Robert E. Gross 
 Colleftion 
 
 A Memorial to the Founder 
 of the 
 
 4 Business Administration Lihrary 
 y l/niverdf/u 0/ K>a^>rn(a 
 
 Los Angeles
 
 ( 1%:' 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 O F 
 
 EDMUND BURKE, Esa, 
 
 &C* &C. &C» 
 
 [ Price 2s. ]
 
 SPEECH 
 
 O P 
 
 EDMUND BURKE, Esq. 
 
 MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR THE 
 CITY OF BRISTOL, 
 
 On prefenting to the Houfe of Commons 
 (On the nth of February, 1780) 
 
 A PLAN FOR THE BETTER SECURITY OF 
 THE INDEPENDENCE OF PARLIAMENT, 
 
 AND THE 
 
 OECONOMICAL REFORMATION OF THE 
 CIVIL AND OTHER ESTABLISHMENTS. 
 
 LONDON: 
 PiHNTEi> FOR J. DODSLEY, in PaLL-MALL. 
 
 M.DCC.LXXX.
 
 SPEECH, ^c. 
 
 I 
 
 Mr. Speaker, 
 
 I Rife, in acquittal of my engagement to the 
 houfe, in obedience to the ftrong and juft re- 
 quifition of my conftituents, and, I am perfuaded, 
 in conformity to the unanimous wilhes of the 
 ■whole nation, to fubmit to the wifdom of parlia- 
 ment, " A plan of reform in the conftitution di 
 feveral parts of the public oeconomy.'* 
 
 I have endeavoured, that this plan ftiould in- 
 clude in its execution, a confiderable redu6tion 
 of improper expence ; that, it (hould effed: a con- 
 verfion of unprofitable titles into a productive 
 eftate -, that, it fhould lead to, and indeed almoft 
 compel, a provident adminiftration of fuch fums 
 of public money as muft remain under difcre- 
 tionary trufts •, that, it Ihould render the incurring 
 d«bts on the civil eftablilhment (which muft 
 ultimately affed national ftrength and national 
 credit) fo very difficult, as to become next to 
 imprafticable. 
 
 But what, I confefs, was uppermoft with me, 
 what I bent the whole force pf my mind to, was 
 
 B the
 
 [ 2 ] 
 
 rhe rediicllon of that corrupt influence, wfiich i:?- 
 itJelf tife perennial fpring of all prodigality, and of 
 all diforder-, which loads us, more than millions 
 of debt •, which takes away vigour from our arms, 
 wifdom from our councils, and every fhadow of 
 authority and credit from the moll venerable parts 
 of our conftitution. 
 
 Sir, I aflure you, very folemnly, and with a 
 very clear confcience, that nothing in the world 
 has led me to fuch an undertaking, but my zeal 
 for the honour of this houle, and the fettled, ha- 
 bitual, fyftematic affedlion I bear to the caufe, and 
 to the principles of government. 
 
 I enter perfedlly into the nature and eonfe- 
 quences of my attempt ; and I advance to it with 
 a tremor that fliakes me to the inmofl fibre of 
 my frame. I feel, that I engage in a bufinefs, 
 in itfelf moft ungracious, totally wide of the 
 courfe of prudent condu6t-, and I really think, 
 the moft compleatly adverfe that can be ima*- 
 gined, to the natural turn and temper of my own 
 mind. I know, that all parfimony is of a qua- 
 lity, approaching to unkind-nefs ; and that (on 
 fome perfon or other) every reform muft optr 
 rate as a fort. of puniflmieot. Indeed the whole 
 clafs of the fevere and reftriflive virtues,, are iac 
 a market almoft too high for hum.anity. What 
 is worfe, there are very few of thole virtues which 
 are not capable of being imitated, and even out- 
 done in many of their moft ftrikingefFe<5ls, by the 
 worft of vices. Malignity and envy will carve much, 
 more deeply, and hnifli much more Iharply, in the 
 work of retrenchment, than frugality amd provi- 
 dence. 1 do not, therefore, wonder that gentle- 
 men have kept away from fuch.a tall<!:, as well from 
 good nature as from prudence. Private feeling 
 might, indeed, be overborne by legiflative reafon ; 
 and a man of a long-fighted and ftrong-nerved 
 z ' , iiumanitVj
 
 i 3 'i 
 
 humanity, might bring himfelf, not fo much to' 
 confider from whom he takes a fuperfluous en- 
 joyment, as for whom in the end he may pre- 
 lerve the abfolute neceffarics of life. 
 
 But it is much more eafy -to reconcile this 
 meafure to humanity;, than to bring it to any agree- 
 ment with prudence. I do not mean that little, 
 fclfifh, pitiful, baftard thing, which fometimes 
 goes by the name of a family in which it is not 
 legitimate, and to which it is a difgrace •,— I 
 mean even that public and enlarged prudence^ 
 which, apprehenfive of being difabled from ren- 
 dering acceptable fervices to the world, with- 
 holds icfelf from thofe that are invidious. Gen- 
 tlemen who are, with me, verging towards the 
 decline of hfe, and are apt to form their ideas 
 of kings from kings of former times, m.ight dread 
 the anger of a reigning prince ; — 'they who arc 
 more provident of the future, or by being young 
 are more interefted in it, might tremble at the 
 refentment of the fucceflbr ; they might fee a long, 
 dull, dreary, unvaried vido of delpair and exclufion, 
 for half a century, before them. This is no plea- 
 fant profpe6l at the outfet of a political journey. 
 
 Befides this. Sir, the private enemies to be made 
 in all attempts of this kind, are innumerable -, and 
 their enmity will be the more bitter, and the more 
 dangerous too, becaufe a fenle of dignity will 
 oblige them to conceal the caufe of their refent- 
 ment. Very few men of great families and ex- 
 ■tenfive connexions, but will feel the fmart of a 
 cutting reform, in fome ciofe relation, fome bo- 
 iom friend, fome pleafant acquaintance, fome dear 
 proteded dependant. Emolument is taken from 
 .fome ; patronage from others ; objects of pur- 
 Itiit from all. Men, forced into an involuntary 
 independence, will abhor the authors of a blefllng 
 which in their eyes has fo very near a refem- 
 blance to a curfc. When officers are removed^ 
 B 2 and
 
 [ 4 ] 
 
 and the offices remain, you may fet the gratitude 
 of Ibme againfl the anger of others -, you may op- 
 pofe the friends you oblige againll the enemies 
 you provoke. But fervices of the prefent fort 
 create no attachments. The individual good felt 
 in a public benefit, is comparatively fo fmall, 
 comes round through fuch an involved labyrinth 
 of intricate and tedious revolutions ; whillt a pre- 
 fent perfonal detriment is fo heavy where it falls, 
 and fo inftant in its operation, that the cold com- 
 mendation of a public advantage never was, and 
 never will be, a match for the quick fenfibility 
 of a private lofs : and you may depend upon it. 
 Sir, that when many people have an intereft in 
 railing, fooner or later, they will bring a con- 
 fiderable degree of unpopularity upon any mea- 
 fure. So that, for the prefent at leafl:, the re- 
 formation will operate againll the reformers ; and 
 revenge (as againft them at the leaft) will pro- 
 duce all the effefts of corruption. 
 
 This, Sir, is almoft always the cafe, where the 
 plan has compleat fuccefs. But how (lands the 
 matter in the mere attempt ? Nothing, you know, 
 is more common, than for men to wifh, and call 
 loudly too, for a reformation, who, when it ar- 
 rives, do by no means like the feverity of its 
 afpefl. Reformation is oneofthofe pieces which 
 mull be put at fome diftance in order to pleafe. 
 Its greatell favourers love it better in the abftraft 
 than in the fubllance. When any old prejudice 
 of their own, or any interell that they value, is 
 touched, they become fcrupulous, they become 
 captious, and every man has his feparate excef>- 
 tion. Some pluck out the black hairs, fome the 
 grey j one point mull be given up to one ; ano- 
 ther point muil be yielded to another •, nothing 
 is fullered to prevail upon its own principle : the 
 whole is fo frittered down, and disjointed, that 
 ■ 9 fcarcely
 
 I 5 ] 
 
 fcarcely a trace of the original fcheme remains 1 
 Thus, between the refiftance of power, and the 
 unfyliematical procefs of popularity, the under- 
 taker and the undertaking are both expofed, and 
 the poor reformer is hilled off the ftage, both 
 by friends and foes. 
 
 Obferve, Sir, that the apology for my under- 
 taking (an apology which, though long, is no 
 longer than neceffary) is not grounded on my 
 want of the fulleft fenfe of the difficult and invi- 
 dious nature of the taflc I undertake. I rifque 
 odium if I fuccecd, and contempt if I fail. My 
 €xcute muft reft in mine and your convic- 
 tion of the abfolute, urgent necejfuy there is, 
 that fomething of the kind fhould be done. If 
 there is any facrifice to be made, either of efti- 
 mation or of fortune, the fmalleft is the beft. 
 Commanders in chief arc not to be put upon the 
 forlorn hope. But indeed it is neceifary that th€ 
 attempt fnould be made. It is neceifary from our 
 own political circumftances •, it is neceffary from 
 the operations of the enemy ; it is neceffary from 
 the demands of the people ; whofe defires, when 
 they do not militate with the liable and eternal 
 rules of jLiilice and reafon (rules which are above 
 us, and above them) ought to be as a law to a 
 Houfe of Commons. 
 
 As to our circumftances \ I do not mean toag- 
 -gravatc the difficulties of them, by the ftrength 
 of any colouring whatfoever. On the contrary, 
 I obfcrve, and obferve with pJeafure, that our af- 
 fairs rather wear a more promifing afped: than 
 they did on the opening of this feffion. We have 
 had fome leadino- fucccffes. But thofe who rate 
 them at the higheft (higher a great deal indeed 
 than I dare to do) are of opinion, that, upon the 
 ground of fuch advantages, we cannot at this 
 time hope to make any treaty of peace, which 
 B 3 would
 
 [ 6 ] 
 
 would not be ruinous and completely difgracefuJ. 
 In fuch an anxious flate of things, if dawnings 
 of fuccefs ferve to animate our diligence, they are 
 -good ; if they tend to increafe our prefumption, 
 they are worfe than defeats. The (late of our af- 
 fairs fhall then be as promifmg as any one may 
 choofe to conceive it : It is however but promifing. 
 We muft recoileft, that with but half of our na- 
 tural ftrength, we are at war againft confederated 
 powers Vv'ho have fingly threatned us with ruin : 
 We muft recolleft, that whilft we are left naked 
 on one fide, our other flank is Uncovered by any 
 alliance •, That whilfb we are weighing and balan- 
 cing our fucccfTes againft our lolies, we are accu- 
 mulating debt to the amount of at leaft fourteen 
 millions in the year. That lofs is certain. 
 
 I have no wifh to deny, that our fuccefles are 
 as brilliant as any one choofes to make them ; our 
 rclources too may, for me, be as unfathomable 
 as they are reprefvinted. Indeed they are juft 
 whatever the people poflefs, and will fubmit to 
 pay. Taxing is an eafy bufinefs. Any proje6to.r 
 can contrive new impofuions ; any bungler can 
 •add to the old. But is it altogether wife to have 
 'no other bounds to your impoficions, than the pa- 
 tience of thole who are to bear them .'' 
 
 Ail I claim upon the fubjectof your refources is 
 this, that they are not likely to be increafed by 
 wafting them.-— 1 think I fliail be permitted to af- 
 fume, thn.t a fyftem of frugality will not lelTen your 
 riches, whatever they may be j — I believe it will 
 not be hotly difputcd, that thofe refources which 
 lie heavy on the fuG)e6t, ought not to be objeds 
 of preference •, that they ought not to be the 
 *very firji cjjoice^ to an honeft reprefentative of 
 the peopla. 
 
 > This is all. Sir, that I ftiall fay upon our cir- 
 <:umftances and Qur refources : I mean to fay a 
 
 little
 
 [ 7 1 
 
 Httk more on die operations of the enemy, be- 
 caufe this matter feems to me very natural in onr 
 prefent deliberation. When I look to the other 
 fide of the water, I cannot help recoUeding what 
 Pyrrhus faid on reconnoitering the Roman camp, 
 *' Thefe Barbarians have nothing barbarous in 
 ** their difcipline.'* When I look, as I have 
 pretty carefully looked, into the proceedings of the 
 French king, I am forry to fay it, I fee nothing 
 of the charader and genius of arbitrary finance ; 
 none of the bold frauds of bankrupt power -, 
 none of the wild ftruggles, and plunges, of def- 
 potifm in diftrefs ; — no lopping off from the ca- 
 pital of debt i — no fufpenfion of intereit •, — no 
 robbery under the name of loan ;— no railing the 
 value, no debafmg the fubftance of the coin. I 
 fee neither Louis the fourteenth, nor Louis the 
 fifteenth. On the contrary, I behold with afto- 
 niihment, rifing before me, by the very hands of 
 arbitrary power, and in the very midft of war 
 and confufion, a regular, methodical fyftem of 
 public credit -, I behold a fabric laid on the na- 
 tural and folid foundations of truft and confidence 
 among men ; and rifing, by fair gradations, or- 
 der over order, according to the juft rules of 
 fymmetry and art. What a reverfe of things ! 
 Principle, method, regularity, ceconomy, fruga- 
 lity, juftice to individuals, and care of the peo- 
 ple, are the refources with which France makes 
 war upon Great Britain. God avert the omen ! But 
 if we fhould fee any genius in war and politics arife 
 in France, to fccond what is done in the bureau ! 
 — -I turn my eyes from the confequences. 
 
 The noble Lord in the blue ribbon, laft year, 
 treated all this with contempt. He never could 
 conceive it polTible that the French minifter of 
 finance could go through that year with a loan of 
 butfeventeen hundred thouland pounds; and that 
 he ihould be able to fund that loan without any 
 B 4 tax.
 
 [ 8 3 
 
 tax. The fecond year, however, opens the very 
 fame fcene. A Irnall loan, a loan of no more than 
 two millions five hundred thoufand pounds, is to 
 carry our enemies through the fervice of this year 
 alfo. No tax is raifed to fund that debt j no tax 
 is raifed for the current fervices. I am credibly 
 informed that there is no anticipation whatfoever. 
 * Compenfations are corredly made. Old debts 
 continue to be funk, as in the time of profound 
 peace. Even payments which their treafury 
 had been authorized to fufpend during the time of 
 war, are not fufpended. 
 
 A general reform, executed through every de^ 
 partment of the revenuey creates an annual income of 
 more than half a million, whilfb it facilitates and 
 fimplifies all thefun(5lions of adminiftration. The 
 king's houfebold — -at the remoteil avenues to which, 
 all reformation has been hitherto flopped — that 
 houfehold, which has been the ftrong hold of pro- 
 digality, the virgin fortrefs which was never ht^ 
 fore attacked— has been not only not defended, 
 but it has, even in the forms, been furrendered by 
 the king to the ceconomy of his minifter. No ca- 
 pitulation ; no referve. CEconomy has entered in 
 triumph into the public fplendour of the monarch, 
 into his private amulements, into the appointments 
 of his neareft and higheft relations. CEconomy 
 and public fpirit have made a beneficent and an 
 honeft fpoil ; they have plundered, from extrava- 
 gance and luxury, for the ufe of fubilancial fervice, 
 a revenue of near four hundred thoufand pounds. 
 The reform of the finances, joined to this reform 
 of the court, gives to the public nine hundred 
 thoufand pounds a year and upwards. 
 
 The minifter who does thcfe things is a great 
 man-^But the king v/ho defires that they fhould be 
 
 • This term comprehends various retributions made to 
 perfons whofe offices are taken away, or who, in any other 
 way* fuffer by the new arrangements that are made, 
 
 dQne,
 
 t 9 1 
 
 done. Is a far greater. We muft do julllce to our 
 enemies — Thefe are the acts of a patriot king. I am 
 not in dread of the vaft armies of France: I am noc 
 in dread of the gallant fpirit of its brave and nu- 
 merous nobility : I am not alarmed even at the 
 great navy which has been lb miraculoufly ere- 
 ;ated. All thele things Louis the fourteenth had 
 before. With all thefe things, the French mo- 
 narchy has more than once fallen proftrate at the 
 feet of the public faith of Great Britain. It was 
 the want of public credit which dilabled France 
 from recovering after her defeats, or recovering 
 even from her victories and triumphs. It was a 
 prodigal court, it was an ill-ordered revenue, that 
 fapped the foundations of all her greatnefs. Credit 
 cannot exift under the arm of neceflity. Neceflity 
 ftrikes at credit, I allow, with a heavier and 
 quicker blow under an arbitrary monarchy, than 
 under a limited and balanced government: but 
 ftill neceflity and credit are natural enemies, and 
 cannot be long reconciled in any ficuation. From 
 neceflity and corruption, a free fl:ate may lofe the 
 fpirj: of that complex confl:itution which is the 
 foundation of confidence. On the other hand, I 
 am far from being fure, that a monarchy, when 
 once it i^ properly regulated, may not for a long 
 time, furnilh a foundation for credit upon the fo- 
 Jidity of its m,axims, though it affords no ground 
 of truft: in its intlitutions. I am afraid I fee in 
 ■England, and in France, fomcthing like a be- 
 ginning of both thefe things. 1 wifli 1 may be 
 found in a miftake. 
 
 This very fliort, and very imperfed fl:ate of 
 what is now going on in France (the lafl: circum- 
 Itances of which I received in about eight days 
 after the regiflry of the * edicT:) I do not, Sir, lay 
 before you for any invidious purpofe. It is in 
 * Edid, reoiilexed 29 Jan, 1780, 
 
 Ofder
 
 [ lo 3 
 
 order to excite in us the fpirit of a noble emula- 
 tion.— Let the nations make war upon each other 
 {fmce we muft make war) not with a low and vul- 
 gar malignity, but by a competition of virtues. 
 This is the only way by which both parties can 
 gain by war. The French have imitated us; 
 let us, through them, imitate ourfelves ; ourfelves 
 in our better and happier days. If public fru- 
 gality, under whatever men, or in whatever mode 
 of government, is national ftrength, it is a ftrengtK 
 which our enemies are in pofleflion of before us. 
 
 Sir, I am well aware, that the ftate and the 
 refult of the French ceconomy which I have laid 
 before you, are even now lightly treated by fome, 
 who ought never to fpeak but from information. 
 Pains have not been fpafed, to reprefent them as 
 impofitions on the public. Let me tell you. 
 Sir, that the creation of a navy, and a two years 
 •war without taxing, are a very fingular fpecies 
 of impofture. But be it fo. For what end does 
 Neckar carry on this delufion ? Is it to lower the 
 eftimation of the crown he ferves, and to render 
 his own adminiflration contemptible? No! No f 
 He is confcious, that the fenfe of mankind is fo 
 clear and decided in favour of ceconomy, and of 
 the weight and value of its refources, that he 
 turns himfelf to every fpecies of fraud and ar- 
 tifice, to obtain the meer reputation of it. Men 
 do- not affeft a condudt that tends to their dif- 
 credit. Let us, then, get the better of Monfieur 
 Neckar in his own way — Let us do in reality 
 what he does only in pretence — Let us turn his 
 French tinfel into Englifli gold. Is then the meer 
 opinion and appearance of frugality and good 
 management of fuch ufe to France, and is the 
 fubftance to be fo mifchievous to England ? Is the 
 very conftitution of nature fo altered by a fea of 
 twenty miles, that ceconomy lliould give power 
 
 on
 
 [ " ] 
 
 on the continent, and that profufion fliould give 
 it here ? For God*s fake let not this be the only 
 falhion of France which we refufe to copy. 
 
 To the laft kind of neceffity, the defines of the 
 people, I have but a very few words to fay. The 
 minifters feem to conteft this point; and afFe(i 
 to doubt, whether the people do really defire a 
 plan of ceconomy in the civil government. Sir, 
 this is too ridiculous. It is impoflible that they 
 fliould not defire it. It is impoffible that a pro- 
 digality which draws its reiources from their 
 indigence, ihould be pleafing to them. Little 
 faftions of penfioners, and their dependants, may 
 talk another language. But the voice of nature 
 is againft them •, and it will be heard. The peo- 
 ple of England will not, they cannot take it 
 kindly, that reprefentatives fhould refufe to their 
 conftituents, what an abfolute fovereign volun- 
 tarily offers to his fubjeds. The expreffion of 
 the petitions is, that " i^efore any ne-w burthens are 
 
 laid upon this country^ effe5lual meafures be taken 
 *' by this houfe^ to enquire into, and corre^, the 
 ** ^^fi ^bufes in the expefiditure of public money." 
 
 This has been treated by the noble lord in the 
 •blue ribbon, as a wild fadious language. It hap- 
 pens, however, that the people in their addrels 
 to us, ufe almoft word for word the fame terms 
 as the king of France uft 3 in audrefiing himfelf 
 to his people ; and it differs oniy, as it falls Ihort 
 of the French king's idea of what is due to 
 his fubjects. " To convince," fays he, " our 
 " faithful fubje<Sls of the defire we entertain not 
 " to recur to 7iew impofitions, until we have firll 
 *' exhaufted all the refources which order and 
 :*' ceconomy can poffibly lupply." — &c. &c. 
 
 Thefe defires of the people of England, which 
 come far Ihort of the voluntary conceffions of 
 the king of France, are moderate indeed. They 
 
 only
 
 . [ 12 ] 
 
 only contend that we fhould interweave fome 
 ceconomy with the taxes with which we have cho- 
 len to begin tlie war. They requeft, not that 
 you fhould rely upon osconomy exclufively, but 
 that you fhould give it rank and precedence, in 
 the order of the ways and means of this fingle 
 fefTion. 
 
 But if It were pofTible, that the defires of our 
 conftituents, defires which are at once fo natu- 
 ral, and fo very much tempered and fubdued, 
 fhould have no weight with an houfe of com- 
 mons, which has its eye elfewhere ; I would turn 
 my eyes to the very quarter to which t.ieirs are 
 directed. I would reafon this matter with the 
 houfe, on the mere policy of the queftion ; and 
 I would undertake to prove, t'l.it an early de- 
 reliction of abufe, is the diredl intereft of go- 
 vernment, of government taken abftracTcedly from 
 its duties, and confidered merely as a fyftem 
 intending its own confervation. 
 
