My Mission to London, 
 1912-1914 
 
 By 
 
 Karl Max Llchnowsky
 
 :?■/- •'-■'•■■"?
 
 :VELATIONS OF THE LAST GERMAN 
 AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND 
 
 AY MISSION TO 
 LONDON 
 
 1912-1914 
 
 By 
 
 PRINCE LICHNOWSKY 
 
 With a Preface by 
 PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY 
 
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 V YORK: GEORGE H. DOR.AN CpMPANY 
 
 •. TEN CENTS
 
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 ■C^H.

 
 MY MISSION TO LONDON 
 
 PRINCE LIGHNOWSKY
 
 MY MISSION TO 
 LONDON 
 
 1912-1914 
 
 .BY 
 
 PRINCE LICHNOWSKY 
 
 Late German Ambassador in England 
 
 WITH A PREFACE BY 
 
 PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY 
 
 Author of "The Policy of Sir Edward Grey," etc. 
 
 NEW YORK 
 GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
 
 
 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
 
 The author of the following pages, Karl Max, Prince 
 Lichnowsky, is a member of a family which holds es- 
 tates both in German and Austrian Silesia, and has an 
 hereditary seat in the Upper House of the Prussian 
 Diet. The father of the present Prince and his predeces- 
 sor in the title was a Prussian cavalry general, who, 
 at the end of his life, sat for some years in the Reichs- 
 tag as a member of the Free Conservative Party. 
 
 His uncle, Prince Felix, was elected in 1848 to rep- 
 resent Ratibor in the German National Assembly at 
 Frankfort-on-Main ; he was an active member of the 
 Conservative wing, and during the September rising, 
 while riding with General Auerswald in the neighbour- 
 hood of the city, was attacked and murdered by the 
 mob. 
 
 The present Prince, after serving in the Prussian 
 army, in which he holds the rank of Major, entered the 
 diplomatic service. He was in 1885 for a short time at- 
 tached to the German Embassy in London, and after- 
 wards became Councillor of Embassy in Vienna. From 
 1899 to 1904 he was employed in the German Foreign 
 Office, and received the rank and title of Minister Pleni- 
 potentiary. 
 
 In 1904 he retired to his Silesian estates, and, as he 
 states, lived for eight years the life of a country gen- 
 tleman, but read industriously and published occasional 
 political articles. He himself recounts the circumstances 
 in which he was appointed Ambassador in London on 
 the death of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein. 
 
 Baron Marschall, who had been Secretary for For- 
 
 307302
 
 vi Biographical Note 
 
 eign Affairs under the Chancellorships of Count Caprivi 
 and for a time under Prince Hohenlohe, had achieved 
 great success as Ambassador at Constantinople, and also, 
 from the German point of view, as chief German Pleni- 
 potentiary at the Second Hague Conference in 1907. 
 Baron Marschall was, to use an expression of Bismarck's, 
 "the best horse in Germany's diplomatic stable." And 
 great things were expected of him in London. But he 
 lived only a few months after his appointment. 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky's high social rank, his agreeable 
 manners, and the generous hospitality which he showed 
 in Carlton House Terrace gave him a position in English 
 society which facilitated the negotiations between Eng- 
 land and Germany, and did much to diminish the fric- 
 tion that had arisen during the time that Prince Biilow 
 held the post of German Chancellor. 
 
 The pamphlet which is here translated gives an account 
 of his London mission; after his return to Germany 
 he has lived in retirement in the country, but has con- 
 tributed occasional articles to the Press. The pamphlet, 
 which was written in August, 1916, was not intended 
 for publication, but was distributed confidentially to a 
 few friends. The existence of it had long been known, 
 but it was only in March of this year that for the first 
 time extracts from it were published in the Swedish 
 paper Politiken. Longer extracts have since appeared 
 in the London Press ; for the first time a complete 
 translation made from the German original is now placed 
 before the public.
 
 PREFACE 
 
 Never perhaps in history has the world seen so great 
 an exhibition, as at the outbreak of this war, of the 
 murderous and corrupting power of the organised He. 
 All Germany outside the governmental circles was in- 
 duced to believe that the war was a treacherous at- 
 tack, plotted in the dark by "revengeful France, bar- 
 baric Russia, and envious England," against the innocent 
 and peace-loving Fatherland. And the centre of the 
 plot was the Machiavellian Grey, who for long years 
 had been encircling and strangling Germany in order 
 at the chosen moment to deal her a death-blow from 
 behind. The Emperor, the princes, the ministers, the 
 bishops and chaplains, the historians and theologians, 
 in part consciously and in part innocently, vied with 
 one another in solemn attestations and ingenious forgeries 
 of evidence ; and the people, docile by training and long 
 indoctrinated to the hatred of England, inevitably be- 
 lieved and passionately exaggerated what they were told. 
 From this belief, in large part, came the strange bru- 
 talities and ferocities of the common people of Ger- 
 many at the opening of the war, whether towards per- 
 sons who had a right to courtesy, like the Ambassa- 
 dors, or a claim on common human sympathy, like the 
 wounded and the prisoners. The German masses could 
 show no mercy towards people guilty of so hideous a 
 world-crime. 
 
 And now comes evidence, which in normal times would 
 convince even the German nation, that the whole basis 
 of their belief was a structure of deliberate falsehood; 
 which shows that it was the Kaiser and his Ministers 
 
 vii
 
 viii Preface 
 
 who plotted the war; while it was England, and espe- 
 cially Sir Edward Grey, who strove hardest for the 
 preservation of peace. 
 
 It is the evidence of the German Ambassador in Lon- 
 don during the years 1912-1914, Prince Lichnowsky, 
 corroborated rather than confuted by the comments of 
 Herr von jagow, who was Foreign Minister at the 
 time, and carried further by the recently published Mem- 
 oranda of Herr Miihlon, one of the directors of the 
 Krupp armament factory at Essen. One could hardly 
 imagine more convincing testimony. Will the German 
 people believe it? Would they believe now if one 
 rose from the dead? 
 
 We cannot yet guess at the answer. Indeed, there is 
 another question which must be answered first: For 
 what motive, and with what possible change of policy 
 in view, has the German Government permitted the 
 publication of these papers and the circulation of Lich- 
 nowsky's Memorandum as a pamphlet at 30 pfennig? 
 Do the militarists think their triumph is safe, and the 
 time come for them to throw off the mask? Or have 
 the opponents of militarism, who seemed so crushed, 
 succeeded in asserting their power? Is it a plan to 
 induce the ever docile German populace to hate England 
 less? 
 
 It must be a startling story for the Germans, but for 
 us it contains little that is new. It is an absolute con- 
 firmation, in spirit and in letter, of the British Blue Book 
 and of English books such as Mr. Headlam's "History 
 of Twelve Days" and Mr. Archer's "Thirteen Days." 
 Prince Lichnowsky's summing-up agrees exactly with 
 the British conclusions : The Germans encouraged Count 
 Berchtold to attack Serbia, well knowing the conse- 
 quences to expect ; between the 23rd and 30th July they 
 rejected all forms of mediation; and on the 30th July, 
 when Austria wished to withdraw, they hastily sent an
 
 Preface ix 
 
 ultimatum to Russia so as to make withdrawal impos- 
 sible (pp. 39-40). A ghastly story of blindness and 
 crime ; but we knew it all before. 
 
 Equally interesting is Prince Lichnowsky's account 
 of the policy of Germany and England before the war. 
 He confirms our knowledge of the "sinister vagueness" 
 of German policy in Morocco, the steady desire of 
 England to come to an understanding and of Germany 
 to elude an understanding. As for our alleged envy of 
 German trade, it was in English commercial circles that 
 the desire for an understanding with Germany was 
 strongest. As for our "policy of encirclement," it was 
 the deliberate aim of our policy, continuing the line of 
 Lord Salisbury and Mr. Chamberlain, to facilitate rather 
 than hinder the legitimate and peaceful expansion of a 
 great force, which would become dangerous if sup- 
 pressed and confined. 
 
 The test cases were the Bagdad Railway and the Por- 
 tuguese Colonies. We agreed to make no objection to 
 Germany's buying them when Portugal was willing to 
 sell ; we agreed in the meantime to treat them as a 
 German sphere of interest and not to compete for in- 
 fluence there. We agreed, subject to the conservation 
 of existing British rights and to certain other safe- 
 guards, to the completion of the great railway from the 
 Bosphorus to Basra, and to the recognition of the whole 
 district tapped by the railway as a German sphere of 
 interest. The two treaties, though completed, were never 
 signed ; why .'' Because Grey would sign no secret treaty. 
 He insisted that they must be published. And the Ger- 
 man Government would not allow them to be published! 
 To Lichnowsky this seemed like mere spite on the part 
 of rivals who grudged his success, but we see now that 
 it was a deliberate policy. The war-makers could not 
 afford to let their people know the proof of England's 
 goodwill.
 
 X Preface 
 
 Lichnowsky was a friend of England, but he was no 
 pacifist or "little German." His policy was to favour 
 the peaceful expansion of Germany, in good understand- 
 ing with England and France, on the seas and in the 
 colonies. He aimed at "imperial development" on Brit- 
 ish lines; he abhorred the "Triple Alliance policy" of 
 espousing Austria's quarrels, backing Turkey against the 
 Balkan States, intriguing against Russia, and seeing all 
 politics in the terms of European rivalries with a back- 
 ground of war. His own policy was one which, if fol- 
 lowed loyally by the German Government, would have 
 avoided the war and saved Europe. 
 
 There are one or two traits in Lichnowsky's language 
 which show that, with all his liberality of thought, he is 
 still a German. He accepts at once, on the report of a 
 German secret agent, the false statement that Grey had 
 concluded a secret treaty with France. He mentions, 
 as if it were a natural thing, the strange opinion that 
 the Standard was "apparently bought by Austria." He 
 describes Mr. Asquith as a pacifist and Sir Edward Grey 
 as both a pacifist and, ideally and practically, a Socialist. 
 One must remember the sort of views he was accustomed 
 to at Potsdam. 
 
 There can be no doubt that Lichnowsky was delib- 
 erately deceived by his Government, and not much that 
 he was chosen for his post in London with a view to 
 deceiving us. These things are all in gospel according 
 to Bernhardi. Lichnowsky himself was both an honest 
 and an able diplomatist, and there is the ring of sincerity 
 in his words of self-reproach: "I had to support in 
 London a policy the heresy of which I recognised. That 
 brought down vengeance on me, for it was a sin against 
 the Holy Ghost." 
 
 If Grey, in the tangle of terrific problems that sur- 
 rounded him, ever erred, his sin was not against the 
 Holy Ghost. The attack made on him at the ouset of
 
 Preface xi 
 
 the war by Radical idealists was easy to confute. If 
 ever a statesman strove, with due prudence, for peace, 
 for friendship between nations, for a transformation of 
 armed rivalries into cordial and democratic under- 
 standings, our great English Minister was that man. He 
 was accused as a maker of secret treaties; and we find 
 him all through the times of peace, and through all times 
 when choice was still possible, a steady refuser of 
 secret treaties. He was accused as a seeker for terri- 
 tory; and we find him, both in war and peace, steadily 
 opposing all territorial aggrandisement. Such was the 
 policy approved by the leaders of both English parties 
 before the war. 
 
