannot be directly 
 treated; and then we resort to various devices of sub- 
 stitution or transformation, whereby they are made amen- 
 able to our calculus. But these devices are no part of the 
 fact ; they are only our shifts for dealing with it. A large 
 part of mechanics is of this sort. The compositions and 
 decompositions of forces and motions, the analysis of mo- 
 tion into abstract laws, the breaking up of complex facts 
 into simple ones, are mainly to be looked upon as devices 
 of method, and not as some actual process in reality. They 
 are purely relative to ourselves, as much so as the degrees 
 of the circle or the meridians and parallels of the geog- 
 rapher. 
 
 And in so far as mechanics deals with the objective order, 
 
 16
 
 242 METAPHYSICS 
 
 it is only phenomenal. We must reduce the whole apparent 
 world in space and time to phenomenal existence, and study 
 its phenomenal laws, leaving the metaphysical question to 
 philosophy. As a matter of fact, phenomena have laws. 
 They come together, vary together, succeed one another ac- 
 cording to rule. These laws are largely spatial and tem- 
 poral, and admit of geometrical and numerical expression. 
 Every such expression is valuable if it helps us to a knowl- 
 edge of the order of phenomena, and especially if it gives 
 us any practical control of them. These laws have to be 
 learned from experience. Neither the laws of motion nor 
 the so-called laws of force admit of a/priori deduction, and 
 all alike are valuable only for the practical control of phe- 
 nomena to which they may help us. But in all of this we 
 are dealing only with phenomena, and not. with the essential 
 dynamics of the system. The true efficient causality lies in 
 a realm into which science as such has neither the call nor 
 the power to penetrate. 
 
 Again, speech will always substantiate the constant phe- 
 nomena of perception, and for obvious reasons. Without 
 fixed conceptions thought would vanish. Unless the phe- 
 nomenal world presented relatively fixed objects, we could 
 do nothing with it. Hence, except upon occasion, the phe- 
 nomena revealed in perception will be spoken 'of as things; 
 and there is no objection, if we remember that this is only 
 a convenient form of speech, as when we speak of the set- 
 ting of the sun. In like manner the study of the phe- 
 nomena of body ma} 7 suggest that they result from more 
 elementary phenomena; and there is no objection to sub- 
 stantiating these elementary phenomena under the name of 
 molecules and atoms, if any practical advantage or con- 
 venience of representation be found to result. But such 
 practical convenience must not mislead us into overlooking 
 the purely formal character of these notions. The material
 
 MATTER, FORCE, AND MOTION 243 
 
 world is not compounded of atoms and their forces, but is 
 rather a product of one infinite, omnipresent, eternal en- 
 ergy by which it is continually supported, and from which 
 it incessantly proceeds. 
 
 But because this world shows a constant phenomenal 
 order, and because this order admits of being to some ex- 
 tent expressed and construed by us under the forms of 
 space and time and number, we may resume with prac- 
 tical confidence the language of daily life and of mechani- 
 cal science, only guarding ourselves against mistaking the 
 form of the world for an ontological reality, or for its ulti- 
 mate causal ground. 
 
 Criticism, however, is in its full right when it reminds 
 us that our confidence in concrete science must always 
 be practical rather than speculative, and hence must grow 
 shadowy when the doctrines are remote from any practical 
 interest. The holding together of the experienced order is 
 a condition of living at all ; and faith in the order to that 
 extent is secured by a psychological expectation which is 
 too strong for any scepticism. But when it comes to trans- 
 forming this expectation into a logical warrant, logic has 
 to confess its failure. And as a compromise between the 
 imperious practical necessity and the insight of the critical 
 intellect, logic advises us to limit our speculative affirma- 
 tions in the scientific field to a reasonable degree of exten- 
 sion to adjacent cases, or to remember their purely hypo- 
 thetical character.
 
 NATURE 
 
 ALL the categories of reason manifest themselves, at 
 least implicitly, even in the crude products of spontaneous 
 thought. Space, time, matter, motion, and force seem to 
 supply all the materials for objective thought and specu- 
 lation. They are the factors into which, apparently, experi- 
 ence resolves itself upon analysis, and out of which experi- 
 ence must be built. But there is one demand of thought 
 which these factors alone do not supply. In themselves 
 they give no totality, no system, nothing complete and 
 rounded off into an all-embracing whole, but only a hete- 
 rogeneous collection of things and events. This demand 
 for system and totality the mind has met by forming the 
 notion of nature or the cosmos or the universe, the im- 
 plicit aim being to pass from the discontinuous events 
 and scattered existences of experience to a law -giving 
 whole. 
 
 This nature Kant called an idea of the reason, and we 
 have ourselves seen that it is primarily an ideal of reason 
 rather than a fact of experience. Experience keeps us 
 among details ; the building these into a systematic whole 
 is a special venture of the mind itself, in which it follows 
 not so much the compulsion of the facts as the impulsion of 
 its own rational Jaw. Kant held the idea to be regulative 
 only, and not objectively valid. To this view he was led 
 partly by the logic of his system and partly by the heresy
 
 NATURE 245 
 
 of extra-mental realities. For one who has reached the in- 
 sight, that thought can never recognize anything which is 
 not rooted in thought, the Kantian contention is antiquated 
 in its traditional form. How we must think about things 
 is the only question which can rationally be raised in any 
 case. Hence, instead of wasting time in barren discussions 
 concerning the relative or absolute validity of thought, we 
 do well rather to inquire what thought really gives us when 
 it becomes reflective and critical. The final utterances of 
 thought admit of no real doubt, but only of verbal denial". 
 
 The end sought in the notion of nature is justified, and 
 must in some way be reached. But the formal justifica- 
 tion of a category by no means insures its right applica- 
 tion. After we are sure that there is causation, the form 
 under which we must think it remains an open question. 
 So, after we are sure that there is a law -giving system 
 underlying experience, the form under which we shall con- 
 ceive it is a problem for further investigation. How we 
 shall think of nature, then, is our next inquiry. The sig- 
 nificance of the study arises from the fact that there is 
 probably no other notion in the range of thought which 
 contains so much bad logic and crude metaphysics, and 
 which is at once the source and expression of so much con- 
 fusion and error. To see this, one need only recall the tra- 
 ditional debates over the natural and the supernatural, and 
 the various interesting functions ascribed to " Nature " by 
 popular rhetoric and speculation. There is enough of this 
 crude matter floating about to give a large measure of jus- 
 tification to Kant's claim. This nature of popular thought 
 is more than relative ; it is fictitious. 
 
 What, then, is nature? From our own metaphysical 
 stand-point this question admits of a brief answer. Indeed, 
 it has already been implicitly answered ; and for the prac- 
 tised thinker nothing more is needed than to gather up into
 
 246 METAPHYSICS 
 
 concise and explicit statement the implications of the prin- 
 ciples already established. But for the sake of the beginner 
 and the weaker brother and both of these are always with 
 us it seems pedagogically desirable, even at the expense of 
 much repetition, to take a somewhat roundabout way. The 
 popular view must be studied in its logical and psychologi- 
 cal origin, if we would understand its plausibility, and also 
 its inherent and incurable confusion. It must also be stud- 
 ied in its concrete forms and specifications if we would 
 thoroughly understand it. 
 
 There are two conceptions of nature implicit in popular 
 speculation which are rarely distinguished, and each of 
 which becomes explicit upon occasion. One view identifies 
 nature with physical nature, and the other identifies it with 
 the system of law. In the former view man and spirit 
 stand in antithesis to nature. With this view spontaneous 
 thought generally begins, at least by the time it has at- 
 tained to the early stages of self-conscious reflection. Then, 
 as the unity of the world begins to appear in experience, 
 and the reign of law manifests itself in the human realm, 
 and the desire for one all-embracing system gives implicit 
 direction to thought, nature expands beyond the physical 
 realm and becomes identical with the universal system of 
 law. In all of this the speculator is rarely intelligible to 
 himself, but he is perfectly intelligible to the philosophic 
 critic, who sees in this performance the unconscious work- 
 ing of unmastered logical principles. 
 
 But in popular thought and experience physical nature 
 bulks so large as to be pre-eminently, if not exclusively, 
 what we mean by nature. Most of our theorizing on the 
 subject, also, rests on a physical basis. We shall do well, 
 therefore, to stud} 7 first this ph} T sical conception of nature, 
 and afterwards advance, if need be, to the more abstract con- 
 ception of nature as the system of law.
 
 NATURE 247 
 
 Nature as Matter and Force 
 
 As the untrained mind is naturally objective in its think- 
 ing, the things and bodies about us are taken for substantial 
 realities as a matter of course ; and they tend, in advance 
 of reflection, to become the standard by which all reality 
 must be measured, or to which it must conform. Spirits 
 may be doubted, and, at best, are somewhat hypothetical, 
 but things are undeniably there. And as these things by 
 an easy generalization may be gathered under the one head, 
 matter, and their activities may be ascribed to the one cause, 
 force, matter and force come to be the supreme and basal 
 realities of objective experience. Space and time, then, 
 furnish the scene ; matter furnishes the existence ; and force, 
 manifesting itself in motion, furnishes the causality. These 
 five factors constitute nature, and from them nature is to 
 be construed and comprehended. According to a popular 
 and showy cosmic formula, cosmic processes consist of an in- 
 tegration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion. 
 Here space and time are implied ; matter is expressed ; 
 and force, as the grammarians would say, is elegantly un- 
 derstood. And we are often impressively, or at least em- 
 phatically, told that all interpretation of nature must be in 
 terms of these factors. Anything else would be unscien- 
 tific, or something just as bad. 
 
 Here we have a confusion of a metaphysical proposition 
 with a principle of inductive method. Our study of expla- 
 nation in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge showed 
 that our practical study of nature must mainly consist in 
 looking for the laws of coexistence and sequence, and of 
 combination and concomitant variation among phenomena, 
 and that our valuable practical knowledge must very large- 
 Iv consist in a knowledge of these laws. Even on a phe- 
 
 * O
 
 248 METAPHYSICS 
 
 nomenal theory of matter, space, and time, matter and mo- 
 tion must be the great categories of inductive study and 
 practical understanding. Matter is the phenomenal subject 
 without which thought and speech would be crippled ; and 
 space, time, and motion represent the prominent relations 
 existing among material phenomena. In this methodologi- 
 cal sense we accept and emphasize the importance of the 
 categories of space and time, matter and motion, for the 
 practical study and mastery of experience. But we cannot 
 allow them to represent independent ontological facts. The 
 universe has only a phenomenal existence ; and its causality 
 must be traced to the fundamental reality behind it. Nat- 
 ure, then, is phenomenon. Nature as matter and force is 
 a fiction of crude thought, arising from the substantiation 
 of physical phenomena, and the application to them of cat- 
 egories which find their true significance only in another 
 field. 
 
 But of all this sense thought has no suspicion, and on the 
 basis of the undoubted metaphysical reality of space, time, 
 matter, motion, and force, it proceeds to build up a me- 
 chanical doctrine of nature. Nature is made into a mechan- 
 ism of impersonal things and forces, and all its changes go 
 on mechanically. At present, at least, it runs itself, and, on 
 due consideration of the indestructibility of matter and the 
 conservation of energy, it even becomes doubtful if nature 
 has not always run itself. Of the phenomenality of nature, 
 of course, there is not the slightest suspicion. This notion 
 also deserves examination, as it is the perennial source of a 
 great cloud of whimsies and divers conflicts of science and 
 religion. 
 
 Nature as Mechanism 
 
 Nature, then, is a mechanism ; and all natural phenomena 
 are to be mechanically explained. This is agreed and in-
 
 NATURE 249 
 
 sisted upon. There has never been, however, the clearest 
 conception of what mechanism is to mean. The notion it- 
 self has undergone various changes, all of which have left 
 traces in the current view. Some have insisted that a pure- 
 ly mechanical theory must assume nothing but matter and 
 motion under the conditions of space and time. Force is a 
 dynamic idea, not a mechanical one. Hence it has been 
 claimed that a strictly mechanical theory of things is found 
 only in the Greek atomism, which, without appealing to 
 moving forces or occult qualities of any kind, sought to con- 
 strue the system from atoms and the void alone. Descartes 
 went even further and rejected the Greek conception as not 
 purely mechanical. This he did partly on the ground that 
 the Greeks assumed the void as real, and partly because they 
 posited weight as a property of the atoms. The reality of 
 the void he denied as absurd, and the assumption of weight 
 he viewed as a return to the dreary waste of occult qualities. 
 For Descartes the essence of matter was extension, and for 
 him the mechanical theory implied that all heterogeneity 
 of quantity and quality in the material world can be ex- 
 plained as modifications of the one homogeneous property 
 of extension and the one experienced fact of motion. Any 
 theory which came short of this simplicity was in so far 
 a departure from the mechanical view. Accordingly the 
 dynamic conception of matter was for a long time resisted 
 as not mechanical. Matter, it was held, can act only by 
 impact ; and any other theory was rejected as a return to 
 occult qualities. In this view that alone is a mechanical 
 explanation which refers a phenomenon to a combination 
 of particles whose essence is extension, and which act only 
 by impact. Extension, solidity, motion, and impact are 
 viewed as self-sufficient ideas, and as the only outfit de- 
 manded by the mechanical philosophy. Hence, in the Car- 
 tesian philosophy, all dynamic theories of matter are op-
 
 250 METAPHYSICS 
 
 posed to mechanism ; and the antithesis of mechanism is not 
 organism, but dynamism. 
 
 This conception of mechanism arose partly from the facts 
 of sense experience and partly from the analogies of the 
 machines of our own invention. The bodies about us are 
 apparently in the passive voice, and move only as they are 
 moved. Our machines also generate no force, but only 
 transmit force imparted from without. With this concep- 
 tion of mechanism we are forced to affirm a prime mover 
 in any case, and, if material phenomena refuse to be ex- 
 plained as the result of impact, we have to assume an extra- 
 material power as the ever-present source of the energies 
 of nature. 
 
 But since the time of Newton the mechanical theory has 
 been transformed by importing causation into the mech- 
 anism. Nature is not a mechanism in the sense of trans- 
 mitting or modifying forces imparted from without, but 
 rather in the sense that all phenomena are produced by res- 
 ident forces according to mechanical laws. And yet traces 
 are not lacking of the feeling that a pure mechanism ought 
 not to appeal to other notions than those mentioned. 
 Still, the holders of this view make the freest use of the 
 notion of moving forces ; and it is chiefly in occasional at- 
 tempts to explain these forces as the result of pressure 
 or of impact that the inner unrest appears. But the mov- 
 ing forces assumed are made as colorless as possible ; and 
 thus the mechanical theory becomes about identical with 
 theoretical mechanics. In this science we have the three 
 factors of matter, force, and motion to determine their 
 mutual relations. Here, too, all qualitative differences are 
 ignored. Matter is simply a rigid mass or an aggregate of 
 rigid atoms. Force is viewed simply as causing or retard- 
 ing motion. All is quantity in the theory ; and quality is 
 dealt with only as it can be transformed into quantity.
 
 NATUKE 251 
 
 The system thus reached differs from the corpuscular theory 
 only in the conception of moving forces ; but these are so 
 colorless as not to change the appearance of the whole. 
 Both views are equally monotonous. All that is possible 
 in either is a redistribution of matter according to the laws 
 of motion. This is produced in one case by the atoms 
 knocking against one another; in the other case the atoms 
 pull or push one another; but in both cases the process is 
 a perfect monotone. Accordingly, a mechanical system is 
 often said to be one in which there is nothing but a re- 
 distribution of matter and motion; and the claim that 
 the system is mechanical is understood to mean that every- 
 thing can be explained in terms of matter and motion ; and 
 matter is conceived as essentially the same in all its com- 
 binations. This is the current popular conception of the 
 mechanical theory. 
 
 This also is an ontological doctrine. It claims to set forth 
 not merely a practical interpretation of physical phenom- 
 ena, but also the r ^ f intial things and forces by which 
 those phenomena are produced. Its ontological untena- 
 bility is already familiar to us ; and equally familiar is its 
 logical inadequacy, in the form given, to the work assign- 
 ed it. As soon as we think concretely and adequately, it 
 becomes plain that nothing whatever can be explained by 
 mechanism, atomic or otherwise, which is not assumed in 
 principle in the mechanism. It is only the imposture and 
 deceit of words, or the delusive unities and simplifications 
 of speech, which prevent us from seeing this. The material 
 mechanism explains the physical facts only because we build 
 the mechanism to contain the facts, and thus it becomes only 
 another aspect of the facts themselves. 
 
 This aspect of all mechanical explanation has been dwelt 
 upon at length in the Theory of Thought and Knowkdge ; 
 but the fallacy of the universal, which is in play here, is
 
 252 METAPHYSICS 
 
 so subtle and pervasive that it seems desirable to show 
 once more the emptiness of all such explanation, when it 
 assumes to be ontological and final. The persuasion that 
 matter and force already explain much and are daily ex- 
 plaining more, so that no one can really set any bounds to 
 their capabilities, is one which goeth not readily out, not 
 even when its fallacious and illusory character is brought 
 to light. No single anointing will open the eyes which are 
 blind concerning this matter. 
 
 Now, returning to our atoms, which for the present we 
 allow to be real things in space, it is plain, first of all, that 
 we can do nothing with them unless we regard them as 
 dynamic. Bare lumps can only lie around. They would 
 not even explain heaps, unless we assumed a mover out- 
 side of them to give the original shove and direction, or 
 shoves and directions. We must then posit moving forces 
 within. How to do this at all is a problem of notorious 
 metaphysical difficulty; and how to do it so as to make 
 the forces adequate to their task is a problem of exceeding 
 logical difficulty. For unless these forces are under some 
 structural law they will explain only heaps again. Simple 
 pulling and pushing in a straight line, as in the case of 
 linear forces, makes no provision for organization, but only 
 for amorphous masses. Just as little do they provide for 
 the qualitative changes arising in the cosmic process. A 
 linear force like gravity might explain aggregation, but it 
 contains no account of the selective and qualitative action 
 of affinity, no account of the building forces of crystalliza- 
 tion, no account of the infinitely complex products of or- 
 ganization. 
 
 Assuming, then, the existence of our mechanical system, 
 we have a double order of facts, one of spatial change, com- 
 bination and separation in space, and one of a metaph} T sical 
 and dynamic nature. The former is a visible, or at least
 
 NATURE 253 
 
 picturable, change, among things ; the latter is an invisible 
 and unpicturable change in things. The former depends 
 on the latter. All spatial changes among things must be 
 viewed as translations into phenomenal form of dynamic 
 relations in things. These are the real ground of whatever 
 takes place under the spatial form. Nothing whatever 
 which takes place in the spatial order explains itself, or 
 anything else, until it is taken as the exponent of a hidden 
 dynamic order. If to a collection of bricks we should add 
 another brick, no one could find in that fact the slightest 
 ground for any qualitative change in the collection. We 
 might conceivably pile them in various shapes, or arrange 
 them at the angles of different geometrical figures, but we 
 could find in all this no reason for varying behavior on 
 the part of the bricks. If to a given chemical molecule we 
 should add another chemical element, they must remain as 
 mutually indifferent as the bricks, unless we assume a 
 system of dynamic relations within the elements themselves 
 which determines their interaction and the form of their 
 manifestation. 
 
 This invisible dynamic system is largely overlooked by 
 superficial thought ; and its complexity is overlooked alto- 
 gether. Such thought has the atoms and the void for its 
 principal data, and it can easily conceive the atoms as vari- 
 ously grouped within this void. The spatial imagination 
 serves for this insight; and the demand for causation is 
 met by a simple reference to force in general. If one asks 
 how these peculiar groupings are accounted for and how 
 they themselves account for anything, he must be content 
 to wait long for an answer. 
 
 Two points are to be borne in mind. First, the depend- 
 ence of the spatial system on an unpicturable dynamic sys- 
 tem. AVe may resolve to locate the forces in the elements, 
 but it is strictly impossible for us to represent our meaning
 
 254 METAPHYSICS 
 
 in any way whatever. Spatial combination we can picture. 
 Volitional causality we experience. But here is a dynam- 
 ism which is less than the latter and more than the former, 
 and we have absolutely no data of experience by which to 
 represent such a notion. We have indeed located the forces 
 in the spatial elements, but they are not in them so as to 
 be objects of any possible intuition. How does affinity or 
 gravity look? Does a necessity have shape? or is a dy- 
 namic law something which might be thrown on a screen, 
 if the light were strong enough ? If by mechanism we 
 understand the spatial system, its ideas are clear, but it is 
 limited to phenomena and explains nothing. If we extend 
 mechanism to include the dynamics of the system, we are 
 no longer dealing with clear ideas, but rather with the ab- 
 stract categories of cause and ground, and are dealing with 
 these in such a way as to make impossible any concrete con- 
 ception of our meaning, and indeed in such a way as to con- 
 tradict the, categories themselves. 
 
 The second point to be borne in mind is that if we would 
 make our mechanism adequate we must make it as complex 
 as the facts themselves. This point becomes self-evident as 
 soon as we get a logical grasp of the problem. In all re- 
 ferring of effects to causes, in a mechanical scheme, we are 
 bound to determine the thought of the causes by the effects. 
 The causes we infer or postulate must be the causes of just 
 the effects in question, no more, no less, and no other. That 
 is, we carry the effects in principle into the causes, and in 
 such a way that whoever should think the causes exhaust- 
 ively would find that they contain, or imply and necessitate, 
 the effects. If the causes do not imply the effects, the effects 
 are not provided for. If they do imply them, then the ef- 
 fects are explained by being smuggled into the data of the 
 explanation. This, as we have seen in the Theory of Thought 
 and Knowledge, is the deadlock into which every mechani-
 
 NATURE 255 
 
 cal explanation inevitably falls when it assumes to be onto- 
 logical and final. 
 
 The blindness of popular thought at this point is due to 
 the fallacy of the universal. We construct our mechanism 
 with very simple factors space, time, matter, motion, and 
 force. These show no complexity, and at the same time 
 they seem to be all-embracing. What is there, at least in 
 the outer world, which does not come under some of these 
 categories ? and as mechanics is the science of these factors, 
 what is there which mechanics does not explain ? But this 
 is an illusive simplicity. These categories apply to the con- 
 crete facts without implying any of them. The concrete 
 fact is not space, time, and motion in general, but an indef- 
 inite multitude of particular forms, groupings, and move- 
 ments in particular temporal relations. Neither is the con- 
 crete fact matter and force. These are only class terms of 
 which the reality in this scheme is a great multitude of par- 
 ticular elements, each of complex nature and engaged in a 
 highly complex interaction with every other. The elements 
 must be such as to involve to the minutest detail all they 
 will ever do. If we ask what the " such " is which the ele- 
 ments must be in order to do the work, the answer must be 
 that no inspection of the elements as existing in space will 
 ever reveal it. It is an unpicturable, dynamic such. And 
 the such itself is manifold. It is not such, but an indefinite 
 number of suches, involving not merely the general dynamic 
 relations of the elements, but all the myriad structural and 
 organic laws which run through the world of things. Ho\v 
 this can be, indeed, passes all picturing and even all under- 
 standing ; but nevertheless we know that it is so by hypoth- 
 esis, and we know that it must be so in the same satisfac- 
 tory way by hypothesis. 
 
 Space, time, matter, motion, and force may indeed be said 
 to be the elementary factors out of which nature is built ;
 
 256 METAPHYSICS 
 
 but they are the component factors in the same sense in 
 which the letters of the alphabet are the components of lit- 
 erature. Take away the letters and literature would disap- 
 pear, as lacking the instruments of expression. And yet 
 there is a great deal more in literature than the alphabet, 
 or even than the dictionary. The collocations of letters 
 into words, the information of words with meanings and 
 their grouping into discourse, must also be taken into ac- 
 count. In like manner in the mechanical system we must 
 consider not merely the simple abstract ideas of space, time, 
 matter, motion, and force, but we must take account also 
 of the concrete forms, relations, laws, and products which 
 exist or emerge in the process. But by this time the mech- 
 anism has become as complex as the facts themselves. As 
 an explanation of the facts, it is a tautology. If the facts 
 needed explanation before we built the mechanism, they 
 need it equally after the building, for the mechanism only 
 repeats the facts. 
 
 Thus logic shows the tautologous character of all me- 
 chanical explanation of a metaphysical type. Mechanism 
 can make no new departures; it can only unfold its own 
 implications. Our previous study has also shown the un- 
 tenability of the metaphysics on which this mechanical 
 theory rests. Nature in the sense of a system of matter 
 and force, moving and acting in space and time, and form- 
 ing a substantial mechanism, is only a phantom of sense 
 thinking which arises from hypostasizing the phenomena of 
 objective experience. With this result the notion of mech- 
 anism begins to be wavering and uncertain. In any case 
 the notion of self-running material machinery must be emp- 
 tied out of it, and mechanism must be restricted to a phe- 
 nomenal plane and significance. The term, too, is some- 
 what misleading because of the company it has kept, and 
 because of its physical, if not materialistic, connotation.
 
 NATURE 257 
 
 Mechanism has a perfectly clear meaning only for the com- 
 position or decomposition of motions and masses. When 
 it goes beyond this to abstract mechanics it is infected with 
 the uncertainties of the metaphysics of dynamics, and even 
 then it has no clear meaning except as applied to bodies 
 separated in space and to quantities which can be summed 
 up in time. From this point on all is dark. When we 
 come to organization we may posit subtle tendencies, or 
 mysterious affinities, or latent organizing powers ; but of 
 all these no mechanical representation whatever is possible. 
 We shall do well, therefore, to reserve the' term mechanism 
 for the spatial and temporal composition or decomposition 
 of motions, masses, and quantities, and to replace it in other 
 applications by the more general and abstract term law. 
 This will include mechanism in its proper field, and will also 
 embrace the larger field of life and man to which mechan- 
 ism does not manifestly apply. 
 
 If we should ask for a definition of the natural, the first 
 answer would almost certainly limit it to the physical field. 
 But a little reflection would soon show the narrowness of 
 this view. Mental and social movements, as well as phys- 
 ical changes, arise naturally. Life, mind, society, all human 
 activity and progress, show an order of uniformity ; and all 
 changes in accordance with that order are called natural. 
 The result of these considerations is to make the natural 
 coextensive with law, and thus finally nature comes to be 
 identified with the order of law. This is that second con- 
 ception of nature which, we have said, is implied in popular 
 speculation. 
 
 Of course, in uncritical thought this nature is metaphys- 
 ically conceived. Xature is not merely an order of phe- 
 
 17
 
 258 METAPHYSICS 
 
 nomena, but a cause or system of causes. There is here 
 a failure to distinguish the phenomenal and the causal, and 
 also a confusion of the formal necessity of affirming causal- 
 ity with a particular conception of its form and location. 
 The untenability of this metaphysics needs no further expo- 
 sition. 
 
 But in this conception of nature as the order of law there 
 is an important truth which we must disengage from its 
 crude metaphysics. It is this truth which constitutes the 
 significance of the mechanical theory of nature, and the 
 gist of what we call scientific method. But this truth 
 must be sought in logic and epistemology and not in sense 
 metaphysics. We proceed to the exposition. 
 
 Logic shows that experience arises only as the categories 
 of thought are applied to the raw material of the sensi- 
 bility; and that a mastery of experience is possible only 
 as phenomena are subject to fixed laws. The mind, then, 
 in its effort to rationalize, comprehend, and control experi- 
 ence, must reflect upon the categories of its procedure and 
 must look for the laws of phenomena. Undigested experi- 
 ence gives us phenomena in very rude and crude masses, 
 and the mind attains to any mastery of this experience 
 only as it subordinates these masses to law, and especially 
 as it analyzes them into their simplest elements, and dis- 
 covers the elementary laws which govern their coexistence 
 and combination. When this is done we get a practical 
 mastery of experience and some proximate insight also. 
 We see how things and events hang together in an order 
 of law, how one state of things grows out of another state 
 of things and produces a new state of things. With this 
 knowledge we get a basis for practical expectation and a 
 means of controlling phenomena to some extent. 
 
 This mode of procedure, we have said, is the gist of sci- 
 entific method ; and the great bulk of our valuable knowl-
 
 NATURE 259 
 
 edge of the world and man is obtained in this way. And 
 the study of things by this method can be carried on on a 
 purely inductive basis. Its postulate is an order of law r 
 and its aim is to connect things and events with one an- 
 other in this order. It does not pretend to deduce the order, 
 nor to tell how it is possible or is produced. It accepts the 
 order as a fact, and seeks to find how things and events hang 
 together within the order. 
 
 Xow such an order, though no metaphysical necessity, is 
 a necessary postulate of human thought, and some knowl- 
 edge of this order is necessary in order to live at all. Study 
 in any field proceeds on this basis. The very notion of sys- 
 tem implies it. The study of life, of mind, of society, of 
 history, assumes that there are elementary laws by which 
 the whole is to be understood. Our efforts at education, at 
 mutual influence, at self-government, all rest on the notion 
 of fixed laws through which alone our aims can be realized. 
 It is plain, therefore, that, whatever our metaphysics, the 
 laws which obtain among phenomena are a most important 
 object of study. For all speculators alike, practical wisdom 
 must centre here. 
 
 If, now, there were any advantage in it, we might call 
 this order of law mechanism. This has been done, and the 
 universality of mechanism has been proclaimed. We might, 
 without utter linguistic impropriety, speak of the mental 
 mechanism, the social mechanism, the mechanism of feel- 
 ings or ideas, etc. These phrases may be allowed upon oc- 
 casion, but the associated connotations of the terms are 
 such as to make them misleading except for the initiated. 
 We had better, therefore, speak of the realm of law rather 
 than of the realm of mechanism. 
 
 But the notion of nature in popular thought is so rooted 
 in metaphysics that special effort is needed to make the 
 phenomenality of nature even intelligible. When we speak
 
 260 METAPHYSICS 
 
 of events coming about in an order of law, it is easy to 
 conclude that the law explains them as being their effi- 
 cient cause. But logic has taught us to distinguish between 
 inductive and productive causality. The former expresses 
 only phenomenal conditions, and has nothing to do with 
 efficiency. The question, how things are brought about, is 
 itself ambiguous. It may mean, How are phenomena con- 
 nected in an order of discoverable law ? and it may mean, 
 What are the causes which produce them? The former 
 question belongs to inductive science, and may be answered 
 on a purely experiential basis. The latter question runs 
 into metaphysics, and must be tested by metaphysical can- 
 ons. The two questions are never sufficiently distinguished 
 by popular scientific thought, which oscillates confusedly 
 between them. 
 
 The non-existence of any ontological mechanism is already 
 an article of metaphysical faith with us. Our previous 
 study has convinced us of the phenomenality of all that 
 appears in space or that exists in space relations. It has 
 also shown that impersonal being in general can be viewed 
 only as an unwarranted hypostasis of phenomena. Nature 
 as an order of law, then, has only phenomenal existence ; 
 and the explanations within the order have only phenome- 
 nal application. They have no causality in them, and they 
 do not penetrate to the seat of power. 
 
 And these explanations remain on the surface in any 
 case. They commonly consist in linking event with event 
 in an order of law, but there is rarely any insight into the 
 antecedent which shows the consequent to be a necessary 
 implication. Events follow, indeed, in a certain order, but, 
 for all we can see, any other order .whatever is just as 
 possible. We learn the order by observation ; and after we 
 have learned it, when the antecedents are given, we predict 
 the consequents, simply as an opaque expectation. It is
 
 NATURE 261 
 
 only in the abstractions of pure kinematics and pure dynam- 
 ics that we can trace the antecedent into the consequent, 
 or exhibit the consequent as the resultant, of the antece- 
 dents. But as soon as we come to concrete reality this 
 insight fails entirely. We jolt and bump along from one 
 event to another with not the slightest reason for expecting 
 one event rather than any other, except the fact that the 
 expected event is the kind which hitherto has happened in 
 our experience. We expect wheat from wheat and barley 
 from barley ; and we know the practical conditions of rais- 
 ing wheat and barley ; but we know absolutely nothing of 
 the causality at work, and we are totally unable to connect 
 the successive steps of the process by any causal or deduc- 
 tive bond in the phenomena themselves. 
 
 When we come to life, mind, and society, scientific 
 method itself begins to lose its objectivity and sinks tow- 
 ards a relative validity. In the inorganic realm compo- 
 sition is the great category ; and here explanation takes 
 on the form of analysis and synthesis. The whole is un- 
 derstood through its parts. But this is impossible with 
 organic and intellectual wholes. Here the parts exist only 
 through the whole, and, instead of being the factors out of 
 which the whole is built, they are simply particular aspects 
 of the whole which are separated by abstraction for the 
 sake of logical convenience. This is especially the case in 
 psychology. The faculties are not the factors out of which 
 the mind is built up. The sensations are not atoms of feel- 
 ing out of which mental molecules and masses are con- 
 structed. These mechanical analogies are misleading and 
 illusory. Our analysis of the mind gives not components 
 but aspects, distinctions rather than divisions. And the 
 mind is not to be understood through these aspects, but, 
 conversely, they are to be understood through the mind. 
 In this realm our analysis and synthesis are relative to
 
 262 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ourselves, and represent logical devices rather than the 
 fact. 
 
 This field of experienced law is the field of inductive 
 science. Its practical importance cannot be overestimat- 
 ed, but its theoretical significance is easily misunderstood. 
 Crude thought turns it into ontology, finds in it the order 
 of efficient causation, and makes everything hard and fast 
 by importing the notion of necessity into it. For us this is 
 an " overcome stand-point." The only definition of nature 
 which criticism can allow is, the sum-total and system of 
 phenomena which are subject to law. The definition of 
 physical nature is, the sum-total of spatial phenomena and 
 their laws. This nature is throughout effect, and contains 
 no causation and no necessity in it. To use the scholastic 
 phrase, it is natura naturata. Nature as cause may be sim- 
 ply a name for the cause of natural phenomena. In that 
 case the name hag no connotation and simply denotes a 
 problem. But when nature as cause is posited as some blind 
 agent or agents, it represents only bad metaphysics. This 
 is natura naturans, and is simply an idol of the sense tribe 
 or of the metaphysical den. 
 
 But we find, however, that laws obtain among phenom- 
 ena, and that by a study of them we can get a very consid- 
 erable practical mastery over phenomena. These give us 
 no theoretical insight into the causal ground and connec- 
 tions of things. They remain on the surface, and are to be 
 studied purely for their practical significance, or for what 
 they may help us to. Any scientific or other generalization 
 is to be welcomed which will give us a more convenient 
 expression of the natural order, or a greater mastery of it, 
 but no metaphysical insight is to be found in this field.
 
 NATURE 263 
 
 Nature as Continuous 
 
 The habit of looking upon nature as a system of neces- 
 sary causality easily leads to the conception that all phe- 
 nomena are to be explained within the system itself. There 
 must be no interferences or irruptions from without, under 
 penalty of the speculator's displeasure. This conviction 
 expresses itself in the law of continuity. 
 
 This law is another principle of superficial reflection 
 which contains some truth and some error, but still more 
 confusion. It is, indeed, rooted in a genuine rational de- 
 mand, but the meaning is far from clear. Continuity of 
 some kind there must be, but what it is and where it is 
 remain a problem. 
 
 The law of continuity is one which has had great promi- 
 nence in the history of speculation. This law was first 
 formulated by Leibnitz, and was at first confined to mo- 
 tion only. Afterwards it was extended to every depart- 
 ment of thought and experience. The evolutionists in par- 
 ticular have made it one of their first principles and the 
 most fundamental law of progress. In this wide sense the 
 law has no fixed and scarcely any assignable meaning. As 
 used by some speculators, it seems to exclude all antitheses 
 whatever ; and Spencer's attempt to deduce all heterogene- 
 ity from the homogeneous may be viewed as an attempt to 
 give the law this universal significance. The-Leibnitzians, 
 also, were fond of making the increments of variation in- 
 finitesimal in all directions, so that all widely separated 
 groups are joined by missing links or are produced by in- 
 finitesimal variations. On the basis of this conception, 
 Leibnitz ventured to affirm something like the development 
 of species, and the indistinguishability of all realms at their 
 points of junction. He also ruled out all absolute oppo-
 
 264: METAPHYSICS 
 
 sitions like rest and motion, and all incommensurable reali- 
 ties as space and time. On the same ground he denied all 
 beginning in time and all bounds in space. Rest is insensi- 
 ble motion. Space and time are ideas ; and creation means 
 only dependence. This doctrine of continuity in general 
 has had great favor \vith flighty and impatient speculators 
 from its first announcement, because it is at once so effec- 
 tive and so cheap. If missing links are sought for and fail 
 to be found, it is easy to say that the law of continuity 
 proves that they must have existed even if they cannot be 
 found. The distinction between the organic and the in- 
 organic is easily removed by the same method. In psychol- 
 ogy, also, the empiricist has no difficulty in showing that 
 sensation is the only fact, because to allow anything differ- 
 ent would be to break continuity. But while one speculator 
 deduces life from the lifeless by the principle of continuity, 
 another denies the possibility on the same ground. Conti- 
 nuity, he urges, demands that life shall come from life, and 
 forbids any other view. Materialism likewise is affirmed 
 and denied in the name of continuity. Unfortunately these 
 speculators have never bethought themselves to give a gen- 
 eral demonstration of this law, nor even to define the vari- 
 ous senses in which it is used. Sometimes it is simply a 
 denial of creation and the supernatural ; sometimes it means 
 that nature never makes a leap ; sometimes it means that 
 all phenomena are but phases of a common process, and 
 that from any fact whatever in the system we can pass to 
 any other, however different, by simple modifications of this 
 process. In short, it means anything which happens to be 
 desirable. These flighty imaginings can be escaped only 
 as we apply the law to some concrete matter and fix its 
 significance and value for that matter. 
 
