IRLF tmm of No ...... .... Division _______ . Range Slielf.... ......... * UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, GIFT OF DANIEL C. OILMAN. REV. JEREMIAH DAY, S .T.D.LL.D. JRESIDKNT OF YALE COLIJIOE. ( 6t-/t AN I N d U I R Y RESPECTING THE SELF-DETERMINING POWER OF THE WILL; OR CONTINGENT VOLITION. SECOND EDITION, WITH ADDITIONS AND ALTERATIONS BY JEREMIAH DAY, LATE PRESIDENT OF YALE COLLEGE. " I think that the notion of liberty, consisting in a contingent self-determination of the will, as necessary to the morality of men's dispositions and actions, is almost inconceivably pernicious ; and that the contrary truth is one of the most important truths of moral philosophy that ever was discussed, and most necessary to be known." President Edwards. NEW HAVEN: DAY & FITCH. 1849. - Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1849, by JEREMIAH DAY, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Connecticut. PRINTED BY B. L. HAMLEN, Printer to Yale College. CONTENTS. INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. Page. Review of Cousin, 13 President Edwards on self-determination, ...... 14 Moral government of God, 14 Testimony of Scripture, 15 Ambiguous phraseology, 17 Figurative language, 19 Acrimonious controversy, ......... 20 SECTION I. POWERS OF THE MIND. Cause and effect, 22 Dependence, 23 Efficacy of a cause, 24 Complex cause, 25 Efficient causes, 26 Physical and Moral causes, 26 IV CONTENTS. Page. Negative causes, 27 Every change has a cause, 27 Contingence, 28 Popular meaning of contingence, 29 Absolute contingence, 29 Power, 31 Most extensive meaning of the word, 32 Mental powers, 33 Classification of mental powers, . . . . . . .34 The will, volition, 35 The will, according to Edwards, includes emotions, .... 36 SECTION II. SELF-DETERMINATION. What is the point of our inquiry ? .39 The cause of volition is the cause of its direction, .... 39 It is the mind itself that wills, 40 What determines a man to will as he does ? 41 One act of the will determining another, ...*.. 42 Is any thing exterior to the mind concerned in volition ? 43 Are volitions determined by the substance and nature of the mind ? . 43 Is the power of willing the cause of volition ? 44 Contingent determination of volition, 46 To what part of the series of mental acts, does contingence belong ? . 47 Forming of purposes, . . 47 Desires and appetites, 48 Spontaneous volition, 49 Personality, 49 Originating volitions, 50 Is the mind the efficient cause of its volitions ? 51 Causing choice by the act of choosing, . .... 52 CONTENTS. V Page. Meaning of cause, 53 Cause antecedent to volition, ......... 54 Are volitions the only causes ? 54 Is the mind the sole cause of its volitions ? 55 Definitions are not arguments, 56 Limited definition of cause, 56 Wo change without a prior cause, 57 We are conscious of willing from motives, 58 Bledsoe's Examination of Edwards, 59 Concessions of Edwards' opponents, ... .^ ... 59 Self-determining power, . . . . . . . . . 60 Is volition an effect? 61 Has it any cause ? 62 Has it an efficient cause ? 63 Volition comes to pass, 64 Has it, in any sense, a cause ? 64 Do motives induce the mind to will ? 65 Bledsoe's originality, 67 The main point at issue, 68 SECTION III. INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES. Nature of motives, 70 Internal and external motives, 71 Are motives mere objects of choice ? 71 The strongest motive, 72 Are motives the cause of volition ? 73 Conditions and occasions of volition, 74 Conditions which give no direction to choice, 75 Quotation from Mill's Logic 76 Are motives the efficient cause of volition ? 77 VI CONTENTS. Page. The same external motives excite different volitions in different minds, 77 la the efficacy of motives from the mind ? 78 Willing against motives, 79 Are volitions determined by the understanding ? 79 Do they always conform to the strongest motive ? 80 SECTION IV. LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. Common notion of liberty, ' . 82 Internal freedom, ; 83 Willing as we please, .......... 83 Liberty of contingence, 84 Moral freedom, 84 Contrary meanings of liberty, 85 Power of contrary choice, 86 Cousin's view of this, 86 His analysis of the will, . 89 The faculty of willing, 89 The influence which gives direction to choice, 90 In what sense, have we the power of contrary choice, . . . 91 Decision of consciousness, 93 In what sense, do we know that we have power to the contrary, . 94 Is there no impossibility of a contrary choice ? ..... 94 Dr. Edwards on natural power to the contrary, 95 Do. do. on natural and moral inability, 96 Power to contrary emotions, 98 Difference between external and internal liberty, 99 Liberty considered a privilege, . . IQO Necessity is the opposite of liberty, 100 Philosophical necessity, 101 Various meanings of both liberty and necessity, 102 . CONTENTS. Vll Page. Natural and moral necessity, .... ... 102 Is certainty necessity ? 103 Edwards on moral necessity, 104 SECTION V. ABILITY AND INABILITY. Inability in relation to external conduct, . 106 Natural and moral inability, 107 Opposition to the will belongs to natural inability, 107 Inability in relation to acts of the will, 108 President Edwards' definition of moral inability, 109 Moral inability of willing right, 109 Different meanings of ability, inability, &c., 110 Is obligation commensurate with ability ? Ill Controversies respecting inability, Ill Practical application of the doctrine of inability, . . . . 113 Natural and moral inability, . . . . . .. . . .115 SECTION VI. CONSCIOUSNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY. Consciousness of power, . . . . . . . . . .117 Are we conscious of self-determination ? 118 Liberty to either side, . . 120 Accountability, 121 Power to will the contrary, 122 Does liberty to either side lie in the affections ? 123 Vlll CONTENTS. Page. Is contingence essential to accountability ? 123 Originating volitions, 124 Can a man avoid willing as he does ? 124 SECTION VII. COMMON SENSE. Customary use of the phrase, . . . . . . . . . 126 Philosophical use, 126 Application to philosophical speculations, . 127 Remarks of President Edwards, 127 Decisions of common sense respecting volition, 128 do. do. respecting motives, .... 129, 130 do. do. respecting accountable agency, . . .130 SECTION VIII. MECHANICAL AND PHYSICAL AGENCY. Is the will a mere machine ? 132 Does it resemble a machine ? 132 Several meanings of the term physical, . 132 Is the will subject to physical laws ? . 134 Is it subject to the laws of cause and effect ? . 135 Motives are not the sole cause of volition, . . . . . . 136 Is certain connection physical causation ? 136 What is meant by moral certainty ? 137 Certainty of knowledge, 137 President Edwards' opinion, 138 Dr. Edwards on moral necessity, 138 Physical necessity, 139 CONTENTS. IX SECTION IX. MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. Page. Has the divine government any influence on the will ? . 140 Can his providence influence volition ? 142 Influence of commands, threatenings, &c., 142 God's foreknowledge of human volition, . . . ' . . 143 Has the Spirit of God any influence on the will, 144 Is God the author of sin ? 145 Prevention of ein, 147 Could He prevent all sin, without destroying moral agency ? . . 148 Is sin the means of the greatest good ? 148 Can the greatest good be obtained without means ? . ... 150 Are there any limits to the power of God ? 150 Is the highest supposable good attainable ? 151 Happiness of God, 152 Three different theories of the origin of evil, 153 Agreement of the three suppositions, 153 Their difference, 155 SECTION X. ACTIVITY AND DEPENDENCE. Ambiguity of the terms active and passive, 158 Can any thing be both active and passive ? 159* Mental activity, . .159 Can volition be passive ? 160 a- CONTENTS. Page. Can an agent be passive ? 160 Can that which is merely passive be active ? ..... 162 Can an}' thing act, if it be acted upon ? 162 Mr. Chubb on action and passion, 163 Gratuitous assumptions, and their consequences, ..... 164 SECTION XI. FATALISM AND PANTHEISM. Different forms of Fatalism, 165 Is there no medium between contingent volition and Fatalism ?. . 167 Pantheism, , 167 SECTION XII. TESTIMONY OP SCRIPTURE. Difficulties of philosophical views of volition, 170 Appeal to scripture testimony, x . . 171 How are the scriptures to be interpreted, ...... 171 Must they be made to conform to our previous opinions ? . . . 172 Does scripture ever contradict reason ? 173 Literal and figurative language, 175 Has God any control over the will ? 176 He causes his people to do His will, 176 He inclines their hearts to obey him, 177 He turns the hearts of men, . 177 His purposes extend to the heart, ........ 178 He changes the hearts of men, . . . . . . . ' . 179 They are kept by the power of God, ....*.. 180 CONTENTS. XI Page. They incline their own hearts, 180 They do it in consequence of God's agency, 181 The purposes of God in relation to sin, ...... 182 Men harden their own hearts, 184 Permission of sin, 184 Practical importance of the subject under discussion, .... 187 Efficacy of the means of holiness, . 187 The doctrine of human depravity, 188 Influence of the Spirit of God, . 188 Conversion of the world, 189 Perpetual holiness of heaven, 190 AN INQUIRY, INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS, Review of Cousin President Edwards on self-determination Moral government of God Testimony of Scripture Ambiguous phraseology Figurative language Acrimonious controversy. SOON after the publication of Henry's translation of Cousin's Psychology, I undertook to write a review of the work, for the Christian Spectator. Before coming to the chapter which treats of the Freedom of the Will, in the latter part of the book, the review had already been extended so far, that there was not room left to do jus- tice, at that time, to so difficult a subject. It was, there- fore, passed without notice. I have since been appre- hensive, that from this omission, an inference might perhaps be drawn, that I acquiesce in the opinions there presented by Cousin. Long continued ill health, and urgent official engagements, have prevented an earlier expression of my own views on the subject. In endeav- oring to give it a fair examination, I have not thought it necessary to confine my observations to a review of Cousin. The self-determining power of the will is a subject which is intimately connected with many of the theological discussions of the present day. Yet there are reasons for believing that it is not, in all points of view, generally and clearly understood. President Ed- 2 14 INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. wards, in his treatise on the Will, has given a masterly exposition of the principal forms in which it is com- monly presented. But for some reason or other, his view of contingent self-determination appears to have attract- ed less attention of late, than that particular mode of statement which he resolves into an infinite series of volitions. The doctrine of his opponents was this, that the free acts of the will are not determined to be as they are, by any influence from without the will itself. This was considered by him as involving the alternative, that every volition is determined either by a preceding voli- tion, or by nothing at all. The latter is contingent self- determination. To the other branch of the alternative, he has done such ample justice, that the question con- cerning it may be considered as definitively settled. This may be one reason why the advocates of a self-deter- mining power in the will, adhere so tenaciously to that form of the doctrine which implies contingence, as being the only ground left, on which they can hope to main- tain their position. The momentous interest which belongs to this sub- ject, lies in its relation to the moral government of God. If nothing from without the will of the agent can have any influence in determining what his volitions shall be, then it must be beyond the power of even the Father of our spirits to give direction to the acts of the will, without interfering with the prerogative of accountable agency. Omnipotence itself can not work contradic- tions. When that inexplicable power, the human will, has once been set a going, it must, according to the doctrine of some, be suffered to run on forever, throw- ing off its volitions by contingent efficiency, uncontrolled INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. and uncontrollable, by any thing from without itself. If the Creator has filled this and other worlds with liv- ing agents, whose acts of will are entirely independent of himself; he can only look on, and observe the opera- tion of their voluntary powers j accommodating the course of his external providence to what they may happen to determine. On this supposition, he can pun- ish iniquity, but can do nothing to prevent it, without impairing the independence of moral agency. He can render a reward to virtue, but can take no effectual measures to promote it, except by such a determining influence, as is supposed to be inconsistent with the very nature of virtue. He can rule the worlds of mat- ter, which roll in harmony and brightness through the heavens, but can not control the heart of man. The rewards and punishments which he distributes to the subjects of his moral kingdom, can have no efficacy in favor of obedience. Human means also for the pre- vention of vice, and the promotion of holiness in oth- ers, must be entirely unavailing, if they can have no influence in determining the acts of the will. To what purpose are the restraints of education, the injunctions of parental authority, the admonitions of friendship, the sanctions of law, and the solemn ministrations of the house of God ; if the purposes of the heart are wholly independent of them all ; if contingence is the supreme law of voluntary agency. On a subject so momentous, and so difficult to be thoroughly comprehended in all its relations, it might be expected, that we should almost instinctively turn to the records of inspired truth for instruction. He who gave to the human soul its being, and all its powers of 16 INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS thought and volition, must surely know, whether any efficacious influence from without, is inconsistent with accountable agency. But here we are met with an assumption which pre- cludes a reference to the decision of scripture. It is claimed, that reason, and consciousness, and common sense, have already decided the point f and that God can not contradict, in his word, what he has distinctly made known to us, by the faculties which he himself has implanted in the soul. Whatever passages, there- fore, which seem to favor a particular doctrine, may be found in the scriptures ; they are to be so interpreted, as not to signify any thing which reason pronounces to be absurd. We are called upon, then, to inquire, wheth- er the position, that nothing but the will itself has any influence in determining what its acts shall be, is so in- tuitively and demonstrable certain, as to preclude all possibility of finding the contrary declared in the word of God. So long as this position is adhered to, it is in vain to think of appealing to the authority of the scrip- tures, on the question respecting a self-determining power of the will. They will, of course, be so explained, as to express a meaning in conformity with the principles assumed. This is my apology for making an applica- tion of dry metaphysics to a subject so nearly connected with one of the most important departments of scriptu- ral theology. Those who are prepared to receive im- plicitly the divine testimony, just as they find it on the sacred page, may pass over this part of the subject, as being unnecessary for them : and proceed to the section in which the evidence from scripture is presented. I do not propose to establish certain theological points, by INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. 17 metaphysical reasoning, and then call in the aid of rev- elation, merely to confirm the results of philosophical discussion. I would only aim at removing some of the objections which may lie in the way of a ready admis- sion of the testimony of scripture, on the subject under consideration. In attempting to express my views, on a point of some difficulty, it has been a question with me, what chance I have of making myself well understood. I have no expectation of being able to write in such a manner, as to avoid all danger of being misapprehended ; especially if quotations should be made of single sentences or short paragraphs, cut out from the passages which explain and qualify their meaning. A composition must be in- sufferably tedious, which is so elaborately wrought, that each sentence can be as clearly and fully understood, when taken by itself, as when read in connection with what precedes and what follows. An intricate subject can not be thoroughly discussed, in a way to be compre- hended at once, by hasty and superficial readers. The main source of the misapprehensions which are so common, in metaphysical investigations, is the great ambiguity of the language of mental philosophy. It forms a striking contrast to the uniform distinctness of the terms in mathematical science. The value of a dis- cussion upon any point connected with the freedom of the will, must depend, in a great measure, upon the skill with which the writer disengages the subject from the ambiguities of language which meet him at every turn. This is not to be done, by avoiding the use of such terms as have various meanings. For he will find no others belonging to this department of knowledge. 2* 18 INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. The art of rightly using ambiguous terms, consists in so introducing and placing them, that, with suitable definitions and explanations, when necessary, the con- nection will show which of their several meanings is to be given them at the time. The writer need not go upon the supposition, as is too often the case, that a word which he uses has only one proper signification. He may even be allowed to use it in different senses him- self, if he will enable the reader to distinguish the vari- ous meanings given to it in different places. And while he makes his own selection among the authorized sig- nifications of a term ; he ought readily to concede to others the privilege of making a different choice, upon the condition of rendering the meaning distinct to the reader. A large portion of the agitating controversies which bring such reproach upon the Christian church, at the present day, would be put at rest, if each contend- ing party would no longer insist that others should not only agree with them in opinion, but should express their belief in the same words. Doctrinal differences among Christians are often greatly magnified, by the diversity in the phraseology to which the opposing par- ties are severally accustomed. They frequently agree in their opinions, while they differ in the language which they use to express them. Jealousy, and alienation, and division may be removed, by explaining the ambi- guity of theological terms. On the other hand, there may be important differences of opinion, among those who agree in the use of the same form of words. A man who is deviating from scriptural truth, may avail himself of long established and approved phraseology, for the purpose of concealing erroneous views, which, INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. if prematurely disclosed, might excite suspicion and alarm. There is a wide difference between using am- biguous language from necessity, and using it of choice. In the one case, the writer endeavors to guard, as much as possible, against misapprehension. In the other, to render the meaning dubious, is the very purpose for which the ambiguous terms are chosen. Even those who are sound in their doctrinal views, may uninten- tionally propagate error, by an unguarded use of ex- pressions, which may convey to many minds, a mean- ing very different from what was intended. I am far from supposing, that all the differences of opinion among professing Christians are merely verbal. There is surely an immeasurable distance between a system of doctrines which considers the volitions of creatures as all fortui- tous, and one which views them as under the direction of the divine will. One very fruitful source of the misapprehensions which are so frequent in metaphysical investigations, is the use of figurative language. To avoid this wholly, is almost impossible. It is true, that metaphorical ex- pressions may be without ambiguity. But the figures in mental philosophy, are almost exclusively drawn from material objects ; and the properties and laws of the mind, differ so widely from those of matter, that the analogies which are drawn between them, are often cal- culated to mislead. Even the most cautious metaphy- sician will find it difficult to avoid altogether this source of error ; for the most familiar and well established terms in mental science, have been borrowed from lan- guage originally appropriated to material phenomena. 