UP SB LIBRARY 
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION 
 AND A SUPPRESSED CHAPTER OF HISTORY 
 
 NAPOLEON III. 
 
 AND THE 
 
 KINGDOM OF ROUMANIA 
 
 15 Y 
 
 STUART F. WELD 
 
 WITH AN INTRODUCTION 
 BY REV. EDWARD EVERETT HALE, D.D. 
 
 "A forgotten, or, indeed, almost a suppressed chapter of history." JOHN FISKE 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 GEO. H. ELLIS, 141 FRANKLIN STREET 
 1897
 
 MR. WELD has devoted much time and study to unveiling 
 the mysteries which have surrounded the creation of Rou- 
 mania, and which have attended Eastern diplomacy in all 
 the recent history of that State. Mr. Weld has found, as 
 any student finds who attempts the difficult studies attend- 
 ing the history of the Second Empire, that the part taken 
 by Napoleon III. in the making of that history has been 
 construed in different ways according as men hated Napo- 
 leon or as they flattered him. As one of his French 
 authorities says, "Xapoleon's history has passed through 
 the double criticism of hate and love." From sources not 
 largely studied, even in Europe, not studied at all, one 
 might say, in America, Mr. Weld has constructed an in- 
 telligible history of the diplomacy, the intrigue, the failures, 
 and final success which have attended the history of Rou- 
 mania since that name was given to the provinces which 
 were united in the new-born kingdom. As has been aptly 
 remarked by Professor John Fiske in reference to this 
 study, Mr. Weld has reproduced a lost passage in history. 
 
 It will be seen that at the meeting at Osborne, in 1857, 
 of the sovereigns of France and of England, a meeting in- 
 teresting at the time, and celebrated since, the first impor- 
 tant step was taken which led forward to the establishment 
 of the new kingdom. Prince Albert, however, opposed any 
 immediate action ; and the plan of Napoleon III. was for 
 the moment delayed. The determination of the people of 
 Wallachia was strongly in favor of such union. The people 
 of Moldavia, if they wanted it, were not at first permitted to 
 express themselves. But not long after the Osborne in-
 
 cident the legislature of Moldavia, by a vote of eighty-one to 
 two, expressed the almost unanimous wish of that province 
 for union. For a considerable time, however, the wish of 
 the people of the two provinces was thwarted by the oppo- 
 sition of England and Austria. A motion introduced by 
 Mr. Gladstone, then in opposition, favoring the union, was 
 defeated in Parliament. All the same, however, the people 
 of the two provinces themselves went forward to carry out 
 their own purposes. By an extraordinary movement of pop- 
 ular enthusiasm, Moldavia and Wallachia, each having the 
 privilege to choose its hospodar, chose the same person, 
 Colonel Couza. He was chosen Prince of Moldavia in 
 January, Prince of Wallachia in February, 1859. Here was 
 practical union ; and Napoleon, in his address to the French 
 Chambers, February 7, said with some pride, "If I were 
 asked what interest France has in these countries, I should 
 answer that the interest of France is everywhere where a 
 cause of justice and civilization is to be maintained." 
 
 Mr. Weld's history, which is in the reader's hands, shows 
 how very close was Napoleon's connection with the sub- 
 sequent events which his policy, indeed, up to this time had 
 foreseen and prepared the way for. 
 
 The tendency of the last half of the present century has 
 been to union. United Italy and United Germany are illus- 
 trations of this tendency on the continent of Europe. The 
 increasing commerce of the States of America, the virtual 
 establishment of the Monroe Doctrine, and the great Pan- 
 American Congress are the most signal illustrations of the 
 same determination in this country. Illustrations on a 
 smaller scale, but not less interesting, are those of the estab- 
 lishment of the States on the Danube, which give to Europe 
 and civilization a new barrier against the barbarism of the 
 crowned assassin of Stamboul. Mr. Weld's study of the 
 history of Roumania will open the eyes of most American 
 readers to the difficulties which ancient diplomacy and the 
 conservative prejudices of half Europe have placed in the
 
 5 
 
 way of such consolidation of States. All the more interest- 
 ing is a history of one of the great providential movements 
 in which is answered that prayer which foreshadows the 
 Christian civilization of the future. 
 
 That prayer was answered in a certain measure in the 
 Constitution of the United States, which made one nation 
 out of many. It was answered when the Italian provinces 
 formed themselves into the Kingdom of Italy ; when the 
 petty duchies of Germany united with such kingdoms as 
 Bavaria and Prussia in the formation of the Empire of Ger- 
 many ; when Austrians and Hungarians consent to the dual 
 Empire of Austria; and when the kingdom of Roumania 
 came into being in the face of jealousies and of the sway 
 of ancient prejudices. 
 
 Civilization advances and the kingdom of heaven comes 
 as children of God work together with him to bring about 
 the hope and the prayer of the Saviour of mankind, 
 
 " That they all may be one." 
 
 EDWARD E. HALE.
 
 THE EASTERN QUESTION AND A SUP- 
 PRESSED CHAPTER OF HISTORY. 
 
 NAPOLEON III. AND THE KINGDOM 
 OF ROUMANIA. 
 
 Our historian George Bancroft wrote in 1867 : " It is the 
 glory of the French nation that it has, on many decisive 
 occasions, put forth its strength on the side of liberty ; and 
 the Netherlands, the United States, and Italy bear witness 
 to her effective services as the defender of nationalities and 
 the soldier of freedom." 
 
 No instance better illustrates these words than that 
 furnished by France, Roumania, and the Crimean War. 
 Not one man in a thousand, however, is aware of the 
 services of France in this case, still less of the fact that the 
 prime, successful mover was Napoleon III. 
 
 No doubt the estimate of this remarkable ruler has, since 
 his fall in 1870, lost some of the harshness which then 
 characterized it. A French writer, M. de La Gorce, has 
 just published the third volume of his " History of the 
 Second Empire," bringing the work down to 1861. The 
 preface begins as follows : 
 
 " The reign of Napoleon III. has been judged thus far 
 either through favor or hatred. Twice it has undergone the 
 test of falsehood, the falsehood of adulation during its time 
 of power, the falsehood of calumny when the time of mis- 
 fortune came. To this reign, brilliant and inauspicious, 
 superficial and tragic, I propose to apply the customary rules
 
 8 
 
 of criticism, which establish facts according to testimony, 
 and thus restore to their true places men and events." 
 
 No better purpose could be entertained. This is scarcely 
 the place, however, to discuss how far our author has suc- 
 ceeded. When we find a passage like the following, we are 
 ready to ask whether M. de La Gorce is not fighting 
 vigorously the " falsehood of calumny " of which he speaks. 
 Of Napoleon III. he says : " He had the ambition to 
 re-establish the liberty which he had formerly overthrown. 
 Above all, he loved the people, not his own people espe- 
 cially (for he was more of a humanitarian than a patriot), 
 but all peoples ; that is to say, the poor, the weak, the 
 disinherited." When, upon another page, we read that the 
 coup d'etat was "one of the greatest crimes against society 
 which any ruler of any civilized nation has committed during 
 the present century," we are tempted to ask whether our 
 author's estimate differs, after all, from the estimates of 
 Kinglake and Victor Hugo. With regard to the coup d'etat, 
 nevertheless, he states circumstances which, he avers, gave 
 some sort of justification to the act. 
 
 To show the way in which our writer compounds praise 
 and blame so as to challenge the reader, it would seem, to 
 draw his own conclusions, we add the following : De La 
 Gorce describes Napoleon as having qualities not common, 
 adding, however, that he possessed everything which makes 
 a sovereign unfortunate ; that is, high purposes without the 
 wisdom to carry them out. In spite of this, let us remember 
 to what extent Napoleon did carry out his high purposes, 
 among which are to be reckoned the liberation of Italy and 
 the liberation of Roumania. Henri Martin, the Republi- 
 can historian, says in like manner, in his " Popular History 
 of France " (vol. iii. p. 538) : " His character was a complex 
 one. He had great aims, but he failed in their realization." 
 
 We quote again : " When face to face with public calam- 
 ities and in the midst of conspiracies, he displayed a calm 
 and simple courage qui conquit meme ses adversaires."
 
 A final sketch of the historian's plan is found in the 
 following : 
 
 " One personage dominates this entire history, the myste- 
 rious man who during eighteen years incarnated in himself 
 the life of the nation. At the origin of his career, when he 
 baffled with equal dexterity the plots of demagogues and 
 intrigues of parliamentarians, it was the fashion to laugh at 
 his incapacity. When his throne had been established by 
 violence and consecrated by popular suffrage, so much good 
 fortune dazzled, not only vulgar minds, which bow down to 
 success, but also Jes esprits e/evts qui osent discuter les arrets 
 de la fortune. Finally, misfortunes came, so bitter that all 
 reprobation is lost in one immense compassion." 
 
 It may be added that the work of M. de La Gorce has 
 been crowned by the French Academy, a distinction which 
 it certainly deserves. 
 
 In one of the extracts furnished, our author refers to 
 Napoleon III. as a "mysterious man." It is precisely 
 because, in spite of the researches of De La Gorce, so much 
 mystery still attaches to Napoleon and so much need exists 
 of further research that the present sketch has been written. 
 
 An element aside from that which relates to the "mysteri- 
 ous man " points to the examination suggested. 
 
 At a time when the Armenian massacres and the Greek 
 war have attracted attention to the famous Eastern Question, 
 and some have imagined that the time of its solution was 
 near, it may be well to consider an element of the problem 
 not yet examined. The origin of the Kingdom of Roumania 
 and the part taken by Napoleon III. constitute this element. 
 In 1831 Mazzini predicted that the Question of Nationalities, 
 or Principle of Nationality, would give its name to our 
 century ; and there is reason to believe that this principle is 
 to be carried out to a great extent in the settlement of the 
 Eastern Question. The Principle of Nationality was the 
 basis of the policy adopted by Napoleon and his govern- 
 ment. The facts to be narrated are so little known that we
 
 IO 
 
 have ventured to refer to them as a suppressed, or we might 
 say neglected, chapter of history. 
 
 Let us inquire what this suppressed chapter was. 
 
 Few persons are aware of the fact referred to in the 
 following telegrams. A despatch to the London Times, 
 dated Bucharest, Jan. 15, 1873, said: "Funeral services in 
 honor of the Emperor Napoleon will be held in all the 
 churches in the country to-day. The entire Roumanian 
 press contains sympathetic obituary notices of the deceased 
 emperor.'' 
 
 A despatch from Bucharest to the Bonapartist paper, 
 L'Ordre, said: "To-day a funeral service for Napoleon 
 occurred throughout the country. The journals publish 
 obituaries and express sentiments of sympathy." 
 
 The following telegram to the London Times does not 
 refer to the funeral services, but its import is similar to 
 that of the above despatches. It is dated Bucharest, 
 Jan. 24, 1873. "The Chamber of Deputies to-day unan- 
 imously voted an address of condolence with the Empress 
 Euge'nie." 
 
 The celebration of these rites would have had less sig- 
 nificance if at the time of his death Napoleon had been 
 emperor. Save in two States Italy and Roumania scant 
 honor was shown his memory. It is not the way of the 
 world to pay respect to the fallen, and the fact that in these 
 States it was paid to Napoleon redounds both to their honor 
 and his. Still, this action was not perhaps what one might 
 expect. 
 
 Neither would one suspect Prince Charles of Roumania, 
 a Hohenzollern, of undue anxiety to honor a Bonaparte. 
 Indeed, one special consideration might have influenced 
 him against such a manifestation. The candidature of his 
 brother, Prince Leopold, to the Spanish throne had precipi- 
 tated the war of 1870 ; and it was owing to the persistence 
 of Napoleon III. in requiring the withdrawal of this candi- 
 dature that Prince Leopold retired. But, if Prince Charles
 
 II 
 
 knew that Napoleon had prevented his brother from acquir- 
 ing the Spanish crown, he might have asked himself to what 
 extent he was indebted to the emperor for his own. 
 
 He heartily united in the wish of the people of Roumania 
 to honor Napoleon. 
 
