By the same Author. Preparing, and will soon be ready, A BRIEF GREEK SYNTAX, WITH HINTS ON THE ACCIDENCE. THE peculiarity of this Syntax, which is intended mainly for the higher classes of Schools, will be a constant reference to the general principles of all language, and an illustration of Greek Idioms by comparing them with those of various other languages. ON LANGUAGE, Works by the same Author. ERIC ; or, Little by Little. A Tale of Roslyn School. Seventh Edition. JULIAN HOME. Third Edition, carefully reyised. ST. WINIFRED'S ; or, The World of School. Second Edition. An ESSAY on the ORIGIN of LANGUAGE, based on Modern Researches. 8vo. 5s. ' The uninitiated reader can, at the present time, find no better guide in the English language.' ATHEX.ECM. ' Mr. FABRAB has done what no one before him has attempted, and has filled up in a very masterly manner a place that had been too long vacant in the popular literature of science .... His book will be read with pleasure by those to whom the subject is wholly new, and will command the respect of proficients in philology. As a popular introduction to the science it is among the best books in any lan- guage, and is unique in our own.' SPECTATOR. "N CHAPTERS ON LANGUAGE. BY THE KEV. FKEDERIC W. FARRAE, M.A. LATE FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE ; HON. FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON ; AUTHOR OF 'THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE' ETC. Non excogitandum neqne fingendum, sed inveniendum quid Natnra faciat ant ferat. BACON. '701 /j.ev ovv iff pi TOVTWV &>s etpov KO! avijvtav ovrias typwfya.' el 5e TIS &\\tas ftov\^fffrai $o T V JOSEPHUS, Antt. x. 11, 7. LONDON : LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO. 1865. LOSDOX PBISTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AJfD CO. NEW-STREET SQUAB E TO R. B. LITCHFIELD, ESQ. IN MEMORY OF MANY YEARS OF FRIENDSHIP, THESE PAGES ARE AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED. PREFACE. WHEN, more than four years ago, I published my book on the * Origin of Language,' it was, I believe, the only book distinctly devoted to that subject which had appeared in England since the end of the last century. Since that time Philology has been daily gaining ground as a study of infinite importance, and I believe that the stimulus it has received has been mainly due to the eloquence and genius of Professor Max Miiller, whose first series of Lectures was published in 1861. The views however which it was the object of my Essay to explain and illustrate, although they were propounded by philologists of the most unquestioned eminence, have found in Professor Miiller a strong opponent, and there- fore have met in England with but few converts and fewer supporters. Nevertheless after constant study, and the most candid consideration of the objections urged against them, I believe that those views, in spite of the vehe- ment assaults directed against them, remain absolutely unshaken. Now, if they are true, they furnish to Ety- mologists so simple and luminous a principle whereby Vlll PEEFACE. to guide their researches, and they throw so strong a light on one of the most interesting problems that can be presented for our solution, that it is most desirable that they should not be dismissed unexamined and with a sneer. I have therefore devoted some portion of this book to a careful, detailed, and respectful review of all that has been urged against them, and I have thought it due to the high authority deservedly attributed to Professor Miiller's opinion, to state those objections in his own language. The answer may not be convincing to every one, but at least it will be admitted that the objections have been fairly met. I hope that I have never used a single expression inconsistent with the high respect which is due to the courtesy, learning, and ability of so eminent an opponent. The controversial part of the book however only occupies a few chapters, and even in these I have steadily kept in view the object of bringing the theory into clearer and fuller relief, of placing it as far as possible on a scientific basis, of removing the mis- representations which have clustered round it, and of supplying linguistic facts and illustrations which might be valuable to the student without any reference to his particular views. And, besides this, there are whole chapters of the book which have no controversial aspect whatever, and which may, I hope, contain suggestions not wholly unworthy of consideration by scholars of every shade of opinion. I should not for a moment venture to speak of my work in these terms if it contained nothing beyond the PREFACE. IX results of my own thought. But besides my own reasonings and speculations it sets forth the views of those who are incomparably more entitled to a hearing. A glance at almost any page will show that the au- thorities quoted are neither few nor unimportant ; and, as I have carefully avoided an idle parade of learned names, I can assure the reader that there are very few references in the book certainly none of any im- portance which have not been derived immediately from my own reading. And, more than this, I have often fortified my position by the authority of others in cases where the thought was my own, and was ex- pressed in my own language. In one or two places, which are always carefully pointed out, I closely fol- low the reasonings of the late Professor Heyse, whose book (System der Sprachwissenschaft} is one of the wisest and most beautiful treatises on this subject which have ever fallen into my hands. The reader too will find constant allusions to other profound philological writings, which I have always studied with great profit. I have placed at the end of the book a list of the works from which I have derived most advantage, and which have been most constantly in my hands. In conclusion I have only to thank those critics who bestowed such indulgent consideration on my previous labours. Their approval, and the still more valuable notice of my work by some very eminent scholars, both English and continental, have encouraged me to pro- cee,d. My present book is solely addressed to serious students. I am indifferent to the view taken of it by X PREFACE. the prejudiced and the ignorant; yet as I am solely actuated by a desire for truth, I have tried to eliminate every expression which was likely to cause needless offence. If any such have escaped my notice I trust that they will be attributed to a lively interest in my subject, and that no one will consider them to have been dictated by a presumptuous or unkindly tone of mind. I shall be the first to regret it, if I have ever been misled by the zeal of controversy into any want of amenity or moderation. I cannot hope to have escaped errors, and for these I venture to ask an indulgent consideration. These pages have been written, and the proof-sheets corrected, under a pressure of other avocations which has often made me hesitate whether I ought not wholly to aban- don this subject to those who can study it under greater advantages. Any mistakes into which I have fallen are due to this cause, and not either to wilfulness or care- lessness. Whether they are pointed out by friendly or by unfriendly critics, I shall always be ready to acknowledge and to correct them with cheerfulness and candour. HARROW: Augtist, 1865. SYNOPSIS. CHAPTER L LANGUAGE A HUMAN DISCOVERY. PAGE Nothing humanly discoverable has been made a subject of revelation . . . . . . ,1 Language was humanly discoverable . , 3 Certainty of its non-revelation ..... 5 Scripture asserts its discovery by man .... 7-8 ' God said ' . . .... 8 Adam, the Name-giver . . . . . .10 Nature's teaching . . . ' . . . .11 Slavery to the letter , ' . . . , .12 CHAPTER II. THE EXPERIMENT OF PSAMMETICHUS. The story probably true . . . '*'' . 14 It confirms inferences from other data . . -' -i : . 14 (i.) Deserted children would probably evolve a language . 15 (ii.) Animal-names among the earliest words . . .16 (iii.) Animal-names naturally Imitative . . .17 Their value as suggesting the Idea of Language . . .19 "Wild-children. Their Onomatopoeias . ... .20 CHAPTER HI. THE NAMING OF ANIMALS. Primitive necessity for Onomatopoeia . . . .22 Classification of animal-names . 23 Xll SYNOPSIS. PAGE The class nnder which they must have originally fallen . . 24 Australian names for animals . . . . .24 Chinese Onomatopoeias . . . , . .25 Animal-names in Sanskrit . . -. . .26 In Hebrew . . . . . .28 In Ancient Egyptian . . . . . .29 Names adopted by Colonists . , ' . . .30 They are either (1) Borrowed native names .. . .30 Or (2) Expressive of attributes . . ^ . .30 Or (3) Misapplications suggested by analogy f . . .31 Or (4) When invented are invariably Imitative . . .34 Imitative words invented in modern Argots . . .35 Why new words must be Imitative . . . .37 Inferences . . .37 CHAPTER IV. THE INFANCY OF HUMANITY. Primitive inferiority of Man . . ..- . .; , . 39 Man created with only the capacity of Speech . . , . 41 Even if Language were revealed . . . . .41 A priori objections are valueless . . . . .41 And presumptuous . . . .... .41 And contradictory of existing facts . . . * .. .42 Existing degradation of human races . . ... . 436 The 'state of nature' not necessarily miserable . . .46 Fancies versus Facts, respecting the first men . . .47 The Darwinian hypothesis . . . f .49 Language furnishes fresh proofs of our position . . . 52-3 Bizarre complexity and cumbrousness of savage dialects . .53 Opinion of Mr. Garnett . ... . . .54 And of Mr. A. Gallatin .. . . . >..' .55 Inference ..... 55 CHAPTER V. PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT. ' Invenisse non instituisse ' . . . . .57 Admitted fewness of roots . . . . .58 Very few words necessary for the wants of life '' . .59 Germs of Speech developed by the Intellect . . . 59-82 Realisation of the Ego . . . . . .62 SYNOPSIS. Xlll PAOB Gradual distinctness of Sensuous Impressions . . .63 Sensations become Perceptions . . . . .64 Intuitions . . . .'.''.' . . 65 Kepresentations . . . . ' t .65 Concepts . . . . . . - .66 "Words correspond to Representations . . . . 67 Illustration of the Process . , ... .67 Recapitulation . . . . .69 CHAPTER VI. POSSIBLE MODES OF EXPRESSING THOUGHT. Tactile Language . . ._ . . . .71 Art, a Language addressed to the Eye . . . .72 Language of Gesture . . . . . . 73-6 Its advantages and imperfections . . . . .77 Superiority of Audible Language . . . , . . 79 CHAPTER VII. SOUND AS A VEHICLE OF THOUGHT. Analogies of Light and Sound . . . . .81 The Voice ..... , . . 82 Its penetrative power . . . . . . * .83 Machinery by which it is produced .... 84-5 Elementary Sounds . . y* .86 Material of Speech . .-'' . . . .87 CHAPTER VIII. INTERJECTIONS. Ultimate identity of Interjection and Onomatopoeia "V . 88 Two classes of Interjections . . . . .89 Interjections in different languages ,. . .. . 90-1 Home Tooke's denunciation of them . . . .92 Interjections are parts of Speech . ' .' . . .93 The source of many words . ..';.. . 94 Their value in Etymology . . ; . * . .96 'Roots' . . . -. . . ' . . . . 96 Dignity of Interjections . . . . . .98 The part they play in Literature ., 98-100 XIV SYNOPSIS. PAGB Their high linguistic importance . . . . .100 Originally more numerous . *. , . . .101 Impressions provoke expressions. Ancient stories . 101-2 The Idea of Speech . . . . . : . 103 CHAPTER IX. LAUTGEBERDEN, OR VOCAL GESTURES. The term due to Heyse . . . . . 104 Expressions of the will ...... 105 Recapitulation ....... 106 What is Prof. Max Muller's view? . . . .107 CHAPTER X. .VOCAL IMITATIONS. Epicurus ........ 109 Instinct of Imitation ...... 109 Onomatopoeias imitate the subjective impression . - . .110 Story of Phsedrus . . . . '- . . Ill Diversity of Imitations for the same Sound . . .112 Not mere passive echoes . . . . \ , .114 But ideally modified . ' . . ,, . . .114 Names for Thunder . . .' . . .115 Instinctive evolution of Language . . . 116-7 Myths, indicative of Onomatopoeia . . .117 / CHAPTER XI. FROM IMITATIVE SOUNDS TO INTELLIGENT SPEECH. Sounds developed into words . . . . .121 Connection between Sound and Sense . . . . .121 Sounds, to become signs, must have been self-explaining . . 122 The only theory of Language ..... 123 CHAPTER XII. ONOMATOPCEIA. Matter-words and Form-words 124 Sounds as the signs of other sounds . . . .126 Vocal imitation only a stepping-stone for Language .>' . 127 Sounds became Words ...... 128 Imitation the starting-point . . . . .128 SYNOPSIS. XV CHAPTER XIII. OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY ; HOW REFUTED. PAGE First objection. ' Onomatopoeias few in number' . . . 130 Dictionaries of them . . . " ' . ' . .132 They become greatly modified in form . . . .132 Just as alphabetic letters lose their pictorial significance . .134 The Hebrew Alphabet . . . . . .136 Closeness of the Analogy ..... 137-8 New words, not self-explicative, never succeed . . .138 Second objection. ' Animal-names not Imitative* . .140 A few such instances would prove nothing . . .141 But nearly all of those adduced are Imitative . . . 141 As may be seen by their cognate forms : The word ' Goose ' . . . . . . 143 The word ' Hen ' . . * . . .144 The word ' Dove ' . . . . . .145 The word 'Hog' . . . . . .164 The word 'Cat' . . . . . .146 The word 'Dog' ..... 147-9 CHAPTER XIV. FERTILITY OF ONOMATOPOETIC ROOTS. Third objection. ' Onomatopoeias are sterile ' . . 152 The root 'cuckoo' . . . . ... . 152 The root 'era' ....... 153 General predicative ' roots ' inconceivable . . . . 154 Onomatopoeia a luminous principle of Etymology . . .155 Immense fertility of Imitative roots .... 156 Fertility of the primitive sounds ma, ta, da, &c. . . 157-61 Onomatopoeias even among the numerals .... 162 CHAPTER XV. DIGNITY OF ONOMATOPOEIA. Language an echo of Nature ,, ; ... . - t . A ,. . 165 Fourth objection. ' Onomatopoeias are modern' . .166 If true, an argument in their favour . ... . 167 Their function in Poetry . f . . . 9 - , ' t . 168 Harmonies of Language . . . . ._ . .169 XVI SYNOPSIS. CHAPTEE XVI. SUPPOSED ILLUSORINESS OF THE SEARCH. PAGE The search not ' lawless ' but the reverse . . . .171 Errors of ' scientific ' Etymologists . . . .174 Prof. Miiller's instances all fail ..... 174 The interjections Fie ! &c. . . ', . 174-6 'Squirrel' . . . . . . , . 176 Katze' . . . . . . . .176 ' Thunder ' Onomatopoetic in all languages . . .177 Examination, and probable history of the word . , 178-82 CHAPTEE XVII. REFLEX IMITATIVE TENDENCY OF LANGUAGE. The charge of ' fancifulness ' . . . , . ,.. .183 Falls to the ground . . . . .. . 184 Views of St. Augustine . . . . , . .185 Contain a residuum of truth . . . ., : .186 Instances . . . . . . ' . 187 CHAPTEE XVIII. THE PART PLATED BY THE IMAGINATION. ' How are ideas not expressive of sound to be accounted for by Onomatopoeia?' . ' . . . . .190 Illustration of the subject from the Chinese Ideography . .192 Fancy indispensable . . . . . > 193 Close analogy to the Progress of Language . . .194 Verbal roots could not have been the earliest . . . 196 Feebleness of abstraction among uncivilised races . 199 ' Ideas of going ' . . . . . . ' . 201 ' Ideas of standing ' . . . . ... 202 ' Ideas of tasting ' . . , . . . .202 CHAPTEE XIX. METAPHOR. Sound, the exponent of things soundless . . . " . 205 All impressions subjective . . . . ' . 206 The Sensorium Commune . . . . . . 207 Instinctively observed analogies of different senses . . 208 Light and Sound . . . . . . . 209 Other senses . . .211 SYNOPSIS. XVli PAOB Gonders ........ 212 Catachresis ....... 212 ' The Pathetic Fallacy ' . ... 214 Personification .. ., .. . . . .214 Human relationships attributed to things inanimate . .215 The Unseen described by analogy . . . . . .216 Analogies to describe the Soul, &c. . . . 219-21 Localisation of the passions . ' . . . 221 Hieroglyphics . . . . .'",. 222 Colours in metaphor . . . . . . : . . 223 Metaphor among the Numerals . . . . 223-26 CHAPTER XX. METAPHOR IN VARIOUS LANGUAGES. Metaphor most abundant at earliest stages . . . 227 Hebrew vagueness of terms ..... 229 Hebrew Metaphors . . . . . 230 Metaphors in Greek Tragedy . . . . . 231 Metaphor and National Character . . . . .231 Kafir Metaphors ... . . . .233 Malay Metaphors . . . ... . 233 Chinese Homonyms . . . . . . 234 Metaphors in the Argot ..... 236-7 Evanescence of conscious Metaphor .... 237 Universal consequent confusion of Metaphors . . . 239 Especially in Shakspeare ...... 240 Metaphor, happily indispensable to Language .* . . 241 Their illustrative Power . . . . . 242 Languages without Metaphor . . . 2424 What the results would be ... . . . 245 CHAPTER XXI. OTHER LINGUISTIC PROCESSES. Recapitulation , , . . . . . . 247 Struggle for existence among words .... 250 Different possible characteristics. 'Left'. . . . 251 Contradictory roots . . . . . .251 Their explanation ....... 252 Antiphrasis ....... 253 Errors about it ....... 254 Proclus's fifteen methods ...... 255 Reducible to three or four .... 256 XV111 SYNOPSIS. CHAPTEK XXII. THE NATURE OF WORDS. PAGK Analogists and Anomalists . . . . . 258 Confusions of the subject . .. . . -, . 258 Heraclitus ........ 260 Democritus ....... 261 Weak arguments on both sides . . . . 262 Universality of Analogist views . . ... . 263 The Jews Analogists ...... 264 Paronomasia ....... 265 Mystic import of words . . . . . ' . 266 And names. Biblical Etymologies .... 267 'Adam' . . . . . . ,. , . 268 Insulting name-changes . . . ; .271 Myths about Adam ...... 272 Import of names among the Greeks . . . 2725 Among the Eomans . ' . ' . . . . 275 Among the Moderns . . . . . . 276 Alterations of names . . . . . . 277 Euphemism '.-'. . . . . 278 Its source . . . . . . 278-80 The primitive granite of Language . . . . 280 Dangerous hypocorisms of Vice . . . . .281 The 'fatal force' of words . . . . 283 CHAPTEK XXIII. THE NATURE OF WORDS continued. Sound and sense ....... 286 The Senses, and the Understanding . . " iT ;- ' . 287 The three factors of a word ..... 287 Words express nothing of the nature of things . . . 288 They teach us nothing about things . . .' . 289 Which is a knowledge impossible to us . .' . . 290 And they teach us nothing about our abstract nature .- .291 A knowledge no less impossible to us . . . . 291 They merely express relations . . ' . . 292 And even as the signs of our conceptions they are essentially imperfect . . ." . .' . 293 Instances . . . ...'. . 294 They are the starting-point of the full-grown Intelligence . 296 But the goal of its earlier development . . . . ' 295 Their immense historical, intellectual, and moral importance 296-7 Conclusion . . . . 298 ERRATA AND ADDENDA. Page 42, line 11, for which read whom. 43. See some examination of the question about races with a deficient language in Mr. E. Burnet Tylor, Researches into the Early History of Mankind (p. 77 sq.), who also has some admirable chapters on gesture language, picture writing, &c. Unfortunately Mr. Tyler's work appeared after my own was in print. I am glad to find in his two chapters on myths abundant confirmations of the arguments which I have used in a paper on ' Traditions real and fictitious' in the Trant. of the Ethnol. Soc. 1865. 156. The Essay of Buschmann's here referred to will be found translated in the sixth volume of the Philological Society 1 * Transactions (1852-1853). Buschmann shows that even as far back as the Etymol. Magnum these sounds had been noticed, thus : jramros { curb TJ riav iraiSuv rS>v lunptav 7rpo<7riVI B'SaS ) by 'a speaking spirit' (K^0 PP"^ 3 )- If these versions were correct, it is obvious that the texts would contradict each other as much as they do in M. Ladevi-Eoche's inference from Gen. ii. 19. ' Ce que signifie "quo 1'homme avait ete cree pensant et parlant ' (p. 9). One of the rabbis explains ' that was the name thereof,' to mean its name in the thought of God before Adam uttered it. Hamann, Herder's friend, approves this explanation, and illustrates it by ' the Word was God.' John i. 1. For a mass of idle learning (?) on the subject of Adam's ovofj.o6fffta, see Clem. Alex. Strom, i. 335 ; Jos. Antt. 1, 2 ; Fabricius, Cod. Pseudep. v. 6 ; Buddseus, Hist. V. T. i. 93; Heidegger, Hist. Pair. i. 148; Witsius, 3, 162; Carpzov. Ararat. Crit. p. 113; Otho, Lex. Bab. s. v. Adam ; Hottinger, Hist. Or. 22, &c. After diligent examina- tion of these passages, and many more on the same topic, I may safely say that more really valuable exegesis may be found in a sentence or two of Steinthal, Urspr. d. Spracht. p. 23 ; Gesch. d. Sprachwissensch. p. 12, 15. CH. i. LANGUAGE, A HUMAN DISCOVERY. 11 Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field'' (Gren. ii. 19,20). When we remember the invariable tendency of the Semitic intellect to overlook in every instance all secon- dary causes, and to attribute every result directly to the agency of superior beings, it is clear that by no possi- bility could the writer have given more unmistakeable expression to his view that language was the product of the human intelligence, and had no origin more divine than that which is divine in man. Nature with its infinity of sweet and varied sounds was ringing in the ears of primal man. * Heavens ! J exclaims Herder, 'what a schoolroom of ideas and of speech ! Bring no Mercury or Apollo as a Deus ex machina from the clouds to earth. The whole many- sounding godlike nature is man's language-teacher and Muse. She leads all her creatures before him; each carries its name upon its tongue, and declares itself vassal and servant to this veiled yet visible god ! It delivers to him its markword into the book of his sovereignty, like a tribute, in order that he may by this name remember it, and in the future use and call it. I ask whether this truth, viz., that the understanding, whereby man is lord of nature, was the source of a living speech which he drew for himself from the sounds of creatures, as tokens whereby to distinguish them, I ask whether this dry truth could in Oriental fashion be more nobly or beautifully expressed than by saying that God led the animals to him to see what he would name them, and the name that he would give them, that should be the name thereof? How, in Oriental poetic fashion, can it be more distinctly stated that man discovered speech for himself out of the tones of living 12 OX LANGUAGE. CH. i. Nature, as a sign of his ruling intelligence ? and that is the point which I am proving.' l There are other meanings of the passage in Genesis, full of profundity and moral value. This is not the place to dwell upon them, although they have almost universally been overlooked ; but what we may at once conclude from the passage is this that in this case, as in so many others, those who oppose science and try to sweep back with their petty human schemes of in- terpretation its mighty advancing tide, are usually as much at variance with the true meaning of Scripture, as they are in direct antagonism to reason and truth. * The expressions of Moses,' says one 2 whose orthodoxy none will call in question the late Archbishop Sumner in his ' Records of Creation ' < are evidently adapted to the first and familiar notions derived from the sen- sible appearances of the earth and heavens; and the absurdity of supposing that the literal interpretation of terms in Scripture ought to interfere with the advancement of philosophical inquiry would have been as generally forgotten as renounced, if the op- pressors of Galileo had not found a place in history.' 1 Abhandlung iiber den Urspr. d. Sprache. p. 77. This is one of the most eloquent and delightful essays ever written. That Herder should have lived to retract it, and retrograde into the orthodox mysticism of Hamann is truly astonishing. He gave up his own invincible argu- ments to acquiesce in an opinion which had been contemptuously re- jected by Plato two thousand years before him, and which had even been refuted by a Father of the Church Gregory of Nyssa when it had been supported by Eunomius, the Arian Bishop of Cyzicus. 2 Abp. Sumner, Records of Creation, i. 270. 13 CHAPTER II. THE EXPERIMENT OF PSAMMETICHUS. Keu (ffiotni TO. ircuSfa afupSrfpa trpoffiriinovTa BEKO2 ty&vfov. Herod, ii. 2. LET us try for a moment to pass back in imagination to the dawn of humanity. Let us try to conceive not as an idle exercise of the fancy, but in accordance with inductive observations and psychological facts the processes by which the earliest human beings were led to invent designations for the immense and varied non- ego of the universe around them. The analogy between the childhood of our race and the childhood of every human being has been instinc- tively observed, and has been used for the purpose of linguistic experiments. Whether Frederic II. (of Ger- many) or James IV. (of Scotland) l ever shut up children in an island or elsewhere, with no attendants, or only such as were dumb, may not be certain; but after due deliberation, I strongly incline to accept as a fact the famous story which Herodotus received from the Egyptian priests, that a similar attempt to discover the original language was made by Psammetichus, king 1 See Origin of Lang. p. 9 and p. 14, where I have given some reasons for not rejecting the story about Psammetichus, as is done by Sir G. Wilkinson (Rawlinson's Herod, i. 251) on very insufficient grounds. ]4 ON LANGUAGE. CH. n. of Egypt. I am not aware that a single valid argument has been adduced against its authenticity. Not only does the story carry with it, in its delicious naivete, the air of truth, but also it is quite certain that a nation, so intoxicated with vanity on the subject of their tran- scendent age as the Egyptians were, would never have invented a story which unjustly conceded to the Phry- gians a precedence in antiquity. Accepting the story, therefore, we disagree from Professor Max Miiller 1 in despising all such experiments, and, on the contrary, regard this fragment of practical philology as one of extreme value, and all the more valuable because, as he justly observes, all such experiments would now be * impossible, illegal, and unnatural.' For the story, if it be true, establishes three most important conclu- sions, which are in themselves highly probable viz., 1* That children would learn for themselves to exercise the faculty of speech ; 2. That the first things which the young Egyptian children named were animals ; and 3. That they named the goats, the only animals with which they were familiar, by an onomatopoeia ; for that Bekos, the word uttered by the children, is simply an imitation of the bleating of goats 2 is evident. It is 1 Lectures, First Series, p. 333. He is so far right that the experiment would be inconclusive ; but why? because to make it valuable we should require an indefinite number of children and an indefinite length of time. But our assertion of the human origin and gradual discovery of language rests on quite other grounds. 2 'Bekos' is (if we regard os as a mere Greek termination added by Herodotus) the exact and natural onomatopoeia for the bleat of a goat, as has been noticed by English children ; and it is in fact so used in the chorus of more than one popular song, and in the French becqueter. The fact that no suspicion of suck an explanation of the sound occurred to Psammetichus, or any of those who heard the story, is an additional con- firmation of its truth. It is strange that no Greek was ingenious enough CH. ii. THE EXPEKIMEXT OF PSAMMETICHUS. 15 to us a strong internal evidence of the truthfulness of the story that it furnishes us with conclusions so exactly in accordance with those at which we arrive from a number of quite different data. The radii of inference from many other sources all converge to the common centre of a similar hypothesis. And be it observed that the facts, so far from being invented in confirmation of any such hypothesis, were interpreted by the Egyptian philosophers in a totally different, and indeed in a most ludicrous manner. The confirmation ought to remain unsuspected, because it is wholly unintentional. (i.) As regards the first of these conclusions that children left to themselves would evolve the rudiments of a language Max Miiller says that it ' shows a want of appreciation of the bearings of the problem, if philo- sophers appeal to the fact that children are born without language, and gradually emerge from mutism to a full command of articulate speech. We want no explanation how birds learn to fly, created as they are with organs adapted to that purpose.' The illustration appears to be unfortunate in many respects, and wholly beside the mark. Every bird flies at once and instinctively when its organs are full-grown the action is as instinctive to them as sucking is to every infant mammalian ; but the exercise of speech is an action infinitely complex, and innumerable accidents have proved that a single child growing up in savage loneliness would have no articu- late language. But is it by any means certain that this would be the case with a colony of infants, isolated and kept alive by some casualty which prevented them from to hit on this explanation, although they had the onomatopoeias V?, fi-flffcrw, 7jxia, &c. Compare the French name for a goat bouc, Germ. boc, Ital. becco, &c. 16 OX LANGUAGE. CH. n. learning any existing dialect ? The question cannot be answered with certainty, though it seems probable that as our knowledge advances we may be able to affirm that such must and would be the case. It is a well- known fact that the neglected children in some of the Canadian and Indian villages, 1 who are often left alone for days, can and do invent for themselves a sort of lingua franca, partially or wholly unintelligible to all except themselves. And if it be objected to this illus- tration that these children have already heard articulate speech, which, on the theory of a human invention of language, would not have been the case with the earliest men, we again appeal to the acknowledged fact that deaf-mutes have an instinctive power to develope for themselves a language of signs a power which con- tinues in them until they have been taught some artifi- ficial system, and which then only ceases because it is useful no longer ;- just as in the animal kingdom an organ decays, and becomes rudimentary when its exer- cise ceases to be of any importance to the possessor. (ii.) Our second observation from the story of Herodo- tus was that the first things which the children named were animals ; and this too is precisely in accordance with every-day facts. Even a young infant learns very soon to distinguish practically between the animate and the inanimate creation ; and few things excite its asto- nishment and pleasure more than the various animals around it. Careful observation of the progress of children in the power of using speech will soon convince any one that they learn to name the dog, the cow, the sheep, and the horse among their earliest words, and indeed 1 Mr. R. Moffat testifies to a similar phenomenon in the villages of S. Africa, Mission. Travels. CH. it. THE EXPERIMENT OF PSAMMETICHUS. 17 soon after they have learnt to attach significance to those natural sounds by which all nations express the relationships of father l and mother. Thus, in repre- senting the animals as the first existing things which received their names from the earliest man, the Jehovist of the Book of Genesis wrote with a profound insight into the nature of language and the germs out of which it is instinctively developed. (iii.) But, thirdly, from the fact that the only sound used by the Egyptian children was an imitation of the sounds made by the only living things with which they were familiar, we saw another indication of the fact that onomatoposia (which is only a form of the many imitative 2 tendencies which characterize the highest o animals) is the most natural and fruitful source out of which the faculty of speech was instinctively evolved ; the first stepping-stone in the stream which separates sound from sense, matter from intelligence, thought from speech ; the keystone of that mighty bridge which divides the Svvajus from the epyov, the faculty from the fact. In this point also our inference i& curiously con- firmed by a variety of observed phenomena. What, for instance, are the names by which, in the present day, children first learn to distinguish animals ? Are they not invariably onomatopoetic ? 3 Is any one acquainted with any child, ordinarily trained, which first learned to call a dog, a cow, or a sheep by their names, without having learnt, by means of the nursery 1 See Buschman, Ueber d. Naturlaut. 2 The cause of this particular development of the imitative instinct will be explained hereafter. 1 A horse does not frequently neigh ; and this is probably the reason that in so many dialects the childish onomatopoeia for it is derived, not C 18 ON LANGUAGE. CH. n. onomatopoeias, that a sound may stand for a thing ? This is the most difficult lesson of all language ; and when, by the use of a few words, the child has once learnt it, when it has once succeeded in catching this elementary conception, the rest follows with astonishing rapidity. Hence, very few onomatopoeias, and these borrowed from the commonest and simplest objects, are sufficient for the purpose. What the child has to learn is, that a modification of the ambient medium by a motion of the tongue can be accepted as a representation of the objects which are mirrored upon his retina in other words, that the objects of sight may be recalled and identified by articulated sounds. But how is he to learn this marvellous lesson ? Only by observing in- stinctively that since certain things give forth certain sounds, the repetition of the sound, by an inevitable working of the law of association, recalls the object which emits it. Nor is it the slightest objection to this to say that the child does not learn the onomatopoeia for itself, but learns it from its nurse. Supposing that from the sound it makes, but from the sounds (Lautgeberden) addressed to it, e. g. in English gee-gee ; in parts of Germany, on the other hand, hotte-p'drd ; in Finland humma, &c. See Wedgwood, Etym. Diet. s. v. Hobby, ii. 246. (That horse is itself an onomatopoeia seems probable from the cognate form hross, Germ. Boss.) The fact, then, that a young child names a horse from the sounds used in urging horses on, only shows how widely various are the points which may suggest the onoma- topoetic designation. Similarly in Spain a mule-driver is called arriero from his cry arri, and in the French argot an omnibus is aie aie. The whole observation illustrates the active, living power of speech, which is no mere dead matter that can be handed over from father to son. See Heyse, Syst. d. Sprachwissenschaft, 47. Even a watch is to a child in- variably a tick-tick, and the very same onomatopoeia is used in the Lingua Franca of Vancouver's island, and in which we also find 'hehe,' ' liplip,' 'tarn-water/ &c. for ' laugh,' 'boil,' ' cataract,' &c. CH. ii. THE EXPERIMENT OP PSAMMETICHUS. 19 we grant this, what does it prove? Simply the fact that every nurse and every mother is guided by the swift, beautiful, and unerring beneficence of instinct to follow the very same process which the great mother, Nature, adopted when man was her infant child ; or let us say, in language more reverent, and not less true, that such a process is in instinctive unconscious accord- dance with the great method of the Creator. For the whole idea of language, the conception that those impressions which the brain mainly receives through the sense of sight may be combined and expressed by means of the sense of hearing, influenced through the organs of sound, the discovery, in fact, of a common principle, by virtue of which unity and coherence may be given to every external impression, all lies in the discovery, by a child, that a rude ideal imitation of the bark of a dog may serve as a sign or mark for the dog itself. Hence, although Professor Max Miiller's desig- nation of the onomatopoetic theory of language as the ' bow-wow theory,' J was accepted by all flippant minds as a piece of crushing and convincing wit, it is really nothing but an undignified way of expressing that which is, as we shall see by his own admission, a great linguistic probability, and which at any rate deserves respectful consideration because it has been deliberately accepted by some of the greatest thinkers and the greatest philologists of the century. Plutarch tells us the commonly-accepted Egyptian legend that Thoth was the first inventor of language ; 1 We are glad to find an expression of half-regret for this unfortunate term in later editions of Prof. Muller's lectures ; to abandon it finally would be but a graceful concession to the many eminent men who have held the view. C 2 20 ON LANGUAGE. CH. n. and he adds the curious tradition that, previous to his time, men had no other mode of expression than the cries of animals. That such may well have been the case is illustrated by the fact that it has been found to be so among wild children lost in the woods and there caught long afterwards. Thus we are told of Clemens, one of the wild boys received in -the asylum at Over- dyke (an asylum rendered necessary by the number of children left destitute and uncared for in Germany after Napoleon's desolating wars), that 'his knowledge of birds and their habits was extraordinary,' and that * to every bird he had given a distinctive and often very appropriate name of his own, which they appeared to recognise as he whistled after them ; ' l a sentence which can only mean that his onomatopoeias were of the most objective or simply-imitative kind. Here, then, in his- torical times, is a surprising, unquestionable, and most unexpected confirmation of the inferences which we felt ourselves entitled to draw from the story of Psammeti- chus. Without dwelling on the arguments adduced in a previous 2 work, or attaching too much importance to the fact that the aborigines of Malacca f lisp their words, the sound of which is like the noise of birds,' or that the vocabulary of the Yamparicos is f like the growling of a dog, eked out by a copious vocabulary of signs,' we may find a very strong indication of the reasonableness of 1 See an interesting paper on Wild Men and Beast Children, by Mr. E. Burnet Tylor, Anthropol. Eev. i. p. 22 ; and Ladevi-Roche, De F Orig. du Lang. p. 55. H t. Hist, d'une jeune Fille sauvage, Paris, 1775. Tulpius, Obs. Med. p. 298. Camerarius, Hor. Subsec. Cent. 1. Francf. 