20 INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. But the liabilities to uncertainty of meaning are greatly multiplied, by the ardor of theological contro- versy. The language of excited feeling is almost always figurative. And in the glow of party contention, a man does not always stop to consider, whether the figures which he uses have all the precision that is requisite to secure them from misinterpretation. He regards more the keen edge of his weapons, than the unerring aim with which they might be directed. L may be with a sacrifice of some of the ornaments of style. The subject of our inquiry has important relations to almost every part of doctrinal and practical theology. But in attempting to examine a single point, I have not thought it necessary to write a whole system of divinity. Though it will be requisite to refer, occasionally, to sev- eral kindred subjects, for the purpose of illustration, and to obviate objections ; yet it is desirable to avoid render- ing the investigation needlessly complicated, by the in- troduction of superfluous matter. SECTION I. POWERS OF THE MIND. Cause and effect Dependence Efficacy of a cause Complex cause Efficient causes Physical and Moral causes Negative causes Every change has a cause Contingence Dependent contingence -Absolute contingence Power Mental powers Classification of Mental powers The will Volition Emotions. THE point proposed for our examination is the self- determining power of the will. But here we are met, at the threshold, by a very ambiguous term. What is power ? Before we proceed, it will be necessary to stop and inquire what it means. In all the significations of the term, it probably has relation to a cause. The meaning of one of the words is explained, by referring to the other. What, then, is a cause ? A CAUSE, in the more extended signification of the term, is an ANTECEDENT on which something DEPENDS. An EFFECT is a CONSEQUENT of something upon which it DEPENDS. Between a cause and its effect, there is always the relation of antecedent and consequent. But antece- dence is not the only element, in the notion of a cause. There must also be dependence. The darkness of the night precedes the light of the day. But the darkness is not the cause of the light. The one does not de- pend on the other. Every change in the universe, at any one moment of time, is the immediate antecedent of every change which takes place in the succeeding POWERS OF THE MIND. 23 moment. But every one of the former changes, is not the cause of every one of the latter. One thing depends on another, when the one exists on account of the other, and when, without the other or something equivalent, it would not exist. This im- plies, that there is that, in the nature and relations of the antecedent, which secures the existence of the con- sequent. It is what is called efficacy, in reference to the cause ; and dependence, in reference to the effect. An event, or change, or action, depends on a particular ante- cedent or antecedents, when it takes place on account of such antecedents, but would not take place without them. One thing depends on another for the mode of its existence, when any difference in the antecedent makes a difference in the consequent. Thus the waves of the sea vary, according to the changes in the force of the wind. The ground of dependence may be very different, in different cases. In many instances, the relation is not that of antecedent and consequent, of cause and effect ; thus, the quantity of surface on a globe, depends on the length of the diameter. Any change in the diameter would make a difference in the surface. The ground of dependence, here, is the geo- metrical relation of the parts of the globe. The veloci- ty of a given body, moving without resistance, depends on the force with which it has been impelled. Any change in the impelling force would make a change in the velocity. This is dependence of an effect upon its cause. A mathematical theorem depends on the defini- tions and axioms by which it is demonstrated. This is a logical dependence of a conclusion upon premises, not of an effect upon its causes. In all these cases, the de- 24 POWERS OF THE MIND. pendence is certain, though the grounds of it may be very different. One thing depends upon several others taken together, when it is the consequence of these, but without the united influence of them all, it would not be what it is. One thing depends in part on another, when this is one of two or more antecedents, upon which, taken collectively, the consequent depends. The tides of the ocean depend partly on the position of the moon, and partly on the place of the sun in the heavens. That on which something in part depends, may be what is called causa sine qua non, a condition without which it can not be ; and with which it may, or may not be. A man's existence is a condition, with- out which he can not be a scholar, and with which he may be either learned or ignorant. One event is mde- pendent of another, when the one neither promotes or hinders the taking place of the other. A cause is that which not only is followed by its effect, but which renders the effect certain. It is not only an antecedent, but an efficacious antecedent. Pres- ident Edwards says, " I sometimes use the word cause, in this Inquiry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner or circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the ground and reason, either in whole or in part, why it is rather than not ; or why it is as it is, rather than otherwise."* " Dependence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect, "f Even Dr. Thomas Brown, who has written largely on this subject, though he asserts, that the only essen- * Edwards on the Will, Part II, Sec. 3. f Ibid. Part II, Sec. 8. POWERS OF THE MIND. 25 tial circumstance of causation is invariableness of ante- cedence and consequence; yet uses language which implies, that in this expression, he includes what is commonly meant by dependence, efficacy, influence, &c. He employs the very terms efficacy and efficiency, as synonymous with power. He says, that "to be that which can not exist, without being instantly followed by a certain event, is to be the cause of the event, as a correlative term." He evidently does not intend to exclude dependence, efficacy, &c., from our notion of causation ; but seems to suppose, that they are, of course, implied in " a sequence so invariable, that it forever has been, forever will be, and forever must be." The two elements of dependence and invariable antecedence, he appears to blend into one. If they are distinct, as, by most minds, they will probably be thought to be ; both are certainly to be included in our notion of causation.* An effect may, in many cases, be produced, not by any single antecedent ; but by the combined influence of sev- eral. All the circumstances upon which the effect de- pends may be considered as a complex cause. If any one of the antecedents be wanting, the effect may fail. If either the soil upon which grain is sown, or the rain, or the sunshine be deficient, an abundant harvest will not be gathered. The influence of the several parts of a complex cause may be very various. In the formation of the rainbow, the sun has an agency widely different from that of the cloud. If external motives are, in any proper sense, the cause of a man's volitions ; they are so, * Brown's Cause and Effect; third Edinburgh edition, pp. 39, 108, 113, 114, 120, 124, 135, 136, 389, 466, 468, 482. 3 26 POWERS OF THE MIND. in a very different way from that in which the agent himself is the cause of them. Motives do not resolve and choose ; though they may have an important influ- ence, in determining a man how to choose. The mo- tives and the agent are both causes, in this sense, that they are antecedents on which the volitions depend. In the case of a complex cause, some one of the prin- cipal antecedents may be spoken of as the cause ; though the effect is not supposed to follow from that alone, without the concurrence of others. Some writers speak of efficient causes, as being a dis- tinct class. But all real causes are so far efficient, or efficacious, that they are antecedents on which, in part at least, effects depend. That on which nothing de- pends is no cause. Dugald Stewart makes a distinction between efficient and physical causes ; meaning by the former real causes, and by the latter, those phenomena in the material world which appear to be causes ; though it is possible, that they are not truly so. Others appear to intend by an efficient cause, an immediate an- tecedent, in distinction from one which is remote, and which produces effects by the intervention of other causes. Some consider an efficient cause to be that which gives existence to a substance, either matter or mind ; or which produces some change in the nature of a substance. Others apply the term to an agent, to one who gives existence to volitions. Some distinguish between physical and moral causes. But they do not always give us to understand whether, by a moral cause, they mean a cause of moral effects, or a cause which is itself moral; that is, which is either holiness or sin. The cause of all sin can not be a moral cause, in the POWERS OF THE MIND. sense of being itself sin. By some, the term physical appears to be applied to those causes, between which and their effects, the connection is admitted to be cer- tain ; while they consider the connection between moral causes and their effects as being only probable. These and other distinctions upon this subject, it is not neces- sary to dwell upon at present. President Edwards speaks of a negative cause. But absolute nothing can only be the cause of a negative effect, that is of nothing. It is very true, that the dis- continuance of a positive agency may result in a dis- continuance of its appropriate effects. It may leave the subject to the influence of other causes. In the exam- ple which Edwards gives, the presence of the sun is the cause of the fluidity of the waters. The withdraw- ing of his beams, in the winter, is followed by the freezing of the waters : because they are then left to the uncontrolled agency of the positive causes of con- gelation. The axiom, that every change implies an adequate cause, is a primary element of human thought. It has all the characteristics of a fundamental truth. It is in- tuitive, requiring no course of reasoning to prove it. It is irresistible ; no power of argument can overthrow it. It is universal ; compelling the belief of all classes, in all ages of the world. A few skeptical philosophers have professed to call it in question. But they have plainly shown, by their writings and their conduct, that they were as truly under its influence as others. We sometimes hear it stated, very incorrectly, that every thing which exists requires a cause of its being. This is a proposition widely different from the axiom, 28 POWERS QF THE MINI*. which has now been mentioned. That which has ex- isted from* eternity does not sorely require an antecedent. But that which begins to exist, or which is subject to any change in the mode of its existence, requires a cause of that change ; some antecedent, on which it depends for being what it is. It is not sufficient to say, that there is no effect without a cause. This may be admitted by those who affirm, that there may be chan- ges which are not effects, and which therefore have nc cause. CONTINGENCY, However preposterous is the position, that any change can take place without a cause, yet for argument's sake, there is sometimes occasion to make the supposition : and to look for some convenient word or phrase to ex- press it. As the absolute negation of a cause, in any case, is not a doctrine of common sense ; the language of common life does not supply us with terms which, according to customary usage, have this signification. The term contingence, is sometimes employed for this purpose. But when this is done, it ought to be with the distinct understanding, that the denial of causation and dependence, is not the only meaning which the word is used to express. Some writers speak of all created existences as being contingent, in distinction from the necessary existence of the Creator. The for- mer are said to be contingent, because God might, at his pleasure, have made them different, or not made them at all. In this sense, contingence, is so far from being opposed to causation, that dependence on the will of the Creator, is the very relation which the word is employed to express. POWERS THE MIND. 29 But in popular use, it is most commonly applied to cases in which something takes place, the immediate cause of which is unknown or unobserved. Yet even in this application of the term contingence, there is no intention of denying the dependence of events upon some cause. Thus the Assembly of Divines at West- minster, in their Confession of Faith, speak of the " contingency of second causes ;" and to illustrate their meaning, adduce the proof text, u The lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord" The common meaning of chance, contingence, &c., may be considered a negative idea, implying the absence of a known cause ; but neither affirming or denying an unknown cause. But philosophers frequently use the term contingence to signify, that some change takes place, which is abso- lutely without any cause ; which has no dependence on any thing preceding. There is occasion to use it in this sense, when examining the various theories respecting acts of the will. In the present inquiry, it will com- monly be used to signify the exclusion of causation or dependence, in the case of volition ; the denial that there is any thing preceding which determines the act of the will to be what it is. According to this signifi- cation, the opposite of contingence is dependence. So far as any thing is contingent, in this absolute sense ; so far it is dependent on nothing ; and so far as it is depen- dent, it is not contingent. The very definition of this kind of contingence, renders it wholly incompatible with dependence. There can be no medium between the two conditions, unless it be, that a thing may be partly dependent, and partly contingent. If human 30 POWERS OF THE MIND. volitions are dependent on nothing preceding, for being what they are, then they come to pass by perfect ac- cident. It is very important, that the difference between the popular and the philosophical meaning of contingence, should be kept clearly in view, in the discussions con- cerning the attributes and prerogatives of the will. President Edwards was careful to mark this distinction. " As the words necessary, impossible, unable, &c. are used by polemic writers in a sense diverse from their common signification, the like has happened to the term contingent. Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connection with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned ; and so is what we have no means of foresight of. And especially is any thing said to be contingent or accidental with regard to us, when any thing comes to pass that we are concern- ed in, as occasions or subjects, without our foreknowl- edge, and beside our design and scope. But the word contingent is abundantly used in a very different sense ; not for that whose connection with the series of things we can not discern, so as to foresee the event ; but for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has any fixed and cer- tain connexion."* A similar distinction is applicable to the corresponding terms accident, chance, fortui- tous, &c. * Freedom of the Will, Part I, Sec. 3. POWERS OF THE MIND. 31 POWER. A cause always implies an effect. By observing the relation between these, we have the idea of power. The efficacy of the cause, its being of such a nature as to. produce effects, is its power. In other words, power is that, belonging to a cause, upon which the effects de- pend. Though the term is primarily used to express the relation between the cause and its effects, yet it is frequently applied in such a way, as to appear to stand for the cause itself, or some part of the cause. The power of a substance to produce certain effects, may depend upon a portion only of the substance, or upon some one of its qualities. The magnetic power of the loadstone is owing to the particles of iron which it con- tains. This, may be spoken of, as constituting the at- tractive power of the stone. Frequently also, power is considered as something intervening between the cause and the effect ; a connecting link which is supposed to give efficacy to the cause. The harpsichord produces impressions on the ear, by means of vibrations in the air. The power of the instrument to affect the ear, de- pends upon these vibrations. But in this case, there arc, properly speaking, two causes, one immediate, the other remote. The motion in the air is the effect of the motion in the instrument, and the cause of the impres- sion on the ear. Between an effect and its immediate cause, we know of nothing intervening. Power is sometimes ascribed to effects, as well as to causes. The liability of a thing to be influenced by a cause, is called passive power, or more properly, suscep- 32 POWERS OF THE MIND. tibility ; while the efficacy of the cause is called active power. Heat has the power of melting ice ; and, in the language of some, ice has the power of being melted. In the most extensive use of the term, the power to do any thing, includes the influence of all the antecedents, the whole aggregate of circumstances, upon which the effect depends. These, in many cases, may be very numerous. Yet the effect may fail, from the absence of any one of them. In this comprehensive, though rather unusual sense of the word, a man has not power to do any thing which he does not actually do. For if all the antecedents upon which the effect depends are united in the cause, the effect must certainly follow. If it fails, its failure must be owing to the fact, that some one, at least, of the elements in the complex cause is wanting. We rarely have occasion, however, to speak of power in this absolute sense. When a thing is done, there is no need of inquiring, whether there was power to do it. We more commonly ascribe power to a cause, when it possesses all the requisites for producing a particular effect, except something which may be easily added. We say that gunpowder has the power of exploding ; meaning that it has this power when touched by a spark of fire. The fire is the additional element, which must form a part of the complex cause, before the effect will be pro- duced. In speaking of human agency, we are accus- tomed to say, that a man has power to do any thing, which he does whenever he will. The willing mind is all that is wanting to complete the list of antecedents on which the effect depends. When this is added, the thing will be done. The common phraseology relating POWERS OF THE MIND. 33 to such cases is ; " The man can do the thing, if he ivill;" that is, he has all the requisite power, except a willing mind ; and when that is added, the effect will take place : he has already that which is most commonly called power : and when there is added the consenting will, he will have full power ; power in the broadest sense of the term, including every antecedent on which the effect depends. This was evidently the meaning of the leper, when he came to Christ with the cry ; " Lord, ifthou wilt, thou canst make me clean." MENTAL POWERS. The powers of the mind are known, by what the mind does. Our- own mental acts, our thoughts, our emotions, our purposes, are the objects of our conscious- ness. But every act implies an adequate cause. What- ever the mind does, it must have power to do. It is sometimes said, that we are conscious of our own men- tal powers. But according to the definitions of modern philosophers, the direct objects of consciousness are the operations of the mind ; not its substance, or its facul- ties. Still it must be true, that our own existence is implied, in every act of consciousness. A man is con- scious not only that he has thoughts ; but that they are his own thoughts, and not another man's. Every men- tal operation of which we are conscious, implies not only our own existence, but a mental power adequate to the effect. But at any one time, a man is not conscious of powers which are not then in exercise. He can not have an intuitive view of the substance of his mind, when it is wholly inactive ; or of any faculty of the 34 POWERS OF THE MIND. mind ; when it is not in operation : though he may know, from what'was implied in previous consciousness, that he possesses powers which are now called into exercise. The classification of our intellectual and moral pow- ers, is a subject of importance ; yet not easily settled, if we may judge from the clashing representations of dif- ferent philosophers. One principal difficulty arises from the fact, that each considers his own method as the only one which is admissible. Now the truth is, that there is no one scheme of classifying the powers of the mind which is essential, to the exclusion of all others. Clas- sification is a matter of convenient arrangement ; and may be varied, according to the purposes to which, in different cases, it is to be applied. The practical farmer has no occasion to classify his cattle, his grasses, and his grains, according to principles laid down in works on natural history. The architect does not find it neces- sary to arrange the materials of his masonry, according to mineraiogical and geological distinctions. No partic- ular mode of classification, is rendered necessary, by the laws of nature. It is true indeed, that in all attempts at classifying, the nature of things is to be regarded, so far as this, that all correct arrangement in classes, must be founded on resemblance. In the same class, are to be put those objects only, between which there is some real or supposed resemblance. Things are to be arranged in distinct classes, according to some difference between them. But as resemblances and differences may be end- lessly varied, there may be different classifications of the same objects ; and though one may be more convenient than another, all may be consistent with the nature of things. POWERS OF THE MIND. 35 In classifying the powers of the mind, we have no other guide, than the operations or mental states of which we are conscious. As we can not look directly into the faculties of the mind, when not in exercise, we can dis- cover the resemblances and differences upon which a correct classification is to be founded, only by observing what the mind does, and from this, inferring the corres- ponding powers. Strictly speaking, these powers are as numerous, as the varieties in our mental operations. In classifying them, we can regard only the more prominent resemblances and differences. THE WILL. There has been no settled agreement with respect to that most important faculty called the will. European writers generally confine the term to the power of order- ing some bodily or mental act. Volition, according to them, is determining to do something. A man wills to move his hand, or to think on a particular subject. In such cases, the act which is willed, immediately follows the volition. A man determines to speak, and he speaks; he wills to walk, and he walks. We frequently resolve to enter on a course of conduct, for the sake of obtaining some distant good. A man determines to devote him- self to the acquisition of property, to gaining applause, to sensual gratification, or to a life of benevolent effort. Such a resolution is called a commanding purpose of life, predominant inclination, governing state of the will, dominant preference, generic volition, &c., to distinguish it from those particular acts by which these general de- terminations are carried into execution. 36 POWERS OF THE MIND. In addition to both these classes of volitions, the New England divines, since the days of Edwards, at least, have very commonly considered emotions or affections as acts of the will. The elder Edwards says, " I humbly conceive, that the affections of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will ; as though they were two faculties in the soul."