 What Napoleon effected in behalf of Roumania is referred 
 to briefly or not at all in the histories of the time ; and 
 almost the same may be said respecting his American and 
 English biographies, although the British work occupies 
 four volumes.* 
 
 It is easier to ask why these events have been neglected 
 than to give a satisfactory explanation. As a reply in part, 
 however, it may be conjectured that events in those half- 
 civilized, if not half-barbarous, provinces of Turkey, could 
 not be expected to attract so much attention as events 
 elsewhere. Few had sagacity enough to perceive the 
 meaning of the changes which successively occurred. 
 Besides, neither the present Republican government of 
 France nor Republican writers have shown much zeal in 
 recognizing or putting on record the acts of the Second 
 Empire which merit praise. But there is a further explana- 
 tion. During the year subsequent to the Treaty of Paris, 
 Napoleon and the czar had an interview at Stuttgard ; and a 
 rapprochement between France and Russia powers which 
 had been so recently at war was effected. From that 
 time to the present, if we except the date of the last 
 Polish revolt, 1863, friendly sentiments have existed between 
 France and the Muscovite Empire. In 1893 and 1896 the 
 understanding between these States reached a climax during 
 the demonstrations which attended the visit of the Russian 
 fleet to France and the visit of the czar to Paris. French 
 authors, whatever their party preferences, have seemed 
 reluctant to discuss or even state the " true inwardness " of 
 
 * The British biographer, Blanchard Jerrold, relates in detail the circumstances of 
 Napoleon's visit to Osborne in 1857. The facts so closely concerned the British govern- 
 ment that they could scarcely escape the notice of a British writer.
 
 12 
 
 the Crimean War. How Napoleon III. thwarted Russia, 
 how he established upon her southern border a compact and 
 progressive State, these things have been passed over. 
 
 Whatever the reason, the fact is scarcely to be disputed 
 that an entire chapter that which relates to the origin of the 
 Kingdom of Roumania has been dropped out of the history 
 of the century. 
 
 While we cannot fail to note the neglect which has fallen 
 upon these events, it is just to observe that an annual 
 publication, the Annuaire des Deux Mondes, which has 
 never been accused of Bonapartist proclivities, stated the 
 facts with much fidelity. Six closely printed pages on an 
 average are occupied for twelve years, 1855 to 1866, with 
 a chronicle of Roumanian events, and give an account of 
 the genesis of the kingdom. 
 
 Let us review the chief facts connected with the enfran- 
 chisement of Roumania and the part of Napoleon. How 
 happened it that Roumania observed those funeral rites 
 Jan. 15, 1873? 
 
 Those who read these pages should not imagine that the 
 writer's purpose is to present a summing up of the charac- 
 ter and acts of Napoleon III. As M. de La Gorce says, 
 for twenty-five years the empire has suffered from "the 
 falsehood of calumny." The evils of this period have been 
 pointed out and multiplied. Our plan is to show in part 
 the reverse of the picture. The achievements of the em- 
 peror should be considered as well as his blunders and 
 faults. Then alone can a verdict be rendered. It is 
 especially our design to examine one of Napoleon's great 
 achievements which has been in a remarkable manner 
 ignored, the liberation of Roumania. 
 
 First of all, let us call to mind that the origin of the 
 Kingdom of Roumania is intimately connected with the 
 Eastern Question, one of the greatest questions of history. 
 This problem has been of recent years conspicuously 
 before the public because of the anomalous position of
 
 13 
 
 Prince Ferdinand and Bulgaria. To this complication the 
 Armeno-Eastern and Greco-Eastern complication has been 
 added. 
 
 On the 26th of March, 1855, when the siege of Sebasto- 
 pol was half over, Napoleon laid before the powers at the 
 Conference of Vienna the following propositions respecting 
 the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which form 
 to-day the Kingdom of Roumania : 
 
 First. To unite the Principalities into one. 
 
 Second. To confer the sovereignty upon a foreign, not 
 a native, prince.* 
 
 Not one of the powers indorsed Napoleon's propositions. 
 But in less than twelve years they were carried out. To 
 what extent did Napoleon contribute toward this result? 
 to what extent did others ? 
 
 The propositions submitted at Vienna were stated with 
 moderation and reserve. Their shape was almost that of 
 suggestions rather than of formal propositions. Partly on 
 this account and partly because of the prestige which 
 France acquired in the Crimean War, Napoleon was more 
 successful after Sebastopol fell. 
 
 March 8, 1856, Count Walewski, the emperor's minister 
 for foreign affairs and president of the Paris Congress, 
 submitted to that body the first of the propositions of 1855. 
 The second was not brought forward. Count Walewski 
 urged the union of the Principalities as a measure in 
 accordance with their interests and with the wishes of the 
 people. This proposal met with less opposition at Paris 
 than at Vienna. France, England, Russia, and Sardinia 
 supported it, while Austria and Turkey continued hostile. 
 As the powers could not agree, the settlement of the ques- 
 tion was excluded from the Treaty of Paris and left for 
 later consideration. 
 
 But Napoleon had gained a step. In 1855 France alone 
 
 * Sixth protocol of the Conference of Vienna. A nnuaire des Deux Moitdes for 1854- 
 55. P- 891.
 
 14 
 
 recommended union. In 1856 union was advocated by 
 four States instead of one. 
 
 If, however, the union of the provinces was not effected 
 by the Treaty of Paris, stipulations were inserted which 
 prepared the way for it. The treaty provided that legisla- 
 tures should be chosen in Wallachia and Moldavia, which 
 should express the preferences of the people as to the 
 organization of the Principalities. These preferences 
 should be submitted to an advisory Commission, to be 
 appointed by the powers. The Commission, having taken 
 into account the votes of the Principalities, should prepare 
 a report and forward it to Paris. Here the representatives 
 of the powers should be again convoked. The future 
 organization of the Principalities should be decided by them, 
 and their decisions embodied in a convention. Thus the 
 convention known as that of 1858 grew out of the Treaty 
 of 1856. Of that treaty we may regard it as a part. 
 
 Another article of the Treaty of Paris strongly favored 
 Moldo-Wallachia. 
 
 According to the treaty of Adrianople in 1829, between 
 Russia and Turkey, the privileges which the Principalities 
 enjoyed were confirmed by Turkey and placed under the 
 guarantee of Russia. Virtually, a Russian protectorate was 
 established.* In place of this the Treaty of Paris estab- 
 lished a virtual protectorate to be exercised by the signa- 
 tory powers, /.<?., the five great powers, Sardinia, and the 
 Porte. The privileges possessed by the Principalities were 
 placed under their collective guarantee. 
 
 The use which Russia might be expected to make of a 
 Russian protectorate would be, of course, in the interest of 
 Russian aggrandizement. The joint protectorate, however, 
 would naturally be more ready to favor the interest of the 
 Moldo-Wallachian States. But, owing to the ascendency 
 possessed by France and to the interest which Napoleon 
 
 *The Turco- Russian Convention of Balta-Liman, concluded in 1849, in some re- 
 spects strengthened the Russian protectorate.
 
 personally took in the Principalities, the joint protectorate 
 of 1856 was so dominated by France that a sort of French 
 protectorate succeeded the Russian. Accordingly, while the 
 treaty of 1856 did not unite Moldavia and Wallachia, it was 
 one of the helps that prepared the way for union.* 
 
 We have seen that Count Walewski laid before the Paris 
 Congress the first of the measures proposed at Vienna (that 
 in favor of the union of the Principalities), and that on this 
 occasion France was supported by England, Russia, and 
 Sardinia. England thus took a liberal position. But her 
 statesmen, influenced by her traditional policy, which had 
 for its basis the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, soon re- 
 garded a union of Moldavia and Wallachia as likely to prove 
 a menace to that integrity. England, Austria, and Turkey 
 being once more in accord, England again advocated the 
 anti- union policy which in 1855 had been that of all the 
 powers except France. 
 
 The official organ of the French government, the Moniteur 
 Universe!, made a declaration Feb. 5, 1857, in which the 
 policy of France in favor of the union of the Principalities 
 was reiterated. This led to much discussion in France and 
 England; and no little antagonism of purpose and feeling 
 arose. 
 
 Napoleon now determined to make a final effort to secure 
 the co-operation of Great Britain. He proposed that the 
 empress and himself should visit Queen Victoria ; and, the 
 offer having been accepted, the sovereigns met at Osborne 
 in the Isle of Wight. Besides the personages named, there 
 were present Prince Albert ; Lord Palmerston, the British 
 premier ; Lord Clarendon, British ambassador to France ; 
 Count Walewski, referred to already ; and the Count of 
 Persigny, French ambassador to England. 
 
 * A further advantage conferred by the treaty of 1856 was the cession by Russia to 
 Moldavia (subject to Turkish suzerainty) of a portion of Bessarabian territory at the 
 mouth of the Danube. At the treaty of Berlin in 1878 Roumania was constrained by the 
 powers to cede this territory back to Russia, accepting a like area of Turkish territory, 
 the Dobrudscha, to the south.
 
 i6 
 
 On the morning of August 6 the yacht of the emperor 
 arrived. After breakfast, in the course of a walk, Napoleon 
 and Prince Albert discussed the Roumanian and Eastern 
 Questions. So impressed was the prince by Napoleon's 
 statements that on the day on which their conversation 
 occurred he wrote out a record of it. This " memoran- 
 dum " occupies six pages in Martin's " Life of the Prince 
 Consort."* 
 
 Napoleon argued in favor of the union of the Principali- 
 ties, Prince Albert against it. In order to show that his 
 policy accorded with the wishes of the people of the prov- 
 inces, Napoleon related an incident. 
 
 The Treaty of Paris had provided for the appointment of 
 an advisory Commission, whose function should be to inquire 
 into the condition of the Principalities. The people of Bu- 
 charest were aware of the purposes of France ; and, when 
 the French commissioner, Baron Talleyrand, arrived, the 
 populace received him with acclamations, even taking the 
 horses from his carriage and drawing it through the streets. 
 
 During the conversation Prince Albert asked Napoleon, 
 "~Do you really care for the continuance of the integrity of 
 the Turkish Empire ? " The prince observed at the same 
 time that this was a principle which had led England into 
 the French alliance, for which England had made endless 
 sacrifices and which she was determined to maintain with 
 all her energy. Napoleon replied, " If you ask me as a 
 private individual, I do not care for it, and cannot muster 
 up any sympathy for such a sorry set as the Turks. But," 
 he continued, "if you ask me as an homme politique, Sest u/ic 
 autre chose. I am of course not prepared to abandon the 
 original object of our alliance, for which France, also, has 
 made great sacrifices." Thus the emperor distinguished 
 between Napoleon the man and Napoleon the diplomatc. 
 He would not abandon the British alliance. In carrying 
 out the ends of his European policy, this alliance might be 
 
 *Vol. iv. p. 99.
 
 17 
 
 of use. But none the less did he adhere to his design to 
 effect a union of the Principalities. This union might 
 eventually prove, as it did, inconsistent with the integrity 
 of the sultan's dominions. 
 
 Besides the interviews between Napoleon and Prince 
 Albert, others took place between Napoleon and the British 
 and French statesmen already named. But the Englishmen 
 were not to be convinced ; and Napoleon was compelled, 
 for the present, to waive his plan of uniting the Principal- 
 ities. While, however, the emperor could not carry his 
 point, England also made a concession. It referred in- 
 directly to the very point which Napoleon had waived, the 
 question of union. What was the British concession ? 
 
 Article 24 of the Treaty of Paris had provided that each 
 Principality should choose a legislative assembly. " These 
 legislatures," the article stated, "shall be called upon to 
 express the wishes of the people with regard to the final 
 organization of the Principalities." Accordingly, the legis- 
 latures were chosen. In Wallachia the great majority of 
 the assembly voted for union. In Moldavia the prince, or 
 Hospodar, appointed by the Turkish government, succeeded 
 through frauds and illegalities in getting returned a nominal 
 majority against union. Napoleon urged the sultan to 
 annul these elections, and was joined in his demand by 
 Russia, Prussia, and Sardinia. The Sublime Porte, sup- 
 ported by England and Austria, refused. Finally, France 
 and the protesting powers resorted to coercion, and broke 
 off diplomatic relations with the sultan. Such was the post- 
 ure of affairs at the time of the visit to Osborne ; and Napo- 
 leon insisted, in his conferences with the English statesmen, 
 upon the necessity of rescinding these elections. England 
 finally yielded. On the other hand, as has been said, 
 Napoleon agreed that, in the convention to be concluded, 
 the Principalities should not be united as one State. This 
 was the compromise. 
 