 If there is any one eminent criterion, which, 
 above all the reft, diftinguifhes a wife government 
 from an adminiftration weak and improvident, it 
 is this i-^— " well to know the bed time and manner 
 " of yielding, what it is impofTible to keep."— ^ 
 There have been. Sir, and there are, many who 
 chufe to chicane with their fituation, rather than 
 be inflru<5led by it. Thofe gentlemen argue againlt 
 every defire of reformation, upon the principles 
 of a criminal profecution. Jt is enough for them 
 to juflify their adherence to a pernicious fyftem, 
 that it is not of their contrivance j that it is an 
 inheritance of abfurdity, derived to them from 
 their anceftors j that they can make out a long 
 and unbroken pedigree of mifmanagers that have 
 gone before them. They are proud of the anti- 
 quity of their houfe j and they defend their 
 errors, as if they were defending their inheritance: 
 
 afrai4
 
 [ «3 ] 
 
 afraid of derogating from their nobility ; and care* 
 fully avoiding a fort of blot in their fcutcheon, 
 which they think would degrade them for ever. 
 
 It was thus that the unfortunate Charles the 
 Firft defended himfelf on the practice of the Stuart 
 who went before him, and of all the Tudors •, 
 his partizans might have gone to the Planta- 
 genets.— They might have found bad examples 
 enough, both abroad and at home, that could 
 have (hewn an antient and illuftrious defcent. But 
 there is a time, when men will not fuffer bad 
 things becaufe their anceftors have fuffered worfe. 
 There is a time, when the hoary head of invete- 
 rate abufe, will neither draw reverence nor obtain 
 proteftion. If the noble Lord in the blue ribbon 
 pleads, " Jtot guilty" to the charges brought againft 
 the prefent fyftem of public oeconomy, it is no6 
 pofTiole to give a fair verdift by which he will not 
 Hand acquitted. But pleading is not our prefent 
 bufinefs. His plea or his traverfe may be allow- 
 ed as an anfwer to a charge, when a charge is 
 made. But if he puts himfelf in t]he way to ob- 
 ftruft reformation, then the faults of his office 
 inftantly become his own. Inftead of a public 
 officer in an abufive department, whofe province 
 is an objeft to be regulated, he becomes a ch* 
 minal who is to be punilhed. I do moft feri- 
 oufiy put it to adminiftration, to confider the 
 vvifdom of a timely reform. Early reformations 
 are amicable arrangements with a friend in power: 
 Late reforniiations are terms impofed upon a con- 
 quered enemy •, early reformations are made ia 
 cool blood ; late reformations are made under a 
 ftate of inflammation. In that Rate of things the 
 peopl'e behold in government nothing that is re- 
 fpedable. They fee the abufe, and they will fee 
 nothing elfe — They fall into the temper of a fu- 
 rious populace provoked at the diforder of a houfc 
 
 of
 
 / 
 
 [ »4 ) 
 
 of ill fanne ; they never attempt to coi'redl or re- 
 gulate ; they go to work by the fhorteil way—** 
 They abate the nufance, they pull clown the houfe* 
 
 This is my opinion with regat;d to the true 
 intereft of government. But as it is the intereft 
 of government that reformation fhould be early, 
 it is the intereft of the people that it fhould 
 be temperate. It is their intereft, becaufe a tem- 
 perate reform is permanent ; and becaufe it has 
 a principle of growth. Whenever we improve, it 
 is right to leave room for a further improvement. 
 It is right to confider, to look about us, to exa- 
 mine the effect of what we have done.— Then we 
 can proceedwith confidence, becaufe we can proceed 
 with intelligence. — Whereas in hot reformations, 
 in what men, more zealous than confiderate, £all 
 making clear work^ the whole is generally fo crude, 
 lb harfh, fo indigefted ; mixed with fo much im- 
 prudence, and fo much injuftice j fo contrary to 
 the whole courfe of human nature and human in- 
 llitutions, that the very people who are moft eager 
 for it, are among the firft to grow difgufted at 
 what they have done. Then fome part of the ab- 
 dicated grievance is recalled from its exile in ordei" 
 to become a corredive of the correction. Theo 
 the abufe affumes all the credit and popularity oi' 
 a reform. The very idea of purity and difm- 
 tereftednefs in politics falls into difrepute, and is 
 confidered as a vifion of hot and inexperienced 
 men •, and thus diforders become incurable, not 
 by the virulence of their own quality, but by the 
 unapt and violent nature of the remedies. A 
 great part therefore, of my idea of rctorm, is 
 meant to operate gradually; fome benefits will 
 come at a nearer, fome at a more remote period- 
 We muft no more make hafte to be rich by parfi* 
 mony, than by intemperate acquifition. 
 
 In my opinion, it is our duty when we have 
 
 ths
 
 t 15 3 
 
 th€ deftresof the people before us, to purfuc 
 them, not in the fpirit of literal obedience, which 
 may militate with their very principle, much lefs 
 to treat them with a peevifh and contentious litiga- 
 tion, as if we were adverfe parties in a fuir, Ic 
 would. Sir, be molt difhonourable for a faithful 
 reprefentative of the commons, to take advantage 
 of any inartificial expreffion of the people's wifhes, 
 in order to fruftrate their attainment of what they 
 have an undoubted right to exped:. We are un- 
 der infinite obligations to our conftituents, who 
 have raifed us to fo diflinguifhed a truft, and 
 have imparted fuch a degree of fanftity to com- 
 mon characters. We ought to walk before them 
 with purity, plainnefs, and integrity of heart; 
 with filial love, and not v/ith flavifh fear, which 
 is always a low and tricking thing. For my 
 (Dwn part, in what I have meditated upon tha£ 
 fubjed:, I cannot indeed take upon me to fay I have 
 the honour to follow the fenfe of the people. The 
 truth is, I met it on the way, while I was purfuing 
 their intereft according to my own ideas. I am 
 happy beyond expreffion, to find that my intentions 
 have fo far coincided with theirs, that I have not 
 had caufe to be in the leaft fcrupulous" to fign 
 their Petition, conceiving it to exprefs my own 
 opinions, as nearly as general terms can exprefs 
 the objed: of particular arrangements. 
 
 I am therefore fatisfied to ad as a fair mediator 
 between'' government and the people, endeavouring 
 to form a plan which fhould have both an early 
 and a temperate operation. I mean, that itfhoulcj 
 be fubllantial ; that it fhould be fyflematic. Tha; 
 it lliould rather ftrike at the firft caufe of prodi- 
 gality and corrupt influence, than atterfipt to fol- 
 low them in all their effeds. 
 
 It was to fulfil the firft of thefe objeds (the 
 propofal of fomething"fubftantial)' that' I found 
 
 myfelf
 
 [ i6 I 
 
 myfelf obliged at the oiit-fer, to reject a plart 
 propofcd by an honourable and * attentive mem* 
 ber of parliament, with very good intentions 
 on his part, about a year or two ago. Sir, 
 the plan I ipeak of, was the tax of 25 per cent, 
 moved upon places and penfions during the con- 
 tinuance of the American war.— -Nothing, Sir, 
 could liave met my ideas more than fuch a tax, 
 if it was conlidered as a pradlical fatire on "that 
 war, and as a penalty upon thofe who led us into 
 it ; but in any other view it appeared to me very 
 liable to objedions. I confidered the fcheme as 
 neither fubftantial, nor permanent, nor fyftema- 
 tical, nor likely to be a corredlive of evil in- 
 fluence. 1 have always thought employments a 
 very proper fubjeft of regulation, but a very ill- 
 chofen fubjedt for a tax. An equal tax upon 
 property is reafonable ; becaufe the obje6l is of 
 the fame quality throughout. The fpecies is the 
 fame, it differs only in its quantity: but a tax 
 upon falaries is totally of a different nature ; 
 there can be no equality, and confequently no 
 juftice, in taxing them by the hundred, in the 
 grols. 
 
 We have, Sir, on our eflablifhment, feveral 
 offices which perform real fervice — We have alfo 
 places that provide large rewards for no fervice at 
 all. We have ftations which are made for the 
 public decorum ; made for preferving the grace 
 and majefty of a great people. — We have likewife 
 cxpenfive formalities, which tend rather to the 
 difgrace than the ornament of the ftate and the 
 court. This, Sir, is the real condition of our 
 eftablifhments. To fall with the fame fcverity on 
 objedls fo perfeflly diffimilar, is the very reverfe 
 of a reformation. I mean a reformation framed, 
 
 • Thomas Gilbert, Ef<ij member for Litcbfieli. 
 
 as
 
 i 17 ] 
 
 as all ferious things ought to be, In number,' 
 weight, and meafure. — Suppofe, for inftance, that 
 two men receive a falary oi £. 8co a year each.— 
 In the office of one, there is nothing at all to be 
 done-, in the other, the occupier is opprelTed by 
 its duties. — Strike off twenty-five per cent, from 
 thefe two offices, you take from one man £. 200, 
 which in juftice he ought to have, and you give 
 in effe6l to the other £. 600, which he ought not 
 to receive. The public robs the former, and the 
 latter robs the public ; and this mode of mutual 
 robbery is the only way in which the office and 
 the public can make up their accounts. 
 
 But the balance in fettling the account of this 
 double injuftice, is much againft the ftate. The 
 refult is fliort. You purchafe a faving of two hun- 
 dred pounds, by a profufion pf fix. Befides, Sir, 
 whilft you leave a fupply of unfecured money be- 
 hind, wholly at the difcretion of miniilers, they 
 make up the tax to fuch places as they wifh to fa- 
 vour, or in fuch new places as they may choofe 
 to create. Thus the civil lift becomes opprefied 
 with debt j and the public is obliged to repay, and 
 to repay with an heavy intereft, what it has takem 
 by an injudicious tax. Such has been the effeft 
 of the taxes hitherto laid on penfions and employ- 
 ments, and it is no encouragement to recur again 
 to the fame expedient. 
 
 In effed, fuch a fcheme is not calculated to pro-* 
 duce, but to prevent reformation. It holds out a 
 fhadow of prefenc gain to a greedy and neceiTi- 
 tous public, to divert their attention from thofe 
 abufes, which in reality are the great caufcs of 
 their wants. It is a compofition to flay enquiry ; 
 it is a fine paid by mifmanagement, for the re- 
 newal of its leafe. What is worfe, it is a fine paid 
 by indullry and m.erir, for an indemnity to the idle 
 and the worthlefs. But I fiiall iay no more upon 
 
 C this
 
 [ .s ] 
 
 this topic, becaufe (whatever may be given out to 
 the contrary) I know that the noble lord in the 
 blue ribbon perfedlly agrees with me in thefe fen- 
 timents. 
 
 After all that I have faid on thi:i fubjecb, I 
 am fo fenfible, that it is our duty to try every thing 
 which may contribute to the relief of the nation, 
 that I do not attempt wholly to reprobate the idea 
 even of a tax. Whenever, Sir, the incumbrance 
 of ufelcfs office (which lies no lefs a dead weight 
 upon the fervice of the (late, than upon its reve- 
 nues) fhall be removed ; — when the remaining of- 
 fices fhui! be clafled according to the juft propor- 
 tion of their rewards and fervices, fo as to admit 
 the application of an equal rule to their taxation, 
 when the difcretionary power over the civil lift caflx 
 fhall be fo regulated, that a minifter fhall no 
 longer have the means of repaying with a private, 
 what is taken by a public hand — if after all thefe 
 preliminary regulations, it Ihould be thought that 
 a tax on places is an objeft worthy of the public 
 attention, I fhall be very ready to lend my hand 
 to a reduction of their emoluments. 
 
 Having thus. Sir, not fo much abfolutely rejefb- 
 ed, as poitponed, the plan of a taxation of office, 
 — my next bufmefs was to find fomiething which 
 might be really fubftantial and effectual. I am 
 quite clear, that if we do not go to the very origin 
 and firft ruling caufe of grievances, we do no- 
 thing. What does it fignify to turn abufes out of 
 one door, if we are to let them in at another ? 
 What does it fignify to promote oeconomy upon a 
 meafure, and to fuffer it to be fubverted in the 
 principle ? Our minifters are far from being 
 wholly to blame for the prefent ill order which 
 prevails. Whilft inftitutions dire<ftly repugnant 
 to good management, are fuffered to remain, no 
 effectual or lafting reform (an be introduced. 
 
 I therefore
 
 [ 19 1 
 
 I theJ-efore thought it necefTary, as foon as I 
 conceived thoughts of fubmitting to you fome plan 
 of reform, to take a comprehenfive view of the 
 ftate of this country ; to make a fort of furvey 
 of its Jurifdictions, its Eftates, and its Eftablifh- 
 ments. Something, in every one of them, feemed 
 to me to ftand in the w^ay of all ceconomy in their 
 adminiftration, and prevented every pofTibility of 
 methodizing the fyftem. But being, as I ought to 
 be, doubtful of myfelf, I was refolved not to pro- 
 ceed in an arbitrary manner, in any particular 
 which tended to change the fettled ftate of things, 
 or in any degree to affedt the fortune or fituation, 
 the intereft or the importance, of any individual. 
 By an arbitrary proceeding, I mean one conduced 
 by the private opinions, taftes, or feelings, of the 
 man who attempts to regulate. Thele private 
 meafures are not ftandards of the exchequer, nor 
 balances of the fan£tuary. General principles can- 
 not be debauched or corrupted by intereft or ca- 
 price ; and by thofe principles I was refolved to 
 work. 
 
 Sir, before I proceed further, I will lay thefe 
 principles fairly before you, that afterwards you 
 may be in a condition tojudge whether every ob- 
 jed of regulation, as I propofe it, comes fairly un- 
 der its rule. This will exceedingly fhorten all 
 difcuffion between us, if we are perfeflly in ear- 
 neft in eftabliftiing a lyftem of good management. 
 I therefore lay down to myfelf, feven fundamen- 
 tal rules \ they might indeed be reduced to two or 
 three fimple maxims, but they would be too gene- 
 ral, and their application to the feveral heads of 
 the bufinefs, before us, would not be fo diftinft 
 and vifible. I conceive then, 
 
 Firji^ That all jurifdidions which furnifh 
 more matter of expence, more tempta- 
 tion to oppreflion, or more means and 
 C 2 inftruments
 
 [ 20 1 
 
 inftruments of corrupt Influence, than 
 advantage to juftice or political ad- 
 niinidration, ouo-ht to be aboliflied. 
 
 Secondly^ That all public eftates which are 
 more fubfervient to the purpofes of vex- 
 ing;, overawino;, and influencino; thofe 
 who hold under them, and to the ex- 
 pence of perception and management,, 
 than of benefit to the revenue, ought, 
 upon every principle, both of revenue 
 and of freedom, to be difpofed of. 
 
 Thirdly^ That all offices which bring more 
 charge than proportional advantage to 
 the ftate ; that all offices which may be 
 engrafted on others, uniting and fim- 
 plifying their duties, ought, in the firfl 
 cafe, to be taken away; and in the fe- 
 cond, to be confolidated. 
 
 Fourthly^ That all fuch offices ought to be 
 abolifhed as obftruft the profped of the 
 general fuperintendant of finance-, which 
 deftroy his fuperintendancy, which dif- 
 able him from forefeeing and providing 
 for charges as they may occur; from pre- 
 venting expence in its origin, checking 
 it in its progrefs, or fecuring its appli- 
 cation to its proper purpoles. A mi- 
 nifter under whom expences can be 
 made without his knowledge, can never 
 fay what it is that he can fpend or what 
 it is that he can fave. 
 
 Fifthly, That it is proper to eftablifh an 
 invariable order in all payments ; which 
 will prevent partiality ; which will give 
 preference to fervices, not according to 
 the importunity of the demandant, but 
 the rank and order of their utility or 
 theirjuitice. 
 
 Sixthly,
 
 [ 21 ] 
 
 Sixthly, That it is right to reduce every 
 eftablilhment, and every part of an efta- 
 blifhment (as nearly as pofTible) to cer- 
 tainty, the life of all order and good 
 management. 
 Seventhly^ That all fubordinate treafuries, 
 as the nurferies of mifmanagement, and 
 as naturally drawing to themfelves as 
 much money as they can, keeping it as 
 long as they can, and accounting for 
 it as late as they can, ought to be dif- 
 folved. They have a tendency to per- 
 plex and diftrafb the public accounts, 
 and to excite a fufpicion of govern- 
 ment, even beyond the extent of their 
 abufe. 
 Under the authority and with the guidance of 
 thofe principles, I proceed ; wifliing that nothing 
 in any eftablilhment may be changed, where I am 
 not able to make a ftrong, direfl, and folid appli- 
 cation of thofe principles, or of fome one of them. 
 An oeconomical conftitution is a necefiary bafis for 
 an oeconomical adminiftration. 
 
 Firft, with regard to the fovereign jurifdiflions, 
 I muft obferve, Sir, that whoever takes a view 
 of this kingdom in a curfory manner, will ima- 
 gine, that he beholds a folid, compared, uniform 
 fyftem of monarchy •, in which all inferior jurif- 
 didtions are but as rays diverging from one center. 
 But on examining it more nearly, you find much 
 excentricity and confufion. It is not a Monarchy 
 in ftriflnefs. But, as in the Saxon times this 
 country was an heptarchy, it is now a ftrange fort 
 oi Pentarchy, It is divided into five feveral dif- 
 tind principalities, befides the fupreme. There 
 is indeed this difference from the Saxon times, that 
 as in the itinerant exhibitions of the ftage, for want 
 cf a complete company, they are obliged to throw 
 C 3 a variety
 
 [ 22 ] 
 
 a variety of parts on their chief performer ; i'o 
 our fovereign condefcends himfelf to acft, not 
 only the principal, but all the fubordinate parts 
 in the play. He condefcends to diflipate the royal 
 -^ charadter, and to trifle with thofe light, fubordinate^ 
 ) acqutFedfceptres, in thofe hands thatfuftain the ball 
 ^^"^ reprefenting the world, or which wield the trident 
 that commands the ocean. Crofs a brook, and 
 you lofe the king of England-, but you have fome 
 comfort in coming again under hismajcfty, though 
 *' fhorn of his beams," and no more than Prince 
 of Wales. Go to the north, and you find him 
 dwindled to a Duke of Lancafter •, turn to the 
 weft of that north, and he pops upon you in the 
 humble charader of Earl of Chelter. Travel a 
 few miles on, the Earl of Chefter difappears -, 
 and the king furprifes you again as Count Pala- 
 tine of Lancafter. If you travel beyond Mount 
 Edgecombe, you find him once more in his in- 
 cognito, and He is Duke of Cornwall. So that, 
 quite fatigued and fatiated with this dull variety, 
 you are infinitely refrefhed when you return to 
 the fphere of his proper fplendor, and behold 
 your amiable fovereign in his true, fimple, undif- 
 guifed, native charadter of majefty. 
 
 In every one of thefe five Principalities, Duchies, 
 Palatinates, there is a regular eftablifhment of 
 confiderable expence, and moft domineering in- 
 fluence. As his majefty fubmits to appear in this 
 ftate of fubordination to himfelf, his loyal peers 
 and faithful commons attend his royal transforma- 
 tions •, and are not fo nice as to refufe to nibble at 
 thole crumbs of emoluments, which confole their 
 petty metamorphofes. Thus every one of thofe 
 principalities has the apparatus of a kingdom, for 
 thejurifdidlion over a few private eftates j and the 
 formality and charge of the exchequer of Great 
 Britain, for colledling the rents of a country 
 
 'fquire.
 
 [ 23 1 
 
 'fquire. Cornwall is the belt of them ; but when 
 you compare the charge with the receipt, you 
 will find that it furnilhes no excep'iion to the 
 general rule. The djchy and county palatine 
 of Lancafter do not yield, as I have reafon to 
 believe, on an average of twenty years, four 
 thoufand pounds a year, clear to the crown. As 
 to Wales, and the county palatine of Chefter, 
 I have my doubts, whether their produftive ex- 
 chequer yields any returns at all. Yet one may 
 fay, that this revenue is more faithfully applied 
 to its purpofes than any of the reft •, as it exifts 
 for the Ible purpofe of multiplying offices, and 
 extending influence. 
 
 An attempt was lately made to improve this 
 
 branch of local influence, and to transfer it to 
 
 the fund of general corruption. I have on the 
 
 feat behind me, the conftitution of Mr. John 
 
 Probert ; a knight-errant, dubbed by the noble 
 
 lord in the blue ribbon, and fent to fearch for 
 
 revenues and adventures upon the mountains 
 
 of Wales. The commifllon is remarkable; and 
 
 the event not lefs fo. The commifllon fets 
 
 forth, that " Upon a report of the deputy au- 
 
 *' ditor (for there is a deputy auditor) of the 
 
 principality of Wales, it appeared, that his 
 
 majefty's land-revenues in the faid principality, 
 
 are greatly dimintjhed\^ — and " that upon a re* 
 
 " port of the furveyor general of Wis majeity's land 
 
 revenues, upon a memorial of the auditor of his 
 
 " majefty's revenues within the faid -principality^ 
 
 *' that his mines and forefts have produced very 
 
 *' little profit either to the public revenue or to iyidi- 
 
 *' viduals'" — and therefore they appoint Mr. 
 
 Probert, with a penfion of three hundred pounds 
 
 a year from the laid principality, to try whether 
 
 he can make any thing more of that very little 
 
 which is ftated to be fo greatly diminifbed. '' A 
 
 C 4 1' beggarly
 
 [ 24 ] 
 
 " ^^IK^^b ^(^'^'^^^^ of empty boxes J'^ And yet, Sir, 
 you will remark — that this diminution from lit- 
 tlenefs (which ferves only to prove the infinite 
 divifibility of matter) was not for want of the 
 tender and officious care (as we fee) of furveyors 
 general, and furveyors particular ; of auditors 
 and deputy-auditors ; not for want of memorials, 
 and remonflrances, and reports, and commiffions, 
 and conftitutions, and inquifitions, {ind pen- 
 fions. 
 