 It is an attack from the other side that now reaches 
 him. If the war had been short and successful, this 
 would not have occurred. But a long and bitter and 
 dangerous war of necessity creates its own atmosphere, 
 and the policy that was wisdom in 19 13, when the world 
 was at peace and our relations with Germany were im- 
 proving, strikes us now perhaps as strangely trustful 
 and generous. Yet, if we try to recover that mental 
 calm without which the nations will never till the end 
 of time be able to restore their wasted wealth and re- 
 build the shattered hopes of civilisation, I think most 
 Englishmen will agree that Grey's policy was, as we 
 all thought it at the time, the right and the wise policy. 
 To let all the world know that we would never join in 
 any attack on Germany, but would never permit any 
 attack on France; to seek to remove all causes of fric- 
 tion between England and Germany, as they had been 
 removed between England and France and between Eng- 
 land and Russia; to extend the "Entente Cordiale" by 
 gradual steps to all nations who would come into it, and 
 to "bring the two groups of Europe nearer." This 
 was the right policy, whether it succeeded or failed;
 
 xii Preface 
 
 and it will, in spirit at leas^-, some day be the right 
 policy again. 
 
 No Englishman, I think, will regret the generous cour- 
 tesy which sent off the German Ambassador with a guard 
 of honour, "like a departing sovereign." No one will re- 
 gret our Prime Minister's silent tears when the war be- 
 came inevitable, or Grey's conviction that it would be 
 "the greatest catastrophe in history" — not even if mad 
 German militarists drew the conclusion that the only 
 motive for such grief must be the fear of defeat. For 
 my own part I am glad that, at the last interview with 
 Lichnowsky, Grey assured him that, if ever a chance 
 came of m.ediation between the combatants, he would 
 take it, and that "we have never wished to crush Ger- 
 many." 
 
 Surely, even now in the crisis of the war, it is well 
 to remember these things. The cleaner our national con- 
 science the keener surely will be our will to victory. The 
 slower we were to give up the traditions of generosity 
 and trustfulness that came from our long security the 
 firmer will be our resolution to hold out, through what- 
 ever martyrdom may be yet in store for us, until we or 
 our children can afford once more to live generously and 
 to trust our neighbours. In the long run no other life 
 is worth living. 
 
 G. M.
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 My Appointment i 
 
 Morocco Policy 2 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's Programme 4 
 
 The Albanian Question 5 
 
 The Near East and the Policy of the Triple Alliance 7 
 
 The Conference or Ambassadors 10 
 
 The Balkan Conference 12 
 
 The Second Balkan War 13 
 
 LiMAN Von Sanders 14 
 
 The Colonial Treaty iS 
 
 The Bagdad Treaty 20 
 
 The Question of the Navy 21 
 
 Commercial Jealousy 23 
 
 The Court and Society 24 
 
 Sir Edward Grey 26 
 
 Mr. Asquith 28 
 
 Nicholson . 29 
 
 Tyrrell 3° 
 
 Attitude of the German Foreign Office 30 
 
 In Case of War 31 
 
 The Serbian Crisis 31 
 
 ziii
 
 xiv Contents 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The English Declaration of War 37 
 
 Retrospect 3^ 
 
 My Return 40 
 
 The Question of Responsibility 4° 
 
 The Enemy Point of View 41 
 
 Bismarck 42 
 
 Our Future 43
 
 MY MISSION TO LONDON
 
 MY MISSION TO LONDON 
 
 1912-14 
 
 My Appointment 
 
 In September, 191 2, Baron Marschall died after he had 
 only been at his post in London for a few months. His 
 appointment, which no doubt was principally due to his 
 age and the desire of his junior officer to go to London, 
 was one of the many mistakes of our policy. 
 
 In spite of his striking personality and great reputa- 
 tion, he was too old and too tired to adjust himself to 
 the Anglo-Saxon world, which was completely alien to 
 him; he was rather an official and a lawyer than a 
 diplomat and statesman. From the very beginning he 
 was at great pains to convince the English of the harm- 
 lessness of our fleet, and naturally this only produced 
 the contrary effect. 
 
 Much to my surprise, I was offered the post in Octo- 
 ber. I had retired to the country as a "Personalreferent" 
 after many years of activity, there being then no suitable 
 post available for me. I passed my time between flax 
 and turnips, among horses and meadows, read exten- 
 sively, and occasionally published political essays. 
 
 Thus I had spent eight years, and it was thirteen 
 since I had left the Embassy at Vienna with tlie rank 
 of Envoy. That had been my last real sphere of politi- 
 cal activity, as in those days such activity was im- 
 possible unless one was prepared to help a half-crazy
 
 2 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 chief in drafting his crotchety orders with their crabbed 
 instructions. 
 
 I do not know who was responsible for my being 
 appointed to London. It was certainly not due to H.M. 
 alone — I was not one of his intimates, though he was 
 at all times gracious to me, I also know by experi- 
 ence that his nominees generally met with successful 
 opposition. Herr von Kiderlen had really wanted to 
 send Herr von Stumm to London! He immediately 
 manifested unmistakable ill-will towards me, and en- 
 deavoured to intimidate me by his incivility. Herr von 
 Bethmann Hollweg was at that time kindly disposed 
 towards me, and had paid me a visit at Gratz only a 
 short time before. I am therefore inclined to think 
 that they all agreed on me because no other candidate 
 was available at the moment. But for Baron Marschall's 
 unexpected death, I should no more have been called 
 out of retirement then than at any other time during 
 all those previous years. 
 
 Morocco Policy 
 
 It was certainly the right moment for a new effort to 
 establish better relations with England. Our enigmatic 
 Morocco policy had repeatedly shaken confidence in our 
 pacific intentions. At the very least, it had given rise 
 to the suspicion that we did not quite know what we 
 wanted, or that it was our object to keep Europe on 
 the qui vive, and, when opportunity offered, to humiliate 
 France. An Austrian colleague, who had been in Paris 
 for a long time, said to me: "Whenever the French 
 begin to forget about revanche, you always remind them 
 of it with a jack-boot." 
 
 After we had repulsed M. Delcasse's efforts to arrive 
 at an understanding with us about Morocco, and prior 
 to that had formally declared that we had no political
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 3 
 
 interests there — which conformed to the traditions of 
 the Bismarckian policy — we suddenly discovered a sec- 
 ond Kriiger in Abdul Aziz. We assured him also, like 
 the Boers, of the protection of the mighty German 
 Empire, with the same display and the same result; 
 both demonstrations terminated with our retreat, as 
 they were bound to do, if we had not already made up 
 our minds to embark on the world-war. The distressing 
 congress at Algeqiras could not change this in any way, 
 still less the fall of M. Delcasse. 
 
 Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and later 
 the Anglo- Japanese rapprochement. In face of "the Ger- 
 man Peril" all other differences faded into the back- 
 ground. The possibility of a new Franco-German war 
 had become apparent, and such a war could not, as in 
 1870, leave either Russia or England unaffected. 
 
 The uselessness of the Triple Alliance had been shown 
 at Algegiras, while that of the agreements arrived at 
 there was demonstrated shortly afterwards by the col- 
 lapse of the Sultanate, which, of course, could not be 
 prevented. Among the German people, however, the be- 
 lief gained ground that our foreign policy was feeble 
 and was giving way before the "Encirclement" — that 
 high-sounding phrases were succeeded by pusillanimous 
 surrender. 
 
 It is to the credit of Herr von Kiderlen, who is 
 otherwise overrated as a statesman, that he wound up 
 our Moroccan inheritance and accepted as they were 
 the facts that could no longer be altered. Whether, 
 indeed, it was necessary to alarm the world by the 
 Agadir incident I will leave others to say. It was jubi- 
 lantly acclaimed in Germany, but it had caused all the 
 more disquiet in England because the Government were 
 kept waiting for three weeks for an explanation of 
 our intentions. Lloyd George's speech, which was meant 
 as a warning to us, was the consequence. Before Del-
 
 4 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 casse's fall, and before Algegiras, we might have had a 
 harbour and territory on the West Coast, but after 
 those events it was impossible. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's Programme 
 
 When I came to London in November, 1912, the ex- 
 citement over Morocco had subsided, as an agreement 
 with France had been reached in Berlin. It is true 
 that Haldane's mission had failed, as we had required 
 the assurance of neutrality, instead of being content 
 with a treaty securing us against British attacks and 
 attacks with British support. Yet Sir Edward Grey 
 had not relinquished the idea of arriving at an agree- 
 ment with us, and in the first place tried to do this in 
 colonial and economic questions. Conversations were 
 in progress with the capable and business-like Envoy 
 von Kiihlmann concerning the renewal of the Portuguese 
 colonial agreement and Mesopotamia (Badgad Railway), 
 the una vowed object of which was to divide both the 
 colonies and Asia IMinor into spheres of influence. 
 
 The British statesman, after having settled all out- 
 standing points of difference with France and Russia, 
 wished to make similar agreements with us. It was not 
 his object to isolate us, but to the best of his power 
 to make us partners in the existing association. As 
 he had succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and An- 
 glo-Russian differences, so he also wished to do his 
 best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and by a network 
 of treaties, which would in the end no doubt have led 
 to an agreement about the troublesome question of naval 
 armaments, to ensure the peace of the world, after our 
 previous policy had led to an association — the Entente — 
 which represented a mutual insurance against the risk 
 of war. 
 
 This was Sir E. Grey's plan. In his own words : With-
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 5 
 
 out interfering with our existing friendship with France 
 and Russia, which has no aggressive aims and does not 
 entail any binding obHgations on England, to arrive at 
 a friendly rapprochement and understanding with Ger- 
 many, "to bring the two groups nearer." 
 
 As with us, there were two parties in England at that 
 time — the Optimists, who believed in an understanding, 
 and the Pessimists, who thought that sooner or later war 
 was inevitable. 
 
 The former embraced Messrs. Asquith, Grey, Lord 
 Haldane, and most of the Ministers in the Radical Cabi- 
 net; also the leading Liberal papers, such as the West- 
 minster Gazette, Manchester Guardian, Daily Chronicle. 
 The Pessimists were mainly Conservative politicians like 
 Mr. Balfour, who repeatedly made this clear to me; 
 also leading Army men, like Lord Roberts, who pointed 
 out the necessity of universal military service ("The 
 Writing on the Wall") ; further, the Northcliffe Press 
 and the eminent English journalist Mr. Garvin, of The 
 Observer. During my period of office, however, they 
 abstained from all attacks, and maintained both per- 
 sonally and politically a friendly attitude. But our naval 
 policy and our attitude in 1905, 1908, and 191 1 had 
 aroused in them the conviction that after all it would 
 some day come to war. Just as it is with us, the former 
 are now being accused in England of short-sightedness 
 and simplicity, whereas the latter are looked on as the 
 true prophets. 
 