 If Napoleon regretted his inability to change the views of
 
 i8 
 
 the British government upon the main question, he was 
 gratified by the friendly sentiments entertained by Queen 
 Victoria toward himself and the empress. Writing to her 
 uncle, King Leopold of Belgium, the queen said, " Nothing 
 could be more amiable, kind, pleasant, or ungcnant than 
 both Majesties were." Respecting the empress, she said, 
 " We are all in love with her, and I wish you knew her." 
 Nor was this the first occasion on which the sovereign of 
 England had expressed herself in like terms. During the 
 last days of the siege of Sebastopol that siege whose ter- 
 mination liberated, or rather largely contributed toward lib- 
 erating, Roumania -Queen Victoria, in her diary, Aug. 27, 
 1855, referred to Napoleon as follows: "I know few peo- 
 ple whom I have felt involuntarily more inclined to confide 
 in and speak unreservedly to. I should not fear saying any- 
 thing to him. I felt I do not know how to express it 
 safe with him. . . . There is something fascinating, melan- 
 choly, and engaging which draws you to him in spite of any 
 prevention you may have against him. . . . He undoubtedly 
 has a most extraordinary power of attaching people to him." 
 
 It appears, therefore, that the friendly relations estab- 
 lished between the French and English courts in 1855 still 
 continued, although they disagreed upon the question of 
 uniting the Principalities. 
 
 As was to be expected, Queen Victoria's views of the 
 Eastern Question agreed with those held by her husband and 
 by Englishmen in general . In her letter to King Leopold, 
 she wrote that the visit of the emperor and empress "was in 
 every way very satisfactory." " Politically," she continues, 
 " it was, as Lord Clarendon said, ' a godsend ' ; for the un- 
 happy difficulties in the Principalities have been aplanis and 
 satisfactorily settled." The good queen meant what she 
 said. But these difficulties were far from settlement. A 
 thin compromise, one not destined to last and which, like 
 the Missouri compromise, did not deserve to last, had been 
 concluded.
 
 On the xoth of August the emperor and empress re- 
 turned to France. Four days later, August 14, Mr. Glad- 
 stone referred in the House of Commons to the Moldavian 
 elections. He said, " It is all very well that these elec- 
 tions should have been quashed ; but, if these elections 
 have been a source of jobbery and wicked oppression, why, 
 then, it was to England we ought to have looked to quash 
 them, and that task ought not to have been left to the abso- 
 lute sovereign of France." 
 
 Mr. Gladstone was right. The fact that England de- 
 fended these elections was not to her honor. In his speech 
 Mr. Gladstone presented a mass of evidence as to the 
 trickery, frauds, and intimidation which had characterized 
 them. England and Austria finally advised the Porte to 
 cancel them. The new elections resulted, like those in Wal- 
 lachia, in a great majority for union. 
 
 The success thus obtained was followed up. In October, 
 
 1857, two months after Napoleon's visit to Victoria, the leg- 
 islature of Wallachia, by unanimous vote, passed several 
 resolutions, the chief of which repeated the propositions 
 laid before the powers by the emperor in 1855, those in 
 favor of union and of a foreign prince. In Moldavia, 
 likewise, by a vote practically unanimous (81 to 2), resolu- 
 tions were passed which comprised these propositions. 
 Few instances have occurred in which a nationality has 
 shown more patriotism, unanimity, and wisdom in the pur- 
 suit of its ends. 
 
 It was decided that the conference which was to fix the 
 status of Wallachia and Moldavia should meet in Paris in 
 
 1858. Mr. Gladstone, who ten years later was to be prime 
 minister of England, was thoroughly in sympathy with the 
 Principalities and with the efforts of France in their behalf, 
 and regretted the attitude of England. On the 4th of May, 
 1858, before the meeting of the Paris Conference, he moved 
 in the House of Commons that an address be presented to 
 the queen to convey to her majesty the hope of the House
 
 20 
 
 that in the negotiations to ensue "just weight may be given 
 to those wishes of the people of Wallachia and of Moldavia 
 which they have recently expressed " ; that is, their wish 
 for union. 
 
 In his speech, Mr. Gladstone referred to his subject as 
 one "of the utmost interest and importance." The ques- 
 tion, he said, " nearly and vitally touches the happiness of 
 millions of our fellow-creatures." "The union of the Prin- 
 cipalities," he averred, " is the one great, main, and para- 
 mount ob'ject of the people by whom they are inhabited." 
 Of the inhabitants, speaking in general, he said : " The peo- 
 ple are men attached to the religion which we profess ; they 
 are men attached to the liberty which we cherish ; they are 
 men who have suffered during a long course of years in 
 consequence of the ambitious policy of aggrandizing neigh- 
 bors." 
 
 In conclusion he said : " France is ready to do her part. 
 She has never departed from her policy. . . . The question 
 whether England shall desert her is a question now to be 
 decided ; and the question of that desertion on the one 
 hand, or of perseverance in her policy and redemption of 
 her pledges, is the question which with earnest hope and 
 confidence I this night submit to the House of Commons." 
 
 The cheers which greeted these words were not proof 
 that Mr. Gladstone's motion would prevail. His eloquence 
 was recognized by opponents who did not choose to be con- 
 vinced either by eloquence or facts. Lord Palmerston, the 
 leader of the Liberals, and Disraeli, the leader of the To- 
 ries, vehemently opposed Mr. Gladstone. It is amusing 
 now to read their predictions of the evils which would at- 
 tend a union of the Principalities under a foreign prince, 
 evils not one of which has come to pass. 
 
 The vote stood: for Mr. Gladstone's motion, 114; against 
 it, 292. 
 
 If we call to mind that, besides those Liberals who 
 adopted the views of Palmerston, all the Tories voted
 
 21 
 
 against Mr. Gladstone, it appears that the latter carried 
 with him half or more than half of his party.* 
 
 At the close of the debate a strange surprise awaited Mr. 
 Gladstone. Disraeli, the chancellor of the exchequer, de- 
 clared that upon this subject there was between the French 
 and English governments " a perfect identity of sentiment, 
 of views, and of policy in the widest and truest sense." 
 Mr. Gladstone scarcely knew what to say. In reply, he ob- 
 served, we cannot but note his frankness, " The right 
 honorable gentleman has been so enigmatical as to leave 
 me without the slightest guide for my conduct." The 
 enigma, however, was quickly solved. The French and 
 English governments had compromised. Just so they had 
 compromised at Osborne. In each case Napoleon had the 
 advantage. According to the agreement of 1858 the prin- 
 ciple of union was, in certain instances, to be introduced 
 into the convention. To a large extent Napoleon, Glad- 
 stone, and the Principalities had their way. As regards 
 the more ostensible features of the convention, the prin- 
 ciple of separation was adopted. Of this compromise Mr. 
 Gladstone was ignorant. His hope was that the British 
 government might be brought to give up altogether its oppo- 
 sition to the union of the provinces. 
 
 Although Mr. Gladstone's motion was lost, his speech 
 did much to enlighten public opinion and lessen that dispo- 
 sition to consult Turkish interests rather than those of 
 Christians which had marked the policy of Great Britain. 
 The events which occurred in the Principalities exerted a 
 like influence. 
 
 The debate in the House took place May 4. On May 22 
 the conference met in Paris under the presidency of Count 
 Walewski. In opening the debates, he stated that the con- 
 victions of the French government with regard to the Prin- 
 cipalities had been strengthened. To unite Moldavia and 
 Wallachia as a single State under a foreign prince, his gov- 
 
 " At this time the Tories were in power. Lord Derby was premier.
 
 22 
 
 eminent held to be the best solution. Besides, it was a 
 solution which accorded better than any other with the 
 wishes of the people. But he recognized the need of find- 
 ing a common ground upon which all could stand. On 
 June 5 he presented a plan of convention, and asked that 
 it be accepted as a basis for discussion. This was done. 
 The plan represented, generally speaking, the views of the 
 French and British governments, agreed upon in a spirit of 
 conciliation or shall we say? of compromise. Many 
 details had to be discussed, and no less than nineteen sit- 
 tings of the conference took place. It was not till the igth 
 of August that the convention was signed. How much 
 union and how much anti-union did this compound contain ? 
 
 The convention stated that in each Principality the ex- 
 ecutive functions should be vested in a Hospodar, who 
 should be a native of the Principalities and elected for life. 
 In each the legislative functions were vested jointly in an 
 elective assembly and the Hospodar. But the convention 
 also stated that a Central Commission should be estab- 
 lished, which should prepare and submit to each legislature 
 measures of mutual interest to the States. It established a 
 supreme judicial court which was common to both. It stip- 
 ulated that the organization of the military forces of each 
 Principality should be identical, as though they constituted 
 two corps of the same army. At times these forces were to 
 be united under a single commander. Finally, the official 
 designation of the States was the United Principalities of 
 Moldavia and Wallachia. So far as a name goes, this 
 looked more like union than the reverse. One is at once 
 reminded of our national designation, the United States of 
 America, as well as that of our kindred beyond the water, 
 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
 Our attention has thus far been directed exclusively to 
 the question of union. But a reform of another character 
 was effected. Prior to 1858 the government of the sultan 
 had often interfered with the administration and laws of the
 
 23 
 
 provinces. By the convention such interference was pro- 
 hibited, and thus an important step was taken in the direc- 
 tion of autonomy. 
 
 As far as it went, the Convention of 1858 was excellent. 
 It had, however, as every compromise has, two aspects. It 
 did not suit the diplomats who had constructed it at Pans. 
 According to some, too little had been done for union ; 
 according to others, too much. It did not suit the people of 
 Moldavia and Wallachia. They had no common executive, 
 no common legislature ; and it was their purpose to get 
 both. 
 
 Here were two States kept apart by the obstinacy of two 
 great Christian powers, England and Austria, powers 
 which acted in the interest of .Turkey. 
 
 They served, of course, their own interests, so far as they 
 understood them. The apprehension of England was that 
 Russia, through the conquest of Turkey and the possession 
 of Constantinople, would become a vast overshadowing 
 power, a peril to Europe and the British possessions in 
 Asia. One question to be decided was as follows, whether 
 by liberating and strengthening the Christian nationalities 
 of Turkey, precisely in the way that these objects have been ac- 
 complished, a stronger barrier might not be erected against 
 Russia than through attempts to bolster up the Turk. The 
 latter was the method of England, -that of oppression. 
 The former was the method of Gladstone, Napoleon, and 
 France, that of freedom. 
 
 The fixed purpose of the Principalities was manifest in 
 the action of the new legislatures elected under the Conven- 
 tion of 1858. When the time came to elect in each State 
 an executive, or Hospodar, the same man was chosen! 
 Colonel Alexander Couza. The idea did not at first occur 
 to the members of the Moldavian and Wallachian assem- 
 blies that, by choosing the same candidate, the cause of 
 union might be promoted. Colonel Couza, a native of 
 Moldavia, was unanimously chosen by the Moldavian as-
 
 24 
 
 sembly. The Wallachian assembly met shortly after, and 
 several ballots were had ; but no candidate received a ma- 
 jority. Then the idea was presented of selecting a candi- 
 date already chosen in Moldavia, and Colonel Couza was 
 elected unanimously. Thus did the Principalities circum- 
 vent the Convention of 1858, the intent of which did not 
 accord with the double election. 
 
 Colonel Couza was chosen Prince of Moldavia Jan. 17, 
 1859, and Prince of Wallachia February 5. Two days 
 later occurred the opening of the French Chambers. In his 
 address, quoted in part in the Introduction, Napoleon re- 
 ferred to the Principalities and the Convention of 1858 as 
 follows : " The reconstruction of the Danubian Principali- 
 ties was not effected till many difficulties had been met, 
 difficulties which interfered with \gui ont nui a\ the full sat- 
 isfaction of their most legitimate wishes." " If," he contin- 
 ued, " I were asked what interest France had in these dis- 
 tant countries watered by the Danube, I should answer that 
 the interest of France is everywhere where a cause of jus- 
 tice and civilization is to be maintained." 
 
 Exceptions to this chauvinistic statement are found, of 
 course : no exception, however, in the case of Roumania. 
 