 Probert, thus armed, and accoutred,-^— and 
 paid, proceeded on his adventure; — but he was 
 no fooner arrived on the confines of Wales, than 
 all Wales was in arms to meet him. That na- 
 tion is brave, and full of fpirit. Since the in- 
 vafion of king Edward, and the maflacre of the 
 bards, there never was fuch a tumult, and alarm, 
 and uproar, through the region of Prejlatyn. 
 Snowden fhook to its bafe •, Cadcr Edris was 
 loofened from its foundations. The fury of 
 litigious war blew her horn on the mountains. 
 The rocks poured down their goatherds, and 
 the deep caverns vomited out their miners. 
 Every thing above ground, and every thing under 
 ground, was in arms. 
 
 In fhort. Sir, to alight from my Welfti Pegafus, 
 and to come to level ground ; the Preux Chevalier 
 Probert went to look for revenue, like his mailers 
 upon other occafions ; and like his mafters, he 
 found rebellion. But we were grown cautious by 
 experience. A civil war of paper might end in a 
 more ferious war; for now remonftrance met re- 
 monftrance, and memorial was oppofed to memo- 
 rial. The wife Britons thought it more reafonable, 
 that the poor, wafted, decrepit revenue of the prin- 
 cipality, fhould die a natural than a violent death. 
 In truth, Sir, the attempt was no lefs an affront 
 il^on the underftanding of that refpedtable people, 
 3 than
 
 t 25 ] 
 
 than it was an attack on their property. Theychofe 
 that their ancient mol's-grown caftles, fhould moul- 
 der into decay, under the filent touches of time, 
 and the flow formality of an oblivious and drowfy 
 exchequer, than that they fhould be battered 
 down all at once, by the lively efforts of a pen- 
 fioned engineer. As it is the fortune of the no- 
 ble lord to whom the aufpices of this campaign 
 belonged, frequently to provoke refillance, fo it is 
 his rule and nature to yield to that refiftance in 
 all cafes ijohatfoever. He was true to himfelf on 
 this occafion. He fubmitted with fpirit to the 
 ■fpirited remonflrances of the Welch. Mr. Pro- 
 bert gave up his adventure, and keeps his pen- 
 fion — and fo ends " the famous hiftory of the 
 " revenue adventures of the bold Baron North, 
 *' and the good Knight Probert, upon the moun- 
 *' tains of Venodotia.'* 
 
 In fuch a ftate is the exchequer of Wales at 
 prefent, that, upon the report of the treafury it- 
 felf, its little revenue is greatly diminifhed ; and 
 we fee by the whole of this flrange tranfadion, 
 that an attempt to improve it, produces refiilance -, 
 the refirtance produces fubmiflion \ and the whole 
 ends in pen lion *. 
 
 It is nearly the fame with the revenues of the 
 duchy of Lancatler. To do nothing with them 
 is extinction ; to improve them is opprefllon. In- 
 deed, the whole of the eftates which fupport thcfe 
 minor principalities, is made up, not of revenues, 
 
 * Here Lord North /hook his head, and told thofe who fat 
 near him, that Mr. Probert's penfion was to depend on his 
 fuccefs. It may be fo. Mr. Probert's penfion was, however, 
 no cflential part of the quellion ; nor did Mr. B. care whe- 
 ther he ftill poffefl^d it or not. His point was, to fhew the 
 ridicule of attempting an improvement of the Wei (h revenue 
 under its prefent eflablifhmcnt. 
 
 and
 
 I 26 ] 
 
 and rents, and profitable fines, but of* claims, 
 of pretenfions, of vexations, of litigations. They 
 are exchequers of unfrequent receipt, and con- 
 •ftant charge ; a fyftem of finances not fit for an 
 ceconomitl who would be rich ; not fit for a prince 
 who would govern his fubjedls with equity and 
 juftice. 
 
 It is not only between prince and fubjetfl, that 
 thcfemockjurifdi(5tions, and mimic revenues, pro- 
 duce great mifchief. They excite among the peo- 
 ple a fpirit of informing, and delating ; a fpirit 
 of fupplanting and undermining one another. So 
 that many in fuch circumftances, conceive it ad- 
 vantageous to them, rather to continue fubjed: to 
 "vexation themfelves, than to give up the means 
 and chance of vexino- others. It is exceedinglv 
 common for men to contract their love to their 
 country, into an attachment to its petty fubdivi- 
 fions ; and they fometimes even cling to their pro- 
 vincial abufes, as if they were franchifes, and 
 local privileges. Accordingly, in places where 
 there is much of this kind of eftate, perfons will 
 be always found, who would rather truft to their 
 talents in recommending themfelves to power for 
 the renewal of their intereils, than to incumber 
 their purfes, though never fo lightly, in order to 
 tranfmit independence to their pofterity. It is a 
 great miftake, that the defire of fecuring property 
 is univerfal among mankind. Gaming is a prin- 
 ciple inherent in human nature. It belongs to us 
 all. I would therefore break thofe tables ; I 
 would furnilh no evil occupation for that fpirit. 
 I would make every man look every where, ex- 
 cept to the intrigue of a court, for the improve- 
 ment of his circumftances, or the fecurity of his 
 fortune. I have in my eye a very ftrong cafe in 
 the duchy of Lancafter (which lately occupied 
 
 "Wcftminfter
 
 [ 27 1 
 
 Weftminfter-hall, and the houfe of lords) as my 
 voucher for many of thefe refledions *. 
 
 For what plaufible reafon are thefe principali- 
 ties fuffered to exift ? "When a government is ren- 
 dered complex (which in itfelf is no defirable 
 thing) it ought to be for fome political end, which 
 cannot be anfwered otherwife. Subdivifions in 
 government, are only admilTible in favour of the 
 dignity of inferior princes, and high nobility ; or 
 for the fupport of an ariftocratic confederacy un- 
 der fome head ; or for the confervation of the 
 franchifes of the people in fome privileged pro- 
 vince. For the two former of thefe ends, fuch 
 are the fubdivifions in favour of the eledoral, and 
 other princes in the empire ; for the latter of thefe 
 purpofes, are the jurifdidlions of the imperial ci- 
 ties, and the Hanfe towns. For the latter of thefe 
 ends, are alfo the countries of the States [Pais 
 d'Etai] and certain cities, and orders in France. 
 Thefe are all regulations with an objedt, and fome 
 of them with a very good objedt. But how are the 
 principles of any of thefe fubdivifions applicable 
 in the cafe before us ? 
 
 Do they anfwer any purpofe to the king ? 
 
 The principality of Wales was given by patent to 
 
 Edward the Black Prince, on the ground on which 
 
 t has fince flood. — • Lord Coke fagacioufly ob- 
 
 ferves upon it, " That in the charter of creating 
 
 the Black Prince Edward prince of Wales, 
 
 there is a great myjiery — for kfs than an ef- 
 
 tate of inheritance, fo great a prince could not 
 
 have, and an abfolute ejiate of inheritance in fo 
 
 great a principality as Wales (this principality 
 
 being fo dear to him) htfhould not have j and 
 
 • Cafe of Richard Lee, Efq; Appellant, againft George 
 Vcnables Lord V«rnon, Refpondent, in the year 1776. 
 
 " therefore
 
 [ 2$ ] 
 
 *' therefore it was made, y/i*/ et heredibus fuis regi- 
 *' bus Anglice^ that by his deceale, or attaining to 
 *' the crown, it might be extinguifhed in the 
 " crown." 
 
 For the fake of this foolifh myjtery^ of what a 
 great prince could not have lefs^ 2indJhould not have 
 fo much, of a principality which was too de^r to be 
 given, and too greal to be kept — and for no other 
 caufe, that ever I could find — this form and fha- 
 dow of a principality without any fubftance, has 
 been maintaiRed. That you may judge in this 
 inftance (and it ferves for the relt) of the differ- 
 ence betv/een a great and a little oeconomy, you 
 will pleafe to recolleft, Sir, that Wales may be 
 about the tenth part of England in fize and popu- 
 lation J and certainly not a hundredth part in opu- 
 lence. Iwelve judges perform the whole of the 
 bufinefs, both of the ftationary and the itinerant 
 juftice of this kingdom •, but for Wales, there are 
 eight judges. I'here is in Wales an exchequer, 
 as well as in all the duchies, according to the very 
 beft and moft authentic abfurdity of form. There 
 are in all of them, a hundred more difficult trifles 
 and laborious fooleries, which ferve no other pur- 
 pofe than to keep alive corrupt hope and fervile 
 dependence. 
 
 Thefe principalities are fo far from contributing 
 to the eafe of the king, to his wealth, or his dig- 
 nity, that they render both his fupreme and his 
 fubordinate authority, perfeftly ridiculous. It 
 was but the other day, that that pert, faflious fel- 
 low, the duke of Lancafter, prefumed to fly in the 
 face of his liege lord, our gracious fovereign ; and 
 affcciciting with a parcel ot lawyers as factious as 
 himfelf, to the defl:ru6tion of all Icsjj and order, 
 and in committees leading diretlly to rebellion — • 
 prefumed to go to law with the king. The ob- 
 
 jea:
 
 [ 29 ] 
 
 je<ft is neither your bufinefs, nor mine. Which of 
 the parties got the better, I really forget. I think 
 it was (as it ought to be) the king. The mate- 
 rial point is, that the fuit coft about fifteen thou- 
 fand pounds. But as the duke of Lancailer is but 
 a fort of duke Humphrey^ and not worth a groat, 
 our fovercign was obliged to pay the cofts of both. 
 Indeed this art of converting a great monarch into 
 a little prince, this royal mafquerading, is a very 
 dangerous and expenfive amulement ; and one of 
 the king's menus plaijirs, which ought to be reform- 
 ed. This duchy, which is not worth four thou- 
 fand pounds a year at beft, to revenue^ is worth 
 forty or fifty thoufand to influence. 
 
 The duchy of Lancajler, and the county pala- 
 tine of Lancafter^ anlwered, 1 admit, fome pur- 
 pofe in their original creation. They tended to 
 make a fubjedt imitate a prince. When Henry 
 the fourth from that (lair afcended the throne, 
 high-minded as he was, he was not willing to 
 kick away the ladder. To prevent that prin- 
 cipality from being extinguifhed in the crown, 
 he fevered it by aft of parliament. He had a mo- 
 tive, fuch as it was ; he thought his title to the 
 crown unfound, and his poflelTion inf^cure. He 
 therefore managed a retreat in his duchy ; which 
 lord Coke calls (I do not know why) par multis 
 regnis. He flattered himfelf that it was practica- 
 ble to make a projecting point half way down, to 
 break his fall from the precipice of royalty ; as 
 if it were poffible for one who had loft a king- 
 dom to keep any thing elfe. However, it is 
 evident that he thought fo. When Henry the fifth 
 united, by aft of parliament, the eftates of his 
 mother to the duchy, he had the fame predi- 
 leftion with his father, to the root of his fa- 
 roily honours, and the fame policy in enlarging 
 
 the
 
 [ 30 ] 
 
 the rphere of a pofiible retreat from the flippery 
 royalty of the two great crowns he held. All this 
 was changed by Edward the fourth. He had no 
 fuch family partialities, and his policy was the 
 reverfe of that of Henry the fourth and Henry 
 the fitth. He accordingly again united the duchy 
 of Lancafter to the crown. But when Henry the 
 feventh, who chofe to confider himfelf as of the 
 houfe of Lancafter, came to the throne, he brought 
 v/ith him the old pretenfions, and the old politics 
 of that houfc. A new adl of parliament, a lecond 
 time, diflevered the duchy of Lancafter from the 
 crown ; and in that line things continued until 
 the fubverfion of the monarchy, when principa- 
 lities and powers fell along with the throne. The 
 duchy of Lancafter mull: have been extinguilhed, 
 if Cromwelly who began to form ideas of aggran- 
 dizing his houfe, and raifmg the feveral branches 
 of it, had not caufed the dutchy to be again fe- 
 parated from the commonwealth, by an a6t of the 
 parliament of thofe times. 
 
 What partiality, what objefls of the politics 
 of the houfe of Lancafter, or of Cromwell, has 
 his prefent majefty, or his majefty's family ? 
 What power have they within any of thefe prin- 
 cipalities, which they have not within their king- 
 dom ? In what manner is the dignity of the no- 
 bility concerned in thefe principalities .'' What 
 rights have the fubjedt there, which they have not 
 at leaft equally in every other part of the nation. 
 Thefe diftindions exift for no good end to the 
 king, to the nobility, or to the people. They 
 ought not to exift at all. If the crown (contrary 
 to its nature, but moft conformably to the whole 
 tenor of the advice that has been lately given) 
 fhould fo far forget its dignity, as to contend, 
 that thefe jurifdidions and revenues are eftates of 
 private property, I am rather for ading as if that 
 5 ground lefs
 
 r 31 3 
 
 groundlefs claim were of fome weight, than for 
 giving up that effential part of the reform. I 
 would value the clear income, and give a clear 
 annuity to the crown, taken on the medium pro- 
 duce for twenty years. 
 
 If the crown has any favourite name or title, if 
 the fubje(5l has any matter of local accommodation 
 within any of thefe jurifdidtions, it is meant to pre- 
 ferve them. ; and to improve them, if any improve^ 
 ment can be fugoefted. As to the crown rever- 
 Cons or titles upon the property of the people 
 there, it is propofed to convert them from a fnare 
 to their independance, into a relief from their bur- 
 thens. I propofe, therefore, to unite all the five 
 principalities to the crown, and to its ordinary 
 junfdi<5lion, to abollfh all thofe oFRres that pro- 
 duce an ufelefs and chargeable feparation from 
 the body of the people, — to compenfate thofe 
 who do not hold their offices (if any fuch there 
 are) at the pleafure of the crown, — [o extinguifli 
 vexatious titles by an a6t of fhort limitation,— 
 to fell thofe unprofitable eftates which fupport 
 ufelefs jurifdidions, and to turn the tenant-right 
 into a fee, on fuch moderate terms as will be 
 better for the flate than its prelent right, and 
 which it is impofTible for any rational tenant to 
 refufe. 
 
 As to the Dutchies, their judicial osconomy may 
 be provided for without charge. They have only 
 to fall of courfe into the common county admi- 
 niftration. A commiflion more or lefs made or 
 omitted, fettles the matter fully. As to Wales, 
 it has been propofed to add a judge to the feverai 
 courts of Weftminfter-hall j and it has been con- 
 fidered as an improvement in itfelf For my parr, 
 I cannot pretend to fpeak upon it with clearnefs 
 or with decifion ; but certainly this arrangement 
 would be more than fufficient for Wales. My 
 
 original
 
 t 32 ] 
 
 original thought was to fupprefs five of the eight 
 judges ; and to leave the chief Jullice of Chefter, 
 with the two fenior judges ; and, to facilitate the 
 bufinefs, to throw the twelve counties into fix 
 diftrids, holding the fefllons alternately in the 
 counties of which each diftricSt Ihall be compofed. 
 But on this I fiiall be more clear, when I come to 
 the particular bill. 
 
 Sir, the houfe will now fee whether, in praying 
 for judgment againft the minor principalities, I do 
 not act; jn conformity to the laws that I had laid to 
 myfelf, of getting rid of every jurifdidrliion more 
 fubfervient toopprefilon and expence, than to any 
 endpf Juftice or honeft policy •, of aboliihing offices 
 more e?6penfive than ufeful •, of combining duties 
 improperly fepararerl • of rhanglng revenues more 
 vexatious than productive, into ready money ; of 
 fupprefling offices which ftand in the way ot ceco- 
 nomy -, and of cutting off lurking fubordinate 
 treafuries. Difpute the rules ; controvert the ap- 
 plication i or give your hands to this falutary mea- 
 fure. 
 
 Moft of the fame rules will be found appli- 
 cable to my fecond object — the landed ejlate of 
 the crown. A landed eftate is certainly the very 
 word which the crown can pofiefs. All minute 
 and difperfed pofleffions, pofieffions that are often 
 of indeterminate value, and which require a con- 
 tinued perfonal attendance, are of a nature more 
 proper for private management, than public admi- 
 niftration. — They are fitter for the care of a frugal 
 land ftcvvard, than of an office in the ftate. What- 
 ever they may pcfiibly have been in other times, 
 or in other countries, they are not of magnitude 
 enough with us, to occupy a public department, 
 nor to provide for a public objed. They are al- 
 ready given up to parliament, and the gift is not 
 of great value. Common prudence drdates, even 
 
 in
 
 r 3.? 3 
 
 in the management of private affairs, that all dif- 
 perfed and chargeable eftaces, fhould be facrificed 
 to the relief of eftates more compad" and better 
 circumftanced. 
 
 If it be objecfted, that thefe lands at prefent 
 would fell at a low market ; this is anfvvered, by 
 fhewing that money is at high price. The one 
 balances the other. Lands fell at the current rate, 
 and nothing can fell for more. But be the price 
 what it may, a great objeft is always anfwered, 
 whenever any property is transferr'd froiip hands 
 that are not fit for that property, to thofe that are. 
 The buyer and feller muft mutually profit ■b'y^fuch 
 a bargain; and, what rarely happens in matters of 
 revenue, the relief of the fubjeft will go hand in 
 hand with the profit of the exchequer. 
 
 As to the forejl lands, in which the Crown has 
 (where they are not granted or prefcriptively held) 
 the dominion of the foil, and the vert and venifon j 
 that is to fay, the timber and the game, and in 
 which the people have a variety of rights, in com- 
 mon of herbage, and other commons, according 
 to the ufage of the feveral forefts ; — I propofe 
 to have thofe rights of the crov/n valued as ma- 
 nerial rights are valued on an inclofure; and a 
 defined portion of land to be given for them ; 
 which land is to be fold for the public benefit. 
 
 As to the timber, I propofe a furvey of the 
 whole. What is ufelefs for the naval purpofes of 
 the kingdom, I would condemn, and difpofe of, 
 for the fecurity of what may be ufeful •, and to 
 inclofe fuch other parts as may be molt fit to 
 furnifli a perpetual fupply ; wholly extinguifh- 
 ing, for a very obvious realon, all right of vmifon 
 in thofe parts. 
 
 The foreft rights which extend over the lands 
 
 and poffefTions of others, being of no profit to the 
 
 crown, and a grievance, as far as it goes, to the 
 
 D fubjed ;
 
 [ 3+ 3 
 
 fubjeft •, thefe 1 propofe to extingurdi witliowt 
 charge to the proprietors. The leveral commons 
 are to be allotted and compenfated for upon ideas 
 which I fliall hereafter explain. They are nearly the 
 fame with the principles upon which you have 
 a6ted in private inclollires. I Hiall never quit 
 precedents where I find them applicable. For 
 thofe regulations and compenfations, and for every 
 other part of the detail, you will be fo indulgent 
 as to give me credit for the prefenc. 
 
 The revenue to be obtained from the fale of 
 the forell lands and rights, will not be fo confi- 
 derable, I believe, as many people have ima- 
 gined ; and 1 conceive it would be unwife to 
 fcrew it up to the utmoft, or even to fuffcr bidders 
 to inhance, according to their cagernefs, the pur- 
 chafe of objects, wherein the expence of that 
 purchafe may weaken the capital to be employed 
 in their cultivation. This, I am well aware, 
 might give room for partiality in the difpofal. In 
 my opinion it would be the leffer evil of the two. 
 But I really conceive, that a rule of fair prefe- 
 rence might be ellabliflied, which would take 
 away all fort of unjuft and corrupt partiality. 
 The principal revenue which 1 propofe to draw 
 from thefe uncultivated waftcs, is to fpring from 
 the improvement and population of the kingdom j 
 which never can happen, without producing an im- 
 provement more advantageous to the revenues of 
 the crown, than the rents of the beft landed eflate 
 which it can hold. I believe. Sir, it will hardly 
 be neceffary for me to add, that in this i'ale I na- 
 turally except all the houfes, gardens, and parks 
 belonging to the crown, and luch one foreft as 
 fliall be chofen by his majefty, as beft accommo- 
 dated to his plcafures. 
 
 By means of this part of the reform, will fail 
 the cxpenlive oiiice of furveyor general^ with all 
 
 the
 
 f 35 ] 
 
 the infiuertce that attends it. By this, will fall 
 fdjo chief jufiiccs in Eyte^ with all their train of 
 dependents. You need be under noapprehenfioni 
 Sir, that your office is to be touched in its erriolu- 
 ments. They are yours by law \ and they are but 
 a moderate part of the compenfation which is 
 given to you for the ability with which you exe- 
 cute an office of quite another fort of importance! 
 it is far from overpaying your diligence ; or more 
 than fufficient for fuilaining the high rank you 
 .Hand in, as the firfl gentleman of England. As 
 to the duties of your chief jufticefhip, they are 
 very different from thofe for which you have re- 
 ceived the office. Your dignity is too high for 
 a jurifditlion over wild beafts •, and your learn- 
 ing and talents too valuable to be waited as chief 
 jultice of a defert. I cannot reconcile it to my- 
 felf, that you, Sir, fhould be ftuck up as a ufelefs 
 piece of antiquity. 
 
 I have now difpofed of the unprofitable land- 
 ed eftates of the crown, and thrown them into the 
 mafs of private property ; by which they will 
 come, through the courfe of circulationj, and 
 through the political fecretions of the ftate, into 
 our better underftood and better ordered reve- 
 nues. 
 
 I come next to the great fupreme body of the 
 civil government itfelf. I approach it with that 
 awe and reverence with which a young phyfician 
 approaches to the cure of the diforders of his pa- 
 rent. Diforders, Sir, and infirmities, there are — 
 fuch diforders, that all attempts towards method, 
 prudence, and frugality, will be pcrfeflly vain, 
 whilfta fyilem of confufion remains, which is not 
 only alien but adverfe to all oeconomyi a fyilem, 
 which is not only prodigal in its very efi&nce, but 
 caufes every thing clfe which belongs to it to be 
 prodigally conduced. 
 