 What is it, then, in the case -of nature which is continu- 
 ous ? Is it natural things in their existence, or natural
 
 NATURE 265 
 
 causality, or nature as phenomenon ? The suspicion begins 
 to dawn upon us that nature is not continuous in any of 
 these senses, and that the continuity of nature is to be 
 .found in the continuous validity of the system of law and 
 in the continuity of the thought of which nature is the 
 flowing expression. 
 
 That nature is continuous in its existence is a metaphys- 
 ical proposition. It might mean that nature itself is a con- 
 tinuous substantial somewhat, or that the material elements 
 are continuous in their existence, and suffer no increase or 
 diminution of their number. Both propositions are already 
 condemned. The necessary dependence of the finite on the 
 fundamental reality reduces it to contingent existence, and 
 leaves us entirely unable to say how, or when, or in what 
 order finite things shall begin, or how long they shall con- 
 tinue, or when, or in what order, they shall cease to be. A 
 metaphysical doctrine with so many riders as this can never 
 be put forward as a first principle. In addition, metaphys- 
 ics reduces all impersonal existence to a flowing form of 
 the activity of the fundamental reality. The only meta- 
 physical continuity in the case is the continuity of the in- 
 finite being in which nature has its root. 
 
 But natural causality is continuous. To question this 
 would be fatal to all science. But here again we have con- 
 fusion. Some causality must be continuous, without doubt; 
 the cessation of all causality would be the vanishing of nat- 
 ure. If natural causality means the causality which sup- 
 ports nature, it is continuous, not indeed as a necessity, but 
 as a matter of fact. How long it shall remain continuous, 
 however, is unknown to all but the uncritical dogmatist, 
 and he simply mistakes the monotony of his thinking for 
 a law of existence. If by natural causality we mean the 
 causality of nature, considered as an impersonal agent or 
 system of agents, we have to say that there is no such thing.
 
 266 METAPHYSICS 
 
 Again, what the uncritical speculator really needs here 
 is not a metaphysical doctrine about natural causality, but 
 rather an inductive postulate of the continuity of natural 
 law. As long as the order of law holds we may hope to 
 construe experience. If this order should fail us, all hope of 
 dealing with experience would vanish. But no metaphysical 
 principle whatever can assure us of this continuity. There 
 is nothing in the conception of impersonal causality to as- 
 sure us that it is shut up to a uniform manifestation. The 
 continuity of law, therefore, is a pure postulate which must 
 either be referred to an abiding purpose in the cosmic in- 
 telligence, or else be accepted out of hand as an opaque 
 fact. 
 
 The continuity of nature as phenomenon means the same 
 thing, the continuity of phenomenal laws. In the strictest 
 sense a moving world has no continuity in itself, but only 
 for the observing or producing mind. Apart from this 
 mind, nature, supposing it to exist at all, would be a mi- 
 rage of vanishing phantoms, each and all perishing in the 
 attempt to be born. But granting the observer and the 
 phenomenal world, the only continuity possible would be 
 the continuous succession of phenomena according to the 
 same laws. The new phenomena as events would be other 
 than the old, however similar they might be, as a new day 
 is another day notwithstanding its logical equivalence to 
 old days. But all the phenomena, new and old alike, would 
 be comprehended in the same scheme of law and relation : 
 and this fact constitutes the unity and continuity of the 
 system. From the phenomenal stand-point nature has no 
 other continuity. 
 
 Possibly we may still think that there is a deeper con 
 tinuity, in that the antecedents condition and explain the 
 consequents. Causal break and irruption are thus excluded, 
 and we find our way from antecedent to consequent with-
 
 NATURE 267 
 
 out logical jolt or jar. But here again the thought is am- 
 biguous, and is untenable in both its meanings. We have 
 just pointed out the impossibility of tracing, either phe- 
 nomenally or metaphysically, the antecedent into the con- 
 sequent. We see an order of succession, but the inner con- 
 nection eludes us. In passing from one phenomenon to 
 another, thought moves along no continuously welded line 
 of logic, but rather by a corduroy road with all the accom- 
 paniments of bumping and jolting. Except in a very gen- 
 eral sense, nature, as we know it, abounds in discontinuities. 
 This has to be admitted even by tne believer in an ontolog- 
 ical mechanism as the reality of nature. For, as we saw, he 
 must recognize a double aspect to his system, a spatial and 
 a dynamic. And the spatial is but the translation into phe- 
 nomenal form of the dynamic, and has no continuity in it- 
 self. The movements of a thing may sometimes be the con- 
 tinuations or resultants of previous movements, but more 
 often they are the expression of invisible dynamic changes. 
 A kinematic system would be perpetually at fault in its 
 conclusions, because the motions of the system have their 
 roots not in previous movements, but in an invisible dynam- 
 ism. Thus the continuity disappears from the phenomenal, 
 where we might get at it, and takes refuge in metaphysical 
 theory. 
 
 The only inductive continuity we can find or allow is 
 one of phenomenal law. And this law produces nothing 
 and really prescribes nothing. It merely states a uniform- 
 ity of the phenomenal order. It erects no barrier of neces- 
 sity against any one. The order of law is plastic, and its 
 continuity does not consist in a rigid identity and monotony 
 of its factors from everlasting to everlasting, but in a sub- 
 ordination of all factors, new and old alike, to the same 
 laws. For every believer in freedom there are mental 
 states or acts which cannot be deduced from the antece-
 
 268 METAPHYSICS 
 
 dent states. These are pure self-determinations which can 
 be understood in their purpose, but cannot be explained in 
 their origin. By their very nature they lie beyond scientific 
 explanation, yet when they have arisen they then become 
 subject to the fundamental laws of mental action. At th'e 
 basis of the mental life, also, we meet with elements which 
 cannot be deduced from the antecedent state of mind. 
 These are our sensations, and are contributed or excited 
 from without. But after they have been aroused, they then 
 combine according to certain laws inherent in the nature 
 of the mind. Hence the integrity of the mental mechan- 
 ism does not consist in a self-enclosed continuity of mental 
 states, but in the identity of those laws which determine 
 the combination and succession of mental states, whether 
 arising from interaction with the outer world or from the 
 pure self-determinations of the mind. The same must be 
 said of the cosmical mechanism. Here too, for every be- 
 liever in freedom, there is much which cannot be explained 
 as the result of the antecedent state of the system. Human 
 thought and purpose have realized themselves in the phys- 
 ical world, and have produced effects which the system, 
 left to itself, would never have reached. A great multitude 
 of forms and collocations of matter can be traced back to 
 human volition guided by purpose ; and beyond that they 
 have no representation whatever. These interventions, 
 however, have violated no laws of nature. They arise from 
 the introduction of a new antecedent, and the i3sultant 
 varies accordingly. And the effect produced enters at once 
 into the great web of law, and is combined with other 
 effects according to a common scheme. Hence the integ- 
 rity of the cosmic mechanism, as in the case of the mental 
 mechanism, does not consist in a self-enclosed movement, but 
 in the subjection of all its factors to the same general laws. 
 The conception of the cosmic mechanism as incapable of
 
 NATURE 269 
 
 taking up new factors or new impulses, and subjecting them 
 to a common order of law, is borrowed entirely from our 
 experience with the coarsest of human inventions. The 
 actual cosmic mechanism is able to receive the greatest 
 variety of impulses from without, and to combine them with 
 the part according to fixed laws. Only in this way can it 
 be adapted to the use of our intelligence at all. 
 
 We conclude, then, once more that the continuity of nat- 
 ure means simply the continuity of phenomenal law, and 
 we see that this continuity in no way conflicts with the 
 complete pliability of the system to free intelligence, which 
 may found it or be in interaction with it. The laws of the 
 system are no independent necessities by which the action 
 of the fundamental reality is bound ; they are rather and 
 only the rules according to which that reality proceeds. 
 Neither are they anything which opposes a rigid bar to 
 finite freedom ; they are rather the conditions of any effec- 
 tive exercise of freedom. 
 
 Thus we set aside the error which frequently appears in 
 popular speculation, the fancy, namely, that the actual sys- 
 tem of law shuts everything up to a rigid fixity which can 
 be modified only by irruption and violence. Unless appear- 
 ances are very deceiving, we live under a system of law, 
 and we find that system within certain limits pliable to our 
 purposes and serving our aims. The system of law is the 
 one thing which founds our control of nature, and by means 
 of it we contrive to bring a great many things to pass which 
 the system of law, left to itself, would never accomplish. 
 The multitude of machines of human invention owe all 
 their value to the laws of nature, but those laws alone 
 would never have produced one of them. 
 
 The same considerations apply to the ultimatum often 
 proposed by closet speculators, either absolute continuity or 
 no science. For science as absolute system, comprehending
 
 270 METAPHYSICS 
 
 all things in a spatial and temporal order, and rigidly de- 
 ducing every consequent from its antecedents, thus bind- 
 ing all things together by an " iron chain of necessity," etc., 
 the assumption in question may well be a " postulate," but 
 whether we are to grant the postulate remains for decision. 
 There is something humorous in supposing a thing real be- 
 cause it is postulated. Such intimidations are formidable 
 only in the closet. A set of sprites cognizant of physical 
 phenomena, but not of human personality, might set them- 
 selves to study the physics of bodily movement. They 
 might discover a great many uniformities in which all might 
 agree ; but if they should proceed to lay it down as an ab- 
 solute postulate that every physical movement must be rig- 
 orously deduced from an antecedent movement, and espe- 
 cially that no extra-physical influence of a volitional nature 
 was to be allowed, under penalty of exploding science, we 
 should think that they had got hold of the writings of some 
 of our romantic continuity theorists and dealers in absolute 
 science. 
 
 But whatever freedom we allow our hypothetical sprites, 
 it is high time we saw through these fictions of abstract 
 theory. Absolute continuity may be a postulate of absolute 
 science, but it is no postulate of the only science we have, 
 and the only one worth having. If we allow that human 
 wills, or other wills, are playing into nature for its modifi- 
 cation, there is still a great realm of discoverable phenome- 
 nal uniformity which is the fruitful field of practical science. 
 This remains, whatever our theory of causation and meta- 
 physical connection. Even if we suppose that it is free- 
 dom which acts through the law, the law remains, and the 
 knowledge of it is as valuable as ever. Freedom in nature 
 cancels no law of physics. Freedom in willing cancels no 
 law of mind. The claim that the realm of law would go 
 if we admitted that our volition has any causal efficiency,
 
 NATURE 271 
 
 without or within, is not speech, but interjectional ejacula- 
 tion. It is a product of that superficial closet speculation 
 which has been so prolific of verbal intimidations. 
 
 Evolution 
 
 The popular notion of nature, we have said again and 
 again, is a confused compound of phenomenal law, crude 
 metaphysics, and misunderstood epistemological postulates. 
 This confusion finds further illustration in the current doc- 
 trine of evolution. The factitious importance which this 
 doctrine has acquired for speculators of the hearsay and of 
 the physiological type warrants us in continuing to trace 
 the familiar confusion. 
 
 Evolution may be either a cosmic formula or a biological 
 doctrine. For the present we take it in the former sense. 
 
 As a cosmic formula evolution may have two distinct 
 meanings. It may be a description of the genesis and his- 
 tory of the facts to which it is applied, and it may be such 
 a description, plus a theory of their causes. In other words, 
 evolution may be a description of the order of phenomenal 
 origin and development, and it may be a theory of the met- 
 aphysical causes which underlie that development. These 
 two conceptions are seldom distinguished ; and it is their 
 confusion, or conglomeration, which makes evolution so im- 
 mensely significant, on the one hand, and such a bugbear 
 on the other. 
 
 The formula of evolution as a description of the phenome- 
 nal order is familiar to every reader. The simplest and 
 lowest forms of existence preceded the higher and more 
 complex forms. Nothing begins ready-made. The present 
 grows out of the past, the complex out of the simple, the 
 high out of the low, the heterogeneous out of the homo- 
 geneous. In the inorganic world, if we should trace its his-
 
 272 METAPHYSICS 
 
 tory backward, we should find simpler and simpler physical 
 conditions, until we came to some simple state of dispersed 
 matter say, a nebulous cloud. In the organic world, if 
 we should trace living forms backward along genealogi- 
 cal lines, we should find those lines converging towards a 
 common point of radiation. The forms of life would grow 
 simpler, until in some very simple form or forms we. should 
 find the common starting-point from which the complex 
 forms of to-day have been developed. The same order is 
 to be observed in the development of mind, society, civiliza- 
 tion, and institutions in general. 
 
 Now evolution in this sense is simply a description of an 
 order of development, a statement of what, granting the 
 theory, an observer might have seen if he had been able to 
 inspect the cosmic movement from its simplest stages until 
 now. It is a statement of method and is silent about cau- 
 sation ; and the method itself is compatible with any kind 
 of causation. One might hold to this phenomenal order 
 and be an agnostic, or a positivist, or an idealist, or a theo- 
 logian, as to the causation. 
 
 Th's conception of the phenomenal history of the world 
 as showing such a continuous progress from the simple to 
 the complex, from the low to the high, we may call the doc- 
 trine of evolution in its scientific sense. It lies within the 
 field of science, and is open to scientific proof or disproof. 
 Whenever the doctrine transcends this field of phenomenal 
 description, and claims to give a theory of the productive 
 causes, it then becomes metaphysics, and must be handed 
 over to philosophical criticism for adjudication. 
 
 Evolution, then, in the scientific sense, is neither a con- 
 trolling law nor a producing cause, but simply a description 
 of a phenomenal order. And it is plain that there might 
 be entire unanimity concerning evolution in this sense along 
 with complete disharmony in its metaphysical interpreta-
 
 NATURE 273 
 
 tion. In such cases we have at bottom, not a scientific 
 difference, but a battle of philosophies. The theorists agree 
 on the facts, but interpret them by different schemes of 
 metaphysics. This is the reason why some thinkers find in 
 evolution a veritable aid to faith, while others see in it 
 nothing but atheism. And the latter class are not entirely 
 without excuse, owing to the failure to keep the scientific 
 and the metaphysical questions apart, and especially owing 
 to the bad metaphysics by which the facts have commonly 
 been interpreted. 
 
 This metaphysics has commonly been of the mechanical 
 and materialistic type, and almost invariably it has main- 
 tained a doctrine of necessity. Nature has been erected 
 into a self-contained and self-sufficient system ; and natural 
 laws have been viewed as self-executing necessities. Under 
 the influence of these crude notions evolution has been de- 
 "clared to maintain natural against supernatural causation, 
 and continuity and uniformity against break and irruption. 
 This antithesis has become a standing part of the popular 
 discussion. 
 
 It is worth noting, also, that much of the current argu- 
 ment ill comports with the underlying philosophy. It is 
 supposed that natural causation somehow secures phenome- 
 nal continuity and progress, and, conversely, that such con- 
 tinuity is especially favorable to the belief in natural causa- 
 tion. But there is absolutely no logical connection between 
 natural causation, in the sense of material or physical or 
 necessary causation, and the law of evolution, in the sense of 
 gradual progress from the simple to the complex. Natural 
 causation, in the sense mentioned, contains no provision what- 
 ever for phenomenal uniformity or progress. For all we 
 can say, such causation might have a purely kaleidoscopic 
 effect, and might perpetually cancel its own products. The 
 continuity of physical causes and forces would be compati- 
 
 18
 
 274 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ble with the most chaotic sequences of phenomena, and the 
 system might advance by perpetual explosion and catas- 
 trophe. If the actual system does not thus proceed, it is 
 not because it is natural, but because it is confined by its 
 laws and the relation of its parts to orderly and progressive 
 movement. 
 
 And, on the other hand, if we assume that nature is a self- 
 enclosed, self-executing mechanical order, what significance 
 for the evolution argument is there in the presence or ab- 
 sence of missing links, or in the fact of progress by slow 
 gradation? This conception of nature does, indeed, imply 
 that every product must be the result of its antecedents, but 
 it implies no given order or measure of likeness. In a sys- 
 tem assumed to be self-executing the present gro\vs out or. 
 the past as a matter of definition. Missing links might 
 modify our conception of the order of procedure, but they 
 would not affect our general view of causation. Sometimes' 
 the speculators have a suspicion of this fact, and point out 
 that the absence of missing links, and even the fact of prog- 
 ress, are no necessary part of the evolution doctrine. The 
 great thing is to maintain the continuity of natural causa- 
 tion, whatever the breaks and faults in the phenomenal 
 order. Evolution, it is said, permits us to recognize any 
 number of phenomenal fractures, if only we reject all inter- 
 ference with natural causation. The work must be natural, 
 and must be carried on by "resident forces," if it is to be 
 true evolutionary doctrine. But by this time the speculator 
 has unwittingly changed his position without forsaking the 
 old one. If the inquirer asks for the ground of progress, he 
 is referred to evolution. If he should express surprise that 
 evolution must be progressive, he is told that he is mistaken. 
 Evolution implies neither progress nor regress, but only 
 continuity. If the inquirer should find it still more surpris- 
 ing that there should actually be order and progress when
 
 NATURE 275 
 
 evolution is thus undetermined in its nature, the speculator 
 will probably refer him back to evolution again ; for is not 
 evolution a change from an indefinite, incoherent homoge- 
 neity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity through con- 
 tinuous differentiations and integrations? Thus with one 
 barrel or the other the popular evolutionist is pretty sure 
 to bring down the game. For the critic, however, who is 
 not so easily intimidated, the two questions remain in plain 
 sight : First, does evolution necessarily mean qualitative 
 progress ? If so, a necessarily progressive universe is a 
 highly interesting subject for reflection, and readily lends 
 itself to teleological interpretations. Secondly, does evolu- 
 tion mean only causal continuity ; and is it equally compati- 
 ble with either progress or regress? If so, how is the actual 
 progress to be explained? 
 
 Something of an opposite confusion is beginning to creep 
 into the thought of evolutionists of the theistic type. They 
 bring forward the familiar arguments from gill -slits and 
 that sort of thing, and point out that it is a mockery of our 
 intelligence to see in these anything but a proof of genetic 
 connection. But when they introduce God as the cause of 
 the successive members of the evolving series, the series 
 seems not to have in it anything sufficiently independent 
 and abiding to give the argument a footing. In a phenom- 
 enal system nothing abides, but the order is incessantly 
 reproduced; and if similar factors appear along the line, 
 the later appearances are in no way due to the earlier ones, 
 but to the law of the whole. If there were a tendency to 
 gill -slits ensconced somewhere in nature, we might refer 
 the later mislocated slits to it; but when the infinite is the 
 cause of the members of the series, it would seem that, 
 whatever mockery of our intelligence it might involve, we 
 must, after all, refer them to the Creator, who, for reasons 
 known only to himself, has seen fit to produce them. The
 
 276 METAPHYSICS 
 
 wicked are not the only persons who stand in slippery 
 places. 
 
 But all this is something of an aside, and has its justifica- 
 tion only as illustrating the confusion of popular specula- 
 tion. 
 
 Evolution as a theory of causation is simply a piece of 
 bad metaphysics produced by bad logic. Logic shows that 
 in a mechanical or necessary scheme of any kind we can 
 reach neither the one from the many nor the many from 
 the one, neither the high from the low nor the low from the 
 high, neither the definite from the indefinite nor the indef- 
 inite from the definite. If we seem to do so we merely fall 
 a prey to the fallacy of the universal and mistake the sim- 
 plifications of logical manipulation for the order of concrete 
 fact. If there be a real progress from the simple to the 
 complex, there must be a free intelligence as its author. If 
 there be no such free intelligence, there is no progress, but 
 only an unintelligible passage from potentiality to actual- 
 ity. This in reality and for clear thought. Of course all 
 things are possible to a cloudy intelligence ; having no clear 
 ideas, it can pass from everything to nothing and from noth- 
 ing to everything with admirable facility. A vocabulary 
 supplies all its needs. 
 
 For the further clearing up of our thought concerning 
 the relation of inductive science to metaphysics we recall 
 again some results reached in the Theory of Thought and 
 Knowledge. Explanation in general, we saw, consists in re- 
 ferring an event to its causes, or in connecting it with other 
 events according to law, or in relating it in a scheme of 
 purpose. In the first case explanation is metaphysical, in 
 the second scientific, in the third teleological. 
 
 In popular speculation the first and second are confused 
 because of the general failure to distinguish the phenomenal 
 the ontological. But when thought is clear all three
 
 NATURE 077 
 
 forms are seen to be distinct and alike necessary for the 
 full satisfaction of our mental demands. When we have 
 named the cause and the purpose of nature, we have gained 
 no insight into the methods of the cause, or of the way in 
 H'hich the purpose is realized. And when we have discov- 
 ered the uniformities of nature, we have gained no knowl- 
 edge either of the cause or of the purpose of nature. When 
 we are speaking of causes, metaphysics is in its full right 
 and has the final word. When we are speaking of methods, 
 inductive science has the right of way. We are seeking to 
 connect events with other events in an order of law; and 
 both metaphysics and teleology are irrelevant. We can 
 make absolutely no use of theological suggestions in this 
 field. We may, indeed, not find the law we seek, but the 
 law, whatever it may be, must be sought within the order 
 of phenomenal experience. Finally, when we are seeking 
 to interpret nature teleologically, it is quite irrelevant to 
 object the way in which events are brought about. No 
 doubt events come to pass in some way, but that does not 
 decide whether they mean anything when they do come to 
 pass. Walls are built by laying stone on stone or brick on 
 brick ; but this fact does not reveal the plan of the building, 
 still less does it disprove a plan. 
 
 We repeat this matter in another form. Apart from the 
 general question of causality, every event has a dual aspect. 
 We may view it from the stand-point of purpose, and try to 
 tell what it means. And we may view it as an occurrence 
 in the cosmic series, and try to comprehend it in the order 
 of law. In the former case it expresses a purpose ; in the 
 latter case it is an outcome of law. In the former case it 
 appears as purposed ; in the latter it appears as product. 
 These two points of view are necessary for our complete 
 understanding of .anything ; and they can never collide 
 except through that crude metaphysics which erects the
 
 278 METAPHYSICS 
 
 system of law into a self -running and independent mech- 
 anism. 
 
 Separate things should be kept separate. The cosmic 
 movement has these several aspects ; and neither the sci- 
 entific nor the teleological aspect admits of perfect insight. 
 However much we may believe in purpose, \ve can trace it 
 but a little way. And however much we may believe in 
 the reign of law, we can trace it only in general outlines 
 and in a superficial manner. We trace it in a way which 
 serves for practical purposes rather than for theoretical in- 
 sight. If we seek to go farther than this we stumble into 
 metaphysics, and begin to talk of "subtle tendencies" and 
 "the nature of things," and possibly even of "Nature" her- 
 self; and these are mouth-tilling rather than mind-filling 
 phrases. When we examine ourselves we find that we have 
 nothing in mind in such cases beyond the abstract category 
 of ground ; and metaphysics shows that this notion vanishes 
 unless we raise it to the form of free intelligence. We need 
 to bear these several aspects of the problem in mind in order 
 to vindicate for each its proper field and significance, and 
 especially to ward off that crude dogmatism which makes 
 the dicta of science all-embracing and final. Inductive sci- 
 ence has the right of way in its own field, and only in its 
 own field. And after it has made all possible discoveries in 
 that field the metaphysical and teleological problems re- 
 main untouched. 
 
 We are really not under obligation to have a scientific 
 theory unless we can find it in the facts ; or, rather, we are 
 under obligation not to have such a theory unless we can 
 find it in the facts. When the facts themselves do not give 
 it we must wait for light, and meanwhile have recourse to 
 teleology and metaphysics for such help as they can give. 
 But no theory is better than a fictitious one. Ignorance is 
 often a virtue, but sham knowledge is an intellectual crime.
 
 NATURE 279 
 
 Lord Salisbury, in his Presidential Address before the Brit- 
 ish Association for the Advancement of Science, gives the 
 following quotation from a distinguished scientist, which 
 well illustrates the confusion of current thought on this 
 matter : 
 
 " We accept natural selection, not because we are able to 
 demonstrate the process in detail, not even because we can 
 with more or less ease imagine it, but simply because we 
 must because it is the only possible explanation that we 
 can conceive. We must assume natural selection to be the 
 principle of the explanation of the metamorphoses, because 
 all other apparent principles of explanation fail us, and it is 
 inconceivable that there should be yet another capable of 
 explaining the adaptation of organisms without assuming 
 the help of a principle of design." 
 
 This is a very instructive quotation. It shows the logical 
 rashness of the dogmatic mind, which must have a theory 
 at all hazards. The process cannot be demonstrated in de- 
 tail; it cannot even be imagined in most of its supposed ap- 
 plications. And yet it must be affirmed, for we must have 
 a theory ; and we cannot conceive of any other which would 
 not involve design. But why must we have a theory unless 
 it helps us to insight ? We cannot conceive of any other, but 
 it seems that we cannot even conceive of this. It is only 
 the ill-starred mind which must have a theory that would 
 insist on theorizing under such circumstances. All other 
 minds would recognize the impossibility of referring the 
 metamorphoses of the organic world to any inductively dis- 
 covered principle, and would content themselves with classi- 
 fying and describing organic forms according to their affin- 
 ities and various relations. This would not take us very 
 far, indeed, but it would be real and not sham knowledge, 
 so far as it went. 
 
 The emptiness of this principle of selection has been
 
 280 METAPHYSICS 
 
 pointed out in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge. 
 When the anthropomorphism is eliminated, we said, the 
 principle reduces to the survival of the fittest; and when 
 the ambiguity is eliminated from the latter principle, it in 
 turn reduces to the statement that the able to survive sur- 
 vive and the unable to survive do not survive. That this 
 is true is certainly unquestionable, but unless we can point 
 out in particular cases the fitness which leads to survival, 
 or the un fitness which leads to non-survival, we make no 
 progress. We merely shuffle the abstract notions of fitness 
 and unfitness, and draw the barren conclusion that what- 
 ever survives does so because of its fitness, and whatever 
 fails to survive does so because of its unfitness. We know 
 that it was fit because it survived, and unfit because it failed 
 to survive ; and, being fit or unfit, it could not fail to sur- 
 vive or not survive; and what more is there to wonder 
 about ? 
 
 Some of these days even teleology will be found to be a 
 relief from this barren play of words. Meanwhile, we point 
 out that to get any light from this principle, we must be 
 able to show what the fitnesses and un fitnesses are, and 
 in particular how the fitnesses arise, and how they fall out 
 in such a way that an orderly system of organic existence 
 emerges. When the unfit is defined as unable to survive, 
 we can readily see that it cannot survive; but the arrival 
 of the fit, and its arrival in so many forms, are left quite 
 unaccounted for by the great principle of natural selection. 
 Yet these arrivals contain the knot of the problem. A few 
 cases of arrival and survival may make no impression of 
 purpose, but when the sum of arrivals and survivals is the 
 orderly system of living things the case is different. But 
 popular thought lingers among details without any thought 
 of the whole, and thus gets no impression of purpose what- 
 ever.
 
 NATURE 281 
 
 There are a great many showy arguments which in their 
 abstract form seem invincible, but which, nevertheless, look 
 very different when concretely applied. Then it often ap- 
 pears that various riders have to be added which reduce 
 them to commonplaces, if not to nothingness. The follow- 
 ing is an illustration : 
 
 u Organic form is the result of motion. 
 
 "Motion takes the direction of least resistance. 
 
 " Therefore organic form is the result of motion in the 
 direction of least resistance." 
 
 The major premise is undeniable. The minor premise is 
 a mechanical axiom. The conclusion necessarily follows. 
 And thus we see from this beautifully simple syllogism how 
 the organic world necessarily results from elementary me- 
 chanical laws. To be sure, we cannot by any reflection on 
 those laws deduce the result, but, by reflection on the re- 
 sult, we see that it must come under the law. If, then, 
 any one should be inclined to wonder at the complexity of 
 organic forms, we quietly refer him to the principle that 
 motion takes the direction of least resistance. 
 
 But the argument admits of endless application. Thus: 
 
 The writing of a book, say Paradise Lost, is a case of 
 motion. 
 
 Motion takes the direction of least resistance. 
 
 Therefore, the writing of Paradise Lost is the result of 
 motion in the direction of least resistance. 
 
 This argument is just as good as the other. And now it 
 begins to dawn upon us, either that the line of least resist- 
 ance is an enormously complicated affair, which implicitly 
 contains the whole system of effects, or else that the line is 
 determined by something beyond it. If, for instance, the 
 line of least resistance is determined by some immanent 
 organic law, or by the thought, purpose, and volition of 
 the writer, the formal argument is as good as ever, but its
 
 282 METAPHYSICS 
 
 purely verbal character is evident. The application to nat- 
 ural selection and the survival of the fittest is manifest. 
 
 Our scientist insisted that we must affirm natural selec- 
 tion as the principle of the metamorphoses in the organic 
 world. The reply is that we are not under obligation to 
 affirm this or any other principle, unless it pays expenses. 
 Now it is perfectly clear that this principle, when raised 
 from a very subordinate position and made universal, be- 
 comes a barren formalism, leading to no insight, and large- 
 ly a tautology. The rest of his claim is equally instructive. 
 Either we must affirm natural selection or have recourse to 
 design. Of course this would be in the highest degree un- 
 scientific. 
 
 And it would be unscientific in the technical sense. In- 
 ductive science as such knows nothing of God, and has no 
 occasion to know anything. It moves in another field al- 
 together. Design is not technically a scientific hypothe- 
 sis. If one were trying to see how the parts of a com- 
 plex mechanism hang together, it would be quite absurd to 
 tell him to look for the design. Design might throw light 
 upon the existence of the whole, when one is looking for 
 the ground of the arrangement of the parts, but it can never 
 tell what the arrangement is. Equally irrelevant is the 
 reference to design in the world movement, when one is 
 looking for the forms of that movement, and for the laws 
 according to" which phenomena are connected. But of this 
 division of labor our scientist has no suspicion. He tacitly 
 erects nature into a self-running mechanism which has no 
 root in purpose, and opposes natural selection to design as 
 being its contradiction. 
 
 Now all this is very crude and superficial logic and met- 
 aphysics. Science as such has no place for design ; but 
 reason, which is the source of science, has a place for de- 
 sign. Teleology is unscientific in the technical and limited
 
 NATURE 283 
 
 sense, but it is not unscientific in the sense of being false. 
 Moreover, it seems there is no scientific explanation. The 
 one offered cannot be demonstrated in detail, and cannot 
 even be imagined in many of its applications. Besides, if 
 we had a scientific explanation, it would not exclude the 
 teleological one ; for this only claims that the net result of 
 ail the arrivals and survivals in the organic world is such as 
 to be unintelligible without the assumption that they root 
 in purpose somewhere, whatever the method by which they 
 have been reached. Nor is the view any more unscientific 
 than the alternative doctrine, when the scientific explana- 
 tion is thought through to its metaphysical basis. If we 
 reject the control of purpose, then we must find the ground 
 for all the complex forms of nature in the nature of things, 
 subtle tendencies, latent laws, mysterious affinities, etc. But 
 this matter is not only unscientific in the technical sense; it 
 is unscientific in any sense, being simply bad and impossible 
 metaphysics. 
 
 Nature as the System of the Finite 
 
 From the form of our experience the physical world is 
 the great object of thought. Hence it results that the no- 
 tion of nature is generally and often exclusively built on 
 physical lines. But by and by we recollect that man is 
 also a part of existence, and that we must make some pro- 
 vision for him. Then if our thought is not very critical 
 we tend to make man a physical product. Or if we see the 
 impossibility of this view we tend to transform our thought 
 of nature so as to make it all-inclusive. "We see that man 
 cannot be made a function of physical nature, but then 
 physical nature is not the sum or sole reality of nature. 
 It is rather only one aspect of that all-embracing nature 
 which produces alike the inorganic and the organic, the
 
 284 METAPHYSICS 
 
 physical and the spiritual. The apparent antitheses of ex- 
 perience, as the living and the dead, the spiritual and the 
 material, man and nature, are only phenomenal ; and they 
 all vanish in the unity of the one mysterious nature from 
 which all things proceed. If we knew all we should see 
 that all things are natural and hive their natural explana- 
 tion. 
 
 This notion results from the desire for unity working 
 under the limitations of sense metaphysics. Eliminate 
 these, and this mysterious nature becomes simply a name 
 for the fundamental reality, and its properties remain a 
 problem for investigation. But there is implicit in the doc- 
 trine the conception of an impersonal existence and of 
 necessary causation, and the claim is that if we knew this 
 impersonal somewhat and its necessary activities, we should 
 find it including and explaining the whole system of the 
 finite. 
 
 The untenability of this notion we have long since seen. 
 Both the impersonal existence and the necessary causation 
 have been cast out as evil. This nature is one of the idols 
 of the speculative den which is seen in its true character 
 as soon as it is brought into the Hght. Epistemology con- 
 vinces us that nature has neither existence nor meaning 
 except for and through intelligence. 
 
 Yet after all there is a certain interest underlying this 
 notion of nature ; but the speculator does not know what 
 it is, and seeks to satisfy it in impossible ways. The things 
 to be secured are the continuity of law and the possibility 
 of comprehending all things under some law-giving plan. 
 Things must not exist at random. Events must not occur 
 at hap-hazard. Whatever antitheses may be found in ex- 
 perience, they must admit of being comprehended in a 
 deeper plan which unites and explains them. But these 
 demands cannot be met by any impersonal mechanism,
 
 NATURE 285 
 
 but only by the constitutive intelligence which founds and 
 maintains the order. Considered in itself, nature is simply 
 a form of working for the expression and realization of a 
 thought or plan. Its continuity is intellectual, and all its 
 laws and phenomena, its constants and variables, are to be 
 understood from the side of this plan. In the realm of nat- 
 ure that which was does not in the deepest sense explain 
 that which is, but that which was, that which is, and that 
 which will be, are all to be explained, logically, by their re- 
 lations to one another in the plan of the whole, and, meta- 
 physically, by that Living Will which not only worketh 
 hitherto, but worketh still and worketh forevermore. Log- 
 icall\ T , all things explain all things, that is, imply all things 
 in the plan of the whole, the future implying the past 
 as much as the past implies the future. Dynamically, no 
 impersonal thing explains anything, for all such things 
 are but phases, constant or variable, of an activity beyond 
 them. 
 
 Every one familiar with anti-religious polemics will recog- 
 nize that the discussion has largely proceeded on a certain 
 conception of the natural. Evolution would never conflict 
 with religion but for a peculiar conception of the natural. 
 Xo one would ever have dreamed of a conflict between 
 science and religion but for a particular conception of the 
 natural. In history, also, all alleged supernatural occur- 
 rences are to be looked upon either as fictions or as mis- 
 understood natural events. A natural interpretation of all 
 events is insisted upon, and this is held to exclude the super- 
 natural. Thus the natural and the supernatural are set up 
 as mutually exclusive, so that the more we have of the one 
 the less we must have of the other. 
 
 Of course an event may be natural and yet be apparently
 
 286 METAPHYSICS 
 
 a great departure from the familiar order. The continuity 
 of natural law is compatible with great phenomenal discon- 
 tinuity. We often have apparent departures from the famil- 
 iar order ; but, on closer inspection, it is found that the es- 
 sential order of law is maintained even in its seeming in- 
 fraction. Thus, an earthquake may be a departure from 
 the accustomed immobility of the earth's crust ; but it is 
 nevertheless the outcome of the familiar laws of physics. 
 Thus, again, the freezing of water in a flame seems like a 
 contradiction of natural law ; and yet the laws of physics 
 are not violated, but rather illustrated, by this fact. Hav- 
 ing once mastered this distinction between essential contin- 
 uity and phenomenal discontinuity, we become somewhat 
 tolerant even of apparently miraculous stories, only nothing 
 of the supernatural must be allowed in them. Cures at 
 shrines, or by means of relics or holy water, or by formulas 
 of blessing or exorcism, become quite credible if we may 
 view them as cases of the influence of the mind on the 
 body. Even witches, who have long been under the ban. 
 are becoming a fairly intelligible folk since the development 
 of hypnotism 
 
 Now in this there is a double assumption. First, nature 
 is supposed to be a metaphysical system with divers res- 
 ident forces by virtue of which it produces a great variety 
 of effects which, as products of nature, are natural. Second- 
 ly, this nature is tacitly and often avowedly supposed not 
 to root in, or be subordinate to, intelligence anywhere. If 
 rooted in intelligence at all it is so only as to its general 
 forms and laws, and not as to its details. In either case, 
 nature is conceived as a blind causality which does a great 
 many unintended things on its own account. This notion 
 is the source of the difficulty so many feel over the doc- 
 trine of evolution', and also of the traditional polemic con- 
 cerning prayer and special interpositions in general. The
 
 NATURE 287 
 
 naturalistic interpretations of religious history have the 
 same root. In all of these cases there is a latent or ex- 
 plicit assumption that whatever can be referred to natural 
 agency is thereby rescued from any purposive interpreta- 
 tion. 
 
 But allowing that nature is at present a metaphysical 
 fact with inherent resident forces, this conclusion does not 
 follow, unless it be shown that nature is essential!} 7 blind, 
 mechanical, and self -existent. If nature be dependent on 
 intelligence, then all its phases and products must be re- 
 ferred to intelligence. All that the rational believer in pur- 
 pose cares to maintain is that natural products are intended, 
 however realized ; and what the unbeliever should show, in 
 order to give his claim any significance, is that they root in 
 no purpose anywhere. If an event represents a divine pur- 
 pose, it is as truly purposeful, when realized th *ough natural 
 processes, as it would be if produced by fiat ; and it would 
 be as "special" or "particular," if thus produced, as it 
 would be if created on the spot. In any other sense than 
 that of being intended, it is unnecessary to insist upon any- 
 thing special or particular in the flow of events ; and in this 
 sense it is hard to see how any theist can reserve anything 
 from being special and particular. We may not be able, 
 indeed, to trace the meaning in an event, but if there be 
 meaning in anything there is meaning in all things. It is 
 only superficial thought which fancies that mechanism dis- 
 places meanings. 
 