 The Albanian Question 
 
 The first Balkan War had led to the collapse of Tur- 
 key and thus to a defeat for our policy, which had been 
 identified with Turkey for a number of years. Since 
 Turkey in Europe could no longer be saved, there were 
 two ways in which we could deal with the inheritance :
 
 6 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 either we could declare our complete disinterestedness 
 with regard to the frontier delimitations and leave the 
 Balkan Powers to settle them, or we could support our 
 "Allies" and carry on a Triple Alliance policy in the 
 Near East, thus giving up the role of mediator. 
 
 From the very beginning I advocated the former 
 course, but the Foreign Office emphatically favoured the 
 latter. 
 
 The vital point was the Albanian question. Our Allies 
 desired the establishment of an independent Albanian 
 state, as the Austrians did not want the Serbs to obtain 
 access to the Adriatic, and the Italians did not want the 
 "Greeks to get to Valona or even to the north of Corfu. 
 As opposed to this, Russia, as is known, was backing 
 Serbia's wishes and France those of Greece. 
 
 My advice was to treat this question as outside the 
 scope of the Alliance, and to support neither the Austrian 
 nor the Italian claims. Without our aid it would have 
 been impossible to set up an independent Albania, which, 
 as anyone could foresee, had no prospect of surviving; 
 Serbia v/ould have extended to the sea, and the present 
 world-war would have been avoided. France and Italy 
 would have quarrelled over Greece, and if the Italians 
 had not wanted to fight France unaided they would have 
 been compelled to acquiesce in Greece's expansion to 
 the north of Durazzo. The greater part of Albania is 
 Hellenic. The towns in the south are entirely so ; and 
 during the Conference of Ambassadors delegations from 
 principal towns arrived in London to obtain annexation 
 to Greece. Even in present-day Greece there are Al- 
 banian elements and the so-called Greek national dress 
 is of Albanian origin. The inclusion of the Albanians, 
 who are principally Orthodox and Moslem, in the body 
 of the Greek state was therefore the best and most 
 natural solution, if you left Scutari and the north to 
 the Serbs and Montenegrins. For dynastic reasons H.M.
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 7 
 
 was also in favour of this solution. When I supported 
 this view in a letter to the monarch I received agitated 
 reproaches from the Chancellor; he said that I had the 
 reputation of being "an opponent of Austria," and I was 
 to abstain from such interference and direct correspon- 
 dence. 
 
 The Near East and the Policy of 
 THE Triple Alliance 
 
 We ought at last to have broken with the fatal tradi- 
 tion of pursuing a Triple Alliance policy in the Near East 
 also, and have recognised our mistake, which lay in iden- 
 tifying ourselves in the south with the Turks and in the 
 north with the Austro-Magyars. For the continuance of 
 this policy, upon which we had entered at the Berlin 
 Congress, and which we had actively pursued ever since, 
 was bound to lead in time to a conflict with Russia and 
 to the world-war, more especially if the requisite clev- 
 erness were lacking in high places. Instead of coming 
 to terms with Russia on a basis of the independence of 
 the Sultan, whom even Petrograd did not wish to eject 
 from Constantinople, and of confining ourselves to our 
 economic interests in the Near East and to the partition- 
 ing of Asia Minor into spheres of influence while re- 
 nouncing any intention of military or political interfer- 
 ence, it v/as our political ambition to dominate on the 
 Bosphorus. In Russia they began to think that the road 
 to Constantinople and the Mediterranean lay zna Berlin. 
 Instead of supporting the active development of the Bal- 
 kan States — which, once liberated, are anything rather 
 than Russian, and with which our experiences had been 
 very satisfactory — we took sides with the Turkish and 
 Magyar oppressors. 
 
 The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and Near 
 East policy — which had forced Russia, our natural best
 
 8 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 friend and neighbour, into the arms of France and Eng- 
 land and away from its policy of Asiatic expansion — 
 was the more apparent, as a Franco-Russian attack, 
 which was the sole hypothesis that justified a Triple 
 Alliance policy, could be left out of our calculations. 
 
 The value of the Italian alliance needs no further ref- 
 erence. Italy will want our money and our tourists even 
 after the war, with or without an alliance. That this 
 latter would fail us in case of war was patent before- 
 hand. Hence the alliance had no value. Austria needs 
 our protection in war, as in peace, and has no other sup- 
 port. Her dependence on us is based on political, na- 
 tional, and economic considerations, and is the greater 
 the more intimate our relations with Russia are. The 
 Bosnian crisis taught us this. Since the days of Count 
 Beust no Vienna Minister has adopted such a self-confi- 
 dent attitude towards us as Count Aehrenthal during 
 the later years of his life. If German policy is con- 
 ducted on right lines, cultivating relations with Russia, 
 Austria-Hungary is our vassal and dependent on us, 
 even without an alliance or recompense ; if it is wrongly 
 conducted, then we are dependent on Austria. Hence 
 there was no reason for the alliance. 
 
 I knew Austria too well not to be aware that a return 
 to the policy of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg or Count 
 Moritz Esterhazy was inconceivable there. Little as the 
 Slavs there love us, just as little do they wish to return 
 into a German Empire even with a Habsburg-Lorraine 
 emperor at its head. They are striving for a federation 
 in Austria on national lines, a state of things which 
 would have even less chance of being realised within the 
 German Empire than under the Double Eagle. The Ger- 
 mans of Austria, however, acknowledge Berlin as the 
 centre of German Might and Culture, and are well aware 
 that Austria can never again be the leading Power. 
 They wish for as intimate a connection with the Ger-
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 9 
 
 man Empire as possible, not for an anti-German policy. 
 
 Since the 'seventies the position has fundamentally 
 changed in Austria, as in Bavaria. As, in the latter, a 
 return to Great German separatism and old Bavarian 
 policy is not to be feared, so with the former a resusci- 
 tation of the policy of Prince Kaunitz and Schwarzen- 
 berg v^as not to be expected. By a federation with Aus- 
 tria, however, which resembles a big Belgium, since its 
 population, even without Galicia and Dalmatia, is only 
 about half Germanic, our interests would suffer as 
 much as if we subordinated our policy to the views of 
 Vienna or Budapest — thus espousing Austria's quarrels 
 {"d'epouser les querelles d'Aiitriche"). 
 
 Hence we were not obliged to take any notice of the 
 desires of our ally ; they were not only unnecessary but 
 also dangerous, as they would lead to a conflict with 
 Russia if we looked at Oriental questions through Aus- 
 trian spectacles. 
 
 The development of the alliance, from a union formed 
 on a single hypothesis for a single specific purpose, into 
 a general and unlimited association, a pooling of inter- 
 ests in all spheres, was the best way of producing that 
 which diplomacy was designed to prevent — war. Such 
 an "alliance policy" was also calculated to alienate from 
 us the sympathies of the strong, young, rising communi- 
 ties in the Balkans, who were prepared to turn to U3 
 and to open their markets to us. 
 
 The difference between the power of a Ruling House 
 and a National State, between dynastic and democratic 
 ideas of government, had to be decided, and as usual 
 we were on the wrong side. 
 
 King Carol told one of our representatives that he had 
 entered into the alliance with us on the assumption that 
 we retained the leadership ; but if this passed to Austria, 
 that would alter the foundations of the relationship, and
 
 10 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 under such circumstances he would not be able to go on 
 with it. 
 
 Things were similar in Serbia, where, contrary to our 
 own economic interests, we were supporting the Austrian 
 policy of strangulation. 
 
 Every time we have backed the wrong horse, whose 
 breakdown could have been foreseen: Kriiger, Abdul 
 Aziz, Abdul Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, ending — the most 
 fatal of all mistakes — with the great plunge on the Berch- 
 told stable. 
 
 The Conference of Ambassadors 
 
 Shortly after my arrival in London, at the end of 191 2, 
 Sir E. Grey proposed an informal conversation to pre- 
 vent the Balkan War developing into a European one, 
 after we had unfortunately refused, on the outbreak 
 of the war, to agree to the French proposal of a dec- 
 laration of disinterestedness. The British statesman 
 from the very beginning took up the position that Eng- 
 land had no interest in Albania, and had no intention 
 of going to war over this question. He merely wished 
 to mediate between the two groups as an "honest broker" 
 and smooth over difficulties. He therefore by no means 
 took sides with the Entente, and during the eight months 
 or so of the negotiations his goodwill and his authori- 
 tative influence contributed in no small degree to the 
 attainment of an agreement. We, instead of adopting 
 an attitude similar to the English one, invariably took 
 up the position which was prescribed for us by Vienna. 
 Count Mensdorff was the leader of the Triple Alliance 
 in London; I was his "second." It was my duty to 
 support his proposals. That clever and experienced man 
 Count Szogyenyi was conducting affairs in Berlin. His 
 refrain was "Then the casus foederis will arise," and 
 when I once ventured to doubt the truth of this conclu-
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 11 
 
 sion I was severely reprimanded for "Austrophobia." 
 It was also said that I had an ''hereditary weakness" — 
 the allusion being to my father. 
 
 On all questions we took sides with Austria and Italy 
 — about Albania, a Serbian port on the Adriatic, Scu- 
 tari, and also about the delimitation of the frontiers of 
 Albania — while Sir E. Grey hardly ever supported the 
 French or Russian claims. He mostly supported our 
 group in order not to give a pretext like the one a dead 
 Archduke was to furnish later on. Thus with his as- 
 sistance it was possible to coax King Nikita out of 
 Scutari again. Otherwise this question would already 
 have led to a world-war, as we should certainly not have 
 ventured to induce "our ally" to give way. 
 
 Sir E. Grey conducted the negotiations with circum- 
 spection, calm, and tact. When a question threatened to 
 become involved, he sketched a formula for agreement 
 which was to the point and was always accepted. His 
 personality inspired equal confidence in all the partici- 
 pants. 
 
 As a matter of fact we had again successfully emerged 
 from one of those trials of strength which characterise 
 our policy. Russia had been obliged to give way to us 
 on all points, as she was never in a position to procure 
 success for the Serbian aims. Albania was established 
 as a vassal state of Austria and Serbia was pressed 
 back from the sea. Hence this conference resulted in a 
 fresh humiliation for Russian self-esteem. As in 1878 
 and in 1908, we had opposed the Russian plans although 
 no German interests were involved. Bismarck was clever 
 enough to mitigate the mistake of the Congress by the 
 secret treaty and by his attitude in the Battenberg ques- 
 tion; but we continued to pursue in London the danger- 
 ous path, upon which we had once more entered in the 
 Bosnian question, nor did we leave it in time when it led 
 to the precipice.
 