 Di It
 
 r 36 ] 
 
 It is impofTible, Sir, for any perfon to be an 
 oeconomilt where no order in payments is eftabliUi- 
 cd ; 1!: is impoflible for a man to be an oeconomift, 
 who is not able to take a comparative view of 
 his means, and of his expcnces, for the year which 
 lies before him; it is impoflible for a man to be 
 an ceconomill, under whom various officers in 
 their fevtral departments may fpend, — even jull 
 what they plcafe, — and often with an emulation 
 of expence, as contributing to the importance, 
 if not profit, of their leveral departments. — — ' 
 Thus much is certain ; that neither the prefent, 
 nor any other firft lord of the treafury, has been 
 ever able to take a lurvey, or to make even a to- 
 lerable guefs, of the expences of government for 
 any one year; fo as to enable him with the leaft 
 degree of certainty, or even probability, to bring 
 his affliirs within compafs. Whatever fcheme may 
 be formed upon them, muft be made on a cal- 
 culation of chances. As things are circum- 
 ftanced, the firft lord of the treafury cannot make 
 an eftimate. I am fure I ferve the king, and I 
 am fure 1 affift adminiftration, by putting ceco- 
 nomy, at leaft in their power. We muft clafs fer- 
 rices \ we muft (as far as their nature admits) ap- 
 fropriate- funds -, or every thing however reform- 
 ed, will fall again into the old confufion. 
 
 Coming upon this ground of the civil lift, the 
 Srft thing in dignity and charge that attracts our 
 notice, \s the royal /joufebold. This eftablifliment, 
 in my opinion, is exceedingly abufive in its con- 
 ftitution. It is formed upon manners and cuf- 
 toms, that have long fmce expireci. In the firft 
 place, it is formed, in many refpecls, upon feudal 
 prmciples. In the feudal times, it was not un- 
 common, even among fubjeds, for the loweft 
 offices to be held by confiderable perlbns ; per- 
 fbns as unfit by their incapacity, as improper 
 
 froin
 
 [ 37 -] 
 
 from their rank, to occupy fuch emplovments. 
 They were held by patent, fometimes for' life, 
 and fometimes by inheritance. If my memory 
 does not deceive me, a perfon of no flight confi- 
 deration, held the office of patent hereditary cook 
 ta an earl of Warwick — The earl of Warwick's 
 foups, I fear, were not the better for the dignity 
 of his kitchen, I think it was an earl of Glou- 
 cefter, who officiated as fteward of the houfehold 
 to the archbiffiops of Canterbury. Inftances of 
 the fame kind may in fome degree be found in the 
 Northumberland houfe-book, and other family 
 records. There was fome reafon in ancient ne- 
 ceffities, for thefe ancient cuftoms. Protedlion 
 was wanted ; and the domeftic tie, though not the 
 highefl, was the clofeft. 
 
 The king's houfehold has not only feveral ftrong 
 traces of this f€u<^alil)\ but it is formed alfo upon 
 the principles of a Body-Corporate. It has its own 
 magiitrates, courts, and by-laws. This might be 
 neceffary in the antient times, in order to have a 
 government within itfelf, capable of regulating the 
 vaft and often unruly multitude which compofed 
 and attended it. This was the origin of the an- 
 tient court called the Green C/i?/-^ — compofed of 
 the marfhal, treafurer, and other great officers of 
 the houfehold, with certain clerks. The rich fub- 
 jefts of the kingdom, who had formerly the fame 
 eftablifliments (only on a reduced fcale) have fmce 
 altered their ccconomy ; and turned the courfe of 
 their expcnce, from the maintenance of vail efta- 
 bliiliments within their walls, to the employment 
 of a great variety of independent trades abroad. 
 Their influence is lefTened •, but a mode of accon-^- 
 modation and a ftyle of fplendour, fuited to the 
 tpanners of the times, has been encreafed. Royalty 
 itfelf has infenfibly followed; and the royal houfe- 
 hold has been carried away by the refiltlefs tide 
 of manners : but with this very material difference. 
 
 D z Privat€i
 
 [ 3« 3 
 
 Private men have got rid of tlic cftabllflimeius 
 along with the reafons of them-, whereas ihe royal 
 houlehold has loll ail that was llately and venerable 
 in the antique manners, without retrenching any 
 thins; of the cumbrous charge of a Gothic efta- 
 blifnment. It is fhrunk into the polifhed little- 
 nefs of modern elegance and perlbnal accommo- 
 dation. It has evaporated from thegrofs concrete, 
 into an effence and rectified fpirit of expence^ 
 where you have tuns of antient pomp in ^i vial of 
 modern luxury. 
 
 But when the reafon of old eilablilhments is 
 gone, it i- abfurd to preierve nothing but the bur- 
 then of them. This is fuperftitioully to embalm 
 a carcafs not worth an ounce of the gums th;^t 
 are ufcd to preferve it. It is to burn precious 
 oils in the tomb ; it is to offer meat and drink to 
 the dead, — not fo much an honour to the de- 
 ceafed, as a difgrace to the furvivors. Our palaces 
 are vail inhofpitable halls. There the bleak winds, 
 there, " Boreas, and Kurus, and Caurus, and 
 Argeftes loud," howling through the vacant lob- 
 bies, and clattering the doors of deferted guard- 
 rooms, appal the imagination, and conjure up the 
 grim fpectres of departed tyrants — the Saxon, tire 
 Norman, and the Dane •, the flern Edwards and 
 fierce Henrys — who ihilk from deiblation to de- 
 folation, through the dreary vacuity, and melan- 
 choly fucceflion of chill and comfortlefs chambers. 
 When this tumult fublides, a dead, and Hill more 
 frightful filence would reign in this defert, if every 
 now and then the tackino- of hammers did not 
 announce, that thole conilant attendants upon all 
 courts, in all ages, Jobbs, were ft ill alive •, for 
 whofe fake alone it is, that any trace of ancient 
 grandeur is fuftered to remain. Thefe palaces are 
 a true emblem of fomc governments j the inha- 
 ' brtants are decayed, but the governors and magi- 
 •\1:rates Hill fiourifii. They put me in mind of Old 
 
 Sarum
 
 r 39 ] 
 
 ^arum^ where the reprefentatives, more in number 
 than the conllituents, only ierve to inlbrm i-is, that 
 that this was once a place of trade, and rounding 
 with " the buiy hum of men," though now you can 
 only trace the ftieets by the colour of the corn; and 
 its fole manufadure is in members of parliament. 
 
 Thele old ethiblifhments were formed alfo on a 
 third principle, ilill more adverfe to the living 
 economy of the age. I'hey were formed, 
 Sir, on the principle ot' purvey art ce, and receipt in 
 kind. In former days, when the houlehold was 
 vail, and the fupply fcanty and precarious, the 
 royal purveyors, tallying forth from under the 
 Gothic portcullis, to purchafe provilion with 
 power and prerogative, inftead of money, brought 
 home the plunder of an hundred markets, and 
 all that could be feized from a flying and hid- 
 ing country, and depoiited their fpoil in an hun- 
 dred caverns, with each its keeper. There, every 
 commodity, received in its rawell condition, went 
 through all the orocefs which fitted it for ull\ 
 This inconvenient receipt produced an ceconomv 
 luitcd only to icielf. It multiplied offices beyond 
 all meafure •, buttery, pantry, and all tliat rabble 
 of places, which, though profitable to the holders 
 and expenfive to the fcate, are almail too mean to 
 mention. 
 
 -All this might be, and I believe was neceflary 
 at iirll i for it is remarkable, ih^i purveyance^ after 
 its regulation had been the fubject of a long line 
 of llatutes, (not fewer, I think, than twenty- fix) 
 was wholly taken away by the twelfth of Charles 
 the fecond y yet in the next year of the fame reign. 
 It was found neceflary to revive it by a fpecial 
 ail of parliament, for the fake of the king's jour- 
 nies. This, Sir, is curious ; and what would 
 hardly be expeded in fo reduced a court as that 
 oi Charles the fecond, and in fo improved a 
 D 4 country
 
 [ 40 ] 
 
 country as England might then be thought. But 
 fo it was. In our tinic, one well filled and well 
 covered ftage-coach, requires more accommoda- 
 tion than a royal progrcfs ; and every diilrift at an 
 hour's warning, can lupply an army. 
 
 I do not fay, Sir, that all thefe eflabliihments 
 whofe principle is gone, have been fyftematically 
 kept up for influence folely : neglecft had its (hare. 
 But this I am fure of, that a confideration of in- 
 fluence has hindered any one from attempting to 
 pull them'dovvn. For the purpofes of influence, 
 and for thofe purpofes only, are retained half ac 
 leafl; of the houfehold efl:abliflimcnts. No reve- 
 nue, no not a royal revenue, can exift under the 
 accumulated charge of antienteftablifhment •, mo- 
 dern luxury ; and parliamentary political corrup- 
 tion. 
 
 If therefore we aim at regulating this houfe- 
 hold, the quefl:ion will be, whether we ought to 
 ceconomize by detail^ or hy principle? The example 
 we have had of the fuccefs of an attempt to ceco- 
 nomize by detail, and under eftablifliments ad- 
 verfe to the attempt, may tend to decide this 
 queftion. 
 
 At the beginning of his majefty's reign. Lord 
 Talbot came to the adminiftration of a great de- 
 partment in the houfehold. I believe no man 
 ever entered into his majefty's fervice, or into the 
 fervice of any prince, with a more clear integrity, or 
 with more zeal and afFe6tion for the intereft of hi* 
 mafter-, and I muft add, with abilities for a ftiil 
 higher fcrvice. GEconomy was then announced as 
 a maxim of the reign. This noble lord, therefore, 
 made feveral attempts towards a reform. In the 
 year 1777, when the king's civil lift debts came 
 laft to be paid, he explained very fully the fuc- 
 cefs of his undertaking. He told tjie houfe of 
 lords, that he had attempted to reduce the charges 
 
 2 of
 
 t 41 ] 
 
 of the king's tables, and his kitchen. — The thing. 
 Sir, was not below him. Fie knew, that there is 
 nothing interefting in the concerns of men, whom 
 we love and honour, that is beneath our atten- 
 tion. — " Love," lays one of our old poets, " ef- 
 ** teems no ofHce mean ;'* and with ftill more 
 fpirit, " Entire affection fcorneth nicer hands." 
 Frugality, Sir, is founded on the principle, that 
 all riches have limits. A royal household, grown 
 enormous, even in the meaneil departments, may 
 weaken and perhaps deflroy all energy in the high- 
 eft offices of the ftate. The gorging a royal kitchen 
 may ftint and famifh the negotiations of a king- 
 dom. Therefore, the objed: was worthy of his, 
 was worthy of any man's attention. 
 
 In confequence of this noble lord's refolution, (as 
 he told the other houfe) he reduced feveral tables, 
 and put the perfons entitled to them upon board 
 wages, much to their own fatisfailion. But un- 
 luckily, fubfequent duties requiring conftant atten- 
 dance, it was not po/Tible to prevent their being 
 fed where they were employed — and thus this firft 
 ftep towards oeconomy doubled the expence. 
 
 There was another difafter far more doleful than 
 this. I fhall ftate it, as the caufe of that misfor- 
 tune lies at the bottom of almoft all our prodiga- 
 lity. Lord Talbot attempted to reform the 
 kitchen •, but fuch, as he well obferved, is the 
 confequence of having duty done by one perfon, 
 whilft another enjoys the emolumencs, that he 
 found himfelf fruftrated 1n all his defigns. On 
 that rock his whole adventure fplit — His whole 
 fcheme of oeconomy was daflied to pieces ; his de- 
 partment became more expenfive than ever; — the 
 civil lift debt accumulated— -Why .? It was truly 
 from a' caufe, which, though perfeclly adequate 
 to the effeCl, one wouki not have inftantly gueifed ; 
 r^It was becaufe the turnfpt in the king's kitchen 
 
 Kas
 
 [ 42 1 
 
 vjas a member of parliament* . The king's domeftic 
 fervants were all undone •, his tradeliiien remain- 
 ed unpaid, and became bankrupt — becaufe the turn- 
 fpit of the king's kitchen ivas a member ^f parliament. 
 His majcily's (lumbers were interrupted, his pillow 
 was ftuffed with thorns, and his peace of mind 
 entirely broken, — becaufe the king's lurnfpit ivas a 
 member of parliament. I'he judges were unpaid \ 
 the jullice of the kingdom bent and gavt way •, the 
 foreign minillers remained inai^tive and unpro- 
 vided; the fyllem of Europe was difiblved ; the chain 
 of our alliances was broken -, all the wheels of go- 
 vernment at home and abroad were Hopped ; — be- 
 caufe the king's turnfpit ivas a member of parliament. 
 
 Such, Sir, was the fituation of affairs, and fuch 
 the caufe of that fituation, when his majefty came 
 a fecond time to parliament, to defire the pay- 
 ment of thofe debts which the employment of its 
 members in various offices, vifible and invifible, 
 had occafioned. I believe that a like fate will 
 attend every attempt at oeconomy by detail, under 
 fimilar circunidances, and in every department. 
 A complex operofe office of account and controul, 
 is in itfclf, and even if members of parliament 
 had nothing to do with it, the molt prodigal of 
 all things. The moll audacious robberies, or 
 the molt fubtle frauds, would never venture up- 
 on fuch a wuite, as an over careful, detailed guard 
 againlt them will infallibly produce. In our efla- 
 blifliments, we frequently ke an office ot account, 
 of an hundred pounds a year expence, and an- 
 other office, of an equal expence, to controul 
 that office, and t.'ie whole upon a matter that 
 is not worth twenty ffiillings. 
 
 To avoid, therefore, this minute care which 
 produces the confequences of the molt extenfive 
 neo-ledt, and to oblige members of parliament t(j 
 
 • Vide Lord Talbot's fpee.ch, in Almon's "Parliamentary 
 RegUter, vol. vli. p. 79 of the Proceedings of the Lordi. 
 
 attend
 
 [ 4S ] 
 
 attend to public cares, and not to the fervile of- 
 fices of domeftic management, I propole. Sir, 
 to cccommize by principle^ that is, I propofe, to 
 put affairs into that train, which experience 
 points out as the moll effectual, from the 
 nature of things, and from the conftitution 
 of the human mind. In all dealings, where 
 it is polTible, the principles of radical ceconomy 
 prefcribe three things ; firft, undertaking by the 
 great ; fecondly, engaging with perlbns of fkill in 
 the fubjed matter j thirdly, engaging with thofe 
 who iliall have an immediate and dirc6l intereft in 
 the proper execution of the bufinefs. 
 
 To avoid frittering and crumbling down the 
 attention, by a blind unfyftematic obiervance 
 of every trifle, it has ever been found the beft 
 way, to do all things, which are great in 
 the total amount, and minute in the component 
 parts, by a general contratL The principles of 
 trade have fo pervaded eveiy fpecies of dealing, 
 from the highell to the lowed objeds ; aU 
 tranfactions are got fo much into fyftem •, that we 
 may, at a moment's warning, and to a farthino- 
 value, be informed at what rate any fervicc 
 may be fupplied. No dealing is exempt from 
 the pOiTibility of fraud. But by a contrafl on 
 A matter certain, you have this advantage — you 
 are fure to know the utmofl extent of the fraud 
 to which you are fubject. By a contract with 
 ^ peilbn in his o-ivn tradc^ you are fure you lliali 
 not fiifi^er by ivant of Jhll. By 7i JJjort contract 
 you are fure of making it the intcrejt of the con- 
 tractor to exert that ikill for the fatisfadion of 
 his employers, 
 
 I mean to derogate nothing from the diligence 
 pr integrity of the prefent, or of any former board 
 of green-cloth. But what flcill can members of 
 parliament obtain in that low kind of province ? 
 Wliat pleafure can they have in tJie execution of 
 
 that
 
 [ 44 ] 
 
 that kind of duty ? And if they fliould neglcft ir, 
 how does it affe6l their intereft, when we know, 
 that it is their vote in parliament, and not their 
 diligence in cookery or catering, that recommends 
 thsm to their office, or keeps them in it ? 
 
 I therefore propofe, that the king's tables (to 
 whatever number of tables, or covers to each, he 
 fhall think proper to command) fhould be clafled 
 by the fteward of the houfehold, and Ihould be 
 contradled for, according to their rank, by the 
 head or cover ; — that the eftimate and circum- 
 llance of the contratft Ihould be carried to the 
 treafury to be approved ; and that its faithful 
 and fatisfadlory performance Ihould be reported 
 thdre, previous to any payment ^ that there, and 
 there only, fliould the payment be made. I pro- 
 pofe, that men fhould be contraded with only 
 in their proper trade ; and that no member of 
 parliament fnould be capable of fuch contract. 
 By this plan, almoll all the infinite offices un- 
 der the lord ftev/ard may be fpared ; to the ex- 
 treme fimplification, and to the far better exe- 
 cution, of every one of his funftions. The king 
 of Pruffia is fo ferved. He is a great and emi- 
 nent (diough indeed a very rare) inftance of the 
 poffibility of uniting in a mind of vigour and 
 compafs, an attention to minute objects, with 
 the largefb views, and the mod complicated plans. 
 His tables are ferved by contract, and by the head. 
 Let me fay, that no prince can be afhamed to 
 imitate the king of Pruffia-, and particularly to 
 learn in his fchool, when the problem is — *' The 
 " beR manner of reconciling the ftate of a court 
 *' with the fupport of war?" Other courts, I 
 underftand, have followed him with effedl, and 
 to their fatisfaction. 
 
 The fame clue of principle leads us through 
 the labyrinth of the other departments. What, Sir, 
 is there in the office of the great ivardroi^e (which 
 
 has
 
 r 45 ] 
 
 has the care of the king's furniture) that may not 
 be executed by the lord chamberlain himfelf. He 
 has an honourable appointment •, he has time 
 fufficient to attend to the duty •, and he has 
 the vice chamberlain to alilft him. Why fhould 
 not he deal alio by contrail, for all things be- 
 longing to this office, and carry his eftimates 
 firft, and his report of the execution in its proper 
 time, for payment, direftly to the board of trea- 
 fury itielf ? By a fimple operation (containing in 
 it a treble control) the expences of a department, 
 which for naked walls, or walls hirng with cob- 
 webs, has in a few years cod the crown L. 150,000, 
 may at length hope for regulation. But, Sir, the 
 office and its bufinefs are at variance. As it 
 ftands, it ferves, not to furnifh the palace with its 
 hangings, but the parliament with its dependent 
 members. 
 
 To what end. Sir, does the office of removing 
 "j}ardrobe ferve at all ? Why fliould a jewel office 
 exift for the fole purpofe of taxing the king's gifts 
 of plate ? Its objed: falls naturally within the 
 chamberlain^^ pirovince ; and ought to be under 
 his care and infpeftion, without any fee. Why 
 fhould an office of the robes exift, when that of 
 groom of the Jlole is a finecure, and that this is a 
 proper object of his department ? 
 
 All thefe incumbrances, which are themfelves 
 nulances, produce other incumbrances, and other 
 nufances. For the payment of thefe ulelefs efta- 
 bliffiments, there are no lefs than three tifekfs 
 treafiirers ; two to hold a purfe^ and one to play 
 with a ftick. The treafurer of the houfehold is 
 a mere nam?. Tlve cofferer, and the treafurer 
 of the chamber, receive and pay great funis, 
 which it is not at all neceffary they fhould either 
 receive or pay. All the proper officers, fervants, 
 and tradefmen, may be i-nrollcd in their fevcral 
 departments, and paid in proper claHcs and times 
 
 with
 
 r 46 ] 
 
 ^•'i!;?! great fimplicity and order, at the exchequer, 
 and by directrion from the treafury. 
 
 The beard of ix:orksy wliich in the feven years 
 preceding 1777, has coll towards L. 400,000 *j and 
 (if I recollecl rightly) has not cod Icfs in propor- 
 tion from the beginning of the reign, is under the 
 very fame defcription of all the other ill-con- 
 trived cilablilhments, and calls for the very fame 
 reform. We are to feek for the vifible figns of all 
 this expence. — For all this cxpence, we do not 
 fee a building of the fize and importance of a 
 pigeon-houfe. Buckingham-houfe was reprifed 
 by a bargain with the public, for one hundred 
 thouland pounds ; — and the fmall houfe at Wind^. 
 for has been, if I miftake not, undertaken fincethat 
 account was brou2;ht before us. Theo-ood works of 
 that board of works, are as carefully conceakd, 
 as other good works ought to be. They are per- 
 fectly invifible. But though it is the perfection 
 of charity to be concealed, it is, Sir, the pro- 
 perty and glory of magnificence, to appear, and 
 Hand forward to the eye. 
 
 That board, which ought to be a concern of 
 builders, and fuch like, and of none elfe, is turn- 
 ed into a junto of members of parliament. That 
 office too has a treafury^ and a paymafter of its 
 own ; and Icll the arduous affairs of that impor- 
 tant exchequer fhould be too fatiguing, that 
 paymaller has a deputy to partake his profits, 
 and relieve his cares. I do not believe, that ei- 
 ther now or in former times, the chief managers 
 of that board have made any profit of its abufe. 
 It is," however, no good reafon that an abufive 
 cilablifliment fhould fubfift, becauie it is of as 
 little private as of public advantage. But this 
 eflablifhment has the grand radical fault, the 
 orjoinal fin, that pervades and perverts all our 
 
 • More exaftly jC- 37S,6i6. 10/. id. I. 
 
 eftablifliments ;
 
 [ 47 ] 
 
 eflablifliments •, — The apparatus Is not fitted to the 
 object, nor the workmen to the work. F,xpences 
 are incurred on the private opinion of an interior 
 eftablifl-iment, without conililting the principal ; 
 who can alone determine the proportion which 
 it ought to bear to the other eftablifhments of the 
 itate, in the order of their relative importance. 
 
 I propofe, therefore, along with the reft, to puU 
 down this whole ill-contrived fcafFolding, which 
 obllrufts, rather than forwards our pub licworks; 
 to take away its treafury •, to put the whole into 
 the hands of a real builder, who fliall not be a 
 member of parliament ; and to oblige him by a 
 previous eftimate and final payment, to appear 
 twice at the treafury, before the public can 
 be loaded. The king's gardens are to come under 
 a fimilar regulation. 
 