* "The affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the in- clination and will of the soul."f " The affections are only certain modes of the exercise of the will."f But although emotions, purposes, and executive volitions are, in some respects, similar ; yet, in other respects, they are different. Emotion is directed to an object ; a purpose fixes on an end ; an executive volition orders an act. Executive acts may depend on a predominant purpose ; and the purpose may depend on antecedent emotions. A general purpose may look to some distant end ; an executive volition relates to something which is imme- diately to follow. President Edwards himself has fre- quent occasion to make a subdivision of the acts of the will, into those which are immanent and those which are imperative. Whatever classification of the mental powers we may think proper to adopt, it is of the first importance to bear steadily in mind, that distinct faculties are not distinct agents. They are different powers of one and the same agent. It is the man that perceives, and loves, and hates, and acts ; not his understanding, or his heart, or his will, distinct from himself. * Revival of Religion in New England, Part I. f Treatise on Religious Affections, Part I. Treatise on the Will. POWERS OF THE MIND. 37 Some writers speak of the power of the will. If by this be meant the power of the mind to will, to put forth volitions ; this is nothing more nor less than the will itself. Bat acts of the will may have a command over the motions of the body, and over certain operations of the mind. When a man wills to move his hand, it com- monly obeys. When he wills to fix his attention on a particular subject, the current of thought may be turned into that channel. This appears to be what some intend by the expression the power of the will. 38 SECTION II. SELF-DETERMINATION. Point of inquiry Particular determination of the will It is the mind itself that wills One act of the will determining another Are volitions determined solely by the nature or state of the mind ? or by the power of willing Contingent determination Spon- taneous volition Personality of the will Originating volition Is the mind the efficient cause of its volitions? Causing choice by the act of choosing Meaning of cause Edwards on the Will Volitions alone said to be causes Meaning of cause A definition not an argument Limited definition of cause No change without a cause Evidence of consciousness Bledsoe's Examination of Edwards Concessions of Edwards's opponents Self-determin- ing power Is volition an effect ? Has volition any cause ? Has volition an efficient cause? Volition comes to pass In what sense has volition a cause ? Do motives induce the mind to will ? Originality of Bledsoe's view The main point at issue. THUS far, we have been mainly occupied, in explain- ing some of the ambiguities in mental philosophy, to prepare the way for the principal point of our inquiry, the self-determining power of the mind. The obstruc- tions arising from indefinite language are not, even now, so far removed, as to render further explanation unneces- sary. We shall still find occasion for it, in almost every step of our progress. Such is the unsettled condition of metaphysical phraseology, that we can scarcely make any advance in an argument, on the subject before us, without stopping continually, to explain the meaning of ambiguous terms. SELF-DETERMINATION. 39 The object of our inquiry, is not to learn whether the mind wills at all. This no one can doubt. INor is it to determine ivhy we will at all. The very nature of the faculty of will implies, that we put forth acts of will. But the real point of our inquiry is, why we will one way rather than another ; why we choose one thing rather than its opposite ; why one man wills to obey God, and another chooses to disobey him : why one pre- fers to go to the gaming table, while another goes to the house of prayer. What is it that determines not merely that there shall be volitions, but what they shall be ? It is true, indeed, that whatever determines us to will, determines us to will in some particular way. Every volition is a particular act, choosing or rejecting some particular object ; and whatever determines volitions to be, determines what they will be. The force which gives motion to a body, gives direction to the motion. So whatever agencies, causes, or influences there may be, which give rise to acts of choice, these also, taken together, determine of what kind the choices shall be. There is riot one cause of volition in the abstract, and a different cause of its direction. But the inquiry why we will at all, may be different from the inquiry why we will one way rather than another. To answer the former, it may be sufficient to say, that the human mind is so constituted, as to have the power and inclination to will, and that there are objects of choice presented be- fore it. But a satisfactory answer to the latter requires an investigation of the particular state, feelings, suscep- tibilities, &c. of the mind, and the nature of the objects presented to its choice. We may answer the one, by saying that there is some cause of volition ; and the other, 40 SELF-DETERMINATION. by shewing what is the cause. In giving a reason why the wind blows, it is sufficient to prove that there are forces in the atmosphere adequate to its production. To explain why it blows East or West, rather than North or South, we must point out the particular nature and direction of these forces. The latter explanation in- cludes the former ; but the former does not necessarily include the latter. A man may ride often, because he is fond of riding ; but this is not all the reason why he rides in one direction rather than another. To account for a man's willing at all, it is sufficient to state the re- quisites which are common to all cases of willing. To explain the ground of his willing in a particular way, it is necessary to add the considerations which give to his choice this special direction. On the question why does a man will at all, the parties in a philosophical contro- versy may be agreed, while they are altogether at vari- ance, in giving the reasons for his choosing one thing rather than another. The latter may be the main point, if not the only point, in the discussion between them. With some, indeed, there appears to be a farther ques- tion, whether any thing antecedent to an act of choice is at all concerned, in giving it a particular direction. With those who deny this, the inquiry respecting the direction of choice, must be distinct from that relating to the prerequisites of every volition. 1. If the question be, whether the man himself de- cides between the objects of choice presented before him, there surely can be no doubt on this point, if it be ad- mitted, that he wills at all. For to will, is nothing more nor less, than to decide in favor of an object of choice. If a man wills to walk, he determines to walk. SELF-DETERMINATION. 41 And it is he himself that determines. Motives may influence him to walk or ride, to lie and steal. But mo- tives do not lie and steal. Nor do they will to lie and steal. A man may be persuaded, by others, to will in a certain way. Their influence may give a direction to his choice. But his act is not their act. He himself chooses. He is the author of his own volitions. This, according to one signification of the term, is self-deter- mination. And a power of choosing is, in this sense, a self-determining power. 2. But this is not all that is ever meant, by the advo- cates of a self-determining power in the will. The in- quiry still recurs, what determines the man to will as he does ? What determines him to determine thus ? Is it a preceding- act of the will ? This is undoubtedly the case, in many instances. Taking the will in its most enlarged acceptation, as including not only execu.- tive acts, but purposes and emotions, acts of one class may be determined, by those of another. A man pur- poses to go to the post-office : every step he takes, on his way, is determined by this purpose. And the purpose may have been determined, by some strong emotion an eager desire, perhaps, to receive intelligence of the recovery of a friend from sickness, or the safe arrival of a richly freighted ship. Farther, the emotions them- selves are commonly excited, either by perceptions of external realities, or by the internal imaginings of our own minds. Imperative acts of the will, then, may be preceded by purposes, the purposes by emotions, the emotions by perceptions, or the workings of imagination. But all these belong to the mind. They do not reach 4* 42 SELF-DETERMINATION. beyond ourselves. So that, thus far,, our emotions and volitions may be truly said to be self-determined. Again, present acts may have an influence, in deter- mining future volitions, by placing us in circumstances fitted to excite certain classes of emotions. The man of gaiety and mirth, banishes serious reflection, by throw- ing himself into a circle of jovial companions. The pious man rouses himself to charitable effort, by bring- ing into view the various plans of Christian benevolence. The man who has been heretofore intemperate, but has now taken a firm resolution to reform, guards himself against a violation of his vows, by giving his name to a temperance pledge, and avoiding the occasions which might inflame his appetite. In tracing back a series of acts, we may often find several successive steps within the mind, and therefore self-determined, as those which follow are dependent on those which precede. But every step can not be dependent on another within the mind. For this would involve the absurdity of at least one step before the first, or else, of an infinite series of steps. The first act, then, must proceed from something within the mind which is not an act, or from something without^ or from both together, or from nothing. The last sup- position implies absolute contingence, which we are soon to consider. If the first act of the series proceeds from some mental state, which is neither an act nor the sub- stance of the mind : that state must have had an origin, either from without, or from something within, which, if we trace back the chain of dependencies, and do not admit contingence, any where, to break the series, will bring us to something without the mind. SELF-DETERMINATION. 43 We are not inquiring whether a man has any thing to do, in determining the nature of his own acts of will j but whether they are wholly independent of every thing else ; whether any other being, or event, or thing, can have any share of influence, in connection with his o\vn agency, to render his volitions different from what they would otherwise be. The inquiry, whether any thing exterior to the mind is concerned in determining the mind itself to will in a particular way, is very different from the inquiry, whether exterior influence determines the volition, without the agency of the mind. If it be said, that our mental exercises are dependent on our pro- pensities, which are a part of ourselves ; still it is to be considered, that our propensities are either acquired, in consequence of previous states of mind, in connection with external circumstances ; or are a part of the original constitution of the mind, received from its Creator. Or if it be supposed, that a man practices iniquity or virtue, because he has formed a sinful or holy purpose ; or be- cause, by his own acts, he has contracted a sinful or vir- tuous habit ; yet his first sinful or virtuous act, on which the others are considered as dependent, did not proceed from a purpose or habit of his. 3. Is the kind of volitions which a man puts forth, determined by the substance and nature of his mind, in- dependently of motives, external influences, &c. ? This might be supposed to be the ease, if the volitions of the same individual were all perfectly uniform. But they are very multifarious. One hour, he chooses to be ac- tive ; another, to remain at rest. At one time, he is struggling against calamity ; at another, exulting in the success of his plans and efforts. Why such frequent 44 SELF-DETERMINATION. changes, if external circumstances have no influence on his actions ? The present nature of the mind is either original or acquired, or has been given by the Spirit of God. In either case, it is dependent on something preceding. If it is acquired, it is dependent on the man's original na- ture, together with the circumstances in which he has been placed. If the kind of volition depends immediately and solely on the original nature of the mind, it depends on that which was given by the Creator. This is what some would call physical causation, producing physical depravity or physical virtue. The advocates of inde- pendent self-determination, however, do not go so far, as to deny all dependence of volitions upon the nature of the mind. They will admit as much, at least, as this, that it is the mind which wills. Without agents, there can be no volitions. But to suppose that the character of volitions, as being right or wrong, sinful or holy, should depend on the substance of the mind, would im- ply, that, they are dependent, for being as they are, on a nature which is created, and therefore not self-originated. 4. Some writers speak of the power of willing, as be- ing the sole and sufficient cause, why the mind wills one way rather than another. But it is evident, that the mere power of willing is not, of itself alone, even the reason why a man wills at all ; unless the term power be used in the broad and unusual sense, which includes every antecedent on which his willing depends. Is a man's power to walk, the only reason why he actually walks ? Does a man always speak, when he has power to speak ? It would be nearer the truth to say, that he wills, because he has not the power to avoid willing, in SEL.F-DETERMIW ATION. 45 some way or other. But whatever may be assigned as the reason why he wills at all, the main inquiry will still return upon us : Why does the mind will one way rather than another ; why does it choose one object rather than its opposite ? Is the simple power of willing the only cause of this ? Does a man choose to walk to church for no other reason than because he has power to walk in any one of a thousand different directions ? Does he speak the truth for no other reason, than because truth and falsehood are equally in his power ? The mere power of willing is no more concerned in giving direc- tion to the acts of the will, or in preventing them from being directed by influence, than is the equal weight of the arms of a balance in directing their motion, when unequal bodies are placed in the opposite scales. If the mind wills contingently, that is, without any direction from any thing preceding ; it undoubtedly has the power to will thus. But an equal power to will any way indif- ferently, is not surely the only ground of willing one way rather than another. That which renders it certain, that the saints and angels in heaven will be uniformly and forever holy, is not merely the fact, that they have the same power to revolt, as to praise and adore. The only reason why fallen spirits invariably sin is not, that they have equal power to obey God and to rebel. Lib- erty to either side, does not turn the will uniformly to one side. Power to the contrary, does not bind the soul in unwavering devotedness to its Maker. An equal chance of doing right and doing wrong, does not secure a course of uniform rectitude. If it be said, that there is really no cause or reason, why the will turns one way rather than the contrary ; this brings us to contingent self-determination, 46 SELF-DETERMINATION. 5. Shall we then, to avoid admitting any dependence of volitions, either immediate or remote, upon external influence, say that they are dependent on nothing ; that the mind throws them off at random ; that they happen to take place, without any ground or reason whatever, why they are as they are, rather than otherwise ? This is the doctrine of contingence ; of contingence in the ab- solute sense ; not that which signifies, that the cause or reason is unknoivn or unobserved ; but that which ex- cludes every thing on which volitions may be supposed to depend, for being as they are ; which implies that it is a matter of mere accident, that they take place as they do. According to this view of the case, a man's voli- tions are determined, not by the man himself, but by the volitions themselves ; that is, they are determined only by the event, by their happening to be what they are. They are dependent, for their character, on noth- ing preceding. The question, then, for our considera- tion is whether the volitions of accountable beings are contingent, or dependent ; not whether they are depend- ent on the mind, objects of choice, &c., for coming into existence merely ; but for being such volitions as they are, right or wrong, sinful or holy. The mind, it is ad- mitted, puts forth volitions ; but does it determine of what sort they shall be ? Does any thing else determine this ? Does any thing else make any difference in the volitions? Or is it a mere matter of accident, that they are as they are ? If they are not dependent, they must be contin- gent, in the absolute sense in which we are now using the term. If they are not contingent, they must be de- pendent. For, from the very definition of the terms, one is the opposite of the other, There can be no in- SELF-DETERMINATION. 47 tcrmediate supposition, unless it be that they are partly contingent and partly dependent. If dependence is in- consistent with liberty, then so far as there is depend- ence, liberty is impaired ; it is enjoyed only so far as volitions are contingent. If the kind of volitions which a man puts forth, is to be ascribed to accident, in ivhat part of the series of mental acts, does this prolific contingence, this wonder- working nonentity, " this effectual no cause," do its work ? Where does it break the connection, between volition and all preceding influence ? Are executive acts of the will, independent of purposes, and emotions, and appetites ? Do hunger and thirst never incline a man to partake of refreshments set before him ? Does the tippler resort to the dram shop without any induce- ment ? Or if, at any time, he denies himself his ac- customed indulgence, has he no motive for his absti- nence ? Is it from mere chance, that the demagogue courts the favor of his fellow citizens ? When he shifts his plans and measures, as the popular breeze turns to different points of the compass, has he no purpose to answer by this ? Is it as probable, that a-man will act against all motives, as that he will yield to the influence of any ? If an expert metaphysician, when occasion requires, can put himself into the posture of resisting all common inducements, is it certain, that he is not prompted to this, by the motive of just showing how the will can work without motive ? Is the forming of purposes, the place where the dependence upon preceding influence is broken off? When a man resolves to devote his powers and labors to the calls of ambition, is it done independently of any 48 SELF-DETERMINATION. love of distinction ? When the Christian abandons his former pursuits, and forms the purpose of devoting his life to the service of God, does he do it without a rea- son; a reason of sufficient efficacy to control his decis- ion ? Do men form resolutions, for the sake of obtain- ing those objects to which they are perfectly indifferent ? Is not every purpose made to obtain some object which was previously an object of affection ? If it be admitted, that our imperative volitions are in- fluenced by our purposes, and our purposes by our de- sires arid appetites ; shall we find in the latter the inde- pendence which contingent self-determination implies ? When objects are brought before our minds, is it alto- gether a matter of accident whether we shall be pleased with them or not ? Is it as easy for us to be gratified with contemptuous treatment, as with applause ? Is it an even chance, whether a miser will be most pleased with a guinea or a sixpence ? In the case of the bodily appetites, the gratification depends on the correspon- dence between the external object and that part of the body which is affected by the object. So in the case of intellectual and moral enjoyment, there must be a correspondence between the subjects before the mind, and the state of the intellect and heart. But this men- tal state is not the product of chance. If volitions are not dependent on any thing preceding, for being as they are ; if they are determined neither by the mind and its acts, nor by any thing without the mind, nor by both together ; then they are not determined at all, un- less it be in this sense, that each volition is determined by itself; that is, it is determined, merely by taking place. SELF-DETERMINATION. 