 12 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 The ill-humour which prevailed in Russia at that time 
 was shown during the conference by attacks in the Rus- 
 sian Press against my Russian colleague and Russian 
 diplomacy. The dissatisfied circles made capital of his 
 German descent and Roman Catholicism, his reputation 
 as a friend of Germany, and the accident that he was 
 related both to Count Mensdorff and to me. Without 
 possessing a very distinguished personality, Count Benck- 
 endorff is endowed with a number of qualifications that 
 distinguish a good diplomat — tact, polished manners, ex- 
 perience, courtesy, and a natural eye for men and mat- 
 ters. He was always at pains to avoid a brusque attitude, 
 and was supported in this by England and France. 
 
 Later I once remarked to him: "I presume that Rus- 
 sian feeling is very anti-German." He replied: "There 
 are also very strong and influential pro-German circles, 
 but in general people are anti-Austrian." 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add that our "Austrophilie a 
 outrance" (friendship for Austria through thick and 
 thin) was hardly calculated to loosen the Entente and to 
 direct Russia towards her Asiatic interests ! 
 
 The Balkan Conference 
 
 At the same time the Balkan Conference was sitting 
 in London and I had occasion to come into contact with 
 the leaders of the Balkan States. M. Venizelos was cer- 
 tainly the most distinguished personality. At that time 
 he was anything rather than anti-German, and visited 
 me several times ; he was especiall}' fond of wearing the 
 ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle— he even wore it 
 at the French Embassy His prepossessing charm and 
 ways of a man of the world secured him much sympathy. 
 Next to him M. Danefl, at that time Bulgarian Premier 
 and confidant of Count Berchtold, played a great part. 
 He gave the impression of a subtle and energetic man,
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 13 
 
 and it is probably only due to the influence of his Vienna 
 and Budapest friends, of whose homage he often made 
 fun, that he was induced to commit the folly of enter- 
 ing upon the second Balkan War and of refusing Rus- 
 sian arbitration. 
 
 M. Take Jonescu was also frequently in London and 
 then visited me regularly. I knew him from the time 
 when I was Secretary at Bucharest. He was also one 
 of Herr von Kiderlen's friends. In London he was 
 endeavouring to obtain concessions to Rumania from 
 M. Daneff by means of negotiations, in which he was 
 assisted by the very able Rumanian Ambassador Misu. 
 It is known that Bulgarian opposition brought about 
 the failure of these negotiations. Count Berchtold (and 
 we of course with him) was entirely on Bulgaria's side, 
 otherwise by putting pressure on M. Daneff we might 
 have secured the desired satisfaction for Rumania and 
 placed her under an obligation to us; she was jfinally 
 estranged from the Central Powers by Austria's atti- 
 tude during and after the second Balkan War. 
 
 The Second Balkan War 
 
 The defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War 
 and the victory of Serbia, with the Rumanian inva- 
 sion, naturally constituted a humiliation for Austria. The 
 plan to rectify this by an expedition against Serbia 
 seems to have been evolved in Vienna soon after. The 
 Italian revelations prove this, and it may be assumed 
 that Marquis San Giuliano, who described the plan — most 
 aptly — as a pericolosissima aventiira, saved us from being 
 involved in a world-war as early as the summer of 1913. 
 
 Owing to the intimacy of Russo-Italian relations, the 
 Vienna plan was doubtless known in Petrograd. In 
 any case, M. Sazonow openly declared at Constanza, 
 as M. Take Jonescu told me, that an Austrian attack on 
 Serbia would be a casus belli for Russia.
 
 14 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 When one of my staff returned from leave in Vienna 
 in the spring of 1914 he said that Herr von Tschirschky 
 had declared that there would soon be war. As I, how- 
 ever, was always left in ignorance about important events 
 I considered this pessimism to be unfounded. 
 
 As a matter of fact it would appear that, ever since 
 the peace of Bucharest, Vienna was bent on securing 
 a revision of the treaty by her own effort and was 
 apparently only waiting for a favourable pretext. Vi- 
 enna statesmen could, of course, depend on our support. 
 They were aware of that, as they had been repeatedly 
 accused of lack of firmness. In fact, Berlin was press- 
 ing for a "rehabilitation of Austria." 
 
 LiMAN Von Sanders 
 
 When I returned to London in December, 1913, from 
 a lengthy leave, the Liman von Sanders question had 
 led to a fresh crisis in our relations with Russia. Sir 
 E. Grey, not without concern, pointed out to me the 
 excitement there was in Petrograd over it : "I have never 
 seen them so excited." 
 
 I received instructions from Berlin to request the Min- 
 ister to exert a restraining influence in Petrograd, and 
 .:o assist us in settling the dispute. Sir Edward gladly 
 did this, and his intervention contributed in no small 
 degree to smooth the matter over. Aly good relations 
 with Sir Edward and his great influence in Petrograd 
 were repeatedly made use of in similar manner when we 
 wished to attain anything there, as our representative 
 proved himself quite useless for such a purpose. 
 
 During the fateful days of July, 19 14, Sir Edward 
 said to me: "When you want to obtain anything in 
 Petrograd you always apply to me, but if I appeal to you 
 for your influence in Vienna you fail m.e."
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 15 
 
 The Colonial Treaty 
 
 The good and confidential relations which I had suc- 
 ceeded in establishing, not only with society and the 
 most influential people like Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, 
 but also with the great public at public dinners, pro- 
 duced a marked improvement in the relations of the two 
 countries. Sir Edward honestly tried to confirm this 
 rapprochement, and his intentions were most apparent on 
 two questions — the Colonial and the Bagdad Railway 
 Treaties. 
 
 In 1898 Count Hatzfeld and Mr. Balfour had signed a 
 secret agreement dividing the Portuguese colonies into 
 economic spheres of influence between us and England. 
 As the Government of Portugal had neither the power 
 nor the means to open up her extended possessions or to 
 administer them properly, she had already thought of 
 selling them before and thus relieving her financial bur- 
 dens. An agreement had been come to between us and 
 England which defined the interests of both parties, and 
 which was of the greater value because Portugal is en- 
 tirely dependent on England, as is generally known. 
 
 On the face of it this agreement was to safeguard 
 the integrity and independence of the Portuguese State, 
 and merely declared the intention of being of financial 
 and economic assistance to the Portuguese. Literally, 
 therefore, it did not contravene the ancient Anglo-Por- 
 tuguese Alliance of the fifteenth century, which was last 
 renewed under Charles II. and gave a reciprocal terri- 
 torial guarantee. 
 
 In spite of this, owing to the endeavours of Marquis 
 Soveral, who was presumably aware of the Anglo-Ger- 
 man agreement, a new treaty — the so-called Treaty of 
 Windsor — was concluded between England and Portugal 
 in 1899, confirming the old agreements, which had always 
 remained in force.
 
 16 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 The object of negotiations between us and England, 
 which had commenced before my arrival, was to amend 
 and improve our agreement of 1898, as it had proved 
 unsatisfactory on several points as regards geographical 
 delimitation. Thanks to the accommodating attitude of 
 the British Government I succeeded in making the new 
 agreement fully accord with our wishes and interests. 
 The whole of Angola up to the 20th degree of longitude 
 was assigned to us, so that we stretched up to the Congo 
 State from the south; we also acquired the valuable 
 islands of San Thome and Principe, which are north of 
 the Equator and therefore really in the French sphere of 
 influence, a fact which caused my French colleague to 
 enter strong but unavailing protests. 
 
 Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozam- 
 bique; the Licango formed the border. 
 
 The British Government showed the greatest consider- 
 ation for our interests and wishes. Sir E. Grey in- 
 tended to demonstrate his goodwill towards us, but he 
 also wished to assist our colonial development as a 
 whole, as England hoped to divert the German develop- 
 ment of strength from the North Sea and Western 
 Europe to the Ocean and to Africa. "We don't want 
 to grudge Germany her colonial development," a mem- 
 ber of the Cabinet said to me. 
 
 The British Government originally intended to include 
 the Congo State in the agreement, which would have 
 given us the right of pre-emption and enabled us to 
 penetrate it economically. We refused this offer nomi- 
 nally in view of Belgian susceptibilities. Perhaps we 
 wished to be economical of successes ? With regard also 
 to the practical realisation of its real though unexpressed 
 intention — the later actual partition of the Portuguese 
 colonies — the treaty in its new form showed marked im- 
 provements and advantages as compared with the old 
 one. Cases had been specified which empowered us to
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914. 17 
 
 take steps to guard our interests in the districts as- 
 signed to us. These were couched in such a manner 
 that it was really left to us to decide when "vital" inter- 
 ests arose, so that, with Portugal entirely dependent on 
 England, it was only necessary to cultivate further good 
 relations with England in order to carry out our joint 
 intentions at a later date with English assent. 
 
 Sir E. Grey showed the sincerity of the British Gov- 
 ernment's desire to respect our rights by referring to us 
 Englishmen who wished to invest capital and asked for 
 the support of the British Government in the districts 
 assigned to us by the new agreement, even before this 
 was completed and signed, and by informing them that 
 their enterprise belonged to our sphere of influence. 
 
 The agreement was practically completed at the time 
 of the King's visit to Berlin in May, 1913. At that 
 time a conference took place in Berlin under the presi- 
 dency of the Imperial Chancellor; in this conference I 
 also took part, and certain further wishes of ours were 
 defined. On my return to London I succeeded, with the 
 assistance of Councillor of Legation von Kiihlmann, who 
 was working at the agreement with Mr. Parker, in having 
 our last proposals incorporated, so that the whole agree- 
 ment could be paragraphed by Sir E. Grey and by me 
 in August, 191 3, before I went on leave. 
 
 But now fresh difficulties arose which prevented its 
 being signed, and I did not obtain the authorisation to 
 conclude it till a year later — that is, shortly before the 
 outbreak of the war. It was, however, never signed. 
 
 Sir E. Grey was only willing to sign if the agreement 
 were published together with those of 1898 and 1899. 
 England had, as he said, no other secret treaties besides 
 these, and it was contrary to established principles to 
 keep binding agreements secret. Therefore he could not 
 make any agreement without publishing it. He was, 
 however, willing to accede to our wishes with regard to
 
 18 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 the time and manner of publication, provided that such 
 publication took place within one year from the date of 
 signature. 
 
 At our Foreign Office, where my London successes had 
 caused increasing dissatisfaction, and where an influen- 
 tial personage, who acted the part of Herr von Holstein, 
 wanted the London post for himself, I was informed that 
 the publication would endanger our interests in the colo- 
 nies, as the Portuguese would then not give us any more 
 concessions. 
 
 The futility of this objection is apparent from the con- 
 sideration that the Portuguese, in view of the closeness 
 of Anglo-Portuguese relations, were most probably just 
 as well aware of the old agreement as of our new ar- 
 rangements, and that the influence which England pos- 
 sesses at Lisbon renders their Government completely im- 
 potent in face of an Anglo-German agreement. 
 