 The mini, though not a department of the 
 houfehold, has the fame vices. It is a great 
 expence to the nation, chiefly for the fake of 
 members of parliament. It has its officers of pa- 
 rade and dignity. It has its treafury too. It is 
 a fort of corporate body •, and formerly was a 
 body of great importance j as much fo, on the 
 then fcale of things, and the then order of 
 bufmcfs, as the bank is at this day. It was the 
 great center of money tranfactions and remittances 
 for our own, and for other nations; until king 
 Charles the lirft, among other arbitrary proje6ts» 
 did:ated by defpotic necelTity, made him withhold 
 the money that lay there for remittance. That 
 blow, (and happily too) the mint never recover'd. 
 Now it is no bank -, no rcmittance-fhop. The 
 mint,. Sir, is a manufa5lure, and it is nothing elfe; 
 and it ought to be undertaken upon the principles 
 of a manufacture ; that is, for the beft and cheapeft 
 execution, by a contrad, upon proper fecurities, 
 and under proper regulations. 
 
 lo The
 
 [ 48 ] 
 
 The artillery is a far greater obje<5l; ; it is 
 a military concern -, but having an affinity and 
 kindred in its defefts with the cftablifliments 
 I am now fpeaking of, I think it bell to fpeak 
 of it along with them. It is, I conceive, an 
 eftablifliment not well fuited to its martial, 
 though exceedingly well calculated for its par- 
 liamentary purpofes. — Here there is a trea- 
 furjy as in all the other inferior departments of 
 government. Here the military is fubordinate to 
 .the civil, and the naval confounded with the land 
 fervice. The objecft indeed is much the fame in 
 both. But when the detail is examined, it will be 
 found that they had better be feparated. For a 
 reform of this office, I propole to reftore things, 
 to what (all condderations taken together) is their 
 natural order; to reftore them to their juft propor- 
 tion, andto their juft diftribution. Ipropofe, inthis 
 military concern, to render the civil fubordinate to 
 the military-, and this will annihilate thegreateft part 
 of the expence, and all the influence belonging to 
 the office. I propofc to fend the military branch to 
 the army, and the naval to the Admiralty : and I 
 intend to perfect and accomplifh the whole detail 
 (where it becomes too minute and complicated for 
 legiflature, and requires exaft, official, military, 
 and mechanical knowledge) by a commiffion of 
 competent officers in both departments. I pro- 
 pofe to execute by contradt, what by contraft 
 can be executed, and to bring, as mijch as pof- 
 fible, all eftimates to be previoufly approved, and 
 finally to be paid by the treafury. 
 
 Thus, by following the courfe of nature, and 
 not the purpofes of politics, or the accumulated 
 patchwork of occafional accommodation, this vaft 
 expenfive department may be methodized •, its fer- 
 vice proportioned to its neceffities ; and its pay- 
 ments fub')C(5ced to the infpeftion of the fuperior 
 miniftcr of finance ; who is to judge of it on the 
 
 refult
 
 [ 49 ] 
 
 refuk of the total colle^llve exigencies of the 
 ilate. This laft is a reigning principle through 
 my whole plan; anid it is a principle which I hope 
 may hereafter be applied to other plans. 
 
 By thefe regulations taken together — befides 
 the three fubordinate treafuries in the lefTer prin- 
 cipalities, five other fubordinate treafuries are 
 fuppreffed. There is taken away the whole ejla- 
 hlijhment of detail in the houfehold ; the treafu- 
 rer ;— the comptroller (for a comptroller is hardly 
 -neceflary where there is no treafurer) the cofferer 
 cf the houfehold •,— the treafurer of the chamber ;— - 
 the majler of the houfehold •, — the whole board' of 
 green cloth ;<!— and a vaft number of fubordinate 
 offices in the department of the fieward of the 
 houfehold; — the whole eilabliiliment of the great 
 ivardrobe •y-'^ the removing wardrobe ^'•^^ihe Jewel 
 office •,— the robes •, — the board cf works -, altnofb 
 the whole charge of the civil branch of the board 
 cf ordnance, are taken away. All thefe arrange- 
 ments together will be found to relieve the nation 
 from a vaft weight of influence, without dif- 
 trefling, but rather by forwarding every public 
 fervice. When fomething of this kind is done, 
 then the public may begin to breathe. Under 
 other governments, aqueftion of expenceis only a 
 queftion of ceconomy, and it is nothing more ; 
 with us in every queftion of expence, there is 
 always a mixture of conftitutional confiderations. 
 
 It is, Sir, becaufe I wifti to keep this bufinefs 
 of fubordinate treafuries as much as I can to- 
 gether, that I brought the ordnance - office 
 before you, though it is properly a military 
 department. For the fame reafon I will now 
 trouble you with my thoughts and propofiti- 
 ons upon two of the grcateft under treafuries^ I 
 mean the office of paymaflcr cf the land forces or 
 treafurer of the army \ and that of the treafurer
 
 [ so ] 
 
 of the navy. The former of thefe has long been 
 a great object of public fufpicion and uneafinefs. 
 Envy too has had its fhare in the obloquy which- 
 is cad upon this office. But I am lure that it has 
 no fliare at all in the refleftions I fhall make upon 
 it, or in the reformations that I fl:iall propofe. I do- 
 not grudge to the honourable gentleman who atpre- 
 fent holds the office, any of the effeds of his talents^ 
 his merit, or his fortune. He is refpcftabk in all 
 thefe particulars. I follow the coniticutionof the 
 office, without perfecuting its holder. It is ne- 
 celfary, in all matters of public complaint, where 
 men frequently feel right and argue wrong, to fe- 
 perare prejudice from realon ; and to be very fure, 
 in attempting the redrefs of a grievance, that we 
 hit upon its real feat, and its true nature. Where 
 there is an abufe in offi.ce, the firft thing that oc- 
 curs in heat is to cenfure the officer. Our natu- 
 ral difpofuion leads all our enquiries rather to 
 perfons than ta things. But this prejudice is to 
 be corre<51:ed by maturer thinking. 
 
 Sir, the profits of the pay c^.cc (as an office) 
 arc not too great, in my opinion, for its duties, 
 and for the rank of the perfon wlio has generally 
 held it. He has been generally a perfon of the 
 higheft rank ; that is to fay, a perfon of eminence 
 and confideration in this houfc. The great and 
 the invidious profits of the pay-office, are from the 
 Bank that is held in it. According to the prefent 
 courfe of the office, and according to the prefent 
 mode of accountincT there, this bank muft neceffia- 
 rily exifl: fomewhere. Money is a productive 
 thing; and when the ufual time of its demand can 
 be tolerably calculated, it may, v/ith prudence, be 
 fafely laid out to the profit of the holder. It is. 
 on this calculation, that tlie bufinefs of banking, 
 proceeds. But no profit can be derived from the 
 xik of money, which docs not make it the intereft 
 
 of
 
 [ 5> ] 
 
 of the holder to delay his account. The procefs 
 of the exchequer colludes with this intereft. Is 
 this coUufion from its want of rigour, and ftrift- 
 nefs, and great regularity of form ? The reverfc 
 is true. They have in the exchequer brought ri- 
 gour and formalifm to their ultimate perfedtion. 
 The procefs againft accountants is lb rigorous, 
 and in a manner lb unjuft, that correctives mull, 
 from time to time, be applied to it. Thcfe cor- 
 reflives being difcretionary, upon the cafe, and 
 generally remitted by the barons to the lords of 
 the treafury, as the beft judges of the reafons for 
 refpite, hearings are had ; delays are produced \ and 
 thus the extreme of rigour in office (as ufual 
 in all human affairs) leads to the extreme of lax- 
 ity. What with the interefted delay of the offi- 
 cer ; the ill-conceived exadlnefs of the court ; the 
 applications for difpenfations from that exa6tnefs, 
 the revival of rigorous procefs, after the expira- 
 tion of the time j and the new rigours producing 
 new applications, and new enlargements of time, 
 fuch delays happen in the public accounts, that 
 they can fcarcely ever be clofed. 
 
 Befides, Sir, they have a rule in the exchequer, 
 which, I believe, they have founded upon a very 
 ancient ftatute, that of the 51ft of Henry III. by 
 which it is provided, " That when a fheriff or 
 *' bailiff hath began his account, none other 
 " fhall be received to account, until he that was 
 *' firfl appointed hath clearly accounted, and that 
 '* the fum has been received *." Whether this 
 claufe of that ftatute be the ground of that abfurd 
 prafbice, I am nor quite able to afcertain. But it 
 has very generally prevailed, though I am told 
 
 • Et quant vlfcount ou baillifFalt commence de accompter, 
 Tiul autre ne feit refceu deacconter tanque le primer qe foit 
 afTis, eit peraccomptc, et qe la fomme foit refceu. Stat. 5. 
 ann. dom. i266» 
 
 £ 2 thac
 
 t 52 ] 
 
 that of late they have began to relax from k. 
 In confequcnce of forms adverie to fubftantial 
 account, we have a long fucceflion of pay-raafters 
 and their reprefentatives, who have never been 
 admitted to account, although perfedly ready to 
 do lb. 
 
 As the extent of our wars has fcattered the 
 accountants under the pay-mafler into every part 
 of the globe, the grand and lure pay-mafter. 
 Death, in all his fhapes, calls thefe accountants 
 to another reckoning. Death, indeed, domineers 
 over every thing, but the forms of the exchequer. 
 Over thefe he has no power. They are impaf- 
 five and immortal. The audit of the exchequer, 
 more fevere than the audit to which the ac- 
 countants are gone, demands proofs which in the 
 nature of things are difficult, fometimes impoffible 
 to be had. In this refpe6t, too, rigour, as ufual, 
 defeats itfelf. 1 hen, the exchequer never gives a 
 particular receipt, or clears a man of his account, 
 as far as it goes. A final acquittance (or a quk- 
 tus, as they term it) is Icarccly ever to be obtained. 
 Terrors and ghofts of unlaid accountants, haunt 
 the houfes of their children from generation to ge- 
 neration. Families, in the courfe of fuccefTion, 
 fall into minorities •, the inheritance comes into 
 the hands of females -, and very perplexed affairs 
 are often delivered over into the haixis of negli- 
 gent guardians, and faithlefs ftevvards. So that the 
 demand remains, v;hen the advantage of the money 
 is gone, if ever any advantage at all has been 
 made of it. This is a caufe of infinite diftrefs to fa- 
 milies -y and becomes a fource of influence to an 
 extent, that can fcarcely be imagined, but by 
 thofe who have taken Ibme pains to trace it. 
 The mildnefs of government in the employment 
 of ufelefs and dangerous powers, furnifhcs no rea- 
 1lq:\ for their continuance. 
 
 As
 
 [ 5^ 1 
 
 As things ftand, can you in jiin-ice (except 
 perhaps in that over-perfed kind of jiiftice which 
 has obtained, by its merits, the title of the oppo- 
 pofite vice*) infill that any man ihould, by the 
 courfe of his office, keep a bank from vv'hence he 
 is to derive no advantage ? That a man fliould be 
 fubjeft to demands below, and be in a manner 
 refufed an acquittance above ; that he fhould 
 tranfmit an original fin, and inheritance of vexation 
 to his pofterity, without a power of compenfating 
 himfelf in fome way or other, for fo perilous a 
 fituation ? We know, that if the pay-mafter 
 fliotild deny himfelf the advantages of his bank, 
 the public, as things ftancl, is not the richer for it 
 by a fingle fliilling. This I thought it necefiary to 
 fay, as to the ofFenfive magnitude of the profits 
 of this office •, that we may proceed in reformation 
 on the principles of reafon, and not on the feelings 
 of envy. 
 
 The treafurer of the navy is, 7iiutatis mutajidis^ 
 in the fame circumftances. Indeed all account- 
 ants are. Inftcad of the prefent mode, which is 
 troublefome to the officer, and unprofitable to the 
 public, 1 propofe to iubllitute fomething more 
 effeftual than rigour, which is the worft ex- 
 a6lor in the world. I mean to remove the very 
 temptations to delay •, to facilitate the account ; 
 and to transfer this bank, now of private emolu- 
 ment, to the public. The crown will fufi-er no 
 wrong at lead from the pay offices ; and irs terrors 
 will no longer reign over the families of thole who 
 hold or have held them. I propofe, thatthefe offices 
 Ihould be no longer banks or treafuries^ but mere 
 tiffices of adminijlration. — I propofe, firft, that 
 the prefent paymaller and the treafurer of the 
 «avy, ffiould carry into the exchequer the whole 
 
 f Summum jus fumma injuria. 
 
 E 3 body
 
 [ 54 ] 
 
 body of the vouchers for what they have paid 
 over to deputy paymafters, to regimental agents, 
 or to any of thofe to whom they have and ought 
 to have paid money. 1 propofe that thofe vouch- 
 ers fhall be admitted as aftual payments in their 
 accounts i and that the perfons to whom the mo- 
 ney has been paid, fhall then Hand charged in 
 the exchequer in their place. After this pro- 
 cefs, they fliall be debited or charged for no- 
 thing but the money-balance that remains in 
 their hands. 
 
 I am confcious. Sir, that if this balance (which 
 they could not expedb to be fo fuddenly de- 
 manded by any ufual procefs of the exchequer) 
 ibould now be exaded all at once, not only their 
 ruin, but a ruin of others to an extent which I do not 
 like to think of, but which I can well conceive, 
 and which you may well conceive, might be the 
 confequence. I told you, Sir, when I promifed 
 before the holydays to bring in this plan, that I 
 never would fuffer any man, or defcription of 
 men, to fufFer from errors that naturally have 
 grown out of the abufive conftitution of thofe 
 offices which I propofe to regulate. If I cannot 
 reform with equity, I will not reform at all. 
 
 For the regulation of pad accounts, I fhall 
 therefore propofe fuch a mode, as men, temperate 
 and prudent, make ufc of in the management of 
 their private affairs, when their accounts are vari- 
 ous, perplexed, and of long Handing. 1 would 
 therefore, after their example, divide the public 
 debts into three forts; good; bad; and doubt- 
 ful. In looking over the public accounts, I 
 fhould never dream of the blind mode of the ex- 
 chequer, which regards things in the abftrad, and 
 knows no difference in the quality of its debts, 
 or the circumftancesof its debtors. By this means, 
 it fatigues itfelfj it vexes others s it often crufhes 
 
 the
 
 [ 55 ] 
 
 the poorj it lets efcape the rich •, or in a fit of 
 mercy or careleffneis, declines all means of re- 
 covering its juft demands. Content with the 
 eternity of its claims, it enjoys its Epicurean 
 divinity with Epicurean languor. But it is 
 proper that all forts of accounts fliould be clofed 
 fome time or other — by payment ; by compo- 
 fition •, or by oblivion. Expedit reipuhlic^ ut Jit 
 finis litium. Conftantly taking along with me, that 
 an extreme rigour is fure to arm every thing againft 
 it, and at length to relax into a fupine negle6l, I 
 propofe. Sir, that even the bed, founded, and the 
 moft recent debts, lliould be put into inftalments, 
 for the mutual benefit of the accountant and the 
 public. 
 
 In proportion, however, as I am tender of the 
 pad, I would be provident of the future. All mo- 
 ney that was formerly imprefted to the two great 
 pay-offias^ I would have imprefled in future to 
 the bank of Engla7id. Thcfe offices fiiould, in future, 
 receive no more than caih fufficient for fmall pay- 
 ments. 'I'heir other payments ought to be made 
 by drafts on the Bank, cxprefiing the fervice. A 
 cheque account from both offices, of drafts and 
 receipts, Ihould be annually made up in the ex- 
 chequer, charging the bank, in account, with tlie 
 caffi-balance, but not demanding the payment un- 
 til there is an order from the trealliry, in confe- 
 quenceof a vote of parliament. 
 
 As I did not. Sir, deny to tlie paymafter the na- 
 tural profits of the bank that was m his hands, io 
 neither would I to the bank ot England. A Hiare 
 of that profit might be derived to the public in 
 various ways. My favourite mode is this ; that, in 
 compenfation for the ufe of this money, the bank 
 may take upon themfelves, fird, the charge of ths 
 mint i to which they are already, by their charter, 
 E 4 obliged
 
 t 5" ] 
 
 obliged to bring in a great deal of bullion anrtualljT 
 to be coined. 
 
 In the next place, I mean that they fliould 
 take upon tliemfelves the charge oi remittances 
 to our troops abroad. This is a fpecies of dealing 
 from which, by the fame charter, they are not 
 debarred. One and a quarter per cent, will be 
 faved inftantly thereby to the public, on very 
 large fums of money. This will be at once d, 
 matter of oeconomy, and a cqnfiderable redu6lion 
 of influence, by taking away a private contraft 
 of an expenfive nature. If the bank, which is a great 
 corporation, and of courle receives the leaft profits 
 from the money in their cuftody, fliould of itfelf 
 refufe, or be perfuaded to refufe, this offer uponr 
 thofe terms, I can fpeak with fome confidence,^ 
 that one at leafl, if not both parts of the condi-? 
 tion would be received, and gratefully received, 
 by fevcral bankers of eminence. There is no 
 banker who will not be at leaft as good fecurity 
 as any paymafter of the forces, or any treafurer 
 of the navy, that have ever been bankers ' to 
 the public: as rich at leaft as my lord Chatham,' 
 or my lord Holland, or either of the honourable 
 gentlemen, who now hold the ofHces, were, at the 
 time that they entered into them •, or as ever the 
 whole eftablifhment of the mint has been at any 
 period. 
 
 Thefe, Sir, are the outlines of the plan I mean 
 to follow, in fupprefilng thefe two large fubor- 
 dinate treafuries. I now come to another fubor- 
 dinate treafury ; I mean, that of the paymajler of 
 the pcnfions -, for which purpofe I re-enter the li- 
 mits of tlie civil eftablifliment — I departed from 
 thofe limits in purfuit of a principle •, and follow- 
 ing the fame game in its doubles, I am brought 
 into th.ofe limits again. That treafury, and that 
 o/hcc; 'I mean to rake away ; and to transfer the 
 
 payment
 
 r 57 ] 
 
 payment of every name, mode, and denomina- 
 tion of penfions, to the exchequer. The prefent 
 courfe of diverfifying the fame object, can anfwerno 
 good purpofe-, whatever its ufe may be to purpofes 
 of another kind. There are alfo other lifts of 
 penfions ; and I mean that they fliould all be here- 
 after paid at one and the fame place. The whole 
 of that new confolidated lift, I mean to reduce to 
 £. 60,000 a year, which fiim I intend it fhall ne- 
 ver exceed. ' I think that fum will fully anfwer as 
 a reward to all real merit, and a provifion fpr all 
 real public charity that is evTr like to be placed 
 upon the lift. If any merit of an extraordinary 
 nature Iliould emerge, before that redu6lion is 
 completed, I have left it open for an ad- 
 drefs of either houfe of parliament to provide 
 for the cafe. To all other demands, it muft be 
 anfwered, with regret, but with firmnefs, " the 
 " public is poor." 
 
 I do not propofe, as I told you before Chrift- 
 mas, to take away any penfion. I know that the 
 public feem to call for a redudlion of fiich of 
 them as fliall appear unmerited. As a cenforial 
 ad, and punifliment of an abufe, might an- 
 fwer fome purpofe. But this can make no part 
 of my plan. I mean to proceed by bill ; and I 
 cannot ftop for fuch an enquiry. I know fome 
 gentlemen may blame me. It is with great fub- 
 milTion to better judgments, that I recommend it 
 to confideration ; that a critical retro fpeftive exa- 
 mination of the penfion lift, upon the principle 
 of merit, can never ferve for my bafis. — It can- 
 not anfwer, according to my plan, any effedual 
 {Durpofeof oeconomy, or of future permanent re- 
 formation. The proccfs, in any way, will be en- 
 tangled and difficult ; and it will be infinitely 
 flow : There is a danger that if we tuni our 
 line of march, now direcfled towards the orand 
 
 objed.
 
 r 5S ] 
 
 obje(5l, into this more laborious than ufeful de- 
 tail of operations, we fhall never arrive at our end. 
 
 The king. Sir, has been, by the conllitution, 
 appointed Ible judge of the merit for which a 
 penfion is to be given. We have a right, un- 
 doubtedly, to canvafs this, as we have to can- 
 vafs every aft of government. But there is a ma- 
 terial difference between an office to be reformed, 
 and a penfion taken away for demerit. In the for- 
 mer cafe, no charge is implied againft the holder ; 
 in the latter, his charader is llurred, as well as his 
 lawful emolument affefted. The former procefs 
 is againfb the thing -, the fecond againft the perfon. 
 The penfioner certainly, if he pleafes, has a right to 
 ftand on his own defence •, to plead his pofleflion j 
 and to bottom his title in the competency of the 
 crown to give him what he holds. PolTeffed, and on 
 the defenfive as he is, he will not be obliged to prove 
 his fpecial merit, in order to juftify the aft of 
 legal difcretion, now turned into his property, 
 according to his tenure. The very aft, he will 
 contend, is a legal prefumption, and an im- 
 plication of his merit. If this be fo (from the 
 natural force of all legal prefumption) he would 
 put us to the difficult proof, that he has no merit 
 at all. But other queftions would arife in the courle 
 of fuch an enquiry ; that is, queftions of the merit 
 when weighed againft the proportion of the re- 
 ward ; then the difficulty will be much greater. 
 
 The difficulty will not, Sir, 1 am afraid, be 
 much lefs, if we pafs to the perfon really guilty, 
 in the queftion of an unmerited penfion; the mi- 
 nifter himfelf. I admit, that when called to ac- 
 count for the execution of a truft, he might fairly 
 be obliged to prove the affirmative ; and toftate the 
 merit for which the penfion is given ; though on the 
 penfioner himfelf, fuch a procefs would be hard. If 
 in this examination we proceed methodically, and 
 9 fo
 
 [ 59 ] 
 
 fo as to avoid all fufpicion of partiality and pre- 
 judice, we muft take the penfions in order of time, 
 or merely alphabetically. The very firft penfion 
 to which we come, in either of thefe ways, may ap- 
 pear the mod grofsly unmerited of any. But tfie 
 minifter may very polTibly fhew, that he knows no- 
 thing of the putting on this penfion — that it was 
 prior in time to his adminiilration— that the mini- 
 fter, who laid it on, is dead •, and then we are 
 thrown back upon the penfioner himfelf, and 
 plunged into all our former difficulties. Abufes, 
 and grofs ones, I doubt not, would appear •, and to 
 the corre6tion of which I would readily give my 
 hand ; but, when I confider that penlions have 
 not generally been affedled by the revolutions 
 of minirtry j as I know not where fuch enquiries 
 would ftop ; and as an abfenceof merit is a nega- 
 tive and loofe thing, one might be led to derange 
 the order of families, founded on the probable 
 continuance of their kind of income. I might 
 hurt children ; I might injure creditors. I really 
 think it the more prudent courfe, not to follow 
 the letter of the petitions. If we fix this mode of 
 enquiry as a bafis, we fhall, I fear, end, as par- 
 liament has often ended under fimilar circum- 
 ftances. There will be great delay -, much con- 
 fufion; much inequality in our proceedings. But 
 what prelTes me moll of all is this ; that though we 
 fiiould ftrikeoff all the unmerited penfions, while 
 the power of the crown remains unlimited, the 
 very fame undeferving perlbns might afterv/ards 
 return to the very fame lift: or if they did not, other 
 perfons, meriting as little as they do, might be 
 put upon it to an undefinable amount. This I 
 think is the pinch of the grievance. 
 