 Familiar oversights are apt to master us here. First, the 
 fallacy of the universal misleads us into thinking that the 
 creative act produced only a system of things in general, 
 and that this system then wrought out on its own account 
 a set of particular effects for which no one is responsible. 
 General laws and classes were the first and only created 
 product; and thereafter things got on by themselves. But
 
 288 METAPHYSICS 
 
 these laws and classes as such contain no hint of concrete 
 and particular things and events ; and hence the latter are 
 thought to be no part of the original plan. Through this 
 deceit of the universal they fall out of our thought, and are 
 supposed not to have been in the creative thought. Thus, 
 finally, they sink down into unintended by-products of the 
 natural mechanism, and admit of being thought meanly of. 
 
 The nai've superficiality of all this is evident. General 
 laws and classes can have real existence only in concrete 
 and particular application. There is and can be no system 
 of things in general. If then we suppose that God created 
 a system of nature which was intended to unfold according 
 to inherent laws, we must say that the creative act implied 
 and carried with it all that should ever arrive in the un- 
 folding of the system. There is no way by which things 
 or events could slip in which were not provided for in the 
 primal arrangement. Mechanism can only unfold its own 
 implications ; it can make no new departures so as to reach 
 anything essentially new. And if we suppose the Creator 
 to have known what he was doing, we must suppose him 
 either to have intended the implications, or to have been 
 unable to prevent them. But the reality of the purpose is 
 missed because of the deceit of the universal ; and even if 
 we allow it, it fails to make any impression upon us, from 
 being far removed in time. Here we overlook the relativity 
 of our time estimates and practically fancy that a purpose 
 so distant must have faded out of the divine interest, if not 
 out of the divine thought altogether. 
 
 The question of natural and supernatural, so far as it has 
 a religious interest, is purely one of intended or unintended. 
 But this question is obscured by supposing the issue to con- 
 cern the method of realization ; as if the natural were nec- 
 essarily unrelated to intelligence, and as if purpose could be 
 realized only by unnatural methods.
 
 NATURE 289 
 
 These conclusions would hold even if nature were a meta- 
 physical reality ; but nature is nothing of the kind. There 
 is no substantial nature, but only natural events; and a nat- 
 ural event is one which occurs in an order of law, or one 
 which we can connect with other events according to rule. 
 But this order has no causality in it. In the causal sense 
 it explains nothing. It is only a rule according to which 
 some power beyond it proceeds. Its value for us is prac- 
 tical rather than speculative. But the cause lies beyond the 
 law ; this is the supernatural. But this cause is essentially 
 personal and purposive ; and the system of law represents 
 only the general form of its free causality. The supernat- 
 ural, then, is nothing foreign to nature and making occa- 
 sional raids into nature, but so far as nature as a whole is 
 concerned, the supernatural is the ever-present ground and 
 administrator of the natural. It is not something of a 
 scenic ami arbitrary character apart from nature, but rather 
 a supreme reason and will realizing its purposes under the 
 form of nature. Hence events in general must be said to 
 be at once natural in the mode of their occurrence, and 
 supernatural in their causation. The commonest event, 
 say the falling of a stone, is as supernatural in its causality 
 as any miracle would be ; for in both alike the fundamental 
 reality, or God, would be equally implicated. As soon as 
 we eliminate the crude metaphysics of uncritical thought 
 we see that there is no more needless conflict anywhere in 
 speculation than this which sets the natural and supernatu- 
 ral apart in mutual hostility. 
 
 Miracles 
 
 There is probably no discussion in which the ratio of bad 
 logic to good has been greater than in that concerning mir- 
 acles. With our conception of the divine immanence, of a 
 
 19
 
 290 METAPHYSICS 
 
 natural supernatural and a supernatural natural, the ques- 
 tion loses all essential importance. Miracles in themselves 
 would be no more divinely wrought than any natural event 
 whatever. The only place or function we could find for 
 miracles would be as signs of a divine power and purpose 
 which men immersed in sense could not find in the ordinary 
 course of nature. They might be necessary condescensions 
 to human weakness, but they would root no more intimate- 
 ly in the divine will and purpose than any familiar event. 
 
 How to define a miracle has always been a question of 
 difficulty ; and the tendency has been to give specimens in- 
 stead of definitions. Thus, to raise the dead would be a 
 miracle. Answers to prayer concerning familiar matters, 
 it is said, would not be miracles. To the charge made by 
 the unbeliever that an answer to prayer involves a miracle, 
 the believer commonly replies with denial. Miracles are 
 the great wonders which were needed for the original estab- 
 lishment of the faith, or for its vindication against its ene- 
 mies ; and the age of miracles has long since passed away. 
 
 But this attempt to fix the definition of miracle by sam- 
 ple never fails to awaken criticism. It seems to make the 
 miraculous character to depend not on the fact of a depart- 
 ure from the order of nature, but on the size of the depart- 
 ure. Small departures, then, are not miraculous, but large 
 ones are. Now a disciple of logical rigor and vigor can 
 never endure any such shuffling and shilly-shallying as this; 
 and he hastens to announce that any departure from the 
 order of nature is a miracle, and of course is to be denied. 
 Not merely the stories of sacred books, but answers to pray- 
 er of all sorts, providential interferences, spiritual leadings, 
 inspirations, etc., must be set aside as miraculous. 
 
 There is an air of great clearness to this which almost 
 excuses its peremptoriness. Unfortunately, this clearness is 
 only apparent. If we mean by a departure from the order
 
 NATURE 291 
 
 of nature the production of something which nature left 
 to itself would not produce, we must say that physical nat- 
 ure, where the admission of miracle is pre-eminently per- 
 horresced, is the scene of continuous miracles. For that nat- 
 ure is perpetually undergoing modification and taking on 
 new forms because of human volitions which play into it 
 and produce effects. These effects cannot be deduced from 
 the antecedent state of the physical system, but are inter- 
 ferences, interpolations, interjections from without. If these 
 are miracles, and so abundant, there seems to be no good 
 speculative reason why we should object to miracles in gen- 
 eral. But if they are not miracles, then, it appears, we may 
 have interferences, etc., which represent and realize purpose 
 in the system, but which, as being every-day occurrences, 
 are not to be called miraculous. 
 
 Miracle, then, in the sense of effects interpolated into the 
 order of law without being a consequence of that order, 
 would seem to be a fairly familiar fact of experience. If 
 we should think to avoid this conclusion by saying that 
 physical nature alone would not explain the effects, but 
 nature as a whole, including man, would explain, we should 
 have a perfectly barren contention, as long as we left man 
 free, and a self-destructive one if we should include man in 
 a scheme of necessity. 
 
 These considerations suggest, what reflection confirms, 
 that the traditional debate respecting miracle is marked by 
 all the confusion and uncertainty which appear in the pop- 
 ular notions of the natural and supernatural. Neither party 
 to the debate is certain of its own position or has any con- 
 sistent position ; and whichever part} 7 attacks wins. 
 
 From our own point of view the natural has its source 
 and abiding cause in the fundamental reality, which is liv- 
 ing will and intelligence ; and physical nature is throughout 
 only the form and product of its immanent and ceaseless
 
 292 METAPHYSICS 
 
 causality. The question of miracle, then, is not a question 
 of natural versus supernatural, nor a question of causality, 
 but solely and only a question of the phenomenal relations 
 of the event in question. The natural event is one which 
 comes in a familiar order, or one which we can relate to 
 other events according to rule. The miracle could only be 
 viewed as an event arriving apart from the accustomed 
 order and defying reduction to rule. 
 
 This question goes deeper than at first appears. It raises 
 first the query what objective and logical ground we have 
 for believing in a fixed and all-embracing natural order. 
 The answer must be that we have no such ground which 
 does not either rest on theistic faith or else float in the 
 air as a subjective postulate. Thought needs such an order 
 for the realization of its own tendencies, but that does not 
 prove its existence. In a rational system we can infer some- 
 thing from the experience and anticipations of our own rea- 
 son, but in a system not rooted in reason nothing can be 
 inferred. In an atheistic scheme psychological expecta- 
 tions may be formed, but they constitute no logical warrant. 
 Nothing is possible on such a view but dogmatic assump- 
 tion. 
 
 An order of law, then, becomes a rational thing and fur- 
 nishes ground for rational assumption only on a theistic 
 basis. From the orderly nature of intellect \ve should ex- 
 pect order and consistency in its activities and products. 
 Now from this stand-point there is a decided presumption 
 against miracle, and .the presumption arises from the nature 
 of intelligence itself. And nothing can save us from re- 
 jecting miraculous stories as antecedently incredible, except 
 the showing of an adequate reason for their performance. 
 And in deciding what an adequate reason may be, men will 
 judge one way or the other in accordance with their explicit 
 or implicit assumption concerning the meaning of the world
 
 NATURE 293 
 
 and life. If they think that nature is there on its own ac- 
 count, and that its highest law is that M F" shall remain 
 a constant quantity, there is no question as to their position 
 on miracles. The one sacred thing will be \ MV*, and if 
 there be anything which interferes with that, anathema sit. 
 And if, on the other hand, there be any who hold that nat- 
 ure is second and not first, that it is meant to serve moral 
 and religious ends, they will find no apriori difficulty in 
 the notion of miracle if they find it occurring in connection 
 with spiritual exigencies which could have been met in no 
 other way as well. Abstract and unrelated wonders might 
 conceivably be proved by abstract testimony, but such ques- 
 tions have only academic existence; and however much 
 evidence might be offered for such wonders, they would 
 inevitably fade out of rational belief, until at last no one 
 would even take the pains to deny them. The reason is 
 that such wonders are essentially incredible in a world 
 which roots in a supreme reason and a worthy purpose. 
 But faith or unfaith in all miracles roots too deep in life to 
 be entirely amenable to logic. Logic, however, may be 
 allowed to remark that those persons who think that " sci- 
 ence demonstrates the impossibility of miracles" or that 
 " science shows that miracles have never occurred " might 
 possibly be helped by a few lessons in logic. 
 
 But, on the other hand, the believer in the omnipresent 
 supernatural, if he be at all skilled in logical and psycholog- 
 ical reflection, or learned in history, will steadfastly main- 
 tain that the supernatural manifests itself chiefly and al- 
 most exclusively under the natural form. Only thus can 
 nature be the instrument of our instruction and develop- 
 ment. Only thus can the mental and moral sanity of in- 
 dividuals and the community be secured. Only thus can 
 the low, wonder-loving tendencies of the untrained intellect 
 be prevented from plunging men into unfathomable depths
 
 294 METAPHYSICS 
 
 of superstition. Only thus, finally, can many individuals 
 be saved from abysses of fanaticism and conceited unchari- 
 tableness, because of fancied visions and revelations. In a 
 time when men have lost themselves in the mazes of imper- 
 sonal mechanism, they need enlightenment so as to find 
 God in the law, but at all times they eq.ually need to recog- 
 nize the law, even if it should temporarily hide God from 
 them. 
 
 Nature as Idea 
 
 In the Theory of Thought and Knowledge we have dis- 
 cussed the general question of idealism, pointing out, how- 
 ever, that the full discussion involves metaphysics as well 
 as epistemology. We recur to the subject here for the sake 
 of emphasizing the phenomenality of external nature ; that 
 is, its existence only in, for, and through intelligence. On 
 whatever line we approach the subject, we find thought 
 able to save itself from contradiction and collapse only as 
 all reality is taken up into mind. The extra-mental world 
 of sense-thought is seen to be a misreading of experience ; 
 and it must inevitably vanish before criticism. A thought 
 world is the only knowable world ; and a thought world is 
 the only real world. And of this world intelligence is at 
 once the origin and the abiding seat. Nature as being van- 
 ishes instantly unless we raise our thought to the abiding 
 idea which binds the successive phases into one .conception. 
 The rational ideas and relations and system in what we call 
 things are the only thing with which thought can deal ; and 
 they are nothing in abstraction from a mind which consti- 
 tutes and maintains them. 
 
 Here our study of nature ends. It has been of set pur- 
 pose exceedingly repetitious, as in no other way did it seem 
 possible to reveal the multitudinous forms which the bad
 
 NATURE 295 
 
 metaphysics of crude thought assumes on this subject. We 
 emerge finally with the conception of the finite spirit in the 
 presence of a phenomenal system which forever proceeds 
 from the immanent energy of the one Living Will. This 
 system cannot be deduced by any apriori reflection, but 
 must be learned from experience. Still it is possible to learn 
 something of its laws and to construe some of its mean- 
 ings ; and all our effort should be directed to this end. 
 
 In neither case, however, can we reach anything like com- 
 pleteness. From our theistic stand-point, we are forced to 
 find the reason why the system is as it is in the purposes of 
 the infinite. This fact, in itself, would not be incompatible 
 with an insight into these purposes, and into the means of 
 their realization ; but both the purposes and the methods of 
 accomplishment are largely hidden from our knowledge. 
 In most cases, where design is manifest, the end seems to 
 have little worth ; and where a worthy end is affirmed, the 
 system seems quite indifferent, if not inimical, to its realiza- 
 tion. The only end which can be allowed to have absolute 
 value is an ethical one ; but it is hard to detect any relation 
 to such an end in the mass of cosmic details. It is still 
 harder to find any reason why this end might not have been 
 secured in a more direct and efficient way. Viewed as a 
 whole, the great cosmic drift does not seem to set very de- 
 cidedly in any direction, and the mass of results seem more 
 like products than purposes. The great forms of elemen- 
 tary activity are maintained, and in their interaction they 
 give rise to various products to which it is difficult to as- 
 cribe any further significance. The belief in purpose in the 
 system has its special embarrassments as well as its ad- 
 vantages. We cannot do without it, and it is not easy to 
 do with it. In particular, it precipitates upon us the great 
 mass of failure, insignificance, and mischief which forms so 
 large a part of visible nature, and demands an interpretation.
 
 296 METAPHYSICS 
 
 And here all human wisdom is at an end. The problem of 
 evil to which these questions belong admits of no speculative 
 solution at present. "We cannot give up our affirmation of 
 purpose, but we must admit that the purposes of the sys- 
 tem are mostly inscrutable. Yet, still, we hold that neither 
 the existence nor the circumstances of the cosmos are in 
 any respect ontological necessities, but, both in extent and 
 duration and character, it is what the plan of the creator 
 calls for. Whether uniform or variable, stationary or pro- 
 gressive, depends on something deeper than itself. It is 
 possible that the elementary forms of action are fixed ; and 
 it is equally possible that these also undergo variation. The 
 necessary uniformity of natural law is a postulate for which 
 we have not the slightest rational warrant. Experience is 
 the only source from which we learn what the laws of nat- 
 ure are, and from which we learn that they are even rela- 
 tively fixed. To what extent they are relative to ourselves, 
 our circumstances, our terrestrial life, is beyond us. 
 
 Of course speculators of the dogmatic type will take um- 
 brage at this conclusion ; and they will complain that sci- 
 ence is not provided with a secure basis, and that honor 
 enough is not done to the majestic conception of nature, the 
 mother of us all, natura naturans, ordo ordinans, etc. But 
 as to science, we must remember the relativity and incom- 
 pleteness of actual science. If it will hold for "a reason- 
 able degree of extension to adjacent cases,* it will do all we 
 can ask of it. As to absolute science, the will and purpose 
 of the supreme reason will seem the best foundation we can 
 get to all but those whose peculiar type and experience of 
 intelligence make a lump the only thing that is sure and 
 steadfast. And as to that nature with the big names, the 
 only way of getting it is to ignore, or be ignorant of, all 
 the results of philosophic criticism, and demonstrate its ex- 
 istence by giving us the speculator's word of honor.
 
 part Iff 
 PSYCHOLOGY
 
 CHAPTER I 
 THE SOUL 
 
 THUS far we have dealt either with the general meta- 
 physical categories or with so-called material existence. In 
 Part II especially we have treated of physical nature. We 
 have now to consider the world of mind. 
 
 As the metaphysics of nature does not involve a study of 
 details, but only of the fundamental conceptions on which 
 the doctrine of nature rests, so the metaphysics of mind 
 does not concern itself with the details of descriptive psy- 
 chology, but only with the basal ideas on which that psy- 
 chology rests. Until these are mastered, empirical psychol- 
 ogy is a mere chaos of alleged facts, partly true and partly 
 false. And the facts themselves, like the facts of physical 
 nature, depend for their interpretation on some metaphys- 
 ical conception. Accordingly, it is found that the various 
 schools of psychology, like the various schools of cosmic 
 speculation, agree as to the phenomena, but differ in their 
 metaphysics. Hence, also, harmony and advance are to be 
 secured, less by a thoughtless heaping up of observations 
 than by a study of the metaphysics of psychology. In 
 duction which is guided by no principle leads to nothing, 
 whether in psychology or elsewhere. 
 
 The central point in popular psychology is the doctrine 
 of the soul. This necessarily results from the form of our 
 mental life. In all articulate experience the self appears as 
 the abiding subject, the same yesterday and to-day. The
 
 300 METAPHYSICS 
 
 experience is owned ; and the owning self which thinks and 
 feels and wills we call the soul. The soul is equally the 
 central point in metaphysical psychology ; and the concep- 
 tion we form of it has profound significance for our doctrine 
 of thought and knowledge, and thus finally for philosophy 
 and science themselves. However abstract the question 
 may be, it has deep practical significance. 
 
 In spontaneous consciousness the mental subject is given 
 as active and abiding ; and the race has constructed various 
 names for it, as mind, soul, spirit, and their equivalents, to 
 indicate its reality. The structure of all thought and lan- 
 guage concerning the inner life also implies it. This gen- 
 eral conviction of the race we believe to be correct. Never- 
 theless it is disputed on various grounds ; and the soul is 
 declared by many to be only a name for a group of states 
 of consciousness, more or less complex, which are produced 
 in some way or other, but which inhere in no substantial 
 or active subject. This view we proceed to discuss. 
 
 The question concerning the reality of the soul is com- 
 monly called the question of materialism or spiritualism ; 
 but these terms are hardly exact without some further de- 
 termination. The true question is whether the soul be a 
 proper agent acting out of itself, or whether it is only a 
 name for a set of states of consciousness produced and 
 brought together from without, by physical organization or 
 otherwise. The view which maintains the former position 
 we call spiritualism. 
 
 For the other view there is no single satisfactory name. 
 Materialism is the term most commonly used, but it is of- 
 ten repudiated with warmth, and even with indignation, 
 by those to whom it is applied. In the general confusion 
 which infests the metaphysics of physics, materialism itself 
 has become ambiguous. It may imply the crude theory of 
 matter held by uncritical common-sense, and it may imply
 
 THE SOUL 301 
 
 merely the unreality of mind. Clearly one might be a ma- 
 terialist in the latter sense without being such in the former. 
 One might repudiate altogether the crude lump notion of 
 matter, regarding it as something subtle, mystic, wonder- 
 ful, and at the same time he might hold that the mind is 
 only the unsubstantial product of organization. This is the 
 source of those indignant denials of materialism which com- 
 mon-sense finds so bewildering on the part of many specu- 
 lators of the evolution type. Materialism may be defined 
 by its doctrine of matter or by its doctrine of mind. Com- 
 mon-sense defines it by its doctrine of mind ; and whenever 
 it finds any one affirming the inactivity and unsubstantial- 
 ity of mind, it calls him a materialist. For common-sense 
 every system which reduces mind to a sum of mental states 
 and then views these states as the result of organization is 
 materialistic, no matter what it may call .itself, or what its 
 metaphysics may be. It may be nihilism, idealism, panthe- 
 ism, or agnosticism in its doctrine of existence, and be ma- 
 terialism in its doctrine of mind. Historically these appar- 
 ent contradictions have often been yoked together in one 
 system. 
 
 Materialism 
 
 The denial of the substantial reality of the soul finds its 
 popular expression in traditional materialism. On this view 
 the soul is substantially nothing. The various states of con- 
 sciousness exhaust the fact, and these are produced by the 
 physical organism. The organism in turn is only a special 
 material aggregate. A complete knowledge of its factors 
 would enable us to understand its mental as well as its 
 physical manifestations. 
 
 If we should appeal to the results of our previous study 
 we might regard the debate as already decided against ma- 
 terialism. We have found that matter is only a substanti-
 
 302 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ated phenomenon, and can lay no claim to a properly sub 
 stantive existence. Only spirit fills out the notion of being ; 
 and the only being of which we have any proper experience 
 is ourselves. But inasmuch as we have returned again and 
 again to the stand-point of spontaneous thought, we do so 
 once more and open the discussion on the assumed reality 
 of matter and on the basis of popular metaphysics. In this 
 way we shall better understand the superficiality of the 
 doctrine. Later on we shall consider the deeper metaphys- 
 ical difficulties in the light of a profounder metaphysics. 
 
 The positive argument for materialism is undecisive. It 
 consists entirely in appealing to the familiar fact that the 
 condition and development of the organism have important 
 bearings on the mental life. But this fact would result on 
 any theory. If, as every one admits, the mind is now or- 
 ganically conditioned, it is plain that the health and per- 
 fection of the organism must have a profound significance 
 for the conscious life. But there is no need to dwell upon 
 truths so nearly self-evident. It will always be a highly im- 
 portant duty of the physician to study the mental signif- 
 icance of pathological physical states; but only extreme 
 superficiality can expect thereby to solve the problem of 
 the soul. 
 
 The chief source of materialism of this type is ignorance 
 of both physical and mental science. The physical and the 
 mental life appear together, advance together, fail together, 
 and disappear together. Viewing these facts superficially, 
 we very naturally come to the conclusion that the physical 
 causes the mental. The conclusion is perfectly clear and 
 perfectly cogent. 
 
 But as soon as we come close to the facts both the clear- 
 ness and the cogency vanish. The first thing which strikes 
 us is the complete unlikeness of physical and mental facts. 
 Thoughts and feelings have nothing in common with mat-
 
 THE SOUL 303 
 
 ter and motion ; and no amount of reflection will serve to 
 identify them, or to deduce one from the other as its neces- 
 sary implication. But physical science deals only with mat- 
 ter and motion and moving forces, and ail its explanations 
 are in terras of these factors. The molecule and the mass 
 are only specific groupings of material elements ; and the 
 forces with which physics deals are known only as related 
 to motion. Hence a physical explanation of thought and 
 feeling must consist in a representation of them in terms 
 of material movements and groupings. Just as a given 
 number of elements grouped in a certain way is a chem- 
 ical molecule, so, if thought is to be physically explained, 
 we must be able to say that a certain number of elements 
 grouped or moving in a certain way is a thought. 
 
 In other words: all physical forces are moving forces, 
 and their effects consist in modifying the groupings and 
 movements of the elements. The new grouping or move- 
 ment is the effect. If now the production of thought is to be 
 assimilated to causation in the physical world, we must say 
 that a certain grouping of chemical elements is a thought ; 
 and it might conceivably be brought under a microscope 
 and looked at. But if thought is not such a grouping, then 
 it demonstrably lies outside of the range of physical causa- 
 tion as the term is understood in exact science. 
 
 All but the crudest materialists recognize the absurdity 
 of calling thought a movement or grouping of the physical 
 elements, and the impossibility of viewing it as a case of 
 physical causation, as generally understood. The notion 
 that matter as commonly conceived can explain life and 
 mind they declare "absurd, monstrous, and fit only for the 
 intellectual gibbet." They propose, however, to escape the 
 absurdity by a new definition of matter. Matter conceived 
 as the movable explains only motion and aggregation ; but
 
 304 METAPHYSICS 
 
 is it not possible that we have held too low a view of mat- 
 ter? Indeed, how can we tell what matter is, except by ob- 
 serving what it does? In its inorganic state it does, indeed, 
 show no signs of life and mind ; but it has other properties 
 also which appear only under certain conditions. Its chem- 
 ical affinities are not always manifest; and its building 
 energies, as in crystallization, do not always appear. Apart 
 from experience, who would have dreamed that a slender 
 wire could take up human speech and deliver it miles away, 
 or that water contains such mystic building powers as it 
 shows on the frosted pane ? Again, all matter has relation 
 to magnetism and electricity ; and yet these qualities but 
 seldom reveal themselves. Why may we not say that men- 
 tal properties also are hidden in the mysterious nature of 
 matter, and manifest themselves upon occasion? They 
 would not, indeed, be deduced from the other properties of 
 matter; but they would, nevertheless, belong to the same 
 subject as the physical qualities. All definitions of matter 
 which exclude life and mind are inadequate, if not untrue, 
 we are told ; but what warrants us in excluding them ? 
 "What matter as the movable cannot do, matter as the 
 mystic may well accomplish. Why not ? 
 
 This is the higher materialism. It views materiality and 
 mentality as opposite sides of the same substance. It even 
 regards itself as the higher unity which transcends and 
 reconciles both materialism and spiritualism. Vulgar ma- 
 terialism, on the other hand, it stigmatizes as the material- 
 ism of the savage. Monism is the name which this view 
 especially affects at present. 
 
 This monism is the crude product of crude reflection, and 
 represents some of the most extraordinary antics in the 
 history of speculation. Genuine speculative principles are 
 latent in it, but, not being mastered, they lead only to con- 
 fusion. In this respect they are like the religious principles
 
 THE SOUL 305 
 
 latent in fetichisra or totemism ; they fail to lift the prod- 
 uct into rationality, and leave it on the plane of supersti- 
 tion. We must seek to help the doctrine to self-conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 It is difficult to give this view a form sufficiently defin- 
 ite for criticism. Its root in sense metaphysics is manifest. 
 Existence in space is tacitly assumed to be the only real ex- 
 istence, and, of course, all phenomena must find their source 
 in it. "When, then, vital or mental manifestations are dis- 
 covered, there is nothing to do but to refer them to matter, 
 and to enlarge the notion of matter so as to meet the new 
 demand. The ontology of sense thinking hardly admits of 
 any other conclusion. 
 
 There is no need to criticise this ontology, as we have 
 long since set it aside. But it is worth while to study the 
 curious logic of the view in question. There is an air of 
 profundity and cogency in the reasoning which disappears 
 on examination. Thus, when it is proposed to define mat- 
 ter as the mysterious cause of all phenomena, both of the 
 outer and of the inner world, it is plain that we get only a 
 phrase for our pains. The cause being mysterious, its nat- 
 ure remains a problem. The cause of mind is matter by 
 definition, but what matter? Matter as the sufficient ex- 
 planation of physics? Not at all. Such a conception is 
 "absurd, monstrous, and fit only for the intellectual gib- 
 bet." It is that matter of which we read, "If life and 
 thought be the very flower of both [matter and force], any 
 definition which omits life and thought must be inadequate, 
 if not untrue." Such matter might well explain mind, being 
 already mind itself. 
 
 Of course this matter is not the phenomenal bodies about 
 us, as trees and stones and clods in general. Such things 
 would never be offered in explanation of thought, or as hav- 
 ing a thought side. The matter in question is not phenom- 
 20
 
 306 METAPHYSICS 
 
 enal, but ontological, the dynamic matter of scientific theory 
 or of physical metaphysics. Here, if anywhere, the sub- 
 jective aspect is to be found. 
 
 But is this matter one or many ? The term indeed is one, 
 but what of the thing? As the materialist is very fond of 
 physical science, and generally gives it to be understood 
 that he has the prestige and majesty of science on his side, 
 we naturally conclude that matter is to be taken in the sci- 
 entific sense. Matter then is many ; and the reality is a 
 multitude of physical elements, each of which is endowed 
 with sundry mystic or mental properties whereby, upon oc- 
 casion, they become the sufficient explanation of our mental 
 life. The real thing is the elements, and their main business 
 is to be and carry on the physical order ; but now and then, 
 especially, if not entirely, in connection with organized bod- 
 ies, they do a little in the mental line. Thus physics is as- 
 sured of its field and essential priority, and psychology be- 
 comes an unimportant appendix of the physical realm, of 
 somewhat obscure origin no doubt, yet certainly rooted in 
 the physical world. 
 
 This notion has a certain plausibility for superficial re- 
 flection. To be sure it does not really deduce the mental 
 from the physical, for both aspects are posited as original 
 endowments of the elements, yet a certain unit t y seems to 
 be secured by calling them endowments of the same thing 
 Unless carefully managed, also, the doctrine results in turn 
 ing the elements into little souls, in order to explain away 
 the only souls of which we know anything, namely, our 
 own. But this, too, is easily overlooked. Finally, the doc- 
 trine is the extreme of pluralism, but this is readily hidden 
 by calling it monism a device so effective that it is likely 
 long to remain in fashion. 
 
 But an unhappy dualism has emerged in the doctrine in 
 the attempt to fix the relation of the physical and the men-
 
 THE SOUL 307 
 
 tal facts. We may call the changes of position, grouping, 
 and movement, which arise in connection with thought, the 
 physical series; and the changes of thought and feeling 
 which attend the physical changes, the mental series. Some 
 persons with a gift for expression have called them respec- 
 tively neurosis and psychosis. How does this doctrine con- 
 ceive their relation ? Several conceptions are possible. 
 
 First, the two series may be conceived as mutually inde- 
 pendent. They both depend indeed upon a common subject, 
 but within the unity of that subject each series goes along 
 by itself. In that case the mental series would be self-con- 
 tained and independent, so far as the physical series is con- 
 cerned. Nothing that happens in the latter would be the 
 ground for anything in the former; and there would be no 
 reason for affirming a real physical series. Psychosis does 
 not amount to much in reality, but it is important in the 
 theory of knowledge; and neurosis must be careful in deal- 
 ing with it, or it may cancel itself. 
 
 But the materialist is sound on neurosis. The physical 
 series is the independent and universal fact; and psychosis 
 must accommodate itself thereto. Out of this necessity 
 arises a second view and also a second difficulty. The phys- 
 ical series is subject only to the laws of force and motion. 
 If now we aim to make the physical series self-contained 
 and independent, we must deny that physical energy ever 
 becomes anything else. For if physical energy is really 
 spent in producing thought as thought, the continuity of 
 the physical series would be broken, and energy would dis- 
 appear from the physical into the mental realm. In that 
 case, either energy would be lost, or thoughts would be as 
 real and as active as things. The latter view cannot com- 
 mend itself to us as materialists, and hence we are shut up 
 to the view that the physical series is self-contained and 
 independent. It suffers no loss and no irruption. Both
 
 308 -METAPHYSICS 
 
 energy and continuity are absolutely conserved. Each phys- 
 ical antecedent is entirely exhausted in its physical con- 
 sequent ; and conversely each physical consequent is fully 
 explained by its physical antecedent. In the strictest sense, 
 the physical series goes along by itself, and subject only to 
 the laws of force and motion. But in such a view, thought 
 as such cannot be an effect of the physical series ; for under 
 the law of conservation there can be no effect which does 
 not in turn become a cause. If energy is expended, it pro- 
 duces some other form of energy either kinetic or potential, 
 and this new form possesses all the causal efficiency of the 
 'old. Hence, as the physical series is assumed to be contin- 
 uous, and thought is powerless, thought is shut out from the 
 series of cause and effect. We must, then, hold that phys- 
 ical energy is never spent in producing thought as thought, 
 but only in producing those physical states which have 
 thoughts for their inner face. These thoughts, again, as 
 thoughts, are powerless. They affect the physical series not 
 as thoughts, but as having physical states for their outer 
 face. The thought -series as such is not the effect of the 
 physical series, but simply its attendant. When the phys- 
 ical series is of a certain kind and intensity, it has a subjec- 
 tive side ; but the reality, the energy, the ground of move- 
 ment are entirely in the physical series, and this goes along 
 by itself. No study of this series as such would reveal the 
 thought-series which accompanies it. 
 
 The view thus presented is the current one among mate- 
 rialists. From fixing their thoughts exclusively on the phys- 
 ical series, and from their desire to avail themselves of the 
 doctrines of physics, they have been led to deny all energy 
 to thought as such, and to affirm the continuity and inde- 
 pendence of the physical series. Sometimes they will not 
 even allow thought to be a phenomenon of matter, but de- 
 grade it to an "epiphenomenon." This of course saves the
 
 THE SOUL 309 
 
 physical continuity, but at the expense of another order of 
 difficulty. Thought is reduced to a powerless attendant on 
 some phases of the physical series, or to a subjective aspect 
 of certain physical activities. But there is no assignable 
 ground for this subjective attendant in general, and of course 
 there is no ground why it should attend as and when it 
 does. If we could look into a brain, we should see on this 
 theory a great variety of molecules in various kinds of 
 movement. We might see right- or left-hand spiral move- 
 ments, or circular, or elliptical, or oscillatory movements. 
 Some of these movements would be attended by thoughts 
 and some not. But what is the ground of difference ? As- 
 sume that an elliptical movement of definite velocity is 
 attended by thought, while an oscillatory movement is not 
 so attended, there is still no reason why either movement 
 should be attended by thought, and also none why one 
 should be thus attended rather than the other. Both the 
 elliptical and the oscillatory movements confine themselves 
 strictly to being what they are ; and neither by hypothesis 
 loses anything which passes into the thought-realm. If we 
 might say that an elliptical movement is a thought, we might 
 get along ; but this view has been turned over to the savage. 
 But since the elliptical movement confines itself to moving, 
 and loses nothing for purposes of thinking, the thought- 
 series appears as a gratuitous and magical addition to the 
 thing-series. There is no reason why it should appear at 
 all, and none why it should appear where and when it does. 
 The most profound reflection upon molecular groups and 
 movements reveals no reason why any should be accom- 
 panied by an incommensurable attendant, thought, or why 
 one rather than another should be thus attended. If there 
 were a mental subject in interaction with the physical series, 
 it is easy to conceive that different states of that series might 
 be attended by different mental states ; but when this is not
 
 310 METAPHYSICS 
 
 the case, the connection is one of pure magic. The epiphe- 
 noraena, being nothing, may need no explanation ; but if 
 they should need an explanation, there is nothing in the 
 physical series to account for them. 
 
 Magic, however, is an evil word, and we must seek to es- 
 cape it. We recur, then, to the doctrine that matter has a 
 mental as well as a physical side, and that the former is as 
 original as the latter. But in order to explain the form and 
 peculiar character of any specific mental manifestation, we 
 must further allow that the mental side is in interaction 
 with the physical side. Without this admission, thought 
 might appear at one place as well as at another, and in one 
 form as well as in any other. The opposite faces in no way 
 remove the necessity and complexity of this interaction. 
 Thought in general is only a class-term ; the reality is al- 
 ways specific thoughts about specific things ; and in order 
 that these thoughts shall appear as, and where, and when 
 they do, it is necessary that the inner series and the outer 
 series shall be in mutual determination. But this necessi- 
 tates the further admission that the mental series is as real 
 a form of energy as the physical series ; and this raises the 
 question whether matter as moving or matter as thinking 
 and willing be the ultimate fact. 
 
 We are not at present seeking to disprove materialism, 
 but only to understand it ; and the task is no easy one. 
 Into this discussion of the relation of the two series an am- 
 biguity and an unreal simplification have already crept. By 
 the mental series we may mean the thoughts and feelings 
 
 / o o 
 
 which we call ours, or we may mean the mystical endow- 
 ments, the subjective aspects, of the elements themselves. 
 For the sake of clearness these meanings must be kept dis- 
 tinct. But this complicates the matter most unpleasantly. 
 We have now three factors, the physical order, the sub- 
 jective aspects of the elements, and our own thoughts
 
 THE SOUL 
 
 and feelings; and we have to determine their mutual rela- 
 tions. 
 
 When the materialist is pressed with these difficulties he 
 is apt to solve the problem by saying that the mental series 
 is an aspect, or phenomenon, or epiphenomenon of the ph} r s- 
 ical series. Here the mental series means our thoughts 
 and feelings; and phenomenon is the word which removes 
 all difficulties. Unfortunately, it is the most treacherous 
 ally the materialist can have ; for where there is no subject 
 there are no '"aspects" and no "phenomena." Suppose n 
 atoms turn in a left-hand spiral, and love is an aspect of this 
 fact. But for whom? For the atoms? If so, for all, or 
 for each, or for only one ? If not for the atoms, for what 
 or for whom ? For the motion itself perhaps ! A phenom- 
 enon as such cannot exist apart from consciousness. Hence 
 a doctrine which would make thought phenomenal tacitly 
 assumes the very mental subject it aims to deny. 
 
 The same is true for a still more thoughtless doctrine 
 sometimes put forward, according to which the two series 
 are identical. They are the same thing viewed in different 
 ways. So far as this is intelligible it is absurd. The thing 
 series is a set of moving elements ; the thought series is a 
 group of mental states. That one should cause the other 
 is an intelligible proposition, however false ; that one is the 
 other is meaningless. Besides, the two ways of looking 
 which make the one double imply a mind outside of the 
 machine to make the notion possible. 
 
 We next need light on two other points of about equal 
 difficulty, the relation of the physical aspect to the mental 
 aspect of the elements themselves, and the relation of that 
 mental aspect to our thoughts and feelings. 
 
 The first point remains in profound obscurity. The ma- 
 terialist seldom troubles himself about matters so occult. 
 He knows that the inner aspect is there, and we know it
 
 312 METAPHYSICS 
 
 because he tells us. It does not seem to be a source of phys- 
 ical change, for that is provided for by the laws of force 
 and motion ; and we could not allow it to be such a source 
 without seriously affronting the law of physical continuity. 
 And, on the other hand, if we allow no dynamic relation 
 between the inner and the outer we are quite at a loss to 
 see, first, how the inner gets any hint how and when to 
 manifest itself; and, secondly, how it can manifest itself in 
 any case, seeing that the physical order is closed against it. 
 