 The speech of Mr. Gladstone in 1858 and that of Napo- 
 leon in 1859 show the interest taken by each in the Princi- 
 palities. But between the Frenchman and Englishman 
 there was no co-operation. Probably Mr. Gladstone would 
 not have delivered his speech of May 4, had he known that 
 an agreement existed between Napoleon and England. The 
 common interest of Gladstone and Napoleon in Roumania 
 shows how two thinking minds, with a widely different en- 
 vironment, may, each independently of the other, grasp the 
 same principle. The principle here involved was that of 
 Nationality. In the persevering efforts of Mr. Gladstone 
 in the interest of Irish autonomy, we see how far he went 
 in his endeavor to apply to Ireland the Nationality Princi- 
 ple. The failure of his attempt has perhaps a parallel in
 
 25 
 
 the failure of the negotiation which Napoleon undertook, in 
 1863, in behalf of Poland. Whether or how far the Na- 
 tionality Principle is yet to be applied to Poland and Ire- 
 land is a question. 
 
 The juncture at which Napoleon made his statement re- 
 specting the Principalities February, 1859 is full of 
 significance. The Italian War was at hand. Incidents 
 which provoked or at least foreshadowed it the remark 
 made by Napoleon on New Year's Day to the Austrian am- 
 bassador, and the marriage of Prince Napoleon to Victor 
 Emanuel's daughter had recently occurred. Napoleon 
 was now to lay the foundation of a larger national unity 
 than that of the Principalities of the Danube. Italy, the 
 State whose destinies were shaped in 1859, was, in one 
 sense, the fatherland of Franqe and Roumania. The rela- 
 tion of these three States merits a more careful analysis 
 than it has received. 
 
 The double election of Prince Alexander was, as has 
 been said, contrary to the intent of the Convention of 1858. 
 Whether this election should be ratified, the powers must 
 decide. Before the question came before them, Prince 
 Alexander adopted measures which showed, as his election 
 had shown, what the sentiment of the provinces was. To 
 make this sentiment conspicuous was his design. Part 
 of the troops of Moldavia were sent to garrison posts in 
 Wallachia, while part of the Wallachian troops were sta- 
 tioned in Moldavia. The Wallachian cabinet of Prince 
 Alexander contained a Moldavian, and his Moldavian cab- 
 inet contained a Wallachian. 
 
 The tenacity with which the Principalities adhered to 
 their purpose, and the support which they received from 
 France and other States, did not fail of effect. In April, 
 1859, another conference met in Paris. All the powers, 
 except Austria, urged upon Turkey the recognition of Prince 
 Alexander as sovereign of both States. This recognition, 
 however, they proposed as an exceptional step : it was not
 
 26 
 
 to apply to the successors of Prince Alexander. The War 
 of 1859 broke out while the conference continued, and its 
 sittings were suspended. Three of the parties to the con- 
 ference were parties to the war. Let us recur for a moment 
 to the scope of the Italian War. Its sudden termination at 
 Villafranca disappointed many. Yet its results are among 
 the most liberal of the nineteenth century. It exerted a 
 vast influence in favor of the Nationality Principle, chiefly 
 in Italy, but not in Italy alone. To this influence was due 
 in part the annexation of the Ionian Islands to Greece, 
 and the expulsion of the Turks from all the fortified posts, 
 including the fortress of Belgrade, which they still held in 
 Servia. Nor was the war without effect in the Principali- 
 ties themselves. The beginning of hostilities interrupted, 
 as we have seen, the Paris conference. Prior to the cam- 
 paign of 1859 Austria was the only power which supported 
 Turkey in her refusal to recognize Alexander as sovereign 
 of both Moldavia and Wallachia. Owing to her defeat, 
 Austria yielded. The conference resumed its sittings, and 
 on the 6th of September all the powers acted in unison. 
 The recognition of Alexander as prince of both Principali- 
 ties, subject to the stipulation that this grant should not 
 apply to his successors, was accorded by the sultan. But 
 the influence of the Italian War was not limited to the 
 Italian and Balkan peninsulas. It was felt in Germany ; 
 and to that influence, in part, must be ascribed the down- 
 fall of Napoleon. 
 
 If we start with 1855 in the case of Roumania, and 1859 
 in that of Italy, and trace the emperor's course, we find two 
 lines of policy (subject to obstacles and interruptions, some- 
 times of like, sometimes of unlike nature) which were in 
 essence the same. The basis was the Principle of Nation- 
 ality. As regards the obstacles met with in the emperor's 
 Eastern and Western policy, let us note a distinction. 
 
 His policy in the East was consistently and quietly 
 pursued. In France no opposition was found. Not so in
 
 27 
 
 the case of his Italian policy. To this great opposition 
 existed in France. Thiers became its chief spokesman. 
 This opposition could scarcely fail to influence the emperor. 
 The battle of Mentana shows how far at times his policy ran 
 counter to the Italians.* 
 
 Let us revert to the Danube. The relation of the Princi- 
 palities to each other resembled at this time that which 
 exists between the Kingdom of Hungary and the rest of the 
 Austrian Empire. Two legislatures existed, but a bond of 
 union was found in the person of the sovereign. 
 
 The growth of the Nationality Principle in Austria and in 
 Roumania has been effected through processes precisely 
 opposite. Austria consists of several nationalities ; and the 
 tendency has been to give them greater independence. In 
 Roumania there is only one nationality : here the tendency 
 has been to unite the parts. A centrifugal force acted in 
 the one case, a centralizing force in the other ; but the result 
 is the same. 
 
 In October, 1860, upon the advice of the French govern- 
 ment, Prince Alexander visited Constantinople, where he 
 made a favorable impression. He stated to the Porte and 
 to the representatives of the powers the inconveniences 
 which an executive union of the Principalities involved, if 
 clogged by two ministries and two legislative assemblies ; 
 and, after his return to Bucharest, he formally communi- 
 cated to the Turkish government his views. These, we 
 need not say, were also Napoleon's. They were recom- 
 mended by the French government to the Turkish ; and in 
 1 86 1 the Porte sent to the powers a firman, in which it 
 granted for the lifetime of Prince Alexander a union of 
 the legislatures of the Principalities. On Dec. 23, 1861, 
 
 * Respecting the hostility in France to Napoleon's policy Charles de Mazade may 
 be consulted. In his biography of Cavour, " Le Comte de Cavour," p. 242, he says, 
 " La politiquequi s'etait declared depuis le ler Janvier soulevait, dans une partie de la 
 societd francaise, dans le monde religieux, dans 1'ancien monde parlementaire et meme 
 dans une certaine classe des amis de 1'empire, un tourbillon d' opposition." We 
 might perhaps ask whether this opposition did not influence Napoleon, as the reluc- 
 tance, if not hostility, of the North to emancipation influenced Mr. Lincoln.
 
 28 
 
 the union of Moldavia and Wallachia was proclaimed at 
 Bucharest. Thus was effected the legislative union of the 
 Principalities, as two years before a union had been effected 
 in the person of the sovereign. 
 
 The descendants of the colonists of Trajan chose a name 
 for themselves which recalled the greatness of their origin. 
 In his proclamation Prince Alexander named the new State 
 Roumania* 
 
 In the same year, 1861, in which the Principality of Rou- 
 mania was established, the Kingdom of Italy was established 
 also. Not a few may aver and who can dispute it? 
 that Napoleon's policy in behalf of these States, Italy and 
 Roumania, was due in part to the fact that both are Latin. 
 Each, in common with France, Spain, and Portugal, speaks 
 a tongue derived from that of Rome. 
 
 The circumstance may be noted that, as long as Count 
 Cavour lived, he supported Napoleon's policy in favor of the 
 Latin Principalities of Turkey.t Nor should we fail to add 
 that Cavour sent 15,000 Sardinian troops to the Crimea, so 
 that Italy, both by diplomacy and arms, contributed to the 
 enfranchisement of Roumania. 
 
 Let us rapidly sketch the events which ensued. 
 
 In 1863 the convents of Roumania were confiscated. In 
 carrying out this policy, the Roumanian government was 
 supported by France and Italy. The French government 
 finally induced the powers to sanction this act on condition 
 that the confiscated convents should be indemnified, and a 
 sum of 35,000,000 francs was voted for this purpose. 
 
 In 1864 occurred a reform of wider scope. Prince Alex- 
 ander had vainly endeavored to induce the legislature to 
 
 *The Roumanians trace their origin as a people to the conquest of Dacia by Trajan, 
 A.D. 103. Broken piers of the bridge which Trajan built and upon which he crossed the 
 Danube are still seen beneath the water. The language of Roumania shows its deriva- 
 tion from the Latin, while wholly dissimilar tongues are spoken in the surrounding States. 
 In Roumania the language and the vigor of Rome survive. 
 
 t " Le Comte de Cavour," by Charles de Mazade, p. 178. 
 \Anwiaire des Deu.r 3fondes for 1862-63, p. 681.
 
 2 9 
 
 * abolish the feudal obligations to which the peasantry were 
 still subject. By means of a coup d'etat which save that 
 no bloodshed occurred recalls that of Napoleon, he dis- 
 solved the legislature and appealed to the people. The coup 
 d'etat was ratified by a great majority, and the emancipa- 
 tion of the peasants followed. More than 400,000 became 
 proprietors of the soil. An English writer, James Samuel- 
 son, published in 1882 a work entitled " Roumania, Past 
 and Present." In his preface he states that one of his pur- 
 poses was to lay before his countrymen an account of the 
 reform of 1864. The successful manner in which the land 
 question had been settled, and facts therewith connected, 
 might, he thought, be profitably considered in connection 
 with the land question in Ireland. 
 
 But we have not asked in what manner the Revolution in 
 the Roumanian government, which the coup d'etat effected, 
 a revolution which increased the authority of the prince, 
 was recognized by Turkey. Prince Alexander, recalling 
 the success of his former journey to Constantinople, again 
 went thither ; and, through his efforts and those of the 
 French ambassador, the Marquis of Moustier, the change in 
 the government of Roumania was ratified by the Porte and 
 the powers. 
 
 The relation of Roumania to France and other States sub- 
 sequent to the Crimean War is well described in an extract 
 from the Constantinople correspondence of the New York 
 Tribune:* "France and Italy have sought to make these 
 provinces independent of Turkey. England has, of course, 
 done her best to strengthen the power of Turkey, and re- 
 press any tendencies toward independent action. Russia is 
 determined to annex these provinces to her own territory. 
 Turkey wishes to retain them with as little trouble and ex- 
 pense as possible. The provinces themselves desire to 
 become an independent kingdom. Consequently, French 
 policy has been triumphant ; and, to the dismay of England, 
 
 * New York Tribune, July 14, 1864.
 
 30 
 
 Prince Couza has been doing very much as he liked, with- 
 out regard to treaties or anything else." 
 
 The following reference occurs to the reforms just men- 
 tioned. The statement, however, as to the real estate of 
 the Principality is much exaggerated. " Prince Couza first 
 confiscated all the property of the Greek monasteries, which 
 owned about half the real estate in the Principality ; and, 
 then, having turned the assembly into the street at the 
 point of the bayonet, he annulled the constitution, and freed 
 all the serfs in the provinces." * 
 
 The writer predicts that Prince Couza, " strong in his 
 faith in Napoleon," would go on and do as he chose. To 
 do as we choose often succeeds admirably, but sometimes 
 the proceeding comes to a sudden termination. 
 
 One of the purposes of Alexander, briefly stated, was to 
 assimilate the civilization of the Principality to that of 
 Western Europe. Among the reforms of this period, besides 
 those already noted, were the establishment of schools, the 
 partial introduction of the Gregorian calendar, and the 
 adoption of the metric system of weights and measures. 
 But the statesmanship of the prince was not without defect. 
 The finances of the State had been mismanaged. 
 