 For thefe reafons, Sir, I am obliged to wave 
 this mode of proceeding as any part of my plan. 
 In a plan of reformation, it would be one of my 
 
 maxims,
 
 [ 6o ] 
 
 maxims, that when I know of an eftablifhmcnt 
 which may be fubfcrvient to ufeful purpofes, and 
 which at the fame time, from its difcretionary na- 
 ture, is liable to a very great perverfion from, 
 thofe purpofes, / would Imit the quantity of the 
 'power that might he fo ahufed. For I am fure, that 
 in all fuch cafes, the rewards of merit will have 
 very narrow bounds ; and that partial or corrupt 
 favour will be infinite. This principle is not 
 arbitrary •, but the limitation of the fpecitic quan- 
 tity muft be fo in fome meafure. I therefore 
 ilate C6o^ooo\ leaving it open to the houfe 
 to enlarge or contract the fum as they fhall fee, on 
 examination, that the difcretion I ufe is fcanty or 
 liberal. The whole amount of the penfions of 
 all denominations, which have been laid before 
 us, amount, for a period of feven years, to con- 
 liderably more than L- 100,000 a year. To what 
 the other lifts amount, I know not. That will 
 be feen hereafter. But from thole that do appear, 
 a faving will accrue to the public, at one time or 
 other, of jC. 40,000 a year, and we had better in 
 my opinion to let it fall in naturally, than to 
 tear it crude and unripe from the ftalk. * 
 
 There is a great deal of uneafmefs among the 
 people, upon an article which I muft clafs under 
 the head of penfions. I mean the great patent of- 
 fices in the exchequer. They are in reality and 
 fubftance no other than penfions, and in no other 
 light fhall I confidcr them. They are finecures, 
 
 * It was fuppofed by the Lord Advocate, in a fubfequent 
 debate, that Mr. Burke, becaufe he objctled to an enquiry 
 into the penfion WX for the purpofe of ceconomy and relief of 
 the public, would have it withheld from the judgment ef 
 parliament for all purpofes whatfoever. This learned gen- 
 tleman certainly miliinderRood him. His plan fhevvs, that 
 he wiiljed the whole ]i;1 to be eafily acceflible ; and he 
 knows that the public eye is of itfelf a great guard againft 
 gbafc. 
 
 They
 
 [ 6' ] 
 
 They are always executed by deputy. The duty 
 of the principal is as nothing. They differ how- 
 ever from the penfions on the lift, in fome parti- 
 culars. They are held for life. I think with the 
 public, that the profits of thofe places are grown 
 enormous-, the magnitude of thole profits, and 
 the nature of them, both call for reformation. The 
 nature of their profits which grow out of the pu- 
 blic diftrcfs, is itfelf invidious and grievous. But 
 I fear that reform cannot be immediate. I find 
 myfelf under a reftridion. Thefe places, and 
 others of the famekind, which are held for life, have 
 been confidcred as property. They have been given 
 as a provifion for children ; they have been the 
 fubjedb of family fettlements •, they have been the 
 fecurity of creditors. What the law refpeds lliall 
 be facred to me. If the barriers of law fhould be 
 . broken down, upon ideas of convenience, even of 
 public convenience, we fii all have no longer any thing 
 certain among us. If the difcretion of power is once 
 let loofe upon property, we can be at no lofs to deter- 
 mine whole power, and what difcretion it is that will 
 prevail atlaft. It would be wife to attend upon the 
 order of things ; and not to attempt to outrun the flow, 
 butfmooth andevencourfe of nature. There are oc- 
 cafions, I admit, of public necefrity,fovaft, fo clear, 
 fo evident, that they fuperfede all laws. Law 
 being only made for the benefit of the communi- 
 ty cannot in any one of its parts, refift a demand 
 which may comprehend the total of the public 
 intereft. To be fure, no law can fet itlclf up 
 againft the caufe and reafon of all law. But fuch 
 a cafe very rarely happens-, and this moft certainly 
 is not fuch a cafe. The mere time of the reform is 
 by no means worth the facrifice of a principle of 
 law. Individuals pafs like Ihadows; but the com- 
 monwealth is fixed and liable. The difference there- 
 fore of to-day and to-morrow, which to private 
 
 people
 
 [ 62 ] 
 
 people is inlmcnfe, to the ftate is notRing. At any 
 rate it is better, if poffible, to reconcile ovir 
 cEConomy with our laws, than to let them at 
 variance ; a quarrel which in the end muft be de- 
 ftruiflive to both. 
 
 My idea, therefore, is to reduce thofe offices to 
 fixed falaries, as the prefent lives and reverfions (hall 
 luccefTively fall. I mean, that the office of the great 
 auditor (the auditor of the receipt) fliall be reduced 
 to £. 3,000 a year ; and the auditors of the impreft 
 and the reft of the principal officers, to fixed ap- 
 pointments of j^. 1.500 a year each. It will not 
 be difficult to calculate the value of this fall of 
 lives to the public, when we fhall have obtained 
 a juft account pf the prefent income of thofe 
 places ; and we fhall obtain that account with 
 great facility, if the prefent pofTefTors are not 
 alarmed with any apprehcnfion of danger to their 
 freehold office. 
 
 1 know too, that it will be demanded of me, how 
 it comes, that fince I admit thcfe offices to be no 
 better than penfions, I chofe, after the princi- 
 ple of law had been fatisfied, to retain them at 
 all ? To this, Sir, I anfwer, that conceiving it to 
 be a fundamental part of the conftitution of this 
 country, and of the realon of itate in every coun- 
 try, that there muft be means of rewarding public 
 ftrvice, thofe means will be incomplete, and indeed 
 wholly>infuffic:ent for that purpofe, if there fhould 
 be no further reward for that fervice, than the daily 
 wages it receives during the pleafure of the crown. 
 
 Whoever ferioufly confiders the excellent argu- 
 ment oi-' Lord Somers, in the banker's cafe, will 
 fee he bottoms himfclf upon the very fame maxim 
 which I do ; and one of his principal grounds of doc- 
 trine for the alienability of the domain in England* 
 
 • Before the flatute of Queen Anne, which limited the 
 alienation of lar^d, 
 
 contrary
 
 [ 63 ] 
 
 contrary to the maxim of the law in France, he 
 lays in the conftitutional policy, of furnifliing a 
 permanent reward to public fervice ; of making 
 that reward the origin of families -, and the foun- 
 dation of wealth as well as of honours. It is 
 indeed the only genuine unadulterated origin of 
 nobility. It is a great principle in government ^ a 
 principle at the very foundation of the whole flruc- 
 ture. The other judges who held the fame doc- 
 trine, went beyofid Lord Somers with regard to 
 the remedy, which they thought was given by 
 law againft the crown, upon the grant of penfions. 
 Indeed no man knows, when he cuts off the in- 
 citements to a virtuous ambition, and the juft re- 
 wards of public fervice, what infinite mifchief he 
 may do his country, through all generations. Such 
 faving to the public may prove the worfl mode 
 of robbing it. The crown, which has in its hands 
 the truft of the daily pay for national fervice, ought 
 to have in its hands alfo the means for the re- 
 pofe of public labour, and the fixed fettlemenc 
 of acknowledged merit. There is a time, when 
 the weather-beaten velTels of the ftate, ought to 
 come into harbour. They mull at length have a 
 retreat from the malice of rivals, from the perfidy 
 of political friends, and the inconftancy of the peo- 
 ple. Many of the perfons, who in all times have 
 filled the great offices of ftate, have been younger 
 brothers, who had originally little, if any fortune. 
 Thefc offices do not furnifh the means of amaffing 
 wealth. There ought to be fome power in the 
 crown of granting penfions out of the reach of 
 its own caprices. An intail of dependence is a 
 bad reward of merit. 
 
 I would therefore leave to the crown the pofli- 
 bility of conferring fome favours, which, whilft 
 they are received as a reward, do not operate as 
 corruption. W'li^n men receive obligations from 
 
 the
 
 [ 64 ] 
 
 the crown through the pious hands of fathers, 
 or of connexions as venerable as the paternal, the 
 dependences which arife from thence, are the 
 obligations of gratitude, and not the fetters of 
 fervility. Such ties originate in virtue, and they 
 promote it. They continue men in thofe habi- 
 tudes of friendfliip, thofe political connecStions, 
 and thofe political principles in which they began 
 life. They are antidotes againft a corrupt levity, 
 inftead of caufes of it. What an unfeemly fpedacle 
 would it afford, what a difgrace would it be to the 
 commonwealth that fuffered fuch things, to fee 
 the hopeful fon of a meritorious minifter beg- 
 ging his bread at the door of that trcafury, from 
 whence his father difpenfed the oeconomy of an 
 empire, and promoted the happinefs and glory of 
 his country ? Why fliould he be obliged to prof- 
 trate his honour, and to fubmit his principles at 
 the levee of fome proud favourite, fnouldered and 
 thruft afide by every impudent pretender, on the 
 very fpot where a few days before he faw himfelf 
 adored ? — obh"ged to cringe to the author of the 
 calamities of his houfe, and to kifs the hands 
 that are red with his father's blood? — No, Sir, 
 — Thefe things are unfit—^They are intolerable. 
 
 Sir, I lliall be afked, why I do not chufe to 
 deftroy thofe ofSces which are penfions, and 
 ' appoint penfions under the dire6l title in their 
 llead ? I allow, that in fome cafes it leads to 
 abufe i to have things appointed for one pur- 
 pofe, and applied to another. I have no 
 great objedtion to fuch a change : but I do 
 not think it quite prudent for me to propofe it. 
 Jf I fhould take away the prefent eftablifliment, 
 the burthen of proof refts upon me, that fo many 
 penfions, and no more, and to fuch an amount 
 each, and no more, are neceflary for tlie public 
 fervice. This is Nvhat I can never prove ; for it 
 
 is
 
 ( 65 ) 
 
 is a thing incapable of definition. I do not like 
 to take away an object that I think anfvvers my 
 purpofe, in hopes of getting it back again in a 
 better Ihape. People will bear an old eftablilh" 
 ment when its excefs is corrected, who will revolt 
 at a new one. I do not think thefe ofiice-penfions 
 to be more in number than fufficient : but on that 
 point the Houfe will exercife its difcretion. As to 
 abufe, I am convinced, that very few trufts in 
 the ordinary courfe of adminiftration, have ad- 
 mitted lefs abufe than this. Efficient mini- 
 fters have been their own paymafters. It is 
 true. But their very partiality has operated as 
 a kind of juftice-, and flill it was fervice that 
 was paid. When we look over this exche- 
 quer lift, we find it filled with the defcendants of 
 the Walpoles, of the Pelhams, of the Town- 
 ihends ; names to whom this country owes its li- 
 berties, and to whom his majefty owes his crown. 
 It was in one of thefe lines, that the immenfe and 
 envied employment he now holds, came to a cer- 
 tain duke *, who is now probably fitting quietly 
 at a very good dinner diredlly under us •, and act- 
 ing high life belcw fiairs^ whilft we, his mafters, 
 are filling our mouths with unfubftantial founds> 
 and talking of hungry oeconomy over his head. 
 But he is the elder branch of an ancient and de- 
 cayed houfe, joined to, and repaired by the re- 
 ward of fervices done by another. I refpeft the 
 original title, and the firft purchafe of merited 
 wealth and honour through all its defcents, through 
 all its transfers, and all its afllgnments. May fuch 
 fountains never be dried up. May they ever 
 flow with their original purity, and refrelh and 
 frudify the common wealth, for ages 1 
 
 • Duke of Newcaftle, whofe dining-room is under the 
 Houfe of Commons. 
 
 F Sir,
 
 [ 66 3 
 
 Sir, I think myfelf bound to give you my 
 reafons as clearly, and as fully, for ilopping in the 
 courfe of reformation, as for proceeding in it. 
 My limits are the rules of law •, the rules of po- 
 licy ; and the fervice of the ftate. This is the 
 reaibn why I am not able to intermeddle with 
 another article, which feems to be a fpecific ob- 
 ieft in feveral of the petitions ; I mean the reduc- 
 tion of exorbitant emoluments to efficient offices. 
 If I knew of any real efficient office, which did 
 pofTefs exorbitant emoluments, I Ihould be ex- 
 tremely defirous of reducing them. Others may 
 know of them. I do not. I am not puffeired of 
 an exac5t common mealure between real fervice and 
 its reward. I am very lure, that dates do fome- 
 times receive fervices, which is hardly in their 
 power to reward according to their worth. If I 
 were to give my judgment, with regard to this 
 country, I do not think the great efficient offices 
 of the itate to be overpaid. The fervice of the 
 public is a thing which cannot be put to auftion, 
 and ftruck down to thofe who will agree to exe- 
 cute it the cheapeil. When the proportion be- 
 tween reward and fervice, is our objeft, we muft 
 always confider of what nature the fervice is, and 
 what fort of men they are that mutt perform it. 
 What is juft payment for one kind of labour, 
 and full encouragement for one kind of talents, is 
 fraud and difcouragement toothers. Many of the 
 great offices have much duty to do, and much ex- 
 pence of reprefentation to maintain. A fecretary 
 of ftate, for inftance, muft not appear lordid in 
 the eyes of the minifters of other nations ; neither 
 -ought our minifters abroad to appear contempti- 
 ble in the courts where they refide. In. all of- 
 fices of duty, there is, almoft necefiarily, a great 
 neglect of all domeftic aifairs. A perion in high 
 office can rarely take a view of his family-houTe. 
 
 If
 
 [ 67 ] 
 
 If he fees tliat the ftate takes no detriment, the 
 ftate mud fee that his affairs fhould take as little. 
 
 I will even go fo far as to affirm, that if men were 
 willing to ferve in fuch fituations without falary, 
 they ought not to be permitted to do it. Ordinary 
 fervice muft be fecured by the motives to ordinary 
 integrity. I do not hefitate to fay, that, that ftate 
 ■which lays its foundation in rare and heroic vir- 
 tues, will be fure to have its fuperftruflure in the 
 bafeft profligacy and corruption. An honourable 
 and fair profit is the beft fecurity againft avarice 
 and rapacity; as in all things clie, a lawful and 
 regulated enjoyment is the beft fecurity againft 
 debauchery and excefs. For as wealth is power, 
 fo all power will infallibly draw wealth to itfelf 
 by fome means or other : and when men are left 
 no way of afcertaining their profits but by their 
 means of obtaining them, thofe means will be en- 
 creafed to infinity. This is true in all the parts 
 of adminiftration, as well as in the whole. If 
 any individual were to decline his appointments, 
 it might give an unfair advantage to oftentati- 
 ous ambition over unpretending fervice ; it might 
 breed invidious comparifons •, it might tend to 
 deftroy whatever little unity and agreement may 
 be found among minifters. And after all, when 
 an ambitious man had run down his competitors 
 by a fallacious fhew of difmtereftednefs, and 
 fixed himfclf in power by that means, what fecu- 
 rity is there that he would not change his courle, 
 and claim as an indemnity ten times more than 
 he has given up ? 
 
 This rule, like every other, may admit its ex- 
 ceptions. When a great man has fome one great 
 objeft in view to be atchieved in a given time, it 
 may be abfolutely neceffary for him to walk out 
 of all the common roads, and if his fortune per- 
 mits it, to hold himfelf out as a fplendid exanv 
 pie. I am told, that fomething of this kind is 
 
 F 2 now
 
 [ 68 ] 
 
 ndw doing in a country near us. But this is 
 for a fhort race ; the trainiiig for a heat or two, 
 and not the proper preparation for the regular 
 ttages of a methodical journey. I am fpeaking 
 of cftablifhments, and not of men. 
 
 It may be expected. Sir, that when I am giv- 
 ing my reafons why I limit myfelf in the reduction 
 of employments, or of their profits, I ibould fay 
 fomething of thole which feem of eminent inutility 
 in the ftate -, I mean the number of officers who 
 by their places are attendant on the perlbn of the 
 king. Confidering the commonwealth merely as 
 fuch, and confidering thofe officers only as relative 
 to the diredt purpol'es of the ftate, I admit that they 
 are of no ufe at all. But there are many things 
 in the conftitution of eftablifhmenis, which appear 
 of little value on the firft view, which in a 
 fecondary and oblique manner, produce very ma- 
 terial advantages. It was on full confideration 
 that I determined not to lefTen any of the offices 
 of honour about the crown, in their number or 
 their emoluments. Thefe emoluments, except in 
 one or two cafes, do not much more than anfwer the 
 charge of attendance. Men of condition naturally 
 love to be about a court -, and women of condition 
 love it much more. But there is in all regular at- 
 tendance, fo much of conftraint, that if it were a 
 mere charge, without any compenfation,you would 
 foon have the court deferted by all the nobility of 
 the kingdom. • 
 
 Sir, the moft ferious mifchiefs would follow 
 from fuch a defertion. Kings are naturally lovers 
 of low company. They are fo elevated above all 
 the reft of mankind, that they muft look upon all 
 their fubjedts as on a level. They are rather apt 
 to hate than to love their nobility, on account of 
 the occafional refiftance to their will, which will 
 be made by their virtue, their petulance, or their 
 pride. It muft indeed be admitted, that many of 
 
 the
 
 [ 69 ] 
 
 the nobility are as perfeftly wrlling to a6l the 
 part of flatterers, tale-bearers, parafites, pimps, 
 and buffoons, as any of the loweft and vileft of 
 mankind can poffibly be. But they are not pro- 
 perly qualified for this objed of their ambition. 
 The want of a regular education, and early habits, 
 and fome lurking remains of their dignity, will ne- 
 ver permit them to become a m.atch for an Italian 
 eunuch, a mountebank, a fidler, a player, or any 
 regular praflitioner of that tribe. The Roman 
 emperors almoft from the beginning, threw them- 
 felves into fuch hands •, and the mifchief increafed 
 every day till its decline, and its final ruin. It 
 is therefore of very great importance (provided 
 the thing is not overdone) to contrive fuch an 
 cftablifhment as muft, almoft whether a prince will 
 or not, bring into daily and hourly offices about 
 his perfon, a great number of his firfl: nobility ; 
 and it is rather an ufeful prejudice that gives them 
 a pride in fuch a fervitude. Though they are 
 not much the better for a court, a court will be 
 much the better for them- I have therefore not 
 attempted to reform any of the offices of honour 
 about the king's perfon. 
 
 There are, indeed, two offices in his ftables 
 which are finecures. By the change of manners, 
 and indeed by the nature of the thing, they mud 
 be fo ; 1 mean the feveral keepers of buck-hounds, 
 ftag-hounds, fox-hounds, and harriers. They 
 anfwer no purpofe of utility or of fplendor. 
 Thefe I propofe to abolilh. It is not proper that 
 great noblemen fhould be keepers of dogs, though 
 they were the king's dogs. In every part of my 
 fcheme, I have endeavoured that no primary, and 
 that even no fecondary lervice of the ffate, Ihoulcj 
 fuffer by its frugality. I mean to touch no offices 
 but fuch as I am perfe6lly fare, are either of no ule at 
 all, or not of any ufe in the ieafl afTignable propor- 
 tion to tlie burthen with which they load th^ 
 F ^ rcvenucx
 
 [ 70 ] 
 
 revenues of the kingdom, and to the influence with 
 which they opprefs the freedom of parliamentary 
 deliberation •, for which reafon there are but two 
 offices which are properly (late offices, that I 
 have a dcfire to reform. 
 
 The firft of them is the new office of third 
 fecretary of Jlate^ which is commonly called fecre- 
 iary of Jlate for the colonies. 
 
 We know that all the correfpondence of the 
 colonies had been, until within a few years, car- 
 ried on by the fouthern fecretary of ftate-, and that 
 this department has not been fhunned upon account 
 of the weight of its duties ; but on the contrary, 
 much fought, on account of its patronage. Indeed 
 hemuft be poorly acquainted with the hiftory of 
 office, who does not know how very lightly the A- 
 inerican fun<^ions have always leaned on the fhoul- 
 ders of the minifterial Jtlas^ who has upheld that 
 fide of the fphere. Undoubtedly, great temper 
 and judgment was requifite in the management 
 of the colony politics •, but the official detail was 
 a trifle. Since the new appointment, a train of 
 unfortunate accidents has brought before us al- 
 moft the whole correfpondence of this favourite 
 fecretary's office, fince the firfl: day of its eftabliih- 
 ment. I will fay nothing of its aufpicious foun- 
 dation ; of the quality of its correfpondence •, or 
 of the effcds that have enfued from it. I fpeak 
 merely of its quantity; which we know would 
 have been little or no addition to the trouble of 
 whatever office had its hands the fulleft. But 
 what has been the real condition of the old office 
 of fecretary of ftate ? Have their velvet bags, and 
 their red boxes, been fo full, that nothing more 
 could poffibly be crammed into them ? 
 
 A correfpondence of a curious nature has been 
 lately publifhed f . In that correfpondence. Sir, 
 
 •f- Letters between Dr. Addington and Sir James Wright. 
 
 we
 
 [ 7' ] 
 
 yvs find, the opinion of a- noble perfon, who 
 is thought to be the grand manufadturer of ad- 
 n'linillrations •, and therefore the beft judge of the 
 quality of his work. He was of opinion, that there 
 was but one man of diligence and induftry in the 
 whole adminiilration — it was the late earl of Suf- 
 folk. The noble lord lamented very juftly, 
 that this ftatefman, of fo much mental vigour, 
 was almoft wholly difabled from the exertion of 
 it, by his bodily infirmities. Lord Suffolk, dead 
 to the llate, long before he was dead to nature, at 
 lad paid his tribute to the common treafury to 
 which we muft all be taxed. But fo little want 
 was found even of his intentional induftry, that 
 the office, vacant in reality to its duties long be- 
 fore, continued vacant even in nomination and 
 appointment for a year after his death. The whole 
 of the laborious and arduous correfpondence of this 
 empire, refted Iblely upon the activity and energy 
 ■of Lord Weymouth. 
 