49 When the several meanings of the expression self-de- termination are so definitely explained, that it no lon- ger answers the purposes of a term designedly ambigu- ous, then it is sometimes found convenient to substitute for it some other words the ambiguity of which is less exposed to detection. Of this nature is the term spon- taneous. This, in the more common acceptation, sig- nifies the same as voluntary ; referring not to the ante- cedents of volition, but to its consequents ; to what is done in accordance with the will, to the exclusion of compulsion and restraint. We are said to act spontane- ously, when we do as we choose ; when there is noth- ing to prevent our imperative volitions from being car- ried into execution. Sometimes also, our actions are considered as spontaneous, when they proceed from the impulse of the moment ; when we will and act, with- out taking time to deliberate. This is so far from im- plying, that our emotions have no concern in giving di- rection to our volitions, that the cases in which we act suddenly, and without reflection, are precisely those in which the controlling influence of- our passions is the most manifest, and the most powerful. But some writers, when they speak of the human mind as being endowed with a principle of spontaneity, seem to consider this as accounting fully for the partic- ular direction of our volitions, independently of the in- fluence of motives. This is a summary mode of set- tling a fundamental principle, by merely giving it a name, by taking for granted the main point in discus- sion. Another term which has, of late, been applied in a similar way, is personality. It is first claimed, that the will is a person, is self, is the me ; arid then the as- 5 50 SELF-DETERMINATION. sumption is made, that this can act independently of any influence distinct from itself. This affirming the will to be a person, a being, a substance, rather than a power, an attribute of a being, is a wide departure from the accustomed use of language. A will may be essen- tial to personality; but is not more so than reason, or consciousness, or emotions. That which wills and acts is not the will ; but the man, the mind, the living, con- scious being. An attribute is riot an agent. That which makes a choice is not the mere power of choos- ing ; but the being who possesses this power. Though a substance without a will may.not be a person ; neither is any thing which is wholly destitute of understanding, or feeling, or thought, as a tree or a stone, a person. But supposing it were proper to denominate the will a per- son, how would this relieve any difficulty respecting its agency in choosing ? Is it easier to prove, that the pow- er of choosing can act independently of motives, than to prove, that a being possessed of this power can thus act ? But, it may be asked, does not a man originate his own volitions ? They undoubtedly begin with him, in this sense, that they have no existence, till he puts them forth. They are strictly his acts, and not the acts of another. They proceed immediately from him. They are not produced beforehand and afterwards put into his mind. He is truly their author. But does this imply, that dependence, in the case, can be traced no farther back than to the agent ? From the fact, that he causes his own volitions, does it follow, that he is himself un- caused ; that he also is self-originated? If he is not, his volitions are remotely, though not immediately, de- pendent on something besides himself. He has not SELF-DETERMINATION. originated all the causes from which his choices proceed. If it be said, that the nature of his volitions depends on nothing but the nature of the man ; yet it is to be con- sidered, that this nature of his must have had an origin from some cause. Or if there be a state of the mind which is different from its nature and its operations, and which is the cause of its volitions, that state is not the product of chance. Even those who maintain, that acts of the will are independent of every thing prece- ding, for being what they are, do not, it is presumed, claim this privilege for any thing else. If volitions are thrown off contingently, so that, as far as their^ virtuous or vicious character is concerned, they depend neither on the nature, nor the state, nor the previous acts, of the agent ; with what propriety can it be said, that he originates their sinfulness or holiness? According to the supposition, he merely happens to choose as he does. Is a man the efficient cause of his own volitions? There surely can be no reasonable doubt on this point, if by efficient cause, be meant the agent who wills. To be the cause of volitions, in this sense, is nothing more nor less than to will. If it is the man himself that wills, it is he himself that is the efficient cause of his volitions. Or if, by the efficient cause, be meant the immediate antecedent, the man is, in this sense also, the efficient cause of his own choices. There is nothing intervening between him and his volitions, no connect- ing link, between the agent and his own acts. But if we apply the term efficient cause to every thing which is in any way concerned, in determining what a man's volitions shall be ; we cannot say, that he is the only 52 SELF-DETERMINATION. efficient cause of them, without setting aside the influ- ence of external motives. By the cause of volition, some writers appear to mean the agent in the exercise of choice ; in the very act of choosing. This, it would seem, is making the cause of an act of the will to be a part of the act itself. Is this a correct view of the nature of volition? What is choice ? Is it not the mind choosing ; the mind in a particular state ? Can this be separated into two distinct elements, the one bearing to the other the relation of .a cause to its effect ? A cause is antecedent to its effect. Is the mind, in the very act of choosing, to be consid- ered as something antecedent to its choice ? We can easily conceive of one state of mind as being antecedent to another ; and can suppose that one may be the cause of the other. But what propriety can there be in speak- ing of the mind in a particular state as being the cause of that state ? When a man sees, or feels, or thinks, or moves, or lives, we are not accustomed to speak of him as being the cause of his sight, or feeling, or thought, or motion, or life ; unless it be by something which he has previously done. Is there any more propriety in speaking of a man in the act of choosing, as being the cause of his choice ? Is not his agency in choosing the very choice itself? Does not the attempt to separate this into two elements, make the act of choosing both cause and effect? In the language of President Ed- wards, " To say that the mind determines itself to exert such an act as it does, by the very exertion itself, is to make the exertion both cause and effect ; or, to exert such an act, to be a cause of the exertion of such an act." Has not this peculiar phraseology been adopted. SELF-DETERMINATION. 53 to avoid the necessity of admitting any cause of voli- tion antecedent to itself. It is commonly thought that choice, as well as every other change, must have some cause. But the advocates of independent volition find themselves involved in formidable difficulties, whenever they venture to admit of any cause of volition prior to itself. Even if the previous cause be supposed to be some other state of the same mind, so as to limit the agency concerned to the man himself; yet to account for this, another antecedent cause will be needed ; run- ning into a series which must extend back, beyond the mind of the choosing agent. If it be conceded, that the writers now referred to have a real meaning, when they speak of a man's caus- ing his volitions in the very act of choosing ; yet this can give them no warrant to claim that every other au- thor shall use the term cause, as applied to the will, in the same sense ; and shall be precluded from using it with any other meaning. It certainly can give them no right to charge an opponent with denying man's agency in his own volitions, because he does not call it by the name which they give it ; because he considers this agency so essential to choice, as to be identified with the very act of choosing. Nor can they be justified in assuming, that there can be no proper application of the word cause to the will, except their own ; and in this way, taking for granted the whole subject in debate. Great latitude may indeed be allowed to writers of con- troversy, to use their technical terms and phrases in their own way ; provided they will adhere to their own defi- nitions, so as to give no needless occasion for misappre- hension ; and will allow to others the privilege which 54 SELF-DETERMINATION. they claim for themselves. Many writers, and among them President Edwards, while they hold, in the most decided terms, that when a man wills, the agency is that of his own mind, yet think they have reason for believing, that this event, whether it is to be considered simple or complex, whether it does or does not include in itself both cause and effect ; that this choosing is de- pendent on something preceding, which they call cause. " In every act of the will whatever," according to Ed- wards, " the mind chooses one thing rather than an- other." The very act of volition itself, he says, "is doubtless a determination of the mind, that is, it is the mind's drawing up a conclusion ; or coming to a choice, between two things or more proposed to it." " For the will to determine any thing, is the same as for the soul to determine a thing by willing." But back of this agency in willing, he seeks for an antecedent cause. " What is the cause and reason," he asks. " of the souVs exerting such an act."* Here lies the great point in discussion between Edwards and his opponents. They agree in the fact, that that which chooses is the mind of the agent. They diffei^ in their explanations of the ground and reason of his choosing as he does. Neither side can settle the question, by giving their own mean- ing to the word cause, and taking it for granted, that this alone corresponds with the facts in the case. A still different view has been taken of the term cause, as applied to volition. It is said that volitions are the only causes in the universe, at least the only efficient causes ; that while they are themselves un- * Edwards on the Will, Part II, Sec. 2. SELF-DETERMINATION. 55 caused, they are the causes of all the effects which are produced, in either matter or mind ; that nothing which is a cause can be an effect ; that in any series of con- secutive and dependent changes, the first only is a cause, and that must be a volition, the others being merely ef- fects. It must be admitted that a man has a right to say what he means by the word cause ; but he has no right to insist, that the various other meanings which have been customarily given to it, both by the learned and the unlearned, in different countries and ages, have all been improper. As motives, exclusive of the mind of the agent, are not the sole cause of volition ; on the other hand, the mind is not the sole cause, unless the word cause be used in the very restricted sense, to signify either the immediate antecedent of choice, or the agency of the mind in the very act of choosing. The latter applica- tion of the term involves the absurdity of either iden- tifying volition with its cause, or of resolving a simple act of choice into two different elements, the act itself and its cause. If it be affirmed, that the agency of the mind in choosing is the sole cause of its choice, this is making an act its own cause ; for the agency of the mind in choosing is the very choice itself. Restricting the term cause to this agency, is a measure wholly un- warranted by the customary use of the word, in all ages, and in all languages in which this or a corresponding term is found. If it be said, that this limited significa- tion of the word is claimed in its application to volition only, and that, in this application, it can have no differ- ent meaning, whatever may be its use as applied to other subjects, this is giving a definition by which the whole 56 SELF'BET/ERMltf ATlOtf. question under discussion is taken for granted. The point in controversy is, Whether there is any cause of volition, other than the agency of the mind in willing. The disputant settles the question, to his own satisfac- tion, by saying that nothing but this agency is meant by the term cause, when applied to volition. This is an easy and summary way of terminating a discussion, however unsatisfactory it may be to those who prize more highly the means of discovering the truth, than dexterity in evading the force of an argument. A man has, indeed, a right to give his own definition of a term which frequently occurs, in a controversy in which he is engaged ; to say in what sense he would be understood when he uses it j provided he does not offer his definition as a substitute for evidence, but mere- ly as preparing the way for a better understanding of the nature and validity of his proof when presented. This, of itself, is no petitio principii. The advocates of dependent volition have been accused of taking an essential point for granted, by defining a motive to be that which tends to move or incline the mind to a par- ticular choice. The charge is well founded, if they rely upon this to prove that the mind is thus moved or in- clined. But if the definition is given merely for the sake of having it distinctly understood what it is which they propose to prove, and what they think they actually prove, this is taking nothing for granted, except that they understand their own meaning. One way of evading a full and fair discussion of a subject of controversy, is to give so limited a definition of a leading term, as to cover no more ground than that in which the parties are agreed; leaving out of ac- SELF-DETERMINATION. 57 count the whole extent of that on which they differ. Thus some of the opponents of President Edwards de- fine the cause of volition to be the agency of the mind in choosing ; and then affirm, what no one denies, that in this sense, the man is the sole cause of his volitions, neither motives nor any other mind choosing for him. But they fail to prove, that there are not other causes of volition, in the sense in which Edwards has defined the term. Their definition covers only the ground on which he agrees with them his embraces the whole extent of the difference, on the subject of the cause of volition. He holds that a man's volitions are his own acts, not only as it is he that chooses, but also, as his imperative volitions are owing to his emotions, desires, &c., which are themselves owing partly to the nature and state of his mind, and partly to impressions made on it by ex- ternal objects. He differs from his opponents, in believ- ing that a man is not the only cause of his acts of choice, to the exclusion of all external influence. The assumption that volition has no cause but itself, that is, the mind in the exercise of choice, is in direct contradiction of the fundamental axiom universally re- ceived, except by a few sceptical philosophers, that every change whether of substance or modes, every thing which begins to be, must have an adequate cause. This indubitable principle, broad as it is, is never stretch- ed so far, by men of common understanding, as to em- brace the supposition, that an event may be the cause of itself; that a man's choosing a thing is the only reason why he chooses it. It implies that, in every instance, the cause is prior to its effect. If for argument's sake it 58 SELF-DETERMINATION. be admitted, that volition may be separated into two distinct parts, one bearing to the other the relation of a cause to its effect ; this cause, unless it be the immedi- ate agency of an eternal being, must have had another prior to itself. This, if it be simply the nature of the mind, it did not itself create ; it came from the hand of its Maker. Or if it be a particular state of the mind, consisting of emotions, desires, &c., these also must have begun to be, and must be referred to something still farther back, either in the mind itself, or in some- thing exterior, or in both together; so that the first m this series of antecedents and consequents, can not be the agency of the man in the act of choosing. But the axiom that every change must have an ade- quate cause, is not the only ground of argument on the side of dependent volition. Its advocates appeal also to their own consciousness, and to every day's observa- tion of the conduct of others. They neither experience in themselves, nor infer from the deportment of those around them, that acts of choice are independent of all directing influence of motives. We are conscious that we ourselves choose; and we are also conscious that motives induce us to choose as we do. It is rarely the case that the advocates of independent volition have explicitly stated, and steadily maintained, the opinion, that our acts of choice are entirely free from the directing influence of motives, feelings, desires, &c. If they bring forward the principle at all, it is in such an ambiguous dress, that they can either disclaim it, or invoke its aid, according as the pressure of their oppo- nents' arguments may require. SELF-DETERMINATION. 59 But a late writer* has had the magnanimity distinctly to avow his belief in it, and firmly to adhere to it, through a great portion of his book. It is upon this ground only, that he hopes to demolish the pillars of Ed- wards' work on the Will. It is, as he thinks, for the want of adhering steadily to this, that the other assail- ants of Edwards have so signally failed, in their efforts to dislodge him from his strongly fortified positions. Bledsoe's sword is a two edged weapon, which deals its blows, with impartial justice, to both friends and foes ; against the sturdy logic of Edwards, and the incautious admissions of his opponents. To show this, the fol- lowing extracts from his book may be sufficient. " If his system be false, why, it may be asked, has the In- quiry so often appeared to be unanswerable?" "His system has appeared to stand upon immovable ground, in so far as logic is concerned, only because he has, with such irresistible power and skill, demolished and tram- pled into ruins that of his adversaries. Reason has been supposed to be on his side, because he has so clearly shown, that it is not on the side of his opponents." p. 10. " It is a deep and earnest conviction, wrought into my mind by the meditation of years, that the great and glo- rious cause of free agency has been retarded, by some of the errors of its friends, more than by all the truths of its enemies." p. 213. What are these concessions, by which the cause of liberty of will is so disastrously affected? One is, That motives have a real influence, in giving direction to acts * An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Free- dom of the Will, by Albert T. Bledsoe, Esq. Philadelphia, 1845. 60 SELF-DETERMINATION. of choice. " The true liberty of indifference does not consist, as I have endeavored to show, in a power to re- sist the influence of the appetites and passions strug- gling to produce volition ; because there is no such in- fluence in existence." p. 103. Quoting from Edwards the assertion, that the liberty of indifference consists in this, that the will, in choosing, is subject to no prevail- ing influence ; he adds, " Now this is a fair statement of the doctrine in question." p. 109. " If we suppose there is a real strength in motives, that they exert a positive influence in the production of volitions, then we con- cede every thing to President Edwards." p. 38. " In- deed, it seems to me, that while the notion that our de- sires possess a real power and efficacy, which are exerted over the will, maintains its hold upon the mind, the great doctrine of liberty can never be seen in the bright- ness of its full-orbed glory." p. 104. " He does not, however, claim a liberty of indifference for our desires and affections" " The liberty which we really possess, then, does not consist in an indifference of our desires and affections, but in that of the will itself." p. 105. If Mr. Bledsoe thus sets aside all prevailing influence which is antecedent to actual choice, he must, it may be thought, hold to a self-determining poioer of the will. By no means. " I have long been impressed with the conviction," he says, " that the self-determining power, as it is generally understood, is full of inconsistencies." p. 211. " Difficulties have always encumbered the cause of free and accountable agency, just because it has been supposed to consist in the self-determining power of the will. We should therefore abandon this doctrine. It is high time it should be laid aside for ever." p. 212. SELF-DETERMINATION. 61 But if the will is determined neither by itself, nor by the influence of motives, by what is it determined, ac- cording to Bledsoe ? By nothing at all. "It has al- ways been taken for granted," he says, "that the will is determined. The use of this word clearly proves that the will is acted upon, either by the will itself, or by something else. It has been conceded, on all sides, that it is determined ; and the only controversy has been, as to what is the determiner." " But behind all this con- troversy, there is a question which has not been agita- ted ; and that is, whether the will is determined at all. For my part, I am firmly and fully persuaded that it is not, but that it simply determines. It is the determiner, but not the determined. It is never the object of its own determination. It acts, but there is no causative act, by which it is made to act." p. 212. To what, then, is volition to be ascribed? Is it the effect of any thing whatever? Mr. Bledsoe says it is not. He has a chapter to show that volition is not an effect, in the proper sense of the word. " If our wills are caused to put forth volitions, and are turned to one side or the other, by the controlling influence of motives ; we have no will at all" p. 178. " A caused volition is no volition." p. 177. "Let it be assumed, that volition is, properly speaking, an effect, and every thing is con- ceded. On this vantage ground, the scheme of neces- sity may be erected, beyond the possibility of an over- throw." p. 58. " From the fact that Edwards has gone round in a circle, it has been concluded that he has beg- ged the question ; but how or wherein he has begged it, is a point which has not been sufficiently noticed. The very authors who have uttered this complaint, have 6 62 SELF-DETERMINATION. granted him the very thing for which he has begged. Admit that volition is an effect, as so many libertarians have done, and then his definition of motive, which in- cludes every cause of volition, places his doctrine upon an immutable foundation. We might as well heave at the everlasting mountains, as try to shake it." p. 45. " Indeed, all that is assumed by Edwards, has been conceded to him, by most of his adversaries." p. 208. Mr. Bledsoe does not, however; deny that a volition is something which begins to be. " If we mean by an effect, every thing that comes to pass, of course a voli- tion is an effect ; for no one will deny that it comes to pass. All that I deny is, that a volition does proceed from the mind, or from motive, or from any thing else, in the same manner that an effect, properly so called, proceeds from its efficient cause." p. 47. If volition is not an effect, has it any cause 1 To this question, Mr. Bledsoe is cautious of giving an un- qualified answer, on account of the great ambiguity of the word cause. " It is true," he says, " that every change in nature must have a cause ; that is to say, it is in some sense of the word an effect, and consequently must have a corresponding cause." p. 70. " No man in his right mind, ever ventured to deny that every change in nature, even the voluntary acts of the mind, must have a cause." p. 74. In what sense, then, has volition a cause ? It is not the cause of itself. " Did any man, in his right mind, ever contend that a volition could produce itself, can arise out of nothing, and bring itself into existence ? If so, they were certainly be- yond the reach of logic. I have never been so unfor- tunate, as to meet with any advocate of free agency, * SELF-DETERMINATION. 63 either in actual life or in history, who supposed that a volition arose out of nothing, without any cause of its existence, or that it produced itself. They have all maintained, with one consent, that the mind is the cause of volition." p. 71. In what sense, is the mind the cause of its own acts of choice ? It cannot, according to Bledsoe, be the efficient cause. " The philosophers of all ages," he says, " have sought for the efficient cause of volition ; but who has found it ? It has never been found, be- cause it does not exist ; and it never will be found, so long as an action of the mind continues to be what it is." pp. 218, 219. An act of the mind, according to him, may be the efficient cause of a change in matter, but not of volition. " We can only infer, from a change or modification in matter, the existence of an act by which it is produced. The former is the only idea we have of an effect the latter is the only idea we have of an efficient cause. Hence, in reasoning from effect to cause, we can only reason from a change or modifica- tion in matter, or in that which is passive, to the act of some active power." " But the case is very different, when we turn from the contemplation of a. passive re- sult, to consider an efficient cause when we turn from the motion of body, to consider the activity of mind. In such a case, the consequent ceases to be the same ; and hence we have no right to infer that the ante- cedent is the same." p. 80. " We have no experience that an act of the mind is produced by a preceding act of the mind, or by the prior action of any tiling else" " A change in body necessarily implies the prior action by which it is produced ; an act of mind only implies 64 SELF-DETERMINATION. the existence of an agent that is capable of acting." " A change in that which is by nature passive, necessa- rily implies an act by which it is produced. But an act of the mind itself, which is not passive, does not likewise imply a preceding act by which it is produced." p. 81. But if volition has no efficient cause, how is it to be accounted for? According to Bledsoe, it comes to pass. " If we mean by an effect, every thing that comes to pass j of course a volition is an effect, for no one can deny that it comes to pass." p. 47. It arises in the mind. " We are forced back upon the conclu- sion that action may and actually does arise in the world of mind, without any efficient or producing cause of its existence, without resulting from the prior action of any thing whatever. Any other hypothesis is involved in absurdity." p. 58. Is there, then, any sense in which volition has a cause ? " There is," says Bledsoe, u a sufficient ground and reason for our actions ; but not an efficient cause of them." " No one ever imagined, that there are no indis- pensable antecedents to choice, without which it could not take place." " Unless there were a mind there could be no act of the mind ; and unless the mind pos- sessed the power of acting, it could not put forth vo- litions. The mind then, and the power of the mind called will, constitute the ground of action or volition." pp. 215, 216. There must not only be a mind, and a power of willing ; but there must also be motives, ob- jects of choice before the mind. This Bledsoe admits. " A desire or affection is the indispensable condition, an invariable antecedent of an act of the will." p. 93. " There is not an advocate of free agency in the uni- SELF-DETERMINATION. 