 In February, 1866, Prince Alexander was deposed. 
 No one of his countrymen had done so much as he toward 
 achieving the union of the Principalities and introducing re- 
 forms. But, though an admirable reformer, he was a volup- 
 tuary. His deposition was owing partly to this latter fact, 
 partly to the fact that the people of Roumania were de- 
 termined to have a foreigner for sovereign. So fixed was 
 the purpose of Roumania to connect herself with the rest of 
 
 * The liberation of the peasants was effected by means of a decree issued by Prince 
 Alexander prior to the meeting of the legislature, which was elected after the coup d'ttat. 
 This decree had the force of law. After the coup d'etat of 1851 a like state of affairs 
 existed in France. Between the coup d'etat and the opening of the Chambers in March, 
 1852, the decrees of Napoleon had the force of law. The decree which liberated the peas- 
 ants in Roumania we might regard as part of the coup d'etat itself. From one point of 
 view we may compare the emancipation proclamation of President Lincoln to the decree 
 of Prince Alexander. Each was an act of the executive, not of the legislature. West 
 India emancipation was due to Parliament.
 
 Europe by a dynastic tie that, when Alexander was elected 
 Hospodar of Moldavia in 1859, he signed an agreement to 
 relinquish the sovereignty in favor of a foreign prince, should 
 the union of the Principalities be accomplished. The prince 
 seems to have had a presentiment of his fall. A few weeks 
 before it occurred, the Chambers were opened ; and in his 
 message he observed that he had received the sovereign power 
 as a sacred trust, and was ready to relinquish it in favor of a 
 foreign prince. The election of a foreign prince, it will b'e 
 recalled, constituted the second of the propositions sub- 
 mitted by Napoleon to the powers in 1855. After the 
 deposition of Alexander the legislature proceeded to choose 
 his successor. 
 
 The first choice fell upon the Count of Flanders, brother 
 of the King of Belgium. The count having declined, the 
 next candidate was Prince Charles of Hohenzollern. The 
 relations of France and Prussia at this time prior to 
 the war of 1866 were not unfriendly; but it was thought 
 that Napoleon might object to a Hohenzollern prince. 
 Bratiano, one of the chiefs of the liberal party in Roumania, 
 was in Paris, and laid the matter before the emperor. Not 
 only he made no objection : he suggested to the Roumanian 
 government to offer Prince Charles the crown ; and this was 
 done. Accurately stated, Napoleon's suggestion (Anregung) 
 was that the Roumanian government should propose Prince 
 Charles to the people as their prince.* That the prince, 
 when elected, was chosen by a plebiscite, was owing perhaps 
 to the form of this proposal. 
 
 At the Prussian court there were influences both favor- 
 able to the prince's acceptance and unfavorable. His 
 father, Prince Anthony, whose part in the negotiations 
 which preceded 'the war of 1870 is well known, was 
 favorably disposed. The crown prince observed to Prince 
 Charles that the fact that France had brought forward the 
 candidature was the only disturbing circumstance. France, 
 
 * Memoirs of the King of Roumania, vol. i. p. 3.
 
 32 
 
 having conferred a favor, might expect it to be returned. 
 Prince Charles replied that he did not think Napoleon had in 
 view such a policy. In his opinion the French sovereign was 
 influenced rather by the relationship which existed between 
 his Majesty and the Hechingen branch of the Hohenzollerns 
 than by any selfish considerations.* Prince Frederick 
 Charles advised the prince to decline the offer, not thinking 
 the position which he would hold in Roumania that of 
 a prince tributary to the sultan a position worthy of him. 
 The King of Prussia occupied an attitude of reserve. When 
 Prince Charles referred to the Roumanian question, his 
 Majesty erwdhnte mit keinem Worte. 
 
 At Bucharest it was decided to proceed with the election, 
 and also that it should take place as a plebiscite. The 
 Chambers which had elected the Count of Flanders had 
 been dissolved. The voting occupied seven days, from 
 April 14 to April 20, and resulted in 685,969 votes in the 
 affirmative and 224 in the negative. April 20 was the 
 birthday of Prince Charles, and also that of Napoleon III. 
 Even after the triumphant election of the prince the King 
 of Prussia seemed almost neutral. He determined to exert 
 no direct influence upon the decision, yes or no, which the 
 prince was now to take.f 
 
 The election was virtually unanimous, and Prince Charles 
 determined to accept. He set out for Roumania, and wrote 
 to Napoleon III. as follows : 
 
 " I have set out, trusting in God and your Majesty." 
 
 He also wrote, " I dare to hope that your Majesty will 
 kindly continue to Roumania and her prince his powerful 
 protection, which brings to life and sustains oppressed 
 nationalities." 
 
 *The kinship referred to was due to the marriage of the Princess Josephine, a grand- 
 daughter of the Empress Josephine and daughter of Napoleon's uncle, Prince Eugene, 
 to the Prince of Hohenzollern-Hechingen. Subsequently, in a letter to Napoleon, 
 Prince CMiarles refers to this relationship. Alluding to his Majesty he says, " J'ai en 
 moi de son sang." 
 
 t Memoirs of King Charles of Roumania, vol. i. p. 27.
 
 33 
 
 In this letter the prince ascribes his election to the fact 
 that the people of Roumania remembered his relationship 
 to Napoleon.* 
 
 A romantic circumstance attaches to the journey of the 
 prince. He was an officer in the Prussian army ; and, owing 
 to the hostility of Austria to his candidature, he traversed 
 that empire under an assumed name. The prince was a 
 lieutenant in the dragoons of the Guard, and exchanged his 
 uniform for a civilian's dress. He went up the Rhine to 
 Basle and Zurich in Switzerland, and thence through 
 Munich to Vienna. Here he took a train down the Danube, 
 and waited at Bazias, near the Roumanian frontier, for the 
 steamer. May 18 he went on bqard, taking, as a precau- 
 tion, a second-class passage. . Bratiano arrived from Paris 
 at the same time, was informed of the presence of his 
 prince, and notified that he would have to ignore him entirely 
 for a while. When they landed in Roumania at Turnu 
 Severin, the very spot where Trajan built his bridge, their 
 restraint was thrown off. On the 22d of May the prince 
 entered Bucharest, where he was greeted with loud accla- 
 mations, and flowers were strewn in his path. 
 
 This journey of the prince is connected in a strange 
 manner with Napoleon's destinies. Reference has pre- 
 viously been made to the candidature of Prince Leopold, 
 the brother of Prince Charles, to the throne of Spain in 
 1870. After the withdrawal of this candidature, Napoleon 
 wrote a letter to his minister for foreign affairs, in which 
 he insisted that the withdrawal, under the attending circum- 
 stances, was not sufficient. The King of Prussia ought to 
 agree, he said, that the candidature should not be repeated. 
 He ought to agree not to allow Prince Leopold " to follow 
 the example of his brother, and set off some fine day for 
 
 *This letter and others are found in a German work, the " Memoirs of King Charles 
 of Roumania/' published at Stuttgard in 1894. The contents are described as Aufzeich- 
 mingen eittes Aiigenzeugen. These two volumes are full of evidence of the relation 
 between Napoleon III. on the one hand and Roumania and Prince Charles on the 
 other.
 
 34 
 
 Spain." Thus the romance of the journey down the 
 Danube which enhanced, we may suppose, the enthusiasm 
 of the prince's reception in Bucharest, was one of many 
 circumstances which helped bring on the war of 1870 and 
 destroy Napoleon.* 
 
 Let us return to 1866. There has probably been more 
 policy than sincerity in those professions of interest often 
 put forth by Russia as to the Balkan States. To prove this, 
 it is not necessary to refer to the present relations of 
 Russia and Bulgaria. The events of 1866 tell the same 
 story. Although the policy of Russia toward Roumania 
 had thus far in most cases coincided with that of France, 
 yet on this occasion Russia declared herself opposed both 
 to the election of a foreign prince and to the continued 
 union of the Moldo-Wallachian State ! It scarcely served 
 the designs of Russia to have an independent, vigorous 
 nationality planted upon the road from Moscow to the 
 Golden Horn.f 
 
 To explain more fully the attitude of Russia and also of 
 Turkey in 1866, we may call to mind that, when the union 
 of the Principalities was effected, its recognition by the 
 Turkish government applied to the reign of Prince Alexan- 
 der only. Upon his deposition the question once more be- 
 came open. The friends of union believed that although, 
 in a strict sense, the union was only temporary it was 
 destined to become lasting. The powers hostile to union 
 Russia, Austria, and Turkey hoped that an opportunity 
 
 * A misapprehension as to the war of 1870 may here be noted. Many suppose that 
 the first demand made by the French emperor just before the war was granted. It was 
 not. The requisition was that the King of Prussia, who had sanctioned the candidature 
 of Prince Leopold, should advise or order him to abandon it. But, when it had been 
 abandoned, the Prussian government stated that the action of the prince was voluntary, 
 and that the King of Prussia had nothing to do with it. See " La France et la Prusse 
 avant la Guerre," by the Due de Gramont, p. 118. We need not discuss Napoleon's 
 course. It is, nevertheless, true that the second demand was made in order to provide a 
 substitute for the part of the first which had not been granted, and which, in the nature 
 of the case, could not be granted when the candidature had been withdrawn. 
 
 tThe population of the Kingdom of Roumania, at present 5,800,000, exceeds that of 
 Sweden.
 
 35 
 
 had arrived which would enable them to split the State into 
 its original halves. 
 
 The choice of a Hohenzollern prince was fortunate. 
 Such was the hostility of the "Porte that troops were de- 
 spatched to the Danube, and a military occupation of the 
 Principality was threatened. A few weeks after the arrival 
 of Prince Charles in Roumania, however, the battle of 
 Sadowa occurred. The prestige acquired by Prussia over- 
 threw the hopes of Russia and Turkey, and hastened the 
 recognition by all the powers of the newly elected sovereign. 
 Since the fall of France in 1870 the Roumanians, while 
 cherishing a remembrance of the services rendered by her, 
 can afford to felicitate themselves that their sovereign is a 
 German. 
 
 By the choice of Prince Charles the second of Napoleon's 
 propositions submitted to the powers in 1855 was carried 
 out. The union of the Principalities had been accom- 
 plished in 1 86 1. A foreign prince was chosen hereditary 
 sovereign in 1866. 
 
 We are not to suppose that, upon the acquisition of the 
 crown by Prince Charles, Roumania became independent. 
 The Principality continued to recognize the suzerainty of 
 the sultan, to pay a fixed tribute, and to owe military ser- 
 vice. It was not until after the Turco-Russian War of 
 1878, in which the prince and army of Roumania took an 
 honorable part, that the tie between Turkey and Roumania 
 was sundered. At this time the Principality was erected 
 into a kingdom. The death of Napoleon occurred in 1873, 
 about half-way between the election of Prince Charles as 
 Prince of Roumania in 1866 and his assumption of the 
 regal title in 1881. 
 
 If the services of Napoleon to Roumania were many and 
 effective, at times his judgment may have been lacking. 
 At least, it seems to have wavered. After the revolution 
 which deposed Prince Alexander, the Italian government, 
 fixed upon the acquisition of Venetia, urged upon the em-
 
 36 
 
 peror the following scheme, that Austria should give up 
 Venetia, and accept instead the Principalities of the Dan- 
 ube. The German historian Von Sybel tells us that Napo- 
 leon "had scarcely favored such an idea."* 
 
 However, at present he seemed ready to indorse it, in 
 part at least, and communicated it to the powers. This 
 scheme, as far as Roumania was concerned, amounted to a 
 transfer from the Ottoman to the Austrian Empire. If such 
 a transfer seemed contrary to the interests of Roumania, an 
 argument nevertheless may be alleged in its favor. If we 
 consider that the population of Roumania was about 4,500,- 
 ooo, and that the parts of Austria adjacent to Roumania 
 contained a Roumanian population of 2,600,000 (a fair ma- 
 jority of the population of Transylvania is Roumanian), it 
 might be urged that an eventual union of all parts of the 
 Roumanian nationality might be promoted by the annexa- 
 tion. Austria, however, objected ; and so did the other 
 powers. Austria, perhaps, objected for a reason similar to 
 that which led Napoleon, it would seem, to favor the project, 
 an apprehension that, if the 7,000,000 Roumanians of 
 Austria and Roumania were brought under one government, 
 an agitation would be started to bring into closer union all 
 parts of the Roumanian race, and establish some such king- 
 dom of Roumania as that which we have at present, of 
 which the correspondence of the Tribune spoke. Of what 
 use was it to extract from the foot of Austria a thorn in the 
 shape of an unruly Latin province, if a fresh one were im- 
 planted in its place ? It is possible that Napoleon's indorse- 
 ment of the scheme was owing to a wish to conciliate 
 Austria. If not successful in one respect, he may have 
 been in another. How was the cession of Venetia to Italy 
 effected ? By means of the treaty of June 12, 1866, Venetia 
 was ceded by Austria to Napoleon, and by Napoleon trans- 
 ferred to its rightful owners. If he failed to liberate Venice 
 in 1859, he had, to say the least, a hand in the liberation of 
 1866. 
 