 Another pretext had therefore to be found for wreck- 
 ing the treaty. It was suggested that the publication of 
 the Treaty of Windsor, which had been concluded during 
 the time of Prince Hohenlohe — though it was only a 
 renewal of the Treaty of Charles IL, which had always 
 remained in force — might endanger the position of Herr 
 von Bethmann Hollweg, as a proof of British hypocrisy 
 and perfidy! 
 
 I pointed out that the preamble of our agreement ex- 
 pressed the same thing as the Treaty of Windsor and as 
 other similar treaties, namely, that we would protect the 
 sovereign rights of Portugal and the inviolability of its 
 possessions. In vain! In spite of repeated discussions 
 with Sir E. Grey, at which he made many fresh sug- 
 gestions for the publication, the Foreign Office persisted 
 in its attitude, and finally arranged with Sir E. Goschen 
 that matters should be left as they were! 
 
 The treaty, which offered us extraordinary advantages,
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 19 
 
 the result of more than a year's work, was thus dropped 
 because it would have been a public success for me. 
 
 When I mentioned the subject to Mr. Harcourt at a 
 dinner at the Embassy in the spring of 1914, the Minister 
 for the Colonies told me that he was placed in a difficult 
 position, and did not know how to act. The present 
 position was intolerable — he wished to safeguard our in- 
 terests, but was in doubt whether he should proceed on 
 the terms of the old or the new treaty. It was therefore 
 urgently desirable to clear up the situation and to settle 
 the matter, which had dragged on for such a long time. 
 
 In reply to a dispatch in this sense I received instruc- 
 tions couched in terms which showed more emotion than 
 civility, telling me to abstain from any further interfer- 
 ence in the matter. 
 
 I now regret that I did not immediately travel to Berlin 
 and place my post at the disposal of the monarch, and 
 that I had not lost faith in the possibility of arriving at 
 an understanding with those in authority, a sinister mis- 
 take which was to take its revenge a few months later 
 in such a tragical way. 
 
 However little I even then enjoyed the goodwill of the 
 highest official of the Empire, as he feared that I was 
 aspiring to his post, yet I must in justice to him say 
 tliat during our last interview before the outbreak of 
 war, at the end of June, 1914, to which I will refer later, 
 he gave me his assent for the signature and publication 
 of the treaty. In spite of this it required repeated ap- 
 plications on my part, which were supported by Herr 
 Dr. Solf in Berlin, before sanction was finally obtained 
 at the end of July, 1914. As the Serbian crisis at that 
 time already imperilled the peace of Europe, the comple- 
 tion of the treaty had to be postponed. It also is one 
 of the sacrifices of this war.
 
 20 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 The Bagdad Treaty 
 
 At the same time I was negotiating In London, with 
 the able support of Herr von Kiihlmann, about the so- 
 called Bagdad Treaty. The real object of this was to 
 divide up Asia Minor into spheres of influence, although 
 this term was anxiously avoided in view of the rights 
 of the Sultan. Sir E. Grey also repeatedly stated that 
 there were in existence no agreements with France and 
 Russia about the partition of Asia Minor. 
 
 In consultation with a Turkish representative, Hakki 
 Pasha, all economic questions concerning German under- 
 takings were settled in the main according to the wishes 
 of the Deutsche Bank. The most important concession 
 Sir E. Grey made to me personally was the continuation 
 of the railway as far as Basra. We had dropped this 
 point in favour of the connection to Alexandretta ; up to 
 that time Bagdad had been the terminal point of the 
 railway. An international commission was to regulate 
 navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. We were also to have 
 a share in the harbour works at Basra, and received 
 rights for the navigation of the Tigris, which hitherto 
 had been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch. 
 
 By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as 
 Basra was included within our sphere of influence (with- 
 out prejudice to already existing British navigation rights 
 on the Tigris and the rights of the Wilcox irrigation 
 works), as well as the whole district of the Bagdad and 
 Anatolian railway. 
 
 The coast of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin 
 railway were recognised as the British economic sphere, 
 Syria as the French, and Armenia as the Russian. If 
 both treaties were executed and published, an agree- 
 ment with England would be reached which would pre- 
 clude all doubts about the possibility of an "Anglo-Ger- 
 man co-operation."
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 21 
 
 The Question of the Navy 
 
 The Naval question was and is the most delicate of 
 all. It is not always regarded rightly. 
 
 The creation of a powerful fleet on the other side of 
 the North Sea— the development of the greatest military 
 power of the Continent into the greatest naval power as 
 well — was bound to be felt in England as at least "in- 
 convenient." There can be no doubt about this in any 
 reasonable view. In order to maintain her advantage 
 and not to become dependent, in order to secure the 
 rule over the seas which is necessary for her if she 
 is not to starve, she was compelled to undertake arma- 
 ments and expenditure which weighed heavily on the tax- 
 payer. England's international position would be threat- 
 ened, however, if our policy created the belief that war- 
 like developments might ensue — a state of affairs which 
 had almost been reached during the time of the Morocco 
 crises and the Bosnian problem. 
 
 Great Britain had become reconciled to our fleet within 
 its then appointed limits, but it was certainly not wel- 
 come, and was one of the causes — though not the only 
 cause and perhaps not the most important — of her adhe- 
 sion to France and Russia; but on account of the fleet 
 alone England would not have drawn the sword any 
 more than on account of our trade, which has been al- 
 leged to have produced jealousy and finally war. 
 
 From the very beginning I maintained that, notwith- 
 standing the fleet, it would be possible to arrive at a 
 friendly understanding and rapprochement if we did not 
 introduce a new Navy Bill and our policy were indubi- 
 tably pacific. I also avoided mention of the fleet and the 
 word never passed between Sir E. Grey and me. On 
 one occasion Sir E. Grey said at a meeting of the Cabi- 
 net, "The present German Ambassador has never men- 
 tioned the fleet to me."
 
 22 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 During my tenure of office Mr. Churchill, then First 
 Lord of the Admiralty, proposed, as is known, the so- 
 called "Naval holiday" and suggested for financial rea- 
 sons, and probably also to meet the pacific wishes of his 
 party, a year's pause in armaments. Officially Sir E. 
 Grey did not support the proposal; he never men- 
 tioned it to me, but Mr. Churchill repeatedly spoke to 
 me about it. 
 
 I am convinced that his suggestion was honest, as pre- 
 varication is altogether foreign to English nature. It 
 would have been a great success for Mr. Churchill if 
 he could have come before the country with reductions 
 of expenditure and freed it from the nightmare of arma- 
 ments that weighed on the people. 
 
 I replied that for technical reasons it would be diffi- 
 cult to agree to his plan. What was to become of the 
 workmen who were engaged for this purpose, and what 
 of the technical staff? Our Naval programme had been 
 decided on, and it would be difficult to alter it in any 
 way. On the other hand we had no intention of exceed- 
 ing it. But he reverted to it again and pointed out that 
 the sums used for enormous armaments might better 
 be employed for other and useful purposes. I replied 
 that this expenditure too benefited our home industries. 
 
 Through interviews with Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir E. Grey's 
 principal private secretary, I managed to have the ques- 
 tion removed from the agenda without causing any ill- 
 feeling, although it was again referred to in Parliament, 
 and to prevent any official proposal being made. It was, 
 however, a pet idea of Mr. Churchill's and the Govern- 
 ment's, and I think that by entering upon his plan and 
 the formula i6:io for battleships we might have given 
 tangible proof of our goodwill, and strengthened and 
 encouraged the tendency (which already prevailed in the 
 Government) to enter into closer relations with us. 
 
 But, as I have said, it was possible to arrive at an un-
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 23 
 
 derstanding in spite of the fleet and without a "Naval 
 holiday." I had always regarded my mission from this 
 point of view, and I had also succeeded in realising my 
 plans when the outbreak of war destroyed everything I 
 had achieved. 
 
 Commercial Jealousy 
 
 The "commercial jealousy," about which we hear so 
 much, is based on a wrong conception of the circum- 
 stances. Certainly Germany's rise as a commercial power 
 after the war of 1870 and during the following decades 
 was a menace to British commercial circles which, with 
 their industries and export-houses, had held a virtual 
 monopoly of trade. The increasing commerce with Ger- 
 many, which was the leading country in Europe as re- 
 gards British exports — a fact to which I invariably re- 
 ferred in my public speeches — had, however, given rise 
 to the wish to maintain friendly relations with their 
 best customer and business friend, and had driven all 
 other considerations into the background. 
 
 The Briton is matter-of-fact — he takes things as they 
 are and does not tilt against windmills. Notably in com- 
 mercial circles I encountered the most friendly spirit 
 and the endeavour to further our common economic in- 
 terests. As a matter of fact nobody in them took any 
 interest in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even in the 
 French representative, in spite of his striking personality 
 and his political successes. Only the German and Ameri- 
 can Ambassadors attracted public attention. 
 
 In order to get into touch with important commercial 
 circles, I accepted invitations from the United Chambers 
 of Commerce, and from the London and Bradford Cham- 
 ber, and was the guest of the cities of Newcastle and 
 Liverpool. I was well received everywhere ; Manchester,
 
 24 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 Glasgow, and Edinburgh had also invited me, and I in- 
 tended to go there later. 
 
 People who did not understand British conditions and 
 did not realise the importance of "public dinners," also 
 people to whom my successes were unwelcome, re- 
 proached me with having done harm with my speeches. 
 I believe on the contrary that by appearing in public and 
 emphasising common commercial interests I contributed 
 in no small measure to the improvement of relations, 
 quite apart from the fact that it would have been clumsy 
 and churlish to refuse all invitations. 
 
 In all other circles I also met with the most friendly 
 reception and hearty co-operation — at Court, in society, 
 and from the Government. 
 
 The Court and Society 
 
 The King, although not a genius, is a simple and well- 
 meaning man with sound common sense ; he demonstrat- 
 ed his goodwill towards me and was frankly desirous of 
 furthering my task. Although the British Constitution 
 leaves only very limited powers to the Crown, yet the 
 monarch, in virtue of his position, can exercise a con- 
 siderable influence on opinion both in society and in the 
 Government. The Crown is the apex of the social pyra- 
 mid; it sets the fashion. Society, which is principally 
 Unionist (Conservative), has always taken an active 
 interest in politics, a habit which the ladies share. It is 
 represented in the House of Lords, the House of Com- 
 mons, and hence also in the Cabinet. An Englishman , 
 either is a member of society, or he would like to be 
 one. It is his constant endeavour to be a "Gentleman," 
 and even people of undistinguished origin, like Mr. As- 
 quith, delight to mingle in society and the company of I 
 beautiful and fashionable women. 
 