65 verse, who will contend that the mind can choose a thing, unless there is a thing to be chosen." p. 121. But he denies that motives are the efficient or producing cause of volition. If by producing cause, he means that which chooses, refuses, purposes, &c., he can prob- ably find no one to differ from him on this point. Mo- tives do not make choices, resolve, reject, &c. It is the mind, the willing agent, thai does this. But does noth- ing incline, induce, or influence the mind to will ? The great point in question is, whether motives have any directing influence over the will ; whether they ever induce the mind to will one way rather than another. That they do not force its choice, is agreed on all hands. " A volition is not, and cannot be, produced by any co- ercive force." p. 188. But do motives incline the mind to choose one thing rather than another; to choose a particular object rather than refuse it ? ^ " If our desires, affections, &c., operate to influence the will, how can it be free in putting forth volitions ? How does Mr. Locke meet this difficulty ? He does not place liberty on the broad ground, that the desires by which volition is supposed to be determined, are in reality nothing more than the condition or occasions on which the mind acts ; and that they themselves can exert no positive influence or efficiency." pp. 94, 95. " Having admitted that the sensitive part of our nature always tends to produce vo- lition, and in some cases irresistibly produces it, the ad- vocates of free agency have not been able to maintain the doctrine of a perfect liberty, in regard to all human action." p. 103. "The mind is endowed with various appetites, passions and desires, with noble affections, and above all, with a feeling of moral approbation and 6* 66 SELF-DETERMINATION. disapprobation. These are not the ' active principles,' or the ' motive powers,' as they have been called ; they exert no influence on the will. " We act accor- ding to reason, but not from the influence of reason." pp. 216, 217. " Reflection must show us, I think, that it is absurd to suppose that any desire, affection, or dis- position of mind, can really and truly exert any positive or productive influence." p. 97. He admits that, in a certain sense, motives may be the reason why a volition may be one way rather than another. " Although we may suppose that the activity of the soul may be the cause of its acting ; yet motive may be the indispensa- ble condition of its acting ; and in this sense, may be the reason why a volition is one way rather than anoth- er." p. 19. But he does not tell us, whether this means any thing more than that the mind chooses an object which is before it, rather than one which is not in its view. After all, he seems to hesitate to adopt the unqualified conclusion, that motives have no concern in giving direction to our acts of choice. Naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret. The various appetites, passions and desires, with which we are endowed, he considers " the ends of our act- ing. We simply act in order to gratify them" " We see that certain means must be used in order to gratify the passion, desire, affection or feeling which we intend to gratify; and we act accordingly." p. 216. Now if we act in order to gratify our desires and feelings, and adapt our means to this purpose ; it is difficult to see that they have no influence over our volitions. Yet Mr. SELF-DETERMINATION. 67 : Bledsoe affirms that " they exert no influence over the will ;" that " we form our designs or intentions free from all influence whatever ;" that " we act according to reason, but not from the influence of reason ;" " with a vieiv to our desires, but not from the influence of our desires." pp. 216,217. He seems to claim this as an original discovery of his own. He thinks that the assailants of Edwards have failed to take the only ground which could save them from inevitable defeat ; and that, in doing this, they have acted in conformity with an erroneous opin- ion universally received. " It is a commonly received opinion, among philosophers, that the passions, desires, and Part II, Sec. 12. f Freedom of Will, Part II, Sec. 12. Examination of Edwards^ Sec. 11. PHYSICAL AGENCY. 139 divine knowledge, existed, in the order of nature, ante- cedently to the divine knowledge."* The certainty which he calls moral certainty is ; according to him, " the real and certain connection between some moral action and its cause ;" not the certain foreknowledge of an ac- tion which is, in the absolute sense, contingent. It is objective, and not merely subjective certainty. " No doubt knowledge in the Deity, is the same thing with subjective certainty, or certain knowledge ; but it is not the same with objective certainty, or the truth which is the object of the divine knowledge."! The term physical, even when taken by itself, is a word of very vague signification. But when it is com- bined with another ambiguous term, it forms a com- pound the meaning of which is still more multifarious. The expression physical necessity, for instance, compo- sed of two words each of which has half a dozen dif- ferent meanings, is sufficiently indefinite to answer the purposes of the most evasive metaphysician. Or if he ever has occasion for phraseology still more ambiguous, he has only to call to his aid a few more similar expressions, such as necessary cause, physical efficiency, fatal neces- sity, originating volition, efficient cause, irresistible influ- ence, &c., taking care not to annex to them any definite signification. The whole subject of the freedom of the will, may easily be thrown into utter confusion, by a liberal use of a few ambiguous words and phrases. Essays on Liberty and Necessity, pp. 145, 149. f Page 140 SECTION IX. MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. Has the government of God any influence upon the human will ? Has his providence any concern in giving direction to volition ? Influence of commands and threatenings, rewards and punish- ments Does God merely accommodate his administration to what he foresees will be the conduct of his creatures ? Have the word and Spirit of God any efficacious influence upon the will ? Is God the author of sin ? Why has he not prevented all sin ? Cou]^ he not do this, without destroying moral agency ? Is sin the necessary means of the greatest good ? Can God promote the highest good of the universe without means ? Are there any limits to the power of God ? Is it certain that the highest sup- posable good of the universe is actually attainable ? Happiness of God Three different theories to account for the origin of evil Agreement of the three suppositions Difference of the suppositions. THE deep interest which belongs to the subject of contingent self-determination, lies in its relation to the moral government of God. This, in the more enlarged acceptation of the term, is commonly understood to mean that system of dispensations, by which he not only distributes rewards and punishments to the right- eous and the wicked ; but exerts an efficacious influence in favor of holiness, and in opposition to iniquity. It implies that, in some way or other, he has the power of giving a direction to the volitions of his creatures ; of securing some in a course of uniform obedience, and re- covering others from the dominion of sin. The great MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 141 question before us is, whether he has, in fact, any such determining influence ; or whether he merely arranges his system of providential and retributive dispensations, in such a manner, as to adapt them to what he foresees may happen to be the results of man's voluntary agency. The very definition of absolute contingence implies that it is inconsistent with any control or direction, from any cause whatever. If the nature of moral agency requires, that whenever two objects of choice are before the mind, the tendency in the will to choose the one, should be exactly balanced by its tendency to choose the other ; and if any influence which interposes to disturb this equilibrium, interferes with the freedom of the will ; then how is it possible, that even divine power should give a direction to the acts of choice, without interfering with the accountability of the agent ? The impossi- bility in the case, according to the supposition, is not owing to any limitation of power, but to an incompati- bility in the nature of things. It is immaterial what is the kind or degree of the determining influence, if all such influence is inconsistent with voluntary agency. If contingency is an essential attribute of volition, then God can not create moral agents with such a na- ture, such capacities, and such propensities, as will se- cure their continuance in holiness. To say that a man's volitions are contingent, in the absolute sense, and yet that they are invariably holy, is a manifest contradic- tion. There is no uniformity in the results of contin- gence. If a man's volitions are rendered holy, by the very nature which his Creator has given him, they are not left to the determination of chance. Nor can acts of the will, if they are contingent, be controlled by the 142 MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. providence of God. He may bring objects of choice be- fore the mind, and thus give it an opportunity to make an election. But so far as these objects have any deter- mining influence on the will, they must affect its de- cision, in a way inconsistent with contingence. The same observation may be applied to what is more appropriately called the moral government of God ; his commands and prohibitions, his promises and threaten- ings, his rewards and punishments. To what purpose are all the precepts and sanctions of his law, the press- ing invitations of his gospel, the representations of heav- enly glory, and the terrors of the world of perdition ; if they have no power to influence the decisions of the will, without destroying moral agency ; if their efficacy is inconsistent with that contingence which is supposed to be essential to the freedom of the will ? How can the doctrine, that volition is independent of all directing power of motives, be reconciled with what is commonly understood to be the benevolent design of the divine administration, the increase and continuance of holiness and consequent happiness ? Has the law of God, with its penalty, its promises, and its threatenings, no tendency to promote obedience, and deter from transgression ? From the exhibitions of mercy in the gospel, from the sufferings and death of the Savior, from his compassionate calls to those who are ready to perish, from the offers of a free and everlasting salvation, does there come no influence which can reach the heart, to bring forth holy affections, and purposes and works ? If both the law and the gospel are really efficacious, in re- straining iniquity and promoting holiness, is this at the expense of the free agency of man ? What purpose is MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 143 to be answered, by the manifestations of majesty, and justice, and grace, in the retributions of the judgment day ; if they are to have no effect to bind the heavenly hosts in firmer bonds of love and gratitude, arid allegi- ance to their Maker ? Of what avail are all the terrors of the eternal prison, if they have no tendency to deter others from disobedience and revolt. Would a God of infinite compassion inflict punishment on his creatures, even when it is deserved, if it could have no effect in maintaining the authority of his law, and securing the holiness and happiness of his kingdom ? If acts of the will are altogether contingent, can he have any moral government, any course of dispensations which will have a determining influence over the volitions of his creatures ? It may be thought, perhaps, that although the nature of our minds, constitutional propensities, acquired habits, circumstances, and motives, are not the causes of voli- tion, and do not determine of what character they shall be ; yet the omniscient Ruler of the universe, having a perfect comprehension of all the possible antecedents of volition, can select and introduce, into his providential arrangements, those which he foresees will be followed by certain acts of the will. To this it may be answer- ed, that if these volitions are not dependent on the sup- posed antecedents, then no change in the antecedents would make any difference in the volitions ; and there- fore no influence would be exercised over the volitions, by any regulation of the antecedents. But if the voli- tions are dependent, they are not, in the absolute sense, contingent. Their character is determined by some- thing preceding. 144 MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. If man is no longer a free agent, when the acts of his will are subject to any determining influence ; then the Spirit of God can not transform the heart, arid turn it to the exercise of holiness. Whether he operates on the mind directly, or through the instrumentality of mo- tives ; in either case, if a change of the will is effected, by his agency, there is no room left for the determining power of contingence. But if this has absolute control, neither the providence of God, nor his government and laws ; neither the mercy of the gospel, nor the terrors of his throne of judgment ; neither his word nor his Spirit ; nor all these together, can have efficacy sufficient to se- cure the decisions of the will. No accumulation of power comes any nearer towards gaining the point. The greater the controlling influence, the greater the interference with the determinations of contingence. But if the volitions of accountable agents are depen- dent, for their nature, on any thing preceding ; if con- tingence does not come in, to break the chain of con- nection ; then the Creator may have a determining in- fluence over the volitions themselves, by the power which he possesses over the causes, conditions, oc- casions, and other antecedents on which choice de- pends. If the natural constitution of the agent has any concern in deciding the character of his volitions, this constitution is moulded by the hand of God. If external 'motives have any sway over the will, these are presented under a superintending providence. If internal percep- tions and emotions have any influence on volition, these are dependent on other antecedents which are tinder the regulation of divine power. By either leaving his crea- tures to themselves, to yield to their own propensities, MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 145 and the various influences with which, in the natural course of events, they are surrounded ; or by the special interposition of his providence, whenever he sees fit, and by the agency of his Spirit; he can exercise a control- ling power over the acts of the will. This he can do, if such a superintendence is not inconsistent with the nature of moral agency. The inquiry, then, concerning contingent self-determination, involves no less a question than this ; Whether God can exercise any determining influence over the moral actions of his creatures ? Are we prepared to decide this momentous question in the negative ? While the worlds and systems of worlds in the material universe, are under the perfect control of their Maker, is the moral world unavoidably left to the dominion of chance ? It may be thought, perhaps, that although God can not control the free acts of his creatures, yet he may ad- minister a moral government, by rendering to them righteous retribution ; by rewarding or punishing them, according to their deserts. But if motives have no ten- dency to affect the decisions of the will, all this array of precepts and penalties, of promises and threatenings, of representations of heavenly glory, and the hopeless doom of the finally impenitent, is devoid of all efficacy, for the promotion of holiness, and the prevention of iniquity. It has no influence which can reach the em- pire of contingence. AUT HOR OF SIN. To the supposition, that human volitions are de- pendent on something preceding, for being as they are, it may be objected, that this makes God the author of sin. 13 146 MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. What is it to be the author of sin ? According to the proper use of language, it is to commit sin. To be the author of sinful actions, is to do that which is sinful. To be the author of sinful volitions, is to put forth such volitions. The author of sin is the agent who wills and does the evil. To avoid bringing upon God the impu- tation of being the author of sin, is it necessary to con- sider all sinful volitions as contingent ; having no de- pendence on any thing preceding, for being what they are ? If it be said, that they are dependent upon nothing but the nature of the agent ; will it also be said, that this nature has been derived from nothing preceding, that it has come into existence by accident ? If sin must not be dependent on any thing which is dependent on God, then he can do nothing in his providence, which may be even the occasion of sin. For occasions are among the antecedents on which volition depends. Is it making God the author of sin, to ascribe to him the creation of the agent who sins ? Will any one charge upon God the sin which his creatures commit ? He is the author of their being. He may be the author of the circumstances in which they are placed. But does this make him the author of their sin ? If it does, how is the difficulty removed, by considering volitions as alto- gether contingent ; by representing it to be the very na- ture of a moral agent, to be liable to sin by accident ? Who gave to man this nature, from which contingent volitions proceed ? Did not the author of our being fore- see that, with such a nature as he gave us, and in such a world as that in which he placed us, we should not only be liable to sin, but should actually sin ? If the millions of millions of volitions which are put forth every MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 147 moment, are all perfectly contingent ; that is, if there is an even chance, with respect to each one, whether it will be sinful or holy, it is certain that some of them will be sinful. Is the author of our moral nature to be considered the author of these? Is our Creator the author of all the acts of his creatures ? Is he to be con- sidered the author of sin, if he gives being to that which causes sin ? Nothing is more directly the cause of sin, than the sinner himself. -Yet he is a creature of God. Is God to be considered the author of sin, if he has either created such agents as would be liable to sin, or brought before his creatures such objects as might in- fluence them to sin? Is he the author of sin, if he creates a being who will certainly sin ? In our fallen world, it is certain that every rational creature of God will sin. PREVENTION OF SIN. If the volitions of moral agents are under the control of the Creator, the inquiry may be made, why has he not wholly prevented the existence of sin ? Perfect goodness must be displeased with all iniquity. If hu- man volitions are always dependent on some antecedent or antecedents ; if these are connected with something preceding ; if the links in the chain of dependence are uninterrupted, till they terminate in the self-existent cause of all things ; does not he hold the whole succes- sion of intermediate causes, of circumstances, and agents, and conditions, and occasions, and motives, and voli- tions, entirely at his disposal ? Why then does he suffer that which he abhors to take place ? Does not the ex- istence of sin imply a limit, either to his power, or to his goodness 1 148 MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. This difficulty does not press exclusively upon the opinion, that volitions are dependent upon something preceding, for being what they are. It bears upon the scheme of the objectors, as well as upon that of their opponents. Yet they bring it forward, and reiterate it, with an air of triumph which indicates their forgetful- ness of the force with which it may be turned upon their own views. Let it be supposed, that volitions are contingent. It is generally admitted, by those who believe that this is the case, that they are foreseen by God. Why then does he give existence to beings who he knows will sin ; and that many of them will so sin, that it would have " been good for them if they had never been born ?' r Will it be said that he could not avoid bringing them into being, consistently with the best good of the universe? And how do we know, even supposing that the volitions of his creatures are under his control, that he could interpose to prevent all sin, in a way consistent with the best good of the universe ? Do you say, that if he could not, it must be because he could not prevent all sin without destroying moral agency ? Is the destroying of moral agency the only evil which could possibly result from deranging the plans of infinite wisdom and benevolence ? If it be ad- mitted, that all sin can not be prevented, in the best moral system ; does it follow, that it could not be pre- vented in any moral system ? Will it be said, that if we do not adopt the opinion, that sin is suffered to take place to avoid destroying moral agency, we must be driven to the position, that sin itself is the necessary means of the greatest good ? Can no intermediate supposition be made ? Do these two theo MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 149 ries stand in such relation to each other, that either one or the other must certainly be true ? God has arranged a vast and complicated system of means, for advancing the interests of his kingdom. May it not be true, that the measures necessary to prevent all sin, would involve such a change in this system of means, as would impair the happiness of the universe ? This supposition does not necessarily imply, that sin itself is one of the means of the greatest good. It only implies, that greater good will follow from the permission* of sin, than could result from such a change of measures in the moral system, as would be necessary in order to prevent all sin. The means which God employs, for enlarging the happiness of his kingdom, may be so perverted by his creatures, as to become the occasion of sin. The- exalted natures of the angels, and their capacity for high enjoyment, may have been, to some of them, a temptation to rebel- lion. The bounties of providence, which in rich abun- dance are spread before us for our good, are our principal temptations to sinful indulgence. The plan which infi- nite benevolence has devised, for the salvation of our race, is, by multitudes, perverted to licentiousness. The long-continued forbearance of God towards sinful men, to give them an opportunity of securing eternal life, is often so abused, as greatly to aggravate their guilt. The measures of the divine providence and government are not all employed in preventing evil. Some must be directed to the attainment of positive good ; and these may indirectly be the occasion of sin. * Permission of sin may signify either not forbidding or not pre- venting sin. It is scarcely necessary to state, that the expression is to be understood in the latter sense only, in this discussion. 