 * Founding of the German Empire, vol. iv. p. 334.
 
 37 
 
 The scheme above referred to has been stated, in order 
 that all needful facts may be before us with respect to Napo- 
 leon and Roumania, those wholly to his credit and others 
 of which so much perhaps might not be said.* 
 
 Let us note a further circumstance with regard to the 
 negotiations of 1866. After the deposition of Prince Alex- 
 ander a conference, as on previous occasions, met in Paris. 
 But it did not amount to much. Early in May it reminded 
 the people of Roumania that, according to the Convention 
 of 1858, the prince to be elected was to be a native prince. 
 At this very time Napoleon had assented to the candidature 
 of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern, and this prince had 
 been elected. If Roumania and Napoleon worked one way 
 and the conference another, there was a fair chance for dis- 
 agreement. The battle of Sadowa was worth a dozen con- 
 ferences. 
 
 If Prince Charles was chosen April 20 by means of a 
 plebiscite, this election was followed by another less revolu- 
 tionary in form. He was chosen by a constituent assembly 
 May 13. It has been observed that at the time of the 
 coup d'etat and the liberation of the peasants the constitu- 
 tion of the State became more autocratic. The Annuaire 
 des Deux Mondes remarks that this autocratic constitution 
 resembled that of the Second Empire. According to the 
 same authority the constitution substituted in 1866 for this 
 autocracy resembled the constitution of Belgium. We may 
 call to mind that the first offer of the crown was made to a 
 Belgian prince. 
 
 Having reviewed the events which took place between 
 
 * Mr. Fyffe alleges (History of Modern Europe, vol. iii. p. 235) that during the Con- 
 gress of Paris in 1856 Napoleon "had revived his project of incorporating the Danubian 
 Principalities with Austria in return for ths cession of Lombardy." Let us suppose that 
 Napoleon suggested this scheme as a solution which deserved consideration. Mr. r'yffe 
 is, however, in error when, having observed that Austria declined the proposition, he 
 states that "Napoleon consequently entered upon a new Eastern policy"; namely, by 
 proposing the union of the Principalities ' 'into a single State." The original proposition 
 to unite the provinces was made by Xapoleott at Vienna, March 26, 1855. This policy 
 could not have been "new" in 1856.
 
 38 
 
 the French propositions of 1855 and the carrying out of the 
 second in 1866, let us note certain circumstances which refer 
 to later occurrences or to Roumania at present. 
 
 That Napoleon continued to interest himself in the Prin- 
 cipality appears from the following despatches which passed 
 between himself and Prince Charles. 
 
 The Jews of Roumania, like those of Russia, have suffered 
 at times from persecution. In 1867, the year after the ac- 
 cession of the prince, France, England, and Austria remon- 
 strated against certain measures which had severely op- 
 pressed Jews accused of vagrancy. The Roumanian gov- 
 ernment replied that the matter should be minutely investi- 
 gated. Napoleon, at the time of this intervention, sent from 
 Paris the following despatch to Prince Charles : " I ought 
 not to allow Your Highness to be ignorant of the manner 
 in which public opinion here is stirred up respecting the 
 persecutions to which, it is said, the Jews of Moldavia are 
 exposed. I cannot believe that the enlightened govern- 
 ment of Your Highness authorizes measures so contrary to 
 humanity and civilization." 
 
 The prince answered: "Your Majesty may be assured 
 that I have no less solicitude than yourself for the Jewish 
 population. The measures which the government thought it 
 ought to take have nothing exceptional about them and be- 
 long to the common law. I shall have a severe investiga- 
 tion, however, to ascertain whether subaltern officials have 
 not exceeded their instructions. The guilty shall be pun- 
 ished with all the rigor of the laws." 
 
 This intervention seems at least to have lessened the 
 grievances of the Jews. But a strict enforcement of the 
 " common law " was not sufficient. For over fifty years 
 the laws had discriminated against the Jews. Finally, it was 
 stipulated in the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 that the recogni- 
 tion by the powers of the independence of Roumania was 
 conditioned upon the recognition by that State of the equality 
 of all sects before the law (Arts. 43-45).
 
 39 
 
 On setting out to consider the part of Napoleon in the 
 liberation of Roumania, the first circumstance noted referred 
 to the funeral rites which occurred at his death. In the 
 ' Memoirs of King Charles " we read as follows (vol. ii. 
 p. 300) : "15 January. In the Metropolitan Church as well 
 as in all the churches of the country took place the funeral 
 service \Trauergottesdiensf\ which had been ordered in 
 honor of the Emperor Napoleon." 
 
 These rites were observed on the same day, Jan. 15, 1873, 
 on which occurred Napoleon's funeral at Chiselhurst. 
 
 Under the date January 10, on which day the news ar- 
 rived of the emperor's decease, we find the following: 
 "The Prince and Princess send to the widowed Empress 
 and Imperial Prince the expression of their affectionate 
 sympathy. In his own name the Prince adds : ' Pour mo 
 le souvenir des bontes de 1'Empereur est a jamais grave 
 dans mon coeur.' " 
 
 Under this date we also read, " Prince Charles is deeply 
 affected ; and throughout the whole country is manifested a 
 spontaneous, sincere grief at the death of the former pro- 
 -tector of the Principle of Nationality \Nationalitatsprinzips\^ 
 to whom Roumania owes her existence as a State." 
 
 A few years after Napoleon's death the army of the new 
 State was summoned to the field. 
 
 At the siege of Plevna the Roumanian army greatly dis- 
 tinguished itself. Prince Charles was commander-in-chief 
 of the united Russian and Roumanian forces. In 1881 
 President Grevy of France sent the prince, who at this time 
 assumed the title of king, the decoration known as the 
 military medal. In his reply Prince Charles says : u I feel 
 myself the more flattered by this distinction on your part 
 because it is reflected upon my whole army, which knew 
 how to perform its duty on the field of honor, commanded 
 by brave officers who owe their military training \leurs con- 
 naissances militaires\ in large part to the schools of France." 
 
 It thus appears that one of the services which Napoleon
 
 4 o 
 
 rendered .was the permission to have officers of the Rou- 
 manian army educated in the French military schools. 
 
 Another circumstance relates to the flag of Roumania. 
 It is a tricolor, and is in fact the same as the French, save 
 that a yellow stripe in the Roumanian replaces the white. 
 
 One result of the intimate relation between the States has 
 been the use of the French language by the educated classes 
 in Roumania. An authority already cited, Mr. Samuelson, 
 says, " French is almost the universal language of the 
 middle classes." Among the publications of the late 
 George M. Towle is a political and historical sketch of 
 Roumania. Respecting Bucharest he says, "No one is 
 worthy of social consideration who is not familiar with 
 French." Edward King, well known as a journalist and 
 author, wrote, " In Roumania there is a little France, al- 
 though it is ruled by a German king." * A further indica- 
 tion of the influence of France is found in the fact that the 
 code of Roumania is based upon the Code Napoleon. 
 
 In summing up the services which Napoleon III. ren- 
 dered to Roumania, let us, first of all, bear in mind that in a 
 special sense he represented France. One is reminded of 
 the saying of Louis XIV., " L'etat, c'est moi." When we 
 find that the French government pursued a specific course, 
 this means that Napoleon pursued it. In an extract already 
 quoted Mr. Gladstone referred to the emperor as "the 
 absolute sovereign of France." And yet this absolute 
 sovereignty reposed upon universal suffrage. In the case 
 of Napoleon's Roumanian policy no hostility, as we have 
 seen, existed in France. We are even more certain of 
 seeing an act of the emperor in each act of his government 
 than in the case of Italy, for here Napoleon encountered 
 opposition : his course was deflected from that which he 
 would otherwise have pursued.! 
 
 * Boston Journal, Aug. 29, 1885. 
 
 t In the above the writer does not mean to eulogize autocratic government. One of 
 the best things that Napoleon did was to give up, to the extent to which he did, between 
 1860 and 1870 (beginning with the famous decree of Nov. 24, 1860), autocracy. If, how- 
 ever, in any case his autocratic power was justly used, let us note the fact.
 
 41 
 
 Briefly stated, Napoleon's services to Roumania were 
 these. In laying before the powers during the siege of 
 Sebastopol the propositions of 1855 those in favor of the 
 union of the Principalities and the sovereignty of a foreigner 
 he advocated measures called for by the interests and the 
 people of the Moldo-Wallachian States.* 
 
 The propositions submitted at Vienna ; the first of these, 
 submitted twelve months later at Paris ; a renewed declara- 
 tion of the French government in favor of union, Feb. 5, 
 1857; Napoleon's visit to Osborne ; the cancelling of the 
 Moldavian elections and the Convention of 1858, these 
 were the first steps. The final achievement of union was 
 effected, partly through the election of Colonel Alexander 
 Couza just before the war of 1859, partly by the consolida- 
 tion of both legislatures and the assumption of the name 
 Roumania two years later. 
 
 Finally, the proposition respecting the sovereignty of a 
 foreign prince, advocated by France both in 1855 and 1858, 
 was realized through the deposition of Prince Alexander 
 and the election of Prince Charles in 1866. 
 
 Owing to the English alliance and the Crimean War, 
 conditions were supplied without which Napoleon's plan 
 could scarcely have succeeded. The lessening of the pres- 
 tige of Russia and her exhaustion consequent upon the war 
 were circumstances not inimical to the growth of the eman- 
 cipated State, one which Russia had occupied at the begin- 
 ning of the war and had hoped to make part of her 
 dominions. 
 
 The Treaty of Paris, which closed the Crimean War. 
 favored the interests and autonomy of the Moldo-Wallachian 
 States. Owing to the stipulation which provided for elec- 
 
 * Evidence enough has perhaps been given that Xapoleon correctly interpreted the 
 interests and will of the people. The following might be added. In January, 1859, a few 
 months after the conclusion of the Convention of 1858, the Moldavian assembly voted a 
 declaration in which it stated that the union of the Principalities under a foreign prince 
 " has been, is, and always will be the most active, ardent, and universal wisli of the Rou- 
 manian nation."
 
 4 2 
 
 tions in the Principalities and for an expression of the pref- 
 erences of the people, Napoleon was able, to a large extent, 
 to introduce those preferences into the Convention of 1858. 
 Thus was the way prepared for the final union of Moldavia 
 and Wallachia. 
 
 That provision of the Treaty of Paris which abolished the 
 Russian protectorate of 1829, substituting for it a joint pro- 
 tectorate of the powers, had great value. While nominally a 
 joint protectorate, it was virtually French. This instrumen- 
 tality Napoleon constantly employed. 
 
 In reviewing the events recorded, we cannot fail to note 
 in how hearty a manner the governments of France and 
 Roumania worked together, whether with regard to a reform 
 of the highest moment, the union of the provinces, or to 
 lesser and yet important changes, such as the confiscation 
 of the convents and the enfranchisement of the peasants. 
 
 A reference to the scheme brought forward by Italy in 
 1866 with regard to Austria, Venetia. and Roumania, is 
 hardly called for. Napoleon could scarcely have considered 
 the plan feasible save upon the condition of its acceptance 
 by both Austria and Roumania. Austria never accepted 
 it ; and this killed the plan whenever it was -suggested. 
 
 A divided State, legally subject to Turkey, but occupied 
 at the beginning of the Crimean War by the Russian arms, 
 has become a free, united, and prosperous kingdom. Not a 
 few personalities, historical influences and historical tenden- 
 cies have contributed to this result. That among personal- 
 ities the first place belongs to Napoleon, we cannot doubt. 
 Here the testimony of the liberated State should be consid- 
 ered, the funeral rites of 1873. 
 
 One noteworthy circumstance connected with the services 
 of Napoleon to Moldo-Wallachia is the fact that for several 
 years after the inauguration of his policy Great Britain 
 opposed him. His policy was liberal, hers the reverse. 
 Mr. Gladstone was an exception among British statesmen, 
 and, we may also add, Lord John Russell. Comparing the
 
 43 
 
 statesmen of England on the one hand and Napoleon on the 
 other, Napoleon had the greater political and moral insight. 
 