1602. Diet, des Merveilles de la Nature, v. Sauvage. Virey, Hist, du Genre Hum. i. 88 and ad f. &c. 2 Origin of Lang. p. 75 seqq. CH. ii. THE EXPERIMENT OF PSAMMETICHUS. 21 our belief in the certainty that the more savage (i. e. the more natural and primitive) any language is, the more invariably does it abound in onomatopoeias, and the more certain we are to find that the large majority of animals has an onomatopoetic designation. 22 OX LANGUAGE. CH. HI. CHAPTEE III. THE NAMING OF ANIMALS. 'Fingere . . . Grsecis magis concessum est, qui sonis etiam quibusdam et affectibus non dubitaverunt nomina aptare ; non alia libertate, quam qua itti primi homines rebus appellationes dederunt.' QUINCTHJAN, Instt. Or. Tiii. 3. EVERT fact which as yet we have passed in review would lead us to the conclusion that the first men, in first exercising the faculty of speech, gave names to the animals around them, and that those names were ono- matopoetic. 1 It is hardly too much to say that they could not have been otherwise. For unless we agree with the ancient Analogists, and see a divine and mys- terious connection, a natural and inexplicable harmony between words and things, by virtue of which each word necessarily expresses the inmost nature of the thing which it designates ; or unless we are Anomalists, and attribute the connection of words with things to the purest accident, and the most haphazard and arbitrary conventions ; unless we declare ourselves unreservedly 1 The word 'onomatopoeia' is now universally understood to mean a word invented on the basis of a sound-imitation. It may be worth a passing notice that Campbell's use of it in his Rhetoric (ii. 194), to signify the transformation of a name into a word, as when we call a rich man a Croesus, or as in the line ' Sternhold himself shall be out-Stern- holded' is, so far as we are aware, wholly unauthorised. CH. in. THE NAMING OF ANIMALS. 23 the champions of one or other of these equally exploded views, or accept in their place some mystical or inex- plicable theory of * roots,' we must be prepared with some other explanation which shall exclude from lan- guage alike the miraculous and the accidental. What this explanation is will appear hereafter ; but at present we may say that, having disproved the revelation of language, we cannot suppose its development possible without some connection between sounds and objects. Now, as we have seen already, no connection is so easy and obvious, so self-suggesting and so absolutely satis- factory, as the acceptation of a sound to represent a sound, which in its turn at once recalls the creature by which the sound is uttered. If we consider the natural instinct J which leads to the reproduction of sounds, the brute imitations of wild-men and savage children, the onomatopoetic stepping-stones to speech adopted by all children, and the a priori presumption just explained, little or no doubt upon this point can remain in any candid mind. But we can go yet further by examining the actual nomenclature of animals in existing languages. If we consider any number of names for animals in any modern language, we shall find that they fall into various classes, viz. : 1. Those for which no certain derivation can be suggested; 2. Those derived from 1 This imitativcness (in -which lies the tendency to onomatopoeia) is found even in animals. I once possessed a young canary which never sang until it had heard a child's squeaking doll. It immediately caught up and imitated this sound, which it never afterwards lost. It is well-known that nest-birds, if hatched by a bird of another species, will reproduce, or attempt to reproduce, its notes. There are good reasons for believing (since wild dogs do not bark) that the bark of the domestic dog is the result of hearing the human voice. See Rev. dis deux M&ndes, Feb. 1861. 24 OX LANGUAGE. en. in. some analogy, or characteristic, or combination of cha- racteristics which the animal presents ; 3. Those which are distinctly onomatopoetic in origin or in form. The first class of words cannot of course furnish us with any linguistic inferences, and may here be left out of the question ; l under the second and third classes fall all names of recent origin ; and ?/, as the Bible asserts, and as has been shown to be independently probable, animals were the first objects to receive names, they MUST have received names belonging to the third class (viz. : onomatop&ias}, because no previous words would have existed wherewith to designate or combine their observed qualities. But the imitative origin of animal names is not only a priori most probable, but reasoning a posteriori we see it to be generally the fact. If we would discover any analogies for the speech of primitive man, we must look for them in the languages of those savage nations who approach most nearly to the condition in which man must have appeared upon the earth. Yet if we examine the vocabulary of almost any savage nation for this purpose, what are we certain to discover ? That almost every name for an animal is a striking and obvious onomatopoeia. Take, for instance, the following names of some of the few birds and animals found in Australia : Ke-a-ra-pai. The white cockatoo. Wai-la. The black cockatoo. Ka-rong-ka-rong. A pelican. 1 We assume, however, that every word has a reasonable derivation if we only knew what it was ; just as we know that no place in the world ever received a name which could not be accounted for, though there are hundreds of such names of which we can now give no explanation. CH. 111. THE NAMING OF ANIMALS. 25 Ki-ra-ki-ra. The cock king-parrot. Kun-ne-ta. The hen king-parrot. Mo-a-ne. The kangaroo. Nga-ii-ivo. The seagull. These are chosen almost at random from 'Threlkeld's Australian Grammar,' and in other cases the author himself calls marked attention to the similar origin of others, as follows : " Kong-ko-rong. The emu, from the noise it makes" p. 87. " Pip-pi-ta. 1 A small hawk, so called from its cry." p. 91. " Kong-kung. Frogs, so called from the noise they make." p. 87. " Kun-bul. The black swan, from its note." p. 87. Or again, let us take some specimens from a North American 2 dialect the Algonquin. Shi-sheeb, duck ; Chee-chish-koo- / ivan, kos-kos-koo-oo, owl; oo-oo-me-see, screech-owl; mai-mai, redcrested woodpecker; pau- pau-say, common woodpecker; shi-shi-gwa, rattle- snake; pah-pah-ah-qwau, cock. 3 In Chinese, too, a language which is generally believed to retain more of the characteristics of primitive speech than any other, ' the number of imitative sounds is very considerable.' A few may be seen quoted by Professor 1 Compare the English name Pippit ; the Latin Pipilare, &c. 2 The highly euphonic character of the New Zealand language renders it unsuitable for illustrating the point before us; otherwise one can hardly avoid seeing onomatopoeias in Ti-oi-oi, Aki-aki, Akoa-akoa, the names of different birds, Pipipi, the turkey, &c. See the Ch. Miss. Soc.'s New Zealand Gram. Lond. 1820. 3 I have borrowed these Algonquin words from a suggestive chapter in Dr. Daniel Wilson's Prehistoric Man, i. 7-i. 25 ON LANGUAGE. CH. in. Miiller in the first series of his Lectures (p. 252) ; but in point of fact they constitute a whole class. The sixth class of Chinese characters is called Hyai-Shing ' meaning and sound.' " These," says Marshman, 1 in his Chinese Grammar, " are formed by adding to a character which denotes the genus, another which denotes the imagined sound of the species, or the individual sig- nified. They adduce by way of example kyang, which, by adding to shooi water, the character kong, forms a character which denotes a rapid stream, from an allu- sion to the sound of its water when rushing down with violence. And also ho, the generic name of rivers, which is formed by adding to shooi, water, ho the sup- posed sound of a river in its course." These, with the signs Chwan-chyn, are about 3,000 in number. Savage languages are, as we have already observed, the best to show us what must have been the primitive procedure ; but we can trace the same necessary ele- ments of words in languages far more advanced. In Sanskrit, for instance, is not go, the original of our cow 2 (Germ, kuh ; comp. the words bos, /3oDs, ftoda), jodw], a direct imitation of the sound which the English child imitates by moo (comp. mugire) ? Is not bukka a goat (comp. bukkana barking, bukhara the lion's roar, ySvo-o-o), fivfcrys, bucca, buccina, buck, butt) a very obvious onomatopoeia ? Is not cukara 3 a pig (cf. , fremo, &c. ). The bee. Bambhara (cf. jSopfios, &c.). The bee; like our childish word bumble-bee. Indindira. Great bee (cf. nOprivrj). Druna (probablement aussi une onomatopee). A drone. 1 See Pictet, Les Origines Indo-Europeennes, ou les Aryas Primitifs, i. pp. 330535. We should certainly feel inclined to add many other words (e. g. sarispra, serpent, &c.), in spite of the often-strained and unlikely derivations suggested for them. If they were not originally onomatopoeias, they have at least become so ; and instances of this reflex tendency are hardly less important, as throwing light upon our in- quiries, than names indubitably imitative in their origin. 28 OX LANGUAGE. CH. HI. Katurava. Frog (cri rauque) ; and Bheka, frog ; ' sans doute une onomatopee.' Bhiruka (root bhr, cf. Pers. bir, thunder). A bear. Kurara and Khara$abda. Eagle. Kukkuta. A cock. Grdhra. Vulture. Krdgha (Pers.). Hawk (cf. karaghah, crow). Krkavdku. Fowl in general ; from krka, and va9, to sound. Uhika, alu, ghuka, gharghara, &c. Owls of different kinds. Karaka. Crow. Kaka (cf. chough, &c.), ' e*videm- ment une pure onomatopee.' Kuktika. Cuckoo. Kolm. Swan ; ' imitatif du cri kouk ! kouk ! ' Karatu. Crane. Tittiri. Partridge. Varvaka. Quail. Pika. Woodpecker ; ' cette racine n'est sans doutc qu'une onomatopee.' The list might be indefinitely multiplied ; but let us now turn to the Hebrew, and see what analogous facts it offers. For the sake of English readers we will represent the Hebrew words in English characters also, that they may judge for themselves. Take, for instance, such distinctive imitative words as Scherakreka. A pye; the Greek icapd/ca^a. Bochart, Hieroz. ii. p. 298. t Zarzir. A starling. Id. p. 353. Schephiphoun. The horned snake. Gresen. Thes. iii. p. 146. CH. nr. TIIE NAMING OF ANIMALS. 29 .V)K Aryeh. The lion. The supposed derivations are very doubtful. M .K lyim. Lynxes. Nomen ovofjuzTOTroirjriKov. Boch- art, Id. i. 845. -13 Gur. A whelp. Shdchal. The roarer. From an Arabic root= rugitus. Dukiphath. Lapwing (rather Hoopoe, cf. Copt. kukupha); Lat. Upupa. 1 Bochart, Hieroz. ii. p. 347. OVV Tziim. Wild cats, &c. N'5? Labhia. A lioness ; ' rugiendi sonum imitans.' Gresen. Thes. s. v. D^p Sis. A swallow ; compare Ital. zizilla, Lat. zinzu- lare, &c. Bochart, Hieroz. vol. ii. p. 62. Tor. A turtle-dove (turtur, &c.). Tsildtzdl. A locust, from its shrill noise. Again, if we take the ancient Egyptian language 2 we find such words as mouee, a lion ; hippep, an ibis ; ehe, a cow ; hepepep, hoopoe ; croor, frog ; rurr, pig ; chaoo, cat ; phin, mouse. We see then that, alike in the Semitic and in the Aryan families, onomatopoeia supplies a certain and satisfactory etymology for the names of many animals ; and if we add doubtful cases, where the suggested deri- vations are awkward and farfetched, we might say, without exaggeration, of most animals. We have seen similar onomatopoeias in the ancient Egyptian, which is supposed to have affinities with both ; and we have found them immensely prevalent in various sporadic 1 Hence, the Greek legend about its cry, that it was the transformed Tereus crying IIoD, iroO. 1 Prehistoric Man, i. 71. 30 OX LANGUAGE. cu. nr. families, which some would call Turanian a name which we may on some future occasion see very good reason to reject. In fact, in these Allophylian savage dialects, and the more so in proportion to the primitive character of the people who speak them, onomatopoaia appears to be the rule, and terms derived from other relations or properties the rare exception. Without going any further, is it possible to doubt what must have been the tendency of animal nomenclature among the earliest men ? It has often happened in modern times that the extension of travel and commerce has thrown nations into connection with lands in which the flora and fauna are wholly different from their own. The instinctive procedure which they adopt to name these new objects will add new strength to our position. For here again one of these four processes takes place; either 1. They adopt the existing or aboriginal term, which they find already in use ; or 2. They use a compound, expressive of some quality or resemblance, as in cat-bird, snow-bird, mocking-bird, blue-bird, &c ; 3. They misapply some previous name of the animal most nearly resembling the one to be named ; or 4. If they invent a new and original (indecomposible) term, it is invariably an onomatopoeia. 1. The first procedure requires no illustration, as it offers nothing curious or instructive beyond the fact that the shorter and easier a native name is, the more readily is it adopted. The only reason why this practice is not more common is the inordinate length of the delicate imitative appellations in primitive languages. 2. The second process is not so common, and is only interesting as illustrating the variety of observed charac- CH. in. THE NAMING OF ANIMALS. 31 teristics by which a name may be suggested. For instance, the elephant has been called by names meaning i the twice-drinking animal (dvipa], or the two-tusked (dvirada\ or the creature that uses its hand (hastiri) ; yet these different conceptions all represent one and the same object. Similarly the serpent is called in Sanskrit by names meaning ' going on the breast,' l or * wind-eating.' Pictet furnishes us with many similar instances of this method of nomenclature, which is illus- trated by the name duck-billed platypus, or * beast with a bill,' for the ornithorhynchus of New-Zealand, and the Dutch aardvark, or ' earth-pig,' for the Orycteropus capensis. * Of everything in nature,' says Bopp, * of every animal, of every plant, speech can seize only one property to express the whole by it.' 3. The third process deserves passing notice, because we shall see hereafter its importance. 'In the slow migrations of the human family,' says Dr. Daniel Wilson, * from its great central hives, language imper- ceptibly adapted itself to the novel 'requirements of man. But with the discovery of America a new era began in the history of migration. ... In its novel scenes language was at fault. It seemed as if language had its work to do anew as when first framed amid the life of Eden. The same has been the experience of every new band of invading colonists, and it can scarce fail to strike the European naturalist, on his first arrival in the New World, that its English settlers, after occupying the continent for upwards of three centuries, instead of 1 Les Orig. Indo-Eur. i. 383. It is perhaps more common in the Zincali language than any other. BiondelK Studii Linguistici, p. 114, and in many argots, e. g. in the German Rothwelsch, goose is Plattfusz, hare Laugfusz, ass = Langohr, &c. Id. 113. 32 OX LANGUAGE. CH. m. inventing root-words wherewith to designate plants and animals, as new to them as the nameless living creatures were to Adam in Paradise, apply in an irregular and unscientific manner the names of British and European flora and fauna. Thus the name of the English part- ridge is applied to one American tetranoid (Tetrao umbellus), the pheasant to another (Tetrao cupido) ; and that of our familiar British warbler, the robin, to the Turdus migratorius, or totally different American ' thrush.' Mr. E. J. Eyre remarks that when an Australian sees any object unknown to him, he does not invent a name for it, but immediately gives it a name drawn from its resemblance to some known object. This is very true, but it is strange that he should have considered it as peculiar to Australians. 2 On the contrary, the fact has been observed from the earliest times, and is noticed by authors so ancient as Epicurus, 3 Aristotle, 4 and Varro. The latter 5 observes that in Latin the names of fish are usually borrowed from the land creatures which most resemble them, as anguilla (eel) from anguis (snake). Several similar instances occur among the Eomans. The elephant, for instance, they called the Lucanian ox, 1 Prehistoric Man, i. 62. 2 'Der Mensch stellt bestandig Vergleichungen an zwischen dem Neuen was ihm Yorkommt, mit Alten was er schon kennt.' Pott. Etym. Forsch. ii. 139. * "O9fv Kal irfpl TUV oSrJActfi/ cwrb nav (paivopfvcw xpr] ffrmeiovcrBai. Epic. ap. Diog. Laert. x. 32. 4 QbaiKo.. i. 1. 5 ' Vocabula piscium pleraque translata a terrestribus ex aliqua parte Bimilibus rebus, ut anguilla.' Varro, De Ling. Lat. v. 77. (Comp. X' S > *7X e * os )- Compare Amos ix. 3, where ' snake ' is used for a sea- creature. By a very natural transference anguilla in later Latin means a thong for punishing boys the Scotch ' tawse.' Du Cange. 8. v. CH. in. THE NAMING OF ANIMALS. 33 not being at first familiar with its name, and knowing of no animal larger l than the ox ; the giraffe they styled camelopardus, from its points of resemblance to the camel and the leopard, and ovis fera 2 (or foreign sheep), from the mildness of its disposition ; and they knew the black lion by the synonym of * Libyan bear.' The Dakotas, we are told, call the horse sungka-wakang, 3 or spirit-dog; and Mr. Darwin 4 tells us that in 1817, 'as soon as a horse reached the shore, the whole population took to flight, and tried to hide themselves from " ilie man-carrying pig" as they christened it.' Some American nations call the lion * the great 5 and mischiev- ous cat.' In the Fiji Islands man's flesh is known as * long pig.' When first they saw a white paper kite 6 they called it * manumanu' (a bird), having never seen such a thing before ; and money from the same cause they called * ai Lavo,' from its resemblance to the flat round seeds of the Mimosa scandens. The Dutch could find no better name than Bosjesbok, bush-goat, for the grace- ful African antelope ; and in the Spanish name alligator we see that they regarded that unknown river-monster as a large lizard. 7 The New Zealanders called the first horses they saw ' large dogs,' as the Highlanders are said to have called the first donkey which they brought to their mountains * a large hare.' The Kaffirs called 1 It is very doubtful whether in some Aryan languages there has not been a confusion between the names for elephant and camel. See Pictet s. v. Le Chameau. See Plin. viii. 17- Fera=peregrina. Prehist. Man, i. 72. Voyage of the Beagle, p. 408. Michaelis, De T Influence des Opinions sur le Langage. Seeman, Mission to Viti, pp. 45, 377. El lagarto, the lizard. See Farrar, Origin of Lang, p, 119. D 34 OX LANGUAGE. CH. in. the first parasol 1 to which they were introduced 'a cloud.' To this day the Malays have no better name for rat than 2 * large mouse.' This, then, is an important principle to notice in all theories respecting language. 4. If, however, none of these processes furnish a con- venient name for animals hitherto unfamiliar to new colonists, if the native name be too uncouth or difficult for adoption, and the animal offer neither a ready analogy, nor any very salient property, to provide itself with a new title, then a new name must be invented ; and in this case we venture to assert that there is not to be found in any country a single instance of a name so invented which is not an onomatopwia. Such names as whip-poor-will, pee-vfla.ee (Musdcapa rapax), towhee (Emberiza erythropterd], kittawake (Larus tridactylus\ &c., may be profusely paralleled ; and in some cases the onomatopoetic instinct is so strong that it asserts itself side by side with the adoption of a name ; thus (as in the childish words moo-cow, bumble-bee) the North American Indian will speak of a gun as an Ut-to-tafi-gmi, or a Paush-ske-zi-gun.. It has often been asserted that man has lost the power of inventing language, and this present inability is urged as a ground for believing that language could not have been a human invention. We have elsewhere 3 given reasons for disputing the assertion, and even if it were true, it would be beside the mark, seeing that the absence of all necessity of exercise for a faculty is the certain cause of its all-but-irretrievable decay. From the fact, how- 1 Charma, Or. du Lang. p. 277, who refers to Condillac, Gram. eh. v. Crawford, Malay Gram. i. 68. 3 Origin of Lang. p. 68 sqq. A very few instances of invented words, with some remarks upon them, may be found, Id. pp. 60, 61. CH. in. THE NAMING OF ANIMALS. 35 ever, that when men do invent new words they are almost invariably onomatopoeias, we see an indeM pointing us back with unerring certainty to the only possible origin of articulate speech. For whatever may be true of abstract * roots,' it is demonstrable, and will be shown hereafter, that roots which by their onomatopoetic power are the only ones capable of explaining and justifying themselves, so far from being the sterile playthings which Professor M. Miiller repre- sents them to be, have in them a fertility and a power of growth which can only be represented by the analogy of vegetable life, and which is as sufficient to account for the fullgrown languages of even the Aryan family as the germinative properties of an acorn are sufficient to account for the stateliest oak that ever waved its arms over British soil. The history of colonisation, then, by reproducing some of the conditions of primitive man, enables us to see his linguistic instincts in actual operation, and those instincts undeniably confirm our theory by dis- playing themselves in the very directions which we have been pointing out. But we can offer yet another proof of the reasonableness of our view in certain languages of modern invention, to which we shall again allude. I mean the various Argots of the dangerous classes throughout Europe. These languages have to fulfil the opposite conditions of being distinct to those who use them, and unintelligible to the rest of the world. And how do they effect this ? Partly indeed by gene- ralising the special, and specialising the general; partly by seizing on some one very distinct attribute and describing it, if necessary, by periphrases ; but also in great measure by the obvious resource of direct sound- it 2 36 OX LANGUAGE. CH. in. imitation. Thus the German thief, no less than the English, calls a watch a tick, the French thief calls it tocquante ; the Italian thief speaks of a pig as grug- nante, the German as grunnickel, the English 'the grunting,' the French as grondin, &c. These languages must, from their very nature, remain uncultivated, and the consequence is that they abound in onomatopoeia. In the English slang, a pulpit is a Tmm-box ; carriages and horses are rattlers and prads. In the French argot the heart is battant; a sheep is belant; a grimace is bobine ; a marionette is boms-bouis ; to die is claquer', a liar is craquelin; to drink a health is eric-croc ; a skeleton-key is frou-frou ; a glutton is licheur ; a shoe is paffe ; a soldier, by an onomatopoeia \which it would take too long to explain, is piou-piou ; a little chimney-sweeper is raclette ; a cab is roulant ; .a dog tambour ; a noisy child tarabate ; and gendarmes, from the songs which soldiers like, is called tourlouru. These are but a few instances out of many, and it is impossible to deny that they establish the necessity of having recourse to onomatopoeia when new words have to be invented. They therefore furnish a fresh support to the views here advocated. When by strict etymological laws we have traced back a word through all its various changes, instructive and valuable as the process is sure to have been, we have done nothing to explain its origin or to account for its earliest history, unless we can point to its ultimate germ in some onomatopoetic or interjectional root ; and per- haps in the majority of cases this can be done with a fair ...mount of probability; for the number of roots required for the formation of a language is extremely small ; and that small number is amply supplied by the imitation CH. ni. THE XAMIXG OF AXIMALS. 37 of natural sounds, and by the instinctive utterances which all violent impressions produce alike in animals and in men. The reason why new words, except of an imitative kind, are not invented is because every word involves a long history from its sensational origin to its final meaning, and the result without the process is felt to be a contradiction and an impossibility. This is why all attempts to frame an artificial language have been a failure, and the ponderous schemes of Kircher, and Becker l and Dalgarno, and Wilkins, and Faignet, and Letellier can only move us to a smile, because they are based on a conventional theory of language which is utterly mistaken. This, too, is the reason why lan- guage is stronger than emperors, and Tiberius 2 could neither give the citizenship to a word, nor Claudius 3 procure acceptance even for a useful letter. A radically new word to have any chance of obtaining currency must of necessity be of an imitative character. It is a curious fact that some of the tribes 4 on the coast of New Guinea derive even the names which they give to their children from direct imitations of the first sounds or cries which they utter. We are surely entitled then to draw secure inferences from the facts hitherto observed, and those inferences 1 For an account of their systems see Du Ponceau, Mem. sur le Syst. Gram, de quelques Nations Indiennes, pp. 26-31, 320. Hallam, Lit. Eur. iii. 362 ; and Letellier, Etablissement immediat de la Langue Universelle. 2 ' Tu enim Caesar civitatem potes dare hominibus, verbis non potes,' said Capito to Tiberius. Sueton. De Ulustr. Gram. * Claudius vainly tried to introduce into the Roman alphabet an antisigma X, with the value Ps. 'pro qua Claudius Caesar Antisigma > hac figura scribi voluit, sed nulli ausi sunt antiquam scripturam mutare. Priscian, i. De Literarum Numero et Affinitate. 4 Salverte, Hist, of Sames, i. 62. Engl. Transl. 38 OX LANGUAGE. CH. in. may be summed up in the observation that animals were among the first objects to receive names, and that, in the absence of any previous words, they could not have been named except by onomatopoetic designations. This we have endeavoured to render strong and secure by many proofs, drawn both a priori from the nature of the case, and from the analogies presented by the methods in use among children and among savages; and a posteriori from the phenomena which have invariably recurred when, in the course of history, a condition of circumstances has been reproduced which in any way resembles that which must have existed in the case of primal man. 39 CHAPTER IV. THE INFANCY OF HUMANITY. ~*Ht> -)(f6vos 8r' %v &TO.KTOS avOpdnrtav jSi' Kal 0Tjpic8rjs, icrxws 0' inrr^perris. TijviKavrd /uoi Soice? TlvKi>6s TIS &\\os Kal ff Teyovevcu, bs . 6eiov el IGNOT. ap. SEXT. EMPIRIC. As we have here arrived at a sort of landing-place, we may devote a separate chapter to consider the full bearing of the conclusions thus formed. In so doing, we are not digressing from the main point, but rather we are removing a groundless prepossession which would lie in the road of all further advance, and we are at the same time calling attention to one of those important facts which it is the object of philology to illustrate or discover. For, obviously, if language was a human invention, and was due to a gradual development, there must have been a time in man's history when he was possessed of nothing but the merest rudiments of articulate speech ; in which, therefore, he must have occupied a lower grade than almost any existing human tribe. This is a conclusion which cuts at the root of many preconceived 40 OX LANGUAGE. CH. iv. theories. Thus, Lessing l remarks that God is too good to have withheld from his poor children, perhaps for centuries, a gift like speech; and M. de Bonald asks how we can suppose * that a Good Being could create a social animal without remembering that he ought also from the first moment of his existence to inspire him with the knowledge necessary to his individual, social, physical, and moral life.' Such reasoners, therefore, reject the doctrine of the human origin of language as alike an injustice to God and an indignity to man. In answer to such ' high priori ' reasonings, it might be sufficient to say that we are content, for our part, humbly to observe and record what God has done, rather than to argue what He ought to do or ought not to do, incompetent as we are in our absolute ignorance * to measure the arm of God with the finger of man.' Claiming for ourselves the character of observers only, and desirous to accept the results to which our enquiries directly lead, without any regard to system or prejudice, we might easily repudiate assumptions which rest on the mere sandy basis of systematic prejudice. It is childish arrogance in us to argue what plans are consonant to, and what are derogatory of God's Divine Power and Infinite Wisdom. Seeing that we have not the capacity for understanding that which is, it is preposterous in us to argue on any general principles as to what must have been. Perfect humility and perfect faith, a faith in Truth which seems to have the least power in many of the loudest champions of a supposed orthodoxy, are the first elements of scientific success. The problems and mysteries which encumber all our enquiries, the 1 S'dnmtl. Schriften, Bd. x. CH. iv. THE INFANCY OF HUMANITY. 41 adamantine wall against which we dash ourselves in vain whenever we seek to penetrate the secrets of the Deity, should at least prevent us from following Lessing and M. de Bonald in laying down rules of our own, in accordance with which we fancy that God MUST inevitably have worked. Moreover, if language was a Revelation and not an Invention, at what period in man's life was it revealed ? If, indeed, man was, according to the Chaldee paraphrast, wealed *a speaking intelligence' (see p. 10), we get over this difficulty, though it is only at the expense of an absurdity, and by making the Bible contradict itself. But if not, there must have been a time, on any sup- position, when man wandered in the woods a dumb animal, till God bethought Him of inspiring language. Surely such a view is even less pious than that of Lucretius himself. 'Any one,' says Steinthal, 1 'who thinks of man without a Language ' [or, he should ha?e added, the capacity for evolving a language] ' thinks of him as one of the Brutes ; so that any one who calls down the Deity as his teacher of Language, gives Him only an animal as a scholar.' In other words, unless man was born speaking, (and it is apparent in Scrip- ture that language was subsequent to creation), then, even on this theory, man must have once been destitute of a language, and must, therefore, on this theory also, have emerged from a condition of mutism. Why then should a similar belief be held an insuperable objection to a theory so certain as the human discovery of lan- guage ? It is forsooth an insult to the dignity of man and a slur on the beneficence of God to suppose that 1 Urspr. d. Sprache, p. 40. 42 ON LANGUAGE. CH. iv. man appeared on this earth in a low and barbarous condition ! But WHY is it ? Do those who use such reasonings consider that they are thereby arraigning and impugning before the bar of their own feeble cri- ticisms the actual dealings of God? If it be indeed irreconcileable with Grod's goodness to suppose that He would have created man in a savage state, is it more easy to believe that He would nmv suffer, as He does suffer, the existence of thousands who are doomed throughout life to a helpless and hopeless imbecility, and that for no fault of their own? thousands in which the light of reason has been utterly quenched ; thousands in whom it never existed, and who pass in helpless idiocy from the cradle to the grave, as irresponsible as the brutes who perish, without language, without reli- gion, without knowledge, without hope? Facts like these ought to silence us for ever when we attempt beforehand to assign limits to the possible workings of God's Providence. We know that He is infinitely good and gracious, but we cannot know how His Providence will work. If for many ages millions of the human race have been, and still are, born into a low and barbarous con- dition, why may they not have been originally so created? We know from history and from ordinary reasoning that existing savage races could not have sunk 1 into this condition, and there seems every ground for believing that they are morally, mentally, and physically incapable 1 Archbp. Whately (Preliminary Dissert, iii. in the Encycl. Britannica) argues that savages can never, of themselves, rise out of degradation ; it is as easy to show that they can never sink into such a condition. We do not believe that the primeval savages were in any way direct ancestors of the two noble races the Aryan and the Semitic. CH. iv. THE IXFAXCY OF HUMANITY. 43 of rising out of it, since they melt away before the advance of civilisation like the line of snow before the sunlight. 'God,' says M. Jules Simon, 1 'who suffers millions of savages to exist in three quarters of the globe, may well be supposed to have permitted in the beginning that which he permits at the present day,' What shall we say, for instance, of the tallow-coloured Bosjesman, 2 who lives for the most part on beetles, worms, and pismires, and is glad enough to squabble with the hyaena for the putrid carcass of the buffalo or the antelope ? Of the leather-skinned Hottentot, 3 * whose hair grows in short tufts, like a worn-down shoe brush, with spaces of bare scalp between,' and who is described as a creature 'with passions, feelings, and appetites as the only principles of his constitution'? Of the Yamparico, ' who speaks a sort of gibberish like the growling of a dog,' and who ' lives on roots, crickets, and several bug-like insects of different species ; ? 4 Of the aborigines of Victoria, 5 among whom new-born babes are killed and eaten by their parents and brothers, and who have no numerals beyond three? Of the Puris 6 of Brazil, who have to eke out their scanty language by a large use of signs, and who have no words for even such simple conceptions as l to-morrow ' 1 Rev. des Deux Mondes, 1841, p, 536. 2 Caldwell, Unity of the Human Race, p. 75. 3 Personal Adventures in S. Africa, by Eev. G. Brown (a missionary), p. 7. 4 Capt. Mayne Reid, Odd Races, p. 330 sqq. * W. Stainbridge on the Aborigines of Victoria. Trans, of Etkn. Soc. 1861, p. 289. Fern-roots, grubs, mushrooms, and frogs are their main diet ; that of some other savages is too disgustful for utterance. Greenwood, Curiosities of Savage Life, p. 15. 6 Mad. Ida Pfeiffer, Voyage round the World, 44 OX LANGUAGE. CH. iv. and s yesterday ' ? Of the naked, houseless, mischievous, vindictive Andamaner, 1 with a skull hung ornamentally round his neck ? Of the Fuegians, 2 * whose language is an inarticulate clucking,' and who kill and eat their old women before their dogs, because, as a Fuegian boy naively and candidly expressed it, ' Doggies catch otters, old women no'? Of the Banaks, 3 who wear lumps of fat meat, artistically suspended in the cartilage of the nose ? Of the negroes of New Guinea, 4 who were seen springing from branch to branch of the trees like monkeys, gesticulating, screaming, and laughing? Of the Alforese 5 of Ceram, who live in trees, * each family in a state of perpetual hostility with all around ' ? Of the forest-tribes of Malacca, 6 'who lisp their words, whose sound is like the noise of birds ? ' Of the wild people of Borneo, 7 whom the Dyaks hunt as if they were monkeys ? Of the cannibal Fans 8 of equatorial Africa, who bury their corpses before eating them ? Of the pigmy Dokos, 9 south of Abyssinia, * whose nails are allowed to grow long like the talons of vultures, in order to dig up ants and tear in pieces the flesh of serpents, which they devour raw ' ? Of the wild Veddahs 10 of Ceylon, who have gutturals and grimaces instead of 1 Mouatt's Andamaners, p. 328. 2 Darwin, Voyage of a Naturalist, p. 214. The boy who gave the philosophic defence of cannibalism, imitated, as a great joke, the screams of the poor old women, while being choked in the smoke. 3 Hutchinson, Ten Years' Wanderings, p. 245. 4 Crawfurd, Malay Gram. i. clxi. s Pickering, Races of Man, p. 304 sqq. Id. 7 Id. 6 Du Chaillu's Equatorial Africa. This has been denied. 9 Prichard, Nat. Hist. L 306. Norris's Note. Dr. Davy, Researches, ii. 177. 