 The second question, the relation of the inner aspect to 
 our thought, is at once more intelligible and more difficult. 
 Here we come upon the unreal simplification mentioned a 
 page or so back. We speak of the aspect as one, whereas 
 it is many. The elements being many, so are the aspects. 
 Now what are these aspects ? Are they thoughts and feel- 
 ings? If so the elements are souls; and we are in the 
 extraordinary position of starting out to find a physical 
 explanation of our mental life, and coming back with a set 
 of hypothetical souls with which to explain away the only 
 soul we know anything about. If the aspects are not 
 thoughts and feelings, what light do they throw upon our 
 conscious life ? There is no longer any thought in the case, 
 but only words. 
 
 But allowing the aspects to be true thoughts and feelings, 
 what is their relation to our thoughts and feelings ? Are 
 they a kind of raw material out of which our thoughts are 
 made ? Such a notion could be entertained only by an un- 
 tutored imagination. Is there any way whereby these as- 
 pects may leave their respective subjects and congregate in" 
 the void to form a compound mental state which passes for 
 me? Such a notion is as bad as the former. As well might 
 a series of motions break loose from moving things and 
 compound themselves in the void to form a new motion 
 which should be the motion of nothing. These mental as-
 
 THE SOUL 313 
 
 pects, supposing them to be there, are absolutely useless in 
 explaining our thoughts and feelings. They help the imag- 
 ination by making possible crude fancies about " mind-stuff." 
 They help the uncritical mind which has not learned the 
 distinction between formal logical manipulation and real, 
 concrete thinking. The)' make a show of satisfying the 
 demand for unity and continuity in the system, but it is a 
 false show. These notions are barely intelligible at their 
 best, and when taken in earnest they soon appear in their 
 utter worthlessness. 
 
 When matter is many the simple analysis of materialism 
 reveals its hopeless confusion. As long as we treat the 
 problem in a vague and superficial way, there is a kind of 
 plausibility to it, but as soon as we understand the problem, 
 materialism is with difficult} 7 saved from perishing of its 
 own absurdity without any further argument. Like the 
 swine of the parable, it seems possessed to rush down steep 
 places of nonsense into abysses of fatuity. But possibly 
 we shall do better if we regard matter as one. 
 
 There is just vagueness enough in popular scientific 
 thought to make this notion acceptable. The frequent 
 use of such terms as monism, popular misunderstandings of 
 the doctrine of energy, its conservation and transformation, 
 and the growing tendency to regard the elements them- 
 selves as only functions of an energy beyond them, lend 
 favor to the view. Let us say, then, that matter is one ; is 
 materialism any more tenable? Or, since monism is the 
 name preferred by the holders of the new view, is monism 
 any more successful than materialism in accounting for our 
 mental life ?
 
 314 METAPHYSICS 
 
 Monism 
 
 In this view we have one substance or energy with two 
 aspects, an objective and a subjective one, or a pln'sical and 
 a mental one. In Spinoza's system, which was the earliest 
 specimen of monism of this type, the one substance had two 
 attributes ; in modern systems it is more common to speak 
 of two aspects, or faces, or modes of manifestation. Two 
 points must be considered, the metaphysics of the view and 
 its bearing on the question of the soul. 
 
 The first point is very obscure in the theory. Are the 
 two faces of the one only aspects, or properly objective 
 attributes? Spinoza himself was not certain. Commonly 
 they were objective attributes, but at times even he regard- 
 ed them as points of view, or ways of regarding the one 
 substance that is, as phenomena. The modern monist com- 
 monly views them as phenomena. 
 
 Supposing them mutually independent attributes, several 
 questions arise. First, what becomes of the unity of the 
 substance? Secondly, how is the parallelism of thought 
 and thing which knowledge presupposes secured ? Thirdly, 
 seeing that knowledge is a mode of thinking and falls with- 
 in the thought attribute, how can we admit a thing attri- 
 bute at all, except as a phenomenon or mode of thought ? 
 
 But supposing the faces to be only phenomenal, then the 
 question arises, whence the thought which is the condition 
 of all phenomena, and without which there could be no 
 faces, or aspects, or unity of any sort ? If it is our thought 
 which sees the one as double and gives it its attributes, then 
 that thought turns out to be the precondition of the monis- 
 tic system itself. If it is not our thought, it is nevertheless 
 thought ; and then our system involves the one substance 
 with the two aspects of thought and extension, and back of
 
 THE SOUL 315 
 
 these another order of thought as the condition of the as- 
 pects and their bond of union. Without this deus ex machina 
 the system is contradictory ; and with it the system is ab- 
 surd. 
 
 Again, the two attributes, whatever they may be, cannot 
 be conceived as passive qualities like extension, but rather 
 as forms of activity. Thought exists only in and through 
 thinking, and the physical world exists only through the 
 constant forthgoing of energy. In that case we have one 
 agent energizing in two entirely incommensurable forms, 
 and apparently in such a way that the left hand knoweth 
 not what the right hand doeth. Thought counts for noth- 
 ing in the physical ongoing; and the physical ongoing has 
 no significance for thought. There is not even a strained 
 relation between them ; and yet knowledge is made possi- 
 ble by hypothesis. 
 
 That the metaphysics of this monism is pretty crude is 
 evident. A monism of some kind we must have, but mon- 
 isms of this sort are such only in name. Active intelligence 
 is the supreme condition of any real monism ; and when we 
 seek it elsewhere and look for thought among the objects 
 of thought, we are sure to fall into such vagaries and cru- 
 dities as those we have been considering. 
 
 But supposing the metaphysics possible, does this view 
 help us to dispense with a real self in understanding the 
 mental life ? That it does not soon appears. Allowing all 
 these queer things about aspects and faces, our thought is 
 not explained. If we conceive the inner aspect of the one 
 substance to be other or less than thought, no thought is 
 explained. If we conceive it to be thought or thoughts, 
 our thoughts are not explained. If the one substance has 
 thoughts and feelings they belong to it and not to us ; and 
 they contain any account of our thoughts only for those 
 unhappy beings who believe in mind -stuff, or who fancy
 
 316 METAPHYSICS 
 
 that thought may be cut up and parcelled out, or that 
 thought is a material phenomenon which might conceivably 
 be seen, or which can exist in any other way than in and 
 through the act of the thinker. For all others it is plain 
 that this view begins, continues, and ends in hopeless super- 
 ficiality and confusion. 
 
 Thus far we have foeen mainly trying to understand the 
 metaphysics of materialism, and we find it shaky enough. 
 Our only interest in it is pathological. It is an instructive 
 illustration of the implicit working of speculative principles 
 in minds which have not risen above the sense plane. The 
 sense categories warp the higher principles to themselves, 
 producing the most fantastic results ; and meanwhile there 
 is not sufficient critical insight to detect the illusory nature 
 of the performance. With our conviction of the phenomenal- 
 ity of matter and of all impersonal existence, and with the 
 further conviction that active intelligence is the only reality, 
 whether in the inner or in the outer world, materialistic 
 metaphysics from beginning to end is simply illusion and 
 error. 
 
 But materialism is weaker in its psychology and episte- 
 mology than in its metaphysics. To this point a word must 
 be devoted. 
 
 Materialism has generally adopted the psychology and 
 epistemology of empiricism. To be sure, the two doctrines 
 are mutually destructive, but uncritical eyes are easily hold- 
 en. In this view particular sensitive states are produced in 
 or by the nerves, and out of these the higher contents of 
 consciousness are built by repetition and association, aided 
 and abetted by heredity. 
 
 In opposition to this view we recall the conclusions reach- 
 ed in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge. We saw that 
 thought is impossible except through a unitary, abiding and
 
 THE SOUL 317 
 
 active self, that this self has never been other than verbally 
 denied, and that when denied it is always forthwith reaf- 
 firmed in some figure of speech, or assumed in the language 
 employed. The very nature of thought and language makes 
 it impossible to maintain the denial without self-contradic- 
 tion. Metaphysics further has shown that the bdf is the 
 only reality of which we have any knowledge, and the only 
 thing which fills out the notion of reality in distinction 
 from phenomena. 
 
 As to the epistemology of materialism, it can hardly be 
 said to have any. It takes knowledge for granted and as a 
 matter of course. That knowledge is a problem, and that 
 not every speculative theory is compatible with knowledge, 
 are facts undreamed of. Nevertheless, while materialists 
 may have no theory of knowledge, materialism has a bear- 
 ing on knowledge. Its logical outcome is to make all 
 knowledge impossible. As a system of necessity it breaks 
 down on the problem of error, and reason collapses in hope- 
 less scepticism. 
 
 For the practised reader this point needs no further illus- 
 tration, but for the sake of the beginner we may be par- 
 doned for some repetition of matter which ought to be 
 familiar. 
 
 We have previously pointed out that the materialistic 
 doctrine of the relation of the thought-series to the physical 
 series is essentially unclear. The materialist cannot allow 
 the mental series to be independent of the physical series ; 
 for this would be to abandon his monism and surrender his 
 own theory. No more can he allow the mind to be a real 
 and active something; for this also is contran 7 to the hy- 
 pothesis. In some way the mental series must be made 
 to depend on the physical series; and this can be done 
 only by teaching the materiality of thought, or by mak- 
 ing thought a powerless attendant upon the physical series.
 
 318 METAPHYSICS 
 
 The latter course is the one generally adopted. The phys- 
 ical series is viewed as going on by itself, and as subject 
 only to the laws of force and motion ; and the mental series 
 is simply the subjective shadow which the physical series 
 casts. As such it contributes nothing and subtracts noth- 
 ing. A shadow effects nothing; and, in turn, no energy is 
 expended in making it. The physical series is not affected 
 from without, and nothing is drawn off from it to make 
 thoughts and feelings. Hence, the presence and movement 
 of the mental series are determined by the physical series, 
 just as the presence, form, and movement of a shadow are 
 determined by the body which casts it. The existence of 
 any thought or feeling is due to the general form of nervous 
 action. The existence of this or that particular thought or 
 feeling is due to specific peculiarities of nervous action with- 
 in the limits prescribed by the general form. 
 
 The powerlessness of the mental series has been sharply 
 stated by Professor Huxley in his lecture " On the Hypoth- 
 esis that Animals are Automata," where he says that he 
 knows of no reason for believing that any mental state can 
 affect any physical state, and adds, " It follows that, to take 
 an extreme illustration, the feeling we call volition is not 
 the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state 
 of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act." The 
 general view has been wrought out at great length by Mr. 
 Spencer in his " Principles of Psychology," where, along 
 with many bewildering remarks about opposite faces of the 
 unknowable, he represents the mental face as completely 
 determined by the physical face, so that memory, reflec- 
 tion, reasoning, and consciousness in general are only the 
 subjective shadows of molecular changes in the brain, or of 
 what he calls nascent motor excitations. Mental movement 
 of every sort is due, not to any self-determination of reason, 
 but to the nervous mechanism ; and this, in turn, is subject
 
 THE SOUL 319 
 
 only to the laws of molecular mechanics. The coexistence 
 of ideas means the coexistence of the appropriate nervous 
 states. The comparison of ideas means the interaction 
 of these states. A conclusion, or a choice, means that 
 one nervous set has displaced another nervous set. The 
 processes of logic represent no fixed and necessary order 
 of reason, but only the subjective side of a conflict among 
 nervous states. A conclusion actually reached, or a view 
 actually held, represents no fixed truth, but only the su- 
 perior strength of the corresponding nervous combination. 
 Truth in any case is only a nervous resultant, and depends 
 upon the nerves. We now inquire into the bearing of 
 this view on knowledge. 
 
 We point out in the first place that we reach the thing- 
 series only through the thought-series. We know that there 
 are things and what they are only through thought. Hence, 
 while the thing-series may be first and fundamental in the 
 order of fact, in the order of knowledge the thought-series 
 is first. A first question, then, would be, What warrant is 
 there for affirming any thing-series? Why may not the 
 thing-series be after all only a phase of the thought-series ? 
 From Hume to Spencer, the thing-series has been defined 
 as a series of vivid states of consciousness, while the ego is 
 a series of faint states of consciousness. But, vivid or faint, 
 this definition makes both subject and object states of con- 
 sciousness; and, hence, both belong to the thought -series. 
 The ego, as a series of states of consciousness, can lead to 
 nothing beyond itself; and the object, as a series of con- 
 scious states, exists only in thought. Here is the place 
 where materialism always tumbles into nihilistic idealism 
 whenever it attempts to reason out a theory of perception. 
 It is well known that Spencer, at this point, when his theory 
 was about to collapse into nihilism, saved himself by rein- 
 stating the ego as a true agent. In his argument with the
 
 320 METAPHYSICS 
 
 idealist the ego acquires a new character. It is no longer 
 a series of faint impressions, or the inner side of nerve- 
 motions, but a true source of energy ; and the warrant for 
 affirming a thing -series, apart from the thought -series, is 
 found in the fact that our energy is resisted by an energy 
 not our own. This is excellent doctrine, but it does not 
 agree with the other doctrine, that the ego is only the sum 
 of mental states, and that mental states affect no physical 
 states; for it makes our own consciousness of effort and 
 energy the turning-point of the entire debate between the 
 nihilist and the realist. It saves realism by surrendering 
 materialism ; and nihilism can be escaped in no other way. 
 We pass to another point. All arguments for the suffi- 
 ciency of matter assume a valid knowledge of matter. That 
 X is adequate or inadequate is a proposition which admits 
 of no discussion. It is, then, a matter of interest to know 
 what warrant there is for affirming that the thought-series 
 rightly represents the thing-series. The general fact that 
 the latter determines the former in no way implies that the 
 latter must determine the former so as to correspond with 
 itself. If an organism be able to generate thoughts, it by 
 no means follows that the thoughts must represent external 
 reality. The thoughts might be as subjective as the fancies 
 produced in dreams. One would expect that the thoughts 
 would represent, if anything, the organic processes of which 
 they are said to be the inner face ; whereas they never refer 
 to these, and commonly refer to things entirely apart from 
 the organism. Nervous combinations and movements are 
 said to have ideas for their mental face; and the natural 
 thought would be that those ideas would be ideas of their 
 peculiar nervous correlates. But this is never the case ; in- 
 deed, that there are such correlates is even now a matter 
 of not very cogent inference. This complete silence of the 
 organism as to what is going on in itself, and the report in-
 
 THE SOUL 321 
 
 stead of what is taking place in the outer world, are very 
 remarkable facts. Certainly, when matter is declared to be 
 a double-faced entity we should expect to find the mental 
 face reflecting that part of the physical face which attends 
 it, or which is next to it ; but the mental face never reflects 
 the physical series which produces it, but some other and 
 unconnected series. Thus a set of rays of light fall upon 
 the body and a thought results, but not a thought of the 
 nerve -processes, or molecular motions which produce the 
 thought, but a thought of some external luminous object. 
 It is strange, indeed, that anything should result, but that 
 the thought should be a reproduction of the object is sur- 
 prising in a far higher degree. The wonder is still greater 
 in our perception of others' thoughts. Here some waves of 
 air fall upon the ear, and at once the nerves produce thoughts 
 with the added assurance that they are the reproduction of 
 a thought-series which exists apart from our own. 
 
 We can now understand the problem. If knowledge is 
 to be possible, the mental series must rightly represent the 
 physical series and all other mental series ; but what ground 
 is there for affirming that they must correspond ? And for 
 the materialist there is no answer except in some debased 
 form of the pre-established harmony. He must assume not 
 only that matter in general is capable of generating thoughts, 
 but that it is shut up by its nature to the generation of 
 thoughts which correspond to the outward fact. He must 
 even assume that bodies are so related to the universe as 
 to be under obligation to generate correct thoughts about 
 things in general. Leibnitz found some reason for the har- 
 mony in the fact of its pre-establishment ; but the material- 
 ist has simply to assert it as an opaque fact, 
 
 Still the problem has not been entirely unnoticed. Nota- 
 bly Mr. Spencer has sought to account for the harmony in 
 question by a theory framed from natural selection and 
 
 21
 
 322 METAPHYSICS 
 
 heredity. According to this view, there is no original need 
 that matter should think rightly ; but if any organism should 
 think wrongly, it would soon collide with reality and perish. 
 Eight thinking, therefore, is necessary to continued exist- 
 ence. Natural selection must tend to pick out the sound 
 thinkers from the unsound ; and by heredity their tenden- 
 cies will be integrated and transmitted. The final result 
 will be that thought will at last be adjusted to things, yet 
 without any reference to an opaque and uncaused harmony. 
 The ingenuity of this view is wonderful ; still more so is 
 the uncritical faith which can receive it. For since thought 
 has no effect on physical processes, it is hard to see what 
 effect for good or evil thought can have. The survival of 
 the organism is a purely physical matter, with which, by 
 hypothesis, thought has nothing to do. There seems to be 
 here a trace of the antiquated notion of self-control, accord- 
 ing to which our knowledge determines our course. In a 
 system of freedom the theory would have application ; but 
 when thought is only the powerless shadow of reality, its 
 misadjustment is insignificant. In this theory, the destruc- 
 tion of the organism is not due to a maladjustment of 
 thought, but to a maladjustment of the organism. The 
 organisms which perish are not those which think wrongly, 
 but those which cannot maintain their equilibrium with the 
 environment. But there is nothing in this which implies 
 that those organisms which are in equilibrium with the en- 
 vironment must produce true thoughts of the environment. 
 The crystal maintains itself against its surroundings by vir- 
 tue of its physical structure ; but it does not follow that if 
 a crystal should have thoughts they must reflect the sur- 
 roundings. But why should the same equilibrium imply 
 more in the organism? "Why must organisms which can 
 physically maintain themselves think rightly about their 
 surroundings? This they must do if knowledge is to have
 
 THE SOUL 323 
 
 any validity ; but it is hard to find any reason for it. "We 
 are forced either to abandon knowledge or else to fall back 
 again on a grotesque harmony between organisms and their 
 surroundings, such that when they take to thinking they 
 can but reflect their environment. But this is Leibnitz's 
 theory of pre-established harmony in its most debased form. 
 Leibnitz was not content to affirm the harmony between 
 mind and its objects ; he explained it by its pre-establish- 
 ment. Materialism degrades it to a physical significance 
 and leaves it unaccountable. 
 
 Again, it is very remarkable that the narrow range of the 
 Spencerian principle should have been overlooked. If it 
 were true, it would provide for valid thoughts only as they 
 are related to survival ; whereas the bulk of our thoughts 
 have no bearing on survival. A mistake in our theory of 
 double stars or in solar physics would not be attended with 
 any physical disaster. The true theory and the false theory 
 are equally without significance for survival. And since 
 this is the case with the mass of our alleged knowledge, the 
 action of natural selection can never come into play to sep- 
 arate the true from the false. What warrant, then, have 
 we for trusting the report of thought on these things ? The 
 uninitiated may be tempted to think that we reach these 
 things by reasoning ; but on this theory, reasoning itself is 
 only a function of the nerves. It is but the subjective side 
 of the nervous mechanism ; and there is no assignable rea- 
 son why the nerves should reason more accurately than they 
 perceive. If reasoning were an independent mental activity, 
 self-poised and self- verif} 7 ing, the case would be different; 
 but the mind is only the sum of mental phenomena; and 
 these phenomena are called up and shifted by the nervous 
 mechanism. Once more, then, what warrant is there for 
 trusting our nerves? That they should produce thoughts 
 about everything is very remarkable; but that these thoughts
 
 324 METAPHYSICS 
 
 should represent the reality is in the highest degree sur- 
 prising. The mental series, which originally was the sub- 
 jective face of sundry nervous movements, turns out to be 
 the inner face of all physical series or movements, with the 
 one amazing exception of the physical series on which it 
 depends. To retain our trust in knowledge, we must make 
 once more the assumption of a pre-established harmony in 
 its worst form. Who would have expected to find the 
 ghost of LeibnitZj in a somewhat degraded state, lurking 
 among the ponderous phrases of the Spencerian philosophy. 
 "We see, then, that natural selection, as a principle of 
 belief, does not escape the admission of an uncaused har- 
 mony between the body and the environment. We next 
 point out a peculiar difficulty which arises from this princi- 
 ple, if we allow it to be valid. It follows directly from it 
 that no belief can become wide-spread which is contrary to 
 reality ; for maladjusted beliefs must lead to collision with 
 the nature of things and consequent destruction. It further 
 follows that every widespread and enduring belief must 
 correspond to the nature of things. Certainly those beliefs 
 which originated in the earliest times, and which have main- 
 tained themselves ever since, must be viewed as having far 
 higher probability than the late opinions of a sect. The 
 great catholic convictions of the race represent the sifting 
 action of the universe from the beginning. The} 7 are, there- 
 fore, the only ones which, on the theory, can lay the slight- 
 est claim to our acceptance. It is, then, in the highest de- 
 gree inconsistent when the disciples of this view reject a 
 belief because it is old and reaches back to the infancy of 
 the race ; for this is the very characteristic of true beliefs. 
 A belief which has only recently appeared can hardly lay 
 any claim to be considered at all. What, then, shall we do 
 with such beliefs as the belief in God, freedom, the spiritu- 
 ality and immortality of the soul, and the existence of a
 
 THE SOUL 325 
 
 moral government in the universe ? Of course, as materi- 
 alists, we cannot accept them; but how can we as mate- 
 rialists reject them? The same brain which has ground 
 out the truths of materialism has also ground out these 
 other notions. That they are not fatally maladjusted to 
 the nature of things is proved by their continued exist- 
 ence ; and, by hypothesis, they are products of that natural 
 selection whose especial business it is to sift the true from 
 the false. There is nothing to do but to attempt a distinc- 
 tion between maladjusted thoughts which lead to destruc- 
 tion and others which do not. Our thoughts of God and 
 supersensible things are of the nature of dreams. They lie 
 outside of any possible physical experience, and hence they 
 cannot collide with reality any more than could a ghost. 
 Unfortunately, it is not easy to draw this line so as to con- 
 serve those physical truths which lie outside of any possible 
 experience, and at the same time put religious and other ob- 
 noxious ideas to flight. It is a very grave circumstance 
 that matter should be so given to dream and error. Of 
 course, the uninitiated will think that reasoning will serve 
 our purpose; but reasoning itself is a part of the nerve- 
 process. 
 
 Throughout the past, natural selection has favored anti- 
 materialistic views; in the future the same process must 
 eliminate materialism. It is plain that those beliefs which 
 make most of the person and which give one most energy 
 and hope must in the long run have an advantage over 
 others which are relatively discouraging and depressing. 
 Hence, in the end, beliefs which tend to righteousness and 
 cheerfulness must overcome all beliefs which tend to loose- 
 ness and despair. The former will tend to conserve the 
 physical and moral health both of the person and of society, 
 and the latter will be in alliance with destruction. If it 
 be said that we here forget our previous assumption that a
 
 326 METAPHYSICS 
 
 mental state cannot affect a physical state, we reply that 
 that assumption is not our own, but the theorist's. We do 
 not assume any responsibility for any of these views; we 
 inquire merely into their implications. And since the the- 
 orist has introduced natural selection as a determining prin- 
 ciple of belief, we inquire whither it will carry us. That 
 this principle does not agree with the other principle, that 
 the physical series goes along by itself, is not our affair. 
 And even if the uvo did agree, it would be highly unscien- 
 tific to hold that a change of opinion will have no effect on 
 action. As opinion, of course it would be powerless, but as 
 opinions are only the subjective side of nervous states, it 
 follows that a change of opinion points to a change in the 
 nervous processes, and hence it must lead to change of 
 action. Now, as a matter of fact, the belief in God, immor- 
 tality, and moral government, has a great value both for 
 personal and social well-being. It is the great source of cour- 
 age, hope, cheerfulness, and steadfastness in righteousness. 
 And, on the other hand, it is undoubted that materialism, 
 atheism, etc., are relatively depressing and demoralizing. 
 The rapid spread of pessimism among the more earnest of 
 the advanced thinkers is sufficient proof of this. Hence, 
 under the operation of natural selection, the former set of 
 beliefs will have a decided advantage over the latter, and 
 in the end they must conquer. That matter can form the 
 conception of freedom, the soul, and God we know by the 
 fact ; hence, they are plainly not repugnant to the nature 
 of matter. The direction which its future thinking must 
 take under the influence of natural selection is plain. Matter 
 must come at last to a firm faith in the soul, immortality, 
 and God. Of course, the eager objector, carried away by 
 his nerves, urges that believing them would not make them 
 true, but only cherished delusions. It is odd how hard it is 
 for one to master his own theory. By hypothesis, matter is
 
 THE SOUL 327 
 
 capable of valid thinking ; and why should we not trust it 
 when it thinks about God as well as when it thinks about 
 the world ? We do not insist that it is equally trustworthy ; 
 \ve only ask for some standard whereby one set of thoughts 
 can be ruled out, while another is retained. Of course, we 
 are beyond the point where we fancied that reason itself is 
 such a standard ; for reasoning is a part of the nerve-proc- 
 ess. It does not contain any standard of truth in itself, but 
 comes and goes according to the principles of nerve-me- 
 chanics. 
 
 As materialists, then, we are shut up to the doctrine of 
 an opaque harmony between thought and thing. But while 
 this doctrine is necessary to save knowledge from one dan- 
 ger, it exposes it to another equally great. The theory calls 
 for the most exact and consistent knowledge ; and unfortu- 
 nately we have no such knowledge. How, then, are we to 
 decide between opposing views ? The most natural assump- 
 tion would be that those views are most likely to be true 
 which matter produces most freely ; but, sadly enough, the 
 average brain is not so made as to grind out materialism 
 and atheism. Matter in its thinking has a strong tendency 
 towards theism, morality, and the spiritual conception of 
 the soul; and it has even devoted much attention in the 
 past to theology and metaphysics. Of course, these views 
 are false, but how are we to escape them ? If the human 
 mind were something which is capable of free reflection, 
 and which develops variously according to its circumstances, 
 we might account for much variation by the mental environ- 
 ment ; but, of course, this is not the case. It is indifferent 
 to a molecule where it is, and it ought to be indifferent to 
 any complex of molecules. In particular, it is hard to see 
 how the organism can be affected by its mental atmosphere. 
 Prejudice and superstition might influence minds ; but they 
 do not seem adequate to influence material movements. Be-
 
 328 METAPHYSICS 
 
 sides, if they could, they are themselves the outcome of ma- 
 terial activity. If there be prejudice, superstition, and stu- 
 pidity in the \vorld, matter is to blame for it. It is mat- 
 ter that hath made both us and our opinions, and not we 
 ourselves. If, then, there could be any distinction between 
 reason and unreason in this system, we should be forced 
 to allow that, along with a little right thinking, matter has 
 done a vast deal of wrong thinking. It has an inherent 
 tendency to irrationality and falsehood. It is the sole source 
 of theologies, superstitions, and anthropomorphisms, as well 
 as of the sun-clear truths of advanced science. If we were 
 persons with faculties which could be carelessly used or 
 wilfully misused, these things might be laid to the charge 
 of individual carelessness or stupidity or dishonesty ; but as 
 we are not such persons, all these things must be charged 
 to matter itself. This conclusion remains if we call matter 
 the unknowable, the mysterious one, or anything else which 
 may strike our fancy. In every system, of necessity we 
 have to posit in being, along with reason, a strong tendency 
 to unreason, which throws discredit on all knowledge. Ac- 
 cording to the materialist himself, for one sound opinion 
 matter has produced a myriad unsound and grotesque ones. 
 But even yet we have no ground for distinguishing the 
 rational from the irrational. In the old philosophy the dis- 
 tinction between a rational and an irrational belief is, that 
 the former rests on grounds which justify it, while the lat- 
 ter is groundless. But materialism cancels this distinction 
 entirely, and reduces all beliefs to effects in us. It recog- 
 nizes production only, and allows of no deduction. All our 
 beliefs are explained by their causes, and none have any 
 rational advantage over any other. The only distinction 
 is of relative extent ; and the only standard possible, unless 
 we yield to pure ipsedixitism, is to take a vote and view 
 rational beliefs as those which are most widespread and en-
 
 THE SOUL 329 
 
 during. But even this is impossible. In raising the ques- 
 tion how to decide between opposing beliefs we have im- 
 plicitly assumed that reasoning is possible, and that we have 
 power over our beliefs. In discussing the problem of error 
 we pointed out that rationality and the distinction between 
 truth and error are possible only in the fact of freedom. 
 Where there is no freedom, there is no reason. So far from 
 having power over our beliefs, we are our beliefs, and they 
 are determined solely by the nerves. If there were any 
 reason left, the only conclusion it could draw would be that 
 one belief is as good as another as long as it lasts. The 
 actual is all, and any rational distinction between true and 
 false vanishes. 
 
 Thus we have traced the materialistic theory of knowl- 
 edge to its outcome, and the outcome is overwhelming scep- 
 ticism. The theory can lay no claim to be either scientific 
 or philosophic, because it makes both science and philosophy 
 impossible. Looking at the world with materialistic eyes, 
 we see a necessary kaleidoscopic process. Parts of the proc- 
 ess are attended by thoughts, partly true, but mostly false. 
 All of these thoughts which collide with materialism are 
 known to be false, not by reasoning, but by hypothesis. 
 Throughout the world-process there is a strong and almost 
 overwhelming tendency to dream and falsehood ; and, but 
 for certain advanced thoughts, error would have reigned 
 supreme. We say advanced thoughts, for, by hypothesis, 
 thinkers do not exist. Looking at human life and action, 
 we see pure automatism. The action of men and women 
 may be attended with thought and feeling; but from the 
 beginning it has taken place without any intervention of 
 thought and feeling; for there is no reason for believing 
 that any mental state can affect any pl^sical state. Even 
 the materialist's thought and purpose count for nothing in 
 the exposition and publication of his philosophy. By his
 
 330 METAPHYSICS 
 
 own theory all that has ever been done in this direction has 
 taken place without any control or guidance of thought a 
 statement which is the most credible of the materialist's 
 many utterances. Indeed, this statement throws light on 
 many of the homilies from this quarter. It has long been 
 a puzzle to the critical mind how any rational being could 
 produce some things which have appeared from materialistic 
 speculators. But now we see that reason had nothing to 
 do with their production, and the wonder rather becomes 
 that the nerves should do so well. 
 
 Thus the metaphysics, the psychology and the episte- 
 mology of materialism appear equally superficial or self- 
 destructive. It is properly a philosophical superstition rath- 
 er than a philosophical doctrine, for a certain measure of 
 rationality is necessary to constitute a doctrine. All that is 
 needed to dispose of it is to understand it, and it vanishes 
 of itself. 
 
 And where in the meantime is the soul. Spatially, it is 
 nowhere, having neither form nor spatial relations. Actual- 
 ly, however, it is the self that thinks and feels and wills, 
 and in this activity experiences and knows itself as the 
 active and abiding subject of this inner life. It is not some- 
 thing which can be sensuously presented ; it is what we all 
 experience as ourselves. It is not a sense object, it is the 
 living subject in unchangeable antithesis to all sense objects. 
 It is not an object, it is the subject which is the condition 
 of all objects. Through oversight of this fact, the materi- 
 alist always seeks to find the subject among its objects, 
 where in the nature of the case it never can be. He like- 
 wise seeks to construe the subject in the forms of spatial 
 objects, and this leads to absurdity. He looks for the sub- 
 ject in the wrong place, and failing to find it, concludes that 
 it does not exist. But mind, as the knowing subject, can 
 never be found among its external objects. In this respect,
 
 THE SOUL 331 
 
 it is like vision, which gives us all objects, but never gives 
 us itself. And the materialist who concludes to its non- 
 existence is like a physiologist who should so lose himself 
 among the objects of vision as to forget, or even deny, that 
 there must be an eye in order to vision. The mind is the 
 eye, which sees, and, of course, cannot be found among the 
 things seen. But this the monist incessantly forgets, and, 
 after he has looked through the list of objects which the 
 mind has given him without finding the knower among 
 them, he forthwith proceeds to deny the knower. If, in 
 addition, he has looked carefully through the brain, and 
 caught no glimpse of the mind, he becomes fixed in his 
 denial. Thus the order of fact is inverted. The real is 
 made phenomenal, and the phenomenal is viewed as real. 
 Of all the extraordinary delusions which have ever possess- 
 ed the human mind, this is the most extraordinary. Over- 
 looking the necessarily antithetical nature of subject and 
 object, the subject looks for himself among the objects, and, 
 confounded by the failure to find anything, overlooks and 
 denies himself entirely. The knowing self which is the 
 primal reality in knowledge, and the only reality of which 
 we have proper consciousness is denied, because it will not 
 consent to become a phenomenon, although, in the nature 
 of the case, it never can do so. 
 
 As against materialism, the affirmation of the soul as the 
 active and abiding subject of the mental life must stand. 
 The case of spiritualism versus materialism must be declared 
 closed and a verdict given for the former. But some more 
 subtle difficulties arise from the side of epistemology and 
 metaphysics ; and these we have next to consider. These, 
 however, have no tendency to establish materialism, but 
 rather to dissolve the soul away into a phenomenal and 
 metaphysical haze of a pantheistic type. This is another
 
 332 METAPHYSICS 
 
 doctrine altogether from the traditional materialism which 
 explains the mental life by the combination and interac- 
 tion of physical agents. 
 
 And first it is said that this doctrine of the soul, though 
 true for phenomena, is not true for noumena. The self as 
 it appears is indeed the unitary subject of the mental life, 
 but this fact allows no conclusion as to the unity of the 
 noumenal self. 
 
 A first remark in reply would be that if the unity of the 
 self in experience does not warrant us in concluding to its 
 substantial unity, still less does it warrant us in concluding 
 to its composition. A thing must always be allowed to be 
 what it seems unless reasons can be given for going behind 
 the appearance. But the true answer to the objection lies 
 in a fact dwelt upon in the Introduction. We there saw 
 that the question, What is being? reduces always to this 
 other, How must we think about being? The self as we 
 know it is the only self there is to know ; and the only 
 question which can arise concerning it is, How must we 
 think of it? We insist that in the face of all the facts we 
 must think of it as one and not many, as simple and not 
 compound. Objections to this conclusion must take the 
 form of showing that the facts can be otherwise interpret- 
 ed in articulate thought. Objections based on the phenom- 
 enality of human thought rest at bottom on the crude fancy 
 that there may be some form of thought which can grasp 
 reality otherwise than by thinking of it, and on the further 
 superstition of extra-mental reality. 
 
 This style of objection dates back to Kant ; and since his 
 time certain speculators have given themselves an air of 
 great profundity by speaking of the empirical, or phenom- 
 enal, and the noumenal ego. In order to carry through his 
 phenomenalism of thought and knowledge, Kant denied the 
 possibility of concluding from the unity of the ego in con-
 
 THE SOUL 333 
 
 sciousness to its unity in being, alleging that if such a con- 
 clusion were allowed, it would overturn his entire criticism. 
 But this reason was purely personal, and has no value in 
 logic. Indeed Kant's regard for his system led him to use 
 extremely feeble arguments in his criticism of rational psy- 
 chology. He insists strongly on the unity of the empirical 
 ego and on the " synthetic unity of apperception " as a nec- 
 essary condition of consciousness ; but he disputes the spec- 
 ulative conclusion that the transcendental ego must be a 
 numerical unity. 
 
 Unfortunately, the nature of this empirical ego, and its 
 relation to the transcendental ego, are left very unclear. If 
 we say that the empirical ego is the form under which the 
 noumenal subject appears, the question at once arises, To 
 whom does the empirical ego appear, and what recognizes 
 the appearance ? There can be no appearance without some- 
 thing which appears and something to which it appears. 
 If the ego is the appearance, what is the ego which perceives 
 it ? If it be said that the empirical ego is but the aggregate 
 of conscious mental states, we must know the subject of 
 these mental states. It cannot be the empirical ego, for 
 that is the states themselves ; and it would be quite absurd 
 to speak of an aggregate of states as its own subject. If 
 we should push these questions, it would at last appear that 
 the transcendental ego is not something lying beyond all 
 consciousness and knowledge, but is simply that abiding 
 self revealed in consciousness and thought as one. Besides, 
 the unity of the ego is not affirmed because we appear to 
 ourselves as units, but because we appear to ourselves at all. 
 The unity of the true ego is necessary to the existence of 
 any mental life. 
 
 But, says Kant, the unity and identity of the subject does 
 not prove the unity and identity of the substance. He no- 
 where attempts to show how an aggregate can give rise to
 
 334: METAPHYSICS 
 
 a unitary consciousness ; but he uses an illustration to show 
 how identity of the subject might be combined with non- 
 identity of the substance. When an elastic ball strikes an- 
 other of equal mass, the motion of the former is transferred 
 to the latter. He speaks of this as one body transferring 
 its state to another. In the same way, he suggests, a men- 
 tal substance might transfer its entire consciousness to an- 
 other. The consciousness being thus passed along from 
 one to another, the subject would remain identical, while 
 the substance would be incessantly changing. Kant was 
 doubtless led to this strange notion by his anxiety to ward 
 off all attempts at ontological knowledge ; but whatever its 
 ground, and however great Kant's genius, this is certainly 
 a case where good Homer nods. For, in the first place, 
 states are incapable of transfer except in a figurative sense. 
 The moving ball does not transfer its motion, but sets an- 
 other ball in motion. Kant adopts here the crudest possi- 
 ble conception of inherence, and speaks as if states, or at- 
 tributes, could be loosened from their subject and transferred 
 bodily to something else. The subject appears as the bearer 
 of properties instead of the agent which, by its activity, 
 founds properties. Hence the idea of a bodily transfer. 
 This notion we have transcended. The only possible con- 
 ception of his illustration would be that one substance might 
 by its action on another cause that other to assume a men- 
 tal state like its own, so that it should seem to itself to 
 have had a past experience when it had not had it. 
 