 It is therefore demonftrable, fince one diligent 
 man was fully equal to the duties of the two offices, 
 that two diligent men will be equal to the duty of 
 one. The bufinels of the new office which 1 ihali 
 propofe to you to fupprefs, is by no means too 
 much to be returned to either of the fecretaries 
 which remain. If this dull in the balance Ihould 
 be thought too heavy, it may be divided between 
 them both -, North America (whether free or redu- 
 ced) to the northern fecretary, the Weft Indies 
 to the fouthern. It is not neceffary that I Ihould 
 fay more upon the inutility of this office. It is 
 burning day light. But before I have done, I fhalJ 
 juft remark, that the hiftory of this office is too 
 recent to fuffer us to forget, that it was made 
 for the mere convenience of the arrangements of 
 political intrigue, and not for the fervice of the 
 ^tate i that it was made, in order -to give a 
 
 F 4 colour
 
 ' r 72 ] 
 
 lour to an exorbitant increafe of the civil lift; 
 and in the fame a6t to bring a new accelTion to 
 the loaded compoft heap of corrupt influence. 
 
 There is, Sir, another office, which was not 
 long fince, clofely connedled with this of the A- 
 merican fecretary ; but has been lately feparatcd 
 from it for the very fame purpofe for which it had 
 been conjoined ^ I mean the fole purpofe of all 
 the feparations and all conjunctions that have 
 been lately made — a job. — I fpeak. Sir, of the 
 board cf trade and plantations. This board is a foit 
 of temperate bed of influence ; a fort of gently 
 ripening hot-houfe, where eight members of Par- 
 liament receive falaries of a thoufand a year, for 
 a certain given time, in order to mature at a pro- 
 per feafon, a claim to two thoufand, granted for 
 doing lefs, and on the credit of having toiled fo 
 long in that inferior laborious department. 
 
 I have known that board, off and on, for z, 
 great number of years. Both of its pretended 
 objefts have been much the objects of my 
 ftudy, if 1 have a right to call any purfuits 
 of mine by fo refpedlable a name. I can aflTure 
 the houfe, and I hope they will not think, that I 
 ri(k my little credit lightly, that, without m.ean- 
 ing to convey the leaft rtflcclion upon any one of 
 its members paft or prefent, — -it is a board which, 
 if not mifchievous, is of no ufe at all. 
 
 You will be convinced, Sir, that I am not 
 miftaken, if you refled how generally it is true, 
 that commerce, the principal object of that 
 office, flourifhes motl when it is left to 
 itfelf. Interefb, the great guide of commerce, 
 is not a blind one. It is very well able to find its 
 own way •, and its neceffities are its beft laws. 
 But if it were poffible, in the nature of things, 
 that the young ihould direcft the old, and the in- 
 experienced inftru(^ the knowing -, if a board in 
 
 the
 
 C n ] 
 
 the ftate was the beft tutor for the conntlpgr 
 houfej if the defl<: ought to read ledlu res to the 
 anvil, and the pen to ufurp the place of the 
 fhuttle — yet in any matter of regulation, we 
 know that board mufl: a6l with as little au- 
 thority as fkill. The prerogative of the crown is 
 utterly inadequate to its objeft ; becaufe all 
 regulations are, in their nature, reftriftive of fome 
 liberty. In the reign indeed, of Charles the firjl^ 
 the council, or committees of council, were ne- 
 ver a moment unoccupied, with affairs of trade. 
 But even where they had no ill intention 
 (which was fometimes the cafe) trade and 
 manufacture fuffered infinitely from their injudi- 
 cious tampering. But fince that period, when- 
 ever regulation is wanting (for 1 do not deny, 
 that fometimes it may be wanting) parliament 
 conftantly fits ; and parliament alone is compe- 
 tent to fuch regulation. We want no inftruftion 
 from boards of trade, or from any other board ; 
 and God forbid we Ihould give the leafl atten- 
 tion to their reports. Parliamentary enquiry is 
 the only mode of obtaining parliamentary infor- 
 mation. There is more real knowledge to be ob- 
 tained, by attending the detail of bufinefs in the 
 committees above Hairs, than ever did come, or 
 ever will come from any board in this kingdom, 
 or from all of them together. An affiduous mem- 
 ber of parliament will not be the worfe inflrudied 
 there, for not being paid a thoufand a year for 
 learning his lefibn. And now that I fpeak of the 
 committees above {lairs, I niuft fay, that having 
 till lately attended them a good ' deal, I have 
 obferved that no defcription of members give 
 fo little attendance, either to communicate, or 
 to obtain inilrudtion upon matters of com- 
 merce, as the honourable members of the grave 
 board of trade. 1 really do not recollect, 
 
 that
 
 [ 74 ] 
 
 that I have ever fecn one of them in that fort 
 of bufinefs. Poflibly, fome members may have 
 better memories ; and may call to mind fome job 
 that may have accidentally brought one or other 
 of them, at one time or other, to attend a matter 
 of commerce. 
 
 This board. Sir, has had both its original for- 
 mation, and its regeneration, in a job. In a job 
 it was conceived, and in a job its mother brought 
 it forth. It made one among thofe fhewy and 
 fpecious impofitions, which one of the experi- 
 ment-making adminiftrations of Charles the fecond 
 held out to delude the people, and to be fubfti- 
 tuted in the place of the real fervice which they 
 might expeft from a parliament annually fitting. 
 It was intended alfo to corrupt that body when- 
 ever it Ihould be permitted to fit. It was pro- 
 jecled in the year 1668, and it continued in a tot- 
 tering and rickety childhood for about three or 
 four years, for it died in the year 167:^, a babe of 
 as little hopes as ever fwelled the bills of mor- 
 tality in the article of convulfed or overlaid 
 children, who have hardly fteppcd over the 
 threfliold of life. 
 
 It was buried with little ceremony -, and never 
 more thought of, until the reign of King William, 
 when in the flrange viciffitude of negletl and vi- 
 gour, of good and ill fuccefs that attended his 
 wars, in the year 1695, the trade was diftrefTed 
 beyond all exam.ple of former fufferings, by the 
 piracies of the French cruifers. This fuffering 
 incenfed, and, as it fnould feem, very juilly in- 
 cenfed, the houfe of commons. In this ferment 
 they ftruck, not only at the adminiftration, but 
 at the very confticution of the executive govern- 
 ment. They attempted to form in parliament a 
 board for the proteftion of trade -, which, as they 
 "planned ir, was to draw to itfelf a great part, if 
 
 not
 
 [ 75 ] 
 
 not the whole, of the fundions and powers, both 
 of the admiralty, and of the trcakiry ; and thus, 
 by a parliamentary delegation of office and of- 
 ficers, they threatened abfolutely to feparate thefe 
 departments from the v/hole fyftem of the execu- 
 tive government, and of courfe to veft the moft 
 leading and efleritial of its attributes in this board. 
 As the executive government was in a manner 
 convifled of a derel!<5lion of its fun6tions, it was 
 with infinite difficulty, that this blow was ward- 
 ed off in that feflion. There was a threat to 
 renew the fame attempt in the next. To prevent 
 the effefl of this manoeuvre, the court oppofed 
 another manoeuvre to it; and in the year 1696, 
 called into life this board of trade, which had 
 flept fince 1673. 
 
 This, in a few words, is the hiftory of the rege- 
 neration of the board of trade, it has perfedly an- 
 fwered its purpoles. It was intended to quiet the 
 minds of the people, and to compofe the ferment 
 that then was Itrongly working in parliament. The 
 courtiers were too happy to be able to fubftitute 
 a board, which they knew would be ufelefs, in 
 the place of one that they feared would be dan- 
 gerous. Thus the board of trade was repro- 
 duced in a job ; and perhaps it is the only in- 
 ftance of a public body, which has never dege- 
 nerated ; but to this hour preferves all the health 
 and vigour of its primitive inftitution. 
 
 This board of trade and plantations has not been 
 ofanyufeto the colonies, as colonies; fo little 
 of ufe, that the ftourilhing fettlements of New 
 England, of Virginia, and of Maryland, and all 
 our wealthy colonies in the Welt Indies, were of 
 a date prior to the firft board of Charles the fe- 
 cohd. P^nfylvania and Carolina were fettled 
 during its dark quarter, in the interval between 
 the extindlion of the firiV, and the formation of 
 
 the
 
 [ 76 ] 
 
 t>ie fecond board. Two colonies alone owe their 
 origin to that board. Georgia, which, till lately, 
 has made a very (low progrels ; and never did 
 make any progrels at all, until it had wholly got 
 rid of all the regulations which the board of 
 trade had moulded into its original conftitution. 
 That colony has coll the nation very great fums of 
 money ; whereas the colonies which have had the 
 fortune of not being godfathered by the board of 
 trade, never coft the nation a fliilling, except 
 what has been lb properly fpent in lofing them. 
 But the colony of Georgia, weak as it was, car- 
 ried v/ith it to the lalt hour, and carries, even in 
 i|s prefent dead pallid vifage, the perfect refem- 
 blance of its parents. It always had, and it now 
 has, an ejlabltjhmcnt paid by the public of Eng- 
 land, for the fake of the influence of the crown \ 
 that colony having never been able or willing to 
 take upon itfelf the expence of its proper govern- 
 ment, or its own appropriated jobs. 
 
 The province of Nova Scotia was the youngeft 
 and the favourite child of the board. Good 
 God ! What fums the nurfing of that ill-thriven, 
 hard-vifaged, and ill-favoured brat, has coft to 
 this wittol nation .? Sir, this colony has ftood us 
 in a fum of not lefs than fevcn hundred thoufand 
 pounds. To this day it has made no repayment 
 r— It does not even fupport thofe offices of ex- 
 pence, which are mifcalled its government j the 
 "whole of that job ftiil lies upon the patient, cal- 
 lous flioulders of the people of England. 
 
 Sir, 1 am going to ftate a faft to you, that will 
 ferve to fet in full funfliine the real value of for- 
 mality and official fupcrintendance. There was 
 in the province of Nova Scotia, one little ne- 
 glected corner i the country of the jieutral French-^ 
 which having the good fortune to efcape the fof- 
 tcring care both of France and England, and to 
 
 have
 
 [ 77 1 
 
 have been (hut out from the protedinn'anci regii-^ 
 lation of councils of commerce, and of boards 
 of trade, did, in filence, without notice, and 
 without afliftance, increafe to a confiderable de- 
 gree. But it feems our nation had more fkiil and 
 ability in deftroying, than in fettling a colony. 
 In the laft war we did, in my opinion, moft in- 
 humanly, and upon pretences that in the eye of 
 an honeft man are not worth a farthing, root out 
 this poor innocent deferving people, whom our 
 utter inability to govern, or to reconcile, gave us 
 no fort of right to extirpate. Whatever the me- 
 rits of that extirpation might have been, it was 
 on the footfteps of a negle(^ted people, it was on 
 the fund of unconflrained poverty, it was on the 
 acquifitions of unregulated induftry, that any 
 thing which deferves the name of a colony in that 
 province, has been formed. It has been formed by 
 overflowings from the exuberant population of 
 New England, and by emigration, from other 
 parts of Nova Scotia of fugitives from the pro- 
 tedion of the board of trade. 
 
 But if all of thefe things were not more than 
 fufficient to prove to you the inutility of that ex- 
 penfive eilablifhment, I would defire you to re- 
 coiled, Sir, that thole who may be very ready- 
 to defend it, are very cautious how they employ 
 it ; cautious how they employ it even in appear- 
 ance and pretence. They are afraid they fhould 
 lofe the benefit of its influence in parliament, if 
 they feemed to keep it up for any other purpofe. 
 If ever there were commercial points of great 
 weight, and moft: clofely conneded with our de- 
 pendences, they are thole which have been ao-i- 
 tated and decided in parliament fince I came into 
 it. Which of the innumerable regulations fince 
 made had their origin or their improvement in the 
 board of trade ? Did any of the feveral Eaft India 
 5 bills
 
 [ 78 ] 
 
 bills which have been fucceflively produced fince 
 1767, originate there ? Did any one dream of 
 referring them, or any part of them thither ? Was 
 any body fo ridiculous as even to think of it ? If 
 ever there was anoccafion on which the board was 
 fit to be confulted, it was with regard to the a(5ts, 
 that were preludes to the American war, or at- 
 tendant on its commencement : thofe a6ts were 
 full of commercial regulations, fuch as they were ; 
 — the intercourie bill •, the prohibitory bill •, the 
 filhery bill ? If the board was not concern- 
 ed in fuch things, in what particular was it 
 thought fit that it jfhould be concerned ? In the 
 courfe of all thefe bills through the houfe, I ob- 
 ferved the members of that board to be remark- 
 ably cautious of intermeddling. They underddod 
 decorum better ; they know that matters of trade 
 and plantations are no bufinefs of theirs. 
 
 There were two very recent occafions, on which, 
 if the idea of any ufe for rhc board had not been 
 extinguiflied by prefcription, appeared loudly to 
 call for their interference. 
 
 When commifiioners were fent to pay his ma- 
 jefty's and our dutiful refpefts to the congrefs 
 of the United States, a part of their powers un- 
 der the commiffion were, it feems, of a commer- 
 cial nature. They were authorized in the moft 
 ample and undefined manner, to form a com- 
 mercial treaty with America on the fpor. This 
 was no trivial objefl. As the formation of fuch 
 ii treaty would necefiarily have been no lefs than 
 the breal<.ing up of our whole commercial fyftcm, 
 and the giving it an entire new form •, one would 
 imagine, that the board of trade would have fat 
 day and night, to model propofitions, which, on 
 our fide, might ferve as a bafis to that treaty. 
 No iucli thing. Their learned leifure was not in 
 the lead interrupted, though one of the members 
 3 of
 
 r 79 ] 
 
 of the board was a commifTioner, and might, in 
 mere compliment to his office, have been fiippofed 
 to make a fhew of deliberation on the fubjed. 
 But he knew, that his colleagues would have 
 thought he laughed in their faces, had he at- 
 tempted to bring any thing the moft diftantly re- 
 lating to commerce or colonies before them. A 
 noble perfon, engaged in the fame commiffion, 
 and fent to learn his commercial rudiments in 
 New York, (then under the operation of an aft for 
 the univerfal prohibition of trade) was foon af- 
 ter put at the head of that board. This con- 
 tempt from the prefent minillers of all the pre- 
 tended functions of that board, and their manner 
 of breathing into its very foul, of infpiring it 
 with its animating and prefiding principle, puts 
 an end to all dilputc concerning their opinion of 
 the clay it was made of. But I will give them 
 heaped meafure. 
 
 It was but the other day, that the noble lord 
 in the blue ribbon carried up to the houfe of 
 peers, two acts, altering, I think much for the 
 better, but altering, in a great degree, our whole 
 commercial fyftem. Thefe ads, I mean, for 
 giving a free trade to Ireland in woollens and 
 in all things elie, with independent nations, and 
 giving them an equal trade to our own colo- 
 nies. Here too the novelty of this great, but ar- 
 duous and critical improvement of fyftem, would 
 make you conceive that the anxious folicitude of 
 the noble lord in the blue ribbon, would have 
 wholly deftroyed the plan of fummer recreation 
 of that board, by references to examine, compare, 
 and digeft matters for parliament — You would 
 imagine, that Irifh commiffioners of cuiloms and 
 Englifh commifTioners of cuiloms, and commif- 
 fioners of excife, that merchants and manufadu- 
 rers of every denomination, had daily crowded 
 
 their
 
 [ So ] 
 
 their outer rooms. Nil horum. The perpetual 
 virtual adjourninent, and the unbroken fitting 
 vacation of that board, was no more difturbed 
 by the Irifa than by the plantation commerce^ 
 or any other commerce. Tlie fame matter made 
 a large part of the bufinefs which occupied the 
 houfe for two leffions before ; and as our mi- 
 nifters were not then mellowed by the mild, emol- 
 lient, and eno-aginor blandifhments of our dear 
 
 . CD & tD 
 
 filler, into all the tendernefs of unqualified fur- 
 render, the bounds and limits of a retrained bene- 
 fit naturally required much detailed management 
 and pofitive regulation. But neither the quali- 
 fied propofitions which were received, nor thofe 
 other qualified propofitions which were rejeded 
 by minifters, were the leaft concern of theirs, or 
 were they ever thought of in the bufinefs. 
 
 It is therefore, Sir^ on the opinion of parlia- 
 tnent, on the opinion of the minifters, and even 
 on their own opinion of their inutility, that I fhall 
 propofe to you to fupprefs the board of trade and 
 ■plantations •, and to recommit all its bufinefs to the 
 council from whence it was very improvidently 
 taken ; and which bufinefs (whatever it might be) 
 was much better done and without any expence ; 
 and indeed where in eff^e^t it may all come at 
 laft. Almoft all that deferves the name of 
 bufinefs there, is. the reference of the planta- 
 tion adts, to the opinion of gentlemen of the 
 law. But all this may be done, as the Irilh bu- 
 finefs of the fame nature has always been done, 
 by the council, and with a reference to the attor- 
 ney and folicitor general. 
 
 There are fome regulations in the houfehold, re- 
 lative to the officers of the yeomen of the guards, 
 and the officers and band of gentlemen pen- 
 fioners, which I fhall like wife fubmit to your 
 
 confideration.
 
 [ 8i ] 
 
 confideration, for the purpofe of regulating efla-* 
 blilhments, which at prefent are much abufcd. 
 
 I have now iinilhed all, that for the prefent 
 I fliall trouble you with on the plan of redu5iion. I 
 mean next to propofe to you the plan of arrange- 
 n^ent, by which I mean to appropriate and fix the 
 civil lift: money to its feveral fervices according 
 to their nature ; for I am thoroughly fenfible, thaq 
 if a difcretion, wholly arbitrary, can be exercifed 
 over the civil lift revenue, although the moil effec- 
 tual methods may be taken p prevent the inferior 
 departments from exceeding their bounds, the plan 
 of reformation will ftill be left very imperfedl:. 
 It will not, in my opinion, be fafe to permit an 
 entirely arbitrary difcretion even in the lirft lord 
 of the treafury himfelf : It will not be fafe to 
 leave with him a power of diverting the public 
 money from its proper objects, of paying it in an 
 irregular courfe, or of inverting perhaps the 
 order of time, didated by the proportion of va- 
 lue, which ought to regulate his application of 
 payment to fervice. 
 
 I am fenfible too, that the very operation of a 
 plan of CEConomy which tends to exonerate the 
 civil lift of expenfive eftabliftiments, may in 
 fome fort defeat the capital end we have in view, 
 the independence of parliament ; and that in re- 
 moving the public and oftenfible means of influ- 
 ence, we may increale the fund of private cor- 
 ruption. I have thought of fome methods to pre- 
 vent an abuie of furplus cafti under difcretionary 
 application; I mean the heads of fecret feriice^ 
 fpecial f^vice^ %'anous payments, and the like; 
 which, I hope, will aniwer, and which in due 
 time I ftiall lay before you. Where I am unable 
 to liniit the quantity of the fums to be applied, by 
 reafon of the uncertain quantity of the fervice, I 
 ^nde^vour to confine it to its line j to fecure 
 
 Q an
 
 [ S2 ] 
 
 an indefinite application to the definite fervlce 
 to which it belongs ; not, to flop the progrefs of 
 expence in its line, but to confine it to that line 
 in which it profelTes to move. 
 
 But that part of my plan. Sir, upon which I 
 principally refl, that, on which I rely for the pur- 
 pofe of binding up, and fecuring the whole, is 
 to eftablifli a fixed and invariable order in all its 
 payments, which it fhall not be permitted to the 
 firft lord of the treafury, upon any pretence what- 
 foever, to depart from. I therefore divide the ci- 
 vil lift payments into nine clalTes, putting each 
 clafs forward according to the importance or juf- 
 tice of the demand, and to the inability of the 
 perfons entitled to enforce their pretenfions ; that 
 is, to put thofe firft who have the moft efficient 
 offices, or claim the jufteft debts ; and, at the 
 fame time, from the charafter of that delcrip- 
 tion of men, from the retirednefs, or the re- 
 motenefs of their fituation, or from their want of 
 weight and power to enforce their pretenfions, or 
 from their being entirely fubjeft to the power of 
 a minifter, without any reciprocal power of awe- 
 ing, ought to be the moft confidered, and are 
 the molt likely to be neglefted ; all thefe I place 
 in the higheft clafles : I place in the loweft 
 thofe whole fundlions are of the leaft importance, 
 but whole perfons or rank are often of the greatelt 
 power and influence. 
 
 In the firft clafs I place the Judges, as of the 
 firft importance. It is the public juitice that holds 
 the community together; the eal'e, therefore, and 
 independence of the judges, ought to fuperfede all 
 other confiderations, and they ought to be the 
 very laft to feel the necefiities of the ftate, or to 
 be obliged either to court or bully a minifter for 
 their right : They ought to be as v.'enk folici- 
 Sors on their, cjon demands, as itrenuous afTcrtors of 
 
 the
 
 [ 83 ] 
 
 the rights and liberties of others. The judges 
 are, or ought to be, of a referved and retired 
 chara6ler, and wholly unconneded with the po-.^ 
 litical world. 
 
 In the fecond clafs I place the foreign mini- 
 fters. The judges are the links of our connec- 
 tions with one another ; the foreign miniflers are 
 the links of our connection with other nations. 
 They arc not upon the fpot to demand pay- 
 ment, and are therefore the moft likely to be, as in 
 fad; they have fometimes been, entirely negleded, 
 to the great difgrace, and perhaps the great detri- 
 ment of the nation. 
 
 In the third clafs I would bring all the tradef- 
 men who fupply the crown by contrad, or other- 
 wife. 
 