10 Sir J. Emerson Tennent, Ceylon. CH. iv. THE IXFAN'CY OF HUMANITY. 45 language ; ' who have no God ; no idea of time and dis- tance; no name for hours, days, or years; and who cannot count beyond five on their fingers'? Of the Miautsee, 1 or aborigines of China, whose name means 'children of the soil,' and who, like the Malagassy, the Thibetans, and many African tribes, attribute their origin not to gods and demigods, not even to lions (as do the Sahos), or to goats (as do the Dagalis), but, with unblushing unanimity, to the ape ? Of the Negrilloes of Aramanga, the Battas of Sumatra, the wild people of Borneo, the hairy Ainos of Jesso, the Hyglaus of the White Nile, the Kukies and other aborigines of India, even the Cagots and other Eaces Maudites of France and Spain ? These beings, we presume no one will deny, are men with ordinary human souls. If then (rod can tolerate for unknown generations the perpe- tuation of such a state of existence as this, the perpetu- ation of people with squalid habits, mean and deformed heads, hideous aspect, and protuberant jaws, what possible ground is there for denying that he may also have suffered men at the Creation to live in what is called a state of nature, which is the name given to a state of squalor and ignorance, of savagery and degra- dation? Considering these facts, and believing with Schlegel that savage nations are savage by nature, and must ever remain so, some (and among them Niebuhr) have been Polygenists precisely because they thought 1 Authorities for the facts mentioned in these two sentences will be found in Hitter, Erdkunde, Asien, ii. 273, 431 sqq. ; Hope, Ess. on the Origin of Man ; Virey, Hist. Nat. du Genre Humain, ii 12 ; i. 190. Pickering, Races of Man, 175-179, 302-308; Journ. A&iat. Soc. of Bengal, xxiv. 206 ; Prichard, Nat. Hist, of Man, i. 250-274 (ed. Norris). Pouchet, Des Races, p. 59; Perty, Anthropol. Vortrage, p. 41; Michel, Hist, des Races maudites, &c. 46 OX LANGUAGE. CH. iv. it was more consonant with God's attributes to have created men in different grades of elevation than to have suffered them to degenerate in so many regions from a condition originally exalted. 1 The argument in this case may be as worthless as in the other; but what is the value of a method of reasoning from which two conclusions so opposite can be drawn ! It would be an error to suppose that * the state of nature,' with its imperfect language, its animal life, its few natural wants, its utter ignorance, is necessarily a state so low as to render existence a misfortune or a curse. Nature, in all probability, provided as bountifully for her first-born as she does for many of his descend- ants ; and if not, she at any rate c makes habit omni- potent and its effects hereditary.' Even the Fuegian, in his land of cold and rain, crawling from the lair in which he lies, unsheltered, coiled up like an animal on the wet ground, to gather at all hours, from morn till midnight, the mussels and berries, which are his only food, does not decrease in numbers, and must, there- fore, as Mr. Darwin observes, 2 be supposed 'to enjoy a sufficient share of happiness (of whatever kind it may be) to render life worth having.' It is hard to say how little is ' necessary ' for man ; and it is certain, both from Scripture and history, that not only the luxuries and ornaments of life, but even those things which we regard as indispensable, were the gradual inventions, or long-delayed discoveries, of a race which had received from Grod certain faculties in order that they might at once be exercised and rewarded by a perpetual progress in dignity and self-improvement. There can be no 1 Pouchet, Plural, des Races, p. 105. 2 Darwin, Voy. of a Naturalist, p. 216. CH. iv. THE INFANCY OF HUMANITY. 47 question that the systems of those Eabbis and Fathers, 1 and their modern imitators, who make Adam a being of stupendous knowledge and superhuman wisdom, are more improbable, as well as more unscriptural, than those of writers who, like Theophilus of Antioch among the Fathers, and Joseph Ben Grorion among the Jews, make his original condition a weak and inferior one. Philosophy, the arts, the sciences, the observations of the simplest natural facts, the elucidation of the simplest natural laws, required centuries to elaborate. We do not even hear of the first kingdom till some thousands of years after the first man. It is but as yesterday that man has wrung from the patient silence of Nature some of her most important, and apparently her most open secrets. It is forsooth a degradation to suppose that man originated in an ignorant and barbarous condition ! People prefer the poet's fancies : One man alone, the father of mankind, Drew not his life from woman ; never gazed With mute unconsciousness of what he saw On all around him; learned not by degrees: Nor owed articulation to his ear ; But, moulded by his Maker into man, At once upstood intelligent, surveyed All creatures ; with precision understood Their purport, uses, properties ; assigned To each his place significant ; and filled With love and wisdom, rendered back to Heaven In praise harmonious the first air he drew. 1 Clem. Alex. Strom, iv. 25, 173 ; 23, 152. Buddseus, Philos. Hebr. 383-388, where he gives the Eabbinic fancies about Adam Kadmon. Suidas s. v. 'ASdp. South, State of Man before the Fall, &c. On the other side see Clem. Alex. Strom, vi. 12, 96 ; Greg. Naz. Or at. xxxviii. 12 ; and even Irenseus, Adv. Hares, iv. 38. 48 ON LANGUAGE. CH. iv. He was excused the penalties of dull Minority. . . . History, not wanted yet, Leaned on her elbow, watching Time, whose course Eventful should supply her with a theme. * Fascinating and poetical, no doubt; the primal man, regarded as a being beautiful of body, gracious in soul, 2 filled in heart with virgin purity and sweetness, and discovering everything with exquisite and lightning- like spontaneity ! Nevertheless, ' Science 3 banishes amongst myths and chimeras the fancy of a primitive man, burning with youth and beauty, to show us upon icy shores I know not what abject being, more hideous than the Australian, more savage than the PatagoDian, a fierce animal struggling against the animals with which he disputes his miserable existence.' What support is there for the poetic hypotheses of those who love their own assumptions better than they love the truths which science reveals? In a handful of rude and bizarre traditions, in a few skulls of the very meanest and most 4 degraded type, in here and there a gnawed fragment of human bones, in a few coarse and pitiable implements of bone and flint, what traces have we of that radiant and ideal protoplast whom men have 1 Cowper, The Task. * The Bible tells us nothing of this kind ; but it would take us too long here to examine fully the Biblical data. I believe that when fairly and thorougly considered, they sanction the view here expressed. For a picture of frightfully degraded aboriginal races, see Job xxx. 1-8 ; Ewald, Gesch. d. Volkes Israel, i. 27 ; De Gobineau, i. 486. 3 Aug. Laugel, Rev. des Deux Mondes, May 1, 1863 ; cf. De Gobineau, De Tlnegalite des Races, i. 228 ; Link, Die Urwelt, i. 84 ; Lyell, Princ. of Geol. i. 178 ; Laugel, Science et Philosophie, p. 270. 4 It has even been suspected (most likely on insufficient grounds), from the position of iheforamen magnum, that the head was not vertical on the neck. See Ethnol Trans, p. 269, 1863. CH. IT. THE INFANCY OF HUMANITY. 49 delighted to invest with purely imaginary attributes, and to contemplate as the common ancestor of their race ? But man, in his futile and baseless arrogance, must exalt the earliest representatives of his kind, though he cannot deny the infinite debasement of his cotemporary brethren. He refuses to see in his far-off ancestors what he must see in his living congeners, a miserable l population maintaining an inglorious struggle with the powers of nature, wrestling with naked bodies against the forest animals, and forced to dispute their cave-dwellings with the hysena and the wolf. Years pass before the infant can realise and express his own individuality; ages may have rolled away before those ancestors of man who lived in the dim and misty dawn of human 2 existence could in any way understand their own position in the yet untamed chaos of the ancient world. The recognition of the long and feeble periods of animalism and ignorance is no more degra- ding to humanity than the remembrance of the time when he was rocked and swaddled and dandled in a nurse's arms is a degradation to any individual man. Disbelieving, on the scientific ground of the Fixity of Type, 3 the Darwinian hypothesis, we should yet consider 1 It is agreed on all hands that Gen. i. 26, has no bearing on this question, since it refers to the moral and intellectual nature of man reason, liberty, immortality. ' Non secundum formam corporis factus est ad imaginem Dei, sed secundum rationalem mentem.' Aug. de Trin. xii. 7. Obviously if all men even Mundrucus and Ostiaks are created in the ' image of God,' then the first men were so, however low theif grade. 8 It is a remarkable fact that native legends betray a reminiscence of the Elk, Mastodon, Megalonyx, Deinotherium, &c. Hamilton Smith, Nat. Hist, of Human Spec. pp. 104-106 ; Maury, Des Ossemens humains (Mem. de la Soc. des Antiq. i. 287), &c. 3 I may perhaps be allowed to refer to my paper on this subject read 50 ON LANGUAGE. CH. iv. it disgraceful and humiliating to try to shake it by an ad captandum argument, or a claptrap platform appeal to the unfathomable ignorance and unlimited arrogance of a prejudiced assembly. We should blush to meet it with an anathema or a sneer ; and in doing so we should be very far from the ludicrous and complacent assumption ' that we were on the side of the angels ! ' Is it not indisputable that man's body ' all but an inappreciable fragment of its substance ' is composed of the very same materials, the same protein and fats, and salines, and water, which constitute the inorganic world, which may unquestionably have served long ago as the dead material which was vivified and utilised in the bodies of extinct creatures, and which may serve in endless metensomatosis l for we know not what organisms yet to come ? Was there, or was there not, a time in the embryonic dawn of individual life, when every one of us drew the breath of life by means not of lungs but of a species of gills ? Is this fact any disgrace to us, or will any pseudo-theologian have the dogmatic hardi- hood to deny it ? Are we, in our gross and haughty ignorance, to assume that, because by God's grace we carry in ourselves the destinies of so grand a future, a deep and impassable gulf of separation must therefore divide even the material particles of our frame from those of all other creatures which find their develop- ment in so poor a life ? What sanction have we for this assumption? Is it to be found in the future fate of before the British Association this year, and now in the Ethnolog. Soc.'s Transactions. 1 If the word, which has the authority of Clemens Alexandrinus, and which is now imperiously demanded by the wants of science, may be pardoned on the score of its necessity. CH. iv. THE INFANCY OF HUMANITY. 51 the elements of our body destined, as we know they are, to be swept along by the magic ! eddy of nature, to be transmuted by her potent alchemy into nameless transformations, and subjected by her pitiless economy to what we should blindly consider as nameless dis- honour ? or, looking backwards as well as forwards, is it to be found in the fact that there are stages in the earlier development of the human embryo, during which the most powerful microscope, and the most delicate analysis, can neither detect nor demonstrate the slightest difference between the 2 three living germs of which one is destined to be a wolf, the second a horse, and the third a man ? If the question is to be degraded from scientific decision into a matter for tea- table aesthetics and ignorant prepossessions, is this certain embryonic degradation or immaturity less op- pressive than the admission of a bare possibility that, myriads of centuries ago, there may have been a near genetic connection between the highest of the animals and the lowest of the human race? It is not yet proved that there was ; we believe that there was not ; but, nevertheless, the hypothesis is neither irreverent nor absurd. Let those who love truth only consider what are the certain facts about our mortal bodies, and be still; awaiting the gradual revelation of His own past workings which the All-wise Creator may yet vouchsafe, not assuredly to the clamorous, the idle, and the ignorantly denunciative, but to humble and studious enquirers, to those loftier and less self-complacent souls, whom He has endowed with the desire, the wisdom, and the ability to search out the pathless mystery of 1 Coleridge, Aids to Reflection ; Huxley, Led. pp. 15-19"; Hamlet, \. 1. 2 Karl Snell, Die Schopfung des Menschcn, p. 130. I 2 52 OX LANGUAGE. CH. iv. His ways, through long years of noble and self-sacrifi- cing toil. It has, indeed, been asserted that the languages of Rome barbarous nations for instance, the Greenlanders and the North American Indians are of so rich, so perfect, and so artistic a structure, that they could not possibly have been achieved by them in their present condition, and furnish a proof that they have sunk into savagery from a state of higher culture. Du Ponceau ' speaks in the most glowing terms of the genius dis- played in the infinite variety and perfect regularity of those languages. Charlevoix calls attention to the beautiful union of energy and nobleness in the Huron, where, as in the Turkish, 'tout se conjugue.' Dr. James says that there are seven or eight thousand pos- sible forms of the verb in Chippeway. Appleyard 2 tells us that ' the South African languages, though spoken by tribes confessedly uncivilised and illiterate, are highly systematic and truly philosophical ; ' that in Kafir there are a hundred different forms for the pro- noun 'its,' 3 and that 'the system of alliteration main- tained throughout its grammatical forms is one of the most curious and ingenious ever known.' Threlkeld 4 tells us similar facts about the Australian dialects; and Caldwell, 5 in his ' Comparative Grammar of the Dravi- dian Languages,' occupies many pages with the laws of euphonic permutation of consonants and harmonic se- 1 Et. du Ponceau, Mem. sur le Syst. Gram, de quelques Nations in- diennes, passim. A most valuable and brilliant work. 2 Kafir Grammar, pref. * Id. p. 66 ; p. 6, note, &c. 4 Threlkeld, Australian Gram. p. 8. * Dravidian Grammar, pp. 126-138. CH. iv. THE INFANCY OF HUMANITY. 53 quence of vowels, which exist both in those and in the Scythian languages. Instances of similar exuberance and complexity in savage languages might be indefinitely multiplied ; l and the argument that they imply an intellectual power superior to what we now find in these races, and that they therefore prove a condition pre- viously exalted, is so plausible that in a former 2 work I regarded it as convincing. Further examination has entirely removed this belief. For this apparent wealth of synonyms and grammatical forms is chiefly due to the hopeless poverty of the power of abstraction. It would be not only no advantage, but even an impossible incum- brance to a language required for literary purposes. The 'transnormal' character of these tongues only proves that they are the work of minds incapable of all subtle analysis, and following in one single direction an erro- neous and partial line of development. When the mind has nothing else to work upon, it will expend its energy in a lumbering and bizarre multiplicity of lin- guistic expedients, and by richness of expression will try to make up for poverty of thought. Many of these vaunted languages (e. g. the American and Polynesian), these languages which have countless forms of conju- gation, and separate words for the minutest shades of specific meaning, these holophrastic languages, with their 'jewels fourteen syllables long,' to express the commonest and most familiar objects, so far from proving a once-elevated intellectual condition of the people who speak them, have not even yet arrived at 1 Appleyard, p. 69 ; Du Ponceau, p. 95 ; Howse, Cree Gram. p. 7 ; Pott, Die Ungleichheit d. menschl. Sagen, p. 253 ; Steinthal, Charakter- istik, p. 176 ; Maury, La Terre et FHomme, p. 463. * Origin of Lang. p. 28. See too Vater, Mithrid. iii. 328. 54 OX LANGUAGE. CH. iv. the very simple abstraction l required to express the verb * to be/ which Condillac assumed to be the earliest of invented verbs ! The state of these languages, so far from proving any retrogression from previous culture, is an additional proof of primordial and unbroken bar- barism. The triumph of civilisation is not complexity but simplicity : and unless an elaborate Polytheism be more intellectual than Monotheism, unless the Chinese ideography, with its almost indefinite number of signs, be a proof of greater progress than our alphabet, then neither is mere Polysynthetism and exuberance of syn- onyms a proof of actual culture in the past, or possible progress in the future. If language proves anything, it proves that these savages must have lived continuously in a savage condition. 2 I will here quote two high and unbiassed authorities in support of the same conclusion: 'It has already been observed,' says Mr. G-arnett, 3 ' that very exaggerated and erroneous ideas have been advanced respecting the structure of the class of lan- guages of which we have been treating in the present paper. They have been represented as the products of deep philosophical contrivance, and totally different in organisation from those of every part of the known 1 In American and Polynesian languages there are forms for ' I am well,' ' I am here,' &c., but not for ' I am.' In Elliot's Indian Bible ' I am that I am,' is rendered ' I do, I do' (compare the French idiom ' il fait nuit,' &c.). More than this, savage nations cannot even adopt the verb ' to be.' A negro says, ' Your hat no lib that place you put him in.' 'My mother done lib for deyilly' (=is dead). Hutchinson, Ten Years' Wanderings, p. 32. 2 See among many other authorities Pott, Die Ungl. der mensch!. Safen, p. 86; Du Ponceau, Transl. of Zeisberger' s Lenni-Lenape Gram. p. 14 ; Crawfurd. Malay Gram. i. 68 ; Adelung, Mithrid. iii. 6, 205. 1 Philological Essays, p., 321. CH. iv. THE INFANCY OF HUMANITY. 55 world. The author of " Mithridates " regards it as an astonishing phenomenon that a people like the Green- landers, struggling for subsistence among perpetual ice and snow, would have found the means of constructing such a complex and artificial system. It is conceived that there cannot be a greater mistake than to suppose that a complicated language is like a chronometer, or a locomotive engine, a product of deep calculation, and preconceived adaptation of its several parts to each other. The compound parts are rather formed like crystals, by the natural affinity of the component ele- ments ; and whether the forms are more or less complex, the principle of aggregation is the same.' * In those which abound most in inflections,' says Mr. Albert Gallatin, 1 ' nothing more has been done than to effect, by a most complex process, and with a cumber- some and unnecessary machinery, that which, in almost every other language, has been as well, if not better performed by the most simple means. Those transitions, in their complexness, and in the still visible amalgama- tion of the abbreviated pronouns with the verb, bear, in fact, the impress of primitive and unpolished languages.' Language, then, from whatever point of view we regard it, seems to confirm instead of weakening the inference to which we are irresistibly led by Geology, History, and Archaeology that Man, The heir of all the ages in the foremost files of Time, is a very much nobler and more exalted animal than the shivering and naked savage whose squalid and ghastly relics are exhumed from Danish kjokken-moddings, and 1 Archeeologia Americana, ii. p. 203, quoted by Mr. Garnet*. 56 ON LANGUAGE. CH. iv. glacial deposits, and the stalactite flooring of freshly- opened caves. These primeval lords of the untamed creation, so far from being the splendid and angelic beings of the poet's fancy, appear to have resembled far more closely the Tasmanian, the Fuegian, the Green- lander, and the lowest inhabitants of Pelagian caverns or Hottentot kraals. We believe that in Scripture itself there are indications that they appeared upon the sur- face of the globe many ages before those simple and noble-minded shepherds from whose loins have sprung the Aryans and Semites those two great races to whom all the world's progress in knowledge and civilisation has been solely due. 57 CHAPTER V. PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DISTINCT THOUGHT. Wenn ein unendlich Gefuhl aufwogt in der Seele des Dichter's, dann mag er ahnen von fern das Geheimniss der Sprache, Wie in der Zeiten Beginn aus dem erwachenden Geist, Da er sich selbst und die Dinge vernahm, das lebendige Wort sprach Offenbarung und That, gottlich und menschlich zugleich. GEIBEL. LANGUAGE may with more accuracy be called a Discovery or a Creation, than an Invention of the human race. Undoubtedly the idea of speech existed in the human intelligence as a part of our moral and mental constitu- tion when man first appeared upon the surface of the earth. In this sense we may call language a divine gift, and may apply to it, with perfect truth, the passage of Tertullian : * invenisse dicuntur necessaria ista vitse, noil instituisse ; quod autem invenitur fait, et quod fait non ejus deputabitur qui invenit, sed ejus qui instituit. Erat enim antequam inveniretur.' * But the germs may perish for want of development, and like the seeds in the diluvium, or grains of wheat in the hand of a mummy, may lie hidden for centuries before they meet with that combination of circumstances which is capable of quickening them into life. Yet we J Apolog. adv. Gentes, zi. 58 ON LANGUAGE. CH. v. do not agree with Leasing in supposing that if man dis- covered language by the exercise of his own endowments, i.e. if he merely evolved the speech-power which existed within him as an immanent faculty, long centuries would necessarily have been required for the purpose. The wants of primitive men, like the wants of infants, are few and simple, 1 and wholly sensuous. It is certain, by universal admission, that the ultimate roots of lan- guage are few in number ; it is nearly certain that no language possesses more than a thousand, and that some have far fewer. These roots we regard as mere etymo- logic fictions ; but if, with Max Miiller, we suppose that they were ever used as words, there must, even on this theory, have been a period when men used but a f&iu words ; and consequently, since the notion of any reve- lation of these roots is expressly repudiated, there must have been a time, however short, in which man had no words, no articulate language at all, and in which significant gestures could have been his only way for communicating his thoughts. And this time, however short, must also be postulated even if, in defiance of Scripture, it be supposed that language was revealed. But why should it be held impossible that man once existed with nothing but the merest rudiments of speech ? There are whole nations even now which, if the testimony of travellers is to be accepted, possess very 1 Prof. Max Miiller traces back all language to ' roots,' and there he would stop, declaring the use of them to be an ultimate and inexplicable fact. Inexplicable indeed! yet the 'theory of roots,' 'phonetic types,' incapable of further analysis and, so far as appears, either wholly arbi- trary, or else containing in themselves some mystic inherent fitness, is offered to us in the place of theories, so simple, so natural, and in part so demonstrable, as those -which trace the rise and gradual growth of language out of onomatopoeia and interjection. CH. v. DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT. 59 little more. Nor, indeed, is it necessary to look to the remotest parts of the earth to find how very few are the words which are necessary to express the wants of man. Mr. D'Orsey mentions that some of his parishioners had not a vocabulary of more than 300 words ; and although the assertion has been widely disputed, I should cer- tainly be inclined to confirm it out of my own experi- ence. I once listened for a long time together to the conversation of three peasants who were gathering apples among the boughs of an orchard, and as far as I could conjecture, the whole number of words they used did not exceed a hundred ; the same word was made to serve a multitude of purposes, 1 and the same coarse expletives recurred with a horrible frequency in the place of every single part of speech, and with every variety of meaning which the meagre context was capable of supplying. Kepeated observation has since then confirmed the impression. If this be so in Chris- tian and highly-civilised England in the nineteenth century, what may not have been perhaps ten thousand years before the Saviour was born into the world ? If, then, man once existed with only the germs of speech and of understanding, to what was their develop- ment due? The question admits of distinct answer, and that answer is full both of interest and value. The first men who ever lived must have learned for themselves those simplest lessons which have to be learnt afresh by every infant of their race. Confused, yet lovely, was the multitude of influences and appear- ances by which they were surrounded ; how should they 1 Just as in Chinese the same root may be a noun, a yerb, and some- times also a particle. Heyse, 134. 60 ON LANGUAGE. en. Y. thrid the ail-but inextricable mazes of impressions so manifold ? Over their heads the sun, and moon, and the infinite stars of heaven, 1 rose and set in endless succession ; the heavens outspread their illimitable splendour ; woods waved, and waters rolled, and flowers exhaled their perfume, and fruits yielded their sweet- ness, and the hours of day and night and the four seasons of the year encircled them in their mystic dance. Had man been created unintelligent, and merely recep- tive, the waves of this vast tide of being must have broken over him in vain ; and, in the absence of a living spirit, the world must have continued to seem unto all save the Highest Being a formless chaos no better, for all its lustre and loveliness, than if the darkness had still brooded over the void abyss. But that soul, ' created in the image of God,' whose birth is recorded in the book of Genesis, bore no resemblance to the statue-man of Condillac's famous Traite des Sensations. Had it been so, the senses could only have produced a jarring multitude of heterogeneous impressions, and man would have continued to be that mere organised sensitive mass which Saint Lambert supposes him to be at the moment of his birth until ' Nature has created for him a soul ! ' For unless there had also been in man the ' intellectus ipse ' of Leibnitz, unless there had been the intelligence, as well as the sensorium commune, even sensation would be impossible, 2 seeing that in the complex act which we call sensation man opposes the internal action of his conscious individuality to the influence of external causes. Without this apperception, there could be no 1 See a glorious passage of S. Chrysostom, Or. xii. 385, quoted by Lersch, i. 89 ; and Herbart, Lehrb. d. Psychol. p. 194. 2 Herbart* Psychol. p. 108. CH. v. DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT. 61 such thing as self-conscious sensation, 1 nor could man- kind ever have arisen to any higher region than that of mere organic impressions. But although at first the intellect be but a passive and dormant faculty, it is there, and it is the sole clue wherewith we disentangle the myriad-ravelled in- tricacy of sensuous impressions. And thus the senses become the gateways of knowledge; and a man born without the capacity for external sensations would also be of necessity soulless and mindless, because, though not the single source of all our thoughts and faculties, the senses are yet the necessary condition of their development. Thus it is that the senses, during the earliest days of man's existence, act the part of nursing mothers 2 to the soul, to which afterwards they become the powerful and obedient handmaids. They are the organs of communion between man and the outer world ; they place him en rapport with it, uniting man to the Universe, and men to one another. Thus they baptize man as a member of the moral and physical cosmos, 1 See Viet. Cousin, Cours de Phil. iii. passim. ' Sensation,' says Morell, ' is not purely a passive state, but implies a certain amount of mental activity. It may be described on the psychological side as resulting directly from the attention which the mind gives to the affections of its own organism. Extreme enthusiasm, or powerful emotion of any kind, can make us altogether insensible to physical injury.' Hence, a soldier, during the battle, is often unconscious of his wounds, and a general of the roar of cannon going on around him. ' Numerous facts of a similar kind prove demonstrably, that a certain application and exercise of mind, on one side, is as necessary to the existence of sensation, as the occurrence of physical impulse on the other.' Psychology, p. 107. In point of fact, some nations are as pre-eminent for the keenness of their senses as for the meanness of their intellect, which could not be the case if the senses created the intellect. 2 Heyse, I. c. 62 ON LANGUAGE. CH. v. and awaken thereby the intellect, which would other- wise l remain infructuous, like an unquickened seed. The first conception which man must learn is the conception of his own separate independent existence, and without this conscious distinction between the Ego and the Non-ego, not indeed as a notion so clear and accurate as to admit of expression by the nominative of the personal pronoun, but as the general basis of all possible sensations, he cannot advance a single step. And this lesson he learns by contact with the outer world, and mainly, beyond all doubt, from the organ of sight. At first he would regard himself (as all children do) rather as an object than a subject; 2 rather as 'me' than as * I ;' rather as 58s than as syto ; rather in relation to others than as ' the machine which is to him, himself.' But even this elementary lesson is sufficient for the purposes of further education ; and As he grows he gathers much And learns the use of ' I ' and ' me,' And finds ' I am not what I see, And other than the things I touch : ' So rounds he to a separate mind From whence clear memory may begin, As thro' the frame that binds him in His isolation grows defined. 3 1 ' The earliest sign by which the Ego becomes perceptible is corporeal sensation.' Feuchtersleben, Med. Psychol. p. 83, quoted by Fleming, Vocab. of Phil. p. 457. 2 Mr. Browning, with that rare metaphysical accuracy which charac- terises him, no less than the other great poet of our age, chooses the third person as the only appropriate one for the meditations of the semi-brutal Caliban. ' Setebos, Setebos, and Setebos ; Thinketh he dwelleth in the cold grey moon,' &c. Theology in the Island. * Tennyson, In Memoriam, xliv. CH. v. DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT. 63 The child, like the primal man, who has advanced thus far, learns with rapid and intuitive instinct to separate and discriminate between the many distinct and different impressions caused by physical contact with the outer world. Thus, then, by means of an instinctive and reciprocal action, the senses develop the self-conscious individu- ality; and the self-consciousness, which contains indeed the germ of all intelligence, first quickens and then distinguishes, analyses, and combines, the impressions of those senses which have called it into life. And since two factors the physical and the psychical are in- dispensable to every true sensation, the two are so in- timately related that, whereas without the psychical factor the physical could not exist, on the other hand, without the physical factor the psychical could not be developed. Speech is undoubtedly the product of the thinking spirit; but this spirit 1 received the first im- pulse of development from the impressions of the outer world and the needs of practical life. At first, if we may trust the analogy of childhood, even . sensuous influences must have been frequently repeated before they produced any definite impression. Feeling, which is a dull total impression, precedes sensation, to which indeed some of the lowest organisms 1 Steinthal, Grammatik, Logik, und Psychol. 238 fg. Heyse, 46. In this and the following remarks I have chiefly, though by no means exclusively, followed this wise and clear thinker. I fear that the un- familiar words, intuition, representation, concept, &c., will render this tedious to readers unaccustomed to metaphysical enquiry ; but I thought it better to adopt them than to confuse matters by that excessive loose- ness of English philosophical terms which we chiefly owe to the vacil- lating usage of Locke. I am greatly indebted to Fleming's Vocabulary of Philosophy. 64 OX LANGUAGE. CH. v. can never attain at all ; for, as we have seen already, an act of attention is required for every definite sensa- tion, and it is not until after many sensations that we obtain a clear perception. * Light l strikes on the infant retina ; waves of air pulsate on the infant tympanum, but these as yet produce neither sight nor hea'ring ; they are only the preparations for sight and hearing. . . . On the educated sense objects act so instantaneously as to produce what we call their sensations ; on the uneducated sense they act only so as to produce a vague impression, which becomes more and more definite by repetition.' It is not, however, long before the sensuous impression (Sinnes-eindruck] has kindled the electric fire of self- consciousness in other words, the presentation soon becomes a perception or a sensation ; for by a perception (Wahrnelvmung} we mean a conscious presentation in reference to an object, and by a sensation (Empfindung} we mean a conscious presentation in reference to the modification of our own being. The impression on the senses, by calling into reciprocal action the two parts of our nature, produces a sensation, i. e. a certain conscious change in the state of our own minds ; and these sensa- tions rapidly give us a perception, i. e. they teach us something, which is at least subjectively true, respecting the qualities of matter. But sensation and perception are common to man with the more intelligent animals, and the perfection 1 Lewes, Biog. Hist, of Phil. p. 442. That attention is necessary even for a sensation, we may see from the fact that ordinarily (without a definite act of abstraction and observation) we are wholly unconscious of the numberless reflections of light, sound, smell, &c., which are playing on our senses. In fact, the phenomena of abstraction, reverie, preoccu- pation, absence of mind, &c., all point to this conclusion. See Sir H. Holland, Chapters on Mental Physiology. CH. v. DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT. 65 of human reason enables us to advance further than this. Sensations tell us nothing about objects, but only about properties or attributes ; we rise from sensations there- fore to intuitions (Anschauungeri), 1 which are a complex of all the sensations caused by an object, Sensations are analytical ; they come to us from different senses, and tell us the shape, colour, sound, weight, hardness, &c., of an object: the intuition gives us the object itself as the synthesis of all these separable attributes, so that gradually we grow familiar with the sensuous perception, in its totality, as a ' collective impression,' or definite picture, ' presented 2 under the condition of distinct existence in space or time ; ' and this we call an Intuition, i. e., according to the definition of Coleridge, ' a perception immediate and individual.' And when this intuition has, by the power of abstrac- tion, been raised into a complete picture, capable of being analysed into various elements, and is held fast in the consciousness as a permanent intellectual form, which may be banished and recalled cut will, then we have a Representation (Vorstellung) 3 the first per- manent product of intellectual spontaneity, the first definite intellectual exertion of the will. Lastly, by still higher processes of intellectual abstrac- 1 Steinthal, Gram. Log. und Psychol. 261. His general outline of the psychological process differs in some particulars from Heyse's. Mr. Mill (Logic, i. 58 sq.) briefly touches on the same subject. He only alludes to perceptions as acts of the mind ' which consist in the recognition of an external object as the exciting cause of the sensation.' 2 Mansell, Proleg. Log. p. 9. We mean, of course, an ' empirical intuition,' which, in the Kantian philosophy, corresponds to the repre- sentation of a sensible object. German, Anschauung. 