13* 150 MORAL, GOVERNMENT OF G00. The doctrine, that God can control, at pleasure, the volitions of his creatures, does not necessarily imply, that he can do this without means. Do you say, that om- nipotence can accomplish every thing, by any means, or even with no means ? Then surely sin is not the neces- sary means of the greatest good ; he can effect his be- neficent purposes without its aid. Is it urged, that to consider means necessary in the government of God, is limiting his power ? And is it not limiting his power, to affirm that he can not promote the highest good, ex- cept by means of sin ? If he can accomplish all hi& purposes as well without means as with them, why does he ever make use of means ?* Do we always understand ourselves, when we speak of limitations to the power of God ? May it not some- times be the case, that what we call a limit of power, is really an inconsistency in the nature and relations of things ? It is not owing to defect of power, that the diameter of a circle can not be made equal to its circum- ference ; that a straight line can not be made to coincide in all its parts, with a curve ; or that a world can not be made perfectly happy, while perfectly sinful. In the nature and relations of things supposed to exist, there may be inconsistencies not observed by us. An unedu- cated man does not see the absurdity of affirming, that the three angles of a plane triangle may be greater than two right angles. " With God, all things are possible." But the suggestions of metaphysical philosophy are not always things. Frequently, they are neither realities * See Chalmers r Natural Theology, Vol. II, Book V, Chap. ! Sec. 17. MORAL GOVERNMENT OF G fi < nor possibilities. A God of infinite power and benevo- lence will undoubtedly secure the highest attainable good of the created universe. But every created thing is finite. Does it imply any deficiency either of power or of goodness in God, that he does not confer infinite happiness on his creation ? We may suppose all the holy and happy beings in the universe to be as holy and happy as they now are, or as they ever will be j and in addition to this, that all who are now sinful and misera- ble, should be entirely holy and happy. Would not this, to our fallible apprehensions, be a more perfect universe than the present ? Or if we assume, with the Univer- salist, that all will be holy and happy hereafter ; we may suppose, that they might have been as holy and happy from the beginning. We may suppose, that all these might have commenced their existence, ages of ages be- fore they did. We may still go on with our supposi- tions, till we imagine an infinite number of created be- ings, all infinitely .great, and infinitely happy, and exist- ing from eternity. Is there no impossibility or absurdity in this ? Yet any thing short of this, implies a limita- tion somewhere ; not a limitation of the power of Godj but of the powers and capacities of things. There is no avoiding this conclusion, but by denying that there ever has been, or ever will be, either sin or misery, in this or any other world. By admitting such a limitation, are we guilty of ascribing a defect to the power or goodness of God ? May it not be inconsistent with the nature of things, that all sin should be prevented, in a universe filled with intelligent beings, possessing such natures, capacities, and propensities, placed in such circumstances, and with such motives before them,, as are best calcu- lated for attaining the highest good ? 152 MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. For aught that we can tell, it may be necessary, in carrying into execution the purposes of infinite benevo- lence, not only that means should be used, but that there should be a choice of means ; a selection of those which are better adapted than others to the great end proposed. And this system of means may be inconsist- ent with such a course of measures as would prevent the existence of all sin. This supposition does not imply, that sin itself is one of the necessary means by which the greatest good is attained; but only that it could not be wholly prevented, except in such a way as would de- range and impair the best possible system of means. According to this view, sin is neither good in itself, nor in its tendency. Though wholly evil, infinite wisdom suffers it to take place, rather than relinquish the course of measures which are necessary to the best good of the universe. These may have been adopted, not for the sake of the sin which follows, but notwithstanding the sin, for the sake of the good, which they are calculated to produce, and which greatly overbalances the evil of sin and its consequences. Will it be said, that God must be rendered unhappy, if sin and misery result from the measures which are necessary to secure the highest good of the universe ? Why then must he not be unhappy, if it is out of his power to secure this highest good, except by means of the sin which he abhors? On either supposition, the actual amount of sin and misery is the same ; and is equally displeasing to a being of infinite holiness and be- nevolence. Is it said, that he would be more happy, if the immense good of his kingdom could be attained, without involving the sin and suffering of any of his MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 153 creatures ? Why then would he not be more happy, if this immense good could be attained in some other way than by means of sin ; so that all those who, upon the present system, are or will be perfectly holy and happy, would be equally so, without sin in others ; and in addi- tion to this, that those who are now lost would also be perfectly holy and happy ? Has not God abundant reason to rejoice in his works, if the good in the crea- tion immeasurably overbalances the evil ? The three suppositions which have been mentioned here, respecting the origin of evil, are these : 1. That sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. 2. That sin is the natural consequence of a moral sys- tem ; of any system of voluntary agents. 3. That sin is the certain consequence of the best moral system ; the system of divine administration which will result in the highest good of the universe. In what respects do these three suppositions agree, and in what do they differ ? The advocates of each, it is presumed, will agree that the present system of the created universe, considered in all its results, in all worlds, and throughout all ages, is the best possible ; or at least, that none better, if another equally good, could have been produced by infinite wisdom and goodness. By the best possible system, is meant that in which the greatest attainable good, the greatest amount of holiness and happiness, will be actually attained. The principle here stated may be inferred, with certainty, from the fact that all the parts of the system have been arranged and are superintended, by a being of unlimited goodness, intelligence and power j of infinite benevolence to choose, 154 MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. of infinite skill to devise, and infinite power to execute, the best possible plan of a created universe. We may, indeed, suppose a more perfect system, than that which now exists ; but to affirm that there might have been one chosen, from which better results, on the whole, could be obtained, is to say that which implies, that a God of infinite benevolence has preferred a lesser good to a greater. It may be said, that our limited capacities are wholly unable to bring into view all possible sys- tems, and by a comparison of their respective natures and results, to determine which is the most perfect. It is not pretended that we are able to do this ; or that, from an actual survey of all moral systems, we judge that the best has been selected. But to the omniscient mind, they must be all present at one view ; and if there is any difference between them, we infer from his per- fect benevolence, that the one which He has adopted is not inferior to any of the others. As this is the best possible system of created things, or certainly one of the best, and as in this, sin actually exists j it would seem, that the respective advocates of the three suppositions stated above must further agree, that in the best moral system, all sin could not be pre- vented j that it could not be prevented, by divine inter- position, consistently with that course of measures which infinite wisdom has adopted, for attaining the ends which infinite benevolence has chosen. Again, the three suppositions must agree in admitting that there is a limit, not to the divine attributes, but to the natures and capacities of created beings, and consequent- ly, to the amount of good to which they can attain. The best possible system is not the best supposable. Sin MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 155 and misery actually exist. The holiness arid happiness of the creation, therefore, are not infinite ; not as great as they would be, if to the present and future amount, there could be added the holiness and happiness of all who, in the present system, are sinful and miserable. Still farther, it would seem, that the advocates of the first two suppositions must admit all which is affirmed in the third. If according to the first, sin is the neces- sary means of the greatest good, then it must be the certain consequence of the best moral system. And if according to the second, sin is the natural consequence of every moral system, it is the consequence of the best. But each of the first two suppositions affirms something more than what is contained in the third. The advo- cates of the first two appear to take it for granted, that the only alternative in the case must be this, that sin is not wholly prevented, under the divine government, either because, so far as it is not restrained, it is the means of the greatest good, or that an entire prevention of it would be inconsistent with the nature of moral agency. Each party sees that to one of the suppositions there are formidable objections; and finds no way of escape from these, but by adopting the other alternative. By the third supposition, the necessity of being con- fined, in our inquiries, within the limits of the other two is avoided. It admits of a different mode of account- ing for the existence of sin, under the government of a Being infinitely wise and benevolent. It differs from the first supposition, in not representing the sin which exists in the world as the necessary means of the great- est good. Why then has it not been wholly prevented ? May not the reason be this, that it could not be entirely 156 MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD, excluded, except in a way which would derange and impair the best system of measures for securing the great- est amount of positive good ? According to this expla- nation, the Creator and Governor of the universe adopts no measures for the sake of introducing sin into the sys- tem ; though He knows that what he designs for good, will be perverted to the introduction of evil. What He is supposed to purpose is not directly the existence of sin, but those dispensations of benevolence which He foresees will become, by abuse, the occasion of sin. These may be adopted, not merely to furnish an oppor- tunity of overruling sin for good ; but for the valuable results which they are fitted directly to produce, greatly overbalancing the evil of sin and its consequences, of which they are, by perversion, the occasion. This ex- planation does not imply, that sin and its consequences are preferred to holiness and its consequences, in the circumstances in which sin is actually committed. It does not imply that, in these circumstances, sin answers a better purpose, than holiness in its stead. The third supposition above differs from the second, in not representing the prevention of all sin as inconsist- ent with the nature of accountable agency. That it can not be wholly prevented in the best moral system, we have the evidence of fact. It has entered a universe of accountable beings, under the government of infinite wisdom and goodness. But we have not this proof, that it must take place in every supposable system of volun- tary agents. With hypothetical systems, we have no practical concern. All our interests lie in that one which a God of boundless wisdom and benevolence has chosen ; and which we therefore conclude to be the best possible. MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD. 157 In this real universe, we have abundant evidence, both from His word and His providence, that He does re- strain sin ; and therefore, that this interposition is not inconsistent with accountable agency. To what extent this pre.vention might be carried, in any supposable sys- tem, we have not the evidence of fact, to enable us to determine. This is a field for a free and profitless indul- gence in metaphysical speculation. It does not come within the design of the present in- quiry, to discuss the subject of the permission of sin, except so far as it has a bearing on the question of self- determination.* * For a more particular view of this subject, see Examination of Edwards, Sec. 1& 14 158 SECTION X. ACTIVITY AND DEPENDENCE. Ambiguity of the terms active and passive Can any tiling be ac- tive and passive, at the same time ? Mental activity Can voli- tion be passive ? Can an agent be, in any sense, passive ? Can any being act, if he is acted upon ? Mr. Chubb on action and passion. To the supposition, that the will is dependent on any thing without itself, for the nature of its volitions, it is objected, that an accountable agent must be an active being ; that dependence implies, that he who is the sub- ject of it is passive ; and that these are opposite quali- ties, each being inconsistent with the other ; so that he who is active can not, at the same time, be passive or dependent. These are terms of very convenient ambi- guity, with which it is easy to construct a plausible but fallacious argument. The word passive is sometimes used to signify that which is inactive. With this mean- ing, it must, of course, be the opposite of every thing which is active. To say that that which is in this sense passive, is at the same time active, is to assert that that which is active is not active. But this is not the only signification of the term passive in common use. It is very frequently employed to express the relation of an effect to its cause. In this sense, it is so far from being inconsistent with activity, that activity may be the very effect which is produced. A thing may be caused to ACTIVITY AND DEPENDENCE. 159 be active. A cannon shot is said to be passive, with respect to the charge of powder which impels it. But is there no activity given to the ball ? Is not the whirl- wind active, when it tears up the forest ? If it is, does this prove that it has no cause ; that it has not received its impulse from any thing without itself? But are not cause and effect, you ask, opposite in their nature ? They are opposite relations; but not always opposite things. The very same thing may be both cause and effect. The mountain wave, which is the effect of the wind, may be the cause which buries the ship in the ocean. The stream of volcanic lava, which is the cause of ruin to fields, and herds, and villages, may be the effect of internal fires and vapors. The same thing is not both cause and effect, in the same respect. It is not the cause of its antecedents, nor the effect of its conse- quents. It is not passive, in the same sense, in the same relation, in which it is active. The axe is passive, with respect to the hand which moves it ; but active, with respect to the object which it strikes. The wicket club is passive in receiving motion from the hand of the player ; it is active in communicating' motion to the ball. It may be objected, that these are all examples of in- animate objects ; and that they have no proper applica- tion to mental activity. Take then the case of deep and earnest thinking. Is there no activity in this ? And is it without a cause ? When reading the orations of Demosthenes, or the demonstrations of Newton, are our minds wholly inactive ; or if they think intensely, have our thoughts no dependence on the book before us ? Is there no activity in the passions ? Do they always burst forth without a cause ? When a patriotic 160 ACTIVITY AND DEPENDENCE. orator rouses his countrymen to deeds of heroism, is there no cause of their impetuous ardor? But can volition be passive ? Mast it not be alto- gether active ? A volition is undoubtedly an act. The mind must, therefore, be active in willing ; and if the term passive be used to signify simply that which is in- active, the will can not, in this sense, be passive, in the same exercise in which it is active. But this truism does not touch the question, whether volition is depend- ent, for being as it is, on any thing preceding, and whether it is, therefore, in that sense, passive. The most active thing in the world may be passive, in the sense of being dependent for its activity on some an- tecedent. It may be caused to be active. This will be admitted, with respect to inanimate matter, if not with respect to the understanding also. But it is claim- ed, that the agency of the will implies independence ; that moral action is opposed not only to inaction, but to its being affected by any external influence. Now if a metaphysician chooses to annex to the terms active, ac- tion, and activity, when applied to the will, a meaning entirely different from their signification in all other cases ; and even in this case, according to all common usage ; he has a right to use language in his own way, if he will take the requisite precaution to make his anomalous vocabulary understood. But he has no right to avail himself of this license, to offer to the public deceptive arguments, which derive all their plausibility from an artful interchange of his own, with the common meaning. It is asserted, that to be an agent, is to act independ- ently of external influence. If this is given as a defi- ACTIVITY AND DEPENDENCE. 161 nition of an agent, it remains still to be shown, that the human mind is in fact such an agent. The definition is of no use, unless it correspond with the real nature of the being to whom it is applied. Is it a self-evident truth, that man is such an agent, that neither his natural constitution, nor his acquired propensities, neither his bodily appetites, nor external objects, have any influ- ence in determining the nature of his volitions? Can this be proved by any analogy with the material world ? The vapor which gives motion to the steam engine, the fire which devours a dwelling, the wind which sweeps over the ocean, are all very active. Does it follow, that they can not be passive, in the sense of being depend- ent on something preceding? Does the fact, that all activity in material things must have a cause, prove that activity of will can not have a cause ? Do you say, that the man himself is the cause of his volitions ? Very true. But how does this agree with the assertion, that that activity which consists in willing has no relation to a cause ? Do you still insist, that the agent himself is active, and not passive ? Does this imply that he is un- caused ; that he is self-originated. If a created being can be an agent, he can be active in willing, though he is passive in relation to the cause of his being. Do you admit, that he is passive, in relation to the cause of his existence ; but deny that he is passive, in relation to any cause of his activity ? Is there then no cause of his activity ? Is it a mere matter of accident, that he wills as he does ? Is absolute contingence an essential con- dition of all activity of the will ? It has been said, that a man can not be a free agent, if he is a mere passive recipient of influence from with- 14* 162 ACTIVITY AND DEPENDENCE. out. This is very true. If he is merely passive ; he is no agent at all. If he is merely passive, he is not ac- tive, and therefore does not act. But what absurdity is there in supposing, that he may be active and passive too : active in willing, passive in being caused to will ? If a thing is caused to be active, does it follow, that it is not active : that it is merely passive ? If a man is made willing to act in a certain way, does this prove, that he is not willing ? Is it urged, that to suppose a man to be caused to act freely, is inconsistent with the definition of free agency ? Would it not be more to the purpose, to endeavor to render our definitions conform- able to the reality of things; rather than to take it for granted, that facts correspond with our arbitrary defini- tions? Dr. Reid appears to suppose, that that which is acted upon can not act. Would he say, that the water wheel can not act, when it is acted upon by the stream ? 1 am aware that his observations were probably meant to be applied, not to the action of matter upon matter, but to the agency of the will. The laws and condi- tions of these, it is said, are not only different, but con- trary. Matter can not act, if it is not acted upon ; but the will, it is supposed, can not act, if it is acted upon. Why not ? Because this would be inconsistent with our definition of action, when speaking of the will. When a definition is framed, for the express purpose of excluding all dependence of agency of the will upon any thing preceding ; it is easy to see, that such agency, if such there ever was or can be, in the human mind, is inconsistent with being acted upon. But it ought to be understood, that a definition is not argument. It is of itself no proof. Though it may be the basis of an ar- ACTIVITY AND DEPENDENCE. 