 The British gentlemen of both parties have the same
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 25 
 
 education, go to the same colleges and universities, have 
 the same recreations — golf, cricket, lawn-tennis, or polo. 
 All have played cricket and football in their youth ; they 
 have the same habits of life, and spend the week-end in 
 the country. There is no social cleavage between the 
 parties, but only a political one; in recent years it has 
 so far developed into a social cleavage that the politicians 
 of the two camps avoid social intercourse with one 
 another. Even on the neutral territory of an Embassy 
 one did not venture to mingle the two parties, as since 
 the Veto and Home Rule Bills the Unionists have ostra- 
 cised the Radicals. When the King and Queen dined 
 with us a few months after my arrival. Lord London- 
 derry left the house after dinner, as he did not wish to 
 remain together with Sir E. Grey. But it is not a differ- 
 ence of caste or education as in France; they are not 
 two separate worlds, but the same world, and the opin- 
 ion about a foreigner is a common one, and not without 
 influence on his political position, whether Mr. Asquith 
 be governing or Lord Lansdowne. 
 
 There has been no difference of caste in England since 
 the time of the Stuarts, and since the Guelphs and Whig 
 oligarchy, in contrast to the Tory landed gentry en- 
 couraged the rise of an urban middle-class. It is rather 
 a difference of political opinions about questions of con- 
 stitutional law and taxation. Especially aristocrats like 
 Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, Crewe, who joined the peo- 
 ple's party — the Radicals — were most hated by the Union- 
 ist aristocracy; one never met any of these gentle- 
 men at any of the great aristocratic houses, except at 
 those of a few party friends. 
 
 We were received in London with open arms and 
 both parties rivalled one another in courtesy towards us. 
 In view of the close relationship between politics and 
 society in England, it would be wrong to undervalue
 
 26 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 social relations, even when the majority of the upper ten 
 thousand are in opposition to the Government. 
 
 There is not the same unbridgable gulf between Mr. 
 Asquith and the Duke of Devonshire that there is be- 
 tween, say, M. Briand and the Due de Doudeauville. 
 Certainly they do not consort together in times of great 
 tension; they belong to two separate social groups, but 
 these are parts of the same society, though of different 
 grades, the centre of which is the Court. They have 
 common friends and habits of life; mostly they have 
 known each other from their youth up and also are 
 frequently related to one another either by blood or 
 marriage. 
 
 Phenomena like Mr. Lloyd George — the man of the 
 people, petty attorney, and self-made man — are the ex- 
 ception. Even Mr. Burns, the Socialist Labour leader, 
 and self-educated man, sought contact with society. In 
 view of the prevailing attempt to rank as a gentleman, 
 whose unattained prototype is still the great aristocrat, 
 the value of the verdict of society and its attitude must 
 not be underestimated. 
 
 Hence the social adaptability of a representative no- 
 where plays a greater role than in England. A hospitable 
 house with pleasant hosts is worth more than the most 
 profound scientific knowledge; a savant with provincial 
 manners and small means would gain no influence, in 
 spite of all his learning. 
 
 The Briton loathes a bore, a schemer, and a prig; 
 he likes a good fellow. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's influence in all matters of foreign 
 policy was almost unlimited. On important occasions he 
 used indeed to say, 'T must first bring it before the Cab- 
 inet" ; but this always agreed to his views. His authority
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 27 
 
 was undisputed. Although he does not know foreign 
 countries at all, and had never left England except for 
 a short visit to Paris, he was fully conversant with all 
 the important questions owing to his long parliamentary 
 experience and his natural insight. He understands 
 French, but does not speak it. He was returned to 
 Parliament as a young man, and soon began to interest 
 himself in foreign affairs. Under Lord Rosebery he 
 was Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and 
 became Secretary of State in 1906, under Mr. Campbell- 
 Bannerman; he has now held the post for some ten 
 years. 
 
 The scion of an old north country family, which had 
 already furnished Grey, the well-known statesman, he 
 joined the left wing of his party and sympathised with 
 Socialists and pacifists. You may call him a Socialist 
 in the ideal sense, as he carries the theory into his 
 private life and lives very simply and unpretentiously, 
 although he has extensive means. Ostentation is foreign 
 to him. In London he only had a small house, and 
 never gave dinners, except the one official dinner at the 
 Foreign Office on the King's Birthday. On the few oc- 
 casions when he entertained guests it was at a simple 
 dinner or lunch with maidservants to wait. Also he 
 avoided large functions and banquets. 
 
 Like his colleagues, he regularly spends his week-ends 
 in the country, but not with large or fashionable parties. 
 He is mostly by himself in his cottage in the New For- 
 est, where he takes long walks to study birds and their 
 ways, as he is a passionate lover of nature and an 
 ornithologist. Or sometimes he goes to his estate in 
 the north, where he feeds the squirrels that come in 
 at the windows, and breeds different species of water- 
 fowl. 
 
 He was very fond of going to the Norfolk marshes
 
 28 My Mission to London 1912--1914. 
 
 to watch in their breeding season the rare kinds of 
 herons, which nest only there. 
 
 In his youth he was a well-known cricket and racquet 
 player; now his favourite pastime is salmon and trout- 
 fishing in Scottish rivers in company with his friend 
 Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law. "All the 
 rest of the year I am looking forward to it." He has 
 published a book on fishing. 
 
 On one occasion, when we spent a week-end with him 
 alone at Lord Glenconner's, near Salisbury, he arrived 
 on a bicycle and returned to his cottage about thirty 
 miles distant in the same way. 
 
 The simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him 
 the esteem even of his opponents, who were to be found 
 rather in the sphere of home affairs than of foreign 
 policy. Lies and intrigue are equally repugnant to him. 
 
 His wife, to whom he was devotedly attached and 
 from whom he was inseparable, died in consequence of 
 being thrown from a trap she was driving. As is gen- 
 erally known, one of his brothers was killed by a lion. 
 
 Wordsworth is his favourite poet, and he could quote 
 much of his poetry. 
 
 The calm quiet of his British nature is not lacking in a 
 sense of humour. Once when he was lunching with us 
 and the children, and heard them talking German, he 
 said, "I can't help thinking how clever these children 
 are to talk German so well," and was pleased with his 
 joke. 
 
 This is a true picture of the man who is decried as 
 "Liar-Grey" and instigator of the world-war. 
 
 Mr. Asquith 
 
 Mr. Asquith is a man of an entirely different stamp. 
 A jovial bon-vivant, fond of the ladies, especially the 
 young and pretty ones, he is partial to cheerful society
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 29 
 
 and good cooking ; and his zest for enjoyment is shared 
 by his wife. Formerly a well-known barrister with a 
 large income, and for a number of years in Parliament, 
 then a Minister under Mr. Gladstone, a pacifist like his 
 friend Grey, and favouring an understanding with Ger- 
 many, he treated all questions with the cheery calm 
 and assurance of an experienced man of business, whose 
 good health and excellent nerves were steeled by devotion 
 to the game of golf. 
 
 His daughters were at school in Germany and spoke 
 German fluently. In a short time we got on friendly 
 terms with him and his family, and were his guests in 
 his small country house on the Thames. 
 
 Only on rare occasions did he concern himself with 
 foreign politics, when important questions arose ; then of 
 course his decision was final. During the critical days 
 of July Mrs. Asquith repeatedly came to us to warn 
 us, and in the end she was quite distraught at the 
 tragic turn of events. Mr. Asquith also, when I called 
 on him on the 2nd August to make a last effort in the 
 direction of expectant neutrality, was quite broken, 
 though absolutely calm. Tears were coursing down his 
 cheeks. 
 
 NiCOLSON 
 
 Sir A. Nicolson and Sir W. Tyrrell were the two 
 most influential men at the Foreign OflSce after the Min- 
 ister. The former was no friend of ours, but his at- 
 titude towards me was absolutely correct and courteous. 
 Our personal relations were excellent. He too did not 
 want war; but when we advanced against France, he 
 no doubt worked in the direction of an immediate in- 
 tervention. He was the confidant of my French col- 
 league, with whom he was in constant touch; also he 
 wished to relieve Lord Bertie in Paris.
 
 30 My Mission to London 1912-1914. 
 
 Sir Arthur, who had been Ambassador at Petrograd, 
 had concluded the treaty of 1907, which had enabled 
 Russia again to turn her attention to the West and to 
 the Near East. 
 
 Tyrrell 
 
 Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir Edward's private secretary, pos- 
 sessed far greater influence than the Permanent Under- 
 Secretary. This highly intelligent man had been at school 
 in Germany, and had then turned to diplomacy, but 
 had only been abroad for a short time. At first he 
 favoured the anti-German policy, which was then in 
 fashion amongst the younger British diplomatists, but 
 later he became a convinced advocate of an under- 
 standing. He influenced Sir E. Grey, with whom he 
 was very intimate, in this direction. Since the outbreak 
 of war he has left the Office and found a place in the 
 Home Office, probably because of the criticisms passed 
 on him for his Germanophil tendency. 
 
 Attitude of the German Foreign Office 
 
 Nothing can describe the rage of certain gentlemen at 
 my London successes and the position which I had man- 
 aged to make for myself in a short time. They devised 
 vexatious instructions to render my office more difficult. 
 I was left in complete ignorance of the most impor- 
 tant matters, and was restricted to the communication 
 of dull and unimportant reports. Secret agents' reports, 
 on matters about which I could not learn without espion- 
 age and the necessary funds, were never available to 
 me; and it was not till the last days of July, 1914, that 
 I learnt, quite by chance, from the Naval Attache of the 
 secret Anglo-French agreement concerning the co-opera- 
 tion of the two fleets in case of war. The knowledge 
 
 \
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 31 
 
 of other important events which had been known to the 
 Office for a long time, like the correspondence between 
 Grey and Cambon, was kept from me. 
 
 In Case of War 
 
 Soon after my arrival I obtained the conviction that 
 under no circumstances had we to fear a British attack 
 or British support for any foreign attack, but that 
 under any circumstances England would protect the 
 French. I expressed this view in repeated dispatches, 
 with minute proof and great emphasis, but did not obtain 
 any credence, although Lord Haldane's refusal to assent 
 to the neutrality formula and England's attitude during 
 the Morocco crisis had been pretty obvious indications. 
 In addition there were the secret agreements which I have 
 referred to, and which were known to the Office. 
 
 I always pointed out that in the event of a war be- 
 tween European Powers, England as a commercial state 
 would suffer enormously, and would therefore do her 
 best to prevent a conflict; but, on the other hand, she 
 would never tolerate a weakening or annihilation of 
 France ; because of the necessity of maintaining the Eu- 
 ropean balance of power and of preventing a German 
 superiority of force. Lord Haldane had told me this 
 shortly after my arrival, and all the leading people had 
 expressed themselves in the same sense. 
 
 The Serbian Crisis 
 
 At the end of June I went to Kiel by command of 
 the Emperor. A few weeks prior to this I had been 
 made an honorary D.C.L. of Oxford, an honour which 
 had not been conferred on any German Ambassador 
 since Herr von Bunsen. On board the Meteor we learned 
 of the death of the Archduke. H.M. regretted that his
 
 32 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 efforts to win him over to his way of thinking had thus 
 been rendered vain. I do not know whether the plan 
 of an active poHcy against Serbia had already been de- 
 cided on at Konopischt. 
 