1 Steinthal calls this Ansehauung der Anschauung, i. e. a power of regarding the intuition (v. supra) as an Intuition, which is firmly fixed in the consciousness and memory. Grammatik, p. 295. F 66 OX LANGUAGE. CH. v. tion, in which the judgment for the first time plays a part, we raise the representation into the sphere of generality, and then possess a notion or concept (Begriff). A concept 1 grasps an object as the synthesis of all its constituent attributes or properties ; the Kepresenta- tion or image ( Vorstellung) is subjective, and different people may have different images of the same object; but the notion is the objective conception of the species, and being independent of all accidental marks of the individual representation, is and must be the same for all men. The representation is due to the analytic activity of Abstraction, but is entangled with the sen- suous accidents of the individual object; the notion (or concept) is the product of a higher creative activity of the thinking (logical) intelligence, and produces that ideal synthesis which enables us to think of a Genus or Species. It so far retrogrades to the concrete intuition as to reduce to unity a multitude of phenomena ; but this unity is not that of the immediate object, but one ideally recognised by the synthetic activity of the in- tellect. The representation is arrived at by a merely material analysis of the Intuition; the notion 2 by a formal and logical analysis ; and distinct knowledge is impossible without notions, which are thus the com- mencement of the development of pure logical thought. 1 ' Conception ' should more accurately be used of ' the act of the under- standing, bringing any given object or impression into the same class with any number of other objects or impressions, by means of some character or characters common to them all' (Coleridge, Church and State, Prel. Rcm.'); concept of the result of the act. 2 'Notions, the depthless abstractions of fleeting phenomena, the shadows of flitting vapours, the colourless repetitions of rainbows, hare effected their utmost when they add to the distinctness of our know- ledge.' Coleridge. CH. v. DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT. 67 Nevertheless, words correspond not to notions, but to images or representations. They mark the object of perception, not in the totality of its essential attributes, but by some single mark whereby the image may be conceived and fixed in the intelligence. In fact, the representation ( Vorstellung\ which in ordinary, although not in philosophical language, is called the conception, is a mere empirical notion, derived from familiarity with the external properties of the object (Anschauungs- begrif, Erfahrungsbegriff], and this is what every word expresses. The logical conception may be indefinitely more accurate and profound, but must yet employ the same word for its expression. Thus, to men in general, * bird ' simply means a creature with wings ; nor would their rough definition of it exclude either butterflies or bats; yet the man of science has no other word than this (bird), to express the complex of essential cha- racteristics involved in the accurate definition. And the philosopher uses the word 'man,' no less than the world in general ; although the philosopher thereby expresses an idea which it exhausts his intellect to describe or to define, while the world merely implies by it the animal which Plato characterised as ' a feather! ess biped,' and which a modern philosopher has described as c a forked radish with a curiously carved head.' To illustrate this process : (i.) I see a bird flying, or a tree in bloom, and it makes a sensuous impression on my retina ; but if I am absent or preoccupied, I may be wholly unconscious of this impression, which does not become even a sensation until my consciousness is excited. But when this is done, when my Attention is drawn to it, I have (ii.) a perception (Wahi^nehmung], When I contemplate this perception as an inward pic- T 2 68 ON LANGUAGE. CH. v. ture, mirrored in my consciousness, I have (iii.) the intuition (Anschauung) of the flying bird and the blooming tree. If, by abstraction, I separate this individual phenomenon in its concrete totality into its several component elements, and range those elements under some definite intellectual form as an ideal pos- session of my consciousness, I then have (iv.) the repre- sentations ( Vorstellungen, vernacule ' conceptions ') of * bird,' ' flying,' * tree,' ' blooming.' But the analytic activity of the intelligence proceeds still farther into particulars : it separates the elements of a representa- tion, and apprehends them as so many independent representations. In the tree it distinguishes between leaf, twig, stem, root, and the properties of height, greenness, &c. all of which furnish so many separate representations. It further distinguishes the species of a representation, such as tree, into oak, beech, pine, &c., each regarded as special representations, and recognised by specific signs ; all of which I bear in mind when I use the word ' tree,' which thus, by material analysis, becomes to me (v.) an empirical concept (Erfahrungs- begriff), formed by a synthesis of observed characteris- tics, and expressing more or less adequately the nature of the object. Lastly, by still further acts of intellec- tual abstraction, I arrive (vi.) at the logical notion (Verstandesbegriff), which is no longer merely empirical or material, but which, by the synthetic activity l of the judgment, recognises the object as the sum-total of all those attributes (and those only) which constitute its essence. Once more then. From passive receptivity I am 1 Heyse, p. 86. CH. v. DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT. 69 awoke by sensuous impressions into free, spontaneous, creative activity, whereby I pass through the stages of sensation and perception to that of Intuition, in which I first become independent of the immediate effect of the external object on my senses, and then free myself from the dominion of the senses, and possess an inward picture which I can contemplate without any assistance from them. Still advancing, my intellect creates re- presentations for itself, no longer merely retaining the sensuous picture, but forming it to an ideal existence, and using it as its own possession and its own pro- duction. Sensations, Perceptions, Intuitions are individual and special in their character ; but representations are general, and no longer refer to that which is single and concrete, or to the individual object of perception. In this sense all words are Abstracta. The real world of appearances, in which everything is individual, is recreated ! by the intelligence into an ideal world of general conceptions. Thus, then, we have traced the psychological growth of the concepts, which may be represented by language. A word is a recognised audible sign for a special definite Intuition or concept. From the genesis of the concept we pass to the genesis of the sound which is accepted as its sign ; and the questions which we have to consider are, How does the sound originate, and what is the connection, if any, between these two elements, the intellectual and the sensual, the concept and the sound ? We need not fear that all such questions are insoluble. Speech is the expression of the free intellect, and if the 1 Heyse, p. 88. 70 ON LANGUAGE. CH. v. laws and processes of the intellect are capable of being conceived and understood, why should Speech, 1 which is nothing miraculous, arbitrary, or accidental, but which is the natural organ and product of the intellect, be deemed incapable of similar comprehension ? 1 Heyse, s. 20. 71 CHAPTEK VI. * POSSIBLE MODES OF EXPRESSING THOUGHT. lie winketh with his eyes, he speaketh with his feet, he teacheth with his fingers. PBOV. vi. 13. FROM what we have already observed, it is evident that every mode of expression serves only to describe internal sensations, not outward facts ; it throws light on that which is subjective, not on that which is objective ; it expresses ourselves, not the world around us; sensations, perceptions, intuitions, not external things. But what is the medium of expression ? Obviously it must have been one of the senses, which are the main gateways of knowledge, the portals of intercommuni- cation between man and man, between men and the Universe around them. It is conceivable that a language (i. e. a mode of com- munication) might have been invented which should use the medium of * the touch, the taste, or the smell. Yet such a language, in the case of the two latter, could not but be infinitely imperfect, difficult, and obscure, nor has the attempt ever been made. This is to a less degree the case with the touch. It is well known that among certain animals the touch does serve all neces- sary purposes of intercommunication. Bees, for instance, 1 Heyse, p. 29 ; Charma, Ess. sur le Lang, p. 50. 72 ON LANGUAGE. CH. vi. to mention but one notorious case, communicate to each other the death of the queen by a rapid interlacing and striking together of the 'antennae. Nor is a tactile language wholly unknown to man. For instance, the Armenian merchants, as we are informed by the traveller Chardin, are able to inform each other of any modifica- tion in their bargains, however complex, without the notice of the purchaser, by holding their hands toge- ther under their mantles, and moving * them in a par- ticular manner. Yet a language which required for its possible development a constant contact, could never serve the purposes of so elevated a being as man. ' A The two highest and most ideal senses remain, and these, as they affect the soul more nearly and powerfully than the others, were clearly the best adapted for the expression of thought, which is a modification of the intelligent subject. We find accordingly that all actual language addresses itself to the eye or to the ear. For in point of fact Art may be regarded as a lan- guage. We have read of a sculptor who conveyed, by means of a statue, the intense impression produced in his mind by the dawn of a summer day ; and there is scarcely a thought, an emotion, or a fact that may not be conveyed by painting. Imitation a fundamental principle on which rests the possibility of any commu- nication between two sentient beings may appeal as directly to the eye as to the ear. Philomela effectually reveals, by the mute tapestry, her woven tale : 1 Voy. en Perse, iv. 267, ed. Rouen. ' The finger extended means ten ; bent it means five ; the bottom of the finger is one ; the hand, a hundred ; the hand bent, a thousand. By similar motions of the hand they indicate pounds, shillings, and pence, their faces all the while continuing to be expressionless and blank.' CH. vi. MODES OF EXPRESSION. 73 Os mutum facti caret indice. Grande doloris Ingenium est, miserisque venit solertia rebus ! Stamina barbarica suspendit Candida tela, Purpureasque notas fllis intexuit albis, Indicium sceleris. 1 Shakspeare's mutilated Lavinia does not lack the means of revealing the authors of the outrage she has suffered. Pictures and hieroglyphics continue to this day among various Indian tribes, a sure method of reporting facts ; and we know from history that a rude sketch first con- veyed to Montezuma the ominous intelligence that men in strange vessels and of strange garb had landed on his shores. Nay, more, the mighty invention of a written alphabet has translated the sounds addressed to the ear into symbols for the eye ; and one half at least of the thoughts of other men, whereof we become cognisant from day to day, is conveyed to us through the medium of sight. How easy and how natural would have been a lan- guage of gesticulation, addressed solely to the eye, is proved by the large use of gestures to supplement the lacunas of a miserable speech among some degraded savage tribes ; as, for instance, the Delaware Indians, who count by raising their hands a certain number of times, striking them as many times as there are tens. With savages generally, quot membra, tot linguae ; and of course for the deaf and dumb an eye language is the only one that can exist. To them the 'parole matiuelle' 2 is the only possible or intelligible speech, as it undoubt- edly would be to the whole human race if the sense of hearing were to become extinct. And that such a lan- 1 Ov. Met. vi. 38 sqq. 2 An expression of Jamet (Mem. sur flnstr. des Sourds-muets, p. 15), quoted by Channa, p. 187. Condillac called it ' langage de la danse.' 74 ON LANGUAGE. CH. vi. guage would be most rapidly developed, and would be the same throughout the globe, appears certain from the fact that deaf mutes from different countries can at once converse together with freedom, when their speaking countrymen can hold no communication; and that many signs, even some which apparently are quite arbi- trary, 1 are mutually intelligible to the deaf mute and the savage. ^Elian 2 relates an amusing instance of such a result. The tyrant Tryzus, that he might repress all possible means of conspiracy, published an edict that his subjects were to hold no communication with each other, either in public or in private. The order was at once rendered nugatory by an extraordinary develop- ment of the power of expressing thought by signs and gestures. When even this mode of intercourse was for- bidden by the suspicious despot, one of the citizens went into the forum, and, without speaking a word, burst into a flood of tears. He was soon surrounded by a weeping multitude, who flew upon the tyrant and his bodyguard when he advanced to scatter them, and vin- dicated by his assassination their liberty of speech ! 3 In truth, gesture is a most eloquent and powerful exponent of emotion, and may add almost incredible force to the utterance of the tongue. ' Every passion 1 See some curious confirmations and instances of this in Marsh's Lectures, ed. Smith, p. 486. 2 Hist. Far. xiv. 22. 3 See some excellent remarks in Marsh's Lectures, pp. 486-488. 'The language of gesture,' he says, ' is so well understood in Italy, that -when King Ferdinand returned to Naples after the revolutionary movements of 1822, he made an address to the lazzaroni from the balcony of the palace, wholly by signs, which, in the midst of the most tumultuous shouts, were perfectly intelligible to his public. And it is traditionally affirmed that the famous conspiracy of the Sicilian vespers was organised wholly by facial signs, not even the hand being employed.' CH. vi. MODES OF EXPRESSION. 75 of .the heart,' says Cicero, 1 * has its appropriate look, and tone, and gesture ; and the whole body of man, and his whole countenance, and all the voices he utters, reecho like the strings of a harp to the touch of every emotion in his soul.' * What would you have said had you heard the master himself? ' exclaimed ^Eschines to the admir- ing Rhodians, who had just heard him read the mighty oration of Demosthenes on the Crown ; and Demosthenes has doubtless told us one great secret of that eloquence which Fulmined o'er Greece, and shook the Arsenal To Macedon, and Artaxerxes' throne, when he defined gesticulation as the first, the second, and the third qualification of the successful orator. Who that in modern days has seen a Kemble or a Siddons, a Rachel, a Helen Faucit, or a Ristori, can be ignorant of what a language may be uttered by every motion and every look ? Yet it is probable that even the first of our modern actors falls short in this respect of the skill of the ancient pantomimes, of whose ' loqua- cissimae manus, linguosi digiti, silentium clamosum, ex- positio tacita,' Cassiodorus 2 gives so lively a description. These may have been the considerations which led Isaac Vossius deliberately to give the preference to ges- ticulation over language, and to regret that the whole human race does not banish ' the plague and confusion of so many tongues,' and adopt an universal and self- evident system of signs and pantomimic expression. 3 'Nunc vero,' he continues, 'ita comparatum est ut 1 De Oratore, iii. 216. * Var. iv. 51. * Many an amusing story has been told of the facility with which by such means of expression Englishmen have travelled all over the con- tinent with no fragment of any language except their own. 76 ON LANGUAGE. CH. vi. animalium, quae vulgo bruta creduntur, melior longe quam nostra hac in parte videatur conditio, utpote quse promptius et forsan felidus sensus et cogitationes suas sine interprete significant, quam ulli queant morta- les (!), prsesertim si peregrine utatur sermone.' 1 Idle as the complaint may be, it is founded on the fact that gesture is in many cases more rapid and intense in the effect which it produces than words themselves. The sidelong glance, the drooping lid, the expanded nostril, the curving lip are more instantaneously eloquent than any mere expression of disdain; 2 and the starting eye- ball and open mouth tell more of terror than the most abject words. M. Charma tells an anecdote of the actor Talma that, disgusted at the disproportion of praise which' was attributed to the words of, the poets, by which in the theatre he produced such thrilling effect, he one day, in the midst of a gay circle of friends, suddenly retreated a step, passed his hand over his fore- head, and gave to his voice and figure the expression of the profoundest despair. The assembly grew silent, pale, and shuddering, as though (Edipus had appeared among them, when, as by a lightning-flash, his parricide was revealed to him, or as though the avenging Furies had suddenly startled them with their gleaming torches. Yet the words which the actor spoke with that aspect of consternation and voice of anguish formed but the fragment of a nursery song, and the effects of action triumphed over those produced by words. 3 1 Is. Vossius, De Poematum Cantu, p. 66, Oxon. 1673. It was the love of paradox, apparent in this passage, that led Charles II. to say of Voss that he believed everything except the Bible ! 2 See Charma (Ess. sur le Lang. p. 21), who has treated this subject admirably. * Garrick on rare occasions used, as he called it, ' to go his rounds,' CH. vi. MODES OF EXPRESSION. 77 It is, however, easy to see that gesture could never be a perfect means of intercommunication. Energetic, rapid, and faithful, it is yet obscure because it is syl- leptic, i. e. it expresses but the most general facts of the situation, and is incapable of distinguishing or decomposing them, and wholly inadequate to express the delicate shades of difference of which every form of verbal expression is capable. The flashing of a glance may belie years of fulsome panegyric ; a sudden yawn may dissipate the effect of a mass of compliments poured out during hours of simulated interest ; an irre- pressible tear, a stolen and smothered sigh, the flutter of a nerve, or the tremble of a finger, may betray the secret of a life which no words could ever have re- vealed. 1 The veiled and silent figure of Niobe may be more full o*f pathos than the most garrulous of wailing elegies. The wounds of the victor of Marathon, or the maimed figure of the brother of ^Eschylus, the unveiled bosom of Phryne, or the hand pointing to the Capitol which Manlius had saved, may have produced effects more thrilling than any eloquence; but such appeals were only possible at moments of intense passion, or under a peculiar combination of circumstances. The i. e. to make his face and gestures assume in succession the aspects produced by the whole round of passions and emotions, from simple good humour to that of profound despair. 1 ' Whereto the Queen agreed With such and so unmoved a majesty She might have seemed her statue, but that he, Low-drooping till he well-nigh kissed her feet For loyal awe, saw with a sidelong eye The shadow of a piece of pointed lace, In the Queen's shadow, vibrate on the walls, And parted, laughing in his courtly heart.' Tennyson, Idylls of the King, p. 208. 78 ON LANGUAGE. CH. vi. ancient orators, well aware of the power which lies in these mute appeals, made them gradually ridiculous by the frequency with which they employed them ; and the introduction of a weeping boy upon the rostrum would produce but little weight when many of the audience knew that weeping may express a wide variety of emotions, and when an injudicious question as to the obscure cause of those moving tears might elicit the mal-apropos complaint ' Se ex pcedagogo vellicari.'' l In moments of extreme passion, then, a language of gesture, a language appealing to the eye rather than the ear, is not only possible but extremely powerful, and one which will never be entirely superseded. And pos- sibly some natures may be so sensitive, some faces so expressive, that even during the most peaceful and equable moments of life the passing thought may touch the countenance with its brightness or its gloom. But this could never be the case with any but a few; and even with these, what attention would be found equal to read and interpret, without fatigue, symbols and expressions so subtle and so fugitive ? Moreover, to the blind, and to all during the darkness, and when- ever an opaque body intervened, and whenever the face was turned in another direction, such language would instantly become impossible. It is incapable of repre- senting the distinctness and successiveness of thought ; it is limited on every side by physical conditions ; it requires an attention too exclusive and intense ; it would reach a shorter distance, 2 and appeal to a less spiritual sense. 1 ' Puer, quid fleret, interrogates, se ex psedagogo Tellicari respondit.' Quint, vi. 1. On the adoption of this trick before the dikasteria, see Aristophanes, Vesp. 568-571. 2 Charma, p. 51. Heyse, 29. CH. vi. MODES OF EXPRESSION. 79 For though both Sight and Hearing are ideal senses, as distinguished from the inferior ones of touch, taste, and smell, Hearing is more ideal in its nature, and reaches more nearly to the soul than Sight. It is the clearest, liveliest, and most instantaneously affected of the senses. That which is seen is material, 1 and remains in space, but that which is heard (although in reality as permanent and as corporeal ) yet to our blunt senses has a purely ideal existence, and vanishes imme- diately in time. Hence sound is especially adapted to be the bearer; and the ear to be the receiver of thought, which is an activity requiring time for its successive developments, and is therefore well expressed by a succession of audible sounds. Juxtaposition in space appealing to the eye could only remotely and analo- gously recall this succession in time. Moreover, hearing requires but the air, the most universal of all mediums, the most immediate condition of life; whereas the eye requires light as well, and is far more dependent on external accidents. The fact that even a sleeper is instantly awoke to consciousness by the tremor of his auditory nerve under the influence of the voice, is a proof of the impressive and immediate adaptability of sound to the exigencies of the intellectual life. So that hearing is the very innermost of the senses, and stands in the strictest and closest connection with our spiritual existence. The ear is the ever-open 2 gateway of the soul ; and, carried on the invisible wings of sound, 3 1 Heyse, 29 ; and see some beautiful remarks in Herder's Abhandlung uber d. Urspr. d. Spracke, a. 101-108. 2 Heyse, p. 31. s "Eirea irrtp6evra, or (as Home Tooke called his famous work) language not only the vehicle of thought, but the wheels. 80 OX LANGUAGE. CH. vi. there are ever thronging through its portals, in the guise of living realities, those things which of themselves are incorporeal and unseen. Wonderful, indeed, that a pulse of articulated air should be the only, or at any rate the most perfect means wherewith to express our thoughts l and feelings ! Without its incomprehensible points of union with all that passes in a soul which yet seems so wholly dissimilar from it, those thoughts and emotions could perhaps have no distinct existence the exquisite organism of our hearing would have been rendered useless, and the entire plan of our existence would have remained unperfected ! 1 Herder, Ideen zur Gesch. d. Menschheit,f. 190. 81 CHAPTER VII. SOUND AS THE VEHICLE OF THOUGHT. ' Words are the sounds of the heart, and writings its pictures.' YANGTSEE. A GREAT part of the world around us is inanimate and dumb ; yet such is the nature of all substances l that, by means of sound, we can interpret to the intellect their innermost peculiarity and constitution, even when light is absent, or the eye is most easily deceived. The inward shudder or oscillation of the component parts, even of lifeless objects, produced by any mechanical or external interference, betrays to us at once the degree of cohesion and homogeneity between the component particles, and some of their most general and necessary properties. There is, as might have been expected, a close analogy between the phenomena of Light and those of Sound. Thus Sound, 2 in general, corresponds to Sheen', Clear Sound to Brightness; Echo to Reflexion; Noise, a confused indistinct sound, to Glimmer ; Clang, a steady, pure, homogeneous sound, to Gloiv; Tone, which is the element of music, and is derived from TS ivw 1 In the earlier part of this chapter I am mainly following the guidance of Heyse (Syst. d. Sprachwissenschaft, 16), but I generally use my own words, because I have sometimes to amplify and more often to condense. 2 Schall, Schein ; Hall, Helle ; Wiederhall, Wiedersehein ; Gerausch, Schimmer or Geflimmer ; Klang, Glanz ; Ton, Farbe. a 82 OX LANGUAGE. CH. vii. because it depends on the greater or lesser tension by which it is produced, corresponds to Colour, and the relations between the different colours in a picture no less than those between the different intervals and harmonic relations of sound in music, are expressed by the word Tone. All these kinds of sound are produced out of lifeless substances by mechanical influence ; but they all differ from articulate sound, and from all sound which is the dynamic product of the animal organism. For sound, thus spontaneously produced, the Germans reserve the word Laut, for which we have no exact English equi- valent, unless we choose a special sense of the word utterance. Voice (Stimme) is the capacity of dynamic sound- production, but in English is chiefly used of man alone. The lower order of animals, which have no lungs, and fish, whose element is the water which is not a con- ductor of voice, are dumb. The higher animals have each their own utterance, by which they are recognisable, and by which they recognise each other. It has gene- rally been asserted, and it is repeated by Heyse, that we cannot speak properly of a language of animals, because their utterances only express a general con- sciousness of existence, or at the best but a few sensa- tions, a few longings and desires of the animal life (^ fV Xn}> which, even in their highest possible develop- ment even in the song of the nightingale cannot attain to the expression of anything individual. With this conclusion, so like a thousand other hasty assertions ! of human dogmatism, it is not necessary to agree, but, 1 See a paper on ' The Distinction between Animals and ilan,' in the Anthropological Review, No. 5. CH. vn. SOUND AS THE VEHICLE OF THOUGHT. 83 in order not to break the continuity of the subject, I have relegated all further examination of it to another place. Man possesses a voice, a capacity for the dynamic production of sound, as a mere animal Being in the yet dark and unconscious slumber of natural Life. The new-born infant enters the world with a cry, which is a mere natural sound, the expression of animal feeling, and is soon liable to various modifications for the pur- pose of expressing the different stirrings of life and sensation. These natural sounds are no more speech than the cries of animals are ; no human intelligence is expressed by them ; and the origin of rational language cannot be explained by them alone. They are inarti- culate and involuntary; they are mere modifications of the breath, and do not express the thinking spirit. Nevertheless, they prove the possession of a high capa- city, and this capacity is developed by man into signi- ficant speech, as the expression of his highest and innermost nature. His voice, independently of the words it utters, is capable, by natural flexibility, of expressing every variation of emotion, in all degrees of intensity; and by virtue of the penetrating nerve- shaking influence of sound upon the soul, it can convey to others a sympathy * with the same feelings, and the impression of a free activity. It instantly and involun- tarily stirs the attention of the hearer by an energy which, like that of the soul itself, is to the highest 1 The power of influencing by the voice is found in all, but in very different degrees. Few had it in greater perfection than Dr. Chalmers, who, we are told, moved a whole congregation to tears by the few simple words ' It was because God was very gool to him.' Every one has experienced the effect of what Lamartine beautifully calls ' the gift of tears in the voice.' o2 84 ON LANGUAGE. CH. vn. degree varied, energetic, and effectual, yet is at the same time ideal and unseen. The voice, then, by a natural necessity, by an organic connection, is the organ of the understanding ; and speech is the expression of the thinking spirit in articulate sounds. The union in speech of sound and sense, the combination of the phonetic and the intellectual elements into one organic unity, will be the subject of our enquiry hereafter. At present we must say a few words on the mechanical means by which the emission of the voice is rendered possible. The voice of man is produced by a machinery far more exquisite l and perfect than that possessed by any other animal. The Larynx, with ite cartilages and muscles, forms, in point of fact, a combination of musical instruments ; it is at once a trumpet, an organ, a hautboy, a flageolet, and an ^Eolian harp. ' The air passing upwards and downwards through the larynx and trachea, 2 forms its analogy with the wind-instruments: the vibration of the chordae vocales, its resemblance to the stringed.' < The voice 3 is produced by the larynx, which is situated beneath the base of the tongue, and in front of the pharynx. The sides of the larynx are formed by the two large thyroid cartilages, which rest on the annular cricoid cartilage. On the upper surface of the back of the cricoid cartilage are mounted two small cartilaginous bodies, called the arytenoid, which are moveable in various directions by various muscles. 1 Ladevi-Roche, De F Orig. du Lang. p. 49 ; et ibi Bossuet, Con- naissance de Dieu et de soi-meme, p. 194. 2 Hilles, Essentials of Physiology, p. 272. 3 I have abridged this account from Dr. Carpenter's Animal Physio- logy (p. 528), generally using his own words. CH. VH. SOUND AS THE VEHICLE OF THOUGHT. 85 To these arytenoid cartilages are attached two ligaments of elastic fibrous substance, which pass forward to be attached to the front of the thyroid cartilage, where they meet in the same point. These are the instruments concerned in the production of sound, and also in the regulation of the aperture by which air passes into the trachea; and they are termed vocal chords. By the meeting of these ligaments in front, and their separation behind, the usual aperture has the form of a V ; but it may be narrowed by the drawing together of the ary- tenoid cartilages until the two vocal ligaments touch each other along their whole length, and the aperture is completely closed. In ordinary breathing the ary- tenoid cartilages are wide apart ; but for vocal sounds it is necessary that the aperture should be narrowed, and that the flat sides rather than the edges of the vocal ligaments should be opposed to one another. When the ligaments are brought into position, by the contrac- tion of certain muscles, the air, in passing through the larynx, sets them in vibration, in a manner very much resembling that in which the reed of a hautboy or clarionet, or the tongue of an accordion or harmonium, is set in vibration by the current of air made to pass beneath them. The rapidity of the vibration, and consequently the pitch of the sound, depends on the degree of tension of the vocal ligaments.' * When we reflect,' says Mr. Hilles, 1 'that the range of the human voice will extend, although rarely, to the compass of two octaves, and that in this range are included, in some singers, as many as 2,000 minor tones, we shall form some idea of the extreme delicacy of motion, of which the laryngeal muscles are capable when fully educated.' 1 Ubi supra, p. 275. 86 OX LANGUAGE. CH. vii. The elementary sounds of which the voice is capable are about twenty in number, 1 and it is easy to see that the permutations and combinations of these sounds are amply sufficient to provide the world with an infinite variety of languages. The elements of articulate sound are three 1. The aspirate, 2 which is a mere strength- ened expiration ; 2. The vowel sounds, produced by a continuous stream of air passing through the trachea, and modified only by the form of the aperture through which they pass ; and 3. The consonants, 3 for the utter- ance of which is required a partial or complete inter- ruption of the breath in its passage through the organs in front of the larynx. These are of two kinds, viz. those 4 of which the sound can be prolonged, and the explosive consonants (b, p, d, t, g, &), which require a total stoppage of the breath at the moment previous to their pronunciation, and which therefore cannot be prolonged. The sound of the former is modified by the position of the tongue, palate, lips, and teeth, and also by the degree in which the air is permitted to pass through the nose. 1 Harris, Hermes, ii. 2, 3rd ed. p. 325. 2 Heyse, p. 74. In pp. 78, 79 Heyse traces what he supposes to be the natural connection of the vowels with various emotions ; he admits, however, that language in its final stage confuses and neglects these primitive relations of sound to emotion, and makes the vowels mere signs in the service of the free understanding. Hence it is in interjections and other primitive words that we must study their original value. But alike for vowels and for consonants such enquiries seem to me both dubious and difficult. 3 Hence it is in the use of consonants, speaking generally, that the sounds uttered by animals differ from the articulate human voice. Aristotle speaks of ol aypa^naroi tioQoi olov Qypicw, Probl. xi. 57. They have but one or two consonants at most. Id. x. 39. K, for instance, is called ' litera canina.' ' Irritata canis quod rr quam plurima dicit.' Lucilius. ' R is for the dog.' Shaks. 4 Carpenter, /. c. CH. vii. SOUXD AS THE VEHICLE OF THOUGHT. 87 Now, the natural sensuous life expresses itself in three kinds of natural sound, viz., Interjections, Imitations, and those sounds, expressive of some desire, which in imitation of the German Lautgeberden l we may roughly designate as vocal gestures. Aspirates and vowels are generally sufficient to express the mere passing emotions of the natural life ; consonants are more the expres- sion of the free intelligence. Interjections are the arbi- trary expression of subjective impressions ; Imitations advance a step farther, spontaneously reproducing some- thing which has influenced the senses from without ; Lautgebevden, though like .jterjections they have their source in the subject,' are not a mere utterance of passive sensation, but an energetic expression of will, though as yet only in the form of desire. At present, it will be observed, we are only dealing with the elements of articulate speech ; the natural sounds out of which, by the aid of the understanding, perfect language is developed, and which in themselves are the mere expressions of animal feeling. In tracing the physical development of sound which corresponds to the psychical development of thought, we have not yet got beyond the means of finding vent for the sensuous impression, or at most the conscious perception. We have not even arrived at the root, which corresponds, in the development of sound, to the intuition (Anschauung) in the development of thought. The word which cor- responds to the representation (Vorstellung) is beyond the vocal elements which we have yet reached. The further steps of the Process, which are as yet unex- plained, will become evident as we proceed. 1 Heyse, p. 71. 88 ON LANGUAGE. CHAPTEE VIII. INTERJECTIONS. 'Hs SiSdffKfi 'Eir'tKOvpot tyvffei 0 (Ez. ii. 10), and ^s (Mic. vii. 1 ; Job x. 15), are almost identically the same with at/So?, papse, phui, s\e\sv, and even the Irish whilleleu ! We find the same exclamations, Ha ! ha ! for surprise, Au-e ! for sorrow, Abah ! for disgust, among the New Zealanders; 3 and the Australian Ala! dif- fers little either in sound or meaning from the English Halloo! Latin is particularly rich in genuine interjections ; and, besides this, Latin, Greek, English, and nearly all languages have a number of words which, although used inter] ectionally, are not really to be classed under this head, like the Hebrew np^n, ^ ysvoiTo, ' Grod forbid ! ' Such are the Latin malum ! nefas ! macte ! amabo ! age, sodes, sis, nae, profecto, &c., some of which are 1 Ewald's Hebrew Grammar, 440. 2 See, too, Glass, Phil. Sacr. lib. iv. tract. 8. 8 Ch. Miss. Soc. New Zealand Gram. p. 57. Threlkeld's Austral. Gram. p. 20. CH. viii. INTERJECTIONS. 91 verbs, and some are adverbs. Such too are the Greek ays, v, K.r.\. Greg. Nyss. Contra Eunom. xii. p. 848. 