 There is a point of view not yet touched upon with regard 
 to the emperor and the Crimean War. Some have averred 
 (Mr. Kinglake's History, vol. i. p. 49) that Napoleon's pur- 
 pose in the negotiations with Turkey, which occurred in 
 1851 and 1852, negotiations which resulted in granting 
 to France and the Latin Church certain privileges as to the 
 shrines in Palestine, was to provoke war. That the carry- 
 ing up to Bethlehem of a silver star adorned with the arms 
 of France (Kinglake's History, vol. i. pp. 51, 53) should 
 have caused the siege of Sebastopol may seem improbable. 
 But the granting of this and other privileges did provoke 
 Russia; and six months later, in July, 1853, the invasion of 
 Turkey began. 
 
 If it was Napoleon's design by inaugurating the Turkish 
 negotiations prior to the coup d'etat to bring about a Rus- 
 sian war, if it was his design to pursue in behalf of Moldo- 
 Wallachia the policy which he did pursue, he possessed a 
 degree of foresight and sagacity for which not many have 
 given him credit. At all events, if Napoleon did not pro- 
 voke the Crimean War, he knew how to use it in the interest 
 of justice and freedom. 
 
 We have reviewed facts which relate to the Crimean War 
 and Napoleon III. Mr. A. D. Vandam, in a series of ar- 
 ticles in the North American Review, says (May, 1895) that 
 the Crimean War " was undertaken, not for political, but for 
 social purposes ; namely, to give the new empress the spon- 
 sor she lacked face to face with the sovereigns of Europe." 
 Let us imagine that the emperor cherished this design. He 
 cherished others. The verdict of history must be that to 
 the fall of Sebastopol and the masterly policy which Napo- 
 leon pursued between 1855 and 1866 the establishment of 
 Roumania as a free State is chiefly due. 
 
 If George Washington or Abraham Lincoln had pursued 
 for eleven years such a policy and effected such results, 
 should we not eulogize the purpose and achievement ?
 
 44 
 
 Toward the close of the empire the services which it 
 rendered to oppressed States seem to have attracted the at- 
 tention of Anglo-Saxon writers. Our historian George Ban- 
 croft wrote, our sketch begins with these noble lines, 
 Jan. 25, 1867 ; * "It is the glory of the French nation that 
 it has on many decisive occasions put forth its strength on 
 the side of liberty ; and the Netherlands, the United States, 
 and Italy bear witness to her effective services as the de- 
 fender of nationalities and the soldier of freedom." 
 
 To the services rendered by France in the instances 
 named should be added those of Napoleon III. in the liber- 
 ation of Roumania. 
 
 The policy of Napoleon, both in Roumania and Italy, was 
 based upon the Nationality Principle. If we consider his 
 policy in other cases, in the difficulty between Prussia and 
 Switzerland in 1857, which resulted in the abdication by 
 the King of Prussia of all his rights as sovereign of Neu- 
 chatel ; the difficulty between Prussia and France as to Lux- 
 emburg in 1867, which resulted in the evacuation of Lux- 
 emburg by Prussia and the demolition of the fortress ; if we 
 consider the case of Savoy and Nice ; if we consider the 
 fact that in the Sleswick-Holstein Question the emperor 
 favored the Germans of those provinces in their wish to be- 
 long to Germany, and, in like manner, the Danes of north- 
 ern Sleswick in their wish to continue Danes ; if we con- 
 sider an instance in which the emperor's policy failed, the 
 joint intervention of the French, British, and Austrian gov- 
 ernments in behalf of Poland at the time of the insurrection 
 of 1863 ; if, finally, we consider the question which arose 
 between Servia and Turkey as to Belgrade and other fort- 
 resses in 1862 and 1866, we find in every instance that the 
 emperor's policy rested upon the Principle of Nationality.! 
 
 * Letter read at a meeting in New York in sympathy with the revolted Cretans. 
 
 t In two speeches made in the Chamber, March 14 and 18, 1867, Thiers arraigned 
 Napoleon's government because of its services to Nationality. The imperial govern- 
 ment, he alleged, had substituted for the principle of the balance of power the Principle
 
 45 
 
 Mr. John Fiske, in an article in the Atlantic Monthly, 
 April, 1877, entitled "The Races of the Danube," gives an 
 excellent definition of what constitutes a nationality, and 
 also designates the relation between the Principle of Nation- 
 ality and the Eastern Question. He says, the Italics are 
 our own : " In the famous Eastern Question, which now 
 for half a century has alternately threatened and disturbed 
 the peace of Europe, may be noted two aspects of a process 
 which under great variety of conditions has been going on 
 over European territory ever since the dawn of authentic 
 history. The formation of a nationality that is, of a com- 
 munity of men sufficiently connected in interests and dis 
 ciplined in social habits to live together peacefully under 
 laws of their own making has been the leading aspect of 
 this process, in which the work of civilization has hitherto 
 largely consisted.* But along with this, as a correlative 
 aspect, has gone the pressure exerted against the com- 
 munity by an external mass of undisciplined barbarism ever 
 on the alert to break over the fluctuating barrier that has 
 warded it off." 
 
 Ever since authentic history began, Mr. Fiske tells us, 
 this process has gone on. The Principle of Nationality has 
 asserted itself, and "barbarism" has fought against it. 
 During this whole period no instance perhaps has occurred 
 
 of Nationality. To this principle he referred as"ce principe, deplorable a mon avis, 
 des nationalites." It is true that Thiers's objection to the principle lay in his forecast 
 that the devotion of Napoleon to it would raise up enemies to France. Nor were his 
 sombre predictions long in coming to pass. The question has not occurred to Americans 
 as forcibly as it might whether France since 1870 has not deserved our sympathy pre- 
 cisely because her overthrow was due in part to her services to Nationality. 
 
 As regards the two speeches of Thiers, Gustave Rothan, in his work " L' Affaire du 
 Luxembourg," gives their gist in one sentence, (p. 193). The imperial government, 
 Thiers said, "had substituted for the principle of the balance of power the Principle of 
 Nationality, of which it had made itself on every occasion the devoted champion and per- 
 severing apostle." 
 
 True to the above definition of nationality, which refers neither to origin nor 
 language, Mr. Fiske, in an introduction to a work by Mr. Harold Murdock, published in 
 i8&j, "The Reconstruction of Europe from the Rise to the Fall of the Second Empire," 
 observes that "the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany was really a violation of 
 what is the sound basis of the sacredness of nationalities."
 
 46 
 
 of the genesis of a nationality fraught with greater interest 
 than the genesis of Roumania.* 
 
 The irruption of the Nationality Principle into the Balkan 
 peninsula was a great event. One even greater was its 
 irruption shortly after into the Italian. To the east and 
 west of the Adriatic, Napoleon grasped the issues, and 
 planted them upon this principle. As the inspiration of 
 his thinking and doing, Napoleon chose a principle of 
 liberty, according to Mazzini the first principle of the 
 century. Not a bad way of judging the value of Napoleon's 
 work in Roumania is to estimate it in the light of Mr. 
 Fiske's words respecting the Eastern Question and Na- 
 tionality Principle. 
 
 The significance of the Nationality Principle applied to 
 Roumania largely consists in the fact that this principle 
 was applied to the Eastern Question. September 8 the 
 Malakoff fell. September 8 is one of the red-letter days 
 of freedom. The fall of this fortress meant that the Princi- 
 ple of Conquest, Russia's principle, was worsted. The 
 arms and diplomacy of the Second Empire made noble 
 preparation for the further growth of the Nationality Princi- 
 ple, which occurred after the war of 1878, not only in 
 Roumania, but in Servia and Bulgaria. We should note 
 especially the steadfastness and advance of Bulgaria in 
 spite of Russia. 
 
 In an article contributed to the Edinburgh Review by 
 Mr. Gladstone immediately after Sedan, he refers to the 
 ten years which followed the Crimean War as a period of 
 " towering influence, prosperity, and power." f During this 
 period Napoleon carried out in the Balkan peninsula the 
 process of liberation which we have considered. Respect- 
 ing Napoleon, Mr. Gladstone says, " Two services he has 
 conferred upon the world." One referred to the liberation 
 
 *Mr. Fiske uses the words "undisciplined barbarism." "Undisciplined" could 
 not be applied to Russia in 1855. Had it not been for the discipline of her civilization 
 and arms, the defence of Sebastopol would not have been what it was. 
 
 t "Germany, France, and England," Edinburgh Review, October, 1870.
 
 47 
 
 of Italy, the other to the treaty known at the time as the 
 Cobden Treaty, but which, in the language of American 
 politics, we might describe as the tariff-reform or reciprocity 
 treaty of 1860. \Yhatever the merits of this treaty, we 
 might have more reason perhaps to name, if we emphasize 
 two services, the liberation of Italy and the liberation of 
 Roumania. It does not often happen in the whole range of 
 history that a prince or president emancipates two States. 
 One is the more ready to ask why Mr. Gladstone did not 
 associate the liberation of Italy and that of Roumania as 
 Napoleon's achievements par excellence because he agreed 
 with the emperor's Roumanian policy. In support of it he 
 made a powerful speech. 
 
 It is useless to attempt to settle what matter of man 
 Napoleon was till we know his acts. In any review of his 
 reign nothing will appear so absurd as the way in which his 
 Roumanian policy has been ignored. A remarkable series 
 of events transpired between March, 1855, and May, 1866. 
 Scarcely was the world aware of the fact that the world was 
 being revolutionized, as far as the Eastern Question went 
 and the adoption of the Nationality Principle as the chief 
 factor in its settlement. 
 
 Let us cite an illustration of the manner in which these 
 events have been suppressed. How happens it that Mr. 
 Kinglake, in his history of the " Invasion of the Crimea," in- 
 eight volumes, omits all reference to the fact that Napoleon 
 submitted to the powers the propositions, or plan, of 1855 ? 
 This plan not one of the powers indorsed. France and 
 Napoleon carried it out. Mr. Kinglake devotes thirty-five 
 pages to the proceedings of the Conference of Vienna before 
 which the emperor's plan was laid, and even names the date, 
 March 26, upon which it was submitted. To it he makes no 
 reference. What was Mr. Kinglake's motive ? The ques- 
 tion is complex. It relates to the attitude of England 
 toward Roumania, to that of Napoleon, and to the views 
 propounded by Mr. Kinglake as to the coup d'etat and
 
 4 8 
 
 Napoleon's character. Is it possible that our author was 
 ignorant of the facts ? The essence, one might almost say, 
 and outcome of the Crimean War are found in the plan of 
 1855. Nevertheless, with reference to it and the grand 
 policy which issued from it our historian is dumb.* 
 
 Lieutenant F. V. Greene, in his report to our government 
 on " The Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey in 
 1877-1878," refers to the siege of Sebastopol as "the most 
 famous perhaps of authentic sieges." The fame of this 
 siege will become yet greater in proportion as the use to 
 which it was put by France and Bonaparte is understood.! 
 
 A question as interesting as any which the independence 
 of Roumania suggests is whether the popular estimate of 
 Napoleon III. should not be revised. If Mazzini was a true 
 prophet, if the Principle of Nationality has given its name 
 to this century, it cannot be denied that Napoleon III., 
 rather than any other man, was the champion of this prin- 
 ciple. $ It is the fashion with many to disparage, in com- 
 parison with the uncle, the nephew. The nephew has, 
 nevertheless, one great advantage. The achievements of 
 Napoleon I. were such a mixture, his services to despotism 
 and freedom so combined, that, when he fell, the changes 
 which he had made on the map of Europe perished with 
 him. Exceptions we need not discuss. If expiation was 
 made at Leipzig for the subjugation of the Tyrol, Napo- 
 leon's best work, on the other hand also perished the 
 Kingdom of Italy and that part of the Kingdom of Poland 
 which he emancipated after Friedland. 
 
 It is the glory of Napoleon III., if he achieved any, that, 
 taking as the key of his European policy a principle of lib- 
 erty, that of nationality, he wrought with such success that 
 
 * See " Invasion of the Crimea," vol. vii. pp. 313 to 347, inclusive. 
 
 tOf course, Lieutenant Greene, in using the word "authentic," excludes sieges which, 
 like that of Troy, are not authentic. Our author might have referred to the siege of Sebas- 
 topol as the most famous perhaps of all sieges, save the siege of Troy. 
 