 But this notion of a transmitted consciousness is a gra- 
 tuitous violation of appearances instead of their explanation. 
 Moreover, it fails to do what it is invented for. For, in the 
 case supposed, there would not be a single and identical 
 mental life, but a number of similar mental lives, each of 
 which has its unitary subject. There would be much that 
 is magical in such a view; but the point in dispute, the
 
 THE SOUL 335 
 
 unity of the being, is admitted. If, however, the mental 
 subject, the conscious, active ego, is passed along, it would 
 by hypothesis be the same mental subject after all. The 
 ego, the personality, would not change, but only the un- 
 known and inactive substance. But this substance is a 
 myth. Here appears a crude notion of substance in Kant's 
 view. He views it as a mysterious substratum, whereas 
 substance and subject, or agent, are identical. We have 
 repudiated the substratum-notion as the product of sense- 
 bondage. That which can act and be acted upon is the es- 
 sential idea of substance. When, then, we have found the 
 mental subject, we have found the mental substance, for 
 subject and substance are identical. Kant's admission of 
 the necessary unity of the mental subject is all we ask. 
 The mental subject is all we recognize. We admit no sub- 
 stance behind the subject and outside of knowledge. The 
 ego which thinks, feels, and acts is all there is to know ; 
 and for us the fact that the ego knows itself as the subject 
 of its acts, and as one in the unity of its consciousness, 
 together with the further fact that this unit} 7 appears on 
 reflection as the absolute postulate of the mental life, is the 
 highest possible proof of its unity and reality. We must 
 repeat the conclusion reached in our ontological studies, 
 that a thing is to be viewed as real and substantial not be- 
 cause it has a kernel of substance in itself, but because it is 
 able to assert itself in activity. Things do not have being 
 or substance, but they act, and by virtue of this activity 
 they acquire the right to be considered as existing. In like 
 manner the soul has no being in it ; but it knows itself as 
 active and as acted upon ; and in this fact and knowledge 
 it has the only possible mark of reality. 
 
 Finally, we mention the argument based upon Kant's 
 phenomenalism. The self as object of knowledge must 
 come under the conditions of knowledge ; and by so doing
 
 336 METAPHYSICS 
 
 it must become a phenomenon. Our self-knowledge, there- 
 fore, only reveals the phenomenal self, or the self as we ap- 
 pear to ourselves, and never the noumenal subject, or the 
 self as it really is. Whether any one was ever convinced by 
 this argument may be doubted ; at any rate, no one ought 
 to have been convinced by it. As to the possibility of self- 
 knowledge, experience only can decide. We have no knowl- 
 edge of any sort which can deal with this problem apart 
 from experience. The application of the categories to the 
 knowledge of self does not make it fictitious. In treating 
 of scepticism we have seen that a thorough-going doctrine 
 of relativity cancels noumena altogether. They must either 
 consent to be known, or go out of existence. There is a 
 real as well as a formal application of the categories. In 
 the case of physical phenomena the application is formal ; 
 in the case of the soul it is real. The soul itself as object 
 of knowledge does come under the categories ; but it does 
 not come under them as abstract principles imposed from 
 without, but as the living principles of intelligence itself, 
 revealed and understood in experience. Without this ad- 
 mission, the transcendental ego vanishes from thought alto- 
 gether ; and with it we have valid knowledge. 
 
 But now we come upon some more subtle speculative 
 suggestions which constitute real difficulties in the doctrine 
 of the soul. These have nothing in common with the crude 
 fancies of materialism, but come from the depths of meta- 
 physics. 
 
 And first, it may be asked, what have we won in calling 
 the soul real and abiding ? Is not the experienced life, the 
 stream of thought and feeling, the main thing after all ; and 
 is not this just as good without metaphysics as with it? 
 
 The underlying question here concerns the application of 
 the categories of being and identity to the soul; and the
 
 THE SOUL 337 
 
 suggestion is that in any case they are barren, and that the 
 stream of thought itself is all we can find, and all we need 
 to find. We consider the two categories in order. 
 
 In reflecting on this subject with any precision one begins 
 to realize how imperfect language is as an instrument of 
 expression, when abstract matters are under discussion. 
 And we need to bear in mind not only what we may mean 
 by our terms, but also what others will understand them to 
 mean, !N"ow in calling a thing real, common-sense means 
 to affirm that the thing is not an illusion, a fiction, a phan- 
 tom of an ignorant or disordered intelligence, but is some- 
 thing which acts or is acted upon, and thus appears as a 
 veritable factor in the actual ongoing of the world. And 
 from this point of view, what we mean by calling the soul 
 real is just what we mean by calling anything real, namely, 
 that it acts and is acted upon, and that it is a determining 
 factor in the world of change and effects. And what we 
 gain by calling the soul real in this sense is double. First, 
 negatively, we rescue the soul from the position of a fiction 
 or hallucination. Second, positively, we satisfy the rational 
 demand for a sufficient reason for the mental life, we supply 
 the unity without which the thought life falls asunder, and 
 we secure some ground for the conviction of responsibility 
 on which society is based. To call the soul unreal involves 
 failure in all these respects, and carries both theoretical and 
 practical demoralization with it. This from the stand-point 
 of popular speech. 
 
 It is also to be noted that whatever difficulty there may 
 be in the notion of reality it emerges at least no less when 
 applied to matter than when applied to mind. Indeed we 
 have abundantly seen that the category of causal reality 
 cannot be applied to matter without contradiction. The 
 notion breaks up and vanishes under criticism ; and the soul 
 is the only thing which fills out the notion of reality. Hence
 
 338 METAPHYSICS 
 
 no one who admits the reality of matter ought to have the 
 least difficulty in admitting the reality of the soul; for the 
 evidence in favor of the reality of the soul is indefinitely 
 stronger than that for the reality of matter. And it fills 
 one, first with astonishment and then with compassion, to 
 find persons objecting to the reality of the soul as a useless 
 or groundless metaphysical doctrine, while admitting all 
 sorts of physical metaphysics as undeniable first principles. 
 What wonder that with such blind leaders of the blind we 
 fall into the ditch of " mind-stuff" and similar infantilities. 
 
 If, then, w T e question the reality of the soul, we ought to 
 have it clearly understood that we do not mean thereby 
 that it is a fiction, or that it cannot act or be acted upon, 
 or that it is relatively unreal in comparison with matter, 
 but only that it is unreal in comparison with some absolute 
 reality. This only, we may say, truly is. All other things 
 are comprehended in an order of becoming, and hence are 
 relatively shadows and vanishing. But such doctrine moves 
 over the head of common-sense altogether; and criticism 
 must never fail to remind us that, however true it may be, 
 it does not remove the fact that we still are real in the 
 sense that we can act and be acted upon, and may be held 
 responsible for our actions. 
 
 But it is probable that the objections to regarding the 
 soul as real, so far as they do not spring from crude mate- 
 rialism, are not due to these high considerations regarding 
 the relation of the finite to the infinite, but rather to a kind 
 of lumpish notion of reality itself. There seems to be a 
 fancy that an agent is constituted real by the category, and 
 that this category might conceivably be discovered in the 
 agent, if the light were strong enough. A little reflection 
 shows the artificial and mechanical nature of such a notion ; 
 and reality is ruled out as a useless fiction. How complete- 
 ly this inverts the true order is plain to us. The soul is not
 
 THE SOUL 339 
 
 constituted real by a category located within ; but it acts 
 and thus acquires the only possible claim to be considered 
 real. The reality of the soul consists in its ability to act ; 
 other reality it has none. How the soul can act there is no 
 telling. In thinking of the soul we must not look for a 
 lump, nor for a category, nor for a picture, but for the 
 agent which thinks and feels and wills, and knows itself in 
 so doing. And this soul is neither in the heights nor in the 
 depths; it is very nigh indeed, for it is simply the living 
 self. 
 
 Much the same line of thought must be repeated concern- 
 ing the soul's identity. For common-sense, identity, as ap- 
 plied to things, means simply numerical identity, or that 
 the present being is continuous with the past being. The 
 being A has not disappeared and another, B, numerically 
 distinct from A, has not taken its place. Such a solution of 
 identity would make thought impossible. The soul, then, is 
 real and abiding or identical. 
 
 But in discussing the problem of change we found un- 
 suspected obscurities and perplexities in this notion of iden- 
 tity. We seemed compelled to admit some species of con- 
 tinuity in the successive stages of things, but identity seemed 
 provided for onty in consciousness. Recalling this result 
 we might argue as follows : 
 
 After all, the identity must lie in consciousness or the 
 stream of thought itself ; for if we conceive this lacking, the 
 remaining identity is a barren if not a meaningless thing. 
 Consciousness not merely reveals, but makes, the only iden- 
 tity worth talking about. Further, there is no way of see- 
 ing how the soul as bare substance could ever provide for 
 the identity of consciousness. And now that we have done 
 away with the soul as lump or inert substance, what remains 
 but to say that the stream of thought is all ? 
 
 There is something to this, but we are not completely car-
 
 34:0 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ried along. The argument seems to rest on an improper 
 logical disjunction. In any logical judgment the subject is 
 not the subject except as modified by the predicate. If I 
 say the rose is red, it is not every rose which can be the sub- 
 ject but only the red rose ; and in any particular case only 
 the particular red rose in question. So the subject of con- 
 sciousness is not the soul, considered as blank substance or 
 blank subject, but the conscious soul ; and the thing which 
 is identical is neither consciousness in abstraction from the 
 soul, nor the soul in abstraction from consciousness, but the 
 conscious soul. The thought has this dual aspect and can- 
 not be completed without embracing both. Abstract sub- 
 jects and abstract predicates are logical fictions, and we 
 must not allow ourselves to be deceived by them. 
 
 If, however, we are not satisfied with this, and still in- 
 sist on finding the identity in consciousness alone, we reach 
 the same result in another way. For consciousness as a 
 succession of particular states is not identical or even pos- 
 sible. The successive states are all perishing existences and 
 are all mutually other and external. That stream of thought 
 is in the same case. It is a stream only for that which is 
 not a stream. Hence the consciousness in which identity 
 resides is not the particular states nor the flowing stream, 
 but something continuous and active. It must comprise the 
 states in its own unity ; it must distinguish itself from them 
 as their abiding subject, and must work them over into the 
 forms of intelligence. Thus it becomes only another name 
 for the soul itself. 
 
 And here, as in the case of reality, the objector is tacitly 
 under the influence of a crude notion of identity. He sup- 
 poses that there is a category of identity whereby the soul 
 is enabled to be or become identical. But this also inverts 
 the true order. We have seen that intelligence cannot be 
 understood through the categories, but that the categories
 
 THE SOUL 341 
 
 must be understood through intelligence. Active intelli- 
 gence is the only illustration of the concrete meaning of the 
 metaphysical categories. Hence if we would know what 
 concrete identity is we must not look about for an abstract 
 category to tell us, but must rather consider the self-identi- 
 fying action of intelligence. There is no other real identity; 
 and indeed, closely considered, real identity has no other 
 meaning than that which emerges in the self-identification 
 of intelligence. 
 
 But what of the soul when it is unconscious? Is it not 
 the same soul after a season of unconsciousness tha.t it was 
 before ; and is there not therefore some identity of being 
 which is quite independent of self-identification in conscious- 
 ness? 
 
 Before it was the metaphysical doubter who spoke ; now 
 it is the metaphysical realist. The former sought to find 
 the identity in the flowing consciousness; the latter seeks 
 it in some back -lying substance. If sameness can endure 
 across unconsciousness, then consciousness does not consti- 
 tute sameness. If unconsciousness continued, and conscious- 
 ness never returned, we might, indeed, be at a loss to tell 
 what the sameness would amount to, or in what it would 
 consist ; but since the same being has pauses of conscious- 
 ness in the identity of his existence, we clearly see that 
 consciousness is not the seat of identity. 
 
 This question takes us into the depths, and a completely 
 satisfactory answer is hard to find. The matter is compli- 
 cated with the dependence of the finite and the relativity of 
 time also ; and the answer must be given in sections. 
 
 We may first point out that this question assumes that 
 things exist in a real time, which is not the case. There is 
 no time in which things exist ; neither is there any absolute 
 time to which all existence is to be referred. Time is rela- 
 tive to self-consciousness, and not conversely. The fact al-
 
 342 METAPHYSICS 
 
 leged means simply a fault in the self-consciousness of one 
 being judged by the self-consciousness of another being, or 
 by conceived possibilities of consciousness. We might, then, 
 offer this relativity of time as vacating the inference from 
 the alleged fact. 
 
 But this is a dark saying for all but the very elect, and 
 only fe\v can hear it. Let us fall back, then, on our distinc- 
 tion between continuity and identity, and say that continuity 
 of being might conceivably abide across periods of uncon- 
 sciousness, but that only consciousness can raise continuity 
 to identity. This continuity is what common-sense means 
 by identity, and it cannot be denied without dissolving the 
 mental life away into a magical phantasmagoria. 
 
 So much may be affirmed with all conviction, but if we 
 ask in what this continuity consists we begin again to grope. 
 Many will find no difficulty. The same thing just exists, 
 and no more need be said about it. But for us who have 
 done away with rigid lumps and changeless cores and ab- 
 stract identities, this nai've solution is impossible ; and there 
 seems to be no way out except to fall back upon some no- 
 tions which began to dawn upon us when treating of in- 
 teraction and the relation of the finite to the infinite. We 
 there saw that no finite thing has its existence in itself. 
 A finite thing has its existence only in dependence on the 
 infinite, and in relation to other members of the system. 
 It is then a dependent and relative, and, so to speak, only a 
 partial existence. The full and complete notion of exist- 
 ence is realized only in the absolute and infinite intelligence. 
 All other existence is partial and incomplete. 
 
 When we are dealing with the world of things we dis- 
 cover that they have existence only for others. To some 
 extent they exist for us ; but they have their essential ex- 
 istence for God. And for him their existence consists in 
 the idea they express and in the activity in which the idea
 
 THE SOUL 343 
 
 finds expression. The identity of the idea is the identity 
 of the thing ; and the continuity of the activity of expres- 
 sion is the continuity of the thing. As having existence for 
 others, they are real in one way. As having no existence 
 for themselves, they are unreal in one way ; that is, they 
 have only phenomenal existence. 
 
 Something of this double aspect appears in our own ex- 
 istence. "We have to distinguish our existence for ourselves 
 from our existence for others. The soul has its existence 
 primarily in the divine thought and act, and it may remain 
 on the plane of existence for others without at once attain- 
 ing to, or always possessing, existence for itself. Apart 
 from the latter the soul has its existence and continuity 
 solely in the divine thought and will. However mysterious 
 this result may be, it seems to be the conclusion to which 
 we are shut up. How that which begins without selfhood 
 and in absolute dependence can yet attain to selfhood and 
 a measure of independence is the mystery of finite existence. 
 
 If it be said that on this view the true existence of the 
 soul, its existence for self, is a discontinuous thing, and hence 
 without any but a magical identity, the answer is found in 
 what we have already said. The objection assumes, first, a 
 real time, and, secondly, that we have some real notion of 
 identity other than what we experience. Both assumptions 
 are false. There is no real time in which the unpicturable 
 pauses of finite existence occur, and we have no proper no- 
 tion of concrete identity by which to determine whether 
 experienced identity be genuine or not. We form the no- 
 tion of abstract metaphysical identity by conceiving con- 
 tinuous existence through real time; and any solution of 
 continuity is held to destroy identity. But this notion has 
 no application when time is made phenomenal. Then ex- 
 perienced identity is the only identity, and of course the 
 only test of identity. The self -identification of the soul,
 
 344 METAPHYSICS 
 
 then, is the best proof of identity, for identity has no other 
 meaning. Whatever may lie beyond this must be sought 
 not in the realm of metaphysical abstractions, but in the 
 thought and self-consciousness of the infinite. 
 
 After these long wanderings through the dry places of 
 metaphysics, it may be well to rest ourselves by taking an 
 account of stock, so as to see where we stand, or where we 
 think we stand. "We do so in the form of question and answer. 
 
 1. Can the mental life be deduced from physical organ- 
 ization ? 
 
 No. All that takes place in the organism can be reduced 
 to some form of movement and grouping of the physical 
 elements; and no reflection on such movement and group- 
 ing will ever reveal thought and feeling as an analytical 
 consequence. Moreover, all physical causation consists in 
 producing new movements and groupings of the elements. 
 Antecedent movements and groups are the cause; conse- 
 quent movements and groups are the effect. Hence thought, 
 which is not a physical movement or grouping, lies outside 
 of physical causation. 
 
 2. Can the mental life be understood without admitting 
 a real something, the self or soul, which cannot be identified 
 with the physical elements, and which is the abiding sub- 
 ject of thought and feeling ? 
 
 Again, no. Capital facts and the most cogent kind of 
 reasoning unite in enforcing this answer. However myste- 
 rious and inscrutable the physical elements may be, the 
 mental life cannot be viewed as a resultant of their inter- 
 action. It is, rather, demonstrably impossible without the 
 one and abiding self. 
 
 3. May not this self be dispensed with if we suppose mat- 
 ter to be one and duly furnish it with mysterious subjective 
 faces or aspects?
 
 THE SOUL 
 
 Once more, no. The nature of thought and consciousness 
 necessitates the admission of the one abiding self as their 
 indispensable condition. 
 
 4. Can the mental facts be described in terms of their 
 physical attendants or conditions ? 
 
 Still the answer is, no. The antecedents are some form 
 of molecular grouping and movement ; the consequent is a 
 thought or feeling. The latter may be summoned or ex- 
 cited by the former, but it can in no way be expressed or 
 understood in terms of the former. The incommensurability 
 is absolute. We trace the physical series a certain way, 
 and then we reach a fact of another order, a sensation or 
 perception. Facts of the latter kind are known only in and 
 through consciousness, and never through reflection on their 
 antecedents. The two orders are as incommensurable as 
 the letters of a printed page are with the meaning they 
 convey. 
 
 Hence physiological psychology presupposes the psychol- 
 ogy of introspection. If our aim is to explain the mental 
 facts of course we must first know the facts. Or if the aim 
 is to find the physical attendants or conditions of the men- 
 tal facts, again we must know the facts. Without this 
 knowledge we have no problem ; and without introspection 
 we have not this knowledge. Introspection, then, must 
 observe the facts and classify and formulate them before 
 physiological psychology can begin. 
 
 5. Is the mental life dependent on the organism ? 
 
 This question is unclear. Dependence may be understood 
 in the sense of causal production by the organism or it may 
 mean an order of concomitant variation in the physical and 
 the mental series. In the former sense the mental life is 
 not dependent on the organism. In the latter sense there 
 is mutual dependence of each on the other. There are men- 
 tal states arising in connection with organic states; and
 
 346 METAPHYSICS 
 
 there are organic states arising in connection with mental 
 states. In this sense the causality works both ways. 
 
 But the question is further unclear. It may mean, Could 
 a mental life go on apart from any organism ? Could our 
 mental life go on apart from any organism? Could it go 
 on apart from the present organism ? 
 
 To question one, the answer must be that an absolute 
 mental life would need no organism. To question two, the 
 answer is that the finite spirit, in so far as it is in interac- 
 tion with other spirits and with the cosmic system, must 
 always need some fixed system for receiving and giving im- 
 pulses ; otherwise it would not be in the world at all. If 
 this means organism then organism is necessary. To ques- 
 tion three the answer is that it is easily conceivable that 
 our mental life should go on under other organic conditions. 
 The actual organism is only a stimulus to mental unfolding 
 and a servant of the unfolded life ; and there is no difficul- 
 ty in the thought that this service should be performed in 
 other and better ways. At present, however, the organism 
 is mentally conditioned and the mind is organically con- 
 ditioned, in the sense of mutual concomitance in their re- 
 spective changes. 
 
 6. Can we learn anything of these conditions ? 
 
 Without doubt. In a general way we already know 
 much, and it is conceivable that we should know much 
 more. The interdependence of mind and body might be 
 specified into minute details. We know that we see with 
 the eye and not with the ear, while we hear with the ear 
 and not with the fingers. It is conceivable that, in like 
 manner, other mental functions should find their physical 
 attendants located in some specific part of the brain, and 
 not in the brain as a whole. Such a fact, if established, 
 would contain no ground for alarm or even surprise. On 
 the other hand, it is conceivable that growing knowledge
 
 THE SOUL 
 
 should extend the significance of the mind for the or- 
 ganism far beyond what is at present surmised. In a gen- 
 eral way, physicians have long recognized the importance 
 of mental health for physical health ; and that a merry 
 heart doeth good like a medicine is a truth of ancient recog- 
 nition. 
 
 Here then is a large and important field of study, to find 
 and fix the facts of the mutual dependence of mind and 
 body. This field belongs to the physician and the physio- 
 logical psychologist. The only caveat the critic cares to 
 issue is to beware not to take the order of concomitant va- 
 riation for one of materialistic causation. 
 
 At the same time it is plain that this can be done only 
 in a general way. By long and careful pathological study 
 a doctrine of localization might conceivably be proved for 
 various mental functions, and important correlations and 
 concomitances might be discovered between physical and 
 mental pathology. Such facts lie within the range of pos- 
 sible discovery and might be valuable if established. But 
 when we begin to theorize on the molecular structure of 
 the brain and the peculiar molecular structure and func- 
 tions whereby the brain serves as the organ of thought, 
 then we pass beyond the range of our faculties and lose our- 
 selves in vain imaginings. What takes place in the living 
 brain as the centre of the physical system is only a matter 
 of hypothesis ; what takes place in the brain as the organ 
 of thought is a subject of the vaguest surmise. That this 
 is so is manifest upon inspection. Unfortunately, this field 
 has been ravaged by dealers in mind-stuff who think only 
 in physical images, and they have made such fearful and 
 wonderful discoveries that one is at a loss to say which is 
 the more mythological, their psychology or their anatomy 
 and physiology. " Memory-pills " are already advertised ; 
 and we may confidently expect the discovery of the thought
 
 348 METAPHYSICS 
 
 microbe, to be followed by the preparation of " cultures " 
 for inoculation. 
 
 7. What shall we say of psychology without a soul ? 
 
 There is no such thing. The phrase is either absurd, or 
 else it is a misleading expression for the following common- 
 place fact : 
 
 It is possible to do detailed work in psychology without 
 in any way going into the metaphysics or the presupposi- 
 tions of psychology. Detailed studies of the senses, or the 
 general dependence of the mental life on physical conditions, 
 and pretty much all special questions, are of this sort. Such 
 inquiries can be carried on on the general basis of experi- 
 ence without ever asking how experience is possible. It 
 ought, however, to be possible to distinguish between this 
 familiar fact and the denial which the phrase seems to im- 
 ply. Such phrases are not needed to express either the 
 problem or its solution. The fact of experience is exhausted 
 in the discovery that the mental life has physical processes 
 for its concomitant ; and the aim of the wise man must be 
 to find the law of this concomitance, without confusing or 
 distorting the fact by importing materialistic suggestions 
 into it in the guise of figures of speech. The extreme deli- 
 cacy and sensitiveness of intellectual conscience which finds 
 in the soul an unscientific metaphysical entity would lead 
 us to expect equal caution in assuming physical entities and 
 in using materialistic metaphors. But, as of old, those who 
 strain out the gnat are apt to bolt the camel. 
 
 Herewith we close our catechism and our profession of 
 faith concerning the soul in itself.
 
 CHAPTER n 
 SOUL AND BODY 
 
 IT may be metaphysical, or anything else disagreeable, 
 but there is no escape from regarding the soul as some- 
 thing substantially real. It abides, acts, and is acted upon ; 
 and these are the essential marks of ontological reality. 
 Whatever it may be with respect to the infinite, no other 
 finite thing can show so good a title to the name of reality. 
 In comparison with the body, the soul is the more real of 
 the two ; for the former is in perpetual flux, and, as body, 
 it is at best only a more or less constant form of the inces- 
 sant flow of the physical elements ; and these, in turn, are 
 suspected of being only abstract hypostases of phenomena. 
 But this is commonly overlooked. That the body is sub- 
 stantially real common sense never doubts; and even the 
 contemners of metaphysics in psychology are clear as to 
 the metaphysics of body. Finally, from the phenomenal 
 point of view, the body is an important adjunct of the in- 
 ner life ; and we need to get some conception of its mean- 
 ing and function. Thus we are introduced to a new problem, 
 that concerning the mutual relations of the body and the 
 soul. Our aim is not to go into details, but only to deter- 
 mine the general form both of the problem and of its solu- 
 tion. 
 
 Popular thought with its all-embracing category of space 
 has often puzzled itself with questions concerning the mut- 
 ual space relations of soul and body ; and many whimsies
 
 350 METAPHYSICS 
 
 have been entertained concerning the whereabouts of the 
 soul and its location in the body. These questions we pass 
 over as vacated by the phenomenality of space. The in- 
 teraction of soul and body, however, is a more important 
 problem. 
 
 Interaction of Soul and Body 
 
 This problem is vaguely conceived in both popular and 
 scientific thought. For the former, space is the supreme 
 category, and all existence is spatial and spatially deter- 
 mined. Hence results a variety of vague fancies respecting 
 the soul as having form, small or great, and as various- 
 ly located in the body, sometimes filling out the body as a 
 pervasive aura, and sometimes confined to the brain. In 
 popular scientific thought traces of these whimsies are not 
 lacking ; and, apart from them, the problem is ambiguously 
 conceived because of the double meaning of interaction 
 itself. 
 
 Causation, as we have so often said, may be taken in an 
 inductive and in a metaphysical sense. In the inductive 
 sense interaction means simply the laws of mutual change 
 or of concomitant variation among things. In this sense 
 the interaction of soul and body means only that there is 
 an order of concomitant variation in mental and organic 
 changes ; and the inductive problem is to discover the law 
 of these changes. 
 
 As thus understood the problem involves no doctrine of 
 causality whatever ; and the workers in this field often give 
 out that they eschew all reference to metaphysical efficiency. 
 Commonly, however, they are mistaken. They bring a full 
 line of physical metaphysics with them, which the} 7 hold in 
 high esteem ; and after they have talked a while it becomes 
 clear that, at least tacitly, they regard the physical order 
 as a substantial and independent fact, while the mental order
 
 SOUL AtfD BODY 351 
 
 is only a secondary and shadowy appendix of the physical. 
 Out of this confused state of mind only further confusion 
 can come ; and the inductive problem, which has no alliance 
 with materialism, becomes involved in the imbecilities of 
 that superstition. 
 
 From our own metaphysical stand -point the inductive 
 problem is the only one we have to consider. The tradi- 
 tional notions of interaction have been set aside, and the 
 body itself reduced to a phenomenal significance. But there 
 still remains the important field of study to discover the laws 
 of concomitant variation in physical and mental changes, 
 or to find what mental states go with what physical states 
 and what physical states go with what mental states. This 
 is the task of the physiological psychologist. And no one 
 can have any interest in forbidding his work, or in wishing 
 him other than complete success. But nothing is likely to 
 be accomplished except by those who have a competent 
 knowledge of real psychology and of real anatomy and 
 physiology. The picture psychology and hearsay anatomy 
 which have been so prominent in this field have their chief 
 value as sources of educational treatises, rather than of 
 scientific progress. 
 
 But in spite of the pretended rejection of metaphysics, 
 this question of the interaction of soul and body is sure to 
 be approached by the rank and file of investigators with 
 full faith in the metaphysics of common-sense. Hence it is 
 worth while to consider the form under which the inter- 
 action is to be conceived, assuming the body to be sub- 
 stantially real, or to be an aggregate of substantial realities. 
 
 By interaction in that case we could only mean that soul 
 and body affect each other. Indeed the union of the two 
 has no other meaning than this fact of mutual influence. 
 On the most realistic theory there is no other interaction or 
 bond of union than this reciprocal influence.
 
 352 METAPHYSICS 
 
 The imagination has commonly confused the problem by 
 attempting to construe it spatially. The body is conceived 
 as a physical aggregate ; and the attempt is made to picture 
 the soul as somewhere within this aggregate, either as a 
 manikin located within the brain and nervous system, or 
 as a pervasive and all-embracing aura. Then the elements 
 of the nervous system are supposed at certain times and 
 places to start aside from the line of the physical resultant 
 of their antecedent states without any visible reason ; and 
 by this time the notion breaks down from its own absurdity. 
 The manikin soul is absurd; and the laws of continuity 
 and the conservation of energy are affronted by such a 
 procedure. 
 
 Some of these difficulties disappear on grasping the phe- 
 nomenality of space. On that view we give up the attempt 
 to picture the causal realities of the system. Souls and 
 atoms f.like, supposing the latter real, lie among the unpict- 
 urabie agencies of the system. Shape, size, form, and where- 
 abouts are inadmissible notions when we pass beyond phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 The horror felt at the atoms not moving in a line with 
 the physical resultant is a purely home-made one. The in- 
 visible dynamic states of the elements are the forces which 
 determine the resultant; and that some of these states 
 should be in the soul is qpriori<yait6 as credible as that 
 they should be only in the physical elements, and empirically 
 it is quite as well established. The dogmatic assumption 
 that the physical system is complete in itself, and closed 
 against all modification from without, is the only thing dis- 
 turbed thereby. And seeing that this assumption implies 
 that our thoughts and volitions have no significance in the 
 direction of our bodies, it deserves to be disturbed on the 
 ground both of experience and of good sense. 
 
 The conservation of energy, to which reference has been
 
 SOUL AND BODY 353 
 
 made, has been the source of much pathetic blundering at 
 this point. Of course the doctrine, so far as proved, does 
 not forbid us to admit that our thoughts and volitions count 
 in the control of the organism, if the facts point that way. 
 On this matter the wayfaring man can judge as well as the 
 scientists. But some speculators, whose knowledge would 
 seem to be mainly of the hearsay type, have been pleased 
 to erect the doctrine into an absolute necessity which for- 
 bids the slightest modification. This is pure delusion and 
 error. Particularly, psychologists who have wished to 
 stand well with physics have fallen into this blunder. And 
 then they have said the oddest things about double-faced 
 somewhats, the complete continuity of the physical series, 
 and the impossibility of modifying it from the mental side. 
 Of course this implies that the body starts, stops, and di- 
 rects itself, speech and all, without control from thought ; 
 and they have given out that we must not think other- 
 wise under penalty of conflicting with science. This illus- 
 trates the extremes to which a romantic devotion to mis- 
 understood abstractions can carry a mind of the passive 
 type. 
 
 The notion is traditional that the interaction of soul and 
 body is a specially difficult conception. This mistake is 
 partly due to the spatial fancies referred to, and partly to 
 the further fancy that interaction must be by impact. All 
 are alike groundless. Given the conception of interacting 
 members, it is quite impossible to tell apriori what states 
 shall arise in J., B, and C under the condition X. They 
 might conceivably be the same, and they might be very 
 different, according to the nature of the subjects. 
 
 Oversight of this fact has led to the invention of go-be- 
 tweens to mediate the interaction of soul and body. That 
 certain motions in the brain should be the cause of sensa- 
 tions in consciousness is thought to involve a break of con-
 
 354 METAPHYSICS 
 
 tinuity too great for belief. Accordingly, the attempt has 
 been made to refine the motions, on the one side, and on 
 the other, to reduce the sensations to a sub-conscious form 
 which should be less unlike their physical ground. This 
 attempt is a product of the imagination, and gives no relief 
 to thought. Allowing the elements to be real agents, their 
 motions are not the cause of sensation ; the cause is rather 
 the metaphysical dynamic states of which the motions are 
 the spatial expression. Now why, when certain brain mole- 
 cules are in the metaphysical state which expresses itself in 
 motion, the soul should pass into the state of conscious sen- 
 sation is of course mysterious enough ; but it is no more so 
 than that a piece of iron should become magnetic when an 
 electric current passes round it. In both cases the mystery 
 of interaction is equally involved; and in both cases the 
 mystery is equally great. Neither the fact nor the order 
 of interaction admits of apriori deduction, even on the 
 most realistic theory ; neither have we any insight into the 
 possibilities which would make one order antecedently more 
 credible than another. The reason why any order of inter- 
 action is as it is must ultimately be sought in the plan of 
 the fundamental reality. The unity of the system cannot 
 consist in the likeness of the interacting members, but rather 
 in their subordination, with all their likenesses or antitheses, 
 to the plan of the whole. 
 
 No theory whatever can escape this sharp antithesis of 
 the physical and the mental. It is no special difficulty of 
 spiritualism, but lies with equal or even greater force against 
 materialism. The materialist and the believer in double- 
 faced substances cannot give the slightest reason why a 
 given subjective phase should attend a certain objective 
 phase and not rather some other. It must be affirmed as 
 an opaque fact, or else the reason must be found in the plan 
 of the whole.
 
 SOUL AND BODY 355 
 
 This general conclusion must stand. There is, however, 
 some apparent mitigation of the antithesis in the fact of the 
 organism. The interaction of soul and body takes place 
 under the organic form. It is not, then, all physical ele- 
 ments, or the same physical elements al \vays, which inter- 
 act with the soul, but only those elements which are com- 
 prised within the range of an organic activity ; thus the 
 organism seems to be a kind of link between the inorganic 
 physical and the mental. As physical, it is allied to the 
 world of matter ; and, as living, it is allied to the world of 
 mind. Thus it appears in a measure to mediate the sharp 
 opposition of mind and matter. That thought should at- 
 tend, or be summoned by, any sort of inorganic physical 
 movements seems something like an affront to the law of 
 continuity, but that thought should attend organic changes 
 impresses us as a much more manageable thesis. And, 
 conversely, that, upon occasion of thought and volition, 
 inorganic physical changes should arise which were not con- 
 sequents of their physical antecedents would seem to many 
 altogether incredible, who would yet find it quite within 
 the limits of credibility that organic physical changes should 
 result from mental states. The supposed relief here may 
 turn out to be fictitious; nevertheless there is sufficient faith 
 in it, both in popular thought and in current speculation, 
 to make it desirable to examine it. This raises the ques- 
 tion what the organism is and how it comes to exist. 
 
 The Body as Organism 
 
 Still assuming the reality of the physical elements, we 
 have three factors in the problem as a whole : (1) the ele- 
 ments which compose the organism ; (2) the cause of their 
 union into an organism ; and (3) the subject of the mental 
 life which is manifested in connection with the organism.
 
 356 METAPHYSICS 
 
 The consideration of these points will prepare the way for 
 our final view. 
 
 Of course on the realistic physical basis the organism is 
 substantially nothing. It is a highly complex aggregate of 
 physical elements, but if these were removed nothing would 
 remain. Allowing, however, as universally recognized, that 
 we find in the organism factors and processes which are 
 found in the inorganic realm, we must also allow that we 
 find them subordinated to an organic law, so that they 
 build an organism which is as different from the component 
 elements as an architectural structure is more than the un- 
 formed material of which it is built. Where shall we find 
 the seat of this law ? 
 
 First, we may seek to find it in the elements themselves. 
 This leads, as we shall see, to fantastic and grotesque as- 
 sumptions. 
 
 Secondly, we may ascribe it to life, as something distinct 
 from the elements, on the one hand, and from the soul, on 
 the other. This view is not so clear as it seems, nor so use- 
 ful either. 
 
 Thirdly, we may view the soul itself as the ground of 
 form. It has a phase of organic activity and one of con- 
 scious activity. Both of these are united as the expression 
 of the nature of the one soul. In this view we should have 
 the following stages : 
 
 1. The soul in interaction with the general physical sys- 
 tem builds and maintains an organism within certain limits 
 and under certain conditions set by its own nature and the 
 general laws of the system. 
 
 2. This organized matter is already within the sphere of 
 the soul's activity as well as under the general physical laws. 
 
 3. Hence the organism is partly a physical and partly a 
 psychical function. Its interaction with the extra-organic 
 realm involves the organic activity of the soul ; and because
 
 SOUL AND BODY 357 
 
 of the unity of the soul it could hardly fail to have signif- 
 icance for the mental activity. 
 
 4. Conscious activity based upon and growing out of the 
 organic activity is the final stage. Thus the continuity of 
 the organic and the mental world is in a measure assured 
 and some reason given for their intimate inter-relations. 
 
 On the assumed reality of the physical elements, this is 
 the view which offers least resistance to thought. In all 
 complex organisms, whether in the animal or plant world, 
 \ve should have to assume an organic subject as the ground 
 of form. When these subjects also rise into conscious men- 
 tal life we have souls. 
 
 No one of these views quite agrees with that which our 
 more idealistic metaphysics demands. But before develop- 
 ing this view it seems well to expound more at length the 
 two first views mentioned. Between them they divide the 
 assent of popular thought in this field, and both alike 
 abound in bad logic and crude metaphysics. 
 
 Mechanism and Vitalism 
 
 There has been a very general demand in recent years 
 that the organism be viewed as a function of its component 
 elements, just as any machine is a function of its parts. As 
 aquosity, it was said, is not needed to explain the water 
 molecule, but only the hydrogen and oxygen which com- 
 pose it, and as horologity is not needed to explain the run- 
 ning of a clock, but only the parts in their actual relations ; 
 so vitality is not needed to explain the existence and pro]> 
 erties of the organism, but only the component elements 
 with their inherent laws and complex interactions. Vitality 
 is as great a fiction as aquosity or horologity. This was 
 called the mechanical view of life and was opposed by the 
 defenders of vitalism.
 
 358 METAPHYSICS 
 
 The mechanical view has often been ambiguously con- 
 ceived. Sometimes the claim has been made that physics 
 and chemistry explain life, but this was due to logical su- 
 perficiality. Physics and chemistry explain nothing but 
 themselves, and indeed they explain nothing in any case, 
 being but names for certain orders of phenomena. The ele- 
 ments as doing only what they are found to do in the phys- 
 ical or chemical laboratory could do nothing else, unless we 
 assume other and hidden powers which might be manifest- 
 ed upon occasion. It was this insight which led Professor 
 Tyndall to say that the attempt to explain life by matter 
 as conceived in the inorganic sciences is "absurd, monstrous, 
 and fit only for the intellectual gibbet." Accordingly he 
 proposed to enlarge the notion of matter and endow it with 
 various mystic and subtle properties and potencies. 
 