104 ON LANGUAGE. CHAPTER IX. LAUTGEBERDEN, OR YOCAL GESTURES. ' Isis et Harpocrates digito qui significat st ! ' Vet. Poeta ap. Varr. L. L. IT. 10. So far as I am aware, Professor Heyse, in his * System der Sprachwissenschaft,' was the first to distinguish accurately between interjections which are the signs of individual emotion beginning and ending with the utterer, and which are in fact a concentrated soliloquy, and those which, like visible gestures, convey meaning to some other person, and generally intimate a desire or command. It was certainly Heyse who first 1 called the latter by the expressive and picturesque name of Laut- geberden or Begehrungslaute, vocal gestures or sounds of desire, like st! ps! schl and to animals brr! He called them by this name both because they are often connected with gestures, and because they can be repre- sented by them ; as st! by the finger on the lips, &c. 2 Such in English are tush ! pish ! pshaw ! pooh ! which are expressive of contempt or aversion, and can only be conceived of as addressed to another ; hush! hist! 3 mum ! 1 See Syst. der Sprach. p. 29. ' Die Lautgeberden. So nenne ich solche, zum Theil consonantische und dabei nicht syllabische Laute,' &c. 2 Compare the French zest ' interjection, qui ne se prend que dans cette acception proverbiale, " entre le zist et le zest" ' i. e. ' middling.' 1 M. Nodier observes that it would hardly be supposed that etymo- logists could be found who derived st ! from ' silentium tene.' ' Cela, est CH. ix. LAUTGEBERDEX, OR VOCAL GESTURES. 105 hark ! halloo ! hip, &c. ; and of this nature are many of the exclamations addressed to animals. 'Among them,' says Mr. Marsh, 1 who does not however refer to Heyse, ' are all the isolated, monosyllabic, or longer words by which we invite or repel the approach, and check or encourage the efforts of others; in short, all single detached articulations intended to influence the action or call the attention of others, but not syntactically connected with a period.' This class of interjections rises, in three respects, above those previously noticed ; first, because they are mainly consonantal, and therefore approach more nearly than the others, in which consonants play a very sub- ordinate part, to the complicated articulations of human speech; secondly, because they have for their object, not merely expression, but communication ; and thirdly, because they do not originate in a mere passive feeling, but are, as has been already noticed, the ener- getic utterance of desire or will, and are spontaneous rather than involuntary. They hardly attain to the dignity of Language because they express no thought, and are the utterance rather of the feeling life than of the thinking spirit ; yet they, in common with the other natural sounds which we have mentioned, correspond to a new step in the development of the human intelli- gence. The Interjection corresponds to the dawn of sensation ; the mere Imitation is an analogon of the word into which it almost immediately passes ; the Vocal gesture is an analogon 2 of the sentence, especially of the imperative sentence (compare st ! with the Latin cependant vrai, car il n'y a point d'idee bizarre dont ce genre d' erudition ne puisee offrir un exemple.' Diet. p. 87. 1 Mareh, Lectures, p. 196. 2 Heyse, p. 73. 106 OX LANGUAGE. CH. ix. sta !). And thus in the sphere of the natural life, the three chief steps in the development of Intellect and Language are foreshadowed or represented. To recapitulate a little. Impressions affecting the senses produced a physical effect on the organs of sound, and thereby provoked interjeetional expressions ; the repetition of these expressions recalled, by the law of association, the impressions of which they were the utterance, and recalled them not only in the mind of the speaker but also of the hearer. Hence the Inter- jection served as a sign, and could be recalled by the intellect, no less than the impression by the memory. Here, then, we are at once furnished with all the elements or requirements of speech, namely impres- sions producing sensations, sensations becoming repre- sentations (Vorstellungen), and representations expressed by signs. Thought receives its life from Sensation, and Language receives from the interjeetional elements its capability of being intuitively understood. Is any other origin of speech conceivable ? l Speech results from the combined working of the Intellect and the Senses, and no part of speech more directly and imme- diately illustrates this united activity of the Senses and the Intellect than the Interjection. Is it then strange that Interjections should become as it were the tap-root of all Language ? If we extend the meaning of ' Inter- jection' to embrace the imitations of all spontaneous sounds expressive of physical conditions, not only the natural sounds of wrath, horror, disgust, &c., but those which express the sounds of yawning, sneezing, licking, heavy breathing, shuddering, &c., then the words im- 1 See on the whole subject F. Wiillner, Ueb. d. Urspr. d. Sprache. Minister, 1838 (passim). CH. ix. LAUTGEBERDEX, OR VO^AL GESTURES. 107 mediately reducible to this origin may be counted by hundreds ; and if to these we add their derivatives, they may perhaps be counted by thousands. And this is equivalent to saying that they alone can form a lan- guage ; for be it remembered that even the Bible itself says all that it has to say by the help of 10,000 words. And as we shall say no more on the Interjectional origin of Language, we will add what has long been a puzzle to us. While arguing against such an origin, Professor Miiller appears to us to accept what is the same thing in other words. If, as is probable, he also seems to have at least modified his originally strong hostility to Onomatopoaia, we may yet perhaps live to see a change of view as complete, though less marvellous, than that of Herder. I allude to the only passage in which I can from his writings discover the faintest gleam of light on the question, * What was the origin of roots ? ' Now if he confessedly gave up this question as insoluble, there would be no more to say ; but this he does not do. He rejects utterly and distinctly the miraculous origin of language, yet he says t\i&t phonetic types ' exist as Plato would say by nature, though with Plato we would add that when we say by nature, we mean by the hand of God.' He rejects and nicknames the Interjectional theory of Language ; yet on a page (i. 370) which, in spite of the generally matchless clearness of his style, gives me none but the very vaguest and most uncertain conception of his funda- mental belief on the matter, unless it be a complete acceptation of the Interactional theory, he says, re- ferring to Heyse, * There is a law which runs through nearly the whole of nature, that everything which is sti^uck rings. ... It was the same with man, the most 108 ON LANGUAGE. CH. ix. highly organised of nature's works.' In the note he says that this fact * can of course be used as an illustra- tion only, and not as an explanation.' Yet he adds, * The faculty, peculiar to man in his primitive state, by which every impression from without received its vocal expression from within, must be accepted as a fact.' And in the text he continues, ' Man . . . was endowed not only, like the brute, with the power of expressing his sensations by Interjections, and his perceptions by onomatopreia. He possessed likewise the faculty of giving more articulate expression to the rational con- ceptions of his mind.' This was 'an irresistible instinct;' * the creative faculty which gave to each con- ception, as it thrilled for the first time through the brain, a phonetic expression.' Now what explanations have we here ? Language was not revealed, yet * pho- netic types ' ' exist ... by the hand of God.' Language did not arise from Interjections or Imitations, yet it came from these plus an irresistible instinct whereby man gave ' more articulate expression to the rational instincts of his mind.' l I leave the explanation as I find it. The postulated additional instinct is either a mere development of the Interjectional faculty, or I can only repeat of it, ' Entia non sunt multiplicanda prseter necessitated. Frustra fit per plura quod fieri possit per pauciora.' 1 Long after this passage was written I met with an almost verbally identical criticism of this passage in Steinthal, Philologie, Geschichte, und Psychologie (Berlin, 1864), p. 21. He ends, 'd. h. obwohl hier der Ursprung der Sprache erklart sein sollte, so bleibt er doch eben vollig unerklart." 109 CHAPTEE X. TOCAL IMITATIONS. 'O yap 'Eirf/covpos e\tyfv STI ou^l faurrijfuSvus oirroi eBftno ret 6v6fj.ara, OAAct QvfflKUS KtVOVfJLfVOl, d)S ol ^ffffOVTfS KO.I 1TTaipOVTJ Kdi /J.VKUfJ.tVOl Kal v\curts Kal aTfva&tnts. PBOCLUS, p. 9. EPICURUS, if he be correctly reported by Proclus, in the often-quoted passage which stands at the head of this section, espouses the views of the Analogists who argued for the natural origin of language, against the Ano- malists who regarded it as the result of convention. Thus much, at least, is certain : the sounds to which language gave distinct meaning and regular articulation were all of them readily supplied by nature, 1 partly as the involuntary expressions of feeling or desire, under which heads fall the Interjections and Lautgeberden, partly as the instinctive imitations of an external world of sound. The instinct of imitation has a far deeper foundation than is usually supposed, and plays a most important part in the history of human progress. There is hardly a branch of art, there is hardly a mechanical invention which has not originated in the observation and copying of some process or phenomenon of nature. The instinct, 1 ra ov6fjMTa Kal TO. prf^ara tpwval, a! Se ifxaval iifffi, TO. &pa dvop.ara Kal rck jS^/nora vcTfi, Alex. Aphrodis. Schol. in Arist. de Interpr. p. 103, in Lersch, i. 89. 110 OX LANGUAGE. CH. x. as Herder observes, is common to men and to the higher animals, and is by no means the result of intelligent reflection, but an immediate product of organic sym- pathy. As one string sounds in unison with another, as a lute laid on the table echoes the tune played upon the lute in the performer's hand, so the human organism is a musical instrument strung into such exquisite harmony with nature, that it vibrates in sym- pathy with all external influences. The imitative in- stinct is in fact a kind of intellectual assimilation. We have already seen how powerfully it has worked among all nations in the nomenclature of animals, which were probably the earliest objects to acquire a name. At present, however, we are speaking only of natural sounds, and simple imitations which have not yet reached to the position of language, but are the childish instinctive echoes of sensuous perceptions, or the playful reproductions of animal cries and other sounds. The main object of language is communication; but these imitations, in their earliest stage, convey nothing to the hearer, and are merely the result of an inherent tendency to imitate and reproduce, which is found also among birds and animals, and in which a child at a very early stage of his existence finds spontaneous amusement. It is however important to observe that the imita- tion is purely subjective ; in other words the imitative sound represents rather the impression produced than the sound which produced it. 1 The sounds of nature, 1 ' Man vergesse nieht, dass urspriinglich niclit von Naehahmung des Lautes der Aussenwelt die Rede sein kann, so dass gleiehsam ein Wetteifern mit der Natur stattgefunden hatte ; sondern dass der Mensch durch den Eindriick des aiisseren Lautes eine bestimmte Empfindung erhalte, und dass sieh diese unmittelbar, ohne Reflexion, durch einen CH. x. VOCAL IMITATIONS. Ill for instance, are inarticulate ; but by the very nature of the human voice, as used for purposes of speech, the imitation must be more or less articulate, and must require consonantal sounds for its production. It is true that caw-caw, bow-wow, fipsKS/ceicet;, KOI' Kot, &c., are not words ; but nevertheless they are imitative utterances which stand much nearer to words than the mere unarticulated emission, which is quite within the range of the human voice, of the sounds which are actually uttered by the rook, the dog, the frog, or the pig. A child can with a little practice imitate with tolerable accuracy the crowing of a cock, and this imi- tation merely exercises one capacity of his voice ; but if he says * cock-a-doodle-doo,' the imitation is subjective, and merely reproduces in a conventional but very simple manner the impression caused by the cock's noise ; the child has not yet got to a word properly understood, but he is on the high road which leads directly to it. Some inkling of this fact must be lurking in the curious story of Phaedrus about the buffoon who received the plaudits of a crowded theatre for his very successful imitation of the squeaking of a pig. As he had begun by bending down his head into the bosom of his robe, the multitude believed that he had a pig concealed there, and re- doubled their applause when he shook out his robe and showed them that it was empty. An envious rustic exclaimed that he could excel the exhibitor, and next day both of them appeared on the stage. The buffoon, pretending to have a pig hidden in his robe, repeated Laut aussert,' &c. Wiillner, Ueber die Verwandschaft des Indogerm., &c. 3. ' The imitative nature of language consists in an artistic imitation not of things, but of the rationed impression which an object produces by its qualities.' Bunsen, Outlines, ii. 103. 112 ON LANGUAGE. CH. x. his exhibition of the previous day to the delight of the populace; the rustic, going through the same panto- mime, pinched the ear of a real pig which he had brought in with him, and which naturally squeaked its sincerest and best. The people exclaimed that the buffoon's imitation was much the more natural of the two, and ordered the rustic to be kicked out ! At ille profert ipsum porcellum e sinu, Turpemque aperto pignore errorem probans, En ! hie declarat quales sitis judices ! ' 'Nevertheless,' says Perrault, 'the people was in the right ; for the comedian who imitated the pig had studied all its most marked and characteristic sounds, and, collecting them together, came closer to the notion which all the world has of a pig's grunts.' 2 The story is too curious not to be true, and the explanation too ingenious not to be correct ! The same fact as to the nature of linguistic imitations explains the vast diversity in the articulated attempts of various nations to reproduce one and the same sound. This subject has been already illustrated fully, 3 and little more need be added upon it. Who would assert that kiao kiao in Chinese, and dchor dchor in Mandshu, cock-a-doodle-doo in English, and Goekerdihce in Fran- conian, are not onomatopoeias for the crowing of a cock, 1 Phsedrus, Fab. v. 5. 2 Parallels des Anciens et des Modernes, iii. 216. Charma, p. 253. 3 See Lobeck, Aglaophamus, i. 779. Origin of Lang. pp. 81-85. The fact, however, that the actual sounds imitated are often really different in different countries has often been overlooked. Ding-dong represents the tone of a large church-bell, but bilbil or tintinnabulum of a little hand-bell. So pflV represents the laughter of an Oriental, cacMnnus of an Italian, &c. Compare, however, J^J^J with yeAcwo, lachen, Gothic hlahjan. CH. x. VOCAL IMITATIONS. 113 because on paper they look so different ? or that ' bang ' is not an onomatopoeia for the sound of a gun, because it is wholly unlike the ' Pouf ' of the French ? or that Screech-owl is not as onomatopoetic as ulula ? or that taratantara is not as much an imitation of the trum- pet as the Hebrew Chatzotzrah (rn/ivq ), or thie Grerman Kling-klang as the Hebrew (^) Tziltzal, though they have not a letter in common? The Greeks used both Koyj; and /3\uv^]v IffKOvtr" a\6xourtv. 2 Drechsler, ubi supra, p. 10. CH. x. VOCAL IMITATIONS. 117 correspond with and paint the sensations they expressed ; Instinct supplied them, in the form of Interjections and Imitations, far more powerfully and swiftly than could have been done by the wavering process of conscious selection. ' As the artist fashions the symbol in which his Idea is reborn, not by conscious consideration, but, like nature, by unconscious science ; as the heart stirred by joy or sorrow, still, without search or hesitation, im- mediately, unconsciously, but surely and appropriately, utters the sound which truly paints the colour of the passion, so it is in all language.' To develop Language was the appointed task for the youth of humanity, and its work, as is ever the case with the work of the inspired artist, is inconceivable to the uninitiated, and wonderful to all. It is a curious and interesting fact that even among uncivilised nations we find what appears to be a trace, mythologically expressed, of this same conception, viz. that it was the mighty diapason of nature which fur- nished man with the tones which he modulated into articulate speech. The Esthonian l legend of the kettle of boiling water which ' the Aged one ' placed on the fire, and from the hissing and boiling of which the various nations learned their languages and dialects, mythically represents the Kesselberg, with its crests enveloped in the clouds of summer steam, which they regarded as the throne of the thunder-god ; and the Languages which it distributes are the rolling echoes of Thunder and Light- ning, Storm and Kain. They have another and still more beautiful legend of a similar character to explain the 1 Grimm, Urspr. d. Sprache, p. 28. The explanations are given by Steinthal, Gcsch. d. Sprachwissenschaft bet den Griichen und Romern. p. 10. 118 OX LANGUAGE. CH. x. origin of Song or Festal-speech. The god of song Wannemunne descended on the Domberg, on which stands a sacred wood, and there played and sang. All creatures were invited to listen, and they each learnt some fragment of the celestial sound; the listening wood learnt its rustling, the stream its roar ; the wind caught and learnt to reecho the shrillest tones, and the birds the prelude of the song. The fish stuck up their heads as far as the eyes out of the water, but left their ears under water ; they saw the movements of the god's mouth, and imitated them, but remained dumb. Man only grasped it all, and therefore his song pierces into the depths of the heart, and upwards to the dwellings of the gods. The legends of savages, and their mythical attempts to express a dim philosophy of speech, are so extremely few that it is interesting to observe in them thisten- deney. The following legend of the Australian abori- gines appears at first sight to be meaningless. They say that there was an old woman named Wururi, who went out at night and used to quench the fires with a great stick. When this old woman died the people tore her corpse to pieces. The Southern tribes coming up first ate her flesh, and immediately gained a very clear language. The Eastern and the Northern tribes, who came later, spoke less intelligible dialects. If Steinthal 1 be right in seeing in Wururi a personification of the damp Night-wind, then at the root of this legend also, lies the notion that the Imitation of Nature helped largely to furnish the material of speech. 1 Gesch. der Sprachwissenschaft, p. 9. 119 CHAPTER XI. FROM IMITATIVE SOUNDS TO INTELLIGENT SPEECH. Wl(yd\ri rovruv apx^l xal $i$dVwv CH. xir. ONOMATOPOEIA. 125 In the primitive language indeed, parts l of speech had no recognised existence ; the very genius of language was holophrastic, and a sound stood for a sentence, 2 the same sound having many meanings according to its position or pronunciation. Nevertheless there must have been from the first a traceable distinction between nominal and pronominal roots. 'A rigorous analysis of the Indo-European tongues,' says Mr. Garnett, ' shows, if we mistake not, that they are reducible to two very simple elements : 1. Abstract nouns, 3 denoting the simple properties or attributes of things. 2. Pronouns, originally denoting the relations of Space.' We shall hope to show reasons for believing that nouns had, for the most part, their direct origin in imitative sounds ; and considering that in the origin of language the dis- tinction between parts of speech is only of the slightest and most rudimentary character, 4 if we can trace the genesis of nouns, we have solved the problem before us. 1 ' Die Sprache ist nicht stiickweis odpr atoraistisch, sie ist gleich in alien ihren Theilen als Ganzes und demnach organisch entstanden.' Schelling, Einl, in die Philos. d. Mythologie, p. 51. On the primitive speech-cells, which have as yet no special organs for the functions of distinct parts of speech, see Schleicher, Die Darwinische T/teorie und die Sprachwissenschaft, p. 23. This is an ingenious pamphlet showing the light which the Darwinian hypothesis throws upon language. 2 ' Les inventeurs des langues n'etaient pas des grammairiens comme Condillac, Adam Smith et tant d'autres, qu'on croirait avoir dine avec nos premiers parents, tant ils sont bien instmits de la maniere exacte etr precise dont le premier langage a et6 formeV Du Ponceau, Mem. sur le Syst. Gram, des Langues de V Amerique du Nord, p. 15. 8 It is impossible to speak of the priority of nouns or verbs ; both originate together, as specialisations of the original vague elements of speech. See Schleicher, Compend. d. vergl. Gram. p. 412. 4 Every lingua franca presents a picture of what the primitive lan- guages must have been, by reducing language to its simplest elements and by the almost complete elimination of grammar. See Appleyard, Kaf. Gram. p. 10. Latham, Var. of Man, p. 320 sqq. Here for in- 126 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xn. An imitative sound, gives expression to an auditory perception, and therefore has a necessary and obvious relation to the object which causes the perception. The sound, perceived and reproduced, gives to the Intellect a fixed mark of the object perceived. How then could man more naturally name the representation of an object which he has grasped in his intelligence, than by the copy of its characteristic mark ? Now when the Imitative natural sound is firmly held as a sign of, and then as a name for the representation, it becomes a Word ; and this method of forming words is named Onomatopoeia. First of all man names the perceived sound, itself by the natural imitation of it, e.g. a croak, a shriek, ftoij, &c. ; next the producing of the sound, as croaking, shrieking, /36ai>, &c. ; and finally the object from which the sound emanates, and which the repetition of it recalls before the mind, as crow, /Sovy, cuckoo, &c. Now those who attack the Onomatopoetic theory in- variably leap to the conclusion that we mean by it to describe Language as due solely to the Instinct of Imita- tion, and that as other animals have this instinct and yet do not possess language the theory breaks down. Possibly indeed such a notion may arise from want of sufficient precision in our statements of the theory ; but as we have repeatedly protested against it before, so we stance is a negro crier's rersion of the notice that ' Pigs without rings in their noses are to be shot.' ' I say suppose a pig walk iron no lire for him nose ! gun shoot ! kill im one time.' Hutchinson, Ten Years' Wanderings, p. 32. And here is a specimen of the Chinese ' pigeon ' (i. e. 'business') English. 'My chin-chin you, this one velly good flin (= friend) belong mi; mi \vantchie you do plopel pigeon (= proper business), along he, all same fashion along mi,' &c. Prehistoric Man, ii 428. CH. xii. OXOMATOPCEIA. 127 here again caution the student that this is not our view, and that to argue as if it were is not to refute but to misrepresent. A mere capacity for sensuous imitation would end, as it does with the jay and the mocking- bird, in a mere collection of natural sounds. But here the intellect steps in, and makes the imitation a means for the satisfaction of its higher needs. In itself the mere imitation is a natural sound expressive of a sen- suous impression, and nothing more; but the mind seizes upon it as a means for its own culture, reproduces it at will as the sign of a fixed representation, as the name of that representation, and so as a WORD. . And when the Sound has become a Word, it has a far richer and at the same time more abstract meaning, inasmuch as it no longer signifies or even calls attention to the imitated Sound, but stands for the whole conception. Nobody for instance in using the word cow l dreams of its primeval significance as the creature that Imvs (in North Country dialect * coo '), but as a most useful domestic animal, possessing numberless familiar attri- butes. Now, as far as the mere outward form is concerned, there may be only a single step from the natural Sound to the Word ; nay more the two may be phonetically 1 Is it conceivable that any one can, with this explanation before him, prefer to derive it from the Sanskrit root gu, to go? Would any human being have fixed on going as a special attribute, a characteristic mark, of the cow ! so characteristic as to be selected out of a host of attributes to suggest the animal's name! See Pictet, Lts Orig. Ind. i. 331, who very sensibly admits the onomatopoetic origin. See too T. Hewitt Key's able pamphlet, Qu&ritur, p. 8. I take this opportunity of apolo- gising to Professor Key for my inadvertence in attributing to him the derivation of ' vivo ' from ' bibo,' which he never in any way sanctioned (Orig. of Lang. p. 105). I have already explained to him by letter the origin of my mistake. 128 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xn. coincident; but between the inner meaning of the two lies the entire chasm which separates the natural life of sense from the free intellectual life, the entire chasm which separates the sensation from the concept. It is true that in finished language the pure and obvious onomatopoeias are mainly those which express the actual sounds imitated, or verbal forms derived from them ; to roar, 1 buzz, whizz, crack, clang, screech, hiss, rustle, &c.; and more rarely substantives, such as crow, cuckoo, peewit, &c., because when the Intellect pierces deeper into the nature of things, it often rejects the crude imitation which is no longer a necessity, and proceeds to the naming of objects by deeper-lying and more significant characteristics, which are often ex- pressed by words in which all traces of original imitation have disappeared for centuries. So far Heyse ; with much that he proceeds to add, we disagree, and we shall incidentally give reasons for doing so in the following part of the chapter. On one point however we are entirely of his view, in regarding the onomatopoetic principle as a starting-point of Lan- guage; we do not however think with him that the advancing intellect of mankind soon dispensed with it, and still less that it had but a trifling influence in 1 It would be easy to produce a very long and striking list of such verbs in Hebrew. Greek is also rich in them, as o\o\vtw, a\a\d^eiv, (j.r)Kaffdai, fj.vKaff6ai, PpvxfiffOcu, fioifciv, xpM eTt 'C "') """P'C 6 '") ffi^etv, K\ay- yaivtiv, K.T.A. Latin ululare, balare, mugire, rugire, stridere, hinnire, sibilare, &c. See Egger, Notions Blementaires de Gram. Comp. p. 155. The little poem Philomela, by Albius Ovidius Juventinus, is a string of such onomatopoeias, mostly of his own invention. It deserves a passing glance, though its value is purely philological. Many of these imitations with others may be seen in the fragment of an old glossary, ' Ex regula Phocae.' Mai, Auct. Class, vi. 600. CH. xii. OXOMATOPCEIA. 129 liberating the intellect from mere sensuous impressions. The fact that it is still seen so conspicuously at work in the language of children and savages seems to us to refute such conclusions. I venture to disagree from Heyse only in the small degree of importance which he attaches to the principle. Granting that he is correct in considering the Sound to be a mere means, or element, or * moment ' in the development of the Word, just as the perception is in the development of the concept, granting that the Word never, or very rarely, continues to be a mere Echo or Reflex of the sensuous impression still without this means, without these mere echoes, it seems to us certain that language could never have existed. They were the appointed instrument to de- velope the latent germ, or Idea, of Speech, and we believe that they suggested the vast majority of actual roots. Perhaps a consideration of the objections to the theory will enable us to understand it more clearly. They will at any rate leave the reader more in a posi- tion to judge for himself, and will show our desire to avoid mere ex parte statements and reasonings. I have searched for these objections and refutations far and wide, and not consciously shirked any one of them ; and in order to give them the best possible position, I shall quote them, as often as I can, from the pages of Professor Max Miiller. It will, I think, be seen that the only ones which are at all insuperable are aimed not at the theory rightly understood, but at mere mis- apprehension of it. 130 ON LANGUAGE. CHAPTER XIII. OBJECTIONS TO THE IMITATIVE THEOKT ASSERTED PAUCITY OF ONOMATOPOEIAS, EVEN IN ANIMAL NAMES. ' Gallorum cantus, et ovantes gutture corvos, , Et vocum quidquid bellua et ales habet, Omnia cum simules ita vere ut ficta negentur, Non potes humanae vocis habere sonum.' Auson. Epig. Ixrvi. 1. THE first objection to the theory that the imitation of natural sounds was the chief starting-point of lan- guage, and the source of most nominal roots, is that * the certain onomatopoeias in our language are few in number? * Though there are names in every language formed by mere imitation of sound, yet these constitute ! a very small proportion of our dictionary. They are the playthings, not the tools of language, and any attempt to reduce the most common and necessary words to imitative roots ends in complete failure.' So wrote Professor Miiller in his first series of Lec- tures (i. p. 347); but it is fair to hope that his view has been a little modified, because in his second series 1 A similar objection is urged byEgger: 'Si Ton compare a 1'immense richesse des langues grecque, latine et frar^aise, le petit nombre des mots dont il peut rendre compte, on se convaincra que 1' Etymologic lie doit pas accorder a 1'onomatopee une trop grande importance.' Notions fyementaires, p. 155. CH. xiii. OBJECTIONS TO THE IMITATIVE THEORY. 131 he writes (ii. 92), * There is one class of scholars who derive all words from roots according to the strictest rules of comparative grammar, but who look upon the roots in their original character as either interjectional or onomatopoeic.' With regard to this theory, which is the only one which I am maintaining, he says, */ should wish to remain entirely neutral, satisfied with con- sidering roots as phonetic types till some progress has been made in tracing the principal roots not of Sanskrit only, but of Chinese, Bask, the Turanian, and Semitic languages, back to the cries of man or the imitated sounds of nature.' Our reply to the objection is this : That if the pro- posed etymologies be correct, 'the words formed by mere imitation of sound ' do not constitute by any means 'a very small proportion of our dictionary.' Perhaps the meaning is however that the obvious, certain, and indisputable onomatopoeias are few in number. Indeed we conceive that this must be the meaning because elsewhere it is admitted ' that each language possesses a large stock of words imitating the sounds given out by certain things.' l The word * few ' then is a very relative word, and if any one will examine for himself with patience a fair portion of a Greek, Hebrew, or English Lexicon, he will find that even the certain onomatopoeias, with their derivatives, furnish him with a very long list ; and that the number of words which have so much of the onomatopoetic element in them as most plausibly to be referred to a similar origin (especially as any other account which can be given of them is at least equally questionable), is very large in- 1 Lectures, ii. 89. K 2 132 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xin. deed. In French and in English the student will find the task ready performed to his hands by Charles Nodier in his Dictionnaire des Onomatopees, and by Mr. Hens- leigh Wedgwood in his Dictionary of English Etymo- logy. The former is full of errors which were perhaps inevitable at the time when it was written ; and every student will find a good deal from which he must withhold his consent until further proofs are adduced. But even with this deduction a candid consideration of M. Nodier's and Mr. Wedgwood's labours can hardly fail to convince him that the objection as to the paucity of actual onomatopoeias is one which is wholly without weight. Only, in looking for onomatopoeias he must remember that there is an immense gap between articulate and inorganic sounds, 1 and that he is looking, not for imita- tions, like bow-wow, but for human words adopted into rational speech, and therefore framed by the Intelligence of man from mere raw echoes to artistic articulated sounds in accordance with the processes which we have already endeavoured to trace. He must remember too that in the course of ages, Words (to borrow the frequent similitude) are tossed and rolled and chipped 2 out of 1 And, for this reason, ' in the imitative synonyms of the same or cognate tongues, we must expect only to meet with resemblances of a very general nature. 1 Mr. Wedgwood, in Phil. Trans, ii. 118. It is most necessary to enforce this observation. Onomatopoeia is not so much the imitation of sounds, as the instinctive and quasi-imitative reproduction of the impressions made by sounds. Wiillner, Urspr. d. Sprache, s. 28. We must not therefore expect to find them either uniform or exact. They may range over wide phonetic differences, and yet be onomatopoetic in origin. 2 Similarly, in ideographical characters which were once pictorial, ' that the resemblance should be in many cases so exact as in itself to demon- strate the object, is scarcely to be expected.' Marshman, Chinese Gram. p. 17. And Ewald (Hebr. Gram. 135) says of the Hebrew alphabet, CH. xin. OBJECTIONS TO THE IMITATIVE THEORY. 133 shape like the pebbles which are perpetually tumbled by the sea-waves upon a shingly beach, and that there- fore a word, once distinctly imitative, has often lost every possible external trace of its sensuous origin. It is now an established fact that every abstract word has acquired its meaning by derivation and metaphor from other words expressive of mere sensation, 1 yet how long and difficult, in some cases how uncertain or even im- possible, it is to point out the intervening stages ; and to the flippant and the ignorant how ridiculous is the apparent inadequacy of the origin to produce the result ! Yet the fact has now been demonstrated, and we only ask the same patience and unprejudiced learning in the endeavour to trace the physical origin of all our words from natural sounds. And as we are confirmed in our conviction of the sensational origin of all our abstract words by observing that the more primeval and uncul- tivated a language is, the more numerous are its sense- words, and the fewer its abstractions, so we are confirmed in our conviction about onomatopoeia by observing its extreme prevalence and vividness in the tongues which have least been subjected to the influences of civilisa- tion. * That portion of the vast growth of language,' says an ingenious writer, 2 ' which can be traced to a directly mimetic root may remain a small fraction of the whole; but if it be the only portion whose structure is intelligible to us, we shall readily believe that the ' The signs have been for the most part very much altered, because in \vriting they retained the dead traces only from habit, without thinking of their meaning according to the intention of the first discoverers.' This is, verbatim, true of language also. 1 ' So hat auch keine Sprache ein Abstractum, zu dem sie nicht durch Ton und Gefiihl gelangt -ware." Herder, Abhandl. 6. 122. 2 In Macmillaris Magazine. 134 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xm. working of this principle is limited by our ignorance and not by its own nature. The progress of all science consists in the destruction of these phantasmal limita- tions which, like the circle of the visible horizon, we project upon the outward world. . . . The study of lan- guage, we doubt not, is destined to achieve an analogous triumph over the weakness of our imagination, teaching us, in the imperfect accents of the child or the savage, to recognise the working of that principle which has perfected for us the instrument of thought.' Let us take a parallel case. It is now admitted by all competent scholars that all alphabetic writing de- rived its origin from pictorial and ideographic signs which originated from systems invented in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, and elsewhere. The analysis of the whole body of speech into its elementary sounds, and the representation of these sounds to the eye by figures on a plane surface, is so marvellous a discovery, hardly less marvellous than the discovery of speech itself, that, like speech and no less erroneously, it has been attri- buted to direct inspiration, and ascribed by Jews and Christians to Moses, Abraham, Seth, or Noah, 1 as by the ancient Egyptians to the god Thoth. Yet it is now established that writing was a gradual human discovery, and that the secret of it, like that of speech, was sug- gested by the instinct of imitation. Now this has been proved by precisely similar steps of induction to those 2 1 Voss, De Arte Grammatica, pp. 39-43. He truly says that on this topic ' multi multa tradideruiit et fuse, et confuse.' 