 Z With regard to Mazzini the following work should be consulted : "Joseph Maz/.ini : 
 His Life and Writings, with an Introduction by William Lloyd Garrison," p. 87. Hurd 
 & Houghton, 1872.
 
 49 
 
 his noblest work, Italy and Roumania, survived him. No 
 eclipse fell upon either, such as that which ruined the Grand 
 Duchy of Warsaw and the Kingdom of Italy of Napoleon I. 
 In lesser instances the work of Napoleon III. lasted. This 
 we may say of the expulsion of Prussia from Switzerland in 
 1857, and from Luxemburg ten years later. Nor is reference 
 needed to Savoy and Nice. The lasting character of his 
 work, a work in behalf of nationality and freedom, is the 
 glory of the man of Solferino and Sedan. It is not equally 
 the glory of the man of Austerlitz and Waterloo. 
 
 If a revision of the popular estimate of Louis Napoleon is 
 demanded, the facts to determine it do not relate to na- 
 tionality only. Hugh McCulloch, twice our Secretary of 
 the Treasury, published in the New York Tribune in 1875 
 a series of letters on finance. There were eleven, and they 
 were written in London. They had special reference to our 
 own finances, but the first two were entitled " The Finances 
 of France." In the fourth, published in the Tribune May 8, 
 1875, the ex-Secretary refers to the period of the empire as 
 one of "unexampled prosperity." Let us call to mind that 
 the growth of private enterprise, which was the basis of this 
 prosperity, achieved its greatest result in the Suez Canal, a 
 work dedicated by its charter and, in 1888, by European 
 treaty to neutrality and peace.* We may perhaps concede 
 that in several respects Napoleon III. did not deserve ill of 
 posterity: he deserved well. 
 
 Perhaps we might pardon, at least part way, the coup d'etat 
 if we measure its achievements. 
 
 It may be worth while to glance at the view of the coup 
 d'etat and the Revolution of 1848 presented by Renan. 
 Both acts were acts of violence, in contempt of law. Renan 
 despised them. But he makes a distinction. The Repub- 
 lican party of 1848, he says, was a turbulent, imperceptible 
 minority. This minority set aside the will of the majority. 
 
 * The Suez Canal was the last achievement of the empire. It was inaugurated by 
 the empress, Nov. 16, 1869, less than a year before Sedan.
 
 So 
 
 The French, partly by the election of Napoleon, Dec. 
 10, 1848, and partly by the sanction which they gave to 
 the coup d'etat, overthrew the minority. They established 
 the will of the people again. According to this view the 
 usurpers were the men of 1848, Victor Hugo and the 
 rest. According to Renan the coup d'etat possessed one ele' 
 ment of freedom not found in the Revolution of 1848, 
 the right of the majority to govern.* The French had as 
 much right perhaps to sanction the coup d'etat as, twenty 
 years later, they had to sanction Sedan. 
 
 The distinguished French Republican, Jules Simon, 
 lately deceased, who after Sedan was a member of the 
 Government of National Defence, seems to entertain like 
 views. In a statement communicated to the Ganlois 
 shortly before his death (reprinted in the weekly edition of 
 the Courrier des Etats-Unis, April 25, 1896) he observes that 
 the majority of those who voted for Louis Napoleon in 
 December, 1848, expected a coup d'etat. If so, they voted 
 for him because they expected a coup d'etat and wished it. 
 Ought we to accuse Napoleon of perjury if he interpreted 
 the vote which gave him so vast a majority five millions 
 against one and a half in precisely the way in which 
 those who elected him interpreted it ; namely, as signifying 
 that for the present he should be President of the repub- 
 lic, but that by and by he should upset the republic and 
 establish the empire ? Respecting his statement that most 
 of those who elected Napoleon President expected a coup 
 d'etat, Simon observes, "Je 1'ai deja dit a la decharge du 
 prince- president. " 
 
 In the opinion of good judges no short History of 
 France has greater merit than one in two volumes by a 
 distinguished minister of Napoleon III., Victor Duruy. He 
 occupied the post of minister of public instruction during 
 most of the latter years of the empire. Ex-President An- 
 drew D. White, of Cornell, whose acquaintance with French 
 
 * Kenan's " Monarchic Constitutionnelle en France" may be consulted (pp. 62 to 67).
 
 history is well known, says, "Of all the short summaries of 
 French history, this is probably the best." In his " Manual 
 of Historical Literature," ex-President C. K. Adams says 
 that it is "beyond question the best History of France ever 
 published in the short space of two volumes." Professor 
 J. F. Jameson, of Brown University, writes that no better 
 choice could be made than " the famous work of M. 
 Uuruy." Owing to the interest which Professor Jameson 
 took in it, he added to an English translation a continuation 
 which brings the \vork down from 1870 to 1889. He also 
 prefixed an introductory notice, which consists of a short 
 sketch of the author. To the administration of Duruy he 
 refers as "this great administration." Again, referring to 
 Duruy, he speaks of " his brilliant and extraordinarily fruit- 
 ful official career." Most persons are not aware that so 
 much was done under the Second Empire for popular edu- 
 cation. Brief references to the educational work of Duruy 
 are found in Professor Jameson's sketch. In this sketch 
 the author says, " Duruy has himself told us that he never 
 received from the emperor any other instructions than these 
 words, in a letter written soon after his appointment: 
 1 Maintain, as I do, an enthusiasm for all that is great and 
 noble.' " The fact that Duruy acquiesced in what some 
 might term so arrogant a claim, acquiesced at least in part, 
 none will deny. Duruy was more intimate with the em- 
 peror than were most of his ministers. He assisted him in 
 the preparation of his Life of Caesar. Duruy was the better 
 able thus to assist because of his familiarity with Roman 
 history. His History of the Romans, which in its final 
 shape occupies seven volumes, is probably the most com- 
 plete and scholarly ever written.* 
 
 *To honor the man who in so able a manner had told the story of Rome, King Hum- 
 bert of Italy presented to Duruy in 1885, on the completion of his history, a gold medal. 
 It bore the following inscription: " Vittorio Duruy qui ausus est unus Gallonim omne 
 Romanorum jpvum explicare.'' 
 
 To preceding testimonies with respect to Duruy the writer adds the following, taken 
 by permission from a letter written, July 22, 1885, by Andrew D. White, LL.D. : 
 " There is one thing to be said which you do not mention. I have always thought that
 
 52 
 
 If the claim of Napoleon as to his motives was ac- 
 quiesced in by Duruy, as much may perhaps be said of 
 Professor Jameson, the eulogist of Duruy. All human 
 creatures have faults. In the case of Napoleon III. this 
 was manifest enough. That, however, the chief aims of 
 Napoleon's life were worthy aims, such as belong to true 
 statesmanship, posterity, freed from certain prejudices of 
 to-day, will perhaps admit. If what may be termed the 
 old-fashioned view of Napoleon III., that of Kinglake and 
 Victor Hugo, gives way to views more moderate, one evi- 
 dence of the fact that Napoleon's aims were high is found 
 in his astonishing services to a principle of freedom, the 
 Principle of Nationality. It is a singular fact that, if we 
 look at the services of France to this principle and those of 
 Napoleon III., no French writer has eulogized them more 
 heartily than two foreigners, our historian Mr. Bancroft 
 and a prince of the House of Hohenzollern, the King of 
 Roumania. 
 
 After the war of 1859 Mrs. Browning expressed a wish as 
 to Napoleon : 
 
 " The praise of nations ready to perish 
 Fall on him." 
 
 So much obscurity has rested upon the liberation of 
 Roumania that we may doubt whether Mrs. Browning knew 
 what she said. Did she know that her words applied both 
 to Italy and to a second State, one on the Euxine ? Who 
 the liberator of Roumania was, Roumania never forgot. 
 
 At a banquet given in Boston, May 24, 1892, to Thomas 
 Jefferson Coolidge, just appointed our minister to France, 
 President Eliot of Harvard said, " I have always felt that 
 we of the United States ought to have the opportunity to 
 
 the retention of Duruy as minister of public instruction was very creditable to the em- 
 peror. Duruy once told me that he was minister of public instruction for six years 
 [1863-69], and that during the six years which had elapsed between his retiring from 
 office and the date of our conversation there had been seven different ministers of public 
 Instruction in France. That would seem to be somewhat creditable to the empire, as is 
 the fact that a man of such fine character, powers, and ideal, was put into such a place."
 
 53 
 
 pay France the enormous debt we owe her, a debt in- 
 curred in war and unpaid ; a greater debt incurred in peace, 
 also unpaid, her philosophy and literature of the eigh- 
 teenth century. Jefferson was full of that French philos- 
 ophy, and I doubt not our friend here inherits his due share 
 of that humane philosophy. And I hope he means to pay 
 this debt we owe to the country in which he is to represent 
 the United States." 
 
 One might ask whether it is not possible to pay, not this 
 debt, but part, if the facts stated in these pages are clearly 
 and honestly set forth. May we not contribute toward 
 paying our debt, if, as regards one of the great epochs of 
 French history, we substitute truth for its suppression and 
 facts for calumny ? From an historian of the Second Em- 
 pire, M. de La Gorce, the statement has been quoted that 
 the empire underwent the falsehood of adulation, and then 
 the falsehood of calumny. Is it not time that the falsehood 
 of calumny should cease ? At least, ought not Americans 
 to desist, and leave to others a task which to others may 
 prove more congenial ? An expression due in a special 
 sense to one of the clergymen of New England is, " Lend a 
 hand." The careers of few kings, presidents, or emperors 
 better exemplify it than that of Louis Napoleon. If we 
 consider what he did in behalf of freedom and nationality 
 in Italy and Roumania, not to mention Switzerland, Luxem- 
 burg, and Servia ; if we neglect wholly the similar, if not 
 conspicuous, action of France as regards Poland and Hun- 
 gary, may we not acknowledge that few statesmen have 
 better deserved a title such as we may apply to Napoleon 
 III. ? A great soldier he was not : a great lend-a-hand 
 emperor he was. 
 
 Let us compare Mrs. Browning's eulogium of Napoleon, 
 
 " The praise of nations ready to perish 
 Fall on him,"* 
 
 * To Mrs. Browning's testimony as to Napoleon III. and the Nationality Principle 
 we add another, also British. In a work published in 1896, entitled "The Balkans,"
 
 54 
 
 and Robert Browning's eulogium of France. This latter 
 occurs in Mr. Browning's poem entitled " Prince Hohen- 
 stiel Schwangau." Prince Hohenstiel stands for Louis Na- 
 poleon ; and, according to the author's dramatic method, the 
 eulogium is put into Napoleon's mouth. It is a noteworthy 
 fact that in the poem Napoleon is represented as giving a 
 justification, in part at least, of his life and purposes to a 
 woman whom we need not describe. Thus Mr. Browning, 
 whatever sympathies he entertained, as well as his wife, for 
 Napoleon, lashes in this cynical manner one of his faults. 
 Browning's eulogium of France is as follows : 
 
 " The people here, 
 
 Earth presses to her heart, nor owns a pride 
 Above her pride i' the race all flame and air 
 And aspiration to the boundless Great, 
 The incommeasurably Beautiful, 
 Whose very faulterings groundward come of flight 
 Urged by a pinion all too passionate 
 For heaven and what it holds of gloom and glow : 
 Bravest of thinkers, bravest of the brave 
 Doers, exalt in Science, rapturous 
 In Art, the more than all magnetic race 
 To fascinate their fellows, mould mankind."* 
 
 Mr. William Miller, referring to the State of Roumania (i.e., Moldo-Wallachia) in 1848, 
 said, " The revolutionary leaders of 1848 had been inspired by the idea of national unity; 
 and their cause had gained the ardent support of Napoleon III., with whom the doctrine 
 of nationalities was a passion." 
 
 * The entire poem, save the last few pages, consists of a dream from which the em- 
 peror awakes. He makes some sententious remarks to the effect that people often de- 
 ceive themselves, and adds a word respecting the Hohenzollem candidature to the Span- 
 ish throne, which had just appeared, and in the course of a few weeks was to destroy 
 perhaps his dynasty, certainly himself.
 
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