 And this is the form which the mechanical view must 
 take if it is to be held at all. The forces of the elements 
 are only abstractions from the activities of the elements ; 
 and the elements do whatever is done. And as the elements 
 in certain relations manifest physical and chemical proper- 
 ties, so in certain other relations they manifest vital prop- 
 erties. But just as the properties of an inorganic atomic or 
 molecular complex depend on the properties of the con- 
 stituent elements, so the properties of an organic molecular 
 complex depend on the properties of the constituent atoms. 
 The mechanical theory, therefore, can assume a vital force 
 with just the same right as it does a chemical force. In- 
 deed, it must assume both, but both in the same sense. To 
 explain gravitation, it assumes a peculiar endowment of the 
 elements and calls it gravity. To explain chemical action, 
 it assumes another peculiar endowment of the atoms and 
 calls it affinity. So also to explain vital phenomena, it as- 
 sumes again a peculiar endowment of the elements and calls 
 it vitality. These several -ities all stand on the same basis.
 
 SOUL AND BODY 359 
 
 They are all alike necessary and are all alike but abstrac- 
 tions from the several forms of atomic interaction. 
 
 Many upholders of vitalism surrender at this point. They 
 think it sufficient to point out that the elements, as capable 
 of only physical and chemical manifestation, are inadequate 
 to vital manifestation, and that hence we must posit a new 
 endowment to account for the new manifestation. This is 
 true enough, and follows as a matter of definition ; but as 
 long as the new endowment is posited in the physical ele- 
 ments, and not in some separate agent, we still hold the 
 mechanical theory. Physics and chemistry do not explain 
 even magnetism ; but we never dream that magnetism is 
 something independent of the elements ; we regard it sim- 
 ply as a manifestation of the nature of the elements under 
 peculiar circumstances. No one denies vitality as a mode 
 of agency : the dispute is over vitality as an agent. All the 
 other -Hies are forms of agency, and the mechanical theorist 
 holds that vitality is no more. The agents are the physical 
 elements in every case. 
 
 The mechanical theory is clear at least in its meaning, 
 if not in its possibility. The thought is formally complete. 
 It speaks of activities, forces, and endowments, and names 
 their subjects. But in order to make this view sufficient, 
 we have to add some rather peculiar assumptions. If or- 
 ganisms were all of a kind, or had anything like a common 
 form, it would be comparatively easy to accept the belief 
 that the physical elements which compose a germ, together 
 with those in contact with it, are the only agents concerned. 
 But the forms and qualities of organisms are of the most 
 diverse kinds, while the component elements are all of a 
 kind. Hence it seems as if the elements, because able to 
 enter into any organic form, were indifferent to all organic 
 forms. If there were only one form, we might speak of a 
 " subtle tendency " in the elements to that form, or of an
 
 360 METAPHYSICS 
 
 "affinity" or "inherent aptitude" for it. But when they 
 assume all organic forms, we must either make them as in- 
 different to those forms as the bricks which are built into a 
 variety of structures are to the plan of those structures, or 
 we must endow them with a great variety of " subtle ten- 
 dencies " and " inherent aptitudes." In the former case, 
 the variety and constancy of form seems to be a matter of 
 chance or accident ; for the matter contains no principle of 
 organic form. Yet the second case reduces to the first, for 
 these tendencies are mutually exclusive in realization, and 
 the elements have in themselves no ground for realizing one 
 set of tendencies rather than another. The coexistence of 
 the tendencies does not explain the selection. Hence, in 
 each case, we have to fall back on the arbitrary constants 
 which enter into the equation. As the laws of motion are 
 consistent with all motions, so the elements in general are 
 adapted to all forms. The ground of direction, then, is to 
 be sought in the conditions under which they work. Under 
 given conditions, they can build only a given organism. 
 But these conditions, again, must lie very deep. If they 
 were merely general conditions, germs might be inter- 
 changed ; whereas, two seeds grow side by side, and each 
 to its typical form. The germ itself contains implicitly all 
 the differences which become explicit in the organism. But 
 these differences are so many and great that no one would 
 pretend to represent them by difference of spatial colloca- 
 tion of the elements which compose the germ. Such collo- 
 cation would explain nothing, unless it were attended with 
 peculiar forces. 
 
 Here we may fall back on the conception of subtle ten- 
 dencies which are, in some way, located in the germ. This 
 notion has been formulated in the doctrine of " physiologi- 
 cal units," each of which has the power of reproducing the 
 organism under appropriate conditions. But, unfortunately,
 
 SOUL AND BODY 361 
 
 even this notion is not as clear as could be wished. It at- 
 tributes the tendencies to the germ, and forgets that, by 
 hypothesis, the germ is a compound of elements. The ten- 
 dency, therefore, no matter how " subtle," belongs to the 
 elements which compose the germ. And, without doubt, 
 this tendency is very subtle, for it is really an implicit ex- 
 pression of the plan of the organism. It implies, then, that, 
 under certain conditions, the elements act with constant 
 reference to the plan of an organism ; and under certain 
 other conditions, precisely similar elements act with refer- 
 ence to the plan of some other organism. If we should see 
 a pile of bricks moving so as to build a given house, we 
 should probably conclude that some invisible builder was 
 present ; but, if we declined this view, the very least we 
 could say would be, that the plan of the house is implicit 
 in the bricks, and that their activities are all put forth with 
 reference to this plan. If we should refuse this admission, 
 then the house-building would be purely a chance-product 
 a coincidence of moving bricks. But if, in addition to 
 building a single kind of house, we should see them assum- 
 ing all possible architectural forms, we should be forced 
 either to appeal to chance or to admit that the bricks con- 
 tain in themselves the plans of all possible combinations. 
 But reason can allow no appeals to chance, and hence we 
 conclude that, to make the elements adequate to the ex- 
 planation of organisms, we must assume that the plans of 
 all organisms are implicitly given in the nature of the ele- 
 ments, and so given that, when they begin building upon a 
 certain plan, they forsake all others, and cleave to it alone. 
 The action is still mechanical, but, in this action, the mystic 
 nature of the elements unfolds itself, so that organisms re- 
 sult. 
 
 This gives us some idea of the complexity of the problem, 
 and of the confusion in popular thought respecting it. This
 
 362 METAPHYSICS 
 
 complexity has been hidden by the simplicity of the terms, 
 and the elements have seemed adequate because of the tacit 
 assumption that there is nothing else in space, and because 
 of some vague and mistaken notions about continuity. These 
 subtle tendencies defy all representation, and even all con- 
 ception. Their mechanical possibility cannot be construed. 
 They are really nothing but a specification of the abstract 
 notion of ground, without inquiring whether the demand 
 for a ground can be satisfied in this form ; and they are at- 
 tributed to the atoms as a matter of course, because of the 
 implicit assumption that there is nothing else concerned. 
 
 But vitalism is equally unclear. In the first place, many 
 of its upholders neglect to say whether vitality is a quality 
 in the elements which conditions their agency, or whether 
 it is a separate agent. Many of the arguments for vitality 
 go no further than the maintenance of the former position, 
 and thus fail to escape the mechanical theory. But sup- 
 pose we say that life is a true agent which is separate from 
 the physical elements, and which builds them into form. 
 Life would thus appear as the builder of organisms, and 
 matter would appear as simple material. 
 
 This view doubtless derives a great part of its clearness 
 and sufliciency from the analogy of man's constructive ac- 
 tivities. In itself it is unclear without some further deter- 
 minations. Is this agent one or many? Is it the same life 
 which works in all organisms, plants and animals alike, or 
 is there a separate vital agent in each one ? In the former 
 case, how does this agent distinguish between the plans of 
 the different organisms which it is constructing and main- 
 taining all around the globe at the same time ? The readiest 
 answer would be that it is intelligent ; but this would go a 
 long way towards confounding it with God. If we decline 
 this view, and say that the agent works differently in dif-
 
 SOUL AND BODY 363 
 
 ferent conditions, it is still necessary that it shall be affected 
 in some way by the conditions in order to respond with the 
 appropriate activity. That is, we must bring it into a sys- 
 tem of fixed interaction with the elements ; and when this 
 is thought out into its implications we are not much ad- 
 vanced beyond the mechanical view. 
 
 If, however, we prefer to view the vital agent as many, 
 and posit a separate subject in each organism, we have the 
 same difficulties and some additional ones. The vital agent 
 must interact with the physical elements ; and in this inter- 
 action the laws of matter would be as prominent as the laws 
 of life. The only advantage this conception would have 
 over the material view would be in planting the "subtle 
 tendencies" in a single definite agent, and in finding the 
 chief formative conditions in the nature of that agent. This 
 would remove the necessity of departing so widely from the 
 common view of matter as we otherwise must; since we 
 could then allow, what all knowledge seems to indicate, that 
 matter in itself is indifferent to organic forms, and assumes 
 them only as it comes into interaction with some agent 
 which contains the ground of form within itself. Life does 
 not start up everywhere, but only in connection with things 
 already living. 
 
 But this view contains some special difficulties. The 
 reality is no longer singular and universal life, but discrete 
 individual lives; and these lives must have some source. 
 Have they always existed ; are they separately created ; do 
 they abide after the organism perishes? These questions 
 crowd upon us. The law of continuity is in active protest. 
 The problem is insoluble as long as we remain on the plane 
 of the finite. 
 
 Thus both the mechanical and the vitalistic view of life 
 are seen to be exceedingly obscure when only the problem 
 of organization is under discussion. The matter becomes
 
 364 METAPHYSICS 
 
 still worse when we inquire concerning the subject of the 
 thought and sensibility which seem to be manifested in con- 
 nection with the organism. Unless appearances are unu- 
 sually deceiving, there is an inner life of feeling of some sort 
 in connection with all the higher animal forms. Neither 
 theory provides for this. If the body be simply a function 
 of the physical elements, it is sensitive and truly living only 
 in appearance. The difference between it and any com- 
 plex inorganic mass is phenomenal only, not essential. The 
 atom of hydrogen, or oxygen, or carbon, that may be cours- 
 ing in a man's blood is no more alive than similar atoms 
 blazing in the sun or locked in the coal-mine. Of course 
 the organism has many qualities which other combinations 
 have not ; but, in fact, since matter and motion are all that 
 is concerned in the organism, there is nothing but matter 
 and motion in it. But feeling is something totally unlike 
 motion ; and no analysis of motion will reveal feeling as 
 one of its constituents. There is no way of passing from 
 one to the other. The organism, then, is only a highly 
 complex group of physical elements without any proper 
 life or feeling. 
 
 The deduction of life from the non-living has led to many 
 agonistic efforts and some notable contributions to the dic- 
 tionary. A much admired popular formula defines life as 
 an adjustment or correspondence of inner relations to outer 
 relations ; and we seem to be getting a deep draught of wis- 
 dom undefiled, until we bethink ourselves to inquire what 
 " inner " means ; and then it turns out that inner means 
 nothing to the purpose, unless it is referred to the activity 
 of some vital agent. Those things are inner to the body 
 which are vitally connected with the organic processes; 
 and those are outer which are not thus connected, even 
 though comprised within the spatial limits of the body. 
 But when it comes to the deduction of life the mechanical
 
 SOUL AND BODY 365 
 
 theorists always delude themselves with words. They point 
 out that in chemistry we pass from the atom to the mole- 
 cule, and from the simple molecule to the complex molecule, 
 and from the complex molecule to the organic molecule, and 
 from the simple organic molecule to complex organic mole- 
 cules, and from these again to groups of the same. But 
 these already exhibit signs of life and organization. After 
 a little skirmishing with the formidable terms of organic 
 chemistry, reproduction and heredity are quietly brought 
 in, and the evolution of life from the inorganic is com- 
 plete. 
 
 A word will suffice to show the verbal character of this 
 process. If we begin with matter and motion, we must end 
 with it also ; and whatever cannot be construed in terms of 
 moving matter must be rejected as illusory. There is no 
 difficulty in passing from the atom to the molecule, or in 
 passing from simple molecules to complex molecules and 
 groups of molecules; but there the advance ceases. All 
 that remains is to increase the complexity of the molecules 
 and the molecular groups; for this is the only direction 
 which the redistribution of matter can take. When, then, 
 the theorist next presents us with the organic molecule, we 
 are a little puzzled to know what he means by the new ad- 
 jective. It may mean simply a molecule which is commonly 
 found only in connection with organisms ; but in that case 
 it is nothing to the purpose. But if it mean something 
 more than complex, we need to have the distinction be- 
 tween an organic molecule and a complex molecule more 
 clearly stated. It may be said that an organic molecule is 
 essentially only a highly complex molecule, but it manifests 
 different phenomena. We reply that we are after the es- 
 sential and not the phenomenal. There is no dispute as to 
 the phenomena of organisms, but as to their essential nature. 
 And if their phenomena are all explained by the interaction
 
 366 METAPHYSICS 
 
 of the elements, then organisms are essentially atomic com- 
 plexes and nothing more. 
 
 The truth is this deduction is purely verbal and has a 
 strong smack of question - begging about it. If we should 
 speak only of complex molecules \ve should clearly see the 
 impossibility of advancing beyond them. Such groups 
 would appear as products of physical and chemical attrac- 
 tions and repulsions, and even the most determined evolu- 
 tionist would hardly venture to speak of them as alive or 
 as subject to experience and heredity. But if, instead of 
 calling these groups complex molecules and groups of mole- 
 cules, which by the theory is all they can be, we call them 
 organic, then by the sheer force of the terms we shall find 
 it easy to pass on to speak of organization and heredity ; 
 and the way will be open before us. We can then appeal 
 to life and biological laws without any reference whatever 
 to the possibility of interpreting them in terms of matter 
 and motion. But if thought be clear, this procedure must 
 be seen as delusive. There is nothing in the most complex 
 organism but complex molecules ; and the only difference 
 between the elements as thus grouped and as otherwise 
 grouped is purely phenomenal. A living thing is essentially 
 an inorganic complex which seems to be alive. In itself 
 one thing is as dead or as living as another. The distinc- 
 tion is only in appearance, and even this appearance is im- 
 possible as long as there is no mind to which it appears. A 
 mind which could grasp things as they are would see in an 
 organism only a complex system of moving atoms. Along 
 with this admission goes the absurdity of the notion of 
 heredity. The laws of the elements are hardly to be viewed 
 as acquired or inherited ; and since these laws determine 
 all compounds, the organism also must be fixed. Life, then, 
 is phenomenal ; and an animal is but an automaton which 
 only seems to think and feel.
 
 SOUL AND BODY 367 
 
 We get no relief from this conclusion, if we endow the 
 atoms with the most mystic qualities, or even allow them to 
 be alive. These mystic properties remain subjective to each 
 atom, and manifest themselves externally only in changes 
 of place and condition. The inner life, therefore, would not 
 appear as any factor of observation, but would only be one 
 of the inner forces which condition redistribution. Such a 
 view might help in explaining organization, but not in ac- 
 counting for the life of the organism. For on this view 
 the organism still remains an aggregate without any sub- 
 jective unity, or subjectivity of any sort. Hence, the feel- 
 ing and thought which the animal seems to manifest are 
 again phenomenal. A mimicry of thought and feeling is 
 possible in an aggregate or automaton ; but their reality is 
 possible only to some unitary subject which thinks and 
 i'eels. To say that the organism thinks and feels is thought- 
 less ; for the organism is just such a reality as the public 
 in social science. When we speak of the public thought 
 and feeling, we know very well that only individual persons 
 think and feel. The public, as such, neither thinks nor feels, 
 but only the persons who compose it. We must, then, reduce 
 the animals to automata which mimic thought and feeling, or 
 we must allow a real substantive subject of their mental life. 
 
 We are no better off with the view which regards God 
 as the builder of the organism. For still the organism ap- 
 pears either as a pure phenomenon, or as a complex of dis- 
 crete activities, and as such it is without any mental sub- 
 ject. Hence, any thought and feeling which the animal 
 may seem to show are illusory, and do not indicate any true 
 thought or feeling which the animal has. The view which 
 regards life as a kind of universal agent, manifesting itself 
 in different forms, is subject to the same difficulties. It 
 provides no subject for the individual life and feeling of the 
 individual animal.
 
 368 METAPHYSICS 
 
 Thus it appears that the most important question con- 
 cerning life is not that of organization, but that of the sub- 
 ject of the thought and feeling which animals manifest. 
 Where it is merely a question of organization, as in the 
 vegetable world, there are several possible views, each of 
 which would be adequate ; but when mental manifestations 
 appear, as in all the higher orders of animals, then we must 
 make a choice. Either we must view these manifestations 
 as purely illusory, and make the animals senseless automata 
 which only mimic thought and feeling, or we must declare 
 that with each new animal a new factor is introduced into 
 the system as the thinking and feeling subject of the ani- 
 mal's experience. Thus the problem of life comes back 
 again to the problem of the soul. 
 
 This long excursus was undertaken for the sake of show- 
 ing how confused and uncertain popular thought is on this 
 subject. On the basis of the popular metaphysics there is 
 no way out of the confusion. We now return to our own 
 conception of the interaction of soul and body. 
 
 In this view the soul is posited by the infinite, and the 
 body is simply an order or system of phenomena connected 
 with the soul which reproduces to some extent features of 
 the general phenomenal order, and which also expresses an 
 order of concomitance with the mental life. Thus it be- 
 comes a visible expression of the personality, a means of 
 personal communion, and also a means for controlling to 
 some extent the inner life. The concomitance is the only 
 interaction there is; and its determining ground must be 
 sought in the plan and agency of the infinite. Only in this 
 sense of a physical concomitance is it permissible to speak 
 of a physical basis of thought, or of a physical foundation 
 of mental activity. And only in the same sense of concom- 
 itance is it allowed to speak of the soul as building and
 
 SOUL AND BODY 369 
 
 maintaining the organism. Each is adjusted to the other 
 in accordance with the plan of the whole ; but so far as the 
 two factors are concerned, the connection is logical, not 
 dynamic; and any dynamic relation which we may affirm 
 must be seen to be only a form of speech. We may use 
 such language for convenience of expression, as when we 
 apply causal terms to phenomenal relations, but we must 
 not forget its metaphorical character. 
 
 In estimating, and adjusting ourselves to, this general re- 
 sult we need to recall the distinction between the inductive 
 and the metaphysical stand-point. In studying either life 
 or mind the inductive scientist is in his full right when he 
 looks for the phenomenal or experienced laws and condi- 
 tions, and traces them as far as he can. At the same time 
 he must be reminded that these laws remain on the surface 
 and contain no causal efficiency. If he could trace the phe- 
 nomenal order into minute details the nature of the causal- 
 ity would remain unrevealed. And, on the other hand, the 
 metaphysician who is persuaded that the infinite is the 
 ever-present source of all things must not overlook the fact 
 that the cosmic causality proceeds in certain ways, and that 
 a knowledge of those ways is of great practical importance. 
 With this understanding we may carry on the study of the 
 physical basis of life and mind without the least fear of 
 seeing them vanish into mechanical by-products. And see- 
 ing that the soul is that with reference to which the organ- 
 ism has its existence, we may also speak of the soul as the 
 builder and maintainer of the organism. There is no reason 
 to think there would be any organism if there were no inner 
 life. 
 
 This general view, however, according to which the in- 
 finite is a silent factor in all finite ongoing will tend to re- 
 strict our theorizing when it far transcends experience and 
 practical interests. Our knowledge even of phenomena is
 
 370 METAPHYSICS 
 
 very superficial, while of the underlying plan which condi- 
 tions the form and movement of the whole we have the 
 scantiest knowledge. As this is more and more seen to be 
 the case, abstract and theoretical deductions will gradually 
 be restricted to a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent 
 cases ; and whatever lies beyond these will be handed over 
 to magazine science. 
 
 The physical and mental series are separate and incom- 
 mensurable ; it is conceivable, however, that there should 
 be a correspondence between them, such that a given state 
 of the one should always attend a given state of the other. 
 Without some order of this kind, the mental life would be 
 lost in hopeless confusion. This would be the case if the 
 same sense stimulus might result in the perception of differ- 
 ent objects, or if the same volition should lead to different 
 deeds. Both knowledge and action would become chaotic. 
 The need is clear, however, only for those mental states 
 which result in objective knowledge, or which produce ob- 
 jective effects. The matter is much more uncertain when 
 mental states are concerned which arise within thought it- 
 self and without any assignable physical stimulus. The 
 matter is further complicated by the modifying influence 
 of attention or mental distraction, because of which the 
 physical state often fails to be attended by its appropriate 
 mental state. 
 
 When we pass beyond the experienced concomitance and 
 affirm an absolute order, the result is unedifying. Such a view 
 can never be submitted to a practical test, and can only be a 
 matter of speculative fancy. Whoever will reflect on the 
 enormous complexity of thought and feeling and their mul- 
 titudinous shades, together with the still greater complexity 
 of contexts in which they are perpetually occurring, will 
 see that to find an exact physical representative for each
 
 SOUL AND BODY 371 
 
 state of thought and feeling, we must run into the molecular 
 realm forthwith. Whoever further reflects on the complete 
 ignorance on our part of what it is in the brain molecules 
 or phenomena which fits them to attend any thought at all, 
 or one thought rather than another, will see that this field 
 can only be the subject of lawless imagination. Any one 
 with a sense of logical responsibility will content himself 
 with tracing as far as may be the concomitance in experi- 
 ence without affirming any absolute laws whatever. 
 
 The wisdom of this last position is seen on contemplating 
 the unwisdom of those who have sought to find a physical 
 correspondence for every mental fact. The imagination 
 has run riot in mythological molecular constructions. " Neu- 
 rotic diagrams," "apperception and ideational centres" have 
 been invented. Cells, vibrations, and nascent motor exci- 
 tations in rich variety have been feigned ; and these are 
 supposed in some unexplained way to stand for mental 
 facts, and in imaginary fluctuations and permutations to 
 express the laws and relations of the facts. The mental 
 facts, as qualitative data of consciousness and in their ideal 
 logical relations, are too refined for our understanding. 
 Hence we first interpret them into a series of physical fic- 
 tions, which soon pass for the facts themselves, and then 
 we victoriously deduce the mental life by an exegesis of 
 our metaphors. 
 
 It would be impossible adequately to express the illogical 
 and fictitious character of most of this work. .The specu- 
 lator is unable to grasp the mental facts in their unpictura- 
 ble nature, and substitutes for them some physical image. 
 The only demand he makes upon this image is that it shall 
 be easily pictured. Then come fictitious and improvised 
 anatomy and a great cloud of whimsies about cells and 
 fibres and nascent motor excitations and inter-cellular ac- 
 tivities. But whoever affirms such things is bound in logic
 
 372 METAPHYSICS 
 
 either to show by analysis of the mental life that we must 
 affirm the facts in question, or else by observation and ex- 
 periment to prove that these facts exist, and especially that 
 they exist in the alleged correlation with the mental facts. 
 That brain-cells and fibres exist is far enough from proving 
 that they have any such functions and relations as our pic- 
 torial psychology ascribes to them. The strict application 
 of this rule would probably make a solitude and a grateful 
 silence in this region, and would result in a somewhat ag- 
 nostic attitude towards all speculation on this subject which 
 goes beyond some general principles which may be verified 
 in experience. Such are. the general laws of concomitant 
 development, laws of habit, laws of health, laws of rest and 
 repair, general laws of the influence of body on mind and 
 of mind on body. We know that the physical echoes the 
 mental and that the mental varies with the physical. Laws 
 of this kind lie open to investigation ; but whatever lies be- 
 yond them in the way of abstract speculation is to be re- 
 ceived with the utmost caution. Most of what has been 
 done in this field is a sad reflection on human intelligence. 
 
 Origin of Souls 
 
 On this subject only two views are self -consistent, the 
 creation of souls, or the reduction of mental phenomena to 
 functions of organization. The second view is materialism, 
 and has been finally condemned. 
 
 The first view may be held in a double form. We may 
 suppose that souls were all produced by some original crea- 
 tive act, or that they are individually produced in connec- 
 tion with the individual organism. The former conception 
 would give, so far as this life is concerned, the doctrine of 
 the pre-existence of souls and possibly some form of trans- 
 migration, or metempsychosis.
 
 SOUL AND BODY 373 
 
 This doctrine of pre-existence has found favor with some 
 speculative and religious dreamers, but it is so utterly with- 
 out any positive foundation or speculative advantage, and 
 involves us in so many gratuitous difficulties, that it is likely 
 to be confined to the dreamers. An existence in which the 
 solution of personality is so complete as this view would de- 
 mand would be only verbally the same. Practically, then, 
 we are shut up to affirm the individual creation of souls in 
 connection with individual earthly existence. 
 
 This view, however, has not always found favor. Theo- 
 logians especially have found it a stumbling-block, and have 
 sought a more excellent way. The soul of the child is said 
 to be in some way derived from the parents, the doctrine 
 of traducianism. It is held that there is a law, or a world- 
 order, according to which souls are produced, yet without 
 being created outright. This is vague. A law, or world- 
 order, is only a conception and always needs some agent or 
 agents for its realization. Hence, to make this theory in- 
 telligible, we must know what the agents are which produce 
 the effect. If it be said that God has made the elements 
 such that when combined in certain ways mental phenomena 
 result, this is simple materialism. If it be said that when 
 the elements are combined in certain ways a substantial 
 soul results, this is to allow creation ; but it does not tell us 
 what creates. But the fancy that the elements, or the 
 souls of the parents, have power to create a being beyond 
 themselves, or that they give off something out of which 
 new souls can be made, is utterly untenable. Emanation, 
 budding, fission, division, and composition of any kind are 
 forbidden by the necessary unity of the soul. There is 
 nothing to do but to fall back on the world-ground, or God, 
 and say that where and when the divine plan, which is the 
 law of cosmic activity, calls for it, there and then a soul 
 begins its existence and development. It is not the out-
 
 374 METAPHYSICS 
 
 come of its finite antecedents, but is a new beginning in the 
 system and is immediately posited by the infinite. 
 
 There are two classes of difficulties that meet us here. 
 The first class springs from the imagination. "We try to 
 picture the operation in terms of s^ace. We tend to con- 
 ceive the soul as a thing to be brought from somewhere, 
 probably from some extra-siderial region, and we are puz- 
 zled concerning the bringer and his space relations. In ad- 
 dition, there is a fancy that the divine agent must appear 
 among the phenomenal antecedents, a conception which 
 both science and religion would perhorresce. The matter 
 admits of being treated in a very pleasant and lively fashion ; 
 and when the various fancies are traced in detail the con- 
 ception seems to perish of its own irreverent absurdity. 
 But all of these whimsies disappear when we see that all 
 finite reality has its spaceless roots' in the omnipresent di- 
 vine, and that all things stand or move or come to pass be- 
 cause of the immanent God. The divine immanence and 
 the non-spatiality of the real, in distinction from the appar- 
 ent, remove the difficulties arising from the imagination 
 and the deistic type of philosophy with its absentee God. 
 
 If then we ask how souls originate, the answer will fall 
 out differently according to our stand-point. If we occupy 
 the phenomenal or inductive stand-point the answer will 
 recite the various phenomenal conditions revealed in expe- 
 rience. If we are seeking for the essential causality no 
 answer can be complete which omits God. 
 
 The second class of difficulties referred to arises from sev- 
 eral sources, theological and moral exigencies and the facts 
 of heredity. All of these taken together are supposed to 
 disprove the direct creation of souls. 
 
 The strictly theological exigencies are mainly connected 
 with the doctrine of original sin and its transmitted guilt. 
 Some have thought that a doctrine of creation would cut
 
 SOUL AND BODY 375 
 
 off the entail or the corruption of blood. This difficulty is 
 fast becoming obsolete. 
 
 The moral exigencies arise from the supposed difficulty 
 in assuming that God should make morally imperfect souls. 
 And human beings, by the time they exhibit any moral 
 traits, often show such earthiness that we hardly like to 
 think of them as fresh from the hand of God. 
 
 This difficulty impresses the imagination and a certain 
 demure type of piety, but traducianism offers no way out. 
 Its metaphysical untenability has already appeared. Par- 
 ents are not creators. They and their deeds are only the 
 occasions on which the world-ground produces effects and 
 introduces new factors into the system. Neither can the 
 unaesthetic and unseemly features of the case be removed 
 by introducing any sort of mechanism between the creator 
 and the final product. Eesponsibility cannot be diminished 
 by employing machinery to do our work. 
 
 The argument from heredity mostly mistakes a theory of 
 the fact for the fact itself. The fact is simply a certain 
 similarity between parents and children. There is likewise 
 often a certain dissimilarity. The likeness which the gen- 
 eral type demands is supposed to be a matter of course. 
 The likeness which relates to specific peculiarities is referred 
 to heredity. If it refers to remote ancestors it is atavism, 
 or a case of reversion, etc. The unlikeness is referred to 
 variation, or possibly the instability of the homogeneous, or 
 some other formidable phrase. 
 
 The likenesses and unlikenesses among genealogically 
 connected individuals are the fact ; all else is theory. The 
 likenesses are explained by heredity. But heredity is a 
 metaphor. In a literal sense one individual can inherit 
 nothing from another. Soul substance admits of no division. 
 Qualities can neither propagate themselves nor be passed 
 along. "We are led by experience to expect certain similar-
 
 376 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ities between the generations, though in most cases we have 
 to wait for the facts to declare themselves. But the ulti- 
 mate ground of the relation, whether of likeness or unlike- 
 ness, must be sought not in the finite series itself, but in 
 the plan of the infinite power which produces individuals 
 and determines their nature. Of course this conclusion does 
 not forbid our availing ourselves of all the knowledge which 
 experience may furnish in this field, neither does it deny 
 that this knowledge often has great practical value ; it only 
 warns against the fancy that the facts explain themselves, 
 or that they can be explained by figures of speech. The 
 wild work of popular writers on this subject and of students 
 of genealogies, particularly of their own family, is distress- 
 ingly familiar. The theme readily lends itself to fine writ- 
 ing, and has been prolific of not a little rhetoric. 
 
 What we have said thus far applies to heredity in the 
 mental field. As a theory in speculative biology, the doc- 
 trine of heredity generally contradicts itself. In a scheme 
 which builds on fixed physical elements with fixed forces 
 and laws, there is no place for heredity of any kind, except 
 as a description of the successive phases of a phenomenal 
 order. It would be such heredity as might exist among 
 the successive combinations in a kaleidoscope. And if we 
 begin without such forces and laws we lose ourselves in a 
 primal indefiniteness which would found nothing and be 
 nothing ; and out of this we could never emerge except by 
 verbal incantations about differentiation and integration. 
 It would be an interesting task to determine the meaning 
 of heredity, habit, and such terms in a purely physical sys- 
 tem ; and it might not be easy to do much in biological 
 speculation with the resultant conceptions. Out of some 
 vague sense of this implicit contradiction has arisen in un- 
 clear minds a tendency to confound both realms to vitalize 
 matter and devitalize life. Physical laws are spoken of as
 
 SOUL AND BODY 377 
 
 " only the fixed habits of the elements," and habits in living 
 things are simply the greater facility due to the removal of 
 mechanical obstruction. Thus the two realms are happily 
 approximated in word, which is the main thing ; and the work 
 is completed by a discussion of the " psychology of the cell" 
 and the " psychology of the micro-organisms." Both physical 
 and mental science cannot fail to be greatly advanced by these 
 violent plunges into the depths of antithetical absurdities. 
 
 The ontological individuality and separateness of souls va- 
 cate all such questions as whether the human mind devel- 
 ops from the brute mind; whether they differ in kind or 
 only in degree. There is no human mind and no brutes- 
 mind, but minds, no one of which develops from any other, ^ 
 or inherits anything from any other. The possibility of ar- 
 ranging these in ascending linear order is only a logical one, 
 and it in no way does away with the metaphysical separate- 
 ness and incommunicability of each individual. The fact 
 that they appear in connection with a series of organisms 
 genealogically related decides nothing as to what the indi- 
 vidual is when he comes, or what the essential power is 
 which produces individuals. Popular thought finds the 
 causality in the phenomenal antecedents, where it never 
 can be. For the rest, the traditional debate does not touch 
 reality at all, but only the contents of a pair of logical ab- 
 stractions, the human mind and the brute mind. If the 
 two abstractions were found to be identical, the concrete 
 problem would be as hard as ever ; for this consists not in 
 a verbal shuffling of logical symbols, but in the production 
 of a series of concrete minds, each of which is a distinct in- 
 dividual and, except in a figurative sense, inherits nothing 
 from any other. It has been mistakenly supposed that the 
 origin of species is the great problem, whereas the impor- 
 tant question concerns the origin and nature of individuals. 
 All else is logical manipulation.
 
 378 METAPHYSICS 
 
 The Future of Souls 
 
 On this point speculation cannot say much that is posi- 
 tive. The fact of experience is, first, that in our present 
 'existence the mental life has intimate and complex concom- 
 itance with the physical, and, secondly, that with the re- 
 'moval of the body the phenomenal manifestation of the 
 soul life ceases. We know death only from the outside; 
 what it is from the inside is beyond us. 
 
 The fact that consciousness varies with physical condi- 
 tions is often used to prove that apart from the body the 
 mental life would be impossible, and hence that for the con- 
 scious life, at least, death ends all. If, then, we admit a 
 soul in connection with the body, we must look upon its 
 conscious life as bound up with the existence of the body. 
 
 But the matter is not quite so simple. We do not see 
 that the body is necessary to consciousness, but that ab- 
 normal physical conditions may derange or hinder the de- 
 velopment of consciousness. On the most realistic view of 
 the body, it might conceivably be altogether other than it 
 is, and the mental life might go on just the same. We see 
 what we view as mental life in connection with the most 
 diverse organisms. There is, therefore, no a/priori connec- 
 tion between the mental life and any particular type of or- 
 ganism ; and, indeed, we are quite unable to tell in any case 
 what the present or any other organism, could do as a ground 
 of mentality. The relation, whatever it is, can only be 
 viewed as factual and contingent. The actual body, then, 
 is no analytically necessary factor of our inner life. We 
 may suppose the necessary stimulus thereto given directly 
 by the infinite, or we may suppose a succession of organ- 
 isms to provide the conditions of higher and higher mental 
 life.
 
 SOUL AND BODY 379 
 
 As to the fact of future existence pure speculation can- 
 not decide. It destroys knowledge, but it makes room for 
 belief. Criticism makes short work of the pretended dis- 
 proofs of immortality, by showing that they are only weak- 
 nesses of the dogmatic imagination. It equally overturns 
 the sense dogmatism which finds in the spatial and ph} T sical 
 the supreme, if not the only, type of the real. It shows 
 that the physical, even if temporally first in the finite order, 
 can lay no claim to be the truly real of which all later fac- 
 tors must be viewed as only products. The reality of the 
 finite would not be the physical alone, nor the mental alone ; 
 but both alike must be viewed as phases and implications 
 of the thought and plan of the infinite. By showing the 
 phenomenality of all spatial existence and of space itself, 
 criticism further removes the difficulties which arise from 
 the attempt to construe the soul and the immortal life spa- 
 tially. The decay and failure of the body do not analyti- 
 cally imply the destruction of the soul, as would be the 
 case if the body were its causal ground. The soul, when 
 the body fails, has not to go wandering through space to 
 find another home ; it is continuously comprised in the 
 thought and activity of the infinite. God gave it life, and 
 if he wills he will maintain it. This actual existence of all 
 things in God, while it does not remove the mystery of our 
 being, does diminish the sense of grotesque forlornness which 
 the conception of our disembodied existence is pretty sure 
 to awaken when we conceivs it in spatial forms. 
 
 Speculation makes room for belief, but for positive faith 
 we must fall back on the demands of our moral and relig- 
 ious nature, or on some word of revelation, or on both to- 
 gether. Our metaphysical reasonings on the nature of sub- 
 stance do not help us here. Speculatively we can only lay 
 down a formal principle without being able to draw any 
 concrete inferences from it. As all finite things have the
 
 380 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ground of their existence in the divine plan, we must say 
 that they will continue or pass away as their significance 
 for that plan demands. Of course we are ready to say that 
 only moral values are eternally significant, but it is well 
 not to be too sure of our deductions in the concrete. If 
 so many seemingly absurd things can exist, there is no 
 telling how long they may continue; and, on the other 
 hand, there are few things of such supreme value as to 
 make their vanishing a self-evident absurdity.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 
 
 IN a previous chapter we have treated of mechanism and 
 mechanical explanation. We seek to break up the complex 
 into the simple and combine it again from its elements. 
 We look for the elementary laws of procedure and then 
 seek to understand the fact as a result of those laws. In 
 the mechanical and inorganic world this largely takes the 
 form of analysis and synthesis according to rule, or of de- 
 composition and recomposition. We break up the body 
 into elements and regard it as resulting from their union, etc. 
 
 As the inorganic sciences first attained to any settled and 
 successful method of procedure, they very naturally tended 
 to give law to the studies in higher realms. Accordingly, 
 the attempt has very generally been made to carry this 
 mechanical method into the organic and mental field, but 
 only with imperfect success. Explanation by composition 
 is possible only when dealing with numerical and inorganic 
 wholes, the parts of which may exist independently. But 
 the living body is not the sum of its parts, but the parts 
 are functions of the body. The organic law of the whole 
 precedes and determines the parts; and the parts are not 
 parts existing by themselves, but only in connection with 
 the whole. Neither are the parts mechanically united by 
 mere juxtaposition; they unfold organically through the 
 life within. 
 
 No mechanical or spatial representation of organic activ-
 
 382 METAPHYSICS 
 
 ities is possible. And the mechanical study of life must 
 be confined to a study of the observable phenomenal laws 
 revealed in organic processes. This study is of the greatest 
 practical value, but it remains on the surface. When it 
 claims to reveal life itself it loses itself among showy ver- 
 bal generalizations which at bottom mean nothing or are 
 mere assurances of dogmatic theory. 
 