2 In fact the processes are strictly analogous. The alphabet originally presented pictures, i. e. copies or imitations, to the eye, and when the secret of such representation was once learnt, the pictures rapidly became conventional and unrecognisable : so language presented copies or imita- CH. xm. OBJECTIONS TO THE IMITATIVE THEORY. 135 which we have followed in referring all roots to an onomatopoetic origin ; and if the steps of the argument have been in the one case universally accepted as con- clusive and satisfactory, why should they not be simi- larly accepted in the other ? Just as we have proved that imitative words are most common in savage lan- guages ; that they are more numerous and distinct in primitive than in modern languages ; that many of them are confessedly and clearly traceable ; that they supply us with a vera causa or adequate explanation ; that the steps of the progress are thus simple and natural ; and that no other theory has been seriously attempted ; so we show that picture-writing has pre- vailed and does prevail among various uncultivated races ; that it is the most obvious principle which could have been adopted; that it explained itself; that in all traceable instances the picture was the origin of the letter ; and that for instance in Egyptian l writing the Demotic or enchorial system is a corruption of the Hieratic, which is a degeneration of the Hieroglyphic, which is but a modification of the pictorial. With these clues we take any alphabet ; and as the Aramaean is the most important, and may most probably, as tradition asserts, have been the origin of the Phoenician, and through that of the Greek, and through that of the Eoman alphabet and of our own, and as the Hebrew alphabet is one of our oldest approximations to the Aramaean, 2 let us take that alphabet, and see how it was tions to the ear, which imitations were rapidly modified out of mere echoes into definite words by the action of well-defined physical and psychical laws. 1 See for details the admirable article on Hieroglyphics by Mr. E. S. Poole in the 8th ed. of the Encycl. Britannica. 2 According to Ewald it was not invented by the Phoenicians (Luc. 136 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xm. arrived at. "We find then at once that the name of each letter is the name of some object, and the form of the letter a rude representation of the form of the object. Thus : X Aleph = an ox; originally "V" an ox's head. 1 i Beth = a house; sometimes f| a tent (nearly as in Chinese). j Gimel = a camel; the form representing its neck or hump. T Daleth = a door ; Greek A a tent-door. 1 Vau=a tent-peg, or hook. And so on in nearly every case ; so that in the doubtful instances, such as n He, and D Samech, 2 we are entitled at once to conclude a similar parentage, though not with certainty discoverable. If we take other letters from the Greek alphabet, which were not among the original (froiviKtjia , is said to have invented the figure of the first because it resembles a saw of which its sound is an imitation, and the second because 'ps* recalls the whistling of an arrow, which the letter roughly represents. Of T and , both of which are mythically attributed to Palamedes, tradition tells us Phars. iii. 220), but by the Aramaeans (Plin. Nat. Hist. vii. 56). The name of each letter begins with the letter for which it stands. 1 See Ewald's Hebr. Gram. 135-140. 2 The word samech possibly means ' a prop;' but may not its form, no less than that of the letter B, the Greek njffv, Canis, the Sanskrit Qvan, are distinctly imitative, and are recognised as such by Pictet, who adds that, except on the imitative principle, it is impossible to account for the wide similarity between the names for the dog among various nations. A name bow-wow might, indeed, have been invented, 'yet, strange to say, we hardly ever find a civilised language in which the dog 1 Diez, s. v. Gatto ; and Wedgwood, Et. Diet. 2 To say nothing of the fact that the dog furnishes to language his full share of onomatopoeias ; such as the words jBatffc, baubari, v\aKTfiv, better, aboyer, f>vy%os, knurren, &c. In some Canadian languages the dog is called gagnenon. L2 148 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xm. was so called' (ii. 312). True, and for this perhaps a very sufficient reason may be given. Although as far back as history carries us the dog has been a domesti- cated animal, yet it must at one time have been "wild, and it may probably have received a name, or some of its names, while in this condition. Now it is at least doubtful whether the bark is a dog 1 8 natural utterance, and whether in its original state the dog did bark. For whole races of dogs, and perhaps it may be said all wild dogs, do not know how to bark, for instance the Esquimaux dogs, and those which run wild in the Pampas, in Chili, and in the Antilles, which only howl. Indeed Prichard, 1 who notices this fact, mentions the conjecture that the dog's bark * originated in an at- tempt to imitate the human voice ! ' If this conjecture, however apparently ludicrous, be correct, then men will have contributed more to the language of dogs, than dogs to the language of men ; for, as Dr. Daniel Wilson 2 observes, the words bark, yelp, howl, snap, snarl, whine, whimper, are ( words directly derived from the dog language!' At any rate it is certain that the dogs left by the Spaniards on Juan Fernandez to destroy the goats on which the pirates fed, had, when found thirty years afterwards by Don Antonio Ulloa, forgotten how to bark, and only imitated very awkwardly the bark of other dogs. It is known too that some puppies brought by Mackenzie from Western America were unable to bark, though their puppies acquired the power. There would be a reason then why bow-wow should not be the 1 Prichard, flat. Hist, of Man, p. 33 (ed. Norris). Sev. des Deux Mondes, Feb. 1, 1861. 2 Prehistoric Man, i. 83. Many German words, as winseln, heulen, &c., might have been added. CH. xin. OBJECTIONS TO THE IMITATIVE THEORY. 149 particular form assumed by any onomatopoetic name of the dog. 'What really took place was this,' says Professor Miiller rather dogmatically. * The mind received nu- merous impressions from everything that came within its ken. A dog did not stand before it at once pro- perly defined and classified, but it was defined under different aspects, now as a savage animal, now as a companion, sometimes as a watcher, sometimes as a thief, occasionally as a swift hunter, at other times as a coward or an unclean beast. From every one of these impres- sions a name might be framed, and after a time the process of natural elimination would reduce the number of these names, and leave only a few or only one, which like canis would become the proper name of the dog ' '(ii. 312). Now, would it not be amazing if the most obvious aspect of all, the noise made by the animal, which would be the first thing noticed about it, as it is the first thing noticed by all children, should not have contributed one of the characteristics which suggested a name ? Secondly, observe that the name which in the Aryan family did prevail was the one derived from the onomatopreia ^van. Thirdly, observe that out of Jive Sanskrit names for dog, three are imitative, viz. cvan, rudatha from rud (rudire) * 1'animal qui hurle et gemit,' and bhacha ' the barker ' from the root bhach, to bark ! Do not these facts speak for themselves ? Surely therefore, even when we meet Professor Miiller on ground selected by himself, we can abund- antly vindicate the applicability of our theory, throw- ing, we trust, some further light on the nature of the theory in the course of our enquiry. We have dwelt upon it in detail because he does so, being desirous, 150 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xnr. from his well-merited authority in all matters of philo- logy, to give full consideration to all the arguments on the subject which we could find in his writings, and to state the reasons why they do not carry conviction to our minds. To us the answer appears complete and convincing. 151 CHAPTEE XIV. FERTILITY OF ONOMATOPOETIC ROOTS. . ' Sed cunctas species animantum nemo notabit, Atque sonos ideo dicere quis poterit ? ' Alb. Ov. Juventinus, Philomel. 68. IN his second series of Lectures, the Professor returns to the attack with undiminished vigour, and as though he felt the insecurity of the outpost which we have just been trying to carry by assault, he entirely abandons it, and retreats behind another which is presumed to be more strongly fortified. In point of fact he cedes by implication his previous position ; ' Ibi omnis effusus labor ! ' Nevertheless, as the cession is only apparent, we do not regret the trouble we have taken to secure our ground ; and so we proceed to the new points of attack and defence. 'The onomatopoaic theory,' he says (Lectures, ii. 91), * goes very smoothly as long as it deals with cackling hens and quacking ducks ; but round that poultry-yard there is a dead wall, and we soon find that it is behind that wall that language really begins.' So far as this means merely that natural imitations are not in themselves language, but only the materials of it, and the stepping-stones to it, we not only agree with such a view but have from the first been asserting and illustrating it. If however it means that out of 152 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xiv. the sphere of animal names the imitative principle is excluded from its immense share in the elements of language, then we must once more emphatically dissent. For the meaning will then be the same as that which has so often been asserted in other forms, and which we will consider as the third objection, viz. that 3. Onomatopoeias are * like artificial flowers without a root. They are sterile, and are unfit to express any- thing beyond the one object which they imitate.' Professor Miiller illustrates this by saying that there are but few derivatives from the root ' cuck,' which is found in cuckoo, and cock,- and that ' cuckoo stands by itself like a stick in a living hedge.' Heyse implies the same (s. 92) by his remark that many onomatopoeias are not ' old fruitful roots of language, but modern inventions which remain isolated in language, and are incapable of originating any families of words, because their meaning is too limited and special to admit of a manifold application.' There is a certain primd fade truth in this remark, but it seems to us wholly immaterial to the question before us, which is merely this, * Did language originate, from interjectional and imitative roots?' With the reasons urged against the interjectional origin we have already dealt ; and it is surely no refutation whatever of the imitative origin of another great division of language to say that some imitative roots (and especially modern ones) are infructuous, or nearly so. The pau- city of the original roots of Language is an admitted fact, and if the difficult combination of c's or k's in 4 cuckoo ' be a root of which little use is made we cannot be surprised, although even from this root, as Professor Miiller himself admits, various words have been derived, CH. xiv. FERTILITY OF OXOMATOPOETIC ROOTS. 153 and the list of derivatives might be largely increased ; ! but at any rate there are plenty of other roots which we believe to be imitative, and some ivhich every one will admit to be so, which so far from being sterile are ' the mothers of thousands.' On the very page from which we have been quoting, Professor Muller supplies us with one, the root ru or kru, which passes through all kinds of fruitful metamorphoses, and ' has ever so many rela- tions from a rumour to a row.' But this, says the Pro- fessor, ' is derived from a root which has a general predicative power. It is not a mere imitation of the cry of the raven ; it embraces many cries from the harshest to the softest.' Here apparently we are at issue. For whether the root was originally suggested by the cry of the raven or not, and this is a matter on which dogma- tism is impossible, it is most certainly a natural sound, a sound caught from nature, an imitative sound, and therefore the words formed from, it were formed in strictest conformity with the Imitative theory. ' It might have been applied to the nightingale as well as to the raven,' says Prof. Muller. In the absence of any proof we should hold this to be very questionable, but if so it only shows how exquisitely delicate were the nuances which a word might receive by differences of pronunciation. Every one will admit that crow and croon are onomatopoeias ; yet the one is used of the harsh caw of the rook, and the other of the soft moan of doves. Every one will admit that these names of the grasshopper in different languages Sanskrit ciri, Ar- menian dzghrid, Greek ypv\\os, Cymric grilliedyz, Basque quirquirra, Mahratta ralra, Chinese sirsor, 1 The verb to cock, cog, cockade, coquet, coxcomb, &c. ; in short, so many that even this root cannot be called a sterile one. 154 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xiv. Hebrew tsldtsdl, and many more which might be ad- duced l are all imitative: yet how immensely are they varied by the fantasies of imitation ! How is this to be explained ? Simply by the fact to which it is so often necessary to recur, that words are not mere imitations but subjective echoes and reproductions repercussions which are modified both organically and ideally which have moreover been immensely blurred and disinte- grated by the lapse of ages. Koka in Sanskrit is a confessed onomatopoeia, and it means a goose, a cuckoo, a frog, a lizard, and a wolf. How wide then must be the differences expressed by one and the same imita- tion ! But we leave it to the reader whether it is more reasonable to suppose that the root ( kru ' was a ' pho- netic type,' having f a general predicative power,' arrived at by abstraction from the combined influence of all sorts of noises from the murmur of rivers, and the barking of dogs, to the songs of nightingales, or to suppose with us that it was an imitative root, the echo of some one distinct sensuous impression, which subsequently was modified to suit other sounds, and which passed through a whole cycle of meanings by the working of processes which we shall hereafter consider ? Which of the two suppositions is most in accordance with common probability, and with the remarkable feebleness of the power of abstraction among all unci- vilised men ? But we shall perhaps best refute the asserted sterility of imitative roots, by producing a few instances of the 1 Pictet, i. 528. Our blunted senses can no more realise the original delicacy of the appellative faculty than they can attain to the keen perfection in which they still exist in the savage. Lepsius, Paldogr. p. 21, quoted by Pott, Etym. Forsch. ii. 261. CH. xiv. FERTILITY OF OXOMATOPOETIC ROOTS. 155 vast range of conceptions which they have been made to express. If, in a few traceable instances, an onomatopoeia be found to fructify so far as to convey notions and impres- sions which might be thought to be infinitely removed from the possibility of even a metaphorical expression by sounds borrowed from the outer world, we shall see that these sounds, raw and vulgar as they may originally have been, were the natural sound-cells * iri which thought was quickened and developed into perfect speech. Whether the earliest origin of a word can be definitely proved or not, let it be considered that the choice rests in every case between an ultimate imita- tion or interjection and nothing. Most etymologists when they have got to a root stop there, at the most interesting point of the enquiry, pretending to offer no explanation whatever of the root itself, although if they could do so they would obviously be throwing a flood of light on the whole history of the word, and would also be inevitably illustrating the influence of certain pri- mary psychological laws, the observation of which is of the utmost importance both to philosophy and history. It is true that the Mimetic School (if I may be allowed such a term in treating of a subject in which the nomen- clature is as yet cumbrous and only tentative) must often stop short of what they believe to be the final step of Etymology ; but this does not detract from the value of their actual results, nor diminish their belief in the principle on which they rely. The principle indeed is one which requires the less proof, because we see its 1 The prominence recently given to Mr. Darwin's theories naturally suggests this metaphor. Since -writing it I have met with Aug. Schleicher's pamphlet (previously referred to) on the bearings of Lan- guage upon the hypothesis of development. 156 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xiv. daily-working and powerful effect even on living lan- guages, and especially in the process of their earliest acquisition. Let us look at the history of one or two imitative roots, and I think that we shall definitely prove how little they deserve the charge of sterility. For instance, let us take some of the simplest and earliest roots, beginning with ma. From the fact that it is among the most facile, and therefore among the earliest sounds uttered by children, we have it (and cognate sounds) first applied in almost all languages to name the simplest and tenderest and earliest known of relationships, * motherhood.' This is not an hypothesis but a certainty ; l it is one of those linguistic discoveries which must be accepted as established facts from which to start in all enquiries about the origin of language. 'It is impossible to doubt,' says M. Pictet, 'of their nature, purely phonetic and imitative of the earliest infantile syllables, when one finds them reappear among the most diverse nations. The reduplications papa, mama, so familiar to our European ears, have astonished more than one traveller who discovered them among the negroes of Africa, no less than among the savages of America and Oceania.' a For a comparative list of such terms we must refer to the interesting and ingenious essay of Buschmann Ueber den Naturlaut. In it he points out that this identity of terms is due to the fact we have mentioned, and is no proof whatever 1 Lists have often been published. Among others, see Nodier, Diet, des Onomatopees, pp. 18-21 (taken from De Brosse). 2 Pictet, ii. 348. The fact that in Sanskrit and most Aryan lan- guages they are attached to a verbal root in no way detracts from their imitative origin. CH. xiv. FERTILITY OF ONOMATOPOETIC ROOTS. 157 of the connection or relationship of Languages. It is one of the merits of the Imitative theory that it explains, not in this case only but many others, the similarity of a few words in languages which, as may be easily proved, are neither genetically nor historically connected with each other, but which have probably been separate from the very dawn of human life. But the root ma (or am, 1 which is the same thing) does not remain sterile. We get from it at once, as we should expect alike from the limited range of a child's experience and his limited command of articulate sounds a name for other relations, as the Latin amita aunt, the German amme 2 a nurse, the Spanish and Portuguese ama a housewife, amo master of a house, amma screech-owl from its supposed affection for its young (cf. stork from (rrepyco), and, indeed, in all pro- bability the root ' amo ' 3 I love, with all its immense stream of derivatives. Then by an easy and natural transference we get the Latin mamma, the breast, which is also found with the same meaning all over the world ; and the Dutch 1 Cf. Hebr. DK= mother, grandmother, &c. It is strange that Plato does not in the Cratylus notice this syllable, which would have afforded so singularly strong an illustration of the point contended for (viz. the intrinsic meaning and appropriateness of certain consonants) in sections 91-94. C. Lenorman sees in this reticence ' une reservation conseille'e par la gravite religieuse de cette syllable pv, qui esb le nom meme des mysteres.' Comment, sur le Cratyle, p. 275. * Diez, ed. Donkin, s. v. Ama ; and cf. Pictet, ii. 350. * "We say ' in all probability.' If any one prefers to suppose that ' amo ' is from the Sanskrit am ' to rush forward,' he may ; and he will have Professor Miiller on his side. (Lectures, ii. 91.) Let me here observe that the mere production of some analogous Sanskrit form as the derivation of a word is by no means a refutation of its imitative origin. I have already called attention to many admitted Sanskrit onomatopoeias. 158 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xiv, moeder the womb, &c. And so by simple laws of assor elation we get to the English mammetj Swiss mdmmi a doll, German memme a coward, and memmerei pol- troonery. So widely and so rapidly does the ripple spread on the surface of language ! Equally universal, equally fruitful, and equally rapid in its development is the cognate root pa. In Greek alone we have irarrip a father, irdTrwos a grandfather, TraTTTra^G) to wheedle and to prattle, irdinros the first down on the cheek of youth, TraTnToairsp^ra the bearded seeds of the dandelion, TraTnrcaSrjs woolly. In Latin we have papparium (the English pap), and papilla the bosom (cf. mammilla). In Sardinian papai to eat, in Italian (and Russian) pappo bread ; in Spanish and Portuguese (connected with papilla) we have papo a dewlap, or anything fat and puffy. Then from Papa as a title of respect, we get Pope, Papist, Papistry. In German we have Pappe in the sense of paste, pasteboard. Thus from some of the most obvious derivatives of two very simple imitative roots we at once and without any shadow of difficulty get meanings so different, and apparently so much beyond the range of onomatopoetic representation, as aunt, owl, breast, doll, coward, dande-. lion-seed, bread, a fatty protuberance, the Pope of Eome, and pasteboard ! Who after this shall assert the sterility of imitative roots ? From ta and da, two other of the earliest sounds, we get to dade? an old English word for teaching a child 1 Not to be confounded with Mawmet (from Mahomet). See Wedg- wood, ii. 372. 2 Vide Diez (ed. Donkin), s. w. Dandin and Tartagliare. Wedgwood, a v. Dade. CH. xiv. FERTILITY OF OXOMATOPOETIC BOOTS. 159 to walk ; to toddle, to dawdle, to dandle ; the French dandin a simpleton ; the Italian dandolo a toy, and tartagliare to stutter; the Dutch tateren to stammer; the Icelandic lotto, to suck, teat, &c. (cf. rfaffrj, &c.) Again, from ba, to mention only a few out of many, we have in Latin babiger, 1 bubulus, and baburrus stu- pid (Gloss. Isid.), babcecalus a trifler (Arnob. iv. 141), basium, buss, a kiss ; in Greek we have /3a/3aia>, /3a/z/3aXt'eti>, I stammer ; in Hebrew ??? confundere, ^23 Babel, 2 Babylon. In the Eomance languages babbo a father (Ital.), babbuino baboon, beffa a scoffing (shooting out the lips\ babbeo a blockhead, bambino a doll, bava 3 slaver (cf. Bavieca the name of the Cid's charger), Spanish babosa a slug, badare to gape ; then through the Scotch word ' abeigh ' to stand gazing or gaping at a thing, we have ( abeyance,' and ' to stand at bay,' &c. In French we have babines large lips, beyer, bavardage, babiller, babiole, &c. 4 In English babe, babble, baboon, baffle, &c. We have not nearly ex- hausted the list, and indeed the fertility of this root may perhaps form the excuse or apology for those very bold theorists who have erroneously supposed that the letter B is a picture of the closed lips requisite for the enunciation of this important labial. 5 Again, from ta and ba as emblematic of early, confused, inarticulate sounds we get such national names as Tatars, from ta-ta the Chinese onomatopoeia for a barbarian, 1 See Forcellini, Lex. Tot. Lat. s. w. * 'Ej3paV Sv ov6fj.ara ti/xojo evl eicdffTifi rv op96r7]ros irtpi. Plato, Crat. p. 435. 2 Bopp, Vergl. Gram. 309 sqq. Donaldson, Crat. 154, &c. s Cratylus, 163, where he also supposes a relationship between x e ' flow, x i *-6s fodder, and x^o thousands. CH. xiv. FERTILITY OF ONOMATOPOETIC ROOTS. 163 nection l between pvpo) and the obvious onomatopoeia murmur. The connection between a multitude and sound, and the extremely natural metaphor of waves to describe the roar of a crowd (undo, salutantum, Virg. ; turbo, fluctuantis populi, Aul. Gell. ; pevfia (fxorwv, JEsch.\ show us how probable such a derivation is. Tempting as it is to derive pvpfirjl; l an ant ' from this root, we fear that Benfey's attempt to do so is scien- tifically untenable. 2 But if even a numeral can be so easily and directly traced to an imitative sound, there is little reason to doubt the wide applicability of this principle of word-formation. So that by taking the very first and simplest illus- trations that came to hand, we have shown that imita- tive roots are not sterile ; that, on the contrary, almost every one of them produces so numerous and diverse an offspring as to show the possibility of expressing by their means every possible conception that Language is capable of expressing at all. And, with all these proofs before us, we say with Steinthal 3 that it is inconceivable to us that any one should be hardy enough to deny that Onomatopoeia was the primeval tendency of language which has furnished us with all elementary words. Those who do so must abandon all attempts to see any connection between sound and meaning, except such as 1 Benfey did so on the very insufficient ground that the v in fivpw is long, and in murmuro short. Wur eel-lexicon, i. 16. See the ad- mirable pamphlet Sur f Origine des Noms de Nombre, by Louis Benloew, Giessen, 1861. 1 The Sanskrit vamri, vamraka, the Latin formica, and the form &vp/j.a preserved in Hesychius, seem to render it possible that the root is v am = vomere, from the formic acid which the insect throws from its mouth. 1 Gram. Log. und Psychol. p. 309. X 2 164 ON LANGUAGE. cfi. xiv. was due to the most absolute and unmeaning chance. Without the aid of imitation the earliest communica- tions of mankind must have been a meaningless jabber of arbitrary sounds, and such, from the very nature of the case, they must always have remained. CHAPTER XV. DIGNITY OF ONOMATOP(EIA. ' 'Oyo;uaT(wroua, id est, fictio nominis, Grsecis inter maximas habita virtutes, nobis vlx permittitur. Et sunt plurima ita posita ab Us, qui sermonem primi fecerunt, aptantes affectibus vocem.' QtrmcTiL. Instt. Or. viii. 6. CONDILLAC complained that to suppose man to have learnt his language from imitation would be to place him below the animals, and this was why he favoured the Interjectional origin rather than the Onomatopoetic. We have seen already that both points of origin are requisite, and that neither can be separated from the other ; but independently of this, Condillac's objec- tion, which is perfectly worthless as an argument, was founded on the common misconception of supposing that animal cries offered the only materials for imita- tion. On the contrary every sound of nature con- tributed its element to human speech, the rustling and whispering of her forest leaves, the howling of her storms, the booming of her seas, the rush of her cataracts, the rippling sequacious murmur of her rivu- lets. That there must be an intimate connection between nature and language is shown by the manner in which the sound of a language is often a reflex of the geographical conditions by which the people who speak it are surrounded by the strident hirrient roughness of 166 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xv. Northern tongues (for instance) compared with the soft l musical vowelled undersong of the sunny South. It was suggested by Nodier that the presence or absence of the more remarkable and difficult articulations of language is always explicable by the existence or non-existence of certain animals in the countries where they are spoken, and that the tiger and the rattlesnake have suggested the click of the Hottentot and the rough sibilant of the North American Indian. This may be true or not ; but, as we have shown, 2 onomatopoeia rests on a far wider basis than this, and reproduces ideally and articu- lately that ringing shiver caused by the oscillation of material particles which results from every possible impact. Yet if it were probable that man had been taught to speak by listening to the animals alone, it would be absurd to reject such a conclusion solely in consequence of that a priori assumption of human exal- tation which has stood so often in the path of science, and which has so often prevented men from reaching the Gate of Honour by making them refuse to pass under the Gate of Humility. 4. It has however been urged, with more of plausi- bility, that the most obvious and intentional onomato- poeias are generally modern and often undignified, and that onomatopoeia could never therefore have been a leading principle of Language. We reply briefly that pure imitations are the only words now open for us to invent, and therefore that many such words are apparently modern. Whether they are, in any case, really so may be doubtful when, to 1 Greek, removed to the enervating climate of Asia Minor, becomes the soft Jonian. 3 Origin of Lang. 76. CH. xv. DIGNITY OF ONOMATOPOEIA. 167 give but one instance, we learn that the Laplanders have the onomatopoeia Ho slam' in the very same sense as ourselves, although * countless ages must have elapsed since their ancestors and ours parted from a common stock.' 1 Probably there are not many words which have thus for ages preserved their exact form in the mass of detritus of which modern languages are composed ; but all we have asserted is the traceable existence, often even to the latest moment of a word's history, of the original imitative element. And the fact that an onomatopreia is the only word whose invention is still admissible, is an additional proof of our propo- sition. For what is the reason of this fact? Simply because an onomatopoeia is the only word formed in obvious accordance with the earliest principle of lan- guage, the only one which is immediately intelligible, the only one which possesses an inherently graphic power, the only one which can add the beauty of novelty and delighted surprise to the effects produced by exist- ing language, the only one which has any chance of a permanent currency. The fact, then, that new words are mostly imitative is so far from furnishing an argu- ment against us that it tells distinctly in our favour. It tends to prove that the only words which can be invented on any reasonable principle are onomatoposias ; and therefore points back to onomatopoeia as the neces- sary principle of all language at its commencement. In the present stereotyped condition of language, in which it has been so largely modified and its spontaneous development checked in so many ways by the influence of writing and literature, we can hardly be astonished 1 Wedgwood, i. p. iv. 168 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xv. to find that a direct sound-imitation, particularly if it be rude and inartistic, is probably too special and limited in significance to give birth to a family of words. Yet the fact that the greatest and most popular poets 1 of every age and nation, from Homer to Tennyson, from Ennius to Gothe, from Archilochus to Burger and Lamartine, have employed these Echoes of Nature freely, and that the passages in which they have done so have attracted constant attention, is at least sufficient, as I have previously shown, 2 to redeem these words from the position of ' illegitimate pretenders to the dignity of language.' The timid rhetoricians of the Silver Age, and the desiccated pedantic grammarians of a later period, might not venture to use such a privilege, 3 but they could at least point with admiration to the Xi/y^g /3ioy, and the CH. xvm. IMAGINATION. 197 some places, indeed, Professor Miiller ' appears to hold the correct view, that at first * roots ' stood for any and every part of speech, just as the monosyllabic expressions of children do, and just as they do to this day in that lan- guage of arrested development, the Chinese. This is the view supported with such brilliant acumen, and illustrated with so much philological learning, by the late Mr. Grarnett 2 in his Essay on the Nature and Analysis of the Verb. We believe with him that all language is reducible to roots which are either the basis of ab- stract nouns, or are pronouns denoting relations of place, which latter we believe to have arisen from interjec- tional elements. Now, ' a verb is not a simple, but, ex necessario, a complex term, and therefore no primary part of speech.' 3 From these views we cannot accept it as even possible that, * from roots meaning to shine, to be bright, names were formed, for sun, moon, stars, the eyes of man, gold, silver, play, joy, happiness, love. With roots meaning to strike, it was possible to name an axe, the thunderbolt, a fist, a paralytic stroke, a striking remark, and a stroke of business.' It seems inconceivable that men should have needed, and, there- fore, should have invented, a word meaning ' to shine ' before they had any designation for the sun, or a verb meaning 'to strike ' before they had the imitative sounds tud, tup, tuph (cf. our confessed onomatopoeias thud, tap, tat, rub a dub, &c.), 4 which were amply 1 Lectures, ii. 86. Bunsen, Outlines, ii. 130. 2 The Philol. Essays of the late Eev. Sick. Garnett, edited by his Son, pp. 289-342. No more sound, or valuable, or interesting contribution to Philology has appeared for many years than this volume of Essays. Garnett, p. 290. 4 So obvious is this imitation as to be found also in the Semitic languages. Cf. Hebr. CjQfl, C]h, &c. 198 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xvin.. sufficient for a host of derivatives in every language, as TUTTTO), Tvpiravov, drub, drum, thump, and so forth. We have already seen that the verb is represented by a combination of the noun in the history of Chinese ideography, and it seems to me impossible that it could have been otherwise in speech. In Chinese ming Q|j 'bright' is 1 from P] yih the sun, and pf ngyneh the moon; and yj~ fwun Ho divide' is composed of 77 tao a knife, and /I pah eight. This is a con- ceivable process ; the other would be, in the old sense of the word, preposterous. Nor is it a question as to what is merely probable in language ; for we may regard it as established by the large inductive process of Mr. Garnett, and many others, that ' the radical terms em- ployed to denote action, passion, or state, had originally rather the force of nouns than verbs,' and this espe- cially in the Celtic, which, it need hardly be remarked, is one of the very oldest members of the Aryan family. If so, we must entirely give up the notion that the names of objects came from predicative or verbal roots. We hope, too, that the instance of the root tup and the origin assigned to it, will show our reason for not attaching any importance to the whole divi- sion of roots into primary and secondary, which is elaborated in Professor Miiller's first series of lectures (p. 250). It requires but the feeblest power of abstraction a power possessed even by idiots to use a name as the sign of a conception, e. g. to say 'sun ;' to say * sheen,' as the description of a phenomenon common to all shining 1 Marshman, Chinese Gram. p. 23. CH. xviii. IMAGINATION. 199 objects, is a higher effort, and to say * to shine ' as ex- pressive of the state or act is higher still. Now, fami- liar as such efforts may be to us, there is ample proof that they could not have been so to the inventors of language, because they are not so, even now, to some nations of mankind after all their long millenniums of existence. Instances of this fact have been repeatedly adduced. Even in the Mithridates l we find it noticed that the Society Islanders have words for dog's tail, bird's tail, and sheep's tail, yet no word for tail ; that the Mohicans have verbs for every kind of cutting, and yet no verb 'to cut,' and forms for ' I love him,' * I love you,' &c., but no verb meaning 'I love.' The Choc- taws 2 have names for every possible species of oak, but no word for the genus oak. The Australians 3 have no generic word for fish, bird, or tree ; and the Eskimo, though he has verbs for seal-fishing, whale-fishing, and every other kind of fishing, has no verb mean ing simply ' to fish.' * Ces laugues,' says Du Ponceau, in his admi- rable Essay, ' generalisent rarement.' Thus, they have separate verbs for * I wish to eat meat,' and * I wish to eat soup,' but no verb for 'I wish ; ' 4 and separate words for a blow with a sharp, and a blow with a blunt instru- ment, but no abstract word for blow. Mr. Crawfurd 5 bears similar witness to the Malay languages. 'The Malay,' he says, * is very deficient in abstract words ; and the usual train of ideas of the people who speak it 1 Adelung, Mithr. iii. 325, 397. See, too, Pott, Etym. Forsch. ii. 167. Heyse, p. 132. 2 Latham, Races of Man, p. 376. 8 De Quatrefages, Rev. des Deux Mondes, Dec. 15, 1860. Maury, La Terre et IHomme, p. 433. 4 Du Ponceau, p. 120. 