163 gument, yet something more is necessary, to justify us in drawing a conclusion. In all cases, except those in which our reasoning is merely hypothetical, it is essen- tial to a good definition, that it correspond with fact. How, then, does it appear to be a fact, that the will can not act, when it is acted upon; that it can not choose, when it is caused to choose, when it is persuaded to choose ? To maintain the doctrine of independent volition, Mr. Chubb and others make the broad assumption, that whatever is active can not be, in any sense, passive ; that it can not be acted upon ; that it can not sustain the relation of an effect to its cause ; in short, that noth- ing which is a cause can be an effect, and nothing which is an effect can be a cause. From this it follows, that there can be no success-ion of causes, one depending on another ; that every cause must be a first cause, the commencement of a series of changes which are mere passive effects. No place is here left for the common distinction between primary and secondary causes ; be- tween those which are remote, and those which are in- termediate, or proximate j all being considered as o^igin- al and immediate. In accordance with this representation, but in a wide departure from the common use of language, it is assum- ed that in the material world there is no action, no cause ; all its changes being passive effects only. The wind, the cataract, the tempest, and the volcano, unless they are self-determined, are the causes of nothing, are not active agents, but mere passive movements. Being acted upon, they can not act ; being effects, they can not be causes. Even mental operations^ unless they are 164 ACTIVITY AND DEPENDENCE. self-originated, are not acknowledged as active. Noth- ing is called a cause but volition. Action is synony- mous with choice. Even this is allowed the privilege of being considered as active, only on the ground that it is itself uncaused. If it is acted upon, it can not act. We have here then a series of most gratuitous as- sumptions and arbitrary definitions, viz. that the mean- ing of the term active is in opposition to every correct meaning of passive ; that nothing which is acted upon can act ; that no effect can be a cause ; that a material substance never acts, and is the cause of nothing ; that what are called acts of the understanding are, properly speaking, no acts ; that the only appropriate meaning of action is volition, and that even this can not be passive, in the sense of being subject to the influence of a cause. All this is preparatory to the final assumption, which is a complete principii petitio, that volition is in- dependent of all directing influence from without itself. Momentous consequences are deducible from these unwarrantable assumptions. If nothing which is a cause can be an effect, and if volition is the cause of any changes whatever, then it is itself uncaused ; and the mind is not the cause of its own acts of choice, be- ing only the subject of volitions which occur without any cause. But if the ground be taken, that the mind is the cause of its volitions, then according to the phi- losophy under consideration, it has had no cause of it- self, and is not a created substance. If it has been cre- ated, it is an effect, and therefore can be the cause of nothing. Again, if nothing which is an effect can be a cause, then as all created things are effects, He who made them must be the only cause in the universe. 165 SECTION XI. FATALISM AND PANTHEISM. Different forms of Fatalism Many of the ancient Fatalists believ- ed the acts of the will not to be determined by the Fates Is there no middle ground, between Fatalism and the doctrine of contingent volition ? Pantheism of Spinoza. AN argument in favor of independent self-determina- tion is drawn, by some, from the consideration that it enables us to keep at a safe distance from the doctrine of Fatalism. Cousin says, " The theory of Locke con- cerning freedom tended to Fatalism."* This calling in the aid of an odious appellation, is a very convenient and summary mode of confuting an opponent. It has a special advantage, when the name which is substitu- ted for argument, is so indefinite and mysterious, that the reader is in no danger of discovering its meaning. Fatalism is commonly understood to be something hea- thenish. But it has assumed such a diversity of forms, the Astrological, the Platonic, the Stoical, the Mani- chean, and the Mohammedan fatality, that it is suffi- ciently unintelligible to answer the purpose of an argu- ment which is most efficacious when least understood. It would be a more simple, if not a more satisfactory mode of reasoning, to offer direct proof of the reality of contingent self-determination ; instead of taking the cir- * Psychology, 277. 166 FATALISM AND PANTHEISM. cuitous method of first making a selection from eight or ten different kinds of Fatalism, explaining what this is, then proving it to be false, and afterwards supporting the doctrine of self-determination, by shewing in what respect it differs from Fatalism. Whatever was meant by the Fatalism of the ancients, it did not imply, that all the changes in the world are under the guidance of a being of infinite wisdom and infinite goodness. This was so far from being the case, that the Gods themselves were represented, by the doctrine, as being under the control of the Fates. According to the astrological Fa- talists, every thing was affected by influence derived from the motions, positions, and aspects of the heavenly bodies. The Stoics and some other sects held to an eternal succession of causes and effects, analogous to the infinite series of volitions which President Edwards as- cribes to the advocates of a self-determining power in the will. It is urged that Fatalists refer every change to a cause. So do the believers in self-determination ; not excepting even acts of the will. For they hold, that the agent himself is the cause of his own volitions. They believe also in a succession of causes, dependent on God. They do not suppose that man has come into being by chance. They admit that he has derived his existence, and powers of willing from the Creator. But they insist, that the succession of causes does not deter- mine volitions to be in one direction, rather than the contrary. In this also, they agree with many of the ancient Fatalists, who held that the Fates determine other things, but not the free acts of the will. Is there no way of escaping the odium of Fatalism, but by adopting the fortuitous contingence of Epicurus ? FATALISM AND PANTHEISM. 167 Is it Fatalism to believe, that He who formed the soul of man, can so touch the springs of its action, as to influ- ence the will, without interfering with the freedom of its choice ? Is a chain of causes, suspended from the throne of nonentity, to be likened to the purposes and agency of the omniscient Creator ? Is it Fatalism to believe, that motives may have a real influence in deter- mining volitions, and that they may be presented by the providence of God ; that the state of the heart has also some concern in giving direction to our acts of choice, and that this native or acquired state is not always the product of chance ? Is there no medium between acknowledging the sovereignty of the Fates over the will, and admitting no control, but the dominion of chance ? The object of our inquiry is to learn whether moral acts are determined by accident. If they are not, does it certainly follow, that they must be subject to the Fates of the heathen ? Is the authority over the heart so divided between fate and contingence, that what is not ascribed to one, must of necessity belong to the other ? Is there no room left for any effectual influence, from infinite wisdom arid benevolence ?* Pantheism. The suggestion that a denial of contin- gent self-determination leads to Pantheism, is as indefi- nite in its application, as the charge of Fatalism. The doctrine of Pantheism, as held by Spinoza and his fol- lowers, is that the universe is God ; that all finite exis- tences are only modes of the one infinite substance. With him agree substantially the Hindoo, Persian, Gre- cian, and German Pantheists. With some diversity in * See Examination of Edwards, latter part of Sec. 17. 168 FATALISM AND PANTHEISM. the mode of representation, they concur in the state- ment, that all finite beings, both material and immate- rial, either constitute God, or are parts of God ; that there is but one substance in the universe ; that all the phenomena in the world are properties, manifestations, or developments, of the divine existence. These are sometimes spoken of as emanations from the substance of the Deity ; parts separated from Him for a time, and assuming the appearance of distinct agents ; but destined to lose hereafter their individuality, and to be re-absorbed into the infinite Being from whom they have emanated. What has this hypothesis to do with the dependence of volition on the state of the heart, and the influence of motives ? Is every action which is even remotely de- pendent on God to be considered as his act ? If in him "we live, and move, and have our being," does it fol- low, that our life is his life, our motion his motion, our existence his existence? Is it Pantheism to believe, that he " worketh in us, both to will and to do ?" Does such agency of his imply, that he only acts in the case ; that there is neither willing nor acting on our part ; that there is really but one agent in the universe ? Pantheism is so far from coinciding with the doctrine, that God is the original cause of all other beings, with their modes of existence and of action, that it does not even admit that there are other beings ; that either mat- ter or mind has been created ; or that there can be any effects which were not previously contained in their cause; confounding the relation of a cause to its effects, with the relation of a substance to its properties. If it be Pantheism to believe, that God is the original cause of whatever is the cause of volition in his creatures, FATALISM AND PANTHEISM. 169 then they are Pantheists who hold that while men are creatures of God, they are the immediate cause of their own volitions. The charge of Fatalism and Pantheism is sometimes met, in the same style of argumentation, and the ac- count is balanced, by raising the cry of Pelagian and Arminian heresy. But it is quite as important, and in most cases, far more easy, to determine whether a pro- posed doctrine is true or false, than to settle the ques- tion, whether it is most nearly allied to Fatalism or Ar- minianism, to Pantheism or Pelagianism. 15 170 SECTION XII. TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. Difficulty of settling the question before us by philosophical discus- sion Appeal to scripture testimony Upon what principle, are the scriptures to be interpreted ? How far are we to make their meaning conform to our previous opinions ? Does scripture ever contradict reason ? Has God any agency in determining the acts of the will ? He causes his people to do his will He inclines their hearts to obey him His purposes extend to the heart He changes the hearts of men In consequence of his agency, they change their own hearts The purpose of God in relation to sin Men harden their own hearts Permission of sin Practical importance of the subject of our inquiry Efficacy of the means of holiness The doctrine of entire depravity Influence of the Spirit of God Conversion of the world Perpetual holiness of the saints and angels in heaven. OUR inquiry having been conducted thus far, will it now be said, that after all, there is uncertainty and doubt hanging over this subject ; that whichever side of the question we take, there are formidable difficulties to be encountered ; that although our conclusions may appear to be fairly drawn, yet, as we have arrived at them, through a series of logical distinctions, and defini- tions, and explanations, and such a variety of metaphys- ical phraseology, there is reason to suspect there may be some latent fallacy in the argument ; that we want surer ground on which to rest our opinions, upon a sub- ject of such momentous interest. This is the very re- sult to which I have been aiming to bring the discus- TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 171 sion. My object has not been to lay a philosophical foundation for religious belief; but to prepare the way for simple and confident reliance on the testimony of scripture. I have not undertaken to prove, by such ar- guments as must, at once, carry conviction to every mind, that a controlling influence is exercised over the will, in a way which is consistent with accountable agency. It has been my aim to ascertain, whether the absurdity of the doctrine has been so demonstrated, as to preclude all possibility of finding it asserted in the scriptures. If the subject is one which admits of doubt, let us look for a decision to the oracles of God. He who made the human soul, knows whether its volitions are contingent or not. But here is presented the question, in what manner are we to examine the scriptures, to learn their decision respecting a point in discussion ? By what rules are we to interpret the language of inspiration ? Are we to open the sacred volume, in the spirit of mere learners, prepared to receive implicitly whatever we find to be dis- tinctly impressed on its pages ? Or are we to call in the aid of our previous opinions on the subject in question, to enable us to make out a correct interpretation ? When professing to refer to the authority of scripture, to settle a controverted point, are we to take it for granted, that the meaning of the passages consulted must coincide with the decision which we have already formed in our own minds? What kind of reliance on the testimony of revelation is that which pre-judges the very case on ac- count of which the reference is made ? The scriptures, it must be admitted, are addressed to rational beings, to men capable of understanding moral 172 TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. truth. Without these faculties, they could not investi- gate the evidence by which the bible is shown to be a revelation from God. Nor would they have the power of interpreting correctly the language of the inspired penmen. But does the faculty of comprehending the meaning of the scriptures, imply that we are capable of discovering, by reason without revelation, ail the truths which these writings contain ? Does a capacity of un- derstanding the language of a witness, in a court of jus- tice, include a previous knowledge of all which that wit- ness can testify ? Can every one who comprehends the meaning of the declaration, that the dead shall be raised from their graves, demonstrate, by arguments not drawn from revelation, that there will actually be a resurrec- tion? It is said, and truly said, that the instructions of the scriptures go upon the supposition, that we have, or at least are capable of having, some previous knowledge of religious and moral subjects. But does this imply, that all which is contained in the word of God, is known to us, before we open its pages ? Can he who created the soul of man, and gave him all his power of forming and interpreting language, find no way of making himself understood, when communicating truths not previously discovered ? Does the faculty of knowing something on the subject of religion, without revelation, imply the power of knowing every thing, without its aid. If we can learn something of the visible objects around us, by the faint light of the moon, does it follow that we can make no additional discoveries by the bright beams of the sun ? TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 173 It is urged, that the author of revelation is also the author of our natural powers of reasoning ; and there- fore, that the declarations of scripture can not contradict the legitimate conclusions of reason. Are we to infer from this, that in the exercise of our rational faculties, we are never liable to be led into error ; that the decis- ions of human reason, unaided by revelation, are as in- fallible as the scriptures themselves ; that the searching light of inspiration can detect no fallacy in our argu- ments ? But if our powers of reasoning may fail us, in our common investigations ; they may lead us, it is said, especially under the influence of a depraved will, to er- roneous interpretations of scripture. This is undoubt- edly true. But does it follow, that revelation throws no additional light upon our path, in our search after truth ; that we are quite as liable to be deceived, when ingenuously yielding our understandings to the instruc- tions of scripture, as when relying upon the guidance of natural reason alone ? For what purpose, then, have these divine communications been made to us ? Why may we not safely lay them aside, and throw ourselves back on the resources of our own powers of investiga- tion ? Why not discontinue our efforts to send the bible to the heathen, who have the pure light of reason for their guide ; that reason which was given them by the author of the scriptures ? There can be nothing in the word of God opposed to intuitive or demonstrative certainty. But unless human reason is infallible, there may be many things found in the scriptures contrary to our previous opinions ; opin- ions formed by evidence which is merely probable, and therefore subject to be corrected by the perfect decisions 15* 174 TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. of revelation. " If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater." But we daily give credit to human testimony, though directly contradicting our pre- vious opinions. Was it probable to the view of natural reason, that the waters of the Red Sea, and of the river Jordan, would " stand upright as a heap," that the chil- dren of Israel might pass over on dry ground ; that Elijah would ascend to heaven in a chariot of fire ; that five thousand people could be fully fed upon a few bar- ley loaves ? Was it a probable conclusion of reason un- aided by revelation, that he by whom "all things were created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth," would be " made flesh and dwell among us ;" that he would labor, and suffer, and die on the cross ? Here is the probable decision of natural reason, contradicted by the certain evidence of inspired truth. If the result obtained by our reason alone, can never be contrary to revelation, because God is the author of both ; upon the same principle, the opinions of one man can never be opposed to the opinions of another ; for the reasoning powers of all have been given by the same Almighty Parent. If it be admitted, that the scriptures contain not only truths which may be learned without revelation, but some which are different from conclusions obtained by our unassisted reason ; the main inquiry returns upon us, in what way are we to come to a knowledge of the lat- ter class ? If I open the book of God, with a determin- ation to find nothing there opposed to the opinions which I have previously formed, how am I to discover any truths not known before, though written there, in the most distinct and intelligible characters ? How is TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 175 it possible for me to receive instruction from the scrip- tures, to correct any errors which I may have adopted ? My rule of interpretation would remove, at a stroke, all obstacles which might lie in the way of accommodating the meaning to my own creed. It is said, that absurd conclusions are often drawn from the scripture, by giving a literal construction to passages which are really figurative. There is no ques- tion of this. But is there no other way of determin- ing whether a passage is to be taken literally or figura- tively, than to inquire which interpretation would pre- sent a doctrine in accordance with our previous opinions ? When it is once decided, that a portion of scripture has a figurative meaning, does this imply, that it has no meaning at all; that is, that it may signify one thing or another, as occasion may require ? Figurative lan- guage, though "often ambiguous, may, in many cases, have significations as distinct and certain as literal ex- pressions. When God says to Abraham, "I am thy shield," the meaning is as definite as if he had said, I am thy protector. I may have erred, in judging it necessary to devote so large a portion of the present inquiry to an examination of the question, whether the doctrine of contingent self-determination is so demonstrably or intuitively true, that no evidence on the other side is admissible, even if found on the sacred page. I will now proceed to consult the records of inspiration, with the belief, that it is possi- ble they may throw some light on the subject ; provided we are willing to yield our understandings implicitly to the illumination and guidance of the divine testimony. 176 TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. The point on which we are to examine the evidence furnished by the scriptures, is simply this; whether any thing except a man's own will, has any influence in de- ciding what his volitions shall be ; and especially wheth- er God has any agency in determining the character of human volitions. It is not necessary for our present purpose to inquire in what manner he exercises a con- trolling influence over our hearts. If he can do this in any way, without interfering with moral agency, he may have various methods of reaching the heart, and giving a direction to the acts of the will. At one time, he may make use of the influence, the example, and the persuasions of our fellow men. At another, he may impress the truths of his word upon the conscience and the heart. He may sometimes operate upon us, by the arrangements of his providence ; and sometimes by the special agency of his Spirit. If in any or all of these ways, he gives a direction to our volitions, they are not left to the determination of chance ; they are not, in the absolute sense, contingent. Absolute contingency is incompatible with the influ- ence of any cause. But God is said to cause his peo- ple to do his will. " I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes." " The Lord God will cause righteousness and praise to spring forth before all nations.' 1 * Are these declarations consistent with the supposition, that righteousness and obedience are altogether self-determined ; that God does not, in the proper sense, cause them to spring forth among his people ; that at farthest, he does nothing more than render them probable, but not certain. * Ezekiel xxxvi. 27. Isaiah Ixi. 11. TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 177 He is said to incline their hearts to obey him. " The Lord our God be with us, that he may incline our hearts unto him, to walk in all his ways." " Incline my heart unto thy testimonies, and not to covetousness," says the Psalmist. " Incline not my heart to any evil thing."