 As I was not instructed about views and events in 
 Vienna, I did not attach very great importance to this 
 occurrence. Later on I could only remark that amongst 
 Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other 
 sentiments. On board the Meteor there was also an Aus- 
 trian guest of the Emperor's, Count Felix Thun. He 
 had remained in his cabin all the time suffering from sea- 
 sickness, in spite of the splendid weather ; but on receiv- 
 ing the news he was well. The fright or joy had cured 
 him. 
 
 On my arrival in Berlin I saw the Chancellor and told 
 him that I considered the state of our foreign relations 
 very satisfactory, as we were on better terms with Eng- 
 land than we had been for a long time, whilst in 
 France also the government was in the hands of a pacifist 
 Ministry. 
 
 Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not appear to share 
 my optimism, and complained about Russian armaments. 
 I sought to reassure him, emphasising the fact that Rus- 
 sia had no interest in attacking us, and that such an 
 attack would never receive Anglo-French support, as 
 both countries wanted peace. Thereupon I went to Dr. 
 Zimmermann, who was acting for Herr von Jagow, and 
 he told me that Russia was about to raise 900,000 addi- 
 tional troops. His language betrayed unmistakable an- 
 noyance with Russia, which was "everywhere in our 
 way." There were also difficulties in economic policy. 
 Of course, I was not told that General von Moltke was 
 pressing for war ; but I learned that Herr von Tschirsch- 
 ky had been reprimanded because he reported that he 
 had counselled moderation towards Serbia in Vienna. 
 
 On my return from Silesia to London I stopped only
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 33 
 
 a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria in- 
 tended to take steps against Serbia in order to put an 
 end to an impossible situation. 
 
 I regret that at the moment I underestimated the im- 
 portance of the news. I thought that nothing would 
 come of it this time either, and that matters could easily 
 be settled, even if Russia became threatening. I now 
 regret that I did not stay in Berlin and at once declare 
 that I would not co-operate in a policy of this kind. 
 
 Subsequently I ascertained that, at the decisive con- 
 ference at Potsdam on the 5th July, the Vienna enquiry 
 received the unqualified assent of all the leading people, 
 and with the rider that no harm would be done if a 
 war with Russia should result. Thus it was expressed, 
 at any rate, in the Austrian protocol which Count Mens- 
 dorff received in London. Soon afterwards Herr von 
 Jagow was in Vienna to consult Count Berchtold about 
 all these matters. 
 
 At that time I received instructions to induce the Brit- 
 ish Press to adopt a friendly attitude should Austria 
 administer the coup de grace to the "Great Serbia" move- 
 ment, and to exert my personal influence to prevent pub- 
 lic opinion from becoming inimical to Austria. If one 
 remembered England's attitude during the annexation 
 crisis, when public opinion showed sympathy for the 
 Serbian rights in Bosnia, as well as her benevolent fur- 
 therance of national movements in the days of Lord 
 Byron and Garibaldi, the probability that she would 
 support the intended punitive expedition against the mur- 
 derers of the prince happened so remote, that I found 
 myself obliged to give an urgent warning. But I also 
 warned them against the whole plan, which I character- 
 ised as adventurous and dangerous, and advised them to 
 counsel the Austrians to moderation, as I did not believe 
 that the conflict could be localised. 
 
 Herr von Jagow replied to me that Russia was not
 
 34 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 ready ; there would probably be some fuss, but the more 
 firmly we took sides with Austria the more would Russia 
 give way. As it was, Austria was accusing us of weak- 
 ness and therefore we dare not leave her in the lurch. 
 Public opinion in Russia, on the other hand, was becom- 
 ing more and more anti-German, so we must just 
 risk it. 
 
 In view of this attitude, which, as I found later, was 
 based on reports from Count Pourtales that Russia would 
 not move under any circumstances, and which caused us 
 to spur Count Berchtold on to the utmost energy, I 
 hoped for salvation through British mediation, as I knew 
 that Sir E. Grey's great influence in Petrograd could 
 be used in the direction of peace. I therefore availed 
 myself of my friendly relations with the Minister to re- 
 quest him in confidence to advise moderation in Russia 
 in case Austria, as seemed likely, demanded satisfaction 
 from Serbia. 
 
 At first the English Press preserved calm and was 
 friendly to Austria, because the murder was generally 
 condemned. But gradually more and more voices were 
 heard insisting emphatically that, however much the 
 crime merited punishment, its exploitation for political 
 purposes could not be justified. Austria was strongly 
 exhorted to use moderation. 
 
 When the ultimatum was published, all the papers 
 with the exception of the Standard — the ever-necessitous, 
 which had apparently been bought by Austria — were 
 unanimous in condemnation. The whole world, except- 
 ing Berlin and Vienna, realised that it meant war — in- 
 deed, "the world-war." The British Fleet, which hap- 
 pened to have assembled for a naval review, was not 
 demobilised. 
 
 My efforts were in the first place directed towards 
 obtaining as conciliatory a reply from Serbia as was 
 possible, since the attitude of the Russian Government
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 35 
 
 left room for no doubts about the gravity of the situa- 
 tion. 
 
 Serbia responded favourably to the British efforts, as 
 M. Pasitch had really agreed to everything, excepting 
 two points, about which, however, he declared his will- 
 ingness to negotiate. If Russia and England had wanted 
 the war, in order to attack us, a hint to Belgrade would 
 have been enough, and the unprecedented Note would 
 not have been answered. 
 
 Sir E. Grey went through the Serbian reply with me, 
 and pointed out the conciliatory attitude of the Gov- 
 ernment of Belgrade. Thereupon we discussed his pro- 
 posal of mediation, which was to include a formula ac- 
 ceptable to both pprties for clearing up the two points. 
 His proposal was that a committee, consisting of M. 
 Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and myself, should as- 
 semble under his presidency, and it would have been an 
 easy matter for us to find an acceptable formula for the 
 points at issue, which mainly concerned the collaboration 
 of Austrian Imperial officials at the investigations in 
 Belgrade. Given goodwill, everything could have been 
 settled at one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance 
 of the British proposal would have brought about a 
 relaxation of the tension, and would have further im- 
 proved our relations with England. I therefore strongly 
 backed the proposal, on the ground that otherwise there 
 was danger of the world-war, through which we stood 
 to gain nothing and lose all ; but in vain. It was deroga- 
 tory to the dignity of Austria — we did not intend to 
 interfere in Serbian matters — we left these to our ally. 
 I was to work for "the localisation of the conflict." 
 
 Needless to say a mere hint from Berlin would have 
 decided Count Berchtold to content himself with a 
 diplomatic success, and to accept the Serbian reply. This 
 hint was not given ; on the contrary they urged in the
 
 36 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 direction of war. It would have been such a splendid 
 success. 
 
 After our refusal Sir Edward requested us to submit 
 a proposal. We insisted on war. I could not obtain any 
 reply but that Austria had shown an exceedingly "ac- 
 commodating spirit" by not demanding an extension of 
 territory. 
 
 Sir Edward rightly pointed out that even without an 
 extension of territory it is possible to reduce a state to 
 a condition of vassalage, and that Russia would see a 
 humiliation in this, and would not suffer it. 
 
 The impression grew stronger and stronger that we 
 wanted war under any circumstances. It was impossible 
 to interpret our attitude, on a question which did not 
 directly concern us, in any other way. The urgent re- 
 quests and definite assurances of M. Sazonow, followed 
 by the Czar's positively humble telegrams, the repeated 
 proposals of Sir E. Grey, the warnings of the Marquis 
 San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent counsels, all 
 were of no avail. Berlin persisted ; Serbia must be mas- 
 sacred. 
 
 The more I pressed the less were they inclined to come 
 round, if only that I might not have the success of 
 averting war in conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. 
 
 Finally, on the 29th, the latter decided on the famous 
 warning. I replied that I had invariably reported that 
 we should have to reckon with English opposition if it 
 came to a war with France. Repeatedly the Minister 
 said to me: "If war breaks out, it will be the greatest 
 catastrophe the world has ever seen." 
 
 After that, events followed each other rapidly. When 
 at last Count Berchtold, who up till then had, at the 
 behest of Berlin, played the strong man, decided to come 
 round, we replied to the Russian mobilisation, after 
 Russia had negotiated and waited for a whole week in 
 vain, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 37 
 
 The English Declaration of War 
 
 Sir Edward was still looking for new ways of avoiding 
 the catastrophe. Sir W. Tyrrell called on me on the 
 morning of the ist August to tell me that his chief still 
 hoped to find a way out. Would we remain neutral if 
 France did? I understood that we should then agree to 
 spare France, but he had meant that we should remain 
 altogether neutral — towards Russia also. That was the 
 well-known "misunderstanding." Sir Edward had asked 
 me to call in the afternoon. As he was at a meeting of 
 the Cabinet, he called me up on the telephone, Sir W. 
 Tyrrell having hurried to him at once. In the afternoon, 
 however, he talked only about Belgian neutrality and 
 the possibility that we and France might face one another 
 in arms without attacking. 
 
 Thus this was not a proposal at all, but a question 
 without any guarantee, as our interview, which I have 
 mentioned before, was to take place soon afterwards. 
 Berlin, however, without waiting for the interview, made 
 this report the foundation for far-reaching measures. 
 Then there came M. Poincare's letter, Bonar Law's let- 
 ter, King Albert's telegram. The waverers in the Cabi- 
 net — excepting three members who resigned — were con- 
 verted. 
 
 Till the very last moment I had hoped that England 
 would adopt a waiting attitude. Nor did my French col- 
 league feel at all confident, as I heard from a private 
 source. Even on the ist August the King had given 
 the President an evasive reply. But England was already 
 mentioned as an opponent in the telegram from Berlin 
 announcing the imminent danger of war. Berlin was 
 therefore already reckoning on war with England. 
 
 Before my departure Sir E. Grey received me, on the 
 5th, at his house. I had called at his request. He was 
 deeply moved. He told me he would always be prepared 
 
 'M)7 
 
 O/
 
 38 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 to mediate. "We don't want to crush Germany." Un- 
 fortunately this confidential interview was made public, 
 and Herr von Bethmann Hollweg thus destroyed the last 
 chance of gaining peace through England. 
 
 The arrangements for our departure were perfectly 
 dignified and calm. The King had previously sent his 
 equerry, Sir E. Ponsonby, to express his regrets at my 
 departure and that he could not see me himself. Princess 
 Louise wrote to me that the whole family were sorry we 
 were leaving. Mrs. Asquith and other friends came to 
 the Embassy to take leave. 
 
 A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of 
 honour was drawn up for me. I was treated like a de- 
 parting Sovereign. Such was the end of my London mis- 
 sion. It was wrecked, not by the wiles of the British, 
 but by the wiles of our policy. 
 
 Count Mensdorff and his staff had come to the station 
 in London. He was cheerful, and gave me to understand 
 that perhaps he would remain there, but he told the 
 English that we, and not Austria, had wanted the war. 
 