4 Crawfurd. Malay Grammar, i. 68 seq. 200 OX LANGUAGE. cu. xvni. does not lead them to make a frequent use even of the few they possess. They have copious words for colours, yet borrow the word colour, warna, from the Sanskrit. With this poverty of the abstract is united a redun- dancy of the concrete. No word for tree or herb, yet urat, fibre; akar, root; pdrdu, tree-crown; tanglcai, stalk ; battan, stock ; tungal, trunk ; ddan and turuk, twig ; tukut, tunas, and gagang, shoot, &c.' He gives many similar instances, and an analogous one is to be found even in Anglo-Saxon, which had abundant words for all shades of blue, red, green, yellow, &c., but bor- rowed * from the Latin the abstract word * colour ; ' and abundant names for every form of crime, before it borrowed from Latin the abstract words ' crime ' and * transgression.' With instances like these before us and they might be indefinitely multiplied who shall believe that the sun, and moon, and earth, had not been named at all until they received names from roots meaning to shine, to measure, and to plough ? or that cows and reptiles, and creeping plants, and flowing water, and clouds, made shift with being anonymous until after men possessed an indefinite number of verbs all meaning 'to go'? 2 And now then, having cleared the way by these pre- liminary considerations, let us (though we might, as we have shown, fairly decline to accept any one particular test) very briefly consider whether there is no answer, on our principles, to the question, ' How are all things which do not appeal to the sense of hearing how are the ideas of going, moving, standing, sinking, tasting, thinking to be expressed?' It would be tedious to go through 1 Dr. D. Wilson, Prehistoric Man, i. 61. 8 See Prof. Key, ubi sup., 8-16. CH. xvin. IMAGINATION. 201 them all ; let us then take each alternate word. If the question can be answered for these, it can be as easily answered for the rest. Let it be observed that in attempting to answer it at all we are doing something beside and beyond what our opponents ever attempt to do ; we are rising above 'that indolent philosophy which refers to a miracle whatever it is unable to explain.' ' Ideas * of going.' I am not aware that anybody has attempted to explain the origin of the Sanskrit verb ' gaj to go. Of other Sanskrit verbs with this meaning 2 there is at least a reasonable probability that 'pat' (also to fall) and sr, and srp (also to creep), are of imi- tative origin, as they are closely analogous to many formations of similar meaning which are confessedly so. Moreover, to confine ourselves to our own language alone, what shall we say of the words creep, crawl, dawdle, dance, 3 rush, hurry, patter, totter, stump, stamp, and many more, to say nothing of such as expressly imply noise combined with motion, as whizz, whirr, hurl, &c. ? Every one of these is an ' idea of going;' every one of these is and the proof is easy onoma- topoetically expressed. * Ideas of standing.' 4 It would have been difficult, 1 I must remark, en passant, that I am not responsible for this use of the word 'ideas;' though, indeed, it is hopeless to redeem this noble word from the mass of confused usages into which it has fallen. Not one modern writer in twenty thousand uses it either carefully or ac- curately in its only true and proper meaning. 2 As for the root 'i' 'go' in Uvai, &c., Plato says, r$ 5' o3 liar a irpbs ra XeTrTa irdj/TO, & 5rj fj.d\i, lingo, ligurio? or the words going) with an euphonic epenthesis st ! (i) tie ffraffis ait6affis rov ifvai /3ov\fTCu eivai, Sta Se -rbv Ka\\v curb ruv (paivopfvwv XP^J ffrifj-eiovcrdat. Kal yap Kal tirivoiai traaai airb TCCV alaQ-fifffcav yey6vacri Kara, re irepiirruffiv Kal avaXoyiav Kal 6p.oi6rtiTa Kal ffbvQtffiv ffVfj.$aX\opvov ri Kal \oyifffwv. EPIC. ap. Diog. Laert. x. 32. BARON BUNSEN, in one of those eloquent and magnifi- cent bursts of dogmatism which are to be found in his noble book, The Philosophy of Universal History, after describing the Imitative theory in a manner which at any rate does not apply to any of its present holders, and which is based on complete misapprehension of their views, says that such a theory is not only disproved by all history and diametrically opposed by facts (!), but is ' a most absurd supposition in itself, as most objects have no sound tvhatever.' 1 If the former pages of this volume have not satisfied the reader as to the utter groundlessness of the first assertions, it is hardly worth while to argue further ; and I trust that he will have already seen enough to show that the last assertion is none the less erroneous for sounding at first mention plausible. If not, the follow- ing chapter will show that as an objection to our theory it has no weight whatever. Indeed, as we have several 1 Bunsen, ii. 131. CH. xix. METAPHOR. 205 times observed, it is not true, to begin with, that 'most objects have no sound whatever.' Even the mass of objects in the dumb and inanimate world are so con- stituted that the sound produced by them is generally the best and truest indication of their character and properties. The clang of various metals, from the deep reverberations of iron to the tremulous shiver of thin steel, and the sharp tinkling of brass and tin the whisper and splash of cohesionless liquids the crackle, and blare, and roar of flame the ringing resonance of stone and marble the creaking of green boughs the ripping of dead wood the clink of glass the dull thud of soft and yielding bodies the discontinuous rattle of hard, dry substances the flap or rustle of woven fabrics in the wind- every one of these sounds, and of thousands more, betrays instantaneously to the ear the nature of every substance, and is recognisable even from a dis- tance and in the dark. And every one of these sounds is capable of articulate representation. It is not too much to say that there is hardly an inanimate substance in the creation which does not in some way or other connect itself with sound that does not in some way or other recall an acoustic image of itself, We have observed the influence exercised over lan- guage by the emotions (interjections), by the will (Laut- geberden\ and the deep-lying instinct of imitation (onomatopoeia); it remains to see how the materials thus provided were moulded and multiplied by the imagination and the fancy. At first sight there might have appeared to be a difficulty absolutely insuperable in making audible sounds the exponents of impressions which come to us through the gateways of four most different Censes in 206 OX LAXGUAGE. CH. xix. translating for the ear the perceptions which we form through the medium of touch, and taste, and smell, and sight; in giving expression by means of the undula- tions of air sent pulsing upon the tympanum by vibra- tions of the. vocal chords, and motions of the lips and tongue to all that pleases or disgusts in contacts, and savours, and odours, and in the infinite many-coloured world of visual images. Yet over this seemingly fathom- less abyss of separation, Nature flings in one wide arch, and without an effort, her marvellous aerial bridge ! The difficulty is at once enormously reduced by observing that nothing corresponding to the impressions of the senses has any objective or actual existence. There is no such thing in the abstract as a smell, a taste, or a colour. There is nothing in any way analo- gous to these words beyond the boundary-line of our own individualities. Infinitely small particles floating invisibly in the air rest on the fibro-mucous membrane which lines the nasal cavity, and by mechanical or chemical, combinations affect the olfactory filaments, and we say that there is a smell; movements of air undulating on the tympanum are conveyed to the auditory nerve, and modified by the exquisite and dimly-understood mechanism of the cochlea, otolithes, and semicircular passages, and we say there is a sound ; rays of light falling on the cornea, and variously refracted by the crystalline and vitreous humours, pro- duce an inverted image of objects upon the network of optic nerves, and we say that we see ; the delicate sur- face of the skin, conveying the impression of resistance under various forms, leads us to say of an object when we touch it that it is hard, or round, or square ; and other impressions are conveyed by the tongue or palate CH. six. METAPHOR. 207 which we say are sweet or acid. But what are the objective realities corresponding to the words 'a smell,' * a colour,' 'a sound,' * roundness,' 'sweetness?' There are no such objective realities, they are pure nonenti- ties. The words are absolutely meaningless, except so far as they express the modifications, however produced, of one and the same sentient subject. Even substance is but a purely hypothetical postulated residuum after the abstraction of all observable qualities. Nothing has any existence for us except as a synthesis of attributes, and even these attributes are not inherent in matter, but are merely affections of our personality which we project into the external world, and endow with a purely imaginary objectivity; they are but shadows of the inward microcosm flung by the light of our own life upon the external universe, and invested by imagination with an independent reality. When therefore we express by words the impressions of every sense, we are not translating from a number of languages which have no analogy with each other, but we are merely expressing a single subject namely, ourselves. We are dealing, not with external realities, but with subjective sensations. The impressions, how- ever various may be the sources whence they are derived, all act upon a sensorium commune ; l however diverse may be our sensations, they are all of them nothing more than material changes in one common brain. In point of fact, we have not five senses, but only one 1 ' Wie hangt Gesicht und Gehor, Farbe und "Wort, Duft nnd Ton zusammen ? . . . . Wir sind ein denkendes sensorium commune nur von versehiedenen Seiten beriihrt Da liegt die Erklarung.' Herder, s. 94. By the name sensorium commune, however, I do not mean merely the brain, but the brain, the nerves, the organs of sense, &c. See Bain, The Senses and Intellect, p. 61. 208 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xix. sense, the sense of feeling. There may be no connection between a sound and a colour; but since both the sound and the colour are but states produced in a thinking subject, the brain which is affected by the sound can use sound as a means of expressing the effect of the colour also. A smell, the striking of a clock, muscular resistance, and the form of a triangle, are separated from each other by an abyss of difference; there is nothing in common even between different sensations received by the same organ as white and black. Language expresses nothing but the relations of things, and as these are purely subjective, the mind which creates these supposed relations is also capable of expressing them. Hence, by an apparently instinctive process a pro- cess, at any rate, not derived either from logical inference or physical research we find throughout all language an interchange between, rather than a confusion of, the words which properly belong to different senses. This is especially the case in the terms expressive of light and sound. We find nothing to alter in such verses as 'All the people saw the thunderings and lightnings, and the noise of the trumpet' (Ez. xx. 18), or 'I turned to see the voice which spake with me'(Eev. i. 12). In jEschylus, ' The voice ' and the clash are seen (Prom. Vinct. 21, 22) ; in Sophocles the pa3an flashes ((Ed. Tyr. 187), and the echo gleams back from the distant rock ((Ed. CoL 137): by the voice the blind beholds, the ears of the deaf are sightless.' All the effects produced by the senses are indeed but different threads which Nature has woven into one web ; 1 Boyes, Illustrations to JEschylus, &c., p. lii. .CH. xix. METAPHOR. 209 but between light and sound, the two most infinite in their revelations of the outer world, there seems to be a distinct and peculiar connection. 'They are,' says Lamennais, 1 merely 'two different organs of the same faculty, two different manifestations of the same sense.' Hence, the Greek Apollo is the god both of melody and of brightness. The imaginative power to perceive these analogies works instinctively and without reflection ; the mere copy or imitation of a sound is, by a new step in the progress of language which is due to the imagination elevated into a symbol for things which it cannot directly imitate, and finally, this symbol is promoted by the understanding into a general sign ; but each step is taken naturally and unconsciously. Nothing is more common in ordinary language than to hear people adopt these self-explaining and vivid analogies. 2 We speak indifferently of a clear tone or a clear light ; and the word * tone ' itself is applied to a picture no less than to a harmony. No one is struck with a sense of incon- gruity when we speak of a gamut of colours, or a chromatic sequence in a piece of music. Sophocles speaks of a man as ' blind both in ears and eyes.' 3 Who does not see the beauty of this sentence in a modern writer? 'And as the chorus swelled and swelled till the air seemed made of sound, little flames, vibrating too, as if the sound had caught fire, burst out between the turrets of the palace and the girdling towers. That 1 Esquisse d'une Philosophic, in E. Arnould's Ess. d?Hist. Lit. 168. 2 I gave some striking instances from the poets in the Origin of Lang. p. 126. In French there are several which are hardly admissible in English, as 'sombres gemissements,' 'lueurs eclatantes,' &c. 3 TV(f>\bs rd T' ura r6v re vovv TO. T' U^/JLVT' tl. (Ed. Tyr. 371. P 210 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xix. sudden clang, that leaping light, fell on Romola like sharp wounds.' * ' Is not the delight of the quavering upon a stop of music,' says Lord Bacon, ' the same with the playing of light upon the water 2 Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus ? Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs of reflection the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait determined and bounded ? Neither are these only similitudes, as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the same footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon several subjects or matters.' 3 Hence it is that, by a purely unconscious sense of analogy, we find repetitions of light expressed by precisely the same kind of reduplication as repeti- tions of sound ; so that purpura and marmor indicate waves of light no less naturally than murmuro and susurro indicate waves of sound. 4 Quick motions, also producing a sort of flash in the air, are represented by imitative reduplications, as papilio, the butterfly, which in Basque is chickitola, and in Botocudo is kiaku-keck- keck. 1 Romola, ii. 85. There is a direct etymological connection between fragor and bright; between Qdos, 'light,' and Qrju't, 'I say.' VideHeyse, e. 115. A writer whom I have previously quoted says, ' We can readily imagine the imitative tinkle passing into the French etincelle and the English twinkle the sharp delicate impression on the ear recalling that upon the eye." Mocmillaris Mag. 2 Compare ' It is like listening to the mysterious music in the conch sea-shell ; it is like watching the fleeting rays of light which shoot up to heaven as we are looking at the sunset.' Robertson, Addresses, p. 227. Every one knows how Sanderson, born blind, compared ' red ' to a trumpet-note; the reverse story of Massieu, the deaf-mute, comparing a trumpet-note to the same colour, is not so generally known. 8 Adv. of Learning, bk. i. 4 Dwight, Mod. Philology, 2nd Series, p. 210. CH. xix. METAPHOK. 211 Nor is this interchange of the terms proper to diffe- rent senses at all confined to the eye and the ear. ' Ye have made our odour to be abhorred in the eyes of Pharaoh,' we find in Ex. v. 21 ; and 'truly the light is sweetj in Eccl. xii. 7. Dr. Kalisch correctly observes that what such expressions lose in logical accuracy they gain in richness and force; and hence we find them frequently in the poets, as in ^Eschylus, KTVTTOV S^Sopica, s I see a sound,' and in Lucretius, * loca vidi reddere voces' Crashaw talks of ' the murmur of a sparkling noise ;' Akenside of t tasting the fragrance of a rose ;' Byron of ( inhaling an ambrosial aspect." 1 The adjec- tives soft, sharp, hard, mild, rough, smooth, are used indifferently of sounds, of lights, of touch, of taste ; ! the adjective nice, which belongs properly to the region of taste alone, is on the lips of some people an epithet of universal meaning; and other adjectives, not pro- perly belonging to the domain of any sense, are trans- ferred indiscriminately to each sense, so that, for instance, we are not surprised to hear of a rich colour, 2 a rich tone, or rich viands; of delicate tints, delicate odours, or delicate textures. To such an extent is this carried that we hardly notice it in ordinary conversation, nor are we struck by anything metaphorical in the turn of expression when we hear a person speaking collo- quially of a glorious day or a glorious concert ; of bitter 1 The whole subject is admirably treated by Wilhelm von Humboldt, Ueber die Verschiedenheit d. menschl. Sprachbaues, s. 78, fg. But it is not easy to establish any clear distinction between words used symboli- cally (tcatf 6p.oi6Tijra) and analogically (KO.TO. avaXo-fiav'). SeeLersch, iii. 63 ; Heyse, p. 95. One or two of the instances given above are quoted by Mr. Boyes, in his Illustrations to JEfchylus and Sophocles. * In Chinese the word for a gem, is also applied to a dainty. p 2 212 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xrx. cold, bitter experience, or a bitter taste; of a sweet smell, a sweet voice, a sweet taste, a sweet look, or a sweet feeling. We see then that there is no difficulty in expressing anything with which all the senses are conversant in terms derived from the instinctive or imitated sounds furnished to us by one of them ; and thus we are at once supplied with a nomenclature sufficiently ample for all the phenomena of the material universe. At every step in this part of the progress of language, the imagination is dominant. From this source is derived the whole system of genders for inanimate things, which was perhaps inevitable at that early childish stage of the human intelligence, when the actively-working soul attributed to everything around it some portion of its own life, but which has been wisely discarded by our own language as a useless encumbrance. To the quick fancy of the child of nature it seems impossible to regard anything as absolutely without life. The Indian thinks that the shade even of his arrow will accompany him to the regions of the blest. Hence, well-nigh everything is spoken of as masculine or feminine. How completely fanciful were the analogies which in each case suggested the gender is seen from the different genders attributed in different languages to the same thing, and cannot be more clearly illustrated than by the fact that the sun, which in nearly every other lan- guage is masculine, becomes feminine in German (die Sonne}; and the moon, which so many nations wor- shipped as a goddess, is, in German, made masculine (der Mond). By a similar play of fancy, the names for various parts of the body are catachrestically applied to things without CH. xix. METAPHOR. 21$ life. 1 We talk of the leg of a stool ; of the foot, crest, spur, or shoulder of a mountain ; of the teeth of a saw or a comb; of the neck of a bottle; the tongue of a balance or a shoe, the eye of a needle, the head of a cabbage, the arm of a chair, the breast of a wave, the bosom of a rose. Even an island is an oe or ' eye ;' an isthmus is a neck ; a harbour, a jaw ; 2 a central place, a navel ; 3 a crag is a tooth ; a river-bank, a lip ; and a promontory, a ness, naze, or nose. Plants are named from animals or the limbs of animals, as fox -tail, mouse-! ear, goat's-beard, cock's-comb, hare's-foot, crane-bill, lark-spur. Even dead instruments or parts of them are called by the names of animals, as a monkey, a batter- ing-ram, a pig of lead, 4 chevaux de frise, a frog ; cochlea, a screw ; testudo, a penthouse of shields ; lupus, a bit ; s-^vos, a pitcher ; icopaj; , a grappling-iron ; oi/oy, a wind- lass. Ships and ploughs, both as wholes and in their parts, are spoken of as living things. 5 Attributes and functions of animate beings are transferred to the inani- mate, as living water, the living rock, quick-silver ^ lively colours, couleur morte, bleu mourant, a living coal, dying embers ; a comparison stumbles ; an alley is blind ; the ground thirsts, and drinks in the dew. By a reverse process, the life of vegetables is symbolically 1 Heyse, p. 99. 2 2aAjuu5jj(Tia yva.8os, JEsch. Prom. V. 571. Both Job and Sophocles talk of ' the eyelids of the morn,' Job iii. 9 ; and in Ps. ex. 3, we even have ' the womb of the morning.' 3 Judg. ix. 37 ; Ezek. xxxviii. 12 ; Ps. Ixxiv. 12 ; Soph. OE. T. ; Eur. Med.; Plin. iii. 12. It is hardly worth while to heap up references for the other instances ; for 'tooth,' see 1 Sam. xiv. 4; Job xxxix. 28. For lip, Gen. xxii. 17, &c. Heb. 4 Which the Greeks called a dolphin of lead. Thuc. vii. 41. * Heyse quotes Grimm, Gesch. d. deutsch. Sprache, p. 56 ff. ; Pott, Mttaphern vom Leben, in Aufrecht und Kuhn's Zeitschr. ii. 2. 214 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xix. applied to the life of man ; we talk of the scion of a noble stock ; the fruit of good works ; ' a rod of the stem of Jesse ; ' a seed of thought ; the propagation of the Gospel ; a green memory and a green old age. We may notice, in passing, how powerfully the poetic in- stinct reproduces these tendencies of early language. What Mr. Buskin has called ' the pathetic fallacy,' is the indomitable desire to see in Nature, or at least to attribute to her, a sympathy in our joys and sorrows, our hopes and fears. Hence, to the imaginations of the Psalmist and Prophet, ' the hills clap their hands, the valleys stand so thick with corn that they laugh and sing ; ' ( the morning stars shout for joy ; ' * the moun- tains * skip like rams, and the little hills like young sheep;' the fir-trees howl, for the cedar is fallen; the raging waves of the sea foam out their own shame ; the heavens declare the glory of (rod, and the firmament showeth his handy work ; the sun is as a bridegroom going out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a giant to run his course. In modern poets the same fancy recurs with constant intensity, so that there is hardly a single aspect of nature which has not been made to express or to interpret the thoughts and passions of mankind, and hardly a single modern poem which does not illustrate this imaginative power. To the same source is due the universal prevalence of personification (or, as it is technically called, Proso- popoeia) in ancient times. To many ancient nations 1 It is curious to find the very same expressions in Chinese. ' Chu- king ait, Montes et colles pro gaudio tripudiant, volucres etbestise laetitia exultant et saltant ad citharse sonum.' P. Premare, Notitia Lingua Sinica, p. 243. I am aware, however, that Premare's theories may have led him to heighten the similarity; See Stanislas Julien, Lao Tseu Tao-te-Ting, pref. CH. xix. METAPHOR. 215 the earth itself was a living creature, the stars were divine animals, and the very rainbow lived and drank the dew. No wonder that their ' Fancy fetched E'en from the blazing chariot of the Sun A beardless youth, who touched a golden lute, And filled the illumined groves with ravishment. No wonder that, in their belief, an Oread danced on eveiy hill, a Naiad lurked in every fountain, a Hama- dryad lived or languished in every tree, and troops of Napseads and young Fauns or gamesome Satyrs sported among the forest glades, while On the level brine Sleek Panope and all her sisters played. Mythology no less than language springs in great measure from these plays of a self-deceiving fancy. The primal men thought thus because they could not other- wise express their feelings, and they spoke thus because this inability to express themselves otherwise in turn reacted on their thoughts. Nor is Mythology unknown even in these days. We have long personified under the name of Nature the sum-total of (rod's laws as observed in the physical world ; and now the notion of Nature as a distinct, living, independent entity seems to be ineradicable alike from our literature and our systems of Philosophy. In the same manner human relationships are con- stantly attributed by analogy to external things. In jEschylus the Salmydessian harbour is a stepmother of ships ; flame-smoke is the sister of fire ; dust the brother of wind ; and plunderings are the blood-relations of run- nings to and fro. In Pindar, Autumn is the tender mother of the Vine stalk ; and in Hipponax, the fig-tree 216 ON LANGUAGE. en. xix. is a sister of the vine. In the Semitic languages this figure occurs with astonishing frequency; e.g. in Hebrew and Arabic, sparks are the sons of fire, an arrow the sou of a bow, a disease the firstborn of death ; a sound from heaven is the daughter of a voice ; 1 a brave man is a son of valour ; an infant is the son of a year ; a confirmed boy is a son of the law; a condemned criminal is a son of death ; a bad woman is a daughter of worthlessness ; lions are sons of haughtiness; a lynx is the son of howl- ing; a vulture is the daughter of a wing. 2 The figure is more rare in modern poetry, yet Peele calls lightning 1 the faire spouse of thunder/ and Tennyson says Earn well the thrifty months, nor wed Raw Haste, half-sister to Delay. But it is time to pass to still more important applica- tions of the imaginative principle. It is not difficult to see how by its obvious aid man might, by the methods we have been observing, frame a nomenclature for all that he could see, or hear, or taste, or smell, or touch. But how was he to name the abstract, the ideal, the spiritual, the mental, the imponderable, the unseen ? how to name the intuitions of the reason, the conclu- sions of the understanding, the thoughts of the mind, the yearnings of the spirit, the emotions and passions of the soul, nay how was he even to find names for the reason, the understanding, the spirit, the mind, the soul themselves? Could he have invented new terms? would any mystic 1 Compare Milton, 'Left that command Sole daughter of his voice.' 2 For a large number of similar expressions in Arabic, especially in the names of birds and animals, see Bochart, Hieroz. vol. ii. p. 230. CH. xix. METAPHOR. 217 'roots' have appeared by some inexplicable partheno- genesis in his intelligence ? Whatever might have hap- pened, this did not happen. Even if it had been possible to him, the instinctive dislike to needless neo- logisms, observable in every stage of the history of lan- guage, would have probably checked the development of such a power. At any rate the permutations and combinations of the few roots already supplied by ono- matoposia and interjections, were found amply sufficient for the new purpose for which they were required ; and this application of existing sounds was at once easier and more agreeable than a fresh exercise of the power of Invention. We see from hundreds of instances that even the misappropriation of an old term is greatly pre- ferred to the elaboration of a new one. The Greek, whose commonest relish was boiled fish o-fyov (from tya> I boil), used this same word even when his relish hap- pened to be garlic or cress ; and he preferred to say a horse-comber of camels (ITTTTOKO^OS KafLrjXwv) to saying a camel-comber ; and a hecatomb of twelve oxen (from sicctTov = 100) rather than invent an accurate name. The Komans with their military proclivities called any interspace an intervallum, which properly meant a space between the stakes of a palisade. 'The silver pyxis' is quite a proper expression, though pyxis pro- perly means a box made of box-vfood. Homer does not hesitate to say ItcrtSsr) Kvvsrj, or helmet of weasel-skin,, though literally the expression meant 'a weasel-skin dogskin,' just as 'aerea galea' would mean etymologi- cally ' a brazen catskin.' In Exod. xxxviii. 8 we read of ' looking-^asses of brass ' where the misapplication is as perfectly correct as the phrase 'a white blackbird,' because the word f looking-brass ' would be intolerably 218 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xix. novel. Mr. Tennyson shocks no one by the line ' Whose blazing wyvern weathercocked l the spire.' The French talk of ' un cheval ferre d'argent ' rather than compose a proper term for shoeing a horse with silver. A new name is never resorted 2 to unless it is absolutely essen- tial and indispensable. But quite independently of the necessity for finding articulate sounds to describe the phenomena of the mind to express the strange unseen world of the Ego no less clearly than that of the Non-ego there was another reason why all that was subjective should have been named by means of mere modifications of roots already acquired. For this shadowy unseen subjective world was incapable of being knoivn at all except by analogy of those things of which we acquired a knowledge through the action of the senses. The mind, like the eye, becomes conscious of itself only by reflection from other things. We have seen already that men always explain and name the hitherto unknown by adopting the name of that known thing which most nearly re- sembles it ; and that they seem incapable of under- standing new phenomena except by the aid of such analogies as are supplied them by phenomena with which they are already familiar. 3 This may be an in- tellectual weakness, but it is one which recurs with the regularity of a law ; and in the nomenclature of mental and spiritual entities it was inevitable, because those invisible things were only revealed and rendered cog- 1 Unless it be by the verb ! Imagine its being conjugated thus : I weathercock, thou weathercockest, he, she, weathercocks, &c. ! 2 Savage languages specialise everything because they have so few abstract terms ; but it is a law of progressing language, to get rid of all exuberance, and to content itself with the fewest words possible. * Charma, p. 258. ca. xix. METAPHOR. 219 nisable by the things that are seen. 'It is a false assertion,' said Bacon 1 long ago, 'that the senses of man are a measure of all things; because on the contrary, all perceptions, of the senses no less than of the mind, are from the analogy of man, not from the analogy of the Universe. And the human intellect is presented like an unequal mirror to the rays of external things; it mingles its own nature with the nature of things, which it distorts and confuses.' And this remark is the same as that of Proclus, being in fact a mere truism TO vaiv ' that which knows, knows in accordance with its own nature.' Let us then see a few of the analogies which suggested a terminology for the world of mind. It is strange to observe with what unanimity the names for the soul of man have been borrowed from the most obvious of invisible agencies, the wind 'which bloweth where it listeth,' or possibly rather from the breath of life. 2 Thus in Hebrew, alike tJ>53 nephesh, the animal life (Job xii. 10), r\r\ ruach, the human principle of life, and no^J neshamah, life considered as an inspiration of the Almighty, 3 all have the meaning of breath or wind; and therefore resemble the Greek words TTvor), Trvsv/Mt, and tyvxij, of which the latter is derived from -io), ^ blow. The Latin words animus 1 Novum Organum, i. 1, aph. 41 ; comp. Boethius, De Consol. Phil. ' Omne quod recipitur recipitur ad modum recipientis.' 1 Just as ' blood ' is often used for life, Lev. xvii. 2. See Gesenius, Thesaurus, ii. 901. 3 Of these words neshamah is never, and ruach rarely (Eccl. iii. 21), applied to animals. In Gen. ii. 7, ' a living soul ' should be rather ' a living animal,' or 'creature.' The Hindoos distinguish between Brah- matmah and jivdtmah, 'the breath of God' and 'the breath of Life.' Vide Bohleu, Genes, ad I. 220 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xix. and anima, the German Geist, and the English ghost, have the same origin. If we take other words of similar meaning, we shall still find them to have been derived from the analogy offered to the rapidity of thought by swift physical motion. Thus our 'soul,' the German ' SeeleJ is probably from the same root as the word Sea * and the Greek crsiw ; and the Greek 6vfj,6s comes from the root dvco, atro TTJS Ovcrsws KOL ^sascas rr/f ^u^y. 2 Again, the word reason, ratio, oratio, the German Rede, &c., come from the Latin reor, which is in all probability connected with the Greek psw, I flow; an etymology which, if correct, is curiously analogous to the derivation 6f 'soul' from the same root as the word 'sea.' If we enquire how men found a word for an act which most men consider so purely immaterial as that of thinking, we get to this result ; that, since thought is inconceiv- able and impossible without signs of some description, and since words are the most universal of signs, it has been assumed that there is an indissoluble unity between thought and speech. Hence in Hebrew lX and ")3"i mean first to speak and then to think, while D 11 "^ and 33H pass through the meanings of (first) to think, and then to speak, sigh, 3 and murmur. Other words to express the same thing are derived from the .notions of cutting (dividing, dissevering), seeing, and acting (compare thing and think, res and reor). The Greek pde(rdai, to say to oneself, i.e. to think, which, according to Forster, the South Sea Islanders express by * speaking in the stomach.' In Latin, however, external 1 See Heyse, p. 97. 2 Plato, Crat. p. 419 c. 3 The similarity of the Hebrew rVK>, and our sigh, is a noticeable instance of resemblance due to onomatopoeia. CH. xix. METAPHOR. 221 accidents of thought are selected to represent thought, as considerare, (perhaps) to fix the eyes on the stars, like our expression * star gazing ; ' deliberare, to weigh in the balance, like the French penser, and our 'to weigh a matter;' cogitare, to act with the mind; and, among others reor, which Home Tooke renders / am thing-ed, 1 (!) and which, if the Romans ever attached such an astonishing notion to it, would well deserve the title which Quinctilian 2 gives it of a * verbum horridum.' Again> the soul with its faculties, emotions, and de- sires is shadowed forth in language by the various parts of the body in which they were once supposed to be localised, or by which they are capable of being exter- nally indicated. 3 Thus in Hebrew the heart, the liver, and the kidneys are used for the mind, and under- standing ; 'the bowels' means mercy, like the Greek (nr\dfxva ; 'the flesh' means lust; the loins, strength; the nose is used for anger, so that ( long of nose' means patient, and * short of nose' irritable; a 'man of lips' is a babbler (Job xi. 2); the neck is the symbol of ob- stinacy ; the head of superiority ; thirst or paleness the picturesque representatives of fear. In Greek the dia- phragm ((fiprfv, renes, reins) is used for the understanding; the liver for feeling ; the breast for courage, the nostrils for contempt (cf. ftvKrfipss, &c.) ; the stomach and the bile for anger. Similarly in Latin, the nostrils are used for taste and refinement; the nose for satire; 4 the eye- brow for sorrow or disdain ; the stomach for anger ; the 1 Diversions o/Purley, ii. 5. 2 Quintilian, Instt. viii. 3. * See numberless passages in Glass. Philolog. Sacra, p. 866 sqq. * Homo obesse, or emunctse naris in Horace, &c. In Turkestan, ' to be long-nosed ' means to be proud. See Vambery's Travels. 222 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xix. throat for gluttony. The Lithuanians use the same word for soul, heart, and stomach ; and the same is pro- bably true of many nations. Many of these metaphors have been transferred to English, and we also use the blood for passion (hot, or young blood), the phlegm for dulness, the spleen for envy ; we say that a person has sanguine hopes ; we talk of a melancholy man, which means properly a man whose bile is black ; a man has a nervous style, or is nervous in the hour of trial ; and we say of a bitter-minded critic that he has too much gall. The words * body' or 'head' are common in all languages to express personality. The North American Indians constantly use ' body' in speaking of themselves, just as the Greeks used Se/ww and Kapa; 'c'est un plaisant corps' is a common expression in French ; and in English. *head' has even passed into compounds such as boy-, hood, widowhood, and ' so much a-head.' We are again reminded of the analogy between speech and writing. Tzetzes has preserved the following valu- able fragment of Choeremon on Hieroglyphics. 1 * For joy,' he says, 'they paint a woman playing on a drum ; for misfortune, an eye weeping ; for non-possession, two empty hands outstretched ; for rising, a snake coming out of a hole ; for setting, the same going in ; for return to life, a frog ; for the soul, a hawk, and the same for the sun, and for (rod; ... for a king, a bee; for the earth, a bull ; a boy signifies increase ; an old man, decay ; a bow, sharp force ; and there are a thousand other such.' We know, from modern researches, 2 that a cynocephalus stood for anger, a hand with a pair of oars 1 Quoted in Sharpe's Egypt. Hieroglyphics. 2 Encycl. Britan., art. Hieroglyphic. CH. xix. METAPHOR. 223 for a workman, a crux ansata and serpent for immortal, and so on in an endless series of metaphorical pictures. It is a proof of the extent of metaphor that almost every colour recalls at once its emblematic meaning. 