 The same is true of the mind in an even more marked 
 degree. If organic activities cannot be conceived in spatial 
 form, they at least produce spatial forms. They are, then, 
 allied to space in a way which removes any manifest ab- 
 surdity in speaking of them in space metaphors. But when 
 we come to the facts of psychology, neither the mental 
 subject nor the mental states have any spatial properties, 
 and these properties cannot be ascribed to them without 
 absurdity. Yet because we approach the mental life from 
 the physical side, and all our language concerning it is cast 
 in the moulds of matter, there is an almost universal effort 
 to express the life in spatial and mechanical terms ; and, in 
 analogy with the inorganic sciences, composition is put for- 
 ward as the great type of explanation. As masses are com- 
 pounded of molecules, and molecules of atoms, so all com- 
 plex mental states are compounded of simpler ones, and are 
 to be understood through them. This is the conception 
 which underlies the " synthetic psychology." 
 
 This view is perfectly natural and perfectly clear to one 
 who approaches the mental life from the physical side, and 
 without the critical training which enables him to see the 
 mental facts in their unique and incommensurable character. 
 The result is that a fearfully large part of psychological 
 literature is a mirage of words and physical images, which 
 either conceal the facts entirely or distort them out of all 
 likeness to themselves. Nowhere has the fallacy of lan- 
 guage wrought greater havoc and ravage than in this field ;
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 383 
 
 and psychology has no more pressing duty than to throw 
 off its age-long bondage to figures of speech. Of course in 
 studying the mental life, \ve must look for the fundamental 
 psychological laws, and must seek to exhibit particular facts 
 in their relations to these laws ; and if we choose to call 
 this procedure the mechanical method or the scientific 
 method, there is no objection. But we must never forget 
 that the supreme thing is to know the facts themselves, 
 whether we can make anything out of them or not. Ex- 
 planation is desirable when we can get it ; but explanation 
 by distortion is unprofitable business. 
 
 Composition, we said, is the great type of explanation in 
 the inorganic field. We have the atoms, and by variously 
 compounding them we explain molecules and masses. The 
 associational psychology is the analogue of this in the field 
 of mind. Elementary mental states, as sensations, are as- 
 sumed to be the only original raw material of consciousness, 
 and out of them by composition the higher forms of men- 
 tality are built up. This view is constructed entirely on 
 the model of physical mechanics, and more especially on 
 the model of molecular mechanics. The sensations and 
 their traces in memory are the units of the mental life, and 
 by their combination they are supposed to explain all the 
 higher forms. This view finds its most elaborate exposition 
 in the Herbartian psychology ; and in all its forms compo- 
 sition is the type of explanation relied on. Compound sen- 
 sations, groups of sensations, conception masses, are phrases 
 of constant recurrence. 
 
 All this is illusion. It arises from hiding the facts be- 
 hind physical and spatial metaphors, and then mistaking 
 the metaphors for the facts. Hence the need of rigorously 
 inspecting our terms in order to detect any parallax with 
 the facts. All spatial terras as applied to mind and con- 
 sciousness must be seen in their figurative character. Things
 
 384: METAPHYSICS 
 
 or events are not in the mind or in consciousness in any 
 spatial form or relation. They are neither before nor be- 
 hind, neither to the right nor to the left of one another. 
 To be sure we use spatial terms, but to fix the meaning, we 
 have to pass behind the terms to the experience. 
 
 If then we ask what being in consciousness means, the 
 dictionary, and etymology, and the imagination will not 
 help us. We must return to the experience, and then it 
 turns out that being in consciousness means what we ex- 
 perience when we are conscious of something. Objects are 
 separated and united, not spatially, but consciously and logi- 
 cally. They are comprehended in the spaceless, partition- 
 less, unpicturable apprehension of the conscious mind ; but, 
 as mental events or forms of mental activity, they have no 
 spatial properties or relations of any kind. Except in a 
 figurative sense, then, nothing is in consciousness. The ex- 
 act fact is that we are conscious of certain things ; and this 
 consciousness admits of no representation in space images. 
 It is absolutely unique and can only be experienced. 
 
 With the vanishing of space forms and relations from the 
 mental states, the notion of a mental mechanism begins to 
 grow obscure. When we have distinct things in space we 
 can easily picture various combinations ; but when the spa- 
 tial relation is denied we begin to grope as to the meaning 
 of mechanism. The matter is still worse when doubt is 
 cast on the substantiality of the component factors and on 
 their dynamic relations ; and this doubt emerges as soon as 
 we consider the alleged elementary elements of the mental 
 mechanism. 
 
 What are sensations? Because of the implicit working 
 of the category of substance, they tend to take on a substan- 
 tive and even a substantial form. They float vaguely in 
 unclear thought as a kind of something, mindstuff, units of 
 consciousness, or some such thing ; and the analogy of molec-
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 385 
 
 ular mechanics comes to our aid, and the mental mechanism 
 forthwith becomes a solid reality. 
 
 We see how the notion arises, but before we accept it we 
 must examine it more closely. Are, then, sensations things, 
 fragments of mindstuif, or elementary substantial units of 
 mentality ? Probably no one would answer in the affirma- 
 tive when the question is thus barely put. An indefinite 
 amount of psychological language and theory implies their 
 thinghood, but a little reflection dispels the illusion. Well, 
 then, once more, what are sensations ? 
 
 Suppose we call them mental states, or affections or mod- 
 ifications of the sensibility. They certainly are such ; but 
 what can we make of such sensations in constructing a men- 
 tal mechanism? To begin with, the states as occurring, or 
 as mental events, vanish with their date. They are perish- 
 ing phantasmagoria without anything abiding in them or 
 after them. With such data we can construct nothing. 
 But possibly it is their "traces," subconscious or nervous, 
 which abide. This notion of "traces" can be easily pict- 
 ured, and is very popular. But the traces are in the same 
 dilemma. The traces have no identity or constancy in 
 themselves. They are mainly mythological constructions, 
 but in any case they abide only as Niagara abides. In fact, 
 as our studies in epistemology have taught us, in the tem- 
 poral world of psychology nothing abides. It is only in 
 the ideal world of logic that anything abiding can be found. 
 It is not the sensations, then, as mental events which abide, 
 but rather and only the constant meaning which they ex- 
 press, or of which they are the bearers. This meaning, 
 however, is a purely logical and ideal function, and instead 
 of constructing thought it is its product. 
 
 And this leaves us more in the dark than ever as to the 
 possibility and even as to the meaning of our mental mech- 
 anism. Both the spatiality and the substantiality of the
 
 386 METAPHYSICS 
 
 factors have disappeared ; and the real working factors 
 turn out to exist only in and through thought itself. With- 
 out the universals of thought, the doctrine vanishes into a 
 phantasmagoric flux; and with them it begins with the very 
 universals it claims to generate. 
 
 But the deepest depth is not sounded until we inquire 
 concerning the dynamic relations of the sensations. If we 
 conceive the sensations, either as floating free or as affec- 
 tions of a mental subject, there is no answer to this ques- 
 tion which does not either commit us to nonsense, or else 
 subordinate the mechanism to a higher principle. The 
 nonsense results when the sensations are conceived as par- 
 ticular and separate existences, endowed with special forces 
 and united thereby into mental groups. We see this as 
 soon as we remember the adjectival nature of sensation, its 
 phantasmagoric and vanishing character as mental event, 
 and the impossibility of forming any conception of inherent 
 forces in such a case. 
 
 In the other case, where the sensations are regarded as 
 affections of a mental subject, we cannot work the doctrine 
 without appealing to some higher principle. At first it 
 might seem that as affections of a unitary subject they 
 would necessarily be brought into interaction, and then it 
 would be natural to consider them as endowed with inher- 
 ent forces, whereby they modify or combine with one an- 
 other. Herbart's theory is the most distinguished effort to 
 establish this view. 
 
 This doctrine seems simple and clear until we try to un- 
 derstand it, and then it is seen to be ambiguous and uncer- 
 tain. By sensation we may mean the logical contents, and 
 we may mean the psychological activity involved. Sensa- 
 tions in the former sense have only logical existence, and 
 hence have only logical Delations. Dynamism is absurd 
 when applied to logic. An inference is not a dynamic re-
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 387 
 
 sultant, but a logical consequence. The mechanism, then, if 
 there be one, must refer to the psychological activities. 
 
 But to endow these activities with forces of mutual at- 
 traction and repulsion is unintelligible. Being themselves 
 but flowing forms of action, they cannot be made agents. 
 If we decide that they are at least separate states of the 
 subject, and thus must influence one another, and hence 
 must be endowed with forces, we are no further on. We 
 are still in the midst of ambiguity. We oscillate between 
 the substantial and the adjectival conception, and between 
 the psychologic flow and the logical fixity. In any case 
 there is no way of dynamically representing the relations 
 of the mental states. When several impulses, a?, y, 2, are 
 communicated to the same body J/, they unite in a com- 
 mon resultant 7?, in which x, y, and z no longer exist. 
 If we should suppose them to persist as separate impulses, 
 and should next endow them with attractions and repul- 
 sions for one another, we should have precisely the problem 
 in hand. The forces are unintelligible and the unity of the 
 subject disappears. 
 
 The problem is insoluble from the side of the mental 
 states. Any relation which they may have must be through 
 the unity of the mental subject ; and what they are, or 
 what their mutual relations may be, depends not on them- 
 selves, or on any assumed interaction among them, but 
 rather and solely on the unitary mental nature which at 
 once determines their existence, and prescribes their recip- 
 rocal relations. This is the higher principle to which the 
 view must finally appeal ; and of this principle no spatial 
 or mechanical representation is possible. 
 
 This result contains the answer to another scruple which 
 may arise. At all events, we might say, the mental present 
 is the outcome of the mental past ; and what is this but to 
 say that it is the resultant of the past ? If then we could
 
 388 METAPHYSICS 
 
 have exhaustively grasped the past, we should have seen the 
 present necessarily resulting. 
 
 This is a specimen of the vague and hasty generaliza- 
 tions into which the uncritical mind, full of notions about 
 continuity and law and totality, is sure to fall. But not to 
 mention the uncertainties involved in the assumed reality 
 of time, the suggestion becomes relevant only through the 
 further assumption that all that need be taken account of 
 is the particular mental states, or that the mental nature is 
 exhaustively expressed in them. This cannot be allowed ; 
 and if there be a mental nature which determines the rela- 
 tions and resultants of the mental states, the claim is un- 
 important, even if true. It would be like a claim that the 
 development of the organism is intelligible if we consider 
 not only the actual disposition and interaction of the parts, 
 but also the immanent law which determines the direction 
 and type of growth. This would indeed be true, but, as 
 assuming the ground of the progress in the assumed data, 
 it would not be a great contribution to knowledge. 
 
 In the Herbartian view the mind is simply the unitary 
 subject which holds the elementary mental states together. 
 All else in consciousness results from their interaction. The 
 mind is the passive stage across which they pass, or on 
 which they unite or divide, mix and mingle. This exactly 
 inverts the true order. The entire movement can be under- 
 stood only from the side of the unitary nature, and in no 
 way from the side of the particular mental events. The 
 view itself arises from thinking in sense forms and physical 
 metaphors. 
 
 Thus the spatiality, the substantiality, and the dynamic 
 quality disappear entirely from the factors of our mechan- 
 ism. We may still retain something which we call mech- 
 anism, but at all events all attempts at constructing the
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 389 
 
 higher forms of intelligence out of the lower, all explana- 
 tion by composition, must be abandoned. Sensations are 
 not stuff which can be variously moulded, or substantial 
 units which may be variously grouped. Neither are the 
 higher conceptions compounds which admit of being decom- 
 posed into something else. They may emerge only under 
 sense conditions, but they are in no sense made out of them. 
 
 The matter may be abstractly put as follows : Suppose 
 that #, b, c, d are elementary sensations which are followed 
 by M. M may coexist with a, J, c, d; and then the latter 
 would not be the components of M, but its conditions. Or 
 0, b, c, d may disappear from consciousness and M takes 
 their place. In this case we may say that a, J, c, d have 
 fused into M ; but this would be only a metaphor. Or we 
 may say that a, b, c, d are M / and this would be false. It 
 only remains that we say that a, b, c, d are conditions un- 
 der which the mind produces M. This does not contain a, 
 J, c, 6?, and is not made out of #, 5, c, d, but arises under the 
 conditions a, J, c, d. And in order to do this, there must be 
 a specific mental nature, N, which contains the ground of 
 the new reaction M; otherwise there is no ground for going 
 beyond the original , J, <?, d. 
 
 With this result there remains nothing of the mental 
 mechanism beyond the general notion of law; and this 
 must be restricted to phenomenal significance and a reason- 
 able degree of extension to adjacent cases. In other words, 
 we must restrict ourselves to the laws we find, and must 
 hold them for what they are practically worth, without 
 erecting them into an absolute system, dynamic or other 
 wise. But the mechanism of the constructive and synthetic 
 school, whereby all higher forms are deduced or built up 
 from lower forms must be resigned to the pictorial psychol- 
 ogists and writers of popular pedagogics, who have always 
 found their advantage in it. As the material mechanism
 
 390 METAPHYSICS 
 
 of nature must be restricted to phenomenal significance, and 
 in many cases even to a device of method, so the mental 
 mechanism must be similarly restricted. In neither case 
 are we permitted to think we are dealing with the real fac- 
 tors which produce the phenomena. In the case of the 
 mental mechanism, the alleged factors are absurd when 
 hypostasized as realities and endowed with forces. We 
 have absolutely no categories which will furnish any in- 
 sight into the causality involved; and we must content 
 ourselves with describing the phenomenal order as it is re- 
 vealed in experience. All else is rhetoric or fiction. 
 
 The English associationalists have never accepted the 
 Herbartian ontology ; but they have agreed in viewing the 
 sensations as the raw material of the mental life, and in 
 viewing the higher forms of mentality as resulting from the 
 lower forms under the law of association. They have also 
 been, if possible, even more unclear than Herbart in their 
 conception of their own position. They waver between re- 
 garding the association of ideas as an ultimate fact, and 
 viewing the relations of contiguity, similarity, etc., as forces 
 of mental cohesion and movement. How to give such re- 
 lations dynamic significance is an exceedingly difficult prob- 
 lem, and has commonly been solved by simply using dy 
 namic terms. What it is which is associated has also never 
 been clearly thought out. Is it particular states, or logical 
 universals ? It is generally given out that it is the former ; 
 but we have seen that the former are nothing whatever for 
 intelligence, until they are elevated to the plane of the uni- 
 versal. Purely particular experiences admit of no associa- 
 tion, because they admit of no existence. And when the 
 theory sets out with the universals which it professes to 
 generate, its success ought not to surprise us. But the fun- 
 damental conceptions being thus unclear, it is not strange 
 that their application should be full of uncertainty.
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 391 
 
 In addition to explaining construction, the mechanical 
 process is supposed equally to explain reproduction. Here 
 rhetoric has wrought some of its worst ravages. "We first 
 substitute physical images for the facts ; then we h} T posta- 
 size the images and endow them with forces, and finally we 
 regard the images as having veritable identity in time. The 
 result is a grotesque mythology which is solemnly taught 
 and devoutly received as the sincere milk of the psychologic 
 word, but which in fact is the crying scandal of psycholog- 
 ical science. This hocus-pocus necessarily results from try- 
 ing to represent the unpicturable facts of psychology in the 
 picture forms of the spatial imagination. One must read 
 in the synthetic psychology to get an adequate idea of the 
 extent to which these mythological fictions have infested 
 the science. 
 
 It is easy to see how the illusion with respect to reproduc- 
 tion arises. We recall the past, we say, and forthwith we 
 judge it must have been somewhere in the mind ; how else 
 could it be recalled? We have knowledge of many things 
 of which we are not always conscious ; and when this knowl- 
 edge is not in consciousness, where can it be but below con- 
 sciousness ? And this sub-conscious region is easily figured 
 as the vast halls or dim chambers of memory, where the 
 past is stored, or, more scientifically, as submerged strata 
 in which traces of the ancient life remain, or, both scientif- 
 ically and philosophically, as filled with latent mental modi- 
 fications and sub-conscious or sub-liminal mental states, or, 
 as the last word of the objective method, as filled up with 
 nascent-motor excitations with ideal attachments. Or we 
 may endow the ideas with attractive and repulsive forces 
 whereby they repress or re-enforce one another. And if 
 we next endow consciousness with a " threshold," and sup- 
 pose that when the intensity of an idea is above a certain 
 limit it is in consciousness, and that when it sinks below
 
 392 METAPHYSICS 
 
 that limit it is out of consciousness, we see at once that re- 
 production is a simple matter ; it is simply the reappearance 
 above the threshold of ideas which have been in the mind 
 since the original experience. In all of these cases repro- 
 duction consists in bringing back into consciousness matter 
 which exists in some form outside of consciousness. Mem- 
 ory, of course, has no longer any mystery ; for we see how 
 the same idea sinks below and rises above the threshold. 
 This sinking and rising are respectively forgetting and re- 
 membering; and the identity of the idea throughout the 
 process manifestly secures the validity of recollection. 
 
 The critical reader is familiar with the vast amount of 
 this matter in popular psychology. A first criticism must 
 consist in inquiring into the meaning of reproduction itself. 
 "What is reproduced, the original fact as mental event, or 
 the logical contents of that fact ? 
 
 The question answers itself. The original fact as partic- 
 ular mental event vanished with its date, and can be recall- 
 ed as little as its date can be. The logical contents, on the 
 other hand, have no psychological and temporal existence. 
 They are a product of thought, and exist only in the ideal 
 world of logic. With this insight all that elaborate ma- 
 chinery vanishes as an imaginative fiction. 
 
 The reproduction of an idea is a permissible phrase in 
 popular speech, but in reality it would mean the production 
 of another idea, psychologically considered, but with the 
 same logical contents or value. But this sameness, as only 
 a logical identity, exists only for thought and in thought. 
 And it exists for thought, in the case of reproduction, only 
 as the mind relates the ideas to itself and to one another 
 under the form of time, and then assimilates the new idea 
 to the old by identifying the contents common to both. 
 Hence reproduction is impossible as a psychological fact in 
 any case; and it is possible as a logical fact only to a mind
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 393 
 
 endowed with memory. Reproduction could never be known 
 as such by a mind without an independent power of mem- 
 ory. In such a mind there might be a stream of similar ex- 
 periences, the similarity remaining unrecognized, but there 
 would be no suspicion of reproduction. 
 
 When the speculator assumes that identically the same 
 things recur in reproduction and are known as the same as 
 a matter of course, reproduction seems fully to explain mem- 
 ory. Or when he supposes that similar events occur in ex- 
 perience and that this similarity is recognized as self-evident, 
 once more reproduction seems fully to explain memory. 
 But when it is seen that both sameness and similarity are 
 logical relations ; and that they can exist in this connection 
 only for a mind which can give its experience the temporal 
 form, and identify the constant contents in the changing 
 states, then it is plain that we must invert the order and 
 explain reproduction by memory instead of explaining mem- 
 ory by reproduction. 
 
 For the uninitiated of course this will be an unintelligible 
 refinement. As experience occurs in time it will necessarily 
 recur in the old temporal form. And when we think of 
 the original experience in its temporal order and relations, 
 it seems about self-evident that there is nothing for it to do 
 but to come back just as it was. And when it comes back 
 the mind will recognize it as a matter of course, for how 
 could it be otherwise ? But when we remember that mem- 
 ory, so far as it is in time, is in the present, that past expe- 
 rience is neither in the mind nor out of it in a spatial or 
 representative sense, that ideas have no local tags or tem- 
 poral signs, and that events can be in time for the mind 
 only as the mind gives them the temporal form and fixes 
 their temporal relations, the matter is no longer so simple. 
 
 Memory itself can be explained by nothing but itself. 
 If we should suppose experience registered in the mental
 
 394 METAPHYSICS 
 
 mechanism, or written out in full on the nervous or spirit- 
 ual substance, or should suppose a mental mechanism con- 
 tinually producing a set of similar ideas, not a step would 
 be taken toward memory. The person who finds in such 
 a fact a full explanation of memor}' merely mistakes his 
 knowledge of what is to be done for the development of 
 that knowledge within the mental mechanism itself; and 
 that is quite another matter. 
 
 In so far as we distinguish in reproduction anything 
 other than memory proper, it must be brought under the 
 general notion of habit. In the mental and organic world 
 facility increases with practice ; what has been done can be 
 more easily done ; there is a tendency to repeat past forms 
 of activity, or to complete them, if any factor of a past 
 form be given in present experience. Here belong the laws 
 of mental association. But of these laws also no mechani- 
 cal representation is possible. The facts have no physical 
 analogue ; and the application of physical images only mis- 
 leads by a false appearance of knowledge, while they really 
 prevent us from perceiving the true nature of the facts. 
 The mechanical and dynamic categories are illusory in this 
 field. The facts cannot be pictured, but only experienced. 
 If we would know what they are we must enter into con- 
 sciousness itself, and note the experience in question. All 
 that is possible, then, is to seek some expression for the 
 facts which shall give them without distortion, and without 
 admixture of misleading theory. We venture the follow- 
 ing statements : 
 
 1. Thoughts and mental states in general are not things, 
 but mental acts or functions. As such, they exist only in 
 and through the soul's act ; and when the act is not per- 
 formed they exist nowhere, whether in consciousness or out 
 of it. 
 
 2. When in a later experience any elements are given
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 395 
 
 similar to those in an earlier experience, the earlier experi- 
 ence is often reproduced in its significance. 
 
 3. Reproduction in no way brings back the old fact as 
 mental event. The mind performs anew the ancient func- 
 tion, thus producing a new experience but with a content 
 similar to the old. 
 
 4. The past is not in the mind at all except in a figura- 
 tive sense. The fact is exhausted in the power to rethink 
 the past and to know it as past. This power of reproduc- 
 tion and recognition admits of no deduction and is a unique 
 fact of the mental world. All attempts to tell how it is 
 possible overlook the essential features of the fact ; and the 
 various faculties invented for its explanation are abstrac- 
 tions from the fact itself. 
 
 Nobody can remember for another. The notion of an 
 organ or mechanism to remember with is ludicrous. After 
 notebooks, memoranda, brain registers, vibrations, vibra- 
 tiuncles, and nascent-motor excitations have done their best, 
 there is still no provision for the unique act of memory. 
 The living mind must do this for itself. And the laws of 
 association may not be looked upon as causal or as being 
 anything more than descriptive specifications of a process 
 which admits of no construction. The explanation they 
 give consists in classification and leads to no insight. When 
 a so-called fact of reproduction occurs, we classify it under 
 one or another of the laws of association, but we have no 
 knowledge of the inner nature of the fact. And assuming 
 the law, we commonly have to content ourselves with find- 
 ing our way from the fact to the law without being able to 
 reverse the process and pass from the law to the fact. What 
 associations a given fact will call up is beyond us. We have 
 to wait and see ; and then we may possibly find some law 
 exemplified. Of course we fancy that if we knew all the 
 past history of a mind and its present circumstances as well,
 
 396 METAPHYSICS 
 
 we could foretell the course of association ; but this amounts 
 only to saying that there is a sufficient reason in the case. 
 What it is or how to conceive it remains as dark as ever. 
 The attempt to conceive it in mechanical terms and spatial 
 figures leads to absurdity, and beyond these all is mystery. 
 
 For form's sake a word may be devoted to the fancy that 
 this mystery of reproduction is greatly cleared up by fall- 
 ing back upon the brain as the seat of the mental mechanism. 
 Only suppose ideas to have physical representatives in the 
 brain and light begins to break in. These representatives 
 abide, and by their dynamic relations determine one an- 
 other, and thus mediately they determine the ideas. Hence 
 all that takes place in consciousness is but the echo of a 
 series of activities in the brain. 
 
 For all who think in pictures this view is a relief. Re- 
 production as a psychological process is fairly obscure, when 
 the problem is understood ; but " this looks better. One 
 sees both where and how." It is in the brain that the work 
 is done; and the nerve cells or nascent-motor excitations 
 are fully equal to the task. 
 
 With a few additions this theory would be adequate : 
 
 1. There is needed an independent power of memory in 
 the mind itself. Without this there might be in a way a 
 recurrence of experience, but never an experience of recur- 
 rence. This apart from the fact that mind is needed to 
 make the mechanism itself possible. 
 
 2. There is needed a parallel reproductive activity in the 
 mind itself. However wonderfully the nascent -motor ex- 
 citations might work, the product would be non - existent 
 for the mind unless it built it up within and for itself. 
 
 3. There is need for some exposition of the meaning of 
 the doctrine itself. Of course knowledge is not in the brain, 
 for that is purely a function of consciousness ; and the re-
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 397 
 
 lations which constitute knowledge are not in the brain, 
 for they have only a logical existence and depend entirely 
 on the relating activity of thought itself. And what is true 
 of the original knowing is equally true of the later remem- 
 bering. It all lies on the mental side, and is pure nonsense 
 when located on the physical side. 
 
 4. Hence there is special need for more light on the nat- 
 ure of the physical representative. Knowledge being many, 
 is the representative one or many? If one, how can it 
 equally represent the many ? If many, is it a cell, a fibre, 
 a vibration, or a vibratiuncle ? Again, if one, how is its re- 
 productive activity differentiated ? And if many, how are 
 the many activities integrated ? By differentiation and in- 
 tegration respectively perhaps. 
 
 5. There is need for some proof that the physical repre- 
 sentatives are there. No doubt the cells and fibres of anat- 
 omy are there as phenomena, but what is needed is proof 
 that they, or anything else, stands in the psychological re- 
 lations assumed by this theory. 
 
 With these additions the theory might be made adequate ; 
 but at the same time it would be made worthless. The con- 
 fusion and complexity of the doctrine have been unfolded 
 at length in my work, Introduction to Psychological Theory. 
 
 The only sense in which the brain may be called the or- 
 gan of memory is that in which the brain is the organ of 
 thought. This does not mean that the brain does the re- 
 membering and thinking for the mind, or that the mind 
 uses the brain to think or remember with ; but only that 
 thought and recollection are cerebrally conditioned. This 
 simple fact of experience is made the occasion for the fan- 
 tastic whimsies of the cerebral theory with the result of 
 immensely increasing our difficulties without adding any 
 insight. 
 
 In the Academy at Laputa, as reported by Gulliver, there
 
 398 METAPHYSICS 
 
 was great scientific research of a sort. But none of the in- 
 vestigations there undertaken equalled the vagaries of the 
 cerebral theory of reproduction, consisting, as it does, main- 
 ly of improvised anatomy, fictitious psychology, and picture 
 logic. 
 
 The synthetic or constructive psychology, with its im- 
 plicit category of composition and mechanical combination, 
 must be abandoned ; and psychology must be largely de- 
 scriptive and classificatory rather than explanatory in the 
 causal sense. The description and classification of the men- 
 tal facts, however, are important ; and when the work is ac- 
 curately done, it is much more valuable than fictitious ex- 
 planations. The facts will remain mysterious in their inner 
 ground and genesis, but they will be known as facts. And 
 real mysteries are more valuable than unreal fictions, or 
 sham knowledge. 
 
 It is important, however, that in the classification of the 
 mental states we be ever on our guard against the fallacy 
 of the universal. A vast amount of psychological literature 
 has been made irrelevant or barren by this fallacy. The 
 fancy has been held that in classifying the mental facts we 
 come upon their true essence, or original from which they 
 spring. Hence, if we class them all together, they are sup- 
 posed to be unified and traced to a common source. This 
 illusion has been discussed at length in the Theory of Thought 
 and Knowledge. We there saw that classifying things does 
 nothing to the things but leaves them all they ever were. 
 We unify our thoughts or get a more convenient expression 
 for many things, but the things remain as distinct as ever. 
 And when we come to deal with the things as existing we 
 have to pick up all concrete individual elements which we 
 dropped out in the classification. 
 
 All that lies beyond this description and classification in
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 399 
 
 the way of explanation must be taken as we find it, or for 
 what we can make out of it. There are sundry psycholog- 
 ical laws revealed in experience, and by means of them we 
 can get a kind of understanding of many facts, and can lay 
 down various practical rules for the guidance of life. But 
 this understanding, even when it is more than simple classi- 
 fication, must be psychologically, not mechanically, inter- 
 preted. That is, it must not be interpreted by some me- 
 chanical scheme of interacting forces which have a resultant 
 in time, but it must rather be interpreted by our knowledge 
 of human nature, or of the way in which the mind works. 
 In the latter case it is not a mechanical resultant under 
 some law of necessity, but rather the kind of thing which 
 our psychological experience leads us to expect. How this 
 kind of thing is possible may lie entirely beyond us, being 
 as unanswerable as the question how being itself is possible ; 
 but as we find it given in experience, we practically build 
 on it. 
 
 For instance, suppose a new interest or a new idea arising 
 in the mind either of the individual or of the community. 
 We get absolutely no insight by endowing the new idea 
 with dynamic attractions and repulsions whereby it modi- 
 fies other ideas and makes a place for itself. We may in- 
 deed use such language, but when we enter into ourselves 
 we find it impossible to make out any tenable meaning. 
 But by our general knowledge of human nature, and of the 
 way in which the mind works, we are enabled to form some 
 notion of what to expect. Or, after the fact has declared 
 itself, we are able to assimilate it to our general knowledge 
 of humanity so that it falls into line with the continuity of 
 experience. This is the only explanation possible in the 
 case, and the only one we ever get. Such insight as we 
 possess into personal character, the social structure, the 
 philosophy of history, is obtained in this way, and not from
 
 400 METAPHYSICS 
 
 a fictitious mechanism of ideas. Of course no one denies 
 the laws which are actually found in experience. Protest 
 is directed only against distorting these laws into a fictitious 
 mechanical dynamism. 
 
 Understanding of this type is further complicated by the 
 fact of freedom. We have to understand the action of a 
 free being, and not the movements of an automaton, or the 
 resultant of a mechanical combination. But here, too, some- 
 thing can be done, not in the way of mechanical deduction ; 
 but by combining our knowledge of the psychological con- 
 stants with our general knowledge of the way in which 
 men act, we can form some practical expectation for the 
 future and get some idea of the way in which life and his- 
 tory hang together. 
 
 In estimating this result, two things must be borne in 
 mind. The first is the emptiness of most general terms un- 
 til they are illustrated in concrete reality. All terms which 
 have to do with the actual remain bare forms until they re- 
 ceive their contents from experience. This is especially the 
 case with the conscious life. Here the understanding forms 
 and names a content which it does not generate, and which 
 can be realized only in life itself. The understanding can 
 name a certain feeling a sensation, a color sensation, a sen- 
 sation of red, and can locate it in the category of quality ; 
 but all this is empty and formal without the original feel- 
 ing. And when we are dealing with the latter, we see what 
 a gulf there is between anything the understanding can ex- 
 press in its formulas and the actual experience. All warmth, 
 richness, vividness, and immediacy are found in the living 
 experience ; and the logical form is only an instrument for 
 its realization. Logic and epistemology give the general 
 laws of thought and conditions of knowledge, and these are 
 of great importance for the understanding of the thought 
 life ; but apart from these, scientific psychology has exceed-
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 401 
 
 ingly little value for the knowledge of the inner life or of 
 human nature. It furnishes a terminology, but only scanty 
 insight. It reduces the multiplicity of life to a few general 
 heads, as thoughts, feelings, volitions. But what of it? 
 These terms are vague and empty, until we return to life 
 again. And when it comes to a real insight into life and 
 human nature, a professional psychologist would be about 
 the last man that could supply it. A novelist, a poet, a 
 dramatist, a lawyer, a pettifogger, a stump-speaker, a society 
 woman, a confidence man, might well have a knowledge of 
 human nature beyond anything that all the psychologies 
 in the world could furnish. This knowledge must be gained 
 from the study of life and literature, and not from formal 
 psychological treatises. One able lecturer on experimental 
 psychology, indeed, in setting forth its advantages, urges all 
 lawyers to take a course in the psychological laboratory for 
 the sake of greater effectiveness with juries. And prophecies 
 of good and great things to come from this line of investi- 
 gation have abounded and still abound; but up to date there 
 has been so alarming and distressing a tendency to elaborate 
 the obvious and discover the familiar that one is compelled to 
 discount the high expectations created by the advertisement. 
 The other thing to be borne in mind is the fact already 
 often referred to, the impossibility of understanding the 
 mental life in terms of anything but itself. There are no 
 back-lying categories by which the mental life is to be 
 tested, and through which it is to be understood. It is its 
 own test and standard. The phenomenality of all mechan- 
 ism and the relative and methodological nature of much 
 mechanical reasoning must put us on our guard in this Held 
 against all theorizing which cannot be verified in living ex- 
 perience. And in any case, we may never view the mental 
 mechanism as containing the productive causality of the 
 mental life.
 
 402 METAPHYSICS 
 
 It is on this practical basis that human life and history 
 are to be understood, so far as we can understand them. 
 In this way it is possible to deal with the individual for 
 practical purposes ; and in this way we may get some in- 
 sight into the philosophy of history. Not by fictitious me- 
 chanical constructions, nor by feigning unintelligible neces- 
 sities, but by applying our knowledge of mental laws to the 
 conditions of human life, we can get some idea of the un- 
 folding of life and history as a function at once of human 
 nature and of human freedom. To be sure this will not 
 give us an " exact science," but it will give us all the sci- 
 ence we are likely ever to have. The " exact science " in 
 this region up to date consists mainly in flourishes about 
 the reign of law. The rest is largely prophecy and adver- 
 tisement; and these two are one. 
 
 The reign of law is an excellent phrase and represents an 
 important fact, but we have to use it critically, not dog- 
 matically. We must inquire what the laws are which reign, 
 how they are to be understood, and what insight they fur- 
 nish. Laws are to be interpreted in their own field and in 
 accordance with their own subject matter, rather than by 
 analogies borrowed from incommensurable departments. 
 Until this is done we shall have ignorant and flighty per- 
 sons giving mechanical interpretations of life and history, 
 and setting forth that due reflection upon the instability of 
 the homogeneous, or the conservation of energy, or the fact 
 that motion is always along the line of least resistance, will 
 find therein a complete solution of all our problems. But 
 when we remember that there are laws and laws, and take 
 the laws as we find them, we may hope for some practical 
 insight, and in particular we may hope to be relieved from 
 the mass of sham knowledge which now oppresses us. Any 
 interpretation of phenomena which the facts themselves 
 compel will always be accepted ; but grave suspicion at-
 
 OF MENTAL MECHANISM 403 
 
 taches to all deductions from abstract phrases, or from the 
 reigning cosmological or biological speculation. When the 
 fashion changes the old phrases lend themselves equally well 
 to any other deduction whatever. For instance, any one in- 
 clining to write on the philosophy of history can reproduce 
 the familiar contention that history is a science, that social 
 phenomena are subject to law, and then naively assume that 
 his lucubrations are thereby made science and law ; and he 
 will not be so far off from the beaten track. 
 
 Beyond the purely psychological laws lie the laws of 
 logic. These are the great formal constants of thought; 
 and they are independent of all mechanism. They admit 
 of no dynamic expression or representation.
 
 FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 
 
 IN the previous chapter we have discussed the notion of 
 law and mechanism in mind. We have now to consider 
 the general problem of freedom. 
 
 In popular thought the conviction of freedom manifests 
 itself chiefly in connection with moral responsibility and ex- 
 ecutive moral activity; and the traditional argument for 
 freedom consists in appealing to the sense of responsibility, 
 and in pointing out that freedom is a manifest implication 
 of this and other facts of our moral nature. This argument 
 is by no means without weight. For common sense it is 
 the chief argument ; and for the critic who has got beyond 
 the superficial dogmatism of mechanical thinking, the argu- 
 ment has no small value. In the study of various classes of 
 facts we are not required to deal with them all in the same 
 way, unless the facts themselves admit of it. Our funda- 
 mental obligation is to deal with the facts in accordance 
 with their proper nature. If, then, in studying the facts 
 of the physical world we are led to the assumption of an 
 all-embracing uniformity of law, we may make that assump- 
 tion for the physical system. But if in studying the facts 
 of life, of conduct, of society, we find it necessary to assume, 
 in connection with law, a factor of freedom, a power of 
 choice and self - direction within certain limits, we have 
 equal right to assume it. It is only a mind misled by false 
 notions of continuity, and without a due appreciation of
 
 FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 405 
 
 logical method, which can take offence at such an assump- 
 tion. 
 
 But this argument from moral experience is by no means 
 the only one. The assumption of freedom has manifested 
 itself again and again in our previous discussion as a neces- 
 sary factor of rationality. There has been a very general 
 conviction in speculative circles that the belief in freedom 
 is an offence to reason. If we hold it at all it must be out 
 of deference to moral interests, and at a very considerable 
 sacrifice of our intellectual peace. How completely this in- 
 verts the truth has appeared in our previous discussion. It 
 has there appeared that faith in reason itself is involved in 
 freedom, and that the denial of freedom must lead to the 
 collapse of reason. We purpose now to gather up these vari- 
 ous considerations into a connected statement, in order that 
 we may see at once the speculative importance and neces- 
 sity of freedom, and also the superficial conception of the 
 categories out of which the speculative objections to free- 
 dom spring. 
 
 By freedom in our human life we mean the power of self- 
 direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and to 
 work for their realization. We do not mean an abstract 
 freedom existing by itself, but this power of self-direction 
 in living men and women. Abstract freedom exists as little 
 as abstract necessity. Actual freedom is realized only as 
 one aspect of actual life ; and it must always be discussed 
 in its concrete significance. 
 
 A very large part of the discussion of this subject has 
 been vitiated and often made void by failure to keep the 
 concrete definition in view. Freedom has been abstracted 
 as a function of the will without any light from intelligence, 
 or impulse from desire. This is a fictitious problem, and, as 
 such, can receive only fictitious solutions. At best it is a 
 mathematics of imaginary quantities.
 