* How can the heart be inclined in one direc- tion, if the law of moral agency requires, that it be equally inclined to either side, to obedience and disobe- dience ? God is spoken of, as turning the hearts of men, " The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord ; as the rivers of water, he turneth it whithersoever he will." Are not other men's hearts as much in the hand of the Lord as those of kings ? The Psalmist prays, " Turn us, O God of our salvation, and cause thine anger to- wards us to cease." "Turn us again, O God of hosts, and cause thy face to shine, and we shall be saved." " Turn thou me, and I shall be turned, for thou art the Lord my God."f How can the heart be turned by the Lord, if from the very nature of moral agency, it must be left to turn itself, independently of any control- ling influence from any other being ? It is true, that in many instances, God, in his displeas- ure, leaves men to themselves; to the propensities of their own hearts, under the influence of the objects pre- sented to them in the common course of his providence. He gives "them over to a reprobate mind." He with- holds from them the sanctifying influence of his Spirit. But this, so far from being a privilege belonging to them * I. Kings viii. 57, 8. Psalrn cxix. 36 and cxli. 4. f Proverbs xxi. 1. Psalm Ixxx. 7. Ixxxv. 4. Jeremiah xxxi. 18. 178 TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. as moral agents, is a dire calamity, a judgment of heaven for their iniquities. " My people would not hearken to my voice," says God, " so I gave them up unto their own hearts' lust ; and they walked in their own coun- sels." " Ephraim is joined to idols, let him alone."* The control which God exercises over the hearts of men, is declared in many other forms of expression. He is said to make them obedient or perverse. " O Lord, why hast thou made us to err from thy ways, and hardened our hearts from thy fear?" Says Paul to the Thessalonians : " The Lord make you to increase and abound in love." " Make me to go in the path of thy commandments," says the Psalmist. " The Lord direct your hearts into the love of God, and the patient wait- ing for Christ."f The power of God over the hearts of men, is exerci- sed according to the arrangements and purposes of his infinite wisdom. " Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever his hand and his counsel deter- mined before (ngotioiae) to be done." " The king heark- ened not unto the people, for the cause was from the Lord, that he might perform his saying, which the Lord spake by Ahijah the Shilonite, and Jeroboam the son of Nebat." " For God hath put in their hearts to fulfill, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast." " Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands, have crucified and slain." Joseph says to his * Psalm Ixxxi. 11, 12. Hosea iv. 17. f Isaiah Ixiii. 17. Psalm cxix. 35. II. Thessalonians iii. 5. TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 179 brethren : " It was not you that sent me hither, but God."* The purpose of God to change the hearts of men, and turn them from sin to holiness, is declared in dis- tinct predictions. To the people of Israel, he promises thus : " I will take you from among the heathen, and gather you out of all countries, and will bring you into your own land. A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you ; and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh. And I will put my spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes. I will put my fear in their hearts, that they shall not depart from me. I will pour upon the house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the spirit of grace and of supplication. Thy people shall be willing, in the day of thy power."! Whether the term heart, in these passages, is to be understood as referring to the substance and faculties of the soul, or a spiritual taste, or the commanding purpose of life, or virtuous affections ; on either supposition, the change must be such as to secure active obedience ; for the promise of God is, "I will cause you to walk in my statutes." " Elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience." It is such a change as is connected with salvation. " God hath, from the beginning, chosen * Acts iv. 27, 28. I. Kings xii. J5. Revelations xvii. 17. Acts ii. 23. Genesis xlv. 8. f Ezekiel xxxvi. 24, 26, 27. Jeremiah xxxii. 40. Zechariah xii. J 0. Psalm ex. 3. 180 TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth."* The work of God, changing the heart from sin to righteousness, is represented as the exercise of creative power. " Create in me a clean heart," says David, " and renew a right spirit within me." " We are his work- manship, created unto good works."f The continuance of a religious life, as well as its com- mencement, is ascribed to the power of God over the heart. "It is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do, of his good pleasure. Who are kept by the power of God, through faith unto salvation." "Now unto him that is able to keep you from* falling, and to present you faultless before the presence of his glory, with ex- ceeding joy, to the only wise God our Savior, be glory and majesty, dominion and power, both now and ever. Amen."J To avoid the result to which the passages now ad- duced appear so conclusively to lead, it may be said, that there is another class of texts, of a very different, if not opposite meaning. If in one place, God is spo- ken of. as inclining the hearts of men to keep his law ; in others, they are commanded to incline their own hearts to the Lord. If the Psalmist prays, " Incline my heart unto thy testimonies;" he declares, in the same psalm, " / have inclined mine heart to perform thy statutes alway." If God is spoken of, as turning the hearts of men ; they are repeatedly commanded to turn * I. Peter i. 2. II. Thessalonians ii. 13. f Psalm li. 10. Ephesians ii. 10. J Philippians ii. 13. I. Peter i. 5. Jude 24, 25. TESTIMONY OP SCRIPTURE. 181 themselves from their evil ways. If he is said to give them a new heart, and to make them go in the path of his commandments ; they are required to make themselves a new heart, and a new spirit. If he is said to be able to keep his saints from falling ; they are exhorted, by the same apostle, to keep themselves in the love of God. Now, in what way, are we to determine the meaning of these two classes of texts ? Are we to consider them as directly contradictory ? Are we at liberty to make our choice between them ; to adopt the one class as true, and to reject the other as false ; or so explain them away, as to leave them no determinate signification ? If men incline their own hearts to obedience, must we conclude that God does not incline them ? If they are required to make themselves a new heart, does it follow that he does not give them a new heart ? If they turn from sin to righteousness, is it certain, that he does not cause them to turn ; that he does not make them to go in the path of his commands ; that their obedience is independent of his agency and influence ? Are we not bound on the contrary, to put such a con- struction upon the two classes of texts, that both may be admitted as true ? How is this to be done ? Evi- dently, by considering the agency of men, of which the passages speak, as being the consequence of the agency of God. If he causes them to walk in his commands, they do actually thus walk. If he makes them obedi- ent, they really obey. If he turns their hearts to him- self, they themselves turn to the Lord. If he gives them a new heart and a right spirit, they exercise the affections of a new and obedient heart. Not that the agency of God in renewing the heart, is identified with 16 182 TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. the agency of men j but the one is the consequence of the other, is dependent on the other. His turning them is not their turning. Their obedience is not his obedi- ence. His giving them repentance is not their repent- ance. But without his agency, they would not repent. His giving them a new heart, is not the same as their making themselves a new heart ; but it is causing them to make themselves a new heart. His working in them, to will and to do, is not their working ; but it is render- ing them willing to work out their own salvation. God, speaking to the Israelites, says, " I will give them a heart to know me, that I am the Lord ; for they shall return unto me with their whole heart.' 7 * "And that ye put on the new man," says the apostle, " which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness."! The divine purposes are not confined to the com- mencement and continuance of holiness. They have a relation to the commission of iniquity. God is repeat- edly spoken of, in the scriptures, as hardening the hearts of men. Of the Canaanites who were exterminated by Joshua, it is said, " It was of the Lord to harden their hearts, that they should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly." Of Sihon, king of Heshbon, it is said, " The Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver him into thy hand." Isaiah cries unto God and says, " O Lord, why hast thou made us to err from thy ways, and hardened our heart from thy fear ?"{ God repeatedly declared to Moses, that he would harden the * Jeremiah xxiv. 7. f Ep'iesians iv. 24. | Joshua xi. 20. Deuteronomy ii. 30. Isaiah Ixiii. 17. TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 183 heart of Pharaoh, and" the hearts of the Egyptians. " Arid the Lord said unto Moses, when thou goest to re- turn unto Egypt, see that thou do all those wonders be- fore Pharaoh, which I have put in thy hand. But I will harden his heart, that he will not let the people go."* It appears that he had a purpose to accomplish, in relation to the hardening of the king's heart. " And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you, that I may lay my hand upon Egypt, and bring forth my armies, and my people the children of Israel, out of the land of Egypt, by great judgments." " For Pharaoh will say of the children of Israel, they are entangled in the land ; the wilderness hath shut them in. And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, that he shall follow after them, and I will be honored upon Pharaoh, and upon all his host ; that the Egyp- tians may know that I am the Lord." " And the chil- dren of Israel shall go on dry ground, through the midst of the sea: And I, behold I will harden the hearts of the Egyptians, and they shall follow them ; and I will get me honor upon Pharaoh, and upon all his host."f When the fulfillment of these predictions was seen, in the events which followed, " The Lord said unto Moses, go in unto Pharaoh, for I have hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that I might shew these my signs before him."f * Exodus iv. 21. f Exodus vii. 3, 4, and chap. xiv. 3, 4, 16, 17, \ Exodus x. 1. 184 TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. The inference which the apostle draws, from the his- tory of Jacob and Esau, and of Pharaoh, is, " Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth."* If these several passages are allowed to have any meaning at all, they can signify nothing short of this, that God so ordered the course of his providence, that the hardening of the hearts of Pha- raoh and of the Egyptians, and of the Canaanites, was the certain consequence. In answer to these numerous and explicit declarations, will it be urged that, in other passages, it is frequently affirmed, that Pharaoh hardened his own heart ? Does it follow, of course, that the sev- eral texts quoted above are not true ; that there is no sense, in which God has ever hardened the hearts of men? Will it be said, that God merely permitted their hearts to be hardened ; or permitted them to harden their own hearts. If this be conceded, it must still be un- derstood, that he had power to prevent this result. What sort of permission is a mere inability to prevent that which is permitted ? When it is said, that it was of the Lord to harden the hearts of the Canaanites, that he might destroy them utterly ; and of Sihon, that the Lord God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obsti- nate, that he might deliver him into the hand of the Israelites ; and of Pharaoh, that the Lord hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants, that he might shew his signs before him ; is nothing more intended by all this, than that God had no power over the hearts of these men ; that he permitted them to be hardened, be- cause he was unable to prevent it ? * Romans ix. 18. TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 185 Do you say, that he left them to be hardened, under the course of his providence ? Then the course of his providence, his own providential dispensations, had an influence on them. Is the declaration of the apostle, that " he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth," consistent with the sup- position, that God has no power to prevent the harden- ing of the heart ? Is there no distinguishing interposi- tion, in the case of those who are " vessels of mercy ?" Do all these distinct declarations of scripture, respecting God's hardening the hearts of men, mean nothing more than that they happen to become hardened, under the influence to which they are exposed ? After attentively examining the various passages of scripture which speak of the purposes and agency of God, in relation to the hearts and actions of men ; de- claring that he causes righteousness to spring forth ; that he inclines the hearts of his people to obey him ; that he turns them at his pleasure ; that he makes them obe- dient or perverse ; that he directs their hearts into the love of God ; that his counsel determines before, the things to be done by human agency ; that he gives a new heart and a right spirit ; that he works in his people to will and to do ; that he is able to keep them from fall- ing, till he presents them faultless, before the presence of his glory ; and that on the other hand he often hard- ens the heart and makes it obstinate : after weighing well the import of these several expressions, can any one fail to admit, that according to the scriptures, God has a determining influence over human volitions ; can lie escape from this conclusion, on any other ground, than that he has come to the examination, with a pre- 16* 186 TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. conceived and settled opinion, that such a doctrine can not be true, and therefore, can not be found in the ora- cles of God ? Are we thus to explain away the explicit declarations of scripture, till we have brought them to coincide with our own philosophy ? Can the advocates of a directing and determining divine influence, express their opinions in stronger or more definite terms, than those used by the inspired writers? It is not necessary to contend, that a determining in- fluence implies, in all cases, a positive and immediate agency of God upon the heart. If in his unsearchable wisdom, he chooses, in many instances, to leave the hu- man will to itself, and to the motives presented to it, in the ordinary course of events ; while, as often as he sees fit, he interposes by special providences, and by the op- erations of his Spirit, to give a new direction to its acts ; it is then truly under his control. " The rivers of water are in the hand of the Lord," because he either allows them to flow in their accustomed channels, or " turneth them whithersoever he will." So the human heart is in his hand, if he can either directly or indirect- ly, control its exercises, whenever he pleases. But if, from the very nature of moral agents, all their volitions must be contingent, in the absolute sense ; they can be subject to no directing influence, from any quarter what- ever. They must be left wholly to the determination of chance.* The question, whether human volitions are contin- gent, is nothing less than this, whether God can, in any * On the testimony of scripture, see Examination of Edwards, Sec. 19. TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 187 way, by the measures of his providence, by the precepts and sanctions of his law, by the mercy of the gospel, by the terrors of perdition, by the glories of heaven, or by the operations of his Spirit, have any influence over the voluntary acts of his creatures. It is, in short, a question, whether God or chance is on the throne of the moral universe. That the Creator of all things can control the material world, no one ventures to deny. But the theories of many seem to suppose, that he can not touch the springs of moral action, without deranging the essential laws of accountable agency. Yet the gov- ernment exercised over all created minds, is as much more important, than the regulation of the material uni- verse, as the worlds of intelligent creatures, exceed in value the worlds of matter which they inhabit. This is not a subject of barren speculation. Tt is in- timately connected with some of the most important doctrines and duties of evangelical religion. Not only does the efficacy of divine influence on the hearts of men imply, that something from without the will is concerned in determining its volitions ; but the success of all human efforts for the prevention of iniquity, and the promotion of holiness, must depend on their tenden- cy, in connection with other influences, to give direc- tion to acts of the will. If volitions are, in the absolute sense, contingent ; if they are so sellvdetermined, as t,o be entirely independent of every thing from without, for being as they are ; how unavailing must be all our endeavors to induce others to turn from the practice of iniquity. To what purpose are religious instruction, and admonition, and exhortation, and in treaty, if they have no influence upon the feelings and purposes of the 188 TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. persons addressed ? How can a preacher enter the desk, with any hope of success, if he believes, that the hearts of his hearers are controlled by the law of contingence? Why should a parent attempt to guard his child against the allurements of vice, if temptation has no power to influence the will ; if warning has no efficacy in restrain- ing from iniquity ? We ought not, indeed, to rely on any human means as being, of themselves, sufficient to produce holiness, without the accompanying agency of the Divine Spirit. But absolute contingence is as in- consistent with any efficacious operation of the Spirit of God, as with a determining influence from the efforts of men. The belief that human volitions are not rendered sin- ful or holy by blind contingence, is in accordance with the scriptural representation of the entire depravity of man in his unrenewed state. It implies that there are causes and influences in operation, which give a uniform character of sinfulness to his acts of will. But there is no uniformity in the results of contingence. Perma- nent depravity is inconsistent with the supposition that, with respect to each separate volition, there is an even chance whether it will be sinful or holy. Contingent determination of the will is inconsistent with the scriptural account of the change which is wrought, in the heart of man, by the Spirit of God. Here is an influence from without. If it has any effica- cy, in determining the acts of the will to be holy, there is something besides contingence, something besides the man himself, which is concerned in deciding what his volitions shall be. When the Spirit of God, in his sanctifying influence, descends on the churches, is it a TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. 189 matter of chance whether any are brought to repen- tance ? Is the glory of the marvelous change which is witnessed, to be ascribed exclusively to the self-deter- mining power of the converts ? Is this moral renova- tion accounted for, by saying that the subjects of it hap- pen to decide as they do ? On the ground that the means of salvation, when ac- companied with the renewing influence of the Spirit, have a real efficacy, in turning the hearts of men from sin to holiness, we rest our confident expectation of the final triumph of grace on the earth, in the conversion of the ivorld to God. It is a reliance on his power to sub- due the depraved will of man, which has united the hearts of Christians, in prayer and zeal for the salvation of the heathen : which supports the missionary, in his perilous labors among those who are perishing in their superstitions and iniquities; which assures us of the fulfillment of the divine predictions, that " all the ends of the earth shall remember and turn unto the Lord." But if the decisions of the will are independent of all influence from without, what ground of hope can there be, that the heathen world will yield their hearts to the calls of the gospel. If even the Spirit of God can interpose no determining agency, to stay the desola- ting tide of depravity, without violating the laws of ac- countable volition, how can we expect an answer to our prayers for the conversion of the world ? If all the acts of the will are contingent ; if they are equally liable to be holy and to be sinful ; how can we hope for a millennial age of universal and exalted piety ? On this supposition, what security is there, that dis- affection and revolt may not, at any moment, break out, 190 TESTIMONY OF SCRIPTURE. among the hosts of the redeemed in heaven ? Are they safe by being confirmed in perpetual obedience ? How is it possible they should be thus confirmed, if their wills are so balanced, by the freedom to either side, that at every instant, there is an even chance in favor of and against their fidelity ? It may be said, that God has promised to secure them in constant and endless obedi- ence. He has promised, then, to preserve them in that state in which their wills are not evenly balanced between holiness and sin. If their sad experience of the conse- quences of transgression on the earth, if their blissful participation in the glories of heaven, if their gratitude for the mercy which has brought them safe to the para- dise above, if their view of the terror and despair to which the impenitent are doomed ; if these and other motives, powerfully impressed on their minds by divine influence, are sufficient to keep them from falling ; then are they sufficient to prevent that equal tendency of the will to opposite directions, which seems to be thought by some to be essential to responsible agency. Must we then be driven to the conclusion, that as soon as the redeemed are made perfect in heaven, they cease to be moral agents; that they no longer possess that freedom to either side which is necessary to render them deserv- ing of praise or blame ? Confirmation in uniform and never ending rectitude, is inconsistent with contingent determination. If every volition is fortuitous, and if the countless myriads in the heavenly world, are to put forth acts of will continually, through the ages of their future existence ; it is absurd to suppose that all these acts will chance to be on the side of holy obedience. * OVERDUE. ===== OCT 22 ? YB 22670 II I m U M M Y n m m .