 Retrospect 
 
 Looking back after two years, I come to the conclusion 
 that I realised too late that there was no room for me in 
 a system that for years had lived on routine and tradi- 
 tions alone, and that only tolerated representatives who 
 reported what their superiors wished to read. Absence 
 of prejudice and an independent judgment are resented. 
 Lack of ability and want of character are praised and 
 esteemed, while successes meet with disfavour and excite 
 alarm. 
 
 I had given up my opposition to the insane Triple Alli- 
 ance policy, as I realised that it was useless, and that 
 my warnings were attributed to "Austrophobia," to my 
 idee fixe. In politics, which are neither acrobatics nor a
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 39 
 
 game, but the main business of the firm, there is no "phil" 
 or "phobe," but only the interest of the community. A 
 policy, however, that is based only on Austrians, Magyars, 
 and Turks must come into conflict with Russia, and 
 finally lead to a catastrophe. 
 
 In spite of former mistakes, all might still have been 
 put right in July, 19 14. An agreement with England 
 had been arrived at. We ought to have sent a repre- 
 sentative to Petrograd who was at least of average politi- 
 cal capacity, and to have convinced Russia that we 
 wished neither to control the straits nor to strangle Ser- 
 bia. "Laches I'Aittriche et nous Idcherons les Franj;ais" 
 ("Drop Austria and we will drop the French"), M. 
 Sazonow said to us. And M. Cambon told Herr von 
 Jagow, "Vous n'avez pas besoin de suivre I'Autriche par- 
 tout" ("You need not follow Austria everywhere"). 
 
 We wanted neither wars nor alliances; we wanted only 
 treaties that would safeguard us and others, and secure 
 our economic development, which was without its like in 
 history. If Russia had been freed in the West, she could 
 again turn to the East, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry 
 would have been re-established automatically and without 
 our intervention, and not less certainly also the Russo- 
 Japanese. 
 
 We could also have considered the question of the 
 reduction of armaments, and need no longer have trou- 
 bled ourselves about Austrian complications. Then Aus- 
 tria would have become the vassal of the German Empire, 
 without any alliance — and especially without our seeking 
 her good graces, a proceeding ultimately leading to war 
 for the liberation of Poland and the destruction of Serbia, 
 although German interest demanded the exact contrary. 
 
 I had to support in London a policy the heresy of 
 which I recognised. That brought down vengeance on 
 me, because it was a sin against the Holy Ghost.
 
 40 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 My Return 
 
 As soon as I arrived in Berlin I saw that I was to be 
 made the scapegoat for the catastrophe for which our 
 Government had made itself responsible against my ad- 
 vice and warnings. 
 
 The report was deliberately circulated in official quar- 
 ters that I had allowed myself to be deceived by Sir E. 
 Grey, because, if he had not wanted war, Russia would 
 not have mobilised. Count Pourtales, whose reports 
 could be relied on, was to be protected, not least on ac- 
 count of his relationship. He had conducted himself 
 "magnificently," he was praised enthusiastically, and I 
 was blamed the more severely. 
 
 "What does Serbia matter to Russia?" this statesman 
 said to me after eight years in office at Petrograd. The 
 whole thing was a British trick that I had not noticed. 
 At the Foreign Office they told me that war would in 
 any case have come in 1916. Then Russia would have 
 been ready; therefore it was better now. 
 
 The Question of Responsibility 
 
 As is evident from all official publications — and this is 
 not refuted by our White Book, which, owing to the pov- 
 erty of its contents and to its omissions, is a gravely self- 
 accusing document — 
 
 1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, 
 although German interests were not involved and the 
 danger of a world-war must have been known to us. 
 Whether we were aware of the wording of the Ultima- 
 tum is completely immaterial. 
 
 2. During the time between the 23rd and 30th July, 
 1914, when M. Sazonow emphatically declared that he 
 would not tolerate any attack on Serbia, we rejected the 
 British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 41 
 
 Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the 
 whole of the Uhimatum, and although an agreement 
 about the two points at issue could easily have been 
 reached, and Count Berchtold was even prepared to 
 content himself with the Serbian reply. 
 
 3. On the 30th July, when Count Berchtold wanted 
 to come to terms, we sent an ultimatum to Petrograd 
 merely because of the Russian mobilisation, although 
 Austria had not been attacked; and on the 31st July 
 we declared war on Russia, although the Czar pledged 
 his word that he would not order a man to march as 
 long as negotiations were proceeding — thus deliberately 
 destroying the possibility of a peaceful settlement. 
 
 In view of the above undeniable facts it is no wonder 
 that the whole of the civilised world outside Germany 
 places the entire responsibility for the world-war upon 
 our shoulders. 
 
 The Enemy Point of View 
 
 Is it not intelligible that our enemies should declare 
 that they will not rest before a system is destroyed which 
 is a constant menace to our neighbours? Must they not 
 otherwise fear that in a few years' time they will again 
 have to take up arms and again see their provinces over- 
 run and their towns and villages destroyed? Have not 
 they proved to be right who declared that the spirit of 
 Treitschke and Bernhardi governed the German people, 
 that spirit which glorified war as such, and did not loathe 
 it as an evil, that with us the feudal knight and Junker, 
 the warrior caste, still rule and form ideals and values, 
 not the civilian gentleman ; that the love of the duel which 
 animates our academic youth still persists in those who 
 control the destinies of the people ? Did not the Zabern 
 incident and the parliamentary discussions about it clear- 
 ly demonstrate to foreign countries the value we place
 
 42 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 on the rights and Hberties of the citizen if these colHde 
 with questions of military power? 
 
 That intelHgent historian Cramb, who has since died, 
 an admirer of Germany, clothed the German conception 
 in the words of Euphorion : 
 
 Dream ye of peace?* 
 Dream he that will — 
 War is the rallying cry! 
 Victory is the refrain. 
 
 Militarism, which by rights is an education for the 
 people and an instrument of policy, turns policy into the 
 instrument of military power when the patriarchal ab- 
 solutism of the soldier-kingdom makes possible an atti- 
 tude which a democracy, remote from military Junker 
 influence, would never have permitted. 
 
 So think our enemies, and so they must think when 
 they see that, in spite of capitalistic industrialisation and 
 in spite of socialist organisation, "the living are still 
 ruled by the dead," as Friedrich Nietzsche says. The 
 principal war aim of our enemies, the democratisation 
 of Germany, will be realised! 
 
 Bismarck 
 
 Bismarck, like Napoleon, loved conflict for itself. As 
 a statesman he avoided fresh wars, the folly of which 
 he recognised. He was content with bloodless battles. 
 After he had, in rapid succession, vanquished Christian, 
 Francis Joseph, and Napoleon, it was the turn of Arnim, 
 Pius, and Augusta. That did not suffice him. Gortscha- 
 kow, who thought himself the greater, had repeatedly 
 annoyed him. The conflict was carried almost to the 
 point of war — even by depriving him of his railway 
 
 * The original has "war," presumably owing to a misprint. 
 — Translator.
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 43 
 
 saloon. This gave rise to the miserable Triple Alliance. 
 At last came the conflict with William, in which the 
 mighty one was vanquished, as Napoleon was vanquished 
 by Alexander. 
 
 Political life-and-death unions only prosper if founded 
 on a constitutional basis and not on an international 
 one. They are all the more questionable if the partner 
 is feeble. Bismarck never meant the Alliance to take 
 this form. 
 
 He always treated the English with forbearance; he 
 knew that this was wiser. He always paid marked re- 
 spect to the old Queen Victoria, despite his hatred of 
 her daughter and of political Anglomania; the learned 
 Beaconsfield and the worldly-wise Salisbury he courted; 
 and even that strange Gladstone, whom he did not like, 
 really had nothing to complain about. 
 
 The Ultimatum to Serbia was the culminating point 
 of the policy of the Berlin Congress, the Bosnian crisis, 
 the Conference of London: but there was yet time to 
 turn back. 
 
 We were completely successful in achieving that which 
 above all other things should have been avoided — the 
 breach with Russia and England. 
 
 Our Future 
 
 After two years* fighting it is obvious that we dare not 
 hope for an unconditional victory over the Russians, 
 English, French, Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, or 
 reckon on being able to wear our enemies down. But 
 we can obtain a peace by compromise only by evacuat- 
 ing the occupied territory, tlie retention of which would 
 in any event be a burden and cause of weakness to us, 
 and would involve the menace of further wars. There- 
 fore ever}^hing should be avoided which would make 
 it more difficult for those enemy groups who might pos-
 
 44 My Mission to London 1912-1914 
 
 sibly still be won over to the idea of a peace by com- 
 promise to come to terms, viz., the British Radicals and 
 the Russian Reactionaries. From this point of view 
 alone the Polish scheme is to be condemned, as is also 
 any infringement of Belgian rights, or the execution of 
 British citizens — to say nothing of the insane U-boat 
 plan. 
 
 "Our future lies on the water." Quite right; there- 
 fore it is not in Poland and Belgium, in France and 
 Serbia. This is a return to the days of the Holy Roman 
 Empire and the mistakes of the Hohenstaufens and 
 Habsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets, not that 
 of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. The policy 
 of the Triple Alliance is a return to the past, a turning 
 aside from the future, from imperialism and a world- 
 policy. "Middle Europe" belongs to the Middle Ages, 
 Berlin-Bagdad is a blind alley and not the way into the 
 open country, to unlimited possibilities, to the world- 
 mission of the German nation. 
 
 I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or 
 Serbia, or any other state, but only of the Triple Alli- 
 ance policy, which was bound to divert us from our 
 aims and bring us onto the inclined plane of a Conti- 
 nental policy. It was not the German policy, but that 
 of the Austrian Imperial House. The Austrians had 
 come to regard the Alliance as an umbrella under the 
 shelter of which they could make excursions to the Near 
 East when they thought fit. 
 
 And what must we expect as the result of this war of 
 nations? The United States of Africa will be British, 
 like those of America, Australia and Oceania. And the 
 Latin states of Europe, as I predicted years ago, will 
 enter into the same relations with the United Kingdom 
 that their Latin sisters in America maintain with the 
 United States. The Anglo-Saxon will dominate them. 
 France, exhausted by the war, will only attach herself
 
 My Mission to London 1912-1914 45 
 
 still more closely to Great Britain. Nor will Spain 
 continue to resist for long. 
 
 And in Asia the Russians and the Japanese will spread 
 and will carry their customs with their frontiers, and 
 the South will remain to the British. 
 
 The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons, Russians, 
 and Japanese, and the German will remain alone with 
 Austria and Hungary, His rule will be that of thought 
 and of commerce, not that of the bureaucrat and the 
 soldier. He made his appearance too late, and his 
 last chance of making good the past, that of founding 
 a Colonial Empire, was annihilated by the world-war. 
 
 For we shall not supplant the sons of Ichwe. Then 
 will be realised the plan of the great Rhodes, who saw 
 the salvation of humanity in the expansion of Britondom 
 — in British Imperialism. 
 
 Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento. 
 Hae tibi erunt artes : pacisque imponere morem, 
 Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.
 
 \JC 
 
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