 406 METAPHYSICS 
 
 Actual freedom is no such fiction. It is the freedom of 
 thinking and feeling human beings with some insight into 
 values, and a complex body of practical interests ; and this 
 freedom means simply their power of self-direction within 
 certain limits set by their own nature and the nature of 
 things. 
 
 Such freedom is presupposed in every department of life. 
 It is implicit in the assumption of responsibility on which 
 s s society is built. The moral nature in both its mandatory 
 and its retributive aspect is absurd without it. Moreover, 
 this power seems to be involved in the very thought of a 
 personal and rational life. A life of the Punch and Judy 
 type, in which there is a deal of lively chattering and the 
 appearance of strenuous action, yet without any real thought 
 and effort, is not a personal or rational life at all. A life, 
 also, in which consciousness is merely the stage on which 
 underlying mechanical impulses masquerade is likewise no 
 rational life. The purest illustration we have of self-direc- 
 tion is in the case of thinking itself. We direct and main- 
 tain attention, we criticise the successive steps of the argu- 
 ment, we look before and after, we think twice and reserve 
 our decision. The process goes on within reason itself, rea- 
 son supplying the motive, the norm, and the driving force. 
 ^Thus life itself spontaneously takes on the form of freedom ; 
 and if freedom were an unquestioned fact it could hardly 
 manifest itself more unambiguously than it seems to do 
 now. 
 
 With this understanding of what freedom is we recur to 
 its speculative significance. This appears first in its bear- 
 ing on the problem of error. That problem lies in this fact : 
 First, it is plain that unless our faculties are essentially 
 truthful, there is an end to all trustworthy thinking. But, 
 secondly, it is equally plain that a large part of thought and 
 belief is erroneous. Hence the question arises, as a matter
 
 FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 407 
 
 of life or death for rational thought, how to reconcile the 
 existence of error with faith in the essential truthfulness of 
 our faculties. In discussing this problem in the Theory of 
 Thought and Knowledge we saw that freedom is the only 
 solution which does not wreck reason itself. In a scheme 
 of necessity error becomes cosmic and necessary, and reason 
 is overwhelmed in scepticism. 
 
 These considerations make it plain that the question of 
 freedom enters intimately into the structure of reason itself. - 
 It is a question not merely of our executive activities in the 
 outer world, but also of our inner rational activity. Hence 
 the advantage of changing the venue from the court of 
 ethics to the court of reason. In the former there is always 
 room for speaking of the weight of motives, or of the strong- 
 er impulse, and thus we fail to get the clear illustration of 
 freedom involved in the passionless operations of thought 
 itself. There is the further advantage that every one prac- 
 tically allows this self-control in thought. "We are able to 
 think twice, to return upon the argument, to tear asunder 
 the plausible and misleading conjunctions of habit and asso- 
 ciation, and to reserve our decision until the crystalline con- 
 nection of reason has been reached. The necessitarian is 
 impatient of bad logic in his opponent, calls upon him to 
 clear up his thoughts, and wonders why he is so slow in 
 drawing a manifest conclusion. Even the materialist, for 
 whom thinking is but the mental shadow of certain nervous 
 processes, expects logic, and to that extent attributes free- 
 dom. For there is no hesitation, no thinking twice, no re- 
 serving of judgment in an order of necessary movement. 
 There might possibly be to an outside observer a mimicry 
 of such hesitation ; but the reality could not exist. In such 
 an order the resultant is at once and irrevocably declared, 
 as in the movement of a pair of scales. If we should make 
 the grotesque assumption of a series of mechanical forces
 
 408 METAPHYSICS 
 
 endowed with consciousness, what possible meaning could 
 we attach to their demands upon one another for logic, or 
 to their mutual reproaches for failure to think clearly, or 
 for failure to hold this, that, or the other view ? Or if we 
 suppose the scale-pans or their loads to become conscious, 
 while remaining under the law of mechanical resultants, 
 what meaning could be attached to their thinking twice and 
 reserving their opinion as to which should sink or rise? 
 Imagine a scale-pan debating whether to rise or fall, and 
 finally deciding to follow the heavier weight. The farcical 
 . nature of the performance would be apparent to the dullest. 
 In the field of thought proper, every one, in spite of him- 
 self, assumes that reason is a self-controlling force. Free- 
 Vlom in thought cannot be rationally disputed without as- 
 suming it. Such is seen to be the real standing of the 
 necessitarian argument as soon as we transfer the discussion 
 to the field of thought. If, then, we were looking for the 
 most important field of freedom we should certainly find it 
 in the moral realm ; but if we were seeking the purest il- 
 lustration of freedom we should find it in the operations of 
 pure thought. Here we have a self -directing activity which 
 proceeds according to laws inherent in itself and to ideals 
 generated by itself. And any one wishing to find his way 
 into this problem of freedom will do well to consider first 
 of all the relation of freedom to intelligence itself, and the 
 collapse of rationality involved in the system of necessity. 
 
 Thus far on the significance of freedom in relation to the 
 human subject. We next recall our conclusion that with- 
 out assuming a free cause as the source of the outer world 
 the mind is unable to satisfy its own rational nature or to 
 bring any line of thought to an end. We found the con- 
 ception of causality eluding us in the infinite regress and 
 vanishing into the absolute flux, where thought perishes, 
 until we raised the conception to the volitional form. We
 
 FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 409 
 
 also found that the search for unity and the desire for ex- 
 planation and for the unification of the system of things in 
 a common source are alike frustrated until we pass beyond 
 the order of necessary and mechanical thinking, and rise to 
 the conception of free intelligence as the source and abiding 
 seat of all existence. As we need the conception of free- 
 dom in man for the solution of the problem of error, so we 
 also need the conception of freedom as the source of the 
 cosmos to make it amenable to the demands of our intelli- 
 gence. 
 
 Freedom, then, has deep significance for life, for science, 
 for philosophy, for reason itself. This significance will 
 further appear if we next recall our conclusions respecting 
 the opposite idea of necessity. This is commonly supposed 
 to be clear and self-evident, while freedom is the difficult 
 notion. This illusion is pretty sure to arise in the early 
 stages of reflection; but deeper reflection dispels it. We 
 have seen that the only clear conception we have of neces- 
 sity is rational necessity ; that is, the necessity which at- 
 taches to the relations of ideas, as in logic and mathematics. 
 But this necessity is not found in experience, whether of 
 the inner or the outer world. The elements of experience 
 and their connections are all contingent, so far as rational 
 necessity goes ; that is, we cannot deduce them from ideas 
 or connect them by any rational bond. The necessity, 
 then, if there be any, is metaphysical ; and this logic finds 
 to be an exceedingly obscure notion, one which eludes any 
 positive conception. It can be neither sensuously cognized 
 nor rationally comprehended; and the more we wrestle 
 with the idea the worse our puzzle becomes. In discussing 
 the categories in the Theory of Thought and Knowledge we 
 found it impossible to do anything with the notion without 
 adding to it the further notion of potentiality ; and what a 
 necessary metaphysical potentiality might be we found it
 
 410 METAPHYSICS 
 
 hard to say. It must be in some sense an actuality, or it 
 could never affect actuality ; and yet it cannot be an actual 
 actuality without antedating itself. We found ourselves 
 driven, then, to distinguish two kinds of actuality, potential 
 actuality and actual actuality, without, however, the least 
 shadow of insight into the distinction between them. And 
 in order to do this, we have to make causality temporal, 
 which is impossible. Non-temporal necessity, on the other 
 hand, would be motionless and would lead to nothing. Thus 
 the doctrine of necessity finds itself in unstable equilibrium 
 between the groundless becoming of Hume's doctrine, in 
 which events succeed one another without any inner ground 
 or connection, and a doctrine of freedom, in which the 
 ground of connection and progress is to be found, not in 
 any unmanageable metaphysical bond which defies all un- 
 derstanding, but in the ever-present freedom which posits 
 events in a certain order, and thus forever administers all 
 that we mean by the system of law, and founds all that we 
 mean by the necessity in things. 
 
 The metaphysics of necessity is certainly very obscure, 
 and it is even hard to keep the notion from vanishing under 
 our hands. Mr. Mill felt so strongly both the difficulty of 
 the notion and the lack of proof of any corresponding fact 
 that he proposed to banish the term entirely from philosophy, 
 and replace it by the empirical notion of uniformity. But 
 this may be only the obscurity which attaches to all ulti- 
 mate facts ; and the metaphysics of freedom may be equally 
 or more obnoxious to criticism. This indeed is very gener- 
 ally declared to be the case. The difficulties alleged con- 
 sist mainly of misunderstandings. 
 
 And, first, it is supposed that freedom asserts pure law- 
 lessness. This is a closet contention. It is not born of any 
 observation of life and experience, or of any profound re- 
 flection, but only of a verbal exegesis. Freedom every-
 
 FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 411 
 
 where presupposes a basis of fixity or uniformity to give 
 it any meaning. An absolute freedom, unconditioned by 
 any law whatever, is simply our old friend pure being, and 
 cancels itself. Even for the absolute being, we must affirm 
 a fixed nature as the condition of freedom; and without 
 this, thought perishes. 
 
 Now to the superficial thinker and dealer in abstractions 
 this smacks of contradiction ; and so it must as long as we 
 discuss the question abstractly. The abstract notion of 
 freedom and the abstract notion of necessity are contradic- 
 tory ; just as the abstract notions of concavity and convex- 
 ity are contradictory. But as the latter notions, though 
 contradictory, do yet contrive to coexist, so successfully in- 
 deed that they cannot exist apart, so it may be that the 
 other contradictions may be reconciled in reality. We must 
 then look away from the abstract notions to the concrete 
 facts, if we would get any light on this problem. There is 
 no abstract freedom and no abstract necessity. We are 
 thrown back upon experience to discover what the facts 
 really are. 
 
 And here we find a certain measure of self-control and a 
 certain order of uniformity. The former "represents the 
 only concrete notion of freedom which we possess ; and the 
 latter represents the only concrete notion of necessity. Any- 
 thing beyond this is abstract and fictitious. There is noth- 
 ing in experience corresponding to it; and when we get 
 into these depths experience is our only test both of reality 
 and of possibility. And we not only find these elements 
 given in experience, but we find them so given that reality 
 appears inconceivable and impossible without both, just as 
 concavity and convexity must be united in any real curve. 
 
 The clearest illustration of this we find in thought itself. 
 The laws of thought represent absolute fixities of mental 
 procedure. They are the constants of the mental equation.
 
 412 METAPHYSICS 
 
 without variableness or shadow of turning. They repre- 
 sent no legislation of the will, and admit of no abrogation 
 or rebellion. And yet, though thus secure from all tamper- 
 ing and overthrow, though thus existing in their own in- 
 alienable right, they do not of themselves secure obedience. 
 For this there is needed an act of ratification by the free 
 spirit. The mind must accept these laws and govern itself 
 in accordance with them. It must watch itself, scrutinize 
 its processes, tear asunder the associations of habit and re- 
 sist the hasty generalization, if it would reach the truth. 
 Only thus do we become truly rational, and that by our 
 own free act. < Thus we discover freedom and uniformity 
 united in reality ; or rather we discover reality as having 
 these opposite aspects. It is not compounded of them, as 
 if they pre-existed, but it manifests itself in this antithetic 
 way. 
 
 Now if we should discuss this question academically, or 
 with abstract notions, it would admit of no solution. We 
 should be in the same plight as when discussing the union 
 of unity and plurality, or simplicity and variety, or change 
 and identity. We found that the mere analysis of these 
 notions led to nothing. We had to fall back on experience 
 which showed us the ideas actually united in our concrete 
 intellectual life. And we further found that we have no 
 other conception of the concrete meaning of these ideas 
 than that which we get from the study of our mental ex- 
 perience. 
 
 In any case, then, the assertion that freedom means law- 
 lessness is mistaken. An element of uniformity must al- 
 ways be allied with freedom even in the absolute being. 
 At the same time we have seen that this element becomes 
 controlling only through freedom. 
 
 For us human beings this element of fixity is very prom- 
 inent. To a great extent we are a datum for ourselves.
 
 FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 4-13 
 
 The essential nature of our susceptibilities and constitutional 
 activities is beyond our control. So also are the laws of 
 thought and association, and the general laws of nature. 
 "We may use these laws for the attainment of our ends, but 
 we cannot make or unmake them. We are also members 
 of a system of law ; and the demands which this system 
 makes upon us are something we cannot escape. The world 
 of sensation and the resulting desires and attention and re- 
 flex action are only to a slight extent within our power. 
 We are shut in on many sides by walls of hewn stone. 
 
 Hence human freedom has only a limited sphere. It does 
 not provide the laws of the intellect, of the sensibilities, of 
 external nature, or the possibility of its own action. And 
 within its own sphere it is far from absolute. Only a cer- 
 tain intensity of activity seems possible to it in given cir- 
 cumstances", and when the resistance to be overcome is too 
 great freedom is overborne. Of course the speculator of 
 the all-or-none type will take offence at this notion. It will 
 be equally objectionable to those who insist on sharply 
 drawn frontiers. But both of these classes belong to the 
 family of Unwisdom. 
 
 This general conception of freedom vacates a set of ob- 
 jections drawn from the postulates of science. Science, it 
 is said, assumes the uniformity of law, and thus excludes 
 freedom. Science assumes that under like circumstances 
 there must be the same result. Freedom assumes that un- 
 der like circumstances there may be a different result. The 
 opposition is absolute and admits of no mediation. For 
 mental science Mr. Spencer, in his Principles of Psychology, 
 puts the matter very trenchantly : " Psychical changes 
 either conform to law or they do not. If they do not con- 
 form to law, this work, in common with all works on the 
 subject, is sheer nonsense. If they do conform to law there 
 cannot be any such thing as free-will."
 
 414 . METAPHYSICS 
 
 This is peremptory ; and thus we seem to be landed in a 
 very grievous antinomy. On the one hand, a system of 
 necessity destroys reason, and, on the other hand, the ad- 
 mission of freedom is fatal to science. Fortunately the 
 antinomy disappears on noting the purely abstract and ver- 
 bal character of the objection. It tacitly assumes that free- 
 dom means pure lawlessness, whereas our freedom presup- 
 poses the order of law as its condition. Freedom uses this 
 order, and science studies this order. Science concerns it- 
 self with the modes of being and happening among things 
 and events ; and their existence and nature are in no way 
 affected by the question of freedom. The forms and laws 
 of sensibility, the laws and categories of intelligence are not 
 involved in freedom ; and, whether we affirm or deny free- 
 dom, these laws and forms exist as the proper subject of 
 psychological study. The belief in freedom vacates the 
 science of psychology just as much and just as little as it 
 vacates the science of physics and chemistry. In both the 
 physical and the mental realm the believer in freedom finds 
 an agent acting in accordance with an order of law and, 
 by means of that order, freely realizing his own aims. Free- 
 dom, then, is not opposed to physics, or chemistry, or psy- 
 chology, or any other modest science which studies the laws 
 of things and events, but only to " Science " that is, that 
 speculative dream which aims to bind up all things in a 
 scheme of necessity; and this, so far from being science is 
 simply one of those uncritical whimseys of which the dog- 
 matic intellect has ever been so prolific. Indeed, this 
 scheme is so far from being science that it is rather the de- 
 struction of all science and of reason itself. 
 
 The heavy speculative objections to freedom are drawn 
 from the supposed demands of the law of causation. But 
 these also rest upon a misunderstanding of both freedom 
 and causation. Freedom is ascribed to the will; and the
 
 FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 
 
 will is abstracted from feeling and intelligence. Thus free- 
 dom is reduced to blind and lawless arbitrariness, and loses 
 its value. But this fiction results from mistaking the ab- 
 stractions of psychology for separate and mutually indiffer- 
 ent factors. Fortunately, psychology has got beyond this. 
 If anything is free it is not the will, but the knowing and 
 feeling soul ; and this soul determines itself not in the dark 
 of ignorance, or in the indifference of emotionless and value- 
 less life, but in the light of knowledge and with experience 
 of life's values. Such self-directing activity does not violate 
 the law of causation. That law tells us only to seek an 
 agent for every act, but it does not tell us what the agent 
 must be. So far as the law goes, a self-directing cause is at 
 least as possible as any other; and it is the only cause of 
 which we have experience. "Without any deep speculation, 
 the question of free causality is simply one of fact, so far 
 as the law of causation is concerned ; and when we look into 
 the matter critically, it turns out that the notion of causa- 
 tion itself vanishes unless we raise it to the volitional form. 
 Of course we cannot tell how a free agent is made or is pos- 
 sible; but still less can we tell how a necessary agent is 
 made or is possible. But though we cannot tell how a free 
 agent is possible, we have some experience of it as actual ; 
 while we not only have no experience of necessary agency, 
 but the idea itself is elusive to the last degree, vanishing 
 finally either into a groundless becoming, on the one hand, 
 or into the infinite regress, on the other, and in both cases 
 contradicting itself. 
 
 Another quotation from an able writer may be given as 
 an illustration of the abstract method of viewing this ques- 
 tion : " If volitions arise without cause, it necessarily follows 
 that we cannot infer from them the character of the ante- 
 cedent states of feeling. If therefore a murder has been 
 committed, we have apriori no better reason for suspecting
 
 416 METAPHYSICS 
 
 the worst enemy than the best friend of the murdered man. 
 If we see a man jump from a fourth-story window, we must 
 beware of too hastily inferring his insanity, since he may 
 be merely exercising his free-will; the intense love of life 
 being, as it seems, unconnected with attempts at suicide or 
 at self-preservation. We can thus frame no theory of hu- 
 man actions whatever. The countless empirical maxims of 
 every-day life, the embodiment as they are of the inherited 
 and organized sagacity of many generations, become wholly 
 incompetent to guide us ; and nothing which any one may 
 do ought ever to occasion surprise. The mother may stran- 
 gle her first-born child, the miser may cast his long-treas- 
 ured gold into the sea, the sculptor may break in pieces his 
 lately finished statue, in the presence of no other feelings 
 than those which before led them to cherish, to hoard, and 
 to create." 
 
 As the same author elsewhere says, " Verily the free-will 
 question is a great opener of the flood-gates of rhetoric." 
 This is more abstract closet logic. Freedom, taken abso- 
 lutely and verbally exegeted, would imply the abstract pos- 
 sibility of all this ; but this has no connection with the con- 
 crete problem. Suppose there were a free person with 
 experience of life's meanings and insight into its values and 
 obligations, there is nothing in his freedom to hinder his 
 acting rationally, or to excuse him for. acting irrationally. 
 But how he will act does not find its sufficient ground in 
 the " antecedent phenomena " alone, but also in the mys- 
 tery of self-determination. And this is something which 
 cannot be mechanically analyzed, or deduced as a necessary 
 resultant ; it can only be experienced. The attempt to an- 
 alyze it contradicts it. The attempt to construct it denies it. 
 It can only be recognized as the central factor of personal- 
 ity, the condition of responsibility, and the basis of the 
 moral life. Criticism cannot hope to construe it; it can
 
 FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 417 
 
 only point it out as a fact, and show that the objections to 
 it rest on an imperfect understanding of thought itself. In 
 particular, criticism, while it justifies the search for a ground, 
 points out that only free and active intelligence can be a 
 ground in which thought can rest. The notion of a bound 
 will, which has often appeared in theology, is either a con- 
 fusion of limitation of will with the denial of freedom, or 
 else it is an application of the law of the sufficient reason 
 beyond its field. Finally, criticism points out that the ne- 
 cessitarian doctrine in general rests on the fancy that mind 
 may be understood as the result of its own consequences. 
 
 There is, however, in the uncritical dream of the neces- 
 sitarian an implicit speculative aim which deserves consid- 
 eration. This is based on the desire for totality and sys- 
 tematic completeness. There is an unwillingness to leave 
 anything unrelated and uncomprehended. Hence the ever- 
 recurring fancy that, if we knew all, we should find every- 
 thing bound up in a rigid and all-comprehending system. 
 But this aim, which is a legitimate one, is thwarted by a 
 profound ignorance of the conditions of its own attainment. 
 Hence the thought to find the systematic totality in a meta- 
 physical necessity of the mechanical type. The impossibil- 
 ity of this we have already seen. Such totality can exist 
 only in and through intelligence. 
 
 But in our revolt against necessity we must be on our 
 guard against the opposite abyss of lawless caprice. A 
 world in which events fall out by chance and haphazard is 
 also intolerable to intelligence. And the fancy that this is 
 the only alternative to necessity has been one great sup- 
 port of the latter doctrine. As long as this fancy is held 
 the mind must vacillate between the two extremes, being 
 driven out from either as soon as it grasps its implications. 
 The only way out lies in carrying everything back to in- 
 telligence, while resolutety eschewing every attempt to com-
 
 418 METAPHYSICS 
 
 prehend intelligence as the result of its own categories, or 
 to do anything with it but experience and use it. 
 
 In the case of the world we can get on only as we carry 
 all things back to the notion of the absolute intelligence 
 who is working a rational work in accordance with a rational 
 plan. In this plan everything will have its place and func- 
 tion, and will be comprehended in an all-embracing purpose. 
 In this work we shall have no unintelligible metaphysical 
 necessities called laws, but rather uniformities of procedure 
 which are freely chosen with reference to the plan. At the 
 same time we shall have no lawless and chance events, as 
 all will arise in accordance with the purpose of the whole. 
 /Metaphysical necessity in the world must be replaced in our 
 f thought by the conception of uniformity administered by 
 l^ freedom for the attainment of rational ends. Here in the 
 unity of the free Creator, in the unity of his plan, and in 
 his ever-working will is the only place where the world has 
 unity, completeness, and systematic connection. Any ne- 
 cessity other than this is found in our relation to the uni- 
 formities of the system and is relative to ourselves. We 
 call it necessary because, so far as we are concerned, it is 
 fixed. 
 
 But as this plan is very imperfectly known to us, criti- 
 cism warns us against erecting even the phenomenal uni- 
 formities into an absolute system, whether in the inner or 
 the outward world. In the physical world we must take 
 the phenomenal uniformities for what we can make of them, 
 and regard all our theoretical machinery as only a series of 
 devices for representing the facts, the value of which is to 
 be found entirely in their practical convenience, and not at 
 all in any speculative insight which they furnish. And 
 when we are tempted to extend them th rough infinite space 
 and time, we should do well to limit them to a " reasonable 
 degree of extension to adjacent cases." In the inner world,
 
 FREEDOM AND NECESSITY 419 
 
 as pointed out in the last chapter, we must not interpret 
 our laws by any physical analogies, but take them as we 
 find them given in experience. And the explanations in 
 this field must also be carried on without subordinating 
 
 o 
 
 them to physical images and mechanical science. They must 
 be constructed psychologically, not physically ; and their 
 value will consist not in a deduction of life and history from 
 the antecedent phenomena, considered as component forces, 
 but rather in our insight into the facts on the basis of our 
 knowledge of the way in which living men think and feel 
 and act. This insight is purely sui generis, and is only 
 darkened when construed in mechanical terms. In this way 
 a valuable practical insight into human affairs is possible, 
 an insight which would be profitable for doctrine, for re- 
 proof, for correction, and for instruction ; but this insight 
 will never be gained until we construe human life on its 
 own basis as a life of freedom as well as of law, as a life of 
 reason as well of association, as an ethical life as well as a 
 life of sense ; and until this great cloud of physical meta- 
 phors and analogies which has overshadowed and darkened 
 psychology shall be dispersed again into its native nothing- 
 ness. 
 
 Thus we have discussed the fundamental notions which 
 mark the outlines of psychological study. The great weak- 
 ness of this science at present is that investigators common- 
 ly have no consistent conceptions on these points, and in- 
 terpret their facts by a grotesque or impossible metaphysics. 
 Often enough, the more naive mistake their metaphysical 
 and rhetorical imaginings for the mental facts themselves. 
 And there will be no progress in the science, until we have 
 brought forth fruits meet for repentance. We must discern 
 the unique and incommensurable character of the mental 
 facts, and interpret them in accordance with their own
 
 420 METAPHYSICS 
 
 proper nature. We must also discern the complete futility 
 of all mechanical and necessitarian reasoning in this Held, 
 and note its origin in a superficial conception of thought 
 and its categories. Then the mythology which has so long 
 infested this field will be put away ; aud psychology will 
 at last become a sane and sober science,
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 AFTER wandering so far and wide through dry places, we 
 
 sum up the results of our work by calling attention to some 
 leading points which we conceive to have special significance 
 for the progress of speculation. 
 
 The first point is the impossibility of construing the mind 
 as the resultant of the interaction of any number of physi- 
 cal or impersonal elements. Along with this goes the par- 
 allel conviction of the impossibility of constructing thought 
 by any mechanical juxtaposition or associational union of 
 particular mental states, arising in or .through the nerves, 
 or representing simple affections of a passive sensibility. 
 The failure of this view is complete, and philosophy is rap- 
 idly coming to the recognition of the fact. 
 
 The result is that thought is to be viewed as an organic 
 activity, unfolding organically from within and not mechan- 
 ically put together from without. And from this it further 
 results that knowledge can never be a passive reflection of 
 an existing order, still less can it be a passive reception of 
 ready -made knowledge from without. It must rather be 
 viewed as an active construction of the object within and 
 for our thought and by our thought itself. 
 
 In the Theory of Thought and Knowledge the formal 
 nature of the categories as immanent principles of intelli- 
 gence has been set forth. In the present volume we have 
 sought to fix their concrete significance, and we have come 
 upon many surprises. It seemed at first that the categories
 
 422 METAPHYSICS 
 
 are principles of reality, and that reality must be under- 
 stood through them ; but it soon became clear that only 
 phenomenal reality can be thus understood. Reality for 
 intelligence is intelligible in the forms of intelligence. But 
 in popular thought there is always supposed to be reality 
 beyond intelligence and independent of it. This is just real 
 and exists on its own account. Intelligence may possibly 
 know it, but intelligence has at present nothing to do with 
 its existence. 
 
 This conception of an extra-mental reality, external to 
 all consciousness and in antithesis to all consciousness, rep- 
 resents the deepest and dearest conviction of common-sense 
 realism. We have learned how it arises. It is partly due 
 to the conviction, which no one questions, that our thought 
 grasps an order which it does not make but finds. This 
 independence of our thought is mistaken for an indepen- 
 dence of all thought; and crude realism results. The illusion 
 further rests on the failure to distinguish between the phe- 
 nomenal and the ontological reality. Common -sense un- 
 hesitatingly takes phenomena for substantial realities, and 
 takes the phenomenal categories as the deepest facts of real 
 existence. In this way it builds up a mechanical and ma- 
 terial system which often proves a veritable Frankenstein 
 for its creator. 
 
 But when we came to study this extra-mental reality we 
 found it extremely elusive, and finally we discovered it to 
 be no less illusive. The various categories whereby realistic 
 thought constructs reality proved to be simply the bare 
 forms of intelligence, projected beyond intelligence, and 
 thereby made meaningless. Being, causality, unity, iden- 
 tity turned out to be unintelligible and impossible apart 
 from intelligence. It finally appeared that the world of 
 things can be defined and understood only as we give up 
 the notion of an extra-mental reality altogether, and make
 
 CONCLUSION 423 
 
 the entire world a thought world; that is, a world that 
 exists only through and in relation to intelligence. Mind 
 is the only ontological reality. Ideas have only conceptual 
 reality. Ideas energized by will have phenomenal realitv. 
 Besides these realities there is no other. 
 
 This is what is called my idealism a name for which I 
 have no special liking or dislike, provided the thing be un- 
 derstood. Historically, it might be described as Kantianized 
 Berkeleianism. In itself it might be called phenomenalism, 
 as indicating that the outer world has only phenomenal 
 reality. It might also be called objective idealism, as em- 
 phasizing the independence of the object of individual sub- 
 jectivity. It is idealism, as denying all extra-mental ex- 
 istence and making the world of objective experience a 
 thought world which would have neither meaning nor pos- 
 sibility apart from intelligence. And this is the conception 
 to which speculative thought is fast coming. From all 
 sides thought is seen to be converging upon this conviction, 
 as the only one which makes thought possible. In this view 
 the world-old conflict of the Eleatic and Heraclitic factors 
 of thought is brought to an end. The almost equally old 
 antithesis of realism and nominalism finds here its only 
 possible mediation. The mechanical and materialistic view 
 finds a recognition of its phenomenal truth, together with 
 an escape from its essential error. It makes some intelli- 
 gible provision for rational law, system, science, philosophy, 
 morals, and religion, which can hardly be said to be the case 
 with the traditional realistic view when unfolded into its 
 consequences. 
 
 In our study of the categories we have made another dis- 
 covery, namely, that they are either purely formal, and 
 hence phenomenal, or else that they admit of being truly 
 conceived only in the forms of living experience. Here we 
 come upon what may be called a transcendental empiricism,
 
 424: METAPHYSICS 
 
 in distinction from the traditional sense empiricism. That 
 is, instead of testing our fundamental experience by the 
 categories, we must rather find the meaning of the catego- 
 ries in experience. This experience, however, is not the 
 passive experience of sense, but the active self-experience of 
 intelligence. 
 
 We come here into contact with one of Kant's obscure 
 doctrines, the schematism of the categories. Kant pointed 
 out that the categories, abstractly taken, do not admit of 
 being properly conceived. They must be applied to a given 
 sense matter, or else the understanding must be helped by 
 some representation borrowed from intuition. When both 
 elements are lacking, there is really no conception, but only 
 a mental vacuum. Kant found the mediating representa- 
 tion in the temporal intuition, and out of this he evolved 
 the schematism of the categories. A schema is a temporal 
 representation whereby the corresponding category is made 
 apprehensible by intelligence. Thus the schema of reality 
 is time full; that of negation is time empty. The schema 
 of causality is antecedence and sequence. Possibility, im- 
 possibility, and necessity are represented by sometime, never, 
 and ever. 
 
 In all of this Kant was on the right track, but he had 
 not thought through. The categories, conceived as imper- 
 sonal abstractions, do defy all conception ; but Kant's sche- 
 matism does not help the matter. The temporal form does 
 not help us to any real conception. No reflection on tem- 
 poral antecedence and sequence will assist us in conceiving 
 causation. And the case of the categories is really worse 
 than Kant represented ; for when abstractly taken, they 
 not only defy conception, but they contradict themselves ; 
 and they continue to do so until they are brought out of 
 their abstraction and are looked upon as modes of intellect- 
 ual manifestation. As we have so often said, intelligence
 
 CONCLUSION 425 
 
 cannot be understood through the categories, but the cate- 
 gories must be understood through our living experience of 
 intelligence itself. Intelligence is and acts. This is the 
 deepest fact. It is not subject to any laws beyond itself, 
 nor to any abstract principles within itself. Living, acting 
 intelligence is the source of all truth and reality, and is its 
 own and only standard. And all the categories, as abstract 
 principles, instead of being the components of the mental 
 life, are simply shadows of that life, and find in that life 
 their only realization. This may be called ray transcenden- 
 tal empiricism. 
 
 Something of the same kind must be said concerning the 
 general problem of knowledge. The relation of subject and 
 object in knowledge is absolutely unique. As we have said 
 in discussing space, it admits of no spatial or other repre- 
 sentation, and can only be experienced. The mind on the 
 sense plane attempts to conceive the relation in space terms. 
 The subject and object stand over against each other in 
 space, and thus the matter is cleared up, especially as the 
 subject is easily confounded with the physical organism. 
 This is one body among other bodies ; and when other 
 bodies act upon it, what is this but an affection of the sub- 
 ject by the object ; and what can this affection be but 
 knowledge? Of course this is infantile from a speculative 
 stand-point ; but, when we put it away, there vanishes the 
 last possibility of representing the relation of knowledge in 
 terms of anything but itself. This becomes still clearer 
 when we reflect on the phenomenalism of spatial existence. 
 As long as we had an identical and common object in a 
 common space, to which all might have free access for the 
 sake of rectifying and justifying their ideas, we could form 
 some conception of the possibility of knowledge. But when 
 both space and the object become phenomenal, and when 
 the community of the object becomes only the apprehension
 
 426 METAPHYSICS 
 
 of a thought content valid for all, and when, finally, this 
 thought content retreats from space and time into unpict- 
 urable dependence on the infinite intelligence and will, we 
 are utterly beyond all possibility of representation. Our 
 earlier contention that 'knowledge arises in the mind only 
 through its own activity remains unshaken and unshakable ; 
 but if we try to explain knowledge in its essential nature, 
 or to justify it by anything beyond itself, we soon find the 
 task hopeless. After theory has exhausted its resources, 
 there are deeps in the problem of knowledge which recall 
 Jacobi's claim that all knowing involves revelation. In any 
 case knowledge must finally be its own standard ; and in 
 the deepest things we must be content with knowing not 
 how we know, but that we know. 
 
 In discussing the problem of apriorism and empiricism in 
 the Theory of Thought and Knowledge we discovered that 
 they both leave a very important question unanswered ; 
 namely, Can the nature of things be practically trusted? 
 And we also discovered that no answer can be found in the 
 field of the speculative reason. This conviction becomes 
 more emphatic as the result of metaphysical analysis. A 
 great deal of our knowledge has been restricted to phenom- 
 enal validity, and has been found to be very superficial even 
 there. In addition, much apparent knowledge has been 
 seen to be purely relative to our human stand-point and 
 without any claim to proper universality. Our speculative 
 assurance is mainly formal, and it gives very little security 
 for the concrete order. Our convictions here must be prac- 
 tical rather than speculative, and they must be held for 
 what they are practically worth, and not as speculative 
 principles. Our faith in them must rest upon their 
 practical necessity, and possibly upon some conviction 
 of an ethical and aesthetic nature. In any case, logic 
 admonishes us to be very wary of them when carried
 
 CONCLUSION 427 
 
 beyond the reasonable degree of extension to adjacent 
 cases. 
 
 This sounds something like Kant's practical reason ; and 
 in some respects it is identical with it. It is reached, how- 
 ever, in a different way. The conclusion rests on no scepti- 
 cism of reason, but on reason's own testimony concerning 
 itself. The crude dogmatist knows a deal more than he 
 has a right to know ; and when he is cross-questioned the 
 illusion appears. Our reason is not contradictory, but lim- 
 ited ; and the limitation appears on examination. And 
 when knowledge fails, we have to fall back on belief based 
 on the necessities or the intimations of practical life. Here 
 the test of truth is not speculative insight, but practical 
 necessity or practical absurdity. And truth of this sort 
 must never be mistaken for a speculative principle, but only 
 for a practical postulate. 
 
 Finally, we emphasize the futility of all attempts at phi- 
 losophizing on the plane of impersonal existence. On that 
 plane thought is blocked in every direction. If we seek for 
 explanation we never find it. Things themselves are dis- 
 solved away into elusive phantoms. The law of the suf- 
 ficient reason shuts us up to the infinite regress. We can- 
 not deduce motion from the motionless, or change from the 
 changeless; and thus we remain in the eternal flow. On 
 the other hand, it is equally clear that thought can take no 
 step without some strictly changeless and abiding existence. 
 Here is an antinomy almost as old as speculation, which is 
 commonly ignored, but rarely removed. The most favorite 
 device is to carry the change and changelessness into one 
 being, and to suppose that in some way the unity of this 
 being would hold the increments of change together and 
 bridge over the contradiction. But Ms device we have 
 seen to be a failure. And all impersonal devices are failures. 
 Thought remains in deadlock here until we carry the prob-
 
 428 METAPHYSlCb 
 
 Jem up to the plane of free intelligence, and find in thought 
 the source of both change and identity, of unity and plural- 
 ity, and of all outgo whatsoever. This is the deep specu- 
 lative significance of freedom. 
 
 It results from this that all explanation lies within the 
 sphere of the products of thought, and must not be extended 
 to thought itself. We explain the work of intelligence by 
 tracing it to intelligence, but intelligence itself simply is. 
 It accounts for everything else, but it accepts itself. When 
 we seek to construe intelligence in any way we fall into il- 
 lusion. Component factors, antecedent mechanism are fic- 
 tions of unclear thought. When we come to intelligence 
 we must stop in our regress and understand it as intelli- 
 gence. Here our transcendental empiricism again appears. 
 Intelligence has no means of understanding itself as product. 
 It is the source of all products, and for knowledge of itself 
 it must fall back on experience. 
 
 Persons who follow blindly the law of the sufficient rea- 
 son, something as children who ask, Who made God ? may 
 possibly object that in this case there is a gulf between 
 thought and its products; and they would like to be able 
 to trace the product into thought itself, and then trace it 
 out again. For the complete satisfaction of reason the 
 road between the creator and the created must admit of 
 being travelled in both directions. But this too is illusory. 
 Of course we must suppose intelligence to be intelligence, 
 and hence to know what it is doing and why it does it ; but 
 in no other sense can we trace the product into intelligence. 
 For the rest, the only gulf in the case is that between the 
 agent and the act, the doer and the deed. We may trace 
 the deed to the doer, but to trace it into the doer involves 
 confusion and nonsense. The producer is not the work, but 
 he is revealed through the work ; and the work is under- 
 stood through the producer. This is a relation which is
 
 CONCLUSION 429 
 
 perfectly intelligible in experience ; and beyond it we can- 
 not go. When we seek to construe the back-lying intelli- 
 gence we have no guide but experience, and this does not 
 take us far even in our own case. When we turn the con- 
 tents of the infinite consciousness into a kind of eternal and 
 necessary logical mechanism we simply fall back to the 
 lower mechanical categories which thought alone makes 
 possible, and subject thought to its own implications and 
 products. Such a view begins in confusion and ends in 
 self-destruction. 
 
 Herewith our work ends. According to an Oriental 
 proverb, God knows it better. Without recurring to this 
 high consideration, we may well believe that a great many 
 younger and brighter minds also know it very much better. 
 Yet so it seems to me ; and I have set it down in the hope 
 that so it may seem to others also. 
 
 THE END
 
 DATE DUE 
 
 GAYLORD 
 
 PRINTED IN U.S.A.
 
 A 000 636 853 4