 In the fourth clafs I place all the domeflic 
 fervants of the king, and all perfons in efficient 
 offices, whofe falaries do not exceed two hundred 
 pounds a year. 
 
 In the fifth, upon account of honour, whichought 
 to give place to nothing but charity and rigid 
 juftice, I would place the penfions and allow- 
 ances of his majefty's royal family, comprehend- 
 ing of courfe the queen, together with tne ftated 
 allowance of the privy purfe. 
 
 In the fixth clafs, I place thefe efficient offices 
 of duty, whofe falaries may exceed the fum of 
 two hundred pounds a year. 
 
 In the feventh clafs, that mixed mafs, the whole 
 penfion lift. 
 
 In the eighth, the offices of honour about the 
 king. 
 
 In the ninth and the laft of all, the falaries and 
 penfions of the firft lord of the treafury himfelf, 
 the chancellor of the exchequer, and the other 
 commiffioners of the treafury. 
 
 If by- any poffible mifmanagemcnt of that part 
 G 2 of
 
 [ 8+ ] 
 
 of the revenue which is left at diicietion, or by 
 any other mode of prodigality, caih fliould be 
 deficient for the payment of the loweft claflts, I 
 propofe, that the amount of thofe falaries where 
 the deficiency may happen to fall, fhall not be 
 carried as debt to the account of the fucceed- 
 ing year, but that it Ihall be entirely lapfed, funk, 
 and loft ; fo that government will be enabled to 
 flart in the race of every new year, wholly un- 
 loaded, frefh in wind and in vigour. Hereafter, 
 no civil lift debt can ever come upon the pub- 
 lic. And thofe who do not confider this as fav- 
 ing, becaufe it is not a certain fum, do not 
 ground their calculations of the future on their 
 experience of the paft. 
 
 I know of no mode of preferving the effeftual 
 execution of any duty, but to make it the di red: 
 intereft of the executive officer that it fhall be 
 faithfully performed. AfTuming, then, that the 
 prefent vaft allowance to the civil lift is perfcftly 
 adequate to all its purpofes, if there Ihould be 
 any failure, it muft be from the mifmanagemcnt: 
 or negleft of the firft commifiioner of the trea- 
 fury ; fmce, upon the propofed plan, there can 
 be no expence of any confequcnce, which he is 
 not himfelf previouOy to authorize and finally to 
 control. It is therefore juft, as well as politic, 
 that the lofs ftiould attach upon the delinc^uency. 
 If the failure from thedelinquency fliould be very 
 confiderable, it will fall on the clafs direftly above 
 the firft lord of the treafury, as well as upon him- 
 felf and his board. It will fall, as it ought to fall, 
 upon offices of no primary importance in th6 
 ftate i but then it will fall upon perfons, whom it 
 ^vill be a matter of no flight im.portance for a 
 minifter to provoke— it will fall upon perfons of 
 the firft rank and confequence in the kingdom ; 
 uuon thofe who are neareft to the king, and 
 
 Irequently
 
 [ 85 ] 
 
 frequently have a more interior credit with hirti* 
 than the minifter himfelf. It will fall upon mafters 
 of the horfe, upon lord chamberlains, upon lord 
 ftewards, upon grooms of the Hole, and lords of 
 the bedchamber. The houfhold troops form an 
 army, who will be ready to mutiny for want of 
 pay, and whofe mutiny will be really dreadful to 
 a commander in chief. A rebellion of the thir- 
 teen lords of the bedchamber would be far more 
 terrible to a minifter, and would probably affecl 
 his power more to the quick, than a revolt of 
 thirteen colonies. What an uproar fuch an event 
 would create at court! Wh-dt petitions, and com- 
 mittees^ and ajfociations would it not produce ! Blefs 
 me ! what a clattering of white fticks and yellow 
 flicks would be about his head— what a ftorm of 
 gold keys would fly about theears of the minifter— 
 what a ftiower of Georges, and Thiftles, and me- 
 dals, and collars of S. S. would affail him at his 
 firft entrance into the antichamber, after an 
 infolvent Chriftmas quarter. A tumult which 
 could not be appeafed by all the harmony of the 
 new-year's ode. Rebellion it is certain there 
 would be •, and rebellion may not now indeed be 
 fo critical an event to thofe who engage in it, 
 lince its price is lb corredly afccrtained at juft a 
 thoufand pound. 
 
 Sir, this clafling, in my opinion, is a ferious 
 and folid fecurity for the performance of a 
 minifter's duty. Lord Coke fays, that the 
 ftaff was put into the treafurer's hand, to enable 
 him to fupport himfelf when there was no money 
 in the exchequer, and to beat away importunate 
 folicitors. The method, which I propofe, would 
 hinder him from the neceffity of fuch a broken 
 llafF to lean on, or fuch a miferable weapon for 
 repulfmg the demands of worthlefs fuitors, who, 
 the noble lord in the blue ribbon knows, will 
 G 3 bear
 
 [ 86 1 
 
 bear many hard blows on the head, and man/ 
 other indignities, before they are driven from the 
 creafury. In this plan, he is furniflied with an 
 anfwer to all their im.portunity -, an anfwer far 
 more conclufive, than if he had knocked them 
 down with his ftaff — " Sir, (or my Lord), you 
 are calling for my own falary — Sir, you are 
 calling for the appointments of my colleagues 
 who fit about me in office — Sir, you are going 
 " to excite a mutiny at court againft me — you 
 are going to eftrange his majelty's confidence 
 from me, through the chamberlain, or the 
 *' mafter of the horfe, or the groom of the ftole." 
 As things now (land, every man, in propor- 
 tion to his confequence at court, tends to add to 
 the expences of the civil lift, by all manner of 
 jobs, if not for himfelf, yet for his dependents. 
 When the new plan is cftablilhed, thofe who are 
 now fuitors for jobs, will become the moft 
 Itrenuous oppofers of them. They will have a 
 common intereft with the minifter in public oeco- 
 nomy. Every clafs, as it ftands low, will be- 
 come fccurity for the payment of the preceding 
 clafs ; and thus the perfons, whofe infignificanc 
 fdrvices defraud thofe that are ufeful, would 
 then become interefted in their payment. Then 
 the powerful, inftead of oppreffing, v/ould be 
 obliged to fupport the weak •, and idlenefs would 
 become concerned in the reward of indullry. 
 The whole fabric of the civil oeconomy would 
 become compaft and connected in all its parts ; 
 it would be formed into a well organized body, 
 where every member contributes to the fupport of 
 the whole ; and where even the lazy ftomach fe- 
 cures the vigour of the active arm. 
 
 This plan, I really flatter myfelf, is laid, not 
 
 in official formality, nor in airy fpcculation, but 
 
 ia real life, and in human nature, in what 
 
 2 " comes
 
 t 87 J 
 
 ** comes home (as Bacon fays) to the bufinefs 
 " and bofoms of men." You have now, Sir, 
 before you, the whole of my fcheme, as far as 
 I have digefted it into a form, that might be in 
 any refpeft worthy of your confideration. — 1 in- 
 tend to lay it before you in five bills*. The 
 plan confifts, indeed, of many parts ; but 
 they ftand upon a few plain principles. It is a 
 plan which takes nothing from the civil lift with- 
 out dilcharging it of a burthen equal to the funi 
 carried to the public fervice. It weakens no one 
 funftion neceflary to government •, but on the 
 contrary, by appropriating fupply to fervice, it 
 gives it greater vigour. It provides the means 
 of order and forefight to a minifter of finance, 
 which may always keep all the objedts of his 
 office, and their ftate, conditionj and relations, 
 diftindlly before him. It brings forward accounts 
 without hurrying and diftrefiing the accountants: 
 whilft it provides for public convenience, it regards 
 private rights. It extinguifhes fecret corruption 
 almoft to the pofiibility of its exiftence. It de- 
 llroys diredt and vifible influence equal to the 
 offices of at leaft fifty members of parliament, 
 l^aftly, it prevents the provifion for his Majefty*s 
 children, from being diverted to the political pur- 
 pofes of his minifter. 
 
 Thefe are the points, on which I rely for 
 the merit of the plan : I puifue ceconomy in a 
 fecondary view, and only as it is connec^led with 
 thefe great objects. I am perfuaded, that even 
 for fupply, this fcheme will be far from unfruit- 
 ful, if it be executed to the extent I propofe it. 
 I think it will give to the public, at irs periods, 
 two or three hundred thouland pounds a year •, 
 if nor, it will give them a fyftem of ceconomy, 
 
 • Titles of the Bills read. 
 
 G 4 which
 
 I ss ] 
 
 which is itfelf a great revpn'ue. It gives me no 
 little pride and faiisfadion, to find that the prin- 
 ciples of my proceedings are, in many refpedls, the 
 very jame with thofe which arc now purfued in 
 the plans of the French miniller of finance. 1 am 
 lure, that I lay before you a Icheme eafy and prac- 
 ticable in all its parts. I know it is common at 
 once to applaud and to rejed all attempts of this 
 nature. 1 know it is common for "men to fay, that 
 fuch and luch things are perfectly right — very de- 
 firable; but that, unfortunately, they are not prad:i- 
 cable. Oh ! no. Sir, no. Thofe things which 
 are not fyai^licable, are not defirable. There is 
 nothing in the world really beneficial, that does 
 not lie within the reach of an informed un- 
 derftanding, and a well dircfted purfuit. There 
 is nothing that God has judged good for us, 
 that he has not given us the means to accomplilh, 
 both in the natural and the moral world. If we 
 cry, like children for the moon, like children we 
 muft cry on. 
 
 We muit follow the nature of our affairs, and 
 conform ourfclves to our fituation. If we do, 
 our objects are plain and compailable. Why fhould 
 we reloive to do nothing, becaufe what I propofc 
 to you may not. be the exact demand of the pe- 
 tition i when we are far from refolved to comply 
 even with what evidently is lb ? IDoes this fort of 
 chicanery become us ? The people are the maf- 
 ters. They have only to exprels their wants at 
 laro^ and in grofs. We arc the expert artifls j 
 ■we are the Ikilful workmen, to iliape their defircs 
 into perfect form, and to fit the utcnfil to the ufe. 
 They are the fuffcrers, they tell the lymptoms of 
 the complaint ; but we know the exa(ft feat of 
 the dileaJe, and how to apply the remedy, ac- 
 ' cording to the rules of art. How fhocking 
 v^uld it be to fee us {icrvert our Ikill, into a 
 
 finifter
 
 [ «9 1 
 
 fmifter and fervile tkxterity, for the purpofe of 
 evading our duty, and defrauding our ertiployers, 
 who are our natural lords, of the objcdt of their 
 juft expedlations. I think the whole not only 
 practicable, but praflicable in a very Ihort time. 
 If we are in earneft about it, and if we exert 
 that induftry, and thofe talents in forwarding the 
 work, which I am afraid may be exerted in 
 impeding it^ — I engage, that the whole may be 
 put in complete execution within a year. For 
 my own part, I have very little to recommend 
 me for this or for any tafl<, but a kind of earneft 
 and anxious perfeverance of mind, which, with 
 all its good and all its evil effects, is moulded into 
 my conftitution. I faithfully engage to the 
 houfe, if they choofe to appoint me to any pare 
 in the execution of this work, which (when they 
 have made it theirs by the improvements of their 
 wifdom, will be worthy of the able afliftance 
 they may give me) that by night and by day, in 
 town, or in country, at the delk, or in the foreft, 
 I will, without regard to convenience, eafe, or 
 pleafure, devote myfelf to their fervice, not 
 expeding or admitting any reward whatfo- 
 ever. I owe to this country my labour, which is 
 my all -, and I owe to it ten times more induftry, if 
 ten times more I could exert. After all I Ihall 
 be an unprofitable fervant. 
 
 At the fame time, if I am able, and if I ftiall 
 be permitted, I will lend an humble helping hand 
 to any other good work which is going on. I 
 have not. Sir, the frantic prefumption to fup- 
 pofe, that this plan contains in it the whole of 
 what the public has a right to cxpefb, in the 
 great work of reformation they call for. Indeed, 
 it falls infinitely Ihort of it. It falls fhort, eveti 
 gf my own ideas. I have fome thoughts not yet 
 
 fully.
 
 i 90 1 
 
 fully ripened, relative to a reform in the cudoma 
 and excile, as well as in fome other branches of 
 financial adminiftration. There are other things 
 too, which form eflential parts in a great plan 
 for the purpofe of reftoring the independence 
 of parliament. The contradors bill of laft year 
 it is fit to revive ; and I rejoice that it is in 
 better hands than mine. The bill for fiifpending 
 the votes of cuftomhoufe officers, brought into 
 parliament feveral years ago, by one of our wor- 
 thieft and wifeft members, * (would to God we 
 could along with the plan revive the perfon who 
 defigned it.) But a man of very real integrity, 
 honour, and ability will be found to take his 
 place, and to carry his idea into full execu- 
 tion. You all fee how neceflary it is to review 
 our military expences for fome years pad, and, if 
 pofiible, to bind up and dole that bleeding 
 artery of profufion : but that bufinefs alfo, I 
 have reafon to hope, will be undertaken by abi- 
 lities that are fully adequate to it. Something 
 muft be devifed (if pcfiible) to check the ruinous 
 expence of eled:ions. 
 
 Sir, all or moft of thefe things mufl be done. 
 Every one muft take his part. 
 
 If we fhould be able by dexterity or power, or 
 intrigue, to difappoint the cxpcdations of our 
 conftituents, what will it avail us ? we fhall never 
 be ftrong or artful enough to parry, or to put by 
 the irrefiitible demands of our fituation. That 
 fituation calls upon us, and upon our conftitu- 
 ents too, with a voice which zvill be heard, I 
 am fure no man is more zealoufly attached than 
 I am to the privileges of this houfe, particularly 
 in regard to the exclufive management of money. 
 The lords have no right to the difpoficion, in 
 any fenfe, of the public purfe -, but they have 
 
 • W. Dowdefwell, Efq; chancellor of the exchequer, 1765. 
 
 gone
 
 [ 9« 3 
 
 gone further in f felf-denial than our utmofl 
 jealoufy could have required. A power of exa- 
 mining accounts, to cenlure, correft, and punifh, 
 we never, that I know of, have thought of de- 
 nying to the Houle of Lords. It is fomething 
 more than a century fince we voted that body 
 ufelefs : they have now voted themfelves fo. 
 The whole hope of reformation is at length 
 cafl: upon its -, and let us not deceive the 
 nation, which does us the honour to hope every 
 thing from our virtue. If all the nation are not 
 equally forward to prefs this duty upon us, yet 
 be affured, that they all equally exped we fliould 
 perform it. The refpedtul filence of thofe who 
 wait upon your pleafure, ought to be as powerful 
 with you, as the call of thofe who require your 
 fervice as their right. Some, without doors, affe6t 
 to feel hurt for your dignity, becaufe they fup- 
 pofe, that menaces are held out to you. Juftify 
 their good opinion, by lliewing that no menaces 
 are necelTary to ftimulate you to your duty. 
 — But, Sir, whilft we may fympathize with 
 them, in one point, who fympathize with us 
 in another, we ought to attend no lefs to 
 thofe who approach us like men, and who, 
 in the guife of petitioners, fpeak to us in the 
 tone of a concealed authority. It is not wife 
 to force them to fpeak out more plainly, what 
 they plainly mean. — But, the petitioners are vio- 
 lent. Be it fo. Thofe who are leaft anxious about 
 your conduc:f , are not thole that love you mod. 
 Moderate aftecflion and fatiated enjoyment, are 
 cold and rerpe(5tful ; but an ardent and injured 
 paffion, is tempered up with wrath, and (yrief, and 
 fhame, and confcious worth, and the maddenino- 
 
 f Rejeftlon of Lord Shelburne's motion in the Houfe of 
 Lords. 
 
 fenfe
 
 r 92 ] 
 
 fenfe of violated right. A jealous love lights his 
 torch from the firebrands of the furies.— Hiey 
 who call upon you to belong "joholly to the peo- 
 ple, are thofe who wifh you to return to your 
 proper home ; to the fphere of your duty, to the 
 poft of your honour, to the manfion-houfe of all 
 genuine, ferene, and folid fatisfadion. We have 
 furniihed to the people of England (indeed we 
 have) fome real caufe of jealoufy. Let us leave 
 that fort of company which, if it does not deftroy 
 our innocence, pollutes our honour : let us free 
 ourfelves at once from every thing that can in- 
 creafe their fufpicions, and inflame their juft re- 
 fentment : let us call away from us, with a gene- 
 rous fcorn, all the love-tokens and fymbols that 
 we have been vain and light enough to accept ^ — 
 all the bracelets and fnuff-boxes, and miniature 
 piftures, and hair-devices, and all the other adul- 
 terous trinkets that are the pledges of our alienation, 
 and the monuments of our fhame. Let us return 
 to our legitimate home, and all jars and all quar- 
 rels will be loft in embraces. Let the commons in 
 parliament aflembled, be one and the fame thing 
 with the commons at large. The diftindions that 
 are made to feparate us, are unnatural and wicked 
 contrivances. Let us identify, let us incorporate 
 ourfelves with the people. Let us cut all the 
 cables and fnap the chains which tie us to an 
 unfaithful fhore, and enter the friendly harbour, 
 that fhoots far out into the main its moles and 
 
 jettees to receive us. " War with the 
 
 world, and peace with our conftituents/* Be 
 this our motto and our principle. Then indeed, we 
 fhall be truly great. Refpeding ourfelves, we fliall 
 be refpeded by the world. At prefent all is 
 troubled and cloudy, and diltraded, and full of 
 anger and turbulence, both abroad and at home : 
 5 but
 
 [ 93 ] 
 
 but the air may be cleared by this dorm, and 
 light and fertility may follow it. Let us give a 
 faithful pledge to the people, that we honour, 
 indeed, the crown ; but that we belong to them i 
 that we are their auxiliaries, and not their talk- 
 mafters ; the fellow-labourers in the fame vine- 
 yard, not lording over their rights, but helpers 
 of their joy : that to tax them is a grievance to 
 ourfelves, but to cut off from our enjoyments to 
 forward theirs, is the higheft gratification we are 
 capable of receiving. I feel with comfort, that 
 we are all warmed with thefe fentiments, and" 
 while we are thus warm, I wifh we may go di- 
 rectly and with a chearful heart to this falutary 
 work. 
 
 Sir, T move fgr leave to bring in a Bill, " For 
 the better regulation of his Majejly^s civil 
 cjlablijhments, and of certain public of- 
 fices •, for the limitation cf penfions, and 
 the fupprefpion of fundry ufelefs, expenfive^ 
 and inconvenient places \ and for applying' 
 the monies faved thereby tq the public 
 fervice." * 
 
 Lord North dated, that there was a difference 
 between this bill for regulating the eitablifliments, 
 and fome of the others, as they affefted the antient 
 patrimony of tlie crown ; and therefore wiflied them 
 to be poiiponed, till the King's confent could be 
 obtained. This diftinCtion was ftrongly contro- 
 verted i but when it was infifted on as a point of 
 decorum only, it was agreed to poftpone them to 
 another day. Accordingly, on the Monday fol- 
 lowing, viz. Feb. 14, leave was given, on thQ 
 
 • The motion was feconded by Mr, Fox. 
 
 motion
 
 [ 94 ] 
 
 motion of Mr. Burke, without oppofition, to 
 bring in 
 
 I/?, " A hill fc" the fak cf the fcreji and other 
 " crown knds^ refits, and bereditamentSy ivith cer- 
 " tain exceptions ; and for applying the produce 
 *' thereof to the public fervice \ and for fecuring, 
 *' ajcertaining^ and falisfying, tenant-rights, and 
 " commcn and other rights?* 
 
 id, " A hill for the more perfe^h uniting to the 
 *' crc^vn the principality cf IFales, and the county 
 ** palatine of Chefler, and for the more commodious 
 *' adminijiration cf jufiice ivitJyin the fame \ as alfo, 
 *' for abolifning certain offices now appertaining 
 " thereto; for quieting dormant claims, afcer- 
 *' taining and fecuring tenant-rights -, and for the 
 " fale of all for eft Umds, and other lands, tenement Sy 
 " and hereditaments, held by his Majefiy in right of 
 " the f aid principality, or county palatine cf C/jeJler, 
 ** and for applying the produce thereof to the 
 '* public fervice." 
 
 ^d, " A hill for uniting to the crown the duchy 
 *' a7td county palatine of Lancafter -, for the fuppref- 
 *' fion of unneceffary offices now belonging thereto ; for 
 " the alcertainment and fecurity or tenant and 
 *' other rights •, and for the fale of all rents, lands^ 
 " tenements, and hereditaments, and forefls, within 
 " the faid duchy and county palatine, or either of 
 " them; and for applying the produce thereof to 
 
 '' the public fervice." Audit was ordered that 
 
 Mr. Burke, Mr. Fox, Lord John Cavendifh, Sir 
 Geor2;e Savile, Colonel Barre,Mr. Thomas Town- 
 rhend^ Mr. Byng, Mr. Dunning, Sir Jofeph Maw- 
 bey, Mr. Recorder of London, Sir Robert Clay- 
 ton, Mr. Frederick Montagu, the Earl of Upper 
 Oflbry, Sir William Guifc, and Mr. Gilbert, d(> 
 prepare and bring in the fame. 
 
 At the fame time, Mr. Burke moved for leave 
 to brins; in — 4th, " A hill for tuiiti'i^ the dutchy
 
 [ 95 ] 
 
 ?' of Corn-Juall to the crown ; for the fupprejfion of 
 *' certain unmceffary offices no-w belonging thereto^ 
 *' for the afccrtainment and fccuricy of tenant and 
 " other rights j and for the fale of certain rents, 
 '* lands^ and tenements^ within or belonging to the 
 " faid dutchy ; and for applying the produce 
 " thereof to the public Tervice." 
 
 But fome objeftions being made by the fur- 
 veyor general of the dutchy concerning the 
 rights of the Prince of Wales, now in his mino- 
 nty, and Lord North remaining perfe6lly filent, 
 Mr. Burke, at length, though he ftrongly con- 
 tended againft the principle of the obje(5i:ion, con- 
 (ented to withdraw this laft motion for the pre- 
 fent, to be renewed upon an early occafion. 
 
 THE END.