1 Black is indissolubly connected with notions of death, mourning, villany, and misfortune; white with inno- cence, candour, and festivity ; rose-colour with beauty and freshness; purple with magnificence, luxury, and pride; red and scarlet and crimson with shame, and sin, and crime; yellow with old age, decay, and jealousy; green with springtime, vigour, and youth. It might have been supposed that if there were any one domain of language, however restricted, from which Metaphor no less than Onomatopoeia must necessarily be excluded, it would be the names of numbers. Yet what do we find on examination ? Rapidly as they come to be regarded as abstractions, the signs of the most abstract conceptions, yet they like all other abstractions were once living metaphors, images borrowed from na- tural phenomena. Thus five (the same word precisely as cinq, cinque, quinque, ireine, the Gothic fimf, the German funf, &c.) is derived from the Sanskrit pani, a hand ; just as in Celebes, and among various Indian tribes, the words for ' hand' and * five,' or sometimes the words for 'hand' and 'two,' are identical. In Chinese ny and ceul, 'two,' also mean 'ears.' The Abiponian word for four is gejenknate, which means the foot of an ostrich, from its four toes. 2 The name mille, a thou- sand, is in all probability connected with milium* millet 1 See Pott, Etym. Forsch. ii. 263 fg., where many illustrations are given. 2 Pott, ZahlTnethode, p. 4 ; Pictet, Lea Orig. 2nd. ii. 578. 1 This is at least as probable as the derivation from ftvpioi. Dr. Donaldson, Varron. p. 263, connects it with miles, dp-iAfo. Festus 224 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xix. grass, from the same root as mola, mill, &c., which are of onomatopoetic origin. It is therefore a metaphor of the liveliest description. The Greek %iXiot is derived by some etymologists from ^iXos a heap of fodder, 1 ^5w I pour, &c. Myriad is derived from the imitative root mur, which we find in murmur, the Greek /j,vpo), I pour, &c. The syllable to/ma, which in Gal la forms the compounds of ten, is derived by Professor Pott from tahamet^ hair, and G-ilj 2 informs us that the Orinoko Indians touch their hair to indicate a large number, just as the Abipons heap up handfuls of grass, or hand- fuls of sand. The Mexicans used the word tzontli, f hair,' for 400, and their hieroglyphic for 200 is half a feather. Their word for 8,000, xiquipilli, means 'sack,' because they had sacks which would exactly contain that number of cacao grains. In Chinese the word tome, which means 1,000, is borrowed from a root meaning ' mist,' and therefore resembles the Latin phrase 'Nubes peditum,' and a * cloud of witnesses.' In Sanskrit the word jaladhi, ' ocean,' is used for 100 crores of lacs of rupees. The morbid imagination of the Hindoos made them familiar with excessive numbers, and though they formed some compound up to a million (pra-yu-ta), with the syllable yu to add, yet for numbers like 10 billions they were obliged to resort to symbols such as padma or abja, ( lotus,' from the extreme fecundity of this plant, states that milium comes from mille, but obviously the reverse of this is the fact. L. Benloew, ubi infra, p. 68. 1 Donaldson, Varron. ib. It is connected with a Sanskrit root, Hila, seed. . z ' Si toccano i lor capelli in alto di stupore.' Gilj, ii. 332, quoted by L. Benloew, Reckerches sur I' Origine des Noms de Nombre, p. 64. Many of the particulars about numbers here mentioned are borrowed from Pott's ZdJtlmethode, p. 120, &c. CH. xix. METAPHOR. 225 of which the fruit produces millions of grains. In Egyptian a lotus-leaf attached to its stem was the sign for 1,000.* The Greek ^rff^os, the Latin calculus both recall the day when numeration was impossible without the aid of pebbles. If we examine the Semitic nume- rals we find a repetition of the same facts. 2 For instance the Hebrew eleph meaning 1,000, is properly a herd of oxen, and possibly there may be an allusion to this meaning in the punning speech of Samson after his victory at Kamath-lehi; meah 100 is not improbably derived from mo water; shibndh 7 is considered by Dr. Mommsen to mean 'a finger' from a root 'to point,' because after counting five on his left hand, and begin- ning the number six with the thumb of the right hand, the forefinger or indicator would be seventh in order ; 3 shenayim ' two ' was doubtless suggested, like the name and form of the letter shim, itself, from shen 'a tooth, either from the bicuspid teeth or the double row in the mouth which may also account for the invariable dual form of the word for teeth in Hebrew. Strange as this may sound it admits of many parallels. In Thibet and Java 'two' is expressed by paksha 4 a wing, or by other 1 I must again refer to the able and interesting pamphlet of M. L. Benloew, who has however borrowed most of his facts from Prof. Pott. 2 We may here observe that whatever may be the apparent resemblance of the Sanskrit eka ' one ' to the Hebrew tchad, and the Sanskrit shash 'six' to the Hebrew shesh, it is nearly certain (in spite of Dr. Donald- son's authority in Maskil le Sophir, p. 42 sqq. ; Ntw Cratylus, pp. 187, 194 sqq.) that the resemblance is merely apparent, and purely accidental. It is not indeed impossible that the Aryans borrowed from the Semites the single number saptan seven (Hebr. iiyilK') from its mystery and importance in the Semitic system. The reader may see the question clearly discussed in M. Benloew's pamphlet, p. 95, &c. * Hofer's Zeitschr. i. 262 ; quoted by Dr. Donaldson, Maskil le Sopher, p. 42. 4 Pott, L c. Q 226 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xix. members which are double as bdhu arm, vetra eye, &c. Among the Samoieds between the Yenisei and the Lena, the Sioux Indians, &c., two is expressed by 'hand' for the same reason. The history of the Hebrew word gnashtei ' eleven ' is very curious ; from gndshath to labour comes gnashtoth a thought, and thence comes, according to Simonis, the word for eleven, meaning ten counted on the fingers and one in thought. 1 In English the word score is from the root Sciran to shear, because 'our unlearned ancestors to avoid the embarrassment of large numbers, when they had made twice ten notches, cut off the piece or Talley (Taglie) containing them; and afterwards counted the scores or pieces cut off.' 2 If then in a region so unpromising as that of numbers we find it so easy to trace the influence of onomatopceia and metaphor where need we despair? May we not infer the origin of words in cases which are doubtful, from their origin in cases which are proved ? May we not say with De Maistre, ' Ce qu'on sait dans ce genre prouve beaucoup, a cause de 1'induction qui en resulte, pour les autres cas: ce qu'on ignore, au contraire, ne prouve rien excepte 1'ignorance de celui qui cherche.' 1 Gesenius, Thes. s. v. 8 Diversions of Purley, ii. 4. 227 CHAPTEK XX. METAPHOR continued. METAPHOR IN VARIOUS LANGUAGES. ' Among these, fancy next ller office holds, of all external things Which the five watchful senses represent, She forms imaginations, aery shapes, Which reason joining, or disjoining, frames All what we affirm or what deny, and call Our knowledge and opinion.' MILTON, Par. Lost, v. 105. THE pictorial Metaphors with which all languages abound become obscured in course of time under the wearing and modifying processes of literary cultivation, into * a mass of arbitrary, opaque, uninteresting conventional- isms.' But the more ancient, and the more uncivilised a language is, the fewer are its abstractions, and the more numerous are its undisguised metaphors. These metaphors, no less than those of every poet, are due to the spontaneous and unconscious l play of the fancy and the imagination. An abridged personification, says J. P. Richter, 2 is the natural and necessary language of savage life. In modern languages it is by no means always possible to trace the sensuous image underlying 1 Heyse, p. 100- Steinthal, Urspr. d. Sprache, p. 27. 3 J. Paul Kichter, Aesthetik, 56. 228 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xx. every word which implies conceptions incapable of any but a symbolical expression. But in such a language as Arabic we may still see what the condition of every lan- guage must once have been. There the dominion of fancy and poetry is still obvious, and every word is a picture of which the colours are still bright and clear ; with us the power of abstraction is riper, and the sensuous element has left nothing more than the traces of its former prevalence. In fact a style abounding in metaphors is now gene- rally accepted as a proof of weakness, since for an ad- vanced stage of thought it is necessary as far as possible to attach to each word one clear meaning, as little mingled as possible with mere external analogies. Bergmann tells us that the turns of phraseology which the Kalmucks most admire in their own language ' are precisely those which a more advanced civilisation, and a corresponding development of taste, would reject as spurious.' Similarly, ' the Koran is held by the devout Mahommedan to be the most admirable model .of com- position ; but exactly those ornaments of diction and imagery, which he regards as the jewels of the whole, are most entirely in the childish taste of imperfect civilisa- tion.' The gorgeous luxury of Oriental prose would with us be thought extravagant even in the most elabo- rate poetry, and we have long got beyond the stage which makes it almost impossible for an Oriental even to find a title for a book without calling it a mirror, a flower, or a pearl. A glance at the metaphors of some Semitic, Aryan, and Allophylian nations will perhaps illustrate and relieve our subject. In Hebrew the paucity of words necessitates the con- CH. xx. METAPHOR. 229 stant use of metaphor. * The Hebrew has scarcely any individuated words. Ask a Hebrew scholar if he has any word for a ball (as a tennis ball, pila lusoria) ; he says, " yes." What is it then ? Why he gives you the word for globe. Ask for orb, for sphere, &c. Still you have the same answer. The individual circum- stantiations are swallowed up in the general outline.' 1 This latter instance is rather catachresis than meta- phor; i. e. it is rather the application of the same word to different things, than the direct suggestion of a com- parison. But we can best see the rapid working of metaphor in the extraordinary diversities of meaning of which the same Hebrew word 2 is capable. Take for instance the word -fw (Tor), which means a turtle- dove, an ox, 'a string of pearls,' a turn, and a manner ? Or again take the word 1-13 (goor)\ in its meaning of ' a lion's whelp ' we see the imitative principle again at work ; but how comes the verb, goor, to acquire the meanings to sojourn, to assemble, to be afraid, to reve- rence, to worship? Or take the word 3ny gnarabh, which in its various conjugations means to mix, to ex- change, to stand in the place of, to pledge, to interfere, to be familiar ; and also to disappear, to set, and to do a thing in the evening ; besides all this, with various vowel modifications the same three letters mean ' to be sweet,' a fly, or beetle, an Arabian, a stranger, the weft of cloth, the evening, a willow, and a raven. Assuming that all these significations are ultimately deducible 1 De Quincey on Language, Works, viii. 81. To this is due the ex- treme uncertainty of rendering many Hebrew words. 2 'Non est mirum doctissimos etiam Judseorum hodie nihil certi de rerum nominibus, ut animalium, plantarum, metallorum, vestium, instru- mentorum, docere posse.' Gesner, Hist. Quadrup. 230 OX LANGUAGE. CH. xx. from one and the same root, we see at once the extent to which metaphor must have been at work. In most instances the steps of the transition have vanished. In Hebrew the same word means fatness and ashes ; l perhaps this may be because the ancients used ashes for manure ; but who shall tell us with any certainty why 22? means ' to become wise,' and 22? to make cakes ? Again, all Hebrew literature abounds in metaphor. Glassius in his laborious Philologia Sawa (pp. 807 912) has collected innumerable examples of metaphor drawn from the sun, and moon, and stars ; from the times of the day and night ; from fire, air, and water ; from 'the body, the life, the senses, and the actions of men ; and in short from almost every observable phe- nomenon of nature and of life. To take one set of phenomena alone, the mere names of the vine, the olive, the cedar, the lion, the wolf, the serpent, the fox, the horse, the heifer, the goat, the sheep will call up at once in, the memory of the Biblical student the bold metaphors with which they are associated. Christ is ' the true vine,' ' the branch,' * the Lion of the tribe of Judah,' and ' the Lamb that was slain ;' Herod is ' that fox ;' Esau is ' a wild ass of a man ;' 2 ' with- out are dogs,' and the Gentiles are ' dogs ;' Satan is ' a serpent,' and * a roaring lion ;' the Cretans are f evil beasts.' With the use of metaphor in Aryan languages we are familiar, and therefore choosing the Greek trage- dians as our storehouse of illustrations, we may from 1 Plin. xvii. 9. Gesen. Thes. s. v. JKJT 2 Compare the Sanskrit nara-sinha man-lion, and 'two lion-like men of Moab.' 2 Sam. xxiii. 20. CH. xx. METAPHOR. 231 their pages glean the farther fact that in the metaphors of a language we may always learn the habits, the amusements, and the tastes of a nation. For no meta- phors are so common among these Athenians as the very ones which we should expect to be most frequently before their minds, namely those derived from hunting, and from rowing. 7)pav ' to hunt ' comes to be a mere ornate word for * to pursue.' Thus Xerxes desires ' to hunt Athens' (Pers. 229) ; an ambitious man 'hunts for the tyranny' ((Ed. Tyr. 540); 'it is not right to hunt impossibilities' (Ant. 92); 'they will have come to hunt after marriages which cannot be hunted ' (Prom. Vinct. 860). Nautical metaphors are still more fre- quent. As for epscra-eiv ' to row ' we have it in all kinds of conjunctions; we hear of 'rowing a plan' (Ant. 159); to row with another is to aid him (Aj. 1307); the two Sons of Atreus row threatenings (Id. 246); ' row round your heads the tabouring of your hands ' (Sept. c. Theb. 836). A fair wind from a person's eyes wafts away a lukewarm friend (Track. 812); we even are told of 'the harbour of a cry,' ' the prow of the heart,' and ' the rudders of horses.' The Greeks are generally supposed to have had little or no sympathy with external nature, yet the euphemistic pleasure which they display in the incessant use of the word 4 blossom' (avdos), no less than their fondness for garlands, shows that they were far from being dead to impressions of natural beauty. ' Disease blooms forth upon the flesh. The nightingale is shrouded in a bloomy bower of woes. The hoariness of old age is a white blossoming. ' The misfortunes of a noble family 1 Cf. EccL xii. 5. 232 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xx. are made to burst forth into bloom. The haughty speech is the effloi^escence of the lips. Groans are the flowers plucked from the tree of anguish, and the chanters of the funeral dirge shower these upon the bier ; so that not only the custom but the very lan- guage of the Greeks, veiled as it were the deformity of death, and scattered the corpse with flowers.' 1 Before leaving the subject of Aryan metaphors we may further observe that the metaphors of a writer, no less than those of a nation, always carry upon them the strong mark of his own individuality, as for instance the constantly recurring ' bow ' and ' wings ' in the Divina Commedia of Dante ; and that the metaphors most frequently adopted at any particular epoch stamp with terrible energy the characteristics of the age. Take for instance the commencement of the Ckristiade by F. Hojeda : Canto al Hijo de Dios, humano y muerto Con dolores y afrentas por el hombre : Musa divina, en su costado abierto Bana mi lengua y muevela en su nombre, ' I sing the Son of God, who was man and died for man amid anguish and insults ; divine Muse, steep my tongue in his open side, and make it move in his name.' Well may M. Arnould, 2 from whom I quote the lines, ask whether any one but a Spanish monk in the time of Philip the Second could ever have written them ! If we now turn to the metaphors in use among 1 Boyes, p. liv. Mr. Boyes has so amply and so happily illustrated this subject of the metaphors in Greek tragedy, that in this paragraph I found all that I wanted done to my hand. 2 Ess. de Theorie et d'Hist. Lit. p. 203. CH. xx. METAPHOK. 233 savage races we shall find them still more distinct and picturesque. Take for instance a few specimens of Kafir metaphors. 1 Ingcala * flying ant' means 'great dexterity;' inja 'dog' means a dependant; quanka 'to be snapped asunder' means 'to be quite dead;' zikhla 'to eat oneself means 'to be proud,' and there- fore is an exact parallel to Mr. Tennyson's expression, Upon himself, himself did feed. 'He is a wolf means 'he is greedy;' 'he is an ox' means ' he is strong.' 2 Some of the Malay metaphors are very lively. Thus mabuk-ombak ' sea-sick ' means properly ( wave-drunk ; ' mata-ari ' the sun ' is literally ' the eye of day ;' mata- JcaJd ' the ankle ' is ' the eye of the foot ; ' mata-ayar ( a spring ' is ' the eye of water ' (compare the Hebrew fy). The expression for an 'affront' is 'charcoal on the face ;' a key is the ' child of a lock ;' a knee-pan is the 'cocoanut of the knee;' malice is 'rust of the heart;' sincerity ' a white heart,' like the Latin ' candi- dum ingenium;' impudent is 'face of board.' 3 Scarcely less ingenious are the metaphors in Chinese. 4 Capricious' is expressed by 'three mornings, four evenings ;' cunning or persuasive speech by 'convenient hind-teeth, ready front-teeth ;' ' disagreement' by 'you East, I West ; ' attention by ' fine-heart.' Neng ' a bear' means ' powerful ;' 'hao ' a boar' is ' a brave man;' non ' the roar of water among stones' is ' anger.' 4 1 Appleyard's Kafir Grammar, p. 71. Some of these are quoted by Prof. M. Miiller, in his Second Series of Lectures. I had however made a note of these long before I saw them there. * Appleyard, p. 128. * Crawford's Malay Gram, and Diet, i. 62. 4 Premare, Not. Ling. Sin. p. 242. 234 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xx. We encounter once more in Chinese the phenomenon which we have observed in Hebrew, in the number of different meanings possessed by the same root; a phe- nomenon not solely but mainly explicable by the in- fluence of metaphor. For instance, chou means a book, a tree, great heats, Aurora, and the loss of a wager; 1 Ou means ' me,' and also an orator, nothing, a bat, and a kind of tree; 2 Yu means 'me,' and also to agree, to rejoice, a kind of measure, stupid, a black ox, &c. ; Yu ' thou ' means also milk, tender, to eat, honey-cake ; Y 'he' or 'she' is also to laugh in spite of oneself, to sigh, a new-born infant, respect, a stout dog, &c. ; Tchy the sign of the genitive means also it, him, branches, to sustain, yellow fruit, a dead tree, and a labourer ! 3 We must here digress for a moment to remove a misconception. It has been the fashion to compare these homonyms with others which have not the remotest connection with them. Thus we have seen (in the note) that the sound ' cent ' has six different meanings in French, but these words had no original connection with each other, since cent comes from centum, sans from sine, sang from sanguis, sent from sentit, sens from sensus, sont from sunt, and s'en from se inde. 4 Thus aune means an alder-tree and an ell, 1 The missionary Bourgeois, in his Lettres edifiantes, bitterly com- plains of the consequent difficulty which he experienced in learning Chinese. 2 It might be supposed that such a multiplicity of homonyms would introduce endless confusion into a language. Practically, however, such is not the case ; e. g. in French the words cent, sang, s'en, sans, sent, sont, sens, widely different as is their meaning, are never confused. It is the same in English with heir, ere, e'er, air, and Ayr, &c. 1 Benloew, De quelques Caractercs du Lang. Prim. p. 41. 4 Heyse, 210, 220. Similarly we haveners 'towards,' from versus; CH. xx. METAPHOR. 235 but in the former meaning it comes from alnus, in the latter from ulna ; Hail! as a salutation in English is the German heil, but as congealed water-drops it is the German Hagel ; pecher ' a peach ' is Mai us Persica, pecher * to fish ' is from piscari, and pecher ' to sin ' from peccare ; tour ' a tower ' is from turns, and when it means ' a turn ' i. e. a walk, it is from a late vulgar sense of tornare; louer 'to praise' is from laudare, louer 'to let' from locare. These instances are only false analogies of those which we have been considering. They are accidental, being due merely to the phonetic corruption or disorganisation of a language in its ad- vance ; whereas those in Hebrew, Chinese, or Coptic are truly primordial and arose from that indetermination which characterises every primitive language, an in- determination which it is the object of every cultivated language to mould into gradual precision. There are certain dialects or languages spoken by whole classes of men in all countries, yet unowned by any nation. Such are the Italian gergo, furbesco ; the Spanish germania; the Portuguese Caldo; the Ger- man rothwelsch (red Italian ?) ; the Dutch bargoens or dieventael ; the English cant, slang, thieves' Latin, pedlar's French, St. Giles's Greek, flash-tongue, gib- berish, &c. ; the French narquois or Argot. This language of crime and misery ' this pustulous vo- cabulary of which each word seems an unclean ring of a monster of mud and darkness,' is formed (and the vers ' a verse,' from versus ; verre ' glass,' from vitrum ver ' a worm.' from vermis; vkre 'truly' (in old French), from verb. In fact, so numerous are these homonyms, that in 1807 a Dictionnaire des Homonymes was published in Paris by St. de la Madelaine. Charma, p. 272. An interesting list of English homonyms may be found in D wight's Mod. Philolog. ii. 311. 236 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xx. same remark applies partially to the harmless lingua franca of the Mediterranean, the Ligoa geral of South America, the Chinese pigeon-English, the Haytian French, the jargons of the Bastaards of Africa, the Canadian half-breeds, and the English, French, and Chinooks in Columbia) 1 by the adoption of foreign words, by the absolute suppression of grammar, by grotesque tropes, wild catachresis, and allegoric me- tonymy. The study of these corrupt dialects is a most fruitful field for the philologist, and suggests many of the primitive expedients and tendencies of language. But Metaphor is the widest and most important basis of them all, and it is adopted conventionally for the express purpose of disguise and concealment. The words chosen are all from the vernacular, but the senses are entirely different, and are all allegorical. Borrow points this out in his book on the Gipsies, and M. Michel, 2 who has thought the Argot worthy of a serious historian, and who is the greatest authority on the subject, says, ' La metaphore et 1'allegorie semblent former en effet Velement principal de ce langage. . . . Tin fait qui ne saurait manquer de frapper un esprit philosophique a 1'aspect de ce dialecte, c'est que partout Vargot est base sur le vneme principe, cest-a-dire sur la metaphore ; et a cet egard toutes les branches de 1 See specimens in Latham, Var. of Man, p. 330 ; Appleyard, Kafir Gram. p. 10 ; Nodier, Notions de Linguistique; Hutchinson, Ten Years among the Ethiopians, pp. 21-32, &c. * Etudes de Phitologie Comparee sur V Argot, par F. Michel ; Paris, 1856. Victor Hugo dwells on it in Les Miserables, Le Dernier Jour d"un Condamne, and Notre Dame de Paris; and it is also touched on in Vidocq, Eugene Sue, &c. There are several English slang dictionaries, &c., beginning as far back as the year 1560; and also in other lan- guages, as Studii sulle Lingue Furbesche, Milan, 1846. CH. xx. METAPHOR. 237 ce jargon se ressemblent.' ' Again, M. Victor Hugo, whose splendidly powerful chapters on this subject in Les Miserables are well worth the study of the Philologer, says, * Slang is nothing but a vestibule, in which language having some wicked action to commit, disguises itself. It puts on these masks of words, these rags of metaphors. In this way i't becomes horrible and can scarcely be recognised. The metaphors say everything and conceal everything. The devil becomes " the baker." " Les sorgneurs sont sollicer les gails a la lune," " the prowlers are going to steal horses at night." This passes before the rnind like a group of spectres, and we know not what we see.' Metaphor then is universal, and the Imagination plays a prominent part in every form of human lan- guage. It is in their earliest dawn (as we have seen already) that languages are most metaphorical. As civilisation advances, the fancy, to which the origin of the word was due, is forgotten altogether, or remains a dead letter to the popular consciousness even when the etymology of the word is known. 8 The intermediate factor vanishes, and the word appears as the immediate expression of the representation in its totality. To take one or two instances out of thousands : the word * caprice' is in very common use, and is a word to which a most definite meaning is attached; yet out of the myriads who use it correctly how many are distinctly aware that it is a metaphor derived from the swift, short 1 Michel, ubi supra, pp. i., xxiv. The singular points of resemblance in the Argots of different nations are pointed out bj Biondelli, Studii Linguistici, in a very interesting paper, Origine, Diffusions, ed Im- portanza delle Lingue Furbesche, pp. 107120. * Heyse, 164. 238 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xx. leaps of the wild goat on the hills 1 (copra, compare ait; from tuWtu), just as the Italian nuce comes from nucia a goat, and ticchio a freak from ziki a kid, and the French verve from vervex a bell-wether ? Or again how often do people when they 'make a stipulation' recall the fact that the origin of the expression is a custom, dead for centuries, of giving a straw in sign of a completed bargain ? or when they talk of money remember that the word is derived from the accident that gold and silver were coined by the Eomans 2 in the temple of Juno Moneta ? We speak of muskets with- out being aware that the word is ultimately derived from the onomatopoeia musso I buzz, whence come musca a fly, muscatus speckled, muscheta a sparrow- hawk, and hence a musket ; 3 we talk of varnish without recalling the golden tresses of Berenice ; 4 of intoxication with no reference to the poison with which arrows were once smeared ; of a dunce without any intentional insult to the memory of Duns Scotus ; of a poltroon with no allusion to being maimed in the thumb ; of a saunterer 1 See Diez, s. v. Capriccio ; Scheler, s. v. Mr. "Wedgwood, with less probability, connects the word with the roots riccio, ericius (a hedgehog), herisser, Qpitraeiv. Etym. Diet, s, v. 2 Probably the Romans thought just as little of the interesting historic fact fossilised in the word pecunia ; and the Greeks of that involved in the derivation of ofio\os, which shows that money was first used in ingots (j8'\os). s This derivation seems at least as probable as the one suggested by Mr. Wedgwood. The Italians called their muskets, &c., by the names of hawks, falconetto, sagro, &c. ; compare the French sacre, couleuvrine, &c. The Italian terzuolo, a pistol, properly means a male hawk, perhaps from the fancy that the third bird in a nest was a male, or because the male was one third smaller than the female. 4 This word, however, is disputed. It may come from the city Berenice, where amber-coloured nitre was found, or from vitrinus glassy. See Diez, s. v. Vernice, ed. Donkin. CH. xx. METAPHOR. 239 with no reference to the Holy Land ; and not to multi- ply instances which any one can find in hundreds for himself, we go on ending our year with the months of September, October, November, and December, without once troubling ourselves with the consideration that the months are really the 9th, 10th, llth, and 12th, and that our nomenclature merely continues to embalm an error of Eomulus nearly three thousand years ago. This complete evanescence of the original meaning of words and phrases gives rise to that confusion of metaphors which is so common in every literature. There is perhaps in careful writers too pedantic a scruple against ever mingling two conceptions origi- nally distinct. We are not of course advocating such reckless intermixtures as Lord Castlereagh's f My Lords, the main feature on which this question hinges,' or as that by the poetic young tradesman, quoted by Cole- ridge, who said that sorrows Round my heart's leg tie their galling chain. But when Milton wrote in one of his finest sonnets I bate no jot Of heart or hope but still bear up, and steer Uphillward, we cannot but regret that the mere confusion of meta- phor involved in the words 'steer uphillward' 1 would have made him alter that fine expression into the much 1 Comp. Sams. Agonistes : 'I hear The tread of many feet steering this way.' Probably the metaphor is a reminiscence of Euripides, Iph. Taur. 266 : The word wopfl/xevw might have been added to the naval metaphors be- fore alluded to, for Euripides employs it constantly. 240 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xx. tamer phrase ' Eight onward.' Who is annoyed by the confusion involved in Mark vii. 21, 22, Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, &c., ' an evil eye ; ' or in 1 Tim. vi. 19, ' Laying up in store a good foundation' (cnroBr)- travpl^ovTss} ; or in 2 Cor. v. 2, ' to be clothed upon with our house;' or in 2 Tim. ii. 26, 'that they may recover themselves (lit. grow sober, avav^aicn) from the snare of the devil ? ' l The greatest poets have not been the most careful to avoid these incongruities. ^Eschylus talks of * a beacon-light being a lucky throw of the dice 72 for a sentinel. Horace says Urit enim fulgore suo, qui prcegravat artes Infra se positas. And Shakspeare, to say nothing of his * taking up arms against a sea of troubles,' 3 shows in every play his lordly disregard of mere pedantic conventionalities in the way of accuracy. This passage, ' extrait d'une piece intitulee La Tempete,' particularly offends the critical sense of M. Varinot, the author of the Dictionnaire des Metaphores.* The charm dissolves apace, And as the morning steals upon the night Melting the darkness, so their rising senses Begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle Their clearer reason. What English reader with ordinary breadth of under- standing, found anything to jar upon his mind in this 1 Glass. Phil. Sacr. p. 919. * rpls l| pa\ov(rris TTJcrS' e/iol QpvKrwplas. Agam. 33. 8 ' No image of the sea is suggested ; and arms, incongruous in relation to the literal sea, is not so in relation to a multitude ; besides that the image arms itself evanesces for the same reason into resistance. 1 De Quincey, Works, vii. 121 (Black's ed.). Paris, 1819. CH. xx. METAPHOR. 241 passage ? Yet listen to the groan of the French critic ! ' II y a la tant de choses mal-assorties, que 1'esprit ne peut rien voir avec clarte. Le matin qui se glisse fur- tivement sur 1'obscurite, et qui en meme temps la fond, les esprits des homines qui chassent des fumees, des fumees ignorantes, et des fumees qui voilent. Un poete peint un ange (! !) qui franchit les airs, et le represente au meme moment comme etant a cheval, et comme faisant voile sur le sein de 1'air. II est impos- sible que Pimagination se forme un tableau net d'objets aussi confus.' Poor outraged historian of French meta- phors ! and what a drunken savage Shakspeare must have been ! Many have bewailed the necessity of metaphor as the source of constant error, and the strongest proof of the weakness of our intellectual faculties. 'Verborum trans- latio,' says Cicero, * constituta est inopiae causa.' l Un- doubtedly it is so ; but with such faculties as we have, metaphor, and the necessity for the metaphoric element in language, becomes fruitful of blessings. 2 It becomes a means whereby we observe and compare the analogous phenomena of the physical and intellectual world. It adds something of the grace, and charm, and mystery of nature to the thoughts of man. It is the very essence of our most poetical conceptions, and the best mode of shadowing forth our profoundest intuitions. * Thought,' says the eloquent and ingenious Du Ponceau, 'is vast as the air; it embraces far more than languages can ex- press ; or rather, languages express nothing. They only make thought flash in electric sparks from the speaker 1 Cic. De Oratore, iii. 39. Cf. Seneca, De Benefitiis, ii. 34, &c. * See this subject more fully discussed in the Origin of Language, p. 136 sqq. B 242 ON LANGUAGE. CH. xx. to the hearer. A single word creates a crowd of concep- tions, which the intellect combines and marshals with lightning-like rapidity.' l It is idle therefore to complain that metaphor sup- poses a certain indigence, and that if the intellect were endowed with the power of directly and immediately seizing any phenomenon, and of providing an inde- pendent expression for every modification of our minds, it would be unnecessary to drag ourselves from one analogous idea to another. 2 Obviously we must take the mind as we find it; and since it has not been endowed with the power of direct intuition into the nature of things it cannot dispense with tropes and allegories; which so far from hindering and obscuring our power of insight, are, on the contrary, its mightiest assistants. 3 In the true and etymological sense of the word, they illustrate, i.e. they pour a flood of light upon our thoughts. And, reversing the metaphor, we may say with equal truth, that they are the gracious clouds, through whose vail it is alone possible for us to gaze upon the too-dazzling sun. A Language without figures and metaphors would of necessity be a language without poetry. We have already shown the truth of this assertion 4 by comparing the language of Science with the language of common life. It will be interesting to illustrate it further by taking the instance of any ' philosophical language ' 1 Et. du Ponceau, Syst. Gram, des Langues de TAmerique, p. 32. 2 Charma, p. 100. 1 See Arist. Ehet. m. i. 2. In fact they perform in language something of the same function as the symbolic actions of orators or poets. They make our thoughts more clear, graphic, vivid. 4 Origin of Lang. p. 134 sqq. CH. xx. METAPHOR. 243 framed in strict accordance with these supposed prin- ciples of perfection. 4 Une langue philosophique ! ' says Du Ponceau, ' bon Dieu, qu'est-ce qu'une langue philosophique ? . . . une langue philosophique ! et pourquoi non un monde, une creation tout entiere de la main et de la facon des philo- sophes ? ' There have however been several attempts at languages framed on these accurate principles, intended by their inventors to serve as an unerring medium of communication among all nations. 1 The seventeenth century seems to have been particularly fertile in them. A German prince offered a reward of 300 crowns for the best universal language, and Becker wrote in conse- quence his Notitia Linguarum universalis. The prince repaid him by compliments, and asked him to dinner, 'which was more,' says Du Ponceau, 'than the thing was worth.' It was published in 1661 at Frankfort, and is now very rare. In the same year was published Dal- garno's Ars Signorum, vulgo Character universalis. Lond. 166 1. 2 It is founded on the assumption that there has been a complete and certain distribution of all things and ideas. A few years after (in 1 668) ap- peared the celebrated Essay towards a Philosophical Language of Bishop Wilkins, occupying an enormous folio volume. Its ingenuity was undoubted, and c uni- 1 M. Charma, pp. 290-300, gives a long list of writers who have touched on this subject, as Herm. Hugo, Bacon, Des Cartes, Dalgarno, Wilkins, Becker, Kircher, Jo. Voss, Leibnitz, De Brosses, Changeux, De Maimieux, Destrutt de Tracy, Laromigniere, Grosselin, &c. See espe- cially Degerando, Des Signes et de tArt de penser, iv. 10. Some of these systems were founded on a self-explaining pasigraphy, in which e. g. necessity was expressed by a chain, duration by a clock, equality by two parallel lines, a method by a geometrical instrument, &c. * See Hallam, Lit. of Europe, iii. 362. B 2 244 ON" LANGUAGE. CH. xx. formity, the perfection of small geniuses, was observable throughout it.' The substantives were a series of anti- O theses. Thus da meant God, ida devil ; dad heaven, odad hell ; dab soul, adab body ; pida presence, pidas absence ; tadu power, tadus imbecility, The numbers were fashioned on similar principles,^ pobal 10, pobar 100, pobam 1,000. It would be impossible to imagine any spoken language so inconceivably dry, and dreary, and bald, and dead as this, ' I do not know,' observes Du Ponceau, 1 ' whether any one ever studied, learnt, or cultivated this language. It is only found in some libraries, a sad monument of the aberrations of the human intellect,' Without absolutely endorsing so se- vere a remark, we may certainly agree with Hallam that ' it is very fortunate that neither of these ingenious but presumptuous attempts to fasten down the progressive powers of the human mind by the cramps of association had the least success.' The metaphors without which no language worthy of the name can even exist are a proof of the human 1 He mentions also the Specieuse-Generale, a philosophic language by which Leibnitz designed to reduce to a sort of calculus the expression of all truths. It appears from a work of Raspe (Hist. Lingua Charac- teristic